DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
ORRESPONDENCE
lIELATING TO THE
RECALL OF MR. MOTLEY
TRANSMITTED TO THE SENATE
JANUARY 9, 1871,
INT COMPLIANCE WITH A RESOL UTION.
WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1871.








41ST CONGRESS,              SENATE.                       Ex. Doc.
3d Session.                                             No. 11.
MESSAGE
O F TIIHE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
COMMUNICATIN G,
In compliance with the resolution of the Senate of the 5th instant, the last
correspondence between Ir. Motley, as minister to the Court of St.
James, and the Department of State.
JANUARY 9, 1871. —Read, ordered to lie on the table and be printed.
To the Senate of the United States:
I transmit to the Senate, in answer to their resolution of the 5th
instant, a report from the Secretary of State, with accompanying documents.
U. S. GRANT.
WASHINGTON, January 9, 1871.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, January 9, 1871.
The Secretary of State, to whom was referred the resolution of the
Senate of the 5th instant, requesting the President " to communicate to
the Senate, if compatible with the public interests, the last correspondence between BMr. Motley, as minister to the Court of St. James, and
the Department of State, together with such other dispatches or papers
touching the subject-matter to which such correspondence relates, including all telegraphic dispatches and other communications relating
to his recall," has the honor to lay before the President the correspondence and papers called for by the resolution.
HAMILTON FISH.
The PRESIDENT.
List of accompanying papers.
1. Mr. Fish to Mr. Motley, No. 3, May 15, 1869.
2. -Mr. Motley to Mr. Fish, No. 8, June 12, 1869.
3. Mr. Fish to Mr. Motley=, No. 23, June 28, 1869.
4. Mr. Motley to Mr. Fish, No. 48, July 15, 1869.
5. Mr. Motley to Mr. Fish. No. 49, (private and confidential,) Jul y
15, 1869.
6. 3Mr.r Motley to Mr. Fish, No. 65, July 30, 1869.




2                RECALL OF MINISTER MOTLEY.
7. Mr. Fish to Mr. lMotley, No. 75, October 11, 1869.
8. MIr. Motley to Mr. Fish, No. 131, October 28, 1g69.
9. fMr. Fish to MBr. Motley, (no number,) July 1j 1870.
10. Mr. Fish to Mr. Motley, (telegram,) July 127 1870.
11. Mr. Motley to Mr. Fish, (telegrams,) July 14, 1870.
12. Mr. AMotley to Mr. Fish, (no number,) July 14, 1870.
13. Mr. Fish to Mr. Motley, No. 285, Novemnber 10, 1870.
14. Mr. AMotley to Mr. FTish No. 529, December  7:1870.
15. 1Mr. Fish to A r. Moran, No 54, December 30, 1870.
1. rfr. F1ish to MMr. f oti1,
N.o. 3jo                        1):EPnlIPNARTMENT 01  STATE,
Wras hington, lay 15, 1869.
SiPr  Amongs  the matters thaLtt were the subject of negotiation between your imlediate predecessor and her KMajesty's secretary of state
for'oei-on affairs was a proposed convention for the regulation of the
citizenship of the citizens and sulbiects of the respectivTe countries emigrating to the territories of the other.
These negotiations resulted in a protocol, signed on the 9th day of
October, 1868, showing the principles agreed upon by the two powers
upon the question of naturalization. But inasmuch as legislation was
necessary in Great Britain to carry these principles into operation, it was
uagreed that thlle protocol should not take efiect runtil such legislation,could be had.
Inclosed you hlave Ca copy of the resolution of the Senate of the 13th
ultimo advising, and consenting to the conclusion of a treaty, upon the
basis of the aboave-nained protocol, and also full powers authorizing you,
when the necessary legislation shall be had, to execute, on behalf of the'United States, a, convention embodying the principles contained in the
protocol.
On the 14-th day of January, 1869, iMr. Johnson and Lord Clarendon
signed, in London, a joint convention referring to arbitration the water
boundary under a!rticle I of the treaty of June 15, 1846. On the 30th
January last the President transmitted the convention to the Senate,
and it was made the subject of consideration in that body; but the Senate has adjourned without coming to a vote on the same. You will
please communicate this fact to Lord Clarendon, and say that, in the
usual order of business, it will be befbre the Senate again on its reassemlbling in December next.
Your predecessor has already been directed to notify Lord Clarendon
that the Senate has refused its advice and consent to the ratification of
the convention signed at London on the 14th January last, for the settlement of all outstanding claims.
Under some circumstances, the announcement made to your predecessor of the rejection of this convention might be sufficient. But the
magnitude of the claims involved, and the gravity of the questions depending between the two governments, require more than the imere announcement, to which the delicacy of his own relation to the negotiation
limited the direction to him.
This Government, in rejecting the recent convention, abandons neither
its own claims nor those of its citizens, nor the hope of an early, satisfactory, and friendly settlement of the questions depending between
the two governmentls. You will so say to Lord Clarendon, and, in your




RECALL OF MINISTER MOTLEY.                   3
discretion, you may further proceed to communicate the views given
below.
The terms of the convention, having by accident become known to
the public in this country before the action upon it by the Senate, were
disapproved by the people with an approach to unanimity that foreshadowed, possibly, even a less favorable vote on the question of its
ratification than was actually given.
This adverse judgment, while unanimnous, or nearly so, in its conclusion, was not reached by any single train of argument, nor from any
one standpoint of policy, nor with any single standard of estimate of
the claims either of the nation or of its citizens, nor with the same degree of importance attached to various points that have been discussed,n the correspondence referred to in the convention. Various sources
furnished currents running through diffeing and widely separated
channels, but meeting to form one common stream of thought.
Both with the people and in the Senate, different minds, viewing it
from different standpoints, each measuring by its own standard, and
judging in its own way, arrived at the one conclusion.
The time and the circumstances under which the convention was
negotiated were very unfavorable to its acceptance either by the people
or the Senate.
The nation had just emerged fron its periodical choice of a chief
magistrate, and having changed the depository of its confidence and its
power, looked with no favor on an attempt at the settlement of the great
and grave questions depending, by those on the eve of retiring from
power, without consulting or considering the views of the ruler recently
intrusted with their confidence, and without communication with the
Senate, to whose approval the treaty would be constitutionally submitted,
or with any of its members.
It is wholly unnecessary to say to statesmen of the intelligence which
always marks those of the British Empire, that the rejection of a treaty
by the Senate of the United States implies no act of discourtesy to the
government with which the treaty may have been negotiated. The
United States can enter into no treaty without the advice and consent
of the Senate; and that advice and consent, to be intelligen t must be
discriminating; and their refusal can be no subject of complaint, and
can give no occasion for dissatisfaction or criticism.
On the 12th of  May, 1803, a convention between the United States
and Great Britain for settling the boundaries on our northeastern and
northwestern frontiers was signed at London by Mr. Rufus King and
Lord Hawksburg, on the part of their respective governments, and submitted to the Senate by President Jefferson, with a message of the 24th
of October in that year. The Senate approved of the  convention, but
upon the condition that the fifth article should be expunged, a condition
which was never complied with.
On the 31st of December, 1806, Messrs. Monroe and Pinckney, on our
part, signed at Londoni a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation with
Great Britain. This instrument was not acceptable to President Jefferson, as it contained no article providing for the security of United States
seamen from impressment. Consequently the treaty was never even laid
before the Senate for its consideration.
A convention for the suppression of the African slave trade was
signed at London on the 13th of March, and submitted to the Senate by
President Monroe, with a message of the 21st of May, 1824.' This convention, also, was approved by the Senate with conditions which were
not accepted by Great Britain.




4                RECALL OF MINISTER MOTLEY.
Upon one point the President and the Senlate and the overwhelming
mass of the people are convinced, namely: that the convention, from its
character and terms, or from the time of its negotiation or from the circumstances attending its negotiation, would not have removed the sense
of existing grievance; would not have afforded real substantial satisfaction to the people; would not have proved a hearty, cordial settlement
of pending questions, but would have left a feeling of dissatisfaction
inconsistent with the relations which the President desires to have
firmly established between two great nations of common origin, common
language, common literature, common interests and objects in the advancement of the civilization of the age.
The President believes the rejection of the convention to have been
in the interest of peace, and in the direction of a more perfect and cordial friendship between the two countries, and in this belief he fully
approves the action of the Senate. That action is quite recent and has
been the cause of some excitement and popular discussion on both sides
of the Atlantic, and possibly of some little disappointment, if not of
irritation, in England. The tone of the press and the proclaimed opinions of some public men in each country suggest that the present is not
the most hopeful moment to enter upon a renewed discussion, either of
the objections to the lately proposed convention, or of the basis of a
renewed negotiation. A suspension of the discussion on these questions
for a short time (but in communicating with Lord Clarendon you will
be particular to assure him that the desire on our part is that this suspension be limited to the shortest possible time consistent with its
object) will allow the subsidence of any excitement or irritation growing out of the negotiation or of the rejection of the treaty-will enable
the two governments to approach the more readily to a solution of their
differences.
The President hopes that her Majesty's government will view the
propriety of the suspension in the same light in which he proposes it,
as wholly in the interest and solely with a view to an early and friendly
settlement of the questions between the two governments.
He hopes that when the question shall again be considered, it may
comport with the views of her MIajesty's government to embrace within
the scope of the negotiation some agreement by the two governments,
defining their respective rights and duties as neutrals in case the other
government becomes unfortunately involved in war with a third power.
The absence of some agreement or definition on this subject was among
the causes leading to the rejection of the recent convention, under
which, had it been adopted by the two countries, none of the grave
questions which have arisen would have been passed upon by a tribunal
whose decision either party (much less other nations) would regard as
authority, so as to prevent, repetition or retaliation. It might, indeed,
well have occurred in the event of the selection by lot of the arbitrator
or umpire in different cases, involving, however, precisely the same
principles, that different awards,. resting upon antagonistic principles,
might have been made.
If, hibwever, the two great leading maritime commercial nations of
the world establish a rule to govern themselves, each with respect to
the other, they may reasonably hope that their conclusion will be
accepted by the other powers, and will become for the future recognized
as a part of the public law of the civilized world.
The President recognizes the right of every power, when a civil conflict has arisen within another state, and has attained a sufficient complexity, magnitude, and completeness, to define its own relations and




RECALL OF MINISTER MOTLEY.                    5
those of its citizens and subjects toward the partles to the conflict, so
far as their rights and interests are necessarily affected by the conflict.
The necessity and the propriety of the original concession of belligerency by Great Britain at the time it was made have been contested and
are not admitted. They certainly are questionable, but the President
regards that concession as a part of the case only so far as it shows the
beginning and the animus              of tconduct which resulted so
disastrously to the United States. It is important, in that it foreshadows subsequent events.
There were other powers that were contemporaneous with England
in similar concession, but it was in England only that the concession was
supplemlented by acts causing direct damage to the United States. The
President is careful to make this discrimination, because he is anxious
as much as possible to simplify the case, and to bring into view these
subsequent acts, which are so important to determining the question
between the two countries.
You will, therefore, be pleased, in your social and private intercourse
and conversation, as well as when it becomes necessary in your official
conversation and intercourse, to adopt this view of the issuance of the
declaration of neutrality by Great Britain, and the other powers, and to
place the cause of grievance against Great Britain, not so much upon
the issuance of her recognition of the insurgents' state of war, but upon
her conduct under, and subsequent to, such recognition. And it is
desirable that you avail yourself of early and suitable occasion, in your
social intercourse with the representatives of other powers which made
similar recognition, to let them understand the position of this Government on that question, and that the United States make such recognition by them no ground of complaint.
I am, sir, your obedient servant,
HAMILTON FISH.
J. LOTHIROP  TOTLEY, Esq., &c., &C.
2. Mr. Motley to CMr. Fish.
No. 8.]                 LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
London, June 12, 1869. (Rieceived June 23, 1869.)
Sin: On the 10th June I had an interview with Lord Clarendon, at
his house, as owing to a slight indisposition he was unable to go to the
foreign office.
I told him that I had been instructed to say that the United States
Government was ready to enter into arrangements for converting the
protocol signed on 9th October, 1868, in regard to naturalization, into a
treaty, whenever the necessary legislation had been completed by Parliament.
He expressed a doubt whether there would be time for ca-rying the
necessary measure through Parliament during what is left of the present
session; almost every remaining day being assigned for other business,
and there being so many various interests involved in the measure to
be prepared, so far as this country and its Indian and many colonial
possessions are concerned. He did not say positively that it was impossible to introduce and carry through a bill before the prorogation, and
proposed to make some definite inquiries in the proper quarter in regard
to the matter. The report of the commission was voluminous and interesting, but it would require much time and careful deliberation for the




