P S Y C H O L 0 G Y,
OR,
E L E M E N T S
OF A
NEW SYSTEM OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY,
ON THE BASIS OF
CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMM3ION SENSE.
DESIGNED FOR COLLEGES AND ACADEMIES.
BY S. S. SCHMUCKER, D. D.,
PROFESSOR OF (CHRISTIAN TIIEOLOGY  IN THE THtnOL,OGICAL
SEMINARY, GETTYSBURG.
SECOND EDITION, MUlCI  ENANG>..' x
NEW YORK:
HARPER  & BROTIIERS, PUBLIStHERS,
329 & 331 PEARL STREET,
FRANKLIN SQUARE.
1855. 
Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 184S2, by
H AnRPEi   &  BR OTIIERS,
In the Clerk's Office of the Southern District of New York. 
P RE F AC E.
As the following publication proposes a system
of mental philosophy in some degree new, a few
words in regard to its origin may be due alike to
the writer and the reader. In general, it owes its
existence to the author's desire to promote the cause
of truth and science. That cause he regards as
identified with the happiness of his fellow-men and
the glory of his God.  At an early age, he was
deeply impressed with the conviction, which no reflecting mind can fail to feel, that mental philosophy
is properly the basis of all scienc(e, and that a correct acquaintance with the properties and operations
of the mind, would not only facilitate our progress
in the study of every department of truth, but,
what to him was a matter of supreme importance,
would also enable us to acquire a more correct
view of the moral condition of the soul, and shed
abundant light on some of the practical doctrines
of Revelation. This latter consideration is mentioned here, because it was really the writer's principal motive for pursuing this subject, although he
has by no means mingled religion with metaphysics in the following treatise; on the contrary, his
A 2
0
el 
PREFACE.
investigations of the one were conducted altogether
independently of the other. About sixteen years
ago, having been called to take charge of a theological seminary, he felt it a duty to devote particular attention to his instructions in this department, and formed a resolution, which has doubtless
had some influence on this system. He had considerable acquaintance with the patriarchs of British metaphysics, Locke, Reid, Stewart, and Brown,
as well as with some few German authors; but
neither of them seemed to present an entirely natural and satisfactory exhibition of his own mental
phenomena. He then resolved to study exclusively
his own mind, and for ten years he read no book
on this subject.  During this period, he spent much
of his time in the examination of his own mental
phenomena, and having travelled over the whole
ground, and employed the leisure of several additional years to review and mature his views, he now
presents to the public the following outline of a system, as in all its parts the result of original, analytic
induction. That he regards it as a more natural,
faithful, and intelligible exhibition of the operations
of his own mind than is contained in any other work
which he has seen, he will not dissemble. Since the
features of his own system have been settled, the
writer has looked at various other works, and
found much that is valuable, especially in the re.
VI 
PREFACE.:
cent publications of his own countrymen, Professors
Upham, Day, Tappan, and others, yet nothing which
seemed to invalidate his system, or render dubious
the propriety of its publication.
As this work is designed, not only for intelligent
popular readers, but also for use in colleges and
academies, the author has abridged his manuscript,
and made it sufficiently brief to leave ample room
for the explanatory observations of the professors
and teachers, as well as written exercises of the
students. For an experience of more than twenty
years in teaching has convinced him, that the most
successful method of imparting a thorough knowledge of such subjects, is to combine with a brief
text-book the explanations and illustrations of the instructer, and, at the same time, to require the student to exercise his pen in preparing either essays
on the most prominent topics, or an analysis, or a
regular compend of the whole.
After frequent solicitation from those who heard
the author's lectures, and from some other gentlemen of high literary and scientific rank who examined the manuscript, this work is at length submitted
to the public, with an earnest solicitude that it may
subserve the cause of truth and human happiness.
The author does not flatter himself that his views
on all the topics discussed, have reached entire accuracy; he will thankfully receive and carefully
vii 
PREFACE.
weigh any suggestions -which may be made, especially if presented in the spirit of benevolence or
of literary comity. If the map of the human mind
here presented is found to be more faithfuil and
intelligible than those heretofore in use, if it tends
to make perspicuous a subject hitherto proverbially
abstruse and obscure, it will, doubtless find friends,
and the author will rejoice in the assurance that
he has not toiled in vain. Of the salutary influence of the principles and results attained, on the
grand interests of fundamental Christianity, he entertains no doubt.
The influence of the views here presented on lo
gic, rhetoric, and a number of related sciences and
topics, will be evident to  the scientific scholar
Perhaps at a future day some of these relations may
be prosecuted by the author, if his health and numrerous other duties will permit. With these remarks
the work is now commended to the blessing of God,
and the favour of the friends of true philosophy
and religion.
S. S. SCHAmUcKER.
Theological Seminary, t
Gettysburg Pennsylvantiia, }
oi.i
VIII 
SECOND EDITIOI4.
IN preparing for the press this enlarged edition
of his Mental Philosophy, the author faithfully availed himself of the suggestions of the principal reviews of the work which have met his eye. Among
these, that in the American Biblical Repository, by
the distinguished President of Pennsylvania College, exhibited the greatest familiarity with the subject and with the work, and presented the most
numerous suggestions for its enlargemnent   To that
gentleman, as well as to the reviewers in the Methodist Quarterly Review, and the New World, and
others, the author takes pleasure thus publicly to
acknowledge his obligations.  In all cases he has
carefully weighed their suggestions, and, in most
instances, been led to make some farther illustrations or additions, which, he trusts, will contfibute to the value of the work. He has been happy
to find in these writers but little dissent from his
general system.   The principal topics on which he
has made additions, amounting in all to about one
third of the whole work, are the following: the
classification of the different objects or entities in 
PREFACE.
the universe; the subject of mnemonics, or the art
of improving and aiding the memory;  the processes of perception and sensation through the bodily organs, and the different theories for their explanation; the different classes of feeling, especially the intellectual and moral emotions; the nature
of analytic reasoning, and laws of human belief;
imagination; and the operations of conscience.
The work is again commended to the blessing of
God and the favour of the public.
lMay, 1843.
X 
C ON T ENT S.
INTRODUCTION.
Page
On the Methodology of the Science, and the several Points of
Difference between Mathematical and Metaphysical Reason  ing............                         13
Definition.   Sketch of the Different former Systems: the com  mon  division into nine faculties, referred by Reid to two
classes, the Intellectual and Aclive Powers; by Stewart to
three classes, Intellectual, Active, and Social Powers; and by
Brown to External and Internal States of the Mind.          25
The German Division, into Sensibilities, Understanding, and
Will, substantially adopted by Upliam........         26
Different System proposed in this Work, into, 1. Cognitive, or
those Phenomena of the Mind which are Knowledge, our
Cognitions, not including many Operations of the Intellect; 2.
Sentient Phenomena of Mind, including Sensations, Feelings,
Emotions, and, in part, Passions; and, 3. Active Operations,
including not only the Will, but also a large part of what, in
the other Systems, is embraced under the Intellect or Under  standing........                        27
PART I.
COGNITIVE IDEAS.
CHAPTER I.
Of Objective Entities; that is, of the Universe itself, and all the
various Objects and Existences constituting it, in themselves
considered-Their Objectivity; that is, their Real Existence
-Their Division into Classes...39
CHAPTER II.
Of our Cognitive Ideas as Mental Representatives (not images)
of all the different Objects or Existences known to us in the
Universe-Exact Nature of these Ideas —Criteria for Distin  guishing Ideas of the Cognitive Class-Nature and Sources
of Error in our Cognitive Ideas or Knowledge —Ancient
Realists and Nominalists-German Realism and Idealism  Transcendental Idealism of Kant-Division of these Ideas,
1. Into Individual and Relative Knowleige; 2. Into Retro  spective (memory, voluntary and spontaneous -mnemonics),
present (consciousness), and prospectiave knowledge (bases of
the latter are, Analogy, Causation, and Revelation)..  69 
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER 111.
Organic Process by which we obtain these Ideas - Nervous
Connexion between the different Organs of Sense and the
Brain-Phrenology.  1. Sense of Vislno. The Eye, descrip  tion of-Of which Ideas the Eye is the Organ of Perception,
and of which not-Of Colour, Shape, Extension, Direction,
apparent and relative Size-Feelings accompanying these
Perceptions. 2. Sense of Hearing. The Ear, description of  Conductors of Sound, or, rather, of Atmospheric Vibrations  Number of distinguishable Sounds-Relations of Sound, Con  cords, Discords-Their Nature-Difference between our Per  ceptions of Sound and the Feelings accompanying them.. 3.
Sense of Touch. The Organ itself-Of the Ideas acquired by
Touch-Solidity or Fluidity, Shape, Extension, Smoothness
or Roughness, Heat or C(old-Whether all resolvable into
Resistance and Extension. Externity: Improvements of
this Sense-Sanderson-Institutions for the Blind substitute
the Sense of Touch for that of Vision. 4. Sense of Taste.
The Organ of Taste-The Wisdom of its Location — Per  ceptions of Flavour, and Feelings connected with them  Great Variety of Flavours —Mode of Distinguishing them in
Language.  5 Sense of Smell.  The Organ described-Our
Knowledge of Odours —Great Variety-In what the Odour
objectively consists-Feelings connected with the Percep  tion of Odours -Improvement of the Senses generally Cases of Mitchell, Dr. Moyse, &c.
Different Theories on the Mode of Reciprocal Influence of Body
and Soul in general. Theory of Occasionalisni-Of Leib  nitz's Pre-established Harmony-Des Cartes's Theory-New  ton's View-Dr. Hartley's Theory of Nervous Vibrations in
particular.  Result of the Whole...... 105
PART II.
OF SENTIENT IDEAS.
Definition of Feelings-Criteria by which this class of Ideas is
distinguished...146
CHAPTER I.
Classification of Feelings, into ldividual and Relative.  The
Individual class embraces, 1. Sensations, or those Feelings
consequent on Perceptions by the Senses. 2. Some Emo tions, intellectual, as Emotion of the Sublime, of the Beauti.
ful, the Ludicrous, of Surprise, of Wonder, &c.-Moral Emo tions, or those Feelings included in the Operations of Con science   3. Some of the Affections-Pleasant Affections,
Painful Affections. 4. Feelings connected with our Bodily
Appetites.
x 
CONTENTS.
Page
Relative Feelings, including, 1. Benevolent Feelings-as Friend  ship, Benevolence, Gratitude, &c., Filial. Parental Love, I,ove
to God.   2. Malevolent or Defensive Feelings-as Anger,
Hatred, Ingratitude, Cruelty, &c. 3. Syncpathetic Feelings  as Pity, Condolence, Comrnpassion, and Sympathy of various
kinds. 4. Antipoathetic Feelings-as Envy, Jealousy, Horror,
Disgust, Indignation, &c.......... 149
Other less valuable Divisions of Feeling, into Sensuous, Intel  lectual, and Moral-into Present, Retrospective. and Pro  spective..........150
Discussion of the different Branches of the above Classification  151
CHAPTER If.
Of the different Tendency of Entities, or the various Objects in
the Universe, to excite Feeling....178
CHAPTER III.
Susceptibility of the Mind for Feeling-its various Degrees, and
the Laws of their Operation...... 185
PART III.
ACTIVE OPERATIONS.
CHAPTER I.
Criteria by which the Active Operations are distinguished from
all other Mental Phenomena. Materials on which our Active
Operations are performed, are External Objects of the differ  ent classes, past Mental Phenomena of every class, and the
Natural Signs by which these Ideas are expressed              199
Division and Discussion of the Five Active Operations
I Inspection. Its Nature, Objects, &c., includes the Active
Processes of Perception, Consciousness, Conception,
Judgment. Recollection, Analytic Reasoning, and the
Impulsive Element of Conscience-Act of Memorizing
explained........... 203
Fundamnental Laws of Human Belief enumerated.. 213
II. Arrangemen-t.  Definition of this Active Process.
The Purposes aimed at in Arrangement...   218
Various Principles according to which the Process may be
conducted. Arrangement embraces the Processes of
Comparison, different Arithmetical Processes, Classifi      cation, Mental Associations based on any Natural Prin      ciple or Affinity, Composition of Music, and Synthetic
Reasoning. Nature of Evidence Objectively and Sub      jectively considered-Syllogisms, the Nature of.        222
III. Modification. Definition —Objects of this Process.
It embraces Abstraction, Generalization, Imagination,
xi 
CONTENTS.
rP
Fancy; its results are Geometrical Axioms, Metaphysi    cal Axioms, Mathematical Truths, Moral general Truths
or Principles (the fallacy of Kant and other writers,
particularly in Germany, who regard these general
truths as a priori knowledge), Works of Fiction in Wri    ting, Painting, Sculpture, &c.
IV. IelItal Direclion of oui' Physical Agency described —Its
different Kinds-Its several Concomitants.
V. Intellectual Intercourse with other Minds.  Philosophical
Nature of. described.  1. By Articulate Sou,nds-Nature
of Oral Language-Connexion between Words and Ideas
-How far Language is of Divine Origin. 2. By Ges    tur?es and Features of Countenance.   3. By Written
Signs-Alphabet of Chinese, of the Cherokees-Arith    metic Figur-es-Musical Notes-The Complex Opera    tion of Composition described.
Attention -why not a separate Power of the Soul.
CHAPTER II.
Mode of Occurrence of the Five Active Operations is twofold:
I. Volunztary-Proof of Man's Voluntary or Moral Agency
Motives-The Will-Two Constitutional Inclinations of
the Soul; the first, to Obey the Physical, Intellectual,
and Moral Fitness of Things, Conscience-The second,
to pursue our Well-being or Pleasure-The latter Incli      nation stronger in Man since the Fall-Different Modi      fications of these Constitutional Inclinations: love of
Life, of Property, of Power, &c.-Desires: their Differ      ence fiom Feelings.
2. Spontaneous Occurrences of the Active Operations-Dif      ference between Spontaneous and Voluntary Action      Laws of the Spontaneous Active Operations-Laws of
Association-Why we are responsible also for oui
Spontaneous Action
Pragmatic View-Dreams
Recapitulation, for Reviews and Examinations        
*
xii
289
295 
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY
INTRODUCTION.
IT has long been a subject of remark, that while
the science of mathematics, which discusses the
properties and relations of space and number, is accompanied by the most conclusive evidence, and
bears conviction with it at every step of its progress, the philosophy of the mind still remains enveloped in comparative darkness and uncertainty,
after the intellect of ages has been expended in its
investigation. The question arises, Are not both
similar in their nature, and alike susceptible of demonstrative discussion? It seems evident, that they
are not precisely alike, and yet much of the obscurity enveloping mental science, doubtless arises
from the unphilosophical manner, in which its investigations have been conducted, and the inappropriate style in which the result of them has generally been recorded. The superior force of mathematical reasoning, arises from three sources. First,
from an intrinsic difference in the nature of the subjects discussed.  Secondly, from the more rigidly analytic method of investigation, pursued in the mathematics. And, thirdly, from a less elegant, indeed,
but more precise and perspicuous method of conveying to others the knowledge we have acquired.
B 
INTRODUCTION.
A distinguished and popular writers of the present day, alleges the difficulty of ascertaining with precision the operations of other minds, as a prominent
cause of the uncertainty of mental science. But
this appears to us to be an erroneous view. All
minds are, in healthy subjects, constituted essentially alike; and as every student of this science
has access to the phenomena of his own mind, he
can draw from this source abundant materials for
the examination of any and of every aspect of the
subject. We have, moreover, the candid testimony of a multitude of writers onr these topics, each
presenting the details of his own mind; so that
this science need not labour under obscurity for
want of the experience of different and independent
witnesses.  The testimony of consciousness in regard to our individual mental operations separately
considered, seems also to be distinct and satisfactory.  And the testimony of others concerning the
clearness of their consciousness, coincides with our
own experience. But when we attempt to trace
the unknown cause of these operations which lies
behind them; or to determine and systematize their
relations to each other, which are often diversified
and obscure, we encounter difficulties on every
side. And these difficulties encumber the investigation of our own mental phenomena, as well as
those of others.
It is indeed true, that in morbid mental action,
the operations of different minds are very diverse,
and the careful collation of these diversified phases
* Dr. Abercrombie on the Intellectual Powers, p. 15, 16, Harpers' edo
14 
METHODOLOGY OF THE SCIENCE.
of mental obliquity, is interesting to the student of
mental science and essential to the physician; but
the true intellectual system must be deduced from
the phenomena of mind in its ordinary, its healthy
condition. We return therefore to the position,
that the causes of superior lucidness awarded to
mathematical science are chiefly three.
The first of these causes, namely the intrinsic
difference between the subjects discussed in these
sciences, is derived from the Author of our being.
We are so constituted that the properties and especially the relations of space and number, are more
clearly apprehended by us than those of mind.
Yet this difference is not so great as might, at first
view, be supposed. Much of it arises from the fact,
that from our earliest years we are engaged every
hour in perceiving and judging of space and number, while the phenomena of the mind are seldom
thought of until we reach the years of maturity, and
then generally at short periods as subjects of theoretical study. Our perceptions of the former are
therefore improved in an incalculably higher degree
than our views of the latter.
The second source of superior clearness has been
stated to be a more rigidly analytic method of investigation. This has led to greater improvements
in these sciences, and hence the evidence attending
their discussion is also greater. The fact that a
better method of philosophizing has usually been
pursued in the mathematical sciences is not altogether adventitious. We believe it to be chiefly
owing to the peculiar nature of the properties and
15 
INTRODUCTION.
relations of space and number, and to the fixed and
simple nature of mathematical language, which
consists chiefly of a few figures and signs, and a
small number of well-defined words, while it wholly
rejects the flowers of rhetoric.
The same method of inductive investigation is
the only one, by which real progress can be made
in mental science, or in any other department of
human knowledge. It will appear more clearly in
the sequel, that all those of our ideas which are
knowledge, are mental representatives-of entities;
i. e., of things, and their relations, existing in nature; and can be obtained, originally, in no other
way than by the careful examination of entities
themselves. Hence, however knowledge already
acquired may afterward be combined and arranged,
the only accurate method" of obtaining its original
elements is by patient successive examinations of
those entities of which we wish to obtain a knowledge. After such a careful examination of all the
facts in the case has been made, and we have thus
obtained accurate mental representatives of them
all; then, and not until then, can we with certainty
decide, whether or not any supposed property or
law belongs to them all. That method of philosophizing, therefore, which affirms a general law after
the examination of a few facts, must forever be insecure, and tend to obstruct the progress of any science.
The third source of the superior lucidness of
mathematical discussions, is the simple, literal,
concise style, in which they are recorded for the
instruction of others, and the specific numeric no
116 
NATURE OF MATHEMATICAL REASONING.
tation of every item of knowledge obtained.  It
will hereafter appear more clearly, we trust) that
one of the most prolific sources of error in human
knowledge, is the use of language which does not
express our ideas with entire, specific exactness.
But mathematical language, consisting of a few
figures, letters, and signs, and a small stock of welldefined words, the same idea is almost universally
designated by one and the same term. No attempt
is made to avoid the repetition of the same word
in the same sentence, however often the same idea
may recur; and the man would expose himself to
ridicule, who should attempt to imbody the demonstrations of Euclid in profuse and florid language.
Hience arises a degree of perspicuity of style never
attained and rarely aimed at in the discussions of
any other science. Nor is the precise separation
of each item of knowledge from every. other, and
its numerical notation unimportant.   It enables
the reader to know exactly how far an author has
succeeded in establishing the positions assumed,
and of which of them the evidence is inconclusive.
Thus, those positions, the demonstration of which
appears conclusive to all, become a common stock
of knowledge. On these others can build, assuming them as correct, and can then direct their attention to positions yet doubtful.
The same inflexible precision of style and the
distinct separation of the items of our knowledge
would doubtless tend in a high degree to advance
the science of mental philosophy; and ought, so far
as the different nature of the subjects will admit,
B2
17 
INTRODUCTION.
certainly to be introduced. Yet, if even equal pre.
cision could be attained, the style of discussion in
Mental Philosophy would still be far more copious
and diversified, because the subjects of which it
treats are incalculably more numerous and difficult.
The question here arises, What is the exact nature of the demonstration and proof in mathematics, and what in mental science? If a writer wishes
to produce conviction, which of his ideas relating
to the subject under discussion, should he exhibit
to his readers in the language just recommended,
and what active operation of mind must he perform?-Geometry discusses the properties and relations of space.   Demonstration in this science
sometimes consists in bringing the several diagrams
or figures, between which any relation is affirmed,
or in supposing them to be brought into such local
contiguity as will enable the eye to perceive the
relation at a glance. Such is the nature, e. g., of
the demonstration of the theorem of Euclid known
as Prop. IV. of Book I., viz.: If two triangles have
two sides, and the included angle of the one equal
to two sides and the included angle of the other,
they must be identical or equal in all respects. For
it virtually consists in supposing one of the two
figures to be placed upon the other, and then conducting the eye through the successive survey of its
several parts; and it is found that in this survey the
mind intuitively perceives the coincidence of each.
Sometimes the demonstration consists in reducing
the diagram into such other elementary figures by
additional lines, &C., as are intuitively discovered
18 
MATHEMATICAL DEMONSTRATION.
by the eye to possess the property in question, and
which exemplify some of those selfkvident cases
termed axioms. Axioms in Geometry consist of
generic affirmations of certain facts or properties of
space which are intuitively perceived to be true in
individual and specific familiar cases. E g., the
axiom-things equal to the same thing are equal to
one another-is first learned from the observations
of early life. We perceive in the familiar objects
around us which we touch, see, and handle, that if
any two of them are equal or like to a third, they
are also, in the same respects, like each other. The
observation is extended from one case to another,
until, finding no exceptions to it, we set it down as
a universal maxim, and confidently employ it as one
of the instruments of reasoning. This is the case
with other axioms. In arithmetic the same observation is intuitively made in reference to small numbers, and gradually extended to large ones, in regard to which the mind could not intuitively see its
truth, but, after the preliminary process, confidently and safely assumes it.
.When small numbers are added together, the
mind can intuitively perceive the truth of the sum
total. Thus, that 2+3-5, every one can perceive
to be true. But when large numbers, extending to
many figures, are added, the mind cannot see the
truth of the sum total by comparing the entire numbers. We are certain of its accuracy only by successively going through the addition of each figure, and knowing that this operation has been accurately performed. So, also, when the multiplica
19 
liN'TRODt'CTION.
tion or division of small numbers is performed, the
mind intuitively perceives the accuracy of the operation; but in large numbers our perception is indistinct. Our confidence in these cases rests on
our assurance of the accuracy of the rule or mode
of operation, which assurance is acquired in the
case of small numbers.  The same is the case with
the arithmetical proportions, e. gr., 1: 3:: 2: 6, &c.
The   ocess of reasoning in mental science is entirely different. The items of proof and the subjects of discussion are all mental phenomena, of
which each individual must judge for himself by the
testimony of his own consciousness. The art of understanditng the subject well, and of writing upon it
lucidly and conclusively, consists in the habit of carefully studying the operations of our own minds, and
of clothing the result of our observations in such
perspicuous and appropriate language, as will most
successfully conduct our readers or hearers through
the same process on the points in question. Discussions on this subject are successful in producing conviction, just in proportion as they enable the reader
to verify the writer's assertions in his own mind.
The reader's own consciousness must respond  at
every step lo the truth of the positions advanced;
and conviction terminiates, as soon as the response
is doubtfui], or the reader cannot perceive, in the operations of his own mind, the truth of the author's
assertions
20 
.  i., I.t 1     f  
ii i
i a....*  X
~~~;ill; 
THE SUBJECT MATTER AND DIVISIONS
OF
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY may be defined to be that
science which discusses the properties and operations of the human soul.  Other objects, that is,
entities, in the universe, are also the subject of investigation; but only in as far as their influence on
the phenomena of mind is concerned. Thus, in
treating of some of our ideas, we find them to be
mental representatives of external objects around
us, and we are necessarily led to examine those objects or entities, to ascertain what we may and do
know of therm, and what is the process by which,
through the bodily organs, we obtain this knowledge.
This science was formerly termed Metaphysics,
a term barbarously derived from the Greek, in
which its appropriate primitive metaphusike (lera~Vw'KOg, -,q -OV) is not found.  It is supposed to have
originated from the misapprehension of the inscription on a work, consisting of fourteen books, concerning which it is doubtful whether, at least in their
present form, they belong to the productions of
Aristotle, among which they are found. It is an
ancient, though not perfectly substantiated opinion,
that Andronicus  of Rhodes,  who arranged  the 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
works of Aristotle into classes, after he had thus assorted the books on logic, ethics, and physics, placed together several disconnected tracts on different subjects, and endorsed them " meta la physica"
(to be placed or read, after the wo?rks on physics).
Subseqtuently the discussions contained in those
books, were united into a science, which from the
above inscription was termed Metaphysics; because
it succeeded, or because it went beyond physics.
The term Aithropoology is used especially in Germany, to design!e that science, which discusses the
nature of man, as consisting of a body and mind,
and especially the influence of the former on the
latter. It is sometimes divided into Somnatology
and Psychology, the former embracing all those
bodily peculiarities and circumstances, which are
supposed by some writers to exert an influence on
the mind.  In this department much that is fanciful
and ridiculous has been written.
By Psychology is meant everything, that appro
priately belongs to the discussion of the nature,
structure, and operations of the mind, exclusive of
Logic, which is a more extended exhibition of the
laws of the mnind in one branch of psychology,
namely, the process of reasoning.  It is this latter
science which wre propose to discuss on the present
occasion.
An important preliminary question here arises,
What are the proper materials which ought to be
embraced in this science?  These we maintain are,
not so much the supposed faculties, of which we
know nothing directly, but the known phenomena
22 
DIVISIONS OF THE MIND.
of the mind, and all those other known entities or
existences, which exert an influence upon these
phenomena, or are concerned in their production.
The proper basis for a division of mental phenomena is another important aspect of our subject. We
suppose it evident that any correct classification of
mental operations, must be based on those phenomena of mind, which are known to us, and not on
unknown and supposed faculties or essence of the
mind.  The divisions adopted in the various systems
extant are numerous. The first and most generally received in the English philosophical world, is
that into about nine faculties of the mind. This division was in the main adopted by Dr. Reid, Mr.
Stewart, and the other principal metaphysicians in
England and America, until the recent introduction
of Dr. Brown's system, which has gained many ad
mirers.
We shalT first specify some of these divisions and
definitions which have heretofore been received.
The mind has usually been divided into the following faculties:
1. The faculty of perception, which is regarded
as that inherent part of the original constitution of
the soul of man, by which he obtains knowledge of
external objects, through the instrumentality of his
bodily organs.
2. The faculty of consciousness is that power of
the soul of man by which, according to Dr. Reid,
he has " immediate knowledge of all his present
thoughts, and purposes, and, in general, of all the
present operations of his mind."
23 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
3. The faculty of conception is that power of the
soul of man by which he has knowledge of things
not perceived through the instrumentality of his
senses; or, according to Stewart, it is " that power
which enables the mind to form a notion of an absent object of perception, or of a sensation which it
has formerly felt."
4. The faculty of judgment is that inherent power of the soul by which we decide that any proposition is true or not true.  It is also termed the faculty of understanding.
5. Memory is that faculty of the soul by which
we have a present knowledge of our past mental
operations.
6, By the faculty of reasoning is commonly
meant that inherent power of the soul by which
we infer conclusions from premises.  " Reasoning,"
says Dr. Reid, " is the process by which we pass
from one judgment to another, which is the consequence of it. In all reasoning, therefore, there
must be a proposition inferred, and one or more
from which it is inferred."
7. The faculty of conscience has by some been
considered as that power of the soul, by which we
experience either remorse or self-approbation on a
review of our conduct; while others regard it " as
that internal sense which decides upon the moral
character of actions."
8. The faculty of feeling is that power of the
soul, by which we experience sensations or feelings
and emotions.
9. The faculty of volition is that power of the
24 
VIEw O0  FORMER SYSTEMS.
sATAi by which we choose, determine, resolve, purpose, or will to perform or not to perform any contemplated action, of which we judge ourselves capable.
The general division of these powers adopted by
Dr. Reid was into two general elasses, viz.: First.
INTELLECTUAIL POWERS.   Secondly. ACTIVE  POWERS.
By intellectual powers he means those powers by
which we perceive objects and conceive of them;
and remember, analyze, or combine them, and judge
or reason concerning them.
By active powers he understands all those powers of the soul which lead to action, or influence
the mind to act, such as appetites, passions, affections, &C.
Mr. Stewart, the successor and commentator of
Dr. Reid, divides the powers of the mind into three
classes. First. Intellectual- Secondly. Active or
Moral. And, thirdly, Social Powers; which latter
belong to man as a member of political society.
The last division, which has obtained much currency in the English philosophical world, is that of
Dr. Brown, who divides the powers of the soul into
two classes, and designates them by the terms ExTERNAL and INTERNAL affections or states of the mind.
This division appears to bear a distinct affinity to
the old classification into sensations and reflections,
although Dr. Brown expends not a little labour-in
refuting that ancient division. The EXTERNAL AFFECTIONS Dr. Brown has subdivided according to
the organs of sense which are employed in their
C
25 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
production. viz., Smell, Taste, Hearing, Touch, and
Sighlt.  These he denominates the more definite
external affections, while he makes another class
of a less definite character to embrace hunger and
muscular pleasures and pains. The INTERNAL AFtFECTIONS he subdivides into two orders.  Order I.
embraces the intellectual affections. Order II., the
emotions.
Order I. embraces, First. Simple suggestion.
Secondly. Relative suggestion, or feelings of relations. Order II. he divides into, First. Immediate.
Secondly. Retrospective. And, thirdly, Prospective
Emotions.
In Germany, a different division of the powers
or faculties of the mind has, for some time past,
been adopted by many writers on psychology.
" The greater part of psychologists," says Professor Fischhaber, " have arrived at the conclusion,
that the soul of man possesses three principal powers or faculties, viz., the power'of sensibility (Gefiihlsvermogen), the understanding or intellect including the various operations of what are termed
the intellectual powers (Vorstellungsvermogen), and
the will (Begehrungs or Willensvermogen)."  This
division, which is in many respects a very good one,
has been substantially adopted by that excellent
writer of our own country, Professor Upham, if we
may judge from a brief notice of his recent work
which we have seen.  He, however, very properly
changes the order of these faculties, placing the intellect first, which some of the Germans had assigned to the middle; and by the introduction of
26 
OUTLINE OF THE NEW SYSTEM PROPOSED.  27
Dr. Brown's system of suggestions, and of his own
numerous investigations on other important aspects
of the subject, he has doubtless prepared a work of
high and lasting merit.
After mature deliberation, we are unable to adopt
either of these divisions, although each of them coIntains much that is true and usefil; but we propose
another which appears to 11us more simple, more natural, more clear and intelligible, and more accurately conformed to the known phenomena of mind.
This is a threefold division, into
I. COGNITIVE IDEAS.
II. SENTIENT IDEAS.
III. ACTIVE OPERATIONS.
When we strictly contemplate the phenomena of
mind, apart from the powers from which they result, we perceive no other differences of a generic
character between the intrinsic nature of our ideas
themselves, than a threefold one. They are all, in
their own  nature, either kinowled,e, or they are
feeling, or they are action. Let the reader verify
the truth of this assertion by an examilnation of his
own mental phenomena, and he will be the better
qualified to judge of its accuracy, and to enter into
the subsequent discussions. Let him take any one
within the wide range of his thoughts, and upon
examination it will be found that it is in its nature
either knowledge of something in the external universe or in the regions of mind, or it is a feeling
pleasant or painful, or it is an active process of some
kind or other, in which his mind was engaged, 
MENTAL PHILOSOPnHY
Thus, when we examine the ideas designated by
the terms tree, stone, horse, water, air, electric
fluid, mind, deity, &c., we find  them to be our
knowledge of certain objects in creation, whose existence we believe, because we have, in various
ways, ascertained some properties of each. Other
terms, such as joy, contentment, hope, sorrow, love,
friendship, gratitude, hatred, anger, condolence,
pity, envy, jealousy, &c., all express, not knowledge, but feeling; that is, a certain sentient state of
the mind, either pleasant or painful, terminating either on ourselves or on others. While a third
class of terms, such as, to examine, to inspect, to
arrange, to classify, to speak, to walk, all imply activity, and, indeed, are most prominently distinguished from the other by the circumstance of their
being in their own nature different species of activity.  The only method by which each individual
can acquire a correct idea of the difference between
these three kinds of ideas or mental phenomena, is
by examining the testimony of his own consciousness. These ideas, whether cognitive, sentient. or
active, are in their elements simple ideas, and no
definition can explain them without the testimony
of consciousness.
This triple division is mlarked out by criteria,
which we shall more fully discuss when we enter
upon the separate consideration of each individual
class of our ideas, when we think it will be clearly seen that all our ideas are resolvable into these
three classes, either as leading ideas, or appendages of such as are.
28 
OUTLINE OF THE NEW  SYSTEM PROPOSED.   29
This system differs from the one last mentioned
in its essential features.
(a.) They differ in the principle on which they
are constructed, the.former being a division of the
supposed faculties or powers of the mind, of which
we have no immediate knowledge; while the one
we propose is strictly a division of the operations
of the mind, actually and immediately known to us
by consciousness. As we know nothing certainly
of the mind except its operations, it seems to be
more philosophic and safe to base our divisions on
these operations, and in a great measure limit our
discussions to them.
This feature of diversity is applicable only in
part to the excellent work of Professor Upham,
who carefully distinguishes between the faculties
of the mind and its operations, or, as he terms
them, states; yet even he, in his general nomenclature, divides his subject into the states referring
to the Intellect, the Sensibilities, and the Will, by
which latter terms we understand him to mean not
operations of the mind, but powers or faculties.
He is thus led, like his predecessors, to class together, under one head, operations which are gen.
erally different in themselves, namely, such as are
cognitive, with some which are sentient, and others
that are active.
(b.) These systems differ in the lines of division
actually adopted by them, and in the operations of
mind severally assigned to each.   The first division
of the former system embraces all the operations
both of our first and third divisions, excepting only
C 2 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
a subdivision of our third, namely, the voluntary
mode in which our active operations sometimes occur; and that which formts but a subdivision of
our third division, constitutes the whole of it in the
olher system.
(c.) It will also be found, upon examination of
the contents of their different parts, that the two
systems diverge materially from each other.
Our view  of the entire mass of the active operations of the mind, as resolvable into five generic active processes, is, if we mistake not, new;
nothing resembling it being found, as far as we
know, in any other work. In our representation
of the will, and its relation to the activity of the
soul, and also in regard to the spontaneous portion
of our mental activity, our investigations conducted
us to some peculiar results.  But we prefer to let
the learned reader, who is familiar with other systems, judge for himself how far ours differs from
those that have preceded it, and what may be its
value, either as a whole or in its particular parts.
In pursuing our investigations, we have been anxious that they might conduct us along the paths of
truth, regardless of the question whether we agreed
with our predecessors, or differed from them.
30 
OUTLINE OF THE NEW  SYSTEM PROPOSED.    31
ON THE EXTENT OF THE SEVERAL PARTS OF THIS
THREEFOLD DIVISION.
I. The extent of the COGNITIVE CLASS OF IDEAS.
This class, we suppose, embraces,
First. What are termed Perceptions, which are,
by the definition itself, evidently "knowledge of
external objects obtained through the instrumentality of our bodily organs."
Secondly. Our acts of Consciousness. According
to the old definition of consciousness, as being our
knowledge of all our present mental operations, the
very existence of this operation has been denied,
and not without at least partial grounds. May not
the whole difficulty of writers on this subject have
arisen from their not observing the grand threefold
division of all our mental operations on which our
system is founded? Of the first class of our ideas,
viz., the cognitive class, it may justly be said that
they could scarcely be considered as knowledge at
all, if we did not know them at the very moment
in which they are attained. As to the second class,
that of our feelings, the case is somewhat diverse.
Yet certainly we have a knowledge of them, that
is, are conscious of them, and can distinguish our
knowledge of the feeling from the feeling itself, the
very moment after it occurs. In reference to the
third class, it seems, at all times, a matter of great
facility, to discriminate between an active operation, which we are performing, and our knowledge
of the fact, that we are, at present, engaged in it, and
I
i 
MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY.
of the nature of the operation itself. It is by consciousness that we have a knowledge of all the operations of our mind. It is, therefore, an extensive source, or rather department, of our knowledge. It embraces our knowledge of all the socalled internal states of the mind.
Thirdly. Our conceptions also manifestly belong
to the cognitive class of ideas. It cannot fail to be
perceived, that every conception which we have, is
a conception of something, is knowledge. It has
indeed been maintained, that our conceptions are
" knowledge, not obtained through our bodily organs." This, so far as their original elements are
concerned, we are compelled to regard as erroneous. Our system leads us to a different opinion;
yet, as this subject will meet us at a future stage of
our discussions, we shall not now enter on it. Conceptions are evidently knowledge of relations, abstract truths, &c., and thus belong to the cognitive
class of our ideas. Thus our idea of virtue is
termed a conception; and when carefully analyzed,
we find it to be a cognitive idea of the relation of
agreement, between certain actions and the law of
God, or standard of right. Again, we are said to
" conceive" the meaning of general propositions.
Our idea of the proposition: virtue is productive
of happiness, is termed a conception. When examined, this idea is a cognition of the fact learned
by experience or observation, that actions of a given
kind are productive of happiness.  The cases in
which this truth is witnessed, are all individual, but
by a mental process of frequent occurrence, hereafter to be explained, which we term Modification,
32 
OUTLINE OF THE NEW SYSTEM PROPOSED.  33
we omit the individual actions, or subjects of the
proposition, and employ the general term, virtue,
embracing them all. Of this general term virtue
we affirm the predicate of the proposition, affirm
the relation of causation, our idea of which is cognitive, and was learned from individual cases.
Fourthly. It embraces our judgnents: for what
are they but a knowledge of the relations between
propositions?
FiftIly. It embraces our recollections. These are
nothing else than retrospective knowledge, as will
easily be perceived by all.
Sixthly. It embraces the  results of reasoning,
such as belief, &c. The process of reasoning is
itself an active operation, and belongs to our third
class; but the result of the process is a distinct
thing. It is conviction of the truth or falsity of
some alleged truth, it is belief. This belief, or
conviction, is evidently cognitive, it forms an item
in our stock of knowledge.
Seventhly. It embraces the dictates or decisions
of conscience, which are nothing else than the results of our judgment concerning the propriety or
impropriety of our own conduct.   As acts, or rather
the results of judgment, are  evidently cognitive,
the dictates of conscience are in part also of the
samne nature. Yet there is also obviously something active about the dictates of conscience. They
contain not only a cognition of duty, but also an
impulse to obey it. This impulse is active, and
will be discussed in the third general division of
our subject, when we treat of our first Constitutional
Inclination. 
4IENTAL PHILOSOPHtlY.
II. On the extent of SENTIENT IDEAS.
Some objection might, at first view, be made to
the use of the term ideas, as expressive of this
second class of mental phenomena, our feelings.
We therefore request the reader to recollect that,
throughout this work, we employ the word idea, not
in its ancient Platonic sense, to signify the supposed
external and immaterial forms of things; nor with
the Peripatetics, to designate certain formns, phantasms, or sensible species emanating from all external things, and serving as the object of perception to the mind; but we use it in its popular sense,
sanictioned by the usage of the present age, to signify any and every mental operation or phenomenon
of which we are capable, and purely and exclusively the mental act. " In popular use," says the distinguished American lexicographer Webster, " idea
signifies notion, conception, thought, opinion, and
even purpose or intention." In like manner, when,
in the sequel, we speak of the mind's reflecting on
any particular idea, we again disclaim the belief of
any images or species of objects, and mean simply
the past operations of the mind itself.
This class embraces what are usually termed,
first, Sensations; secondly, Emotions; thirdly, Affeclions; fourthly, Passions, to a certain extent.
Sensations have been regarded as the feelings
which are connected with the perceptions of external objects. They are simply pleasant or painful,
and evidently they are sentient in their nature. The
34 
SKETCH OF THIE NEW  SYSTEM.
term sensation, in our language, as well as the corresponding word, sensus, of the Romans, and at'aoqya
of the Greeks, is used with considerable latitude, as
designating both the cognitive and sentient result of
the action of our bodily organs; that is, as indicating both the perception of external objects obtained
through the senses, and the feelings attending them.
In the classification here proposed, we employ the
term in the latter, which must doubtless be admitted to be its most appropriate signification. The
perceptions of external objects obtained through
this source, are discussed in the cognitive department of our work, because they are obviously
knowledge. Sensations have also sometimes been
defined "as states of mind immediately successive to a change in some organ of sense, or, at
least, to a bodily change of some kind;" but this
definition is also applicable to perceptions.
By Emotions are indicated feelings consequent
on other mental operations than present perceptions
of external objects; yet this distinction is not uniformly observed by the best writers. On the contrary, the term emotion is often used for a complex
operation of the mind, in which, though feeling of
a particular species preponderates, a cognitive element is also clearly included, as will, we think, appear when the emotions are particularly discussed.
Emotions may justly be considered as subsequent
to our intellections, and prior to the desires and
other active processes connected with them, or with
the intellections to which they succeed.
35 
MENTAL PHILOSOPIHY.
Affections is a term applied to emotions of a
pleasant character.
Passions also are regarded as emotions, but of a
painful kind. Yet as all emotions are feelings of
some kind or other, it is evident that they all belong
to the second class of ideas according to our division, except in as far as passions fall within the department of our periodical appetites, in which case they
are active in their nature, and are discussed in the
third part of this work. Our own division of the
feelings is different, as will be seen in the second
part of this work, where other definitions of them
are also given.
III. On the extent of ACTIVE OPERATIONS.
This class embraces what are iusually denomi
nated
First, Volitions, in which is comprehended the
whole extent as well as every variety of the direct
action of the will.
Secondly, those operations of the mind termed
processes of reasoning, but not their results; for the
results of reasoning are knowledge, or conviction,
or belief, and therefore they belong to cognitive
ideas.
Thirdly, the act of memorizing, and not its results; that is, the process of mental effort, by which
we impress upon our memory the contents of any
portion of a book or manuscript, or of a discourse
which we have heard. But the impression itself
thus made upon the mind is cognitive.
3,6 
SKETCH OF THE NEW SYSTEM.
Fourthly. The intellectual act of communicating
our thoughts to others, either orally or by letter.
Fifthly. Some other active processes, the nature
of which will hereafter be more fully explained.
When we term the third class of mental operations active, we do not wish to convey the idea, that
the soul itself, in acquiring either knowledge or
feeling, is in a state of entire passivity; for there is,
doubtless, activity in the soul during all its opera.
tions. But, it must be remembered, we are here
classifying and characterizing the ideas or operations
of the mind, and not the powers of the mind itself.
Our division is a classification, not of the activity
of the soul itself, but of the results of its agency.
The soul is often voluntary and active in seeking
the excitement of feeling; yet the feeling itself,
thus excited, seems to be in its own nature merely
sentient. It is in itself simply pleasure or pain.
Thus also the act of acquiring knowledge by inspection is active, and often even voluntary; but
the ideas acquired, the knowledge obtained, is not
active; but consists simply of mental representatives of entities, and is best characterized by the
term cognitive. These ideas are simply knowledge
and nothing more.
As all the ideas or operations of the mind thus
resolve themselves into three classes, viz., Cognitive, Sentient, and Active, the entire science is most
aptly divided into three general parts, one of which
is devoted to each of these classes of mental operations.
D
37 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
PART I.
COGNITIVE IDEAS.
IT is evident, even on a superficial survey of
those ideas which are knowledge, that at least some
of them, especially such as relate to material objects around us, are mental representatives of things,
or subsistencies, or entities, which exist without the
mind. Thus, no one ean doubt, when reflecting
on his idea of an orange, that the fruit, of which
the idea in question is the representative, had a real
existence; for he has often handled, tasted, and
eaten it.  In short, when we carefully examine our
cognitive ideas, and the source whence we derive
them, we find that they are acquired through the medium of certain parts of our body, called organs of
sense; and from the operations and powers of mind,
of which all men are possessed. We see, also, that
our mind, which perceives, and the organs, through
which it perceives, are not in themselves sufficient
to furnish us with these ideas. It is farther necessary, that the organs of sense be brought into a
particular relation-to certain external objects.  This
relation is either that of actual contact, as in the
case of touch and taste, or, it consists in bringing
the organ into the direction of the object, with nothing intervening which prevents the rays of light
from being reflected from that object to the eye;
38 
OBJECTIVE ENTITIES.
or it consists in a relation of proximity to the object, so that the vibrations of the air may be conveyed to the ear, as in sound.  We, therefore, here
clearly perceive three distinct things: first, the external entity, or object, of which our cognitive ideas
are the mental representatives or knowledge; secondly, the knowledge itself, or the representatives,
or ideas, which we have of external objects; and,
thirdly, the organic process, by which we obtain our
ideas, or knowledge.   The discussion of each of
these three things will therefore appropriately form
a subdivision of this part of our subject.
CHAPTER i.
OF OBJECTIVE ENTITIES AS SUBJECTS OF OUR
KNOWLEDGE.
BEFORE entering on the discussions of this chapter, we premise an explanatory remark  relative
to our use of the word entity. This term, long
since naturalized in our language, we use wvith more
than ordinary frequency, because its signification is
more generic than that assigned by usage to the
words more commonly employed, such as thing,
substance, &c.  The latter are ordinarily restricted,
in the popular mind, to material objects, and present some difficulty, as they excite in the mind the
impression of inaptitude when applied to some other subjects of our knowledge. In the progress of
our discussions, we need a term of such latitude of
import as to be applicable to any and every reality
39 
IMENTAL PHILOSOPHIY.
in nature. Such is the term entity, in the caption
of this chapter, which signifies anything that has
existence, and, therefore, answers our purpose.
But we proceed with the discussion of the peculiar topic of this chapter.  It is indeed true, that in
all our reflections on the properties of objects around
us, it is not the objects themselves, but only our
ideas or mental representatives of the properties of
those objects, which are the immediate subjects of
observation to the reflecting mind.  But it may be
asked, What evidence have we that anything beyond
our ideas has a real existence? How do we know,
that such a thing as even the material universe does
actually exist?  To this we reply, that if we were
deprived of the power of bodily action, and capable
of performing no other mental act than that of reflection, and what we, in the sequel, term the process
of Inspection, it might indeed be impossible for us to
establish the objectivity of external objects, that is,
their real existence, out of, and independently of
the percipient mind.  But, when we can take a supposed object or entity, such as an apple, into our
hands, and perceive that it has weight; when we
feel its shape or relation to space; when we take a
knife and cut it in pieces, and eat it, we constitutionally judge it to be different from our idea of an
apple, in which idea, we cannot perceive either
weight, or shape, or divisibility, or capability of being eaten. Moreover, all these operations may be
performed with closed eyes upon an apple which
we never saw, and of which identical apple, therefore, we never had and can never acquire any far
40 
OBJECTIVE ENTITIES.
ther idea than is obtained by touch and taste. In
short, whenever we are using our bodily organs in
touching, tasting, seeing, hearing, or smelling any
object, then the external object itself, either directly, or mediately, and not our idea of it, is the subject of the operation.  But as soon as we reflect
on some idea, formerly obtained through our bodily
organs, this idea, and not the entity itself, is the
subject of the operation.   During this reflection,
we neither do nor can use the bodily organ; for if
that organ be employed, and the attention of the
soul be directed to it, the act of reflection immediately terminates. We therefore, through the instrumeutality of our senses, perceive in external entities properties entirely different from those of an
idea; and we also judge that the entity or substratum to which they belong is a different one; we
judge that the external entities are possessed of
real objectivity, that is, have an actual existence out
of our minds. As to the accuracy of this judgment,
it would be equal folly either to question it, or to
attempt its confirmation by fine-spun trains of abstruse ratiocination. All mankind constitutionally
believe the well-ascertained testimony of their senses. Not even the veriest skeptic can bring himself
to doubt it in the affairs of practical life. Who
ever heard of one that would walk into a fire which
chanoed to be in his way, believing that what appeared to be a burning pile, was only an idea of his
mind?  Or who among these doubting philosophers
did not instantly forget his sophistical reasonings,
and step aside, when he saw a serpent, or any other
D 2
41 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
dangerous object in his path? In like manner, all
men, by a similar necessity of their mental structure, judge that combinations of properties which
are entirely different from each other, appertain to
different substrata or subjects.  Can any person,
when contemplating the properties of a stone which
he has in his hand, believe them to be parts or
properties of a feather, that happens to be lying on
it? Neither can any man, while true to the dictates of common  sense, believe them to be mere
ideas or properties of his own mind, or of that of
another.
The universe, as known to us, consists of nothing
else than infinitely various conbinations of properties and their relations. We may select any object
we please, throughout the whole range of the universe, and this remark will be found to hold good.
Examine a tree, a stone#, a flower, a gas, a mind,
and it will be perceived that all the knowledge we
possess of them is knowledge of their properties
and relations. Thus of any particular stone, we
know its colour, its shape, its gravity, its divisibility, &c.; but what the stone is, beyond its properties, we know not.  We  may analyze it, and reduce it to its constituent simple substances, but, in
this respect, nothing is gained by the process; for
each individual element is, like the compound,
known to us only by its properties. Of gases also
our knowledge is a knowledge of mere properties.
Take, for example, our atmosphere, which is composed of two gases, oxygen and nitrogen, or, as the
older chemists termed it, azote. We do not see it,
42 
OBJECTIVE ENTITIES.
but we feel its resistance when walking against a
strong current of air, or, as it is termed, wind. We
observe its solidity, for we see that water is excluded by it from any confined vessel or receiver. So,
also, we learn its elasticity, its ability to support
combustion, and various other properties; but what
either nitrogen or oxygen is, beyond these properties, we know not.  And so of mind also; we know
its properties or phenomena, its capacity for knowledge, for feeling, for active operations, and its susceptibility of being influenced through bodily organs; but what the mind is, beyond these susceptibilities or properties and phenomena, no man can
tell.
Again; every such combination of properties, as
found in nature, is individual; that is, it is in some
respects different from all Others. No two stones,
or two trees, or any other two objects, are exactly
alike, in regard to all their properties, and to every
particle of matter contained in them.
Still, many combinations have the greater part
of their properties in common, and differ only in
the residue. Thus, many animals resemble each
other in having four legs, others in having two;
some by eating flesh, and others grain or grass;
some by bringing forth their young alive, and others
by incubation. In the vegetable kingdom, some
plants have their stamens and pistils visible, others
not, they being too small to be observed by the naked eye. In the former of these classes, termed
phenogamous, the different plants differ in the number of their stamens, from one to ten. And thus,
43 
MENTAL PHILOSOPIIY.
by their various points of agreement  in stamens;
pistils, &c., they are arranged in botany.
Finally; the various gradations of similarity in
all different entities form a just basis for their classi fication. On such a classification is human lan guage founded. No language has a specific name
for every separate object, for every individual tree,
or stone, or leaf, or flower.
