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THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR








The Origins of the War
By
RAYMOND POINCARE
President of the French Republic, 1913-1920
French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, 1912-1913; 1922
CASSELL AND      COMPANY, LIMITED
London, New York, Toronto and Melbourne
1922




*** Copyright 1921, by Plon-Nourrit & Co.  Rights of reproduction
and translation reserved in all countries,




The Origins of the War
I
FRANCE AND GERMANY AFTER 1870
N July 28, 1914, Austria-Hungary declared
war against Serbia. On August 1, 1914, at
the moment when the clocks of Central
Furope stood at 5 P.M., Germany declared war
against Russia.
On Monday, August 3, 1914, at 6.45 in the evening, the German Ambassador in Paris called on
M. Rene Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for
Fcreign Affairs. On this occasion Baron von Schoen
did not display that smiling good temper and familiar
affability to which even the attendants at the Quai
d'Orsay had long been accustomed. He was gloomy,
and an emotion that appeared to be sincere distorted
his face. He told M. Viviani, although he did not,
however, emphasize his statement, that while he had
been on his way to the Foreign Office he had been
recognized by two ladies, who had jumped on the
footboard of his car for the purpose of insulting him.
As a matter of fact, during the previous fortyeight hours, notwithstanding Germany's declaration
of war against Russia, he had been continually walking about Paris with an ostentation that was not
customary with him; he had been lunching and dining
in the restaurants, and he gave the impression that
i




The Origins of the War
he was looking for some incident that might furn-h
his country with a plausible ground of complaint
against France. Thanks to the wisdom of the people
of Paris, no incident of the kind desired occurred,
and Baron von Schoen was consequently obliged to
put forward, in support of the declaration of war
which he was entrusted to launch against the Government of the French Republic, the absurd pretexts
of which everybody is aware.
"Monsieur le President," he had written in cite
letter which he brought to M. Viviani, " the German
administrative and military authorities note tha'. a
certain number of acts of hostility have been coramitted on German territory by French mili ary
aviators. Several of the latter have manifestly v olated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over he
territory of that country; one of them has attempted
to destroy works near Wesel, others have been seen
in the Eifel region, another has dropped bombs c)n
the railway near Karlsruhe and Nuremberg."
There was not one of these allegations that was
not audaciously contrary to the truth, and Baron von
Schoen,was quite right in leaving the responsibil ty
for such statements to the German administrative
and military authorities. He had even taken upon
himself to throw aside some of the worst of the arguments that had been sent to him from Berlin.   lhe
declaration that had been sent to him by the Imperial
Chancellor, in fact,1 stated that "French troops
yesterday crossed the German frontier at MontreuxVieux, and were on the mountain roads in thie
1 Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegs-Ausbruch, vollstandige Samnlung, von Karl Kautsky (4 vols. 8vo, Charlottenburg, 1919). Frenci'
translation by Victor Dave (A. Costes, Paris, 1921), page 181.
2




France and Germany after 1870
Vosges; they are still in German territory.  A
French aviator, who had had to fly over Belgian
territory, was brought down yesterday while trying
to destroy the railway at Wesel."
Baron von Schoen could not but regard such
extremely precise statements as very compromising.
If he asserted that an aviator had been brought down,
he might perhaps find himself placed under the
obligation of having to identify a phantom. If he
asserted that French soldiers were on German soil
he would lay himself open to being told by M.
Viviani: " You know very well that nothing could be
more false, and that, since the 30th, while Germany
has been bringing her covering forces to within a few
hundred yards of our territory, we French have, by
an excess, of precaution, held our troops back at a
distance of ten kilometres (six and a quarter miles)
from the frontier, and that we have forbidden them
to approach nearer."
Baron von Schoen, who was fully informed as to
this measure, had therefore the good sense not to
put forward anything from the Note which had been
sent to him by the Chancellor, except the fable concerning the aeroplanes; that, at any rate, had the
advantage of being for the moment less easy to refute.
M. Viviani, of course, protested against a statement
which he knew to be unfounded; but how was he able
to prove to Baron von Schoen that no French aviator
had ventured into the forbidden sky?
Germany herself subsequently furnished the proof
required. She was unable to find at Wesel either a
French aeroplane or a French aviator, and in the
Mionth of April, 1916, the burgomaster of Nurem3
//




The Origins of the War
berg, in a letter which has been published by
Professor Schwalbe, certified that no bomb was ever
thrown on the railway.  For the rest, at the very
hour when the German Ambassador was handing his
Government's declaration of war to the French Prime
Minister, the Imperial Chancellor and the Wilhelmstrasse had already received from  the Prussian
Minister at Munich the following information, dated
August 2:
" The only reports received (at Nuremberg) concern unknown aeroplanes, which were manifestly not
military machines. It has not been established chat
any bombs were thrown, and it is naturally still less
proved that the aviators were French."
According to Herr Karl Kautsky there were at
that period, in certain German towns, such strange
collective hallucinations that the Chief of Police at
Stuttgart was compelled to address this significant
appeal to the population: " People are taking clouds
for dirigible balloons, stars for aeroplanes, and the
bursting of bicycle tyres for bombs."  Can the fact
that the Imperial Government, although duly informed of these trifling panics, gave out to France
and the rest of the world as realities the monsters
born from unhealthy imaginations, and held up these
spectres for the purpose of trying to justify a declaration of war, be regarded as anything less than the
most insolent challenge to reason and truth that could
be launched by any civilized State?
M. Viviani reminded Baron von Schoen, moreover, that on the previous evening he had himse f
handed a note to the German Ambassador protests
ing against certain violations of the frontier corn
4




France and Germany after 1870
mitted by the German troops.    Systematic incursions at several points, as a matter of fact, had been
reported to the French Government during the
morning of August 2. Near Longwy and Cireysur-Vezouze German patrols had advanced into the
zone that had been abandoned by the French troops.
In the neighbourhood of Belfort two detachments
of German cavalry had penetrated as far as the
villages of Boron and Joncherey. Baron von Schoen,
warned by the French Prime Minister, had telegraphed to Berlin at 11.15 on the night of August 2:
The French Government has protested to me against
very serious violation of frontier by our troops near Delle,
beyond French ten-kilometre zone; also against military
incursions resulting in murder of a French soldier. In
consequence of this last and other news feeling here very
excited. (Signed) ScHOEN.1
The German Government knew        therefore on
August 3 that its declaration of war contained
nothing but a shameless travesty of well-established
facts.2
But what did it care for that?   The German
Goxernment was in a hurry, and its General Staff
was clamouring imperiously for a sudden attack.
Moreover, during the night of August 1-2 German
troops had invaded Luxemburg, and as an excuse
for disregarding the neutrality of the Grand Duchy
Herr von Jagow had explained to M. Eyschen, the
President of the Government of Luxemburg, that
French forces were on the march in the valley of
the Alzette.
Telegram deciphered in France during the war.
2 See Le Mensolge da 3 Aodt, 1914, by Rene Puaux (Payot & Co.).
5




The Origins of the War
"No," replied M. Eyschen, "there is not a
single French soldier in Luxemburg, and nothing
has happened to justify us in believing that France
is inclined to threaten our neutrality."
The German 8th Corps had nevertheless occupied
the country, in defiance of the laws of nations and
of the treaty of 1867. Her army thus advanced on
France before Germany had even handed her the
declaration of war.
At the same time the German General Staff had
begun its vast turning movement through Belgillm.
At 7 o'clock on the evening of Sunday, August 2,
Herr von Below Saleske, the German Minister in
Brussels, had handed to M. Davignon, the Belgian
Foreign Minister, an ultimatum, of which everybody
remembers the terms, and which began with the
same calumny: " The German Government has received reliable news according to which the French
forces have the intention of marching on the Meuse
by Givet and Namur."
It is a curious thing that-as also revealed by
the documents published in Germany by Kautsky1
-this ultimatum had been in readiness since July 26,
at which time M. Viviani and I were still on the
high seas. It was drawn up on that date by von
Moltke himself, who was then the head of the
German General Staff.   It had been slightly
"touched up" by the Imperial Chancellor and by
Herren Stuann and Zimmermann, and then addressed, under a sealed envelope, by Herr von Jagc w,
Secretary of State, to the German Minister in
Belgium, with instructions that the envelope alas
1 Nos. 375 and 376, French edition, p. 192 et seq.
6




France and Germany after 1870
only to be opened on the receipt of telegraphic orders.
This order was not sent to Herr von Below Saleske
until August 2,1 but the false accusation against
France had been drawn up in the dark as early as
July 26; and it was also on July 26, well before the
long series of mobilizations and declarations of war,
that the German Imperial Government had secretly
composed this cynical statement:
Germany has in view no act of hostility against Belgium. If Belgium consents, during the pending war, to
take up an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards
Germany, the German Government, on its part, not only
undertakes, on the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the
Kingdom and its possessions to their full extent, but is
even disposed to entertain, in the most benevolent manner,
the eventual claims of the Kingdom to territorial compensations at the expense of France.
On August 2, when the Wilhelmstrasse gave
Herr von Below Saleske the expected order to make
known the ultimatum to the Belgian Government,
it directed him to suppress this passage. VWas it
afraid of revolting the Belgian conscience by the
offer of this odious bargain? Or was it desirous of
retaining all territorial compensations for Germany
alone?  This, undoubtedly, we shall never know.
The German Government so fully recognized the
frightful responsibility it had taken in preparing
this ultimatum  as far back as July 26 that it sent
to its Minister in Belgium this urgent recommendation: " The Government down there (in Belgium)
must remain under the impression that the whole
of these instructions have reached you only to-day."
1 Die deufschen Dokumenle, No. 648.
7




The Origins of the War
But the statements that were not true on July 26
were no more true on August 2, and nobody knew
better than the Belgian Government that French
troops were not advancing on Givet and Naraur.
As early as July 81 our Minister at Brussels, M.
Klobukowski, in the course of a friendly chat with
M. Davignon, had spontaneously given him the
assurance that France would not violate the neutrality of Belgium. The Government of King Albert,
therefore, even without being informed as to the
real date of the ultimatum that was addressed to it,
was in a position to appreciate the veracity of the
Imperial Chancellery.
Under the presidency of the august sovereign
who 'has been, during the past few years, the glorious
personification of courage and loyalty, the Belgian
Ministers, during the greater part of the night of
August 2-3, held a long council meeting, at which
the response to the brutal injunctions of the German
Empire was drawn up. It was a tragic night, during
which, under the noble inspiration of its king, a small
nation gave to the universe an immortal lesson in
moral greatness.
Without allowing itself to be perturbed by
threats, Belgium merely reminded Germany that the
treaties of 1889, confirmed by those of 1870, gave
it "its independence and its neutrality under the
guarantee of the Powers, and notably under that of
His Majesty the King of Prussia,",and it added:
"The Belgian Government, in accepting the propositions that have been made to it, would be sacrificing the honour of the nation, and at the same
time would be failing in its duty towards Europe."
8




France and Germany after 1870
This reply, of an imperishable beauty, was handed
to the German Minister at 7 o'clock on the morning of August 3. Twenty-three hours later, at 6 A.M.
on August 4, Herr von Below Saleske transmitted
to M. Davignon a Note in which the German Government declared itself compelled to carry out, by force
of arms if need be, the measures of security considered "as indispensable."  German troops, moreover, had already penetrated Belgian territory at
Gemmerich.
Thus, in the summer of 1914, the Central Empires
noisily opened before the eyes of a dismayed Europe
the doors of the temple of Janus, and, in order to try
to excuse their criminal act, they were obliged to
fall back, to the amusement of universal opinion, on
stories that were simply childish. Apart from any
attempt at historical research or any examination of
records, it would seem that the most impartial and
most conscientious minds must be struck by one commonsense reflection: Why these imaginary raids,
these invented bombardments, this ultimatum  on
which they sat for seven or eight days before hatching
it out? Why those deceitful announcements of the
pretended intentions of France, if Germany possessed really serious complaints and good reasons for
declaring war? What prevented her from stating the
facts? What need had she to have recourse to expedients and roundabout methods if war, as she
asserted immediately afterwards, had been forced
upon her and if she had right on her side?
Hardly had the first shots been exchanged,
however, than a skilful system of propaganda began
to sow the germs of those creeping weeds that grow


B


9




The Origins of the War
so rapidly in the flower-beds of history. Germany
did not even scruple to spread legends that were not
in agreement between themselves.
One German, nevertheless, did not hesitate to
state what the others wished to pass over in silence;
this was Maximilian Harden, who from the commencement of the War declared: " We wanted the
War. Why try and hide it? We wanted it for the
purpose of for ever ensuring the prosperity of Germany and her hegemony over all the other Powers."
In spite of all his talent, however, Maximilian Harden
stood alone, as we still realize to-day, when from time
to time we recognize, in Germany's way of carrying
out the Peace Treaty, the just foundation of our
complaints. Apart from Harden and a few other
men, such as Herren Kautsky, Muellon and Richard
Grelling, the author of " J'Accuse," nearly the whole
of Germany swears that she is innocent. She swears
it and has even come to believe it.
This was to be seen from the very interesting
recital given by one of our professors at the French
Lycee at Mayence, M. Albert Malaurie,1 of an interview which he and his colleagues had not long ago
with the German professors in the same city. The
Frenchmen tried in vain to induce their opponents
to open their obstinately closed eyes to the facts in
front of them. Germany is not very clear exactly
as to who the guilty parties were, but she is quite
convinced, and nothing will shake her belief, that
they are not to be found in Germany.
Sometimes she blames England, as did William II
himself when, on July 29, he peppered with furious
1 Revue des Deux Mondes, November 1, 1920.
IO




France and Germany after 1870
annotations a dispatch from Prince Lichnowsky, his
ambassador in London:1 ' England will show her
hand at the moment when she believes we are in
difficulties and, so to speak, no longer dangerous to
her.  The rascally crowd of shopkeepers has tried to
deceive us with dinners and speeches."  Then, after
a fresh explosion of imperial rage, comes this categorical conclusion: " England alone is responsible
for the war and for peace. All this must be made
known publicly."
On the following day, July 30, in annotating
again a report of Count Pourtales, his ambassador at
Petrograd,2 William indulges in fresh recriminations
against the England on whose neutrality he had
counted down to the last moment:
The net has been suddenly thrown over our head, and
England has secured, grinningly, the finest success in her
purely anti-German world policy.... It is a magnificent exploit, which deserves the admiration even of
those who are killed by it. Edward VII, although dead,
is still stronger than I who am alive. And yet there were
people who believed that something was to be gained
by appeasing England by this or that means! Ceaselessly,
without respite, she has pursued her object with Notes,
proposals for naval holidays, panics, Haldane, etc....
And we fell into the trap, and even slowed down our naval
construction in the hope of appeasing her! All my warnings, all my prayers have been uselessly wasted....
Owing to our fidelity to our alliance with the old and
venerable Emperor (Francis Joseph), they have created
for us this situation, which affords England the wishedfor pretext to crush us, while keeping up the hypocritical
Die deulschen Dokumenle, No. 368, French edition of Kautsky,
p. 140.
2 Ibid., No. 601, p. 141.
II




The Origins of the War
appearance of right-that is to say, by giving her support
to France, in order to maintain the famous " balance of
power,"; in other words, they have succeeded in getting
all the European States to side with England and against
us! We must now, without sparing anybody, unmask
all these manceuvres... And our consuls in Turkey
and India must inflame with savage ardour the whole
Mohammedan world against this detestable nation of liars
and conscienceless shopkeepers; for if we must perish,
England shall at least lose her Indian Empire!
This brain-storm undoubtedly denoted a certain
lack of sang-froid, and it at least brought to the surface some of the old sentiments buried in the depths
of the Imperial soul-those, for instance, that
William expressed in 1904, in his correspondence with
Nicholas II, when he attempted to organize against
England, on the impregnable basis of the Treaty of
Frankfort, a league between Germany, France and
Russia. During the War the German Government
on most occasions appropriated the bad-tempered
theory of its Emperor by attributing the responsibility
for the conflict to British Imperialism.
At other times Germany denounced Russia as
the great culprit. When the delegates of the Reich
made their confused reply to the speech for the
prosecution by the Allies at Versailles, the whole
of their effort was devoted to show that if Russia had
not, on the morning of July 31, ordered her mobilization at the same time as that of Austria, peace might
have been preserved. Austria, it is true, would not
have suspended hostilities against Serbia, and Serbia
would have been    overwhelmed.   But Germany
affirmed that at any rate the other Powers would
have been free to look on with folded arms at
12




France and Germany after 1870
the spectacle of this overwhelming of the small
nation.
In the Memorandum which the Imperial Chancellor presented to the Reidhstag on August 3, he
was not satisfied with reproaching Russia with a
hasty mobilization; he accused her, as he did France,
with having been the first to begin, by violations of
the frontier, the war against Germany, although he
had himself on the previous day handed to the
Emperor a report from the General Staff showing
that it was only on the morning of August 2,
and after Germany had declared war, that two
squadrons of Cossacks had attempted to destroy the
railway near Johannisburg.1 As a consequence
Germany has not dared to assert too often that
Russia began hostilities; but she has never ceased
to state that it was Russia who, by her precipitate
mobilization, caused to vanish such possibilities of
peace as still remained.
We shall see, on the contrary, that there was
nothing to compel Germany, even after that mobilization, to take the irreparable step. The Russian
Emperor personally gave to William II, in a telegram dated from Peterhof on July 81, his word of
honour that his troops should not commit any provocatory act; and on August 1, at 7 o'clock in the
evening, Nicholas II again telegraphed to the
German Emperor:
I conceive that you may be obliged to mobilize, but
I wish to have from you the same guarantee that I have
given you, namely, that these measures do not mean war,
and that we shall pursue our negotiations for the good of
1 Die deutschen Dokumente, No. 620.
I3




The Origins of the War
our two countries and the general peace which is so dear
to our hearts.
Before he had even received this telegram, which
confirmed that of July 31, William II had directed
Count Pourtales to hand to the Russian Government the German declaration of war. At Versailles,
nevertheless, it was on Russia that the delegates of the Reich tried to place the burden of
the guilt.
France has not been spared from the perfidious
campaigns launched by the German Empire any
more than has England and Russia. Both during
the war and since the armistice everything possible
has been done, both in Germany and outside of
it, to distort in the eyes of the world our national
character and to discredit our traditional policy by
attributing to it intentions and hidden motives which
it has never possessed.
If one glances over, for instance, the files of the
Gazette des Ardennes, the journal by means of which
Germany hoped to corrupt the incorruptible spirit
of the invaded provinces, or if one interrogates
inhabitants in the unhappy devastated regions, who
lived for over four years in the midst of the German
armies, one finds, in the articles in that abominable
traitors' journal, in the tracts that were distributed,
in the conversations carried on by the enemy officers,
the same leit motiv: " It was not Germany but the
French Government that wanted the wart.
Not for one moment did the sound common
sense of our population in Flanders, Picardy, Champagne or Lorraine allow itself to be misled by the
I4




France and Germany after 1870
German obsession for repeating this falsehood; yet
incessantly, minute by minute, the same drop of
corrosive acid was made to fall on the same spot.
"Chauvinist France," "Nationalist France," "Imperialist France, whose statesmen, either through
ambition or imprudence, have fostered instead of
checked the secret passion for revenge, and who,
from the day when she felt herself strengthened by
the Russian alliance and the Entente Cordiale,
dreamed of nothing but encircling Germany and
marching on the Rhine"    this was, in brief, the
theme that was developed with skill and careful stage
management by the German propagandists, who
illustrated it, for the purpose of rendering it the
more striking, with carefully selected calumnies
directed against certain French personalities.
That the President of the French Republic
should hold a place of honour in the gallery of men
whom Germany regarded as her natural enemies was
the inevitable consequence of the function which
he fulfilled. The recollection of injustice suffered
in the past, however, is not likely to affect my
impartiality to-day.
If I assert that France and her Government have
nothing with which to reproach themselves, it is not
because I am anxious to defend against foreign
accusers any of the Presidents or Ministers who have,
since 1871, directed the affairs of France; it is not
even in obedience to a wish, however admissible it
may be, to present France before the historians of the
future as an immaculate figure; it is because that,
after having scrupulously investigated the facts and
tested the recollections of those who know, I have
I5




The Origins of the War
failed to find, in connexion with the direction of our
policy in the past, either the shadow of a bellicose
will or even any imprudence, blunder or omission that
might have been able to justify Germany's declarations of war.
There had undoubtedly been for forty-five years
a persistent misunderstanding between Germany and
France. The one did not understand that the other
had decided not to become her "brilliant second."
Austria had forgotten Sadowa. Why did not France
-conquered, offended, despoiled of two provincesalso joyously agree to accept the hegemony of the
conqueror? For her to be pacific, tranquil, resigned,
was not enough; Germany wanted something more
than loyalty, courtesy and consideration; she wanted
to wrest from France, with tender embracements,
the definite acceptance of the Treaty of Frankfort,
and then bind us, complacent and passive, to her own
destinies.
Prince von Biilow himself, a better psychologist
and a more acute observer than most of his fellowcountrymen, wrote before the war a chapter entitled
"Irreconcilable France," 1 in which, while paying
homage to French idealism, he spoke of expecting
time to cure us of our mistakes and found us a trifle
mad for continuing to hold, in the depths of our
souls, a respect for indefeasible right rather than
peacefully to enjoy the sweets of German supremacy.
Because we would not say to Germany, " You were
right in violating the conscience of Alsace and
Lorraine," he came to the conclusion that we were
1 Prince von Billow, La Politique Allemande, French translation by
Maurice Herbette (Henri Charles Lavauzelle).
16




France and Germany after 1870
still dreaming  " of glorious adventures,"  that
" rancour against Germany" was " the soul of
French policy," and that "6 the desire for revenge 
was our "dominant national passion."
From  1870 to 1914 the same incomprehension
was to be found-and, generally speaking, to a much
greater extent-among the majority of the German
people. One day they did everything they could
think  of to irritate  French  opinion, and  the
next day they were astonished to find that we did
not thank them for their provocations.  Down to
well on in 1878 Prince Bismarck threatened and
abused us unceasingly; in 1875 he was even on the
point of recommencing war, and was only stopped
by England and Russia. Then, for some ten years,
he tried by ruses and endearments to associate us
closely with his policy and to bring us to accept, by
a permanent ratification, the dismemberment of our
territory.
In the hope of embroiling us with Italy, he said
to Count de Saint-Vallier, in January, 1879:1 " I
think the Tunisian pear is ripe, and that it is time
you gathered it," and a few months later he repeated:2 " I do not want there to be any point of
discord between us."
In 1884 he went farther and proposed to our
new ambassador, M. de Courcel, a Franco-German
alliance, designed to keep in check the maritime
power of England.3 Baron de Courcel, who saw
through the Chancellor's game, wrote to Jules
1 Dispatch of Count de Saint-Vallier to M. Waddington, Minister for
Foreign Affairs, January 5, 1879.
2 Letter from the same to the same, June 27, 1879.
3 Dispatch from Baron de Courccl to M. Jules Ferry, September 23
1884.
17




The Origins of the War
Ferry.' " At bottom he wants to do England a
bad turn, but by making use of us and without
disclosing himself."  And our ambassador added:
There was one passage in the conversation (with
Bismarck) to which I will ask you to allow me to return.
" What I want to happen," he said to me, " is for you
to forgive us Sedan, as you have forgiven Waterloo." If
we listened to him [continued M. de Courcel] perhaps one
day one of his successors would say to our nephews: "I
wish you to forgive me for a fresh defeat and a fresh
dismemberment, as your fathers forgave us for Sedan."
This proves how impious, how fertile in deadly consequences for the country was the thoughtlessness of those
who, blinded by the transitory interest of party, or the
dupes of fallacious historic theories, undertook to justify
in the eyes of France the treaties of 1815 and to extinguish in her heart resentment for the grievous amputations
of that epoch.
I should like to strike the word "resentment"
out of this fine passage; it is no more just than the
word " rancour.'" It was not by resentment or by
rancour, but by national dignity, by respect for
justice and by fidelity to the populations brutally
severed from the Mother Country that France might
have replied to the invitation of Prince Bismarck.
She might have been able to forget Sedan, she might
have been able to forget a military disaster, but she
could not forget the attack made against the liberty
of her nationals.
M. de Courcel again insisted strongly, in another
letter to Jules Ferry, dated January 20, 1885, on
the peril of the new capitulation which Germany
sought to inflict upon us, and it is unnecessary for
1 Dispatch dated December 3, 1884.
I8




France and Germany after 1870
me to say that his appreciations were entirely in
accord with those of the great Minister to whom he
addressed his letter.
To lull our memories to sleep [he cried], to turn away
our regards from the past towards an undetermined future,
in order better to accustom ourselves to the rigorous conditions of the present; to lead ourselves in this way, almost
insensibly, to the definite acceptance of the faits accomplis of 1815 and 1871, in such a manner that France,
resigned to her successive dismemberments and taking
once and for all her place in the military and geographical
hegemony of Prussia, gravitates henceforward in the
orbit of the German Empire; this is the programme Prince
Bismarck has laid down for us.... " Give up the question of the Rhine! " he has often said to me; " I will
help you to win on all the other points the satisfaction you
may desire."
Some months passed, and as Bismarck perceived
that, in spite of the softer methods which were being
for the moment employed in Alsace-Lorraine by
Field-Marshal Manteuffel, the population continued
openly to regret France, he took advantage of the
death of the Statthalter to replace him by Prince
von Hohenlohe, ambassador in Paris, to whom he
gave orders to resume pitilessly the old methods of
compulsory Germanization.
On September 30, 1885, Prince von Hohenlohe
went to bid farewell to M. de Freycinet, who was
then Premier and Foreign Minister. " I do not
leave for Strasburg without apprehension," he said.
"From Berlin they will press me to take energetic
measures, because they think the population of
Alsace-Lorraine has become more hostile. They fear
incitements from the French side of the frontier,
i9




The Origins of the War
where there is a recrudescence of the idea of
revenge." And the Prince read to M. de Freycinet
this passage in a letter from Bismarck: "I shall
continue to do what I can to maintain good relations
with France, but I am afraid of failure."
M. de Freycinet protested sharply. He showed
Prince von Hohenlohe that France was strongly
attached to the maintenance of peace, and that she
was entirely prepared to act in agreement with Germany in the numerous questions on which their
interests were not divergent; and, defining this policy
in letters which he addressed to Baron de Courcel
on October 17, 1885, and May 10, 1886, he repeated:
' The two countries can work in concert for the
solutions that interest the general peace of Europe.
France threatens nobody.   She is sincere in her
protestations. She asks only one thing: that her
rights be respected and that her just pride be
spared."
Once more, however, these assurances were insufficient for Bismarck. It was our love that he
sought, and by our love our servitude; and as we
hesitated he hustled us. His son, Count Herbert
Bismarck, who was Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, complained to Baron de Courcel of the
popularity of Deroulede, and from March 26, 1886,
our ambassador reported " a serious attack, directed
full against us, with the assent of, or, more properly
speaking, under the impulse of the Chancellor, and
consequently deliberately planned and in view of a
positive object."
M. Flourens replaced M. de Freycinet at the
Quai d'Orsay; M. Herbette replaced M. de Courcel
20




France and Germany after 1870
at the Embassy in Berlin; and on January 1, 1887,
the new ambassador wrote to the Minister:
It is only too true that Germany is making preparations for war, and that people are making up their minds
for any eventuality.... They want to be ready to
fight both Russia and ourselves, if we make up our minds
to make common cause with Russia.
This, it will be noted, was several years before
France became the ally of Russia, and Bismarck,
when he found we were not sufficiently affectionate
and docile, was already thinking of one of those
"preventive" wars of which Bernhardi has attempted to demonstrate the moral necessity, and the
fatal theory of which led Germany to commit the
crime of 1914.
M. Flourens was prodigal with pacific declarations
to Berlin, but his efforts were vain. M. Herbette
feared that at the least imprudence on our part
Bismarck would try and " crush us as a measure of
precaution."  As a matter of fact, the German
Chancellor was at that period in the midst of a very
serious internal crisis. On January 14, 1887, the
Reichstag had thrown out the proposal for seven
years' military service and had been dissolved, and
the elections were pending. It was not a moment
for Germany to be exceptionally kind to France.
Protesting deputies were still being elected in Alsace,
and Bismarek, notwithstanding the fact that the new
Reichstag, on March 11, had agreed to vote the
military law, was still in a very bad temper.
It was at this period, on April 20, that the
Schnoebele affair suddenly broke out. The French
21




The Origins of the War
commissary of police at Pagny-sur-Moselle, enticed
into an ambush by his German colleague at Ars-surMoselle, was arrested by some German police officers
under a warrant issued by the High Court at Leipzig for the prevention of espionage. This incident
marked, in fact, the recommencement, twelve years
later, of the intimidation exercised in 1875. It will
be remembered that the prudence of the French
Government, aided by the knowledge and the juridical experience of President Grevy, enabled it, in
spite of everything, to establish the rights of this
groundless quarrel. Germany herself had taken care
to remind us in this way that, after having offered
us the honey, she was always ready to present us
with the vinegar also.'
William I died on March 9, 1888, and during the
brief reign of Frederick III, the Emperor of whose
liberal sentiments the whole world was aware, the
passport system was established in Alsace-Lorraine.
On June 15 of that year William II mounted the
throne. Less than two years afterwards he dismissed Bismarck; he became sole master of German
policy, and responsible, as he was fond of saying, to
nobody except his country's God.
Did he inaugurate a fresh method in his relations
with France? By no means. On the contrary, he
hastened to pull on the jack-boots of his disgraced
servant.
In the spring of 1891 he was anxious to induce
French artists to participate in an international
exhibition which he had organized in Berlin. He
sent his mother, the Dowager Empress Frederick,
See Pierre Albin's L'Allemagne et France en Europe, chap. 2 (Alcan).
22




France and Germany after 1870
to Paris for the purpose of obtaining their consent.
She went to Versailles, and there visited the Galerie
des Glaces, in which the German Empire had been
proclaimed. This unfortunate action provoked scenes
in the streets, which, although promptly suppressed,
excited the anger of the Emperor and caused him
to speak of "those French young blackguards who
insult a woman."
Then he altered his tactics, and on June 13,
1894, he proposed to M. Herbette, through Baron
Marschall, that France and Germany should undertake common action for the purpose of safeguarding
what Germany then termed " the legal status quo
in Africa " against all attacks by the British Empire.
On January 1, 1896, Baron Marschall again
asked our ambassador in Berlin if France would be
disposed to limit, in concert with Germany, "the
insatiable appetite of England." "It appears to
me to be necessary," he added, " to give a practical
demonstration to England that she must not count
on Franco-German antagonism in order to seize
whatever she thinks fit."
Beneath the manifestations of an impulsive and
versatile character, therefore, William II obstinately
pursued the realization of his idea; he was anxious
-he, even!-that France should like him, and that
she should like him rather than England. In a
report written during February, 1899, our naval
attache, Lieutenant Buchard, narrated that the
Emperor had expressed to him a wish that a French
warship should put into one of the German ports,
where he promised it should be given a good reception. Suddenly the Emperor added: "The Con23




The Origins of the War
tinent must become closely united in order to defend
itself, and to defend itself, above all, against the
peril of the future, which is America." His Majesty
concluded by stating that, "in the event of a war
with England, we must concentrate as many ships
as possible in the Mediterranean."
The Marquis de Noailles, in his turn, reported,
on June 4, 1899, another conversation which the
Emperor had with the same naval attache.
" The time has certainly   come,"  said the
Emperor William, " when the Continent must defend itself against England and America, and I think
that Germany and France must rely upon each other
for support."
In the month of August, 1899, the Emperor was
cruising off Bergen-to which part of the world he
made so many visits and where he again sought an
alibi in July, 1914-and went on board the French
training ship Iphigenie. According to our Minister
at Copenhagen, under date of August 16, he appears
to have jumped at once to the conclusion that this
noisy visit to the Iphigenie was going to result in both
that vessel and France being dragged in the wake
of the German fleet. " I have at last attained my
object," he wrote a few days afterwards to the Grand
Duke of Oldenburg.
In October, 1899, the Transvaal War broke out,
and Prince von Biilow immediately went to find
our ambassador for the purpose of telling him that
throughout the whole of Africa our interests were
the same. Throughout the hostilities German policy,
to use an expression employed by the Marquis de
Noailles, resembled a veritable circus performance.
24




France and Germany after 1870
William II offered sugar to England while Prince
von Billow handled the horsewhip. Germany wished
to bring into the same circus ring the indomitable
and ungovernable steed, without steel bit or golden
reins, which she believed she saw   pawing the
ground and heard neighing across the Rhine. In
1903 he told our new ambassador, M. Bihourd,
through the mouth of the Russian Ambassador,
Count Osten Sacken, that Germany was ready for a
rapprochement with France on the express condition
that no question should be raised as to existing
treaties.'
The Emperor continually repeated the same proposals. I-He made them to our ambassadors, to our
military and naval attaches, to the French statesmen
and politicians whom he received on his yacht and on,whom he showered attentions.   But what is the
matter with you? I am holding out my hand to you.
Why don't you grasp it more warmly?"" And
then, spited against us because we declined an
intimacy which was always directed against someone else-now against our brethren in Alsace, now
against England-Germany began to seek reasons
for our attitude, and began to believe, or affected
to believe, that we cherished hidden designs and
were meditating revenge.
We meditated nothing of the kind. We knew
too well what war would cost France and humanity
itself. Let me say more. When Alsace and Lorraine, as the outcome of the German aggression, were
M. Bihourd to M. Delcass6, July 16, 1903.
2 See in Les Originzes de la Guerre Mondiale, by Albert Bazergue (PlonNourrit), the chapter entitled " First the Extended Hand and then the
Clenched Fist."


C


25




The Origins of the War
given up to us, not even the delirious joy of that
moment allowed us for an instant to lose sight of
our respective responsibilities, and we told our
reunited fellow-countrymen plainly that we ourselves
would never have taken the initiative in a war for
their deliverance.
I do not know a single French Minister, I do
not know a single President of the French Republic
who ever uttered the word "revenge"; I do not
know of one who ever cherished, publicly or secretly,
the idea of an armed conflict. All our Governments, one after the other, whether Conservative or
Moderate or Radical Republican, sought to maintain relations with Germany that would be-I do not
say merely correct, I do not say merely polite, but,
if possible, amiable. They tried to agree with her
on economic and colonial questions; they drew near
to her in connexion with international exhibitions,
congresses and associations; they gave a markedly impressive and often even too admiring welcome to her
savants, her writers and her artists; they multiplied
openly the marks of esteem and good will they
entertained for her. I shall give some characteristic
examples of this when I come to speak of the months
preceding the outbreak of war. The one thing which
all our Governments in succession, ever since 1871,
refused to do was to renounce their own private
sentiments, to repudiate the two lost French provinces, to be guilty of a cowardly betrayal.
France was too proud and too fair to disguise
her regrets in any kind of deceptive formulae, or
to qualify with mental reservations a political
entente with Germany. Germany ought to have
26




France and Germany after 1870
been able to understand the generous ideas of France,
to have spared our legitimate susceptibilities and to,
have maintained with us merely the relations of good
neighbours without wanting to deal with us by alternate cajoleries and blows from the fist. She was
impelled, however, by the fatality that presided over
the constitution of her unity and the birth of her
Empire.
If we are to believe Prince Billow himself,' one
of the most striking merits of Bismarck was that he
realized that in order to bring about the achievement
of German unity the task could not be left to those
faculties which are by heredity the weakest among
those possessed by Germans, " that is to say, their
political faculties, in order to be entrusted to the
greatest of their innate faculties, that is to say, to
their faculty for war"; " and as," continues Billow,
"a lucky chance willed that Bismarck should find
at his side a strategist like von Moltke and a military
organizer like Roon," the miracle of 1871 became
possible.
"Bismarck felt," remarked his successor, "that
German national thought was fanned into flame, not
through friction between the Government and the
people, but by affronts to German pride and the
opposition offered by foreign nations." When the
necessity for provoking such affronts is so clearly
realized there was not much hesitation, as may easily
be imagined, when it became a question of falsifying
the Ems dispatch or of subjugating a region in spite
of the protests of its inhabitants. But when the
birth certificate of an Empire strangely resembles the
1 See La Politique Allemande, by Prince von Billow.
27




The Origins of the War


list of a prisoner's previous convictions and includes
the record of two crimes against the common lawforgery and forcible entry-the authority of the new
State is handicapped by the violence of which it has
been guilty and can only maintain itself on condition
that it remains faithful to the shame of its origin.
In order to inflame from time to time the national
passions of Germany it is necessary, according to
Billow's own words, to provoke affronts to German
pride and make use of foreign opposition to excite
it; and it was for this reason that on every occasion,
when it was a question of voting a new Army Bill
or an increase in the Naval Estimates, Germany
sought to pick a quarrel with France and England;
and it was for this reason that, however slightly
German national pride was felt to be weakening, the
German Government took mischief-making measures
against the Danes in Schleswig, the Poles in Posen,
or the French in Alsace-Lorraine.
The success that resulted from this policy exceeded all the hopes of Bismarck and his successors.
Henceforward,    far  from   diminishing,   German
national pride became inflated to unexpected proportions. The progress made by this megalomania may
be followed by reading the able and very fine studies,
admirably supported by documentary evidence, that
have been written on this subject of German Imperialism by Messrs. Maurice Lair,' Charles Andler,2
and Maurice Muret.3
I L'Imperialisme Allemand (Armand Colin, 1902).
2 See further on.
3 L'Orgueil Allemand, L'Evolution 1Belliqueuse de Guillaume II (Payot
et Cie., Paris). See also Les Causes Profondes de la Guerre, by Emile
Hovelacque (Alcan, Paris); Histoire de la Grande Guerre, by Victor Giraud
(Hachette & Co.).
28




France and Germany after 1870
Germany was carried off her feet by a kind of
drunkenness or vertigo.  She felt that she was
superior to the rest of humanity and that it was
her destiny to regenerate the world. Her generals,
her savants, her professors, carefully fomented this
exasperated vanity. Was it not a German, wNas it
not Nietzsche himself? who wrote: t The Germans
are a dangerous people; they have made up their
minds to get intoxicated."
Listen to the Treitschkes and, more recently, to
the Lamprechts, the Schiemanns and the Delbrucks.
All insist that the German people are, as the Kaiser
'said in 1905, "the salt of the earth."
Lamprecht's admiration for William 1I is due
to the fact that the latter has always believed in the
sublime purity of a German race which has been
invested with a divine mission. This passionate historian trembles with a holy joy when he hears his
Emperor speak of that universal Empire to which the
German spirit aspires. So long as the elected people
attains its natural ends, what matter the means employed? Ad augusta per angusta. The benefits that
Karl Lamprecht confidently expects from "telluric
Germanization " will cause the price they will cost
to be forgotten.
For similar reasons, according to the Clausewitzs,
the Bernhardis and the Iindenburgs, war must be
pitiless so that it may be shorter and more humane,
in the same way as the reign of the tentacular State,
which has been entrusted vith the duty of bringing
happiness to the world, must be brought into being by
the most drastic and the speediest methods. Moreover, Hans Delbruck did not hesitate to voice in the
29




The Origins of the War
Preussische Jahrbucher this cynical cry: "B lessed
be the hand that falsified the Ems dispatch."
Everybody in Germany strove to strengthen
this dangerous state of mind-the universities, the
schools, the army, the Press, the Pan-German
leagues, the naval leagues, the military leagues; and
since the Emperor personified his people, it was
necessary that, in order to remain worthy of his
people, he should personify German pride. Was he
not, moreover, the most intimate confidant of the
great and jealous god who is the god of Germany?
And as the years went by the high priest confounded himself more and more with his divinity.
Edifying phrases fell from him ceaselessly. "Those
who oppose me I will break! " he cried before the
Diet of Brandenburg; and when he wished to be
amiable to one of his Ministers, Herr von Gosseler,
he could think of no more pleasing gift to offer him
than one of his own photographs with this haughty
dedication: "Sic volo, sic jubeo."
To those who imagined that Germany might be
brought to restore pacifically a portion of Lorraine,
he replied on August 16, 1888: " We will leave our
eighteen army corps and our forty-two million inhabitants on the battle-field rather than yield a single
stone of that which our predecessors conquered."
On September 4, 1892, he told the indignant
inhabitants of Metz: " You are Germans and, with
the help of God and the German sword, you will
remain German."
If the agriculturists complained of the free trade
policy he declared to them, without mincing his
words, as on September 6, 1894, that any opposition
30




France and Germany after 1870
by the gentlemen of Prussia against their King w~as
monstrous. If he took umbrage at the power of
Great Britain he launched this challenge: " The
trident of Neptune must be held in our fist."
When the brutalities committed by Germany in
Shantung brought about the Boxer rising and the
siege of the European legations, he burst out: " No
pardons! No prisoners! Just as a thousand years
ago the Huns, under the lead of Etzel, won a renown
which still endures and which filled the world with
terror, so Germany will exercise such violence in
China that no Chinaman will ever again dare to look
a German in the face! "
And what shall we say about the "dry powder"
and the " well-sharpened sword " and all those other
bellicose metaphors which continually appeared in
the Imperial speeches like the lightning which precedes the reverberations of the thunder?  What
other chief of State would have dared to make such
constant use of such a rich vocabulary of insulting
expressions and denunciatory formulae?
Can anyone imagine a President of the French
Republic declaring, during an official ceremony:
" If anyone ventures to insult us without good
reason, or injure us, let us fall upon him with a
mailed fist"? What a terrible outcry there would
be in the German Press the next day against insolent
and chauvinist France! To say nothing of the
fact that such language, worthy only of an irresponsible provincial official, could not fail to be challenged
in the Chambers themselves.
Prince von Biilow has given us a striking explanation of the role played by William II. There
31




The Origins of the War
was in 1870 "a colossus" who went to seek the
Imperial crown in the depths of the Kyffhauser, in
that enchanted castle where Barbarossa slept his
centuries-long sleep awaiting the resurrection of the
Empire. This colossus was called Bismarek. His
unlooked-for dismissal by William II produced a
great uneasiness in every German heart, and this
species of patriotic oppression could not be got out
of the way unless the Emperor could determine for
Germany a fresh object to be attained and furnished
her with the means of taking her place in the sun.
This, according to Biulow, was the origin of the
Weltpolitik and, as a necessary corollary, the creation
of the German navy.
This Weltpolitik, or " world policy," was the
inevitable consequence, not only of William  II's
state of mind, but of the imperialistic instincts of
Germany, and Prince von Biilow was perfectly right
in saying that it was not a disavowal of the Bismarck
policy, but simply, in another form, its logical outcome and continuation.
" It was only after the unification and strengthening of Germany," said the Prince, "that our
economic enterprises were able to attain world-wide
proportions. It was only when the Empire found
its position in Europe assured that it was able to
take under its care the interests to which the German
spirit of enterprise, their industrial activity and their
commercial boldness had given birth."
On the other hand, in 1871 the new German
Empire had a population of 41,058,792; in 1900 its
population had risen to 56,367,178; and in 1914 it
exceeded 65,000,000. How would this enormous
32




France and Germany after 1870
mass of human beings have been able to exist within
the old limits of the Empire? It was very necessary
for part of them to go and seek a living elsewhere,
which meant that in 1914 the Germans were looking
for places all over the world at a moment when,
unfortunately for them, there were very few empty
places left; and one can readily believe that, with
what Prince von Billow termas their " commercial
boldness," they would somehow or other force their
way.
Wherever a German trader was found, however,
he had a right to claim the protection of the German
flag. Wiilliam II solemnly promised his subjects his
support at all points of the globe; and the more
Germans there were who cmigrated, or colonized, or
carried on business abroad, or who constructed,
equipped or chartered merchant ships, the more it
became indispensable to possess warships and to
make of Germany, which was already the greatest
military power, a very great naval power.
Up to this point there was nothing that was not
legitimate, and every prosperous nation naturally
tends to expand. Unhappily the expansive force of
Germany was not always well balanced, and the
national pride gave to all Germany's foreign enterprises a greediness and a violence of manner, an
encroaching habit, that too often brought them
into conflict with other people's interests and with
pre-established rights.
Neither in Europe nor in Asia nor in Africa
was Germany content with the share which circumstances gave her. She insisted on the supremacy.
She did not dispute that, as a unified nation, she
33




The Origins of the War
was the youngest of the European Powers, but she
insisted that, if the new Empire dated only from
1871, it was the inheritor of a glorious past, and
that it had the duty of spreading pure Aryan
civilization throughout the whole world.  People
must give way before her and allow her to pass!
How could Poland fail to understand that it was
for her own good that she had been dismembered?
How was it that Schleswig was not reconciled to
her lot? How was it that Alsace did not recognize
that it was for her happiness that she had been torn
from France? Why did not France herself admit
that, as William had said, she had no sea-legs, that
she would be wiser not to sail the seas, and that she
ought to efface herself everywhere before Germany?
It was for Germany to go first and show the road
to the other nations.
The Emperor did not intend that anyone should
be ignorant of this, and in 1903, when he commented
at Hamburg on his phrase, "Our future is on the
water" (which he had pronounced at Stettin on
September 23, 1898), he gave Germany the first place
in the order of intelligence, as in the domain of
force. Continental Pan-Germanism and colonial
Pan-Germanism, military Pan-Germanism and intellectual Pan-Germanism wvere ideas that marched
side by side and refused to allow themselves to
be divided.'
Those who desire to ascertain how the Germans
succeeded in securing their markets should read the
1 See Charles Andler's Pangermanisme (Armand Colin); Les Origines
du Pangermanisme, Le Pangermanisme Continental sous Guillaume II,
Le Pangermanisme Colonial sous Guillaume II, Le Pangermanisme Philosophique (Louis Conard, Paris).
34




France and Germany after 1870
scholarly work of M. Henri Hauser.' This book
describes the methods employed by the Deutschtum
abroad, its export arrangements, its information
service, its consulates, its agencies, its commercial
spy system, its skill in laying siege to potential
customers; it shows how Germany, after exporting
her products, exports even her factories themselves;
how she seeks everywhere to secure industrial preponderance, how she monopolizes raw materials, how
she practises the "dumping" system abroad; how,
in a word, Germany applies to her economic development the national theory of "Deutschland iiber
alles." For Germany it is an indisputable principle
that, as Derniburg said, the Germans are "the most
learned and the wisest of all mankind."
And yet there are other peoples who want to
exist and to deserve to exist, and among these
peoples is France-France, who remained cruelly
mutilated throughout all those years after 1871, but
who nevertheless rose again, who again assumed a
position in the world that was worthy of her past,
and who, without dreaming of domination over anybody, refuses to be suppressed by anyone. France,
pacific, industrious and patient, by the long-drawnout malice of history and geography, is the immediate neighbour of Germany, and when she hears the
singing on the other side of the Rhine of the chorus
of "Deutschland iiber alles," she understands full
well that it is against her that the threat is primarily
directed.
For forty-four years, however, she succeeded in
maintaining the unstable equilibrium of European
1 Les Methodes Allemandes d'Expansion Economique.
35




The Origins of the War
peace, and in his Message to the Chambers on the
day when war was declared against her, the President
of the Republic was able with a clear conscience, and
without a single voice being raised to contradict
him, to make this brief declaration:
For over forty years the French, in a sincere love of
peace, have thrust down into the depths of their hearts
their desire for legitimate reparations. They have given
the world the example of a great nation which, definitely
risen out of defeat through its will, its patience and its
labour, has made use of its renewed and rejuvenated
strength only in the interests of progress and for the
benefit of Humanity.... At the moment when the first
combats are taking place, France has the right to do herself the justice of solemnly placing on record that, down
to the last moment, she made supreme efforts to avert
the war which has just broken out and for which the
German Empire will bear before History the overwhelming
rws ponsibility.


