RANSOMI G. WILLIA,IS,
JA.I.ES ROB1 NSON,
)LDNIEL P. PARKER,
HENLY CAITN BR,E
C. CORlNELL,
B. GaRIFFI.(,
A. L. VA —, BUREN,
J. ADDISO,N JoY,
B. S. LYMAN,
J. J. DOUBLEDAY,
D.ANI EL BROOKS,
SAI.ON PHELPS.
W. R. DwI(;IIT,
F. T. MIY(;ATT,
J. M1LT'o. S> IIT,
A. WHEELER,
E. A. SIIOTWELL,
HI-RA.T BIRDSALL,
MALTBIE WEEID,
S. OVERACRE,
E. C. HAMNILTON,
JESSE BRusi},
WALTER KELSEY,
JONAS BRusII,
J. A. DAVENPOIT,
Brooklyn, Thanksgiving Day, Dec. 12, 18,0.
(To JOH-INT RANKIN A.ND oTr4ERS.
BItOOKLY.N, Dec. 1]Gth, 1850.
(GENTINLEME3I'N'
I lhave received your note, requesting a copy of the Sermion preached by
me on Thanksgivineg Day, for publication.  In accordance witlh your request,  I
place thle Sermon in your hands for the use proposed. I hlave taken tllhe liberty
of adding two or tliree notes, for the purpose of neore fullly elucidating soime
point-.                           Yours, very respectfully,
S. T. SPEAR.
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.4lxriiitfrh,   uit  t1~t  fititiuL' ~tflu~   o,)-ttrtiu1ll 
A SERMON,
I'ItEACIIED IN TIIE SOUTH PRESBYTERIAN CHIURCH', BROOKLYN,
DEC. 12, 1850,
BY  REV. SAMUEL T. SPEAR.
LNEW-YORK:
LAMbBEIRT & LANE, STATIONERS AND PRINTERS,
69 WALL STREET, NEAR PEARL.
1850. 
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,rl"4p                     ftluf  t45  11ig1tr   r1nIJ tul  CoiisrIIr.
" Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers, for there is no power but of
God; the powers that be are ordained of God.  W:  *  * Wherefore ye must
needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake."-RoM. xiii, 1, 5.
"T'hen Peter andl the other Apostles answered and  said, Wre ought to obey God
rather than meli."-ACTS V, 29.
t-sing tlhese Scriptures as a basis, I dclesign to examine a great moral
question, that is now agitatilig and somewhat distracting the American
p)eople.  MAy object is not denunciation, or to promote unhealthy excit(.nenit here or elsewhere.  I believe in the supremacy of truth, and
in the safety as well as wisdom of temperate and Christianl discussion.
If I did not, I should not enter upol  the task now proposed.   I ask
no luan to accept the views I shall offier, except as they conform to his
,sense of truth.  They will represent my sense.
One of our Senators in  Cong(ress employed the phrase " Higher
Law,," in such connections as to call forthl much rebuke  at the time,
and expose him to the censure of a portion of his constitue~nts.  Let
us hear the passage as it origiinally fell from his lips
"The Constitution regulates our stewardship; the Constitution devotes the domain to union, to justice, to defense, to weltfre, and to liberty.  But there is a
hieyIret- law than the Constitution, w-hich re(gnlates our authority over the domain,
aid devotes it to the saete noble purposes.   lThe territory is a part-no i!.considerable part-of the comnioii hleritag,e of mankind, bestowed upon them by the
Creator of the universe.  We  are htis stewards, and nmust so discharge our trust
ias to secure, in the highest attainable degree, their happiness."
T'his is the passaoe; and I confess that I see in it no heresy, political or moral, no repudiation of mana   or God.   The honorable Senator
aiffii'ms a coincidence, and not a discrepancy, betweeni the Constitutiot
a,,d the liguer Law; and surely no man in his senses ought to coin1lliii of such ai opl)li.io.
Imiiocent and harmless as is this passage, still, in connection with
other causes, it has had the effect of setting before the American people
a great politico-mnoral question, in respect to which  I deem  it a duty
to explress an opinioln.  I'am a lo-ver of Ply country, without being an
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...;)5 4,7)20 
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appl)l)rover of its wroligs. I believe it, on the whole, the l)est coutIlltl'y
on the earth, made such mainly by its civil and religious institutions.
Nothing which concerns its welfare is indifferent to my heart. Hence,
I ask the privilege of speaking vithl fi'eedom and honesty; the one, a
chartered right, and the other, a solemin duty.  To me it seems proper
that the pullpit should be heard.  T''he crisis demands it.
No one who lhas listened attentively to the conversation of others,
or watched the public press for some months past, can fail to have
perceived the existence of at least two classes of consciences: the one,
a 1,Aw-AIIDiNG coniscienee-the other, a HIGHHER LAW conscience; in
some hands, each repl)udiating and violently denouncing the other.  I
respect both, without relishing the extravagance, and much less the
passions of either.  I belong to both parties, with such qualifications
of my adherence as will be unfolded in this Sermon.   In each I see
some truth-not the vwhole in either.  The truth I see, I hold, and
mean on this occasion to assert, as plainly and as kindly as I may be
able.  I do this as a matter of duty to you, beino related to you as a
pastor.  I do it as an hlunble tribute of honest service to my country.
Let me invoke your attention and candor.
Our present work will be to set befbre vout the two consciences-tlhe
law-abiding and the hiygher law conscience; eac,li qualifying the other,
and both moviing in their proper sphere.  In this it will be mly earnest desire to guard your minds and hearts, and not less my own,
against two fanaticisms: one, the fanaticism that repudiates civil government; the other, the fanaticism  that virtually repudiates God, and
,he eternal distinction between riolit and wrong..  I wish to g)et at the
simple truth, the whtole truth, and nothing but the truth.   IIow far I
'ucceed in this, will be for you to judge, after hearing ine.
FIRST, THE LAW-ABIDING CONSCIENCi -E.
Civil law undertakes to prescribe and enforce somve of the social duties of men.  This is mlade necessary mlainly by our depravity.   Law
is the creature of some organized government, addressing its coimiiiands to the subject, and threatening its penalty in case of disobedience.  It is not miere advice; it is clothed with authority, and is
properly accompanied with tlhe righlt of self-vindication in coercion
and punishment.   The sitleii,cy of law consists in its miainitenancein the due and faithful  administration of it  - principles by its auothor 
iz,ed agents, ani, in its power to control ansd gooverin  the practice of the
subject.  This supremacy is the grand( doctrine asserted by the lawaIbidinyf conscience.  This conscience affirms the sanctity and authority
of lawn, and by consequence, the obligation of obedience.  It sets forth
a moral rule, namely, that obedience to civil law is a religious duty.
It spends its whole strength in affirmiing this duty.   Let the siimple
question be, slall a law enacted by the existing civil authority, or in
process of execution, be respected and observed, treated as a law by
all parties whom it involves?  1 say, let this be the question; and  a
law-abiding conscience always answers in the affirmative.
Such is the general doctrine of this conscience; and as a single particular to be placed in the great temnple of truth, it is unquestionably
correct.  Perhaps I need not argie so plain a point.  Lest, however,
I mighlt seemn to undervalue it in another stage of this discussion, I
will pause a moment onl the question of its truth.
It is manifestly a Scripture doctrine.   This you see in one portion
of our text.  The " higher  powers" spokei of by Paul, were the civil
authorities of the Roman empire.  He declares civil goverment to be
of I)ivine appointment, for the proper regulation of human conduct,
for the protection of society by the punishment of crime.  He exhorts
Christians to be subject to the " higher powers," not only on account
of the penalty, but also as a matter of duty.  It was not his purpose
to assert the Divine right of Ihinys, but of civil government, as sulch,
and the duty of the slubject.  T'ere was special pertinence as well as
wisdom  in this illstruction.  The " highler powers" referred to were
Heathen powers; and there was no little dangyer that the disciples of
('hrist, mistaking the proper sphere of their Christian liberty, migllht
come in conflict with thei -i-might take up the idea that, being Christians, they owed no allegiance to a Heathen magistracy.   Paul, as a
judicious counselor and  faithful apostle, endeavors to guard  themi
against so fatal a mnistake.  Peter took the same course.   "Submit
yourselves to every ordinance of iman for the Lord's sake; whether it
be to the King, as supreme; or unto governors, as unto them that are
sent by him for the punishment of evil-doers, and for the praise of
them that do well." The doctrine of sedition, treason, rebellion, and
tumultuous resistance, in civil society, is not inculcated in the teaching
or the example of the apostles, or in those of Christ himself.  This is
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a perfectly clear point.  Hence,  we say, the Scriptures give  their
sanction to the great princ(iple affirmed by the law-abiding conscience.