Human language ordinarily has words merely to
express,
First, our ideas of each property of entilies, such
as black, white, soft, hard, heavy, &c.; but there
is not a separate name for these properties as found
in different objects or entities.  No matter what be
the entity in question, there is ordinarily but one
name for one property, no matter how many entities possess it in common.
Secondly, words to express our aggregate idea
of each species of combinations, as stone, tree, bird,
fish, &C.
Thirdly, words for our ideas of some other classifications and abstractions still more generic, such
as quadrupeds, bipeds, graminivorous, carnivorous,
viviparous, oviparous, &Ce.
Fourthly, to express our ideas of the relations of
the different objects or entities in nature, such as
similarity or diversity of colour or shape in two
balls, contiguity or distance between two objects, as
to place, or time, &c.
On the different degrees of similarity observable
in the various combinations of properties found in
nature, that is, on the different degrees of similar
44 
OBJECTIVE ENTITIES.
ity in the objects around us in the world, different
classifications have been based.   Sometimes, all
things are spoken of as divisible into matter and
mind. This division is good so far as it goes; but,
as we shall see in the sequel, is not sufficiently precise. Such entities as can be chemically analyzed,
have also been reduced to their elementary substances, and arranged according to them. Yet as
chemical analysis cannot reach all objects in nature, such as mind, &c., this classification must
omit some entities of which we have mental representatives, would omit some of the subjects of our
cognitive ideas. However accurate and adequate
this division may be for the purposes of physical
science, we need another more comprehensive, for
the more general purposes of mental philosophy, in
which every object in nature, of which we have any
knowledge, however slight or limited that knowledge may be, claims some attention, and is entitled
to a place.
In all our reflections on absent entities, and our
attempts to classify them, our ideas of their properties, and not the properties themselves, are the subjects of our attention. We spend our whole life
in acquiring mental representatives of the different
entities or objects in the universe; but as only a
small portion of them can at any time be present
before us, we cannot classify these objects themselves in any other way than by comparing and arranging the ideas of them thus obtained.
In endeavouring to make a classification of all
known existences or entities, by examining our cog
45 
IMENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
nitive ideas, we must be careful to make thorough
work. We must summon before us the whole mass
of our knowledge, the entire aggregate of. all our
cognitive ideas in every department of science,
physical, intellectual, and moral. We must, as it
were, assemble our ideas of the heavens, and the
earth, and all the different objects known to be in
them: not only of those objects of which we have
personal knowledge, but also of all others, whatever be the means by which we become acquainted
with them. Our ideas of God, of angels, of devils, of space, of time, of number, of virtue, of vice,
of similarity, of diversity, of analogy, of fitness, of
causation, and of every species of agency, mechanical, instinctive, and voluntary or moral, must all
be taken into account.  We  may review the contents of the most extensive libraries, including discussions on every conceivable subject in the wide
range of human knowledge, and every idea we
rmeet, which is of a cognitive character, which is
in its nature knowledge, must be embraced in our
classification.
Numerous and complicated as this immense mass
of ideas would at first view appear to be, on a
closer examination they will all be found to resolve
themselves into three generic classes; they are either ideas of substantive objects, of objects to which
a combination of properties appertains; or they
are ideas of these individual properties themselves;
or, thirdly, they are ideas of relations which exist
between several such substantive objects or entities as wholes, or between the properties belonging
to them.
46 
OB13JECTIVE ENTITIES..
After we have removed from our view thie latter
two classes of ideas, namely, those which are mere
individual properties, and those which are relations;
and inquire into what general classes may those
substantive entities or objects be reduced, to which
these properties and relations belong, we arrive at
something like the following list of objects:
Solids; Liquids; Gases; the Ethereal or Incoercible fuids, such as Light, Caloric, Electric i:'i/,
Magnetic  Principle; Xind; Spirit; Glorified Bodies; Deity; together with Time, Space, and Nurnber, which are peculiar in their nature. The precise number of these classes is not at all material
to our system; it can be increased or diminished
as the future investigations of science may dictate.
This division we do not propose for the purposes of
the physical sciences; but of metaphysical: not as
adapted to sciences whose discussions are confined
to material objects; but to mental philosophy, which
requires an enumeration of all the objects in existence, of which we have any, even the slightest
knowledge, of which we possess any cognitive
ideas whatever.
Having thus obtained an enumeration of the objects in existence, of which we have some knowledge, some cognitive ideas, that is, an enumeration
of the objects to which the combinations of properties belong, which are found coexisting in nature,
let us examine more closely these individual properties, that we may more accurately determine their
nature.
47 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
Of solid bodies we find the properties to be such
as length, breadth, divisibility, colour, vis inertia,
gravity, solidity, &c. In regard to other properties, such as malleability, solubility, &c., solids may
be subdivided into different classes. No one of
these properties is ever found existing alone. There
are always several of them found together, and these
coexisting properties we constitutionally attribute to
one object, as the properties of such object.  Thus,
with our bodily organs, we perceive a combination
of properties, rotundity of shape, solidity, colour,
&C., and to the object to which we judge these
properties to appertain, we give the name ball.
But we know nothing about the ball itself, beyond
its various properties.
Liquid substances, such as water, milk, &C., possess many of the properties of solids, excepting always solidity itself. They exhibit very little resistance to the touch, yet enough to inform us of their
presence by that organ alone, independently of colour. They cannot be accumulated, unless they are
confined by some vessel, nor be made to retain any
particular shape, except that of the vessel in which
they are contained.
Gases, or aeriform fluids, are in most cases invisible; but their existence is learned from other senses,
such as touch and smnell. No man can doubt the reality of the atmosphere, when he feels the impulse
of a strong wind, and attempts to walk against it;
or when he witnesses the effects of a hurricane,
overturning houses and prostrating the loftiest oaks
of the forest.
48 
OBJI',CTIVE ENTIT'IES.
Of the existence of light, wee are convinced by
the testimony of sight, by the different impression
made on this organ by light, and its absence, darlkness.  In the same way we learn the other properties of light, its different colours, its qualities of reflection, refraction, its motion, &c.
Caloric is, indeed, invisible, but its properties,
and, consequently, its reality, we learn from the
sense of touch, and from the various visible effects
which it produces on other bodies.
Thus also the Electiric Principle, which probably
stands connected with some commonro   basis of light,
caloric, and magnetism, is also invisible;  but its
existence is demonstrated by the interesting and
important phenomena which it produces.  Of these
phenomena we have certain kiiowledge by our senses, and cannot doubt whether they belong to some
cause, or object, by which they are produced.
The principle or fluid of Ma,gnetism is likewise
not visible to human eyes, but its existence is admitted, as the cause or agent, to which we must ascribe a distinct class of phenomena, well ascertained
by the testimony of our senses.
Of Mind we learn the existence in various ways.
We are conscious of the operations of our own
minds. We know, too, that our bodies are to a
certain degree under the control of our minds; and
that certain definite actions of our bodies are consequent on the purposes of our minds to perform
them. Now, as we perceive, in the bodies of all
other persons, actions of the same character, actions
as evidently and systematically adapted to intelli
E
49 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
gent ends, as those which in ourselves we know to
result from the volitions of our minds; we reasonably infer, that in others, also, there is a mind connected with the body. This inference is the more
irresistible, as we cannot perceive in matter, under
any circumstances, any properties which bear the
slightest resemblance to an approximation to the
nature or powers of mind.  On the contrary, all
that we know of the one, is different from all we
know of the other. Nor is it only ill the case of
man that we infer the existence of mind from the
actions of the body.  In the case of all animals, w
infer the existence and the grade of intellect possessed by them, from the various degrees of intelligence, design, and forecast, inferable from their
bodily actions.
The properties of mind are knowledge, feeling,
and action; or cognition, sensibility, and activity,
together with susceptibility of influence from bodily
organs.  Every mental operation is either knowledge, feeling, or action; but no simple operation
consists of several or all these properties together.
It has been customary to consider the phenomena
of mind, as generally different from the phenomena
of other entities, in their relation to our minds as
subjects of knowledge. This habit we are compelled to regard as incorrect.  WXe know generically just as much about one entity as about another,
that is, we know certain properties of each, and
these properties are the subjects of our ideas about
them respectively.  This much also we know about
mind, and more we do not know of anything else,
50 
OBJECTIVE ENTITIES.
even of the grossest forms of solid matter.  It is,
therefore, erroneous to assert, that we know less of
the essence of mind, than of the essence of other entities. With regard to solids, liquids, gases, &c., we
know no more about their essence than about that of
mind; neither do we know less, because the substratulm, or essence, of all the things or entities in exist.
ence, is unknown to us. Our knowledge of each, regards only its properties or operations. But in all
other entities except mind, men generally agree in
admitting that there must be a substratum, to which
these properties belong. Some, indeed, attempt a
different explanation, by referring the aggregation
of these properties into one whole, to a supposed
plastic power of the mind  (Trita;'Ko, 7racaEtv, to
form, to fashion, to make). But we perceive no
advantage in this representation, over the old common-sense view, which has prevailed among British
metaphysicians, of a constitutional judgment; and
the ideas attached to the phrase " plastic power,"
are entirely too loose and indefinite for mnetaphysical purposes. We regard it, therefore, as an intuitive judgment of the mind, that wherever we observe properties, or operations, they belong to a
subject or agent. All languages distinguish. mind
from its properties, as clearly as they do solids and
other entities from their properties. The structure
of the human mind seems to require us to suppose
the existence of such a substratum; as is evident
from the fact, that all languages are constructed on
this principle or supposition. As the Author of our
nature gave us this mental structure, it is probable
61 
MLENT'AL PHILOSOPHYa
that such substrata do belong to all entities.   Indeed, what are these properties, but properties of
the entity itself? What are they but those aspects
of the substratum, which,. by virtue of our organization, are within the reach of our knowledge? The
known properties of any object, such as copper,
lead, silver, gold, are the severaj aspects, in which
these metals are perceptible to us, with our present
organization. In a different state, with more organs
or senses than we now possess, we might perceive
additional properties of these metals; but those
properties perceived by us, prove that the subject,
or substratum, to which they belong, is actually
known to us, as far as these properties extend.
Hence, as there is no difference in this respect between mind and other entities, we are compelled to
regard the views of Hume and others, who regard
the mind as merely a bundle of ideas. and of Brown,
.who considers all ideas as the mind itself in certain
states,* as unphilosophical in themselves, independently of their tendency to foster a skeptical or infidel disposition. The habit of regarding the phenomena of mind as generically different from those
of other entities, has probably arisen in part fromnt
the old imperfect division of all entities into matter
and mind, into material and immaterial, and from
the maxim thence inferred, that mind is indivisible.
But the different properties, operations, and powers
of the mind, which are the subjects of all the ideas
we possess of this entity, are as distinct from each
* See some excellent observations on the fallacy of Brown's view, in the
Biblical Repertory of Princeton, for 1830, p. 186.
6-2 
OBJECTIVE ENTITIES.
other in their nature, as are the different properties
of solids and liquids. Hence, it is evidently ullphilosophie to assert, that the unknown, ulterior something, supposed to belong to mind, as the substratum
of its phenomena or properties, is or is not possessed
of indivisibility.
Of Sp)irits, that is, disimbodied minds, or minds
that have never been associated with bodies, our
only certain knowledge is derived from revelation;
although tradition and analogy may afford some
probable arguments in favour of their existence.
The cardinal known distinction between mind and
spirit, is the connexion of the former with a body
as the organ of its action, and its susceptibility of
being influenced by the body in various ways. To
this class of entities belong the spirits of departed
saints, whose bodies shall slumber in the grave till
the resurrection, as also the angels, archangels, and
devils; in short, all created spirits, of which we
have any knowledge, or which may exist, unknown
to us, in the boundless empire of Jehovah.
To Glorified Bodies we assign a separate class,
because, although we know only that little about
them which the Scriptures teach us, the Apostle
Paul evidently represents them as different from all
other objects, as " spiritual" bodies (rotta7a rrvev-a7t,ca), "; celestial bodies,"  and " incorruptible,"
which predicates necessarily imply an entity radically different from ordinary matter.
The Divine Being, though a spirit, differs from
all other spirits, as the Creator from the creature,
the Infinite from the finite.  The ideas we possess
53
1 2 
MENTALI PHILOSOPHY.
concerning God, are derived partly from the works
of Nature, and partly from revelation. Mortal eyes
have not seen him, mortal ears have not heard him,
but that the reality of his existence may be deduced
from evidences of various kinds, establishing his
agency and attributes, is admitted by all except the
atheist. Our knowledge of the attributes and existence of God, so far as it is derived from nature,
consists of ideas of virtues, which we observed in
good men, separated by a mental process from every
imperfection, with which they are mingled in human
beings, and elevated to the highest conceivable degree.   We thus acquire our ideas of the incomparable excellences of the Divine Being.  Perceiving,
in the structure and operations of the universe, the
evidences of these incomparable attributes, we constitutionally judge (know) that they appertain to
some substratum or being; which being, we in the
same constitutional manner judge to exist. We
do not affirm, that we actually obtain our knowledge
of the Divine character and existence by such a
process of reasoning; but suppose, that by this process we can verify and confirm these truths, which
are ordinarily taught us by tradition, long before
we reach the maturity of mind necessary for such
trains of ratiocination.
Our additional knowledge, derived from revelation, concerning the Divine Being, his works, his
will, and his moral government, likewise consists
of ideas, the constituent elements of which were
originally derived from human beings and human
institutions. Through the medium of these ideas,
54 
OBJECTIVE ENTITIES.
and their various and new combinations and applications, together with anthropopathic representations, the most minute and detailed account of the
will, the providence, and the moral government of
God is represented to us, and we are instructed by
precept and example, what the Author of our being
would have us to do.
Whether the human mind, if left wholly to itself,
would have discovered the existence of God, from
the contemplation of the works of Nature, is somewhat uncertain; as it is much easier to perceive the
truth, propriety, and excellence of an invention or
discovery after it has been made, than to make it.
But there is obviously an aptitude in the human
mind to see the evidences of the Divine existence
and attributes after they have been revealed to us,
which is generally done either by tradition, or the
written revelation.
That we have some knowledge of Space, Time,
and Number will be admitted by all, although the
precise nature of these entities has been the subject
of much disputation.  Into these disputes we shall
not here enter; and we therefore, for the present,
leave it undetermined, whether these entities are
objective, that is, have existence either out of our
minds, as independent entities, or as forms of existence of other entities, or as limitations, or necessary forms of our perceptions; or are mere subjective conceptions of the human mind, having no existence out of the mind itself.  In regard to space,
our ideas of its properties seem to be principally
those of length, breadth, divisibility, and capacity.
Our ideas of time seem to be referable to duration
65 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY~
(or length), augmentability, and divisibility; while
the properties of number seem to be its capability
to be added, subtracted, multiplied, and divided.
Number comprehends an indefinite series of
units. The decimal system of designating and calculating numbers is arbitrary, and seems to have
been adopted fortuitously.  It is neither based on
anything peculiar in the intrinsic nature of numbers
themselves, requiring ten figures, and calculation
by tens, rather than by any other number; nor is
it, by any means, as the ancient Pythagoreans supposed, the most perfect system that could be devised. The dodecadal (duodecimal), having twelve
different figures, would be far more  convenient;
as the number twelve can be divided more frequently without a remainder, and, consequently, calculations by the dodecadal, or duodecimal system,
would be far less encumbered by fractions, than
when conducted on the decimal plan. The Roman
method of quintal calculation, having only five figures, is virtually the same as the decimal. They
employed the letters I and V; and then double V
thus v, forming X; then C (centum) for hundred,
M (mille) for thousand, &e.
M (mille) for thousand., &c.
SECTION II.
Division of these Classes of Entities.
All these classes of entities, when attentively exarmined, appear to be of two distinct kinds, and
may, therefore, with propriety, be referred to two
generic classes:
I. Absolute (or universal, or subjective).
II. Concrete (or individual).
6 
DIVISION OF ENTITIES.
Absolute entities, are those of which we can con.
ceive, without any reference to those of the concrete class.  To this class belong Time, Space, and
~umber.   The properties and relations of the absolute entities are, in their very nature, more definite and clear than those of the concrete.  They are,
moreover, immutable in their character; hence the
sciences discussing these entities, such as arithmetic, geometry, and mathematics in general, are more
certain, conclusive, and immutable. Accordingly,
they are termed " exact sciences," and not with
out obvious reason.  Between the absolute or universal entities time, space, and number, the mind
perceives some points of difference; but they are
rather specific than general, and all three properly
belong to one general class.
Concrete entities are those, of which we cannot
conceive, except as existing in the absolute class,
or, as being related to it.  To this class belong
Solids, Liquids, Ae'riform substances, and, in short,
all the different classes of known entities, except
Time, Space, and Number.
SECTION III.
Sutbdivision of Lidividual Entities.
All entities of every class may naturally be divided into substantive, adjective, and composite, because all objects perceived by us in nature, are
either entire individual objects, or they are one or
more properties of such object, or they are relations of some kind or other, perceived to exist be
57 
MIENTAL PHILOSOP14Y.
tween the perceived properties of objects, or performed by one entity or another.  As every entire
individual object has in reality substantive existence for itself, it may, with propriety, be designated a substantive entity. There is an additional advantage in the adoption of this term, which will appear in the sequel, when we make some application of this subject to the structure of language and
universal grammar.
A substantive entity, then, is that in which prop.
erties cohere, or coexist; or, we might say, a sub.
stantive entity is that to which any number of coexisting properties appertain. Accordingly, every
simple substance, or chemical or ential element, separately viewed, as also each aggregate of all these ential or chemical elements found coexisting, is a substantive entity; such as wood, water, tree, horse, &c.
These ential elements are known to us only relatively; we know their properties and their relation to
time, space, and number, and to each other. In the
case of solids and liquids, and such other substances
as can be subjected to chemical analysis, the ential
elements and chemical elements are the same.
But the term chemical, in this application, is not
so well adapted to metaphysical purposes, because
the usage of our language confines it to a certain
portion only of entities, such as solids, liquids, gases,
&c. It is not improbable, that all the classes of
entities have ential elements, as well as those which
chemical analysis can reach; though of course they
are very different from them in their nature. Ential element is a more suitable term, and designates
58 
SUBSTANTIVE, ADJECTIVE, COMPOSITE ENTITIES. 59
the substratum, to which any set of properties,
found coexisting in any class of entities, belongs.
The idea which we have of a substantive entity,
is the aggregate of our ideas of all those essential,
permanent properties, which are found coexisting
in the same entity, and, without any one of which,
the residue could not be designated by the substantive name, which they collectively bear.
If I am asked what idea I have of a stone, a tree,
an apple, or an orange, I must admit that my only
knowledge of them is knowledge of the properties
which habitually belong to them. I perceive their
colour, their solidity, their shape, &c., but what
their intrinsic nature or essence is beyond these
properties, I know not. Thus also no man ever saw,
or tasted, or touched a mind. Yet every one is
conscious of his own mental operations, knows the
phenomena of his own mind, and constitutionally
judges, that the mental operations of which he is
conscious, must belong to a mental agent, which
agent he calls himself.
Yet our idea of an object, of a substantive entity,
does not embrace every property it may chance to
possess.  Thus, trees and stones may differ in colour, shape, or size, and yet be appropriately desi,gnated by the same namne. Those properties only
are embraced in our ideas of a substantive entity
which permanently and invariably belong to every
individual object to which the name in question can
appropriately be applied. If language furnished a
word to designate every particular individual tree
and stone, then every property and circumstance
belonging to each stone or tree, and necessary to 
MENTAL PHILOSOPIIY.
its identity, would properly be represented by such
word.   But this is not the character of any language on earth.  Therefore it is our ideas of only
those properties common to all the individual trees
or stones of a particular species, which form the ingredients of the collective idea that we attach to. a
word designating a substantive entity, that is, they
are our idea of the substantive entity itself.
An adjective entity is any one property of a substantive entity considered individually; as length,
breadth, colour, gravity, or any other known property. Human language, in most cases, contains
words to designate each individual property of an
entity of which we have an idea, and also names or
words, by which those properties, which are found
coexisting, are collectively designated, not, indeed,
as individuals, but as entire species, such as stone,
tree, house, &c.
A  composite entity consists of two or more adjective entities, viewed together, and considered in
regard to some relation subsisting between them.
Sometimrnes, several properties of the same entity,
constitute a composite entity, between the parts of
which some relation is observed. Thus, different
parts of a painting may have different colours, and
may be viewed in relation to this difference. These
relations of entities exert a very important influence
on some of the active operations of the mind, and
an acquaintance with them, belongs to the most important branches of our knowledge. These relations are not the properties of either part of the
composite entity alone; nor have they a separate
existence of their-own apart from the related enti
60 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
ties; but they are relations existing between them,
and perceivable by the mind. Still, in this ease
also, our knowledge is a knowledge of relations
which actually exist independently of our minds.
Thus, we behold two beautiftul, dark, Arabian horses, and perceive a similarity of colour between
them. Who can doubt, that this similarity would
have existed, whether we had seen it or not? Or
whoever imagined, when contemplating the exact
adaptation of the wheels of a watch to act upon one
another, that this supposed adaptation existed only
in his own mind?  Our ideas of relations, like our
ideas of substantive and adjective entities, do not
resemble the entities themselves, but are only the
divinely appointed mental representatives of them.
Yet, the relation.of similarity of colour between two
gray horses, is as certainly seen by the eyes, as is
the colour of either horse alone, and the constitution of our minds compels us to believe the similarity of colour between them to be real; that is, we
just as invariably believe our idea of the perceived
similarity to be an idea of an objective truth, of a
reality; as we do believe our idea of the colour of
each horse individually to be such.
SECTION!X
Retatio)s of.Entities.
[. What are the perceptible relations of Absolule
E, iilies to each other?
WI. What are the perceptible relations of Concr,iete E]tiiities to each other?
II. What are the perceptible relations between
Coi.crete and Absolitte Entities?
Ft
61 
RELATIONS OF ENTITIES.
The relations which the human mind is capable
of perceiving between entities, both absolute and
concrete, are exceedingly numerous, and may be
variously divided. The following division may
serve as a basis of a comprehensive and accurate
classification.
I. The relations of ABSOLUTE ENTITIES to each
other.
(a.) Equality, diversity, antecedence, subsequence, &c., of different portions of Time.
(b.) Equality, difference, progression, or ratio,
plurality (plus), minority (minus), &c., of different
Numbers.
(c.) Equality, diversity, contiguity, remoteness,
superiority (above), inferiority (below), of different
portions of Space.
In reference to each of these relations, language
embraces a vast multitude of words, expressing
them in different methods and different aspects.
II. The relations of CONCRETE ENTITIES to each
other.
(a.) Similarity and diversity of any of the different
classes of entities, in regard to any one or more of
their properties.
(b.) Contiguity of any of the concrete entities to
each other in regard to Space, Time, or Number.
(c.) Fitness, physical, intellectual, and moral.
Physical fitness includes the relations which are the
basis of beauty, symmetry, taste, &c., in the material world. To this class must be referred the relations of harmony or discord, perceived between
different sounds. The relation exists between the
62 
MENTAL PHtLOSOPHY.
atmospheric vibrations themselves, and even in the
vibrating chords which produce the undulations of
the atmosphere. The reason why discordant vibrations produce unpleasant feelings in us, while those
which accord are pleasing, is unknown to us. But
these vibrations themselves are well understood,
and their chords and discords are the subject of the
most obvious mathematical calculation. Intellectual
fitness embraces our perceptions of fitness in the operations of the mind, in all the various departments
of its agency. Moral fitness embraces all our duties
to God, to ourselves, and our fellow-men. They
are all fitnesses perceived by the mind to exist
objectively between us and God, and our fellowmen. The whole field of moral and religious obligation, of philosophic and Christian ethics, is embraced in this relation. Thus, a dictate of conscience is our knowledge of a composite entity,
viz.) a law; that is, the expressed will of the lawgiver or his acknowledged representative, and some
action of a person under obligation to this law.
The relation perceived between them, is that of
moral fitness or agreement, or of unfitness or disagreement.
In virtue of our constitutional activity we must
act somehow.  By inspection we perceive the moral
fitness of some actions, viewed in relation to the
law, and the unfitness of other actions; and the
first Constitutional Inclination of the soul (see part
iii. of this work) urges us to that which is morally
fit, which is right. This complex operation, when
referring to our own actions, constitutes the dictates
63 
RELATIONS OP ENTITIES.
of conscience.  There is, therefore, in the dictates
of conscience, something that is impulsive and
something that is judicial; both a judgment and
an impulse, and also a feeling.
(d.) The relation of analogy. This relation is
based on past experience. The maxini, " Every
effect must have a cause," is an analogous judgment, resulting fromn experience. Stated at length,
it would read thus: Every effect we ever knew had
a cause, hence all others probably will have.
(e.) Causation, or agencyin general. That causation differs from mere antecedence is evident.
They can often be distinguished by the following
circumstances: 1. The cause also produces such
consequents, under other circumstances; whereas
the mere antecedent, is, on other occasions, and under other circumstances, not attended by the consequent. 2. By some known, intelligible aptitude
in the cause to produce the effect, while this is not
found in the mere antecedent. The light and heat
of the rising sun, are both antecedents to the
melting of the snow on a winter morning. That
the heat and not the light, is the cause of the effect,
is demonstrated by the fact, that caloric without
light will produce the same effect; as when snow
is brought near to a dark but heated stove or other
iron; while light, with little or no caloric, produces
no such effect, as is exemplified in the case of a
candle borne over the snow.  Thus also in the machinery of a watch, there is a perceptible adaptation between the parts to act upon one another, and
to produce the effects for which they are designed.
64 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
But even this judgment of perceptible adaptation,
is the result of former experience in similar cases.
And this experience amounts only to a knowledge of
the fact.  In any new case, not embracing perceptible adaptation on which former experience has instructed us, our belief of the existence of a causative
relation is purely the result of present observation,
and strong or weak according to the extent and uniformity of that observation.  These facts appear
clearly to prove, that our confidence in the uniformity of the operations of nature, and of the relation
of cause and effect, is not, as has sometimes been
affirmed, an original instinctive principle in the
mind; but is a general abstract belief or confidence, derived from our experimental observation
of individual cases.   Experience teaches us, that
the world is governed by general laws, or, rather,
that God causes the properties of all objects in our
world, to act in uniform ways or modes, termed
laws of nature.  Many of these we learn in youth.
To these laws, we refer all the phenomena, for
which they will account.  If we meet  wvith an
event or effect which the known laws do not ex.
plain, we look for another law. Thus additional
laws are occasionally discovered, and thus our confidence in the uniformity of nature's laws, is acquired without the supposition of any instinctive, or
original, or a priori principle or knowledge in the
mind. The relation of causation, or agency, is very
comprehensive and embraces three different species:
(1.) 3Iechanical aGgency.
(2.) Instinctive agency.
F2
65 
66 MECHANICAL, INSTINCTIVE, AND MORAL AGENCY.
(3.) Rational or moral agency.
By Mechanical agency we mean all the unintelligent and merely physical changes of inert matter,
such as the motions and changes of the heavenly
bodies, of solids, liquids, &c.   The  mechanical
changes may be divided into two classes: First,
the uniform or universal changes, viz., gravitation,
attraction, cohesion, repulsion,  &c.   These  are
termed laws of nature, by which phrase, however,
cannot properly be meant an agent or cause of action; but it is merely a statement of our cognitive
idea of a uniform mode of action or of changes observed in entities, of which action or changes God
is the agent or cause. Secondly, mechanical agency includes contingent changes, such as those actions, motions, or changes which are occasioned by
the impulse or influence of other bodies.
The second kind of general agency, viz., the instinctive, embraces all those actions of irrational an,
irnals, which result from what is termed instinct,
that is, a propensity prior to experience and independent of instruction; such as the incubation of
hens, &c.
The third species of agency is rational or moral
agency. To this class belong all those actions of
men, either voluntary or spontaneous, which are
free, for which we are accountable, and which may
be termed moral actions. This class is of the very
utmost importance, and embraces in it the entire
field of all that diversified agency, which is peculiar to man, as a rational and accountable creature
of God. 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
III. Relations between ABSOLUTE and CONCRETE en
tities.
(a.) In reference to number: addition, multiplication, subtraction, and division of numbers (not
of concrete entities). These operations are active
relations of agency, performed by the concrete entity man, onl our ideas of the absolute entity number.
(b.) In reference to space: mensuration of its
parts by the concrete entity man; and fitness or
unfitness of any concrete entity to occupy any given portion, or form of it.
(c.) In relation to time: calculation of its parts
by man; and the relation of fitness or unfitness
of a given portion of it to any specified purpose.
The relations of entities may be divided into
transitive and intransitive. The first, or transitive
class of relations, embraces the relation of causation
or agency in general, mechanical, instinctive, and
moral. The second, or intransitive class, embraces
the relations of similarity, diversity, contiguity, and,
in short, all the other relations excepting those of
causation and agency in general.
These two classes may again be subdivided into
absolute or indicative, and hypothetical or subjunctive. These relations are, in human language, most
naturally expressed by verbs. Those words expressing transitive relations are in their primitive
nature active verbs; those expressing intransitive
relations are in their original form neuter verbs,
verbs expressing a state of being. Passive verbs
appear to be an improvement in language, and are
not based on any separate distinction in the rela
67 
DIVISIONS OF RELATIONS.
tions themselves, but refer simply to the entities
between which they exist, and determine whether
the speaker was the agent or recipient of the active
influence, which they always express. This is beautifully illustrated by the Hebrew verbs in the Kal
voice. The radical word throughout expresses the
relation of action; the appendages prefixed and
suffixed only designate the relations of the speakers and others, as the agents or recipients of the
action.  The same is also true, in a certain degree,
of Latin and Greek verbs.
The subdivision of both classes of relations into
retrospective, present, and prospective, is obviously
natural, and is expressed iln language by the past,
present, and future tenses of verbs.   Each of these
is again twofold; the relation is either absolute or
hypothetical.  In the former case the verb expressing this relation is in the indicative, and in the latter
case it is in the subjunctive mood. The imperative
mood is the annunciation to an individual, of his
relation of obligation to perform a prescribed act;
whether this obligation'results from his relation to
the speaker as authorized to command him, or t(
some other human being, or to God.
The other parts of speech express ideas, wvhick
may probably be reduced to appendages of the
abovc-named three. Thus the prepositions " to,"
" in," &c., express relations of the verb, and are
often incorporated with it; as introduce, induct,
postpone, subject, &c., &c.   Adverbs stand for
ideas which qualify adjectives or composite enti.
ties, that is, adjectives or verbs.
68 
MENTAL  PHILOSOPIIY.
CHAPTER 11.
OF OUR COGNITIVE  IDEAS, OR MLIEN'AI. REi'RSL;NTA                TIVES OF ENTITIES.
SECTION I.
What is the exact nature of those of our ideas which
are knowledge?
IN reply to this inquiry, we remark, that it is
probably impossible to describe the intrinsic nature
of our ideas in any other way than by stating that
they belong to the class of entities termed mind;
and that every individual knows for himself what
his ideas are, by the testimony of his own conseiousness.  One cardinal feature of the first class
of ideas, by which they are clearly distinguished
from all others, is, that they are representatives of
either the properties or relations of things actually
existing. It is, indeed, true of many of our cognitive ideas, that they do not represent actual realities
with exactness. Thus those ideas formed by the
active process of the mind, hereafter explained under the name of iI-odification, such as abstractions,
generalizations, mathematical, moral, and metaphysical axioms, do not correspond exactly to realities,
to real entities; yet the elements of which they are
composed are all derived from the contemplation
(i;9 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
of individual realities, and whatever is affirmed in
them, however generic it may be, is true of all
the objects embraced in their terms: though it
does not constitute a specific or distinguishing
representative  of any one  of them.   Thus the
proposition, "things equal to the same thing are
equal to each other," contains a cognitive idea,
viz., the relation of sameness between three or
more objects.  It is true, this general proposition
does not affirm this relation of any particular obiect. Nevertheless, it was originally learned by
observing its truth in numberless individual cases, even in our earliest years, and it is in reality true of every object embraced in its terms,
that is, it is a correct mental representative of every specific object embraced in its generic terms,
so far as the particular relation affirmed  is concerned.   Thus, if two  triangles or circles are
equal in capacity to a third triangle or circle, they
are equal to each other.   The disputed question,
whether our ideas are to be considered as something distinct from the mind itself, we  feel constrained to answer in the affirmative; while we, of
course, must reject the old Peripatetic notion, that
these ideas are literal images, resembling the entities, which are the subjects of them.
SECTION II.
What are the criteria by which the cognitive class
of ideas is distinguished? 
The following criteria may, we think, be clearly
perceived, and should be regarded as characteristic
70 
CRITERIA OF COGNITIVE IDEAS.
I. The cognitive.deas have for their.bjects entities existing out of the mind, that is, things of any
and of every description. As we regard the mind
as distinct from its operations, it is evident that this
language does not exclude from the list of cognitive
ideas the knowledge of our own mental operations.
In short, our knowledge of mental phenomena of every sort is embraced in this class, whether they be
past, present, or prospective; whether they be the
operations of our own, or of other minds.
II. The cognitive ideas derive their form and are
dependant for their character on the entities themselves which are the subjects of them, which have
existence independently of us, and would be what
they are if we had not this knowledge of them.
We, of course, do not mean, that there exists any
literal resemblance between our ideas of entities,
and these entities themselves. Thus, our idea of a
peach or a pear, does not resemble the object itself,
in any one particular.  But we mean, that there is
a correspondence between the difference subsisting
among different objects in nature, and the intellectual representatives of them, which, by the constitution of the mind, these objects produce, when
brought within its observation. The same entities,
when fairly viewed, always produce the same representatives in the mind of the same person; but it
also affords the same idea to all other persons, or
rather an idea exactly similar. All men have the
same uniform representatives of entities; hence
they can converse intelligibly about them. If the
same entity afforded to different persons different
71 
MIENTAL PHILOSOPIIY.
represelntatives of itself, men could no more (onverse intelligibly about it, than if they did not understand the same language. Our idea of an entity, accordingly, is not what we please that it shall
be, but is such, as, by the constitution of our minds,
is naturally produced by the entity itself, when
brought under the observation of the mind. Nor
is our knowledge of the relations of entities, what
we choose to make it; but what God has made it
by our mental structure. Thus, whether a landscape, or any other object, shall appear to us beautifizl, or otherwise, does not depend upon our wishes. Beauty, and the reverse, are properties and relafions inherent in the objects, to which they belong,
and our apperception of them depends on their existence in the object, which is the subject of our observation.
Our knowledge of the truth or falsity of a propositioni no more depends upon our previous wishes,
if the examination  was impartial and faithful, than
does the shape of a book, or the colour of an apple,
when presented to our eyes. How often are not
men called to attend the examination of a friend,
who has been charged with some heinous erime,
which. if established, would hurl him from the respectable eminence which he occupied in soeiety,
and prove him  unworthy of the confidence which
they had reposed in him, and of the affections of
which he had been the subject. These friends protest his innocence, and gladly lend him every aid
in obtaining able counsel, and the attendanee of
every desired wvitness, to wipe away the odious stain
72 
CRITERIA OF COGNITIVE IDEAS.
from his character. With intense feeling they en ter the halls of justice, anxiously wishing that their
friend may succeed in proving himself still worthy
of their affections and respect. But, alas! one wit ness after another is heard, one item of evidence
after another is brought to light, until the guilt of
their former friend no longer admits of any doubt.
They hear the testimony in his favour, they listen
to the arguments of his counsel, and find nothing
but subterfuge and conjecture; find, indeed, even
in the nature of the efforts made to save his charac ter, collateral evidence of his guilt, and are com pelled, though with bleeding hearts, to believe that
he who stands before them convicted as a criminal,
is no longer the upright man, whom they loved and
respected as a friend.  Here the result of the investigation was the knowledge, that the charge alleged against their friend was true; a knowledge
of the relation of probation (proof or evidence), between the facts adduced in the trial and the guilt
of their friend. Surely no one would contend that
the nature of the result depended on their wishes,
or on anything else than the nature of the testimony itself, that is, on the facts, the entities and
their relations, of which they acquired knowledge
during the trial.
III. The entities which are the subjects of our
cognitive ideas, must have an existence previously
to our knowledge of them. When we make a volition, the subject of that volition is the intended
future exertion of some physical or intellectual
power, and the subject of the volition has no previ                       G
73 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
ous existence. But when we have a knowledge
of an apple, a stone, a mind, of space, or number,
these cognitive ideas, or knowledge, are mental
representatives of entities previously existing; and,
according to universal consent, they presuppose
such previous existence. Thus, even in a fictitious
narration, all the elements, so far as they are cognitive, are made up of ideas of entities which separately had a real existence.
SECTION III.
The nature and sources of ERROR in our cognitive
ideas.
In order to obtain a correct view of this extreme.
ly important subject, it is necessary first to advert
to the exact nature and divisions of truth. All
truths may be divided into three classes:
I. Real or objective truths, that is, entities themselves, existing in nature.
It. Idealistic or subjective truths, that is, correct
mental representatives of objective entities, that is,
of objects in nature.
III. Nominatl or verbal truths, that is, propositions or sentences, expressing in accurate language,
correct ideas of things, correct mental representatives of objective entities.
This division is evidently based on the nature of
things, and affords us no small aid in understanding the sources, whence sprung the former philosophical sects of Realists and Nominalists, as well
as the modern Idealists.
The rancorous contentions of the former sects,
74 
REALISM AND IDEALISM.
about the metaphysical question, whether our generic ideas are mere names (nomina rerum, seu flatus vocis) as the Nominalists contended, or realities
existing in nature, generic archetypes according to
which all individual entities are formed, as was
maintained by the Realists from the days of Aristotle till the time of Roscellinus, in the eleventh century, were continued through subsequent ages, and
rose to such a height, that the blood of several distinguished. leaders was shed in the contest. The
points of controversy were generally the influence
of these metaphysical theories on the various doetrines of the Christian religion. There was scarcely a university in Europe that was not more or less
affected by these controversies. Nor can it be said
that they were ever decided, although the Realists
appear more generally to have been the stronger
party.  These litigations continued till the sixteenth
century, and often exerted an influence on  -he decisions of ecclesiastical councils.
Philosophers of modern days, especially in Germany, have used the terms Realism and Idealism
in a somewhat different sense, as characteristic of
their several systems of philosophy.
By Realism they designate that system of philosophy, which not only admits the existence of something real or actual, something objective in nature;
but also regards this real something as the original
material, anterior to the ideal, and out of which the
ideal (that is, consciousness, conception, knowledge)
was deduced. The principle of ihis system is " reale prius, ideale posterius," the real existed first, the
ideal is posterior to it. But to the various modifica
75 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
tions of this system, it may justly be objected, that
the derivation of the ideal, that is, of mental action,
from the real, that is, from the organization of matter, necessarily results in materialism.  There is,
moreover, no necessity whatever of deriving either
mind from matter, or matter from mind, either the
ideal from the real, or the real from the ideal.
Both are realities created by God, and it is one of
the idle conceits of philosophy, falsely so called, to
suppose, that a system, to be complete, must have
some one element to start from, out of which everything else can be evolved.
By Ideatism they designate that system of philosophy which regards " the real" (das Reale), that
is, the actual or material world, as merely ideal or
imaginary, and assumes that there exists nothing in
nature corresponding to our ideas of the material
world; but that we ourselves confer objectivity on
those ideas, that is, conceive the existence of something real as corresponding to our ideas (to the
ideal), because by a necessity of our nature we find
ourselves possessed of those ideas.  This system
regards " the ideal" (das Ideale) as first, and the
real as posterior to it, yea, admits the existence of
the real or material universe, only because and as
far as, the belief of it is the necessary result of our
mental structure. The real (say they) is the mere
product of the ideal. But this system is after all
not what it boasts to be, a system of pure idealism, for it begins by assuming the " reality" of the
" ideal," that is, it assumes the existence of the
mind which is the subject of the ideal, the mind in
76 
IDEALISM.
which the ideas of the universe are found. To escape from this difficulty,some idealists have supposed, these ideas of the material universe, to be
produced in us immediately by God, the infinite
mind. Fichte and others suppose the mind itself
to be the originator of these ideas, acting by virtue
of its original activity, according to certain laws or
limitations of its nature, which are incomprehensible to itself (to the ego). This system is termed
by German philosophers Egoistic Idealism.
The transcendental Idealism of Kant is, however,
materially different from this. Hle admits or assumes the existence of " the real," that is, of the
material world; but maintains that it cannot be
known to us as it is in itself objectively, apart from
our views of it, but only as it appears to us through
the medium of our senses.
But our present design does not permit us to enlarge on the opinions of these writers; yet we think
the view of this subject to which our system naturally leads us, will enable the reader to form a clear
conception of the extent to which each system adheres to the truth. The exact truth in the dispute
between the ancient Realists and Nominalists, will
fuilly appear in the discussion of the third active process of the mind, modification, in the last part of
this work; where abstraction or generalization is
discussed as a part of that process. The mind
doubtless does possess the power of framing general ideas, which, though derived from real objects
in nature, do not exactly correspond to any specific one. Yet are these not merely names, as the
G g?
77 
MENT'AL PHILOSOPIIY.
Nominalists held, but actual generic conceptions, as
the later Conceptualists more correctly maintain.
But we return to the discussion of the nature of
truth.
We have said, that all entities in the natural, itn.
telleetual, and moral world, and their relations,
are realities or truths objectively considered.   The
word trtht is indeed not often used precisely in this
sense. Most generally it has a reference to our
ideas of entities, and is therefore used subjectively;
but, if we wish to begin at the ultimate ground of
our subject, we may be permitted to employ the
word in this signification. The objective realities
exist out of the mind, and would be what they are
if we knew nothing about them. They are the
subjects of our knowledge, and the ultimate basis
of truth.
Our cognitive idea of each objective reality, or
entity, if it accord with the original, that is, if it be
what by divine appointment and the constitution of
our minds, that entity is designed to give, is an
idealistic truth, or a truth subjectively considered,
and evidently differs from objective truths.   Subjeetive truth is more limited in its extent than
the objective, and is of different extent in different
minds. There is an immeasurable difference betweenr the extended and diversified knowledge of
a Mosheim, a Leibnitz, or a Newton, and the limited stock of ideas found in the mind of an ignorant, unlettered savage; but doubtless the knowledge of the most deservedly celebrated universal
78 
IDEAL AND NOM1I4AL TRU'rH.
scholar, falls short of the entire range of real existences in an inconceivably greater degree.
The manner in which God determined the nature of our representatives of entities, is by the
structure of the human mind itself; so that if we
have freely and impartially examined an entity with
all the light attainable, the idea then formed of it
in the mind, is that appointed by God as its representative.
A nominal or verbal truth, is a sentence or proposition, spoken or written, in which a correct idea
of a real entity is expressed by the precise words,
which, according to the usage of language, are employed to designate those very ideas.
All error in statements, whether oral or written,
must be situated in one of these two latter departments.  There may be an error in regard to the
entire objective entity.  Thus a timid individual, in
a dark night, indistinctly beholding a stump before
him, may believe it a robber, and so relate his story;
but he has made a premature and gratuitous inference from the indistinct testimony of his senses, and
thus obtained a false idea of an entity. The error here is evidently in the idealistic department.
Though the error in this case concerns the objective entity, it specifically consists in the want of
conformity of the subjective idea or mental representative, to the objective or real entity.  In short,
the error can never lie in the first department,
namely, that of real or objective truth.  Objective
truths, or entities, are and must ever be, just what
they are independently of our knowledge of them.
79 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
The fact that our mental representatives of them
are correct or incorrect, cannot affect them in any
degree.
But, if an individual, who has a correct idea of an
entity, either inadvertently, or through design, or
through ignorance of language, describes his idea
in terms which express either more than his precise
idea, or something radically different from it, the
error will be a nominal or verbal one; it will consist in the incorrect selection of words to express
the ideas. In addition to these two locations of
error in statements, there is another in the hearer
or reader. Error may be seated in the incorrect
association in the mind of the reader or hearer,
between the words which he reads or hears, and his
own ideas. Thus, a sentence describing correct
ideas in accurate language, might be mistaken by
an ignorant person. With these preliminary views,
we can find no difficulty in tracing the following
sources of error:
SOURCES OF ERROR IN HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.
Involuntary Error embraces,
I. Incorrect original mental representatives of entities. These may arise from the following sources:
(a.) From a hasty, superficial inspection of entities.
(b.) From forgetfulness of the exact mental representative originally obtained, and a consequent misstatement of it. (c.) From listening to one part of
a statement, and neglecting to listen to the whole.
This remark applies not only to substantive and
adjective entities but also to composite. The re
80 
INVOLUNTARY ERROR.
lations of sameness and contrariety may be easily
observed by attentive inspection. But haste and
inattention may also lead to error. The relation
most difficult to be accurately discerned is that of
causation, which is often prematurely admitted,
where there was mere sequence.
II. Involuntary error may arise from incorrect
selection of sounds and written words, to express to
others the true mental representative which we really have.  Thus we may select a word more or
less specific than it ought to be; as, for example,
when we charge many with a crime which belongs
only to few; or, our expression may convey different circumstances from those which actually exist;
we may incautiously denominate that self-interest,
which was really gratitude, and that pride, which,
in fact, was vanity.
III. Involuntary error may arise from the real
imperfection of language, which does not furnish
words to express our ideas with precision on all
subjects. Thus, in translating a work, and giving
an account of foreign countries, we find offices,
coins, &c., different from any found in our own
country, for which we have no exact name in our
tongue. In the New Testament, denarius is translated a penny, and dat[(ov, devil; not because the
English words were supposed by the translators
exactly to correspond in meaning to the Greek,
but because our language furnishes no words of
precisely the same meaning. We have no coin
exactly corresponding in value to the denarius, and,
therefore, no word in popular use to designate it.
81 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
IV. Involuntary error may arise from mistakes
in judging of the motives of others. We may suppose we perceive the relation of causation, between
ambition and certain conduct of an individual,
whereas that conduct results from a sense of duty
in him.
V. Involuntary errors may arise from unintentional, illogical reasoning, from fallacy either in the
major or minor proposition, or in the conclusion.
This embraces also premature generalization, in
which the conclusion is more general than the extent of our induction justifies. In short, it embraces every species of sophism, which can occur in
any form of the syllogism. But it is unnecessary to
specify these minutely at this time.
VI. Another source from which involuntary error
may arise, is the misapprehension of a correct sentence, through ignorance of language.
SOURCES OF VOLUNTARY ERROR.
I. Intentional misstatement of entities, simple or
composite; that is, of things or actions, fromn malice or any other motive. In these cases, men intentionally use words which recall or suggest to
others erroneous mental representatives, words
which excite in them the idea of some evil property or relation, in connexion with an individual, to
whom that property or relation does not belong.
II. Voluntary error may arise from indulgence in
the habit of mere high colouring, without directly
stating a falsehood.
III. Voluntary error may consist in voluntary ig
82 
VOLUNTARY ERROR.
norance, resulting from the neglect of the means of
information within our reach.  It is obviously the
duty of man to avail himself of all the opportunities
appropriately within his reach, to extend the sphere
of his knowledge, and to correct any errors which
he may have adopted, either innocently or through
neglect.   Whoever,  therefore, remains in error
from this cause, may be justly charged with voluntary error, and will doubtless be held responsible for
it by the omniscient Judge.
IV. Voluntary error may arise from the indulgence of prejudice in regard to persons or things.
So strong, indeed, is the influence of our personal
feelings upon us, that every friend of the truth
should incessantly be upon his guard, lest he be led
captive by it.
V. Voluntary error may result from the indul
gene of passion.  Passion prompts to speedy and
premature action, and thus prevents deliberate investigation, and enlightened, conscientious choice.
When error has been detected in our knowledge, or
when wve have reason even to suspect the accuracy of
any of our opinions, it becomes us to institute inquiry
and settle the point. The generic method of rectifying any mistaken views, is to pass successively
and carefully through the several steps by which,
according to the laws of mind, we obtain our information on the point in question. Truth may
justly be regarded as that which the constitution of
our minds compels us to believe, when its evidences
are fairly presented, and impartially weighed. We
may assume it as an undeniable position, that the
83 
MENTAL PHiLOSOPHY.
evidences of truth are stronger than those of error,
and will, when carefully pondered, produce on a
well-balanced mind a conviction precisely as strong
as it was designed by the Creator to be, and as it
is our duty to entertain.
From  the  above  considerations  we see, at a
glance, the fallacy of the favourite sentiment of freethinkers, that man is not responsible for his opinions, that they are what they are by a constitutional necessity of our minds, and lie beyond the
sphere of human responsibility.
SECTION IV.
Division of our Cognitive Ideas.
All our cognitive ideas may be divided into Individual and Relative: and again into Retrospective,
Present, and Prospective.
I. Of Individual knowledge.   To this class belongs our knowledge of every individual substantive entity in nature, and also of every individual
property belonging to any entity. Our retrospective knowledge of individual entities is also of the
same individual class; as is, in like manner, our
prospective knowledge of them.
II. Of Relative knowledge. To this class belongs all our knowledge of composite entities, that
is, of two or more adjective entities viewed in connexion, in respect to some particular relation between them.  Of this kind are our perceptions of
all the different relations of sameness or difference
in size, colour, shape, local contiguity, &c., of all
perceivable objects.   They are nothing else tilan a
84 
RELATIVE KNOWLEDGE.
knowledge of two or more of these adjective entities viewed together, and viewed in reference to
some onre or more of their relations to each other.
Thus, I see before me a father and his son; my
perception of each of them alone is individual
knowledge; but the father is twice as tall as the
son.   I view them in connexion, to ascertain their
relative magnitude, and my knowledge of this relation of difference is relative knowledge.   It is a
knowledge of something really existing, not in either of them alone, but in both taken together.
To this class, also, belongs the greater part of
our con)zceptions. Many individual, abstract terms,
when rightly examined, are nothing else than signs
of such composite entities.  What do we mean by
the terms virtue and vice, more than our knowledge
of the relation of agreement or disagreement, between human actions of a certain kind and the law
of God, or the structure of the universe.  Just as
the mind, though it at one view acquires a knowledge of the size, form, and  colour of an object,
may make either of these items of its knowledge
the exclusive subject of reflection, or of other mental operations; so it may, by the process of abstraction, make these items of its knowledge  of the
characteristics of humanl actions the subject of reflection, without connecting with them the idea of
individual persons. Of this kind, evidently, are our
ideas of virtue and vice; and language affords us
words to designate these items of knowledge, as
well as others.
Geometrical axioms also belong to relative knowl..
85 
1VMENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
edge.  Thus the axiom, "Things which are equa
to the same thing, are equal to one another," cxpresses our knowledge of the relation of sameness
in dimensions or number, between three, given entities. The axiom, " When equals are added to
equals, the wholes are equal," more definitely stated, would stand thus: If to quantities, dimensions,
or numbers already equal to each other, equal additions be made, the results will also be equal: and in
this form what does the proposition express but our
knowledge of the relation of agreement in quantity, dimension, or number between several entities
viewed together as one compound entity under the
specified circumstances. Thus we might review all
the twelve axioms of Euclid, and would find them
all to confirm the statements we have made.