36




11


THE RUSSIAN ALLIANCE AND THll ENTENTE CORDIALE
FTER the signing of the Treaty of Frankfort
F rance felt that she was pitifully alone in the
world. Faced with a victorious Germany,
that was determined to obtain from her victory all
possible moral and material profits, including an
indemnity that was equivalent to ~200,000,000, the
annexation  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  and   political
supremacy, what could the Governiment of M. Thiers
do? It had only one ideal: to pay off the debt in
order to liberate our territory.
M. de Gabriac, who was sent as Charge d'Affaires
to Berlin, and then M. de Gontaut-Biron, who was
subsequently nominated as French Amnbassador to
Germany, at once set to work to try and demonstrate
to the proud and youthful German Empire the
sincerity of our pacific intentions. The year 1871
had not passed   away, however, before Prince
Bismarck pretended that he had discovered in
French opinion obscure designs for revenge, and he
insisted to our representatives that there was something suspicious in the rapidity of our restoration.
Hie immediately took steps to ensure that we should
be left to ourselves, in penitence, in our corner of
Europe.
He was already sure of Austria. Count Beust,
during the war, had certainly displayed some inclina37




The Origins of the War
tions to intervene against Prussia, but he had
subsequently shown only a desire to obtain forgiveness for this momentary audacity. He had resigned,
moreover, on November 1, 1871, with the Hohenwart Cabinet, and Count Andrassy, who succeeded
him, had immediately turned his eyes towards Berlin.
Further, the visits exchanged between the Emperors
Francis Joseph and William, at Ischl and Salzburg,
respectively, had reassured Bismarck.
Feeling at ease on this side, Bismarck dreamed
of drawing closer the relations between Germany and
Russia. The analogy between the Imperial institutions of the three countries struck him at once as
an excellent means of success. If it were possible
closely to unite the three great houses of the Hohenzollerns, the Romanoffs and the Habsburgs, who
would ever dare resist this formidable trinity? At
Meaux, during the war, Bismarck had already
fondled the idea of this Holy Alliance.
The interview between the three emperors took
place at Berlin in September, 1872, and if it did
not result in quite all that the Chancellor expected,
it none the less appeared in the eyes of the nations
as a solemn confirmation of the defeat of France.
At the end of 1873 the affair of the episcopal
mandates, and, in March, 1875, the creation of the
fourth battalions, furnished Bismarck with two
successive pretexts for such provocations that, in
face of such visibly intentional vexations, the Duke
Decazes replied to Prince Hohenlohe: "If you
attack us,;we shall not defend ourselves, and we
shall allow the whole odium of your aggression to
fall upon yourselves." At the height of the crisis,
38




Russian Alliance and Entente Cordiale


however, the Chancellor, who believed himself to be
in a position to start what he already described as
a preventive war, suddenly put a stop to the carrying
out of his project.
Notwithstanding the meeting of the three
emperors at Berlin, Alexander II had not become,
as Bismarck   had  wished, the  "second "   of
William I. He realized that the crushing of France
would be a catastrophe for Russia, and he said to
General Le Flo: " The interests of our two countries are one, and if-which I refuse to believe-you
are one day seriously threatened, you will very soon
know it, and you will hear of it through us."
In the month of April, 1875, the Russian Government intervened a first time at Berlin in the interest
of peace; then, in the beginning of the following
May, Schouvaloff was sent into Germany by the Tsar
to offer in a friendly manner counsels of prudence.
He left immediately afterwards for London, and on
May 9, Queen Victoria herself wrote to her daughter,
the wife of the German Crown Prince, and Lord
Odo Russell informed Bismarck that England was
in agreement with Russia. This was sufficient to
cause the Chancellor to reflect. On May 10 Alexander II arrived in Berlin in person. The danger had
already passed away.
Bismarck afterwards denied that at that time he
wished to declare war against France, and pretended
to see in this tragic incident nothing but a secret
machination between Gortschakoff and de GontautBiron. Even supposing, however, that this denialcontroverted as it is by both documents and factsmay 'be accepted as well founded, there still remains
39




The Origins of the War
the fact that the violent and threatening procedure
of the German Chancellor had rendered uneasy two
great Powers who, after having remained silent spectators of our disasters in 1870, nevertheless believed
it to be wiser no longer to consent to our abasement.'
On the morrow of this alarming incident the Duke
Decazes wrote to Count d'Harcourt, our ambassador
in London: "You will be able to turn to good
account this first manifestation of firmness on the
part of England. I persist in counting less on her
than on Russia, but I have never ceased to hope for
a rapprochement between these two Powers that will
enable us to go with them without having to choose
between them, and it appears to me that events are
developing in a manner that will prove I am right."
The incident that had just occurred, as a matter
of fact, may be regarded as the first suggestion of
the policy that eventually brought about the Triple
Entente; and when Germany is heard to argue that
England, Russia and France premeditated her encirclement, we may remind ourselves that it was the
threatening policy of Bismarck which in 1875 for the
first time compelled these three Powers to act
together for the maintenance of peace.
In his " Thoughts and Recollections" Bismarck
confides to us that he was for a long time embarrassed
in making his choice between Austria and Russia.
The 1875 adventure in no way induced him to hasten
his decision. In view of the difficulties that awaited
him, however, he tried above all to strengthen the
1 As to the incident of 1875, see Histoire de la France Contemporaine,
by Gabriel Hanotaux, p. 3, chap. 4; also France et Allemagne, 1879-1913,
by Rene Pinon (Perrin)j; Histoire de I'Alliance Francco-Rzusse (1898), by
Ernest Daudet; and the Report of the Senatorial Commission of Inquiry.
40




Russian Alliance and Entente Cordiale


ties that attached Austria to Germany. In the opening of the Eastern Question he very soon perceived
a combination of circumstances that was exceptionally favourable to his designs.
It will be remembered that in July, 1875, the
Christians in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who were
very restless under Turkish sovereignty, suddenly
revolted; that Serbia and Montenegro took the side
of the insurgents; that on May 7, 1876, the French
and German consuls at Salonica were murdered by
fanatical Mohammedans; that when the news of this
tragic affair reached him, the Tsar hastened to
Berlin; and that Bismarck seized the occasion once
more to bring the three Imperial courts together.
What followed will also be recollected: sultans
murdered or deposed after coups d'etat; the
declaration of war by Serbia and Montenegro
against Turkey; the victories secured by the Ottoman troops; the ultimatum sent to Constantinople
by Russia-uneasy at seeing Belgrade fall into
the hands of the Turks; Turkey promising reforms
in favour of the Christians and then breaking her
promise. This dangerous upheaval lasted nearly three
long years.
Throughout the whole of this period Bismarck
kept a very attentive eye on the Balkan Peninsula.
He declared very loudly that the whole Eastern
Question was not worth the bones of a single
Pomeranian grenadier, but at the same time the
German Ambassador and the Military Attache at
St. Petersburg represented to the Tsar, on his instructions, that Russia really could not push her
forbearance any further and that she had already


D


4I




The Origins of the War
received too many affronts from Turkey. He incited
Russia to war, and it was under the auspices of
Berlin that Russia, in order to have her hands free,
entered into a secret agreement with Austria by
which the Dual Monarchy undertook to remain
neutral, in return for which she obtained the
authorization to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina,
when peace was signed.
The Russian army took the field, carried Plevna,
advanced to the gates of Constantinople and, on
March 3, 1878, imposed on Turkey the Treaty of
San Stefano, which created an autonomous Principality of Bulgaria under the suzerainty of the Sultan,
and set forth a programme of reforms for the benefit
of the Macedonian Christians.
Before this treaty had even been signed, however,
Bismarck declared that this Eastern Question, for
which he would not have a single German soldier
killed, had nevertheless a European character, that
Russia could not settle it alone, tete-a-tete with
Turkey, but that there must be a general conference: a theory, in a word, that was diametrically the
reverse of that which Germany sustained in 1914,
when she claimed that Austria had the right to settle,
apart from all reference to the European Powers,
her difference with Serbia.
WVhen he explained his attitude before the
Reichstag on February 28, Bismarck, on the other
hand, was careful to spare Russia, whom he did not
wish to alienate. He denied that he was "a pedagogue " in Europe, and posed as being merely "the
honest broker." He had already, however, come to
an agreement with Andrassy, who had publicly
42




Russian Alliance and Entente Cordiale


reserved for Austria her share of influence in the
settlement of peace, and with England, whose fleet
had come to anchor on February 14 off Princes'
Islands.
The Congress of Berlin opened on June 13, under
the presidency of Bismarck, and the Russian delegates, Gortschakoff and Schouvaloff, realized from
the first sittings that they could not expect any help
from the German Chancellor. They accepted the
occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a matter
of course, seeing that Russia had herself promised
this, but they were obliged to witness the division of
Bulgaria into three portions and the overturning of
the Treaty of San Stefano. Bismarck came to an
understanding with Disraeli for the purpose of taking
away from Russia the fruits of her victory. The work
he accomplished, while remaining as much as possible
in the shade, assured to Germany the gratitude and
the fidelity of Austria; but it humiliated and embittered Russia, and it left the seeds of many future
troubles in the Near East.
Austria, who was given the administration of
two provinces of the Turkish Empire, was placed in
the position of being, little by little, tempted to
annex them, and when, in 1908, she yielded to this
temptation, the responsibility of rekindling the
Balkan conflagration fell upon her. The Treaty of
Berlin authorized her further to establish garrisons in
the Sanjak of Novibazar and to construct ordinary
or strategic roads there-that is to say, to place
herself across all means of communication between
Serbia and Montenegro.
The treaty also entrusted Austria with the police43




The Origins of the War
ing of the port of Antivari and the coast, so that it
in reality established the political domination of
Austria on the west of the Balkans; and while it
pushed that Power towards the Mediterranean and
Constantinople, it cut into three sections the people
of Serbian nationality as well as Bulgaria; it replaced
Macedonia under the Sultan; it paid no attention
to the expressed wishes of the populations. It thus
prepared the way for inevitable conflicts between the
Slavs and Turks and between the Slavs and Austria,
and it accumulated within a small expanse of territory
an enormous quantity of explosive material.
Russia was not responsible for these imprudences,
as she came back beaten from Berlin; while France
was still less responsible, since she sought no advantage from the Congress. In 1912, when we saw the
Balkan wars begin, and in 1914, when Austria sent
her ultimatum to Serbia, it was impossible to overlook
the fact that in order to find the distant causes of
these new-born crises it was necessary to go back to
the Berlin Congress and evoke the tragic shade of
Prince Bismarck.
The disappointment inflicted on Russia by
Germany in 1878, however, soon afterwards had
consequences, so far as the grouping of the European Powers was concerned, of which some had
undoubtedly not been foreseen by the German Chancellor. He still hoped to be able to postpone making
his choice between Austria and Russia, but he was
now tied to the former by the fact of their complicity, and he thought it well no longer to allow
the Dual Monarchy to escape him.      He met
Andrassy at Gastein in the month of August,
44




Russian Alliance and Entente Cordiale
1879, and prepared with him an Austro-German
Alliance.
The old Emperor William, fearing that this
agreement would bring about a definite rupture between Germany and Russia, at first hesitated to sign
the document which his Chancellor presented to him,
and it was not until the following October that he
gave wvay. Three years later, on May 20, 1882,
Bismarck completed the construction of his diplomatic edifice by the accession of Italy. The Triple
Alliance was founded.
Let us remember these dates. At this period
there was no Franco-Russian Alliance, still less was
there any question of an Entente Cordiale. Germany
could not plead that she was threatened with encirclement; nobody was rendering her uneasy,
nobody was provoking her. It Nwas she, however,
who created the Triple Alliance.
She did not even stop at this, for on March 21,
1884, thanks to a skilful policy of counter-assurance,
Bismarck obtained from Russia the signature to a
secret agreement which was to remain in force for
three years and which was a further consecration of
German hegemony.
Nevertheless Russia could not fail to appreciate
that in the Triple Alliance there were two points of
deviation, the one directed towards the west and the
other towards the east, and little by little, by an
entirely spontaneous movement, she tended to draw
nearer to France.
On the morrow of the Berlin Congress, Prince
Gortschakoff, the Russian Chancellor-who sadly remarked that he had just written "the most sombre
45




The Origins of the War
page in his career "-confided to a journalist, M.
Nicolas de Poggenpohl,' that Alexander II was
henceforth convinced that, in keeping step with Germany, Russia was merely playing Bismarck's game;
that the entente of the three emperors no longer
existed; that the disillusionment was now complete;
and that other combinations must in future be relied
upon to ensure the balance of power in Europe.
The relations between France and Russia became,
in fact, more and more cordial; they became closer
under the Gambetta Ministry and, although the
contrary is sometimes stated, under the Ministry of
Jules Ferry.
After having obtained the signing of the agreement of 1884, however, Bismarck brought about a
fresh interview between the three emperors which
took place at Skiernevice during the course of September. Alexander II died in 1881 as the result of
a revolutionary bomb explosion at the moment when
he was preparing to modify Russian institutions in
a liberal sense. Under the influence of this tragedy
his son, Alexander III, repudiated all idea of reform
and entrenched himself in an autocratic regime which
at first scarcely predisposed him towards any great
friendship for republican France. It was in this
state of mind that he went to Skiernevice, where
Russia and Germany each promised to observe
towards the other, for a period of three years, a
benevolent neutrality in the event of either of them
being attacked.
Little by little, however, the Emperor began to
perceive that in all the incidents that arose out of
1 L'Alliance Franco-Russe, by Jules Hansen (Flammarion, Paris,
1897).
16




Russian Alliance and Entente Cordiale
the execution of the Berlin Treaty —and they were
frequent-Germany   secretly supported  Austrian
interests against those of Russia.
When the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia was proclaimed in 188G, France and Russia
both demanded that the provisions of the Berlin
Treaty should be observed. When three Bulgarian
delegates went to the Quai d'Orsay on January 7,
1887, to see M. Flourens, the remarks made to them
by the Minister were most pacific and most friendly
in regard to Russia. When, again, on July 8, 1887,
the Bulgarian Sobranje elected Ferdinand of Coburg,
whose refined knavery was later on to bring so much
evil upon his country and on Europe, Russia and
France were once again found to be in agreement as
to the policy to be followed in regard to him and the
Stambuloff Ministry. The rapprochement was, in a
way, automatic.
Alexander III then decided not to extend the
duration of the agreement which he had signed three
years before with Germany. I-e preferred henceforward to be at liberty.
On February 3, 1888, in the hope of intimidating
the Tsar, Bismarck caused the text of the AustroGerman Treaty of Alliance of October 7, 1879,
which had hitherto been kept secret, to be published
in the Reichs Anzeiger and the Wiener Abendpost.
Alexander III, however, refused to allow himself to
be influenced by this, and it is even possible that
this noisy manifestation had the effect of bringing to
a climax his separation from Germany and drawing
him nearer to France.
In 1890, as most people know, during the period
47




The Origins of the War
when M. de Freycinet was Premier and M. Ribot
Minister for Foreign Affairs, the evolution of Russia
came to an end, and a new group of Powers, outside
the Triple Alliance, really began to be formed.
In March William II had dismissed Bismarck,
and the young Emperor, eager for autocratic power,
insisted on himself directing the affairs of his country.
The ignorance in which everybody then was as
to his real intentions made it the duty of M. de
Freycinet to leave no stone unturned for the purpose
of assuring Berlin of the pacific disposition of France.
The Prime Minister was on excellent terms with the
German Ambassador to France, Count Miinster,
with whom I was myself acquainted and who was
a very honourable man,1 and who had no difficulty
in recognizing, as he was pleased to do, that the
peace of the world had not only nothing to fear but
everything to gain from  a definite rapprochement
between France and Russia.
" The security of a great people," wrote M. de
Freycinet in this connexion, in the interesting
"Memoirs"    which are so characteristic of his
limpid style,
ought not to rest on the good will of others, but should
reside in itself, in its own means, in the precautions which
it knows how to take through its armaments and its
alliances.
And he adds:
M. Ribot, whom I acquainted with what had occurred
under previous Cabinets, entered completely into my
views, and showed himself no less desirous than myself
1 See de Freycinet's Souvenirs.
48




Russian Alliance and Entente Cordiale


to bring to an end the isolation of France. He found
in Baron Mohrenheim (the Russian Ambassador) a similar
desire for the continuation of the conversations that had
already been begun. I was soon able to remark evi dence
of the good disposition of Russia. On May 11, 1890, the
Grand Duke Nicholas, who exercised an enormous influence on matters of war, came to Paris.
M. de Freycinet met him at the Embassy, and
freely informed himi as to our military organization.
The Grand Duke took back to Russia, where he
communicated it to the Tsar, the conviction that
France, although pacific, was not a timid, weak and
unarmed nation.    In the month of August of the
same year General Boisdeffre went for a fortnight
to the Imperial camp at Krasnoe-Selo, and a striking
feature of his visit was that whilee he  as tLere he
was present at a meeting of the two emperors.
On August 23, however, M. de Laboulaye, the
French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, wrote to
M. Ribot:
The rapprochement between lFrance and Russia, which
scarcely three years ago appeared to nearly everybody to
be an illusion, a make-believe from which we expected
too much, has little by little become real enough and solid
enough not to be affected by a spectacular visit like that
of the Emperor William.'
A few months later, on the occasion of the visit
to Paris of the Empress Frederick, occurred the
incident to which I have already alluded, and in
congratulating the French Government, in the name
of his chief, M. de Giers, on the courtesy it had
displayed towards Germany, Baron       Mohrenheim
Yellow Book on the Franco-Russian Alliance, No. 1.
49




The Origins of the War
added that the accord between France and Russia
was now "' solid as granite." 
On July 25 Admiral Gervais' squadron, in
response to an official invitation, anchored in the
roads at Kronstadt, and was visited by the Tsar, the
Empress, and the members of the Imperial family.
When the strains of the " Marseillaise " broke forth
the Emperor rose, and, following his example, the
whole of the Russians present stood up and listened,
with bared heads, to the National Anthem, which
during the recent war so many nations sang as a
song of deliverance, but which thirty years ago was
barely familiar to foreign sovereign's.
Those of us who had reached manhood in 1890
cannot recall without emotion to-day the tremendous
effect produced in France by this friendly demonstration on the part of the Emperor Alexander III. It
was not only, for Republicans, the recognition of
the Republic by a Government whose form and
whose traditions were the most remote from French
institutions; it was, for France herself, the end of
a prolonged isolation and the apparent sign of a
renewal.
The Triple Alliance was prolonged, and M. de
Giers, in an interview  with M. de Laboulaye,
expressed the opinion that this decision of the
Central Powers must have the effect of causing
France and Russia to go farther on the road towards
an entente. MM. de Freycinet and Ribot, after
consulting M. Carnot, then President of the
Republic, decided to enter into pourparlers on the
subject, and some weeks later these conversations
French Yellow Book, No. 2.
50




Russian Alliance and Entente Cordiale
were brought to a conclusion by the drawing up of
the following Memorandum, still a little vague, but
on which the Emperor asked for absolute secrecy:
1. In order to define and to consecrate the entente
cordiale which unites them, and desirous of contributing, by common accord, to the maintenance of peace,
which is the object of their most sincere wishes, the
two Governments declare that they will act in concert
on all questions of a nature to place the general peace
in peril.
2. In the event of this peace being really in danger,
and especially if one or the other of the two parties
be threatened with an aggression, the two parties
agree to come to an understanding as to the measures
the immediate and simultaneous adoption of which
by the two Governments would be imposed by the
realization of this eventuality.'
Some months later the Russian Foreign Minister
came to Paris and had long interviews with M. de
Freycinet and M. Ribot.2 M. de Freycinet explained the necessity of agreeing in advance, while
peace still existed, on the steps that might be imposed on Russia and France by a sudden declaration
of war. A note made by M. Ribot on the same day,
in reference to these conversations, reports that
M. de Giers said: " Germany is sorry she did not
take advantage of the occasion she was offered for
an attack on France in 1887. Although the Triple
Alliance is apparently a defensive one, M. de Giers
agrees that war may break out by surprise and
that it will be wise not to allow   oneself to be
caught napping. M. de Giers thinks that war may
be delayed, but he does not appear to believe that,
1 French Yellow Book, Nos. 17 and 18.  2 Ibid., Nos. 20 and 21.
5I




The Origins of the War
sooner or later, we shall be able to escape it. It is
in this sense that he has spoken to the Emperor.
For the time being he is doing all that can be done
to maintain tolerable relations with Germany."
The establishment of a military convention between
the two countries was projected, and adopted in
principle, but it was agreed that this must first
be considered by   the Emperor and his War
Minister.
On February 4 following M. Ribot sent to M. de
Montebello, the new French Ambassador at St.
Petersburg, a Note from General de Miribel, setting
forth a summary of the forces to be placed in line by
each of the two nations in the case only of a defensive
war provoked by the Triple Alliance against the one
or the other of them or against both at the same time.
The consideration of this project dragged on for
some time at the Russian Ministry of War and at
the Imperial Court, and in July, 1892, MM. de
Freycinet and Ribot had to send General Boisdeffre
to St. Petersburg with a new draft, which, after it
had been modified on certain points, was signed on
July 17 by the representatives of the two General
Staffs.
Modifications afterwards asked for by M. Sadi
Carnot and by the French Minister for Foreign
Affairs, a long illness of M. de Giers, and a ministerial crisis in France further delayed the ratification
of the project by the two Governments,' which did
not take place, as a matter of fact, until December 30, 1893, under the Ministry of M. Casimir Perier.
In the interval, however, the friendship of France
1 See French Yellow Book, Nos. 32 to 91.
52




Russian Alliance and Entente Cordiale


and Russia was publicly affirmed in a fresh manifestation.
On August 10, 1893, 5M. de Montebello had
informed M. Jules Develle, the French Foreign
Minister, of the pending arrival at Toulon of a
Russian squadron commanded by Admiral Avelane.
The visit took place in the month of October, and
the Russian sailors were given an indescribable welcome. They came to Paris. I was then a member
of the Cabinet as Minister of Education, and I can
still even now see the Admiral saluted by frantic
applause at a gala performance that took place at
the Opera.
The satisfaction of the French authorities and the
popular joy were in no way due, however, as I can
affirm, to any secret hopes of revenge, but to a
legitimate sentiment of national pride and especially
to the thought that, thanks to the agreement arrived
at between France and Russia, it would not be
possible again to renew the alarms of 1873, of 1875
and of 1887, and that our peace of mind was henceforward assured. On October 27, at Toulon, President Carnot, after having thanked the Russian and
the French sailors "for having worthily fulfilled their
mission by serving as a link between the sympathies
of the two nations," terminated his address with
these pacific words: " To the toast that I have the
honour to propose of the health of Their Majesties
the Emperor Alexander III and the Empress of
Russia, I join another that responds to the desires
of all-to the friendship of two great nations and,
by it, to the peace of the world."
The same spirit of peace inspired the arrangee Z



The Origins of the War
ment prepared in August, 1892, by General de
Boisdeffre and General Obroutcheff, and formally
adopted on December 15/27, 1893, and December 23, 1893,/January 4, 1894, by an exchange
of letters between M. de Giers and M. de Montebello. On the insistence of the Emperor of Russia
this convention had to be kept strictly secret, and
its text did not appear in any Yellow Book until
1918. In negotiating it, however, M. Ribot was
careful to make known to the Imperial Government
that the French Constitution did not permit any
treaty to be kept secret for an indefinite period,
and that Parliament has inalienable rights before
such treaties could be put into operation.' It is
certain, in fact, that if ever the carrying out of the
Franco-Russian Alliance had led us to take steps of
which the consequences might have been war, the
French Chambers would have had, first of all, to be
informed and called upon to decide on the matter.
In 1914, however, it was Germany herself who
successively declared war against Russia and France,
and the question of their alliance was not raised.
On August 4, 1914, M. Viviani took down to
the Chamber the text of the Franco-Russian Convention of 1892-93 in case anyone should ask for its
terms to be made known, but not a single deputy
put a question on the subject. In face of the German aggression, everybody understood that the
assault to which we had been the victims took away
all practical interest from the consideration of agreements entered into between France and Russia
twenty years before.
French Yellow Book, No. 75.
54




Russian Alliance and Entente Cordiale
Here, however, is the text of the document,
which was preserved at the Quai d'Orsay (in an
envelope on which President Felix Faure had, some
time afterwards, written the following brief annotation: " The military Convention is accepted by the
letter of M. de Giers to M. de Montebello, giving
the force of a treaty to this Convention "):
France and Russia, being animated by an equal desire
to preserve peace, and having no other object than to
guard against the necessities of a defensive war, provoked
by an attack of the forces of the Triple Alliance against
either the one or the other of them, have agreed as
follows:
1. If France is attacked by Germany, or by Italy
supported by Germany, Russia will employ all her
available forces for the purpose of attacking Germany.
If Russia is attacked by Germany or by Austria
supported by Germany, France will employ all her
available forces for the purpose of combating
Germany.
2. In the event of the mobilization of the forces
of the Triple Alliance, or of one of the Powers which
are parties to it, France and Russia, at the first
announcement of that event, and without the need
of any preliminary agreement, will immediately and
simultaneously mobilize the whole of their forces and
advance them to the nearest possible point of their
frontiers.
3. The available forces that ought to be employed
against Germany are, on the part of France 1,300,000
men, on the part of Russia 700,000 to 800,000 men.
These forces will be fully engaged, with all diligence,
in such a manner that Germany will have to fight at
the same time on the East and on the West.
4. The General Staffs of the two countries will
always work in concert for the purpose of preparing
55




The Origins of the War
and facilitating the carrying out of the measures set
forth above. They will communicate to each other,
in time of peace, all information relating to the armies
of the Triple Alliance that shall come to their knowledge. The ways and means of correspondence in
time of war will be studied and provided for in
advance.
5. France and Russia shall not conclude peace
separately.
6. The present Convention shall have the same
duration as the Triple Alliance.
7. All the clauses enumerated above shall be kept
rigorously secret.
This Convention formed, until the month of
August, 1914, the law in regard to French relations
with Russia. One single clause was modified in
August, 1899, by agreement between the Emperor
and President Loubet, by an exchange of letters
between Count Mouravieff and M. Deleasse. The
two Governments feared that the Convention, having
the same duration as the Triple Alliance, might
lapse if the Triple Alliance were dissolved by the
death of the Austrian Emperor and the dismemberment of Austria, and they deemed it prudent to
arrange that it should remain in force, like the
preparatory diplomatic accord passed in 1891, as
long as the common interests of the two countries
demanded it.'
Finally, very soon after I took the direction of
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, I received from our
ambassador in St. Petersburg, M. Georges Louiswith whom, let me say in passing, I never ceased
to be in close agreement as to the policy to be
1 French Yellow Book, Nos. 93, 94 and 95.




Russian Alliance and Entente Cordiale


followed  in  regard  to   Russia-the   following
telegram:
St. Petersburg,
February 6, 1912.
The Minister of Marine told me this evening that he
was authorized to inform me officially that the Emperor
would regard with satisfaction the establishment, between
the General Staffs of the French Navy and the Russian
Navy, of direct relations similar to those that have existed
since 1892 between the General Staffs of the armies of the
two countries. The Admiral made this communication to
me in very warm terms.   He added that M. Sazonoff
would repeat them to me formally.'
The Government over which I presided was
unanimous in deciding that these overtures must not
be repulsed. Although the Russian fleet had not
then again become very powerful, it was evidently
of interest that the two fleets should not be entirely
ignorant of each other. IThe draft of a Naval Convention, establishing permanent and regular contact
between the two navies, was signed on July 16, 1912,
and when I went to St. Petersburg in the following
month, under conditions to which I shall have occasion to refer later on, M. Sazonoff and I exchanged
letters of ratification, the texts of which may be read
in Yellow Book, Nos. 106 and 107.
Such were, as a whole, the documents that
constituted the Franco-Russian Alliance.  It had
scarcely been formed when Germany began to try
to destroy it.  The German Foreign Office first
attempted, in 1895, to organize a triple intervention,
consisting of Russia, France and herself, for the
1Yellow Book, No. 96.
E                  57




The Origins of the War
purpose of taking away from Japan a part of the
advantage she had secured by her victory over China.
Then France was invited, through the intermediary of Count Minster, to attend the opening
of the Kiel Canal. M. Charles Maurras, a Royalist
writer of great talent, reproached M. Gabriel
Hanotaux, who was then Minister for Foreign
Affairs, for having accepted the German invitation
on behalf of the French fleet.'  I was then a
member of the Cabinet, which regarded it as impossible to refuse the invitation that had been given
to us, and it is only fair that I should say that at
first the Government, including the Minister for
Foreign Affairs himself, unanimously decided that
France should not accept. The Emperor Alexander
III, however, had died on November 1 of the previous
year, and nobody yet exactly knew what would be
the attitude of his successor in regard to France;
and when the French Ambassador to Russia had
asked Nicholas II if he intended to send the Russian
Fleet to Kiel, the Tsar had expressed, in the form
of a written Note, the formal wish that our ships
should go there side by side with his. In view of
this insistence the French Cabinet gave way.
Germany, however, showed no particular desire
to please France. With an exquisite tact she deliberately recalled from the Mediterranean, for the
express purpose of taking part in the Kiel festivities,
a warship known as the Woerth,2 and the French
ships had scarcely left the canal on their way back to
France, in order to return home in time for the first
1 Charles Maurras, Kiel et Tanger.
3 In commemoration of the German victory over MacMahon's army at
Woerth.-Translator.
58




Russian Alliance and Entente Cordiale


anniversary of the death of President Carnot, than
the whole Empire threw itself into the preparation
of new fetes for the purpose of commemorating the
twenty-fifth anniversary of 1870.
Throughout the whole of the following year
William II multiplied his efforts to turn Russia
away from France. At the moment of the disaster
suffered by the Italians at Adowa he accused France
at St. Petersburg of seeking an unfounded quarrel
with Italy, and sought above all to prejudice France
in the mind of the Tsar. But Nicholas II, although
perhaps naturally weak and undecided in mind,
worshipped the memory of his father, and refused
to do anything that might be construed as a repudiation of the inheritance he had received. In order
to show to France as plainly as possible that he did
not intend to break the bonds that linked his country
with ours, he came to Paris, with the Empress, in
the early days of October, 1896, and President
Faure returned this visit by going to St. Petersburg
and Moscow in August, 1897.
They inaugurated in this way those reciprocal
courtesy visits which afterwards became the rule
under each successive presidency, the last of which
-it proved, on the return of the President to France,
alas! to be more troubled and more filled with
anxiety than its predecessors-was really, if there is
any need for me to say so, neither more mysterious
nor less pacific than the others.
On the other hand, the Tsar maintained the most
friendly relations with William  II. On leaving
Paris on October 9, 1896, "Nicky " broke his
journey in Berlin for the purpose of shaking hands
59




The Origins of the War
with " Willy," and in the autumn of 1897 the two
emperors found themselves together again at Wiesbaden and at Darmstadt. Events appeared more
and more to be favouring Germany and strengthening her diplomatic situation. William II was working hard to bring about an entente with England,
based on the eventual distribution between various
Powers of the Portuguese colonies in Africa. At
the same time he did his utmost to derive profit for
Germany from the serious misunderstanding that
had occurred between England and France after
the meeting of Major Marchand and Kitchener at
Fashoda; and he tried, as the correspondence
between the Marquis de Noailles and the Quai
d'Orsay shows, to turn France against the England
with which he had just signed an accord.
Meanwhile, on August 28, 1898, the Tsar
Nicholas II addressed to the whole of the Powers a
circular which obviously confirmed his pacific disposition, and which asked the Governments to consider the best means of stopping the continuous
inflation of armaments. The German Emperor, who
felt that he had been checked by this step in the
advances he had been making towards Russia, at
once complained to Mr. White, the United States
Ambassador at Berlin, of the initiative that had been
taken by the Tsar, asked the Reichstag for an
increase in the German military estimates, made a
speech at Wiesbaden which included his customary
references to the "sharp sword." and directed his
representatives at the Hague to bring about the
defeat of the Russian proposal.
There are, it seems, some delicately minded
60




Russian Alliance and Entente Cordiale


persons who are not satisfied by the evidence of the
crimes committed in 1914 by the Central Empires,
and who busy themselves in seeking, sometimes in
incomplete records, at others in the files of the newspapers, and more often than all in the creations of
their own fancies, what they gladly describe as " the
remoter responsibilities for the war."  Let such
people condescend to recall the Hague Conference
which opened on May 18, 1899; let them dwell upon
the long and vain efforts that were made in common
by the Russian delegates and by my illustrious
friend, M. Leon Bourgeois, for the purpose of
stopping, as far as possible, the frenzy of armaments; let them remember the obstinate resistance
of Germany; and let them, after that, continue to
justify, if they dare, the Emperor William II, and
condemn, if they can, the unfortunate Nicholas II!
All the manoeuvres of Berlin, however, were fated
soon to be rendered vain by British policy. On
January 22, 1901, King Edward VII succeeded
Queen Victoria on the throne of Great Britain and
Ireland, and William II soon afterwards began to
sound his "Uncle Bertie": a sovereign who was
unable to regard without impatience the pretensions
of Germany to the domination of Europe.
King Edward undoubtedly did not take the
personal part in the direction of British diplomacy
that was ascribed to him by his Imperial nephew in
his bad-tempered annotations to the diplomatic documents of 1914 to which I have already referred,
nor even to the extent to which he has often been
credited by French imagination. He was a constitutional Chief of State, who respected the Ministers
6i




The Origins of the War
of the Crown; but his experience and his intellectual
ability gave him great authority over the Government
of his country, and his influence was certainly not
without its effect in the happy rapprochement that
occurred between England and France.
Edward VII did much to make France forget
the painful incident of Fashoda. In coming to Paris
in May, 1903, on a visit to President Loubet, in
receiving the latter in London with impressive
warmth a few weeks later, he showed plainly to the
whole world that our two countries had become
reconciled.  The spark that rekindles sentiments
that have long lain dormant springs, however, in the
hearts of the peoples themselves when the propitious
moment arrives. Most of the colonial questions that
had divided England and France had already been
settled by a series of minor agreements. On April 8,
1904, M. Delcasse signed with the British Government an agreement that removed the last causes of
friction and settled, by mutual concessions, the
interests of the two nations in Morocco and Egypt,
the precise points where they were most exposed to
conflict. This agreement of April 8, 1904, was, for
France and for Eurone, like the Franco-Russian
Alliance in 1891-93, the starting-point of a new era.
Two years previously the Triple Alliance had
been again renewed. In the same year of 1902,
however, while still remaining united to the central
group, Italy had already given, by the pen of
M. Prinetti, an assurance to the French Ambassador in Rome, M. Barrere, that she would observe
scrupulous neutrality in any war in which France
was not the aggressor. Italy kept her word in
62




Russian Alliance and Entente Cordiale
August, 1914, under conditions which amounted to
a decisive condemnation of Germany by her ally of
the day before. When the Entente Cordiale, in the
spring of 1904, was found placed side by side with
the Franco-Italian agreements, the equilibrium of
the European forces became much more stable than
it had been during the preceding years, and in any
event there was much less chance than before of any
sudden outbreak at the expense of France.
We heard William II, in 1914, roaring with fury
like a beast at bay and complaining that England,
Russia and France had succeeded in encircling and
isolating Germany. Isolated, Germany never was,
seeing that even in an unjust war she had with her
Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey. Neither
was she ever encircled; neither the Franco-Russian
Alliance nor the Entente Cordiale, nor, later still,
the progressive fusion of the two formations into
the Triple Entente, ever had the encirclement of
anybody for their object.
The language of Prince Billow, when German
Chancellor, was undoubtedly on this point in accord
with that of his Emperor:
British policy [wrote Prince Builow] tried, little by
little, to bring about a check to Germany by displacing
the centre of power in Europe. By a series of agreements,
in which important British interests were often sacrificed,
she sought to attract other European States to herself, in
order thereby to isolate Germany. This was the period of
what was known as the British policy of encirclement.
In the month of August, 1915, the then
Imperial Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, stated to
the Reichstag:
63




The Origins of the War
King Edward VII believed that his principal task was
to isolate Germany. The encirclement by the Entente,
with openly hostile tendencies, was drawn closer year by
year. We were compelled to reply to this situation with
the great Armament Budget of 1913.
Thus we always see the same reversal of the
parts; it is always the robber who believes it clever
to set up the cry of "Stop thief! "   Doctors tell,   us that megalomania and the persecution mania are
two aspects of the same disease. Germany, who
imagines that she is entitled to the empire of the
world, indignantly protests whenever other nations,
no matter to how slight a degree, claim their liberty.
Prince von Billow began with a saner appreciation of things. He was questioned in the Reichstag,
immediately after the announcement of the FrancoBritish agreement, and he wittily replied:
This agreement appears to us to be an attempt to
remove a series of differences between France and England
by means of a friendly understanding. From the point
of view of German interests, we have nothing to object
to in regard to it. We cannot, as a matter of fact, wish
for a strained situation between France and England,
which would be a danger to the peace whose maintenance
we sincerely desire....  Count Reventlow has given
us some variations on the theme duobus litigantibus
tertius gaudet. I won't ask whether this proverb must
always be applied, or whether, in the event of two persons
ceasing to be at variance, the third and fourth ought to
feel themselves injured thereby.'
This statement represented the truth of the
matter.
The new and most important feature of the
Yellow Book, Affaires de Maroc, vol. 1, 1905, pp. 126-127.
64




Russian Alliance and Entente Cordiale


Franco-British agreement lay in the fact that two
great pacific nations, both accustomed to govern
themselves and each the guardian of notable liberal
traditions, had spontaneously come to understand
that if they could succeed in dissipating the memory
of their old disagreements they might be able to
establish between them a co-operation that would
be profitable, not only to their own particular
interests, but also to their common ideas and to
civilization itself. France, the ally of Russia and the
friend of England, might be able, when occasion
offered, to prevent disagreement, of which the causes
still existed, between those two Powers, notably in
Persia and Asia Minor; while Italy, which was attached to the Triple Alliance and at the same time
bound to France by the arrangement of 1902, naturally formed the connecting link between the two
groups.
The particular situation of Italy in relation to the
other Powers had not only been considered as irreproachable in Rome, but also in Paris and Berlin.
Paris never failed to recognize that Italy continued
to form part of the Triple Alliance; in Berlin the
Franco-Italian  rapprochement was well known.
Germany, on the morrow of the agreements of 1904,
therefore in no way dreamed of pretending to be
"encircled," and she knew very well that she was
not.
German Imperialism, however, was not constituted in a manner to enable it to accommodate itself
for very long to the equilibrium of Europe. On
August 20, 1915, at a moment when, under the
illusion that Germany would be victorious, Herr von
65




The Origins of the War
Bethmann-Hollweg felt that he might give way to an
access of frankness, the German Chancellor made this
plain statement to the Reichstag: "The British
policy of the balance of power must disappear." In
other words, Germany must be at liberty to place her
hand on the scales as she pleased; a preponderance of
force must be substituted for an equality of forces.
It was in this sense that the Emperor William II
from the end of 1904 set himself to work with remarkalble persistency. In September, 1917, after the
Russian Revolution, M. Bourtzef discovered at Tsarskoye Selo the whole of the correspondence carried
on by the Emperor Nicholas II with the other European Heads of State. Up to that period Germany
had caused to be circulated the most absurd legends
in regard to the letters that had been written by or
received by the Tsar. During the war there were
even people in France who claimed to be well informed and who whispered in one's ear: "Yes,
undoubtedly Germany is guilty. But if you only
knew the correspondence that took place between
the Russian Emperor and the President of the
Republic! ' When the day came for the drawers
to be opened nothing-and for a good reason-was
found of a kind that could compromise any citizen
of France. What was found, however, was a voluminous package of letters from  " Willy" that
revealed a long and persevering machination with the
object once more of exciting Russia against England.
William II sought at first to turn to account the
defeats sustained by the Russian fleet and the armies
of Kuropatkin in the war against the Japanese. The
echo of the battles delivered on the Sha-ho had barely
66




Russian Alliance and Entente Cordiale


reached Europe than William II began his insinuations and stated that England was secretly conspiring
with France to bring about a peace that would be
favourable to Japan. Then, after the Dogger Bank
incident and Admiral Rojdestvensky's unfortunate
mistake-he fired, it,will be remembered, on some
English  fishing-boats-the  Kaiser  believed  the
moment was more propitious than ever to press his
point. IHe declared to " Nicky" that France was
shirking her duty towards Russia, and he again put
forward his idea of grouping the Continental Powers
against England.1,Skilfully imposed upon by his Imperial correspondent, the Tsar allowed himself on October 20,
1904, to write a phrase that showed only too plainly
that the Triple Entente did not come immediately
out of the agreements of April 8, and that France
had plenty to do in the years that followed to bring
definitely closer together her friend and her Ally.
I thank you cordially [wrote Nicholas II].... I
cannot find words to express my indignation against
England.... It is certainly time to put an end to all
that. The only way to do so would be, as you say, for
Germany, Russia and France to come to an understanding
for the purpose of putting an end to British and Japanese
arrogance and insolence. Are you disposed to sketch out
the main lines of such an agreement and let me see them?
As soon as we have accepted it, France will be compelled
to follow her Ally.
William II, one Imay be sure, did not need to
be asked a second time. He hastened to send an
Imperial feld-jaeger to Peterhof with the rough
1See this correspondence in the Report of the Senatorial Commission
of Inquiry.
67




The Origins of the War
draft of a treaty; but when the moment came to
sign it Nicholas II developed scruples. He feared
that " Willy," in desiring to embroil him  with
England, sought above all to embroil him   with
France, and on November 23, 1904, he informed
"Willy" that before there was any question of
signing he wished to communicate the scheme to.the French Government.
On this "Willy" took fright and unmasked
himself.
It would be dangerous [he wrote] to inform France,
who would not fail to inform England, her friend and
perhaps her secret ally. The result would be an immediate attack from England and Japan in Europe, as
well as in Asia. Her immense naval superiority would
soon enable her to overcome my little fleet, and
Germany would be temporarily paralysed.  Any preliminary warning to France would lead to a catastrophe.
William concluded by saying that if "Nicky"
did not wish to present to France the fait accompli
it would be preferable to drop the proposal. Thus
the German Emperor was conscious that if his secret
plottings came to be known a catastrophe might
result; yet he continued his Machiavellian work. A
conspirator in the dark, he feared the light of day,
but did not, for all that, cease his conspiracies.
In the following summer, while cruising in the
Baltic near Finnish waters, he expressed a desire to
meet "Nicky "-" merely as a tourist and entirely
without ceremony."   In reality he believed the
moment propitious for a renewal of his designs.
Admiral Rojdestvensky's fleet had been sunk near
Tsushima by the Japanese on the 27th of the pre68




Russian Alliance and Entente Cordiale
vious May, and Russia was condemned to impotence.
Revolution threatened to break out against Imperial
institutions both at St. Petersburg and at Moscow.
France herself had been drawn by Germany into the
Algeciras Conference. Was not this the moment for
Germany and her Emperor definitely to isolate
England and to alienate her for ever from France
and Russia?
As " Nicky " did not dare to decline " Willy's"
invitation the two yachts met on July 3 near Viborg
in the peaceful waters of Bjoerkoe Sound. What
passed at this interview did not become known until
twelve years later, after the Russian Revolution, and
it was then revealed by authentic official documents.
Nicholas II had the honesty to go to Bjoerkoe
as a mere tourist as he had been requested. He was
accompanied only by Admiral Birileff, his Minister
off Marine, and Count Benckendorff, his Court
Marshal. William II then presented to him, on the
Polar Star, the text of a positive treaty of alliance
between Germany and Russia. The Tsar, who at
first saw in the text of this treaty nothing more
than a fresh guarantee of peace, signed it, and under
Article 4 of the instrument he engaged himself to
take the necessary steps to make the treaty known
to France and to propose that the latter should
adhere to it as Russia's Ally.
After " Willy's" departure, however, the Tsar
thought the matter over. -He placed the facts
before his Foreign Minister, Count Lamsdorff, who
pointed out to him the impossibility of reconciling
William II's proposals with the French alliance,
with the result that, without the Government of the
69




The Origins of the War
Republic being even informed of the adventure,
the untoward Bjoerkoe Agreement was allowed to
remain buried in a pigeon-hole among the Tsar's
private papers.
The Kaiser, on his side, however, in no way
willingly agreed to this abandonment of his project,
since he telegraphed to the Tsar on October 12:
"We have joined our hands; we have sworn before
God, who has heard our oath....What is
signed is signed. God is our witness. I await your
proposals."
Such was, let us state frankly, the great weakness in our alliance with Russia. The Emperor
Alexander III, before 1891, feared that the French
parliamentary regime would render the friendship of
the two countries uncertain and fragile. This fear,
however, was never justified by any indiscretion or
imprudence on the part of France. But in Russia,
where the solidity of the alliance rested solely on
the personal will of the Emperor, France was always
at the mercy, I will not say of a disloyalty, but of a
mistake or of a weakness. Happily the German
intrigues ended in failure in face of the honesty of
Nicholas II and before that religious respect which
he professed, as I have already stated, for the
decisions that had been taken by his father.
Down to the outbreak of the war, however, and
in sight of and with the full knowledge of France,
he nevertheless continued to be on the most intimate
terms with William II. How, then, can hostile
intentions against the Triple Alliance be attributed
to the Triple Entente? And how can anyone speak
of " encirclement  when two monarchs, belonging
70




Russian Alliance and Entente Cordiale
each to a differert group of Powers, maintained such
constant and affectionate relations?
If an Anglo-Russian Agreement, signed in 1907
on the subject of Persia and the Persian Gulf,
brought the Triple Entente closer together, and if
Edward VII paid a visit to the Tsar at Reval in
June, 1908, Nicholas and William II met at Swinemunde in 1907 and met again in 1909; in November,
1910, the Tsar went to Potsdam; on August 19,
1911, Russia and Germany reciprocally recognized
two railway zones in Anatolia and Northern Persia;
Russia adhered to the great German Bagdad scheme,and signed the charter of the undertaking. In 1912,
after a fresh interview, Twhich on this occasion took
place at Port Baltic, the Vossische Zeitung justly.wrote: " Port Baltic will perhaps live in the memory
of-the nations as the scene of great political bargainings."  And we shall see on what terms of trusted
friendship the cunning "Willy" and the timid
"Nicky" continued to correspond down to the eve
of the war.
Thus Germany never had any just cause for
believing that the Franco-Russian Alliance was
directed against her; the Entente Cordiale, too,
was never aggressive in character. England, further,
was bound neither to France nor Russia by any
diplomatic pact. Her military General Staff was in
unofficial relations with that of France for the
purpose of considering an eventual programme of
defence, but even in so far as concerned the possibility that France might be the victim of an
unjustifiable attack, the British Government had
entered into no engagement with her; and this
71




The Origins of the War
indefinite situation remained without modification
down to the last weeks oft 1912, and even then was
only slightly changed.
In the month of April, 1905, Lord Lansdowne
had seemed disposed to make a further step forward,
and had proposed to M. Paul Cambon a general
formula for an entente; a formula, however, that
was even a little more vague than that by which the
Franco-Russian Alliance had been preluded in 1891.
In September, 1912, the British Admiralty, on
the initiative of Mr. Winston Churchill, having
envisaged with the French Minister of Marine a
concerted distribution of the two fleets with the object
of concentrating the French squadrons in the Mediterranean, the interviews were resumed between M.
Paul Cambon and Sir Edward Grey. We were
unable, as a matter of fact, to modify the distribution
of our naval forces and abandon the protection of the
Channel and Atlantic coasts unless we could be
assured that in case of peril there would be conversations on the attitude and, if need be, on the measures
to be taken.
I was at this period Prime Minister and Minister
for Foreign Affairs. M. Paul Cambon referred the
question to me and, with my authorization, he proposed to the British Government that the mutual
assurance should be placed on record in two letters to
the effect that, if events of a nature to disturb European peace ever occurred, the two Governments
would immediately place themselves in relation, the
one with the other, and consider together the steps
to be taken. Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey
accepted in principle this idea, which I on my part
72




Russian Alliance and Entente Cordiale
submitted to the French Government; and on
October 30, 1912, the British Government at a
Cabinet Council adopted a text in conformity with
M. Cambon's suggestion and setting forth precisely
that if war appeared to be inevitable the two Governments would bring into operation the military and
naval Conventions eventually drawn up by the two
General Staffs.
The text of the letters exchanged between the
French Ambassador and Sir Edward Grey was published in England and then in France after the
German invasion. The phrasing was simply hypothetical and implied no firm obligation of reciprocal
assistance. The British Cabinet did not feel itself
able to contract a positive engagement without parliamentary sanction.
When the horizon darkened, therefore, we had
no certainty of British intervention, and this was a
further reason why our diplomacy never ceased to
be prudent. (We shall see to what point it has always
been prudent.) Nevertheless, in default of an alliance,
the friendship of Great Britain made our foreign
policy easier and more authoritative, and in the
numerous crises that followed each other in Europe
from 1905 onwards we stood shoulder to shoulder
with Britain; we remained united with her at least
as closely as with Russia. In Balkan affairs notably
it was with England first and in all circumstances
that we took care to act in concert. For several
years the two Governments were in consultation day
by day and hour by hour, and on no single occasion
did either of them take an isolated initiative in
any pending question; and together, down to the
F                73




The Origins of the War
supreme moment, they made desperate efforts to
preserve peace.
Close, however, as the Franco-British entente
became, it never disturbed the good relations that
existed, on the other hand, between the British
Government and Germany.' In 1905, on the
morrow of the Anglo-French agreement, addresses
of reciprocal sympathy were voted at meetings in
London and Berlin, luncheons were given to the
German Ambassador, and visits were exchanged
between lord mayors and burgomasters. In 1906
there was an interview between Edward VII and
William II at Friedrichshof, and there were missions
headed by the Duke of Connaught and Mr. Winston
Churchill to the German manoeuvres. In 1907 King
Edward, in German uniform, made another visit to
his nephew in Berlin, and William II visited London
and read with joy the inscription on a triumphal
arch: " Blood is thicker than water." In 1908 the
British First Lord of the Admiralty went so far as
to inform Berlin officially of his naval construction
programme; there was yet another meeting of uncle
and nephew at Cronberg, and a visit by Mr. Lloyd
George to Berlin.
The following years were characterized by one
long series of pacific measures and bargainings,
having for their object the suppression of all naval
competition between the two nations.  In May,
1911, London again gave an enthusiastic welcome
to William II, when he went unexpectedly to be
present with King George V at the unveiling of the
1 See L'Angleterre Radicale, and La Marche d la Guerre, by Jacques
Bardoux (Alcan, Paris).
74




Russian Alliance and Entente Cordiale


monument to Queen Victoria. Lord Haldane, an
eminent British 'Minister, a philosopher and a great
admirer of German civilization, was sent to Berlin
with the mandate to resume, if possible, a conversation between Germany and England opened in 1908
on the subject of the Portuguese colonies and to
assure afresh the exchange of the respective programmes of naval construction.
At the moment when Moroccan affairs and then
Balkan affairs were causing the accumulation of so
much dangerous electricity in the world, neither the
Franco-Russian Alliance nor the Entente Cordiale,
therefore, constituted formations capable of compromising peace. Both, on the contrary, were in
permanent contact with the other group, and France
herself, as we shall see, enjoyed irreproachable relations with both Germany and Austria. I shall be able
to show that in 1912, in 1913 and even in 1914 there
was a veritable co-operation on several important
subjects between Germany and France.
However far back one may go in the policy that
France has followed since 1870, however closely one
may follow it down to the month of August, 1914,
there will be found nothing, absolutely nothing, that
-I will not say that would enable one to incriminate
France-would justify one in reproaching her with
even an involuntary fault.


