I!/
A 1?.'I
INTELLECTUAL  P]HILOSOIIHY.  
A SYSTEM
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
BY REV. ASA MAHAN,
FIRST PRESIDENT OF CLEVELAND UNIVERSITY
" How charming is divine Philosophy I
Not harsh, and crabbed, as dull fools suppose,
But musical as is Apollo's lute,
And a perpetual feast of nectared sweets,
Where no rude surfeit reigns."
REVISED AND ENLARGED FROM THE SECOND EDITION.
NEW YORK:
A. S. BARNES & O., 51 JOHN-STREET.
CINCINNATI:-H. W. DERBY.
1854.
oF
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I 
Entered according to Act of J.irls, in the year 1854, by
ASA MAHAN,
In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States, for
the Southern District of the State of New York.
WILLIAM H. SHAIN & Co.,
STEREOTYPERS, HUDSON, OHIO0. 
y Azo-'S
I- W.''
.' I     8,
DEDICATORY PREFACE
TO THE FIRST EDITION.
THE following Treatise presents the sum of a course of
Lectures, which, for six or eight years past, I have been in
the habit of delivering to successive classes, on the subject of
Intellectual Philosophy. One thing I may say in relation to
this     subject, without boasting.   No  class have yet passed
through this course, without becoming deeply interested in the
science of Mental Philosophy; and, in their judgment, receiving great benefit from the truths developed, as well as from
the method of development which was adopted. Hence the
desire has been very generally expressed by those who have
attended the course of instruction, as well as by others who
have become acquainted with the general features of the system taught, to have it presented to the public in a form
adapted to popular reading. In conformity to such suggestions,    as well as the permanent convictions of my own mind,
the following Treatise has been prepared. In preparing it, it
has been my aim to reject light from no source whatever from
which it could be obtained, and at the same time to maintain
th e          real prerogative of manly independence of thought.   The
individuals to whom I feel most indebted as a philosopher, are
Coleridge, Cousin, and Kant - three luminaries of the first
order in the sphere of philosophy. How far proper discrimi
1
Ili 
tttt.    - o,  -ft           - t --
+ 5 t t e~~ 
DEDICATORY PREFACE.
nations have been made in the study of their works, the reader
will be able to judge. With these remarks, I would simply
add, that
To THE BELOVED AND HONORED PUPILS, WHO HAVE
HITHERTO PASSED FROM UNDER MY INSTRUCTION AS A
TEACHER OF MENTAL SCIENCE, THE FOLLOWING TREATISE
IS NOW AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED, WITH THE EXPRESSION OF THE FOND HOPE, THAT IN ALL FUTURE CLASSES,
WHICH IT MAY BE MY PRIVILEGE TO INSTRUCT, I MAY) IN
THE LANGUAGE OF ANOTHER, " FIND THE SAME LOVE OF
PHILOSOPHY) AND THE SAME INDULGENCE TO THE PROFESSOR."
vi 
PREFATORY NOTE
TO- THE REVISED EDITION.
SINCE the publication of the first edition of this work, the
author has had the benefit resulting from successive years in
teaching the same, and of a oareful reading of other works
upon the same subject.  In this manner, he has been enabled
to perceive defects that needed correction in the work, as first
presented. The work is now given to the public, as the result
of his mature reflections upon this fundamental science.  Some
of the most important chapters have been so entirely rewritten
and remodeled, as to render the present, in some important
respects, a new work on Intellectual philosophy.  I may notice, among others, the chapter on Sense, the examination of
the true as distinguished from false systems of Philosophy, in
the chapter on  Iiscellaneous Topics, and the development of
the evidence of the being and perfections of God, in the last
chapter. The author has always been fully persuaded of the
correctness of his views in respect to external perception, but
has felt a growing dissatisfaction with his manner of presenting
the subject, in the chapter referred to. In the present edition,
this subject, so fundamental to a right system of mental science, is so presented as to meet his ideas in most, if not all
respects. One of the great wants of the age is a fundamental
examination of false systems of Philosophy  as developed in 
PREFATORY NOTE.
Materialism, and in the various forms of Idealism, as distinguished from the true system. This he has attempted, and, as
it appears to him, accomplished, in the chapter on Miscellaneous Topics. The improvements made, in presenting the topic
last named, will be appreciated, we think, by all who carefully
read the chapter in which they appear.  It has been the aim
of the author to give to the public a work, on this great science, which should meet the fundamental philosophic wants of
the age. As such an attempt, he commends his production to
the careful study of all who would understand this science.
I close with a suggestion to teachers who may introduce
this work to their pupils as a text-book. No system of questions is here proposed. Each topic has a heading, however,
which gives the subject-matter therein developed. My own
method of teaching has always been, to read to the class this
heading, and then require the student to state, in his own
words, the subject-matter contained in the topic referred to.
Two benefits result to the pupil by this mode of teaching:
1. He is made to understand the subject much better than he
can by any system of questions. 2. He acquires the important habit of first forming distinct conceptions of a subject before speaking, and then of clothing his thoughts in appropriate
language. Much higher and more perfect forms of mental
discipline are acquired by this mode of teaching, than by any
other which we have ever tried.
CLEVELAND, OHIO, August 1854.
* —
~111 
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION.
Classification of the Sciences- Object of Mental Philosophy -
What is to be expected from such Investigations - Mental Phi  losophy, as a Science, possible - The Method in conformity to
which Psychological Researches should be conducted - The
above the only Psychological Method- Utility of this Science
- State of Mind requisite to a successful prosecution of this
Science....................................................................... 1-12
CHAPTER II.
CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA AND POWERS.
Mental Faculties indicated by the phenomena above classified -
Object of Mental Philosophy -Meaning of the words Mental
Faculties..................................................................13-16
CHAPTER III.
PHENOMENA OF THE INTELLIGENCE.
Principle of Classification -Contingent and necessary Phenom  ena of Thought defined.
PA619 
CONTENTS.
IDEAS OF BODY AND SPACE.
Idea of Body contingent- Idea of Space necessary- Other
characteristics of these two Ideas- Idea of Body relative
Idea of Space absolute - Idea of Body implies that of Limitation - Idea of Space implies the absence of Limitation - Idea
of Body, a sensible representation - Idea of Space a pure rational conception.
IDEAS OF SUCCESSION, AND TIME, OR DURATION.
Idea of Succession contingent - The Idea of Time necessaryOther characteristics of these Ideas.
IDEAS OF THE FINITE AND OF THE INFINITE.
Remarks of Locke- Characteristics of these Ideas- Idea of
Finite contingent and relative; that of the Infinite necessary
and absolute.
IDEAS OF MENTAL PHENOMENA AND PERSONAL IDENTITY.
Idea of Mental Phenomena contingent and relative - Idea of
Personal Identity necessary -Necessary ideas distinguished
as conditional and unconditional.
IDEAS OF PHENOMENA AND SUBSTANCE.
Idea of substance explained -Idea of Phenomena contingent
and relative - that of Substance necessary - Our ideas of
Substance not obscure, but clear and distinct.
IDEAS OF EVENTS  AND CAUSE.
The idea of-events contingent and relative; that of Cause necessary - Theory of Dr. Brown and others - Observations on
Mr. Dugald Stewart.
IDEA OF POWER.
Conclusion of the present Analysis....................................17-87
CHAPTER IV.
APPLICATION OF THE PRECEDING ANALYSIS.
LOGICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER or IDEAS.
Logical order- Chronological order.
PRIMARY  INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES  PRE-SUPPOSED BY THE
PRECEDING ANALYSIS.
These Faculties why called Primary- Also called Intuitive Fac  ulties-Relation of Primitive Intuitive Faculties to each
x 
CONTENTS.
other- Importance of the Truths above elucidated- Classification of Intellectual Phenomena given by Kant.............. 3-46
CHAPTER V.
CONSCIOUSNESS.
Consciousness Defined - Self-Consciousness conditioned on Rea  son, but not a function of Reason - Natural, or spontaneous,
and Philosophical, or reflective Consciousness -Process of
classification and Generalization in Reflection, illustrated -
Functions of Consciousness - Necessity of relying implicitly
upon the testimony of Consciousness - Consciousness, a dis  tinct function or faculty of the Intellect - Theory of Dr.
Brown - Meaning of the term Consciousness as employed by
Sir William Hamilton................................................. 47-59
CHAPTER VI.
SENSE.
To be distinguished from Sensation - Spontaneous and volun  tary determination of Sense -Mental process in Perception
-Objects of Perception- Common and Philosophic doubts
in respect to the comparative validity of the affirmations of
Sense and Consciousness- The province of Philosophy  Comparative validity of the affirmations of Sense and Con  sciousness- True theory of external Perception - Theory
verified - The above Theory verified as a truth of Science -
Qualities of Matter: Primary qualities, Secundo-primary
qualities, and Secondary qualities - What these qualities are
in general- Representative and Presentative Knowledge -
True theory of Perception stated and verified - False theo  ries of external perception: The Scholastic Theory; The
Cosmothetic Theory, and the Idealistic Theories - Reasons
for the Idealistic Theories- Objections to these Theories
Hypothesis, that all our knowledge of Matter is derived
through Sensation exclusively, the main source of error in
Philosophy - Explanation given by Kant and the Transcend  ental School generally of the fact of Sense-perception  Is color a primary or secondary quality of Matter?-Valid  ity of our knowledge of the Non-Ego or Matter- Conclu  sion of the present Exposition........................................ 60-107
xi 
CONTENTS,
CHAPTER VII.
SECONDARY FACULTIES.
UNDERSTANDING.
Notions Particular and General.
ELEMENTS OF WHICH NOTIONS ARE CONSTITUTED.
Contingent Elements -Necessary Elements: Substance and
Cause the fundamental elements of all Notions -Evolution
of these Laws not Arbitrary - I. Time and Space - Errors
of Kant: 1. In respect to the relation of Phenomena and
Noumena to Time and Space -2. Relation of the ideas of
Time and Space to Phenomena -II. Identity,and Diversity,
Resemblance and Difference - III. The idea of a Whole, as
including its parts, or Parts, in reference to the Whole Kant's Antinomy of Pure Reason -IV. The Category of
Quantity- The Category of Quantity distinct from that pre viously considered - V.  Of Quality - VI.  Of Relation VII. Of Modality - VIII. The Idea of Law - Conceptions
as distinguished from Notions - A Fact often attending Per ception- Mistake of Mr. Stewart - Notions and Concep tions charaterized as complete or incomplete, true or false Mistake of Coleridge in respect to the Understanding......... 108-126
CHAPTER VIII.
FACULTY OF JUDGMENT.
Abstraction-Abstract Notions, what, and how formed?  General Notions, how formed.
CLASSIFICATION.
Forms of Classification- Classification, in what sense arbi  trary - Genera and Species.
GENERALIZATION.
Rules in respect to Generalization - The term General sometimes used in a limited sense.
GENERAL TERMS.
Theory of the Realists - Theory of the Nominalists- Theory of the Conceptualists.
UNDERSTANDING AND.JUDGMENT DISTINGUISHED.
Distinction between the Understanding and Judgment verified- Observations of Kant - Relations of the Understanding and Judgment............................................... 126-138
xii 
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER IX.
ASSOCIATION.
Term defined - Term Association, why preferred- The Asso  ciating Principle not without law -Law of Association sta  ted and defined- The present Hypothesis, when established
as the Law of Association- A priori Argument -All the
Phenomena referred to the commonly received Laws, can be
explained on this Hypothesis- Phenomena exist which can
be accounted for on this, and on no other Hypothesis  Those falling under the relation of Analogy - Phenome  na of Dreaming - Phenomena of Somnambulism - Facts
connected with particular Diseases - This Hypothesis es  tablished and illustrated, by reflecting upon the facts of As  sociation - Argument summarily stated- Explanatory Re  marks- Reasons why different objects excite similar
feelings in our Minds-Application of the Principles above
illustrated - Ground of the Mistake of Philosophers in re  spect to the Laws of Association -Action of the Associa  ting Principle in different Individuals-Influence of Habit
- Standards of Taste and Fashion - Vicissitudes ill re  spect to such Standards -Peculiarities of Genius associa  ted with Judgment, or correct Taste - Influence of Wri  ters and Speakers of splendid Genius, but incorrect Taste
- Danger of Vicious Associations- Unrighteous Prejudi  ces, how justified -Giving Individuals a bad Name, spread  ing false Reports, &c.- Influence of the Associating Prin  ciple in perpetuating existing mental Characteristics......... 139-161
CHAPTER X.
MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION.
Terms defined -States of Mind entering into and connected
with these Processes - The above statement verified - Prin  ciple on which Objects are remembered with Ease and Dis  tinctness-Deep and distinct Impressions, on what condi  tioned-Diversity of Powers of Memory, as developed in
different Individuals - Philosophic Memory -Local Mem  ory- Artificial Memory.
MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
A ready and retentive Memory-The  vast and diverse
Power of Memory possessed by different Individuals- Im  provement of Memory - Memory of the Aged - Duration
of Memory...............................................................161-172
2
xiii 
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XI.
IMAGINATION.
Definitions of distinguished Philosophers -Objections to the
above Definitions- Another definition proposed -Imagi nation and Fancy distinguished - Another Definition of the
term Fancy.
IMAGINATION AND FANCY ELUCIDATED.
Preliminary Remarks   Elucidation.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CREATIONS OF THE IMAGINATION.
1. Elements of Diverse Scenes blended into one Whole2. Blending the Diverse - 3. Blending Opposites — 4.
Blending things in their Nature alike- 5. Combining Numbers into Unity, and dissolving and separating Unity into
Number -6. Adding to, or abstracting some Quality from,
an object -7. Blending with external objects the Feelings
which they excite in us -8. Abstracting certain Characteristics of Objects, and blending them into Harmony with
some leading Idea - 9. Throwing the fleeting Thoughts,
Sentiments, and Feelings, of our past Existence, into one
beautiful Conception.
REMARKS ON THE PRECEDING ANALYSIS.
Remark of Coleridge.
CREATIONS OF THE IMAGINATION, WHY NOT ALWAYS FICTIONS.
Sphere of the Imagination not confined to Poetry -- Law of
Taste relative to the Action of the Imagination.
IMAGINATION THE ORGAN OF IDEALS.
Idea defined - Ideal defined- Ideals, Particular and General - Ideals not confined to Ideas of the Beautiful, the
Grand, and the Sublime -Ideals not fixed and changeless,
like Ideas - Ideals the Foundation of Mental ProgressIdeals in the Divine and Human Intelligence.
ACTION OF THE JUDGMENT RELATIVE TO THAT OF THE
IMAGINATION.
Taste defined -Productions of the Imagination when not
regulated by correct Judgment or good Taste.
xiv 
CONTENTS.
PRODUCTIONS IN WHICH THE ACTION OF THE FANCY OR IMAG               INATION IS MOST CONSPICUOUS.
COMBINATIONS OF THOUGHT DENOMINATED WIT, AS DISTIN  GUISHED FROM THOSE RESULTING FROM THE PROPER AC  TION OF THE IMAGINATION OR FANCY.
Bombast - Burlesque - Sarcasm.
PROPRIETY OF USING THE IMAGINATION AND FANCY IN WORKS
OF FICTION.
False idea in respect to the Influence of Familiarity with the
popular Fictitious Writings of the Day -Imagination and
Fancy- How improved..............................................173-213
CHAPTER XII.
REASON.
Reason defined - Coleridge's Characteristics of Reason as dis  tinguished from the Understanding.
Secondary Ideas of Reason-Idea of Right and Wrong.
This Idea exists in all Minds in which Reason is developed -
Idea of Right and Wrong necessary- Ideas dependent on
that of Right and Wrong, &c. - Clironological Adecedent
to the Idea of Right and Wrong, &c.
Idea of Fitness.
This Idea synonymous with Right and Wrong, &c.
Idea of the Useful, or the Good.
The Summum Bonum.
Relations of the Ideas of Right and Wrong, and of the Useful, to
each other.
This purely a Psychological Question -Nature of Virtue -
Happiness a Phenomenon of the Sensibility- Relation of
Willing to Happiness - Conclusion necessarily resulting
From the Facts above stated - Argument Expanded - Additional Considerations - Argument stated in view of another Example - Result of the Discussion thus far - Other
important Considerations - The above Argument of Universal Application - Obligation not affirmed in view of the
subjective Tendencies of Right or Wrong Willing -Another.
General Consideration- Mutable Actions.                  //
xv 
CONTENTS.
Ideas of Liberty and Necessity.
Ideas defined - These Ideas Universal and Necessary -
Idea of Liberty realized only in the action of the Will -
Chronological Antecedents of these Ideas.
Idea of the Beautiful and Sublime.
Opinions of Philosophers - Considerations indicating the
existence in the Mind of Ideas of Reason, designated by the
terms Beautiful and Sublime -Objection to the Universality of these Ideas - Chronological Antecedent of these
Ideas - Illustration from Cousin - Explanatory Remarks.
Idea of Harmony- Reflections.
Mind constituted according to fundamental Ideas- Poetry
defined.
Idea of Truth.
Idea defined- Chronological Antecedent of this Idea.
Idea of Law.
Coleridge's Definition of Law- Law, Subjective and Object ive-Conclusion from the above- Chronological Antece dent to this Idea-Apparent Mistake in respect to Law Theory and Law distinguished - Nature of Proof- Funda mental and superficial Thinkers.
The Philosophic Idea.
Chronological Antecedent of this Idea.
First Truths, or Necessary Principles of Reason, as distinguished from
Contingent Principles.
Contingent and Necessary Principles defined and distin guished- First Truths defined - Kind of Proof of which
Necessary Ideas or Principles admit- Statement illustrated
by a Reference to the Idea of God - Idea and Principle of
Reason distinguished - Axioms, Postulates, and Definitions.
Idea of Science, Pure and Mixed.
Idea of Science defined - Pure Sciences - Mixed Sciences.
Function of Reason denominated Conscience.
Conscience defined - General Remarks - Objection - Term
Conscience as used in the Scriptures.
General Remarks pertaining to Reason.
Relation of Reason to other Intellectual Faculties - Through
Reason Man is a Religious Being-Reason common to all
Men - Error of Coleridge- Paralogism of Cousin- Transcendentalism - Reason, in what sense Impersonal - Reason, in what sense identical in anl Men............................ 214-269
xvi 
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XIII.
RECAPITULATION, WITH ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS.
Intellectual Faculties enumerated -Influence of the above
Distinctions - Errors of Kant - Classification of the Pri  mary Mental Faculties.
Remarks upon the Relations of Intuitions to one another.
Intuitions cannot be opposed to each other - Different Intuition Faculties cannot contradict each other - The logical
Consequents of no one Intuition can be in opposition to any
primary Intuition, nor to the logical Consequents of the
same- Error of Kant and Coleridge.
Secondary Faculties.
Understanding - The Judgment - The Associating Principle- Imagination.....................................................270-282
CHAPTER XIV.
SPONTANEOUS AND REFLECTIVE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE
INTELLIGENCE.
General characteristics of all Objects of Knowledge, and of
our Knowledge of the same- Distinct Apprehension condi tioned on Attention -Spontaneous Development of the In  telligence -Characteristics of this Spontaneity- Charac  teristics Illustrated.
Additional Remarks and Illustrations.
Categories of Spontaneous and Reflective Reason - Relation of Observation and Reflection to this original Spontaneity- Confidence reposed in the first Truths of Reason, how
weakened -Use  of the Common  Demonstrations of the
Divine Existence -Conclusions arrived at by a process of
Reasoning, when false- Reasons of the Diversity and Difference of the opinions of Men -Sources of Error...........283-292
CHAPTER XV.
ORIGIN OF IDEAS.
The two Schools in Philosophy - Principles of Locke - The  ory of Kant -Principles of Locke tested with reference to
Necessary Ideas - Principles of Locke fail in respect to
2*
xvii 
CONTENTS.
Understanding-conceptions Error of, Kant - Position of
Kant true in respect to Understanding-conceptions and Affirmations of the Judgment.
True Explanation.
Intuitions -Notions -The Judgment- Associating Principle and the Imagination- Scientific Movement.
Manner in which the General, Abstract, and Universal, are eliminated
from the Concrete and Particular.
General Notions - Abstract Notions - Universal and Necessary Ideas   Error of Cousin........................................293-304
CHAPTER XVI.
LAWS OF INVESTIGATION.
Investigation and Reasoning distinguished- Substances, how
known - Induction of Phenomena, for what purposes made
-Induction pertaining to particular Substances - Induc  tion for purposes of Classification into Genera and Species -
Finding a General Fact, or Order of Sequence - The prob  able and Improbable - Order of Sequence - The Discovery
of Universal Law.
Testimony.
Characteristics of the Statements made by a Witness - Circumstances which go to establish the Credibility of a Witness - Corroborating Circumstances aside from the Character of the witness - Concurrent Testimony................. 305-315
CHAPTER XVII.
REASONING.
The Syllogism the universal Form of Reasoning -The above
Principle verified - Forms in which the Major Premise ap pears- Principles which lie at the Basis of all Conclusions
from a Process of Reasoning - Remarks upon these Princi ples- Remarks on Aristotle's Dictum.
I)fferent kinds of Reasonin7.
Distinctions elucidated- Distinction between Demonstra tive and Probable Reasoning - Common Impression in re spect to the extent of Demonstrative Reasoning — Method
of Proof- Real Proof found in no other Method - Sources
of Fallacies in Reasoning.
xviii 
CONTENTS.
Conception of Logic.
All Things occur according to Rules- Logic defined-Re-1
lations of Logic to other Sciences..................................316-330
CHAPTER XVIII.
MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
The bearing of the Philosophy of Locke upon Science, prop  erly so called.
Kant's distinction between Analytical and Synthetical
Judgments - Analytical and Synthetical Judgments defined
and distinguished -Consequences which Kant deduced
from the Judgments as defined by himself- Error of Kant
in defining and applying these Distinctions.
True and False Systems of Philosophy.
Criterion or Tests by which we can distinguish the True
from all False Systems -Theory of Realism: This Theory
verified -Materialism: Conditions on which the Material
Hypothesis can be sustained: Objections to Materialism  Systems of Idealism- Ideal Dualism: What are Realities
according to this System- Remarks on this System- Sub jective Idealism: System stated: Remarks upon this Sys  tem -Pantheism or the System of Absolute Identity: El  ements and characteristics of the system: Remarks upon
this System -Pure Idealism: System stated: General Re  marks upon the Systems - General Remarks upon Idealism.
.Iodern Tianscendentalisrn.
Eclecticism of Cousin: System stated: Remarks upon this
system- Common Sense Defined - Common Sense a stand  ard of Truth -Philosophic Principles, why rejected by the
mass of Mankind - Dictates of Common Sense, how known
and distinguished - Characteristics of Men distinguished
for Common Sense..................................................... 331-404
CHAPTER XIX.
THE INTELLIGENCE OF MAN AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THAT
OF THE BRUTE.
Brute Instincts classified -Manifestations of Instinctive In  telligence-Principle on which the Argument is based -
Points of Resemblance between the Man and the Brute  Hypotheses on which these common Facts may be Explain
xix 
CONTENTS.
ed- Points of Dissimilarity between Man and the BruteFacts applied- General Remarks................................. 405-422
CHAPTER XX.
MATTER AND SPIRIT.
Principles on which the Argument is based -Principles ap  plied- Common Objections.........................................423426
CHAPTER XXI.
IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.
Preliminary Considerations-Principles on which the Argu  ment is based- Direct Argument - Future Retributions...427-436
CHAPTER XXII.
THE IDEA OF GOD.
Preliminary Considerations- God the Unconditioned Cause of
all that exists Conditionally -Possible Hypothesis on this
subject- None but the Theistic Hypothesis can be true  The Theistic Hypothesis established as a truth of Science
-Attributes necessarily implied in the idea of the Uncon  ditioned- Attributes of the Unconditioned necessarily sup  posed in the facts of the Universe - Facts of Creation bearing
upon our present inquiries- The Theistic Hypothesis intu  itively certain from these Facts- Truth of this Hypothesis
more particularly developed - Does Creation indicate the
character of God as Infinite and Perfect -God, the Infinite
and Perfect - This a first Truth of Reason - Reason why
these elements have not yet been designated- Foundation
of the conviction that God is both Infinite and Perfect  Relation of the idea of God, above elucidated, to all other
ideas of Him- The idea of a system of Theology - Postu late, Axioms, &c., in Theology -Kind of Proof pertaining
to each particular Attribute - This Science to be evolved in
the light of the Works of God, Material and Mental, and of
the teachings of Inspiration - Theology, Natural and Re vealed-Difference between a Mystery and Absurdity in
Theology -Absurdity defined - Mystery defined - Myste ry and Absurdity defined in another form -Fundamental
characteristics of a real Revelation from God -Revealed
Theology defined -Defects of Method in the common sys tems of Theology -Use of the common Treatises on Natu ral Theology - Conclusion.......................................... 437-476
xx 
IN\TELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION.
CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES.
ALL substances may be classified under two general divisions, Matter and Mind. This arrangement presents a twofold
division of the sciences, to wit, Material, and Mental.
OBJECT OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
Mental Philosophy is the science of Mind, and of the
human Mlind in particular.  Its object is a correct classification
of the phenomena, for the purpose of a full and distinct development of the Powers, Susceptibilities, and Laws of the
human Mind.   This department of inquiry being completed,
Mental Philosophy, as a science, then ascends to an investigation of the wide field of Moral Obligation, for the purpose of
developing the extent, limis, and grounds of human  respolnsibility.
WIIAT IS TO BE EXPECTED FROM SUCH INVESTIGATIONS.
The field before us is of almost boundless extent.   We are
not, therefore, to expect, that any one treatise will present all
1
0 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
that may be known of the human Mind. All that I hope to
accomplish, is to introduce the inquirer to the science, and
give to his inquiries, in respect to it, a right direction. His
own investigations will then lead him to exhaustless treasures
of wisdom and knowledge.
MENTAL PHILOSOPIHY, AS A SCIENCE, POSSIBLE.
Every substance in existence is known, and can be known
by us, through and only through its respective phenomena.
This, with us, is the changeless condition of knowledge, in
respect to all realities which lie around us in the universe.
Every power or substance in existence is knowable to us, so
far only as we can know its phenomena. The question, then,
whether Mental Philosophy is possible to us, depends wholly
upon this, whether the Mind, in the action of its varied powers
and susceptibilities, is so revealed to itself, that it can know
its own operations or phenomena?  To this question, but one
answer can be given. We are so constituted, that we have a
knowledge of whatever passes in the interior of our minds.
This power, or law of our Mental Faculties, explain the fact in
whatever manner we please, is denominated Consciousness,
which is a faithful witness of whatever passes within us. On
the authority of Consciousness, all men do and must rely.
Here Skepticism itself assumes the garb of positive faith: for
in the languag,e of Descartes, "let a man doubt everything
else, he cannot doubt that he doubts j" and " he cannot doubt
that he doubts" for this reason, that he cannot but rely, in
some form  or other, upon the testimony of his own Conciousness.
Not only are all things which pass within us given as phenomena of Consciousness, but we have also the power of retaining these phenomena under the eye of the mind, until we
have fully resolved them  into their original elements, and
2 
INTRODUCTION.
marked their characteristics. This power or exercise of the
mind is denominated reflection, and is conditioned on the Will.
Mental Philosophy then becomes possible for the same
reasons, and on the same conditions, that physical science, or
Natural  Philosophy is possible.   Facts equally undeniable,
and equally distinct and palpable, are given as the foundation
of both sciences.  All that is required in either instance, is,
that our researches be conducted upon right principles -that
we introduce into our investigations nothing but actual facts,
that these facts be correctly arranged and classified,-and
that none but legitimate conclusions be drawn from them.
THE METHOD IN CONFORMITY TO WHICH PSYCHOLOGICAL
RESEARCHES SHOULD BE CONDUCTED.
Having shown that Miental Philosophy, as a science, is
possible, we will now contemplate the question in respect to
the mlethod which should be adopted in conducting our investigations. Every philosopher commences his inquiries in conformity to a certain ideal of which he has conceived, and
which he has assumed, as involving the most perfect method in
conformity to which such investigations can be conducted.   A
remark of Cousin on this point demands special attention.
"As is the method of a philosopher, so will be his system;
and the adoption of a method, decides the destiny of a philosophy."  It becomes us, therefore, at the threshold of our
inquiries, to stop, and with great care, determine the MIethod
in conformity to which we are to investigate the powers, susceptibilities, and laws of the mysterious substance before us.
The following Principles I would propose as involving and
announcing the true MIethod to be adopted:
1. We should present to our own minds, with great distinctness, the question, what are the fcucts which lie at the
basis of all our conclusions in respect to this science; facts
3 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPiIY.
upon which all legitimate conclusions do and must rest?  They
are, as all must admit, the facts which  lie under the eye of
Conrsciousness.  But what are these facts?  In other words,
what are the sole and exclusive objects of Consciousness?
Not, surely, as Cousin observes, the "external world, or its
Creator -not the substanice, nature, essence, or Faculties of
thle soul itself."  They are the soul in its g a-iiJestatiots-ill
tie exercise of its various Faculties.   Upon these all our conclusions in regard to the nature of these Faculties, as well as
upon the nature of the soul itself, and of all other objects are
based.  As  the sole basis of physical science,  we have the
phenomena of plerception.  As  the basis of Psychology, we
has-e the phenomena of Consciousness, and  these only.  As
we k.now the mind only through its phenomena, or manifestations, so all legitimate conclusions in respect to it must
be revealed and affirmed by these manifestations. HIence I
remark,
2. That in pursuing our investigations according to the
true Pssyehological lMetlhod, we shall commience with no questio-ns in respect to the 9nature or esseace of mind, whether it is
material or immaterial, or in respect to its various powers, or
functions, nor in respect to the or2igin of mental phenomena.
All such questions are to be adjourned, until we have observed,
chcrq~:rizcd,~w  aCd cta:siftecl the phenomLena,  or operations,
which  zow, in our present state of mental development,  lie
under thie eye of Consciousness.   The question, in regard to
the o';n/h,  of mental phenomiena, involves, as its foundation
andl starting point, a knowledge of such phenomena  as they
now exist-.  Otherwise we are inquiring after the ori-di, of
that of the aatre of whilich we are profoundly ignorant.   So
also, if, before we have attained this knowledge, we study and
attempt the resolution of questions pertaining to the'lttre or
ess&;';c, of the mind, or in respect to its Faculties, we violate
4 
INTROD'UCTION.
the fundamental law of all correct philosophizing, to wit: that
substances are known and are to be studied only through
their phenomena. The true Psychological Method does not
neglect any legitimate questions in respect to ontology, or
the origin of mental phenomena. It simply adjourns these,
till another preliminary department of inquiry has been completed.
In pursuing our inquiries in respect to mental phenomena,
and in respect to the characteristics of particular phenomena,
two rules of fundamental importance present themiselves,to wit: Suppose or assume, as real, nothing which does not
exist- and omit, or disregard, nothing which does exist.
3. The phenomena which lie under the eye of Consciousness clearly indicate a diversity of mental powers, or functions.   In conformity to the true Psychological  Method, a
fundamental aim of the Mental Philosopher wvill be, to adopt
those principles of classification by which these differenlt powers
or functions shall be distinctly revealed to the Mind.   Two
self-evident principles will guide him in determining the different powers or functions of the Mind.   1. Phenomena, in their
fundamental characteristics alike, are to be attributed to one
and the same Faculty.  2. Phenomena, in their fundamental
characteristics unlike, suppose a diversity of powers or functions. IIence the vast importance of classification with exclusive reference to fundamental characteristics.
4. Amid  the endlessly diversified  phenomena  of Consciousness, there are, in the depths of the Mind, particular
phenomena, which reveal the Laws which govern the action
of the different mental powers.  One of the principal aims
of the MIental Philosopher, in conformity to a correct Psychological Method, will be, to fix upon, and develope those
facts, or phenomena, by which the Lawcs of thought, feeling,
and action, are revealed.  No  department of inquiry in the
1*
5 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
wide field of Mental Science is of greater importance than
this.
5. Having, by careful reflection, and in conformity to correct principles, ascertained, classified, and arranged the phenomena of the 3ind, as they now lie under the eye of
Consciousness, a correct Psychological Method would then lead
us to move the important questions pertaining to the origin
of these phenomena, to Ontology, and to the nature, extent,
limits, and grounds of Moral Obligation. This completes the
circle of investigations in the wide domain of Mental Science.
Much will be done for Philosophy, if this circle is completed
according to the method above developed.
The above the onlyj correct Psycholoyical Jletood.
A moment's reflection will convince us, that this is the
philosophical, and I may add, the only philosophical Method.
The powers of nature, external and internal, are known to
us only in their manifestations, or through their respective
phenomena.   These manifestations must, of course, be known,
or we must remain in total ignorance of the powers themselves.
This is the universal Method, the Method which lies at the
basis of all real science pertaining to Matter or Mind. In
pursuing our investigations in strict conformity to the principles of this Method, we shall be conducted to no conjectural
conclusions, but to certain knowledge; provided we have
marked with correctness existing phenomena, and have proceeded logically from the facts thus given, to our conclusions.
It puts us, to say the least, upon the right road to knowledge.
If we "fall out by the way," the fault will be our own, and
not that of the Method adopted.
If we arrive at correct conclusions, we shall, also, in the
light of the Method pursued, understand and be able to assign
6 
INTRODUCTION.
the reasons for those conclusions, a most important attainment
in the progress of mental development. If, on the other hand,
we adopt any false conclusions, our Method itself presents the
best means for their correction.   No individual will long remain in the embrace of any important error, who has adopted
a correct method of investigation, and who rigidly adheres to
the principles of that method.
UNtil# of this Science.
But little need be said to impress the inquirer with a conviction of the importance of our present investigations.
MIental Philosophy is the science of self-reflection.   It
teaches us to know ourselves, in our relations to God, and to
the universe around us.
The importance of this science may likewise be seen in
the light of its relations to all other departments of human
investigation.   " Whatever be the object of inquiry," says
Cousin, "God or the world, beings the most near or remote,
you neither know nor can know them, but upon one condition,
namely, that you have the faculty of knowledge in general;
and you neither possess nor can attain a knowledge of them
except in proportion to your general faculty of knowledge.
Whatever you attain a knowledge of, the highest or the lowest
thing, your knowledge in the last result rests, both in respect
to its extent and its legitimacy, upon the reach and validity
of that faculty, by whatever name you call it, Spirit, Reason,
Mind, Intelligence, Understanding."   One of the first and
great inquiries of man, then, is the nature, extent and limits
of this faculty.  This is Intellectual Philosophy.   This is
Psychology, a science, which indeed is not the whole of Philosophy, but " must be allowed to be its foundation and starting point."
By developing the laws of human belief, and by habituating
7 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOIPIIY.
the mind to contemplate and investigate cAUSES through their
respective phenomena, this science also furnishes a light, to
guide our investigations in every other science, and presents
the strongest possible motives to lead us onward.
Nor is its connection with morality and religion less important and influential.   Indeed, here lies its chief importance.
The development of the laws of evidence, will place in a clear
light, the ground of our assent to the Divine authority of
Christianity, so far as external evidence is concerned.  A  development of the powers and susceptibilities of the mind itself,
will lead us to a correct understanding of the bearing of the
internal  evidence of Christianity.   A  development of the
grounds of moral obligation will lead us to perceive distinctly,
and to feel deeply, our obligation to obey the moral precepts
of Christianity. Every truth, every principle and precept of
Christianity, supposes some one or more faculties or susceptibilities of the mind, to which they are addressed. A distinct
knowledge of these faculties and susceptibilities, places those
truths and principles in the clearest possible light before the
mind.
One other consideration will show clearly the important
bearing which our present inquiries have upon religion. The
study of ilind, according to the Method above announced,
implies, as its foundation and starting point, a careful investigation of mental phenomena. Among, these phenomena, i(icas
occupy a very important place, and amnong the most fundamental and important of all our ideas, are the conceptions of
the infinite and perfect, that is, of God, of eternity, of immnortality, of moral obligation, and of retribution.  In developing
the characteristics, origin and grounds of these ideas, we are
determining our convictions in regard to many of the most
important and fundamental truths of religion.  We are moulding and forming convictions which will, and must determine
8 
INTRODUCTION.
the meaning, which we shall attach to the most important portions of the Sacred Volume itself.
If we should appeal to facts, we should find the fullest
verification of all that is said above.  All the forms of corrupt
Christianity which have appeared for the last eighteen centuries, all the false religions which have ever cursed the earth, all
the forms of infidelity and skepticism, which the seathings of
human depravity have, in any age, thrown upon the surfhace of
society, have had their foundation in systems of false Philosophy. No maxim is more fully verified, by universal observation than this: as is a man's Philosophy, so is his Tlheology.
The changeless laws of our being renders us, in all deparitmineuts
of research and action, philosophic beings. In religion, we
can no more be exempt from the influence of Philosophy, than
in all other departments of investigation.  Suppose  we professedly, as some have done, repudiate all Philosophy, and
approach the Sacred Volume, to be taught of God, irrespective
of any philosophic speculations. What is this but the enunciation of a peculiar system of Philosophy -a system which,
after all, will determine, in many essential respects, the meaning
which we shall attach to the most important responses of the
Sacred Oracles? God hath joined Philosophy and Pieligion
together. We do violence to the nature which he has given
us, when we attempt to put them asunder. False Philosophy
is the mother of false religions. A correct Philosophy is the
handmaid of true Pteligion.
In short, in every condition and relation of life, next to
the wisdom, which, by direct inspiration, "comethli from above,"
is a correct and comprehensive knowledge of M]ental Philoso.
phy, important to man.  To the citizen, this science is useful
by giving him the reasons of the duties devolved upon him in
all the relations of life.  To the theologian, it will be of great
use, by enabling him not only to understand correctly the truths
9 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
and principles of Christianity, but also to present them in such
a manner that he will " commend himself to every man's conscience in the sight of God."   Iow true also is the sentiment
advanced by the great philosopher of England, to wit. that no
mnan is qualified to fill the sphere of an enlightened statesman,
who has not thought muuch and profoundly upon the infinite,
the just, the right, the true, and the good.
State of 3ined requcisite to  a  successful prosecutions of this
Sc.a
feCte7~.
It remains to speak upon one topic more, the spirit requisite to a successful prosecution of this science.
The first requisite that I mention is this, a deep conviction
of the im29portctnce of the science.   We pursue nothing with
energy which, to our mninds, does not possess an importance demanding the exertion of our entire powers.   If I could impress
the inquirer with a due conviction of the importance of our
present investigations, and could excite in him a purpose of
corresponding inflexibility to master the science, I should not
have any unpleasant apprehensions in respect to the result.
I mention, in connection with the above, another requisite,
to wit, a love of the science for its own sake; that is, for what
presents itself to the inind, as intrinsic in the science itself, as
well as an account of its relative value. That which strongly
appeals, not only to our convictions of what is valuable, but to
the sensibilities of our nature, we readily pursue with the most
untiring energy and perseverance. But two things are requisite to excite in any mind this love for the science under consideration -a proper conviction of the imnportance of the
science, and familiarity with its great truths and principles.
We are naturally such philosophic beings, that almost nothing
else delights us so much as philosophic truths and principles,
when we once become acquainted with them.
10 
INTRODUCTION.
Another essential requisite is the habit or spirit of selfreflection. All legitimate conclusions pertaining to this science
rest upon the facts which lie under the eye of Consciousness.
To know these facts, that eye must be fixed with long and intense gaze upon them, till their fundamental characteristics are
distinctly revealed.  Without the spirit of self-reflection the
inquirer will make but poor progress in Mental Philosophy.
With it, he will " go from strength to strength."
The inquirer who would make progress in this science,
must also be deeply imbued with a teachable spirit. This is
the true and only true philosophic spirit. Under its influence the mind "cries after knowledge, and lifts up its voice
for understanding."   "It seeks for her as silver, and searches
for her as for hid treasures."   "Wisdom  enters into the
heart, and knowledge is pleasant to the soul."   The love
of truth, for her own sake, takes full possession of the mind.
To  " sit under her banners," and " dwell in the light of her
countenance," all opinions, all systems and prepossessions, contrary to her teachings, are readily sacrificed. Facts are weighed
with the utmost care for the exclusive purpose of knowing
their characteristics; and all conclusions, however contrary to
all performed theories, are readily admitted, which sustains to
such facts the relation of logical antecedents or consequents.
In this state of mind, the student will not fail to "understand
righteousness, and judgment, and equity; yea, and every good
path."
I mention as another indispensable requisite,?tnt;ring industry and perseverance.  "There is no royal road to knowledge"
of any kind; much less to a knowledge of ourselves. Before
we attain that high eminence from which the goodly moun.Aains, waving forests, verdant hills, luxuriant valleys, and maIestic rivers of this "land of promise," this "land flowing
with milk and honey," shall lie out with distinctness beneath
11 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIIY.
the enraptured vision; we shall find many a tiresome wilder ness to pass, many a rugged steep to climb, and sometimes,
perhaps, almost "through the palpable obscure," will we be
compelled to "find out our uncouth way."   But when that
eminence has been attained, no one feels that he has " labored
in vain, and spent his strength for nought." Every individual,
who is not fully prepared for the toil of hard and tireless
thitkincg, had better abandon this study before he commences
it. Otherwise, in addition to all the wretchedness of ignorance, he will be subject to the more depressing influence of
conscious unworthiness of the possession of this treasure of
knowledge.
I will allude to but one requisite more - a deeply serious
state of vZi1zd.  In no other state are we prepared for deep
communion with the mysteries, and for profound contemplaticns of the sublime and majestic creations of truth. To walk
among her "cloud-capped towers, gorgeous palaces and solemn
temples," and to worship at her shrine, here is no place for
triflers here.   A  trifler neither knows himself nor respects
himself. Ile is, therefore, wholly unprepared to inquire for,
or appreciate when found, the most momentous of all the revelations of truth, those respecting the nature, character and
relations of himself.
The individual who commences, and continues to prosecute, his inquiries pertaining to this science, in the spirit above
described, will find in the end a full reward of his labors. The
object of the author is not to think for the inquirer, but to
enable him to think for himself.
12 
CHAPTER II.
CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA AND POWERS.
"ALL the facts," says Cousin, "which fall under the Consciousness of man, and consequently under the reflection of
the philosopher, resolve themselves into three fundamental
facts, which contain all others. These facts which, beyond
doubt, are never in reality, solitary, and separate from each
other, but which are essentially not the less distinct, and which
a careful analysis ought to distinguish without dividing, in the
complex phenomena of intellectual life; these three facts are
expressed in the words TO FEEL, TO THINK, TO ACT."
Is this a full and correct classification of the phenomena of the
human mind?  Are these distinctions real?  Are all mental
phenomena included in these fundamental facts? These questions I answer in the affirmative, for the following reasons:
1. No mental phenomena can be conceived of, which do
not fall under one or the other of these facts. What mental
operation can we conceive of, which is not a thought; feeling,
or choice, purpose, or determination?
2. These classes of phenomena differ from one another,
not in degree but in k/ind.  How entirely distinct, for example,
is thought, in every degree and modification, from feeling, on
the one hand, and mental determination, on the other.  Feelings, also, of every kind and modification, stand at an equal
remnove from thoughts and mental acts or determinations. So
of the class last mentioned. Choice in every degree or form
2 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
makes, in its fundamental characteristics, no approach what ever to thoughts or feelings.
3. All men recognize the states of mind designated by the
above expressions, as actually existing in human Consciousness, and as clearly distinguishable from each other. When
I affirm to the peasant, or to the philosopher, at one time, that
I think so and so; at another that I have particular feelings;
and at another still, that I have resolved, or determined upon
a particular course of conduct; both alike readily apprehend
my meaning, and understand me as referring to states of mind
perfectly distinct.
4. In all known languages there are terms employed to
designate these three classes of phenomena; terms, each of
which is applied to one class exclusively, and never to either
of the others.  Thus, the term thouyh7t is never applied to any
mental phenomena but those designated by the words to think.
We never use it to designate feelings, or mental determinations
of any kind.  The terms sensation  or emotion are never applied to any but the phenomena offeeling. In a similar manner, we never apply the terms purpose, willing, determining,
&c., to the phenomena of thought or feeling, but exclusively
to those designated by the words to act. The existence of
such terms undeniably evince, that the different classes of
phenomena, under consideration, are recognized by universal
Consciousness, not only as existing, but as entirely distinct
from one another.
5. As a final reason I would adduce an argument presented
in the work, recently published, on the Will.  "The clearness
and particularity with which the universal Intelligence has
marked the distinction under consideration, is strikingly indicated by the fact, that there are qualifying terms in common
use, which are applied to each of these classes of phenomena,
and never to either of the others.  It is true that there are
14 
MENTAL PHENOMENA AND POWERS.
such terms which are promiscuously applied to all classes of
phenomena. There are terms, however, which are never applied but to one class.  Thus we speak of clear thoughts, but
never of clear feelings or determinations.   We speak of irreprcssi'le feelings  ancd  desires, but never of  irrepressible
thoughts or resolutions.   We also speak of iiflexible determinations, but never of inflexible feelings or conceptions.   With
what perfect distinctness, then, must the universal Consciousness have marked thoughts, feelings, and determinations, as
phenomena entirely distinct from one another- phenomena
differing not in degree, but in kind."
.Jliental Facu7lties indicated by the phenontena above classt!ied.
The threefold classification of mental phenomena, above
established and elucidated, clearly indicate a tri-unity of mental faculties and susceptibilities equally distinct from one another.   These faculties and susceptibilities we designate by the
terms Intellect or Intelligence, Sensibility or Sensitivity, and
Will. To the Intellect we refer all the phenomena of thought,
of every kind, degree, and modification. To the Sensibility
we refer all fcelicgs, such as sensations, emotions, desires, and
affections.   To the Will we refer all mental  deternminations,
such as volitions, choices, purposes, &c.
OBJECT OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
The object of Mental Philosophy is a full development of
the phenomena, characteristics, laws, and mutual relationships
and dependencies of these different faculties.
MIEANING OF THE WORDS MENTAL FACULTIES
When I speak of a diversity of Mental Faculties, I would
by no means be understood as teaching the strange dogma,
that the mind is made up of parts which may be separated
15 
INTELLECTUAL PHIIILOSOPHY.
from one another.   Mind is not composed of a diversity of
substances. It is one substance, incapable of division. Yet
this simple substance, remaining, as it does, always one and
idclentical, is capable of a diversity of functions, or operations,
entirely distinct from one another.  This diversity of capabilities of this one substance, we designate by the words
Mental Faculties.   As the functions of thought, feeling, and
willing, are entirely distinct from each other, so we speak of
the powers of thought, feeling, and willing, to wit, the Intelligence, Sensibility, and Will, as distinct faculties of the Mind.
The remarks made above respecting the Mind itself will,
at once, appear equally applicable to each of the Mental Faculties which have been enumerated. As we speak of the Intelligence, for example, as a Faculty of the Mind entirely distinct from those of the Sensibility and Will, without supposing
that the Mind is not strictly one substance, so we may speak
of the different Powers, or Faculties of the Intelligence itself,
without implying that that Faculty is composed of a diversity
of parts. The term Faculty, whether applied to the whole
Mind, or to any of the departments of the Mind, implies a
diversity of functions of the same power, or substance, and
not a diversity of substances, or parts.
16 
CIIAPTER  III.
PHENOMENA OF THE INTELLIGENCE.
AE are now prepared to enter directly upon the great inquiry to be pursued in this Treatise,-  the PIeiiomecta, I'acq7tics, aeid Iazws of tfe ]tunia?i Itelligeiece.  As all that we
know, or can know, of this, as well as of every other department of the 3Iind, is revealed to us through the phenomena
which lie under the eye of Consciousness, the first inquiries
which now present themselves are, What are the phenomena
of thought thus revealed? What are their fundamental characteristics? In conformity to what principles shall they be
classified and arranged?
PRINCIPLE OF CLASSIFICATION.
There is one principle, in conformity to which all intellectual phenomena may be properly classified, and in the light
of which, the fundamental characteristics of such phenomena
may be very distinctly presented.   I refer to the ntodes in
which all objects of thought are conceived of by the Intelligence.   Of these modes, there are two entirely distinct and
separate, the one from the other.   Every object of thought is
conceived of as existing either continfgently or of iecessity, that
is, that object is conceived of as existing, with the possibility
of conceiving of its non-existence, or it is conceived of as existing, with the impossibility of conceiving of its non-existence.  If we have any conceptions of an object at all, we
2* 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
must conceive of it as falling under one or the other of these
relations. The principle of classification, therefore, is fundamental, and of universal application.
CONTINGENT AND NECESSARY PHENOMENA OF THOUGHT
DEFINED.
Every thought, conception, cognition, or idea, then, by
whatever term we may choose to designate it, all the phenomena of the Intelligence, may  be classed, as continyent, or
necessary. A conception is contingent, when its object may be
conceived of as existing with the possibility of conceiving of its
non-existence.
An idea is necessary when its object is conceived of as cxisting with the impossibility of conceiving of its non-existence.
All the phenomena of the Intelligence must, as shown
above, fall under one or the other of these relations.  It remains now, to illustrate the principle of classification here
adopted, by a reference to an adequate number of particular
phenomena, as the basis of important distinctions pertaining
to the different functions or powers of the Intelligence. In
the notice which we shall take of particular phenomena, other
important characteristics, aside from those under consideration,
will be developed, while these will be kept prominently in
mind, as the grounds of classification.
IDEAS OF BODY AND SPACE.
Two prominent ideas, those of body and space, will first
claim our attention. They are to be analyzed as they now lie
in the Intelligence, in its present state of development.  That
these ideas exist in all minds, which have attained to any considerable degree of development, none can doubt, and none
will deny. The question to be resolved is, what are their fundamental characteristics?
18 
IDEAS OF BODY AND SPACE.
Idea of body contingent. That of Space necessary.
We will begin with the idea of body.   A careful analysis
of this idea will undeniably evince the fact, that it has the
characteristic of conti)7eflecw; in other words,  that its object
may always be conceived of, as existing, with the possibility
of conceiving of its non-existence. Take any body we please,
the book, for example, that lies before us, our own physical
organization, the habitation in which we dwell, the earth itself,
or the entire physical universe together, and we shall find, on
careful reflection, that we may conceive of them as existing, or
as not existing.   We  believe, that things equal to the  same
things are equal to one another, because we cannot even conceive the opposite to be true.   We believe, on the other hand,
that body exists, not because we cannot conceive that it does
not exist, -but on the testimony of our senses.   We  believe,
on suchtestimony, in the reality of body, as a fact, the nonreality of which is conceivable. We believe in the above
axiom, on principle, as a truth, the opposite of which is inconceivable.   MIany have, as a matter of fact, denied the reality
of an external, material universe; but none ever denied the
truth of the above principle, and others of a kindred character.
The reason is obvious.   The idea of body is contingent, the
conception of the existence or non-existence of the object of
that idea being equally possible to the mind. The axiom or
principle under consideration, on the other hand, is a necessary truth, its non-truth being in itself inconceivable, and naturally impossible.
We now turn to a consideration of the idea of space.   We
can, as shown above, readily conceive of the non-existence of
all bodies, of the external material universe itself.  When we
have done this, however, can we even conceive of the nonreality of space, in which the universe does or may exist? We
19
i — 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPIIY.
cannot.  We conceive of space as a reality.  Can we conceive
of it, as not being? We cannot. No intelligent being can
by any possibility form such a conception. Of this every one
cannot, on reflection, but be distinctly and absolutely conscious.
When we have conceived of the non-existence of any one particular body, or of all others, even of the universe itself, let us
attempt to conceive of the non-reality of space, in which we
necessarily conceive of these objects as existing, and we shall
find the formation of such a conception, an absolute impossibility.  The idea of space, then, is necessary.   We conceive
of the object of that idea, as existing, with the impossibility of
conceiving of its non-existence.
OTHER CH.ARACTERISTICS OF TIIESE TWO IDEAS.
It now remains to mark other characteristics of these iImportant ideas.  The following may be presented, as the most
fundamental:
Thte idea of bodj is conditioned and relative.   Tthat of space
is tnconditioned and absolute.
An idea is conditioned and relative, when its object can be
conceived of, as existing, but upon the condition of conceiving
of the reality of the object of some other idea, the reality of
the latter object, being necessarily supposed, as the condition
of that of the former. An idea is unconditioned and absolute,
when the reality of its object does not, of necessity, suppose
that of the object of any other idea, and when the Intelligence
cannot but conceive, that the former object must exist, whether
any other object does, or does not exist.
Now when we conceive of body, as existing, we necessarily,
as the condition of its existence, suppose the reality of another
object, to wit, space in which body does, and must exist, and
without which the latter cannot exist. If body is, as the con
20
I, 
IDEAS OF BODY AND SPAOCE.
dition of its existence, space must be.   The principle, body
supposes space, is just as necessary as any other axiomn, the
prici:ic eabove  referred to, for examnple, that things equal te
the s:lo    tling s are equal to one another.   The idea of body,
thlei, is conditioned and relative, thie reality of the object of
tiit.dei, necessarily supposing, as the conditionI of its existence, tlihat of the object of some other idea, that of space.
When;, on the other hand, we conceive of space, we conceive, as the condition of its existence, of no other reality
Space must be, whether anything else exists or not.  The idea
of space, then, is unconditioned and absolute, the reality of its
o?),"ect supposing, as the condition of its existence, the reality
of the object of no other idea.
The idea of bo(7j im?plies tlhatt of 7iiZ'tation.   The  idea of
space i,pties that of the abs,eice of  iall 1-1iitatioit.
WIVe always, and of necessity, conceive of body as limited.
Under this condition we not only conceive of all particular
bodies, but of the universe itself.  The idea of body, then,
implies that of limitation.  In other words, body is finite.
Space, on the other hand, we necessarily conceive of, as
without limits.  Its idea implies that of the absence of all
limitation. In other words, space is infinite.
z,'e  rea of boc7i, a sewssibce relgresentatiot.    Thtat of,-tace,
a   _ure 2atioi,ctl coieccl)tion.
Wlhen w.e form a conception of any particular body, we can
recdilv conceive of something else with which thlle formner may
be compared, and by which it may be represented.   The huma-n countenance, for example, can be represented upon canvas.  The idea of body, then, is a sensible rep2resettatioi.
AVhen, on the other hand, we have forled an idea of space,
we find that we know, and can conceive, of no existence with
21 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
which the former can be compared. It bears no resemblance
whatever to any other object which we know, or of which we
can form a conception. The idea itself is wholly unlike any
other idea which exists, or ever has existed in the mind. The
idea of space is a pure rational conception.
The remark just made will be found, on reflection, to be
applicable to each necessary idea existing in the Intelligence.
Each one exists entirely alone, and in total separation from all
others of every kind, as far as resemgiblance is concerned.   The
idea of time, for example, substance, cause, right and wrong,
obligation, &c., each bears no resemblance to either of the others,
or to any other actual or conceivable existing in the mind.
The following then may be stated, as the most important
characteristics of these two ideas:
1. The idea of body is contingent.   That of space is
necessary.
2. The idea of body is conditioned and relative. That of
space is unconditioned and absolute.
3. The idea of body implies that of limitation. Or, body
is finite.  The idea of space implies the absence of all limita
tion. In other words, space is infinite.
4. The idea of body is a sensible representation. That of
space is a pure rational conception.
IDEAS OF SUCCESSION, AND TIME, OR DURATION.
These ideas are in all intelligent minds. No individual,
whose Intelligence has been developed at all, will fail to understand you, when you speak of one event, as having happened; of another, as having succeeded it, and of the fact
that that succession took place in some definite period of time.
TWe will now mark the characteristic of these ideas.
22 
IDEAS OF SUCCESSION AND DURATION.
Idea of Stccession contingent.   That of Tigme necessary.
You can conceive of some one event as having happened,
and of another as having succeeded it. In other words, you
have the idea of succession.   Can you not conceive, that neither of these events occurred? Every individual can readily
form such a conception. The same holds true of all events,
of all succession of every kind, and in all time. The idea
of succession, like that of body, is contingent.
But when we have conceived of the total cessation of succession, we find it absolutely impossible to conceive that there
is no time, or duration, in which succession may take place.
We can no more conceive of the non-existence of time, than
we can of that of space. The idea of time, then, like that of
space, is necessary.
Other Characteristics of these Ideas.
When we conceive of succession, we necessarily affirm, as
the condition of its existence, the reality of something else,
that is, of time, in which succession takes place.  The idea
of succession, like that of body, is conditioned and relative.
On the other hand, when we affirm the reality of time, we
suppose, as the condition of its existence, the existence of nothing else. Time is, and must be, whether anything else exists
or not.  The idea of time, then, is unconditioned and absolute.
Once more; whenever we can conceive of succession, we
necessarily conceive of time before, and after it. The idea of
succession, therefore, implies that of limitation, or succession
is limited, finite.
The idea of time, however, implies the absence of all limitation.  Duration never began; nor will it ever cease to be.
In other words, time is infinite. The following are the most
important and fundamental characteristics of these two ideas
23 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIIY.
1. The idea of succession is contingent. That of time is
necessary.
2. The idea of succession is conditioned, and relative. That
of time is unconditioned and absolute.
3. The idea of succession always implies that of limitation.
(O)r succession is finite.  The idea of time, on the other hand,
implies that of the absence of all limitation.  In other words,
durotion is infinite.
IDEAS OF TIlE FINITE AND OF THIE INFINITE.
Body and space, succession and duration, are given to us,
as we have seen, with the following characte,istics:   Body and
succession are limitable; time and space are illimitable.  In
other words, the former are finite, the latter infinite.   " Now
the ideas of the finite and the infinite," as remarked by Cousin,
"may be detached from the ideas of body and succession, time
and space, provided we keep in mind the subjects from which
they are abstracted."
These ideas then are in the mind. They are also distinct,
the one from the other.   Consequently the one cannot be derived from the other.  The multiplication of the finite cannot
give the infinite. Nor by dividing the infinite do we find the
finite.  Being correlative ideas, the one necessarily supposes
and suggests the other. The one cannot possibly exist in the
mind without the other.   Yet, as above remarked, the one is
perfectly distinct from the other.
Nor is one of these ideas less distinct than the other.
WIhen I speak of the infinite, every one as readily and distinctly apprehends my meaning, as when I speak of the finite.
The following propositions, for example -body is limitable;
space is illimitable- are equally intelligible to all minds, the
one as the other.
There are other forms in which these ideas appear in the
24 
IDEAS OF THE FINITE AND INFINITE.
M1ind, in all of which they sustain, to each other, the same relations, and possess the same characteristics. When the 31ind
conceives of power, wisdom or goodness, as imperfect, or limitabIe, or finite, it necessarily conceives of similar attributes
which are perfect, illimitable, and infinite. When it conceives
of anything which is anid began to be, it, of necessity, conceives of something else, which not only is, but always has
been.
If any individual still affirms that he has, in reality, no
idea of the infinite, we have only to ask him, whether he understands the import of the words he employs, when he makes
such an affirmation? whether he is not conscious of speaking
of something, which, in thought, he himself clearly distinguishes from all that is limitable, or limited? These questions he will readily answer in the affirmative.  In this answer
he  clearly contradicts the affirmation under  consideration.
For, if he really, as he affirms, has no idea of the infinite, he
would not know the meaning of the terms he uses, nor could
he, in thought, clearly distinguish the infinite from all that is
limitable, or finite.
If also we have no real or positive idea of the infinite, Be
can have none of time and space, for they are positive ideas,
and their objects are given in the Intelligence, as positively or
absolutely infinite.
REMARKS OF LOCKE.
Four remarks of Locke, pertaining to the idea of the Infinite, demand a passing notice.
His first remark is, that it is an "endlessly growing idea."
On the other hand, the idea of the Infinite is always fixed.
Being a simple idea, it must, when once generated in the mind,
remain there, at all times, one and identical. It may become
more and more vivid.  In the respect under consideration,
3
Fli
25 
INTELLECTUAL PHIIILOSOPIY.
however, this idea undergoes no modification whatever. Who
has ever found, since the ideas of infinite space and duration
were developed in his 1Iind, that these have undergone the
least modification, as far as growth is concerned?
Again: Lockle maintains that the idea of the Infinite is
obscutre. Still it exists, and as a phenomenon of Consciousness, falls, most legitimately, under the cognizance of the
philosopher. But in what sense is this idea obscure? To
those faculties of the Intelligence which pertain to the finite,
it must for ever remain obscure. To that faculty, however,
which apprehends truths necessary and absolute, it is as plain
as any other idea whatever.
According to Locke, also, the idea of the infinite is merely
a neyative idea.   " We have," he says, " no positive idea of
Infinity." This is directly contradicted by the testimony of
universal Consciousness. Who is not conscious that his ideas
of God, of space, and time, all of which are given in the Intelligence as infinite, are just as positive as any of our conceptions whatever? We might also, with the same propriety,
maintain that our conceptions of the finite are negative, as
that our ideas of the infinite are. Being correlative ideas, if
one is assumed as positive, the other will be relatively negative
of course. In themselves, however, both are alike positive
and equally so.
Once more: "Number," says Locke, " affords the clearest
idea of the infinite." This is to reduce the infinite to the
finite; for number, however large, is always limited- that is,
finite.  The multiplication of the finite may call into exercise
the faculty which apprehends the infinite, and thus render our
idea of the latter more distinct and vivid (as all acts of attention do) than it otherwise would be. In no other sense, however, can such repetitions give us the Infinite.
2,6
I 
PHENOMENA AND PERSONAL IDENTITY.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THESE IDEAS.
Having established the fact, that the idea of the infinite,
as well as that of the finite, is in the mind, it now remains to
mark their respective characteristics.
Idea of the Finitte continilent and relative; that (f thle i,fi                nite necessary and absolute.
Whatever substance we conceive of as finite, we cannot but
regard as existing contingently.   We cannot regard it, as in
its own nature, a necessary existence.   Hence, for all that we
conceive of as finite, we naturally and necessarily inquire after
a cause. We do not ask the question, had it a cause? but
what caused it? The idea of the finite, therefore, is contingent, and consequently relative.
On the other hand, whatever we regard as infinite, we necessarily apprehend as uncaused - that is, as existing by necessity. When we trace back any chain of causes and effects,
for the purpose of finding a first cause, at each successive link
we always inquire for its antecedent, till we arrive at the Infinite.  Here we pause; here our inquiries cease; here we recognize ourselves at once, as in the presence of an existence
which is not contingent, but necessary and absolute. The idea
of the Infinite, therefore, is necessary and absolute.
IDEAS OF MIENTAL PHENOMENA, AND OF PERSONAL IDENTITY.
Every individual believes, that he is now the same being
that he was yesterday, and will be to-morrow. Numberless
and ever-varying phenomena are constantly passing under the
eye of Consciousness. Many are recalled of which we were
formerly conscious; yet they are all referred to the sainme individual subject.  Every phenomenon of thoughlt, feeling, aid
willing, of which we are now conscious, which we recall as
27 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIIY.
having, in some former period, been conscious of, or which we
expect to put forth in some future time, is given in the Intelligence in this exclusive form - I- think, I feel, I will; I did
think, I did feel, I did will, so and so. The same holds
equally true of all similar phenomena which we contemplate,
as about to occur in future time.  Whatever the phenomenal
may be, the same identical I is given as its subject. This is
what is meant by personal identity. It is the unity of our
being, of the I, or self, as opposed to the plurality and everchanging phenomena of Consciousness.  Having  shown that
the idea of mental phenomena and of personal identity are in
the Mind, we will consider their characteristics.
Idea of 3Mental Phenomena contingent and relative. 
You Eve a Consciousness of some thought, feeling, or ae
of Will.  You remember similar phenomena  of which youi
were formerly conscious. You conceive of them as now being,
or as having been actual realities. Can you not conceive of
them as not being, or as never having taken place?  You can.
Can you conceive of such phenomena as existing or having
existed, without referring them to some subject? In other
words, can you conceive of some thought, feeling, or volition
as now existing, or as having existed, in former times, without
referring it to some subject, some being which thinks, feels, or
wills? You cannot. All the phenomena of Consciousness
are contingent and relative.
Idea of Personal Identity necessary.
How is it with the idea of personal identity?   You are
now conscious of some thought, or feeling, or act of Will.
You recall others, of a similar nature, of which you have been
formerly conscious. This you refer to one and the same subject, the I of Consciousness, as it is sometimes called. This
28 
PHENOMENA AND PERSONAL IDENTITY.
reference you and all mankind alike must make. This reference mankind universally make in all the transactions of life.
Under its influence we hold ourselves and others bound to fulfill contracts made years ago. Under its influence, the virtuous
are commended and rewarded, and the vicious blamed and
punished for actions long since performed.   Under its influence we anticipate the retributions of eternal justice, in a future state, for the deeds done in the body. Is it possible to
avoid making this reference? It is not. You cannot possibly
conceive of a thought, for example, without referring it to
some subject which thinks. You cannot be conscious of any
mental phenomenon, or recall any others of which you were
formerly conscious, without referring them to one and the
same subject, yourself.  The idea of personal identity, then,
is necessary.
NECESSARY IDEAS DISTINGUISHED AS CONDITIONAL AND
UNCONDITIONAL.
Hiere an important distinction between necessary ideas demands special attention. When we contemplate the ideas of
space and duration, for example, we find that the objects of
these ideas must exist, whether anything else exists or not.
Those ideas, therefore, are not only necessary, but unconditioned and absolute. On the other hand, the ideas of personal
identity, and of substance and cause, which we shall hereafter
consider, are not, in this sense, necessary. They are only conditionally necessary.   Phenomena being given, substance mnust
be. An event being given, the supposition of a cause is necessary. Phenomena and events not being given, we do not
affirm the existence of substances or causes. The phenomena
of Consciousness not being given, we do not affirm the reality
or identity of the self, the subject of these phenomena. Such
ideas are concditionalljy necessary, and not like those of space
3*
29 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIIY.
and time, not only necessary, but unconditioned and absolute.
IDEAS OF PHENOMENA AND SUBSTANCE.
Idea of substance explTained.
If the observations which have been made upon the idea
of personal identity, have been distinctly understood, the characteristics of the idea of substance will be readily apprehended.
All the phenomena of Consciousness and Memory are, as we
have seen, by a necessary law of our being, referred to one
and the same subject. The phenomena are accidents, perpetually changing. The subject, however, remains the same. Now,
in the language of Cousin, "Being, one and identical, opposed
to variable accidents, to transitory phenomena, is substance."
But thus far we have only personal substance.   The same
principle, however, applies equally to all external substances.
Through the medium of our senses, such objects are given to
us as being possessed of a great variety of qualities, and as
existing in a great variety of states.  The qualities and states,
which are perpetually varying, we necessarily refer to one and
the same subject, a subject which remains one and identical,
amid the endlessly diversified phenomena which it exhibits.
This is substance.
Idea of Phenomena contingyent and relative -that of Sub                      stance necessary.
Now as it is with our ideas of the phenomena of Consciousness and personal identity, so it is with our ideas of external
phenomena and external substance.  The former is contingent
and relative; the latter is necessary. WThen any phenomenon
appears, we can readily conceive that it had not appeared. Its
appearance also we can admit, only on the supposition of some
30 
PHENOMENA AND SUBSTANCE.
thing else, to wit, substance, to which this appearance is necessarily referred. Our ideas of phenomena, therefore, are contingent and relative.
On the other hand, the idea of substance, relatively to
phenomena, is necessary.  Phenomena being given, substance
must be.  It is impossible for us to conceive of the former
without the latter.
Outt  iceas of Substance not obscure, but clear and distinct.
According to Locke, " we have no clear idea of substance
in general."  This idea also, he represents, as "of little use
in philosophy." In reply, it may be said, that our idea of
substance is just as clear and important, as those of time,
space, and personal identity. Of this every one is conscious.
The same function of the Intelligence which apprehends one
of these ideas, apprehends them all. Take away the power to
apprehend one, and the power to apprehend every other of
these ideas is annihilated. Philosophy itself also becomes an
impossibility.   How  could we reason philosophically  about
ourselves, in the absence of the idea of personal identity?
Equally impossible would it be, to reason about objects external
to us, in the absence of the idea of substance. This and kindred ideas, instead of being " of little use in philosophy," are,
in reality, the foundation of all our explanations of phenomena, external and internal.
We often hear individuals, in expatiating upon the great
ignorance of man, affirming, that all we "know of realities
within and around us, is their phenomena. Of the substances
themselves, we know nothing." In reply to such rhapsodies,
it may be said, that our knowledge of every substance of every
kind, is just as clear, distinct, and extensive, as our knowledge
of its phenomena. In phenomena, substances stand revealed,
the substance being as its phenomena. In the phenomena of
31 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPHIIY.
thought, for example, we know ourselves, as thinking beings
or substances, our powers being as the thoughts which they
generate.   Our knowledge of the Iowee of thought, is just as
distinct as that of thought itself.  The same holds true, in respect to all substances, material, and mental.
IDEAS OF EVENTS AND CAUSE.
The universe within and around us, presents the constant
spectacle of endlessly diversified and ever-changing phenomena.
Some of these are constantly conjoined, in the relation of " immediate and invariable antecedence and consequence"   The
connection between others is only occasional.  In reference to
events of the former class, the mind judges, that the relation
between them is not only that of antecedence and consequence,
but of cause and effect. In reference to every event, however,
whether its antecedent is perceived or not, we judge that it
had a cause.  This judgment is universal, extending to all
events, actual and conceivable.   It is absolutely impossible
for us to conceive of an event without a cause. Let any one
make the effort to form such a conception, and he will find that
he has attempted an impossibility.
Here it should be noticed, that we do not affirm that every
effect has a cause. That would be mere tautology. It would
be equivalent to the affirmation, that whatever is produced by
a cause, is produced by a cause. All this might be true, and
the proposition, every event has a cause, be false, notwithstanding.
The idea of Events contingent and relative; that of  Cautse
,~necessary.
The relation between the idea of an event, and that of a
cause, may be readily pointed out. Whenever the mind witnesses, or is conscious of, the occurrence of an event, it appre
32 
EVENTS AND CAUSE.
hends that event as contingent and relative.   It might or
might not have happened. There is no impossibility in making these different suppositions. The occurrence of an event
also necessarily supposes something else, to wit, a cause. On
the other hand, no event uncaused can possibly be conceived
to have taken place. The idea of an event, then, is contingent and relative. The idea of cause is necessary, conditionally so, as shown above.
THEORY OF DR. BROWN, AND OTHERS.
The speculations of certain philosophers respecting the
subject under consideration, here demand our attention. The
relation of cause and effect, according to Dr. Brown and others,
is nothing more  than that of "immediate and invariable
antecedence and consequence."   " A  cause," says Dr. B.,
"is nothing else than an immediate and invariable  antecedent." According to this philosopher, in no instance whatever is there any reason, in the nature of any particular cause,
why it should produce one event rather than another. Succession, mere antecedence and consequence immediate and invariable, without any reason in the nature of the antecedent
and consequent why this order of succession should arise,
rather than another, is all that exists in any instance.   In regard to this theory, it is enough to say that no man does or
can believe it. Let any man, for example, behold a piece of
wood and a metallic substance put together into a heated furnace. The wood is immediately consumed, and the metal
changed from a solid to a fluid state. Can he avoid the conviction, that there is, in the nature of these two substances, a
reason, why, that when acted upon by the same cause, one is
consumed, and the other changed from a solid to a fluid state?
When the Almighty said, " Let there be light, and there was
light," who dares believe that there was not, in the nature of
33 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIIY.
that fiat, a reason, why, as its consequent, light, rather than
any other substance, should appear?  When  two pounds
weight are placed on one side of a balance, and five on the
other, who does not believe, that aside from the particular sequence which follows here, there is, in the circumstances supposed, a reason why one particular sequence should follow,
rather than any other? In the succession of day and night,
also, we have an order of sequence immediate and invariable.
Is this equivalent to the declaration, that day causes night,
or night causes the day? It would be so, if the theory under consideration was true.   For all the conditions of that
theory are here fulfilled.  We have an order of sequence immediate and invariable.
As a further illustration, let us, for a moment, consider the
theory of "pre-established harmony" between the action of
the Soul and Body, proclaimed by Leibnitz. According to
this author, Matter and Mind do, and can exert no influence
upon each other, whatever. I will, for example, a motion of
my arm, or of any other part of the body, and the motion follows. Still my volitions have no influence in causing or controlling that motion.   So in all other instances.  God, foreseeing the states of our minds, has so constituted our bodies,
that the action of the latter shall always be in perfect harmony
with that of the former, though wholly uninfluenced by it.
In this theory, the relation of cause and effect, as announced
by the theory of Dr. Brown, is perfectly fulfilled.  Between
the states of our minds, and the corresponding action of our
bodies, we have an order of sequence immediate and invariable.
But who does not regard the Liebnitzian theory as announcing
a relation totally distinct and opposite to what is universally
believed to exist between our minds and bodies? When we
say, that the motion of the body is in immediate and perfect
harmony with that of the mind, we say one thing. When we
84 
EVENTS AND CAUSE.
say, that the action of the mind causes that of the body, we
introduce, in the judgment of all men, an entirely different
idea.  Sequence immediate and invariable is all that we perceive to exist between any antecedent and consequent; but it
is, by no means, all that we believe, yea know to exist.
OBSERVATIONS OF MR. DUGALD STEWART.
The following remarks of Mr. Stewart also demand a passing observation:
"It seems now to be pretty generally agreed among philosophers, that there is no instance in which we are able to
perceive a necessary connection between two successive events,
or to comprehend in what manner the one proceeds from the
other, as its cause.   From experience, indeed, we learn, that
there are many events, which are constantly conjoined, so that
the one invariably follows the other: but it is possible, for
anything we know to the contrary, that this connection, though
a constant one, as far as our observation has reached, may not
be a necessary connection; nay, it is possible, that there may
be no necessary connections among any of the phenomena we
see; and if there are any such connections existing, we may
rest assured that we shall never be able to discover them."
Again:
"When it is said, that every change in nature indicates
the operation of a cause, the word cause expresses something
which is supposed to be necessarily connected with the change,
and without which it could not have happened. This may be
called the mnetaphysical meaning of the word; and such causes
may be called metaphysical or efficient causes.   In natural
philosophy, however, when we speak of one thing being the
cause of another, all that we mean is, that the two are con stantly conjoined, so that when we see the one, we may expect
the other. These conjunctions we learn from experience alone;
3'a 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
and, without an acquaintance with them, we could not accommodate our conduct to the established course of nature."
These remarks certainly cannot hold in regard to the primary qualities of matter, as, for example, solidity considered
as the antecedent, and resistance as the consequent. Is it possible to conceive of the existence of an object which is extended and solid, which is at the same time destitute of the
power of resistance?
Hlere I would drop the suggestion, whether it is possible to
conceive of any substance as existing, which is destitute of
power; and whether our ideas of substance and of power are
not, in fact, identical? For my own part, I find it impossible
to conceive of substances which are not realpowers.
IDEA OF POWER.
The idea of Power, is that of causation in its quiescent
state, or as the permanent attribute of a subject irrespective
of its action, at any particular moment.   When  particular
effects are attributed to particular causes, while the nature of
the substances containing such causes remains unchanged, the
mind considers the power to repeat such effects under the same
circumstances, as the permanent attributes of those substances.
This is the idea of power, as it exists in all minds. All substances, in their active state, are Causes -in their quiescent
state, are Powers. Powers are of two kinds, active and passive. The latter are commonly called susceptibilities. As the
existence of powers and causes is indicated by their respective
phenomena, so the nature of such powers and causes is indicated by the characteristics of their respective phenomena.
The idea of Power, sustaining, as it does, the same relation
to phenomena, that that of cause and substance do, is, of
course, like those ideas, universal and necessary.
36 
IDEA OF POWER.
CONCLUSION OF THE PRESENT ANALYSIS.
Here our analysis of intellectual phenomena will close, for
the present. It might have been extended to almost any
length. Enough has been said, however, to indicate the princip)le of classification adopted, and to show its universal applicability, as well as to lay the foundation for the important distinctions, &c., in respect to the intellectual powers, an elucidation of which will be commenced in the next Chapter.
4
37 
CHAPTER IV.
APPLICATION OF THIE PRECEDING ANALYSIS.
LOGICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF IDEAS.
IN applying the results of the preceding analysis, one of
the first questions which arises, respects the relations of intellectual phenomena, contingent and necessary to each other.
With regard to this question, I would remark, that there are
two, and only two important relations which such phenomena
sustain to each other-  the relation of logical and chronological antecedence and consequence.   The latter relates to the
order of acquisition, or to the question, Which, in the order
of time, is first developed, in the Intelligence.   The former
relates to their order in a logical point of view, that is, to the
question, Which sustains to the other, in the process of ratiocination, the relation of logical antecedent.
Logical order.
In regard to the order last mentioned, I would remark,
that one idea is the logical antecedent of another, when the
latter necessarily supposes the former, that is, when the reality
of the object of the latter can be admitted, only on the admission of that of the object of the former.  The ideas of events
and cause being given in the Intelligence, for example, we
find that we can admit the reality of an event on one supposition only, to wit, that of a cause which produced the event.
We say, therefore, that the idea of cause is the logcal antecedent of that of events. 
APPLICATION OF THE ANALYSIS.
Now, if we contemplate ideas in this view, it will be perceived at once, that necessary ideas are, in all instances, the
logical antecedents  of  contingent ones.   What  was shown
above to be true of the ideas of event and cause, is self-evidently true of the ideas of body  and space, succession and
time, the finite and the infinite, and phenomena external and
internal, and substance and personal identity.   Every contingent idea is relaticve, necessarily supposing, as its logical antecedent, some necessary idea.
Chrono7lotical order.
Contingent ideas, on the other hand, are the chronoloygical
antecedents of necessary ideas, that is, in the order of actual
development in the Intelligence, the former precedes the latter.
Two considerations will render this proposition demonstrably
evident.
1. Necessary ideas are given in the Intelligence, only as
the logical antecedents of contingent ones.   Space, for example, is known to us, only as that in which bodies or substances
exist. In no other light can we possibly know or conceive of
it. Now that which is and can be known to us, only as the
place of some other thing, cannot have been known to us
prior to that thing; otherwise, the former might be known and
conceived of, irrespective of the latter.  The same holds true
of the ideas of succession and time, phenomena and substance,
events and causes.  The latter class of ideas can be conceived
of, only as the logical antecedents of the former.  The former
therefore must have been originated in the Intelligence  prior
to the latter.
2. W1hile necessary ideas can be defined, only as the logical antecedents of contingent ones, the latter can be defined
without any reference to the former -a fact which could not
be true, if the latter were not the chronological antecedents
39 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
of the formner. Cause, for example, can be defined, only as
that which produces events. An event, as any one can perceive, by consulting his dictionary, can be, and is defined,
without any reference to the idea of cause. Contingent ideas
therefore are the chronological antecedents of necessary ones.
PRIMARY INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES PRE-SUPPOSED BY THE
PRECEDING ANALYSIS.
The preceding analysis has fully prepared us to proceed
legitimately and safely to another very important inquirythe Primary Intellectual Faculties pre-supposed by that analysis. As stated in the Introduction, the being and characteristics of every power or substance in existence, are indicated
to us by its respective phenomena.   The perception of such
phenomena, being itself a phenomenon of the mind which
perceives, supposes, in the mind, corresponding powers of perception. When the Intelligence apprehends a fact, or truth
of any kind, such act implies, in the Intelligence, corresponding powers of apprehension. Now truths, perceived by the
Intelligence are, as we have seen, of two kinds, contingent
and necessary. The perception of such truths indicates a corresponding distinction of intellectual functions, or powers.
The faculty or faculties which perceive, and affirm the reality
of contingent phenomena, are clearly distinguishable from that
which affirms the reality of truths necessary and universal.
But contingent phenomena perceived by the Intelligence,
are distinguishable, with equal clearness, as objective and subjective, that is, part pertain to the Miind itself, and part to external material substances.   These facts most obviously demand a twofold division of the Intellectual faculties which
pertain to contingent phenomena, as objective and subjective.
The analysis completed in the last Chapter, presents to our
contemplation three distinct faculties of the Intelligence:
40 
APPLICATION OF TIIE ANALYSIS.
1. That which perceives the phenomena of the mind itself,
the faculty which gives us subjective phenomena. This function of the Intelligence is denominated Consciousness.
2. The faculty which perceives the phenomena of external
material substances, or which gives us objective phenomena.
This function of the Intelligence is denominated Sense.*
3. The faculty which apprehends truths necessary and universal.   This intellectual function, or faculty, is denominated
Reason.
These Functions wchy called Printary.
Consciousness, Sense, and Reason, are called the primary
faculties of the Intelligence, for two considerations:
1. Because, that with them, all our knowledge commences.
2. All our complex cognitions are composed of elements
given by these faculties. All the phenomena of the intelligence are either simple or complex.   All simple ideas are
found to be the direct intuitions of one or of the other of
these faculties.  All complex ideas are found, on a careful
analysis, to be composed of elements previously given by these
faculties. The truth of this last remark will be fully confirmed
in the progress of our subsequent investigations.
Also called Intuitive Faculties.
The faculties above named are also sometimes denominated
Intuitive Faculties. The reason is, that each alike, pertains
to its objects, by direct intuition.   Consciousness, for example,
* The term Sense will be used throughout this treatise, in strict
accordance with this definition. This is the first meaning assigned to
it by Webster, and is the meaning generally attached to it when employed, as it is in this treatise, to designate a special function of the
Intelligence. A great diversity of meanings attach to it when employed for other purposes.
4*
41 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPHY.
by direct intuition, and not through any medium, apprehends
the phenomena of tho mind.   The same is true of the faculty
of Sense in respect to the phenomena of external material
substances. The action of Reason is conditioned on the prior
action of Sense and Consciousness.   It is not through  any
medium, but by direct intuition, however, that Reason affirms
truths universal, necessary, and absolute.   Like the formner,
therefore, it may, with equal propriety, be denominated a faculty of intuition. These faculties, as we shall see hereafter,
give us the elements of all our knowledge.
RELATION OF PRIMITIVE INTUITIVE FACULTIES TO EACH
OTHER.
We are now prepared also for another very important inquiry -  the appropriate spheres of the primary faculties relatively to each other. This inquiry can now be met in very
few words.   Sense, and Consciousness, give us Iphenomenia
external and internal.  Reason gives us the logical antecedentts
of phenomena thus perceived and affirmed. This is its appropriate and exclusive sphere relatively to the other faculties.
It cannot enter the domain of either Sense or Consciousness,
and judge of the validity of its affirmations. The same holds
true of each of these last-mentioned faculties, relatively to the
domain of the other, and that of Reason too.  Each faculty
has its own exclusive sphere in which it is wholly independent
of either or both of the others, and independent in this sense,
that the validity of its affirmations cannot be tested at the bar
of either of the others.  Its response, when questioned, in
respect to what it has affirmed is, " What I have written, I have
written."   When Sense, for example, has made an affirmation
pertaining to the phenomena of an external material substance,
all that Consciousness can do, pertaining to the subject, is, to
give that affirmation as it is, together with its characteristics.
42 
APPLICATION OF THiE ANALYSIS.
Of the valid(ity of the affirmation, it can say nothing. Reason
can give the logical antecedent of that affirmation, and that is
all. WVith its validity it has no more to do, than Consciousness has. The same will hereafter be shown to be true of
Reason, in respect to every other function of the Intelligence.
IMPORTANCE OF THE TRUTHS ABOVE ELUCIDATED.
If the truth of the conclusions above stated be admitted,
they will be found to be of fundamental importance in phlilosophly. They will put an end at once to the wild speculations
of many philosophers of the Super-sensual school, both in this
country and in Europe.   Here lies, for examnple, the gieat
error of Kant, the father of modern Transcendentalism.   le
first gives us a most profound, and correct analysis of intellectual phenomena, together with a statement equally correct,
of the faculties pre-supposed by those phenomena.  Ile then
arraigns all the other faculties at the bar of Reason, there to
test the validity of their affirmations.   It is no matter of surprise at all, that the result of the trial should be thus announced by the philosopher himself who instituted it, a trial,
the entire results of which, as we shall hereafter see, and a
moment's reflection must convince us, must and can rest upon
nothing else than groundless assumptions, and not at all upon
the real affirmations of the Intelligence.  "1 We have therefore
intended to say," says Kant, in giving the results of his phi losophy, " that all our intuition is nothing but the representa tion of phenomenon - that the things which we invisage [form
conceptions and judgments of ] are not that in themselves for
which we take them; neither are their relationships in them selves so constituted as they appear to us; and that if we do
away with our subject, or even only the subjective quality of
the senses in general, every quality, all relationships of objects
in space and time, nay, even space and time themselves would
43 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHIIY.
disappear, and cannot exist as phenomena  in themselves, but
only in us.  It remains utterly unknown to us what may be
the nature of the objects in themselves, separate from all the
receptivity of our sensibility.   We  know  nothing  but  our
manner of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us and which
need not belong to every  being, although to every  man.
With this we have only to do."  The above extract contains
the following strange paralogisms, contradictions and absurdities
1. That our Intelligence takes, that is, affirms things not
to be, what the same Intelligence takes, that is, affirms them
to be. Kant first employs the Intelligence to find out what
things are.  He then employs the same Intelligence to demonstrate, that these very things are not what the Intelligence had previously affirmed them to be. As if a merchant
should profess, that by his yard-stick, he had demonstrated,
that he had a thousand yards of cloth, and then, that, by thQ
same yard-stick, he had as fully demonstrated the fact, that
he had no real cloth at all, and that neither the yard-stick nor
the cloth were, in themselves, what the yard-stick had shown
them to be.
2. That, while our Intelligence represents nothing whatever as it is in itself, this same Intelligence does correctly represent " our manner of perceiving objects "-a most palpable
contradiction, surely.   For if our Intelligence does not represent things as they are, it surely will not represent our "mailnner of perceiving" as it is.
3. Kant affirms, that all that we have to do with objects,
is "according to our manner of perceiving them," that is, as
they are given, in our Intelligence. He then teaches us, that
these objects are not as our Intelligence affirms them to be.
This, certainly, is doing with objects far otherwise than "according to our manner of perceiving them."
44 
APPLICATION OF THE ANALYSIS.
Now all these absurdities and contradictions which Kant
gives as the results of his philosophy, and which constitute its
distinguishing peculiarities, would have been prevented, together with the tide of skepticism, which, through that philosophy, has desolated so large a portion of Europe, had that
great philosopher, after demonstrating the reality of Reason,
as a faculty of the Intelligence, raised, and correctly answered,
the inquiry pertaining to the true sphere of that faculty relatively to other functions of the Intelligence.  Philosophers of
the Super-sensual school have run wild with Reason, just as
those of the Sensual school did with Sensation and Reflection.
The possession of Reason is the great distinguishing characteristic of humanity, that characteristic which separates manl
at an infinite remove from the lower orders of creation around
him, and places him among the great Intelligences of the
universe. The full demonstration of Reason, as a function of
the Intelligence, has placed the philosopher whom Coleridge
not unappropriately denominates the " venerable sag,e of Koning,sburg," among the brightest intellectual luminaries of earth.
When the appropriate sphere of this divine faculty in man,
relatively to the action of the other functions of the Intelligence shall be fully settled, then philosophy, instead of being
the sport of wild and blind assumptions, will stand unmoved
upon the rock of eternal truth.  This subject will be resumied
again in a subsequent part of our investigations.
CLASSIFICATION OF INTELLECTUAL PHENOMENA GIVEN BY
KANT.
It was stated above, that Kant has given a most profound
and correct analysis of intellectual phenomena, together with a
development equally correct of the intellectual faculties presupposed by those phenomena.   I will close this chapter by
giving a concise statement of the results of his analysis.
45 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
Intellectual phenomena, according to this philosopher, are
divided into two classes-those derived from  experincae, and
those not derived from experience - the empirical and rational.