To the same class of relative knowledge belong
all the relations (not properties) of numbers in arithmetical calculations.  Thus, "twice three are six,"
when fully stated, means, that the number three
twice taken, or counted, bears the relation of equality to the number six.
,/etapIhysical axioms, when rightly examined, also
belong to this class of relative knowledge. Thus,
"Every effect must have a cause," or, more fully
stated, every effect we ever knew  had a cause,
hence all other effects most probably have, seems
to be nothing else than our knowledge of the relation of analogy, between two or more given substantive or adjective entites, viewed in relation to
each other. Self-evident truths consist mainly of
relations between entities.
86 
B13ELIEF, IMMEI)IATE ANDI) ACQUIRED.
Moral abstract propositions are also resolvable
into expressions of our knowledge of some relation
or other. Thus the maxim, "Vice is productive
of misery," may be regarded as an abstract expression of the relation of causation, subsisting between
sinful actions and misery; or it may be changed
into the knowledge of the relation of analogy by
thus altering the terms: " Vicious actions have, so
far as we have been able to observe, always sooner
or later produced unhappiness, therefore they, in all
probability, will do so also in future."
Dictates of Conscience, or Moral  Judgements,
that is, judgments concerning the morality of actions, concerning their conformity or non-conformity to the law of God, are also relative knowledge. The operations of conscience, when correctly analyzed, consist of three distinct elements,
the judicial. the sentient, and the imnpulsive.  The
judicial element is cognitive, and consists in a judgment of the mind concerning the relation of our actions to our ideas of the law of God, as being conformed to them, or in violation of them. If the
views of men concerning the Divine law were always correct, the decisions of conscience would invariably be accurate as to the moral character of
human  actions.   This judgment  concerning the
morality of the action always precedes as well the
emotion of pleasure or pain, approbation or disapprobation, as the impulsive dictate of obligation, to
perform or not to perform the act contemplated.
Hence, as the views of the heathen concerning the
law of God are very erroneous, they approve of
87 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY
many actions, such as parricide, infanticide, sacri.
fice of human beings, which are highly sinfuil, although their intentioni in all these cases nmay be to
do right. And even Paul, so long as he considered Christianity a violation of the law of his God,
says, "I verily thought with myself that I ought to
do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of
Nazareth," although after his judgment of the character of the act was changed, he deeply regretted
his conduct.*
Belief of a relation, is also relative knowledge.
Belief may be divided into immediate and acquired;
the former embracing what are usually termed constitutional or intuitive judgments, and the latter,
acquired or deduced judgments. There is no other
difference between immediate and acquired jndgments except that the relation subsisting between
the two entities is so obvious in the one case, that
the mind immediately perceives it to exist; and in
the other, that the relation is so indistinct, that other
additional related entities, must be examined before the mind perceives it to be true.
Both intuitive and acquired truths may be divided
into those relating to our own minds, and those
which refer to other entities.  To the first class of
truths, belong such as these: that the testimony of
our senses fairly ascertained, is true-that we exist
-that the several operations of our minds may generally be relied on-that we are possessed of personal identity.  The second class embraces truths
relating to the absolute and to the concrete entities.
See Part II,, Moral Emotions, and Part III., First Constitutional Inclination.
88
. 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
Among them are the truths, that every effect must
have a cause-that the laws of nature, i. e., the established modes of the Divine agency, are uniform
-metaphysical axioms-moral truths, &c.
All belief, therefore, of whatever degree, whether
presumptive, or probable, or certain, differs in degree, but not in kind. And the all-wise Creator has
so constituted the mind, that when the evidences of
any truth are fully exhibited and impartially weighed, the strength of our belief will be proportionate
to the degree of evidence.
Retrospective, Present, and Prospective Knowledge.
Our cognitive ideas may again be divided into
retrospective, present, and prospective.
I. Retrospective knowledge is our knowledge of
all our former cognitive, sentient, and active ideas,
and is usually termed recollection or acts of memory.  It embraces all our past operations.  This spe.
cies of knowledge may be subdivided into spontaneous and voluntary retrospective knowledge.  By
the former, or spontaneous retrospective knowledge, is meant that, which is not produced in the
mind by a volition to recall it.  By the latter is
meant those recollections of former mental operations, which are produced by a voluntary effort to
recall them. This effort consists in an active review
of related things, times, and places, and sometimes
in a review of the letters of the alphabet, in expectation that the sight of the first letter of a word,
will recall the whole word, and with it, our knowledge of the thing or entity. The extent of our
H 2
89 
90   EXTENT OF RETROSPECTIVE KNOWLEDGE.
spontaneous retrospective knowledge and the extent
to which, and the facility with which we can voluntarily recall it, depend on the following circumstances.
1. On the natural aptitude of the mind for this
exercise; or, in other words, the natural retentiveness of memory. This differs in different persons,
but is, among all the powers of the mind, the most
susceptible of improvement  by practice.   Some
men appear to have at constant command an intuitive retrospect of the great mass of the former incidents of their life, and of the sciences which they
have studied. Doubtless this superior and abundant mass of materials, must necessarily give superior scope and success to those active operations of
the mind, which are based on them. It is thus,
that men of genius, having the vast experience of
former ages, and an extensive acquaintance with
the laws, properties, and relations of entities at
command, can produce much more accurate specimens of prospective knowledge, and make more
able vindications of the positions they assume with
regard to any subject.
2. The second ground of difference in the extent
and facility of our retrospective knowledge, is found
in the different degrees of logical accuracy, with
which our knowledge is arranged, on paper or in
the mind, according to the different relations themselves which subsist between the entities. It is a
well-established fact, that our knowledge of those
entities, which are clearly connected by some obvious relation, such as sameness, contrariety, genus, 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
species, &c., are most easily and most extensively
recollected. Hence, one method of facilitating our
voluntary recollections of former entities is, habitually to classify our knowledge according to the most
obvious relations of the entities themselves, which
are the subjects of them, or with some principle or
fact, confirmed or illustrated by them. This habit
we strongly recommend lo the young student. If
early formed, and steadily persisted in, it will lead
to the gradual and easy accumulation of an amount
of useful knowledge, far greater, more various, and
more readily at command, than would otherwise
be retained.  One important method of aiding us
in committing a speech, or sermon, or any other
composition to memory, is to write it in such a logical manner, according to the objective relations
of the subjects themselves.
3. The third ground of difference, is found in
the different degrees of frequency, with which the
knowledge to be retained was revised by the mind,
and the feeling or interest which was felt in it.
Our retrospective knowledge will be increased
by the following methods: 1. By thinking frequently of the ideas intended to be recollected.
2. By reviewing those ideas together, which we
wish to recollect together; and in the very same
order in which we desire to remember them.  3.
By connecting them, in the act of memorizing, with
some principle or fact, which we will be sure to remember at the intended time. 4. By the habit of
studying subjects rather than books. This is an extremely important habit, which, as it is of constant
91
0 
92 STUDY OF SUBJECTS RATHER THAN OF BOOKS.
application, and may be continued through life,
exerts a very perceptible influence on intellectual
character and attainments. The man who reads
through, even the more important works to which
he has access, not only vainly expends his time in
perusing much that he knew before, but also pursues an intellectual habit not the most profitable.
It is not even every good book that deserves to be
read through.  Far better is it for the student, to
keep up merely a general acquaintance with the
publications which he deems worthy of his attention, by an examination of their table of contents,
and a tasting of them on some of the most important topics, so as to form an estimate of the character and strength of the author, and then lay them
by for future use; while he devotes the greater part
of his time to the systematic study of subjects, examining, on each such subject, all the valuable authors to which he has access, and tracing the subject through all its various ramifications and relations. The selection of these subjects should be
influenced by the professional duties of the individual; and, while collateral matters of taste and sci.
ence should not be excluded, yet the more extensively the choice of subjects coincides with our
daily duties, the greater will be the eminence attained. 5. Our retrospective knowledge will be
increased by interesting our feelings in the subject,
by viewing its relations to some of the constitutional inclinations of the soul, hereafter to be explained.
Scarcely any bounds can be affixed to the degree
of improvement which the retentive powers have 
IMENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
sometimes attained. Kepler, the celebrated German mathematician, could repeat the whole of Virgil's Azneid, and even specify the first and last lines
on every page of the copy which he used. Henry
de Mesmes could repeat the whole of Homer; and
of the celebrated Pascal it was said, that he very
rarely forgot anything which he had ever known.
Cyrus, we are told, knew the name of every soldier
in his army; and Themistocles could call by name
the twenty thousand inhabitants of Athens. Even
admitting that these accounts must be received, as
we suppose they must, with some qualification, they
are remarkable and most interesting examples of
mnemonic power. These were instances of persons in health, who exhibited these extraordiniary
powers through life.  But there are other facts,
which-shed a new light oil the retrospective power
of the soul, and seem  to prove that persons of the
most ordinary talents, yea, that the soul of every
man  naturally possesses equal and even greater
mnemonic powers, which are now confined by the
organs of the body, but will be fully developed in the
eternal world.  Different diseases have called forth
tern porary exhibitiotis of this superior power of memory. " A case occurred at St. Thomrnas Hospital, of
a ian who was in a state of stupor in consequence
of an injury of the head.  On his partial recovery,
fhe spoke a language which nobody in the hospital
understood, but which was soon ascertained to be
W~elsh.  It was then discovered that he had been
thirty years absent from riVales, and, before the accident, had entirely forgotten  his native language.
On his complete re(overy, hle enirely forgot his
93 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
Welsh again, and recovered the English language.
A lady, mentioned by Dr. Pritchard, when in a state
of delirium, spoke a language which nobody about
her understood, but which also was discovered to be
Welsh. None of her friends could form any concep.
tion of the manner in which she had become acquainted with that language; but, after much inquiry,
it was discovered, that in her childhood she had a
nurse, a native of a district on the coast of Brittany,
the dialect of which is closely analogous to the
Welsh. The lady had, at that time, learned a good
deal of this dialect, but had entirely forgotten it for
many years before this attack of fever."* But the
most interesting case with which we have met, is
that mentioned by Coleridge, of a young woman in
Germany, some time before 1798. Though she
could neither read nor write, yet, when labouring
tinder a nervous fever, she uttered numerous sentences in LIatin, Greek, and Hebrew. Her case excited
great attention, and was, for a season, regarded as
inexplicable. At length it was discovered that, in
early life, she had lived in the family of a learned
Protestant minister, who was in the habit of wallking up and down the passage of his house, into which
the kitchen door opened, and reading aloud his fav ourite authors in these languages. And it was also
found, that the passages which she recited corresponded with these authors. In these cases it is
evident that the impression made upon the memnory,
though the persons had not the power to recall them
in health, were, nevertheless, not lost, but still remained engraven, as it were, on the tablets of the
* Abercronibie on the Intellectual Powers, p. 123
94 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
soul, and disease wrought such a change in the
bodily organs, or exerted such a stimulus upon the
brain, that the soul had more free scope for action.
Why, then, may we not indulge the amazing, the
appalling, yet highly probable  conjecture, that
thoughtt is indestructible in its nature, that every individual idea we have ever had, though now forgotten by us, is indelibly impressed upon the soul,
is, as it were, locked up'in its inner recesses, and at
the great day of eternity will stand in full view before us, will be recollected as vividly as the occurrences of yesterday? It seems, indeed, highly probable, that such an increased recollection will bring
the whole agency of our present life into close connexion with the eternal world, and that, in the providence of God, this whole accumulated mass of our
thoughts will be the basis of our future retribution,
will be the occasion, or will give some peculiarity
to the circumstances of the happiness of the righteous and misery of the wicked.
Various attempts have been made, both in ancient
and modern times, to aid the energies of this important power of the soul by artificial contrivances,
not one of which has commanded the permanent
approbation of the wise and judicious.  Some empyries recommended sundry medicinal prescriptions, which are, however, all eventually injurious
to both body and mind. Others invented different
artificial systems of mnemonics, some of which appear in a few instances to afford an advantage; but
all of which are eventually of little or no benefit,
and some of them positively injurious to the real
improvement of the mind.   The credit of having
9.9 
MtENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
invented the first system of this kind is attributed
to Simonides, the poet and philosopher of Ceos, an
island in the ZEgean Sea, who lived B.C. about
557. On one occasion, as Cicero informs us,*
while dining in company with some of his friends,
he was called out of the house, but, on coming out,
found no one.  Just.as he was about to return, the
house or hall suddenly fell and crushed his friends
to death. When the rubbish had been removed,
they were found so much disfigured, that they could
not be recognised; but Simonides could distinguish
them all, because he recollected the place in which
each one had reclined around the table. By this
incident he was led to reflect, that order, or a proper disposition of the objects to be recollected, affords the greatest aid to memory, and that those
yho desire to cultivate this talent should select certain places, and picture upon their minds the things
which they wish to recollect, and arrange them into
these places. Thus the order of the places would
enable them to recollect the order of the things,
and the pictures or images of these things would
point out the things themselves. The same principle of associating our ideas with certain symbols5
or images, or hieroglyphics, and arranging these
in various ways, seems also to be the basis of the
principal systems of mnemonics of modern times.
Different methods have likewise been invented to
facilitate the recollection of dates and figures generally. The most popular is, perhaps, that of Feinagle, who framed the following table, which is first
to be committed to memory with much accuracy.
* Cicero, De Oratore, lib. ii., ~ 86, p. 197.
96 
MENNTAL PHILOSOPHY.
The number in question is then to be expressed by
the letters of this key table, taken either from the
consonants or vowels, as mav seem mnost suitable,
and annexed to the end of the word to which the
figures refer.
a  e  i  0o  u  au oi ei  ou  y
i::  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  0
b  d  t  f  1  s  p  k  n  z
Thus, to recollect the date B.C. 46, when Julius
Cmesar obtained supreme command at Rome, take
the letters o(-4) and s(=6), and put them in place
of the last letters of his name. We then have Julios,
which is easily recollected, and cannot fail to indicate the date 46, unless the alphabet is forgotten.
After all, the best general rule, in addition to those
given above, is daily practice continued for years,
and not entirely omitted even in after life. Quintilian remarks, "Si quis unam maximamque a mne artem memorim queerat, exercitatio est et labor.  Multa ediscere, malta cogitare, et si fieri potest, quotidie, potentissimum est."
We conclude our observations on memory by
adding the excellent practical directions to teachers
and younger pupils, compiled from Dr. Niemeyer.*
1. We should begin at a very early age to teach our
pupils to retain and to repeat what they have heard.
Their internal organs thus acquire a certain degree
of firmness, and their frequent exercise forms a habit. 2. They should be taught to retain signs, espe
* Grundsotze der Erziehung und des Unterrichts, vol. i., p. 124.  On this
eubject see also an excellent work by Professor Smith, Education: its Histor. and Practice, p. 214.
I
97 
-MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
cially words, as well as things. That which is naturally most easy for them, requires less practice;
that which is more difficult, should receive the more
attention. 3. If they retain words with facility,
even  without  understanding  their  import,  they
should be exercised the more faithfully in recollecting ideas and things, both individually, and in their
several relations. Otherwise the memory will be
cultivated at the expense of the judgment. Thus
the pupil should be called on to repeat the substance
of a discourse which he has heard; or, after he has
read one page of a book, let him close the volume,
and repeat to you the train of ideas contained on
it; or let him trace the thread of a discourse backward to its first idea. As a remarkable instance
of the proficiency attainable by this kind of training, we would mention the case of the late Reverend Uhlhorn,  pastor  of the German  Lutheran
Church in Baltimore, and one of the mnost finished
scholars that have crossed the Atlantic, who, after
twice or thrice perusing any hymn of six or eight verses, was able to repeat it backward, word for word,
from end to beginning. 4. If, on the contrary, the
pupil finds it easy to retain and repeat a multitude of
ideas, concerning that which he has heard, or seen,
or read, but cannot preserve their particular order or connexion, or repeat particular expressions;
this also requires special attention.  For it is, on
many accounts, advantageous to be able to retain
namnes, numbers, and passages out of letters or
books, and to repeat them verbatim. A number
of words should, therefore, daily be assigned, but
only such whose meaning the pupil understands, to
98 
PRESENT KNOWLEDGE.
be committed in a given time, and that number
should be gradually increased. Subsequently, se lect passages from different authors may be assign ed, and the interest of the pupils kept up by the
matter of the extracts committed, as well as by em ulation among the scholars, and explanations of the
importance of the exercise. 5. Let not a day pass
without some exercise of memory for all the pupils.
6. Let those of defective memory not be discoutra ged by harshness; but let various methods be em ployed for their encouragement, by calling to aid the
principles of association. Associations of time and
place will assist their recollection. Generic ideas
will recall the specific one embraced in them, &c.
II. Present knovwledge embraces the testimony of
consciousness, by which is meant that knowledge
which we have of all our present mental operations
of every class. Of course, if the lines of division be
strictly adhered to, that portion of our knowledge
which can correctly be called present, is comparatively small; for the moment after any act of present
cognition is past, it belongs to the retrospective department.
Still, even when circumscribed by these narrow
limits, consciousness embraces all the operations of
our minds, at the precise time of their performance
such as our perceptions, our sensations, our em(
tions, our passions, our judgments in general, o0a
acts of conscience, and, in short, all our mental
operations.  So soon, however, as any mental op
eration of which we are conscious is past, it be.
comes, as it were, the property of mernory, and falls
into the retrospective department.   Col..ciousness
99 
0MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
is an important source of new ideas to us.  By it
we acquire all our knowledge of the inner man, ol
the powers, properties, and relations of our own
minds, of that thinking, conscious subject myself.
It is by consciousness that we obtain our knowledge
of those mental operations expressed by the words
thinking, believing, doubting, reflecting, &c.
The term consciousness is strictly confined to the
operations and processes which take place in the
mind itself, and cannot with propriety be applied
to any material object, or, indeed, to any other entity whatever except the phenomena of our own
minds.  We  cannot be said to be conscious of the
existence of the earth, or planets, or mountains, or
trees, or even of our own bodies.  We are conscioLs of certain perceptions and sensations which
these external objects produce in the mind, when
they are at the time acting on us through our bodily
organs, but not of these entities themselves.   Ev.
ery act of consciousness also, by a constitutional
judgment of our mind, implies the existence of a
conscious being, of myself, from whom it proceeds.
III. Prospective knowledge. By this we mean
all our knowledge of the probable future existence
of entities and their relations. That God has actually bestowed on us some knowledge of futurity,
is evident from an examination of our ideas themselves, and even from the structure of human language. Every individual instance in which we use
the future tense of a verb, is an exemplification of
our remark. The vast sphere of human expectations, of hopes and fears, is distinctly embraced
100 
PROSPECTIVE KNOWLEDGE.
within the limits of prospective knowledge. In.
deed, calculations and expectations of a prospective
nature enter into all human pursuits and occupations. Without them, all business would be at a
stand, the principal motive to human action would
be destroyed, and the world itself would cease to
be what it is. But here the question arises, Is our
prospective knowledge also a knowledge of entities,
and their relations really existing?  To this we reply, that in part it is; and we suppose the following to be a correct view of this subject:
The subject of our prospective knowledge, objectively considered, seems always to be a composite entity, viz., a present entity and another supposed, future entity of some given character, as existing at some future time more or less distant.
The relation between these two, observed by the
mind, is that of fitness, or analogy, or causation,
&c. Thus our prospective knowledge or belief of
the probable future existence of the material world,
and of all existing classes of entities and their relations, is nothing else than a knowledge of the relation of fitness or causation, as existing between
present entities and the same entities as existing at
a future time. Thus, also, we behold a drunkard,
fast hastening to the grave, and believe that he may
yet live six months, but not six years. In both instances, the subject of our belief, is a composite entity. We observe, in one case, the relation of fitness between the entity, a drunkard, now existing
with materially injured health, and his being still
alive six months hence; but we also perceive the
I 2
101 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
relation of unfitness, between his present state, and
his existence six years hence. Or we might say,
we see between his present conduct and his death
before six years, the relation of probable causation.
We see that intemperance will cause his death in
less than  the  specified  time.   Our prospective
knowledge of future human actions, under given
circumstances, is nothing else than a prospective
knowledge of the relation of suitableness, or causation, between a given character of all individual,
and a particular course of probable conduct. Of the
many relations, perceivable between the different
classes of entities, a few only seem to serve as bases
of our prospective knowledge; viz., fitness, by
which we mean suitableness, reasonableness, or accordance with the nature of the entity, analogy,
causation, and revelation. Analogy, causation, and
revelation may be regarded as the arches of the
bridge, over which we pass from the present to a
knowledge of the filture. The relation of fitness is
general in its nature, and seems to embrace analogy and causation; yet there are cases in which the
mind cannot clearly determine how far the antecedent is really the cause of the consequent, or whether it be merely the antecedent. The revelation,
which God has given us, is another totally distinct
basis of prospective knowledge. In many items
of prospective knowledge derived from this source,
we can now clearly perceive also the relation of
fitness and causation, since that knowledge has
been communicated to us; although we were totally unable, h priori, to discover it.  Our belief in a
102 
PROSPECTIVE KNOWLEDGE.
Divine revelation is a knowledge of a composite entity, viz., the Divine character, as known to us, and
certain superhuman actions, termed miracles, of
some kind or other. The relation perceived between them, is that of suitableness or exclusive
causation; that is, causation which creatures could
not exert.
Our prospective knowledge of the future operations and states of all inanimate entities, would be
as certain as our present and retrospective knowledge of them, if we possessed a present, omniscient
acquaintance with all their properties; and if their
circumstances and relations were not changed by
the voluntary agency of animated beings, and if we
knew that the Divine Being would not withdraw or
change these properties.  Or, in other words, in a
world purely mechanical, in which no voluntary
agency was mingled, an omniscient present knowledge, would necessarily imply an omniscient prospective knowledge to beings, endowed like ourselves, with thie ability to perceive these relations.
In such a world, the prospective knowledge of any
creature constituted like man, however limited it
might be, would probably be of equal extent with
his present knowledge.  Yet in our world, the operations of inanimate nature are constantly influenced
by the agency of animate beings, rational and irrational; and therefore our prospective knowledge,
even of the inanimate world, is, in many cases, very
uncertain. Our prospective knowledge of the future conduct of animate beings, especially those of
the higher class, must, for obvious reasons, be still
103' 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
more indistinct and uncertain, on account of the
voluntary agency possessed by man. Yet here also,
whatever prospective knowledge we do possess, is
strictly a knowledge of composite entities. Thus,
the late sagacious politician Talleyrand had a prospective knowledge of the French Revolution, of
1S30, some time at least before it occurred. What
else was this knowledge, than a knowledge of the
relation of causation between the arbitrary measures of the French king and his cabinet, and a revolution, that is, resistance to these measures on the
part of the discontented French people? In short,
every individual has a certain sphere of intellectual
vision all around him, which, like the torch of the
benighted traveller, enables him safely to steer his
course through the circumstances and pursuits of life.
This subject is one of great interest to every reflecting mind. The principles above detailed, seem
to present a definite and intelligible view of all our
knowledge of futurity. It is nothing else than a
knowledge of composite entities, one part of which
is present, and the other future. In the present
part we see the relation of fitness, of causation, of
analogy to the supposed  future part.   On  our
knowledge of these relations in present entities, depends our power of prospection.  All our knowledge of futurity, which is so important in human
life, and is the basis of all our plans and enterprises, may be reduced to the simple view, that it is a
knowledge of the relations of causation, analogy,
and revelation, seen by us in some existing entity,
or learned from the inspired volume. On this pro
104 
ORGANIC PROCESS.
spective knowledge, the politician bases his calculations, the man of business and the Christian their
arrangements for future operations.  We  know almost with certainty, that the physical universe, the
properties and tendencies of material things, will
continue: and it is probable, that the other circumstances of our situation will, in the main, remain
unchanged. Thus, we have a highly probable foreknowledge of the future continuance of nine tenths
of the circumstances and prospects of our situation.
We also know, that the changes which may occur
will be limited by the powers of the different
agents, and the laws of -nature. Hence, the possible changes cannot materially affect our prospects,
or alter the propriety and wisdom of our course,
and the principles of our action. Relying on all
these circumstances, we pursue our course of business, secular or sacred, with confidence and de
light.
CHAPTER III.
ORGANIC PROCESS BY WHICH WE OBTAIN OUR IDEAS
THIE entire human body, considered as an organ
for the influence of entities, may be viewed in a
twofold light, as a general organ, and as a collection of several organs. The effects produced in the
mind through the bodily organs are a knowledge
of the shape, colour, odour, flavour, and sound of
entities, together with feelings more or less pleasant
105 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
or unpleasant attending the operation of each organ.  These organs, it need scarcely be observed,
are not themselves the percipient agents; but the
mere unintelligent instrumentality, through which,
by divine appointmrnent, the soul acts. The inverted image of any object within the sphere of vision,
is made on the retina of an ox's eye, after it has
been taken from the head of the slaughtered animal; but, of course, the eye has no vision.  The
eyes of animals are mere instruments, like the telescope of the astronomer. Although it is indispensable to the perception of those celestial bodies,
which are beyond the reach of the naked eye, yet
no one could for a moment imagine that the telescope itself had a perception of these objects. Philosophically speaking, it is, therefore, not the eye
which sees, but the soul.
-We might divide the results of the soul's action
through bodily organs, into those produced through
the medium of every part of the surface of the
body, such as shape; and, secondly, those for which
only particular parts of the body, such as the eye,
the ear, the nose, serve as organs, viz., colour,
odour, sound, &c. I have knowledge of the sun by
my eye, of music by my ear, of the flavour of an
orange by my palate, of the odour of a flower by
my olfactory organs, of the solidity of a ball by
my hand, or some other part of my body which
touches it. And, in each instance, this knowledge
is more or less pleasant or unpleasant, or, in other
words, is accompanied by some degree of feeling,
which is in a greater or less degree either pleasing
or the reverse.
106 
ORGANIC PROCESS.
In all cases, the influence of entities is exerted
by th3 actual contact of the organ; nor does any
"operatio in distans," so far as we know, take
place. Thus, in taste, the palate and tongue are
touched' by the article tasted; in hearing, the tympanuin of the ear is struck by the vibrations of the
atmosphere; in smelling, the olfactory nerves are
touched by the particles emanating from the odoriferous body; as is proved by the fact, that the most
fragrant rose or shrub, if placed under a glass cylinder, cannot be smelled. In vision, the eyes are
touched by the rays of light, proceeding from the
object which is seen, either by reflection, or refraction, or repulsion, as the case may be.  We  are,
therefore, under no necessity of having recourse to
the exploded theory of animal spirits, or nervous
fluid, or of intervening cerebral vibrations, in order
to-form a connexion between the mind and the object of its perception. And, in all these cases, the
nerves of sensation and of motion, which are imbodied in the organ of sense, or constitute a part
of it, are connected with the brain, of which they
are all branches, and which is the ultimate and
principal physical organ, through which the mind
acts and is acted upon, in its connexion with the
material world. Whether the brain is one general
org,an, or, as phrenologists contend, consists of a
collection of individual organs, each corresponding
to a separate faculty of the mind, has been much
disputed. But from the harmony of universal science in all its ramifications, we may confidently
predict, that the results of Phrenology, when brought
107 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
to a satisfactory degree of certainty, will not conflict with the true system of Psychology.
The mental results, both cognitive and sentient,
of our sensorial action through these organs, are, in
general, termed, in popular language, Sensations.
Thus, we speak of the sensations of sight, of smell,
of touch, of taste, &c., meaning principally those
cognitions which we derive through these organs,
and which are more specifically termed perceptions.
This vague use of the term we derive from the Romans, who employ in the same general manner both
seztio and sensus, from which our word sensation
is ultimately derived. Yet, as this term is, in common  language, more generally used as expressive
of feelings, and as the related terms, sensibility,
sensitive, and sentient, are employed exclusively
with a simrilar reference, a laudable desire of rigid
precision, and consistency in metaphysical phraseology, would dictate the constant discrimination between those results of our organic action which are#
cognitive and those that are sentient, and the em.
ployment of the term perceptions, rather than sensations, to designate the former.
The eye, or organ of vision, is an instrument constructed with the most perfect accuracy, in accordance with the ascertained principles of optics. The
most perfect optical instruments fall far short of it
in accuracy and excellence. Indeed, a more striking and intelligible exhibition of the knowledge
and wisdom of the Creator, cannot be imagined.
The ball of the eye itself is a species of camera
obseura.  Its exterior consists of two membraneous
108 
ORGANIC PROCESS.
coverings, the outer one called sclerotica (au~ipoTi~g, hard), on account of its superior firmness, and
the inner, choroid (Xopoet64, like a skin), from its
cuticular appearance. Within this inner coat, and
expanded over its surface, is the optic nerve, which
receives the rays of light, and on which they form
an image of the external object, which reflects
them to the eye. In the front part of the eye, which
is exposed to view, is the cornea, so called because,
when dried, it has nearly the consistence of very
fine horn.  It is transparent, and projects from the
eyeball, like the segment of a smaller sphere. Back
of the centre of the cornea, is a small opening in the
choroid, termed the pupil, through which the rays
of light enter. And in the rear of this, are the
aqueous humour, then the crystalline lens of a
dense texture, both nearly of the same size with the
cornea, and, lastly, the vitreous or glassy humour,
which fills the remaining cavity of the eye. These
several pellucid humours collect the rays of light
into a focus on the retina.
The eye affords us the knowledge of colour, local
direction, and expansion.  When I open my eyes,
I behold the different objects within the range of
my vision, and instantly derive not only the idea of
colour, but also of direction or location in space, of
every one of them, as I successively direct my at.
tention to each.  And, by the improvement resulting from practice, I also become able to judge of
the shape and distance of objects through the instrumentality of the eye.  All objects of vision occupy relative positions in space, and a perception
K
109 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
of this position is one of the primary and original
items of knowledge derived through the visual organ. By touch and locomotion, we may obtain
similar knowledge, even if divested of sight. Yet
the process is more tardy, and can be applied only
to such objects as we can personally reach.
Vision is performed through the mnedium of light,
or, more properly speaking, light is the object of
vision.  It consists of rays of different colours and
of different degrees of refrangibility. When we
permit a oortion of light to pass through a prism, its
differei.. o,iot(s are separated, in consequence of
the shape of that instrument, by which the rays are
refracted in different degrees out of a right line.
We thus perceive the regular series of colours from
red to violet.
The superficial texture of all visible objects may
be reduced to precisely as many varieties as are
found in colour. Each of the textures reflects, or,
according to a different theory, repels the light, in
a manner somewhat different from every other, and
reflects or repels a surface of rays equal to its own
bulk. These rays light upon the lens of the eye,
and are converged with the peculiarity of every different texture to the retina; and thus, by divine constitultion, we have the knowledge of different colours.
So that the rays of light, coming from the objects
in different degrees of spissitude, and in the particular state of reflection or repulsion corresponding to
the particular texture of the objects, are as much,
and inthe same sense, the cause of our knowledge
of colour, as the particles emitted by the rose and
110 
ORGANIC PROCESS.
touching our nostrils, are of smell, or the peach
touching the palate and tongue, is of taste.
In vision we see nothing, originally, but colour
and location, or direction and extension. Distance
is not the direct object of vision, because children
will stretch out their little hands to catch the moon,
until experience teaches them the futility of the attempt; and a person cured of congenital blindness,
by an operation for the cataract, will for some time
hold out his hand and feel his way, lest he strike
against the stove or table at the other end of the
room. That we do form some original judgment
of extension and peripheral shape by the eye, seems
very clear. For, it can be demonstrated that the
images formed on the retina, vary and correspond
to the different outline and extension of the objects
which they represent. Now, as the mind has a correspondent and different idea for every cognoscib]e
diversity of objects, it must have one for this also.
It is doubtless true, as Mr. Locke and others have
maintained, that a blind man, who had learned by
touch the difference of shape between a cube and
a sphere, could not, on being restored to sight, discover by his eye, which was cubical? and which was
spherical. But this fact does not, we think, prove
that we obtain no idea of extension and shape by
the eye.  It only establishes the position, that the
man suddenly restored to sight, could not at once
decide which of the two different outlines of which
he had an idea by sight, corresponds to the one, to
his ideas of which, as obtained by touch, he had
given the name either of cube or sphere.   Both
ill 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
sight and touch give us distinct and definite ideas
of the peripheral shape of objects, but we cannot
tell which one of the properties learned by one
sense, corresponds to a given property learned by
the other sense, until we have ascertained the fact
by the conjoined action of both. It must also be
remembered that the association between words and
our ideas of objects is arbitrary, and is formed only
by practice or usage. The blind man has long been
accustomed to associate the ideas of touch, which
he acquires from those objects, with the words cube
and sphere; but when his first vision also gives him
the ideas of these objects appropriate to sight, there
is no association existing between these ideas and
the words cube and sphere. If, therefore, he be
asked, which of the two is the figure which he had
been accustomed to call either cube or sphere, he
could not tell. He could only reply that they appear evidently different; but the association of these
new ideas with sounds or names is yet to be formed.
As yet, neither of these names will recall or designate his newly-acquired ideas, and he can no more
tell which is the cube, and which the sphere, than
if you were to ask him in Greek, which is the Kvpo.
and Which the aoitpa. He has not yet learned the
correspondence of the ideas themselves, much less
of the terms which usage has employed to designate
them.
That the eye does not originally give us any
knowledge of shape, excepting the mere outline,
or extension, is evident; because a well-executed
painting will deceive even an adult; and all effort
112 
ORGANIC PROCESS.
to represent the shape of objects in portraits or other
paintings, is based upon this fact, and demonstrative
of it.  Many of our readers may recollect, that on
entering Peale's Museum in Philadelphia, at one end
of the long hall, they saw at the other a flight of
stairs, and an aged gentleman just in the act of ascending, but, as if attracted by the noise of their
entrance, looking back at them, full in the face. On
nearer approach, however, the deception was discovered, and the whole proved to be a most successful effort of the artist's pencil, a lasting monument of the high eminence attained by Mr. Peale,
in his favourite pursuit. In short, the entity which
is the object of our knowledge in vision, is not the
external person or thing said to be seen, but is
merely the rays of light. No man has ever literally
seen his nearest friend, his father or mother, his
brother or sister.  He has seen the light reflected
from them on the retina of his eye, and nothing
more. What we see is nothing else than those rays
of light which actually enter into the pupil of the
eye; and it is experience which teaches us, that
there are external objects corresponding to themn,
from which they proceed.  It is the different textures or affinities, corresponding to these different
colours seen by us, of which we thus acquire  a
knowledge.
For the idea of apparent and relative, but not of
actual size, we are also indebted to the eye. The
image formed on the retina is large or small according t        o        the magnitude and distance of the objects. Thus the apparent magnitude of objects va                        K2
113 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
ries, but their real size is of course unchanged.
When we first perceive a vessel at sea in the distant
horizon, it appears very small; but as it approaches
us, its magnitude seems to increase, until it has attained its natural size in proximity; yet the actual
size of the vessel was of course unchanged. Of objects equidistant from the eye, vision will give us a
correct idea of the relative magnitude. Thus, as
we know that the balloon and the basket attached
to it are nearly equidistant from us, however far or
near they may be, we can form an accurate judgment of the relative size of each, so long as both are
visible to us. After we know the distance of any
objects, practice enables us to judge of their actual
size, by sight. Yet this is, originally, the combined
result of touch and vision. Experience teaches us
to judge of the diminution which distance makes,
in the apparent magnitude of objects; and optical
science explains the causes on which these appear
ances depend. We are so accustomed to see objects diminish in size as they recede from us, that
daily observation confers considerable accuracy on
our practical judgment; and thus, by a rapid process, we learn to judge of the actual magnitude of
all objects, whose distance we know.  We form an
estimate of the diminution, which the known distance would make in the apparent size of an object, and thus judge of its actual magnitude. The
idea, which the mind acquires of the images formed
on the retina by different objects, does of course
not resemble that image in any known.. property;
yet, for each image, the mind obtains a definite idea,
114 
ORGANIC PROCESS.
both as to colour, peripheral shape or outline, and
size. It is on this principle, that in the science of
perspective, we indicate on canvass the increased
distance of a known object, by a diminution of its
size. And, when we view an object through a spyglass, and  judge it to be brought nearer to us,
this effect is produced in accordance with the same
principles, the only change being that the lenses of
the instrument make the rays of light fall on the
retina in a more dilated or expanded form, thus actually making on it a larger image.
When objects are near at hand, or in the vicinity
of others of whose distance we have some idea,
we can form a judgment from the degree of inclination on the axis of vision and the angles formed
with surrounding objects. For this purpose, the
Creator has kindly given us two eyes, while for all
other purposes one would suffice, as the action of
each is separate and independent.
The degree of distinctness with which objects
are seen by us also leads us to form some judgment of their distance; as we know that near objects always appear more clearly visible than those
afar off.  For this cause, objects seen through a
mist are judged to be more distant than they really
are. The standard by which we judge is the degree
of clearness in an ordinary atmosphere, and then
i-ur judgment is correct; but when we apply the
sa.me standard to the appearance of objects seen
through a mist, it is calculated to mislead us.
When a strange object is in the vicinity of an.
other of known size, we can judge of the size of
115 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
the former by its apparent relative size, even w-hen
the distance of both is unknown. On this principle, painters show the size of a house by locating a
man, or horse, or fence in its vicinity.   As the
size of these latter objects varies but little, it forms
a standard by which to judge the magnitude of the
others.
It is an interesting fact, that objects appear to us
in their natural position, while it can be proved
that their image formed on the retina is inverted.
Nor has any solution been given of this phenomenon, other than that it is the appointed law of-the
mind. And of similar inexplicable nature is the
fact, that though we see objects with two eyes, they
appear to a person of sound organs as single;
while to persons who are affected with a disease in
one eye, which prevents it from being acted on
precisely like the other, objects are seen double,
that is, images somewhat different are made on the
retina of the two eyes, and ideas somewhat different are thus excited in the mind by the same object.
In addition to the perceptions obtained through
vision, the eye is also, at the same time, one of the
media through which pleasingfeelings are excited in
the mind by external objects. It is through this organ that the pleasant feelings excited by the beauties
of a landscape, that is, by the varieties and combinations of its colours, are produced in the mitnd.
In short, this is the organ through which a benevolent God designed to confer, and actually does
bestow upon us, a large portion of the incidental
happiness belonging to our pilgrimage on earth.
Even the light of the returning day is calculated it
116 
ORGANIC PROCESS.
self to inspire the mind with pleasure; and whithersoever we direct our steps, objects meet the eye
calculated to afford us delight.   The vegetable
kingdom presents to us the flowers of the field and
garden, in their numberless varieties and shades of
colour transcending the array of Solomon in all his
glory: the grain fields, waving like the ocean before the passing breeze; and tLo trees of the forest
bending majestically before the still more powerful
storm, are all calculated to excite feelings of the
most interesting and pleasing nature. The mineral
and animal kingdoms, in like manner, abound in
objects calculated to delight the observer. Yea,
so susceptible are we of pleasure from this source,
that there is need of caution, lest we take so much
delight in the creature as to overlook the Creator,
by whom all these objects were made, and to whom
they are all designed to conduct us. Who among
my readers has not seen some naturalist to whom the
words of nature's favourite, Pollok, would apply?
" One made acquaintanceship with plants and flowers,
And happy grew in telling all their names;
One classed the quadrupeds; a third the fowls;
Another found in minerals his joy:
And I have seen a man, a worthy man,
In happy mood conversing with a fly;
And as he, through his glass, made by himself,
Beheld its wondrous eye and plumage fine,
From leaping scarce he kept, for perfect joy."
But in regard to vision, and to perception through
any of the senses, the attention of the mind is necessary to the perfection of the process. The rays
of light mlay be reflected from an object to the eye,
117 
MENTAI, PHIL,OSOPHY.
and form an image on the retina; but we have no
recollection of a perception, unless our attention be
directed to the object. The rays of light are at all
times as fully reflected to the eye from all other objects within the entire field of vision before us, as
from that one to which our attention is at any given
time directed; and yet we recollect only the one
which has attracted our attention.  In short, there
are hundreds of images formed on the retina at all
times; but it is a law of the soul that, although we
have an indefinite simultaneous vision of several objects before us, we take cognizance only of one at
a time; and of our perceptions of that one alone
do we retain any recollection.
As to the question which has so much puzzled
philosophers of all ages and nations, how this perception is effected through the organs; what, for
example, is the connexion between the image on
the retina and the perception of the soul; our reply is, that it is the constituted order of things, as
appointed by God, and inexplicable to us. The
image on the retina is as indispensable a link in the
chain of instrumentality as the presence of light,
and its passage through the lens of the eye; but
we can no more comprehend the connexion of the
intelligent percipient action of the soul with the
last link of instrumental organism, than with the
first. In this, as in a thousand other instances, the
facts are known and understood, but the mode of
their occurrence, or the causal relation between
them, is beyond our comprehension.
The ear, or organ of hearing, is likewise a com
118 
ORGANIC PROCESS.
plicated and very delicate member, whose structure
is not as easily illustrated as that of the eye.  Like
the latter organ, it is placed in an elevated part of
the body, so as to have a more extended sphere.of
sensorial action. The external ear is expanded, so
as to receive a large surface of vibrations of the air,
which it conveys to the point of entrance. Thence
a tube, termed the auditory passage (meatus auditorius), conducts the vibrations to the tympanum or
drum, which is an expanded nerve analogous to the
retina of the eye. From the tympanum, these
vibrations are communicated, by the means of four
little bones, to the water contained in the cavities
of the labyrinth. By means of this water, they are
conveyed to the auditory nerve, and finally to the
brain. In order that the drum of the ear may act
more freely, there is a communication, termed the
Eustachian tube, extending from the drum to the
back part of the mouth, freely admitting the air
Still, hearing may take place, though less perfectly,
when the drum has been perforated, as is proved in
the case of those persons who can, by taking smoke
into their mouth, express it through one or both
their ears, and yet are not deaf. In some cases,
also, where suppulration had destroyed the continuity
of the chain of little bones, the sense of hearing was
not destroyed. The principal medium for the conveyance of these vibrations is the air; yet any other
body possessing some elasticity, whether it be solid,
liquid, or aeriform, which forms a connexion between
the sounding body and the ear, may become the
medium of sound.  Thus our American Indians
11.9 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
apply tneir ears to the ground, to discover the approach of their enemies, whom they could not yet
hear through the air.  Yet, in a vacuum, sound
cannot be communicated, that is, these vibrations
cannot be propagated to the ear except by some
intervening body. The susceptibility of the auditory organs is different in different persons, but no
one can hear the vibrations of a cord which vibrates
less than about thirty-two times in a second. The
whole range of distinguishable sounds forms upward
of nine octaves.
Sound is therefore an idea of the mind, caused
by the vibrations of some stricken object, which
vibrations are communicated through the air, or
some other elastic medium, to the ear.  When we
hear the discharge of a distant cannon, the noise is
not at the cannon, but in our minds. The discharge
of the cannon causes a tremendous agitation in the
atmosphere around it, which is extended, like the
undulations of a pond when a stone is thrown into
it, until they reach the ears of all animals within
their circumference, and produce in every one of
them the idea of sound.
The number of sounds which we can distinguish
is very great, both as to variety of tone and strength
of utterance, amounting to many thousands.  The
mind also perceives a number of relations between
sounds, and it is the discussion of these sounds and
their relations, as well as the calculation of the caus's, nature, and number of the vibrations, by which
they are produced, which constitute the theoretical
science of music. These vibrations are actions of
120 
ORGANIC PRcE$SB
sounding bodies or entities, and our perceptions of
themrn, and of the relations between them, are cognitive ideas.   The relations of concord and discord
are the coincidence or confusion of the vibrations
of the sounding instrument.  Thus, those different
strings of a piano, which, owing to their length,
thickness, weight, and tension, vibrate in the same
time, are said to be in unison.  If one string vibrates
in exactly double the time of another, every alternate vibration of the one will coincide with the
vibrations of the other, and form the concord of an
octave.
The ear is the medium not only of our knowledge of the vibrations of the atmosphere called
sound, but also of the feeling of pleasure or pain,
which the different combinations of these sounds,
either harmonious or discordant, are intrinsically
calculated to produce. When we listen to a piece
o      f  music,  we find no difficulty in distinguishing between the different notes, that is, the different vibrations of the air, of which we obtain a knowledge
through  the ear, and the pleasant or -unpleasant
feelings excited by these vibrations or notes. Nor
ca        n     we for a    moment hesitate in believing, that the
difference in the feelings excited by the harmonious
or            discordant combinations of sound, arises from a
difference in the notes themselves, considered as
simple entities, or from the relation of concord or
discord  subsisting between them.   These notes, or
rather the ideas of them, are the subjects of mathematical calculations in the science of music. But
who ever heard of a writer on this subject, speak
L
121 
-MENTAL, PHILOSOPHY.
ing of a chord or discord of feeling, that is, a chord
of pleasure or a discord of pain?  Or who ever
heard a musician speak of an octave of pleasure or
pain?  Common  sense, and the structure of the
mind, have led men to distinguish between these
things, and to acknowledge our perception of each
note individually, and of the relations existing between them, as entirely different from the feelings,
pleasant or unpleasant, excited by them. Although
the ear originally affords us only ideas of sound,
yet, by practice, we learn to judge of many other
things by this organ. There is but little doubt, that
an impression somewhat different is made on the
tympanulin, not only by the different degrees of force
with which the undulating atmosphere touches it,
but also by the fact of its striking that organ in a
direct or oblique manner.  Of this difference we
have a distinct idea by tile ear alone; yet, by that
exclusively, we could never know that the difference
in the loudness of the sound resulted either from the
degree of force with which the atmosphere is agitated by the sonorous body, or from its proximity
or distance from our ear: nor that the difference
in our idea, produced by the directness or obliquity
with which the undulations of air strike the ear,
was indicative of the local direction of the sounding
body whence they proceeded.  It is by the combined use of sight, touch, and locomotion, that the
distance and direction of the sonorous body are
originally learned, and practice then enables us to
judge' of these circumstances by the ear alone.
Yea, we even go farther, and apply these results to
122 
ORGANIC PROCESS.'
objects which could not be reached by touch.  It
is thus that, having learned the velocity of sound,
we-judge of the distance of clouds, by the length of
time intervening between the flash of lightning in
them and our hearing the thunder. An interval of
half a minute, we know, proves the cloud to be
about six and a half miles distant. Children hear
persons addressing them, and at the same time see
whether they are in front, at their side, or in their
rear; and thus early learn to associate the peculiar
sounds produced by persons speaking from different
directions, with that direction itself. What this
peculiarity about any sound is, it is not easy to describe; yet every person is familiar with it from
experience. Nay, so obviously do we thus judge
of direction by the ear, that if the vib'rations proceeding from a sonndintg body fall on some smooth
and- solid surface, and are reflected to our ear, thus
causing what is ternied an echo, we judge the cause
of that echo to be in the direction not of the original
-sounding body, but of that smooth and solid surface which reflected them. In the same indirect
manner, the loudness of a sound becomes an index
of the distance of the object whence it proceeds.
By the combined use of different organs, we become
famniliar with the ordinary loudness of any customary
sound at a given distance, and also learn to distinguish and recognise these different sounds, such as
those produced by different musical instruments, by
the voice of man, and other animals, &c.; and these
data being known by experience, we can form a
judgment by the ear alone, of the distance of the
1~3 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
sounding body.  By these results of experience, a
kind of practical commutation of the senses takes
place, and in the daily occurrences of life, though
many objects are within the reach of only one organ, we at once acquire an amount of knowledge
of them, which originally belongs to several. In
the first volume of the Manchester Philosophical
Memoirs is contained the following statement concerning a blind man in that city, quoted by Professor Upham: " I had an opportunity of repeatedly
observing the peculiar manner in which he arranged
his ideas, and obtained his information. Whenever
he was introduced into company, I remarked that
he continued some time silent. The sound directed
him to judge of the dimensions of the room, and the
different voices, of the number of persons that were
present. His distinction in these respects was very
accurate, and his memory so retentive, that he was
seldom mistaken. I have known him instantly to
recognise a person on first hearing him, though
more than two years had elapsed since the time of.
their last meeting. He determined pretty nearly
the stature of those he was conversing with by the
direction of their voices; and he made tolerable
conjectures respecting their tempers and dispositions
by the manner in which they conducted their conversation."
The organ of touch is the whole body, wherever
nerves extend, either over its surface, or through
its interior. It has been a subject of dispute, whether the nerves of the hand have naturally greater
acuteness of sensibility than those of the other parts
124 
OR GANIC - PROCESS.
of the body. As the acuteness or strength of all
our local organs is confessedly much increased by
practice, and, as in the case of this general organ,
those parts of it which are found to be most acute,
are also those which, from their position, are most
used, it is highly probable that the difference between the sensitiveness of the hand and the other
parts of the body, as organs of touch, may also
be attributed to that cause. From early life our
hands are almost incessantly employed to pick up,
to hold, or to move objects, and, in short, to perform all the operations of physical agency, of which
that important organ is capable. And as the attention of the mind is ordinarily directed to these manual operations, we have the greater reason to expect great improvement in the mental results accompanying themn. It is probably to this want of
attention that other portions of the body which are
often brought into contact with various objects do
not improve proportionably in sensibility; or, to
speak more correctly, that the mind does not improve more in sensibility through them.
Whether the organ of touch should be separated
from that of muscular effort, has been disputed.
Perhaps they may, with more propriety, be regarded as one organ exerted in different degrees.'The
slightest possible contact, although it could not afford us the same amount of knowledge which we
derive from stronger contact, and from the muscular
tension caused by firm resistance, yet does seem to
include in it the elementary idea of resistance in a
small degree, and, therefore, also of muscular action.
L2
125 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
By the organ of touch we obtain a knowledge
of the different degrees of solidity or fluidity of
bodies, their shape; extension, smoothness or roughness. heat or cold.  The ideas - embraced in this
knowledge may probably be reduced to modifications of resistance and extension.  WMe know that
the ideas popularly expressed by these terms, as
well as the feelings accompanying them, are derived through the organ of touch; and we know, too,
that in obtaining them our organ meets with resistance perfect or imperfect, continuous or irregular. By the organ of touch combined with motion,
we also acquire an idea of extension and shape; but
individual touch does not afford us a general idea
of the object causing it..The terms heat and cold
properly designate our perception or cognitive idea
of a greater or less degree of caloric in the atmosphere, or any other body with which we come into
contact. Cold is a negative term, implying the
absence of heat. In winter we perceive but little
caloric in the atmosphere, and term the weather
cold.  In summer, when the reverse is the case,
we term it warm. What caloric is we do not exactly know; but we employ the term to express
the perception we have of it.  Nor are we to suppose in this, more than in any other case, that eit.her the perception of caloric, or the feeling attendant on it, has any resemblance to the caloric
itself. This perception, however, does not teach
us the nature of the radiating body,'independently
of the'other organs'of sense.  It is a philosophic
question, belonging to Pyronomics, rather than
126 
ORGANIC PROCESS.