75




III
"  MOROCCO AND THE BALKAN CRISIS1
N      July   1, 1911, at midday, the        German
Ambassador to France, Baron von Schoen,
called at the Quai d'Orsay, with that serious
manner which he assumed, as I have said, only in
quite exceptional circumstances, and handed to
M. de Selves, who was then Minister for Foreign
Affairs, a Note1 which read as follows:
Some of the German firms carrying on business in the
south of Morocco, and particularly in the neighbourhood
of Agadir, are uneasy in consequence of a certain agitation which prevails among the tribes of that region and
which appears to have been provoked by recent events
in other parts of the country. These firms have addressed
themselves to the [German] Imperial Government, and
asked it for aid and protection for their lives and property.
The Government has acceded to this request by deciding
to send a warship to Agadir, for the purpose of helping
and succouring German subjects and proteges, in case of
need, and at the same time for the purpose of watching
over German interests, which are considerable in these regions. As soon as order and tranquillity have returned to
1 On Moroccan affairs see especially: Yellow Book on Morocco, published by the French Government; Le Mystere d'Agadir, by Andre Tardieu
(Calmann-Levy); La Politique Marocaine de l'Allemagne, by "Louis
Maurice, " i.e. M. Louis Maurice Bompard, a former ambassador, now a
member of the Senate for the Moselle (Plon-Nourrit, Paris); Les Origines
de la Guerre Mondiale, by Albert Bazergue (Plon-Nourrit); La Diplomatie
de Guillaume II, by Emile Laloy (Bossard); France et Allemagne, by
Rene Pinon (Perrin and Co.); Chronique de l'an 1911, by Mermeix;
Le Coup d'Agadir, by Ren6 Albin; Les Negociations de 1911, by " Outis"
(Alcan, Paris), etc.
76




Morocco and the Balkan Crisis
Morocco the vessel entrusted with this protective mission
will leave the port of Agadir.
The pretences set forth in this Note were as false
as were, three years later, the complaints embodied
in Germany's declaration of war. No German business firms at Agadir had been threatened in any
way; as a matter of fact, there were no German
firms there. Agadir was then a closed port, where
no European commercial establishments were
allowed to exist. Germany's reasons were not those
which she set forth in her Note, but she had others
which, bad as they also were, were already very
ancient. A hint dropped by Baron von Schoen,
indeed, immediately indicated to M. de Selves what
those reasons were.  The Act of Algeciras, he
said, had lost all its efficacy. Germany must therefore enter into conversations with us in regard to
Morocco and, more generally speaking, as to Africa
as a whole. To begin the conversation she gave,
according to her custom, a bang on the table with
her fist: she sent one of her gunboats, the Panther,
to anchor off Agadir.
Germany had adopted the same graceful method
six years before in order to bring about a conversation with France in regard to Morocco. On
March 31, 1905, the Imperial yacht Hohenzollern
suddenly appeared off Tangier. William II left the
vessel with a suite of something like fifty persons,
and was received on landing by the Sherif Moulay
Abdel Malek, on behalf of the Sultan. Replying
to the words of welcome that were addressed to him,
William declared, in the tones of a protector:
77




The Origins of the War
"I am making a visit to the Sultan to-day in
his character as an independent sovereign. I hope
that, under the sovereignty of the Sultan, a free
Morocco will remain open to peaceful competition
from all nations, without monopoly or annexation,
on a footing of absolute equality. The object of my
visit to Tangier is to make it known that I have
decided to do all that lies in my power to safeguard
efficaciously the interests of Germany in Morocco.
Considering the Sultan as an absolutely free
sovereign, I wish to come to an agreement with
him as to the proper method of safeguarding those
interests."
At the moment when William      II went to
Tangier for the express purpose of saying these
words a French Mission had been at Fez for two
months. It had been sent there, after a long series
of vain representations, to obtain from Sultan Abdul
Aziz the necessary reforms, not only for the protection of French interests in Morocco, but for the
security of the French colony of Algeria; and
William, who knew this, carefully concluded his
address to the Sultan's representative with these
words: " As to the reforms that the Sultan has the
intention of carrying out, it appears to me that he
should proceed with every precaution, in view of the
religious sentiments of the population, in order that
the public peace be not disturbed."
William II had ostentatiously affected to render
homage to the religious sentiments of the Mohammedan population some years before (1898), when he
had gone to Damascus and offered himself, on the
tomb of Saladin, as the defender of Islam in Asia and
78




Morocco and the Balkan Crisis


Africa; on this occasion, at Tangier, it was plainly
against France that he directed his aim. He was
by no means ignorant of the serious difficulties that
the Moorish tribesmen had many times stirred up on
the borders of French Algeria, and he was well
aware that order in Morocco was a vital necessity for
our African possessions. His descent on Tangier, his
speech, his offer of assistance to the Sultan of Fez- 
all constituted, therefore, at that moment, a manifestation of hostility against France.
Whatever German interests were affected in
Morocco in 1905 and 1911, the violence of the incidents of Tangier and Agadir was in itself odious.
It was by provocations of this kind that the Empire 
ran the risk of over-exciting French opinion had not
our country maintained a firm enough will not to
fall into the trap of committing any imprudence.
How was it possible, therefore, on the morrow of
these malicious and noisy demonstrations to prevent
our wounded national pride from remaining for some
time in a somewhat excited state? Our people were
too much attached to peace to reply to Germany's
bad manners as they deserved, but they had some
difficulty in holding themselves in hand, and, as the
result of an irresistible desire to feel that their dignity
was intact, they cheered a passing regiment or a tricolour that floated in the breeze. This gave Germany
an excuse for denouncing our chauvinism, and some
of the foreign diplomatists were a little too quick to
believe that she was justified in making this accusation. The real offender was Germany herself, Who
took a pleasure, by frequently repeated challenges,
in irritating French public sentiment.
79




The Origins of the War
Germany at first appeared to be entirely disinterested in Morocco. In 1880 an International
Conference met at Madrid, on the initiative of Great
Britain, for the purpose of regulating the rights of
consular protection, as exercised in the Sherifian
Empire by the great European Powers; and on this
occasion Prince von Hohenlohe was directed by
Prince Bismarck to inform France that, as Germany
had no interests in Morocco, her delegate at the
Conference had received instructions to model his
attitude on that of his French colleague. M. de
Freycinet, the French Foreign Minister, made a note
of this declaration, which was, moreover, in conformity with all those that Germany had previously
made on the subject. Seven years later Prince
Bismarck once more repeated the same assurances to
the Marquis de Benomar, the Spanish Ambassador
in Berlin.
Little by little, however, the idea came to the
Maghzen-I would not venture to assert that it came
spontaneously-to look to Berlin for support against
France when she complained of the turbulent tribesmen who harassed unceasingly the population in
Algeria. In 1889 a sumptuous Moorish Mission was
sent to Germany, and in the following year Count
von Tattenbach negotiated and signed a treaty of
commerce with the Moorish Government. But this
was merely the commencement of a new policy.
Twelve years later, in 1901, when the Sultan wished
to resume his intrigues with Berlin, he sent El
Menebbhi, his Minister for War, to give orders at
Krupp's works, but he was not received by Count
von Billow, the new Imperial Chancellor, On
SQ




Morocco and the Balkan Crisis
January 12, 1903, Builow repeated to M. Bihourd
that Germany had, so to speak, no interests in
Morocco.
On April 8, 1904, an agreement was concluded
by which England recognized the special situation of
France in Morocco, and on the 6th of the following
October, Spain, to whom a zone of influence had
been reserved in the country, adhered to the AngloFrench declaration. Neither in the month of April
nor in October did Germany protest; she proclaimed, on the contrary, that she had no objection
to make. She certainly began to speak of having
Moroccan interests, but these were, she said, merely
economic interests, and she acknowledged that they
were not threatened.' On January 4, 1905, when
there was a report that a fresh Moorish Mission was
about to leave for Berlin, Herr von Radowitz, the
German Ambassador at Madrid, was still more
emphatic, for he hastened to say to our Charge
d'Affaires in Spain, M. de Margerie, that "if El
Mokri goes to Berlin to protest against the FrancoSpanish agreement he will get a warm reception."
Less than three months later William II landed
at Tangier. France was in an uproar and the whole
world was astonished. What had happened?   This
was soon to be disclosed. On May 30 the Sultan of
Morocco requested the Powers who had signed the
Convention of 1880 to meet in conference for the
purpose of considering the reforms to be introduced
into the Sherifian Empire.  In other words, he
wished to break off the negotiations engaged at Fez
1 Declaration of von Billow in Reichstag, April 12; Conversation
between M. Bihourd and Baron von Richthofen, October 14.
8T




The Origins of the War
between France and the Sultan, and to introduce
Germany into the discussion of Moroccan reforms.
Baron von Lancken and Prince Radolin had on two
successive occasions, moreover, made this threatening declaration to M. Rouvier, the French Premier
and Foreign Minister: " You must understand that
Germany is behind Morocco."'
As no other Power followed the example of
Berlin, however, and as only Germany asked for
the conference, M. Rouvier believed he would be
showing a spirit of conciliation by offering a direct
agreement. This Germany refused. She reckoned,
in spite of everything, to find useful help in an International Conference. On June 6, 1905, the serious
question of whether France should take part in this
conference was considered by the Ministerial Council.
M. Delcasse, the Foreign Minister, advised aibstention and, at the same time, laid before his colleagues
the written proposition for an agreement which had
been transmitted to him a few days before by M. Paul
Cambon on behalf of Lord Lansdowne. M. Rouvier,
who had still confidence, at this date, in certain
promises that had come from Berlin, insisted that
Germany's demand be accepted and that, on the
other hand, the British offer be declined.  M.
Delcasse handed in his resignation. Germany, however, proud at what she considered a success, immediately began to show herself uncompromising, and
the negotiations for the drawing up of the programme for the pending conference had hardly
been commenced between my lamented friend, M.
1 M. Rouvier to M. Bihourd, June 11, 1905 (Yellow Book on Morocco,
p. 232).
82




Morocco and the Balkan Crisis


Paul Revoil, and Herr Rosen, when M. Rouvier,
fearing that a humiliation and a conflict would result,
asked M. Paul Cambon if we could still count upon
England.
Speaking of this incident in the work which I
have already quoted, Prince von Biilow writes:
"M. Delcasse resigned his portfolio. He retired,
and our will enabled us to have our way because we
remained firm."  He added: " At Algeciras we
naturally had difficulties in face of the Powers of
the Entente, and owing to the slight interest the
other Powers took in the Moroccan question."
Prince Billow dared not frankly confess the disappointment which the Conference finally brought to
Germany. It was not through lack of interest that
the Powers other than those of the Entente, including Italy and Austria herself, refused, in general, to
support the pretensions of Germany; it was because
they found these pretensions exorbitant and insupportable. Germany, in short, was unable to
obtain from the Conference what she sought.
But the Act of Algeciras was confused enough
and complicated enough to furnish a perfidious and
pettifogging government with the best hopes for the
future. Germany undoubtedly, from July 8, 1905,
when she brought us to accept the principle of a
conference, recognized the exceptional situation
"and the special interest of France in Morocco,"
and this reassuring formula dominated the general
agreement of April 8, 1906; but Germany also
succeeded in safeguarding the complete sovereignty
of the Sultan, which enabled her to carry on intrigues
with him. She also brought about the establishment
83




The Origins of the War
of international regulations for the organization of
the police, she arranged the creation of a State
Bank that was also international, and she assured
the open door to German enterprise in Morocco.
As Prince Biilow wrote: " In future dealings with
Moroccan affairs Germany thus reserved for herself
a decisive vote-a vote which she will not relinquish
without adequate compensation."
These few words reveal and explain to us the
manoeuvres of Germany during the years that followed and the bargainings that took place in 1911 -manoeuvres in Italy, where Germany vainly tried
to excite M. Sonnino against France on the question
of the Morocco Bank; manceuvres at Constantinople, where Germany tried to induce the Caliph to
bring pressure on the Moorish Sultan; manoeuvres
in Morocco itself, where Count von Tattenbach and
Dr. Rosen attempted to force the Maghzen, in violation of the Act of Algeciras, to grant them favours
and concessions without first submitting them to
public tender, and where brigands like Raisuli, with
the encouragement of Germany, spread disorder and
uneasiness. The,series of crimes committed barely
fourteen years ago in that country, which to-day,
under French authority, is in such a complete state
of pacification, will be recalled-the assassination of
M. Charbonnier on the beach at Tangier, the
murder of Dr. Mauchamp at Marakesh, the killing
of nine Europeans-French, Italian and Spanish.
In concert with Spain, France had to embark
troops at Casablanca in order to protect its
nationals; but at the same time, in order to respect
the Act of Algeciras, the French Government was
84




Morocco and the Balkan Crisis


compelled to give instructions to General Drude and
General Picquart not to set a foot outside the town.
Meanwhile the Germans at Casablanca, grouped and
directed by Herr Karl Ficke (who was shot as a spy
at the beginning of the war of 1914), were able to
send agents into the Shawia country for the purpose
of fomenting a revolt and thus force themselves to
occupy Settat. Simultaneously with Herr Ficke's
operations, the German Consul, the German Imperial
Government, and the German Ambassador in Paris
set to work, and Prince Radolin went to the Quai
d'Orsay to inform the French Government that
Germany would be compelled to renounce a conciliating policy. Then came, it will be remembered,
the proclamation of a Holy War by Muley Hafid,
the adhesion of Germany to that movement, the
defeat of the troops of Abdul Aziz, the recognition
of Muley Hafid, and finally, on September 25, 1908,
the serious incident at Casablanca.
The Germans in that town, with the assistance
of their consul, had established a veritable agency
for the purpose of inciting desertions from the French
Foreign Legion. We were entirely helpless against
these secret plottings, for the regime of Capitulations, which then prevailed in Morocco, protected
the subjects of all European Powers against judicial
proceedings. It was only in 1914, after the war
had begun, that we were able, by laying criminal
information and by the seizure of confirmatory documents, to learn the truth in regard to these machinations and to ascertain the leading part that had been
played therein by the indefatigable Karl Ficke, with
the assistance of the German Consul. The Germans
85




The Origins of the War
had agents in the Legion itself, they assisted men
to escape, and they embarked the deserters on
German ships. At the same time the German press
carried on a violent campaign against the very
existence of the Foreign Legion, a campaign which
continued to the declaration of war. Furious at
seeing Germans freely enter the service of France,
the conductors of this campaign asserted that these
men were tricked into volunteering to join the
Legion. The bravery and devotion of the men of
the Foreign Legion throughout the whole course of
the war amply proved the unfounded nature of these
accusations and the fidelity that these foreign soldiers
have always professed for their adopted country.
The German desertion agency at Casablanca,
however, held out the most glittering hopes before
the eyes of those whom it wished to induce to be
false to their duty, and between September 18 and
22, 1908, the Germans succeeded in prevailing upon
three of their countrymen, including one who had
become French by naturalization, a Russian, a
Swiss and an Austrian to desert from the Legion.
The German Consul supplied them with civilian
clothes, lodged them secretly in the town for
some days, and decided to embark them one morning on the German steamer Cintra, which was
lying in the roadstead. At a suitable moment they
were taken down to the port, as discreetly as
possible, by the chancellor of the German Consulate,
accompanied by a native Moor. They had the bad
luck to capsize the launch when getting into it to
go aboard the steamer, and were compelled to come
ashore again, whereupon they were surprised by the
86




Morocco and the Balkan Crisis


harbour-master, who ordered them to be arrested.
A fight followed, and the German Imperial Consul,
who had given his chancellor written instructions for
the men to be taken off to the steamer, went and
complained insolently to his French colleague.
The Governments were immediately informed of
the affair. Austria declared herself uninterested,
notwithstanding that one of her subjects was implicated in the matter. Germany, of course, made
it her business to cover her desertion agency, and the
same Baron von Lancken who was accustomed to
make his appearance at all critical moments went to
the Quai d'Orsay on September 28 for the purpose of
claiming, in the name of his Government, " prompt
and complete satisfaction." (It was this Baron von
Lancken who intervened in the darkest hours of
1911, and who was governor of Belgium at the time
of the assassination of 'Miss Cavell; it was he also
who tried in 1917 to draw us into his clumsy traps.)
In agreement with M. Clemenceau, who was then
Prime Minister, M. Pichon, who was Foreign
Minister, retorted by demanding that the German
Consul, Luderitz, be disavowed and reprimanded.
Before the firmness of this reply the Imperial
Government, after some days of hesitation, itself
proposed to submit the matter to arbitration.
M. Pichon had scarcely accepted this proposal than
Germany raised a thousand quibbles as to the form
in which the terms of arbitration should be drawn
up, and it was not until November 24 that it could
be signed. A decision was given on May 22, 1909,
which gave complete satisfaction to France and
declared that the chancellor of the German Imperial
87




The Origins of the War
Consulate had been guilty of " a serious and manifest
fault."  During several months, however, a feeling
of anxiety had agitated Europe, and the fuss made
by Germany in connexion with the Casablanca incident aroused in the minds of the nations a vague
presentiment of war.
Meanwhile, France presented Germany with
further evidence of her good will. Before even the
decision of the arbitrator was given, she signed an
agreement with the Imperial Government, of which
the elements had been drawn up two years before,
and which was dated February 8. In this agreement
Germany declared that she pursued only economic
interests in Morocco, and she recognized that the
peculiar political interests of France were closely
bound up with the consolidation of the internal order
and peace of the country. France once more undertook to respect the independence and integrity of
the Sherifian Empire, and bound herself, further,
not to hamper German commercial and industrial
interests. The two Powers also declared that they
desired that their respective nationals should cooperate jointly in such business concerns that
it might be possible to establish in Morocco-an
ill-thought-out plan involving difficulties which
the French Government did not at the time
realize.
This was the commencement of a policy of
economic and financial co-operation between Germany and France, and it will be remarked that this
important concession was made to Germany by
men whom that Empire had always reproached for
their national intransigeance-MM. Clemenceau and
88




Morocco and the Balkan Crisis


Pichon. In negotiating this agreement M. Jules
Cambon had, it is true, taken care to stipulate that,
in the formation of consortiums, the fact that French
interests in Morocco were more important than
those of Germany should be taken into account; but
no sooner were the signatures exchanged than Germany made it her business to show us that it was
not easy to satisfy her greed. Animated by a sincere
desire to bring into operation the agreement of
February 8, the French Government sent to Berlin
M. Guiot, delegate of the holders of Moroccan Loan
Bonds,:who was also in control of the Moorish
Customs. M. Guiot, however, found himself met
with such demands by Germany that it was impossible for him to bring about the formation of the
companies that had been projected, and he was
obliged to leave the business men of the two
countries, the financiers and public works contractors, to come to an agreement between themselves.
This direct agreement resulted in interminable
difficulties, and it was necessary for the Governments to intervene again. They were at last able,
on February 17, 1910, to conclude a fresh agreement
and organize the Societe Marocaine de Travaux
Publics (Moroccan Public Works Company), 50 per
cent. of the capital of which was reserved to France,
30 per cent. to Germany, 7- per cent. to Spain,
71 per cent. to Great Britain, 2} per cent. to
Belgium and 2. per cent. to Sweden. But so far
as the constructions themselves were concernedroads, ports and railways-the distribution of the
supplies of materials and of the undertakings, as
between French and foreign firms, were in no way
G                 89




The Origins of the War
precisely set forth and no precautions taken in
advance against the abuse of competition.
Now, during the pourparlers, Germany hastened
to secure a preponderating position in Morocco, and
carefully carried off the greater part of the available
concessions.  The brothers Mannesmann, in particular, managed to get nearly the whole of the
mines handed over to them by Muley Hafid, to the
prejudice of the Franco-German mining group, and
as an outcome of this M. Regnault, the French
Minister, when he wished to see the Sultan, found
the door closed against him. Herr Karl Ficke, the
whole of whose correspondence was secured in 1914,
stimulated the zeal of his agents and incited them
to foster the ill will of the Maghzen. In spite of
her promise to stand aloof in political matters, Germany did not cease her efforts to circumvent the
Sultan, and, at the very time that she tried to
paralyse the effect of our theoretic agreement in
Morocco, she did her utmost to secure its extension to
other African regions. In this way she obtained from
M. Pichon approval of a project for a consortium
between the French Ngoko Sangha Company and
the German Cameroon. When the proposal met
with opposition from the Budget Commission in the
French Chamber, Baron von Lancken proposed to
the Quai d'Orsay to replace it with a railway from
the Belgian Congo to the Cameroons. In short,
after having wished to take the lion's share in
Moroccan affairs, Germany tried to assume a similar
position in the affairs connected with the Congo.
In the meantime disorders again broke out in
Morocco. The tribes in the north revolted against
90




Morocco and the Balkan Crisis
the Sultan's authority and advanced to the walls of
Fez itself, threatening the safety of the Europeans
there. On April 27, 1911, Muley Hafid, comprehending that he might be about to lose his throne
and that the Germans, after having made use of him,
had precipitated him into a dangerous adventure,
addressed a desperate appeal to France. Rendered
responsible by the agreements themselves for the
maintenance of order in Morocco, France could
not remain inactive. She took care, however, not
to take a step without informing Berlin of her
uneasiness and of her intentions. She scrupulously
informed Germany of the smallest drafts of troops
and of all her projected movements. BethmannHollweg, who had succeeded Prince von Billow on
July 14, 1909, raised no positive objection to the
projects communicated to him, but he promptly
gave M. Jules Cambon the impression, derived from
the Chancellor's studied reticences, that Germany
was finding the occasion favourable to claim colonial
advantages elsewhere than in Morocco.  Strictly
speaking, France ought to have ignored this and
quietly awaited for Germany to formulate her pretensions. We gave a renewed proof of our spirit of
conciliation, however, and spontaneously offered the
German Government to open " conversations" on
the subject. "Bring us back something from Paris,"
the German Foreign Minister, Herr KiderlenWaechter, told M. Jules Cambon when our ambassador was leaving Kissingen to spend a few days in
France. Ten days afterwards, without the slightest
warning, Germany sent the Panther to Agadir, and
she kept that vessel there during the whole of the
9I




The Origins of the War
pourparlers that took place between the two Governments. Germany thereby cast on the negotiations
the shadow of her sword and gave France the impression that she was forcing us to deliberate under
menaces. It was a curious way of preparing a treaty
that would, as we were told, clear away all misunderstandings between the two countries!
Of the pourparlers that preceded the signature of
that treaty everything has been told, and there is,
besides, nothing to refer to in them that is of interest
to our subject, except the fact that but for the support
given to France by England and Russia, Germany
would in all probability have sought to extend even
farther her violent methods. But whatever one may
think of the manner in which the negotiations were
conducted, and however one may judge the result, it
must be recognized that the treaty of November 4,
1911, satisfied neither France nor Germany. At
Berlin the colonial party and the Pan-Germans, who
had in recent years gained a good deal of ground,
protested vehemently against the abandonment of
Morocco and against the insufficiency of the compensations obtained in the Congo. In France the
cession of an important tract of territory to a people
who had taken two provinces from us and who had
wished to humiliate us by compelling us to treat with
them in front of loaded guns, left a painful impression
in the minds of the people. It was only after long
debates that the Chamber authorized the ratification
of the Franco-German agreement. Before the question of the ratification of the treaty came before the
Senate, it may be remembered, there was a Ministerial crisis, and the Cabinet which I was called upon
92




Morocco and the Balkan Crisis
to form, and which included MM. Briand, Leon
Bourgeois, Millerand and Delcasse,' did not find
easy the task of inducing the Upper Chamber to
ratify the new agreement and to assure its application. We were not kept waiting long before
Germany again made use of her usual methods
in regard to the carrying out of the arrangement
arrived at.
The Mannesmanns and Karl Ficke recommenced
their intrigues. They tried to persuade Muley Hafid
to reject the agreement which I presented to him for
the purpose of establishing a Protectorate. In this
they failed, and on March 30, 1912, the Sultan
signed the agreement that had been placed before
him.   Throughout the year there were endless
incidents, however, and every time that one occurred
Baron von Schoen brought it to the notice of the
Minister for Foreign Affairs. One day it was the case
of a German,who had quarrelled with his neighbours
over the question of water for his mill. Another day
it was an incident in which the German Government,
in spite of the treaty of November 4, had unduly
taken under their consular protection certain
rebellious natives, viz. Mohammed Hiba, Kaid
Guellouli and the Sherif Ben Hazzaoui. On one
occasion, when some thieves were arrested in the
Oulad Bessam douar, they were found to be partners
in the German firm of Renschausen.   Under the
pressure of the German Press the Imperial Government protested. I consented to refer the matter to
arbitration, preceded by a joint inquiry, in virtue of
1Translator's Note: In this Cabinet, which followed that of M.
Caillaux, M. Poincare held the posts of Premier and Foreign Minister.: j
93




The Origins of the War
Article 9 of the treaty. Germany immediately sent
into Oulad Bessam a dragoman named Schabinger,,who arrived with an escort of rowdies and gave it to
be understood that he had been sent by his Emperor
to settle the question as between the local Moroccan
and French authorities.
On another occasion Karl Ficke set up a claim
for compensation in respect of territory occupied
by French troops, territory of which he suddenly
claimed to be the owner. In this case Baron von
Schoen asked that the question should not be taken
into court, and it was settled, as a matter of fact, by a
friendly arrangement between the German Ambassador and a representative of the French Government
in consideration of substantial compensation which,was paid by France. The treaty, in brief, was the
cause of continual difficulties, nevertheless France
never ceased to display a patience, a coolness and a
forbearance which were assuredly a striking proof
of her pacific spirit.
Happily for Morocco, General Lyautey accepted
the post which I offered him of French Resident'
General;in the Sherifian Empire.  He speedily
restored order in the country. He was authorized
in February, 1913, to place himself in direct relations with the German Ambassador for the purpose
of trying to arrange litigious questions, but he was
nevertheless unable, before the war broke out, to
overcome the opposition of the Germans, and on
July 28, 1918, he was still writing to the Government
in Paris: " The hostility of Germany remains as
the governing principle of its policy in Morocco.".Although Article 12 of the treaty of November 4,. 4.                    94




Morocco and        the Balkan      Crisis
1911, stipulated that the Germans should revise the
list of their proteges, they obstinately refused to do
anything of the kind, and there is every reason to
believe that if Germany had not found the occasion
to have recourse to arms in August, 1914, she would
have recommenced in Morocco before long the
methods that brought about the Tangier and Agadir
affairs.  The documents seized on the premises of
Karl Ficke and some of his accomplices proved that r'
Germany was carrying on a permanent conspiracy
against France in the Sherifian Empire.
But the East offered the German Empire a much
more speedy means of playing the leading part of
which William II dreamed, and which should assure
him-in peace, if it were found possible, or in war,
if that proved more convenient-the definite hegemony of Mittel Europa.'      It will be remembered
by what artificial and unstable combinations the
Congress of Berlin claimed to have re-established
tranquillity in the Balkans. The Treaty of San
Stefano was torn up. The Great Powers arrogated
to themselves the right to cut up the disputed territories as they thought fit; Austria, which had taken
no part in the Russo-Turkish War, was egged on by
Bismarck to despoil Russia of the fruits of her
victory; Slav interests were deliberately sacrificed;
the Habsburg Monarchy was authorized by Article 25
of the Berlin Treaty to occupy and administer Bosnia
1See especially Les Origines de la Guerre Europeenne, by Auguste
Gauvain (Armand Colin, Paris); La Marche d la Guerre, by Jacques
Bardoux (Alcan, Paris); Les Auteurs de la Guerre, by Ernest Daudet;
L'Allemagne Auant la Guerre, by Baron Beyens; La Diplomatic de Guillaume
II, by Emile Laloy (Editions Bossard); L'Europe et le Jeune Turquie,
by Rene Pinon; La Monarchic de l'Habsbourg, by H. Wickham Steed,
translated by Firmin Roz (Armand Colin, Paris).
95




The Origins of the War
and Herzegovina as the manditaire of Europe and
to maintain a garrison in the Sanjak of Novibazar.
The interested populations were not easily induced
to accept such arrangements, which paid no attention
to their wishes, and for several years the resistance
offered by public opinion in the areas concerned did
not permit Austria-Hungary to consolidate its rule
over Mostar and 'Serajevo. She found herself in
those districts, in fact, in much the same position as
Germany occupied in Alsace-Lorraine.
There were thus existing, both in the west and
the east of Europe, two great injustices, two visible
attacks on the human conscience, two continuous
scandals, which vitiated continental organization and
weakened the supports of European peace.
The Dual Monarchy did not wait long, however,
before wishing to push its advantages further. In
the spring of 1897, when the Emperor Francis
Joseph went to St. Petersburg to repay the visit
which the new Emperor, Nicholas II, had made to
Vienna in August, 1896, the principle of the Balkan
statu quo was admitted by the Governments, but
Count Goluchowski first sought to obtain from Count
Mouravieff the consent of Russia to the annexation
by Austria of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Quos vult
perdere, Jupiter dementat. Austria did not understand that the more she violated the conscience of
the people the faster she precipitated the march of
events that must bring about her ruin. " For a century past," wrote Albert Sorel, " we have been
trying to solve the Eastern Question. On the day
when it is believed to have been solved Europe will
inevitably see the Austrian question brought for96




Morocco and the Balkan Crisis


ward."'  The question of Austria was all the more
inevitable from  the fact that the solutions which
Austria had herself given to the Eastern Question
had been contrary to the wishes and the liberty of
the inhabitants.
Austro-Hungarian policy still hesitated, however,
for some years on the road that led to the abyss. In
the month of September, 1903, the Tsar, accompanied by Count Lamsdorff, the successor of Count
Mouravieff, visited the Emperor Francis Joseph at
Schonnbrunn, and the two monarchs left there
together for Miirzsteg, in Styria, where the Habsburg family possessed a hunting-lodge. Here there
was drawn up in common a programme of cooperation which was known as the "Miirzsteg
Programme," the principal article of which concerned the nomination of Russian and AustroHungarian civilian agents who were to be attached
to Hilmi Pasha, the Inspector-General in Macedonia,
to watch over the carrying out of the reforms asked
for by the Christian population. On the initiative of
England this plan was extended and an International
Commission was given the duty of superintending
the re-establishment of order in the Balkans. Austria, however, never looked very favourably upon her
part in this internationalization.
In spite of the danger that her tete-a-tete with
Russia might sooner or later prove risky to the maintenance of peace, Austria saw in this policy a means
of maintaining her influence in the Peninsula and of
opening for herself a road to Salonica.
1La Question d'Orient au XVIIIme Sidcle, by Albert Sorel (Paris,
1902).
97




The Origins of the War
In October, 1906, when Baron Aehrenthal succeeded Count Goluchowski as Austrian ForJigJ
Minister, Austro-Hungarian diplomacyibecame still
more ambitious, more tenacious and, it is certainly
necessary to add, moreperfidious. At the beginning
of 1907 Baron Aehrenthal, who was a German from
Bohemia and very bold and hypocritical, came to an
agreement with Biilowv for the purpose of addressing
to the Russian Foreign Minister-at that time M.
Isvolsky-a proposal in conformity with fth-ewies
that had so often been expressed in Berlin and
tending to withdraw Russia from England and bind
her to Germany.   It proposed the formation in
connexion with Eastern affairs of a group consisting
of Austria, Russia, Germany and France. By this
means the Anglo-French Entente would have been
broken and the Anglo-Russian Convention, which
was to be signed on August 31, 1907, would have
been rendered definitely impossible.
The Russian Government, however, did not allow
itself to be seduced by the promises that were made
to it, and the project fell to the ground. Aehrenthal
affected nevertheless still to be interested in Macedonian reforms, and even in October, 1907, when
M. Isvolsky was in Vienna, the two Ministers drew
up together, apparently in full agreement, a programme for judicial reorganization in the Balkans.
Simultaneously Aehrenthal made a cynical offer to
the Porte, undertaking not to touch the organization
of Ottoman justice if Austria-Hungary were granted
the concession for a railway across the Sanjak of
Novibazar; and, as a matter of fact, when the conference of ambassadors met at Constantinople for
98




Morocco and the Balkan Crisis
the purpose of beginning the study of the question
of judicial reform, the Marquis Pallavicini, the
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, and his German
colleague, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, joined
hands in blocking the proposed reforms so far as
Turkey was concerned.
On January 28, 1908, Baron Aehrenthal blusteringly announced to the delegates that the railway
concession had been granted, that the line would be
constructed, and that Central Europe would soon be
linked up by a new route with Egypt and India. In
the House of Commons a month later Sir Edward
Grey stated that he could not help regretting the
singular method adopted by Austria-Hungary which
had obtained this personal advantage from the Sultan
at a moment when the whole of the Powers were
acting in common for the purpose of endowing the
peoples of the Balkans with an impartial and incorruptible judicial system.
Nothing, however, could any longer stay Austria
on the slope down which she was gliding. King
Edward VII and the Tsar met at Reval on June 9
and 10, 1908; and Sir Charles Hardinge (now Lord
Hardinge of Penshurst, British Ambassador in Paris)
having again outlined, with M. Isvolsky, the question
of Macedonian reforms, the Young Turks brought to
a head the conspiracy which they had been developing
for some time under the auspices of Germany.
On July 24 revolution broke out in Constantinople.
King Edward, however, as is known, after his visit
to Reval went to see the German Emperor at
Friedrichshof and the Emperor Francis Joseph at
Ischl. In these two interviews he endeavoured to
99




The Origins of the War
come to an understanding with the Triple Alliance
on the limitation of naval armaments, but he had to
leave for Marienbad without having any success.
Neither in Germany nor in Austria was anything
revealed to him concerning the designs of Baron
Aehrenthal and the seizure of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary.   In his turn M.
Isvolsky in the following September paid a visit to
Baron Aehrenthal at Buchlau, in Moravia, on the
estate of Count Berchtold, who was the Austrian
Ambassador to Russia, and at this interview the
Russian Minister unfortunatelyeieide that it would
be a skilful movqyfcalekate tiroe nAfIee-ttul
Monarchy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, provided that
Austria, on her part, pledged herself to support the
opening of the Dardanelles.  In M. Isvolsky's
opinion the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
was not to take place immediately, and he asked that
Russia should be informed of it in advance. From
Buchlau-M.- Isvolsky went to Racconigi, where he
had long conversations with King Victor Emmanuel,
the effect of which was to bring about very friendly
relations between Russia and Italy. On October 9,
1908, when he reached Paris, M. Isvolsky received
from Baron Aehrenthal a letter in which the Austrian
Minister announced that the annexation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina was imuinen.)
Some days previously, and a week after the interview at Buchlau, Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria
(whose secret connexion with Austria-Hungary was
only too plainly revealed during the recent war),
visited Budapest, where he was received as a king
or tsar, and from there he went to Vienna to confer
100




Morocco and the Balkan Crisis


with Aehrenthal. Was it by a mere coincidence that
on the eve of the day when the Ballplatz notified
Europe of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Prince Ferdinand himself began the proclamation of the independence of Bulgaria? It is
unlikely that this was purely fortuitous, for on
October 3 Count Khevenhiiller, the Austrian Ambas- 
sador in Paris, in announcing the annexation, added 
that the initiative of Sofia had advanced it by a day.
There is every reason to believe, therefore, that the >,
double operation had 'been arranged in concert and 
that it had, moreover, been approved by Berlin.  /
M. Isvolsky, 'of course, had the impression that
he had been duped by Aehrenthal, as indeed he had
been very effectively; but he had himself committed
the fault of bargaining with Austria and of desiring
to dispose of Slav populations without their consent.
In order to carry out the annexation Austria was
compelled to send large bodies of troops into the two
provinces, and, as the excitement extended to Serbia,
she mobilized on the frontier, which brought about
corresponding measures in Russia.
The Young Turk Committee, on the other hand,
attributed the proclamation of Bulgarian independence to Vienna, and suspended all commercial
relations with Austria-Hungary. Aehrenthal was
compelled to come to an arrangement with Turkey.
In January, 1909, he renounced the rights that the
Berlin Treaty had given to Austria in the Sanjak
of Novibazar, promised religious liberty to the
Mohammedans in Bosnia-Herzegovina, undertook
to pay compensation to the extent of ~2,500,000
(Turkish), and obtained in return recognition of the
IOI




The Origins of the War
annexation. But neyertheless the evil accomplished
was not lessened. (By proceeding to a territorial
incorporation against the will of the inhabitants, the
Emperor Francis Joseph had torn up a treaty sanctioned by an international congress; he had only
just missed bringing about war; he had violated all
the rules of the laws of nations; and he had also
rendered uneasy and irritated the patriotism of the
Serbs, who had from time immemorial considered
their neighbours in Bosnia and Herzegovina as their
brethren by race. He had, in brief, by the annexation of 1908, preluded the ultimatum of 1914. The
two acts were of the same inspiration; the first
explained the second, the second completed the first.
But agitation continued in Serbia. Under the
pressure of public opinion, the king constituted a
Cabinet composed of all the party leaders who had
an openly-proclaimed programme of resistance to
Austria. Austria herself did all that it was necessary to do for the purpose of keeping the excitement alive.  On the strength of false denunciations, she brought about a great criminal trial at
Agram, involving some fifty Serbs and Croats,
against whom it was impossible to put forward any
serious charge. These men were accused of having
fostered, both in the states of the Austrian Empire
and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, an immense plot with
the object of establishing a great independent Serbia.
It will be recalled that the whole of the documents
designed to furnish proofs of this imaginary conspiracy were manufactured either by the police at
Agram and Semlin or by agents who worked at the
Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade, under the
102




Morocco and the Balkan Crisis


orders of Count Forgach, who was found later on,
in 1914, among the counsellors of the monarchy and
among the draughtsmen of the ultimatum. There
was a question in 1910 of preparing what Austria
then called, and which she termed four years later
also, a repressive expedition.  If Serbia did not
solemnly accept the annexation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, she       be immediately chastised.
Austria was determined to have   C-jiusT as she was in
1914-an indisputable capitulation of the little kingdom  which had the -audaeity 'nt toTs t0 to be
subordinated to her. The Serbian Cabinet attempted
to appeal to Europe, but, as in 1914, the Austrian
Monarchy refused to admit that the question of the
Balkan nationalities could be allowed to assume an
international character. She intended to settle the
question alone, as she thought fit.
The attitude of Serbia, on the other hand, made
it impossible for Russia to ratify Austria's rapacious
act, and as Aehrenthal had not carried out the
promises of compensation which he had made to
M. JIsvl~yTTheiH ussa      reiMiri nte insidered himself freed from his undertaking. The
situation was so critical that war might have broken
out at any moment. Francis Joseph turned to
William II, and the Berlin Government immediately
instructed its ambassador in Russia, Count Pourtales,
to see M. Isvolsky and give him a warning which
Germany, by a delightful euphemism, described as
friendly advice. On March 23, 1909, Count Pourtales therefore declared to Russia that if she did
not recognize, without delay or reserve, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Germany would be
103




The Origins of the War
compelled to allow Austria to act in Serbia, 'whikh
would be war." Further, the German Ambassador
gave&tle  Russian Minister to understand that, while
the Austrian army would be occupied in the
s-ouithi Germany would take military measures for
the purpose of guaranteeing the security of her Ally's
northern frontiers. Simultaneously Dr. Friedjung
began the publication, in the Neue Freie Presse, of
a number of documents tending to show the collusion of the Serbian Government and of several
TV  Croatian politicians. The falsity of these documents
has since been proved.
Everything was ready for the performance that
was to be repeated in 1914. Before the German
ultimatum, however, the Russian Government gave
way. It recognized unconditionally the annexation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina; it accepted the
abolition pure and simple of Article 25 of the
Berlin Treaty, and it advised Serbia herself to yield
to Austria. Britain and France, who had not then
given their adhesion to the Austrian decision, could
hardly show themselves more Serbian than the Serbs
and more Russian than the Russians, and thus
indulgent Europe overlooked, without further
hesitation, a blow directed against European rights.
It was a fatal precedent which, by consecrating
injustice, was bound to encourage Austria to
recommence her dangerous policy and shortly render
inevitable the war which was believed to have been
avoided.
The events of 1914 must be examined in the light
of those events of 1908 and 1909. Germany and
Austria, who had been, the latter the author and
1I B M  -" -^^ ^




Morocco and the Balkan Crisis
the former theac-complice, in the rape of two provinces, jwho had  systematically  oppressed  the
consciences oTthe Jugo-Slavs, and who ha ideliberately exasperated Serbian patriotism, remained
bound together by their common responsibility, and
Europe, which thought it had avoided war by
capitulating, exposed itself, by its weakness and its
concessions, to fresh menaces and increasing peril.
On May 14, 1909, when the crisis was supposed
to be over, William II went to Vienna, and Francis
Joseph expressed to him the profound gratitude of
his country for the efficacious friendship that had
been shown to her by Germany. William I!justly
calculated, moreover, that gratitude would reduce
the House of Habsburg more and more to the rank
of "brilliant second," and in the following year,
when he made a further visit, on Sepember 20,
to the Austrian capital, he had no hesitation, in a
speech delivered in the Rathaus, in insisting on
the service which he had rendered to Austria (with
a fidelity worthy, he said, of the Nibelungen); and
wishing, according to his habit, to give a bellicose
flavour to his harangue, he added that he placed
himself "in shining armour" at the side of his
Ally.
Aehrenthal appeared to regard this ostentation
on the part of the benefactor as rather tending to
reduce the value of the benefit. In his speech to
the Delegations on October 13, 1910, he confined
himself to remarking negligently, with a certain
amount of chilliness, that "recent events have
demonstrated that our alliances have a real value."
The German    party in the    Austro-Hungarian


H


105




The Origins of the War
Monarchy refused to forgive Aehrenthal for this
independence  of heart, and when he died, in
February, 1912, and was replaced by Count Berchtold, he had lost all credit among those whose
instrument he had been for so long.
In the interval the Dual Empire was stirred to
its depths by the conflicting movements of its
various nationalities. More and more shaken by
reason of the ill-assorted nature of its component
parts, it found itself in the dangerous position of
those tottering states which have no other means of
re-establishing their equilibrium than those provided
by external diversions. Some of the Austrian
politicians suggested the establishment of a federal
regime, while others favoured the inauguration of
a threefold combination, in which the Slavs would
be given a greater share in the direction of common
affairs. Francis Joseph, however, was too old to
welcome either of these new modifications with much
enthusiasm, and things went on as they were; but
the most optimistic observers refused to believe that
these conditions could continue after the death of
the Emperor.
Pan-Germanism, at the same time, continued to
become daily more arrogant, and on April 5, 1912,
M. Jules Cambon wrote to me from Berlin:
The credit given to the Emperor in regard to peace
appears to be exhausted so far as the German nation is
concerned, and the officers are everywhere stating that
Germany must devote all her efforts towards the development of her land forces to an overwhelming extent.
1 M. Poincare was at this time Premier, and also held the portfolio of
Minister for Foreign Affairs.-Translator.
1o6




Morocco and the Balkan           Crisis
The British Military Attache at Berlin learnt
from a good source, and informed us of the fact,
that the annual rectifications of the German mobilization plan-which were usually distributed during the
month of April-had been ready since January and
had been communicated to the proper authorities.'
Francis Joseph himself entertained uneasy ideas,
which were reported to me by our ambassador at
Vienna, M. Crozier. "I estimate," the Emperor
said, " that peace has become much more precarious
during the last eight months." 2 Our Consul-General
at Pest, M. de Fontenay, gave me these not very
reassuring details:
Austria is dwelling on the partition of Turkey. The
occasion appears to be good for a new advance, which
would be into Albania, and from there through Monastir,
which is the road to Salonica. This is the plan of certain
Austro-Hungarian military men in Vienna. There is no
doubt they have given King Ferdinand of Bulgaria
promises in regard to Macedonia.  Rumania is being
deluged with amiabilities, and induced to expect the
Bulgarian quadrilateral.3
These previsions were confirmed by our representative at Sofia, M. Dard, who in his turn wrote
to me on February 24, 1912:
As the consequence of the death of Aehrenthal and the
advent to power of Count Berchtold, we may expect an
increase of audacity and renewed activity on the part of
the Hungarian agents. Is it likely that the officers belonging to the army of occupation in Bosnia and the
Austro-Hungarian agents in Belgrade will be forbidden to
1 Dispatch from the French Military Attache at Berlin, Feb. 9, 1912.
2 Dispatch from M. Crozier, April 25, 1912.
3 Dispatches from M. de Fontenay, February 22 and July 27, 1912.
107




The Origins of the War
continue their detective work and their insolent and provocative attitude towards the Serbs? Or that the consuls
and missionaries in Albania and Macedonia will be restrained from pursuing their dangerous intrigues against
the Turks?
During this period, in circumstances that are
still, so far as my own knowledge goes, a little
obscure, Bulgaria and Serbia, then Greece, and then
Montenegro, unknown either to France or Britain,
in turn entered into agreements signed successively
at Sofia on February 29, 1912, at Sofia on April 29,
1912, at Sofia on May 16, 1912, and again at Sofia
on September 22, 1912.
To-day it is no longer doubtful that the initiative
of these agreements was taken by Bulgaria, seeing
that M. Guechoff, who was Prime Minister at Sofia
from March 11-24, 1911, onwards, and who himself
signed all the agreements in question, has taken the
trouble to explain personally the manner in which
he conceived and prepared this Balkan Alliance.1
According to IM. Guechoff, the Cabinet over which
he presided wished at first, in 1911, to make a fair
trial of entering into good relations with Turkey,
but the effort failed owing to the policy of extermination pursued by the Young Turks in Macedonia,
and M. Guechoff felt the necessity for coming to
an understanding with the Serbs on a programme of
eventual co-operation. King Ferdinand of Bulgaria
was then on his way to spend some time on his
estates in Hungary. M. Guechoff followed him,
and had a long interview with him in the royal
train, between Oderberg and Vienna, during which
L'Alliance Balkanique, by Ivan E. Guechofl (Hachette, Paris, 1915).
o08




Morocco and the Balkan Crisis
William II's " brilliant third " gave his full approval
to his Minister's project. Backed by this encouragement, M. Guechoff left for Belgrade, where he
arrived on September 28/October 11, 1911. He
had an interview with M. Milanovitch, who accompanied him as far as Lapovo, and the two statesmen
discussed at length M. Guechoff's ideas as to an
alliance. M. Milanovitch looked favourably upon
the proposal, and expressed the opinion that once
the treaty was signed it must be communicated to
Russia, whose support he regarded as indispensable.
M. Guechoff raised no objecti6n to this suggestion
and returned to Sofia, where he found his Cabinet
very much moved by the announcement that the
Turks had begun to mobilize in Thrace against
Bulgaria.
' M. Guechoff then began, through the ordinary
channels, diplomatic negotiations with Serbia, which
he pressed forward as rapidly as possible, in the fear
that Italy, which was then at war with Turkey, might
sign peace, in which case Turkey would have her
hands free to attack the Balkan Powers. When the
treaty with Serbia was signed, M. Guechoff sent a
copy of it-and not until then-to the Russian
Emperor. This copy of the treaty was sent to
Livadia by M. Daneff, the President of the Bulgarian
Sobranje, who also went to St. Petersburg, where
he was received by M. Sazonoff, the Russian Foreign
Minister, at the beginning of May. Until that
moment, according to M. Guechoff's statements,
M. Sazonoff knew nothing whatever of the SerboBulgarian Convention. He recommended to M.
Daneff a prudent and considered policy, and told
109