Commonll senllse and good citizenship must take the same ground
Society inl the countly or the towni, and eslecially thle latter, cannot
exist a moment, with any safety, if this principle is practically discarded.    Destroy the restraints and retributions of  civil government,
and. leave every man to do as he pleases, and you have so much liberty that you lhav-e none at all;-you are out at sea inl a tremendous
gale, without a rudder or chart.   No man would stay in such a colrinunity any longer thanl it would take lhim to get out of it.  Al Men callnnot live to,ether without the ag'ency of government.   Nothlino is
worse than pure anarchly.  It is the most cruel and( dai-gerous' of all
tyrants.  Goverunment, as the agent in creating and executin'r law,
must have somewhlere a sostainir~ power, else it is no government: it
call do nothing, discharge none of thle duties of governlment-ieithler
protect the innocent nor punishl the guilty.  This sustainingi power lies
in the strong arms, the bones and muscles of men, whlose  services
may  be legally brought into action, to enforce the civil mandate.
Without this, governlnenlt rests on nothing —has  no practicable character-is a miere idea.   If every law it enacts is to be resisted and
put down by popular violence-if every effort to execute the law is to
be treated in the same way-if this is the state of thing's in the co,mlnunnity, thlen there is no goovernmenit of law in that community; society is ill the state of chaos.   Hence, if men wish to live under law,
they must support the supremacy of law.   This doctrine mnust have
some practical and efficient shape, or they canlot live tog'ethler as a
civil community.   Somebody must have a law-uabidin!/ conscience, or
government has no sustaining power.   Wlthatev-er maiyv be the  iliconveniences of this doctrine, at times, or eveni its incideintal injustice, still
the consequences of its practical repudiation would l)e far more serious.
It is a wholesome principle, pre-eminently useful, blessing a vast miany
more than it harms, averting incalculable evils.  I am conscientiously
its advocate.   It commends itself to my comni-on sense, as I have  no
doubt it does to that of the hearer.
Thlis doctrine oughlt to be l)eculiarly welcome  aid sacred to the
Amnerican bosom.   Our Goverlnnent, both State and Federlal, is based
on the represettatiete principle.  We have no law-mvakers or law-agents, 
thini  like popular violence.   They call correct the abuses of Governmnenit withouIt a mob.   Politicians  aIid office-seckers  are vely fonld of
l)eing, w here the peolple are; they gellerally try to think with the imajolity.   Ilence, it is far better to wctit till thle put)lic inid can be eii- 
liglihteied, thlani to atteimpt the cure of aii evil by p)roducilng a gireater
oiie.  (C-ry out agaillst it as long  1111d  as loud  as  you please; write
aainst it; speak against                 it; ry    ist it; vote  against it; but  be
sure to stop here; never lend your  sancetion to tuilultuous or illegtd
iesistance.   Thlis liust be the doctrine of the Ainericaii citizenI; silnce
4)111' ('ii  iiistituticlls are liot olly  vwholly drawn  firom   the peop)le, but
h    lve no sstaini(ng'   ower  exce1)t iii tlir law-a-biding spirit.   I cai)
thinik of 11o occasion  likely to (ccll, ill wliilch I would be the advocate
of a iivtller course.   If by  lopulal  tniiilts you miay  rel)iudiate law oIL
olle sul)bject, you ily ol  anotlice.   Tle prncill)le is full of its dangers,
especlaily so  in a l:,'public.   It  lns ettls the very founldatioi of  civil
society.   It can have 1no lace ini th]e convnictionIs  or sympathies of the
virtuou-s,and (ici1'tcll:l ci tiz en.  Titis great  colliininitv of  fiemn
liiist go'  a',co ig   ) /ct,,, ori tlicy linust't) to lruin.   I spe(ak StrioiiglI
Oil thllis 1'oilt; fbr  I' l?-e a'lways felt stronigly.; atd    do not  feel  less
.so 11ow-.   The civil autlhorities  ilust  put dowin  miii)bs, iliimateni-l Wltt
tllh{ issue 1)e; ad tl le i)eolle lmst;staill t-el.
So illlh I off(er fr yvon' conlsidlerition  ill favo   of t le, w-ahbi,din'
conlsciell(e.   Tlie g:',ii   princie((  it atlirlns, I hold to l)e a saced trutll.
'Ihe'harl   of tlis idea  l]owever, loes  not lie in its a1pl'1c'ttion to(
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s. I *..  I       e   ~s 
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al unjus8t aiid cruel law, but in the fict thalit it is vital to the stability
and safety of civil society.  Here is its excellence-here the retison,l
,which commenII d it to the good snse and patriotic feelirgs of men.
The maii who silences his mforal sense in respect to injustice ancd wrongi
by pleading the supremnacy of law, vwho Inot onliy al,taius irmn al illegal resistance, but also declines the use of lawful mieasures to, correct
unjust enlactments, whose NNhole conscieclee is summlled up i the single senteice, "I believne ia the supremacy of the laws," with whoml
this is the whole idea, who refuses to apply his eonscience to the moraG
nature of a law, and his energies, if nee} be, to a constitutional remnedy; that man, in nmy judgiment, does ino justice to himself or his lega,
privileges, and perhaps not to his nioral duties.   ie shiuts up his eyes
as a moral being,  lani pairrot-like shoutts the supremacy of the law,
anl shouts nothing else.  -ie mis.ppies the doctrline, forgetting his
duties.  His example need only be imitated to imake a bIuad law a perizanent fixture.  Betsweei  hiim and mie tlhere is no debyate ats to the
:ual)remaey of law while it exists; but neither of us shotlxd cancel our
0bligation to seek the eorrnection of legal injustice by a mere glorificatio()n Mi the ground of our common faith.   lie says to me, "I am  a
law-abiding man."   Very well; I am glad lie is; so am I.  I am also
.a law-coi'recting man by such measures as arie la-wful.  I do rIot go for
the plerpettity of unjust laws any longer than is necessary to procure
their miodification or rep)eal.  My duty to seek this is periectly consisent with all due respect for law wrhile it exists.
There is another perversion of this doctrine, against which the citizeni ought carefully to guaid his mind.  I-le should never associate
with it the practical assumption that law is beyond the reach of inoral
inquiry, that law is the end of the chapter, as infallible as it is autho ritativ-e.  This is a vemr  dangerous, and it may be a very immoral
course.  Law proceeds firom  imperfect, and somnetimes very wicked
meni.   It has often legalized the greatest wrongs, legislated the gross est crile iiito eiil virtue, and the purest virtue into crime.  Hence it
will not do in maintaining its supremacy, also to maintain its moral
infallibility.  The latter doctine is properly no part of the former, and
in the bosomi of the citizen should b-e kept distinct fiom it.  The king,
caii do no wrong-can require no wrong; law is always right in morats.  Whiat is this?  Political popery —the (l(octrine of (ldesplotisim, 
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unwvortihy of a home in the breast of a freeman.   In the American
theory of civil s(ociety, law claims no such attribute.  It confesses its
own fallibility ill the provision for amelndment or repeal.  Henee the
question whether it is right or wrong, wh(,tlier it ought to be continued
or not, is not to be ignored or repudiated by declaring its supremnacv.
I hold to the supremacy of no lunnan laws in tihe senise of their infal
libility.  They mnay eontradict God's law; thiiey may violate the plaint
est dictates of natural justice; and whether they do or not, it is mn
prii-ilege and duty, and equally yours, to have an opinion.  If I think
they do, the voice of anmy reason and conscienee is not answered by my
faith in the supremacy of law.  I then believe that the laws are bad,
in themselves morally vieiotts, though not less really laws, and that
all proper mea-iis should be used for their speedy amendment.  We
must hold on to this doctrine, else our law-makers will become Popes,
and the people lose all the rights of private conscience.  If there is
danger in taking too much from Governiment, there is also danger in
conceding too much to it.  One thing I nevler can concede; I never
can say that a Governinent is doing  right, when I think it is doing
wrong;
There is another circumstance that ought always to be taken into
account, when we speak of the supremay of law, especially in a Republic.  Law upon its merits, ald not simply its authority, ought to
be addressed to the good sense and  nmoral feelings of the community
where it is to be executed.  It has no powver to change the conviction.s
of men in respect to the subjects to which it refers.  It can not make
a fireeman think that black is white, or white is black.  It can not sulk
vert the Christian ethics of a community, even by its supremacy.
Hence, it nmust not assume that the subject is a brute, and that he will
blindly swallow anything and call it sweet, that comes to him with a
legislative endorsement. Law, in a firee country, has no such charm.
You must go to the scenes of despotism and popular ignorance, in order to realize this result. In this land a law against the sense of the
people, be that sense a prejudice or a just sense, is always the lawgiver's folly.  It comes into existence with the sentence of death
upon it; and though it is a law, still on its merits it is not welcome
to the subject, and must ultimately be repealed or modified. This is
the fate of all laws, that upon their trial are found to misrepresent the 
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public will.  They are born to die.  They must run a short race.