Mental Philosophy, to determine the precise nature
of caloric itself.  But whether we suppose it to be
an independent subtile fluid, or a mere modification of other bodies, all have the same perception
of its influence on the human body, and of the feelings caused by it. The terms heat and cold, as
expressing the sensation produced by this agent
on our frame, are merely relative, the one being
produced by our touching a body that has more
caloric, and the other one that has less than our
hand at the time possesses; and if, after having
immersed one hand in hot water and the other in
cold, we put them both into water of a medirum
temperature, to the one hand this water will feel
warm and to the other cold at the same time.
In some cases of touch the contact may be so violent that the organ becomes injured, and that the
feeling of pain is so great as to make us lose sight
of the perception connected with it.
The feeling of exhaustion and fatigue, consequent on continued or violent exertion, seems not to
belong to the sense of touch, but rather resembles
the periodical appetites, and is a provision of the
Creator to admonish us of the necessity of rest.
It has been denied by some recent metaphysicians that the idea of externity is a result of touch,
and, consequently, affirmned that our idea of the
real existence of tile external world is not derived
from this or any other organ of sense. This view
we consider erroneous.  Yet those Who maintain
it, admit that the idea of externity and of an external world occurs on occasion of the use of these or.
127 
MENTAL PRILOSOP-HY.
gans, especially that of touch; but affirm that it
then occurs by a separate law of the soul. We see
no reason for the admission of such a separate law
in this case, any more than in that of the ideas obtained by the other senses, and prefer regarding it
as the appropriate information obtained by this organ. Neither of the other senses could afford us
the idea of externity.  By the ear alone we could
obtain only ideas of sound; by the eye, only of colour, expansion, and direction; by the nostrils, only
ideas of odours; but by neither, nor all of these
combined, could we have learned the idea of externity in general, or of the existence of the external world.  It is to touch and locomotion that we
are primarily indebted for our knowledge of the
objective reality of these objects.
The sense of touch has been improved to a most
surprising degree by practice, and especially by the
concentration of the powers of the mind upon it, in
consequence of the loss of other senses.  It appears to be well ascertained, that some blind persons have been able to judge of their distance from
solid bodies by the action or pulsation of the air
upon their face, to distinguish spurious coins from
such as are genuine, and to distinguish and separate garments and other articles with which they
were familiar, from a multitude of others of similar
shape and texture.  We  are told that " Mr. Sanderson, the blind mathematician," could distinguoish
by his hand, il a series of Romrnan medals, the true
from the counterfeit, with a more unerring discrimnation than the eye of a professed virtuoso; and,
128 
ORGANIC PROCE SS.
when he was present at the astronomical observa.
tions in the garden of his college, he was accustomed
to perceive every cloud which passed over the sun.
This remarkable power, which has sormetimes been
referred to an increased intensity of particular senses, in many cases evidently resolves itself into an
increased habit of attention to the indications of all
those senses which the individual retains. "Two instances have been related to me," proceeds Dr. Abercrombie, " of blind men who were much esteemed
as judges of horses.  One of these, in giving his opinion of a horse, declared him to be blind, though
this had escaped the observation of several persons,
who had the use of their eyes, and who were with
some difficulty convinced of it. Being asked to give
an account of the principle on which he had decided, he said it was by the sound of the horse's step
in walking, which implied a peculiar and unusual
caution in his manner of putting down his feet."
Thus, also, in the various institutions for the blind
in this country and Europe, the sense of touch is
employed as a substitute for sight, and by the use
of uncial letters, elevated above the surface of the
page, these unfortunate beings are enabled to distinguish the letters by following them with theii
fingers, and by practice to spell and read with tolerable facility. A communication has thus been
opened for them to the world of intellect, and the
literature of the past and present ages may eventually be brought within their view.
The organ of taste consists of a number of papille, distributed over the surface of the tongue, and
.129 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
particularly over its sides and extreme point, as well
as the roof of the mouth or palate. This organ is
thus wisely located by a benevolent Providence at
the very entrance; through which all articles of food
must pass, the healthy or unhealthy character or
condition of which may by this means, in most cases, be tested.  It serves as a guardian over the
character of everything which finds access to the
alimentary canal; and it is probable, that in its
natural state, unvitiated by luxury and the artificial
habits of civilized life, this organ, together with
that of smell, would be an almost infallible safeguard against unhealthy food. It is, indeed, true,
that these organs alone could merely teach us to
distinguish the various odours and flavours of different objects, and to discriminate between the pleasant and the unpleasant feelings excited by them.
But experience teaches us that articles of certain
odours and flavours are healthy, while others are
the reverse; and thus these flavours and odours become indices of the healthiness or noxiousness of
edible objects.  The pleasantness or unpleasantness of different flavours and odours is somewhat
arbitrary and variable.  What is pleasant to one
man is often unpalatable to another; and a flavour,
which at first was unpleasant, may become agreeable by use. Yet, Providence has wisely ordered
that the staple articles of food, bread and meal,
and also the natural beverage which springs from
the mountain rock, and is everywhere met with by
digging into the earth, are pleasant to all mankind.
It is, indeed, true, that if, with our eyes closed,
we introduce a peach or apricot into the mouth
130 
ORGANIC PROCESS.
We obtain not only the idea of the flavour which
those species of fruit are calculated to excite, but
also some knowledge of their solidity and shape.
By flavour is meant that adjective entity (property)
in the fruit itself, which is the subject of our knowledge, and the excitant of feeling pleasant or unpleasant.  The word taste is used to designate our
knowledge of the flavour, and the words pleasant
and unpleasant express the feeling excited by it.
Thus also the word odour means the adjective entity (property) in objects, of which the term smell
expresses our knowledge, and the words pleasant
and unpleasant the feelings excited by the odour.
But the knowledge of solidity and shape is, in
the above-namrned instances also, obtained by touch,
and the only thing of which the organ of taste is the
medium is, 1. A knowledge of the flavour of the
fruit; and, 2. A feeling, pleasant or unpleasant, connected with it. Oftentimes several of the bodily organs are acted upon simultaneously. Thus in eating a peach the several senses of smell, touch, and
taste may be affected at the same moment, and each
organ be the medium of the appropriate feeling and
knowledge, which the entity peach is capable of
producing. The flavours of different esculent entities are almost as various as the entities themselves;
but it has not been found necessary in human language to distinguish many of them in any other
way than by the name of the object itself. Thus,
we speak of the taste of an orange, of a tomato,
of an onion, of a peach, without having any other
term to designate each.
131 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
Of Smell.  The organ of this sense consists of
numerous and minute ramifications of nerves, distributed over the interior surface of the nostrils, and
the sinuses connected with them. The bony bridge
of the nose, and the cartilaginous projection beyond
it, serve as a protection to these delicate organs,
and their location in the immediate vicinity of the
mouth, through which all that is eaten must pass,
affords peculiar facility for the exercise of their
power in the choice of our food.
The odours of different objects are almost numberless in kind and degree. Indeed, almost every
entity, that has any perceptible odour, has one in
some respect different from all others. But, excepting a few general terms, such as fragrant, putrid,
musty, &c., they are all designated by the name of
the object by which they are emitted, and their
precise nature learned by experience. Thus, we
speak of the odour of a shrub, of a rose, &c.
Some odours are perceptible both to taste and
smell.  Those who have visited regions abounding
in bilious miasma, well know that, on entering the
infected region, the mniasma may sometimes be
tasted on the tongue, as well as smelled by the olfactories. The odour itself appears to consist of
innumerable small particles, emitted in every direclion from the object to which it belongs, and borne
upon the surrounding atmosphere. When this atmosphere is inspired through the nostrils, the olfactories, wisely located by Providence, are touched
by the odorous particles, and thus the smell is obtained. That such minute particles are emitted by
132 
SENSE OF SAMIELI,L.
the odorous body, is demonstrated by the fact, that
if the most fragrant flower be placed under a glass
receiver, no odour will be perceived by those
around it, however near they may be to the glass,
which is therefore impervious to these particles.
Although these particles cannot penetrate glass,
and are therefore not so small as light, they are inconceivably minute; for a grain of musk will fill the
surrounding atmosphere for years with a pungent
odour, without itself experiencing the least sensible
diminution of weight.
This sense gives us no knowledge of the colour
or shape of the entity to which the odour belongs,
but only of the odour itself. In odours of a familiar kind, we instantly recognise the entity by
which it is excited. But this we do by a recollection of the fact, that whenever we saw or felt a
shrub or rose near us, we perceived the same
odour; and hence we discover the relation of analogy between the cases, and believe that the same
entity is again the exciting cause of the odour. It
is thus, that we can, by taste and smell, infer the
entities by which they are excited, because almost
every entity which can act on these two organs,
excites a different idea or mental representative.
That the organ of taste is the medium of knowledge, as well as feeling, is evident,
1. Because our ideas of the flavours of different
objects, are almost as numerous as the objects
themselves; while the feelings excited by them are
simply two, pleasant or unpleasant. There are
some odours concerning which, though totally dis
M
1,33 
IMENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
tinct from all others, and easily distinguished from
them, as they have something very peculiar and
striking in them, we may scarcely be able to determine, whether they are pleasant or unpleasant.
But this does not arise from the fact of their having
but little flavour; on the contrary, their flavour may
be very strong.
2. While all men agree in the knowledge, conveyed by the terms sweet or acid flavour, they very
often differ entirely as to the question, whether a
particular flavour, such as that of the tomato, is
pleasant or unpleasant. Yea, the very same articles of food will at one time be pleasant, and at
another unpleasant to the same person; and yet, to
that same person the flavours of these and other en.
tities, will appear as distinct from each other as they
ever did.  In short, we perceive, that all these several organs are the vehicles both of knowledge and
feeling to the mind.
The acuteness of our perceptions by any one organ, is not only augmented in a surprising degree
by continued practice and the force of habit thus
formed; but is also greatly enhanced by the loss
of one or several other senses. Indeed, when one
organ is destroyed, the.improveinent of the residue
often amounts to a virtual compensation for its loss.
So acute does the sense of touch become in the
blind, that some of them have been able to distinguish colours by it. And the sense of smell has
been so wonderfully improved, that James Mitchell
could distinguish by it the presence and location of
a stranger in a room, and Dr. Moyse the black dress
of his friends.
134 
ACQUIRED PERCEPTIONS.
The different professional pursuits of men, as they
give direction to the action of the individual during
a large portion of his life, naturally lead to a correspondent improvement of particular organs.  Thus,
says Dr. Reid, "Not only men, but children, idiots,
and brutes, acquire by habit many perceptions which
they had not originally. Almost every employment in life hath perceptions of this kind, that are
peculiar to it. The shepherd knows every sheep
of his flock, as we do our acquaintance, and can
pick them out of another flock one by one. The
butcher knows by sight the weight and quality of
his beeves and sheep before they are killed. The
farmer perceives by his eye very nearly the quantity of hay in a rick, or of corn in a heap. The sailor
sees the burden, the build, and the distance of a ship
at sea, while she is a great way off. Every man
accustomed to writing distinguishes acquaintance
by their handwriting, as he does by their faces.
And the painter distinguishes in the works of his
art, the style of all the great masters. In a word,
acquired perception is very different in different
persons, according to the diversity of objects about
which they are employed, and the application they
bestow in observing them."*
In concluding this part of our subject we may yet
remark, that although the body of mnan exerts so important a part in his perception of external objects,
that any material derangement of the bodily organ
often impedes, and sometimes entirely precludes the
specific action of mind, to the perfection of which
* Vol. i., p.286.
135 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHIY.
it is constitutionally necessary; these two parts of
our being are nevertheless separate and distinct.
That a degree of mind, even remotely approximating to that of man, is not necessary to the health
or perfection of the mere animal economy, is demonstrated in the case of irrational beings.  That
mind can exist and prosper separate from body is
also evident from the decided testimony of revelation concerning disimbodied spirits. Hence, it is
by no means a necessary inference, that because
body and mind co-operate in man, to qualify him
for the purposes of his existence on earth, therefore they are amalgamated into one substance, or
have undergone a reciprocal transfusion of properties; or are of such a nature, that the dissolution
of the one, implies the death of the other. This
fact is fully confirmed by the phenomenal appearances of every day's experience The properties of
the mind and those of the body, remain as perfectly
and evidently distinct and different, in the most intricate and involved operation of which man is capable by their joint action, as they are in those of the
simplest character. Often also we find the mind
exhibiting its greatest vigour, after the body has
been mutilated in every possible manner, yea, even
after the greater part of the brain itself has been destroyed. On the other hand, the body is oftenl found
to vegetate best, after almost the last ray of intellect
has been extinguished by misfortune or disease.
Now a single case of this kind demonstrates, that
mind and body cannot, as the materialist affirms, be
one and the same substance; while all contrary
1 r3e 
CONNEXION OF -MIND AND BODY.
cases only establish the fact of a strong sympathy
between them in their present connexion.
As to the questions, how the soul, which is a spirit, can act upon the body, and also how the condition of our bodily organs can affect (as we know it
does) the operations of the mind, it is not probable
that a satisfactory solution of them will be furnished in this life. For, whatever progress we may
make in ascertaining the minor ramifications of our
bodily organism in the brain, there is just as great,
as total a difference between the finest perceptible
branch of nerve and the mind, as between the
mind and the foot or hand. Nor has the finest nerve
one single property in common with mind, any more
than has the hand or foot. The most philosophic
view of the subject, we think, is the following: As
the fact of the reciprocal influence of mind and
body on each other in this life is taught us by the
testimony of our senses and of consciousness, we
should admit it. As God is the author as well of
our mind and body, as of their connexion with each
other, we should refer their reciprocal influence on
each other to his will. It is the Divine will that
mind and body should, in this world at least, constitute one being, man. And He who formed them
thus, established just such a connexion between
them as was necessary to His purpose, as was necessary to make them act in unison, to make the
material organ obey the mental impulse, and to subject that mental agent to sundry influences from the
material organs.  If, then, it be asked why, when
I resolve to raise my hand, do the muscles of the
M 2
137 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
arm obey the volition of my mind, the only philosophie, that is, reasonable and true, answer is, because God has so appointed, has so formed me.
The several theories of former days to account
for the co-operation of soul and body, now find few
advocates. Some writers of the seventeenth century contended that the soul and body have no immediate connexion, nor immediate control or influence over each other, but that God, when he beholds certain changes in the one, causes the correspondent changes to take place in the other by an
immediate exertion of his power.   But this hypothesis denites the reality of the reciprocal influence of
soul and body on each other, instead of explaining
it; and, moreover, by making God the immediate
author of all human actions, necessarily represents
him as the author of sin. It was termed " Occasionalism," because it represents God as causing
human actions from time to time, as occasion required.  Its author. as Dr. Krug informns ius, was
Arnold Geulinx, professor of Philosophy at Leyden,
who died about 1664, or, according to another account, 1669; and Des Cartes embraced a mrnodification of it.
Equally untenable, though for a season far more
popular, was the theory of Leibnitz, termed the
" pre-established harmony" (harmonia prmstabilita).
According to this system, soul and body were from
eternity designed by the Creator for a series of perfectly harmonious changes, or actions, or phenomena. These changes or phenomena, both of the
soul and body, are evolved separately in each, by
138 
THEORY OF LEIBNITZ.
virtue of an inherent necessity, without any connexion with the other; and these phenomena of
the soul and the body do coincide or harmonize
with each other in this life, so as to lead to the
opinion of there being a reciprocal influence between them, not because they actually exert such
a reciprocal influence on each other, but simply in
consequence of the original purpose of God, that
they should so coincide. To this hypothesis, Leibnitz was led by-his well-known system of monads,
according to which every monad, or ultimate atom,
in the universe was thus separately predetermined;
and he illustrated it by the supposition of two
watches, both of which kept perfect time. They
moved on together, they coincided in their indications of time, yet each moved by a separate ittrin
sic force, and there was no real connexion whatever between them. It must be obvious that this
theory also denies instead of explaining the reciprocal influence of mind and body on each other,
and by re(lucing everything to a state of predeterminied fatality, destroys all moral agency and accountability in man.
We may, therefore, with the greater propriety
recur to our first position, and while we, on the best
of evidence, admit the fact of the reciprocal infltience of the soul and body on each other, at the
same time refer it wholly to the Divine constitution
of our complex nature.
Of similar and equally unsatisfactory character
are the later theories, which were designed to explain a part of the general connexion and influence
139 
-AM. MTAL PHILOSOPHY.
between soul and body, namely, those intended to
explain the manner in which thought results from
cerebral action, from impressions made on the bodily organs, and conducted by the nerves to the
brain.
Des Cartes, adopting the ancient notion of animal spirits circulating in the nervous fibres, conjectured these fibres to be so many tubes pervading
the body, and thought he could show how the passage of these animal spirits through these tubes to
and from the brain give rise to not only muscular
motion, but also perception, memory, and imagination. Yet, as anatomical investigations demonstrate that the nerves are not hollow, and as the
very existence of these animal spirits is yet iunestablished, this theory has naturally and justly found
few advocates.
Near the close of the seventeenth century, Sir
Isaac Newton, who always carefully distinguished
between the truths and facts which he considered as
established by inductive evidence, and the mere conjectures which he uttered as subjects of future investigation for himself and others, proposed the inquiry, " Whether there may not be an elastic
medium, or ether, immensely more rare than air,
which pervades all bodies, and which is the cause
of gravitation; of the refraction and reflection of
the rays of light; of the transmission of heat
through spaces void of air; and of many other phenornena."  To these other phenomena he refers in
" the 23d query subjoined to his optics, where he puts
this question with regard to the impression made on
140 
THEORY OF DR. HARTLEY.
the nerves and brain in perception, Whether vision is
effected chiefly by the vibrations of this medium, excited in the bottom of the eye by the rays of light,
and propagated along the solid, pellucid, and uniform capillaments of the optic nerve? And whether
hearing is effected by the vibrations of this or some
other medium, excited by the tremour of the air in
the auditory nerves, and propagated along the solid,
pellucid, and uniform capillaments of those nerves."*
On this conjecture, Dr. Hartley, regarding the
nerves as solid and elastic substances, built his fanciful system, by which he accounts for the transmis.
sion to the brain of the impression made on the external organ, by the supposition that "such impression
causes vibrations of the small, and, as one may say,
infinitesimal medullary particles, first in the nerves,
and then in the brain;"f and farther, that "the vibrations are excited, propagated, and kept up partly
by the ether, that is, by a very subtile elastic fluid;
partly by the uniformity, continuity, softness, and
active powers of the medullary substance of the
brain, spinal marrow, and nerves." But, if it were
even true that the nervous fibre, which is now
known to be unelastic and incapable of tension,
were susceptible of vibrations, and that there is
such a substance as this ether, of which there is no
evidence, and that these vibrations were continued
to the brain, does all this afford us the least assistance in understanding how the perception or sensation of the mind succeeds or is occasioned by the
impression on the external organ? Certainly not.
* Dr. Reid's Works, vol. ii., p. 85, 86.  t Idem, vol. ii., p. 86.
141 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
That there is some communication of influence be.
tween the outward organ and the brain, through the
medium of the nerves, seems to be certain, for the
ligature to the nerve, or its total abscission, at once
interrupts this communication, and destroys the sensibility of the nerve below the point of ligature or
separation. But what the nature of this influence
is, or how it is conveyed along the nerve, we know
not.  And if we did, this also would still leave us
in the dark as to the mode of occurrence of the
mental impression. For the brain itself, and the
finest possible filament of it, is still matter, and approximates no nearer the attributes of mind than
does the external organ, the hand or foot.
The last theory, which claims a passing notice, is
that of ideas, as something intervening between the
external object and  the percipient  mind.  This
view, with various modifications, has had numerous
advocates both among the ancients and the moderns.
The original term itself (idea, froiti detv, to see) signifies an image or form. In the Aristotelian philosophy, this term signified the original types or
images of all created things in the Divine Mind,
and also those higher conceptions of the human
minid which correspond to these types.   Subsequently among the ancients, and also by some moderns, the word idea was used to designate certain
images, or shadowy films, sometimes also termed
species, forms, phantasms, and, by Mr. Hume, im
pressions, which all objects were supposed to be
constantly sending forth in every direction.  These
images, it was believed, came in contact with the
142 
THE IDEAL SYSTEM.
brain through the organs of sense, and were the
immediate-object of perception to the mind. The
particulars of this view are thus described by Malebranche:* " I suppose that every one will grant
that we perceive not the objects that are without us,
immediately or of themselves. We see the sun,
the stars, and an infinity of objects without us; and
it is not at all liklely that the soul sallies out of the
body, and, as it were, takes a walk through the
heavens to contemplate all those objects.  She sees
them not, therefore, by themselves; and the immediate object of the mind, when it sees the sun, for
example, is not the sun, but something which is intimately united to the soul; and it is that which I
call an idea. So that by the word idea I understand nothing else here, but that which is the immediate object, or nearest to the mind, when we perceive any object.  It ought to be carefully observed,
that, in order to the mnind's perceiving any object,
it is absolutely necessary that the idea of that object be actually present to it.  Of this it is not possible to doubt.  The things which the soul perceives are of two kinds. They are either in the
soul or without the soul.  Those that are in the
soul are its own thoughts; that is to say, all its different modifications.   The soul has no need of
ideas for perceiving them. But with regard to things
without the mind, we cannot perceive thenm but by
means of ideas." How far this theory has prevailed in past ages is a matter of some uncertainty,
in consequence of the confused and often figurative
* Payne's Elements, p. 123.
143 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
manner in which writers on the subject often expressed themselves. Dr. Reid supposed it to have
been common till the days of Mr. Locke, and to
have been received even by that illustrious writer
himself. The language of Mr. Locke on this subject is, doubtless, less perspicuous and discriminating than it might be. Speaking of his frequent
use of the word idea, he says, "It serves best to
stand for whatever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks. I have used it to express
whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or
whatever it is, which the mind can be employed
about in thinking. I presume that it will be granted me that there are such ideas in men's minds;
every man is conscious of them in himself, and
men's words and actions will satisfy him that they
are in others."  The former part of this quotation,
it must be confessed, looks much like the ideal
system, while the latter appears to sustain Dr.
Brown, Dr. Beasley,* and others, who deny it, and
to imply that by idea Locke may have generally
meant, not any images or phantasmns extraneous
to the mind, and emanating from the objects perceived, but the perceptions of the mind itself, which
inhere in the mind, and subsequently become the
subjects of reflection. This ideal system was so fully exposed by Dr. Reid, that, at least since his time,
it has found no advocates. Properly considered, it
affords no real advantage in explaining the phenomena of sensation. As these images or phantasms
* See an excellent article by the Rev. Dr. Beasley, late Provost of the
University in Philadelphia, in the Methodist Magazine for October, 1842.
144 
THE IDEAL SYSTEM.
emanated from external objects, they must have
been material; and, however great their tenuity and
refinement, they must have been matter still, and
the transition from them to mind as difficult as that
of any other matter.  Nor is this theory at all applicable to some of our perceptions, such as those
of sound and smell; for in what respect could these
images resemble their original? But the fallacy ot
this theory is most conclusively seen from the fact,
that we have not the least shadow of evidence for
the existence either of these phantasms, or of the
impressions which they were supposed to make
upon the brain.  We must, therefore, revert to the
view already given, that, in all our perceptions of
external objects through any one of our bodily organs, it is the external object itself which is either
directly or mediately the object of perception. And
although we cannot explain the mode of comrnmunication between the external object and the mind,
yet the mystery attendant on this subject is not
greater than that belonging to ten thousand other
objects and processes around us, the truth of which
is certain, while the mode of their existence or occurrence is incomprehensible to us.
N
145 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
PART II.
SENTIENT IDEAS.
HAVING completed the discussion of the first species of mental operations, to wit, the Cognitive class,
we now proceed to call the reader's attention to what
we have ranked as the second general class, namely,
Sentient Ideas, or feelings. We stated on a former
occasion, that entities bear a threefold relation to
the human mind; first, as subjects of our knowledge; secondly, as excitants of our feelings; and,
thirdly, as motives or materials for our action. Assuming, for the present, that entities are the ultimate excitants of feeling in us, we describe feeling
as follows: By Feeling is meant those sentient
states of the mind mediately or immediately excited
by entities simple or composite. This influence is
immediately excited, when the objective entities
themselves, are at the time acting on us through
the appropriate organs; and it is excited mediately, when our feelings are either retrospective or
prospective. In the case of present entities, which
are, at the time, the subjects of our attention, the
entity itself is the excitant of our feeling.  But
when the entity is retrospective or prospective, our
cognitive idea of it seems either to be itself the excitant, or, in some way, the medium or conductor
'146 
CRITERIA OF THE FEELINGS,
through which the external entity acts. Very often
feelings accompanying our knowledge of some en tities, are so feeble and indifferent, that we can
scarcely pronounce them either pleasing or pain ful; yet, whenever they are sufficiently increased
in degree, they will be found to assume this char acteristic.
The criteria, by which feelings are distinguished,
are such as these:
I. They have no object beyond themselves. If
we have knowledge, it is a knowledge of some thing-of some  entity.   But, in feeling, we  can
distinguish nothing but the simple state of the mind
itself, to which we attribute the name feeling. If
we form a volition, that volition has for its subject
some action, physical or intellectual, of which we
judge ourselves capable.   But in feeling, we  can
discover no stuch subjects.
II. Our feelings are not so absolutely dependant
for their character on entities without us, as our
knowledge is. Thus acids, when tasted, afford to
some persons a pleasant feeling, and to others a
contrary one; thus, also, the entity man, in the act
of falling from his horse, excites a painful feeling
in the breast of his friend, and, perhaps, a pleasant
one in that of his inveterate and bitter enemy.
III. Feelings are always preceded by a cognition of the entity which mediately or immediately
prpduces them.
In the farther discussion of our sentient ideas, we
invite your attention to the following three topics:
I. To the classification of Feelings.
147 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
II. To entities as their ultimate excitants; and,
III. To the susceptibility of the mind for feeling;
that is, to the laws of feeling.
CHAPTER I.
THE CLASSIFICATION OF OUR FEELINGS.
THE ideas expressed by the term feelings, being
simple and primitive ideas, cannot be logically defined, but are learned by every individual through
consciousness. All feelings are in their intrinsic
nature much alike, and hence great difficulty has
presented itself in all attempts to classify them.
They are, however, distinguished by a variety of
circumnstances attending them and their occurrence,
and these may furnish a basis for their division.  On
this principle, all the feelings of which the human
mind is susceptible may be divided into two classes
-Individual and Relative Feeling.
By individual feelings are meant those which
have reference exclusively to ourselves; such as
joy, contentment, cheerfulness, hope, sorrow, grief,
despair, &c.  By the phrase relative feelings we
would designate those which have a relation to
some other sentient being, or other object; such as
love, hatred, friendship, compassion, gratitude, anger, envy, &c. We, therefore, present the followilig tabular analysis of human feelings.
148 
ANALYSIS OF HUMAN FEELINGS.
a  1. Benevolent Feelings, or affections; that is, those rela.
tive feelings which are favourable to the  being on  which
they terminate.
Benevolence, hope, confidence, gratitude, respect, ven eration, friendship, adoration, &c.
Filial love.
Parental love.
Love to God.
2. Maleiiolent, or defensive feelings; that is, those which
involve hostility, or at least repugnance to the being on
which they terminate.
Anger, hatred, ingratitude, dissatisfaction, suspicion, resentment, disdain, malignity, shame, cruelty, malice.
1. Sensations, that is, those feelings consequent on percep tions by the senses:
I (a.) Sensations or feelings consequent on perceptions of
I sight, as those feelings attending the visual perception of any
agreeable object.
(b.) of Hearing, as of a piece of music.
(c.) of Smell, as of a rose, a shrub.
(d.) of Taste, as of an orange or apple.
(e.) of Touch, as of any soft, smooth, or acuminated body.
2. Some of the Emotions, that is, of those transient excite ments of feeling consequent on mental operations, direct or re flective, other than perceptions through the organs of taste,
smell, or touch.
(a.) Intellectual emotions; viz., Emotions of the sublime,
the beautiful, the ludicrous, of surprise, of wonder, of astonish ment, amazement, &c., and other emotions resulting from the
operations of intellect.
(b.) The moral emotions; or feelings included in the oper ations of conscience.
3. Some of the Affections, or of those habits or habitual states
of feeling which are more durable than sensations or emotions.
(a.) Pleasant Affections, such as contentment, cheerful ness, patience, humility, joy, &c.
(b.) Painful Affections, some of which are also termed pas sions. Penitence, grief, sadness, discontent, despair, pride,
| vanity, fretfulness, &c.
4. The feelings connected with our Bodily Appetites, or those
occasional feelings which are caused by periodical stimulus in'
ourbodily organization, and are accompanied by desire.  Such
as Hunger-Thirst.
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3. Sympathetic Feelings, or those expressive of similarity
or congeniality to the feelings of the being on which they
terminate.
Pity, condolence, compassion.
Sympathy of different kinds.
4. Antipathetic Feelings.
Envy, jealousy, fear, dread, horror, dis~,mnst, indignation,
grudging, and what the Germans term Sclha(denfreiide, a
I malicious pleasure in the misfortune or sufferings of others.
I.A
to 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
A division of relative feelings might also be
made, into, 1. Those which refer to animate, and, 2.
Those relating to inanimate objects. But this division would be based on the difference in the objects
of the mental operations, rather than in the operations themselves.
Feelings may again be divided into the following
three classes:
I. Sensuous; by which we mean those feelings
obtained immediately through the bodily organs.
II. Intellectual or Reflex, or those resulting from
the reflex operations of the mind; including  the
pleasures of taste, the feelings connected with our
views of the beautiful, the sublime, the ludicrous,
&c.
III. Moral or Religious; viz., those resulting
from the consideration of the actions of moral
agents in reference to the laws of man, and ultimately of God.
Feeling has frequently been divided, in relation
to time, into Present, Retrospective, and Prospective.
This division is clear in its nature, and distinct in
its lines of separation; although we do not consider it so useful as the one first given, nor at all inconsistent with it.  It labours, however, under the
difficulty of requiring us to assign feelings of essentially the same kind to different classes. Thus,
thlose feelings of approbation or disapprobation
which attend the judicial act of conscience, as to the
agreement or disagreement of our actions with the
law of God, that is, with our duty, will belong to
one class when they relate to present actions, but
150 
INDIVIDUAL FEELINGS.
to a different class if they refer to our past conduct.
Upon the whole, we consider the first division as
the most natural and the best, and therefore have
adopted it.
Remarks on the different branches of the above
classification.
CLASS I. OF INDIVIDUAL FEELINGS.
I. Of Sensations.
In a former part of this work, we remarked that
the term sensation has been used by the major part
of authors on this subject, with a degree of vagueness which cannot fail to cause obscurity in metaphysical discussions, if not avoided. Sometimes it
has been employed as synonymous with perceptions,
and, at other times, to designate feelings of various
kinds, but especially those which are consequent
on the perceptions through our bodily organs. It
must be evident to all who reflect ol the criteria
which distinguish cognitive ideas from such as are
sentient, that two kinds of mental phenomena entirely distinct and different are here confounded.
And as the cognates of the term sensation, namely,
sensitive, sensibility, &c., are universally employed
in our language to express feelings and not cognitions, it will, we think, be best, in mental philosophy, to restrict this term alsoin a similar way. We
therefore use the word sensations to express, not
cognitions, but feelings of various kinds, and especially those produced through our bodily organs.
When discussing the process by which we obtain
ideas through the bodily senses, we proved that each
151 
MIENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
of the five senses is a source of cognitions as well
as of feelings. We easily perceive the difference
between the idea obtained by beholding a beautiful
landscape, and the feeling of pleasure which fol
lows it.  The former is cognitive, the latter is sen
tient, is feeling. But is not the idea derived fromr
tasting an apple or orange equally distinct from the
pleasant feeling attending the same process? And
are not our ideas of the successive notes in a piece
of music, different from the feelings, either pleasant
or painful, cheerful or melancholy, which those
notes also produce? There is, therefore, a necessity for both of these terms, for perceptions and
sensations, in reference to the operations of each of
our bodily organs; and if the one be used to express
the cognitive result of their action, and the other
mnore generally be confined to that which is sentient,
much confusion will be avoided.
All these sensations are obviously individual feelings, because they terminate in ourselves, in the
sentient subject.
II. Of Emotions.
The term emotion also is employed in several
different significations by respectable writers. By
some the words sensations, emotions, and passions
are used to designate different degrees of intensity
in one and the same species of mental operations.
But there is certainly a fixed difference between
these terms in the usage of our language. Thus,
no good writer would employ the term emotion to
express a higher degree of the sensation produced
152 
INDIVIDUAL FEELINGS.
by the organ of touch, any more than he would use
the term passion to designate a still higher degree
of it. Some authors by emotion designate a state
of feeling intermediate between sensations and desires.
Others define emotions to be those feelings which
are consequent upon other mental operations than
perceptions by the organs of sense. Yet this use
of it is also not entirely correct; because we speak
of the emotions of the sublime or beautiful, and
yet these emotions are imrmediately consequent on
our perceptions, through the senses, of those objects
which we regard as beautifill or sublime.  And
other writers employ the term emotion with almost
as much latitude as feeling itself. A more correct
description of emotions and appropriate use of the
term, we think, would be the following.  Emotions
are those transient excitements of feeling which
are consequent on mental operations direct or re.
flective, other than perceptions through the organs
of taste, smell, or touch. The very term emotion,
in its primitive import, signifies a moving, a motion,
an impulse; thus indicating its transient nature.
Nothing more is necessary to the intelligent inquirer than to reflect on the testimony of his own consciousness, to enable him to perceive that those
feelings of the mind which he denominates emotions are of brief continuance, that they come and
pass away again in a short time, and are then known
to us only by memory.
That they are different from cognitions and active
operations, and that they are essentially sentient,
153 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY
are a species of feelings, is also a matter which can.
not be rendered intelligible by words, but must be
referred to the consciousness of each individual.
When I behold a messenger, whom I had despatched ofra journey of a hundred miles, in four or five
hours again entering my room, I am filled with surprise at his unexpected return; and certainly I find
no difficulty in distinguishing my perception of his
personal appearance, and my knowledge of the unexpected circumstances under which he appears,
from the feeling or emotion which attends it.
Emotions always succeed some cognition, or some
active operation of the mind. Before I can experience the emotion of the beautiful or sublime, I
must have had a perception of the object by which
the emotion is caused; and if I feel emotions of
regret or sorrow at my failure in any active process
in which I was engaged, say in an attempt to finish
a sermon or other piece of composition within a
-given time, the failure and the consciousness of it
must certainly have preceded the emotion, the temporary regret. Emotions are sometimes motives to
action, and then, of course, they precede the desires
or volitions resulting from them. We do not recollect, however, that the word emotion is applied to
the feelings, of any degree, which are consequent
on our perceptions through the organs of taste,
smell, and touch.
Emotions may be divided into intellectual and
moral. Intellectual emotions are those which express and imply no reference to moral character or
condu'ct.  They are such as the emotions of sub
14 
INDIVIDUAL FEELINGS.
limity, beauty, the ludicrous, emotions of surprise,
wonder, astonishment, amazement, &c. The most
important of these we will endeavour to explain in
few words.   It should, however, be distinctly remembered that, inll popular language, the terms employed to designate these emotions, generally stand
for a complex idea or state of mind, including a
cognitive as well as a sentient element. Thus, when
we speak of admiring the sublimity of a particular
scene, we have reference as much, if not more, to
our perceptions of its character and features, than
to the emotions excited by it. And if we attempt
to describe the ingredients of its sublimity, we describe our perceptions as well as our consequent
feelings. The terms beauty, sublimity, &C., are
used both objectively and subjectively, and in mental philosophy we must discriminate between these
different significations. Objective beauty inheres
in the object itself which is styled beautiful.  Subjective beauty is the effect produced on the mind
by the contemplation of a beautiful object. This
effect is complex, and includes both our perceptions
of the object and the feelings accompanying them.
Sublimity.
The emotion of sublimity is that delightful, solemn, and expansive individual feeling of the mind,
which, to use the language of a distinguished writer
of our country,* is excited by the " contemplation of
whatever is vast in nature, splendid in intellect, or
lofty in morals." Or, in the language of Dr. Brown,
* Dr. Wayland, in his Moral Dignity of the Mtissionary Enterprise
155
0 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
"Whatever is vast in the material world-whatever
is supremely comprehensive in intellect-whatever
in mnora.ls implies virtuous affections, or passionis, far
removed beyond the ordinary level of humanity, or
even guilt itself, that is ennobled, in some measure,
by the fearlessness of its darings, or the magnitude
of the ends to which it has the boldness to aspirethese and various other objects, in matter and mind,
produce the vivid feelings of sublimity." It has
sometimes been disputed whether there is such a
thing as objective sublimity; whether there is, in the
objects which are regarded as sublime, any particular property calculated to excite the emotions in
question; or whether they are not wholly the result
of association of ideas.  That is, when we hear the
thunder rolling over our heads, and perceive the
earth trembling under our feet, and the lightning
flashing in the sky, is it these several appearances
which call forth the emotions of sublimity that we
feel, or is it solely the conception of resistless power
associated with them? Mr. Payne, erroneously, we
think, affirms the latter. That our reflections associated with the perception of these phenomena are
also concerned in the production of these emotions
seems evident; yet they are certainly not the sole
cause of them.  If the property of these phenomena,
by which they cause the emotion of sublimity, be
nothing more than their tendency to impress the
mind with the conception of vast, resistless, and terrific power, still this would be a peculiar property
of these objects, because others of a different kind
do not possess it. Nor does the fact, that the rum
156 
INDIVIDUAL FEELINGS.
bling of a cart may be mistaken for distant thunder,
and excite emotions of sublimnity, appear to disprove
our position. It only shows, that the recollection
of a scene of real sublimity may again excite emotions of the sublime; and that any one feature of
such a scene, or even anything nearly resembling
it, may recall the essential circumstances of such
scenes formerly witnessed by us. Thus the rumbling of the cart recalls our former impressions of
thunder, an(d with it, all those circumstances which
are calculated to excite ideas of vast and resistless
power, and thus it excites the emotions of sublimity.
If thunder had no property peculiarly calculated to
excite those ideas which produce emotions of sublimity, then as the cart by association elicited our
recollection of those same ideas, and thus produced
these emotions, it would itself be regarded by us
as-a sublime object, even after it is known to be the
cause of the sound. The sight of a fellow-mortal
lying emaciated on a bed of sickness, scarce able to
lift his hand, may, by the association of contrast, recall to our minds the resistless power of Jehovah,
and thus the emotion of sublimity be excited. But
does any man transfer this emotion from God to the
feeble mortal? Certainly not. Therefore, whatever is the process by which certain objects or actions produce the emotion of sublimity, whether the
effect be mediate or immnediate, it is evident that
entities or objects of this class do possess a peculiar
tendency to produce these emotions, which objects
of a different kind have not. If, then, it be inquired,
is there ally sublimity in external objects or actions
0
17 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
themselves, we reply, there is that in them which
calls forth emotions of the sublime; and as universal usage designates this something sublimity, we
see no objection to the term. And this same train
of remarks is equally applicable to objects exciting
emotions of beauty.
The ordinary ingredients of sublimity in objects,
or those attributes of them which are found by experience to excite in us the emotions of sublimity,
are vastness in dimension, such as a boundless
plain or the vast ocean; but especially height and
depth, as a high mrountain, a deep precipice, or the
expanse of heaven, which is both high and boundless; resistless force, as the rushing of mighty waters, the devastating tornado, prostrating trees and
houses in its course; extremes of coloutr, as the
dazzling brightness of the sun, or the contrary extreme, in the dark and lowering clouds of a gathering storm; vast sounds, as the roaring of thunder, the sound of many waters; as well as vastness
of power, physical, intellectual, and moral.
Beauty.
The emotion of beauty cannot be logically dehned, but is known by consciousness to every individual. It may be described as that pleasant individ
ual feeling of the mind which is excited by the per
ception of certain objects, termed beautiful, in the
physical, intellectual, and moral world. The term
beauty, like sublimity, is used both objectively and
subjectively; to express a certain property in outward entities, and also to designate the perceptions
158 
INDIVIDUAL FEELINGS.
and feelings caused by them. In reference to this
emotion, also, the very existence of objective beauty has been denied, and the entire effect of objects of particular kinds in causing this emotion
has been attributed to association.   It is needless to say, that these emotions do not resemble
the properties in the object which produces them,
as no mental operation, either cognitive, sentient,
or active, does or can in any one particular resenmble any material object. But that there are certain
characteristics, belonging to those numberless objects termed beautiful, which mediately or immedi.
ately cause our emotions of beauty, and lead us to
regard those' objects as beautiful, is as evident in
the case of beauty as of sublimity; and the same
argumrients employed to prove it in that case are
equally applicable to this. The emotions of beauty
are- augmented and multiplied by the influence of association; but, certainly, there must be some original basis for association to build upon, and even
these associations must contain nothing inconsistent
with the nature of beauty, or they impair instead of
increasing the strength of the emotion.  The influence of association is exhibited in the figurative
language often employed to express these feelings,
or, rather, the objects exciting them. We characterize landscapes as cheerful or gloomy; sounds as
animated or mournful; forms as delicate or modest;
colours as gay or grave, &e.
It is difficult to describe the precise characteristics
of beauty; yet each individual possesses a natural
susceptibility for objects of this kind, and can judge
159 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
for himself.   The influence of association and education causes the diversity of taste observable among
different persons on these subjects; but there are
some objects and characteristics pretty generally
agreed on. Such are delicate rather than glaring
colours, and also a particular variety of such colours.
Solne kinds of motion are beautiful, such as the gentle gliding of a bird through the air, the undulating
motion of the surface of a lake when moved by a
gentle breeze, or the waving of a field of wheat
when a gentle current of air is passing over it.
Some fi,ures or fqorms are beautiful, either on account of their regularity, as in the case of a circle,
a triangle, or a square; or on account of their
graceful variety, as in plants, leaves, or trees. The
waving line is termed the line of beauty, and the
same character belongs to twisted pillars, or the
vine or ivy gracefillly entwined around the oak.
Certain sounds are also found to excite the emotion
of beauty, as well simply as in their combinations.
All men who have a taste for music, characterize
certain airs as beautifill. Some works of art also
are beautiful, when they combine the natural elemnents of beauty in their form or colour. The creations of imagination, as seen in poems or other
works of fiction, are beautiful when the writer has
faithfully copied nature, that is, has employed the
natural sources of beauty, and conformed to their
principles.  The human countenance is often among
the most beautiful objects, not only on account of
the beauties of form and colour, but also the expression of amiable, and cheerful, and benevolent
feelings in its lineaments. This is, in part, a spe
160
I 
INDIVIDUAL FEELINGS.
cies of social, if not moral beauty.   Intellectual
and moral excellence is often exhibited in ways and
under circumstances such as are felt to be beautiful by the corresponding emotions they excite.
In some cases many of these sources of beauty are
combined, and the general effect thus enhanced.
" Perhaps," says Dr. Blair, " the most complete
assemblage of beautiful objects that can anywhere
be found, is presented by a rich, natural landscape,
where there is a sufficient variety of objects: fields
in verdure, scattered trees and flowers, running
water, and animals grazing.  If to these be joined
some of the productions of art which suit with such
a scene, as a bridge with arches over a river, smoke
rising from cottages in the midst of trees, and the
distant view of a fine building seen by the rising
sun; we then enjoy in the highest perfection that
gay, cheerful, and placid sensation which characterizes beauty."  Some operations purely intellectual possess a high degree of beauty, and excite
corresponding pleasing emotions; yet in some cases, especially when they border on the sublimre,
they derive most of their influence from association.
Thus, while there is manifest beauty in many of
the demonstrations of geometry, we doubt not that
the ecstatic emotion felt by the great mathematician
Bernoulli, as he followed Sir Isaac Newton in some
of his great steps-a feeling which he, on his deathbed, informed Professor Robinson, of Edinburgh,
gave him the liveliest conception he had ever enjoyed of the happiness of heaven-arose, not simply from the intellectual process of reasoning, but
chiefly from the enlarged views thus obtained of the
02
161 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
grandeur and overwhelming extent of the universe
itself. But even with this allowance, it is to be
feared his idea of heaven was essentially defective,
as it appears not to have embraced that "holiness"
of thought, feeling, and action which characterizes
the inhabitants and occupations of heaven, and
"without which no man can see God."
Thte Ludicrous.
The emotion of the ludicrous is that transient,
pleasing individual feeling, excited in the mind by
those entities or objects, physical or intellectual,
which are calculated to cause laughter. The objective ludicrous, or that property in entities which
is directly or indirectly the cause of the emotion,
has been variously defined. Mr. Payne and others
regard it as a strange mixture of congruity and incongruity, the unexpected perception of which occasions the mental emotion. This admixture of the
congruous and incongruous is sometimes found in
the language rather than the thing.  Such is the
case, for example, in puns and riddles; as when a
barrister, on hearing it remarked what a large quantity of ham he had eaten, replied that he had only
been taking extracts from  Bacon's  Abridgnmeit.
But in the couplet of Hudibras,
"For rhyme the rudder is of verses,
With which, like ships, they steer their courses,"
the incongruity is observed between the things compared, verses and a ship.
To the class of ludicrous emotions belong those
feelings excited by what is termed eVit.  Wit seems
to be the sudden and unexpected association of ideas,
162 
INDIVIDUAL FEELINGS.
natural, but novel, and often conveying an important
fact or argument in few words, or by an allusion,
the consequence of which flashes on the hearer's
mind; or by an accommodation or play on some
word or thing said before. Thus, Plutarch informs
us, when Metellus Nepos told Cicero that he had
ruined more persons as a witness than he had saved
as an advocate, Cicero replied, "I grant it, for I have
miore truth than eloquence."  And when a young
man, who lay under the charge of having given his
father a poisoned cake, was talking in an insolent
manner, and threatening that Cicero should feel the
weight of his reproaches, Cicero replied, "I would
much rather have them than your cake."
Burlesque is a species of wit employed in rendering ludicrous that which is naturally grave or dignified, or which assumes to be so, by comparing it to
things really mean and contemptible.  Thus, Hudibras burlesques the adventures of his reputed hero:
"Ah me! what perils do environ
The man that meddles with cold iron;
What plaguy mischiefs and mishaps
Do dog him still with after-claps!
For though dame Fortune seem to smile,
And leer upon him for a while, r
She'll after show him, in the nick
Of all his glories, a dog-trick."
The mock-heroic is another species of wit, which
consists in making low or trifling persons or things
appear ridiculous by speaking of them in lofty and
grandiloquent language, or by representing them as
speaking in such style. Thus, in the same poem,
Ralpho is made to address the beaten and prostrate
knight:
163 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
"You are, great sir,
A self-denying conqueror,
As high, victorious, and great,
As ever fought for the churches yet,
If you will give yourself but leave
To make out what y'already have;
That's victory. The foe, for dread
Of your nine-worthiness, is fled;
All save Crowdero, for whose sake
You did the espous'd cause undertake;
And he lies pris'ner at your feet,
To be disposed as you think meet;
Either for life, or death, or sale,
The gallows, or perpetual jail;
For one wink of your powerful eye
Must sentence him to live or die."
Surprise, Wonder, Astonishment, Amazemnent.
These are all different modifications of the same
individual feeling, under different circumstances
and degrees.  Surprise is that feeling excited by
the perception of something novel and unexpected.
This feeling is termed wonder, if the novel and unexpected object is also strange or unaccountable.
Astonishment designates a higher degree of wonder.
And Amazement implies something intricate or inexplicable in the object which caused the feeling.
These emotions may with propriety be termed
monitory emotions, for they arrest for a season the
action of the mind; and, as Dr. Brown justly remarks, " It is in new circumstances that it is most
necessary for ils to be upon our guard, because,
from their novelty, we cannot be aware of the effects
that attend them, and require, therefore, more than
usual caution where foresight is impossible. But
if new circumstances had not produced feelings peculiarly vivid, little regard might have been paid to
164 
INDIVIDUAL FEELINGS.
them, and the evil, therefore, might have been suffered before the alarm was felt. Against this danger nature has most providentially guarded us. We
cannot feel surprise without a more than ordinary
interest in the objects which may have excited this
emotion, and a consequent tendency to pause till
their properties have become in some degree known
to us. Our astonishment may, therefore, be considered as a voice from that Almighty goodness
which constantly protects us, that, in circumstances
in which inattention might be perilous, whispers, or
almost cries to us, Beware."
The Moral Emotion)s.
Moral emotions may be described as those iidividual feelings of the mind which are consequent
on our cognition of moral truth, as well as moral
character or conduct. The contemplation of the
beauty of holiness in the Divine law itself, causes a
delightful emotion in the Christian. The morality
or immorality of an action, properly consists in its
agreement or disagreement with the law of God.
And our ideas of its morality will depend on our idea
of that law, be it more or less accurate or defective.
This relation of agreement or disagreement with
our views of the law of God is, therefore, the entity
which causes the peculiar feelings of pleasure or
pain in view of moral actions, either our own or
those of others. The terms moral approbation or
disapprobation seem to include both the cognitive
and sentient element, both our judgment that the
act is right or wrong, as well as the concomitant
165 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
feeling.  Sense of moral ob,ligation, more properly
designates the impulsiv'e part of conscience, and perhaps more or less feeling accompanying it.  Tlhe
operations of conscience, fully considered, consist of
three in -redients, tle judicial, thie sentient, and the
impulsive. The judicial ingredient is that judgment
which we form of our actions, as being conformed
or contrary to the law of God, and has found its
place in the discussion of our cognitive ideas in the
section  on Relative Knowledge.   The  impulsive
feature is active in its nature, and is discussed in
the third division of our subject, when we treat of
the first constitutional inclination.  Our concern at
present is wholly with the sentient part of these complex operations.
The moral emotions, like all other feelings, are
original feelings of the mind, which imply a sutsceptibility in the mind for such feelings, and thus at
once decide the point, that conscience, or our moral
faculty, is an original part of the constitution of the
soul. But it does not hence follow that its operations are not complex, embracing elements of different kinds. As they are original feelings, they must
be learned from consciousness, and cannot be logiceally defined.
These feelings are neither numerous nor diversified. They are either pleasant or painful, the former consequent on a judgment of approval of a
given action, and the latter resulting from a judgment of disapproval. From their intimate connexion with these judgments, some writers have confounded the two, and even designated the pleasant
feeling a feeling of approbation, anid the uinpleasant
166 
INDIVIDUAL FEELINGS.
one a feeling of disapproval, forgetful of the judgment included in the term. In popular language
this may be allowed, but in philosophical discussions we should always distinguish the feeling accompanying the approval from the approval itself,
which is always a judgment of the mind, that the
act is right, is conformed to the will of God. Keeping in view this distinction, it may not be improper
to retain the popular designation, and speak of
judgments of approval or disapproval, and also feelings of approbation and disapprobation, meaning
by the latter the emotions, either pleasant or painful, consequent on those judgments.  Those feelings are also sometimes termed feelings of innocence or guilt, of self-approbation, or self-condemnation, or remorse.
