AN ESSAY
ON
~irbrtl ant iaber+
BY
ALBERT TAYLOR BLEDSOE, LL.D.
PROFESSOR OF MATHEMATICS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA.
PHILADELPHIA:
J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO.
1856.
? q i C'
- 
* I 
Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1856, by
J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO.
in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania.
STEREOTYPED BY L. JOHNSON AND CO.
PHILADELPIIIA.
An!';;
. _,, i 
CONTENTS.
PANE
0  INTRODUCTION.................................... 5
CHAPTER I.
THE NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY................................. 9
SECT. I.-The commonly-received definition of Civil Li    berty.................................................................. 12
SECT. II.-Examination of the commonly-received defini    tion of Civil Liberty............................ 13
SECT. III.-No good law ever limits or abridges the Na    tural Liberty of Mankind....................................... 22
SECT. IV.-The Distinction between Rights and Liberty..  28
SECT. V. -The Relation between the State of Nature and
Civil Society............................................ 30
SECT. VI.-Inherent and Inalienable Rights.................'34
SECT. VII.-Conclusion of the First Chapter................ 39
CHAPTER II.
THE ARGUHENTS AND  POSITIONS OF ABOLITIONISTS..........
SECT. I.-The first fallacy of the Abolitionist................
SECT. II.-The second fallacy of the Abolitionist...........
SECT. III.-The third fallacy of the Abolitionist...........
SECT. IV.-The fourth fallacy of the Abolitionist..........
SECT. V.-The fifth fallacy of the Abolitionist..............
SECT. VI.-The sixth fallacy of the Abolitionist...........
SECT. VII.-The seventh fallacy of the Abolitionist.......
SECT. VIII.-The eighth fallacy of the Abolitionist........
SECT. IX.-The ninth fallacy of the Abolitionist............
3
43
45
50
52
65
68
62
65
79
82 
CONTENTS.
PAGE
SECT. X.-The tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, four  teenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth fallacies of the Aboli  tionist; or his seven arguments against the right of a
man to hold property in his fellow-man....................   86
SECT. XI.-The seventeenth fallacy of the Abolitionist;
or, the Argument from the Declaration of Independence 102
CHAPTER III
THE ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES.........................
,~ - SECT. I.-The Argument from the Old Testament..........
SECT. II.-The Argument from the New Testament.......
CHAPTER IV.
THE ARGUMENT FPROM THE PUBLIC GOOD........................ 226
SECT. I.-The Question............................. 227
SECT. II.-Emancipation in the British Colonies............ 229
SECT. III.-The manner in which Emancipation has
ruined the British Colonies.................................... 257
SECT. IV.- The great benefit supposed, by American
Abolitionists, to result to the freed Negroes from the
British Act of Emancipation................................... 268
SECT. V.-The Consequences of Abolition to the South.. 284
SECT. VI.-Elevation of the Blacks by Southern Slavery. 292
CHAPTER V.
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.......................................... 801
SECT. I.-Mr. Seward's Attack on the Constitution of his
Country.............................................................. 302
SECT. II.-The Attack of Mr. Sumner on the Constitu    tion of his Country............................................... 311
SECT. III.-The Right of Trial by Jury not impaired by
the Fugitive Slave Law......................................... 353
SECT. IV. -The Duty of the Citizen in regard to the
Constitution of the United States......................... 374
4
138
138 el
167 
INTRODUCTION.
THIS  work  has, for the most part,  been  thought
out for several years, and various portions of it reduced to writing. Though we have long cherished the
design of preparing it for the press, yet other engagements, conspiring with a spirit of procrastination, have
hitherto induced us to defer the execution of this design. Nor should we have prosecuted it, as we have
done, during a large portion of our last summer vacation, and the leisure moments of the first two months of
the present session of the University, but for the solicitation of two intelligent and highly-esteemed friends.
In submitting  the work,  as it now  is, to the  judg.ment of the truth-loving and impartial reader, we
beg leave to offer one or two preliminary remarks.
We   have  deemed  it wise  and  proper  to notice
only the more decent, respectable, and celebrated
among  the Abolitionists of the North.   Those  scur
J*
6 
INTRODUCTION.
rilous writers, who deal in wholesale abuse of Southern character, we  have  deemed  unworthy  of  notice.
Their writings are, no doubt, adapted to the taste of
their readers;  but as it is certain that no  educated
gentleman will tolerate them, so we would  not raise a
finger to promote their downfall, nor to arrest their
course toward the oblivion which so inevitably awaits
them.
In replying to the others, we are conscious that
we have often used strong language; for which, however, we have no apology to offer.   We  have dealt
with their arguments and positions rather than with
their motives and  characters.  If, in pursuing this
course, we have often spoken strongly, we merely beg
the reader to consider whether we have not also
spoken justly. We have certainly not spoken without
provocation.   For  even  these men- the  very lights
and  ornaments  of abolitionism- have seldom  condescended to argue the great question of Liberty and
Slavery with us as with  equals.   On  the contrary,
they habitually address us as if nothing but a purblind ignorance of the very first elements of moral
science could shield our minds against the force of
their irresistible arguments.    In the overflowing exuberance of their philanthropy, they take pity of our
most lamentable moral darkness, and graciously condescend  to teach  us  the very  A  B  C  of ethical
philosophy!   Hence, if we have  deemed it a duty to
6 
IN TR ODUCTION.
lay bare their pompous inanities, showing them to be
no oracles, and to strip their pitiful sophisms of the
guise of a profound philosophy, we trust that no
impartial reader will take offence at such vindication
of the South against her accusers and despisers.
In this vindication, we have been careful throughout
to distinguish between the abolitionists, our accusers,
and the great body of the people of the North.
Against these we have said nothing, and we could
say nothing; since for these we entertain the most
profound  respect.   We   have  only assailed those by
whom we have been assailed; and we have held each
and every man responsible only  for what he himself
has said and done.   We  should, indeed, despise ourselves if we could be guilty of the monstrous injustice  of denouncing  a whole  people on  account  of
the sayings and doings of a portion of  them.   We
had infinitely rather suffer such injustice - as we
have so long done-than practise it toward others.
We cannot flatter ourselves, of course, that the following work  is without errors.   But these, whatever
else may be thought of then, are not the errors of
haste and inconsideration.   For if we have felt deeply
on the subject here discussed, we have also thought
long, and patiently endeavored to guard our minds
against fallacy.   How  far this effort has proved successful, it is the province of the candid and impartial
reader alone to decide.   If our arguments  and views
7 
IN TRODUCTION.
are  unsound, we hope he will reject them.   On  the
contrary, if they are correct and well-grounded, we
hope he will concur with us in the conclusion, that
the institution of slavery, as it exists among us at
the South, is founded in political justice, is in accordance with the will of GOD and the designs of his
providence, and is conducive to the highest, purest, best
interests of mankind.
8 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
ClHAPTER I.
THE NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY.
FEW subjects, if any, more forcibly demand
our attention, by their intrinsic grandeur and
importance, than the great doctrine of human
liberty. Correct views concerning this are, indeed, so intimately connected with the most
profound interests, as well as with the most
exalted aspirations, of the human race, that any
material departure therefrom must be fraught
with evil to the living, as well as to millions yet
unborn.  They  are so inseparably interwoven
with all that is great and good and glorious in
the destiny of man, that whosoever aims to form
or to propagate such views should proceed with
the utmost care, and, laying aside all prejudice
and passion, be guided by the voice of reason
alone.
9 
10     LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
Hence it is to be regretted-deeply regrettedthat the doctrine of liberty has so often been
discussed with so little apparent care, with so
little moral earnestness, with so little real energetic searching and longing after truth. Though
its transcendent importance demands the best
exertion of all our powers, yet has it been, for
the most part, a theme for passionate declamation,
rather than of severe analysis or of protracted
and patient investigation. In the warm praises
of the philosopher, no less than in the glowing
inspirations of the poet, it often stands before us
as a vague and ill-defined something which all
men are required to worship, but which no man
is bound to understand. It would seem, indeed,
as if it were a mighty something not to be clearly
seen? but only to be deeply felt.  And felt it has
been, too, by the ignorant as well as by the
learned, by the simple as well as by thQ wise:
felt as a fire in the blood, as a fever in the brain,
and as a phantom in the imagination, rather
than as a form of light and beauty in the intelligence. flow often have the powers of darkness
surrounded its throne, and desolation marked
its path! How often from the altars of this
unknown idol has the blood of human victims
streamed! Even here, in this glorious land of 
NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY.
ou.rs,- how often do the too-religious Americans
seem to become deaf to the most appalling lessons of the past, while engaged in the frantic
worship of this their tutelary deity! At this
very moment, the highly-favored land in which
we live is convulsed from its centre to its circumference by the agitations of these pious
devotees of freedom; and how long ere scenes
like those which called forth the celebrated
exclamation of Madame Roland-" 0 Liberty,
what  crimes are perpetrated  in thy name!"
may be enacted among us, it is not possible for
human sagacity or foresight to determine.
If no one would talk about liberty except
those who had taken the pains to understand
it, then would a perfect calm be restored, and
peace once more bless a happy people. But
there are so many who imagine they understand
liberty as Falstaff knew the true prince, namely,
by instinct, that all hope of such a consummation
must be deferred until it.may be shown that
their instinct is a blind guide, and its oracles are
false. Hence the necessity of a close study and
of a clear analysis of the nature and conditions
of civil liberty, in order to a distinct delineation
of the great idol, which all men are so ready to
worship, but which so few are willing to tako
11 
12  LIBERTY  AND  SLAVERIY.
the pains to understand. In the prosecution of
such an inquiry, we intend to consult neither the
pecuniary interests of the South nor the prejudices. of the North; but calmly and immovably
proceed to discuss, upon purely scientific principles, this great problem of our social existence
and national prosperity, upon the solution of
which the hopes and destinies of mankind in no
inconsiderable measure depend. We intend no
appeal to passion or to sordid interest, but only
to the reason of the wise and good. And if
justice, or mercy, or truth, be found at war with
the institution of slavery, then, in the name of
God, let slavery perish.  But however guilty,
still let it be tried, condemned, and executed
according to law, and not extinguished by a
despotic and lawless power more terrific than
itself.
~ I. The commonly-received definition of civil
liberty.
"Civil liberty," says Blackstone, "is no other
than natural liberty so far restrained as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage."
This definition seems to have been borrowed
from Locke, who says that, when a man enters
into civil society, "he is to part with so much
ift 
NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY. 
of his natural liberty, in providing for himself, as
the good, prosperity, and safety of the society
shall require." So, likewise, say Paley, Berlamaqui, Rutherforth, and a host of others. Indeed,  among  jurists and  philosophers,  such
seems to be the commonly-received definition
of civil liberty. It seems to have become a
political maxim that civil liberty is no other 
than a certain portion of our natural liberty,
which has been carved therefrom, and secured
to us by the protection of the laws.
But is this a sound maxim? Has it been
deduced from the nature of things, or is it
merely a plausible show of words?  Is it truthsolid and imperishable truth-or merely one of
those fair semblances of truth, which, through
the too hasty sanction of great names, have obtained a currency among men? The question
is not what Blackstone, or Locke, or Paley may
have thought, but what is truth? Let us examine this point, then, in order that our decision
may be founded, not upon the authority of man,
but, if possible, in the wisdom of God.
~ II. Examination of the commonly-received
definition of civil liberty.
Before we can determine whether such be the
2
13 
14.LIB E RTY AND SLAVERY.
origin of civil liberty, we must first ascertain
the character of that natural liberty out of which
it is supposed to be reserved. What, then, is
natural liberty? What is the nature of the
material out of which our civil liberty is supposed to be fashioned by the art of the political
sculptor?  It is thus defined by Locke:  "To
understand political power right, and derive it
from its original, we must consider what state
all men are naturally in; and that is a state of
perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions. and persons as they
think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature,
without asking leave or depending upon the
will of any other man."a  In perfect accordance
with this definition, Blackstone  says:  "This
natural liberty consists in a power of acting as
one thinks fit, without any restraint or control,
unless by the laws of nature, being a right inherent in us by birth, and one of the gifts of God
to man at his creation, when he endowed him
with the faculty of free-will." Such, according
to Locke and Blackstone, is that natural liberty,
which is limited and abridged, as they suppose,
when we enter into the bonds of civil society.
Locke on Civil Government, chap. ii.
f 
NATURE 01? CIVIL LIBERTY.
Now mark its features: it is the gift of God to
man at his creation; the very top and flower
of his existence; that by which he is distinguished from the lower animals and raised to
the rank of moral and accountable beings. Shall
we sacrifice this divine gift, then, in order to
secure the blessings of civil society? Shall we
abridge or mutilate the image of God, stamped
upon the soul at its creation, by which we are
capable of knowing and obeying his law, in
order to secure the aid and protection of man?
Shall we barter away any portion of this our
glorious birthright for any poor boon of man's
devising? Yes, we are told-and why? Because, says Blackstone, "Legal obedience and
conformity is infinitely more valuable than the
wild and savage liberty which is sacrificed to
obtain it."
But how is this?  Now this natural liberty is
a thing of light, and now it is a power of darkness. Now it is the gift of God, that moves
within a sphere of light, and breathes an atmosphere of love; and ahon, it is a wild and savage
thing that carries terror in its train. It would
be an angel of light, if it were not a power of
darkness; and it would be a power of darkness,
if it were not an angel of light. But as it is, it
15 
16     LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
is both by turns, and neither long, but runs
through its Protean changes, according to the
exigencies of the flowing discourse of the learned
author. Surely such inconsistency, so glaring
and so portentous, and all exhibited on one
and the same page, is no evidence that the
genius of the great commentator was as steady
and profound as it was elegant and classical.
The source of this vacillation is obvious.
With Locke, he defines natural liberty to be a
power of acting as one thinks fit within the limitn
.e    b      th e lwoatur; but he soon loses
sight of this all-important limitation, from which
natural liberty derives its form and beauty.
Hence it becomes in his mind a power to act as
one pleases, without the restraint or control of
any law whatever, either human or divine. The
sovereign will and pleasure of the individual becomes the only rule of conduct, and lawless
anarchy the condition which it legitimates.
Thus, having loosed the bonds and marred the
beauty of natural liberty, he was prepared to see
it, now become so "wild and savage," offered
up as a sacrifice on the altar of civil liberty.
This, too, was the great fundamental error of
Hobbes. What Blackstone thus did through
inadvertency, was knowingly and designedly 
NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY.
done by the philosopher of Malmesbury. In a
state of nature, says he, all men have a right to
do as they please. Each individual may set up
a right to all things, and consequently to the
same things. In other words, in such a state
there is no law, except that of force. The
strong arm of power is the supreme arbiter of
all things. Robbery and outrage and murder
are as lawful as their opposites. That is to say,
there is no such thing as a law of nature; and
consequently all things are, in a state of nature,
equally allowable. Thus it was that HIobbes
delighted to legitimate the horrors of a state of
nature, as it is called, in order that mankind
might, without a feeling of indignation or regret,
see the wild and ferocious liberty of such a state
sacrificed to despotic power. Thus it was that
he endeavoured to recommend the "Leviathan,"
by contrasting it with the huger monster called
Natural Liberty.
This view of the state of nature, by which all
law and the great Fountain of all law are shut
out of the world, was perfectly agreeable to
the atheistical philosophy of Hobbes. From one
who had extinguished the light of nature, and
given dominion to the powers of darkness, no
better could have been expected; but is it not
B               2~
17 
18      LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
deplorable that a Christian jurist should, even
for a moment, have forgotten the great central
light of his own system, and drawn his arguments from such an abyss of darkness?
Blackstone has thus lost sight of truth, not
only in regard to his general propositions, but
also in regard to particular instances.  "The
law," says he, "which restrains a man from
doing mischief to his fellow-citizens diminishes
the natural liberty of mankind."- Now, is this
true? The doing of mischief is contrary to the
law of nature, and hence, according to the
definition of Blackstone himself, the perpetration
of it is not an exercise of any natural right.
As no man possesses a natural right to do mischief; so the law which forbids it does not
diminish the natural liberty of mankind. The
law which forbids mischief is a restraint not
upon the natural liberty, but upon the natural
tyranny, of man.
Blackstone is by no means alone in the error
to which we have alluded. By one of the clearest thinkers and most beautiful writers of the
present age,* it is argued, "that as government
implies restraint, it is evident we give up a cer
* Robert Hall.
4 
NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY.    1
tamn portion of our liberty by entering into it."
This argument would be valid, no doubt, if
there-were nothing in the world beside liberty
to be restrained; but the evil passions of men,
from which proceed so many frightful tyrannies
and wrongs, are not to be identified with their
rights or liberties. As government imnplies
restraint, it is evident that something is restrained when we enter into it; but it does not
follow that this something must be our natural
liberty. The argument in question proceeds
on the notion that government can restrain
nothing, unless it restrain the natural liberty of
mankind; whereas, we have seen, the law which
forbids the perpetration of mischief, or any other
wrong, is a restriction, not upon the liberty, but
upon the tyranny, of the human will. It sets a
bound and limit, not to any right conferred on
us by the Author of nature, but upon the evil
thoughts and deeds of which we are the sole
and exclusive originators.. Such a law, indeed,
so far from restraining the natural liberty of
man, recognises his natural rights, and secures
his freedom, by protecting the weak against the
injustice and oppression of the strong.
The way in which these authors show that
natural liberty i.s, and of  right ought to be,
19
, W 
20     LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
abridged by the laws of society, is, by identifying this natural freedom, not with a power to act
as God wills, but with a power in conformity
with our own sovereign will and pleasure. The
same thing is expressly done by Paley.*  "To
do what we will," says he, "is natural liberty."
Starting from this definition, it is no wonder
that he should have supposed that natural liberty
is restrained by civil government. In like manner, Burke first says, "That the effect of liberty
to individuals is, that they nay do what they
please;" and then concludes, that in order to
"secure some liberty," we make " a surrender
in trust of the whole of it."t Thus the natural
rights of mankind are first caricatured, and then
sacrificed.
If there be no God, if there be no difference
between right and wrong, if there be no moral
law in the universe, then indeed would men
possess a natural right to do mischief or to act
as they please. Then indeed should we be fettered by no law in a state of nature, and liberty
therein would be coextensive with power.
Right would give place to might, and the least
* Political Phil., chap. v.
t Reflections on the Revolution in France. 
NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY.
restraint, even from the best laws, would impair our natural freedom. But we subscribe to
no such philosophy. That learned authors, that
distinguishedjurists, that celebrated philosophers,
that pious divines, should thus deliberately include the enjoyment of our natural rights and
the indulgence of our evil passions in one and
the same definition of liberty, is, it seems to us,
matter of the most profound astonishment and
regret. It is to confound the source of all tyranny with the fountain of all freedom. It is to
put darkness for light, and light for darkness.
And it is to inflame the minds of men with the
idea that they are struggling and contending
for liberty, when, in reality, they may be only
struggling and contending for the gratification
of their malignant passions. Such an offence
against all clear thinking, such an outrage
against all sound political ethics, becomes the
more amazing when we reflect on the greatness
of the authors by whom it is committed, and
the stupendous magnitude of the interests involved in their discussions.
Should we, then, exhibit the fundamental law
of society, and the natural liberty of mankind,
as antagonistic principles? Is not this the way
to prepare the human mind, at all times so pas
21 
22     LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
sionately, not to say so madly, fond of freedom,
for a repetition of those tremendous conflicts
and struggles beneath which the foundations of
society have so often trembled, and some of its
best institutions been laid in the dust? In one
word, is it not high time to raise the inquiry,
Whether there be, in reality, any such opposition
as is usually supposed to exist between the law
of the land and the natural rights of mankind?
Whether such opposition be real or imaginary?
Whether it exists in the nature of things, or
only in the imagination of political theorists?
~ III. No good  law  ever limits or abridges the
natural liberty of mankind.
By the two great leaders of opposite schools,
Locke and Burke, it is contended that when we
enter into society the natural right of self-defence is surrendered to the government. If any
natural right, then, be limited or abridged by
the laws of society, we may suppose the right
of self-defence to be so; for this is the instance
which is always selected to illustrate and confirm
the reality of such a surrender of our natural
liberty. It has, indeed, become a sort of maxim,
that when we put on the bonds of civil society,
we give up the natural right of self-defence. 
NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY.
But what does this maxim mean? Does it
mean that we transfer the right to repel force by
force? If so, the proposition is not true; for
this right is as fully possessed by every individual after he has entered into society as it could
have been in a state of nature. If he is assailed,
or threatened with immediate personal danger,
the law of the land does not require him to wait
upon the strong but slow arm of government for
protection. On the contrary, it permits him to
protect himself, to repel force by force, in so far
as this may be necessary to guard against injury
to himself; and the law of nature allows no
more. Indeed, if there be any difference, the
law of the land allows a man to go farther in
the defence of self than he is permitted to go
by the law of God. HIence, in this sense, the
maxim under consideration is not true; and no
man's natural liberty is abridged by the State.
Does this maxim mean, then, that in a state
of nature every man has a right to redress his
own wrongs by the subsequent punishment of the
offender, which right the citizen has transferred
to the government?  It is clear that this must
be the meaning, if it have any correct meaning
at all.  But neither in this sense is the maxim
or proposition true. The right to punish an
23 
24     LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
offender must rest upon the one or the other
of two grounds: either upon the ground that
the offender deserves punishment, or that his
punishment is necessary to prevent similar offences. Now, upon neither of these grounds
has any man, even in a state of nature, the
right to punish an offence committed against
himself.
First, he has no right to punish  such an
offence on the ground that it deserves punishment. No man has, or ever had, the right to
wield the awful attribute of retributive justice;
that is, to inflict so much pain for so much guilt
or moral turpitude. This is the prerogative of
God alone. To his eye, all secrets are known,
and all degrees of guilt perfectly apparent; and
to him alone belongs the vengeance which is
due for moral ill-desert. His law extends over
the state of nature as well as over the state of
civil society, and calls all men to account for
their evil deeds. It is evident that, in so far as
the intrinsic demerit of actions is concerned, it
makes no difference whether they be punished
here or. hereafter. And besides, if the individual had possessed such a right in a state
of nature, he has not transferred it to society; for society neitber has nor claims any 
NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY.
such right. Blackstone but utters the voice of
the law when he says: "The end or final cause
of human punishment is not by way of atonement or expiation, for that must be left to the
just determination of the supreme Being, but
as a precaution against future offences of the
same kind." The exercise of retributive justice
belongs exclusively to the infallible Ruler of the
world, and not to frail, erring man, who himself
so greatly stands in need of mercy. Hence, the
right to punish a transgressor on the ground
that such punishment is deserved, has not been
transferred from the individual to civil society:
first, because he had no such natural right to
transfer; and, secondly, because society possesses
no such right.
In- the second place, if we consider the other
ground of punishment, it will likewise appear
that the right to punish never belonged to the
individual, and consequently could not have
been transferred by him to society. For, by the
law of nature, the individual has no right to
punish an offence against himself in order to
prevent future offences of the same kind  If the
object of human punishment be, as indeed it is,
to prevent the commission of crime, by holding
up examples of terror to evil-doers, then it ix
25 
26     LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
evidently no more the natural right of the party
injured to redress the wrong, than it is the
right of others. All men are interested in the
prevention of wrongs, and hence all men should
unite to redress them. All men are endowed
by their Creator with a sense of justice, in
order to impel them to secure its claims, and
throw the shield of its protection around the
weak and oppressed.
The prevention of wrong, then, is clearly the
natural duty, and consequently the natural
right, of all men.
This duty should be discharged by others,
rather than by the party aggrieved.  For it is
contrary to the law of nature itself, as both
Locke and Burke agree, that any man should
be "judge in his own  case;" that any man
should, by an ex post facto decision, determine
the amount of punishment due to his enemy,
and proceed to inflict it upon  him.  Such  a
course, indeed, so far from preventing offences,
would inevitably promote them; instead of redressing injuries, would only add wrong to
wrong; and instead of introducing order, would
only make confusion worse confounded, and
turn the moral world quite upside down.
On no ground, then, upon which the right to 
NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY.
punish may be conceived to rest, does it appear
that it was ever possessed, or could ever have
been possessed, by the individual.  And if the
individual never possessed such a right, it is
clear that he has never transferred it to society.
Hence, this view of the origin of government,
however plausible at first sight, or however
generally received, has no real foundation in
the nature of things.  It is purely a creature
of the imagination of theorists; one of the
phantoms of that manifold, monstrous, phantom
deity called Liberty, which has been so often
invoked by the pseudo philanthropists and reckless reformers of the present day to subvert not
only the law of capital punishment, but also
other institutions and laws which have received
the sanction of both God and man.
The simple truth is, that we are all bound by
the law of nature and the law of God to love
our neighbor as ourselves. Hence it is the
duty of every man, in a state of nature, to do
all in his power to protect the rights and promote the interests of his fellow-men. It is the
duty of all men to consult together, and concert measures for the general good.   Right
here it is, then, that the law of man, the constitution of civil society, comes into contact
27 
28      LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
with the law of God and rests upon it. Thus,
civil society arises, not from a surrender of
individual rights, but from a right originally
possessed by  all; nay, fromn a solemn  duty
originally imposed upon all by God himself-a
duty which must be performed, whether the
individual gives his consent or not. The very
law of nature itself requires, as we have seen,
not only the punishment of the offender, but
also that he be punished according to a preestablished law, and by the decision of an impartial tribunal. And in the enactment of such
law, as well as in the administration, the collective wisdom of society, or its agents, moves
in obedience to the law of God, and not in
pursuance of rights derived from the individual.
~ IV. The distinction between rights and liberty.
In the foregoing discussion we have, in conformity to the custom of others, used the terms
rights and liberty as words of precisely the same
import. But, instead of being convertible terms,
there seems to be a very clear difference in their
signification.  If a man be taken, for example,
and without cause thrown into prison, this deprives him of his liberty, but not of his right,
to go where he pleases. The right still exists; 
NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY.
and his not being allowed to enjoy this right, is
precisely what constitutes the oppression in the
case supposed. If there were no right still subsisting, then there would be no oppression.
Hence, as the right exists, while the liberty is
extinguished, it is evident they are distinct from
each other. The liberty of a man in such a
case, as in all others, would consist in an
opportunity to enjoy his right, or in a state in
which it might be enjoyed if he so pleased.
This distinction between rights and liberty
is all-imrnportant to a clear and satisfactory discussion of the  doctrine  of human  freedom.
The great champions of that freedom, from a
Locke down to a Hall, firmly and passionately
grasping the natural rights of man, and confounding these with his liberty, have looked
upon society as the restrainer, and not as the
author, of that liberty.  On the other hand, the
great advocates of despotic power, from a Iobbes
down to a Whewell, seeing that there can be
no genuine liberty-that is, no secure enjoyment
of one's  rights-in a  state  of nature, have
ascribed, not only our liberty, but all our existing rights also, to the State.
But the error of Locke is a noble and generous sentiment when compared with the odions
3*
29 
30     LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
dogma of IHobbes and Whewell. These learned
authors contend that we derive all our existing
rights from society. Do we, then, live and
move and breathe and think and worship God
only by rights derived from the State? No,
certainly. We have these rights from a higher
source. God gave them, and all the powers of
earth combined cannot take them away. But
as for our liberty, this we freely own is, for the
most part, due to the sacred bonds of civil
society.  Let us render unto Cesar the things
that are Cesar's, and unto God the things that
are God's.
~ V. The relation between the state of nature
and of civil society.
Herein, then, consists the true relation between the natural and the social states.  Civil
society does not abridge our naturMal rights, but
secures and protects them. She does not assumne our right of self-defence,-she simply discharges the duty imposed by God to defend us.
The original right is in those who compose the
body politic, and not in any individual. Hence,
civil society does not impair our natural liberty,
as actually existing in a state of nature, or as
it might therein exist; for, in such  a sta.te 
NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY.
there would be no real liberty, no real enjoyment of natural rights.
Mr. Locke, as we have seen, defines the state
of nature to be one of "perfect freedom."  Why
then should we leave it?  " If lman, in the state
of nature, be so free," says he,' why will he
part with his freedom?  To which it is obvious
to answer," he continues, "that though, in the
state of nature, he hath such a right, yet the
enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly
exposed to the invasion of others; for all being
kings as much as he, every man his equal, and
the greater part not strict observers of equity
and justice, the enjoyment of the property he
has in this state is very unsafe, very insecure.
This makes him willing to quit a condition
which, however free, isfull of fears and continual
dangers; and it is not without reason that he
seeks out, and is willing to join in society with,
others who are already united, or have a mind
to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives,
liberties, and estates, which I call by the general
name property."* What! can that be a state
of perfect freedom which is subject  to fears
and perpetual dangers? In one word, can a
* Locke on Civil Government, chap. ix.
31 
32     LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
reign of terror be the reign of liberty? It is
evident, we think, that Locke has been betrayed
into  no  little inaccuracy  and  confusion  of
thought from not having distinguished between
rights and liberty.
The truth seems to be that, in a state of
nature, we would possess rights, but we could
not enjoy them. That is to say, notwithstanding
all our rights, we should be destitute of freedom or liberty. Society interposes the strong
arm of the law to protect our rights, to secure
us in the enjoyment of them. She delivers us
from the alarms, the dangers, and the violence
of the natural state. Hience, under God, she
is the mother of our peace and joy, by whose
sovereign rule anarchy is abolished and liberty
established. Liberty and social law can never
be  dissevered.   Liberty,  robed  in  law,  and
radiant with love, is one of the best gifts of
God to man. But liberty, despoiled of law, is
a wild, dark, fierce spirit of licentiousness,
which tends "to uproar the universal peace."
Hence it is a frightful error to regard the
civil state or government as antagonistic to the
natural liberty of mankind; for this is, indeed,
the author of the very liberty we enjoy. Good
government it is that restrains the elements of 
NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY.
tyranny and oppression, and introduces liberty
into the world. Good government it is that
shuts out the reign of anarchy, and secures
the dominion of equity and goodness.  He who
would spurn the restraints of law, then, by
which pride, and envy, and hatred, and malice,
ambition, and revenge, are kept within the
sacred bounds of eternal justice-he, we say,
is not the friend of human liberty. Hie would
open the flood-gates of tyranny and oppression;
he would  mar  the  harmony and  extinguish
the light of the world. Let no such man be
trusted.
If the foregoing remarks be just, it would
follow that the state of nature, as it is called,
would be one of the most unnatural states in
the world. WVe may conceive it to exist, for
the sake of illustration or argument; but if it
should actually exist, it would be at war with
the law of nature itself. For this requires, as
we have seen, that men should unite together,
and frame such laws as the general good demands.
Not only the law, but the very necessities of
nature, enjoin the institution of civil government. God himself has thus laid the foundations of civil society deep in the nature of man.
c
33
'ft.
0 
34     LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
It is an ordinance of heaven, which no human
decree can reverse or annul. It is not a thing
of compacts, bound together by promises and
paper, but is itself a law of nature as irreversible
as any other. Compacts may give it one formi
or another, but in one form or another it must
exist.  It is no accidental or artificial thing,
which may be made or unmade, which may be
set up or pulled down, at the mere will and
pleasure of man. It is a decree of God; the
spontaneous and irresistible working of that
nature, which, in all climates, through all ages,
and under all circumstances, manifests itself in
social organizations.
~ VI. Inherent and inalienable rights.
Much has been said about inherent and inalienable rights, which is either unintelligible or
rests upon no solid foundation. "The inalienable rights of men" is a phrase often brandished
by certain reformers, who  aim to bring about
"the immediate abolition of slavery." Yet, in
the light of the foregoing discussion, it may be
clearly shown that the doctrine of inalienable
rights, if properly handled, will not touch the
institution of slavery.
An inalienable right is either one which the 
NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY.
possessor of it himself cannot alienate or transfer, or it is one which society has not the power
to take from him. According to the import
of the terms, the first would seem to be what
is meant by an inalienable right; but in this
sense it is not pretended that the right to either
life or liberty has been transferred to society
or alienated by the individual. And if, as we
have endeavored to show, the right, or power,
or authority of society is not derived from a
transfer of individual rights, then it is clear
that neither the right to life nor liberty is transferred to society. That is, if no rights are transferred, than these particular rights are still untransferred, and, if you please, untransferable.
Be it conceded, then, that the individual has
never transferred his right to life or liberty to
society.
But it is not in the above sense that the
abolitionist uses the expression, inalienable rights.
According to his view, an inalienable right is
one of which society itself cannot, without doing wrong, deprive the individual, or deny the
enjoyment of it to him.  This is evidently his
meaning; for he complains of the injustice of
society or civil government, in depriving a certain portion of its subjects of civil freedom, and
---''7x'-t —-'I-\"''P:'."............... s._D~tV.-,.._.....,_ _='
35
4t 
36      LIBERTY AND SLAVERXY.
consigning them to a state of servitude. "Such
an act," sas he."is wron_   because it is a violation of the inalienable i                  But
let us see if his complaint be just or well
founded.
It is retended by no one that society has the
~~~~~~~~~~~............  
right to deprive any subject of either life or
liberty, without good and sufficient cause or reason.
On the contrary, it is on all hands agreed that
it is only for good and sufficient reasons that
society can- deprive any portion of its subjects
of either life or liberty. Nor can it be denied,
on the other side, that a'man may be deprived
of either, or both, by a preordained law, in case
there be a good and sufficient reason for the
enactment of such law. For the crime of murder, the law of the land deprives the criminal
of life: ad fortiori, might it deprive him of liberty.
In the infliction of such a penalty, the law seeks,
as we have seen, not to deal out so much pain
for so much guilt, nor even to deal out pain for
guilt at all, but simply to protect the members
of society, and secure the general good.   The
general good is the sole and sufficient consideration which justifies the state in taking either
the life or the liberty of its subjects.
Hence, if we would determine in any ease 
NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY.
whether society is justified in depriving any of
its members of civil freedom.by law we must
first ascertain whether the   eneral good  demands  the enactment of such a law.  If it does,
then such a law is just and good-as perfectly
just a'nd good as any other law which, for the
same reason or on the same ground, takes away
the life or liberty of its subjects. All this talk
about the inalienable rights of men may have a
very admirable meaning, if one will only be at
the pains to search it out; but is it not evident
that, when searched to the bottom, it has just
nothing at all to do with the great question of
slavery? But more of this hereafter.*
This'great problem, as we have seen, is to be
decided, not by an appeal to the inalienable
rights of men, but simply and solely by a reference to tihe generalgood. It is to be decided,
not by the aid of abstractions alone; a little
good sense and practical sagacity should be allowed to assist in its determination.  There are
inalienable rights, we admit-inalienable both
because the individual cannot transfer them,
and because society can never rightfully deprive
any man of their enjoyment.   But life and
* Chap. ii. ~ x.
4
37 
38     LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
liberty are not "among these." There are inalienable rights, we admit, but then such abstractions are the edge-tools of political science, with
which it is dangerous for either men or children
to play. They may inflict deep wounds on the
cause of humanity; they can throw no light on
the great problem of slavery.
One thing seems to be clear and fixed; and
that is, that thhhh ts  of the individual are suboraJte to those of the community.  An inalienable right is a right cougped witha dauty; a duty
with which no other obligation can interfere. But,
as we have seen, it is the duty, and consequently,
the right, of society to make such laws as the
general good demands. This inalienable right
is conferred, and its exercise enjoined, by the
Creator and  Governor of the universe.   All
individual rights are subordinate to this inherent, universal, and inalienable right. It should
be observed, however, that in the exercise of
this paramount right,'this supreme authority,
no society possesses the power to contravene the
principles of justice. In other words, it should
be observed that no unjust law can ever promote the public good. Every law, then, which
is not unjust, and which the public good demands, should be enacted by society. 
NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY.
But we have already seen and shall still more
fully see, that the la-iidih.ordains slavery is
n.?t unjust in itself, or, in other words, that it
interferes with none of the inalienable rights
of man.  Hlence, if it be shown that the public
good, and especially the good of the slave, demands such a law, then the question of slavery
will be settled. We purpose to show this before
we have done with the present discussion. And
if, in the prosecution of this inquiry, we should
be so fortunate as to throw only one steady ray
of light on the great question of slavery, by
which the very depths of society have been so
fearfully convulsed, we shall be more than rewarded for all the labour which, with no little
-solicitude, we have felt constrained to bestow
upon an attempt at its solution.
~ VII. Conclusion of the first chapter.
In conclusion, we shall merely add that if the
foregoing remarks be just, it follows that the
great problem of political philosophy is not
precisely such as it is often taken to be by
statesmen and historians. This problem, according to Mackintosh and Macaulay, consists in
finding such an adjustment of the antagonistic
principles of public order and private liberty,
39 
40       LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
that neither shall overthrow or subvert the other,
but each be confined within its own appropriate
limits. Whereas, if we are not mistaken, these
are not antagonistic, but co-ordznate, principles.
The very law which institutes public order is
that which introduces private liberty, since no
secure enjoyment of one's rights can exist where
public order is not maintained.  And, on the
other hand, unless private liberty be introduced,
public order cannot be maintained, or at least
such public order as should be established; for,
if there be not private liberty, if there be no
secure enjoyment of one's rights, then the highest and purest elements of our nature would
have to be extinguished, or else exist in perpetual conflict with the surrounding despotism.
As license is not liberty, so despotism is not
order, nor even friendly to that enlightened,
wholesome order, by which the good of the
public and the individual are at the same time
introduced and secured. In other words, what
is taken from the one of these principles is not
given to the other; on the contrary, every additional element of strength and beauty which is
imparted to the one is an accession of strength
and beauty to the other. Private liberty, indeed, lives and moves and has its very being in 
NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY.
the bosom of public order. On the other hand,
that public order alone which cherishes the true
liberty of the individual is strong in the approbation of God and in the moral sentiments
of mankind. All else is weakness, and death,
and decay.
The true problem, then, is, not how the conflicting claims of these two principles may be
adjusted, (for there is no conflict between them,)
but how a real public order, whose claims are
identical with those of private liberty, may be
introduced and maintained. -The practical solution of this problem, for the heterogeneous
population of the South imperatively demands,
as we shall endeavor to show, the institution of
slavery; and that without such an institution it
would be impossible to maintain either a sound
public order or a decent private liberty. We
shall endeavor to show, that the very laws or
institution which is supposed by fanatical declaimers to shut out liberty' from the Negro race
among us, really shuts out the most frightful
license and disorder from society. In one word,
we shall endeavor to show that in preaching
up liberty to and for the slaves of the South,
the abolitionist is "casting pearls before swine,"
that can neither comprehend the nature, nor
4-'
41 
42    LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
enjoy the blessings, of the freedom which is so
officiously thrust upon them. And if the Negro
race should be moved by their fiery appeals, it
would only be to rend and tear in pieces the
fair fabric of American liberty, which, with all
its shortcomings and defects, is by far the most
beautiful ever yet conceived or constructed by
the genius of man. 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.
CHAPTER II.
THE ARGUMENTS AND POSITIONS OF ABOLITIONISTS.
IHAVING in the preceding chapter discussed
and defined the nature of civil liberty, as well
as laid down some of the political conditions on
which its existence depends, we shall now proceed to examine the question of slavery. In
the prosecution of this inquiry, we shall, in the
first place, consider the arguments and positions of the advocates of immediate abolition;
and, in the second, point out the reasons and
grounds on which the institution of slavery is
based and its justice vindicated. The first branch
of the investigation, or that relating to the arguments and positions of the abolitionist, will
occupy the remainder of the present chapter.
It is insisted by abolitionists that the institution of slavery is, in all cases and under all
circumstances, morally wrong, or a violation of
the law of God. Such is precisely the ground
assumed by the one side and denied by the
other.
43 
44       LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
Thus says Dr. Wayland:  "I have wished to
make it clear that slavery, or the holding of
men in bondage, and'obliging them to labor
for our benefit, without their contract or consent,' is always and everywhere, or, as you well
express it, semper et ubique, a moral wrQng, a
violation of the obligations under which we are
created to our fellow-men, and a transgression
of the law of our Creator."
Dr. Fuller likewise: "'The simple question
is, Whether it is necessarily, and amid all circumstances, a crime to hold men in a condition
where they labor for another without their consent
or contract? and in settling this matter all impertinences must be retrenched."
In one word, Dr. Wayland insists that slavery
is condemned by the law of God, by the moral
law of the universe. We purpose to examine
the arguments which he has advanced in favor
of this position. We select his arguments for
examination, because, as a writer on moral and
political science, he stands so high in the
northern portion of the Union. His work on
these subjects has indeed long since passed the
fiftieth thousand; a degree of success which,
in his own estimation, authorizes him to issue
his letters on slavery over the signature of "1 THE 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.
AUTIHOR OF THE MORAL SCIENCE." But the very
fact that his popularity is so great, and that he
is the author of the Moral Science, is a reason
why his arguments on a question of such
magnitude should be subjected to a severe
analysis and searching scrutiny, in order that,
under the sanction of so imposing a name, no
error may be propagated and no mischief done.
Hence we shall hold Dr. Wayland amenable to
all the laws of logic. Especially shall we require
him to adhere to the point he has undertaken
to discuss, and to retrench all irrelevancies.
If, after having subjected his arguments to
such a process, it shall be found that every
position which is assumed on the subject is
directly contradicted by himself, wve shall not
make  haste  to introduce  anarchy  into  the
Southern States, in order to make it answer
to the anarchy in his views of civil and political
freedom. But whether this be the case or not,
it is not for us to determine; we shall simply
proceed to examine, and permit the impartial
reader to decide for himself.
~ I. The first fallacy of the abolitionist.
The abolitionists do not hold their passions
in subjection to reason. This is not merely
45 
46       LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
the judgment of a Southern man: it is the
opinion of the more decent and respectable
abolitionists themselves. Thus says Dr. Channing, censuring the conduct of the abolitionists:
"They have  done wrong, I believe;  nor is
their wrong to be winked at because done
fanatically or with good intentions; for how
much mischief maybe wrought with good designs!
They have fallen into the common error of
enthusiasts-that of exaggerating their object, of
feeling as if no evil existed but that which they
opposed, and as if no guilt could be compared
with that of countenancing or upholding it."*
In like manner, Dr. Wayland says: "I unite
with you and the late lamented Dr. Channing
in the opinion that the tone of the abolitionists
at the North has been frequently, I fear I must
say generally,'fierce, bitter, and abusive.' The
abolitionist press has, I believe, from the beginning, too commonly indulged in exaggerated
statement, in violent denunciation, and in coarse
and lacerating invective. At our late Missionary
Convention in Philadelphia, I heard many things
from men who claim to be the exclusive friends
of the slave, which pained me more than I can
* Channing's Works, vol. ii., p. 126. 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.
express.  It seemed to me that the spirit which
many of them manifested was very different
from the spirit of Christ. I also cheerfully bear
testimony to the general courtesy, the Christian
urbanity, and the calmness under provocation
which, in a remarkable degree, characterized
the conduct of the members from the South."
In the flood of sophisms which the abolitionists usually pour out in their explosions of passion, none is more common than what is technically termed by logicians the ignoratio elenchi,
or a mistaking of the point in dispute. Nor is
this fallacy peculiar to the more vulgar sort of
abolitionists. It glares from the pages of Dr.
Wayland, no less than from the writings of the
most fierce, bitter, and vindictive of his associates in the cause of abolitionism. Thus, in one
of his letters to Dr. Fuller, he says: "To present this subject in a simple light. Let us suppose that your family and mine were neighbors.
We,  our wives and children,  are all human
beings in the sense that I have described, and,
in consequence of that common nature, and by
the will of our common Creator, are subject to
the law, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.
Suppose that I should set fire to your house,
shoot you as you came out of it, and seizing
47 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
your wife and children,'oblige them to labor
for my benefit without their contract or consent.'
Suppose, moreover, aware that I could not thus
oblige them, unless they were inferior in intellect to myself, I should forbid them to read,
and thus consign them to intellectual and moral
imbecility. Suppose I should measure out to
them the knowledge of God on the same principle. Suppose I should exercise this dominion
over them and their children as long as I lived,
and then do all in my power to render it certain
that my children should exercise it after me.
The question before us I suppose to be simply this:
Would I, in so doing, act at variance with the relaftions existing between us as creatures of God?
Would I, in other words, violate the supreme
law of my Creator, Thou shalt love thy neighbor
as thyself? or that other, Whatsoever ye would
that men should do unto you, do ye even so
unto them?  I do not see how any intelligent
creature can give more than one answer to this
question. Then I think that every intelligent
creature must affirm that to do this is wrong, or,
in the other form of expression, that it is a great
moral evil. Can we conceive of any greater?"
It was surely very kind in Dr. Wayland to
undertake, with so much pains, to instruct us
48 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.
poor, benighted sons of the South in regard to
the difference between right and wrong. We
would fain give him full credit for all the kindly
feeling he so freely professes for his "Southern
brethren;"  but if he  really thinks  that the
question,  whether  arson,  and  murder,  and
cruelty are offences against the "supreme law
of the Creator," is still open for discussion
among us, then we beg leave to inform him
that he labors under a slight hallucination.
If he had never written a word, we should
have known, perhaps, that it is wrong for a man
to set fire to his neighbor's house, and shoot
him as he came out, and reduce his wife and
children to a state of ignorance, degradation,
and slavery. Nay, if we should find his house
already burnt, and himself already shot, we
should hardly feel justified in treating his wife
and children in so cruel a manner. Not even
if they were -" guilty of a skin," or ever so degraded, should we deem ourselves justified in
reducing them to a state of servitude. This is
NOT "the question before us."  We are quite
satisfied on all such points. The precept, too,
Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself, was not
altogether unknown in the Southern States before his letters were written.  A  committee of
49
D
5 
50       LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
very amiable philanthropists came all the way
from England, as the agents of some abolition
society there, and told us all that the law of God
requires us to love our neighbor as ourselves.
In this benevolent work of enlightenment they
were, if we mistake not, several months in advance of Dr. Wayland. We no longer need to
be enlightened on such points. Being sufficiently instructed, we  admit  that we should
love our neighbor as ourselves, and also that
arson, murder, and so forth are violations of
this law. But we want to know whether, semper
et ubique, the institution of slavery is morally
wrong. This is the question, and to this we
intend to hold the author.
~ II. The second fallacy of the abolitionist.
Lest we should be suspected of misrepresentation, we shall state the position of Dr. Wayland in his  own  words.   In  regard  to  the
institution of slavery, he says: "I do not see
that it does not sanction the whole system
of the  slave-trade.   If I have a  right  to a
thing after I have gotten it, I have a natural right
to the means necessary for getting it.  If this
be so, I should be as much justified in sending
a vessel to Africa, murdering  a part of the 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.
inhabitants of a village, and making slaves of
the rest, as I should be in hunting a herd of
wild animals, and either slaying them or subjecting them to the yoke."
Now mark tihe principle on which this most
wonderful argument is based:  "If I have a
right to a thing after I have gotten it, I have
a natural right to the means for getting it."
That is to say, If I have the right to a slave,
now that I have got him, then I may rightfully
use all necessary means to reduce other men
to slavery! I may shoot, burn, or murder, if
by this means I can only get slaves! Was any
consequence ever more wildly drawn?  Was
any non sequitur ever more glaring?
Let us see how this argument would apply
to other things. If I have a right to a watch
after I have gotten it, no matter how, then I
have a right to use the means necessary to get
watches; I may steal them from my neighbors!
Or, if I have a right to a wife, provided I can
get one, then may I shoot my friend and marry
his widow! Such is the argument of one who
seeks to enlighten the South and reform its
institutions!