Their supremacy cannot save them  from  the ordeal and the dcloom  of
the press and thie ballot-box.   It is well that it is so; for in this way
we rectify legal mistakes in the peaceful and orderly method, without
insurrections or mobs.
SECONDI,Y, THE HIIGHEi LAW CONSCIiE\CE.
The cardinal propositions affirmed by this conscience, are these:First, that thlere is a God: Secondly, that this God is the moral governor of the universe: Tlhirdly. that everv rational creature is directly
a subj(et of his government: Fourtlily, that God's will, when ascertained, is in all possil)1e circumstaces the suplreine rule of duty: anrd,
finally, that every moral creature is by hilmself altd for himself bound
to know the I)ivine will, and, w-lhen  knowing it, never to deviate fiom
it.  These are the great doctrines of this conscience.  To the vision of
piety thleir statement is their  ])roof.  1)eny them, and you overturn or
make morally impractible the government of God;  you release man
from his allegiance to his MaIker, and ulpset all religious systems, that
of the Bible not excepted.  Tiey are not to be denied, but admitted,
be the consequences wlait they  l,may.  They  are true, or nothin    is
true.  If they are not true, duty is a fiction —moral conscelenciousn\.:ss, a
whim —responsibility to ou. MAake, a delusion; and even God himself
is nothing in respect to the duties of men.  I hold these truths' l-s      e
I hold the elements of the Ilighler Law Conscience.  I confess nmyself
to be the subject of such a conscience.
In order to advance to a just aIpplication of these principles, vwe
must pause a moment on a questioi of fact.  God does not administer
his moral government over men simply and whl-olly thlrough the agency
of ci-.-il government.   If hlie did, tlhe sunm of all his commands would
be obedience to "the powers that be;" they would be taken as the
authoritative explonents of all the statutes of the Eternal Throne
aind the subject would be referred to themn in all cases, to know the
will of God. Were this the fact, there could  be no conflict between
Divine and hunian authority; the former would always be identified
with the latter; God's WHOLE will biii(r alwavs found in man's law.
This is not the case.  It is our dutv to pray, to clothe the naked and feed
the hlungry, to do justly, love mercy, and walk humbly  with our God.
Indeed, a great many duties besides subjection to the civil magistracy, 
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are taught by the liglt of nature, and  equally ill the Bible.  Hence,
there may be a conflict between the retuirellets of the civil authorities and those of God.  HIe is not so identified witlh them, neither does
he so guide their action, as to make the result ii-l)ossible.  The event
has often occurred; that is, ma  has commaniided one thiong, and God,
the opposite, miakiing obedience to both a natural impossibility.  This
tact is not to 1)b put out of sio~ht by the clamors of a incre law-mania.
It is a fact. W'hile it is true that there is no higier law than the law
of God, which requires obedience to civil governmenit, it is equally
true that this is not the wvhole of God's law.   ie has givenl other laws
as well as this; and withi tlc e civil goovcrnment may come in direct
conflict.  l)oes God require the subject to obey man, when the latter
requires hiiii to disobey God?  This s a 1oint not fairly and properly
met by some, who have recently publishedl their views on this subject.
Bear these observations iin  find.  AWe slhall have occasion for their
use in another stage of this inquiry.
There are two distinct applications of the great principles set lorthli
by the Higher Law Conscience, in regard to each of which I will express an oplinion with its reasons.
1. The first refers to the powers that be, consiclered as the creators
or executors of law.  Are there any rules of morality for governments, 
for nations, as such; or do they create their own morality at option?
Are law-agents responsible to God for what they do, and equally with
the citizen subject bound by the principles of tlhe Higher Law?   We
hold tlhat they are. Our President, in his receint message, has uttered
this sentilment.  Ile says, " Tlhe great law of morality ought to have 
a national, as well as a personal aund individual app)lTication." Whatever has a moral nature as riglit or wronig, consonant or otherwise
withl the will of God, as disclosed in, his ~Vord or in the sacred rights
of humI anitv, before legislation and comipacts touch it, retains that nature.  Morality is a fixture in God's universe, neithler made nor unmade
by government, alike the legitimate sovereign of nations, kings and
subjects.  It is antecedent to all constitutions and laws-is the rule
by which we try their equity.  Were it otherwise, there could be no
retribution for national crimnes; government might become a coinspilacy -
of unpunished assassins; and the agents of enormous wickedness
might, by their official character, flee firom the moral jurisdiction of
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the Divine law.  G(od holds all ienc responsible to his rule of right,
whether thev are associated as a nation or exist in the state of nature,
whether they are citizens and subjects, or are trusted with the duties
and powers of the civil magistracy. They can not innocently act in
conflict with the Higher Law.
Assumning your assent to this view, let me remark that there are
two practical questions which claim an answer.
Suppose tiat a people are adopting a Constitution for government,
or that law-makers are giving birth to legal enactments, what in this
stage of affairs is the relation of the Higher Law?  Plainly, it requires
them to establish justice, protect right, and provide for the punishment
of wrong, to legislate not against God, but in coincidence with his authority.  They ought to produce just and impartial laws.  This is the
nission and proper aim of civil government.   It is not to be the
instrument of despotism and oppression, but of justice and safety.
The  preamble of our national Constitution sets forth the true doctriae on this subject   "We, the people of the United States, in order
to foin a more perfect union, esulblish  justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare,
and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." This is a sound creed.
Suppose, again, government to be established, and that the execution of its will has passed into the hands of the duly authorized agents
of law, what are they to do? I answer; execute that will as it lies on
the statute-book, or in the fundamental law of the land. Suppose,
however, that the laws themselves, one or more, are so morally vicious,
that the agents can not execute them without sinning against the
Higher Law; what then? I answer, this being their view, they must
either execute the laws or resign their trust.  They must either fulfill
the oath of office, or vacate it.  There is no other alternative.   On any
other principle, civil society would sink to ruin in the hands of its executive agents. A man who holds office contrary to his conscience,
must not plead conscience against its duties.  Which shall they do?
Shall they keep their oath and do wrong, or vacate the office and do
right?  I answer, without one moment's hesitation-the latter.  They
are wanting in moral honesty unless they take this course.   A mili 
1.5)
tary officer, for exaipl)le, who is coimmianded to fight, but who believes
fighting to be sinfuil, must either fight or send in his protest and resignation.  The view he takes of war in general, or of a particular war,
makes the latter his only possible course.  Ile must not hold the fighting commission, and yet refuse to fight at the legal call of his country.
Neither must he fight against the mandate of God.  Hence he must
resigon.
Thi ese are miy views ill respect to the application of the Higher Law
to the powers that be, whether you consider them as a nation establishing the principles and rules of government, or as the personal
.(ag)ents of that gov7erliment.  Both are amenable to the God of truth;
and the HIigher Law ought to be the ultimate standard of both.   Neither has a right by any legal process to trespass upon the supreme
rule of riglht.  It will be sin in either.
2. Let us now, secondly, look at the application of the Hiigher Law
to the citizen-subject.  Of course it lp)resents no difficulties, where Divine and human laws are in harmony-where morality and legislation
wear the same features.  It is their conflict, and this only, that makes
an occasion to test the authority of each.  This conflict may come u)
in one or the other of the following practical shapes
The first is where government, in the judgment of the people, has
become so unjust and oppressive, as to be utterly destructive of its legitimnate and proper ends.   In such a crisis, the people have the in-,
lierent ri,ght cf revolution, by which I miean the total subversion of)
the government that exists, and the erection of a new one.   Tyranny.
iand despotism have not an eternal license.  The duty of obedience'
has a lim)tit somewhere; when a sutiering people may say to legal ty-}
rants, "Begone!-We  can dispense with your services.  We cannot
tolerate you any longer."  The undertaking is  always Ian awful one.
It is open rebellion.  It is to be the last resort of an oplpressed people.|
It is never expedient except when there is a fair hope of success; yet,
whenl the crisis comes for it, then the act is not treason, lIut a legitimate revolution.  Government is not suc(hi ani ordinance of God, that
it maay not write its own do,om.  Tle right, however, of actual revolutioil never beloings to a   i    bit, but alwa,ys to the majority. While 
thle man2?(1/ say, let government  stand( as it is, the few must aquiesce,I
and bear its grievances.   Thev lhave ao other alternative. 
This assertion of the revolutionary ri)ght will not, I trust, sound
strangely in Amnerican ears.  It is the doctrine of the Declaration of
Independence.  This government is founded upon the inherent right
of revolution.  Great Britain drove our  fathers to its exercise; and
had she triumphed, would have lhunig thein as traitors, though we believe they were patriots-lovers of their country and their kind.  No
Amierican, surely, will repudiate this fundamental right of the people.