The Origins of the War
him that an active intervention by the Balkan Allies
in Macedonia would not be regarded sympathetically
in Russia.
Some time afterwards M. Guechoff, to complete
his work, signed with M. Panas a Greco-Bulgarian
treaty of alliance, and during June Montenegro, in
its turn, by a verbal consent also entered the new
grouping.  M. Guechoff and other Bulgarians
who were in a position to know the facts affirm
that King Ferdinand, who was on the best possible
terms with the Austrian   Court, had kept it
informed from the beginning of what was in progress in connexion with the Balkan Alliance. It
is possible, however, that he did not communicate
to Austria the whole of the conventions entered into.
These agreements, on the other hand, were for a
long time withheld from the knowledge of both
Britain and France. They were very serious, and
it was possible they might lead to grave complications in the Balkans.
The first of these treaties, which was termed "a
treaty of friendship and alliance between the Kingdom  of Bulgaria and the Kingdom   of Serbia,"
pledged those countries mutually to guarantee their
political independence and the integrity of their
territory, and to offer mutual assistance if any one of
the Great Powers attempted to annex or occupy
any portion whatever of the Balkan Peninsula. To
this purely defensive convention, however, there
was a secret appendix, which contained clauses of a
barely dissimulated offensive character; it provided
also, in the event of troubles in Turkey or of
menaces merely, for an entente between the Balkan
I I




Morocco and the Balkan Crisis
nations, with a view to common action against
Turkey. The existence of this entente had to be
communicated to Russia; in the event of that Power
raising no objections to it, the entente would become
effective. Any increases of territory that might be
brought about as the result of the hostilities were to
be divided between the Allied States on bases that
were set forth in the treaty.  An area bordering
on Lake Ochrida was to be eventually attributed
according to the decision that might be arrived at
by the Emperor of Russia, who was to be asked to
act as supreme arbitrator. A  third convention,
which laid down the conditions under which mutual
military aid was to be given, provided that if
Rumania attacked Bulgaria, Serbia would immediately declare war, and that if Austria-Hungary
attacked Serbia, Bulgaria, on her part, would immediately declare war against Austria-Hungary.
Vague allusions to these conventions were made
in the Press of several countries a few weeks after
their signature, but neither Serbia, nor Bulgaria, nor
Greece gave France any information concerning the
agreements; and I am obliged to add that neither
did Russia, who, although she undoubtedly had not
inspired them, as Austria and Germany alleged she
did, had had them communicated to her by M.
Daneff, and also by her Minister at Sofia.
In practice, as I have said, the Russo-French
Alliance did not always work without difficulties, and
the task of ensuring the unity of the two policies
often demanded imuch care and patience. At the
beginning of 1912 the Cabinet over which I presided
realized that the bonds between the two countries
III




The Origins of the War
had become somewhat relaxed as the result of various
circumstances-divergence of interests between
French and'Russians in regard to railway concessions
in Anatolia; an international consortium which had
been formed in China for further railway exploitations, in which were included the United States of
America, England, Germany and France, but from
which, rather unfortunately, Russia had been excluded; finally, in addition to all this, the relations
between our ambassador at St. Petersburg, M. Louis,
and the Russian Government were a little cold.
M. Louis was a very good representative of his
country, conscientious, careful and experienced, but
he was in ill-health, and confined a good deal to his
residence, and he lived a very isolated life in the
Russian capital. He scarcely ever saw the Tsar,
whose ideas the French Government by this time
completely ignored and of whose personal influence
the Kiel affair had long ago taught us to be rather
doubtful. Further, there was a kind of incompatibility of temper between M. Louis and the
Russian Foreign Minister, M. Sazonoff, which had
caused the latter to complain of him to Paris, and
had led (M. Isvolsky to ask for his replacement.
After having heard M. Louis's explanations, we
maintained him at his post, but there subsisted a
vague uneasiness between the two Governments, the
cause of which we did not quite know and which it
was necessary should be dissipated in the interest of
the Alliance itself.
On the other hand-and there is no reason why
I should not say so-we were aware that, since his
differences with Aehrenthal, M. Isvolsky had not




Morocco and the Balkan Crisis
been looked upon very favourably in Austria, while
we in France ourselves were very far from approving
all his ideas. Finally, above all else, we were uneasy
from the fact that we had been given no information
about this Balkan Alliance, of which the Paris newspapers were unable to speak precisely, and about
which we were unable to obtain any information from
either M. Louis or M. Isvolsky. M. Fallieres, who
was then President, together with MM. Bourgeois,
Briand, Millerand, Delcasse, Pams, Steeg and all the
other members of the Cabinet over which I presided,
strongly urged me to pay a visit to Russia during
the parliamentary recess, and, as a matter of fact,
I went there during the month of August, 1912.
I discussed  with the  Emperor, with    M.
Kokovtzoff, who was then Premier, and with
M. Sazonoff those questions that had brought about
misunderstandings between the two countries, and
those which might be able to assist in strengthening
the Alliance: the question of our amnbassador, in
regard to which I supported the decision of the
French Government, the Chinese question, the
naval agreement, the Anatolian railways, and other
matters. One of my most important conversations,
however, as may be expected, concerned the Balkan
Alliances. I placed the details of all my interviews
on record in the form of notes, with which, on
my return, I made the members of the Cabinet
acquainted, and which are preserved in the archives
of the Quai d'Orsay. They are too lengthy to give
here, but they are of a nature to show what a huge
mistake was made by those who, on the faith of
statements by Austria and Germany, have reproached
113




The Origins of the War
French policy with having at any moment been
towed in the wake of Russia, and who have credited
M. Isvolsky with having exercised some kind of
occult influence on the French Government.     I
cannot, however, enter into all the details of these
matters in a series of chapters that are necessarily
limited in space, and I must reserve full reference
until I am able to include them in studies of a more
complete character.
For the moment let me confine myself to reproducing the summary of a conversation I had with
M. Sazonoff in regard to the Balkan treaties, which
I have taken from  notes made at the time, and
which are now filed at the Quai d'Orsay:
I asked M. Sazonoff for some enlightenment on the
Serbo-Bulgar and Greco-Bulgar Conventions. I did not
hide the fact that I was not quite able to understand
why these instruments had not been made known to
France by Russia.
M. Isvolsky told me he knew nothing of them, but he
gave me the assurance that their object was to maintain
the status quo.
It appears to be very unlikely that so much time was
spent in drawing up conventions that were merely designed to guarantee the status quo. It is probable that
the most important part of these agreements contains, in
reality, an eventual partition. M. Sazonoff agrees with
this.
He told me that he does not yet know the text of the
Greco-Bulgarian Convention, but that it does not determine any frontier line. He promised to communicate to
me the text of the Serbo-Bulgarian Convention, and the
map attached.
*       -*      *
Have again seen Sazonoff. He had with him the text
114




Morocco and the Balkan           Crisis
of the Serbo-Bulgarian Convention, which was in Russian.
He translated it to me, when reading it.  The only
mention of the status quo is in connexion with the
foreshadowing of the possibility that it may be disturbed.
Bulgaria and Serbia reciprocally undertake to try and
mobilize in concert. If the one believes that she ought
to mobilize, she will inform the other; in the event of the
other refusing to imitate her, she is able to ask Russia to
arbitrate on the question. Arbitration by Russia, moreover, appears in every line of the Convention.
One portion of the frontier, near Lake Ochrida, has not
been definitely settled. Russia will have the duty of
determining this when the proper moment shall come.
I pointed out to M. Sazonoff that this Convention in
no way corresponded to the description of it that had
been given to me, and that it was, as a matter of fact,
a war agreement, and that it not only revealed arrieres
pensees on the part of both the Serbs and the Bulgarians,
but that it was to be feared their hopes appeared to have
been encouraged by Russia, and that the eventual partition had been used as a bait for their covetousness.
M. Sazonoff admitted that the Russian Minister at
Sofia, when transmitting the text of the Convention to
St. Petersburg, had himself described the instrument as
a convention de guerre. But he explained that, as both
Serbia and Bulgaria have pledged themselves not to
declare war and even not to mobilize without the
approval of Russia, the latter will be able to exercise
a right of veto which will assure the maintenance of peace,
which she will not fail to do.
A  few weeks after this interview-on September 17-30, 1912-the Christian states in the Balkans
decreed in common their mobilization, without in
any way taking the veto of Russia into consideration.
We shall see how France at first tried to prevent
the carrying out of their decision and then to
I 15




The Origins of the War
circumscribe hostilities and stave off  a conflict
between Austria and Russia. In this pacific work
France was in daily relation with all the Powers,
but it was above all with Britain that she judged
it good to remain closely in contact, in view of the
fact that Britain, like France, was less interested
in Balkan affairs than was Russia.
In addition to this, on October 15, 1912, I asked
our ambassador in London, M. Paul Cambon, to
transmit to the British Foreign Office the information I had obtained in St. Petersburg.
On my return from Russia (I wrote to M. Paul
Cambon), the Director of Political Affairs gave you, with
my consent, but strictly confidentially, some information
as to the nature of the Convention entered into between
Bulgaria and Serbia.  As you are aware, it was only
during my visit to St. Petersburg that I obtained knowledge of the text of this agreement, which M. Sazonoff
communicated to me at my request under pledge of
secrecy. He added that he did not himself know the
clauses of the Greco-Bulgarian Convention. All that he
had learned, he said, was that it had been drawn up in
view of " an attack being made on International Law."
This vague expression did not tend to reassure me,
but the reading of the text of the Serbo-Bulgarian Convention itself rendered me still more uneasy, and when
I returned to France I was unable to conceal from the
Cabinet the serious anxiety it has caused to me.
Down to my first interview with M. Sazonoff the French
Government, in spite of repeated demands, had no idea
of the outlines of this document. We knew of its existence
only from allusions that were made to it by M. Isvolsky
in referring to the Bulgarian loan....
On April 10 our Minister at Sofia telegraphed that
M. Guechoff had asked M. Sazonoff to recommend to
ii6




Morocco and the Balkan           Crisis
Paris a proposal for a loan, and had asked him also to
" guarantee the pacific intentions of Bulgaria." As a
matter of fact, M. Isvolsky, on the date in question,
actually approached me in this sense....  On May 11
M. Isvolsky came to see me again, with a view to a Bulgarian loan of 180,000,000 frs. being quoted on the Paris
market. On this occasion he spoke to me, for the first
time, in veiled terms, of a rapprochement between Serbia
and Bulgaria. He congratulated himself on a result which
he spoke of as essentially pacific. He indicated at the
same time that Bulgaria had given St. Petersburg the most
formal assurances as to its European policy, and that she
might henceforward be regarded as attached to the future
of the Triple Entente.
The silence that was preserved as to the text of the
Convention, the news that we had received from the
Balkans, the questions themselves that were put to us
by M. Sazonoff as to the attitude France would take in
the event of the outbreak of a conflict in the East, determined us, however, to postpone for as long as possible
the conclusion of any contract for a loan, and fortunately
nothing had been decided on this point at the period when
I went to Russia.
When I obtained knowledge of the Convention, in M.
Sazonoff's cabinet, I could not prevent myself from exclaiming: "Why, it is a convention de guerre!" The
Russian Minister did not appear to be astonished at my
remark, and he even replied: " You are using exactly the
same expression as our Minister at Sofia when he communicated the text of this Convention to us." "But,"
I asked him, " how could you ask us to sanction it by
issuing a Bulgarian loan on the French market? " M.
Sazonoff replied by stating that the Russian Government
had not become immediately aware of the text of the
Convention, and that, moreover, when they did become
acquainted with it, they had not accepted the consequences
thereof.
117




The Origins of the War
I then summarized, in my letter to M. Cambon,
the essential conditions of the Treaty, as they had
been verbally explained to me by M. Sazonoff, and
I added:
To put the matter briefly, this Convention would
appear to have been entered into under the auspices of
Russia, and, in any case, it attributes to Russia, in the
present events and in those that may follow, an active
and preponderating role. M. Sazonoff and M. Isvolsky
have devoted themselves for some weeks past to allaying
the disquiet which the reading of this treaty has caused
me. They have told me repeatedly that Russia has not
adhered to the treaty, that she remains free to refuse the
position of arbitrator which has been offered to her, etc.
What is certain, in any case, is that she has known all
that was happening....
The fear of the serious developments which this Convention may result in has, to a very great extent, inspired
the steps which I have not ceased to take, in the interests
of peace, since I have realized the growing menace of war
in the Balkans. Up to the present, however, I have not
believed myself authorized to reveal the secret confided
to me by M. Sazonoff... 
I have to-day the certitude that a Russian deputy is
aware of the essential clauses of the treaty, and notably
those which constitute Russia as arbitrator. I informed
M. Isvolsky of this, and he did not appear to be unduly
surprised at this revelation. He said to me: " The Bulgarians have been hawking the treaty about St. Petersburg for the purpose of supporting their complaints
against the indifference and the inertia of the Russian
Government. "
M. Isvolsky admitted, further, that Austria herself was
now very probably informed of the facts, either through
some indiscretion having been committed or through
King Ferdinand having himself taken care to arrange some
counter-assurance at Vienna.
I18




Morocco and the Balkan Crisis


In view of all these circumstances, I do not wish to
assume the responsibility for leaving England any longer
in ignorance of a situation which may compel us tomorrow to combine even more closely our efforts for the
purpose of preventing the generalization of the Balkan
conflict.
I beg of you, therefore, to inform Sir Edward Grey
privately of the information which I have given you in
the above, on the meaning and the bearing of the SerboBulgarian Convention.
Without saying anything to him of my apprehensions,
please give him to understand that I do not in any way
cast doubts on the sincerity of the pacific intentions of
the Russian Government. MM. Sazonoff and Isvolsky
evidently did not believe that the rapprochement of the
Serbs and the Bulgarians might have the immediate effect
of bringing about the combined mobilization provided for
by the Convention....
When you saw M. Sazonoff in London he was still
convinced that war would not occur, and that Bulgaria
would confine herself to mere manifestations....
In short, in spite of the mistakes that have been made,
the Imperial Government remains attached to a policy
of peace and of the status quo, and it will be all the more
likely to continue to assume the same attitude if it finds
solid support in London and Paris. It would therefore
be extremely disagreeable if the British Government
should take the past mistakes very strictly into account.
I am, moreover, like yourself, profoundly convinced of
the necessity for maintaining, in the present circumstances, the bonds of the Triple Entente, and I have no
doubt that the British Government will entertain on this
point the same sentiments as yourself and the French
Government.
Thus, finding ourselves suddenly faced with a
situation for which France was in no way responsible,
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The Origins of the War
we took upon ourselves to refuse Bulgaria the issue
of a loan that might have been used for the purpose
of a war, and we did this with no other thought than
of assuring both the safeguarding of our alliances
and the maintenance of peace. It will be seen that
Russia, throughout the whole course of the later
Balkan crises, as after the Serajevo affair, certainly
associated herself with England and France in that
effort. She continued to regret the annexation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina; she was able to see,
with satisfaction, that Serbia, wounded by that act
of violence, drew near to Bulgaria and sought
moral support from St. Petersburg; she was able,
imprudently, to encourage the aspirations-after
all, legitimate ---of the Balkan nationalities for independence.  Nothing of all this was comparable
with the act of Austria in appropriating, through
the violation of a treaty, two Serbo-Croat provinces.
Moreover, as soon as there appeared to be a possibility of an Eastern war, Russia united herself with
Great Britain and ourselves, first for the purpose of
preventing a conflict, and afterwards in an effort to
limit it.


I20




IV


TIIE DRAMA AT SERAJEVO
W        IHILE I was in Russia in August, 1912,
Count Somssich, the    Austrian  Charge
d'Affaires in Paris, called at the Quai
d'Orsay to see M. Briand (who was acting as Minister for Foreign Affairs during my absence), and informed him of the uneasiness felt by his Government
in regard to the situation in the Balkans.  The
Cabinet of Vienna, he stated, wished to know if the
Great Powers would be inclined to enter into pourparlers with it " for the purpose of advising the Porte
to adopt a policy of progressive decentralization which
would furnish the Christian nationalities with the
guarantees which they might legitimately demand,
and for the purpose of adopting such a line of action
in regard to the Balkan States that they would await
peacefully for the results of that policy." In reply
M. Briand informed Count Somssich that: " The
Government of the Republic will examine with
interest the suggestions made by Count Berchtold;
and you may inform him that henceforward the principal aim of French policy in the East will be the
preservation of a general peace and the maintenance
of the status quo in the Balkans. WTe are glad, therefore, to find we are taking the same view as the
Vienna Cabinet." 
Telegram of M. Briand, August 14, 1912.
I                I1 I




The Origins of the War
I was informed of Count Berchtold's proposition
while at St. Petersburg, and it at once appeared to
me that it offered the advantage of giving Balkan
questions not a Russian or an Austrian character but
a European character. This was a new and important
fact in Austrian diplomacy. Since 1897 the Dual
Monarchy had always rejected any common procedure, as she again rejected it, unhappily for the
world, in 1914. In 1908, above all, after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Count Aehrenthal's
constant determination was to avoid the intervention
of third parties. On her part Russia had drifted into
a policy of isolation in the matter of the Balkan
alliances. This course of action of the two Powers,
whose rivalry had so frequently been evident in the
East, was evidently destined sooner or later to lead
to fatal consequences.
I went to see M. Sazonoff again and pointed out
to him that, in my opinion, the return of Austria to
the European Concert might constitute a pledge of
peace. He feared, very naturally, that Court Berchtold's proposition concealed some ulterior motive,
and he at first hesitated to give his adhesion to it. He
ultimately, nevertheless, took the same view as myself, and the whole of the Powers agreed to take part
in the exchange of views that had been proposed by
Austria. Count Berchtold, however, a grand seigneur and somewhat indolent, did not appear to be
in any very great haste to carry out his plan after
he had announced it. The Turks wished to be
first in the field, and promised reforms in Albania.
On receiving information of this the Serbs and the
Bulgarians became alarmed and complained that
122




The Drama at Serajevo
they had been tricked for the benefit of the
Albanians.
Montenegro mobilized. Who influenced her to
take this step? Certainly not Russia, for after my
return to Paris, on August 29, I received a telegram
from M. 'Georges Louis in which he transmitted this
proposal from M. Sazonoff:
Steps should be taken at the same time, both at
Cettinje and at Constantinople, in order to obtain the
simultaneous withdrawal of the troops massed on each
side of the frontier. M. Sazonoff hopes that this proposition will have our support. But, most of all, he is
uneasy about the Bulgarian attitude.  All information
that has reached him shows that the situation is becoming
worse, and he thinks it is necessary we should come to
an agreement without delay, with a view to common action
for the maintenance of peace.
On the same day I replied to M. Louis:
I agree entirely with M. Sazonoff on the necessity for
recommending calm at Sofia. I am renewing the steps
we have taken in this direction, and I am informing the
Bulgarian Government that, in the present disturbed conditions, our bankers will not be able to issue the loan,
which will have to be postponed. As to Montenegro, I
am demanding, both at Cettinje and at Constantinople,
the retirement of the troops from the frontier zone.
On September 3 I received a visit from the Austrian Charge d'Affaires, who thanked {me on behalf
of Count Berchtold for the manner in which I had
received his overtures, and who proposed that I
should request the Porte to extend to the other
Balkan nationalities the advantages that Turkey had
I23




The Origins of the War
promised to the Albanians. On September 5 M.
Louis again telegraphed to me:
I saw the Prime Minister, M. Kokovtzoff, yesterday,
and he was perturbed by the restless state of mind
prevailing in Bulgaria. " We have reached a very difficult moment," he told me. " During the present month
Bulgaria will have completed her military equipment; her
harvest will have been gathered, and she expects, further,
to receive the money from the loan." I reassured M.
Kokovtzoff on the latter point by informing him, as I had
already told M. Sazonoff, that you had last week given
the Bulgarian Government to understand that our bankers
would be unable, in the present disturbed state of affairs,
to agree to the issue of the proposed loan. The Premier
added that fortunately all the Great Powers appeared to
be animated with pacific intentions.
On September 6 there was another telegram from
M. Louis:
I saw M. Sazonoff last night. He told me that, after
having had read to him the last Austrian communication,
he had expressed to the Austrian Ambassador his satisfaction at the entire agreement of view between the two
Governments so far as concerned the necessity of maintaining the status quo, and for the Powers to act only in
concert.
On September 17 M. Jules Cambon informed
me in his turn of the pacific measures undertaken
at Berlin by M. Sazonoff:
M. Sazonoff has made known to the German Government the anxiety which the present attitude of
Bulgaria and Serbia is giving him. He gave expression
to the opinion that it is time the Powers should come to
124




The Drama at Serajevo
some agreement as to the means t th  n  hat should be adopted
for the purpose of localizing the conflict in the event of
its breaking out. Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter replied
that he was entirely disposed to adopt these views.
On the following day, the 18th, M. Isvolsky
laid before me, in the name of the Russian Government, a proposal which I at once forwarded to
London (in a telegram to M. Paul Cambon, dated
September 19), in the following terms:
According to a communication which has just been
made to me by the Russian Ambassador, M. Sazonoff
recently insisted to the Turkish Ambassador the necessity
for the Ottoman   Government to institute reforms
in Macedonia without delay, if it desires to avoid
serious complications. These reforms must guarantee to
the Christian populations (1) the security of person and
property, (2) equality before the law, and (3) participation in the local administration, in accordance with the
ethnological composition of the population. I have informed M. Isvolsky that I should be able to second M.
Sazonoff's initiative only if the British Government agreed
to act similarly, and if there was a probability that the
Governments of Vienna and Berlin were equally prepared
to support it.
It will be noted with what care the French
Government devoted itself to maintaining the
concert of all the Powers. I cite these telegrams
at hazard, out of thousands of others of a similar
kind, for throughout that anxious period there was
constant communication between Paris and London,
Paris and St. Petersburg, Paris and Vienna, Paris
and Berlin.
In spite of all the counsel that was given to them,
however, the Balkan States, more and more irritated
125




The Origins of the War
by the subterfuges of Turkey, followed the lead of
Montenegro and began to mobilize in turn. On
October 1, 1912, NM. Jules Cambon (French Ambassador in Berlin) confessed to me that the German
Government believed that henceforward war between
those States and Turkey had become inevitable.
Meanwhile M. Sazonoff, with increasing uneasiness, had left for London, where he had met Sir
Edward Grey, and had notified his arrival in Paris
for early in October.
Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter [telegraphed M. Jules
Cambon from Berlin on October 1] sees only one means
of localizing the conflict between the Balkan States, and
that is for the Great Powers to declare to all the belligerents that, after the end of the conflict, they will
consent to no territorial changes in the Balkans....
Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter referred again to the fortunate concurrence of circumstances that will enable Your
Excellency to see M. Sazonoff to-morrow. He hopes you
will seriously consider this proposition: c" If Russia agrees
to accept and will take the initiative of proposing a declaration relative to the maintenance of the territorial status
quo, I will do all I can to induce Austria [he remarked,
textually] to associate herself with Russia. I ask only
[he added] that this declaration shall remain secret, for
it is important that it should not reach the ears of
Austria." And the German Minister, who was then in
every way inclined towards peace, and who reposed, as you
will see, unlimited confidence in the French Premier,
added: c Let us hope that the danger of a general war
may be staved off. France can do a great deal, the consequences of which will go a very long way."
On the following day, October 2, M. Jules
Cambon, whom I had encouraged to press forward
126




The Drama at Serajevo
the  suggested  agreement, again telegraphed     to
me:
After having seen the Secretary of State this morning
I called on the Chancellor, who confirmed what Herr von
Kiderlen-Waechter told me. Russia and Austria, if they
take the step which has for its object the maintenance
of the territorial status quo, will be able to act in the
name of the whole of the Powers, including Germany.
Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg expressed to me the hope
that Your Excellency may be able to induce M. Sazonoff
to take the initiative which is proposed. It seems to him
that it is very urgent the declaration should be made, and
in his opinion there is not a day to be lost. Ile repeated
to me that he counted on the peace of Europe being
assured, thanks to your efforts.  The Norddeutscher
Zeitung will publish this evening a communique affirming
that the Great Powers are united for the purpose of preventing, or at all events of localizing, the conflict, and
expressing confidence that they will take no part in it.
In order that not a minute should be lost, I
begged M. Paul Cambon not only to inform the
British Government as to the German proposition,
but to see M. Sazonoff during his stay in London
and to ask his adhesion to it. M. Sazonoff declared
himself favourable, but reserved his definite reply
until he could see me on the subject. I immediately
informed M. Jules Cambon in Berlin:'
Although M. Sazonoff has decided to reserve his reply
until after his interview with me, I have reason to believe,
according to a telegram from your brother, that Russia
will finally agree, in the name of Europe, to exercise with
Austria energetic influence at Constantinople and in the
Balkans. In order to avoid loss of time, it would be to
1 Telegram of October 2, 1912.
127




The Origins of the War
the interest of all concerned that Germany should approach Austria at once and advise her against taking any
isolated initiative.
The permanent idea of France, therefore, was
not only, I repeat, to strengthen the European
Concert, but to prevent the Triple Entente group,
so far as the whole of the Powers were concerned,
from dangerously coming into opposition with those
of the Triple Alliance.
'M. Sazonoff arrived in Paris, and I had a long
interview with him on October 3.    I immediately
telegraphed to Berlin, to  I. Jules Cambon: 
I have had a conference with M. Sazonoff. Russia
agrees to take steps, either with Austria, in the name of
Europe, or with the whole of the Powers, for the purpose
of making the Balkan States understand that they (the
Powers) cannot consent to any breach of the peace, that
they have decided to maintain the status quo, to localize
the conflict, should any occur, and to hold out to those
states that have mobilized no hopes of any territorial
profit. At the same time M. Sazonoff remarked that in
his opinion these steps would have no chance of success
unless the Great Powers were disposed to favour the carrying out of reforms in the interest of the Balkan peoples.
I informed London at the same time, of course,
and I advised Sofia and Belgrade to act with
prudence.   My eminent friend M. Vesnitch, who
became Prime Minister of the Serbian, Croat and
Slovene Kingdom, and      who was then     Serbian
Minister in Paris, and M. Stancioff, who represented
Bulgaria in France, will certainly both remember
with what insistence I spoke to them, in the name
Telegram of October 3, 1912.
I28




The Drama at Serajevo
of the French Government, and I may state that
M. Sazonoff completely associated himself with my
views.
Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter welcomed with
pleasure the details of my interviews with M.
Sazonoff,1 and, having received from Vienna news
which he considered favourable, he again sent for
M. Jules Cambon,2 and expressed to him the fear
that the conversations between the Powers might
require too long a time.
He added [telegraphed M. Cambon] that he would
consequently be very pleased if your Excellency would
take the initiative (in order to act more quickly, as time
was pressing) by drafting exact proposals for submission
to the various Cabinets...  In the dispatch that Baron
von Schoen to-day sent to his Government, after the
conversation he had with Your Excellency, the German
Ambassador wrote that you had stated, textually, " that
the Great Powers would be able to take the execution of
reforms in hand." The Secretary was struck with the
expression " take in hand," which, he remarked, appeared
to him to be a very happy one, as it covered everything
without committing to anything.
In  accordance  with the   wish of Herr von
Kiderlen-Waechter, I drafted a formula, which I
forwarded to the Powers. On October 4 M. Jules
Cambon informed me that H-err von KiderlenXWaechter accepted it, but that he would have to
submit it to the Emperor, and on the following day
the Emperor accepted it in his turn. On October 6,
however, modifications in the text of the document
were asked for by Vienna.3  I replied immediately:
Telegram from M. Jules Cambon, October 3, 1912.
2 Telegram from the same, October 4, 1912.
3 Telegram from M. Dunaine, French Ambassador at Vienna.
129




The Origins of the War
M. Sazonoff and myself accept the modifications asked
for by Count Berchtold, both as a matter of courtesy
towards the Austrian Government and in the interest of
speedy action in favour of peace.
On the same day the Fremdenblatt, thereby
reflecting the attitude of the Austrian Government,
expressed its appreciation of the attitude of the
French Government by stating that: " By a prompt
and decisive initiative the French Government has -
once more furnished a proof of its pacific sentiments,
by setting itself with a zeal that deserves the gratitude of all to prevent a general conflagration."
I will not pursue this part of my argument
further, for I do not wish to inflict on my readers
the reading of a Yellow Book which has not yet been
published, but which will, no doubt, be sooner or
later issued to the public. What I wish to demonstrate, pending the publication of these necessary
records, is the spirit in which, from the first
moments, the French Government regarded the
Balkan crisis. The telegrams I have quoted prove
that from the outset we had the firm resolve to keep
in close and permanent contact with all the Powers.
I think I may say that, from the month of September, 1912, to the month of January, 1913, scarcely
a day passed on which I did not have long conversations, not only with the British and Russian
Ambassadors, but also with Baron von Schoen, the
German Ambassador, and with Count Scezsen, the
Austrian Ambassador.
Eventually, indeed, I was on very confidential
terms with the two latter-so much so that, some
months later, when I had become President of the
130




The Drama at Serajevo
Republic, they both expressed the desire of receiving me, in my new position at their respective
embassies. The ticklish regulations of the protocol
caused me to be faced with serious difficulties:
Could the Chief of State enter a house which, by
virtue of the fiction of ex-territoriality, stood on
German soil? I had no desire to let this scruple
stand in the way. We were at peace with Germany,
and I did not regard it as possible to push courtesy
too far. I therefore accepted the invitations of both
Baron von Schoen and Count Scezsen.
But let us return to our Balkans. It will be
remembered that, on October 8, at the moment
when everything appeared to have been settled, the
Montenegrin troops attacked the Turks. What was
the cause of this sudden offensive? It has often been
said that it was carried out by arrangement with
Austria, and the occurrences at Mount Loevcen
during the war of 1914-18 may, as a matter of fact,
have given ground for many suspicions. Let us
avoid hypotheses, however, and confine ourselves
strictly to the facts.
The events which occurred in the Balkans raised
many complicated questions that Europe had undoubtedly long anticipated, but had always sought
rather to postpone than to resolve. Traditional
French policy in European Turkey, as in Asiatic
Turkey, was based on the integrity of the Ottoman
Empire. The maintenance of the territorial status
quo, in fact, permitted eventualities that were full
of unknown quantities either to be pushed to one
side or postponed, and in these circumstances
matters remained in a provisional condition that
13I




The Origins of the War
one became accustomed almost to regard as
permanent.
The awakening, however, of long-suppressed and
daring nationalities, the faults of Turkish administration, the failure to carry out the promises of reform
contained in Article 23 of the Berlin Treaty, the
disorders and violences that were periodically renewed, the latent discontent that followed the
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina rendered
complications in the Balkans more and more inevitable. The war between Italy and Turkey had in
itself, owing to its prolongation, resulted in a hidden
fever and an ill-concealed agitation among the populations of the Empire. From   time to time the
world heard of sanguinary incidents that spoke
eloquently of a coming upheaval.
When we became acquainted, in the circumstances of which I have spoken, of the existence of
the treaties between the various Balkan States, we
first took every possible step to prevent a conflict.
Had there been only one chance in a thousand of
bringing about a pacific solution of the pending
difficulties, we should have failed in the most imperative of our moral obligations if we had not made
every possible effort to stave off a bloodthirsty war.
The Powers, on the initiative of France, succeeded,
at first, in combining their efforts for the purpose
of ensuring the carrying out of reforms in the
Balkans without bloodshed and without territorial
upheavals. The Allied States themselves, while
mobilizing, declared that the sole object of their
claims was the immediate accomplishment of the
reforms in question, and they had not at that time
132




The Drama at Serajevo
either conceived the hopes or won the rights that
were afterwards rendered possible by their efforts
and their sacrifices. The formula on which this
European agreement was based contained, therefore, nothing that constituted any surprise for them,
and, notwithstanding the fact that it was swept away
by the course of events, this co-operation of Europe
was not without its advantages, since it had the
effect, on the initiative of France, of bringing all the
Powers together in one united pacific demonstration.
War having broken out in spite of their efforts,
however, the only thing left to the European Powers
was to seek to localize the hostilities and to reduce
their duration. As we did not wish, as I have said,
to complicate the difficulties of the moment by a
systematic opposition of one of the great international groups against the other, we proposed to
all the Powers that, when the suitable moment came,
we should offer to the belligerents our collective
mediation. Further, in order to maintain daily cooperation between the Powers, we continued to
meet, and arranged for a conference of ambassadors to sit permanently. The British Government
proposed that this conference should sit in Paris,
but as Austria took umbrage at the personality of
M. Isvolsky, we went so far in our desire to be
conciliatory as to decide that the meeting should
take place in London, where the authority of Sir
Edward Grey exercised a fortunate influence on the
deliberations. It may be regarded as certain that if
the Central Empires, in 1914, had agreed to a
European conference being again convoked, war
might have been avoided.
133




The Origins of the War
The details I have just given demonstrate that,
while taking care to safeguard her alliance wvith
Russia, France preserved, from the beginning of the
Balkan crisis, the whole of her impartiality and
independence of judgment, that she never blindly
accepted the 'Russian theses, and that, on the contrary, she did everything possible with the purpose of
interposing amicably between Austria and Russia.
It is therefore unnecessary, in my opinion, to contradict an allegation that was published by the
Bolshevist Press in Moscow and reproduced in one
of the German White Books. Among the numberless telegrams examined at Petrograd after the
Russian Revolution, there were found two lines
with which an attempt was made to prove the culpability of the French Government. M. Isvolsky had
telegraphed to M. Sazonoff, on September 12 and
November 21, 1912, that the French Minister for
Foreign Affairs had declared to him that "if a
conflict with Austria should determine the armed
intervention of Germany, France would immediately
recognize the casus foederis and would not lose a
moment in fulfilling her engagements towards
Russia." The Bolshevist journals added, with a
certain amount of audacity: " There were neither
reserves nor warnings."
Although there is nothing to guarantee the
authenticity of a quotation which appears to me to
be very suspect, let us for the moment assume that
these two detached lines are textually exact. What
do they mean? That the Russian Ambassador,
anxious to know, as the Imperial Government always
was, whether any and every French Cabinet, in view
134




The Drama at Serajevo
of the instability of our Parliamentary regime, would
respect in 1912 agreements that dated from twenty
years before, had questioned me on this point in the
course of the serious developments in the East; and
that I had naturally replied to him, in the text of the
Alliance itself, that " if Austria wished to declare
war and Germany should support her, we should
fulfil our obligations."
How could I make use of any other expression?
And what moral authority should we have had over
our Allies if we had repudiated our engagements?
But I am certain that I on no occasion uttered a
word that would lead to the supposition that we
might in any case whatever go farther than our
engagements.  I am   equally certain that at the
same time I advised Russia to exercise moderation,
prudence and calm. The telegrams I have cited,
which include the two lines ascribed to M. Isvolsky,
demonstrate emphatically that, instead of French
policy having been coupled to that of Russia in the
settlement of Balkan affairs, it was France who,
in 1912, asked and secured that the whole of the
Eastern questions should take and preserve a European character.
As M. Gauvain has clearly shown, however, in
-his excellent work on the origins of the war, the
Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin, which affected for
an instant the desire to restrain the Balkan states,
were by no means annoyed when they found that
hostilities had been declared. They calculated on a
Turkish victory, and they hoped that the Serbs and
Bulgarians, speedily exhausted, would soon become
either a prey that would be easy to seize, or their
I35




The Origins of the War
convenient instruments.   They were disagreeably
surprised by the brilliant victories of Kirk Kilisse,
Kumanovo and Monastir, which enabled the Serbs
to reach the shores of the Adriatic, through Albania,
and to support the Bulgarian army under the walls
of Adrianople.
Austria, in her alarm, hurriedly armed herself.
In the month of October the Vienna Government
asked the Delegations for Extraordinary Credits,
which were immediately granted. The whole of the
Bosnian and Herzegovinian army corps were eventually mobilized. Over 100,000 men were concentrated at Serajevo, at Gravosa, and then in the
valley of the Danube, at a stone's throw from
Belgrade.
On December 18, 1912, the French ConsulGeneral at Trieste wrote:
The stoppage of the Balkan Allies and the resistance
of Adrianople have enabled Austria to pull herself together.  She has been able to mobilize and find the
necessary cash. The reserve of Russia, which she believes
to be neither ready nor disposed to undertake military
action, the belief of Austria that France will use all her
influence for the purpose of preventing a war which may
bring on a European conflagration, the attitude of
Britain, on whom she rightly or wrongly relies to favour
her pretensions, the exhaustion of the Balkan states, all
these factors have contributed towards rendering Austria
more exacting.
At the London Conference, as a matter of fact,
the Vienna and Berlin Cabinets did their utmost to
impose on Europe solutions that would be favourable
to their own interests and contrary to the aspira136




The Drama at Serajevo
tions of the Balkan peoples. Since Serbia had not
been beaten by Turkey, as they had hoped, it was
necessary that at least the fruits of her victory should
be taken from her.'
The Triple Alliance had    been renewed, by
anticipation, in the month of December, 1912. A
few weeks previously the German General Staff,
under the inspiration of von Moltke and Ludendorff,
had taken fresh military measures, which it judged,
it stated, indispensable for the purpose of assuring
to Germany " the influence which she must have in
the world's affairs." The proposals of the General
Staff were presented to the Chancellor, BethmannHollweg, during the same month of December.
They had been drawn up by Ludendorff and adopted
by the War Minister, von Heeringen. These proposals were ratified on January 1, 1913, by a superior
council of generals, which met at the royal palace,2
and they were submitted to the Reichstag at the
beginning of March. In order to strengthen her
military forces and increase her effectives, Germany
demanded from her taxpayers the levy of exceptional
taxation to the amount of 1,000,000,000 marks.
It was only after Germany had taken this
alarming step that the then Premier, M. Briand,
and after him his successor, M. Barthou, both in
association with the Minister of War, M. Etienne,
respectively laid before the Chamber and secured the
passage into law of the Bill establishing three years'
military service in France, a law which the leaders
1 See La Nouvelle Serbie, by G. Y. Devas (Berger-Levrault, Paris).
2 Dispatch from M. Allize, French Minister at Munich, July 10, 1913;
dispatch from M. Jules Cambon, March 6, 1913, and report on the Military
Law  proposals, April, 1913.


J


I37




The Origins of the War
of the French army, in view of the armaments of
Germany, deemed to be imperatively demanded in
order to ensure our national security. The announcement of the increase in the German army, the
apprehension caused by the Balkan crisis, the difficulties that had been raised in connexion with the
application of the Moroccan Treaty, the recollection
of the alarms caused by the Tangier, Casablanca and
Agadir incidents-all this naturally gave new life to
patriotic sentiment in France.
When the Germans pillaged the records of our
Belgian friends at Brussels, they noisily trumpeted
forth the statement that Baron Guillaume, in one
or two of his dispatches from Paris, where he was
then acting as Belgian Minister, thought he had
discerned a little chauvinism in certain manifestations of French opinion, which were in themselves,
however, very inoffensive. Baron Guillaume was a
worthy man, but a somewhat superficial observer
who, like a few other Belgians before the war,
believed in the pacific spirit of Germany. He had
not taken the trouble to consult his eminent colleague
in Berlin, Baron Beyens, who has since published an
excellent book of his recollections and who has so
ably set forth the evolution in mind of the Emperor
and his advisers.
Baron Beyens himself wrote from Berlin, on
October 18, 1912, to M. Davignon, the Belgian
Foreign 'Minister, that
The first effect of the Balkan crisis has been to bring
about a rapprochement between the Imperial Government
and that of the French Republic. Equally desirous to
see the conflict localized in the Peninsula and to avoid a
138




The Drama at Serajevo
European war, they have agreed to act in the same sense,
with their respective allies, Russia and Austria.  The
initiative taken personally by M. Poincare, with a view to
the re-establishment of peace, has received the approval
and even the praise of the German Press.
In the correspondence of Baron Guillaume
himself, moreover, under the date of March 3, 1913,
we find an opinion expressed by Baron von Schoen,
the German Ambassador in Paris, on the attitude
of the French Government. Baron von Schoen
complains to the Belgian Minister that public opinion
was excited both in Germany and in France, and
he adds:
This is all the more ridiculous in view of the fact that,
during the whole of the crisis we have gone through, the
two Governments have displayed the most pacific sentiments and have constantly supported each other for the
purpose of preventing conflicts from breaking out.
Baron von Schoen undoubtedly spoke in good
faith when, in paying his tribute to our pacific
sentiments, he spoke also of those of his own
Government. How could he explain, however, the
new military measures taken in Germany without
any provocation on our part?     How   could he
explain, further, the fact that a few days after his
conversation with the Belgian Minister, his Imperial
master, William II, went to Pola, to visit the AustroHungarian fleet, and to Venice, to renew to King
Victor Emmanuel his loudly expressed assurances of
his friendship?
The truth is that, at the moment when she was
voting her new Military Law, Germany was still
139




The Origins of the War
seeking to gain time. She wished to be able to arm
herself still more before risking her criminal adventure. When one reads the Memorandum which was
drawn up, with the help of data supplied by Ludendorff, for the purpose of securing from the Reichstag,
in March, 1913, the sanction of the new Military
Law, one finds the following revealing passages:
The people must be made accustomed to the belief that
an offensive war on our part is a necessity, for the purpose
of combating the provocations of the adversary.
Affairs must be handled in such a manner that, under
the pressure of powerful armaments, enormous sacrifices
and a critical political situation, the beginning of hostilities will be considered as a deliverance.'
The German people were schooled, therefore, to
the belief in an offensive war; but while awaiting
the favourable moment and the coming into force
of the new Military Law, General von Moltke
advised his Austrian colleague, Conrad von Hoetzendorf, to have patience, and on February 1 the
Emperor Francis Joseph himself sent to the Tsar
Nicholas II, by the hand of Colonel von Hohenlohe,
a personal letter, in which he proposed the simultaneous demobilization of Austria and Russia-a
proposition which Francis Joseph carefully avoided
renewing in 1914, at a moment when it might have
prevented all that followed. In February, 1913,
Britain and France both bound Russia to give, in
the interest of the general peace, a speedy and
favourable reply, and on both sides of the frontier
the troops were demobilized.
1 French Yellow Book of 1914 on the European War (pp. 10 and 11).
Ludendorff's article in the Deutsche Tageszeitung, July 17, 1919, on " The
French Falsification of my Writings in 1912, on the threatened War."
140




The Drama at Serajevo
At the time that Austria and Germany thus
appeared to be working in the interests of peace,
however, they were secretly manoeuvring with a view
to war.' On January 24, 1913, Enver Pasha, Talaat
Bey and Djemal Pasha seized the reins of power at
Constantinople. They were, as we now know, the
tools of the German Foreign Office. German influence had become sovereign in Turkey. On
March 20 the Austro-Hungarian Government sent a
comminatory Note to Cettinje, and, in order to
compel Montenegro to raise the siege of Scutari, it
gave its Adriatic fleet orders to anchor off the
coast of the little kingdom.
A few days later, according to M. Tittoni (in a
speech which he delivered at the Sorbonne, on
June 24, 1915), Austria manifested the intention of
occupying Montenegro, but found herself faced with
the opposition of Italy. On this occasion, also, the
Cabinets of Paris, London and St. Petersburg united
in support of a compromise which was of a nature
to satisfy Austria rather than Russia and the Balkan
states. They associated themselves with the pressure
brought to bear on Montenegro; and the Conference
of London, in spite of the fact that Scutari, owing
to the double-dealing of Essad Pasha, had fallen
into the hands of its besiegers on April 23, refused
to award the town to King Nicholas.
On May 30, 1913, peace was signed in London
between Turkey and the Balkan states, under the
auspices of the Powers. Serbia received part of
Macedonia, but on the Adriatic she obtained only
a port of entry. Salonica and Crete were definitely
I Take Jonesco, "Les Origines de la Guerre" (La Grande Revue).
141




The Origins of the War
awarded to Greece, while Silistria was recognized
as a Rumanian town. Europe accepted, with good
grace, all Austria's views as to the constitution of
an autonomous Albania, at the head of which the
Central Empires reserved to themselves the right to
place a prince of German blood, Prince William of
Wied, and which they dreamed of making, in the
future, a bulwark of Germanism.
Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador in
London, was pleased to bear witness, in his
" Memoirs," to the entire impartiality shown by
Sir Edward Grey, as president over the long discussions that ended in the signature of the treaty on
May 30; and it is certain, in fact, that it was the
moderation of Britain, Russia and France, day by
day, throughout the whole length of the negotiations, that paved the way to the re-establishment
of peace.
How did Germany recompense us for our efforts
in carrying through this difficult task? She seemed
to be anxious to try our patience by incidents of all
kinds.
On April 3, 1913, at 6 A.M., the Zeppelin
L.Z.16 left Friedrichshaven on a trial voyage, carrying a commission consisting of three officers whose
duty it would be to take over the airship from the
constructors. Between 8 and 9 in the morning
the Zeppelin crossed the French frontier and
travelled over French territory in the neighbourhood of Belfort.  For a period of six hours it
traversed the departments of the Haute-Saone, the
Vosges and the Meurthe-et-Moselle. Having no
more ballast or motor spirit, the vessel's voyage
142




The Drama at Serajevo
came to an end at 2 o'clock in the afternoon,
when it came down on the manoeuvre ground at
Luneville.
This aerial voyage was in every way suspect, and
it enabled the German officers on board to make
observations freely throughout the whole morning.
The German commander, Captain Georg, however,
was allowed to inform Baron von Schoen, by telegram, of the landing of the airship, and the local
authorities placed 150 men of the Luneville garrison
at the disposal of the pilot in order to ensure the
safe anchorage of the Zeppelin. One of the French
express trains was stopped in order that a railway
wagon sent from Oosbaden with tubes of compressed
hydrogen might be attached to it, and we allowed
the airship to return to Germany under its own
power.
The French authorities, in a word, behaved in
such a chivalrous manner that the German Government at first felt compelled to express its gratitude
to them publicly. The dirigible had scarcely got
back to its hangar, however, than the German Press
opened an attack on the French officials and troops
and on the inhabitants of Luneville, who, it was
asserted, had been lacking in courtesy towards the
German officers. The German Government accepted
these calumnies as true, and Baron von Schoen, with
the stormy weather expression on his features which
he invariably assumed on such occasions, called at
the Quai d'Orsay to make formal complaints. He
complained of alleged difficulties that had been
placed in the way of the captain and the pilot of the
Zeppelin in connexion with telegraphic communica143




The Origins of the War
tions, of measures that had been taken to keep the
crew at a distance from their airship, and of insulting inscriptions that had been pencilled on the car
of the vessel by spectators.
Before the French Government had time to verify
these allegations a fresh incident occurred at Nancy,
on April 13. Two parties of German tourists had
gone into the capital of Lorraine for the day, and
one of them became involved in a dispute with a
newspaper seller. The other party, which included
an opera singer, went in the evening to the casino,
and behaved so noisily at dinner that they were called
to order by some students. When the casino closed,
the Germans were making their way to the station,
to take the night train home, when their singing
and shouting drew down upon them the attention
of some of the inhabitants, who followed them to
the station. This manifestation was certainly out of
place, and it ended with an exchange of fisticuffs,
fortunately without gravity. The experience of the
foreign visitors was annoying, perhaps, but they
appeared to have rather brought it upon themselves,
and in any case the worst damage suffered by them
was limited to the loss of a hat.
Nobody could have believed that such a squabble
would have been magnified into the importance of an
historic event. The German Press, however, was on
the watch, and made it the immediate excuse for a
violent campaign against France. On the following
day, April 15, Herr von Richtofen brought the affair
before the attention of the Reichstag. Without
waiting for any confirmation of the fantastic details
published by the reptile Press, the German Foreign
I44




The Drama at Serajevo
Minister, Ierr von Jagow, expressed himself very
strongly against the behaviour of the French at
Nancy.
While the German Government appeared to be
showing every desire to aggravate the incident as
much as possible and to elevate a street brawl to the
importance of an international conflict, the French
loyally proceeded to make an official inquiry into the
affair, as the result of which two police officers were
dismissed and the local chief commissary and the
special commissary were removed elsewhere. The
French Government, moreover, went so far as to
dismiss the Prefect of the Department of Meurtheet-Moselle, the highest administrative official of the
region. Was it possible to show more clearly to
France, to Germany and the world at large the
intention of the Government of the Republic to
impress upon every administrative official, by imposing exceptionally severe disciplinary measures, the
duty of maintaining good and neighbourly relations
between Germany and ourselves?
I may be allowed to add, perhaps, that at the
same period the President of the Republic himself,
in his desire to see that France did not place herself
in the wrong, sought to maintain relations of
irreproachable courtesy with the German Emperor.
On March 5, after the Heligoland catastrophe, I
sent this telegram:
I have learned of the terrible catastrophe that has
plunged the Imperial Navy into mourning. I wish to
express to your Majesty my deepest condolences, and to
assure you of my sympathy with the families of those who
have perished in the performance of their duty.
I45