As our moral emotions are consequent on the
judgments of approval or disapproval to which they
succeed, it follows, that if those judgments change,
the feelings will change also.  Thus, so long as
Paul was conscious that his judgment approved of
the persecution of Christians, he contemplated the
act with pleasing emotions, and felt an inward impulse urging him to do it. But when his views on
the subject of Jesus of Nazareth changed, and his
judgment disapproved the act, he regarded with
emotions of pain and regret the very conduct in
which he had formerly delighted. Nor does this
liability to change in our emotions imply that they
are not to be depended on, any more than change
of opinion in reference to any subject proves that
our intellectual or cognitive powers cannot be relied on. It only proves that our moral nature, in
16,Mt 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
ts cognitive, sentient, and active departments, is
capable of improvement, and is a suitable subject of
education.
The terms moral emotions may also be applied
to transient impulses of some of our relative feelings,
such as love and hatred, sympathy, &c., in as far
as these feelings are matter of duty, and we have
indirect control over them.
III.  The  Affections.
By the term affections we would designate those
habits, or habitual states of feeling, which are more
durable thani sensations or emotions. Some of the
affections refer only to ourselves, and some terminate on other objects. It is the former alone which
belong to the individual feelings, now under discussion.  They may be divided into pleasant and
unpleasant.
The pleasant affections are such as joy, cheerfulntess, contentment, humility, patience. Joy is a
highly pleasurable affection, excited in the mind by
the contemplation of something past, present, or
prospective, which we regard as highly favourable
to us or others.   Cheerfulness is an habitual, moderate, pleasant affection of the mind, resulting from the
view of our condition as on the whole favourable.
It results from the habit of viewing the bright side of
human affairs, and is of great importance in life, to
ourselves and those around us. It often arises from
constitutional temperament, but its purest source is
true piety, which teaches us to dwell much on the
numberless mercies surrounding us, and to believe
that even the ills of life are designed for greater
168 
INDIVID UALI FEELINGS.
good. Contentmnent is a moderate, tranquil, pleasant
affection, resulting from the conviction, that the circumstances of our situation are, on the whole, stuch
as not to give us just cause of dissatisfaction.   Huinitity is a moderate, pleasing affection, arising from
a view of our unworthiness.   P(ttietce is a moderate,
pleasing affection, resulting from our determination
to endure the ills of life without murmuring.
The pai,fail affections are by some writers termed
passions, but this term is often applied to some relative affections both pleasant and unpleasant, to
designate their existence in a high degree.'Thus
we speak of the passion of love and of anger.   The
painful individual affections are such as penitence,
discontent, sadness, grief, despair, pride, vanity,
fretfulness, &c.  Penitence is that painful guilty
feeling of self-condemnation, resulting from a violation of known duty. Discontent is a painful feeling
arising from the conviction, that we have reason to
complain of our condition or treatment.  Sadness
is a moderate, painful feeling of dejection, resulting
from some loss or difficulty to ourselves or those we
love. Grief is a more intense, painful affection than
sadness, resulting from a higher degree of the same
causes. Despair is an intense and settled painful
affection, resulting from the belief that our condition
is hopeless, or the object of our desire unattainable.
Pride is that feeling of self-complacency which arises
from an over-estimate of our own mierits.  Vanity is
that affection of the mind which results from an
over-estimate of our own merits, and a desire that
they may be admired by others. Fretfulness is a
P
169 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
painful feeling, resulting from losses or difficulties
of minor importance.
IV. The feelings connected with our Bodily Appe                       tites.
These appetites are such as hunger and thirst;
the operations of which are connected with feelings, pleasant or unpleasant, of the individual class,
the nature of which will be more fully discussed in
a subsequent section.
We come now to the second general class of
feelings.
CLASS I11. RELATIVE FEELINGS,
OR THOSE WHICH TERMINATE ON SOME OTHER OBJECTS THAN OURSELVES
These we divide into benevolent, malevolent, sympathetic, and antipathetic.
I. Benevolent Feelings or Affections.
These are relative feelings, which are favourable
to the being or thing, on which they terminate.
These feelings constitute one of the noblest portions of our nature. When sanctified by Divine
grace, they enter largely into the elements of true
piety, and even in the natural man constitute one
of the purest and principal sources of the happiness
which he enjoys.  The term affections is applied
to this kind of feelings more generally than to any
others, and in more specific accordance with the
primitive import of the term.
Benevolence, or Love, is a relative affection of a
very broad character, and embraces various modifications, according to the different circumstances
under which it is exercised. In its widest accepta
170 
RELATIVE FEELINGS.
tion, benevolence is a pleasing feeling of good-will
and desire for the happiness of all sentient beings,.ir respective of their character or conduct. With this
affection a good man loves the whole human family, as well as irrational animals. This feeling appears to be much weaker in depraved human nature than the other modifications of love, and a career of sin very soon habitually overpowers it.
Love, in its other modifications, embraces in it a
perception of something agreeable, praiseworthy,
or desirable in the appearance, character, or conduct of the object beloved. It also implies delight
in this object, a desire for its possession or enjoyment, and a disposition to promote its happiness.
It is always, in its intrinsic nature, a pleasing affection. To a certain extent it is voluntary in wellbalanced minds, and can be mediately controlled,
by eithe,r shunning the presence and contemplation
of the object which excites it, or by frequenting
that presence and indulging in reflections on it
when absent. All this, however, clearly proves that
there is something in the beloved object itself which
excites our affection, while, of course, it presupposes in the mind a constitutional susceptibility to be
thus affected.
The principal modifications of this affection are
the following: Paternal love, that affection which
a father feels for his offspring, and which induces
him contentedly to toil all day long for the support
of his children, and to promote their welfare in every possible way.   Maternal love is that affection
felt by a mother for her children, which makes her
watch especially over their defenceless years with
171 
MENTAL  PHILOSOPHIIY.
ceaseless care, and willingly endure the loss of rest
and convenience in protecting and rearing them.
Conjugal love is the affection of husband and wife
towards each other, which induces them to study
to promote each other's happiness, to overlook each
other's infirmities, and to lighten by mutual sympathy the ordinary troubles and afflictions of life. Filial affection is that love which children bear to their
parents. These several species of affection form
alike the basis of the domestic or family institution,
and the cement by which its members are held together. A beautiful instance of conjugal affection
is related by Xenophoil in his semi-historical Cyropodia. Cyrus had taken captive Tigranes, the young
Prince of Armenia, together with his wife, whone he
had recently married, and of whom he was passionately fond. When both were brought before
Cyrus, he asked the prince what he would pay to
receive back his wife again, to which question Tigranes replied, " I will, if necessary, give my life
to redeem her from servitude." Cyrus nobly gave
liberty to all the prisoners, who, on departing, could
not find words to express their admiration of their
noble conqueror; some applauding his wisdom, others his bravery, others his clemency, and some his
beauty and tallness. At length Tigranes thus addressed his wife: "And do you, Armenia, tell me,
did Cyrus appear to you to be handsome?"  " Indee(d," said she, " I did not look at him."  " At
whom, then, were you looking?" said Tigranes.
" At him, truly, who said that he was willing to lay
down his life to purchase my freedom." Of maternal affection the history of every age is replete with
172 
RELATIVE FEELINGS.
examples. An interesting case is quoted fromi an
anonymous writer by Professor Upham. " When
the Ajax, man-of-war, took fire in the straits of
the Bosphorus, in 1807, an awful scene of distractionI ensued. The ship was of great size, fuill of
people, and under the attack of an enemy at the
time; the mouths of destruction seemed to wage
contention for their prey. Many of those onl board
could entertain no hopes of deliverance; striving
to shun one devouring element, they were the vietims of another. While the conflagration was raging filriously, and shrieks of terror rent the air, an
unfortunate mother, regardless of herself, seemed
solicitous only for the safety of her infant child.
She never attempted to escape; but she committed
it to the charge of an officer, Who, at her earnest
request, endeavoured to secure it in his coat; and
following the tender deposite with her eyes as he
retired, she calmly awaited that catastrophe in
which the rest were about to be involved. Amid
the exertions of the officer in such an emergency,
the infant dropped into the sea, which was no sooner discovered by the unhappy parent, than, frantic,
she plunged from the vessel's side as if to preserve
it; she sunk, and was seen no more."
Gratitude, friendship, respect, confidence, patriotism, and hope express pleasing relative feelings,
the nature of which is so well understood as not to
need farther elucidation.
Love to God is that pleasant relative feeling
which the good man cherishes towards God as a
being of infinite perfections, and as deserving of
P2
173 
MENTALI PHILOSOPHY.
his supreme affection. This feeling, the Scriptures
teach us, is supreme in the heart of the true Christian; and, as conversion does but restore the character of fallen man in some degree to its primitive
condition, it seems reasonable to believe that it was
the supreme affection of the soul in the state of
primitive innocence. Adoration includes, besides
its cognitive and active elements, a kindred feeling
of more solemn kind, which accompanies our acts
of worship, that is, our repetition of the truths of
Scripture concerning the glorious character and relations of God, in an oral or mental address to him.
II. illalevolent, Repulsive, or Defensive Feelings.
Malevolent, or defensive affections, are those
painful relative feelings which involve hostility, and
a disposition to injure the beings on which they terminate.  The  malevolent affections appear to be
a perversion of an original susceptibility, which is
per se good, and purely defensive in its nature.
Even in our fallen state the command of God to us
is, in certain circumstances, " Be ye angry and sin
not;" and, prior to the fall, the exercises of this
power were all of that sinless kind. These feelings are consequent on the perception or contemplation of any person or object, which we deem
hostile to ourselves, or to those with whom we sympathize, or to that which is right. In our unfallen
state, our interests and feelings were in invariable
harmony with the will of God: consequently, nothing could call forth these feelings but what was
opposed to the will of God, or, in other words, was
sin. Originally, therefore, our repulsive feelings
174 
RELATIVE F EELINGS.
were purely feelings of abhorrence or repugnance
at sin. But, in the present state of man, it is undeinable that the love of self preponderates over
the love of God, and we often cherish interests and
desires opposed to his will. Hience, when our repugnant feelings are excited against others for opposing us, or our interests or desires, we are often
wrong, and our opponents right, and these feelings
are thus enlisted in opposition to right, in hostility
to the will of God.   Yet, in proportion as the image of God is restored in man, in proportion as he
loves holiness and hates sin, his repugnant affections will always be opposed only to sinners and to
sin  he will hate and feel anger only at that which
God  hates; and thus, in exemplification of the
Scripture precept, he "will be angry and not sin."
The feelings belonging to this class are such as
the following: anger, hatred, resentment, revenge,
malignity, cruelty, and malice.
III. Sympathetic Feelings.
Sympathetic feelings ire relative affections of the
mind, which imply similarity or congeniality to the
feelings of the being on which they terminate.
Sympathetic feelings do not differ in their general nature from the other phenomena of our sentient
nature.  They are all feelings excited in the mind
by the contemplation of certain entities. They are
both pleasant and unpleasant, according as they are
excited by the happiness or misery of our fellowcreatures. It is alike accordant with the principles
of our nature, that we should rejoice with themn that
rejoice, and weep with those who weep.   Yet ex
175 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
perience proves that we sympathize most acutely
with those whose feelings are similar to the prevailing state of our own minds at the time.   We
do not, indeed, even in this case, literally participate in the feelings of others, because every man's
feelings, like his other mental phenomena, are inalienable and untransferable. But in the similar
state of our own minds, our susceptibility for feelings of that kind is peculiarly acute, and, therefore,
deeper and stronger feelings are excited by the contemrnplation of the same entities than would at other
times be the case. The impulses of sympathy are
often sudden and unpremeditated, and lead to instantaneous action for the relief of those in danger
or in pain, as when we rush to the relief of an individual who is sinking beneath the strokes of some
ruffian. These sympathetic feelings have a most
happy influence in harmonizing the differences
which often exist among associates and in families,
and thus making happy the intercourse of those
who would otherwise be ever at variance.
Besides the general term sympathy, which is alike
applicable to a fellow-feeling of a pleasing or painful nature, the terms compassion, pity, commiseration, are often used as synonymous terms, and at
other times to express some shades of diversity in
these feelings. Condolence signifies a fellow-feeling with others in suffering.
IV. Antipathetic Feelings.
To this class we refer all those relative feelling:
which though they have reference to some other
being, imply only opposition of feeling, but not in
176 
RELATIVE FEELINGS.
tention of action. They are such as envy, jealousy,
disgust, grudging, fear, dread, horror, and indignation.
Envy is that painful relative feeling which is exci
ted in the selfish mind by the contemplation of some
desirable property or possession of another. This
feeling is excited more readily in some minds than
in others, and the different susceptibility for it is
proportioned to the relative preponderance of the
second constitutional inclination over the first, that
is, in proportion as the individual is in the habit of
being influenced more by selfishness, the love of
well-being, rather than by the moral fitness of
things, his duty. It is the design and tendency of
true religion t6o suppress and eradicate these feelings,
and the truly pious man is rarely guilty of them.
Jealousy, in its primary application, has reference
to amatory affection, and signifies that painful feeling of temporary or qualified displeasure against an
individual whom we love or have loved, because
we suppose some other person to be preferred to
ourselves. The term jealousy is, however, more
generally applied to that painful feeling which is
excited by apprehension that some other person
has or will obtain some object which we had hoped
to acquire ourselves.  It is in this sense of it that
we speak of professional jealousy, and jealousy between competitors for any supposed good.   This
feeling has a particular tendency to warp the judg.
ment, to make us place the most unfavourable con
struetion on the actions of its )obict, and to magni
fy molehills into mountains;  so that it may wit}
truth be said,
177 
MENTAL PHILOSOPIIY.
"Trifles, light as air,
Are to the jealous confirmation strong
As proofs of Holy Writ."
Disgust is an unpleasant feeling of aversion to an
individual on account of something low, mean, obscene, vulgar, or base in his person or conduct.
Indignation is the same feeling, mingled with contempt and scorn for its object.
Fear is a painful feeling, resulting from the conviction of some impending or probable evil. Dread
is a higher and more permanent degree of the same
feeling. Horror is a still higher degree of fear,
excited by the sudden and unexpected view of
something very evil or dangerous in our condition
or conduct.
CHAPTER II.
OF ENTITIES AS EXCITANTS OF FEELING.
SECTION I.
All feeling, like knowledge, may be traced mediately or immediately to entities without the mind.
The eye could never afford us feeling if the rays of
light were not reflected from external entities to it,
or did not reach it from the surrounding atmosphere.
The pleasing or painful feelings, excited by entities
through the eye, are produced immediately by the
rays of light which reach the eyes, and ultimately,
in a certain sense, by the particular object from
178 
EXTERNAL ENTITIES EXCITANTS OF FEELING. 179
which the rays pass, and which give them their peculiar texture or combination of colours.
The  ear could never be the medium through
which either knowledge or feeling is excited, if the
vibrations of the atmosphere were not permitted to
reach the tympanum. The vibrating atmosphere is
therefore the entity which immediately excites the
feelings connected with sound, and the sounding
body is the ultimate entity which gives the air its
vibratory motion.
The nose could never be the vehicle of knowledge or feeling to the mind, if the effiuvia emanating from surrounding odorous bodies were not permitted to touch the olfactory nerves.
Nor does religious feeling seem to be different in
its nature. Thus, the Christian meditates on the
glorious character of God, and the feelings of his
heart are excited to the highest pitch. But what is
this meditation else than an inspection of the entity
God, and his relations to us? By these it is that
our feelings are excited. The ease is similar, when
our feelings are occasioned by reading the Divine
word; for the signs or letters read remind us of
the sounds for which the letters stand, and the recallection of these recalls the ideas of real, objective
atities. The daily habit of meditating on heaveni or Divine things, by the same law of mind, keeps
alive our interest, or, rather, our feelings, on this
subject, and increases the frequency of our reinspection of them; thus, a kind of rapport is formed between the soul of the Christian and that heaven which is his home, and that God who is his everlasting friend. 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
SECTION II.
EEntities of every class possess some tendency,
though very different in deg ree, to excite jeeling in
the mind. Our remark is not that this tendency is
perceptible in every entity belonging to each class,
but that it is perceptible in some of every class.
With regard to solids and liquids, the truth of this
remark is evident.  It is self-evident, that all articles of food or drink possess it in some degree.
Other objects of these classes, which at first view
might seem incapable of exciting feeling, change
their aspect when more closely examined. Thus,
who would attribute to the earth and minerals the
power of exciting feeling in the mind; and yet
what else is the pleasure found by men in the pursuit of Geology and Mineralogy, than the result of
this very feeling excited by a contemplation of the
laws and principles of these sciences, as delineated
in nature? The pleasures experienced in the study
of optics, exemplify the feelings excited by the entity light, its laws, properties, and relations. Space
and number, which would seem, from their nature,
least capable of exciting feeling in the mind, are,
in fact, found more operative than some others,
and afford all the pleasures of geometrical and
mathematical study.
Our retrospective and prospective knowledge of en.
tities also produces feelings similar in kind, though
generally inferior in degree, to the objective entity
itself, when it is the subject of present attention;
yet our retrospective ideas are also entities without
180 
DIFFERENT DEGREES OF THIS POWER IN ENTITIES. 181
the mind. I can reflect on a former interview with
a long-absent and beloved friend, and derive the
purest pleasure from the recollection.   The  various relations of entities often exert this influence.
Thus, the pleasure experienced by the mind when
contemplating the beauty of holiness, is excited by
the composite entity, a perfect law, and the coinducet of a moral agent; and the relation which excites this feeling, is that of agreement between
them.
SECTION III.
The degrees in which different entities possess this
exciting power are very different, and can be accurately learned only from experience.  Nor can any
organ originally afford us this injformation, except
the one through which the feeling is produced.  We
should be unable, from the mere appearance of an
orange or a peach, to know, a priori, that their redness or yellowness is indicative of superior aptitude
to gratify the palate. Yet after we have by experience learned the fact of this tendency, and learned
that the degrees of it are usually attended by these
external appearances, they serve as indexes to the
rmind. But not only is the feeling, produced by en.
tities of different classes, different in degree; the
same diversity belongs to one and the same entity,
when acting in different ways, and under different
circumstances.   So far as this arises from a different susceptibility in different minds, or in the same
mind at different times, its discussion falls under a
subsequent division of our subject; other circumstances only claim our present attention.
Q 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
The influence of different entities in exciting our
feelings.
(a.) Their strongest influence entities certainly
exert when brought into contact with the particular
organs of our body, through which, according to
the divine constitution, they act upon the mind.
Thus, a peach affords most pleasure, when brought
into contact with the palate; a beautiful landscape,
when actually viewed by the eye; an escape from
the hands of a murderer, when really experienced
by us; and the pains of disease, hunger, disappointed hope or ambition, when we are actually the subjects of them.
(b.) When we have a prospective knowledge,
that we shall, at some future time, probably be the
subjects of their influence, they exert their next
greatest power; that is, when they are the subjects of hope or fear.
In many instances our prospective view is accompanied by stronger feeling than when we are the
direct subjects of the influence of the entity. But
this arises from erroneous ideas of the pleasures or
pains which will be occasioned by actual experience.
The law of nature seems to be that present feeling
is stronger than retrospective or prospective.
(c.) When these entities excite retrospective feeling, they are again productive of a different degree
of pleasure or pain.
(d.) Sympathetic feeling is, as a general rule,
weaker than its corresponding direct class of feel ings.
(e.) The least degree of feeling is excited by en
182 
EXTERNAL ENTITIES AS EXCITANTS OF FEELING. 183
tities, when we view only their abstract tendency
to produce pleasure or pain, without supposing
ourselves or others to be actually the subjects of
them. This might be termed their original degree
of influence, and is, perhaps, the exact degree of
strength which the Author of our being designed
they should exert upon us as motives. It might
also be termed their simple influence, because in
all other cases additional principles, such as selflove, &c., are called into action.
SECTION IV.
Entities of the classes of solids and liquids excite
more feeling, and exert more motive power, when
near us than when far off. This circumstance
may be demonstrated by a variety of cases, although it is not so easy to assign the philosophical
reason of the fact. This appears to be the case
particularly with those solids and liquids, which
gratify our periodical susceptibilities of feeling,
such as hunger and thirst.
SECTION V.
Thile manner in which entities act in excitingfeeling,
seems to be very similar to that observed in the production of knowledge.  Each adjective or composite
entity can originally excite feeling in the mind,
only through that organ by which it becomes the
subject of our knowledge. The flavour of fruit can
excite pleasure in us originally only through the
palate. Again; each individual property or relation of an entity acts independently and individual 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
ly, in exciting feeling; so that the same substantive
entity may produce different feelings in us, when
we inspect different properties or relations of it.
Hence, if I now love him whom I once hated, it is
because I now contemplate different properties, or
relations to me, or to others, from those which were
formerly prominent in the same individual. This
principle is extremely important to enable us to understand how it is, that the penitent and converted
sinner finds very different feelings excited by the
contemplation of the Divine Being, from those
which he formerly experienced.
SECTION VI.
In feeling, as in knowledge, twzo things are necessary; first, the action of the entity on its appropriate
organ;  and, secondly, the attention of the mind to
that entity. Thus, if a peach or pear be placed before my face, and my attention is firmly fixed on
some other object of thought, the rays of light are
indeed reflected from the peach to the retina of my
eye, but the soul derives neither knowledge nor
feeling from the peach, because my attention is otherwise directed.   Hence attention, and the power
of directing the mind to one or other object, are
highly important active powers of the soul.
184 
LAWS OF FEELING.
CHAPTER III.
THE SUSCEPTIBILITY OF THE MIND FOR FEELING, AND
LAWS OF FEELING.
HAVING discussed the nature and classification
of feelings themselves, and also the cause from
which they spring, that is, entities as excitants of
feeling, we now proceed to examine the susceptibilities of the mind for feeling, and the laws by
which they seem to be regulated.
First law. Sensation, no less than cognition, is an
attribute of the mind, and not of the body.  That
is, all sensation is in the mind. As sensations are
obviously ideas, it must be admitted by all except
materialists, that they are phenomena appertaining
to the entity to which ideas belong, that is, to
mind. As to the materialist, since he supposes
cognitions also to be attributes of matter, or the result of bodily organization, he can without greater absurdity extend the same supposition to sensations.  But, so long as all the known properties of
matter are totally different from  all the  known
properties of mind, we may well leave the absurd
supposition of their being the same substance, to
those who delight in philosophical nonsense and paradoxes. The popular impression, that sensations
have some kind of local habitation in the organs,
through the instrumentality of which they are produced, results from a confusion of the organ through
Q2
185 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
which we perceive, and the thinking being itself.
But obviously, there is little more propriety in regarding the eye as the being that sees, than the telescope through which we see; nor ear as the being
that hears, than the acoustic tube by which the
hearing of the partially deaf is improved. In like
manner, the feeling produced by touch is wholly in
the mind; although the antecedent perception, which
is different for some different parts of the body, enables us, by practice, generally to tell what part of
the body has experienced the contact.
Second law. The original susceptibility of different
minds for feeling is evidently very different in degree.
In this there is a striking similarity between the
susceptibility for knowledge and feeling. Whether
the ground of this diversity is seated partly in the
mind itself, or wholly in the different texture or perfection of the bodily organs by which the operations
of the soul are limited, it is difficult to decide.
That there is a striking diversity in the texture or
organization of different individuals, cannot admit
of a moment's doubt; it is a subject of ocular and
anatomical demonstration. The fact, moreover, is
one of universal ocular observation, and its expression provided for in popular language. What
else is meant by the phrases, a person of ardent
feelings, and, a cold-hearted man, than persons characterized by a diversity in the degree of their habitual feelings; i. e., by a natural diversity in their
original susceptibility for feeling. The diversity in
the texture of the organs themselves is designated
by the term temperament. It is a point doubted
186 
LAWS OF FEELING.
by no man of observation, that mankind are distinguished by those diversities, and that they may be
reduced to several classes, such as the phlegmatic,
sanguine, choleric, &c. The various commixtures
of these temperaments are almost infinite; nor is
the difference in the texture of the body which is
designated by the word temperament, confined to
any particular organ of sense; the characteristic
pervades the whole organization of the body; the
skin, the lymphatics, flesh, blood, bones, nerves, &c.
Nothing, however, is more certain, than that the
temperaments of men are hereditarily transmitted
according to certain laws, which are fixed by the
Author of our nature; but which are not, and probably never will be, fully understood by us.
Third law. Excepting this diversity, which results
from the different temperaments, the relative degrees
of susceptibilityfor the influence of different entities
is, in all minds, naturally the same. Although A
is twice as sensitive as B, yet, the difference of temperament excepted, an entity which produces twice
as much feeling in A as another given entity would,
also naturally produces in B twice as much as the
other would. A will be operated upon twice as
forcibly as B by all motives to good, and it might
be supposed that he was favoured by Providence
more highly than B, whose natural susceptibility is
only half as strong. But it must be remembered that
A is also operated upon twice as forcibly as B by
all motives to evil, and therefore the relative degree
of his susceptibility for feeling is, in effect, equal to
that of B. The relative equality of the influence
187 
1MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
of different entities has an important bearing on
the subject of the moral government of God; because feelings are motives to action, and, other
things being equal, they naturally exert a power
proportionate to this degree. That the above peculiarity of the natural susceptibility for feeling also
occurs in feelings of a religious character, seems to
be certain. This fact must be taken into consideration by every pastor, who wishes to form a correct
view of the religious progress of his spiritual children, and also by every individual, who would
judge with accuracy of the religious state of his
own soul.
Fourth law. Feeling is, in a great measure, involuntary at the time. We cannot, when acted upon
by an entity, and when our attention is directed to
it, determine whether feeling shall or shall not, in
the first instance, be excited in us.
Fifth law.  We  can, however, at the time, add to
the intensity and duration of the feeling-, or subtract
from both, by either confining our attention to the
exciting entity, or directing it to another object.
Thus, the more wholly we fix our attention upon a
piece of music performed within our hearing, the
greater will be the feeling excited in us; and the
more wholly and intensely we direct our attention
to the truths pronounced from the sacred desk, the
more fully will they exert their proper influence of
feeling and motive power upon us.
Sixth law. When any particular feeling, or passion, or purpose becomes dominant in the soul, and
absorbs in a great measure its other energies, all
188' 
LAWS OF FEELING.
feelings at variance with this are impaired. Thus
the sensualist, the miser, and the votary of ambition, are in most cases found comparatively insensible to objects unconnected with their favourite
pursuits. In like manner, when men find it necessary to success in any of their habitual pursuits, to
suppress those feelings which would endanger that
success, they can, by a settled purpose and continued effort, succeed in steeling their hearts against
those feelings, and can acquire an insensibility,
which at first is artificial, but if persevered in, becomes habitual and natural. It is on this principle
that the most benevolent physician from the best
of motives, the desire of benefiting his patient, studies to acquire that control over his feelings amid
scenes of the most distressing character, which is
requisite to enable him to judge wisely of his patient's condition, and to select the most appropriate
remedies for his case. And it is upon the same
principle, though from far less honourable motives,
that military chieftains and professional soldiers acquire the unenviable ability to wade in the blood
of their nominal foes, and even to climb unmoved
over the mangled bodies of their slaughtered comrades.
Seventh law. The tendency of entities to excite
pleasant or unpleasant feelin-, when they are the
subjects of prospective or retrospective knowledge,
depends, in a great measure, on their accordance, or
discordance, with what will hereafter be described as
the CONSTITUTIONAL INCLINATIONS of the soul, especially the love of well-being or happiness.
189 
MENTAL PHILOSOIPHY.
Eighth law. The influence of an entity, in exciting feeling, is, to a mind of given susceptibility,
stronger when it for the first time acts upon us, on
account of its novelty. We may here refer to an
analogous case in medical science. A medicine,
administered for the first time, produces a greater
effect than the same dose does after having been repeatedly taken. How far this analogy is occasioned
by similarity of cause, would be an interesting subject of inquiry, in which, however, we have not
time to engage. This principle accounts for the
fact, that the feelings of the newly-converted are
so peculiarly vivid when the entities exciting them,
that is, their new relations to God and his law, and
to the Saviour, are first presented to their minds.
Yet, as continued attention increases the constitutional susceptibility of feeling, the same mind may,
by such attention, subsequently have feelings as
vivid as those first experienced.
Ninth law. Fevlings produced by the same substantive entity, in the same person, at different timnes,
are in some cases different. This fact is explained
by the principle adverted to on a former occasion,
that every property or relation of an entity acts
separately in the production of feeling. Every
property, indeed, and every relation of an entity,
produces a feeling peculiar to itself, and produces
this feeling invariably; but, as entities have various
properties and relations, the different properties and
relations of the same entity, in many cases, produce
contrary feelings. Hence it will always be found,
that when an entity produces feelings diverse from
190 
LAWS OF FEELING.
those which it formerly excited, the reason is, either
that the entity has changed its properties or rela.
tions, or that a different property or relation is now
the subject of our attention, and the excitant of our
feeling. At one time we habitually dwell on one
property or relation of an entity, and our feelings
are correspondent; but when our feelings change,
it is because we dwell upon another relation of the
same entity.  Thus, reflecting on the death of my
friend, viewing its relation to me as a social loss, I
am grieved, that is, this relation produces painful
feeling; but when I reflect on it as a means of his
translation from a bed of long-protracted, painful,
and hopeless sickness to a world of bliss, I rejoice;
this relation of the same event excites pleasant feelings. When our feelings change towards any of
our fellowv-men, it is always because either their
character has changed, or we have acquired additional knowledge concerning it, or, from a change
in our own character, we now dwell on different
relations of it. The character of men being so very
mutable, changes in the relative feelings existing
among them, are constantly occurring.
Tenth law. The susceptibility of the mind for
feelings of every kind is increased by ATTENTIVE
practice.   Here the question arises, whether  the
cause of increased susceptibility from practice is occasioned by an improvement in the bodily organs
or in the mental power.  Probably it may be found
jointly in both. This principle is exemplified in
the pleasures of the glutton, the drunkard, the inusician. In other words, the feelings of men are
191 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
augmented by habit, just as all their cognitive and
active operations are. The law of habit pervades
the entire man physical and intellectual, and adds
facility and strength to all his operations. Feelings
of benevolence or of malevolence may be and are
confirmed and increased by repetition; and it is
owing to this principle that we are enabled, as moral
agents, by repeated voluntary exercise of our affections on proper objects, to cherish and cultivate
those habits of feeling and traits of character which
we know to be good.
Eleventh law.  iitense and  long-continued feeling produces a temporary exhaustion, and fatigues
the system in a manner similar to intense cognitive
mental action. Yet it is difficult, as knowledge and
feeling always go together, to distinguish what portion of the fatigue is to be attributed to each.  The
question might arise whether the sleepiness of the
glutton after dinner be owing to the debility occasioned by this feeling during eating, or by the fact
that nature has been compelled to concentrate her
energies upon the stomach to digest the newly-ret
ceived load.
Twelfth law. The susceptibility for feeling naturally declines with age and with the decline of the
constitution, even if that be premature.
Thirteenth law. A NEGLIGENT review of entities
diminishes their tendency to produce feeling.  Upon
this principle it is that religious formality tends to
produce insensibility of mind.
Fourteenth law. Time wears off retrospective
feeling. There are cases of exception to this law,
192 
LAWS OF FEELING.
such as in those persons who have become mnelancholy in consequence of severe afflictions, and of
always pondering over their loss. But here there
is a morbid state of the mind, which, therefore,
does not disprove the general law. The ordinary
fact is, that the retrospect of our sufferings is attended by feelings less acute than our original sufferings, and that each successive retrospect by the
same individual is productive of emotions of diminished acuteness. This law must be regarded
as a most benevolent arrangement of Providence.
Life is a scene of not unfrequent trials and afflictions. Some of these, at the time of their occurrence, fill us with grief almost as great as we can
bear. Now, if the suffering caused by these successive calamities were all accumulated, with undiminishe        d vigour, a s   we advance in our earthly pilgrimage, life itself would in most cases become an
intolerable burden, and man be disqualified for its
ordinary duties. On the other hand, the death of
friends or relatives could not affect us less at the
tim      e, withou t      such a change in our mental structure as would make us place a far lower estimate
on their value, and thus greatly diminish our social
enjoyments. The result of such a change would
necessarily be to weaken the strongest and most
endearing ties by which society is held together.
We are, therefore, wisely and benevolently so constructed that our suffering at the loss of friends and
relatives is poignant, in order that we may take the
better care of them when living; and time diminish
R
193 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
es the  eight of these sorrows, so that their accumulated pressure might not disqualify us for the duties of life.
Fifteenth law. Feeling is, in general, not instantly excited, as is knowledge, when an entity becomes
the subject of our attention. Oftentimes feeling is
elicited by continued application of the mind.
Sixteenth law. The feelings connected with the
gratification of our periodical appetites, such as hunger and thirst, have the following peculiarities.
(1.) They are stronger in proportion to the length
of previous abstinence, unless that has been extreme,  and has impaired  the organs.   (2.) They
are increased by the frequent attention of the soul
to the entities capable of gratifying these appetites.
(3.) This feeling is diminished and eventually suspended by gratification.  (4.) It is interrupted by
the debility and increased by the vigour of the
body.
From the preceding laws and considerations it
is evident that the state of our feelings is, TO A CERTAIN EXTENT, uinder our own control. It is indeed
true, that no man can instantly change his feelings by a mere volition to do so. But the end can
be accomplished eventually, by his habitually directing his attention to those entities and truths
calculated to produce the desired feelings. We
are, therefore, justly held responsible by our moral
Governor for the character of our feelings, so far
as they are under our control. Nor is the case
different with what is often termed the habitual
194 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
state of our feelings or affections. As every feel ing is individual and transient, as it continues only
so long as our minds dwell on the entity or idea
which excited it, and as it must, in every instance,
be excited anew by the appropriate entity, or our
knowledge of it, it follows that by the state of our
feelings or affections must be meant our susceptibility for feelings from any particular entities. This
susceptibility is permanent, being a part of our original mental constitution, and is either increased or
diminished according as it is more or less frequently and designedly exercised towards any given ob ject.
To this increased susceptibility must be added,
the increased tendency to the spontaneous recurrence of the ideas of the objects, on which our susceptibility is most frequently employed.   These
two things, the increased spontaneous recurrence of
the ideas of the entities which excite feelings of any
given character, and the increased susceptibility of
the mind to their influence when presented, constitute those different habitual states of feeling, or of
the affections, by which different persons are characterized.  In this, so far as known to us, consists
the difference between the virtuous and the vicious,
the pure and the impure, in regard to the state of
their affections. The licentious, for example, by
continued voluntary indulgence of criminal thoughts,
if not actions, have formed the habit of frequent
spontaneous recurrence of licentious thoughts. By
the same course they have increased the susceptibility of their minds to be excited by thoughts of
195 
SUSCEPTIBILITY FOR FEELINGS.
that kind; and thus they have corrupted the state
of their affections, and made them far worse than
they naturally were.  For this corrupted state of
their affections, they will justly be held liable by
the Judge of all the earth.
Thus a person of malevolent disposition, is one
who has formed the habit of indulging in such
views of human character as are calculated to excite the malevolent feelings, and who has thus augmented the susceptibility of his mind for feelings of
that description.
Persons of a benevolent disposition are those of
a directly contrary habit. As our feelings are always preceded by a cognitive idea of the entity by
which they are produced, we cannot determine
whether there is any immediate connexion, any
nexus rerum, between the several feelings themselves, by which their tendency to recurrence is increased, or whether that tendency is based only on
the association between the cognitive ideas, while
the recurrence of these superinduces the repetition
of the feelings. If, however, the individual feelings themselves have this tendency, it is exerted
only through the medium of our cognitive ideas.
The feelings connected with what are termed our
periodical appetites, such as hunger and  thirst.
might at first view seem to form an exception to
the remark, that all our feelings are transient and
individual, and must be excited anew in every instanc.e by their appropriate entity, or the recurrence
of our idea of it; because they seem often to be
permanent, at least for a season, and to continue
196 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
even without the presence of the external entity or
the thought of it, by which they are gratified. But,
upon closer examination it will be evident, that during the whole time of their continuance, there is
an objective entity acting on the organ and exciting the feeling. Thus, for example, in hunger, the
exciting entity has been supposed to be the gastric
fluid irritating the coats of the stomach, which in
this case are the organ of sensation. This irritation is continued so long as there is not a sufficiency
of food thrown into the stomach to absorb or occupy the gastric fluid, and divert it from the coats of
the stomach. And just so long, and no longer, do
we experience the feeling we term hunger, and the
desire of food resulting from it, without its being
excited by any external article of food or the
thought of any. Still, even while this desire and
feeling are excited by continued action of the gastric fluid within us, the idea of food of some kind
or other is almost constantly present to the mind,
and adds its excitement to the feeling and desire
excited from within. The feeling of hunger thus
seems simply to be that pain produced by the gastric fluid. The desire connected with it is the result of the motive influence of some article of food,
or the idea of it, acting on the mind, and tending to
a volition to procure it.  The feeling of hunger can
exist independently of any idea of food; the desire
of any kind of food whatever cannot exist without
either its presence, or the thought of it.
R2
197
It 
1 98    ACTIVE OPERATIONS OF THE SOUL.
PART III.
ACTIVE OPERATIONS OF THE SOUL.
HAVING taken a brief survey of the various classes
of entities around us, and having discussed the two
kinds of mental representatives, which are obtained
by the soul, when these entities are the subjects of
our attention, viz., the cognitive and sentient, that
is, those ideas which constitute our knowledge and
feeling, we must next advance to the examination
of those active operations of which the soul is capable, and which certainly constitute the most important feature of our character, as beings responsible to God. Our knowledge and feeling may be
regarded mainly as our acquaintance with the universe which God created. They are what our
Creator has made them, and, with the exceptions
detailed in former portions of this work, we have
in general little or no influence over them, so far
as their mere original nature is concerned; but
these entities, simple and composite, are the materials with which, and the motives in view of which,
all the active operations of the soul are performed.
As these active operations are either directly or
indirectly, mediately or immediately, under our individual control; as it is by these actions that we
exert our influence on the other rational and sentient beings associated with us in this probationary
world, an influence always operating for evil or for 
ACTIVE OPERATIONS OF THE SOUL.
good; and as it is only through these active operations that the character of our cognitive and sentient states of mind, be they good or evil, can make
their influence felt on others, it must be evident
that these active operations constitute the principal
and most important part of our mental phenomena,
that part more immediately contemplated in the
precepts and sanctions of the moral government of
Jehovah. A man may harbour sentiments of the
rankest infidelity, and so long as he keeps them secret, so long as he does not perform the active operation of communicating them to others, either
orally or in writing, they will exert no direct tendency to contaminate those around him. Perhaps,
if he could prevent his sentiments from influencing
his own conduct in the neglect of duty and in giving direction to his agency through life, his opinions and feelings would injure no one but himself.
But so soon as they are manifest in his active operations, which in most instances is very soon the
case, their baneful tendency is seen and felt by his
associates, and by all within the circle of his influence, either personal or literary.  In accordance
with this is the common sentiment of mankind, that
propriety of conduct is more important than the extent of our knowledge or the acuteness of our sensibility; that to do right is more valuable and meritorious than to know accurately or to reason clearly.
Before we proceed in the attempt to enumerate
the several species of active operations, we shall
first call your attention to the criteria by which mental operations of the third class are distinguished.
The more we compare the active operations of the
19'9 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
soul with its knowledge and feeling, the more distinctly do we perceive that they are radically different in their nature.
The marks of distinction are such as the follow
ing:
(1.) One grand feature of this diversity is, that,
while knowledge and feeling are effects, ultimately
produced upon the mind by external entities, our
active operations are mainly causes originating in
the mind, or rather they are the mind itself, exerting its influence on the entities which are the subjects of its action.  Knowledge and feeling are inward effects produced from without; the active operations are outward effects caused from within.
In short, in the two former mental operations we
are, to a certain extent, passive recipients of external influence; but in the third we are the active
agents, ourselves originating the action.
(2.) The entities by which our cognitive and sentient ideas are excited, must have an existence before we can have either knowledge or feeling by
them; but the action, which is the subject of our
volition, is yet future, and cannot have an existence
at the time when we resolve to perform it. I can
have no knowledge of an orange or a peach which
has no existence, nor can either affect my palate
by feeling unless it exist; but when I will or resolve to perform any action, the act which I determine to perform has no existence at the time when
I resolve upon doing it.
(3.) Our feeling is, in some measure, and our
knowledge still more, dependant for its character
200 
MATERIALS FOR HUMAN ACTION.
on the entities which produce it. But when we resolve to perform an action, that action does not necessarily depend for its character on anything without us; it is what, within the limits of the laws
of nature, we determine that it shall be.
Of Entities as the Materials on which our Active
Operations are performed.
As the soul, in both cognitive and sentient operations, is the subject of the influence of entities
without us; so the active operations of the soul
have also their subjects on which the exerted action is performed. This subject is, in every instance, entities without the mind, which is the case
even when some operation is performed upon ideas.
Entities of every class and of every species are
the materials which, in a greater or less degree, are
within the range of our active influence; and on
these all our active operations are performed. The
soul, like a mechanist, goes to work on these materials, and is capable of producing various combinations, modifications, and alterations in them, limited indeed by the laws of its own nature, and the nature of these materials; but nevertheless important
in themselves, and sufficient to enable us to accomplish the customary purposes of daily life, and the
grand ultimate end of our existence upon earth.
In order that you may be prepared for understanding the active operations of the soul, it will be
advantageous to fix in your minds a specific view
of the various materials for human action. These
are the following:
201 
MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY.
(a.) The external objective entities of the differ.
ent classes.
(b.) Past mental operations of any class; that is,
mental representatives of entities, and sentient
ideas, and active operations either of our own or
other minds.
(c.) The natural signs by which these representatives or ideas are expressed; such as, (1.) The
sounds which constitute oral language, and (2.) The
signs employed; such as the expression of the countenance, gesture, and pantomime in general. The
artificial marks or letters by which these sounds are
designated in written or printed language, might
at first view appear to be an additional class of materials, but they are merely the results of physical
action on paper or other materials, which are embraced in the class of external entities already designated.
CHAPTER I.
DIVISION AND DISCUSSION OF THE ACTIVE OPERATIONS
OF THE SOUL.
ALL the active processes of the soul are essentially alike, so far as mere activity is concerned;
but they differ in the end contemplated by each, in
the operation performed, in the different results of
the action, and in the different objects on which
they terminate. The first place among these ac
1)32 
FIRST ACTIVE OPERATIONS INSPECTION.    203
tive processes seems, for various reasons, to be due
to what may be termed the process of inspection,
by which we mean the survey or investigation of
entities.
SECTION I.
Of Inspection.
By Inspection we would designate that activwe
operation in which the attention of the soul is directed to some entity, simple or composite; prospective,
present, or retrospective; with a view to acquire
some knowledge concerning it. Or, in other words,
inspection is that active process of the mind by
which we contemplate, either some external entity
through the bodily organs, or some idea or operation
of the mind, without employing the bodily organs, at
least at the time. Somrne of the ideas thus inspected,
are often ideas originally obtained through the bodily organs; although this 4s not always the case.
Thus, we inspect the objects in nature around us,
and the result of this act of inspection is a knowledge of the properties perceptible to us. Thus,
also, we inspect a train of argument, which we lately heard, on the importance of phrenology; and
the result is the belief, or knowledge, that the merits of that science are much overrated, and that it
affords few instructions that can safely be relied on,
beyond those general indications which have long
since been established as a branch of physiognomy.
Or, I inspect the abstract proposition, " That things
equal to the same thing are equal to one another,"
and perceive, acquire a knowledge of its truth; or 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
the metaphysical proposition, " It is impossible for
the same thing to be and not to be at the same
time," and I judge, perceive, know its truth. The
sphere in which this operation is conducted, embraces all the entities within our knowledge, including
our own mind and its operations, as well as our
ideas concerning all these entities.  If the entities
inspected were always present, external entities,
and never retrospective or prospective, the definition might be altered thus: Inspection is that active
operation in which, by a voluntary effort, the attention of the soul is directed to some one or more of
the bodily organs, and that organ directed to a particular entity. Thus, when a man who is partially
deaf, and does not hear the carriage that is rushinrg on at some little distance behind him, is called
to by a person standing near him to look at the carriage approaching, the information conveyed to him
through the ear induces-him to look at, that is, inspect the entity by which his safety is endangered.
By what action is this accomplished?  First, by
volition or resolution to inspect; secondly, by a direction of the bodily organ towards the entity to
be inspected; and, thirdly, by directing the attention of the soul to the organ, or, rather, to the rays
of light reflected from the carriage to the retina of
the eye.  But when we contemplate the mind itself or its operations, or when we take a retrospect
of an external'entity, that is, inspect our knowledge
of a past entity, or when we view an entity, either
past, present, or prospective, in its relation to some
abstract truth, or proposition, or law. the bodily or
204 
FIRST ACTIVE OPERATION, INSPECTION.   205
gan is not used at all; and to embrace such cases,
the definition must be more general.
The specific objects of the soul in this inspection
may be various. In present entities its object may
be, and its results are, the following:
(1.) To obtain more correct mental representatives of the properties of entities.   For instance,
suppose the Capitol of the United States were the
subject of our inspection. We direct our attention
to it, and, in so doing, also our eyes, and the first
glance gives us an idea of its general structure.
We, however, wish to acquire a more minute acquaintance with its structure, and for this specific
purpose continue to direct our eyes and our attention successively to every part of it. We may examine it with a specific design of ascertaining its
general plan, or the execution of any particular part
of the work, such as that performed by the mason,
or the plasterer, or the carpenter; and thus, by repeated and continued inspection, we acquire more
correct and minute mental representatives of the
external entity.
(2.) The second object in inspecting present entities may be to give more vividness to our menta]
representatives of them. This vividness may perhaps consist in the additional feeling, excited by a
reiterated and attentive inspection. After having
examined all the features of a painting, we have a
correct mental representative of it; but we may
resolve to fix our attention successively on its different features, and exert the intensity of that attention on them; and thus, perhaps, it is in part, that
S 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
our ideas of it become more vivid, because our feelings are more interested.
(3.) We may inspect entities with the express
view of ascertaining their relations. Thus, we inspect different entities for the purpose of ascertaining their relation of sameness, or diversity, or contiguity, or causation. In all these examinations, the
accuracy of our results will greatly depend on the
deliberateness and degree of attention with which
the process is conducted. Particular caution is requisite, when the design of our inspection is to ascertain the relation of causation between entities,
or to decide, whether the relation be one of mere antecedence and sequence.
In inspecting the moral character of any action,
that is, its relation of congruity or incongruity with
some law of God, inferred by reason from the works
of nature, or learned from Revelation, the relation
may be so obvious as to be instantaneously perceived, and thus our judgment is intuitive. In
otner cases, the moral character of the action mav
not be so clear, and then continued attention and
investigation are requisite, either to ascertain, by an
induction of facts, the real tendency of the actions
in question, or by continued exegetical investigations, conducted according to the laws of impartial
hermeneutics, to ascertain the true sense of Scripture, to determine whether the disputed action is
or is not interdicted in the Sacred Volume.
For the same general purposes, namely, to ascertain the relations of entities, the mechanist exam.nes, inspects the materials which he designs to em
206 
FIRST ACTIVE OPERATION, INSPECTION.  207
ploy. Thus the carpenter inspects a piece of wood
in order to discover its relation of fitness or unfit.
ness for the specific purpose for which he intends
it, or with a view to perform some voluntary action
on it, such as sawing, planing, or cutting it.
In the case of retrospective entities, simple or
composite. (1.) These we inspect, or rather our
mental representatives of them, in order to revive
those representatives, that is, as it is popularly expressed, to refresh our memory. Experience proves,
that both knowledge and feeling have a tendency
to vanish from the mind. Both become weakened
by time, and, unless revived by retrospection, will
be tost to us, at least in the present world. When
we reflect on the instances of extraordinary memory
on record, and combine with them the fact, that
some persons of very ordinary powers of retention
have, under the influence of disease, recollected
facts which they had long forgotten, and rehearsed
extended passages of authors in a language unknown to them, which they had heard repeated
many. years before, but which in health they were
utterly unable to repeat, we may well be inclined
to regard thought as indestructible, and think it
probable that all the mental operations of our whole
life will be recollected by us in eternity, and perhaps these reminiscences will be one of the principal bases of our future happiness or misery.  But
in the present life, there is a constant tendency in
the mind to forget what is long past, if it be not revived by reinspection.
k2.) The second object of inspecting retrospect 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHy.
ive entities is to view their relations to each other;
that is, to compare them with each other, or a present
entity with a prospective one. Thus, we may inspect the relation of causation between the British
Stamp Act and our Revolutionary War, both being
retrospective entities; or we may examine the relation of causation between our Revolutionary War
and our present enjoyment of free institutions; in
which case we compare a retrospective and a present entity or idea. Finally, we may consider the
relation of probable causation between our Revolutionary War and a future regeneration and remodelling of all the governments in Europe; here we
compare a past with a future entity. In this last
example we have an instance of the inspection of
the prospective knowledge of entities. All the
subjects of our prospective knowledge may be subjects of inspection. Indeed, this department of our
knowledge, more than any other, seems to be the
fruit of voluntary inspection. Every hypothetical
case that can be imagined is, at least in part, an inspection of prospective entities.
The process of inspection embraces all the voluntary operations which, in former systems, have
been attributed to the faculties nf perception, consciousness, conception, judgment in moral as well
as intellectual and physical cases, voluntary recollection, analytic reasoning, and conscience.  T'hat
the operations of the mind termed perceptions, when
voluntary, are embraced in the process of inspection, is evident from what was said on the subject
of the inspection of present entities. That the op
208 
FIRST ACTIVE OPERATIONS INSPECTION.
erations usually ascribed to conception are nothing
else than inspection, is evident from the remarks
made on the inquiry, how many of our supposed
faculties furnish us with knowledge, or how mary
of the operations of the supposed faculties are cognitive in their character.   The only cases which
might seem to militate against the classification of
the operations of conception under the process of
inspection are abstract ideas, such as virtue, vice,
&c.  But we have already exhibited to you the
proof, that these terms designate our ideas of certain relations of real entities which are observed by
inspection. The conception of the mneaning of a
proposition, is nothing more than the inspection of
retrospective knowledge, aided by the signs called
words, either written or dral.
In the inspection of present entities, the entity
itself is the subject of inspection. In the inspection
of retrospective entities, however, it is not the entity
itself, but our knowledge of it, which is the subject
of our inspection. This seems evident from the
fact, that, if our original knowledge of an entity was
incorrect, a review of it, however frequent, will not
rectify it; unless we compare our knowledge with
the original entity itself, or with a description of it
by another, whose knowledge was more accurate,
and  in whose testimony  we  confide; whereas,
every attentive review of a present entity tends to
correct any error in our first idea of it.  These facts
also prove the fallacy of Dr. Brown's opinion, that
all mental operations are merely the mind itself in
certain states.  When we review our knowledge,
S2
209 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
are not the passive, inert items of this knowledge
manifestly different from the active being, or mind,
which is at work on them?  As well might we say
that the wood, out of which the cabinet-maker is
framing a desk or table, is nothing else than the
workman himself, in a certain state.