The rights of government are the gift of God to the PEOPLE, and by
the people to the king.  His powers exist by their consent, and terinmate with their dissent.  NVho doubts whether the collected people
of Europe have a righit to dethrone every monarch, and sweep away
the whole system of aristocracy, that of the Pope not excepted, and
establish free governrient? Austria thought Hungary to be guilty of
treason, and butchered her heroes to satiate her vengeance.  We think
her to have been glorious in her struggle-not less so in her fall.
The namne of Kossutli has a charmI, as the eimbodiment of the revolutionlary right.  The Pope thlought the Italians seditious.  W\e honor
them, and despise the infamrous course of the French nation.  Charles
I. thought Cromwell  and the Rloundheads to be a pack of traitors.
lPosterity regards themi as the apostles of civil liberty.  Forget not
that nearly all the liberty of the world has been procured by the revo]utioii,ay right; its exercise being actually put forth, or so menaced as
to miake kings tremble.  Generally, despotism  cannot be reasoned into
justice.  For a rule, the people htav-e been compelled to frighten it or
destroy it.
Thus, on this point, my- doctrile, in a word, is this:-In all those
cases where revolution is really a 1necessary expedient, being the only
resource of an outraged p)eople, resistance to tyrants is obedience to
God.  Here the  ligholer Law of righlt intervenes, and jinstly sweeps
:tlvy the powers that be, in order to make better ones.  I grant you
tl)at it is open rebellion against the existing government; atnd tthat it
]nust be crushed, or government  nimust be overturned  by- it.'llie
ground on whichl I defend it, is thlis:-Passive subjection to legal tylannyr has a i i,)i!t; and at this limiit " The highler Powers" lose all
their moral authlority, giving place to those that shall be tlhe product
of a revolution.  This doctrine I hold as a questionl of morallty, aiid
niot nmerely of strength.   ellice, I qualify the dcctrine which  asserits
16 
17
the supremacy of law, by the revolutionary right.  I do not believe,
that revolution upon a just and sufficient occasion is a crime.   I
hold it to be tile virtue and right of the people. I must, however,
add that the experiment is always a terrible one-the last resort; and
that it should be well considered before undertaken.  In a Republic
suchi as ours, I do not see how such a crisis can ever arrive.  It can not, unless our civil otlicers should enter upon a career of despotism,
of which there is not the faintest prospect.  A people living under a
governmlent of chartered rights and limiited powers, whose action they
control, surely have no occasion  to resort to the Higher Law  of
revolution.
The other form of conflict with government on the part of thle citizen, is where not revolution, but obedience to God with non-resistance to man, is both his rifght and duty.  Let me  carefully state my
ground on this point, and ask you to receive it as I state it.
Here are three parties.  God is one; the subject is the second; and
the civil authorities, the third. Between the first and the third there
is a conflict, the last forbidding what the first requires, or requiring
wliht the first forbids-man by law setting aside the imnperative duties
or  prohibitions  of bod's AVord-man, for example, legally require
ins) me to abjure Christianity, or forbidding me to pray, or commandilg me to worship an idol-man, in short, rendering illegal and criminal the duties that (God imposes.  This is the case supposed:  and it is
not merely a hypothetical case. It has often occurred, and it may
again.   Now what shall the subject do  in the premises? I answer
first, hlie must be clear that the supposed case is a real one-a point in
regard to which so far as he himself is concerned, he is the sole judge,
and yet a point where hlie may not innocently lbe mistaken and act the
part of a fool; and secondly, if in his, view the conflict be real, then
lie must oby (o'od rather than men, and as a liartyr meekly suffelr the
conse(uen(es.   I (lo not see how there can be any question as to the
correctness of this answer.  God's law is certainly higher than mnan's.
The apostles acted upon this principle: Daniel did; so did the three
men that were cast into the fiery furnace; and so have all the Christiaii martyrs, nearly every one of tlhem being slain not by mobs, but by
legal enactment. They had not the seditious spirit; they were pious,
willingcr to do right and suffer for it. The most eminent examtples of
3 
18
(Christian virtue have been produced oni this theatre. Obedience to
God even though it conflict with the laws of nmlanl, is as distinctly a
doctrine of the Bible as anv other found in that book.  Sone are disposed to overlook this point, to shove it out of sight.  They seem to
be afraid of it.  I am not afraid of it; to me it is a p]cr-t of the great
system of truth.  Every man believes it, whether hlie asserts it or not.
I can suppose forty cases, in which every one of you would affirm its
truth; and you will mark, if it is true anywhere, then the principle is
yielded, and the only question that remains, is its applicalion, in regard to Nwhich we might differ thoLughl perfectly agreeing as to the
. *1
rinciple.
llut I must not stop here, for I am anxious to give you anl impartial
,view of the w-hole truth.  WAhat shall the civil authorities do, when
the subject disobeys the law of the land on the ground of the Higher
LLaws?  I answer; inflict upon him  its ipenalty.  They have no other
course.  They can never asesime what hlie alleges, that there is any
conflict between the law of the land and the law of God.   They can
never make his conscience the rule of penal retribution at the hands
of goverlnment.  T'iey must alwvays assume that the law is right, and
that he is wrong, and is therefore to be treated as a criminal.  Without this moral consciousness in fact, go-vermnment is a gross  and detestable hypocrite.  It can never surrender its ideas of what is right, and
yet possess authority.   This  would  be  a confession of judgment
against itself, and disarm it of all its power. It would leave every
man to decide for himself not simnply the question of his personal duty,
but also in what cases law should punish him   that is, his conscience
would be the law of the  land, and the criminal  would be his own
judge.   This would be oiving him the rights of the sul)ject, and at the
same time the p)rerog(ratives of the sovereign.  Now civil society can
never concede this to the conscience of the private citizen.  It would
be tantamount to the destruction of all law.   The subject violates the
law for the sake of obeying God, knowing when he does so that government will deem himn mistaken and punish him accordingly.  He makes
his choice between the precept and the penalty; and chooses the latter-that is, hlie chooses suffering in his view for righteousness sake.
This is a fair transaction on the part of the subject towards the sovereignr; and it may le a very virtuous one. 
19
But which, it may be asked, is right?  The subject says, " I am, I
correctly expound the Higher Law."   The powers that be, say, "We
are, we understand justice and right." In respect to their action they
are both right; each must follow their reslpective sense of duty.  But
which is righ.t really-that is, has the right sense of duty?  Who is
to decide this question? This must be left to posterity and to God.
Every professed martyr virtually appeals to posterity and to God,  to!
review his case, and settle the question whllether lie was a martyr or a
fool, a good man or a bad one.  A great many who have died as crimninals, are on the records of glorious fame.  The judgment of posterity
has reversed that of the age, in which they suffered.   And  then God
has instituted a tribunal based wholly on the principles of the Hiigher
Law, for the trial of all these affecting cases.  At this tribunal God
Himself will give a final and impartial dlecision, canvassing the responsibilities, beliefs and motives of both parties.
Thus, my brethern, without passion or prejudice, I have endeavored
to give you  my sober  and earn.est viewvs in respect to the question,
that was started in the outset.  In this I hlave consulted the creed of
no party, the preferences of no class of men, but the best light of my
own reason, gRaided by the word of God.  Both consciences, the lawabiding and the ]Highei,aawv conscience, have a place in a correct
system of Christian Ethics.  The first is supreme except where qualified by the second.  To repudiate this, is treason to God for the sake
of loyalty to man. I advocate both principles, assigning to each its
proper sphere.  I want to be a good citizen in the land that gave
me birth, and whose laws are my protection. I want more to be a
good citizen under the government of God.  Iii respect to both I have
a conscience.  What that conscience is, has been explained.
Many of the views recently expressed on this general subject, have
failed to satisfy my mind.  They lack what  Locke the philosopher,
used to call "the reound-about view."  Some of them are greatly wanting in prudence; others, exceedingly doubtful in morality; others,
positively immoral.   Some  have  so urged  the Higher  Law  doc-\
trine, as virtually to throw off all the obligations due to civil government,  and advance very near if not quite, to open treason.  They
would almost dissolve civil society, or at least stop its operations, by
the force of their own  conscience.   Others have  rushed into the 
20
extreme, pressing the duty of obedience to the civil authorities as if it
had no limit, except in the rare cases of revolution."  We confess no
little surprise. that even ministers of Christ should preach this as the
morality of the Bible.  What will they do with the case  of Daniel,
of Shadrach, MAeshach, and Abednego, of Peter and John, of Paul himself, and the long line of Christian martyrs?  Do they mean to repudiate the allegiance to God evinced by these men, though in conflict
with the laws of man?  This is really a new doctrine, and as dangerous as it is new. Let it be proved that human government is such an
ordinance of God, that all its decrees are to be taken as the infallible
expresssion of HIis will; and then, we shall have  the Divine right of
kings.  The citizen will then have little else to do but seek God's
whole will in the laws of the land. This is the very worst kind of
Toryism-better suited to the dark ages than to the 19thl Century.  It
makes civil government to be what God and truth never made it. And
still others have failed to distinguish between the declinature to obey
an immoral mandate of civil government, and a positive forcible resistance to the execution of its lawrs-things morally as wide apart as the
poles. Men, even great men, when excited or unduly captivated with
one idea, run into extremes. They shout a single thought, true in its
proper sphere, in a way to make practically a false impression, and inculcate heresy.  I have sought to shun all these extremes, and speak
to you as nearly as possible, in the language of simple truth.