The Origins of the War
The Emperor replied on the following day from
Berlin:
Deeply appreciative of the sympathy which you have
been good enough to express on the occasion of the terrible
catastrophe at Heligoland, I beg of you, Monsieur le
Pr6sident, to accept my sincere thanks, as well as those
of the German navy.         (Signed) WILLIAM I.R.
On May 23, 1913, again, a telegram was sent
to the Emperor for the purpose of offering congratulations on the occasion of the marriage of the
Princess Victoria Louise. On June 15, further, the
Emperor celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of
his accession to the Throne. The President of the
French Republic sent the following telegram:
At the moment when your Majesty celebrates the
twenty-fifth anniversary of your accession to the Throne,
I beg of you to accept, with my sincere congratulations,
my best wishes for yourself personally and for the Imperial
and Royal Family.           (Signed) R. POINCARE.
The Emperor replied:
Very appreciative of your kindly thoughtfulness, I beg
of you, Monsieur le President, to accept my most sincere
thanks for the congratulations and good wishes which
you have been good enough to express on the occasion of
my jubilee.                 (Signed) WILLIAM I.R.
On September 11, 1913, during a visit which I
was making in the Limousin district of France, I
was informed of the loss of a Zeppelin near Heligoland, and from the camp at Courtine I sent the
Emperor an expression of my sympathy. He again
thanked me effusively.
146






The Drama at Serajevo
Five days afterwards the German Military
Attache in Paris, Major (afterwards General)
Winterfeld-who was sent by the Reichstag, at
the time of the armistice, as one of its parliamentaires to Marshal Foch-fell a victim     to an
automobile accident, when following the French
army manceuvres.    He was transported to Grisolles, where he occupied a room at the house of
one of the inhabitants, who had kindly offered
him hospitality. I was myself following the
manoeuvres, and I went immediately to Major
Winterfeld's bedside. Knowing that he was much
liked by the Emperor, I hastened to inform the
latter of his condition, and I telegraphed as follows:
Grisolles, September 16.
I have just been to see Major Winterfeld, after the
unfortunate automobile accident which occurred to him
while following the manoeuvres. I have great pleasure
in informing your Majesty that the opinion of the doctors
is favourable, and that his condition has already appreciably improved. Some contusions and bruises have
been ascertained, but no fractures.  I was able to
converse with him for some minutes without causing him
to feel any fatigue. I beg your Majesty to accept my
compliments.                         R. POINCARA.
Grisolles, September 17.
I sincerely regret to inform your Majesty that during
the night the doctors have realized that the condition of
Major Winterfeld is much more serious than was at first
believed. They have diagnosed a fracture of the pelvis,
which will necessitate a surgical operation. Madame von
Winterfeld has been informed of the accident and is now
at her husband's bedside.            R. POINCARA.
147




The Origins of the War
The Emperor, who was at Cadinen, replied as
follows:
On arriving here I received the two telegrams which
you so kindly forwarded to me in regard to the condition
of Major Winterfeld.  Unhappily the second message
destroyed the favourable hopes to which the first telegram
gave birth. The accident appears to be somewhat serious.
Very touched by all the kindness which you have shown
to the patient and of the warm sympathy to which you
have given expression on this occasion, I beg of you,
Monsieur le President, to accept my deepest and most
sincere thanks.                     WILLIAM I.R.
The major's injuries, as a matter of fact, were
serious, and he lay for several months at Grisolles,
where he was devotedly cared for by the French
doctors.
It is evident, therefore, that the French Government allowed no occasion to pass without giving
evidence of the spirit of concord that animated it
in regard to Germany. What, on the other hand,
was the attitude of Germany?   She celebrated with
ostentation the centenary of the battles of 1813, and
the Emperor himself addressed bellicose speeches to
his army. " We shall go into the conflict," he said
on one occasion, "with joy and with confidence in
our hearts."   And what did Austria do?       She
sought, with the support of Germany and the complicity of King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, to rekindle
in the Balkans the war we had had so much difficulty
in extinguishing.'
During the night of June 29-30 Ferdinand gave
General Savoff orders to attack the Serbian army
1 See Bardoux, La Marche d la Guerre, chap. 4 (La Reprise de I'izcendie
balkanique).
148




The Drama at Serajevo
on the Vardar. On July 10 Rumania, in her turn,
opened hostilities against Bulgaria; and, seeing the
Christian nations thus divided, the Germanophil
Government at Constantinople hastened to throw its
troops against Adrianople and Thrace. M. Daneff,
who had succeeded M. Guechoff as Bulgarian
Premier, has always insisted that he remained totally
ignorant of this unexpected resumption of the war,
while General Savoff, on his part, declares-and his
statement has never been denied-that he acted
under written orders from  the King.   The fact
appears to be established that before attacking
Serbia, his ally of the day before, Ferdinand of
Coburg received from Austria-Hungary, then allied
with Rumania, an assurance that the King, Carol I
of Hohenzollern, would come to his help in consideration of the promise of the Danubian Quadrilateral.
Austria had felt confident that this co-operation
between Rumania and Bulgaria would result in the
overthrow of Serbia. In May prior to the outbreak
of hostilities, the Vienna Government had directed its
Minister at Bukarest, Prince Fiirstenberg, to inform
King Carol's Government that, in the event of
war breaking out between Bulgaria and Serbia,
Austria-Hungary would openly take the part of
Bulgaria against Serbia, and would, if necessary,
defend Bulgaria by force of arms. In the absence
of the Rumanian Foreign Minister, M. Majoresco,
this communication was received by M. Take
Jonesco, who was then Minister of the Interior,
and he gave the communication (as he has himself
narrated)1 such a chilly and discouraging welcome
1 See Jonesco's Journal, La Roumanie, also the Serbian Grey Book.
149




The Origins of the War
that Prince Firstenberg did not venture to repeat
the statement to M. Majoresco.
Far from joining with Bulgaria, however,
Rumania shook off Austrian tutelage. She certainly mobilized, but against Bulgaria. The
Austrian Foreign Office tried to stop her, and to
keep her chained to the Triple Alliance by offering
her a rectification of her frontier to the south of
Silistria and an increase of territory at the expense
of Serbia, but the attempt proved vain. Rumania
found by instinct her natural road, and King Carol
compelled himself to bow to the wishes of his people,
who refused to be involved in a plot against Serbia.
Left to look after himself, King Ferdinand was
caught in his own trap: he attempted to overthrow
the Serbs, but was himself defeated by them.
Austria-Hungary immediately sought other
means to accomplish her unchanging designs. At
the moment when the second Balkan War was
brought to an end by the signature of the Treaty
of Bukarest, Austria addressed herself to Germany
and Italy, and told them plainly that she intended
to take action herself against Serbia. This cynical
project, which is in itself sufficient to condemn
the Dual Monarchy and to explain in advance its
abominable conduct in 1914, was revealed to the
Italian Chamber by M. Giolitti, on December 5,
1914. Now, in the month of August, 1913, the
Serajevo murders had not taken place; Austria had
therefore no pretext for wishing to annihilate Serbia.
Here, however, is what Marquis San Giuliano telegraphed to M. Giolitti on August 9, when the latter,was at the head of the Italian Government:
I 5




The Drama at Serajevo
Austria-Hungary has communicated to us, as well as
to Germany, her intention of acting against Serbia, and
she depicts this as a defensive action, hoping to apply to
the Triple Alliance the casus foederis, which I believe to
be inapplicable. I am trying to act in concert with Germany with a view to prevent this Austrian action, but it
may be necessary for us to say plainly that we do not
regard this contingent action as a defensive matter, and
that consequently we do not regard the casus foederis as
existent. I shall be glad if you will telegraph to me in
Rome if you approve of this.
It is clear, therefore, that in August, 1913,
Austria wished to declare war against Serbia because
Serbia, instead of having been beaten by Bulgaria,
had proved victorious; and in order to try and
justify the aggression which she meditated, AustriaHungary asked Germany and Italy: "Do you agree
with me that, if I attack Serbia, I shall be making
only defensive war, and are you prepared, consequently, to come to my help as provided by the
Triple Alliance?"
Here is the reply that was made, with much good
sense and shrewdness, by M. Giolitti:
If Austria acts against Serbia, it is evident that the
casus Jcederis does not exist. She will be undertaking
action on her own account. It would not be a question
of defensive action, since nobody seeks to attack her. It
is necessary that this should be set before Austria in the
most formal manner, and it is to be hoped that Germany
will take steps to dissuade Austria from this perilous
adventure.
" It is to be hoped! "  M. Giolitti was evidently
a little sceptical as to Germany's disposition. He
was, at that period, better informed on this point
I5I




The Origins of the War
than ourselves.  We, however, had at any rate
commenced to receive disquieting information concerning the attitude of the Imperial Government.
On September 5, 1913, we learned that the lists
of men of Ibetween thirty and forty-five years of age,
who could be mobilized, were being distributed at
Mulhausen, a measure that had not been taken since
1871. Our consul at Basle, moreover, informed us
that at Kirchen, a commune in the Duchy of Baden,
on the borders of Switzerland, similar lists had been
distributed to the Landsturm.
German diplomacy, nevertheless, succeeded in
obtaining yet another concession from the Triple
Entente. Taking advantage of the embarrassment
into which Bulgaria had been thrown, the Turks had
reoccupied Adrianople.  Germany, who wished at
any price to spare Constantinople, insisted to
Britain, Russia and France that Turkey should be
allowed to retain Adrianople, Demotika and Kirk
Kilisse, a skilful manoeuvre which, by turning Bulgaria away from the Bosphorus, threw her back on
Serbia and laid the foundation for a future TurcoBulgarian Alliance, under the auspices of the Central
Empires.'
Bulgaria has signed peace with Turkey [said the
Kolnische Zeitung on October 7], not only for the purpose of bringing the war to an end, but in order to find
at Constantinople support in a common cause.  It is
impossible that treaties so poverty-stricken as those of
London and Bukarest can bring about a durable peace
in the East. Austria, which has every reason to be discontented with the result of the war, must seek more
See Gauvain (already cited).
I52




The Drama at Serajevo
than ever to exercise her influence at Sofia. What will
the attitude of Germany be? All we have to do in the
East is to support the policy of Austria.
It becomes more and more evident how 1913
throws light on 1914.1
On October 17, 1913, there was a fresh alarm.
The Albanians, undoubtedly under the influence of
Austria, renewed their incursions into Serbia. They
were driven back, and in pursuing them the Serbian
troops momentarily passed beyond the frontiers fixed
by the London Conference. It became the duty of
Europe to take up the matter and settle the difficulty,
but Austria declined to accept this view and wished
to act alone and after her own fashion. On her own
authority and with the approval of Berlin she sent an
ultimatum to Belgrade. Serbia, however, immediately gave way, and on this occasion Austria did
not dare go farther.
A few days afterwards the King of the Belgians,
who was visiting at Luneburg the German dragoon
regiment of which he was the honorary colonel, went
to Potsdam, where he met the German Emperor and
General Moltke, the Chief of the German General
Staff. His Majesty was so struck with the language
used by them that before leaving for Brussels he
authorized Baron Beyens, the Belgian Minister at
Berlin, to inform M. Jules Cambon confidentially as
to what had occurred at this important interview.
The King had up to then shared the common opinion
as to the influence that William  II continued to
exercise in favour of peace. He now found, how1 See L'Autriche a Voulu la Grainde Guerre, by Pierre Bertrand (Bossard,
1916); Ernest Denis, La Grande Serbie; H. Wickham Steed, L'Angleterre
et la Guerre.


K


I53




The Origins of the War
ever, that the Emperor entirely shared the ideas of
the German military party, that he complained,
against all semblance of the truth, of the state of
mind in France, and that he proclaimed war as inevitable and fast approaching.
What reason [wrote Baron Beyens] had the German
Emperor for this pessimistic conviction, which impressed
his Royal visitor all the more in view of the fact that
the belief in the monarch's pacific sentiments had not
yet weakened in Belgium? It was that France herself
wanted war, and that she was arming rapidly with this
intention, as was shown by the voting of the law on three
years' military service. William II believed himself, at
the same time, assured of victory.
And Baron Beyens continued:
The Belgian sovereign, who was better acquainted with
the real disposition of the French public and the French
Government, vainly tried to enlighten the Emperor.
On November 6 King Albert had another conversation with General von Moltke, who expressed
himself in similar terms to those used by the Emperor
in regard to France, affirmed the necessity for war
in the near future, and insisted still more strongly on
the certainty that Germany would be victorious.
What [asks Baron Beyens] was the object of these
confidences? It is not difficult to guess. They constituted an invitation to the Belgian King, in face of the
danger overhanging Western Europe, to throw himself into
the arms of the stronger-arms ready to open for the
purpose of clasping Belgium, and then strangling her!
1 L'Allemagne Avant la Guerre (Van Oest et Cie.). See French Yellow
Book, dispatch from M. Jules Cambon, November 22, 1913.
I54




The Drama at Serajevo
This new attitude of the Emperor, which showed
itself at the very period when, at Zabern, some of
his chosen officers were guilty of molesting inoffensive Alsatians, found occasion to manifest itself a few
days later in the East. In the month of December
a German Military Mission took up its quarters on
the banks of the Bosphorus, and its commander,
General Liman von Sanders, was placed at the head
of the Constantinople Army Corps, and then, as the
result of some observations by Russia, placed in a
post which still kept him in the near neighbourhood
of the Straits-for he was nominated InspectorGeneral of the Turkish army with the rank of
Marshal. At the same time, on the instigation of
Germany, Turkey purchased a warship and ordered
two others, while the new War Minister, Enver
Pasha, cashiered all officers who were reputed to be
impervious to German influence.
Faced with all these disturbing symptoms, France
remained, it must be understood, all the more
faithful to her pacific policy. M. Doumergue, who
succeeded to power on the fall of the Barthou
Cabinet, even gave Germany fresh pledges of French
good will. Pourparlers regarding the Asia Minor
railways and the Bagdad railway had been going on
in the most conciliatory spirit. M. Sergent, the
deputy governor of the Bank of France, and M.
Henri Ponsot, one of our consuls, who had been
sent to Berlin by M. Stephen Pichon and who had
arrived at the German Foreign Office a few days
after the conversation between the Emperor and the
King of the Belgians, entered into relations with
Herr von Rosenberg, of the German Foreign Office,
rI55




The Origins of the War
Herr von Radowitz, Counsellor of Embassy, and
Herren Gwinner and Helfferich, of the Deutsche
Bank. M. Jules Cambon, on his side, had conversations with Herr Zimmermann and, in spite of a multitude of difficulties raised by the German delegation,
the two groups, on February 9, 1914, arrived at an
agreement. This agreement, however, was not
arrived at without the Chancellor and the Emperor
himself taking advantage of the occasion to make
some strangely impatient statements to M. Jules
Cambon and the French delegates. " The German
people," said the Chancellor, " has need for expansion; Germany wants her place in the sun."1
" Arrange the matter, and above all without delay,"
the Emperor peremptorily declared.2
A few weeks later one of the secretaries of Prince
Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador in London,
returned from Vienna, where he had been on a
holiday. On his return he confided to his chief that
the German Ambassador in Vienna, Herr von
Tschirscky, had declared to him   that war was
imminent.3
Decidedly, and well before the crime of Serajevo,
there was not only a gradual acceptance but a premeditated search for a bloody solution. The aged
Austrian Emperor little by little yielded to the same
evolutionary trend as William II. In the month of
May Marquis Pallavicini, the Austrian Ambassador
at Constantinople, was received in audience by his
Emperor. The monarch, like his German ally, believed war to be inevitable. " The Central Powers,"
1 Dispatch from M. Jules Cambon, February 28, 1914.
2 Minutes of the fourteenth meeting of the delegates, February 5, 1914.
3 Memoirs of Prince Lichnowsky.
i56




The Drama at Serajevo
he said, " cannot accept the Treaty of Bukarest as
definitely settling the Balkan questions, and nothing
but a general war can bring about a suitable solution."  Marquis Pallavicini himself reported the
statements made at this interview to Mr. Morgenthau, the United States Ambassador at Constantinople, who has placed it on record in his
Memoirs.1  But there is even better proof than
this. There is, as we shall see, the direct confession
of Francis Joseph himself.
Austria was called upon to suffer, to speak
candidly, an unpleasant experience and a blow to
her amour-propre. Prince William of Wied, whom
she had succeeded in inducing the Powers to place
upon the throne of Albania, and who had received
from both Paris and London the most courteous
welcome, had committed stupid blunders in his
methods of government and had been expelled in the
month of May by the Albanian authorities. The
German Emperor at once thought fit to come to an
arrangement in regard to Eastern affairs with the
Austrian Heir Presumptive, the Archduke Francis
Ferdinand, whom he had for some time made his
confidant in ordinary and whom he had then recently
met at Miramar. Another meeting was arranged for
June 12 and, as " the curiosity of the public and the
interest of diplomacy were excited by these evidences
of a friendship that was too intimate not to be disquieting,"2 it was announced that the Archduke
wished to show his Imperial friend the rose gardens
on his favourite estate at Konopischt, in Bohemia.
1 French translation, pp. 83-8-1.
2 Baron Beyens (already qluoled).
'57




The Origins of the War
This, at any rate, is the explanation Herr von Jagow
persisted, down to 1919, in giving in his book,
Ursachen und Ausbruch des Weltkrieges.     It is
probable, however, that while admiring the roses
Archduke and Emperor exchanged ideas.
The   German   Ambassador    in  Vienna,  M.
Tschirscky, sent the Chancellor a report which in
no way treated of horticulture, and which began
thus:
Count Berchtold was invited to Konopischt by the
Archduke Francis Ferdinand, after the Emperor had left.
The Minister informed me to-day that H.I. and R. Highness declared himself to be satisfied to the last degree by
the Emperor's visit. He discussed with his Majesty every
possible question, and they were able to arrive at
complete agreement in their views.'
What exactly were these views?  The Emperor
has not told us, and the Archduke no doubt took
many secrets with him to his grave. On the day of
the assassination at Serajevo, when William II, who
was then at the Kiel regatta, learnt the sad news,
he had by his side, on his yacht, the Prince of
Monaco, and after reading the telegram he said to
his guest, with a voice filled with trouble: " Now
everything I have done has to be begun all over
again! "  The Prince of Monaco was struck with
the Emperor's mysterious remark, which he repeated
to me on his return to Paris, but without, of course,
being able to give me its exact meaning.
Whatever its meaning may have been, the fact
remains that on the very day after the Konopischt
1 Die deutschen Dokumente, No. 4, by Karl Kautsky, French edition
p. 45.
I$8




The Drama at Serajevo
interview, certain inexplicable military measures
were taken by Austria. On June 27-that is to say,
on the eve of the Serajevo crime-our Minister at
Belgrade wrote:
Military measures were taken some days ago on the
Serbian frontier. A hundred thousand men have been
concentrated in Bosnia and Dalmatia, and a cordon of
troops and gendarmerie has been established on the banks
of the Save and the Danube, from Orsova to Raca. The
Semlin brigade has been furnished with cavalry and
artillery.  The railway from  Semlin to Szabatka is
guarded by troops.
The Ballplatz at the same time began the preparation of an important statement designed to
show that the situation in the Balkans had become
intolerable.  As Karl Kautsky-who was German
Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in
the revolution of November 9, 1918-remarked, this
document can scarcely be interpreted otherwise than
as a proposition couched in diplomatic language for
a preventive war against Russia. The authors of this
document dealt first with Rumania, whose king, in
spite of being a Iohenzollern, had just received the
Tsar at Constanza, and who was denounced as having
withdrawn from Austria, notwithstanding all the
"friendly remonstrances" that had been addressed
to him. There was no possibility of expecting, the
document added, any change for the better, and the
authors concluded " that Austria must renounce, not
only in regard to Rumania but also in regard to
Serbia and Russia, what they somewhat disdainfully
termed the policy of tranquil waiting."'
1 Kautsky. op. cit.
59




The Origins of the War
This Memoir, which was written between June 14
and June 27, was sent by Francis Joseph himself to
William II after the tragic death of the Archduke,
and he commented on it in a letter which was also
published by the German delegation and which contained a long expose of a deliberately manufactured
case against Rumania, Serbia and Russia. After
recognizing that the complicity of Serbia in the
Serajevo crime could not perhaps be proved-this
" perhaps," it must be noted, is the Emperor's-he
complains of Jugo-Slav policy, which is, he says,
"a danger to my House and my Empire" (as if
the permanent danger had not arisen as the result
of the Dual 'Monarchy having annexed and oppressed
independent peoples); he complains of Rumania,
who has, he says, drawn closer to Serbia; and he
adds, in plain language, that "the efforts of my
Government must tend in the future towards the
isolation and overthrow of Serbia."
He then sets forth in advance the programme of
the intrigues that the Central Empires carried on
during the war at Sofia and at Constantinople, and
for some time at Bukarest and Athens:
The first stage will be to strengthen the position of
the present Bulgarian Government, in order that Bulgaria,
whose real interests accord with ours, be protected against
a return of Russophilism. If it is understood at Bukarest
that the Triple Alliance has decided not to abandon the
idea of the entrance of Bulgaria into that alliance and
would nevertheless be ready to invite her to ally herself
with Rumania, the people down there perhaps will abandon the dangerous tendencies into which they have been
drawn through their friendship with Serbia.... If this
l o




The Drama at Serajevo
should succeed, we may go farther and make an attempt
to attract Greece towards Bulgaria and Turkey.
The Emperor in this letter, therefore, confesses
plainly that the idea of isolating and overthrowing
Serbia was set up by Austria prior to the fatal date
of June 28. The death of the Archduke was not
the drop of blood that made the cup overflow; it
was only the pretext seized on by the Habsburg
Monarchy for the purpose of proceeding to the
execution of Serbia, and for undertaking against that
little nation the "strafing" or punitive expedition
that the haughty and domineering policy of the Dual
Monarchy had proclaimed necessary.
To all the political motives that impelled Austria
to risk a war must be added the inextricable financial
difficulties in the midst of which she found herself,
and which had been increased, since 1912, by her
armaments and her preliminary mobilizations. On
December 16, 1913, M. Dumaine, our Ambassador
at Vienna, wrote to us:
Austria-Hungary finds herself pinned in an impasse,
without knowing how to get out of it. For this reason
the sentiment that impels nations towards the battlefield,
under the pressure of an insurmountable force, grows day
by day.... It is interesting to note that there is a
tendency here to regard the idea of a general war as the
only possible remedy for the financial congestion which is
being so cruelly felt in this country, following on the
military effort-at the same time without object-which
it has had to make for a year past.
It was at the moment when the public mind of
Berlin, Vienna and Budapest had become accustomed
i6i




The Origins of the War
to the idea of a pending conflict that the Archduke
Francis Ferdinand bade farewell to his Bohemian
rose gardens for the purpose of attending the military
manceuvres in Bosnia. Was it through a clumsy
oversight, or deliberately, that his official entry into
the capital of the annexed province was fixed for
June 28, the "Widow Dan," or the anniversary of
the defeat inflicted on Serbia by the Turks, in 1389,
as the result of treachery, in the Plain of the Blackbirds? To make a state entry into Serajevo on
June 28 was, at all events, to give the appearance of
an odious provocation to a proud nation, to whom
the memory of its ancient servitude remained very
grievous.
Another strange factor was that, although the
heir to the Imperial Crown went to Serajevo with
his wife, Duchess of Hohenberg, with the intention
of proceeding in an open carriage through the streets
of a Slav town that impatiently endured AustroHungarian domination, it appeared as if all precautions for their safety had been deliberately
neglected. There were no police, and no arrangements for the maintenance of order. It has undoubtedly been said that the Archduke had the
right to place confidence in the Slavs, and that he
ought even to have been regarded by them as a
friend, since he was credited, rightly or wrongly,
with the project of reorganizing the Empire on a
basis of three divisions.
I cannot take the risk, in this place, of tracing
the outlines of a figure who remains very enigmatic,
and it is not easy to unravel the truth from among
the many and various designs that were attributed
i62




The Drama at Serajevo
to the Archduke. What is not doubtful is that, so
far as the Serbs were concerned, he had always been
a supporter of the strong hand and the sharp action,
that in going to Serajevo on June 28 he gave the
impression of wishing to outrage the inhabitants,
and that, in any case, on that particular day he took
to them no promise of decentralization and no hope
of liberty. How is it to be explained that, in such
conditions, the Austro-Hungarian authorities in
Bosnia were guilty of such laxity that Dr. von
Bilinski, the supreme administrator of the province,
felt justified in severely reprimanding them for their
conduct? 
The whole town, however, received the Archduke
courteously. But as the procession proceeded towards the Town Hall, a bomb was thrown by a
young compositor, named Nedeljiko Cabrinovitch,
who, curiously enough, was the son of a police
officer at Serajevo. 'The projectile burst behind the
Archduke's coach, and some twenty persons, including his two aides-de-camp, were wounded. General
Potiorek, the Governor of Bosnia-Herzegovina, considered there were no reasons for modifying the
programme for the day, and the Archduke continued
his progress to the Town Hall, where he received the
homage of the municipality.  In his reply, he
assured Bosnia-Herzegovina of his unshaken attachment, and then went on to the hospital to inquire
as to the condition of the two officers who had been
injured.
On the way thither a Bosnian student, named
Gavrilo Princip, dashed towards the Archduke's
1 Kautsky, op. cit., p. 48.
I63




The Origins of the War
carriage, revolver in hand, and fired two shots at
him. One ball struck the Archduke in the
throat, while the second wounded the Duchess
of Iohenberg, who had risen to shield her husband. Both were immediately conveyed to the
Konak in a hopeless condition, and died shortly
after.
The day on which this abominable crime was
committed was, in Paris, that of the Grand Prix.
Count Scezsen, the Austrian Ambassador, was standing by my side in the presidential grand-stand at
Longchamp when the telegram announcing the death
of the Archduke and the Duchess of Hohenberg was
brought to me. I, of course, expressed to the
ambassador the indignation that this horrible crime
could not fail to excite in France, and my profound
condolences for the grief that had fallen upon the
Imperial family, and I left the grand-stand before
the end of the racing.
As I shook hands with M. Lahovary, the
Rumanian Minister, that very shrewd observer of
Balkan events remarked to me, with a preoccupied
air: " This unhappy event may have very serious
consequences." They were, alas, frightful! Nevertheless, on July 13 following, the Sectional Counsellor von Wiesner, whom the Austrian Government
sent to Serajevo for the purpose of examining the
records taken in the judicial inquiry that had been
opened against the authors of the crime, telegraphed
to Vienna:'
Nothing proves complicity of Serbian Government in
carrying out attack or in its preparation or in supply of
Kautsky, op. cit., pp. 48 and 49.
164




The Drama at Serajevo
arms, and it is not even to be presumed.  There are,
on the contrary, indications that give reason to consider
such complicity as non-existent.
What cared Austro-tHungary for that?   Failing
any evidence against the Serbian Government, it was
easy to find one or two Serbians from Belgrade who
could be implicated in the affair, together with the
Serajevo criminals, and that was sufficient to give
the pretext that was sought in order to set the
universe in flames!


i65




V
THE TRAGIC DAYS
O     N July 5, 1914, Count Scezsen, the AustroHungarian Ambassador in Paris, came to
thank me in the name of the Emperor Francis
Joseph for the condolences which I had expressed
to the Imperial Family on the occasion of the murder
of the Archduke. In the course of our interview I
renewed my statements as to the horror the crime
had caused in France, and I added discreetly that
political assassinations, generally speaking, were
merely the work of isolated fanatics, like that of
President Carnot in France. Count Scezsen-with
whom, as I have said, I was on excellent terms
personally, and who had no desire, I am convinced,
for a European    war-replied   to  me, however:
" The crime committed by Caserio was not the outcome of any anti-French agitation in Italy.     In
Serbia, on the other hand, they have been making
use of every means, both legitimate and illegitimate,
for many years past, to excite feeling against the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy." I
Count Scezsen2 reported the facts of this interview to his Government in the following terms:
1Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 4. See Pierre Bertrand's
L'Aulriche a Voulu la Grande Guerre (Bossard); telegram decoded by
the Quai d'Orsay during the war; Joseph Reinach's Histoire de Douze
Jours (Felix Alcan).
2 Austrian Red Book, No. 4.
i66




The Tragic Days
In execution of your instructions, I have transmitted to
M. Poincare the thanks of the Austro-Hungarian Government for his condolences. The President availed himself
of the occasion to renew his expressions of sympathy in
the bereavement which the Monarchy and our sovereign
have suffered. Alluding to the hostile manifestations in
Austria against the Serbs, he recalled that, after the
assassination of President Carnot, the Italians throughout
the whole of France were the objects of persecution by
the population. I informed the President that in that case
the crime had no relation to any anti-French agitation
in Italy, while it had to be recognized that in Serbia, for
many years past, every weapon, both permissible and
otherwise, had been used against the Dual Monarchy. In
terminating the interview, M. Poincare expressed his
conviction that the Serbian Government would give us
all the help it could in connexion with the judicial inquiries and the proceedings to be taken against possible
accomplices. That, he said, was a duty which no State
could escape.
The theory which the Imperial Ambassador laid
before me with so much moderation was that which
had been adopted by his Government immediately
after the crime. M. Forgach, who had concocted
the Agram trial, was the inspirer of the Austrian
Foreign Office, which looked to him to make it
appear that the Serbian Government and the Serbian
Army were the really responsible authors of the
Serajevo crime. A judicial inquiry was of course
opened, domiciliary visits were made and numerous
witnesses were examined. When Austria took the
step of sending to Serbia the notorious ultimatum
she did not assert that the Serbian Government
and its Army were directly concerned in the murder,
but she alleged that the plot, of which Gavrilo




The Origins of the War
Princip and Nedeljiko Cabrinovitch were the instruments, had been organized at Belgrade with the
help of a Serbian officer, Major Voija Tankositch;
that the six bombs and the four revolvers used by
the criminals had been handed to them at Belgrade
by that officer and by a man named Milan Ciganovitch; that the bombs were hand grenades drawn
from a Serbian army depot; and that, in order to
ensure the success of the attempt, Ciganovitch had
drilled Princip, Cabrinovitch and Grabez in the
method of utilizing the grenades and firing the
revolvers.
Supposing that these facts had been established,
what would they have proved? They would have
proved that one or two individual Serbs at Belgrade
had taken part in an inexcusable attack, and they
would certainly have justified a demand for the
guilty men to be severely punished. The AustroHungarian Government, however, wanted something quite different. When it prepared its Note
to the Powers it sought to set up a case against the
whole Serbian Kingdom by accusing it of having
tolerated, in its Press and its schools, a propaganda
hostile to the Empire, and of having permitted associations to exist which fostered agitations against
the Monarchy and wilfully persisted in protesting
against the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
A striking detail discovered by the late Ernest
Denis discloses how absolutely artificial and hastily
drawn up were these Austrian accusations against
Serbia. In the French text of the Memorandum
handed by Count Scezsen on July 27-the eve of the
declaration of war against Serbia-to M. BienvenuI68




The Tragic Days
Martin (who was then Acting Foreign Minister), it is
stated that in order to ensure that secrecy should be
maintained in regard to the plot, Tankositch and
Ciganovitch deputed "Zian Kali" to ensure that
the actual murderers should kill themselves after the
attempt. Who was this new criminal whose duty it
was to remind the criminals that they had taken an
oath to kill themselves in order that their secret might
be buried with them? M. Ernest Denis, after referring to the German text of the Memorandum,
found that "Zian Kali" was really " cyankali," or
cyanide of potassium, and that the original draft of
the memorandum merely stated that " the instigators
of the crime furnished the assassins with cyanide of
potassium, with orders to poison themselves as soon
as they had accomplished the murder."  The haste
with which the translation into French was done was
evident throughout the whole case; nevertheless, for
good or for evil, Austria found in this crime the
pretext she sought.
I have already spoken of the Memorandum that
was drawn up after the crime and sent to William II
by the Emperor Francis Joseph. A postscript added
to this Memorandum    ended with the following
sentence:
It is necessary for the Monarchy to tear to pieces with
a firm hand the network by means of which the enemy
seeks to twist a rope for the purpose of strangling us.
So little Serbia wanted to strangle AustriaHungary! She must therefore be crushed!
The German Emperor was in a greater hurry to
do this than anybody else. On June 30 Tschirscky,
L                I69




The Origins of the War
the German Ambassador in Vienna, sent to Berlin
a report in which he stated:
I heard responsible people yesterday express the desire
to settle accounts definitely with the Serbs. I take advantage of every occasion to advise quietly but seriously
against all precipitate measures.
William II annotated this report:'
Who authorized him to do this? (That is to say,
who authorized Tschirscky to make use of this moderate
language?) It is very stupid. It is no business of his,
in any way. It is exclusively Austria's business to decide
what she ought to do. Afterwards, if things turn out
badly, we can say that Germany did not want this! Let
Tschirscky be good enough to leave all such stupidities
alone.  The Serbs must be finished as soon as possible.... Now or never!
This document, annotated as I have shown, was
sent on July 4 by the Emperor's Cabinet to the
German Foreign Office. The mot d'ordre was given
-not to hold back Austria, but, on the contrary,
to encourage her in taking sudden action against
Serbia. There was really no need to press Austria
to undertake this aggression. Two days before
M. Dumaine had telegraphed from Vienna to the
French Government:
The Serajevo crime has excited the greatest rancour in
Austrian military circles and among all those who do not
wish Serbia to preserve in the Balkans the position she
has conquered for herself. The inquiry into the causes
of the crime which Austria demands from the Government at Belgrade, under conditions intolerable to the
See Die deutschen Dokumente, etc., No. 7.
170




The Tragic Days
dignity of Serbia, will, if refused, furnish a pretext for
proceeding to military measures.
On the very day when Tschirscky's report was
sent back to the Wilhelmstrasse, Count Hoyos, the
chief secretary to the Austrian Foreign Minister,
arrived in Berlin carrying the autograph letter
from the Emperor Francis Joseph, referred to on
page 160, in which the Austrian sovereign insisted on
the necessity for isolating and diminishing Serbia.
On the following day, at the time when I was receiving the visit from Count Scezsen, at which he transmitted to me the Emperor's thanks, long and
mysterious interviews took place in the Imperial
palace at Potsdam.
According to the White Book published by the
Reich in June, 1919, there was no meeting of the
German Crown Council on that day, although statements have been made to the contrary; all that took
place at Potsdam, it is asserted, were some commonplace and inoffensive conversations. The Austrian
Ambassador in Berlin, Szogyeni, to whom Count
Hoyos had given the letter from Francis Joseph, took
it for presentation to William II and was asked by
the Emperor to stay for luncheon. A few minutes
afterwards, and no doubt quite accidentally, the
Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, and the UnderSecretary of State, Zimmermann, who had succeeded
Herr von Jagow, arrived at the palace for the purpose of considering the political situation. On the
following day William, reassured by these interviews, left for a cruise in the North Sea. He had,
therefore, full confidence in the maintenance of
peace.
171




The Origins of the War
The White Book adds, however:
No special decisions were taken [at Potsdam], since it
had been established in advance that it was not possible
to refuse Austria the support that was due to her, in
virtue of the Alliance, in the matter of the demand for real
guarantees to be obtained from Serbia.
The White Book expressly recognizes, moreover,
"that at Berlin the possibility of the intermeddling
of Russia and its consequences had also been taken
into account," but, it states, " it was not regarded
as in any way probable that there would be a general
war. As to any intention of provoking a European
conflict, there was no question of that." In other
words, if one goes into a room filled with inflammable
material and takes a match and throws it on a heap
of tinder, one is able to say: " I wished to burn only
that little heap. If there was a general conflagration
it was not my fault! "
Everybody knew very well that the crushing of
Serbia would not only be a blow against the rights of
nations, however, but that such an effort could not
leave Russian opinion indifferent, and that it must
have the effect of once more awakening the whole
Eastern Question.  The proof that there was no
illusion in this respect is to be found in the Austrian
Red Book of 1919, in which (on page 22) Count
Szogyeni reported to his Government the conversation he had had with William II. He thus summarized the language of the German Emperor on
that occasion:
According to his opinion, there is no need to wait long
before acting. The attitude of Russia would certainly be
I72




The Tragic Days
hostile, but he had for some long time been prepared for
this eventuality, and we might be sure that, even if war
broke out between Austria and Russia, Germany would
stand faithfully at her side. Russia, further, was not
ready for war.
It is true, if we are to believe Professor Hans
Delbriick and the other authors of a memorandum
on the responsibility for the war, that Count
Szogyeni, who was old and fatigued, failed to understand the Emperor properly; but we have been
able to understand him clearly enough, from the
annotations to which we have just referred, which
agree entirely with the statements recorded by the
Austrian Ambassador in his report to his Government. Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador in London, moreover, has also confirmed the
information given by Count Szogyeni.
I understand [he writes in his c Memoirs "] that in the
decisive discussion at Potsdam on July 5, the Austrian
demand met with the adhesion pure and simple of all the
authorized persons, and even with the addition that it
would not be a bad thing if it should result in war with
Russia.  That, at any rate, is what is stated in the
Austrian Minute received in London by Count Mensdorff,
the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in England.
It is true that Tirpitz writes in his " Memoirs ":
According to the explanations given by him [the
Emperor] to my substitute on the morning of July 6, in
the New Palace park at Potsdam, the Emperor did not
consider it probable that Russia would intervene for the
purpose of covering Serbia, on the ground that the Tsar
would not protect regicides, and because Russia at that
period was incapable, militarily and financially, of making
I73




The Origins of the War
war. The Emperor added a little nervously that France
would put a brake on the complaints of Russia, because
of the unfavourable situation of French finances and her
lack of heavy artillery. As to Britain, the Emperor said
nothing. Complications with that State were not even
thought of.
In the first German White Book, however,
published at the beginning of the war, when Germany reckoned on being victorious and did not take
so many precautions as she has done since her defeat,
there is to be found this avowal:
We were able to say to our Ally, with all our heart,
that we shared her point of view, by assuring her that
such action as she considered necessary for the purpose
of putting an end to the agitation pursued in Serbia
against the existence of the Monarchy would have our
entire sympathy. We were conscious that acts of hostility on the part of Austro-Hungary against Serbia might
bring Russia on the scene, and cause us to be drawn into
a war in conformity with the obligations of our alliance.
The German Emperor himself, moreover, knew
so well that in leaving the field free to Austria he
was opening the door to general complications, that
before embarking for the North Sea he thought fit
to take a certain number of military measures. A
Note dated August 30, 1917, and drawn up by the
Chevalier von dem Bussche, Under-Secretary of
State, runs 1:
On the morrow of the day on which the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, in July, 1914, handed to his Majesty
the letter from the Emperor Francis Joseph brought by
Count Hoyos, and after the reception of the Chancellor,
1 Die deutschen Dokumente, etc., Anhang VIII.
I74




The Tragic Days
Herr von Bethmann-Ilollweg, and of Under-Secretary of
State Zimmermann, a consultation between the military
leaders took place at the Kaiser's palace at Potsdam.
In this there took part His Excellency Capelle, replacing
Tirpitz; Captain Zenker, for the Naval General Staff;
representatives of the Ministry of War and the General
Staff. It was decided, with a view to any eventuality, to
take preparatory war measures.  Orders were consequently given. Source absolutely sure.
(Signed) BussciE.
Admiral von Tirpitz, on his part, relates in his
Memoirs " (page 209) that the Emperor ordered
Captain Zenker and the War Minister, Falkenhayn,
to wait on him at Potsdam. Lastly, in October,
1919, an inquiry was opened by the German Chancellery on the subject of Bussche's note, and it was
recognized that, if there had not been, at the
beginning of July, 1914, at Potsdam, a veritable
Crown Council, the Emperor had, at all events,
convoked there Admiral Capelle and General von
Bertrab, representing the General Staff.   Before
starting on his cruise, therefore, he wanted, if not
to give orders, at any rate to obtain exact information as to the military and naval situation.
On returning to the War Office, General von
Bertrab reported the conversation to Count Waldersee, who wrote as follows on the matter:
The Emperor told the General that he had promised
the Emperor Francis Joseph to stand behind him with the
power of Germany if complications resulted from the step
Austria-Hungary contemplated against Serbia.... So
far as concerns myself, who replace General von Moltke
in all matters concerning war, I had nothing to do after
the audience which General von Bertrab had at Potsdam.
J75




The Origins of the War
The mobilization work laid down in the plans had been
completed on March 31, 1914. The army was ready, as it
always was.
Two days later, on July 7, a Council of AustroHungarian Ministers took place, as to which the
Austrian Red Book of 1919 gives us information
(pp. 25-28). Count Berchtold explained that the
time had come for Serbia to be placed in such a
position that she could no longer be harmful: He
added that Germany had promised without reserve to
support Austria in a war against that country, and
he did not conceal the fact that a duel with Serbia
might consequently result in a war against Russia.
But it was better, he concluded, that such a war
should come at once, as Russia was every day
becoming more powerful in the Balkans.
Count Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, showed
himself more moderate. He recognized that a war
against Serbia had become possible, but he condemned speculating on it, nevertheless, and declared
that, for his own part, he would not consent to a
sudden attack on Serbia without preliminary diplomatic action. " Such an attack, however," he said,
"is what appears to be contemplated, and Wvhat, to
my great regret, appears to have been discussed at
Berlin by Count Hoyos."
The Council agreed, in accordance with the wish
of Count Tisza, that the preliminary step should be
taken, prior to mobilization, of sending an ultimatum
to Serbia. All those who were present, however,
were of opinion "that a purely diplomatic success,
even if it resulted in the humiliation of Serbia,
would be valueless, and that sufficiently severe
176




The Tragic Days
conditions must be imposed to make a refusal
probable in order to lead to a radical solution by
military intervention."
Tschirseky, the German Ambassador in Vienna,
was, of course, made acquainted with this consultation by Count Berchtold, and he reported it to Berlin.
On July 10 he reported to his Government, further,
a conversation that Count Berchtold held with the
Emperor Francis Joseph and immediately reported
to him. The Emperor expressed the opinion that
the time had come to lay down concrete conditions
to  Serbia.  On   this William  II, annotating
Tschirscky's report, wrote: "But very plain and
very categoric conditions! They [the Austrians]
have had time enough for that! "
"If the Serbs," continued Tschirscky, "are
able to accept all the conditions laid down for
them, such a solution would be 'very antipathetic to
Count Berchtold,'" and he reflects again on conditions that might be proposed to Serbia, with a
view to rendering complete acceptance impossible.
The Minister finally complains, Tschirscky says, of
the attitude of Count Tisza, who is rendering it
difficult for him to take vigorous action against
Serbia. Count Tisza asserts that it is necessary to
act in a " gentlemanly " manner. This passage was
annotated by the Emperor William thus: " In the
case of assassins!  After what has occurred!
Stupidity! "
Count Tisza's moderation was not of very long
duration. Ile soon rallied to the views held by
Count Berchtold, and on July 11 Count Scezsen
received the following telegram from Vienna:
I77




The Origins of the War
Complete accord has been obtained with Germany in
regard to the political situation resulting from the
Serajevo outrage and all its eventual consequences.l
Then, on July 14, Tschirscky telegraphed to
Berlin:
Count Tisza came to see me to-day, after his conversation with Count Berchtold. The Count told me he had
always counselled prudence, but that each day had confirmed him in the opinion that the Monarchy must take
energetic steps. [" Assuredly " is the German Emperor's
annotation at this point.] Count Tisza added that the
position taken by Germany, in affirming that she would
stand by the Monarchy's side, had exercised the greatest
influence on the firm attitude of the Emperor.
It is therefore proved that Germany might have
been able to hold Austria back. Tschirseky continues:
The actual text of the Note to be addressed to Serbia
has not yet been drawn up. It will be drafted on Sunday.
[July 19.] As to the date when it will be handed to
Serbia, it was decided to-day that it will be preferable
to wait until Poincare has left St. Petersburg; that is to
say, on the 25th.
The German Emperor, always in a hurry, here
threw  in these three words: "What a pity!"
Austria, however, knew what she was doing when
she postponed the sending of the ultimatum for a
few days. The President of the French Republic
was leaving for Russia, and it was not advisable
that M. Viviani and he should have knowledge of
the ultimatum during their stay, otherwise the
Telegram deciphered at the Quai d'Orsay during the war.
178




The Tragic Days
French Government might be able to come to some
arrangement with the Government of its Ally, for
the maintenance of peace, and the plan of the
Central Empires would fail.
On July 12, as we know from a telegram that
was deciphered at the Quai d'Orsay during the
war, the Austrian Foreign Minister telegraphed from
Vienna to Count Scezsen:
Will your Excellency be good enough to let me know
the date of the departure of the President for Russia, and
the probable length of his visit there. Please also let me
know the nature of the programme of the voyage.
Punctually, on the following day, after obtaining
the necessary information at the Quai d'Orsay,
Count Scezsen forwarded to Vienna the itinerary
asked for.
The visit of the President of the Republic, not
only to Russia, but also to Sweden, Norway and
Denmark, had been decided upon several months
previously. From the beginning of 1913 there had
been exchanges of visits between the King of
England and the President, and the King of Spain
and the President, and it seemed difficult to the
Government to postpone for any further period the
visit that MM. Felix Faure, Loubet and Fallieres
had in turn paid to the sovereign of the allied nation,
and which had become a traditional demonstration of fidelity to our agreements. On January 6
M. Doumergue, who was then Prime Minister, had
telegraphed to our ambassador at St. Petersburg
for the purpose of announcing this visit and to ask
what date would be most convenient to the
179




The Origins of the War
Emperor. He suggested that, in view of the French
Parliamentary session and of the elections, the date
should be either from May 10 to 20 or somewhen
after July 16.
For rather less than a year M. Delcasse had been
French Ambassador at St. Petersburg. M. Briand
and M. Jonnart had recalled M. Louis, whose health
had gradually become worse, and had deemed it
advisable to replace him by a political personage of
sufficient importance to have access to the Tsar without difficulty.  In February, 1914, however, M.
Delcasse asked to be relieved of his post, and
M. Doumergue's 'Government nominated M. Paleologue to take his place.
M. Delcasse, who was then still at St. Petersburg,
as I have said, replied to M. Doumergue by stating
that M. Sazonoff, who was very pleased with the
prospect of the pending visit, would consult the
Emperor at his next audience, but that his Majesty
would be going to the Crimea from March until
May for the benefit of the Tsarevitch's health.
Allusions to the proposed Russian visit having been
made in the Press, the French Minister at Stockholm, M. Thi6baut, wrote to the Quai d'Orsay, on
January 15, stating that in his opinion it would be
very desirable if the President of the Republic, on
his return from St. Petersburg, were to stop for a
day or two in Sweden, as MI. Fallieres had done
in 1908.
On January 20 M. Delcasse telegraphed to
M. Doumergue:
The visit to the Crimea, whither the Imperial Family
must return in March, owing to the health of the Empress
180




The Tragic Days
and the Heir to the Throne, renders the visit impossible
for May. It is very probable, indeed, that the Imperial
Family will not return to Petersburg before June. The
period that appears to be most convenient to the Emperor
is between July 7 and 20, Russian style; that is to say,
July 20 and August 2, in our style.
M. Doumergue, further, had      directed  our
ambassador to ascertain if the Tsar would soon
be able to visit France, and his Majesty had given
the promise that he would do so. The programme,was arranged for the visit to Russia to extend from
July 20 to 24. The Kings of Sweden, Norway and
Denmark having been kind enough to request the
representative of France to visit their respective
countries, the programme for the return journey
was drawn up in such a way as to enable these
invitations to be accepted.
I have ventured to go into all these details in
order to demonstrate the absurdity of the statements
that have been circulated by Germany on the subject
of this visit to Russia, which had been decided upon
long before the news of the death of the Archduke
Francis Ferdinand reached Paris, both in regard to
the details of the journey and the various visits that
were to be made on the way home. Not only would
it have been very inconvenient, seeing that four
foreign governments were concerned, for us to have
broken our pledged word, but it had to be considered
that any unforeseen abandonment of a programme
whose details were so well known, and which had
been so long arranged, could only be contemplated
at the risk of being regarded as a proof that the
international situation justified serious misapprehen181