51 
52       LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
~ III. The thirdfallacy of the abolitionist.
Nearly allied to the foregoing argument is
that of the same author, in which he deduces
from the right of slavery, supposing it to exist,
another retinue of monstrous rights.   "This
right also," says Dr. Wayland, referring to the
right to hold slaves, "as I have shown, involves
the right to use all the means necessary to
its establishment and perpetuity, and of course
the right to crush his intellectual and social
nature, and to stupefy his conscience, in so far
as may be necessary to enable me to enjoy this
right with the least possible peril."   This is
a compound fallacy, a many-sided error.  But
we will consider only two phases of its ab
surdity.
In the first place, if the slaveholder should
reason in this way, no one would be more ready
than the author himself to condemn his logic.
If any slaveholder should say, That because I
have a right to my slaves, therefore I have the
right to crush the intellectual and moral nature
of men, in order to establish and perpetuate
their bondage,-he would be among the first
to cry out against  such  reasoning.   This  is
evident from the fact that he everywhere com 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.
mends those slaveholders who deem it their
duty, as a return for the service of their slaves,
to promote both their temporal and eternal
good. Hie everywhere insists that such is the
duty of slaveholders; and if such be their duty,
they surely have no right to violate it, by crushing the intellectual and moral nature of those
whom they are bound to elevate in the scale
of being.   If the  slaveholder, then,  should
adopt such an        arguments his logic would be
very justly chargeable by Dr. Vayland with evidencing not so much the existence of a clear
head as of a bad heart.
In the second  place, the above  argument
overlooks the fact that the Southern statesman
vindicates  the  institution of slavery on  the
ground that it finds the XNegro race already so
degraded as to unfit it for a state of freedom.
Ile does not argue that it is right to seize those
who, by the possession of cultivated intellects
and pure morals, are fit for freedom, and debase
them in order to prepare them for social bondage.  iHe does not imagine that it is ever right
to shoot, burn, or corrupt, in order to reduce
any portion of the enlightened universe to a
state of servitude. He merely insists that those
only who  are already unfit for a higher and
5*
53 
54       LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
nobler state than one of slavery, should be
held by society in such a state. This position,
although it is so prominently set forth by every
advocate of slavery at the South, is almost invariably overlooked by the Northern abolitionists.  They talk, and reason, and declaim, indeed, just as if we had caught a bevy of black
angels as they were winging their way to some
island of purity and bliss here upon earth, and
reduced them from their heavenly state, by the
most diabolical cruelties and oppressions, to one
of degradation, misery, and servitude.   They
forget that Africa is not yet a paradise, and
that Southern servitude is not quite a hell.
They forget-in the heat and haste of their
argument they forget- that the institution of
slavery is designed by the South not for the
enlightened and the free, but only for the ignorant and the debased. They need to be constantly reminded that the institution of slavery
is not the motlier, but the daughter, of ignorance and degradation. It is, indeed, the legitimate offspring of that intellectual and moral
debasement which, for so many thousand years,
has been accumulating and growing upon the
African race. And if the abolitionists at the
North will only invent some mnethod by w'icl 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.
all this frightful mass of degradation may be
blotted out at once, then will we most cheerfully consent to "the immediate abolition of
slavery." On this point, however, we need not
dwell, as we shall have occasion to recur to it
again when we come to consider the grounds
and reasons on which the institution of slavery
is vindicated.
Having argued that the right of slavery, if it
exist, implies the right to shoot and murder an
enlightened neighbor, with a view to reduce his
wife and children to a state of servitude, as well
as to crush their intellectual and moral nature
in order to keep them in such a state, the
author adds,  "If I err in making these inferences, I err innocently." We have no doubt
of the most perfect and entire innocence of the
author. But we would remind him that innocence, however perfect or childlike, is not the
only quality which  a great  reformer  should
possess.
~ IV. The fourth fallacy of the abolitionist.
Hie is often guilty of a petitio principii, in
taking it for granted that the institution of
slavery is an injury to the slave, which is the
very point in dispute.  Thus says Dr. Wayland:
55 
56       LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
"If it be asked when, [slavery must be abandoned,] I ask again, when shall a man begin
to cease doing wrong? Is not the answer immediately.? If a man is injuring us, do we doubt
as to the time whten he ought to cease? There
is, then, no doubt in respect to the time when
we ought to cease inflicting injury upon others."*
Here it is assumed that slavery is an injury
to the slave: but this is the very point which
is denied, and which he should have discussed.
If a state of slavery be a greater injury to the
slave than a state of freedom would be, then
are we -— willing to admit  that it should be
abolished.   But  even  in that  case, not  immediately, unless it could be shown that the
remedy would not be worse than the evil. If, on
the whole, the institution of slavery be a curse
to the slave, we say let it be abolished; not
suddenly, however, as if by a whirlwind, but
by the counsels of wise, cautious, and far-seeing
statesmen, who, capable' of looking both before
and after, can comprehend in their plans of reform all the diversified and highly-complicated
interests of society.
"But it may be said," continues the author,
* Elements of Moral Science, Part ii. chap. i. sec. 11. 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.  57
"immediate abolition would  be  the  greatest
possible injury to the slaves themselves. They
are not competent to self-government." True:
this is the very thing which may be, and which
is, said by every Southern statesman in his advocacy of the institution of slavery. Let us see
the author's reply.  "This is a question of fact,"
says he, "which is not in the province of moral
philosophy to decide. It very likely may be so.
So far as I know, the facts are not sufficiently
known to warrant a full opinion on the subject.
We will, therefore, suppose it to be the case,
and ask, What is the duty of masters under these
circumstances?"  In the discussion of this question, the author comes to the conclusion that a
master may hold his slaves in bondage, provided
his intentions be good, and with a view to set
them at liberty as soon as they shall be qualified for such a state.
Moral philosophy, then, it seems, when it
closes its eyes upon facts,. pronounces that
slavery should be immediately abolished; but
if it consider facts, which, instead of being denied, are admitted to be " very likely" true, it
decides against its immediate abolition!  Or,
rather, moral philosophy looks at the fact that
slavery is an injury, in order to see that it should 
58       LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
be forthwith abolished; but closes its eyes upon
the fact that its abolition may be a still greater
injury, lest this foregone conclusion should be
called in question! Hias moral philosophy, then,
an eye only for the facts which lie one side of
the question it proposes to decide?
Slavery is an injury, says Dr. Wayland, and
therefore it should be immediately abolished.
But its abolition would be a still greater injury,
replies the objector. This may be true, says
Dr. Wayland: it is highly probable; but then
this question of injury is one of fact, which it
is not in the province of moral philosophy to
decide!  So much for the consistency and evenhanded justice of the author.
The position assumed by himn, that questions
of fact are not within the province of moral
philosophy, is one of so great importance that
it deserves a separate and distinct notice.
Though  seldom  openly avowed, yet is it so
often tacitly assumed. in the arguments and
declamations of abolitionists, that it shall be
more fully considered in the following section.
~ V. The fifth fallacy of the abolitionist.
"Suppose that A has a right to use the body
of B  according to his-that is, A's-will.  Now 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.
if this be true, it is true universally; and hence,
A has the control over the body of B, and B
has control over the body of C, C of D, &c., and
Z again over the body of A: that is, every
separate will has the right of control over some
other body besides its own, and has no right
of control over its own body or intellect."*
Now, if men were cut out of pasteboard, all
exactly alike, and distinguished from each other
only by the letters of the alphabet, then the
reasoning of the author would be excellent.
But it happens that men are not cut out of
pasteboard. They are distinguished by differences of character,' by diverse habits and propensities, which render the reasonings of the
political philosopher rather more difficult than
if he had merely to deal with or arrange the
letters of the alphabet. In one, for example,
the intellectual and moral part is almost wholly
eclipsed by the brute; while, in another, reason
and religion have gained the. ascendancy, so as
to maintain a steady empire over the whole
man. The first, as the author himself admits,
is incompetent to self-government, and should
therefore be held by the law of society in a state
* Moral Science, Part ii. chap, i. sec. 2.
59 
60       LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
of servitude. But does it follow that " if this be
true,  it is true  universally?"   Because  one
man who cannot govern himself may be governed by another, does it follow that every
man should be governed by others? Does it
follow that the one who has acquired and maintained the most perfect self-government, should
be subjected to the control of him who is wholly
incompetent to control himself? Yes, certainly,
if the reasoning of Dr. Wayland be true; but,
according to every sound principle of political
ethics, the answer is, emphatically, No!
There is a difference between a IHottentot and
a Newton. The first should no more be condemned to astronomical calculations and discoveries, than the last should be required to
follow a plough. Such differences, however,
are overlooked by much of the reasoning of
the  abolitionist.   In regard  to the question
of fact, whether a man is really a man and not
a mere thing, he is profoundly versed. He can
discourse most eloquently upon this subject: he
can prove, by most irrefragable arguments, that
a Hottentot is a man as well as a Newton.
But as to the differences among men, such nice
distinctions are beneath his philosophy! It is
true that one may be sunk so low in the scale 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS;.
of being that civil freedom would be a curse to
him; yet, whether this be so or not, is a question of fact which his philosophy does not stoop
to decide. Hle merely wishes to know what
rights A can possibly have, either by the law of
God or man, which do not equally belong to
13B? And if A would feel it an injury to be
placed under the control of B, then "there is no
doubt" that it is equally wrong to place B under
the control of A? In plain English, if it would
be injurious and wrong to subject a Newton to
the will of a IHottentot, then it.would be equally
injurious and wrong to subject a Hottentot to
the will of a Newton! Such is the inevitable
consequence of his very profound political principles! Nay, such is the identical consequence
which he draws from his own principles!
If questions of fact are not within the province of the moral philosopher, then the moral
philosopher has no business with the science
of political ethics. This is not a pure, it is a
mixed science. Facts can no more be overlooked by the political architect, than magnitude can be disregarded by the mathematician.
The man, the political dreamer, who pays no
attention to them, may be fit, for aught we
know, to frame a government out of moonshine
61 
62      LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
for the inhabitants of Utopia; but, if we might
choose our own teachers in political wisdom,
we should decidedly prefer those who have an
eye for facts as well as abstractions. If we may
borrow a figure from Mr. Macaulay, the legislator who sees no difference among men, but
proposes the same kind of government for all,
acts about as wisely as a tailor who should
measure the Apollo Belvidere to cut clothes
for all his customers-for the pigmies as well
as for the giants.
~ VI. The sixth fallacy of the abolitionist.
It is asserted by Dr. Wayland that the institution of slavery is condemned as "a violation
of the plainest dictates of natural justice," by
"the natural conscience of man, from at least
as far back as the time of Aristotle." If any
one should infer that Aristotle himself condemned the institution of slavery, he would be
grossly deceived; for it -is known to every one
who has read the Politics of Aristotle that he
is, under certain circumstances, a strenuous advocate of the natural justice, as well as of the
political wisdom, of slavery. Hence we shall
suppose that Dr. Wayland does not mean to
include Aristotle in his broad assertion, but 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.
only those who came after him.  Even in this
sense, or to this extent, his positive assertion
is so diametrically opposed to the plairnest facts
of history, that it is difficult to conceive how
he could have persuaded himself of its truth.
It is certain that, on other occasions, he was
perfectly aware of the fact that the natural conscience of man, from the time of Aristotle down
to that of the Christian era, was in favor of tihe
institution of slavery; for as often as it has
served his purpose to assert this fact, he has not
hesitated to do so.  Thus, "the universal existence of slavery at the time of Christ," says
he,'took its origin from the moral darkness
of the age.  The immortality of the soul was
unknown.   Out of the Hebrew nation not a
man onr earth had any true conception of the
character of the Deity or of our relations and
obligations to him. The law of universal love
to man had never been heard of."* No wonder
he here argues that slavery received the universal
sanction of the heathen world, since so great was
the moral darkness in which they were involved.
This darkness was so great, if we may believe
the author, that the men of one nation esteemed
* Letters on Slaxery, p. 89.
63 
64       LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
those of another "as by nature foes, whom they
had a right" not only "to subdue or enslave,
but also to murder "whenever  and in what
manner soever they were able."* The sweepimg assertion, that such was the moral darkness
of the heathen world, is wide of the truth;
for, at the time of Christ, no civilized nation
"esteemed it right to murder or enslave, whenever and in what manner soever they were able,"
the people of other nations.  There were some
ideas of natural justice, even then, among men;
and if there were not, why does Dr. Wayland
appeal to their ideas of natural justice as one
argument  against  slavery?   If the  heathen
world'"esteemed it right" to make slaves, how
can it be said that its conscience condemned
slavery? Is it not evident that Dr. Wayland
is capable of asserting either the one thing or
its opposite, just as it may happen to serve the
purpose of his anti-slavery argument?  Whether
facts lie within the province of moral philosophy
or not, it is certain, we think, that the moral
philosopher who may be pleased to set facts at
naught has no right to substitute fictions in
their stead.
* Letters on Slavery, p. 92. 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.
~ VII. The seventh fallacy of the abolitionist.
Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,"
is the rule of action which, in the estimation
of abolitionists, should at once and forever decide every good man against the institution of
slavery. But when we consider the stupendous
interests involved in the question, and especially
those of an intellectual and moral nature, we
dare not permit ourselves to be carried away
by any form of mere words. We must pause
and investigate. The fact that the dexterous
brandishing of the beautiful precept in question
has made, and will no doubt continue to make,
its thousands of converts or victims, is a reason
why its real import should be the more closely
examined and the more clearly defined. The
havoc it makes among those whose philanthropy is stronger than their judgment-or, if
you please, whose judgment is weaker than
their philanthropy-flows not from the divine
precept itself, but only from human interpretations thereof. And it should ever be borne.
in mind that he is the real enemy of the great
cause of plhilanthropy who, by absurd or overstrained applications of this sublime precept,
lessens that profound respect to which it is so
E                6.
65 
(66      LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
justly entitled from every portion of the rational universe.
It is repeatedly affirmed by Dr. Wayland
that every slaveholder lives in the habitual and
open violation of the precept which requires us
to love our neighbor as ourselves.  "The moral
precepts of the Bible," says he, "are diametrically opposed to slavery. These are,'Thou shalt
love thy neighbor as thyself,' and'All things
whatsoever ye would that men should do unto
you, do ye even so unto them.' Now, were this
precept obeyed," he continues, "it is manifest
that slavery could not in fact exist for a single
instant. The principle of the precept is absolutely subversive of the principle of slavery."
If strong assertion were argument, we should
no doubt be overwhelmed by the irresistible
logic of Dr. Wayland. But the assertion of no
man can be accepted as sound argument. We
want to know the very meaning of the words
of the great Teacher, and to be guided by that,
rather than by the fallible authority of an earthly
oracle. What, then, is the meaning, the real
meaning, of his inspired words?
Do they mean that whatsoever we might, in
any relation of life, desire for ourselves, we
should be willing to grant to others in the like 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.
relation or condition? This interpretation, we
are aware, has been put upon the words by a
very celebrated divine. If we may believe that
divine, we cannot do as we would be done by,
unless, when we desire the estate of another, we
forthwith transfer our estate to him! If a poor
man, for example, should happen to covet the
est ate o-fFli'ts rich n eighbor,' then he is bound bv
this golden rule of benevolence to give his little
all to him, without regard to the necessities or
wants of his own family!  But this interpretation, though seriously propounded by a man of
undoubted genius and piety, has not, so far as
we know, made the slightest possible impression
on the plain good sense of mankind. Even
among his most enthusiastic admirers, it has
merely excited a good-natured smile at what
they could not but regard as the strange hallucination of a benevolent heart.
A wrong desire in one relation of life is not a
reason for a wrong act in another relation thereof.
A man may desire the estate  he may desire the
man-servant, or the maid-servant, or the wife
of his ne{g bor, but ts is no reason wh    e
shoul'-i' abadl0n his'wn n"'man-servant, or his
Tmai-servant or his wi'temwil otf  anot he  of  r.
TiCte criminal who trembles at the bar of justice
67 
68       LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
may desire both judge and jury to acquit him,
but this is no reason why, if acting in the
capacity of either judge or juror, he should
bring in a verdict of acquittal in favor of one
justly accused of crime. If we would apply the
rule in question aright, we should consider, not
what we might wish or desire if placed in the
situation of another, but what we ouyIht to wish
or desire.
If a man were a child, he might wish to be
exempt  fi-om the wholesome restraint of his
parents; but this, as every one will admit, is
no reason why he should abandon his own children to themselves. In like manner, if he were
a slave, he might most vehemently desire freedom; but this is no reason why he should set
his slaves at liberty. The whole question of
right turns upon what he ought to wish or desire if placed in such a condition. If he were an
intelligent, cultivated, civilized  man,-in one
word, if he were fit for freedom,-then his desire for liberty would be a rational desire, would
be such a feeling as he ought to cherish;  and
hence, he should be willing to extend the same
blessing to all other intelligent, cultivated, civil
ized men, to all such as are prepared for its
enjoyment.  Such is the sentiment which he 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.
should entertain, and such is precisely the senti ment entertained at the South. No one here
.proposes to reduce any one to slavery, much
less those wbho,re qualified for freedom;  and
hence the inquiry so often propounded by Dr.
Wayland and other abolitionists, how we would
like to be subjected to bondage, is a grand
impertinence. We should like it as little as
themselves; and in this respect we shall do as
we would be done by.
But suppose we were veritable slaves-slaves
in character and in disposition as well as in fact
-and as unfit for freedom as the Africans of
the South-what ouyht we then to wish or de sire? Ought we to desire freedom? We an swer, no; because on that supposition freedom
would be a curse and not a blessing.  Dr. Way land himself admits that "it is very likely" free dom would be "the greatest possible injury" to
the slaves of the South. HIence, we cannot
perceive that if we were such as they, we ought
to desire so great an evil to ourselves. It would
indeed be to desire " the greatest possible
injury" to ourselves; and though, as ignorant
and blind slaves, we might cherish so foolishly
-desire, especially f instigated by abolitionists,
yet this is no reason why, as enlightened citi
69 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
zeus, we should be willing to inflict the same
*ia           *       A t;(;7#' (7T-e_*w-''
grew.YMB ~:~L-ut  ~ Ier_  t Jfoolishre,     we-Tepeat, in one relation of life, is not a good reason for
a foolish or injurious act in another relation thereof.
The precept which requires us to do as we
would be done by, was intended to enlighten
the conscience. It is used by abolitionists to
hoodwink  and deceive  the  conscience.  This
precept directs us to conceive ourselves placed
in the condition of others, in order that we may
the more clearly perceive what is due to them.
The abolitionist employs it to convince us that,
because we desire liberty for ourselves, we
should extend it to all men, even to those who
are not qualified for its enjoyment, and to whom
it would prove "the greatest possible injury."
He employs it not to show us what is due to
others, but to persuade us to injure them! lHe
may deceive himself; but so long as we believe
what even he admits as highly probable-namely,
that the "abolition of. slavery would  be the
greatest possible injury to the slaves themselves"-we shall never use the divine precept
as an instrument of delusion and of wrong.
What! inflict the greatest injury on our neighbor, and that, too, out of pure Christian charity?
But we need not argue with the abolitionist
TO 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.
upon his own admissions. We have infinitely
stronger ground  to stand on.   The  precept,
"Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," is to
be found in the Old Testament as well as in
the New.  Thus, in the nineteenth chapter of
Leviticus, it is said,  "Thou  shalt love  thy
neighbor as thyself;" and no greater love than
this is anywhere inculcated in the'New Testament. Yet in the twenty-fifth chapter of the
same book, it is written, "Of the children of
the strangers that do sojourn among you, of
them shall ye buy, and of their families that
are with you, which they begat in your land:
and they shall be your possession. And ye
shall take them as an inheritance for your
children after you, to inherit them for a possession; they shall be your bondsmen forever."
This language is too plain for controversy. In
regard to this very passage, in which the Hiebrews are commanded to enter upon and take
possession of the land of the Canaanites, Dr.
Wayland himself is constrained to admit-"The
authority to take them as slaves seems to be
a part of this original, peculiar, and I may perhaps say, anomalous grant."* Now, if the prin
* Letters, p. 50.
71 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
ciple of slavery, and the principle of the precept,
Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself, be as
Dr. Wayland boldly asserts, always and everywltere at war with each other, how has it happened that both principles are so clearly and
so unequivocally embodied in one and the same
code by the Supreme Ruler of the world? IHas
this discrepancy escaped the eye of Omniscience,
and remained in the code of laws from heaven,
to be detected and exposed by "the author of
the Moral Science"?
We do not mean that Dr. Wayland sees any
discrepancy among the principles of thie divine
legislation. It is true he sees there the precept, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,"
and also this injunction, "Thou shalt buy them
for a possession," and "They shall be your
bondmen forever;" but although this looks
very " anomalous" to him, he dare not pronounce it absurd or self-contradictory. It is
true, he declares, that slavery is condemned
always and everywhere by "the plainest dictates
of natural justice;" but yet, although, according
to his own admission,* it was instituted by
HIeaven, he has found out a method to save
* Letters, p. 50.
72 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.
the character of the Almighty from the disgrace
of such a law. Hie says, "I know the word
'shalt' is used when speaking of this subject,
but it is clearly used as prophetic, and not as
mandatory." Ay, the words "thou shalt" are
used in regard to the buying and holding of
slaves, just as they are used in the commands
which precede and follow this injunction.
There is no change in the form of the expression. There is not, in any way, the slightest
intimation that the Lawgiver is about to prophesy; all seems to be a series of commands,
and is clothed in the same language of authority-" thou shalt."   Yet in one particular
instance, and in one instance only, this language
seems "clearly" prophetic to Dr. Wayland, and
not mnandatory.  Now, I submit to the candid
and impartial reader, if this be not egregious
trifling with the word of God.
Dr. Wayland forgets that he had himself admittedcl that the very passage in question clothed
the Hebrews with "the authority to take slaves."*
Jie now, in the face of his own admission, dec'ares that this language "is clearly prophetic,"
and tells what would or what might be, and not
* Letters, p. 50.
7
73 
74       LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
what should or what must be." The poor Hebrews, however, when they took slaves by the
authority of a "thou shalt" from the Lord, never
imagined that they were merely fulfilling a prophecy, and committing an abominable sin.
This is clear to Dr. Wayland, if we may trust
the last expression of his opinion.   But it is
to be regretted, that either the clearness of his
perceptions, or the confidence of his assertions,
is so often disproportioned to the evidence before him. Thus, he says with the most admirable modesty, "It seems to me that the soul is
the most important part of a human being;"*
and yet he peremptorily and positively declares
tliat the very strongest language of authority
ever found in Scripture "is clearly used as prophetic and not mandatory!"  Hie may, however,
well reserve the tone of dogmatic authority for
such propositions, since, if they may not be carried by assertion, they must be left wholly without the least shadow of support. But one would
suppose that strength of assertion in such cases
required for its unembarrassed utterance no
little strength of countenance.
"If any one doubts," says Dr. Wayland, "re
* Letters, p. 113. 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.
specting the bearing of the Scripture precept
upon this case, a few plain questions may throw
additional light upon the subject."* Now, if
we mistake not, the few plain questions which
he deems so unanswerable may be answered
with the most perfect ease. "Would the master
be willing," he asks, "that another person should
subject him to slavery, for the same reasons and
on the same grounds that he holds his slave
_ in bondage?"  We  answer, No.  If any man
should undertake to subject Southern masters
to slavery, on the ground that they are intellec  tually and morally sunk so loW* as to be unfit
for freedom or self-control, we should certainly
not like the compliment. It may argue a very
great degree of self-complacency in us, but yet
the plain fact is, that we really do believe our  selves competent to govern ourselves, and to
manage our affairs, without the aid of masters.
And as we are not willing to be made slaves
of, especially on any such humiliating grounds,
so we are not willing to see any other nation
or race of men, whom we may deem qualified
for the glorious condition of freedom, sub  jected to servitude.
* Moral Science, Part ii. chap. i. ~ 2.
75 
76       LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
"Would the gospel allow us," he also asks5
"if it were in our power, to reduce our fel]owcitizens of our own  color to slavery?"   Cer
tainly not. Nor do we propose to reduce any
. one, either white or black, to a state of slavery.
It is amazing to see with what an air of confidence such  questions are propounded.   Dr.
Channing, no less than Dr. Wayland, seems to
think they must carry home irresistible conviction to the heart and conscience of every
man who is not irremediably blinded by the
detestable  institution  of slavery.   "Now, let
every reader," says he, "ask himself this plain
question: Could I, can I, be rightfully seized
and made an article of property?"  And we,
too, say, Let every reader ask himself this plain
question, and then, if he please, answer it in
the negative. But what, then, should follow?
Why, if you please, he should refuse to seize
any other man or to make him an article of
property. Hie should be opposed to the crime
of kidnapping. But if, from such an answer,
he should conclude that the institution of slavery
is "everywhere and always wrong," then surely,
after what has been said, not another word is
needed to expose the ineffable weakness and
fuitility of the conclusion. 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.
This golden rule, this divine precept, requires
us to conceive ourselves placed in the condition
of our slaves, and then to ask ourselves, HIow
should we be treated by the master? in order to
obtain a clear and impartial view of our duty to
them. This it requires of us; and this we can
most cheerfully perform. We can conceive that
we are poor, helpless, dependent beings, possessing the passions of men and the intellects of
children. We can conceive that we are by
nature idle, improvident, and, without a protector and friend to guide and control us, utterly
unable to take care of ourselves. And, having
conceived all this, if we ask ourselves, Hiow
should we be treated by the masters whom the
law has placed over us, what is the response?
Is it that they should turn us loose to shift for
ourselves? Is it that they should abandon us
to ourselves, only to fall a prey to indolence, and
to the legion of vices and crimes which ever follow in its train?  Is it that they should set us
free, and expose us, without protection, to the
merciless impositions of the worst portions of
a stronger and more sagacious race? Is it, in
one word, that we should be free from the dominion of men who, as a general thing, are
humane and wise ill their management of us,
77 
LIBERTY AND- SLAVERY.
only to become the victims-the most debased
and hopeless victims-of every evil way?  We
answer, No! Even the spirit of abolitionism
itself has, in the person of Dr. Wayland, declared that such treatment would, in all probability, be the greatest of calamities. We feel X
sure it would be an infinite and remediless curse.
And as we believe that, if we were in the condition of slaves, such treatment would be so great
and so withering a curse, so we cannot, out of a
feeling of love, proceed to inflict this curse upon
our slaves.  On the contrary, we would do as we
so clearly see we ought to be done by, if our conditions were changed.
Is it not amazing, as well as melancholy, that
learned divines, who undertake to instruct the
benighted South in the great principles of duty,
should entertain such superficial and erroneous
views of the first, great, and all-comprehending
precept of the gospel? If their interpretation
of this precept were correct, then the child might
be set free from the authority of the father, and
the criminal from the sentence of the judge.
All justice would  be extinguished, all order
overthrown, and boundless confusion introduced
into the affairs of men. Yet, with unspeakable
self-complacency, they come with such miserable
78 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.
interpretations of the plainest truths to instruct
those whom they conceive to be blinded by custom and the institution of slavery to the clearest
light of heaven.  They tell us, "Thou shouldst
love thy neighbor as thyself;" and they reiterate
these words in our ears, just as if we had never
heard them before.  If this is all they have to
say, why then we would remind them that the
mneaning of the precept is the precept. It is not
a mere sound, it is sense, which these glorious
words are intended to convey. And if they can
only repeat the words for us, why then they
might just as well send a host of free negroes
with good, strong lungs to be our instructors in
moral science.
~ VIII. The eighthfallacy of the abolitzonist.
An argument is drawn from the divine attributes against the institution of slavery. One
would suppose that a declaration from God
himself is somne little evidence as to what is
agreeable to his attributes; but it seems that
moral philosophers have, now-a-days, found
out a better method of arriving at what is implied by his perfections. Dr. Wayland is one
of those who, setting aside the word of God,
appeal to his attributes in favor of the imme
79 
S0       LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
diate  and universal abolition of slavery.   If
slavery were abolished, says he, "thne laborer
would then work in conformity with the conditions which God has appointed, whereas he
now works at variance with them; in the one
case, we should be attempting to accumulate property under the blessing of God, whereas now
we are attempting to do it under his special and
peculiar malediction.   hIow  can we  expect to
prosper, when there is not, as Mr. Jefferson remarks,'an attribute of the Almighty that can
be appealed to in our favor'? "* If we may rely
upon his own words, rather than upon the confident assertions of Dr. Wayland, we need not
fear the curse of God upon the slavehlolder.
The readiness with which Dr. Wayland points
the thunders of the divine wrath at our heads,
is better evidence of the passions of his own
heart than of the perfections of the Almighty.
Again he says: "If Jefferson trembled for his
country when he remembered that God is just,
and declared that,'in case of insurrection, the
Almighty has no attribute that can take part with
us in the contest,' surely it becomes a disciple
of Jesus Christ to pause and reflect." Now let it
* Letters, p. 119, 120. 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.
be borne in mind that all this proceeds from a
man, from a professed disciple of Jesus Christ,
who, in various places, has truly, as well as
emphatically, said, " The duty of slaves is also
explicitly made known in the Bible. They are
bound to obedience, fidelity, submission, and respect to their masters,"* &c. &c.
Such, then, according to Dr. Wayland himself, is the clear and unequivocal teaching of
revelation. And such being the case, shall the
real "disciple of Jesus Christ" be made to believe, on the authority of Mr. Jefferson or of
any other man, that the Almighty has no attribute which could induce him  to take sides with
his own law?  If, instead of submission to that
law, there should be rebellion,-and not only
rebellion, but bloodshed and murder,-shall we
believe that the Almighty, the supreme Ruler of
heaven and earth, would look on well pleased?
Since such is the express declaration of God
himself respecting the duty of slaves, it surely
becomes a disciple of Christ to pause and reflect
whether he will follow his voice or the voice
of man.
We  owe at least one benefit to the Northern
*'Moral Science, Part ii. chap. i. sec. 2.
F
81 
82      LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
abolitionists. Ere the subject of slavery was
agitated by them, there were many loose, floating notions among us, as well as among themselves, respecting the nature of liberty, which
were at variance with the institution of slavery.
But since this agitation began, we have looked
more narrowly into the grounds of slavery, as
well as into the character of the arguments by
which it is assailed, and we have found the first
as solid as adamant, the last as unsubstantial
as moonshine. If Mr. Jefferson had lived till
the present day, there can be no doubt, we
think, that he would have been on the same side
of this great question with the Calhouns, the
Clays, and the Websters of the country. We
have known many who, at one time, fully concurred with Mr. Jefferson on this subject, but
are now firm believers in the perfect justice and
humanity of negro slavery.
~ IX. The ninth fallacy of the abolitionist.
We have already seen that the abolitionist
argues the question of slavery as if Southerners were proposing to catch freemen and
reduce them to bondage. HIe habitually overlooks the fact, that slavery results, not from
thie  action  of  the  individual,  but from  an 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.
ordinance of the State.  iHe  forgets that it is
a civil institution, and proceeds to argue as
if it were founded in individual wrong. And
even when he rises- as he sometimes doesto a contemplation of the real question in
dispute, he generally takes a most narrow
and one-sided view of the subject. For he
generally takes it for granted that the legislation which ordains the institution of slavery
is intended solely and exclusively for the benefit of the master, without the least regard to
the interests of the slave
Thus says Dr. Wayland:  "Domestic slavery
proceeds upon the principle that the master
has a right to control the actions - physical
and  intellectual-of  the  slave for  his  own
(that is, the master's) individual benefit,"* &c.
And  again:  "It  supposes  that the  Creator
intended one human being to govern the
physical, intellectual, and moral actions of as
many other human beings as; by purchase, lihe
can bring within his physical power;  and that
one human being may thus acquire a right to
sacrifice the happiness of any number of other
human beings, for the purpose of promoting his
*  Moral Science, Part ii. chap. i. sec. 2.
83 
84       LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
own."*  Now, surely, if this representation be
just, then the institution of slavery should be
held in infinite abhorrence by every man in
Christendom.
But we can assure Dr. Wayland that, however ignorant or heathenish he may be pleased
to consider the people of the Southern States,
we are not so utterly lost to all reverence for
the Creator as to suppose, even for a moment, that he intended any one human being
to possess the right of sacrificing the happiness
of his fellow-men to his own.  We  can assure
him that we are not quite so dead to every
sentiment of political justice, as to imagine
that any legislation which intends to benefit
the one at the expense of the many is otherwise than unequal and iniquitous in the extreme. There is some little sense of justice
left among us yet; and hence we approve of
no institution or law which proceeds on the
monstrous principle that any one man has, or
can have, the "right to sacrifice the happiness
of any number of other human beings for the
purpose of promoting his own." We recognise
no such right. It is as vehemently abhorred
* Moral Science, Part ii. chap. i. sec. 2. 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.
and condemned by us as it can be abhorred
and condemned by the author himself.
In thus taking it for granted, as Dr. Way]and so coolly does, that the institution in
question is "intended" to sacrifice the happiness of the slaves to the selfish interests of the
master, he incontinently begs the whole question. Let him establish this point, and the
whole controversy will be at an end. But let
him not hope to establish any thing, or to
satisfy any one, by assuming the very point in
dispute, and then proceed to demolish what
every man at the South condemns no less
than himself. Surely, no one who has looked
at both sides of this great question can be
ignorant that the legislation of the South proceeds on the principle that slavery is beneficial, not to the master only, but also and especi ally to  t     he slave.  Surely, no one who  has
either an eye or an ear for facts can be ignorant that the institution of. slavery is based
on the ground, or principle, that it is beneficial, not only to the parts, but also to the
whole,  of th      e     society in which it exists.  This
ground, or principle, is set forth in every defence of slavery by the writers and speakers
of the South; it is so clearly and so un
8
85 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
equivocally set forth, that he who  runs may
read. Why, then, is it overlooked by Dr.
Wayland?  Why is he pleased to imagine that
he is combatting Southern principles, when, in
reality, he is merely combatting the monstrous
figment, the distorted conception of his own
brain,-namely, the right of one man to sacrifice the happiness of multitudes to his own
will and pleasure? Is it because facts do not lie
within the province of the moral philosopher?
Is it because fiction alone is worthy of his
attention? Or is it because a blind, partisan
zeal has so far taken possession of his very
understanding, that he finds it impossible to'
speak of the institution of slavery, except in
the language of the grossest misrepresentation?
~ X.  The tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth,
fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth fallacies of the
abolitionist;  or his seven arguments  aygainst the
right of a man to hold property in his fellow-man.
"This  claim of property in  a human  being," says Dr. Channing, "is altogether false,
groundless. No such right of man in man
can exist. A human being cannot be justly
owned." The only difficulty in maintaining
86 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.
this position is, according to Dr. Channing,
"on account of its exceeding obviousness.  It
is too plain for proof. To defend it is like
trying to confirm a self-evident truth," &c. &c.
Yet he advances no less than  seven " arguments," as he calls them, in order to establish
this self-evident position. We shall examine
these seven arguments, and see if his great
confidence be not built on a mere abuse of
words.
"The consciousness of our humanity," says
he, "involves the persuasion that we cannot
be  owned  as a tree or a brute."   This, as
everybody knows, is one of  the  hackneyed
commonplaces of the abolitionist.   IIe never
ceases to declaim about the injustice of slavery,
because it regards, as he is pleased to assert, a
man as a mere thing or a brute. Now, once for
all, we freely admit that it were monstrously
unjust to regard or treat a man otherwise than
as a man.  We freely admit that a human being "cannot be owned as a tree or a brute."
A tree may be absolutely owned. That is
to say, the owner of a tree may do what he
pleases with his own, provided he do no harm
or injury with it. Hie may cut it down; and,
if he please, he may beat it as long as he has
87 
88    LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
the power to raise an arm. He may work it
into a house or into a piece of furniture, or
he may lay it on the fire, and reduce it to
ashes. Hie may, we repeat, do just exactly
what he pleases with his own, if his own be
such a thing as a tree, for a tree has no rights.
It is far otherwise with a brute. The owner
of a horse, for example, may not do what he
pleases with his own. Here his property is not
absolute; it is linmited.  IIe may not beat his
horse without mercy, "for a good man is merciful to his beast." ie may not cut his horse to
pieces, or burn him on the fire. For the horse
has rights, which the owner himself is bound to
respect. The horse has a right to food and
kind treatment, and the owner who refuses
these is a tyrant. Nay, the very worm that
crawls beneath our feet has his rights as well
as the monarch on his throne; and just in so
far as these rights are disregarded by a man is
that man a tyrant.
Hience even the brute may not be regarded
or treated as a mere thing or a tree. IIe can be
owned and treated no otherwise than as a
brute. The horse, for example, may not be
left, like a tree, without food and care; but he
may be saddled and rode as a horse; or he may 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.
be hitched to the plough, and compelled to do
his master's work.
In like manner, a man cannot be owned or
treated as a horse. IHe cannot be saddled or
rode, nor hitched to the plough and be made to
do the work of a horse. On the contrary, he
should be treated as a man, and required to
perform only the work of a man. The right to
such work is all the ownership which any one
man can rightfully have in another; and this is
all which any slaveholder of the South needs to
claim.
The real question is, Can one man have a right
to the personal service or obedience of another
without his consent? We do not intend to let
the abolitionist throw dust in our eyes, and
shout victory amid a clamor of words.   We
intend to hold him to the point. Whether he be
a learned divine, or a distinguished senator, we
intend he shall speak to the point, or else his
argument shall be judged, not according to the
eloquent noise it makes or the excitement it
produces, but according to the sense it contains.
Can a man, then, have a right to the labor or
obedience of another without his consent? Give
us this right, and it is all we ask. We lay
no claim to the soul of the slave. We grant
8*
89 
90       LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
to the abolitionist, even more freely than he
can assert, that the "soul of the slave is his
own."   Or,  rather,  we  grant  that  his soul
belongs exclusively tQ the God who gave it.
The master may use him not as a tree or a
brute, but only as a rational, accountable, and
immortal being may be used. He may not
command him to do any thing which is wrong;
and if he should so far forget himself as to require such service of his slave, he would himself
be guilty of the act. If he should require his
slave to violate any law of the land, he would
be held not as a particeps criminis merely, but as
a criminal in the first degree. In like manner,
if he should require him to violate the law of
God, he would be guilty- far more guilty than
the slave himself - in the sight of heaven.
These are truths which are just as well understood at the South as they are at the North.
The master, we repeat, lays no claim to the
soul of the slave. lIe demands no spiritual
service of him, he exacts no divine honors.
With his own soul he is fully permitted to
serve his own God. With this soul he may
follow the solemn injunction of the Most High,
"Servants, obey your  masters;"  or  he  may
listen to the voice of the tempter, "Servants, 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.
fly from your masters." Those only who instigate him to violate the law of God, whether
at the North or at the South, are the men who
seek to deprive him of his rights and to exercise
an infamous dominion over his soul.
Since, then, the master claims only a right to
the labor and lawful obedience of the slave, and
no right whatever to his soul, it follows that the
argument, which Dr. Channing regards as the
strongest of his seven, has no real foundation.
Since the master claims to have no property in
the "rational, moral, and immortal" part of his
being, so all the arguments, or rather all the
empty declamation, based on the false supposition of such claim, falls to the ground. So the
passionate appeals, proceeding on the supposition of such a monstrous claim, and addressed
to the religious sensibilities of the multitude,
are only calculated to deceive and mislead their
judgment.  It is a mere thing of words; and,
though "full of sound and' fury," it signifies
nothing.  "The traffic in human souls," which
figures so largely in the speeches of the divines
and demagogues, and which so fiercely stirs up
the most unhallowed passions of their hearers,
is merely the transfer of a right to labor.
Does any one doubt whether such a right may
91 
92       LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
exist?  The master certainly has a right to the
labor of his apprentice for a specified period of
time, though he has no right to his soul even
for a moment. The father, too, has a right to
the personal service and obedience of his child
until he reach the age of twenty-one; but no
one ever supposed that he owned the soul of his
child, or might sell it, if he pleased, to another.
Though he may not sell the soul of his child, it
is universally admitted that he may, for good
and sufficient reasons, transfer his right to the
labor and obedience of his child. W~hy, then,
should it be thought impossible that such a
right to service may exist for life? If it may
exist for one period, why not for a longer, and
even for life? If the good of both parties and
the good of the whole community require such a
relation and such a right to exist, why should it
be deemed so unjust, so iniquitous, so monstrous? This whole controversy turns, we repeat, not upon any consideration of abstract
rights, but solely upon the highest good of allupon the highest good of the slave as well as
upon that of the community.
"It is plain," says Dr. Channing, in his first
argument, "that if any one man may be held
as property, then any other man may be so held." 
AROUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.
This sophism has been already sufficiently refuted. It proceeds on the supposition that if
one man, however incapable of self-government,
may be placed under the control of another,
then all men may be placed under the control
of others! It proceeds on the idea that all men
should be placed in precisely the same condition,
subjected to precisely the same authority, and
required to perform precisely thle same kind of
labor. In one word, it sees no difference and
makes no distinction between a Negro  and a
Newton.  But as an overstrained and false idea
of equality lies at thie foundation of this argument, so it will pass under review again, when
we come to consider the great demonstration
which the abolitionist is accustomed to deduce
from the axiom that "all men are created equal."
The third argument of Dr. Channing is, like
the first, "founded on the essential equality of
men." Hence, like the first, it may be postponed until we come to consider the true meanilg and the real political significancy of the
natural equality of all men. We shall barely
remark, in passing, that two arguments cannot
be made out of one by merely changing the
mode of expression.
The second argument of the author is as fol
93 
94       LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
lows: "A man cannot be seized and held as
property, because he has rights....   A being
having rights cannot justly be made property,
for this clain  over him virtually annuls all his
rights." This argument, it is obvious, is based
on the arbitrary idea which the author has been
pleased to attach to the term property. If it
proves any thing, it would prove that a horse
could not be held as property, for a horse certainly has rights.   But,  as we have seen,  a
limited property, or a right to the labor of a.
man, does not deny or annul all his rights, nor
necessarily any one of them. This argument
needs no further refutation. For we acknovwledge that the slave has rights; and the limited
or qualified property which the master claims in
him, extending merely to his personal human
labor and his lawful obedience, touches not one
of these rights.
The fourth argument of Dr. Channing is identical with the second. " That a human being,"
says he, "cannot be justly held as property, is
apparent from the very nature of property.  Property is an exclusive right. It shuts out all
claim but that of the possessor.   What  one
man  owns  cannot belong to another."   The
only difference between the two arguments is 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.
this: in one the " nature of property" is said "to
annul all rights;" and in the other it is said
"to exclude all rights!" Both are based on the
same idea of property, and both arrive at the
same conclusion, with only a very slight difference in the mode of expression!
And both are equally unsound. True; "what
one man owns cannot belong to another."  But
may not one man have a right to the labor of
another, as a father to the labor of his son,
or a master to the labor of his apprentice; and
yet that other a right to food and raiment, as
well as to other things? May not one man
have a right to the service of another, without
annulling or excluding all the rights of that
other? This argument proceeds, it is evident,
on the false supposition that if any being be
held as property, then he has no rights: a
supposition which, if true, would exclude and
annul the right of property in every living
creature.
Dr. Channing's fifth argument is deduced from
"the universal indignation excited toward a man
who makes another his slave." " Our laws,"
says he, "know no higher crime than that of
reducing a man to slavery. To steal or to buy
an African on his own shores is piracy."  " To
95 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
steal a man,   we reply, is one thing;  and, by
the authority of the law of the land, to require
him to do certain labor, is, one would think,
quite another. The first may be as high a crime
as any known to our laws; the last is recognised
by our laws themselves. Is it not wonderful
that Dr. Channing could not see so plain a distinction, so broad and so glaring a difference?
The father of his country held slaves; he did
not commit the crime of man-stecaling.
The sixth argument of Dr. Channing, "against
the right of property in man," is' drawn firom
a very obvious principle of moral science. It
is a plain truth, universally received, that every
right supposes or involves a corresponding obligation. If, then, a man has a right to another's
person or powers, the latter is under obligation
to give himself up as a chattel to the former."
Most assuredly, if one man has a right to the
service or obedience of another, then that other
is under obligation to render that service or
obedience to him. But is such an obligation
absurd? Is it inconsistent with the inherent,
the inalienable, the universal rights of man
that the "servant should obey his master?"  If
so, then we fear the rights of man were far
better understood by Dr. Channing than by the
96 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.
Creator of the world and the Author of revelation.
Such are the seven arguments adduced by Dr.
Channing to show that no man can rightfully
hold property in his fellow-man. But before
we quit this branch of the subject, we  shall
advert to a passage in the address of tile HIon.
Charles Sumner, before the people of New York,
at the Metropolitan Theatre, May 9, 1855.
"I desire to present this argument," says he,
"on grounds above all controversy, impeachment, or suspicion, even from slave-masters
themselves.   Not on triumphant story, not even
on indisputable facts, do I now accuse slavery,
but on its character, as revealed  in its own
simple  definition of itself.   Out of its own
mouth do I condemn it." Well, and why does
he condemn it?  Because, "by the law of slavery,
man, created in the image of God, is divested of
his human character and declared to be a mere
chattel.  That the statement may not seem to
be put forward without precise authority, I quote
the law of two different slave States." That is
the accusation. It is to be proved by the law
of slavery itself.  It is to be proved beyond
"all controversy," by an appeal to "indisputable
facts."  Now let us have the facts: here they
G                 9
97 
98      LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
are. "The law of another polished slave State,"
says Mr. Sumner, "gives this definition:' Slaves
shall be delivered, sold, taken, reputed, and adjudged in law to be chattels personal, in the
hands of their owners and possessors, and their
executors, administrators, and assignees, to all
intents, constructions, and purposes whatsoever."'
Now, mark;  the learned Senator undertook
to prove, beyond all doubt and controversy, that
slavery divests the slave of his human character,
and declares him to be a mere chattel. But he
merely proves that it declares him to be a
"chattel personal." Jie merely proves that the
law of a Southern State regards the slave, not as
real estate or landed property, but as a "chattel
personal." Does this divest him of his human
character? does this make him a mere chattel?
May the slave, in consequence of such law, be
treated as a brute or a tree? May he be cut
in pieces or worked to death at the will and
pleasure of the master?.
We think that a learned Senator, especially
when he undertakes to demonstrate, should
distinguish between declaring a man to be
"a chattel personal," and a mere chattel.  No
one doubts that a manr is a thing; but is he
therefore a mere thing, or nothing more than 
ARGUIMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.
a thing? In like manner, no one doubts that
a man is an animal; does it follow, tfierefore,
that he is a mere animal, or nothing but an
animal?  It is clear, that to declare a man
may be held as a "chattel personal," is a very
different thing from declaring that he is a mere
chattel. So much for his honor's "precise
authority."
In what part of the law, then, is the slave
"divested of his human  character?"   In no
part whatever. If it had declared him to be
a mere thing, or a mere chattel, or a mere animal, it would have denied his human character,
we admit; but the law in question has done
no such thing. Nor is any such declaration
contained in the other law quoted by the learned
Senator from thie code of Louisiana.   It is
merely by the interpolation of this little word
mere, that the Senator of Massachusetts  has
made the law of South Carolina divest an immortal being of his "human character." iHe
is welcome to all the applause which this may
have gained for him in the "Metropolitan
Theatre."