6                RECALL OF MINISTER MOTLEY.
framing of a proper bill to meet all contingencies, and its introduction
would necessarily cause long debates. Meantime the great principles
on which the treaty would be based had been definitely settled by the
protocol, and would stand as a guide in case of international questions
arising before the conclusion of a convention. The theory of indefeasible allegiance was forever abandoned, and although it was not so simple a matter to cover all the complication of consequences growing out
of the new order of things in so complex an empire as Great Britain
as it was in the case of the treaties made between the United States
and the German governments, yet there could be no doubt that at least
in the next session there would be time for the needful legislation. I
made no further remark save to express the hope that so desirable and
vitally important a measure should not be delayed a moment longer than
absolutely necessary —an observation in which his lordship entirely
acquiesced.
In regard to the northwest water boundary convention, I simply observed that there had been no time for its consideration in the Senate
before the adjournment, but that it would come up in the regular course
of business at the future Executive sessions when that body should
reassemble in its next winter session.
I then approached the mornentous affair of the rejection of the claims
convention. I told him that I was fully sensible of the gravity of the
OCcasion, and of the contingencies which would depend on negotiations
concerning such vital, and as they might be called, such burning questions as those comprehended under the simple title of a convention for
the settlement of all outstanding claims. Certainly it was my wish, so
long as I was honored with my present post of envoy, to do what in me
lay toward establishing a wholesome, honorable, and cordial feeling
between two such great nations as Great Britain and the American
Republic, consistently with regard to the honor and interests and the
just claims of my own country. I observed that I had been instructed
to give the reasons why, in the opinion of the President, the treaty
signed on the 14th of January last had been rejected; hitherto nothing
having been said beyond the bare announcement of the fact.  The
United States Government thought it almost superfluous to say that
the refusal of the Senate to give its consent to a convention implied no
discourtesy to the government with which the treaty was negotiated,
and they recognized that the magnitude of the pending questions and
claims required more than the brief statement to which the peculiar
delicacy of the circumstances had limited the first announcement.
His lordship answered that a dry notification of the refusal of the
Senate's advice and consent had been received from the United States
Government, and they had heard nothing more on the subject, except
Mir. Sumner's speech. I proceeded to say-according to my instructions-that the treaty having been, by accident, made public in the
United States before any consultation upon it in the Senate, had called
forth almost unanimous and singularly strenuous expressions of disapprobation from most of the organs of public thought, and many of the
leading minds in the country. Its rejection in the Senate was foreshadowed by the spontaneously expressed feeling of the nation.
He asked me how the treaty happened to be made public before it had
been acted upon. I answered that, as I had been informed, it was by
an accident. More than this I was unable to state. He said it was first
published in the United States-not in England-to which I made no
reply.
I continued my statement by informing him that there were, various




RECALL OF MINISTER MOTLEY.                      7'
causes for the sentiments so generally made manifest in the United
States; some relating directly to the terms, tenor, and nature of the
convention itself, onu which part of the subject I did not propose at that
moment to dilate, and others to the time and circumstances of the
negotiation. Certainly it could not'be denied that the United States
Government, like all other governments, was continuous in its vitality,
and that a treaty negotiated according to the rules was not an affair of
party, nor to be confirmed or rejected on party grounds. The rejection
of the claims treaty, however, was not in the slightest degree ^an affair
of party, as was sufficiently provec  by the vote in which Senators of
every shade of political opinion had emlph.atically united. His lordship
observed that it could not be denied that this result might induce more
cautionI ian future, as when deanlingl- with plenipotentiaries from  the
United States it Awou-ld be necessary for a government, to remember that
there was a, greater power behind them —namely, the Senate. I answered silmply that this force had alwaays been there, no full power from
the United States Governmlent being drawn ulp without the phrase,'"by anl with the avice and consellt, of the Senate," being inserted,
and that the simple line of the Constitution, giving the treaty-lmaking
power to the Presildent contained the familiar limitation. Of course,
his lor(dship manifested his knowledge and appreciation of these facts.
I proceeded to say that this exercise by the Senate of its power to with.hold its consent, im: regard to treaties, waTs nerer capricious, never
occurred except for gravsTe reasons, and ought never to cause dissatisfaction or complain t on the part of the other contracting power, or be
regarded as a discourteous proceeding. I could give him, if he wished,,
many instaances in oiur history of a similar refusal on the palrt of the
Senate, but certainly never had this coordinate right been used by the
Senate more deliberately and dispassionately, or from purer or rnore
ulmlnixed motives, than in'regard to the c onvenition of tihe 14tll of January, 1839.
I thenl set forth_ very full\y in atcordance w'iteh tihe inst-rutious it your'
No. 3, the reasons whly both the Se-nmate and people of thie United States.
had looked with so m-uchl disfavor upon. an attcmnpt to settle questions
of vast importance -:end of momenctous consequntces  or contingencies
exactly at a moment wLeIn a newT chief mag'istrate letd been elected, and
was, witlhin six or seiven weeks of the date of tire trea ty, to be installede
in his great office —and to settle them without-q any consultation, formal
or informal, nwith that, eminent person, or with the Senate, or with any
member thereoi:  I refrained from any further cosLmments on those proceedings, save to indicate theLm  as in themselves aklmost sufficient to
cause a delay in the ratification of the convention evaen hbad its terms
been in themselves far less objectionable.
Having given the causes at length which had brought about the rejection of the treaty, so far as you wished mle to explain them, I went
on to observe that her Majesty's government would naturally -wish to
learn what, in the opinion of the United States Government, was the
proper course to pursue in the premises. I added, accordingly, that I
was instructed to say that, in the opinion of the President, it would be
well to pause for a brief period-a limited interval-not longer -than
might be necessary for the subsidence of violent emotions and public
manifestations of excited feeling created by the rejection of the treaty,
and by the various trains of causes which had led up to that.event, before once more calurly reviewing the situation, and looking the great
issues between the countries, with all their difficulties, dangers, and
contingencies. steadily in the face.




RECALL OF MINISTER MOTLEY.
The President fully concurred in the action of the Senate refusing its
consent to the treaty, not because he wished or hop'ed for war or unfriendly relations between the two nations, but because he wished for
peace and honest friendship. The rejection of the treaty was in the
interest of peace. Its ratification would have covered up a grievance
which most certainly would have continued to rankle and to fester beneath the surface, however smooth the external relations might for a
time seem. Those wounds must be probed before they could be healed.
That there was a deep and alhnost universal conviction among the American people of a great wrong sustained by them during the war, was a
fact with which the two governments would be obliged to dea.l when
negotiations should be resumed.
At present the United States  Government, while withdrawing
neither its national claims nor the claims of its individual citizens
against the British government, would prefer the pause in the negotiations already suggested.
His lordship observed that he saw no objection to this course, agreeing with me that it would be well to give time for emotions which had
been excited of late to subside, although he expressed a doubt whether
among the inhabitants of this country there was any such intensity
of feeling on the pending questions as I alluded to as exigting in
America. He added, with some feeling, that in his opinion it would be
highly objectionable that the question should be hung ILup on a peg, to
be taken down at some convenient moment for us, w-hen it might be difficult for the British government to enter upon its solution, and when
they might go into the debcate at a disadvantage. These were, as nearly
as I can remember, his words, and I replied very earnestly that I had
already answered that question when I said that -my instructions werel
to propose as brief a delay as would probably be requisite for the cooling of passions and for producing the calm necessary for discussing the
defects of the old treaty and a basis for a new one. The United States
Government had no insidious purposes, and certainly I, as its agent,
felt myself incapable of harboring any such objects. He expressed himself as entirely satisfied.
I proceeded to say that one great objection to the treaty, in the opinion of the President, was that it established no principle; and I callec!
his lordship's attention to your very judicious suggestion that the
throwing of the dice for umpires might bring about opposite decisions
in cases arising out of identical principles. He agreed entirely that no
principle was established by the treaty, but that the throwing of dice
or drawing of lots was not a new invention on that occasion, but a not
uncommon -method in arbitrations. I only expressed the conviction
that such an aleatory process seemned a'n unworthy method for disposing
of questions hinging on great principles of law and involving the welfare of nations and the contingencies of war and peace, a remark in
which I understood limn to acquiesce.
I observed further, that tlhe President hoped, whenT negotiations on
these grave matters should be renewed, for the establishment of general
and fundamental principles, binding' upon both nations, in full view of
the fact that what shouldl after ttlis long international debate, be
adopted by the tw-o leading naval and comimercial powers of the world,
as the amlended lpublic law for their own guidance, would probably be
considered as the "     aiifora tglte ci\vilized w-orld. Hislordship
heartily concurred in this view of the-'ta-ise, saying that it was what he
had always earnestly desired, and thltt he had on a former occasion proposed such a general anmending of the laws to MIr. Adams. That distin



RECALL OF MINISTTER MOTLEY.                    9
guished envoy had, however, shown no disposition to engage in such discussion, contenting himself with the observation that he certainly
thought the English neutrality laws nmch in need of amendment.
I expressed no dissent froml the views of my eminent predecessor,
adding that I thought it probable that t-a settlement of principles of
action for the future, without some retroactive effectupon the past, would
not be entirely satisfactory to MIr. Adams, or to other agents of the
United States Government.
I then stated the opinion of the President in regard to the recognition
or concession of belligerency, as stated in your No. 3, saying that the
President recognized the right of a sovereign power to issue proclamations of neutrality between an insurgent portion of a nation and the
lawful governmlent, when such insurrection should have gained the necessary magnitude, consistency, extent of organized power and probability
of justification by success; but that such measures must always be
taken with a full view of the grave responsibilities assumed.
The famous proclamation of neutrality of M3ay 13, 1861, Was not considered justifiable by the United States Government, but the President
wished it to be usedl, when our case should once more be presented, only
as showing animus, and as being the fountain head of the disasters
which had been. caused to the American people, both individually and
collectively, by the hands of Englishmen.
Other nations had issued proclamations contemporaneously, or nearly
so, with that of Great Britain; but from Great Britain alone had there
come a long series of deeds, injurious to the United States, as the fruits
of the proclamation, while from other nations there had come no injury
save the declaration itself:
His lordship here made the observation that if there was to be any
discussion of principles it had better be done thoroughly and to the bottom; that he would always maintain that the English neutrality had
been a fair and sincere neutrality on the part of the English government.
1I admitted at once the difficulty of keeping out of all discussion of a
subject with which English and American minds were so filled, the tendency to drift into debate, even without intending it, being so natural;
but having said essentially all that I was instructed by my Governmlent
to say, I would abstain, for the moment, from further clisquisition.
I said that I had never been in my life more impressed than now by
the magnitude of the responsibility, weighing upon all men who were
charged with maintaining any part of the relations between two such
vast and powerful communities as the British Empire and the American
Republic —nations that could do each other so much injury orI such infinite good. So far as my humble labors should be concerned, I meant
always to do my best, while maintaining the honor and just rights of my
own country and of all its citizens, to bring' about, if possible, a restoration
of equitable and amicable relations between the two governments. I
did not disguise from myself that the path was surrounded by perils.
It was sometimes thought puerile or unbecoming in political or international affairs to deal with the emotions, the passions, or sentiments of
nations. But after all, nations were aggregates of individuals, and how
were we to rule out the sentiments and the passions from national or
individual life? When a deep and pervading sense of wrong suffered,
of grievances unredressed, existed'in a people, it was a fact to be dealt
with, not a sentiment to be ridiculed.  Enlightened statesmen, like those
ever charged with the conduct of English affairs, would never forget
that grave and disastrous misunderstandings and cruel wars resulted as
often in history from passionately excited emotions and injured feelings




