LIVE QUESTION
IN
PSYCHOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS.
S.IX LECTURES
Selected from those delivered to the Classes in
Cornell University,
BY PROFESSOR W. D.
NEW YORK:
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY.
ITHACA:
ANDRUS, MCCHAIN & COMPANY,
I877.
[COPYRIGHT SECURED. ]
f  in
WILSON. 
I 
CONTENTS.
LECTURE I.-SENSATION.
LECTURE II.-CONSCIOUSNESS.
LECTURE III.-VOLITION.
LECTURE IV.-INSIGHT.
,ECTURE  V.-THE TEST OF TRUTH.
LECTURE VI.-REAL CAUSES.
:t
10
I
I  
LECTURE I.
SENSA TION.
[PREFATORY NOTE. —These Lectures occur in the Courses on Psychology
and Metaphysics with the History of Philosophy. As they are intended
chiefly for the use of the students in my classes, and for distribution among
private friends, and parsons specially interested in such subjects, they are
printed as they were written for delivery; the first three occur in the
Course of Lectures on Psychology; the last three are the conclusion of the
Course on the History of Philosophy.]
Good definitions are the best part of any science, and without them there is no accuracy or scientific comprehension
anywhere.
It seems to me that there are just now several subjects in
the department of Psychology, which are especially in need of
somebody's services in this line.
I propose in the following Lectures to do what I can to aid
the cause of science, and the cause of religion and good morals
also, in so far as they depend upon these subjects, by an effort
at a more clear and satisfactory explanation of some of these
fundamental facts and phenomena, than I have yet anywhere
met with in the books that have fallen under my notice. Among
them Sensation is perhaps the first in order. 
LIVE QUESTIONS.
The two doctrines with regard to Sensation from which I
dissent, and to which I wish to call attention in this Lecture,
are, (I) that it is a state of the mind or soul, and, (2) that it
is an objective something that can be treated as a concrete reality.
The first doctrine is taught, I believe everywhere; the second
has, perhaps, never been avowed or expressly taught by anybody.  It is merely assumed in some discussions, and more
especially in those with regard to " the transmission of sensations" along the different nerves and to the hemispheres of
the brain.
The two doctrines are not necessarily connected. In fact,
they sustain a sort of opposition and incompatible contrariety
to each other. If we regard a sensation as a mere state of the
mind, and keep this view in our thoughts, we shall not be
likely to speak of it, as being "carried along" the nerves from
the organs of sense to the encephalon. In such a juxtaposition
of the definition of the word and the statements made concerning the object which it is used to denote, the absurdity becomes too apparent to be seriously maintained. In those cases,
however, it is not probable that the fallacy-the mere metonymy of using an abstract term for a concrete one,-has done
any real harm to the cause of scientific truth.
There is, however, one case quite distinctly in my mind, in
which it seems to me that this assumption has misled a very
prominent authority, and through him and his influence, the
whole world of thinkers and writers on the physiology of the
nervous svstem.
Some years ago, Dr. Brown-Sequard made a series of experiments for the purpose of testing the, then-received theory
"that sensations are conveyed up the posterior column of the
spinal cord to the brain." Ife published an account of these
6 
SENSA TIO N..
researches in his " Lectures on the Physzology and Pa/holog,y of
the Central Nervous Syseran.  1 860.
Without pretending to give an account of these experiments
in detail, or in the order in which he made them, I will speak
of them as of two classes. In the one, he severed the posterior column, and applied an irritant to the hinder limb of the
animal; the section of the cord having been made quite a distance nearer the head of the animal than the entrance of the
nerve which goes from the place where the irritation was applied into the spinal cord. In these cases he found, that
"sensations were carried up to the brain" as before the operation, from which he inferred that the sensations are not carried
up by the posterior column as had been supposed.
In the next class of cases he severed the gray matter within
the cord, and left the posterior column untouched. On applying irritants as before, he found that "the sensations were
not carried to the brain "-from which he inferred that the gray
matter does "carry the sensations to the brain." Later experiments have led, I believe, to the general adoption of the' doctrine that the "sensations are carried up by the posterior part
of the central gray column and not by the posterior white
column at all."*
*I; shonid 1) noticed, however, that thes. experiments and the inference
from them can be understood as relating only to the sensations of the general
sabjective-sense-the sensations of pain, etc., which appertain to all the tissues of the body, and not at all to the object-sense of touch —by which we
perceive the presence and properties of objects external to the cuticle.
Brown-Sequard made no discrimination in his experiments between the two
classes of sensations; and my belief is, that all the more recent writers on
Physiology do regard the posterior column as the channel  and conductor of
the tactile sensations to the brain.
7 
LIVE Q UESTIONS.
Now as proving that "sensations are not carried up by the
posterior column," these experiments are conclusive and final
But do they prove that "sensations are carried up" by the
gray matter?
It would certainly be pertinent to remark from an ontological point of view, that' sensations" are not bhngs that can be
produced anywhere, and transmitted from one place to another,
as we send packages by express, or letters by mail.  And yet,
Dr. Brown-Sequard's interpretation of his experiments, and his
inferences from them, imply this view of their nature. If the
question were asked him, I do not, for one moment, suppose,
that he would say that he so regarded them at the time, or that
he so regards them now. He had, doubtless, been led, unconsciously, into this error, by what the logicians call the fallacy
of figurc dcltz'onzs. Sensations are spoken of as though they
were concrete substantial entities that can be conveyed or transmitted from place to place; and therefore without stopping to
consider whether they are so or not, he acquiesced in that
view, and proceeded to interpret his experiments accordingly.
However, if this were all I have to say of his experiments it
would hardly be worth the while to have said so much. But it
seems to me that they point to another theory of sensation,
which I am inclined to adopt on other grounds as well as on
this.
In any view, Brown-Sequard's interpretation of his experiments assumes that sensations areproduced at the distal end Of
the nerves-at the periphery of the body-and carried up by
the afferent nerves to the spinal cord; and thence along up
the cord-some part of it-to the brain.  But suppose "the
sensation is produced"-whatever theexpression may mean-zn
/the spzinal cord ztself, and we shall have a very different inference
from his experiments.
8 
S ENSA 7'IO K.
What I mean can be easily illustrated. We stop at a friend's
door and ring the bell.  What we do at the door is a "pull;"
what we produce in the house is a " riny" or a noise.  Or
again: suppose we send an electric current along a copper
wire into a piece of platinum; the platinum not being a good
conductor, becomes heated.  Now what we  "produce" at the
electric machine or the battery, is electricity; and what we
"send along" the wire is electricity but when  it reaches
the  platinum  it becomes  heat.   The  platinum  will  not
" transmit" the eleclrz'city at all, as such, nor yet will it "transmit" the heat in the sense we are now using the word. But
becoming heated, it will heat anything that is in contact with
it; and will especially "conduct the heat" into any substance
with which it may be connected at the end opposite to that at
which the electricity is "conducted" into it.
Now suppose we have an irritation produced in any sensory
tissue in which afferent nerves terminate:-this answers to the
battery or electric machine.   The current is conducted along
the afferent nerves, -which answer to the copper wire in the
electric experiment referred to, and whenever it reaches the
nerve cells in the gray matter of the spinal cord, they are set
into a state of unusual activity, which we may call a sensation:
this coincides with the heat of the platinum. The case of the
electricity being converted into heat is not an argument. It is
neither claimed nor used as such.  It is merely an illustration
of what I mean, and as an illustration it seems to me to be
particularly good.
And it corresponds exactly with Brown-Sequard's experiment.
When the white fibres of the posterior column  were severed,
this fact could make no difference with the sensation if we only
admit that the sensation was a state of the nerve cells in the
I*
9 
LIVE QUESTIONS.
gray matter; for the afferent nerves had entered that portion of
the cord below the section, and had produced their appropriate
effect independently of it. But when he severed the gray matter he produced a paralysis- of that portion of it, which was
below the section; and if the irritation was converted into sensation below the section, as I believe and think I shall show that
it was, no evidence of the fact could have been found in the
brain or in any part of the spinal cord above the place where
the section was made. Nerve influence, whatever it may be, is
in this respect unlike heat and electricity; it will not pass over
a section of the connecting nerve, how closely so ever the two
ends may be kept together.
Other experiments have shown that if the section be made
below the entrance of the afferent nerves into the cord, the
effect is produced in the brain as though no such division had
been made.
I have said that I think that sensation was produced in that
part of the cord which was below the section of the gray matter. And whether I am right or not will depend upon the
question whether my view and my definition of sensation are
accepted or not. The proof that "something was produced"
is found in the fact that reflex action resulted in the limb, when
the irritation was produced.   The irritation passed up, as we
will suppose, to the gray matter of the cord, was converted into sensation by it, was returned as emotion, along the efferent
nerves, until, reaching the appropriate muscles, it produced, in
them contraction.  Just as in the example proposed  for illustration; the electricity that passed along the copper wire became heat in the platinum. And it might have been converted
into motion or into magnetism, by passing into some other
substance. At any rate, the motion in the limb of the animal
10 
SENSA TIOAn.,
does occur as the result of the irritation, even when the cord
has been completely severed -both parts of it —gray and white
matter alike.  And with the view of sensation, which  I propose for consideration, we have here proof of sensation in the
spinal cord when no consciousness of it reaches the brain.
I have already remarked that sensation is regarded by all
psychologists, and physiologists as well, so far as I know, as a
s/ale of the nmznd.
I cite the definition given by President Porter in his work on
the "Human Intellect," p. 128, as being one of the latest authorities I have seen, and equal in importance to any.   He says,
"Sensation proper or the emotional element, comes first in or"der. This does not occur alone or in part. Pure sensation
"is simply an ideal or imaginary experience.   Its nature  can
" be determined only by laying out of view certain character"istics which always attend it.  Though sensation always oc"curs with preception, it may be clearly distinguished frum it.
"Sensation thus considered is a subjective expresszon of the soul,
"as animating an extended sensorizum, usually more or less pleasur"able or painful and always occasioned by some excitement of  he
"'organism."
This definition is given in Dr. Porter's words, the italics being his own also.  It makes sensation to be an experience
or state of the soul.  I wish I could find as clear a statement
of what is understood by perception. I have looked Dr.
Porter's work through in vain for it.  And  I think I should
surely find it in his book if anywhere. The two-sensation
and perception-are most intimately connected. They seem,
sometimes at least, to be one and the same  thing under two
different names. But Dr. Porter does not anywhere, as I can
find, clearly and formally define perception, or point at all
1 1 
I -"E QUESTIO NS.
sharply, the difference between it and sensation.   He  says,
"WVe inquire of consciousness, What is the physical act or
"state, [perception]? She replies, It is a process complex in
"its nature. but instantaneous in time. It is complex, be"cause the soul in its single act, discovers two objects-its own
"condition" [which is I suppose the sensation] "and some
"material reality" [the discovering of which I suppose is the
"act of perception.]   "One of these is subjective, and hence
"is called subject-obec/; the other is objective and is denomi"nated an object-objecl"-[that is, we have two objects, one
"lying within us and the other without.]   "One element is
"called sensaton or sensa/on proper, the other is called percep"hnon or perception proper. The one of these is an element invol"ving feeling-the other is intellectual, being an act of knowl"edge.  Each requires the other.  Each is the attendant of
"the other, there can be no perception without sensation, nor
"can sensation occur without perception." p. 1 27. Again on
p. I3 I, hlie says, of "'percephon or perception proper " —" this,
"as has already been explained, is no separate act or state
"of the soul; it is only a separable or distinguishable element
"of a single complex act.  Perception as such is (I.) clearly
"and distinctly an act of objective knowledge.   (2.)  This
"knowledge is objective-i. e., the soul not only knows the
'object to be, but it knows that it is not itself....  (3.)
"The object in perception proper is not only known as the
"non-ego, but it is known as extended."
And yet after all I cannot help wishing that the Doctor had
told us as clearly and as precisely what perception is as he has
told us what he regards as sensation.
I turn to other authors, and have consulted them in great
numbers, but with no better success. Are the two then, sen
12 
SE~SA TIO V.
sation and perception, really two distinct and separate acts?
Or are they two distinct and separate or even separable "elements" of the same act, "a complex act i"  Or are they only
one and the same act, regarded from different points of viewmere alternate conceptions of one and the same  thing?  If
either were really the case, I can see no reason why we might
not have them well and clearly defined, and all scholars acquiescing in the definition. But so far from this, I have not been
able to find anywhere any such clear definition or distinction of
the two acts-as two distinct acts-two elements of one complex act, or even as two alternate conceptions of one single
and simple act.
Descartes says, Prznc. Philosoph., P. I, ~ 22: "All  the
' modes    of thinking which we experience in ourselves may be
"referred to two general kinds of which one is perception and
"the other volition —for to feel ("sen/zie") to imagine and to
"understand, are only so many ways or modes of perceiving;
"and to desire, to be averse to, to affirm, to deny, and to doubt
"are only diverse modes of volition (" volendz.")
Locke says, (Understanding B, iI, c. 6,) "the two principal
"actions of the mind, are these two, perception or thinking and
"volition or zilling."
Dr. Reid, however, thought it advisable to restrict the word
perception " to a narrower meaning. " Perception," he says,
"is most properly applied to the evidence which we have of
"external objects by our senses"-(Int. Powers, Lss. ii, chap.
I,) " the perception of external objects by our senses," he says,
"is an operation of the mind of a peculiar nature, and ought
" to have a name appropriated to it. It has so in all languages.
"And in English I know of no word more proper to express
"this act of the mind than perception. Seeing, hearing,
13 
LI VE QU ESTI7ONS.
"smelling, tasting and touching or feeling, are words that ex"press the operations proper to each sense-perceiving ex"presses that which is common to them all."
This is very clear and satisfactory.   But if one attempts to
keep in mind what has been said about sensation, while he
reads it, he is apt to wonder what becomes of sensation, what
room, or place, or function there is left for it.  What is ascribed to perception seems to cover the whole ground and exhaust the whole subject.
But I believe that Reid succeeded in limiting the us, of the
word perception to the narrower sphere which he seems to have
intended Kant and the Germans generally have certainly followed Reid and adopted his views in this respect.
Sir William Hamilton, who by his profession as a logician,
ought to be particularly good at definitions and clear in his
statements, is hardly more satisfactory in this respect; although
he is rather severe and unsparing in his criticismns on  others.
He  quotes  Reid apparently with approval, when  he says
"Neither ought we to expect that the sensation and its corres"ponding perception should be distinguishled in common
"language.  Language is made to serve the purposes of ordi"nary conversation, and we have no reason to expect that it
"should make distinctions that are not of common use," etc.
( Lecis. on JIelaphysics, Lecl. X-PIV.. )
But in attempting to improve on what he found done to his
hand, he says, Lect. XXIV. "It ought, therefore, in the first
"place, to have been noticed that the genuine phenomena of
"knowledge and feeling are always found coexistent and yet
"always distinct."...   Perception! proper is the con"sciousness, through the senses, of the qualities of an object
"known as different from self; Sensation proper is the con
i - 
SElSA TI ON,
"sciousness of the subjective affections, of pleasure, or pain,
which accompanies that act of knowledge."
This language is modified by I-Iamilton's peculiar theory of
consciousness'with which, however, we are not now concerned.
Translating the thought from his vocabulary and peculiarities
of idiom, into common  English, I think there can be no
doubt that he intends to regard both sensation and perception
as acts or states of the mind-acts and states of which we are
conscious-by means of which we cognize, think of, and  ac.
quire a knowledge about such things in the external world as
have sensible properties.   At any rate he says, "the opposition
"of Perception and Sensation is true... Perception is
"only a special kind of knowledge, and sensation is only a
"special kind of feeling, and Knowledge and Feeling
"are two out of the three great classes into which we primarily
"divided the phenomena of mind, C,nt/izon being the third."
Sir \William cannot be supposed therefore to have regarded
sensation as anything else than a state or act of mind.
Coleridge has somewhere said, I think, that sensation and
perception are but one and the same thing regarded from different points of view.  If we consider the mental state as produced by an external object, it is regarded and called a sensation; if as an act of the mind by which we become cognizant
of external objects, we call it a perception.
However, I think that most writers agree with Dr. Porter,
or rather that he represents their views, in considering sensation
and perception as two distinct acts or states, or at least as two
distinct elements of an "single complex act."
But they all agree in regarding them as acts or states of //e
minizd or soul, and no one of them, so far as I have been able to
discern, has succeeded in giving a definition to both acts or cle
15 
LIVE Q UESTIONXS.
ments of acts, that makes it at all clear what they mean —by the
two words sensation and perception-what is the real difference
between the two things, or whether in fact there are two things
at all, or only, as Coleridge suggested, one thing considered
from two different points of view.
And yet this certainly is a very important matter-important
not only in a theoretical point of view-but important also for
a clear comprehension of what we mean when we read or speak
of sensation or perception. It is important in a practical point
also.  I have already discussed a case in which a most eminent
Physiologist was misled in the interpretation of some exceedingly valuable experiments that he had made with great pains
and skill, by the want of a clear conception of what is meant
by the word sensation. Inr that case he had unconsciously accepted-or rather acquiesced in, a view which nobody would
accept when attention is directly called to it.
I will now introduce another case in which a man, equally
eminent as a Naturalist, has made, as I think, an equally obvious mistake, in interpreting another class of phenomena in
consequence of the same want of a clear notion of what perception is, and how it differs, if indeed it differs at all, from
sensation.
In the number of A4pleton's Popular  Sczence Afonlhlv, for
Oct., I874, Professor Huxley contributed an exceedingly interesting article on the question "Are Animals Automatons."  I
think I should write the word "Aulomala."  But never mind
that. I agree with the author entirely, in his general conclusion;
although I should explain the matter in different words; I
should also, object to the scope which he gives to the word
"animals" in his discussion.  Huxley introduces the case of
a frog, from which had been taken away "all that part of the
16 
SENSA TIOQN.0
brain which we call hemispheres."  He says, "If that opera "tion is properly performed, very quickly and very skillfully,
"the frog may be kept in a state of full bodily vigor for
months, or it may be for years, but z wz7l szit forever zn the
"same spot.  It sees nothing, it hears nothzng.  It will starve
"sooner than feed itself, although if food is put into its mouth,
" it swallows it.  On  irriation it jumps or walks, if thrown
"into the water it swims.   But the most remarkable thing it
"does is this-you put it in the flat of your hand, it sits
"there, crouched, perfectly quiet, and would sit there forever.
"Then if you incline your hand, doing it very gently and
"slowly, so that the frog would naturally tend to slip off, you
"feel the creature's fore-paws getting a little slowly on  to the
"edge of your hand until he can just hold himself there, so
"that he does not fall; then, if you turn your hand, he
"mounts up ztvh great care and deLi'berahon, putting one leg in
"front and then another, until he balances himself with per"fect percision upon the edge of your hand.   The  doing of
"all this requires a delicacy of co-ordination, and an adjust"ment of the muscular apparatus of the body, which is only
"comparable to a rope-dancer among ourselves-in truth a frog
"is an animal very poorly constructed for rope-dancing, and
"on the whole we may give him rather more credit than we
"should to a human dancer. These movements are performed
"with the utmost steadiness and percision, and you may vary
"the position of your hand, and the frog, so long as you are
"reasonably slow in your movements, will work backward and
"forward like a clock. And what is still more remarkable is
"this-that f _you put hzin on a table and put a book between hzm
"and the light, and gizve hzm a ittle jog behind, he zoz'l junmp"lake a long jump possizbly -BUT HE wON' T UMP AGAINST THE
17 
LI VE Q UESTIONS.
"BOOK, he will jump to the right or to the left, but he will get
"out of the way, showing that, although hie is absolutely insensz"ble to ordinary ilzSpressions of light, there zis s/ill somelhin,g
"which passes through Ihe sensoly nerve, acts upon the machin'ery of his nervous system, and causes it to adapt itself to the
"the proper action." (The italics and small capitals in this
whole quotation are my own.)
Now in this account of the frog two declarations are particularly noticeable. They both state, not facts, but inferences or
theories; and are therefore mixed up with a little metaphysics,
although claiming to deal only with facts, and mere physical
-or physiological science.  Huxley says the frog is "absolulely
'insensible to the ordinary impressions of light." Does this
mean that he has no sensati'ons? or that the book and other
objects before him produce none of the phenomena which we
call sensations?  IJuxley does not use the very word " sensa"tion." But can his language be understood to mean anything
el se? Perhaps he wished to avoid the uncertainty or ambiguity
of the word. If so, I appreciate his caution. But he also says
of the frog, " it sees nothing, it hears nothing." Here I think
hlie can be understood  as intending  nothing  less  than  a
denial of "perception" although hlie does not use the exact
word —verbuw. zosum —and probably for the same reason as in
the other case.
But how then does the frog avoid jumping against the book
if he does not "see" it? If the book produces no " impression"
on his optic nerve —so that there is neither "sensation" nor
perception" in the ordinary sense of those words, howv does
the frog avoid it?  Here is an effect: zhef-og avoids the obstacle
before him. He does not see "it;" there is no " perception"
of the object.  Is it the ordinary reflex action? That cannot
18 
SENSA TTON.A.
be, unless the book makes an "impression " on the retina,
and on the brain as well, through the optic nerve.   But it is
an effect and must have had a cause. And we have the philosopher resorting to the at present "unknown " and perhaps the
unknowable "somelhing whzch passes" through  the  sensory
nerve, etc.  But it seems to me that this is unnecessary.   He
appears to be violating the old maxim-or perhaps I should
rather call it an axiom-" entities" are not to be multiplied
beyond necessity. I think this "something which passes" is
clearly an entity praeler necessilatem, and the philosopher is
making or inventing a something,-an entity of which we
know nothing else; for which we have no other use than to
explain this phenomena of a frog without the hemispheres of
the brain, avoiding an object which is directly before him, when
moving towards it.