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE QUESTION.
This question at the present time is exciting much interest in all
parts of our country. As I doubt not, you have supposed that I would
make some reference to it in this sermon.  The capture of fugitive
slaves on Northern ground, and their return to Southern bondage,
present a very grave matter for a Christian. I have an opinion on this
subject, not hastily adopted-one which I;refer to state, rather than
leave it as a matter of inference. I know of no good reason why you
should not know what that opinion is; and if you will hear me
patiently for a few moments, you shall be thus informed.
My first opinion is, that it is best for all men to keep cool, to separate between their passions and their moral convictions. Men of equal 
21
respectability do not see alike.  The Northern mind is confessedly in
an unsettled state; and I can see nothing to be gained by a crusade of
denunciation.  Some, in their zeal to stop "agitation," almost repudiate the right of free discussion, except for themselves.  This is as bad
in policy, as it is questionai)le in principle.  In a free country it always
costs more to yag a man than it does to hear him. Violent and passionate denunciation frightens no body in this land. Ihence, I think it
best to keep cool. I mean for one to have my own opinions, and yet
I mean to know what I say, and what I do.  I think this becomes every
nl;~l.
In thie next place, there are some facts to be looked at as facts.  It
is a fact, that the Constitution of the United States is the fundamental
civil law of this land.  It is also a fact, that this Constitution does
provide for the capture of fugitive slaves, and their return to Southern
bondage.   Let me give you the words:-" No person held to service
or labor ill one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another,
shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged
from such service or labor; but shall be delivered up, on claim of the
Farty to whom such service or labor may be due." *  The term slave
is not used, but the thing  was meant.  The circumstances, too, in
-which  the agreement was made, were not those of the present time
yet tlhe agreeminent has not, by any legal process, been canceled. It
still remains on the national charter-the contradiction of all its other
principles.  It is also a fact, that a very large number of slaves have
fled fromn their masters, and taken refuge in the free States.  Some of
them lih tv-   become members of Northern churches.  MAany of them
* The legal reason for this provision is very plain. Slavery is not recognized
by the law of n tions. Hence. as a general doctrine, the moment the slave leaves
the local law of bondage, he becomes free;-he does not carry his legal chain
from one civil commnunity to another. The States in this Republic are distinct and
separate communities, existing in the bosom of one nation.  If, therefore, there
were no provision in respect to fugitive slaves, each State might determine for itself, whether the local law of slavery shall follow the victim, when coming within
its jurisdiction The people, in adopting the Constitution, agreed that it shouldthat the question should not be left to the option of the States.  They made an
exception to a general rule of justice. They agreed that a slave, by the laws of
one of the States, escaping into another State, should not in the latter become a
freeman, but should be delivered up on claim of his legal owner.  They limited
the powers of the State in this respect, and by the Constitution created a State
obligation.   The  manner of legally ascertaining the facts supposed, is not
specified. 
22
have entered into the sacred relations of domestic life-have become
fathers and mothers; and probably some of them are even citizens.
Every one of them is legally liable to be captured and returned to
slavery. They will be so, till they die, or the Constitution is altered,
or they flee to another land. I pity them with all my heart. Their
condition is a sad one. It is an awful spectacle in a free country.
These, my brethren, are facts.  It does no good to deny them, or to
reason as if they were not fileacts.  WThat then shall be done in view of
such  facts?   I can answer this question  only for  myself, as an
individual.
If I were a Southern man, and a friend of the Union-as I am not
the former, but am  most cordially the latter-I should, with my present views, say some things to my fellow-citizens at the South.  This
would be the substance of my speech:-As a matter of prudence, patriotism, and wisdom, I would advise them not to insist on the constitutional right secured by this provision.  The argument I would use
in support of this advice, is various. I would tell South Carolina, that
she has on her own statute-book, laws in respect to colored citizens of
other States, that expressly nullify the national Constitution; and that
the wise way for her would be to keep quiet.   I would remind the entire South, that in three instances, namely, in the purchase of Louisiana, of Florida, and the annexation of Texas, the national government
exceeded its constitutional powers for the benefit of slavery: that although the nation has acquiesced in these acts, still there is not one
syllable to show their constitutionality. I would also exhort the South
to remember, that when this provision was admitted, it was not understood to be p)cr?naent, slavery, then, being supposed to be on its
death-bed.  I would point them to the fact, that they have never been
able to recover a sufficient number of these fugitives, and in the nature
of things never will be, to make the experiment one of any great prac2
tical value to them.   The slave, once at the North, has facilities for
escape that not the most stringent laws can ever supersede.  And  finally, I would ask them to turn philosophers upon human nature, and
as such to remember, that the capture of slaves on Northern ground,
by any process, with law or without it, must necessarily be a sore and
exciting offense to the mass of the people. It brings directly before
their eyes one of the very worst scenes of slavery-a scene for which 
23
they are not prepared, and with which niothing call make them sympathize.  Northern civilization has entirely outgrown the thing. There
is a strong element of religious feeling adverse to it; and this feeling
takes hold of the better classes-men who have stern convictions, and
form no inconsiderable portion of the bone and sinew of the Northern
mind.
Now, in view of all these circumstances, the dictate of prudence for
the South is, not to excite either themselves or'the North with the effort to capture slaves in the flee States.  This would be the greatest
peace measure" tihat can be adopted.  The thing cannot be done
without excitenient on both sides; and all the " Union mnieetings" in
creation w-ill not be able to avert the result.  The sympathies of nine
mnen in ten at the No'rth aree, and must be, on the side of the fugitive
slave.  The fact is a credit to their humanity.  It is not fanaticism
and wildfire, but the natural and necessary effect of existing causes.
Hence, I would say- to the South: —If you wish quietude, let the runaway slave go; you will not catch one in a hundred by all the laws
that can be put into action, and this will never pay for the evils produced.  I would say, this if I were  a slaveholder, and at the same
time a friend to tie pete of the Union.
Sul)ppose, however, tlhe South do not choose to act uplon this advice;.
suppose they insist upon the execution of the provision, as they have
a constitutional right to do-what then?  This is the pinching question.  I will endeavor to meet it with candor.  It has two sides, both
of which deserve our attention.
On the side of the Southern claim is the argument drawn from the
compact in the national charter; and as a constitutional question, it is
a complete and perfect argument. Of this there can be no doubt. The
States cannot constitutionally legislate against this provision; they
cannot repudiate it without invading the terms of thoiiational charter.  I am  not aware that any State has ever attempted this.  No
State has the power to do it, except in violation of the Federal Constitution. Those who have lectured the Northern conscience on this
subject, use this argument, and this'oIly.  That it is a strong argumient, no candid man will deny.
On the other side of the question, is the argument drawn firom  the
Higher Law-a law  much older than the Constitution.  This argu 
24
ment conitemplates the moral nature of thie thing to be done, and affirnms its essential iniquity.  To my conscience, as an individual, this
too is a complete and perfect argument.  I am not able to view the
act in any other light than as a gross moral wroing against the victim.
I put the matter directly to the conscience of thl  hearer.  If it is not
morally wrong before God to capture a man who has committed no
crime, and forcibly drag him back to a bondage he loathes, and has a
right to loathe, and which he has done his best to shun-if this
be not morally wrong, then -whlat is there in the distinction between
the right and wrong, that is of any mloment?  Answ-er my  qlestion. What would you think of the act, if made its victim?  Is it
any better for another than it would be for you?  Possibly, my judgmient on this point is in.correct.  Whether it is or not, depends on two
questions; first, whether the slave is a MAN; and secondly, whether
the principles on which this governlment is founded, are true-whether
there is any truth, reality, or sacredness in the natural and inherent
rights of mian, as a moral and immortal being, made in the image of
his God; whether the Divine law of love and equal justice to our neighbor has any claim upon human regard.  I hltve no seer,ts on this subject.  I will not shout one thing il the public ear, and protfess another
privately.  MIy view of man is such, tllht I could neith.r agre.  to (do
the thing, nor do it to fulfill the agreement of otlhers. I would sooner
die than be its agent.  The Hi(gher Law of Et/erial Rig,ht would be
in my way; and by its decision I must abide.