10               RECALL OF MINISTER MOTLEY.
as from cabinet deliberations or political combinations. At any rate, it
would be dishonest in me to conceal the fact that there was much excitement of feeling and intensity of opinion in the United States in
regard to the questions at issue between the countries, and to calmly,
but earnestly, call his attention and that of the British government to
this grave aspect of affairs.
His lordship said that, for this very reason, he was glad that this brief
interval of abstinence from discussion had been suggested, and then
expressed himself in very energetic language, with all the signs of perfectly sincere emotion, upon the horror with which he regarded war, or
even permanent alienation, between the two branches of the Anglo-Saxon
race. He could contemplate, he said, the possibility of war between
Great Britain and any other foreign power, but war with America inspired him with abhorrence. He regarded it, he said, as a " crimem no n
nominandum inter Christianos.ll"  He never could bring himself to look
upon Americans as foreigners. Whlile expressing my entire sympathy
with these sentiments, I confessed to a despondent feeling solmetimes as
to the possibility of the two nations ever unmderstanding each other-of
the difficulty, at this present moment, of their looking intd each other's
hearts.
He agreed that both seemed to have the same Saxon stubbornness,
and absolute confidence in themselves, and each in their own. cause.
Where they quarreled, it was Greek meeting Greek meeting Greek.
It would be unjust if I did not bear testimony to the frankness andl cordiality of his lordship's expressions of good will toward the United States,
and to the sincerity of his hopes for a p)eaceful issue out of our threatening complications.
mI nake no apology for this long dispatch. I have endeavored to
report to you as faithfully as I can my first conversation with her
Majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs. If my own
part in the conversation seems to have undlue proportions, it is because
it was necessary for me to give, in exact accordance with your instructions, a full statement of the causes which led the Senate to refuse its
advice and consent to the treaty signed on the 14th of January last, for
the settlement of outstanding claims.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
JOHN LOTHROP IM[OTLEY.
H0on. HAMIrLTON FISH,
Secretary of State.
3. AMr. Fish to Mr. IMotley.
No. 23.]                         DEPAnRTMENT OF STATE,
VWashington, June 28, 1869.
SIn: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch No. 8, dated
June 12, and have read with much interest its narration of your very
important interview with Lord Clarendon.
Your general presentation and treatment of the several subjects discussed in that interview meet the approval of this Department.
In the course of the conversation, however, it seems that the President's view of the right of every power, when a civil conflict has arisen
within another state, to define its own relations, and those of its citizens, was not conveyed in precise conformity to that view, as I desired




RECALL OF MINISTER MOTLEY.                     11
to present it to you, anld as it would doubtless have been conveyed by
you had your communication been made in writing.
The subject may not again be a topic of official communication between yourself and the minister of foreign affairs, but I venture to call
your attention to it, because of the statement in )your dispatch that Lord
Clarendon replied to that part of your remarks by saying that'I if there
was to be any discussion of principles it had better be done thoroughly
and to the bottom."  The President recognizes the importance of a
thorough discussion (whenever the subtject is restnmed) upon all the
points of difference.
He wishes that whenever negotiations or discussion on the subject of
the "Alabama claims s" (so-called) shall be renewed, they be conducted
in the United States; and he desires that at the proper time you should
convey tlis wish to the minister of foreign affairs. It is impossible to
say at present when that time will arrive, but it will certainly have
arrived whenever the British government shall propose -a discuslsioan, or
shall intimate a desire to reopen the negotiation.
in the meantime, you may be well content to rest the question on t he
very forcible presentation you have made of the American side of the
question. It was strongly done, ancd if there were expressions used
stronger than were required by your instructions, the excess was in the
right direction, and stopping where they do, and uttered as they were,
it may well be hoped that they may tend to impress the miniister with
the seriousness of our appreciation of the, grievances we have sustained.
I aim, sir, your obedient servant,
HAMILTON FISH.
J. LOTH'rTOP MOTLEY, Esq., &c. (c.,  I(C.
4. 1jTr. Motley to Mr. Fish.
No. 48.]                  LE;GATION OF TIE 11 I7NITED STT.TE S,
Lozndon, July 1, 1 1869. (Received July 297 1869.)
SiR: I have the honor to acknowledgoe the receipt of your dlispaitch
No. 23, of the 29th of June.
I take notice tlhat you desire that I should rest upon:- the presentation
of the American side of the case, already made by me; and that I
should not further allude officially to the subject, until such time as trhe
British government may propose a discussion or intimate a desire to reopen the negotiation; in which event I am instructed to convey the
wish of the President that the negotiation, or discussion on the subject
of the so-called Alabama claims, should be conducted in the United
States.
You may rely upon my faithfully carrying out these instructions.I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
JOHN LOTHIROPl     A OTLEY.
Hon1. HAMILTON FISH,
Secretary of State, Washhigton, D). C.




12                RECALL OF MINISTER MOTLEY.
5. Mr. Motley to Mr. Fisth.
['Private and confidential.]
No. 49.]                    LETGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
London, July 15, 1869. (iteceived July 29.)
SIn: I observe that while my general presentation of the subjects
discussed with Lord Clarendon, in the interview described in my No. 8,
meets your approval, the President's view of the right of every power,
when a civil conflict has arisen within another state, to define its relations and those of its citizens does not seem to have been conveyed to
her Majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs in precise
conformity with that view, as you desired to present it to me in your
No. 3.
As it is my earnest wish to. set forth the opinions of the ~President
with exactness, I have reviewed my No. 8, after reading your dispatch
just received, and am led to suppose, as you do not specify the discrepancy between those instructions anid my oral statements to Lord Clarendon, that more stress was laid by ine upon the original investiture of
the insurgent portion of the United States population at the outbreak
of the rebellion with belligerent rights by the British government, and
on the steady persistence of that government in its unfriendly and injurious policy, after its injustice  and its pernicious effects had been
proved, than comports with the intentions of the President. The extensive disasters resulting from that hnrried recognition of belligerency
on the 6th of May, 1861, which was, in fact, one week earlier than the
so-called neutrality proclamation, and from the secret semi-official negotiations then inaugurated with the rebel authorities in regard to two of
the four points of the declaration of Paris'of 1856, have always much
impressed me. The careful elimination of the first point, abolishing
privateering, from those early discussions, and the subsequent' refusal
of the British government to accept the proposition of the United
States Government for the suppression of privateering, except on the
condition of excluding its jurisdiction in this regard over the insurgent
portion of its own citizens, have always seemed to me matters of the
utmost gravity, both for their practical effcts and for the iimportant
principles involved.
As the rebel agents il London frankly avowed to the British government, in one of their earliest interviews, that they had neither armed
ships nor a commercial marine of any aceount, and as Englishmen engaging in depredations upon the commerce of a friendly power, under
cover of rebel letters of marque or pretended commissions to public
ships, would have unquestionably been liable to punishment as pirates,
it would seem to have been the first thought of the British government,
although not foreseeing-, of course, the great system  of marauding
which was so soon to be organized by its subjects, to throw over them,
when employed in such pursuits, the protection of belligerent rights.
Thus privateering, abolished at Paris by Great Britain, France, and
other great powers, as contrary to the hunmaner spirit of the age, was
stimulated, instead of being impeded, although damage was thereby
likely to be inflicted upon the commnerce of a friendly nation. It did
not occur to me, in aly first conversation with the minister, that the
rights and interests of B1lritish citizens had been necessarily affected by
the conflict apparently  i npending in the spring of 1861, merely because
some of them  -might be inclined to furnish to rebels those means of
despoiling the United States of which they had declared themselves




RECALL OF MINISTER MOTLEY.                  13
destitute. I did not, therefore, suppose myself to be transcending the
lucidly and carefully-drawn limitations of the instructions in which you
explain the President's views on the subject of belligerency when I
spoke upon that point.
The significant statements, too, of the British government on the 6th
of May, 1861, in regard to the condition which should precede its concession of naval belligerency to the southern rebellion, (the due establishment, namely, of prize courts and regular adjudication of captures,
according to international law,) and the utter contempt shown by the
rebel cruisers and their English allies for this condition, imposed by
her Majesty's government, have always seemed to me points to be kept
in clear view whenever any allusion to the great principles in debate
between the two countries should be made.
You will pardon me that I venture to make this slight explanation of
the considerations which have, perhaps, led me, in official intercourse,
somewhat beyond the strict letter of my instructions.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
JOHN LOTHROP MOTLEY.
6. Mlr. Motley to Mr. Fish.
[Private and confidential.]
No. (5.]                 LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
London, July 30, 1869. (Received August 11, 1869.)
SIRn: I find that I have inadvertently omitted, until now, to inform
you that my dispatch No. 8, of June 12th, containing a minute record of
an official interview with Lord Clarendon, was confidentially submitted
by me to his lordship, in order that there might be no misunderstanding
at any future day as to the accuracy of the report of our conversation.
I accordingly beg now to say that he quite concurred in the fidelity
of the statements of the dispatch as sent to you. I have also to add that
the dispatch was seen by nobody but Lord Clarendon himself, and that
no extract from it was made.
I am, sir, very respectfully, youar obedient servant,
JOHN LOTHROP MOTLEY.
011on. HAMILTON FSISH,
Secretary of State, &c., &c.
7. Jir. Fish to 1Mr. Motley.
No. 75.]                     DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, October 11, 1869.
SIR: When, on the 28th of June last, I answered your No. 8, in which
you gave a highly interesting account of your interview with Lord Clarendon, and of the views which you there presented to him as the views
entertained by the President upon the subjects of the recognition of the
late insurgents in the Southern States as belligerents, and the destruction of American commerce by cruisers of British origin carrying the
insurgent flag, I was not aware that your statement of the conversation
had been submitted to his lordship for his verification.




14                  RECALL OF MINISTER MOTLEY.
Your No. 65, of the 30th of July last, first acquainting the Department with that fact, arrived here on the morning of' a daly on which I
was about to leave Washington for a temporary absence, and through
inadvertence the fact escaped my notice.
As, without an explanation, his' lordship Inay - naturally be surprised
at finding some of the views, purporting to come froin the President,
which are contained in the written paper submitted by you in June last,
inconsistent with the views contained in the paper dated the 25th of September last, whllich you were instructed to read to him, I must ask you
to explain to him that your presentation and treatment of the subject
discussed at that interview  were, in part, disapproved by me, in my
commu nication of the 28th of June last, to which I have already referred.
This you may do by reading to him  such portion of the instructions
contained in my No. 23, of the 28th of June last, as referred thereto, or
by stating to himn the substance of such part of that note, or by a note
containing the substance of that part of may -note, at. your discretion.
I am-n  sir, your obedient servaint,
HARILTON FISH.
J. LoTHROPc MOTLEY Esq., &c., &c., &     c., London.
8. 3Mr. Motley to M r. Fish.
No. 131.]                     LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
London, October 28, 1869.  (Received November 9, 1869.)
SIR: I have had the honor to receive your dispatches Nos. 75 to 79,
both inclusive.
I beg to transmit herewith copy of a note addressed by ime to Lord
Clarendon, onil the 23d instant, in reference to the interview of June 10,
and to your dispatch, read by me to his lordship, on the 15th instant.
And I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
JOHN LOTHROP MOTLEY.
Honl. HAMILTON FISH,
Secretary of State.
MIr. Motley to Lord Clar endon.
LEGATI()N OF THE UNITED STATES,
London, October 23, 1869.
MY LORD: In reference to the conversation which I had with your lordship on the
10th of June last, and to the dispatch from the United States Secretary of State, which
I had the honor to read to you on the 15th instant, it may have possibly appeared that
there was some inconsistency between the views of the President upon the subject of
the recognition of the late insurgents in the Southern States as belligerents, and the
destruction of American commerce by cruisers of British origin, carrying the insurgent
flag, as verbally expressed by me at the interview in June, and those views as set
forth in the above-mentioned dispatch, I think it necessary to inform your lordship,
therefore, that the Secretary of State, on reception of my dispatch recounting the substance of the conversation in June, observed to me, in a dispatch of the 29th of June,
that it did not seem that the President's view of the right of every power, when a civil
conflict has arisen within another State, to define its own relations and those of its
citizens, had been conveyed in precise conformity to that view as the Secretary of
State desired to present it to me, and as it doubtless would have been conveyed by me,
had my communication been made in writing.
I would therefore request your lordship to consider the dispatch of the United States
Secretary of State, which I read to you on the 15th instant, and a copy of which I




RECALL OF MINISTER MOTLEY.                         15
have had the honor of sending to your lordship, as containing the exact and authoritative statement of the President's views on this subject, as laid down in all the instructions given under his directions by the Secretary of State.
I pray your lordship to accept the assurance of the highest consideration with which
I have the honor to be, my lord, your lordship's most obedient servant,
JOHN LOTHROP MOTLEY.
The Rigrht Honorable the EARL OF CLARlENDON,
~.c., ~c.,,y~c.
9. MIr. Fish to Mr. Motley.
- Private.]
DEPArTMIENT OF STATE,
WFashington, July 1, 1870.
SIR: I am instructed by the President to say that he finds it desirable
to make a change in the mission to England, and that he wishes to allow
you the opportunity of resigning, in case you feel inclined to do so.
With great respect, yours, very truly,
HAMILTON FISH.
J. LOTHROP MOTLEY, Esq., &c., &c., &c., London.
10. 3Mr. Fish to Mr. Motley.
[Telegrani.]
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, July 12, 1870.
Am-i directed to say the President would like an answer by telegraph
to my letter of first instant.
FISH.
_MOTLEY,
Minister, London.
11. 1M1r. Motley to Ml1r. Fish.
[Telegramn.-Received July 14, 1870.]
I respectfully request you'to inform  the President that I feel conm-pelled to decline the offer which he makes in giving me an opportunity,of resigning my post, for considerations which are set forth in full in my
letter of to-day.
MOTLEY,
London.
F    _ISH,
8&ate Dnepart nent, Washington.