Now, laying aside the old notion of sensation being in any
sense an act or state of the mznd or soul, we shall have simply
a case of reflex action. The book affects the retina of the eye;
the motion extends to the optic lobes-perhaps to the Ihalamz
and corpora slrziata-perhaps to the tuber annulare: it certainly
does not reach the hemispheres zn this case, because as we are
expressly informed they had been removed-and then down
the medulla oblongala and spinal cord; and from that centre it
goes, as an emotion, along the efferent nerves to the muscles
called into requisition by that modification of the act of jumping
indicated by the statement that he turned aside so as not to hit
the obstacle before him. The jump itself was undoubtedly
caused by "the little jog behind "  and the jump was a reflex
act, as I suppose no one will doubt.   It was of the excitomotor kind.   "The getting out of the way" was, I think, as
clearly, a reflex act also, of the sensori-motor kind, caused  by
19 
LIVE Q UESTIONS.
the' impression" made by the obstacle on  the retina of the
eye.
Well why not?  If a sensation is a state "of the mind "-the
frog cannot be supposed, under such circumstances, if indeed,
he can be supposed under any circumstances, to have any
mind. If sensation and perception are inseperable-whether
one and the same act, two elements or indeed two phases, of
the same act, I suppose that we must admit that, in this case,
there was no "perception" of the book, in the ordinary sense
of that word-and so, if no perception, no sensation.   And
without sensation it could not be a case of reflex action-of
the sensori-motor kind- whatever else it may have been.
Hence our philosopher's difficulty.   Hence too, the resort to
that most unphilosophical and most mischievous of all resources-supposing a cause when there was no necessity for it,
when one abundantly adequate and applicable was at hand. It
was an accepted view or theory of sensation that misled him,
shall I say? or at any rate it was his view of the nature of sensation that caused his perplexity and led to the suggestion of
the existence of some, as yet unknown and unsuspected, substance existing in the material world, exerting its mysterious
influences, one, which it will hereafter most intensely interest
and behoove all men, ambitious to serve the cause of science
and distinguish themselves, to forthwith investigate and describe to an admiring world.
But abandon the old doctrine that sensation is a state of Ihe
mind-that it is in fact a mien/al or psychologzcal phenomenon at
all, and all the difficulty disappears; we have at once, clearness,
or at least a chance for it, in our conceptions and definitions of
both sensation and perception: and had it been done in season
we should have saved two of the greatest philosophers of
20 
SENSATION.
modern times from errors and perplexities —which, to say the
least of them, have rendered their services, which  are confessedly great-among the greatest that have ever been rendered
by any men of whom history anywhere makes mention, far less
valuable than they otherwise would have been.*
I propose the simple solution: Sensation and Perception
are totally distinct and different, though they are for the most
part concurrent and occur at the same time. I would regard
sensation not as a state of the mind at all) not at all a mental
or a psychical, or a psychological phenomenon, but only a state
of the nerve cells in some one of the nerve centres, and wholly
a physical and a physiological phenomenon. And now the
two acts or states, sensation and perception, are distinct, easily
distinguished and satisfactorily definable. Sensation is a physical state not an act at all; but a state of  the nerve cells-an
active state doubtless so far as they are concerned.   And  perception is an ac/-an act of the mind. The one is for the most
part produced in us, that is, in some one of our nerve centres,
by an external object acting through the organs of sense-as
the eye, the ear, the skin, etc. Perception, on the other hand,
is a mental act which almost invariably occurs whenever any
*I have referred specially to Brown- Sequard and Huxley; but it seems to
me that Ferrier, whose work on " The Functions of the Brain," is not only
the last but the most valuable contribution to our knowledge on these subjects that I have seen, was much in need of the very help I here propose for
him and such as he is.  All through his work he seems to be puzzled and
embarrassed, often at a loss and sometimes misled, by adhering to the old
meaning attacked to the words "sensation," "consciousness" "volition"
and "voluntary action."  I shall have occasion to quote his work quite
largely hereafter, and the truth of my remark will then become apparent;
Accept the definitions and explanations I give and a new light is seen to
shine through the whole of his most interesting and instructive work.
21 
LIVE QUES7IONS.
outward object produces a sensation: and by that act we be
come cognizant of the object.
Of course, I do not see how Huxley and others who do not
believe there is any mind as distinct or different from the body,
can accept this distinction, or the definitions which it renders
possible. And I can see no way in which they can escape the
difficulties I have alluded to, and in part described, except by
abandoning their doctrine with regard to the reality of the
mind. Of course, if there is no mind sensation can be no
"state of the mind;" it can be only physical, as I regard it.
But then if there is no mind, perception can be no act of he
mznd, and can be no more  clearly and satisfactorily  distinguished from sensation than it has been by the philosophers I
have cited, who believe in mind.
Nor do I see how this definition can be accepted by these
philosophers who regard the word "mind" as an abstract term
and  define it accordingly.   Herbert  Spencer, in one place
speaks of the mind as "a phase of nature's order." (Fz'irst
Princiles, Preface.)   Again  in his  "Recenl Discussions zn
Sczence, pp. 344, 345, 347, he repeats these terms, and with great
emphasis, "one's mind is only a series of his own states of
"consciousness."  Of course a "sensation"  cannot be a state
"of a phase of nature's order "-or of "a series of states of
"consciousness."  At all events'perception " can hardly be
regarded as an act of "a phase" of anything; nor yet of a
"series of states."
Two of the greatest authorities in opr country, Drs. Flint
and Hammond both concur in defining the mind  as "a force
"produced by nervous action."  But manifestly  we cannot
speak of sensation as a state of any such "force," nor yet of
perception as an act of any such nervous action, or of any
"force" that may'be produced by such action.
22 
SENSA 7-I0N.
Nor do I see how Mill's definition of mind is going to make
the matter any better.   In his "Examinatlon of Szr W7lzham
"Hramizonz's Philosophy," chap. xII, vol. I, p. 253, Am.  edition,
he defines the M\ind as "nothing but the series of our sensa"tions, to which must now be added our internal feelings, as
they actually occur," etc. Replacing the word mind by the definition of it here given, as we have a perfect right to do, and for
" sensation is a state of the mind," we have "a sensation is a
state of the series of our sensations," etc.  The absurdity in
this case is apparent.
But for men who like Dr. Porter believe in a mind as something distinct from the body, it seems to me that this distinction will be most welcome.
Nor is there any more reason why Huxley and the men, who,
agreeing with him, think there is no mind as distinct from
matter, should not accept my definition of sensation-though
they cannot, of course, accept the distinction I make between
it and perception. In fact, on their ontological theory, sensation zs what I have described it, just that and nothing else. It
can be nothing else than a state of the nerve centres —for they
do not admit any mind, of which it can be said to be an act or
a state. Sensation therefore can be only a physical or physio
logical phenomenon.   But then, what becomes of perception?
I do not see that they can have any use for the word, or any
meaning they can attach to it, or any act or state it can be
needed to describe.
The  question naturally arises therefore, whether "we may
make this distinction and regard sensation as I have proposed
to do, as purely a physiological phenomenon, a mere state of
the nerve ganglia?
Now I admit that all the authority of opinion is against me
23 
LIVE QUESTIONS.
The theories of many philosophers- perhaps the theories of
all the foremost men of the great schools of the day are against
me.
And yet the common sense of mankind —wiser in this I
think, than the philosophers-is in favor of my view. In our
language, and in all languages that I know of, it is the custom
to speak of perception as an act, and to say "I perceive;" and
to speak of sensation as a state-a state of feeling produced in
us by some external object. No language or usage of mankind I think, ever spoke of sensations as produced by ourselves
or of perceptions as produced by anything but ourselves.  I see
not therefore, how it is possible to regard them as but one and
the same thing, consistently with this use of language.
But I have a better reason than any I have yet advanced for
this change in the use and definition of the term sensation.
When writers began to discuss the matters of sensation, perception, etc., they pursued the psychological method only; they
had no other.   But the discovery of the phenomena of reflex
action-now universally accepted —has changed this whole affair. We have now a physiological method as well, the old
writers, pursuing the psychological method, and looking at
consciousness alone, could see no good ground to distinguish
sensation from perception, as anything more than either two
parts of one and the same act or state, at most two aspects of
it. They saw as Reid, Hamilton and Porter have so well remarked, that in this act, (if it be only one), there are two elements, which are usually in the inverse proportion to each
other.  Sometimes, as in ordinary perception with the eye, the
emotional part or feeling, is so slight that it does not amount
to a pain at all. For the most part it is unnoticed; and we
are in fact unconscious of it; so that in reality we assert its
24 
SESA$4 TIOA                             2
existence, if at all, purely and only on theoretic grounds.  As
a matter of fact, we do not kznozo that there is any sensation at
all. But in other cases, when for example the eye has become
inflamed, the feeling becomes pain; and the pain is very great,
so great in fact sometimes, that we cannot see-at all; the intellectual part, the perception proper, disappears. Hence nothing was more natural than the prevailing theory with regard to
sensation and perception, and their relations each to the other.
But now the case is different.  Take a complex case.  Suppose some one should pierce my foot, suddenly, unexpectedly,
with a sharp instrument, we know now, that there are three
distinct phenomena: (I) an irritation produced in the foot.
This irritation extends up to the gray matter of the spinal cord
by the afferent nerves leading from the foot to the spine.   (2.)
The irritation or " snsaion" extends up to the brain, and then
an act of perception takesplace.   It may be very indistinct —
and less distinct than if the sensation or irritation had been less
violent. Nevertheless, there is a perception that something
has touched my foot, and l amn conscious of ISe fact.  But (3),
there went back from that part of the spinal cord  where the
afferent nerve entered it, an influence-call it an emotion
or what you please-along dowvn the efferent nerves, which
produced a contraction of the muscles of the leg and foot; and
motion of the foot ensued-I jerked it away.
In the normal condition of my waking hours I am conscious
of all these phenomena, the sensation caused by the wound
the perception and thinking of it, and of what produced it; and
the motion of my foot in consequence of the pain. There
might have been one or two elements more, if I had been expecting the act that caused the pain.  There might have been
an effort on my part to hold my  foot still, notwithstanding it,
2
2,5 
LIV.E Q UESTIO_NS.
or an effort to resist the tendency to the reflex action. And there
might'have been too, a consciousness of inability to resist it; if
in fact the pain had been so sudden and so great that I could
not have done so.
Now, undoubtedly, the irritation in my foot caused a state
of activity in the nerve cells of the gray matter of the spinal
cord, which did not exist before.  Precisely what that was no
one knows.  And it was some new s/ate of acliviy-one that had
been but recently produced, and one which, both extended
up to the brain, and excited there perception, consciousness and
thought, and which also, extended back downwards, to the foot
and produced there muscular contraction and the phenomena
of motion.
Shall we then call that new state of nerve-cell activity a sensaloiz.? and the mental act, the first of three in the order just
named, percepIhon.  That is what I propose.
But the line of proof is not complete unless we take into
account the fact that these phenomena of reflex action may be
produced, 1st, after the brain has been removed as in -the case
of the frog, cited from Huxley;  2d, after the head has been
entirely removed, carrying with it, of course, the basilar ganglia
or corpora striata, medulla obfongata, etc., —and, 3d, after even
the upper part of the spinal cord itself has been removed and
the animal has become totally dead.
The question of consciousness in these cases, I reserve to
another Lecture. But the phenomena I refer to-which may
be found described in abundance in almost any recent work on
the physiology of the nervous system —or the chapters devoted
to that topic in the more general works —prove, conclusively,
that there are several centres from which reflex action may take
place, totally independent of each other.  Of these the gray
26 
SEN,SAz TIO                         27
matter of the spinal cord, is undoubtedly one. And in this I
think that, beyond all question, the reflex actions called excitomotor have their origin. They are caused by any irritation
that is intense enough to produce such results in any of the
subcutaneous tissues, and in the skin itself, if it be a sensation
of pain-and not a mere transient sensation as of warmth or
coolness, moisture or dryness. Another of these centres is certainly found in that prolongation of the spinal cord into the
skull, which is called by various names as medul/la ob/ongata;
Iuber anniliare, pons Varolzi optic lobes, opl'c thatlam, corpora
sl-itlac, etc.; that part of the brain, I mean, in which  the
nerves of the special cephalic or objective senses have their origili as the optic, the olfactory, etc.
Then it is customary to speak of reflex action from the hemispheres of the brain, ideo-motor, reflex actions, to adopt Carpenter's name for them. If this is to be accepted as correct we
have a third centre of reflex action in the hemispheres themselves.  \Ve know that both the spinal cord and  the medulla
oblongata may be reached separately-by separate and distinct
channels-and that they will re-act independently of the others.
And the recent experiments of Fritsch, Hitzig and Ferrier seem
to show conclusively, that the hemispheres of the brain may
also be reached and excited to action separately from the other
portions of the nervous system; though of course, they can
produce the results of reflex action only through the other
parts, as means of connecting the hemispheres with the muscles which cause the motion.
It is worth noticing, though I shall not discuss the fact here,
that no state of the nerve cells in either of these centres is the
occasion of either conscious perception-or of reflex action —
unless ld 1Ias been recen/ly produced. Put your hand into warm
27 
L 1VE QUESTIONS.
water, and you feel it at first both as water and as warm; but
in a very short time, you will cease to be able to tell by the
feeling alone whether your hand is in the water or not.
Hence I would define sensation as any state of either of the
two lower nerve centres, which has been recently produced.
And I would add, that in all cases, in man, when the sensation reaches the hemispheres of the brain, there is an act of
perception-which is a mental act-and in all cases also there
is resulting from the sensation a tendency going outwards which
will produce muscular contraction, if the painfulness of the
sensation be sufficient to overcome the weight and the inertia
of the limb aroused; and if, furthermore, the tendency is not
counteracted by either voluntary effort, or by what is called the
inhibitory act of the brain itself.
I do not think that the "recently produced" state of nervecell activity, considered as a phenomenon distinct and by itself,
has received any name.   If it has, the fact has escaped my attention. Here then, we have two facts-a series of most important states or things without a name, and a name, hitherto
vaguely used, wandering about without any appropriate use anywhere.  Shall we not put them together-marry the two which
seem so admirably adapted to each other?  I think we had
better do it-the union seems to me exceedingly appropriate
and desirable.
28 
LECTURE II.
CO0NSCIO US&ESS.
In a preceding Lecture I have discussed the nature of Sensation, and pointed out what I regard as an erroneous view
concerning it-with some of the evils and inconveniences that
have resulted from that error.
I propose now to speak of another of those terms, which
have been used with a great variety of meanings, and in ways
which, as I think, have greatly embarrassed the cause of truth,
and the attainment of clear conceptions in regard to some of
the most fundamental facts in science.   I mean Consciousness.
The two are connected-for it has been uniformly held not only
that sensation is a state of the mind; but also that it is of necessity, a matter of consciousness.
If we regard sensation as a state of the imind we can hardly fail
to make the consciousness of it an essential feature, rather
than a mere accidental accompaniment. Even if we do not hold
that all mental acts occur within consciousness, we can hardly
fail to regard the consciousness of sensations as being so essential to them that we should deny that there had been any
sensation if there had been no consciousness of it.  And this,
I think, is the view that has hitherto been entertained by both
psychologists and physiologists.
I cite in this connection only one author, Dr. W. B. Car 
LIVUE  QL-ESTIONS.
penter: and he is eminently worthy of being cited, having been
one of the earliest to investigate and describe the phenomena of
reflex action.  He also gave to actions of that kind the classification and the names which, with few exceptions and  modifications, have been retained to the present day.  I cite "Annzal
"Phjszology," ~ 430, and following, "If, taking the nervous
"system of man as the highest type of this apparatus, we an"alyze in a general way the actions to which it is subservient,
"we find that they may be arranged under several distinct groups,
"which it is very important to consider apart, whether we are
"studying his psychicaZl functions of those of the lowest ani"mals.   I. The simplest mode of its action is that in which
"an impression made upon the aferenl nerve excites, through
"the ganglionlc centre in which it terminates, an impulse in
"the mo/or nerve issuing from it, which, being transmitted by
"it to the muscular apparatus calls forth a respondent move"ment, of this action, which is called reflex, or'excit/ motor,'
"which may be performed wizhoul any consciousness (these
"italics are my own) either of the impression or of the mo tion, we have examples," etc.  I-Iere it will be noted, (I.)
that he does not speak of a sensation as having been produced
at all-nor (2. ) of any active state of the nerve cells " in the
"centre,"-which, in this case, is the spinal cord-at all; but
only of an "impression transmitted" through the ganglionic
centre to the muscular apparatus, etc.
But he proceeds, "2. If the ganglionic centre to which the
"impression is conveyed, should be one through which the
"consciousness is necessarily affected, sensation becomes a ne"cessary link in the circular chain, and the action is distin"guishcd as consensual or' sensori motor.' The closing and
"opening  of the pupil of the eye in accordance  with  the
30 
C0 A %SCCIO USNESS.
"amount of light that falls upon the retina-are  examples of
"this class.  In the foregoing, operations no  mzcl/al change
higher than simple ctzsclo lsnPess of zi;iressizon-that is to say-,
"Sensaioni, with which may be blended the simple feelings cf
"pleasure and pain —is involved...  But sensation is tl-e
"'very lowest form of mental action." Here clearly not only
is sensation regarded as a state of the mind, but consciousness
is made the indispensable condition and sign of sensation —so
that without consciousness of it, no sensation can be recog —
nised or admitted to have taken place.
It will be observed that Carpenter not only does Inot call the
active state of nerve centre from which a reflex action takes
place, without consciousness, a sensation; but also that he
does not give it any name-or even pay much attention to it.
And yet, undoubtedly, there is such an active state of the
nerve cells; and this action is essential to the' conversion of
the sensation into an emotion, so that the irritation applied to
the sensitive surface or tissue, may result in action or motion of
the limb affected.
As this will become an important fact a little further on in
our discussions, I will pause to say a few words more concerning it here. Each afferent nerve enters some one of the gang.
lionic nerve centres.  From most of these centres there emerge
efferent nerves; and in all cases of reflex action, the irritation
must pass through one  of these  centres.  And  there is no
doub'ot, so far as I know —indeed, I think there can be no doubt
-that the nerve cells, are called into activity as a means of the
transformation. WVe cannot connect the end of an afferent
with the end of an efferent nerve so as to send the current of
nerve influence, which is, in this respect entirely unlike the
electric current, through from  the one into the other.  The
31 
LI1VE Q UESTIOIYS.
current in all cases, goes through the gangliori.  Hence, although we do nof know precisely what is the agency or efficiency of the nerve cells of the gray matter, there can be no
reason to doubt their activity, or the necessity of that activity,
to the production of reflex action of any kind.
The above citations from Carpenter would be sufficient for
our present purpose, but as in the words I have cited, he has
spoken of "several groups" of actions, to which the nervous
system of mzan is subservient, I will give his definition of the
remaining three.  "3. When the outness or externality of
the objects which give rise to our sensations has been recog"nized bypercelzion, we begin to form ideas respecting their
"nature, qualities, etc... and they (the ideas) may ex"press themselves in action, as we see in the movements of a
"somnamnbulist... This form of nervous activity, which
"may be termed zdeo-mzo/or, seems to be the ordinary mode in
such of the lower animals as are governed  by l?zlellgence
"rather than by Instinrct; but it is abnormal and exceptional in
"man."'4. WVith ideas are associated feelings of various
"kinds which constitute Passio'is and  Enmolions, and these,
"when strongly excited, may become distinct springs of action,
so powerful as even to master the control of the will, pro"ducing emlohlional movements.    [Carpenter has elsewhere
called them ellzo/o-nmoor motions.j
As to the fifth class, he says, " In the well-regulated mind of
"man, however, the Wil possesses supreme direction over the
"whole current of thought, feeling and action."   This, of
course makes the fifth class and completes the list.
But I see no good reason for the fourth class, as distinct from
the others.  And in the preceeding Lectures [omitted in this
publication], I have given my reasons for regarding the spinal
32 
CO0NS CIO USSNESS.
cord as the centre of the lowest or excito-nmolor emotions, and the
continuation of the spinal cord after it enters the skull-the
sensoriurm, as the centre of the "sensori-motor," and the hemispIheres, as the centre of the "ideo-motor" emotions.   And I
propose also, to make the word " reflex" more general than
Carpenter has done, and use it to include all three kinds.
And I propose to call the active states of the nerve centres
which result in the excit/o-molor and the sensorz'-mo/or actionssensalions; and that in the hemispheres, when regarded from a
purely physical point of view, an zdea or ideaton.
This excitement in the spinal cord is produced by any condition of the body.   The active state of the sensorium is produced by any external object acting-throug(h the special or objective senses. And the active state of the brain —which I propose to call an "idea," is produced by either a state of the
body or any external object, extending its influence up through
the crura cerebrii or the corpus callosum, when there is any,
into the hemispheres.
But to return to the subject now more immediately before
us-Consciousness.  Is consciousness essential to sensation,
either as an element or as a sign?  I propose to answer this
question in the negative. But we must first consider a little
what is really meant by consciousness.
Sir William Hamilton says, [Phiiosophy of the Conditoned, p.