The Origins of the War
sions. The effect of any cancellation of the visit
would, in all probability, have been to excite
imagination and dangerously upset public opinion.
The French Cabinet, over which M. Viviani presided,
therefore decided unanimously that the programme
laid down by their predecessors in office should be
carried out on the dates fixed.
On Wednesday, July 15, the two chambers had
at last succeeded in disposing of the budget for
1914, which in the ordinary course should have been
voted five months earlier, and the ordinary session
had been closed. A Ministerial Council was held
under my presidency, between 8.30 o'clock and
10.30 P.M., in order to expedite current affairs before
my departure, and at 11.30 P.M. I drove to the Gare
du Nord, where I joined M. Viviani. We reached
Dunkirk at five in the morning, and embarked on
the warship France.
The four days occupied in the voyage to St.
Petersburg were delightful, and as M. Viviani and
myself paced the deck we pondered more than once,
and with more than a shade of anxiety, as to what
the meaning of Austria's delay in making known
her intentions might be; but neither the Premier
nor myself dreamed of the probability of a pending
war.
On Monday July 20 our battleship and the
French and Russian vessels that accompanied us
anchored in wonderful weather in the roadstead at
Kronstadt; and among the host of smaller craft and
steamers that came out to meet us I saw with emotion
a vessel that had been chartered, by the aid of a
multitude of individual susbcriptions, to bring off the
182




The Tragic Days
members of the French colony in St. Petersburg to
welcome us.
We left the battleship in a launch for the Imperial
yacht, where we were received by the Tsar with
cordial simplicity, and we immediately left for
Peterhof.  The conversation which I had on the
yacht with the Emperor may be summed up, like all
those on the following days, in this passage from a
letter which he wrote to me on April 80/May 13,
1916, and which M. Viviani brought back with him
on his return from a mission to Russia.
I have had much pleasure in again seeing M. Viviani,
the Garde des Sceaux, whom I had previously known, and
who recalled to me on this occasion my last interview with
you. We then thought only of ensuring the peaceful
development of our two countries, whereas the enemy
was already plotting his attack against the peace of
Europe, in the hope of arrogating to himself the hegemony
of the world.
We were, in fact, and for very good reasons,
ignorant of what was in preparation in Vienna and
Berlin; but, preoccupied by the very obscurity that
enveloped Austro-German policy, the only thought
of M. Viviani and myself was to labour with all our
strength for the maintenance of peace and, in order
the better to guarantee it, to assure ourselves that, in
the event of a fresh crisis occurring, Russia would
remain faithful not only to her alliance with France,
but also to the entente with Great Britain.
We remembered at that moment the moderating
effect of the influence of the British Cabinet, and
particularly of Sir Edward Grey, in 1912 and 1913,
and we considered that in all Balkan difficulties a
183




The Origins of the War
close agreement between London and Paris was the
best security for the Concert of Europe. Unfortunately at this period there were certain jarring
questions at issue between Russia and England. The
Persian question had for some time assumed a painfully acute phase as between the two countries. The
British complained, and not without reason, I believe, of the attitude of several Russian consuls, who
were violating the agreements of 1907 and were
conducting themselves as if they were in a conquered
country.
In accord with M. Viviani, I thought it advisable
to acquaint the Emperor with the legitimate dissatisfaction of the British Government and to suggest
energetically that Russia should make it her business
to remove the causes of the misunderstanding that
had occurred. On his side I found the Emperor disposed to be most conciliatory. He admitted freely
that the Russian agents, dominated by local interests,
were too much inclined to overlook the general
interest. His Majesty assured me that he was firmly
decided to remain in close relations with England,
and he even told me that he had, shortly before,
written to King George, asking him to use his influence in favour of the conclusion of a defensive
naval agreement between the two countries. In all
that he told me the Emperor appeared to be quite
sincerely pacific, and neither he nor myself allowed
ourselves to stop short of the hypothesis of a possible
conflict.
I did not broach immediately with Nicholas II
this rather delicate subject of Anglo-Russian relations, and in the conversations we had on the yacht
I84




The Tragic- Days
Alexandra, between Kronstadt and Peterhof, we
exchanged only somewhat general and, I am bound
to say, somewhat commonplace observations on the
necessity of maintaining our alliance.
The greater part of our conversation turned on
the views of the sea and the shore that passed before
our eyes, on the Imperial family, on the Tsarevitch,
whose health appeared to have improved, and on
certain Russian statesmen, whose character and services the Emperor appeared to wish to make known
to me in advance.
It was not until the following morning, July 21,
that I was able to have a somewhat prolonged interview with the Emperor. Nicholas II came from his
villa to see me at the Peterhof Palace, and he remained with me for nearly an hour. He promised
that he would pay a visit to France in the near future,
and he expressed the hope that the health of the
Empress would permit her to accompany him. He
had no more idea than myself at that moment that
the world was about to be plunged into a cataclysm
that would render this project unrealizable.  He
spoke with gratitude of France and of the welcome
he had received there, and he was obviously pleased
at the prospect of returning there in 1915. On that
Tuesday, July 21, I am convinced the Emperor not
only did not wish that there should be war, but that
he did not even anticipate a conflict.
He touched rapidly on the various questions
that were then before the eyes of Europe.  He
spoke of Albania, and judged with a certain
amount of severity the inexperience and the blunders
of Prince William of Wied. He spoke of Chios
M                185




The Origins of the War
and Mitylene. He expressed the opinion that the
resistance of Greece to the Turkish pretensions was
entirely justified. He referred to the partial mobilization that had taken place in Italy for the ostensible
purpose of staving off the threatened railway strike,
and he showed himself rather sceptical as to the
alleged motive for the mobilization. He also touched
on the policy of King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, and reproached him for having imposed on the Sobranje,
by a kind of parliamentary coup de force, the vote of
a loan from German banks; of Turkey, with whom,
he said, Russia was now on friendly terms; of
Sweden, whose attitude rendered him rather uneasy.
Sweden, he explained to me, had proceeded to increase unjustifiably her armaments, which appeared
to be directed against Russia. He asked me to give
to the King of Sweden, when I reached Stockholm,
formal assurances of the pacific intentions of the
Russian Government.
I told his Majesty that I would willingly act as
the interpreter of his sentiments, but that I gathered
from the reports furnished by M. Thi6baut, our
Minister at Stockholm, that Sweden, on her side, had
put forward against Russia complaints that appeared
to be justified, and that she complained in particular
of attempts at espionage that appeared to have been
encouraged by the Russian Naval Attache.  The
Emperor protested against this accusation. I begged
him to obtain information on the subject, and I
told him that in any case Sweden would be grateful
if he would give orders concerning it to his naval
attache.  He promised that he would obtain the
necessary information.
t86




The Tragic Days
The Emperor, as may be surmised, also spoke
to me in regard to Austria and Serbia, but on this
question he was no better informed than myself. He
asked me what Austria contemplated doing, and his
uncertainty on the matter rendered it difficult for
him, as for myself, to come to any precise conclusion.
All that he could say was: " In this, as in everything
else, our two countries must remain thoroughly in
agreement." And on my part I repeated: " Yes, as
in 1912 and in 1913, in agreement between ourselves
and with England, but without setting one of the
two groups against the other, and in a way that will
best maintain the Concert of Europe and peace."
Moreover, I had summarized in advance the whole
of my ideas and those of the French Government in
the toast which I had offered the night before at the
banquet given by the Emperor:
Nearly twenty-five years have elapsed since, with a
clear vision of their destinies, our countries agreed upon
a common diplomatic policy, and the happy results of
this lasting association are seen every day in the equilibrium of the world. Based on community of interests,
consecrated by the pacific will of the two Governments,
supported by armies and fleets that know each other,
esteem each other and are accustomed to fraternize together, tested by long experience and completed by
invaluable friendships, the Alliance in which the illustrious
Emperor Alexander II and the lamented President Carnot
took the earliest initiatives, has certainly given proof of
its beneficent action and its unshakable solidity. Your
Majesty may rest assured that, to-morrow as to-day,
France will pursue, in close and daily co-operation with
her ally, the cause of peace and civilization for which the
two Governments have never ceased to labour,
187




The Origins of the War
Neither M. Viviani nor myself, throughout the
whole of our stay in Russia, said one single word to
anybody that was not in strict accord with these
public declarations.
On the Tuesday afternoon we left Peterhof for
St. Petersburg. The Emperor did not accompany
us, and I confess that I was rather surprised that we
were left to visit the capital alone, as the population
would certainly have been very pleased to give his
Majesty a cordial welcome.  Serious strikes had
broken out in the city, however, and the Imperial
Government, rightly or wrongly, saw in these the
hand of Germany. The streets were none the less
crowded with joyful and eager crowds.
After having received the French colony at the
Embassy we met the Diplomatic Corps at the Winter
Palace. Assisted by M. Viviani, I first gave a brief
audience to each of the foreign ambassadors. Sir
George Buchanan, the British Ambassador, expressed the hope that the Persian question would
diminish in acuteness as quickly as possible, and that
all cause of difference between Britain and Russia
would pass away. He did not attempt to hide from
me the 'anxiety he felt in consequence of Austria's
silence and the mystery surrounding her future
intentions.
Count Pourtales, the   German   Ambassador,
greeted me with irreproachable courtesy. He was
related to a French family, and I spoke to him particularly as to his personal relations. Baron Motono,
the Japanese Ambassador, whom I had known for a
long time, briefly explained an idea which he had
often previously supported and which was very dear
188




The Tragic Days
to him, namely, that of a quadruple entente between
France, Russia, Britain and Japan.  I informed
him that the accords already existing between Japan
and Britain, like those between Japan and Russia,
naturally ensured to his country the friendship of
France.
Marquis de Carlotti, the Italian Ambassador,
gave me friendly assurances that the movements of
the troops in Italy were solely due to the railway
strikes.
Count Szapairy, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, while extremely polite, displayed great reserve.
He informed M. Viviani and myself, but without
giving us precise details, that (his Government had
decided to take steps at Belgrade, of which he in no
way explained the character, and he gave us to understand that Austria considered that Serbia herself was
directly responsible for the Serajevo crime. I asked
him if the magisterial investigation had revealed
the complicity of the Serbian Government. He
replied to me in embarrassed sentences. I told him,
as I told Count Scezsen on July 5, that I certainly
hoped Serbia would give every facility to Austria for
the prosecution and the punishment of the guilty
parties, and I added, without amplifying the idea,
that perhaps it would not be equitable to involve a
whole nation in a crime in which only a few persons
had participated. I concluded by expressing the
hope that the just punishment of the criminals would
not have any international consequences, and would
not bring about, with the reawakening of Balkan
crises, fresh divergencies of views between Austria
and Russia.




The Origins of the War
Count Szapary gave me some commonplace
assurances as to the inoffensive character of Austrian
policy. I reminded him of the co-operation that had
taken place between the European Powers during
recent years, and in retiring he shook me warmly by
the hand, but left with me, in spite of this, the impression that Austria was preparing " something "
-but what?   This it was impossible to guess, but
the enigma was sufficiently disquieting for there to
be no doubt as to what our duty must be.
Every step must be taken to ensure that Russia,
who had always been regarded as the protector of
Serbia, should not be isolated, in this critical period,
from France and Britain. It was our duty, therefore, to recommend her to adopt, with moderation,
that policy which, firmly backed by the French
Alliance and by her entente with Britain, had ensured the maintenance of peace in 1912 and 1913 -the policy which alone appeared to be capable of
staving off the unknown perils that we felt were
encompassing us.
After these short audiences, I joined the diplomatic circle, where I greeted briefly all the foreign
Ministers, including M. Spalaikovitch, the Serbian
Minister, confining myself to expressing to all of
them my best wishes for their respective countries.
Had I the time to do so, I should like to
write a picturesque narrative of the events of the
two following days, including a review at KrasnoeSelo and a theatrical representation at which we
were the guests.  But my task is merely to set
forth the truth in all its nakedness, and I will not
venture on digressions of this kind. Down to the
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The Tragic Days
time of our departure I had only one other intimate
conversation with the Emperor.    This was at
luncheon on the Thursday, and it was especially in
regard to Sweden that he talked to me.
His Majesty begged me to inform the King that
he cherished the most agreeable recollections of his
visit to Stockholm five years before, and of the visit
the King had paid to him in Finland. He insisted
on the pacific attitude of Russia in regard to Sweden,
as well as to every other country; and when I reminded him of the grievances felt by Sweden, the
Emperor replied: "After all, it is quite possible.
The agents of military ministers are often imprudent.
I will obtain information on the subject, and if there
have been wrongs committed, I shall not hesitate to
redress them."9
" May I tell the King that? " I asked.
" You may not only tell him," was the Tsar's
reply, " but I beg of you to do so."
That same day, July 23, I re-embarked on board
the France, and in the evening I received the Emperor and the Imperial family and the members of
the Russian Government at dinner on the deck of
the battleship. We were all still without information
as to Austria's intentions.
At the end of dinner I briefly thanked the
Emperor and his people for the welcome they had
given to us, and I closed with a phrase that repeated
almost textually the declarations that had previously
been made by Presidents Carnot, Felix Faure,
Loubet and Fallieres:
On all those questions that daily present themselves to
our two Governments, and require concerted diplomatic
I9I




The Origins of the War
action, we continue to remain in accord; and this accord
will endure the more readily in view of the fact that
our two countries have many times enjoyed the mutual
advantages derived from this well-ordered co-operation,
and that both possess the like ideal of a strong peace,
and of honour and dignity.
Towards 10 P.M. the Emperor took his leave, and
repeated to me that he certainly counted on coming
to France in the spring of 1915. The France and
the Jean Bart exchanged final salutes with the Imperial yacht, and M. Viviani and myself, left to
ourselves, mounted the bridge of the battleship to
breathe the evening air and exchange impressions
of our visit. These were not very optimistic. We
asked ourselves again and again what the silence of
Austria meant, but we were far from anticipating
what was about to happen, and we in no way thought
of hastening our return to France. Our programme
of visits to Copenhagen and Christiania, after we
had called at Stockholm, still held good.
On July 21, however, the General Staff of the
German Navy, as the result of information furnished
by the German Naval Attache at St. Petersburg, informed Herr von Jagow, the Secretary of State, that
my departure from Kronstadt had been fixed for ten
o'clock on the evening of the 23rd.
Von Jagow then telegraphed to Count Pourtales
the same day for confirmation of this news, and he
also immediately telegraphed to Vienna:
I have asked Count Pourtales for the programme of
Poincare's visit. He informs me that the President will
leave Kronstadt on Thursday evening at 11 o'clock, that
Die deutschen Dokumente, etc., Nos. 93, 96, 112, 127 (see Kautsky).
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The Tragic Days
is to say, at 9.30 Central European time. If the step is
taken at Belgrade to-morrow afternoon at 5 o'clock, it
will become known at St. Petersburg while Poincare is
still there.
On the 23rd Tschirscky, the German Ambassador in Vienna, replied:
The Imperial and Royal Government warmly thanks
you for your information.  Baron Giesl [the Austrian
Minister at Belgrade] has been directed to delay presentation for an hour.
In this way the Austrian ultimatum was not handed
to the Serbian Government before six o'clock in the
evening on July 23, and the news did not reach St.
Petersburg until after the departure of the France.
Why was there this desire to conceal the information from the Government of the Republic, and to
prevent all immediate conversation on the subject
between France and Russia? According to a telegram from Tschirscky on July 14 (see Die deutschen
Dokumente,    No.   49),  the  Austro-Hungarian
Government merely wished to avoid any celebration,
either at Kronstadt or St. Petersburg " in the excitement of the champagne " (the expression is that of
Tschirscky), of a fraternal character that might influence and perhaps decide the attitude of the two
Powers.
But what did they fear from such fraternization?
Not war, since they spontaneously declared it against
both France and Russia a few days later. What
they feared was an agreement in favour of peace,
and another of those efforts at mediation which
Austria rejected during the days that immediately
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The Origins of the NVar
followed-an effort which, if it had occurred at the
first moment after the ultimatum was launched,
would undoubtedly have proved much more embarrassing.
In the ignorance in which we found ourselves at
the moment of our departure from Russia, M. Viviani
was able to do only one thing: at one o'clock in
the morning he telegraphed to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
who was acting as Foreign Minister at the Quai
d'Orsay, and stated that he and M. Sazonoff were
entirely in agreement in trying to prevent Austria
from acting in any way that would constitute an
attack on Serbian independence. He asked that
M. Dumaine, the French Ambassador at Vienna,
should make a friendly appeal to the moderation of
Count Berchtold, and he added that the British
Ambassador at St. Petersburg had expressed the
hope that his Government would associate itself with
a step of this kind.' It was then too late.
During the morning of the 24th, before we were
out of the Gulf of Finland, a summary of the
Austrian Note to Serbia reached us by wireless
telegraphy from  the French Ambassador in St.
Petersburg. Austria insisted, we were told, that the
bombs used at Serajevo had been supplied to the
murderers from  a Serbian military depot.  She
demanded that an officer and a non-commissioned
officer be immediately cashiered, that the Serbian
Government should disavow, by an official Note, the
propaganda carried on by its agents, and that it
should consent to an inquiry being made at Belgrade
by both Serbian and Austro-Hungarian officials.
Yellow Book, No. 22.
I94




The Tragic Days
M. Viviani immediately telegraphed to London
and to St. Petersburg that in his opinion: (1) Serbia
should at once offer every satisfaction compatible
with her honour and her independence; (2) that she
should ask for an extension of the period of twentyfour hours in which Austria demanded her reply;
(3) that Britain, Russia and France should agree
to support this request; and (4) that the Triple
Entente should ascertain the possibility of substituting for the Austro-Serbian investigation an
International inquiry.
As we drew nearer to Sweden, however, we
began to receive disquieting wireless messages, which
supplemented the telegrams we found shortly afterwards awaiting us at the French Legation when we
arrived at Stockholm.' We thus learnt that Baron
von Schoen had taken the step of demanding at the
Quai d'Orsay that the questions raised by the ultimatum should be settled directly between Austria
and Serbia alone. The German Ambassador had
added that the intervention of other Powers might
have "incalculable " consequences.  This was a
barely disguised threat and a repudiation in advance
of any attempt at action by the Concert of Europe.
We were also informed-but, like the foregoing,
it must be understood, in a very condensed and
very incomplete fashion-that M. Paul Cambon had
suggested that Sir Edward Grey, who regarded the
Austrian ultimatum as utterly exorbitant, should
ask Germany to intervene at Vienna for the purpose
of obtaining an extension of the lime limit set by
the ultimatum. This Sir Edward Grey had agreed
1Yellow  Book, No. 23, and those that followed.
195




The Origins of the War
to do. M. Viviani hastened to reply that he entirely
approved of the initiative taken by M. Paul Cambon.
On the other hand, M. Jules Cambon had seen
Herr von Jagow, who had told him: " I did not
know of the Austrian Note before it was handed to
Serbia, but I approve of it, and there is only one
thing for us to do: to localize the conflict."
By a fatality that still further aggravated the
insufficiency of our information, nothing from
Belgrade reached Paris. Our Minister to Serbia,
M. Descos, had fallen ill, and he should have been
replaced some days before by M. Boppe, who had
not yet arrived at his post. We learnt of the
expiration of the twenty-four hours' delay allowed
in the ultimatum from the King of Serbia himself,
the Austrian Minister having left the Serbian capital.
On his part, M. Dumaine, our ambassador in
Vienna, telegraphed that the Austro-Hungarian
Government had mobilized several army corps-two
or six; it was not known exactly.
During this sinister day of Saturday, July 25,
which we spent at Stockholm, we had to go from
ceremony to ceremony, and present smiling faces in
spite of the terrible situation. King Gustavus V,
the Swedish Government, and the population had
arranged an admirable reception for us, but our
thoughts were far away. In the palace I met the
Russian Minister, M. Nekludoff, whose disposition
I found to be most pacific, and to whom I expressed
the hope that, with a little good will on both sides,
we might be able to stave off the crisis.'
1See article by M. Nekludoff, January 15, 1920-Revue des Deux
Mondes.
I96




The Tragic Days
I also transmitted to the King of Sweden
the friendly assurances given me by the Russian
Emperor, and the promise he had given me that
the abuses of which Sweden complained should be
put an end to. I felt only too strongly, however,
by this time that the peril did not lie between the
northern nations.
Our Minister at Stockholm, M. Thiebaut,
telegraphed to his colleague at Christiania to ask
if he knew what the German Emperor was doing
in the neighbourhood of Bergen, where the Imperial
yacht then was. The first reply was that he had
not moved, but a little later in the day we were
informed that he had left for an unknown destination.
The question then arose as to what decision we
should ourselves take. We had not yet been asked
by the French Government to return. To go at
once direct to Paris might perhaps alarm public
opinion, not only in France, but throughout Europe,
and lead to the belief that we feared a general conflagration. Such a precipitate return, moreover,
would compel us to break our word to Denmark
and Norway.
Before deciding to take this extreme step, we
resolved to await some positive indication from
Paris; and in the evening, when the Lavoisier
resumed her careful journey down the fjords and
between the islands from which the hurrahs of
the people rose, and took us back to the Francewhere, prevented by her draught from going right
into Stockholm, she awaited us majestically in the
transparent night-we were so far from thinking of
'97




The Origins of the War
a European war that we still counted on visiting
both Copenhagen and Christiania.
On Sunday, the 26th, we were steaming through
the open Baltic when a wireless message told us
that the German Emperor had curtailed his cruise
and was on his way back to Kiel. In our floating
abode, however, we heard only the drowsy echoes
of what was happening in the world outside. WVe
no longer received any precise information, either
from St. Petersburg or from Paris, and we became
more and more anxious in our solitude and our
remoteness. Sunday passed away without bringing
us, lost as we were between the heavens and the
sea, any further definite news of the world around
us.
Early on the following morning we were informed
that a German squadron, following the example of
the Emperor, had left the North Sea. Wireless
messages from  Paris simultaneously gave us the
impression that our return was rather impatiently
awaited. The lamented M. Abel Ferry, who was
then Under-Secretary of State, and who died bravely
during the war, informed us that public opinion and
the Press were reproaching us for continuing our
voyage in face of the growing seriousness of the
situation. We decided that to this appeal our duty
would not allow us to remain deaf.
M. Vivilani informed our Ministers at Copenhagen
and at Christiania, and I telegraphed to the Kings
of Denmark and Norway that the gravity of the
situation rendered it imperatively necessary for me
to return to France at once, and begged them to
accept my deepest apologies.
198




The Tragic Days
During the afternoon of the 27th, when we were
to the north of the Bay of Mecklenburg, a German
cruiser met us and saluted us very correctly in passing. A German destroyer, on the contrary, made
a right about turn on sighting us, and made off at
full speed in the direction of the Kiel Canal. Both
vessels had undoubtedly been ordered to ascertain
exactly where we were, for the cruiser which had
saluted us hastened to send a wireless message to
Berlin in cipher, which was intercepted by the
France, but which we were unable to decode.
At the same time we received further, but still
very vague, news from London and from Paris.
Germany having declared to the British Government
that if the war could not be localized the situation
might become aggravated, Sir Edward Grey had
responded that, if war broke out in the East, no
Power could be disinterested.1
In Berlin the language used by the Secretary of
State to the Russian Charge d'Affaires had been
both unsatisfactory and dilatory. When the Tsar's
representative asked him to associate himself with
a step to be taken at Vienna for the purpose of
securing an extension of the time limit of twentyfour hours set forth in the ultimatum, Herr von
Jagow replied that he had already acted in that
sense, but that it was too late. To the demand for
a delay the Minister replied that it was not a question
of war but of a local execution.
M. Bienvenu-Martin added in his report:
Herr von Jagow pretends not to believe that the action
of Austria may lead to general consequences. There is
I Yellow Book, No. 50.
199




The Origins of the War
a regular explosion of jingoism in Berlin. The German
Emperor is returning immediately to Kiel. M. Jules Cambon estimates that, at the first military measures taken by
Russia, Germany will immediately respond, and will very
likely not wait for a pretext in order to attack us. At
Vienna the French Ambassador has not had time to join
in the step taken by his Russian colleague for the purpose
of obtaining an extension of the delay given to Serbia.
He does not regret this, as the step that was taken was
categorically rejected by Austria, while Britain also had
no time to give instructions to her agent on this point.
A Note has been handed to me from the British Ambassador.  It records the conference of the British
Ambassador at St. Petersburg with M. Sazonoff and
M. Paleologue.   Sir Edward Grey considers that the
four Powers who are not interested ought to insist to
Russia and Austria that their armies shall not cross the
frontier, and that they shall give Britain, France, Germany and Italy time to exercise mediation.
A few hours afterwards we received a further
wireless message that had been sent out the night
before by M. Bienvenu-Martin:1
The summary of the Serbian reply to the Austrian
Note reached us after twenty hours' delay. In spite of
the fact that the Serbian Government yielded on every
point, with the exception of two trifling reserves, the
Austro-Hungarian Minister has broken off relations, thus
proving the settled will of his Government to proceed
to the execution of Serbia...
The   German   Ambassador   came  this  afternoon
[July 26] to make a communication to me tending towards an intervention of France with Russia, in a pacific
sense. Austria, he informed me, has declared to Russia
that she seeks neither territorial aggrandisement nor an
attack on the integrity of Serbia. Her only intention is
Telegram of July 26.
200




The Tragic Days
to ensure her own tranquillity, and to carry out police
measures. It will depend on Russia's decision whether
war will be avoided, he said. Germany is at one with
France in the ardent desire that peace may be maintained,
and has the firm hope that France will use her influence
in a manner that will appease St. Petersburg.
I replied to this suggestion by stating that Russia was
peaceful, that she had done nothing that could justify
casting doubts on her peacefulness, and that we were
in agreement with her on the question of seeking a pacific
remedy for this conflict. It appeared to us, therefore,
that Germany ought, in virtue of her being the partner
of Austria-Hungary, to take action at Vienna, and that
her action, taken with a view to avoiding military operations tending to the occupation of Serbia, was certain to
be effective.
The ambassador having remarked to me that this
would be irreconcilable with the position taken by Germany to the effect that "the question concerned only
Austria and Serbia," I replied that mediation at Vienna
and St. Petersburg might be carried out by four other
Powers who were less interested in the question.
Baron von Schoen then put forward the plea that he
had no instructions on this point.
These telegrams reached us bit by bit, and
were often almost undecipherable. On Tuesday,
July 28, however, by which time we had entered
the North Sea, communication became a little more
regular, and more precise information was gathered
by the wireless antenne of the France.
Baron von Schoen, it appeared, had taken three
characteristic steps at the Quai d'Orsay.1 On the
Friday he had read to M. Bienvenu-Martin a Note
in which the German Government interposed itself
1 Yellow Books, Nos. 61 and 62.
N                  201




The Origins of the War
categorically between Austria and the Powers,
approving the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, and
adding that Germany ardently desired that the conflict should remain localized. All intervention of
another Power, Baron von Schoen said, must, by
the play of the Alliances, provoke " incalculable consequences." On the following day, the desired effect
having been produced, and the Powers having, in
consequence of the surprise, the short notice given to
Serbia and the risks of a general war, advised Serbia
to yield, Baron von Schoen returned to the Quai
d'Orsay for the purpose of minimizing the effect of
what he had done the day before. He affected to
be astonished at the impression he had produced,
and he protested that Germany had been credited
with intentions that she did not entertain.
On the third day, July 30, the result having been
obtained, and Serbia having yielded almost totally
to the exigencies of Austria, the German Ambassador appeared twice at the Quai d'Orsay for the
purpose of insisting on the pacific disposition of
Germany, and on her ardent desire to co-operate
in the maintenance of peace.
But [added M. Bienvenu-Martin] the situation remains
disquieting, in view of the incomprehensible refusal of
Austria to accept the submission of Serbia, of her
mobilization operations and of her threats to invade
Serbia. The attitude taken since the beginning, with
German support, by the Austrian Government, her refusal
to accept any conversation by the Powers, does not permit
the latter, practically speaking, to intervene usefully in
regard to her, except through the intermediary of Germany. Nevertheless, time is pressing, for if the Austrian
army crosses the frontier, it will be very difficult to stave
202




The Tragic Days
off the crisis, as Russia would be unlikely to tolerate the
occupation of Serbia now that the latter has, in reality,
accepted the Austrian Note, by giving every satisfaction
and guarantee.
The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs continued in these terms:
The Powers-Russia, France and Britain in particular-by their urgent advice, have persuaded Serbia to
yield. They have therefore fulfilled their role. Germany
is now alone in a position to be speedily heard at Vienna,
and to give advice to Austria, who has obtained satisfaction, and who cannot, for a detail which it would be
easy to settle, unchain a general war.
It is in these conditions that the proposition made by
the Cabinet of London is presented. M. Sazonoff having told the British Ambassador that, on Serbia's appeal
to the Powers, Russia would agree to hold herself aloof,
Sir Edward Grey has laid the following suggestion before
the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin and Rome:
That the ambassadors of France, Germany and Italy
in London should be directed to seek, with Sir Edward
Grey, a method of resolving the present difficulties, it
being understood that during this conversation Russia,
Austria and Serbia will refrain from all active military
operations.
Sir A. Nicolson has spoken of this suggestion to the
German Ambassador, who has shown himself favourable
to it. It will be equally welcomed in Paris and also in
Rome, according to all probability. Here once more the
next step rests with Germany, who has the opportunity to
demonstrate her good will by something other than words.
M. Bienvenu-Martin telegraphed in the same
sense to AM. Jules Cambon in Berlin, telling him:
I beg of you to act in concert with your British col203




The Origins of the War
league, and to support him, in his approaches to the
German Government, in every way that appears to you
to be suitable.
Once again the France intercepted a wireless
message sent out from the Eiffel Tower, and in this
M. Bienvenu-Martin showed us how insistent Baron
von Schoen had been in causing the newspapers to
publish a Note proclaiming the solidarity of Germany and Russia. The Minister explained that the
ambassador gave him the impression that he sought
to compromise France in the eyes of Russia in order
to be able, in case of need, to throw on Russia and
France the responsibility for an eventual war. M.
Bienvenu-Martin added that he had himself published
a Note of a less accusatory character and stating
that: " The German Ambassador and the Minister
for Foreign Affairs have had a further interview, in
the course of which they have considered what
active measures the Powers could adopt for the
maintenance of peace."
To the whole of the telegrams which he thus
received, bit by bit, M. Rene Viviani replied,
on the 28th, from the cabin of the France (see
Yellow Book, No. 76):
I fully approve of the reply you have made to Baron
von Schoen. The thesis you have sustained is the evidence itself.  In seeking for a pacific solution of the
conflict, we are completely in agreement with Russia,
which is not responsible for the present situation, and has
not yet proceeded to take any measure whatever that
can provoke the least suspicion.
It is evident, however, that, in virtue of her partnership, Germany cannot refuse to give advice to the AustroHungarian Government, whose action has brought about
204




The Tragic Days
the crisis. There is reason, therefore, to continue to speak
in the same manner to the German Ambassador. This
advice, moreover, is in harmony with the double British
proposition mentioned in your telegram.
I entirely approve of the suggestion put forward by
Sir Edward Grey, and I directly request M. Paul Cambon
to let him know this.
It is essential that it should be made known in Berlin
and Vienna that our fullest help will be given to the efforts
that are being made by the British Government, with a
view to finding a solution to the Austro-Serbian conflict.
Action need not be confined solely to Vienna and St.
Petersburg. In proposing to act also at Belgrade, or,
above all, in fact, between Vienna and Belgrade, Sir
Edward Grey sets forth the logic of the situation; and,
by not excluding St. Petersburg, he offers Germany, on
the other hand, a means of withdrawing, without loss of
dignity, from the suggestion put forward by the German
Government in Paris and in London to the effect that it
looked upon the question as one solely between Austria
and Serbia and deprived of all general character.
During the following night M. Viviani received
another message from    M. Bienvenu-Martin    (see
Yellow Book, No. 76):
In spite of the assurances given, both in Berlin and in
Paris, by the German agents, of the desire of their Government to co-operate in the efforts for the maintenance of
peace, no definite action is being exercised by them for
the purpose of holding back Austria.
The British proposition, which consists in a meeting
of the four less-interested Powers for the purpose of securing a halt in military operations at Vienna, Belgrade
and St. Petersburg, is meeting objections in Berlin of a
kind to cause it to fail.
The Austrian Ambassador has taken the step of
announcing that his Government will to-morrow take
205




The Origins of the War
energetic measures for the purpose of compelling Serbia
to give the satisfaction and the guarantees demanded by
Austria.
Count Scezsen has not explained what these measures
are. Mobilization, beginning on July 28, appears to be
certain, according to our Military Attache at Vienna.
On the morning of Wednesday, July 29, we
came in sight of Dunkirk, and we hastened to step
ashore, on to the soil of France, which during the
interminable length of our voyage had appeared
to be so terribly far off. We had informed the
mayor of the town, M. Terquem, that it would be
impossible for us to make a stay, as we had promised
to do on our outward journey, and we at once
entered the train that was to take us to Paris. On
all the jetties, on the quays, and at every possible
point along the railway, however, a dense crowd was
massed, in which there were thousands of workmen,
and there was in that great multitude such a
unanimity of patriotic resolution that we were
moved to tears.
On the whole of our journey to Paris, in the
stations and at the level crossings, the spectacle was
the same. The outrage committed against Serbia
had made the whole people conscious of the attack
on the rights of nations. Behind Austria it saw
Germany, and after Tangier, after Agadir, after
all the provocations to which France had been submitted, she saw, in what was happening on the
Danube, a fresh defiance.
" We have had enough of it," said one of the
statesmen who met us at Dunkirk; "the country
has come to the end of its patience! "
206




The Tragic Days
"We niust never come to the end of our
patience," I replied; "let us still try to maintain
peace! "
Two members of the Government, MM. Rene
Renoult and Abel Ferry, came to meet us at Dunkirk. They informed us of the measures of precaution that had been decided upon by the Cabinet
during our absence; soldiers on leave had been
recalled, the men in the training camps had been
sent to rejoin their garrisons; the administrative
officials had all received instructions to remain at
their posts; supplies had been purchased for Parisin a word, all the necessary steps had been taken in
case mobilization should become necessary, but
nothing had been done that would resemble an act
of mobilization.
At the Gare du Nord the Minister of War,
M. Messimy, with all the other members of the
Government, awaited us on the platform. M.
Messimy said to me:
" You are going to see Paris, Monsieur le
President! It is splendid! 
Yes, Paris was splendid! Before, during, and
after the war I have felt the heart of Paris beat on
many occasions, but never have I witnessed such a
profoundly moving manifestation as that on July 29,
1914.
In the open landau in which I was seated with
M. Viviani, I saw with a heavy heart that innumerable mass of people, who had come from every
corner of the city, and who crowded every window,
every pavement and every refuge. The whole multitude had only one cry: " Vive la France!" It had
207




The Origins of the War
only one soul, and it expressed only one thought
and one will.
"Do everything that is possible," Paris said to
us, " to keep us out of the horrors of war, but if
you do not succeed, have confidence in us. All of
us, such as we are, will do our duty! "


2o8




VI
LAST EFFORTS FOR PEACE: WAR
O    N reaching Paris on July 29, 1914, M. Viviani
and myself learned many things that had
occurred in our absence, of which up to then
we had been in ignorance. It was a long time,
however, before we became acquainted with many
facts which became known to us only after the
revolutions in Austria and in Germany placed the
world in the possession of the official records.
The German Emperor, as we knew, had left for
his cruise in Scandinavian waters on July 7, after
having stimulated Austrian diplomacy, and called
together the General Staffs of his own Army and
Navy. He was absent until July 27. This voyage
partook so much of the character of an alibi prepared
in advance by the German Government that on
July 18 Herr von Jagow asked Count Wedel, a
member of the Emperor's suite, to give him details
of the Hohenzollern's programme, and said: "As
we wish to localize the pending conflict between
Austria and Serbia (that is to say, to ensure the
overthrow of Serbia), the world must not be alarmed
by the premature return of his Majesty. Nevertheless, on the other hand, we must be able to get in
touch with the Emperor, in case unforeseen events
necessitate important decisions on our part [in
other words, mobilization], and eventually it must
209




The Origins of the War
be arranged that the last days of the voyage shall
take the form of a cruise in the Baltic."1
Although far away, the German Emperor,
however, did not forget the plan he had drawn up
at Potsdam, and on July 19 he gave orders for the
fleet to remain concentrated until the 25th-that
is to say, until after the ultimatum had been handed
in.2  On the 23rd the Chancellor informed Count
Wedel that the Austrian Note would be handed to
Serbia the same afternoon, and that the time fixed
by the ultimatum would expire on the 25th.
The intervention of other Powers [he telegraphed] will
draw us into the conflict.  This will not occur immediately; that is to say, it is unlikely that Great Britain
will at once decide to intervene. One fact alone will delay
her decision, and that is that President Poineare will not
leave Kronstadt until this evening, and will visit Stockholm on the 25th, Copenhagen on the 27th and Christiania
on the 29th, so that he will not arrive at Dunkirk until
the 31st. The British Fleet, according to the arrangements made by the Admiralty, will be dispersed on the
27th, and the ships will return to their respective ports.
Premature orders to our fleet might provoke general
uneasiness and arouse British suspicions.3
Thus it was hoped by the German Government
that the French President and Prime Minister would
finish their voyage according to their programme,
that Austria would have time to finish with Serbia
before our return, and that any decision by Great
Britain would be delayed.   The Imperial Government believed that, in these conditions, it might
1 Die deutschen Dokumente, No. 67, Kautsky, French translation, p. 85.
2 Ibid., No. 101.
3 Ibid., No. 125.
210




Last Efforts for Peace: War


still be able to delay the recall of its fleet. The
Emperor was more in a hurry, however, and on the
25th, on his own initiative, he gave the German
Fleet orders to return to the Kiel Canal. The
Chancellor telegraphed to him that the British Fleet
was dispersing, that " Sir Edward Grey, for the time
at any rate, is not thinking of any direct participation by Britain in a European war," and that in
view of these circumnstances it would be better not
to be too hasty in ordering the return of the German
Fleet.
The Emperor immediately flew    into a bad
temper and peppered the telegram  with annotations, in which he poured scorn upon his civilian
Chancellor, himself underlining disdainfully the word
civilian."
"The mobilization at Belgrade," he said,  may
cause the mobilization of Russia, which will be
followed by that of Austria, in which case I must
concentrate my forces both on land and sea....
The civilian Chancellor has not yet been able to
understand this! "I
As Kautsky remarks in publishing these documents (Die deutschen Dokumente, etc., No. 182),
William II very clearly foresaw that the Austrian
ultimatum  to Serbia would probably result in a
general war. In pressing Austria to violence, he
perfectly understood that a catastrophe might result
from his action; yet he had nevertheless continued
his guilty encouragement.  But down to the last
moment he tried to conceal his object, and Austria
adopted the same plan.
On the eve of the day on which the ultimatum
21I




The Origins of the War
was handed to the Serbian Government, our ambassador at Vienna, M. Dumaine, went to the Ballplatz,
where Baron Macchio, one of the leading Foreign
Office officials, informed him that the demands
which would be made in the Austrian Note would
still leave the door open to a pacific arrangement.
In forwarding this information to M. BienvenuMartin (then Acting Foreign Minister in the
absence of M. Viviani), M. Dumaine very prudently
added: " In view of the customary methods of the
Austrian Imperial Chancellery, I do not know what
faith can be placed upon these hopes." 1 Baron
Macchio, in fact, was merely carrying out the mot
d'ordre of the two Imperial Governments, which
was to the effect that dust must be thrown in the
eyes of Europe until after the blow that was to prove
fatal to Serbia had been struck.
On July 23 the Austrian ultimatum was handed
in at Belgrade, and on the following day it was
communicated to the Powers, who at the same time
realized that Serbia had been given only until the
following day in which to reply. Everything had
been arranged in such a manner that France, Great
Britain and Russia were surprised by the rapidity of
events.
Germany, at the same time, proclaimed everywhere that she knew nothing as to the step that had
been taken by Austria, and that she had known
nothing in advance as to the contents of the Note.
It is known, however, that she had deliberately given
carte blanche to Austria, and it is now established,
further, that the Berlin Government, contrary to
1French Yellow Book, 1914, No. 20.
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Last Efforts for Peace: War


its repeated affirmations, was actually made acquainted with the terms of the ultimatum itself, even
before it was handed to Serbia.
The German Ambassador in Vienna, Tschirscky, as a matter of fact, received a copy of the
Note on July 21, and he sent it to Berlin in a letter
that arrived there on July 22. The Wilhelmstrasse
had therefore ample time to telegraph to the Austrian
Foreign Office for the purpose of deferring the
decisive act. But it was impossible for her to do
this in view of the fact that for several weeks previously she had been inciting Austria to extreme
measures.
In his book on the origins of the war, Herr von
Jagow asserts that the documents sent to Berlin by
Tschirscky were handed to him only on the evening
of the 22nd, after a visit from the Austrian Ambassador, who had brought him the text of the Note
between seven and eight o'clock. Even if we accept
this version, we cannot but point out that there would
still have been time to telegraph to Vienna, seeing
that the two Chancelleries had agreed to take no step
at Belgrade until six o'clock on the evening of the
23rd-that is to say, at the moment I was due to
leave Russia.
It is evident therefore that Germany, after having
egged Austria on, made no attempt to hold her
back, even after she knew the text of the incendiary
document. We have, moreover, the confession of
Zimmermann, the Secretary of State, who wrote to
von dem Bussche, on August 11, 1917, as follows:
DEAR BUSSCHE,-The statement made by the Evening
News is materially correct to the extent that we received
213




The Origins of the War
the ultimatum, as a matter of fact, twelve hours before
it was handed to Serbia. I do not remember, however,
having said a word about this to any American
diplomatist. It is possible, therefore, to publish a denial.
(Thus, according to Zimmermann, a statement
that is exact may be denied; all that is necessary is
that the truth should be concealed.)
But as to the advisability of issuing this denial, seeing
that it will be impossible to conceal indefinitely the fact
that we knew of this document, that is quite another
question. (Die deutschen Dokumente, etc., Anhang VII.)
The Austrian Red Book for 1919, moreover, confirms that the German Ambassador received a copy
of the complete text of the ultimatum on July 21.
The obstinacy with which Germany has persisted in
asserting the contrary demonstrates thoroughly her
realization of the frightful responsibility which she
assumed when she made herself the accomplice of
Austria.  She then hoped she would be able to throw
dust in the eyes of the world.
Germany's whole plan was clearly set forth in a
report that the Bavarian Legation in Berlin sent to
Munich on July 18, 1914, where it was stated:
In order to localize the war, the Imperial [German]
Government will open diplomatic pourparlers with the
Great Powers immediately after the Austrian Note has
been handed in at Belgrade. In view of the fact that the
Emperor will be absent in northern waters, and that the
Chief of the General Staff and the Prussian War Minister
are also taking a holiday [the comedy of the game of
alibis will be easily appreciated] the German Government
will state that it has been surprised by Austria's action
to exactly the same degree as the other Powers. It will
214




Last Efforts for Peace: War


endeavour to induce the Powers to accept the point of
view that the difference between Austria and Serbia is
a matter that concerns those two Powers alone.
In other words, Germany would endeavour to
induce the Powers to agree to the destruction of
Serbia. We get this information from a German,
who obtained his facts in Berlin, in order that he
might be able to inform Munich.
The conspirators, however, had overlooked the
prudence of Serbia, to whom, in anticipation, Russia
and France had advised moderation. At the moment
when the period set forth in the ultimatum came to
an end, on July 25, M. Pashitch, the Serbian
Premier, handed to Austria a reply which contained,
on all essential points, an acceptance of Austria's
exorbitant demands. Half an hour after receiving
this reply, and without even taking the trouble to
read it seriously, Baron Giesl, the Austrian Minister
at Belgrade, notified to Serbia the breaking off of
diplomatic relations and left the city. Simultaneously, Austria began to mobilize.
On July 28 she declared war against Serbia, and
on the following day she began to bombard Belgrade.
As Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador
in London, subsequently wrote:
A look from Berlin would have been sufficient to decide
Count Berchtold to be content with a diplomatic success,
and to be appeased by the Serbian reply. This, however,
did not take place —very far from it.  The war was
hurried on.
The war was hurried on; nothing, in fact, could
be more certain. When he learnt, on July 25, the
emotion that had been caused in Belgrade by the
215




The Origins of the War
Austrian ultimatum, William II hastened to write
on the margin of the telegram: " How hollow the
whole of this so-called Great Power, Serbia, proves
to be. All the Slav states are of this kind. These
blackguards must be trampled thoroughly under
foot! "1
And   when   Tschirscky   reported  that Count
Berchtold, in order to convince Russia of his good
intentions, had sent for the Russian Charge d'Affaires
in Vienna, the Emperor (on July 26) again annotated
a telegram from his ambassador: s Absolutely superfluous. This will give rise to an impression of weakness and of apology, for which there is no reason at
all, so far as Russia is concerned, and which should
be avoided. Austria had good reasons, and she has
taken measures as a consequence; her action cannot
therefore be brought, so to speak, into discussion." 2
Germany continued to incite Austria so directly
that on July 25 Count Szogyeny telegraphed from
Berlin to Vienna:
It is generally supposed here that the presumably
negative reply of Serbia-for they do not imagine, you
see, that Serbia will accept; they believe that the ultimatum is too severe in terms for a pacific solution to be
feared-will be followed by our immediate declaration of
war, combined with bellicose operations.... We are
advised in the most pressing manner to proceed immediately, and place the world in the presence of an
accomplished fact.3
The Emperor and his Government were anxious,
above everything, to hide their real intentions from
Die deutschen Dokumente, etc., No. 159.
2 Ibid., No. 155.
3 Austrian Red Book, 1919.
2I6




Last Efforts for Peace: War


Britain. They hoped to beguile and deceive her
down to the last minute.
On   July  22 Prince   Lichnowsky   sent from
London to Berlin a report in which he stated that
Sir Edward Grey had expressed to him the hope
that Austria   would  take into  account Serbia's
national dignity.   " Serbia's national dignity,"
wrote William II, " does not exist! The question
has nothing to do with Grey; it is his Majesty
Francis Joseph's affair. What gigantic     British
impudence! "1
On the 24th there was a further report from
Lichnowsky, which also received annotations from
William. The Austrian Note had been communicated to Great Britain, and Sir Edward Grey had
remarked that its contents surpassed anything that
he had ever seen before, and that " any State that
would accept such exigencies would cease to count
among independent States."
"That would be very desirable," wrote William;
"Serbia is not a State in the European sense of the
word; it is a band of brigands'!
Lichnowsky added:
Grey told me that he would be ready to intervene in
order to obtain a prolongation of the delay accorded to
Serbia, as it might be possible in that case to find a solution. [" Useless! " commented William.] Grey finally
suggested that, in case of dangerous tension, the four
Powers not immediately interested-Britain, Germany,
France and Italy-would undertake mediation between
Russia and Austria-Hungary. (It was in this way, you
will remember, that peace was maintained in 1912.)
"Useless! "  repeated  William; "I can     do
1 Die deutschen Dokumente, etc., No. 374.