If, however, the civil community of which I am but a member, and
in which I have t7he rights and resl)ponisibilities of but a single man,
loo'kingio at this sabject in all its relations, judge  differently: if the
good people of the State of New York, for example, have either less or
a better conscience than I have; then, let them execute thle provision
in the most equitable legal way; and all I will do, is in these two sentenees: As a moral being I will, whenever it is my duty so to d(I), put
on record nmy expression of the wrong: As a good citizeni I will submit.  Hlere I stand in moral conviction; and here I lillust, or be a
traitor to the God who  made  me.  Those  who urge the argument of
the compact which we have honored in its place, and even some of God's
ministers who have spoken on this subject, are very careful to keep
clear of the nmoal question.  Foirgettiiig this point, they make a very 
25
oasv matter of it. Let them tell us distinctly, in plain Saxon English,
what they believe in respect to the righteousness or unrighteousness of
capturing men and sending them back to the bondage of Slavery. Let
themi not shun this question, but fairly meet it; and then both the
South and the North will understand them.  If the thing is morally
right, then say so; if not, then say this.  We concede that it is consti tutionral, while we believe it to be morally wrong.
Hiere it may be asked-Do you suppose the North wish to repudiate
the Constitution as a whole, and dissolve the Union on account of this
provision? This may be the feeling of sonme; but there is no evidence that it is so with the great mass of the people.  It is not my
feeling, when  I look at all sides of this embarrassing and difficult
question. I have no idea that now such a compact could be formed;
but being formed, there is no evidence to show that the civil authorities, if called upon, would not execute it, and that, on the whole, the
mass of the people would not sustain them.  The ground would  be
solely the argument drawn from the compact, and not at all the merits
of the thing to be done.  While my moral convictions are and must
A)e against it, still, I see no other course that  is consistent with the
terms of the Union, so long as the States remain together under the
provisiolns of the national charter. Thie people feel the obligation of
constitutional law; and so do I as much as they; yet, being a subject
of God's government as well as man's, I feel the obligation of the
Higher Law more.  "Not that I loved Caesar less, but Rome more."
No compact, no law man ever made, shall restrain me from the declinature of what I believe to be a sin. The obligation of an oath even
has its limitation; for no man is morally bound before God by his oath
to the perfornmance of a wicked and immoral act.  Yet, he must not
profess to keep it, and at the same time mean to repudiate it.  This is
insincere-a virtual perjury.  So the Northern States must not profess
a compliance with all the terms of the Constitution, unless they mean
to be faithlfil to its injunctions.  From this there is no escape, without destroying the legal sanctity of the instrument.
It may be asked-IHow will you reconcile these declarations of colnscience wvithl the legal duties of good citizenship under the Constitution
of the United States? I answer: My citizenship in its relations to
earth must never be so interpreted, as to annihilate all the rights and
responsibilities of a personal conscience. My citizenship is no obliga
4 
26
tion to execute the will of this nation, or any part of it, unless I am its
officer and chosen to remnain such.  The Quakers believe it to be wron g
to fight. Hence, they refuse to bear arms; yet, they do not resist the
civil authorities when collecting the militia fine. They suffer this penalty for conscience sake. Are they traitors? Are they bad citizens?
Now in respect to the capture of the fugitive slaves, I stand on the
Quaker principle. I will neither do it myself, nor say that I think it
right when done by the civil authorities. But does not this imply some
reflection upon the Constitution? It expresses my honest conviction in
respect to one of its features. I have never been taught to worship
that instrument, or highly as I appreciate it, to assume its perfection
as a standard in morals, especially in those clauses which refer to
slavery.  Let it not be forgotten, that this very Constitution contains
the toleration of the foreign slave trade for twenty years-a trade
now declared piracy puniishable with death; that is, the people made a
bargain to tolerate for twenty years what the nation now visits with its
highest penalty.  Was the thing any better for the bargain?  Did it
cease to be a crime for this reason? Forget not that morality and
God are older and more infallible than the Constitution, and that a
compromise with wrong for the sake of union does not convert it into
right. Those who choose to give up their mzoral sense to the decisions
of the Constitution, let them do so; I will not. I acknowledge no such
citizenship under any government man ever made, as destroys the present obligation invariable and irrepeaiable of the Supreme Rule. What
then will you do in respect to the wrongs of your country? Just what
I am doing to-day: give you my opinions; state what I believe to be
the truth; do my best to have those wrongs rectified.  Anything else?
Nothing else. Here I stop, where good citizenship and God equally
bid me to pause. This is my creed as a Christian, being a citizen.
In respect to the recent Fugitive Slave Law, professedly built on
this provision of the Constitution, I will say a word. The conflicting
opinions in regard to it abundantly show, that it is not adapted to meet
the public sentiment of the North. To me it seems questionable,
whether Congress has any legislative power in the premises.   The
provision in the Constitution for the delivery of fugitive slaves is not a
grant of power to Congress, but the imposition of an obligation upon
the States.  Such is the published opinion of Daniel WVebster.  In
his speech in the Senate, March 7th, 1850, he says: "I have always 
27
thought that the Constitution addressed itself to the legislatures of the
States themselves, or to the States themselves. It says that those
persons escaping into other States shall be delivered up; and I confess
that I have atlways been of opinion that that was an injunction upon the
States themselves.  It is said that a person escaping into another State,
and becoming therefore, within the jurisdiction of that State, shall be
delivered up. It seems to me that the plain import of the passage is,
that the State itself, in obedience to the injunction of the Constitution,
shall cause him to be delivered up.  This is my  judgment; I have
always entertained it; and I entertain it now." Such is the opinion of
Daniel Webster.  Whoever examines the Constitution, will fail to find
any grant of power to Congress express or implied, to p)ass a fugitive
slave law. He will find a compact addressing itself to the States, and
making the delivery of fugitive slaves a matter of State obligation,
and therefore of State legislation.* And here I frankly confess that if
it were left to the State, I see no way, in which she could constitutionally avoid the obligation, when the claim for the slave is established by
"due process of law," without repudiating so much of the national
charter. The Constitution does in plain words impose this duty upon
* The Federal Government is, in the strictest sense, a Government of chartered
powers.  The Constitution is its charter.  Upon Congress it confers all the legislative powers of this Government.   These are granted by clauses referring to
specific subjects, and by the Eighth Section of the First Article, which after enumerating seventeen particulars of Federal Legislation, makes a grant of implied
powers, namely, "To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this
Constitution in the government of the United States, or any department or officer
thereof." This is not a grant of implied powers, to carry into execution all the
provisions of the Constitution, but to execute all the powers expressly vested by
the Constitution in the Federal Government. Where then is the grant of power
to this Government, to legislate in respect to fugitive slaves?  Nowhere, unless
in the provision bearing on this subject.  Is this such a grant of power?  Read
it; see, if upon its face any such idea appears.  It is a clause of compact between
the people of the respective States, restricting the States from passing any laws
discharging the fugitive from the legal condition of slavery, and imposing on them
the duty of delivering him up on claim of his owner.  It is a capital mistake to
assume, that all the provisions of the Constitution are grants of power to the
Federal Government. Many of them are provisions of compact, limiting state
powers, or defining State duties.  The provision securing to citizens of each State
the privileges and immunities of citizens in the respective States, and also the
provision for the recovery of fugitives from justice, are of this character. The
same is true of the one in respect to fugitive slaves. It creates a State obligation;
and clearly a State obligation is not a grant of Federal powver. The common
complaint of the South, that the Northern States have not done their duty on
this subject, confesses that the d,livery of fugitive slaves is the work of the
States; for if not, then they have no duty to perform. If it is, then it is not properly the work of the Federal Government. 
the States.  I am sorry that it is so; but my sorrow does not change
the fact. This is the sad consequence of an agreement to do wrong.
The main ground, however, upon which  the North have  most*
strongly objected to the recent law of Congress, is to be sought in its
features.  It is to be remembered, that at the North we have no slaves
and no slave-laws.   Hence  every  man, black or white, is legally
presumed to be a freeman, until he is proved to be a slave.  It is also
to be remembered, that the provision of the Constitution does not point
out the process, by which the fact of slavery as against a person
claimed, shall be judicially ascertained. It simnply says that the slave
shall be delivered up.  What! any person whom allnother may choose
to claim as a slave? Surely not this; but the person who is proved
to be such as the Constitution describes, namely, a fugitive slave.