The act of memorizing is an active operation embraced under the process of inspection. It may
be defined thus: The act of memorizing is a voluntary, repeated, attentive review of some entities,
or of our ideas of them, or of somne signs of such
ideas, in order that we may have a retrospective
knowledge of either the ideas of the entities, or the
ideas of the associated signs. Thus, if we commit
to memory a piece of composition with a view to
speak it verbatim, we make the recollection of our
ideas of the sounds, which are associated with the
ideas of the entities, the subjects of our chief attention. But if we wish to recollect only the ideas
of the entities themselves, we pay little attention to
the ideas of the sounds, and leave them to be re.
called at the time of delivery by the ideas of the
entities. Thus, it is evident, we are able to make
different things the subjects of our aim in the act
of committing to memory, and different persons
have different habits on this subject. The man
who, as it is usually expressed, recollects only
ideas, is one who by habit, or possibly by a constitutional predisposition, recollects principally the
ideas of the entities themselves about which he is
speaking, and trusts to the association formed in
his mind between the ideas of the entities and those
210 
SECOND ACTIVE OPERATION, ARRANGEMENT. 211
of the sounds designating them, for the suggestion
of words at the time of speaking. The man distinguished for verbal memory, on the contrary, is
one who is in the habit of inspecting the ideas of
the sounds as well as of the entities signified by
them; and to his mind, in the moment of delivery,
the very words recur in which he had committed
the speech. Perhaps, in the one case, the train of
the ideas of the signs is the leading train, on which
the retrospective energy of his mind is expended;
and this train of the ideas of sounds does, in the
moment of delivery, recall the parallel train of the
ideas of entities.  In the other ease, the train of
the ideas of entities is the prominent one which recurs, and, by association, brings with it the train of
the ideas of the connected sounds. Yet, as there
is no relation at all between the ideas of sounds
except that of contiguity, whereas the ideas of the
entities are related by the additional connexion subsisting between them in a well-digested composi
tion, it is not improbable that the ideas of the entities discussed are in most cases the prominent
train in the recollection; and the different degrees
in which sounds are recollected form the difference
between ideal and verbal memories.
That analytic reasoning is also chiefly a process of
inspection, is evident from its nature, as it consists of
the successive investigation of a series of particulars,
from which eventually a general conclusion is inferred
to be applicable to all other particulars of the same
kind. Thus we learn from observation (inspection),
that a number of material objects, such as trees,
stones, portions of lead, water, earth, &c., gravitate 
MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY.
towards the centre of the earth. Hence, as we find
this property to belong to all material objects, without excepiton, which we have examined, we infer,
with the greatest probability, that it belongs also to
all other material substances. Our syllogism will
then stand thus:
Trees, stones, lead, water, earth, &c., gravitate
towards the centre of the earth
Trees, stones, lead, water, earth, &c., are all the
material bodies which are within the reach of our
examination:
Therefore all the material bodies which are within the reach of our observation, gravitate towards
the centre of the earth.
Should we invert this reasoning, and form our
syllogism in the synthetic mode, it would run thus:
All material bodies, within the reach of our observation, gravitate towards the centre of the earth:
Stone is a material body within the reach of our
observation:
Therefore stone gravitates towards the centre of
the earth.
The analytic method is best adapted to the investigation of subjects, and the synthetic to the
communication of knowledge already attained.
In all its reasonings, however, the mind is governed by certain principles of its own structure, or
Laws of Belief, the most important of which it may
not be unimportant to enumerate. These truths
are, however, not abstract or general in their intrinsic nature or form, in which they operate on the
mind. They are, indeed, often formed into general
truths, and by some writers these general truths
212 
LAWS OF HUMAN BELIEF.
were supposed to possess greater strength of evidence than the individual eases from which they
are derived. But this is incorrect. The general
truth is merely an abstract statement, derived fromn
the individual cases, and embracing them all, and,
consequently, cannot possibly possess stronger probative influence than the individuals of which it is
composed. With this explanation, we proceed to
state the
Fundamental Laws of Human Belief.
All men make the following constitutional judgments, in each individual case as it occurs:
1. That the testimony of their senses, when clearly ascertained, is true. This truth has never been
sincerely doubted by any man in his senses, not
even by those skeptics who, in theory, professed
to do so.
2. That the testimony of consciousnzess is entitled
to our confidence in every case. This is, indeed,
the fundamental source of our knowledge of all our
mental operations, of our cognitions, of our feelings,
and of our active processes of mind.  If this channel, so to speak, through which all our knowledge
passes, were unworthy of confidence, of course no
other item of our knowledge, of any kind whatever,
could claim a higher degree of certainty.
3. That the testimony qof memrnory, when distinct,
and so far as distinct, may be relied on as true. I
am just as certain that I lately re-examined the
prophecies of Daniel, and the Revelation of St.
John, on the second coming of our Saviour, a subject now arresting so much attention in some parts
218 
MENTAL PHItOSOPHY.
of our country, as that I see the pen with which I
am now writing. Our confidence in our reminis.
cences is strong in proportion to the degree of distinctness which they appear to us to possess. Yet
our recollection of a general fact may often be
perfectly distinct, while we recollect but imperfectly some of its attendant circumstances. In this
case our confidence in the former is unwavering,
and our belief in the latter doubtful. I remember
with great certainty my having read Dr. Channing's
sermon at the ordination of Mr. Sparks upward of
twenty years ago, and also Professor Stuart's letters
in reply to it; yet of some of the arguments and
explanations contained in these works) my recollection is indistinct. But I can, on this account, no
more doubt that I perused these productions, than
if it had occurred yesterday.
- 4. That all the other operations of our mind, such
as reasonings and judgment, may be relied on with
a degree of certainty proportioned to their nature,
and to the circumstances under which they are performed.
5. That all men naturally speak the truth, when
they have no motive to practise deception.
6. That every act of consciousness presupposes or
implies a conscious being, the soul. On occasion of
every such act we constitutionally judge the existence of a conscious subject, to whom these acts belong. The only case we have met with of an individual who disbelieved the existence of his soul,
is that of Rev. Simon Browne, of England, a dissenting minister, of excellent character, who died
about 1732. " He imagined, that in consequence
214 
LAWS OF HUMAN BELIEF.
of an extraordinary interposition of Divine power,
his rational soul was gradually annihilated, and that
nothing was now left of him but a principle of animal life, which he held in common with the brutes."
But no man can be at a loss for the proper solution
of this melancholy phenomenon. All will just as
readily regard it as the result of mental derangement, as if he had denied the axioms of mathematics, or disbelieved the existence of his body. The
circumstance which so preyed upon his mind as to
deprive him of reason, was the death of his wife
and only son, in 1723.*
7. That every act of memory, or succession of
acts of consciousness, implies our personal identity,
and is the occasion which elicits the constitutional
judgment of such identity. Nor is this judgment
of our identity destroyed, even if consciousness and
memory, yea, all conscious mental action, is for a
season interrupted. A very singular case, illustrative of this fact, was reported to the Royal Academy of Sciences in France. " A nobleman of Lausanne, as he was giving orders to a servant, suddenly lost his speech and all his senses. Different remedies were tried without effect for six months, during all which time he appeared to be in a deep
sleep, or deliquium, with various symptoms at different periods. At last, after some chirurgical operations, at the end of six months his speech and senses
were suddenly restored. When he recovered, the
servant to whom he had been giving orders when
he wvas first seized with the distemper, happening to
* See the Narrative of his case in the Adventurer, No. 88.
215 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
be in the room, he asked whether he had executed
his commission: not being sensible, it seems, that
any interval of time, except, perhaps, a very short
one, had elapsed during his illness. He lived ten
years after, and died of another disease."* Dr.
Beattie also cites his own experience in support of
the same view.  "That consciousness may be interrupted by a total deliquium, without any change
in our notions of our own identity, I know by my
own experience.   I am, therefore, fully persuaded
that the identity of this substance, which I call my
soul, may continue even when I am unconscious of
it; and if for a shorter space, why not for a longer?"f
8. In addition to the above constitutional truths,
there are some other judgments, not intuitive, indeed,
but early acquired and universally entertained, which
also lie at the basis of much of our reasoning. Thus
all men judge that the laws of nature and the known
properties of all entities or objects in the world will,
with almost entire certainty, continue, because they
have found them to continue with absolute invariableness during the whole time of their observation
and recollection.
9. Different kuinds of truth are found to be possessed of different kinds and degrees of evidence.
And we have reason to believe that the Author of
our nature has invested every truth, which he has
placed within our sphere of observation, with a degree of evidence sufficient, when fully and impartially weighed, to produce just as strong a convic.
tion as he designs us to feel.
* Dr. Beattie, on Truth, p. 36.
216
t Essay on Truth, p. 36 
REASONING. 
These principles are presupposed in all kinds of
r,asoning.   The different species of reasoning are
inflitenced by the nature of the subject or entity
under inpestigation.  Analytic reasoning may relate
to physical, intellectual, or moral subjects or entities.
In the investigation of physical objects, the materials for reasoning must be acquired through our
bodily senses, on the testimony of which we confiIenttly rely.
In the investigation of intellectual objeets, the
phenomena of mind are the materials for reasoning,
and these we acquire by the testimony of consciousness, which we judge to be true.
In the investigation of moral truth, in its most
limited sense, the moral relations of rational beings
to each other and to God, as well as the relation of
their actions to the Divine law, are the materials for
reasoning; and in the acquisition of our knowledge
of these, we rely on the accuracy of consciousness
and other powers of the soul, as well as on the testimony of our senses when the actions of men are
concerned. But, as it is not our design to embrace
Logic in this treatise, we shall not enter into the
discussion of these different processes of ratiocination.
SECTION II.
Of Arrangeement.
Arrangement is Cat active operation of the soul
by which we select s( -e from among the mass, either
of external entities themselves, or of our mental representatives of them, and place them, as wholes or
T
217 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY;
units, il a particular order, with a view to a specific
purpose.  In present entities, the entities themselves
are the subjects of the arrangement. Thus, having
a number of ivory balls of different cologrs before
us, after having inspected them, the result of this
inspection is a knowledge of their shape, colour,
&c., and nothing more than knowledge.   But when
we select those of the same colour from the mass
and place them together, we perform an additional
and distinct operation, viz., that of arrangement.
In addition to the present entities themselves, this
operation is also performed on our mental representatives of retrospective and prospective entities.
When, e. g., we resolve to arrange into classes all
the various animals which we have ever seen, and
of which we have a recollection, we can acconmplish the work, though not one of those animals be
present. But then it is not the animals themselves
(present entities) which we arrange into different
classes of quadrupeds, bipeds, carnivorous, graminivorous, oviparous, viviparous, &c., but only our
mental representatives or cognitive ideas of them.
The purposes of this arrangement, and the principles on which it is made, may be various.
(1.) W'e may arrange them according to any
one of the various relations of entities to each
other; such as sameness, diversity, contiguity, causation, majority, minority, progression, proportion,
&C. Thus the mental act of. comparison in language is nothing else than the arrangement of two
entities according to the relation of similarity, together with an expression of their relation in words.
2 L —  
SECOND ACTIVE OPERATION, ARRANGEMENT.  t9
E. g., "Virtue is the pillar of a republic." This
sentence means, that virtue in a republic resembles
the pillar of an edifice, which supports the fabric.
Comparison may be performed on present entities,
or on our ideas of them.
The arithmetical processes of addition, subtrac tion, division, multiplication, are so many species
of this second active operation, arrangement, per formed by man on different numbers. Addibility,
subtractibility, &c., i. e., the capacity of being thus
operated on, are properties of the absolute entity
number; but the operation of addition, &c., is an
active process of the mind of man on these properties.   Addition is the arrangement of several
numbers into one class or sum; division is the arrangement of a certain number into a given number of parts; subtraction is the arrangement of
some of the integral parts of a given number into
a separate class or number; and multiplication is
the addition of a sum a given number of times.
(2.) The second principle according to which
the process of arrangement may be conducted, is
that of genus, species, class, &c. The difference
between this and the first mnode of arrangement is,
that in the former only one classification is embraced, whereas, in the latter, there are several
grades of similarity. The arrangement of entities
differs from the mere reinspection of them, in the
fact, that the latter always embraces merely the view
of entities, without including any change effected
in their relations to other entities or ideas.  Inspection can only view the universe of entities as it 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
exists at the time of inspection, but arrangement
changes their order, or connexion, or relation, by
bringing those into contiguity which were separate
before, and by separating such as were before contiguous.  By this process, we form all the varieties
ol mental associations which are based on any natural principle or affinity; while unnatural and arbitrary associations are the product of what we term
the third active process, modification.
The musician, who composes a piece bf music,
performs this process of arrangement.  He takes
the several individual notes or sounds, and places
them into such relation as, by the constitutional influence which they exert on our minds, will produce
the effects at which he aims. The act of recording
such composition by writing is a process of physi
cal agency.
(3.) This arrangement may be made according
to thb probative relation of entities to a given proposition or to the human mind. The order in which
evidence, that is, related entities are arranged, gives
them more or less force or influence upon the mind.
This is well understood by the advocate, the logician, and the intelligent and faithful preacher. The
successful arrangement of our knowledge or arguments according to their probative relations to the
human mind, constitutes the all-important operation
of synthetic reasoning, so far as its object is to produce in others, conviction of truths already known
to the speaker or writer. The capacity of reasoning clearly, in a public speaker or writer, is nothing
else than the ability to arrange his ideas or argu
220 
SECONI) ACTIVE OPERATIONS ARRANGEMENT. 221
ments in their best probative order, and in that
order in which they produce their greatest colvincing effect, to enunciate them in words, or record
them in written signs, which will recall those words
to all who read (i. e., inspect) them.   Thus we see
that analytic reasonin-, or, more properly, investigation, is an operation of inspection, while synthetic
reasoning, that is, the logical arrangement of the
result and evidences of our investigation, is chiefly
an instance of the second active operation, viz.,
Arrangement. The formation of generic propositions, in which the results of our investigations are
synthetically proposed, is a process of abstraction
or generalization, and thus belongs to the active
process, modification.    The  presentation  of the
whole to others in oral or written language belongs
to the last active operation, namely, the communication of our ideas to others, or intellectual intercourse with other minds.
Evidence, objectively considered, is the tendency
or fitness of ally one entity in the physical, intellectual, or moral universe, or of its relations, to
make the reality of another supposed entity credible, that is, apparent to the mind. Evidence, subjectively considered, is the tendency of our knowledge of some entity, or its relations, to make oust
knowledge of other entities, or their relations, appear true. Here is presented to our view one of
the grandest features of intellectual science-truth
based upon the rock of the universe, which God
fouinded, while our knowledge is but the shadow
or reflection of it, merely its mental representative.
T 2 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
The probative order or relation of entities to a
certain proposition, seems to consist in their being
detached from all irrelevant appendages, and placed
in such connexion of contiguity or succession, in
relation to the proposition, as is best calculated for
the inspection of the hearer, so as to present the
greatest facility for the operation of inspection by
the auditors or readers. The more completely arguments are separated from everything irrelevant,
the more easily can they be inspected by the mind.
Every species of syllogism is nothing else than a
particular arrangement of certain entities, or rather
of propositions e.xpressing our ideas of them, such
as is best calculated to facilitate their inspection;
and the art of reasoning well is nothing else than
the habit of arranging the related ideas in this way
for easy inspection. Before we exemplify these
observations by the examination of the process of
reasoning itself, we would remind the student of
the classification of composite entities, that is, of
relations as the bases of verbs in human language:
for, as all syllogisms embrace verbs, an accurate
idea of the nature of verbs is essential to the comprehension of the subject. We have, on a former
occasion, remarked that the words in human language originally and most naturally expressing substantive entities are in grammar substantives, and
those standing for adjective entities are originally
adjectives. But it is the verbs which alone most
naturally express the relations subsisting between
different entities. In pursuing our examination of
syllogisms, we begin with the several parts, and
22~ 
SYLLOGISMS.
first inquire, What are they? They consist of human  language, of propositions.   These describe
some of our mental representatives or ideas; and
the question is, Of what entities are they representatives, of substantive, or adjective, or composite
entities, or of all combined?  An example will best
illustrate these observations in their application to
the structure of the syllogism.
Major proposition: If there is a God, he ought
to be worshipped.
Minor proposition: But there is a God.
Conclusion: Therefore he ought to be worship
ped.
Here the term God, or letters G, o, d, express
the sound, which, in our language, is the sign of a
certain idea, which idea is our mental representative of a real entity, viz., the great Author of the
universe. This is a substantive entity. The phrase
" ought to be worshipped" is a verb, and expresses
our idea of a certain composite entity, viz., the relation of moral fitness or obligation between the two
parts of a composite entity, viz., God (a Being of a
certain character), and his rational creatures worshipping him. The major proposition, therefore,
expressed in the language of our system, would run
thus: "If there be an entity corresponding to the
idea designated by the sound which is spelled by
the letters G-o-d, he ought to be worshipped;" i. e.,
we see the relation of suitableness between him and
those actions of his rational creatures called the
worship of him. The major proposition, when
closely examined, seems evidently to be nothing
223 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
else than a sentence expressing in words our ideas
of a composite entity, i. e., of the relation of two
simple entities to each other. The simple entities
are, (1.) A Being corresponding to the idea designated by the sound and word God; and, (2.) Those
actions of his rational creatures, which they perform  with a view of worshipping him; and the
relation between them is that of suitableness.
The process by which this relation is known is
none other than that of inspection. The result of
inspection is, in all cases, knowledge; and in this
case likewise we can trace no other operation than
the act of inspecting the two parts of a composite
entity, God and the worship of him by rational
creatures, and the result of this inspection is, conviction of the relation.  This knowledge or conviction is not optional, but necessary. The minor
proposition, philosophically stated, runs thus: "But
there is an entity corresponding to the mental representative designated by the sound, which we describe by the letters G-o-d;" "' hence he ought to
be worshipped" is the conclusion or relation perceived by the mind. It is evident that the only
point to be proved in this syllogism is the minor,
viz., that there exists an entity which we designate
by the term God, and this must be done, and can
be done, only by the successive inspection of the
entities which constitute the proof.
224 
MODIFIcATION.
SECTION III.
Of Modification.
The third active operation or process is termed
modification, and embraces a class of operations
distinct in their nature from those which have preceded. Mlodification is that active operation of the
soul, by which we take some from among our mental
representatives of real entities (rarely the objective
entities themselves), and bring them into such forms
or combinations as do not correspond to realities;
that is, make arbitrary substantive and composite entities out of them. The materials on which these operations are performed are seldom objective entities themselves, but generally are our mental representatives of them. This operation is distinguished from the two preceding by the following distinct peculiarities: (1.) The operations of inspection and arrangement act as generally on objective
entities themselves, as on our mental representatives of them; whereas, that of modification is conversant chiefly about our ideas. (2.) The former
two operations take our mental representatives of
substantive entities as wholes or units, and leave
them such throughout all the process of their influence; take our ideas of the combination of prop.
erties found coexisting, and leave these combinations unaltered; but modification changes them
from their natural state, and brings their constituent
parts or elements into forms and combinations
which do not exactly correspond to real entities.
This operation embraces, among others, the following processes:
225 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
1. The process of abstraction and generalization;
that is, the process of framing ideas and combinations of ideas, which do not fully represent any one
entity, but are used to express a whole class of individual entities which have, in common, the properties expressed by the generic idea and  term.
Thus the idea quadruped is formed by the process
of abstraction. We take the combinations of our
mental representatives of the properties found coexisting in each of the several animals, horse, cow,
sheep, dog, &c. We compare with each other our
ideas of these several combinations of properties,
each one of which combinations is found coexisting
in one or other of these animals. Thus comparing
these several combinations of ideas, we omit from
each every individual idea which is peculiar to
itself, until at last we have nothing remaining but
the idea of four legs, as the property or peculiarity
which they have in common, and by which they
are distinguished from animals of a different class.
In considering this process, let it be recollected that
our mental representative of each one of the different coexisting objective properties is separate and
independent.  We can therefore, with the greatest
ease, abstract from our ideas of the combination,
any one or more of its elements at option, and use
the residue as a substantive entity in our ratiocinations. It is in this way that all generic terms are
formned.
If we examine the ideas conveyed to the-mind
by the term quadruped and the phrase four legs,
we instantly perceive a great distinction between
226 
PROCESS OF MODIFICATION.
them: the latter designates our idea of a part of an
animal, while the former signifies not only a whole
animal, but a whole class of animals each of which
has four legs.  But it is evident that the idea expressed by the term quadruped does not correspond
with any individual entity intended by it, any farther than the circumstance of its having four legs.
The term quadruped, therefore, expresses one of
those general ideas which we refer to the process
of abstraction. Thus also the idea expressed by
the term all, when definitely used, does not correspond fully to any real entity, but is a generic idea
embracing a great number of entities.
Of the same character, generically, are niegations,
and the ideas expressed by particles of speech
which have no objective entity in nature corresponding to them.   They are, though of different kinds, the product of this power of modification.  Thus the word "nothing" expresses a negative generic idea, and is equivalent to not a solid,
not a liquid, not a gas, not light, not caloric, &c.,
&c. The idea is acquired by the perception of the
absence of one entity after another, and ultimately
the supposed absence of all entities.  Generally,
however, when we use the term nothing, we employ it in a qualified sense. About absolute nothing we seldom speak, and can say but little intelligently.
Generic propositions are formed by striking out
from a specific proposition, the name of the individual objective entity of which the predicate
of the proposition may be affirmed, and substitu
227 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
ting in its stead some generic name, which comprehends all the individual objective entities to
which the predicate is believed to be applicable.
One of the most important rules of correct reasoning is, that the utmost caution be always observed
not to introduce into our general proposition a term
more generic than our actual examinations warrant,
not so general as to include any entity, of which
we are not certain that the predicate really belongs
to it, or in regard to which our experience is not
sufficiently extensive, and also uniform so far as it
goes. This process of generalization or abstraction is one of the most important among all our
mental operations.
Among its results are embraced, (1.) Geometrical
axioms; (2.) Metaphysical axioms; (3.) Mathematical truths; (4.) Moral general truths or principles;
such as, virtue is productive of happiness and vice
of misery.
Hence the opinion of Kant and many other German
philosophers, that knowledge of this kind is ad priori,
that is, inherent in the mind, is erroneous. There
are, indeed, many truths which may be characterized
as universal and unchangeable, which are the properties assigned by him to the truths of pure reason
(Reine Vernunft). And there can be no10 objection
to calling them transcendental. But they do not
differ in their nature from other ideas. Viewed
subjectively, these general ideas are phenomena of
our minds, are mental representatives of actual relations in nature, abstracted from the entities in
which they are found. Viewed objectively, gen
228 
KANT'S VIEW OF A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE.  229
eral truths are  relations actually existing in nature, not in an abstract, but in a concrete state, between different individual entities. Thus the axiom,
" Things which are equal to the same thing areequal to one another," is nothing else than a prop.
osition expressing the relation of agreement between different entities, and especially the truth
taught by experience, that any two of them which
are equal to a third, will also be found equal to
each other. But if it be inquired whether these
truths are a priori knowledge, we reply in the negative. The individual relation of equality between
the different objects existed before we perceived
it; but the general, abstract, subjective idea of this
relation, having been formed from the ideas of the
individual relations perceived, must necessarily be
subsequent to our (empyric) perceptions of the individual relations. The general truth has nothing
in nature corresponding to it; because all actual
relations and entities are individual.  It therefore
exists only as an idea in the mind of man. There
are, indeed, some laws of the mind itself, which regulate and limit its operations, our knowledge of
which is not derived from the observation of external nature. These laws, it is admitted, exist prior
to our knowledge of them.   But so do the laws of
the material universe. And just as we derive our
knowledge of the laws of the physical universe by
observation of external nature, so we acquire our
knowledge of the laws of mind by observing the
phenomena of mind. Yet, there is as much difference between the laws of mind and our knowledge
Ui 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
of those laws, as there is between the laws of mat.
ter and our knowledge of them. Nor can we perceive any reason why the one should be regarded
as a priori knowledge, rather than the other; for in
reality neither possesses any claim to that character.
2. Fictitious combinations of ideas: (a.) Fictitious
simple entities, either substantive or adjective, i.e.,
fictitious persons, things, and properties.   (b.) Fictitious composite entities, or relations, or actions
performed by one on the other, or existing between
several. Th.is process brings different entire substantive entities into imaginary combinations, and
attributes to them imaginary actions. To this species of modification belong all the operations of
imagination and fancy, the active element of many
specimens of wit and burlesque; all specimens of
painting, and all works of fiction, either in poetry
or prose; and also, what is of the same character,
though of different design, every species of misrepresentation, falsehood, or lying.
The operations of what is termed imagination
are clearly specimens of modification. The definitions of imagination, adopted by the best writers,
sufficiently prove this.  " It is the province of imagination," says Mr. Stewart, " to make a selection of
qualities and of circumstances from a variety of different objects, and by combining and disposing
these, to form a new creation of its own."  What
is this else than modification, which, according to
our definition, "is that active operation of the soul,
by which we take some from among our mental
representatives of real entities (rarely the objective
entities themselves), and bring them into such forms
2,30 
aELAPIONS 0-F ENTITIES.
or combinations as do not correspond to realities."
Still more accordant with our definition of modification is that given of imagination by Dr. Abercrombie, who says, "In the process of imagination,
we take the component elements of real scenes,
events, or characters, and combine them anew by a
process of the mind itself, so as to form compounds
which have no existence in nature." But the process of abstraction, or generalization, also consists
in an operation of the same general kind, but for
different purposes. Some of the processes termed
wit, burlesque, and the ludicrous, partake of the
same nature. Hence, as these several processes
differ only in minor circumstances, while they are
generically the same, it is more philosophic not to
regard them as entirely different operations, but to
adopt one general process of modification, and regard these as its different species. Thus, when the
painter designs to paint an imaginary landscape
of perfect beauty, how does he proceed? He recalls to his reminiscences all the most beautiful
scenes which he has witnessed in nature, and selecting from them his ideas of those traits which
strike him as most beautiful, he forms these into
one imaginary landscape in his own mind. After
this, he tries successively to imitate these several
features with his pencil, that is, he records this new
creation of his imagination on the canvass. The
poet passes through the same process, more or less
formally, only he makes his record in words instead
of colours, with the pen instead of the painter's pencil.  " Milton," says Mr. Stuart, " has, in his garden of Eden, created a landscape more  perfect,
21 
MAINTAL PHILOSOPHY.
probably, in all its parts, than has ever been realized in nature, and certainly very different from anything that this country (England) exhibited at the
time when he wrote. It is a curious remark of
Mr. Walpole, that Milton's Eden is free from the
defects of the old English garden, and is imagined
on the same principles, which it was reserved for
the present age to carry into execution."   But it
was no peculiarity of Milton, that he depicted his
garden as more beautiful than any which nature
presents to us. This is characteristic of poets and
novelists generally. They exhibit their heroes and
heroines either as elevated above the bounds of humnan perfection, or sunk below the dregs of our
race. For this very reason, a fondness for works
of this description is no promising trait of character, especially in the young; and the habitual indulgence of it almost invariably disqualifies, in a
greater or less degree, for the sober realities and
the active scenes of real life.  But another and
still more serious objection to the great mass of
popular novels, romances, tragedies, and comedies,
is, that they familiarize the mind with scenes of pollution, and thus destroy the moral sensibilities of
the soul; and they often present vice arrayed in so
many circumstances of interest, as to make the
reader insensibly forget its deformity. Nor does
the unfortunate end which is sometimes made to
close the career of wickedness, and which is the
reputed moral of the tale, at all compensate for the
corrupting influence exerted on the reader's mind
by long familiarity with scenes of impurity through.
out the book. Even when scenes of affliction or
232 
CONNEXION BETWEEN MIND AND MATTER. 233
nmisfortune are presented, and the sympathy of the
reader becomes deeply interested, as the whole is
confessedly fictitious, and no opportunity is afforded to him to exercise his sympathy in efforts to relieve the unfortunate, the practical benevolent tendencies of his nature are impaired, and even his
sensibility to real misfortune blunted.
The sudden and arbitrary combinations of thought,
which constitute the intellectual part of wit and
burlesque, are in many cases different species of
the process of modification, while the sentient part
of these conmplex efforts of mind constitute the feeling or emotion of the ludicrous.
The architect and the sculptor, likewise, first
make a creation of fancy, and then endeavour to
realize it by erecting some splendid and tasteful edifice, or an animated, almost living statue.
SECTION IV'.
The fourth active process is that mental agency
which immediately regards and regulates the action
o     f      our bodily organs. It may be termed the mzental direction of our physical action. It embraces
all voluntary control over the entire muscular systein, by which alone motion is produced in any
part of the body. The intrinsic connexion between
mind and matter, and the manner in which the latter is made to obey the former, is a mystery to us.
The fact of the obedience of the body to the mind
is of daily and hourly, yea, of incessant occurrence;
but is as incomnprehensible to the greatest philoso                      U2 
234 CONNEXION BETWEEN MIND AND MATTER.
pher, as any other mystery in nature or religion.
I will to hold the'pen in my right hand, and so to
move it as to form letters and words; but why my
right hand takes the pen rather than the' left, why
my fingers move the pen so as to form alphabetic
letters rather than mathematical figures, I know
not. I can assign no other reason than my antecedent volition, that they should do so. And a man
who has suffered a paralysis is surprised when, for
the first time, he finds that the muscles of his arm
or leg refuse to obey the volitions of his mind.
This connexion between the mind and body,
this obedience of the muscles to the will, in healthy
persons, being assumed as one of the best-established facts in nature, our next inquiry is, how far
is so-called physical action really physical, and
how far is it mental? It seems evident that everything about it, except the simple tension and relaxation of the muscles, and consequent locomotion of
the body, or some of its parts, is mental.  Mechanical skill is an improvement of the mind in directing bodily motion. Intelligence, memory, wisdom
in the selection of appropriate-materials, and appropriate bodily motions, to effect an end, are involved, as are also other mental processes.
This agency might be divided into different kinds,
according to the different organs to which it more
immediately relates; or it might be divided into
the different processes effected by the hands, by
the feet, the eyes, the whole body, &c. tnder the
operations effected by the hands would be embraced. (1.) The different species of mechanical and 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
agricultural labour; (2.) The manipulations requisite to performances on musical instruments, in
which there is, combined with much physical activity, remarkable intellectual skill.  Of the operations of the feet, walking is the most remarkable.
It properly results from the combined muscular effort of the whole body, and consists in balancing
the body by leaning forward so far that the centre
of gravity is brought beyond the base, and sustaining the body from falling by the continued position
of one foot after another in advance of the whole.
In all cases of voluntary physical action, we can
distinguish the following mental processes: (1.) Selection of the end to be accomplished; (2.) Knowledge of the ways and means for its attainment;
(3.) The volition to exert the bodily organ; (4.) The
attention of the soul to the organ; (5.) The inspection of the material on which the agency is to be
performed; and, (6.) The active process of the mind
conducting and regulating the physical action.
SECTION V.
The fifth process is that of holding intellectual
intercourse with other minds; or, as it is commonly, though incorrectly termed, the process of
commun)icating our ideas to others.
Philosophically speaking, this process consists in
exciting in others the ideas which they themselves
have already obtained from those entities on which
we wish them to think, and exciting them in such
order, and in such combinations, and with such adjective properties annexed, as we wish them to en
235 
INTELLECTUAL INTERCOURSE.
tertain. When we utter articulate sounds, these
sounds, by their exact similitude to those which the
person whom we address has heard in connexion
with certain ideas, first recall his idea of the similar sound formerly heard by himself, and this recalls the idea of an entity then connected in his
mind with that idea of the sound. Thus, by speaking to others, that is, by successively pronouncing
the sounds corresponding to the train of thought in
our own minds, we not only excite in others the
similar ideas which they have received from entities, but we bring them into new connexions, and
add epithets to suit our purpose.
This process of intellectual intercourse is carried
on in different ways:
I. By speaking, or expressing our ideas by articulate sounds. We are born with organs of articulation, by the voluntary action of which we
can so modify the expiring breath as to produce
specific articulate sounds. The air on which the
action of these organs is exerted is only the expiring breath, the breath as it is in the act of passing out from the lungs. The constant inhalation
and expiration of breath is, within certain limits,
involuntary, and goes on during sleep; but whether we will or will not modify this breath by the organs of speech, and emit it with such force as to
produce sound, is voluntary. The scope of voluntary control which we have over respiration,
seems to be just as much as is necessary for speaking, and yet not sufficient to destroy life by a total
interruption of breathing. If it were possible to
236 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
withhold respiration entirely, a man might at any
moment easily put an end to his existence. If, on
the other hand, we had no control over our respiration, but were compelled to inspire and expire
at regular intervals, our sentences would all have
to be of a certain length, or our enunciation could
have no reference to their punctuation, and the operation of speaking would be subject to such inonotonous interruptions, as would be unpleasantly mechanical. Hience, it is evident, this voluntary control was given, and this voluntary respiration withheld, for these very purposes.
Children find the same pleasure in exercising
their organs of articulation on the expiring breath,
that they do in ulsing their arms and legs. God
has so constituted animals, that the use of their organs is, in itself and for its own  sake, pleasant.
The fishes skipping about in their watery element,
the birds in the atmosphere filling it with warbling
notes. exhibit such signs of enjoyment as to leave
no doubt, that if the vocabulary of their language
were intelligible to man, the feelings would be joyous which they express. For the same reason, children, when they find themselves able to talk, are
prone to talk incessantly. Even before they can
articulate correctly, they find, by crying, that they
can in some measure control their organs of speech,
and thus they learn the rudiments of oral action.
By continued practice they increase this ability,
and in due time they learn to articulate, that is, to
speak, with tolerable accuracy.
The following appears to be the manner in which
237 
23S   CONNEXION OF WORDS WITH THINGS.
words become connected with things, or, rather, in
which the ideas of oral words, that is, sounds, be
come connected in our minds with the ideas of external entities. Children see an entity, and hear a
certain sound pronounced in connexion with it.
The idea of an entity, for example, an apple, obtained by sight, and the idea of the sound obtained
by the ear, are received almost simultaneously, and
thus, having the relation of contiguity of time, the
one, by virtue of this relation, recalls the other.
Thus a father approaches his child with an apple;
he stretches out the fruit that the child may take
it, and, in so doing, pronounces the word apple.
The child's mind thus receives, almost simultaneously, two ideas, viz., that of the colour of the apple, obtained by the eye, and that of the sound indicated by the written word apple, acquired by the
ear.  Originally the child perceives no connexion
between these ideas, the one of sound and the other
of colour; but finding the two generally connected
by other persons, that is, hearing the same sound
pronounced by all who seem to be speaking of the
same entity, the child soon learns that the one, viz.,
the sound apple, is used as a sign or name to designate the other, the thing apple.   Thus both these
ideas, or items of knowledge, having been obtained
together, have the relation of (temporal) contiguity,
and become so closely related, that if the attention
of the mind is by any means directed to the one,
it spontaneously pursues this relation, and is conducted to the other.   The idea of the colour of the
apple may also at any time be recalled by the pres 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
ence of another apple, which will afford a similar
idea, and thus, by the relation of similarity, recall
the first. The visual idea may likewise be mediately recalled by seeing the letters which spell the
sound which stands for that idea.
These remarks show us that, parallel to our train
of thoughts, the subjects of which are objective entities, runs another coequal train of thoughts, the
subjects of which are sounds, viz., those sounds
which, by experience, have become associated with
those entities.  But speaking is an active operation
of the articulating organs consequent on a volition
to communicate our wishes, commands, or other
ideas, to those whom we address; experience having taught us that others associate with certain
sounds the same ideas that we do, and, therefore,
that the utterance of sounds by us, similar to those
which we have heard uttered by others, will excite
in others the same ideas which we attach to these
sounds.
Properly speaking, however,, we neither do nor
can excite in others the same identical ideas which
we connect with our words. The ideas which all
men connect with words are the mental representatives of entities which they originally derive from
entities themselves, and which they can derive from
no other source. When they hear others pronounce
the same, or, rather, exactly similar sounds, they,
by the relation of similarity, recall the recollection
of the sounds which they formerly heard; and the
recollection of these former sounds recalls the ideas
formerly associated with them.   Thus, when a
239 
-40  PARALLEL AND COEQUAL TRAINS OF THOUGHTS.
speaker addresses an audience, there is a truly remarkable train of collateral and parallel operations
running on with the train of the speaker's ideas.
Every idea of the speaker is succeeded by the following operations before it accomplishes its design.
(1.) The idea of the speaker himself.  (2.) The
speaker's recollection of the idea of the sound formerly associated with that idea by himself. (3.)
His volition to articulate a similar sound. (4.) The
articulating action of his organs on the expiring
breath to produce a similar sound. (5.) The hear.
er's idea of the sound produced by the speaker's
voice. (6.) The hearer's recollection of the similar sound which he himself had often made. (7.)
The recurrence of the idea which he formerly connected with the similar sound made by himself.
All these parallel trains of operations attend every
thought conveyed by the speaker.   The security
that men by this process will substantially understand each other, rests on the fact, that all men de.
rive from an inspection of the same entity substantially the same representative; otherwise there
could not be any common language or communication of thought among men.
Our ability to make just such sounds as correspond to our recollection of sounds made by others, results from our being able to make at option
coarser or finer, dental or labial, lingual or guttural
sounds, and from our ability to discern whether the
sounds which we mnake, and of which we have an
idea so soon as we hear them, exactly resemble
those which we heard from others. 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
The structure of the human articulating organs is
such, that all men naturally make certain element ary sounds. These sounds are expressed by the
letters of the alphabet, and are substantially the
same in all languages. Even the difference observed in the number of letters in different languages is often the result of the imperfect state of the
art of designating these elementary or alphabetic
sounds, and two languages whose alphabets differ
most, may, when spoken, bear much greater similarity to each other in their elementary sounds.
So far then, at least, as the elementary sounds are
concerned, we must answer the long-disputed question in the affirmative, and maintain that language
is of Divine origin; because the nature of these elemnentary sounds results from the structure of the
organs which God gave us.
We learn, by early habit, to articulate nearly all
the elementary sounds with great promptness and
certainty; and it is thus that we learn new langutages; because we can form relations of contiguity
between our ideas and thle words of a new tongue.
Nay, although it is a rare attainment, we may, by
frequent repetition and long-continued habit, form
so close a connexion between old ideas which we
were wont to express in our vernacular tongue, and
the words of a new language, that we spontaneously think in it; that is, as we reinspect the old ideas,
the corresponding words of the newly-acquired language will spontaneously recur to our mriemory as
we advance, instead of those of our vernacular
tongue. In the exercise of articulation the breath
X
241 
242 COMMUNICATION OF THOUGHTS BY WRITTEN SIGNS.
is voluntarily modulated into those sounds: one
lungs' full after another, leaving only short intervals
for inspiration, just as long as we wish to convey
our ideas to others; and when this volition is accomplished, the articulating organs become motionless, and the breath is inhaled and exhaled without
aiy sound, except what is termed audible breathing.
II. The second means of communicating our
ideas to others is by gestures and muscular action
of the countenance correspondent to the thought.
How far this kind of comrnmunication mnay be carried, is forcibly exhibited in pantomimic exhibitions,
in which a regular succession of scenes is intelligibly represented by gestures and muscular expression of the countenance, without the utterance of a
single word. This process it is not necessary for
our purpose to examine in greater detail.
III. The  third mode  of communicating  our
thoughts is by WVRITTEN SIGNS. These signs are of
different kinds.  (1.) The regular alphabetical letters. These designate the elementary sounds which
belong to languages in general, and are virtually
the same in them all. These signs, or letters, constittite the most perfect form of the alphabet, and
in point of time were probably later than the hieroglyphic and syllabic signs. In the Chinese language the written signs do not designate elementary sounds; but at least many of them stand for
whole words, and designate those elementary objects which men find it necessary to express in the
infancy of knowledge; additional words being formed by a combination of these. You will easily per 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
ceive, that the accumulation of signs in this language must be unusually great, and very inconvenient. So much is this the case, that it is said very
few of the most learned men in China itself are
fully acquainted with all the marks of their own
language, and the exact import of their numerous
combinations.
Of the syllabic alphabet, intermediate between
the Chinese and European languages, we have a
modern instance in the invention of See-qua-yah
(George Guess), a North American Indian of the
Cherokee tribe, which deserves notice. It consists
of an alphabet of eighty-six letters, each of them
designating neither an elementary sound, as in European languages, nor an entire word, as in the
Chinese, but a syllable or part of a word.
(2.) Arithmetical figures and signs, which stand
for sounds designating our ideas of the entity number.  (3.) Musical notes, which designate our ideas
of such sounds as arc used in musical composition.
IV. The fourth mode of expressing our thoughts
is by SINGING. This is a voluntary effort to make
certain sounds in accordance with different principles, with a view to excite in ourselves or others
certain feelings, and sometimes to give interest to
certain truths. This mode might, indeed, be regarded as a subdivision of the first or oral sounds.
The exercise of Composition is a complex operation, consisting of an act of voluntary inspection
and arrangement of ideas of entities, simple or com
243 
THE EXERCISE OF COMPOSITION.
posite, together with the act of expressing the ideas
thus arranged, by signs on paper; that is, writing
the ideas as arranged by us.  Thus, e. g., we resolve to compose an essay on the evils of intemperance. We reflect on the entity a drunkard, or our
idea of him, that is, inspect it in all its various mel
ancholy and disgusting relations, and arrange our
ideas with reference to the object in view, and then
write them as arranged. We do not write every
idea which the mind lights on in its voluntary inspection, but only those which are particularly suited to our purpose. Here the question arises, What
are the new ideas, not retrospective, which we never had before, but which thus oftentimes occur to
the mind? Are they not merely cognitive representatives of relations; of new combinations of sirnmple entities, which were known before, but never
precisely thus combined by the mind? Now from
these new combinations result new relations, which,
when viewed by the mind, are called original or
new ideas. This feature of suggestion presented
some difficulty to Dr. Brown; but, according to this
view of it, its nature would be sufficiently plain. It
is incorrect to say that the new idea recurred to the
mind.  The true statement is this: the simple entities thus viewed together by the mind are inactive,
as are also our ideas of them; but the mind itself
is the active agent, which, in voluntarily contemplating, that is, inspecting the entity and its relations,
perceives this, to it, new relation, which, however,
existed before it was viewed, and was perhaps perceived by many others before, and which would
244 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
exist in nature if it had never been viewed by any
one.
The preceding five operations, viz., Inspection,
Arrangement, Modification, Physical action or agency, and Intellectual intercourse with other minds,
appear to constitute all the specific active operations of the soul.  To one or other of these every
operation of the mind may be referred which is in
its nature active, excepting only what remains to
be discussed under the mode of their occurrence.
SECTION VI.
Of Attention.
We shall first make a few remarks on the subject of attention before we inquire whether it is
entitled to the rank of a distinct active process.
Whatever be the active operation in which we are
engaged, the clearness, success, and mnemonic tenacity attending it, will generally be in proportion
to the degree of attention exerted in the operation.
Every one must have observed, that an inattentive
perusal of a book leaves an indistinct impression,
figuratively speaking, of its contents on the mind
while an attentive perusal produces a directly con
trary effect. In conducting an inquiry, if the pro
cess be negligently conducted, the result may be a
total failure to obtain a clear conviction; but an
attentive review, that is, reinspeetion, of the very
same evidence, will often produce clear conviction,
and dispel every doubt.
The influence of attention on the degree of feeling excited in the mind is equally striking. In
X2
245 
ATTENTION.
deed, in most cases, there can be very little feeling,
that is, little pleasure or pain, without attention. The
same remark is equally true of knowledge. Thus,
the rays of light may be reflected from an object to
the retitia. of the eye, and form the image there, but
it will fail to convey knowledge to the mind, if the
attention be not directed to it.  So also the same
entity can produce no feeling unless the attention
be directed to it; or, in other words, unless it be
observed. There are, inideed, cases of disease in
which painful feeling is irresistibly produced, and
we are not able entirely to divert our attention from
it; but in so far and so long as we can divert it, the
pain is greatly diminished.
Attention also greatly improves every active operation to which it is directed. The success and
accuracy of inspection are obviously improved by it
in the highest degree. Arrangement can also be
performed with an accuracy and facility proportioned to the attention bestowed on the operation.
The abstractions and generalizations of the active
process of modification are in like manner greatly
improved by attention. Who can doubt, that the
excellence of mechanical operations, or of the execution of instrumental music, requires the attention
of the performer?  Or who would be guilty of the
absurdity of denying, that the communication of
thought on any subject, whether performed orally
or in writing, can be executed with greater accuracy, and system, and effect, when the energy, the
attention of the soul, is expended on the effort?
In complex operations, also, the influence of con
246 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
tinued attention, that is, of attention combined with
habit, is strongly displayed. Some talented individuals have thus acquired the ability to conduct a
simultaneous train of several operations, each of
which ordinarily engrosses the attention of men
separately. Thus, of Julius Cesar it is said, that
he could at the same time dictate seven letters to
as many secretaries, and that even when engaged
in writing himself, he could dictate to four others.
Attention, too intenely exerted, and too long
continued upon any one subject, sometimes induces
monomania. But it is a benevolent law of our nature, that the lassitude arising from continued attention unlooses, as it were, the grasp of attention, and
enables the mind to resume the natural and salutary
self-control and equipoise of its powers.
That attention, however, is not a distinct and
separate operation, will appear evident from the followillng facts: (1.) We cannot conceive of it as
acting by itself, but only in connexion with some
other operation of the mind. (2.) It does not give
us any results of its action, distinct from those of
the active operation with which it is combined.
(3.) It is common to all the active operations. (4.)
It seems only to be a property of the active operations conducted at the time. We therefore define
attention to be the energy of the soul exerted in some
active operation.
The causes which excite attention appear, in general, to be these. (1.) A volition to bestow attention on the performance of some active operation.
(2.) The present interest or pleasure felt in the op.
0
~247 
24,8 IODE OF OC~RRENCE OF ACTIVE OPERATIONS,
eration itself. Thus, we commence the perusal of
a book incidentally met with, not knowing what its
contents may be, but soon become so interested,
that the most intense attention is excited in oux
breast.  (3.) Some impression firom without mado
through the bodily organs.  Thus, we may be engaged listening to some interesting narrative; but,
a band of musicians passing by, their music makes
an impression on the organs of hearing, and it attracts and diverts the attention. This we suppose
to be a correct view of the character of attention,
which we, therefore, cannot regard as a separate or
distinct active operation.
CHAPTER II.
THE MODE OF OCCURRENCE OF THE FIVE ACTIVE
OPERATIONS.
IF it be asked, why does the soul engage in active
operations at all rather than not, we reply, the reason is, because the nature of the soul is active.
By this we mean, that the Divine Author of our
nature has so constituted the mind of man, that, during his waking hours, it is unavoidably and incessantly engaged in some one of these five active
processes. Of this we can be convinced by an examination of our own mental operations. On such
an investigation we find, that it is not optional with
us whether our minds shall be engaged in thinking 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
or not; we are constitutionally thus engaged, and
can at best, by the most determined voluntary effort, interrupt the succession of thought for a few
seconds only.
As to the manner in which this continued action
is mediately sustained, several theories might be
suggested; but the fact, which is Beyond dispute,
is all that is requisite to the accuracy of our system; and as we have endeavoured to avoid mere
theory heretofore, we shall not at present call your
attention to either of these.
If it be inquired, in the second place, why does
the soul, at any given time, engage in one of these
active operations rather than another, the experience of every individual will unhesitatingly reply,
that these operations are engaged in in one of two
ways: either from deliberate choice or from habit.
The testimony of every man's own consciousness,
if we mistake not, is decided and conclusive on this
subject, and teaches that in one of these two ways,
and in no other, do active operations at any time
take place.
The mode of occurrence in the active operations
of the mind is twofold:
I. Voluntary. II. Spontaneous.
SECTION I.
Of the Voluntary Occurrence of the Active Opera                      tions.
The active processes of the soul are voluntary,
when we engage in them in consequence of a voli tion so to do, or, to express the same in populm
249 
50 VOLUNTARY OCCURRENC,E OF ACTIVE OPERATIONS.
language, when they are undertaken from deliberate choice.   That we do perform such acts of
choice every hour of the day, must be evident to
every impartial inquirer, from the testimony of his
own consciousness.
(1.) The certainty of our performing such acts
of uncontrolledchoice is just as evident and indubitable to every individual, as is the certainty of
his performing any other mental act. All men
agree as to the existence of our other mental operations, such as knowledge and feeling; nor do any
doubt in practice the existence of our acts of choice,
because it rests on the same basis.
(2.) As to the nature of this act of choice, our
ideas must be derived from the same source by
which we become acquainted with the nature of
knowledge and feeling. It is probable, too, that
all men agree in fact and practice, though not in theory, in their views of these acts of choice, as much
as in their ideas of knowledge and feeling.   The
differences of opinion which exist do not relate to
the existence of the power of willing, nor to the
idea which consciousness furnishes of our volitions
as mental acts, but to the supposed relations between volitions and precedent operations, and to
other powers and principles of the mind. (a.) All
men agree that these acts of choice differ from acts
of necessity, and are in their nature opposite to them.
When the fiendlike assassin has deliberately sent
the fatal ball through the heart of his victim, we do
not censure the bullet that penetrated his heart,
nor the rifle which contained the powder, nor the 
IENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
spark which ignited it, nor the cock which elicited
the spark, nor the trigger which moved the cock,
nor even the finger which moved the trigger: but
instantly perceiving that all these are not voluntary
agents, we  attribute the blame to the malicious
mind, which originated the whole train of second
causes.  Nor does the common sense of mankind
discriminate merely between the voluntary actions
of man and the actions of mechanical and irrational agents; the distinction between the voluntary and
involuntary actions of man himself is equally clear,
and universally acknowledged. What different
feelings from those produced by the voluntary act
of the cold-blooded assassin, are excited in every
bosom when, as two intimate companions are running through a thicket in pursuit of game, their
guns cocked and hands applied to the trigger, the
foot of the hindermost is caught in a brush; he
stumbles, and in his effort to regain himself presses
unconsciously the fatal trigger, and prostrates his
friend, a corpse, before him.  (b.) It is only for
such actions as are voluntary that we accuse or
excuse ourselves, anrid for these alone can we feel
true penitence, if they are contrary to known duty.
When we have yielded to the force of temptation,
we are conscious of our guilt, because we know
that the force of these temptations was not irresistible; we know that we could and ought to have resisted it.  (c.) All men agree, that for their own
acts of choice alone, and the consequences of them,
can they really and justly be held responsible either
by God or man.  (d.) Every reflecting man who
251 
252 CONSTITUTIONAL INCLINATIONS OF THE SOUL.
has attained mature development of mind, is conseiois of the fact that he can and ought to regulate
the voluntary actions of his life according to certain
fixed rules and principles.