The operations of our own mninds, for example, together
with the qualities of external material substances, are given
us by the direct intuitions of Sense and Consciousness.   Such
intuitions, therefore, are exclusively empirical, being derived
solely from experience.
On the other hand, space is an object neither of Sense nor
Consciousness. Its reality we know, and know absolutely; but
not as an object of experience. The same is true of the ideas
of Time, the Inufinite, Substance, Caust and Effect, &c.
Rational intuitions are by Kant  denominated "intuitions
a   riori."   Events, for example, are objects of experience;
as such we know them. But the proposition, every event has
a cause, we know d priori, and not by experience.
Intuitions a priori, have these characteristics, and by these
they are distinguished from empirical intuitions, viz.: U,,ives(tltity  and necessity.  Though we might know by experience,
that such and such events have a particular cause, we cannot
know from experience, that every event has a cause; much
less, that every event qwtist have a cause.  Experience, if it
could give us what is, could not give us the fact that what is,
imust be.
The above classification, it will readily be perceived, is, in
reality, identical with that elucidated in the preceding Chapter, and leads to precisely the same division of the Intellectual faculties, a division which Kant, in fact, presents, as the
result of his investigations.   The " a" priori" phenomena of
Kant are those there given as necessary, while his empirical
intuitions are the contingent phenomena of Sense and Consciousness.
46
I 
CHAPTER V.
CONSCIOUSNESS.
CONSCIOUSNESS DEFINED.
OF this function of the Intelligence various definitions have
been given by different philosophers. The following is the
definition given by Dr. Webster.   "The knowledge of sensations and mental operations, or of what passes in our own
mind; the act of the mind which makes known an internal
object."  Cousin represents it as that function of the Intelligence which  " gives us information  of everything which
takes place in the interior of our minds."   "Perhaps  the
most correct description of the mind in Consciousness, i. e.,
of the conscious states of the mind," says the translator of
Cousin's Psychology, "is the being aware of the phenomena
of the mind- of that which is present to the mind; and if
self-consciousness be distinguished, not in genera, but as a
special determination of Consciousness, it is the being aware
of ourselves, as of the me, in opposition to the not mne, or as
the permanent subject, distinct from the phenomena of the
mind, and from all outward causes of them." In simple Consciousness, according to this author, we have a knowledge, in
conformity to the statement of Cousin, of whatever passes in
the interior of our own minds, that is, of all our mental exercises. In self-Consciousness, which is only a special form or
determination of the former, we know ourselves in those phe.
nomena,  and thus distinguish ourselves  from  all external
causes of them. This, certainly, is a very distinct and correct
exposition of the subject. 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPHY.
The definition of Professor Tappan, given in his work on
the Will, though somewhat lengthy, demands special attention, on account of the distinctness and correctness with which
the subject is there presented.
"Consciousness," he says, "is the necessary knowledge
which the mind has of its own operations. In knowing, it
knows that it knows.   In experiencing emotions and passions,
it knows it experiences them. In willing, or exercising acts
of causality, it knows that it wills or exercises such acts. This
is common, universal, and spontaneous Consciousness.
"This definition may appear to some an identical proposition - the mind knows its knowledges, the mind knows its emotions, the mind knows its acts of causality, may seemi to be
implied, if not affirmed, when we say, the mind knows, feels,
and wills. Therefore, we would say further:
"By Consciousness more nicely and accurately defined, we
mean the power and act of self-recognition: not, if you please,
the mind knowing its knowledges, emotions, and volitions; but
the mind knowing itself in these."
In the above definitions the subject is presented with such
distinctness, and correctness, that I shall attempt no particular
definition of my own. In the exercise of Consciousness, we
are not only aware of some mental state, or exercise, but we
know ourselves, in that state, as the subjects of it.  In every
exercise of thought, feeling, and willing, we not only know
what these states are, but know ourselves in them, as exercising them, and as the subjects of them.  Hence all mental
phenomena, as given in Consciousness, are expressed in propositions like the following: -I think, I feel, I will; -the
mental phenomena being given, together with the self, the I,
as the subject of them.
A remark, which I deem of special importance to make
here, is this: In Consciousness, we not only know mental
48 
CONSCIOUSNESS.
phenomena as they are, but what is in reality implied in such
knowledge; we know also the fundamental and distinguishing
characteristics of such phenomena. If we could merely know,
by Consciousness, mental-phenomena, and not also their distinguishing characteristics, we could never classify and arrange
such phenomena as the basis of important conclusions in the
science of Mind. Whatever intelligent affirmations we can
make respecting ourselves, as beings capable of thinking, feeling, and willing, we must affirm, on the exclusive authority
of the characteristics of such phenomena, characteristics perceived and affirmed by Consciousness.
SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS CONDITIONED ON REASON, BUT NOT A
FUNCTION OF REASON.
The exercise of Self-Conscious,ness, contemplated as a particular form or determination of Simple Consciousness, is
conditioned on the prior exercise of the Reason.   It is by
Reason, as we have already seen, that we know that phenomenon supposes substance, or a subject, and that each particular
phenomenon supposes a particular subject.   But for Reason,
therefore, whatever mental phenomena might be given in Consciousness, we could not know, that, for such phenomena, any
subject whatever is supposed. Simple Consciousness gives us
mental phenomena.   Self-Consciousness, a particular form, or
determination of the former, connects such phenomena with
the subject, the reality of which Reason has affirmed, and connects them in the propositions, I think, I feel, I will, &c.
While, therefore, Self-Consciousness is conditioned on the Reason, the former, as a function of the Intelligence, is clearly
distinguishable from the latter.  This is further evident from
a single consideration. Reason is the organ of d priori, that
is, universal and necessary truths. This is its exclusive sphere.
All the affirmations of Consciousness, even in the form called
5
49 - 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPIIY.
Self-Consciousness, bear the characteristic of contingency.  A
sound philosophy, therefore, will not fail, as philosophers sometimes have done, to distinguish these different functions of the
Intelligence from each other.
NATURAL, OR SPONTANEOUS) AND PHILOSOPHICAL, OR RE                 FLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS.
Consciousness, in its simple spontaneous form, is common
to all mankind, in the natural development of their Intelligence.  In the language of Cousin, it is, "in all men a natural process." Every individual is accustomed to use the propositions, I think, I fee], I will, &c. All persons are accustomed, also, to speak of themselves, as conscious of particular
states, or exercises of mind.  This shows, that they not only
are conscious of their mental exercises, but also are aware of
the function of the Intelligence exercised under such circumstances. All men, also, in the spontaneous developments of
Consciousness, clearly distinguish themselves as subjects of
mental phenomena, from all external causes, or objects of the
same.   They may not be able technically to express this distinction with the clearness and definiteness that a philosopher
would. They may not be able to understand at first, the meaning of the terms he would employ to express that distinction.
Still it is, to them, a no less palpable reality, than to him.
Now Consciousness, which is thus seen to be, "in all men,
a natural process, some," in the language of the philosopher
above named, "elevate this natural process to the degree of an
art, a method, by reflection, which is a sort of second Consciousness-a free re-production of the first; and as Consciousness gives all men an idea of what is passing in them, so
reflection gives the philosopher a certain knowledge of everything which falls under the eye of Consciousness."  Reflection,
or philosophic Consciousness, is simple or natural Conscious
50 
CONSCIOUSNESS.
ness directed by the Will, in the act of careful attention to the
phenomena of our own minds.   As natural Consciousness is
one of the characteristics which distinguishes man from the
brute, so philosophic Consciousness is the characteristic which
distinguishes the mental philosopher from the rest of mankind.
The above remarks may be illustrated by a reference to
two common forms of observation in respect to external mnaterial substances.   The phenomena  of such substances  all
mankind alike notice, and to some degree reason about.   It
is the natural philosopher, however, who attentively observes
these phenomena, for the purpose of marking their fundamental characteristics, as the basis of philosophic classification,
generalization, &e.  The same holds true in respect to the two
forms of Consciousness  under consideration.   Mental phenomena all men are conscious of, and all men, to a greater or
less degree, are accustomed to reason about.   The philosopher,
however, by laborious efforts of self reflection, most critically
attends to these phenomena, for the purpose of marking their
characteristics, classifying and arranging them according to
philosophic principles, and thus determining the powers and
laws of mental operations.   In simple Consciousness, we have
a knowledge of whatever passes in our minds.   In reflection,
we have the same phenomena classified and generalized, according to fundamental characteristics thus perceived and
affirmed.
PROCESS OF CLASSIFICATION AND GENERALIZATION IN RE                 FLECTION, ILLUSTRATED.
I will now present a short illustration of this process, for
the purpose of elucidating the proper  nmcodl,~ of questioning
Consciousness, although in so doing I shall allude to a mental
process of a secondary character, hereafter to be explained.
The mind perceives, we will suppose, some object, an external
51 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPIIY.
material substance, denominated body. With this perception
there arises the conception of the object as existing somewhere,
- in space. The proposition, this body exists somewhere,
or in space, falls under the eye of Consciousness.   It is taken
up by reflection, and by the process of abstraction, hereafter
to be described, the two elements constituting the proposition
are separated from each other. Thus the mind obtains two
distinct ideas, that of body and space. These two ideas are
now separately considered and marked with their respective
characteristics of contingency and necessity.   Again, sorme
event is perceived.   With this perception arises the conviction
that it had a cause.   The proposition, this event had a cause,
falls under the eye of Consciousness.   It also is taken up by
reflection, and by the process above described, two new ideas,
that of event and causation, marked by their respective characteristics of contingency and necessity, are obtained.   These
two ideas now being in the mind, by the laws of association,
the other two, above referred to, are suggested and ranged with
them in two distinct classes, as contingent and necessary ideas.
HIere we have the process of classification. Now on a further
examination of the particular ideas comprehended under either
of the above classes, some new characteristic common to them
all, may be discovered; as, for example, all contingent ideas
may be found also to have the characteristic of relative. This becomes a general fact, and we have it in the process of generalization. The Intelligence now takes up these phemomena, originally given by Consciousness, and then analyzed, arranged, and
generalized by reflection, and gives us the powers and susceptibilities of the Mind, as indicated by these phenomena, &c.
FUNCTIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS.
Such are the nature and functions of Consciousness, together with the knowledge derived through it.
52 
CONSCIOUSNESS.
1. In its original spontaneity, it gives us all the phenomena
of the mind.
2. In connection with the Reason, it gives us ourselves as
the subjects of these phenomena, and as distinguished from
all existences around us, perceived or apprehended.
3. In reflection it gives the same phenomena, analyzed,
arranged, and generalized.
4. From these data, the Intelligence gives us the nature,
faculties, susceptibilities, and laws of mental operation, indicated by these phenomena.
NECESSITY OF RELYING IMPLICITLY UPON THE TESTIMONY OF
CONSCIOUSNESS.
In the Introduction, a proof of the possibility of mental
philosophy, as a science, was attempted. On this point I
shall add nothing more here. I will make a few remarks upon
the necessity of relying with implicit confidence upon the
testimony of Consciousness, as the basis of all conclusions
pertaining to the science of Mind.   The great reason, as I
suppose, why many individuals are prejudiced against mental
philosophy, as a peculiarly difficult, obscure, and uncertain
science, is a secret distrust of the validity of the facts which
lie at the basis of the science; in other words, in the credibility of the witness through whom the facts are obtained.
In respect to physical science, no such distrust is felt. MIankind generally rest with implicit confidence in the validity of
Sense, with regard to external, material substances.   With
equal assurance do they, consequently, rest on any conclusions
legitimately drawn from such phenomena respecting the nature
and laws of the substances revealed in those phenomena.
Now, why should we not repose the same faith in the validity
of the testimony of Consciousness, in respect to those phenomena which constitute the basis of an infinitely more im
5*
53 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIIY.
portant science, the knowledge of Mlind, than we do in our
senses in respect to external, material phenomena?  Of these
two sciences, that which is by far of the highest concernmient to us, we should not suppose would rest upon the most
uncertain basis.  If we look also at the real facts of the case,
can any one tell us, or even conceive of the reason why we
should rest with less assurance in the truth of that of which
we are conscious, than in that which is perceived and affirmed
by the external senses?
The visionary speculations, and dreamy theories of many
of the most distinguished mental philosophers of ancient and
modern times, has no doubt contributed (and rightly, too, if
mad speculations are the legitimate results of the principles
of the science), to the impression on the minds of many, that
the Scotchman's definition of MIetaphysics must be the true
one, to wit: "Metaphysics is, when he that is listening dinna
ken what he that is speaking means, and he that is speaking
dinna ken what he means himself." It should be borne in
mind, however, that up to the time of Bacon, a remark precisely
similar would have been equally applicable to the speculations
of natural philosophers; and that while the principles of physical science have, since that period, been settled upon the right
foundation, the true method in mental science is of comparatively recent development. I will here drop the suggestion,
whether posterity will not regard itself as almost as much indebted to Victor Cousin for the annunciation of the true
method in mental Seience, as to Bacon for announcing the
same in respect to physical? Mental philosophy, just emerging from the darkness of ages, seems now to have gained the
high road to truth, with its laws of investigation correctly settled. If we would make sure and rapid progress, two things
are indispensable - that we enter upon our investigations with
implicit confidence in the validity of the facts of Conscious
54 
CONSCIOUSNESS.
ness, as the basis of the science of mind- and that we adhere
with equally assured confidence to all conclusions to which
those facts legitimately conduct us.
CONSCIOUSNESS, A DISTINCT FUNCTION OR FACULTY OF TIE
INTELLECT.
We  are now prepared to answer the question, whether
Consciousness is a distinct function, or faculty of the Intelligence? All philosophers, when speaking of it without reference to any pre-formed theory, agree in speaking of it as a
function as distinct and real as any other, Sense and Reason,
for example.   Yet, by some, the fact that it is such a faculty
has been denied. Consciousness, says the translator of Cousin's
Psychology, "is not to be confounded either with the Sensibility
(external nor internal) nor with the Understanding, nor with
the Will; neither is it a distinct and special faculty of the
Mind; nor is it the principle of any of the faculties; nor
is it, on the other hand, the product of them." It would be
somewhat difficult, after so many negations, to put anything
very positive into a definition of the subject.  Yet the learned
author has himself given to this something a "local habitation
and a name."   "Consciousness," he says, " is a wi:tness of our
thoughts and volitions."  Now as this witness has a special
function distinct from every other function of the Intelligence,
ought we not to conclude that it is a special function of that
Intelligence?
The act of knowing also implies the power of knowledge.
A knowledge unlike all other knowledges, implies a special
function of knowledge, a function distinct from every other.
Is not the knowledge obtained by Consciousness, thus distinct
from all other knowledges?  Does it not, therefore, imply a
special function distinct from every other function of the Intelligence?
55 
INTELLECTUAL PIHILOSOPHY.
Consciousness also, must be a special function, or it must
be a peculiar function of somne other faculty, or of the whole
together.  From Sense and Reason, it is as clearly distinguishable, as either of those is firom the other. No one will pretend, that it is a special function of any of the secondary
faculties hereafter to be named, nor of all the Intellectual faculties together.   What shall we regard it then  but a special
function of the Intelligence?
One other consideration which I present, is, as it appears
to me, quite decisive of the question under consideration. The
exercise of Consciousness is dependent on the Will, in the
same sense, that that of the other special functions of the
intelligence is.  When, for example, an external object makes
an impression upon  one or  more of  the organs of Sense
through this function, there is an instant and spontaneous apprehension  of the  cause of that impression.   Before  that
cause is C/ti   t  perceived, however, the perceptive faculty
must, by a voluntary act of attention, be directed particularly
to the object.  The specific control which the Will thus exercises over this faculty, clearly indicates it, as a special function
of the Intelligence.  Now a relation precisely similar, as shown
above, in respect to its spontaneous, and reflective determinations, does the Will exercise over Consciousness.   We  have
the same evidence that it is a special function of the Intelligence, that we have that Sense is.
TIIEORY OF DR. BROWN.
I will close my remarks upon the subject of Consciousness,
by a reference to the theory of Dr. Brown in respect to it.
Consciousness, according to this philosopher, is simply a general term expressive of all the phlenomena or states of the
mind.  a Sensation," he says, for example, " is not an object
of Consciousness differing from itself but a particular sensation
56 
CONSCIOUSNESS.
is the consciousness of the moment, as a particular hope, or
fear, or grief, or resentment, or simple remembrance, may be
the actual consciousness of the next moment."
A single example will fully demonstrate the incorrectness
of this theory.   I affirm (what is actually true), to myself, or
some other individual, that I am  in pain.   This affirmation
implies three things- the existence of the feeling as a state
of the Sensibility -an apprehension of pain in general, together with that of the particular feeling referred to -and a
reference of that feeling to myself as the subject, this apprehension and reference being exclusively states of the Intelligence. Now this knowledge of the feeling under consideration, with its reference to myself as the subject, is an act of
Consciousness; an exercise of the Intelligence which accompanies all mental states, and which differs as much from sensation,
or any other state of the Sensibility, as thought differs from such
states.   Sensation then is an object of Consciousness differing
from itself.  The same holds true in respect to all mental exercises.   The state itself is one thing.   The knowledge of that
state, and reference of it to ourselves is quite another.   This
last exercise of the Intelligence is Consciousness, an exercise
as distinct from the state of which it takes cognizance, as that
state is from the object which causes it.
MEANING OF TIHE TERM CONSCIOUSNESS, AS EMPLOYED BY
SIR WILLIAM IIAMILTON.
There is all apparent, though not real, discrepancy, if not
contradiction, in the analysis of the Intellectual faculties, as
given by Sir William Hamilton, and that developed in this
Treatise, as far as the function of Consciousness is concerned.
This discrepancy, on careful examination, however, will be
found to consist, not in the analysis itself, but simply and exclusively in the use of terms, which each philosopher is per
57 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHIIY.
mitted to employ according to his own definition.  For  the
term Consciousness, as defined and employed in this Treatise,
he substitutes that of Self-Consciousness, which, as the followilg paragraph will show, he uses in strict conformity to the
definition above referred to.  In the same paragraph also, lihe
defines " External Perception or Perception simply," in perfect
accordance with that given of the term Sense, as employed in
this Treatise.
is L'xtciial lPeicelftioit or Percep)tion, simply, is the faculty
.prese)tative or intu?itive of the Nvon.~Eo or 3latter, if there be
any ii(tcitive apprehension allowed cf the -Yoi-Eyo at all.  Iaterzact Pe ce,)tio,)z, as Self-Consciousness, is the faculty ])resecitatite or iitttitive of the phenomena of the LEo or miind."
In a subsequent paragraph, he defines Consciousness itself,
as the g'elericl faculty of Ittuition,  As thus defined, it would
include Sense, Consciousness, and Reason, as these terms are
defined and employed in this Treatise, and would differ from
each of these functions of the Intelligence, only as the whole
differs froni each of its parts.  " Consciousness," he says, " is
a knowledge solely of what is now here present to the mind.
It is therefore only intuitive, and its objects exclusively presentative.  Again, Consciousness is a knowledge of all that is
notc he)e r)C.seytt to the mind: every immediate object of cognition is thus an object of Consciousness, and every intuitive
cognition itself, simply a special form of Consciousness."
When, therefore, our author affirms that we are <         dtttc7 conscious of the existence of the "Non-Ego or 3iatter,"
that is, of its primiary qualities, he means, not that such qualities are the immediate objects of Self-Consciousness, as he has
defined the term, that is, of Consciousness as defined in this
Treatise, but that they are the immediate, that is, the " presentative or intuitive" objects of the faculty of "External
Perception, or Perception simply," that is, of Sense, as this
58 
EVENTS AND CAUSE.
function of the Intelligence is defined in this Treatise. No
difference of opinion obtains, therefore, between us and our
author, so far as the analysis of the primary faculties themselves of the Intelligence is concerned.   The only difference,
which does obtain, is in the use of terms, in respect to which
even, we would not willingly depart from such authority as
Sir William Hamilton, but for the fact, that a single term is
needed in a Treatise like this, to express each special function
of the Intelligence, that the nomnenclature which we have
adopted has this special advantage over that adopted by our
author, and that, with all, it is equally definite, and is now
very generally obtaining in mental philosophy.
59 
CHAPTER VI.
SE N SE.
SENSE has already been defined, as that Faculty or Function of the Intelligence, by which we apprehend the phenomena,
or qualities [primary qualities, as we shall hereafter see] of
external material substances.
As thus defined, the exercise of this faculty should be carefully distinguished from those states of the Sensibility denominated sensactions, states which always accompany external perception, but which are, notwithstanding, none the less, for that
reason, distinct from it.  Sensation is that state of the Sensi7ilitj which imnimediately succeeds anjy ig)l)ressioit made,y
any cause qp)on the physical organization.  Sensation is exclusively a state of the Sensibility.  Sense is no  less exclusively a function of the Intelligence.   Of these distinctions
we should never lose sight, when reasoning upon this department of mental science.
SPONTANEOUS AND VOLUNTARY DETERMIINATION OF SENSE.
Sense, like Consciousness, is, in its primitive developments,
a simple spontaniety of the Intelligence.  Its action, in this
state, is, in no degree, conditioned on that of the Will.   Perception, in its distinct fornm, is conditioned on attention, which
is nothing but the perceptive faculty directed by the Will, and
hence, for the want of a better term, or phrase, called the
,w.v — 
SENSE.
voluntary determination of the faculty.   Attention in the
direction of Consciousness, that is, when directed to mental
phenomena-  is called rejection.  When in the direction of
the faculty of external perception -that is, towards the phenomena of material substances- it is called observatioa.
The necessity of observation, that is, of attention, in the
voluntary direction of the perceptive faculty towards phenomena obscurely given in the spontaneous developments of that
faculty, may be readily illustrated. A portion of a congregation, for example, who have been listening to a certain speaker,
have fallen into a state of slumber. The speaker suddenly
stops, and immediately are all aroused. Now, if the audience
had not, in some form, heard the voice which broke upon their
ears, why were they roused? Yet, if inquired of, in respect
to what had been spoken to them, they would, for the obvious
and exclusive reason, that they had not attended to it, be
wholly unable to answer. How often do we hear the remark,
I gained no distinct conception of that part of a discourse.
MIy attention happened, at the time, to be directed to something else.
The attention may, in some instances, be so fixed upon
some object in one direction, that the Sensibility and Intelligence both may be almost, if not quite, totally isolated from
what would otherwise deeply affect us in another direction.
A gentleman, for example, who was employed about the machinery in a factory, had one of his fingers entirely cut off, by
th e           sudden and unexpected starting of a portion of that machincry which carried, with great velocity, a circular saw. So
intensely did his attention instantly become occupied with the
prevention of the destruction of the whole machinery, that he
was not aware of the injury done to his own person, nor was
he sensible of the least pain fiom it, till the accident was
pointed out to him by another who stood by. As soon, how
6 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIIY.
ever, as the injury was discovered, the pain from it became
intense.
The basis of attention is the spontaneous action of the
Sensibility and  Intelligence-action  which  always  occurs,
when the proper conditions are fulfilled, and when the mind is
not isolated from objects in other directions, by its intense
action upon some object (as in the case above cited), in some
specific direction.
MIENTAL PROCESS IN PERCEPTION.
The process of the mind, in the perception of external
objects, is doubtless originally something like this: An  impression is made upon the Sensibility, or a sensation is produced, by the action of some external material object upon the
physical organization.   In connection with the sensation, there
is a direct and immediate spontaneous apprehension (perception), of the presence and quality (primary quality, as we
shall hereafter see), of the object which caused the sensation.
To this quality the attention, by an act of volition, is then
directed.   Thus the apprehension or perception becomes clear
and distinct.  Sensation always, as a matter of fact, accompanies Sense-perception.  Sensation, also, is the occasion of the
perception, but not its cause, that cause being always found
in the correlation between the nature of the Intelligence, as a
f-cutlty, and that of the Non-Ego or MIatter, as an  ol)ect
of knowledge.*
* The distinction between a condition, and a cause of a given event
is obvious, and may be readily elucidated. The removal of an obstruction may be the occasion of the descent of a heavy body towards the
earth; but it is, in no proper sense, the cause of such an occurrence,
the principle of attraction being itself the real cause. So, in the
language of Sir William Hamilton, "Sensation proper is the condition
62 
SENL SE -
OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION.
The objects of Sense-perceptions, which, as we shall hereafter show, always pertain directly and immediately to said
objects, are the qua[ities (primary or secundo-primlary qualities, terms hereafter to be defined) of external nmlaterial substances, qualities, such, for example, as extension, form, solidity, &c.   The secondary qualities, such as those of taste,
smell, sound, &c., are apprehended indirectlj and mediately,
through, and in the consciousness of sensations.   Such qualities are to us the index, and the only index we have, of the
nature of their respective subjects.   In the consciousness of
thought, feeling, and acts of will, we know ourselves, as thinking, feeling, and acting beings. So in the consciousness of Senseperceptions, and sensations, produced in us by external material substances, we know such substances as the subjects of the
qualities thus perceived and apprehended.
COMMION AND  PHILOSOPHIC  DOUBTS  IN  RESPECT  TO  TIHE
COMPARATIVE VALIDITY OF THE AFFIRMATIONS OF SENSE
AND CONSCIOUSNESS.
WThile the mass of mankind appear to exercise more confidclence, theoretically, in the testimony of Sense than in that
of Consciousness, the case seems, in many instances, to be
reversed in respect to philosophers. The testimony of Consciousness the latter appear to regard as valid in respect to
s ~tlcctgre, while  that of Sense is not, in their estimation,
equally so in respect to objective phenomena. Now the reason
of the presence of these philosophic doubts, as Coleridge would
call them, in the latter instance, and of their absence in the
sine qTua non of a perception proper of the primary qualities."  The
cause proper of the perception, on the other hand, is found, as said
above, in the correlation between the nature of the Intelligence, as a
faculty and of the Non-Ego or Matter as an object of perception.
63 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIIY.
former, arises, as I suppose, from the fact that philosophers
have attempted to explain the quo gmodo of external perception, and not that of internal.  This is the very reason for the
doubts under consideration, assigned by Coleridge himself.
"As this," he says [to wit, the belief that tlhere exist thtiits
wit/hoitt its], "o on the one hand, originates neither in grounds
nor arguments, and yet, on the other hand, remains proof
against all attempts to move it by grounds or arguments
(7tCtt, J'    a /ca exiellas tanmet  usue redeloit); on the one
hand, lays claim to I,MIMEDIATE certainty as a position at
once indemonstrable and irresistible; and yet, on the other
hand, inasmuch as it refers to something essentially different from ourselves, nay, even in opposition to ourselves,
leaves it inconceivable how it could possibly become a part of
our immediate Consciousness (in other words, how that which
is ex h}-pothesi continues intrinsic and alien to our being); the
philosopher, therefore, compels himself to treat this faith as
nothing more than a prejudice, innate indeed and connatural,
but still a prejudice." Now why does this philosopher compel
himself to treat as a groundless prejudice and an untruth that
which himself acknowledges to be an innate, connatural belief,
an irresistible affirmation of his own and of the universal Intelligence?  Simply because he cannot explain the quo modo
of external perception- cannot see how an object not ourselves, and wholly unlike ourselves, as matter is universally
conceived to be, should be to us an object of knowledge. If
that is a reason why we should compel ourselves to treat as
false what we know to be true, it should certainly induce us to
treat his theory as equally false. For how can we explain the
imanner in which that which is intrinsic and a part of ourselves, should be presented to us, by our Intelligence, as wholly
extrinsic and foreign, and even opposed to ourselves -how it
can present that which is exclusively subjective, as wholly oh
64 
SENSE.
jecti've -that which is purely spiritual, as wholly materialthat, in short, which is " without form and void," as possessed
of a definite form?  The quo mzo(lo of knowledge, according
to this last theory, would be found quite as difficult of explanation as in conformity to any other whatever.
Let us now suppose that philosophers should undertake to
explain the qpeo nidol of knowledge by Consciousness.  How,
for example, can I perceive and attend to an object external to
myself, and yet have, at the same time, a consciousness equally
distinct of the act of perception itself?  Suppose they should
attempt to explain such mysterious acts of the Intelligence as
these, and at the same time compel themselves to treat as a
prejudice all mental affirmations, the mode of origination of
which they cannot explain. Would not their philosophic doubts
be quite as strong in respect to the validity of Consciousness, as
with regard to that of any other function of the Intelligence?
TIHE PROVINCE OF PHILOSOPHY.
Philosophy, it should be borne in mind, has to do with
facts as they are, with the nature of the powers revealed in
those facts, and with the laws in conformity to which those
powers act.  AWith the mode of their action, further than this,
it has nothing to do.  In the fall of heavy bodies to the earth,
for example, we learn that attraction is a property of all material substances. We then set ourselves to determine the law
which controls the action of this property. Here we are within
the legitimate domain of philosophy. But suppose we attempt
to explain the anode in which the attractive power acts.  " Such
knowledge is too wonderful for us.  It is high, we cannot attain unto it."  Philosophy, well satisfied with her own legitimate and wide domain, resigns such things to the Eternal One,
who created all the powers of the universe, and consequently
understands the mode of their action. All that philosophy
6*
65 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
can say in regard to the mode of action of~ any power is, that
such is its nature.
COMPARATIVE VALIDITY OF THE AFFIRMATIONS OF SENSE
AND CONSCIOUSNESS.
,Ve are now prepared to contemplate the comparative validity of the affirmations of these two functions of the Intelligence, Sense and Consciousness.   I will suppose that I have
a perception of some external object, as possessed of the q(jualities of extension, form, and color.  In Consciousness I recognize the existence of this perception as a phenomenon of my
own mind.   Which of these affirmations are, in reality, the
most valid, and which would a wise and sound philosophy impel me to esteem and treat as such- the affirmation of Sense,
in respect to the qualities of the external object, or of Consciousness, in regard to the existence and character of the
affirmation of the former faculty, as a phenomenon of the
MIind itself? Neither, surely. Each faculty pertains alike to
its object, by direct and immediate intuition.  The affirmation
of each is alike positive and absolute in respect to its object.
The action of one is, in reality, no more a mystery than that
of the other.  The quo moodo of the action of each is alike
inexplicable, and no more inexplicable than the mode of action
of every other power in existence.   It is a sage remark of Dr.
Brown, when speaking of the mode in which causes produce
their respective effects, that " eve2-yth iinq  is mysterious, or
nothing is."  When philosophy leads us to doubt the real
affirmations of any faculty of the Intelligence, then philosophy
itself becomes impossible, and the attempt to realize it, the
perfection of absurdity.
TRUE THEORY OF EXTERNAL PERCEPTION.
The way is now prepared for an enunciation of the theory
66 
SENSE.
of external perception, taught in this Treatise.   Knowledge
implies two things, an object to be known, and a suitject capable of knowing.   Between the nature of the subject and object there must be such a mutual correlation, that, when certain conditions are fulfilled, knowledge arises, as a necessary
result of this correlation.   Between matter and mind this correlation exists.  The latter knows the formier, because the one
is a fact(ty, and the other an object of knowledge.  Mind perceives the qualities of matter, because  the formner has  the
loIcer of perception, and the latter is an ol)ject of perception.
Mlind also exists in a tri-unity, consisting, as we have seen,
of the Intelligence, Sensibility, and Will.  To each of these
departments of our nature, the external world is correlated.
Certain conditions being fulfilled, particular qualities of material substances become to the Intelligence, direct objects of
knowledge.   Other conditions being fulfilled, they affect our
Sensibility, producing in us certain sensations, either pleasurable, painful, or indifferent. Our Will then acts upon these
substances, controlling their movements, and modifying their
states, while they, in turn, react upon the Will, modifying
and limiting its control.   In the first instance, knowledge is
direct and immediate. In the second, through a consciousness
of sensations, we learn the correlation: between those objects
and our sensibility.  In the last, through a consciousness of
the nisuses of our Will, and an experience of their results,
we learn the correlation between these substances and our voluntary powers.   In respect to the manne   in which, when
certain conditions are fulfilled, we know these objects, the only
answer that philosophy gives or demands, is this: Such is the
correlation between the nature of the knowing faculty and
that of the objects of knowledge.
67
i4 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPIIY.
Theory Verifed.
It is a sufficient verification of the theory above announced,
that it is a statement of the case, as it presents itself to the
universal Intelligence - that it is encumbered with no difficulties which are not involved in every theory of a different kind
which has hitherto been presented, and is entirely free firom
those difficulties which are perfectly fatal to those theories.
Every individual believes, that he knows the external world
as correlated to the threefold departments of our nature under
consideration, and in accordance with the principles above
stated.  Every theory also must rest, in the last analysis, in
respect to the movie of knowledge, upon  this one principle,
lTIhe vti)zd kit0oz's, because it is a facuttjy of kliowle(Ige.  The
difficulties which all theories, contradictory to that above announced, involve, are these: either they do not present the
facts or conditions of knowledge, or the manner of knowing,
as they are given in the universal Intelligence.
THE ABOVE THEORY VERIFIED AS A TRUTH OF SCIENCE.
As this Theory, however, is regarded, by the author of this
Treatise, not only as true, but also as of fundamental importance in philosophy, a more extended and logical verification
of it is deemed requisite, than that above given.
QUALITIES OF M3ATTER.
In accomplishing the object which I have in view, I would,
in the first place, direct special attention to a considerition of
the qualities of matter, as given in the universal Intelligence.
According to Sir William Hamilton, such qualities may, and
according to a strictly scientific arrangemient, should be classed
as, Primary-proper, Secundo-primary, and Secondary.
68 
(69
.r' L        qrj    [aitite-.
Tie first class, Primary-proper, incluce all those properties
which belong to Matter, as such, and  jwhich cannot, in thought
even, be separated fiom it as Mlatter.  The necessary constituents  of our idea of Matter, as such, are two, that it occuj)ies
space, and is co,)latcied ito space.  Ilenee, in the language of
the author referred to, "we  have thus eight proximate  attributes: 1. Extension; 2. Divisibility; 3. Size; 4. Density or
Rarity; 5. Figure;  6. Incompressibility absolute;  7. 31obility; S. Situation."   ThLiat which occupies space, and is contained in it, must have extension; else it would fulfill neither
of these conditions.   An extended substance occupying space
and, at the same time, contained it, must also, be divisible, on
the one hand, and possess size, on the other, Size which refers
to the quatitfy of.)ctce which the substance occupies.  When,
on the other hand, we refer to the quantity of mncer occupyin space, we attain to the conception of the quality of Density
or Paritv.  That also which has Extension and Size must have
Forma or Figure.  That too which occupies space, and is containedl in it, must be susceptible of motion from  one point of
space to another, and must, at each successive moment, have a
given situation in space.  Hence we have the idea of the qualities of Mobility and Situation.  These then must be reckoned
as the qualities Primary-proper of M3latter.   They distinguish
no one lkind of material substance from another, but Matter
itself firom every other substance, and cannot, even in thought,
be separated from it, as Matter.
Secndo(7o-lrimarJy ftua,ities.
The Secundo-primnary qualities are those which pertain, not
to Matter, as such, but which distiinguish different classes of
material substances from one another, and which pertain, as
SENSE.
IF. ".  -  
INTELLECTUAL PHIILOSOPIIY.
essential qualities, to such classes. Thus bodies are classed,
in reference to their Gravity and Cohesion, also as Heavy and
Light, as Hard and Soft, Solid and Fluid, Viseid and Friable,
Tough and Brittle, Rigid and Flexible, Fissile and Infissile,
Ductile and Induetile, Elastic and Inelastic, Rough and
Smniooth, Slippery and Tenacious, Compressible and Incomipressible, Resilient and Irresilient, Movable  and Immuovable.   I
namne the qualities, as given by the author above referred to.
The classification is undeniably correct, and complete.
Secondary quaities.
The Secondary qualities are, properly speaking, subjective
affections in ourselves, and not properties of flatter at all.
They pertain to Matter, only as the causes, unperceived in
themselves, of these affections or sensations.  Such, for example, are the qualities represented by the terms Sound, Flavor, Savor, Tactual sensation, &c.
Whatever may be thought of the propriety of the phraseology adopted, no one can doubt the reality of the distinctions
above made, or the consequent propriety of the corresponding
classification of the qualities of 3latter. My own opinion is, that
it would be as well to retain, for the sake of convenience, the
old classification of Primary and Secondary, making a subdivision of the first class, as Primary-proper and Secundo-primary.
TVI/at these q?Ualities are in general.
As no form of statement can excel that given by our
author of the genieral cI,aracteristics of these three classes of
qualities, I will venture to take from his writings the following
extract, in which we have a specific statement of such characteristics:
" 1. The primary are less properly denominated Qualities
(Suchnesses), and deserve the name only as we conceive themni
70 
SENSE.
to distinguish body from not body- corporeal from incoporeal
substance.   They are thus merely the attributes of body  as
bo -j - coipor;8 o t l coiols.
"The Secundo-primary and Secondary, on the contrary, are
in strict propriety denominated Qualities, for they discriminate
body from body.   They are the attributes of body, as this or
tr(ct kind of bo( y-corporis tt tale corpus.
" 2. The Primary rise from the universal relations of body
to itself; the Secundo-primary from the general relations of
this body to that; the Secondary from the special relations
of this kind of body to this kind of animated or sentient
organsm.
" 3. The Primary determine the possibility of matter absolutely; the Secundo-primary the possibility of the material
universe as actually constituted; the Secondary the possibility
of our relations as sentient existences to that universe.
" 4. Under the Primary we apprehend modes of the Non~,/o; under the Secundo-primary we apprehend modes both of
the Ego and of the Aon-E~o; under the Secondary we apprehend modes of thle ~Eo, and infer modes of the Non-Egco.
" 5. The Primary are apprehended as they are in bodies;
the Secondary as they are in us; the Secundo-primary as they
are in bodies, and as they are in us.
"6. The term qucaity in general, and the names of the
qualities in particular, are- in the case of the Primary, unuivocal, one designation unambiguously marking out one quality
- in the case of the Secundo-primary and Secondary equivocal,
a single term being ambiguously applied to denote two qualities, distinct though correlative - that, to wit, which is the
mode of existence in bodies, and which is a mode of affection
in one organism.
"7. The Primary and also the Secundo-primary qualities
are definite in number and exhaustive, for all conceivable re
71 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPIIY.
lations of body to itself, or of body to body merely, are few,
and all these found actually existent.  The Secondary, on the
contrary, are in number indefinite; and they actually hold no
proportion to the possible.  For we can suppose in animal organismt, any number of unknown capacities of being variously
affected, and, in matter, any number of unknown powers of
thus affecting it, and this though we are unable to imagine to
ourselves w"hat these actually may be."
As our author subsequently shows, the " Primary are conceived as necessary and perceived as actual; the Secundoprimary are perceived and conceived as actual; the Secondary
are inferred and conceived as possible."  "The Primary are
perceived as conceived.   The Secundo-primary are conceived
as peceive(l.  The Secondary are neither perceived as conceived, nor conceived as perceived; for to perception they are
occult, and are conceived only as latent causes to account for
manifest effects."  The Primary are given in Consciousness,
as "modes of a not-self;" the Secondary as " modes of self;"
and the Secundo-primary as " modes of self and of a not-self
at once." -  " In the apppehension of the Primary qualities
the mind is primarily and principally active; it feels only as
it knows.   In that of the Secondary, the mind is primarily
and principally passive;  it knows only as it feels.  In the
Secundo-primiary the mind is equally and at once active and
passive; in one respect it feels as it knows, in another, it knows
as it feels." Hence, as our author might have shown, our
knowledge of the Primary qualities is given in our minds, as
valid for all Intelligents.  Our  knowledge of the Secundoprimary is given, as, in one form, valid for all Intelligents, and
in another, as valid only for ourselves in the present constitution
of our sensitive nature.   Our knowledge  of the Secondary
qualities is given, as valid for ourselves exclusively, and that in
the sense last named.
72
.1 
SENSE.
REPRESENTATIVE AND.PRESENTATIVE KNOWLEDGE.
Every one is accustomed to distinguish between that kind
of knowledge which is direct and i)ameneiate, and that which
is obtained, gitedictebj, that is, through something  differing
num.erically from the object of knowledge.  The former kind
of knowledge, Sir William Hamilton denominates Presenttative,
and the latter, 2Representattive knowledge.   "An  immediate
cognition," he says, "inasmuch as the thing known is itsef
presentecd to observation, may be called presentative, and inas.
much as the thing presented is, as it were, viewed c y t7te nAic
face to face, may be called intuitive. A mediate cognition,
inasmuch as the thing known is held up or mirrored to the
mind in a vicarious representation, may be called a representative cognition."  No remarks are necessary to show the reality
of the above distinction, or the propriety of the phraseology
employed to represent it.
TRUE THEORY OF PERCEPTION STATED AND VERIFIED.
I now lay down the following propositions pertaining to our
knowledge of the qualities of matter, propositions which I will
then proceed to verify: 1. Our knowledge of qualities Primary-proper of matter is exclusively Presentative, that is, is not
mediate, but direct and  imlediate  or  intuitive.   2. Our
knowledge of the Secundo-primnary qualities is partly  Presefntatie, and ])artly Representative.  3. Our knowledge of
the Secondary qualities, is wholly and exclusively Rep2resentative, such qualities being revealed to us, only as the unknown
causes of known sensations, and revealed also, as exclusively
through such sensations.
That our knowledge of the Secondary qualities is wholly,
and of the Secundo-primary, partly, to say the least, Representative, no one will deny. The only question that can arise,
7
73 
INTELLECTUAL PIHILOSOPII-Y
pertains to the matter of fcct, whether our knowledge of the
Primary qualities, and of the Secundo-primary is, in ca)yfora,
Presentative, and not like that of the Secondary, wholly and
exclusively Representative. That we have a direct and inmmediate, that is, Presentative knowledge of the two classes of
qualities first named, to wit, the Primary, and Secundo-primary, I argue from the following considerations:
1. The fact of such knowledge cannot be shown, a priori,
to be, in itself, impossible. If an individual should affirmr,
that things equal to the same things are not equal to one another, we should have no occasion to appeal to experience to
determine the question, whether such a proposition is, or is
not, true.  Prior to such an appeal, or a _priori, we know absolutely, from the nature of the case, that such a proposition
is not, and cannot be true.   Can we thus know, that a presentative knowledge of the qualities referred to, is in itself, an
impossibility?  Certainly not, and who will affirmn the truth
of the contrary proposition?  Neither the existence, nor the
extent or limits, of the Faculty of Knowledge, can be known,
d priori.  The existence of the power of knowledge is revealed
wholly and exclusively, through the fact of knowledge. The
extent and limits of the possible reach that power, can be determined, as exclusively, only by what the mind actually does
know, and by what is logically implied in such knowledge.
WTe can know, dpriori, that knowledge cannot extend beyond
the compass of realities.  But how far such realities are, to
the intelligence, real or possible, objects of knowledge, or what
realities do, in fact exist as objects of knowledge, cannot be
known at all, a priori, but, as said above, wholly and exclusively, by a reference to what the mind does, in fact, know,
and to what is necessarily implied in such knowledge. Suppose, that extended substances actually occupy space, and exist
i 4. 
7,5
in it, and the Intelligence cannot affirm the reality of such
existences, to be a natural impossibility, who will pretend to
say, that a faculty of knowledge may not be given, to which
the essential qualities of such substances, as Miatter, and as
particular classes of 3iatter, shall be objects of direct, and
immediate or Presentative knowledge?   Whlo will pretend,
then, to know, d piriori, that the human Intelligence, in the
very condition of its present existence, is not, in fact, just such
a faculty; that such qualities do not, in fact, exist, sustaining
to it the relation of objects, while it sustains to them the relation of a l)ower of real Presentative knowledge? The reality
of such qualities as objects, and of the Intelligence, as a power
of such knowledge, cannot be intelligently affirmed to be, in
itself, impossible.   Hence, no evidence does, or can exist, a
I)riori, against the truth of the propositions under consideration.
2. It cannot be shown, a posteriori, that is, by an appeal
to facts, that such knowledge does not, in fact, exist in the
human Intelligence.   WVe are absolutely conscious,  that our
knowledge of the Secondary qualities of 3lattcr is not Presentative, but wholly and exclusively Representative. Have we,
in fact, a similar consciousness, in reference to our knowle(,dge
of the Primary and Secundo-primary qualities of the same
substance? The Secondary qualities are consciously given, in
the Intelligence, wholly inferrentially as the unknown causes
of known sensations.  Is the quality of extension, in Mlatter,
for example, given in the same Intelligence, consciously in the
same manner, and as a precisely similar cause of a similar
feeling?  On  the other hand, while the Secondary quality is
given, in Consciousness, as the q(ok)towiUn ca?.se of a k,.iown
state of the Sensibiltly; is not the primary quality given, as
a k7cnow?n object of a known state of the Iiite7ijyeflce?  WTe are
SEI,ISE, 
INTELLECTUAL PHIIILOSOPIIY.
conscious, that a state of the Sensibility lies between the Intelligence, and the unknown cause of that state, the Secondary
quality, and that the reality of that cause is not directly perceived, but inferred. Are we also conscious, that a known
sensation, or state of the Sensibility, lies between the known
act of the Intelligence above referred to, and its known object,
the Primary quality, that the sensation is, and the quality is
not, the immediate object of perception, and that, consequently, the quality is consciously not perceived, but its reality, niediatel7y inferred? If our knowledge of the Primary qualities
of matter is not Presentative, but wholly and exclusively Representative, no one will pretend that we have a consciousness
of the fact; nor wvill any one attempt to prove the fact, dposteriori, by an appeal to the facts of Consciousness.
Nor can the same fact be established by an appeal to any
known facts connected with the condition of the mind, as connected with its phtysical organization.   What shall be the extent, limits, or modes of its knowledges, in connection with
such an organization, or whether it knows all or any of the
facts referred to mediately or immediately, cannot be determined, d priori. All such questions can be intelligently answered, but by an appeal to Consciousness. Now we are not
conscious, at all, that all our knowledge of the facts referred to,
the Primary qualities of our own physical organism, for example, is, in no form, Presentative, but wholly and exclusively
Representative.
Nor do any other known facts anywhere exist, in the universe of Matter or Mind, from which we can draw the inference that our knowledge of these qualities is not Presentative.
The proposition that this knowledge is Representative, then,
is neither a necessary intuitive truth, nor is it capable of being
established, d posteriori, that is, by an appeal to facts.
76 
SENSE.
3. Hence, I remark, in the next place, that the theory,
that all our knowledge of Matter, is exclusively Representative,
that is, through the consciousness of Sensations, rests upon
absolutely nothing but a baseless assumption, an assumption
wholly unsustained by any form or degree of evidence, d
I-io);, or a posteriori, that is, an assumption neither selfevidently true, nor sustained by any known facts of Matter or
of Mind.  The only merit that can be claimed for it is, that
like all false theories in mental science, it rests upon a partial
induction of the facts of Consciousness. That all our knowledge of the Secondary qualities of Matter is exclusively Representative, and derived wholly through  a known medium,
Sensation, is an absolute fact of Consciousness. Upon this
simple fact, the assumption, on which Philosophy, in all ages,
has run off the track of truth, has been based, to wit, that all
our knowledge of all the qualities of the same substance, is,
and must be, of the same character, and derived exclusively
through the same medium.   No assumption conceivable is, or
can be, more unreasonable in itself, or more unphilosophically
induced.   How  unreasonable the assumption, that because
qualities of a given character, and universally recognized as
not fundamental, are known in a given manner, that therefore
qualities of a totally different and opposite character, and universally recognized as fundamental, must be known in the
same manner, and through the same uncertain medium.
4. The origin of this assumption should not be overlooked,
in this connection, as having a not unimportant bearing upon
our present inquiries. This assumption had its origin in an
attempt to determine, a priorti, the natture, extet, lim ts and
mnode of human knowledge, facts none of which can, by any
possibility, be determined only t p)osteriori; or by an appeal to
Consciousness.  These are all, it should be borne in mind, as
7*
77 
INTELLECTUAL PHIIILOSOPIIY.
facts, contingent and  not necessary truths.   They cannot,
therefore, be determined, t priori, but must be resolved wholly
a  )osteriori.  This assumption, therefore, is the exclusive result of a most unscientific procedure in philosophy, a procedure
in which mere guessing has ever been substituted for certain
knowledge, when the latter was in the immediate presence of
the philosopher, and when no higher merit was attained, than
very poor guessing at that.
5. I now adduce, in favor of the truth of the three propositions under consideration, to wit, that our knowledge of the
Primary qualities of Matter is wholly Presentative, that that
of the Secundary-primary is partly Presentative  and partly
Representative, and finally, that that of the Secondary is
wholly Representative, the direct, immediate, and absolute
testimony of universal Consciousness. No one will deny, that
in the universal Consciousness, the Primary quality is recognized as the known object of a known act of the Intelligence
(Sense-perception), and that the  Secondary quality is also
recognized as the unknown cause of a known state of the Sensibility (Sensation). Nor does any one doubt that our knowledge of the Sensation itself is Presentative, wholly so. Now,
in all proper Sense-perceptions, we have, undeniably, just as
distinct and absolute a consciousness of a direct and immediate or Presentative aspect or knowledge of the Primary quality,
extension for example, as we have of the Sensation itself, when
produced by the unknown cause referred to, the Secondary
quality. It would be a denial of the facts of Consciousness
no more palpable, to affirm, that our knowledge of Sensation
itself is wholly Representative, than it would be, to affirm, that
our knowledge of the Primary qualities is not Presentative.
No honest interpreter of the facts of Consciousness will deny
the truth of these statements.   The truth of the propositions
under consideration can be denied, but upon one assumption,
78 
SENSE.
that the same faculty affirms, with the same absoluteness, what
is true in regard to Sensation, and what is not true in regard
to Sense-perception.   The true and only true interpretation of
the facts of Consciousness, on the subject, is this: The Primary qualities are given in Consciousness, exclusively as the
known presentative objects of known acts of the Intelligence,
Sense-perceptions. The same holds true of the Secundo-primary, so far as they are given as qualities of Matter.   So far
forth as they are given as causes of Sensations, they are given
as the otherwise unknown causes of known states of the Sensibility. The Secondary, on the other hand, are given exclusively as such causes of such states, and in no other form as
objects of knowledge. In reference to the Secondary qualities, and of the Secundo-primary, so far forth as they are given
as causes of sensations, we are conscious of the presence of a
in'ecdiufli between us and the object of knowledge, and that it
is wholly througch such medium that the object is known. In
reference to the Primary qualities, and the Secundo-primary,
so far as the latter are regarded as essential qualities of their
respective subjects, we are conscious of no medium between us
and the object of knowledge, and still less of the fact, that it
is wholly through such medium that the object is known.'We
can therefore, by no possibility, have a consciousness, that any
form of knowledge whatever is Presentative, if we have not
that such is the character of our knowledge of the qualities
last named.
6. I remark, in the next place, that our knowledge of the
Primary qualities has all the essential characteristics of Presentative, and none of those of Representative knowledge;
while that of the Secondary has all of the characteristics of
Rtepresentative, and none of those of Presentative knowledge.
Our knowledge of the Secundo-primary, on the other hand, so
far forth as they are given, as objects of Sense-perceptions, has
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INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIHIY.
all, and exclusively, the characteristics Presentative, and so far
forth, as they are given as causes of sensations, has all, and
exclusively, the characteristics of Representative knowledge.
In Representative knowledge, the object is never given, as per(ei'e(l, but its reality exclusively, as inferred; precisely the
opposite obtains, in all respects, in Presentative knowledge.
In this case, the object is given, as known in itself, that is, its
reality is given, not as infe)recd, but as pcrceited.  These are
the fundamental distinctions between Presentative and Representative knowledge.
Now the Secondary qualities of matter are given, in our
Intelligence, as not known in themselves.   Their reality is
given exclusively, as inferred, as known only relatively.  The
Primary qualities are given exclusively, as known in themselves,
and their reality as perceived, and not as inferred.   The  Secundo-primary are given partly, as perceived, and partly, as
inferred, and that just so far forth as they rank with the lirimary, on the one hand, and with the Secondary, on the other.
AVe experience a sensation pleasurable or painful.   We affirm,
that it had a cause, and that in the cause, there is a quality
adapted to affect our Sensibility, in the manner referred to,
while that Sensibility remains constituted as it now  is.  The
reality of the cause and the quality is given, as not perceived,
but inferred, and the nature of the quality, not as known as it
is in itself, but only relatively to our Sensibility.  The Primary
quality, on the other hand, that of extension for example, is
given as known in itself, and its reality is affirmed as perceived,
and not as inferred as the unknown cause of a known sensation, as is true of the Secondary qualities. The same holds true
of all the Primary qualities, and of the Secundo-primnary, so far
as the latter take rank with the former.  We can, by no possibility, make a distinction between Presentative and Representative knowledge, if we have not these two kinds of knowledge
80 
SEINSE.
before us, if our knowledge of the Primary qualities of Matter is not exclusively of the former kind, and of the Secondary
of the latter, and if that of the Secundo-primary does not, in
the sense explained, partake partly of both.
7. There are also undeniable facts of Consciousness which
can be explained but upon the admission of the truth of the
propositions which I am now endeavoring to establish. It will
not be denied either, that our knowledge of the Priminary, and,
in the sense explained, of the Secundo-primary qualities of
Mlatter, is Presentative, or that all our knowledge of Matter is
equally and in the same sense Representative, and derived entirely through the same medium, Sensation. On the latter
supposition, all qualities alike should be given, in precisely the
same form, as exclusively the unknown causes of known sensations, and all alike given, not as known in themselves, but
only relatively. Their reality also should be given, as not perceived, but inferred. Now how can one class of qualities, all
of which are alike exclusively objects of Representative knowledge, and known as exclusively through the same identical
medium, be given in Consciousness, as the objects exclusively
of Presentative and the other as exclusively of Representative
knowledge; the one class as known in themselves, and the
other as known only relatively; the one class, as exclusively
the known objects of known perceptions, and the other with
equal exclusiveness, as the unknown causes of known sensations; the one class as directly perceived, and the other as
merely inferred qualities?  On this theory, the theater of Consciousness is one exclusive scene of palpable contradictions
more irreconcilable than the discords of Chaos and Old Night.
If, on the other hand, we suppose that our knowledge of the
Primary qualities is really and truly Presentative, and that of
the Secondary as really and truly Representative, and finally,
81 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
that that of the Secundo-primary blends, in the sense explained, both forms of knowledge, then all the facts of Consciousness bearing upon the subject, are susceptible of a ready
and perfectly consistent explanation, and they can be explained
upon no other supposition.
8. I remark, finally, that the existe2ice of the conceptionts
of these qualities, just as they lie in the Consciousness, can,
by no possibility, be accounted for, on the supposition, that all
our knowledge of Matter is derived exclusively through Sensation, and can be accounted for but upon the assumption of
the truth of the propositions which I am endeavoring to establish.   We will take, as an example, one quality, that of extenisioiz. The conception of this quality must have had its origin
primarily in the mind, in consequence of the quality itself
having been originally the object of immediate perception, that
is, of Presentative knowledge; or it must have been derived
mediately, as the logical antecedent or consequent of sensation.
The direct and immediate perception of the quality will account
for the idea of said quality in the mind. Suppose we reject
this supposition, and attempt to account for the existence of
the idea mediately, as the logical antecedent or consequent of
Sensation.   If the idea be assumed as the logical antecedent
of the consciousness of Sensation, then the reality of the
quality must be supposed to account for the existence of the
sensation itself.  If, on the other hand, the idea be assumed
as the logical consequent of the consciousness of the Sensation, then the quality must be held as an effect of the Sensation, and Sensation as the cause of said quality. No one will
take the latter position.   Let us, for a few momints, look at
the former.  As the cause of the sensation, the quality would
be known not as it is in itself, but only as the unknown cause
of a known sensitive state.  It would be the object, not of
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SENSE.
absolute but of rc7ative knowledge. Further, nothing is necessarily supposed, in the cause, which is not as absolutely
revealed in the effect. Now the sensation has, in itself, the
phenomena, neither of length, breadth, nor thickness.  How
can the consciousness of such a phenomenon suggest even the
idea of the quality of extension, as the cause of such a phenomenonil? Nothing conceivable can be more unphilosophieal
than the supposition of such an origination of this idea.  Its
existence in the Intelligenfce can be scientifically accounted for,
but upon one supposition, that the quality of extension was
itself originally given as the object of Presentative kntowledge.
So of all the other Primary qualities of Matter, and of the
Secundo-primary, so far as they take rank with the Primary.
The truth, then, of the propositions under consideration,
may be assumed as a truth of science, and, as such, employed
in the elucidation of the various functions of the Intelligence.
FALSE THEORIES OF EXTERNAL PERCEPTION.
Theories of Sense-perception differing from that above elucidated, Theories formed by philosophers to explain the manner in which the mind perceives external material objects, divide themselves into two classes-those which affirm, that
our knowledge of such objects is real - and those which affirm
that it is not real, and that all that we can know of such objects is our manner of conceiving of them.
Of the former Theories, there are two subdivisions, both
agreeing in this, that our knowledge of Mlatter is, in no form,
Presentative. The first affirms, that we know external material objects through the medium of certain LiL(,es existing
between such objects and the faculty of knowledge. The second affirms, that all our knowledge of such objects is exclusively representative, and derived wholly through the medium
83
.1 
INTELLECTUAL PHIIILOSOPHY.
of Sensation.   The former I will venture to denominate  the
Scholastic Theory. The latter has, by Sir William Hamilton,
been very properly denominated the Cosmrnothetic Theory.
The Theories which affirm that our knowledge of matter is, in
no sense, real or valid for the reality or true character of its
object, we will denominate the Idealistic Theories. As thus
designated, we will notice them, in the order named above.
THE SCHOLASTIC THEORY.
To all of the forms in which this Theory has been developed, says Mr. Dugal Stewart, "I apprehend the two following
remarks will be found applicable: First, that in the formation
of them, their authors have been influenced by some general
maxims of philosophizing borrowed from physics; and, secondly, that they have been influenced by an indistinct, but,
deep-rooted conviction of the immateriality of the soul; which,
although not precise enough to point out to them the absurdity
of attempting to illustrate its operations by the analogy of
matter, was yet sufficiently strong to induce them to keep
the absurdity of their theories as far as possible out of view,
by allusions to those physical facts, in which the distinctive
properties are the least grossly and palpably exposed to our
observation.  To the former of these circumstances is to be
ascribed the general principle upon which all the known
theories of perception are produced, to the latter, the various
metaphorical expressions  of ideas, species, forms, shadowcs,
phantasms, imnayes; which, while they amused the fancy with
some remote analogies to the object of our senses, did not directly revolt our reason."   Very little in addition to the observations above cited, need be said upon these theories.  They
all agree in leaving totally unexplained the very difficulties
which they profess to explain, to wit, How can the mniind perceive an object out of itself, and at a distance from itself?
84 
SENSE.
The image between the mind and the object, is as really distinct from the mind, and as really removed from it, though at
a less distance, as the object itself. Perception of the intermediate image is just as difficult of explanation, and as truly
needs another intermediate image, as perception of the object.
THE COSMOTHETICAL THEORY.
According to the Cosmothetic Theory, we have no Presentative knowledge whatever of the material universe. All
such knowledge, on the other hand, is, as we have said above,
altogether Representative, and derived exclusively, through
the medium of Sensation. If the material universe had no
existence, and we had the same sensations that we now have,
sensations produced by any cause whatever, the immediate interposition of Deity, for example, we should have, from the
laws of our Intelligence, precisely the same Sense-perceptions,
apprehensions, and knowledge that we now have, and the external universe would be just as real to us, as it now is, and
in all respects just what it is.  God has so constituted our Intelligence, that, on occasion of these Sensations, our perceptions, &c., became what they are.  We are so constituted also,
that we instinctively believe the universe to be what we have
conceived it, or rather perhaps imagined it, to be. In constituting us with such an instinctive belief, the divine veracity
stands pledged, that what we thus believe in must be real: for
God would not constitute us thus to believe in what is unreal
Thus we are required to believe in an external material universe, not because we have, in fact, in our experience, any
actual knowledge or perception of its reality, any real evidence
of the fact. Our belief, on the other hand, really rests upon
such grounds as the following: 1. Such is the constitution
of our intelligence, that on occasion of sensations induced in
us, we conceive of an external material universe, as their
2
85 
INTELLECTUAL PHIILOSOPI~Y.
cause.   2. From  the laws of the same constitution also, we
instinctively believe in the reality of that of which we have
formed a conception.   3. In this constitution, we have a direct
revelation from  the author of nature, that what we thus apprehend and instinctively believe in as real, is real. 4. On the
ground, therefore, not of our own perceptions and knowledges,
but of the veracity of the author of nature, we believe in the
reality of the material universe.   This is the ground on which
Christian Theists, holding the Sensational Theory, do, in fact,
believe in the reality of the material universe, and is the only
ground on which they can, by any possibility, believe in it.
On this Theory we need only make the following remarks:
1. It has already been proved to be false.
2. It is in itself, most palpably self-destructive, and selfcontradictory.   According to it, God has so constituted our
Consciousness, that, in it, the material universe is given, as, in
very fundamental respects, the object of real Presentative,
while it is, in fact, the exclusive object of Representative
knowledge, and also that certain qualities of Matter are given,
as the known objects of known states of the Intelligence, while
they are, in fact, nothing but the unknown causes of known
states of the Sensibility. Now if the author of nature has deceived us in the constitution of our Consciousness, why should
we suppose, that He has not done the same thing, in reference
to our instinctive beliefs? If the voice of the author of nature is to be heeded, in our Instinctive beliefs,-why not, in the
revelations of Consciousness?   We  should then  be required
to contradict this Theory, and hold, that certain qualities of
matter are, in reality, what they are given, in our Consciousness, as being, to wit, the real objects of Presentative knowledge.
3. This Theory also involves a most vicious reasoning in a
circle. We first reason from this very universe to the reality
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I 
SENSE.
of the Divine existence and attributes, and then backward from
the reality of the Divine existence and attribues to that of the
universe from  which we started.   We  must first know  the
universe, at least as real, before we  can reason at all, legitimately, from it, to its author or any of his attributes.   If the
universe, as this Theory affirms, is in reality in itself unknown
to us, we can only find, through it, an unknown God, a God,
fiomn whose attributes, we cannot legitimately reason to anything.   Nothing further need be added to prove that such a
Theory cannot be true.
THE IDEALISTIC THEORIES.
Of the Theories which affirm, that our knowledge of the
material universe is, in no sense real, some affirm, that there
are no objects whatever external to the mind, that what we
have postulated, as the qualities of objects external to us, are,
in fact, nothing but our own mental states seen by the eye
of Consciousness. This is the Theory of Coleridge, and of
modern  Transcendentalists generally.   Others  maintain  the
reality of something called mind, on the one hand, and of a
something not mind, on the other. They deny, however, that
the latter can be to the former, in any sense, an object of real
knowledge, or that either is, in itself, what we take it to be.
WVhen this unknown something, having in itself neither extension nor form, and existing nowhere and in no time (inasmuch as neither time nor space are realities in themselves, but
only modes in us of conceiving of things as external to us),
when I say, this unknown and nameless something, in some
unknown and nameless manner, affects the unknown something
called mind - the latter, by virtue of laws innate in itself,
postulates to itself its own sensations as the qualities of substances distinct from itself.  Thus the great universe, in which
we contemplate ourselves as existing, together with time and
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INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHIIY.
space, in which we contemplate ourselves and the universe as
having being, is nothing in itself but a fiction of our own Intelligence.  This is the theory of Kant, stated without caricature. Both the kinds of theories under consideration agree
in this, that what our Intelligence postulates as the qualities
of external substances, are, in reality, nothing  but mental
states seen by the eye of Consciousness.   External perception
is nothing but the eye of Consciousness directed to an affection
wholly subjective, which the Intelligence postulates as the
quality of something objective and external to the mind. In
Consciousness, mental affections of different kinds are given
as subjective and objective: that is, some are given as phenomena of the mind itself, and others as those of objects external to the mind. Hience, according to philosophers maintaining these theories, Consciousness has two distinct functions,
the external and the internal. When taking cognizance of
some affection which the Intelligence has postulated as a subjective phenomenon, this is Consciousness in the exercise of
its interior function. When taking cognizance of some affection which the Intelligence postulates as a phenomenon of an
object external to the mind, this is Consciousness in the exercise of its exterior function.   Sense, according to these theories, is not a faculty of knowledge at all; but only a receptivity
of affections or impressions, postulated by the Intelligence as
the qualities of objects external to the mind. Thus that
which we have been accustomed to regard as a real world external to the mind, and altogether unlike ourselves, has no
existence  out of ourselves.   Neither  the universe, nor its
author have any existence in itself. They are mere ideals of
our own creating; ideals grand and perfect, and which we are
therefore bound to regard and revere, not as realities in themselves, but as grand conceptions - sublime creations of our
own Intelligences, creations which are true, as Coleridge re
88 
SENSE.
marks simply and exclusively, "because we have conceived
themlu."
Reasons for these Theories.
Amnong the reasons given for these theories, the most important, and all that I now need to notice, are the following:
1. They explain the possibility of knowledge.   Of  all
things real to us, as objects of knowledge, we have a direct
and iiimmediate Consciousness.   All objects of knowledge,
therefore, are brought within the sphere of direct mental vision.
The possibility of perception is thus fully demonstrated.
2. These theories render the realityj and certainty of knowledge self-evident. If nothing exists in the object, but what
our Intelligence has put there, our knowledge of the object
must be real, certain, and absolute. If, for example, nothing
exists in a contribution box but what I have put there, and I
know what I have put into it, then my knowledge of what the
box contains is real and absolute.  So when I contemplate an
object which my Intelligence has postulated as external to
myself, if that object is in reality nothing but a pure creation
of my Intelligence, and contains nothing but what the same
Intelligence has put into it, how demonstrably manifest it is,
that my knowledge of the object is real and absolute.
Objections to these Theories.
But while these theories apparently, at first thought, commend themselves to our minds, as explaining things which
would otherwise be wholly inexplicable to us, they are at
once, in our Intelligence, met with difficulties perfectly insurmountable.
1. They leave totally unexplained the same mystery hanging
over the subject which they profess to explain, that hung over
it before, to wit, the possibility of knowledge. The distance
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8* 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
between the subject and object of knowledge is, to be sure,
greatly abridged; inasmuch as all things are brought under the
immediate vision of Consciousness itself.  A theory, however,
which is valid as an explication of the possibility of knowledge,
must explain the possibility, not of one, but of all kinds of
knowlecdge.   Now the theories under consideration, explain, in
a certain form, the possibility of what is called external perception. ]3ut they leave wholly unexplained the possibility of
knowledge of another kind, the possibility of which needs to
be explained, just as much as that of the former, to wit, the
possibility of kiiow7edye by Conscioitsness.  Suppose an explication of the possibility of a knowledge of our own mental
states be demanded, what answer can be given, but that which
is rejected as valid, in regard to the possibility of external perception- to wit, that Consciousness, relatively to mental states,
is afaculty, and the states themselves are objects of perception,
or knowledge. Now this explication, the only one possible, in
the case under consideration, and indeed in any case whatever,
is equally valid, as an explanation of the possibility of external
perception.   We have only to postulate the Intelligence as a
faci(ty, and external substances as objects of perception, and
the possibility of such knowledge is just as manifest as knowledge by Consciousness, or through any other function of the
Intelligence.
2. These theories leave another mystery, still more inexplicable, hanging over the question in respect to the possibility
of knowledge, to wit, how can the Intelligence postulate a
purely mental affection as exclusively the quality of an external object? In other words, how can the Intelligence give a
phenomenon as pertaining, an object wholly distinct from and
independent of the precipient subject, which, after all, is nothing but a phenomenon of that subject? Above all, how can
the Intelligence first give an affection purely subjective, as a
90
I 
SENSE.
quality exclusively objective, and afterwards  give the same
quality as exclusively subjective, and that without the possibility, as Coleridge acknowledges, of considering it, as anything
but objective?  All these contradictions take place in the interior of our intelligence, in respect to external perception, according to the theories under consideratioun-contradictions
perfectly equivalent to the declaration, that the same thing, at
the same time, is, and is not.  Should it be said, that this process is possible to the Intelligeuce, because, that such is its nature,  the same  explanation  renders equally explicable, the
possibility of external perception as maintained in this Treatise, a fact denied exclusively on the ground of its inexplicability.
3. The explication which these theories give of the fact of
perception is, in reality, the destruction of the fiact, and not its
explication at all.  In the Intelligence, there appears a perception of an external object. Philosophy is called upon for an
explanation of the fact. The fact to be explained is that of
the perception of such objects.  As such exclusively, it is to
be explained, and not as something different from a real perception of something external.   This is what philosophy is bound
to do, if she speaks at all.  Now what is the explication given
by the theories under consideration? The perception of an object external to the mind, is explained by a profound  demonstration, that no such object, nor perception of such object,
exists in the Intelligence, and that such perception is an inexplicable impossibility. Now this is not the explanation of a
fact, but its destruction, the most unphilosophical procedurea procedure very much like the Frenchman's definition of the
flea, to wit, an animal upon which, if you put your finger, he
is not under it.
4. These theories involve an explication equally sophistical
and unphilosophical of the question, in respect to the certainty
91 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIIY.
and rea7ity of knowledge. An apprehension of an object exists in
the Intelligence. Philosophy is called upon to answer the question, whether this apprehension is valid, in respect to the object?  If it is so, our knowledge is real, certain.  What
answer do these theories give to this question? This: Our
knowledge is certain and absolute, for the obvious reason, that the
object has no existence at all; that the perception itself is the
only thing real, and as it contains nothing but what the Intelligence has put into it, therefore our knowledge is real and absolute. What a strange answer this to the question, the only
question submitted to philosophy, to wit, the validity of the
perception relatively to its object.
5. These theories annihilate wholly all distinctions between
truth and error, all criteria of truth whatever.   The reality,
the certainty of knowledge, according to these theories, consists
in this- that as our conceptions are the only realities existing,
and as these contain nothing but what the Intelligence puts
into them, therefore our knowledge is real, is absolute. Now,
this condition of certainty holds, in respect to one conception,
just as well as another; and if this is the condition of certainty, the wildest vagaries of the maniac are just as true as
the sublimest demonstrations of Newton.
6. Finally, all such theories give a totally false explication of
the real procedure of the Intelligence in respect to knowledge
of every kind.   Let any one attempt to apply such theories, as
elucidating the process of his own mind in its perceptions and
knowledges, and the effect cannot be better expressed, than in
the following extract of a letter written to Coleridge by a
frienud, explaining to the philosopher the effect of a careful
study of his theory of the Imagination:
" As to myself, and stating, in the first place, the effect on
my unzderstandling, your opinions and method of argument
were not only so new to me, but so directly the reverse of all I
92
I 
SENSE.
had ever been accustomed to consider as truth, that, even if I
had comprehended your premises sufficiently to have admitted
them, and had seen the necessity of your conclusions, I should
still have been in that state of mind, which, in your note, p.
251, you have so ingeniously evolved, as the antithesis to that
in which a man is when he makes a bull. In your own words,
I should have felt as if I had been standing on my head.
"The effect on my feeings, on the other hand, I cannot
better represent, than by supposing myself to have known only
our light, airy, modern chapels of ease, and then, for the first
time, to have been placed, and left alone, in one of our largest
Gothic cathedrals, in a gusty moonlight night of autumn.' Nowv
in glimmer, now in gloom;' often in palpable darkness, not
without a chilling sensation of terror; then suddenly emerging
into broad, yet visionary light, with colored shadows of fantastic shapes, yet all decked with holy insignia and holy symbols;
and ever and anon, coming out full upon pictures, and stonework images, and great men, with whose nanmes I was familiar,
but which looked upon me with countenances, and an expression, the most dissimilar to all I had been in the habit of connecting with those names. Those whom I had been taught to
venerate as almost superhuman in magnitude of intellect, I
found perched in little fret-work niches, as grotesque dwarfs;
while the grotesques, in my hitherto belief, stood guarding the
high altar with all the characters of apotheosis. In short, what
I had supposed substances, were thinned away into shadows,
while, everywhere, shadows were deepened into substances:
'If substances may be call'd what shadows seem'd,
For each seemed either! "'
Now, a theory which gives such an explanation of the process of the human Intelligence as this, does not give a true ex
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INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPI-IY.
position of that process. There is surely no presumption in
such an affirmation as this.
In the remarks above made upon the theories under consideration, I have anticipated some things which properly belong to a later department of mental science; no more,
however, than was necessary to a distinct presentation of our
present subject of investigation.
THE HYPOTHESIS THAT ALL OUR KNOWLEDGE OF MATTER IS
DERIVED THROUGH SENSATION EXCLUSIVELY, THE MAIN
SOURCE OF ERROR, IN PHILOSOPHY.
Before leaving this department of our inquiries, a few remarks are deemed requisite upon the main source of error, in
Philosophy. All systems of false Philosophy, almost without
exception, have one common basis, and start from one common
assumption, to wit, that all our knowledge of Matter is Representative, and derived exclusively, through one mediumn, Sensation. If this hypothesis is true, as we have already seen, all
our perceptions, apprehensions, and knowledge, pertaining to
'Matter, would be, in all respects, just what they are, provided
we had all our present sensations, as they are, whatever may
be the cause of such states, and whether any external material
universe exists or not.  As  these causes also are, and must
be, to us, according to this hypothesis, wholly unknown as
they are in themselves, being given in the Intelligence exclusively, as the unknown causes of known states of the Sensibility, we can, by no possibility, determine whether our present
impressions, in respect to them, be true or false, whether they
are, in reality, extended or unextended substances, whether
they are material or immaterial, finite or infinite, and whether
they are objective or subjective, whether they exist out of, and
separate from, the mind, as real Noon-Egoes, or whether they
are inherentprinciples of our own nature.
94 
95
We have, therefore, and cannot but have, according to this
hypothesis, just as many theories of perception, and of nature
too, as we have conceivoble causes of our sensations. All these
theories have perfectly equal claims, and each of them has absolutely no claims whatever to be regarded as true.  If also,
our knowledge of what is given in Consciousness, as the No6nLyo, or 3Matter, is thus uncertain, it must be equally so in respect to the ~Eyo or Mind itself. The same Intelligence which
has thus deceived us, in the one case, cannot but have done the
same in the other.  Of nature, subjective and objective, we can
have no certain knowledge.   If we attempt to pass "' through
nature up to nature's God," every step of our progress must
be in absolute midnight.   We are advancing through the absolute unknown, to find the unknown. God, accordingly, can be
nothing to us, but an unknown and unknowable something, sustaiing unknown and unknowable relations to an unknown and
unknowable something called the Universe.   The only proper
altar of worship that can be raised to such a being, will have
upon it the inscription, "To the Unknown God." Absolute
skepticism, in regard to the possibility of all knowledge, objective or subjective, and pertaining to the Finite or the Infinite,
is the only true Philosophy.   All systems of Realism resting
as most of them do, upon the Sensational hypothesis, are mnoving on the track of truth, only by a happy, buy palpable violation of their own foundation principle. David Ilume was a
universal skeptic, and the evangelical philosophers of his own
age, who held with him this hypothesis, were believers in the
truth, simply and exclusively because he reasoned logically,
and they most illogicaly from the fundamental principle which
they held in common. All the consequences above alluded to,
arise from the hypothesis under consideration, and can, by no
possibility, be separated from it.
In regard to this hypothesis, I need only remark, in this
SENSE, 
INTELLECTUAL  PIIILOSOPIIY.
connection, that we have already demonstrated, as we judge,
the fact, that it cannot be true.  In showing that our knowledge of somie of the qualities of matter is, in fact, Presentative, we have shown that (cll our knowledge of Matter is not,
and cannot be, what this hypothesis affirms it to be, exclusively
Representative. In showing, as we have done, that some of
these qualities are the known Presentative objects of known
acts of the Intelligence, we have shown, that they are not, as
they must be exclusively, according to this hypothesis, the unknown causes of known states of the Sensibility. Universal
Consciousness is itself a lie, if this hypothesis is true.
There is one fundamental fact alluded to above, but which
was not brought to bear in the preceding argument, that I will
adduce in this connection. Our knowledge of the Secondary
qualities of Matter, and of the Secundo-primary, so far as they
take rank with the Secondary, is given in Consciousness, as
valid, only to ourselves, and to ourselves only as our sensitive
nature is now constituted. Our knowledge of the Primary
qualities, and of the Seeundo-primary, so far as they take rank
with the former, is given in the same Consciousness, as valid
for all Intelligeuts, whatever the constitution of their sensitive
nature may be. Now, if all our knowledge of all the qualities
of matter alike, was derived through Sensation, it would be
given in its entireness in Consciousness, as only valid for ourselves, and for ourselves only in the present constitution of our
sensitive nature. It is not thus given, and therefore the Sensational hypothesis is demonstrably false.
I remark, also, that fundamental facts pertaining to Sensepereeption, are totally inexplicable on the Sensational hypothesis. In such perceptions, the object, whatever it may be in
itself, the object actually perceived by the mind is given in
Consciousness; 1st, as an object of direct and immediate perception; 2nd, as the known quality of a N2on-Eyo, or Matter;
96 
SENSE,
3rd, as a -\'on-Ego, as possessed of definite extension and form.
No one will question the truth of any of these statements.
Now, according to the Sensational hypothesis, the reality truly
perceived is nothing but a Sensation, and consequently, in no
sense, an object-object, but wholly and exclusively a subjectobject, that is, the real object of perception is not, in fact, a
quality of the ANo?-Ego or Matter at all, but exclusively a
phenomenon of the Ego or Mind. That also which is given
in Consciousness, as having actual extension and form,  the
sensation itself, the sole object perceived according to this hypothesis, has, in reality, neither of these characteristics, nor
any others of a kindred nature. Now by what known, or intelligently conceivable law of mind can that, which as an object of immediate perception, is given in Consciousness, as
exclusively an object-object, be, in reality, nothing but a subject-object; and that also which, in itself, has absolutely no
extension or form, be given in the same Consciousness, as having both these characteristics?  The Sensational hypothesis is
not an explanation of the facts of Consciousness pertaining to
Sense-perception, but their total perversion,or destruction rather.
I remark, finally, what has already been shown, that this
hypothesis rests, like all other false hypotheses, on a partial
induction of facts, and that, in the presence of other facts
equally palpable, of a contradictory nature.   That we  have
sensations, and through them a certain form of knowledge,
knowledge mediate and relative, of Matter, we know absolutely.
That we have Sense-perceptions, and through these, a Presentative knowledge of other and more fundamental qualities of
the same substance, we know with the same absoluteness.   We
are as absolutely conscious of the existence of such perceptions as we are of that of Sensations.   It would be no more a
denial of the palpable facts of Consciousness, to deny the
reality of the one class of phenomena, than it would to deny
9
97
,,, ,'I, 
INTELLECTUAL PIHILOSOPI-IY.
that of the other.  It would therefore be no more a denial of
the palpable facts of Consciousness to affirm, that all our
knowledge of Mlatter is through Sense-perceptions exclusively,
and therefore, as exclusively, Presentative, than it would to
affirm, as this hypothesis does, that all knowledge of this substance is through Sensation, and therefore exclusively Representative. On such a partial, and therefore false induction of the
real facts of Consciousness, does this hypothesis rest, an hypothesis more fruitful of frightful error than almost any other
that was ever introduced into the domain of philosophy. - I need
not, however, any further repeat arguments by which the total
groundlessness of this hypothesis  has been already demonstrated.
EXPLANATION GIVEN BY KANT AND THIE TRANSCENDENTAL
SCHOOL GENERALLY OF THE FACT OF SENSE-PERCEPTION.
According to Kant, all Sense-perception is exclusively
through Sensation. The object really perceived, in such perception, is nothing but the Sensation itself.  Yet this subjectobject having, ill itself, neither extension nor form, is given, in
Consciousness, as an objecct-oljcct, having both extension and
form. In this, all forms of the Transcendental School, from
Kant, through Fichte, and Scheling to Hegel, perfectly agree.
Now what is that which, according to these Schools in Philosophy, renders to Consciousness this purely subject-object, having, in itself, neither extension nor form, an exclusively objectobject, possessed of both the forenamed qualities? The Sensation itself, it is replied, gives the contenpt of the perception,
while the ideas of Time and Space existing, c priori, in the
mind, gives it its forn, and makes it appear as an object-object.
"Space and Time," says Kant, " are the pure forms of them"
[Sense-perceptions], " Sensation in general the matter." The
thing really perceived, in such perceptions, or the content of
98 
SENSE.
the perception, is the Sensation.   That which makes this immaterial, and consequently unextended and formless subjectobject, appear wholly as a material object-object, having definite
extension and form, is the ideas of Tinme and Space. I will
venture the affirmation, that a greater absurdity never danced
in the brain of Philosophy than that which is involved in this
Transcendental exposition.   Space and Time are given, in the
Intelligence, as absolutely infinite quantities, the latter in two,
and the former in all directions. Now how can ideas which
pertain to their objects exclusively, as iifinitely extended,
make objects which really have no extension whatever appear
as having this quality in a finite degree?  How  can ideas
which pertain to their objects as having no form whatever, impart to that which is also itself without form, the appearance
of having a definite form? If these ideas should impart the
appearance of extension at all, they must, it would seem, iimpart to them that of infinite instead of finite extension.   Further, if they should impart to sensations the appearance of
extension at all, it would seem that they must impart to themn
all alike that of the samue extension.   So of form.   How can
ideas which pertain to their objects, as infinite, and consequently without form, impart to these different sensations, all
of which are alike without extension or form, and in this respect,
sustaining the same identical relations to precisely the same
ideas, the appearance even of possessing different degrees of
extension, and a diversity of forms?  HIow can these ideas
make sensations which are exclusively subjective phenomena
appear whollo as qualities of objects exclusively external to the
mind, having an existence out of, and independent of the mind?
How can these ideas impart to one class of sensations the appearance of being wholly independent qualities of a  \AT)o-Li>;o
or MIatter, and to another, that of being as exclusively phlenonlena of the Elo or Mind itself, when all of them alike are
99
,, I.: 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPIHY.
exclusively phenomena of the Ego, and sustain precisely the
same relations to the ideas themselves?   We may just as reasonably suppose, that pure Time and absolutely empty Space
contain, in themselves, infinite Intelligence and Almighty creative Power, as to suppose their ideas contain the qualities attributed to them in the Transcendental Schools of Philosophy.
Besides, this exposition of Sense-perception is based wholly
upon a very gross psychological error. In this exposition, the
ideas of Time and Space are given as chronological antecedents
and determining causes or principles of Sense-perception;
whereas they are, in fact, chronological conisequents of such
perceptions.   These ideas, as we have seen in a former chapter, are the logical antecedents of those of body and succession,
while the latter ideas are the chronological antecedents of the
former. We must first perceive succession and extension before we can, in any degree, conceive of Time and Space, the
former of which is given in the Intelligence, as the place of
events, and the latter originally exclusively as that of extended
substances.  These ideas, then, instead of giving us the perception of extension and form, cannot exist, as ideas in the
mind at all, that of Space especially, till after these qualities
are actually perceived. The entire Transcendental exposition
of Sense-perception is based wholly upon a singular reversal
of the relations between an antecedent and its consequent;
and with that exposition all the forms of this Philosophy must
fall to the ground. Not one of these Theories can be true, if
this exposition is false, as it has now, we think, been fully
proved to be.*
* In a subsequent chapter it will be shown, that the ideas of Time
and Space, instead of being laws of Sense-perception, as affirmed by
Idealism, are in fact categories of understanding conceptions, that
is, they are laws not of the Primary, as Kant affirms, but of the Secondary faculties.
100
,.  1.:; 
SENSE.
IS COLOR A PRIMARY OR A SECONDARY QUALITY OF MATTER?
In'all schools of Philosoplly with which I am acquainted,
color is assumed as exclusively a Secondary quality of Matter.
Into this error, Sir William Hamilton has fallen, although he
has himself given, with absolute correctness, the distinguishing
characteristic which separates the Primary from the Secondary
quality, and then, in express words, and as correctly given this
identical characteristic to this one quality. The primary quality of matter, as he has defined it, is that quality which necessarily pertains to this one substance, as Matter, and which consequently cannot, in thought, be separated from it. Such
qualities are Extension and Form, for example. We cannot
even conceive of matter, as void of these qualities. They pertain to it as Matter. In the presence of this definite and distinguishing characteristic of the Primary quality, our author
uses the following language, in a note under a paragraph in
which he ranks color as a Secondary quality: "But as Aristotle has observed, we cannot imagine body without all color,
though we can imagine it without any ovie."  The same precisely he might have said of extension and form.  We cannot
imagine body without all extension and form, though we can
imagine it without any one. That which cannot, even in
thought, be separated from body, without annihilating it as
body, must be ranked as a Primary quality of body, or it has
no such qualities.  Color, then, is such a quality of Matter,
or by the showing of Aristotle and Sir William Hamilton both,
it has no Primary qualities. Such also is this quality as given
in the universal Intelligence.  Such we cannot but regard it,
even when attempting to demonstrate its rank among Secondary
qualities, and when we suppose we have accomplished our object. " We know well," says Dr. Brown (a strange assertion,
that we know well, what he goes on to show we cannot believe,
9*
101 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
even while attempting to prove it), " when we open our eyes,
that whatever affects our eyes is within the small compass of
their orbit; and yet we cannot look for a single moment, without spreading what we thus visually feel over whole miles of
landscape.  Still, I must repeat, not the slightest doubt is
ihi7oso]i;ca~lbj entertained by those, who, when  they open
their eyes, yield like the vulgar to the temporary illusionthat the colors, thus supposed to be spread over the external
objects, or rather the rays of light that come from them, are
merely the unknown causes of certain sensations in ourselves.
When questioned on the subject of vision, we state this opinion with confidence; and even with astonishment, that our
opinion on the subject, in the present age of philosophy, should
be doubted by him who has taken the superfluous trouble of
putting such a question.   At the very moment, probably, at
which we give our answer, we have our eyes fixed on him to
whom we address it. His complexion, his dress, are regarded
by —us as external colors, and we are practically, at the very
moment, therefore, belying the very opinion which we profess,
and in speculation truly profess, to hold."
For myself, my opinions must undergo an essential modification before I shall hold a dogma philosophically, which I
cannot intellectually but disbelieve, even in the act of attempting to demonstrate its truth.
There is a very singular mistake into which Sir William
Hamilton appears to have fallen, in the subsequent part of
the note above alluded to.  " In like manner," he says, " where
the qualities are mutual contradictories, we cannot positively
represent to ourselves an object without a determination by
one or other of these opposites. Thus we cannot conceive a
body which is not either vapid or tasteless, either sonorous or
noiseless, and so forth.  This observation applies likewise to
the first class."  The cases cited are, in no form, parallels.
102 
SENSE.
The terms "vapid and tasteless," "sonorous and noiseless,"
are contradictories, while "any color" sustains to "all color,"
the relation of a subaltern proposition merely.   I can conceive
of a body as vapid or tasteless, because we have here a secondary quality, which body consequently may or may not possess.
I cannot, on the other hand, conceive of body as possessed of
color, or as void of all color, for the reason, that we have here
a Primary quality which body, as an extended visible substance, cannot but possess.
Hence I do not agree, in the absolute truth of the statements of this author, that " the primary are perceived as in,
our organism," and that the "primary qualities of things external to our organism we do not perceive, i. e., immediately
know." On the other hand, I hold, that vision is direct and
immediate, when the proper conditions are fulfilled, and that
consequently color "is an object not of sensation proper, but
of perception proper, in other words, we perceive color not as
an affection of our minds, but as a quality of external things."
I believe that color is given, in Consciousness, as a direct and
immediate known object of a known state of the Intelligence,
and consequently its knowledge is Presentative, just as much
and for the same reasons, that extension is. Every characteristic which our author has given by which we can distinguish Presentative from Representative knowledge, marks
color as belonging to the former class  It is not given, in Consciousness, as an unknown cause of a known sensation, but as
a known object of a known Sense-perception.