16              RECALL OF MINISTER MOTLEY.
12. Mr. Motley to — Mr. Fish.
[Privte. ]
LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES
July 14, 1870. (Received July 2Q, 1870.)
SIR: I have had the honor to receive your private letters of 1st instant, from which I learn that you are instructed by the President to
say that he finds it desirable to make a change in the mission to England, and that he wishes to allow me the opportunity of resigning in
case I feel inclined to do so.
In compliance with the request contained in your telegram of 12th
instant, I have replied this day to the above-mentioned letters by a
telegram in these words:
" I respectfully request you to inform the President that I feel compelled to decline the offer which he makes in giving me An opportunity
of resigning my post, for considerations which are set forth in full in my
letter of to-day."
I have now to observe, in further explanation of my course, that as
no reasons are given me why I should resign the post to which I was
appointed by the President fifteen months ago, with, I believe, the
unanimous consent of the Senate; as I myself know of none, and as I
am not conscious of having ever omitted to carry out, to the best of my
ability, the policy and instructions of the President during the period
of my mission, I fail to perceive why I should offer my resignation.
Certainly it is not my wish to embarrass an administration which I
have always faithfully supported, but I owe something to myself.
Were I now to make use of this permission accorded me to resign, it
would seem that I did so in order to avoid a removal which I knew to
be just, and to escape a stigma which I felt to be deserved.
As I know the record of my mission, as it stands in the archives of
the Department and of this legation, to be free from intentional fault,
and as I have therefore no reason to shun the strictest scrutiny, I do
not like to have even the appearance of making a contrary admission.
A man is sometimes permitted, as a favor, to resign a post of honor
and responsibility, in order to escape examination, censure, or removal;
but resignation, under such circumstances, is not a voluntary act, and
does not seem to differ essentially from removal.
Such a proceeding on my part would possibly be misinterpreted by
many, both at home and abroad, whose opinions I value.
With great respect, yours, very truly,
JOHN LOTHROP MOTLEY.
Hon. HAMILTON FISH,
Secretary of State.
13. Mr. Fish to Mr. _Motley.
No. 285.]                  DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 10, 1870.
SIR: Herewith you will receive a letter addressed by the President
to her Majesty the Queen announcing your recall. You will accordingly
communicate to her Majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign
affairs the accompanying copy of the President's letter, and whllen you




RECALL OF MINISTER MOTLEY.                  17
shall have ascertained in what manner it will be most.agreeable to her
Majesty to receive the original, you will take leave of the British government with an expression on the part of the President of his desire to
maintain the friendly relations which now so happily subsist between
the two countries.
Upon retiring from the mnission you will commit the archives and
other property of the legation inito the hands of Mr. Moran, who will
take charge of the same.
I an, sir, your obedient servant,
HAMTILTON FISH.
JOHN LOTHROP MOTLEY, Esq.
14. iMr. llMotley to Afr. FTish.
[End of mission.]
No. 529.]                 LEGATION Or THE UNITED STATES,.
London, December 7, 1870. (Received Dec. 22.)
Referring to my No. 525, I have now the honor to state that yourNo. 285,
accompanying a letter addressed by the President to her Majesty the
Queen, announcing my recall, was received by me on the 22d ultimo.
I had an interview with the principal secretary of state for foreign
affairs on the same day, and verbally communicated to hiim the fact of
my recall. As her Majesty was then in Scotland, but was intending to
return very soon to Windsor Castle, it was agreed between Lord Granville and myself that it would be best to defer for a few days my formal
note, announcing that I had been intrusted with the abovementioned
letter of the President.
Accordingly, on the 29th ultimo, I made a written commlnication to
his lordship, a copy of which is appended.
On the 4th instant I received a notification announcing that her Ma-.
jesty would receive me on the 6th instant; and, on the same day, a letter
from Lord Granville, of which a copy is annexed.
On the 6th instant I had the honor of taking leave of her Majesty, and
of stating, in accordance with your instructions, the desire of the President to maintain the friendly relations which now so happily subsist between the two countries.
Upon retiring from the mission. upon the 7th instant, I commnitted the
archives and other property into the hands of Mr. Moran, who has now
charge of the legation.
Having thus closed my brief mnission at this court, I think it proper to
place on record a statement of the manner in which it has been terminated.
On the 25th of June last I read in the telegraphic intelligence from
the United States of a London journal the announcement, unofficial, but
verified by subsequent events, that the President of the United States
had signified his intention of removing me from my post.
It would be impossible for any diplomatic agent to believe himself as
more thoroughly possessing the confidence of the government which he
had the honor to serve than I supposed myself to enjoy at that moment.
No intimation of a contemplated change had been made to me; no
shadow of a difference of opinion existed between'the President and his
government and myself, as to our relations with Great Britain or any
other power, or as to the general policy of his administration; and I was
S. Ex. 11    2




18                 RECALL OF MINISTER MOTLEY.,at that very period engaged in as delicate and confidential a diplomatic
correspondence with yourself and the British goverinment, upon several
important matters, as could well be confided by a government to its
foreign agent.
The report in the newspapers I dismissed, therefore, as an idle rumor;
the President of the United States being incapable, as I believed, of thus
dealing with a public servant whom he had himself so recently appointed.
Had a change been contemplated, I felt certain that I should have been
privately informed of it first, and the public afterward.  Had any charges
against me of dereliction from duty been possible, I was sure that they
would have been preferred to my face, so that I might have the opportunity of answering them. Had the public service, or even the exigencies of party politics, made a change in this mission necessary in the
opinion of the President, I could not doubt that a courteous dispatch
would have apprised me of the fact, and the reasons coupled with the
acknowledgment, to which I felt myself entitled, that I had been zealous and faithful in the discharge of the high office with which the President and Senate had honored me.
No man has the right to doubt that in such case I would have at once
offered my resignation.
Nineteen days later than the appearance of the original announcement,
frequently repeated alnd commented upon afterward by the journals of
the United States and this country, I had the honor to receive, on the
13th of July, a letter from yourself to the following effect:
[Private.]
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WTashihngton, July 1, 1860.
SIR: I, am istrLuctecd by the Presidenlt of the United States to say that he finds it
desirable to make a change in the mission to England, and that he wishes to allow
you the opportunity of resigning in case you feel inclined to do so.
WVith great respect, yours, very truly,
HAMILTON FISH.
J. LOTHROP MOTL'EY, Esq., Londotn.
Complying with the request contained in your brief telegram received
a few hours earlier than your letter, (midnight, 12th July,) which was
to this effect:
Am directed to say the President would like an answer by telegraph to my letter of
1st instant.
I sent you on the 14th July a telegram in cipher, as follows:
I respectfully request you to inform the President that I feel compelled to decline
the offer which he makes in giving me an opportunity of resigning my post, for considerations which are set forth in full in my letter of to-day.
The telegraph soon informed the world that a gentleman was nominated to the Senate as my successor, on that same day, 14th July, and
that he was confirmed on the 15th.
Thus my reception of the President's first and only notification to
me, my refusal by telegraph to resign, the nomination of a successor,
and his confirmation by the Senate, were events all comprised within
about forty-eight hours. My letter, of even date, with my telegram was
sent in the dispatch bag of that day, but of course could not arrive until
many days later.  It was in these words:
LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
London, July 14, 1870.
SIR: I have had the honor to receive your private letters, from which I learned that
you are instructed by the President to say that he finds it desirable to make a change




RECALL OF MINISTER- MOTLEY.                         19
in the mission to England, and that he wishes to allow me the opportunity of resigning in case I feel inclined to do so.
In compliance with the request contained in your telegram of 12th instant, I have
replied this day to the above-mentioned letter by a telegram in these words:
[The text of the above-cited telegram was then given.]
I have now to observe, in further explanation of my course, that as no reasons are
given me why I should resign the post to which I was appointed by the President fifteen months ago, with, I believe, the unanimous consent of the Senate, as I myself
know of none, and as I am not conscious of having ever omitted to carry out, to the
best of my ability, the policy and instructions of the President during the period of
my mission, I fail to perceive why I should offer my resignation.
Certainly it is not my wish to embarrass an administration which I have always
faithfully supported, but I owe something to myself.
Were I now to make use of the permission accorded me to resign, it would seem that
I did so in order to avoid a removal, which I knew to be just, and to escape a stigma
which I felt to be deserved.
As I know the record of my mission as it stands on the archives of the Department
and of this legation to be free from intentional fault, and as I have therefore no reason
to shun the strictest scrutiny in this regard, I do not like to have even the appearance
of making a contrary admission.
A man is sometimes permitted, as a favor, to resign a post of honor and responsibility
in order to escape examination, censure, and removal; but resignation under such
circumstances is not a voluntary act, and does not seem to me to differ essentially from
removal. Such a proceeding on my part would perhaps be misunderstood by many,
both at home and abroad, whose opinions I value.
With great respect, yours very truly,
JOHN LOTHROP MOTLEY.
I suppose, of course, that this letter duly reached you, although its
receipt has never been acknowledged, nor, indeed, has a single line
since your above-quoted letter been received by me in regard to my
removal, or to the appointment of one or another gentleman to this post,
until the arrival of your before-mentioned dispatch of the 10th November
last. -
It would be difficult to treat an envoy of the United States, accredited
to the sovereign of a powerful government, with a more marked disrespect for his official position, or for his feelings as a loyal citizen of the
republic, than has been done in my case.  So far as I am  aware, no
regularly confirmed minister at this court has ever been removed by the
President who appointed him.
It has generally been admitted in our country that power and responsibility are inseparable, and that republican institutions are founded upon
reason, justice, and honor, not upon arbitrary will. Yet the Governuient of the United States has deliberately wrought as much injury to
my reputation in an honorable profession as it could do, and there is
not a charge against me.
My ambition has always been to deserve the good opinion of my
countrymen.  The American people are just and honorable, and I should
be pained if they believed me unfaithful to the high trust reposed in
me, or to have been at any time deficient in maintaining their honor or
interests.
Many far abler men than myself, illustrious statesmen beside whose
names my own cannot even be mentioned, have preceded me in this
office, but not one has ever been more zealous or assiduous, or more
anxiously resolved to obey the instructions of his Government.
The egotism of this dispatch is not in accordance with my taste or my
feelings, but Government has placed me in a position in which selfdefense is imperative.
This.much I owe to the dignity of an office which has been insulted in
my person-to my own character, which has been subjected to malignant
and anonymous attack.
It is of the least conceivable consequence to the American'people




20               RECALL OF MINISTER MOTLEY.
whether they are or are not represented in this country by myself. It
is of very grave consequence that.a representative of the United States
abroad may be suddenly visited at any Inmoment by the severest penalty
that the Executive can deal to a delinquent minister; and yet that
there should be no default.
The position of United States minister at this court is a laborious ones
and my whole time has been devoted to its duties. The naturalization
treaty, the proposed consular convention, the attainment of the release
by her Majesty's government of American citizens confined in British
prisons for complicity with Fenianism, matters, among others, especially
intrusted to me, have been either concluded or are upon the point of
fulfillment, as appears by my latest correspondence.
As to the so-called Alabama negotiations, I never received a power
in regard to them, Government having hitherto thought it best to keep,
them suspended, and to conduct them, when resumed, at Washington.
And now, in the profound silence of Government in regard to this
sudden change, I am obliged to seek enlightenment at a source whence
a diplomatic agent does not usually expect his original and only information as to himself and his mission. Froml rumior alone I derived all the
facts connected with my dismissal, and rumor alone has vaguely attempted to indicate its cause. It is not for me to say whether reasons
are legally necessary, but neither governments nor individuals, however
arbitrary, can escape the tribunal of the public conscience.
It has been said that I volunteered to prepare my own instructions;
that, when prepared, they were submitted to and disapproved by you, as
not being in accordance with the views of the administration; that I
was subsequently fiurnished by you with the instructions of the President; that on my first interview with the late Lord Clarendon, I suppressed those instructions and submitted to the English secretary of
state my own private views, contained in the paper which had been
disapproved, and which were in direct opposition to those of the
President; and, moreover, that I formally presented those views in
writing to the English government as the policy of the President.
Certainly if this tale were true, it would have been the duty of the
President, as soon as the facts became known to him, to recall me, without a moment's delay. Diplomatic intercourse between nations would
be impossible if an agent should be retained in office who deliberately
and intentionally violates instructions of his government.
But the tale is false, and in order to disprove it I shall take the
liberty of recalling certain important facts to your recollection.
After the President had honored me with the appointment of minister
to this court, I employed myself in the interval of waiting for my instructions at Washington in examining the archives, and in revising
my recollections of previous important negotiations and discussions between the Governnments of the United States and Great Britain. In so
doing, I drew up an historical memoir concerning which there occurred
some entirely informal conversation between yourself and one or two
other friends of mine, and it was suggested that it might be worth your
while to read the paper, if you could find leisure to do so.
It was accordingly sent to you, and subsequently returned to me with
no expression of dissent as to any of its views, but with an intimation
on your part, in the wisdom of which I entirely acquiesced, that it was
thought best by the President, in consequence of the excitement existing
in both countries by reason of the rejection of the convention of 14th
January, 1869, to suspend for a, limited time the discussion of the differences between the two countries.