0


217




The Origins of the War
nothing, unless Austria urgently begs me to, which
is not at all likely. In questions of honour and vital
interests, one does not consult other people! " 1
Britain was not the only Power that caused
anxiety to Germany. There was also Italy. Article 7
of the treaty of the Triple Alliance laid down that
the contracting Powers must come to an agreement
between themselves before modifying the status quo
in the Balkans, and that if Austria obtained any
increase of territory, Italy should have the right to
compensation.
On July 24, Flotow, the German Ambassador in
Rome, telegraphed that he had had "a somewhat
exciting interview" with the Italian Premier, M.
Salandra, and with the Foreign Minister, Marquis
di San Giuliano. The latter insisted that "the
spirit of the Triple Alliance, in the case of an aggressive demand by Austria that might be so fertile in
consequences, required that Austria should first
come to an agreement with her Allies. As Italy
had not been informed of what was going on, she
could not consider that she was bound."  And the
Italian Foreign Minister added: " The text of the
Austrian Note has been drawn up in such an aggressive and clumsy manner that the public opinion of
Europe and of Italy would be against Austria, and
would be stronger than any Government."
"Humbug!" commented William II; "Italy
has already tried to cheat in Albania, and caused
Austria to raise her eyebrows.. *. All this is only
twaddle, as we shall see very plainly as time goes
on. 2
1 Die deulschen Dokumente, etc., No. 157.
2 Ibid., No. 168.
218




Last Efforts for Peace: War
Notwithstanding the optimism of the Emperor,
however, the German Government, disturbed by the
language of Italy, tried to bring the Cabinets of
Rome and Vienna closer together, and on the
26th Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg telegraphed to
Tschirscky:
The Chief of the General Staff considers that it is
absolutely necessary that Italy should be kept in the
Triple Alliance. An entente between Vienna and Rome
is therefore necessary.'
The German Emperor himself, notwithstanding
the contempt that he pretended to feel for Italy,
bowed before the opinion of his Government, and on
the 27th Herr von Jagow telegraphed to the German
Ambassador in Austria:
His Majesty the Emperor considers it as indispensable
that Austria should come to an understanding with Italy
on Article 7 and on the question of compensation. His
Majesty orders me to communicate his instructions to
your Excellency, and asks that you will acquaint Count
Berchtold with them.2
Why were they so anxious to bring Austria and
Italy together?   Evidently because, on the more
probable hypothesis of a general war, Germany was
anxious to be assured of having with her the whole
of the Triple Alliance.
For a moment the attitude of Italy and the
unexpected yielding of Serbia made the German
Emperor hesitate. On July 28 he wrote to von
Jagow3 to the effect that the Serbian reply met
1 Die deutschen Dokumenle, etc., No. 202.
2 Ibid., No. 267.
3 Deutsche Polilik, July 18, 1919; Die deutschen Dokumente, etc.,
No. 293.
2I9




The Origins of the War
the wishes of the Danubian Monarchy, and that " a
humiliating capitulation, announced urbi et orbi,
would eliminate all reason for war."  He added,
nevertheless: " The Serbians are Orientals, and consequently liars, deceivers and hypocrites. In order
to transform their fine promises into acts, it is
necessary to employ methods of gentle violence.
This must be done in such a manner as to give
Austria a pawn-Belgrade. This is necessary also
in order to give to the army, which has been three
times mobilized in vain "-it should be noted
that, according to William himself, therefore, the
Austrian Army actually had been mobilized-" the
appearance of a success in foreign eyes, and the
consciousness of having at least trodden foreign
soil."
Thus, at the very moment when he regarded
Austria's aims as having been accomplished,
William still demanded that " a gentle violence"
be inflicted on Serbia. And if he appeared to
hesitate for a moment before the inevitable decision,
he himself gives us the reason for his fleeting
scruples.
On July 28 the German General von Chelius,
who was attached to the personal suite of the Tsar,
reported to Berlin a conversation which he had had
that day with Prince Troubetzkoy, who belonged to
the entourage of the Tsar. The Prince remarked
that, after the humiliating reply given by Serbia,
Austria would incur grave responsibility if she provoked a European conflict. To this observation
William, thereby betraying his innermost thoughts,
made this simple annotation: "That was what
220




Last Efforts for Peace: War
worried me after reading Serbia's reply." He was
"worried" at the thought that Austria should
not appear to be responsible; but when Chelius
reported that Prince Troubetzkoy had said: "We
believe the German Emperor will advise Austria not
to press things too far, to recognize Serbia's good
will, and to leave it to the Hague Arbitration Court
to decide on the points at issue," William hastened
to write on the margin of the report: "Absurd!
These phrases are intended to throw the responsibility upon me. I won't have it! " 1
He was so firmly resolved, in fact, to throw the
responsibility upon Russia that on the 28th his
Chancellor,  Bethmann-Hollweg,     telegraphed  to
Tschirscky:
The Serbian Government's reply to the ultimatum
shows that Serbia has gone so far towards meeting the
Austrian demands that, if the Imperial Government maintains an absolutely intransigent attitude, it must be
foreseen that it will alienate successively the whole public
opinion of Europe.... It may be exposed to proposals
from other Powers for mediation and conference, and if
she persists in her present silence in regard to such propositions, the reproach will finally fall on Austria, even in the
eyes of the German people, of having provoked a worldwide war. In these conditions a victorious war on three
fronts could not be begun. It is therefore to the last
degree necessary that the responsibility for the eventual
extension of the conflict to the States that are not
directly interested in the question shall in any case fall on
Russia.... You should carefully avoid creating the
impression that we desire to hold Austria back. It is
only a question of finding some means to permit Austria
to realize her object; that is to say, to stop Serbian
1 Die deutschen Dokumente, etc., No. 337.
22I




The Origins of the War
propaganda, without unchaining a universal war; and if,
in the end, such a war cannot be avoided, to improve in
our favour, as far as possible, the conditions in which it
will be necessary to carry it on.'
On the morrow of Serbia's reply, therefore,
Germany stopped for a moment on the edge of
the abyss towards which she had pushed Austria.
Instead of speaking plainly to Vienna, however, and
saying to the Dual Monarchy:;" Now that you have
received satisfaction, stay quiet," she still counselled
her to employ "gentle violence" in the form    of
an occupation of Belgrade.   She did not want to
create the impression that she wished to hold Austria
back. She allowed the Austro-Hungarian Government to declare war against Serbia. She was above
all anxious to throw upon Russia the responsibility
she had incurred, and to prepare the falsification of
history that she attempted from the day hostilities
opened.
These tactics appear clearly in the correspondence
exchanged between William II and Nicholas, which
is reproduced in the German White Book, although
with omissions and falsifications of dates.2  Thus on
July 28, after Austria's declaration of war against
Serbia, Nicholas telegraphed from Peterhof to the
German Emperor:
I am glad that you have returned to Germany. In
this grave moment I beg of you to come to my help. A
disgraceful war has been declared against a helpless
people. Indignation, which I share whole-heartedly, is
intense throughout Russia. I foresee that very shortly I
shall be unable to resist any longer the pressure that is
I Die deutschen Dokumenfe, No. 323.
2 Ibid., No. 323; Report of Senatorial Commission of Inquiry.
222




Last Efforts for Peace: War


being put upon me, and I shall be forced to take those
extreme measures that lead to war. In order to prevent
the calamity that would occur through a European war, I
beg of you, in the name of our old friendship, to do everything in your power to prevent your Ally from going too
far.
William  II read this telegram  and annotated
it. He placed two notes of exclamation opposite the
words "disgraceful war," and added: "Confession
of his own weakness and an attempt to throw the
responsibility for the war on me. The telegram
contains a hidden threat and a summons which is
equivalent to an order to hold back the arm of my
Ally! "  And notwithstanding the supplication of
the Tsar, William sent off to Peterhof a telegram,
which he himself prepared during the day, for the
purpose of justifying, in the eyes of Nicholas, the
bellicose action of Austria:
It is with the deepest anxiety that I have learnt of the
impression produced in your Empire by Austria's advance
against Serbia. The unscrupulous agitation that has been
carried on for years in Serbia was the cause of the monstrous crime to which the Archduke Francis Ferdinand
fell a victim... 
You will undoubtedly agree with me that we have
both of us-yourself as well as me-like all sovereigns,
a common interest in insisting that those who were responsible for this terrible murder should receive the
punishment they deserve.
(Thus he approved of Austria's wish to punish
Serbia, which had submitted, and he attempts, in
order to intimidate Nicholas, to appeal to the
solidarity of emperors and kings. Then he continues):
223




The Origins of the War
On the other hand, I cannot hide from myself how
difficult it is for you and your Government to resist public
opinion.
In memory of the warm friendship that so closely binds
us, I have for a long time used all my influence to induce
Austria to come to a loyal and satisfactory understanding
with Russia. I am counting firmly on you to support me
in my efforts to overcome all difficulties that may yet
arise.
Your very sincere and devoted friend and cousin,WILLIAM.
We shall see that, far from making the efforts
he announced, William strove, on the contrary, to
nullify all the means of conciliation proposed by
Britain and France.    For the moment, however,
it is only necessary to remark that the Tsar's telegram reached Berlin at 1 A.M. on July 29, and that
William's reply did not leave until 1.45 A.M.,
twenty-four hours later.  In the German White
Book the order of the two telegrams is reversed, so
as to induce the belief that WVilliam  was the first
to telegraph, and that it was Nicholas who replied.
The German Government went still further. The
Tsar's reply, which left Peterhof on July 29 at
8.30 P.M., and which is of capital importance, was
left out of the German White Book.' Its very
importance, indeed, explains why it was suppressed.
In his conciliatory and amiable telegram the Tsar
said:
I thank you, although the official communications of
your ambassador to my minister have been of a very
different tone. I beg of you to clear up the cause of this
difference. It would be much better to submit the AustroDie deutschen Dokumente, etc., No. 360.
Z24




Last Efforts for Peace: War


Serbian problem to the Hague Conference. I rely on your
wisdom and friendship.
(Signed) Ton Nicky qui t'aime.
Note this telegram. It is dated July 29. War
against Serbia had been declared, and Belgrade was
being bombarded. The German Ambassador was
using threatening language at St. Petersburg; yet
nevertheless the Tsar proposed to William that the
Austro-Serbian dispute should be referred to the
Hague Conference. He went as far as possible,
therefore, in a spirit of conciliation.
What was the German Government's reply?
The Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, immediately
telegraphed to the German Ambassador in Russia:
I beg your Excellency, by immediately discussing the
subject with M. Sazonoff, to explain the alleged contradiction between your language and the telegram from his
Majesty.  The idea of the Hague Conference will, of
course, be excluded from the present case.
'The Hague Conference was excluded, all question
of an International conference was excluded, all
mediation was excluded; such was the determination
of Germany.
On the day AM. Viviani and I returned to Paris
(July 29) a Council of Ministers was held, at which
we considered the situation at length. We had
learned that iM. Boppe had reached Belgrade on the
25th, that he had advised Serbia to make every
possible concession that was consistent with her
dignity, that M. Bienvenu-Martin had given similar
advice to M. Pashitch since July 24, and that these
recommendations had been supported by the British
and Russian Ministers.
225




The Origins of the War
Suddenly, however, our efforts towards conciliation were paralysed by the mot d'ordre given by the
German Chancellor to all his agents from July 23
onwards: ' This matter," he declared, "is one that
must be settled between Austria and Serbia alone."
In fact, when Sir Edward Grey took the initiative
of proposing that the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin and
Rome should co-operate with him with a view to the
maintenance of peace, Germany (which, however,
had at first affected to adhere to the principle of a
mediation) immediately avoided the issue and flatly
rejected the idea of a conference of the Powers, or
even of a meeting of ambassadors.1
M. Viviani had barely returned to Paris when he
telegraphed to M. Paul Cambon in London, asking
him to encourage the British Government in its
attempts at conciliation.
I shall be very much obliged [he said] if you will ask
Sir Edward Grey to be good enough to repeat in Berlin,
as soon as possible and under the form that he thinks
likely to be the most efficacious, his proposal for the
mediation of the four Powers, which has received in
principle the adhesion of the German Government. The
Russian Government, on its part, has directly expressed
the same desire to the British Government; the Austrian
declaration of war against Serbia, Austria's dispatch of
troops to the Austro-Russian frontier and the consequent
Russian mobilization of troops on the Galician frontier
have, as a matter of fact, brought direct Austro-Russian
conversations to an end.2
The Austro-Hungarian Government, as a matter
of fact, had promptly rejected the overtures made
1M. J. Cambon's telegrams, July 27; Yellow Book, Nos. 73 and 74.
2 Yellow Book, No. 97.
226




Last Efforts for Peace: War


by M. Sazonoff, and Sir Edward Grey, informed of
this refusal, at once took up, with the most admirable patience, the idea of a friendly intervention
by the four Powers who were the least interested.
The   same  game    was  then  recommenced    at
Berlin.'
The German Government had accepted this intervention in principle, but it did not wish to hear
either conference or mediation spoken of. "Very
well, then," replied Sir Edward Grey to Prince
Lichnowsky; " ask your Government to prepare its
own formula. Whatever it is, if it enables peace to
be maintained, it will be accepted by Britain, France
and Italy."
This conversation with the German Ambassador,
however, left such uneasiness in the mind of Sir
Edward Grey that, in reporting it to M. Paul
Cambon, he thought fit to tell him that he regarded
the situation as very serious, and that he had very
little hope of a pacific solution.2
The presentiments of Sir Edward Grey, in fact,
became more and more justified. M. Mollard, the
French Minister to Luxemburg, telegraphed that
the German garrison at Thionville had advanced in
the direction of Pierrevillers, in front of Homecourt.
Our consul at Mannheim informed us of two trains
that had brought troops from Augsburg to Metz.
Our consul at Stuttgart reported that soldiers on
leave had received telegraphic orders on the 28th
to rejoin their regiments. Our Consul-General at
Frankfort, M. Roussin, reported important troop
1 Qui a Voulu la Guerre? by MM. Durckheim and E. Denis (Colin,
Paris), pp. 25 and 28.
2 Telegram from M. Cambon, Yellow Book, No. 98.
227




The Origins of the War
movements that continued from overnight, through
the night and the next day.'
Nevertheless, Baron von Schoen went to the
Quai d'Orsay at 5.30 in the afternoon for the
purpose of interrogating M. Viviani as to the
military measures of precaution taken by the French
Republic. He added, certainly, that France was at
liberty to act in this way, "but in Germany," he
continued, "we have neither the right nor the means
to keep such preparations secret, so that French
public opinion must not be alarmed if Germany considers certain measures to be necessary."
"VWe are doing nothing that is of a nature to
alarm anybody," M. Viviani replied; " we are thinking only of maintaining peace. We are ready to
do everything to attain that object, and we are ready
to enter into any negotiations that will prevent
war." 2
Baron von Schoen, I am ready to admit, faithfully reported this conversation to his Government.
" M. Viviani," he telegraphed to Berlin, "does not
wish to abandon the hope that peace may be maintained, an end which is earnestly desired here." 3
M. Viviani came to see me in the course of the
night. He had received a visit from M. Isvolsky,
the Russian Ambassador, who reported that Count
Pourtales had seen M. Sazonoff at St. Petersburg
and had told him: " Germany has decided to mobilize
her armed forces if Russia does not cease her military
preparations." " But," the Russian Foreign Minister replied, " we commenced our preparations only
1 Yellow Book, No. 88.
2 Ibid., No. 101.
3 Telegram from Baron von Schoen, deciphered during the war.
228




Last Efforts for Peace: War


because Austria mobilized eight army corps and
because that Power has refused any kind of peaceful
settlement of her dispute     with  Serbia! "   M.
Sazonoff had requested the Russian ambassadors to
inform  us that, in these conditions, " Russia was
compelled to envisage the imminence of war, and
that she relied on us as an ally."
In full agreement with myself, M. Viviani at
once telegraphed to St. Petersburg and London.
He naturally stated that France was ready to carry
out her obligations under the Alliance, but he
hastened to add:
We shall not neglect, however, any effort for the purpose of bringing about a settlement of the dispute in the
interests of the general peace. The conversations that
have taken place between the less directly interested
Powers enable us still to hope that peace may be preserved.
I suggest, therefore, that, in connexion with the precautionary and defensive measures which Russia believes
it to be her duty to carry out, she will take no immediate
steps that may give Germany any pretext for the total
or partial mobilization of her forces.'
On July 80 M. Paleologue, the French Ambassador, reported the result of the mission that had been
entrusted to hinm by M. Viviani.
M. Sazonoff [he said], to wvhomn I have made known
your desire to avoid any military measure that may offer
Germany a pretext for general mobilization, replied to
me that even in the course of last night the Russian
General Staff had postponed certain precautionary steps
for the purpose of avoiding all suspicion. The Chief of
the Russian General Staff yesterday sent for the German
Military Attache and gave him his word of honour that
Yellow Book, No. 101.
229




The Origins of the War
the mobilization ordered this morning is aimed exclusively
at Austria. Nevertheless, in an interview which he had
this afternoon with Count Pourtales, M. Sazonoff was
forced to the conviction that Germany does not wish to
say in Vienna the decisive word that would safeguard
peace. The Emperor Nicholas has the same impression,
as the result of an exchange of telegrams that has
taken place between himself and the Emperor William.
On the other hand, the Russian General Staff and
the Russian Admiralty have received disquieting information as to the preparations made by the German
Army and Navy.    In giving me this information M.
Sazonoff added that the Russian Government is none the
less continuing its efforts of conciliation. He repeated to
me: "Down to the last moment I will negotiate."'
WJe now know, in part at least, what the Imperial
telegrams of which tM. Sazonoff spoke contained.
I say " in part " because Germany did not publish,
in her White Books, the telegram sent by the Tsar
to the Kailser on July 29, for the purpose of explaining to him that Russia, in presence of the Austrian
mobilization, was compelled to reply with similar
measures.   The German     Emperor retorted   that
Austria-Hungary had only mobilized against Serbia,
and that if Russia mobilized against Austria, the
mission of mediator which he had accepted-without
doing anything, however, to fulfil it!-would become
impossible.
Nicholas II immediately replied:
Peterhof, July 30 (1.20 p.m.).
I thank you cordially for your prompt reply. I am
sending this evening Ratischef, with instructions. The
military measures that have been put into operation were
taken five days ago, on the ground of defence against
Yellow Book, No. 102.
230




Last Efforts for Peace: War
Austria's preparations. I hope with all my heart that
these measures will not in any way influence your role of
mediator, which I approve greatly. We have need for
your energetic intervention with Austria, so that she will
come to an agreement with us.
During this day of the 30th there still remained
a ray of hope. In the morning the Ministerial
Council again met at the Elysee. The Prime
Minister and M. Messimy, the War Minister, had
received information that the German covering
troops had taken up a position a few hundred yards
from our frontier, along the whole of the front
from Luxemburg to the Vosges, and that she had
even sent her troops forward to take up their
fighting positions.
After consulting General Joffre, who would be
the French Commander-in-Chief in the event of
war, MM. Viviani and Messimy proposed to the
Council that we should adopt similar measures, but
that we should withdraw our troops to a distance
of ten kilometres (six miles) from the frontier, and
prohibit them from approaching nearer. M. Viviani
at once asked M. Paul Cambon to make this step
known to the British Government, and he added:
Our plan, which has been conceived in a defensive
spirit, nevertheless provides that our covering troops will
be as near as possible to the frontier. In thus delivering
a belt of territory without defence to the sudden aggression of the enemy, the Government of the Republic wishes
to demonstrate that France is no more responsible for
the attack than is Russia.
In order to reinforce this affirmation, M. Viviani
compared the measures that had been taken during
231




The Origins of the War
the previous few days on each side of the frontier
respectively: the German soldiers absent on leave,
recalled five days before ours; the armament of the
fortresses on the borders of France begun by Germany on the 25th, although nothing similar was
done by France; the German reservists called up
by individual notices, while ours still remained
quietly at home; finally, the entry, twice in
succession,  of   German    patrols  into   French
territory.'
The mind of the German Government, nevertheless, was apparently somewhat disturbed on July 80,
as the result of the expressions that had been used by
Sir Edward Grey in his conversation with Prince
Lichnowsky the night before.    The terror of Germany was that Britain might intervene in the
conflict. The Imperial Chancellor transmitted to his
ambassador in Vienna the observations of the British
Minister, accompanied by the following comments:
If Austria refuses all mediation, we are therefore now
in the presence of a conflagration in which, from all
appearances, Italy and Rumania will not be with us,
and Britain will be against us. We shall both find ourselves, therefore, in opposition to the four Great Powers.
If Britain participates, the principal weight of the
struggle will fall on Germany. The political prestige of
Austria, the honour of her arms and her justifiable complaints against Serbia, may be sufficiently safeguarded
by the occupation of Belgrade or other places.
By humiliating Serbia, the Monarchy would strengthen
its position both in the Balkans and in regard to Russia.
In these circumstances we are compelled to recommend, most urgently, for the consideration of the Cabinet
'Yellow Book, No. 106.
232




Last Efforts for Peace: War


of Vienna, the acceptance of mediation on the honourable
lines indicated.'
Although Germany had not yet publicly taken
sides, the attitude of Sir Edward Grey had thus made
Germany, for a moment, reflect on the terrible
responsibilities that she and Austria were incurring.
At the same time what kind of pacific solution did
she regard as desirable? A solution that involved
the humiliation of Serbia and the strengthening of
Austria against Russia!
In the afternoon of the same day BethmannHollweg requested the German Ambassador in
Vienna to induce the Austro-Hungarian Government
to resume conversations with St. Petersburg;2 and
the same evening he telegraphed again for the purpose of expressing the wish that Austria would not
deliberately reject the British propositions:
If Great Britain succeeds in her efforts, while Vienna
refuses everything, Vienna affirms by this that she absolutely wants war, in which we should be implicated, while
Russia remains innocent. The result of this, so far as
Germany is concerned, is that we should be placed in an
untenable position so far as our own people are concerned.
We cannot therefore but firmly recommend to Austria to
accept Grey's proposition, which will safeguard us from
peril from all points of view.3
This telegram had hardly left the Wilhelmstrasse, however, than another one was sent ordering
Tschirscky not to carry out the directions contained
in the first.4  The German General Staff had inter1 Die deutsclen Dokumenle, etc., No. 395; Kautsky, French translation already cited, pp. 148-9.
2 Ibid., No. 396.
3 Ibid, etc., No. 441.
4 Ibid., No. 450.
P                   233




The Origins of the War
vened on the pretext that the military preparations
of Russia and France no longer allowed diplomatic
efforts to be continued and rendered a rapid decision
necessary.'
The night before, as a matter of fact, there had
taken place at Potsdam, under the presidency of the
Emperor, an extraordinary sitting of the Council,
to which the military authorities had been summoned.
As the outcome of this meeting, and in the course of
the same night, the Chancellor had hastily sent for
Sir E. Goschen, the British Ambassador. He expressed the fear that the European conflagration was
henceforward inevitable and, to use the words of Sir
E. Gosehen, he offered " a strong bid for the purpose
of ensuring the neutrality of Britain."
There was always, it will be seen, the same
obsession.
"If Great Britain," the Chancellor said, "consents to remain out of the conflict, the Imperial
Government is ready to give every assurance that, in
case of victory, it will 'seek no territorial aggrandisement at the expense of continental France."
He refused, however, to give a similar undertaking in regard to the French colonies.... As to
Belgium, the operations Germany found herself compelled to undertake there would depend on what
France did.2
Such was the abominable " deal" that Germany
proposed incontinently to the British Ambassador.
Nothing could show better that, on the evening
of July 29, after the Potsdam Council, she would
1 Die deutschen Dokumente, etc., Nos. 451 and 464; Kautsky, p. 152.
2 Correspondence of the British Government relative to the European
Crisis, No. 85.
234




Last Efforts for Peace: War
have been delighted to take her part in a war against
France if she could have been assured of the neutrality of Great Britain.  rlhe uncertainty she felt in
regard to the intentions of Great Britain was the
only thing that put a brake on her desires and held
her back.   Her General Staff, however, did not
believe that even this would delay the great blow.
On July 30 a semi-official journal, the Berlin
Lokalanzeiger, published a special edition at 1 P.M.
for the purpose of announcing the general mobilization of the German Army and Navy. This edition
was distributed through Berlin and was then seized
by the order of the Government, who sent a formal
denial of the news to the foreign ambassadors.1
Naturally, however, the news published by the
Lokalanzeiger was immediately telegraphed to St.
Petersburg and Vienna. It was regarded as all the
more probable in Russia from the fact that at the
same moment everybody in Berlin was talking about
the imminence of German mobilization.
M. Jules Cambon, as a matter of fact, telegraphed to M. Viviani at 2.30 P.M. on July 30:
It is reported that mobilization was decided on at this
morning's council, and will probably be decreed tomorrow.   At the Wilhelmstrasse the newspaper correspondents were informed that the reports could neither
be confirmed nor denied, but that important resolutions
were arrived at this morning. There is great excitement.
Simultaneously Sir George Buchanan telegraphed
from St. Petersburg to London:
1 M. Jules Cambon to M. Viviani, Berlin, 3.30 P.M., received in Paris
at 10 P.M.
235




The Origins of the War
Nervousness here has reached such a pitch that, if
Austria refuses to make concessions, Russia will be unable
to hold herself back any longer, and now that she knows
that Germany is arming, she can scarcely, for strategic
reasons, delay transforming her partial mobilization into
a general mobilization.
The immensity of the Russian Empire and the
insufficiency of her means of communication rendered
Russian mobilization much slower than that of the
other European nations. It was therefore only too
obvious why the news of what was happening in
Berlin, coupled with that of the bombardment of
Belgrade in the course of July 30, caused great excitement in St. Petersburg.'
On the following day, July 31, M. Dumaine, our
ambassador, telegraphed from Vienna to M. Viviani:
The mobilization of all men between the ages of 19
and 42 was decreed by the Austro-Hungarian Government
early this morning.'
A little later the same day M. Viviani received
the following message from St. Petersburg from M.
Paleologue:
In consequence of the Austrian general mobilization,
and the measures taken for a secret but continuous mobilization in Germany for six days, orders have been given for
the general mobilization of the Russian Army, Russia
being unable, without placing herself in the greatest
danger, to allow herself to be forestalled any further. In
reality she has only taken military measures corresponding
to those taken by Germany.'
Everything, in fact, confirmed in our minds the
intentions of Germany. From Munich M. Allize


'Yellow Book, No. 113.   2 Ibid., No. 115.  s Ibid., No. 118.
236




Last Efforts for Peace: War


informed us that corps commanders had been given
the alarm during the night of the 30-31st, and that
the bridges over the railways were guarded by
soldiers. Our Minister at Copenhagen informed us
that mobilization was in progress on the Danish
frontier, and that the Hamburg troops had left for
the East; M. Roussin telegraphed from Frankfort
that, in spite of her denials, Germany had at least
begun partial mobilization and that numerous recruits
had left Frankfort on the evening of the 30th.
A good deal of other similar news also reached us,
and on the Friday morning, when the Ministerial
Council again met, it found itself facing an horizon
rapidly becoming darker and darker.
During the night a telegram arrived from M.
Jules Cambon which read as follows:
The hesitating attitude of the British Government is
of a nature that may lead to the most terrible consequences, for here in Berlin they have the greatest hopes
of success in a struggle against France and Russia alone.
The possibility of the intervention of Britain is the only
eventuality that has any effect on the Emperor, his
Government and every interest.  The question of revictualment is being considered, and private persons are
laying in stocks of provisions.  The announcement of
British intervention will therefore tend to have a preventive effect.'
Having read this telegram, I proposed to the
Ministerial Council, which accepted my suggestion,
to send a courier to London with a personal letter
from myself to King George V, emphasizing to his
I Telegram from Berlin, July 31, 1.30 A.M. (received at 3 A.M., " very
urgent ") No. 231.
237




The Origins of the War
Majesty the importance there was in an immediate
and public declaration by Great Britain:
According to all the information that is reaching us [I
said] it is clear that if Germany were certain that the
British Government would not intervene in a conflict in
which France would be engaged, war would be inevitable;
and, on the other hand, if Germany were certain that the
Entente Cordiale would be operative, in such case, as far
as the battlefield, there would be the greatest chance that
peace would not be broken.
This letter has been published by the British
Government since the end of the war. I therefore
need not hesitate to reproduce the complete text of
it:
Paris, July 31, 1914.
CHER ET GRAND AMI,
In the grave circumstances through which Europe is
passing, I believe it to be my duty to communicate
directly to your Majesty the information the Government
of the Republic has received from Germany.
The military preparations that are being made by the
Imperial Government, notably in the immediate neighbourhood of the French frontier, are every day assuming
additional intensity and acceleration. France, determined
to do until the last all that she can for the maintenance
of peace, has so far confined herself strictly to indispensable measures of precaution. It does not appear that
her prudence and her moderation will abate the determination of Germany-far from it. We are therefore,
perhaps, in spite of the discretion of the Government of
the Republic and the calmness of public opinion, on the
eve of the most formidable events.
From all the information that is reaching us, it is clear
that if Germany were certain that the British Government
would not intervene in a conflict in which France would
be engaged, war would be inevitable; and that, on the
238




Last Efforts for Peace: War


other hand, if Germany were certain that the Entente
Cordiale would be operative, in such case, as far as
the battlefield, there would be the greatest chance that
peace would not be broken.
Undoubtedly our military and naval agreements leave
your Majesty's Government entirely free, and in the
letters exchanged in 1912 between Sir Edward Grey and
M. Paul Cambon, Great Britain and France are merely
pledged, the one to the other, to conversations in the event
of European tension, with a view to considering whether
there is ground for common action.
The intimate character, however, that public opinion
in both countries has given to the entente between Great
Britain and France, the mutual confidence in which our
two Governments have unceasingly worked for the maintenance of peace, the sympathy your Majesty has always
manifested for France, encourage me to make known to
you quite frankly our feelings, which are those of the
Government of the Republic and of the whole of France.
I believe that henceforth the last possibilities of peace
depend on the language and the conduct of the British
Government.
We have ourselves, since the beginning of the crisis,
recommended to our allies a moderation to which they
have adhered. In accord with the British Government
and in conformity with the latest suggestions of Sir
Edward Grey, we shall continue so to act. But if all
the efforts at conciliation come from the same side, and
if Germany and Austria are able to speculate on the
abstention of Great Britain, the demands of Austria will
remain inflexible and an agreement between Russia and
her will become impossible.
I have the profound conviction that at'the present
moment the more Great Britain, France and Russia present a strong impression of unity in their diplomatic
action, the more we may still rely on the preservation of
peace.
239




The Origins of the War
Your Majesty will be good enough to excuse a step
which is inspired solely by the desire that the stability
of Europe may be definitely secured.  I beg your
Majesty, etc.               RAYMOND POINCARE.
M. William Martin, Director of the Protocol
Department at the Elysee, took this letter direct to
London and handed it to the King the same evening.
Down to the last moment we desired, as will be
realized, to leave no stone unturned to prevent war.
In the meantime, however, matters again became
worse. A   state of "danger of war" (Kriegsgefahrzustand) was proclaimed in Germany, and at the
same time Count Pourtales was directed by the
Imperial Government to request Russia to demobilize
within twelve hours, both on the Austrian and on the
German frontiers; otherwise, it was stated, Germany
would herself be compelled to mobilize.'
Baron von Schoen came to announce this decision
to M. Viviani. A singular detail was that in the
Note designed for France there appeared a phrase
which was not included in the Note to Russia,
namely, that " Mobilization will inevitably mean
war."  The object of including this phrase was, no
doubt, to enable Baron von Schoen to interrogate
France on what she would do in the case of war between Germany and Russia.
The German Ambassador, in any case, began by
setting forth the Kriegsgefahrzustand as a reply to
the Russian mobilization, and afterwards he asked,
in the name of his Government, what would be the
attitude of France in the event of a war between
Russia and Germany.    M. Viviani intentionally
1 Die deutschen Dokumente, etc., No. 490; Yellow Book, No. 116.
240




Last Efforts for Peace: War


avoided informing him, and Baron von Schoen said
he would come for the reply on the following day
at one o'clock.
He added some disquieting words. He asked M.
Viviani to present to the President of the Republic
his homage and his thanks, and asked that arrangements should be made in regard to himself personally.
To put it briefly, he seemed to refer to his own
departure as probable and pending.'
The Prime Minister, with whom I was in constant touch, hastened to inform me of this interview.
We agreed that when Baron von Schoen returned on
Saturday he should simply be told that France would
be guided by her own interests. To reply that she
would remain neutral would be, in effect, to betray
our Ally; to reply that we should go to the help of
Russia would be to risk aggravating a situation that
was already very serious, and would amount to offering Germany a pretext to say we were threatening
her with a declaration of war.
The   Kriegsgefahrzustand, moreover, enabled
Germany to call up her reservists immediately, to
proceed to a secret mobilization and to proclaim a
state of siege. As a matter of fact, during the day
she cut the railway on territory in the neighbourhood of our frontier, suspended the passage of trains,
and detained a French locomotive.
Three sittings of the Ministerial Council took
place at the Elyse. After having again consulted
General Joffre, the Minister for War found it
necessary to propose supplementary precautionary
measures.  These were decided upon, and the
1 Yellow Book, No. 120.
241




The Origins of the War
Council sanctioned the organization and completion
of the second covering line. By agreement with the
War Minister and the General Staff, however, and
in order to maintain until the last moment an irreproachable reserve, the Government did not yet
issue orders for mobilization.
At that period we did not know the instructions
Baron von Schoen had received from the Chancellor,
Bethmann-Hollweg, at the moment when he presented himself at the Quai d'Orsay, for the purpose
of putting his insidious question to M. Viviani. The
telegram he received was deciphered only during the
war. It was in the following terms:
Russia, in spite of our efforts at mediation, which are
still in progress, and notwithstanding that we have ourselves taken no steps of any kind towards mobilization,
has decided to mobilize the whole of her Army and Navy,
and by consequence against us. We have thereupon declared that a state of danger of war exists, and that
mobilization must follow in the event of Russia not suspending within twelve hours all measures of war against
both Austria and ourselves. Mobilization will inevitably
mean war. Be good enough to ask the French Government if, in the event of a Russia-German war, it will
remain neutral. Reply must be given within eighteen
hours. Telegraph immediately time question put. Utmost urgence is necessary.
And the telegram  concluded, in a cipher more
complicated and still more secret, with these words:
If the French Government declares to remain neutral,
your Excellency will be good enough to inform it that,
as guarantee of this neutrality, we must insist on the
handing over to us of the fortresses of Toul and Verdun,
242




Last Efforts for Peace: War
which we shall occupy and which we shall restore after
the completion of the war against Russia. Reply to this
last question must reach us here before four o'clock
Saturday afternoon.   (Signed) BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.
That was the reward that was to be offered to us
in the event of our repudiating our Alliance with
Russia!
In spite of this step, a ray of hope still shone on
the evening of the 31st. Count Scezsen came to the
Quai d'Orsay with this declaration:
My Government has officially advised Russia that it
has no territorial ambition and that it will not touch the
sovereignty of the State of Serbia. It repudiates also all
intention of occupying the Sanjak. But these declarations
of disinterest will continue to hold good only in the event
of the conflict remaining localized to Austria and Serbia.
In the case of a European war, we shall resume our rights.
Commenting on this declaration, the Austrian
Ambassador allowed it to be understood, as coming
from himself personally, that if his Government was
unable to reply to questions from Powers who spoke
in their own name, he could undoubtedly reply to
Serbia or to any other Power who asked him, in the
name of Serbia, to state his conditions.
At St. Petersburg, simultaneously, the Austrian
Ambassador had been to see M. Sazonoff and had
informed him that the Austrian Government would
agree to enter into a discussion with Russia.  M.
Sazonoff, very satisfied, proposed that the pourparlers
should take place in London.
All this had been quite unhoped for, and M.
Viviani hastened to inform our ambassadors in
243




The Origins of the War
London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna and Rome
of what had occurred.1   Matters thus appeared to
be on the way to an arrangement, and possibly they
would have been arranged but for the ultimatum
addressed to Russia by Germany in which she demanded total demobilization. As M. Jules Cambon
telegraphed from Berlin on August 1:
The ultimatum to Russia can only destroy the last
chances of peace that seemed, from the conversations in
progress, still to exist. It may be asked, in such conditions, if Austria's acceptance was serious, or if its object
was to throw responsibility for the conflict on Russia.
During the night my British colleague made a strong
appeal to Herr von Jagow's humane sentiments. The
latter replied that the matter had now gone too far,
and that the reply of Russia to the German ultimatum
must be awaited.
Further, he told Sir E. Goschen that the ultimatum
demanded   the  withdrawal of Russian   mobilization
measures not only on the German but also on the Austrian
side. My British colleague was extremely astonished at
this, and informed him that this last point would appear
to be unacceptable by Russia.
The German ultimatum, coming at the precise moment
when an agreement appeared to have been almost established between St. Petersburg and Vienna, is significant
of her bellicose policy. The conflict exists, in fact, only
between Russia and Austria, Germany having intervened
only as Austria's ally.
In these conditions, the two Powers principally
interested being disposed to negotiate, it is incomprehensible, unless Germany is anxious for war on her own
account, that she should have sent Russia an ultimatum,
instead of continuing to work, like all the other Powers,
for a peaceful solution.      (Signed) J. CAMBON.2
1 Yellow Book, No. 120.  2 Ibid., No. 121.
244




Last Efforts for Peace: War
Yes, incomprehensible! M. Jules Cambon was
right in using that term. And it was all the more
incomprehensible in view of the fact that the Emperor William having telegraphed to the Tsar on
July 31 that he could guarantee the conciliatory
disposition of Austria, Nicholas II replied:
I thank you with all my heart for your intervention,
which allows a ray of hope that all may yet end happily.
Technically, it is impossible to suspend our military
preparations, which have been necessitated by Austria's
mobilization. We are far from desiring war. Also, as
long as the pourparlers continue with Austria on the
subject of Serbia, my troops will commit no act of provocation —that I give you on my word of honour. I have
absolute confidence in Divine grace, and trust that your
longed-for intervention at Vienna will be for the good of
our countries and the peace of Europe. Cordially yours,
NICHOLAS. 
The fact that the ultimatum was delivered and
maintained in spite of that word of honour was
certain evidence of odious premeditation on the part
of Germany.
On Saturday, August 1, Baron von Schoen did
not wait until 1 P.M. before coming to the Quai
d'Orsay.  He saw M. Viviani again in the morning, and repeated his question of the day before.
France, the Premier told him, would consult her own
interests.
" I admit," the ambassador added, " that my
question is a little naive," but as M. Viviani did not
inform him that France would remain neutral, he
could not very well carry out the instructions of the
1 German White Book, p. 16, where the order of the telegrams has once
more been reversed.
245




The Origins of the War
Imperial Chancellor with reference to the military
occupation by Germany of Toul and Verdun. He
did not apply for his passports, but confined himself
to protesting his love for France and his thanks for
the reception that had always been accorded him
there.
M. Viviani remarked that, for some hours past,
he had had a more favourable impression, and informed the ambassador that Britain had put forward a fresh proposal for a compromise that would
involve the suspension of the Russian military preparations, on condition that the other Powers did
the same, and that M. Sazonoff had accepted this
proposal; that, on the other hand, the Austrian
Government had declared that it did not wish either
to increase its territory at the expense of Serbia, or
even to penetrate the Sanjak, and that it was prepared to discuss with the other Powers, in London,
the fundamentals even of the Austro-Serbian question. " How can it happen," M. Viviani demanded,
" that Germany, at such a moment, refuses all
further pourparlers and sends an ultimatum to
Russia? "
Baron von Schoen was very much at a loss for
a reply, and he confined himself to the statement
that he was ignorant of the developments that had
occurred during the previous twenty-four hours,
that there was still perhaps a ray of hope that an
arrangement would be come to, that he had received
no further communications from his Government,
and that he would try to obtain later information.
He protested afresh his sincere desire to join his
efforts to those of France for the purpose of arriving
246




Last Efforts for Peace: War


at a solution of the conflict. M. Viviani insisted on
the serious responsibility that would fall on the
German Government if, in such circumstances, it
took unjustifiable initiatives that would be of a nature
to compromise peace irremediably.1
The period of delay given to Russia by Germany,
in which to bring about a general demobilization,
expired at noon on August 1, and by that time
the Imperial German Government had already dispatched to St. Petersburg the official text of the
declaration  of war that Count Pourtales      was
instructed to hand to the Russian Government.2
The German Ambassador sought out M. Sazonoff at
seven o'clock in the evening (Russian time), and as
the Russian Foreign Minister could not promise
that a one-sided and immediate demobilization should
take place, he handed in the declaration that had
been prepared.
During the afternoon, however, the Tsar had
once more telegraphed to the German Emperor:
Your telegram received: I understand that you are
compelled to mobilize, but I wish to obtain from you the
same guarantee that I have myself given, namely, that
the measures taken do not mean war, and that we shall
continue to negotiate for the safety of our two countries
and for the general peace which is so dear to our hearts.
Our long-standing friendship will succeed, with the help
of God, in preventing the shedding of blood.  Full of
confidence, I await your urgent reply.
(Signed) NICHOLAS.3
The reply had already left. It was a declaration
of war.
Yellow Book, No. 125.
2 Die deuitschen Dokuzmenle, etc., No. 542.  3 Ibid., No. 546.
247




The Origins of the War
It was impossible to foresee, on Saturday morning, that events would occur with this frightful
rapidity. However, in the presence of the danger
that threatened Europe, the Government of the
Republic did not believe that it would be possible
to postpone further the order for mobilization. The
Ministerial Council, at its meeting during the morning, decided that the order for mobilization should
be sent out telegraphically. In order to eliminate
all offensive character from the measures we were
compelled to adopt, we resolved at the same time
to address to the people of France a collective
proclamation, signed by the President of the
Republic and all the Ministers, and stating that,
proud of its desire to bring about a pacific solution
of the crisis, the Government would continue, in
spite of the military precautions that it was obliged
to take, the diplomatic action that it had pursued
without respite since the origin of the dispute.
The counsels of discretion and of calm that we
gave were, however, superfluous. Never did France
present such a spectacle of unity, of sang-froid and
of dignity.
During the night, about 11.30 P.M., M. Isvolsky,
who was very much upset, called at the Elysee and
announced to me Germany's declaration of war
against Russia. He had received instructions to ask
me what France was going to do.
" The Government," I told him, " is considering
the matter, and I have no doubt that it will be ready
to fulfil the obligations imposed upon us by the
Alliance. But do not insist that we should declare
war against Germany immediately. On the one
248




Last Efforts for Peace: War
hand, we have every interest in mobilizing as far as
possible before the commencement of the inevitable
hostilities; on the other hand, it will be much better
that we should not, in adhering to the Alliance, have
to declare war. If Germany declares war against
us, the people of France will rise with greater ardour
to defend its soil and its liberty."
The ambassador recognized the truth of my
observations. The Ministerial Council, which was
immediately convoked, sat from midnight until four
in the morning. It unanimously approved the reply
I had made to M. Isvolsky and asked me to confirm it
to him. I left the Council chamber for a moment,
accompanied by M. Viviani, for the purpose of
repeating to M. Isvolsky, in the name of the
Government, the statement I had made to him
personally, and it was agreed that we should await
events before carrying out our undertakings under
the Alliance.
During the course of Sunday morning, August 2,
M. William Martin arrived with King George's reply
to my letter. This reply, dated Buckingham Palace,
August 1, was as follows:
CHER ET GRAND AMI,
I appreciate to the fullest extent the sentiments that
have led you to write to me in such a cordial and friendly
spirit, and I am glad that you have set forth your views
so fully and so frankly.
You may be assured that the present situation in
Europe has been the cause of much anxiety and preoccupation to me, and I am thankful to think that our
two Governments have worked so amicably together in
order to try and find a peaceful solution of the questions
in dispute.