VALIDITY OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THIE NON-EGO OR MATTER,
If all our knowledge of Matter is through Sensation, then
we can know it only in its relation to our Sensibility as now
constituted, and consequently as an unkown and unknowable
cause of such sensitive states. What this cause is, in itself,
103 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
or whether it does or does not accord with our mediate appre hlensions in regard to it, we can have no certain knowledge
whatever.  We must regard ourselves as mere dreamers in habiting a dream-land, and whether our sleeping or waking
dreams best accord with the objects to which we refer them, or
whether both are alike deceptive, we have no means of knowing, both forms of perception and apprehension being alike
and equally necessary results of the sensations produced in us
at the time, and those sensations in neither instance proceding
from known or knowable causes. We must regard ourselves,
not in the possession of real knowledge, but as the hopeless
victims of baseless conjectures, conjectures the more torturing
the more we philosophize upon them.
If, on the other hand, we not only know realities around
us, as causes of certain sensitive states, but in all their fundamental qualities, as objects of immediate or Presentative
knowledge, that is, as they are in themselves, then we are not
inhabitants of a mere'"dreaml land," but of a universe of
knowable and known realities.  In speaking of these realities,
" we speak that we do know, and testify to that which we have
seen," and the time is not distant when even philosophy, so
long bewildered by false hypotheses, will receive our testimony.
Every theory of knowledclge but that which postulates the Intelligence relatively to realities within and around it, as a
_power, and such realities relatively to it, as oljects of real
knowledge, and every theory of nature material and mental
but that of absolute Realism, will not only be condemned, as
contrary to the Commnon Sense of the race, but equally to all
the teachings of sound and valid Philosophy.  In regard to
the question of reality of the mnaterial  universe, and of the
validity of our knowledge in regard to it, I need but allude,
in this connection, to the following considerations bearing upon
such questions:
104 
SENSE.
1. By no possibility can the reality of the one, or the
validity of the other be disproved, and the one must be held
as real and the other as valid, till the opposite in both particulars, is proved. The burden of proof lies upon the skeptic exclusively. There are but two ways in which the skeptic can,
by any possibility, accomplish his object - by showing that the
conception of such a reality is self-contradictory, like the proposition, that it is possible, for the same thing, at the same time,
to be and not to be -or that such conception is contrary to
some known and absolute truth, or truths, or to some of their
logical consequents. Now such an end never has been accomplished in either of the forms named, and we may rest assured, that it never will nor can be. This we shall attempt
specifically to show in a subsequent chapter.
2. The reality of the material universe is an object of direct, immediate, and, therefore, of absolute knowledge.  We
have the same absolute perception of it, that we have of any
of our own mental states. The latter is no more given in Consciousness, as the objects of direct Presentative knowledge,
than the former. We have the same grounds to hold our
knowledge as valid, in the one case, that we have in the other.
The following remarks of Sir William Hamilton on this topic,
are deemed worthy of very special attention in this connection:
" In perception, Consciousness gives, as an ultimate fact, a belief of the k~iowledye of the existence of somethiiyg (li:ffrest tfro?n,
self. As ultimate, this belief cannot be reduced to a higher principle; neither can it be truly analyzed into a double element.
We only believe that this something exists, because we believe
that we know (are conscious of) this something as existing;
the belief of the existence is necessarily involved in the belief
of the knowledge of the existence.   Both are original, or neither.  Does Consciousness deceive us in the latter, it necessarily
deludes us in the former; and if the former, though a fact of
105 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
Consciousness, be false; the latter, because a fact of Consciousness, is not true. The beliefs contained in the two propositions:
"l st. I believe that a material world exists;
"2d. I believe that I inr?nediately know a material world
exiisti, (in other words), I believe that the external reaity
itself is the object of which I aIn  contsciOus iu pereeptiont):
though distinguished by philosophers, are thus virtually identical."
In another place, he adds, "In our perceptive Consciousness there is revealed as an ultimate fact, a self, and a not-self,
each given as independent -each known only in antithesis to
the other.  No belief is more i?tuitive, universal, imnmediate,
or ii-resistible, than that this antithesis is real and known to be
real; no belief is therefore more true. If the antithesis be
illusive, self and not-.self, subject and object, I and Thou are
distinctions without a difference; and Consciousness, so far
from being'the internal voice of our Creator' is shown to be,
like Satan,'a liar from the beginning.'"
.3. Neither the reality of the material universe, nor the validity of our knowledge in respect to it, can be denied, without,
to be logically consistent, an universal impeachment of the Intelligence itself, as in respect to any subject external or internal, a faculty of real knowledge. If Consciousness has deceived us, in regard to the character of our knowledge of the
.ioil-Ego, it should not be held as worthy of confidence in regard to any other mental states.  Sound Philosophy requires,
that we hold the universe of Matter as real, or nothing as real,
our knowledge, in respect to it as valid, or as valid in respect
to no subject whatever.   All forms of real Presentative knowledge must be held to be valid for the reality and character of
their respective objects; or to be logically or philosophically
consistent, no form whatever must be thus held. Each form
106 
SENSE.
must be held a priori, as just as possible in itself as any other,
and each pertains, with the same directness and absoluteness to
its respective objects.   We must deny the reality of all our
own mental states, and the validity of our knowledge, in respect to them, or to be logically consistent, we must admit the
reality of the external material universe, and the validity of
our knowledge in respect to it.
CONCLUSION OF THE PRESENT EXPOSJTION.
The conclusion to which we are conducted, as the result of
our investigations in this chapter, is this: Sense, like Consciousness, and Reason, is a source of real, valid knowledge.
The basis for the procedures of the Secondary Faculties which
are next to claim our attention, is not shadows, but eternal
rock, the rock of truth. Through a real and known universe,
we are advancing towards a real, and not " unknown God."
107 
CHAPTER VII.
SECONDARY FACULTIES.
UNDERSTANDING.
THiROUGH the faculty of Sense, and a consciousness of sensations, we have, as we have seen, intuitions of the qualities
of external material substances; phenomena, such as are expressed by the terms extension, form, resistance, color, taste,
smell and sound. By Consciousness, we have similar intuitions of the operations of our own minds, such as thinking,
feeling, and willing. Through Reason, on condition of the
perceptions of Sense and Consciousness, we have the intuitions
of time, space, personal identity, substance, and cause. These
intuitions being given, another and secondary intellectual
proc(ss occurs, a process, in which these intuitions, necessary
and contingent, are united into notions of particular things.
Thus, our notion of body, for example, is complex, and when
analyzed into its distinct elements, is found to be constituted
exclusively of intuitions given by the faculties above referred
to. We conceive of it as a substance, in which the qualities
above named, inhere, a substance existing in time and space,
and sustaining certain relations to other substances, of which
we have notions similarly compounded. The same holds true
of our notions of all substances whatever.  They are all complex, and constituted exclusively of intuitions given by the
primary faculties. 
UNDERSTANDING.
A notion, then, is a complex intellectual phenomenon, composed of intuitions.  The faculties, or functions of the Intelligence, which give us the latter, we have already considered.
What shall we call that which gives us the former?   In other
words what shall we call the notion-formingy power of the mind?
In conformity to a usage which has, since the time of Coleridge, extensively obtained, we denominate this faculty of the
Intelligence, the Understanding.   In strict conformity to this
specific application, will the term Understanding, when special
notice to the contrary is not given, be employed throughout
this Treatise. It will be employed, not as Locke uses it, as
designating the general intelligence, but to designate a special
function of that Intelligence, a function in which intuitions
contingent and necessary, given by the primary faculties, are
combined into notions or conceptions of particultar objects, or
classes of objects.
NOTIONS PARTICULAR AND GENERAL.
Notions are of two kinds - particular and general. Particular notions are such as we form of individuals, and designate
by terms which are applicable to such individuals only - such
as John, Samuel. General notions appertain to classes of individuals, and are designated by terms of corresponding application, such as man, mountain. The fornation of the notions
last mentioned, will be considered in a subsequent chapter.
ELEMENTS OF WHICIH NOTIONS ARE CONSTITUTED.
The elements of which all notions are constituted, are, as
we have seen, of two kinds -contingent and necessary. A
proper philosophical analysis of notions would lead us to contemplate them in the light of these two distinct classes of
elements.
10
109 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHIY.
Coatt,.j,en.t  -lemen   its.
The contingent elements entering into every notion are all
expressed by the general term phenomenon. Now, phenomiena present themselves under the following entirely distinct
relations:
1. That of i)ihcrenlce, or those particular qualities which
inhere in particular substances, and by which the substances
in which they thus inhere, are distinguished from other substances.   That all substances shall have qualities of some kind
or other, is a necessary element of our idea of substance.
The particular qualities which, in fact, inhere in particular substances, however, are contingent elements of our notions of
such substances. Thus, whiteness should be reckoned as a
contingent element of our idea of snow, sweetness of that of
sugar, form of that of body, and thought, feeling, and will, of
that of Mlind. Those phenomena, then, which we contemplate as inhering in particular substances, as distinguishing
clear characteristics of the same, we denominate Quality.
One great object of observation and scientific research, is to
determine what are the specific qualities which inhere in particular substances.
2. There is still another point of light in which substances
are contemplated. One substance, we well know, is affected,
or determined, in its state or states, by other substances. This
property of being thus affected, we denominate Susceptibility.
Thus gold is susceptible of fusion by heat, and water of existing in a solid, fluid, or vaporous state, from the different degrees
in which it is penetrated by the same substance.   Body is divisible, and Mlind is susceptible of being pleasurably or
painfully affected from an endless diversity of causes. The
particular effects which particular subjects are capable of
receiving, enter as contingent elements of our notions of such
110 
ELEMENTS OF NOTIONS.
substances, effects which, as intimated above, we designate by
the term susceptibility.
3. Substances have what may be called extern,al rclations
to each other, relations which we designate by the term  Cohere),ce. Thus individuals sustain to each other the relations of
employer and agent, physician and patient, teacher and pupil,
&c.  Accordingly, when we think,of one individual, we think
of him as the child of some other particular person, and this
last as the parent of that particular child.   We think of particular objects, a farm for example, as the particular property
of some particular individual, and such individual as the particular owner of said property.   All such facts enter as contingent elements into our specific notions of particular objects
as individuals, and such facts, I repeat, we designate by the
general term Coherence. When we would complete our notions of such objects or individuals, one specific inquiry which
we make is, WVhat are the particular mutual relations existing
between them and other objects or individuals?
4. The next class of contingent phenomena which constitute corresponding elements of our notions or conceptions, may
be denominated accidental. The fact that any individual now
existing was born soomewhere, constitutes an essential element
of our conception of him as a man. The fact that he was
born in London, Paris, England, America, or.any one partiecular place instead of some other, does not enter as such an element into our conception of him as a man, but constitutes a
contingent element of our conception of him as such a being.
That every living individual is either poor or rich, wise or ignorant, learned or unlearned, or that he occupies some intermediate position between these extremes, we know very well,
firom the nature of the case, cannot but be true of him.  The
particular position which he does occupy, or has occupied,
however, enters as a contingent element into our conception
III 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
of him. Every object is conceived by us not only in respect
to its inherent qualities and susceptibilities, and to the mutual
relations existing by which it stands, in special coherence with
other objects, but in reference to facts which accidentally pertain to it.
5. The relation of phenomena pertaining to _pace, next
claim our attention. Thus, when any phenomenon appears,
we ask, where is it?  If one individual, for example, who is
ignorant of the facts, should hear others speaking of the Astor
HIouse, he would at once ask after its location. The particular
place where the house is located, is a contingent element of
our conception of it. The same holds true of all other substances.
6. Phenomena present themselves under one other relation
still, that of antecedence, and succession. When any event is
announced to us, as having occurred, we ask the question, whea
did it occur? The answer to this question, that is, the particular time of the event, enters as a contingent element into
our conceptions of it.
As far as my present investigations extend, the above present a complete enumeration of the contingent elements of all
our notions. Whenever we contemplate an object, we always
think of it in relation to what is intrinsic in the object, irrespective of other objects - to what we have witnessed in regard to the effects resulting from the action of other powers
upon it, or from its action upon them -to its external relations to other objects-to accidental circumstances connected
with it -to the place where it is located, or its phenomena
have appeared, - and the time of such occurrences. I have
hesitated considerably in respect to the question whether the
last two classes should not be ranged under the fourth, and
classed as accidents. To me, however, they appear sufficiently
distinct to justify the arrangement above made.
112 
ELEMENTS OF NOTIONS.
NECESSARY ELEMENTS.
Of the necessary elements which enter into, and determine
the characteristics of all our notions, a complete enumeration,
in the present state of mental science, is hardly to be expected.
AVe may hope, however, to make an approach somewhat near
to that result.
Stbstaace and Cause the ftc?damental elements of all Notions.
One fact, pertaining to this department of our inquiries, is
quite evident.  It is this: The fundamental elements which
enter into all our notions, and which, as laws of thought, determnine the character of such phenomena, are two: s?ubstance
a     nd ccase.  If we make inquiries respecting any object, for
the purpose of perfecting our notions or conceptions of it, it
is as substance or cause, that such object is contemplated. All
our inquiries are but different forms in which these two ideas
evolve themselves in the Intelligence.
Evoluition of these Laws not Arbitrarjy.
A careful analysis will also convince us, that the forms in
which these two laws of thought evolve themselves, are by no
means arbitrary. On the other hand, their principles of evolution are perfectly fixed.  Whenever we would make inquiries respecting substances or causes, for the purpose of perfecting our notions of them, we, on reflection, find that certain
specific inquiries we do and must put, and that none others we
can make.   In the light of the answers obtained to such inquiries, are all our notions of substance and cause determined.
An elucidation of these laws of thought, and as a consequence,
an evolution of the direction of the Understanding in all legitimate inquiries after right notions of substances, constitutes
one of the great problems in philosophy. A development of
10*
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INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
these laws, in other words, of the Categories of the Understanding, will now be attempted.  Whether that development
shall be complete or incomplete, the result will determine.
I.-TIME AND SPACE.
I begin with the categories of time aizd sp)ace.  These are
entirely distinct from each other.  As the same remarks, however, are equally applicable to each, I shall consider themn
together.
Whenever any substances or phenomena  are thought of,
two inquiries arise in respect to them,  When and where do, or
did they exist or occur? When we think of the world, for
example, we naturally raise the inquiries, When  was it created? how loig has it stood? what place does it occupy in the
universe? So also when we think of any occurrence in, or on
the earth, we raise inquiries precisely similar, to wit, When and
where did they occur? The same holds true in respect to all
objects of the Understanding. All substances, all causes, all
phenomena are thought of in relation to time and space.  The
ideas of time and space, as laws of thought, enter into all our
notions, or Understanding-conceptions.
ERRORS OF KANT.
1. In resl)ect to the relation of Phenomenia and -Youmena to
Time and Space.
Kant makes a distinction obviously correct, between the
impressio,us which objects make upon  us, and the causes of
these impressions, or the objects themselves.  The former he
denominates phenomena.   The latter, that is, what he regards
as the unknown objects which produce impressions in us, he
calls noumena. Now phenomena, he says, we necessarily conceive of, as in time and space. Noumena, on the other hand,
have no such relation, indeed, no relation whatever, to either
time or space. Here a great mistake of this profound analyzer
114 
ERRORS OF KANT.
of the human mind presents itself. Reason affirms absolutely,
that noumena have as real a relation to time and space as phenomena do.  Whatever is to us an object of thought, whether
it be an object, as it exists in itself, or whether it be a phenomen-n of such object, we do, and must, put the questions,
When? -  how long? -  and where? - in respect to it.  Noumena, as well as phenomena, do and must have their locations
in time and space.   In the language of Dr. Murdoch, we may
triumiphantly ask, " How  can physical effects be limited to
time and space, and not also the physical c(a0ses which produce
them?  Can a material thing operate or produce effects, where
it is not present to produce them?  Or can Reason any more
conceive, a prior;, of a necessity for phenomena  to exist
only in time and space, than for noumena to exist in the
same manner?   If, then, Reason decides a p))riorl; or intuitively, that phenomena must so exist, does she not equally decide, d priori, or intuitively, that noumena must so exist?"
The overlooking of this obvious and undeniable fact, led this
great philosopher to accord to time and space a necessary reality, as laws of sensible intuition, that is, of external perception, and to deny all reality of them, as realities in themselves.
2. Relatiob of the Iceas of Time anct SI)ace to Phcao)menfa.
Another error of this philosopher consists in representing
the ideas of time and space as laws of sensible intuition, that
is, of external perception, and not as categories of the Understanding.   They are, Kant maintains, the "formns of the phenomiena of external Sense, or the aspects in which those phenomena present themselves to our Senses."   They not only
determine the forms of phenomena, but alone render perception
possible to us.  Now a moment's reflection will convince us,
that these ideas have no relation whatever to perception, external or internal, but exist in us exclusively as laws of the Understanding, or notion-forming power.
115 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
In the first place, these ideas, instead of existing in the
mind prior to, and thus determining the form of phenomena,
are chronologically, as we have seen, developed in the Intelligence subsequent to phenomena, external and internal.  W1e
must first I)erceive extension, for example, and thus form a notion of something extended, before we can conceive of space
in which such objects exist.  It is not, therefore, as this philosopher maintains, through the idea of space that objects present themselves to us, in perception, as extended.   On  the
other hand, without the perception of extension, the idea of
space, as the place of the object perceived, would not be developed at all.  The same illustration holds equally in regard
to time.  This idea does not first exist in the mind, and then
determine our perception of events, as simultaneous or successive.  The prior perception of succession, on the other hand,
develops the idea.  Perception, in all forms and degrees, exists
wholly independent of the ideas of time and space.  The mistake of Kant, in this case, consists in putting the antecedent
for the consequent.
Equally manifest is it, on the other hand, that these ideas
do not givefor)m to perception, but, as laws of thought, determine the characteristics of conceptions or notions.   When  we
perceive or think of phenomena, and of substances also, then,
as the ideas of time and space are developed, we put the inquiries, Where? when? how long? &c., in respect to them.
WVe do not perceive, but conceive or think of objects, as in
time and space.  The ideas of time and space are, therefore,
categories, not of Sense, but of the Understanding.
II. - IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY, RESEMBLANCE AND DIF                         FERENCE.
An essential element of our ideas of substance, is that of
116 
ERRORS OF KANT.
identity and diversity.  As the relation between substances
and their phenomena is that of necessity, a necessary law of
conceptions, or of notions, is that substances are as their phenomena.   Hence the two great necessary laws which determine our notions of substances, to wit, similar phenomena,
suppose similar substances; dissimilar phenomena suppose dissimilar substances.   Under  the categories of Identity and
Diversity, Resemblance and Difference, all classification, as we
shall see, in a subsequent chapter, proceeds.   The conception
of the likeness or unlikeness of an object to something else,
enters, as an essential element, into all our notions of it.
Perhaps some might be inclined to place the above ideas under
a category hereafter to be considered - that of Relation. They
are no less distinct from it, however, than either of those next
to be mentioned.
III.- THE IDEA OF A WHOLE, AS INCLUDING ITS PARTS, OR
PARTS IN REFERENCE TO THE WHOLE.
Every notion pertains to its object as a whole, including
parts, or as a part relatively to a whole.  This is a universal
and necessary law of all Understanding-conceptions, or notions.
Thus, when we conceive of the Mind, we necessarily conceive
of it as a whole, including the Intelligence, Sensibility, and
Will; or we think of some department of mental operation
relatively to the whole Mind. If we would form a notion of
any material substance, any body, the same holds true in a
more specific and special sense. Body, as given in all Understanding-conceptions, or notions, is a whole, a compound, con-lstituted of simple parts.
KANT'S ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON.
According to this philosopher, all transcendental ideas, that
is, all the necessary elements of our notions of substances
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INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPIIY.
around us, involve palpable contradictions. Two distinct and
opposite propositions are susceptible of equal and absolute de monstration from these ideas.  For example, the two following
propositions, which are perfectly contradictory to each other,
are equally susceptible of demonstration:
1. "Every compound  substance in the world consists of
simple parts, and there exists everywhere nothing but the
simple, or that which is compounded of it."
2. "No  compound thing in the world consists of simple
parts, and there exists not anywhere therein anything simple."
The amount of the proof of the first, which he denominates the Thesis, is this: If the compound is not made up of
simple parts, then, if all composition were done away in thought,
no compound part could remain; and as there is, in that case,
none simple, nothing would remain, and, consequently, no compound would be given.
His proof of the second, denominated Anti-Thesis, is, that
the simple, whatever it may be, must occupy space, and therefore be made up of parts existing externally to each other, and
consequently compounded.    The conception of the simple,
which is not a compound of something which is itself compounded, is a contradiction, and of course an impossible conception.  No simple, therefore, does or can exist.   From the
contradictions necessarily involved in the Thesis and AntiThesis above given, each of which, from the nature of Understanding-conceptions, he affirms, is susceptible of equal and
absolute demonstration, he infers, as demonstrably evident, the
non-reality of all material existences, such as we conceive of
them; inasmuch as the supposition of their real existence involves contradictions perfectly synonymous with the affirmation
that the same thing, at the same time, may be and not be.  In
reply, I remark,
1. That the proposition, that that which is compounded
118 
UNDERSTANDING.
must be made up of simple parts, is an intuition of Reason,
and therefore incapable of demonstration, in the same sense
that all other intuitions are. We may show, as in the Thesis
above given, that the opposite proposition involves a contradiction, and that is all.
2. The conception of the simple is a pure idea of Reason,
and not an Understanding-conception at all. The compound
only is an object of perception, and consequently of Understanding-conceptions. All bodies, therefore, as the Understanding forms notions of them, must be compounded. Not
so with the simple, as given by the Reason.
3. In his Anti-Thesis, Kant assumes the idea of the simple
as an Understanding-conception, which, of course, involves the
idea of composition, and hence his boasted demonstration is
nothing but a singular paralogism.  If we assume that the
idea of the simple is a notion, that is, that it is complex and
not simple, then we have the contradictions presented by Kant
in his Thesis and Anti-Thesis. Take away this assumption,
and the contradictions wholly disappear.  I believe that it can
be shown that all the antinomies of pure Reason, as given by
this philosopher, involve paralogisms similar to the one under
consideration.
IV. - THiE CATEGORY OF QUANTITY.
Whenever we contemplate a notion which lies under any
term whatever, we find that it always does and must refer to
some one object, to a nember or n,ultitutde of objects, or to
a total race or class of objects.  For example, the term man
may be used to designate some one individual, or a plurality
of men, or the total race of men.  This is what is meant by
the logical quantity of a notion or conception, and presents
us with the category of Quantity-  with its sub-categories,
Unity, Plurality, and Totality. Under the first, we have the
119 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
notion of an individual. Under the second, that of a number
of individuals. Under the last, we have a multitude of individuals classed together as a total race, on the ground of common qualities.   Whenever we inquire after the extent or logical
quantity of any term, or of that of the notion which lies under that term, we ask in which of the senses above named is it
to be taken?
The Category of Quantity distinct from that previously
considered.
At first thought, the category of Quantity may be regarded
as identical with that previously considered.  The ideas of
whole and of parts, however, are correlative ideas.  It is not
so with those of unity and totality. A class supposes individuals; but the individual does not necessarily suppose a class.
Totality, as distinguished from individuality, is distinct from a
whole as distinguished from parts.
V. -  OF QUALITY.
To complete and perfect our notions of substances, a fundamental inquiry arises, to wit, what is this substance? When
we would answer the question pertaining to the nature of the
object, but one thing is considered -the qual'i'es of the object.  As it is a necessary intuition of Reason, that substance
supposes quality, and that substances are as their qualities,
hence arises the category of Quality.
In all distinct notions of an object, certain qualities are
positively affirmedl, others denied, and others affirmed in a limited degree, of the object.   Thus, in our notions of an individual, for example, distinguished intellectual powers may be
affirmed, prudence denied, and courage affirmed in a limited
degree. This principle is observed when we would describe
an object to others, for the purpose of conveying distinct con
120
I 
UNDERSTANDING.
ceptions of it to their minds.   Wre designate the positive qualities which appear in it.   Aeo deny other qualities of it, which
might appear, but do not.  WAe  then designate others which
might appear in all its parts, or in a certain degree of perfection, but which appear only in a limited degree.  Thus the category of Quality presents itself in three forms, or sub-categories,
those of Affirmation, Negation, and Limitation.  WVhen  an
object has been placed in the light of all these, then our notions of its nature are full and distinct.
VI. - OF RELATION.
Another form in which objects are given to us in notions,
or Understanding-conceptions, is their relatious to other objects.  According to Kant, the category of Relation also develops itself in three forms.  WVhen  two objects are brought
together for the purpose of comparing them with each  other,
we consider the question, what qualities i/there in one which
do not in the other?  Here we have the first sub-category
of Relation, that of Inherence. Each substance is thus contemplated in its relations to its distinctive attributes or qualities.
Objects also are contemplated relatively to their powers of
affecting other objects and determining their states, or their
susceptibilities of being affected by such objects.   The metals,
for example, are conceived of; as susceptible of fusion from
heat, andl caloric as possessed of the power of producing such
effects in metals.   In the one case, we give our notions of the
sowers of substances, and in the other of their susceptibilities.
Two substances also may be compared relatively to their powers and susceptibilities.   Thus we have the relation, or subcategory of causality and dependence.
A third relation is that of reciprocity, denominated by
Kant the sub-category of Community.    When  objects, for
1
121 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIIY.
example, mutually attract or repel each other, this relationship
differs entirely from that of cause and effect.  All objects in
the universe around are, in some form or other, thus correlated
to each other. The relation of employer and agent falls under
the principle under consideration.
Such is the category of Relation. When we have contemplated objects till we know them, in the light of their comparative qualities, or attributes- in reference to their powers of
affecting other objects, or of being affected by them -and
as they mutually and reciprocally affect each other, then our
notions are complete, as far as the idea of relation is concerned.
VII. - OF MODALITY.
Every Understanding-conception respects its object, as a
possible or imnpossible- a real or unreal existence- and as
existing of necessity or contingently. These ideas enter, as
necessary elements, into all our notions, and constitute what
is denominated the niodality of Understanding-conceptions.
Suppose I convey the conception I have of some object, to
any individual.  He will naturally and necessarily inquire,
Can such a thing be? Is it a reality? Does it exist of necessity, or contingently?
VIII.- TlIE IDEA OF LAW.
When we have formed our notions of objects, in the light
of the preceding principles, another inquiry of great importance arises, to wit, according to what law, or laws, do those
powers act? The forms in which the nomological idea, as
it is denominated by Prof. Tappan, develops itself are various, according to the nature of the objects to which it pertains,
and the point of view in which the object is contemplated.
Still, as a necessary element, it enters into, and determines
the character of all our notions of substances within and
1-22 
UNDERSTANDING.
around us.  When we come to speak of the Reason again,
this idea, together with the conditions of its development, and
the varied forms in which it appears will be the object of special remark. I deemed it important to simply refer it to here,
on account of its omnipresent influence, in determining the
character of all our Understanding-conceptions.
Such are the elements which enter into all our notions, or
Understanding-conceptions. That the above analysis presents
us with real elements of such phenomena there can be no
doubt. But whether that analysis is complete, will be ascertained in the more perfect developments of mental science.
CONCEPTIONS AS DISTINGUISHED FROM NOTIONS.
Conception, as commonly defined by philosophers, is a
past perception recalled in Memory or Recollection. It is
rather, as it appears to me, the recalling of the iot~ion formed
of the object when perceived. Perceptions may be renewed
but not recalled. The conceptions of individuals will vary, as
the notions which they formed of objects when perceived.
The terms notion and conception are often used as synonymous.
A FACT OFTEN ATTENDING PERCEPTION.
It is a fact with which all are familiar, that when we unexpectedly meet an object before unknown to us, but which, in
certain particulars, resembles one well known, we seem for a
time to see the latter with perfect distinctness. The reason
of this phenomenon I suppose to be this: Under such circumstances, the notion we have of the known object is recalled
with such vividness, that it almost exclusively occupies the attention of the mind.
MISTAKE OF MR. STEWART.
According to this philosopher, in all conceptions, the ab
123 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPItY.
sent object is, in the first instance, always believed to be present, as an object of direct perception.  Universal consciousness affirms the error of such a dogma. The mistake of Mr.
S. arose, as I suppose, from his definition of conception, that
is, that it is a past perception recalled.  If this were true, I
do not see but we must, not only at first, but at all times, regard the object of our conception, as directly present.
NOTIONS AND CONCEPTIONS CHARACTERIZED AS COMPLETE OR
INCO3IPLETE, TRUE OR FALSE.
In the former part of this Chapter, we have contemplated
the elements, contingent and necessary, which enter into all
Understanding-coneeptions.  It now remains to consider these
phenomena in their relation) to their objects.  All Understanding-conceptions pertain to their objects, in two important relations, as complete or incomp)lete, or as true or false.
Such conception is complete, when it represents all the elements really existing in the object.  It is incomplete, when it
fails to do this. Absolute completeness characterizes probably
none of our conceptions.
An Understanding-conception is true, when it represents
completely or incompletely, the real attributes of its object,
and nothing else.  It is false, when it attributes to the object
unreal attributes, or denies of it what is real.
Two facts are obviously true from the above definitions.
1. A conception may be incomplete, and yet true, it being
true, when it attributes to the object nothing but what is real.
Or a notion might be complete, and yet, in a certain sense,
false; as it might attribute to the object all that is real, and
something not real. 2. Conceptions may be wholly true, or
wholly false; or partly true, and partly false.   That is, they
may attribute to their objects nothing but what is real, or nothing that is real; or they may attribute to them some things
124 
UNDERSTANDING.
real, and some not real.   Unmingled error seldom characterizes
any of our conceptions.
MISTAKE OF COLERIDGE IN RESPECT TO THiE UNDERSTANDING.
Coleridge defines the Understanding as the "faculty of
judging according to Sense," a definition which he copied from
Kant and other German philosophers. According to such phi4
losophers, the Understanding pertains only to external material substances. It has nothing to do with the subjective, with
Mlind.
Now this is a great error in Philosophy. As a matter of
fact, we form notions and conceptions of Mind as really as we
do of anything not ourselves. Notions subjective as really exist, in Consciousness, as those which are objective.   Nor can
any reasons be assigned, why we should attribute the formation of the latter to one faculty of the Intelligence, and that
of the former to another.   The appropriate sphere of the Uncderstanding is evidently limited only by the Finite. Reason
alone pertains to the Infinite, the Absolute, and the Universal.
All other realities fall within the range of the Understanding.
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125
..:,: 11 
CHAPTER VIII.
FACULTY OF JUDGMENT.
ABSTRACTION.
ALL our notions, or Understanding-conceptions, are, as we
have seen, complex, constituted of elements furnished by the
primary faculties, Sense, Consciousness, and RPeason. To
make an abstraction of a notion is, in thought, on the ground
of the ideas of resemblance and difference, to separate these elements from one another, giving special attention to some one,
or more, or each of them in particular.  Into our conceptions
of body, for example, the elements of form, soldity, color, &c., en
ter. Now in the light of the ideas of resemblance and difference,
the Intelligence perceives at once, that the element of solidity
differs from that of form, and that of color from either of the
others. In thought, therefore, either of these elements may
be so separated from all the rest, that it shall be the object of
special observation. Thus our conceptions of each element of
the object, and consequently our notions of the entire object
may become more or less distinct and complete.
ABSTRACT NOTIONS, WHAT, AND It0W FORMED.
When the Intelligence, in the sense above explained,
makes abstraction of a particular element of an object or conception, it may, ever after, conceive and speak of that element
without reference to the particular object from which it was
abstracted. Then we have what is denominated an abstract 
FACULTY OF JUDGMENT.
notion, such as is designated by the terms redness, sweetness,
hardness, &c.
GENERAL NOTIONS, HOW FORMED.
Originally all Understanding-conceptions are particular.
From these, all notions, abstract and general, are formed. How
is the general evolved from the particular?  Let us suppose
that, in conformity to the process above described, the Intellect
has formed notions of two particular objects, mountains, for
example. These two notions lie together under the eye of
Consciousness. In the light of the idea of resemblance and
difference, the mind at once perceives that there are certain elements, common to the two.  Abstraction is made of these
elements, and a third notion is formed, embracing them alone.
Here is the first appearance of a general notion. When a
third mountain is perceived, and a notion formed of that, the
general notion undergoes a new modification, and now embraces those elements only common to the three. Thus the
process of abstraction goes on, till the general notion pertains
to those elements only common to all mountains. This same
process takes place in all instances in which general notions are
evolved from particular ones.
CLASSIFICATION.
The process of classification can now be readily explained.
We will refer back to the case when two particular notions
were in the mind, and the general was evolved from them. As
soon as the notion last named appears, the two particulars are
subsumed or classed under it. In the same manner every
particular previously perceived is arranged under the general,
in all the successive modifications which it subsequently undergoes.
127 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
tForms of  Cl7ossyic(ttion.
There are three distinct points of view from which objects
are classified.
1. In view of general resemblances, they are classed, on the
ground of common qualities, under general notions, such as
nIan, animals, &c.
2. uIn view of some one quality without reference to resemblance in any other particular, they are classed under notions
purely abstract, such as redness, whiteness, &e.   We often
class objects together, as white, hard, sweet, &c., without reference to their relations, in any other particulars.
3. Objects are classed togethler, in view of their correspondence to pure rational conceptions, such as a circle, square,
right and wrong, &c.
(YctassficatioGi. in w,hat Ssesc arbitrary.
It will readily be seen that classification froml one point of
view, will run directly across and break up that which is
formed from another.   How distinct and opposite, for example, will classification be which is founded in view of sonme one
abstract quality, such as redness, from that which is based
upon general resemblance, and formed under a general conception. Equally distinct and unlike either of the others will be
the arrangement of objects which  are classed together under
some pure rational conception.
For these reasons classification has, by many, been regarded
as perfectly arbitrary.  It is true, that we are at liberty to
adopt either of the principles of classification above described
we please.   In this respect, the process is perfectly arbitrary.
If we classify at all, however, we must adopt one or the other
of the forms under consideration, no other forms being  conceivable.  Wlhen  we  have  selected our  principle also, the
128 
FACULTY OF JUDGMENT.
subsequent arrangement of objects in conformity to it is necessary.  In very important respects, therefore, classification
has its laws, which are by no means arbitrary.
GENERA AND SPECIES.
In the process of classification, objects are ranged together
as genera and species. Thus we have the genus tree, and the
different classes, or species of fruit-bearing and forest trees,
ranged under it.  A  species also is often itself a genus relatively to particular and distinct classes belonging to that species.  If fruit-bearing be assumed as the genus, then we have
the apple, plum, peach, cherry trees, &c., ranged as species
under this generic term.   The illustration might be extended
indefinitely, from the highest to the lowest forms of genus and
species.  Our present concern is with the )2iiii?e)cle on which
objects are thus classed.  It is that to which we have frequently referred in this Chapter, the idea of resenmblance and
d~5ier~ce.  The genus is formed on the perception of remote
resemblances.   Species under the genus are formed on tile perception of important differences; while objects are classed
under the species, on the perception of resemblances more near
and special.  Thus the genus tree is formed on the perception
of qualities common  to all trees.   The species fruit-bearing
and forest trees, are separated from each other, on the perception of important differences, each species being formed on the
ground of resemblances more near and particular than those
designated by the general term tree.
In illustration of the process in which classes, as genus and
species, are formed, we will take the case of the child.  A
certain object stands near the paternal mansion, which he has
learned to designate by the term tree.   By  and by hlie sees
another object resembling this in all important particulars.
Hiere, he says, is another tree.  In his mind they are distin
129 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
guished as greater and less, and in respect of location.  Here
is the obscure development of the ideas of genus and species.
At length, however, he perceives a tree differing in very important particulars from either of the others.  He now asks
the question, what ki)nd of tree is this? The answer is, we
will suppose, a maple tree.  Then the inquiry arises, what tree
is that which stands near the house? Hle is told that it is an
elm tree.  lie has now the idea of the genus tree, formed on
the perception of common qualities, and of two species, separated from each other on the perception of important differences. All trees subsequently perceived, presenting similar
resemblances and differences, will be separated and arranged
accordingly.  As other trees, differing from either of these,
are perceived, they will be separated and classed in a similar
manner. Throughout the whole process, one idea guides the
mind, that of resemblance and difference.
GENERALIZATION.
But few words are requisite in the explanation of the mental process called Generalization. A general fact is a quality
common to every individual of a given class. It may be peculiar to that class; or, while it belongs to each individual of
the class, it may appertain to individuals of other classes.
Rules in respect to Ge?eralization.
1. No fact must be assumed as general, which does not belong to each individual of the class to which it is referred.
2. No general fact must be assumed as _peculiar to one
class, which, though strictly general in respect to that class,
nevertheless appertains to individuals of other classes.
3. No fact must be assumed as general without a sufficient
induction of particulars, to remove all doubt in respect to the
question whether it is, or is not, a general fact.
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FACULTY OF JUDGMENT.
The Ternm General sometimes used in a limited se,se.
In common usage, a fact is called general, when it belongs
to a majority of the individuals of a certain class. In such a
case, its existence in connection with an individual of the class
is only probable. Great injury is often done to individuals in
the application of facts of this kind.
GENERAL TERMS.
In the progressive developments of mental science, the
question has long been agitated among philosophers, whether
when we use general terms, such as mlan, animal, there are
ideas in the mind, and objects in the universe around us, corresponding to these terms, or whether they are mere terms,
without corresponding ideas and objects. In respect to such
terms, three distinct theories have been formed by as many
different sects of philosophers.
Theory of the Realists.
The first was maintained by a particular class of the schoolmen, and deduced from certain principles, real or supposed,
maintained by Aristotle. The theory was this: There exists
in nature, not only individual substances, but certain essences,
corresponding with the general ideas which exist in the mind.
When, for example, we use the term man, it was maintained
that there exists in the world around us a certain essence,
which is found in no individual of the species, and which exists in connection with no individual, but which corresponds
with the idea in the mind, which idea is designated by the
above term.  So of every other general term.  The sect of
philosophers maintaining this theory was called Realists. Their
dogmas have been long since exploded.
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INTELLECTUAL IIHILOSOP1iY
Th1eory of the.Aomii)i ((lsts.
Another theory directly opposed, to the above, was maintained by a sect of philosophers which arose in the eleventh
century.' According to those philosophers," says iMIr. Stewart, "there are no existences in nature, corresponding to general terms; and the objects of our attention, in all speculations,
are not ideas, but words."   This sect was called the Nominalists.  As there are no existences in nature, according to this
sect, corresponding with general terms, all our speculations
and reasonings, but for our knowledge of such ternis, must be
confined to individuals.   The following from Mr. Stewart, wlho
was an avowed Nomninalist, will illustrate the meaning of the
above remarks, as well as show their correctness: "It has
been already shown, that without the use of signs, all our
knowledge must be necessarily limited to individuals;  and
that we should be perfectly incapable, both of classification,
and general reasoning." If the author means that without
the use of signs, we should be unable to communicate our
thoughts to each other, what he says is a mere truismn, which
is no less applicable to individuals.   But if he means, as he
evidently does, that without the use of signs, we could not
reason upon general subjects, I reply,
1. That the existence of the names themselves implies the
previous process of reasoning and classification, to which he
supposes these terms give birth. A class must first be formed,
and a judgment affirmed, before any particular term can be
chosen to designate them. Now as the process of classification gives existence to general terms, which process must always be anterior to the terms themselves, the mind must possess the power of classification and general reasoning, in the
absence of such terms.  The mistake of the author consists in
changing the order of sequence, putting the effect for the
cause.
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I 
FACULTY OF JUDGMENT.
2. Individuals have been known who have lost entirely all
recollection of general terms, and who have yet retained the
power of classification and reasoning upon general subjects
unimpaired.
3. If our reasonings upon general subjects respect not
ideas, nor things, but words merely, then all general conclusions must be absolutely useless in all the concerns of real life.
In such circumstances, we have to do with realities exclusively,
and shall find no place for conclusions in respect to abstractions, or rather in respect to the re(clations of abstractions which
have no existence in nature.
4. The fact, that general terms are always defined by a
reference to individuals, shows clearly, that there are, in such
individuals realities corresponding to the terms employed.
Theory  of  thte Co)zceptltalsts.
WVe come now to notice the doctrine of the sect denominated Conceptualists, or Notionalists. According to the doctrine of this sect, a general term, when considered objectively,
denotes those qualities which exist alike in all individuals of a
given class -when considered stbjectivelg, it designates the
coicel)tioit of these qualities in the mind.   Instead of there
being no existences in nature, according to the doctrine of the
Nominalists, corresponding to general terms, the Conceptualists maintain, that there is in every individual of a given class,
that which corresponds with those terms. The doctrine of
this sect, as will be seen, is equally removed from that of the
Realists and Nominalists both. That the doctrine of this sect
is correct, and the only correct view of the subject, is evinced,
because:
1. When the mind affirms of any particular object, as soon
as perceived, that it is a man, a horse, an animal, such affirmation supposes the existence in the mind of a certain notion, or
12
133 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIIY.
conception of a given class of objects, and the perception of
the agreement of the given object, with that conception. It
can be accounted for upon no other supposition.
2. Every person, when he appeals to his own Consciousness, knows, that when using general terms, he is designating
conceptions really existing in his own mind, conceptions pertaining to real qualities of classes of objects existing around him.
3. General terms are always defined by a reference to the
qualities existing in individuals of a given class, and no definition is allowed to be correct, which does not designate the
qualities common to the whole class to which it is applied.
4. General conclusions, when correct, must be applicable
to all the individuals of the particular class to which they are
applied. This shows that such conclusions are based upon the
conception of the common qualities of each individual of the
class.
UNDERSTANDING AND JUDGMENT DISTINGUISIIED.
Having explained the process of abstraction and classification, it now remains to compare this process with the action
of the Understanding. A moment's reflection will convince
us, that this process, and that of forming notions, are entirely
distinct from each other, and must be referred to functions of
the Intelligence equally distinct. To form a notion of A and
B, and to affirm that they agree or disagree, are intellectual
operations, entirely distinct from each other. The former process is called conception; the latter is called judgment.   So
also when the Understanding combines the elements given by
the primary faculties into notions, particular and general, that
is one thing. When the Intelligence classes an individual
under a general notion, in the affirmation, this is a man, an
animal, &c. that is quite another thing, an intellectual
process entirely distinct from the formation of notions. In
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FACULTY OF JUDGMENT.
this last process we conceive, that is, combine intuitions. In
the former, we judge.
As the function of the Intelligence by which we form notions
is called the Understanding, so that by which we judge, that is,
abstract, classify, and generalize, is denominated the Judgment.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN THiE UNDERSTANDING AND JUDGMENT
VERIFIIED.
A single additional consideration will fully verify the distinction above made between the Understanding and Judgment. We often meet with individuals in whom the Understanding is strongly developed, and embraces a wide range of
objects. Yet the same individuals may be almost totally wanting in respect to the faculty of Judgment. They conceive
distinctly and vividly of objects presented, yet make no important discriminations between them.  They will read a book,
for example, and give a full and distinct account of what it
contains, and yet appear to be none the wiser for what they
know. They, as is commonly said of them, appear to know
everything, and yet can make little use of their knowledge.
They form notions of objects just as they present themselves,
without making important discriminations between them. This
is owing to the fact that the Understanding, which simply knows
objects as they appear, is exercised, while the Judgment, which
separates things that differ, and ranges together those that
agree, and then abstracts, classifies, and generalizes our conceptions, or rather the objects of thought, is wanting or inactive.
On the other hand we meet with individuals who, with a
very limited acquaintance with particular objects, yet possess a
great amount of what is called practical wisdom. Their information is limited, yet what they know is analyzed, classified,
and generalized. In other words, in such individuals the faculty of Judgment is fully developed.
135 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIY.
Such considerations clearly show that the function of the
Intelligence denominated Understanding is one thing, while
that of Judgment is quite another. With the facts upon
which the distinction under consideration is based, all men are
familiar. They recognize readily the distinction between information and knowledge, between conceiving of objects, and
in this sense knowing them, and making important discrimninations between them.  In short, the basis for the distinction
between the Understanding and Judgment is laid in facts recognized by all men.
OBSERVATIONS OF KANT.
The remarks of Kant upon the subject under consideration
are so much to the point, that I will present one or two quotations from his Critick on the faculty of Judgment.   "If the
Understanding," he says, "in general be explained as the faculty of rules, the faculty of Judgment is that of subsuming
under rules; that is to say, of distinguishing whether something does or does not stand under a given rule." Again:
" The faculty of Judgment is a particular talent, which is not
to be taught, but only exercised; and this, consequently, is
the speciality of the so-called mother-wit, the want of which
no schooling can supply; for although this may offer to, and,
as it were, graft upon a limited Understanding, rules in abundance borrowed from another mind, still the faculty of availing
himself correctly of these must belong to the hearer himself:
and no rule which we could prescribe to him with this intention is, under the deficiency of such a natural gift, secure from
misuse. A physician, therefore, a judge, or politician, may
have many excellent pathological, judicial, or political rules in
his head, to such a degree that he himself may become therein
a profound teacher, and yet in the application of them will
easily make a mistake, either because he is deficient in natural
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I 
FACULTY OF JUDGMAIENT.
Judgment (although not in Understanding), and certainly can
see the general ino abstr)acto, but cannot distinguish whether a
ease i)B cebco)et(, fall under it, or from this cause, that he has
not sufficiently been trained by examples and real business to
this judgmient."
Two characteristics, entirely distinct and opposite, of different individuals of distinguished minds, may very properly
be alluded to here, as illustrating and confirming the distinction between the Understanding and Judgment above made.
WVe often meet with individuals, public speakers, for example,
distinguished for strong and vivid conceptions of whatever
subject their minds are occupied with. Yet one of their discourses shadowing forth some bold and grand conception, will
contain elements manifestly contradictory to those contained in
a prior discourse of a similar character.  Yet the speaker himself appears wholly insensible of such contradiction.  Hle contradicts himself, without at all being sensible of the fact.  A
bold and strong conception with such a mind is, of course, true,
together with all the elements embraced in it.
The productions of other minds are distinguished not only
for logical and scientific arrangement, but for the consistency
and harmonoy of the elements introduced into one discourse
with those introduced into others. Such individuals seldom,
to use a phrase commonly applied in such cases, cross their
ownv tracks, and if they do this at any time, they will pereeive
it qcuite as soon as others.
hIow shall we account for such diversities? The answer
is, that in the first instance, the Understanding, and frequently
the imagination, are strongly developed, while there is a deficiency of Judgment.   In the latter cases, there is a strong
development of the faculty last named. Now, phenomena so
diverse and opposite necessarily suppose faculties fundamentally
distinct from each other.
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137 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
RELATIONS OF THE UNDERSTANDING AND JUDGMENT.
Hlaving shown the distinction between these faculties, it
now remains, in the conclusion of the present Chapter, to show
the relations between them. The Judgment pre-supposes the
Understanding.   The former can analyze, abstract, classify,
and generalize only what is furnished by the latter. Understanding might exist without Judgment; but the latter cannot
exist, or rather cannot act, without the former.
The Understanding also not only precedes, but succeeds
the action of the Judgment. When the Judgment has abstracted, analyzed, classified, and generalized objects of the
Understanding, the latter faculty then combines into its conceptions of such objects all the discriminations of the former
faculty pertaining to them.   When, for example,  we  have
passed a judgment upon any individual, affirming that he belongs to a particular class, that judgment, ever after, enters as
an essential element into our conception of him. This is
universally true of all judgments and notions.
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I 
CHAPTER IX.
ASSOCIATION.
TERMI DEFINED.
"THAT one thought is often suggested to the mind by another, and that the sight of one external object often recalls
former occurrences, and revives former feelings, are facts,"
says )Ir. Dugald Stewart, " which are perfectly familiar, even
to those who are least disposed to speculate concerning the
principles of our nature." This is what is meant by the term
Association. It is that principle of our minds by which past
thoughts and states are recalled, and revived, through the influence of present perceptions, thoughts and feelings.  This
law of the human mind was denominated by the old philosophers, "Association of ideas-"   By Dr. Brown it was denominated "Suggestion."   By  others, it is designated  by the
simple term, Association.
Termi Associationt, wh,y preferred.
I prefer the latter term to either of the former, because it
alone expresses all the phenomena which require consideration,
when treating of the subject before us. We find by experience, that not only thoughts and events are associated, but
thoughts, events, and feelings also. The term Association of
ideas, can be properly applied to ideas only. The same is true 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIIY.
of Suggestion.   An  idea or event cannot properly be said to
suggest feelings.   Thoughts and events may be said to revive
feelings; and feelings may  be said to suggest thoughts and
events.   Association is the term, and the only term, which
can properly be applied to all these different classes of phenonlena.
THE ASSOCIATING PRINCIPLE NOT WITIHOUT LAWV.
Although the Mlind is so constituted, that certain states
follow certain other states, these phenomena, as philosophers
have long since observed, not only do not follow each other at
random, but are known to follow some one or mnore fixed law
or laws.   To ascertain and illustrate the operation of these
laws, has been considered one of the great problems in Intellectual Philosophy; and has accordingly occupied a conspicuous place in almost every treatise upon the science.   Mr.
Hiume, I believe, was the first philosopher who attempted to
settle definitely the number of these laws.   According to this
philosopher, they are all reduced to three: Resemblance,
Cause and Effect, and Contiguity in time and place. Others
have since added that of Contrast.
LAWI OF ASSOCIATION STATED AND DEFINED.
It is somewhat remarkable that while philosophers have
observed, that the principle of Association acts, as a matter
of fact, in accordance with the above so-called laws, they have
not inquired after the ultimate cause of its action in these
forms, and have not raised the inquiry, whether this cause is
not always one and the same. Some bodies, vapor for example, rise from the earth, while others descend  towards it.
Somne bodies float upon the surface of water, while others sink
to the bottom. Philosophy has long since demonstrated the
fact, that the cause of all these diverse effects is one and
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ASSOCiATION.
identical, in all instances. The same law which causes the
stone to descend towards the earth, causes the vapor to rise
above it. The same law which causes lead to sink to the bottoli of a mass of water, causes other substances to float upon
its surface.  Does not a similar unity obtain, in the action of
the associating principle?  Mlay not all the facts of Association be reduced to one common principle, and the laws of Association, as presented by philosophers generally, be shown to
be but different forms in which this one principle develops itself?  I think that this may be done, and that the principle
referred to, may very readily be pointed out.
When the mind has once been in a given state, we are all
aware that there is in it a strong tendency to return to that
state again.   Hence, if any one element of that state is reproduced from any cause whatever, a recurrence of that state to a
greater or less degree, is very likely, from the known principle
under consideration, to be occasioned. Every perception, every
thought in the mind, induces a certain mental state. Now
suppose, that by some new perception or thought, some element of this state is revived. By the law of mind under consideration, is not the state itself likely to be revived, in a
greater or less degree, and with that state, is not the remembrance of the perception or thought referred to, likely to be
recalled?  Have we not here the universal law of Association?
A train of thought passed through my mind on yesterday, for
example.   Another is now passing.  As  a consequence, the
formier train is recalled.  What is the reason of this fact?  It
is this: Something in the present train has reproduced some
element of the state of mind induced by the one which passed
through the mind on yesterday. By means of this common
state, and that exclusively, the latter train has been recalled.
So in all other  instances.   The  law  of Association,  then,
may be thus stated:  When present thoughts or trains of
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INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPHIIY.
thought, recall former ones, it is always and exclusively because the present has induced the state of feeling, or some element of the state induced by the former.   It is always, and
exclusively by means of this common state, that such Associations arise in the mind.   The truth of this proposition it will
now be my object to establish.
THE PRESENT HYPOTHESIS, WHEN ESTABLISHED AS THE LAW
OF ASSOCIATION.
To establish the hypothesis under consideration, as thelaw
of Association, two conditions must be fulfilled:
It must be shown, in the first place, that all phenomena referred to the commonly admitted laws, can be accounted for on
this hypothesis.
It must be shown with equal clearness, in the second place,
that there are facts of Association which cannot be accounted
for by these laws, but which admit of a ready explanation on
.this hypothesis, and upon none other conceivable by us. These
positions being established, the Judgment affirms the hypothesis, as the exclusive and universal law of Association.
WVe are now prepared to take up the question, whether
there are many, or but one law of Association, and whether
the hypothesis under consideration gives us that law?
A PRIORI ARGUMENT.
It will be admitted on a moment's reflection, that there is
a very strong a priori probability in favor of the supposition,
that the facts of Association are controlled by one law, instead
of many. The opposite position supposes a departure, in this single instance, from what we find true of all other classes of facts
which lie within and around us in the universe. The phenomena of attraction in the material universe, for example, are
many, and endlessly diversified. Yet they are all controlled
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ASSOCIATION.
by one law. Why should we suppose the phenomena of Association to be an exception? Should we not expect, in the ultimate analysis of facts, to find unity amidst diversity here, as
well as everywhere else? This argument is adduced as of
weight, simply in favor of the supposition of one instead of
many laws, and not at all in favor of any one hypothesis, in
distinction from another. Any one principle, which would
lay claim to the prerogative of universal law, must fulfill the
conditions above presented. We are now prepared for a direct
investigation of the question, whether the hypothesis under
consideration fulfills these conditions.
ALL THE PHENOMENA REFERRED TO THE COMMONLY RECEIVED
LAWS, CAN BE EXPLAINED ON THIS HYPOTHESIS.
That many of the phenomena of Association can be accounted for, in consistency with the commoply admitted laws,
will be denied by no person of reflection.  That objects which
resemble each other, that those which have been perceived at
the same time or place, that sustain to each other the relation
of contrast, or cause and effect, do mutually suggest each other,
is undeniable. But do such phenomena necessarily suppose
the existence of a plurality of laws? May they not all be referred to one, and that the one under consideration? Those
of resemblance, obviously may. The same is true of those
which sustain to each other the relations of contiguity of time
and place, and of cause and effect. For they undeniably have
co-existed with the same feelings or states of mind. The only
phenomena which present the appearance of difficulty, are those
of Contrast. That a giant and a dwarf resemble each other
in but few particulars, and that they stand in striking contrast
to each other, is readily admitted; but that, as objects of perception, or recollection, they may have co-existed with the
same feelings, or states of mind, and as causes also of the same,
143 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
I as fully believe, as I do that the conception of a hero and a
lion have co-existed in a similar manner.  A giant and a dwarf
are strongly contrasted, but each, as striking departures, though
in different directions, from the common stature, may have coexisted with similar feelings of wondcer or surprise, and as cormmeon causes of the same; and this may be the only reason
why one suggests the other. In conversing upon this subject
on a particular occasion, an individual present remarked, that
he recollected having, at a particular time, seen a dwarf. A
giant, which he had previously seen, was not suggested at all,
but another dwarf whom he had before met with. I at once
asked the speaker, if the giant referred to, was not a familiar
acquaintance of his. He replied that he was. This fact readily accounted for the phenomenon of Association, presented by
him.   Familiarity had destroyed the feeling of strangeness,
which had formerly co-existed with the perception or recollection of the giant. The same feeling, however, co-existing with
the perception of the two dwarfs; the perception of one would
of course suggest the other.   In the same manner all the phenomena of Contrast may be reduced to the hypothesis before us.
PHENOMENA EXIST WHICH CAN BE ACCOUNTED FOR ON THIS,
AND ON NO OTHER HYPOTHESIS.
1.  Those fac[lliiz  ie)cder the rciction of Aalogy. -But
how can we account for those associations which fall under the
relation of analogy?  A  hero and a lion sustain no relation
of external resemblance, by which one would suggest the
other.   Equally removed are they from the relations of contiguity, cause and effect, or contrast.   But  as causes of similar
feelings, or states of mind, the conceptions of them have coexisted in the mind, in connection with such states; and this,
I believe, is the only reason that can be assigned, why the contemplation of one suggests the other.
144
I 
ASSOCIATION.
3Iilton's account of the fight of Abdiel and Satan, may
present a striking illustration of the principle under consideration:
"So saying, a noble stroke he lifted high,
Which hung not, but so swift with tempest fell
On the proud crest of Satan, that no sight,
Nor motion of swift thought, less could his shield,
Such ruin intercept. Ten paces huge
He back recoiled; the tenth on bended knee
His massy spear upstayed; as if on earth
Winds under ground, or waters forcing way,
Sidelong had pushed a mountain from his seat,
Half sunk with all his pines."
Now, why did the conception of Satan, thus smitten down,
suggest to the mind of 3ilton that of a mountain pushed
from his seat? The only answer that can be given is, that
the contemplation of each induces similar feelings or states of
mind.   So of all the phenomena of association falling under
the relation of analogy. Suppose, further, that an individual
relates to a number of men sonice incidents of a sublime, beautiful, heroic, horrid, or ludicrous character.   How happens it
that each hearer instantly recollects almost every incident of a
similar character, which he has ever met with?  These incidents resemble each other in one particular only, and sustain
no other relation to each other than this: they have, as objects
of perception or contemplation, existed in the mind as causes
of similar feelings to those awakened by the incident under
consideration. The hypothesis before us is the only one colnceivable, which accounts for such phenomena.
2. Pheiiomiena of Dreaniing. -The phenomena of dreaming can readily be accounted for on this hypothesis, and, as I
conceive, upon no other. In consequence of peculiar attitudes
of the body, or states of the physical or mental system, certain
13
145
I 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPIIY.
feelings are awakened in the mind. Those objects of thought
or perception, which have formerly co-existed with similar
feelings, are consequently suggested; and these are judged to be
the causes of existing feelings. A sick man, for example, with
a bottle of hot water at his feet, dreamed that he was walking
upon the crater of AEtna, and that this was the cause of the
burning sensation which he felt.  He had formerly felt similar
sensations when walk;ng upon the crater of Vesuvius, and had
just been reading of a traveler's walking upon the crater of
JEtna. These facts fully account for his dream. In a similar
manner, all the phenomena of dreaming may be accounted for.
Can they be accounted for by the common laws of Association?
I answer, no.
3. Phenomena  of Som?zambttism. -Some of the  phenomena of somnambulism here deserve an attentive consideration.  It is well known that somnambulists frequently pass
from a state of wakefulness to that of sleep, and vice versa,
very suddenly; and that in each change, there is an entire oblivion of what passed in the preceding state; while the train
of thought, or the employment left, when passing from the
present state, is, on returning to that state, instantly resumed,
at the very point where it was left.  Sentences left half finished, when passing out of one state, are completed as soon as
the individual  enters  upon the same  state  again.   How
manifest, from such phenomena, is the fact, that th, universal law of suggestion is based upon similarity of states or
feelings.
4. Facts connected with particular Diseases.- There are
many facts connected with particular diseases, which more
fully confirm and illustrate the principle which I am endeavoring to establish.  Take, as a specimen, the two following cases
stated by Dr. Abercrombie, in his Intellectual Philosophy. I
give them in the words of the author:
146
.1 
ASSOCIATION.
" Another very remarkable modification of this affection is
referred to by Mr. Combe, as described by Major Elliot, professor of i1athematics in the United States' Military Academy
at West Point.  The patient was a young lady of cultivated
mind, and the affection began with an attack of somnolency,
which was protracted several hours beyond the usual time.
When she came out of it, she was found to have lost every
kind of acquired knowledge. She immediately began to apply
herself to the first elements of education, and was making
considerable progress, when, after several months, she was
seized with a second fit of somnolency. She was now at once
restored to all the knowledge which she possessed before the
first attack, but without the least recollection of anything that
had taken place during the interval. After another interval
she had a third attack of somnolency, which left her in the
same state as after the first.  In this manner she suffered
these alternate conditions for a period of four years, with the
very remarkable circumstance that during the one state she
retained all her original knowledge; but during the other,
that only which she had acquired since the first attack.  During the healthy interval, for example, she was remarkable for
the beauty of her penmanship, but during the paroxysm wrote
a poor, awkward hand.  Persons introduced to her during the
paroxysm she recognized only in a subsequent paroxysm, but
not in the interval; and persons whom she had seen for the
first time during the healthy interval, she did not recognize
during the attack."
" Dr. Prichard mentions a lady who was liable to sudden
attacks of delirium, which, after continuing for various periods,
went off suddenly, leaving her at once perfectly rational. The
attack was often so sudden that it commenced while she was
engaged in interesting conversation, and on such occasions it
happened, that on her recovery from the state of delirium she
147 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
instantly recurred to the conversation she had been engaged in
at the time of the attack, though she had never referred to it
during the continuance of the affection. To such a degree
was this carried, that she would even complete an unfinished
sentence.   During the subsequent paroxysm, again, she would
pursue the train of ideas which had occupied her mind in the
former. MIr. Combe also mentions a porter, who in a state of
intoxication left a parcel at a wrong house, and when sober
could not recollect what he had done with it. But the next
time he got drunk, he recollected where he left it, and went
and recovered it."
Here are manifest and striking facts of Association. On
the commonly received laws of the associating principle, they
cannot be explained at all. On the hypothesis under consideration, however, they admit of a most ready explanation. How
can they be explained on any other hypothesis?
I will adduce another fact taken from the same author.
" A case has been related to me of a boy, who at the age
of four received a fracture of the skull, for which he underwent the operation of trepan.  Ile was at the time in a state
of perfect stupor, and after his recovery retained no recollection
either of the accident or the operation.  At the age of fifteen,
during the delirium of a fever, he gave his mother a correct
description of the operation, and the persons who were present
at it, with their dress, and other minute particulars.   lie had
never been observed to allude to it before, and no means were
known by which he could have acquired the circumstances
which he mentioned."
But one explanation can be given of such a remarkable
fact. During the interval between the surgical operation and
the sickness referred to, the feelings existing in connection
with the operation had never been revived, and from the pecu
148
.1 
ASSOCIATION.
liarity of the feelings could not have been. During this sickness, in consequence of the action of the fever upon the brain
and skull, these feelings were revived. The consequence was,
that the circumstances attending their existence were recalled.
No other hypothesis can explain such facts.
5. This fjfpothesis established and illustrated, by reflectiij( ztpon the facts of Association.-  Every true explanation
of the facts of Consciousness, will, as soon as it is understood,
be confirmed in the conviction of every one who understands
it, as he subsequently reflects on what passes in the interior
of his own mind.   This is, in a special manner true of the
hypothesis under consideration.   Every person  who understands it, subsequently finds its truth confirmed and illustrated
by his own reflections upon the facts of Association, as they
fall under the eye of his Consciousness.
ARGUMENT SUMMARILY STATED.
The argument in support of the principle of Association
under consideration may be summarily stated, in the following
propositions:
1. It is known to exist as a law of Association, in certain
cases-in all instances of Association founded on the relations of analogy. No other reason can be assigned why the
conception of a hero, for example, suggests that of the lion,
but the fact that they have each co-existed with similar feelings, and as causes of such feelings.
2. All the phenomena, explicable by the commonly received
laws of Association, admit of an equally ready and consistent
explanation, upon the hypothesis before us.
3. All other phenomena, which cannot be explained by the
commonly received laws, admit also of a ready explanation,
when referred to the above hypothesis.
13*
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INTELLECTUAL PHIIILOSOPHY.
4. No other hypothesis yet known, explains all the phenomena of Association.
WTe are at liberty then to assume, that the hypothesis with
which we started, ceases to be an hypothesis. It may be regarded as the law of Association.
EXPLANATORY REMARKS.
To understand fully the operation of the associating principle, two circumstances pertaining to it demand special attention.
The first is the fact, that when a deep impression has been
made upon the mind by any thought or perception, the feeling
excited may not only be revived by some subsequent thought
or perception, but those feelings may afterwards recur spontaCneousl, without any other apparent cause, than the well-known
mental tendency to return to states in which our minds have
previously existed. When we have listened to an enchanting
musical performance, for example, who has not, months subsequent to the event, felt, in the depths of the inner being, the
spontaneous movements of the cords of melody, which were
so powerfully swept on the occasion referred to, and which, at
once, bring the whole past scene into distinct remembrance?
The law of Association is this:  When any feeling which has
co-existed with any past intellectual state is revived, whether
that revival is spontaneous, or is occasioned by some present
thought or perception, that state will recur again, as a consequence of the revival of this feeling.
The second remark is this: The feeling which has coexisted with any former intellectual state, need not be wholly,
but only partially revived, in order to occasion the recurrence
of that state.  Let some present occurrence produce feelings
of joy, wonder, surprise, or regret, for example. Should any
subsequent event excite these feelings in only a very slight
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ASSOCIATION.
degree, the former occurrence would thereby be suggested.
This is a universal characteristic of the action of the principle
of Association.
REASONS WHY DIFFERENT OBJECTS EXCITE SIMILAR FEEL                   INGS IN OUR MIINDS.
The law of associations has been stated and illustrated.
We are now prepared for another important inquiry, to wit,
On?, tihat i)ifnciple is it that clifferent objects, or rather tho?ughts
and }perceptions, excite similar feelin~gs in our monds, and thus
ntutually sitggest each other?  The following may be specified
as the most important reasons why different objects excite such
feelings:
1. In consequence of natural resemblance between the objects themselves.   That objects naturally alike should excite
similar feelings, is a necessary consequence of personal identity.
Such objects do not suggest one another, because they are
alike, but because, that being alike, they excite similar feelings. The principle of association in such instances, is the
same as in all others.
2. Objects excite similar feelings, and thus mutually suggest each other, in consequence of similarity of relations to
the originalprincipls of our nature.  Sweetness, beauty, and
harmony, as mere objects of sense, are totally unlike.  But
they may and do sustain such a relation to the original prin ciples of our nature, as to induce similar states of mind.
Consequently, the perception of one may suggest that of the
other. Thus the origin of figurative language, such as sweet
or beautiful sounds, admits of a ready explanation.   Also the
sublime comparisons of poetry and oratory, founded upon  the
relations of analogy.   An  Indian  orator, speaking  of  the
American Revolution, said, " That it was like the whirlwind,
which tears up the trees, and tosses to and fro the leavcs, till
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INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
we cannot tell from whence they come, or whither they will
fall. At length the Great Spirit spoke to the whirlwind, and
it was still."  Says another, whose age numbered more than
one hundred years: "I am the aged hemlock.  The winds of
an hundred winters have whistled through my branches, and I
am dead at the top."  "' And I heard," says the sacred writer,
"as it were the voice of a great multitude, and as the voice of
many waters, and as the voice of mighty thunderings, saying,
Allclujah; for the Lord God omnipotent reigneth." Milton,
speaking of the breaking up of the counsel of Pandemonium,
says:
"Their rising all at once, was as the sound
Of thunder heard remote."
An aged soldier, in one of the tragedies, says of himself:
"For I have fought when few alive remained,
And none unscathed; when but few remained,
Thus marred and mangled-as belike you've seen
0' summer's night, around the evening lamp,
Some scorched moths, wingless, and half consumed,
Just feebly crawling o'er their heaps of dead."
How different, as mere objects of sense, are all the things
compared together in the above quotations.   But sustaining a
common relation to the original laws of the mind, they induce
similar feelings or states of mind.   Consequently, the apprehension of one, suggests that of the other.
3. Objects co-exist with, and excite similar feelings, in
consequence of a peceicvedc  relation between  the objects themselves; such, for example, as the relations of cause and effect
-parent and child, &c. Why it is that the feelings excited
by one of these objects are transferred to the other as soon as
the relation between them is perceived, we cannot tell. All
that we can say is, that such is the constitution of our minds,
152
I 
ASSOCIATION.
that when two objects are known to sustain such relations to
each other, they will, in all ordinary circumstances, excite
similar feelings, and the idea of one will, consequently, suggest that of the other.
4. Objects co-exist with similar feelings in consequence of
mere accidental association. Whenever the mind has been
brought from any cause whatever, into any particular state,
the accidental perception of any object, or suggestion of any
thought, however foreign to the cause of the present state,
will so modify that state, that the new object will ever after
sustain an entirely new relation to the Sensibility of our nature.  To the present state of the mind, thus modified, it sustains the relation of a cause.   Consequently, its subsequent
presence as an object of perception, or of conception, will
excite, in a greater or less degree, that state, and will of course
recall the objects which formerly co-existed with the same
state. Thus the same object may, at different periods of our
lives, be associated with entirely different, and even opposite
states of mind, and states of mind totally different firom what
they are naturally adapted to produce. Thus of course they
may, and will recall entirely different objects to our remembrance. In many instances, we find it wholly impossible to
account for the change which has taken place in the effect
of particular objects upon our Sensibility, and consequently
upon our trains of association; so gradual, and accidental, has
been the transfer of the object from one state of feeling to
another.
APPLICATION OF THiE PRINCIPLES ABOVE ILLUSTRATED.
The law of Association which has been confirmed and illustrated, has many and very important applications. To a few
of these special attention is invited, as we conclude the present
Chapter.
153 
INTELLECTUAL PHIILOSOPHY.
Ground of the Jlistake of Philosophers in respect to th7e Laws
of Association.
WVe are now prepared to state distinctly the groundof the
mistake of philosophers, pertaining to the laws of Association.
Because objects sustaining certain relations to each other do
mutually suggest one another, they have fastened upon these
relations as the laws of Association.   In this manner, they
have overlooked the fact, that objects suggest each other, only
on the ground of a common impression made by each upon the
mind, and that the relations existing between them present
the reason why they make a common impression, instead of
revealing laws of the associating principle. Philosophers have
noticed the fact, that some objects are associated on the exclusive ground of a common impression. Yet they have singularly overlooked the universal law of Association revealed in
that fact.   "Things,"  says Mr.  Stewart, "which have no
known relation to each other, are often associated, in consequence of their producing similar effects on the mind. Some
of the finest poetical allusions are founded on this principle;
and, accordingly, if the reader is not possessed of sensibility
congenial to that of the poet, he will be apt to overlook their
meaning or censure them as absurd." Now, had the question
suggested itself to this philosopher, Is not this the condition
and ground of all Association of every kind, and do not
objects sustaining to each other the relations of resemblance,
contiguity in time and place, contrast, cause and effect, and
analogy, mutually suggest each other, because, that being thus
related, they produce a common impression? he would  have
perceived, at once, that his mind had dropped down upon the
universal law of Association.
154 
ASSOCIATION.
Action of the associating Principe it deffcreit Il,diviiduials.
Ve are all familiar with the fact, that the action of the
associating principle is very different in different individuals.
This is evidently owing to two circumstances -  natural temperament, and the diverse pursuits of individuals - one thereby being more deeply interested in, and consequently more
deeply impressed with different objects, and with different elements of the same object, than another.   Let any number of
individuals of diverse temperaments, for example, contemplate
the same painting, each will be more forcibly impressed with
those features of it particularly correlated to his own peculiarities of natural temperament.   Hence the corresponding diversity of the action of the associating principle, in such a case.
So with a gentleman on a tour of observation, a merchant engaged in the purchase and sale of grain, and a farmer seeking
a location for his family, in looking over the same plantation.
Each will contemplate it in the light of the leading idea in his
own mind. A corresponding diversity will of course exist in
the impressions received, and in the consequent action of the
associating principle.
Influence of Habit.
That actions and trains of thought, to which we have been
long familiar, are performed and carried on by us with a degree of ease and exactness perfectly unaccountable to a new
beginner, is obvious to every one. In respect to the ease and
exactness with which trains of physical actions to which we
have become habituated are repeated, two reasons may be assigned.
The first is, a certain conformation of the physical organization, so that, as soon as the train is commenced, the action
155 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
of the muscles in obedience to the will is spontaneous and necessary in a given order of action.
The second is, the fact that all the actions under consideration have become indissolubly associated with the same state of
mind.   Of course, as soon as that state is reproduced, those
actions are spontaneously suggested in their proper order.
The same remarks are equally applicable to trains of
thought to which we have become habituated. When the
mind has often existed in a certain state, there is, as shown
above, a strong tendency, spontaneously, or on the slightest
impression, to recur to that state again.   The train of thought
having become associated with this state is, of course, pursued
with precision and facility.
Standards of Taste and cFashion.
"A mode of dress," says Dugald Stewart, " which at first
appears awkward, acquires in a few weeks or months, the appearance of elegance.  By being accustomed to see it worn
by others whom we consider as models of taste, it becomes associated with the agreeable impressions which we receive from
the ease, and grace, and refinement of their manners." Thus
the pronunciation common to the higher classes in Edinburgh,
while it remained the capital of Scotland, and which was then
regarded as the standard of purity in diction, has now become
barbarous, in consequence of the removal of the capital to
London.
Vicissitudes in respect to such Standards.
Every one is familiar with the perpetual vicissitudes in
dress, and everything, the chief recommendation of which is
fashion.  The remarks of Mr. Stewart on this point also, are
so much to the purpose, and so well expressed, that I will ven- 
156 
ASSOCIATION.
ture another citation from him.   "It is evident that, as far as
the agreeable effect of ornament arises from association, the effect will continue only while it is confined to the higher orders.
When it is adopted by the multitude, it not only ceases to be
associated with ideas of taste and refinement, but it is associated with ideas of affectation, absurd imitation, and vulgarity.
It is accordingly laid aside by the higher orders, who studiously avoid every circumstance in external appearance, which
is debased by low and common use; and they are led to exercise their invention in the introduction of some new peculiarities, which first become fashionable, then common, and last of
all are abandoned as vulgar." There is one circumstance
which Mr. Stewart has not mentioned, which has perhaps quite
as much influence in inducing these vicissitudes as that presented above.   "The higher classes" are pleased with revolutions in society which are visibly produced by themselves, and
which do not diminish, but increase and render manifest, to
themselves and the world, their own controlling influence. In
the perpetual vicissitudes of costume proceeding from and controlled by themselves, they are continually manifested to themselves as the " glass of fashion, and the mould of form."
Thus a continued gratification of the love of power is enjoyed,
a motive not the most commendable to be sure, but yet quite
as real as that above presented
Peculiarities of Genius associated with Judgment  or correct
Taste.
We are now able to state distinctly the pecularities of true
genius, when associated with good Judgment. It consists in
distinguishing those things which please simply in consequence
of accidental associations, like those above referred to, from
those which are correlated to the original and changeless prin            14
157 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPIIY.
ciples of our nature, and in thus shadowing forth the real and
permanent forms of beauty, sublimity, and fitness.  Those
forms of thought which stand correlated to the current opinions of the day, may have a wide-spread ephemeral popularity,
after which they sink to a silent or dishonored grave, and a
long oblivion. The productions of true genius, associated with
good taste, on the other hand, will please as long as human nature remains what it is.
Influence of Writers and  Speakers of splendid Genius, bat
,'ncor2-rect Taste.
It is well known, that very strong conceptive and imaginative faculties (the peculiarities of true genius), sometimes exist in the absence of a well-balanced Judgment, and consequent
good taste.  The> productions of such individuals will be characterized by surpassing excellencies, and glaring defects. Yet
the mass of their admirers will, in time, become as well pleased
with the latter as with the former; and the defects will be more
frequently copied by imitators, perhaps, than the excellencies.
The reason is this:  The defects come  to be associated with
the feelings of interest and delight which the excellencies excite. The former are thus embalmed and consecrated by the
latter. Every individual who would preserve his taste unvitiated, should be, in a special sense, on his guard under such
circumstances.
D)anger of vicious Association)s.
Great genius and great vices, polished manners and corrupt
morals, and productions the most finished in respect to style
and imagery, and the most foul in respect to sentiment, are
not unfrequently associated among men.   The imminent peril
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.1 
ASSOCIATION.
of intercommunion with such minds and with such productions, is manifest, in the light of the law of Association above
illustrated. The feelings of sublimity, beauty, and delight,
awakened by the contemplation of great minds, polished man.
ners, and the perfections of style and imagery, at first weaken,
and finally entirely supplant the feelings of disgust, abhorrence, and repellency, which the contemplation of vice, and
corrupt principle, in their unassociated grossness, excites. The
final result is, the acquirement of polished manners and style,
with the loss of virtue and virtuous principles. That " which
cannot be gotten for gold," and for " which silver cannot be
weighed as the price thereof," in comparison with which " no
mention shall be made of coral or of pearls, and the price of
which is above rubies," has been exchanged for that which
might have been attained in much higher perfection without
this irreparable loss; but which may exist in connection with
the foulest morals, and an equal pre-eminence in guilt.
Unrighteous Prejudices, 7how jistifed.
Every individual is familiar with the fact, that persons and
classes of men, placed in circumstances degrading in public
estimation, often become the victims of cruel and unrighteous
prejudice.   Some circumstance, aside from condition, is fastened upon as the cause of this feeling, which is thus justified,
on the assumption that it is natural, and therefore necessary,
designed and sanctioned by Providence. Feelings connected
with individuals by accidental association, are assumed as resulting from the original constitution of our nature, and are
justified on that assumption.
159 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
Givingy Individuals a  bad Name, spreading  false Re                       ports, &c.
It is very frequently asserted as a proverb, that the evils
resulting from giving persons a bad name, and spreading false
reports respecting them, will ere long correct, and more than
correct themselves, in consequence of a reaction of public
feeling, as the truth comes to be known. This would be true,
were men disposed to render impartial justice in all instances.
But this is far from being the case. Pre-eminent virtues and
endowments, together with a commanding influence, may often,
under such circumstances, occasion a reaction of public feeling
which will perfectly overwhelm the authors of the mischief.
The standing of the mass of mankind, however, is not such as
to occasion such reaction, even when the wrong done comes to
be known.   Hence it often happens that-the feelings first
awakened come to be permanently, to a greater or less degree,
associated with them in the public mind. If this is not so, no
thanks are due to those who first set the ball rolling.
ISfltence of the associating Prin?ciple in perpetuating existing
mental Characteristics.
"To the pure," says the Sacred Writer, "all things are
pure; but to the corrupt and unbelieving, there is nothing
pure." In other words, a mind truly pure comes to be so
correllated to objects in respect to not only the action of the
voluntary power, but also in respect to the Sensibility and
Intelligence, that all things awaken thoughts and feelings
tending to perpetuate and increase that purity. The same is
true with the vicious. Every object of thought and perception
is brought into such a relation to their Minds, as to generate
thoughts and feelings which tend only to develop and confirm
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.1 
ASbOCIATION.
existing tendencies to corruption. This law of self-perpetuation which virtue and vice respectively possess, is found
in the associating principle. In a Mind which has long been
the cage of impure thoughts and feelings, those feelings at
last come to be associated with all objects of thought, and
thus the entire current of thought and feeling is turned into
an impure channel.
There are no limits to the application of the associating
principle, as above illustrated. Its importance in mental science will be appreciated as it is understood in its endlessly
diversified applications.
14*
161 
CHAPTER X.
MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION.
TERMS DEFINED.
MEMORY and Recollection are treated by philosophers only
as important departments of the principle of Association.
This, as we shall see, is demanded by sound philosophical
analysis. The two terms above named are often used interchangeably, and never distinguished but by the following
circumstances. In the process denominated Memory, notions,
or conceptions of facts and events, are spontaneously recalled
to the Mind. In that called Recollection, these Intellectual
states are recalled by an effort of Will.
STATES OF MIND ENTERING INTO AND CONNECTED WITHII
THESE PROCESSES.
There are three distinct mental operations connected with
each of these processes of Mind.
1. Some feeling or state of Mlind which has formerly coexisted with the perception or apprehension of the object recalled -a feeling or state spontaneously recurring, or revived
by some object of present thought, perception, or sensation.
2. A simple apprehension of the object or event itselfan apprehension attended with no belief or judgment whatever
pertaining to the object.
3. A recurrence, in thought, of the circumstances of time 
MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION.
and place connected with the perception or apprehension of the
object.
The above statement verifccl.
That objects of Memory and Recollection are not recalled
directly and immediately, but are suggested, in the manner
above described, is obvious from two considerations.
1. From universal Consciousness.   Those  who  are least
accustomed to analyze the operations of their own minds, as
well as philosophers, have noticed this fact.  Hence the common affirmations: "This reminds me of," or " This suggests
to my mind such and such occurrences," clearly showing, not
merely that such events are suggested, but that the subjects
of them are conscious of it.
2. Wvhen we wish to recollect any events, or in the common phrase, to recall them, we do not attempt to do this
directly, but by directing the attention to various objects, at
present before the Mind, that they may suggest those which
we wish to recall.  Memory and Recollection are, in this respect, subject to precisely the same law, and the law which
governs each is the same which governs the entire phenomena
of Association. The above remark is so obviously true, that
philosophers, as stated above, almost universally treat of these
subjects in the same connection, Memory being considered
only as one department of Association.
PRINCIPLE ON WHICH OBJECTS ARE REMEMBERED IVITHI
EASE AND DISTINCTNESS.
Taking this position for granted, or as having been already
proved, it will follow, as a necessary consequence, that the
ease and distinctness with which any objects or events will be
recalled to the Mind, will always be proportioned to the depth
and intensity of the impressions formerly received from them,
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INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHIIY.
and with the number of objects and events with which such
impressions have heretofore co-existed, or may hereafter coexist. This conclusion we also find to be confirmed by universal experience.  When you hear the declaration, "Such and
such events I shall never forget," suppose you ask the reason
for such an affirmation.   The answer will invariably be, "It
made such a deep IMPtrRESSION upon my  MIind."   On  the
other hand, if a person is asked for the reason why he recalls
with such difficulty any particular event, he will uniformly
answer, "It made such a feeble impression upon my  lind."
Assuming that the state of the Sensibility is the regulating
principle of suggestion, the fact is self-evident, that the case
with which any particular event will be recalled, depends not
only upon the depth and intensity of the impression which it
formerly made, but upon the number of objects or events with
which such impression may have co-existed, and shall hereafter
co-exist.
Deep and distinct Iinpressionls, ont what con'ditioned.
One inquiry, of no small importance in mental science,
here claims our attention, to wit, the circumstances under
which impressions received from objects of thought or perception are rendered deep and distinct. Among these I notice
the three following, as the most important:
1. Attention. In former Chapters it has been shown that
attention is the condition of distinct perception, both in respect to the phenomena of Sense and Consciousness.   In
walking, for example, we do not remember the particular acts
of volition, which directed each particular step.   Yet we know
that we must have been conscious of such acts. The eye
runs carelessly over a particular landscape, and nothing but
the most general outline is remembered, while we know that
each particular part must have been seen by us.   For the
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MIEMORY AND RECOLLECTION.
want of attention, however, these objects were not distinctly
perceived.  Of course no distinct and vivid impression was
made upon the Mind, and consequently they are not remembered. The manner in which attention influences Memory is
twofold.  It not only impresses deeply and distinctly on the
Mind particular scenes, each taken as a whole, but all the
parts of such scenes. Hence the whole of such scenes will be
recalled by the perception or suggestion of any particular part
which may be met with in other scenes. That Memory, however, does not depend primarily upon attention, but on the
irnpressiot made by an objectsof attention, is evident from the
fact, that the ease with which any particular event is recalled,
is not proportioned to the degree of attention devoted to it,
but to the vividness of the impression received from it.
2. The impressions made upon the mind by a particular
event, and consequently the ease with which it will be remembered, depends upon the circumnstances in which the event occurred -circumstances external to the Mind; such for example, as its occurrence at a time or place unexpected, in
connection with other events deeply interesting to us, &c.
3. The impression which events make on the Mind, depends upon the state of  the  1-id itself, when they occur.
Offices of kindness, when we little need them, make a coimparatively slight impression upon the Mind.  They are accordingly forgotten with comparative ease. But the stranger who
watched over us when we were sick in a strange land, we
never forget, for the obvious reason that such occurrences are
deeply impressed upon the Mind. Who is not aware that the
impression made upon the Mind in reading a book, listening
to a discourse, or witnessing any scene, and consequently the
ease and distinctness with which they are recalled, depends
greatly upon the state of Mind at the time?
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INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPHY.
DIVERSITY OF POWERS OF MEMORY, AS DEVELOPED IN DIF                   FERENT INDIVIDUALS.
Assuming the principle, that those things of which we
have formed distinct conceptions, and which have deeply moved
and affected our Sensibility, will be easily and distinctly remembered, the diverse kinds of Memory, as they appear in
different individuals, may be readily explained.
Philosophic Memory.
The philosopher is, above all things, interested in universal
truths and general principles, and in facts which illustrate such
truths and principles.   WVith names, and minor circumstances
of timle and place, he has little or no interest.  These, of course,
he seldom recalls; while general principles and facts connected
with, and illustrative of general principles, he never forgets.
Here we have the peculiarities of what may be called Philosophical MIemory.
Local 3iemory.
With general principles, however, the mass of men  axe
very little interested.   Events, as mere events, with all their
circumstances of time, place, &c., are the things which chiefly
interest them.   In such cases, general princeiples, if understood at all, will readily pass from the Mind, while facts and
events, with all their adventitious circumstances, will leave their
permanent impress upon it.  HIere we have the characteristics
of what is called Local Memory.
Artfcial -3lTemory.
The third and only kind of 3Iemory which it is necessary
to notice, is called Artificial Memory, a method of connecting
things easily remembered with those which are recalled with
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MIEMORY AND RECOLLECTION.
greater difficulty, that the latter may be recalled by means of
the former. The manner in which the principle of suggestion
operates in this instance, may be readily explained. The two
objects are brought into the relation of co-existence with one
and the same state of M3ind; and the familiar object, by exciting that state, recalls the one less familiar. The inexpediency of resorting to such associations, excepting upon trivial
subjects, is so obvious as not to need any particular remarks.
MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
A few topics of a somewhat  miscellaneous character, connected with our present inquiries will close this Chapter.
A ready and retentive Memory.
The distinction between what is called a ready, and retentive MIemory, next demands attention. A philosophical Memory is known to be the most attentive and least ready.  General
principles are regarded by the philosopher, as above all price.
These of course he never forgets.   For the same reason, facts
and events connected with, and illustrative of general principles leave an impress equally permanent upon his mind. The
Memory of such a person however, will not, in ordinary circumstances, be ready, for the obvious reason that when he
wishes to recall any particular fact, he finds it necessary first
to recall the general principle with which it was associated.
For the same reason, Local Memory will be more ready, but
less retentive. The qualities in objects with which such persons are interested, exist alike in such an infinite variety of
objects, that when this quality is met with, a great multitude
of similar objects will be at once suggested. They will generally be those however, which have been most recently seen.
Persons possessing Local Memory merely, will excel in common conversation, and in what may be called loose and
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INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
rambling composition. Philosophical 3Iemory displays itself
in the laboratory, the hall of science, on the bench, in the
lecture room, and pulpit.
The vast and diverse Power of Mlemory possessed by d~erent
Individual7s.
The degree in which this faculty is developed in different
individuals, may now be readily accounted for. It is owing,
as I suppose, to two circumstances -natural diversities in
which the power is possessed by different individuals, and an
accidental direction of the power. Themistocles knew every
citizen of Athens by name. Cyrus and Hannibal had each a
similar knowledge of every soldier in his respective army.
Their original endowments made them capable of such acquisitions. They made such acquisitions, because they considered
them necessary to the end they designed to accomplish.
Improvement of Memory.
But for the faculty under consideration, the past would be
to us, as if it had not been. No advantages could be derived
from experience of our own or that of others. Existence, at
each successive moment,  must be commenced anew.   The
same errors and follies, which formerly occurred, must be
repeated, without the possibility of improvement. Through
this faculty, the past furnishes the chart and compass for the
future. The progress of improvement is onward, with perpetually accumulating force.  The question, therefore, How can
this faculty be improved? presents itself, as of special inmportance. The following suggestions may not be out of place
on this point:
1. The first thing to be kept distinctly in Mind, in all plans
for the permanent improvement of Memory, is the princi)le
on which its ready and retentive action depends, to wit, deep
168 
MIEMIORY AND RECOLLECTION.
and dstinct iil])ession.  All our plans for the accomplish   ment of the object under consideration, should be formed with
direct reference to this one principle.