RECALL OF MINISTER MOTLEY                     21
From that day to this there has been no question in regard to this
memoir. It has lain undisturbed among my papers. It has never been
seen or heard of by any member of the British government or by'any
person whatever in this country. So far as I am informed, no one but
yourself and two other American friends ever saw it, and not one line
of it has ever been nsed by me officially or privately.
The instructions in your No. 3 were delivered to me on the morning
of my departure from New York for Liverpool. Calling upon Lord
Clarendon, as an old acquaintance, at his private residence, on the day
after my arrival, I took pains to state, as appears by his dispatch to
MIr. Thornton, 10th June, 1869, (published in parliamentary papers
nearly a year ago,) that " I preferred not to enter upon matters of business that day, as my instructions had only been delivered to me when
on the point of embarkation, and I had not yet had time sufficiently to
consider them."
I solemnly assert that I was actuated at that moment of arrival, and
at every inoment since, by the earnest desire and determination to carry
out the President's instructions, with loyalty, and to the best of my
ability, and never intentionally to propound my own individual opinions
as those of the Government.
So far as my humlble services could contribute to the result, it was
my wish that nothing should be left undone on my part to make his
civil administration as successful as his military career had been glorious.
It was, as I supposedcl, understood before my departure for England,
although not publicly announced, that the so-called Alabama negotiations, whenever renewed, should be conducted at WTashington, in case
of the consent of the British government.
I had been instructed, however, to suggest to that government that
there should be a suspension of all discussion of disputed questions for a
short time, in order to allow the subsidence of excitement or irritation
growing out of the negotiation or rejection of the convention of 14th
January, 1869.
This suggestion I made at the outset of my first official interview with
Lord Clarendon,  which took place on thle 10th June, 1869, and we had
then a full conversation on the general relations between the two countries. I was not authorized to read him these, your first general instructions; still less to furnish him with a copy of them. Such a course
would have been opposed to diplomatic usage. I was allowed " in my
discretion- to communicate certain views," and I proceeded in the exercise
of that discretion to render the substanee of your paper of instructions
(17 folio pages) with as mllch accuracy as to the order of topics, tone of
thought and general phraseology as it was possible for me to do in a
familiar conversation. The full record of that conversation is mlade iln
my No. S. It reveals throughout an earnest disposition on my part to
reproduce your instructions with fidelity.
On receiving that communication, you addressed me a courteous,
candid and friendly dispatch, in which there were some criticisms upon
certain portions of my narrative. I take leave to quote in this place the
whole of that dispatch, because it contains the only exceptions taken by
you to any expressions of mine during the whole course of mny mission.
No. 23.]                                 DEPARTMENT OFr STATE,
TEas7hington, June 29, 1869.
SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch No. 8, dated June 12, and
have read with much interest its narratisre of your very important interview with Lord
Clarendon.




212:RECALL OF MINISTER  MOTLEY.
Your general presentation and treatment of the several subjects discussed- in that:
interview meet the approval of this Department.
In the course of the conversation, however, it seems that the President's view of the
right of every power, when a civil conflict has arisen within another state, to define
its own relations ando those of its citizens, was not conveyed in precise conformity to
that view, as I desired to present it to you, and as it would doubtless have been conveyed by you, had your communication been made in writing.
The subject may not again be a topic of official communication between yourself and
the minister for foreign affairs; but I venture to call your attention to it, because of
the statement in your dispatch, that Lord. Clarendon observed at that part of your remarks, "that if there was to- be any discussion of principles, it had better be done
thoroughly and to the bottom." The President recognizes the importance of a thorough
discussion, whenever- the subject is resumed, upon all the points of difference.
He wishes that whenever negotiation or discussion on the subject of the Alabama
claims, so-called, shall- be renewed, they be conducted in the United States; and he
desires that at the proper time you should convey this wish to the minister for foreign
affairs. It is impossible to say at present when that time-will arrive; but it will certainly have arrived whenever the British government shall propose a discussion, or
shall intimate a desire to reopen the negotiation.
In the mean time you may be well content to rest the question on the very forcible
presentation you have made of the American side of the question. It was strongly
done; and if there were expressions used stronger than were required by your instructions, the excess was in the right direction; and stopping where they do, and uttered
as they were, it may well be hoped that they may tend to impress the minister with
the seriousness of an appreciation of the grievances we have sustained.
I-am, sir, your obedient servant,
HAMILTON FISH.
JOHN LOTHROP MOTLEY, Esq. je., pc., c.e.
The paragraph of your instructions especially alluded to by you in theabove-mentioned letter is as follows:
The President recognizes the right of every power, when a civil conflict has -arisen
within another state, and has obtained a sufficient complexity, magnitude, and com —
pleereess, to define its own relations, and those of its citizens and subjects, toward the
parties to the conflict, so far as their rights and interests are necessarily affected by
the conflict.
The necessity and propriety of the original concession of belligerency by Great
Britain, at the time it was made, have been contested and are not admitted. They ceratainly are questionable; but the President regards that concession as a part of the
case only so far as it shows the beginning and the animus of that course of conduct
which resulted so disastrously to the United States. It is important in that it foreshadowed subsequent, events.
There were other powers that were contemporaneous with England in similar concession, but it was in England only that the concession was supplemented by acts
causing direct damage to the United States. The President is careful to make this
discrimination because he is anxious as much as possible to simplify the case and to bring
into view these subsequent acts, which are so important to determining the question
between the two countries.
In my conversation, endeavoring to report in my own words the substance of the whole paper, I said, in regard to this paragraph, as appears
by the record:
I then stated the opinion of the President in regard to the recognition or concession
of belligerency, as stated in your No. 3, saying that the President recognized the right
of a sovereign power to issue proclamation of neutrality between an insurgent portion
of a nation and the lawful government, when such insurrection should have gained
the necessary magnitude, consistency, extent of organized power and probability of
justification by success, but that such measures must be taken with a full sense of the
grave responsibilities incurred.  The famous proclamation of neutrality, of 13th May,
1861, was not considered justifiable by the United States Government, but the Presi —
dent wished it to be used, when our case should once more be presented, only as showing animus, and as being the fountain-head of the disasters which had been caused to
the American people, both individually and collectively, by the hands of Englishmen.
Other nations had issued proclamations, contemporaneously, or nearly so, with that
of Great Britain, but from Great Britain alone had come a long series of deeds, injurious
to the United States, as fruits of the proclamation, while from other nations there had
come no injury save the declaration itself.
Nothing further on the subject occurred. The pause recommended by




RECALL OF MINISTER  MOTLEY.                       23
you was scrupulously observed until the arrival of your dispatch of 25th
September, 1869, in which you informed me that " the President was
inclined to believe that sufficient time had elapsed to allow subsidence
of emotions, and that thus it might be opportune to place in my hands
for appropriate use a dispassionate exposition of the just causes of complaint of the Government of the lUnited States against that of Great
Britain."
On receiving that dispatch, in order to avoid a possibility of misunderstanding the President's instructions, I immediately telegraphed to
you for permission to furnish a copy of it to Lord Clarendon, as you
instructed me only to read it to him. You replied by authorizing me to
send a copy if he should ask for it in writing.  This was accordingly
done without delay.
As Lord Clarendon's langtuage at the interview in June had been, significant and decided in regard to the expediency of abstaining at that
moment from discussion of exciting questions, unless they were to be
fully debated, as his expressions of friendship towards the United States,
and of abhorrence of even the possibility of war between the two countries, were singularly warm, and' as his part in the conversation was
most important and interesting, I had taken the precaution before sending you a dispatch on the subject to request him, confidentially, to read
over the record which I had made: of our conference.
It was expressly understood between us that- no one should look at it
but himself, and that not a single note of its contents- should be made.
Conscious that I had endeavored to- present the President's views with
fidelity and accuracy, aind not doubting that I had done so, I wished to
be sure that I had correctly reported what Lord Clarendon had said,
and to avoid the possibility of future differences: of recollection.
This proceeding, entirely in accordance with the best diplomatic
usage and' with common; sense, did not seem to me at first of sufficient
importance to be narrated.
It was' only after receiving your No. 23, with its friendly criticisms on
my report of the interview, that it occurred to me it might be useful: for
you  to, know  the fact of the confidential revision made by Lord
Clairendon of his share in the conversation.
I made a communication to you accordingly to that effect on the 30th
of July, of which no acknowledgment- was received, by me until nearly
three months afterwards.  Meantime, your instructions, No. 70, had
been received by me, and read in accordance with your directions to
Lord: Clarendon.  On the 23d of October, 1869, I received a brief
instruction from  you, in consequence of which I addressed on the same
day the following note to Lord Clarendon, (published in the Gazette,
December 24 1869:)
LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
London, October 23, 1869.
MY LORD: In reference to the conversation which I had with your lordship on the
10th of June last, and to the dispatch from the United- States Secretary of State, which I
had the honor to read to you on the 15th instant, it may have possibly appeared that
there was some inconsistency between the views of the President upon the subjects of
the recognition of the late insurgents in the Southern States as belligerents, and the
destruction of American commerce by cruisers of British origin, carrying the insurgent
flag, as verbally expressed by me at the interview in June, and those views as set
forth in the above-mentioned dispatch. I think it necessary to inform your lordship,
therefore, that the Secretary of State, on reception of my dispatch recounting the substance of the conversation in June, observed to me, in a dispatch of the 29th of June,
that it did not seem that the President's view of the right of every power, when a civil
conflict has arisen within another state, to define its own relations and those of: its
citizens, had been conveyed in precise conformity to that view, as the Secretary ol




24                 RECALL OF MINISTER MOTLEY.
State desired to present it to me, and as it doubtless would have been conveyed by me
had my communication been made in writing.
I would, therefore, request your lordship to consider the dispatch of the United
States Secretary of State, which I read to you on the 15th instant, and a copy of which
I have had the honor of sending to your lordship, as containing the exact and authoritative statement of the President's views on this subject, as laid down in all the
instructions given under his directions by the Secretary of State.
I pray'your lordship to accept the assurances, &c., &c.
JOHN LOTHROP MOTLEY.
And on the 26th October I wrote a note to you, from which the following is an extract:
Had I submitted the whole case in writing on my first arrival, instead of conversation, (which would have been difficult and unusual,) I should, of course, have used the
very words of your instructions, so as to transmit with absolute exactness their tenor.
My wish is to conform with entire fidelity to the President's views and your directions.
I doubt whether Lord Clarendon observed any marked inconsistency between the
views as verbally stated by me on June 10th and as set forth in your No. 70, which I
read to him on the 15th October. At any rate, he made no comment to such effect,
either during the reading or after it had been concluded.
If ever diplomatic incident, not profoundly importrant in itself, could
be considered as terminated, certainly here was one.
To suppose that an unintentional and almost imperceptible variation
in the verbal rendering by a minister of a single paragraph in a long
dispatch, scrupulously set right on the first opportunity, could be cause
or justification of that minister's sudden dismissal from office thirteen
months afterward, without a word of explanation, is monstrous.
Penalty, even under the most arbitrary and irresponsible government,
would follow  at once upon the imaginary offense, and be openly and
frankly assigned.
Lord Clarendon, in his reply to my letter of 23d of October, did not
admit, and never in conversation, official or private, subsequently admitted that he had discovered any inconsistency between the brief exposition made by me in the conversation in June of the President's
views on belligerency, as I understood them, and the elaborate statement on the subject contained in your No. 70, a copy of which I furnished him. It would have been difficult for him to do so, as my record
had not been officially submitted, and no trace of it exists in the archives
of the Foreign Office.
It would, I think, have been difficult in any event for him  or any
other statesman to have discovered a serious inconsistency.
In nineteen folio pages of your No. 70, of the 25th of September, you
speak of the proclamation of the 13th of May, 1861, and the previous announcement on the 6th of that month, as having been received by the,
United States Government " with painful astonishment."  You say that
"4 every sovereign power decides for itself on its responsibility whether
or not it will at a given time accord the status of belligerency to tohe
insurgent subjects of another power; but that the rightfulness of the
act depends on the occasion and the circumstances.
You speak of the proclamation as "' precipitate," 7   unseasonable,"
"premature," and characterized, "in the words of Mr. Bright, by remarkable celeritv, undue and unfriendly haste."  You call the assumed
belligerency of the insurgents II"a fiction," and say, that so far as it was
maritime, it proceeded froml the ports of Great Britain and her dependencies alone, with aid and cooperation of subjects of Great Britain.
You characterize the recognition as 4"prejudicial to the legitimate government," and you say that there were no facts " to justify the action of
Great Britain in the present case;" that, therefore, "' the United States
felt constrained at the time to regard the proclamation as the sign of a