57, note,] "The Greeks, perhaps fortunately, had no special
"term for consciousness." And at the end of the note he
says, " some, however, of the commentators on Aristotle intro"duced the term  uvez'Oqoz;, employing it by extension
"for  consciousness in general.   The  word  *vvyiezioz;,
however, certainly occurs-but probably it meant more nearly
the same, as our word conscience, rather than consciousness
2*
33 
.LIVE, QUESTIO02S.
Locke, as is well known, referred the origin of all knowledge to Seensa/lij  and Re.lechon.  And  in this connection he
defines reflection as follows: "The other fountain.
"which I call Reflection...  from  which  experience
"furnisheth the understanding with ideas, is the perception of
"the operations of our own mind within us, as it is employed
"about the ideas it has got; which operations, when the soul
"comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understand " ing with another set of ideas, which could not be had frcm
"things without-aland such are perception, thinking, doubt''ing, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the dif"ferent actings of our own minds."  (Essay B, II, ch. I, ~ 4.)
And in ~ I9 he says, " Consciousness is the perception of what
' passes in a man's own mind."  It is difficult to see how the
two words, as thus defined, can be regarded as having a different meaning.
And yet Hamilton, (work before cited p. 53,) says, "Aris"totle, Descartes, Locke and philosophers in genera], have re"garded consciousness, not as a particular faculty, but as the
"universal condition of intelligence." Locke does, undoubtedly, argue at great length, and with great pertinacity, that
there is no consciousness without thought, and no thought,
feeling or will without consciousness.   But it does not seem to
me, on a careful reading of all that Locke has said, and especially the words just quoted, that Hamilton has quite appreciated what Locke did really mean by the word consciousness.
However it seems worth while to quote Hamilton's words a
little further.   He  says, " Reid on the contrary, following,
"probably, Hutcheson, and followed by Stewart, Royer Col"lard, and others, has classed consciousness as a coordinate
"faculty with the other intellectual powers-distinguished from
31 
C 0 NS C10 USNESS.
' them, not as a species from the individual, but as the indi"vidual from the individual. And as the particular faculties
"have each their peculiar object, so the peculiar object of con sciousness is, tile operations of ahe other faculties themselz,es, to
"the excluszonz of the objects about which these operations are
" conversant.
Jlamilton, as we all know, had a peculiar view of consciousness.  It had been held that we have "izmedia/e" knowledge
of external things.  This he was not disposed to deny, though
others had denied it, and he sought rather to confirm and justify the doctrine.   Hence he says, p. 37, " Consciousess and
imBzmediate knoivledge are thus terms universally convertible,
"and. if there be an immediate knowledge of things external,
"there is consequently the consciousnzess of  an outer ztorld."
Again in his "Philosophy of Common Sense," (p. 31, Appleton's
edition) he says, "In the act of sensible perception, I am con"scious of two things: —of nmyself as the perceizvin,g szubject and
"of an external realiTy, in relation to my sense, as the object
"perceived. Of the existence of both of these things I am
"convinced-because I am conscious of knowing each of
"them, not mediately in something else as -epresented, but im"mediately in itself as exizstizg." Again "Philosophy of Per ception," (same vol., p. 1 73,) he says, " the assertion that we
"can be conscious of an act of knowledge without being con"scious of its object is virtually suicidal."
We see here clearly the motive which  led Hamilton  to his
peculiar theory or doctrine concerning consciousness.  Probably no position taken in the domain of philosophy or religion,
merely for the sake of any such utilitarian ends, has ever been
finally adopted or found tenable. Sir William Hamilton's experiment in that line certainly has fared no better than the
thousands of others.
35 
Ll1fE QUESI ION-S.
It is due, however, in justice to so distinguished an author
and philosopher, to say a word in his defence-not indeed, in
defence of his nmoti/es; for they need no defence-but in regard
to the error he had in view.   Let us recall a few of his words,
and consider one or two of the peculiarities of his phraseology.
He says-giving my italics and not his-" I am conscious of
"knowing each of them not i;edeiakly zn somethling else, as refre"senled butl immedi/ely, " etc. Now the words "as represented,"
seem to show that he had in mind either the scholastic doctrine
of "sensible species," or Locke's doctrine of' idea-images" or
perhaps both —both of which, however, have nlow been exploded.  Again the words "not mediately, z'iz something else-but
immediately Zn z/seif" look to me, as though he had in mind
Hegel's doctrine of "the thing in itself, (ding an szcA,) as contrasted with Hamiltop's doctrine, that we see things only in relation one to another, and as "conditioned."  CertainlyI Hamilton did not mean to say, or at least he would not have in-'
tended to say, if only his attention had been called to his assertion, that we perceive external things zmmedia/ely-in reference to the external organs of sense, as the eye, the ear, etc.,
nor yet in reference to "that state of mind" produced by them,
which is called "sensation."  It is possible also, that he had in
mind Cousin's doctrine concerning the spontaneous and the
reflex action of "the Reason," in affirming the existence and
reality of external objects.
But admitting, as most assuredly Hamilton did, the use and
the necessity of the external organs of sense, he could not have
intended to say that the perception of external objects is izzmediate, as not implying their use.
So too, I think it obvious that he used the word "consciousness " in two entirely different senses.  Without  being at all
36 
CO I s CIO USNESS.
aware  of any ambiguous  middle, he was  commnitting one.
When he says,  "I am conscious of perceiving," etc., he  uses
the word in the stricter and narrower sense, as defined by
Locke when he said, "Consciousness is the perception of what
"passes in a man's own mind."   But when he says, "I am
"conscious of an external reality," he uses the word in that
broader and more comprehensive sense, in which it becomes
equivalent, or nearly so, " to perceiving" or even to "knowing,"
as if he had said "I know  immediately, and not as an infer"ence from a process of reasoning, laboriously and conscious ly performed-that there is an external object in relation with
my senses."
Notwithstanding, therefore, this effort of HIamilton's to introduce a new definition for the word "Consciousness,"'
President Porter gives the old and simpler one.   "Conscious"ness," says he, "' is briefly defined as the power by which the
"soul knows its own acts and states.  T'he soul is aware of the
"fleeting and transitory cacts which it performs; as when it
"perceives, remembers, feels and decides. It also knows its
"own states; as when it is conscious of a continual condition
of intellectual activity, a gay or melancholy mood of feeling,
"or a fixed and enduring purpose.   Whether the state is in
"such cases in fact prolonged, or only repeated by successive
"renewals, we need not here inquire; it is sufficient that states
"of the soul are distinguished firom its acts by their seeming
" continuance."
On this definition I have two comments to make.
I. Consciousness is defined as apower," the power by which"
-I think this is not quite accurate. Doubtless the phrase
might be allowed in ordinary discourse, but in a definition, it
seems to me, that not the word "power," but the word " act,"
37 
LIVE QUESTIONYS.
should have been used.  We have been too long accustomed
to speak of " mental faculties" and "mental  powers" as if
they were something concrete, as we speak, in fact, of thile organs of the body, as heart, lungs, etc.  We have been so long
accustomed to this way of speaking, that by a sort offigu,(
dz'ci/onzi, we have come to believe that the soul is made  up of
faculties, as the body is, of organs and tissues. I would say,
therefore, that consciousness is the act of knowving, or by which
we know, etc., and not "' the power" or' the faculty," etc.
2. I think that the primary and fundamental ground of distinction between "acts" and "states" is not well presented
and is perhaps rather ignored or winked out of sight. I doubt
whether the length and duration of their continuance  is the
real ground of the distinction. That ground is rather, as I
think, the fact that in the one class, "the acts," we are conscious that we ourselves are the agents, the efficient cause of
them, and in the other, "the states," we are equally conscious
that we are acted upon by something external to and different
from ourselves. Perception is an ac/; sensation is a slate. Of
this distinction I shall have occasion to say more hereafter.
But I think it of fundamental importance and based upon a
difference that cannot be ignored or explained away.
I think then, llotwithstanding Hamilton's opinion to the
contrary, that Locke did use the word Consciousness in the
modern sense, and that this use of it began with him, and is
likely to remain.* Hlamilton's theory is peculiar, and has led
*There is something peculiar and noteworthy in Locke's manner of introducing the word " Cnsciousness."  Inl the 4th Section of B. If. ch. I, he
used the wvord "reflection," as we have just seen.  But in pursuing his subject, in elaborating and emphasizing his statement, the word " conscious"ness " comes in only a few pages after the formal use of the word "re
38 
COA.SCIO USN ESS.
to forms of expression that are not in accordance with the
common sense and the common usages of mankind.  And  in
such conflicts between philosophy and common sense, common sense usually gets the best of it in the end.
On Locke's definition, however, I would offer one or two
remarks.   Ile says, "consciousness is the perception of what
passes in a man's own mind."
Note in the first place that he does not call it a " ptower"' or
a " faculty" of the mind. I think that in this he was more fortunate than Reid and his followers, including if we may do so,
both Sir \Villiam ilImilton and President Porter.  This use of
the wvords " power" and "faculty" has been, as I believe, the
cause of much mischief. Almost instantly, and without thought
or consciousness of the act, they have been taken as concrete
terms, and set imagination or fancy at work to think what they
are-what relation they sustain to the mind, how they work,
under what laws, and within what limits they perform their
special functions.   And  the discussions and answers which
these questions have elicited have constituted pretty much all
that we have been accustomed to get under the head of " Psychology" or "Mental Philosophy."
But they are no concrete terms at all; when we say the mind
has the power of doing so and so, we only mean it is able to
do so —we affirm only a property or quality of the mind. \Ve
do not necessarily create —and we certainly should not intend
"flection."  It seems  to come  of itself, and as though Locke  was  not
aware that he was doing a thing that was to be forever —introducing an ex
pression that was to take the place of tho one he himself had already given
out with apparent care and set purpose. But it is so convenient that he himself uses it ever after in his Essay more frequently than the former term and
almost to its entire exclusion.
39 
LIVE Q UESTIO:YS.
to violate the old axiom and "create an entity prae/tr necessiIalemt." It is much the same with the word "faculty." The primary signification of the word was  "power,"  "ability," and
then it came to denote the person or body of persons, as in a
college or university, who had the power or right to do certain
things.  But since the time of Reid it has been applied to the
mind in a way, which I think has sugg,ested very much the same
view of the mind as we have of tbie body —a heart for o.e class
of functions, lungs for another, and so on. But all of this is
wrong and mischievous. Locke's phraseology gives no occasion for this error.
But Locke uises the word "'perception," "' the perception
which we have," etc. I would avoid that word in my definition; both because it is used elsewhere to denote one specific
class of the phenomena or acts of which we are conscious, and
also because it is so used here as to denote  "something that
"we have" instead of the act of having it.
I would say then that in the strictest sense of the word, consciousness is the act of knowing what passes in the mind.
The word is also used in several other more general and
somewhat different senses, which it is not necessary to discuss
here.  One of them only, will I mention: the word is often
used to denote that which is known by the acts of consciousness; and sometimes it is used as if to denote a space or sphere
within which the facts thus known, occurred.
The practical question now is, what is contained in coinsciousness?  How  much do we know by these acts of consciousness? Is what we thus know zmmedi'a/ely known? And
can we be said to know anything else immediately, or in any
way except by inference, from what is thus known by consciousness? Of course, here are more questions than can be an
4O 
CO AS CIO USN-ESS.
swered in one Lecture. I shall therefore confine myself for
the present, to one or two of them.
I have already remarked that Locke was very positive on the
point that there is no state or act of the mind of which we are
not conscious.  Hle  says, B. ii, c. I, ~ Io: " I do not say
"there is no soul in a man, because he is not sensible of it in
"his sleep-but I do say, he cannot think at any timne, waking
"or sleeping, without being sensible of it.  Our being sensi"ble of it, is not necessary to any thing, but to our thoughts;
"and to them it is, and to them it will always be necessary, till
"we can think without being conscious of it."
Locke is here attempting to account for "the idea" of personal identity-as derived fromnt "reflection." And it seems to
rne that all throughout this argument he makes about as sharp
a distinction between consciousness and reflection as can well
be made. Consciousness, like perception, is an act which we
cannot but perform when the conditions which occasion it
occur.   But reflection has an element of duration in it. It is
produced too, in part, at least, by the will directing, control.
ing and guiding it.  \When a sensation is produced under ordinary circumstances, we cannot but perceive the object that
occasioned it, according to the mode and measure of the kind
of sensation it produces. So when the mind is called into activity-whether by external objects acting through the organs
of sense-by the will rousing the mind to activity-or by the
autonomy of the brain, if there be such a thing, wv cannot but
be conscious that we are perceiving, thinking, willing, etc.
and we may direct our thoughts chiefly to either of two phenomena-our own acts in perceiving, imagining, willing, etc.,
-or to the object which occasions the perception —or about
which the iimagination, the thinking, the willing, etc, takes
place.
41 
LIVE Q UESTIO AS.
Locke goes on to meet the objection of those  who had opposed his theory, by drawing from it the inference, that if the
idea of personal identity is derived from reflection-that is from
consciousness-men have no existence when they are unconscious, and are not the same persons in any two successive
states of conscious existence.  And I quote a little farther
"I grant that the soul of a waking man  is never without
"thought, because it is the condition of being awake, but
"whether sleeping without dreaming be not an affection of the
whole man, mind as well as body, may be worth a waking
man's consideration  it being hard to conceive, that anything
"should( think, and not be conscious of it."
Farther on, ~ 19, he says, "For they who tell us that the
soul always thinks, do never, that I remember, say that a
"man always thinks. Can the soul think and not the man?
"or a man think and not be conscious of it?..  If they
"say the man thinksalways, but is not always conscious of it,
"they may as well say his body is extended without  having
' parts."
Locke's definition and account of sensation is rather pecuiar, and ought to be cited.  B. I, c. X, ~ 2, definring sensation
ie says, "' Our senses, conversant about particular sensible ob"jects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of
"things,.. thus we come by those ideas which we have of
"yellow, white, etc., and all those which we call sensible qual ities, which, when I say the senses convev into the mind, I
"mean, they, from external objects, convey into the mind what
"produces there those perceptions.  This great soLrce of most
"of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses
"and directed by them to the understanding, I call SE,NSATION."
Sensation, therefore, is not, according to Locke, a mere s/ale
42 
CO NS CIO US',XESS.
of the iZII(/; it is rather " the source of ideas," the means or
channel by which they come into the mind. Again, B. I, C. 2 ~ 3.
"Thus the perception which actually accompanies, and is an"nexed to any impression on the body, made by an external
"object, being distinct from all other modifications of thinking,
furnishes the mind with a distinct idea, which we call sensa"tion; which is, as it were, the actual entrance of any idea
"into the understanding by the senses-the same idea, when
"it again recurs without the operation of the like object on the
"external sensory, is remembrance."   Here "the furnishing
"of the mind with a distinct idea" "the actual entrance of
"any idea into the understanding by the senses," he calls a
sensation.
Locke'lived before the discovery of reflex action, and before
attention had been called to the fact of a state of activity in
the nervous centres, which may result in reflex action, or in
conscious perception, with or without pain —or both reflex action and pain —whenever the irritation produced in any organ of
sense or in any sensitive part of the body extends to that centre, along the path of the afferent nerve to the brain.   Here,
then, we have a phenomenon, now known and admitted bv
all-of which, however, he knew nothing, to which he gave no
thought, and for which he had no occasion for a name.   Shall
we call it sensation? that is what I propose.   And then I shall
have departed about as far, perhaps, from the doctrines of this
great founder of English metaphysics, as those, wvho going in
the opposite direction, have called it "a state of Ithe mrind."
Locke never went so far as that.
But  how  about consciousness?  I suppose Locke would
agree with them that there can be no sensation without consciousness as completely as if he had foreseen and acquiesced
43 
LITlE QUESTIONAS.
in their definition of sensation  although his definition differs
as far from theirs, I think, as mine does.
Believing that sensation is purely a physical  phenomenon —
a mere state of nerve-cell activity, I do not think that consciousness is any element of sensation; nor always and necessarily the only sign of its existence.
We certainly know that in many cases of reflex action, from
the spinal cord, there is no consciousness of sensation and no
perception or knowledge of the muscular contraction, or of the
motion of the limb, except what is derived by other senses and
is known to the patient himself by precisely the same means as
it is known to other persons, and by no other means.   A man
who is paralyzed in his lower limbs, for example,  will often
move one of his feet if an irritation is produced on the bottom
of it. I suppose there can be no doubt the irritation extends
up the afferent nerves, produces a new state of activity in the
cells of the gray matter of the spinal cord, and they send down
an influence that contracts the muscles and moves the foot.
But there is no consciousness of the irritation in the foot, or of
the active state of the nerve cells, or of the motion that ensues.    If, however,  there had  been  no  interruption,  the
irritation would have, in some way, reached the hemispheres of
the brain, and then there would have been perception and consciousness.
But was the active state of the nerve cells in the spinal cord,
from which reflex action ensued, or was it not, the same as it
would have been if there had been no discontinuity between it
and the brain?  No one, of course, knows precisely  what it
was or is, in either case. No one can tell precisely what are its
elements, or in what it consists. But it seems to me that all
the indications are that it is the same in both cases; where
41 
CO.YSCID USNESS.
there is consciousness, and where there is not.  At all events,
we know of no difference whatever. And therefore, it seems to
me that it is best to call them, for the present at least, by the
same name; and to admit that, although consciousness and
perception do accompany sensation when the body is in its
normal condition. they do not always accompany it and are not,
either of them, essential to it.
There is another kindred subject of great importance in this
connection.  It is what Carpenter has called "unconscious cere"brahibn."  I do not like the name; but it points to, and is
used to denote, a class of phenomena that deserve consideration.
In his late work' Princifles of Afenlal Physilogy, p. 5 I 5, he
introduces the chapter which he heads "Unconscious Cerebra"tion,"' thus: "Having thus found reason to conclude that a
"large part of our intellectual activity —whether it consists in
reasoning processes, or in the exercise of the imagination —
is essentially automatic and may be described in physiological
"language as the reflex achon of the cerebrum, we have next to
"consider whether this action may not take place unconsciously.
"To affirm that the cerebrum may act upon impressions trans"mitted to it and may elaborate intellectual (?) results such as
"we mnight have attained by the intentional direction of our
"minds to the subject, witlhout any consciousness, on our parts,
"is held by many metaphysicians, more especially in Britain,
"to be an altogether untenable and most objectionable doc"trine.  But its affirmation is only the physiological expression
o' a doctrine which has been current among the metaphysi"cians of Germany, from the time of Leibnitz to the present
"date, and  was systematically expounded  by  Sir William
"I tamilton."
45 
LIVE QUTESTIO-NS.
HIamilton, however, would have avoided-and so far as I
know he always did avoid-the expression that affirms that
"the cerebrum elaborates in/e/lec/ual results "-whether  consciously or unconsciously.   He always attributed  such results
not to the brain, but to the mind.
The phenomena referred to are called by others, besides
Carpenter, "latent mental modification," or in short, "latent
"mental action."
It is not my purpose now' to describe at length, the phenomena here spoken of, 9r to give the proof of their reality.
They consist mostly of cases like what occur to all persons.
Suppose, for instance, I think of a man now, and cannot recal
his name; I may turn my thoughts to something else, and my
mind, so far as I am conscious of its activity, may be wholly
occupied with something else; and  yet, after a few minutes,
the name will come to me again; I may go to bed perplexed
over an incomprehensible problem, and after a night's sleep,
arise with the whole solution as clear as any thought I can
have.   Or in other cases the solution or comprehension of the
subject will not come until after weeks or even months,' during
which I have been wholly occupied with other things, and have
scarcely given a conscious thought to the subject that had thus
puzzled me. Carpenter remarks somewhere, if I remember
rightly, that nearly all the best thoughts he has ever had, have
come to him in this way-weeks or months after he had given
up a subject-perplexed with it and disheartened of all hope
of ever comprehending it-at some unexpected moment, perhaps in the midst of other forms of intense mental activity, the
whole thing would come to him in perfect order, and with the
clearness of a long comprehended truth.
How shall we explain these phenomena? Shall we depart
46 
CON0;CIO USN-ESS.
from Locke's doctrine and admit that there are many states or
acts of the mind of which we are not conscious?   Or shall we
admit, as Carpenter clearly claims, that the cerebrum is undergoing, unconsciously, changes which bring it to a state in
which the act of memory-the insight into a problem or the
solution of its difficulties, is immediate and without apparent
or conscious, effort?
I think that the progressing study of the physiology of the
nervous system is doing great things for us; and  will do even
greater things yet.  i fully expect that we shall yet admit that
the active state of the nerve centres, occasioned by the excitement of any external object, is a sensation-and that it is the
only phenomenon that deserves that name.   We have then two
distinct centres of seisation-the spinal cord, for all the sensations produced by the tissues of the body and their changing
conditions, their aches and their pains-and the sensorium, the
centre in which-all the nerves of the special sense terminate,
including, as I think, the sense of touch, regarded as distinct
from the general sensibility to pain-as well as the sense of
sight.
Then we know also that whenever either of these centres is
excited to a state of activity-the state which I am  proposing
to call a sensation-they communicate with the hemispheres
of the brain, the cerebrum, and produce there a state of nervecell activity.  And what shall we call that state?   Wi4h it there
comes perception and consciousness- or consciousness and
perception. Sometimes the one and sometimes the other appears, in our after remembrance of the event, to have been first.
But what is it? Doubtless there is mental activity wil, it.
But it is not menial activity that we are talking about or inquiring after.  To that activity we give the names perception, con
47 
LIVE Q UESTIOQ;S.
sciousness, etc. What then shall we call the physical state,
the state of the brain-the mere nerve-cell activity- that is associated with it, and which in fact, in these cases, occasions the
mental states or acts?  It would be departing, hardly, if at
all, farther from established usage to call it an' idea"-or
"ideation," than it is to call the nerve-cell activity in the spinal cord and sensorium a "sensation."  And  there would be
an analogy in the two; good reasons, I think for both.