The learned Senator adduces another authlority. "A careful writer," says he, "Judge
Stroud, in a work of juridical as well as phi
99
I;,,. 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
lanthropic merit, thus sums up the law:'The
cardinal principle of slavery-that the slave is
not to be ranked among sentient* beings, but
among  things- as an  article of property- a
chattel personal-obtains as undoubted law in
all these (the slave) States.'" We thus learn
from  this very  "careful writer"  that  slavos
among us are "not ranked among sentient beings," and that this is "the cardinal principle
of slavery." No, they are not fed, nor clothed,
nor treated as sentient beings! They are left
without food and raiment, just as if they were
stocks and stones!  They are not talked to,
nor reasoned with, as if they were rational animals, but only driven about, like dumb brutes
beneath the lash! No, no, not the lash, for
that would  recognise them  as " sentient beings!"  They are only thrown about like stones,
or boxed up like chattels; they are not set,
like men, over the lower animals, required to
do the work of men; thle precise work which,
of all others, in the grand and diversified
economy of human industry, they are the best
qualified to perform!   So far, indeed, is this
from being "the cardinal principle of slavery,"
* The Italics are his own.
100
... I I 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.   101
that it is no principle of slavery at all.  It
bears not the most distant likeness or approximation to any principle of slavery, with which
we of the South have any the most remote
acquaintance.
That man may, in certain cases, be held as
property, is a truth recognised by a higher
authority than that of senators and divines.
It is, as we have seen, recognised by the word
of God himself. In that word, the slave is
called the "possession"* of the master, and
even "his money."t Now, is not this language as strong, if not stronger, than that adduced from the code of South Carolina? It
certainly calls "the bondman" his master's
"money."   Why, then, did not the Senator
from Massachusetts denounce this language, as
divesting "a man of his human character," and
declaring him to be mere money?   Why did
he not proceed to condemn the legislation of
Heaven, as well as of the' South, out of its
own mouth? Most assuredly, if his principles
be correct, then is he bound to pronounce the
law of God itself manifestly unjust and iniquitous. For that law as clearly recognises the
t Exod. chap. xyi.
* -Lev. ohap. xxv,
9'-" 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
right of property in man as it could possibly
be recognised in words. But it nowhere commits the flagrant solecism of supposing that
this right of the master annuls or excludes all
the rights of the slave. On the contrary, the
rights of the slave are recognised, as well as
those of the master. For, according to the law
of God, though "a possession," and an "inheritance," and "a bondman forever," yet is
the slave, nevertheless, a man;  and, as a man,
is he protected in his rights; in his rights, not
as defined by abolitionists, but as recognised
by the word of God.
~ XI.  The  seventeenth  fallacy of the abolztionzist; or the argument from the Declaration
of Independence.
This argument is regarded by the abolitionists as one of their great strongholds; and no
doubt it is so in effect, for who can bear a
superior? Lucifer himself, who fell from heaven because he could not acknowledge a
superior, seduced our first parents by the suggestion that in throwing off the yoke of subjection, tliey should become  "as gods."  We
need not wonder, then, if it should be found,
that 4a appeal to the absolute equality of all
102 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.   103
men is the most ready way to effect the ruin
of States. We can surely conceive of none
better adapted to subvert all order among us
of the South, involving the two races in a servile war, and the one or the other in utter
extinction. Hience we shall examine this arguinent from the equality of all men, or rather
this appeal to all meii's abhorrence of inferiority. This appeal is usually based on the
Declaration of Independence: "We hold these
truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal;  that they are endowed  by their
Creator with certain inalienable rights; that
among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness." We do not mean to play upon
these words; we intend to take them exactly
as they are understood by our opponents.  As
they are not found in a metaphysical document
or discussion, so it would be unfair to suppose-as is sometimes  done-that they inculcate the wild dream of Helvetins, that all men
are created with equal natural capacities of
mind.   They occur in a declaration of independence; and as the subject is the doctrine
of human rights, so we suppose they mean to
declare that all men are created equal with
respect to natural rights. 
LI_BERTY AND SLAVERY.
Nor do we assert that there is no truth in this
celebrated proposition or maxim;  for we believe that, if rightly understood, it contains
most important and precious truth.  It is not
on this account, however, the less dangerous as
a maxim of political philosophy.   Nay, falsehood is only then the more dangerous, when
it is so blended with truth that its existence is
not suspected by its victims.  Hience the unspeakable  importance of dissecting this  pretended maxim, and separating the precious
truth it contains from the pernicious falsehood
by which its followers are deceived. Its truth
is certainly very far from being self-evident, or
rather its truth is self-evident to some, while
its falsehood is equally self-evident to others,
according to the side from which it is viewed.
We shall endeavor to throw some light both
upon its truth and its falsehood, and, if possible, draw the line which divides them from
each other.
This maxim does not mean, then, that all
men have, by nature, an equal right to political power or to posts of honor.   No  doubt
the words are often understood in this sense
by those who, without reflection, merely echo
the Declaration of Independence; but, in this
104 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.  105
sense, they are utterly untenable.  If all menii
had, by nature, an equal right to any of the
offices of government, how could such rights
be adjusted?  How could such a conflict be
reconciled? It is clear that all men could not
be President of the United States; and if all
men had an equal natural right to that office,
no one man could be elevated to it without a
wrong to all the rest. In such case, all men
should have, at least, an equal chance to occupy the presidential chair. Such equal chance
could not result from the right of all men to
offer themselves as candidates for the office;
for, at the bar of public opinion, vast multitudes would not have the least shadow of a
chance.  T.he only way to effect such an object
would be by resorting to the lot. We might
thus determine who, among so many equally
just claimants, should actually possess the power
of the supreme magistrate. This, it must be
confessed, would be to recognise in deed, as
well as in word, the equal rights of all men.
But what more absurd than such an equality of
rights? It is not without example in history;
but it is to be hoped that such example will
never be copied. The democracy of Athens,
it is well known, was, at one time, so far car 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
ried away by the idea of equal rights, that her
generals and orators and poets were elected by
the lot. This was an equality, not in theory
merely, but in practice. Though the lives and
fortunes of mankind were thus intrusted to
the most ignorant and depraved, or to the
most wise and virtuous, as the lot might determine, yet this policy was based on an equality
of rights. It is scarcely necessary to add that
this idea of equality prevailed, not in the better
days of the Athenian democracy, but only
during its imbecility and corruption.
If all men, then, have not a natural right to
fill an office of government, who has this right?
Who has the natural right, for example, to
occupy the office of President of the United
States?  Certainly some  men  have  no such
right.   The  man, for example, who  has no
capacity to govern himself, but needs a guardian, has no right to superintend the affairs
of a great nation. Though a citizen, he has no
more right to exercise such power or authority
than if he were a Hottentot, or an African, or
an  ape.   Hence, in bidding such a one to
stand aside and keep aloof from such high
office, no right is infringed and no injury done.
Nay, right is secured, and injury prevented.
l06 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.  107
Who  has such a right, then?-such natural
right, or right according to the law of nature or
reason? The man, we answer, who, all things
considered, is the best qualified to discharge the
duties of the olffice. The man who, by his
superior wisdom, and virtue, and statesmanship,
would use the power of such office more effectually for the good of the whole people than
would any other man. If there be one such
man, and only one, he of natural riyht should be
our President.   And  all the laws framed  to
regulate the election of President are, or should
be, only so many means designed to secure the
services of that man, if possible, and thereby
secure the rights of all against the possession of
power by the unworthy or the less worthy. This
object, it is true, is not always attained, these
means are not always successful; but this is
only one of the manifold imperfections which
necessarily attach to all human institutions; one
of the melancholy instances in which natural
and legal right run in different channels. All
that can be hoped, indeed, either in the construction or in the administration of human
laws, is an approximation, more or less close,
to the great principles of natural justice.
What is thus so clearly true in regard to the 
LIBIERTY AND SLAVERY.
office of President, is equally true in regard to
all the other offices of government. It is contrary to reason, to natural right, to justice, that
either fools, or knaves, or demagogues should
occupy seats in Congress; yet all of these classes
are somnetimes seen there, and by the law of the
land are entitled to their seats. Hlere, again,
that which is right and fit in itself is different
from that which exists under the law.
The  same  remarks, it is evident, are applicable to governors, to judges, to sheriffs, to constables, and to justices of the peace. In every
instance, he who is best qualified to discharge
the duties of an office, and who would do so
with greatest advantage to all concerned, has
the natural right thereto. And no man who
would fill any office, or exercise any power so as
to injure the community, has any right to such
office or power
There is precisely the same limitation to the
exercise of the elective franchise. Those only
should be permitted to exercise this power who
are qualified'to do so with advantage to the
community; and all laws which regulate or limit
the possession of this power should have in
view, not the equal rights of all men, but solely
and exclusively the public good. It is on this
108 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.  109
principle that foreigners are not allowed to vote
as soon as they land upon our shores, and that
native Americans can do so only after they have
reached a certain age. And if the public good
required that any class of men, such as free
blacks or slaves, for example, should be excluded from the privilege altogether, then no
doubt can remain the law excluding them
would be just. It might not be equal, but
would be just. Indeed, in the high and holy
sense of the word, it would be equal; for, if it
excluded some from a privilege or power which
it conferred upon others, this is because they
were not included within the condition on
which alone it should  be  extended  to any.
Such is not an equality of rights and power, it
is true; but it is an equality of justice, like
that which reigns in the divine government
itself. In the light of that justice, it is clear
that no mans and no class of men, can have a
natural righ/   exercise a power which, if intrusted to   m,  would be wielded for harm,
and not fr:o.
This great:t!" th, when stripped of the manifold sophistications of a false logic, is so clear
and unquestionable, that it has not failed to
secure the approbation of abolitionists them
10
,... 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
selves. Thus, after all his wild extravagancies
about inherent, inalienable, and equal rights,
Dr. Channing has, in one of his calmer moods,
recognised this great fundamental truth.  "The
slave," says he, "cannot rightfully, and should
not; be owned by the individual. But, like
every citizen, he is subject to the community, AND
THE COMMUNITY HAS A RIGHT AND IS BOUND TO
CONTINUE ALL SUCH RESTRAINTS AS ITS OWN
SAFETY AND  THE  WELL-BEING  OF  THE  SLAVE
DEMANDS."  NOW this is all we ask in regard to
the question of equal rights.  All we ask is, that
each and every individual may be in such wise
and so far restrained as the public good demands and no farther.  All we ask is, as may
be seen from the first chapter of this Essay, that
the right of the individual, whether real or
imaginary, may be held in subjection to the
undoubted right of the community to protect
itself and to secure its own highest good. This
solemn right, so inseparably linked to a sacred
duty, is paramount to the rights and powers of
the individual. Nay, as we have already seen,*
the individual can have no right that conflicts
with this; because it is his duty to co-operate in
* In the first chapter.
110 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.  111
the establishment of the general good. Surely
he can have no right which is adverse to duty.
Indeed, if for the general good, he would not
cheerfully lay down both liberty and life, then
both may be rightfully taken from him. We
have, it is true, inherent and inalienable rights,
but among these is neither liberty nor life. For
these, upon our country's altar, may be sacrificed; but conscience, truth, honor may not be
touched by man.
Hias the community, then, after all, the right
to compel "a man," a "rational and immortal
being," to work? Let Dr. Chanining answer:
"If he (the slave) cannot be induced to work by
rational and natural motives, he should be obliged
to labor, on the same principle on which the
vagrant in other communities is confined and compelled to earn his bread." Now, if a man be
"confined, and compelled" to work in his confinement, what  becomes  of -his "inalienable
right to liberty?"  We  think there must be a
slight mistake somewhere. Perhaps it is in the
Declaration of Independence itself. Nay, is it
not evident, indeed, that if all men have an inalienable right to liberty," then is this sacred
right trampled in the dust by every government
on earth? Is it not as really disregarded by the 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
enlightened Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
which "confines and compels" vagrants to earn
their bread, as it is by the Legislature of Virginia, which has taken the wise precaution to
prevent the rise of a swarm of vagrants more
destructive than the locusts of Egypt?   The
plain truth is, that although this notion of the
"inalienable right" of all to liberty may sound
very well in a declaration of independence, and
may be most admirably adapted to stir up the
passions of men and produce fatal commotions
in a commonwealth, yet no wise nation ever has
been or ever will be guided by it in the construction of her laws. It may be a brand of discord in the hands of the abolitionist and the
demagogue. It will never be an element of
light, or power, or wisdom, in the bosom of the
statesman.
"The gift of liberty," continues Dr. Channing, "would be a mere name, and worse than
nominal, were he (the. slave) to be let loose
on society under circumstances driving him to
commit crimes, for which he would be condemned to severer bondage than he had escaped."  If then, after all, liberty may be worse
than a mere name, is it not a pity that all men
should have an "inalienable right" to it?  If
112 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.  113
it may be a curse, is it not a pity that all men
should be required to embrace it, and to be
even ready to die for it, as an invaluable
blessing?  We trust that "no man," that "no
rational and immortal being," will ever be so
ungrateful as to complain of those who have
withheld from him that which is "worse than
nominal," and a curse. For if such, and such
only, be his inalienable birthright, were it not
most wisely exchanged for a mess of potage?
The vagrant, then, should not be consulted
whether he will work or not. He should be
"confined and compelled" to work, says Dr.
Channing. Nor should the idle and the vicious,
those who cannot be induced to work by
rational motives, be asked whether they will
remain pests to society, or whether they will
eat their bread in the sweat of their brow.
"For they, too," sayl Dr. Channing, "should be
compelled to work.    But how?  "The slave
should not have an owner," says Dr. Channing,
"but he should have a guardian.   He needs
authority, to supply the lack of that discretion
which he has not yet attained; but it should
be the authority of a friend, an official authority, conferred by the State, and for which there
should be responsibility to the State."  Now,
H               10, 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
if all this be true, is not the doctrine of equal
rights, as held by Dr. Channing, a mere dream?
If one man may have "a guardian," "an official authority," appointed by the State, to compel him to work, why may not another be
placed under the same authority, and subjected
to the same servitude?   Are not all equal?
Hlave not all men an equal right to liberty
and to a choice of the pursuits of happiness?
Let these questions be answered by the admirers of Dr. Channing; and it will be found
that they have overthrown all the plausible
logic, and blown away all the splendid rhetoric, which has been reared, on the ground
of equal rights, against the institution of
slavery at the South.
We are agreed, then, that men may be compelled to work. We are also agreed that, for
this purpose, the slaves of the South should
be placed under guardians and friends by the
authority of the State. Dr. Channinig thinks,
however, that the owner is not the best guardian or the best friend whom the State could
place  over  the  slave.   On  the contrary, he
thinks his best friend and guardian would be
an official overseer, bound to him by no ties
of interest, and  by no  peculiar  feelings  of
114 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS. 115
affection. In all this, we think Dr. Channing
greatly mistaken; and mistaken because he is
an utter stranger to the feelings usually called
forth by the relation of master and slave. But,
be this as it may, since such are the concessions made by Dr. Channing, it is no longer
necessary to debate the question of slavery
with him, on the high ground of abstract inalienable rights. It is brought down to one
of practical utility, of public expediency.
And such being the nature of the question,
we, as free citizens of the South, claim the
right to settle the matter for ourselves. We
claim the right to appoint such guardians and
friends for this class of our population as we
believe will be most advantageous to them, as
well as to the whole community. We claim
the right to impose such restraints, and such
only, as the well-being of our own society
seems to us to demand.  This claim may be
denied.   The North may  claim the right to
think for us in regard to this question of expediency.   But it cannot be denied  that if
liberty may be a curse, then no man can, in
such case, have a right to it as a blessing.
If liberty would be an equal blessing to all
men, then, we freely admit, all men would have 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
an equal right to liberty. But to concede, as
Dr. Channing does, that it were a curse to some
men, and yet contend that all men have  an
equal right to its enjoyment, is sheer absurdity
and nonsense. But Dr. Channing, as we have
seen; sometimes speaks a better sense. Thus,
he has even said, "It would be cruelty, not
kindness, to the latter (to the slave) to give
him a freedom which he is unprepared to understand or  enjoy.   It would be  cruelty to
strike the fetters from a man whose first steps
would infallibly.lead him to a precipice." So
far, then, according to the author himself, are
all men from having an "inalienable right"'
to liberty, that some men have no right to it
at all.
In like manner, Dr. Wayland, by his own
admission, has overthrown all his most confident deductions from the notion of equal rights.
He, too, quotes the Declaration of Independence,
and adds, "That the equality here spoken of
is not of the means of happiness, but in the
right to use them as one wills, is too evident
to need illustration." If this be the meaning,
then the meaning is not so evidently true. On
the contrary, the vaunted maxim in question,
as understood by Dr. Wayland, appears to be
116 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS. 117
pure and unmixed error. Power, for example,
is one means of happiness; and so great a
means, too, that without it all other means
would be of no avail. But has any man a
right to use this means of happiness as he
wills? Most assuredly not. He has no right
to use the power he may possess, nor any other
means of happiness, as he will, but only as
lawful authority has willed. If it be a power
conferred by man, for example, such as that
of a chief magistrate, or of a senator, or of a
judge, he may use it no otherwise than as the
law of the land permits, or in pursuance of
the objects for which it was conferred. In like
manner, if it proceed from the Alinighty, it
may be used only in conformity with his law.
So far, then, is it from being true that all
men possess an equal right to use the means
of happiness as they please, that no man ever
has, or ever will, possess any such right at all.
And if such be the meaning of the Declaration of Independence, then the Declaration of
Independence is too evidently erroneous to
need any further refutation.   Unless, indeed,
man may put forth a declaration of independence which shall annul and destroy the immutable obligations of the moral law, and erect 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
one's will as the rule of right.   But  is an
equal exemption from the restraints of that
law liberty, or is it universal anarchy and
confusion?
It were much nearer the truth to say that
all men have an equal right, not to act as "one
wills," but to have their wills restrained by
law.  No  greater want is known  to man, indeed, than the restraints of law and government. Hience, all men have an equal right to
these, but not to the same restraints, to the
same laws and governments. All have an equal
right to that government which is the best for
them. But the same government is not the
best for all. A despotism is best for some; a
limited monarchy is best for others; while, for
a third people, a representative republic is the
best form of government.
This proposition is too plain for controversy.
It has received the sanction of all the great
teachers of political wisdom, from an Aristotle
down to a Montesquieu, and from a Montesquieu
down to a Burke. It has become, indeed, one
of the commonplaces of political ethics; and,
however  strange the conjunction, it is often
found in the very works which are loudest in
proclaiming the universal equality of human
118 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.
rights. Thus, for example, says Dr. Wayland:
"The best form of government for any people
is the best that its present moral condition renders
practicable. A people may be so entirely surrendered to the influence of passion, and so feebly
influenced by moral restraints, that a government
which relied upon moral restraint could not exist
for a day. In this case, a subordinate and
inferior principle yet remains-the principle of
fear, and the only resort is to a government of
force or a military despotism.  And such do we
see to be the fact." What, then, becomes of
the equal and inalienable right of all men to
freedom?  iHas it vanished with  the occasion
which gave it birth?
But this is not all.  "Anarchy,"  continues
Wayland, " always ends in this form of government. [A military despotism.] After this has
been established, and habits of subordination
have been formed, while the moral restraints
are too feeble for self-government, an hereditary
government, which addresses itself to the imagination, and strengthens itself by the influence
of domestic connections, may be as good a form
as a people can sustain. As they advance in
intellectual and moral cultivation, it may advantageously become more and more elective,
119 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
and, in a suitable moral condition, it may be
wholly so.   For  beings who  are willing  to
govern themselves  by moral principles, there
can be no doubt that a government relying
upon moral principle is the true form of government. There is no reason why a man should
be oppressed by taxation and subjected to fear
who is willing to govern himself by the law of
reciprocity. It is surely better for an intelligent
and moral being to do right from his own will,
than to pay another to force him to do right. And
yet, as it is better that he should do right than
wrong, even though he be forced to do it, it is
well that he should pay others to force him, if
there be no other way of insuring his good conduct. God has rendered the blessing of freedom  inseparable  from moral restraint to the
individual; and hence it is vain for a people to
expect to be free unless they are first willing to
be virtuous."  Again, "There is no self-sustaining power in any form of social organization.
The only self-sustaining power is in individual
virtue.
"And the form of a government will always
adjust itself to the moral condition of a people.
A virtuous people will, by their own moral
power, frown away oppression, and, under any
1I0 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.   121
form of constitution, become essentially free.
A people surrendered up to their own licentious
passions must be held in subjection by force;
for every one will find that force alone can protect him from his neighbors; and he will submit to be oppressed, if he can only be protected.
Thus, in the feudal ages, the small independent
landholders frequently made themselves slaves
of one powerful chief to shield themselves from
the incessant oppression of twenty."
Now all this is excellent sense. One might
almost imagine that the author had been reading Aristotle, or Montesquieu, or Burke. It
is certain he was not thinking of equal rights.
It is equally certain that his eyes were turned
away from the South;  for he could see how
even "independent landholders" might rightfully make "slaves" of themselves.  After such
concessions, one would think that all this clamor
about inherent and inalienable rights ought to
cease.
In a certain sense, or to a certain extent, all
men  have  equal rights.   All  men  have  an
equal right to the air and light of heaven; to
the same air and the same light. In like manner, all men have an equal right to food and
raiment, though  not to  the same  food  and
11 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
raiment. That is, all men have an equal right
to food and raiment, provided they will earn
ftiem.  And if they will not earn them, choosing
to remain idle, improvident, or nuisances to
society, then they should be placed under a
goverment of force, and compelled to earn
them.
Again, all men have an equal right to serve
God according to the dictates of their own
consciences. The poorest slave on earth possesses this right this inherent and inalienable
right; and he possesses it as completely as the
proudest monarch  on his throne.  He  may
choose his own religion, and worship his own
God according to his own conscience, provided
always he seek not in such service to interfere
with the rights of others. But neither the slave
nor the freeman has any right to murder, or
instigate others to murder, the master, even
though he should be ever so firmly persuaded
that such is a part of his religious duty. He has,
however, the most absolute and perfect right to
worship the Creator of all men in all ways not
inconsistent with the moral law. And wo be
to the man by whom such right is denied or
set at naught! Such a one we have never
known; but whosoever he may be, or where
122 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS. 123
soever he may be found, let all the abolitionists,
we say, hunt him down. Hie is not fit to be a
man, much less a Christian master.
But, it will be said, the slave has also a right
to religious instruction, as well as to food and
raiment. So plain a proposition no one doubts.
But is this right regarded at the South? No
more, we fear, than in many other portions of
the so-called Christian world.   Our  children,
too, and our poor, destitute neighbors, often
suffer, we fear, the same wrong at our remiss
hands and from our cold hearts. Though we
have done much and would fain do more,
yet, the truth must be confessed, this sacred
and imperious claim has not been fully met
by us.
It may be otherwise at the North. There
children and poor neighbors, too, may all be
trained and taught to the full extent of the
moral law. This godlike work may be fully
done by our Christian brethren of the North.
They certainly have a large surplus of benevolence to bestow on us. But if this glorious
work has not been fully done by them, then
let him who is without sin cast the first stone.
This simple thought, perhaps, might call in
doubt their right to rail at us, at least with 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
such malignant bitterness and gall.  This simple thought, perhaps, might save us many a
pitiless pelting of philanthropy.
But here lies the difference-here lies our
peculiar sin and shame.   This great, primordial right is, with us, denied by law. The
slave shall not be taught to read.   Oh! that
he might be taught! What floods of sympathy, what thunderings and lightnings of
philanthropy, would then be spared the world!
But why, we ask, should the slave be taught
to read? That he might read the Bible, and
feed on the food of eternal life, is the reply;
and the reply is good.
-Ah! if the slave would only read his Bible,
and drink its very spirit in, we should rejoice
at the change; for he would then be a better
and a happier man.  He would then know his
duty, and the high ground on which his duty
rests.  He would then see, in the words of Dr.
Wayland, that "The duty of slaves is explicitly
made known in the Bible. They are bound to
obedience, fidelity, submission, and respect to
their masters-not only to the good and kind,
but also to the unkind and froward; not, however, on the ground of duty to man, but on the
ground  of duty to God."   But, with  all, we
124 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.  125
have some  little glimpse of our  dangers, as
well as some little sense of our duties.
The tempter is not asleep. His eye is still,
as ever of old, fixed on the forbidden tree;
and thither he will point his hapless victims.
Like certain senators, and demagogues, and
doctors of divinity, he will preach from the
Declaration of Independence rather than from
the Bible.   He will teach, not that submission, but that resistance, is a duty. To every
evil passion his inflammatory and murder-instigating appeals will be made.  Stung by these
appeals and maddened, the poor African, it is
to be feared, would have no better notions of
equality and freedom, and no better views of
duty to God or man, than his teachers themselves have.   Such, then, being the state of
things, ask us not to prepare the slave for his
own utter undoing. Ask us not 0 most
kind and benevolent Christian teacher!-ask
us not to lay the train beneath our feet, that
you may no longer hold the blazing torch in
vain!
Let that torch be extinguished.  Let all incendiary publications be destroyed. Let no
conspiracies, no insurrections, and no murders
be instigated. Let the pure precepts of the
11* 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
gospel and its sublime lessons of peace be
everywhere set forth and inculcated. In one
word, let it be seen that in reality the eternal
good of the slave is aimed at, and, by the cooperation of all, may be secured, and then may
we be asked to teach him to read. But until
then we shall refuse to head a conspiracy
against the good order, the security, the morals, and against the very lives, of both the
white and the black men of the South.
We might point out other respects in which
men are essentially equal, or have equal rights.
But our object is not to write a treatise on the
philosophy of politics. It is merely to expose
the  ernors of those who  push  the idea  of
equality to an extreme, and thereby unwisely
deny the great differences that exist among
men. For if the scheme or the political principles of the abolitionists be correct, then
there is no difference among men, not even
among the different races of men, that is
worthy the attention of the statesman.
There is one difference, we admit, which
the abolitionists have discovered between the
master and the slave at the South. Whether
this discovery be entirely original with them,
or whether they received hints of it from
126 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.  127
others, it is clear that they are now fully in
possession of it. The dazzling idea of equality
itself has not been able to exclude it from
their vision. For, in spite of this idea, they
have discovered that between the Southern
master and slave there is a difference of color!
Hence, as if this were the only difference, in
their political harangues, whether from the
stump or from the pulpit, they seldom fail to
rebuke the Southern statesman in the words
of the poet: "He  finds his fellow guilty of a
skin not colored like his own;" and "for such
worthy cause dooms and devotes him as his
lawful prey." Shame and confusion seize the
man, we say, who thus dooms and devotes his
fellow-man, because he finds him "guilty of a
skin!" If his sensibilities were only as soft as
his philosophy is shallow, he would certainly
cry, "Down with the institution of slavery!"
For how could he tolerate an institution which
has no other foundation than a difference of
color? Indeed, if such were the only difference between the two races among us, we
should ourselves unite with Mr. Seward of New
York, and most "affectionately advise all men
to be born white."  For thus, the only difference having been abolished, all men would 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
be equal in fact, and consequently entitled to
become equal in political rights, and power,
and position. But if such be not the only difference between the white and the black man
of the South, then neither philosophy nor
paint can establish an equality between them.
Every man, we admit, is a man. But this
profound aphorism is not the only one to which
the political architect should give heed. An
equality of conditions, of political powers and
privileges, which has no solid basis in an
equality of capacity or fitness, is one of the
wildest and most impracticable of all Utopian
dreams. If in the divine government such an
equality should prevail, it is evident that all
order would be overthrown, all justice extinguished, and utter confusion would reign.
In like manner, if in human government such
equality should exist, it would be only for a
moment. Indeed, to aim at an equality of conditions, or of rights and. powers, except by first
aiming at an equality of intelligence and virtue,
is not to reform-it is to demolish-the governments of society. It is, indeed, to war against
the eternal order of divine Providence itself,
in which an immutable justice ever reigns.
. It is this aiming after an equality," says
128 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.   129
Aristotle, "which is the cause of  seditions."
But though seditions it may have stirred up,
and fierce passions kindled, yet has it never
led its poor deluded victims to the boon after
which they have so fondly panted.
Equality is not liberty. "The French," said
Napoleon, "love equality: they care little for
liberty." Equality is plain, simple, easily understood. Liberty is complex, and exceedingly difficult of comprehension. The most illiterate peasant may, at a glance, grasp the idea of equality;
the most profound statesman may not, without
much care and thought, comprehend the nature
of liberty. Hence it is that equality, and not
liberty, so readily seizes the mind of the multitude, and so mightily inflames its passions.
The French are not the only people who care
but little for liberty, while they are crazy for
equality. The same blind passion, it is to be
feared, is possible even in this enlightened
portion of the globe.  Even here, perhaps, a
man may rant and rave about equality, while,
really, he may know but little more, and consequently care but little more, about that complicated and beautiful structure called civil
liberty, than a horse does about the mechanism
of the heavens.
I 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
Thus, for example, a Senator* of the United
States declares that the democratic principle
is "Equality of natural rights, guaranteed and
secured to all by the laws of a just, popular
government.   For one, I desire  to see that
principle applied to every subject of legislation, no matter what that subject may be-to
the great question involved in the resolution
now before the Senate, and to every other
question." Again, this principle is "the element and guarantee of liberty."
Apply this principle, then, to every subject,
to every question, and see what kind of government would -be the result. All men have an
equal right to freedom from restraint, and consequently all are made equally free. All have
an equal right to the elective franchise, and to
every political power and privilege. But suppose the government is designed for a State in
which a large majority of the population is
without the character, or disposition, or habits,
or experience of freemen? No matter: the
equal rights of all are natural; and hence they
should be applied in all cases, and to every
possible" subject of legislation." The principle
* Mr. Chase, of Ohio;
130 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.   131
of equality should reign everywhere, and mould
every institution. Surely, after what has been
said, no comment is necessary on a scheme so
wild, on a dream so visionary. "As distant as
heaven is from earth," says Montesquieu, "so is
the true spirit of equality from that of extreme
equality." And just so distant is the Senator
in question, with all his adherents, from the
true idea of civil and political freedom.
The Senator thinks the conduct of Virginia
"singular enough," because, in presenting a
bill of rights to Congress, she omitted the
provision of "her own bill of rights," "that all
men are born* equally free and independent."
We think she acted wisely. For, in truth and
in deed, all men are born absolutely dependent,
and utterly devoid of freedom. What right, we
ask, has  the new-born infant?   Has he  the
right to go where he pleases? He has no power
to go at all; and hence he has no more a right
to go than he has to fly. Has he the right to
think for himself? The power of thought is
as yet wholly undeveloped. Hao he the right
to worship God according to his own conscience?  He has no idea of God, nor of the
* "By nature," in the Original Bill of Rights. 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
duties due to him. The plain truth is, that no
human being possesses a right until the power
or capacity on which the enjoyment of that
right depends is suitably developed or acquired.
The child, for instance, has no right to think
for himself, or to worship God according to
the dictates of conscience, until his intellectual
and moral powers are suitably developed. He
is certainly not born with such rights. Nor
has he any right to go where he pleases, or
attempt to do so, until he has learned to walk.
Nor has he the right then, for, according to
the laws of all civilized nations, he is subject
to the control of the parent until he reaches
the lawful age of freedom. The truth is, that
all men are born not equally free and independent, but equally without freedom and
without  independence.   "All  men  are born
equal," says Montesquieu; but he does not
say they " are born equally free and independent." The first proposition is true: the last
is diametrically opposed to the truth.
Another Senator* seems to entertain the same
passion for the principle of equality. In his
speech on the Compromise Bill of 1850, he says
* Mr. Seward, of New York.
132 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.   133
that "a statesman or a founder of States" should
adopt as an axiom the declaration, "That  all
men are created equal, and have inalienable
rights of life, liberty, and choice of pursuits
of happiness." Let us suppose, then, that this
distinguished statesman is himself about to
establish a constitution for the people of Mississippi or Louisiana, in which there are more
blacks than whites. As they all have a natural
and "inalienable right" to liberty, of course
he would make them all free. But would he
confer upon all, upon black as well as upon
white, the power of the elective franchise?
Most certainly.  For he has said, "We of New
York are guilty of slavery still by withholding
the right of suffrage from the race we have
emancipated." Surely, if he had to found a
State himself, he would not thus be guilty of
slavery-of the one odious thing which his
soul abhors. All would then be invested with
the right of suffrage. A black legislature would
be the consequence.  The laws passed by such
a body would, we fear, be no better than the
constitution provided by the Senator-by the
statesman-from New York.
"All men are born equal," says Montesquieu;
but in the hands of such a thinker no danger
12 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
need be apprehended from such an axiom. For
having drank deeply of the true spirit of law,
he was, in matters of government, ever ready
to sacrifice abstract perfection to concrete utility.
Neither the principle of equality, nor any other,
would he apply in all cases or to every subject.
He  was  no  dreamer.   He  was  a profound
thinker and a real statesman. "Though real
equality,"  says he, "be the very soul of a
democracy, it is so difcult to establish, that an
extreme exactness in this respect is not always
convenient."
Again, he says: "All inequalities in derno:
cracies ought to be derived from the nature
of the government, and even from the principle of equality. For example, it may be apprehended that people who are obliged to live
by labor would be too much impoverished by
public employment, or neglect the duties of attending to it; that artisans would grow insolent; and that too great a number of freemen
would overpower the ancient citizens.  IN THIS
CASE, THE EQUALITY IN A DEMOCRACY MAY BE
SUPPRESSED FOR THE GOOD OF THE STATE."
Thus to give all men equal power where the
majority is ignorant and depraved, would be
indeed to establish equality, but not liberty.
134 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.   135
On the contrary, it would be to establish the
most odious despotism on earth,-the reign of
ignorance, passion, prejudice, and brutality. It
would be to establish a mere nominal equality,
and a real inequality. For, as Montesquieu
says, by introducing "too great a number of
freemen," the "ancient citizens" would be oppressed. In such case, the principle of equality,
even in a democracy, should be "suppressed
for the good of the State." It should be suppressed, in order to shut out a still greater and
more tremendous inequality. The legislator,
then, who aims to introduce an extreme equality, or to apply the principle of equality to
every question, would really bring about the
most frightful of all inequalities, especially in
a commonwealth where the majority are ignorant and depraved.
Hence the principle of equality is merely a
standard toward which an approximation may
be made-an approximation always limited and
controlled by the public good. This principle
should be applied, not to every question, but
only to such as the general good permits. For
this good it "may  be  suppressed."   Nay, it
must be suppressed, if, without such suppression, the public order may not be sustained; 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
for, as we have abundantly seen, it is only in
the bosom of an enlightened public order that
liberty can live, or move, or have its being.
Thus, as Montesquieu advises, we deduce an
inequality fri-om the very principle of equality
itself; since, if such inequality be not deduced
and established by law, a still more terrific inequality would be forced upon us. Blind passion would dictate the laws,  and brute  force
would reign, while innocence and virtue would
be trampled in the dust. Such is the inequality
to which the honorable senators would invite
us; and that, too, by an appeal to our love of
equality! If we decline the invitation, this is
not because we are the enemies, but because
we are the friends, of human freedom.   It is
not because we love equality less, but liberty
more.
The legislators of the North may, if they
please, choose the principle of equality as the
very "element and guarantee" of their liberty;
and, to make that liberty perfect, they may apply it to every possible " subject of legislation,"
and to "every question" under the sun.  But,
if we may be permitted to choose for ourselves,
we should beg to be delivered from such an
extreme equality.   We  should reject it as the
136 
ARGUMENTS OF ABOLITIONISTS.   137
very worst "element," and  the  very surest
"guarantee,"  of an unbounded licentiousness
and an intolerable oppression.   As  the " element and guarantee" of freedom for ourselves,
and for our posterity, we should decidedly prefer the principle of an enlightened public
order.
12* 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
CHAPTER III.
THE ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES.
IN discussing the arguments of the abolitionists, it was scarcely possible to avoid intimating,
to a certain extent, the grounds on which we
intend to vindicate the institution of slavery, as
it exists among us at the South. But these
grounds are entitled to a more distinct enunciation and to a more ample illustration.   In
the prosecution of this object we shall first
advert to the argument from revelation; and,
if we mistake not, it will be found that in the
foregoing discussion we have been vindicating
against aspersion not only the peculiar institution of the Southern States, but also the very
legislation of Heaven itself.
~ I. The argument from the Old Testament.
The ground is taken by Dr. Wayland and
other abolitionists, that slavery is always and
everywhere,  semper et ubique, morally wrong,
and should, therefore, be instantly and univer
138 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 139
sally swept away. We point to slavery among
the Hebrews, and say, There is an instance in
which it was not wrong, because there it received the sanction of  the Almighty.   Dr.
Waylanl  chooses to overlook or evade  the
bearing of that case upon his fundamental
position; and the means by which he seeks to
evade its force is one of the grossest fallacies
ever invented by the brain of man.
Let the reader examine and judge for himself.  Here it is:  "Let us reduce this argument to a syllogism, and it will stand thus:
Whatever God sanctioned among the Hebrews
he sanctions for all men and at all times.  God
sanctioned slavery among the Hebrews; therefore God sanctions slavery for all men and at
all times."
Now I venture to affirm that no man at the
South has ever put forth so absurd an argument in favor of slavery,-not only in favor of
slavery for the negro race. so long  as they
may remain unfit for freedom, but in favor of
slavery for all men and for all times. If such
an argument proved any thing, it would, indeed, prove that the white man of the South,
no less than the black, might be subjected to
bondage. But no one here argues in favor of 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
the subjection of the white man, either South
or North, to a state of servitude. No one here
contends for the subjection to slavery of any
portion of the civilized world.  We  only contend for slavery in certain cases; in opposition
to the thesis of the abolitionist, we assert that
it is not always and everywhere wrong. For
the truth of this assertion we rely upon the express authority of God himself.   We  affirm
that since slavery has been ordained by him, it
cannot be always and everywhere wrong. And
how does the abolitionist attempt to meet this
reply? Why, by a little legerdemain, he converts this reply from an argument against his
position, that slavery is always and everywhere
wrong, into an argument in favor of the monstrous dogma that it is always and everywhere
right! If we should contend that, in some
cases, it is right to take the life of a man, he
might just as fairly insist that we are in favor
of having every man on earth put to death!
Was any fallacy ever more glaring? was any
misrepresentation ever more flagrant?
Indeed we should have supposed that Dr.
Wayland might have seen that his representation is not a fair one, if he had not assured us
-of the contrary.   We  should have supposed
140 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 141
that he might have distinguished between  an
argument in favor of slavery for the lowest
grade of the ignorant and debased, and an
argument in favor of slavery for all men and
all times, if he had not assured us that he possesses no capacity to make it.  For after having
twisted the plea of the most enlightened statesmen of the South into an argument in favor
of the universal subjection of mankind to
slavery, he coolly adds, "I believe that in these
words I express the argument correctly. If I
do not, it is solely because I do not know h6w
to state it more correctly." Is it possible Dr.
Wayland  could  not  distinguish between  the
principle  of slavery for some  men  and the
principle of slavery for all men? between the
proposition that the ignorant, the idle, and the
debased  may  be subjected  to servitude,  and
the idea that all men, even the most enlightened and free, may be reduced to bondage? If
he had not positively declared that he possessed
no such capacity, we should most certainly have
entertained a different opinion.
It will not be denied, we presume, that the
very best men, whose lives are recorded in the
Old Testament, were the owners and holders
of slaves. "I grant at once," says Dr.Way
..f 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
land, "that the Hebrews held slaves from the
time of the conquest of Canaan, and that Abraham and the patriarchs held them many centuries before. I grant also that Moses enacted
laws with special reference to that relation.....
I wonder that any should have had the hardihood to deny so plain a matter of record. I
should almost as soon deny the delivery of the
ten commandments to Moses."
Now, is it not wonderful that directly in
the face of "so plain a matter of record," a
pious Presbyterian pastor should have been
arraigned by abolitionists, not for holding
slaves, but for daring to be so far a freeman
as'to express his convictions on the subject of
slavery?  Most abolitionists must have found
themselves a little embarrassed in such a proceeding. For there was the fact, staring them
in the face, that Abraham himself, "the friend
of God" and the "father of the faithful," was
the owner and holder of more than a thousand
slaves.   How,  then,  could  these  professing
Christians proceed to condemn and excommunicate a poor brother for having merely approved what Abraham had practised? Of all
the good men of old, Abraham was the most
eminent. The sublimity of his faith and the
Ir
142 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 143
fervor of his piety has, by the unerring voice
of inspiration itself, been held up as a model
for the imitation of all future ages. How, then,
could a parcel of poor common saints presume,
without blushing, to try and condemn one of
their number because he was no better than
"Father Abraham?" This was the difficulty;
and, but for a very happy discovery, it must
have been an exceedingly perplexing one.
But "Necessity is the mother of invention."
On  this trying  occasion  she  conceived  the
happy thought that the plain matter of record
"was  all a mistake;"  that Abraham  never
owned a slave; that, on the contrary, he was
"a prince," and the "men whom he bought
with his money" were "his subjects" merely!
If, then, we poor sinners of the South should
be driven to the utmost extremity,-all honest
arguments and pleas failing us,-may we  not
escape the unutterable horrors of civil war, by
calling our masters princes, and our slaves
subjects?
We shall conclude this topic with the pointed
and powerful words of Dr. Fuller, in his reply
to Dr. Wayland: "'Abraham," says he, "was
'the friend of God,' and walked with God in
the closest and most endearing intercourse; nor 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
can any thing be more exquisitely touching
than those words,'Shall I hide from Abraham
that thing which I do?' It is the language of
a friend who feels that concealment would
wrong the confidential intimacy existing. The
love of this venerable servant of God in his
promptness to immolate his son has been the
theme of apostles and preachers for ages; and
such was his faith, that all who believe are called
'the children of faithful Abraham.' This Abraham, you admit, held slaves. Who is surprised
that Whitefield, with this single fact before
him, could not believe slavery to be a sin? Yet
if your definition of slavery be correct, holy
Abraham lived all his life in the commission
of one of the most aggravated crimes against
God and man which can be conceived. His
life was spent in outraging the rights of hundreds of human beings, as moral, intellectual,
immortal, fallen creatures, and in violating
their relations as parents  and  children, and
husbands and wives.  And God not only connived at this appalling iniquity, but, in the
covenant of circumcision made with Abraham,
expressly mentions it, and confirms the patriarch in it, speaking of those'bought with his
money,' and requiring him to circumcise them.
144 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 145
Why, at the very first blush, every Christian
will cry out against this statement. To this,
however, you must come, or yield your position;
and this is only the first utterly incredible and
monstrous corollary involved in the assertion
that slavery is essentially and always'a sin of
appalling magnitude.'"
Slavery among the Ilebrews, however, was
not left merely to a tacit or implied sanction.
It was thus sanctioned by the express legislation
of the Most Hiigh: "Both thy bondmen and
thy bondmaids, which thou shalt have, shall
be of the heathen that are round about you;
of them shall ye buy bondmen and bondmaids.
Moreover, of the children of the strangers that
do sojourn among you, of them shall ye buy,
and of their families that are with you, which
they begat in your land; and they shall be your
possession. And ye shall take them as an
inheritance for your children after you, to inherit them for a possession; they shall be your
bondmen forever."* Now these words are so
perfectly explicit, that there ig no getting around
them. Even Dr. Wayland, as we have seen,
admits that the authority to take slaves seems
Lev. xxv. 44, 45, 46.
13
R 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
to be a part of "thlis original, peculiar," and
perhaps  "anomalous  grant."   No  wonder  it
appeared peculiar and anomalous. The only
wonder is, that it did not appear impious and
absurd. So it has appeared to some of his coagitators, who, because they could not agree
with Moses, have denied his mission as an inspired teacher, and joined the ranks of infidelity.
Dr. Channing makes very light of this and
other passages of Scripture. He sets aside this
whole argument from revelation with a few
bold strokes of the pen.' In this age of the
world," says he, "and amid the light which
has been thrown on the true interpretation of
the Scriptures, such reasoning hardly deserves
notice."  Now, even if not for our benefit, we
think there are two reasons why such passages
as the above were worthy of Dr. Channing's
notice. In the first place, if he had condescended to throw the light in his possession on
such passages, he might have saved Dr. Wayland, as well as other of his admirers, from the
necessity of making the very awkward admission
that the Almighty had authorized his chosen
people to buy slaves, and hold them as "bondmen forever." He might have enabled them
146 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 147
to see through the great difficulty, that God
has authorized his people to commit "a sin of
appalling magnitude," to perpetrate as "great
a crime as can be conceived;" which seenms so
clearly to be the case, if their views of slavery
be correct. Secondly, he might have enabled
his followers to espouse the cause of abolition
without deserting, as so many of them have
openly done, the armies of the living God.  For
these two reasons, if for no other, we think Dr.
Channing owed it to the honor of his cause to
notice the passages of Scripture bearing on the
subject of slavery.
The  Mosaic  Institutes  not  only  recognise
slavery as lawful; they contain a multitude of
minute directions for its regulation. We need
not refer to all of them; it will be sufficient
for our purpose if we only notice those which
establish some of the leading characteristics
of slavery among the people of God.
1. Slaves were regarded as property. They
were, as we have seen, called a "possession"
and  an "inheritance."*    They  were  even
called the "money"  of the master.  Thus, it
is said,' if a man  smite his servant or his
* Lev. xxv. 44, 45, 46. 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
maid with a rod, and he die under his hand,
he shall surely be punished.  Notwithstanding,
if he continue a day or two, he shall not be
punished, for he is his money."*  In one of
the ten commandments this right of property
is recognised:  "Thou  shalt  not  covet  thy
neighbor's house, thou shalt not covet thy
neighbor's wife, nor his man-servant, nor his
maid-servant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor any
thing that is thy neighbor's."
2. They rMight be sold.   This is taken for
granted in all those passages in which, for
particular reasons, the master is forbidden to
sell his slaves. Thus it is declared: "Thou
shalt not make merchandise of her, because
thou  hast humbled  her."   And  still more
explicitly:" If a man sell his daughter to be
a maid-servant, she shall not go out as the menservants do. If she please not her master who
hath betrothed her to himself, then shall he let
her be redeemed: to sell her to a strange nation, hlie shall have no power, seeing he hath
dealt deceitfully with her."t
3. The slavery thus expressly sanctioned was
hereditary and perpetual: "Ye shall take them
* Exod. xxi. 20. 21.
148
t E:iod. xxi. 7, 8. 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 149
as an inheritance for your children after you, to
inherit them for a possession; they shall be
your  bondmen  forever."   Even  the Hebrew
servant might, by his own consent, become in
certain cases a slave for life:  "If thou buy a
Hebrew servant, six years shall he serve; and
in the seventh shall he go out free for nothing.
If he came in by himself, he shall go out by
himself: if he were married, then his wife shall
go out with him.  If his master have given him
a wife, and she have borne him sons or daughters, the wife and the children shall be her
master's, and he shall go out-by himself. And
if the servant shall plainly say, I love my master,
my wife, and lny children; I will not go out
free: then his master shall bring him unto the
judges: he shall also bring him to the door or
unto the door-post, and his master shall bore
his ear through with an awl, and he 8hall serve
him forever."
Now  it  is  evident,  we  think,  that  the
legislator of the Hebrews was not inspired
with the sentiments of an abolitionist. The
principles of his legislation are, indeed, so
diametrically opposed to the political notions
of the abolitionist, that the latter is sadly perplexed to dispose of them. While some deny
1l3 " -- 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
the authority of these principles altogether, and
of the very book which contains them, others
are content to evade their force by certain ingenious.devices of their own. We shall now
proceed.to examine some of the more remarkable of these cunningly-devised fables.