2. As impressions depend very much upon distinctness of
conception, in all efforts, to improve this faculty, we should
habituate ourselves toform) dcistitter concel-tioGs of objects, es   pecially of those which we wish to recollect.  In this manner,
the impression will not only be deep and permanent, but the
notion associated with it being distinct, will, when recalled.,
possess a corresponding distinctness.
3. In thought, the object should be located, in distinct
relation to the circimstances of time anid place with which it
is associated.  In this manner the impression and conception
both will not only be rendered deep and distinct, but each cir  cumstance referred to, as it recurs in connection with other
thoughts and perceptions will, by exciting the feelings under
consideration, recall the object associated with it.
4. Knowledge, in order to be retained permanently, must
be systematized and reduced to general perw,anegit _principles.
Otherwise, it will be exclusively subject to the law of local
Association which is so temporary in respect to retention.
5. To converse with others, and write down our thoughts
which we wish to retain, contributes to permanency and dis tinctness-of recollection.   Knowledge, by this means, is rendered distinct, the corresponding impression deep and permanent, and the whole subject of thought miost likely to be
systematically arranged.   All these circumstances tend to render Miemory distinct and permanent.
6. iIemory also, to be improved, must be trusted, but at
the same time, not overburdened, as is the case when everything is committed to it, without the aid of a judicious
diary of important thoughts and occurrences.   That faculty
which is not exercised will not be developed and improved.
15
169 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIHY.
Miemory is not exempt from this law. At the same time, to
overburden a faculty is a sure way to palsy its energies.
Nothing but Refiection and Judgment, properly exercised, can
fix upon the line where memory should and should not be
trusted, without the aid of written records of our thoughts,
and thus secure a proper development of this faculty.
3fremory of the Aged.
One of the first indications of the approaching feebleness
of age, is the failure, in a greater or less degree, of the power
of MIemqry. A characteristic precisely the opposite is also
sometimes presented in the experience of aged persons - a
wonderful revival of the Memory of the occurrences of early
life. A lady of my acquaintance, for example, aged about
ninety years, had occasion to amuse some of her great-grandchildren one day. She thought she would, as a means to this
end, relate to them the substance of a story, related in verse,
which she had read, when quite young.   She had never committed it to memory, and doubtless had thought little of it for
more than half a century.   As she commenced  the story, the
entire poem came fresh to her recollection.   She could repeat
it all, word for word. These two facts in the experience of the
aged, the failure, on the one hand, and the wonderful revival
of this power, on the other, need to be accounted for.
In respect to the fi-st class of phenomena, two reasons
may be assigned for their existence:
1. The failure of the faculty of perception and attention.
As a consequence, distinct notions are not formed of objects
of present thought and perception. Nor do they affect the
MIind as they formerly did. For these reasons, the peculiar
feelings which have co-existed with former thoughts and per ceptions, and would, if revived, suggest them, are not revived.
2. In the failing of the perceptive faculty, there is a cor
170 
MEMORPY AND RECOLLECTION.
responding change in the correlation of the Sensibility to ob jects of thought and perception.   Hence  the  same feelings
precisely are not now excited by objects of thought and perception, as formerly, and consequently former intellectual states
are not reproduced.
In respect to the second class, I would remarkl, that every
one is aware, that amid the hurrying scenes of ordinary life,
such crowds of associations rush upon the mind, at one and
the same time, that no one entire scene of the past, is often
distinctly recalled. On the other hand, when we are in a
state of temporary isolation from the varying tide of events
which is floating by and around us, then is the time when our
recollections of the past become full and distinct. Now the
aged are in a state of isolation of a more permanent character.
Hence when a past scene is recalled, the 3lind is in a state of
comparative freedom from all diverting and distracting associations.  Consequently the scene, in its entireness, is brought
into full and distinct remembrance.
Duratio?n of Jiemory.
If the law of Association illustrated in the preceding Chapter be admitted as true, it will follow, as a matter of course,
that  Memory is absolutely indestructible.   Thought can never
perish. If the impression with which any thought has coexisted, should, at any period, however remote, be in any formi
revived, the thought itself may be recalled.   If any element
of a given impression be reproduced, no reason can be assigned
why a thought which co-existed with it, myriads of ages ago,
should not thereby be recalled, as well as the one which coexisted with it but yesterday.
Numberless facts also, which lie around us in society, fully
confirm the principle under consideration as a law of Memnory.
The case of the aged lady referred to above, presents a fact
171
I 
INTELLECTUAL PHIILOSOPI-IY.
of the kind.  The most striking one that now recurs to my
recollection is given by Coleridge. It is the case of a German
girl who had always labored as a domestic.  WThile Coleridge
was on a visit to Germany, and in the vicinity of her residence, she sickened, and if I mistake not, died. During her
sickness, she began to utter sentences in languages unknown
to all her attendants.  Learned men, from a neighlboring University, were called in. It was then found that she was reciting, with perfect correctness, entire passages from the Ilebrew,
Greek, Arabic and Syriac Scriptures, and also from the writings of the ancient Fathers. The occurrence was, by many,
regarded as miraculous. A young physician in attendance,
however, determined to trace out her past history, for the purpose of finding a clue to the mystery.  HIe found at last, that
when quite small, the young woman had lived in the family of
an aged clergyman of great learning, who  was in the daily
habit of reading aloud in his study from the writings above
referred to. As the child was at work in a room contiguous,
she was accustomed to stop, from time to time, and listen to
those strange sounds, the meaning of not one of which did
she understand.  There was the clue to the mystery.  Those
sounds were imperishably impressed upon the Memory. Hence
their repetition, under the circumstances named.   Cases of a
similar nature might, to any extent, be adduced. They point
with solemn interest, to the nature of the immortal powers
within, as well as to facts of portentous moment in the future
development of those powers.
172 
CHAPTER XI.
THERE is hardly any department of the present Treatise, in
respect to which I feel a greater solicitude, than that upon
which we are now to enter. I freely acknowledge, that I have
not been satisfied with the views given upon the subject by
authors held in general repute. It is by no means certain,
however, that, when we have discovered real or apparent defects in the productions of others, we can produce anything
more perfect ourselves. It not unfrequently happens, also,
that the supposed defects lie in our own ideal, and not in that
in which we suppose ourselves to have found them.  All are
aware that there is such a function of the Intelligence as the
Imagination.   When we meet with any of its real creations
also, all recognize them as such. But then, when the questions are asked, What is this power? What are its functions?
or, WVhat are the laws of its action? a true answer does not so
readily occur, as, at first thought, might be anticipated.
DEFINITION OF DISTINGUISHED PHILOSOPHERS.
In further remarking upon the subject, I will first present
some of the definitions of this faculty, given by distinguished
philosophers. I begin with the definition of Dr. Brown: -
"We not only perceive objects," he observes, "and conceive
and remnember them as they were, but we have the power of
combining them with various new assemblages-of forming,
15'
IMAGINATION. 
INTELLECTUAL PHIILOSOPHIIY.
at our will, with a sort of delegated omnipotence, not a single
universe merely, but a new and varied universe, with every
succession of our thoughts."
"What is imagination," says 3Ir. Payne, "but  MIemory
presenting the objects of pure perceptions (in a manner afterwards to be explained) in groups, or combinations which do
not exist in nature?"
"In the exercise of the Imagination," says Abercrombie,
"We take the component parts of real scenes, events or characters, and combine them anew, by a process of the mind
itself, so as to form compounds, which have no existence in
nature."
"But we have the power of modifying our conceptions,"
says Mr. Dugald Stewart, " by combining the parts of different ones together, so as to form new wholes of our own creation. I shall employ the word Imagination, to express this
power."
"Imagination," says Professor Upham, "is a complex exercise of the mind, by means of which various conceptions are
combined together, so as to form new wholes."
It will be perceived at once, that, according to some of
these definitions, the Imagination has a primary reference to
the objects of sense; and according to all, its creations are
ffictioits, which have no corresponding realities in nature. Such
creations are composed of elements of perceptions of real
scenes; but yet these elements are so combined, that the creations, in all instances, have nothing corresponding to them in
the universe within or around us.
OBJECTIONS TO THIE ABOVE DEFINITIONS.
If these definitions be admitted as correct, and as presenting the entire and appropriate sphere of the Imiagination, we
must find some other faculty to which to attribute a large por
174 
IMAGINATION.
tion of the best poetry in existence. I will present a few
familiar quotations, as examples.
Take, in the first instance, Wordsworth's description of the
White Doe of Rylstone:
"White she is as the lily of June,
And beauteous as the silver moon
When out of sight the clouds are driven,
And she is left alone in heaven;
Or like a ship, some gentle day,
In sunshine sailing far away
A glittering ship that hath the plain
Of ocean for its wide domain."
Nothing is here presented but what really exists in nature.
Yet nothing but a creative Imagination, of a very high order,
could have shadowed forth such a beautiful conception.
Take, as another example, the 19th Psalm, as given in
our Bibles, or as thrown into verse in our common hymn
books:
"The heavens declare thy glory, Lord,
In every star thy wisdom shines."
"Thy noblest wonders here we view,
In souls renew'd, and sins forgiven," &c.
Who will pretend that we have not here the creations of
the Imagination, in its purest, highest flights? Yet in the
first instance there are no new combinations of sensible objects
presented, but a simple statement of facts in regard to objects
perfectly familiar.   In the second instance, no invisible object
is referred to, but simple facts in regard to spiritual objects.
Again:
"Along the banks where Babel's current flows,
Our captive bands in deep despondence strayed.
175 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
While Zion's fall in sad remembrance rose,
Her friends, her children, mingled with the dead.
"The tuneless harp, that once with joy we strung,
When praise employed, and mirth inspired the lay,
In mournful silence on the willows hung,
And growing grief prolonged the tedious day."
No one, surely, will pretend that here is a combination of objects of perception, which had no existence in nature.
Take the following lines from a poemn, designed to present
the scene which transpired in the wilderness where Elijah
lodged, after he fled from the wrath of Jezebel:
" Amidst the wilderness, alone,
The sad, foe-hunted prophet lay;
And darkened shadows round him thrown,
Shut out the cheerful light of day.
"The winds were laden with his sighs,
As resting'neath a lonely tree,
His spirit, torn with agonies,
In prayer was struggling to be free."
I make but one other selection, taken from Wordsworth's
Boy of Winander Mere:
" Who
Blew mimic hootings to the silent owls,
That they might answer him. And they would shout
Across the watery vale, and shout again
With long halloos, and screams, and echoes loud,
Redoubled and redoubled, concourse wild,
Of mirth, and jocund din. And when it chanced
That pauses of deep silence mocked his skill,
Then sometimes in that silence, while he hung
Listening, a gentle shock of wild surprise
Has carried far into his heart, the voice
176 
IMAGINATION.
Of mountain torrents; or the visible scene
Would enter, unawares, into his mind,
With all its solemn imagery, its rocks,
Its woods, and that uncertain heaven, received
Into the bosom of the steady lake."
Surely, in none of these instances, have the poets given
to "airy nothing a local habitation and a name."   Yet no
one fails to notice in all of them the appropriate results of the
Imagination.
I have still another objection to these definitions.  A  correct definition always gives at least the leading characteristic
of the object to which it pertains. Now the simple recombination of the elements of thought into conceptions which have
no corresponding realities in nature, if it be the exclusive
work of imagination, is the action of that faculty in its lowest
functions, a function in which its action is hardly to be distinguished from those of Understanding and Judgment. I
have seen a man, and I have seen a horse.  To conceive of the
body of the man substituted in the place of the neck and head
of the horse, gives the conception of a non-reality.  It is
hardly needful, however, to suppose the action of a new power,
to account for such a creation as that.  No one ever thinks of
saying of a given conception, This is the work of Imagination,
becautse no corresponding reality exists in nature. On the
other hand, when the child Milton presented to the judges
who were to award a prize to the pupil who should present the
best poem on the miracle of turning water into wine, the single line,
"The conscious water saw his God and blushed,"
it is no matter of wonder, that those judges looked at each
other with astonishment, and instantly awarded the prize to
the child-poet and genius before them.   If they could not
have given a correct definition of the Imagination, they could
177 
INTELLECT-CAL PHILOSOPIIY.
not fail to recognize themselves as' in the presence of one of
its sublime creations, and its author as possessed of a mind in
which that peculiar faculty was energizing with wondrous
power. The reason why they thus regarded this production
was not the fact, that it presented "a new whole," but that in
the creation itself there was the realization of a particular
i(lea, and its realization in a form adapted to impress the mind
with a pectliar scittiizeiit.  Hence we propose a new definition
of this faculty.
ANOTHER DEFINITION PROPOSED.
It now remains to attempt, at least, an enunciation of the
true conception of the Imagination.   An  object may sometimes be best explained by comparing it with another of which
we have distinct apprehensions. Of the Understanding we
have such apprehensions. The fundamental elements of all
its conceptions are, as we have seen, substance and quality,
cause and effect. It combines the elements given by the primary faculties as given, without modifying them at all.  It is
the faculty, in short, which takes cognizance of realities as
they are. Now we have in our minds other ideas than those
of substance and quality, cause and effect; such, for example,
as the ideas of the beautiful, the grand, and the sublime.
These ideas last named, do not respect objects as they really
exist (for they may, or may not, exist in harmony with such
ideas), but as arranged and combined in a given manner.   We
have in our minds, therefore, two entirely distinct classes of
conceptions-those which respect objects just as they exist in
the universe of matter and mind, within and around us, and
those in which the elements of such objects are in thought
combined, in harmony, more or less perfect, with fundamental
ideas in the mind. itself; as those of the beautiful, grand, sublime, &C. which do not respect objects as they are, but certain
i i-s 
LIAGINATION.
arrangements of such objects.  The function of the Intelli
gence which gives us the former class of conceptions, we have
denominated the Understanding.   That which gives us the
latter, that which "hovering o'er" all the elements of thought
appearing upon the field of Consciousness, combines tlhemn
into conceptions, more or less perfectly conformed to fund(lamental ideas, like those referred to above, is the Imagination.
By Coleridge it is called the "Esemplastie, or into-one-forming power."   It recombines the elements of thought into
conceptions which pertain not to mere existe?ces, but ideas
of the beautiful, the perfect, the sublime, &c., in the mind
itself. A conception of the understanding is perfect, when
it represents its object as it is, whatever the object may
be.   A  conception of the Imagination is perfect when it
shadows forth forms of beauty, grandeur, sublimity, &c., which
correspond with the idea in the mind. Understanding-conceptions are compared with the object.  The only standard
with which the creations of the Imagination are compared, is
the idea.
IMAGINATION AND FANCY DISTINGUISHED.
SIr. Dugald Stewart is the first philosopher that I have met
with, who makes a distinction between the Imagination and
Fancy. I will give the remarks to which I refer, as it will
prepare the way for the distinction which I wish to make.
"It is the power of Fancy," he observes, " which supplies the
poet with metaphorical language, and with all the analogies
which are the foundation of his allusions. But it is the power
of the Imagination, that creates the complex scenes he describes, and the fictitious characters which he delineates."
According to the distinction here made, it was the Imagination of MIilton, which created the whole scene and the particular characters presented in "Paradise Lost."  His Fancy, on
179 
INTELLECTUAL PHIIILOSOPIIY.
the other hand, furnished the figurative langfuage, analogies,
and illustrations with which it is adorned. The Fancy, as thus
described is, as it will readily be perceived, nothing but a particular department of the operation of the principle of Association. It collects the materials from which the Imagination
creates its scenes and characters, and then furnishes the attendant embellishments. In conformity to this view of the subject,
Fancy is defined by Coleridge, as the "aggregate and associative power."   Thus defined, while the Imagination is that
function of the Intelligence which is correlated to ideas of the
beautiful, the grand, the sublime, &c., the Fancy is that function of the associative principle, which is correlated to the
same ideas.
Anot/er Defitnitoia of the tern  Fancy.
There is another use of the term Fancy called "arbitrary
Imagination," or Imagination not governed by the pure ideas
of truth and beauty. In this use of the' faculty of Imagination, instead of the beautiful being shadowed forth, grotesque
images are produced with intentional violation of all laws of
esthetics. In the present Treatise, the term Fancy will be
used in conformity to the definition first given.
IMAGINATION AND FANCY ELUCIDATED.
Preliminaory Remarks.
I will here introduce two remarks, which it may be important to keep in mind, in order to a full appreciation of what is
to follow, and will then proceed to the illustration and elucidation of the subject before us:
1. The imniagination pre-supposes the Fancy, as the aggregative power; while the latter does not pre-suppose the former.
2. Upon these distinctions are founded the epithets com
180 
IMAGINATION.
monly applied to each, the Fancy being, in different individuals, denominated rich, luxuriant, or the opposite; the Imagination being denominated sublime, beautiful, or the opposite,
according to the nature and character of its creations.
Elucidation.
TWe now proceed to a further elucidation of the nature of
the Imagination, as distinguished from the Fancy, and of the
characteristics of each.  We will commence as the basis of
our illustrations, with a work familiar to all, and for that reason the more to our purpose, to wit,' Paradise Lost.' Before
Milton existed, the various parts of the entire scene presented
in this work, had been for ages before the minds of millions.
Every one that had read his Bible was perfectly familiar with
the revolt of Satan and his legions - the war in heaven - the
creation of man, and his fall, through the wiles of Satan -the
Eden of man's first abode, and his subsequent expulsion, &c.
These scenes, by the aggregative powers of the Fancy had
often been brought together in the same mind at the same
moment. But here they remained in scattered fragments,
" without form and void," as far as unity and identity are concerned, till a new creative power in the mind of Milton,
" moving upon the face of the waters," brought all the disordered and scattered elements into one harmonious whole. Now
what is this power which gave unity to all these endlessly diversified scenes?  It is the Imagination.  The  Fancy first
aggregates the materials - the elements.   The  imagination
then calls into being the "new heavens and the new earth,"
formed into a harmonious unity out of the elements thus
brought together.  The same remarks apply to all the individuals, &c., real or imaginary, presented to our contemplation in
the above poem.   For the further illustration of these remarks
I will now present a few extracts from the poem itself:
16
181 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHIIY.
" He scarce had ceased when the superior fiend
Was moving towards the shore; his pond'rous shield,
Ethereal temper, massy, large, and round,
Behind him cast; the broad circumference
Hung on his shoulders like the moon, whose orb
Through optic glass the Tuscan artist views,
At evening, from the top of Fesole,
Or in Valdarno to descry new lands,
Rivers or mountains in her spotty globe."
The character and scene here presented, were created by the
Imagination. The comparison of the shield to the moon, was
the suggestion of the Fancy. Again:
" Which when Beelzebub perceived, than whom
Satan except, none higher sat, with grave
Aspect he rose, and in his rising seemed
A pillar of state; deep on his front engraven.,
Deliberation sat, and public care;
And princely counsel in his face yet shone,
MIajestic though in ruin; sage he stood
With Atlantean shoulders fit to bear
The weight of mightiest monarchies; his look
Drew audience and attention, still as night
Or summer's noon-tide air, while thus he spake."
The operation distinct and separate of the two faculties under
consideration, is too obvious here to need any remarks.
To the same purpose I make one more quotation:
" He, above the rest,
In shape and gesture proudly eminent,
Stood like a tow'r; his form had yet not lost
All its original brightness, nor appear'd
Less than archangel ruined, and th' excess
Of glory obscur'd: as when the sun new risen
Looks through the horizontal misty air
Shorn of his beams: or from behind the moon,
182 
IMAGINATION.
In dim eclipse, disastrous twilight sheds
One half the nations, and with fear of change
Perplexes monarchs."
Here you perceive the propriety of the epithets, rich, and luxuriant, beautiful, and sublime, as applied to the Imagination
and Fancy. - An imagination, the creations of which are beautiful, grand or sublime, is characterized accordingly. As the
Fancy adorns such creations with analogies varied, multiplied,
and appropriate, it is denominated rich, luxuriant, &c.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CREATIONS OF THiE IMAGINATION.
The Imagination is exclusively a secondary faculty. It operates only upon elements which the other faculties furnish. As
the laws which control the Imagination, are the ideas of unity,
beauty, grandeur, sublimity, &c., it is by blending, in a
peculiar manner, the elements of thought and feeling which
lie under the eye of Consciousness, that this faculty shadows
forth those forms which correspond to these ideas.  MIy present object is to mark some of the principles in conformity to
which a creative imagination blends, unifies, and shadows forth
the forms of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity.
1. Elemnients of Diverse Scenes blended into one new TYhole.
The first that I mention is that already noticed in the case
of "Paradise Lost;" that in which the elements of different,
and widely diversified scenes, are combined into one harmonious whole - into one beautiful, grand, or sublime conception.
The character of the conception will depend upon two circumstances - the elements introduced into it - and the manner in
which they are blended. To move upon the elements of
thought, and blend them into form, in harmony with some one
conception, is the principal law which controls the Imagina
183
I 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
tion, in shadowing forth the beautiful, the grand, and the sublimne.  Nothing, almost, has greater influence in awakening in
us the sense of the beautiful, the grand, or the sublime, than
thus to contemplate parts of widely diversified scenes, which,
in our thoughts, have lain in scattered fragments, all harmoniously blended into one grand conception. Thought is beautiful, and that which is brought into harmony with thought, has
great power in awakening in us the sense of the same. To
blend into one that which in thought has before been disconnected, and thus to unify our conceptions, and excite in us the
sense of the perfect, the true, the beautiful, the grand, and
the sublime, is the peculiar function of the Imagination.
2. JBendi)?g the.Diverse.
The poet had heard, with feelings of awe and rapture, from
the neighboring hills and mountains, the reverberations of the
trumpet's notes, as they were sounded forth from some high
cliff, on the mountain side. Amid similar scenes he had listened to similar sounds from the waterfall. His Imagination
blends the two, and thus shadows forth the conception of the
beautiful:
cc The cataracts blow their trumpets from the steep."
The Fancy, or associative faculty, may connect, but not blend.
This is the peculiar function of the Imagination. Under the
influence of the former faculty, the poet would have said,
"The cataracts sound like trumpets from the steep."
"The sunshine is a glorious birth."
To blend the conception of the production of light, with
that of a birth, reveals the plastic power of the Imagination.
"But now, when every sharp-edged blast
Is quiet in its sheath."
184 
IMNIAGINATION.
It requires some reflection to appreciate the beauty of diverse
thoughts here blended. Yet reflection will draw it forth.
We have all conceived of the'sharp-edged sword,' ceasing
from the work of death, and lying quiet in its sheath. We
have also heard the chill wind of winter spoken of as having a
keen edge. As the poet walks forth amid the bland and mellow air of Miay, when the keen edge of winter has passed entirely from the atmosphere, his plastic Imagination unites the
two conceptions above referred to into one.  Hence the beautiful thought, " every sharp-edged blast is quiet in its sheath."
I might multiply examples of the kind under consideration
to any extent.  But these are sufficient  to illustrate the principle.
3. Blendi;,g Opposites.
Another principle in conformity to which the Imagination
shadows forth the forms of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity,
is by blending things opposite to each other, such as the animate and inanimate, material and mental, the rational and irrational. I will give a few examples, the most of which will
illustrate the principle under consideration with such obviousness as to render any particular remarks upon them unnecessary.
"'Twas night: the sultry atmosphere
Half palpable with darkness seemed,
Save when the lightnings, quick and clear,
Across wide heaven in grandeur gleamed,
Rousing along the fields of air,
The growling thundersfrom their lair."
Every one is aroused to a deep sense of the grand and sublime on
reading such a stanza.  Two circumstances impart special grandeur and sublimity to the thought here presented -separating
and presenting as opposites, things sustaining the relation to
16*
185 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
each other of cause and effect, as the lightning and the thunder-and blending opposites, the animate and inanimate, and
thus representing the thunders as growling monsters in their
lair, roused to rage and fury by the lightnings gleaming in
grandeur across the fields of air.
I cite another passage from the same author -a poet yet
unknown to fame. The language quoted, the poet has put
into the mouth of an ancient ]Roman chieftain slave, dying in
his humble shed, amid his comrades whom he was about to
lead forth in a struggle for liberty, and who were assembled
" To hear his last and solemn charge,
Ere Death should set his soul at large.
Half-raising up his giant form,
With awful luster in his eye,
He spake:
' Ye spirits of the storm,
Careering chainless, through the sky,
Your thunder-trumpet peals for me
A glad and glorious jubilee.
Like you, unmock'd by man's control,
When on the clouds your chariots roll,
My free and disembodied soul
Soon makes the Elysian fields, long sought,
The play-ground of its deathless thought,'" &c.
I shall not spoil the passage,  by particular comments.
Every one will perceive, that it is combining things opposite,
things in themselves grand and sublime, that imparts peculiar
grandeur to this grand conception.
In similar strains the same writer represents the imprisoned
eagle, as longing to
" Rise through tempest-shrouded air,
All thick and dark, with wild winds swelling,
To brave the lightning's lurid glare,
And talk with thuinders in their dwelling."
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I 
IMAGINATION.
Here the rational, in its sublimest forms, is first blended with
the irrational, and then with the inanimate; and then one
of these beings is represented as longing to rise amid scenes
of fearful grandeur and sublimity, to converse with the other
iu his awful dwelling-place.   Thus  a creative Imagination
evolves the forms of grandeur and sublimity.
It is the peculiar man,)er in which opposites are blended,
that imparts such peculiar beauty to that most beautiful of
almost all compositions, the 19th Psalm. The imagination
of the poet represents the entire material universe, especially
the luminaries of heaven, as all held in a blissful and devout
contemplation and study of the perfection and glory of the
Creator-all learning, and each imparting to the other a
knowledge of the Infinite and Perfect.   Day speaks to day,
and night to night, of some new-discovered excellence revealed
in the manifold works of God.
"I Hark! his hands the lyre explore.
Bright-eyed Fancy hovering o'er,
Scatters from her pictured urn,
Thoughts that breathe, and words that burn."
Fancy, as a bright-eyed, embodied spirit, hovering over, breathing thoughts, and burning words - opposites, in themselves
beautiful, so beautifully blended, are what impart such surpassing beauty to this beautiful thought.
"But trailing clouds of glory do we come
From God, who is our home."
By blending things so opposite as spirits and trailing clouds,
does the poet impart an ineffable beauty to the idea of the
soul coming from the hands of its 3Iaker.
4. Blendiig Thindgs in their Nvature alike.
Sometimes the Imagination evolves the beautiful, by blend
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INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIIY.
ing things in their nature identical.   I will give a single
example of this kind, the subjective influence of maternal affection, as the poet has presented it:
"Her love to me, in strong control,
Form'd of her life the dearest part;
It seem'd a soul within her soul,
The very pulse within her hecart."
No comments are requisite here, in pointing out the blending,
plastic influence of the Imagination, in thus evolving the forms
of the beautiful.
5. Combiining  utrnbers into Unity, and dissolviiy and sepa                 rati)g Unity into Nttmber.
Perhaps in no way does the Imagination more frequently
body forth the forms of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity, than
by " consolidating numbers into unity, and dissolving and separating unity into number."
"How beautiful are thy tents, 0 Jacob,
And thy dwelling-places, 0 Israel,
As rivers spread themselves abroad,
As gardens by the river side.
He couclheth and lieth down as a lion,
As a young lion, who shall rouse him up.
Blessed is he that blesseth thee,
And cursed is he that curseth thee."
The main force and beauty of this passage consists in the
manner in which a vast number of people are presented as one
venerable personage. Every one is so familiar with examples
of this kind, that I need not multiply them.
I will give a single example or two of the opposite kind,
that of dissolving and separating unity into number:
188 
IMAGINATION.
"And too oft
Even wise men leave their better sense at home,
To chide and wonder at them when return'd."
No individual can fail to recognize the beauty of the thought
here expressed.   Yet it mnainly consists in dissolving the unity
of the Mlind itself.
"Between the acting of a dreadful thing
And the first motion, all the interim is
Like a phantasma, or a hideous dream:
The genius and the mortal instruments
Are then in council; and the state of man,
Like a little kingdom, suffers then
The nature of an insurrection."
6. Adding to, or abstracting some Quaity from, an Object.
When a property is added to an object which it does not
possess, the object then, as M1r. Wordsworth observes, " reacts
upon the mind which has performed the process, like a new
existence."  This is one of the ways in which the Imagination
delights us with the conception of the beautiful. For example:
"0 Cuckoo! shall I call thee bird,
Or but a wandering voice?"
The cuckoo, though almost continually heard through the season of spring, is herself almost always invisible. This fact
imparts a surpassing beauty to the conception evolved, in abstracting from her the idea of substantial existence, and representing her as a "1 wandering voice."
Examples of the former kind -that of blending with objects qualities which do not belong to them - have been given
under the preceding topics.  I will not forbear, however, the
presentation of a single additional instance:
" Sweet day! so cool, so calm, so bright,
The bridal of the earth and sky:
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INTELLECTUAL PIILOSOPHIY.
The dew shall weep thy fall to-night,
For thou must die."
The beauty of this inconceivably beautiful thought, consists
in representing the dew drop, which in itself is the pure result
of physical causes, as a tear which Nature sheds over the fall
of a bright and gladsome day. Adding this new quality to
the dew-drop, makes it act upon us as a new existence.
7. Blending with external Objects the Feelings which they
excite in us.
The Imagination often imparts a surpassing beauty to what
is in itself beautiful, by blending with the object the feelings
which the contemplation of it excites in our minds:
" O then what soul was his, when on the tops
Of the high mountains he beheld the sun
Rise up, and bathe the world in light?  He look'd -
Ocean and Earth, the solid frame of Earth,
And Ocean's liquid mass, beneath him lay
In gladness and deep joy.  The clouds were touch'd,
And in their silent faces he did read
Unutterable love."
"The moon doth with delight
Look round her when the heavens are bare."
No particular remarks, after stating the principle, are requisite, to show lhow that principle is illustrated by such
creations.
8. Abstractiig certain) CGharacteristics of  Objects, and blend      ing them into faarmo)?y with some leading Idea.
The same object, in respect to different features of it, may
be contemplated relatively to different ideas in the mind. In
the light of how many leading ideas, for example, may the
190 
IMAGINATION.
bright worlds that hang around us, in the immensity of space,
be contemplated.   Now, the Imagination often evolves the
forms of the beautiful, the grand, and the sublime, by throwing these objects before the mind, in harmony with one or
more of these leading ideas. Take, as an example, the following stanzas from a poem entitled "A Psalm of Night:"
"Fades from the West the farewell light,
Flung backward by the setting sun,
And silence deepens as the Night
Steals with its solemn shadows on!
Gathers the soft, refreshing dew
On spiring grass and flowret stems And lo! the everlasting blue
Is radiant with a thousand gems!
Not only doth the voiceful Day
The loving kindness, LoRnD! proclaim -
But Night, with its sublime array
Of worlds, doth magnify Thy name!
Yea-while adoring seraphim
Before Thee bend the willing knee,
From every star a choral hymn
Goes up unceasingly to Thee!
Day unto Day doth utter speech,
And Night to Night thy voice makes known;
Through all the earth where Thought may reach,
Is heard the glad and solemn toneAnd worlds, beyond the farthest star
Whose light hath reached the human eye,
Catch the high anthem from afar,
That rolls along Immensity!"
Every one who contemplates the thought here embodied, aside
from the sentiment of devotion awakened in his mind, will
have a sense of beauty, majesty, and sublimity of the works
of Divinity, unfelt before. In the stanzas, also,
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INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPIIY.
"And beauteous as the silver moon,
When out of sight the clouds are driven,
As she is left alone in heaven,"
that beautiful orb is thrown before the mind in the light of
one idea only, that of the beautiful.   To blend thus into one
conception, the elements of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity,
existing in objects which may be contemplated in the light of
other ideas, is one of the peculiar functions of the Imagination. In the light of the conceptions which it shadows forth,
objects the most familiar put on new forms, and stand before
the mind in an array in which we never contemplated them
before. New fountains of thought and feelings are thus awakened in the depths of our own minds.
9. Throwivg t7he fleetig Thouyhts, Seiztitecnts, an(d Feel2bgs,
of outr past LExistence, into one beautiful Conception.
I mention but one other form in which the Imagination
4elights us with the forms of the beautiful, the perfect, and
the true, &c. It is by throwing into distinct and hallowed
embodiment, those deep thoughts and sentiments which have
had a fleeting existence in our experience, but which above all
things, we desire never to forget.  Who  does not feel like
dropping a tear of gratitude for that divine gift which enabled the poet thus beautifully to embalm, for eternal remembrance, what we have all experienced, but might otherwise
forget?
" The tear, whose source I could not guess,
The deep sigh, that seem'd fatherless,
Were mine in early days."
Every one feels himself richer, whuen he has found such a
thought as this.  Of the same character is the following:
"To me the meanest flower that blows can give
Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears. "'
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IMAGINATION.
Every one, also, who is familiar with Death as the " shadow of the rock Eternity," finds his own hallowed experiences
embalmed in lines like the following:
"The clouds that gather round the setting sun,
Do take a sober coloring from an eye
That hath kept watch o'er man's mortality."
I forbear further citations. To embalm in beautiful forms
the hallowed experiences of the race, is one of the high prerogatives which he enjoys who has been favored by his MIaker
with the higher functions of the Imagination.
REMARKS ON THE PRECEDING ANALYSIS.
It is not professed that the preceding analysis has presented
all the forms in conformity to which the Imagination moulds
its creations. All that was designed, is to give a sufficient
number of particular forms, to aid the student in his inquiries
into the operations of this mysterious power.
Another remark is this: The examples presented in illustration of one particular form, often contain elements equally
illustrative of other forms.   This was unavoidable.   It was
enough for my purpose to present, in each example, the element illustrative of the principle to which it was referred.
REMARK OF COLERIDGE.
Coleridge has somewhere made a remark, which I regard
as of great importance in guiding the judgment in detecting
the peculiar operations of the Imagination, and separating
them from the operations of other intellectual faculties.  The
amount of his remark is this:  It is not every part of what is
called a production of the Imagination, that is to be attributed
to that faculty.  Much often is mere narration, and much the
mere filling out of the grand outline of the conception which
17
193 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
the Imagination has combined, and which as properly belongs
to the Understanding and Judgment, as the filling up of the
outlines of any other discourse of which the Intelligence has
conceived. With a great portion of the filling up of Paradise
Lost, for example, Imagination had no more to do than with
that of filling up the grand outline of a sermon, or oration.
In the sublime conception itself, and in the mysterious blending of the elements of thought often met with, in throwing
that conception into form, here we find the workings of this
creative, plastic faculty.   To evolve principles which would
enable the student, under such circumstances, to discern the
operations of this faculty, has, as before said, been the main
object of the preceding analysis.
CREATIONS OF THE IMAGINATION, WHY NOT ALWAYS
FICTIONS.
In the preceding part of this Chapter, it has been shown,
that the creations of the Imagination are not always, as it has
been often stated by philosophers, " new wholes which do not
exist in nature." It becomes an important inquiry, when and
why is not this stateanent true? It will be evident, at first
thought, that when the elements of thought which enter into
particular conceptions, are wholly recombined, the new wholes,
thus produced, must exist purely in thought, without any corresponding existence. On the other hand, when the elements
of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity exist in objects in connection with other and different elements, elements also related to
other and different ideas, and when the Imagination, as in the
Psalm of Night, above cited, blends these elements first named
into some one beautiful, grand, or sublime conception, every
element in the conception may be in strict correlation to realities. Take as a further illustration, a single stanza from a
familiar hymn:
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IMAGINATION.
"His word of grace is sure and strong,
As that which built the skies!
The voice that rolls the stars along
Speaks all the promises."
Every element in this beautiful thought is strictly conformed
to realities, as they are. Yet in the blending of these elements,
particularly in the last two lines, we distinctly mark the plastic
power of the Imagination, in its sublimest and most beautiful
form.
The same is equally true, where, as shown above, the same
power embalms, in similar conceptions, the hallowed sentiments
and experiences of the past and present. Who that ever saw
the tear of gratitude lying in the eye of affliction- a thing
far more beautiful than the dew-drop, when it holds in its embrace the image of the morning sun -a tear started by some
gift that eased, for a time, the pressure of woe, and then
turned away with a sorrowful heart, that such worth should be
crushed beneath such a weight, does not recognize the truth,
as well as beauty, of the thought contained in the following
stanza, especially in the last two lines?
"I have heard of hearts unkind, kind deeds
With coldness still returning:
Alas! the gratitude of men
Has oftener left me mourning."
In another sense, all the proper creations of the Imagination are true.  They are true to thought.  In the depths of
our inner being, there lie thoughts too deep for any words
which we can command.   Nothing but an overshadowing Imagination can call them forth, and give them an external embodiment. Whether the forms in which they are embodied
are correlated to substantial realities or not, they are true to
thought, the most important of all realities.   We feel grateful,
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INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPIIY.
therefore, when we find thoughts which we had vainly endeavored to express, moulded into form, and thus assuming "a
local habitation and a name."
I mention one other, and a very important sense, in which
the creations of the Imagination are true.  They sustain, in
many instances, relations to realities analogous somewhat to
that sustained by general notions.  In a very important sense,
these last have no realities in nature corresponding to them;
that is, there is no one object, that in all respects corresponds
to a general notion, that is, that contains the elements it represents, and nothing more nor less. The elements belonging to
it, however, are found in each particular ranged under it. Let
us now, in the light of this illustration, contemplate the forms
of the beautiful, for example, shadowed forth by the Imagination.  Wre may not be able, in all instances, to find any one
particular object which contains, and nothing more nor less,
the elements which enter into this form. Yet, whenever we
meet with an object containing the elements of beauty, we find
that element represented in the forms of the beautiful bodied
forth by the Imagination. In these forms, we do not find any
one particular shadowed forth, but each particular blended in
the universal. In the most perfect forms of statuary, for example, we do not find any one human form, in distinction from
all others, represented, but we find whatever is beautiful in
every forn, there embodied.  As the Understanding there represents the particular in the general, so the Imagination represents all particulars relating to the beautiful, &c., in the universal.
SPHERE OF THlE IMAGINATION NOT CONFINED TO POETRY.
MIost of the examples introduced into this Chapter are
poetical. From this I would not have it supposed, that, in
my judgment, the Imagination is confined to this species of
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IMAGINATION.
composition. We meet with its finest creations, on the other
hand, in painting, in statuary, in prose, and in every kind of
discourse in which the elements of thought can be blending in
harmony with pure ideas. It admits, at least, of a doubt,
whether the Imagination of Milton ranged with a more discursive energy in his highest prose compositions, or in his
Paradise Lost.
LAW OF TASTE RELATIVE TO THE ACTION OF THE IMAGI                          NATION.
It is, as we have seen, the peculiar province of the Imagination to dissolve, recombine, and blend the elements of
thought. Its procedure in all these respects, however, is not
arbitrary. Every thought cannot be blended with every other,
without violating the laws of good taste. Here, then, an important question presents itself, to wit: What is the law which
guides the Imagination, in blending the elements of thought?
I will present my own ideas on this subject, by an example
taken from the book of Job:
"Hast thou given the horse his strength?
Hast thou clothed his neck with thunder? "
The propriety of blending the two coneeptions, that of the
mnane of the war-horse and of thunder, has been questioned
by some, on account of the total dissimilarity of the objects
of those conceptions.   It is readily admitted, that no two objects are in themselves more dissimilar.   Yet it is confidently
maintained, that there never was a figure of speech more appropriate.  The reason is obvious, and every one feels it, though
he may not have an analytical consciousness of it.  When two
objects are, as objects of sense, totally dissimilar, the conception of each may excite precisely similar feelings.  Hence the
propriety and force of the figure employed by the sacred writer,
17*
197 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
in blending the two conceptions into one.   This I conceive to
be the universal law of good taste, relative to the action of the
plastic power of the Imagination.   WheVeaever two conceptions
sustain). a, si7milar r.elation, to cn,y oge commnoni feeling or sentiment, they )iay b)e blenlded into one.  The more diverse the
objects of those conceptions, the more striking the figure, under
such circumstances.   I will give one other example:
"The twilight hours like birds flew by,
As lightly and as free;
Ten thousand stars were in the sky,
Ten thousand in the sea;
For every wave with dimpled cheek
That leaped apon the air,
Ilad caught a star in its embrace,
And held it trembliny there."
Who is insensible to the exquisite beauty of the thought here?
Yet the wave of the sea or lake, reflecting the stars of night,
no more, as an object of sense, resembles the dimpled cheek of
beauty, or the mother catching up her babe and holding it in
her embrace, than the mane of the war-horse resembles thunder. VlWhy, then, are we struck with such delight at the blending of conceptions, the objects of which, are, in themselves, so
unlike? The answer is: These conceptions are mutually correlated to the same or similar feelings.  When such conceptions are thus blended into a beautiful emotion common to both,
there is shadowed forth the perfection of beauty. For this
reason our hearts leap up, when we meet with such thoughts as
the following, taken from the same effusion, as that above cited:
"I have heard the laughing wind behind,
When playing with my hair The breezy fingers of the wind,
Hlow cool and moist they were!"
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IMAGINATION.
IMAGINATION THE ORGAN OF IDEALS.
Another important function of the Imagination now claims
our attention; its functions as the organ of Ideals.  In illustrating this function, the first thing to be accomplished is to
distinguish between Ideals and Ideas.
Idea defined.
An Idea, properly defined, is a conception of Reason. As
such it has the characteristics of universality and necessity,
and is consequently incapable of change or modification.
Thus when certain conditions are fulfilled, Reason evolves the
ideas of time, space, substance and cause, which we have
already considered, together with such as the beautiful, the
right, the true, and the good, &c., hereafter to be considered.
Ideal defined.
An Ideal is a form of thought intermediate between an
idea, and the conceptions or notions which the Intelligence
generates of particular objects, and presents archetypes in conformity to which the elements of such conceptions may be
blended in harmony with ideas. In the mind of Milton, for
example, the ideas of the beautiful, the grand, and the sublime, &c., existed, as pure conceptions of Reason. When the
varied conceptions, the elements of which are blended together
in Paradise Lost, lay under the eye of his Consciousness, his
Intelligence, brooding over those elements, at last blended
them together into that grand conception, of which the poem
itself is the external embodiment. This conception was the
Ideal after which the poem was formed, to realize his ideas of
the grand, the beautiful, and the sublime.
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INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPEIY.
Ideals, Particular and General.
Ideals, like notions, are particular and general. Thus, in
the mind of M1ilton, there existed a general ideal of what a
poem  should be, in order to realize, in greater or less perfection, the pure ideas of Reason.   At the same time, there existed a particular Ideal of the manner in which the elements
entering into that poem should be  blended, in order in that
particular production, to realize those ideas.
Ideals not co?fined to ideas of the Beautiful, the Grand, and
the Suibline.
Ideals are not confined to any one class of ideas. Every
individual, in all departments of human action, has an ideal of
the form to which the objects of his action should be brought
into conformity, and in the light of which he judges  of all
productions which meet his eye.  Ideas of fitness, of the true,
the perfect, and the good, are archetypes of Ideals, as well as
that of the beautiful.
Ideals not fixed and changeless like Ideas.
Ideals, as compared with ideas, may be perfect or imperfect. They are consequently capable of continued modifications.   We often hear it said of individuals, that their Ideals
are imperfect or wrong. As intermediate archetypes between
conceptions of particular objects, and pure ideas of Reason,
Ideals may, in the future progress of the Intelligence, undergo
endless modifications, always advancing towards the perfect and
absolute, without reaching it.
Ideals the Foundation of.fental Progress.
As intermediate archetypes between particular conceptions,
and universal and necessary ideas, Ideals constitute the founda
200 
IMAGINATION.
tion of endless progress in the development of the mental
powers.  Every new elevation which the Intelligence gains,
presents new conceptions of particular objects, and consequently  new  elements of thought.   Every new element of
thotught involves a new Ideal, more nearly approaching the perfect and the absolute, and thus lays the foundation for fresh
activity, and further progress in the march of mind.   Sometimes also Ideals degenerate, and thus the foundation is laid
for the backward movements of society.
It is hardly necessary to add that the Imagination is the exelusive organ of ideals.  To form such conceptions is not a
function of Reason, nor of the Understanding or Judgment.
It remains, then, as the exclusive function of the Imagination.
Idleals in the )Divine and I~uman littelligence.
In the Divine mind, the action of the Imagination is always
in perfect and absolute correspondence to the Reason. As a
consequence, there is a similar correspondence between the
Divine ideal and idea.  All of God's "works, therefore, are
perfect."  Not so with the finite.  AIan may eternally progress
towards the infinite and perfect, but can never reach it.
ACTION OF THE JUDGMENT RELATIVE TO THAT OF TIHE
IMAGINATION.
Taste defined.
Taste is thatfunctioa of the Judgment by which the charac.
teristics of productions, especially in belles-lettres and the fine
arts, are determiced in the light of ideals and ideas of beaut(y,
order, coizgruitg, proportion, syummetry, fitness, and whatever
constitutes excellence in such productions.   The Judgment may
be exercised upon Ideals relatively to ideas, and upon particular productions relatively to both. Thus Milton when he ap
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INTELLECTUAL PIHILOSOPIIY.
prehended the conception realized in Paradise Lost, might,
and doubtless did, often compare that conception with his own
idea, to determine the fact whether the former made a near approach to the latter.  In filling out the conception, he would
continually compare the external embodiment with the internal
Ideal. In all such operations, he was exercising those functions of the Faculty of Judgment denominated Taste. The
existence of good taste depends upon the existence in the Intelligence of correct Ideals, together with a well balanced, and
well exercised Judgment pertaining to the ideas of beauty, fitness, &e. If a man's Ideal is false, his Taste is of course
vitiated. If his Ideal were ever so correct, and he was not
possessed of a well balanced, and well exercised Judgmnent,
pertaining to such productions, he would also lack the characteristics of good Taste.
Productions of the Iniagination when not regulated by correct
J,ttdgment or good Taste.
In some individuals in whom the Imagination exists and
operates with a high degree of energy, its action is not guided
and chastened by good Taste, or a well-regulated Judgment.
In such cases we find the most perfect forms of beauty and
sublimnity shadowed forth in connection with the grossest deformities. The subject also will, in most instances, be wholly
unable to distinguish the one from the other. In listening to
such men, we, at one moment, are perfectly electrified with
the forms of beauty, grandeur and sublimity which are shadowed forth to our ecstatic vision; but the next, perhaps, we
are equally shocked and disgusted with images worse than grotesque, and forms of speech in strange violation of all the laws
of good Taste. Under such circumstances we have special
need of two things, Patience and good Judgment. The former
will enable us to endure the evil for the sake of the good: the
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IMAGINATION.
latter to separate the one from the other, that we do not receive the good and the bad, as is too often the case, as alike
good, nor reject both as alike bad.
The most perfect of all human productions are the results
of genius associated with good judgment. Of these the productions of 3ilton may be referred to as striking examples.
Grandeur and sublimity are the pre-eminent characteristics of
his genius.  And  how  seldom are his sublime  conceptions
marred with violations of good Taste.
PRODUCTIONS IN WHICH THE ACTION OF TIlE FANCY OR
IMAGINATION IS MOST CONSPICUOUS.
The productions of different authors we read with almost
equal interest, but for entirely different and opposite reasons.
I now refer to two classes of productions only, in one of which
the operation of the Fancy is most prominent,  and in the
other, that of the Imagination.   In productions of the former
class, there will be an exuberance of metaphor, and beautifully
appropriate comparisons and illustrations, and these will be the
main source of the interest felt.  In contemplating the productions of a creative Imagination, on the other hand, the
grand conception will be the chief, and in some instances, the
exclusive source of interest.
COMBINATIONS OF THOUGHT DENOMINATED WIT, AS DISTIN   GUISHED FROM THOSE RESULTING FROMI THE PROPER
ACTION OF THE IMAGINATION OR FANCY.
By the imagination different conceptions are l1cgided on the
ground of co-existence with similar feelings. The feeling into
which they are blended will be the leading one with which each
is associated. By the Fancy different conceptions are associated on precisely the same principle.   Now  Wit consists in
blending and associating conceptions on the ground of remote
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INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPHIIY.
and generally merely accidental elements found in them in
common.   Such combinations and associations therefore sur prise and amuse us.   When  the Irishman, for example,  re plied to the question, what he would take to go, on a cold winter's night, a certain distance, in a state of nudity, " That lhe
thought he should take a very bad cold," all recognize the reply as an example of genuine Wit. On an analysis we find
that two thoughts are blended here on the ground merely of
an accidental element common to both. The term take is permanently associated with the phrase taking cold, and has a
mnere accidental association with the question proposed, since
some other term (as what will you ask?) would have answered
just as well. The blending of the two thoughts, in consequence of such an accidental element, is what surprises and
amuses us, and constitutes the real wit involved in the reply.
A clergyman once delivered a discourse on the Divine
works.  In the progress of his remarks, he said that everything God had made was perfect in its kind.  As the speaker
descended from the pulpit, he was accosted at the door by an
ill-formed hunchback of a man, who, looking him in the face,
with a kind of malicious grin, asked the question, " What,
sir, do you think of my form? Do you think that to be perfect?  "Yes," replied the speaker, " you are a perfect hunchback." Hlere is genuine Wit. It consists, as every one will
perceive, in assuming the idea of a hunchback as a conception
of the perfect, and then classing the individual present under
it as an embodied realization of that idea.
A combination, in its nature, not unlike the above, was
made by a celebrated convict at Botany Bay, in respect to
himself and associates:
"True patriots we,
For, be it understood,
We left our country
For our country's good."
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IMAGINATION.
Wit may not inappropriately be denominated shallow
sense, being, in most instances, the antithesis of a blunder, or
a blunder from design. As two Irishmen were walking together, for example, the one after the other, the individual
foremost took hold of the limb of a tree, which extended
across the path (the end being broken off), and holding it in
his hand as he passed along, as far as his strength would
allow, suddenly let it fly back. His companion behind receiving the blow in the forehead, was thereby thrown from a perpendicular to a horizontal position. On recovering his standing, however, as he was rubbing his eyes, he very gravely remarked to his associate, " In faith, it is well you held the limb
back as long as you did. Had you not done so, it would
probably have killed me." Here was a blunder. Now suppose that a bystander had witnessed the occurrence, and had
made a remark precisely similar in respect to it. This would
have been genuine Wit. I would here drop the suggestion,
whether the most of what is denominated Irish wit, is not,
after all, amusing blunders?
BOMBAST.
In the appropriate exercise of the Imagination, the elements of some important and deeply interesting subject lie out
with distinctness under the eye of the mind.   The Imagination, brooding over these elements, combines and blends them
together into forms of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity, according to the leading idea in the light of which they are
viewed. Now, when the Intelligence, in any department of
the empire of thought energizes upon some subject of deep
and glowing interest, it will never throw upon its conceptions
the attire of bombast. It may shadow forth figures homely,
and in opposition to the laws of good Taste. There will be
no forms of expression, however, swollen or bombastic. But
s18
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INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
this presents the inquiry, What is bombast?  There are three
forms which this style of writing and speaking assumes.
The first is that in which an individual, without any object
of thought before him, attempts to form and shadow forth
some vast and sublime conception.  Thus the subject attempts
to grasp and express " some boundless thing," by a simple
effort of self-inflation. If anything is generated under such
circumstances, it will, of course, be windy, and inflated with
"great swelling words of vanity."
"0," said a miscalled clergyman, as he rose to address a
congregation amidst the solemnities of the Sabbath, "0 that
this very refined, polite, intelligent, and virtuous audience
would soar - and soar - and soar with me - to some unknown -planet."  He arose, of course, without thought, excepting the conception that he must say something very fine.
In his efforts at self-inflation, the idea of soaing would most
naturally suggest itself, and with that, the rhapsody that followed.
The second form is, when an individual endeavors to impart to a thought of trifling importance in itself, a very great
interest, by arraying it in the attire of objects of great beauty,
grandeur, or sublimity. We are all necessitated, from time to
time, to speak of subjects of little or no great importance.
We ought, in such circumstances, to show our good sense, by
letting such thoughts pass from us "with the naked nature,
and living grace," if they have any, which naturally belong
to them. But no. Some individuals can never speak upon
any subject, without showing their want of sense, by throwing
around it a drapery which subjects really beautiful and sublime would be ashamed to wear. I will give a specimen from
memory.   I will attribute it to no individual, because I do not
know that any individual ever said it. I give it as what a son
of Erin is reported to have said:  An individual who wished
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IMAGINATION.
to express the simple conception, that he might have stayed in
his native country, but chose to emigrate to this, and came
accordingly; a conception, surely, which it required but few
and very simple words to express. To him, however, it was a
conception of vast interest.  His Fancy was accordingly sent
abroad for figures with which to adorn it, and thus the con ception appears:
"Silent in some hermit's grot, and lulled to rest on mossy
carpets, he might have spent his truant hours. But as he
sped his trackless footsteps through the labyrinthian wastes
of Fancy's rich, enchanted landscape, a voice re-echoed from
the vaulted palace of the skies, and in sounds seraphic dwelt,
and hung upon his ear. Obedient to the heavenly call, he
bade adieu to fair Hlibernia's hills, and with his staff, like
Bunyan's Pilgrim, he followed the guiding star, till it shot its
sparkling beams, and ming,led with its mates around Columbia's
banner."
The third form in which the vice we are considering appears, is when an individual has a very meager, feeble, and
faint conception of a subject of great interest in itself, and
when he attempts to inflate his conceptions to the vastness of
his subject, by swelling words and pompous imagery and illustrations. How often is a great subject marred and defaced,
by being daubed over with the "gloss and fustian" of minds
who never had an adequate conception of it.
"Poets and painters alike unskilled to trace
The naked nature, and the living grace,
With gloss and fustian cover every part,
Alnd hide with ornament their want of art."
I will not forbear doing myself the pleasure, nor the reader
the profit, of the following quotation from the " British Spy,"
as it presents one of the sources of bombast in public speak
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INTELLECTUAL PHIIILOSOPIIY.
ing- the conception, that in some part of a discourse an individual must be pathetic:
"This leads me to remark a defect which I have noticed
more than once in this country. Following up too closely the
cold conceit of the Roman division of an oration, the speakers
set aside a particular part of their discourse, usually the peroration, in which they take it into their heads that they will be
pathetic. Accordingly, when they reach this part, whether it
be prompted by the feelings or not, a mighty bustle commences.   The speaker pricks up his ears, erects his chest,
tosses his arms with hysterical vehemence, and says everything
which he supposes ought to affect his hearers; but it is all in
vain: for it is obvious that everything he says is prompted by
the head; and, however it may display his ingenuity and fertility, however it may appeal to the admiration of his hearers,
it will never strike deeper. The hearts of the audience will
refuse all commerce, except with the heart of the speaker;
nor, in this commerce, is it possible, by any disguise, however
artful, to impose false ware on them.  However the speaker
may labor to seem to feel, however near he may approach the
appearance of the reality, the heart nevertheless possesses a
keen unerring sense, which never fails in detecting the imposture. It would seem as if the heart of man stamps a secret
mark on all its effusions, which alone can give them currency,
and which no ingenuity, however adroit, can successfully counterfeit." *
* When I listen to such an attempt at the pathetic as the above, I
amn reminded of a fact which an individual used to tell the students,
when I was in college; - an individual who was accustomed to visit
us statedly two or three times a year, and whose visits were not the
most welcome to those of us who never were able to pay our bills, and
others especially who had had money enough, and could not give a good
account of the manner in which they had got rid of it. This individual,
20S 
IMAGINATION.
BURLESQUE.
Burlesque sustains the same relation to bombast, that wit
does to a blunder. Each copies its antithesis from design.
The proper, and only proper object of burlesque, is bombast,
and faults of a kindred character.  To attempt to burlesque
that which is in itself deserving of veneration, is to render
one's self most criminal.
In genuine burlesque, the original will be copied to a certain extent, but yet with such variations as to leave no doubt
of the design of the speaker or writer.  One of the finest
specimens of genuine burlesque, that I recollect to have met
with, was given some years since in a foreign review of the
works of an Irish orator of some celebrity, especially for what
the reviewer termed bombast.   He  accordingly presents  a
speech professedly after the style of the orator, a speech designed to show the great advantages which the poor man has
over the rich, in respect to happiness. I quote a single paragraph from the speech, as it occurs in memory:
"Happiness, SIr. Speaker, is like a crow seated upon the
top of a mountain, which the hunter vainly endeavors to reproach. The hunter looks at the crow, MIr. Speaker, and the
notwithstanding his unwelcome errands, was accustomed to render
himself very agreeable, by amusing anecdotes, which he would relate
for the benefit of the students. Among these he was accustomed to
relate the following, which he himself had heard: After the death of
Washington, a Dutch orator in one of the villages on the Mohawk was
appointed to deliver an oration on the character of that great man.
The people assembled, and were entertained for about an hour and a
half, wvith a most bathotic eulogy of the hero. At last the speaker
came to a sudden and solemn pause.  "Boys!" he exclaimed, "be
very still now dere in de gallery; -now I be'sh come to de patetic.Vashington died vidout a grunt, or a groan, or a grumble."
18 *
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INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
crow looks at him. But if he should attempt to reproach him,
he banishes away, like the schismatic tints of the rainbow,
which it was the sublime, and astonishing genius of Newton
that developed and deplored."
SARCASM.
Analogous to burlesque is sarcasm. Its appropriate sphere
is to burlesque false claims to merit-  claims which may not
be assumed in a bombastic style. It attributes to the individual his claims, but does it in such a manner, that the irony
shall be visible. "No doubt ye are the people, and wisdom
will die with you."
PROPRIETY OF USING THE IMAGINATION AND FANCY IN WORKS
OF FICTION.
I close this protracted chapter with two or three suggestions
of a general nature.
The first is, the propriety of employing the Imagination
and Fancy in the production of fictitious composition. Of
the propriety of employing such a noble faculty in bringing
out such productions, some persons, whose opinions are deserving respect, have serious doubts.   To me it appears that such
doubts have been occasioned exclusively by an abuse of what
is in itself proper.  Suppose I am contemplating a statue.  It
presents all the forms almost of grace and beauty that appear
in all beautiful human forms. I ask the question, What individual does this statue represent? The answer is, that it represents no one human form, but the statuary's own ideal of
beauty and grace, as it may be embodied in a human form.
Am  I offended at the fact contained in the reply?  By no
means. Why may not an individual as properly embody, in
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IMAGINATION.
external form, an Ideal in his own mind, as copy an object less
beautiful without? The Ideal within is just as much a reality,
as the object without, and may as properly be represented with
the chisel, the brush, or the pen. To shadow forth conceptions more perfect than the real around, is to lay a foundation
for human improvement. But let us suppose, that an individual, gifted with the power of thus blessing his race, employs that power, not in shadowing forth the forms of truth,
beauty and perfection, but in throwing such attractions over
vice and error, as tend to draw the young, the thoughtless,
and the ignorant from the paths of truth, purity and peace;
- such individuals deserve the deepest reprobation of the
universe, as having abused and perverted one of the highest
gifts with which any intelligent being has ever been intrusted.
The individual also who will familiarize himself with the productions of such authors, subjects himself to an influence of
all others, best adapted to sap the foundations of moral character.  The maxim of ancient wisdom, "The companions of
fools shall be destroyed," is no more true, than the maxim
that the reader of impure books will himself become impure.
FALSE IDEA IN RESPECT TO THE INFLUENCE OF FAMIILIARITY
WITH THE POPULAR FICTITIOUS WRITINGS OF THE DAY.
A very common impression exists, that familiarity with
fictitious writings, especially with the popular fictions of the
day, tends to improve the Imagination, and that because they
are fictitious. Now this is a grand mistake. It by no means
follows, that because a work is fiction, and not sober history,
the perusal of it tends to improve the Imagination. It may
tend, on the other hand, to no other end, than to vitiate the
Fancy, by generating impure associations.  For myself, I am
persuaded, that the study of such works as Prescott's' Con
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INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIIY.
quest of 3Iexico,' and IAlison's History of Modern Europe,'
tends incomparably more to develop the Imagination than the
perusal of the great mass of fictitious works that are floating
upon the surface of society. The question whether the perusal of a work tends to improve the Imagination, depends, not
upon the fact whether it is fiction, but upon the manner in
which the elements of thought are therein blended.  W'ithout
departing at all from the path of truth in the narration of facts,
the Imagination of the historian may be almost continually
energizing, in blending into the forms of beauty, grandeur,
and sublimity, the elements of thought which the narrative presents.  In contemplating history, as its glowing facts are set
forth in such forms, the Imagination may receive its most
rapid development. The remark of Coleridge, that but a small
part of even the best poems that we meet with, presents the
appropriate creations of the Imagination, is pre-eminently true
of fictitious writings. The question, then, whether the perusal of a particular work of fiction tends to improve the Imagination, depends not upon the fact that it is fiction, but upon
the manner in which the elements of thought are therein
blended.
IMAGINATION AND FANCY -HOW IMPROVED.
Every power is developed in one way only -in being exercised upon its appropriate objects.  Each of the functions
of the Intelligence under consideration, has its appropriate
sphere.  To develop the power, we  must find its legitimate
sphere, and in that sphere exercise it upon its appropriate objects.  The Fancy is improved, by developing in the mind the
sense of the beautiful, the true, the perfect, and the sublime,
by furnishing the Intelligence with distinct apprehensions of
the forms of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity, which the universe of matter and mind, nature and art present-s.
212 
IMAGINATION.
The Imagination will be improved by familiarizing the
mind with the true functions of the power itself, with the laws
which regulate its action, in blending into form the elements
of thought, and with its actual creations, as given in the
works of minds most highly gifted with this function of the
Intelligence.
213 
CHAPTER XI.
REASON.
THIE preceding Chapters have occupied more than the entire ground which is traversed in the common systems of Philosophy, so far as an analysis of the Intellectual Powers is
concerned. Such an analysis, however, leaves untouched many
of the more important phenomena of the human Mind. Consciousness and Sense, which lie at the foundation of all the
faculties which have been the subject of the preceding analysis,
can never give us infinite, eternal, absolute, universal, and
necessary truths, nor can they account for the existence of the
ideas of such truths in the Mind. Such ideas demand the admission of another power, not supposed in the existence of
conceptions of contingent and relative phenomena. These last
might exist in a Mind totally destitute of a knowledge of universal and necessary truths.
REASON DEFINED.
That faculty which apprehends truths, infinite, eternal,
absolute, universal, and necessary, is the Reason.   It bears
precisely the same relation to such truths, that Consciousness
and Sense do to contingent phenomena. Like those faculties,
all its affirmations are direct and intuitive.
Coleridge's Characteristics of Reason as distinguishted from
the Understanding.
Coleridge has taken great pains to establish and elucidate
the distinction between the Reason and the Understanding. 
REASON.
Before proceeding to a further analysis of the phenomena and
functions of the former faculty, I will present some of the
characteristics of these faculties - characteristics which he has
given to distinguish the one from the other. In giving their
characteristics, I shall use the term Understanding in the sense
in which Coleridge himself appears to use it, as including the
Judgment as well as the notion-forming power. I desire this
fact to be kept distinctly in mind.  In all other parts of this
Treatise I use the Understanding and Judgment in strict accordance with the definitions given in preceding Chapters.
Hiere I use the term Understanding in accommodation to the
usage of the author whose distinctions I shall endeavor to
elucidate.   What then are the great distinctions between the
Reason and Understanding, as laid down by this Philosopher?
1. "The Understanding, in all its judgments, refers to
some other faculty as its ultimate authority."   "The Reason in
all its decisions appeals to itself." Take as an illustration of the
above distinction the following proposition: "This is a book."
" Space is, or exists." The first proposition supposes three
things in the Mind -the conception designated by the term
book - the perception of the particular object, a judgment that
the object corresponds to the conception-and a consequent subsumption of the object under the conception.   Now this judgment is an affirmation of the Understanding. Is it self-affirmed,
or is it based upon the authority of some other faculty?  Ask
the speaker, how he knows that this is a book? Hie refers at once
to Sense ("I see it"), and to a notion of a class derived from
previous perceptions. The same may be shown to be true of
every other affirmation of the Understanding, or generalizing
power.
Let us now look at the second proposition- Space is. On
what authority is this affirmation made?   Upon  no other
authority than that of the faculty which apprehends the idea.
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INTELLECTUAL PHIIILOSOPIIY.
So of the proposition, " Every event has a cause."  All men
know it to be true.  In all minds, however, the faculty which
affirms it is the sole authority for the affirmation. The same principle holds in respect to all the judgments of the pure Reason.
2. "The judgments of the Understanding admit of degrees.  Those of the Reason preclude all degrees."   In reference to some particular object of the perception, for example,
under certain circumstances, we conjecture that it is a man;
under others, we believe it to be a man; under others, we are
sure that it is; and under others still, we know it to be a man,
&e. But who merely conjectures or believes that every event
has a cause?  We know it absolutely.   In respect to this
subject, the affirmation of the child and of the man, of the
philosopher and of the peasant, are equally  positive,  and
equally preclude all degrees.
3. The laws which govern the Understanding in all its
judgments are imposed upon it by the Reason; while the laws
of the Reason are self-imposed. I feel, for example, a painful
sensation.  Instantly I apply my Understanding to determine
the particular cause. By what law is my Understanding governed, under such circumstances?  By  an idea or law, certainly, which exists, not in the Understanding itself, to wit,
the affirmation of the pure Reason, that every event must have
a cause. The same is true in regard to all other inquiries and
affirmations of the Understanding, in regard to material substances. It obeys laws prescribed by another faculty. The
Reason, however, obeys no laws but those which are selfimposed.   When  the Reason affirms absolutely that every
event must have a cause-  that succession supposes timeand that body supposes space, what law prescribed by another
faculty or faculties does the Reason obey in such affirmations?
None, surely.
4. All the judgments of the Understanding are contingent.
216 
REASON.
All the affirmations of the Reason are universal and necessary.
I have before me, I will suppose, a right-angled triangle.   I
wish to know what relation exists between the square of the
hypothenuse and the sum of the squares of the two sides.   I
first determine this question by actual measurement, and find
that they are equal.   I have now before me a particular fact.
WVhy it is so, I know not, or whether this fact holds true in
regard to other triangles, I know not. I repeat the experiment
upon similar triangles of various sizes, and find that they all
give me precisely the same result.  I very soon begin to con jecture that this fact holds true of all similar triangles.  Re peated experimnents ripen this conjecture into such a conviction
as to preclude all doubt.  Still there is no absolute knowledge.
Nor does there appear any necessity, from the nature of the
subjects of these experiments, that the conclusions should not
be different from what they are. Now let a person, in whose
nmind the principles of Geometry are developed, construct a
figure and demonstrate the fact under consideration, in respect
to that one particular triangle.   What is the conclusion  dedcluced firom this demonstration? Not only that this fact holds
in regard to this particular triangle, but that it does and must
hold true in regard to all other similar triangles.   In the
former instance, we obtained a particular, contingent truth, as
conceived by the Mind. In the latter we obtained a truth,
universal and necessary.
5. The "Understanding is discursive."   "The Reason is
fixed."  The judgments of the Understanding admit of  degrees, and are perpetually passing and repassing from mere
conjecture to positive affirmation; from doubt and disbelief to
positive faith, and the opposite.   The decisions of the Reason,
however, have ever been characterized by the total absence of
all degrees. They are, and always have been, positive, absolute affirmations.
! 9
017
I
'k II 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPHIIY.
6. The Understanding is the faculty of believing.  The
Reason is the faculty of knowing. Those who have never
been in London or Paris, believe, with greater or less degrees
of confidence, according to their knowledge of the facts, that
there are such cities in existence. Yet they cannot, with strict
propriety, be said to know these facts. But every person, in
whose mind Reason exists at all, knows absolutely that space
is -that every event must have a cause, &c.
The above distinctions, most of which are specifically
stated, though none of them are illustrated, by Coleridge, not
only distinguish the Understanding and Judgment from the
Reason, but tend to elucidate the functions of each.   I will
now proceed directly to a further elucidation of the functions
of Reason.
SECONDARY IDEAS OF REASON.
In former Chapters it has been shown, that Reason sustains
this relation to the faculties of Sense and Consciousness: It
gives the logical antecedents of phenomena affirmed by these
faculties. Thus, on the perception of phenomena, we have
the ideas of time, space, substance, personal identity, and
cause.
Now Reason sustains a relation to the Understanding precisely similar to that which it sustains to Sense and Consciousness.  It gives the logical antecedents of notions and concepltions, as well as of primary intuitions. The idea of right and
wrong, of obligation, is not the logical antecedent of mere
phenomena given by Sense and Consciousness. Before obligation can be conceived of or affirmed, the notion or conception,
not of mere phenomena, but of an agent possessed of certain
powers, and sustaining certain relations to other agents, must
be developed in the Intelligence. The idea of obligation, then,
is not the logical antecedent of phenomena affirmed by Sense
218 
REASON.
and Consciousness, but of notions given by the Understanding.
These considerations fully establish the propriety of the distinction between ideas of Reason as primary and secondarjy.
The former are the logical antecedents of phenomena given by
the primary contingent faculties.   The latter sustain the same
relation to those of the secondary faculties.   The distinction
here made seems hitherto, as far as my knowledge extends, to
have escaped the notice of the analyzers of the human Intelligence. Its reality and importance to a correct understanding
of the operations of the human Mind, will appear manifest, as
we proceed with our analysis of the secondary ideas of Reason. An exposition of all the ideas comprehended under this
class will not be attempted.   All that will be attempted will
be the induction and elucidation of a sufficient number of particulars to serve as lights to the philosophic inquirer, in his
researches in the domain of mental science.
IDEA OF RIGHT AND WRONG.
Of the Secondary ideas of Reason, that which claims the
first, and more special attention, is the one mentioned above,
that of right or wrong, together with those dependent upon it,
or necessarily connected with it.
This Idea exists in all blinds in which Reason is develol)ed.
It is an undeniable fact, that in the presence of certain
actions, the human mind characterizes them as good or bad,
right or wrong; that the mind affirms to itself, that one class
of the actions ought, and the other ought not to be performed;
that when we have performed certain actions, we deserve reward, and that when we have performed others, we deserve
punishment; and that when this takes place, there is moral
order, and when it does not, there is moral disorder.  Such
judgments are passed alike by all mankind, the old and the
219
I 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPIIY.
young, the learned and the ignorant, the savage and the civilized. Should it be said, that mankind differ in different circumstances in their judgment of the moral qualities of actions,
I reply:
1. This objection itself implies the universality of moral
distinctions.  As men may differ in referring particular effects
to particular causes, while all agree in the judgment, that
every event must have a cause, so it is with moral distinctions.
MIen may not always attribute the same moral qualities to the
same actions; yet they universally agree in this, that actions
are either right or wrong.
2. But when we refer to iitentions, in which alone the
moral quality of actions consists, we find a more extensive
agreement among men than is generally supposed. A man
wills the good of an individual possessed of moral excellence.
WAhere is the intelligent being in existence who does or can
regard such an act as any other than virtuous?  Who is not
aware, that men always justify wrong actions, if at all, by a
reference to their intentions, showing by such reference, that
in their judgment of the great law of love, all agree.
3. Vicious actions are seldom regarded as virtuous.   Men
may persuade themselves that it is not wrong to perform such
actions, but never that they are bound to do them, or deserve
a reward for having done them.
4. When an intention morally right is submitted to the
contemplation of mankind, all agree in admitting it as virtuous
and meritorious.   Thus the sacred writer speaks of himself
and associates, as through a "' manifestation of the truth, commending themselves to every man's conscience."   This could
not have been the case, had not the consciences of all men
been in fixed correlation to the moral law. The idea of right
and wrong, then, is universal.
2 -'-? 0 
REASON.
Idea of Right and -Erong necssary.
It is also necessary.   When  the Intelligence affirms an
action or intention to be right or wrong, it is impossible even
to conceive of it, as possessed of the opposite character.  We
can no  more form  such a conception, than we can conceive
of the annihilation of space.   It has the same claim  to the
characteristics of universality and necessity, that any other
idea has.
Itceas depec7ent on that of ]Right anid W)on2.
A moment's reflection will convince us, that the idea of
right and wrong is the foundation of that of obligation; and
this again, of that of merit or demerit; and this last of that
of reward and punishment. When men would justify the bestowment of reward, or the infliction of punishment, they
always refer to the merit or demerit of the individual.  This
judgment is sustained by a reference to the oblyation of the
same individual, and his obligations are shown by a reference
to the idea of right and wrong. Such facts clearly indicate
the relation of these ideas, the one to the other.
C7ronoloygical Anztecedent to the Idea of Riyht and Wrong, &c.
It has already been remarked, that the ideas under consideration are the logical antecedents, not of the phenomena of
the primary contingent faculties, but of Understanding-conceptions.  Before we can conceive of ourselves as subjects of
moral obligation, we must be conscious of the possession of
certain powers, and of existence in certain relations to other
beings.  This knowledge is the chronological antecedent of the
ideas of right and wrong, while these ideas sustain to these facts
of Consciousness the relation of logical antecedents.   The
question now is, What are the elements of moral agency,
19*
221
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INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPIIY.
necessarily pre-supposed, as the condition of the existence of
the ideas of right and wrong, of obligation, &c., in our minds?
They are the following:
1. Power to know ourselves together with our relations.
2. The actual perception of such relations.
3. Power to act, or to refuse to act, in harmony with these
relations.
That the ideas of right and wrong sustain to such conceptions the relation of logical antecedent, is evident from the
following considerations:
1. When we conceive of a being possessed of these powers,
and existing in such relations, we necessarily affirm obligations
of him.   An intelligent being is revealed to me, as possessed
of capacity for virtue or vice, together with susceptibilities for
happiness or misery.   I have a consciousness of the power to
will his virtue and happiness, or his vice and misery. I instantly affirm myself under obligation to will the former instead of the latter.   No other conceptions are necessary to the
existence of this affirmation.   These  facts also being postulated, obligation must be affirmed.   We can no more conceive
it right to will the evil instead of the good, or, that we are not
under obligation to will the latter, than we can conceive of the
annihilation of space.
2. If any of these elements are not postulated, obligation
cannot be conceived of, nor affirmed. If we deny of a creature intelligence to perceive his relations to other beings, we
cannot conceive of him as under obligation to them. Whatever degree of intelligence be attributed to him, this involves,
in our apprehensions, no obligation to one act of Will instead
of another, in the absence of all power to put forth the required, instead of the prohibited act.  Suppose a creature has
any degree of intelligence whatever. This creates no obligation to locomotion in the absence of corresponding power.
Suppose  the mind located in a body totally destitute of the
222 
REASON.
power of locomotion. Would the existence of intelligence create
obligation to locomotion?  Certainly not.   Such would be the
response of universal Mind.   Now the power to will is just as
distinct from the Intelligence, as that of locomotion is. Hience,
intelligence, of whatever kind or degree, can no more create
obligation to one than the other, in the absence of corresponding power.   To the conception of an agent, then, possessed of
intelligence to know his relations, and power to act, or refuse
to act, in harmony with those relations, the ideas of right and
wrong, of obligation, &c., sustain the relation of logical antecedents.
IDEA OF FITNESS.
Every person who has attentively noticed the operations
of his own mind, must have observed, that under certain circumstances, certain actions, or certain states of mind, appeared
to him fit and proper.  When asked to give a reason for such
judgments, no other account can be given, than a simple reference to the nature of the thing itself, and to the circumstances
supposed.   For illustration, take  the following passage of
Scripture: "It was meet that we should make merry and be
glad; for this thy brother was dead, and is alive again; and
was lost, and is found." Suppose that father to have been required to give a reason for the judgment, that under the circumstances supposed, joy and merriment were fit or proper.
What answer could he have given? No other answer than for
the judgment, that no phenomena exist without a cause.  In
both instances, the mind knows absolutely that its judgments
are, and must be true. No other reason for their truth, however, can be given, than this: The circumstances being given,
they are selfaffirmed.
Tans Idea s1y)oiymous with that of PRight and  IVrong, &c.
Now the idea of fitness, when applied to moral 2-elations,
223
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INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPIIY.
is identical with that of right and wrong. It is the foundation of the idea of merit and demerit; and consequently of
that of reward and punishment.
It is also identical with the idea of moral order. When
it is asked, Why is that state in which virtue is rewarded and
vice punished, regarded as a state of moral order? no other
reason can be assigned than this: Such a state is fit and
proper.
IDEA OF THE USEFUL, OR THiE GOOD.
Whenever we conceive of a creature capable of pleasure or
pain, happiness or misery, we necessarily conceive of a state in
which all the capacities of such a creature for pleasure and
happiness are perfectly filled.  This state we designate by the
term good, a term sometimes used in another sense, as synonymous with that of right.  Whatever tends to fill out the measure of pleasure and happiness, we designate by the general
term, useful.
The ideas of the useful and the good, above defined, give
birth to all the varied forms of human industry, such as agri culture, the mechanic arts, commerce, &c.  All are moving on
to the realization of one great leading idea, the filling up of
the capacities of man for pleasure and happiness.
THE SUMMUIM BONUM.
There is one idea of Reason, expressed by the words, the
g1reat yood, the sutnmum bonum, and the r-o xaXov, about which
philosophers have long disputed, and in respect to which they
have been about equally divided in opinion. The question
may be thus put: When we think of ourselves, or of the
universe at large, what is that state to which our nature is
correlated, so that we regard it as preferable to any other, actual or conceivable?
224 
RE-ASON.
Some have placed the great good in happiness merely. To
this position, hlowever, we find that our nature is not exclu sively correlated. If happiness were the only thing to which
our nature is correlated, as in itself alone to be desired, if
happiness exists, we should be totally indifferent in respect to
the means, or  conditions  of  its existence.   We  are  not
pleased, but pained at the thought, for example, that perfect
happiness should be associated with great wickedness.
Others, in departing from this idea, have placed the great
good in virtue.  To this position, also, we find that our nature
is not correlated.   If virtue is the only thing that the Blind
regards as good, it would be indifferent in respect to the condition in which it should exist; whether, for example, the
virtuous agent were happy or miserable.   We are pained, on
the other hand, at the thought, that virtuous beings should
not be happy.   Happiness our Intelligence affirms to be the
right of the pure and the virtuous.
The true solution is, no doubt, to be found in the blending
of the two above given, or, as Cousin expresses it, "In the
connection and harmony of virtue and happiness, as merited
by it." If we conceive of a state of perfect virtue, associated
with perfect happiness, this conception contains a realization of
our idea of the stmmum boaUrn.   Every department of our
nature is correlated to that idea.  We can conceive of no state
so much to be desired as this.  Nor can we perceive any element in this state to which the laws of our being do not fully
respond.
RELATIONS OF THE IDEAS OF RIGHT AND WRONG AND OF
THE USEFUL TO EACIH OTHER.
We have seen above, that the ideas of right and wrong are
the foundation of obligation, and this of merit and demerit,
&C. The question has long been agitated among philosophers,
225 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPI-IY.
whether there is any idea that sustains a similar relation to
that of right and wrong, and of obligation   By  sonme it is
maintained, that this is not an ultimate idea of Reason, but
that it has its foundation in another, to wit, that of the useful.
This question I regard as of such fundamental importance in
mental and moral philosophy both, that I shall enter into a discussion somewhat  protracted of it.  The  question then is,
What is the foundation of moral obligation? Is utility this
ground?
This purely a Ps}ychological Question.
The object of 3Iental Philosophy, it should be borne in
mind, is to explain human  nature.   When the Intelligence,
for example, makes particular affirmations, the object of this
science is, to ascertain the reasons in view of which such affirmations are made.
It is admitted by all, that in the presence of certain actions,
the Mind does, as a matter of fact, affirm its obligation to perform them. The question, and the only question, for the philosopher to solve here is, What is the element or elements, in
view of which this affirmation is made? The Utilitarian
affirms that the perceived utility of the action, or its perceived
tendency to promote happiness, is the only element in the ac.
tion, and the only circumstance connected with it, in view of
which obligation to perform it is, or can be affirmed. In view
of nothing else, if this theory is true, can such affirmation be
made? Now, as every one will perceive at once, the question
whether this theory is true, is exclusively a psychological question. It can be truly answered, only by an appeal to Consciousness.
The theory under consideration is also given as a universal
theory. If obligation is, in any instance, affirmed in view of
any other consideration, this theory falls to the ground.
226 
REASON.
Further, if the Utilitarian, as is sometimes done, assumes
the position, that PERCEIVED tendency is not the sole reason,
lwhy obligation is, in all instances affirmed, while it is in fact
the only clement which gives existence to obligation, his theory, instead of explaining the human  Intelligence, convicts it
of futndamental error, inasmuch as it asserts, that the Intelli,gence affirms obligation in view of considerations, which do not
give existence to obligation.   Having thus convicted the Intelligene of fundamental error, how is he afterwards, through
the same Intelligence, to find out the truth? Now, at this
point, we join issue with the Utilitarian.   We assert that  his
theory does not correctly explain the human Intelligence relatively to the question under consideration, and is therefore
wrong,. To show this we will inquire,
lATature of  Virtue.
In the first place, What is virtue? I answer, virtue is not
a phenomenon of the Intelligence or Sensibility, but of the
WIill.  As a phenomenon of Will, it must consist in right willi,&.  This is a definition sufficiently explicit for the present
argument.   Should any  one  feel disposed to question  the
statement, that virtue consists exclusively in right willing, he
will not deny that it is in part, at least, found here. This is
all that is requisite to the present argument.   The question
then to be settled is this:  Is ob)liyation to will in a given direction alecays a         ae(irad affirned exclsicel}y, i?t view of
the perceived te?zcdencjy of thus qcilling q
Happiness a Pheniomenon of the Sensibiit,y.
VWhile virtue is, in this discussion, postulated as a phenomenon of the Will, happiness, on the other hand, is a phenomenon, neither of the Intelligence, nor Will, but of the Sensibility exclusively. This no one will deny.
227
I 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
Relation of  Wtill;z?  to Jctppiqess.
Now the tendency of willing of every kind, to promote
happiness, or its opposite, depends entirely upon the correlation between the nature of the Will and Sensibility. To understand, in this respect, the nature of willing, that is, its
tendency to promote happiness, or its opposite, this correlation
must be known. How can such knowledge be obtained? By
experience only. This is self-evident. Prior to experience, I
know not even that I have a Sensibility.   Much less, if possible, can I know, prior to experience, the adaptation of any
cause whatever, as for example, willing in one direction or another, in view of affirmed obligation, to produce in the Sensibiiity, happiness or misery.
Conclusion Necessarily resulting f.)om  the Facts above stated.
Now as I can know from experience only, the tendency of
willing in one way or the other, in view of affirmed obligation, to promote happiness or misery, it is demonstrably evident, that obligation must, in all instances, be in the first case
affirmed, in total ignorance of such tendency. It must be affirmed, in view of other considerations exclusively. Perceived tendency, or utility, therefore, is not the exclusive reason in view of which obligation is affirmed. It is not the
element which enters at all into original and primary affirmations of this nature. Utility, then, is not the exclusive ground
of right.
Aryument Expa?nded.
The above argument is as susceptible of absolute demonstration, as any proposition in mathematics.   To show this, let
A represent a moral action, B its results, the results which A
tends to produce.  As A is the cause of B, the relation of A as
228 
REASON.
cause to B, as effect, must be learned exclusively from experience.   For the same reason, A  must be, in the mind, the chlronological antecedent of B. Now as A is willing in view of
affirmed obligation, it implies two things, obligation affirmed,
and action or willing, in view of it. Let C then represent the
former, that is, obligation affirmed, and D the latter, or willing
in view of such affirmation.  Now  C must have been in the
mind prior to D, because D is action or willing in view of C.
But B is known subsequently to the existence of D, the former
being an effect of the latter, an effect learned by experience
alone.  Now as D is known  prior to B, much  more  must C
have been known and affirmed prior to all knowledge of B.
Because C is affirmed prior to the existence even of D, which is
the chronological antecedent of B.   Obligation, therefore, is in
all instances, first affirmed in view of totally different considerations than the perceived tendency of action in view of such
affirmation, and the theory of the Utilitarian falls to the ground.
Additionzal Considerations.
The nature of willing may be contemplated and known in
another and different point of light still, not in relation to the
phenomena of the Sensibility, but of the Intelligence. A
mountain, we will suppose, is before the mind. Prior to experience, we cannot know, but that such is the correlation between our Wills and the mountain, that willing its removal to
a certain place will cause its removal.   In total ignorance of
this relation, we may conceive of the removal of the mountain,
and know what would be the effects of such an event, and understand perfectly what it is to will it. Our knowledge of the
nature of willing in this respect, cannot be increased or diminished, by our knowledge of the tendency of willing in the
other respect above mentioned. Now the question arises,
whether, in total ignorance of the tendency of Willing to
20
229
I 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHIY.
produce this result, the Intelligence may not affirm, and affirm
absolutely, that it is proper or improper, right or wrong, for us to
will the removal of the mountain? Suppose we know, that
the removal of the mountain would occasion the death of a
thousand individuals; but we do not know at all, whether our
willing it has any tendency to produce the result. Would not
the Intelligence under such circumstances affirm absolutely our
obligation not to will the removal of the mountain? Who
does not know, that it would make this affirmation? Obligation to right willing is therefore affirmed, in view of considerations entirely distinct and separate from the perceived tendencies of thus willing to promote happiness.
Ari,ztne)t stated il, view of another Example.
God, we will suppose, is present to the contemplation of
a rational being as capable of an infinite amount of happiness
or misery. Before we can know whether willing God's happiness or misery has any tendency to produce the one or the
other, we must understand the correlation between the nature
of our Will and the Divine Sensibility.  In total absence of
this knowledge, however, we can understand perfectly the nature of willing in another respect, that is, what it is to will the
infinite happiness, instead of misery of God. Now in total
ignorance of the tendency of willing, to produce the result,
and in view exclusively of its nature, in the other respect
named, may not the Intelligence affirm absolutely the obligation of the creature referred to, to will the infinite happiness,
instead of the infinite misery of God? If so (and who will
dleny that the Intelligence would, under the circumstances supposed, make the affirmation under consideration,) we have demonstrative evidence, that utility, or the perceived tendency
of right willing, is not the reason in view of which obligation
thus to will, is affirmed.
230 
REASON.
To bring this question to a final issue, let us suppose the
being of God present, in the sense above explained, to the
contemplation of one of his rational offspring, and that no
other creature but this exists.  In view of the divine capaci ties, this creature affirms absolutely his obligation to will God's
infinite happiness, instead of his misery.   In view of God's
infinite excellence he affirms his obligation to love him.   Now
the question is, in view of the nature of willing, in which of
the senses above named has this affirmation been made?  In
answering this question I remark, that the happiness of God
may be assumed as an infinite quantity, incapable of any in crease or diminution from any finite cause; or it may be as sumed as a finite quantity, capable of increase or diminution
from such a cause. Or (the only remaining supposition con ceivable) the mind may be in doubt which of the above posi tions is true.  Of these positions, the first, as I suppose, is
the general impression of the race, and it certainly accords
wvith the Bible.
Now, in whichsoever of these states the mind is, it affirms
with equal absoluteness its obligation to will the infinite happiness, instead of misery, of God. When it holds that the
happiness of God cannot be increased or diminished by any
act of any finite will, still it affirms its obligation to will the
infinite happiness of God, instead of his infinite misery. Now
an affirmation made in the absence of a certain element cannot
be based upon that element.
Further, the thing which this creature affirms himself
bound to will, under the circumstances supposed, is the infinite
happiness of God. Now it..is demonstrably evident, that our
willing cannot have any tendency to produce this result, a
cause in its nature finite having no tendency to produce an
effect that is infinite.   The utmost that can be said of the
tendency of willing is, that it is adapted to effect the happiness
231 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPHY.
of God in a finite degree. Now, is it in view of such a result
that we affirm our obligation to will a result that is infinite?