But to our more immediate purpose.   We have seen, beyond
doubt, that the nerve-cell conditions or states, which we propose to call sensations may take place without our being conscious of them.   That they occur is proved by the reflex actions that ensue; that we are unconscious of them is proved
by the testimony of all human beings who have been subject
to them. Now may not precisely this thing take place in the
brain? and may not modifications of its nerve cells be going
on when there is no conscious thought —no perception of anything; no consciousness at the time and no memory of it
afterwards?
But says the objector, what if we have sensations with no
consciousness of them?  I answer nothing,.  We  have them
and are not conscious of them-that is all.  And if we are not
conscious of them, they can b~ no means of knowledge to us
-though they may be, and in fact they often are, means of
reflex action.
Some changes are going on doubtless, while we are asleep.
Not only does the blood continue to circulate, but the brain
itself undergoes repair, and is restored to the conditon it was
in, before the fatigue and exhaustion that preceded the sleep.
Nor is this all. I have defined sensation as a state of the
nerve centres which has been recenIly produced; and I have
48 
CO /S CIO US A-ES S.
given examples of cases in which a state that has long contin ued, ceases tobe a means, either of perception or of reflex
action.  It may be that the nerve cells are never quite at rest in
any one of the nerve centres. The keeping up of the vital
functions in sleep, would seem to indicate this fact.  If so, we
have the important modification of our doctrine, that not all
the states of the nerve centres can be regarded as sensations.
They become such only under certain conditions and circum stances; and these centers are probably active in the way of sen sation, only a small part of the time during one's life.
The idea I have, is easily illustrated by reference to facts (and
theories) in physical science. Light and sound consist of dif ferent kinds of waves and in different media.   But it is only
within certain limits that these waves are luminous or sonorous.
Light waves are dark, and not light at all, outside of the spec trum.   So again light and heat are supposed to depend on different kinds of molecular motions. So it may be with the
nerve-cell activities. It may be that only those that are within
certain limits of intensity, become sensations-causes of reflex
action, or occasions of consciousness and perception. Or it
may be that those that are sensations and those that are not,
differ in kind, as heat, motion and light-motions in the molecules of bodies are supposed to differ from one another.
So with the nerve centres.  There may be a great many forms
and occasions of nerve-cell activity-which do not excite the
mind to either consciousness or perception, cr to any other
mental act. There may be therefore many changes going on in
the brain —-a kind of "cerebration" of which we are unconscious,
and of which we know nothing except what we infer from
results.
Now, whether this kind of nerve-cell activity, in the hemispheres, will explain what Carpenter calls the phenomena of
49 
LIVE Q UESTIO  S.
"unconscious cerebration," and others call "latent mental
"action" or not, I will not attempt here to inquire.  I proceed rather to one more thought which I wish to offer in concluding this Lecture.
That human beings are conscious of some of their mental
acts and states is not denied. That there are many states of
the nerve centres that excite to consciousness and other forms
of mental activity, is not a matter of question. Nor do I think
it any more a matter of question, that by far the largest part of
these states or stages of activity do not occasion, and are not
accompanied by consciousness.   But is there consciousness in
animals also? using the word in the sense in which we have
been using it to denote a class of the phenomenon of human
intelligence. I think not.
I do not propose to prove a negative.   I propose rather  to
call attention to thestate of the argument —the negative char acter of the argumentation —so to call it.
In human beings we assert consciousness on the ground of
being conscious. I am not only conscious that I perceive, but
I am conscious that I am  conscious.   Without consciousness
there would be no intelligence-no affirmation-no assertion,
and no denial even-of anything —no use of articulate lan guage or intelligible signs of /hough/.  Signs and proofs of
feelig there of course, could be; for animal motion proves
feeling in the lower sense of reflex emotion, at least. But it
does not prove thought. Even if one could perceive without
being conscious of it, he would not know that he perceived,
and consequently would knozo neither himself nor the perceived
object-he would perceive, but know nothing.
But in regard to dumb animals it is otherwise. I am con scious of mental action wizhznz myse/f   I am  convinced that
there is a like consciousness of mental action in other human
50 
CONSCIO USNESS.
beings-because they signify it to me, most unmistakably, by
their language-articulate or otherwise. Not only have they a
word for the class of mental acts which we call consciousness,
but their language shows that they have experienced such phenomena.   In fact I doubt whether there can be articulate language without consciousness. Parrot-like imitation of words
there doubtless can be-but, I doubt if those processes of abstraction and generalization which occur in the crigination of
language, and in the intelligent acquisition of the use of it as
well, ever occur or could occur without consciousness.
But animals have no such language.  Their sounds and cries,
as well as their acts, so far as we know, do not go beyond the
expression of emotions,  excito- and sensori-motor emotions.
And acts of these two kinds may be performed in entire unconsciousness. We have spoken of the case of the motion of the
foot on tickling it, in paralysis of the lower limbs.   I suppose
all persons have seen the spasmodic motions, and even heard
the moaning sounds-whichl in some cases come to be  articulate words, in the ease of the sick and dying.  These often occur when we can arouse the patient; and then on inquiry we
find that there was no consciousness of the motion or of the
sound, no conscious intention to say anything, or call anybody's name.
Ferrier in his late work on "The Funzchns of the Brazi,"
has given the result of many exceedingly interesting experiments.   He speaks of cases in which the brain down  to the
medulla oblongata was wholly removed, and yet the animal gave
forth cries on pinching its toes, (pp. 26, 39, 67.)  But the cries
appeared to be purely mechanical, like those of an organ pipe,
expressive of no emotion or feeling. He supposes they were
produced by the reflex action that passes down the pneumogastric nerve to the diaphragm and inter-costal muscles.   In
51 
LIVE QUES2 IONS.
some cases, as in cases of rabbits for instance, after the removal
of the hemispheres, leaving the sensorium intact, sound was
also produced; but in this case it was a moaning piteous cry,
as of sadness, rather than of sharp pain,  (p. 68.)  The sound
was accompanied with feeling. But there was no consciousness.  And Ferrier adds, (p. 247,) "I have repeatedly insisted
on the fact, that we are not to take mere reactions to sensory
"impressions as indications of true sensation. If they are to
"be so regarded, then we must clearly differentiate between
"the lower animals and men.   For it has been conclusively
"demonstrated that in man, the consciousness of sensory im"pressions, or true sensation, is a function of the cerebral
hemispheres."
I suppose that we must accept it as an established fact, that
without the hemispheres there can be no consciousness, whether of sensations or of anything else.  I accept the conclusion,
though I cannot here give the proof in detail.  Without the
hemispheres there is no consciousness, and yet without them
"animals," in the words of Ferrier, (p. 37,)' continue to per form actions differing little if at all from those manifested by
"the same animals under absolutely normal conditions."
But it will be said that animals in their health, and in the
perfection of their organism, act precisely as men do who are
conscious of their activity. True indeed; but then they act
just as men do also, when they are unconscious and know nothing of their activity. Shall we then, go beyond the evidence
and ascribe to mere dumb animals, a kind of mental activity,
for the existence and reality of which we have no proof? The
ascribing of consciousness to them is our theory for the explanation of their acts; but it is only a theory. We are doubtless,
led to it by appearances and the analogy of human actions.
But in precisely the same way, mankind were led for thousands
52 
CO~NSC10 USNAESS.
of years to ascribe a motion to the sun and the other heavenly
bodies, which we now hnow they do not possess.
As already remarked, the discovery of the phenomena of the
reflex action of the nervous centres, has done much already to
revolutionize many of our most cherished  psychological  doctrines. I think it will go yet farther, and compel us to cease
to ascribe consciousness to dumb animals at all-and to admit
that in man also, there may be, and probably are, many changes
in the nerve-cells of the brain, involving corresponding changes
in the mental activity, of which we know  nothing, when they
occur-either by consciousness or otherwise.
It will doubtless be difficult for us to understand "animal
"intelligence" in this view of it; difficult to comprehend
how animals act as they do. But it is as difficult to comprehend what is below us, as what is above us, if they are both
different in kind.  It is as difficult, perhaps,  to comprehend
animalintelligence'such as it is, as to comprehend the dizne
omniscience with its fore-knowledge and the freedom of moral
actions.   But I think we have the elements of both in ourselves.  Omniscience is but the perfection of what is in us;
and I fancy-I don't know —but I fancy that what we call animal intelligence is the same in kind as that which we ourselves
experience in some of those moments of the most intense activity, when we do some things-sometimes even very extraordinary things-in a sort of waking somnambulism, with no
consciousness of what we do at the time, and no recollection
of it afterwards.
53 
LECTURE III.
VOLe[ION.
Questions concerning the origin and nature of human action
have occupied about as much attention, and occasioned about
as much discussion and dispute as those that relate to the origin and foundations of human knowledge. And the question
concerning the nature and prevalence of volition and voluntary
action, properly so-called, seems to me to be one of those that
are eminently demanding consideration, and some more definite agreement among psychologists and moralists, as well as in
the speculations of physiologists and the mere students of
Nature.
The discovery of the phenomena and laws of reflex action
have introduced a new element into this discussion, if it has
not given us facts that will totally revolutionize all our previous notions on the subject altogether.
We have seen that any recently produced condition of any
of the tissues of the body, especially if it be painful, extends
up to the gray matter of the spinal cord; and is thence returned as an emotion or a motive tending to put the muscles concerned in the motion to which such a condition of the
tissues should naturally give rise.  This phenomena, we have
seen, may occur in human life, when the patient is entirely unconscious of it, or of any part of it. It may occur also, in 
JO0ITI~ ON.
animals after the brain has been removed —after the spinal cord
has been severed; and to some extent even after death; although in this case it requires, in all cases, I believe, the powerful stimulus of the electric current to produce the motion.
We have seen, also, that external objects, acting upon either
of the five objective senses, touch, taste, smell, sight and hearing, may, ztilhoul produiczng any pazn, exert an influence upon
the nerve centres in which the afferent nerves leading to the
organs of those senses terminate-provided thie afferent nerves
of touch terminate (as I here claim that they do,) in the optic
thllalami-such as to cause the nerve-cells in those centres to
send out a motive influence, or an emotion, which results in
action, in the contraction of muscles, the movement of limbs,
and even the utterance of cries.  It is not quite so)'clear that
this can take place, without either the spinal cord or the medulla oblongata.  But there seems to be abundant proof that
such phenomena can occur without the hemispheres; and with
no consciousness of sensation, no perception, no mental act of
any kind whatever.   See Ferrier's "FiFunclzons  of the Brains,"
pp. 26, 39, etc.
There is, I think, a class of reflex actions in which the brain
proper-the hemispheres-take part, called, as we have remarked in preceding Lectures, ideo-motor. I believe-though
I am not so sure of it —that actions of this kind, can take
place without our consent; and even against our will; and they
occur also at times when we do all in our power to prevent
them.  The laug-hing, at something ludicrous,  when  we are
heartily ashamed of our apparent levity; the weeping when the
grief seems unmanly, or the expression of it, a weakness that
we would avoid at any cost, if we could, are examples of this
kind of ideo-motor emotions.   The nerve cells of the brain
53 
L1-VIE QUESTIONS.
have been put into a state of activity which we neither desired,
nor consciously produced, and which we would'gladly have
avoided, could we have done so.
Now, in hunlan life, all action or motion, before birth, is of
the first named kind, the lowest in the order, or excito-motor,
and is occasioned by some effects produced in the tissues of the
body, acting on the subjective sense-the sense of bodily condition. After birth, the objective senses, are, for a while, in
such a conditionsthat no external object makes any very definite impression upon them.  But still they do make impressions; and we have almost immediately sensori-motor motions.
And soon, too, —but nobody can tell how soon-ideo-motor
emotions ensue.   And it is probable,  nay, certain, that the
brain exerts an influence upon the two other ceitres,-the spinal cord and the sensorium,-in the way of what is called
"iznAb7tion," if nothing else.  But soon come the ideo-motor
emotions; and as a result, emotions and actions that have their
origin in the nerve-cell action of the hemispheres of the brain.
And they are such as would never occur if there were no brain,
or if there were not somewhere in the body nerve-cells that
correspond to those which constitute the gray coating or cineritious matter of the hemispheres. I say in the brain, or somewhere else —for as Ferrier remarks, (p. 44,) in view of some
reflex actions, which seem to be ideo-motor even when there
are no hemisphere: " It is probable therefore, that in the gang" lia of the invertebrates there are nerve cells which perform,
"in however lowly a manner, the functions of the cerebral
" hemispheres in the vertebrates."
And after a while too, there come both consciousness and
volition.  I am not sure which comes first, nor whether they
do not come together.  I think it doubtful if there is any con
56 
VOL  TION,                 5
sciousness, in the proper sense of the word, in the earliest days
of human infancy.   I doubt too, if there is any consciousness
before there is volition, or any volition before consciousness.
It is very likely that it is the exercise of volition that first awakes
consciousness.
But with volition there comes a fourth kind of action; or at
least a fourth element that enters henceforward, into human
experience, and largely into all human action. Seldom is any
motor tendency, whether excito-motor, sensori-motor, or ideomotor, so strong as to overcome the weight and inertia of a
limb, and thus move it by the purely physical effect of the sensation transformed into reflex emotion alone; and seldom is
there any so strong that we cannot control them, and resist
them, if we will.
This reflex action we know in ourselves-in two ways, or by
two means.   (I) We are conscious of it, and (2) we  cognise
the motions by the physical method, just as we do similar phenomena in lower animals.   Even a paralyzed man  can see his
foot move as truly as he sees the frog jump, when the irritation
used is applied to his hinder limb. But the voluntary element
like consciousness itself, we know only by this faculty of interior observation. as it has been called, that is by consciousness,
and by consciousness alone.  Of course, therefore, in the exercise of this method or means of knowledge, each one of us,
is observant of himself alone; and he can apply the methods
to no being, human or otherwise, besides himself. With regard to all others, the voluntary element is a matter of inference, and of inference only.
And as with consciousness so with volition also; we  znfer
volition in the case of our fellow men, from the language they
use in describing what they know  of their own  actions.   But
o3g
57 
LIVE Q UESTI02O S.
in regard to the mere dumb animals, we are left to such inferences as we can draw from their actions alone.  They often act
as human beings do, and as human  beings, voluntary agents
might be supposed to do, if they were in the place of the animals. And this is all. It is much like the condition the human race were in before Copernicus. They supposed that the
sun and stars rose and set; that was one way, /hezr way, of accounting for the phenomena they observed. But objections
were raised, arguments adduced, facts established, tending in
the other direction, and now nobody believes the old theory.
\Vith regard to human action, then, we have three causesor classes of causes, the one, the tissues of our own bodies,
their pains and aches, acting on the spinal cord and producing
excito-motor emotions; and, of course, external objects may
cause the pains and aches.  Second, external objects acting
through the objective senses, upon the sensorium and producing there sensations which those centres convert into sensorimotor emotions. We usually call the condition of the nerve
centers in both these cases, a sensation.   But these objects
may extend their influence up to the hemispheres; and then
not only do we become conscious of the sensations, and perceive the object that produced it; but there occurs also a state
of the nerve-cell activity which we call ideahon or an "idea"
simply. This idea may also result in an ideo-motor emotion.
And then in the third place, we have the mind or the body
as one of the forces that produce action. It acts on the nervecells of the hemispheres of the brain; and through them, on
the afferent nerves that go to the muscles and glands of the
body, producing in the one what we call volun/ary action-or
the voluntary element in human action-and in the other, those
activities of the gland and the changes of the secretions which
58 
VOLITIO                   59
come fiom over exertion, preverse action, or  the improper
thoughts of the mind.
Now I think that in the three kinds of reflex action, namely,
excito-motor, sensori-motor and ideo-motor, we have what
writers in all ages have been accustomed to call INSTINCT.
Instinct has sometimes been regarded as opposed to, or contrasted with reason; and quite as often, perhaps, as contrasted
with volition.  It has seldom been defined; and no definition
of it that has been given is generally accepted. The fact is, it
has not been understood) and therefore it could not be defined.
The word instinct has however been used to indicate, in a general and indistinct way, whatever any man or animal does naturally and not from any conscious reasoning or choice, concerning what he does do. But I think it will now be admitted
that whatever we do in this way falls into one or the other of
these three categories: excito-motor, sensori-motor or ideomotor.   And this is all the kinds or varieties of action that any
one can recognise, who does not admit the existence of a mind
which is self active and spontaneous ill its nature.
There are, doubtless, activities in the nerve centres of different animals, as well as in those of human beings. And they
constitute the peculiarities of their nature. For example, there
is something in the sensorium or brain of a young duck whereby water is attractive, and induces the young bird to run and
plunge into it, and enables it to swim at once, when in the
water, without experience or instruction. But water repels the
youlng of many), other species of birds, so that they avoid it.
All ruminants draw up the water they drink by suction. Cats
and dogs lap theirs up with the tongue; and the one species,
dogs, bend their tongues backwards, while the other, cats,
bend theirs forward in the act of throwing the water into their
59 
L1 VIE QUESTIOAS.
mouths. No one can explain these differences, that I know of,
but doubtless they are all instinctive, and all owing to some
differences in the nerve centres of these animals.
And so of the thousand little, nameless traits and habits by
which we never fail to discriminate one species of animals from
another.   They are doubtless, all of them, instinctive, determined by some peculiarity either of the nerve-cells or of their
distribution and relations-and so fore-ordained in the very
constitution and nature of the animals, each one by itself and
"after its kind."  This is shown by the two-fold fact (I) that
when the young are taken from the mother before any possibility of education or imitation, they never fail to be like their
parents in all the traits that characterize the species.  (2.) The
other fact is that by no amount of "variation under domestica"tion," " natural selection," nor yet by climatic or other influences, so far as we know, can man or nature overcome or
outdo those specific instincts and habits which are peculiar to
the species and characteristic of it.  Color  and form may
change; size may vary within almost any limiting extremes
new habits and instincts may be acquired or superinduced and
transmitted through any number of generations. But after all,
and through all, the peculiar traits and habits, motions, actions and instincts, that distinguish species from species, do not
change, and apparently cannot be changed, except by the special act of the Creator Ilimself. Take Tor example two dogs,
the most unlike of any that are called by that name, the largest
and the smallest let them differ never so much  in form, in
shape of head or limb, and in all the acquired habits as of
hound and spaniel, setter and pointer, all that man  has been
able to educate them to, or to supeiinduce uponl them, and it
requires no anatornist to describe their osseous system, or to
60 
VOLEII ON.G.
formulate their dentition, though differing as much as hipparion from a horse. WVe all know them to be dogs and
nothing else, from their looks and their habits-their habits
more than their looks-as soon as we see them. These things
were predetermined in their veryconstitution, before man had
control of them.  And they remain in spite of all he can do,
and so far as we know in spite of all the changes that "evolu"tion" and "variation" can make.  MIr. Darwin's most interesting and valuable books-have shown, as clearly as they
have shown that there are wide variations under external
ternal influences; that there are also certain specific traits and
instincts- a fixity of character, hemming in each species by
bonds and limits, beyond which there can be no variation.
And so I have no doubt it is with the differences in the mental capacities, preferences and tastes of mankind, whereby
some are mathematicians and some are poets, by nature; some
are naturalists and some linguists; some are artists, others are
,o awkward that they can do nothing as other people do it.
rhese differences are all instinctive, pre-determined and foreordained in the very constitution of the nervous system of the
individual-necessitated so far as he is concerned by some peculiarity of nerve cell, or nerve centre, over which he has but
a limited control. Though he can restrain to some extent the
manifestation of his peculiarities he cannot become wholly like
another nman.
But we must return to the consideration of the subject that
is more immediately before us, Volition.  Unless there were a
mind in man-a something that is not inert like matter, but is
spontaneous and self active, there could be neither consciousness nor volition.   Knowledge, in any of its forms is not a
function, a property, or a mode, of mere matter.
61 
LIVE QUESTIONYS.
As soon as we become conscious at all we are conscious of
volition and we know, if we reflect upon it at all, that we ourselves-this which I call I, or myself, is one of the forces that
produce my action. I know, because I am conscious and have
reflected upon it, that I think.  I consider, reason for and
against, and resolve or choose, that I will do something, and
that as a consequence, my hands or my feet, my body or my
tongue  moves.   And  without that effort, they, in most of
the ten thousand acts which I perform daily, would not move.
I am conscious, in some cases of a reflex tendency to act in the
same direction as my choice leads me. I am conscious in
others of an effort to resist such tendency to action; and in
som2 cases I become painfully conscious that, do the best I can,
I cannot resist them-there will be involuntary-spasmodic
actions-in spite of myself.
Now we may analyse these phenomena, as we please-we
may contradict, deny or explain them away, as we please; but
we cannot get rid of the fact that in them all, and in our very
acts of analysis or contradiction, denial or explanation, there
is a something that acts, that analyses, denies or affirms. And
this something, we represent and denote by the pronoun I,
when speaking of these acts as our own.   This pronoun is in
all dialects; it is an element in all languages; it represents an
element-the agent-in all thought, and in all the personal actions of which we are conscious, and without it the
thoughts and the actions could not be at all.  It is a cause;
we use the name of it as nominative to active verbs i   think,
Ispeak, I walk, etc; and the consciousness of these acts of
causation, it is probable, is what first gives us the thought of
cause, and is moreover, what first      suggested to us the idea of
that spontaneity which, as a character of some acts and of
" 62 
VIOLITI[N.
some agents-a more extended analysis shows us must exist
sorme where in the world where there is motion and change at
all.