It is admitted by the inventors of these devices, that God expressly permitted his chosen
people to buy and hold slaves. Yet Dr. Wayland, by whom this admission is made, has
endeavored to weaken the force of it by alleging
that God has been pleased to enlighten our race
progressively. If, he argues, the institution of
slavery among His people appears so very "peculiar and anomalous," this is because he did not
choose to make known his whole mind on the
subject. ie withheld a portion of it from his
people, and allowed them, by express grant, to
hold slaves until thie fuller revelation of his will
should blaze upon the world. Such is, perhaps,
the most plausible defence which an abolitionist
could possibly set up against the light of revelation.
But to what does it amount? If the views
of Dr. Wayland and his followers, respecting
slavery, be correct, it amounts to this:  The
Almighty has said to his people, you may commnit "a sin of appalling magnitude;" you may
160 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURE-S. 151
perpetrate " as great an evil as can be conceived;" you may persist in a practice which
consists in " outraging the rights" of your fellow-men, and in "crushing their intellectual
and moral" nature. They have a natural, inherent, and inalienable right to liberty as well
as yourselves, but yet you may make slaves of
them, and they may be your bondmen forever.
In one word, you, my chosen people, may degrade "rational, accountable, and immortal beings" to the "rank of brutes." Such, if we
may believe Dr. Wayland, is the first stage in
the divine enlightenment of the human race!
It consists in making known a part of God's
mind, not against the monstrous iniquity of
slavery, but in its favor! It is the utterance,
not of a partial truth, but of a monstrous falsehood!  It is the revelation of his will, not
against sin, but in favor of as great a sin "as
can be conceived."   Now, we  may fearlessly
ask if the cause which is reduced to the necessity of resorting to such a defence may not
be pronounced desperate indeed, and unspeakably forlorn?
It is alleged that polygamy and divorce, as
well as slavery, are permitted and regulated in
the Old Testament. This, we replv, proves, in 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
regard to polygamy and divorce, exactly what
it proves in regard to slavery,-namely, that
neither is in itself sinful, that neither is always
and everywhere sinful. In other words, it proves
that neither polygamy nor divorce, as permitted
in the Old Testament, is "realum in se," is inconsistent with the eternal and unchangeable
principles of right. They are forbidden in the
New Testament, not because they are in themselves absolutely and immutably wrong, but
because they are inconsistent with the best interests of society; especially in civilized and
Christian communities. If they had been wrong
in themselves, they never could have been permitted by a holy God, who is of purer eyes than
to behold iniquity, except with infinite abhorrence.
Again, it is contended by Dr. Wayland that
"Moses intended to abolish slavery," because
he forbade the Jews "to deliver up a fugitive
slave." The words are these: "Thou shalt not
deliver unto his master the servant that is
escaped from his masterk aito thee:  Hie shall
dwell with thee, even among you, in that place
which he shall choose in one of the gates where
it likelh him best: thou shalt not oppress him."*
* Deut. xxiii. 15,16.
152 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 153
"This precept, I think," says Dr. Wayland,
"clearly shows that Moses intended to abolish
slavery.  I-ow could slavery long continue in
a country where every one was forbidden to
deliver up a fugitive slave?  Ihow different
would be the condition of slaves, and how soon
would slavery itself cease, were this the law
of compulsory bondage among us!"
The above passage of Scripture is a precious
morsel with those who are opposed to a fugitive
slave law. A petition fromn Albany, New York,
from tihe enlightened seat of empire of the Empire State itself, signed, if we recollect right, by
one hundred and fifty persons, was presented
to the United States Senate by Mr. Seward,
praying that no bill in relation to fugitive slaves
might be passed, which should not contain that
passage. Whether Mr. Seward was enlightened
by his constituents, or whether he made the
discovery for himself, it is certain that he holds
an act for the reclamation -of fugitive slaves
to be "contrary to the divine law."  It is certain
that he agrees with his constituents, who, in
the petition referred to, pronounced every such
act' immoral," and contrary to the law of God.
But let us look at this passage a little, and see
if these abolitionists, who thus plant themselves 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
so confidently upon "a higher law," even upon
"the divine law" itself, be not as hasty and
rash in their interpretation of this law as they
are accustomed to be in their judgment respecting the most universal and long-established
institutions of human society.
In the first place, if their interpretation be
correct, we are at once met by a very serious
difficulty.  For we are required to believe that
one passage of Scripture grants an "authority
to take slaves," while another passage is designed to annul this authority. We are required to believe that, in one portion of the
divine law, the right of the master to hold his
slaves as "bondsmen" is recognised, while another part of the same law denies the existence
of such right.   In fine, we  are  required to
believe that the legislator of the Jews intended,
in one and the same code, both to establish
and to abolish slavery; that with one hand he
struck down the very. right and institution
which he had set up with the other. How Dr.
Channing and Mr. Sumner would have disposed
of this difficulty we know full well, for they
carry within their own bosoms a higher law
than this higher law itself. But how Dr. Wayland, as an enlightened member of the good
154 
ARGUMENT FROM THE ScRIPTURES. 155
old orthodox Baptist Church, with whom  the
Scripture is really and in truth the inspired
word of God, would have disposed of it, we
are at some loss to conceive.
We labor under no such difficulty. The
words in question do not relate to slaves owned
by Hebrew masters. They relate to those slaves
only who should escape from heathen masters,
and seek an asylum among the people of God.
"The first inquiry of course is," says a learned
divine,* "in regard to those very words,'rhere
does his master live?'   Among the Hebrews,
or among foreigners?   The language of the
passage fully develops this and answers the
question.'iHe has escaped from his master
unto the iebrews; (the text says-thee, i.e. Israel;) he shall dwell with thee, even among you...
in one of thy gates.'   Of course, then, he is an
immigrant, and did not dwell among them before
his flight. If he had been a Hebrew servant,
belonging to a Hebrew, the whole face of the
thiing would be changed. Restoration, or restitution, if we may judge by the tenor of other
* Moses Stewart, a divine of Massachusetts, who had devoted a long and laborious life to the interpretation of Scripture, and who was by no means a friend to the institution of
slavery. 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
property-laws among the Hebrews, would have
surely been enjoined. But, be that as it may,
the language of the text puts it beyond a doubt
that the servant is a foreigner, and has fled from
a heathen master.   This  entirely changes the
complexion of the case. The Hebrews were
God's chosen people, and were the only nation
on earth which worshipped the only living and
true God..... In case a slave escaped from
them (the heathen) and came to the Hebrews,
two things were to be taken into consideration,
according to the views of the Jewish legislator.
The first was that the treatment of slaves among
the heathen was far more severe and rigorous
than it could lawfully be under the Mosaic law.
The heathen master possessed the power of life
and death, of scourging or imprisoning, or putting to excessive toil, even to any extent that
he pleased. Not so among the Hebrews. Humanity pleaded there for the protection of the
fugitive.   The  second  and  most  important
consideration was, that only among the Hebrews could the fugitive slave come to the
knowledge and worship of the only living and
true God."
Now this view of the passage in question
harmonizes one portion of Scripture with an
156 
ARGUMENT FROM THE, SCRIPTURES. 157
other, and removes every difficulty. It shows,
too, how greatly the abolitionists have deceived
themselves in their rash and blind appeal to
"the  divine law" in question.   "The reason
of the law," says my Lord Coke, "is the law."
It is applicable to those cases, and to those cases
only, which come within the reason of the law.
Hience, if it be a fact, and if our Northern
brethren really believe that we are sunk in the
darkness of heathen idolatry, while the light
of the true religion is with them alone, why,
then, we admit that the reason and principle
of the divine law in question is in their favor.
Then we admit that the return of our fugitive
slaves is' "contrary to the divine law." But if
we are not heathen idolaters, if the God of the
Hiebrews be also the God of Southern masters,
then the Northern States do not violate the
precept in question-they only discharge a so].emn constitutional obligation- in delivering up
our "fugitives from labor."
~ II.  The argument from the New Testament.
The New Testament, as Dr. Wayland remarks, was given, "not to one people, but to
the whole race; not for one period, but for
all time." Its lessons are, therefore, of uni                     14
'r 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
versal and perpetual obligation. If, then, the
Almighty had undertaken to enlighten the
human race by degrees, with respect to the
great sin of slavery, is it not wonderful that,
in the very last revelation of his will, he has
uttered not a single syllable in disapprobation
thereof? Is it not wonderful, that he should
have completed the revelation of his will,-that
he should have set his seal to the last word he
will ever say to man respecting his duties, and
yet not one word about the great obligation of
the master to emancipate his slaves, nor about
the "appalling sin" of slavery?  Such silence
must, indeed, appear exceedingly peculiar and
anomalous to the abolitionist. It would have
been otherwise had he written the New Testament. He would, no doubt, have inserted at
least one little precept against the sin of
slavery.
As it is, however, the most profound silence
reigns through the whole word of God with
respect to the sinfulness of slavery. "It must
be granted," says Dr. Wayland, "that the New
Testament contains no precept prohibitory of
slavery."   Marvellous  as  such  silence  must
needs be to the abolitionist, it cannot be more
so to him than his attempts to account for it
158 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 159
are to others. Let us briefly examine these attempts:
"You may give your child," says Dr. Wayland, "if he were approaching to years of discretion, permission to do an act, while you
inculcate upon him principles which forbid it,
for the sake of teaching him to be governed by
principles, rather than by any direct enactment.
In such case you would expect him to obey the
principle, and not avail himself of the permission." Now we fearlessly ask every reader
whose moral sense has not been perverted by
false logic, if such a proceeding would not be
infinitely unworthy of the Father of mercies?
According to Dr. Wayland's view, he beholds
his children living and dying in the practice
of an abominable sin, and looks on without the
slightest note of admonition or warning. Nay,
he gives them permission to continue in the
practice of this frightful enormity, to which
they are already bound by the triple tie of habit,
interest, and feeling! Though he gives them
line upon line, and precept upon precept, in
order to detach them from other sins, he yet
gives them permission to live and die in this
awful sin!  And why?  To teach them, forsooth, not to follow his permission, but to be 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
guided by his principles! Even the guilty Eli
remonstrated with his sons. Yet if, instead of
doing this, he had given them permission to
practise the very sins they were bent upon, he
might have been, for all that, as pure and
faithful as the Father of mercies himself is
represented to be in the writings of Dr. Wayland. Such are the miserable straits, and such
the impious sophisms, to which even divines
are reduced, when, on the supposition that
slavery is a sin, they undertake to vindicate or
defend the word which they themselves are
ordained to preach!
Another reason, scarcely less remarkable than
the one already noticed, is assigned for the
omission of all precepts against slavery.  "It
was no part of the scheme of the gospel revelation," we are told by Dr. Wayland, (who
quotes  from  Archbishop  Whately,) "to  lay
down any thing approaching to a complete system of moral preceptsto enumerate every thing
that is enjozned or forbidden by our religion."
If this method of teaching had been adopted,
"the New Testament would," says Dr. Wayland, "have formed a library in itself, more
voluminous than the laws of the realm of Great
Britain." Now, all this is very true; and hence
160 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 161
the necessity of leaving many points of duty to
the enlightened conscience, and to the application of the more general precepts of the gospel.
But how has it happened that slavery is passed
over in silence?  Because, we are told, "every
thing" could not be noticed. If, indeed, slavery
be so great a sin, would it not have been easier
for the divine teacher to say, Let it be abolished, than to lay down so many minute precepts for its regulation? Would this have
tended to swell the gospel into a vast library,
or to abridge its teachings? Surely, when Dr.
Wayland sets up such a plea, he must have forgotten that the New Testament, though it cannot notice " every thing," contains a multitude
of rules to regulate the conduct of the master
and the slave.   Otherwise he could  scarcely
have imagined that it was from an aversion to
minuteness, or from an impossibility to forbid
every evil, that the sin of slavery is passed over
in silence.
He must also have forgotten another thing.
He must have forgotten the colors in which he
had painted the evils of slavery. If we may
rely upon these, then slavery is no trifling offence. It is, on the contrary, a stupendous sin,
overspreading the earth, and crushing the
L               14* 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
faculties-both intellectual and moral-of millions of human beings beneath its odious and
terrific influence.   Now,  if this be so, then
would it have been too much to expect that at
least one little word might have been directed
against so great, so tremendous an evil?  The
method of the gospel may be comprehensive, if
you please; it may teach by great principles
rather than by minute precepts. Still, it is certain that St. Paul could give directions about his
cloak; and he could spend many words in private salutations. In regard to the great social
evil of the age, however, and beneath which a
large majority of even the civilized world were
crushed to the earth, he said nothing, lest he
should become too minute,-lest his epistles
should swell into too large a volume! Such is
one of Dr. Wayland's defences of the gospel:
We shall offer no remark; we shall let it speak
for itself.
A third reason for the silence in question is
the alleged ease with which precepts may be
evaded.   "A  simple precept or prohibition,"
says Dro Wayland, " is, of all things, the easiest
to be evaded. Lord Eldon used to say, that
'no man in England could construct all act of
Parliament through which he could not drive a
162 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 163
coach-and-four.' We find this to have been
illustrated by the case of the Jews in the time
of our Saviour. The Pharisees, who prided
themselves on their strict obedience to the letter, violated the spirit of every precept of the
Mosaic code."
Now, in reply to this most extraordinary passage, we have several remarks to offer. In the
first place, perhaps every one is not so good a
driver as Lord Eldon. It is certain, that acts
of Parliament have been passed, through which
the most slippery of rogues have not been able
to make their escape. They have been caught,
tried, and condemned for their offences, in spite
of all their ingenuity and evasion.
Secondly, a "principle"* is just as easily
evaded as a" precept;" and, in most cases, it is
far more so.  The great principle of the New
Testament, which our author deems so applicable to the subject of slavery, is this:  "Thou
shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Now, if
this be the great principle intended to enlighten
us respecting the sin of slavery, we confess it
has been most completely evaded by every slave
State in the Union. We have, indeed, so entirely deceived ourselves in regard to its true
import, that it seems to us to have not the 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
most remote application to such a subject. If
any one will give our remarks on this great
"principle" a candid examination, we think he
will admit that we have deceived ourselves on
very plausible, if not on unanswerable, grounds.
If slavery be a sin,- always and everywhere a
monstrous iniquity,-then we should have been
far more thoroughly enlightened with respect
to its true nature, and found evasion far more
difficult, if the New Testament had explicitly
declared it to be such,  and commanded  all
masters everywhere to emancipate their slaves.
We could have driven a coach-and-four neither
through, nor around, any such express prohibition. It is indeed only in consequence of the
default, or omission; of such precept or command, that the abolitionist appeals to what he
calls the principles of the gospel. If he had
only one such precept,-if he had only one
such precise and pointed prohibition, he might
then, and he would, most triumphantly defy
evasion. He would say, There is the word; and
none but the obstinate gainsayers, or unbelievers, would dare reply. But as it is, he is
compelled to lose himself in vague generalities,
and pretend to a certainty which nowhere exists) except in his own heated mind. This pre
164 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 165
tence, indeed, that an express precept, prohibitory of slavery, is not the most direct way
to reveal its true nature, because a precept is so
much more easily evaded than a principle, is
merely one of the desperate expedients of a forlorn and hopeless cause.   If the abolitionist
would maintain that cause, or vindicate his
principles, it will be found that he must retire,
and hide himself from the light of revelation.
Thirdly, the above passage seems to present a
very strange view of the Divine proceedings.
According to that view, it appears that the
Almighty tried the method of teaching by precept in the Old Testament, and the experiment
failed. -For precepts may be so easily evaded,
that every one in the Mosaic code was violated
by the Pharisees. Hence, the method of teaching by precept was laid aside in the New Testament, and the better method of teaching by
principle was adopted.   Such is the  conclusion to which we must come, if we adopt the
reasoning of Dr. Wayland. But we cannot
adopt his reasoning; since we should then have
to believe that the experiment made in the Old
Testament proved a failure, and that its Divine
Author, having grown wiser by experience, improved upon his former method. 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
The truth is, that the method of the one Testament is the same as that of the other.  In
both, the method of teaching by precept is
adopted; by precepts of greater and of lesser generality. Dr. Wayland's principle is merely a general or comprehensive precept; and his precept
is merely a specific or limited principle. The
distinction he makes between them, and the use
he makes of this distinction, only reflect discredit upon the wisdom and consistency of the
Divine Author of revelation.
A third account which Dr. Wayland gives of
the silence of the New Testament respecting
the sin of slavery, is as follows: "'If this form
of wrong had been singled out from all the
others, and had alone been treated preceptively,
the whole system would have been vitiated.
We should have been authorized to inquire
why were not similar precepts in other cases
delivered? and if they were not delivered, we
should have been at liberty to conclude that
they were intentionally omitted, and that the
acts which they would have forbidden are innocent." Very well. But idolatry, polygamy,
divorce, is each and every one singled out, and
forbidden by precept, in the New Testament.
Slavery alone is passed over in silence.  lIence,
.16-6 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 167
according to the principle of Dr. Wayland himself, we are at liberty to conclude that a precept
forbidding slavery was "intentionally omitted,"
and that slavery itself " is innocent."
Each one of these reasons is not only exceedingly weak in itself, but it is inconsistent with
the others. For if a precept forbidding slavery
were purposely omitted, in order to teach mankind to be governed by principle and to disregard permissions, then the omission could not
have arisen from a love of brevity. Were it
not, indeed, just as easy to give a precept forbidding, as to give one permitting, the existence
of slavery? Again, if a great and world-devouring sin, such as the abolitionists hold slavery
to be, has been left unnoticed, lest its condemnation should impliedly sanction other sins, then
is it not worse than puerile to suppose that the
omission was made for the sake of brevity, or
to teach mankind that the permissions of the
Most High may in certain cases be treated with
contempt, may be set at naught, and despised
as utterly inconsistent, as diametrically opposed
to the principles and purity of his law?
If the abolitionist is so completely lost in
his attempts to meet the argument from the
silence of Scripture, he finds it still more 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
difficult to cope with that from its express
precepts and injunctions.   Servants, obey your
mnasters, is one of the most explicit precepts of
the New Testament. This precept just as certainly exists therein as does the great principle
of love itself. "The obedience thus enjoined is
placed," says Dr. Wayland, "not on the ground
of duty to man, but on the ground of duty to
God." We accept the interpretation. It cannot for one moment disturb the line of our
argument. It is merely the shadow of an attempt at an evasion. All the obligations of the
New Testament are, indeed, placed on the same
high ground. The obligation of the slave to
obey his master could be placed upon no higher,
no more sacred, no more impregnable, ground.
Rights and obligations are correlative. That
is, every right implies a corresponding obligation, and every obligation implies a corresponding right. Hence, as the slave is under an obligation to obey the master, so the master has a
right to his obedience. Nor is this obligation
weakened, or this right disturbed, by the fact
that the first is imposed by the word of God,
and rests on the immutable ground of duty to
him. If, by the divine law, the obedience of
the slave is due to the master, then, by the
168 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 169
same law, the master has a right to his obedience.
Most assuredly, the master is neither "a
robber," nor "a murderer," nor "a manstealer,"
merely because he claims of the slave that
which God himself commands the slave to
render. All these epithets may be, as they
have been, hurled at us by the abolitionist.
His anathemas may thunder. But it is some
consolation to reflect, that, as he was not consulted in the construction of the moral code
of the universe, so, it is to be hoped, he will
not be called upon to take part in its execution.
The mostenlightened abolitionists are sadly
puzzled by the precept in question; and, from
the manner in which they sometimes speak of
it, we have reason to fear it holds no very high
place in their respect.   Thus, says the Hon.
Charles Sumner, "Seeking to be brief, I shall
not undertake to reconcile texts of the Old
Testament, which, whatever may be their import, are all absorbed in the New; nor shall I
stop to consider the precise interpretation of
the oft-quoted phrase, Servants, obey your masters; nor seek to weigh  any such imperfect
injunction in the scales against those grand
15 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
commandments on which hang all the law and
the prophets."* Now this is a very significant
passage.   The orator, its learned author, will
not stop to consider the texts of the Old Testament bearing on the subject of slavery, because
they are all merged in the New! Nor will he
stop to consider any "such imperfect injunction"
as those contained in the New, because they are
all swallowed up and lost in the grand commandment, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as
thyself!"
If he had bestowed a little more attention on
this grand commandment itself, he might have
seen, as we have shown, that it in no wise cont:icts with the precept which enjoins servants
to obey their masters. Hie might have seen
that it is not at all necessary to "weigh" the
one of those precepts "in the scales against"
the other, or to brand either of them as imperfect. For he might have seen a perfect harmony between them. It is no matter of surprise, however, that an abolitionist should find
imperfections in the moral code of the New
Testament.
It is certainly no wonder that Mr. Sumner
* Speech in the Metropolitan Theatre, 1855.
170 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 171
should have seen imperfections therein. For
he has, in direct opposition to the plainest terms
of the gospel, discovered that it is the first duty
of the slave to fly from his master.   In his
speech delivered in the Senate of the United
States, we find among various other quotations,
a verse from Sarah W.l Morton, in which she
exhorts the slave to fly from bondage. Having
produced this quotation "as part of the testiirlony of the times,"  and  pronounced it "a
truthful homage to the inalienable rights" of
the slave, Mr. Sumner was in no mood to appreciate the divine precept, "Servants, obey your
masters." HIaving declared fugitive slaves to be
"the heroes of the age," he had not, as we may
suppose, any very decided taste for the commonplace Scriptural duties of submission and obedience. Nay, he spurns at and rejects such
duties as utterly inconsistent with the "inalienable rights of man." iHe appeals from the oracles
of eternal truth to "the testimony of the times."
iHe appeals from Christ and his apostles to Sarah
W. Morton. And yet, although he thus takes
ground directly against the plainest precepts
of the gospel, and even ventures to brand some
of them as " imperfect," he has the hardihood
to rebuke those who find therein, not what it 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
really contains, but only a reflection of themselves!
The precept in question is not an isolated
injunction of the New Testament. It does not
stand alone. It is surrounded by other injunctions, equally authoritative, equally explicit,
equally unequivocal. Thus, in Eph. vi. 5:
"Servants, be obedient to them that are your
masters according to the flesh." Precisely the
same doctrine was preached to the Colossians:
(iii. 22:) "Servants, obey in all things your
masters according to the flesh; not with eyeservice, as men-pleasers, but in singleness of
heart, fearing God." Again, in St. Paul's Epistle to Timothy, he writes:  " Let as many servants as are under the yoke count their own
masters worthy of all honor, that the name of
God and his doctrine be not blasphemed."
Likewise, ill Tit. ii. 9, 10, we read: "Exhort
servants to be obedient to their owvn masters,
and to please them well in all things; not
answering again; not purloining, but showing all good fidelity, that they may adorn the
doctrine of God our Saviour in all things."
And in 1 Pet. ii. 18, it is written: "Servants, be subject to your masters with all
fear; not only to the good and gentle, but
172 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 173
also to the froward."   Yet, in  the face of
these passages, Mr. Sumner declares that it is
the duty of slaves to fly from bondage, and
thereby place themselves among " the heroes of
the age." HIe does not attempt to interpret or
explain these precepts;  he merely sets them
aside, or passes them by with silent contempt,
as "imperfect."   Indeed, if his doctrines be
true, they are not only imperfect-they are radically wrong and infamously vicious. Thus, the
issue which Mr. Sumner has made up is not
with the slaveholders of the South; it is with
the word of God itself. The contradiction is
direct, plain, palpable, and without even the
decency of a pretended disguise. We shall
leave Mr. Sumner to settle this issue and controversy with thie Divine Author of revelation.                                -
In the mean time, we shall barely remind the
reader of what that Divine Author has said in
regard to those who counsel and advise slaves
to disobey their masters, or fly from bondage.
"They that have believing masters," says the
great Apostle to the Gentiles, "let them not
despise them because they are brethren; but
rather do them service, because they are
faithful and beloved, partakers of the benefit.
13 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
These things teach and exhort.  If any man
teach otherwise, and consent not to wholesome
words, even the words of our Lord Jesus
Christ, and to the doctrine which is according
to godliness, he is proud, knowing nothing."
Mr. Sumner congratulates himself that he has
stripped "from slavery the apology of Christianity."  Let servants "count their own masters worthy of all honor," and "do them service," says St. Paul.   "Let servants disobey
their masters," says Mr. Sumner, "and cease
to do them service." " These things teach and
exhort," says St. Paul. "These things denounce
and abhor," says Mr. Sumner.   "If any man
teach otherwise," says St. Paul, "he is proud,
knowing nothing."  " I teach otherwise," says
Mr. Sumner.   And is it by such conflict that
he strips from slavery the sanction of Christianity'? If the sheer ipse dixit of Mr. Sumner
be sufficient to annihilate the authority of the
New Testament, which' he professes to revere as
divine, then, indeed, has he stripped the sanction of Christianity from the relation of master
and slave. Otherwise, he has not even stripped
from his own doctrines the burning words of
her condemnation.
Dr,  Tayl1and avoids a direct conflict with the
174 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 175
teachings of the gospel. He is less bold, and
more circumspect, than the Senator from Massachusetts. He has honestly and fairly quoted
most of the texts bearing on the subject of
slavery. Hie shows them no disrespect. iHe
pronounces none of them imperfect. But with
this array of texts before him he proceeds to
say: " Now, I do not see that the scope of these
passages can be misunderstood." Nor can we.
It would seem, indeed, impossible for the
ingenuity of man to misunderstand the words,
quoted  by  Dr. Wayland  himself, "Servants,
obey in all things your masters according to
the flesh." Dr. Wayland does not misunderstand them. For he has said, in his Moral
Science: "The duty of slaves is explicitly made
known in the Bible. They are bound to obedience, fidelity, submission, and respect to their
masters, not only to the good and kind, but
also to the unkind and froward." But when
he comes to reason about these wvords, which he
finds it so impossible for any one to misunderstand, he is not without a very ingenious
method to evade their plain import and to
escape from their influence.   Let the reader
hear, and determine for himself.
"I do not see," says Dr. Wayland, "that the 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
scope of these passages can be misunderstood.
They teach  patience, meekness, fidelity, and
charity-duties which are obligatory on Christians toward all men, and, of course, toward
masters.   These  duties are obligatory on us
toward enemies, because an enemy, like every
other man, is a moral creature of God."  True.
But is this all? Patience, meekness, fidelity,
charity-duties due to all men! But what has
become of the word obedience? This occupies
a prominent-nay, the miost prominent-place
in the teachings of St. Paul. It occupies no
place at all in the reasonings of Dr. Wayland.
It is simply dropped out by him, or overlooked;
and this was well done, for this word obedience
is an exceedingly inconvenient one for the abolitionist. If Dr. Wayland had retained it in his
argument, he could not have added, "duties
which are obligatory on Christians toward all
men, and, of course, toward masters." Christians are not bound to' obey all men.   But
slaves are bound to obey "their own masters."
It is precisely upon this injunction to obedience
that the whole argument turns. And it is precisely this injunction to obedience which Dr.
Wayland leaves out in his argument. He does
not, and he cannot, misunderstand the word.
176 
ARGUM.IENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 177
But he can just drop it out, and, in consequence, proceed to argue as if nothing more
were required of slaves than is required of all
Christian men!
The only portion of Scripture which Mr.
Sumner condescends to notice is the Epistle
of St. Paul to Philemon.   Tie introduces the
discussion of this epistle with the remark that,
"In the support of slavery, it is the habit to
pervert texts and to invent authority.  Even St.
Paul is vouched for a wrong which his Christian life rebukes."*   Now we intend to examine
who it is that really perverts texts of Scripture,
and invents authority. We intend to show, as
in the clear light of noonday, that it is the conduct of Mr. Sumner and other abolitionists, and
not that of the slaveholder, which is rebuked by
the life and writings of the great apostle.
The epistle in question was written to a slaveholder, who, if the doctrine of  Mr. Sumner be
true, lived in the habitual practice of "a wrong
so transcendent, so loathlsorrle, so direful," that
it "must  be  encountered  wherever  t can be
reached, and the battle must be continued, without truce or compromise, until the field is en
* Speech at the Metropolitan Theatre, 1855.
M 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
tirely won."  Is there any thing like this in
the Epistle to Philemon? Is there any thing
like it in any of the epistles of St. Paul? Is
there anywhere  in his writings the slightest
hint that slavery is a sin at all, or that the act
of holding slaves is in the least degree inconsistent with the most exalted Christian purity
of life?  We may safely answer these questions
in the negative. The very epistle before us is
from "Paul, a prisoner of Jesus Christ, and
Timothy our brother, unto Philemon, our dearlybeloved, and fellow-laborer." The inspired writer
then proceeds in these words:  "I thank my
God, making mention of thee always in my
prayers. Hearing of thy love and faith, which
thou hast toward the Lord Jesus, and toward
all saints; that the communication of thy faith
may become effectual by the acknowledging
of every good thing which is in you in Christ
Jesus. For we have great joy and consolation
in thy love, because the bowels of the saints are
refreshed by thee, brother."
Now if, instead of leaving out this portion
of the epistle, Mr. Sumner had pronounced it
in the hearing of his audience, the suspicion
might have arisen in some of their minds that
the slaveholder may not, after all, be so vile a
178 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 179
wretch. It might even have occurred to some,
perhaps, that the Christian character of Philemon, the slaveholder, might possibly have been
as good as that of those by whom all slaveholders are excommunicated and consigned to
perdition. It might have been supposed that
a Christian man may possibly hold slaves without being as bad as robbers, or cut-throats, or
murderers. We do not say that Mr. Sumner
shrunk from the reading of this portion of the
epistle in the hearing of his audience, lest it
should seem to rebuke the violence and the
uncharitableness of his own sentiments, as well
as those of his brother abolitionists at the lNorth.
We  do say, however, that Mr. Sumner had no
sort of use for this passage. It could in no way
favor the impression his oration was designed
to make. It breathes, indeed, a spirit of goodwill toward the Christian master as different
from that which pervades the speeches of the
honorable Senator, as the pure charity of heaven
is from the dire malignity of earth.
"It might be shownr," says Mr. Sumner, "that
the present epistle, when truly interpreted, is a
protest against slavery, and as voice for freedom."
If, instead of merely asserting that this "might
be done," the accomplished orator had actually 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
done it, he would have achieved far more for
the cause of abolitionism than has been effected
by all the splendors of his showy rhetoric. iHe
has, indeed, as we shall presently see, made
some attempt to show that the Epistle to Philemon is an emancipation document! When we
come to examine this most extraordinary attempt, we shall perceive that Mr. Sumner's
power "to pervert texts and to invent authority,"
has not been wholly held in reserve for what
"might be done." If his view of this portion
of Scripture be not very profound, it certainly
makes up in originality what it lacks in depth.
If it should fail to instruct, it will at least amuse
the reader. It shall be noticed in due time.
The next point that claims our attention is
the intimation that St. Paul's "real judgment
of slavery" may be inferred "from his condemnation, on another occasion, of'manstealers,'
or, according to the original text, slave-traders,
in company with murderers of fathers and murderers of mothers."  Were we disposed to enter
into the exegesis of the passage thus referred
to, we might easily show that Mr. Sumner is
grossly at fault in his Greek. We might show
that something far more enormous than even
trading in slaves is aimed at by the condemna
180 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 181
tion of the apostle. But we have not under taken  to  defend  "manstealers,"  nor  "slavetraders," in any form or shape.   Hence, we
shall dismiss this point with the opinion of
Macknight, who thinks the persons thus condemned in company with murderers of fathers
and mothers, are " they who make war for the
inhuman purpose of selling the vanquished as
slaves, as is the practice of the African princes."
To take any free man, whether white or black,
by force, and sell him into bondage, is malnstealing.   To  make  war for such  a purpose,
were, we admit, wholesale murder and manstealing combined. This view of the passage
in question agrees with that of the great abolitionist, Mr. Barnes, who holds that "the essential
idea of the term" in question, "is that of converting a free man into a slave".... the "changing
of a freeman into a slave, especially by traffic,
subjection, &c." Now, as we of the South,
against whom Mr. Sumner is pleased to inveigh,
propose to make  no such changes of freemen
into slaves, much less to wage war for any such
purpose, we may dismiss his gross perversion
of the text in question.   He may apply the
condemnation of the apostle to us now, if it so
please the benignity of his Christian charity,
16 
-LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
but it will not, we assure him, enter into our
consciences, until we shall not only become
"slave-traders," but also, with a view to the gain
of such odious traffic, make war upon freemen.
We have undertaken to defend, as we have
said, neither "slave-traders, nor "manstealers.
We leave them both to the tender mercies of
Mr. Sumner. But we have undertaken to defend slavery, that is, the slavery of the South,
and to vindicate the character of Southern masters against the aspersidns of their calumniators.
And in this vindication we shrink not from St.
Paul's "real judgment of slavery." Nay, we
desire, above all things, to have his real judgmnent.  His judgment, we  mean, not of manstealers or of murderers, but of slavery and
slaveholders. We have just seen "his real judgment" respecting the character of one slaveholder. We have seen it in the very epistle
Mr. Sumner is discussing. Why, then, does he
fly from St.Paul's opinion of the slaveholder
to what he has said of the manstealer and the
murderer? We would gather an author's opinion of slavery from what he has said of slavery
itself or of the slaveholder. But this does not
seem to suit Mr. Sumner's purpose quite so well.
182 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 183
Entirely disregarding the apostle's opinion of
the slaveholder contained in the passage right
before him, as well as elsewhere, Mr. Sumner
infers his "real judgment of slavery" from
what he has said of manstealers and murderers! Hie might just as well have inferred
St. Paul's opinion of Philemon from what he
has, "on another occasion," said of Judas Iscariot.
Mr. Sumner contents himself with "calling
attention to two things, apparent on the face"
of the epistle itself; and which, in his opinion,
are "in themselves an all-sufficient response."
The first of these things is, says he: "While it
appears that Onesimus had been in some way
the-servant of Philemon, it does not appear that
he had ever been held as a slave, much less as
a chattel." It does not appear that Onesimus
was the slave of Philemon, is the position of
the celebrated senatorial abolitionist. We cannot argue this position with him, however, since
he has not deigned to give any reasons for it,
but chosen to let it rest upon his assertion
merely.  We  shall, therefore, have to argue the
point with Mr. Albert Barnes, and other abolitionists, who have been pleased to attempt to
bolster up so novel, so original, and so bold an 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
interpretation of Scripture with exegetical reasons and arguments.
In  looking  into these  reasons  and  arguments,-if reasons and arguments they may be
called,-we are at a loss to conceive on what
principle their authors have proceeded.   The
most plausible conjecture we can make is, that
it was deemed sufficient to show that it is possible, by a bold stroke of interpretation, to call
in question the fact that Onesimus was the
slave of Philemon; since, if this may only be
questioned by the learned, then the unlearned
need not trouble themselves with the Scripture,
but simply proceed with the work of abolitionism.  Then may they cry, "Who  shall decide
when doctors disagree?"'* and give all such disputings to the wind. Such seems to us to have
been the principle on which the assertion of
Mr. Sumner and Mr. Barnes  has  proceeded;
evincing, as it does, an utter, total, and reckless
disregard of the plainest teachings of inspiration. But let the candid reader hear, and then
determine for himself.
* Fools may hope to escape responsibility by such a cry.
But if there be any truth in moral science, then every man
should examine and decide, or else forbear to act.
184 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 185
The Greek word 8o52o,, applied to Onesimus,
means, according to Mr. Barnes, either a slave,
or a hired servant, or an apprentice. It is not
denied that it means  a slave.   "The  word,"
says Mr. Barnes himself, "is that which is commonly applied to a s'avev."  Indeed, to assert
that the Greek word 8o5),oc does not mean
slave, were only a little less glaringly absurd
than to affirm that no such meaning belongs to
the English term slave itself. If it were necessary, this point might be most fully, clearly,
and conclusively established; but since it is not
denied, no such work of supererogation is required at our hands.
But it is insisted, that the word in question
has a more extensive signification than the English term slave.  "Thus," says Mr. Barnes, "it
is so extensive in its signification as to be applicable to any species of servitude, whether
voluntary or involuntary." Again: "All that
is necessarily implied by it is, that he was, in
some way, the servant of Philemion-whether
hired or bought cannot be shown."  Once more,
he says:  "The  word denotes servant of any
kind, and it should  never  be assumed that
those to whom it was applied were slaves."
Thus, according to Mr. Barnes, the word in
16* 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
question denotes a slave, or a hired servant,
or, as he has elsewhere said, an apprentice. It
denotes "servant of any kind," whether "voluntary or involuntary."
Such is the positive assertion of Mr. Barnes.
But where is the proof?  Where is the authority on which it rests? Surely, if this word is
applied to hired servants, either in the Greek
classics or in the New Testament, Mr. Barnes,
or Mr. Sumner,  or some  other learned  abolitionist, should refer us to the passage where
it is so used.   We  have  Mr. Barnes'  assertion, again and again repeated, in his very
elaborate Notes on the Epistle to Philemon;
but not the shadow of an authority for any
such use of the word. But stop: in making
this assertion, he refers us to his "Notes on
Eph. vi. 5, and 1 Tim. vi." Perhaps we may
find his authority by the help of one of these
references. We turn, then, to Eph. vi. 5; and
we  find the following note:  "Servants.   Oc
8ou5ot. The word here used denotes one who
is bound to render service to another, whether
that service be free or voluntary, and may denote, therefore, either a slave, or one who binds
himself to render  service to another.   It is
often used- in  these  senses in the New  Testa
186 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 187
ment, just as it is elsewhere."* Why, then, if
it is so often used to denote a hired servant, or
an apprentice, or a voluntary servant of any
kind, in the New Testament, is not at least one
such instance of its use produced by Mr.
Barnes? iHe must have been aware that one
such authority from the New Testament were
worth more than his bare assertion, though it
were a hundred times repeated. Yet no such
authority is adduced or referred to; he merely
supports his assertion in the one place by his
assertion in the other!
Let us look, in the next place, to his other
reference,  which  is to 1 Tim. vi. 1.  Ijere,
again, we find not the shadow of an authority that the word in question is applicable to
"hired servants," or "apprentices."  We  simply  meet  the oft-repeated  assertion  of  the
author, that it is applicable to any species of
servitude. He refers from assertion to assertion, and nowhere gives a single authority to
the point in question. If we may believe him,
such authorities  are abundant, even  in the
New Testament; yet he leaves the whole matter to rest upon his own naked assertion.!
* The Italics are ours. 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
Yea, as Greek scholars, he would have us to
believe that 8o52o- may mean a "hired servant,"
just as well as a slave; and he would have us
to believe this, too, not upon the usage of
Greek writers, but upon his mere assertion!
We look for other evidence; and we intend
to pin him down to proof, ere we follow him
in questions of such momentous import as the
one we have in hand.
Why is it, then, we ask the candid reader,
if the term in question mean  "a hired servant," as well as a slave, that no such application  of  the  word  is given?   If  such
applications be as abundant as our author asserts they are, why  not refer us to a single
instance, that our utter ignorance may be at
least relieved by one little ray of light? Why
refer us from assertion to assertion, if authorities may be so plentifully had? We cannot
conceive, unless the object be to deceive the
unwary, or those who may be willingly deceived.   An  assertion  merely,  bolstered  up
with  a "See note," here or there,  may  be
enough for such;  but if, after all, there be
nothing but assertion on assertion  piled,  we
shall not let it pass for proof. Especially, if
such assertion be at war with truth, we shall
188 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 189
track its author, and, if possible,  efface his
footprints from the immaculate word of God.
If the term 8o5u2o signifies "a hired servant,"
or "an apprentice," it is certainly a most extraordinary circumstance that the best lexicographers of the Greek language have not made
the discovery. This were the more wonderful,
if, as Mr. Barnes asserts, the word "is often used
in these senses" by Greek writers. We have
several Greek lexicons before us, and in not one
of them is there any such meaning given to the
word. Thus, in Donnegan, for example, we
find: "1dob~o, a slave, a servant, as opposed to
8EalrorC, a master."   But we do not find from
him that it is ever applied to hired servants or
apprentices. In like manner,,Liddell and Scott
have " 8o),o~, a slave, bondman, strictly one born
so, opposed to ia8parorov."  But they do not lay
down "a hired servant," or "an apprentice," as
one of its significations. If such, indeed, be
found among the meanings of the word, these
celebrated lexicographers were as ignorant of
the fact as ourselves. Stephens also, as any one
may see by referring to his "Thesaurus, Ling.
Grec., Tom I. art.,ou5o~," was equally ignorant
of any such use of the term in question. Is it
not a pity, then, that, since such knowledge
(, t    J.!. 8, -' (   v,'  t               l e      ",i_;   Cfe,
I'  e'
9 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
rested with Mr. Barnes, and since, according to
his own statement, proofs of its accuracy were
so abundant, he should have withheld all the
evidence in his possession, and left so important
a point to stand or fall with his bare assertion?
Even if the rights of mankind had not been in
question, the interests of Greek literature were,
one would think, sufficient to have induced him
to enlighten our best lexicographers with respect
to the use of the word under consideration.
Such an achievement would, we can assure him,
have detracted nothing from his reputation for
scholarship.
But how stands the word in the New Testament?  It is certain that, however "often it may
be applied" to hired servants in the New Testament, Mr. Barnes  has not condescended to
adduce a single application of the kind. This
is not all.  Those who have examined every
text of the New Testament in which the word
8ou2o~ occurs, and compiled lexicons especially
for the elucidation of the sacred volume, have
found no such instance of its application.
Thus, Schleusner, in his Lexicon of the New
Testament, tells us that it means slave as opposed to eA2vOepoc, freeman.  His own words are:
"4lo5o~oc, o,, (1) proprie: servus, minister, homo
190
t' 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 191
non liber nee sui juris, et opponitur V7 eCs)O)poo.
Matt. viii. 9; xiii. 27, 28; 1 Cor. vii. 21, 22; xii.
13; se 8o52ot, eC"se ~2zuOpooe.  Tit. ii. 9."
We next appeal to Robinson's Lexicon of the
New  Testament.  We  there find these words:
"ou2o0   or, o, a bondman, slave, servant, jr. by
birth;  diff. from av?alro3ov,'one enslaved in
war,' comp. Xen. An., iv. 1, 12," &c.  Now if, as
Mr. Barnes asserts, the word in question is so
often applied to hired servants in the New Testament, is it not passing strange that neither
Schleusner nor Robinson should have discovered any such application of it? So far, indeed, is Dr. Robinson from having made any
such discovery, that he expressly declares that
the- 8o5oc "WAS  NEVER A HIRED SERVANT;  the
latter being called /aOcos, tcod~,roo."   "In a fa
mily," continues the same high authority, "the
8ob2o~ was bound to serve, a slave, and was the
property of his master,'a living possession,' as
Aristotle calls him."
"The  Greek 8o52oc," says Dr. Smith, in his
Dictionary of Antiquities, "like the Latin servus,
corresponds to the usual meaning of our word
slave..... Aristotle (Polit. i. 3.) says that a complete household is that which consists of slaves and
freemen, (otxi'as re'Aos 8x 8ovA2o xa' e2suOepowv) 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
and he defines a slave to be a living working-tool
and possession.  ( 0;o52o~ /~vo'pravov, Ethic.
Nicim. viii. 13; o dob2o~ xW/la'  uVOXOv, Pol. i.
4.) Thus Aristotle himself defines the 8o52oto be, not a "servant of any kind," but a slave;
and we presume that he understood the force
of this Greek word at least as well as Mr.
Barnes or Mr. Sumner. And Dr. Robinson,
as we have just seen, declares that it never
means a hired servant.
Indeed, all this is so well understood by Greek
scholars, that Dr. Macknight does not hesitate
to render the term 8o62oc, applied to Onesimus in
the Epistle to Philemon, by the English word
slave. Hie has not even added a footnote, as
is customary with him when he deems any
other translation of a word than that given by
himself at all worthy of notice. In like manner, Moses Stuart just proceeds to call Onesimus
"the slave of Philemon," as if there could be
no ground for doubt on. so plain a point. Such
is the testimony of these two great Biblical
critics, who devoted their lives in great measure
to the study of the language, literature, and
interpretation of the Epistles of the New Testament.
Now, it should be observed, that not one of
192 
ARGUMENT FROM  THiE SCRIPTURES. 193
the authorities quoted by us had any motive
"to pervert texts," or "to invent authorities,"
"in support of slavery."  Neither Donnegan,
nor Liddell and Scott, nor Stephens, nor Schleusner, nor Robinson, nor Smnith, nor Macknight,
nor Stuart, could possibly have had any such
motive.   If they were  not  all perfectly unbiassed witnesses, it is certain they had no bias
in favor of slavery. It is, indeed, the abolitionist, and not the slaveholder, who, in this
case, "has perverted texts;" and if he has not
' invented authorities," it is because his attempts
to do so have proved abortive.
Beside the clear and unequivocal import of
the word applied to Onesimus, it is evident,
from other considerations, that he was the slave
of Philemon. To dwell upon all of these
would, we fear, be more tedious than profitable
to the reader.  Hence we  shall confine  our
attention to a single circumstance, which will,
we think, be sufficient for any candid or impartial inquirer after truth. Among the arguments
used by St. Paul to induce Philemon to receive
his fugitive slave kindly, we find this: "For
perhaps he therefore departed for a season, that
thou slihouildest receive him forever." This verse
is thus paraphrased by Macknight:  "To miti     N                17 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
gate thy resentment, consider, that perhaps also
for this reason he was separated from thee for a
little while, (so irpo  S?pav signified, 1 Thess. ii.
17, note 2,) that thou mightest have him thy slave
for life." Dr. Macknight also adds, in a footnote: "By telling Philemon that he would now
have Onesimus forever, the apostle intimates to
him his firm persuasion that Onesimus would
never any more run away from him."   Such
seems to be the plain, obvious import of the
apostle's argument.  No one, it is believed, who
had no set purpose to subserve, or no foregone
conclusion to support, would view this argument in any other light.  Perhaps he was separated for a while as a slave, that "thou mightest have him forever," or for life. How have
him? Surely, one would think, as a slave, 6r
in the same capacity from which he was separated for a while. The argument requires this;
the opposition of the words, and the force of
the passage, imperatively require it.  But yet,
if we may believe Mr. Barnes, the meaning of
St. Paul is, that perhaps Onesimus was separated for a while as a servant, that Philemon
might never receive him again as a servant, but
forever as a Christian brother! Lest we should
be suspected of misrepresentation, we shall give
194 
ARGUMENT FROM TIE SCRIPTURES. 195
his own words.   "The meaning is," says he,
"that it was possible that this was permitted
in the providence of God, in order that OnesimeUs might be brought under the influence
of the gospel, and be far more serviceable to
Philemon as a Christian than he could have
been in his former relation to him."
In. the twelfth verse of the epistle, St. Paul
says: "Whom I have sent again," or, as Macknight more accurately renders the words,
"HIim I have sent back," (Jv aC7~,-flta.) Hiere
we see the great apostle actually sending back a
fugitive slave to his master.   This act of St.