TWilling an infinite good derives, in our judgment, all its obligation from the perceived tendency of such willing to produce
a finite good. Such is the doctrine of Utility.
Result of the Discussion thus far.
The result of the discussion thus far, is this: The perceived adaptation of willing the infinite happiness of God to
promote that end, cannot be the reason of the affirmation that
we are bound to will his infinite happiness,   1. Because this affirmation is, as a matter of fact, made
with the most perfect absoluteness, in the full belief that such
willing has no tendency to effect his happiness at all.
2. Because that this affirmation is made with equal absoluteness, while the mind is in perfect suspense in respect to
the fact whether our willing has any tendency to affect at all
the happiness of God.
3. Suppose we adopt the conclusion that our willing has
such tendency, this conclusion we can adopt only as the result
of a process of reasoning.   Before we have arrived at this
result, the above affirmation was made with perfect absoluteness, and could not, therefore, have been based upon such
conclusion.
4. When this conclusion is arrived at, the absoluteness of
the affirmation under consideration is neither increased nor
diminished.
5. To suppose that the obligation to will the infinite happiness of God is based upon the perceived tendency of thus
willing to affect his happiness in a finite degree, is to abandon
entirely the position that intentions, or what a man wills, determines moral character.
'?32 
REASON.
Othe) imtportait Considerations.
Other considerations, bearing upon this point, now demand
our attention.
1. No one is conscious of a reference at all to the tendency
of our willing to affect the happiness of God, as the ground
of the affirmation that we ought to will it.
2. When this tendency is pointed out and proved to exist,
no one recognizes it as the reason of the affirmation under consideration.
3. No one who attempts to assign to others the reason why
they are bound to love God, or to will his happiness, ever assigns this as the reason.   Assuming the position, on the other
hand, that we affirm ourselves bound to love God, or to will
his happiness, for the sole and exclusive reason that the character of God is intrinsically excellent, and that his happiness
is a thing in itself of infinite value, this assumption I affirm
to be correct,
1. Because universal Consciousness affirms its truth.
2. When this fact is pointed out, universal Reason responds
to it, as the real ground of the affirmation under consideration,
and as an all-sufficient ground.
3. This fact is invariably referred to, when we attempt to
convince others of their obligation to love God, or to will his
happiness, and of their guilt in not doing it.
4. Upon this ground Utilitarians, as well as others, found
their affirmations of obligation to will what is right, whenever
their theory is not distinctly before their minds.
5. The more perfectly the mind is abstracted from all considerations but the simple relation of willing to what is intrinsic in the object presented, the more distinct and vivid will be
the affirmations of Reason in respect to the moral character of
our determinations.   Of this every one is conscious.
20*
233 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIIY.
The above Argument of universal Application.
The argument thus far has been based mainly upon one
example, willing the happiness instead of the misery of God.
It will readily be perceived, however, that this example is of
universal application in respect to all duties which, as creatures, we owe to God. If obligation to will God's happiness
is not based upon perceived tendencies of willing it, to produce
that result, no more surely can obligation to love him, submit
to his authority, or be grateful for his mercies, be based upon
perceived tendencies of yielding to such claims to produce the
same result.
ObUcatiout not affirmed il view of the subjective Tendencies
of Right or Wrong  Wiirlyg.
Suppose the Utilitarian shifts his ground, and assumes the
position that we affirm our obligation to will the happiness of
God, or to love him, in view of the perceived tendencies of
such willing to advance our own or the happiness of others.
I reply    1. That, as shown above, obligation must have been perceived, affirmed, and complied with, or transgressed, prior to
the perception of any such tendencies.   Such perceptions,
therefore, cannot have been the basis of such affirmations.
2. The testimony of universal Consciousness is opposed to
this supposition. When we affirm our obligation to love God,
for example, nothing is further from our views than the thought,
that this affirmation is based upon the perceived tendencies to
make us happy.
3. No person ever assigns this as the reason why we are
bound to will the happiness of God.
234 
REASON.
Another gen)eral Conisidcration.
I have one consideration further, of a general nature, in
favor of the position which I am endeavoring to establish. It
is this: The more perfectly a man is emancipated fromn the
belief of the doctrine of utility, the more perfectly he is " rooted
and grounded" in the belief of the opposite doctrine, the
more sacred in his estimation does right, does duty appear.
As proof of this assertion I appeal to the consciousness of
those who have had experience of the influence of this belief
upon their minds.  That error should have such an influence,
is the strongest anomaly in the history of human nature.
" That which maketh manifest is light," and nothing, surely,
but light can sanctify duty in our estimation.
Once more, according to the showing of Utilitarians themselves, the tendency of willing, as, for example, the happiness
of God, is a consideration, in view of which, it is iimpossible
for us to will. Now that fact in view of which it is impossible
for me to act, is a fact in view of which I cannot affirm my
obligation to act.  On  the other system, the very consideration, in view of which we affirm our obligation to will what is
right, is the very consideration in view of which alone, as all
admit, right willing is possible.
Jfutable Actions.
The way is now prepared to consider a class of actions denominated Mutable.  Here, at first thought, it would appear
that utility must be the ground of right.  For example, the
parent says to his child, " You must not strike your brother
or sister;" and the reason assigned for this prohibition is,
" because it will hurt." Now this prohibited act is composed
of two elements.   1. The physical part, or the motion of the
hand. 2. The volition or act of the Will, as willing such mo
235 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIIY.
tion.  The real meaning of the prohibition is, "You shall not
will this motion of your hand."   The reason of the prohliibition, and consequently the ground of obligation to comnply, is
the perceived connection between the muotion and the wellbeing of the person exposed to its effects. Now here also it
is demonstrably evident that utility is not the ground of the
right. For the obligation to avoid willing arises from the perceived connection between the motion under consideration and
its effects, and not firom the perceived connection between
willing and the motion itself. Because, when we suppose all
such connection between willing and the motion destroyed, the
obligation of the subject to avoid willing such motion remains
equally sacred. The connection between willing and its effects
is accidental. The character of willing, however, remains the
same, whether this connection exists or not. This principle is
of universal application. Whenever we are bound to will any
end, we affirm ourselves under obligation to will every means
which we judge adapted to secure that end.  In neither instance is our obligation to will affirmed in view of the perceived connection between our willing and the object willed;
but on account of what is intrinsic in the object itself.
I here close this protracted discussion of the relations between the ideas of obligation, and of the useful.  It is not
intended to be denied that perceived tendency is a ground of
obligation, but that it is the exclusive ground. Less than I
have said upon this subject, I could not have said, and satisfied my own mind. We will now proceed to the analysis of
other ideas of Reason.
IDEAS OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.
Ideas defined.
These ideas, like those of right and wrong, are opposites.
236 
REASON.
The elements entering into one, are excluded from the other.
The question is, Wh iat are the characteristics which separate
and distinguish one of these ideas from  the other?   In answer, I would remark, that they represent two entirely distinct and opposite relations, which may be supposed to exist
between an antecedent and its consequent.   The first is this:
The  antecedent being given, but one consequent is possible,
and that mu?st arise  This relation we designate by the term
necessity.   The second relation is, The antecedent beiggiven
either of two or more consequen ts arepossible, a)td conseuzcntcy?,
~ wlhent any one cdoes arise, either of the others might arise in its
stcad.
These Ideas l)5tiversal and Necessary.
These ideas have the characteristics of absolute universality and necessity.  Every antecedent and consequent, actual
and conceivable, must fall under one or other of the relations
which they represent.  These ideas have nothing to do with
the nature of antecedents and consequents.  They simply and
exclusively represent the r2elations existing between them.  As
representing such relations, they must bear the fundamental
characteristics of all other ideas of Reason, inasmuch as no
other relation, differing in kind from either of these, and not
included in one or the other of them, is even conceivable.
Idea of Liberty realized only ia)t thte Action of the TVill.
The relation between all antecedents and consequents, with
the exception of motives and acts of Will, are conceived by
the Intelligence as necessary.  If the idea of Liberty is not
realized in the action of the Will, it exists in the Intelligence
without an object, or any element in any object corresponding
to it, in the universe.
237 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPHIIY.
Chronoloygical Antecedents of these Ideas.
No idea of Reason does or can exist in the Mind, without
the appearance of some phenomena, through which it is revealed.  The existence of the idea of Liberty can be accounted
for only on the supposition of the appearance in Consciousness
of the element of Liberty in the action of the Will.  In all
other phenomena of which the 3lind is conscious, the element
of necessity appears.  The appearance of these phenomena,
then, are the chronological antecedents of the ideas of Liberty
and Necessity.
IDEA OF THiE BEAUTIFUL AND SUBLIME.
Opin ionis of Ph7ilosophers.
All men agree in pronouncing some objects beautiful, and
some sublime, and others the opposite. By many philosophers,
the beautiful and sublime are contemplated as simple emotions.
Some suppose, that all objects are to the Mind originally alike
in this respect, that they are unadapted to awaken any such
emotions in the Mind, and that these feelings come to be connected with particular objects by accidental association. Pleasing emotions are from somue cause awakened in the mind.
While in this state, we perceive, we will suppose, a rose.
These emotions are thus associated with that object, so that
when it is perceived again, they reappear.  Hence, not because the rose is in itself more beautiful than any other object, but on account of the feelings thus associated with it,
it is ever after regarded as beautiful.  Now to this theory
there exists this insuperable objection.  Accidental association
can never account for the absolute universality of judgment
which exists among mankind, in respect to particular objects.
NWhy, for example, do all the world agree in pronouncing the
238 
REASON.
rose and lily more beautiful than the poppy or sun-flower?
Accidents never produce perfect uniformity.
Others suppose, that there are in the mind ideas of Reason
represented by the terms beautiful and sublime, and that objects are referred to one or the other, as they present corresponding characteristics.   I will now present certain considerations designed to show, that this last is the true conception.
Considerations indicatiqg the existence in the Jlii2nd of Ideas
of Reason, desigi,ate(I by the terms Beaittiful and Stblime.
One fact which has a very important bearing upon this
question, strikes the mind at first view. It is this: No human
form or countenance is regarded by any person as perfect.
Hlow can this fact be accounted for, except on the supposition,
that every such judgment is based upon a comparison of the
external object, with an idea more perfect, existing in the mind
itself?
Again, the ancient sculptors and painters, when they attempted to give to the world, what all men would alike regard
as the forms of perfect beauty, copied after no living model;
but took from all the forms of beauty in the world around
them, those parts which were most beautiful, and from  these
combined new forms more beautiful than any realities actually
existing. Does not this show, that they were endeavoring to
realize, not the forms of beauty actually existing in the universe
around them, but an idea in their own minds more perfect than
these forms?
WVith this supposition also, and with this only, consists the
fact, that the pleasure derived from the contemplation of certain forms of beauty is permanent, and becomes more intense,
the more intimate and protracted our acquaintance with them;
cwhlie the pleasure derived from the contemplation of other
239 
INTELLECTUAL PHIILOSOPIIY.
forms ceases on a protracted and intimate acquaintance.   The
reason of this obviously is, that the first mentioned forms correspond very nearly, in all their parts, to the ideal in the
mind.   An intimate acquaintance with the others, however,
gives us a knowledge of their defects, and in time destroys the
pleasure which we felt when those defects were not perceived.
I will present one other consideration bearing upon the
subject, which I regard as perfectly decisive.  The particular
elements which mark objects as beautiful or sublime, do in
fact correspond with fundamental ideas.   In respect to the
sublime, all agree in fixing upon the Infinite as the chief source
of emotions of sublimity.   In finite objects one element only
is correlated to these emotions, that of vastness.
The characteristics of the beautiful are determinate form,
regularity, uniformity, and variety.   A  waving, instead of a
crooked line, a line realizing the ideas of uniformity and variety, has universally been fixed upon, as the line of beauty
and grace.  Now that which proceeds according to fundamental ideas, must be itself the representative of such ideas.
O)Objection to the Uiiveg-sati;ty of these Ideas.
An objection to the principle above elucidated, to wit, the
different standards of beauty adopted by different nations, and
by the same nations, at different periods, has sometimes been
adduced. In reply, the following considerations are presented
as deserving special attention:
1. It may be questioned whether the savage when he paints
and tattoes his form, and the civilized person when he adorns
his with the ornaments of civilized society, are endeavoring to
realize the same idea.  The one may be aiming to realize the
idea of the beautiful, and the other (the savage), that of the
terrible.  The same holds true of architecture.   The prominent
idea in the Grecian style is the beautiful. That in the Gothic
240 
REASON.
is the grand, the solemn, the sublime. The former and the
latter then, had not different standards of beauty.  They were
aiming to realize different ideas.
2. While the idea may exist alike in all minds, the ideal,
that is, the fo7'n in which the idea shall be embodied, may
exist in different minds, and among mankind at different
periods, in different degrees of development.   Consequently
the fornts in which they will embody the idea will be various.
3. In contemplating particular forms of beauty, in which
many defects of course exist along with the beautiful, these
may be mistaken for the particular features which  are the
source of the pleasurable emotions felt under these circumstances.   These defects then will be copied instead of the
actual beauties.
4. But in the midst of all this apparent variety, there is a
more general acgreemnent than is commonly supposed; an agreement that is fundamental to the inquiry before us. Introduce
men of all ag,es, and of every nation into the same family, and
ask them which of the children in that particular family is the
most beautiful, and you will find but little diversity in their
judgments, and no diversity wvhich is not perfectly consistent
with the supposition of a common ideal in their minds, while
the striking coincidence in their judgments can be explained
on no other supposition.
5. There are actual forms of beauty, in respect to which
all men do agree. The most perfect specimens of ancient
sculpture and painting may be adduced as an illustration. Also
forms of beauty in the world around us; as the rose and the
lily. Such circumstances we should find it difficult to explain
on any other supposition than the one before us.
Chronologdical Angtecedent of  these Ideas.
The condition of the development of the idea of beauty
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241 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPIIY.
and sublimity in the mind, is the perception of the elements
of the beautiful and sublime in some external object. In the
Divine mind, these ideas, among others, existed eternally as
the prototypes after which creation was formed and moulded.
The human Intelligence is so constituted, that in the presence
of objects, in the conformation of which the Divine idea is
more or less nearly realized, the same idea is awakened in the
mind of man. This idea then becomes the standard by which
the external object is characterized as beautiful, grand, or
sublime.
Illtstration f;ono  Cousin,.
Cousin thus beautifully explains the origin of the idea of
beauty in the mind: "The idea of the beautiful is equally inherent in the mind of man, as that of the just and good.   Interrogate yourselves, when a vast and tranquil sea, when
mountains of harmonious  proportions,  when  the manly or
graceful forms of men or women, are present to your view, or
some trait of heroic devotion, to your recollection. Once impressed with the idea of the beautiful, man seizes, disengages,
extends, develops and purified it in his thought, and by the
assistance of this idea, which external objects have suggested
to him, he re-examines these same objects, and finds them
inferior to the idea which they themselves have suggested."
Explagatory PRemiarks.
The remarks above made have directly respected the beautiful and sublime, as they are embodied in external form. By
this I would not be understood as implying that nothing else is
beautiful or sublime, or that this is their chief source.  There
are beauty and sublimity in thought, and if possible, higher
still in action.
242 
REASON.
IDEA OF HARMONY.
The remarks and illustrations above presented, pertaining
to the ideas of the beautiful and sublime, are equally applica ble to that of harmony. The ear tryeth sounds, as the eye
doth form and color. In harmony words and sounds ate ar ranged according to fundamental ideas, just as other elements
are in the beautiful and sublime. That this is the true expli cation of the subject will appear, I think, from the following
considerations:
1. WVhen highly excited by musical performances, those
who attentively watch the operations of their own minds, can not fail to notice, that under such circumstances they uni formly conceive of the same pieces as performed infinitely bet ter; and that it is this conception which constitutes the main
source of delight.
2. Persons in whose minds the principle of harmony is
most fully developed, enjoy an exquisite piece of music quite
as highly, when reading it alone, in the absence of all musical
sounds, as when hearing it performed by the best trained
choir, clearly showing that the idea in the mind far surpasses
realities without.
3. Skillful performers on the organ or piano, who have lost
the faculty of hearing, enjoy these instruments no less than
before.  I recollect to have read of a celebrated musician in
Germany, who in his old age lost his hearing entirely. Yet,
as his fingers would run over the keys of his piano, the instrument used being (a fact unknown to him) totally destitute of
power to produce any sound whatever, he would rise in his
feelings to perfect ecstacy of delight.  In his own mind there
was harmony deep and profound. It was harmony in idea.
4. The principles of harmony are all found to be reducible
to mathematical formulas.   These principles are not deduced,
243
I 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
in the first instance, from observation, irrespective of fundamental ideas.   Such ideas must first be developed, before the
principles of harmony can be understood.
REFLECTIONS.
Two reflections suggest themselves from the above analysis.
1. Jfind constituted according  to fundamneitat Ideas.
The first is, that a profound knowledge of mind clearly shows
that our nature is constituted according to absolute principles
of pure science, or of fundamental ideas of Reason. Nothing,
at first thought, would appear to be at a further remove from
the principles of pure science, especially of the pure mathematics, than the laws of harmony. Yet, when we have developed the laws of proportion in the pure mathematics, we find
that we have developed those principles without the knowledge
of which the laws of harmony could not be understood. The
same results are equally applicable to external existences. In
the study of pure science we have not departed from nature.
AVe are only in the depths of our own Reason, developing the
forms and laws to which nature, material and mental, is conformed. We are only developing those formulas and principles which enable us to understand the universe as it is. The
more deep and profound our descent into the depths of pure
science, the more profound and perfect is our knowledge of
nature.  What do such facts indicate in respect to the character of the Author of our being? HIe must be a pure Intelligence, in whose mind absolute science pre-existed ts the
patterns and laws after which all things, visible and invisible,
are constituted. Hence, when the principles of the same science are developed in our own miinds, we are then able to comprehend our own nature, and the constitution of things around
us. Because we are from our nature scientific beings, for this
244 
REASON.
reason alone it is that we can understand the works of God.
Thus it is that
"Trailing clouds of glory do we come
From God who is our home."
Hiow little is the student accustomed to reflect that in the
study of the laws and principles of the triangle, the square,
the circle, the ellipse, the parabola, and hyperbola, together
with the science of number and proportion, he is developing
in his own mind, those formulas and principles by which alone
the wonders of astronomy, and the laws of attraction which
bind the universe of matter in harmony together, &c., can be
understood and explained by him.   In our descent into the
deep profound of the pure and abstract sciences, we find ourselves, whenever we comlue to recognize our position, in the deep
profound of nature, and of the Infinite Intelligence of Nature's
God.
2. Poetry defined.
We are now prepared for a definition of poetry, properly
so called. A mere rythmical jingle of words at the end of
lines of a given length, does not constitute poetry, according
to the true signification of the term.  Nor have I been satisfied with the popular definitions of the subject which I have
met with. I will present, as an example, that given by Coleridge: "A  poem is that species of composition which is opposed  to works of science, by proposing  for  its iinme(liate
object pleasure, not truth; and from all other species (having
this object in common with it) it is discriminated by proposing to itself such delight from the who7,e as is compatible with
a distinct gratification from each component part."   The great
objection to this definition is, that many prose, as well as poetical compositions, would fall under it. I will now propose
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245 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIY.
another and a different definition.  Poetry, or more properly,
perhaps, a poem, is the c}reations of the Imafyination embodied
i,t lan)uage air'a,ge(d i, coiifor)nity to the idea of harmony.
I leave the definition to speak for itself.
IDEA OF TRUTII.
Idclea defined.
Another fundamental idea of Reason - an idea which
controls the Intelligence in all its movements -is the idea of
truth. The term Truth may be contemplated objectively and
subjectivel.  Objectively, it comprehends and expresses all
realities, whatever they may be.  Subjectively, it designates an
intellectual conception in harmony with the object of the conception.
Chronoloyical Antecedent of this Idea.
The chronological antecedent of this idea, or the condition
of its development by the leason, is the perception of phenomena, and the consequent development of the idea of substance.  Then the great question, " What is truth?" becomes
the leading.idea in the Intelligence.
IDEA OF LAW.
The term law is used in a great variety of significations.
Two general divisions, however, include all the meanings ever
attached to this term, to wit, Natural or Physical, and Moral
Law, words which are applied to the action of two distinct and
opposite classes of powers.
In general, Law may be defined as a r9ule of action. Natural or Physical Law is that rule in conformity to which the
natitral oi, )hysical otowers  of the universe dclo act.  Moral
law is that rule in conformity to which moral agents are re
246 
PREASON.
qiuiled to act.  Natural or Physical Law is a rule of action.
Moral Law is a rule for action.
The words Natural or Physical Law are used, among others,
in the two following senses
1. To designate the rule in conformity to which each particular power in nature acts, in the production of specific results.
Between all material substances, for example, there exist two distinct and opposite principles, those of Attraction and Repulsion. The rules in conformity to which these principles act are
called the Laws of Attraction and Repulsion. It is also a
fixed and immutable principle, with such substances, that a
body at rest, or in motion, will continue in the same state, till
that state is changed by the action of some power external to
the body itself, and that with such bodies, action and reaction
are always equal.  Here we have the laws of Rest and Motion,
and of Action and Reaction. Every power in nature, mental
and physical, has its laws.  Thus we speak of theLaws of Miatter and of the Laws of Mind.
2. To designate the rule in conformity to which certain powers of nature are or may be arranged for the production of
certain results.  The motion of the heavenly bodies, for examample, the balance of the material Universe, the phenomena
of animal and vegetable life and production, &c., arise not from
the original properties of the powers of nature, irrespective of
their present arrangement and organization, but from the mutual action and reaction of those powers consequent on that
peculiar arrangement and organization. Each particular power
manifests many, to say the least, of its present peculiar qualities, in consequence of its present position and arrangement
relatively to other powers around it.  Thus we have that class
of the laws of nature comprehended under the idea of Means
and Ends.   In this respect, the Universe is one vast whole,
throughout all departments of which an absolute unity of de
247 
INTELLECTUAL PHIIILOSOPIIY.
sign and arrangement obtains.   Everything in nature exists
and acts as a means to one all-comprehending whole. The
wants of mind is the end.   The entire arrangement and action
of the powers of nature throughout, are subordinated as a systemoni of means for the realization of this one end, and this is
the law of nature, all particular principles pertaining to the
arrangements of the powers of creation, such as those above
referred to, being only particular parts of this all-comprehending whole.   It is to this idea of law, that Coleridge refers in
the following paragraph, to which I will append some illustratrations:
COLERIDGE'S DEFINITION OF LAW.
"The first is that of Law, which, in its absolute perfection, is conceivable only of the Supreme Being, whose creative
id(ea not only appoints to each thing its position, but in that
position, and in consequence of that position, gives it its qualities, yea, it gives its very existence, as that particular thing.
Yet in whatever science the relation of the parts to each other
and to the whole, is predetermined by a truth originating in
the Jjniid, and not abstracted or generalized from observation
of the parts, there we affirm the presence of a lal, if we are
speaking of the physical sciences, as of Astronomy, for instance; or the presence of fundamental ideas, if our discourse
be upon those sciences, the truths of which, as truths absolute, not merely may have an independent or!iin in the Mind,
but continue to exist in and for the Mind alone. Such, for instance, is Geometry," &C.
To set the above definition in a clear and distinct light, take
the following illustration: Let us suppose a body of men, say
one hundred thousand in number, assembled together, all perfectly armed and equipped with all the implements of war, but
without officers, without discipline, without order.  Hiere is a
248 
REASON.
congregated mass of powers, but the absence of law   In other
words, these powers act in conformity with no rule.   What is
the condition of this army? It is powerless, except for selfdestruction, and that in exact proportion to its numbers. Contemplate now this army, officered, disciplined, and all brought
into perfect order under some experienced commander. You
have the same powers as formerly, but now acting in conformity with certain rules or laws. The army now becomes
powerful, not for self-destruction, but for attack and defense.
But what is the law which these powers obey, or in conformity
with which they act?  It is an idea in the mind of the commander.   It is this idea which gives to each part of this army
its particular position, and in consequence of that position,
gives it its qualities, its very existence, as that particular part.
The army receives its existence and qualities as that particular
army firom the law or idea which it obeys, or in conformity
with which it acts.
You will now readily apprehend the meaning of the remark
of Coleridge: "Law in its absolute perfection is conceivable
only of the Supreme Being, whose creative idea not only appoints to each thing its position, but in that position, and in
consequence of that position, gives it its qualities, yea, it gives
its very existence, as that partictular thing."  The meaning,
as far certainly as it is correct, is this: An idea in the mind
of God appoints to every power in nature its particular position, and in consequence of that position, gives it its qualities,
its very existence, as that particular thing.
In illustration, I would remark, that if we conceive of the
powers of nature, as existing each one by itself alone, or as
existing in different relations to each other from that which
they now sustain, few of the peculiar qualities which they
now exhibit would appear. All the phenomena of vegetation,
for example, result from  the peculiar arran2tgemet of the
249
.1 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
powers of the material creation relatively to each other.
Change this arrangement, and nothing  but barrenness and
universal desolation, or phenomena totally different from those
which now appear, would appear. Each particular particle,
therefore, receives its qualities, yea, its very existence, as the
particular thing manifested to us, in consequence of its position relative to surrounding particles.   Everything  we behold
or contemplate is to us what it is, in consequence of its existence, position, and consequent action in harmony with an Idea
in the infinite Intelligence.
Law, subjective and objective.
Law, in this sense, may be contemplated in two points of
light, subjective and objective.  In the first sense, it is an idea,
in which powers are contemplated as arranged relatively to
each other, so that their mutual action and reaction shall produce results in correspondence to a certain end conceived of,
and chosen by the mind.   In the second sense, it is the existence, arrangement, and consequent action of these powers, in
harmony with that idea.
Conclusion fromn the above.
We come to this conclusion: that wherever powers act in
conformity with law, they are acting in obedience to some idea
existing in some intelligent mind.   To illustrate this, let us
suppose an army of one hundred thousand men all dressed
and equipped alike, arranged in a given order, and all performing perfectly harmonious motions and evolutions. You here
perceive the presence and all-pervading influence of law. Is
it possible to conceive all this, and not suppose this law to be
some idea in some intelligent mind- a mind that comprehends
all the parts, and assigns to each part its position, &c.?  If
this could not be supposed of intelligent powers, much less
could we suppose a similar action of necessarv an]d    4-; ^l:
250 
REASON.
gent ones.  The grand problem, then, the solution of which
is the final object and distinctive character  of philosophy,
when once solved, leads the mind to the direct apprehension
and contenmplation of the Infinite, of God, whose creative idea
is the law of all existences. The problem referred to is this:
For all that exists conditionally (i. c. the existence of which
is inconceivable, except under the condition of its dependency
on some other as its antecedent) to find a ground that is unconditional and absolute, and thereby to reduce the aggregate
of human knowledge to a system.   Now, this ground can be
found in nothing but in the mind of God.
CO/roi,ological Antecedent to the Idea of Law.c.
As Miind wakes into conscious existence, and contemplates
the action of the powers of nature within and around it, it at
once perceives all things existing and acting as a means to an
end.  Everywhere diversity blended with harmony, presents
itself.  Now, this presentation of the powers of nature is the
chronological antecedent of the idea of Law in the Reason.
Hence the great inquiry ever after imposed upon the Intelligence, to wit: What are the laws in conformity to which these
powers act?  In this inquiry, the Intelligence begins to " feel
after" the Infinite, and it never rests until it finds itself in the
presence of " that creative idea, which appoints to each thing
its Position, and in consequence of that position, gives it its
qualities, yea, its very existence as that particular thing."
APPARENT MISTAKE IN RESPECT TO LAW.
Philosophers, as well as others, often appear at least to
speak on this subject, as if, in their judgment, the powers of
nature, with their present arrangement, on the one hand, existed, and Law on the other, as a separate something controlling their action.   Coleridge maintains, that law (and by law,
251 
INTELLECTUAL PIHILOSOPIIY.
he means thought) is the only reality. Now, it should be
borne in mind, that when we depart from ideas, nothing relative to the powers of nature exists, but the powers arranged in
such a manner, that their mutual action and reaction shall
produce results in harmony with such ideas. Look, as an illustration, at the steamboat.  There is not here powers  arranged in a given order, and then a something else, which controls their action. All the results we witness arise from the
nature, and the peculiar arrangement of the powers here combined. So in all other instances.
THEORY AND LAW DISTINGUISHED.
The term theory is used in two senses somewhat different.
The first meaning may be illustrated by a reference to what is
denominated the Theory and Practice of Medicine. The end
for which medicinal substances are used, in cases of disease, is
the controlling of the disease, and its consequent removal.
Now, when a certain disease appears, a particular course is
adopted. The results are marked down. That course which,
in given circumstances, is attended with the most favorable
results, is set down as the course to be pursued in the treatment of this disease. The course becomes a Theory, to which
medical practice is conformed. According to this usage, the
term Theory supposes certain powers arranged under some one
point of view, and certain principles of action adopted for the
purpose of controlling these powers.
According to another usage, Theory means a certain hypothesis which has been adopted for the explanation of a given
class of facts; an hypothesis, in conformity to which, it is
supposed, the facts may be explained. In respect to a given
class of facts, it frequently happens that all admit of an
equally ready explanation, on either of two or more distinct
and opposite hypotheses, and hence a corresponding number
252 
REASON.
of Theories are adopted for their explanation. Thus we have
two distinct and opposite Theories of electricity, all the facts
presented being equally explicable in conformity to each.
Now Law, as distinguished from Theory, is an hylpothesis
ic7gch st(stc(ios to a given ntvGber of facts the relation of a
loyijcil cuitecedent.  The facts being given, the hypothesis must
be assumed as the ground of their explanation. The facts
must not only be explicable by the hypothesis, but affirmed by
it, in such a form as to contradict every other hypothesis
which can be adduced for their explanation. This condition
we find realized in the facts adduced by Newton, in demonstration of the law of attraction.
NATURE OF PROOF.
One thought suggested by the preceding analysis demands
special attention -the nature of proof.  No proposition is,
properly speaking, proven, till facts or arguments are adduced,
which not only affirm its truth, but contradict every opposite
proposition. Hlow often is this fundamental law of evidence
overlooked and disregarded in almost every department of
human investigation. In Theology, for example, how often is
an hypothesis denominated a doctrine, which merely consists
with a given class of passages of Holy Writ, assumed as absolutely affirmed by these passages, when, in reality, they equally
consist with the contradictory hypothesis.   Let it ever be
borne in nlind, that no passage or passages of Scripture prove
any one doctrine which do not contradict every opposite doctrine.   No  facts affirm any one hypothesis which  do  not
equally contradict every contradictory hypothesis.
FUNDAMENTAL AND SUPERFICIAL THINKERS.
Another suggestion which presents itself is this - the difference between s upe):ficial and fundamental thinkers.  The
22
253 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPI-IY.
former dwell only upon the surface of subjects, and having
there found certain hypotheses which consist with mere exterior facts, they gravely conclude that they " have heard the
conclusion of the whole matter." They have discovered all
that can be known, and "wisdom will die with them."   The
latter class, on the other hand, retire into the interior of subjects, and takling their position upon some great central facts,
announce the existence and operations of universal laws sustaining to exterior facts the relation of logical antecedents, and
explaining them all.  The reason why the positions assumed
by such men are uniformly so impregnable is, that the error
of every hypothesis, in opposition to that which they have
assumed, as well as the truth of their own, becomes visible at
once, in the light of the great central facts on which they
have taken their stand.
THE PHILOSOPHIC IDEA.
The philosophic idea realized, or objectively considered, is
the reduction of phenomena to fundamental ideas, the reduction of the sum of human knowledge to a system, the finding,
amid the infinity of facts which are floating in the universe
around us, some great central fundamental facts or laws, which
are affirmed by all others, and explain them all.
This idea subjectively considered is a conception lying
down in the depths of the Reason, that all substances exist
and act in harmony with such ideas. Hence the questions
perpetually imposed upon the Understanding and Judgment,
in all departments of human research, to wit, what are the
laws which explain the facts here presented?   Science  is
everywhere now on the high road tending to the realization of
this great idea. Happy the eyes that shall see it realized.
254 
REASON.
Chronologyical Atecedents of this Itea.
The chronological antecedents of this idea are the same
as those which sustain a similar relation to that of law.  Indeed this idea is but one form in which the idea of law manifests itself.
Other ideas of Reason will be considered, when  we speak
of matter and spirit, the soul, God, &c.
FIRST TRUTHS, OR NECESSARY PRINCIPLES OF REASON) AS
DISTINGUISHED FROM CONTINGENT PRINCIPLES.
Coitiniiget and necessary Principles defi2ed an(l dlistinguTished.
" Contingent principles," in the language of Cousin, "are
those which force belief, though without implying any contradiction in the denial of them, and which are not therefore necessary, but irresistable, natural beliefs, actual, primitive, and
instinctive, such as the belief in the stability of the laws of
nature, the perception of extension," &c.
A necessary truth or principle, on the other hand, is one
which not only forces assent, but which is always attended
with absolute conviction of its necessity, of the total impossi
bility of supposing the contrary; such  as the proposition,
Every event must have a cause.  The above distinction perfectly corresponds with those made by Dr. Reid.   "Truths,'
he observes, "which fall within the compass of human  knowledgc, whether they be self-evident, or deduced from those that
are self-evident, may be reduced to two classes. They are
either necessary or immutable truths, whose contrary is impossible; or they are contingent and mutable, depending upon
some efifct of W' ill or power, which had a beginning, and may
have an end."
That a cone is a third part of a cylinder of the same base,
255 
INTELLECTUAL PHIILOSOPHY.
and the same altitude, is a necessary truth.  It depends not
upon the will or power of any being. It is immutably true,
and the contrary impossible.   That the sun is the center,
about which the earth, and the other planets of our system,
perform their revolutions, is a truth, but it is not a necessary
truth. It depends upon the power and will of God.
First Truths defined.
First truths are those principles, whether contingent or
necessary, which lie at the foundation of all science, of all
reasoning.   "They admit," says Dr. Reid, " of no other proof
than the following: 1. All men do admit them, as a matter
of fact in all their reasoning. 2. All men, even those who
deny their validity, act upon them. 3. If denied, the validity
of all reasoning fails."
Klnd of Proof of which necessary Ideas or Princip(es admit.
The above remarks of Dr. Reid are strictly applicable to
contingent principles. Necessary ideas and principles, on the
other hand, admit of a kind of proof, that, as far as my knowledge extends, has escaped the notice of philosophers.   All
such ideas and principles sustain, as we have seen, to contingent phenomena and principles, the relation of logical antecedents, while the former sustain to the latter, the relation of
chrozoloygical antecedtents.   Now, in addition to the kind of
proof, adduced by Dr. Reid, necessary ideas and principles
admit of this also: We can designate the phenomena or principles to which they sustain the relation of logical antecedents.
Thus we may prove the reality of time, by refering to succession, of the reality of which every one is conscious.  This is,
in fact, the highest kind of proof of which any principle is
susceptible.
256 
REASON.
Statement illustrated by a Reference to the Idea of  God.
The idea of God is a first truth of Reason. In reference
to the proof of the Divine existence, two errors, as it appears
to me, have been committed by philosophers and theologians.
Some have affirmed, that this truth is wholly insusceptible of
any proof of any kind.   Others have supposed that it admits
of logical demonstration from given premises.   Now the truth
pertaining to the subject lies between the two errors above
named.   The Divine existence admits of the same proof that
other necessary ideas of Reason do; that is, we may find the
contingent phenomena or principles to which this great truth
sustains the relation of logical antecedent.   This, in common
with the kind of proof common to all first truths, is the only
kind of which it is susceptible; and when philosophical and
theological research takes this direction, we shall find the
highest kind of demonstration of the Divine existence. But
this subject will claim attention in a subsequent part of this
Treatise.
IDEA AND PRINCIPLE OF REASON DISTINGUISHED.
An idea of Reason is the pure conception of an object of
Reason, irrespective of any other object; as the idea of space,
time, substance, cause, &c.
A principle of Reason is the conception of the necessary
relatioit of such objects to some other reality, as the principles, Body supposes space, succession supposes time, phenomena suppose substances, and events causes.  Here the relation
existing between contingent and necessary ideas is affirmed.
This is what is meant by a principle of Reason.
AXIOMS, POSTULATES, AND DEFINITIONS.
An axiom is a first priiicil)lc of Reason.  Axioms which
22*
25 i' 
INTELLECTUAL P HILOSOPIIY.
are employed in particular sciences do not belong to those
sciences exclusively.   On the other hand, they pertain to all
sciences, and are only in the form in which they are presented
adapted to the particular science to be treated of.  The axiornms
in Geometry, for example, The whole is greater than any of
its parts, things equal to the same thing are equal to one another, &c., are not peculiar to Geometry, but are common to
all sciences.  The last named is the same thought expressed
in a somewhat different form, as the axiom in logic, to wit,
Where two terms agree with one and the same thing, they
agree with one another.
Postulates are assumed axiomatic principles of Reason,
which pertain exclusively to the particular sciences to be treated
of.  The postulate in Geometry, for example, that a straight
line may be drawn between any two points in space, belongs
exclusively to this and other cognate sciences.
Definitions, scientifically considered, give the objects, and the
quaitics of the objects to be investigated in the light of given
axioms, and postulates.   The conception, for example, of a
straight line, a triangle, square, &c., of which the science of
Geometry treats, are given by definition.
These principles arc applicable to all sciences whatever.
IDEA OF SCIENCE, PURE AND MIXED.
Idea of Science defined.
The idea of Science, which of course is a pure conception
of Reason, is k1towlcljle reduced to findtamenetal ideas and
prigic?p7es; or the propeg2ties an,d relations of objects, systematically erolved in the light of stch id(leas and yrincil~es. Thus
in Geometry, we have the proprieties and relations of particular objects systematically evolved in the light of axioms and
postulates, which are, in reality, fundamental ideas of Rea
2'O' 8 
REASON.
son. Whenever this end is accomplished, in reference to
any phenomena, or objects, then we have the scientific idea
realized.
Pure Scientces.
When the axioms, postulates, and definitions are all alike
pure conceptions of Reason, and when the Judgment evolves
the properties and relations of the objects of such definitions
in the light of such axioms and postulates, then we have what
are denominated pure sciences.  Such is Geometry, and the
mathematics generally.
A[ixed Sciences.
When the axioms and postulates are ideas or principles of
Reason, and when the definitions pertain to phenomena or objects contingent and relative, as in natural philosophly, and
when  the Judgment evolves the relations and properties of
such objects in the light of such ideas and postulates, then we
have mixed sciences.
FUNCTION OF REASON DENOMINATED CONSCIENCE.
Co)science  defined.
Conscience is that function of Reason which pertains to
the ideas of right and wrong, of obligation, of merit and demerit, &c. It is a testifying function of Reason, pertaining
to the relation which ought to exist between the action of the
Will and the idea of right and wrong.
General Remarks.
1. Conscience always commands us in the name of God.
Her mandates are regarded as the voice of God speaking
within us, and when disregarded, we  always hold ourselves
259 
INTELLECTUAL PHIIILOSOPHIIY.
amenable to the Divine tribunal. Conscience in the heathen
is not only a law, but a law of God; and so it is regarded by
them.
2. As Conscience is the voice of God within us, it follows
that it can never, in its appropriate exercise, put right for
wrong, and the opposite. In other words, no man acts conscientiously when doing wrong, nor in opposition to Conscience,
when doing right.  "Conscience," as Coloridge remarks, "in
the absence of direct inspiration, bears the same relation to
the will of God, that a good chronometer does to the position
of the sun in a cloudy day."
Objection.
In opposition to the principle above stated, it is very common to refer to the contradictory standards of moral obligation adopted by different nations, communities, and individuals.
The following considerations are deserving of special attention
in reply to this objection:
1. To suppose that the heathen, for example, in all their
rites and ceremonies, are endeavoring to realize the idea of
right, is as absurd, as to suppose that the savage is endeavoring to realize the idea of the beautiful, when he is tattooing
his body.
2. The Bible affirms that the heathen are actuated by fear
and not by Conscience, " And deliver them who through fear
of ceatth were all their lifetime subject to bondage."
3. The judgment that a thing is not wrong, is often mistaken for the testimony of Conscience to its rightness.
4. WThen a reference is made to the intention, the only
appropriate object of Conscience, we find a more universal
agreement among men than is generally supposed, an agreement of such a nature as to demand the truth of the above
260 
REASON.
proposition, while every shade of difference may be explained
in perfect consistency with it.
Term  Coizscieiice as used it  the Scriptures.
A good conscience, as the words are used, in the Scriptures, is the testimony of the mind to the agreement of the
Will, or moral action, with the moral law. An evil conscience
is the opposite, the testimony of the mind to the fact of the
disagreement of the action of the Will with that law.
GENERAL REMARKS PERTAINING TO REASON.
Relation of Reason to other Intellectual Faculties.
The relation of Reason to other functions of the Intelligence may now be readily pointed out. Of the phenomena,
or truths affirmed  by those faculties, Reason gives the logical
antecedents.  This is its exclusive function.   The Judgment,
in all its operations, is exclusively analytic. It simply evolves
what is embraced in the affirmations of the other faculties.
Reason is synthetic. It always adds to the affirmation of
the other faculties something not embraced in the affirmation.
The element added, however, always sustains to that to which
it is added a fixed relation, that of logical antecedent.   Thus
when Sense or Conscience affirms phenomena, Reason adds to
the affirmation an element not embraced in it, that of Substance, an element, however, sustaining to the affirmation a
fixed relation, that of logical antecedent.
Throuth Reason Jfan is a religious Being.
As possessed of Reason alone is man a religious being.
Through this awful power he attains to a knowledge of the
soul, of moral obligations and retributions, of immortality, of
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INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
God, and enters into inter-communion with the Infinite and
Eternal One.
Reason comnmon to all JIeg.
Reason also exists in all men, and equally in all who possess it at all. This is evident from the fact that if an individual knows a truth of Reason at all, he does and must know it
absolutely. There are no degrees in such knowledge. The
difference, and only difference, between men lies in their perceptive and reflective faculties.  Newton differed from other
men not because he knew any more absolutely than they that
events suppose a cause, that things equal to the same things
are equal to one another, &c., but because he possessed powers
of perception and reflection which enabled him to see (what
they could not discover) the consequences involved in such
truths.
~rEor of Coler}ide.
Reason is not, as Coleridge maintains, an "organ identical
with its appropriate objects."  "Thus God, the soul, eternal
truth," he adds, "are not the objects of the Reason, but they
are the Reason itself."  Space and duration he would admit
are the objects of the Reason; but are they Reason itself?  If
God and the soul are the Reason, then they are identical, and
Pantheism is eternal truth.  Philosophers, as well as others,
are accustomed to take many things for granted which need to
be proved. We must, if we are not willing to be greatly mnisled, be careful what assumptions we permit them  to make.
Otherwise we may find ourselves under the direction of principles which may lead us we know not whither.
Paralogism of Cozusin.
In order to do justice to this great philosopher, I must
make quite a lengthy quotation from him, on the important
262 
REASON.
point next to be considered. The extract is taken from his
remarks on enthusiasm, and commences with a quotation from
Locke.
"' Intuitive knowledge is certain, beyond all doubt, and
needs no probation, nor can have any, this being the highest
of all human certainty.   In this consists the evidence of all
those maxims which nobody has any doubt about, but every
man (does not, as is said, only assent to, but) knows to be
true as soon as ever they are proposed to his Understanding.
In the discovery of and assent to these truths, there is no use
of the discursive faculty, no need of reasoning, but they are
known by a superior and higher degree of evidence; and such,
if I may guess at things unknown, I am apt to think that
angels have now, and the spirits of just men made perfect shall
have in a future state, of thousands of things, which now
either wholly escape our apprehensions, or which, our shortsighlted Reason having got some glimpse of, we, in the dark,
grope after.'  I accept this statement, let it be consistent or
not with the general system of Locke.  I hold likewise that
the highest degree of knowledge is intuitive knowledge.   This
knowledge, in many cases, for example, in regard to time,
space, personal identity, the infinite, all substantial existences,
as also, the good and the beautiful, has, you know, this peculiarity, that it is not grounded upon the Senses nor upon the
Consciousness, but upon the Reason, which, without the intervention of any reasoning attains its objects and conceives them
with certainty.  Now, it is an attribute inherent in the Reason
to believe in itself: and from hence comes faith. If, then,
Intuitive Reason is above Inductive and Demonstrative Reason,
the faith of Reason in itself in intuition, is purer and more
elevated than an induction  and  demonstration.  Recollect,
likewise, that the truths intuitively discovered by Reason are
not arbitrary, but necessary; that they are not relative, but
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INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
absolute.  The authority of Reason is absolute; it is then a
characteristic of the faith attached to Reason, like Reason absolute.  These  are the admirable characteristics of Reason,
and of the faith of Reason in itself.
" This is not all. When we come to interrogate Reason
about itself, to inquire into its own principle, and the source
of that absolute authority which characterizes it, we are forced
to recognize that this Reason is not ours, not constituted by us.
It is not in our power; it is not in the power of our Will to
cause the Reason to give us such or such a truth, or not to give
us them. Independent of our will, Reason intervenes, and,
when certain conditions are fulfilled, gives us, I might say, imposes upon us, these truths.  The Reason makes its appearance in us, though it is not in ourselves, and in no way can it
be confounded with our personality. Reason is impersonal.
Whence, then, comes this wonderful guest within us, and what
is the principle of this Reason which enlightens us, without
belonging to us? This principle is God, the first and the last
of everything. Now, when the faith of Reason in itself is attached to its principle, when it knows that it comes from God,
it increases not merely in degree, but in nature, by as much,
so to say, as the eternal substance is superior to the finite substance in which it makes its appearance.  Thus comes a redoubled faith in the truths revealed by the Supreme Reason in
the shadows of time, and in the limitations of our weakness.
" See, then, Reason become, to its own eyes, divine in its
principle. Now this mode or state of Reason which hears itself, and takes itself as the echo of God on the earth, with the
particular and extraordinary characteristics connected with it,
is what is called Enthusiasm. The word sufficiently explains
the thing; Enthusiasm [(@so  sv Slav] is the spirit of God
within us; it is immediate intuition, opposed to induction and
demonstration; it is the primitive spontaneity opposed to the
264 
PREASON.
ulterior development of reflection; it is the apperception of
the highest truths by Reason in its greatest independence both
of the senses and of our personality.  Enthusiasm in its high est ldegree, in its crisis, so to say, belongs only to particular in dividuals, and to them  only in particular circumstances; but
in its lowest degree, Enthusiasm is as much a fact as anything
else, a fact sufficiently commnon, pertaining not to any particu lar theory, or individual, or epoch, but to human nature, in all
men, in all conditions, and almost at every hour. It is Enthu siasm which produces spontaneous convictions and resolutions,
in little as in great, in the hero, and in the feeblest woman.
Enthiusiasm is the poetic spirit in everything; and the poetic
spirit, thanks to God, does not belong exclusively to poets.   It
has been given to all men in some degree, more or less pure,
more or less elevated; it appears above all, in particular men,
and in particular moments of the life of such men, who are
the poets by eminence. It is Enthusiasm, likewise, which
produces religions, for every religion supposes two things
1. That the truths which it proclaims are absolute truths;
2. That it proclaims them in the name of God himself who reveals them to it."
It requires a great philosopher to conceive of a great absurdity, and to give a professed demonstration of that absurdity
by a great paralogismu.  In all these respects, I give it as my
sober judgment, that the above passage is almost unequaled
among  the absurdities and paralogisms  of modern  times.
What are the conclusions to which we are conducted in this
strange rhapsody?  They are the following:  1. Reason is in
us, but belongs not to us.  It constitutes no part of our personalit.   It is not a'faculty of the soul, like the Understanding and Judrgmenlt, but is a light in the soul.  2. Reason is
God, "the spirit of God within us."  3. In its own eyes Reason is God, " is divine in its principle."
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INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIIY.
WThat are the arguments by which these dogmas are affirmed to be proven? The following:
1. Knowledge  by  Reason  is  "intuitive  knowledge."
a Without the intervention of any reasoning, it attains its objects a,d conceives them with certainty."   This peculiarity, I
remark, Reason possesses only in common with Sense and
Consciousness, with this advantage on their part, that intuitions through these faculties are prior, in the order of time,
to any through Reason.   If for such a consideration Reason is
to be deified, and deemed no part of ourselves, much more
should Sense and Consciousness.
2. " Truths intuitively discovered by Reason, are not arbitrary, but necessary; they are not relative, but absolute."
Now what a leap in logic is that, to go from such a premise
to the conclusion, that therefore Reason is God, "the spirit
of God in us," and no part of ourselves.   Cousin himself, in
another place, has fully demontrated the fallacy of his own
conclusions here. He has laid it down as a fundamental principle in mental philosophy, that the fact of knowledge of any
kind in man, implies in him corresponding  owcers of knowledge. le himself affirms, that we do know by direct intuition, truths, absolute, universal, and necessary. The knowledge
of such truths belongs to us, just as much as knowledge of any
other kind, and implies in us corresponding power. If we
had not the power to know such truths, the knowledge of them
would never belong to us as phenomena of our intelligence.
Now, the faculty by which, when certain conditions are fulfilled, we know such truths, is Reason, a faculty which belongs
as much to us as any other functions of our Intelligence, and
is no more impersonal than any of them.
3. His third and last argument is this, "Reason is not
constituted by us.  It is not in our power; it is not in'the
power of our W,ill to cause Reason to give us such or such a
266 
REASON.
truth, or not to give us them," &c.   In view of such a consideration, to hear the philosopher exclaim, "See, then, Reason become, to its own eyes, divine in its principle." The
man that, in such a premnise, can see any such conclusion,
must throw away his Reason, and see without his eyes. Reason, instead of deifying itself, and then falling upon its knees
to worship its own image, exclaims,
"for my single self,
I had as lief not be, as live to be in awe
Of such a thing as I myself."
No, Reason is too noble, too truthful a faculty to perform
such an act of self-apotheosis.   Reason stands in awe of nothing but the Infinite, which it apprehends, without ever confounding itself with that which it knows, adores, and worships.
He also whom Reason reveals, has said, "Thou shalt have
no other gods before me."   The man who deifies Reason, and
gets upon his knees before that, is, in "Reason's eye," as well
as in the light of inspiration, a heathen, as much as the man
who worships devils.
In the paragraph above cited, Cousin himself furnishes us
with a full demonstration of the fallacy of all his reasonings
here.  Reason, he says, "wheti. ce-taii coitditio)ls are fulj7le(l,
gives us- I may say, imposes upon us - those truths." Now
if Reason was really divine, God in us, knowledge through
Reason would be unconditioned, as it is in God. Must the
Divine Intelligence, as is true with ours, first perceive phenomena, before the Divine Reason can apprehend the idea of substance, space, time, &c.?  Certainly not.  We  have Reason
just as we hav-e Free Will, because "we are made in the image of God." Yet Reason in us is not God, any more than
Free Will is.  Reason, too, has a sphere in the human Intelligence -a sphere which marks it as a function of that Intelli
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INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIIY.
gence, just as much as any other faculty, and as impersonal in
no other sense than all other intellectual functions are.
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
Every one is surprised that, because, when certain intellectual faculties have given, by direct intuition, phenomena,
another faculty should then give us the logical antecedents of
such phenomena, philosophers should hence conclude, that this
last faculty is God- is no part of our Intelligence, but the
"spirit of God  in us."   Yet upon just such paralogisms is
the entire fabric of German Transcendental Pantheism founded.
When philosophers discover any power in nature before unrecognized, they are very apt to worship it as a God. Kant developed Reason as a function of the Intelligence- a function
which philosophers had before failed to recognize.   Gerimany
at once raised the cry, "The gods have come down  to us."
Great is Reason.   "God in us."  There is no God but Reason, and Reason is everything. Everything, therefore, is God.
Sorry am I to record the fact, that the great high priest of
philosophy in France " has brought oxen and garlands" to do
sacrifice to this new divinity.
REASON, IN WHAT SENSE IMPERSONAL.
From what has been said above, one thing is perfectly evident, to wit, in reason we are impersonal in the same and in
no other sense, than we are in the exercise of all other intelleetual faculties. What Cousin has said in respect to the
action of Reason being independent of our Wills, is equally
applicable to every intellectual faculty.  "It is not in the
power of our Will," he says, " to cause Reason to give us such
or such a truth, or not to give us them."  Nor is it in the
power of our Will to cause Sense or Consciousness to give us
such or such phenomena, or the Understanding or Judgment
268 
RIEASON.
to give such or such notions or affirmations, or not to give them,
when certain conditions are fulfilled. In one department of
the Intelligence, we are impersonal in the same sense, and for
the same reason, that we are in another.
REASON, IN WHAT SENSE IDENTICAL IN ALL MIEN.
From the fact that, in all men, Reason gives precisely the
same truths, it has been inferred that Reason does not exist
subjectively in us, as other intellectual faculties do.  It is like
the atmosphere, it is said, which is in the lungs of all, but
subjective to none.   So Reason is a light in all, but a function
of the Intelligence of none.   Now it by no means follows from
the fact, that the same phenomena  appear in all men, that
therefore, the power to perceive such truth, is subjective in
none. The same phenomena appear in all, because the power
to which they are to be referred is in all of precisely the same
nature.  Reason in all men is alike, in the same sense that
powers which produce precisely similar phenomena are in their
nature one.
23*
269 
CIIAPTER  XIII.
RECAPITULATION, WITTI ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS.
TIIE last Chapter completes our analysis of the Intellectual
powers.   This analysis has led to the following classification
of the powers, or functions of the Intelligence, distinguished
as primary and secondary:
INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES ENUMERATED.
The former include Consciousness, the faculty which gives
us a knowledge of whatever passes in the interior of our own
minds,  or sub7jective phenomena -  Sense, the faculty which
gives the qualities of external, material substances, or objective phenomena -and Reason, the faculty which  apprehends
and affirms the reality of necessary, universal, spiritual, infinite,
and eternal truths.
The secondary faculties comprehend the Understanding,
the conceptive or notion-forming power- the Judgment, the
classifying, generalizing, and realizing power - the associating
principle, with its varied functions, as simple association or
suggestion, lMemrnory, Recollection and Fancy -and the Imagination, or esemplastic power.
All these faculties we have found distinctly marked, and
separated, the one from the other, by fundamental phenomena.
Into these, we have found, that all the phenomena of human
Intelligence may be resolved. These, then, we conclude to be
the faculties of the human Intelligence. 
RECAPITULATION.
Feeling a deep solicitude that the grounds of the above
distinctions may be understood and appreciated, I have determined upon a cursory review of the various topics discussed in
the prececling analysis.   For particular reasons, I shall base
this recapitulation upon the principle of classification of mental
phenomena adopted by Kant in his Critick of Pure Reasona principle, as we have seen, leading to the same classification
of the intellectual powers, and to the advanced student, on
some accounts, preferable to the one adopted in the preceding
analysis.
"That all our cognition," he says, "begins with experience, there is not any doubt; for how otherwise should the
faculty of cognition be awakened into exercise, if this did not
occur through objects which affect our senses, and partly of
themselves produce representations, and partly bring our Understanding-capacity into action, to compare these, to connect,
or to separate them, and in this way to work up the rude
matter of sensible impressions into a cognition of objects,
which is termed experience? In respect of time, therefore,
no cognition can precede in us experience, and with this all
commences.
"But although all our cognition begins with experience,
still on that account, all does not precisely spring up out of
experience. For it may easily happen that even our empirical cognition may  be a compound of that which we have
received through our impressions, and of that which our proper Cognition-faculty (merely called into action by sensible
impressions) supplies from itself, which addition we cannot
distinguish from the former original matter, until long exercise has made us attentive to it, and skillful in the separation
thereof."
All cognitions, or intellectual phenomena, are therefore
divided by Kant into two classes - those derived from experi
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I 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
enee, and those not thus derived.   The former he denominates
empirical, the latter d jpiori cognitions.  Cognitions d oriori
all have these fundamental chlaracteristies, and by these they
are distinguished from the empirical of every kind, to wit,
~?;liec~i/itj and aecessity.  The proposition, for example, An
event supposes a cause, is not only true of every event of
which we have had experience, but we know absolutely that it
must be true of all events actual and conceivable.   These
characteristics can never pertain to phenomena  which  have
their source in experience, which is always limited, and in no
instance can affirm anything more than that a thing really is,
without ever affirming that it must be.
INFLUENCE OF THiE ABOVE DISTINCTIONS.
The student who has followed this philosopher thus far,
and has understood the ground of his classification, will never
after, whatever his philosophic destiny may be, range himself
as a disciple of Locke, maintaining and believing that all our
knowledge comes from experience.   I-e may fall into vagaries
incomparably more wild and extravagant than ever appeared
among the disciples of the sensual school. Yet between him
and Empiricism "there is a great gulf fixed," and he will
never pass over it to the school from which he has been separated.  His destiny lies in another direction.   Having  discovered in the depths of his intelligence, cognitions bearing
the characteristics of absolute universality and necessity, he
never will, and never can, adopt the principle, that all our
knowledge comes from sensation and reflection.
ERRORS OF KANT.
While we admit the reality and validity of cognitions d
priori, as distinct from the emnpirical, it becomes a matter of
fundamental importance in philosophy to settle definitely the
272 
RECAPITULATION.
relations between these two classes of phenomena thus distin guished.   This point has been settled in the preceding analy sis.  Cognitions apriori universally sustain this relation to the
empirical, that of logical altccedc7ctts, while the latter are the
chirooloygical anitcecedeits of the former.  Now these relations
Kant overlooks entirely.  Here lies his first error.   On the
other hand, he assumes, without argument or any attempt at
proof, that there are cognitions d priori- cognitions more im portant than all others -which not only do not spring out of
experience, but which transcend all experience, and extend the
compass of our judgments wholly beyond its limits.  "And
exactly," he adds, "in these last cognitions, which transcend
the sensible world, where experience can afford neither guide
nor correction, lie the investigations of Reason, which we, as
far as regards their importance, hold to be highly preferable,
and in their object, far more elevated, than all the Understanding can teach in the field of phenomena, even with the danger
of erring, rather than that we should give up such  important investigations from any ground of doubtfulness, or disregard, or indifference. These unavoidable problems of pure
Reason itself, are God, Liberty, and Imm )-ortality."  The principle announced in this passage is this, That the cognitionfaculty, once roused into action by experience, evolves through
its own laws, and wholly irrespective and independent of what
is given in experience, the conceptions above named - conceptions which sustain the relation of logical antecedents to no
empirical cognitions whatever, and that the chief investigations
of Reason pertain to these conceptions.   Here lies the great
error of this philosopher.   From  this single assumption flow
out the most important peculiarities of his philosophy, together
with all the wild vagaries of Transcendentalism. If these
ideas are in the mind as logical antecedents of no empirical intuitions whatever  they are there as splendid conceptions to be
273
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INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
sure, but with no claims whatever to objective validity- with
no evidence that any corresponding realities exist.  Yet as laws
of thought, they determine our Understanding conceptions
pertaining to ourselves, the external universe, and the origin
of each.  Such notions, therefore, as far as they depend upon
and receive their character from these ideas, have no claim to
objective validity. They are realities to us, simply and exclusively because our Intelligence, by virtue of its own inherent laws, has made them, relatively to ourselves, what
they appear to be.  Further, if these ideas of Reason exist
in the Mind thus independent of experience, and at the same
time exist there as regulative principles of experience-conceptions, should we not suppose, and does it not follow as a logical consequent, that all other d _priori ideas have the same
characteristics, and sustain the same relation to experiencesuch ideas, for example, as those of time, space, cause and
substance?
These last ideas have the same characteristics of universality and necessity as those of God, Liberty, and Immortality;
and, as laws of thought, sustain precisely the same relations to
all Understanding-conceptions. All d _priori ideas, therefore,
exist in the Intelligence without any claim to objective validity. As those ideas, also, as laws of thought, determine the
character of all Understanding-conceptions, these last are alike
destitute of any claim to objective validity.  Neither ourselves,
nor the external world, nor that which our Intelligence gives
us, as the cause of each, "are what we  take them to be."
They are all mere fictions of our Intelligence. Such Kant
himself denominates them.   Since this philosopher passed off
the stage, his successors, such as Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel,
have been laboring to build up the fabric of human knowledge
upon the assumption above named, all agreeing in laying the
foundation of their glorious temple upon "airy nothing," upon
274 
RECAPITULATION.
the wise assumption that the very temple they were building
with so much toil and trouble was not "what they took it to
be."  Such, however, is the logical consequence of the assumiption on which all their conclusions rest.
Onil the other hand, if we conceive the entire action of Reason to be in fixed correlation, in the first instance, to the intuitions of Sense and Consciousness, and in the second to
Understanding-conceptions, giving the logical antecedents of
such intuitions and conceptions, if we suppose that such intuitions and conceptions, in the order of actual development, precede the ideas to which they are respectively correlated, and
are consequently unmodified by them, then we have an entirely
different system of knowledge.   On this topic I shall have occasion to speak again hereafter.
CLASSIFICATION OF THE PRIMIARY MENTAL FACULTIES.
AVhile the great principle which peculi.-rizes the system of
Kant, and determines its destiny, is found to be a baseless assumption, his classification of the Intellectual faculties clearly
designates him as one of the greatest analyzers of the human
mind that has yet appeared. We will now proceed to a consideration of this subject.   Knowledge, with  us, commences
not with jit(dl7g?tets, but ittuitions.  This is evident from the
fact that all judgments are composed of intuitions.  Intuitions
are of two classes, empirical, and 4 priori.  The former also
are subdivided as stl1jecti;e and objective.  This classification
of intuitions gives us a, threefold division of the primary faculties, or functions of the Intelligence, to wit, Sense, which
gives us the qualities of external material substances- Consciousness, which gives us the qualities of the mind, or subjective phenomena -and Reason, which gives us intuitions d
priori.  This classification is sustained by phenomena fundamentally distinct from one another.
275 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIY.
REMARKS UPON TIIE RELATIONS OF INTUITIONS TO ONE
ANOTHER.
Before leaving the present subject it may be important to
make a few remarks upon  the relations of intuitions to one
another, together with that of the faculties of intuition.
Iltuitions canot be oppgosed to eacht other.
3Iy first remark is, that intuitions can never be in contradiction to each other.   The intuitions of Consciousness, for
example, can never be in contradiction to those of Sense, inasmuch as the exclusive office of the former, under such circumstances, is to give to the mind itself, what  the latter
faculty has affirmed of its object.  For similar reasons intuitions d priori can never contradict the empirical of either class,
because a logical antecedent can never, from the nature of the
case, be contradictory to that to which it sustains such a relation.  How can the idea of Time be in opposition to that of
succession, or that of space to that of body, or the idea of phenomnena be opposed to that of substance or cause?  Nor can
an   priori  or empirical intuition be in opposition to another
of the same class. The idea of substance, for example, cannot
be in opposition to that of space, time, or cause; nor can the
phenomena of extension be opposed to those of resistance or
color.  The same holds true in all other instances.
Different Ijituition Faculties cannot contradict each other.
From the above principles the conclusion is irresistible,
that the affirmations of no one faculty of intuition can be opposed to the other intuitions of the same faculty; nor can the
intuitions of one faculty be opposed to the intuitions of
another. For the same reasons it might be shown that, the
276 
RECAPITULATION.
affirmations of the primary and secondary faculties cannot be
opposed to each other. These conclusions are so self-evident,
that no remarks in confirmation are deemed requisite.
The lojical Consequents of lo one Intuitiont can be in  Oppo   tioil to any pri)mary  ituition, nor to the logical Conse   qtceits of the samine.
Another conclusion is equally self-evident, to wit, That the
logical consefzentts of no one intuition can be in opposition to
any primary intuition, or to the logical consequents of the
same. As the ideas of time, space, substance, cause, and of
the infinite cannot be in contradiction to one another, nor to
the intuitions of phenomena,, so the logical consequents of any
one of these ideas cannot be in contradiction to any other of
these intuitions, or to the logical consequents of the same. If
the ideas of substance and space, for example, are not contradictory to each other, how can the logical consequents of one
contradict the other idea, or its logical consequents? So in
all other instances.
ERROR OF KANT AND COLERIDGE.
We are now  fully prepared to appreciate the theory of
Kant, Coleridge, and the Transcendental school, generally,
pertaining to the external world, or as Coleridge expresses it,
pertaining to the "presumption that there exist things without
ts."  All tliese philosophers acknowledge, in the first instance,
that through the faculty of Sense we have intuitions of the
qualities of external material substances, and that by means of
such intuitions together with the ideas of substance, cause,
space, time, &c., the Intelligence gives us the external universe
as a real existence. They then profess to find other intuitions
of Reason, from which the necessary conclusion is, that "the
things which we envisage are not that in themselves for which
24
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I 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
we take them."   In other words, the logical consequents of
one class of intuitions given by the Intelligence, are in opposition to other intuitions of the same Intelligence, and to the
logicall consequents of the same.  Thus one series of intuitions
devors others, together with all their consequents.  The procclure of the Intelligence, according to this theory very much
resemnbles that of the serpent in the fable, who seizing his tail
in his mouth finally succeeded in burying his entire body so
completely in his own stomach, that the body itself became
wholly invisible.  From the Intelligence in the first instance,
proceed intuitions empirical and ad priori, from which most logicailly result the apprehension, and knowledge of a vast and
glorious universe of real existences. From the profound
depths of the same Intelligence, there then proceed other intuitions through which the entire and before conceived substantial system of knowledge
"Is melted into air, into thin air:
And like the baseless fabric of a vision,
The cloud-eapp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces,
The solemn temples, the great globe itself,
Yea, all that it inherit, are dissolved;
And like an unsubstantial pageant faded,
Leave not a wreck behind."
3Iost sublime philosophy that, surely! And after these voracious intuitions have devoured all others that were before
them, together with their consequents, " themselves still being
so ill-favored that it cannot be known that they have eaten
anything," it would be easy to find others by which these, in
their turn, would be devoured, and so on interminably. Indeed this is the necessary procedure of the Intelligence, according to the system under consideration.  For if, as this system maintains, all other objects of knowledge "are not what we
take them to be," we must of necessity conclude, that this sys
278 
RECAPITULATION.
tein of philosophy is not what we or its advocates take it to be.
For the system itself is given by an intelligence, which, as they
maintain, does not give things as they are, or as this same Intelligence "takes them to be."
On what, then, does this whole theory rest? On baseless assumptions, and nothing else.  Coleridge directly acknowledges
that his theory does rest upon assumptions.  The same is true,
however, he says, of the opposite theory. This is freely admitted, with this difference, however: His theory rests upon
assumptions which are not affirmed as true by the Intelligence.
The theory which gives us "' things without us," rests upon
assumptions affirmed as true by the Intelligence.  There is a
wide difference between a theory resting upon assumptions in
opposition to intuitions, and one resting upon assumptions in
harmony with such intuitions.
SECONDARY FACULTIES.
WVe are now prepared for a consideration of the secondary
faculties or functions of the Intelligence.
Uitderstaindfi)zn.
After intuitions, the next class of phenomena which strikes
our attention is notions, or Understanding-conceptions.   Such
notions are of two classes- those which pertain to individuals,
and those which represent classes of individuals, or notions,
particular and general. All such phenomena are found, on
analysis, to be composed of intuitions given by the primary
faculties. Now the act of combining intuitions into notions,
particular and general, reveals an entirely new function of the
Intelligence, a function not implied in the operation of either
of the intuitive faculties, nor in all combined. This intellectual function we denominate the Understanding.
279 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
The Judgmert.
As soon as an Understanding-conception appears on the
theater of Consciousness, an intellectual process entirely new
succeeds, a process by which, under the influence of the ideas
of resemblance and difference, the particular elements which
enter into the conception are separated from one another, and
each is contemplated apart by itself.  Here we have what is
called the process of abstraction. When also one notion pre sent in the Intelligence, suggests another of a similar charac ter, by a similar process, to the one last stated, the qualities
common to the two are separated. These the Understanding
then combines into a general notion, a notion representing a
class or classes of individuals. This notion being given by
the process under consideration, the particular conceptions
referred to, are subsumed, or classed under the general. Now
this process differs entirely from the action of the notionforming power.   To combine intuitions into notions, particular
and general, and in view of the ideas of resemblance and difference, to separate the elements of a given conception from
one another, or in view of the same ideas, to separate the elements common to two or more conceptions, and finally when
the Understanding has combined the elements thus separated
into a general notion, to subsume the particulars under the
general, are intellectual processes certainly entirely distinct
from each other.  The power to abstract and classify is not
implied in the power simply to combine intuitions into notions,
either particular or general. This function of the Intelligence,
the power which separates things that differ, and ranges together under some common designation those that are alike,
we denominate the Judgment.   This is the faculty also chiefly
employed in processes of reasoning. Reason furnishes principles, the Understanding terms, and the Judgment affirms, in
280 
RECAPITULATION.
the light of the principles of Reason, the agreement, or disagreement of the terms.  If the student will attentively reflect
upon what is passing in his own mind, he will clearly recognize
the distinction above made between the Understanding and
Judgment.   W'ho ever confounds the formation of a conception of an object, with that action of the Intelligence which
judges that such and such elements in the conception resemble, or are unlike each other?  Who ever confounded the
formation of general notions, such as are designated by the
terms man, horse, &c., with that action of the Intelligence
which affirms of individuals, This is a man, That is a horse?
Such intellectual operations differ not in degree, but in kind,
and suppose two functions of the Intelligence entirely distinct
from each other.
The Ass,ociatigg  Pric)le.
That principle of the Intelligence by which the presence
of one thought in the mind recalls another which has formerly
existed there, is so manifestly distinct from all other intellectual functions, that no philosopher has ever confounded it
with any of them. As the object of the present recapitulation is to give the grounds of the distinctions made in this
Treatise between the different intellectual faculties, a simple
allusion to the principle of Association is all that is requisite
in this department of our subject.   It remains only to speak
of the
Imagination.
A reference to a distinction made in a preceding Chapter,
between the ideas of Reason, as primary and secondary, will
enable us to explain very distinctly our own conception of the
nature of this function of the Intelligence. With the former
class of ideas, such as those of time, space, substance, and
24*
281 
INTELLECTUAL PHIIILOSOPHIY.
cause, objects exist in full and perfect harmony.   The sphere
of the Understanding, therefore, is actualities as they are.
With most of the secondary ideas of Reason, however, such
as those of the right, the just, the good, the beautiful, the
grand, and sublime, realities may or may not exist in correspondence. Now we find a power of the Intelligence which is
perpetually laboring to combine, in thought, the endlessly diversified elements of objects given by the other faculties into
harmony with those ideas last named, especially those of the
beautiful, the grand, and sublime. This function of the Intelligence we denominate  the Imagination.   The Ideal generated by this faculty, incomparably superior as it is to what
the Understanding conceives in the sphere of realities, finds
an external embodiment in poetry, sculpture, painting, and in
all the varied adornments of art.  The peculiar sphere, as well
as phenomena of the Imagination thus clearly distinguish it
from all other intellectual faculties.
Such is the classification of the intellectual faculties presented in this Treatise.   Of two  things pertaining  to it., the
author himself is fully persuaded - that the distinction here
made between the intellectual faculties is real, being sustained
by fundamental phenomena- and that the classification is
complete, inasmuch as there is no intellectual operation, actual
or conceivable, which may not be resolved into the appropriate
action of one or more of these faculties.
282 
CHAPTER XIV.
SPONTANEOUS AND REFLECTIVE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE
INTELLIGENCE.
I-IAVING completed our analysis of the intellectual powers,
other important questions pertaining to the action of the Intelligence  next demand our attention.   We are all aware, that
objects of observation and reflection are distinctly apprehended
on one condition only, to wit, that we give attention to them.
But we observe and reflect upon that, and that only, which
has been given in the Intelligence prior to all acts of attention.
When we give attention, it is to some definite thing, as this or
that particular object. Now the object must have been given
prior to the act of attention; else the direction of the act
would be wholly indefinite, and without respect to any particular object. The inquiry which will occupy our attention in
the present Chapter is this: WVhat is the state of the I]telligenee, chctt are the  characteristics of its affrrmations relative
to oljects of knoecledge, prior to observation and reflection.?
ancd what are the relations qf such affirmatfons to the state
of the Intelligence, in observation and( reflection? The former
we denominate the spontaneous, and the latter the reflective
developments of the Intelligence.
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ALL OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE,
AND OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SAME.
Before proceeding further, I would invite special attention
to two or three preliminary observations: 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIIY.
1. All objects of thought are finite or infinite, and each of
these bears the respective characteristics of contingency or
necessity.
2. All finite substances comprehend ourselves, and that
which is not ourselves.   The infinite substance sustains the
relation to each of unconditioned and absolute cause.
3. Consequently, all our knowledge consists in apprehending the nature of the finite and of the infinite, together with
the relations of the finite to the finite, and of the finite to the
infinite. The Intelligence can never go beyond these; because
these comprehend all possible existences, and all the modes
and relations of existence.
DISTINCT APPREHENSION CONDITIONED ON ATTENTION.
But these things, as I have remarked, we distinctly know
only on one condition- that we attend to them; in other
words, observe and reflect upon thenm. Yet they must, in
some sense, have been apprehended before observation and
reflection, because the objects of observation and reflection
must have been previously given in Sense, Consciousness, or
Reason.
SPONTANEOUS DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE.
The question again returns upon us, What is the state of
the Intelligence, as developed, previous to attention, i. e. previous to observation and reflection? To attend, to observe,
and reflect, are acts of the Will, directing the action of the
Intelligence.   But, as before observed, the objects must have
been in some sense apprehended previous to attention.   For
when we will to attend to anything, the act implies that the
thing itself was in some sense in the mind, as an object of
thought. How came this thought here? Certain conditions are
284 - 
SPONTANEITY AND REFLECTION.
requisite to its existence.   But when these conditions are fulfilled, how does this thought arise? I answer, by a spontaneous action of the Intelligence, a spontaneity previous to all acts
of the WAill.  "When  Intelligence manifested itself for the
first tinie," says Cousin, to whom  I am  indebted for almost
everything I now say, "it is evident that its manifestation
could not have been a voluntary act.  It manifested itself,
nevertheless, and you possess a consciousness of it, more or less
vivid.   Endeavor to take your thought unawares, in the act
of thinking without having wished to think; and you will find
yourself at that point which the Intelligence takes as its point
of departure; and thus you may at the present moment observe,
with more or less accuracy, that which did occur, and must necessarily have occurred, in the first act of your Intelligence, at
a time which is no more, and which can never return."   Now
what is contained in this primitive intuition, this spontaneity
of human intelligence?  All that will subsequently be found
in observation and reflection; but as Cousin observes, " If all
is there, all is there on certain conditions."
CHARACTERISTICS OF THIS SPONTANEITY.
The next inquiry demanding attention is the characteristics of this spontaneity.   The  most important are the two
following:
1. It is in all instances a positive affirmation, and not a negation.   "To think," says Cousin, "is to affirm.   The first affirmation into which nothing of volition has entered, and by
consequence, nothing of reflection, cannot be an affirmation
mingled with negation; for our first acts are not denials.  It
must therefore have been an affirmation without negation, an
instinctive perception of truth, an entirely instinctive development of thought."
2. The other characteristic of this primitive intuition is,
285 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPHY.
that although it contains all that is subsequently found in observation and reflection, it contains them obscurely.   In observation and reflection, and there only, all things are distinct,
because that there, and there only, do we find not only affirmations, but negations.
Characteristics ill7strated.
I have said, that in this primitive spontaneity there is contained all that is subsequently found in observation and reflection, but somewhat obscurely.   Consequently, there was a time
when indeed mind was, and the universe also; but to itself, as
an object of knowledge, neither the mind, nor the universe,
nor God existed.  At the next moment, by a spontaneous development of the Intelligence, the mind was revealed to itself.
At the same moment that which is not itself, and the cause of
itself, and of that which it perceived as not itself, was also revealed. In other words, the mind apprehends but obscurely
the finite and the infinite, with a mysterious consciousness of
the relation of the one to the other.   "We do not commence,"
says Cousin, again, "with seeking ourselves, for this would
imply that we already know that we exist, but on a certain
day, at a certain hour, at a certain moment, a moment solemn
in existence -without having sought ourselves, we find ourselves; thought, in its instinctive development, discloses to us
that we ared we affirm our existence with profound assurance
with an assurance unmingled with any negation whatsoever.
We perceive our existence, but we do not discern, with all the
distinctness of RIefiection, our proper character, which is that
of being limited and bounded; we do not precisely distinguish
ourselves from the world, nor do we precisely discern the character of this world; and besides these, we perceive the exist
ence of something different from those, to which naturally and
instinctively we refer both ourselves and the world; we distin
286 
SPONTANEITY AND REFLECTION.
guish all this, but without very strictly discriminating between
its component parts.  Intelligence, in developing itself, perceives all that is; but it is not able to perceive it in a reflective, distinct, and neg,ative manner; and although it perceives it
with perfect assurance, it perceives it somewhat confusedly."
Again -" Spontaneous and instinctive thought enters upon its
functions by virtue of its own nature; and first of all, it gives
us ourselves, the world, and God; the world and ourselves,
with boundaries confusedly perceived, and God, without
bound - the whole in a synthesis, in which clear and obscure
ideas are mingled togethler."
But while these truths are thus revealed and affirmed, they
are not, I repeat, clearly, but confusedly apprehended.  The
nature of the self, and of the not-self, which was the inmmediate object of perception, together with that of the cause of
each, was not distinctly given.  Yet all were given, and given
in such a manner, that observation and reflection would separate the one from the other, and render each distinct and palpable to the mind. But the basis of observation and reflection
is given in this primitive spontaneity.   Observation and reflection may separate these elements, and determine their relative
characteristics; but they can add no new element to the composition, unless it be themselves as facts of Consciousness, which,
as facts, must also be first given in the manner above referred to.
Some additional remarks, designed to elucidate still further the subject before us, are here required.
CATEGORIES OF SPONTANEOUS AND REFLECTIVE REASON.
I begin with noticing the distinction between the categories of spontaneous and reflective Reason, and with such illustrations as will enable us to distinguish theml.  The categories
of  the  reflective Reason  are all abstract,  universal,  and
287
I 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
necessary.   Those of spontaneous Reason, are necessary, but
concrete, and particular.   WVith this difference, they are identical.  In other words, the categories of spontaneous Reason,
are those of reflective Reason in a concrete and particular
form.   For example, the principle of causality, as a category
of the reflective Reason, is this:  Every event must have a
cause -  a truth, universal, necessary, and absolute.   Now this
principle, as a category of spontaneous Reason, is this:  This
particular event,- this particular sensation, for example, must
have a cause.   The principle of space, as a category of reflective Reason, is, Body supposes space. As a category of spontaneous Reason it is, This particular body is somewhere, or in
space.   Thus by determining the categories of reflective Reason, we can readily determine those of spontaneous Reason.
For the former are the latter in a necessary, to be sure, but
concrete and particular form.
RELATION OF OBSERVATION AND REFLECTION TO THIS ORIG                    INAL SPONTANEITY.
The relation of observation and reflection to the original
spontaneity of the Intelligence, next claims attention.  Their
exclusive object is to determine the nature, character, and relations of that, the reality of which has been previously affirmed.   With the reality itself they have nothing to do.   For
examnple, what has reflection to do with determining the question whether I really exist, or not, the very truth which must
be assumed as the basis of all reflection?  Reflection may determine my nature and character, but my existence must be
first affirmed, and then assumed, before reflection becomes possible.  The same remarks apply equally to external existences.
Observation and reflection may determine their character, but
never their reality.   Henee the reason of the universal inquiry
in respect to external objects, which inquiry is, not whether
288 
SPONTANEITY AND REFLECTION.
this particular object EXISTS; but what are its nature, character, and relations? the reality of the object being necessarily
assum,ed as the ground of all such inquiries.  Observation and
reflection, then, assume an entirely wrong direction when we
attempt by them to determine the reality of our own existence,
or of the existence of the external world, or of that to which
we necessarily refer ourselves, and the external world.   The
reason or ground of such affirmations we can know only by
falling back upon the original spontaneity of the human Intelligence. There no man is or can be a skeptic, and he that
makes himself such by observation  and reflection, is, in the
language of Inspiration, a fool. Yes, he is more than a fool;
he is supremely wicked.
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN THE FIRST TRUTHS OF REASON,
1HOW WEAKENED.
You see how it is, that the confidence of men, in the first
truths of human Reason, is often weakened.   They expect,
by a process of reasoning, to demonstrate the reality of those
very truths which must be assumed, or all reasoning becomes
impossible; and which, as the ground of such reasoning, have
been previously affirmied with absolute certainty, in the primnitive spontaneity of the human Intelligence.  They expect also
to have their convictions strengthened by the demonstration,
an expectation not realized, of course.  The result is, that the
conviction is weakened, instead of strengthened.   The  man
who expects to have his confidence in the reality of his own
existence, or in that of the external world, or of God, increased
by any process of reasoning, is, in my judgment, seeking for
truth iil the wrong direction.  Whenever we fall back upon
the spontaneity of our own Reason, we find ourselves intuitively affirming each of these truths with equal absoluteness
25
289
I 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPHY.
and assuming them as the ground of all our inquiries.   When
we contemplate our own existence, and that of the external
world, as we necessarily do, as conditioned and relative, we
never inquire whether there is an existence unconditioned and
absolute, to which the former may be referred; but what is
the character of that unconditioned and absolute existence, to
which, by a previous, spontaneous, intuitive, and absolute
affirmation of Reason, all that is conditioned and relative has
been referred.
USE OF THE COMMON DEMONSTRATIONS OF THlE DIVINE
EXISTENCE.
Of what use, then, it may be asked, are the common  demonstrations of the existence of God?   Of none, I answer,
in satisfying our own minds of the reality of the Divine existence. If this is expected from them, our confidence will be
rather weakened than strengthened, and that, for this reason:
The mind begins the investigation by suspending its belief in
the reality of the Divine existence, upon the validity of the
demonstration.   It also expects  and demands, as above  remarked, that the demonstration shall be such as to increase
its previous confidence in the reality of the Divine existence.
But such expectation will not be realized.   Hence the demonstration will, under such circumstances, rather diminish than
increase our confidence in this fundamental truth.  The most
delightful feature of our holy religion, to my mind, is this:
its great fundamental truths are all suspended, not upon the
validity of demonstrations, but placed at the foundation of all
demonstration, among the primitive, absolute, and necessary
intuitions and affirmations of Reason; intuitions which no one
can deny without violating the fundamental laws of his own
being, and rendering himself a fool, not only, but infinitely
impious. For no man can possibly become so impious and
290 
SPONTANEITY AND REFLECTION.
wickled as the skeptic. The man who enters a family and seduces every female there, but leaves a consciousness of guilt as
a foundation for repentance, and reformation to virtue, is a
saint, compared with the man  who, without actual seduction,
annihilates in the minds of such females, all regard to chastity,
as a virtue, and to its opposite as a sin.   This the skept;'c does
when he has obtained his object. Of what use then, the question returns upon us, are such demonstrations? Of no use but
this, to turn the weapons of the enemy against himself.  To
substantiate his position, he appeals to science.   Now science,
when pressed into the field, must be shown to be on the side
of his opposers.   Till thus pressed she remains silent, because
her influence is not needed.
CONCLUSIONS ARRIVED AT BY A PROCESS OF REASONING)
WHEN FALSE.
We see when it is, that any conclusions to which we come
by a process of reasoning are, and must be false. When they
contradict any of the necessary and spontaneous intuitions of
human Intelligence, as for example, the reality of our own existence, or that of the external world.   Every  step in a process of reasoning must be intuitively certain.   Now to bring a
conclusion to which we have arrived by a series of intuitions,
against another primitive intuition, is to affirm the falsity of
one intuition upon the authority of another; and the nonreality of the primitive upon the authority of the derivative.
This is precisely what Coleridge has done, or rather, promises
to do.   He  first  acknowledges  that  the  belief in the reality of things without us is an intuition, primitive and
necessary, and then promises, by a series of intuitions, to
demonstrate the non-reality of such existences. -  See Biog.
Lit. p. 153.
291 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
REASONS OF THE DIVERSITY AND DIFFERENCE OF THE
OPINIONS OF MEN.
In judzcqments, men differ, not in the spontaneous, but reflective developments of their Intelligence. In the former
state, all put essentially the same inquiries, and all believe the
same things. There is no doubt or disbelief here. In this
inner sanctuary of the Intelligence, skepticism has no place.
In respect to the results of observation and reflection, here diversity and contradiction appear.  The reason is, that in the
former state, nothing but the pure affirmations of the Intelligence are met with.   In the latter, cassuml)tions mingled with
such affirmations, together with the logical consequents of assumptions, present themselves.
SOURCES OF ERROR.
Error has no place among the spontaneous affirmations of
the Intelligence, for the obvious reason that here nothing but
pure intellectual affirmations appear. The same would be true
in the reflective operations, but for the fact, that assumptions
are here mingled with such affirmations.  When men contenmplate one class of facts, for example, various hypotheses may
present themselves as grounds of the explanation of the facts,
hypotheses none of which are affirmed as true by the Intelligence. The Will, however, may assume some one as true,
which is not so. The assumption, together with all its logical
consequents, is now mingled with the facts, and all together
present a confused mass of error and truth.   Iletcre is the
source of error of every kind, and in connection with all subjects of thought. Pure thinking, unmingled with assumptions,
is never adulterated with error.
292 
CHAPTER XV.
ORIGIN OF IDEAS.
IN all our inquiries hitherto, one question has been left al
most wholly untouched, the question in respect to the ORIGIN
OF OUR IDEAS.   To this question  special attention is now invited.
THE TWO SCHOOLS IN PHILOSOPHY.
Two great schools have, for the last century or two, divided
the philosophical world, in respect to the question before us.
These schools have been denominated the Sensual, and Ideal or
Transcendental school.  At the head of the former is Locke.
At the head of the latter is Kant. A few remarks explanatory of the principles of these schools, may prepare the way
for amore distinct elucidation of the present subject.
Prifcl)les of Loecke.
I begin with Locke. According to him, all ideas existing
in the mind, are derived from two sources, Sensation and Refjlectio?. To establish his principles, he first proves that there
are no innate ideas in the mind, that is, ideas previous to experience.  Having disposed of this question, he starts the following as the great problem in philosophy:
"Let us suppose," he says, " the mind to be, as we say,
white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas, how
comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store
which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it,
with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the mate            25* 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIIY.
rials of P~eason and knowledge?  To this I answer," he adds,
"in one word, fromrl experience; in that all our knowledge is
founded, and fronri that it ultimately derives itself."
In a subsequent section, he shows that the sources of experience are twofold, as observed above, Sensation, and Reflection or Consciousness.
Our observation," he says, " employed either about external, sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our
minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which
supplies our Understandings with all the materials of thinking.
These two are the fountains of knowledge from whence all the
ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring."  Experience
being the watchword of the school of Locke, and of his systemn, the system itself has been denominated Empiricism.
It should be borne in mind, that Locke does not speak of
experience, as the mere con/ditiore of all our knowledge. In
that ease, his system would be undoubtedly correct.   Nor
would his principles be doubted by any school in philosophy.
On the other hand, he speaks of experience, as furnishing the
7lctte'icals of all our knowledge.  All knowledge is exclusively
constituted of elements furnished by experience.
Theorjy of Kant.
In opposition to Empiricism, Kant and the Transcendental
school maintain that experience is so far from giving us necessary truths, that these truths themselves lie at the foundation
of all experience.