And  this is more than reaction.   When  the experimenter
pinched the frog's foot and the limb contracted it was a re-action of the spinal cord. When a strong light falls on the retina of the eye, the pupil will contract. This is a re-action of the
nerve cells of the sensorium. And when the whole body leaps
at a sudden fright, this too, is a re-action: in many cases it is
only reaction, in which the cerebellum, if not the cerebum also,
is concerned. But in volition there is more than re-action.
I do not know  that we can choose without a motive.  I presume we cannot.   A pain in the foot reaches the spinal cord,
and moves the foot, if the pain be intense enough.  It may  be
so intense that we cannot if we try, hold the foot still.  But it
may not be intense enough to move the foot; it reaches the
brain, we are conscious of the pain, we think the foot would
be easier or less painful if it were lying in a different position;
we put forth the effort, and move the foot.   Our effort supplements the excito-motor emotion, and the foot moves —we have
a motive for moving the foot.
Again, I see something coming towards my  eye, the lid
shuts; I can't help it.  Perhaps the whole head moves.  Perhaps also the effect which it produces, reaches the hemispheres
of the brain, and, almost quicker than though, I move my
head.   I think it best to get it out of the way.  The object in
some way not only reaches the optic lobes, producing sensation,
but the hemispheres also, ploducing ideathon, as well.
It is certainly very possible that no act of volition takes
place until some object, perceived, imagined, remembered or
conceived, has excited the nerve-cells of the brain to a state of
63 
LI VE QUESTIONS.
activity in which there is not only the mental ac',s of perception, imagination, conceptions, etc., but also some ideo-motor
emotion or tendency to move the muscles.   There is scarcely
any object that can be perceived, or thought of, without some
feeling, some emotion of some kind or another. This feeling
is a tnoloe to action; and to the volition that precedes and produces the action. It is also in its physical aspect, an ideo-motor emotion.
But in very few if in any of these cases is the re-action-the
reflex tendency to action of which the object itself may properly be said to be the cause, and the occasion merely, sufficient to move the limb, carrying the weight and inertia of the
part of our body which is concerned in the motion. And we
are conscious of supplying the rest of the force that is rendered.
We move the hand or the foot.   We set the tongue in motion,
and guide it in the articulation of the words we utter.
I am well aware of the fact that we must make a distinction
between the consciousness of a mental act or state, and our
judgment concerning its character. We often call our mental
acts and states by names which indicate almost anything but
their real character.  Men  call mere acts of fancy, insight or
intuition.  They speak of having an idea, and  of being conscious of it too, when they really haz,e nothing, but are only
/Tzhinkzing of something.   A man may easily mistake anger which
is purely a personal feeling, for indignation which is of a
much  higher  character.   So too, we  often meet  with cases
in which we cannot help thinking that one mistakes and  miscalls his pride and self-conceit by the name of humility.   But
I do not see how one can be mistaken in supposing that he
makes an effort when he does not make any. The act is simple, as simple as sensation, perception, or as consciousness it
64 
FOLII~Y x
self.  It can hardly be mistaken for re-action-for we are perhaps the most conscious of effort, when  we are making the
greatest effort to resist and control the re-actions which external
objects would occasion by the sensations and ideas they produce in us.
Effort is moreover a simple act.  It makes one of the three
coordinate classes of the phenomena of which we are conscious,
sensation or feeling, perception or thought, and volition or effort. The three are unlike in kind. Neither of them can be
resolved into the other.  Neither of them can be mistaken for
the other; and, as I believe, it results from the law or condition
of coordination in cognition, that neither one of them could
have been thought of by any human being, or would have had
a name in any human language, if only the other two-had been
matter of experience.
We may reach the same conclusion with regard to this psychological fact in another way.
I have spoken of reflex action as the result of a re-action of
tha great nerve centres,  It is not, however, as I have explained
elsewhere, so much in the nature of a mechanical re-achion as
in the nature of a physical conversion of one force into another.
A ball thrown against the wall is repelled instantly; the  re-action is instantaneous, and equal to the action. But in the
physico-chemical sciences, re-action or transformation is not
always instantaneous. A feeble current of electricity will, in
time, charge a very large Leyden jar. A piece of platinum
into which a current of electricity is passing, grows warm
gradually, especially if the platinum bar is large and the current is small.   But it gradually heats up to the point where
radiation becomes equal to the rate of increase of heat occasioned by the continuance of the electric current.
65 
LIVE QUESTIO0S.
So it seems to be with the nerve centres,  The intensity of
the sensation increases in some cases, with the continual activity of a cause until it reaches its highest point of intensity
and that point in many cases, becomes so high that we cannot
control our actions; they become involuntary and spasmodic
-we act whether we will or not, and we cannot help acting in
accordance with the reflex impulse.
But we can easily suppose a case in which there is no such
increase of intensity, and yet there is a result which shows an
increase of effort.  In fact, it is obvious, that all through life,
we do not put forth effort in proportion to the value of that
which we seek —but rather in proportion to our estimate of the
difficulty to be overcome, in the Bay of getting it.  However
valuable or necessary an object may be, we put forth but little
effort when we know that it can be obtained with perfect certainty and with ease. But let us take a simple case. Suppose
there is something on the floor that offends me, my eyes or my
nose, and I stoop down with the purpose of picking it up and
tossing it out of the window\v. I suppose it to be loose on the
floor and weighing but a few grains.   I put forth effort accordingly-but it does not come.   I put forth more effort until I
exert strength enotugh to raise the object, or find that it is too
heavy for me to raise it at all. Now here was an increase of
effort, w7it a change of lhoughl, but there was no corresponding
change in the mrni've.  The object did not become more offensive meanwhile. Nor was there time enough for the sensation
to intensify up from a strength sufficient to raise a few grains,
to that which is required to raise as many pounds.  With  no
change therefore, in the force of the motive, or one that is inconsiderably small, there was a great change in the effort I
made. Hence, the I, that made the effort must be a real and
6O 
VOLTION..
an efficient cause. And not only so, it must be a spontaneously.acting, cause; there was nothing but thought and volition in
the case, that varied or changed.   I thought to do it, and  I
willed to do it, and! did it.  The offensive object did not
move itself out of my way; nor did it move me to move it, as
steam and water move the machinery that accomplishes the
wonders of modern manufacture.   There was a force within,
supplementing the force without, cooperating with it, in this
case, although it might have acted in the opposite direction.
All mere matter is now considered as acting under the law of
inertia.  If a mass or a molecule is at rest, no physicist expects that it will change from a state of rest to a state of motion
without the action of some force from without itself. If two
substances, as oxygen and hydrogen are mixed and in contact,
and yet not acting upon each other, no chemist supposes they
will begin to act until something external to them acts upon
them and changes their condition, by pressure, by hleat, by
light, by electricity, or by something of the kind.
But this law cannot hold throughout the universe. It may
pertain to all mere matter; and in fact it is the doctrine of
modern science that it does so extend, and mark off the limits
of mere matter and the material phenomena of change and
motion.   But there must be somewhere  something that does
not act under this law, or rather, perhaps we should say something that is not confined to, and limited by this law. Professor Pierce, of Harvard, in his great work on  "Analylzc Me chanics," begins his treatise with these words: " Motion is
"an essential element of all physical phenomena; and its
"introduction into the universe of matter was necessarily the
"preliminary act of creation, the earth must have remained
"forever without form and void; and eternal darkness must
67 
LIVE QUESTIONS.
"have been upon the face of the deep, if the spirit of God
"had not first moved upon the face of the waters." And he
closes his Book with these words: "But it is time to return to
"nature and learn from her actual solutions, the recondite
"analysis of the more obscure problems of celestial and phys ical mechanics.   In these researches there is one  lesson
"which cannot escape the profound observer.  Every portion
"of the material universe is prevaded by the same laws of me"chanical action, which are incorporated into the very consti"tution of the human mind, the solution of the problem of
"this universal presence of such a spiritual element is obvious
"and necessary.  THERE IS ONE GOD, AND SCIENCE IS TIHE
" KNOWLEDGE OF HIM.
From this it would appear as though the study of the phenomena and laws of motion andchlange in nature would lead
to, and suggest, the conception of a spontaneous cause-of a
something that is not material, and does not act under the
purely physical law of action and reaction, as being equal and
in opposite directions-a something that can begin to act when
not acted upon, and can increase the intensity of its action,
and the strength of its effort, at zwil, and with the mere knowledge that such an increase is demanded by the emergency of
the occasion. The nature of the Personal Cause may be suggested in this way, it would seem, as well as by the consciousness of spontaneous activity within ourselves. But doubtless
we could have no very adequate conception of it without the
experience of its exercise which we get from the consciousness
of that spontaneous activity which takes place within us nearly
every moment of our waking lives.
I have expressed the opinion that consciousness is an zmmnediate source or means of klnowledge, and  that it is in reality
63 
VOLITI0 K.
the only immediate source. Philosophers have disagreed and
disputed much, as to what is zmt)mediate knowledge-what are
the objects of it.  But they have never disagreed that I know
of, as to the fact that such knowledge, whatever it may be, neither requires proof, nor admits of denial. \Whether it be the
" iate ideas" of the schoolmen and Descartes, the  "idea"images" of Locke, or the "sensations" of Condillac and
Hume-our knowledge of them is admitted to be absolute.
It admits of no proof-because nothing can be better kilown
as a means whereby to prove it. And it admits of no denialbecause the effort at denial would put one in the awkward condition either of being unconsciously conscious or consciously
unconscious.
Sense-perception at any rate, is certainly medziae and depends
on sensation.  It may be modified by any change in the organs
of sense.  It depends largely on a process of reasoning also.
Hence we can have no zmmediate knowledge of the objects in
the external world.  Nor, of course, can any knowledge be
called imnmdiza/e which depends upon reasoning and inference.
This would seem to reduce all immediate knowledge to the two
classes, (I) the acts and states of our own minds of which we are
conscious, and (2) those intuitive a przori judgments which constitute the self-evident axioms and first principles of all branches
of knowledge.  Besides these two I know of no other.   I do
not see how there can be any other.
But we cannot if we would deny a fact of consciousness.
The effort would be like that of the man who after having been
knocked over, vociferously proclaimed himself, "nol dead, but
'"speecAless." We may vary our explanation of these facts,
give them different names, and refer them to one or another
class; but we cannot deny their existence. The fact of vo
69 
LIVE QUESTIONS.
lition or conscious self-activity, we cannot deny or explain,
in any way that will enable us to get rid of the characteristic I
am ascribing to it.  Say what you will you cannot avoid saying
I, I did it, or I did not do it, I affirm, or I deny.  I doubt, or
Ibelieve.   In all ways and under all forms of expression the
I, the ego, the conscious self-or the self-conscious person, appears, standing prominently out or necessarily implied in the
very substratum and indispensable condition of our assumption. When we can banish all personal pronouns from any
human language, or speak of what we do without using the
pronoun I, or its equivalent, we may claim to really disbelieve
in volition; but not as I think, before.
But we have not the same grounds or reasons for ascribing
volition or voluntary action to dumb animals. If they have
volition and are conscious of it, they have not the means of
making it known to us.   Thy use nopersonal pronouns.  I am
conscious of volition in myself, and as a part of my own experience. The language that my fellow men use, makes me
equally sure of such an element in their experience. But when
we come to dumb animals it is only an inference from their actions. It is only our theory for explaining them.
So long as the nature of reflex action was unknown, there
was, perhaps, no way explaining what appears to be animal
intelligence and voluntary action, but by ascribing those phenomena as seen in animals, to the same psychological conditions as in man.   The question of "instinct and reason"  was
discussed, much discussed, but nowhere was there a clear line of
distinction drawn between them.   It was a matter of dispute
whether they differed in kind, or only in degree. It was supposed and held that men  have some instincts, and it was
thought to be equally certain that animals have some reason or
intelligence.
70 
VOLITION 7.
But the discovery of the machinery of reflex action in the
animal frame, and the laws and nature of that action, has put
the whole subject of animal intelligence and animal action in
a new light. It has shown us an entirely new set of phenomena, which we cannot neglect to take note of. It has shown
that, however we may continue to call it, all of animal instinct
except perhaps a part of the very highest, may be mere reflex
action, and may imply neither mind, nor thought, nor intelligence, nor will; and that so far at least, the actions of animals
need not be regarded or called either rational or voluntary.
And the question arises how far may this explanation go in
accounting for the higher forms of action?  I agree entirely
with Professor Huxley in his article in  The Popular  Science
AfonIhly already quoted, as far as his conclusions apply to dumb
animals. And he teaches that animals are only aulomata; that
is, mere machines-without intelligence or volition, as we have
been using these terms. If there is no mind, as a substantial
thing, different in kind from the body, there can be no volition, no voluntary action, no spontaneity, nothing but reflex
action, which is merely re-action to the sensible objects around
them, and to the condition of the tissues of their own bodies.
And most assuredly all the tendencies of experiments and observations in regard to reflex action and the functions of the
nerve centres are in the direction of Huxley's conclusion, so
far as mere dumb animals are concerned.
I have made no original investigations or explorations in this
department myself. But I have eagerly sought and carefully
studied the accounts given of the researches of others and their
inferences from them; and I believe that they confirm this
general statement, that the effect of removing the hemispheres
is merely to render the animal more stupid. It does not de
71 
LIVE QUES7YIJO(S.
prive the animal of any one class of functions or actions,
which it was capable of perftcrming before. In the case of the
frog, spoken of by Hluxley, he says, "It will starve sooner
"than feed itself, although if food is put into its mouth, it
"swallows it."  Dalton says,  " the effect of this mutilation is
"simply to plunge the animal into a profound stupor, in which
"he is almost entirely inattentive to surrounding objects; the
"bird (he is speaking of a pigeon,) remains motionless upon
"his perch, or standing on the ground with its eyes closed,
"and the head sunk between the shoulders." (Physziology, p.
405.)  Ferrier, one of the latest authorities on the subject-the
latest in fact that I have seen-says, (p. 34, 35,) of a frog-from
which the hemispheres had been removed, " Deprived of its
"cerebral hemispheres, the frog will maintain its normal  atti"tude, and resist all attempts to displace its equilibrium.   If
"laid on its back it will immediately turn on its face and re
"gain its station on its feet. If placed on a board and the
"board be tilted in any direction, the animal will make the
"appropriate bodily movements, to throw its centre of gravity
"within the basis of support. If the fqot be pinched, it will
"leap away.  If it be thrown into the water it will swim until
"it reaches the side of the vessel, and then clambers up and
"sits perfectly quiet.  If its back be stroked gently it will ut"ter loud croaks, and this with such uniformity on each appli"cation of the stimulus, that as Goltz indicates, a chorus of
"brainless frogs might be obtained, which  would utter their
" [chorus] on the appropriate occasion in a manner that would
"have delighted the heart of Aristophanes.".. "If placed
"at the bottom of a pail of water, it will ascend to the surface
"to breathe. And not merely so, but if placed in a vessel
"inverted over a pneumatic trough, containing a column  of
72 
T'OL17 ION. 
-'water sustained by barometric pressure, it will ascend to the
"surface as before; but not finding there the necessary atmos "pheric air, it will work its way downwards and succeed in
"making its escape out of the vessel to the free surface of the
"trough. There is a method in its movements. If an obsta "cle be placed between it and the light of a window, the frog
"will not spring blindly against the obstacle, when its toe is
pinched, but will clear it and spring to the side.  It will al"ter the course of its leap according to the position of the
"obstacle between it and the light.   There is so far no d$zfer"e,ce be/ween zIs behaviour and Ihal of a frog zn Ihe full posses"szon of all its faculties.  But yet a very remarkable difference
"is perceptible; the brainless frog, unless disturbed  by some
"peripherical stimulus, will sit forever quiet in the same spot,
"and become converted into a mummy.   All sbontancous ac"lion zi annihilated.  Its past experience has been blotted out,
"and it exhibits no fear in circumstances which otherwise
"would cause it to retire or flee from danger.  It will sit quite
still if the hand be put forth' cautiously to seize it; but  it
"will retreat if a brusque movement is made close to its eyes."
The italics are my own.
I have given above from Dalton, an account of the appearance of a pigeon from which  the hemispheres had  been  removed.   Ferrier, p. 38, gives a very similar account.   But on
p. 35, he speaks thus of a fish' A  fish so mutilated  main"tains its normal equilibrium in the water, and uses its tail
"and fins in swimming, wvith as great percision and co-ordina"tion as before. The brainless fish is, however, continually on
"the move, and there is also method  in its movements.   It
"will not run its head against any obstacle placed in its path,
"but turn to the right or left according  to circumstances.
4
73 
LI VE QUESTIONS.
Left to itself in the water, it swims in a straight line, and,
"unlike other fishes which loiter by the way, smelling of this,
"and nibbling at that, it keeps on its course, as if impelled by
',some irresistible impulse, and only stops when it reaches the
"side of the vessel, or when worn out by pure nervousness and
"fatigue."  Ferrier also adds some few items to those givenby
Dalton, in his account of the pigeon. After speaking of the
profound sleep, he says, (p. 36), "' From  this state of repose
"it is easily awakened by a gentle push or pinch, and looks
"up  and opens its eyes.  Occasionally, apparently without
"any external stimulation it will look up and yawn...
"Should a fly happen to settle on its head it will stroke it off,"
etc. And on p. 37, he repeats the assertion [the animals]
"continue to perform actions in many respects differing little,
"if at all, from those manifested by the same animals under
"absolutely normal conditions."
As, however, we ascend in the scale, the difference between
the two conditions of the animals becomes greater.  And yet
in no case that he describes or alludes to, does he show anything, that militates against the general statement I have made
above, namely, the only observed or known difference is one
of degree only, and not one of kind; the animal becomes
more stupid and inefficient-but it does not lose any one entire class of mental or psychological phenomena.   It must be
remembered, however, that Ferrier has included "dogs," which
are regarded as among the highest in the scale of animal intelligence, in the remarks I have quoted in regard to the effects of a total removal of the hemispheres. They become only
a little more sluizpid, a little more incapable of co-ordinate action,
"though the fact of emotional response to sensory impressions
"points," as he remarks,' to the conclusion that we have to
74 
VOLITIOn K.
"deal not with the complete absence, but only with a suspen"sion of the other forms of functional activity," p. 40.
These phenomena have led to the conjecture that consciousness and volition may exist in other centres besides the hemispheres.  But the suggestion meets no favor, and is in fact entirely disproved.   Ferrier says, p. 45, "we obviously cannot
"obtain any answer to the queston-whether the hemispheres
"are necessary for sensation and consciousness-when the
"functions of the hemispheres are so affected as to prevent the
"expression in words or by gestures, language of subjective
"states, if any such really exist. But we have experiments of
"disease [in man] which practically detach the hemispheres
"from the mesencephalic connections, and leave thought and
"speech intact, so that we can obtain direct testimony in re"gard to the consciousness of impressions... When  this
"occurs, the individual has absolutely no consciousness of
"tactile impressions,.. however much he may strazn his al'len/ion lo receive them."  And he says elsewhere, (p. 248,)
"It has been conclusively demonstrated that, in man, the con"sciousness of sensory impression.. is a function of the
"cerebral hemispheres." The italics are my own.
And the statement is reiterated in various forms, p. 40.
"When the hemispheres are removed, all the actions of the
"animal become the immediate and necessary response to the
"form and intensity communicated to its afferent nerves." p.
12I.  "Removal of the cerebral hemispheres..  reduces
"the animal to the condition of a machine."
There seems to be no doubt, therefore, that all, or nearly all
the acts that an animal ever performs, may be performed after
that which has been demonstrated to be the only organ and
centre of consciousness and volition has been removed.   The
75 
LIVE Q UES71OL\S.
only question that remains, I believe, is in regard to the instinct of reproduction.  As yet no proof has been discovered
of its retention. But this is not important, it seems to me.
The state of stupidity and inaction which always ensues upon
the operation, is, 1 think, a sufficient explanation of the nonappetarace of any manifestations of that kind.
But what I chiefly niote is the fact that there is not the loss
of any one class of acts or instincts; but only a stupefaction
of them all, and of one about as much as another. If a man
loses his eyes he becomes blind-one entire class of his psychological experiences is gone.   It is not a general stupefaction; but is the loss of one class or kind of forms of activity
-with perhaps, a quickening of the rest.   With the loss of the
hemispheres in animals it is otherwise. No entire species or
kind of experiences is gone-they all remain, only they are
impaired in intensity.
With man, however, it is otherwise.  With the inactivity of
the brain, as in the case of tumrt, abs-ess, congestion, or any
cause producing coma, there is a total loss of consciousness,
of volition, and of all that one knows by consciousness, and
by that exclusively, to be a part of his experience. The spinal
cord remains active; the scnsorium re-acts, and the patient is
like an animal with the brain removed; only the change is
greater, the stupidity more profound, the inaction inore complete, as we should naturally expect would be the case, from the
greater size of the brain in proportion to the other parts of the
nervous system.  But all intelligence proper, all consciousness
at the time, all recollection afterwards, and all volition are at an
end.   Excito-motor and  sensori-motor  action  remain-but
probably there is no reaction of the hemispheres —or ideomotor action in such cases at all. The contrast between men
76 
VOLITIO0                       7
and animals is complete and entire, the on, only becomes more
sluggish and stupid-the other loses one entire class of vital
phenomena-and that one the most characteristic of all-the
facts and phenomena of consciousness.
I think then, we must admit that we have no authority for
ascribing volition and voluntary action to animals, in any of
the ordinary functions of their lives. They are all instinctive,
all mere reflex actions, mere manifestations of physical phenomena.