Paul is not, and cannot be, denied. The words
are too plain for denial. Onesirmus "I have sent
back." Surely it cannot be otherwise than a
most unpleasant spectacle to abolitionist eyes
thus to see Paul, the aged,-perhaps the most
venerable and glorious hero whose life is upon
record,-assume such an attitude toward the
institution  of  slavery.   iad' he  dealt with
slavery as he always dealt with every thing
which he regarded as sin; had he assumed
toward it an attitude of stern and uncompromising hostility, and had his words been thunderbolts of denunciation, then indeed would he
have been a hero after the very hearts of the
O 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
abolitionists. But, as it is, they have to apologize for the great apostle, and try, as best they
may, to deliver him from his very equivocal pos8ztion!  But if they are true apostles, and not
false, then, we fear, the best apology for his
conduct is that he had never read the Declaration of Independence, nor breathed the air of
Boston.
This point, however, we shall not decide.
WVe shall examine their apologies, and let the
candid reader decide for himself. St. Paul, it
is not denied, sent back Onesimus.  But, says
Mr. Barnes, he did not compel or urye him to
go.   He did not send him back against his
will. Onesimus, no doubt, desired to return,
and St. Paul was moved to send him by his
own  request.   Now,  in the first place, this
apology is built on sheer assumption.   There
is not the slightest evidence that Onlesimus requested St. Paul to send him back to his master. "There may have been many reasons,"
says Mr. Barnes, " why Onesimus desired to
return to Colosse, and no one can prove that
he did not express that desire to St. Paul, and
that his'sending' him was not in consequence
of such request." True; even if Onesimus had
felt no such desire, and had expressed no such
196
0 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 197
desire to St. Paul, it would have been impossible, in the very nature of things, for any one to
prove such negatives, unless he had been expressly informed on the subject by the writer
of the epistle. But is it not truly wonderful,
that any one should, without the least particle
or shadow of evidence, be pleased to imagine a
series of propositions, and then call upon the
opposite party to disprove them? Is not such
proceeding the very stuff that dreams are made
of?
No doubt there may have been reasons why
Onesimus should desire to return to his master.
There were certainly reasons, and reasons of tremendous force, too, why he should have desired
no such thing. The fact that Philemon, whom
he had offended by running away, had, according to law, the power of life and death over
him, is one of the reasons why he should have
dreaded to return. Hience, unless required by
the apostle to return, he may have desired no
such thing, and no one can prove that an expression of such desire on his part was the
ground of the apostle's action.  It is certain,
that he who affirms should prove.
In the second place, if St. Paul were an abolitionist at heart, he should have avoided the
17I'* 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
appearance of so great an evil. He should not,
for a moment, have permitted himself to stand
before the world in the simple and unexplained
attitude of one who had sent back a fugitive
slave to his master.   No  honest  abolitionist
would  permit  himself  to  appear in such a
light. He would scorn to occupy such a position.  Hence  we repeat, if St. Paul  were an
abolitionist at heart, he should have let it be
known that, in sending Onesimus back, he was
moved, not originally by the principles of his
own heart, but by the desire and request of the
fugitive himself. By such a course, he would
have delivered himself from a false position,
and spared his friends among the abolitionists
the necessity of making awkward apologies for
his conduct.
Thirdly, the positions of Mr. Barnes are not
merely sheer assumptions; they are perfectly
gratuitous. For it is easy to explain the determination of St. Paul to send Onesimus back,
without having recourse to the supposition that
Onesimus desired him to do so. Such determination was, indeed, the natural and necessary
result of the well-known principles of the great
apostle. IHe had repeatedly, and most emphatically, inculcated the  principle, that it is the
198 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 199
duty of slaves to "obey their masters," and to
"count them worthy of all honor."  This duty
Onesimus had clearly violated in running away
from his master. If St. Paul, then, had not
taught Onesimus a different doctrine from that
which he had taught the churches, he must
have felt that he had done wrong in absconding from Philemon, and desired to repair the
wrong by returning to him. " It is," says Mr.
Barnes, "by no  means necessary to suppose
that Paul felt that Onesimus was under obliyation to return."   But we must suppose this,
unless we suppose that Paul felt that Onesimus
was under no obligation to obey the precepts
which he himself had-delivered for the guidance and direction of all Christian servants.
We shall now briefly notice a few other of
Mr. Barnes' arguments, and then dismiss this
branch of the subject.  "If St. Paul sent back
Onesimus,"  says he, "this was, doubtless, at
his own request; for there is' not the slightest
evidence that he compelled him, or even urged
him, to go." We might just as well conclude
that St. Paul first required Onesimus to return,
because there is not the slightest evidence that
Onesimus made any suclh request.
"Paul," says Mr. Barnes, "had no power to 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
send Onesimus back to his master unless he chose
to go." This is very true. But still Onesimus
may have chosen to go, just because St. Paul,
his greatest benefactor and friend, had told him
it was his duty to do so. lie may have chosen
to go, just because the apostle had told him it
is the duty of servants not to run away from
their masters, but to obey them, and count
them worthy of all honor. It is also true, that
"there is not the slightest evidence that he
compelled him, or even urged him, to go." It
is, on the other hand, equally true, that there
is not the slightest evidence that any thing
more than a bare expression of the apostle's
opinion, or a reiteration of his well-known
sentiments, was necessary to induce him to
return.
"The language is just as would have been
used," says our author, "on the supposition,
either that he requested him to go and bear a
letter to Colosse, or that Onesimus desired to
go, and that Paul sent him agreeably to his request. Compare Phil. ii. 25:'Yet I suppose it
necessary to send Epaphroditus, my brother, and
companion in labor,' &c.; Col. iv. 7, 8:'All
my estate shall Tychicus declare unto you,
who is a beloved brother, and a faithful mi
200 
ARGUMENT FROM THIIE SCRIPTURES. 201
nister and fellow-servant in the Lord: whom I
have sent unto you for the same purpose, that
he might know your estate.'   But  Epaphroditus and Tychlicus were not sent against their
own will,-nor is there any more reason to
think that Onesimus was."   Tow there is not
the least evidence that either Epaphroditus or
Tychicus requested the apostle to send them as
he did; and, so far as appears from his statements, the whole thing originated with himself. It is simply said that he sent them. It
is true, they were "not sent against their own
will," for they were ready and willing to obey
his directions. We have good reason, as we
have seen, to believe that precisely the same
thing was true in regard to the sending of
Onesirmus.
But there is another case of sending which
Mr. Barnes has overlooked. It is recorded in
the same chapter of the same epistle which
speaks of the sending of Epaphroditus. We
shall adduce it, for it is a case directly in point.
"But ye know the proof of him, (i. e. of Timothy,) that, as a son with the father, he hath
served with me in the gospel. Hiim, therefore,
I hope to send presently, so soon as I shall see
how it will go with me." - Now, here the apostle 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
proposes to send Timothy, not so soon as Timothy should request to be sent, but so soon as
he should see how it would go with himself as a
prisoner at Rolnme. "As a son with the father,"
so Timothy, after his conversion, served with
the great apostle, and, not against his own will,
but most cheerfully, obeyed his directions. And
in precisely the same ineffably endearing relation did Onesimus stand to the apostle. As
a recent convert,-as  a sincere and humble
Christian,-he naturally looked to his great inspired teacher for advice, and was, no doubt,
with more than filial affection, ready to obey.
Hence, we insist that Paul was responsible
for the return of Onesimus to his master.  He
might have prevented his return, had he so desired; for he tells us so himself, (ver. 13.) But
he chose to send him back. And why? Because Onesimus requested? The apostle says
not so. " I would have retained him with me,"
says he to Philemon, " that in thy stead he
might have ministered unto me in the bonds
of the gospel.   BUT WITHOUT THY MIND WOULD
I DO NOTHING."  Nay, whatever may have been
his own  desires, or those  of  Onesimus, he
would do nothing without the mind of Philemon.   Such is the reason which the -apostle
202 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 203
assigns for his own conduct, for his own determination not to retain the fugitive slave.
"What  the apostle wrote to Philemon on
this occasion is," says Dr. Macknight, "highly
worthy of notice; namely, that although he had
great need of an affectionate, honest servant to
minister to him in his bonds, such as Onesiirus
was, who had expressed a great inclination to
stay with him; and although, if Onesimus had
remained with him, he would only have discharged the duty which Philemon himself owed
to his spiritual father, yet the apostle would by
no means detain Onesimus without Philemon's
leave, because it belonged to him to dispose of
his own slave in the way he thought proper.
Such was the apostle's regard to justice, and to
the rights of mankind!"
According to Mr. Barnes, however, the apostle was governed in this transaction, not by a
regard to principle or the rights of mankind,
but by a regard for the feelings of the master!
Just listen, for one moment, to his marvellous
discourse:  "It is probable," says he, " that if
Onesimus had proposed to return, it would have
been easy for Paul to have retained him with
him. HIe might have represented his own want
of a friend. lile might have appealed to his 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
gratitude on account of his efforts for his conversion. He might have shown him that he
was under no moral obligation to go back. lIe
might have refused to give him this letter, and
might have so represented to him the dangers
of the way, and the probability of a harsh reception, as effectually to have dissuaded him
from such a purpose. But, in that case, it is
clear that this might have caused hard feeling
in the bosom of Philemon, and rather than do
that, he preferred to let him return to his master,
and to plead for him that he might have a kind
reception. It is, therefore, by no means necessary to suppose that Paul felt that Onesimus
was under obligation to return, or that he was
disposed to compel him, or that Onesimus was
not inclined to return voluntarily; but all the
circumstances of the case are met by the supposition that, if Paul had retained him, Philemon might conceive that he had injured
him."
Alas! that so much truth should have been
suppressed; and that, too, by the most glorious
champion of truth the world has ever seen.
ie tells not his "son  Oniesimus" that he is
under no moral obligation to return to his
master. On the contrary, he leaves him igno
204 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 205
rant of his rights-of his inherent, sacred, and
eternal rights.   He  sees him  blindly put off
"the hero," and put on "the brute" again.
And why?   Because,  forsooth, if he  should
only speak, he might cause hard feeling in tthe
bosom of his master!   Should he retain Onesimus, his son, he would not injure Philemon at
all. But then Philemon "might conceive" that
he had injured him. Ah! when will abolitionist
again suppress such mighty truth, lest he disturb some fancied right, or absurd feeling
ruffle?  When  the volcano of his mind suppress and keep its furious fires in, lest he consume some petty despot's despicable sway; or
else, at least, touch his tender sensibilities
with  momentary  pain?   "fiat  justitia, ruat
coelum," is a favorite maxim with other abolitionists. But St. Paul, it seems, could not assume quite so lofty a tone. He could not say,
"Let  justice  be  done, though  the heavens
should fall."   He  could not'even say, "Let
justice be done," though the feelings of Philemon should be hurt.
It is evident, we think, that St. Paul needs
to be defended against Mr. Barnes' defences
of him, and vindicated against his apologies.
If, indeed, he were so pitiful a pleader of "the
18 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
innocent cause" as Mr. Barnes would have us
to believe he is, then, we ask if those abolitionists are not in the right who despise both
the apostle and his doctrine? No other abolitionist, it is certain, will ever imitate his example, as that example is represented by M\r.
Barnes. No other abolitionist will ever suppress the great truths-as he conceives them to
be-with which his soul is on fire, and which,
in his view, lie at the foundation of human happiness, lest he should " cause hard feelings" in
the bosom of a slaveholder.
It may be said, perhaps, that the remarks and
apology of Mr. Barnes do not proceed on the
supposition that Onesimus was a slave. If so,
the answer is at hand.  For surely Mr. Barnes
cannot think it would have been dishonorable
in the apostle to advise, or even to urge, "a
hired servant," or " an apprentice," to return
and fulfil his contract.   It is evident that,
although Mr. Barnes would have the reader to
believe that Onesimus was merely a hired servant or an apprentice, he soon forgets his
own interpretation, and proceeds to reason
just as if he himself regarded him as a slave.
This, if possible, will soon appear still more
evident.
206 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 207
The apostle did not, according to Mr. Barnes,
wholly conceal his abolition sentiments.  iHe
made them known to Philemon. Yes, we are
gravely told, the letter which Onesirmus carried
in his pocket, as he wended his way back from
Rome to Colosse, was and is an emancipation
document! This great discovery is, we believe,
due to the abolitionists of the present day. It
was first made by Mr. Barnes, or Dr. Channing,
or some other learned emancipationist, and after
them  by Mr. Sumner.   Indeed, the discovery
that it appears from the face of the epistle itself
that it is an emancipation document, is the second of the two "conclusive things" which, in
Mr. Sumner's opinion, constitute "an -all-sufflcient response" to anti-abolitionists.
Now supposing St. Paul to have been an abolitionist, such a disclosure of his views would,
we admit, afford some little relief to our minds.
For it would show that, although he did not
provoke opposition  by proclaiming the truth
to the churches and to the world, he could at
least run the risk of hurting the feelings of a
slaveholder.   But let us look into this great
discovery, and see if the apostle has, in reality,
whispered any such words of emancipation in
the ear of Philemon. 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
In his note to the sixteenth verse of the
epistle, Mr. Barnes says: " Not now as a servant.
The adverb rendered'not now,' (oux-C,) means
no more, no further, no longer." So let it be.
We doubt not that such is its meaning. Hence,
we need not examine Mr. Barnes' numerous
authorities, to show that such is the force of
the adverb in question. He has, we admit,
most abundantly established his point that o'x/re
means no longer. But then this is a point which
no  anti-abolitionist has the least occasion to
deny. We find precisely the same rendition
in Macknight, and we are perfectly willing to
abide by his translation. If Mr. Barnes had
spared himself the trouble of producing these
authorities, and adduced only one to show that
So),o~o means a hired servant, or an apprenticzee,
his labor would have been bestowed where it
is needed.
As the passage stands, then, St. Paul exhorts
Philemon to receive Onesimus, "no longer as
a servant." Now this, we admit, is perfectly
correct as far as it goes. "It (i.e. this adverb)
implies," says Mr. Barnes, "that he had been
in this condition, but was not to be now."  He
was no longer to be a servant!  Over this view
of the passage, Mr. Sumner goes into quite a
208 
ARGUMENT FROM TIHE SCRIPTURES. 209
paroxysm of triumphant joy. "Secondly," says
he, "in charging Onesimus with this epistle to
Philemon, the apostle announces  him  as'not
now a servant, but above a servant,-a brother
beloved;' and he enjoins upon his correspondent the hospitality due only to a freeman, saying expressly,'If thou count me, therefore, as
a partner, receive him as myself;' ay, sir, not as
slave, not even as servant, but as a brother
beloved, even as the apostle himself.   Thus
with apostolic pen wrote Paul to his disciple
Philemon. Beyond all doubt, in these words
of gentleness, benediction, and EMANCIPATION,*
dropping with celestial, soul-awakening power,
there can be no justification for a conspiracy,
which, beginning with the treachery of Iscariot,
and the temptation of pieces of silver, seeks
by fraud, brutality, and violence, through officers of the law armed to the teeth like pirates,
and amid soldiers who degrade their uniform,
to hurl a fellow-man back into' the lash-resounding den of American slavery; and if any one
can thus pervert this beneficent example, allow
me to say that he gives too much occasion to
doubt his intelligence or his sincerity."
* The emphasis is ours.
18*
0 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
Now in regard to the spirit of this passage
we have at present nothing to say. The sudden
transition from the apostle's "words of blessing
and benediction," to Mr. Sumner's words of
railing and vituperation, we shall pass by unnoticed.  Upon these the reader may make his
own  comments.   It is our  object simply to
comment on the words of the great apostle.
And, in the first place, we venture to suggest
that there are several very serious difficulties
in the way of Mr. Barnes' and Mr. Sumner's
interpretation of the passage in question.
Let us, for the sake of argument, concede
to these gentlemen that Onesimus was merely
the hired servant, or apprentice, of Philemon.
What then follows?  If they are not in error,
it clearly and unequivocally follows  that  St.
Paul's "words of emancipation" were intended,
not for slaves merely, but for hired servants
and apprentices!  For  servants  of any and
every description!- Mr. Sumner expressly tells
us that he was to return, "not as a slave, not
even as a servant, but as a brother beloved."
Now such a scheme of emancipation would, it
seems to us, suit the people of Boston as little
as it would  those of Richmond.   It would
abolish  every kind of "servitude, whether vo
210 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 211
luntary or involuntary," and release all hired
servants, as well as apprentices, from the obligation of their contracts.   Such is one of the
difficulties in their way.   It may not detract
from the "sincerity," it certainly reflects no
credit on the "intelligence," of Mr. Sumner,
to be guilty of such an oversight.
There is another very grave difficulty in the
way of these gentlemen. St. Paul writes that
the servant Onesimus, who had been unprofitable to Philemon in times past, would now be
profitable to him. But how profitable? As a
servant? No! he was no longer to serve him
at all.  his "emancipation" was announced!
He was to be received, not as a slave, not even
as a servant, but only as a brother beloved!
Philemon was, indeed, to extend to him the hospitalities due to a freeman, even such as were
due to the apostle himself? Now, for aught
we know, it may have been very agreeable to
the feelings of Philemon, to' have his former
servant thus unceremoniously "emancipated,"
and quartered upon him as "a gentleman of
elegant leisure;" but how this could have been
so profitable to him is more than we can conceive.
It must be admitted, we think, that in a worldly 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
point of view, all the profits would have been
on the side of Onesimus.   "But," says Mr.
Barnes, "he would now be more profitable as
a Christian brother." It is true, Onesimus had
not been very profitable as a Christian brother
before he ran away, for he had not been a
Christian brother at all. But if he were sent
back by the apostle, because he would be profitable merely as a Christian brother, we cannot
see why any other Christian brother would not
have answered the purpose just as well as Onesimus. If such, indeed, were the apostle's
object, he might have conferred a still greater
benefit upon Philemon by sending several
Christian brethren to live with him, and to
feast upon his good things.
Thirdly, the supposition that St. Paul thus
announced the emancipation of Onesimus, is
as inconsistent with the whole scope and design
of the passage, as it is with the character of
the apostle.  If he would do nothing without
the consent of Philemon, not even retain his
servant to minister to himself while in prison,
much less would he declare him emancipated,
and introduce him to his former master as a
freeman. WVe submit to the candid reader, we
submit to every one who has the least percep
212 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 213
tion of the character and spirit of the apostle,
if such an interpretation of his words be not
simply ridiculous.
It is certain that such an interpretation is
peculiar  to  abolitionists.   "Men,"  says  Mr.
Sumner, "are prone to find in uncertain, disconnected texts, a confirmation of their own
personal  prejudices  or  prepossessions.   And
I,"-he continues, "who  am  no  divine, but
only a simple layman-make bold to say, that
whosoever finds in the gospel any sanction of
slavery, finds there merely a reflection of himself." He must have been a very simple layman indeed, if he did not perceive how very
easily his words might have been retorted. We
venture to affirm that no one, except an abolitionist, has ever found the slightest tincture
of abolitionism in the writings of the great
apostle to the Gentiles.
The plain truth is, that Philemon is exhorted
to receive Onesimus "no longer as a slave ONLY,
but above a slave,-a brother beloved." Such
is the translation of Macknight, and such, too,
is the concurrent voice of every commentator
to whom we have access. Pool, Clarke, Scott,
Benson, Doddridge-all unite in the interpretation that Onesimus was, in the heaven-inspired 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
and soul-subduing words of the loving apostle,
commended to his master, not as a slave merely,
but also as a Christian brother.   The great
fact-the "words of emancipation," which Mr.
Sumner sees so clearly on "the face of the
epistle,"-they cannot see at all. Neither sign
nor shadow of any such thing can they perceive. It is a sheer reflection of the abolitionist
himself. Thus, the Old Testament is not only
merged in the New, but the New itself is merged
in Mr. Charles Sumner, of Massachusetts.
We  shall notice one passage more of Scripture. The seventh chapter of the Epistle to
the Corinthians begins thus: "Now concerning
the things whereof ye wrote unto me;" and
it proceeds to notice, among other things, the
relation of master and slave. This passage was
designed to correct the disorders among the
Christian slaves at Corinth, who, agreeably to
the doctrine of the false teacher, claimed their
liberty, on pretence that,' as brethren in Christ,
they were on an equality with their Christian
masters." Here, then, St. Paul met abolitionism
face to face. And how did he proceed? Did
he favor the false teacher? Did he recognise
the claim of the discontented Christian slaves?
Did he even once hint that they were entitled
214 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 215
to their freedom, on the ground that all men
are equal, or on any other ground whatever?
His own words will furnish the best answer
to these questions.
"Let every man," says he, "abide in the
same calling wherein he was called.  Art thou
called, being a servant? care not for it." Thus,
were Christian slaves exhorted to continue in
that condition of life in which they were when
converted to Christianity.   This will not be
denied. It is too plain for controversy. It is
even admitted by Mr. Barnes himself. In the
devout  contemplation  of this passage  Chrysostom exclaims: " Hast thou been called, being
a slave? Care not for it. Continue to be a
slave. Hast thou been called, being in uncircumcision? Remain uncircumcised. Being circumcised, didst thou become a believer?  Continue circumcised. For these are no hindrances
to piety. Thou art called, being a slave; another, with an unbelieving wife; another, being
circumcised.  Astonishing!  Where has he put
slavery? As circumcision profits not, and uncircumcision does no harm, so neither doth
slavery nor yet liberty."
"The  great argument" against  slavery is,
according to Dr. Channing and other aboli 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
tionists drawn from the immortality of the soul.
"Into  every human  being,"  says  he,  "God
has breathed an immortal spirit, more precious
than the whole outward creation.   No earthly
nor celestial language can exaggerate the worth
of a human being."  The powers of this immortal spirit, he concludes, "reduce to insignificance all outward distinctions."   Yea, according to St. Paul himself, they reduce to utter
insignificance all outward distinctions, and especially the distinction between liberty and slavery.
"Art thou called," says he, "being a slave?
care not for it." Art thou, indeed, the Lord's
freeman, and as such destined to reign on a
throne of glory forever?   Oh, then, care not
for the paltry distinctions of the passing world-!
Now, whom shall the Christian teacher take for
his model?-St. Paul, or Dr. Channing?  Shall
he seek to make men contented with the condition in which God has placed them, or shall
he stir up discontent, aind inflame the restless
passions of men? Shall he himself, like the
great apostle, be content to preach the doctrines
of eternal life to a perishing world; or shall he
make politics his calling, and inveigh against
the domestic relations of society? Shall he exhort men not to continue in the condition of
216 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTUREs. 217
life in which God has placed them, but to take
his providence out of his hands, and, in direct
opposition to his word, assert their rights? In
6ne word, shall he preach the gospel of Christ
and his apostles, or shall he preach the gospel
of the abolitionist?
" Art thou called, being a servant? care not
for it; but if thou mayest be made free, use it
rather."   The  Greek  runs  thus:  d2A' e' xa'
uvaaae deu'Osepoo TrzaOae, paS),ov Zopoaat,-literally, "but even if thou canst become free,
rather  make- use of."   Make  use of  what?
The Greek verb is left without a case. HIow,
then, shall this be supplied? To what does
the ambiguous it of our translation refer?
"One  and all of the native Greek commentators in the early ages," says Stuart, "and
many expositors in modern times, say that the
word to be  supplied  is  ovu),ia, i. e. slavery,
bondacge.   The  reason which they give for it
is, that  this is the  only construction  which
can support the proposition the apostle is laboring to establish, viz.:'Let every man abide in
statu quo.' Even De Wette, (who, for his high
liberty notions, was banished fromr Germany,)
in his commentary on this passage, seems
plainly to accede to the force of this reason
19 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
ing; and with him many others have agreed.
No man can look at the simple continuity of
logic in the passage without feeling that there
is force in the appeal."   Yet the fact should
not be concealed, that Stuart himself is "not
satisfied with this exegesis of the passage;"
which, acceording to his own statement, was
the  universal  inteq)retation from  "the early
ages" down to the sixteenth century. This
change, says he, "seems to have been the
spontaneous   prompting   of   the  spirit  of
liberty, that beat high" in the bosom of its
author.
Now have we not some reason to distrust an
interpretation which comes not exactly from
Jleaven, but from a spirit beating high in the
human breast?  TItat is certainly not an unerring spirit. We have already seen what it
can do with the Scriptures.   But whether it
has erred in this instance, or not, it is certain
that it should never be permitted to beat so
very high in any human breast as to annul the
teachings of the apostle, or to make him contradict himself. This has been too often done.
We too frequently hear those who admit that
St. Paul exhorts "slaves to continue in slavery,"
still contend that "if they may be made free,"
218 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 219
they should move heaven and earth to attain so
desirable an object. They "should continue in
that state," and yet exert all their power to escape therefrom!
Conybeare and Howson, who are acknowledged to be among the best commentators
on the Epistles of St. Paul, have restored "the
continuity of his logic."   They translate his
words thus: " Nay, though thou have power to
gain thy freedom, seek rather to remain  content." This translation certainly possesses the
advantage that it makes the doctrine of St.
Paul perfectly consistent with itself.
But let us return to the point in regard to
which there is no controversy. It is on all sides
agreed, that St. Paul no less than three times
exhorts every man to continue in the condition
in which Providence has placed him.  "And
this rule," says he, "ordain I in all the
churches." Yet-would any man believe it
possible?-the very quintessence of abolitionism itself has been extracted from this passage of his writings! Let us consider for a moment the wonderful alchemy by which this has
been effected.
We find in this passage the words: "Be not
ye the servants of men."   These words  are 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
taken from the connection in which they stand,
dissevered from the words which precede and
follow  them,  and then  made  to teach  that
slaves should not submit to the authority of their
masters, should not continue in their present
condition.   It is certain that no one but an
abolitionist, who has lost all respect for revelation except when it happens to square with his
own notions,. could thus make  the apostle so
directly and so flatly contradict himself and
all his teaching. Different interpretations have
been given to the words just quoted; but until
abolitionism set its cloven foot upon the Bible,
such violence had not been done to its sacred
pages.
- Conybeare  and  Howson  suppose that the
words in question are intended to caution the
Corinthians against " their servile adherence to
party leaders."   Bloomfield, in like  manner,
says: " The best commentators are agreed,"
that they are " to be tal(en figuratively, in the
sense,' do not be blindly followers of men, conforming to their opinions,' &c."  It is certain
that Rosenmiiller, Grotius, and we know not
how many more, have all concurred in this
interpretation.   But be the meaning what it
may, it is not ani exhortation to slaves to burst
220 
ARGUMENT FROM THE ScRIPTURES. 221
their bonds in sunder, unless the apostle has,
in one and the same breath, taught diametrically opposite doctrines.
Yet, in direct opposition to the plain words
of the apostle, and to the concurrent voice of
commentators and critics, is he made to teach
that slaves should throw off the authority of
their masters!  Lest such a thing should be
deemed impossible, we quote the words of the
author by whom this outrage has been perpetrated. "The command of the 23d verse,"
says he, "'be not ye the servants of men,' is
equally plain.   There are no such commands
uttered in regard to the relations of husband
and wife, parent and child, as are here given in
regard to slavery.   No one is thus urged to dissolve the marriage relation.  No such commands
are given to relieve children from obedience to
their parents," &c.* Nor is any such command,
we repeat, given to relieve slaves from obedience to their masters, or to dissolve the relation
between them.
If such violence to Scripture had been done
by an obscure scribbler, or by an infidel quoting the word of God merely for a purpose, it
* Elliott on Slavery, Vol. I., p. 295.
19-,: 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
would not have been matter of such profound
astonishment.    But  is it not  unspeakably
shocking that a Christian man, nay, that a
Christian minister and doctor of divinity,
should thus set at naught the clearest, the
most  unequivocal,  and  the most  universally
received teachings of the gospel?  If he had,'
merely accused the Christian men of the South,
as he has so often done in his two stupid volumes on slavery, of the crimes of "swindling,"
of "theft," of "robbing," and of "manstealing," we could have borne with him well; and,
as we have hitherto done, continued to pass
by his labors with silent contempt.   But we
have deemed  it important to show in what
manner, and to what extent, the spirit of abolitionism can wrest the pure word of God to
its antichristian purpose.
We shall conclude the argument from Scripture with the following just and impressive
testimony of the Princeton Review: "'The mass
of the pious and thinking people in this country are neither abolitionists nor the advocates
of slavery.  They stand where they ever have
stood-on the broad Scriptural foundation; maintaining the obligation of all men, in their several
places and relations, to act on the law of love,
222 
ARGUMENT FROM THE ScRIPTURES. 223
and to promote the spiritual and temporal welfare
of others by every means in their power. They
stand aloof from the abolitionists for various
reasons. In the first place, they disapprove of
their principles. The leading characteristic
doctrine of this sect is that slaveholding is in
all cases a sin, and should, therefore, under all
circumstances, be immediately abandoned. As
nothing can be plainer than that slaveholders were
admitted to the Christian church by the inspired
apostles, the advocates of this doctrine are brought
into direct collision with the Scriotures. This
leads to one of the most dangerous evils connected
with the whole system, viz., a disregard of the
authority of the word of God, a setting up a different and higher standard of truth and duty, and
a proud and confident wresting of Scripture to
suit their own purposes. THE HISTORY OF INTERPRETATION  FURNISHES  NO  EXAMPLES  OF  MORE
WILFUL AND VIOLENT  PERVERSIONS OF THE  SACRED TEXT THAN ARE TO BE FOUND IN THE WRITINGS OF THE ABOLITIONISTS. THEY SEEM TO CONSIDER THEMSELVES ABOVE THE SCRIPTURES; AND
WHEN THEY PUT THEMSELVES ABOVE THE LAW OF
GOD, IT IS NOT WONDERFUL THAT THEY SHOULD
DISREGARD THE LAWS OF MEN. Significant manifestations of the result of this disposition to 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
consider their own light a surer guide than
the word of God, are visible in the anarchical
opinions about human governments, civil and
ecclesiastical, and on the rights of women,
which have found appropriate advocates in the
abolition publications. Let these principles be
carried out, and there is an end to all social
subordination, to all security for life and property, to all guarantee for public or domestic
virtue. If our women are to be emancipated
from subjection to the law which God has imposed upon them, if they are to quit the retirement of domestic life, where they preside in
stillness over the character and destiny of society; if they are to come forth in the liberty
of men, to be our agents, our public lecturers,
our committee-men, our rulers; if, in studied
insult to the authority of God, we are to renounce in the marriage contract all claim to
obedience, we shall soon have a country over
which the genius of Mary Wolstonecraft would
delight to preside, but from which all order
and all virtue would speedily be banished.
There is no form of human excellence before
which we bow with profounder deference than
that which  appears  in  a  delicate woman,
adorned with the inward graces and devoted
224 
ARGUMENT FROM THE SCRIPTURES. 225
to the peculiar duties of her sex; and there is
no deformity of human character from which
we turn with deeper loathing than from a woman forgetfiul of her nature, and clamorous
for the vocation and rights of men. It would
not be fair to object to the abolitionists the
disgusting and disorganizing opinions of even
some of their leading advocates and publications, did they not continue to patronize those
publications, and were not these opinions the
legitimate consequences of their own principles.
Their women do but apply their own method
of  dealing  with  Scripture  to  another  case.
This no inconsiderable portion of the party
have candor enough to acknowledge, and are
therefore prepared to abide the result." 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
CHAPTER IV.
THE ARGUMENT FROM THE PUBLIC GOOD.
WE have not shunned the abstractions of the
abolitionist. We have, on the contrary examined all his arguments, even the most abstract, and endeavored to show that they either
rest on false assumptions, or consist in false deductions. While engaged in this analysis of
his errors, we have more than once had occasion
to remind him that the great practical problem
of slavery is to be determined, if determined at
all, not by an appeal to abstractions, but simply
by a consideration of the public good. It is
under this point of view, or with reference to
the highest good of the governed, that we now
proceed to consider the institution of slavery.
The way is open and clear for this view of
the subject.  For we have seen, we trust, that
slavery is condemned neither by any principle
of natural justice, nor by any precept of divine
revelation. On the other hand, if we mistake
not, it has been most clearly shown that the
226 
4
ARGUMENT FROM THE PUBLIC GOOD. 227
doctrines and practices of the abolitionist are
at war with the most explicit words of God, as
well as with the most unquestionable principles
of political ethics.   Hence, without  the least
disrespect to the eternal principles of right, we
may now proceed to subject his doctrines to
the only remaining test of political truth, namely, to the test of experience.   Having examined
thle internal qualities of the tree and found them
bad, we may now proceed to inquire if "its
fruits" be not poison. And if the sober lessons
of history, if the infallible records of experience,
be found in perfect harmony with the conclusions of reason and of revelation, then shall
we not be triply justified in pronouncing abolitionism a social and a moral curse?
~ I. The Question.
Here, at the outset, we may throw aside a
mass of useless verbiage, with which our inquiry is usually encumbered. We are eternally
told that Kentucky has fallen behind Ohio, and
Virginia behind Pennsylvania, because their
energies have been crippled, and their prosperity over-clouded, by the institution of
slavery.   Now, it is of no importance to our
argument that we should either deny the fact, 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
or the explanation which is given of it by abolitionists. If the question were, whether slavery
should be introduced among us, or into any
non-slaveholding State, then such facts and explanations would be worthy of our notice.
Then such an appeal to experience would be
relevant to the point in dispute. But such is
not the question. We are not called upon to
decide whether slavery shall be established in
our midst or not. This question has been decided for us.  Slavery-as everybody knowswas forced upon the colonies by the arbitrary
and despotic rule of Great Britain, and that, too,
against the earnest remonstrances of our ancestors. The thing has been done. The past is
beyond our control. It is fixed and unalterable.
The only inquiry which remains for us now is,
whether the slavery which was thus forced upon
our ancestors shall be continued, or whether it
shall be abolished?  The question is not what
Virginia, or Kentucky, or any other slave State,
might have been, but what they would be in
case slavery were abolished.   If abolitionists
would speak to the point, then let them show
us some country in which slavery has been abolished, and we will abide by the experiment.
Fortunately for us, we need not look far for
228 
ARGUMENT FROM THE PUBLIC GOOD. 229
such an experiment;-an experiment which has
been made, not upon mere chattels or brutes,
but upon the social and moral well-being of
more than a million of human beings. We
refer, of course, to the emancipation of the
slaves in the British Colonies. This work, as
every one knows, was the great vaunted achievement of British abolitionists. Here, then, we
may see their philosophy-if philosophy it may
be called-"teaching by example."  Here we
may see and taste the fruits of abolitionism, ere
we conclude to grow them upon our own soil.
~ II. Emancipation in the British Colonies.
It is scarcely in the power of human language to describe the enthusiastic delight with
which the abolitionists, both in England and
in America, were inspired by the spectacle of
West India Emancipation. We might easily
adduce a hundred illustrations of the almost
frantic joy with which it intoxicated their
brains. We shall, however, for the sake of
brevity, confine our attention to a single example,-which will, at the same time, serve to
show, not only how wild the abolitionist himself was, but also how indignant he became
that others were not equally disposed to part
20 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
with their sober senses. "The prevalent state
of feeling," said Dr. Channing in 1840, "in the
free States in regard to slavery is indifferencean indifference strengthened by the notion of
great difficulties attending the subject. The fact
is painful, but the truth should be spoken. The
majority of the people, even yet, care little
about the matter. A painful proof of this insensibility was furnished about a year and a
half ago, when the English West Indies were
emancipated. An event surpassing this in
moral grandeur is not recorded in history. In
one day, probably seven hundred thousand of
human beings were rescued from bondage to
full, unqualified freedom. The consciousness
of wrongs, in so many breasts, was exchanged
into rapturous, grateful joy.   What shouts of
thanksgiving broke forth from those liberated
crowds! What new sanctity and strength were
added to the domestic ties!  What new hopes
opened on future generations! The crowning
glory of this day was the fact that the work of
emancipation was wholly due to the principles
of Christianity. The West Indies were freed,
not by force, or human policy, but by the reverence of a great people for justice and humnanity. The men who began and carried on this
230 
ARGUMENT FROM THE PUBLIC GOOD. 231
cause were Christian philanthropists; and they
prevailed by spreading their own spirit through
a nation. In this respect, the emancipation of
the West Indies was a grander work than the
redemption of the Israelites from bondage.
This was accomplished by force, by outward
miracles, by the violence of the elements.  That
was achieved by love, by moral power, by God,
working, not in the stormy seas, but in the
depths of the human heart.  And how was this
day of emanlcipation-one of the most blessed
days that ever dawned upon the earth-received
in this country? While in distant England a
thrill of gratitude and joy pervaded thousands
and millions, we, the neighbors of the West Indies, and who boast of our love of liberty, saw
the sun of that day rise and set with hardly a
thought of the scenes on which it was pouring
its joyful light. The greater part of our newspapers did not refer to the event. The great
majority of the people had forgotten it. Such
was the testimony we gave to our concern for
the poor slave; and is it from discussions of
slavery among such a people that the country is
to be overturned?"
Such were the glowing expectations of the
abolitionists. It now remains to be seen whe 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
ther they were true prophets, or merely "blind
leaders of the blind." Be that as it may, for the
present we cannot agree with Dr. Channing,
that the good people of the free States were
insincere in boasting of their "love of liberty,"
because they did not go into raptures over so
fearful an experiment before they had some
little time to see how it would work. They
did, no doubt, most truly and profoundly love
liberty.   But then they had some  reason to
suspect, perhaps, that liberty may be one thing,
and abolitionism quite another.  Liberty, they
knew, was a thing of light and love; but as for
abolitionism, it was, for all they knew, a demon
of destruction.   ience they would wait, and
see. We do well to rejoice at once, exclaims
Dr. Channing. If a man-child is born into the
world, says he, do we wait to read his future
life ere we rejoice at his birth? Ah, no! But
then, perhaps, this offspring of abolitionism is
no man-child at all.. It may, for aught we
know, be an abortion of night and darkness
merely. Hience, we shall wait, and mark his
future course, ere we rend the air with shouts
that he is born at last.
This man-child, or this monster, is now seventeen years and four months old.  His character
232 
ARGUMENT FROM THE PUBLIC GOOD. 233
is developed, and fixed for life. We may now
read his history, written by impartial men, and
determine for ourselves, whether it justifies the
bright and boundless hopes of the abolitionists, or the "cold indifference," nay, the suspicions and the fears, of the good people of the
free States.
We shall begin with Jamaica, which is by
far the largest and most valuable of the British
West Indies.   The very first year after the
complete  emancipation  of the slaves of this
island, its prosperity began to manifest symnptoms of decay.   As long as it was possible,
however, to find or invent an explanation of
these fearful signs, the abolitionists remained
absolutely blind to the real course of events. In
1839, the first year of complete emancipation, it
appeared that the crop of sugar exported from
the island had fallen off no less than eight thousand four hundred and sixty-six hogsheads. But,
then, it was discovered that the hogsheads had
been larger this year than the preceding!   It
is true, there was not exactly any proof that
larger hogsheads had been used all over the
island, but it was rumored; and the rumor
was, of course, eagerly swallowed by the abolitionists.
20* 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
And besides, it was quite certain that the
free negroes had eaten more sugar than while
they were slaves, which helped mightily to account for the great diminution in the exports
of the article.  No one could deny this.  It is
certain, that if the free negroes only devoured
sugar as eagerly as such floating conjectures
were gulped down by the abolitionists, the
whole phenomenon needed no other cause for
its perfect explanation. It never once occurred,
however, to these reasoners to imagine that
the decrease in the amount of rum  exported
from another island might be owing to the circumstance that the free blacks had swallowed
a little more of that article as well as of sugar.
On the contrary, this fact was held up as a most
conclusive and triumphant proof that the free
negroes had not only become temperate themselves, but also so virtuous that they scorned
to produce such an article to poison their fellow-men. The English abolitionists who rejoiced at such a reflection were, it must be
confessed, standing on rather delicate ground.
For if such an inference proved any thing, it
proved that the blacks of the island in question
had, at one single bound, passed from the
depths of degradation to an exaltation of virtue
234 
ARGUMENT FROM THE PUBLIC GOOD. 235
far above their emancipators, the English people
themselves; since these, as every reader of history knows, not only enforced the culture of
opium in India, but also absolutely compelled
the poor Chinese to receive it at the mouth of
the cannon!
It also appears that, for 1839, the amount of
coffee exported had fallen off 38,554 cwt., or
about one third of the whole amount of the
preceding year.   "The  coffee is a very uncertain crop," said a noted English emancipationist, in view of this startling fact, "and the
deficiency, on the comparison of these two years,
is not greater, I believe, than has often occurred
before." This is true, for a drought or a hurricane had before created quite as great a
deficiency. But while the fact is true, it only
proves that the first year of emancipation was
no worse on the coffee crop than a drought or
a hurricane.
" We should also remember," says this zealous abolitionist,'" that, both in sugar and coffee,
the profit to the planter may be increased by
the saving of expense, even where the produce
is diminished."   Such a thing, we  admit, is
possible; it may be true. But in point of fact, 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
as we shall soon see, the expense was increased,
while the crop was diminished.
But after every possible explanation, even
Dr. Channing and Mr. Gurney were bound to
admit "that some decrease has taken place in
both the articles, in connection with the change
of system."  They also admitted that "so far
as this decrease of produce is connected with
the change of system, it is obviously to be traced
to a corresponding decrease in the quantity of
labor."
May we not suppose, then, that here the ingenuity of man is at an end, and the truth
begins to be allowed to make its appearance?
By no means. For here "comes the critical
question,"-says Mr. Gurney, "the real turning
point. To what is this decrease in the quantity of labor owing? I answer deliberately
but without reserve,'Mainly to causes which
class under slavery and not under freedom.' It
is, for the most part, the result of those impolitic attempts to force the labor of freemen which
have disgusted the peasantry, and have led to
the desertion of many of the estates."
Now suppose this were the case, is it not
the business, is it not the duty, of the legislator
to consider the passions, the prejudices, and
236 
ARGUMENT FROM THE PUBLIC GOOD. 237
the habits of those for whom he legislates?
Indeed, if he overlook these, is he not a reckless experimenter rather than a wise statesman?
If he legislates, not for man as he is, but for
man  as he ought to be, is he not a political
dreamer rather than a sound philosopher?
The abolitionist not only closed his eyes on
every appearance of decline in the prosperity
of the West Indies, he also seized with avidity
every indication of the successful operation of
his scheme, and magnified it both to himself
and to the world. Hie made haste, in particular, to paint in the most glowing colors the
rising prosperity of Jamaica.* Hlis narrative
was hailed with eager delight by abolitionists
in all parts of the civilized world. It is a pity,
we admit, to spoil so fine a story, or to put a
damper on so much enthusiasm. But the truth,
especially in a case like the present, should be
told. While, then, to the enchanted imagination of the abolitionist, the wonderful industry
of the freed negroes and the exuberant bounty
of nature were concurring to bring about a
paradise in the island of Jamaica, the dark
stream of emancipation was, in reality, under
* Life of Joseph John Gurney, vol. iL p. 214. 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
mining its prosperity and glory. We shall
now proceed to adduce the evidence of this
melancholy fact, which has in a few short years
become so abundant and so overwhelming,
that even the most blind and obstinate must
feel its force.
After  describing  the immense  sources  of
wealth to be found in Jamaica, an intelligent
eye-witness says: " Such  are some of the natural resources of this dilapidated and povertystricken country. Capable as it is of producing
almost every thing, and actually producing
nothing which might not become a staple with
a proper application of capital and skill, its
inhabitants are miserably poor, and daily sinking deeper and deeper into the utter helplessness of abject want.
"' Magnas inter opes inops.'
"Shipping has deserted her ports; her magnificent plantations of sugar and coffee are
running to weeds; her private dwellings are
falling to decay; the comforts and luxuries
which belong to industrial prosperity have been
cut off, one by one, from her inhabitants; and
the day, I think, is at hand when there will
be none left to represent the wealth, intelli
238 
ARGUMENT FROM THE PUBLIC GOOD. 239
gence, and hospitality for which the Jamaica
planter was once distinguished."*
"It is impossible," says Mr. Carey, "to read
Mr. Bigelow's volume, without arriving at the
conclusion that the freedom- granted to the
negro has had little effect except that of enabling him to live at the expense of the planter
so long as any thing remained. Sixteen years
of freedom did not appear to its author to have
'advanced the dignity of labor or of the laboring classes one particle,' while it had ruined
the proprietors of the land, and thus great
damage had been done to the one class without benefit of any kind to the other."
From a statistical table, published in August,
1853, it appears, says one of our northern journals, that, since 1846, "the number of sugar
estates on the island that have been totally
abandoned amounts to one hundred and sixtyeight, and the number partially abandoned to
sixty-three; the value of which two hundred
and thirty-one estates was assessed, in 1841, at
~1,655,140, or nearly eight millions and a half
of dollars. Within the same period two hun
* Bigelow's Notes on Jamaica in 1850, as quoted in Carey's
" Slave Trade, Foreign and Domestic." 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
dred and twenty-three coffee-plantations have
been totally, and twenty partially, abandoned, the
assessed value of which was, in 1841, ~500,000,
or two millions and a half of dollars; and of
cattle-pens, (grazing farms,) one hundred and
twenty-two have been totally, and ten partially,
abandoned, the value of which was a million
and a half of dollars. The aggregate value of
these six hundred and six estates, which have
been thus ruined and abandoned in the island
of Jamaica, within the last seven or eight years,
amounted by the regular assessments, ten years
since, to the sum of nearly two and a half millions of pounds sterling, or twelve and a half
nillions of dollars."*
In relation to Jamaica, another witness says:
1"The  marks  of  decay abound.  Neglected
fields, crumbling houses, fragmentary fences,
noiseless machinery-these are common sights,
and soon become familiar to observation.   I
sometimes rode for miles in succession over fertile ground, which used to be cultivated, and
which is now lying waste. So rapidly has cultivation retrograded, and the wild luxuriance of
nature replaced the conveniences of art, that
* Quoted by Mr. Carey.
240 
ARGUMENT FROM THE PUBLIC GOOD. 241
parties still inhabiting these desolated districts
have sometimes, in the strong language of a
speaker at Kingston,'to seek about the bush to
find the entrance into their houses.'
"The  towns  present a  spectacle  no  less
gloomy. A great part of Kingston was destroyed, some years ago, by an extensive conflagration: yet multitudes of the houses which
escaped that visitation are standing empty,
though the population is little, if at all, diminished. The explanation is obvious. Persons
who have nothing, and can no longer keep up
their domestic establishments, take refuge in
the abodes of others, where some means of subsistence are still left; and in the absence of any
discernible trade or occupation, the lives of
crowded thousands appear to be preserved from
day to day by a species of miracle.  The most
busy thoroughfares of former times have now
almost the quietude of a Sabbath.
"'The finest land in the world,' says Mr.
Bigelow,'may be had at any price, and almost
for the asking.'  Labor' receives no compensation, and the product of labor does not seem
to know how to find the way to market.' "*
* Carey's Slave Trade.
21
Q 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
From the report made in 1849, and signed by
various missionaries, the  moral and religious
state of the island appears no less gloomy than
its scenes of poverty and  distress.   The following extract fri-om that report we copy from
Mr.  Carey's  "Slave  Trade,  Domestic  and
Foreign:"
"Missionary efforts in Jamaica are beset at
the present time with many and great discouragements.  Societies at home have withdrawn
or diminished the amount of assistance afforded
by them to chapels and schools throughout this
island.  The prostrate condition of its agriculture and commerce disables its own population
from doing as much as formerly for maintaining
the worship of God and the  tuition of the
young, and induces numbers of negro laborers
to retire from estates which have been thrown
up, to seek thie means of subsistence in the mountains, where they are removed in general from
moral training and superintendence. The consequences of this state of matters are very disastrous. Not a few missionaries and teachersoften struggling with difficulties which they
could not overcome-have returned to Europe,
and others are preparing to follow them. Chapels and schools are abandoned, or they have
242 
ARGUMENT FROM THE PUBLIC GOOD. 243
passed into the hands of very incompetent instructors."