The question now arises, Is the soul, in choosing
and refusing from among the acts possible to it, entirely free from any and every bias, and left to make
its choice uninfluenced by anything whatever, or do
we perceive in the voluntary actions of the soul any
evidence to the contrary? If we find, that the great
majority of the acts of deliberate choice in all men
of every character, under all circumstances, and of
every age, are of a particular kind, are calculated
to promote a particular general end, and made with
a view to accomplish the same general purpose, we
are irresistibly led to the belief, that there is in the
soul itself a constitutional impulse, or bias, or inclination to that end.  This inclination must be prior
to the actions themselves, and is among the causes
which produce them. It must belong to the structure of the soul itself, and may therefore with propriety be termed a constitutional inclination.  If we
are not grossly mistaken, the conduct of all men
does present evidence of such inclinations in every
situation of life, from the cradle to the tomb.
Though these inclinations at first view appear
numerous and complicated, on closer examination
they resolve themselves into the following two constitutional inclinations:
I. TIlE INCLI,INATION TO ACTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE FITNESS OF THINGS, moral, intellectual, and physi.
.cal. 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
II. THE INCLINATION TO WELL-BEING, or the elijoyment of pleasure, present and ultimate; and the
avoiding of pain.
These inclinations are not faculties, because they
are not sources of distinct species of mental operations. Nor are they themselves mental operations,
in the ordinary sense of the term, because they exist constantly, and prior to action. Nor are they
habits of the soul, for habits are merely a facility
for the performance of actions of particular kinds,
and a tendency to their spontaneous performance,
which facility is acquired by practice, and may be
changed; while the constitutional inclinations are
permanent and  immutable.   They  are therefore
natural characteristics of the soul, and belong to its
constitutional structure. This bias seems to have
been impressed upon our minds by the great Creator, to determine, in some degree, the general tenour of our voluntary actions; and experience teaches us that the great mass of all human actions is in
accordance with one or the other, or both of these
inclinations.
I. T he first constitutional inclination, viz., the inclination to action in accordance with the physical,
intellectual, and mioral ftitness of things, is an attribute of the soul, the existence of which is clearly
established by a multitude of facts. All mnankind
do habitually evince the existence of this disposition, in a greater or less degree, in their unpremeditated actions. It is this inclination which leads
all men, even from their earliest years, naturally to
speak the truth rather than falsehood, unless they
Y
253 
FIRST INCLINATION OF THiE SOUL.
have acquired the habit of misrepresentation from
deliberate and  self-interested calculations.   The
truth of this fact is not only admitted by men on
ordinary occasions, but is incorporated into their
criminal codes and judicial proceedings. It is an
admitted rule of testimony in all our courts. Accordingly, if the testimony of a stranger be offered
in a trial, we inquire whether he has any interest in
the issue, which his testimony may tend to produce.
And if it be fully ascertained that no interest of
his, even of the most remote kind, can possibly be
affected by the decision, we naturally expect, in the
absence of contrary evidence, that he will not designedly swerve from the truth.
All mankind have a constitutional sense of obligation, a constitutional inclination to obey the moral
fitness of things.  Whatever meii naturally judge
to be right, they also feel some impulse to do.  This
impulse is, alas! too often, and in many persons
habitually resisted; yet its existence is clearly
taught in the occasional unpremeditated actions,
and in the deathbed confessions of the most abandoned. And all who pay the least attention to the
moral dictates of their nature, will not only freely
admit its existence, but also acknowledge that its
empire is justly unlimited; that wherever, throughout the whole range of creation, they perceive a
trace of moral fitness, there they also find this impulse accompanying it, and feel a constitutional
monition to obey its dictates. This obligation, too,
though so often resisted, is seen by all men to be
paramount in importance, and in the strength of its
254 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
claims, to everything else. It is this inclination
which leads men, when travelling in a strange land,
to keep the road rather than pass through an adjoining grain-field, where they would destroy the
provision which God has made for his creatures.
This inclination also urges us to obey the intellectual fitness of things in general; such as, to yield
submission to those who have a right to direct, and
to receive instruction from those who are older and
wiser than we; to arise in the morning when we
awake; to take care of things belonging to unknown persons, rather than to destroy them.  In
short, when we examine the whole sphere of human
agency, we find that the crimes of men alone are
exceptions to the observance of this constitutional
inclination, while the precepts of the law on all
subjects exhibit its appropriate dictates.  The tendency to observe the physical fitness of things is
witnessed throughout the whole sphere of physical
action, ill every department of life. Thus, apart
from every self-interested motive, who can doubt
that there is a natural disposition in persons engaged in mechanical or commercial pursuits, to make
things right rather than wrong? to make them according to the principles of physical fitness rather
than the reverse?
From the above considerations, it is evident that
the first constitutional inclination is one of the most
important features of our moral nature, and embraces all that is monitory or impulsive, in what is
termed the moral sense, in the widest import of the
term, and also in conscience, in its stricter accepta
255 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
tion.  As the operations of conscience are complex
in their nature, their several constituent parts belong
to different branches of our subject.  There is in
conscience something that is judicial, something that
is sentient, and something that is inipulsive.  The
first was discussed in the observations made oil relative knowledge; the second, when treating of
moral emotions; and the third, or impulsive part,
belongs to this place.
The monitions or impulses of conscience are
original and constitutional. If we attend to the
testimony of our own consciousness on this subject,
we think all will admit that these impulses arise
spontaneously in the soul, whenever we contemplate
our relations to the beings around us in the universe,
in their bearings on our own conduct. Whatever
we thus perceive to be dictated by these relations,
to be our duty, to be right, to be conformed to the
moral fitness of things, we also feel an imperative
monition to perform. It follows, therefore, that
conscience, in its principal, its impulsive feature, is
an original faculty or power of the soul, although
the operations generally designated by the term are
complex, and several of their elements referable to
cognition (judgment) and sensibility.  The very
structure of all different languages, proves alike
the existence and the universality of this principle.
Whenever we use the term " ought," or any others
equivalent to it, we express an impulse of this constitutional inclination of conscience; and where is
the language on earth that is destitute of terms
equivalent to these; or where is the individual, in
256 
CONSTITUTIONAL INCLINATIONS.
any nation under  the sun, which never employs
them?
All men also judge the imnpulses of this monitor,
whom God has implanted into our breasts, to be supreme in the authority of its dictates.  If at any time
we yield to the solicitations of passion, and violate
the prescriptions of conscience, we feel guilty and
degraded; we feel that we have done that which
is unworthy of our nature, and have violated the
relations we sustain to the great Author of our
being.
This principle of our nature is one of the fundamental bases of our moral responsibility. Without
it, man could not be a moral agent; for, however
lucid might be his views of the relations of the different beings in the universe to God and to each
other, and of the influence of his conduct on their
happiness or mnisery, he certainly could not be responsible for the conduct he pursued, if he felt no
sense of obligation, no impulse to select the one and
shun the other.
The impulses of this principle of our moral nature,
though strong enough in all to make us justly responsible for our conduct, are not, in any ease, irre.
sistible. They never destroy our liberty, although
they are strong enough to justify conscience in " excusing, or else accusing, us" for our conduct.
Like every other power of the soul, the constitutional inclination can be strengthened by faithful
exercise, and it may be weakened by the neglect
or violation of its dictates.  The first entrance into
the paths of known sin is generally made with a
Y2.    2.
257 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
tremulous step.  The first oath, or the first act of
theft or violence, is perpetrated with uncomfortable
feelings, and followed with a sense of guilt and selfcondemnation. Happy would it be, if erring guilty.
man would then listen to this kind, monitory voice,
and return to virtue's paths, for they are paths of
pleasantness and peace!  But  the repetition of
crimne soon impairs the strength of these monitory
impulses, and every subsequent transgression makes
farther violations easier. On the other hand, sincere
and faithful obedience to the dictates of conscience,
both in ascertaining what our duty is, and in labouring to perform it, will increase the strength of its
imnpulses, and make subsequent obedience the more
easy.
II. The second constitutional inclination, viz., the
love of well-being, acquires different names in popular language, according as it is habitually indulged
in reference to any particular class of entities. This
inclination embraces the following, among other
modifications: (1.) Love of life. This is one of the
fundamental principles of the soul, and is implied
in all the subsequent modifications of this constitutional inclination. Independently of its superadded pleasures, life itself is regarded by man as a
great good.   " Skin for skin, and all that a man
hath, will he give for his life," is a sentiment which,
notwithstanding the source whence it proceeded, is
undeniably true. The afflictions of life have sometimes made men willing to leave this world; but it
was always in the expectation, true or false, that a
hereafter: would restore them to life and pleasure.
258 
CONSTITUTIONAL INCLINATIONS.
So much is man attached to his existence, and so
deeply ingrafted on our nature is the love of life,
that we can scarcely find, even among the most
miserable of the sons and daughters of affliction,
one who would be willing to purchase release from
his sufferings at the expense of his being, one who
would be willing to be blotted out from existence.
In the beautiful language of Grey, we may confidently inquire,
"For who, to dumb forgetfulness a prey,
This pleasing, anxious being e'er resigned;
Left the warm precincts of the cheerful day,
Nor cast one longing, ling'ring look behind?"
This love of life leads us to a proper care of our
health, and to all necessary acts of self-defence in
time of danger. As this principle is an. inherent part
Qf our mental nature, it seems to be right that man,
whenii assailed by violence, should defend himself
to the utmost extremnity, unless by the laws of God
he has forfeited his right to live. And if in this
defence his own life cannot be preserved except at
the risk of that of his assailant, this constitutional
principle seems to dictate a preference of his own
existence to that of others.  The propriety of this
position is not doubted if the assailant be a serpent
or some ravenous beast, nor can we perceive why
it should not be equally proper in reference to robbers and murderers. We have no right to submit to
be murdered, and by doing so we would often cause
two deaths instead of one, as the murderer will generally also, and' justly, be executed. But "if he has
done anything worthy of death," then, like Paul,
259 
MENTAL PHILOSOPlHY.
he ought "not to refuse to die."  (2.) Love of esteem or power, which is the inclination to gratify
our love of well-being by the pursuit of such entities and the performance of such active operations
as acquire for us the applause and admiration of
men.  A desire for the approbation and esteem of
others is in itself, when regulated by a proper regard
to the first constitutional inclination, an important
and useful principle of our nature.  It tends  to
make us observe the decencies of life, and to pursue such a course of conduct as will commend us
to others. It is only when it becomes inordinate,
and is indulged in violation of the fitness of things.
that it becomes sinfuil and pernicious in its conse
quences.
So, also, the desire of possessing influence or pow
er is in itself commendable, if that influence be desired not to promote any selfish ends, but chiefly as
a means to advance the welfare of the community
and the glory of God. When this principle bet
comes inordinate, it is termed ambition, in the  un
favourable sense of that term.  (3.) Love of prop.
erty or possession, which is the inclination to gratify
our love of well-being in the pursuit and possession of wealth. So long as the love of property is
controlled by the first constitutional inclination, the
fitness of things; so long as it is not pursued contrary to right, contrary to the relations we sustain
to others, it is a useful principle, and leads men to
industry and exertion to provide comfortably for
themselves, and those of their own household; but
when it degenerates into avarice, it becomes not
-2-60 
CONSTITUTIO.AL INCLINATIONS.
only morally wrong, but also detrimental to the interests of society. (4.) Love of novelty, or curiosity, which is the inclination to gratify our love of
well-being by the pursuit of frequent change in the
objects of our attention, having learned from our
experience that any entity excites the greater feeling for being novel to the mind.  (5.) Sensuality,
which is the inclination to gratify the second constitutional inclination by the pursuit of objects adapted to the indulgence of the sensual propensities.
(6.) Love of science, which is the inclination to
gratify our second constitutional inclination by the
pursuit of the different objects of human  knowledge.  (7.) Social inclination, which is the inclination to gratify our love of well-being by seeking the
society of others. These, and various other modifications of the second constitutional inclination, are
exhibited in the actions of mankind generally.
This second constitutional inclination, the love of
self, or of well-being, was, in its original condition,
morally good, and of salutary tendency. The Scriptures often address our love of happiness, and the
Saviour expressly commends it: "' Thou shalt love
thy neighbour as thyself."
These two constitutional inclinations of the soul
exert more or less influence on the character of our
acts of choice, but never destroy the ability to
choose; that is, they never act irresistibly. When
an individual act of choice is in harmony with both
these inclinations of the soul, both as to motive and
outward form, it is right in the sight of God. But
it is evident that the great mass of human actions
261 
MENTAL PHILOSOPIIY.
is an indulgence of the second inclination at the
expense of the first, that is, consists in actions which
are an indulgence of our love of pleasure or wellt)eing in violation of the dictates of the physical, intellectual, or moral fitness of things. All such actions are sinful. Among this class must be reckoned, also, some actions which, in themselves considered, that is, so far as the outward acts are concerned, are right, but which originate from a motive of pure selfishness. Thus, that modification
of the second constitutional inclination termed ambition, induces many men of the world to observe
outward morality of deportment, and even to perform acts of beneficence, and to support the institutions of religion, in order that they may secure the
public approbation, and be successful in their aspirations after fame or power. Such morality is, indeed, less unfavourable in its influence on the community at large than open vice; yea, it may even
tend to support the order and promote the well-being of society; but it evidently cannot secure the
Divine approbation, because a regard to the moral
fitness of things, a regard to what is morally right,
and duty, did not enter into the motive with which
it was performed.
It is greatly to be feared that a large portion of
the morality of the world is of this kind, is the result of selfishness in some one or other of its modifications.  This may even be the case without the
person himself being fully aware of it, because he
has not carefully and faithfully examined his heart,
262 
CONSTITUTIONAL INCLINATIONS.
and tested the motives of his conduct by the light
of truth, either natural or revealed.   Thus multitudes deceive themselves as to their real character. The first constitutional inclination is manifestly the more noble; but it is evident to all impartial observers, that in the natural state of man
the second greatly preponderates: and in this, so
far as the mind is concerned, may at least in part
consist the natural or constitutional depravity or
disorder of mnan. Self preponderates over God,
pleasure over what is right. This constitutional
bias of the soul itself, let it be remembered, determines only the general end; but not the specific
means by which, in any case, we accomplish that
end.   Thus, the second constitutional inclination,
in the form of self-interest, inclines our fellow-citizens to seek the melioration of their temporal condition by the construction of internal improvements; but it does not decide whether they shall
do it by making railroads or canals. This latter
point the soul itself decides, after an inspection of
the relative properties and advantages of both these
means of gratifying our constitutional inclination.
The several volitions of the mind, resulting from
these different sources, are different in regard to
comprehensiveness. Some of them are of the most
generic kind, as they relate indefinitely to the general end; others, which contemplate some particular method of accomplishing the generic one, are
specific in their character. Resolutions in regard
to our general conduct are generic volitions, and
exert an important influence on the specific voli
263 
264  MOTIVE POWER OF EXTERNAL ENTITIES.
tions, and other operations of the mind, concerned
in executing them.
Besides these constitutional inclinations within
the soul itself, by which the Author of our nature has
given a general direction to the agency of man,
there is also in entities themselves without the mind,
a certain degree of motive influence, that is, a certain degree of adaptation to influence the mind to
action, in view of which the soul exercises its powers of choice.
All entities without the mind may be divided, in
reference to this subject, into two classes:
1. Our own bodies.
2. All other entities in the universe.
In our own bodies we find certain phenomena,
termed bodily appetites, which possess a strong motive
power. By bodily appetites we here strictly mean
the corporeal part, the material part of those appetites.  Thus by the bodily appetite, hunger, we mean
the periodical action of the gastric fluid on the coats
of the stomach (or, as this theory has of late been
impugned, whatever other physical change that may
be the true cause of the feelin,g), which results fromrn
the structure of our bodily organisms, and was designed by the Creator as a periodical motive to urge
us to take the necessary food. The same remarks
are applicable to thirst, which is nothing else than
that peculiar condition of the throat and fauces, oeeasioned by the want of a liquid, and causing a desire to obtain it, or some other substance, in order
to relieve the pain felt; and also sometimes in order to enjoy the pleasure occasioned by the reception 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
of the liquid.  The fluid thus taken into the stomach is consumed by the progress of the bodily functions, and its want occasions a painful feeling termed thirst. Both these appetites are the work of
God. They are the necessary results of the bodily
organization of man, and may justly be considered
by him as clear indications of the Divine will, that
they should lead to the course of action by which
they are relieved, though under the limitations of
reason.
The second general class of motives embraces all
other entities except the above. The pleasure we
expect to derive from eating any fruit, or from perusing the work of a well-known author, acts as a
motive to procure the object of our desire. Entities of every class seem to possess some motive influence on the will, e. g., all kinds of food, a land.
scape, a beautiful passage in any author, literary or
scientific. To the mathematician, the pleasures
found in the discussion of the relations of space
and number are a strong inducement to the repetition of the exercise.
The question here arises, Have these entities any
certain motive power which they exert on all minds,
and how is their relative strength determined? It
is certain that every entity does possess a definite,
invariable, intrinsic desirableness, or the contrary;
and one entity is more or less desirable than another. Again, when we view these relatively, they all
have certain fixed relations to each other, and to
human actions and interests, as means to an end.
After having weighed the merits of a case or a plan,
z
265 
MOTIVE POWER OF ENTITIES.
we can practically decide which is most suitable,
and which presents the strongest inducements to its
adoption; and we are seldom in doubt as to what
we ought to do, that is, on which side the strongest
inducements lie.
But these inducements or entities do certainly
not act with irresistible force or mechanical power
on the will; otherwise men would always act in
obedience to the strongest consideration, that is, to
truth, and thus they would act virtuously. It is evidently the duty of all men thus to do; God has
made the inducements to virtue stronger than those
to vice, the evidences of truth stronger than those
of falsehood; hence it is the duty of all men voluntarily to obey the truth by pursuing virtue.  But
have they no power to act otherwise? The fact
that they do, must forever set this point at rest.
And it is certain even with regard to our bodily appetites, that we can resist their cravings.  A sensible man can refuse to satisfy the most ravenous appetite, when he knows that abstinence is necessary
to the recovery of health.  In this case, regarding
health as a greater motive than present gratification,
he wills to obey the stronger motive, and declines
eating; while another, under the same circumstances, wills to prefer present gratification to ultimate
health.
It seems evident, therefore, that, though men generally do, in matters relating to temporal interests,
will in accordance with the strongest motive, yet
they certainly can will contrary to conviction and to
a sense of duty. Hence it is evident that, though
266 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
the determinations of the will are made in view of
motives, that is, of a knowledge of entities, they are
nevertheless made freely.
The spontaneous reculrrence of retrospective
knowledge of certain entities exerts an important
motive influence upon tile soul. When this recurrence is habitual, it will constitute a particular trait
in the character of its subject. A certain sphere of
this knowledge and feeling, retrospective, present,
and prospective, is constantly at our command, and
some item or other of it is constantly recurring to
us spontaneously, when the attention of the mind is
not occupied in some active, voluntary operation.
When we are not engaged in any voluntary active
process, the tenour of this spontaneous recurrence
is regulated by the impressions made on the organs
of sense, or by other principles to be enumerated in
the discussion of spontaneous inspection.  Some
such impression is made almost every moment, and
each object, seen, or heard, or felt, educes a train
of related spontaneous knowledge. Thus each item
of present knowledge or feeling gives rise to a train
of related ideas, which runs on according to certain
laws, until interrupted by some other impression on
the organs of sense, or by some process of voluntary
action. Peculiar pursuits in life, also, form habits
of peculiarly frequent spontaneous recurrence of our
knowledge of the particular entities connected with
them, which also exert an important influence on
the will, by bringing the entities referred to more
frequently to bear on it by their retrospective influence.  Henoe the incalculable advantage of a good,
26'7
0 
t INELTYNcE OF - DESRE.
a religious education. And as knowledge can influence our active operations only so long as it is
recollected, the advantage of early good instruction
is manifest; because what is learned in early life
is longest recollected. And, finally, as a daily, or,
at least, frequent attentive review of such truths,
tends to rivet them on the mind, and make them the
subjects of frequent spontaneous retrospection, we
cannot fail to perceive the salutary tendency of the
habit of daily perusing a portion of the Sacred Volume, or reading it in our family circle.
Desire is that state of the soul in which an entity,
that is the subject of inspection, is exerting its motive power, but the will has not yet made a decision. Hence desire may be regarded as incipient,
but suspended volition. Nor is the decision of the
.will always, or at any time necessarily, in accordance with the desire. Oftentimes we decide against
the solicitations of the present desire, in consequence
of our recollection of other and more influential
considerations to the contrary. And if we direct
our attention to these preponderant considerations
or objects, and dwell upon them, they will gradually
excite desire in us. Desire is therefore a state of
soul, tending to a volition to choose the object by
which it is excited, but not necessarily producing it.
Various objects possess different degrees of desirableness in our view; and each one, when it is made
the subject of our deliberate attention, will excite
its appropriate degree of desire in us.
Desires differ from feelings in this particular, by
which they may easily be distinguished. The inmmediate object of desire is always some  action;
268
/
*1
0 
DESIRES.
while the immnediate object of relative feelings, with
which alone it may be confounded, is always some
person or thing. If I desire, I always desire to do,
to be, or to possess some person or thing; but if I
have love it is towards some person or thing; and
if I hate, I hate something or some person. Or, in
the language of our system, relative feeling immediately contemplates substantive or adjective entities, while the inmmediate object of desire is a composite entity.
The strength of our desires for particular objects
is not the same in all men, nor in the same person
at all times of life. It is very much influenced by
the preponderance of the one or the other constitutional inclination in reference to the objects in
question, and the strength of the constitutional inclination is influenced by the habitual voluntary
conduct.  To the miser a purse of gold will appear
more desirable than to another man; because the
second constitutional inclination has become stronger in consequence of his long-continued voluntary
pursuit of money, and seeking his enjoyment in its
possession.
Desires always presuppose a cognition of the
object desired, and generally, also, a pleasant emrnotion or feeling in reference to it. Yet this pleasant
feeling does not appear to be always present; for
we may desire a dose of medicine that is nauseous
to us and makes us shudder; but here the end which
we hope to accomplish by it appears desirable to us.
Desire is a state of mind, which is sometimes of
long continuance.
Z2
269 
MENTAL  PHILOSOPHIY.
With regard to our power of choice, usually termed power of volition, we may yet remark, that it is
confined, in the intended objects on which it determines to act, to some future time. However various the actions which we resolve to do or not to do,
they must be done or avoided hereafter. Yet this
future time admits of various modifications in relatioil to the will; we can resolve to do anl act immediately, or at some future time more or less distant;
we can resolve absolutely or conditionally.  The
object of every act of volition or choice is the performance or non-performance of some one or more
of the five active operations; and one trait of difference between them is, that, while some one or
other of the five active operations is always going
forward in the mind, the act of choice occurs more
rarely and at intervals, either to give a new direction or continued energy to the current active process.
Our entire view of the will therefore resolves
itself into the following features.
I. The soul of man does possess the power of
free, uncontrolled choice.
II. In the exercise of this power, the soul is influenced  (but not  certainly or irresistibly determined) by the following things:
1. By its two constitutional inclinations, which
relate only to the general end to be aimed at.
2. By the motive power of entities without the
mind. These relate to the specific means for the
270 
THE SOULLS CHOICES BY WHAT INFLUENCED. 271
attainment of the ends pointed out by our constitutional inclinations. These entities are the following: (a.) Our bodily appetites. (b.) All other external entities.
3. By our knowledge of these entities, either retrospective or prospective.   This knowledge  embraces truth of every kind, which, by generating
conviction and exciting feeling, exerts a definite
motive influence.
4. By the habitual state of our feelings on similar
or related subjects, or, to speak more accurately, by
the state of our susceptibility of feeling from the object in question; that is, from the degree in which
our feelings are susceptible of being excited by said
object. Every feeling is individual, and more or
less transient in its nature. Every individual feeling
must be excited anew in each individual case, either
by its appropriate objective entity, or by our knowledge of it, retrospective or prospective. But our sus.
ceptibility for feeling is permanent, and is increased
or diminished, in each individual, by his mental habits. Thus the ambitious man habitually seeks the
gratification of his second constitutional inclination,
the love of well-being, by the pursuit of human applause. By this habit, the susceptibility of his mind
to pleasure from demonstrations of popular approbation, and pain from the reverse, is augmented.
Thus also the sensualist habitually seeks the gratification of his second constitutional inclination, the
love of well-being or pleasure, ill the pursuit of objects of licentious indulgence.
His mental associations cluster around such 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
scenes, and his spontaneous mental operations re.
cur to them.  By this habit the susceptibility of his
mind to be influenced by such objects is greatly
increased. Thus, every circumstance, however remotely connected with such scenes, becomes a
temptation to him, and every exposure to direct
temptation acquires a double influence on his mind.
And thus it is that his volitions, in view of such
circumstances of temptation, will obviously be influenced by the state of his susceptibility for feeling
in reference to them.
The native activity of the soul prompts us to ac
tion.
The constitutional inclinations of the soul determine the general character of the ends, or results,
at which we aim.
Our knowledge presents to us the various entities,
with their different and relative properties, by active operations upon which the proposed end may be
attained in various ways and in different degrees.
The different entities exert a motive power proportional to their relative adaptation to accomplish
the end proposed, and influenced by the habitual
state of our feelings on related subjects; and, finally, in view of all these circumstances, the soul freely
determines in its choice of the different possible
means of attaining the desired end. We therefore
define the will as follows:
The WILL is that power of the soul by which it
freely determines, in view of motives, either now or
hereafter, absolutely or conditionally, to perform or
not to perform some one or more of the five active
operations.
272 
SPONTANEOUS OCCURRENCE OF ACTIVE OPERATIONS. 273
SECTION II.
Of the Spontaneous Occurrence of the Active Oper
ations.
When the attention of the soul is withdrawn, the
greater part, if not all the five active operations, are
carried on spontaneously, viz., inspection, arrangement, modification, the intellectual agency concerned in physical action, and intellectual intercourse
with other minds.
The difference between the voluntary and spontaneous active operations seems to consist chiefly in
the following circumstances:
1. The former are the results of volition in their
commencement, that is, are always begun in consequence of volition; while the latter are not commenced in consequence of volition, but result from
an inherent constitutional disposition of the mind to
be always, during waking hours, engaged in some
active operation. The reason why one active operation is spontaneously engaged in rather than another, or why one entity is the subject of its action
rather than another, seems to be a previous habit
formed by frequent or late voluntary action of the
same kind, on the same entities, or on our mental
representatives of them.   Habit is an increased
facility in the performance of any active operation,
resulting from repeated acts of the same kind.
Habit not only renders the performance of any operation more easy, but also enables us to perform
it with greater perfection and success. It is truly
surprising with what facility and perfection we are 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
able to perform many active operations when long.
continued practice has rendered them  habitual;
which at first we could perform at all only with the
greatest difficulty.  After years of continued practice, a student will commit to memory a given piece
of composition, in one fifth of the time at first requisite for the task. An expert performer on the
pianoforte will with ease execute some of the most
intricate and difficult pieces of music, which he
could not perform at all, in proper time, before long
practice had established the habit from which his
ability results. The same is true of all intellectual
operations: habit makes them easy, and, in most
cases, pleasant. This principle of habit seems to
be nothing more than the progressive development
of the powers of the soul by continued practice,
and is applicable more or less to every part of our
mental and bodily organism, not excepting even
the constitutional inclinations of the soul.  It is witnessed in the rapid reasonings, the almost intuitive
conclusions of the experienced logician, in the declamation of the orator, and in the skill and expertness of every species of mechanical operation.  It
must, however, not be supposed, that these processes, which have become habitual to us, and inll
which continued practice has enabled us to make
great improvements, are always performed spontaneously. The contrary is obviously the case. Even
the celebrated Paganini, when performing a difficult piece of music, which he has never before
seen, must certainly exert a volition to strike every
individual note; although the execution may be
so rapid that he will have no recollection in refer
274 
SPONTANEOUS ACTION.
ence to any single note, and will merely remember
his generic volition to play the piece, that is, to follow the series of notes, as he sees them before him.
The same is also the case when a familiar piece of
music is designedly performed by the most skilful
artist. He has, indeed, no recollection of a volition in
reference to a score of things, a knowledge of which
is implied by every note that he strikes, and each
of which he had at first to perform by deliberate
volition. But then he has learned to produce musical sounds on an instrument with as much facility
as he utters oral sounds when reading the printed
page.  And who, in reading, can recollect the separate volitions to articulate each individual letter,
and to combine these sounds into syllables, and
these syllables into words, as he is rapidly reading?
These operations are spontaneous only when attention is withdrawn, and they are performed negligently, without deliberate purpose to do so. And
even when thus negligently commenced, there is
probably some effort of will occasionally exerted in
the progress of such spontaneous exercises.
The improveableness of the different bodily and
mental powers by practice is a subject of great extent and peculiar interest; but we shall not pursue
it farther in this place.
The formnation of these habits is voluntary, but
their subsequent action is spontaneous. When we
say, the formation of these habits is voluntary, we
do not mean that there are not, in the constitutional
structure of our minds and bodies, more opportuni
ties, yea, constant temptations to the formation of
275 
276 SPONTANEOUS OPERATIONS OF THE MIND.
some particular habits rather than others. The
contrary is evidently the fact. There seems to be,
even in the mind itself, a greater aptitude for tihe
formation of sinfiul habits than of such as are holy.
Fewer voluntary acts will create or form a sinful
habit, and the habit resulting from any given number of voluntary sinful acts is stronger than would
result fromr the same number of acts of a different
character. The perverted state of our bodily propensities, since the fall, also leads men into frequent
temptations to sin. The bodily propensity is involuntary, but the indulgence of the inspection of objects to which it prompts is voluntary and sinful,
and is one cause of the formation of sinful habits.
2. Voluntary active operations are carried on with
much more attention and energy than those which
are spontanedus.
The spontaneous operations of the mind in many
persons constitute far the greater part of all their
mental action; and in all persons, even in those
most constantly engaged in duties or labours, mental or bodily, they occupy much of their time. Indeed, it is the spontaneous action of an individual
that exhibits his real character.  Hence, as the
spontaneous action results from that which is voluntary, and is correspondent with it, either holy or
unholy, it is evident that we are responsible to God,
not only for our voluntary action, but also for that
which is spontaneous, i. e., for the mental habits by
which we are characterized.   It might, at first
glance, appear as if our view of the spontaneous operations tended to remove them from the sphere of
responsibility; but, on a more careful examination, 
SPONTANEOUS ACTION.
we think this difficulty wvill vanish. The grounds of
our responsibility for spontaneous action, and the reasons which will make it evident, are the following:
(a.) The fact, that any particular active operation is spontaneously engaged in rather than another, is owing to the circumstances of our having, by
previous voluntary action, formed a habit, or facility, and inclination for such action. As it is thus
ultimately caused by our voluntary acts, responsibility justly attaches to it.
(b.) We can, moreover, prevent much of our
spontaneous mental action, by keeping the mind
constantly employed in voluntary engagements.
(c.) Although spontaneous operations are commenced without deliberate volition to do so, there
is often some slight degree of volition exercised in
their progress.
- (d.) Spontaneous operations are at all times under the control of the wvill as to their continuance.
We can at any moment put a stop to any spontaneous operations of the mind, by a volition to do
so, and to engage in some other mental process.
Spontaneous operations are, therefore, continued
by consent of the will. Since, therefore, the commencement, continuance, and termination of these
processes are at all times under our voluntary control, it seems evident that we are justly held responsible for their character by our great moral
Governor.
Spontaneous action has for its materials, like our
voluntary action, entities, simple or comrposite, past,
present, or future.
AA
277 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
An  important fact of a physiological nature
touching this subject is, that spontaneous active
operations are much less debilitating to the mind
than voluntary.  The more entirely we  can withhold the mind from voluntary action, and even
from intense attention to a process of spontaneous
thought, the more complete is this state of rest.
Hence, riding on horseback or walking in company
with others, by presenting a series of changing objects to the mind, and preventing us from entering
on a very attentive inspection of any of them, is
excellent relaxation. A solitary walk of at student,
in which he becomes absorbed in the customary
subjects of his pursuit, is but an ambulatory study,
and affords very slight relaxation to the mind. On
this principle, the different debilitating tendency of
various species of mental exercise can be regularly
graduated. Each mental process will debilitate in
proportion to its difficulty to the student, and to the
degree of attention requisite to its performance.
When the mind is fatigued, or, for any reason
whatever, does not engage by volition in any of the
five active processes, some of them will invariably
occur in a spontaneous, indifferent, and careless
manner; so that we have little, and sometimnes no,
recollection of the operation so long as it proceeds
in this spontaneous way. The operations which occurspontaneously with the greatest frequency belong
chiefly to the process of inspection, and they are generally such as are most frequently, or have been
mnost recently, engaged in in a voluntary manner.
I. Spontaneous Inspection. —In the spontaneous
278 
SPONTANEOiS INSPECTION.
inspection of entities, or their mental represeutatlives, the mind is found generally to proceed in
ieveral uniform ways, or laws of association.
(1l.) It seems to follow the relations of the entities, which are the subjects of its inspection. The
relations which are most frequently followed are
sameness, contrariety, contiguity-temporal, local,
or numerical-and causation.  But all the other
relations are also occasionally pursued in our spontaneons inspections.  Perhaps the relative frequency with which each of the relations is pursued in
spontaneous inspection, is not materially different
from the order in which those relations have been
enumerated. But the course of the mental train
of action is often changed by one or more of the
principles yet to be enumerated.
- (2.) There is a tendency in spontaneous inspection to pursue, in preference, the train of those entities which have most frequently been the subjects
of its voluntary attention. Thus, the mind of the
mathematician pursues its spontaneous rambles in
the regions of mathematical science; the mind of
the sensualist recurs to the objects of his sinful gratification; and the mind of the faithful Christian delights to dwell upon the topics connected with his
high and holy calling. And if several persons, of
different pursuits, were requested to give us some
account of their reminiscences of a recent tour which
they had made, the memory of the farmer would
spontaneously recur to the agricultural productions
of the country through which he had passed; the
painter would think first of the landscapes, the
279 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
statesman of some political intelligence which he
had obtained, and the Christian, of an interesting
conversation which he had heard on the subject of
the Redeemer's kingdom.
(3.) The mind more readily recurs to those objects which have lately been the subjects of its attention.
(4.) It pursues more frequently those entities
which excite the most pleasant feelings and gratify
the second constitutional inclination. This inclination, or love of well-being, is not, in itself, sinful; on the contrary, the joys and pleasures of religion itself are sought in accordance with its dictates. But it becomes sinful when it is so inordinate as to outweigh the sense of obligation to obey
the fitness of things, to obey the strongest evidence,
that is, to obey truth. This preponderating influence is found in all unconverted persons by nature,
and thus all by nature are sinners.
(5.) The mind is diverted from the pursuit of the
above-mentioned relations in its spontaneous operations, by the immediate action of some entities,
at the time, through the bodily organs.
(6.) It is interrupted by volition. While engaged in spontaneous action we may, for some reason or other, resolve to do something, i. e., to en.
gage in some active process, and thus the sponrtaneous character of our mental action is instantly
interrupted and succeeded by a process of a volun.
tary nature.
These spontaneous retrospections have, by some
recent metaphysicians, been termed suggestions.
280 
ARtRANGEMENT SOHIETIMES SPOITTANEOUS.   281
This word, though it conveys something of the char.
acter of these operations, seems not to be well selected as their generic and characteristic appellation.
It seems to represent one item in a train of conrsecutive remriniscences or associations, as the agent
that causes the occurrence of the other, while the
mind is regarded rather as the passive recipient of
these influences. In reality, however, the mind is
the active subject; its spontaneous rambles result
from the constitutional activity of its nature, while
in these rambles it, by a law of its nature, pursues
in preference the channel of those natural relations
between the different entities or objects which real
ly subsist between them, or those artificial relations constituted in the course of events, or those
habits of mind which proceed from individual vol
untary action. The principles regulating these as
sociations are therefore intelligible, and it is ales
evident that, to a certain extent, they are the rt
sutilt of our most frequent voluntary actions. These
character is therefore, though not immediately, yet
ultimately, in a great measure under our control
And just so far as this is the case, we are evidently
responsible for the moral character of our sponta
neous reminiscences and other spontaneous menta?
operations.
II. The operations of Arrangement are also some
times carried on spontaneously. If, in passing along
the road, we see any animal, and especially one of
rare occurrence, how often do we not spontaneously
arrange it with the class of quadrupeds, or bipeds,
&c., as the case may be; how often do we not
AA2 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
compare it to other similar animals, and thus spon.
taneously arrange the two by the relation of sameness. Every figure of comparison used by extemporaneous speakers, consists of spontaneous arrangements according to the relation of similarity, expressed in words. And when a person of well-disciplined mind hears a fact which has an important
probative bearing, he instantly and previous to volition, even in the act of rapidly reading a book, arranges it with other facts bearing on the same subject.
III. The process of modification very seldom occurs spontaneously, especially in persons of veracity
and conscientious character; yet, doubtless, the
mind of the novelist, who has habituated himself by
voluntary effort to the very frequent fabrication of
fiction, will, when left unoccupied, sometimes form
such combinations spontaneously.
IV. The mental process regulating our physical
action is very often exercised spontaneously. How
many motions of the hands, or feet, or entire body
do we not daily perform from mere habit, without
volition. How often does the musician find himself engaged in the spontaneous act of singing, and
the ambitious orator, in practising emphatic and pectliar pronunciation.  How  often do some  men
spontaneouisly fumble their watch-key, or play with
their penknife, without being aware of the fact. In
short, all those actions of the body, which are said
to be performed from mere habit, are spontaneous
operations. Men sometimes, and with truth, assign it as an excuse for particular actions, that they
282 
SPONTANEOUS INTELLECTUAL INTERCOURSE. 283
did them without thinking, did them unintentionally; doubtless some of these acts are spontaneous.
Sometimes, however, physical action is performed
in a manner which does not properly fall within the
division either of spontaneous or voluntary action,
but is properly attributed to instinct.
V. The process of intellectual intercourse is sometimes carried on spontaneously, in a revery; as is
evident from our making articulate sounds in the
same spontaneous manner to express our ideas.
How often do those who are in the habit of talking
much, such as children and some talkative superannuated persons, talk not only without a volition, but
even contrary to a resolution not to do so. 
A PRAGMATIC VIEW
OF THE
OPERATIONS OF THE WAKING MIND;
FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXEMPLIFYING THE PRECEDING
PRINCIPLES.
I. WHEN a superabundance of animal and mental vigour has been accumulated during sleep, we
make a transition from the sleeping to the active,
conscious, waking state. This transition is, in general, independent of our wishes, and seems to be
the result of the stimulating or exciting influence
of the principle of animal vigour, accumulated during sleep. In some cases the act of awaking is
produced by the uneasiness resulting from the
accumulation of some of the products of the animal economy, such as a painful stricture on the
bladder in persons advanced in years, and some
other cases which might be cited; but these we
should regard as mere exceptions to the general
rule. Persons labouring under such difficulties,
awake before the time in which the system would
spontaneously return to the condition of cerebral
preponderance or waking action. And if the ac
cumulated vigour is not yet sufficient to produce
this effect by itself, the auxiliary stimulus of the
light of returning day will aid in exciting us to a 
OPERATIONS OF -THE WAKING MINI)D.
waking state. This is demonstrated by the fact,
that all persons can sleep longer and more soundly
in a dark, than in a light room. Thus the adorable
Author of our being admonishes us, that night is
the proper time for sleep, and that the artificial
perversions of day and night, which are met with
in some of the more fashionable ranks of society,
are not only contrary to the constitution of our nature, but also detrimental to our health.
II. The moment we make the transition from the
sleeping to the waking state, the mind begins to
act, and the body, particularly the muscles and organs of sense, become subservient to the mind.
The first action of the waking mind seems generally to be spontaneous; in most cases it consists in
the spontaneous inspection of the objects surrounding our bed. Sometimes this spontaneous inspection gives rise to voluntary action, such as the reflectioni, i. e., the voluntary retrospection, of some
entities related to those spontaneously seen by us
and recalled by them. Thus, from the light perceived in the room, the mind of pious habits will
revert to the great Father of lights from whom it
comes, and to the value of that spiritual light, which
constitutes the Christian's greatest and most constant source of happiness on earth and expected
bliss in heaven. The worldly-minded, from the
inspection of the same light, will be led to reflect
on some profitable business or pursuit which this
light enables themn to prosecute. In this manner
more or less time is spent until the next prominent
active operation is engaged in, viz.,
285 
MENTAL PHILOSOPIIY.
III. The voluntary actions of physical agency,
such as rising, dressing, washing, &c. If we inquire in what manner these voluntary actions take
place, we trace them to the constitutional itnclination to obey the fitness of things actively prompting us to perform what is right, fit, suitable, profitable, or agreeable to the Divine will. We have a
knowledge that it is right or fit to rise in the morning, and, invited by the joint influence of these
several considerations, we voluntarily determine to
perform the active operation. HIere, then, we distinguish the following several things:
1. Our constitutional vigour compels us to act
either spontaneously or voluntarily, i. e., it keeps
the mind always engaged in some active process
during waking hours.
2. The constitutional inclinations of the soul incline us to the end, viz., obedience to the fitness,
or propriety, or constitution of things, or pursuit of
pleasure.
3. Our knowledge of the manner in which that
end will be accomplished, determines the means or
individual acts to be performed. Inasmuch as duty,
fitness, profit, love of pleasure, often all dictate the
performance of the same action, persons of different character will frequently do the same act from
different motives. This is a very important fact,
and shows that the moral worth of actions must be
judged by the view or motive from which they
were performed. Those who are in the habit of
being influenced by the love of gain, i. e., of self,
and personal advantage, will rise early, because
286 
OPERATIONS OF THE WAKING MIND.
they know early rising to be a means of enabling
them to transact more business, and accumulate
wealth.
4. The same view seems to be exemplified in the
daily duties of men. The Christian is prompted,
by an habitual regard to the first constitutional inclination, to obey the moral fitness or obligation, i.e.,
to obey the Divine will. He knows that the act
of offering up his morning and evening sacrifice to
the Author and Preserver of his life, is a means or
instance of obedience to his will, and thus performs
it with benefit and delight. With the same motive
he pursues his daily business, because he regards it
as a means of supporting his family and of glorifying his God. The man of the world engages in
the same various occupations of the day from different motives, some more and others less honourable in their nature.
Thus, throughout the day, various active operations are voluntarily engaged in and pursued. The
intervals between these voluntary operations are
filled up with spontaneous active processes, the nature of which, as has been already explained, will
be influenced by the prevailing habits of voluntary
engagement of each individual.   Thus,  between
the voluntary and spontaneous processes, between
labours and intermissions of labour, the day is passed. To the several customary meals the individual
is invited, partly by the recurrence of stated times,
partly by the solicitations of his periodical appetites,
and partly by other circumstances.
The close of the engagements of the day and
287 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
evening, ordinarily finds every individual somewhat
languid, and finally a feeling of exhaustion or drowsiness ensues, and sooner or later the cerebral gives
way to the preponderance of the ganglionic action,
and he relapses into the state of sleep in which the
vigour of his system, if he be in health, is again recruited, and he prepared to pass through the same
routine of another day.
288 
OF DREAMS.
BEFORE closing the discussions of this volume, it
may not be improper to add a few words on the
subject of another species of spontaneous mental
operations, which, though properly belonging to the
diseased action of the soul, is of such frequent occurrence, and oftentimes attended by so slight a
derangement of the bodily functions, that it is popularly, though erroneously, regarded as a healthy
state of mental action.
The existence of mankind in this life, is divided
by a clear and definite line into two very different
states; that of dormancy, and the waking state.
Between these two conditions, the life of man and
of every other animate being is spent. It is our
waking action that properly belongs to us as moral
beings, and constitutes the appropriate agency of
man in life. Indeed, it seems to tbe the design of
the Author of our nature, that sleep should be, as
in healthy subjects it actually is, an entire cessation
from all conscious mental action. Habitual, deep
sleep is a characteristic of sound general health;
and those who enjoy the highest degree of it are
not conscious of dreaming at all.  It, however, not
unfrequently happens, that disease affects our bodily
functions, and disturbs the exact relation which ordinarily subsists between them and the soul, thus
B B 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
rendering less distinct the line of separation between our sleeping and our waking hours.
Sleep being properly a physical phenomenon,
belonging in common to man, to irrational animals:
and, in a subordinate sense also, to the vegetable
kingdom, its particular discussion does not fall witlhin the design of our work. In animals it is a most
important and salutary restorative process of nature.
It is a fact of daily observation, that the performance of the various mental and bodily operations,
during our waking hours, exhausts the animal vigour of the system, and that this exhaustion in a
healthy subject naturally predisposes to sleep, and
results in it. Equally well established is the position, that the healthy subject awakes with the returning light of the morning, refreshed by sleep,
and conscious of the feelings of renovated life and
vigour, but without any recollection of having been
disturbed by dreamts. Yet it may, perhaps, be possible to excite dreams in a healthy subject, by designedly acting on his bodily senses during his sleep,
and the same effect may with equal probability be
produced, when such impression is made accidentally.  But we suppose that no healthy person will
have any recollection of dreams, unless thus acted
oii from without.
As we recollect some dreams ourselves, and as
others have discovered from our talking, and walking, and other actions in sleep, that we did dream
when we had no recollection of it ourselves, the
probability is, that the soul is essentially active, that
active operations are always going on spontaneous
290 
NATURE OF DREAMS.
ly when we are asleep.  This is rendered the more
probable, because many of the dreams recollected
by is, occurred, while others who observed us saw
that our bodies were perfectly motionless, and supposed us to be enveloped in profound sleep. The
most perfect repose of the body, therefore, affords
no argument against the supposition of constant,
spontanleolus, mental processes.
Dreams may be regarded as those spontaneous
trains of mental operation, which occur, when sleep
has, in a great measure, suspended that self-control,
through reason and volition, which we possess, and
ordinarily exercise when awake.  The term dream
has often been confined to those trains of thought,
of which we retain some recollection in our waking
state. But it is also applied to the cases observed
by others, though not recollected by ourselves, and
is in its nature equally applicable to all other instances of mental action in sleep.
The correctness of this view of dreams is strongly corroborated by the fact, that we often have no
recollection of them until some time after, when they
are recalled to our memory by some related thought
or occurrence, which would, on the principles of
association, have recalled the same train, if it had
first occurred when we were awake.
In dreams the exercise of reason and volition is
not entirely suspended; although it is probably
more in a defect of the exercise of these powers
than in anything else, that dreams differ from our
waking reveries or unrestricted spontaneous mental
trains. We can and do sustain conversations ei
291 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
ther mentally or orally; we enact scenes, and per.
fortn various achievements; in short, all the different powers of the mind appear sometimes to be
exerted in dreams, though with various degrees of
imperfection.  The farmer has sometimes engaged
in threshing his grain, the lawyer has prepared his
argument, and the preacher has imagined himself
in the great assembly, and proclaimed to listless
walls the truths of his holy religion.  Such cases
of somniloquism-and somnambulism are within the
knowledge of all. Other instances of still more
singular and extraordinary morbid action of the
mind are on record; but, as they do not properly
fall within the limits of our science, we pass them
in silence. From the map of the mind in its healthy
state, which we have endeavoured to present, we
perceive evidence enough that we are " wonderfully and fearfuilly," and, at the same time, benevolently " made;" and that we " should praise the
Lord for his goodness and his wonderful works to
the children of men."
It is an interesting peculiarity of dreams, that
they often disregard the exact relations of time and
space.  Though the scenes are passed through with
the utmost rapidity of waking thought, we sometimes suppose them all to have been real, and imagine that months, and sometimes years, have trans.
pired in their occurrence. This singular circumstance may be owing, among other things, to two
causes; to the fact, that in sleep we hold no cominunion with the visible world through the senses,
by which, especially through the succession of night
292 
CONNEXION OF DREAMS WITH WAKING THOUGHTS. 293
and day, and the aid of memory, we have learned
to measure time, even in its minor fractions, and
also the fact, that the exercise of judgment is chiefly
suspended, by which, in our waking state, we can
distinguish between fact and fiction.
From this view of the nature of dreams it follows, that however fantastic and unnatural they
may sometimes be, yet there will, on the whole, be
some analogy between the dreams of any individual, and the habitual traits and peculiarities of his
mind when awake. The poet, the mathematician,
the lawyer, the politician, the agriculturist, the mechanic, and the minister of religion, will all find in
their habitual dreams some special relation to their
waking pursuits.  Even the peculiarities of genius
may often be traced in dreams. The moral character, which is frequently concealed during waking
hours, will sometimes be betrayed in dreams; and
the Rev. Mr. Young, in his " Record of Providence," relates an instance of a murderer in England, whose dreams led to his arrest and conviction, seven years after he had committed the crime,
for which he was eventually executed.
It is also evident from the nature of dreams, that
there can be nothing ominous or prophetic in them.
We do not affirm that no dream was ever of this
character.  The Almighty doubtless can, and, as
the Volume of Inspiration teaches, has communicated his will to some individuals in the form of
dreams. But this was as certainly miraculous, as
if the same communication had been made in open
day by a voice from Heaven. What we maintain
B B2
0 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
is, that dreams have nothing ominous or prophetic
in their  own nature.  As they are spontaneous processes of the mind, they depend for their character,
in some measure, on the voluntary waking habits,
from which they result. As the peculiarities of
these spontaneous processes arise from the suspension of the exercise of judgment and reason in
sleep, they must evidently be entitled to less confidence than our waking thoughts. And the adventitious influences on the senses, which tend still farther to modify them, cannot fail to divest them of
all claim to confidence.   Such are our natural
dreams. The fact, that one dream in a million has
some resemblance to an event that succeeds, only
proves that in these cases men may form somewhat
correct anticipations of coming events when awake,
and that the same conjecture may recur to them in
their sleep, and constitute the burden of their prophetic dreams!
49
294 
RECAPITULATION.
CHAPTER III.
ItECAPITULATION) FOR THE PURPOSE OF REVIEWS.
INTRODUCTION.  Methodology of Mental Philosophy.  Difference between Mathematical and Mental Science, p. 13-20.
Mental Philosophy is that science which discusses
the properties and operations of the human soul, p.
21. Various names have been attached to this science, such as Metaphysics, Anthropology, Psychology, p. 2t, 22.
The proper materials of this science doubtless
are, not the supposed faculties, of which we know
nothing directly, but the known phenomena of the
mind, and all those other entities, or existences,
which exert an influence upon these phenomena, or
are concerned in their production, p. 22, 23.
In the classification of mental operations, various
systems have been adopted.  The first, and most
generally received in the English philosophical
world, is that into Nine Faculties of the Mind: viz.,
Perception, Consciousness, Conception, Judgment,
Memory, Reasoning, Conscience, Feeling, and Volition, p. 23, 24.
Dr.' Reid, adopting in the main this classification, separates these'faculties or powers into two
general classes, viz., Intellectual Powers and Active
PozAers.
295 
MENT'AL PHILOSOPHY.
Mr. Stewart adds to these a third general class,
viz., Social Powers.
Dr. Brown's celebrated division is into two classes: External and Internal A4ffections or States of the
Mind, p. 25, 26.
The German division into three faculties, Sensibilities, Understanding, and Will. Professor Upham's view, p. 26.
Unable, after mature deliberation, to adopt either
of these divisions, we propose another, founded, not
upon the unknown and supposed faculties or essence of the mind, but upon those mental phenomena which are known to us. It is a threefold division, into Cognitive Ideas, Sentient Ideas, and Active Operations, p. 27.