And this leads me  to question whether ideo-motor action,
as defined by Carpenter, in the passage cited in a former Lecture, (p. 32,) is really found in animals in their ordinary instincts and actions at-all.  The Brain is undoubtedly, a reservoir of power, a sort of Leyden jar of nerve activity, for animinls as for men. But I doubt if there is ordinarily any purely
ideo-motor reaction from that centre, in animals below man.
It will be noted that Carpenter speaks of it as manifested in
man.   I-le says,  " objects which give rise to our sensations,"
"we begin to form ideas," etc, and "these ideas may  express
"themselves in action, as we see in the case of the somnambu"list, etc. It is true Carpenter ascribes it to animals, such as
are, in his words, "governed by intelligence."  But it seems
to me to be a fact, inferred from th-e discoveries made since he
wrote, that there is nothing in that " z/ellilence" that differs
in kind from what the same animals perform,!-after the hemispheres have been entirely removed or have become paralyzed by
disease, so as to preclude the possibility of any ideo-motor
actions as defined by Carpenter.
These views are confirmed by the experiments of Ferrier.
He claims to have found three regions of the hemispheres, an
antero-frontal, as he calls it, an occipital, and a middle region.
77 
LIVE Q UESTIONS.
From the middle or central region he gets, by stimulation of
the cortical covering of gray matter, responses in the way of
reflex action. But from the antero-frontal-the forehead part,
which is the seat and organ of intelligence in man, he gets no
response whatever in the form of reflex action. It is of this
part of the brain he is speaking, when he  says, p. 23I,  "Re"moval or destruction of the antero-frontal lobes is not fol  lowed by any definite physiological results.   The animals re"tain their appetites and instincts, and are capable of exhibit"ing emotional feeling...  The powers  of voluntary mo"tion (in his sense of voluntary,) are retained in their integ"rity.".. The animals were selected on account of their
"intelligent character.   After the operation,  though, they
"might seem to one who had not compared their present with
"their past, fairly up to the average of monkey  intelligence,
"they had undergone a considerable psychological alteration."
This change, however, consisted, as I have already stated, chiefly
in their disposition " to remain in an apathetic, dull condition,"
"dozing off to sleep," "a form of mental degradation which
"may be reduced in ultimate analysis to loss of the faculty of
"attention," p. 288.
But the question remains with regard to those more remark
able instances, which are always cited and referred to in such
discussions, as proof of intelligence and  volition.  The  case
which Carpenter cites, of his horse, which learned to take the
pump handle in his mouth and raise water for himself and
others to drink, is a good one. The case of a cat, I once had,
in another. The wire from the door knob passed along the
banisters of the stairs, that led from the hall to the basement.
The bell was in sight; the cat learned to stand on the stairs,
and with one fore paw on the banister, he would catch the other
78 
VOLIT[O-L7
hold of the wire and ring the bell, whenever he  wanted to
have the door opened so that he might get into the parlor.
These cases seem like reasoning, and are commonly cited
as proof it. If there were volition in the cases, there will be
no doubt, I presume, that there was intelligence and reasoning
as well.  In fact, I doubt whether there can be volition at all,
without intelligence and reasoning. And no one, so far as I
know, would ascribe voluntary action to an animal without at
the same time ascribing to it reasoning and intelligence also.
Well, why not? This is the natural question.
As preliminary to any answer, we must consider the fact that
acts which are clearly reflex, and only reflex, differ so little
from those that are voluntary, that there is no possibility of distinguishing the one from the other, by the purely phisical
method.  I presume there is no reflex action, that may not be
successfully imitated, voluntarily.   I know of none-and  I
know of no " voluntary action" so called, that may not be produced under circumstances which entirely and absolutely preclude the supposition that there is any volition or conscious
thought in its production.   I have cited Huxley's striking article in a preceding Lecture, and I have cited statements somewhat like his from Ferrier in this.  Huxley, it is true, had, or
is supposed to have had, a motive in advocating his views.
Animals without the hemispheres can perform acts which appear to indicate intelligence and volition-they perform them,
as he says, " with great care and deliberation." And then, on
the next page but one, he speaks of a man acting under circumstances where intelligence and volition are precluded, and
he says, "I show y7ou a case of a man performing actions evi"dently more complicated and mostly more rational (the ital"ics are my own) than any of the ordinary operations of ani
79 
LIVE  Q U,ESlIfOANS.
"mals; and yet you have positive proof that these actions are
"merely mechanical."  If then, animals and men, without consciousness and volition, can performsutch acts, all acts in fact,
that are ordinarily supposed to imply volition and thought, we
can have no good reason for ascribing volition and thought
to any body.  And if there is no reason for ascribing thought
and volition-there can be no reason, aforlzor, for ascribing a
mind which can reason and choose.  \Well, if we are limited
to the physiological method, or if we intentionally and-. purposely (I will not say preversely) confine ourselves to that
method, Huxley is right, and there can be no successful refutation of his conclusion.
The "naturalist" with one eye on his microscope, and the
other shut that he may see the better, sees brains and can see
only brains.   He sees that even the lowest vertebrate has the
rudiment at least of a brain. Fishes have one that is quite distinctly developed.  Birds and reptiles have a larger one; and
in mammals the brain becomes marked by convolutions and
its hemispheres are connected by a somewhat massive commissure.  And in man it only reaches a larger size and a higher development.   If then, brain is the organ of mind, we find
mind, with its inseparable elements intelligence, consciousness and volition, in all the orders of the vertebrates.   And
even below them, there are nerve-cells  "which perform, in
however lowly a manner, the functions of the cerebral hemispheres."  (Ferrier, p. 44.)
But would it not be better for the naturalist to open the
other eye and look within himself; and see there, facts of another order and of an entirely different significance? WVe see
there facts in ourselves,.which, however, it may be elsewhere,
disclose to us a something that does think and choose. We find
80 
VOL 7'.ION.
proof of volition or rather not proof of volition- but volition
itself.  By this method we know volition, more certainly, than
we can possibly know, by the other method, any of the facts
that are supposed to prove volition. In this method there is
but one step-we are znimedaI/el]conscious of the volition.
In the other there are two, (1) conscious of the perception,
and (2) the act of precepticn itself, with our inferences from
it.  In the first method there can be  no error.  In the last
there is always the possibility of false-perception and mistaken
inference.
But it is time to proceed to consider some of the reasons for
denying intelligence and volition to animals, over and above
the mere fact that we can account for all of their actions as
reflex, and without volition.
In the first place the animals that perform such unusual acts
do not show any more intelligence in respect to other things
than those that exhibit no such feats. With the human child,
when it attains the intelligence to do any one thing, it at once
shows the intelligence, by doing other things of a like grade
There is a gradual growth and development of intelligence.
But this is not at all the case with these animals.  I have no
doubt they are generally among the most  "intelligent" of
their species-above the average.  But they develope no general
intelligence-no superior skill or instincts in regard to other
things that require intelligence, and are just as necessary for
their welfare and their comfort, as the one that is spoken of as
so remarkable.
In the next place, I can see no reason why, if these animals
possess so much intelligence as is thus ascribed to them, they
should not have a language.   Certainly these mental processes,
which they are supposed to possess, imply enough, in the way
4*
81 
.LIVLE QUESTIONS.
of analysis, abstraction and generalization —-all of which are
implied in any act of reasoning-to give rise to a set of sounds
or signs "to express their ideas" with-or if not enough  to
enable them to invent one, enough at least to learn and adopt
one from man.
And finally, I think there can be no doubt, that if they possessed so much intelligeice as this theory of their acts implies,
they would come to have an education that would result in the
acquisition of knowledge, that might be transmitted from generation to generation, as is the case with man.  It is not a question now, whether there is not an improvement in their physical constitution from generation to generation-resulting in an
improvement of instincts, as I have explained the word. Such
an improvement undoubtedly, has occurred in many of the
kinds of domesticated animals, and may not unlikely have occurred in the wild animals also. But such improvement is not
at all like in kind, that which the human family have made in the
discoveries of science, or which they perpetuate by the education of their children, in what they themselves have learned.
I think, therefore, that these extraordinary cases constitute
no exception to the rule that all such acts are merely instinctive, and that instinct is reflex action, and that only.  It is not
unlikely that in these cases the hemispheres may re-act, or respond to sensations in a way that becomes common and perfectly normal in man-though rare and exceptional in the animals
below him. The brain re-acts in these cases in a way in which
man can and does voluntarily cause it to act whenever, in the
exercise of his judgment, he comes to think it best, and to
choose so to act.  I think, therefore, that neithei consciousness nor volition, nor voluntary action in the proper scientific
sense of these words can be ascribed to any animal below man,
82 
VOLITIONTI0
and that all language that seems to ascribe to them voluntary
action-or to speak of voluntary action as belonging to animals, is the result of a misinterpretation of the facts that are
observed. And it requires no words to show how extensive a
chang,e in our theories and discussions would be required by
the adoption of this view of volition and voluntary action.
Of course, we cannot expect any change in the current language of the people on this subject.  It was at best, a hundred
years after Copernicus had promulgated the true theory of the
apparent changes in the heavenly bodies, before it was fully
adopted, even by sczenltzfc men. Bacon, who lived nearly a
century later than Copernicus, did not accept the theory, [C.,
born in I473, and B. in I56i.] And even now we continue
to speak of the sun and moon and stars, as rising and seling,
etc., as though the motion which causes these apparent
changes were theirs, and not our  own.   But I think that
for scientific purposes, we must cease to speak of voluntary action in animals, and cease to ascribe to them volition in any
sense of the word, until we have some other and better proof
of its existence than we now have, or can ever expect to have,
without other means of observation or proof than seems likely
ever to become possible for us. -We know that in man there is
consciousness, reasoning and volition —in animals we have no
proof of these elements, and reasons, which, are, at least, very
strong, for denying their existence.
83 
LECTURE IV.
I propose to devote the remaining Lectures of this Course,
to a brief consideration of the three great questions in AMetaphysics, that remain as yet unsettled. I intend to offer a solution and answer to them-differing in some respects from any
that have ever yet been proposed-which as I believe after much
and prolonged consideration, will in the end be accepted and
prove satisfactory. These answers, as I think, will not only
settle these questions for metaphysical purposes-but they will
also, I hope  supply a new basis for some very important physical inductions and theories, and lead to results differing in
some respects from the doctrines now held.
The questions, as previously stated, relate to, I. The nature
and origin of knowledge.   2. The ground and extent of certainty, or absolute truth. 3. The nature and limits of real
causes.
I propose to devote a Lecture to each of these subjects respectivelvy.
I think we may assume that all knowledge is, or may be expressed in language.  This may not be true of feeling or of
mere sentiment.   It may not be true of the products of imagination or of fancy. But I think it is true, beyond question or peradventure, of whatever comes within the domain of knowledge.
Language consists of words; and words, for our purpose,
I A-SIGHT. 
IANSIGHTS.
may be divided into two classes-names —wihich denote the ob jects or things we speak about, and the other, includes what ever other parts of speech there are in use, or may be needed,
in order to construct and articulate the names into sentences,
so that what we say of things will represent them as they ap pear to us, or as we think and believe them to be, in themselves
and in their relations to each other.
For the present I shall'consider the names only.  And this
I do the more readily, because in the controversy with regard
to the origin of knowledge, names have been selected and put
forward, on the one side, and accepted on the other, as tests,
as I have remarked in a previous Lecture, and shall have occasion to consider again, before I get through with the subject.
Names then, are considered as denoting thiings. And I shall
assume for the present, that all objects of immediate  knowledge are denoted by names; that is, whatever we know immuediately, is denoted by a name.
Bat of these objects we always predicate adjectives, as snow
is white, the table is hard, the orange is round, etc.  And, in
fact, we cannot cognize any object without so cognizing it that
we can, by acts of analysis and judgment, which I need not
now explain, predicate and affirm of it some property.  In
short, we cannot know that anything is-without knowing, to
some extent, at least, w,ha it is.
Hence, while names denote the things that we cognize or
know, the adjectives that we may predicate of them, denote
what we know of them.
The same is undoubtedly true of verbs to some extent. But
then, verbs can always be expressed, or at least replaced, by
adjectives, without harm or loss, so far as our present purpose
is concerned. Thus, if I say, John walks, I can also say, John
is walking.
81 
LIVE QUESTION S.
Now, all the adjectives, (including the verbs if we choose,)
that we use, or all those at least, that we can use to express
what we know of things, may be resolved or divided into four
classes-with reference to their origin, and their relation to the
subject before us.
ist. We have what we may call the objective adjectives, such
as denote the sensible properties, the properties by which objects appear to us, and are cognized and perceived in senseperception, as hard, soft, round, square, hot, cold, wet, dry,
etc., including in this class every sensible property, every one,
which, in accordance with the common use of language, we
can be said to know by the senses.
2d. Wre have what may be called the subjeclihe adjectivessuch as indicate our feelings towards an object; as beautiful,
frightful, etc. These adjectives, neither give, nor express, any
knowledge concerning the objects of which they are predicated. They indicate only our feelings towards the objects. And
as the origin of the objective adjectives is accounted for by reference to sensation and perception, so these are to be accounted for by reference to the sensibility or emotional part of our
nature.
3d. There is a class of adjectives that denote the relations of
one thing to another, as heavy, hard, near, distant. These we
may call relativhe adjectives. In this class I include all those
adjectives and verbs, that are used to denote that knowledge of
things which we get from our observation of their relations to,
and actions upon  one another.   In this class, therefore, will
be included most, if not all, those terms that are used to
denote the physical and the chemical properties of bodies.
And there may be occasion to subdivide them into two classes,
as (a) such as relate to place and time, as far, near, early, late,
8G 
1:SIGIHT.
etc., and (b) such as denote acliz,e properties, including all
those that are learned by an observation of the actions of objects upon one another.
4th. And finally, there is a class that denote properties and
relations that can be derived from no one of the sources named
above-namely, mere sense-perception of the objects, as the
objective properties, mere feeling, occasioned by the objects, as
the subjective properties, nor yet the mere observation of their
effects on one another, or on our own bodies, as is the case with
the active properties. Those properties I propose to call-for the
want of a better name —metap2yszcal properties.
Now, if we had only the first three classes of adjectives, I
presume no question would ever have arisen, as to the origin of
ideas. All words in use, could easily have been traced to and
accounted for by reference to " sensation and reflection,  (and
to sensation alone, for all sense-perception is based upon and
conditioned by sensation,) by one or the other of the three different mental process, that follow upon sense-perception, (I)
analysis and abstraction, (2) aesthesis or feeling, (3) comparison of objects one with another. Thus far we have no word
and no element of knowledge that cannot be traced to "sen"sation and reflection"' as explained by Locke, and fully accounted for by his theory.
It is, however, a question which I will not discuss here,
whether with only sensation and reflection-staking the word
"reflection," in Locke's sense, there could be any of the mental processes just spoken of.  I think there could not.   But I
prefer to waive that question, for the present; as its discussion
is not important to the undertaking now before us.
Let us take for our first example the word "shortIes/" as used
in the proposition-" the straight line is the shortest between
two points."
87 
.1 l'E QUESTIOXS.
I am aware that "shorteshness" can hardly be called a metaphysical property.  The word is derived etymologically, from
the adjective short, which may be regarded as denoting a relative or comparative, property. But this word suits my present
purpose better than any other one that has occurred to me, and
better, in some respects, perhaps, than if it denoted a metaphysical property.
No one, I presume, will doubt the proposition just cited "a
straight line is the shortest line that there can be between any
two points."  But how do  we know  this?  Suppose that we
admit that "straightness " is an objective, or-which is the
same thing a word that denotes-a sensible property-so that
we can, not only see the line, but also see that it is straight. \Ve
may also see that it is "short ".so that the adjective "short
may denote only a relative property.   But how about "short"estness"?  This cannot be seen by the eye.  It cannot be
ascertained by measurement or comparison; for all our means
of  measurement and comparison fall short of that absolute exactness and certainty which we not only obtain, but unhesitatingly and-inexorably demand, in mathematics.
How then do we know that the straight line is the shortest?
I think we are now face to face, with the phenomena we are in
quest of. WVe certainly know the fact-we can demonstrate it,
if any body doubts, disputes or questions it.  And yet we cannot make it perceptible to the senses; or measure it to a difference, which, in the language of the mathematicians is "less
"than any assignable quantity." It is a proposition which
"experience," if we limit the word, as Locke,  Mill, and the
men of that school necessarily do and must, has not taught us,
and never can teach us. The reasons just given prove this. If
we cannot either see or measure to an exactness that is nearer
83 
l'S]81I HT.
than any assignable difference, and which-whatever mathematicians may find it convenient to regard it, is yet ontologically
something. There must be some means of knowledge, besides
sense-perception, and any reasoning we can base upon it.
I think we shall see, if we look at the facts, -that we do
somehow, see, know, and affirm, the truth of the proposition,
just as soon as we understand the import of its terms. Nor is
this all. \Ve affirm it with a confidence in its certainty, that
we do not feel in any proposition that affirms a merely sensible
property.  \We all know and admit that "the senses may deceive
"us;" that Bwe may be mistaken, possibly, in regard to what
we see or hear, even when we feel the most confident.  There
is a false-perception, to which we are all liable.  But in this
case we feel that there is no mistake, no chance for false perception, no dependence upon conditions, times and places;
but always, everywhere, and under all circumstances, the straight
line is the shortest. \Ve feel and declare that this is an absolute truth.
But hozw do we know it?  This is the real question.   I do
not think that any theory of "; ziiate zdeas" of'"schena/a " or
of a przori' "conceptions" will much  help us.  Suppose  we
almit that any one of them, or all of them are real —what
good can they do us? How do we know that they are what
they claim to be?  How do we know  that they are true and
trustworthy?  No answer has been given; and no answer as I
think, can be given, that does not assume something that needs
proof quite as much as the theory that is to be proved by it.
My  answer is as follows: there is an act of insight —not
mere znltizz'on, for that is a looking upon a thing-ebut an act of
i)z,foh- or seeing nt/o things, that goes along with the act of
perception or imagination by which we think of a straight line,
89 
LIVE Q UESIIONS.
whereby we see that, from its very nature, it must be the shortest line that there is or can be between the points.  It is certain that we prove this proposition with rekard to the straight
line, as in fact, we do all other points in Geometry, by reasoning a p)-ori and from the nature of the subject.   Wre never resort to measurement; that method would be regarded as unscholarly and unsatisfactory.   And we reason a prizor  from the
nature of the subject  and hence our conclusion, as the process has involved no accidental or mere circumstantial matter,
is regarded as universal and absolutely true.
I cite another example both for the sake of proof and of
illustration-lithe case of causation.
I have already spoken of this as having been used as a sort
of test instance —experimenzlum cruciz —between the two schools
that differ so widely in regard to this matter.   Locke, Mill and
the men of that school, account for "the idea of cause," by
reference to sensation alone; and as I have before remarked
they reduce it to mere antecedence.  Cousin, and those who
agree with him on the other hand, claim " the idea of cause"
as proof of either an znnale, or at least an a ~rbrz' idea "fur"'nished by the reason," in its spontaneous activity. But as I
have already remarked, on either theory there would be no difference between antecedence and causalioz; and it is not likely
that any language would have the two words. On Locke's
theory, we have, and can have only' the idea of antecedence,"
and on Cousin's theory, although we might " have both ideas,"
we could have no ground or means of distinguishing between
cases.  Nor could we apply the one word in the same cases,
and the other in others. Nor could there be any cases to which
both words might not, so far as we have any nzeans of discrzminatzng, be applied to one as well as to the other.
90 
]NSIGIHT.
But there is a difference in the meaning and force of the
two words. No one uses causation and antecedence indiscriminately. Everybody knows that there is a difference- that
there may be antecedence without causation and-in a certain
sense-causation without antecedence. How do we know the
difference?  Not by sensation alone —not by "sensation  and
"reflection" in Locke and Mlill's sense of the word reflection.
Not by any znnale or aprzori idea, for then there would be no
means of discrimination.
I am inclined to think that M. de Biran, as stated by Cousin, who adopts his view, is right when he says, that " the
"idea of cause is first derived from consciousness." Cousin's
example is as good as any that has occurred to me. Suppose
I am thinking of an air, and wish to hear it.  In one case, I
get up and go to the instrument and play it myself; in the
other, some one in an adjoining room, unbeknown to me, and
unseen by me, at that precise moment strikes up the air I
was wishing to hear.' In the one case I have the two elements,
the thought of the music and the hearing of it; and in the
other'I have these two, with a third, which does not exist in
the other, namely, a consciousness qf makzing the mus'ic-which,
in the last analysis, is resolved into a consciousness of myself
as making the music, or as causing it, and so "the idea of
"cause "-an element which is not contained in my consciousness of what occurred in the case of the music performed by
another person, and in the adjoining room.
But "this idea" of cause, is the result of an insight into
the phenomena. \What I am conscious of is thinking, wishing, willing, doing, and hlearing the music.  No  analysis will
carry us back of these facts to a something that acted on me,
so that in willing or doing, or in both together, I was only a
91 
LINE QUESTIONS.
second cause, a mere  instrumnent.   But even if there were, we
should come to this ulterior something, as a cause, and as a
cause only.  It is not, and has not bzen cog,nized directly or
immediately as an object, or by any objective properties whatever.  Or in other words we know of nothing which caused us
to will, or to do, in the premises.   l[ence we think of ourself as cause —nd obtain the "idea" of cause  or causation,
by th  ae same process as in the case  of sense-perception.   I see
this white paper, and then think of or have "the idea" of
whiteness. I am coniscious of willing and doing an act, and
then think of myself as doing it, and by generalizing the fac:,
get the "idea" of cause.