We cannot dwell upon each of the West India Islands. Some of these have not suffered so
much  as others;  but while some, from wellknown causes, have been partially exempt from
the evils of emancipation, all have suffered to
a fearful extent. This, as we shall now show,
is most amply established by English authorities.
Mr. Bigelow, whose "Notes on Jamaica in
1850" we have noticed, is all American writer;
a lorthern man; and, it is said, by no means a
friend to the institution of slavery. It is certain that Mr. Robert Baird,  from whom  we
shall now quote, is not only a subject of Great
Britain, but also a most enthusiastic advocate
of " the glorious Act of British Emancipation." But although he admires that act, yet,
on visiting the West Indies for his health, he
could not fail to be struck with the appalling
scenes of distress there exhibited. In describing
these, his object is not to reflect shame on the
misguided philanthropy of Great Britain;  but
only to urge the adoption of other measures, in
order to rescue the West Indies from the utter
ruin and desolation which must otherwise soon 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
overtake them. We might easily adduce many
impressive extracts from his work; but, for the
sake of brevity, we shall confine our attention to
one or two passages.
"I Hope," says Mr. Baird, "delights to brighten
the prospects of the future; and thus it is that
the British West Indian planter goes on from
year to year, struggling against his downward
progress, and still hoping that something may
yet turn up to retrieve his ruined fortunes.
But all do not struggle on. Many have given
in, and many more can and will confirm the
statement of a venerable friend of my  own
-a gentleman high in office in one of the
islands above-mentioned-who, when showing
me  his own  estate and sugar-works, assured
me, that for above a quarter of a century they
had yielded him nearly ~2000 per annum;
and that now, despite all his efforts and improvements,  (which  were  many,)  he  could
scarcely manage to make the cultivation pay
itself. Instances of this kind might be multiplied till the reader was tired, and even
heart-sick, of such details. But what need of
such? Is it not notorious? Has it not been
proved by the numerous failures that have
taken place of late years among our most
244 
ARGUMENT FROM THE PUBLIC GOOD. 245
extensive West Indian merchants?   Are not
the reports of almost all the governors of our
colonial possessions filled with statements to
the effect that great depreciation of property
has taken place in all and each of our West
Indian colonies, and that great has been the
distress consequent thereupon?   These governors are, of course, all of them imbued, to some
extent, with the ministerial policy-at least it
is reasonable to assume that they are so.  At
all events, whether they are so or not, their
position almost necessitates their doing their
utmost to carry out, with success, the ministerial views and general policy. To embody
the substance of the answer given by a talented
lieutenant-governor, in my own hearing, to an
address which set forth, somewhat strongly, the
ruined prospects and wasted fortunes of the
colonists under his government:'It must, or
it ought to be, the object and the desire of
every governor or lieutenant-governor in the
British West Indian Islands, to disappoint and
stultify, if he can, the prognostications of coming ruin with which the addresses he receives
from time to time  are continually charged?'
Yet what say these governors?   Do  not the
reports of one and all of them  confirm  the
21: 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
above statement as to the deplorable state of dis.
tress to which the West Indian planters in the
British Colonies are reduced?"*
Again, he says: "That the British West Indian colonists have been loudly complaining that
they are ruined, is a fact so generally acknowledged, that the very loudness and frequency of
the complaint has been made a reason for disregarding or undervaluing thie grounds of it.
That the West Indians are always grumbling
is an observation often heard; and, no doubt,
it is very true that they are so. But let any one
who thinks that the extent and clamor of the
complaint exceeds the magnitude of the distress
which has called it forth, go to the West Indies
and judge for himself. Let him see with his
own eyes the neglected and abandoned estates,the uncultivated fields, fast hurrying back into a
state of nature, with all the speed of tropical
luxuriance-ithe dismantled and silent machinery,
the crumibling walls, and deserted mansions,
which are familiar sights in most of the British
WVest Indian colonies.  Let him, then, transport himself to the Spanish islands of Porto
* " The West Indies and North Amnierica," by Robt. Bairdcl, A.M.,
I. l15.
246 
ARGUMENT FROM THIIE PUBLIC GOOD. 247
Rico and Cuba, and witness the life and activity which in these slave colonies prevail. Let
him observe for himself the activity of the
slavers-the improvements daily making in the
cultivation of the fields and in the processes
carried on at the Ingenios or sugar-mills-and
the general indescribable air of thriving and prosperity which surrounds the whole,-and then let
him come back to England and say, if he
honestly can, that the British West Indian
planters and proprietors are grumblers, who
complain without adequate cause."*
Great Britain has shown no little solicitude
to ascertain the real state of things in her West
India  colonies.   For  this  purpose,  she  appointed, in 1842, a select committee, consisting
of some of the most prominent members of Parliament, with Lord Stanley at their head. In
1848, another committee was appointed by her,
with Lord George Bentinek as its chairman, to
inquire into the condition of her Majesty's East
and West India possessions and the Mauritius,
and to consider whether any measures could be
adopted for their relief.   The report of both
* "The West Indies and North America," by Robt. Baird, A.M.,
p. 1438. 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
committees show, beyond all doubt, that unexampled distress existed in the colonies. The
report of 1848 declares: "That many estates in
the British West India colonies have been
already abandoned, that many more are in the
course of abandonment, and that from this
cause a very serious diminution is to be apprehended in the total amount of production.
That the first effect of this diminution will be
an increase in the price of sugar, and the ultimate effect a greater extension to the growth
of sugar in slave countries, and a greater impetus to slavery and the slave-trade." From the
same report, we also learn that the prosperity
of the Mauritius, no less than that of the West
India Islands, had suffered a fearful blight, in
consequence of the "glorious act of emancipation."
A  third commission was appointed, in 1850,
to inquire into the condition and prospects of
British Guiana.   Lord Stanley, in his second
letter to Mr. Gladstone, the Secretary of the British Colonies, has furnished us with the following extracts from the report of this committee:  "Of Guiana generally they say-' It would be
but a melancholy task to dwell upon the misery
and ruin which so alarming a change must have
248 
ARGUMENT FROM THE PUBLIC GOOD. 249
occasioned to the proprietary body; but your
commissioners feel themselves called upon to
notice the effects which this wholesale abandonmient of property has produced upon the colony
at large.   Where whole districts are fast relapsing into bush, and occasional patches of
provisions around the huts of village settlers
are all that remain to tell of once flourishing
estates, it is not to be wondered at that the
most ordinary marks of civilization are rapidly
disappearing, and that in many districts of the
colony all travelling communication by land will
soon become utterly impracticable.'
"Of the Abary district:-' Your commission
find that the line of road is nearly impassable,
and that a long succession of formerly cultivated estates presents now a series of pestilent
swamps, overrun with bush, and productive of
malignant fevers.'
"Nor are matters," says Lord Stanley, "much
better farther south.
"'Proceeding still lower down, your commissioners find that the public roads and bridges
are in such a condition that the few estates still
remaining on the upper west bank of Mahaica
Creek are completely cut off, save in the very
dry season; and that with regard to the whole 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
district, unless something be done very shortly,
travelling by land will entirely cease. In such a
state of things it cannot be wondered at that the
herdsman has a. formidable enemy to encounter
in the jaguar and other beasts of prey, and that
the keeping of cattle is attended with considerable loss from the depredations committed by
these animals.'
"It may be worth noticing," continues Lord
Stanley, "that this district-now overrun with
wild beasts of the forest-was formerly the very
garden of the colony. The estates touched one
another along the whole line of the road, leaving
no interval of uncleared land.
"The east coast, which is next mentioned by
the commissioners, is better off.  Properties,
once of immense value, had there been bought
at nominal prices; and the one railroad of
Guiana passing through that tract, a comparatively industrious population-composed of former laborers on the line-enabled the planters
still to work these to some profit. Even of this
favored spot, however, they report that it'feels
most severely the want of continuous labor.'
"The commissioners next visit the east bank
of the Demerara River, thus described:  "'Proceeding up the east bank of the river
-250 
ARGUMENT FROM THE PUBLIC GOOD. 251
Demerara, the generally prevailing features of
ruin and distress are everywhere perceptible.
Roads and bridges almost impassable are fearfully significant exponents of the condition of
the plantations which they traverse; and Canal
No. 3, once covered with plantains and coffee,
presents now a scene of almost total desolation.'
"Crossing to the west side, they find prospects somewhat brighter:'A few estates' are
still' keeping up a cultivation worthy of better
times.' But this prosperous neighborhood is
not extensive, and the next picture presented to
our notice is less agreeable:   "'Ascending the river still higher, your commissione-rs learn that the district between Itobaboe- Creek and " Stricken iHeuvel" contained, in
1829, eight sugar and five coffee and plantain
estates, and  now there remain  but three in
sugar, and four partially cultivated with plantains, by petty settlers; while tile roads, with
one or two exceptions, are in a state of utter
abandonment. Here, as on the opposite bank
of the river, hordes of squatters have located
themselves, who avoid all communication with
* Europeans, and have seemingly given themselves up altogether to the rude pleasures of a
completely savage life.' 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
"The west coast of Demerara-the only part
of the country which still remains unvisited-is
described as showing only a diminution of fifty
per cent. upon its produce of sugar; and with
this fact the evidence concludes as to one of
the three sections into which the colony is
divided. Does Demerara stand alone in its misfortunes?
"Again hear the report: -' If the  present
state of the county of Demerara affords cause
for deep apprehension, your commissioners find
that Essequibo has retrograded to a still more
alarming extent. In fact, unless a large and
speedy supply of labor be obtained to cultivate the deserted fields of this once flourishing
district, there is great reason to fear that it will
relapse into total abandonment.'
"Describing another portion of the colonythey say of one district,'Unless a fresh supply of labor be very soon obtained, there is
every reason to fear that it will become completely abandoned.' Of a second,'speedy immigration alone can save this island from total
ruin.''The prostrate condition of this once
beautiful part of the coast,' are the words which
begin another paragraph, describing another
tract of country.   Of a fourth,'the proprie
252 
ARGUMENT FROM THE PUBLIC GOOD. 253
tors on this coast seem to be keeping up a
hopeless struggle against approaching ruin.'
Again,'the once famous Arabian coast, so long
the boast of the colony, presents now but a
mournful picture of departed prosperity. IIere
were formerly situated some of the finest estates
in the country, and a large resident body of
proprietors lived in the district, and freely expended their incomes on the spot whence they
derived them.' Once more,'the lower part of
the coast, after passing Devonshire Castle, to the
river Pomeroon, presents a scene of almost
total desolation.'  Such is Essequibo!
"Berbice," says Lord Stanley, "has fared no
better. Its rural population amounts to 18,000.
Of these, 12,000 have withdrawn from the estates, and mostly from the neighborhood of the
white man, to enjoy a savage freedom of ignorance and idleness, beyond the reach of example and sometimes of control. But on the
condition of the negro I shall dwell more  at
length hereafter; at present it is the state of
property with which I have to do. What are
the districts which together form the county
of Berbice?  The Corentyne coast-the Canje
Creek-east and west banks  of the Berbice
River - and  the west  coast, where, however,
22 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
cotton was formerly the chief article produced.
To each of these respectively the following passages, quoted in order, apply:  "'The abandoned plantations on this coast,*
which, if capital and labor could be procured,
might easily be made very productive, are either
wholly deserted, or else appropriated by hordes
of squatters, who of course are unable to keep
up at their own expense the public roads and
bridges; and consequently all communication
by land between the Corentyne and New Amsterdam is nearly at an end. The roads are
impassable for horses or carriages, while for
foot passengers they are extremely dangerous.
The number of villages in this deserted region
must be upward of 2500, and as the country
abounds with fish and game, they have no difficulty in making a subsistence. In fact, the
Corentyne coast is fast relapsing into a state
of nature.'
"'Canje  Creek was  formerly considered a
flourishing district of the county, anal numbered
on its east bank seven sugar and three coffee
estates, and on its west bank eight estates, of
which two were in sugar and six in coffee,
* The Corentyne.
254 
ARGUMENT FROM THE PUBLIC GOOD. 255
making a total of eighteen plantations.   The
coffee cultivation has long since been entirely
abandoned, and of the sugar estates but eight
still now remain.   They are suffering severely for want of labor, and being supported
principally by African and Coolie immigrants,
it is much to be feared that if the latter leave
and claim their return passages to India, a
great part of the district will become abandoned.'
"' Under present circumstances, so gloomy
is the condition of affairs here,* that the two
gentlemen whom your commissioners have examined with respect to this district, both concur
in predicting "its slow but sure approximation
to the condition in which civilized man first
found it."' 
"'A districtt that in 1829 gave employment
to 3635 registered slaves, but at the present
moment there are not more than 600 laborers
at work on the few estates still in cultivation,
although it is estimated there are upward of
2000 people idling in villages of their own.
The roads are in many parts several feet under
* East bank of the Berbice River.
F West bank of the Berbice River. 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
water and perfect swamps, while in some places
the bridges are wanting altogether.   In fact
the whole district is fast becoming a total wilderness, with the exception of the one or two
estates which yet continue to struggle on, and
which are hardly accessible now but by water.'
"'Except in some of the best villages,* they
care not for back or front dams to keep off the
water; their side-lines are disregarded, and consequently the drainage is gone, while in many
instances  the public  road  is so completely
flooded that canoes have to be used as a means
of transit. The Africans are unhappily following the example of the Creoles in this district,
and buying land on which they settle in contented idleness; and your commissioners cannot
view instances like these without thie deepest
alarm, for if this pernicious habit of squatting
is allowed to extend to the immigrants also,
there is no hope for the colony.' "t
We might fill a volume with extracts to the
same effect.  We might in like manner point
to other regions, especially to Guatemala, to
the British colony on thie southern coast of
* West coast of Berbice River.
t Quoted in Carey's Slave Trade.
256 
ARGUMENT FROM THE PUBLIC GOOD. 257
Africa, and to the island of Hiayti, in all of
which emancipation has been followed by precisely similar results. But we must hasten to
consider how it is that emancipation has
wrought all this ruin and desolation. In tihe
mean  time, we  shall conclude this section in
the ever-memorable words of Alison, the historian:  "The  negroes," says he, "who, in a
state of slavery, were comfortable and prosperous beyond any peasantry in the world,
and rapidly approaching the condition of the
most opulent serfs of Europe, have been by the
act of emancipation irretrievably consigned to a state
of barbarism."
~ IIE[. The manner in which  enmancipation has
ruined the British Colonies.
By the act of emancipation, Great Britain
paralyzed the right arm of her colonial industry.
The laborer would  not work except occasionally, and the planter was ruined. The morals
of the negro disappeared with his industry,
and he speedily retraced his steps toward his
original barbarism. All this had been clearly
foretold.  "Emancipation," says Dr. Channing
in 1840, "was resisted on the ground that the
slave, if restored to his rights, would fall into
R                22* 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
idleness and vagrancy, and even relapse into barbarism."
This was predicted by the West Indian planters, who certainly had a good opportunity to
know something of the character of the negro,
whether bond or free. But who could suppose
for a moment that an enlightened abolitionist
would  listen to  slaveholders?   His response
was, that "their  unhappy position  as  slaveholders had robbed them of their reason and
blunted their moral sense." Precisely the same
thing had been foretold by the Calhouns and
the Clays of this country.  But they, too, were
unfortunately slaveholders, and, consequently,
so completely "sunk in moral darkness," that
their testimony was not entitled to credit.  The
calmest, the profoundest, the wisest statesmen
of Great Britain likewise forewarned the agitators of the desolation and the woes they
were about to bring upon the West Indies.
But thie madness of the day would confide in
no wisdom except its own, and listen to no
testimony except to the clamor of fanatics.
Hence the frightful experiment was made,
and, as we have seen, the prediction of the
anti-abolitionists has been fulfilled to the very
letter.
258 
ARGUMENT FROM THE PUBLIC GOOD. 259
The cause of this downward tendency in the
British colonies is now perfectly apparent to
all who have eyes to see. On this point, the
two committees above referred to both concur
in the same  conclusion.   The  committee of
1842 declare, "that  the principal  causes of
this  diminished  production,  and  consequent
distress, are the great difficulty which has been
experienced by the planters in obtaining steady
and continuous labor, and the high rate of remuneration which they give for even the broken
and indifferent work which  they are able  to
procure."
The cry of the abolitionist has been changed.
At firsteven before the experiment was more
than a year old -he insisted that the industry
of the freed black was working wonders in the
British colonies.   In the West Indies, in particular, he assured us that the freed negro
would do "an infinity of work for wages."*
Though he had been on the islands, and had had
an opportunity to see for himself, he boasted
that "the old notion that the negro is, by constitution, a lazy creature, who will do no work at
all except by compulsion, is now forever ex
* Gurney's Letters on the West Indies. 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
ploded."* Hie even declared, that the free
negro "understands his interest as well as a
Yankee."t These confident statements, made
by an eye-witness, were hailed by the abolitionists as conclusive proof that the experiment
was working admirably.  "The great truth has
come out," says Dr. Channing, "that the hopes
of the most sanguine advocates of emancipation
have been realized-if not surpassed-by the
West Indies." What! the negro become idle,
indeed!  "'He is more likely," says the enchanted doctor, "to fall into the civilized man's
cupidity than into the filth and sloth of the
savage."  But all these magnificent boasts were
quite premature. A few short years have sufficed to demonstrate that the deluded authors
of them, who had so lamentably failed to
predict the future, could not even read the
present.
Their boasts are now exploded. Their former
hopes are blasted; and their cry is changed.
The song now is,-" Well, suppose the negroes
will not work: they are FREE! They can now
do as they list, and there is no man to hinder."
Ah, yes! they can now, at their own sweet will,
* Gurney's Letters on the West Indies.
260
t Ibid. 
ARGUMENT FROM THE PUBLIc GOOD. 261
stretch themselves "under their gracefully-waving groves," and be lulled to sleep amid the
sound of waterfalls and the song of birds.
Such, precisely, is the paradise for which the
negro sighs, except that he does not care for
the waterfalls and the birds. But it should be
remarked, that when sinful man was driven from
the only Paradise that earth has ever seen, ha
was doomed to eat his bread in the sweat of his
brow.  This doom he cannot reverse.  Let him
make of life-as the Hiaytian negroes do-"' one
long day of unprofitable ease,'.'* and he may
dream of Paradise, or the abolitionists may
dream for him.   But while  he  dreams, the
laws of nature are sternly at their work.
Indolence benumnbs his feeble intellect, and inflames  his passions.   Poverty and want are
creeping on him. Temptation is surrounding
him; and vice, with all her motley train, is
winding fast her deadly coils around his very
soul, and making him the devil's slave, to do
his work upon the earth. Thus, the blossoms
of his paradise are fine words, and its fruits are
death.
"If but two hours' labor per day," says
* Dr. Channing. 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
Theodore Parker,  "are necessary for the support of each colored man, I know not why he
should toil longer." You know not, then,
why the colored man should work  more than
two hours a day? Neither does the colored
man himself. You know not why he should
have any higher or nobler aimn in life than to
supply his few, pressing, animal wants? Neither does he. You know not why he should
think of the future, or provide for the necessities of old age?  Neither does he.  You know
not why he should take thought for seasons of sickness?  Neither does he; and hence
his child often dies under his own eyes, for the
want of medical attendance. You know not
that the colored man, who begins with working
only two hours a day, will soon end with ceasing
from all regular employment, and live, in the
midst of filth, by stealing or other nefarious
means?  In one word, you know not why the
colored man  should not live like the brute, in
and for the present merely-blotting out all the
future from his plans of life? If, indeed, you
really know none of these things, then we beg
you will excuse us, if we do not know why you
should assume to teach our senators wisdom;if we do not know why-the cobbler should not
262 
ARGUMENT FROM THIIE PUBLIC GOOD. 263
stick to his last, and all such preachers to their
pulpits.*
Abolitionism is decidedly progressive. The
time was when Dr. Channing thought that men
should work, and that, if they would not labor
from  rational motives, they_should  be  compelled to labor.t  The time was, when  even
abolitionists looked upon labor with respect,
and regarded it as merely an obedience to the
* We moot a higher question: Is he fit for the pulpit,-for
that great conservative power by which religion, and morals, and
freedom, must be maintained among us?  "I do not believe,"
he declares, in one of his sermons, "the miraculous origin of
the Hebrew church, or the Buddhist church, or of the Christian
church, nor the miraculous character of Jesus.   I take  not
the Bible for my master-nor yet the church-nor even Jesus
of Nazareth for my master.......... He is my best historic
ideal of human greatness; not without errors-not without the
stain of his times, and I presume, of course, not without sins;
for men without sins exist in the dreams of girls." Thus, the
truth of all miracles is denied; and the faith of the Christian
world, in regard to the sinless character of Jesus, is set down by
this very modest divine as the dream of girls!  Yet he believes
that half a million of men were, by the British act of emancipation, turned from slaves into freemen! That is to say, he does
not believe in the miracles of the gospel; he only believes in
the miracles of abolitionism. Hence, we ask, is he fit for the
pulpit,-for the sacred desk,-for any holy thing?
t See extract, p. 111. 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
very first law of nature, or merely a compliance
with the very first condition of all economic,
social, and moral well-being.   But the times
are changed. The exigencies of abolitionism
now require that manual labor, and the gross
material wealth it produces, should be sneeringly
spoken of, and great swelling eulogies pronounced on the infinite value of the negro's
freedom. For this is all he has; and for this,
all else has been sacrificed. Thus, since abolitionists themselves have been made to see that
the freed negro-the  pet and  idol of their
hearts- will not work from rational motives,
then the principles of political economy, and
the affairs of the world, all must be adjusted
to the course he may be pleased to take.
In this connection we shall notice a passage
from Montesquieu, which is exactly in point.
He is often quoted by the abolitionists, but seldom fairly. It is true, he is exceedingly hostile
to slavery in general, and very justly pours ridicule and contempt on some of the arguments
used in favor of the institution. But yet, with
all his enthusiastic love of liberty,- nay, with
his ardent passion for equality,-he saw far too
deeply into the true "Spirit of Laws" not to
perceive that slavery is, in certain cases, founded
264 
ARGUMENT FROM THE PUBLIC GOOD. 265
on the great principles of political justice. It is
precisely in those cases in which a race or a
people will not work without being compelled
to'do so, that he justifies the institution in question. Though warmly and zealously opposed to
slavery, yet he was not bent on sacrificing the
good of society to abstractions or to prejudice.
Hence, he could say: "But as all men are born
equal, slavery must be accounted unnatural,
THOUGH IN SOME COUNTRIES IT BE FOUNDED ON
NATURAL REASON; and a wide difference ought
to be made betwixt such countries, and those in
which natural reason rejects it, as in Europe,
where it has been happily abolished."* Now,
if we inquire in what countries, or under what
circumstances, he considered slavery founded on
natural reason, we may find his answer in a preceding portion of the same page. It is in those
"countries," says he, "where the excess of heat
enervates the body, and renders men so slothful
and dispirited, that nothing but the fear of
chastisement can oblige them to perform any
laborious duty," &c. Such, as we have seen, is
precisely the case with the African race in its
present condition.
* Spirit of Laws, vol. i. book xv. chap. vii.
23 
266     LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
"Natural slavery, then," he continues, "is to
be limited to some particular parts of the
world."* And again: "Bad laws have made
lazy men-they have been reduced to slavery
because of their laziness." The first portion of
this remark-that bad laws have made lazy men
-is not applicable to the African race. For they
were made lazy, not by bad laws, but by the
depravity of human nature, in connection and
in co-operation with long, long centuries of
brutal ignorance and the most savage modes of
life. But, be the cause of this laziness what it
may, it is sufficient, according to the principles of this great advocate of human freedom
and equality, to justify the servitude in which
the providence of God has placed the African.
No doubt it is very hard on lazy men that
they should be compelled to work. It is for
this reason that Moontesquieu calls such slavery
"the most cruel that' is to be found among
men;"' by which he evidently means that it is
the most cruel, though necessary, because those
on whom it is imposed are least inclined to
work.   If he had only had greater experience
* Spirit of Laws, vol i. book xv. chap. viii. 
ARGUMENT FROM THE PUBLIC GOOD. 267
of negro slavery, the hardship would have
seemed far less to him.  For though the negro
is naturally lazy, and too improvident to work
for himself, he will often labor for a master with
a right good will, and with a loyal devotion to
his interests.  IHe is, indeed,  often prepared,
and made ready for labor, because he feels
that, in his master, he has a protector and a
friend.
But whether labor be a heavy burden or a
light, it must be borne. The good of the lazy
race, and the good of the society into which
they have been thrown, both require them to
bear this burden, which is, after all and at the
worst, far lighter than that of a vagabond life.
"Nature cries aloud," says the abolitionist, "for
freedom." Nature, we reply, demands that
man shall work, and her decree must be fulfilled. For ruin, as we have seen, is the bitter
fruit of disobedience to her will.
It is now high time that wie should notice
some of the exalted eulogies bestowed by abolitionists upon freedom; and also the kind of
freedom on which these high praises have been
so eloquently lavished. This, accordingly, we
shall proceed to do in the following section. 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
~ IV. The great benefit supposed by American
abolitionists to result to the freed negroes from the
j3ritish act of enumancipation.
We have, in the preceding sections, abundantly seen that the freed colored subjects of
the British crown are fast relapsing into the
most irretrievable  barbarism, while  the  once
flourishing colonies themselves present the most
appalling scenes of desolation and distress.
Surely it is no wonder that the hurrahing of
the English people has ceased. "At the present moment," says the London Times for December 1st, 1852, "if there is one thing in the
world that the British public do not like to
talk about, or even to think about, it is the condition of the race for whom this great effort
was made." Not so with the abolitionists of
this country. They still keep up the annual celebration of that great event, the act of emancipation, by which, in the language of one of their
number, more than half a million of human
beings were "turned from brutes into freemen!"
It is the freedom of the negro which  they
celebrate.   Let us 1:;0k, then, for a few moments, into the mysteries of this celebration,
and see, if we may, the nature of the praises
268 
ARGUMENT FROM THE PUBLIC GOOD. 269
they pour forth in honor of freedom, and the
kind of freedom on which they are so passionately bestowed.
We shall not quote from the more insane
of the fraternity of abolitionists, for their wild,
raving nonsense would, indeed, be unworthy of
serious refutation. We shall simply notice the
language of Dr. Channing, the scholar-like and
the eloquent, though visionary, advocate of
British emancipation.  Even as early as 1842,
in an address delivered on the anniversary of
that event, he burst into the following strain
of impassioned eulogy:  "Emancipation works
well, far better than could have been anticipated. To me it could hardly have worked otherwise than well. It banished slavery, that wrong
and curse not to be borne. It gave freedom, the
dear birthright of humanity; and had it done
nothing more, I should have found in it cause
for joy.  Freedom, simple freedom, is'in my
estimation just, far prized above all price.'  I
do not stop to ask if the emancipated are better
fed and clothed than formerly.  THEY ARE FREE;
AND THAT ONE WORD CONTAINS A WORLD OF
GOOD,* unknown to the most pampered slave."
* The emphasis is ours,
23* 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
And  again, he says, "Nature cries aloud for
freedom as our proper good, our birthright and
our end, and resents nothing so much as its
loss."
In these high-sounding praises, which hold
up personal freedom as "our proper good," as
"our end," it is assumed that man was made
for liberty, and not liberty for man.   It is, indeed, one of the fundamental errors of the
abolitionist to regard freedom as a great substantive good, or as in itself a blessing, and not
merely as a relative good. It may be, and indeed often is, an unspeakable benefit, but then
it is so only as a means to an end.  The end
of our existence, the proper good, is the improvement of our intellectual and moral powers, the
perfecting of our rational and immortal natures.
When freedom subserves this end, it is a good;
when it defeats this end, it is an evil. Hence
there may be a world of evil as well as a world
of good in "this one word."
The wise man adapts the means to the end.
It were the very height of folly to sacrifice
the end to the means. No man gives personal
freedom to his child because he deems it always
and in all cases a good.  His heart teaches him
a better doctrine when the highest good of his
270 
ARGUMENT FROM THIE PUBLIC GOOD. 271
child is concerned.   Should we  not be permitted, then, to have something of the same
feeling in regard to those whom Providence
has placed. under our care, especially since, having the passions of men, with only the intellects of children, they stand in utmost need
of guidance and direction?
As it is their duty to labor, so the law which
compels them to do so is not oppressive. It
deprives them of the enjoyment of no right,
unless, indeed, they may be supposed to have
a right to violate their duty. Hence, in compelling the colored population of the South to
work, the law does not deprive them of liberty,
in the true sense of the word; that is, it does
not deprive them of the enjoyment of any natural
right. It merely requires them to perform a
natural duty.
This cannot be denied.  It has been, as we
have  shown, admitted both  by Dr. Wayland
and Dr. Channing.*  But while the end is approved, the means are not liked. Few of the
abolitionists are disposed to offer any substitute
for our method. They are satisfied merely to
pull down and destroy, without the least
* See pages 110 and 119. 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
thought or care in regard to consequences.
Dr. Channing has, however, been pleased to
propose another method, for securing the industry of the black and the prosperity of the
State. Let us then, for a moment, look at
this scheme.
The black man, says he, should not be owned.
He should work, but not under the control of
a master. His overseer should be appointed
by the State, and be amenable to the State
for the proper exercise of his authority. Now,
if this learned and eloquent orator had only
looked one inch beneath the surface of his
own scheme, he would  have  seen that it is
fraught with the most insuperable difficulties,
and that its execution must needs be attended
with the most ruinous consequences.
Emancipate the blacks, then, and let the State
undertake to work them. In the first place,
we must ignore every principle of political
economy, and consent to the wildest and most
reckless of experiments, ere we can agree that
the State should superintend and carry on the
agricultural interest of the country. But suppose this difficulty out of the way, on what
land would the State cause its slaves to be
worked? It would scarcely take possession of
272 
ARGUMENT FROM TIIE PUBLIC GOOD. 273
the plantations now under improvement; and,
setting aside the owners, proceed to cultivate
the land. But it must either do this, or else
leave these plantations to become worthless
for the want of laborers, and open new ones
for the benefit of the State! In no point of
view could a more utterly chimerical or foolish
scheme be well conceived. If we may not be
allowed to adhere to our own plan, we beg
that some substitute may be proposed which
is not fraught with such inevitable destruction
to the whole South.   Otherwise, we shall fear
that these self-styled friends of humanity are
more bent on carrying out their own designs
than they are on promoting our good.
But what is meant by the freedom of the
emancipated slaves, on which so many exalted
eulogies have been pronounced? Its first element, it is plain, is a freedom from labor*freedom from the very first law of nature. In
one word, its sum and substance is a power
on the part of the freed black to act pretty
much as he pleases. Now, before we expend
oceans of enthusiasm on such a freedom, would it
not be well to see how he would be pleased to act?
* See chap. i. ~ 2,
S 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
Dr. Channing has told us, we are aware, of
the "indomitable love of liberty," which had
been infused into the breast of "fierce barbarians" by their native wildernesses.* But we
are no great admirers of a liberty which knows
no law except its own will, and seeks no end
except the gratification of passion.t Hence,
we have no very great respect for the liberty
of fierce barbarians.   It would make  a hell
on earth.   "My maxim,"  exclaims Dr. Chainning, "is any thing but slavery!"  Even slavery,
we cry, before a freedom such as his!
This kind of freedom, it should be remembered, was born in France and cradled in the
revolution.   May it never be forgotten that
the "Friends of the Blacks"  at Boston had
their exact prototypes in "les Amnis des Noirs"
of Paris.   Of this last society Robespierre was
the ruling spirit, and Brissot the orator. By
the dark machinations of the one,t and the
fiery eloquence of the other, the French peoplela grande nation-were induced, in 1791, to pro
* Works, vol. v. p. 68.             t See chap. i. ~ 2.
I We have in the above remark done Boston some injustice.
For New York has furnished the Robespierre, and Massachusetts only the Brissot, of "les Amis des Noirs" in America.
274 
ARGUMENT FROM THE PUBLIC GOOD. 275
claim the principle of equality to and for the
free blacks of St. Domingo.   This  beautiful
island, then the brightest and most precious
jewel in the crown of France, thus became the
first of the West Indies in which the dreadful
experiment of a forced equality was tried.
The authors of that experiment were solemnly
warned of the horrors into which it would
inevitably plunge both the whites and the
blacks of the island. Yet, firm and immovable as death, Robespierre sternly replied, then
"Perish the colonies rather than sacrifice one
iota of  our  principles!"*   The  magnificent
colony of St. Domingo did not quite perish, it
is true; but yet, as every one, except the philanthropic "Ami des Noirs" of the present day,
still remembers with a thrill of horror, the
entire white population soon melted, like successive flakes of snow, in the furnace of that
freedom which a Robespierre had kindled.
The atrocities of this awful massacre have had,
as the historian has said,t no parallel in the
* This reply is sometimes attributed to Robespierre and
sometimes to Brissot; it is probable that in substance it was
made by both of these bloody compeers in the cause of abolitionism.
t See Alison's History of Europe, vol. ii. p. 241. 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
annals of human crime.  "The negroes," says
Alison, "marched with spiked infants on their
spears instead of colors; they sawed asunder
the male prisoners, and violated the females on
the dead bodies of their husbands." The work
of death, thus completed with such outbursts
of unutterable brutality, constituted and closed
the first act in the grand drama of Hiaytian
freedom.
But equality was not yet established.  The
colored men, or mulattoes, beheld, with an eye
burning with jealousy, the superior power and
ascendency of the blacks. Hience arose the
horrors of a civil war. Equality had been proclaimed, and anarchy produced. In this frightful
chaos, the ambitious mulattoes, whose insatiable
desire of equality had first disturbed the peace
of the island, perished miserably beneath the
vengeance of the very slaves whom they had
themselves roused from subjection and elevated
into irresistible power.  Thus ended the second
act of the horrible drama.
This bloody discord, this wild chaos of disgusting brutalities, of course terminated not in
freedom, but in a military despotism. With
the subsequent wars and fearful destruction of
human life our present inquiry has nothing to
276 
ARGUMENT FROM THE PUBLIC GOOD. 277
do.   We  must  confine our attention to the
point before us, namely, the kind of freedom
achieved by the blacks of St. Domingo. We
have witnessed the two great manifestations of
that freedom; we shall now look at its closing
scene. This we shall, for obvious reasons, present in the language of an English author.
"An independent negro state," says he, "was
thus established in Hiayti; but the people have
not derived all the benefits which they sanguinely expected.   Released. from their compulsory toil, they have not yet.learned to subject themselves  to the restraints of regular
industry. The first absolute rulers made the
most extraordinary efforts to overcome the indolence which soon began to display itself.
The Code Rural directed that the laborer should
fix himself on a certain estate, which he was
never afterward to quit without a passport from
the government. Hiis hours of labor and rest
were fixed by statute.  The whip, at first permitted, was ultimately prohibited; but as every
military officer was allowed to chastise with a
thick cane, and almost every proprietor held
a commission, the laborer was not much relieved.  By these means Mr. Mackenzie  supposes that the produce of 1806 was raised to
24 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
about a third of that of 1789. But such violent regulations could not continue to be enforced amid the succeeding agitations, and under a republican r#gime. Almost all traces of
laborious culture were soon obliterated; large
tracts, which had been one entire sugar garden,
presented now only a few scattered plantationIs."*
Thus the lands were divided out among the
officers of the army, while the privates were
compelled to cultivate the soil under their
former military commanders, clothed with more
than  "a  little brief authority."   No  better
could have been expected except by fools or
fanatics. The blacks might preach equality, it
is true, but yet, like the more enlightened ruffians of Paris, they would of course take good
care not to practise what they had preached.
Hence, by all the horrors of their bloody revolution, they only effected a change of masters.
The white man had disappeared, and the black
man, one of their own race and color, had assumed his place and his authority. And of all
masters, it is well known, the naturally servile
are the most cruel. "The earth," says Solo
*Encyclopedia of Geo., vol. iii. pp. 802, 303.
278 
ARGUMENT FROM THE PUBLIC GOOD. 279
mon,  " cannot   bear  a  servant when   he
reigneth."*
"The sensual and the dark rebel in vain:
Slaves by their own compulsion, in mad game
They burst their manacles, to wear the name
Of Freedom, graven on a heavier chain."
COLERIDGE.
Thus "the world of good" they sought was
found, most literally, in "the word;" for the
word, the name of freedom, was all they had
achieved-at least of good. Poverty, want, disease, and crime, were the substantial fruits of
their boasted freedom.
In 1789, the sugar exported was 672,000,000
pounds; in 1806, it was 47,516,531 pounds; in
1825, it was 2020 pounds; in 1832, it was
0 pounds.  If history had not spoken, we might
have safely inferred, from this astounding decline of industry, that the morals of the people
had suffered a fearful deterioration.   But we
are not left to inference. We are informed, by
the best authorities,t that their "morals are exceedingly bad;" and that under the reign of
* Prov. xxx. 22.
t Encyc. of Geo., vol. iii. p. 303.  Mackenzie's St. Domingo,
vol. ii. pp. 260, 321. 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
liberty, as it is called, their condition has, in all
respects, become far worse than it was before.
"There appears  every reason to apprehend,"
says James Franklin, "that it will recede into
irrecoverable insignificance, poverty, and disorder."*
Mr. T. Babington  Macaulay  has,  we  are
aware,  put forth certain notions on the subject of liberty, which are exactly in accordance
with the views and the spirit of the abolitionists, as well as with the cut-throat philosophy of
the Parisian philanthropists of the revolution.
As these notions are found in one of his juvenile productions, and illustrated by "a pretty
story" out of Ariosto, we should not deem it
worth while to notice them, if they had not been
retained in the latest edition of his Miscellanies.
But for this circumstance, we should pass them
by as the rhetorical flourish of a young man
who, in his most mature productions, is often
more brilliant than profound.
"Ariosto," says he, "tells a pretty story of a
fairy, who, by some mysterious law of hel
nature, was condemned to appear at certain seasons in the form of a foul and poisonous snake.
* Franklin's Present State of Hayti, &c., p. 265.
280 
ARGUMENT FROM THE PUBLIC GOOD. 281
Those who injured her during the period of her
disguise were forever excluded from participation in the blessings which she bestowed.
But to those who, in spite of her loathsome
aspect, pitied and protected her, she afterward
revealed herself in the beautiful and celestial
form which was natural to her, accompanied
their steps, granted all their wishes, filled their
houses with wealth, made them happy in love,
and victorious in war. Such a spirit is Liberty.
At times she takes the form of a hateful reptile.
She grovels, she hisses, she stings. But wo to
those who in disgust shall venture to crush her!
And happy are those who, having dared to receive her in her degraded and frightful shape,
shall at length be rewarded by her in the time
of her beauty and her glory."
For aught we know, all this may be very fine
poetry, and may deserve the place which it has
found in some of our books on rhetoric. But
yet this beautiful passage will-like the fairy
whose charms it celebrates-be so surely transformed into a hateful snake or venomous toad,
that it should not be swallowed without an antidote.  Robespierre, Danton, Marat, Barrere, and
the black Dessalines, took this hateful, hissing,
stinging, maddening reptile to their bosoms,
24* 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
and they are welcome to its rewards. But they
mistook the thing:  it was not liberty transformed; it was tyranny unbound, the very
scourge of hell, and Satan's chief instrument
of torture to a guilty world.   It was neither
more nor less than Sin, despising GOD, and warring against his image on the earth.
We  do not doubt-nay, we firmly believethat in the veritable history of the universe, analogous changes have taken place. But then these
awful changes were not mere fairy tales. They
are recorded in the word of God. When Lucifer, the great bearer of light, himself was free,
he sought equality with God, and thence became a hateful, hissing serpent in the dust.
But he was not fully cursed, until "by devilish
art" he reached "the organs of man's fancy,"
and with them forged the grand illusion that
equality alone is freedom.
For even sinless, happy Eve was made to feel
herself oppressed, until, with keen desire of
equality with gods, "forth reaching to the fruit,
she plucked, she ate:"
"Earth felt the wound, and Nature from her seat,
Sighing through all her works, gave signs of wo,
That all was lost."
282 
ARGUMENT FROM THE PUBLIC GOOD. 283
Hiow much easier, then, to effect the ruin of
poor, fallen man, by stirring up this fierce desire of equality with discontented thoughts and
vain hopes of unattainable good!   It is this
dark desire, and not liberty, which, in its rage,
becomes the "poisonous snake;"  and, though
decked in fine, allegoric, glowing garb, it is
still the loathsome thing, the "false worm,"
that turned God's Paradise itself into a blighted
world.
If Mr. Macaulay had only distinguished between liberty and license, than which no two
things in the universe are more diametrically
opposed to each other, his passion for fine
rhetoric would not have betrayed him into so
absurd a conceit respecting the diverse forms of
freedom.   Liberty is-as we have seen-the
bright emanation of reason in the form of law;
license is the triumph of blind passion over all
law and order. HIence, if we would have
liberty, the great deep of human passion must
be restrained. For this purpose, as Mr. Burke
has said, there must be power somewhere; and
if there be not moral power within, there must
be  physical power  without.   Otherwise, the
restraints will be too weak; the safeguards of
liberty will give way, and the passions of men 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
will burst into anarchy, the most frightful of all
the forms of tyranny. Shall we call this liberty?
Shall we seek the secure enjoyment of natural
rights in a wild reign of lawless terror? As
well might we seek the pure light of heaven in
the bottomless pit.  It is, indeed, a most horrible desecration of the sacred name of liberty, to
apply it either to the butcheries and brutalities
of the French Revolution, or to the more diabolical massacres of St. Domingo.   If  such
were freedom, it would, in sober truth, be
more fitly symbolized by ten thousand hissing
serpents than by a single poisonous snake; and
by all on earth, as in heaven, it should be abhorred.   Hence, those pretended friends and
advocates of freedom, who would thus fain
transmute her form divine into such horribly
distorted shapes, are with her enemies confederate in dark misguided league.
~ V. The consequences of abolition to the South.
~ V. The consequences of ab~olition to the South.
"We  have  had experience enough in our
own colonies," says the Prospective Review, for
November, 1852, "not to wish to see the experiment tried elsewhere on a larger scale."
Now this, though it comes to us from across the
Atlantic, reallv sounds like the voice of genuine
284 
ARGUMENT FROM THE PUBLIC GOOD. 285
philanthropy. Nor do we wish to see the experiment, which has brought down such widespread ruin on all the great interests of St.
Domingo and the British colonies, tried in this
prosperous and now beautiful land of ours. It
requires no prophet to foresee the awful consequences of such an experiment on the lives,
the liberties, the fortunes, and the morals, of
the people of the Southern States.   Let us
briefly notice some of these consequences.
- Consider, in the first place, the vast amount
of property which would be destroyed by the
madness of such an experiment. According to
the estimate of Mr. Clay, "the total value of the
slave property in the United States is twelve
hundred millions of dollars," all of which the
people of the South are expected to sacrifice on
the altar of abolitionism.  It only moves the
indignation of tihe abolitionist that we should
for one moment  hesitate.   "I  see," he exclaims, "in the immenseness of the value of
the slaves, the enormous amount of the robbery committed on them. I see'twelve hun dred millions of dollars' seized, extorted by
unrighteous force."*   But,  unfortunately, his
* Dr. Channing's Works, vol. v. p. 47.
1% 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
passions are so furious, that his mind no sooner
comes into contact with any branch of the subject of slavery, than instantly, as if by a flash
of lightning, his opinion is formed, and he
begins to declaim and denounce as if reason
should have nothing to do with the question.
tie does not even allow himself time for a single moment's serious reflection. Nay, resenting
the opinion of the most sagacious of our statesmen as an insult to his understanding, he deems
it beneath his dignity even to make an attempt
to look beneath the surface of the great problemn  on which  he  condescends to pour the
illuminations of his genius. Ere we accept his
oracles as inspired, we beg leave to think a
little, and consider their intrinsic value.
Twelve hundred millions of dollars extorted
by unrighteous  force!  What enormous  robbery! Now, let it be borne in mind, that this
is the language of a man who, as we have seen,
has-in one of his lucid intervals-admitted that
it is right to apply force to compel those to work
who will not labor from rational motives. Such
is precisely the application of the force which
now moves his righteous indignation!
This force, so justly applied, has created this
enormous value of twelve hundred millions of
286 
ARGUMENT FROM THE PUBLIC GOOD. 287
dollars. It has neither seized, nor extorted this
vast amount from others; it has simply created
it out of that which, but for such force, would
have been utterly valueless. And if experience
teaches any thing, then, no sooner shall this
force be withdrawn, than the great value in
question will disappear. It will not be restored;
it will be annihilated. The slaves-now worth
so many hundred millions of dollars-would become worthless to themselves, and nuisances to
society.  No free State in the Union would be
willing to receive them-or a considerable portion of them-into her dominions. They would
be regarded as pests, and, if possible, everywhere expelled from the empires of freemen.
/  Our lands, like those of the British West Indies, would become almost valueless for the
want of laborers to cultivate them. The most
beautiful garden-spots of the sunny South
would, in the course of a few years, be turned
into a jungle, with only here and there a forlorn plantation.   Poverty and distress, bankruptcy and  ruin, would everywhere be seen.
In one word, the condition of the Southern
States would, in all material respects, be like
that of the once flourishing British colonies in 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
which the fatal experiment of emancipation has
been tried.
Such are some of the fearful consequences of
Emancipation. But these are not all. The ties
that would be severed, and the sympathies
crushed, by emancipation, are not at all understood by abolitionists.   They  are, indeed,
utter strangers to the moral power which
these ties and sympathies now exert for the
good of the inferior race.   " Our patriarchal
scheme of domestic servitude," says Governor
Hammond,   "is  indeed  well  calculated  to
awaken the higher and finer feelings of our
nature.   It is not wanting in its enthusiasm
and its poetry. The relations of the most beloved and honored chiefs, and the most faithfuil
and admiring subjects, which, from the time of
HIomer, have been the theme of song, are frigid
and unfelt, compared with those existing between the master and his slaves; who served
his father, and rocked his cradle, or have been
born in his household, and look forward to
serve his children; who have been t!rough life
the props of his fortune, and the objects of his
care; who have partaken of his griefs, and
looked  to him  for  comfort in their  own;
whose sickness he has so frequently watched
288 
ArGUMENT FROM THE PUBLIC GOOD.'89
over and relieved;  whose  holidays he has so
often made joyous by his bounties and his
presence; for whose welfare, when absent, his
anxious  solicitude  never  ceases,  and  whose
hearty and affectionate greetings never fail to
welcome him home.   In this cold, calculating,
ambitious world of ours, there are few ties more
heart-felt, or of more benignant influence, than
those which mutually bind the master and the
slave, under our ancient system, handed down
from the father of Israel."
Let the slaves be emancipated then, and, in
one or two generations, the white people of the
South would care as little for the freed blacks
amnong us, as the same clatss of persons are now
cared for by the white people of the North.
The prejudice of race would be restored with
unmiitigated violence.   The blacks  are  contentecl in servitude, so long as they find themselves excluded from none of the privileges of
the condition to which they' belo;  but let
them be delivered from the authy  of their
Pasters, and they will feel their rigid exclusion
from  the society of the whites and all participation in their government.   They would become clamorous for "their inalienable rights."
Three  millions of freed blacks, thus cireum
T
25 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
stantced, would furnish the elements of the most
horrible civil war the world has ever witnessed.