Q


249




The Origins of the War
It would be a source of deep satisfaction for us if our
united efforts should end as we wish, and I am not yet
without hope that the terrible events that appear to be
so near may yet be avoided.
I admire the constraint that you and your Government
are exercising in abstaining from taking, on your frontiers,
the final military measures, and in adopting an attitude
that can in no sense and in no way be interpreted as a
provocation.
I am personally making the strongest efforts with the
Emperors of Russia and Germany for the purpose of finding some means by which the present military efforts may
be, in any case, postponed, so that time may be gained
for calm discussion between the Powers.
I intend to prosecute these efforts unceasingly, so long
as there remains any hope of an amicable settlement.
As to the attitude of my country, events are happening
so rapidly that it is difficult to foresee future developments, but you may be assured that my Government will
continue to discuss freely and frankly with M. Cambon
everything that may arise and that may present an
interest for our two nations.
Believe me, Monsieur le President, —Your sincere
friend, GEORGE R.I.
At the moment when this letter reached me the
hope still cherished by the King had unhappily died
out, since at 7.10 on the evening before (Saturday,
August 1) Germany had upset all the negotiations
and followed her ultimatum by declaring war against
Russia.
But what was England going to do?    The King
did not say, and Sir Edward Grey had not yet been
able to give any positive assurances to M. Paul
Cambon. Germany had asked in London for a
declaration of neutrality, and had not obtained it.
250




Last Efforts for Peace: War


Great Britain remained, therefore, free to act as she
thought fit. The British Fleet was still mobilized,
and Sir Edward Grey was prepared to propose to his
colleagues in the Government that Great Britain
should declare her opposition to any passage through
the Strait of Dover by the German Fleet.' This
was a first step; but even now, at the moment when
war had become inevitable, we knew nothing more.
In the course of Sunday afternoon M. Viviani
learnt by telegram from M. Paul Cambon 2 that Sir
Edward Grey, at the close of a Cabinet Council that
had been held in London during the morning, had
made the following declaration to our ambassador:
I am authorized to give you the assurance that if the
German Fleet enters the Channel, or crosses the North
Sea, in order to undertake warlike operations against the
French coast or the French mercantile marine, the British
Fleet will extend all the protection in its power.
There was not yet a promise of entire co-operation, and Great Britain was so profoundly pacific that
she decided, as is well known, to intervene in the
conflict with all her strength only after having seen
the neutrality of Belgium violated by Germany.
We therefore passed the second day of August
in a state of very great anxiety. During the morning, at the sitting of the Ministerial Council, a state
of siege was proclaimed. This decision involved the
convocation of the Chambers within forty-eight
hours, and they were accordingly summoned for
Tuesday. German aggressions continued on our
frontiers and incidents were multiplied, although
1 Yellow Book, No. 126.
2 Ibid., No. 137.
251




The Origins of the War
our troops were still held ten kilometres behind the
frontier line. M. Viviani handed a detailed protest
to Baron von Schoen.
On the following morning, Monday, August 3,
Prince Ruspoli, the Italian Charge d'Affaires (in the
absence of M. Tittoni, the Ambassador, who was
enjoying a cruise on the Norwegian coast), called on
M. Viviani and officially notified him of the declaration of neutrality that had been made by Italy.
The Prime Minister thanked Prince Ruspoli with
enthusiasm, and emphasized how delighted France
would be in not having to engage in a fratricidal
struggle with Italy.
At the isame time, however, our Minister in
Brussels, M. Klobukowski, informed us that on the
previous evening the German Minister in Belgium
had handed to the Belgian Government the ultimatum I have already referred to. Belgium had
given the admirable reply which the world will never
forget, and the German armies were preparing to
march on Liege.
The whole of the rest of the day passed away
without the French Government becoming aware
as to what the intentions of England were. All
that Sir Edward Grey had been able to make known
to M. Viviani was that, at Tuesday's sitting of the
Chambers, the French Government might make the
following declaration:
In the event of the German Fleet passing through the
Straits of Dover or passing up the North Sea for the purpose of going round the British Islands, with the object
of attacking the French coasts or the French Navy and
disturbing the French mercantile shipping, the British
252




Last Efforts for Peace: War


Fleet will intervene in order to extend its entire protection to the French Navy, so that from such a moment
Great Britain and Germany will be in a state of war.
This was a step farther, and England had already
promised us extremely precious help; but this help
remained conditional, and if Germany did not attack
us by sea, Britain might abstain from intervention.
Germany, however, was not disposed to wait any
longer; she meant to press matters forward rapidly,
and at 6.45 P.M. on August 8 Baron von Schoen
handed to M. Viviani Germany's declaration of war
against France, and asked for his passports. At
10 o'clock that evening the German Ambassador
entered a special train at the Porte Dauphine, which
took him to Germany; while M. Jules Cambon was
compelled to leave Berlin under conditions which the
German Imperial Government did its utmost to
render systematically disagreeable.'
In the House of Commons Sir Edward Grey
explained, in terms that were very sympathetic
towards France, that Germany had declared an
aggressive war against us, that although undoubtedly
Britain was under no diplomatic obligation towards
France, she was bound to France by the ties of
sincere friendship, and that it was to Britain's own
national interests that the French coasts should not
be insulted by a foreign fleet. He dwelt at still
greater length on the ultimatum that had been sent
to Brussels, on the letter King Albert had addressed
to King George V, on the guarantees of neutrality
that had been given to Belgium by the Powers, and
he was cheered by the whole House.
1 Yellow Book, No. 155.
253




The Origins of the War
At a meeting of the Cabinet held on the Saturday evening, the British Government decided that
instructions should be sent on Tuesday morning to
the British Ambassador in Berlin to call upon the
German Government to withdraw its ultimatum and
to respect Belgian neutrality.
" If Germany refuses," said Sir Edward Grey to
M. Paul Cambon, "it will be war! " 1
On.the Tuesday morning I wrote again to King
George to thank him     for his letter and for the
declarations made by Sir Edward Grey.      At the
same time I urged upon him the necessity for cooperation on land, both for the defence of Belgian
and French territory:
CHER ET GRAND AMI,
I thank your Majesty for the letter which you have
been good enough to write to me.
The declarations that have been made in the House of
Commons by the Royal Government have made a profound impression in France. The entente cordiale between our two nations is closer than ever, and the news
of common action has been welcomed by public opinion
with emotion and joy.
Understanding is complete between the General Staffs
of our two countries, but so far we have not been informed
whether your Majesty's Government has definitely made
its decision in regard to co-operation on land.
His Majesty King Albert has appealed for our help,
as well as for yours, for the defence of Belgian territory.
The Government of the Republic considers that, if it were
possible for Britain to land in France at once, for
operations in Belgium, the military units which we understand you have available, such a step would furnish public
1 Telegram from M. Paul Cambon, 12.17 (received at 3.47), No. 194.
254




Last Efforts for Peace: War
proof of our fraternity in arms and would produce a most
salutary effect both in Belgium and in France.
I feel it my duty to make this feeling known to your
Majesty, and I again thank you for your expressions of
friendship.                (Signed) R. POINCARt.
The French Ministerial Council approved the text
of this letter, and it also approved the Message which
I had prepared for the Chambers, which was read by
M. Viviani at the same afternoon's sitting.
That sitting was magnificent. I heard the details
of it immediately from the members of the Government who were present. Every Minister came away
in a state of inexpressible emotion, and repeated to
me as one man: "If only you could have been there
with us! France has never been so fine! "
The union sacree, to which I had appealed,
sprang spontaneously, in fact, from every heart, and
France, before the abominable aggression of which
she was the victim, immediately found herself ready
for every effort, for every virtue and every sacrifice.
She knew that for years past her Government had
performed almost the impossible to stave off the
cataclysm that had now burst upon Europe. She
was conscious that she had always kept to herself
the feelings of sadness and regret left behind by her
defeat of 1870 and the loss of her provinces. She felt
that she was innocent of the crime that was being
committed against humanity. She could leave, with
her head held high, for the fields of battle, where the
future of the world was to be decided. In contrast.with Austro-German Imperialism, France became,
in the eyes of the nations, the living representative
of Right and of Liberty.
255








INDEX


A
ABDUL Aziz, defeat of his troops, 85
William II and, 78
Adowa, Italian disaster at, 59
Aehrenthal, Baron, a bold scheme
thwarted by Russia, 98
and the Kaiser's speech in the
Rathaus, 105
death of, 106
his cynical offer to the Porte, 98
renounces rights granted by
Berlin Treaty, 101
succeeds Count Goluchowski, 98
Agadir, alleged trouble at, 76
Panther at, 77, 91
Albania, and the London Pact, 142
Prince William of Wied expelled
by, 157
Albanian question, the, views of
the Tsar on, 185
Albanians, renewed incursions into
Serbia, 153
Albert, King of the Belgians, appeals for British help, 253, 254
at Luneburg, 153
converses with von Moltke: a
curious coincidence, 154
presides at a council meeting, 8
visits Potsdam, 153
Albin, Pierre, 22 (note)
Albin, Ren6, 76 (note)
Alexander II of Russia, and General
Le Flo, 39
assassination of, 46
disillusionment of, 46
in Berlin, 38, 39, 41


Alexander III, Tsar, autocratic
regime of, 46
visits French fleet at Kronstadt,
50
Algeciras Conference, the, 69, 83
Algeria, population harassed by
turbulent tribes in, 80
Allizd, M., French   Minister at
Munich, 137 (note)
disquieting news from, 236
Alsace-Lorraine, attempted Germanization of, 19
pre-war conditions in, 19
restitution of, 26
the passport system established
in, 22
America, as "the peril of the
future," William II on, 24
Anatolia, railway zone in, recognized, 71
Andler, Charles, 28, 34 (note)
Andrassy, Count, an agreement
with Bismarck, 42
Bismarck's meeting with, 44
succeeds Count Beust, 38
Anglo-French Entente, task of ensuring unity of, 111
German plot against, 98
Anglo-Russian agreement, 71
plot to destroy, 98
Asquith, Mr., and the subject of
British intervention, 72
Austria, a secret agreement with
Russia, 42
accuses Serbia of Serajevo crime,
168


257




Index


Austria, after the Franco-Prussian
War, 37 et seq.
and annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 96 et seq.
and the Balkan situation, 47 et
seq., 121
and the Eastern Question, 95 et
seq.
announces intention to take
action against Serbia, 150
Bismarck and, 40
declares war against Serbia, 215
encouraged by Germany to take
action, 170
mobilization of, 136, 215
rekindles the Balkan conflagration, 43
secretly manoeuvring for war,
140
Treaty of Berlin and, 43
ultimatum to Serbia, 44, 153, 167,
193, 212
unpopularity of M. Isvolsky in,
112, 113, 133
Austria-Hungary asks Germany and
Italy to observe provisions of
Triple Alliance, 151
conflicting movements of nationalities of, 106
mobilization of, 196
powers conferred on, by Berlin
Treaty, 96
Austrian Government's tribute to
French Government, 130
Austrian Note communicated to
Great Britain, 217
Austro-German Alliance, the, 45
Austro-German Treaty, publication
of, 47
Austro-Hungarian Government conceals news of ultimatum to Serbia, 193
Austro-Hungarian  Ministers,  a
Council of, 176
Austro-Hungary sends a comminatory note to Cettinje, 141




Avelane, Admiral, arrives at Toulon, 53
B
BALKAN ALLIANCE, the, and its
signatories, 108
Balkan Peninsula, trouble in, 41, 43
Balkan States, mobilization of, 115,
126
Balkan peace signed with Turkey,
141
Balkan wars, 44, 150
Balkans, the, an International Commission for, 97
Bardoux, Jacques, 74 (note), 95
(note), 148 (note)
Barrer, M., French Ambassador in
Rome, 62
Barthou, M., introduces military
service Bill, 137
Bazergue, Albert, 25 (note), 76
(note)
Beaconsfield, Lord, at Berlin Congress, 43
Belgium, German ultimatum to, 6,
252
Germany violates neutrality of, 6
replies to Germany, 8
Belgrade, bombardment of, 215
fall of, 41
the Kaiser's "pawn" for Austria, 220, 222
Benckendorff, Count, accompanies
the Tsar to Bjoerkoe, 69
Berchtold, Count, conversation with
Francis Joseph, 177
invited to Konopischt, 158
on Serbia, 176
replaces Aehrenthal, 106
Berlin, a meeting of three Emperors at, 38
an international exhibition in, 22
Congress of, 43, 95
Treaty of, and Austria, 43


258




Index


Berlin, M. Sazonoff's pacific measures at, 124
Bernhardi, on war, 29
Bertrab, General von, reports Potsdam conversation to Count
Waldersee, 175
Bertrand, Pierre, 153 (note), 166
(note)
Bethmann-Hollweg, von, German
Chancellor, 6
a momentous statement in the
Reichstag, 66
and Morocco, 91
and the Balkan Question, 127
at Imperial Palace, Potsdam, 171,
175
bids for British neutrality, 234
considers entente between Vienna
and Rome necessary, 219
on British " encirclement policy,"
64
on Germany's need for expansion,
156
on Russia's responsibility for war,
13
recommends Austria to accept
Sir E. Grey's proposition, 233
urges acceptance of mediation,
232-3
Beust, Count, 37
resignation of, 38
Beyens, Baron, Belgian Minister in
Berlin, 95 (note), 157 (note),
138, 153
Bieberstein, Baron Marschall von
(see Marschall)
Bienvenu-Martin, M., acts as Foreign Minister, 194
advice to M. Vesnitch, 225
messages to author on Austrian
ultimatum, 199, 200
von Schoen's interview with, 201
et seq.
Bihourd, M., Emperor's overtures
to, 25


Bilinski, Dr. von, reprimands Austro-Hungarian  authorities in
Bosnia, 163
Birileff, Admiral, accompanies Tsar
to Bjoerkoe, 69
Bismarck, Count Herbert, complains of popularity of Derou16de, 20
Bismarck, Prince, a secret agreement with Russia, 45
and Austria, 40
and Germany's faculty for war,
27
and Morocco, 80
and Russia, 38, 42
and the Eastern Question, 41
contemplates a preventive war,
39
dismissal of, 22, 32, 48
poses as " the honest broker," 42
presides at Congress of Berlin, 43
proposes a European conference,
42
proposes Franco-German alliance,
17
suggests a new capitulation by
France, 18-19
suspicious of rapidity of French
restoration, 37
threatens France, 17
tries to embroil France with
Italy, 17
Bjoerkoe agreement, the, 69, 70
Boisdeffre, General, at KrasnoeSelo, 49, 143
mission to Russia, 52
Bolshevist Press, Russian, a reflection on France in, 134
Bompard, M. Louis Maurice, 76
(note)
Boppe, M., arrives in Belgrade, 225
replaces M. Descos, 196
Bosnia, occupation of, 43
revolt of Christians in, 41
the Berlin Treaty and, 95


259




Index


Bosnia-Herzegovina, annexation of,
96 et seq.; the prelude to
World War, 102
Bosphorus, the, German military
mission on banks of, 155
Bourgeois, M. Leon, 93, 113
efforts for limitation of armaments, 61
Bourtzef, M., discovers letters compromising the Kaiser, 66
Boxer rising, the, 31
Briand, M., 93, 113
acts as Minister for Foreign
Affairs, 121
Brussels, Belgian records at, pillaged by Germans, 138
Buchanan, Sir George, announces
mobilization of Germany, 236
received by author in St. Petersburg, 188
Buchard, Lieutenant, the Emperor's
conversations with, 23, 24
Buchlau, M. Isvolsky at, 100
Budapest, visit of Ferdinand of
Bulgaria to, 100
Bukarest, Treaty of, 150; William
II on, 157
Bulgaria, division of, 43
independence proclaimed, 101
self-government granted to, 42
signs peace with Turkey, 152
signs secret agreement at Sofia,
108
union with Eastern Roumelia, 47
Billow, Prince von, and Morocco, 81
and the Transvaal War, 24
explains role of William II, 31
on Algeciras Conference, 83
on British policy of encirclement,
63
on " irreconcilable France," 16
on the merits of Bismarck, 27
Bussche, Chevalier von dem, and
the Potsdam interview, 174
Zimmermann's confession to, 213


C
CABRINOVITCH, NEDELJIKO, and the
Serajevo crime, 163, 168
Cambon, M. Jules, announces German mobilization, 235
conversations with Herr Zimmermann, 156
informed of interview at Potsdam, 153
leaves Berlin, 253
on gravity of ultimatum to
Russia, 244
on Pan-Germanism, 106
on preventive effect of British
intervention, 237
stipulates terms of consortiums,
89
Cambon, M. Paul, and the situation
in Morocco, 83
apprises British Foreign Office of
Serbo-Bulgarian treaty, 116
interviews Sir Edward Grey, 72
Lord Lansdowne's proposal to,
72
suggests British intervention, 195
Capelle, Admiral, at Potsdam, 175
Carlotti, Marquis de, Italian Ambassador, 189
Carnot, President, 50, 191
assassination of, 166
his peace toast, 53
Carol, King of Rumania, 150
informed of Austria-Hungary's
attitude in event of war, 149
Casablanca incident, the, 84, 85, 88
Caserio assassinates President Carnot, 166
Cavell, Miss, murder of, 87
Cettinje, Austro-Hungarian comminatory note to, 141
Charbonnier, M., assassination of, 84
Chelius,> General von, conversation
with Prince Troubetzkoy, 220,
221


26o




Index


Churchill, Winston, and distribution of naval forces, 72
witnesses German   manceuvres,
74
Ciganovitch, Milan, and the Serajevo tragedy, 168, 169
Cintra, and Casablanca incident, 86
Clemenceau, M., his policy of cooperation with Germany, 88
Connaught, Duke of, at German
mancceuvres, 74
Constantinople, German intrigues
at, 84, 141, 152
revolution in, 99
Russia's ultimatum to, 41
Crete awarded to Greece, 141-2
Cronberg, meeting of Edward VII
and William II at, 74
Crozier, M., reports uneasiness of
Francis Joseph on the peace
outlook, 107
D
DAMASCUS, the Kaiser as "defender of Islam " at, 78
Daneff, M., President of Bulgarian
Sobranje, at St. Petersburg,
109
succeeds Guechoff as Premier, 149
Danube, valley of the, Austrian
concentration in, 136
Danubian Quadrilateral, the, 149
Dard, M., on Austro-Hungarian intrigues, 107
Darmstadt, meeting of the Kaiser
and the Emperor of Russia
at, 60
Daudet, Ernest, 40 (note), 95 (note)
Davignon, M., a German ultimatum
received by, 6, 9
Belgian Foreign Minister, 138
De Benomar, Marquis, Spanish
Ambassador in Berlin, 80


De Boisdeffre, General, and the
Russian Alliance, 54
Decazes, Duke, and Prince Hohenlohe, 38
letter to Count d'Harcourt, 40
De Courcel, M., Bismarck's proposition to, 17
De Fontenay, M., previsions of,
107
De Freycinet, M., and the Russian
Alliance, 50, 51
meets Grand Duke Nicholas, 49
on Franco-Russian rapprochement, 48
Prince von Hohenlohe and, 19, 20
De Gabriac, M., Charge d'AfTaires
in Berlin, 37
De Giers, M., 49, 50
and the certainty of war, 52
illness of, 52
De Gontaut-Biron (see GontautBiron)
D'Harcourt, Count, French Ambassador in London, 40
De Laboulaye, M., interviews M. de
Giers, 50
on rapprochement with Russia, 49
Delbriick, Professor Hans, and
Count Szogyeny, 173
and his cynical cry, 29, 30
Delcassd, M., 56, 93, 113
asks to be relieved of his post, 180
resigns, 82
signs agreement with British
Government, 62
De Margerie, M., French Charge in
Spain, 81
De Miribel, General, a Note from, 52
De Montebello, M., French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 52,
53, 54, 55
Denis, Ernest, 153 (note), 227 (note)
and the Austrian accusations
against Serbia, 168, 169
6I




Index


De Noailles, Marquis, and the German policy during Transvaal
War, 24
reports  Kaiser's  conversation
with Lieut. Buchard, 24
De Poggenpohl, Nicolas, Gortschakoff's confidences to, 46
Dernburg, Herr, a dictum of, 35
Deroulkde, M., Count Herbert Bismarck and, 20
Descos, M., French Minister to
Serbia, illness of, 196
replaced by M. Boppe, ibid
De Selves, M., receives Note on
Morocco, 76
Devas, G. Y., 137 (note)
Develle, M. Jules, informed of pending arrival of Russian squadron, 53
Disraeli, Benjamin (see Beaconsfield)
Djemal Pasha, action at Constantinople, 141
Dogger Bank incident, the, 67
Doumergue, M., and the French
President's visit to Russia, 180
his pledges to Germany, 155
Drude, General, 85
Dual Monarchy, the, and the punitive expedition against Serbia,
161
Dumaine, M., announces mobilization decree, 236
French Ambassador at Vienna,
129 (note)
on the Austrian Imperial Chancellery, 212
on the inevitability of war, 161
on the Serajevo crime, 170
Dunkirk, demonstration at, 206
Durckheim, M., 227 (note)
E
EASTERN QUESTION, the, Bismarck
on, 41


Eastern Question, Germany and the,
95 et seq.
Eastern Roumelia, union with Bulgaria, 47
Edward VII, King, accession of, 61
and the limitation of naval armaments, 100
interviews William II at Friedrichshof, 74, 99
meets Francis Joseph at Ischl, 99
visits Paris, 62
visits Tsar at Reval, 71, 99
El Menebbhi in Berlin, 80
Ems dispatch, the, falsification of,
27; Delbriuck on, 30
England, attitude of, regarding
annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 104
Bismarck's designs on, 17-18
her attitude after German ultimatum, 250 et seq.
(cf. Great Britain)
English fishing-boats fired on: Admiral Rojdestvensky's unfortunate mistake, 67
Entente Cordiale, the, signed, 62 et
seq.
Enver Pasha, as tool of German
Foreign Office, 141
drastic action of, 155
Essad Pasha, double-dealing of, 141
Etienne, M., and the military law
proposals, 137
Europe exposes itself to increasing
peril, 104-105
European Turkey, the traditional
French policy in, 131
Eyschen, M., and the German invasion of Luxemburg, 5, 6
F
FALKENHAYN, VON, at Potsdam, 175
Fallibres, M., 191
urges author to visit Russia, 113


262




Index


Fashoda incident, the, 60
Faure, President, 191
and the Franco-Russian Convention, 55
visits St. Petersburg and Moscow, 59
Ferdinand of Bulgaria, King, and
the Balkan conventions, 110
caught in his own trap, 150
Guechoff's interview with, 108
orders attack on Serbian army,
148
proclamation of, 101
visits Budapest, 100
Ferdinand of Coburg elected King
of Bulgaria, 47
Ferry, M. Abel, death of, 198
meets author at Dunkirk, 207
Ferry, M. Jules, Baron de Courcel's
dispatches to, 18
Fez, a French mission at, 78
the Kaiser offers assistance to
Sultan of, 79
Ficke, Herr Karl, 85
his papers seized, 90, 95
intrigues of, 93, 94
Flotow, M., interviews Italian Premier, 218
Flourens, M., his pacific declarations to Berlin, 21
replaces M. de Freycinet, 20
Forgach, Count, and the Serajevo
crime, 103, 167
France, a dinner to the Tsar and
Imperial family on board, 191
France, a secret agreement with
Russia, 54
accused by Germany of wanting
war, 14 et seq.
and annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 104
and Germany after 1870, 1 et seq.
and Russia, ratification of rapprochement delayed, 52
and the German indemnity, 37


France, and the situation in the
Balkans, 121 et seq.
commemoration of 1870 in, 59
cordial relations with Russia, 46
disciplinary measures by, 145
her desire for peace, 94, 116, 125,
203 et seq., 228, 229
her policy in the East, 121
ignorant of Balkan Alliance, 111,
113
informed of military measures on
Serbian frontier, 159
message to the Chambers, 255
military service Bill passed, 137
ministerial crisis in, 92
mobilization of, ordered by Government, 248
prudent diplomacy of, 73
question of her neutrality, and
German guarantee demanded,
242
rapprochement with Russia, 47, 51
refuses Bulgarian loan, 121
weakness of her alliance with
Russia, 70
Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, assassination of, 158, 161, 164
goes to Serajevo, 162
the German Emperor and, 157 et
seq.
Francis Joseph, Emperor, a memorandum to the Kaiser on Serajevo crime, 160, 169
and Serbia, 177
and the imminence of war, 156
autograph letter to Berlin on
Serajevo tragedy, 171
on the precariousness of peace,
107
proposes demobilization of Austria and Russia, 140
receives Kaiser in Vienna, 105
visits St. Petersburg, 96
visits William I, 38
Franco-British agreement, Bllow
on, 64


263




Index


Franco-German agreement, the, 88
ratified, 92
Franco-Prussian War, indemnity
demanded by Germany, 37
Franco-Russian Alliance, constitution of, 57
Franco-Russian Convention, 55;
modification of, 56
Frankfort, Treaty of, 16; France
after, 37
Frederick III, Emperor, brief reign
of, 22
Frederick, Dowager Empress, visits
Paris and Versailles, 23, 49
French action regarding the incident at Nancy, 145
French Foreign Legion, the, and
German intrigues, 85, 86
Friedjung, Dr., misleading documents of, 104
Furstenberg, Prince, a snub for,
149, 150
G
GAUVAIN, AUGUSTE, 95 (note), 152
(note)
his work on the origin of Great
War, 135
Georg, Captain, of Zeppelin L.Z. 16,
143
George V, King, replies to M. Poincare's letter, 249
text of M. Poincare's letter to,
238 et seq.
unveils monument to Queen Victoria, 74
George, Right Hon. D. Lloyd, visits
Berlin, 74
German Empire, population of, 32
German General Staff, the, military
measures of, and their object,
137
German gratitude: two outstanding examples of, 142, 144


German Imperial Government, the,
a cynical statement by, 7
German Imperialism, growth of, 28
German Navy, the, creation of, 32
German official Blue and White
Books, omissions and falsifications of dates in, 222, 224, 230,
245
German Press, the, and the Nancy
affair, 144; on landing of
Zeppelin at Luneville, 143
Germans pillage Belgian records, 138
" the salt of the earth," 29
Germany, a state of "danger of
war" proclaimed in, 240, 242
an internal crisis in, 21
and Constantinople, 152
and Morocco, 90
and the Agadir incident, 76 et seq.
another concession from Triple
Entente, 152
anxious for safety of Triple Alliance, 219
asked to observe provisions of
Triple Alliance, 151
attitude of, in Kiel festivities, 58
bargainings by, 84
constant irritation of France by,
17 passim
creates Triple Alliance, 45
declares war against France, 1 et
seq., 253
declares war against Russia, 1,
14, 247
extends consular protection to
rebels, 93
fear of British intervention in
conflict, 232
her desertion agency at Casablanca, 85, 86
her destiny, 29
her " economic"   interests in
Morocco, 81
her knowledge of, and acquiescence in, Austrian ultimatum,
212 et seq.


264




Index


Germany, how national passions
are inflamed in: Bismarck's
view, 27-8
how she secured her markets, 35
intrigues with Sultan, 83
invades French territory, 5, 6, 251
mobilization  announced- and
formally denied, 235
obtains a consortium from M.
Pichon, 90
population of, 32
proclaims a state of siege, 241
proposes a deal to ensure British
neutrality, 234
protests her innocence for outbreak of war, 9 et seq., 14 passim
secretly manoeuvring for war, 141
skilful system of propaganda, 9
suppresses telegrams of importance, 224
taxation in, to strengthen her
forces, 137
the incident of 1875, 38 et seq.
ultimatum to Russia, 14, 244
world policy of, 32 et seq.
Gervais, Admiral, his squadron
anchors at Kronstadt, 50
Giesl, Baron, Austrian Minister at
Belgrade, 193
leaves Belgrade, 215
Giolitti, M., and Austria's projected
" defensive war," 151
revelations by, in the Italian
Chamber, 150
Giraud, Victor, 28 (note)
Goluchowski, Count, and the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 96
supersession of, 98
Gontaut-Biron, M. de, French Ambassador to Germany, 37, 39
Gortschakoff, Prince, 39
at Berlin Conference, 43
confidences to a journalist, 46
Goschen, Sir E., offered a " strong
bid for neutrality," 234




Gosseler, Herr von, the Kaiser's
gift to, 30
Grabez, his part in Serajevo crime,
168
Gravosa, Austrian concentration at,
136
Great Britain, assures France of
protection by British Fleet,
251, 252
blamed by Germany for the war,
10 et seq.
demands withdrawal of ultimatum, 254
Great Powers, the, author submits
a formula to, on Balkan Question, 129
Greco-Bulgarian treaty of alliance,
the, 110; author's discussion
with M. Sazonofl, 114
Greece, awarded Salonica and Crete,
141
signs a secret agreement at Sofia,
108
Grelling, Richard, 10
Grdvy, President, and the Schncebele affair, 22
Grey, Sir Edward, and the Austrian ultimatum, 195, 217
announces British intervention,
251, 252, 253
effect of his attitude on Germany,
232, 233
interviews M. Cambon, 72
Lichnowsky's tribute to his impartiality, 142
proposals for maintenance of
peace, 203, 226, 227
Gu6choff, M., an interview with
Ferdinand in the royal train
108
and a proposed Bulgarian loan,
117
interviews M. Milanovitch, 109
prepares the 'Balkan alliance, 108
signs Greco-Bulgarian treaty, 110




Index


Guelloull, Kaid, consular protection for, 93
Guillaume, Baron, Belgian Minister in Paris, 139
Guiot, M., sent to Berlin by French
Government, 89
Gustavus V, King of Sweden, receives author, 196-7
Gwinner, Herr, of the Deutsche
Bank, 156
H
HABSBURG MONARCHY, the, and
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 95 el seq.
Hague Conference, the, 61
Haldane, Lord, his mission to Berlin, 75
Hanotaux, Gabriel, 40 (note)
reproached by M. Maurras, 58
Hansen, Jules, 46 (note)
Harden, Maximilian, a frank confession by, 10
Hardinge, Sir Charles (Lord Hardinge of Penshurst), 99
Hauser, M. Henri, describes how
Germany secured her markets,
35
Hazzaoui, Sherif Ben, consular protection for, 93
Heeringen, von, adopts proposals
of German General Staff, 137
Helfferich, Herr, of the Deutsche
Bank, 156
Heligoland catastrophe, France's
expression of sympathy, 145
Herbette, M., replaces M. de Courcel, 20
the Kaiser's proposal to, 23
warns France of Germany's preparations for war, 21
Herzegovina, occupation of, 43
revolt of Christians in, 41
the Berlin Treaty and, 96


Hilmi Pasha, Inspector-General in
Macedonia, 97
Hoetzendorf, Conrad von, Gen. von
Moltke and, 140
Hohenberg, Duchess of, accompanies her husband to Serajevo, 162
assassination of, 164
Hohenlohe, Colonel von, carries a
letter to the Tsar, 140
Hohenlohe, Prince von, and Germany's attitude on Morocco, 80
bids farewell to M. de Freycinet, 19
Bismarck's orders to, 19, 20
Hohenwart Cabinet, resignation of,
38
Hohenzollern appears off Tangier,
77, 81
Hollweg (see Bethmann-Hollweg)
Holy War proclaimed, 85
Hovelacque, Emile, 28 (note)
Hoyos, Count, conveys autograph
letter from Francis Joseph to
Berlin, 171
I
Iphigenie, French training ship, the
Kaiser aboard, 24
Ischl, meeting between Emperors
at, 38
Isvolsky, M., and a proposed Bulgarian loan, 117
and reorganization in the Balkans, 98
and Serbo-Bulgarian treaty, 117
and the annexation of BosniaHerzegovina, 100
and Victor Emmanuel, 100
announces Germany's declaration
of war, 248
asks for replacement of M. Louis
at St. Petersburg, 112
bargains with Austria, 100
disclaims knowledge of Balkan
treaties, 114


I


266




Index


Italy, and the Triple Alliance, 45,
151, 218 et seq.
German anxiety as to her action,
218
German intrigues in, 84
war with Turkey, 132
J
JAGOW, HERR VON, a significant inquiry by, 208
and the Austrian   ultimatum,
192-3, 199, 213
and the incident at Nancy, 145
and the Konopischt interview,
158
and violation of Luxcmburg, 5, 6
approves of Austrian Note to
Serbia, 196
British Ambassador's appeal to,
244
Japanese  sink   Rojdestvensky's
fleet, 68
Joffre, General, ministerial consultations with, 231, 241
Jonesco, M. Take, 141 (note)
and Prince Fiirstenberg, 149
Jonnart, M., recalls M. Louis, 180
Jordan, M. Camille, 170 (note)
K
KAUTSKY, HERR KARL, 10, 164
(note), 210 (note), 211, 233
(note), 234 (note)
a singular admission by, 4
and the German ultimatum   to
Belgium, 6
and the situation in the Balkans,
159
Khevenhiiller, Count, and annexation  of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
101
Kiderlen-Waechter, Herr, and the
Bulgarian unrest, 125




Kiderlen-Waechter, Herr, and the
conflict between Balkan States,
126
and the crisis in Morocco, 91
Kiel Canal, opening of the, 58
Kirchen, military measures at, 152
Kirk Kilisse, Serbian victory at,
136
Kitchener, Lord, and Fashoda incident, 60
Klobukowski, M., and the German
ultimatum to Belgium, 252
and tihe neutrality of Belgium, 8
Kokovtzoff, M., and Bulgaria, 124
author's interview with, 113
Konopischt, happenings at, 157 et
seq.
Krasnoe-Selo, a review at, 190
meeting of two Emperors at, 49
Kronstadt, Admiral Gervais' squadron at, 50
AM. Poincard's welcome at, 182
Kumanovo, Serbian victory at, 136
Kuropatkin, General, defeat of, 66
L
LAnIOVARY, M., and the Serajevo
tragedy, 164
Lair, Maurice, 28
Laloy, Emile, 76 (note), 95 (note)
Lamprecht, Karl, and "telluric
Germanization," 29
Lamsdorff, Count, accompanies
Tsar to Schbnbrunn, 97
and the Bjoerkoe agreement, 69
Lancken, Baron von, a threatening
declaration by, 82
and the Franco-German consortium, 90
demands satisfaction, 87
Lansdowne, Lord, proposes formula
for an entente, 72
Le FI6,General, Alexander II and, 39


267




Index


Lichnowsky, Prince, a candid statement by, 215
a dispatch from, annotated by
the Kaiser, 11
confirms information given by
Count Szogyeny, 1734
confidences of a secretary of, 156
on the London Conference, 142
London, Conference of, 141 et seq.
London welcomes William II, 74
Loubet, President, 56, 191
received by King Edward, 62
Louis, M. Georges, and Russia's
naval overtures, 56-7
recall of, 180
reports interview with M. Kokovtzoff, 124
strained relations with Russian
Government, 112
transmits Sazonoff's proposal re
Montenegrin mobilization, 123
Ludendorff, and Germany's new
military law, 140
Luderitz, German Consul at Casablanca, 87
Luneville, a Zeppelin lands at, 143
Luxemburg, German invasion of, 5
Lyautey, General, accepts post as
Resident in Sherifian Empire,
94
M
MACCHIO, BARON, and the Austrian
Note, 212
Macedonia, partition of, 141
Russia's opinion of Balkan intervention in, 110
Sazonoff desires immediate reforms in, 125
Macedonian reforms, Germany and,
98 et seq.
Madrid, an International Conference at, 80
Majoresco, M., Rumanian Foreign
Minister, 149


Malaurie, M. Albert, interviews
German professors, 10
Malek, Sherif Moulay Abdel, receives the Kaiser, 77
Mannesmanns, the, intrigues of, 90,
92
Manteuffel, Field-Marshal, and Alsace-Lorraine, 19
Marchand, Major, and the Fashoda
incident, 60
Marschall von Bieberstein, Baron,
23
and Turkey, 99
Martin, M. William, hands M. Poincard's letter to King George,
and brings reply, 240, 249
Mauchamp, Dr., murder of, 84
Maurras, M. Charles, and the opening of Kiel Canal, 58
Mensdorff, Count, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in England,
173
Messimy, M., French Minister of
War, 207, 231
Milanovitch, M., and the Balkan
Alliance, 109
Millerand, M., 93, 113
Mohammed Hiba, German consular protection for, 93
Mohrenheim, Baron, and M. Ribot,
49
Mollard, M., reports German advance, 227
Moltke, von, and the German
military law, 137, 140
Prince Biilow's appreciation of,
27
draws up ultimatum to Belgium,
6
meets the Kaiser, 153
Monaco, Prince of, and a mysterious remark by the Kaiser,
158
Monastir, Serbian victory at, 136


268




Index


Montenegrin troops attack  the
Turks, 131


Montenegro declares war against
Turkey, 41
mobilization of, 123
raises siege of Scutari, 141
signs agreement at Sofia, 108
Moorish missions to Germany, 80, 81
Morgenthau, Mr., and Francis
Joseph's confession, 157
Morocco, and Anglo-French agreement on, 81
and the Balkan crisis, 76 et seq.
Franco-German agreement regarding, 88
German intrigues in, 80, 84
revolt in, 90
Sultan of, requests International
Conference, 81
the open door to German enterprise in, 84
William II desires agreement with
Sultan of, 78
Motono, Baron, explains his idea of
a quadruple entente, 188
Moulay Abdel Malek, Sherif, 77
Mount Loevcen, occurrences at,
during Great War, 131
Mouravieff, Count, 56, 96
Muellon, Herr, 10
Muley Hafid appeals to France, 91
grants mines to Germany, 90
proclaims Holy War, 85
signs Protectorate agreement, 93
Mulhausen, mobilization measures
at, 152
Miinster, Count, author and, 48
invites France to attend opening of Kiel Canal, 58
Muret, Maurice, 28
Mtirzsteg programme, the, 97
N
NANCY, an unfortunate incident at,
144


Naval competition, measures for
suppression of, 74, 75
Nekludoff, M., Russian Minister at
Stockholm, 196
Nicholas II, Tsar, a personal letter
from Francis Joseph, 140
and the Kaiser, 67, 68
and the opening of Kiel Canal,
58
and the Persian Question, 184
at Bjoerkoe, 69
circular to the Powers, 60
correspondence with the German
Emperor, 222
his assurances to the Kaiser,
13
his last effort for peace, 247
maintains friendly relations with
the Kaiser, 59
meets William II, 71
on Russia's attitude towards
Sweden, 191
promises to visit France, 181, 185
proposes that Austro-Serbian dispute be referred to Hague Conference, 225
receives MM. Poincare and Viviani, 183
thanks the Kaiser for intervention, 245
the Kaiser's correspondence with,
12
visits Francis Joseph, 97
visits Paris, 59
Nicholas, Grand Duke, visits Paris'
49
Nicolson, Sir A., 203
Nietzsche, 29
Northern Persia, railway zone in,
71
Novibazar, the Sanjak of, 96
Treaty of Berlin and, 43
Nuremberg, an alleged French airraid on, 3, 4
the burgomaster's denial of a
German accusation, 3, 4


269




Index


0
OBROUTCHEFF, GENERAL, and a
Russian alliance, 54
Oldenburg, Grand Duke of, the
Kaiser's admission to, 24
Oulad Bessam douar, 93, 94
P
PAGNY-SUR-MOSELLE, the    commissary of police at, arrested,
22
Paleologue, M., announces Austrian mobilization, 236
reports result of his mission, 229
succeeds Delcasse at St. Petersburg, 180
Pallavicini, Marquis, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, 99
received by Francis Joseph, 156
Pams, M., 113
Pan-Germanism, increasing arrogance of, 106
Panas, M., signs a Greco-Bulgarian
treaty, 110
Panther anchors off Agadir, 77, 91
Paris, intense patriotic scene in, 207
momentous ministerial councils
in, 249, 251
Russian Admiral in, 53
the German Ambassador's visit
to M. Viviani in, 1 et seq.
Pashitch, M., hands Serbia's reply
to Austria, 215
Persian Question, friction between
Russia and Britain on, 184
Pichon, M., and the Casablanca
incident, 87
grants   consortium   between
French company and German
Cameroon, 90
his policy of co-operation with
Germany, 89, 155
Picquart, General, 85
27(




Pinon, Ren6, 40 (note), 76 (note),
95 (note)
Plevna carried by Russian army, 42
Poincar6, M., a prolonged interview
with the Tsar, 185
and France's alleged responsibility for war, 15 et seq.
and the Balkan trouble, 121 et seq.
and the Heligoland catastrophe,
145
and the Serajevo tragedy, 164,
166
and the subject of British intervention, 72
Austrian curiosity as to date of
his departure for Russia, 1791
congratulatory telegrams to the
Kaiser, 146
disquieting wireless messages at
Stockholm, 195
embarks on France, 182
forms a Cabinet, 92
German propagandists and, 15
gives audience to foreign ambassadors in St. Petersburg,
188
hastens to Paris, 198
his mission to St. Petersburg, 57
issues proclamation to the French,
248
learns by wireless of Kaiser's return from Kiel, 198
message to the Chambers on declaration of war, 36, 255
news, by wireless, of Austrian
Note to Serbia, 194
on France's efforts for peace, 36
presides at a ministerial council
on eve of his visit to Russia, 182
programme for his visit to Russia,
181
received at Austrian and German
embassies on becoming President, 131
reception at Stockholm, 196
sends personal letters to George
V, 237 et seq., 254




)




Index


Poincard, M., telegraphs to Kaiser
re Major Winterfeld's accident,
147
toast at Tsar's banquet, 187
transmits report of Russian interviews to M. Cambon, 113, 116
et seq.
visits Major Winterfeld after his
accident, 147
visits Russia, 113
Pola, William II's visit to, 139
Ponsot, M. Henri, enters into relations with German Foreign
Office, 155
Port Baltic, political bargainings at,
71
Potiorek, General, Governor of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 163
Potsdam, a virtual Crown Council
at, 175
an extraordinary sitting of Council at, 234
momentous interviews at, 171
the Tsar's visit to, 71
Pourtalds, Count, a report from,
annotated by the Kaiser, 11
and Russia's military preparations, 228
author and, 188
directed to request Russia to
demobilize, 240
"friendly advice " to Russia, 103
hands Germany's declaration of
war to Russian Government, 14
Princip, Gavrilo, 168
assassinates Francis Ferdinand
and his wife, 164
Prinetti, M., and Italian neutrality,
62
Puaux, Rene, 5 (note)
R
RACCONIGI, M. Isvolsky at, 100
Radolin, Prince, and Morocco, 82


I
i


Radowitz, Herr von, 156
and Morocco, 81
Raisuli the brigand, 84
Regnault, M., unsuccessful attempt
to see the Sultan, 90
Reinach, Joseph, 166 (note)
Renoult, M. Rene, meets author at
Dunkirk, 207
Renschausen firm, partners of,
arrested, 93
Reval, King Edward at, 71
Reventlow, Count, von Billow on,
64
Revoil, M. Paul, 83
Ribot, M., 48, 50, 51, 52
and secret treaties, 54
and the isolation of France, 48
Richthofen, Baron von, 81 (note)
and the incident at Nancy, 144
Rojdestvensky, Admiral, his fleet
sunk, 68
unfortunate mistake of, 67
Roon, Field-Marshal, as military
organizer, 27
Rosen, Dr., 83, 84
Rosenberg, Herr von, M. Stephen
Pinchon and, 155
Roumelia (Eastern), union with
Bulgaria, 47
Roussin, M., announces German
mobilization, 237
reports movements of troops, 227
Rouvier, M., and the conference on
Moroccan affairs, 82
Roz, Firmin, 95 (note)
Rumania, King of, receives Tsar at
Constanza, 159
mobilizes against Bulgaria, 150
opens hostilities against Bulgaria, 149
Ruspoli, Prince, notifies M. Viviani
of Italy's neutrality, 252
Russell, Lord Odo, 39


27I




Index


Russia, a secret agreement with
Austria, 42
and annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 100 et seq.
and the Balkan alliances, 122
and the Berlin Congress, 43, 44
apprised of Balkan treaty, 109
cordial relations with France, 46
declaration of war dispatched to,
1, 14, 247
efforts at conciliation by, 230
Germany's efforts to incriminate,
221
Germany's ultimatum to, 244
her responsibility for war, 12
mobilization of, 12, 13; exclusively aimed at Austria, 230, 231
M. Sazonoff and the situation in
the Balkans, 125
overtures to France on naval relations, 57
rapprochement with France, 47
revolution in, 166
secret agreement with France, 54
secret agreement with Germany,
45
signs German Bagdad scheme, 71
the Memorandum on the entente
cordiale, 51
threatened revolution in, 69
Russian Alliance, the, and the
Entente Cordiale, 37 et seq.
Russian delegates at Berlin Conference, 43
Russian Government intervenes in
interests of peace, 39
Russo-French Alliance, difficulties
of working, 111
Russo-Japanese War, the, William
II and, 66
Russo-Turkish War, the, 42
S
SACKEN, COUNT OSTEN, and M.
Bihourd, 25


St. Petersburg, author's visit to, 188
strikes in, 188
Saint-Vallier, Count de, his dispatch to M. Waddington, 17
Salandra, M., interview of M.
Flotow with, 218
Saleske, Herr von Below, a suppressed order to, 7
hands ultimatum to M. Davignon, 6, 7, 9
Salonica, awarded to Greece, 141
murder of French and German
consuls at, 41
Salzburg, Emperors' meeting at, 38
San Giuliano, Marquis di, M. Flotow's interview with, 218
on Austria's intention to declare
war against Serbia, 151
San Stefano, Treaty of, 42
violation of, 95
Sanders, Gen. Liman von, and Constantinople army corps, 155
nominated Inspector-General of
Turkish Army, 155
Savoff, General, ordered to attack
Serbian army, 148, 149
Sazonoff, M., and M. Louis, 112
and mobilization of Montenegro,
123
and reforms in Macedonia, 125
and the Serbo-Bulgarian Convention, 109
author's conversation with, on
Balkan treaties, 114
informed of Austria's desire for
discussion with Russia, 243
letters of ratification between
author and, 57
meets Sir Edward Grey, 126
overtures for peace rejected by
Austro-Hungary, 226
Scezsen, Count, Austrian Ambassador, 130
and  Austria's  declaration  to
Russia, 243


272




Index


Scezsen, Count, his memorandum to
M. Bienvenu-Martin, 168
reports interview with author to
Austria, 167
thanks author for condolences on
Serajevo tragedy, 166
Schabinger, Dragoman, 94
Schiemann, 29
Schncebele affair, the, 21
Schoen, Baron von, alleges unrest
in Morocco, 76
an insidious question to M.
Viviani, 240, 245
an intercepted message from, 204
apprises Berlin of French protest, 5
demands his passports, 253
false allegations against France
by, 2 et seq.
hands Germany's declaration of
war to M. Viviani, 1 et seq., 253
informed of landing of Zeppelin
at Luneville, 143
on the attitude of French Government, 139
reports " incidents " in Morocco,
93
Sch6nbrunn, the Tsar at, 97
Schouvaloff, at Berlin Conference,
43
his mission to Germany, 39
Schwalbe, Professor, and Burgomaster of Nuremberg, 4
Scutari, Austro-Hungarian fleet anchors off, 141
siege of, 141
Serajevo, Austrian concentration
at, 136
Serajevo tragedy, the, 163 et seq.
Serbia, a part of Macedonia awarded
to, 141
advised to make concessions, 225
agitation in, 102
and question of Balkan nationalities, 102-3




Serbia, Austria's ultimatum to, 153
167, 193, 212
complicity of, in Serajevo crime;
an Austrian official's denial of,
164;  the Kaiser on, 160;
author and Count SzApAry exchange views, 189
declares war against Turkey, 41
signs secret agreement at Sofia,
108
war declared against, 1, 215
yields to Austria, 202, 203
Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty, the, 108,
109, 110
author's  discussion  with  M.
Sazonoff, 113, 114 et seq.
Russian Minister at Sofia and, 115
Sergent, M., deputy governor of
Bank of France, 155
Settat, occupation of, 85
Shantung, German brutalities in, 31
Sherifian Empire, the, France and,
88
Sultan of Morocco desires reforms
in, 81
Silistria, recognized as a Rumanian
town, 142
Skiernevice,  interview  between
three Emperors at, 46
SociUt6  Marocaine  de  Travaux
Publics, organization of, 89
Somssich, Count, Austrian Charge
in Paris, 121
Sonnino, M., and German manceuvres against France, 84
Sorel, Albert, and the Eastern
Question, 96, 97 (note)
Spalaikovitch, M., Serbian Minister at St. Petersburg, 190
Stancioff, M., 128
Steed, H. Wickham, 95, 153 (notes)
Steeg, M., 113
Stettin, the Kaiser's memorable
phrase at, 34?73




Index


Stockholm, author at, 196
Stuann, Herr, and the ultimatum, 6
Stuttgart, Chief of Police appeals
to population of, 4
Sweden, complains of Russia's attitude, 186
the Tsar's uneasiness regarding,
186
Swinemunde, meeting of the Tsar
with William II at, 71
SzApary, Count, at reception by
author of foreign ambassadors,
189
Szogyeny, Count, an incriminatory
telegram from, 216
at Potsdam, 171
Austrian Ambassador in Berlin,
171
lunches with the Emperor, 171
summarizes his conversation with
William II, 172
T
TALAAT BEY, his action at Constantinople, 141
Tangier, William II lands at, 77
Tankositch, Major Voija, his alleged
part in Serajevo tragedy, 168,
169
Tardieu, Andre, 76 (note)
Tattenbach, Count von, intrigues in
Morocco of, 84
signs treaty of commerce with
Moorish Government, 80
Terquem, M., Mayor of Dunkirk,
welcomes MM. Poincare and
Viviani on their return from
Russia, 206
Thiebaut, M., French Minister at
Stockholm, 180, 197
Thiers, M., and the French indemnity after Franco-Prussian
war, 37


Tirpitz, Admiral von, and the Potsdam interview, 173, 175
Tisza, Count, Berchtold's complaint
against, 177
deprecates war on Serbia, 176
Tittoni, M., cruises on Norwegian
coast, 252
on Austria's intentions regarding
Montenegro, 141
Toulon, a Russian squadron at, 53
Transvaal War, the, outbreak of, 24
Treitschke, 29
Triple Alliance, the, and the
Balkan Question, 160
foundation of, 45
Italy and, 218 et seq.
renewal of, 62, 137
Triple Entente, the, inception of, 40
Troubetzkoy, Prince, Gen. von
Chalins and, 220
Tsarskoye-Selo, M. Bourtzef's discovery at, 66
Tschirscky, Herr   von,  advises
moderation: the Kaiser's comment, 170
declares war imminent, 156
receives an advance copy of
Austrian ultimatum, 213
report of Konopischt interview,
158
reports to Berlin, 177
Turkey, Aehrenthal and, 101
and the Balkan Question, 123,
126
and the Eastern Question, 41
Bulgaria signs peace with, 152
fails to carry out reforms, 132
German influence in, 141
purchases a warship, 155
signs pact with Balkan States,
141
subterfuges of, 126
Treaty of San Stefano imposed
on, 42
war with Italy, 132


274




Index




V
VERSAILLES, visit of Dowager Empress Frederick to:  excitement in France, 23
Versailles Conference, the, German
shuffling at, 12, 14
Vesnitch, M., M. Bienvenu-Martin
and, 225
M. Poincard and, 128
Victor Emmanuel, King, converses
with M. Isvolsky, 100
the Kaiser and, 139
Victoria Louise, Princess, marriage
of, 146
Victoria, Queen, 39
Viviani, M., accompanies M. Poincare to Russia, 182
and the Austrian ultimatum to
Serbia, 194, 195, 196
and the Franco-Russian Convention, 54
asks M. Paul Cambon to encourage attempts at conciliation,
226
Germany's declaration of war
handed to, 1 et seq., 253
hands detailed protest to Baron
von Schoen, 252
his pertinent question to Baron
von Schoen, 246
visited by Baron von Schoen, 1,
253
W
WALDERSEE, COUNT, General von
Bertrab's report re Potsdam
interview, 175
War, a moral necessity: Bernhardi's view, 21
Wedel, Count, Herr von Jagow's
request to, 209
Weltpolitik, the, origin of, 32
Wesel, a phantom French aviator
at, 3


I
I


White, Mr., U.S. Ambassador at
Berlin, 60
Wiesbaden, two Emperors at, 60
Wiesner, Sectional Counsellor von,
and the Serajevo crime, 164
William I, Emperor, death of, 22
visits Emperor Francis Joseph, 38
William II, German Emperor, a
cruise in the North Sea, 171
accession of, 22
advises Nicholas II of Austria's
conciliatory disposition, 245
alters his tactics, 23
and   the  Archduke    Francis
Ferdinand, 157 et seq.
and the Heligoland catastrophe,
146
and the responsibility for war, 10,
11
and the Serajevo tragedy, 160, 169
and the Tsar's circular, 60
annotates dispatches, 11, 169,
170, 178, 211, 216 et seq., 220
et seq.
as personification  of German
pride, 30
at Bjoerkoe, 69
at Damascus, 78
at Konopischt, 157
believes France meditates revenge, 25
bellicose speech to his army, 148
complains of Jugo-Slav policy, 160
correspondence with Nicholas II,
12, 222
declares necessity of overthrow
of Serbia, 160, 161
demands " gentle violence," 220
desires  rapprochement   with
France, 25
dismisses Bismarck, 22, 32, 48
duplicity of, 60,
efforts to  turn  Russia from
France, 59
endeavours to group Continental
Powers against England, 67


275




Index


William II, encourages Austria,
211
examples   of   his  bombastic
speeches, 30, 31, 34, 60, 105,
148
goes on board the Iphigenie,
24
goes to Vienna, 105
his volte-face, 219
his " world policy," 32 et seq.
indignant with England, 67
justifies bellicose action of Austria, 223
lands at Tangier, 81
learns of assassination at Serajevo, 159
meets King Albert, 153
on America as " the peril of the
future," 24
Pan-Germanic ideals of, 32 et seq.
proclaims war as inevitable, 154
renews expressions of friendship
to Victor Emmanuel, 139
tries to incite Russia against
Britain, 66
twenty-fifth anniversary of his
accession, 146
visits Austro-Hungarian fleet at
Pola, 139
visits London, 74


William of Wied, Prince, 142
expulsion of, 157
Winterfeld, Major, in an automobile
accident, 147
Woerth, recall of, 58
y
YOUNG TURKS, conspiracy of, 99
policy of, in Macedonia, 108
suspend commercial relations
with Austro-Hungary, 101
Z
ZABERN, Alsatians molested at, 155
Zenker, Captain, at Potsdam, 175
Zeppelin, a, crosses the French
frontier, 142 et seq.
loss of a, near Heligoland, 146
"Zian Kali," Serajevo murders and
169
Zimmermann, Herr, and ultimatum
to Belgium, 6
at Potsdam Imperial palace, 171,
175
confesses to Germany's knowledge of ultimatum, 213
conversations with M. Jules
Cambon, 156


PRINTED IN ENGLAND BY CASSELL & COMPANY, LIMITED, LONDON, E.C.4.
Fr5I22




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THE UNIVERSITY OF M'"' ""AN
THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
DATE DUE


DEC 0 -- lj-g




BouOD
MAY 12 1938
UNIV.  r.,iJH,
LIBRARY


UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
3 90111115 1102 6311 77t1111
39015 01102 6377