Or a,gain, I look out at my window and see, near by, a man
trundling a wheel-barrow before him; and a little farther on up
tle hill, I see a horse drawing a wagon.   i have no hesitation
in saying that the horse draws the wagon.   And I as unhesitatingly affirm that the man pushes the wheel-barrowv; notwithstanding the barrow goes before the man, as the horse does before the wagon.  In both cases I ascribe causality.  I consider
the horse as the cause in the one case, and the man in the
other. But I do not see how, on Locke's theory, I could affirm that the man pushes the wheel-barrow any more than in
the other case, I should say that the wagon pushes the' horse.
Mere antecedence is not enoug,h.   Suppose the horse and
wagon were going down a very steep hill, I might find occasion to change my affirmation and say that the wagon pushes
the horse, thus making the wagon  the cause.   Mere antecedence, whether in time or in space, is not of itself and alone,
conclusive and final. Nay more, as I think I have shown, it
could never of itself have suggested  "the idea" of causation
— or given rise to the word, or in fact, to any word that would
nmean more than mere antecedence.
92 
I-NSIGHT.
It is possible that without the experience which, as de Biran and Cousin  thought, gives rise to the "idea of cause,"
there might  ba an insight into  the nature  of the objects
named,  " horse," " wagon,"  "man," and  " wheel-barrow,"
whereby we should affirm causation of the man and the horse,
and deny it of the wagon and the wheel-barrow, and thus derive the "idea of cause" from phenomena in the external
w-orld. On this point, however, I prefer to express no opinion
at present.
But in either case we see, think of, and so come to speak of,
an agency, an efficiency which we call causation in some cases,
which we do not see or ascribe in others.
I am  unable to see how Mill and others, who  advocate
Locke's theory get over the difficulty here referred to.  Like
going to the moon, "il is /the firs step /hal costs."  When that
has been successfully taken, the rest offer no difficulty. When
a child has once seen a case of causation-once got the "idea"
of a cause there is no difficulty in ascribing it, whenever there
may be occasion, or disposition to do so.  And it is very likely that with the "idea" once in the mind, we should be inclined to ascribe it, whenever we see a pretty uniform sequence.
But how first get the "idea "?  How first think of more than
is apparent to sense-perception —the mere antecedence —in the
first instance? Does it come by insight into the nature and
relations of things in the outward world?  Does it come from
consciousness of volition and effort within?  In either case
there is more than these philosophers include in their enumeration and description of the sources of knowledge.   And if so,
why not extend this to other similar cases and solve the difficulty at once?   The  habitual  association of which  M;ill
makes so much account, needs something to begin with-some
starting point which he has not furnished.
93 
LIVE QUESTIONS.
Now this act or fact of insight -has not been, so far-as I
know and believe, distinctly recognize~dand described by any
author or teacher of metaphysics.  Doubtless it wvas included
among the facts which led Plato to propose his theory of
"ideas."  I have no doubt it was one among the rest of those
which Locke included, though he was not aware of it, in his
somewhat comprehensive and ill-defined term "reflection."
Nor have I any doubt that it was the presence and force of this
element that led Kant to suggest his doctrine of schtemata,
Brown to propose his "relative suggestion," and Cousin to
claim the reality of a przori ideas and the spontaneity of the
reason. But no one of them pointed it out, or apparently,
clearly saw it, as a distinct element of knowledge or "source
of ideas."  Like some one of the more recently discovered
and widely diffused elements in Chemistry, it had always been
present though not distinctly recognized-always influenced
phenomena and alway given rise to theories and conjectureswhich, satisfactory in some respects, involved consequences and
doctrines which in others were untenable, if not absurd; while
the distinct recognition of the new element makes all intelligible and consistent and satisfactory.
The word " znsighi" has been used by English writers for
many years, undoubtedly; yet, I do not find that in any case
it has been employed to denote precisely the form of mental
activity, I have been speaking of. This was no doubt because,
no one of those who have used it seems to have had any clear
and distinct conception of what I mean, as a separate and original element in our mental activity. It differs widely from
what the Germans do mean by their Ansclauung-and the
French by their znthziion.  They are both, as I think, forms of
imagination or fancy  They are occupied with things or ob
94 
INSIG7HT.
jects that might be seen; if they were present to the eye.
Whereas insight, as I think is wholly occupied with prolerlzes
-the properties and relations of things.  I have no doubt, as
I shall undertake to show bye-and-bye, that it furnishes the
means by which we can irove the existence of objects that are
unseen, and objects, moreover, which in their nature are invisible and have no sensible properties.   But I do not think that
any one of them, or any entity, whatever, is the immediate object of insight, unaccompanied by either sense-perception or
consciousness. Insight goes along and cooperates with both.
When I perceive an object, I have over and above the sight of
it, some insight into its nature.   When I am  conscious of
thinking, I have an insight into the nature of the process, so
that I know that there can be no thinking where there is not
something that thinks, and that beneath the phenomena there is
an I that thinks, so that I can say cogzlo ergo sutm.  I think,
therefore I am.
Again.   In all classification there is an exercise of insightand  classification is essential  to language itself.  Language
consists of words, a part of which are proper nouns or individual names, and another part consists of common nouns.
Without this last there could be no language. But classification implies a discrimination of essential and accidental properties.   Nay, even the distinction of two individual objectswhen nolt seen al the same time-implies the recognition of some
of the properties of each as only accidental, and others as essential or inseparable characteristics. And all classification,
giving rise as it does to common nouns, denoting classes-sOeczes
and genera, implies a like discrimination.   But this acczi'enlalness and this essen/zalness, are not sensible properties.   They
affect no one of the organs of the objective senses.   They are
95 
LI VE QUESTi ONS.
purely matter of insight.  They  are not in all cases  distinguished at first sight.  It may require time and reflection to
appreciate them.   But we  do  distinguish and  discriminate
them. And we distinguish individual objects by them. And
by them too, we arrange all objects of thought into these subordinate classes, on which all reasoning and all language as
well depends.
I have not, however, yet stated what  I believe to be  tlhe
greatest and most prevailing function of this faculty of insight.
I believe it to be the basis or organ of all those elementary
axioms which underlie all science, and all branches of knowledge; and which we call intuitive or self-evident.   They are
what IKant called, as I have explained in a preceding Lecture,
"Analytic Judgments,  a brzorz'."  Surely there is something
more in these than mere sense-perception.   And  I cannot see
how ideas, whether innate, a przorz; or obtained in any other
way, can help the matter.
There is an orange on the table before me. I see that it is
round, redish, somewhat hardcl, and rather rough in its surface,
I can zmagine that its color will change, that its form will deliquesce, or its surface become smooth as polished marble
though I do not expect any of these changes.  But it is also
extended, and I knozv that it is divisible, and I knoze too, that
these two properties cannot disappear. It may be condensed
by pressure until it will have the density of platinum or of a
diamond. It may become expanded for aught I know, until
its rarity will be as great as that of hydrogen, or any other gas
of less specific gravity, if there be one.   But yet it will be extended, with a greater or less expansion of surface; and so long
as it is extended it will be divisible. No change can deliver it
or relieve it of these properties.  Only annihilation  can do
96 
13G1ilGT.
that; and then it is no longer an orange; it has become noth
ing, it has no properties, not even extension.
Now, manifestly, here are two classes of properties which the
orange is supposed to possess, and there are two classes o
propositions which we affirm concerning it.  Properties of the
one class can be changed the one into the other, or totally dis appear, as the color in the dark, or the hardness by evapora tion; and our affirmation of them makes what we call con tingent matter-synthetic a pos/erzori.  And the other proper ties, though they may be changed in degree as extension, di visibility, etc., can not be changed in kind or become extinct,
so long as the object itself remains; and the affirmation of
these properties constitutes what we call necessary matter.
And so far as we have yet considered it, it is analytic a przori.
Nor is this all. I not only know of the orange, that it is
extended and divisible, but. I know the same, and that too,
without any observation, of any and every piece of matter,
whether mass or molecule, that actually exists. I know it, as I
say, without any observation, experience or testimony concerning it. It belongs to its very nature, and I know by insight
into its nature as a material object, that whatever else it may
be, and wherever else it may be, it is extended and divisible;
extended in fact. and divisible in theory; divisible if we have
the power and means to divide it.
To say that we cannot separate "the idea of extension from
the idea of material substance," as philosophers of the ideal
school do, does not express the thought.  It is not, with me, a
question of "ide.as" or of "separahon" at all-but a question
of the nature of matter, and pertains equally to any material
substance whatever, totally independent of all other properties,
considerations or conditions.  And  to say, as  writers of the
5
9)7 
LIVE} QUESI IONS.
sensational school do, that my inability to think of matter
without extension, and of extension without divisibility, is
merely a habit that has grown up from the frequent and unvarying perception of them together, comes utterly short of explaining the confidence I feel in the certainty of the truth of
my assertion. I have never actually and really perceived either
exteizszon or doivisz'biz_i  or their "ideas," any more than I have
perceived the "shortestness" of the straight line.  And I can
no more perceive the one than the other.   Hence  I cannot
understand how my confidence can have come, as Mill holds
that it does, from the frequency and constant recurrence of that
which can never have occurred at all.
The remark I have thus made and illustrated with regard to
the primary axioms in necessary matter. extends to all those
propositions that we are accustomed  to call "self-evident."
They are of such a nature that the truth of the propositions is
evident to insight as soon as we understand the nature of the
subject and the meaning of the predicate, we affirm of it; just
as in all our primary judgments in contingent matter, the truth
of the assertion is apparent as soon as we see or perceive the
object and knowu the meaning of the predicate. This paper is
white. I need only to see the paper and to know what the
word "white" means, to assent to the proposition; knowing
that it is true.  But when we say that a straight line is the
shortest possible line between two points, I do not need to see
the line or anything else —probably no mere line could be seen
at all-but only to conceive of it. 1 can not even imagine it.
But I can conceive of it, know what it is; and as soon as I do
this, I know that there can be no shorter line between the same
limiting points.
With such axioms all knowledge begins. They are first in
the logical order, though not, as I think, in any case, the first
98 
YNSiGIHT.'.
in the chronological order; we see objects first, and before we
see znto them.  We are conscious of mental states, before we
have, or can have, any insight into their nature.   But with
perception and consciousness there comes insight; and witii
reflection this same function continues.   We soon evolve, and
and state explicitly, certain fundamental and self-evident
axioms; such as are stated usually at the outset in any treatise of Geometry; and such as are implied,  and constantly
assumed, in the prosecution and teaching of any science, or
branch of knowledge whatever.
This insight into the meaning of propositions and into the
nature of things, accompanies and enters into every act of reasoning, and every act of understanding and comprehension, we
ever perform. It makes all the difference between the man of
wisdom and of genius on the one hand, and the merest idiot
— not at all above the brutes in the scale of intelligence, on
the other.  It is by it and because of it that we understand,
and it is because of the want of it that they can not.
It is well to take note again of test words which Cousin has
proposed.   They are not mere inventions of his own.  They
are the accumulation of centuries of controversy. The schoolmen had proposed some of them, Locke suggested others, and
I believe that Cousin himself added to the list a few of his
own  selection.  His list is as follows: "Space,"  " Time,"
The Infinite," "Personal Identity," "Substance," "Cause,"
"Good and Evil."
Of these "time" and "space" denote no real or substantial objects-nor yet the objectified properties, relations or
modes of objects.   They are pure creations of fancy-very
useful, nay indispensable, to science and to speech, doubtless.
But they are pure creations of fancy nevertheless; and hence
they imply neither sensation, nor insight, nor y)et " ideas " as
*:.:' i-.-X!
99 
L1 VE Q UESTIONAS.
ontological realities; but only acts of fancy or imagination.
They are not causes, they are never imagined as real agents or
forces; and are spoken of as objects and agents only by a recog,nized and admitted figure of speech.
The terms "infinite" and  "substance" belong to another
category. They are but etymological compounds, and imply
only a process of word-making, of which any person living is
capable. WVe doubtless get "finite" from our experience  of
objects; they exist for a while or for a space, and then come
to an end, or rather they cease to exist. We call that, an end
and finzs-and so we call them finite or end-having. Bat we
can suppose something not having an end: we can suppose it, I
say, though we cannot imagine it; and I am inclined to think
that we can prove that nothing that is extended, either in space
or time, can be without an end also. But when we have supposed it, we can easily put before the adjective finite the negative particle "in," and we have the word  " infinite."   But
what does it mean? It is easy to say that it means "without
limits."  But without limits is a negative term, and by one of
the first and most fiundamental laws of Logic, negative terms
affirm nothing. Hence Iheir origin implies neither sensation,
"ideas," nor yet insight —but only etymological construction,
mere word manufacture.
The word "substance," however, will hardly be regarded as
a negative term.   Nor does its use, in several of its acceptations or senses, require any explanation here. They involve no
difficulty.  And if there had been no use of the word besides
them, it never would have been cited as an example or test in
this controversy. We call any object a substance, when  we
wish to denote it as a realitv and have no special reference to
its accidental modes and properties. In this sense the pen,
the paper,.te book, etc.., are each and all substances.
!-z "' *" ~ n
100 
IASIGH T.
Again we call chemical or mineral matters substances-as
when we say iron is a substance, limestone another, and so on
notwithstanding there may be a great many objects that are
made of these substances, and into which they are divided.
But in the sense in which metaphysicians use the word substance-and that is the only one that puzzles us-it denotes a
something that has no properties, something that underlies, or
understands, rather, all properties, something that would be
left if we should take all the properties away.  Of course,
there is no such thing; the word is a mere etymological compound denoting the supposed result of an impossible process.
"Personal Identity" cannot be derived from sensation alone
-for leaving out of account now the word "identity," we can
have no "idea" of person-can not even think of it, or in any
way have the thought of it, as part of our knowledge, except
by insight.  We penetrate through the phenomena that are
apparent in consciousness; and see that below thought —and
before it, there is a something that thinks. And this something, we call the person; or we may call it by any other word
-the name is unimportant.   But the word as well as the
thing, do undoubtedly, imply something besides, and more
than sensation, and mere sense-perception. The mere fact
that the person or self has no sensible properties is proof of
this.
But I do not readily see how "personal identity" can be of
more importance than mere personality, in such a controversy
as this. Identity, I think, implies not a sensation or an " idea"
or mere insight even, but a judgment and  a comparison, as
well. Nay, it implies more. It implies some accepted criterion of identity. We have all heard of the vexed question
about the identity of the boy's jack-knife-which had lost first
the blade, then the handle, anal finally the spring, and had
101 
LIfVE QUESTIONS.
had each and all of these parts replaced as soon as they were
gone. The whole difficulty results from th2 want of a criterion
or standard of identity in the case.
Of the word "cause " I have said all that the occasion calls
for. I think it an unanswerable refutation of Locke's theory;
and of the whole doctrine and system of philosophy that would
derive all our knowledge from sensation alone, without either
"ideas" or insight. But for reasons already given, I do not
see how it can prove the reality of ideas-or the ideal theory of
the origin of knowledge in any of the forms it has assumed —
or in any form it can assume.
The terms " good" and " evil," as distinct from pleasant and
painful, do indeed imply, as Cousin has so eloquently urged,
something  more  than sense-perception; just as  the  word
"cause," as something more than mere antecedence, implies
such an element of knowledge. But I do not see how they
imply the reality of "ideas" any more than any and every
other adjective, or abstract term derived from an adjective.
Nor has Cousin shown us how this is to be inferred.   It is in
deed a "survival" of the old Platonic notion —that the properties of objects are realities, the only realities; that they are
ideas, and are the very essence of the objects to which they are
attached. On this theory, names for these properties do imply
the properties, which are ideas, and of course, therefore, ideas
themselves.   But the words "good" and  "evil " imply these
ideas no more than any other adjectives that we may use to denote the qualities of objects or acts.
In another, and an important sense, however, these words
do imply something more than sensation. And in this respect
they differ from other adjectives. They denote no sensible properties,  as do  for instance the adjectives  "hard "  "red"
"sweet' "bitter," etc.  Hence tthey  imply something besides
102 
i)-SIGIIHT.
mere sense-perception for their origin as representatives or expressions of a part of our  knowledge.  What  they require,
however, is not, as I think, any "ideas," but only an insight
into the nature of the acts which we call good or bad.
The objections to the sensational theory of the origin of
knowledge, regarded as exclusive of all other sources or means
are,
ist. The theory does not, in any of its forms, modifications,
or statements, account for that part of our knowledge which is
expressed by (I) such adjectives as I have called metaphysical —
such as represent no sensible quality —as "shortest"' causal,"
etc., or (2) by such names as denote real things, which yet can
not have been cog,nized by sense-perception as "person,"
"mind," etc. These words are found in all languages. They
are neither abstract nor negative.  They are both positive and
concrete; they denote objects which are known as causes, if
not by objective properties also.
2d. The theory does not, in any of its statements or modifications, account for the certainty or confidence which  we ce:tainly feel in the analytic a pblri propositions-the axioms and
self-evident propositions, which underlie all knowledge and
constitute, in fact, the Major Premises —to all reasoning, even
in the a pos/eriorisciences.  We call them self-evident because
we see their truth as soon as we understand or comprehend the
meaning of their terms.  They need no proof, no intervention
of a Middle Term.  And, in fact, from their very nature, they
admit of none. The first principles or premises of reasoning,
can not be the result of any previous process of reasoning.
Nor can they, in fact, be prGcvd by reasoning, though they can
be tlested as we shall shoQ)w n the next Lecture, by the indirect
method.
103 
LVE' QUESTIONS.
3d. And finally, it leads to Nominalism, and its inevitable
consequences, materialism and atheism.  It is not only that it
fazils to account for certain words, or that it does not explain
them,  and their existence and use in all human  languages.  It
is active in the negative way as well.  It teaches that there are
and can be no entities, no realities, substances and causes that
are not material and that do not have sensible properties. Not
only does the theory fail to prove their existence and account
foir the origin of the words that denote such objects, but it
gives us, as irrefutable and unquestionable, the data, on which,
by the use of the principle of identity and contradiction, we
can prove that there are no such things as realities, and show
that their veriysupposition involves a contradiction of terms.
It is just as if we admit that twice two are five; we can render
any proposition in mathematics absurd, and throw confusion,
uncertainty and disagreement into all the transactions of life'
\We can escape these consequences only by showing that the
fundamental principle, the seminal fact, is absurd. There is a
means of knowledge besides sense-perception.
The objections to the idealistic theory, in whatever form, and
under whatever modifications it has been presented, are,
ist. It assumes the existence of ideas, as something more
than mere states of the mind, mere mnodes or forms of thought.
If they are no more than s/a/es of the mind, they explain nothing;  they account for nothing pertinent to the question.   Any
resort to them is but saying that we think so and so, because
we do think so and so.  Instead of accounting for the phenomena they only state and affirm their existence in other terms,
with another form of phraseology.   If ideas are anything more
than mere thoughts, their reality as such has not been proved.
Nay, I suppose it will be admitted that thy  ha,e no such ex
1_4 
ILAYSIGII T.
istence, whenever attention is called to the point.  And in fact,
I presume that I could cite words that imply as much, from
nearly or quite every philosopher who has written on the subject from Plato down to our times.
2d. But waiving this objection, and admitting the reality
of ideas for the present, it does not appear how they are a
source of knowledge, or a ground of certainty.  Whence come
they?  What assurance have we that they represent things?
Or rather, what ground have we for such assurance?  If we
say they come from God and with Cousin, that they are "the
essence of God," His existence is assumed in the assertion and
we rest all knowledge on an act of faith in Ilim.  Now  I have
no objection to the exercise of faith. Nay, I believe in it; but
to rest knowledge upon it, and make it the cornerstone and
foundation of knozwledge, is to vacate the term knowledge of its
characteristic and distinctive meaning. What we know compels us to believe in something that we do not know.
3d. As the attempt to account for all Knowledge, by reference to sense-perception alone, has led to mere Nominali'sm, so
on the other hand, it is customary to speak of the theory that
derives it from ideas alone, as leading to Realism.* But it
seems to me that Idealism is rather a step in the progress of
Realism, than its origin and  cause.  Idealists begin with the
objectification of abstractions.  They make of thought, a reality, and call it ideas. HIence what is called Realism is actually
begun before idealism is possible. Realism leads to idealism
rather than the reverse.
*I call it "Realism " in accordance with the common usage. But it seems
to me that I am more truly a realist and more of a realist than they. They
are called realists because they regard as real, mere unsubstantial nonentities.
My claim is based on the fact that I would limit all knowledge and all that
is to be regarded as such, to substantal realities.
1 o0><) 
LIVE QUESTION S.
It is also customary to speak of Pantheism as the characteristic outcome and practical reduczo ad absurdur)  of Idealism.
But it seems to me that our modern physicists-by objectifying
mere properties, and modes of action, and treating them as forces
and real causes, have reached a materialism that is about as
bald and lifeless, as that of the Nominalists and Pantheists themselves, taking, as they do, the  other extreme as a  starting
point.
This whole controversy concerning the origin and nature of
knowledge has been, from the very beginning, embarrassed,
by this innate, and apparently unconquerable tendency to objectify mere modes and properties-neglecting the substantial
things in nature, and treating their modes and properties as
realities. This is eminently conspicuous in Cousin's Review of
Locke's Psychology.  He treats "time" and "space" as his
strongest points.   He elaborates the part of his argument that
is based on them, with the utmost care and zest. It does not
appear to have occurred to him that any body ever did, or ever
could, doubt the substantial reality of these assumed entities.