These elements would soon burst in fury on
the land.  There was no civil war in Jamaica,
it is true, after the slaves were emancipated;
but this was because the power of Great Britain
was over the two parties, and held them in subjection.  It would be far otherwise here.  For
here there would be no power to chelck —while
there would be infernal agencies at work to promote-civil discord and strife. As Robespierre
caused it to be proclaimed to the free blacks of
St. Domingo that they were naturally entitled
to all the rights and privileges of citizens; as
Mir. Seward proclaimed the same doctrine to
the free blacks of Newv York;  so there would
be kind benefactors enough to propagate the
same sentiments among our colored population.
They would be instigated, in every possible
way, to claim their natural equality with the
whites;  a  by  every diabolical art, their bad
passions would be inflamed.  If the object of
such agitators were merely to stir up scenes
of strife and blood, it might be easily attained;
but if it were to force the blacks into a social
and political equality with the whites, it would
290 
ARGUMENT FROM THE PUBLIC GOOD. 291
most certainly and forever fail. For the government of these Southern States was, by our fathers,
founded on the VIRTUE and the INTELLIGENCE of
the people, and there we intend it shall stand.
The African has neither part nor lot in the matter.
We cannot suppose, for a moment, that abolitionists would  be  in  the slightest  degree
moved by the awful consequences of emancipation.   Poverty, ruin, death, are very small
items with these sublime philanthropists. They
scarcely enter into their calculations. The dangers of a civil war-though the most fearful the
world has ever seen- lie quite beneath the
range of their humanity.
Indeed,  we  should  expect  our argument
from the consequences of emancipation to be
met by a thorough-going abolitionist with the
words, -"  Perish the Southern States rather
than sacrifice one iota of our principles!" We
ask them not to sacrifice their principles to us;
nor do we intend that they shall sacrifice us to
their principles.  For if perish vmust, it shall
be as a sacrifice to our own principles, and not
to theirs.
NOTE. - It has not fallen within the scope of our
design to consider the effects of emancipation, and of the
consequent destruction of so large an amount of pro 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
perty, on the condition and prosperity of the world.
Otherwise it might easily have been shown that every
civilized portion of the globe would feel the shock. This
point has been very happily, though briefly, illustrated
by Governor Hammond, in his "Letters on Slavery."
Nor has it formed any part of our purpose, in the following section, to discuss the influence of American
slavery on the future destiny and civilization of Africa.
This subject has been ably discussed by various writers;
and especially by an accomplished divine, the Rev. William N. Pendleton, in a discourse published in the
" Virginia Colonizationist," for September, 1854.
~ VI. Elevation of the Blacks by Southern slavery.
The abolitionists, with the most singular
unanimity, perseveringly assert that Southern
slavery degrades its subjects "into brutes."
This assertion fills us with amazement.   If it
were possible, we would suppose, in a judgment
of charity, that its authors knew nothing of the
history of Africa or of the condition of our
slaves. But such ignorance is not possible.
On the other hand, we find it equally impossible
to believe th4io many men  and women-the
very lights of abolitionism —could knowingly
utter so palpable  a falsehood.   Thus we  are
forced to the conclusion, that the authors of
this charge are so completely carried away by a
blind hatred of slavery, that they do not care to
292 
ARGUMENET FROM THIE PUBLIC GOOD. 293
keep their words within the sacred bounds of
eternal truth.   This seems to be the simple,
melanchlloly fact.  The great question with them
seems to be, not what is true or what is false,
but what will most speedily effect the destruction
of Southern slavery.  Any thing that seems to
answer this purpose is blindly  and furiously
wielded by them. The Edinburgh Review, in a
high-wrought eulogy on an American authoress,
says that she assails slavery with arrows "poisoned by truth."  Her words, it is true, are
dipped in flaming poison; but that poison is
not truth.   The truth is never poison.
The native African could not be degraded.
Of the fifty millions of inhabitants of the colntinent of Africa, it is estimated that forty mnillions were slaves. The master had the power of
life and death over the slave;  and, in fact, his
slaves were often fed, and killed, and eaten, just
as we do with oxen and sheep in this country.
STay, the hind and fore-quarters of men, women,
and children, might there be set  hung on the
shambles and exposed for sale!  Their women
were beasts of burden;  and, wn-lhen young, they
were regarded as a great delicacy by the palate
of their pampered masters.  A warrior would
sometimes take a score of young females along
"  -:0 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
with him, in order to enrich his feasts and regale
his appetite. l e delighted in such delicacies. As
to his religion, it was even worse than his morals;
or rather, his religion was a mass of the most disgusting immoralities.   HIis notion of a God,
and the obscene acts by which that notion was
worshipped, are too shocking to be mentioned.
The vilest slave that ever breathed the air of a
Christian land could not begin to conceive the
horrid iniquities of such a life.   And  yet, in
the face of all this, we are told -yea, we are
perseveringly and eternally told-that "the African has been degraded into a brute" by American slavery   Indeed, if such creatures ever
reach the level of simple brutality at all, is it
not evident they must be elevated, and not degraded, to it?
The very persons who make the above charge
know better. Their own writings furnish the
most incontestable proof that they know better.
A writer iu the Edinbuirgh Review,* for example, has not oby asserted that "slavery degrades
its subjects into brutes," but hlie has the audacity to declare, in  regard to slavery  in the
United States, that " we  do not believe that
* Ap,il   No., 18. 5.
294 
ARGUMEN\T FROM TIlE PUBLIC GOOD. 295
such oppression is to be found in any other
part of the world, civilized or uncivilized. We
do not believe that such oppression ever existed
before." Yet even this unprincipled writer has,
in the very article containing this declaration,
shown that he knows better. He has shown
that he knows that the African has been elevated
and improved by his servitude in the United
States.   We shl-all proceed to convict him out
of his own mouth.
" The African slave-trade was frightful," says
he;  "but its prey were  savages, accustomed
to suffering and misery, and to endure them
with patience almost amounting to apathy.
The victims of the American slave-trade have
been bred in a highly-cultivated  community.
Their dispositions have been softened, their
intellects sharpened, and their sensibilities excited, by society, by Christianity, and by all the
ameliorating but enervating influences of civilization.   The  savage  submits  to be  enslaved
himself, or have his wife or his thild carried off
by his enemies, as merely a calamity.   Ihis
misery is not embittered by indignation.  IIe
suffers only what-if he could-he would infict.  Ile cannot imagine a state of society in
iwhich there  shIall not be masters and slaves, 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
kidnapping and man-selling, coffles and slavetraders, or in which any class shliall be exempt
from misfortunes which appear to him to be
incidental to humanity."
Thus, according to this very sagacious, honest, consistent writer, it matters little what
you do with the native African: hlie has no
moral sense; he feels no wrong; he suffers only
what he would inflict. But when you come to
deal with the American slave, or, as this writer
calls him, "the civilized Virginian," it is quite
another  thing!  His  dispositions  have  been
softened, his intellect sharpened, and his sensibilities roused to a new life, by society and by
Christianity! And yet, according to this very
writer, this highly civilized Virginian is the
man who, by American slavery, has been degraded from the native African into a brute!
We dismiss his lawless savage, and his equally
lawless pen, from our further consideration.
We  proceed, in like  manner, to condemn
Dr. Channing out of his own mouth. IIe has
repeatedly asserted that slavery among us degrades  its subjects into  brutes.'Now  hear
him on the other side of this question
" The European race," says hlie, " have manifested more courage, enterprise, invention; but
296 
ARGUMENT FROM THE PUBLIC CGOOD. 297
in the dispositions which Christianity particularly honors, how inferior are they to the African! When I cast my eyes over our Southern
region,- the land of bowie-knives, lynch-law,
and duels, of' chivalry,''honor,' and revenge;
and when I consider that Christianity is declared to be a spirit of charity,'which seeketh
not its own, is not easily provoked, thinketh
no evil, and endureth all things,' and is also
declared to be'the wisdom from above, which
is'first pure, then peaceable, gentle, easy to be
entreated, full of mercy and good fruits;' can I
hesitate in deciding to which of the races in
that land Christianity is most adapted, and in
which its noblest disciples are most likely to be
reared?"*
It was by casting his eyes over "our Southern region" that Dr. Channing concluded "that
we are holding in bondage one of the best races
of the human family." If he had cast them over
the appallingly dark region of Africa, he would
have been compelled, in spite of the wonderworking power of his imagination, to pronounce it one of the very worst and most
degraded races upon earth. If, as he imagines,
* Dr. Channing's Works- vol. vi. p. 50, 51. 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
this race among us is now nearer to the kingdom of heaven than we ourselves are, how dare
he assert- as he so often has done-that our
slavery has "degraded them into brutes?" If,
indeed, they had not been elevated-both physically and morally-by their servitude in America, it would have been beyond the power of
even Dr. Channing to pronounce such a eulogy
upon them. WVe say, then, that he knew better when he asserted that we have degraded
them into brutes.  IIe spoke, not from his better knowledge and his conscience, but from
blind, unreflecting passion. For he knew- if
he knew any thing-that the blacks have been
elevated and imIproved by their contact with
the whites of this enlightened portion of the
globe.
The truth is, the abolitionist can make the
slave a brute or a saint, just as it may happen
to  suit the  exigency  of  his argument.   If
slavery degrades its subjects into brutes, then
one would suppose that slaves are brutes. But
the moment you speak of selling a slave, he is
no longer a brute,-he is a civilized man,
with all the most tender affections, with all the
most generous emotions.   If the object be to
excite  indignation  against  slavery   then  it
298 
ARGUMENT FROM THE PUBLIC GOOD. 299)
always  transforms  its  subjects  into  brutes;
but if it be to excite indignation against
the slaveholder, then he holds, not brutes,
but  a  George  Harris- or an Eliza-or an
Uncle  Tom- in  bondage.    Any thing, and
everything, except fair and impartial statement, are the materials with which he
works.
No fact is plainer than that the blacks have
been elevated and improved by their servitude
in this country. We cannot possibly conceive,
indeed, how Divine Providence could have
placed them in a better school of correction.
If the abolitionists can conceive a better method  for their  enlightenment  and  religious
improvement, we should rejoice to see them
carry their plan  into execution.   They need
not  seek  to  rend  asunder  our  Union, on
account of the three millions of blacks among
us, while there are fifty millions of the same
race on the continent of Africa, calling
aloud for their sympathy, and appealing to
their Christian benevolence.  Let them look to
that  continent.   Let  them  rouse  the  real,
active, self-sacrificing benevolence of the whole
Christian world in behalf of that most degraded- portion of the human family; and, 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
after all, if they will show us on the continent of Africa, or elsewhere, three millions of blacks in as good a conditionphysically and morally-as our slaves, then
will we most cheerfully admit that all other
Christian nations, combined, have accomplished as much for the African race, as has
been done by the Southern States of the
Union.
300 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
CHAPTER V.
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
WE have, under our present Union, advanced
in prosperity and greatness beyond all former
example  in the  history of nations.  We  no
sooner begin to reason from the past to the
future, than we are lost.in amazement at the
prospect before us. We behold the United
States, and that too at no very distant period,
the first power among the nations of the earth.
But such reasoning is not always to be relied
on. Whether, in the present instance, it points
to a reality, or to a magnificent dream merely,
will of course depend on the wisdom, the integrity, and the moderation, of our rulers.
It cannot be disguised that the Union, with
all its unspeakable advantages and blessings,
is in danger.  It is the Fugitive  Slave Law
against which the waves of abolitionism have
dashed with their utmost force and raged with
an alnost boundless fury.  On the other hand,
301
26 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
it is precisely the Fugitive  Slave Law-that
great constitutional guarantee of our rightswhich the people of the South are, as one man,
the most inflexibly determined to maintain. We
are prepared, and we shall accordingly proceed,
to show that, in this fearful conflict, the great
leaders of abolitionism the Chases, the Sewards,
and the Sumners, of the day-are waging a
fierce, bitter, and relentless warfare against
the Constitution of their country.
~ I. Mr. Seward's attack on the Constitution of his
country. 
- There is one thing which Mr. Seward's reasoning overlooks,-namely, that he has taken
an oath to support the Constitution of the United
States. We shall not lose sight of this fact, nor
permit him to obscure it by his special pleadings
and mystifications; since it serves to show that
while, in the name of a "higher law," he denounces the Constitution of his country, he at
the same time commits a most flagrant outrage
against that higher law itself.
The clause of the Constitution which Mr.
Seward denounces is as follows: "No person
held to service or labor in one state, under
tie laws thereof, escaping  into another, shall,
302 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
in consequence of any law or regulation therein,
be discharged from such service or labor, but
shall be delivered up on claim of the party to
whom such service or labor may be due."
This clause, as Mr. Seward contemptuously
says, is "from the Constitution of the United
States in 1787." IHe knows of only one other
compact  like this "in  diplomatic  history;"
and that was made between despotic powers
"in the year of grace 902, in the period called
the Dark Ages." But whether this compact
made by the fathers of the Republic, or the
sayings and doings of Mr. Seward in regard to
it, are the more worthy of the Dark Ages, it
is not for him alone to determine.
"The law of nature," says  he, "disavows
such compacts; the law of nature, written on
the hearts and consciences of freemen, repudiates them." If this be so, then it certainly
follows that in founding states no such compacts should be formed. For, as Mr. Seward
says, "when we are founding states, all these
laws must be brought to the standard of the
laws of God, and must be tried by that standard,
and must stand or fall by it."  This is true, we
repeat; but the Senator who uttered. this truth
was not founding states or forming a consti
303 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
tution. Hie was living and acting under a constitutionl already formed, and one which he had
taken an oath to support. If, in the construction of this instrument, our fathers really followed "as precedents the abuses of tyrants and
robbers," then the  course of the Senator in
question was plain: he should have suffered martyrdom rather than take an oath to support it.  For
the law of nature, it is clear, permits no man
first to take an oath to support such compacts,
and then repudiate them. If they are at war
with his conscience, then, in the name of all
that is sacred, let him repudiate them, but, by
all means, without having first placed himself
uinder the necessity of repudiating, at the same
timne, the obligation of his oath.
There is a question among casuists, whether
an oath extorted by force can bind a man to act
in opposition to his conscience. But this was
not Mr. Seward's case. Hiis oath was not extorted. If he had refused to take it, he would
have lost nothing except an office.
" There was deep philosophy," says he, "in
the confession of an eminent English judge.
When he had condemned a young woman to
death, under the late sanguinary code of his
country, for her first theft, she fell down dead
304 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
at his feet.'I seem to myself,' said he,'to
have been pronouncing sentence, not against
the prisoner, but against the law itself.' " Ay,
there was something better than "deep philosophy" in that English judge; there was
stern integrity; for, though he felt the law
to be hard and cruel, yet, having taken an
oath to support it, he hardly felt himself at
liberty to dispense with the obligation of his
oath. We commend his example to the Senator from New York.
But who is this Senator, or any other politician of the present day, that he should presume to pass so sweeping and so peremptory
a sentence of condemnation on a compact made
by the fathers of the Republic and ratified by
the people of the United States? For our
part, if we wished to find "the higher law,"
we should look neither into the Dark Ages nor
into his conscience. We had infinitely rather
look into the great souls of those by whom
the Constitution was framed, and by every
one  of whom  the very compact  which  Mr.
Seward pronounces so infamous was cordially
sanctioned.
"Your Constitution and laws," exclaims Mr.
Seward,  "convert hospitality to the refugee
U               26*
305 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY,
from the most degrading oppression on earth
into a crime, but all mankind except you esteem that hospitality a virtue." Not content
with thus denouncing  the "Constitution  and
laws," he has elsewhere exhorted the people
to an open resistance to their execution.   "It
is," says he, in a speech at a mass-meeting in
Ohio,  "written  in  the  Constitution  of the
United  States," and  "in violation to divine
law,* that we shall surrender the fugitive slave
who takes refuge at our fireside from his relentless pursuer." He then and there exhorts
the people to resist the execution of this clear,
this unequivocal, this acknowledged, mandate of
the Constitution! "Extend," says he, a "cordial welcome to the fugitive who lays his weary
limbs at your door, and DEFEND HIM AS YOU WOULD
YOUR HOUSEHOLD GODS."
We shall not trust ourselves to characterize
such conduct. In the calm, judicial language
of the Chancellor of his own State such proceeding of Mr. Seward will find its most fitting
rebuke. "Independent, however," says Chancellor Walworth, "of any leyislation on this subject either by the individual States or by Congress,
* On this point, see page 153.
306 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
if the person whose services are claimed is in
fact a fugitive from servitude under the laws
of another state, the constitutional provision is imperative that he shall be delivered up to his master
upon claim made." Thus far, Mr. Seward concurs with the chancellor in opinion; but the
latter continues-" and any state officer or
private citizen, who owes allegiance to the
United States, and has taken the usual oath
to support the Constitution thereof, cannot,
WITHOUT INCURRING THE MORAL GUILT OF PERJURY, do any act to deprive the master of his
right of recaption, when there is no real doubt
that the person whose services are claimed is
in fact the slave of the claimant."* Yet, regardless of the question whether the fugitive is
a slave or not, the life and labors of Mr. Seward
are, in a great measure, dedicated to a sub version of the constitutional clause and right
under consideration. Ite counsels open resist ance!   Yea, he exhorts the people to protect
and defend fugitive slaves as such, and though
they had confessed themselves to have fled from
servitude! But we doubt not that "the law of
nature, written on the hearts and consciences
* XIV. Wendell, Jack v. Martin, p. 528.
307 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
of freemen," will reverse this advice of his,
and reaffirm the decision of the chancellor of
his own State. Nay, wherever there exists a
freeman with a real heart and conscience, there
that decision already stands affirmed.
As  Mr. Seward's arguments  are more fully
elaborated by Mr. Sumner, of Massachusetts,
so they will pass under review when we come
to examine the speech of that Senator. In
the mean time, we beg leave to lay before the
reader a few living examples of the manner
in which the law of nature, as written on the
hearts and consciences of freemen, has expressed itself in regard to the points above
considered.
"I recognise, indeed," says the IIon. R. C.
Winthrop, of Boston, "a power above all human law-makers and a code above all earthly
constitutions! And whenever I perceive a
clear conflict of jurisdiction and authority between the Constitution of my country and the
laws of my God, my course is clear. I shall
resign my office, whatever it may be, and renounce all connection with public service of
any sort. Never, never, sir, will I put myself
under the necessity of calling upon God to
witness my promise to support a constitution,
308 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
any part of which I consider to be inconsistent
with his commands.
" But it is a libel upon the Constitution of the
United States-and, what is worse, sir, it is a
libel upon the great and good men who framed,
adopted, and ratified it; it is a libel upon
Washington and Franklin, and Hamilton and
Madison, upon John Adams, and John Jay, and
Rufus King; it is a libel upon them all, and
upon the whole American people of 1789, who
sustained them in their noble work, and upon
all who, from that time to this, generation after
generation, in  any capacity,-national, municipal, or state,-have lifted their hands to heaven in attestation of their allegiance to the
government of their country;-it is a gross libel
upon every one of them, to assert or insinuate
that there is any such inconsistency! Let us
not do such dishonor to the fathers of the Republic and the framers of the Constitution."
Mr. Ashmun, of Massachusetts, after reciting
the clause in the Constitution which demands
the restoration of fugitive slaves, proceeds as
follows: "This reads very plainly, and admits
of no doubt but that, so far as fugitive slaves
are concerned, the Constitution fully recognises
the right to reclaim them from within the limits
309 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
of the free States. It is the Constitution which
we have all sworn to support, and which I hope
we all mean to support; and I have no mental
reservation excluding any of its clauses from
the sanction of that oath. It is too late now to
complain that such a provision is there. Our
fathers, who formed that entire instrument,
placed it there, and left it to us as an inheritance; and nothing but an amendment of the
Constitution, or a violation of our oaths, can
tear it out.  And, however much we may abhor
slavery, there is no way for honorable, honestnay, conscientious - men,  who  desire  to live
under our laws and our Constitution, but to
abide by it in its spirit."
In like manner, the Hlon. S. A. Douglas, of
Illinois, declares: "All I have to say on that
subject is this, that the Constitution provides
that a fugitive from service in one State, escaping into another,'shall be delivered up.' The
Constitution also provides that no man shall be
a Senator unless he takes an oath to support the
Constitution. Then, I ask, how does a man acquire a right on this floor to speak, except by
taking an oath to support and sustain the Constitution of the United States? And when he
takes that oath, I do not understand that he
310 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
has a right to have a mental reservation, or
entertain any secret equivocation that he excepts that clause which relates to the surrender
of fugitives from service.   I know not how a
man reconciles it to his conscience to take that
oath to support the Constitution, when he believes that Constitution is in violation of the law
of God. If a man thus believes, and takes the
oath, he commits perfidy to his God in order
that he may enjoy the temporary honors of a
seat upon this floor. In this point of view, it is
simply a question of whether Senators will be
true to their oaths and true to the Constitution
under which we live."
~ II.  The attack of Mr. Sumner on the Constitution of his country.
If we have not noticed the arguments of Mr.
Chase, of Ohio, it is because they are reproduced in the celebrated speech of Mr. Sumner,
and because he has so fully endorsed the history and logic of this speech as to make it his
own. Hence, in replying to the one of these
Senators, we at the same time virtually reply to
the other.
We select the speech of SIr. Sumner for examination, because it is generally considered the
311 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
more powerful of the two. It is, indeed, the
most elaborate speech ever made in the Senate
of the United States, or elsewhere, on the subject of the Fugitive Slave Law.  Even Mr. Weller found it "so handsomely embellished with
poetry, both Latin and English, so full of classical allusions and.rhetorical flourishes," as to
make it more palatable than he supposed an
abolition speech could possibly be made. As
to the abolitionists themselves, they seem to
know no bounds in their enthusiastic admiration of this sublime effort of their champion.
We should not wonder, indeed, if many a
female reformer had gone into hysterics over
an oration which has received such violent
bursts of applause from grave and dignified
Senators.  "By this effort," says Mr. HIale, he
has placed "himself side by side with the first
orators of antiquity, and as far ahead of any
living American orator as freedom is ahead of
slavery. I believe that he has formed to-day a
new era in the history of the politics and of the
eloquence of the country; and that in future
generations the young men of this nation will
be stimulated to effort by the record of what an
American Senator has this day done," &c.
-We have no doubt that young men may at
312 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
tempt to imnitate the speech in question; but, as
they grow older, it is to be hoped that their
taste will improve.   The speech in question
will make a "new era" in the tactics of abolitionism, and that is all. We shall see this
when we come to examine this wonderful
oration, which so completely ravished three
Senators, and called forth such wild shouts
of applause from the whole empire of abolitionism.
Mr. Chase  seems  almost equally delighted
with this marvellous effort.   "I avow my conviction, now and here," says he, "that, logically
and historically, his argument is impregnableentirely impregnable......... "Inmy  judgment," he continues, "the speech of my friend
from Massachusetts will make  a NEW ERA in
American history." Indeed, Mr. Sumner himself does not seem altogether dissatisfied with
this effort, if we may judge from the manner in
which it is referred to in his other speeches.
We do not blame him for this. We can see
no reason why he should be the only abolitionist
in the universe who is not enraptured with his
oration.  But when he so "fearlessly asserts"
that his speech "has never been answered," we
beg leave to assure him that it may be refuted
27
313 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
with the most perfect ease. For, indeed, its history is half fiction, and its logic wholly false:
the first containing just enough of truth to deceive, and the last just enough of plausibility to
convince those who are waiting, and watching,
and longing to be convinced.
The first thing which strikes the mind, on
reading the speech of Mr. Sumner, is the
strange logical incoherency of its structure.
Its parts are so loosely hung together, and appear so distressingly disjointed, that one is frequently at a loss to perceive the design of the
oration. Its avowed object is to procure a repeal of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850; but no
one would ever imagine or suspect such a thing
from the title of the speech, which is as follows:
"Freedom, national; Slavery, sectional."  It is
difficult, at first view, to perceive what logical
connection this title, or proposition, has with
the repeal of the Fugitive Slave Law. But if
there be little or no logical connection between
these things, we shall Soon see how the choice
of such a title and topic of discourse opens the
way for the rhetorician to make a most powerful appeal to the passions and to the prejudices
of his readers. We say, of his readers, because
it is evident that the speech was made for Bun
314 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
combe, and not for the Senate of the United
States.
Mr. Sumner deems it necessary to refute the
position that slavery is a national institution, in
order to set the world right with respect to
the relations of the Federal Government to
slavery.  "The relations of the Government of
the United States," says he,-"I speak of the
National Government-to slavery, thouyh plain
and obvious, are constantly rnmisunderstood."  Indeed, nothing in history seems more remarkable than the amount of ignorance and stupidity
which prevailed in the world before the appearance of the abolitionists, except the wonderful illuminations which accompanied their
advent.  "A popular belief at this moment,"
continues Mr. Sumner,  "makes  slavery a national institution, and, of course, renders its
support a national duty. The extravagance of
this error can hardly be surpassed." In truth,
it is so exceedingly extravagant, that we doubt
if it really exists. It is certain, that we have no
acquaintance, either historically or personally,
with those who have fallen into so wild an absurdity.
It is true, there is "a popular belief"-nay,
there is a deep-rooted national conviction-that
315 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
the Government of the United States is bound
to protect the institution of slavery, in so far as
this may be done by the passage of a Fugitive Slave Law. This national conviction has
spoken out in the laws of Congress; it has been
ratified and confirmed by the judicial opinion
of the Supreme Court of the United States, as
well as by the decisions of the Supreme Courts
of the three great non-slaveholding States of
Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania.
But no one, so far as we know, has ever deduced
this obligation to protect slavery, in this respect,
from the absurd notion that "it is a national
institution." No such deduction is to be found
in any of the arguments of counsel before the
courts above-mentioned, nor in the opinions of
the courts themselves. We shrewdly suspect
that it is to be found nowhere except in the fertile imagination of Mr. Sumner.
We  concede that slavery is not "a national
institution."   In combatting this position, Mr.
Sumner is merely beating the air. We know
that slavery is not national; it is local, being
confined to certain States, and exclusively established by local or State laws. Hence, Mr.
Sumner may fire off as much splendid rhetoric
as he pleases at his men of straw.   "Slavery
316 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
national!" he indignantly exclaims: "Sir, this
is all a mistake and absurdity, fit to take a place
in some new collection of'Vulgar Errors' by
some other Sir Thomas Browne, with the ancient but exploded stories that the toad has a
stone in its head  and  that  ostriches  digest
iron."   These  may  be  very  fine  embellishments; they certainly have nothing to do with
the point in controversy. The question is not
whether slavery is a national institution, but
whether the National Government does not recognise slavery as a local institution, and is not
pledged to protect the master's right to reclaim
the fugitive from his service. This is the question, and by its relevancy to this question the
rhetoric of Mr. Sumner must be tried.
We do not say it has no such relevancy.  Mr.
Sumner beats the air, it is true, but he does not
beat the air in vain. His declamation may have
no logical bearing on the point in dispute, but,
if you watch it closely, you will always find that
it is most skilfully adapted to bring the prejudices and passions of the reader to bear on
that point. Though he may not be much of a
logician, yet, it must be admitted, he is "skilful
of fence." We should do him great injustice as
an antagonist, at least before the tribunal of
27*
317 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
human passion, if we should suppose that it is
merely for the abstract glory of setting up a
man of straw, and then knocking it down, that
he has mustered all the powers of his logic and
unfurled all the splendors of his rhetoric. He
has a design in all this, which we shall now'proceed to expose.
Here are two distinct questions. First, Is
slavery a national institution? Secondly, Has
Congress the power to pass a Fugitive Slave
Law? These two questions are, we repeat,
perfectly distinct; and hence, if Mr. Sumner
wished to discuss them fairly and honestly, he
should have argued each one by itself. We
agree with him in regard to the first; we dissent toto coelo from him in regard to the last.
But he has not chosen to keep them separate,
or to discuss each one by itself. On the contrary, he has, as we have seen, connected them
together as premiss and conclusion, and he
keeps them together through the first portion
of his speech.   Most  assuredly Mr. Sumner
knows that one of the very best ways in the
world to cause a truth or proposition to be rejected is to bind it up with a manifest error or
absurdity. Yet the proposition for which we
conltend-that Congress has the power to support
318 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
slavery by the passage of a Fugitive Slave Law
-is bound up by him with the monstrous absurdity that " slavery is a national institution;"
and both are denounced together as if both were
equally absurd. One instance, out of many, of
this unfair mode of proceeding, we shall now lay
before our readers.
"The Constitution contains no power," says
he, "to make a king or to support kingly rule.
WVith similar reason it may be said that it contains no power to make a slave, or to support a
system of slavery.   The absence of all such
power is hardly more'clear in one case than in
the other. But, if there be no such power, all
national legislation upholding slavery must be
unconstitutional and void."
Thus covertly, and in company with the supposed power of Congress to make slaves or to
institute slavery, Mr. Sumner denounces the
power of Congress to enact a Fugitive Slave
Law! IIe not only denounces it, but treats it
as absurd in the extreme; just as absurd, indeed, as it would be to assert that Congress had
power " to support kingly rule!"  We can listen
to the arguments of Mr. Sumner; but we cannot accept his mere opinion as authority that
the power of Congress to enact such a law is so
319 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
glaringly unconstitutional, is so monstrously absurd; for, however passionately that opinion
may be declaimed, we cannot forget that a
Fugitive Slave Law was passed by the Congress
of 1793, received the signature of George Washington, and, finally, the judicial sanction of the
Supreme Court of the United States. Mr. Sumner is but a man.
This advantage of mixing up with a glaring
falsehood the idea he wishes to be rejected is not
the only one which Mr. Sumner derives from
his man of straw. By combatting the position"the popular belief," as he calls it-that "slavery
is a national institution," he lays open a wide
field for his peculiar powers of declamation.
He calls up all the fathers-North and Southto bear witness against slavery, in order to show
that it is not a national institution. He quotes
colleges, and churches, and patriots, against
slavery. Not content with this, he pours down
furious invectives of his own, with a view to
render slavery as odious as possible. But, since
the simple question is, What saith the Constitution-why this fierce crusade against slavery?
In deciding this very question, namely, the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793,
a high judicial authority has said that "the ab
320 
TITE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
stract proposition of the justice or injustice of
slavery is wholly irrelevant here, and, I apprehend, ought not to have the slightest influence
upon any member of this court."*
It ought not to have-and it did not havethe slightest influence on the highest judicial
tribunal of New York, in which  the  above
opinion was delivered. Much as the author of
that opinion (Mr. Senator Bishop) abhorred
slavery, he did not permit such an influence to
reach his judgment.   It would have contaminated his judicial integrity.  But although before a judicial tribunal, about to decide on the
constitutionality of a Fugitive Slave Law, the
abstract proposition of the justice or injustice of
slavery is out of place, yet at the bar of passion
and prejudice it is well calculated, as Mr. Sumner must know, to exert a tremendous influence.
Hence, if he can only get up the horror of his
readers against slavery before he comes to the
real question, namely, the constitutionality of
the Fugitive Slave Law, he knows that his victory will be more than half gained. But we admonish him that passion and prejudice can only
give a temporary eclat to his argument.
* XIV. Wendell's Reports, Jack v. Martin.
321 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
So much for the unfairness of Mr. Sumner.
If we should notice all such instances of artful
design in his speech, we should have no space
for his logic. To this we would now invite the
attention of the reader, in order to see if it be
really "impregnable."
As we have already intimated, Mr. Sumner
does not, like Mr. Seward, openly denounce the
Constitution of his country.  On the contrary,
he professes the most profound respect for every
part of that instrument, not even excepting the
clause which demands the restoration of the
fugitive from labor. But an examination of his
argument, both historical and logical, will enable
us, we trust, to estimate this profession at its real
intrinsic worth.
We shall begin with his argument from history. In the examination of this argument, we
beg to excuse ourselves from any further notice
of all that vast array of historical proofs to
show that "freedom is national and slavery sectional."* We shall consider those proofs alone
* In asserting that freedom is national, Mr. Sumner may perhaps mean that it is the duty of the National Government to
exclude slavery from all its territories, and to admit no new
state in which there are slaves.  If this be his meaning, we
should reply, that it is as foreign from the merits of the Fugi
322 
THlE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
which relate to the real point in controversy,
namely, Hias Congress the power to pass a Fugitive Slave Law?
Mr. Sumner argues, from the well-known sentiments of the framers of the Constitution with
respect to slavery, that they intended to confer~
no such power on Congress. Thus, after quoting the sentiments of Gouverneur Morris, of Elbridge Gerry, of Roger Sherman, and James
Madison, he adds: "' In the face of these unequivocal statements, it is absurd to suppose
that they consented unanimously to any provision by which the National Government, the
work of their own hands, could be made the
most offensive instrument of slavery." Such
tive Slave Law, which he proposed to discuss, as it is from the
truth. The National Government has, indeed, no more power to
exclude, than it has to ordain, slavery; for slavery or no slavery
is a question which belongs wholly and exclusively to the sovereign people of each and every state or territory. With our
whole hearts we respond to the inspiring words of the President's
Message:  " If the friends of the Constitution are to have another struggle, its enemies could not present a more acceptable
issue than that of a state, whose Constitution clearly embraces a
republican form of government, being excluded from the Union
because its domestic institutions may not, in all respects, comport with the ideas of what is wise and expedient entertained in
some other state."
323 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
is the historical argument of Mr. Sumner. Let
us see what it is worth.
Elbridge Gerry had said: "We ought to be
careful NOT to give any sanction to slavery;"-language repeatedly quoted, and underscored as
above, by Mr. Sumner. It is absurd, he concludes, to suppose that a man who could use
such language had the least intention to confer
a power on Congress to support slavery by the
passage of a Fugitive Slave Law. This is one
branch of his historical argument. It may appear perfectly conclusive to Mr. Sumner, and
"entirely impregnable" to Mr. Chase; but, after
all, it is not quite so invulnerable as they
imagine.   Mr. Sumner stopped his historical
researches at a most convenient point for his
argument. If he had only read a little further,
he would have discovered that this same identical Elbridge Gerry was in the Congress of 1793,
and VOTED FOR the Fugitive Slave Law then
passed!
It fares no better with the historical argument
to prove the opinion or intention of Roger
Sherman.  He had declared, it is true, that he
was opposed to any clause in the Constitution
"acknowledging men to be property." But we
should not, with Mr. Sumner, infer from this
324 
THIE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
that he never intended that Congress should
possess a power to legislate in reference to
slavery.   For, unfortunately for such a conclusion, however confidently it may be drawn,
or however dogmatically asserted, Roger Sherman himself was in the Senate of 1793, and was
actually on the committee which reported the
Fugitive Slave Law of that session! Thus, although the premiss of Mr. Sumner's argument
is a historical fact, yet its conclusion comes
directly into conflict with another historical
fact!
We cannot, in the same way, refute the argument from the language of Gouverneur Morris,
who said "that he never would concur in upholding domestic slavery," because he was not
in the Congress of 1793. But Robert Morris
was there, and, although he helped to frame the
Constitution in 1787, he uttered not a syllable
against the constitutionality of the Fugitive
Slave Law. Indeed, this law passed the Senate
by resolution simply, the yeas and nays not having
been called for!
The words of Mr. Madison, who "thought it
wrong to admit in the Constitution the idea
that there could be property in man," are four
or five times quoted in Mr. Sumner's speech.
28
325 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
As we have already seen,* there cannot be, in
the  strict sense of the  terms, "property in
man;"  for the soul is the man, and no one,
except God,  can own  the soul.  Hence  Mr.
Madison acted wisely, we think, in wishing to
exclude such an expression from the Constitution, inasmuch as it would have been misunderstood by Northern men, and only shocked their
feelings without answering any good purpose.
When we say that slaves are property, we
merely mean that their masters have a right to
their service or labor. This idea is recognised
in the Constitution, and this right is secured.
We ask no more. As Mr. Madison, and the
whole South, had the thing, he did not care to
wrangle about the name. We are told, again
and again, that the word slave does not appear
in the Constitution.  Be it so.  We  care not,
since our slaves are there recognised as "persons held to service" by those to whom "such
service is due." It is repeated without end that
the "Constitution acts on slaves as persons, and
not as property." Granted; and if Northern
men will, according to the mandate of the Constitution, only deliver up our fugitive servants,
* Chap. ii. ~ x.
326 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
we care not whether they restore them as persons or as property. If we may only reclaim
them as persons, and regain their service, we
are perfectly satisfied. We utterly despise all
such verbal quibbling.
Mr. Madison was above it. He acted wisely,
we repeat, in refusing to shock the mind of any
one, by insisting upon a mere word, and upon a
word, too, which might not have conveyed a
correct idea of his own views. But that Mr.
Madison could, as he understood the terms, regard slaves as property, we have the most incontestable evidence. For in the Convention of
Virginia, called to ratify the Constitution of the
-United States, he said, "Another clause secures
us that property which we now possess. At
present, if any slave elopes to any of those
States where slaves are free, he becomes emancipated by their laws, for the laws of the States
are uncharitable to one another in this respect."
He then quotes the provision from the Constitution relative to fugitives from labor, and adds:
" This clause was expressly inserted to enable
owners of slaves to reclaim them." So much
for Mr. Sumner's main argument from the language of the members of the Convention of
1787.
327 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
Arguing from the sentiments of that convention with respect to slavery, he concludes that
nothing could have been further from their intention than to confer upon Congress the power
to pass a uniform Fugitive Slave Law. He
boldly asserts, that if a proposition to confer
such a power upon Congress had "been distinctly made it would have been distinctly denied."  "But no person in the convention," he
says, " not one of the reekless partisans of slavery,
was so audacious as to make the proposition." Now
we shall show that the above statement of his
is diametrically opposed to the truth. We shall
show that the members of the convention in
question were perfectly willing to confer such a
power upon Congress.
The reason why they were so is obvious to
any one who has a real knowledge of the times
about whose history Mr. Sumner so confidently
declaims. This reason is well stated in the language of the Chancellor of New York whom
we have already quoted. " The provision," says
he, "as to persons escaping from servitude in
one State into another, appears by their journal
to have been adopted by a unanimous vote of
the convention. At that time the existence of
involuntary servitude, or the relation of master
328 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
and servant, was known to and recognised by
the laws of every State in the Union except
Massachusetts, and the legal right of recaption by
the master existed in all, AS A PART OF THE CUSTOMARY OR COMMON LAW OF THE WHOLE CONFEDERACY."   Hence, instead of shocking  the
convention,  a clause  recognising such  right
would have been merely declaratory of the
"customary or common law" which then universally prevailed.  The "history of the times"
confirms this view, and furnishes no evidence
against it.
Mr. Sumner tries to make a different impressiqn.  He lays great stress on the fact that
it was not until late in the convention that the
first clause relative to the surrender of fugitive
slaves was  introduced.   But this fact agrees
more perfectly with our view than with his.
There was no haste about the introduction of
such a provision, because it was well known
that, whenever it should be introduced, it would
pass in the affirmative without difficulty. And,
in fact, when it was introduced, it' "WAS UNANIMOUSLY  ADOPTED."    This  single  fact speaks
volumes.
Let us now  attend, for a moment,  to Mr.
Sumner's historical proofs. He quotes the fol                       28*
329 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
lowing passage from the Madison Papers:"Gen. (Charles Cotesworth) Pinckney was not
satisfied with it. He seemed to wish some provision should be included in favor of property
in slaves."   "But," by way of comment, Mr.
Sumner adds, "he made no proposition.  Unwilling to shock the convention, and uncertain
in his own mind, he only seemed to wish such a
provision." Now, a bare abstract proposition to
recognise property in men is one thing, and a
clause to secure the return of fugitive slaves is
quite another.  The first, it is probable, would
have been rejected by the convention; the last
was actually and unanimously adopted by it.
Mr. Sumner's next proof is decidedly against
him.  Here it is.  "Mr. Butler and Mr. Charles
Pinckney, both from South Carolina, now
moved openly to require'fugitive slaves and
servants to be delivered up like criminals.'.....
Mr. Wilson, of Pennsylvania, at once objected:'This would oblige the executive of the
State to do it at the public  expense.'   Mr.
Sherman, of Connecticut, saw no more propriety in the public seizing and surrendering a
slave or servant than a horse! Under the pressure of these objections the offensive proposition
was quietly withdrawn."
330 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
Now mark the character of these objections.
It is objected, not that it is wrong to deliver up
fugitive slaves, but only that they should not be
" delivered up like criminals;"  that is, by a
demand on the executive of the State to which
they may have fled. And this objection is
based on the ground that such a requisition
would oblige the public to deliver them up at
its own expense. Mr. Sherman insists, not that
it is wrong to surrender fugitive slaves or fugitive horses, but only that the executive, or public, should not be called upon to surrender
them. Surely, if these gentlemen had been so
violently opposed to the restoration of fugitive
slaves, here was a fair occasion for them to
speak out; and as honest, out-spoken men they
would, no doubt, have made their sentiments
known.  But there is, in fact, not a syllable of
such a sentiment uttered.   There is not the
slightest symptom of the existence of any such
feeling in their minds. If any such existed, we
must insist that Mr. Sumner has discovered it
by instinct, and not by his researches in history.
The statement that "under the pressure of
these objections the offensive proposition was
quietly withdrawn" is not  true.  It was  not
831 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
quietly withdrawn; on the contrary, it was
withdrawn with the assurance that it would be
again introduced.   "Mr. Butler withdrew his
proposition," says Mr. Madison, "in order that
some particular provision might be made, apart
from this article."* Accordingly, the very next
day he introduced a provision, which, as Mr.
Madison declares, "'was expressly inserted to
enable owners of slaves to reclaimn them.';
These glosses of Mr. Sumner on the history
of the times will appear important, if we view
them in connection with his design. This design is to bring into doubt the idea that slaves
are embraced in the clause of the Constitution
which requires fugitives from service or labor to
be delivered up. We should not suspect this
design from the hints here thrown out, if it
were not afterward more fully disclosed. " On
the next day," says Mr. Sumner, "August 29th,
profiting by the suggestions already made, Mr.
Butler moved a proposition, substantially like
that now found in the Constitution, not directly
for the surrender of'fugitive slaves,' as originally
proposed, but as'fugitives from service or
labor,' which, without debate or opposition of
* Madison Papers, p. 1448.
332 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
any kind, was unanimously adopted."  Was it
then unanimously adopted because it was a
clause for the surrender of " fugitives from service or labor" only, and not for the surrender of
fugitive slaves?
Such appears to be the insinuation of Mr.
Sumner. Be this as it may, it is certain that he
has afterward said that it may be questioned
whether "the language employed" in this clause
"can be judicially regarded as justly applicable
to fugitive slaves, which is often and earnestly denied."... "IStill further," he says, in italics, "to
the courts of each State must belon the determination
of the question, to which class of persons, accordintg
to just rules of interpretation, the phrase'persons
held to service or labor' is strictly applicable."
Mr. Sumner doubts, then, whether this provision, after all, refers to "fugitive  slaves."
Now, although he has said much in regard to
"the effrontery of the Southern members of the
convention" that formed tlie Constitution, we
may safely defy him, or any other man, to point
to any thing in their conduct which approximates to such audacity. What! the clause in
question not designed to embrace fugitive
slaves?  Mr. Butler, even before he introduced
the clause, declared, as we have seen, that such
333 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
would be its design. It was so understood by
every member of the convention; for there was
not a man there who possessed the capacity to
misunderstand so plain a matter;  and it has
been so understood by every man, of all parties
and all factions, from that day down to the
present. Not one of the hired advocates who
have been employed, in different States, to argue
against the constitutionality of the Fugitive
Slave Law, has ever had the unblushing effrontery to contend that the clause in question is not
applicable to fugitive slaves. Nay, more, until
Mr. Sumner appeared, the frantic zeal of no
abolitionist had ever so completely besotted his
intellect as to permit him to take such ground.
By Dr. Channing, by Mr. Seward, and by Mr.
Chase, such application of the words in question is unhesitatingly admitted; and hence we
dismiss Mr. Sumner's discovery with the contempt it deserves.
But to return. "The provision," says Mr. Sumner, " which showed itself thus tardily, and was
so slightly noticed in the National Convention,
was neglected in most of the contemporaneous
discussions before the people." No wonder; for
it was merely declaratory of the " customary or
common law" of that day.  "In the Conven
334 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
tions of South Carolina, North Carolina, and
Virginia," he admits, "it was commended as
securing important rights, though on this point
there was a difference of opinion. In the Virginia Convention, an eminent character, —Mr.
George MVason,-with others, expressly declared
that there was'no security of property coming
within this section.'"
Now, we shall not stickle about the fact that
Mr. Sumner has not given the very words of
Mr. Mason, since lhe has given them in substance. But yet he has given them in such a
way, and in such a connection, as to make a
false impression.   The words of Mr. Mason,
taken in their proper connection, are as follows:
"We have no security for the property of that
kind (slaves) which we already have. There is
no clause in this Constitution to secure it, for
they may lay such a tax as will amount to manumission."  This shows his position, not as it is misrepresented by Mr. Sumner; but as it stands in
his own words. If slave property may be rendered worthless by the taxation of Congress,
how could it be secured by a clause which enables the owner to reclaim it? It would not be
worth reclaiming. Such was the argument and
true position of Mr. George Mason.
335 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
"Massachusetts,"  continues  Mr. Sumner,
"while exhibiting peculiar sensitiveness at any
responsibility for slavery, seemed to view it with
unconcern."   If Massachusetts  had only believed that the clause was intended to confer on
Congress the power to pass a Fugitive Slave
Law, into what flames of indignation would her
sensitiveness  have  burst!  So  Mr. Sumner
would have us to believe. But let us listen,
for a moment, to the sober voice of history.
It was only about four years after the government went into operation that Congress actually
exercised the power in question, and passed a
Fugitive Slave Law. Where was Massachusetts
then?  Did she burst into flames of indignation? Hier only voice, in reply, was as distinctly
and as emphatically pronounced in favor of that
law as was the voice of Virginia itself. - With a
single exception, her whole delegation in Congress,* with Fisher Ames at their head, voted
for the Fugitive Slave' Law of 1793! Not a
whisper of disapprobation was heard from their
constituents.  As Mr. Sumner himself says, the
passage of that  act " drew little attention."
Hence he would have us to believe that Massa
* One member seems to have been absent from the House.
336 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
chusetts would have been stirred from her
depths if the convention had conferred such a
power upon Congress, and yet that she was not
moved at all when Congress proceeded, as he
maintains, to usurp and exercise that power!
This is not all. Every member from the free
States, with the exception of five, recorded his
vote in favor of the same law.* In the Senate,
as we have already said, it was passed by resolution, and not by a recorded vote. No one, in
either branch of Congress, uttered a syllable
against the constitutionality of the law, though
many of the most distinguished members of the
very convention which framed the Constitution
itself were there. Not to mention others, there
were James Madison, and Roger Sherman, and
Elbridge Gerry, and Rufus King, and Caleb
Strong, and Robert Morris, and Oliver Elsworth; and yet from not one of these illustrious
framers of the Constitution was a syllable uttered against the constitutionality of the law in
question. Nay, the law was supported and
enacted by themselves. What, then, in the face
of these indubitable facts, becomes of all Mr.
Sumner's far-fetched arguments from "the lite
* Annals of Congress; 2d Congress, 1791-1793, p. 861.
w                     29
337 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
rature of the age" and from his multitudinous
voices against slavery? It is absurd, says Mr.