To understand the principles of Kant correctly, it is necessary to keep in remembrance the fact, that he evidently uses
the term experience in two senses -in respect to the Sensibility and the Intelligence.   When  he says that all our cognition begins with experience, he then refers to the Sensibility;
291"~ 
SPONTANEITY AND REFLECTION.
for he speaks of tile " faculty of cognition being awakened into
exercise," by this experience.   To suppose that by experience
here, he refers to the action of the Intelligence, would make
him  say, that the " cognition-faculty is awakened into exercise"
by the action of the cognition-faculty.   He supposes, and very
correctly, that the condition of the primary action of the Intelligence, is some effect from some cause upon the Sensibility.
By the term experience here, he refers to this effect.
On the other hand, when he affirms that a_priori or necessary ideas, are the condition and ground of all experience, he
here uses the term under consideration with reference to the
Intelligence exclusively.  htis meaning is, that ideas a' priori
are the condition and ground of all other mental perceptions
and affirmations.   In conformity with this statement, he first
attempts to show that the ideas of time and space are the necessary condition of all affirmations of Sense and Consciousness pertaining to the qualities of all substances subjective and
objective. When, for example, a certain effect is produced
upon the Sensibility by some unknown cause - a cause, as his
theory affirms, existing nowhere and in no time -the ideas
of time and space are developed, while the effect is postulated
as the quality of some cause external to the mind, and existing
in time and space.   This mental act postulating a subjective
effect as the quality of some external cause, is what  he  calls
perception.   But for these ideas, no such perception could
have taken place.
He then goes on to show (and, as we shall see, he is here
correct), that other d priori ideas are the condition of all Understanding-conceptions and affirmations of the Judgment.
Such are the principles of these schools. In their fundamental affirmations, both are alike wrong.  This I will now
attempt to show.
295 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
PRINCIPLES OF LOCKE TESTED WITII REFERENCE TO NECES                        SARY IDEAS.
We begin with Empiricism -the proposition that all our
knowledge, all ideas now in the mind, come from experience,
from sensation and reflection.  Take as an example the idea
of space. Here I lay down this proposition as self-evident,
that that which cannot give the essential fundamental characteristics of an idea, cannot give the idea itself. Now the fundamental characteristics of the idea of space, are iifiltity and
qecessity.  The Reason apprehends space as infinite, and not
only affirms that it is -that is, that it exists, but that it must
be. On the other hand, everything of which we are conscious and which we perceive, is finite, and as we have seen in
former Chapters, is also contingent.   Nor call these faculties
reach beyond the finite.  But the idea of the infinite is in the
3Iind, because the idea of space is there, which is infinite.
The idea of space, then, cannot come from Sensation or Reflection. But suppose that Sensation or Reflection, or both together, could give space as infinite.  They could merely affirm
that it is, not that it mtust be.  The  system of Locke, and
of the entire sensual school, falls to the ground, when tried
upon the idea of space. The same fact might with equal distinctness be shown to be true with respect to all ideas which
lie beyond the limits of the contingent.   Thus far and no
further can Empiricism go. Necessary, universal, absolute,
and eternal truths, can never be derived from experience, for
the obvious reason that they are not the objects of experience.  They lie entirely beyond the limits of Sense, and Consciousness or Reflection, which constitute the sole ground and
source of experience.
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ORIGIN OF IDEAS.
PRINCIPLES OF LOCKE FAIL IN RESPECT TO UNDERSTAND                     ING-CONCEPTIONS.
But Empiricism not only fails entirely, when tried upon all
necessary truths, but also upon all the phenomena of the Understanding. Every notion existing in the Understanding, is
composed, as we have seen, of two classes of elements, the
phenomenal and the rational, the contingent and the necessary.
These elements are given by faculties entirely distinct the one
from the other. The phenomenal are given by Sense and Consciousness. The rational by the Reason. The first elements
only are given by experience. The last lie beyond the bound
of experience. Example: Sense perceives the quality of some
external substance.  No notion can be formed till the idea of
substance is developed, by conceiving of this quality as belonging to some substance.   So of all the notions of the Understanding.  As they all embrace elements necessaryj as well
as cojti,igen,t, and as the latter only are derived from experience, all such notions include elements which were never given
by experience.
ERROR OF KANT.
The fundamental error of Kant, understanding the proposition, that necessary ideas are the condition and ground of all
experience, as he employs it -that is, in its universal form,
as including all intellectual affirmations- has been made sufficiently manifest in preceding Chapters. The intuitions of
Sense and Consciousness, instead of being conditioned on the
prior existence, in the mind, of the ideas of time and space,
are themselves the necessary chronological antecedents of these
ideas.  Using then the term experience as pertaining to the
intuitions of these faculties, the proposition of Kant is demonstrably false. All necessary ideas sustain to the contingent the
297
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INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
relation of logical, while the latter sustain to the former the
relation of clironological antecedents.   It is the height of absurdity to represent the logical antecedent as the condition and
ground of the existence of the chronological.
POSITION OF KANT TRUE IN RESPECT TO UNDERSTANDING   CONCEPTIONS AND AFFIRMIATIONS OF THE JUDGMENT.
If we admit that contingent intuitions are the chronological antecedents of necessary ones, still it may be asked, is there
not an important sense in which the proposition, that ideas d
priori are the condition and ground of all experience, is true?
It is strictly true, I remark, if the term experience be used
with reference, not to the phenomena of Sense and Consciousness, but as it is sometimes used, with reference to the Understanding and Judgment. There is a wide difference between
merely perceivin?g and understandiig an object.   An object is
perceived when it is presented to the mind as an object of
Sense. It is untderstood when, and only when, such questions
as these have been resolved in respect to it, to wit:  When
and where does it exist? what are its qualities, its nature, substance, quantity, and relations? But the resolution of these
questions necessarily pre-supposes the existence of the ideas of
time, space, substance, quantity, quality, and relation, in the
mind.   Using the term experience in the sense of understanding objects, how perfectly manifest is the fact, that necessary
ideas are not derived from experience, but are themselves, together with the perceptions above referred to, the condition and
ground of experience.   Some object must first be perceived,
not understood, but perceived -before necessary ideas can be
developed in the mind. Perception and Consciousness, then,
in the sense now explained, are the chronological antecedents
of all necessary ideas, and these again are both the logical and
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ORIGIN OF IDEAS.
chronological condition and ground of experience - that is, of
understandibig objects. But Perception and Consciousness do
not give necessary ideas, only in this sense: when any object
or phenomenon is perceived by Sense or Consciousness, the
Reason, on occasion of such perceptions, enters into immediate and spontaneous exercise, and apprehends the ideas of
space, time, substance, cause, quantity, quality, relation, &c.
These ideas are not derived from, but merely occasioned by
such perceptions.  These ideas thus developed, then become
the laws of thought, under the influence and guidance of which
all our knowledge of objects is derived - that is, anll our experience, using the term in the sense of understanding objects.
Now if we understand the word experience as mere Sense
and Consciousness, then, I repeat, it is the chronological condition or ground of all ideas in the mind.   In this sense of
the term Locke is, no doubt, right in the affirmation, that all
our knowledge is derived from experience.  But this is evidently not the sense in which the term was understood by him.
But if experience be understood, as designating the notions
(contingent and relative) formed in the mind, of objects of
Sense and Consciousness, then I affirm that such notions, instead of being either the logical or chronological aitecedegnts
of necessary ideas, are themselves both the logical and chronological CONSeQUENTS of such ideas.
TRUE EXPLANATION.
Intuitions.
The question in respect to the origin of our knowledge, together with its progress from its commencement to its development in its present form, now admits of a ready explanation.
Knowledge, in all instances, commences (certain conditions be
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INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
ing fulfilled) with the intuitions of Sense and Consciousness.
Reason then intervenes, and affirms the logical antecedents of
each empirical intuition, as it is given.
Notions.
The next class of phenomena that appears is Understanding-conceptions, in which the intuitions referred to are comnbined into notions of particular things.   At first all such
notions are  concrete  and  particular.   The elements of  the
abstract, the general, and the universal exist, but they exist
only in the concrete.
The Judgment.
The Judgment now intervenes, and under the influence of
the ideas of resemblance and difference, separates the elements
of the abstract, general, and universal, from the concrete and
particular. Then notions, abstract and general, and ideas of
Reason in their abstract and universal form, appear on the
theater of Consciousness. A new action of the Judgment
now takes place -an action in which the particular is subsumed under the abstract, the general, and the universal.
Associatiny Principle and thte Inaygnaation.
In the midst of all this movement, the associating principle
is perpetually active, and over all the great deep of thought
thus set in motion, the Imagination then hovers, and blends
the endlessly diversified elements of mental conception, feeling,
and action, into forms more perfectly harmonizing with the
ideas of the just, the good, the beautiful, the sublime.
Scientific JIovement.
The last movement of iIind is the scientific movementa movement in which the properties and relations of the
300 
ORIGIN OF IDEAS.
varied objects of thought are systematically evolved in the
light of fundamental ideas and principles of Reason.  Such is
the origin of knowledge.   Such, too, is the movement of Mind
from the beginning, as it rolls on towards its final consummlation in pure and universal science. In beauty, grandeur, and
sublimity, nothing can be compared with the movement of
Mind.  All that is external and visible but feebly reflects it.
MANNER IN WHICH THE GENERAL, ABSTRACT, AND UNIVERSAL
ARE ELIMIINATED FROM THE CONCRETE AND PARTICULAR.
But one additional topic, connected with the present subject, requires elucidation, to wit: The manner in which notions, general and abstract, and ideas and principles, universal
and necessary, are eliminated from notions and judgments,
concrete and particular.
General Notions.
In answering this inquiry, I begin with general notions.
We will take for example and illustration, the notion designated by the word mountain.  It is admitted, that in the first
development of the Intelligence, there was no such general
notion in the mind. The Intelligence began not with the general notion, but with the conception of some particular mountain which had before been an object of perception. How
then is the general eliminated from the-particular? Another
mountain becomes an object of perception. Under the influence of the associating principle, the first notion is recalled.
The Judgment, as these perceptions arc present on the theater
of Consciousness, separates the elements common to the two.
The Understanding now combines these common elements into
a new conception, under which the Judgment subsumes the
two particulars. On the perception of a third mountain, the
26
301 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
general notion, in a manner like that just described, undergoes
a new modification, by which it embraces those elements only
common to the three particulars, while each particular is again
classed under the general. Thus the process goes on, till the
notion under consideration assumes its most general form.
This is the process by which general notions are, in all instances formed, a process so particularly elucidated in a former
Chapter, that nothing further need be said upon it here.
Abstract Notons.
We will now consider the origin and genesis of abstract
notions, such as are designated by such terms as redness, sweetness.  These are distinguished from general notions, and also
from necessary and universal ideas, by this characteristic:
They designate some single quality of particular substances
without reference to those substances.
To form general notions, more than one object must be
given. To form abstract notions but one is required. Example: This apple is red. When we have separated the
quality designated by the term red, from the subject to which
it belongs, we then have the abstract notion designated by the
term redness. The same holds in all other instances.
U5niversal and 2~ecessary Ileas.
In explaining the origin and genesis of universal and neces.
sary ideas, in their abstract and universal form, we will take
as the basis of our explanation and illustration the principle
of causality, to wit: Every event has a cause.
It is admitted, that originally, this principle is not given in
this form. What is given? Some particular event, and the
affirmation of the Reason, This particular event had a cause.
It is also admitted and affirmed, that the universal principle is
not here, as is true of contingent general principles, given by
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ORIGIN OF IDEAS.
the succession of particulars.   For if you suppose the event
repeated a thousand or a million times, all that you have in
each inistance is the particular event, and the particular affirm ation, Tlis event had a cause.  How then shall we account for
the foimIltion of the idea or principle under consideration?
Let us eccur to the individual fact above alluded to- the fact
composed of two parts; the empirical and absolute parts.   We
will leave out of view the idea of succession, and confine ourselves to the one fact before us.
By immediate abstraction let us suppose the separation of
the empirical, and the disengagement of  the necessary and
absolute.   We then have the pure idea of the absolute and
necessary. This idea thus developed we find it impossible not
to apply to all cases, real or supposed.   We have then, and in
this manner, the universal, necessary, and absolute idea or
principle.
This process might perhaps be more distinctly explained
by a reference to the ideas of body and space.  These ideas
are not originally given in their present simple abstract form.
They are given in such proportions as this:  This particular
body is somewhere, or in space. Here you have the empirical
par't, body, and the necessary and absolute part, space.   Separate the two, and you have the contingent idea of body, and
the necessary and absolute idea of space.  Hence the principle, universal, necessary, and absolute: Body supposes space.
ERROR OF COUSIN.
I have now a word to say upon a favorite principle of
Cousin, that most necessary ideas, such as the idea of time,
cause, &-c., have their origin in Reflection, and what he calls a
sentiment of the Will.  The first succession of which we are
conscious, he says, is some act of the Will, for the reason that
we perceive nothing only on the condition that we attend to it,
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INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
and the condition of attention is the Will. To this I reply:
It is admitted that we know nothing, i. e. have a distinct
knowledge of nothing, only on the condition of attention, and
that the condition of attention is the Will. But from this it
does not follow, that the act of attention is the first thing of
which we are conscious. It may be some feeling or thought,
it being impossible for us to become distinctly conscious of the
act of attention, till we attend to that.  Equally false is his
conclusion that the consciousness of our own proper causality
precedes any conception of the principle of causality. We are
not conscious of our Will as a cause, but of the acts of the
Will as mere phenomena. Succession within and without is
nothing but succession.   The first phenomenon that is observed
by the mind, whether it is within or without us, develops the
principle of causality, or we can never account for its existence
in the mind.
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CHAPTER XVI.
LAWS OF INVESTIGATION.
INVESTIGATION AND REASONING DISTINGUISHED.
ONE department of inquiry of great importance still remains.   When we have done with this, our inquiries in regard
to the intellectual powers will have closed, only as far as we
may find their operations combined with that of the other faculties or susceptibilities of the mind.
The department to which I refer, is the employment of
these powers in what is called a process of Investigation and
Reasoning.   These processes, though intimately connected, are
entirely distinct, and should be carefully distinguished the one
from the other.  In the former process our exclusive object is
the discovery of truth. In the latter, the object equally exclusive is, to prove the trutth already discovered.
Your attention in the present Chapter will be directed to
the first process.  Our inquiry is, What are the laws which
govern the mind, or ought to govern the mind, in a process of
Investigation of truth?
SUBSTANCES) HOW KNOWN.
All substances are revealed to us by their respective phenomena. Their existence, not only, but their giatitre, chiaracter, and powers, are revealed to us in this manner, and this
manner exclusively. The induction of phenomena therefore
lies at the basis of all our investigations pertaining to substances.
26*
I 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
INDUCTION OF PHENOMENA, FOR WhIIAT PURPOSES MADE.
There are four purposes entirely distinct, for which an induction of phenomena is made:
1. For the purpose of discovering the nature, characteristics, and powers of some particular substance.
2. For the purpose of classification, into genera and
species.
3. For the purpose of discovering some general fact, or
order of sequence.
4. For the purpose of discovering universal laws, in conformity to which the action of substances is subordinated.
Now the principles which should guide us in the induction
of phenomena, depend upon the object we have in view in such
induction.
INDUCTION PERTAINING TO PARTICULAR SUBSTANCES.
In the induction of phenomena for the purposes of determining the characteristics and powers of some particular substance, the following principles are of fundamental importance
in guiding our investigations:
1. In marking the phenomena which appear, or the characteristics of particular phenomena, omit none which do exist,
and suppose none which do not exist.
2. In determining the particular powers of the substance
in the light of phenomena thus classified and characterized,
undeviatingly adhere to the following principles: Phenomena,
in their fundamental characteristics alike, suppose similar powers.  Phenomena, in their fundamental characteristics unlike,
suppose dissimilar powers. In strict conformity to those principles, an attempt has been made, in a preceding part of the
present Treatise, to determine, among other things, the different
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LAWS OF INVESTIGATION.
functions of the human  Intelligence.   Whether the effort has
been successful, time will determine.
INDUCTION FOR PURPOSES OF CLASSIFICATION INTO GENERA
AND SPECIES.
In the induction of phenomena for the purpose of classification into Genera and species, the following principles should
be strictly adhered to:
1. Fix definitely and distinctly upon the I)riiciple of classificationi, whatever it may be.
2. With a rigid reg,ard to principle, range with the given
class every object, whatever its diversities in other respects,
which bears the characteristic mark.
3. Strictly exclude from the class, every individual in
which the characteristic mark is wanting.
The correctness and apparently easy application of the
above principles are so obvious, that it would seem every
one would find it very easy to apply them in all cases. But
their rigid application, in cases where it is often most denlanded,
requires an intellectual integrity, and sternness of virtue, which
the mass of mankind " very little wot of."   Every one almost
would readily apply them to shells, and rocks, and earths, and
beasts, and fowls, and fishes, and even to the objects in the
firmament above us.  But let us suppose that an individual
has before him a correct definition of treason, murder, theft,
and of kindred crimes punishable by the law, and that he
should discover upon an only son, a dark spot, which, if carefully examined, would mark him  as a subject of one of the
crimes above named; it would require the stern virtue of a
Brutus, to be willing to have inquisition made according to the
principles of immutable justice.   Cases which thus try the
virtue of mankind are of very frequent occurrence.
307 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIIY.
FINDING A GENERAL FACT, OR ORDER OF SEQUENCE.
A general fact, as we have seen, is a quality which attaches
itself to each individual of a given class.  Sometimes it may
be peculiar to this one class; sometimes it may be common
to it and other classes.  In other instances, it may be an essential quality of one class, and a mere accident in connection
with another.   When we have ascertained a fact to be general, then when an individual of a given class appears, we
know, without particular investigation, that the quality is also
present.  In determining the question whether a fact is strictly
general, the only difficulty which presents itself, is in distinguishing between an essential and accidental quality. These
two principles should determine our conclusions under such
circumstances:
1. The existence or absence of perfect uniformity of experience.
2. Experience in such decisive circumstances, as to render
it certain that the fact is or is not an essential, and not an accidental quality of the class. Nothing but good judgment can
enable one to distinguish between decisive and indecisive facts
under such circumstances.
One of the most fruitful sources of error is based upon
uniformity of experience in certain circumstances. The absence of such uniformity is certain evidence that a fact has
an accidental, and not a necessary connection with a certain
class. Its presence, however, may constitute no certain ground
for the opposite conclusion. The king of Japan, for example,
reasoned very inconclusively, fromn an experience perfectly unvarying in his circumstances, to the conclusion, that water
never, under any circumstances, exists in any other than the
fluid state. To separate the decisive from the indecisive, and
rest our conclusions upon the former class of facts only, is the
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LAWS OF INVESTIGATION.
distinguishing characteristic of strong perceptive powers associated with good judgment.
The Probable anid Ignprobab7e.
Between the perfectly certain and uncertain lie the probable and improbable. If, as has been already said, a fact has
been ascertained to have a necessary connection with a given
class, its presence, when any individual of the class is met
with, becomes perfectly certain.   But if its connection is accidental, its existence in connection with a particular individual
of the class becomes probable or improbable in proportion to
the uniformity or want of uniformity of experience under similar circumstances. 3Iany, very many of the most serious
transactions of life rest upon a calculation of probabilities.
ORDER OF SEQUENCE.
The object of investigation here is to ascertain, in reference to given effects, those things which sustain to such effects
the relation of real causes.   The difficulty to be overcome,
often consists in this:  The real cause of a given effect may
exist in connection with such combinations of powers, that it
may be difficult if not impossible for the beholder to determine
which produced it. Under such circumstances, careful experiments, in connection with close observation, can alone determine the real order of sequence.   There are four important
principles which should be strictly adhered to, as tests of all
our conclusions in relation to such investigations:
1. When in each experiment, the combination  has been
different, with this exception, that one element has been present in all, and the given effect has in each instance arisen, we
then conclude that this element is the real cause of the effect.
2. When, on the removal of a certain element, the given
effect disappears, while it remains, this being present when
309 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
each of the others is removed, we then conclude that this particular element is the particular cause.
3. WhVen the given effect is the invariable consequent of
the addition of a new element to a given combination, while
the effect does not appear, when this antecedent is not added,
we then fix upon this particular antecedent as the real cause.
4. Wrhen a number of consequents exist in connection with
a number of antecedents, and when a particular consequent
invariably disappears on the removal of a given antecedent,
we fix upon the latter as the real cause of the former.
THE DISCOVERY OF UNIVERSAL LAW.
In the induction of phenomena for the discovery of universal law, three important principles are to be strictly adhered to.
1. The phenomena must not merely consist with this particular hypothesis, but demand it as their logical antecedent.
2. Consequently such phenomena must contradict, with
equal positiveness, every other contradictory hypothesis.
3. All phenomena to which the given hypothesis does not
sustain the relations of logical antecedent, must be left wholly
out of the account, as having no bearing upon the subject.
But this subject has been so fully treated of in the preceding Chapter, that nothing further upon it is demanded here.
TESTIMONY.
It often happens, and that in reference to subjects of the
greatest importance, that the facts which constitute the basis
of our inquiries after truth, have never been given to us as
objects of Sense or Consciousness.   We  are compelled to receive or reject them on the testimony of others.   From this
source the greatest part of our knowledge, and of the most
important of our knowledge, is derived.
310 
LAWS OF INYESTIGATION.
The great inquiry here presents itself:  What arc the laws
of evidence under the influence of which we judge ourselves
bound to receive and act upon phenomena revealed  to us
through the affirmations of other minds?  Testimony is used
for the same purpose that the faculties of Sense and Consciousness are used, to wit, for the ascertainment of facts, or
phenomena, which constitute the basis of judgment in regard
to a given subject.
CI-IARACTERISTICS OF THE STATEMENTS MIADE BY A WITNESS.
The statements made by a witness may be contemplated in
three points of light.
1. In the light of the idea of possibility or impossibility.
If an individual should affirmn that an idiot, remaining such,
had given a scientific demonstration of some of the most abstruse problems in the higher mathematics, we should give no
credit at all to his statement, on the ground of a perceived
impossibility of the occurrence of such  a fact.  If, on the
other hand, the witness should affirm that an individual remaining an idiot up to a certain period, did, from that period,
manifest a high degree of mental energy, we should pronounce
the statement highly improbable, though not absolutely impossible in itself.  The statement, therefore, is capable of being
established by testimony.
2. The statement may also be contemplated in reference
to the question whether in itself, aside from the character of
the witness, it is credible or incredible.   A statement characterized as impossible, is absolutely incredible. No weight of
testimony can render it worthy of belief. An event also may
be contemplated as possible, and yet the statement that it has
actually occurred may be almost wholly wanting in respect to
credibility. If it should be said that a pure spirit before the
throne had, without any form of temptation from without or
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INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHIIY.
within, violated his duty to his God, we should hesitate to
pronounce the occurrence impossible in itself. Yet we should
deem it hardly credible.  A  statement, to be credible, must
assert what is in itself perceived to be possible.  It must also
fall within the analogyj of experience. Thus, to the great
mass of mankind, there is wanting entirely any experience of
a direct revelation from God.  Yet the existence of such a
revelation for the good of the race, is analogous to what all
have experienced of the Diviue beneficence to man. There
is, therefore, nothing incredible in the statement, that such a
revelation has been made. A statement, then, which affirms
the occurrence of an event in itself possible, and which falls
within the analogy of experience, is capable of being rendered
worthy of all confidence by testimony.
3. A statement is in itself probable or improbable, when it
does or does not accord with general experience in similar circumstances. A thing may be possible, and, at the same time,
very improbable.  No one would say that it is absolutely inmpossible that a die, when thrown, should fall twenty times in
succession with the same number uppermost. Yet all would
pronounce such an occurrence in an extreme degree improbable. An improbable event may be rendered worthy of belief
by testimony. A much higher degree, however, is demanded
to establish such an occurrence, than one which accords with
what we have had experience of in similar circumnstances.
CIRCU.NISTANCES WHICIH GO TO ESTABLISII THE CREDIBILITY
OF A WVITNESS.
Tie will now consider the circumstances which go to establish the credibility of a witness.   Among  them I will specify
the following, without enlarging upon any of them:
1. The most important characteristic is a chaeacter for
vexracity.
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LAWS OF INVESTIGATION.
2. The next is a capacity to comprehend the particular
facts to which he bears testimony.
3. Full opportunity to have observed the facts, together
with evidence that adequate attention was given to them at
the time.
4. Evidence that the occurrence was of such a nature
that the individual was not deceived at the time, and that it
sustains such a relation to the individual, as to preclude the
reasonable apprehension that his memory has failed him in
respect to it.
5. An entire consistency between the statements of the
witness and his conduct in respect to the events, the occurrence of which he affirms. If an individual affirms his entire
confidence in the veracity of a certain person, and his entire
treatment of him is in full harmony with his statements, we
are bound to admit the truth of what the witness testifies in
relation to his own convictions.
CORROBORATING CIRCUMSTANCES ASIDE FROM TIIE CHARACTER
OF THE WITNESS.
But there are circumstances often attending the testimony
of a witness, totally disconnected with the question of his
veracity, which  demand  our confidence.   Among  these,  I
specify the following:
1. The entire absence of all motives to give false testimony. This principle is based upon the assumption, that men
do not act without some motive, and that consequently they
will not ordinarily violate the principles of truth without some
temptation to do it.
2. Wlhen no assignable motives exist to induce an individual to make a given statement, if he is not convinced of its
truth, and when strong motives impel him  to deny it, especially if it be false, then we recognize ourselves as obligated to
27
813
I 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIIY
believe his statements without reference to his moral character
at all.
3. Another circumstance which tends strongly to corroborate the statements of a witness is this: When the facts
affirmed lie along the line of our own experience in similar
circumstances. This, however, is not a safe principle to rely
upon, in the absence of other circumstances of strong corroboration.  Villains often throw their statements into harmony
with experience, for the purpose of covering their dark designs.
4. When, though new, they accord with the known powers
of the agent to whom they are ascribed.
5. When these facts stand connected with the development
of laws and properties in the agent, before unknown.,
Under such circumstances, the further removed from experience the facts are, the greater the probability of their being
true. Because the greater the probability that they would, if
not true, have been unknown to the witness.
CONCURRENT TESTIMONY.
The confidence which we repose in the affirmations of a
witness is greatly strengthened by the concurrent testimony
of other individuals. Hlere the following circumstances should
be especially taken into the account:
1. Wvhen each witness possesses all the marks of credibility
above refered to.
2. When there is an entire concurrence in their statements, or a concurrence in respect to all material facts.
3. When the characters of the several witnesses are widely
different, as friends and enemies, &c., and who of course must
be influenced by widely different motives, and even by those
directly the opposite; especially when their character, motives,
and relations to the subject, are so different as to preclude the
supposition of a collusion between the witnesses.
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LAWS OF INVESTIGATION,
4. When one witness states facts omitted by others, and
when all the statements together make up a complete account
of the whole transaction.
5. WAhen there are apparent contradictions between the
statements of the witnesses, which a more enlarged acquaintance with the whole subject fully reconciles. Such occurrences in testimony preclude the supposition of collusion, and
present each individual as an independent, honest witness in
the case.
6. Coincidences often occur in the statements of witnesses
which, from the nature of the case, are manifestly undesigned.
WVhen such occurences attend the testimony of various individuals, all affirming the same great leading facts, they tend
strongly to confirm the testimony given.  This principle is
most beautifully illustrated by Dr. Paley, in his Hiorne Paulinc -  a work deserving more attention than almost anything
else the Doctor ever wrote.
Great care and sound judgment are requisite in the application of the principles above stated.   When they are fulfilled
in the case of testimony pertaining to any subject, it would be
the height of presumption and moral depravity in us not to act
upon it as true. Infinite interests may be safely based upon
the validity of such testimony.   Wre are often necessitated to
decide and act, however, in the absence of testimony thus full
and complete, and often upon testimony failing in many respects of the marks of credibility above laid down. To discern between the valid and the invalid- to determine correctly
when to trust and when to withhold confidence, requires stern
integrity of heart, and a Judgment, "by reason of use exercised" to distinguish the true from the false.
315 
CHAPTER XVII.
REASONING.
TIHE distinction between Reasoning and Investigation was
made plain in the last Chapter. The former process has nothing to do with the discovery of truth.  Its exclusive object is
the establishment of truth already discovered. It belongs to
Intellectual Philosophy to develop the laws of Reasoningthat is, to develop those laws which control the action of the
Intelligence, when drawing conclusions from premises laid
down.
TIlE SYLLOGISM THE UNIVERSAL FORM OF REASONING.
I will introduce what I have to say upon this subject by
the following quotation from Whately's Logic:
" In every instance in which we reason, in the strict sense
of the word, i. e. make use of argument, either for the sake
of refuting an adversary, or of conveying instruction, or of satisfying our own minds on any point, whatever may be the subject we are engaged on, a certain process takes place in the
mind, which is one and the same in all cases, provided it be
correctly conducted."  Again: "In pursuing the supposed investigation, it will be found that every conclusion is deduced
in reality from two other propositions (thence called premises),
for though one of them may be, and commonly is suppressed,
it must nevertheless be understood as admitted; as may be 
REASONING.
made evident by supposing the denial of the suppressed premise,
which will at once invalidate the argument."
Hence this author affirms, in opposition to the opinion of
some on the subject, that the syllogistic is not a particular kind
of reasoning, as distinguished from moral or inductive reasoning, for example, but the sole and universal process.
The above Principle verified.
That this author is correct in the principle above stated, a
very few considerations will render evident.
That all reasoning, purely demonstrative, is strictly conformed to the law of the syllogism, none will deny.  As an
example and illustration of this kind of reasoning, we may
take the following: "Things equal to the same thing, are equal
to one another.   A  and B  are each equal to C.  Therefore
they are equal to one another.   The major premise, in all such
processes, is either an intuition of Reason, or some proposition
previously demonstrated.
But inductive Reasoning has by some been supposed to be
an exception, because that, in the syllogism, we go from the
general to the particular; whereas, in the inductive process,
we reason from the particular to the general.   This objection,
if valid, would equally exclude almost the entire mass of demonstrative reasoning.  Here also we do in reality go from the
particular to the universal -that is, the minor premise is
particular.  This objection assumes also what is not true of
the syllogism -that is, that in all instances, in the syllogistic
form, we reason from the general to the particular.  All reasoning is strictly conformed to the  laws of the  syllogism,
wherein a conclusion is legitimately drawn from two premises,
a major and a minor. In induction, as well as everywhere else,
these two premises appear, the major being almost universally
suppressed. In no form of reasoning legitimately conducted
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.1 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
is the conclusion more extensive  than  the major premise.
Wvhen we reason from the particular to the general, we always
do it under the assumption (and this assumlption is the suppressed major) that what is true of the particular, is also true
of the class to which the individual belongs.
FORMS IN WIIICII THE MIAJOR PREMIISE APPEARPS.
There are three forms in which what is called the major
premise, that which asserts the universal or general faict, is
expressed; a circumstance which has led others to suppose
that there are three kinds of reasoning, of which the syllogism
is one. These forms are the categorical, in which the general
fact is directly affirmed or denied-  the hypothetical, in which
the general principle is hypothetically affirmed or denied, as in
the proposition, If A is B, C is D - and the disjunctive, in
which a fact is affirmed to attach to some one of a given nlumber, without determining which, as in the proposition A is
either in C or D.
The categorical we have already considered. It remains
to consider the last two.  Now a moment's reflection will convince us, that a hypothetical premise is nothing but a universal
put into the form of a particular.   The proposition, for example, If Caesar was an usurper he deserved death, is nothing
more than the universal proposition, All usurpers deserve
death, expressed in a concrete and particular form.   The same
holds in respect to all propositions of a similar character. A
hypothetical proposition is nothing but a general or universal
principle hypothesized in respect to a particular case.
A careful analysis will show that a disjunctive proposition,
also, is in reality nothing but a general, or universal proposition, expressed in a concrete and particular form.   When, for
example, we say, A is either in B or C; it is not in B, therefore it is in C, we find, on analysis, that the first premise con
318 
REASONING.
tains a universal principle, expressed in a concrete and particular form. The principle is this - when an element must
exist in connection with somne one of a given class, to prove
that it does not attach to some one or more of the members,
is to prove that it does belong to those, be they one or more,
that remain. The syllogism, therefore, might be thus expressed: If C is not in one of the two, it is in the other. It
is not in one, to wit, B.   Therefore it is in C.  The syllogism
then is not a particular form of reasoning, but the universal
and exclusive form.
PRINCIPLES WHICIH LIE AT THE BASIS OF ALL CONCLUSIONS
FROMI A PROCESS OF REASONING.
All conclusions in a process of reasoning are, of course,
either affirmative, as A is B, or negative, as A is not B. Such
conclusions rest upon two distinct and opposite principles, on
which all reasoning, legitimately conducted, rests.
1. All terms which agree with one and the same term,
agree with one another.
2. All terms which agree with a particular term, differ
from all others which disagree with the same term.
Remarks upon. these Principles.
On the former principle all affirmative, and on the latter
all negative conclusions rest. All reasoning strictly conformed
to these principles, must be right, and all which transgresses
them, must be wrong.
It will be perceived also, that these principles are nothing
more than particular forms of the axioms  common  to all sciences, as the axiomn in mathematics,  "Things equal to the
same thing are equal to one another," &e.
In the celebrated dictum of Aristotle, these two principles
319
I 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPHY.
are expressed in one formula, to wit:  B  matever may be af.fi rmed or denied of anly ternm  distributed (i. e. takeri universally), mncay be affirmed or denied of every tarticular comprebeieId(ec itlider that term.
REMARKS ON ARISTOTLE'S DICTUM.
The two principles under consideration, thrown into this
form, are not rendered more distinct and sinmple than they
were before; nor, in my judgment, are they rendered as dis tinct as when they appear in their separate form, the form
in which they are announced in connection with all other
sciences.  Throwing them into this form has also, I believe,
induced two quite common mistakes connected with the science of logic.
The first is the impression noticed above, that the syllogism
is exclusively confined to one kind of reasoning, to wit: that
in which we proceed from the universal to the particular.
From the form of the principles, as announced in the dictum,
we should suppose that this must be the case in respect to all
reasoning conformed to the syllogism; whereas no such difficulty even apparently attaches to these principles, when announced in their distinct and separate forms.
The second mistake is found in the somewhat harmless,
but very useless labor, which we meet with in the common
Treatises on Logic, of rediuciny all the syllogisms in the last
three figures to the first.  This is done because that in this
last-named figure only, is the dictum d(irectly applicable to the
syllogism. Now what is the real use of these reductions?
Are the two terms more fully compared with one and the same
third, or is their agreement or disagreement with that term,
and consequently with each other, more distinct, in the first
figure, than in all the legitimate moods in either of the others?
320 
REASONING.
By no means. Take, as an illustration, the following syllogism in Camestres, in the second figure. Every X is Z. No
Y is Z. Therefore no Y is X. This syllogism reduced to
Celarent in the first figure, would stand thus: No Z is Y.
Every X is Z. Therefore no X is Y; the converse of the
conclusion above obtained, and which, by simple conversion,
may be changed into the same, to wit, no Y is X. Now I
ask, is the proposition, No Y is X rendered any more evident
by all this process than it was before? Are X and Y more
distinctly compared with Z, or is the fact that one agrees, and
the other disagrees with that term, and consequently that
they disagree with each other, more distinct and palpable, in
the last instance, than in the first? If any person can see the
difference between them, they can see what I cannot. Of
what use then is all this labor at reduction? This only:
the student is taxed with much labor in the conversion and
transposition of propositions, under the promise of additional
light upon the correctness of conclusions previously obtained
upon principles undeniably legitimate. The result is, that his
conclusions are rendered not one whit more distinct or valid
to his view than they were before. No science should be burdened with useless labor. Logic, like all other sciences, with
these principles in their distinct and separate forms, is far better off without the dictum than with it.
DIFFERENT KINDS OF REASONING.
We are now prepared for a contemplation of the different
kinds of reasoning resulting from the nature of the different
subjects upon which the Intelligence is employed in such processes. I will introduce my remarks upon this department
of our inquiries, with the following quotation from Coleridge:
321 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIIY.
a Every man must feel, that though he may not be exert ing different faculties, he is exerting his faculties in a different
way, when in one instance he begins with some one self-evident
truth (that the radii of a circle, for instance, are all equal),
and in consequence of this being true, sees at once, without
any actual experience, that some other thing must be true likc wise, and that, this being true, some thi?d thing  must be
equally true, and so on, till he comes, we will say, to the prop erties of the lever, considered as the spoke of a circle; which
is capable of having all its marvelous powers  demonstrated
even to a savage who had never seen a lever, and without supposing any other previous knowledge in his mind, but this one,
There is a conceivable figure, all possible lines from the middle
to the circumference of which are of the same length: or when,
in the second instance, he brings together the facts of experience, each of which has its own separate value, neither increased
nor diminished by the truth of any other fact which may have
preceded it; and making these several facets bear upon some
particular project, and finding some in favor of it, and some
against the project, according as one or the other class of facts
preponderates: as, for instance, whether it would be better to
plant a particular spot of ground with larch, or with Scotch fir,
or with oak in preference to either. Surely every man will acknowledge that his mind was very differently employed in the
first case from what it was in the second, and all men have
agreed to call the results of the first class the truths of sciee)ce,
such as not only are true, but which it is impossible to conceive otherwise: while the results of the second class are called
f(acts or things of ex-perience: and as to these latter we must
often content ourselves with the greater probability, that they
are so, or so, rather than otherwise - nay, even when we have
no doubt that they are so in the particular case, we never presume to assert that they must continue so always, and under
322 
REASONING.
all circumstances.   On the contrary, our conclusions depend
altogether on contingent circuimstances. Now when the mind
is employed, as in the case first mentioned, I call it Reasoniieg,
or the use of the pure Reason; but, in the second case, the
Ztderstazdiilg or P,udence."
Without reference to the propriety of the peculiar use here
made of the terms Reasoning, Understanding, and Prudence,
I would observe, that no one can doubt the reality of the distinction between the kinds of reasoning designated in this passage.  The question arises, What is this distinction?  What
are the peculiarities which distinguish the one kind of reasoning from the other?
Distinctions Elucidated.
1. One ground of distinction is found in the nature of the
objects of ratiocination in the two instances referred to.  In
the first example the objects are pure and necessary conceptions of Reason.   In the second, the objects are realities contingent and particular.
2. In the first instance no elements exist in the objects
but what are perfectly known to the mind. No unknown elements exist to vitiate our conclusions. In the second instance
what is known exists in connection with elements of which we
are totally ignorant, and which may operate in the production
of results precisely opposite to the conclusions which we have
drawn from what we do know.
3. Consequently, in the first instance, our conclusions involve nothing but universal, necessary, and absolute knowledge.
In the second instance, the utmost that we obtain is, conclusions more or less probable, according to the degree in which
the known may be affected by the unknown, to wit, conclusions
not necessary but contingent.
323 
INTELLECTUIAL PHILOSOPIHIY.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN DEMONSTRATIVE AND PROBABLE
REASONING.
The distinction between demonstrative and probable, or as
it is sometimes improperly called, mnoral reasoning, can now be
readily pointed out. When the properties and relations of
objects embracing no elements which are not perfectly known,
are systematically evolved in the light of axioms and postulates,
which are the intuitions of Reason, the result is absolute demonstration. If the objects themselves are pure ideas of Reason, the conclusions will be universal and necessary. If the
objects are contingent, such will be the conclusions. The result, however, is pure demonstration, in both instances alike.
The syllogism, for example, every X is Y, every Z is X, and
therefore every Z is Y, is perfect demonstration, whatever the
objects represented by the terms may be.
On the other hand, when we attempt to determine questions pertaining to events depending in part upon circumstances which we know, and in part upon others which we do not
know, and in a state of ignorance of the influence of that which
is unknown in determining the result, or when we attempt, in
the light of fundamental principles, to determine the relations
and properties of substances embracing elements known and
unknown, and while we are ignorant of the extent in which
these relations and properties depend upon the unknown elements, then our conclusions are in no sense demonstration, but
partake of probabilities greater or less, according to the degree
in which the known or unknown elements preponderate.  Thus
we have a distinct view of the broad distinction between the
two kinds of reasoning under consideration.   It does not lie
in the nature of the objects to which such reasoning pertains,
but in the relatiopos of the objects to our Intelligence.  Were
all objects as perfectly known to the mind, as the objects treated
324 
REASONING.
of in the mathematics, then all reasoning would be alike demonstrative.
COIMMION IMPRESSION IN RESPECT TO THE EXTENT OF DEMON                   STRATIVE REASONING.
" If," says Mr. Dugald Stewart, " the account which has
been given of demonstrative evidence be admitted, the province over which it extends must be limited almost entirely to
the objects of the pure mathematics."   With  this statement
there is quite an extensive agreement, I believe, among philosophers. The reasons assigned for the above conclusion are the
following:
1. The fact that the basis of all mathematical demonstrations, are axioms and postulates which are intuitively certain.
2. That every step from these axioms and postulates to the
remotest conclusions, is equally intuitive.
3. That the terms employed are so few, and distinctly defined, that they cannot be misapprehended.
The principle assumed is, that no other science is capable
of possessing the above characteristics, and consequently that
no other science can so properly be called demonstrative.
Let us first inquire, whether the mathematics is the only
science based upon axioms and postulates intuitively certain.
Take as an illustration the following axiom in mathematics:
The whole of a thing is greater than any of its parts, and compare it with the following affirmation of Reason: Every event
has a cause.  Which is the least certain?  Neither.   Thus
I might show by an induction of many particulars, that all
the fundamental principles of morals and religion are as intuitively certain as any of the primary intuitions of the mathematics.
Permit me in the next place to ask, whether there are no
28
325 
INTELLECTUTAL PHILOSOPIIY.
important truths resulting with as intuitive certainty from the
priimary truths of morals as from those of the mathematics?
Takle the following intuition in morals: "Thou shalt love thy
neighbor as thyself," and consider the following proposition
blosed upon it: "Love worketh no ill to his neighbor."   Conseqcluently the man that does his neighbor a deliberate injury
cannot be actuated by the principle of love. The above conclusion is of great practical importance, and yet I shall not
hesitate to pronounce it as absolute a demonstration as can be
found in Geometry. So of the numberless other truths based
upon the primary intuitions of morals and religion.
In regard to the last peculiarity of mathematics I have only
to say that when the principles of morals are as definitely settled as those of the mathematics (and no reason but a false
philosophy can be assigned why they have not been thus settled long ago), we may expect the same precision in morals as
in any other science.
METHOD OF PROOF.
Having shown that all reasoning resolves itself into two
classes, demonstrative and probable, another topic demanding
attention is the method of _proof, or the general mode to be
adopted in proving a proposition, the truth of which has been
already ascertained. In the last Chapter I endeavored to develop those laws of belief which should guide the mind in its
inquiries after truth. Now when truth has been discovered
and adopted in conformity with those rules, and we wish to
present arguments for the purpose of conveying to other minds
the same convictions which exist in our own, one rule of fundamental importance presents itself.  Present those considerations by which our own mind has been convinced. This rule
might, at first thought, seem to be so obviously proper, and so
manifestly of universal application, as to render its statement
3-9 6 
REASONING.
entirely unnecessary.   But there is no rule which is more frequently transgressed, and for the obvious reason, that few persons practice self-reflection sufficiently to render themselves
distinctly conscious of the real ground of their assent to a vast
majority of the truths which they believe.  Hence  it very
commonly happens, that when individuals are called upon to
assign reasons for propositions which they most firmly believe
to be true, they for the first time, perhaps, begin to doubt the
reality of the objects of their faith.  This most frequently
happens, perhaps, in reference to truths the mnost obvious, and
with which the mind is most familiar. The reason of this
most singular fact is obvious.'We seldom recur to the grounds
of our belief in truths so obvious and familiar, that they have
been universally admitted. The evidence of such truths has
come into the mind unsought. The reverse is the fact with
respect to truths less obvious and familiar.
Real proof found in no other.Method.
On reflection, it will appear evident, that in no other method of argumentation is real proof to be met with. We may
show an individual that the truth of a given proposition necessarily results from principles which he admits.   But this (the
arg}ume(netti   adc hotilem)n) is merely hypothetical, and not
real proof.  For if the principles of the individual are false,
the argument is good for nothing, as far as the real establishment of truth is concerned.   The same may be said of every
other kind of proof but that of which we are speaking.
SOUTJRCES OF FALLACIES IN REASONING.
Assuming the proposition which I have endeavored  to establish as true, to wit: That every conclusion in a process of
reasoning is based upon two propositions called premises, the
place where fallacies in reasoning are to be found, if they exist,
327 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
may be readily pointed out. They must be found in one or
both of the premises, or in the conclusion. Hence, in examining any particular process of reasoning, such questions as
these are of fundamental importance.: What is the proposition which the author is aiming to establish?  What principles
has he assumed as previously established or as self-evident?
Are these principles legitimately assumed? What statements
does he propose as matters of fact?  Are they authentic? Do
they belong to the principle to which they are applied? Do
his conclusions legitimately result from the premises laid down?
By such questions as these, fallacies, if they exist, may commonly be detected.   Four great questions, I repeat, should be
asked, if we would determine correctly whether a proposition
has been proved by a given process of argumentation, to wit:
What is the precise nature of the proposition which is the subject of the argument? What are the premises or arguments
by which the proposition has been sustained?   Are these
premises sound?  And does the conclusion legitimately result
from the premises? If fallacies have been introduced into the
process, we shall thus discover their particular hiding-places,
and know how to bring them into the light.
CONCEPTION OF LOGIC.
The object of the present and preceding Chapter has been
to lay down certain great principles, in respect to the discovery
of truth, and its establishment by a process of argumentation.
In this department of our investigations, it remains to speak
of but one additional topic, the Conception of Loyic.
ALL THINGS OCCUR ACCORDING TO RULES.
" Everything in nature," says Kant, and this is one of his
most important thoughts, "as well in the inanimate as in the
animated world, happens or is done according to rules, though
328 
REASONING.
we do not always know them. Water falls according to the
laws of gravitation, and the motion of walking is performed
by animals according to rules.  The fish in the water, the bird
in the air, moves according to rules."
Again: "There is nowhere any want of rule.   When we
think we find that want, we can only say that, in this case the
rules are unknown to us."
The exercise of our Intelligence is not an exception to the
above remark. When we speak, our language is thrown into
harmony with rules, to which we conform without, in most instances, a reflective consciousness of their existence.   Grammar is nothing but a systematic development of these rules.
So also when we judge a proposition to be true or false, or to
be proved or disproved by a particular process of argumentation; or when we attempt to present to ourselves, for self-satisfaction, or to others for the purpose of convincing them, the
grounds of our own convictions - that is, when we reason,
our Intelligence proceeds according to fixed rules. When we
have judged or reasoned correctly, we find ourselves able, on
reflection, to develop the rules in conformity to which we
judged and reasoned, without a distinct consciousness of the
fact. In the light of these rules, we are then able to detect
the reason and grounds of Fallacious judgments and reasonings.
Loyic defitncd.
The above remarks have prepared the way for a distinct
statement of the true conception of Logic.  It is a systematic
developenlt of those rues in coaformnity to which the uitiverscatl Itellieiece acts, in jtudqiyg and reasoni)?g.   Logic,  according to this conception, would naturally divide itself into
two parts-a development of those rules to which the Intelligence conforms in all acts of correct judgment and reasoning,
28*
329 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
and a development of those principles by which false judgments and reasonings may be distinguished from the true. A
Treatise on Logic, in which the laws of judging and reasoning
are evolved in strict conformity to the above conception, would
realize the idea of science as far as this subject is concerned.
Logic, to judging and reasoning, is what Grammar is to speaking and writing.  Logic pertains not at all to the particular
objects about which the Intelligence is, from time to time, employed, but to rules or laws in conformity to which it does act,
whatever the objects may be.
RELATIONS OF LOGIC TO OTHER SCIENCES.
In the chronological order of intellectual procedure, Logic
is preceded by judging and reasoning, just as speaking and
writing precede Grammar.   In the logical order, however, it
is the antecedent of all other sciences.  In all sciences the Intellig,enee, from given data, judges in respect to truths resulting from such data. We also reason from such data for the
establishment of such truths. Logic develops the laws of
thought which govern the action of the Intelligence in all
such procedures.  As a science, it is distinct from all other
sciences, yet it permeates them all, giving laws to the Intelligence, in all its judgments and reasonings, whatever the objects may be about which it is employed.
330 
CHAPTER XVIII.
MiISCELLA-NEOUS TOPICS.
THERE are a few topics of a miscellaneous character connected with our previous investigation, which I have reserved
for a distinct and separate Chapter. The first to which I would
direct attention is,
THE BEARING OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOCKE UPON SCIENCE
PROPERLY SO CALLED.
In the philosophy of Locke, axioms have no place, except
as objects of ridicule and contempt.  Hle directly denies that
any science whatever is founded upon them.  Equally removed
from his philosophy are all ideas of pure Reason. All the objects of knowledge are qualities external and internal. Now
in what sense and in what form is science pertaining to any
subject possible, according to the fundamental principles of
this philosophy? The answer which I give to this question is
this: In no form whatever is science of any kind possible, accordcling to the fundamental principles of this philosophy.  NVWe
will take in illustration the science of external and material
substances. All that we know of these substances, according
to this philosophy, is by sensation- that is, qualities, and
nothing else.  Now the first step in a scientific process pertaining to these qualities, is that of making abstraction of them,
in thought separating those which differ, and uniting those
which agree.  On what condition can this process take place?
On one condition only, to wit: that we have in our minds the
ideas of resemblance and difference.  But these ideas are pure
conceptions of Reason, and are not given by sensation at all. 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIIY.
Sensation may give the colors red and yellow, for example;
but it can never give the fact, that the one color differs from
the other.  This judgment is conditioned on the prior exist ence in the mind of pure conceptions of Reason, the ideas
above named. But the reality of such ideas this philosophy
denies.  It thereby, in its fundamental principles, renders the
first step in a scientific process impossible.
But let us suppose that this philosophy did admit of abstraction.  Simple classification and generalization would  be
possible- that is, these qualities, as they exist in combination,
might be classed into genera and species, and then qualities,
common to all individuals of given classes, might be found.
This would be the utmost limit of scientific procedure, according to this philosophy, and this comprehends the limits of the
sphere of the Intelligence as presented in the school of Locke.
But this is the starting point of real science, properly defined.
When substances have been classified and generalized, the Intelligence is then brought into circumstances to evolve their
properties and relations in the light of fundamental ideas.
This is science -a thing impossible according to the philosophy of Locke.
In the denial of the axioms, also, as the foundation of science, Locke renders science of all kinds impossible.  Suppose
we did not know the axiom, Things equal to the same thing
are equal to one another, how could we affirm that because
A and B are equal to C, therefore they are equal to one
another?  It would be impossible to make such an affirmation.
The same holds in respect to every step in all the sciences,
pure and mixed.   Take away the axioms, and "darkness all,
and ever-during night" enshrouds the sun of science.   Whenever we meet with scientific Treatises in the school of Locke
(and we meet with many), they exist in spite of his philosophy, and not as a consequent of it.
332 
MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
KANT'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN ANALYTICAL AND SYNTHETI                     CAL JUDGMENTS.
I have reserved for this place, the consideration of the distinction above named, a distinction whichl constitutes one of
the fundamental peculiarities of the philosophy of Kant, and
which laid the foundation for the various systems which have
risen out of the principles and fragments of his philosophy.
Anal,ytical and  Synthetical Jtds,fme?its  (efined and distin.
gquished.
The first thing to be done is to define these judgments, as
given by our author, and to distinguish the one from the other.
All judgments pertain to the relation between a subject and
predicate.  This relation, he affirms, is possible only in two
ways.   Either the predicate is really contained in the subject,
and the judgment evolves, or designates it as a quality necessarily embraced in our conception of the subject; or the predicate lies completely out of the subject, although it sustains a
certain relation to it.  Thus when we affirm that all bodies are
extended, the predicate is really embraced in our conception
of the subject; since it is impossible to conceive of a body
which is not extended.   The judgment in this case simply designates the quality named as thus embraced in the conception.
All such judgments proceed on the principle of contradiction.
No  individual, for example, can deny the proposition, All
bodies are extended without contradicting the essential conception which every one has of body. All such judgments Kant
denominates analytical.  To find them, we have only to analyze our conceptions and find the elements essentially embraced
in them.
On the other hand, when we say all bodies are heavy, the
predicate does not, as in the former case, lie within the subject,
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I 
INTELLECTUAL PHIIILOSOPHIY.
as an essential element of our conception of the subject.  WVe
cannot conceive of body which is not extended. But we can
conceive of body as extended, without including in the conception the idea of weight.  That all bodies have weight, we
learn from experience alone.  Through experience this clement
is added to our notions of body. All judgments of this character, Kant denominates synthetical.
All pure experience-judgments are synthetical, that is,
when, by investigation, we have discovered, as connected with
an object, or an essential element of it, some quality unknown
before, we then, in thought, add that quality to our former
conception of the object.
But we find, on analysis of our judgments, that we  have
not only empirical, but c lr)iori judgments, which are synthetical.  Of this character are all the primary principles of Reason-judgments, such as, Body supposes space: succession
time; events causes, &c.  In all such judgments the predicate
is not contained in the subject, as an essential element of our
conception of that subject, but lies wholly without it, and the
Judgment affirms the relation between them.
Consequences which Kant has deduced from the above judg     ments as defined and distibiquished by hinmsef.
At first thought, it would appear that the principles above
elucidated would be very harmless, at least in their results
(and so they will be found to be when legitimately applied),
and thlat they would lead to no disastrous conclusions pertaining to the validity of our knowledge relative to realities within
and around us. Yet upon these principles, this philosopher
has founded most of his conclusions, in which the validity of
our faculties, in reference to all affirmations pertaining to realities, material and mental, finite and infinite, is denied. T-he
334 
AIISCELLANEOULS TOPICS.
conclusions to which he pushes these principles, may be thus
stated:
1. Not only are all experience-judgments synthetical, but
also all judgments of pure science, such, for example, as mathematical judgments.
2. As in all such judgments, the predicate lies wholly out
of the subject, such judgments have no claim whatever to objective validity.  They are entirely foundationless.  In themselves the ideas represented by both the subject and predicate
have no claim whatever to objective validity, and as the predicate lies wholly out of the subject, it can have no foundation
in that.
3. As such judgments are themselves without foundation,
so also must be all sciences founded on them as principles.
4. As all pure sciences rest exclusively upon such judgments, and as all judgments pertaining to such sciences, such
for example, as mathematics, are purely synthetical, such sciences, with all judgments pertaining to them, are wholly without any objective validity.
5. As synthetical judgments, a priori, precede as laws of
thought, and determine the character of all experience-judgments, and all conclusions based upon them, these last judgments, like the former, are wholly destitute of all claims to
objective validity. The entire fabric of human knowledge,
consequently, falls. Our Intelligence is exclusively a faculty
of cognizing as real, what has no existence out of the cognitionfaculty itself. The universe, material and mental, God, liberty,
and immortality, are the unreal objects of foundationless conceptions.  Yet they are objects which we are bound to treat
as real, because our cognition-faculty presents them as such,
and practical Reason, that function of RPteason which teaches
what we ought to do, affirms our obligation thus to treat
them.
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INTELLECTUAL PHIILOSOPIYW.
6. On no other supposition than that such is the nature
and procedure of the cognition-faculty, can we account for the
possibility of d p)riori synthetical judgments of sciences all
of whose judgments are synthetical, together with the relations
above stated of synthetical judgments to experience.  The existence of synthetical judgments reveals the nature of the
cognition-faculty, and determines the character of its whole
procedure. The basis of the whole system of knowledge is
synthetical judgments, having no claim to objective validity.
The entire superstructure receives its form and dimensions
from such judgments.   The building, therefore,  cannot be
more substantial or real than the foundation on which it rests.
Eirrors of Kcngt, in defining and appljyi'g the distinctions
which he has made between these judyme2nts.
Such is the system of this philosopher, a system moulded
from the airy materials, and built upon the airy foundation
under consideration.  It now remains to point out some of the
errors into which he has fallen on this subject.
1. It may be questioned whether he has rightly defined
these judgments, and consequently given the true criterion by
which the one class may be distinguished from the other. WVe
will propose another definition. When the connection between
the subject and predicate in any given proposition is such, that
we have no occasion to go beyond the proposition itself, to determine its validity, then the judgment expressed in that proposition is analytical. When, on the other hand, this connection is such, that we have to go beyond the sphere of the
proposition, that is, to bring in other propositions, to determine
its validity, then the judgment is synthetical.  Take the two
following propositions in illustration, the first of which is analytical, and the second synthetical, according to Kant: Body is
extended; and Body supposes space. Why should the judg
336 
.IISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
ment expressed in one of these propositions, be denominated
analytical, and that in the other synthetical?  In neither instance have we occasion to go beyond the sphere of the proposition or judgment itself to discern its validity; and it is
exclusively by analysis and not by synthesis, that is, by an
analysis of the nature of the subject and predicate, and of the
necessary relations between them, and not by the introduction
of other judgments, that that validity is in both instances
alike and equally discerned. Both judgments also have precisely the same characteristics of absolute universality and
necessity, and this universality and necessity are in both cases
alike and equally discerned within the sphere of the judgments
themselves. Nor is the predicate contained in the subject, in
the former proposition, and not contained in it, in the latter,
in any such form, as to make any fundamental difference between the judgments themselves. In the one instance we
compare the idea of body with that of extension, and perceive
intuitively that if body is, it must have extension.  In the
next instance, we compare the same idea, that of body, with
that of space, and perceive, with the same absolute intuitiveness, that if body is, space must be.  No important reasons
can be assigned why one of these propositions should be denominated analytical, and the other synthetical.
By Kant's own fundamental characteristic of analytical
judgments also, the validity of our definition of these two
kinds of judgments, and the error of his own, is rendered
self-evident. The truth of all analytical judgments, he affirms,
is discerned, on the principle of contradiction, that is, if you
deny them, you deny what is necessarily involved in the very
idea of the subject and predicate. Now this holds equally
true of the two judgments above adduced.   It is no more a
contradiction of our idea of body, to affirm, that body is not
extended, than it is to affirm, that body does not suppose space.
29
337 
INTELLECTUAL  PIIILOSOP-IY.
If then all judgments, the truth and necessity of which may
be discerned on the principle of contradiction, are to be reckoned as analytical judgments, and they are according to Kant
himself, and also according to all principles of sound science,
then all of his a priori synthetical judgments are, in fact, analytical and not synthetical judgments at all.
2. Hence I remark, in the next place, that Kant errs fundamentally, in his assumption, that all the pure sciences, the
mathematics for example, have their exclusive basis in synthetical judgments. All basis principles of such sciences, on the
other hand, the axioms, I mean, are exclusively analytical
judgments. There is not a single axiom in any of these sciences, the truth and necessity of which is not discerned exclusively on the principle of contradiction, the distinguishing
characteristic of analytical judgments, according to Kant himself. The axioms, for example, things equal to the same
things are equal to one another, and the whole is greater than
any one of its parts, and equal to all its parts together, are
discernible upon the principle of contradiction, and upon no
other principle.  So of all the basis principles of all the sciences without exception.
3. But incorrect classification is not the only error of
Kant, in respect to d lpriori synthetical judgments, synthetical
judgments as he has himself defined them.  He has failed to
mark the real relations between the subject and predicate
in such judgments. Had he done this, a failure to do which
is a capital omission in philosophy, he would have perceived
at once that no such conclusions as he supposed, can be
drawn from those judgments.  In an  d priori synthetical
judgment,  as defined  by  Kant  (the  d prior?  analytical
judgment according to our definition), the predicate lies out
of the subject, and is not included in it, as in empirical
analytical  judgments,  the  only  analytical, according  to
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MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
Kant.* In the former judgments, the predicate to be sure is
not contained in the subject as an essential element of the
same.   On the other hand, the former sustains to the latter
the relation of logical antecedent.   Now such a judgment is
self-evidently as valid for things in themselves, as a judgment
which affirmus of a subject an element embraced in the conception of that subject. The propositions. for example, If body
is, there must be real extension and if body is, space must be,
are in themselves equally self-evident, and equally valid for
things in themselves.  We have then, even granting that one of
these judgments is analytical and the other synthetical, no
more occasion to question, as Kant has done, the validity for
things in themselves of one of these judgments, than we have
to do the same thing in respect to the other.
4. Another great error of Kant, in the use which he has
made of the Judgments under consideration, is found in the
affirmation which he makes, that in all the pure sciences, the
pure mathematics for example, all judgments alike are exclusively snythetical; when, in fact, they are all alike, as actually
discerned, analytical.  This is evident from the fact, that all
such judgments are discerned on the principle of contradiction.
In the mlathematics, for example, the truth of all the axioms
is discerned, exclusively on the principle of contradiction, and
every conclusion is so deduced, that it must be admitted, or
* The distinction between an empirical and a priori analytical judgment here becomes perfectly manifest.  In the first case, the predicate is really contained in the subject as an essential element of the
same, as in the judgment, Body is extended.   In the latter case, the
predicate lies out of the subject, but sustains to it the relation of
logical antecedent, as in the judgment,  Body supposes space.  Both
classes of judgments are analytical, for the fundamental reason, that
their truth and necessity are alike discerned on the principle of contradiction.
339
.1 
INTELLECTUAL PHIIILOSOPHY.
the axioms denied. In other words, the whole procedure of
such sciences is on the principle of contradiction- Kant's own
criterion of analytical judgments.   I-e himself admits, that
all derivative judgments, in the mathematics, do proceed on
the principle of contradiction, and yet affirms, that such judgments are, in fact, synthetical and not analytical. " Although,"
he says, "a synthetical proposition may at all times be discerned by means of the principle of contradiction, yet only in
this way, inasmuch as another synthetic proposition is pre-supposed from which it can be deduced-but never of itself."
Now here are two important mistakes.  The first is, that no
synthetical proposition understood as he has defined it, is discerned of itself on the principle of contradiction; when, as
we have already seen, all of his d priori synthetical propositions are thus discerned, and that exclusively. On no other
principle do we, or can we, discern the truth of the axioms,
things equal to the same things are equal to one another, if
equals be added to, subtracted from, multiplied or divided by
equals, the products will be equal, and the whole is greater
than any one of its parts, and all the parts together are equal
to the whole, &c. Being thus discerned, they should, as already shown, be ranked as analytical and not as synthetical
judgments. Being also ranked by Kant as synthetical judgments, he is undeniably in error, in affirming that no synthetical judgments as defined by himself, are discerned, of themselves, on the principle of contradiction. The second error
into which he has fallen, is found in the affirmation, that all
derivative synthetical propositions are discerned through some
other synthetic proposition, when in the pure sciences, the
mathematics, for example, all such propositions are discerned
analytically through analytical and not synthetical propositions
properly defined, that is, through propositions which are them
340 
MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
selves and of themselves, discerned, on the principle of con.
tradiction.
5. Hence, I remark finally, that Kant, for the reasons
above stated, gives an entirely and fundamentally false account
of the procedure of the Intelligence in the sciences.   According to him, the Intelligence, in all the Sciences, begins with
synthetical judgments, judgments in which the predicate lies
wholly out of the subject. From this predicate, as a subject,
the next step is to another predicate lying in a similar manner
out of that, and so on, each step being like the first purely
synthetical. If this were the case, we should have, in none
of the sciences anything like demonstration; for this in all instances, rests exclusively upon the principle of contradiction.
All demonstrative sciences are truly analytical, and not synthetical. Their basis principles are all analytical propositions,
that is, propositions whose truth is discerned exclusively, on
the principle of contradiction.   Every deduction  from these
propositions is made exclusively on the same principle. No
philosopher, therefore, has more fundamentally erred, on any
subject, than Kant has, in his definitions of analytical and
snythetical judgments, and in the use which he has made of
those judgments.
THE TRUE AND FALSE SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY.
WVe are now prepared to contrast the system of Philosophy
taught in this Treatise, with what we will take the liberty to
denominate false systems, systems to which it stands opposed.
All systems of philosophy take form and receive their fundamental characteristics from the ideas which their respective advocates entertain in respect to the question of Ontology, that is,
in respect to the question, What shall we regard as real? This
question resolves itself into another, to wit, What do we kowo
29*
341
I 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
to be real? The true answer to each of these questions must
be found in one of these three systems, to wit, Rlealismn, as
taught in this Treatise, Materialism, or Idealism in one of its
formis.   As no other theories of Ontology are conceivable or
possible, and as but one of these can be true, that one, whichsoever it may be, must be true, in which the true answer to
the questions under consideration is found.   We will now consider these diverse systems in the order above named.
CRITERION OR TESTS BY WHICHI WE MAY DISTINGUISHII THE
TRUE FROM ALL FALSE SYSTEMS.
Before proceeding, however, it may be well to fix definitely
in mind somne sure tests by which the true theory may be
known and distinguished from all false ones.  The following
principles I lay down as involving such tests:
1. The true theory will take into account all the facts of
Consciousness with all their essential characteristics, just as
they arc, supposing nothing which does not exist, and omitting
nothing which does exist.
2. The I)riiic~iles of this theory will readily account for
all these facts with all their characteristics, and that without
exception.
3. The l}ri-z1c' les of this theory will be  necessarily supli)osed by these phenomena, and all its decluctions will be necessary logical coiisetueits of these principles and phenomena, so
that it will be manifest not only that this one system is true,
but that all contradictory ones must be false.
Every theory possessing these characteristics, it will readily
be seen, cannot be false, and every one wanting or contradicting all or any of them, cannot be true.   Suppose, for example,
a theory is constructed which accords only with a part of the
real facts of Consciousness, that one circumstance is an absolute demonstration of the fact that such theory is founded in
342 
MiISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
error; for if it were true, it would not only accord with but be
demanded by the facts referred to. We are now prepared to
consider the systems before us.
THE SYSTEM OF REALISIM.
1. Knowledge, according to the teachings of the system of
Realismn, implies two things, -an object of knowledge and a
subj;ect possessed of the poweur of knowledge. Between the
nature of the subject and object such a correlation exists, that
when the appropriate conditions are fulfilled real knowledge of
such object arises, as the necessary consequent of this correlation.
2. Between mind and realities within and around it, this
correlation exists.  It is relatively to them  a power- and they
are relatively to it, objects of real knowledge.
3. As a faculty of knowledge, the action of the Intelligence is, and must be, as the essential characteristics and reclatiois7l i)s of the objects of knowledge.
4. There are two classes of realities known as such, with
equal absoluteness to the Mlind - Spirit and Matter, on the one
hand- and Time, Space, and God, &c., on the other. Of
the real fundamental qualities of the first class, the Mind has
a direct and immediate, or presentative knowledge, through
Consciousness and Sense. The second class it knows as real,
as necessarily supposed by the actual facts of which it has an
absolute presentative knowledge.
According to this system, " the things which we envisage
are that in themselves for which we take them," and " their
relationships are so constituted as they appear to us." All
" our intuition is" not " nothing, but the representation of phenomena," but that of real qualities of objects which have not
a mere ideal, but a real existence.  " Every quality," " all relationships of objects in space and time," and time and space
843 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
themselves would remain what our Intelligence now affirms them
to be, " whatever changes might take place in the subjective qualtiy of our senses," or if the Sensibility and Intelligence both
should be done away with.  Mlatter and Spirit,jin their essential characteristics, are realities in themselves.   The universe,
material and mental, and God as the free, intelligent, self-conscious author of each, are realities also.   Mind knows not only
its own manner of perceiving such objects, but the objects
themselves, and has to do with each alike, because each alike
is real.  According to this theory, Mind is not in a universe
of fictions of its own creation, but of realities, realities finite
and infinite, realities which it knows because they are objects
and it is a faculty of knowledge, and to which it sustains relations infinitely solemn and momentous.   That this is the true
and only true theory, I argue from the following considerations:
THEORY OF REALISM VERIFIED.
1. It, and it alone, accords with the intuitive and necessary
convictions of the universal Intelligence on the subject.  All
mnen do and must believe, whatever their speculative theories
may be, that they have an actual knowledge not only of their
manner of perceiving, but also and equally of the objects of
perception themselves.  To this statement there is absolutely
no exception.  Either the universal Intelligence is a lie, or
this is the true theory of knowledge.
2. By no possibility can this theory be shown to be false,
and any one of an opposite character true.  Suppose an individual should undertake to prove that " the things which we
envisage are not that in themselves for which we take them."
How could he do it? lie has in the whole procedure to employ the very faculty which he affirms to "take things" and
and their " relationships for that in themselves" which they are
not.  Then, by the fundamental demands of his theory, we
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MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
are bound to say, that his arguments and their relationships
and bearings are not that in themselves for which he takes
them. Nor is his theory of knowledge that in itself for which
he takes it.  No theory of knowledge,  the opposite of that
under consideration, can be devised, which does not render real
knowledge on all subjects alike impossible. Now a theory
which undeniably accords with the intuitive convictions of the
universal Intelligence must be held to be true, until it is demlonstrated to be false.
3. All the facts and o1)erattions of Mind, in all its needlessly diversified procedures, can be exp~aited in perfect accordance with this theory, and cannot, as we shall hereafter
perceive, be explained in accordance with any other. The actual procedure of the Intelligence will be the same, whether we
suppose the objects of knowledge to be real or not. Nothing
in the supposition of such reality therefore can lie in the way
of such explanation, though it may appear, as hereafter it will,
that on any other theory, the facts of mind could not be what
they now are.
4. All the activities of universal humanity, the entire procedure of the Intelligence in all the sciences mental and physical, have their actual basis in the truth of the theory of knowledge under consideration, and are the height of absurdity on
any other assumption. The science of Mind is based throughout upon the assumption, that the phenomena of spirit, as
given in Consciousness, phenomena which lie at the basis of
that science, are to the Intelligence real objects, and it is to
them a real power, of knowledge. The science of natural
Philosophy and Astronomy, and all the natural sciences, procede entirely upon the assumption that a relation precisely
similar exists between the Intelligence, on the one hand, and
the qualities of external material substances, on the other.
The same is true of the Mathematics, and all the activities of
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I 
INTELLECTUAL PI-IILOSOPHY.
humanity. All have their basis in one assumption exclusively,
to wit, that 3Iind, as a faculty of knowledge, knows things
and their relationships as they are, and are the perfection of
absurdity on any other supposition. Hlow infinitely absurd
was it in Kant, for example, to spend his life in writing books
to convince the world that "things which we envisage are not
that in themselves for which we take them;" when, according
to his theory, there was no such world as he was writing to;
there were no real beings, such as he took them to be, to be
convinced; no real beings holding any theory at all; nor was
his own theory that in itself for which he took it.  So of all
the activities of humanity, whatever their objects or directions.
5. As a final reason for holding this theory, we remark
that it is involved in no difficulties which are not common to
all others, and rests upon the very principle, as far as the mode
of knowledge is concerned, upon which, in the last analysis,
all others must rest.  If Intelligence be given, as in its nature
a faculty, and realities as in their nature objects of real knowledge, all difficulties, as far as the facts of knowledge are concerned, disappear, and that totally.   The reason for knowledge
is that the Intelligence is a faculty, and realities within and
around it are objects of real knowledge. Now the sanme reason precisely must be assigned, if we assume that such a relationship does not exist between the Intelligence and realities.
Wvhy is it, that they are not to it objects, and it to them, a
faculty of real knowledge? The answer, and the only answer,
that, in the last analysis, can be given, is that such is the nature of Mlind, on the one hand, and of realities on  the other.
Wyhy is it that the Intelligence takes things and their relationships to be that in themselves which they are not? The answer is, such is the nature of the Intelligence as a faculty, atnd
of realities as objects of real knowledge.   Why is it, finally,
that the Intelligence, in the first instance, envisages things and
346 
MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
their relationships as possessed of given real characteristics,
and then the same Intelligence envisages the same things to
be not that in themselves which it had previously envisaged
them to be? But one answer can be given, to wit, that such is
the nature of the Intelligence, as an envisaging faculty.   As
this is the reason which, in the last analysis, must be given
for all the procedures of the Intelligence, whatever their nature may be, it is surely infinitely more reasonable to stop just
where the universal Intelligence, in fact, does stop, to wit, with
the principle, that mIind is a faculty, and realities around it are
objects of real knowledge. WVe are then involved in no difficulties not common, and escape those which are perfectly fatal
to all others.
MATERIALISM.
MIaterialism assumes MIatter to be, to the mind, the only
possible object of knowledge, and consequently as the only
reality.  It is also a system of absolute Atheism.  It admits
and can admit of no overruling power, of no power whatever
which is not itself a result of material development and operation.  All the facts of the universe, material and mental, it
resolves into the necessary results of such development and
operation.  Now the mrerial hypothesis can be sustained but
upon the following conditions:
CONDITIONS ON WHICH THE MATERIAL HYPOTIIESIS CAN BE
SUSTAINED.
1. It must be admitted, that Matter, with all its qualities,
properties, and laws, has existed from eternity, and has, from
eternity contained within itself, as an inherent property of its
own nature, and that without change or modification, the unconditioned and absolute cause of all its own dispositions,
34 i' 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIlY.
arrangements and operations; yes, of all the phenomena of
Mind, and of all the facts of the universe just as they actually
occur.
2. All our reasonings and deductions must be based exclusively upon the known properties of matter.  We  are not to
assume, as the basis of our explanations of any of the facts
of the universe, any unknown properties in this substance,
unless the reality and character of such unknown properties
are most clearly indicated and affirmed by those that are known.
3. It must be shown, that nothing but the known properties of Matter need be assumed to account for the entire facts
of the universe, material and mental, just as they are, and that
these facts can be better accounted for, by a reference to said
properties, as the unconditioned cause of these facts, than to
any other conceivable hypothesis.
4. It must be admitted that all the known properties of
matter are comprehended in its Primary, Sccundo-primary,
and Secondary qualities, as elucidated in the Chapter on Sense.
The known properties of Mind, on the other hand, are undeniably thought, feeling, and voluntary determination, and nothing else. Mind is given to itself as an absolute unity wholly
incapable of composition.  Matter is given as a multiple always existing as a compound, and capable of an endless diversity of compositions, and in every new composition exhibiting
properties wholly unknown before. Mind everywhere exists
as the cndl, and Matter, in all its known dispositions and arrangements, exists as the means to this one end- the wants of
Mind.  Matter, so far forth as known to us, possesses no inherent power of originating animal or physical organizations,
such as now exist, the only power which, in this respect, it apparently possesses, being that of perpetuating organizations
already existing, and that according to fixed and immutable
laws of propagation. The power of origination from a state
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MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
of total unorganization, of any real or conceivable forms of
animal or vegetable organization, has never yet been proven to
exist in Matter. No known facts indicate in it the existence
of such a power, much less the power to originate the leading
forms of organization actually existing on earth.  Yet the fact
is absolutely undeniable, that the time was when no such organizations did exist, nor any of the embryo principles from
which they now result. If science has established anything,
it has established the fact, that the present order of things
throughout the universe had its beginning in time. The time
was, when the heavens as now organized, had no existence,
when " the earth was without form," and when neither vegetables nor animals, rational or irrational, had any existence
upon it.
Mind, also, in all the higher and spiritual departments of
its nature, is constituted in fixed and immutable adaptation to
one all-overshadowing idea, that of God, as the unconditioned
cause of all that conditionally exists, who, as a free, intelligent,
self-conscious personality, presides over the entire movements
of the universe, who, in absolute wisdom and righteousness,
exercises a moral government over all moral agents in being,
and who, as the creator, proprietor, and governor of all, is in
himself possessed of all the attributes involved in the ideas
of absolute infinity and perfection. The instinct of worship
and prayer are absolutely universal principles of Mind, and the
only appropriate object of these principles, is a _ersolality
possessed of the attributes above referred to.  We never pray
to a principle, a blind, unconscious truth, whatever its nature
may be, but to a person upon whom we recognize ourselves as
dependent, and who has the power to grant or withhold our requests.  W1orship, when directed to any other object than infinity and perfection, tends undeniably to limit and degrade the
mind, and when directed towards a personality possessed of
30
349
I 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPI-IY.
these attributes, as undeniably tends to expand, elevate and
ennoble it.  These facts clearly indicate, that such a personal ity is the only appropriate object of thcse immutable principles
of universal Mlind.
MIind, also, is fundamentally constituted to act under a
system of moral government, presided over by such a person ality. In all the circumstances of its existence, the MIind can not but have a consciousness of actions as morally right and
morally wrong. By the law of its conscience also, it cannot
but feel impelled to do the one and avoid the other. When the
voice of conscience is seconded by a positive command and prohibition from lawful authority, the Mind is under a much higher
influence in favor of the right and against the wrong, than when
left to the unseconded behests of conscience. Now suppose the
MIind, under these circumstances, should regard itself as under
an absolute command from a being possessed of absolute infinity and perfection, a being to whom it owes its existence, and
upon whom it hangs in absolute dependence for all the blessings of that existence, and to whom it is bound by all the ties
actual and conceivable, that can bind a creature to its creator,
suppose the Mind, in the presence of the right and the wrong,
ever regards itself as subject to a solemn command from such
a being to do the right and avoid the wrong, it is then undeniably subject to the highest moral influence, and all in the right
direction, of which we can possibly form a conception. Under
precisely such an influence is the Mind while acting under the
omnipresent conviction of the being and perfections of God.
This is enough to show, that in all the higher and spiritual departments of its nature, it is constituted in fundamental correlation to the idea of such a supreme being.
5. I remark finally, that it must be admitted that throughout the wide domain of Nature, one law obtains with absolute
universality, unless the higher and spiritual department of our
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MIISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
nature be an exception, to wit, that wherever there is a
f,ii(lamenteta wett of sea?tient! existence, there is a correspon(diOJg provision, an(Sc wherever there is a fatndanmeital a(laptatio), there i-s a corg'eispoa(di)ig olject or 5I)here of action.  This
statement will be universally admitted, as all science pertaining
to nature is based upon the assumption of its truth.   With
these conditions and facts in mind, I urge against Materialisi
the following considerations:
OBJECTIONS TO MATERIALISM.
1. It has not a shadow of positive evidence in its favor,
evidence either ad priori or d posteriori.  The reality of an
I.NIMA.TERIAL substance, endowed with the power of thought,
feeling, and voluntary determination, is to the Intelligence
just as conceivable, and therefore possible, in itself, as that
of a material substance possessed of the attributes of extension and form.  From none of the known attributes of Mind
can we derive the remotest evidence that it possesses any of
the known attributes of Matter. Mind is an absolute unity,
with not a solitary phenomenon indicating in it the properties
of extension, form, solidity, or color, of any indeed of the
Primary, Secundo-prinmary, or Secondary properties of Matter.
Nor does Matter exhibit a solitary phenomenon indicating in it
the remotest likeness to any of the properties of Mind. Nor
do its powers indicate in it any unknown properties from which
the phenomena of Mind can result. The proposition, then,
that Matter is the only reality, is not only wholly incapable of
being proved, but is absolutely unsustained by any form or degree of positive evidence whatever.
2. The dogma that Matter is the only reality, is opposed to
the intuitive convictions of the race. All mankind, however
ignorant or barbarous, have a conception of two orders of existencee The rudest savage in being, no more confounds his
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I 
INTELLECTUAL PHIIILOSOPIIY.
soul with his body, or any of its phenomena with any of those
of Matter, than he does night with day. Now this conviction
indicating, as it does, the presence to the universal Intelligence
of phenomena in these substances, phenomena which affirm
them to be distinct and opposite in their nature, the one to the
other, must be held as true, till the opposite is proven, which,
as we have seen, can never be done. The burden of proof is
with the materialist.
3. WIe have precisely the same evidence of the reality of
Jligd as something Rot materia, that we have of JIatter, as
something not spiritual. We have the same evidence of the
reality of the phenomena of Mind, that we have of those of
Matter, and we have as distinct a knowledge of one class of
phenomena as we have of the other. We can as readily resolve the phenomena of Matter, solidity, extension, and form,
into those of Mind, thought, feeling, and voluntary determination, as we can the latter into the former. We can, with
the same propriety and logical consistency, assume spirit to be
the only reality, and deny the existence of all solid and extended substances, as we can assume Matter to be the only
reality, and deny the reality of Mind, and we have absolutely
no evidence whatever in favor of either of these exclusive
assumptions.
4. It is absolutely impossible, from the fundamental characteristics of Matter, to deduce those of Mind, or to conceive
how those of the latter can proceed from those of the former,
any more than we can conceive how that creation itself can be
the result of a power inhering in empty space. There is no
resemblance or analogy between the one class of phenomena
and the other.  They are, in every conceivable respect, total
opposites.   How can phenomena, which are totally void of the
characteristics of solidity, extension, and form, result from the
phenomena last named? How can a compound extended and
3'02 
MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
solid substance, every particle of which is absolutely void of
thought, feeling, and free will, produce an absolute simple,
which is totally incapable of composition, which, as a simple,
exhibits none of the known properties of that from which it is
derived, and in which the power of thought, feeling, and voluntary determination, as its sole and exclusive known properties, inheres? Can ally one perccive any intellijgent adaptation
in any or all of the known properties of Matter to produce
those of Mind? Or do the known properties of the former
substance indicate in it any unknown properties from which
those of the latter substance can by any possibility result?
Certainly not, and no one will pretend the opposite. Here is
the burden that lies upon Materialism. Before it can lay the
least shadow of claim to validity, it must take the known properties of Matter just as they are, on the one hand, and those
of Mind on the other, and then show an intelligent adaptation
in the former to produce the latter.  Or it must show from
the known properties of Matter, that those which are unknown
do inhere in it from which those of Mind may result. Now
no one ever did or ever will even attempt to accomplish any
such object, and until it is accomplished, Materialism must be
regarded, not only as utterly void of all evidence to sustain its
claims, but as contradicted by the highest possible evidence.
5. Materialism also rests upon the assumption, that
Nature, in the very highest departments of her creations,
is fundamentally constituted in fixed and immutable adaptation to the unreal instead of the real, and that the principle that for all the necessities or demands of the nature of
sentient existences, there are corresponding provisions, and
for every fundamental adaptation of such existences, there
is a corresponding sphere of action, is totally false, as far as
the highest wants and adaptations of such existences are concerned, and this system must be false, unless that assump            30*
853 
INTELLEOTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
tion is true, an assumption also unsustained by the least
shadow of evidence of any kind. Mind, as we have seen, is,
in all the higher departments of its nature, fundamentally con stituted in fixed and immutable correlation to one all-overshad owing reality, that of a personal God, endowed, as the creator
and governor of the universe, with all the attributes involved
in the ideas of absolute infinity and perfection.   Materialism
takes away this greatest of all actual or conceivable realities,
and thus assumes, that the great basis principle of all Science
pertaining, to the relations of sentient existences, is totally false
as far as the highest wants and adaptations of such existences
are concerned, to wit, the moral and spiritual nature of Mind.
Natture necer vibrates to the unreal.   Why should we assume
this principle to be false, in reference to the highest of all the
wants and adaptations of that to which all things else sustain
the exclusive relation of a means? Should we grant the as sumption without absolute demonstration of its validity?  3la terialisni demands this assumption of us, without producing
the least shade of evidence of its truth, and Materialism must
fall unless this foundationless assumption is granted.
6. Nor is it possible, in accordance with the principles of
this system, to account for the great leading facts of the Universe.  Those of Mind, of all others the great central facts,
we have already considered. To an explanation of not one of
these facts, can this system make the least approach whatever.
Equally impotent is it, in its attempts to explain the facts of
the external material creation.  If Matter is the only real substance, it must contain within itself, as an immutably inherent
law of its own nature, the unconditioned and absolute cause of
all organizations animal and vegetable, in existence, and of
the entire mechanism of the universe.   As that cause existed
from eternity, it must have acted from eternity, and that with
all possible force.  It must have thus acted, or it could never
354 
MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
have acted at all. Those internal principles which prevented
its acting from eternity up to any given or conceivable period,
must have prevented its acting at all to eternity.  Creation,
then, the general organization of the universe, and all vegetable and animal organization, must have been fromnt eternity, or
it could, by no possibility, have occurred at all.  Creation is
not fi'on eternity, but had its origin in time.  Its cause, then,
can be no inherent law of Matter.   The materialist may deny
the fiact of the origin of the present order of things in time,
and then he is confronted by all the known leading facts of the
universe; or he may admit the fact under consideration, and
then his own system is demonstrably false.  It can no more be
true, than that the same thing can exist and not exist, at the
same time.  That which, from eternity to a given period of
time, had no existence, and then began to be, as is true of the
present order of things throughout the universe, can, by no
possibility, owe its existence to any inherent law of Matter. If
this proposition is not self-evident, none other is, or can be.
The time was when the earth existed with a total destitution of all forms of vegetable or animal organization, and of
all the embryo principles from which such organizations now
result.  Such are the absolute teachings of Science upon this
subject.  Fromn what known law of Matter (and we are perumitted to reason from such laws only), could existing and past
organizations  have  originated?   With  Matter  given  in a
state of total and universal unorganization, and of corresponding destitution of all embryo principles from  which animal or vegetable organizations now arise, let the Materialist
designate the known law of Matter from which he can deduce
the organizations which do exist.  Unless he can do this, every
principle of true Science requires, that we refer the origin of
such effects to a cause out of Matter and above it.
It is also a well ascertained fact of Science, that the gen
355 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
oral organization of the universe, as revealed by the science of
Astronomy, is an event of time, and not a reality existing from
eternity. The time was when Matter was not organized into
systems of suns and worlds as it now is. As now organized,
there are two classes of facts which demand special attention,
those which result from the inzherent laws or properties of Matter, and those which pertain to what may be called its acecidents.  The attraction of bodies towards a common center results from the inherent properties of Matter.   Motion, on the
other hand, and especially in any given direction, is not such
a property, but a pure accident of this substance. The harmony of the movements of the heavenly bodies results from a
perfect equality of two opposite motions, one o' which results
exclusively from the inherent properties of Matter, and the
other, both in its degree and direction is, as exclusively, a
pure accident of the same substance.   I refer, of course, to the
centripetal and centrifugal forces, by the perfect equality of
which the planets are held in their orbits, as they move about
their central suns.' Now this centrifugal force, both in its degree and direction, must have existed from eternity, or it can
never be accounted for by a reference to the inherent properties of Matter: because it in no form results from such properties. Separate this motion in either form from Matter, and
by no conceivable possibility, but by a power out of Matter,
can that motion ever be attached to it.  If this motion did
eternally attach to this substance, the system of worlds, as they
now exist, must have been from eternity. So of the world
which we inhabit, with all its animal and vegetable organizations.  The Materialist may take the ground, that this motion,
in both forms, did attach to Matter from eternity, and then he
is confronted by all the teachings of Science, and by all the
great leading facts of the Universe. Or he may admit that
these accidents did not thus attach to this substance, and then
356 
MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
his system leaves him no principles by which he can account
for the organization of the system of creation.  Upon one or
the other of these rocks his system must be fatally impaled.
7. 5Iaterialism, I remark finally, must fall to pieces upon
its own favorite principle, to wit, that the laws of nature are
absolutely uitform and invariable in their operation.   We
grant this principle as of fundamental authority in interpreting the facts of the universe. But what are the laws of nature? This question cannot be answered a' priori, but exclusively d posteriori. Nature's laws can be discovered only by
careful observation of her actual operations.   When we have
discovered those laws, if we can find any undeniable facts in
nature which could not have been produced through those
laws, then we know absolutely that a power out of and above
nature does exist, and that these facts are the result of the action of that power.  Let us now notice some of these laws:
1. Every species of vegetables and animals has an independent
existence, that is, was not derived by transmutation from any
other species. Not a solitary fact can be adduced, in the present or geological history of the earth contradictory to, and
not confirmatory of this law. No advocate of the Development theory pretends to find, in the present or past facts of the
earth's history, a solitary intermediate formation from which
the truth of his theory can be deduced.   The above then
must be regarded as a law of nature, or no such law stands revealed through the known facts of the universe. 2. Every
individual vegetable and animal derives its existence, as such
a vegetable or animal, through a fixed and immutable law of
)ro2)agat'io).  Every plant is derived from a seed, and every
seed from a plant of its own species, and every animal is derived through the prior union of two individuals, a mnale and a
female. If this is not a law of nature, no such law can be
revealed to us through  nature's operations.   3.  Another
357 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
equally manifest and universal law of nature is this, that all
animals, and vegetables too, commence their existence in an
embryo state, and that all the leading species of the former
class can arrive at maturity but through parental care and sustenance.