RECALL OF MINISTER MOTLEY.                 25
purpose of unfriendliness to them and of friendliness to the insurgents,
and that in virtue of the proclamation maritime enterprises in the ports
of Great Britain, which would otherwise have been piratical, were rendered lawful, and thus Great Britain became, and to the end continued
to be, the arsenal, the navy yard, and the treasury of the insurgent confederates."      
I have not been able to discover wherein that inconsistency between
my effort in June, as above cited, to explain what I understood to be
the President's views, and the exposition from which these extracts are
made. You have never explained the nature of the discrepancy, and it
still remains a mystery to mne.
The correspondence communicated to the Senate on the 13th July,
1870, and much more which remains unpublished, shows how earnestly I
supported the views of the President, as communicated in your abovecited dispatch.
I have recalled to your memory these facts at some length, because
the statement shows that there has always been scrupulous and minute
fidelity to instructions on my part.
During thirteen months succeeding the incidents of June, 1869, Government has employed me in the most serious matters that can occupy
an envoy in the negotiation of treaties and other important and confidential business, up to the moment when, in three lines, you informed
me that the President, for no reason whatever, would permit me to
resign.
Since that hour I have heard, through the public press, from time to
time, and through. that source only, that the mission had been offered
to and refused by one gentleman after another.
Having for well-considered reasons refused to resign, I have been
obliged to await, and with extreme impatience, my recall,, and the notification of the appointment of my successor. No successor having been
al)pointe(l, the President has thought proper at last to order me peremptorily, without one word of explanation, to place the conduct of the
mission in the hands of the secretary of legation, and to retire from
my post; an indignity, I believe, to which no public minister of the
United States has ever before been subjected. History will decide upon
whom the discredit of the transaction rests.
I have heard of no other pretext, deserving anything but disdain in
an official document like this, to justify the action of the, Government,
save one which I reserve to the last.
It has been rumored, in every way by which public thought can unofficially express itself, that I have been removed from the post of minister to England because of the opposition made by an eminent Senator
who honors me with his friendship to the ratification of the San Domingo
treaty.
Upon this I shall only observe that my own opinion in regard to the
annexation of that island has never been asked for by any person whatever; that I have never expressed an opinion on the subject, publicly or
privately, for the simple reason that the materials for forming an opinion
have never been within my reach, and that I have had enough to do-in
attending to the duties of my mission, without meddling with matters
which did not concern me.
I know not whether the rejection of that treaty by the Senate was
the cause of my removal, but this I do know: that the Senate rejected
the treaty on the 30th of June of this year, and that the letter requesting my resignation was written the next day, namely, on the 1st of July.
I here place it on record as an historical fact.




26-                 RECALL OF MINISTER  MOTLEY.
I have thus recorded in my last official act a solemn protest against
the outrage, as I believe entirely without precedent, of my peremptory
removal.
I shall only add that while maintaining, during my brief mission, the
honor and rights of the country which I had the privilege to represent,
I have always reported faithfully the earnest, and, as I believe, the
sincere desire of the British government and people to revive cordial
and kindly relations between the two countries, to make fresh efforts
for the settlement of past grievances, and to provide against their future
recurrence.
There can be no nobler ambition than to strive for such a result, and
the statesman who may accomplish it will deserve well of two great
nations.
JOHN LOTHiROP MOTLEY.
Mr. Motlzy to Lord Granville.
LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
London, NAovember 29, 1870.
MY LORD: Referring to my verbal communication to your lordship on the 22d instant,
I have now the honor to state that I have received a letter addressed by the President
of the United States to her Majesty the Queen, announcing my recall from the post of
envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary at this court.
I have the honor to inclose herewith an office copy of the President's letter, and to
request your lordship to be so good as to ascertain in what manner it will be most
agreeable for her Majesty to receive the original, and to accept the expression on the
part of the President of the United States, which I have been instructed, on taking
leave of her Majesty, to convey, of his desire to maintain the friendly relations which
now so happily exist between the two countries.
I have further to acquaint your lordship that, on retiring from the mission, I have
been instructed to commit the archives of the legation into the hands of Mr. Moran, to
whom for the present such bommunications as may be necessary can be addressed.
In thus closing my official relations with your lordship, I trust that you will permit
me to express my high sense of the uniform courtesy and cordiality, both on your lordship's part and on that of the late lamented Earl of Clarendon, which have so much
facilitated the discharge of my duties here, and to assure you that they have ever
been highly appreciated by me.
I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, my lord, your lordship's most
obedient servant,
JOHN LOTHROP MOTLEY.
The Right Hon. the EARL G RANVILLE,'C., XC., SAc.
Lord Granville to Mr. Motley.
FOREIGN OFFICE,
December 5, 1870.
SIR: I have not failed to lay before the Queen your note of the 29th ultimo, inclosing
a copy of your letter of recall; and in acquainting you that her Majesty will grant you
an audience at Windsor Castle to-morrow at 3 o'clock, for the purpose of delivering
the original, I am commanded to express to you her Majesty's sincere esteem, and her
regret at your departure from this country.
I thank you much for the kind expressions with regard to my predecessor and myself
which are contained in your note. It was to him, as it has been to me, an agreeable
duty to communicate with you on the affairs of our respective countries.
I shall be happy to address to Mr. Moran, as you request, any communications which
it may be necessary to make to the legation.
I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,
GRANVILLE.
JOHN LOTHROP MOTLEY, Esq., 4c., &'c., &c.




RECALL OF MINISTER MOTLEY.                   27
15. 3lr. Fish to- Mr. lforan,
No. 54.]                    DEPARTMENT OF- STATE,
~Washington, December 30, 1870.
SIR: A paper was received at the same time with your latest dispatches, purporting to be from the legation of the United States in
London, in the form of an official dispatch, numbered 529, and signed by
Mr. Motley, the late envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary
from this Government to that of Great Britain.
Mr. Motley retains in this paper the form and style of official correspondence, although he had ceased to hold officiail relations with this
Government. He professes to write from the legation no longer in his.
charge.
His paper is entitled ": End of Mission," and extends over sixty-two
pages of manuscript, of which two are given to the acknowledgment of
the receipt of his letters- of recall, and the alleged causes of delay in
their presentation, and less than one page records his taking leave and
the committal to your charge of the archives and other property of the
legation. Here, it might be supposed, having reached and recorded the:
" End of (his) Mission," would be found the end of the paper. But Mr.
Motley proceeds, through fifty-odd pages, after recording the "End of'
his Mission," to place on record a "' statement of the manner in which it;
has been terminated."
It may possibly occur to some sensitive persons that delicacy, not t(o
say propriety, would suggest to a retired official of the Government,
wishing to place his views on its: official archives, to make a; request to,
that efifect, which certainly would have been most cheerfully accorded"
to a gentleman of Mr. Motley's eminent distinction and: great ability.
But Mr. Motley, "having closed" his mission, asks no permission, but
assumes as a right, to place his statement on record. Questioning the
taste and denying the right of this assumption, I nevertheless allow a
place in the diplomatic records of the country to- Mr. Motley's history
of the end of his mission.
TMr. Motley states that " on the 25th day of June last, he read in the
telegraphic intelligence from the United States of a London journal"'
the announcement of his coming removal.
He had not been an attentive reader of American newspapers if the
25th day of June had arrived before the first rumor of a change, which
for months had been an occasional newspaper topic, arrested his- attention.
He says "it would be impossible for any diplomatic agent to believe,
himself as more thoroughly possessing the confidence of the Government" than he supposed himself "to enjoy at that moment;" and
that "no shadow of a difference of opinion existed between the President and his Government and himself, as to our relations with GreatBritain."
It is not for me to question the measure of Mr. Motley's appreciation
of his position in the confidence of his Government, but I cannot accept
his statement that no shadow of a difference of opinion existed between
the President and his Government and himself, as to our relations with
Great Britain.
Mr. Motrley was appointed minister to the Court of St. James in April,
1869, under the impression of an entire agreement on his part with the
President as to our relations with Great Britain, and with the confidentf
expectation that if any difference might exist, or should arise, the mieA




28               RECALL OF MINISTER MOTLEY
ister would accept and represent the views, opinions, and policy of the
Government under which he held his power.
Shortly after his appointment, and before he left this country for his
post of duty, it became apparent that, upon a question of controlling
interest, at that moment occupying the attention of the thoughtful and
the prudent, to restrain the passions which had been excited by eloquent
declamation and powerful rhetoric Mr. Motley accepted the views upon
which popular excitement had been stimulated and wrought to the verge
of dangerous irritation, rather than those which the President deemed
to be sound and based upon the true principles of public law.
With much evident study and labor, he prepared an elaborate " memoir," and submitted it as his views upon the questions at issue between
the two governments, and as the general tenor of the instructions
which he would desire to receive. It was expressed in the felicitous and
captivating style which has given Mr. Motley so distinguished a position in the world of letters; but it was written with a full impression
of the views presented in a then recent debate in the Senate, and
abounded in forcible expressions and strong epithets, and terms of denunciation not appropriate to the calm discussion of a grave international difference, and little calculated to allay existing excitement or irritation, or to induce her Majesty's government to lend a patient ear
to the presentation of the American case.
Beyond the objection to its general tone and style of expression, this
paper appeared to the President to be objectionable in other respects.
It assumed to state what had passed in the Senate in its secret session, and the motives which had actuated the members of that body.
It has always b3en held that the debates in either house of Congress,
like the communications of the President to either of those bodies, are
not subjects for discussion with foreign powers. Upon them the Government does not allow itself to be interrogated. They are purely internal and deliberative, and are the privileged interchange of views and
opinions between parties charged with and engaged in the formnation of
the aggregated and official expression of the public will, with which
alone foreign powers are permitted to enter into discussion. To have
laid before one of those powers the action of the Senate, other than its
final judgment, or to have undertaken to explain the motives leading to
that judgment; would have been an unauthorized assumption, inconsistent with the independence of that body, and with the respect due to it.
Agaia, Mr. Motley's'"memoir," if adopted, would have assumed to
express the views of the President upon the main questions at issue;
whereas, the President thought it wise, andcin the interest of peace
and of the future amicable settlement of those grave questions, to postpone any presentation of his views upon the main issues (beyond those
which were subsequently expressed in the instructions of May 15, 1869)
until the passions which had been aroused in England by the rejection
of the treaty and by the leading speech made upon it had exhausted
themselves. There was nothing exceptionable in the manner in which
these views of Mr. Motley were brought to the notice of the Government, nor anv undue tenacity exhibited in their maintenance. He pre-:,sented them in an entirely acceptable form and manner, free froml any,obtrusiveness or forwardness.
They were carefully considered, and were thought to be neither sound
nor politic. His instructions were framed in a different view of rights
and duties involved in the questions upon which the two governments
were at issue.
It was not doubted, when he left the United States for his post, that