Sumner, to suppose that such men intended to
confer any power upon Congress to pass a Fugitive Slave Law. It is a fact, we reply, that as
members of Congress they proceeded, without
hesitation or doubt, to exercise that very
power.   It "dishonors  the memory  of  the
fathers," says Mr. Sumner, to suppose they
intended that Congress should possess such a
power.  Hiow,  then, will  he  vindicate  the
memory of the fathers against the imputation
of his own doctrine that they, as members of
Congress, must have knowingly usurped the
power which, as members of the convention,
they had intended not to confer?
One more of Mr. Sumner's historical arguments, and we are done with this branch of the
subject. He deems it the most conclusive of
all. It is founded on the arrangement of certain clauses of the Constitution, and is, we believe, perfectly original. We must refer the
reader to the speech itself if he desire to see
this very curious argument, since we cannot
spare the room to give it a full and fair statement.
Nor is this at all necessary to our purpose,
338 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
inasmuch as we intend to notice only one thing
about this argument, namely, the wonderful
effect it produces on the mind of its inventor.
The framers of the Constitution," says he,
"were wise and careful men, who had a reason
for what they did, and who understood the language which they employed." We can readily
believe all this.   Nor can we doubt that they
" had a design in the peculiar arrangement" of
the clauses adopted  by them.   That design,
however, we feel quite sure, is different from the
one attributed to them by Mr. Sumner.  But let
us suppose he is right, and then see what would
follow.
The design attributed to them by Mr. Sumner
was to make every one see, beyond the possibility of a mistake, that the Constitution confers
no power on Congress to pass a Fugitive Slave
Law.  " They not only decline all addition of
any such power to the compact," says he, "but,
to render misapprehension impossible,-to make assurance doubly sure,-to exclude any contrary conclusion, they punctiliously arrange," &c. Now,
if such were the case, then we ask if design of
so easy accomplishment were ever followed by
failure so wonderful?
They failed, in the first place, "to exclude a
339 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
contrary conclusion" from the Supreme Courts
of Massachusetts, of New York, and of Pennsylvania, all of which tribunals have decided
that they did confer such a power upon Congress. In the second place, although those wise
men labored to make "misapprehension impossible," yet, according to Mr. Sumner, the Supreme Court of the United States has entirely
misapprehended them. So far from seeing that
the power in question is not granted to Congress, this high tribunal decides that it is clearly
and unquestionably granted.   This is not all.
The most marvellous failure is yet to come.
For, after all their pains to make the whole
world see their meaning, these wise men did
not see it themselves, but went away, many of
them, and, in the Congress of 1793, helped to
pass a Fugitive Slave Law!
It is to be feared, indeed, that the failure
would have been absolutely total but for the
wonderful sagacity of a few abolitionists. For
the design imputed to the framers of the Constitution, and which they took so much pains to
disclose, had remained profoundly concealed
from nearly all men, not excepting themselves,
until it was detected by Messrs. Sumner, Chase,
and company.   But these have, at last, dis
340 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
covered it, and now see it as in a flood of light.
Indeed, they see it with such transcendent clearness, with such marvellous perspicacity of vision,
as to atone for the stupidity and blindness of the
rest of mankind.
So much for Mr. Sumner's historical argument. Hiis logical argument is, if possible, still
more illogical than his historical. In regard to
this, however, we shall be exceedingly brief; as
we are sick of his sophisms, and long to be delivered from the pursuit of them.
Hle encounters, at the outset, "a difficulty" in
the legislation of the Congress of 1793 and in
the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States."  But " on examination," says he, "this
difficulty will disappear." Perhaps difficulty so
great never vanished so suddenly from before
any other man.
The authority of the Congress of 1793, though
it contained so many of the most distinguished
framers of the Constitution, is annihilated by a
few bold strokes of Mr. Sumner's pen. One
short paragraph, containing two ineffably weak
arguments, does the business.
The first of these arguments is as follows:
"The act of,1793 proceeded from a Congress that
had already recognised the United States Bank,
29*
341 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
chartered by a previous Congress, which, though
sanctioned by the Supreme Court, has been
since in high quarters pronounced unconstitutional. If it erred as to the bank, it may have
erred also as to fugitives from labor." We cannot conceive why such an argument should have
been propounded, unless it were to excite a prejudice against the Congress of 1793 in the
minds of those who may be opposed to a National Bank. For if we look at its conclusion
we shall see that it merely aims to establish a
point which no one would deny. It merely aims
to prove that, as the Congress of 1793 was composed of fallible men, "so it may have erred!"
We admit the conclusion, and therefore pass by
the inherent weaknesses in the structure of the
argument.
His second argument is this:'" But the very
act contains a capital error* on this very subject,
so declared by the Supreme Court, in pretend ing to vest a portion of the judicial power of the
nation in state officers. This error takes from the
act all authority as an interpretation of the Constitu tion. I DISMISS IT." This passage, considered
as an argument, is simply ridiculous. How
* This error was by no means a capital one.
342
I 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
many of the best laws ever enacted by man
have, in the midst of much that is as clear as
noonday, been found to contain an error!
Should all, therefore, have been blindly rejected? As soon as the error has been detected,
has any enlightened tribunal on earth ever said,
"I dismiss" the whole?
By such a process we might have made as
short work with Mr. Sumner's speech. If, after
pointing out one error therein, we had dismissed
the whole speech as worthless, we should have
imitated his reasoning, and inour conclusion have
come much nearer to the truth. If we should
say,-indeed, that because the sun has a spot on
its surface it is therefore a great ball of darkness, our argument would be exactly like that
of Mr. Sumner. But that great luminary would
not refuse to shine in obedience to our contemptible logic. In like manner, the authority
of the illustrious Congress of 1793, in which
there were so many profound statesmen and
pure patriots, will not be the less resplendent
because Mr. Charles Sumner has, with Titanic
audacity and Lilliputian weakness, assailed it
with one of the most pitiful of all the pitiful
sophisms that ever were invented by man.
In regard to the decision of the Supreme
343  
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
Court he says: "Whatever may be the influence
of this judgment as a rule to the judiciary, it
cannot arrest our duty as legislators. And here
I adopt, with entire assent, the language of Pre sident Jackson, in his memorable veto, in 1832,
of the Bank of the United States." Hie then
quotes this language, in which he italicizes the
following  sentence:  "Each  pubic off cer, who
takes an oath to support the Constitution, swears that
he will support it as he understands it, and not as it
is understood by others." "With these authoritative words of Andrew Jackson," says he, "I
dismiss this topic. The early legislation of Congress and the decisions of the Supreme Court
cannot stand in our way. I advance to the argument." We shall let him advance.
But we must say a few words in conclusion.
Mr. Sumner swears to support the Constitution
as he understands it; but how is it supported by
him? Is it supported by him at all or in any
way? Let us see. The clause respecting "persons held to service or labor," says he, imposes
an obligation, not upon " the National Government, but upon the States." Is he then in favor
of the States passing any law, or doing any act,
by which fugitive slaves may be delivered up?
" Never," he replies. Massachusetts will never
344 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW,
do any such thing by his advice or consent.
Surely, then, he will speak a kind word to the
good people of Massachusetts, and advise them
to do nothing in violation of this solemn compact of the Constitution. If he will do nothing
to support the compact, surely he will do nothing to break it down. Hie will not permit us
to indulge any such charitable hope. For it is
his avowed object, by speech-making and by agitation, to create such a " public opinion" as
" shall blast with contempt, indignation, and abhorrence, all who, ib whatever form, or under
whatever name, undertake to be agents"* in reclaiming fugitive slaves. Yea, upon the very
officers of the law themselves, who, for this purpose, act under and by authority of the supreme
laws of the land, he pours down scorn and derision.  Even these, though in the discharge of
an official duty, are-if it be in the power of Mr.
Sumner-to be blasted with abhorrence, indignation, and contempt!
The Constitution declares that the fugitive
slave "shall be delivered up."  Hie shall NOT
"be delivered up," says Mr. Sumner; and, in
order to make his words good, he means to
* Speech in the Senate, in 1855.
345 
46     LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
create a "public opinion," which no Southern
master dare encounter. Nay, he rejoices to believe
that such public opinion is, in sorie localities,
already created and prepared for open resistance to the Constitution of the United States.
"There are many," says he, "who will never
shrink at any cost, and, notwithstanding all the
atrocious penalties of this bill, from efforts to
save a wandering fellow-man from bondage.
They will offer him the shelter of their houses,
and, IF NEED BE, WILL PROTECT HIS LIBERTY BY
FORCE."*   Horrible  words!  Words  tending
directly to a conflict in which the brightest
hopes of humanity must perish, and the glory
of the Republic be extinguished in oceans of
blood.
In the face of such things, we are imperiously
constrained to doubt Mr. Sumner's regard for
the obligation of the oath which binds him to
support the Constitution of his country. It is
certain that he can rejoice in the breach of this
obligation by others. A certain judge in Vermont, who, like every other State officer, had
taken an oath to support the Constitution of the
United States, just set Constitution, laws, evi
* Speech in Boston, October 8d, 1850. 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
dence, all at defiance, and boldly declared that
the fugitive should not be delivered up, "unless the
master could show a bill of sale from the Almighty."
This deed, which, in the language of Chancellor
Walworth, is stamped with "the moral guilt of
perjury," appears heroic to Mr. Sumner, by
whom it is related with evident delight. It
would seem, indeed, as if the moral sensibility
of an abolitionist of his stamp is all drawn to a
single point of his conscience, so that it can feel
absolutely nothing except  slavery.   It seems
dead to the obligation of an oath, to the moral
guilt of perjury. Nay, it seems to rejoice in
the yery bravery of its perpetration, provided
it only enables a fugitive slave to effect his
escape.
Perhaps Mr. Sumner would seek to justify
himself by declaring that the language ftyitives
from service does not include fugitive slaves. If
so, we reply that the Vermont judge, whose infamous decision he approves, had no such fine
pretext. It is Mr. Sumner, as we have seen,
who first suggested this most excellent method
of reconciling conscience with treachery to the
Constitution.   Though he professes the most
profound respect for that instrument, he deliberately sets to work to undermine one of its
347 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
most clear and unequivocal mandates. IHe does
not, like Mr. Seward, openly smite the Constitution with his hand, or contemptuously kick
it with his foot. tie betrays it with a kiss.
Mr. Sumner admires the conduct of the Vermnont judge; but he can heap the most frantic
abuse on the acts of the best men America has
produced. Though they be the deliberate public
acts of a Clay, or a Calhoun, or a Webster, or a
GEORGE WASHINGTON, his language is not the
less violent, nor his raving vituperation the less
malignant. In regard to the Fugitive Slave
Law of 1850, lie says: "And still further, as
if to do a deed which should'make heaven
weep, all earth amazed,' this same Congress, in
disregard of all the cherished safeguards of
freedom, has passed a most cruel, unchristian,
devilish act." The great difficulty under which
Mr. Sumner labors, and which all the energy of
his soul struggles to surmount, is to find language violent enough in which to denounce
this "foul enactment," this "detestable  and
heaven-defying bill," this "monster act," which
"sets at naught the best principles of the Constitution and the very laws of God!"
Now, this bill, let it be remembered, is liable
to no objection which may not be urged against
348 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793. It will not be
denied, indeed, that if the one of these laws be
unconstitutional so also is the otlier, and that
both must stand or fall together. Let it also be
borne in mind that, as the one received the support of a Clay, and a Calhoun, and a Webster,
so the other received the sanction and the signature of George Washington.  Yet, in the face
of these facts, Mr. Sumner does not moderate
his rage. They only seem to increase the intensity and the fury of his wrath. "The soul
sickens," he cries, "in the contemplation of this
legalized outrage. In the dreary annals of the
past there are many acts of shame-there are
many ordinances of monarchs, and laws which
have become a byword and a hissing to the nations. But when we consider the country and
the age, I ask fearlessly, what act of shame,
what ordinance of monarch, what law, can compare in atrocity with this enactment of an
American Congress?"
Not content with pouring floods of abuse on
the law itself, Mr. Sumner proceeds to consign
to infamy its authors and all who have given it
their support. For, after furnishing examples of
what he deems among the most atrocious transactions of the past, he adds: "I would not exag                     30
349 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
gerate. I wish to keep within bounds; but
I think no person can doubt that the condemnation affixed to all these transactions and to their
authors must be the lot hereafter of the Fugitive Slave Bill, and of every one, according to
the measure of his influence, who gave it his
support. Into the immortal catalogue of national crimes this has now passed, drawing with
it, by an inexorable necessity, its authors also,
and chiefly him who, as President of the United
States, set his name to the bill, and breathed into
it that final breath without which it would have
no life.  Other Presidents may be forgotten,
but the name signed to the Fugitive Slave Bill
can never be forgotten. There are depths of
infamy, as there are heights of fame. I regret
to say what I must, but truth compels me.
Better far for him had he never been born;
better for his memory, and for the name of his
children, had he never been President!"
If neither Mr. Fillmore nor George Washington swore to support the Constitution as Mr.
Sumner understands it, we beg him to consider
that his opinion was not known when they took the
oath of office. Mr. Fillmore had, at that time,
no better guide to go by than the decisions of
the most enlightened judicial tribunals of his
350 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
country, with the Supreme Court of the United
States at their head. iHe was not so far raised
above other men, nor possessed of so wonderful
an insight into the Constitution, as Mr. Sumner;
for he could understand it no better than its
framers. Hence he was, no doubt, so conscious
of his own fallibility that he could hardly look
upon modesty as a crime, or upon a deference
to the judicial tribunals of his country as infamous.   We  trust, therefore, that his good
name will survive, and that his children will
not blush to own it. It is certain that the
American people will never believe, on the bare
authority of Mr. Sumner, that, in his course regarding the Fugitive Slave Law, he planted his
feet in the very "depths of infamy," when they
can so clearly see that he merely trod in the
footsteps of George Washington.
If what a man lacks in reason he could only
make up in rage, then, after all, it would have
to be concluded that Mr. Sumner is a very respectable Senator; for, surely, the violence of
his denunciations is almost as remarkable as
the weakness of his logic. Fortunately, however, it can hurt no one except himself or those
whom he represents. Certainly, the brightest
names in the galaxy of American statesmen are
351
0 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
not to be swept away by the filthy torrent of his
invectives. The Clays, the Calhouns, the Websters, and the Washingtons of America, are,
indeed, as far above the impotent rage of this
Senator as the very stars of heaven are beyond
his arm.*
* Mr. Sumner has a great deal to say, in his speech, about
"the memory of the fathers."   When  their sentiments agree
with his own, or only seem to him to do so, then they are "the
demi-gods of history." But only let these demi-gods cross his
path or come into contact with his fanatical notions, and instantly they sink into sordid knaves. The framers of the Constitution of the United States, says he, made "a compromise,
which cannot be mentioned without shame.   It was that hateful
bargain by which Congress was restrained until 1808 from the
prohibition of the foreign slave trade, thus securing, down to
that period, toleration for crime.".....  "The  effrontery of
slaveholders was matched by the sordidness of the Eastern members.".... "The bargain was struck, and at this price the
Southern States gained the detestable indulgence. At a subsequent day, Congress branded the slave trade as piracy, and
thus, by solemn legislative act,. adjudged this compromise to be
felonious and wicked."
But for this compromise, as every one who has read the history of the times perfectly well knows, no union could have been
formed, and the slave trade might have been carried on to the
present day. By this compromise, then, the Convention did not
tolerate crime nor the slave trade; they merely formed the
Union, and, in forming it, gained the power to abolish the slave
trade in twenty years. The gain of this power, which Congress
352 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
~ III. The right of Trial by Jury not impaired by
the -'ugitive Slave Law.
It is alleged that the power to enact such a
law does not reside in Congress, because no
such power has been "expressly delegated," and
because it is not "necessary and proper" to
carry any expressly delegated authority into
effect.  We  should have replied to this argument; but it has been urged before every tri
had not before possessed, was considered by them as a great
gain to the cause of humanity. If the Eastern members, from a
blind and frantic hatred of slavery, had blasted all prospects of a
union, and at the same time put the slave trade beyond their
power forever, they would have imitated the wisdom of the
abolitionists, who always promote the cause they seek to demolish.
If any one will read the history of the times, he will see that
"the fathers," the framers of the Constitution, were, in making
this very compromise, governed by the purest, the most patriotic, and the most humane, of motives. He who accuses them
of corruption shows himself corrupt; especially if, like Mr.
Sumner, he can laud them on one page as demi-gods, and on the
very next denounce them as sordid knaves, who, for the sake of
filthy lucre, could enter into a "felonious and wicked" bargain.
Yet the very man who accuses them of having made so infamous and corrupt a bargain in regard to the slave trade can
and does most eloquently declaim against the monstrous injustice of supposing them capable of the least act in favor of
slavery!
X                    30*
353
X
30'. 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
bunal in which the great question under consideration has been tried, and everywhere refuted.  By Mr. Justice Nelson, in the Supreme
Court of New York,* by Mr. Senator Bishop, in
the Court of Errors in the same State,t and by
Mr. Justice Story, in the Supreme Court of the
United States, it has been so clearly, so powerfully, and so triumphantly demolished as to
leave nothing more to be desired on the subject.
And besides, it has been our object not so much
to refute arguments against the law in question,
or to establish that which has been so long established,$ as to show on what slender grounds,
and yet with what unbounded confidence, the
greatest champions of abolitionism are accustomed to oppose the Constitution, the laws,
the judicial decisions, and the uniform practice,
of the whole government under which we live.
In pursuance of this design, there is another
sophism of theirs, which it now devolves upon
us to examine. We allude to the argument
* XII. Wendell, p. 314.
t XIV. Wendell, p. 580; XVI. Peters, p. 608.
1 Indeed, if we had produced all the arguments in favor of the
constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Law, it would have carried us far beyond our limits, and swelled this single chapter
into a volume.
354 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
that the Fugitive Slave Law is unconstitutional,
because it denies the right of trial by jury.
Is this still an open question? In the biography of Mr. Justice Story, published by his
son, it is said: "The argument that the Act of
1793 was unconstitutional, because it did not
provide for a trial by jury according to the requisitions of the sixth article in the amendment
to the Constitution, having been suggested to
my father on his return from Washington, he
replied that this question was not argued by
counsel nor considered by the court, and that
he should still consider it an open one." Mr.
Sumner adduces this "distinct statement that
the necessity of trial by jury was not before the
court;" and adds, "So that, in the estimation
of the judge himself, it was still an open question."
In the case here referred to-Prigg v. The
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, reported in
XVI. Peters-it is true that the question of trial
by jury was not argued by counsel nor considered by the court. But if the greater includes the less, then this question was embraced
in the decision; for, in that case, Prigg had
seized the fugitive slave without process, and
carried her away without any certificate from
355 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
magistrate or judge in the State of Pennsylvania. The court declared that he had a right
to do so under and by virtue of the Constitution
of the United States. Most assuredly, if he had
a constitutional right to such proceeding, then,
in such cases, the Constitution dispenses with
the necessity of trial by jury.
It was urged by counsel that such summary
method of reclaiming fugitive slaves was unconstitutional; but the court decided otherwise. It
was insisted by Mr. Hambly, just as it is now
insisted by Mr. Sumner and others, that such
arrest was unconstitutional, because it was made
by the mere will of the party, and not, as the
Constitution requires, " by due process of law."
Thus the point was  presented by the record,
argued by the counsel, and overruled by the
court.
In overruling this argument the court says:
"The owner must, therefore, have the right to
seize and repossess the slave which the local
laws of his own State confer upon him as property; and we all know that this right of seizure
and recaption is universally acknowledged in all
the slave-holding  States.   Indeed, this is no
more than a mere affirmance of the principles
of the common law applicable to this very sub
356 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
ject." Then, after a quotation from Blackstone,
the court adds: "Upon this ground, we have not
the slightest hesitation in holding that, under
and in virtue of the Constitution, the owner of a
slave is clothed with entire authority in every
State in the Union to seize and recapture his
slave whenever he can do it without any breach
of the peace or any illegal violence."
In accordance with this opinion of the courtdelivered by Mr. Justice Story-Mr. Chief Justice Taney says: the master "has a right, peaceably, to take possession of him, and carry him
away, without any certificate or warrant from a
judge of the District or Circuit Court of the
United States, or from any magistrate of the
State; and whosoever resists or obstructs him is
a wrong-doer; and every State law which proposes, directly or indirectly, to authorize such
resistance or obstruction, is null and void, and
affords no justification to the individual or the
officer of the State who'acts under it. This
right of the master being given by the Constitution of the United States, neither Congress
nor a State Legislature can by any law or regu lation impair it or restrict it."*
* This decision of the Supreme Court, which authorizes the
mnaster to seize his fugitive slave without process, (see his speech,
36T 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
Hience it would have been well if Mr. Sumner
and the son of Judge Story had looked into
this decision again before they proclaimed the
opinion that the right of trial by jury is, in such
cases, still an open question. Mr. Justice Story
himself must, on reflection, have seen that the
offhand expression attributed to him was erroneous.   his more  deliberate opinion  is recorded, not only in the case of Prigg, but also
Appendix to Congressional Globe, vol. xxii., part 2, p. 1587,) is
exceedingly offensive to Mr. Chase, of Ohio; and no wonder,
since the legislature of his own State has passed a law, making
it a penitentiary offence in the master who should thus prosecute his constitutional right as declared by this decision. But,
in regard to this point, the Supreme Court of the United States
does not stand alone. The Supreme Court of New York, in the
case of Jack v. Martin, had previously said: "Whether the
owner or agent might have made the arrest in the first instance
without any process, we will not stop to examine; authorities
of deserved respectability and weight have held the affirmative.
2 Pick. 11, 5 Serg. & RawIe, 62, and the case of Glen v.
Hodges, in this court, before referred to, (in 9 Johnson,) seem
to countenance the same conclusion. It would indeed appear to
follow as a necessary consequence, from the undoubted position,
that under this clause of the Constitution the right and title of the
owner to the service of the slave is as entire and perfect within the
jurisdiction of the State to which he has fled as it was in the one from
which he escaped. Such seizure would be at the peril of the party;
AND IF A FREEMAN WAS TAKEN, HE WOULD BE ANSWERABLE LIKE
ANY OTHER TRESPASSER OR KIDNAPPER."
358 
THiE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
in his "Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States."  " It is obvious," says he, "that
these provisions for the arrest and removal of
fugitives of both classes contemplate summary
ministerial proceedings, and not the ordinary
course of judicial investigations to ascertain whether the complaint be well-founded or the claim
of ownership be established beyond all legal controversy.  In cases of suspected crimes the guilt
or innocence of the party is to be made out at
his trial, and not upon the preliminary inquiry
whether he shall be delivered up. All that
would seem in such cases to be necessary is that
there should be prima facie evidence before the
executive authority to satisfy its judgment that
there is probable cause to believe the party
guilty, such as, upon an ordinary warrant, would
justify his commitment for trial. And in the
cases of fugitive slaves there would seem to be
the same necessity of requiring only prima facie
proofs of ownership, without putting the party
to a formal assertion of his rights by a suit at
the common law."*
But, since the abolitionists will discuss this
point, then let it be considered an open ques
* Story on Constitution, vol. iii., book iii., chap. xl.
359 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
tion, and let them produce their arguments.
The first we shall notice is from Mr. Sumner,
who again reasons from the sentiments of the
fathers. "At the close of the National Convention," says he, "Elbridge Gerry refused to sign
the Constitution, because, among other things,
it established'a tribunal without juries, a Star
Chamber as to civil cases.' Many united in his
opposition, and, on the recommendation of the
First Congress, this additional safeguard was
adopted as an amendment."  Thus, according
to Mr. Sumner, Elbridge Gerry was the father
of the clause in the Constitution which guarantees the right of trial by jury. Yet Elbridge
Gerry never dreamed of applying this clause
to the case of fugitive slaves; for, as we have
already seen, he voted for the Fugitive Slave
Law of 1793, in which such application of it is
denied. Nor did any other member of that
Congress propose the right of trial by jury in
such cases.
No doubt there would have been opposition to
the act of 1793 if any member of Congress had
supposed, for a moment, that it denied the right
of trial by jury to the fugitive slave. It does no
such thing. It leaves that right unimpaired;
and if any slave in the Union, whether fugitive
360 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
or otherwise, desire such trial, it is secured to
him by the Constitution and laws of the country. But he cannot have such trial where or
in what State he chooses. If he lives in Richmond, he may have a trial by jury there; but he
cannot escape to Boston, and there demand this
as a right. The fugitive from labor, like the
fugitive from justice, has a right to a trial by
jury, but neither can claim to have this trial in
any part of the world he pleases. The latter
must be tried in "the vicinage" where the offence is alleged to have been committed, because there the witnesses are to be found. He
has no right to flee from these and require
them to follow him with their testimony. As
he has a constitutional right to be tried in the
vicinage of the alleged offence, so has the commonwealth a right to insist on his trial there.
In like manner, and for a similar reason, if the
colored man wish to assert his freedom under
the law, he may appeal to a jury of the country;
but this must be done in the State under whose
laws he is claimed as a slave and where the
witnesses reside.   He cannot fly to a distant
State, and there demand a kind of trial which
neither the Constitution, nor the laws, nor public
expediency, secures to him. If he assert this
31
861 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
right at all, he must assert it in conformity with
the undoubted right of the other party, which is to
be sued in this, as in all other personal actions,
in the place where he resides.
In the face of these considerations, it is no
wonder that the Congress of 1793 were so unanimous in regard to the Fugitive Slave Law.
Though this law did not provide for a jury trial,
yet its authors all knew that such trial was not
denied to the fugitive slave, if he had a mind to
claim it.  Hence the law was passed by that
Congress, without  even  an  allusion to this
modern abolition objection to its constitutionality.   Among  all the members of that body
who had taken part in framing the Constitution
of the United States,* not one was found to hint
* The framers of the Constitution in that Congress were:"John Langdon and Nicholas Gilmer, of New Hampshire; Caleb Strong and Elbridge Gerry, of Massachusetts; Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth, of Connecticut; Rufus King, of New
York; Robert Morris and Thomas Fitzsimmons, of Pennsylvania; George Reid and Richard Basset, of Delaware; Jonathan
Dayton, of New Jersey; Pierce Butler, of South Carolina;
Hugh Williamson, of North Carolina; William Few and Abraham Baldwin, of Georgia; and last, but not least, James Madison, of Virginia." Yet from not one of these framers of the
Constitution-from not one of these illustrious guardians of
freedom-was a syllable heard in regard to the right of trial by
362 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
at such an objection. This objection is of more
recent origin, if not of less respectable parentage.
An amendment to the law in question, allowing a trial by jury to the fugitive slave in a distant State, would indeed be a virtual denial of
the constitutional right of the master. Either
because the jury could not agree, or because distant testimony might be demanded, the trial
would probably be continued, and put off, until
the expense, the loss of time, and the worriment
of vexatious proceedings, would be more than
the slave is worth. The language of Mr. Chief
Justice Taney, in relation to an action for damages by the master, is peculiarly applicable to
such a trial by jury.  The master "would be
compelled," says he, " to encounter the costs and expenses of a suit, prosecuted at a distance from his own
home, and to sacrifice perhaps the value of his property
in endeavoring to obtain compensation." This is
not the kind of remedy, says he, the Constitu
jury in connection with the Fugitive Slave Law then passed.
The more pity it is, no doubt, the abolitionist will think, that
neither Mr. Chase, nor Mr. Sumner, nor Mr. Seward, was there
to enlighten them on the subject of trial by jury and to save the
country from the infamy of such an Act. Alas! for the poor,
blind fathers!
363 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
tion "intended to give.  The delivery of the
property itself- its PROMPT AND IMMEDIATE DELIVERY-is plainly required, and was intended to be
secured." Such prompt and immediate delivery
was a part of "the customary or common law"
at the time the Constitution was adopted, and
its framers, no doubt, intended that this practice
should be enforced by the clause in question, as
appears from the fact that so many of them concurred in the Act of 1793.
But if such right to a prompt and immediate
delivery be guaranteed by the Constitution itself,
then, with all due submission, we would ask,
what power has Congress to limit or abridge
this right?  If under and by virtue of the Constitution this right to a prompt and immediate
delivery be secured, then what power has Congress to say there shall not be a prompt or immediate delivery?  "This right of the master,"
says Mr. Chief Justice Taney, "being given by
the Constitution of the United States, NEITHER
CONGRESS NOR A STATE LEGISLATURE CAN BY ANY
LAW OR REGULATION IMPAIR IT OR RESTRICT IT."
If this be sound doctrine,-and such we hold it
to be,  then Congress - has no  constitutional
power to impair or restrict the right in question,
by giving the fugitive slave a trial by jury in the
364 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
State to which he may have fled. This would
not be to give a "prompt and immediate delivery," such as the Supreme Court declares the
master is entitled to by the Constitution itself;
it would be either to give no delivery at all, or
else one attended with such delays, vexations,
and costs, as would materially impair, if not
wholly annihilate, the right in question.
It is right and proper, we think, that questions arising exclusively under our own laws
should be tried in our own States and by our
own tribunals. Hlence we shall never consent,
unless constrained by the judicial decision of
the Supreme Court of the Union, to have such
questions tried in States whose people and
whose juries may, perhaps, be hostile to our interests and to our domestic institutions. For we
are SOVEREIGN as well as they.
Only conceive such a trial by jury in a Northern State, with such an advocate for the fugitive
slave as Mr. Chase, or Mr. Sumner, or some
other flaming abolitionist! There sits the fugitive slave,-" one of the heroes of the age," as
Mr. Sumner calls him, and the very embodiment of persecuted innocence.   On the other
hand is the master,-the vile "Slave-hunter,"
as Mr. Sumner delights to represent him, and
31*
365 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
whom, if possible, he is determined " to blast
with contempt, indignation, and abhorrence."
The trial begins. The advocate appeals to the
prejudices and the passions of the jury. He
denounces slavery-about which neither he nor
the jury know any thing-as the epitome of all
earthly wrongs, as the sum and substance of all
human woes. Now, suppose that on the jury
there is only one man, who, like the Vermont
judge,  requires  "a  bill of sale  from  the
Almighty" before he will deliver up a fugitive
slave; or who, like Mr. Seward, sets his own
private opinion above the Constitution of his
country; or who, like Mr. Sumner, has merely
sworn to support the supreme law as he understands it; and who, at the same time, possesses
his capacity to understand it just exactly as he
pleases: then what chance would the master
have for a verdict? Just none at all. For that
one man, however clear the master's evidence,
would hang the jury, and the cause would have
to be tried over again.
But suppose the whole twelve jurors should
decide according to the law and the evidence,
and give a verdict in favor of the claimant;
would his rights then be secured? Very far
from it, For there is the eager crowd, which
866 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
never fails to flock to such trials, and which the
inflammatory eloquence of the advocate has
now  wrought  into a frenzy.   Cannot such
crowd, think you, furnish a mob to effect by
force what every member of the jury had refused to accomplish by falsehood? If the master-if the abhorred "slave-hunter"- should
escape from such a crowd with a sound body
only, and without his property, he ought, we
think, to deem himself exceedingly fortunate.
Mr. Winthrop, of Massachusetts, has advovocated a trial by jury in such cases.  ie was,
no doubt, perfectly sincere in the belief expressed by him, that under such a provision
more fugitive slaves would be reclaimed than
under the law as it now stands. But it is
equally certain that neither Mr. Seward nor
Mr. Chase was of this opinion when the one
proposed, and the other voted for, a trial by
jury in such cases. Neither of these Senators, we think we may confidently affirm, intended to aid the master in reclaiming his fugitive slaves.
"At any rate, sir," says Mr. Winthrop, "I
shall vote for the amendment offered by the
Senator from New Jersey, as right and just in
367 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
itself, whatever may be its effects." That is to
say, whatever may be the effect of a jury trial in
such cases, he means to vote for it as right and
just in itsef!  Whether this were a burst of passion merely, or the deliberate conviction of the
author of it, we are not able to determine, but
we shall trust it was the former. For surely
such an opinion, if deliberately entertained, is
creditable neither to a Senator nor to a jurist.
Neither this, nor any other mode of trial, is
"right in itself;" and when right at all, it is
only so as a means to an end. It is only right
when it subserves the great end of justice; and
if it fail to answer this end it is then worse than
worthless.   IHence the statesman who declares
that, "whatever may be the effects" of a particular
mode of trial, he will nevertheless support it
"as right and just in itself," thereby announces
that he is prepared to sacrifice the end to the
means,-a sentiment which, we venture to affirm,
is more worthy of a fanatical declaimer than of
the high-minded and accomplished Senator by
whom it was uttered.
The great objection urged against the Fugitive Slave Law is that under it a freeman may
be seized and reduced to slavery. This law, as
well as every other, may, no doubt, be grossly
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THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
abused, and made a cover for evil deeds. But
is there no remedy for such evil deeds? Is there
no protection for the free blacks of the North,
except by a denial of the clear and unquestionable constitutional rights of the South? If not,
then we should be willing to submit; but there
is a remedy against such foul abuse of the law
of Congress in question, and, as we conceive, a
most ample remedy.
The master may recapture his fugitive slave.
This is his constitutional right. But, in the
language of the Supreme Court of New York,
already quoted, if a villain, under cover of a
pretended right, proceeds to carry off a freeman,
he does so "at his peril, and would be answerable
like any other trespasser or kidnapper." He must
be caught, however, before he can be punished.
Let him be caught, let the crime be proved upon
him, and we would most heartily concur in the
law by which he should himself be doomed to
slavery for life in the penitentiary.
The Fugitive Slave Law is not the only one
liable to abuse. The innocent may be, and
often have been, arrested for crime; but this is
no reason why the law of arrest should be
abolished, or even impaired in its operation.
Nay,- innocent persons have often been mali
Y
369 
LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
ciously prosecuted; yet no one, on this account,
ever dreamed of throwing obstacles in the way
of prosecution for crime. The innocent have
been made the victims of perjury; but who
imagines that all swearing in courts of justice
should therefore be abolished? Such evils and
such crimes are sought to be remedied by separate legislation, and not by undermining the
laws of which they are the abuses. In like
manner, though we wish to see the free blacks
of the North protected, and would most cheerfully lend a helping hand for that purpose, yet,
at the same time, we would maintain our own
constitutional rights inviolate. The villain who,
under cover of the law made for the protection
of our rights, should seek to invade the rights
of Northern freemen, is as much abhorred by
us as by any abolitionists on earth. Nor, on
the other hand, have we any sympathy with
those who, under cover of a law to be made for
the protection of the free blacks of the North,
seek to invade the rights of the South. We
have no sympathy with either class of kidnappers.
Is it not wonderful that, while the abolitionists
of the North create and keep up so great a clamor about the danger their free blacks are'in,
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THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
they do so little, and ask so little, either by
legislation or otherwise, in order to protect
them, except in such manner, or by such legislation, as shall aim a deadly blow at the rights
and interests of the South? If they really wish
to protect their free blacks, and if the laws are
not already sufficient for that purpose, we are
more than willing to assist in the passage of
more efficient ones. But we are not willing to
abandon the great right which the Constitution spreads, like an impenetrable shield, over
Southern property to the amount of sixteen
hundred millions of dollars.
The complaint in regard to the want of protection for the free blacks of the North is without just foundation. In the case of Jack v. Martin, decided in the Court of Errors of New York,
we find the following language, which is here
exactly in point:-" It was contended on the
argument of this cause, with great zeal and earnestness, that, under the' law of the  United
States, a freeman might be dragged from his
family and home into captivity. This is supposing an extreme case, as I believe it is not
pretended any such ever has occurred, or that
any complaint of that character has ever been
made; at all events, I cannot regard it as a very
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LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
potent argument. The same position might as
well be taken in the case of a fugitive from justice.  It might be assumed that he was an innocent man, and entitled to be tried by a jury of
the State where he was arrested, to ascertain
whether he had violated the laws of the State
from which he fled; whereas the fact is, the
executive of this State would feel bound to
deliver up the most exalted individual in this
State, (however well satisfied he might be of his
innocence,) if a requisition was made upon him
by the executive of another State."
In the same case, when before the Supreme
Court of New York, the court said: "In the
case under review, the proceedings are before a
magistrate of our own State, presumed to possess a sympathy with his fellow-citizens, and
where, upon the supposition that a freeman is arrested, he may readily procure the evidence of his
freedom. If the magistrate should finally err
in granting the certificate, the party can still
resort to the protection of the national judiciary.
The proceedings by which his rights have been invaded being under a law of Congress, the remedy for
error or injustice belongs peculiarly to that high
tribunal.   UNDER THEIR AMPLE SHIELD, THE AP
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THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
PREHENSION OF CAPTIVITY AND OPPRESSION CANNOT
BE ALARMING."
It is evident that when this opinion was pronounced by the Supreme Court of New York, it
had not fathomed the depths of some men's
capacity of being alarmed by apprehensions of
captivity and oppression. The abolitionists will,
whether or no, be most dreadfully alarmed.
But the danger consists, not in the want of laws
and courts to punish the kidnapper, but in the
want of somebody to catch him. If he does all
the mischief ascribed to him by the abolitionists,
is it not wonderful that he is not caught by
them? R          umor, with her thousand tongues, is
clamorous about his evil deeds; and fanatical
credulity, with her ten thousand ears, gives heed
to the reports of rumor. But yet, somehow or
other, the abolitionists, with all their fiery, restless zeal, never succeed in laying their hands
on the offender himself. Hie must, indeed, be a
most adroit, a most cunning, a most wonderful
rogue. Ile boldly goes into a community in
which so many are all eye, all ear, and all
tongue, in regard to the black man's rights; he
there steals a free negro, who himself has the
power to tell when, where, and how, he became
free; and yet, in open day, and amid ten thou
32
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LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
sand flaming guardians of freedom,* he escapes
with perfect impunity! Is he not a most marvellous proper rogue?  But perhaps the reason
the abolitionists do not lay hands on him is
that he is an imaginary being, who, though intangible and invisible, will yet serve just as
well to create an alarm and keep up a great excitement as if he were a real personage.
~ IV. The Duty of the Citizen in regard to the
Constitution of the United States.
The Constitution, it is agreed on all sides, is
"the supreme law of the land,"-of every State
in the Union. The first duty of the citizen in
regard to the Constitution is, then, to respect and
obey each and every one of its provisions. If
he repudiates or sets at naught this or that provision'thereof, because it does not happen to
agree with his own views or feelings, he does
not respect the Constitution at all; he makes
his own will and pleasure the supreme law.
The true principle of loyalty resides not in his
bosom. We may apply to him, and to the supreme law of the land, the language of an in
* This crime of kidnapping, says Mr. Chase, of Ohio, is "not
un-frequent" in his section of country; that is, about Cincinnati.
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THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
spired apostle, that "whosoever shall keep the
whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is
guilty of all." He is guilty of all, because, by
his wilful disobedience in the one instance, he
sets at naught the authority by which the whole
was ordained and established.
In opposing the Fugitive Slave Law, it is forgotten by the abolitionists that, if no such law
existed, the master would have, under the Constitution itself, the same right to reclaim his fugitive from labor, and to reclaim him in the
same summary manner; for, as we have seen,
the Supreme Court of the United States has decided that by virtue of the Constitution alone
the master has a right to pursue and reclaim his
fugitive slave, without even a writ or legal process. Hence, in opposing the Fugitive Slave
Law because it allows a summary proceeding in
such cases, the abolitionists really make war on
the Constitution. The battery which they open
against the Constitution is merely masked behind the Fugitive Slave Law; and thus the
nature of their attack is concealed from the eyes
of their non-legal followers.
But, says Mr. Chase, of Ohio, I do not agree
with the Supreme Court of the United States.
I oppose not the Constitution, but the decision
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LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
of the Supreme Court: "A decision of the Supreme Court," says he, "cannot alter the Constitution." This is very true; but then, on the
other hand, it is equally true that neither can
his opinion alter the Constitution. But here
the question arises, which is the rule of conduct
for the true and loyal citizen,-the decision of
the Supreme  Court of the United States, or
the opinion of Governor Chase? We decidedly
prefer the  former.   " Sir,"  says  Mr. Chase,
"when gentlemen from the slave States ask us
to support the Constitution, I fear they mean
only their construction of the Constitution." We
mean not so. We mean neither our nor his construction of the Constitution, but that construction only which has been given to it by the
highest judicial tribunal in the land, by the supreme and final arbiter in all such conflicts of
opinion.
But Mr. Chase opposes argument as well as
opinion to the decision of the Supreme Court in
regard to slavery.  "What more natural," says
he, " than that gentlemen from the slave States,
in view of the questions likely to come before
the Supreme Court, should desire that a majority of its members might have interests like
those which they would desire to maintain!
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THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
Certain it is that some care has been taken to secure
such a constitution of the court, and not without success."  If Mr. Chase, or any other abolitionist,
should insinuate that the decision in question is
owing to such an unfair constitution of the
Supreme  Court, the answer  is  as  easy and
triumphant as the accusation would be infamous
and vile; for, as is well known, the very decision which is so obnoxious to his sentiments
was delivered by the great jurist of Massachusetts, Mr. Justice Story, and was concurred in
by the other Northern members of the Court.
This is not all. How did it happen that substgntially the same decision has been rendered
by the Supreme Courts of New York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania?  Were these high
tribunals also constituted with reference to the
peculiar interests of the South?
The question is not whether the decision of
the Supreme Court, or the opinion of Mr. Chase,
the more perfectly reflects the Constitution.
Even if he were infallible, as the Supreme Court
certainly is not, we, the people of the United
States, have not agreed that he shall decide such
questions for us. And besides, it would be
difficult, perhaps, to persuade the people that he
is, for the determination of such questions, any
32*
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LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
more happily constituted than the Supreme
Court itself, with all the manifold imperfections
of its Southern members. But, however this
may be, it is certain that until the people shall
be so persuaded, and shall agree to abide by his
opinions, it is the duty of the good citizen to
follow the decisions of the great judicial tribunal provided by the Constitution of his
country.
If you, good citizen of the North, have a right
to set up your opinion in opposition to such decisions, then I have the same right, and so has
every other member of the commonwealth.
Thus, as many constructions of the Constitution
would necessarily result as there are individual
opinions in the land. Law and order would be
at an end; a chaos of conflicting elements
would prevail, and every man would do that
which seemed right in his own eyes. The only
escape from such anarchy is a just and loyal
confidence in the judicial tribunals of the landis a subjection of the intense egotism of the individual to the will of the nation, as expressed
in the Constitution and expounded by the constitutional authorities. Hence, we mean to support the Constitution, not as we understand it
nor as you understand it, but as it is understood
378 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Such, it seems to us, is the only wise coursenay, is the imperative duty-of every citizen who
does not intend to disorganize the fundamental
law and revolutionize the government of his
country.
It may be supposed, perhaps, by those who
have reflected little on the subject, that the controversy respecting the Fugitive Slave Law is
merely about the value of a few slaves. It is,
in our opinion, far otherwise; it is a great constitutional question; and hence the deep interest which it has excited throughout the
nation, as well as in the Senate of the United
States.  It is a question, as it appears to us,
whether the Constitution or the abolitionists
shall rule the country. The Fugitive Slave Law
is, as we have seen, surrounded by the strongest
possible evidences of its constitutionality; and
hence, if this may be swept away as unconstitutional by the passions of a mad faction, then
may every other legal defence be levelled before like storms, and all security annihilated.
Hience, as the friends of law and order, we intend to take our stand right here, and defend
this Act, which, although despised and abhorred
by a faction, has received the sanction of the
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LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
fathers, as well as of the great judicial tribunals,
of the land.
We are asked to repeal this raw-ay, by the
most violent agitator of the North we are
asked to repeal this law-for " the sake of tranquillity and peace!"   But how  can this bring
peace? Suppose this law were repealed; would
tranquillity be restored? We have not forgotten-nor can we be so easily made to forgetthat this very agitator himself has declared, that
slavery is "a wrong so transcendent" that no
truce is to be allowed to it so long as it occupies
a single foot of ground in the United States.
Is it not, then, a delusive prospect of peace
which is offered to us in exchange for the law in
question?
Nor can we forget what other agitators have
uttered respecting the abolition of slavery in the
Southern States. "Slavery," said Mr. Seward,
at a mass-meeting in Ohio, "can be limited to
its present bounds; it can be ameliorated. It
can be-and it must be-ABOLISHED, and you
and I can and must do it." Does this look like
peace, if the Fugitive Slave Law were only out
of the way? Mr. Seward, from his place in the
Senate of the United States, tells us how we
must act among the people of the North, if, in
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THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
reclaiming our fugitive slaves, we would not disturb their peace. But he had already exhorted
the people of the North to "extend a cordial
welcome" to our fugitive slaves, and to "defend
them as they would their household gods."
What, then, does he mean by peace?
This outcry, indeed, that the peace of the
country is disturbed by the Fugitive Slave Law,
is as great a delusion as ever was attempted to
be palmed off on any people. If this law
were repealed to-morrow, would agitation cease?
Would the abolitionists of the North cease to
proclaim that their doors are open, and their
hospitality is ready, to receive the poor benighted blacks? (the blacks of the South, we
mean; for we have never heard of their open
doors, or cordial hospitality, for the poor free
blacks of their own neighborhood.) But we
have heard-from Dr. Channing himself-of "a
convention at the North, of highly respected
men, preparing and publishing an address to
the slaves, in which they are exhorted to fly
from bondage, and to feel no scruple in seizing
and using horse or boat which may facilitate their
escape." Now, if the Fugitive Slave Law were
repealed, would all such proceedings cease? Or
if, under the Constitution as expounded by the
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LIBERTY AND SLAVERY.
Supreme Courts of the Union and of New York,
and without any such law to back him, the master should seek to reclaim his property, would
he be welcomed, or hooted and resisted, by the
defenders of the fugitive from his service? Let
these things be considered, and it will be evident, we think, that the repeal of the law in
question would only invite further aggressions,
and from this prostrate outpost the real enemies
of the peace of the country would march, if
possible, over every other defence of the Constitution.
Hence, although we most ardently desire harmony and concord for the States of the Union,
we shall never seek it by a surrender of the
Constitution or the decisions of the Supreme
Court.  If it cannot be found under these, it
cannot be found at all. Mr. Chase assures us,
indeed, that just so long as the rule laid down
by the Supreme Court in the case of Prigg prevails, we must "encounter difficulties, and serious
difficulties."* If it must be so, then so be it.
If the question be whether the decisions of the
Supreme Court, or the dictation of demagogues,
* Appendix to Congressional Globe, vol. xxii., part ii., p.
1587.
382 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
shall rule our destinies, then is our stand taken
and our purpose immovably fixed.
We have a right to peace under the decisions
of that august tribunal. It is neither right nor
proper-it is contrary to every principle of natural justice-that either party to this great controversy should decide for itself. Hence, if the
abolitionists will not submit to the decisions of
the Supreme Court, we shall most assuredly refuse submission to their arrogant dictation. We
can, from our inmost hearts, respect the feelings
of those of our Northern brethren who may
choose to remain passive in this matter, and
leave us-by such aid as the law may afford-to
reclaimn our own fugitives from labor.  For such
we have only words of kindness and feelings of
fraternal love.  But as for those-and especially
for those in high places-who counsel resistance
to the laws and to the Constitution of the Republic, we hold them guilty of a high misdemeanor, and we shall ever treat them as disturbers of the public peace, nay, as enemies of
the independence, the perpetuity, the greatness,
and the glory of the Union under which, by the
blessing of Almighty God, we have hitherto so
wonderfully prospered.
THE END.
383