Now if it is true (and no fact can properly be adduced as
a fact of science, if this cannot), that the time was when no
vegetables or animals, or any embryo principles from which
such organizations now originate, did exist, then the following
conclusions are undeniable: 1. Every species of vegetable
and animal existence owes its origin, not to the laws of nature,
but to a power not only out of and above Matter, but nature
also. 2. The original pair from which all leading species of
animals was derived, was originally produced, not in an embryo state, but in a state of maturity, a state in which they
were capable of self sustentation.  3. The laws of nature, in
accordance with which such species now derive their existence,
owe their origin, not to nature herself, but to the very power
above referred to.  How can MIaterialism avoid these conclusions?  We affirm, that it cannot avoid them, and therefore,
that it must fall to pieces upon its own principles.   I have
just alluded to a few of the considerations which lie against
this theory, a theory not only not sustained by any form or
degree of evidence whatever, but also confronted by all the
great central facts of the universe.  I have said enough, however, to enable the reader to estimate duly its real claims to
his regard, a theory which has no higher merit than the infinitely absurd attempt to resolve the highest conceivable orders
of substances into the lowest, and to deduce from the lowest
conceiveable phenomena those which are absolutely the highest.
Matter and lMind stand at the widest extremes of conceivable
existence.  To resolve the latter into the former, is an absurd"
358 
BfISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
ity no less than the affirmation, that the whole is always less
than any one of its parts.
SYSTEMIS OF IDEALISM.
\While Materialism  resolves all substances  into Matter,
Idealism denies all reality of Matter, and resolves all realities
into different forms of spiritual existence, or manifestation.
All that the Mind knows or can know, according to this system, is its own operations. Nothing out of the Mind, therefore, can be to it an object of knowledge. Now the various
forms of Idealism, to an elucidation of which special attention
is here invited, take their rise wholly from the different principles on which the facts of Consciousness are explained.
IDEAL DUALISM.
One system assumes the reality of two unknown and unknowable substances, called Noumena, to wit, the subject which
thinks, and the object which, in some unknown and unknowab)le imanner, affects the thinking something, and sets the machinery of thought in motion.  This is the system of Ideal
Dualism, of which Kant is the great representative and expounder.   The effect which the external object produces in the
thinking subject, is denominated sensation.  This sensation,
through the idea of substance and phenomena, is given in
Consciousness, as a phenomenon of the subject, the Ale, and
thus we have the idea of ourselves.   At the same time, the
same phenomenon, the sensation, is, in the same Consciousness, through the ideas of time and space, perceived as a quality of a substance external to the mind, a substance having
extension, form, &c., the sensation constituting, as we  have
seen in former chapters, the content of the perception, while
the ideas of time and space give it formt and make the object,
359 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
the sensation itself, appear as a reality wholly external to and
diverse firom the 3lind.   Through ideas pre-existing in the Reason, the Understanding forms notions of this and other objects
similarly envisaged in the Mind, and the Judgment, through the
ideas of resemblance and difference, abstracts, classifies and generalizes them. Thus we attain to our conceptions of the universe,
umaterial and mental. No real objects corresponding to these
conceptions exist. " The things which we envisage," in the language of Kant, " are not that in themselves for which we take
them; neither are their relationships so constituted as they appear to us. If we do away with our subject, or even only the subjective quality of the senses in general, every quality, all relationships of objects in space and time, nay, even space and time
themselves would disappear, and cannot exist as phenomena in
themselves, but only in us." We ourselves, and all things
which we take as real, are mere phenomena to which no corresponding realities do, or, as we shall see must be the case according to the fundamental principles of the theory, can exist.
'WHAT ARE REALITIES ACCORDING TO THIS SYSTEM?
Such is the system of Ideal Dualism. While, according
to its fundamental teachings, we can have no positive knowledge of noumena, that is, of things as they are in themselves,
we can make some important declarations gnegativelj in regard
to them, declarations which cannot but be true. For example:
1. According to the principles of this system, there can be
no substances, or noumnena, having real extension orform. If
space has no real existence, as this system affirms that it has
not, and the system cannot be true if it has, then, by no possibility can any objects exist which really and truly have extension and form.
2. Nor, according to the principles of the same system, can
there be any intelligent or sensitive existences which really
360 
IISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
have any successive experiences, that is, thoughts, or feelings?
or purposes, which really succeed each other, nor can there be
anywhere any really successive events?  Time as well as space,
is nothing in itself, according to this system.  Then  there can
be no succession of events, or experiences, mental or physical.
3. Neither can there be any God sustaining to this or"any
other universe, to noumena or phenomena of any kind, the
real relation of creator or governor.   Creator and creature, ruler and subject, of necessity, suppose events as really successive.  No such realities can exist, according to this system
The only idea of God that it can admit as valid, is that of an
unknown and unknowable something, sustaining unknown and
unklnowable relations to unknown and unknowable noumena
existing nowhere and in no time, and which have in themselves neither extension, nor form, nor successive phenomena.
4. According to the principles of this system also, it is totally unphilosophical to suppose a real Divinity of any kind. The
supposition of such a reality is wholly unnecessary to account
for the facts of Consciousness as given in the system, or any
other facts whatever.  This  Kant  himself perfectly understood. lie was in theory, in consistency with the principles
of his system, as blank an atheist as David Hume, though not
as far fiom the just charge of hypocrisy.  Kant gave out to the
world that the doctrines of the evangelical faith would be immutably established by his system, that "only by means of
this Critick can the roots themselves be cut off from Materialism, Fatalism, Atheism, Free-Thinkling, Unbelief, Fanaticism
-and Idealism and Skepticism," and then taught positively
that God is nothing, but like time and space "a regulative
idea," "in many respects a very useful idea," that when  we
think of God, "it is only a being in idea that we think," and
that in reference to the order and harmony of the universe, " it
must be the same thing to us where we perceive this, to say,
31
piiq
361 
INTELLECTUAL PI-ILOSOPIiY.
God has so wisely decreed, or nature has so wisely ordered it."
Practically we are to treat the idea of God as valid, just as we
should that of nature; but neither is to be intellectually regarded as representing anything whatever that is real.  It is
enough to say, however, that if Kant was not a blank Atheist,
it was because he refused to admit the necessary logical consequences of his own fundamental principles.  Ideal Dualism is,
and can be in itself nothing more than a system of absolute
Atheism.
REMfARKS UPON THIS SYSTEM.
In demonstrating, as we have done in former chapters, that
all the fundamental principles of this system are false, and totally so, we have shown undeniably, that the system itself cannot be true.
1. The system of Ideal Dualism,  or that of Kant,  rests
fundamentally upon the assumption that alel of our  lknowledge of 3latter is exclusively through sensation, and therefore
mediate, or representative.    Ce hlave shown that but a lpiet of
our knowledge of 3latter is through sensation, and therefore representative; that, on the other hand, our knowledge of all its essential qualities is really and truly presentative, and therefore
just as valid for the reality of its object as is that of our own
mental states.  2. Kant nmaintains, that the ideas of time and
space give form to Sense-perceptions, and that those ideas are,
consequently, the chronological antecedents of such perceptions.
We have shown that these ideas, on the other hand, are the chronological consequents of suce  perceuptions, that we do not have
these perceptions because we have these ideas, but that we have
these ideas, because we  first have the perceptions, and that
these ideas instead of being laws of Sense-perception,  are in
fact, categories of Understanding-conceptions.  3.  Kant, in
the nest place, bases his sy,stem upon  a distinction which he
362 
MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
makes between analytical and synthetical judgmients.   We
have shown that he has fundamentally erred, first, in his definition of these judgments, and secondly, in the application
which he has made of them even as defined by himself, and
consequently, that none of the conclusions which hlie deduces
from them are valid. 4. Kant maintains, that all our ideas
of an external material universe are self-contradictory, and
therefore that no such universe can exist.   We have shown,
that his whole argument upon this subject is based upon a
very gross psychological error, miistaking an idea of Reason for
an Understanding-conception, and that no such contradictions
as he professedly adduces do or can exist.  5. Kant maintains
that Lone of the ideas or principles of Reason are valid for
things in themselves. We have shown that all such ideas and
principles must be thus valid.  Ideal Dualism cannot be true,
unless all the above-named principles of Kant are true, and,
as we have seen, not one of them is or can be true.
In addition to the above, I would here remark, that this
system is totally se.f-contradicefory.   It maintains, that ao
ideas of Reason are valid for things in themselves, and then
rests wholly upon the assumption, that som?eC at least of these
very ideas are thus valid. To explain the facts of Consciousness, it assumes the reality of two entities, the st7ject and
object. Here then we have the idea of substance and quality
as valid for things in themselves.   Kant affirms also, "that all
our cognition occurs through objects which affect our senses,
and partly of themselves produce representations, and partly
bring our Understanding capacity into action."   Hiere we have
the idea of cause and effect assumed as valid for  things in
themselves, and also that of time; for cause and effect imply
real succession, and consequently the objective validity of tthe
idea of time. Now if these ideas of Reason should be regarded as valid for things iu themselves, all others would be.
863
I 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHIIY.
Further, the entire system of Ideal Dualism is based upon the
assumption, that knowledge has a real beftif and a Beal
prof iess.  But this not only assumes the reality of succession,
and consequently the objective validity of the idea of time,
but also bases the explanation of the facts of Consciousness
upon an assumption which this philosophy denies, which cannot
be true, if this philosophy is true, and which Kant  himself
formally denies in his Critick of pure Reason, page 41, to wit,
that human knowledge has a real beginning and real progress.
A system thus self-contradictory cannot be true.
The system of Ideal Dualism also rests upon an assumiption, the truth of which, as Kant himself admits, we cannot
even conceive to be possible, and that system cannot be true
unless the validity of this assumption be granted, to wit, the
pure ideality of space.   " We can never make to ourselves,"
he says, " a representation of this, - that there is no space,
although we may very readily think, that no objects therein
are to be met with."   In a few pages subsequent, he tells us,
that " if we should do away with our subject, or even only the
subjective quality of our senses in general, every quality, all
relationships of objects in Space and Tinme, nay, even Time
and Space themselves, would disappear, and cannot exist as
phenomena in themselves, but only in us."  In other words,
that which we cannot but conceive of as real, whether we ourselves, or anything else exists or not, would, according to this
philosophy, be totally annihilated, if even the subjective quality of our senses was changed.  The same idea is given in this
philosophy, as unconditionally necessary and absolute, on the
one hand, and as purely contingent on the other, and Ideal
Dualism cannot be true, unless the same thing in itself cannot
but be, and at the same time may or may not be, that is, unless the same thing can, at the same time, exist and not exist.
This philosophy also rests upon the assumption, that all
364 
MIISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
departments of our nature, intellectual, sensitive, and voluntary, are immutably correlated to the unreal, instead of the
real, and that in respect to ourselves, the universe, and God.
For a personal God whom, according to the fundamental demands of our higher nature, we can love, worship, pray to,
and confide in, it substitutes a mere " regulative idea," an infinite nonentity, without substance or real attributes.   For a
substantial and glorious universe, material and mental, to
which as such a reality, as Kant admits, our nature is correlated, it substitutes an "airy nothing," without "a local habitation or a namie."  In other words, according to the fundamental teachings of this philosophy, our entire nature is immutably correlated to the unreal, instead of the real.  Unless
nature vibrates exclusively to the unreal, this philosophy must
be false.
The entire deductions of this philosophy, I remark again,
are immutably opposed to the necessary intuitive convictions
of the universal Intelligence.   This Kant  himself  admits.
This philosophy gives the universe as a non-reality, but it can
never, as he affirms, make that universe appear to the Intelligence as anything else than real.  " For," he says, " we have
to do with a gicttc?ral acd l,navoidclable illsio), which itself
reposes upon subjective principles," an illusion which, as he
subsequently affirms, "irresistibly adheres to human reason."
In other words, his philosophy gives, as only true, what, as he
himself affirms, human reason irresistibly affirms to be false.
Need we any further demonstration of the fact, that such a
philosophy must be " science falsely so called?" Other considerations bearing upon this system are reserved till we come
to speak of the general characteristics of Idealism in all its
forms.
31'
365 
INTELLECTUAL PI]ILOCSOFIIY.
SUBJECTIYE IDEALISMi. -SYSTEM  STATE)D.
Ideal Dualism, as we have seen, affirius the reality of two
unknown  and unknowable entities (noumiena),  the one sustaiming to certain phenomena  (sensations) in the other, the
relation of a cause.  This  admission, as we  have also seen,
affirms the validity of certain ideas of Pteason, for things in
tllemselves, an admission perfectly fatal to the claims of IdLealismI in every form, a system which, in no form, can be true, if
ati3, ideas of Reason are thus valid.   To avoid this fatal rock,
Fichte, who was at first a disciple of Kant, and who, as finally
dissenting from him, became the author of Subt)jective Idealism,
in its modern form, took away the external object entirely, resolving all realities, the universe, and God into the subject,
"the,Ie."   Kant took for granted the validity of sensation
for an external object or cause.   The unity of scientific truth,
as Fichte nmaintained, requires that nothing should be taken
for granted, that beginning with self-evident truths, every subsequent step should be taken with absolute demonstrative certainty.   Of what then has the Mind an absolute knowledge,
a knowledge so absolute, that no skeptic ever questioned its
validity? Of its own operations, its sensations, desires, perceptions, judgments, ideas, &e.  These then are to be assumed
as the only known realities, and whatever else is to be admitted
as real, must be shown from these to be such, and that with
demonstrative certainty.   In  the center of  this one circle,
therefore,-  tlhe mind's  own  operations,-  Philosophy must
take its stand.  All without this circle must be held as unreal.
Yet in this very circle, the Mind, the only reality according
to this system, apprehends itself, as encompassed by an external universe, as the grand theater and cause of its own operations.   IIowv shall we account for such phenomena?   We
must find their cause wholly within the subject.
366 
hIISCELLANEO0US TOPICS.
In the subject, according to this systemn, two distinct acnd
opposite principles exist-  the principle of spontaneous selfactivity and expansion - and that of certain " inexplicable
limitations."   In its spontaneous activities, its efforts after
self-development and expansion, the MIind, through laws and
principles inherent in its own nature, finds itself limited and
confined.  In itself, therefore, it experiences the feeling of 1Csistanee to its own activities, of confinement within certain
limits beyond which it vainly endeavors to expand itself.  This
feeling may be called a scls(-(tiogL  As seen by the eye of Consciousness, it is in the first instance, through the idea cof sutbstance and phenomena, postulated by the Intelligence as a
phenomenon of the Mind  itself, and thus the idea of "the
Mie" is attained.  In the next instance, this same feeling, as
seen by the eye of Consciousness, in its exterior function, is
perceived, through the ideas of Time and Space, as the quality
of an object external to the Mind, an object having extension,
form, &c.  Thus we attain to the idea of a " Not-me," an external material universe, and to that of God, as the creator and
governor of this universe.  As  the universe is no  realitv in
itself, and has no existence out of the 3Iind, so God is nothing
but an ideal of the Mind's own formiation, an idea of moral
order formed by the Mind, and in conformity to which it realizes its own development.   God is not the creator of "the
MIe," or of  the Not-mne," but is himself created by " the MIe,"
a favorite form of expression with certain leading disciples of
this school.
Ideas and principles of Reason have the same place in this
system, that they have in that of Ideal Dualism, that of principles and laws which have  no objective validity.  Such is
subjective Idealism.   On this system I remark:
367 
INTELLECTUAL PHIIILOSOPHY.
REMARKS UPON THIS SYSTE,M.
1. That it is throughout irreconcilably self-contradictory.
Its fundamental principle is this, that nothing is to be taken
for granted, and then it bases its entire explanation of the facts
of Consciousness upon a pure assumption which is taken for
granted, to wit, the existence within the MIind of certain
"spontaneous activities,"  on the one hand, and of certain
"inexplicable limitations," on the other.  These entities, if
they be such, lie as much without the circle of the Mind's
conscious operations as the external universe.   The latter may
just as properly be taken for granted as the former.  Further,
this system rests upon the assumption that no ideas of Reason
are valid for things in themselves, and then assumes that some
of these ideas are thus valid, those of cause and effect, phlenomena and substance, &e.
2. The explanation of the facts of Consciousness, as given
in this system, is based wholly upon mere assumptions, which
are not only not self-evident, but whose validity can, by no
possibility, be established by evidence.   The reality of these
" spontaneous activities," and " inexplicable limitations," cannot be shown to be either the logical antecedent or consequent of
any one, nor of all of the facts of Consciousness together.   In
other words, this system  is wholly based upon an hypothesis
which is not only not self-evident, but which is wholly incapable of being established by any form or degree of evidence
whatever.
3. But granting this hypothesis as true, it is absolutely
impossible to deduce from it the entire facts of Consciousness
just as they are, what every valid hypothesis must and will
do.  Take these activities and limitations, and how can it be
shown, that from them, in connection with the known laws of
mind, just the thloughts, feelings, and voluntary determinations
868 
NIISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
actually given in Consciousness, would arise, and that none
others could arise.  There is no conceivable connection between the antecedent and consequent, in this case, and no such
consequent can be shown to exist. Yet such a connection
must be shown to exist, or Subjective Idealism is void of all
claims to our regard.
4. This system also rests upon an assumption which we
have already shown to be false, the assumption that the Mlind
has no absolute knowledge of anything but of its own operations.  WIe have already seen, that the Mind  has the same
direct, presentative knowledge of the qualities of Matter, that
it has of its own operations.  It would be no more a denial of
the palpable facts of Consciousness to affirm the non-reality of
the former than it would to deny that of the latter. This system cannot be true, unless Consciousness is'"a liar from the
beginning."
5. The legitimate logical results of the fundamental principles
of this system, is absolute Nihilism, a denial of the reality of
all substances, objective and subjective, finite and infinite.
Everything without the circle of absolute knowledge is, according to these principles, to be held as unreal, and nothing but
the ilind's own operations are objects of this form of knowledge. These, then, should be assumed as the only realities,
and the reality of all else denied. This is pure Idealism, or
Nihilism, a system which must be true, if the fundamental
principles of that under consideration are true.
6. This system, I remark finally, is fundamentally subversive of all the principles of morality and religion.  As far as
God is concerned, it is a system of absolute Atheism. Equally
subversive is it of all forms of obligation, arising from the
civil, social and domestic relations of life.  Nonentities have
no moral claims upon us. All is unreal according to this system, without the circle of "the Me."   "The Me" is the only
369 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
reality.   "The MIe" begets its own parent as well as creates its
own God, and things begotten and created are absolute nonentities.  To whom, then, does it owe its moral allegiance?  To
itself alone.   There is not, and cannot be, any  religions, social, civil, or domestic moral tie, if this system is true.  TThese
are its legitimate logical consequents, the total subversion of
all the principles of morality and religion.
PANTIUEISI, OR TIHE SYSTEM OF ABSOLUTE IDENTITY.
Subjective Idealism assumes the subject, "the MI," as the
absolute principle of all things, thus resolving the universe and
the Infinite into the Finite.   Each individual being has this
principle in himself, and hence there are as many such principles as there are men.   The unity of Science requires that
there should be but one Absolute.  Hence the assumnption,
that the Absolute, in the language of Morell, "is not the individual'Mie' that resides in every man, but the divine' Ie'
of which every nman is the image or reflection."  Fichte, to
escape certain insuperable difficulties involved in the system of
Kant, took away the object, and resolved all realities into the
subject.   Schelling, the author of the system  of Absolute
Identity in its modern form, to escape similar difficulties in the
system of Fichte, took away all subjects but one, the Infinite
and the Absolute, and resolved all realities into that.  The
grand consummation to be sought, the Absolute unity of Science, required, that a principle should be found in which there
should be an absolute identity between the Finite and the Infinite, the subject and the object, between beinq and k7?o,wil,.
The  following propositions will present the fundamental elements and characteristics of this system
ELEMENTS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THiIS SYSTEM.
1. Being and knowing are in fact one and identical. There
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MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
is no such thing as an object to be known, and a power of knowledge, and then an cct of knowledge consequent on the mutual
correlation between the object and power referred to.  The cct
of knoViDg and the thin;g iq zowtn on the other hand, are one
and identical.
2. The universe, material and mental, is nothing but the Infinite and Absolute in a state of development.   Before creation
commenced, an infinite mind, essence, or thought-these words,
according to this system, being identical in their meaningfilled the immensity of space.   This infinite something is the
only reality.   All individualities, all finite objects, or personalities, are nothing but the diverse forms which this one sole
substantiality assumes, in the process of self-development.   In
the Infinite and Absolute, two opposite forces, each infinite and
indestructible, exist, one tending to expand infinitely, and the
other seeking to know itself in this infinity.   The result of
these two forces interpenetrating each other, each being infinite
and indestructible, is a finite generation.   I-Ience individualities finite and limited, arise.  These individualites are not separate existences, but only forms in which the Infinite and
Absolute develops itself.  In the finite the same contradiction,
the same conflict of opposing forces, is repeated - the finite
seeking to expand itself, and to know itself in this expansion.
In this act of self-consciousness, the finite is present to itself
as subject and object.  The  object is the external creation.
The subject is the being who knows this creation. Yet the
subject and object are not two, but one and the same.   Neither
is distinct from the Infinite and Absolute, but only a form in
which the postulate Iam in the Infinite is repeated.   The  I
in the Finite and Infinite, in order to know itself, must see itself in the act of perceiving an object.   For how can we know
what perception is, that is, know ourselves as percipients, only
by knowing ourselves in the act of perceiving something, that
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ID 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIIY.
is, some object?   But the object known  cannot be different
from the subject which knows, since being and knowing are
correlative, and must meet in the same subject.   The subject,
then, knows itself by seeing itself as its own object, an object
postulated as external to the self, in order that the I may
know itself in the act of perceiving something which to itself,
that is, to the philosopher (since, as Coleridge remarks, none
but philosophers who have a  ~)ccutiar philosophical talent can
descend to such depths), is both itself and not itself.  In thus
seeing ourselves in all things, and finding all things in ourselves, we at length, as streams in the ocean from whence
they came, lose ourselves and all things in the Infinite and Absolute.  The infinite projects itself into the finite in order to
know itself in producing and perceiving the finite.   The finite
loses itself again in the Infinite, as bubbles in the ocean from
which, for a moment, they appear as separate, without being
in reality distinct existences.   God is the sole reality, creation
the mirror in which he sees himself, by an act of self-projection in the finite. This is the Pantheistic System, which resulted as the " natural daughter" from the philosophy of Kant.
I do not say, that I have made myself understood, in the hints
above given, of this strange philosophy. Ilow can that be
rendered intelligible which its great expounder affirms can
never be symbolized by words, which must be thoultht in order
to be understood, which can be thought only by the peculiarly
gifted, and to these has no other claims to truth, than that it
is thought?
3. Prior to development in the universe, God exists in a
state of undeveloped, unconscious impersonality, and exists
simply and exclusively as the absolute essence from which all
things, by a necessary law of development in said essence, proceed. As developed in the universe also, the Absolute attains
372
6 
MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
to Self-Consciousness, that is, to the exercise of real Intelligence, only in the consciousness of humanity.
4. Creation, while it proceeds according to laws of Intelligence, is not the result of intelligent foresight, and of a corresponding act of Will, but, as said above, of a necessary  law
acting potentially in the Absolute. This law renders it impossible that this process should not occur, or that it should take
on a differet form from what it actually does.
5. This system, as a matter of fact, leaves us with no
higher object of intelligent worship, and no more perfectly
meets the demands of the religious sentiment in man, than
does that of Subjective Idealism. An undeveloped unconscious impersonality is surely no object of intelligent worship,
and this is God, as originally given in the system. Then, if
the Absolute, in a state of development, is to be worshiped at
all, it should be most undeniably, in the highest form in which
Hie is therein presented, and that is the state in which He attains to self-conscious personality, that is in the Consciousness
of man. Hiumanity, and that only, is God, in a state of development.  HIumanity, then, is to itself the only proper object
of worship- humluanity as the Absolute developed. But the
same thing appears, only under another name, in the system
of Subjective Idealism.   Any system which presents the universe in a state of development, or undevelopment, as God, is
really and truly a system of blank Atheism, and nothing else.
6. The necessary logical consequence of this system is that
of Absolute Idealism, with a denial of the existence of all substances, finite and infinite. If being and knowing are one and
identical, then, undeniably, thought without subject or object,
is the only reality.  Creation is nothing but a process of thinking, and God is only an infinite thought in a state of undevelopment.
32
373 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPIIY.
REMIARKS UPON THIS SYSTEMI.
Such is the system of Absolute Identity or Pantheism.
That it is utterly false and foundationless, I argue fromi the
following considerations
1. While it professedly gives a perfectly scientific system of
knowledge, a system based upon self-evident axioms and postulates, it actually rests upon no form or degree of evidence
whatever.   The only claim set up in its behalf by Schelling
himself, is a special faculty of intuition, inborn only in the few,
and absolutely wanting in the general Intelligence, a faculty
of intuition which, in the language of Morell, "affords us a
species of knowledge which does not involve the relation of
subject and object, but enables us to gaze at once by the eye
of the Mind upon the eternal principle itself, from which both
proceed, and in which thought and existence are absolutely
identical."  The reality of such a faculty, and its absolute authority in philosophy is wholly taken for granted in the systern, without any attempt to establish either by evidence.   In
other words, this system rests upon unathorized assumptions,
and upon nothing else.  All real science has its exclusive basis in axioms and postulates, self-evident not only to the few,
but to the universal Intelligence. Such would be the basis of
this system, were it founded on the rock of truth.
9. The system is, in itself, intrinsically absurd and selfcontradictory.   The idea that that which is in itself already
both infinite and absolute, has in itself the principle of selfdevelopment and self-expansion is intrinsically absurd and selfcontradictory.   We might, with the same propriety affirm, that
infinite duration and boundless space contain in themselves the
same principles, and that the action of these principles in these
realities is the cause of all the facts of creation.   The idea of
development pertains to the finite alone.   The  Infinite and
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MIISCELLAiNEOUS TOPICS.
Absolute are already developed, or they never can be.  Then
the idea of an infinite and absolute thought (for being and
knowing are identical, according to the system) seeking sclfdevelopmient, or having in itself such  a principle, is, of all
things, intrinsically  absurd and  self-contradictory, and  the
3lind cannot but thus regard the subject, the moment the idea
is suggested.
3. There is an absolute want of intelligible coit,icctio~i betweenrl the I)riicfiples of the system and the results deduced
from them.  We will first present these principles as set forth
by Coleridge.  " Descartes," he says, " speaking as a naturalist, and in imitation of Archimides, said, Give me matter and
motion, and I will construct you the universe.   We  must of
course understand him to have meant: I will render the construction of the universe intelligible.  In the same sense the
transcendental philosopher says, Grant me a nature having two
contrary forces, the one of which tends to expand infinitely,
while the other strives to apprehend or fild itself in this infinity, and I will cause the world of intelligences, with the
whole system of their representations, to rise up before you.
Every other science pre-supposes Intelligence as already existing and complete.   The philosopher contemplates it in its
growth, and, as it were, represents its history to the mind,
fromnt its birth to its maturity."  Again, " It is equally clear,
that two equal forces acting in opposite directions, both being
finite, and each distinguished from the other by its direction
only, must neutralize or reduce each other to inaction.   Now
the transcendental philosophy demands, first, that two forces
should be conceived which counteract each other by their essenrtial nature; not only in consequence of the accidental direction of each, but as prior to all direction, nay, as the primary forces from which the conditions of all possible directions
are derivative and deducible: secondly, that these forces should
375 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHIIY.
be assumed to be both alike infinite, both alike indestructible.
The problem will then be to discover the result or product of
two such forces, as distinguished from the result of those
forces which are finite, and derive their difference solely from
the circumstance of THESE DIRECTIONS. When we have formed
a scheme or outline of these two different kinds of force, and
of their different results, by the process of discursive reasoning,
it will then remain for us to elevate the Thesis fromli notional
to actual, by contemplating intuitively this one power, with its
two inherent, indestructible, yet counteracting forces, and the
results or generations to which their interpenetration gives existence, in the living principle, and in the process of our own
self-consciousness."
Now, in the namue of the universal Intelligence, we may
ask, and we may ask it at the risk of being told that the
"philosophic talent is not yet inborn in us," Can any Intelligence like ours, either by intuition, or by any process of discursive reason, calculate the results of the action of two such
forces as these? Can he show the results, let him conceive
these infinite and indestructible forces to meet in what direction he will? Above all, can he show, or conceive, that the
result of the action of such forces, begun in the Infinite and
repeated in the finite, shall and must be the system of which
we are conscious, and nothing else?  This he must do, or his
conclusions are not scientific.  Must not a philosopher be, "not
in himnself, but beside hin?se,f," who can suppose that the system of mental operations of which we are actually conscious,
is the real result of the action of two forces, one of which
tends to expand infinitely, and the other to know itself in that
expansion, and especially that he can logically deduce from the
action of such forces, as the necessary result, this system just
as it is? Even Hegel could not digest such absurdities; and
376 
MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
hence, he rejected the system which rested on them  as a system of monstrosities.
We will next contemplate these principles as given  by
Schelling.  We have given an infinite being, essence or thought,
an undeveloped, unconscious infinite impersonality, having in
itself the law or principle of self-development.  These are tie
sole principles of the system.   Can any one coaceive how that
the necessary results of the process of self-developlient in such
an unconscious, undeveloped, infinite impersonality, would be
the facts of human Consciousness pertaining to the universe
of iMatter and MIind just as they are, and nothing else? that
from such a process in such an impersonality, an infinite number of self-conscious personalities, such as man is, with all his
experiences, external and internal, would arise, and that none
others can arise?  Such a connection as this must be shown
to exist between the principles of a system, and these facts, or
it has no claims whatever to our regard. No such connection
can be conceived or shown to exist between the principles of
the system under consideration, and the facts attempted to be
deduced from them.
4. There are undeniable facts of human Consciousness
which could not exist at all, if the principles of this system
were true.  If being and knowing, as this system teaches, are
one and identical, then thought is the only reality, and there
cannot be in the Infinite and Absolute, developed or undeveloped, or in any of the forms of its development, anything
like a Sensibility or Free Will, or any of the phenomena pertaining to either of these faculties. But we have the same
evidence of the reality of the phenomena of these faculties,
that we have of those of thought.   We might, with the same
propriety, assume, that Sensibility or Will is the only reality,
as to assume that Intelligence is, as this system does. This
377
82* 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
system can give us but a part of the facts of Consciousness,
and these not as they are.  It therefore must be false.
5. The idea of God as going through the process of selfdevelopment, attributed to Him  in this system, a process in
which He finally attains, from a state of unconscious irapersonality, to self-consciousness and personality only in man, degrades the Infinite and Perfect infinitely belf,w religious worship or veneration, and thus does the most fatal violence to l
religious principles and sentiments in the human mind.   The
entire moral and spiritual departments of our nature are wholly
correlated to the unreal, or this system must be false.  Every
feature of the divine character given in the system, tends to
degrade infinitely the Divinity in our estimation, on the one
hand, and the character of humanity, in entertaining such
ideas of God, on the other.  Take this process as described by
ilorell    "This Infinite being, containing everything in itself
potentially which it can afterwards become actually, strives by
the law which we have above indicated, after self-development.
By the first movement (the potence of Reflection), it embodies
its own infinite attributes in the finite.  In doing this, it produces finite objects, i. e., finite reflections of itself, and thus
sees itself objeetified in the forms and productions of the material world.  This movement, then, gives rise to the )hilosoply of noature.  The second movement (potence of sub-sumption) is the egress of the Finite into the Infinite; it is nature,
as above constituted, again making itself absolute, and resuming the form of the eternal.  The result of this movement is
i, as existing in man, which is nothing else than nature
gradually raised to a state of consciousness, and attempting in
that way to return to its infinite form.  This gives rise to
transcendental idealism, the philosophy of gniTnl.  The combination of these two movements  (Patur der Vernunft) is the
reunion of subject and object in the divine reason; it is God,
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MIISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
not in his original or potential, but in his unfolded and realized
existence, forming the whole universe of  3lind and Being.
This is the proper view of Sehelling's pantheism, and is fully
unfolded in the philosophy of the Absolute." In other words,
the Infinite and Absolute, the ucndeveloped, unconscious infinite Impersonality, attempts in the procecs of sel-f-refecti(on to
develop itself, that is, to see and know itself as it is, a'4d not
as it is not.  The result is certain sensations which it sees as
phenomena of a not-self, and hence the generation of the external material universe, or rather perceptions of it, the seeing
and the thing seen being, according to the system, one and
identical.   The Infinite and Absolute having thus seen itself
as it is not, that is, as finite instead of infinite, and thus having got out of itself and beside itself, attempts a regress
through the Finite back into the Infinite, that is, back into
itself again. In this process the Infinite and Absolute attains,
for the first time, to the exercise of self-consciousness, and
here it appears transformed into an indefinite number of selfconscious individualities (men), not one of whom knows  hiimself as he is, that is, as Deity developed, but conceives of hinmself as a self-conscious finite personality, surrounded with finite
impersonal realities, wholly separate from  itself, the material
universe, and owing its existence to an infinite self-conscious
personality, God.   The Infinite and Absolute now having got
wholly out of itself and beside itself, and hopelessly so, by any
process of intuition or induction hitherto generated in any
form which it has assumed, as a last and desperate resort, generates in a few reflections of itself, " an intellectual intuition"
through which the Infinite and Absolute perceives the whole
process by which it got out of itself and beside itself, and thus
it gets back into itself again,' not however as it was originally,
but in a state of complete development. This is no caricature.
It is this system developed as it is, and who can entertain sen
879 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIiY.
timents of respect for the Infinite and Absolute when contemplating, him as necessitated by the laws of his own being, to go
through an endless round of such processes as these, and in
none of them attaining to any higher forms of development,
or to the exercise of any higher degrees of intelligence than
appear in the consciousness of man?
6. There are other respects in which this system does violence to all the laws of the higher, spiritual and religious nature of universal MIind. For a self-consciousness personality,
endowed with all the attributes of infinity and perfection, and
to whom we can look with sentiments of love, veneration, confidence and hope, the only idea of God to which our nature is
correlated, it substitutes, in the first instance, an undeveloped,
unconscious impersonality that neither knows itself nor any
other object, and in the next, the universe itself as this God
developed in the highest form to which he can possibly attain,
an idea of Divinity that meets not a solitary demand of the
religious sentiment in humanity. For fellowship and intercommunion with God, a fundamental demand of the sentiment
under consideration, it substitutes the union of absolute identity. For moral purity, as the exclusive condition of this
union, it substitutes science, "intellectual intuition."  Every
feature of Divinity presented in the system is in absolute antagonism to the demands of the religious principle in universal
Iind.
7. This system is also equally subversive of morality, in
every form or degree. All realities in existence are, according
to its fundamental teachings, nothing but the Infinite and Absolute developed or undeveloped.  All acts and events that actually occur, are only different forms and developments of the
necessary activity of God himself.  Unless God himself, and
the necessary activity of the divine nature, are moral evil,
there can be no such thing as moral wrong in the universe.
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MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS,
Now a system that thus subverts fundamental and immutable morality, and belies the Universal Conscience, is not hastily
spoken of, when it is denominated "science falsely so called."
8. I remark finally, that there is not, in a single principle
or deduction of the system, anything good, or useful, or tending, in any form, in that direction. Upon the procedure of
none of the sciences does it throw a solitary ray of liglht, nor
present a principle which can be a guide in morals, religion, or
in any department of human activity.   The system stands before us simply as a lasting monument of illustrious talents
wholly misdirected, talents laboring undesignedly, it may be
hoped, for the subversion of every useful idea and principle
pertaining to God, to humanity, and the universe.
PURE IDEALISM.
All forms of Idealism which we have yet contemplated, involve  absolute  contradictions, at the same  time  affirming
and denying the same things. They are all based upon the
exclusive assumption, that no ideas of Reason are valid for
things in themselves, and then fundamentally base their explanation of the facts of Consciousness, upon the assumption,
that some of these very ideas are thus valid, the ldeas of substance, for example, cause and effect, antecedence and consequence, &c. To escape such fatal rocks, Pure Idealism - the
last and only other form which Idealism itself ever assumestakes away all substances, all subjects and objects, all real entities of every kind, and resolves all things into pure thought
without subject or object.
Thought has been supposed to imply two things, a subject
and object.  If either is assumed as real, then ideas of Reason
are valid for things in themselves.  To escape this difficulty,
Hegel - the author of Pure Idealism in its modern formtook away both the subject  and the object, and affirmed
881 
INTELLECTUAL PtiTi'i i
thought itself to be the only reality.  Crea.tiol is nothing but
a process of thlinking, and the law of development inherent in
thought itself, and giving existence and direction to the process
of its development is God, God the  Infinite and Abs-liute.
According to the process of ordinary thinking, every thought
implies the reality of a subject andl object, with a prceived rielation between them.   Tlie subject and object, IIegel afflirms to
be nothing: and the re2-atio-,' as existing in thought, to be the
only reality.   The universe, therefore, is constituted wholly of
relations, relations with no real objects related to each other.
God is not a self-conscious personality, but, as we have said, a
law of development in thought itself, and attains to self-consciousness only in man, the divine Consciousness being identical with the endlessly progressing Consciousness of humanity.
In the system of Hegel, God, as an object of thought, occupies no higher place than in that of Sehelling.   In that of the
latter, he is, as we have before shown, an infinite, unconscious,
undeveloped Imapersonality, who attains to development only
in the Universe, and to self-consciousness only  in man.  In
the former system He is an infinite and eternal principle, or law
inherent in thought itself, an endlessly progressive principle of
development which attains to Consciousness only in man, and
is itself synonymous with the ever-advancing Consciousness of
Humanity.   From what is said above, the reader will form a
conception sufficiently distinct of the principles, essential characteristics, and bearings of this system, and that is all that is
requisite for our present investigations.   The details are left to
other writers, whose object is to present the system in its entireness, in its principles and deductions.   A few remarks only
are requisite to demonstrate its total invalidity.
1. The system, in its essential principles and logical dedulctions, is in direct contradiction to undeniable and fundamental
facts of Consciousness.  No  system, as we have before sai,d,
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MIISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
can be true, whose essential principles do not, as their necessary
results give, and whose logical deductions do not perfectly accord with, those facts, just as they are.  Now assuming thought
to be the only reality, the principle and cause of all things,
what can be deduced from it?  Absolutely nothing but forms
and developments of pure thought itself.  Nothing approaching the phenomena of Sensibility or Will, can, by any possibility, arise.   But these phenomena  are realities as fully
attested as such, as thought itself.  We have the same authority for affirming feelings or voluntary acts to be exclusive realities, and to resolve all things into forms which such feelings
or acts assume, as to postulate the same thing pertaining to
tlthoughts. If these phenomena are not real, nothing is, and
if they are, the system of Absolute Idealism must be founded
wholly in error.
2. This systemi is perfectly self-contradictory in its fundamcental principles.   The assumption on which the entire superstructure rests is this, that nothing shall be assumed as the
basis of philosophy which is not given in Consciousness, as
contained in thought itself.  The systems of each of his predecessors was rejected by Ileg,el for this reason, that in all of
these systems, alike, something not given in thought, and as
one of its essential elements, was assumed, as the ground of the
explanation of the process of thought.  After rejecting such a
principle, as wholly unphilosophical and fatal to the system
based upon it, what does Ilegel do, in the construction of his
own system? He has, to be sure, not assumed the reality of
anl infinite and absolute szubstacnce from which all things proceed, a substance lying out of thought, but he has assumed, as
the condition and ground of explaining the process of thought,
the reality of an infinite, eternal, and absolute law, a law inherent in thought itself.  Now this law is no more given in Consciousness as an element  of thought, than the finite  and
8 8 El) 
INTELLECTUAL PIIHILOSOPHY.
absolute substance above referred to.   Both alike, and one
just as much as the other, lie without the circle of Consciousness, and both are assumed for the same reason precisely, the
explanation of the facts of Consciousness.   If such an assumiption is fatal to one system, it is to another; the system of
Absolute Idcalism falls to pieces upon its own principles. Besides, if we are allowed to assume anything lying without
thought itself, as the condition and ground of explaining the
facts of Consciousness, we should make that assumption which
is in itself the most reasonable, and which best accords with
the laws of human nature, and the facts of the universe. Now
the reality of an infinite Being, as the cause of all things, is
in itself just as conceivable as that of an infinite Law, and
the former assumption infinitely better accords with the facts of
Consciousness, the fundamental demands of our entire moral
and spiritual nature, and with the facts of the Universe within
and around us.  The system under consideration is not only
fatally self-contradictory, but is based upon a principle the
most unreasonable in itself.
3. The validity of the principles on which this system is
exclusively founded, is absolutely inconceivable and impossible.
Thought without a thinker, without subject or object, relations
without realities related, and phenomena without substance, we
can no more conceive to be possible or real, than we can conceive of the annihilation of space.   Yet these constitute the
entire basis and substance of this theory. Well has one of his
own countrymen remarked, that " Hegel's philosophy is nothing in itself, and by itself, nor was its author in himself, but
beside himself."
4. The legitimate bearings of this system upon morality
and religion must claim our attention.  If thought, with its
developments, is the only reality, then of nothing but thought
can any form of moral obligation be predicated; and unless
384 
MIISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
thought can affir m of itself. that it ought not to develop itself
according to the necessary operations of an infinite, eternal,
and absolute law, residing within itself, morality has and can
have no place in the universe.  Unless thought also can be to
itself an object of self-worship, thought which attains and can
attain to no higher forms of development than appear in the
Consciousness of humanity, there can be no religion, no sphere
whatever for the action of the religious sentiment.   Yet Absolute Idealism speaks of God, of Morality, Religion, Sin, Hioliness, Redemption, and Immortality; and professes to solve
all the great problems of thought pertaining to all these high
themes.  But what are its actual teachings on these subjects?
Let an individual from the country, from whence this system
proceeded, answer.  "Heg,el has a God without holiness, a
Christ without free love, a Holy Ghost without illumination, a
Gospel without faith, an Apostacy without sin, WMickedness
without conscious guilt, an Atonement without remission of sin,
a Death without an offering, a religious Assembly without divine worship, a Release without imputation, Justice without a
judge, Grace without redemption, Doigmatical Theology without a revelation, a This Side without a That Side, an Iimmortality without existence, a Christian Religion without Christianity, and in general, a Religion without religion." This is no
caricature, but a valid statement of facts.  Take the principles
of the system, and no other or higher forms of thought on any
of these subjects can be deduced from it.  This system, together with that of Absolute Identity, does idealistically what
Polytheism does materially.  It "changes the glory of the
Incorruptible God, into an image made like unto corruptible
man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things."
GENERAL REMARKS UPON THE SYSTEMS OF IDEALISM.
I shall conclude what I have to say upon Idealism, with a
33
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INTELLECTUAL PIHILOSOPIIY.
few general remarks upon its diverse forms which we have contemnplated.   All these systems, as we have seen, rest upon
common assumptions, and perfectly harmonize in certain fundamental particulars, in the assumptions, for example, that no
ideas of Reason are valid for things in themselves, that neither
ourselves, the universe, nor God, time, space, cause, nor substance, are in themselves, or their relationships, " that for
which we take thenm," &c.  Hence it is that there are certain
remarks which are equally applicable to every form of development which this system has assumed, or can assume. Among
these remarks I would direct special attention to the following:
1. All these systems alike rest upon mere assumpton)s unsustained by any form or degree of positive evidence whatever.
Not one of their basis principles are intuitively evident, nor
can their validity be established by any process of discursive
reasoning.   This has been rendered perfectly evident in our
preceding investigations.  All real science, all true systems of
knowledge have their basis in principles having apodictical
certainty, principles whose validity is self-affirmed.  Not one
of these systems rests upon any such principles, and consequently not one of them has any claim whatever to a place in
the firmament of the sciences.
2. All these systems are perfectly sey-contradictory, and
rest upon the assumption, that the same identical principles are
both true and false at the same time.   They all rest upon the
assumption, that 2o ideas of Reason are valid for things in
themselves, and must be false, unless that assumption is true.
Then they all alike base their explication of the facts of the
universe upon the assumption, that some of these ideas have
this validity, and not one of these systems can be true, unless
this assumption also is valid.  They all agree, for example,
that there is somewhere an ultimate reason why the facts of
Consciousness are what they are, and not otherwise, that there
386 
MIISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
is in these facts a real _pocess, a beyinning, and a proyress, a
process which results from a real cause inherent in thought itself, in the substance of the Mind, or in the Infinite and Absolute.  Here we have the assumption of the validity of the
ideas of substance, cause, antecedence and consequence, succession and time.   But none of these systems can be true, if any
of these ideas have objective validity, and they cannot be true
unless these same ideas have this validity.  They all rest upon
the assumption that nothing without the circle of the Mind's
conscious operations is to be assumed as real, and then base
their explication of these very facts upon the assumption of
the validity of principles lying wholly without the circle of
Consciousness. Now systems thus fundamentally self-contradictory must be false.
3. From the principles of none of these systems, nor of all
together, can we explain the facts of Consciousness, as they
are.  On the other hand, it can be rendered demonstrably evident, that if these principles were true, these facts could not,
by any possibility, be what they are. If, for example, there
is in the human Mlind the power of Will, of voluntary determination, not one of these systems can be true, and if such a
power does not exist, no facts of Consciousness should be assumed as real.  If either of the systems last elucidated is true,
there not only cannot be any such power as that of Will in
man, but not even a sensibility: for if being and knowing are
really and truly one and identical, as they both alike affirm,
and cannot otherwise be true, then thought is the only reality.
There can be no Sensibility or Will in any being. No system
can be true which does not explain all the facts of Consciousness as they are.  Not one of the systems under consideration
can give us but a part of these facts, and not even these as
they are.
4. According to all these systems, there is a necessary and
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INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIHY.
irreconcilable antagonism between the?iattral and scienttifc
procedures of the Intelligence.  In the former, we attain, as
they all teach, to a knowledge of ourselves as endowed with
the powers of thought, feeling, and voluntary determination,
of the external material universe, of Matter, as a substance
possessed of the qualities of extension, form, &c., and of God,
as the creator and governor of all things, and as such, as possessed of all the attributes involved in the ideas of infinity and
perfection.  In the latter procedure, we discover that all these
great pre-affirmned realities are nothing but splendid nonentities. Thus science and nature are and must be eternally at
war with each other, the exclusive function of the former being to destroy and dissolve what the latter constructs  and
builds up. Now the exclusive function of real science is, not
to annul, but to enlarge and perfect the natural procedures of
the Intelligence.   Idealism, in all its forms, is based exclusively upon the assumption, that the exclusive direction of the
natural and unavoidable procedure of the Intelligence is
towards the unreal and nothing else, an assumption just as absurd
and self-contradictory as the idea of an event without a cause.
5. Hence, I remark, that there is a precisely similar antagonism between the theoretical and practical sides of all these systems.  Practically, as they all teach, we are to treat ourselves,
the world and God, as given in the natural procedures of the
Intelligence, as most real and substantial verities.  Theoretically we are to hold and treat these same verities, as nothing
but absolute nonentities.   Such are the fundamental teachings
of all these systems.   Now what man  in his senses can believe that there is any such antagonism between true theory
and right practice?  What is the province of true theory or
science, but to give to practice its most perfect direction?
What must we think of systems of philosophy whose fundamental assumptions are, that all right forms of human activity
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MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
are in the exclusive direction of the unreal?  Such is Idealism, whatever form it assumes.
6. Idealism, in all its forms alike, totally confounds all distitctio- beticeet trtth adcl error, and annihilates all tests by
which the one can be distinguished from the other.  If mental
operations are the only objects of real knowledge, and all else
is to be held as unreal, as all these systems maintain, then as
one form of cognition is, in itself, just as real as another, it is
consequently just as true.  The wildest vagaries of the maniac
are in themselves just as real, and consequently just as true, as
the most sober deductions of the phlilosopher.  One system of
philosophy is as real a development of the Ego, of the Absolute, or of the law of thought, as anothler, and consequently
has precisely the same claims to be received as true.  These
are the legitimate consequences of Idealism, and can, by no
possibility, be separated fromt it.  There is no such thing as
truth as distinguished from error, if any of the forms of Idealism are true.
7. I remark finally, that Idealism in all its forms, is utterly subversive of all the principles of morality and religion.
It takes from God every attribute to which the religious sentiment in humanity is correlated, and from humanity every element on which moral obligation can be based, and every
principle by which the right can be distinguished from the
wrong. By it the universe is unpeopled of all proper subjects
of moral government, and left itself as a nonentity without a
divine sovereign to rule over it.  This is Idealism in its
" naked nature," and " living grace."  M3luch more might be
said of it, but nothing good.  There is not a principle in it
which tends in that direction.  It takles from humanity its universe, its God, its redeemer, its guide of life, and the vista of
immortality, and leaves it to satisfy the longings of its immortal nature with the empty shadows of absolute nonentities.
33*
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INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPt t~.
I would not here be understood as affirnming that none of the
teachings of the advocates of Idealism are true and worthy of
regard.  WAVhat I do say is this, that what they have said that
is true, has not grown out of their theories, and is not to be
found among the basis principles of the same.  Not a solitary
proposition that is true can be found among those principles,
or can be logically deduced fronm them.   We say this in sorrow, not in anger.  WAVe commenced  our inquiries into the
German philosophy, confidently expecting to be thereby enriched with priceless treasures of wisdomn and knowledge.  rWe
take leave of it, with the fullest persuasion, after fathoming
its depths, that it is nothing but an abyss of darkness and
error.
MODERN TRANSCENDENTALISIM.
The procedure of the systems of philosophy, which  we
have been considering, has been very much like the " endless
wars of Chaos and old Night," described by 31ilton. Each
new sect in philosophy demolished the system of their predecessors, and then erected another, to be demolished by a third
more foundationless, if possible, than any that preceded; and
the last that appears is the most baseless of all, and leaves the
great questions in philosophy more in the dark than they were
before.  As a consequence, the public mind has been fast becoming, somewhat skeptical in respect to the _possibility of philosophy itself.  This circumstance apparently has given rise in
Europe and this country to a new sect, it would hardly be
proper to say of philosophers, since they systematically reject
all philosophy.   They assumte as true, the general principles
of Cousin, Hegel, Schelling, &c., and then reject and denounce
all philosophy, everything like consecutive reasoning, or logical
deduction. Action purely instinctive, they hold, is by far the
most perfect form of activity.  The same holds of the Intelli
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MIISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
gence. Philosophical reflection, logical deduction, and systematic treatises, especially in respect to Mental Philosophy,
Theology, or M1orals, only trammel thought and darken the
spiritual vision.  Thought, purely spontaneous and instinctive,
is the most true, and the most perfect.
A,hen Reason is permitted to develop itself freely, untrarmmeled by logic; when  men, in short, think, speak, and act
from pure instinct, without system, there is the most perfect
system.   The most perfect demonstration is the simple enunciation of spontaneous mental conceptions, without argument.
Hilence, they never reason, never explain, never discuss, but, as
oracles of Reason, simply announce her dicta.  If you call in
question any of their enunciations, they have one reply, and
that is always at hand, to wit, You are not spiritual. The
truly spiritual is not developed in you. How can a man that
never saw, discriminate between colors?  You ask of them a
particular explanation of their principles.  This only occasions
the retort, You are not spiritual-the truly spiritual is not
yet inborn in you.   They talk much of religion, and complain
that all the world lacks it; and yet religion is, with them,
"without form and void;" for almost all of them deny of God
everything but an ideal existence.  They speak of Christ as
the incarnation of divinity; and then, in the language of one
of their great leaders, represent his character as essentially defective, on account of the lack of "fun" in its composition.
They talk much  of sin, regeneration, atonemrent, redemption,
repentance, faith, holiness, purity, and love, &c. All the vocabulary of evangelical religion is introduced as familiar terms
into their discourses: yet all such terms find themselves there
in such strange company, and in the midst of such new and
bewildering associations, that they cannot even know themselves. The following passage will give, perhaps, as correct a
view of the meaning which they attach to terms like the above,
391 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHIY.
as any that is often met with in their writings.  It is from one
of their leading writers, in an article found in the Dial, the
organ of the sect:
"Holding, as they do, but one essence of all things, which
essence is God, Pantheism must deny the existence of essential
evil.  All evil is negative-  it is imperfection, non-growth.
It is not essential, but modal.   Of course, there can be no
such thing as hereditary sin-a tendency positively sinful in
the soul.  Sin is not a willful transgression of a righteous law,
but the difficulty and obstruction which the Infinite meets with
in entering into the finite.  Regeneration is nothing but an
ingress of God into the soul, before which sin disappears, as
darkness before the rising sun.   Pantheists hold also to the
Atonem?ent, or at-one-ment, between the soul and God. This
is strictly a unity, or oneness of essence, to be brought about by
the incarnation of the Spirit of God in us, which is going
on in us as we grow in holiness. As we grow wise, just, and
pure - in a word, holy - we grow to be one with himi in
mode, as we always were in essence.  This atonement is effected by C7hrist, only in as far as he taught the manner in which
it was to be accomplished more fully than any other, and gave
us a better illustration of the method and result in his own
person, than any one else that has ever lived."
Now, if any one should ask this writer to explain the
meaning he really attaches to such terms and phrases as " nongrowth," the "Infinite entering into the finite," and " the incarnation of the Spirit of God in us," and especially if we
should ask of him  a reason of his belief in Pantheism, his
only reply, no doubt, would be: You are not spiritual; the
spiritual is yet to be inborn in you. And then he would go
on with most pitiful lamentations over the want of religion,
of spirituality, in all the world; of the melancholy decay of
the god-like spirit of faith, and spiritual vision, and inspira
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MIISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
tion, that existed in Moses, and Christ, and Paul, and Mahomet, and among the heroic spirits of the Reformation. Now,
the philosophic observer is not at a loss to perceive, that all
this complaining of the non-growth, and absence of spiritual
vision in all the world but themselves, is nothing but a feint,
to keep from view a mass of foundationless assumptions, the
validity of which they themselves dare not seriously examine,
nor have distinctly exposed to public view, lest their baselessness should become so manifest, that even their abettors would
be ashamed to avow them any more. Mysticism is the consummation, the last development, of false philosophy. Men who
are on the track of error, will reason and philosophize, as long
as they can hope to convince the world of their principles by
reasoning based upon the result of philosophic investigation.
When this hope fails, the last resort is assumptions, attended
with the usurpation of direct spiritual vision, and superior divine insight and illumination.
ECLECTICISM OF COUSIN.
System stated.
From the chair of Philosophy in Paris, Cousin has pronounced Eclecticism as constituting the distinguishing characteristic, the perfection of the philosophic movement of the
ninteenth century.  Before admitting this enunciation as true,
it becomes us to inquire diligently into the meaning of such
an imposing term.  The attentive reader of the works of this
great philosopher will not be at a loss to determine the meaning which he attaches to the term, nor the doctrine represented
by it. This philosopher professes to have obtained a point of
observation, from which he has brought all previous systems
of philosophy into complete harmony with each other. All
possible questions in philosophy have been solved in these dif
393
I 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
ferent systems.  Each system has moved in the direction of
some one great question, and has attained its object in the solution of that question.  It now remains to take from all these
systems the principle on which each rests, and which each
has developed, and resolve the whole into one harmonious
unity. The following passages will show that I have not misconceived nor misstated the principles of this philosopher:
"You may perceive the tendency of my discourse.  After
the subjective idealism of the school of Kant, and the empiricism and sensualism of that of Locke, have been developed,
and their last possible results exhausted, no new combination
is, in my opinion, possible; but the union of these two systems,
by centering them both in a vast and powerful eclecticism."
Again: " Our philosophy, gentlemen, is not a melancholy and
fanatical philosophy, which, being prepossessed with a few exclusive ideas, undertakes to reform all others on the same model
it is a philosophy essentially optimistical, whose only end is to
comprehend all, and which therefore accepts and reconciles all.
It seeks to obtain power only by extension; its unity consists
only in the harmony of all contrarieties."
Remarks upon this System.
For myself, I would say, that I wholly dissent from the
system of Eclecticism as above announced. I do it for the
following reasons:
1. It is, as a system, totally unlike the procedure of the
Intelligence in reference to every other science.   No science
whatever that has stood the test of time has been evolved in
conformity to this principle.   What if some astronomer, for
example, should arise, and profess to have found some point
of observation from which he could show that all systems
of astronomy were essentially correct, and should proclaim that
the true system is found in all, as the general in the particu
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MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
lar, and should be so evolved as to include all other systems?
He might say, in the language of this great philosoplher, "Our
astronomy, gentlemen, is not a melancholy and fanatical astronomy, which, being prepossessed with a few exclusive ideas,
undertakes to reform all others upon the same model; it is as
an astronomy essentially optimistical, whose only end is to comprehend all, and which, therefore, accepts and reconciles all.
It seeks to obtain power only by extension; its unity consists
only in the harmony of all contrarieties."  All this is well
said, and looks well on paper. But who would expect to find,
in a system constructed in conformity to such an hypothesis,
the true "' M6canique C6leste?"   In every other science, each
school has found.its point of observation, from which it has attempted a solution of the great questions pertaining to that
particular science, and which  was its object to solve.   One
school has succeeded another, till some one has evolved a systenm which has stood the test of time.   So, I venture to predict, it will be in respect to the Philosophy of Mind. If the
true system has not yet been developed, the time is coming
when it will be. And that philosopher will have the happiness of attaining this great end, who shall find, not some point
of observation from which he can reconcile all the jarring antagonistic systems which have claimed the credence of man,
but some great central position, in the depths of our inner being, from which he can solve the diversified questions of philosophy pertaining to the facts of universal Consciousness.
2. The assumption on which Eclecticism, as above defined,
rests, is totally false in point of fact: the position that the
essential element in each system is true.  Take, as an illustration, the system of Pantheism.   Now that system is either
totally right or wholly wrong.   It either correctly explains
every fact pertaining to the universe, or it totally falsifies every
fact professedly explained by it.  It either rightly explains, or
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INTELLECTUAL PI{ILOSOPItIY.
totally misrepreonts all things. Further, if this system is
right, every other system is totally wrong, and misrepresents
everything which it professedly explains. There is no blending of this system with any other which does not assert its
fundamental principle; and then it is not another, but one and
the same system.
-  The same holds true of the systems of Hegel, Kant, and
Locke. Either thought is the only reality, and then Hegel is
totally right, and all other systems wholly false, or thought is
not the only reality, and then in nothing is Hegel right. This
system either correctly explains or totally misrepresents every
fact in the universe.
Either ideas of Reason are valid for things in themselves,
and then Kant is wholly wrong, or they are not thus valid,
and Kant is wholly right. His fundamental principle either
rightly explains or totally misrepresents every idea of Reason.
There is no position midway between these extremes.
Either all ideas do come from experience, and then Locke
is wholly right, and all systems denying this are so far wholly
wrong, or all ideas do not come from experience, and then
Locke is wholly wrong. It does not help the matter to say,
that some ideas come from experience, and therefore Locke is
partly right. Locke and all the world knew, long before his
celebrated Essay was thought of, that some ideas came from
experience.   It was only as an universal proposition that
Locke affirmed his position.  If that proposition is not strictly
universal, Locke is wholly wrong, and so he himself regarded
the subject.
Nor, in my judgment, was it becoming in a great philosopher to attempt to show, as Cousin has done, in conformity to
the spirit of Eclecticism, that the great principle of Locke's
philosophy is right, by attributing to him a principle that he
never held, or conceived of; to wit, that ideas of experience
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MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
are the chro, ological antecedents of all other ideas. The individual who has ever read Cousin's Psveychology, translated by
Prof. Henry, a work presenting one of the finest specimens of
philosophic reasoning to be met with in any language, will
recollect the frequency with which the remark is made in that
work, that there is an important sense in which the propositions of Locke, that all ideas come from experience, is true.
Locke's whole system rests upon this one proposition. Cousin,
after proving the proposition false, must show that after all it
is true, or the fundamental position of his own Eclecticism
would fail entirely. How does he accomplish his object? By
the affirmation that there is a sense in which the proposition,
that all ideas are derived from experience, is true; that is,
such ideas are the ch7tronological antecedents of all other ideas.
But this, I repeat, is a sense in which Locke never presented
the proposition under consideration, and never thought of doing it. Did it become a great philosopher to attempt to save
his own hypothesis, by attributing to another a principle which
all the world know he never held, or, at least, never avowed?
In the remarks made above, I would by no means be understood as advancing the sentiment, that if Pantheism or any
other system is wrong, that therefore nothing which the abettors      of such systems may say, is true.  Nothing is further
from      my intention than this.  This whole Treatise presents
proof sufficient of the fact, that no such thing is intended.
VWhat I        do mean is this, That whatever truths exist in connlection vith false systems, and many such often are therein found,
exist in them not in consequence of the systems, but in spite
of            them, and are totally misrepresented by them.   The true
Eclecticism, as I understand it, is this, To search for truth in
connection with every system, without assuming beforehand,
that i t does or does not exist there.  " Prove all things; hold
fast that which c good." Thisis an Eclecticism, which is in            34
397 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPHY.
finitely preferable to that which "consists only in the harmony
of all contrarieties."
3. In his position as an Eelectic, Cousin has fallen into the
very error which he has charged upon Locke, as so greatly
vitiating his method as a philosopher.    The error is this
Beginning with an hypothesis, before carefillly analyzing and
classifying the facts of Psychology as the basis of an hypothesis. Locke, as Cousin has shown, by assuming at the outset
a particular hypothesis respecting the origin of Ideas, was led
to misrepresent (an error perfectly natural under the circumstances) the most important facts of human Consciousness.
So Cousin, by assuming, that the fundamental elements of all
systems are right, must, to be consistent, be a sensualist with
Locke, a spiritualist with Fichte, a pantheist with Schelling,
and a nihilist with Hegel. These considerations are abundantly sufficient to show the claims of Eclecticism to the regard
of philosophers.
COMMION SENSE.
There are few words in more common use than the above.
Common Sense is everywhere appealed to as a standard and
test of truth and error. Yet it would be somewhat difficult,
without the most careful reflection, to define correctly the
words under consideration. Dr. Reid regards Common Sense
as a distinct faculty of the mind. Philosophers generally have
rejected this assumption. This they have done, however, without themselves attempting to tell us what this something is,
the reality of which they all acknowledge. Miy object will be,
to state distinctly the real meaning of the words under consideration.
Common Sen2se defined.
Every one is aware, that, in the presence of certain facts,
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MIISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
the universal Intelligence invariably makes particular affirmlations.  WAith such affirmations,  numberless assumptions, together with their consequents,  may  be mingled.   Hence, in
reference to almost all subjects of thought, diversity of opinion appears.   Yet, in the midst of all this diversity, there are
judgr,ments common to all minds who have apprehended the
same facts.
Arow these affrmatioas, common to all minds in the prescece of the same facts, aftirmations i  theb' concrete aced ])artictular fore?, is uwhat  is eieant by the torcds Comm1nonI Sense.
The words designate the real affirmations of the universal Intelligence, in view of given facts, as distinguished fromi assumptions, and the logical consequents of the same, pertaining to
the samne facts.   Common  Sense, then, is not, as Dr.  Reid
supposes,  a special  faculty of the Intelligence.  It designates, I repeat,  the  real affirmations  of the  general Intelligence, in distinction from assumptions and their logical consequents.
Comiizoa Sense a Staiidard of Truth.
Commron Sense, then, may be properly  appealed to, as a
decisive standard of truth.   Its responses must be true, else
the universal Intelligence is a lie.  No conclusions in philosophy and religion, no results of processes of investigation and
reasoning which are in contradiction to its decisions, will stand
the test of time.  I will here confess, that the principle under
consideration has been a leading idea which has guided my
Judgment in respect to the great facts and principles announced in the present Treatise.  That philosophy, which, disregarding all assumptions and their consequents, shall announce
the real convictions of the universal Intelligence, is the true
philosophy. Philosophy and Comimon Sense the Author of our
existence has joined together. Philosophy runs mad with the
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INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
wildest conceivable delusions, when divorced from Common
Sense as a light, and authoritative guide.
Philosophic Principles- why rejected by the mtass of Man                           kiizcd.
Philosophy (falsely so called) has at various periods denied
the reality of MIind, of Mlatter,  or the external world, and of
God, the author of the two former. Yet the mass of mankind
have continued to believe their own substantial existence, together with that of the external world, and of God. The reason is, that philosophers have rested their investigations upon
baseless assumptions; while the mass of mankind, more fully
influenced by the philosophic spirit in respect to such subjects,
have followed the dictates of Common Sense. Universal materialism, on the one hand, or spiritualism on the other, together with kindred systems, such as Pantheism and Idealism,
can never become the sentiments of the race.   The  Common
Sense of mankind is at war with all such principles. Suppose,
for example, an individual announces as a truth of philosophy,
what Pantheism affirms, that all individualities in the universe
are not real, but only apparent, that they are all the phenomena of one common substance.   Such a dogma can never become the belief of the race; for the obvious reason that it
contradicts the fundamental affirmations of the universal Intelligence pertaining to phenomena and substance. The reason
is that separateness, and not absolute unity, is the fundamental
phenomenon which all individualities present in respect to each
other.  When things appear as separate, we must admit that
they are separate; in other words, that Pantheism is false, or
deny the fundamental convictions or Common Sense of the
race, pertaining to their ideas of substance.
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MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
Dictates of Common Sense -how known  and distinguished.
One important question arises here, to wit: Ilow can we
determine, whether a given fact or principle is or is not a dictate of Common Sense?  This question we can answer, not by
an appeal to tradition, to books, or to the responses which the
race at large might formally give, if required to respond to
the inquiry.   For with all such responses, numberless assumiptions would no doubt be mingled. On the other hand, every
one who would understand the dictates of Common Sense must
enter into the depth of his own Mind, and there notice the
real affirmations of his own Intelligence, in view of given facts.
Such affirmations he may trust in and announce, as the real
dictates of the Common Sense of the race.  I-e that will most
correctly interpret the real dictates of his own Intelligence, is
the most perfect oracle of the universal Intelligence.   In retiring, then, from the outward world into the depths of our own
BIinds, and there receiving the real dictates of our own Intelligence, we find the true facts and principles of Common Sense.
Cla racteristics of  ien d istiitjuished for Comnmon  Sense.
re often hear individuals spoken of as wanting in, or possessed of a great degree, of Common  Sense.  The characteristic which distinguishes the latter from the former class, is a
well-balanced Judgment, particularly in respect to the common
transactions of life - a Judgment by which they detect and
announce at once the real affirmations of the Intelligence in
the presence of given facts.  The mass of men -a fact to
which philosophers as a body are by no means exceptionsare so blinded by assumptions, and theories founded thereon,
that, in respect to the most important subjects, they do not
recognize the real affirmations of their own Intelligence. - In
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I 
INTELLECTUAL PHIIILOSOPHIIY.
the presence of given facts, they see in them what all tlhe world
sees.  Yet under the influence of false assumptions and theo ries, they disregard what their own Intelligence really affirms.
mIen, on the other hand, distinguished for Common Sense, in
the presence of the same facts and convictions, announce and
rely upon, not in their abstract and universal, but in their con crete and particular form, their own judgmllents, just as they lie
in their own Intelligence -judgments  whiich all the world
really pass in the presence of the same facts; but whiclh, for
reasons above stated, philosophic minds especially, in many in stances, totally disregard.   Of the latter class we say, they are
destitute of, or rather do not quse, their Common Sense.
After writing the above, I was much interested to find that
the sentiments expressed so fully, correspond with those of
Jouffroy, in respect to the same subject. I will present, as a
further elucidation of this important subject, two extracts
from the writings of the philosopher above named
"The history of philosophy presents a singular spectacle;
a certain number of problems are reproduced at every epoch;
each of these problems suggests a certain number of solutions,
always the same; philosophers are divided; discussion is set
on foot; every opinion is attacked and defended, with equal
appearance of truth.  Hlumanity listens in silence, adopts the
opinion of no one, but preserves its own, which is what is
called Commtfon, Sease.
"Thus, to refer to examples, all philosophical epochs have
produced upon the stage the opposite theories of Materialism
and Spiritualism in metaphysics, and those of Stoicism  and
Epicureanism in morals.   None of these doctrines has permanently prevailed: none has perished; all have found sincere
and illustrious partisans; all have exerted nearly the same influence; but, in the end, the human race, which has witnessed
their debates, has become neither Materialist nor Spiritualist,
402 
MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.
neither Stoic nor Epicurean; it has remained what it was prior
to philosophy, believing at once both in matter and spirit, respecting duty and pursuing happiness at the same time."
Again: "Everybody understands by Common Sense a certain number of principles or notions evident of themselves,
from which all men derive the grounds of their judgment and
the rules of their conduct; and nothing is more correct than
this idea.  But it is not sufficiently known that these principles are merely positive solutions of all the great problems
which philosophy agitates. How could we regulate our conduet, what judgments could we form, if we could not distirnguish between good and evil, truth and falsehood, beauty and
deformity, one being and another, and reality and nullity; if
we did not know what we should hold to, concerning that
which we see with our eyes, perceive with our Consciousness,
and apprehend with our Reason; if we had no idea of the
purpose and the consequences of this life, of the Author of all
things and of his nature?  What would be the light of Intelligence, how would society proceed, if there were even the
shadow of doubt on the notions which we possess in regard to
most of these points?  Now what are these notions, so firmly
and so necessarily established in the Intelligence of all men,
but a series of responses to these questions:  What is the
true?  What is the good?  What is the beautiful?  What is
the nature of things?  What is being?  What is the origin
and certainty of human knowledge?  What is the destinv of
man in this world? Is his entire destiny accomplished in this
life? Is this world the production of chance, or of an intelligent cause? And, we ask, are not these the questions with
which philosophy is occupied? DI)o they not contain, in their
germs at least, all the questions of logic, metaphysics, morals,
politics, and religion?
" Common Sense, therefore, is nothing but a collection of
403
.1 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIIY.
solutions to those questions which philosophers agitate.  It is
another philosophy prior to philosophy  properly so called,
since it is found spontaneously at the bottom of every Consciousness, independently of all scientific research.   There are
accordingly two votes on the questions which interest humianity, namely, that of the mass and that of the philosophers, the
spontaneous vote and the scientific vote, Common Sense and
systems."
40 
CHAPTER XIX.
THE INTELLIGENCE OF MIAN, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM
THAT OF THE BRUTE.
IT has been very common with philosophers to represent
all created existences, from the highest Intelligences in heaven
to the crude forms of matter, as successive links in one great
chain, each link in the chain, commencing with the lowest,
differing mainly in degree from that which immediately succeeds it. The highest forms of brute, and the lowest of rational Intelligence, for example, differ, it is asserted, not in
kind, but only in degree. Of late, the reality of orders of existences, as successive links of a great chain, has come to be
seriously doubted.  The intelligence of man and of the brute, it
is said, differs not in degree, but in kind.  If we conceive of
the highest forms of brute intelligence increased to any degree
whatever, as far as degree is concerned, still it makes no approach at all to real rationality.  The different orders of brute
instincts do constitute, it is thought, different links of one
chain.  Those of rational Intelligences constitute another and
totally different chain, a chain none of the links of which are
connected, in any form, with any of those of the other.  This
last is the opinion entertained by the author of this Treatise.
I will now proceed to state the grounds of this opinion.   I
will introduce what I have to say upon this subject by two extracts, somewhat lengthy, from Coleridge.  In  the first, we
have a classification of the different forms of brute Instinct;
in the second, we are presented with two instances of Instinctive Intelligence, in their highest manifestations. 
INTELLECTUAL PtIILOSOPIHY.
BRUTE INSTINCTS CLASSIFIED.
"It is evident that the definition of a genus or class is an
adequate definition only of the lowest species of that genus:
for each higher species is distinguished from the lower by some
additional character, while the general definition includes only
the characters common  to all the species.   Consequently it
describes the lowest only.   Now I distinguish a genus or 7iciid
of powers under the name of adaptive power, and give, as its
generic definition, the power of selecting and adapting means
to proximate ends; and as an instance of the lowest splecies of
this genus, I take the stomach of a caterpillar.  I ask myself,
under what words I can generalize the action of this organ;
and I see that it selects and adapts the appropriate means (i. e.,
the assimilable part of the vegetable conyesta) to the proximate end, i. e., the growth or reproduction of the insect's body.
This we call VITAL POWER, or vwta p;rol})ia of the stomach;
and this being the locest species, its definition is the same with
the definition of the kz;itd.
" Well, from the power of the stomach I pass to the power
exerted by the whole animal.  I trace it wandering fromn spot
to spot, and plant to plant, till it finds the appropriate vegetable; and again on this chosen vegetable, I mark it seeking out
and fixing on the part of the plant, bark, leaf, or petal, suited
to its nourishment; or (should the animal have assumed the
butterfly form), to the deposition of its eggs, and the sustentation of the future larva.  Here I see a power of selecting
and adapting means to proximate ends according to circurmsta.?ces. And this higher species of adaptive power we call
INSTINCT.
" Lastly, I reflect on the facts narrated and described in
the succeeding extracts from Huber, and see a power of selecting the proper means to the proximate ends, according to vay
406 
HUMAN AND BRUTE INTELLIGENCE.
ang circumstances. And what shall we call this yet higher
species?  We name the former, Instinct; we must call this
INSTIN-CTIVE INTELLIGENCE.
" Here then we have three powers of the same kind, Life,
Instinct, and Instinctive Intelligence; the essential characters
that define the genus existing in all three.   But in addition to
these, I find one other character common to the highest and
lowest, viz.: that the purposes are all manifestly pre-determined by the peculiar organization of the animals; and though
it may not be possible to discover any such immediate dependency in all the actions, yet the actions being determined by the
purposes, the result is equivalent: and both the actions and
purposes are all in a necessitated reference to the preservation
and continuance of that particular animal or of the progeny.
There is a selection, but not choice - volition rather than Will.
The possible kiiozeledge of a thing, or the desire to have the
th,l~y representable by a distinct correspondent thought, does
not, in the animal, suffice to render the thing an object, or the
ground of a purpose.   I select and adapt the proper means to
the separation of a stone from a rock, which I neither can, nor
desire to make use of for food, shelter or ornament: because,
perhaps, I wish to measure the angles of its primary crystals,
or, perhaps, for no better reason than the apparent d'ificlty
of loosening the stone-  stat pro ratione volutitas- and thus
make a motive out of the absence of all motive, and a reason
out of the arbitrary will to act without any reason."
MIANIFESTATIONS OF INSTINCTIVE INTELLIGENCE.
"I Huber put a dozen humble-bees under a bell-glass along
with a comb of about ten cocoons, so unequal in height as not
to be capable of standing steadily. To remedy this, two or
three of the humble-bees got upon the comb, stretched themselves over its edge, and with their heads downwards fixed
407 
INTELLECTUAL PHIIILOSOPIIY.
their fore feet on the table on which the comb stood, and so
with their hind feet kept the comb from falling.  WThen these
were weary others took their places.  In this constrained and
painful posture, fresh bees relieving their comrades at intervals, and each working in its turn, did these affectionate little
insects support the comb for nearly three days, at the end of
which they had prepared sufficient wax to build pillars with.
But these pillars having accidentally got displaced, the bees
had recourse again to the same manoeuver (or rather pedoeuver), till Huber pitying their hard case, &c.
"' I shall at present describe the operations of a single ant
that I observed sufficiently long to satisfy my curiosity:
"'One rainy day, I observed a laborer digging the ground
near the aperture which gave entrance to the ant-hill. It
placed in a heap the several fragments it had scraped up, and
formed them into small pellets, which it deposited here and
there upon the nest.  It returned constantly to the same place,
and appeared to have a marked design, for it labored with ardor
and perseverance. I remarked a slight furrow, excavated in
the ground in a straight line, representing the plan of a
path or gallery.  The laborer, the whole of whose movements
fell under my immediate observation, gave it greater depth and
breadth, and cleared out its borders: and I saw at length, in
which I could not be deceived, that it had the intention of establishing an avenue which was to lead from one of the stories
to the under-ground chambers. This path, which was about
two or three inches in length, and formed by a single ant, was
opened above and bordered on each side by a buttress of earth,
its concavity en forme de gouttiere was of the most perfect regularity, for the architect had not left an atom too much.  The
work of this ant was so well followed and understood, that I
could almost to a certainty guess its next proceeding, and the
very fragment it was about to remove.   At the side of the
408 
HUMAN AND BRUTE INTELLIGENCE.
opening where this path terminated, was a second opening, to
which it was necessary to arrive at by some road.  The same
ant engaged in and executed alone this undertaking.   It furrowed out and opened another path, parallel to the first, leaving between each a little wall of three or four lines in height.
Those ants who lay the foundation of a wall, a chamber or gallery, from working separately, occasion now and then a want
of coincidence in the parts of the same or different objects.
Such examples are of no unfrequent occurrence, but they by
no means embarrass them. What follows, proves that the
workman, on discovering his error, knew how to rectify it. A
wall had been erected with the view of sustaining a vaulted
ceiling, still incomplete, that had been projected from the wall
of the opposite chamber. The workman who began constructing it, had given it too little elevation to meet the opposite partition upon which it was to rest.  I-ad it been continued on
the original plan, it must infallibly have met the wall at about
one-half of its height, and this it was necessary to avoid.
This state of things very forcibly claimed my attention, when
one of the ants arriving at the place, and visiting the works,
appeared to be struck by the difficulty which presented itself;
but this it as soon obviated, by taking down the ceiling and
raising the wall upon which it reposed. It then, in my presence, constructed a new ceiling with the fragments of the
former one.' "-  Htuber's Nat. Hfist. of Ants.
The facts above cited, every one will acknowledge, may be
assumed as representing Instinctive Intelligence, in its highest
form. The question to be settled is, In what respects is this
like rationality, as it exists in man? In what respects do these
forms of Intelligence agree, and disagree?
35
409 
INTELLECTUAL PHIIILOSOPHY.
PRINCIPLE ON WIHICH THE ARGUMENT IS BASED.
In conducting our inquiries on this subject, the first thing
to be settled is, the priitc?ple on which our conclusions shall
be based.   On all hands it is agreed, that there are points of
resemblance between the manifestations of Intelligence in the
brute and among mankind. At the same time, there are points
of dissimilarity equally manifest and important.   Now  let A
represent the mental phenomena which appear in man, and
never appear in the brute.  If we can find the power or powers in man from which the phenomena represented by A result, we have then determined fully the faculties which man
possesses and the brute wants.  The faculties thus asserted of
man, are to be wholly denied of the brute, and all the mnanifestations of brute intelligence are to be accounted for by a
reference to what remains, after the former have been subtracted.  All must admit, that this is the true and the only
true principle to be applied in the case. It now remains to apply the principle to the solution of the question before us.
POINTS OF RESEMBLANCE BETWEEN THE MAN AND THiE BRUTE.
That brutes, such as are supposed in the present argument,
possess the faculty of external perception, such as sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch, that such perceptions are followed
by feelings of a given character, and that these feelings are
followed by external actions which are correlated to the perceptions referred to, and that all these manifestations are common
to man and the brute both, will be denied by none who have,
however carelessly, observed the facts which have presented
themselves to their notice.   Such are the phenomena common to
man and the brute.
410 
HUMAN AND BRUTE INTELLIGENCE.
HYPOTHESES ON WHICH THESE COMMON FACTS MAY BE
EXPLAINED.
There are two distinct and opposite hypotheses on which
these common facts may be explained. When man has an
external perception, Reason at once suggests certain fundamental ideas in the light of which he explains to himself the
phenomena perceived, and passes certain judgments upon them.
Action with him has special reference, not to the phenomena,
but to the judgments thus passed. All these things we know
from Consciousness, to be true, in reference to man.
As far as the facts under consideration are concerned, it
may be that the same is true of the brute. All the phenomena of brute action, however, are equally explicable, on an
entirely different hypothesis.   When a brute has a perception
of some object, without the presence of any fundamental ideas
in the light of which he can explain to himself what he sees,
and consequently form notions and judgments of the object
perceived, and then act in view of judgments thfus formed, it
may be, that such perceptions are followed by certain feelings,
and that firom these, as necessary consequents, external acts,
such as the brute puts forth, arise. All that would be intellectual with the brute, on this hypothesis, would be the simple
power to perceive the object, without the capacity to recognize
himself as the sTbject, or the thing perceived as the olject of
the perception, so as to form any conceptions or judgments
pertaining either to the subject or object.  The feelings which
attend such perceptions, together with such as arise from the
internal organism of the brute, such as hunger and thirst, are
followed necessarily by external actions in harmony with the
sphere for which the creature was designed. The action of
the brute would be in fixed harmony with law- law, however,
which has no subjective existence in the Intelligence of the
411 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHIIY.
creature, but which exists as an idea in that of the Creator.
Action, in such a case, would be purely mechanical, the propelling,, force being the feelings generated as above supposed,
while the law of action would be an idea which the subject of
the action never apprehended, but in conformity to which the
organism of the brute is formed.
A case stated in the public prints, a case, whether true or
false, at least conceivable, and therefore proper to be used in
illustration, will fully illustrate the hypothesis under consideration. A lady, some time before the birth of a child, was
struckl at by a rattlesnake, and barely escaped with her life.
As a consequence of the fright of the mother, the child, when
born, had upon parts of its body the marks of the serpent.
His eyes had the fiery and vengeful appearance peculiar to the
reptile. One arm, also, lay coiled upon its side in a manner
perfectly serpentine. As the child grew up, and came into the
presence of certain objects, despite of all efforts of his Will to
the contrary, his eyes would roll in their sockets, with the fiery
vengeful appearance peculiar to the serpent when attacked by
an enemy.   At the same time, the arm referred to would strike
at the object perceived, in exact conformity to the motions of
the reptile in similar circumstances.   In connection with the
physical organization of this individual, two classes of actions,
each equally conformed to ideas, appeared; the one class, however, the consequents of volition in harmony with conceptions
and judgments, and the other caused byfeelings generated  by
external perceptions. Now, in conformity with the fact last
named, we can explain all the phenomena of brute action, however intelligent in appearance. All such phenomena may be
the exclusive result of the peculiar feelings and organism of
the animal, in the total absence of the Intelligence peculiar to
man.   The question is, Are there any facts peculiar to brute
and human action, verifying this hypothesis?  This question I
412 
HIUMIAN AND BRUTE INTELLIGENCE.
will now endeavor to answer, in the light of the principle I
have laid down as the basis of our conclusions on this subject.
POINTS OF DISSIMILARITY BETWEEN MAN AND THE BRUTE.
In order to test the validity of the hypothesis under consideration, we will now attend to the fundamental phenomena
which distinguish man from the brute.   Among these, I will
specify only the following:
1. )lan, from  the laws of his Intelligence, is a scientific
bein'g.  The main direction of the human Intelligence is not
merely towards phenomena, but towards the sciettjfic explanatiot of phenomena.   This is one of the great wants of human
nature, the scientific explanation of phenomena.  All mankind
agree in the assumption, that in the brute there is a total absence of this principle. Brute intelligence pertains exclusively
to mere phenomena.   The creature never seeks an explanation
of what he sees. He acts from feelings generated by perceptions, without ever seeking an explanation of what he sees or
feels.
2. itan, as a race, is progressive.   The brute is perfectly
stationary.   For six thousand years, each race has been spectators of precisely the same phenomena.   The commencement
of observation with man, was the commencement of intellectual
progress, which has been onward from generation to generation.   With all his observations, the brute has never advanced
a single step. He is now just where he was six thousand
years ago.  The beaver builds his dam, lives and dies, just as
did the first that ever appeared on earth. The same is true of
the action of every brute race.
3. SIan is the subject of moral obligation, and consequently of moral government.   In other words, man is a moral
agent.  All this is universally denied of the brute.  lIe is
35*
413 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHIIY.
never, except when man acts towards him, as all acknowledge,
irrationally, regarded or treated as the subject of moral obligation or of moral government.   I might cite other points of dissimilarity, equally manifest, and equally fundamental. But
these are sufficient for the present argument.
FACTS APPLIED.
It now remains to apply the facts above stated to the solution of the question under consideration. When we have determnined the faculties necessarily supposed, as the condition
of science, progress, and moral agency in man, we have determinaed the faculties which we are totally to deny of the brute.
For it should be borne in mind, that the facts above named do
not exist in one degree in man, and in a smaller degree in the
brute.  The difference is not that of degree, but of total dissimilarity.   What various individuals of our race, in the respects under consideration, possess in different degrees, the
brute totally wants. The faculties, therefore, which are to be
affirmed of man as the condition and ground of these facts, are
to be totally denied of the brute.
1. I ask, then, in the first place, What faculties constitute
man a scientific being, those in the absence of which he cannot
possess science, and in the possession of which he is, of course,
scientific? Sense, the faculty of external perception, man, as
we have seen, has in common with the brute.   But this a creature may possess in any degree, and make no approach whatever to science.  Other faculties in addition are supposed as
the condition and ground of such developments. What, then,
are these faculties?  I answer, they are of the primary faculties, Reason, and Self-Consciousness; and of the secondary,
Understanding and Judgment. In the absence of Reason,
fundamental ideas, in the light of which phenomena may be
explained, are totally wanting, and consequently Science be
414 
HNUMAN AND BRUTE INTELLIGENCE.
comes impossible.  Without Reason also, Self-Consciousness
would, properly speaking, be impossible, or if possible, absolutely useless, and therefore not supposable, as originating
fioom perfect Intelligence.  Without Reason, too, conceptions,
notions, and judgments would,  as we have seen in former
Chalpters, be absolutely impossible.  Notions cannot be formed
without ideas of Reason, such as substance, cause, time, space,
&c.  Judgments, also, and consequently classification and generalization, cannot take place without the ideas of resemblance
and difference.  In other words, without Reason, the exercise
of the Understanding and Judgment is impossible. The existence of these faculties is therefore not to be supposed.  If,
then, as we are logically bound to do, we take from the brute
Reason, Self-Consciousness, Understanding, and Judgment,
what remains to him?  Just what we have attributed to him,
to wit, the power of external perception, together with corresponding feelings and susceptibilities, and an external organism,
the action of which is in necessary conformity to the feelings
thus generated.
It should be borne in mind, that science in man does not
depend upon the ceyree in which the faculties above named
are possessed by him. The degree of the scientific movement
will be, other things being equal, as the degree in which these
powers are possessed. When they exist in any degree, there
will be real science. The total absence of science in the brute,
indicates most clearly a total absence of the scientific faculties,
faculties which are so connected with each other, that if one be
conceived of as wanting, the others also must be.
The question, I repeat, is not whether the action of the
brute is not in harmony with fundamental ideas, but whether
these ideas have a subjective existence in his Intelligence. The
bee, for example, builds its cell in conformity to pure ideas of
Reason. But does it not thus build, not because it knows such
415 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
ideas, but because of the peculiarity of its perceptions, sensations, and physical structure, all of which render its thus building mechanically necessary? The facts before us show clearly
that it does.
2. In the next place, we will raise the inquiry, What faculties in inan render him a progressive being?  They are evidently the same as those which render him scientific, with the
addition of the Imagination. It is because that where phenomnena appear, mankind are able, in the light of ideas of Reason, to explain to themselves these facts, and thus find the
fundamental principle involved in them, that, as a race, we are
progressive.   For this reason, also, mankind gain important
knowledge from accidental experience, a fact which never appears in the brute. A man and a brute are swimming together
across a river. They become exhausted, and when about to
sink, meet with something like a plank floating by.  They
both get on to it and are saved. The brute passes on without
being a whit wiser from his experience. The occurrence constitutes an era in the history of the human race.   Man reflects
upon the occurrence, and hence arises all the wonders of shipbuilding and navigation.   All these had their origin in accidental occurrences like that above supposed. In the knowledge
obtained from occurrences similar in their nature, the art of
printing, and all the results of steam-power, &c., originated.