Difference between this and the German system.
(a.) In its principle. (b.) In its lines of division.
(c.) In the contents of the different parts, p. 29.
On the extent of the several parts of this division, p. 30.
I. The Cognitive class embraces Perceptions,
Acts of Consciousness, Conceptions, Judgments,
Recollections, Results of Reasoning, and the Dictates or Decisions of Conscience, p. 31.
II. The Sentient class embraces Sensations, Emotions, Affections, and Passions, p. 34.
III. The Active class embraces Volitions, Processes of Reasoning, the Act of Memorizing, the Intellectual Act of communicating our thoughts to
others, and some other processes, p. 36.
296 
RECAPITULATION.
PART I.
COGNITIVE IDEAS.
Cognitive Ideas are acquired by the mind through
the mrnedium of certain parts of the body called organs of sense, when these organs are brought into
a particular relation to external objects, and from
the operations and powers of the mind of which we
are conscious. In this acquisition we distinguish
three things, p. 3S, 39.
First. The external entity, or object of knowledge;
Secondly. The knowledge itself; and,
Thirdly. The process by which the knowledge
is obtained.
CHAPTER I.
OF OBJECTIVE ENTITIES AS SUBJECTS OF OUR KNOWL
EDGE, p. 39.
SECTION I.
Of the different classes of Entities, p. 40.
We constitutionally judge external entities to be
possessed of real objectivity, i. e., to have an actual existence out of our mninds. An entity is anything whatever, of which we can have an idem, p. 39.
The reality of the material universe, in general,
is proved by the testimony of our senses, which we
constitutionally judge to be true.
No reasoning is necessary on this point; nor could
it make the testimony of our senses more certain.
297 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
The universe, as known to us, consists of nothing
else than various combinations of properties.
Each of these combinations, as found in nature,
is individual, and in some respects different from
all others.
There are, nevertheless, gradations of similarity
in these properties, which form a just basis for
classification.
On such classification human language is framed,
having words not for each individual substantive
object, but (a) for the different properties, (b) for the
relations subsisting between them, and (c) for the
different classes of substantive objects, more or less
generic, as stone, tree, quadrupeds, &c.
All objects known to us in the universe are
either substantive objects, that is, objects to which
several coexisting properties appertain, or they are
individual properties, or relations between them.
All substantive objects may be referred to the following classes:
Solids, Liquids, Gases, the Ethereal or Incoercible Fluids, such as Light, Caloric, Electric Fluid,
and the Magnetic Principle; Mind, Spirit, Glorified Bodies, Deity;  together with Time, Space,
and Number.
Therelation of the properties of mind to mind
itself is not different from that of the properties of
other objects to their substratum, the objects themselves.   Supposed  plastic power rejected.   Our
knowledge of the Divine Being, how acquired, its
nature.
The peculiarities of Time, Space, and Number:
298 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
as three universal, fundamental entities created by
God, of entirely peculiar properties, in which, or in
the formns of which, all other created entities exist,
p. 55.
No one denies that we have ideas relating to all
these classes of entities.
Not all are agreed as to the question whether
they are ideas of reality, many supposing them to
be niere ideas of the mind, without anything in nature corresponding to them, or causing them.
SECTION II.
Division of these Classes, p. 56.
All these classes of entities may be referred to
two generic kinds, viz., Absolute and Concrete Entities.
Absolute are those of which we can conceive
without reference to the concrete class. They are
Space, Time, and Number.
Concrete are those of which we cannot conceive
except as existing in the absolute class, or being related to it. They are all the others except Space,
Time, and Number.
SECTION III.
Subdivision of Individual Entities, p. 57.
Entities may be subdivided into Substantive, Ad.
jective, and Composite.
A Substantive Entity is that to which any number of coexisting properties appertains.
An Adjective Entity is any one property of a substantive entity,
299 
RECAPITULATION.
A Composite Entity consists of two or more adjective entities, viewed in regard to some relation
existing between them.
SECTION IV.
Relations of Entities.
1. Of Absolute Entities, p. 61.
(a.) Equality, diversity, antecedence, subsequence, &c., of Time.
(b.) Equality, difference, progression or ratio,
plurality, minority, &c., of Number.
(c.) Equality, diversity, contiguity, remoteness,
superiority, and inferiority of Space.
2. Of Concrete Entities to each other.
(a.) Similarity and diversity.
(b.) Contiguity or remoteness, as to space, time,
and number.
(c.) Fitness, physical, intellectual, and moral.
(d.) Analogy.
(e.) Causation or agency. (a.) Mechanical, either uniform or contingent; (b.) Instinctive; and
(c.) Moral.
3. Between Absolute and Concrete Entities.
These, (a.) in regard to number, are Addition,
Multiplication, Subtraction, and Division; which
are active relations of agency performed by the concrete entity man on our ideas of the absolute entity
number. (b.) Space. (c.) Time.
These Relations are, (a.) Transitive or Intransi
tive.
(b.) Absolute or Hypothetical.
(c.) Retrospective, Present, or Prospective.
300 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
CHAPTER II.
OF OUR COGNITIVE IDEAS, OR MENTAL REPRESENTA               TIVES OF ENTITIES.
SECTION I., p. 69.
Of the exact Nature of those of our Ideas which are
Knowledge.
They belong to the class of entities termed Mind,
but are distinct from the mind, and are, with cer.
tain qualifications, representatives of things actually existing.
SECTION II.
Of the Criteria by which the Cognitive Class of Ideas is
distinguished, p. 70.
I. The Cognitive Ideas have for their objects entities existing out of the mind, or some mental operation of our own or other minds.
II. The Cognitive Ideas are dependant for their
character on the entities themselves.
III. The Cognitive Ideas presuppose the previous existence of the entities, from which they are
derived.
SECTION III.
On the JNature and Sources of Error in our Cognitive
Ideas, p. 74.
In order to obtain a correct view of this extremely
important subject, it is necessary first to make some
remarks upon the nature and divisions of truth.
All truths may be divided into three classes; viz.,
I. Real or Objective Trutibs; that is, objective
entities existing in nratlre.
Cc
301 
RECAPITULATION.
II. Idealistic or Subjective Truths; i. e., correct
mental representatives of objective Entities.
View of thile ancient Realists and Nominalists, and
of modern German Realism and Idealism; Transcendental Idealism of Kant.
III. Nominal Truths; i. e., correct mental representatives expressed by proper words.
1. Sources of Involuntary Error, p. 80.
I. Incorrect original mental representatives of entities.. These may arise,
(a.) From a hasty, superficial inspection of entities.
(b.) From forgetfulness of the exact mental representative originally obtained, and a consequent
misstatement of it.
(c.) From listening to one part of a statement,
and neglecting to listen to the whole.
II. Incorrect selection of sounds and written words,
to express to others the true mental representative
which we really have.
III. The real imperjfection of language, which
does not furnish words to express our ideas exactly
on all subjects.
IV. Mistakes in judging of the motives of others.
V. Unintentional illogical reasoning.
VI. Misapprehension of a correct sentence, through
ignorance of language.
2. Sources of Voluntary Error, p. 82.
I. Intentional misstatement of entities, simple or
composite.
II. Indulgence in the habit of mere high colourting,
without directly stating a falsehood.
302 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
III. Errors resulting from voluntary ignorance.
IV. The indulgence of prejudice in regard to per.
sons or things.
V. The indulgence of passion.
SECTION IV.
Division of our Cognitive Ideas, p. 84.
They may be divided in two ways:
First, into Individual and Relative; and,
Secondly, into Retrospective, Present, and Pro
spective.
I. Individual Knowledge.  To this class belongs
our knowledge of every individual substance in nature, and also of every individual property belonging to any entity.
II. Relative Knowledge.   To this class belongs
our knowledge of composite entities; the greater
part of our conceptions; geometrical axioms; the
relations of numbers; metaphysical axioms; moral
abstract propositions; and belief, immediate and
acquired.
I. Retrospective Knowledge, p. 89. This is our
knowledge of all our former cognitive, sentient, and
active ideas, and is usually termed memory.
It may be divided into spontaneous and voluntary.
The extent of our spontaneous retrospective
knowledge depends on,
(a.) The natural aptitude of the mind for this exercise; i. e., the natural retentiveness of memory.
(b.) The different degrees of logical accuracy with
which our knowledge is arranged on paper, or in
the mind, according to the different relations themselves which subsist between the entities.
303 
RECAPITULATION.
(c.) The frequency with which the knowledge to
be retained was reviewed by the mind, and the interest which was felt in it.
Our retrospective knowledge will be increased by
the following methods:
(a.) By thinking frequently of the ideas intended
to be recollected.
(b.) By reviewing those ideas together which we
wish to recollect together, and in the very same order in which we wish to remember them.
(c.) By connecting them, in the act of memorizing, with some idea which we will be sure to recollect at the intended time.
(d.) By the habit of studying subjects rather than
books.
(e.) By interesting our feelings in the subject.
Cases of extraordinary memory in persons in
health, Kepler, Des Mesmes, Pascal, Cyrus, The.
mistocles.
There is reason to believe that the soul of every
man naturally possesses a degree of mnemonic power, equal or greater than was exhibited by these
distinguished men; but this power is restrained by
our bodily organs. Yet in eternity it will be released from the shackles of these organs, and will
develop its expanded powers.
Remarkable  cases in proof.   A  man  in  St.
Thomas hospital.
Case cited by Dr. Pritchard; another remarkable
case cited by Coleridge:
Probable inference, that thought is indestructible,
304 
RECAPITULATION.
and will be a prominent ingredient inl the future
retribution of the righteous and wicked.
Mnemonics; different systems.
The inventor of the earliest system, Simnonides. Cicero's account of him. Account of the
system.
The greater part of modern systems are based on
the same principle.
Numerical mnemonics, Feinagle's system and
table.
Dr. Niemeyer's directions to teachers and pupils
for the improvement of mnemory.
Case of Rev. Mr. Uhlhorn, as an example of a
well-trained memory.
I1. Present Knowledge, p. 99.
III. Prospective Knowledge, p. 100.  This is all
our knowledge of the probable future existence of
entities and their relations.
(a.) The Subject of our prospective knowledge is
always a composite entity; viz., the relation between
a present entity and a siUpposed fiture entity.
(b.) The Bases of prospective knowledge are
Analogy, Causation, and Revelation.
CHAPTER III.
OF THE ORGANIC PROCESS BY WHICH WE OBTAIN OUR
IDEAS, p. 105.
The influence of entities upon the mind is exerted either throughi) the medium of every part of the
C c2
305 
RECAPITULATION.
body, such as shape, &c.; or through particular
parts of the body, called organs of sense.  In all
cases, actual contact of some kind is necessary.
Nervous connexion between the different organs
and the brain. Phrenology, its results, when once
fully settled, will not conflict with a correct system
of mental philosophy.
The Eye: description of its constituent parts, the
sclerotica, choroid, cornea, optic nerve, pupil, &c.
The eye affords us knowledge of colour, local direction, and expansion. Light is the medium, or,
rather, the object of vision. The different colours.
Distance not an original object of vision, but acquired.
Proof that extension is an original object of vision.
Solid shape is not originally perceived by sight,
though peripheral shape is.
Apparent  and relative, but not actual size, is
taught by the eye.  The distinctness of objects affords some indirect criterion of their distance. The
image formed on the retinia of the eye, inverted.
The objects of our perceptions are also excitants
of feeling.
Variety and different degrees of feelings excited
by the works of nature.
Attention necessary to the recollection of our
perceptions.
The connexion between the image on the retina
and the perception of the mind unknown.
The Ear: description of its parts, the external
ear, the auditory passage, the tympanum, the auditory nerve, &e.
s06 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
The atmosphere is the principal medium of sound;
other elastic bodies. Sound is an idea of the mind,
caused by the vibrations or pulsations of the agita
te(l air upon the tympanum of the ear.
The various feelings attending our perceptions of
sounds.
Sound the exclusive original result of our auditory organs; yet by practice we learn also to judge
of local direction anrid distance. Of echoes. Improvement of the sense of hearing in the blind.
Organ of touch is the whole body, especially the
hands. By this organ we acquire a knowledge of
the solidity or fluidity of bodies, their shape, extension, smoothness or roughness, heat or cold; together
with the feelings accompanying these perceptions.
Feeling of exhaustion from violent effort does
not belong to the sense of touch. The idea of externity is the result of touch.   Improvement of this
sense, especially in the blind. Examples, Sanderson, &c. Method of printing for the blind.
The organ of Taste: description of its parts.
Benevolent location of this organ. Different flavours; cognitive and sentient results of this sense.
Organ of Smell: description of it. Different
odours-emitted by all objects that can be smelled.
Knowledge of odour alone is the original cognitive
result of smell; but by experience we learn to recognise different objects by their odour. Improvement of this sense. Quotation from Dr. Reid.
The different theories on the mode of the reciprocal influence of the body and the soul upon each
other in general.
307 
RECAPITULATION.
The theory of Occasionalism. Theory of preestablished harmony by Leibnitz.
Theories to account for a part of this influence,
viz., in sensation through the bodily organs. Des
Cartes's theory; Newton's view; Dr. Hartley's
theory of nervous vibrations.  The last-named theory is that of ideas, as something material, as films,
or images, or phantasms, emanating from outward
objects and passing through the medium of the organ of sense to the brain, and there perceived by
the mind. Malebranche's account of this theory.
This view charged on Mr. Locke by some writers,
and denied by others. Result: no theory can explain this subject. The facts we know, and must
admit-the mode we must refer to the great Au.
thor of our being.
PART II.
SENTIENT IDEAS, p. 146.
Feelings are those sentient states of the mind me.
diately or immediately excited by entities, simple
or composite.
Feelings are known by the following criteria:
I. They have no object beyond themselves.
II. Our feelings are not so absolutely dependant
for their character on entities without us, as our
knowledge is.
III. Feelings are always preceded by a cognition of the entity which mediately or immediately
produces them, p. 147.
308 
RECAPITULATION.
CHAPTER I.
CLASSIFICATION OF OUR FEELINGS, p. 148.
All Feelings are either,
I. Individual; viz., those which have reference
exclusively to ourselves; or,
II. Relative; viz., those which have a relation to
some other sentient being, or other object.
1. Sensations; feelings accompanying the
perceptions of sight, touch, smell. &c.
e   2  Some  Emotions: (a.) Intellectual emo a  tions, of the sublime, beautiful. (b.) Moral
emotions, connected with conscience.
v    3. Some  of the Affections: (a.) Pleasant.
(b.) Unpleasant.
4. Feeling attending the bodily Appetites.
Benevolent feelings: love, friendship, grati      tude, veneration, &c.
c       alevolent feelings: hatred, malice,anger.
'd..Malevoln elns ard aie anger.
,    Sympathetic feelings: condolence, pity, &c.
Antipathetic feelings: envy, grudging, and
what the Germans term Schadenfreude.
Remarks on the Analysis of Feelings.
CLASS I.
INDIVIDUAL FEELINGS.
1. Of Sensations. Twofold use of the term, both
cognitive and sentient.  The latter use preferred,
and perception for the cognitive result.
2. Emotions are those transient excitements of
feeling which are consequent on mental operations,
309 
IiMENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
direct or reflective, other than perceptions through
the organs of taste, smell, or touch.  Emotions succeed cognitions or active operations; and some.
times are succeeded by desires or volition.
(a.) Intellectual emotions-of the sulbliiie, its nature, objective and subjective; beautiful; ludicrous;
wit; burlesque; mock-heroic-surprise, wonder, astonishment, amazement.
(b.) Moral emotions are those individual feelings
of the mind which are consequent on the cognition
of moral truth, conduct, or character.  Moral emotions are the sentient part of acts of conscience.
It is consequent on the cognitive or judicial ingredient of conscience, and precedes the impulsive.
They are either pleasant or painful, and, in popular language, termned feelings of approval or disapproval, though, strictly speaking, the approval or
disapproval is judicial and cognitive.
Our moral emotions, in reference to particular
acts, change if our judgment concerning them does.
3. The Affections. By affections we mean those
habits, or.habitual states of feeling, which are more
durable than sensations or emotions.
They are either pleasant, as joy, cheerfulness,
contentment; or painful, as penitence, discontent,
sadness, despair.
4. Feelings connected with our bodily appetites,
such as hunger and thirst.
CLASS II.
RELATIVE FEELINGS.
1. Benevolent feelings: those feelings which are
favourable to the object on which they terminate.
310 
RELATIVE FELLINXGS. 
Importance of these feelings to piety and social happiness.  Benevolence; love, parental, filial, conjugal; gratitude, friendship, respect, confidence, &c.
Love to.God, adoration.
2. Malevolent, or defensive feelings, are those
painful relative feelings which involve hostility, and
a disposition to injure the beings on which they terminate. These affections were, before the-fall, purely defensive and good: in our fallen state, often offensive and sinful.
3. Sympathetic feelings are those relative affections of the mind, which imply similarity or congeniality to the feelings of the being on which they
terminate. They are either pleasant or painful. We
sympathize most freely with those whose feelings
are similar to the prevailing state of our own minds
at the time. They are such as compassion, pity,
commiseration.
4. Antipathetic feelings are those relative feelings
which, though they have reference to some other
being, imply only opposition of feeling, but not intention of action, such as envy, jealousy, disgust,
grudging, fear, dread, horror, &c.
Feelings may also be divided into Sensuous, Intellectual, and Moral; and into Present, Retrospective, and Prospective.
CHAPTER II.
OF ENTITIES AS EXCITANTS OF FEELING, p. 178.
SECTION I.
All feeling, like knowledge, may be traced, me.
diately or immediately, to entities without the mind,
p. 178.
311 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
SECTION II.
Entities of every class possess some tendency,
though very different in degree, to excite feeling in
the mind, p. 180.
SECTION III.
The degrees in which different entities possess
this exciting power are very different, and can be
accurately learned only from experience; nor can
any organ originally afford us this information, except the one through which the feeling is produced,
p. 181.
I. The strongest influence is exerted by entities
when they are brought into contact with their appropriate organ.
II. The next strongest, when we have a prospective knowledge that we shall, at some future time,
probably be the subjects of their influence.
III. The next strongest, when they excite retrospective feeling.
IV. Sympathetic feeling is weaker than its corresponding direct feeling.
V. The least influence is exerted by them, when
we view merely their abstract tendency to produce
feeling.
SECTION IV.
Entities of the classes of solids and liquids excite more feeling, and exert more motive power
when near, than when far off, p. 183.
SECTION V.
The manner in which entities act in exciting feel
312 
RECAPITULATION.
ing, seems to be very similar to that observed in
the production of knowledge, p. 183.
SECTION VI.
In feeling, as in knowledge, two things are necessary; viz., 
I. The action of the entity on its appropriate organ; and,
II. The attention of the mind to that organ, p.
184.
CHAPTER III.
SUSCEPTIBILITY OF THE MIND FOR FEELINGs. AND LAWrS
OF FEELING.
First law. Sensation, no less than cognition, is an
attribute of the mind and not of the bod(ly, p. 185.
Second law. The original susceptibility of different minds for feeling is very different in degree.
Influence  of temperament:  phlegmatic, choleric
&c., temperament, p. 186.
Third law. Excepting this diversity, which results from the different temperaments, the relative
degree of susceptibility for the influence of different
entities is in all minds naturally the same, p. 187.
Fourth law. Feeling is, in a great measure, involuntary at the time, p. 188.
Fifth law. But we can add to or subtract from
the duration or intensity of the feeling, by confining
our attention to the exciting object, or directing it
to another, p. 188.
Sixth law. When any one feeling or purpose becomes dominant and habitual in the soul, all others
inconsistent with it are impaired, p. 188.
313
D T) 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
Seventh law. The two constitutional inclinations
of the soul exert an influence upon the tendency
of entities to excite feeling in the mind, p. 189.
Eighth law. Entities always exert a greater influence when first presented, on account of their
novelty, p. 190.
Ninth law. Feelings produced in the same person, by the same entity, at different times, may be
different, p. 190.
Tenth law. The susceptibility for feeling is increased by attentive practice, p. 191.
Eleventh law. Intense and long-continued feeling exhausts and fatigues the system, p. 192.
Twelfth law. Susceptibility for feeling declines
with age and with the decline of the constitution,
though that be premature, p. 192.
Thirteenth law. A negligent review of entities
diminishes their tendency to produce feeling, p. 192.
Fourteenth law. Time wears off retrospective
feeling, p. 192.
Fifteenth law.  Feeling is, in general, not instantly excited, as knowledge is, p. 194.
Sixteenth law. The feelings connected with the
gratification of our periodical appetites are peculiar, p. 194.
I. They are stronger in proportion to the length
of previous abstinence, unless that be extreme.
II. They are increased by the frequent attention
of the soul to the entities capable of gratifying those
appetites.
III. This feeling is diminished, and eventually
suspended, by gratification.
314 
RECAPITULATION.
IV. It is interrupted by the debility and increased by the vigour of the body.
(a.) From the preceding considerations, it follows that we are responsible in a great degree for
our individual feelings, as also for the habitual state
of our feelings or affections, p. 194.
(b.) That feelings are individual, and transient,
and continue no longer than the attention of the
mind is directed to the entity or to the cognitive
idea with which they are connected, p. 195.
(c.) By the state of our affections or feelings, is
meant the increased or diminished degree of habitual susceptibility for feelings of any particular kind,
produced by continued voluntary practice, and also
the increased or diminished tendency to the spontaneous recurrence of the ideas of the entities, which
produce the feelings in question, p. 195.
PART III.
ACTIVE OPERATIONS.
Active Operations constitute the most important
feature of our character as beings responsible to
God, p. 198.
The criteria by which they are known:
I. Knowledge and feeling are inward effects produced from without. Active operations are outward effects, or operations tending ad extra, produced from within.
II. Knowledge and feeling require the entities
exciting them to have a previous existence; but the
active operations contemplated by our volitions, are
fiuture.
315 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
III. The character of our active operations depends but little upon the entities upon which they
are exerted.
The materials on which our active operations are
performed, p. 201.
I. The external objective entities of the different
classes.
II. Past mental operations of every class.
III. The natural signs by which these represent.
atives are expressed.
CHAPTER I.
DIVISION AND DISCUSSION OF THE ACTIVE OPERATIONS
OF THE SOUL.
All active operations are alike as it respects mere
activity, )ut differ in regard to the end contemplated; in the operation performed; in the results of
the action; and in the objects on which they terminate, p. 202.
SECTION I. 
Of Inspection.
Inspection is that active operation in which the
attention of the soul is directed to some entity, simple or composite; prospective, present, or retrospective, with a view to acquire some knowledge
concerning it, p. 203.
The specific object of inspection, in present entities, may be,
I. To obtain more correct mental representatives
of the properties of entities, p. 205.
II. To give more vividness to our mental repre
sentatives of them.
316 
RECAPITULATION.
III. To ascertain their relations.
In retrospective entities, it may be,
I. To revive their representatives, p. 206.
II. To view their relations to each other.
Inspection embraces the voluntary operations of
Perception, Consciousness, Conception, Judgment,
Recoliection, Analytic Reasoning, and Conscience.
The Act of Memorizing explained.
Analytic reasoning explained.
In all our reasonings we proceed on the implication of certain laws of human belief, which are admitted and acted on by all men.
Fundamental Laws of Human Belief.
1. That the testimony of our senses, clearly ascertained, is true.
2. That the testimony of conscience can be relied on.
3. That memory, as far as it is distinct, may be
relied on.
4. The other operations of the mind, such as
reasoning and judgment, may be relied on, with a
certainty proportioned to the circumstances of the
case.
5. That all men will naturally speak the truth,
when they have no motive to practise deception.
6. That every act of consciousness presupposes
a conscious being, the soul.-Case of Rev. Dr.
Brown.
7. That every act of memory, or succession of
acts of consciousness, implies our personal identity.
Other truths universally implied in reasoning.
DD2
317 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
S. That the laws of nature and known properties
of entities will continue unchanged.
On the uniformity of these laws the enterprise
of tnan and the business of life in general depend.
9. That different kinds of truth possess different
kinds and degrees of evidence, producilng different
degrees of belief.
SECTION II.
drrangement, p. 217.
Arrangement is that active operation of the soul
by which we select some from among the mass, either of external entities themselves, or of our mental
representatives of them, and place them, as wholes
or units, in a particular order, with a view to a specifice purpose.
The purposes of this arrangement, and the principles upon which it may be made, are various:
I. We may arrange them according to any one
of the various relations of entities to each other;
sameness, diversity, &c.
II. We may arrange them according to any principle of genus, species, &c.
III. We may arrange them according to the probative relation of entities to a given proposition, or
to the human mind.
Here is included all syllogistic reasoning.
SECTION III.
M/odication.
Modification is that active operation of the soul
318 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
by which we take some from among our mental
representatives of real entities (rarely the objective
entities themselves), and bring them into such forms
or combinations as do not correspond to realities,
p. 225.
This operation differs from the preceding; because,
I. The operations of Inspection and Arrangement are performed as frequently on objective entities themselves as on our mental representatives
of them; whereas, that of Modification is convert.
sant chiefly about our mental representatives.
II. The former two operations take our mental
representatives of substantive entities as wholes or
units, and leave them sich throughout all the process of their influence; but Modification changes
themn from their natural state, and brings them into
formts and combinations which do not actually correspond to real entities.
Modification embraces,
I. The process of Abstraction or Generalization.
Among the results of this are, (a.) Geometrical
axioms; (b.) Metaphysical axioms; (c.) Mathematical truths; (d.) Moral general principles.
Objection to Kant's view of these truths, as
knowledge ad priori.
11. Fictitious combinations of ideas.
(a.) Fictitious simple entities: (b.) Fictitious
composite entities or relations, imagination, fancy,
wit. burlesque, painting, sculpture.
319 
RtECAPITULATON.
SECTION IV.
Mental dgency concerned in the production of Physical
Jiction.
This embraces all voluntary control over the entire muscular system, by which alone motion is produced in any part of the body, p. 233.
The mode of this influence, of the action of mind
on muscle, is inexplicable.
In all cases of voluntary physical action, we can
distinguish the following mental processes:
I. The volition to exert the bodily organ.
II. The attention of the soul to that organ.
III. The inspection of the material on which the
operation is to be performed.
IV. The active process of the mind conducting
and regulating the physical action.
SECTION V.
Intellectual Intercourse.
This process consists in exciting in others the
ideas which they themselves have already obtained
from those entities on which we wish them to think,
and exciting them in such order, and in such combinations, and with such adjective properties an
nexed, as we wish them to entertain, p. 235.
This process is carried on in different ways:
I. By speaking, or expressing our ideas by articulate sounds.
We do not, however, by speaking, excite in others identically the same ideas which we connect
with our words, but such ideas as they formerly at
320 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
tached to the words which we utter. Every idea
of a speaker is succeeded by the following operations
before it accomplishes its design, p. 240:
(a.) The idea of the speaker himself.
(b.) The recollection of the idea of the sound formerly associated with that idea by the speaker.
(c.) His volition to articulate a similar sound.
(d.) The articulating action of his organs on the
expiring breath, to produce a similar sound.
(e.) The hearer's idea of the sound produced by
the speaker's voice.
(f.) The hearer's recollection of the similar sound
which he himself had often made.
(g.) The recurrence of the idea which he formerly connected with the similar sound made by
himself.
The structure of the human articulating organs
is such, that all men naturally make certain elementary sounds; alphabetic sounds are, therefore,
substantially the same in all languages, p. 241.
II. By gestures and muscular action of the countenance, p. 242. Pantomime.
III. By written signs.
(a.) Alphabetical letters; (b.) Arithmetical figures and signs; (c.) Musical notes.
SECTION VL
Composition.
Composition is not a distinct active operation, but
is complex, consisting of voluntary inspection and
arrangement of ideas of entities, simple or compos.
321 
RECAPITULATION.
ite, together with the act of expressing the ideas
thus arranged, by signs, on paper, p. 243.
What are called new or original ideas are merely old relations, for the first time viewed by the
mind.
SECTION VII.
.Attention, p. 245.
Attention is likewise not a distinct operation; because,
I. We cannot conceive of it as acting by itself,
but only in connexion with some other operation
of the mind.
II. It does not give us any results of its action,
distinct from those of the active operation with which
it is combined.
III. It is common to all the active operations.
IV. It seems only to be a property of the active
operation, conducted at the time.
Attention is the energy of the soul exerted on some
active operation.
The causes which excite attention appear, in
general, to be these:
I. A volition to bestow attention on the performance of some active operation.
II. The present interest or pleasure felt in the op
eration itself.
III. Some impression from without made through
the bodily organs.
322 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
CHAPTER II.
THE MODE OF OCCURRENCE OF THE FIVE ACTIVE OP                    ERATIONS.
Active Operations are either Voluntary or Spontaneous, p. 248.
SECTION I.
Of the Voluntary Occurrence of the dctive Operation.
The active processes of the soul are voluntary,
when undertaken from deliberate choice, p. 249.
Do we perform acts of choice?
Yes; the certainty of our performing such acts
rests upon the same basis with the certainty of our
other mental operations, such as knowledge and
feeling.
What is the nature of acts of choice?
I. All men agree that acts of choice differ from
acts of necessity.
II. It is only for such actions that we accuse or
excuse ourselves.
III. All men agree that only for their own acts
of choice, and the consequences of them, can they
really and justly be held responsible, either by God
or man.
IV. Every reflecting man, who has attained mature development of mind, is conscious of the fact
that he can and ought to regulate the voluntary actions of his life according to certain fixed rules and
principles, p. 250.
But the soul is not left entirely free from bias in
the performance of these acts of choice. There
323 
RECAPITULATION.
are two constitutional inclinations by which it is
materially influenced.
I. The inclination to Action in accordance with
the fitness of things, moral, intellectual, and physical.
This inclines us naturally to speak the truth, and to
do whatever is right. Crimes are the only exception to the observance of this constitutional inclination.  This sense of obligation is universal.  It embraces in it the impulsive part of
The Operations of Conscience.
The operations of conscience are complex, including a judicial, a sentient, and an impulsive ingredient.
Conscience, in its impulsive feature, is an original
faculty. Each of its features is treated of in its appropriate part of this work.
The structure of all languages implies the existence and operations of conscience.
All men judge the authority of conscience to be
supreme.
Conscience essential to our character as moral
agents.
The influence of this constitutional inclination,
like that of every other power of the soul, can be
increased by obedience to its dictates and diminished by disobedience.
II. The inclination to Well-being, or the enjoyment of pleasure, present and ultimate, and the
avoiding  of pain.   This  embraces,  1. Love of
Life: this is universal, and of great utility in its
effects.  On  this principle is based the right of
324 
RECAPITULATION.
self-defence when unjustly assailed by personal vi
olence.
The case the same in principle, whether the assailant be a serpent or ravenous beast, or a robber
2. Love of esteem or power. Proper use of this
princ.iple. Its abuse.
3. Love of property or possession Its use and
abuse-avarice.
4. Love of novelty-curiosity.
5. Sensuality. 6. Love of Science. 7. Social
Inclination, &c.
These inclinations are not faculties, nor mental
operations, nor habits, but natural characteristics
of the soul.
The first of these inclinations is evidently the
more noble; but in the natural state of man the
second preponderates.
These inclinations do not act irresistibly. The
soul is secondly influenced by
f 1. Our own bodies, acting upon us
Exrnal through the bodily appetites.
[ 264.
But these entities act not with irresistible force,
else men would be compelled always to act virtuously, since God has made the inducements to
virtue stronger than those to vice. Men can and
do resist these motives.
Desires-their nature.
The native activity of the soul prompts us to ac
t-ion.
E,
325 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
The constitutional inclinations of the soul deter.
mine the general character of the ends, or results,
at which we aim.
Our knowledge presents to us the various entities
with their different and relative properties, by active operations upon which the proposed end may be
attained in various ways and in different degrees.
The different entities exert a motive power proportional to their relative adaptation to accomplish
the end proposed; and, finally, in view of all these
circumstances, the soul freely determines in its
choice of the different means of attaining the desired end. Our definition therefore is,
The Will is that power of the soul by which it
FREELY DETERMINES, in view of motives, either now
or hereafter, absolutely or conditionally, to perform
or not to perform some one or more of the five active
operations, p. 270.
SECTION II.
Of the Spontaneous Occurrence of the dJctive Opera                   tions, p. 273.
There are two marks of difference between Voluntary and Spontaneous active operations.
I. The former are the result of volition in their
commencement: the latter, not.
II. The former are carried on with much more
attention and energy than the latter.
We are responsible to God for all our spontaneous actions.
I. Spontaneous Inspection, p. 278.
In the spontaneous inspection of entities or their
326 
RECAPITULATION.
mental representatives, the mind is found to proceed in several uniform ways:
1. It seems to follow the relations of the entities
which are the subjects of its inspection; especially
sameness, contrariety, contiguity, and causation.
2. It has a tendency to pursue the train of those
entities, which have most frequently been the subjects of its voluntary attention.
3. It more readily recurs to those objects which
have lately been the subjects of its attention.
4. It pursues more frequently those entities which
excite the most pleasant feelings, and gratify the
second constitutional inclination.
5. It is diverted from its spontaneous operations
by the immediate action of some entities through
the bodily organs.
6. It is interrupted by volition.
II. Spontaneous Arrangement, p. 281.
This operation is sometimes carried on spontane.
ously. Every figure of comparison consists of
spontaneous arrangements according to the relation
of similarity expressed in words.
III. Spontaneous Modification, p. 282.
This occurs very seldom, especially in persons
of veracity.
IV. Mental Process regulating our Physical Action, p. 282.
This is very often exercised spontaneously. All
habits of bodily action are spontaneous operations
of this kind.  But some actions apparently sponta.
neous are instinctive.
V. The Process of Intellectual Intercourse, p.
327 
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
283, is sometimes carried on spontaneously in a
revery; as is evident from our making articulate
sounds, in the same spontaneous manner, to express
our ideas.
PRAGMATIC VIEW, &c.
I. When a superabundance of animal and men
tal vigour has been accumulated during sleep, we
make a transition from the sleeping to the active,
conscious, waking state.
II. The moment we make the transition from the
sleeping to the waking state, the mind begins to
act, and the body, particularly the muscles and organs of sense, becomes subservient to the mind.
Its first action is generally spontaneous, but this
soon gives way to,
III. The voluntary actions of physical agency;
which are performed in accordance with the prin.
ciples laid down in part iii., chap., ii., sect. i.
IV Other voluntary operations of various kinds
are undertaken; and the interval between them
filled up by such as are spontaneous.
DREAMS.
Dreams are those spontaneous trains of mental
operation which  occur when sleep has in a great
328 
RECAPITULATION.
measure suspended that self-control through reason
and volition, which we possess, and ordinarily exercise, when awake.
Dreams can have nothing ominous or prophetic
in them, unless they are miraculous.
THE END.
329  
SCHMUCKER'S MENTAL PHILOSOPHY,
DESIGNED FOR ACADEMIES AND COLLEGES.
PUBLISHED BY HARPER & BROTHERS.
From the American Biblical Repository,  the sources of error, the careful study
in a review of the work by Re?,. Dr.  of which cannot but be of great use
KRAUTO, President of Peunsytvatia  to every one who would have clear
Colhge.                             -mental  representatives  of external
T he Psychology of Dr. Schmucker  things or an accurate acquaintance
comes betore us with peculiar preteni-  with truth.  We think the subject of
sionrs, and raises, ill consequence of  feeling has been placed in a clear and
them, peculiar expectations. It propo   comprehensive light.  IThe pages on
ses to be the product, riot of the study  this subject cannot be read without
of the patriarchs of the science, but  the conviction that the author was
of original examination of the mind   not moving in the beaten track; that
or, to express it in the wonted phra-  he has studied carefully the evolution
seology of the craft, the exercise of  of feeling, and has exhibited it in such
consciousnessin regard tothe author's  a manner as to render his  labours
mental operations.'I he propriety and  wot thy of high praise.  A slight com the value of this method all the initi- parison of the systems of metaphy ated will concede.  Its difficulty has  sicians will render it evident that a
deterred many from undertaking  it,  reforming hand was needed in this
and but few comparatively havepush- part of mental science.  We  see it,
ed it to any great extent.  But, not- and we seek it here; and, without
withstandiig the magnitude of the  claiming for this part of the work per undertaking, our author  has, during  fection, we give it our decided appro years of patient study, ventured iniide- bation.  The third and last part of
pendently to analyze his own mental  the work we take up with the feel processes.  The history of his pro-  ing that it would require much space
cedure, and the classification of our  to do it justice.  Had the author done
mental actions. are here given  us.  nothing else, his account of the ac Such acontribution from such a mind  tire operations would entitle him to
ought to be regarded as a present of  the praise which we have accorded,
no inconsiderable value.... The au-  and give to his contributions to meta thor of this book, in the true spiuit of  physics the claims of originality and
the Baconian philosophy, discards for  depth.  We challenge for this part of
the time the labours of others, and  the work no ordinary interest. It is
engages in proper efforts of induction,  interesting to the man of letters, to
to obtain a firmner footing.  In pursu-  the metaphysician, to the orator, to
ing this course. he  has not failed.  the theologian, and to the expounder,
'I hose who read his book-and we  in the sacred desk, of the Gospel of
ventutre to predict that it will be exten- the Son of God.  The whole subject
sively read-will not fail to perceive  of the freedom of the will is discussed
that he has planted his standard in ad-  in a very satisfactory manner, and the
vance of his predecessors.  He takes  account of the constitutional  inclihis place among the original and in- nations by which we  are influenced
dependent thinkers, and deserves to  presents the whole matter in a novel
be enrolled -an honour which we   light, and renders this part of the
would not allow to the mere compi-  work  peculiarly instructive.  It enler or teacher of mental philosophy  ables us to solve the manifestations
— amonog metaphysicians, with such  of man's moral structure, and shows
men as Kanlt, Heinroth, Schubert, in  clearly the source of the light and shade
Germany; Locke,  Reid, Stuart, and  of human character.  We  leave this
Brown, in tGreat Britain.  Our author  work  with sincere respect for the
divides  all mental phenomena into  abilities of the author, gratitude for
three classes: 1. Cognitive ideas; 2. his labours, which have been brought
Sentient ideas; and, 3. Active opera-  to so successful an issue, and with
i tiols.  The reniarks on the cognitive  the determination to make use of his
class of ideas are admirable.   The  labours in our future efforts to teach
details of their extent is very accu-  ingenuous youth thephilosophy ofthe
irately given. In connexion with cog-  noblest part of God's creation, the imnitive ideas, we have a statement of  mnortal mind of immortal man.
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SCHMUCKERI S ME
Letters-continued.
, lhecation of his svstem of Psvcholo.  gy; and from the representations of
.  its character by his pupils, to whom
- it has been taught for some years; it
i   has been looked for with impatience.
t  We are aware of his fondness for such
investigations and his metaphysical
I acumen, and we had a right to expect
a work of uncommon character and
- of an original cast-hence we have a
new and original system.  This work
g   presents an admirable specimen of
. rigid analytical induction.  It is all
,  close, solid, massive argumentation.
is The  lines of division are distinctly
drawn-the whole subject is nicely
dissected-each part is separately laid
before you, and then, again, its con  nexion with the whole plainly demont strated.
i    From the Methodist Quarterly Review.
...Designing the work, as the title
intimates, for a text-book in colleges
and academies, Dr. Schmucker has
judiciously confined himself to a rigid
outline of his system, leaving detailed
illustration chiefly to the viva voce in  structions of the teacher.  This is a
feature of the work which pleases us
much.  We are presented, as it were,
with an anatomical skeleton, which
shows us clearly the connexion and
ramification of'the operations of the
mind; with a chart of our road, which
may guide us safely as Ariadne's clew
through the labyrinthine windings of
the darksome way.  Perhaps the most
interesting and valuable portion of the
volume is the third part: that treats
of the active operations of the mind
under five heads. inspection, arrange  ment, modification, mental direction
of physical action, and the process of
intellectual intercourse between dif  ferent minds.  We are convinced that
those who have most deeply studied
the constitution of the human mind
will here find much matter for profit  able reflection.  We cannot conclude
this review without a hearty recom  mendation of the work to the atten  tion of instructers.
From the American Biblical Repository,
in an editorial notice.
Dr. Schmucker, if we mistake not,
has accomplished a valuable work by
the clearness and simplicity of his di  vision of the elements of this science.
There is no affectation of novelty; but
the author, having thoroughly studied
the works of others, has carefully sub  iected every principle to the test of his
I From Rev. D. MICc
I  President of Washim
I have read withim
Schm!cker's late wo
ence. It seems to n
accurate and intelligil
of th e   phenomena                          of'
all included in his di
are assigned to their
Those classes are enti
able and distinct. TI
give rise to the vario
nomena are well defin
sultin~ knowledge, fee
are explained in a m
verified by the conscic
man who attentively
ry of his own mind.
terms and phrases wk
consecrated by their I
with psychological su
nomenclature strikes
singular, but in impo
and significant. I cu
author upon having p
literary world a volui
much useful informs
constitution, laws, an
the mind, and I hope
cial influence will be
its merit be duly apprl
From Rev. S. BoYEi,
of the Academy in
I concur in the (
M'Conaughy, believin
Dr. Schmucker to be
much merit, and we
only for intelligent p(
but also for use as a te
leges and academies.
Extract of a letterfrom
WELI,, Professor of 1
Political Economy in
lege, Carlisle, Pa.
I have examined at
the work of Dr. Schm
tal Philosophy, and, I
increased satisfaction.
with the spirit in whi
has conducted his inve
doubt not but many
views will be adopted
ters on the human mi
standing the forbiddin
adopted in the work,i
sophical character will
read with interest by
mental science.
From the Rev. Dr. Mo
more.
...It has long been k
learined'author contemt
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Commendatory 
SCHMUtJKER'S MEN
Commendatory L~
own experience.  The resul          t  is the
suggestion of what he regards some
important modifications and improve-nents in the arrangement and classification of the materials of the science, and which, as a system, may
perhaps with some propriety be denominated new. This system has been
constructed with great care and thoroughness.  It is sufficiently condeied( in the volume before us, and Is
stated and illustrated with unusual
precision and clearness.  it is in these
respects well adapted for use as a
text-book in academies and colleges.
The difference between the principles
of this system and those of others is
only occasionally referred to, and the
work is wholly free from that polemical aspect which has too mch  affected most philosophical discussions.
On the whole, we anticipate a favourable reception of this new system, as
a concise, intelligible, and convenient
class-book of mental science.
:tters —ontinued.
From a review of the work in. the New
World.
... Casting away the trammels of
authority, Dr.  Schm ucker  has dared,
to be an original and independent
thinker.  Those who read the    boonw
will not fail to perceive that it is  not I
the  sole product of the study of  thep
patriarch s    of th e science, but th at 
its original features    give th e a uthor
a  place  alongside thos e  patriarchs
Locke,  Reid, Stewart, and    Brown 
Dr. Schmucker has given us a new
analvsis of the   mental    o perat ions, by 
which    the ir synthesis is illustrated
and ren de red mor e       intelligible.  The  antagonism of  his system to  transcen
dentalism is decided.  The friends of l
the German or  transcdedental school 
may naturally be e xpec ted   to resist Dr
Schmucker's publication,  which, be
loning to the  school of  Locke  a nd
Reid, was professedly and fairly con
structed by inductive investigations.
From the Southern Literary Messenget
of May, 1842.
... For purposes of education, we  know of no book more available that I
a concise and well-arranged treatise.
on Psychology, or a system of Mental
Philosophy founded on consciousness i
and common sense, by one of the able|
theological professors at the Gettys
burg Institution. It is expressly de
signed for the use of academies and
colleges, and we commend it to the
attention of teachers and all interested
in education.
From the Philadelphia Observer.
... It gives us pleasure to commend
this work to the attention of the pub
lic. It contains the results of long
continued thought and inquiries of a
distinguished scholar and able writer
on a science which is intimately con nected with the progress of truth in
almost every department of knowl.
edge....We consider the work emi nently worthy of the attention and
study of ministers, students, and intel ligent popular readers.
=7 In addition to the above, nu merous notices, equally favourable,
of Schmucker's Psychology, have
been received from the most respect able sources, from some of which the
publishers may hereafter present brief
extracts.
,-  ~..
From the Lutheran Observer.
Dr. Schmucker's work bears the
same relation to the present stage of
mental science which was sustained
by the immortal essay of Locke to the
systems by which it was surrounded...
The great incantation by which Locke
wrought such wonders was not that
he produced anything positively new,
nor that his system advanced facts
before unheard of; but that he remodelled, simplified, and stated with
more correctness, and'a reduction to
truer principles, what had long been acknowledge-d as truth.... It is in these
important particulars that we trace
th       e resembl           ance between L ocke's Essay on the Human Understen and   an d
Dr. Schmucker's Psychology. The
great (might I be        allowed the expression), the transcendent merit of this
Psychology, is its new division and
its accurate definition. Completeness
and order are the characteristics alike
of the mind and writing of its author.
~. To the Psychology, the cherished
product of years of cyareful investigation, those qualities belong in an eminent degree', and moral evidence beneath his'pen has assumed almost the
simplicity of element, and clearness
of mathematical demonstration.... In
our opinion this work presents the
clearest, most intelligible, and satisfactory view which has yet been furnished of the workings -of the inner
mllan1.
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SCfliMUIICKE't S  MI  N i'AL  i'P ILt}SOPfIY.
-'-.........   _-..... _:;~l:.~& a ~  _c';:z ~O: i~
*            C.ri~zXcoftezttry Lr;-.,ra-,CQ,'it;i'u.t'rom  R!ev. Dr. AYi)iLOTT, Preside?st  menetal phenomrnena has, I think, some
of ]'5,Vvdward Collf,g, Ci",ici;?,,.i.  illportanlt advanrtages; and I discern
An ori.ii l work on the min(d by a  i  it little that seems liab!e to objec- 
vwelil-q uafied  writer cannot  but be  ttion.  Thle work cannot  fail  to be
valiuarOe and instructive.  Shoul(il it read with  interest and  profit by any
1eve- develop no new facts or views,  one (devoted at all to   etaphysical
still, as an independent witness, his  investigations.    And  I regard it as
testinony to what was before kniow,n  admiirably  a(1al)ted to elementary in uist be important.   B3ut  in  bot'i  struction in avitailyimportant branch
hese points of view the Mental Phi-  of education, uniing, as it does, great
os Ihy of Dr. Schrntucker is of much  condensation of mnatter  with clear- 
value'   The section on Inspection or  ness and force of illustration.
Perce)tion  (p  293-3i3, 2d ed.), to  From Rev. S. NoRPH, LL.I)., Pre   i
grtive oly one istace, certaltiny pre-    dent of I-Iamilton Cfliege, Yew- York.
isenus a novel view of the subject   t         have examined Dr.chmckers
.  1,        6                 J~~~~ I have examinedl Dr. Schllmtiker'.s
is also perfectly clear, thoughl exceed-  receot work on  Mental Philosophy
iingly condensed, and yet, we belie-ve,
ingy coudeeed  anrl yet    ti v,  and talie great pleasure in saving that
contains  fraotoie satisfac  tiorynnl 1- Ithinkit in mnost respects well adapttion on the subj'ect thanr can e -i'
tuon on th  iu)   thn can be fount   ed to the imporant purpose for whichl
in anv other wri'ter.                     it has been prepared.  It is designed
It i sca rcely, n,.,,-?esay toad,ta
~It is        o ito a I    t  especially for use as a text-book in
the res        lts of'.::.s    oser   academies and colleges, and for this
vations and(  refectiavays       accrd.
vaIo   ad r.,.,    <              d  it appears to be admlrablv fittc,l i, not
with the oral es of' td an)(d thius fUr                 wtt -rs of.' 11     only bv the general colrrectness aid
nishI. a secies of' ev7.Iidene foir Chiris
nish a                    iecies ot ci  ere for Cohi  sounduess of its views, but bv the
tiarulty pe,iui-alvra.li 3i 1   h! a (1concise, arnd clear, and compreheiisive
quirinz aoe.  1'I'elttle att(i true  pt'-  manner in which it exhibits the leadlosophy wilt ever be founod in perfect  in  fats ad pnciples perta
har~~~~~~~~~inoy    fepofothshoe-ng facts and principles pertaining to
harmony. ThOe poof of this, however, is ee'etiean    d it is po fthb  glore of  this important department of'sience.
We deem it rno inconsiderable mier it
modern  science -to have  a(i(led so
that while it exhibits a commendable
mn;uch to it.  TIhe work before us i1S  familiarity with the writings of other
here- worthy  of great praise.  No  philosophers, it is at the sae tie
Christian can rise fromi the study of  entirely free from a polemic an   on          it'    ~~~~~~~entirely free from a polemic and (,onit without beiiig better prepared to  troersial spitard obvislyimbol
giv   a   easn   fr  te hpe hat1,- in troversial spirit, and obviously irmbelgive a reason for the hope that is in ies the results of moth original and
ies the results of much original and
him, and, as we would hope, without  independent thinkin
an  increase of that blessed charity                           t
which is the essence of holiness and  From  lfr N. C. BROOKS, A.M., Pri?                I ipal ~~~~~Fof Vr tNe 1C.g Bcoos, A,    Prli:,-,r
alirnentof happiness.  Icaiinot,there-    cl of te   gh SchoI, Baltire.
fore, but regard the Psychology of    I have examinedl with much care
Dr. S. as an important contributionto  Dr. Schmucker's  Svstei- of Mental
~~~~~~~r cmce' s   y tm ion Metol
the text-books of colleges and other  Philosophy. designed for the use of
seminaries of learniug.                   colleges and academies.  1 aiii much
From Rev. Dr. DICKINSON, Pmfessor  pleased with the arrangeiment of the,
R      *ori   o  Ps torl Thes   matter, andl with the cleariess and(
of Sacredl Lhetoric and a cstoral 1The- 
olfgy IS.TheoLR Sete. adt Atobure, N  y    -precision of the language.
ology in- Thee,l. Sero. at Autburn, N. Y.
I have just finished a somnewhat    Fromn the Pr-ovid.,,ce R. I. JoLtr001.
careful examination of Dr. Schritick-    We have been tmuch gratified b  a
er's late treatise on the Philosophy of  attentive perusal of the Psycliology
the Mind, and, 1 am  happy to say,  of Dr. Schinuclier, and( haive  rever
received decided impressions of its  met with avny wvork on Mental Plilosworth.  There is ample evidence of- ophy better adapted  to the gerral
originaland patient investigation, and  reader.  Books of this cls  a re ustia  thorough acquaintance  with  the  ally passed unnoticed, except by sti-I
general subject of mnental science.  In  dents and those who  have a,atticathe nomenclature of the work there  lar taste for themi; but iii the wvolis a good deal of novelty;  but the  before us the autlhor sees to haI
terms are all well-defined, the style  edapted his style arld mode of rec,co"rv i.
throughout is chaste and clear, and  to those whose minds are,,ot gen-erallg
the arrangement excee(lingly lucid.  turned to philosophical works, as weli.
Dr. Schinucker's classification of the  as for colleges and academies.
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