Here then is manifestly a trial on a question of fact. Is the man a
slave? The mere fact, that he is claimed as such, is no proof. There
is a fact to be proved before a competent tribunal, before the Conlstitution in the remotest sense puts his liberty in peril. How shall this
question be tried?   We answer; it ought to be by the ordinary
method of judicial procedure-by what is known in the Constitutions
and usage of the country as a "due process of law"-that is to say, a
regular, open trial by a JuRY of fieemen, hearing the evidence and
pleading on both sides, and then giving a verdict accordingly. The
burden of proof, by the rule of justice, falls wholly upon the claimant.
He must show all the facts supposed in the Constitution, in relation to
the particular man he claims; namely, that the man is a slave under
the laws of one of the States-that he the claimant is the owner, or
his authorized agent-and that the person has made  his escape from
his legal master. These facts ought to be proved to the satisfaction
of a jury, before the legal presumption of freedom is surrendered in
the Free States. If, in any instance under the sun, a jury trial should
be had, it is when a man is tried on the question, whether he is a
freeman or a slave. This question ought to be thus settled before the act
of delivery takes place.  Let it not be said that it can be tried at the
South, after the delivery is effected. The North ought never to sur render colored men to be transported to thi  South, and there tried
under the presumptions and disadvantages of the slave code.  This
would be injustice. It is practically equivalent to consigning them to
slavery.  The act of delivery is in effect a verdict of slavery against
*::-   f A:.  *~~~~~
28
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29
the man.   Suppose, that hlie is a freeman;  how  is he to show it
where a black skin presumes slavery, and possession presumes title?
How is hlie to procure witnesses, and provide himnself with a competent
defense? The delivery of a person claimed as a slave, is essentially
unlike that of a fugitive from justice. The latter is delivered up that
he may be tried by an impartial jury, with all the legal securities of a
freeman.   Such is not the fact in regard to the person alleged to be a
slave.  Hence, the legal ascertainment of slavery, by a "due process
of law" as recognized where the claim is prosecuted, ought to precede
the delivery.  So it strikes a large portion of the Northern mind;
md I confess, this is my judgment, as a Christian and a citizen.
What, then, are the objections to the recent Fugitive Slave Law?
I answer; it does not conform to these principles. It disposes of the
whole question in a "summary manner." Without the form of so
doing, it in effect nullifies the right to the writ of Habeas  Coipus.
It precludes a trial of the questions of fact by a jury. It contains the
anomaly of judicial tribunals created by other tribunals-a principle
wholly unknown in the legislation of this country. In respect to the
rule of testimony to be had in the case, it throws all the advantages
on the side of the claimant, and against the person claimed. It makes
acts of hospitality, and gospel mercy to the unhappy fugitive, a
crime for which the agent may be severely punished.   It authorizes
the officers of the law, to compel the services of the people in cal)turing the slave, and returning him to bondage. In a word, it is an
effort to carry out, upon the soil of freedom, the legal principles and
practice of the slave-code. Such a law would be very much in harmony with Southern institutions and ideas; but is not so with those
of the FREE STATES.
I might sustain this general estimate of the law by a long list of
very respectable authorities. I will give you two opinions.
The Hon. Josiah Quincy, Sen., remarks:-" Could  it have  been
anticipated by the people that a law would be passed superseding that
great principle of human freedom, and that in this State, (Massachusetts) in which the claimant of ownership for a cow, an ox, or a horse,
or an acre of land, could not be divested of his right without a trial
by jury, yet that by the operation of such a law, a citizen might be
seized, perhaps secretly carried before a single magistrate, without the
right of proving before a jury his title to himself, and be sent out of 
30
the State, onil the certificate of such single magistrate, into hopeless
and perpetual bondage; it is impossible, in my judgment, that the
Constitution of the United States could have received the sanction of
one-tenth part of the people of Massachusetts."  Again he says:-" The
people of Massachusetts understood that such claim should be enforced, in conformity to, and coincidence with, the known and established
principles of the Constitution of Massachusetts." Again he remarks:
"Let the laws upon this subject be so modified as to give to every
person, whose service is thus claimed, the right of trial by jury before
being sent out of the land, and the universal dissatisfaction would be
almost wholly allayed."-New York T'ibune, Oct. 17 th., 1850.
The other opinion proceeds from the Governor of Ohio, in his recent
message to the Legislatureof that State. lte objects to the law on
the followingr grounds:-" Because it makes slavery a national, instead of a State institution, by requiring the costs of reclaiming the
slave in some instances to be paid out of the United States Treasury:
because it attempts to make ex parte testimony, taken in another jurisdiction, final and conclusive, in cases where its effects may be to enslave a man and his posterity for all time, and commits the decision
of this question of civil liberty to officers not selected for their judicial
wisdom or experience: because it attempts to compel the citizens of
free States to aid in arresting and returning to slavery the man who is
only fleeing for liberty, in.the same manner as they would rightfully
be bound to aid in arresting a man fleeing from justice, charged with
the commission of a high crime and misdemeanor: finally, in relation
to the manner of trial, and other particulars, the law is contrary to
the genius and spirit of our free institutions, and therefore dangerous
to both free and slave States, and consequently ought to be amended or
repealed."-New- York Tribune, -Dec. lo10th, 1850.
Now, I suppose, these opinions represent the general sentiments
held by a very large portion of the Northern people. They deem the
features of the law to be an infringement upon chartered rights, not
required by the provision of the Constitution, and in express conflict
with other provisions of the same instrument. No one will deny that
it has awakened a very strong excitement among the Northern people;
and this is enough to prove that it is not well adapted as a "peace
measure," to settle the vexed questions that have been agitating this
Union. In my judgment, it has made things worse rather than better. 
31
The Legislature of Vermont, for example, has recently passed an act,
securing to the person claimed as a slave, a right to the writ of habeas
corpus, and directing the judge  issuing the writ, to order a trial by
jury on all the questions of fact involved in the issue. This takes the
person claimed from the jurisdiction of the Commissioner, and places
himi  under State law.  It is not done for the protection of the slave
against the demand of the Constitution, but for the due protection of
her own citizens.  Vermont virtually says by this act, that no man on
her soil shall be deemed a slave, until so adjudged by a jury. It is
her legal protest against not the end, but the features of the Fugitive
Slave Law.
I think it a great misfortune to both sections of the Union, thait
Congress should have passed the law in question. It does not, and in
its present form never can, answer the mission of a "peace measure.'"
If it is to be practically a dead letter on the part of the South, this
will be one thing; but if it is to be executed with stringency and rigor, then I mistake public sentiment, especially in the interior of the
country, if the petitions are not long and loud for its modification or
repeal. I do not see how, in view of all the facts, we can reasonably
expect any thing else. It is well to look at facts as they are on all
sides, as well as one side.
After having heard this expression of my views in regard to the law
itself, you may ask me, what shall be done, the law having been
passed? I deemn it a privilege to have the opportunity of answering
this question.
In the first place, let every citizen remember that our system of government provides a competent tribunal to test its constitutionality.
While it is to be lamented that legislation should ever be so extraordinary, as to make its constitutionality even doubtful, still, no private
citizen can authoritatively settle this point.  This must be done by a
tribunal having jurisdiction. I have an opinion, and so have you, and
both of us have a right to an opinion; but neither your opinion nor
mine is clothed with any legal authority. This fact should be remembered by those who warmly condemn the law. They may express
their opinions; yet they are not the legal judges in the case.
In the second place, let no citizen, be his opinions what they may in
regard to this law, think himself entitled to resist the civil authorities
in its execution. The moment he does this, he makes a new issue 
32
one in which he ought to be crushed.  Ile has no right to an oirinion
that shall be made the basis of rebellion.  If, in his judgment, any or
all of the requirements of this law are in conflict with the Higher Law,
then let him obey God, always remembering that God does not require
him to fight the civil authorities; and if there is any penalty incurred
by this course, then let him  meekly suffer it.  This is orthodox for
both worlds.   While I could not force one of my fcllow-creatlres into
bondage under any law it is possible for iman to create; yet, if I were
a civil officer, required to do it lby the legal duties of my office, I
would either do it or resign my trust; and I should certainly take the
latter course.   This is good morality also for both worlds.   I would
not hold the office, and violate my oath.  I would not hold it, and
violate the Higher Law.  Hence, I would not hold it at all.
In the third place, let no citizen feel himself authorized to advise the
fugitive slave to arm  himself, and prepare for a deadly conflict with
the civil authorities, in case of an effort to arrest him  under this law.
I regard sucl. advice as positively immoral.   I regard it as wanting in
every element of good sense.  Whlatever may be the motive, the man
who gives it is not, in fact, the friend of the slave, or of the community in which he lives.  He has not well considered his own  words
and, in my judgment, is justly obnoxious to public censure.  If lie
wore himself to do what he advises others to do, hlie would be guilty
of open treason.  He patronize,s a war upon civil society in an illegal
way.  Much as I hate slavery and slave-catching, I have no synmpathy
with this doctrine.  The natural and inherent right of self-defenlse is
not the natural and inherent right of slayqhter for no purpose, for no
attainable end.  I would not fight for fireedom even, wheni I should
be sure to involve both myself and others in greater calamities by it.