AIan and the brute also hear melodious sounds.   Each alike
copies what he hears. On the part of man, these sounds are
recombined into strains still more melodious. Hence the science of music.  The brute copies what he hears, but never, in
a solitary instance, recombines, in the least, what he hears.
The mocking-bird presents a striking illustration of the truth
of this statement.   It will copy almost every melodious sound
it ever hears.   Yet it was never known  to produce a single
new  combination  of sounds.   Such  facts  most indubitably
416 
tlIUMAN AND BRUTE INTELLIGENCE.
indicate in the brute the total absence of all the faculties
which lay the foundation for progress in man, the faculties of
Reason, Self-Consciousness, Understanding, Judgment, and
the Imagination.   With these in any degree, creatures are in
a corresponding degree progressive. Without them, whatever
else they may possess, they are perfectly stationary. Nothing
is more unphilosophical and illogical, than the conclusion often
drawn, in the presence of progress on the one hand, and its
total absence on the other, that brute Instinct and human Intelligence differ only in degree. How demonstrably evident is
the conclusion, that they differ not in degree, but in kind.
3. In respect to the inquiry, What Iaculties in man exist
as the condition and ground of moral agency in him? the answer is ready. They are the faculties above named, together
with that of Free Will.  The absence of those first named, in
the case of the brute, has already been established.   Shall we
still attribute to him that of Free Will?  The following con.
siderations perfectly satisfy my own mind on this point:
(1.) The action of Free Will, in the absence of conceptions
and judgments, is impossible. Till I have conceptions of A
and B, and judge that one differs from the other, or at least,
that one is not the other, I cannot choose between them.
There may be selection, but not choice; nor can there be selection such as implies the action of Free Will.
(2.) None of the phenomena of brute action necessarily
suppose the presence of Free Will in the subject. All such
phenomena are just as explicable on the opposite hypothesis as
on this. Now a power is never to be supposed, when its presence is not affirmed by positive facts, or necessarily supposed
by the known sphere of the subject. No such considerations
demand the assumption of Free Will in the brute.  Such an
assumption therefore is wholly illogical.
(3.) All the phenomena of brute action clearly indicate the
417 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIIY.
absence of the power under consideration. Place the brute in
any circumstances whatever, and there let particular sensations
be generated in him, and his action will be just as fixed and
uniform, as that of any mechanical power whatever.   As
often as the experiment is repeated, it will invariably be attended with the same results.   With such facts before us, how
illogical the assumption of Free Will in the Brute.
(4.) Such a power as that under consideration would be a
totally useless appendage to the brute, contemplating him in
reference to the sphere for which he is designed.  When the
intellectual faculties above named are denied him, what a useless appendage to the brute, and how worse than useless to
man, in respect to the use to be made of the animal, would
such an appendage as Free Will be. The creation of such a
power, under such circumstances, would be a wide departure
from all the manifestations of wisdom visible in all the Divine
works beside.
(5.) Finally, the power under consideration constitutes one
of the most essential elements of the Divine image in which
man was created.. Why should we suppose an element so fundamental in that image to exist in a creature, in whom all the
other elements are totally wanting, atnd that without any solid
basis for that conclusion?
Thus, by the most logical deductions, we have determined
the powers of the brute, as distinguished from those of man.
Taking firom the former, what fundamental phenomena require
us to do, to wit, the powers of Reason, Self-Consciousness,
Understanding, Judgment, Imagination, and Free Will, we
leave him with the powers of external perception, with a sensibility, and physical organization, of such a nature, that under
the varied circumstances of his being, his action is in necessary
harmony with the ends for which the all-wise Creator designed
him. All the phenomena of brute action can be accounted
418 
HUMAN AND BRUTE INTELLIGENCE.
for on this hypothesis, and its truth is also affirmed by fundamental phenomena.  In this lower creation man stands alone.
There is nothing like him "in the heavens above, nor in the
earth beneath, nor in the waters under the earth."  There he
stands, " the image and glory of God." Fallen though he is,
" his form has yet not lost
All its original brightness, nor appears
Less.... than the excess
Of glory obscured."
GENERAL REMARKS.
1. We are now prepared to explain the ground of the misjudgment so common in respect to the action of the brute.
MIen judge of brute action in the light of their own consciousness, pertaining to similar actions in themselves. When men
and brutes are placed in similar circumstances, and the exter'
nal actions of both are similar, men often conclude that the
brute acts in view of the same conceptions and judgments, in
view of which they are conscious of acting themselves. Now
such conclusions are wholly unauthorized. The external manifestations of instinctive and rational Intelligence may be, in
many important respects, similar, yet there may be a total dissimilarity in the nature of these different kinds of Intelligence.
2. We are also prepared to state the conclusion which the
facts connected with brute Intelligence force upon us.  It is
one of these two: Either the Intelligence of the brute is incomparably more perfect than that of man, or, aside from the
power of external perception, he has no Intelligence at all,
such as man possesses. The first manifestations of Intelligence
in man, how imperfect and feeble! How rude and ill-shaped,
for example, the first habitations built by man! IIow slow the
progress of human architecture from such rude beginnings to
419
6
I 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPIIY.
its present perfection!  On the other hand, the first production of the brute bears the stamp of perfection.  The first
dani built by the beaver, the first nest built by the bird, have
never been surpassed.   The first cell built by the bee  can
hardly be improved, even in thought. Now suppose that such
actions of the brute are, as is the case with man, the result of
the carrying out of an idea, a plan, previously developed in his
Intelligence, what must we conclude?   Why, that the first
race of brutes that ever appeared on earth, had a degree of
Intelligence which man, after six thousand years of laborious
progress, has hardly reached. This or the opposite one forces
itself upon us.
3. Another consideration to which I would direct attention
is this - the facts on which the conclusions of individuals have
been based, in respect to the existence of the higher powers
of Intelligence in the brute, as contrasted with others in the
same connection, which have been totally overlooked. A distinguished naturalist, for example, states that the wild ass,
when hlie begins to flee from a man, will first turn one ear, and
then the other, backwards towards the object of his terror.
From this fact, he concludes that the animal is deliberating
what course he shall take; and, as a consequence, attributes
to it the possession of the powers of deliberation and Free
Will. A grave conclusion, surely, to infer from the leering
of an ass, the existence of such powers. How often have the
actions of the elephant been proclaimed, as proof of the existence of the higher powers of Intelligence in that animal?
Now let us contemplate another class of facts in connection
with the same animal. Those who have visited menageries
are familiar with the dancing of the animal at the "sound of
the lyre," actions as indicative of superior Intelligence as any
he ever puts forth.  How was the creature taught such an
act? Did lihe take lessons, as men do, and thus acquire it?
420 
HUMIAN AND BRUTE INTELLIGENCE.
It was by a process very different from this. When the keepers wish to have the animal acquire the art under  consideration, they place him upon a floor covered with plates of iron.
These plates are gradually heated, till the creature, beginning
to feel pain in his feet from the heat, lifts first one foot and
then the other. As soon as such motions begin, the music
commences, which is made to become more and more lively as
the animal steps with greater and greater rapidity. When this
process has been continued for a sufficient length of time, the
music ceases, and the animal is instantly taken from his painful condition. These experiments being repeated a few times,
such an association is established between the sound of the
lyre and the Sensibility of the animal, that as soon as he hears
the music he begins to dance, and continues the pace till the
music ceases. Thus we have the elephant dancing in his wisdom, as many suppose. Now had the animal the real Intelligence possessed by any individual of our race, who is in any
degree removed above absolute idiocy, such an imposition could
not be practised upon him for a single hour.
The actions of the creature, in this case, in conformity to
Intelligence, are not, as all perceive, a manifestation of Intelligence in him, but in the keeper. So whatever Intelligence
the animal manifests in any instance, is not an indication of
Intelligence in him, but in the Creator. The same is true of
all other animals.
4. The form in which memory exists in brutes, may now
be readily pointed out.  Memory, in man, is the recalling of
the fact that we were, in particular circumstances, the subjects
of such and such thoughts, feelings, &c. In the brute no
such recollections can occur. When the brute has been affected in a given manner, in given circumstances, the same sensations are reproduced in him when he comes into similar circumstances again, and hence the same actions are repeated.
36
421
I 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
5. Finally, we notice the error of some who attempt to account for the diversities of intellectual manifestations between
men and brutes, on the ground of diversities of phrenological
development. To suppose that the soul of a dog, if placed in
connection with the brain of a Newton, would manifest the
Intelligence of that great philosopher, is as illogical as to suppose that gold and water will exhibit the same phenomena,
when subjected to the same influences. The manifestations of
substances diverse in their nature will, under the same circumstances, be as diverse as their nature. The brute, in any circuminstances, is still a brute, and not a man, nor an angel. Diversities of phrenological development may account for the
diverse intellectual manifestations among  men;  but not for
those between man and the brute. The brute must become
another being, before he can manifest the intelligence of man.
422 
CHAPTER XX.
MATTER AND SPIRIT.
PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE ARGUMENT IS BASED.
ALL legitimate reasoning, in respect to the nature of any
substance, is based upon the assumption, that all substances
are as their essentialphenomena, that substances all of whose
phenomena are totally and fundamentally unlike, are as totally
and fundamentally diverse from each other in their nature, and
that so far as the fundamental phenomena of any substances
differ, there is, and must be, a corresponding difference in the
nature of the substances themselves.
All reasoning, also, pertaining to substances, must be based
upon their kiltoW   qualities.  No qualities  known  to exist
must be overlooked or disregarded, and no unknown qualities
must be supposed to exist, unless the reality and the character of
the unknown are clearly indicated by those that are known,
and then the former are no longer unknown, but positively discerned. Such are the principles on which the argument pertaining to these two substances -  Matter and Spirit - must
be based.
PRINCIPLES APPLIED.
We have already, in a former Chapter, said all that need be
said on this subject. In showing, as we think we have done,
that the material hypothesis cannot account for all the facts of
the universe - that of Mind especially - we have shown that
Matter is not the only substance; in other words, that Spirit 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
or Mind is not Matter. All that is requisite on the present
occasion, is to indicate simply the nature of the argument
bearing upon this subject. The reality of a fundamental distinction between these two substances, can be denied but upon
one of two hypotheses - the Material hypothesis which resolves the phenomena of Mind-into those of Matter, or the
Spiritual hypothesis which resolves the phenomena of Matter
into those of Spirit. Against each of these hypotheses I urge
the following fundamental objections:
1. Each alike stands opposed to the absolute intuitions of
the universal Intelligence. That Intelligence no more confounds one of these substances with the other, than it does
substance with space, or scarlet color with the sound of a trumpet. It has separated them as opposites. Now this conviction must be held to be true until it has been demonstrated to
be false. The universal Intelligence has separated Matter and
Spirit, as diverse and opposite substances. The burden of
proof lies upon him who would convict that Intelligence in this
separation of fundamental error.
2. No positive evidence of any kind or degree can be adduced in favor of either of these hypotheses. Each hypothesis alike must rest, as we have seen in a former Chapter, upon
mere assumptions wholly unsusceptible of proof, and as totally
unsustained by any form or degree of positive evidence. This,
we are quite sure, will not be denied.
3. The truth of either of these hypotheses is absolutely
inconceivable and impossible, excepting upon the assumption
that our knowledge of the qualities of these two substances is
not valid. If we admit that thought, feeling, and voluntary
determination, are the real qualities of the Mind, we must admit that the substance in which these qualities inhere is an absolute unity, wholly incapable of division or composition on the
one hand, and as utterly void of solidity, extension, and form, on
424 
MATTER AND SPIRIT.
the other.  We cannot divide a thought, feeling, or act of
Will. Neither of these phenonmena has a this side, a that
side, a top or a bottom, length, breadth, thickness, taste or color.
The substance, itself, thus assuming that its real qualities are
known, must be an absolute unity, as absolutely void of all the
properties of Matter.   So if we assume that the qualities of
Matter are really known to us, and that the substance itself is
as its qualities, then we can, by no possibility, conceive of it
as anything else than a compound, extended, solid, and figured
substance, that is, as not being an absolute unity, void of extension and form, and endowed with the powers of thought,
feeling, and free Will. Suppose we assume that our knowledge
of the qualities of these substances is not valid, then the substances themselves are absolutely unknown to us, and we cannot reason about them at all. We should also deny the
validity of all knowledge of every kind: for if we know not
the qualities of Mind, on the one hand, and of Matter, on the
other, it is absolutely impossible for us to know  anything.
Assuming our knowledge of the qualities of these substances
to be real, the truth of the doctrine of Materialism  or Idealism, each alike, is absolutely inconceivable and impossible. Assuming this knowledge to be invalid, then neither of these
hypotheses can be held as true, because we know nothing, and
can know nothing, upon this subject or any other. The doctrine of the immateriality of the soul, then, can be denied but
upon one hypothesis, a denial of the integrity of the Intelligence as a faculty of knowledge in respect to all subjects alike.
COMMON OBJECTIONS.
A few of the common, and most important objections to
the above argument, demand a passing notice:
1. It may be said, that for aught we know, there may be
phenomena yet unknown to us, common to both these substan        36*
425 
INTELLECTUAL PHIIILOSOPIIY.
ces. To this I reply, that when such phenomena are discovered, we will acknowledge that so far, and so far only, their
natures are alike.  Such a discovery, however, would not affect
the above demonstration; for it would still remain true, that,
as far as the phenomena under consideration are concerned,
they are wholly unlike.
2. It may also be objected, that these two substances have
always, so far as our knowledge extends, existed together. This
objection supposes us ignorant of the Eternal mind, an admission which we shall by no means grant.   But suppose we yield
even this.  Does co-existence, and even necessary co-existence,
suppose a common nature? Body and Space always co-exist, as
far as Body is concerned, and as far as our experience goes; but
to supppose them, for this reason, identical in their nature, is
absurd.
3. The mutual influence of these two substances, the one
upon the other, is often adduced as proof of the identity of
their ultimate essence.   But this fact equally consists with both
hypotheses, and of course can prove neither. Before it can be
shown to possess any force, it must be shown that no two substances can mutually affect each other, only on the single condition of a common nature. But this can never be done.
These are the principal and only objections, as far as my
knowledge extends, to the above demonstration.   Their weakness shows the weakness of the hypothesis they are designed
to sustain.
426 
CHAPTER XXI.
IMMIIORTALITY OF THE SOUL.
THE relations of spirit to the eternal future before us, present questions of greater moment to us, as intelligent beings,
capable of investigating the question of our own destiny, than
any other of which we can conceive. Indeed, all real interests with such beings are involved in such a question. In the
volume of Inspiration, this doctrine is, as we should expect,
set with the greatest possible distinctness before our minds.
The individual who confides in the truth of that sacred record,
needs no other foundation on which to rest the question of his
own Immortality.  The examination of the truth of this doetrine, however, pertains not merely to those who are privileged
with the knowledge of Inspiration.   This conviction may properly be presented as the great phenomenon of the race, of the
universal human  Intelligence.   It belongs to Philosophy to
investigate the grounds of this universal conviction.
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS.
Before proceeding to a direct consideration of the grounds
of this conviction, a few preliminary considerations demand
our special attention:
1. The first that I notice, is the fact above stated, that the
conviction of the truth of this doctrine is co-extensive with
the race of man.   It belongs to no age, to no form of religion,
to no nation, to no race of men, as a peculiarity.   It is the
common element of all religions, the common  conviction of 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIIY.
the race, in all ages and conditions. To the wild son of the
forest, to the ferocious cannibal of the isles of the Pacific, to
the wanderer among "Afric's sunny mountains," and the inhabitants of "India's coral strand," as well as to that portion
of the race to whom Christianity has imparted the blessings of
civilization, the conviction of an endless existence after the
closing up of the concerns of this mortal sphere is an omnipresent reality.  "Simple nature" has imparted this expectation to the race, as the common boon of Heaven, irrespective
of rank or condition.
2. This conviction does not exist in the universal Intelligence as the result of izvestiyation, of loygical deductions from
processes of reasoning.   This is evident from the fact, that it
exists among races of men totally unaccustomed to reason on
any such subject.  HIere, also, it exists with as much strength
as among those who are most disciplined in logical deductions.
It lies in the mind as one of the great primary intuitions of
the universal Intelligence. It has precisely the same claim to
a place among such intuitions that the belief of our own existence has.
3. This conviction lies in the Intelligence in such a form,
as to be, in reality, incapable of increased confirmation by any
process of reasoning. When we fall back upon the primary
intuitions of our minds, we find it there, as one of the great
starting points of the Intelligence. We find it, not as a point
to be reached after we have left the sphere of primary intuitions, but as one of the seven pillars on which the temple of
truth, reared by investigation and reasoning, must rest. Like
all other primary intuitions, this conviction is incapable of essential confirmation by any process of logical deduction.
4. While this conviction, as a primary intuition of the
universal Intelligence, is incapable of essential confirmation
from logical deductions, it remains equally proof against all
428 
IMMORTALITY OF TIIE SOUL.
apparent demonstrations to the contrary. An individual may
pile what he may deem demonstration upon demonstration
upon this conviction, in order to crush and annihilate it, till he
triumphs in the terrible assumption, that its light is for ever
extinct in his mind. Still, in a moment, it will rise before
him again, in all the strength and vigor of immortal youth.
He again knows the truth of that conviction, with an assurance with which he hardly recognizes his own existence. This
apparent resurrection is not the result of logical deductions.
In that moment the Intelligence looks down into the depths
of its inner being, and there again finds this intuition unmoved
from its eternal foundations, as the moveless rock beneath the
billows of the ocean. The individual who thinks that he has
demonstrated to himself the fact, that as a brute he shall live
and die, should remember, that however secure he may think
himself from the conviction of, to him, the unwelcome truth
of his own immortality, the terrible reality will hereafter leap
upon him again, as an armed man. Hie will never escape
from it. It will and must be to him as a guardian angel, or a
specter of darkness.
5. In the facts above stated, we have the highest possible
evidence of the truth of the doctrine under consideration.
WVhat the universal Intelligence affirms, in view of certain
facts, must have its foundation in these faets, or we must assume that the Intelligence itself is a lie; and then to reason
on any subject becomes the perfection of folly.
6. As a primary conviction of the universal Intelligence,
the exclusive province of philosophy pertaining to it is, to investigate the grounds of this conviction, and not to attempt to establish the truth of it by any other process of logical deduction.
Hlere, I think, lies the error in the common demonstrations, or
attempted demonstrations, of  the doctrine  of Immortality.
The assumption in all such demonstrations is, that the truth
429
I 1, I' 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
of this doctrine is to be found as some distant point in a process of logical deduction, instead of recognizing the conviction
of the truth of the doctrine as one of the primary intuitions
of universal Reason, and then falling back upon the intuition
itself, to discover its foundation, or chronological antecedent.
One fact should be kept in mind here. In falling back upon
any primary conviction of the Intelligence, for the purpose of
finding the foundation of the same, the validity of that conviction does not depend upon the success of our endeavors. Reflection may fail of its object, "yet the foundation of truth
standeth sure."
PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE PRESENT ARGUMENT RESTS.
There are two foundation principles on which the entire
argument pertaining to the doctrine of Immortality rests:
1. The first is this, that every sentient being is formed for
a particular destiny. To fill the sphere of existence for which
each creature was formed, that constitutes his destiny.   That
each creature is thus formed and adapted to a particular sphere,
the filling up of which constitutes his destiny, is a fundamental conviction of the race.
2. There is in the constitution of each being, and order of
beings, a fixed adaptation to his or their particular destiny.
To suppose the opposite, would be to suppose that the Creator
lacks wisdom, or goodness, or both.
HIence, if we would determine the destiny of any being,
or order of beings, we must investigate their powers and susceptibilities, and from these learn what their real destiny is.
The great French naturalist, from a single bone belonging to
an animal of an extinct species, could determine at once, in
view of that single part, the genus or species of the animal,
and the main features of its physical structure.   So true is
Nature in the adaptation of one part of her works to another.
430 
IMMOP,TALITY OF TIIE SOUL.
Equally real and perfect is the adaptation of the constitution
of each creature to his particular destiny.   Of this all men
are convinced. All men believe that the destiny of the bee
differs from that of the horse, and that that of man differs
from that of either of the former.   The ground of this conviction is the fundamental difference of their nature and constitution
We' must admit the validity of the above principles, as the
ground of the argument pertaining to the doctrine of Immortality, or deny wholly the validity of all conclusions based
upon the laws and constitution of Nature. If we deny the
propriety of reasoning from the fundamental laws and constitution of a being to his destiny, it becomes perfect folly for us
to reason from or about creation at all. If the voice of Nature is false in this instance, he is guilty of infinite folly and
absurdity who will trust her anywhere.
DIRECT ARGUMENT.
WIe are now prepared for a distinct statement of the ground
of the universal conviction of the truth of the doctrine of Immortality.  i  is the coliscio'es adalgtation of the jpowers and
suisceptibi[ities of the sootl to that great idea, or to its realizatio??, as the ag)eapt )Msate clestiiy of man.   Our godlike powers
and susceptibilities are in conscious adaptation to the realization
of that idea as our appropriate destiny, and to none other.
1. The universal conception of the idea, as one of the
primitive ideas of Reason, indicates in man powers adapted to
its realization. For who should realize an idea but the being
who has conceived of it? The conception of the idea of Paradise Lost indicated, in Miilton, powers adapted to the produclion of that imiihortal poem. So the universal conception of
Immortality, as one of the fundamental phenomena of the
431 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
human Intelligence, indicates, in man, powers adapted to the
realization of that conception.
2. But when this conception arises in the human mind, we
find our powers and susceptibilities in conscious adaptation to
it. The realization of the idea becomes the great object of
desire, and our whole being shrinks back with horror at the
thought of annihilation.   How  true to nature, as the truth
lies revealed in the depths of universal mind, is the sentiment
which Hilton has put into the mouth of a fallen spirit:
" For who would lose,
Though full of pain, this intellectual being
These thoughts that wander through eternity,
To perish rather, swallowed up and lost
In the wide womb of uncreated night,
Devoid of sense and motion?"
Unless the fixed direction of universal nature is towards
the unreal, Immortality is the destiny of man. Now it is the
conscious adaptation of his powers to that idea, together with
the principle, that the destiny of each being and race of beings
is as their powers and adaptations, that constitutes, as it appears to me, the chief ground of the universal conviction of
the truth of the doctrine of Immortality.   What other conviction should arise in the conscious presence of such facts?
3. But there is another fundamental fact which lies at the
basis of the universal conviction of which we are speakinga fact of which every one becomes sufficiently conscious, as
soon as he knows himself, to lay the foundation of the conviction under consideration, although the fact may not, in most
minds, possess all the distinctness of reflection.  It is the fact,
so undeniably and universally manifest, that all the powers of
the soul are capable of and adapted to a state of endless progression. The powers of thought involve the elements of end
-A
432 
IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.
less progress in knowledge.   So all our capacities are in their
nature adapted to a state of limitless expansion.  What is the
conviction which forces itself upon the mind in the presence
of such powers?  The answer is, that the doctrine of Immortal-ity reveals the destiny of man, or the fundamental tendencies of nature are towards the unreal and untrue.  Which conclusion is most reasonable, that powers and susceptibilities
adapted to endless expansion are just to begin to open to the
light and influence of truth, and then descend into the abyss
of non-existence, or that "the eternal years of God are theirs?"
What excuse can a rational being have, in the presence of such
faculties, for not assuming his own Immnortality as the great
goal towards which all his plans and purposes shall be directed?
4. There is another important fact bearing upon this topic
-a fact of which every one is conscious as soon as he comes
to recognize himself as a moral agent. It is a fact, that we
do violence to our moral nature, and render ourselves really
incapable of the virtues to which our nature is adapted, when
we reject the doctrine of Immortality.   When we contemplate
ourselves as the creatures of a day, our nature shrinks to the
dimensions of its own withering, contracted conceptions, and
thus becomes incapable of great thoughts and noble aspirations.  "The grander my conceptions of being, the nobler my
future.  There can be no sublimity in life without faith in the
soul's eternity." It is only ih the presence of such conceptions and anticipations, that great virtues, such as render us
pure and blessed even here, become possible to us. The individual who does not " dial on time his own eternity," cannot
become truly great, nor greatly good.   His aspirations and his
virtues, if he could have any, would, of necessity, be as contracted and groveling as his conceptions of his own destiny,
and that of the race with which he is connected. Now this
feeling of suicidal violence done to the higher departments of
37
433 
INTELLECTUAL PIILOSOPI-F.
our nature, in the denial of this doctrine, is one of the chief
sources, as I suppose, of the universal conviction of the truth
of the soul's eternity.
5. I mention another fact as the ground of this conviction.
It is the fact, that every one becomes aware of as soon as the
fact presents itself to his mind, that no real reasons whatever
exist against the doctrine of which we are speakiing.  On the
one hand, the truth of the doctrine stands forth as a primary,
fundamental intuition of universal Reason.   On  the other, no
reasons at all present themselves against this intuition.  What
reason, for example, does the dissolution of the physical organization, with which the soul is now connected, and the consequent disappearance of any manifestations of the soul's existence to us, afford against this doctrine?   This fact is just as
consistent with the soul's Immortality, as with the opposite
supposition.  It may be but one of the necessary steps in the
progress of its future development.
The  same holds true of the loss of mental xvigor which
often attends the approach of dissolution under consideration.
WVhen from weariness and exhaustion, we approach a state of
sleep, we find the same want of vigor; yet we know that the
real powers of the soul are not the less, under such circumstances.  The same may hold true in the case above referred
to.  It may be, and no doubt is, one circumstance which attends our mortal state, while it has no bearing whatever against
the soul's Immortality.  With such evidences as that above
stated, and in the total absence of all evidence to the contrary,
every one feels that it would imply infinite guilt in him not to
assumrne the doctrine under consideration as true.
6. There is one fact which science has developed, as confirmatory of the universal conviction under consideration,
though from its being a fact of science, it cannot constitute a
ground of that conviction   At death, not a particle of the
434 
IMMORTALITY OF TIIE SOUL.
physical organization, with which thle soul is here connected,
perishes. How unreasonable and absurd the supposition, that
the soul, for which all else was made, is the only reality that
then ceases to be'? As the particles of the body immediately
enter into new combinations, how reasonable the conclusion
(and how unreasonable and absurd the opposite conclusion),
that the soul also passes away from the present scene to the
sphere of its future existence!
FUTURE RETRIBUTIONS.
There is one element of the doctrine of Immortality which
should not be passed over without special attention.   I refer to
the question, whether the soul, in the eternal future, is to exist in a state of moral retribution.   The following considerations may be presented as having a decisive bearing upon this
question:
1. Wherever, throughout the wide world, the idea of Immortality is met with, we find it connected with the belief and
anticipation of a state of moral retributions.  There is not an
age or nation where an exception to this belief can be met with.
Such a fact marks the doctrine of future retributions, as one
of the primary intuitions of universal PRason.
2. All our ideas of moral fitness are met in this doctrine,
and are perfectly reversed by every other hypothesis.   No individual can contemplate a life of self-sacrificing virtue, and
of flagrant wickedness and crime unattended with repentance,
as terminating in the same condition hereafter, and retain his
sentiments of moral esteem for the "Judge of all the earth."
Every individual does as fatal violence to his moral nature,
who entertains the sentiment that God does not, in eternity,
hold deserved retributions in readiness for the virtuous and vicious, as the man does who denies the soul's immortality. I
feel perfectly safe in venturing the affirmation, that there is
435 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHIIY.
not an individual on earth, who holds that God has prepared
the same rewards hereafter for the virtuous and the vicious here,
that does, or can, in the depths of his own mind, entertain feelings of esteem and reverence, and is inspired with feelings of
delight and praise, for the Eternal One.
3. I mention one other very decisive fact bearing upon this
question. Every observer of the facts that lie all around hinm
in the universe, cannot have failed to notice an invariable tendency, common to the practice of both virtue and vice; it is a
tendency to changeless fixedness of character in the one specific direction in which an individual accustoms himself to act.
Now, what does such an unvarying and universal fact indicate,
in respect to the character of the future destiny of moral
agents?  Certainly this, and this only, that the moral universe
is advancing, not only in the line of immortal existence, but to
a state of fixed and changeless moral retributions. What
other convictions do such considerations tend to impress upon
the Mlind of all who seriously throw their thoughts upon the
eternal future before them? How thoughtfully, then, does it
become us to walk along the borders of that "undiscovered
country," across whose bourne we are so soon to pass.
436 
CLHAPTER XXII.
THE IDEA OF GOD.
WE come now to a consideration of the last and most important subject to be investigated in the present Treatisethe idea of God.
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS.
In the commencement of my remarks upon this subject.,
special attention is invited to the following preliminary considerations:
1. The idea of God, like that of Immortality, is in all Minds
in whom Reason is in any considerable degree developed.
This will be admitted by all who are at all acquainted with the
history of the race.  The idea of God is a common phenomenon of the universal Intelligence.
2. Like the doctrine above named, it is not in the Mind as
the result of logical deduction; yet it is there with such weight
of conviction, that every one feels that he involves himself in
infinite guilt, in denying, or entertaining a doubt of its objective validity.  This is evident from the fact, that every skeptic,
in the depths of his own mind, believes that, if there is a
God, he has forfeited His eternal favor, in the denial of htis
existence, a fact clearly evincing the consciousness, that in
doubting, instead of adoring and worshiping, he has done fatal
violence to the laws of his own being.
3. This idea is naturally in the Mind with such weight of
37* 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPIIY.
conviction, as to be apparently incapable of any considerable
increase or diminution by any process of logical deduction.
Argumpents in favor of its validity, do not, in mllost instances,
really increase the weight or force of this conviction.   They
simply develop in the Mind a distinct anid reflective consciousness of what it was absolutely assured of before.   Nor can professed arguments to the contrary erase this conviction from the
Mlind; a fact fully evinced by the force with which the assurance of the boing of God often leaps upon the Mind  of the
skeptic, in moments  of solemn  thought, of sudden  calamity,
or unexpected exposure to death.
4. As this conviction is thus in the Mlind, and not there as
the result of logical deduction, it must be ranked among the
~riflau7/ intuitions of Reason.
5. As a first truth of Reason, the Divine existence is susceptible, in the first instance, of the kind of proof common to
all first truths, and in the second, of that which is peculiar to
all necessary intuitions.
In the light of the above observations, we will now proceed
to a consideration of the ground of the universal conviction of
the reality of the Divine existence. There are two fundamental forms in which the idea of God exists in the Mlind, to
each of which special attention will be directed, to wit, God,
the unconditioned cause of all that exists and acts conditionally- and God, the Infinite and Perfect.
GOD TIHE UNCONDITIONED CAUSE OF ALL THAT EXISTS
CONDITIONALLY.
Whatever ideas  malnkind may entertain of the universe,
whether they resolve all substances into Mlatter or into Spirit,
or whether they regard thought as the only reality, there is
one point in respect to which they all in fact do, and must
perfectly harmonize, to wit, that there is an tt7tiiimate rcasoit
438 
THE IDEA OF GOD.
w7y t]he facts of the u2ziverse, whatever  their  (attre  ay be
sutlp)osed to be, are what they are, an(d Mot otherw-i,se.  Now if
the term God be employed to designate this ultimate Reason,
or unconditioned Cause, then all mnankind do really and truly
believe in God, and none doubt, or profess to doubt his existence.  It is no more possible for us to doubt the reality of
such ultimate Reason, than it is to doubt the validity of tlhe
principle, that every event must have a cause.   As thus define(l, the question, and only question, at issue between the
Theist and anti-Thleist is, not whether God exists, but uhat'is
7iis chae1'cter? that is, What is the nature and character of
this final, unconditioned Cause, the reality of whose existence
all admit, and none can, by any possibility, doubt?
POSSIBLE HYPOTHESES ON THIS SUBJECT.
On a moment's reflection, it will be perceived, that there
are but a certain number of possible hypotheses on this sub.
ject, and that some one of these, to the exclusion of all the
others, must be true.  It is self-evident, that this cause must
exist as an inherent law of nature, or it must exist out of and
above nature, as a power exercising an absolute control over it.
If the latter supposition be granted, then, as all will a!dmit, the
Theistic hypothesis, as above defined, must be true.  If, on the
other hand, the formner supposition be granted, then the unconditioned Cause must exist as an inherent law of Matter, or of
Spirit, or of pure thought, no other supposition being conceivable or possible.  The true answer, then, to the question, What
is the nature and character of the ultimate leason or unconditioned Cause under consideration, will be found  in the hypothesis of Theism, of MIaterialism, or in that of some one of
the forms of Idealism.   This must be true, because these include all conceivable hypotheses.
439
111" " . 
INTELLECTUAL PHIIILOSOPIIY.
1None but the Theistic H,Vpothesis can be true.
If it be admitted, that there are two orders of finite substan ces -- Matter and Spirit-  and that they possess the attributes,
and sustain to each other the relations which we have attributed to them, then the truth of the Theistic hypothesis is undeniable. Indeed, it has never been denied, but upon the
assumption of the non-reality of Spirit as distinct from Matter, or of Miatter as distinct from Spirit, or of all substances
whatever. The Unconditioned must be an inherent law of
thought, of Spirit, or of Matter, or the free, intelligent, selfconscious personality of Theism.   The truth of these statements is so self-evident, that no one was ever known to deny it.
Now it has already, we think, been rendered perfectly evident, that neither the hypothesis of Materialism, nor any one
of those of Idealism can be true. That of Theism, then,
must be true. We might with perfect safety rest the argument here. The paramount importance of the subject, however, requires that we give to the argument bearing upon that
subject, a still more extended elucidation.
THE THEISTIC HYPOTHESIS ESTABLISHED AS A TRUTII OF
SCIENCE.
The relation of the Divine existence considered as the Ultimate Reason or Unconditioned Cause of the facts of the
universe, is an absolutely necessary truth, the opposite being
inconceivable, and in itself, impossible.  Hence, as we have
already remarked, it is a truth universally admitted. Now
whatever attributes are necessarily implied in the idea of such
a cause, on the one hand, and in the facts of the universe, on
the other, must  be affirmed of God.   This all will admit.
The process of the argument, in the first instance, is wholly a
Il'i-oi and in the next d posteriori.
440 
TIlE IDEA OF GOD.
ATTRIBUTES NECESSARILY IMPLIED IN THE IDEA OF THE
UNCONDITIONED.
The following may be enumerated as the attributes necessasarily implied in the idea of God considered as the Unconditioned Cause, to wit, Eternity, absolute Immutability, and full
and perfect adequacy and adaptation to produce the facts of the
universe, and render them what they are, and not otherwise.
If this Cause did not exist from eternity, it would itself be an
effect of some other and prior cause, and therefore not itself
the ultimate or unconditioned Cause. If it were not absolutely
immutable, its condition and states would be determined by
some other cause, in which case also, it would not be the ultimate Cause. If it did not possess perfect adequacy, and adaptation to produce the facts of the universe, it could, in no
sense, be the cause of those facts.  These attributes then must
pertain to God, as the Unconditioned. As necessary corollories from these truths, the three following propositions may be
affirmed of the Unconditioned:
1. The cause assigned, in any given hypothesis, must have,
to possess any claims whatever to our regard, an intelligent
adaptation to produce the facts of the universe, and render
them what they are. If it has no apparently adequate adaptation to such an end, the hypothesis containing it, is intrinsically absurd, and may be properly rejected on the ground of
impossibility.
2. The cause assigned must not rank lower in kictd than
the effect attributed to it: otherwise such cause could have no
intelligent adaptation to produce the effects attributed to it.
3. The Unconditioned Cause assigned for the facts of the
universe, must be one which possesses in itself the power of
self-originating activity, that is, of commencing action from a
state of rest, and that from the influence of no cause out of
441 
INTELLECTUAL PIHILOSOPIIY.
itself. The facts to be accounted for are not a series of events
existing fiori eternity, but one having, as we shall see hereafter, its beginning in time.  Tile Unconditioned  must be a
cause then, having in itself the power of pure self-originating
activity. It must be one possessing a creative, or formative
energy, which remained inactive from eternity up to a certain
moment in time, and then, from no cause out of itself, coinmmnenced such activity.  The truth of these statements, the
first two, to say the least, will not be denied. How the last
can be is hardly conceivable.
ATTRIBUTES OF TIlE UNCONDITIONED NECESSARILY SUPPOSED
IN TIIE FACTS OF TIlE UNIVERSE.
ATe now come  to a consideration of the attributes of the
Unconditioned, necessarily supposed in the facts of the Universe.   To proceed intelligently in this department of our inquiries, we must first classify the facts from which these attributes are to be deduced. Among these facts, I notice the
following:
Facts of creation bearing UIpon otur l2resent inquiries.
1. These facts, that is, the present order of things throughout the universe, had  their oriji,), in) tite, and are not a series
of events existing from eternity.   This statement is affirmed
as tiuc by the intuitive convictions of the race, by all the deductions of science bearing upon the subject, is assumed as
true in all the theories of the universe invented by the ingenuity of man, and is contradicted by no known facts in existene.  WAe therefore assume the truth of the proposition as
universally granted.
2. The present state of the earth is the result of a series
of i,ee c7t creations, each having its beginning in time.
The earth has existed under the reign of Fishes, under the
442 
TIiE IDEA OF GOD.
reign of RPeptiles, under the reign of M,ammals, and it now
exists under that of MIan.   Not a solitary fact can be adduced
presenting lthe remiotest indication, that any one of these orders
of existence originated by transmiutation from any one  that
preceded it.  All the known facts of creation, on the other
hand, affrm, and that most absolutely, the opposite supposition.  I simply announce here the teachings of science on this
subject, and assume the truth of its uneontradicted teachings
as the basis of the present argument.
3. Every distinct species of animals or plants that now
exists, or ever has existed on earth, has an iii(lei)c(le)lt existenee, that is, did not derive its existence by transmutation
from any pre-existing species.  If science has not established
this fact, it may truly be said to have established nothing.
4. Creation, from its commencement, has been progressive
in one direction exclusively, from the less to the ntore  perfct.
The truth of this proposition is affirmed directly by all the
teachings of science pertaining to the facts of creation, and is
assurmed as true in all the theories of the universe, of every
kind.   This fact, which is in itself of fundamental importance,
also implies, that the series of creations had a beginning; else
there could be no progress in the direction referred to.
5. No evidence whatever can be adduced of the existence
of any power inhering intrinsically in nature, of originating
from a state of total and universal inorganization, any, much
less the leading, orders of animals or vegetables that now exist,
or ever have existed on the earth.  The only power pertaining
to this subject, even apparently inhering in nature, is that of
I)Cet,t,,ati?iy species already existing, and that according to a
fixed and immutable law of lgropo7ation.   Nothing  can be
affirmed as a law of nature, if this proposition is not true.
6. All the material elements of which the earth is now
constituted, once existed in a state. of total unorganization,
443 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIIY.
with no animals or vegetables upon it, and no embryo principles from which such organizations new originate. An individual must close his eyes to all the facts of Geological science,
to doubt the truth of this proposition.
7. Two orders of finite substances, Matter and Spirit, are
to the Mind, as the basis of its reasonings on this subject, objects of absolute knowledge.   These substances are in all their
known qualities not only diverse the one from the other, but
perfect opposites. Mind, rational Mind, I mean, everywhere
stands revealed with the attributes of a free, intelligent, sensitive, self-conscious personality. Matter exhibits none of the
properties which make any approach whatever towards the
idea of such a personality. Undeniable and fundamental phenomena place an impassable gulf between them, as far as unity
of nature is concerned. No one will question at all these
statements, but upon one assumption, that their real qualities
are wholly unknown to us.  This is a formal impeachment of
the validity and integrity of the Intelligence, as a faculty of
knowledge, and then all inquiry after truth becomes an absurdity. Hence, I remark:
8. That while these substances are in their nature fundamental opposites, a fixed and undeniable relation exists between
them, which imparts an absolute vanity to creation.   Mind is
the center about which the entire material universe revolves.
Mind is the end, to which the entire organization and movements of the universe sustain the exclusive relation of a means.
Creation is thus an absolute whole, in which there is a place
for everything, and everything is in its place, as far as the
great, all-comprehending law of means and ends is concerned.
9. Creation, throughout, is constructed upon principles of
pitre science as developed in the Intelligence.  Everything
within and without us, seems, to say the least, to be the realization of a plan, which had a pre-existence in the Intellect of
444 
THE IDEA OF GOD.
the great Architect of nature. In the constitution of our nature, mental and physical, in the general structure of the universe, as developed in the science of Astronomy, and in the
organization of animals and plants in the world around us,
ideas and principles of pure science, as they exist in the Intelligence, are everywhere realized. Creation, throughout, wears
this one exclusive aspect, and this is one of the fundamental
facts that bear upon our present investigations.
10. Mlind is constituted in fundamental and immutable correlation to one idea of the Unconditioned, the idea exclusively
presented in the Theistic hypothesis. Two absolutely universal
instincts noticed in a preceding Chapter, point, as thus shown,
exclusively in this one direction - those of worship and prayer.
To these I may add a deep and universal sentiment, from
which, indeed, those just named take their rise, that of profound dependence upon a power out of and above itself. Man,
also, is fundamentally constituted as a subject of moral government.  In the interior of his Mind there is a perpetual revelation to him of the idea of right and wrong, or of the law of
duty; through his conscience he ever recognizes himself as in
the presence of a solemn behest to do the one and avoid the
other. At the same time, he feels deeply impressed with the
sense of the moral desert of good or ill, as he does the one or
the other, and he instinctively anticipates from a power out of
and above himself corresponding retributions. It is, finally,
an immutable demand of the moral nature of universal Mind,
that all the interests of the moral universe should be finally
adjusted according to the principles of eternal and immutable
justice. All the above-mentioned principles and instincts of
our rational nature, are immutably correlated to but one idea of
the Unconditioned, that of a free, intelligent, self-conscious
personality, ruling the universe in absolute wisdom and righteousness. Whether such a being exists, is not now the question.
38
445 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPIIY.
WAc mright, however, as well deny that Mlind, or any of its
operations exists at all, as to deny the facts of its constitution
above referred to.
11. Finally, throughout the entire domain of nature, one
fixed and imm-utable law obtains, as far as the observation of
man extends, to wit, For every fundamental want of sentient
existence, there are corresponding provisions, and for every
fucndalmental adaptation a corresponding object, or sphere of
activity.   Human observation has never yet discovered a solitary exception to this principle. Nature never vibrates towards
the unreal. Nor is there, we may safely conclude, throughout
the wide domain of her creations, such a chasm as there would
be, were the above principles untrue.
THE THEISTIC HYPOTIHESIS INTUITIVELY CERTAIN FROM
TIIESE FACTS.
Such are the great leading facts of the universe bearing
upon our present inquiries, facts against none of which will
any well-informed and candid mind venture a denial.   Now
we affirm, without fear of contradiction, that from these facts
the truth and necessity of the Theistic hypothesis, in opposition
to every other, actual or conceivable, is intuitively evident.
We cannot deny the facts without impeaching the validity and
tntegrity of the Intelligence itself, as a faculty of knowledge,
and then all inquiries after truth of every kind become absurd.
AYe cannot, on the other hand, admit the facts, without affirming, as self-evident, the truth of this one hypothesis, and the
total invalidity of every other.   But the truth of this one lypothesis, as affirmed by these facts, needs a still more particular and special development. To accomplish this end, I
remark -
446 
TIlE IDEA OF GOD.
TRUTH OF THIS HYPOTIIESIS MIORE PARTICULARLY DEVELOPED.
1. The Unconditioned can, by no possibility, be any law
1i/tel-il: i'll, 7attrc, any law, as affirmied by the material hypothesis on thie one hand, or the Idealistic, in any of its forms,
on the other.  This I affiirm for the following reasons:
(1). As we have already seen, not one of these hypotheses
can be true, and some one of these must be true, if the Unconditioned is an inherent law of nature.  We need not repeat the argument, by which the truth of these statements has
already been demonstrated.
(2). On no such hypothesis can we account for the undeniable fact pertaining to the Unconditioned, that of comnmencing
actritit, or puttingforth of creative power f'oin a state of inactions.  Creative energy in the Unconditioned remained inactive
from eternity up to a given period, and then it commenced action. Now this could not possibly be true of any law inhering in nature. Any such law remaining inactive, from eternity
to any one period, must remain so to eternity, unless roused to
action by some power out of itself, and then this law would
not itself be the Unconditioned.   The idea of a law of nature
remaining from eternity to a given period inactive, and then
commencing action from no cause out of itself, is just as inconceivable and impossible as an event without a cause, or the
annihilation of space.
(3). Hence, I remark, that on no such hypothesis, can we account for the undeniable fact of Creation, that of its origin ia,
time). The Unconditioned, as we have seen, must be immutably the same, from eternity to eternity.   If it were an inher ent law of nature, it must have acted as a creative energy from
eternity, or it never could have acted at all.  Creation, then,
could not have been a fact having its origin in time. It is such
447 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
a fact, and therefore the Unconditioned is no law inhering in
nature.
(4). The element of progression from the less in the direction of the more perfect, an element which undeniably constitutes a fundamental characteristic of creation, can be accounted
for on no hypothesis that the Unconditioned is in any form a
law inhering in nature. Progression proceeding from such a
law must have been from eternity, and would already have attained to infinity.  It has not thus attained, and therefore cannot proceed from such a law. The hypothesis, under consideration, then, cannot be true.
(5). The facts of the origoin of animal and vegetable organizations, such as really appear on earth, from a state of
universal unorganization, cannot be accounted for on the hypothesis under consideration. MIatter was once exclusively in
this state, with no embryo principles or conditions from which
such organizations now originate, or by any known law of nature can originate. This is absolutely undeniable. Now from
what known (and we must reason only from the known) inhering law of nature can the origin of all the species of animals
and vegetables that have existed and now exist on earth, be
accounted for? No such law can be designated, and therefore
the facts before us must be attributed to a power out of and
above nature.
(6). This hypothesis can be true, also, but upon the validity
of one assumption, to wit, that nature, in all the higher departments of her works, is immutably correlated to the unreal, instead of the real in the Unconditioned. I refer, of course, to
the higher and spiritual departments of MIind. These, as we
have seen, are in fixed correlation to the Theistic hypothesis, in
opposition to every other. The great fundamental principle
of science, that for every fundamental want of sentient existence there is a supply, and for every fundamental adaptation a
448 
TIlE IDEA OF GOD.
corresponding sphere of action, is totally false, if the hypothesis
under consideration is true.  It cannot be true, for the reason
that for the facts of the universe it assigns a cause, which
makes nature opposed to herself and from which such facts
can, by no possibility, arise.
2. The Unconditioned can be no cause actiny f)-om necessity. This is absolutely evident from considerations already
presented. A necessary cause must act, as soon as the conditions of its activity are fulfilled. This is the fundamental element of our idea of such a cause. WVith the Unconditioned
these conditions must have been fulfilled from eternity, or not
at all. The opposite supposition involves the assumption that
the action of the Unconditioned depends upon a cause out of
itself, in other words, that it is not the Unconditioned.  Creation, then, would be from eternity, and could not be an event
of time. To account for creation as having had its beginning
in time, a cause must be assigned, that could have acted as a
creative energy, at that one moment, and need not to have
thus acted at any preceding one, and that cause remaining
from eternity to eternity absolutely immutable and determined
in its activity by no other cause. Now the idea of necessitated causation does not, and cannot answer these conditions.
It has no power from a state of inaction to commence activity,
but from causes out of itself. From one state it cannot assume
a new form of activity, but from the occurrence of new conditions which render continuance in the former state, and nonaction in the new direction, equally and absolutely impossible.
Now no such new conditions could have arisen with the Unconditioned, at the moment referred to, the very supposition of
their occurrence implying a self-contradiction, to wit, that the
Unconditioned is not the Unconditioned.   No reasons existed
for the commencement of creation at the moment referred to,
rather than at any other moment, each period being in itself
38*
449 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
in all respects absolutely like every other, and as equally distant from the eternity past and the eternity to come.   The
fact of creation as an event of time, a fact undeniable, cannot
be accounted for upon the supposition, that the Unconditioned
is any form of necessitated causation.
Every objection also, almost without exception, that lies
against the idea that this cause is any inhering law of nature,
lies with equal force against the idea, that it is any other form
of necessitated causation.  It is just as impossible to account
for the facts of creation on one supposition as on the other.
3. The Unconditioned must be afree Cautse, in opposition
to all forms of necessary causation.   On no other supposition
is the undeniable fact of creation as an event having its beginning in time, a conceivable or possible event.   On  this hypothesis, it is both conceivable and possible. If the Unconditioned is a firee and not a necessary cause, then at each
successive moment from eternity, he might or might not put
forth his creative energy.   Its non-exercise at each previous
moment, and its exercise at the moment when it was put forth,
is conceivable, and therefore possible.   On  no other conceivable supposition can the fact, that the effects of the Divine
agency are in time and not from eternity, be accounted for.
A cause that acts from necessity must, as we have seen,
act as soon as it exists, and the conditions of its activity are
fulfilled, wlichi   must have been true of the Unconditioned
from eternity.  The efiets of the Divine agency, then, if the
1;5 co~dgtlaed is a necessary cause, must have been from eternity, and not, as in fact they are, in time. If the human race,
or the universe of mind around us, had their origin from  a
necessary cause, their existence must have been from eternity,
or they could never have existed at all.  That which rendered
it impossible for the Unconditioned to create such beings from
450 
TIIE IDEA OF GOD.
eternity up to any one moment, would have rendered it impossible for him to have created them to eternity.  There can be
no possible escape from this supposition.
To suppose the Unconditioned to be a necessary and not a
fice cause, is also self-contradictory.  WVhat is the fundamental
eiement of our idea of a necessary cause?   It is this: a cause
which can act only as it is acted upon  by something which
necessitates its action.  A necessary cause, therefore, in its action, must be conditioned, and not unconditioned and absolute.
If God, then, is not a free, he is not the unconditioned cause
of all conditional existences.  Besides the supposition that the
unconditioned and absolute is under the law of necessity, inmplies that the necessitating power acted anteccdeitly/ to the
unconditioned.   This is equivalent to denying that God is the
.first, as well as the unconditioned and absolute cause.
4. As an unconditioned and absolute cause, God must be
possessed of Intelligence.  This follows as a necessary consequenee of the fact, that he is a fee, and not a necessary agent.
Free agency, ill the absence of Inltelligence, is an absolute ilumpossibility.  AVe cannot possibly conceive of such an agent.
Further, the universe to which God has given existence is ole.
Every object and element in the universe exists as a part of
the great whole.   The whole is in perfect adaptation to each
and every part, and every part is in adaptation equally perfect
to the whole; and the great whole, with all its parts, exists in
perfect harmony with fundamental ideas of the Intelligence.
Nlowv to suppose that a free cause without Intelligence  has
created and constituted a universe, all the parts and departments of which, as parts of one great whole, exist in perfect
harmony with fundamental ideas of the universal Intelligence,
is an absolute impossibility.  -It is, in reality, the gross ahsurdity of affirming an event without a cause.
451 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPIIY.
5. As the unconditioned and absolute cause of all that
conditionally exists, God is a spiritual, and not a mater)ial
existence.  This follows, as the logical consequent of the fact,
that he is a free and intelligent, and not a necessary and unintelligent agent.
6. God also must be a zoral agent. This likewise is a
logical consequent of the fact that he is an intelligent and free
agent. Intelligence and free agency cannot be postulated of
any being without, as the logical consequent of that supposition, attributing to him moral agency.
7. As the unconditioned cause, God exists and acts as the
moral legislator and governor of the moral universe, exercising
the functions of moral government in perfect harmony with
the laws of absolute wisdom and rectitude. The basis of the
universal and necessary conviction that God thus exists and
acts, is found, I suppose, in the conscious laws and operations
of our own mental and moral nature.   Here we are conscious
of the actual establishment of a moral government in perfect
harmony with the immutable principles of justice and goodness.  Conscience reveals the right and the wrong, and demands implicit and absolute obedience to the one, and corresponding avoidance of the other.   Nor can we  do the one or
the other without experiencing in ourselves corresponding retributions.  Here is moral government established, and no one
can mistake its character.  What is without may present apparent disorders, in the midst of which, however, we cannot
mistake the fact, that all things are tending towards an ultinate adjustment, in accordance with the principles of absolute
truth and justice. The revelations in the interior of our own
mental and moral being, however, we cannot mistake, the revelations of " God as the judge of all," ruling the moral universe in absolute wisdom, justice, and beneficence.
452 
THE IDEA OF GOD.
8. I remark, finally, as a necessary deduction from all that
we have previously established, that as the Unconditioned, God
is a free, intelligent, self-conscious Persolality?' in opposition
to the impersonal god of Pantheism and kindred hypotheses.
Freedom, intelligence,   rituality, and moral agency must, as
we have seen, be affirmed of God. Now these attributes necessarily imply Personality in the Godhead.   With this position the entire facts of the universe, material and mental, perfectly accord, and they accord with none other.   Our entire
mental and moral nature are immutably correlated to the unreal, if God is not such a personality. Man also exists as such
personality. To suppose that the Unconditioned is not a person, but a thing, as in that case he must be, is to assign for
the effect a cause which ranks infinitely lower in kind than
that which it produces. From what has already been established, however, the truth of the proposition before us is selfevident. No further enlargement of the argument is demanded
in this connection.
GOD, THE INFINITE AND PERFECT.
We come now to consider the second form in which the
idea of God is revealed in the human Intelligence, to wit, God,
the itfinite and Perfect.
This a First Truth of Reason.
That this form of the idea of God is a first truth of Reason, is evident from this one consideration.  Should any one
attribute to God an acknowledged imperfection of any kind,
he would know in himself, that he had thereby involved himself in infinite guilt.  Men may, without conscious guilt, im
453 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIIY.
pute to the 3lost High real imperfections, but not as such.
Whatever individuals regard as necessarily implied in the idea
of the Infinite and Perfect, they universally conceive themselves as under the highest obligation to attribute the same to
God.   Further, there never was a time, since the idea of God
first arose in our minds, when we did not thus regard him.
There never was a time since the period under consideration,
when we would not regard ourselves as infinitely guilty in attributing to God any acknowledged imperfection, or in not
affirming of him whatever we regarded as involved in the idea
of the Infinite and Perfect.   God, then, the Infinite and Perfect, is a first truth of universal Reason.   It now remains to
designate the grounds of our conviction of the objective validity of this form of the idea of God.
DOES CREATION INDICATE THE CHARACTER OF GOD AS INFI                    NITE AND PERFECT?
At the outset of our inquiries here, an important question
arises, to wit: Does creation reveal its author as Infinite and
Perfect? Can an effect acknowledged to be finite reveal its
cause as infinite?  If so, this revelation cannot be found in
the mere exteitt of the Divine works.  Suppose that the creation of oite world only would have revealed its author as finite,
how imany such worlds would it take, to reveal himni as infinite?
Nothing short of a number absolutely infinite, which is an absurdity. It is the height of absurdity, therefore, to reason, as
is commonly done, from the mere exte.nt of creation, which is
still acknowledged to be finite, to the absolute infinity and perfection of its author.  Yet we cannot say, c _pefori, that God
may not stand revealed in his works, as the Infinite and Perfect. That he is thus revealed therein, has been shown above.
The fact we are bound to admit, although we may not be able
454 
THIE IDEA OF GOD.
to designate the grounds of our convictions in respect to it.  It
not unfrequently happens, that in the presence of certain facts,
our Intelligence affirms absolutely particular conclusions,  as
the logical antecedents of the facts, while we may be at a loss
to determine the particular elements in view of which those
conclusions are affirmed.   For such a reason, the conclusions
ought to be to us none the less valid. I once read of a painting which presented with great perfection of execution, a human countenance.   Every one that contemplated the countenance, felt, as his eyes were fixed upon it, a sort of horror
creeping over him.   Let us suppose that no one could designate the elements in the picture, which sustained to those feelings the relation of cause.  No one would, for that reason,
doubt the existence of such elements in the object.  So, in
the presence of the universe, God stands revealed to our minds
as the Infinite and the Perfect. Though we may not be able
to find those elements in his workls, which thus reveal him,
shall we, for that reason, doubt the reality of the revelation?
In the case of the painting referred to, it was found that the
author had produced it, after perpetrating the crime of mnurder.  Hence he had penciled in the countenance, the internal
feelings of his own mind.   So God, for aught we  can klinow,
a 1Jriori, may have somewhere in his creation, penciled out the
indications of his own Infinity and Perfection, pencilings which
the universal Intelligence discovers and correctly interprets,
without, in most instances, being able to distinguish.   This I
believe to be the real state of the case.  God, in his works,
stands revealed as the Infinite and Perfect.   The elements in
his works, by which he is thus revealed, may not yet have
been designated. Yet they will be. It becomes us, as phlilosophers and Christians, to continue our observations till the
elements under consideration are recognized and presented to
the world.
455 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPIIY.
REASONS WHY THESE ELEMENTS HAVE NOT YET BEEN
DESIGNATED.
Permit me here to suggest the inquiry, whether, mainly
for the three following reasons, almost, if not quite all efforts
to find the ground of the conviction under consideration, pertaining to the Divine Infinity and Perfection, have proved
unsuccessful:
1. The two forms above designated, in which the idea of
God is developed in the Intelligence, have not been recognized
and separated from each other. Hence, considerations adapted
only to reveal God as the unconditioned and absolute cause,
have been adduced to prove his Infinity and Perfection. Failing to establish this last point, they have been rejected, as
having no bearing whatever upon the question of the Divine
existence.
2. An attempt is always made to demonstrate the reality
of the Divine existence and perfections by a formal process
of logical deduction, instead of recognizing the belief of these
truths as among the primary and necessary intuitions of Reason, and then falling back upon those intuitions to find their
chronological antecedents, in other words, the grounds of such
affirmations of Reason pertaining to God.
3. The argument for the Divine Infinity and Perfection
has almost invariably taken a wrong direction, to wit, the element of immensity in the external creation. This immensity
is limited, finite. The infinite is not found here. Hence,
many have concluded, that no evidence at all exists in creation,
of the Infinity and Perfection of God.   So Kant reasons;
and because this one element of creation does not reveal God
as the Infinite and Perfect, he argues, that creation presents
no evidence at all, even of the Divine existence, -a most
strange and illogical conclusion. Where, then, should we cx
456 
TIlE IDEA OF GOD.
pect, a  2'iori;, to find those pencilings in view of which the
Intelligence affirms the Divine Infinity and Perfection? Not
surely in the external material universe, but in that " which is
made in the image of God," the universe of Mlind. Among
the laws of its inner being, Mind will find the indications of
the Infinity and Perfection of its Author, if it finds them at all.
FOUNDATION OF THE CONVICTION THAT GOD IS BOTH INFI                    NITE AND PERFECT.
WVe are now prepared for a direct consideration of  the
grounds of the affirmation of the Intelligence, that God is both
Infinite and Perfect.
1. The first that I notice is a fundamental element in the
idea of God, as the unconditioned and absolute cause of all
that exists conditionally.  lWhatever  the Intelligence necessarily apprehends as finite, it as necessarily regards as conditioned.  In tracing back every chain of causes and effects to
the first, or unconditioned and absolute cause, we naturally and
necessarily ask, in respect to everything given as finite, What
caused that? WVe put this question with no more doubt that
it had a cause, than we have that no event exists without a
cause.  The Intelligence does not, and cannot recognize itself,
as in the presence of the unconditioned and absolute, till it
finds itself in the presence of the Infinite and Perfect. This
I believe to be one of the chief sources of the conviction in
our minds in respect to God as the Infinite and Perfect.
2. In the presence of this idea of God, the Intelligence
intuitively and absolutely affirms the total absence of all evidence, that God is finite and imperfect.  Hence the Intelligence cannot affirm  either of God.   Further, from the depth
of our inner being there proceeds a solemn prohibition against
imputing to God any imperfection, natural or moral, without
39
457 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
positive evidence.   Every one feels the presence and force of
that prohibition, who attends properly to the admonitions of
his own nature.
3. To the idea of God, as the Infinite and Perfect, our entire mental constitution is in conscious harmony. It is only
in the presence of this idea that the MIind is capable of the
degree of virtue and happiness which its nature consciously
demands.   We cannot exist without a consciousness of such
facts pertaining to the fixed correlation between the changeless
demands of our own nature and the reality of God, as the Infinite and Perfect. Our nature shudders and shrinks back
with horror at any other conception of God than this.   The
idea of God, as the Infinite and Perfect, is the great want of
universal M1ind. To every other want, in the universe within
and around us, a corresponding reality exists.  To know the
demands of the nature of any being, is to know with perfect
certainty the reality of corresponding objects in creation
around.   Shall we suppose that the great ov-ershadowing want
of universal MIind is the only necessity to which no corresponding reality exists?  Now, I believe that the conscious correlation of our immortal powers to the idea of God, as the Infinite
and Perfect, and to that idea alone, is one of the chief grounds
of the affirmations of our Intelligence, under consideration,
pertaining to God.
4. In all minds, also, there exists a conscious conviction
that God should be nothing else than the Infinite and Perfect.
MIorally perfect we know he ought to be. So the Intelligence
affirms, that having voluntarily given existence to beings whose
nature demands nothing else than Infinity and Perfection in
him, he ought to be to those beings what their nature, as he
has constituted it, demands.   Ilence, also, from the depths of
our being, there not only comes up a solemn prohibition against
attributing finiteness and imperfection to God, but a solemn
4 - 8 
THE IDEA OF GOD.
admonition to esteem, adore, and worship him as nothing else
than the Infinite and Perfect. Every one who properly listens to what is passing in the inner sanctuary of his own mind,
will recognize what I mean in these declarations.
5. WAorship is recognized by universal Consciousness, as a
changeless demand of our nature.   Yet every one feels that he
does that nature infinite violence, when hlie worships anything
but divinity, and divinity in harmony with any idea opposed
to that of God as the Infinite and Perfect. What does such
a law of universal 3lind indicate?  Certainly, that God, the
only object of worship, is nothing else than the Infinite and
Perfect. In the consciousness of such demands in our nature,
the Inteiligence perceives at once, as their logical antecedent,
the reality of Infinity and Perfection in the Author of that
nature.
6. One other ground of conviction under consideration yet
remains to be designated, a ground more fundamental, if possiblc, than any yet pointed out. Mind is everywhere revealed
to itself, not only as destined to an immortal existence, but as
possessed of powers involving in their own nature the elements of endless progression.   Every power and susceptibility
of our nature possesses this one characteristic, a fixed adaptation to a state of endless growth and expansion. Of this
characteristic of his own immortal powers every one is really,
though he may not be reflectively, conscious.   What  do such
powers indicate in respect to their Author? Nothing else than
Infinity and Perfection. As Mind descends to a contemnplation of its own powers and susceptibilities, and perceives in
them all the elements not only of Immortality, but of endless
growth and expansion in thought, feeling, and action, here it
finds those pencilings in which it reads, with the most profound
and solemn convictions of its being in the presence of eternal
realities, the Infinity and Perfection of the Author of its ex
459 
INTELLECTUAL PHIIILOSOPHIIY.
istence. MIind knows, that in the endless growth and expansion of its immortal powers, nothing but Infinity and
Perfection in God can meet the eternally enlarging demands
of those powers. In view of its own powers and destiny,
MIind reads, with the most undoubted convictions, the Infinity
and Perfection of the eternal Guardian and Disposer of the Immortal interests involved in the possession of such powers.
Such, as I conceive, are the grounds of the affirmations of
the universal Intelligence in reference to God, as the unconditioned and absolute cause of all that conditionally exists, and
as the Infinite and the Perfect.
RELATION OF THE IDEA OF GOD, ABOVE ELUCIDATED, TO
ALL OTIIER IDEAS OF HIM.
The two forms of the Divine idea above elucidated, to wit,
God, the absolute and unconditioned cause of all that exists
conditionally, and God the Infinite and Perfect, are the great
foundation principles in the science of Theology. Whatever
is correctly affirmed or denied of God, must be done in the
light of these two principles. In their light every other truth
of God, and all the principles of his eternal government, stand
revealed to our minds.   Do  we, for example, affirm omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience, justice, goodness, truth, of
God; it is because these perfections are involved, as essential
elements, in our idea of him as the Infinite and Perfect. Do
we legitimately deny anything of God, it is because that, in attributing it to him, we should affirm finiteness or imperfection of him.   The same holds true of every form in which
any particular characteristic is to be attributed to God. That
conception of any particular characteristic which most fully
harmonizes with the fundamental elements involved in the idea
of absolute Infinity and Perfection, is to be affirmed of God;
460 
THE IDEA OF GOD.
while every other, and especially every opposite form, is to be
denied of him.
THE IDEA OF A SYSTEM OF THEOLOGY.
Theology defined.
Theology is the science of God, systemnatically evolved in
the light of the fundamental ideas of Reason, pertaining  to
hin, (tbove eltcicdate(l.  This will be admitted by all in whose
minds the idea of science is developed at all, as a correct, and
the only correct, definition of the subject.
Postulate, Axioms, &c., in Theology.
The great postulate, the foundation principle in the science,
as shown above, is the idea of God as the unconditioned and
absolute cause, and as the Infinite and Perfect.
The axioms in the science are the two following:
1. Whatever is involved as an essential element of our
idea of an unconditioned and absolute cause, and of Infinity
and Perfection, is to be affirmed of God.
2. WVhatever, if attributed to him, would contradict the
idea of an unconditioned and absolute cause, or affirm finiteness or imperfection of God, is to be denied of him.
All particular attributes, the definitions in the science, are
then to be elucidated in the light of the postulate and principles, or axioms, above presented.
Kigd of Proof pe)etaining to each particular Attribute.
The proof, and the only proof, to be presented, that any
particular characteristic is to be affirmed of God, is a demollnstration of the fact, that such characteristic is essentially involved in our conception of him as the unconditioned and
39 *
461
.1 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPIIY.
absolute cause, or as the Infinite and Perfect.   This is the
kind of proof peculiar to all sciences - proof resting upon the
principle of contradiction.   WVhile it is shown  that such or
such an attribute, or any particular form of a given attribute,
mrust be affirmed  of God, else we deny of himn the prerogative
of unconditioned and absolute cause, or the characteristics of
Infinity and Perfection, we have presented absolute demonstration of the fiact, that such attribute belongs to God.
This A~cieMce to be evolved fi the liyht of the FTVors of  God,
mqateiiatl atoll meiltal, and of the Teachings of Inspiratioln.
This science also should be evolved with continued reference
to the workls and Word of God.   In developing the attributes
involved in the principles under consideration, we should not
go to the Bible to prove that such a characteristic is to be
affirmed of God, but the teachings of Inspiration should be
adduced, to show the correspondence between the affirmations
of science and the Word of God. Thus the science under
considcleration would be, as far as it extends, a continued commentary upon the sacred volume.   The perceived harmony of
the two would give additional force to the influence of each
upon the mind.   Facts in the external material creation will
not be addtuced in proof of the reality of particular attributes
in God, but creation itself will be thrown before the mind, as
the work of God, in the light of all the attributes involved in
the ideas of him as the unconditioned and absolute cause, and
as the Infinite and Perfect.  The great truth to be developed
is, What may be accomplished through matter, under the guidance and control of a being possessed of all the perfections involved in the principles under consideration? Of course, no
attempt will be made to determine _particular developments.
But this great thought will be thrown into distinct visibility
before the miind, to wit: that all that is possible, through mat
462 
THE IDEA OF GOD.
ter, the attributes involved in the ideas of Infinity and Perfection enable the Mlost High to discern and accomplish.
In respect to Mind, this science should be evolved in correlation to all the powers and susceptibilities of our nature.
The fundamental object of the science relating to Mind being
miental development, in harmony with the idea of God as the
unconditioned and absolute cause, and as the Infinite and Perfect, under the influence of these ideas, it should be so evolved
that the natural result upon the Mind, of a knowledge and
contemplation of the system, would be endless progression and
expansion of the powers of thought, feeling, and action.  The
demands of the logical department of our nature will be fully
met, when each attribute, and each characteristic of every attribute, are seen to follow, as logical consequents of the ideas
of God under consideration.   The demands of the Sensibility
will be met, when the Divine perfections rise before the contemnplation in such a manner, as is best adapted to excite all
those feelings and sentiments which the finite is bound to
cherish towards the Infinite. The demands of the voluntary
powers are met when the Divinity stands in distinct contemplation before the Mind, as the proper, and only proper object
of the Ailind's supreme choice, obedience, love, worship, and
delight.
In the development of this science, another great thought
would be thrown into distinct visibility before the Mind, to
wit: What will be the destiny of Mind, what its future developments, under the teachings, guidance, and control of such a
being?   Here, also, no attempt would be made to determine
particulars.  The contemplation, on the other hand, would be
turned upon the destiny and developments of Mind, viewed in
the general point of light, in the contemplation of the facts
under consideration.
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.1 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
THEOLOGY, NATURAL AND REVEALED.
Theology, with truth and propriety, has been separated into
two departments, natural and revealed.
.ZVIttural Theology, as a science, is a systematic developnizeit of those tr?ths pertainiig to the attvib(tes, character,
and governm1?zent of God, involved in the ideas of hin, con —
sideired as the qtiecoiditionted and absolute cause, and as the
I2f)Ti~te a)xd Perfect.
The idea of a Divine revelation, as far as it pertains to God,
is, God the  inco??ditioned and absolute cause, and God the
Iifiaiite aid Perfect, revealed in fixed and peafeet correlation
to the Necessities of the beiygs to uhonm that revelation is mnade.
Nothing in such revelation would contradict either of the
principles under consideration, nor any of the logical consequences of the same.  As far as natural theology and revelation pertain to the same things, there will be a perfect harmony between them.  Each  will elucidate and confirm  the
teachings of the other.  Revelation will extend the sphere of
mental vision in relation to divinity and humanity both, far
beyond the reach of natural theology.   But the natural and
revealed will harmoniously blend into one beautiful, all-comprehending unity.   Such will be the character of any real
revelation from God. Such a revelation the sacred volume
claimns to be.  Its friends have no fear, in meeting the question of its divine origin, in the light of these principles.
WVhen the science of theology shall be developed in a form
truly scientific, then the hlarmony between the natural and revealed, and of the teachings of both with the dictates of universal Reason, will become distinctly visible to the world.  The
accomplishment of this object is a want yet, as it appears to
me, to be met with, in the science of theology.
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TIIE IDEA OF GOD.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A MYSTERY AND ABSURDITY IN
THEOLOGY.
The terms mnystery and absurdity are in very common use
in theology.   Doctrines presented as affirmed by  the direct
teachings of Inspiration, are often objected to, on the ground
of intrinsic absurdities imputed to them. When the element
of absurdity is imputed to a given doctrine, the doctrine is
often defended, on the ground, that mystery is a common element of all religious truth, and that consequently the fact that
any doctrine is very mysterious, is no valid objection against it.
It belongs to the province of Intellectual Philosophy to discriminate between a real mystery and absurdity.
Absurd(ity Defined.
When all the elements contained in the subject and predicate of a given proposition are fully and distinctly known to
the mind, and when those terms are said to agree, while the
Intelligence clearly perceives, from the nature of the elements
which they represent, that they cannot agree, or when they are
affirmed to disagree, while the Intelligence perceives and affirms absolutely that they do and must agree, here we have a
contradiction, or absurdity.   If God himself should directly
require us to affirm as true, what our Intelligence thus affirms
to be false, we could not comply with the requisition. A professed revelation containing any such proposition as the above,
we cannot admit to be a real revelation from the Infinite and
Perfect. The Intelligence, on no authority whatever, can affirm any such proposition of God, while it still affirms his
Infinity and Perfection.
MJjystery defined.
On the other hand, let us suppose that the subject and pre
465 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPHY.
dieate of a proposition, each embraces some elements which we
know, and somie which we do not know, and that in the proposition the subject and predicate, in view of the elements which
we knowv, are affirmed to disagree, and on the ground of the
unknown it is affirmed that they agree, or vice versa, the admission of the truth of such a proposition involves no contradiction.  The grounds of the agreement or disagreement under
consideration would he a mystery. As such we might reasonably admit the truth of the proposition, on sufficient testimony.
2j[ster,y and Absurdity defined i?, a?oth7er Fonzm.
Further, facts are sometimes presented  to us in such a
light, that their logical antecedents, or the condition and ground
of their existence and explanation, are also given at the same
time.   On the other hand, facts of the highest moment to us
may be revealed as facts merely, while the condition and
ground of their existence are wholly unrevealed and unknown
to us.  In the former instance, if a proposition is presented to
us, affirming, as the logical antecedent of the facts referred to,
what our Intelligence affirms can never be such antecedent, in
other words, when any proposition contradicts the necessary
intuitions of our Reason,; the Intelligence, on no authority
whatever, can admit its truth.  The proposition  is absurd.
On the other hand, when facts are affirmed, as in the second
instance above specified, we can admit their reality as facts,
while the ground of their existence is unknown, that is, nmysterious to us.  There is a mnystery but no absurdity in such a
case. The proper application of these principles will be found
to be of fundamental importance in the science of theology.
FUNDAMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS OF A REAL REVELATION
FROM GOD.
WVe have in our hands a book which claims to be a revela
466 
THE IDEA OF GOD.
tion to man  from the Infinite and Perfect.   The  question
arises, In what light shall we regard the book?  By what principles shall we test its claims? The following may be laid
down as decisive principles to be rigidly applied under such
circumstances:
1. As far as the revelation pertains to the same subjects
which fall within the legitimate domain of natural theology,
as above defined, there will be a perfect harmony between the
natural and revealed.
2. In this revelation, the Infinite and Perfect will stand
revealed in full and fixed correlation to the condition and fundamiental wants of man, circumstanced as he now is, as aftirmed by the testimony of human consciousness. The consciousness
which every man that truly knows himself and God, has that
the truth of what is affirmed is a changeless demand of his nature, in his present and prospective condition, will be to him
the highest evidence that the record is and must be true.
3. Such a revelation will present a resolution of the great
questions of human duty and destiny, the solution of which
is one of the great wants of man.
4. The claims of the record, as a revelation from God, will
be urged upon us, by all the external evidence which, in all
other cases, distinguishes truth from error.
Such a record the sacred volume  professes to be.  Its
friends, as before remarked, have no fear, in submitting the
claims of Christianity to the most rigid test of the principles
above elucidated.
Revealed Theology defined.
We are now prepared for a distinct definition of revealed
theology. As revealed theology includes the teachings of natural, it may be defined as the systematic development, in the
light of some one great central idea or principle, of the truths
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.1 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPIIY.
of I)spiIrat-o) pertainfing to the character an?d gover?lme)It of
God.   In its most comprehensive signification, it would include the entire system of divine truth, pertaining not only to
God exclusively, but to human duty and destiny, in both of
which God stands revealed to our minds.  Everything pertaining not only to the character and government of God, but
to the subjects of that government, so far forth as their revealed duty and destiny would-llustrate the principles of the
Divine administration, would be comprehended in a system of
revealed theology, using the words in their most extensive
application.  Such, as I suppose, is theology.  Its systematic
development upon principles purely scientific, still remains as
one of the great wants of humanity. This want will remain
unmet, till the true conception of such a system shall be distinctly developed in the minds of philosophers and theologians
both. If the hints above given shall tend to this result, I
shall feel that no small service has been done to the cause
of truth.
DEFECTS OF METHOD IN THE COMMON SYSTEMS OF THEOLOGY.
There is no department of human thought where system,
scientifically developed, is not a great want of the human
mind. In no other department is this want more deeply felt,
than in theology. There is no subject of thought which, when
developed upon scientific principles, does not become an object
of interest. Theology, in itself the most interesting and important of all subjects, will, when as a system it shall be developed upon profoundly scientific principles, possess an interest which shall, as it ought to do, overshadow all other subjects.  Every system of truth has some  one great central
truth or principle about which all the others revolve, and in
the light of which they appear as harmonious parts of one
468
rs,'1:" 
TITHE IDEA OF GOD.
great whole. No subject of thought is scientifically developed,
until it is evolved in conformity to the conception above given;
in other words, till it is systematically evolved in the light of
fundamental ideas. To no subject are the above remarks more
fully applicable than to that of theology.   Theology, like
every other department of human research, has its great
central truths and principles, about which all other truths
and principles pertaining to the same subject revolve, and
in the light of which they all appear as parts of one great
whole. Unless this is true, to speak of the science, or system
of theology, is to use words without meaning, or to "speak of
things that are not, as though they were."   In the definition
given of revealed theology, I have not designated the particular truth or truths, about which, as I suppose, the entire systern of revelation revolves, and into which all its diversified
parts blend into one sublime and harmonious unity. I leave
it to theologians who may condescend to receive a hint from a
source so humble, to find, inthe light of it, this great central
position, and from it to give to the system of theology a truly
scientific development. The man is yet to rise, who, by a
" wisdom which cometh from above," shall do this great work
for humanity. That man, when his work shall come to be
appreciated, will be ranked among the greatest benefactors of
his species.
But I have wandered much further than I expected, when
I commenced this seeming digression from my subject, which
is, the defects of method in the common systems of theology.
On this subject, as a friend of truth as well as philosophy (for
philosophy as well as theology is deeply concerned in the subject upon which I am speaking), I may be permitted to speak
my thoughts with all freedom. What then are the errors,
particularly of miethod, in the common systems of theology?
Among these I notice the following:
40
469 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
1. An error frequently noticed in the preceding part of
this Chapter, and which I need but hint at here, is the method
of proviing the Divine existence.  If in the first step an error
of method is committed, the whole subsequent procedure is
marred, and the system of theology is developed in a manner
not fully satisfactory to the mind.   If the question in respect
to the Divine existence is not settled to the full satisfaction of
the mind, the proof pertaining to each particular attribute will
be in a corresponding degree unsatisfactory, and a feeling of
uncertainty, in respect to that which the mind really knows
with more certainty than almost anything else, a feeling somewhat at least bordering on skepticism, will creep over the mind,
in relation to the whole system. Now there are, as it appears
to me, three prominent errors of method in the prevailing
treatises on theology, in respect to the subject before us.
The first is the fact, as stated above, that the Divine existence is not recognized as a truth already known and affirmed
by the human Intelligence, and that the only proper method
of demonstration of that truth, is by a method purely psychological, that is, by falling back upon the conviction itself, and
finding the real facts on which it truly rests, in the depths of
the Intelligence.   When  the Intelligence  has affirmed  any
truth with profound conviction on any subject, the only real
demonstration of that truth which  can be presented to the
mind, is to throw into distinct visibility, the real facts in view
of which the reality of the truth was affirmed. Now theologians, instead of recognizing this fact in respect to theology,
have gone beyond the circle of the mind's convictions, to find
some facts in the external world from which, as a logical consequent, the truth of the Divine existence would follow. The
mind of course returns from its researches more unsatisfied
than when, from the center of real illumination, it wandered
abroad in search of light.
4-i 0 
THE IDEA OF GOD.
Another error which I repeat here, is not recognizing the
two distinct and prominent forms in which the idea of God
is developed in the human Intelligence, to wit: God the unconditioned and absolute cause, anrd God the Infinite and Perfeet. Hence considerations perfectly demonstrative of the
validity of the idea in one form, but which are without force
in reference to the other, are adduced without discrimination
of their real bearing.  The  Mind perceiving that the argumnent has no real weight to prove the existence of God in the
form in which it expects it to prove it, assumes that it has no
real bearing upon the subject, and thus becomes dissatisfied
with the whole argument on the subject. This is a natural
consequence.  Hence many a student in theology has had occasion to confess that he never doubted the reality of the Divine existence, till he turned to the arguments adduced in
bookls and the theological recitation room to prove it.
The other error is in attempting to deduce the evidence of
the infinity and perfection of God from the extent and laws
of the world of Matter, instead of that of Mind. On this
point I have already said so much that I shall not enlarge
here.
2. The second, and the great error of method, in the common (so called) systems of theology, is an almost, if not quite,
total want of scientific development.  I know of no professed
system of theology, the mode of presentation and development
of which accords with any proper conception of a system of
truth, much less with a true definition of real science.  There
is and can be no real system where there are not one or more
great central truths or principles which impart unity and harmony to the whole.  There is and can be no such thing as a
system evolved in such a manner as to realize the idea of science, in which the relations and properties of a given subject
are not systematically evolved in the light of fundamental ideas,
471
I 
INTELLECTUAL PHIILOSOPIIY.
Now where is the system of theology that is developed in
any degree of conformity to the idea of system or science as
above announced, or to any other proper definition of the idea
of a system scientifically expressed? I know of no such system.  WIhat is the mode of procedure in such systems?  The
first thing proposed is to prove the existence of God.   The
next step is to take up each particular attribute, and by a separate course of argument, prove that such attribute is to be
affirmed of him.   Now this can be shown in a moment to be
a most unphilosophical procedure.
In the first place, if the proposition first proved, to wit,
God( exists, does not in itself involve a real demonstration of
the reality of his particular attributes, the proposition absolutely amounts to nothing; for it is a demonstration of the existence of a God without attributes- that is, the existence of
no God at all. For a God without attributes, is, in fact, no
God.
If, on the other hand, the demonstration of the proposition,
God exists, does involve in itself a corresponding proof of his
particular attributes, then the only proper subsequent scientific procedure is, to evolve analytically each particular attribute as involved in the proposition already demonstrated. To
attempt in any other form, by a separate course of argumentation, a subsequent demonstration of each particular attribute,
is a most unphilosophical and unscientific procedure -a procedure which really, as shown above, nullifies all that went
before.
Further, when the proposition, God exists, is proposed as
a subject of demonstration, the first thing to be done is to
define the terms used, especially the term God. Now if this
term is not so defined as to involve his particular attributes,
the term means nothing, and the demonstration is null and
void.  If the term is so defined as to involve the particular at
472 
THE IDEA OF GOD.
tributes, then, when the proposition, God exists, has been
demonstrated, the reality of each attribute is involved in the
demonstration, and the only subsequent procedure really philosophic, scientific, and reasonable, is to evolve each particular
attribute as thus involved in what has already been proven.
To attempt, by a separate course of argumentation, to demonstrate the reality of any particular attribute, is to confess the
futility of the previous demonstration.   In fact, if the common procedure is the correct one, we have not proved that
God according to any proper definition of the term, exists,
till we have presented a formal demonstration of the reality
of each particular attribute. For a God destitute of any essential attribute is not God.
In proving the proposition, God exists, according to the
two forms above stated, to wit, God the unconditioned and absolute cause, and God, the Infinite and Perfect, we have done
what every demonstration should do-that is, demonstrated a
proposition which involves every particular attribute, and which
has given us a great central position, from which the entire
system of theology may receive a purely scientific development.
The whole sphere of vision becomes as luminous as heavenly
light.
3. The third general defect that I notice in the common
systems of theology, is the total unsatisfactoriness of the arguments adduced to prove the reality of particular attributes.
Suppose we have fully satisfied our minds of the validity of
the two forms of the idea of God presented in this Chapter.
Our attention is turned to a particular attribute. We see at
once that we must affirm this attribute of God, or deny of
hi m  t he prerogative of unconditioned and absolute cause, or
impute  to him finiteness and imperfection.  The reality of the
attribute as a characteristic of God, thus becomes demonstrably evident. In affirming the attribute of him, every depart            40*
473 
INTELLECTUAL PIIILOSOPHY.
ment of our nature is satisfied. The demands of the logical
department are fully met.   The  scientific and philosophical
ideas also receive a most full and delightful realization.
On the other hand, let us suppose, that having proved the
proposition, God exists, we attempt, by a new and separate
course of argumentation, to prove the reality of some particular attribute -the Divine omnipotence, for example.   What
should we naturally expect from such a procedure? Just
what, in fact, we shall find- arguments perfectly unsatisfactory and inconclusive.  The nature of the argument, as presented in such a system of natural theology, may  be thus
stated, and these present the strongest arguments that can be
met with:
1. The fact and the extent of creation.
2. The fact that God now sustains and governs the universe, particularly the physical.
Now, here are effects undeniably finite.  From them  it is
argued, that their cause must be infinite, a palpable violation
of a fundamental principle of logic, a principle universally admitted, to wit, that no legitimate conclusion is more extensive
than the premises from which it is deduced.  Hence it is,
that the Mind does not and cannot perceive any force in the
argument; and as this is the best that can be adduced in the
same direction, a feeling of dissatisfaction and doubt arises in
respect to all arguments to prove the divine Infinity and Perfection.
When the testimony of Inspiration is adduced in confirmation of such arguments, the feeling of dissatisfaction experienced in the presence of the first attaches to that of the second,
and the result very probably is, that feelings more allied to
skepticism than joyful confidence and faith, creep over the
mind, and it may be, mar its peace and purity.
I mention  one  other defect.   According  to  the com
P'1i1
474 
TIlE IDEA OF GOD.
mon method of developing truth in theology, we have no
proper tests which we can apply to determine the question,
whether any particular attribute shall be affirmed of God, or
the particular formii in which it shall be affirmed.  If we assumie the idea of God as the unconditioned and absolute cause,
and God the Infinite and Perfect, as the great central idea
about which the entire system of truth pertaining to God, his
character and government, is to revolve, and in the light of
which each particular truth is to be explained, we have a plain
and sure test, a standard to which we can apply in all cases in
determining what attributes and characteristics we shall affirm
or deny of God, and the light in which we shall affirm or deny
them.   The great question to be asked in each instance is,
3Iust we affirm this particular attribute, and must we affirm it
in this or that particular form, or either deny of God his prerogative, as the cause unconditioned and absolute, or assert of
him finiteness or imperfection?
But according to the common  methods of theologizing,
when we take up any particular attribute, we have nothing in
what has gone before, or what is to follow, to which we can appeal as a standard or test, to determine what attributes, or
what forms of particular attributes, we are to affirm or deny of
God. The entire system of theology is thus rendered vague
and indefinite, and the truth makes no deep and palpable impression upon the mIind. No other result can follow from such
a method of evolving the truths of theology.
USE OF THIE COIMION TREATISES ON NATURAL THEOLOGY
The question is often asked, Of what real utility are the
conmmon treatises on natural theology - such, for example, as
that one so celebrated of Dr. Paley? To mne such treatises
appear really worse than useless, if presented as grounds of
proof of the existence of God, particularly as the Infinite and
475 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPIIY.
Perfect. How many persons have said, "I never doubted the
reality of the Divine existence, till I sought for a proof of it in
"Paley's Natural Theology."' If, on the other hand, such works
are referred to, as sources of beautiful and striking illustrations
of the "handiwork of God," thus awaking in us a sense of the
Divine wisdom and glory, they may be read with great interest
and profit. This, as I conceive, is their appropriate, and only
appropriate use.
CONCLUSION.
I must here take my leave, for the present, of the inquirer
after truth in this field of vast and solemn thought and contemplation. If we were never to return to it again, to renew our researches, I should part with him with the deepest regret.  If,
however, the inquirer has become imbued with a love of the science which we have investigated, and has understood and appreciated the bearing of its principles, it may be that the time
is not far distant when I shall behold him upon elevations, and
traversing fields of thought which my own powers never enabled me to reach.
One thing has cheered me on in these interesting and momentous investigations- the thought that they were all legitimately tending in one fixed direction - to God as the Infinite
and Perfect.
Here I leave the inquirer, with the fervent hope, that at
last, in the unveiled presence of that infinite, all-perfect, and
Eternal One, we may again meet; that Eternal One, "in whose
presence there is fullness of joy, and at whose right hand there
are pleasures for evermore."
476 
A,                                                    ~~~~NON
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