RECALL OF MINISTER MOTLEY.                    29
he would cordially accept and carry out the views of his Governmenit
according to these instructions, even when they differed from those
which he himself entertained. That such was the duty of a public
minister, deputed to represent his Government, there will be none to
question; that stich was not his course must be admitted by every cawn
did and impartial person who compares his instructions, dated May 15,,
1869, with his dispatch No. 8, giving the account of his interview with
the Earl of Clarendon on the 10th of June of that year. The tone,,
temper, and language of the instructions were conciliatory; their object
was to postpone discussion, and to avoid further irritation. This
Government had rejected the convention that had been negotiated, and
had refused the mode and measure of redress which Great Britain had
been willing to accord; a consequent disappointment and irritation were
manifested in that country, which the President thought should be
allowed to subside before the two governments could resume the discussion with a reasonable expectation of an amicable and satisfactory
solution.
He therefore not only abstained most cautiously from any irritating
expressions, but also from a discussion of the main issue.
Reasons were assigned why the rejected convention had not provent
satisfactory, without entering into argument.
The positive instructions to Mr. Motley as to what he must say, were
limited to two points.
I. He was directed- to say to Lord Clarendon that the Governments,
in rejecting the recent convention, abandoned neither its own claims
nor' those of its citizens, nor the hope of an early, satisfactory, and
friendly settlement of the questions pending between the two governments.
II. He was further instructed that in his private and social intercourse,
as well as in his official conversations, when it should become necessary,.
he should place the cause of grievance of the United States against
Great Britain, not so much upon her issuance of the recognition of the
insurgents' state of war, as upon her conduct under and subsequent to
such recognition.
It was left discretionary with Mr. Motley to touch upon the other
points referred to in his instructions; and it certainly was not contemplated or expected that he would go beyond the cautiously guarded expressions of that paper.
A main point of difference between the views of the President and
those advanced in 3Mr. Motley's' memoir," was in connection with the
amount of stress to be laid upon the time, the manner, and the rightfulness, as a measure justified by public law, of the concession of belligerency to the insurgents of the South by Great Britain. The President
held, in accordance with the doctrine of the best writers upon international
law, and with the precedents of our own history, and as a logical result from
the fact of national sovereignty, that it is the right of every power, when
a civil conflict has arisen within another state, and has attained a sufficient complexity, magnitude, and completeness, to define its own relations, and those of its citizens and subjects, toward the parties to the
conflict, so far as their rights and interests are necessarily affected by it.
Mr. Motley was instructed that such were the President's views, which
he was to present, if he referred to this point in the question; and that
while the President regarded the necessity and the propriety of the
original concession of belligerency by Great Britain as " questionable,'
he regarded that concession as " part of the case only so far as it shows
the beginning and the animus of that course of conduct which resulted




30                RECALL OF MINISTER MOTLEY.
so disastrously to the United States."  "' It was important [not so much
in itself, but] in that it foreshadowed subsequent evefits."
That it was not to be treated as the gravamen of the complaint, the
instructions made more clear by their reference to the fact that there
were other powers that were contemporaneous with Great Britain in
similar concessions; but that in England only had the concession been
followed by acts resulting in direct damage to the United States.
Mr. Motley was expressly instructed, in his social and private intercourse and conversation, as well as when it might become necessary to
do so officially, to adopt these views of the President. He was requested;
-in his social intercourse with representatives of other powers which had
gmade similar recognition, to let them understand that the United States
made such recognition by them no ground of complaint. This was
regardless of the time or of any supposed prematurity of such recognition.
Mr. Motlev's dispatch of the 12th of June, already referred to, shows
how he fulfilled the trust committed to him.
The determination of this Government not to abandon its claims nor
those of its citizens, was stated parenthetically and in such a subordinate way as not necessarily to attract the attention of Lord Clarendon;
and instead of expressing the' hope entertained by this Government that
there would be an early, satisfactory, and friendly settlement of the
questions at issue, he volunteered the unnecessary, and, from the manner in which it was thrust in, the highly objectionable statement that
"the United States Government had no insidious purposes," and, in
violation of the spirit of his instructions, he " confessed to a despondent
feeling sometimes as to the possibility of the two nations ever understanding each other —of the difficulty at this present moment of their
looking into each other's hearts."
He repeats, in almost the identical words, the strong expressions,
adjectives, and expletives, the stinging allusions, and the cutting observations which had been submitted in his  lnmemloir," and rejected by this
-Department, and none of which were authorized by his instructions.
He said that he "had been instructed to give the reasons why, in the
opinion of the President, the treaty signed on the 14th of January last
had been rejected," while no such instruction had been given him. He
volunteered the information that the rejection of the convention was
"not in the slightest degree an affair of party."  He talked of the
4 gravity of the occasion," of the'" burning questions," of " grievances that must continue to rankle and fester," of " wounds that must
be probed, " of the " intensity of opinion," &c.
The whole tone of these remarks was in entire variance with the tone
and spirit of his instructions.
More than once he went to the very verge of admissible diplomatic
suggestion, in alluding (without any authority in his instructions for
such minatory or threatening intimations) to "the contingencies which
would depend on negotiations concerning such vital questions;" that
the President-concurred in the action of the Senate, "not because he
wished or hoped for war or unfriendly relations;" that he wished a brief
pause in the negotiations "before once more calmly reviewing the situation, and looking the issues between the countries, with all their difficulties, dangers, and contingencies steadily in the face."  " The contingencies of war or peace."
Neither the letter nor the spirit of his instructions authorized such
expressions, with which his remarks abounded; much less did his instructions, or the proprieties of the occasion, or the feelings of the




RECALL. OF MINISTER MOTLEY.                  31
President, justify his repeated allusions to the contingency, or to the
possibility of war. It is a grave responsibility for a minister to assume
to intimate to the government to which he is accredited the contingencies of war. Nations have been dragged into war by indiscretions less
flagrant than those of Mr. Motley. He assumed a responsibilify beyond the proprieties of his trust.
Instead of saying what he had been authorized to say in relation to
the concession of belligerency, Mr. Motley informed the Earl of Clarendon that the President " recognized the right of a sovereign power to
issue proclamations of neutrality between an insurgent portion of a nation
and the lawful government, when such insurrection should have gained
the necessary magnitude, consistency, extent of organized power, and
probability of success; but that such measures must always be taken with a
full view of the grave responsibilities assumed."
He was not instructed to threaten Great Britain, or to refer to her
responsibilities. It is reserved to the President to decide when intimations of consequences, or allusions to the responsibilities of other powers
shall be uttered. To Mr. MAotley he had committed no discretion in such
delicate matters.
Mr. Motley had been authorized to say that the President " regarded
the concession of neutrality as a part of the case only so far as it shows
the beginning and the animus of that course of conduct which resulted
so disastrously to the United States." Mr. Motley characterized this
concession, in his interview with Lord Clarendon, as " the fountain head
of the disasters which had been caused to the American people, both
individually and collectively, by the hands of Englishmen." And he
added that "from Great Britain alone had there come a long series of
deeds injuirious to the United States as the fruits of the proclamation."
Well might he say, as he did in a subsequent dispatch on the 15th of
July, 1869, that he had gone "beyond the strict letter of his instructions." He might have added, in direct opposition to their temper and
spirit.
It may be said by some that what Mr. MIotley expressed was true.
He, however, was not instructed or authorized to say it. The public
representative of a government fails in his duty, and does it wrong,
when he uses in its behalf language unauthorized, or when he utters in
its name opinions and thoughts which possibly his government may
entertain, but has not thought it expedient or proper to express.
Many if not the most of these extreme expressions and intimations of
consequences, and the prominence given and stress laid upon the concession of belligerency, were in the'4memoir" which had been submitted by Mr. Motley. He was, therefore, fully apprised that the Government had refused to sanction what, in his interview with Lord
Clarendon, he deliberately expressed.
That he had in his mind at that interview, as a guide, something else
than his letter of instructions from this Department would appear to be
evident, when he says that " he called his lordship's attention to your
[my] very judicious suggestion, that the throwing the dice for umpire
might bring about opposite decisions." The instructions which Mr. Motley received from me contained no suggestion about "' throwing of dice."
That idea is embraced in the suggestive words "aleatory process,7"
(adopted by Mr. Motley,) but previously applied in a speech made in the
Senate on the question of ratifying the treaty.
Mr. Motley's dispatch of the 12th of June, 1869, was received at the
Department of State on the 23d of the same June. The Department




32               RECALL OF MINISTER MOTLEY.
did not then know that it had been submitted for verification to the
inspection of her Majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs.
Such submission is not inconsistent with diplomatic usage, but it is
inconsistent with the duty of a minister, reporting an important interview, when he has thus submitted his report for verification, not to inform his government of that submission. Mr. Motley submitted the
draft of his No. 8 to Lord Clarendon, and failed to communicate the fact
to his government.
The discrepancy between what Mr. Motley had been instructed or authorized to say and what he did say did not fail to attract attention,
and a memorandum was made at the time, for the purpose of criticism
at least. There were especial and peculiar reasons why the Government
desired to be kind to Mr. Motley. His high reputation in the field of letters. his recognized general intelligence, his unquestioned purity of character, and his personal familiarity with many prominent persons in official life in Great Britain, had secured for his designation to the post
which he was filling a considerable amount of popular approval and, as
was then hoped, would commnand confidence in Great Britain.
There were other reasons peculiar to himself which suggested the
avoidance of sharp criticism. The earnest tone of the'" memoir" which
he had offered as the basis of his instructions was remembered, and was
recognized in his narrative of the interview with Lord Clarendon. It
was thought not improbable that his language in that interview had
been less strongly pronounced and. more in accordance with the tone
and letter of his instructions than appeared from his dispatch; that in
attempting to record what he had actually said, the tenacity of memory
and adherence to previously expressed opinion interpolated much of
what he had written in his I" memoir" with that which he had said to
Lord Clarendon.
The Government sought excuses and desired to avoid a rebuke and
determined to overlook all thatit could overlook in his case. It appeared
from his dispatch that he had already received a check from Lord Clarendon, when, in the midst of his departure from his instructions as to
the President's view of the concession of belligerency, he was arrested
by the remark, that if the subject was to be discussed it must be discussed from the bottom and thoroughly. The British government had
accepted the propriety of the President's suggestion to temporarily suspeld the negotiations, and no special exception had been openly taken
to the tone or manner in which Mr. Motley had presented himself.
This afforded the President an opportunity to prevent any further
misapprehension of his views through Mr. Motley, by taking from him
the right to discuss further the "Alabama claims."
In the spirit of kindness and tender consideration for the feelings of
Mr. Motley, my dispatch of the 28th of June, 1869, (quoted at length,
and in the main accurately, though under the date of the 29th of June,
in the paper now under consideration,) was written. The desire to
avoid criticism, and to save his feelings, may have been carried too far
in that dispatch; bat it was at the time thought that the withdrawal
from Mr. Motley, upon the receipt of his first effort on the subject, of
the right of any further discussion of the only very important or difficult
question at the time pending between the two governments, would be
regarded by a sensitive gentleman who had devoted so much time and
labor to his " memoir" on that question as so severe a rebuke, and so
practical a proof of want of confidence, that kind words in the generalities of the dispatch might be indulged.
It was not until more than a fortnight after the receipt by Mr. Motley




RECALL OF MINISTER MOTLEY.                    33
of the dispatch prohibiting his further discussion of these questions,:
that he wrote to the Department informing it that his No. 8, of the 12th
of June, had been submitted for verification to Lord Clarendon, before
its transmission  to his own Government. 1Had that submission been
known at the date of my acknowledgment, on the 28th of June, of his
statement, it cannlot be doubted that a, very different reply would have
been made. The e tardy report of this important fact was received here
on the 11th of August, when I was on a, visit fior only a day to Washington, durinug  temnpoary vacation, and the dispatch wras not brought
to my notice. The kllowledge of it did not reach me till October.
When the President w-as informed that Mr. Motley had withheld this
important ficet until after he haad obtained the acknowledgment and the
reply of the Department to a dispatch which had already drawn to the
utmost upon his kindness and forbearance, it may be imagined that his
confidence and his respect for his minister did not remain as they had
been. From tihat time it was impossible that he should remain as the
representative of the Government longer than the exigencies of the
public service, as to the other matters specially committed to his
charge, might require. Probably his public employment would then
have instantly ceased but for considerations presented to the President, partly of a personal nature with respect to Mr. Motley, but
more especially as to the negotiations then pending for the completion
of the naturalization convention, for a consular convention, and as to
other matters then in discussion between the two governments.
Without violating any confidence, I aml  quite justified in asserting,
that, from October of last year until the day when his successor was
nominated to the Senate, Mr. Motley's retention in his position was with
the reluctant approval of the President~, and with  his frequently declared intention to name a successor at no distant day. The withdrawal
of all right to discuss the "Alabanma" question, on which he had man-ifested an absence of sympathy with the President, and of willingness
to represent the views of the Government, left no room. for further
mistakes on that question; and as he ha.d, on entering upon his mission,
been intrusted with the completion of the naturalization convention,
and with the negotiation of a consular treaty, on both which he was
then actively engaged, the President was inclined to allow hint to conplete at least one of these before his recall.
The naturalization convention was -signed by Mir. Motley on theI 13th
of May last, was received here in the latter part of that montlh, was
~immediately sent to the Senate, and was under consideratiol by that
body in the latter days of June last. The consular convention promised a more protracted negotiation.
On the 27th of June last Lord Clarendon died. Congress was then
drawing its session to a close. The President has never failed to d esire tlhe
earliest possible adjustment of the "Alabama" question. In September,
1869, before the knowledge of the submission of Air. Motley's dispatch of June 12 to Lord Clarendon came to me, AIr. Motley had been
instructed to express to her Majesty's government the readiness of the
United States to enter upon the consideration of the question.
The death of the British minister for foreign affairs suggested the possibility of advancing a settlement under the successor of the deceased
statesman, either by restoring' the discussion of the question to the
American minister in London, or through his agency in advancing its
prosecution in Washington. The cordial and sympathetic co6peration
of the America'n minister was necessary for the realization of any hope
in that direction. However able and faithful Mr. Motley may have
S. Ex. 11- 3