If I said  anything to the fugitive slave, I would  exhort him to
(quietude, to good behaviour amid his griefs and dangers; and  if he
could not feel safe in this land, then w'ith sliaie ind sorrow of soul I
would point him  to the north star, aid tell him, if possible, to quit a
coiuntry of so much peril to himself.   I p)ity him, though I cannot
iutnake the fact that he is legally a slave in this land, go where  he
wevill.  He cannot destroy this goverinment, and I do not wish to do so.
HItece I cannot tell him to fight.   I He never will at my instigation.  I
reprobate the advice.  This advice has been severely and deservedly 
rebuked.  Yet, we cannot withhold the expression of our regret, that
some who have ministered this rebuke, had not applied  their con science with equal intensity to another moral question.  As Christians,
what do they think of capturing and returning men to slavery?
In the fourth place, this law like every other, is amenable to the
power of public sentiment. It has no sanctity that places it above the
judgment of the people. If it misrepresent their will, nothing can save
it from repeal or modification. It is one of the glories of our system,
that when the people are displeased with a law, they can freely discuss
it, and then vote it into its grave. It takes a little time to do this; but
the event is always certain. In respect to this law, I wish for it no
other  doom  than  the legally ascertained judgment of the people.
Those who think it right as it is, let them  advocate it and vote
for it. This is their right-as much so as it is mine not to do so, dis senting as I do fiom their opinion.  If the majority think as they do,
the law will stand; if not, it will not stand.   For one taking into
view all the circumstances of the nation, I doubt the practical wisdom
of any attempt to alter it by the present Congress; yet, I greatly misinterpret the signs of the times, as well as the character of the Northern
heart, if this law is not ultimately modified, especially if the South
seek to use it with rigor.  And in the meantime, I protest against any
effort to silence or frighten Northern sense on this subject. I do honestly suppos't,, that Northern people have a right to think, and freely
to express their thoughts.  I am a Unionist, and so is the great body
of the Northern mind; yet, I doubt whether this Union is to be preserved by getting up a panic. Congress enacted this law; and it has
as much power to change it as it had to make it.  To say that its
modification or repeal will dissolve the Union, is a confession that some
people are ready for treason. Much as I dislike the features of the
law, I am willing to wait till an ascertained public will can do its
work; and in the meantime, let no man think himself acting the part
of wisdom or duty, in denouncing his neighbor for a difference of
opinion.    Let us have light and love, always  remembering that
no one is justly required to put out his own eyes, or repudiate either
his common or moral sense, for the sake of love.
In the fifth place, as I doubt not, the President of these United
States will do his official duty, as the Chief Magistrate of this nation
" take care (I am  quoting his recent Message) that the laws  be
5
33 
34
faithfully executed." As a citizen, I honor the doctrine, and the man
for its utterance.   As a public officer, acting under the solemnity
of an oath, he has no other course; we the people, no other safety.
Hle is the sworn executive of the will of this nation, legally ascertained.
The will of this nation is not that there should be rebellion anywhere, North or South. Hence, if necessary, as I hope it never may
be, he must crush it by the last resort of government-the power of
the sword. HIe is to show no favor to the accursed spirit of treason.
I mean this equally for both sections of the Union. A portion of the
South, not all, I hope, not a majority, yet a portion have fallen into the
habit of saying to the Federal Government, "You must do this, and
you must do that, or we will dissolve the Union." Whoever tries this,
-I trust, will have an ample opportunity to judge whether this is a
practicable government, whether it has any power, and can execute its
own laws. If government must coax and pet every man who chliooses
to whine, then it is no government. Both the North and South are
in this Union; and if we have a faithful President, as I trust we have,
they will stay there. Let it be well understood, that this government is to go forward and do its proper work, making laws or
altering them at the command of the public voice; let it be
known that traitors are to be hung as high as Haman, that the
first man who is guilty of treason within the meaning of the Constitution, forfeits his life, and so of the second, and the third, and
so on; let not a threat be followed by a panic, but met with that
calm and dignified firmness that becomes government; and there
will be no civil tumult anywhere; the party of disunionists will
lose all their thunder, and run down to nothing. There is n(, occasion for a resort to the revolutionary right. There are no grievances that call for it. Neither section has so invaded the chartered
rights of the other, as to justify in either a rebellion against the Federal Government.
It is a species of incipient treason to be constantly threatening the
dissolution of the Union, in case of certain contingencies. Hie who
openly resists this Government, who attempts to revolutionize it, let
him be treated according to law. He starts a new question, very different from the one whether slavery and slave-catching are right or
wrong. With him on this point I have no sympathy. If the Government, State or Federal, pass a law which, in his judgment, impo 
ses duties in direct conflict with the Higher Law of his God, then let
him obey God, and quietly suff,,r the legal consequences, if there be
any, leaving the final judgment to decide whether he was a martyr or
a fool.
And, finally, let us commend our country to the God of nations, in     voking the care and direction of his Providence.  Nations as such, are
amenable under His government.  In His sight "righteousness exal     teth a nation, but sin is a reproach to any people."   Of the nation
that will not serve God, it is written, that it shall perish, that it shall
be utterly wasted.  There is no principle truer, none of more thrilling
interest to this Republic, than that God  holds organized comlnunities
responsible for their conduct. The American people must do right,
and thus please God; or in due season the day of vengeance will
come.  His favor is more important than a vast navy, or strong ram     parts, or the skill of politicians. Let us invoke that favor. Let us be     seech the great God to dispose events for his own glory, and the na     tion's good. There are great dangers in our pathl. There are serious
evils that call for redress. There is an awful incongrluity in our prac     tice, evidenced in the melancholy fact that on this soil of freedom,
blest with the purest civil system  man ever formed, millions of our
fellow-creatures are doomed to the toil and bondage of slavery.   The
sigh of the bondman has entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth.
Say what we will, conceal it as we may, slavery is our great danger    the most stupendous form of wrong found in the bosom of this people.
It always has been, and always will be, the curse of a people who
practice it. It is the source of our present difficulties. It has outlived
its day.  It oughlt long since to have gone to rest.  It is the fretting
sore of our institutions. It ever will be a difficulty, until a rectified
public sentiment shall demand and secure its removal. Neither by a
divine, nor by a human right, does  it exist on this soil.  That sober,
and honest, and earnest, and moderate counsels-not the less deter    mined for their moderation-free, on the one hand, from the spirit of
reckless passion and wild denunciation, and on the other, from that
dishonorable policy which is ever ready to sacrifice the truth;-coun    sels neither palsied by a panic, nor driven by a storm of fury-coun    sels commending themselves to God for the equity of their purpose,
and the wisdom of their mode-counsels that embody the honest and
mnanly sense of enlightened Christian men, exercising their rights, and
i
35 
doing their duty in the fear of God:-that all this is needed, greatly
needed, in all parts of this Union, is very apparent.
I see not what benefit is to arise from the sundering of the political ties that make us one nation. I thank God that there is
very little desire for this at the North.   Most of the menaces
proceed from the South. Let them well consider before they act.
The attempt would be to themselves the most perilous experiment,
a misguided people ever undertook. The weakness is withthemselves. The power of this nation is not in their hands, if brought
into effective and vigorous action. This power is in the free
States; and there it must remain, by the inevitable necessity of a
natural cause.  May God preserve the South  from committing
themselves to the dreadful issue. I can conscientiously and piously pray for the peaceful perpetuity of this Union, and not less
so for the removal of the evils that constitute its danger, and
most expose us to the displeasure of God.  This is my prayer.  I
trust it is yours, while to-day we thank our common Father for
blessings past, and implore others yet to come.
In closing let me say, that you now have my whole soul on
this great subject.  God is my witness that I have not made  a
speech for Northern or Southern ears, to manufacture capital with
either.  I despise the infamous trick on a theme of so much importance.  I have not sought to nmagnify one truth at the expense
of another. These are my sentiments. So I believe. Not a
sentence has fallen from my lips, which, so far as I can now perceive, I should wish to recall.  I came here not to please or offend any body, but to speak the truth according to the best light
of my own understanding.  Whether these opinions suit you, is
for you to settle. I have, under a solemn sense of duty, assumed
the responsibility of their utterance; and I do not expect to disclaim it.  Thanking you for having attentively listened to these
observations, I now commend you, and my country, aud the slave,
to the guidance and mercy of that God, whose government is always just, whose grace is equal to our wants, whose providence
is our personal and national shield, whose law is the HIGHEST in
the universe, and at whose bar both speaker and hearer will soon
appear.  May He be merciful to us all!
36