3 4              RECALL OF MINISTER MOTLEY.
shown himself on o other questions, it had been demonstrated that the
President could not rely upon his cooperation in the line of his views
and his policy on this great question.
When the intelligence of Lord Clarendon's death reached here, (27th
of Juine,) Congress was near its adjournment. The day for the final
adjournment had been indicated as the 15th of July.
The opportunity for a renewal of negotiations might arise before the
Senate would again convene in December. It was foreseen that a new
minister would naturally hesitate to enter upon so important a position
without having been confirmed by the Senate; would have less confidence in his position, and would speak with less authority, should he go
abroad, without having received the assent of the Senate to his appointment.
It seemed that any supposed reasons for the further retention of Mr.
Motley should yield to the more important public consideration of having a representative in sympathy with the President's views, who could
take advantage of any disposition to renew the discussion of the " Alabama" questions. Consequently, on the 1st of July, (three days after
the death of Lord Clarendon,) by the President's direction I addressed
-to Mr. Motley the letter of that date, quoted in his paper, informing him
that the President found it desirable to make a change in the mission,
and wished to allow him an opportunity to resign.
in view of the importance of having the nomination of Mr. Motley's
successor confirmed by the Senate before its adjournment, I sent a calble dispatch on the 12th of July, requesting an answer to my letter of
the 1st of July. No question was entertained that Mr. Motley would
have felt it his duty, on the first and faintest suggestion that a change
was desired, to hasten to place that resignation in the Presiden t's hands.
In fact, I regarded my message of' the 12th as superfluous, not doubting that IMr. Motley would, without other suggestion than his own
sense of propriety, and his appreciation of the relations of a minister
to the President, have resorted to the telegraph instantly on the receipt of the letter. I sent the dispatch only because of the imminence
of t.he adjournment of the Senate, " exabundsante cantela."
Mr. Motley's commission expressed on its face that he was to hold his office during the pleasure of the President. In his paper he expresses the
opinion that, had a change been contemplated, he should have been privately informed of it. He was thus informed before the public was informed, and before there was any other than speculative announcements,
such as had frequently before appeared in the public prints with respect to
himself, and such as had for months formed the almost daily staple of
newsp.aper gossip with respect to many other gentlemen of high position. IHe thinks that he should have been apprised of the " reasons,"
coupled with " an acknowledgment that he had been zealous and faithful." I cannot admit that he had the right to require of the President
the assignminent of his "'reasons" for the exercise of one of his constitutional prerogatives, nor to niake terms with the President by demanding from him hin a  acknowledgment of his zeal and fidelity."  That acknowledgment is often made on the acceptance of a resignation from an
officer who has proved zealous and faithful, and then it is significant
and complimentary. I fail, however, to appreciate the value of such
acknowledgment, exacted as a condition precedent of resignation.
He further says: " No man has a right to doubt that in such case I
would have at once offered my resignation." The cases have been namerous, through the whole history of the Government, of gentlemen of
high character and intelligence, and of unquestioned integrity, resigning
CO                 I                      zl~~~~~~~~el't(  * ~I LCI~hV~~I~A ~ lV




RECALL OF MINISTER MOTLEY.                    35
high positions on the simple indication of tihe desire of the President.
But Mr. Motley, although requested, did not see fit to resign. On the
14th of July, the day before the Senate was to adjourn, he telegraphed
declining to do so. The nomination of his successor was sent to the
Senate that same day; on that day, also, he wrote a letter to me, which
is set forth at length,' (substantially, but not entirely as written,) in his
paper. This letter was marked 1" Private," although that designation is
omitted in the copy in his paper, doubtless through inadvertence. The
omission becomes important, however, since he states, somewhat in the
tone of complaint, thiat it has never been acknowledged. It is as well,
therefore, to note this character of his letter, assigned to it by himself;
and to state further, that it was not written as a dispatch, was not numbered, and was not in the form of an official paper.
In this letter he speaks of his appointment, "4 with, he believes, the
unanimous consent of the Senate."  I know not Mar. Motley's sources of
information of the proceedings of the Senate in their secret session, in
which alone, nominations for office are considered. He refers to these
secret proc ceedings with an apparent confidence that suggests more intimacy with the executive proceedings of that body than is allowed by
its rules to those who are not members. The injunction of secrecy has
not been removed from the proceedings of the Senate on Mr. Motley's
confirmation. Possibly he relies upon outside rumors, which certainly
were current, that the consent of the Senate had been unanimous. My
confidence in the wisdom and appreciation of that body leads me to
concur in AMr. Motley's belief. Rumor, however, also says that, upon
the question of his recall, the Senate approached nearly to the same
degree of unanimity; that only three votes' were recorded against his
recall; a dl that among the three, so voting was not " the eminent Sen~ator" Nithl whose name he subsequently seeks to identify thle cause of
that recali.
On thle question (tf his appointment, and on that of his recall, therefore, the Senate wvas nearly or entirely nnanimous in its concurrence
with the President.
MAr. AMotley says thlltt, C"so fa;r as; he is aware, no regularly confirmed
minister at this court [London] has ever been removed by the President
who appointed himl.1  Possibly this may be so; it mlay also be true as
to some other courts than that of London. There have been, however,
frequent instances of successive ministers to London, as well as elsewhere, appointed by the same President; but I have not examined, and
it would be unprofitable to waste time in the examination to ascertain
whether the first of the succession was removed or had resigned, or, in
case of a resignation, whether or not he had been requested so to do.
It will be safe to assume, however, that Mr. Motley has furnished the
first instance in the history of the Government of a minister refusing
his resignation when it had been requested by the President from whom
he received his appointment. Moreover, Mr. Motley must be aware that
a government, desiring to rid itself of a minister, can find other means
of obtaining a resignation, or enforcing a vacancy in the office, than
through a written request.
When Mr. Motley, referring to my dispatch of June 28th, 1869, (quoted
by him as of June 29th,) says that it " contains the only exceptions taken
by you [me] to any expression of mine [his] during the whole course of
my [his] mission," he has probably forgotten the dispatch, No. 75, of
October 11, 18697 in which, after referring to my not having been aware
that his statement of his conversation with Lord Clarendon on the 10th
of June had been submitted to his lordship for verification, he was told




36                RECALL OF MINISTER MOTLEY.
that " as without explanation his lordship may naturally be surprised at
finding some of the views purporting to come fronm tie President, which
are contained in the written paper submitted by you in June last, inconsistent with the views contained in the paper dated the 25th of September
last, which you were instructed to read to him, I lmust ask you to explain
to him that your presentation and treatment of the subject discussed at
that interview were in part disapproved by me in my communication of
the 28th of June last."
The requirement upon a minister to state to the government to which
he ib accredited that a presentation made by him, as the views of the
power which he represents, was inaccurate and is disapproved, is a, hard
one, but its necessity in this case was unmistakable. In his execution
of this requirement, Mr. Motley only partially appreciated, or only partly
presented to Lord Clarendon the exceptions taken to his part in the
interview of the 10th of June. It was thought best, however, to pass
the matter over, for reasons the general nature of which has been already
indicated.
He now treats this serious —I hope not intentional-departure from
his instructions, as a " diplomatic incident," and designates as 1"an
almost imperceptible variation in the verbal rendering of a single paragraph in a long dispatch," what had been in fact an entire misrepresentation both of the tone, temper, and object of his instructions, and of an
important doctrine of public law.
Mr. Motley seeks to justify his presentation (in June) as the views of
the President, of that which he was not then authorized to present, by
reference to the statements and presentation   contained in subsequent
instructions of the 25th of September. There are wide differences and
broad distinctions between those instructions and Mr. lM-otley's paper of
the 12th of June, although he states his inability to discover the inconsistency; but even supposing them to be identical, the minister is censurable, who presumes to anticipate the authority of his goverun cut in
the i)resentation of its wishes or opinions.
It remains only to notice Mr. Motley's adoption of a rumior which had
its origin in this city, in a source bitterly, personally, and vindictively
hostile to to te President.
Mlr. Motley says it has been rumored that he was " removed from the
post of ninister to England " on account of the opposition made by aln
1"-eminent Senator who honors mie [him] with his friendshiip,'" to the
San )omingo treaty.
AMen amre apt to attribiute the causes of their own failures or their own
misfortunes to others tlhan themselves; and to claim association or seek
a p artnershi) with renal or imaginary greatness, with which to divide
their sorrows or their mistakes. There can be no question as to the
identity of the eminent Senator at whose door Mr. Motley is willing to
deposit tle cause of his renmoval. But hle is entirely imistaken in seeking a vicarious cause of his loss in confidence iand ihvor, and it is unwort;li of Mr. Motley's real merit and ability, and an injustice to the
venerable Senator alluded to, (to whose influence and urgency he was
originally  indebted for his nomlination,) to attribute to him any share in
-the cause of his removal.
3Mr. 3Motley must kinow, or if lhe does not kniow it he stands alone in
his igynorance of the fact, that many Senators opposed the San Domingo
treaty openly, generocmsly, and with $ Ea lmuch efficiency  as did the distin glished Senator to whomll he refers, and have nevertheless continued
to emijoy the undiminished confidence and the friendship of the President-thanl whom no tan living is more tolerant of Tlhoest and maffnly




RECALL OF MINISTER MOTLEY.                  37
differences of opinion, is more single or sincere in his desire for the
public welfare, is more disinterested or regardless of -what concerns
himself, is more frank and confiding in his own dealings, is more sensitive to a betrayal of confidence, or would look with more scorn and
contempt upon one who uses the words and the assurances of friendship to cover a secret and determined purpose of hostility.
The President has not withheld his confidence or respect, nor has he
withdrawn his friendship from any Senator for reason of such Senator's
difference with him on the question of San Domingo, or on any other
subject or question of public policy. To affect to give credit to the suggestion that he has done so, or that he would visit upon a third party
resentments caused by real or imagined indignation against another, is
unworthy of 3Mr. Motley, and will doubtless be regretted by him when
the morment of thoughtless excitement, which betrayed him into the utterance, has passed away.
In conclusion, Mr. Motley collates the dates of the rejection of the
San Domingo treaty (the 30th of June) and that of my letter requesting his resignation, (the 1st of July,) which he "places on record as an
historical fact." To some minds "post hoc, propter hoc," is conclusive of
cause and effect. There is a tradition in England, believed by many,
that the Goodwin sands owed their appearance to the fall of a certain
steeple in the preceding year.
The coincidence which Mr. Motley stamps as "an historical fact,' is
not the only or the most remarkable one which has been the subject of
history. It finds its parallel in that recorded by another illustrious author, who tells us of two old women who, 1" tracing things back from
effects to causes, naturally reverted to their deceased husbands, respecting whose lives, deaths, and burials they compared notes, and discovered sundry circumstances that tallied with wonderful exactness; such
as Barbara's father having been exactly four years and ten months older
than Kit's father, and one of them having died on a Wednesday and
the other on a Thursday; and both of them having been of very fine
make and remarkably good-looking, with other extraordinary coincidences."
How Mr. Motley, who, in his paper on the " End of [his] Mission," denies having ever expressed any opinion on the subject of the San Domingo
treaty, seeks to connect his recall with the almost contemporaneous rejection of that treaty, except by some process of reasoning similar to
that which occupied the heads of the two worthy old women, or by
placing himself under the sheltering wing of the eminent Senator referred to, it is difficult to see. It were useless to attempt to refute such
logic. But Mr. Motley and the world know that the hostility and opposition of the Senator in question to the San. Domingo treaty had
accomplished all that they could accomplish toward its rejection many
months before he was invited to resign. The treaty was admitted to be
practically dead, and was waiting only the formal action of the Senate,
for weeks and months before the decease of the illustrious statesman of
Great Britain. This event, which took place on the 27th of June, determined the time for inviting Mr. Motley to make place for a successor
who might be intrusted with the negotiations in case a disposition
should be shown on the part of the successor of Lord Clarendon to enter
upon the discussion and adjustment of the "Alabama claims."
I am, sir, your obedient servant,
HAMILTON FISH.
BENJAMIIN MORAN, Esq., &c., &c., &c.