And, if not, his argument was complete-his refutation over
whelming; though I do not see how it could prove the reality
of ideas.
But I think that the function of insight, when duly considered, answers all the demands and conditions of the problem.
It certainly supplies, or rather, more properly speaking, it accounts for, all the elements of knowledge that sensationalism
has proved itself incompetent to account for. It assumes nothing, and is unlike the theory of ideas in this respect.  It is
undoubtedly, a real mental act. All men understand it. All
men speak of getting an insight into a thing, and there is no
man that speaks the Enfglish language, so ignorant that he will
106 
I     -SIGI1T.
not understand you when you so use the word. You refer to
something that he is conscious of, as having occurred in his
own experience. He may not be aware that he is al the time
getting an insight; or that he is "seeing into" things every time
he sees anything; draws any inferences from a principle, or
makes any application of a rule. But he is conscious of many
an hour of hard study, of intense thought, when what he is
trying to do, and the only thing that occasions any effort in
the doing, is the seeing into or getting an  insight into something that he does not at once and easily understand.
And this is insight; it is the leading characteristic of all intelligence; it furnishes an element in all knowledge.   It enables us to reason from the seen to the unseen, and to draw
clearly and sharply the line of distinction that marks off knowledge and certainty on the one hand, from the domain of mere
opinion, and the still more etherial domain of faith, on the
other.  It constitutes the "good sense" of the great mass of
mankind.   It sharpens into "the tact" of the successful maii
of the world, it grows brilliant in the man of "genius," it
guides the imagination of the artist and the artiz-n so that
the products of their labor are objects of beauty and not mere
monstrosities. And combined with sentiment, and the result
of that experience which comes from the exercise of faith, it
gives the highest tone, and the finest trait to that spiritualitv of
character, which triumphs over things material and temporal,
and is the sure hope and fruition of the presence and  favor of
God, both here and hereafter.
107 
LECTURE V.
THE TEST' OF TRUT7I.
The next of the three great questions which we have reserved
for consideration, is that which relates to the test and limit of
absolute truth-fixing the border line that divides off truth and
knowledge, from mere opinion and the domain of faith.
The admitted facts, that "the senses deceive us," and that
"there can be no science of the variable," constituted the leading feature3 in the problem, which Plato set himself to solve
and to solve which hlie proposed his theory of ideas. The same
problem led Aristotle to the composition of most or all of his
Logical Treatises; and it occupied a large share of the attention of every speculator from the time of Zeno, the Eleatic, to
the close of the Alexandrian period.
The same question was the leading object alike with Descartes and Locke, with Leibintz and Bacon, with Reid and
Brown, with Kant and Cousin. Sir William Hamilton and
John Stuart Mill, each had a theory of his own on the subject,
and the discussion of it has entered largely into the writings
and speculations of every one who has either done, or aimed to
do, any original thinking, within the domain  of metaphysics
And yet the question is unsettled.
The schoolmmen had held that it "is impossible for the same
thing to be and not to be at the same time." Leibintz, as we
have seen, formulated and expressed the same doctrine in what 
7'IE I-EST  OF TR U7'l[.
has generally been called since his time, the principle of identity and contradiction. The other great principle of knowledge or g(round of affirmation he stated as the principle of sufficient cause.
Now, the fundamental difference between these two-in relation to the assertions, or the doctrines that can be based upon
them respectively, in this; whatever is true or can be affirmed
on the principle of Identity, is necessarily and absolutely true,
independent of times, circumstances, conditions and places,
the truth of the affirmation being founded in the very nature
of the subject; while whatever is affirmed on the ground of
sufficient cause, is only conditionally and contingently true
Its truth depends upon the will, the intention, or the activity,
at least, of the agent or cause that produced it.  There is,
therefore a reason for saying that the propositions of the first
kind express Iruths; whilethose of the latter kind express only
facts or events.  To the former there can be no exceptions;
we cannot imagine one, nor even suppose one; if by supposing
it we imply any belief in its reality or possibility, anything
more than the mere putting together of words in a proposition
which are self-contradicting,  In this sense, we can supose,
that is, speak of, two straight lines as enclosing a space, but
not with the belief that they do, or can by any possibility enclose a space.
But with regard to the assertions or "truths," that rest on the
principle of Sufficient cause, we not only can suppose and imagine exceptions; we know that, for the most part, exceptions
do occur, and we can imagine the whole law or truth to be reversed. Thus it is a truth of this kind, commonly accepted,
that every piece of matter attracts every other piece of matter,
with an intensitv proportional to its mass, and inversely as the
109 
LIVE QUES TI70NS.
square of the distance between them. But we can imagine exceptionls to this rule or law. We can even imagine it reversed,
so that these masses and molecules will repel, instead of attracting, one another.   It is indeed true that if this were  the
case, it would make or require a change in almost, if not quite
all of our cosrnical laws, and the system of the material universe dependent upon them. But we can even imagine the
material universe as nriot existing. Most of us believe in a time
before it existed, and of a time when it shall have ceased to
exist.
The difference then, is a fundamental one, and it becomes
a question of the utmost importance, how far does the principle of identity and contradiction extend.
We sometimes speak of them as two, and at others as one
-the only difference is that if the proposition is true, it rests
on the principle of identity; and if false it can be tested by
that of contradiction. Or in other words, if the proposition be
true, it can be reduced to the form, A is A, and if false it can
be reduced to the form, some A is not A, that is, in the old
phraseology of the scholastics, if it is true, so that A is A, it
cannot be possible that any of A is not A. Or if All A are A,
it cannot be true that some A are not A.
It is customary to add by an express statement, what is clear ly implied in the foregoing, namely, that the use of the predi cate must be taken and understood in reference to the same
time and the same relations; thus a man may be both father
and son, though the words are contradictory, father to one per son, and a son to another. A man may be both sick and well
sick at one time and well at another. Or a man may be tall
when compared with a short race of men, and yet spoken of as
a short man if compared with a race much taller than hlie is.
lio 
TIlE TEST OF Ti U:I7 
\We have seen that Kant, while recognizing the principle of
identity and contradiction, thought that it could be applied to
only the analytic a priori propositions.   And this virtually restricted it to mere definitions. And, if so, of course, it was no
means or ground of knowledge at all; since in knowing that an
object is, whatever may be our means of knowledge, we know
all of it that we can know by its definition, all that we can
really express in a definition. In fact, a definition is but the
expansion and expression of the idea, or conception, which,
to use the language of those schools,-we form of the object in
the very act of cognizing it, or understanding what it is. I have a
conception of a plane figure.  I call it a triangle.  I say it has
three sides.  In each of these three mental stages or acts, there
is just the same amount of knowledge; and neither the giving
the name, nor the affirmation of three-sidedness, increases the
knowledge there was in the conception, before naming the object or making the affirmation concerning it. In case, however,
an assertion increases our knowledge, or affirms anything concerning the object that was "not contained in the mere conception of it," the proposition becomes synthetic. Thus, if 1
say the triangle has three sides, the proposition is analytic —but
if I say it exists, the proposition is synthetic. and may calf for
proof.
\Ve all admit that the contradictory of any real or logical
definition is a contradiction in terms; and so involves an ontological absurdity-a something that is nothing, and can not
exist or be real as an entity, or a law or a truth anywhere. If
we define a triangle as a three-sided figure, and then speak of
a triangle that has not three sides, we have a case in point.
\Ve do not need to make any words about it, and are not likely
to make any.
ill 
L1 VE QUESTIONS.
But no predicate, that is not obviously involved in the very
conception of the object denoted by the subject of the proposition, can be thus affirmed in a definition or included within
the scope which Kant would allow to theprinciple of indentity
and contradiction.   Hence, to speak of anything and say "it
exists," would transcend this scope-since its existence is not
implied in the conception of anything. We can imagine or
suppose it to exist, even when we know that it does not.
Hence we are left, not only to a perfect blank with regard to
the whole sphere of ontology; but we are left also without any
fundamental principles of science, the very first Premises for induction, or any certainty in the domain of knowledge anywhere.
I think that Kant made his fatal admission, chiefly because
he did not take time to consider, or perhaps, because there had
not been so much done then as now, to show what the principle really means, and how it iiiay be applied.
There is, indeed, a broad difference between the principle of
identity and contradiction, and the method of applying it.
The principle is obvious to the insight of all men. It needs
no proof. It is assented to by all persons as soon as it is understood.   And so, too, its application to all merely analytic
propositions, is obvious and easy, so that we never ask to see it
applied, or to have the proposition reduced to the form in
which its application is obvious.  We see it, and are content
with seeing it, We do not ask to have its application displayed.
And here our work must begin. We say all triangles have
three sides.  We see at once, that if any figure has not three
sides it is not a triangle, whatever else it may be. And here
we ordinarily stop. We have not reduced the proposition to
the form of a contradiction in terms; bat we see thai it contains
112 
9IIE TEST OF TR UTIIL.
one, just as an algebraist, from the formula, x2+Sx+i 6=64, sees
that x-4, without going through the operation of solving the
equation.  Nevertheless, as truly as in the algebraic example,
there is a process of solution and resolution whereby x28Sx+I 6
can be brought into the form x+4, without changing the value
of a single term, letter or figure, in the original formula, so
truly can  the proposition  "a  triangle has three sides," be
brought to the form A is A-that is, to a proposition, in which
both subject and predicate are one and the same. Or if the
proposition is false ic can be brought to the form Some A is not
A; on what has been explained as the principle of contradiction.
Now that the principle of identity and  contradiction does
extend beyond the mere analytic propositions, the mere logical
definitions, I think can be made perfectly obvious, without
considering at all how it is to be applied. The mode of ap plying it is indeed a more difficult matter; and I think I might
accomplish all I need to do in this connection, by showing the
applicability of the principle without going into the method of
applying it at all; although I propose to make some  sugges tions on this subject before I close this Lecture.
Let us see what the principle really is. It has been expressed
as I have said in the form "a thing can not be, and not be at
the same time."  But in a more general form it is, that nothing
can exist in a manner, mode or form, which is inconsistent
with, or contradicts its very nature.   If tlhree-sidedness is of the
nature or essence of a triangle, there can be nothing, figure or
,object, that is triangular and not three-sided.  If extension is
of the very nature and essence of matter, there can be
no piece of matter, mass or molecule, that is not extended.   And  if extension  implies  divisibility, there can
113 
LIVE QUESTIONAS.
be no piece of matter which is not also divisible. Hence
if one says, this triangle has not three sides, we do not
hesitate to say, you are mistaken, it nmay be something elsebut a triangle it certainly is not.  Aind for the most part we go
no farther.  No one asks or desires, that we should;  we have
done what is required in all demonsrahzbon.  \Ve have taken the
last step that is needed or expected. \Ve have brought the
truth to the insight of the hearer.  He sees it, and is content.
He asks no more; and more would be tedious and unnecessary, if not an unendurable prolixity, and an insult to his understanding.   It is, however, but one step more  to say, if it
were so we should have a "' a triangle that is not a triangle,"
or "'a triangle that is not triangular-a three-sided figure that
is not three-sided.
Such a contradiction cannot occur in necessary matter. It
can occur only in that part of the natural sciences where a
generalization is based on prominent properties, which, however, may iot be of the essence and nature of the subject. We
have an example in the case of "c white black birds." That is,
the animals are called black birds, though the blackness is not
essential.  It may be, and probably is, a prevalent color; but
it is not the differentia of the species.   A bird may be white
and be a " black bird" nevertheless.
Now, suppose we go one step farther. All admit that a
plane figure that has not three sides, is not a triangle; this would
be, if it were contradicted, the contradiction of an analytic
proposition. Hence we say if the figure has not three sides it
is not a triangle. But suppose we go one step farther and say,
"the sum of the angles in any triangle, is equal to two right
angles."  This would be a synthetic pro,)sit.on.  Thousands
know what a triangle is, without knowing this property of tri
114 
TIJE.TEST OI TR UTH 1.
angles.  I suppose we can all recollect the time when  we  had
to learn it, with more or less of labor. But when we had
learned it, and had really mastered the demonstration by which
it is proved, not only seen into it, but "seen /hrough " it, it became a matter of necessary truth, as much so as the original definition or axiom had been. And we had come to know as fully
after that demonstration that if the angles of any plane figure
bounded by straight lines, are not equal to two right angles.
the figure is not a triangle, as we did, or could have done,
when the assertion was made that it had not three sides, or had
not just three angles, and neither more nor less.
But, if this be true, and I presume no one will doubt ordispute it, then the synthetic proposition of the equality of the
angles to two right angles, is as much and as truly founded in
the very nature and essence of the triangle, as its definition;
and the one as truly rests upon the principles of identity and
contradiction as the other.   The only difference is in the
method of applying the principle.   But if the principle applies to the case, there must be a way of applying it; though
possibly it may not yet have been found out and stated to the
world. There was a time when the method of solving cubic
equations had not been found out, and yet, even then, men
must have known that for any complete cube there must be
some way of finding its root. Even to-day, some mathematicians believe there is a way of solving equations of the fifth degree, although no one knows how it can be done.
WVe ought not, however, to stop here with our illustrations.
I select my next example on grounds which are somewhat peculiar to myself.  It is an elementary doctrine in plane Trigonometry, that the sines of the several angles in any triangle are
to each other as the sides opposite these angles are respect
115. 
LI VE QUESTIONS.
ively. The doctrine of the equality of the angles to two right
angles was easily seen by me, but this matter with regard to the
ratios of sines and opposite sides semed at first thought impossible.  At any rate, it was far more difficult to comprehend
than the other. And I found great difficulty in reahlzing its
truth after I had mastered the demonstration; so that to me it
was most emphatically synthetic.   And yet, when once mastered it became as self-evident as either of the others I have
named.   And I was as thoroughly sure and confident  that if
in any case this ratio or proportion did not hold true, the figure, whatever else it might be, could not be a plane triangle.
The truth as completely rested on the principle of identity and
contradiction as the definition of the triangle itself. And, representing the angles by the small letters, a, b, etc., and the opposite sides by the correspocnding capitals, we have the proportion, sin. a: sin. b:  A: B.  And, if in any case we should
find that the equation is not true, we should as unhesitatingly,
and for the same reason declare, the figure not to be a plane
triangle, as if we had found that it had not three sides or three
angular corners.
What I have thus said of the two last named truths in regard
to triangles, extends to every proposition in Mathematics, every
doctrine that the Mathematician ever affirms, so long as he
confines himself to his appropriate sphere of quantity and form
only.  They are synthetic; they,  most of them, at least, increase his knowledge; they extend his understanding, and the
scope of his comprehension; they are not evident at first sight,
as the many, long, and weary hours of labor which they cost
him, abundantly attest.  But he begins with definitions and
self-evident axioms; proceeds by steps each one of which, is,
or must be made, self-evident, before he can proceed any far
116 
TIIE TEST OF TR U  TI1.
ther; and they lead to results which are as truly founded in the
nature of the subject of his investigations, and as truly based
on the principle of identity and contradiction, as the first
axioms-the self-evident analytic propositions he started with.
For the sake of one or two more illustrations-and it seems
to me important that this point should be well illustrated-we
will take the following. In the pursuit of Analytic Geometry,
we soon find that the equation x2-+y2R2, is one of the many
equations of the circle. If now, a mathematician should find
in any line, a point, whose coordinates are not exactly given
by this equation, he would know that that line is not a circle,
as truly as if he knew that some of its radii, were not equal to
others.
Or, if in pursuing the Calculus, he comes to the  equation
dx-ydy divided by the square root of(2ry-y2, ) as an expression
of the cycloid, and yet, should find that dy does not become
zero whenever y becomes equal to either zero or 2r, he would
know that the curve, whatever else it might be, could not be a
cycloid. These doctrines or facts have become as obvious to
him, and in a certain sense, as sel-evident as the first axioms
of his Geometry, or his Algebra. They are as obvious to his insight, as soon as he sees into them, or sees through  them, as
the diagrams or the letters he uses in expressing the equations
that represent them, are to his sight.
The entire process of "indirect'proof," as it is called, rests
on this principle. It furnishes another illustration of it, an illustration too, that is, in some respects better than any we have
considered.   It introduces us to the consideration of another
principle of reasoning, known technically as the principle of the
Excluded Afidd/e.
Take as an example the ordinary proof of the proposition
117 
.LIVE QUES7IO.AS.
that "a straight line let fall from any given point, upon another straight line so as to make a right angle with it, is the
shortest line that can be drawn from that point to the line."
The method of proof usually begins by supposing that some
other line is shorter than the one drawn from the point perpendicularly to the line, and arrives at the conclusion that the assertion that any other line is shorter than the one that is drawn
perpendicularly, implies that there is a line which is shorter than
the shortest.  But "shorter than the shortest" is a contradiction
in terms.  The contradiction is obvious  to insight; although
the proposition may not have been put into the form where the
contradiction is obvious to inspection. And, we infer, that if
the proposition which asserts that any other line than the perpendicular is shorter than it, is absurd-zt is so because ztzinvolves
a contradz'iction zn terms, and its contradictory-" the perpendicular line is the shortest "-is true by Excluded Middle, that is,
by virtue of a contradictory apposition between them. The
principle mnerely implies that there is no other proposition in
the same terms, however diffierent in quantity or quality, that
can be true, while both of these are false.
I think it worth while for the sake of the completeness of
the statement of the subject, to go a little farther and call attention to one aspect more of the case.
All language is based on a classification of the objects denoted by the terms of a proposition.   Triangles, for example, are
but one,species of the proximate genus, plane figures. And
every affirmative proposition asserts either the ontological identity of the subject and predicate, as A is A,-or that the subject is an individual or a class, in the higher class denoted by
the predicate, if it be a noun; or conznoled by it if it be an adjective, as "horses are quadrupeds," " horses are useful," etc.
118 
TliE TEST OFTRUTIL.
In the same way a negative proposition excludes the subject
from the class denoted by the predicate, as "birds are not
mammals." \When, therefore, we apply the principle of identity and contradiction, I get the result A is not A, we do not
infer that A is no-thing, and does not denote any real or possible entity, but only that it cannot be in the species to which
the proposition referred it.  A  " triangle " without three sides,
cannot be in the species triangle; it may  be. a rectangle, etc.
That is. it may be a plane figure of another species, but not a
triang,le.
Now, whether we can in all cases reduce the doctrines, or
rather the propositions in which they are stated, to the form
that exhibits an identity of terms, or a contradiction in terms,
is a question of our ability, and of our presenl ability and attainments in this matter; and not at all a question as to
whether the principle of identity and contradiction, underlies
and serves as a basi3 to them or not. Wte have seen, I think,
that it does sustain this relation to them; that every mathematician so regards the matter, and that he acts upon it, and never
asserts or assents to a proposition, until he has seen this underlying principle, this basis of truth.  And if, at present, we can
not reduce the equation, or proposition to that form, we are in
the same relation to the matter as all were in regard to the
methods of solving the higher equations before they were discovered; just where we ourselves were, when we began our
Algebra, and before we had learned how to solve our quadratic and cubic equations.
I do not know that any effort was ever made to show the
process of this resolution until the publication of my "In/roducz'on to MIetaphyszcs and the Hislory of Philosophy," in I872.
The method there presented is, in many respects, analogous to
119 
LIVE QUEST10NS.
A.lgebra.  That science, or art, perhaps we should rather call
it, consists in ways and rules for the transformation of equa tions, performing operations upon them, and making changes
in their terms, so that the'value of the unknown quantity may
be found, or the relation of one term to another may be made
obvious to sight. So in this case, the process consists in
changing the form of expression, and substituting certain words
for others, until the proposition comes to exhibit the truth which
had all along been concealed, though implied, in its previous
form.
But to explain and apply the process is, as f have said, quite
another affair.  And yet, undoubtedly, it can be done.  To
take the simplest case and give an idea of the process, we will
select an example from the science of numbers. Suppose we
have the equation in figures I+2-3.   It is manifest that  2
may be written I+I, and  3 may be written I —I-tI.  Now,
putting the equation into the new form which we have found
to be practicable without changing the value of its terms, we
have I1-I+I I+t+i, the two members are identical.  HIence
we may call them by the same name, and have A is A, or three
is three.   And it will make no difference what A  denotes, so
long as we can be perfectly sure that it denotes precisely the
same thing in both places as subject and as predicate.
If any one doubts or hesitates at either of these steps, we
must do as we always do elsewhere, reduce it to its more elementary forms, if it has any, and if not, illustrate and explain,
until the doubter sees, or rather, sees into its truth. Do you
ask what we shall do, if after all he don'/ see it, or won't see
it? I hardly know what to say. One thing is certain however,
we are not supposed to be dealing with perversity, or trying to
overcome obstinacy-that belongs to the Rhetorician.   We are
120 
T-IiE TEST OF TIRUTH.
enacting only the role of the logician and the philosopher.  So
too, there are undoubtedly, various degrees of quickness and
penetration of insight. I have seen boys to whom, one-half
at least, of the propositions in plane Geometry were so ob viously true that they needed no demonstration or proof. They
saw znto them, at once, and saw through them too, as soon  as
they saw them at all.  The propositions were as self-evident as
the axioms they began with. And then, too, I have seen boys
who apparently could not learn much of mathematics, whether Geometry or Algebra, except as the saying is, by heart; in
which case they did not uznderstand it at all.  But I never
knew that anybody had doubted or denied the truth of mathlematics on that account.  But more than this, I believe, and I
think I both can demonstrate, and have demonstrated in practice, the doctrine, that while all the synthetic proposition, a
priior  can be tested by the principle of identity, the analytical
propositions-even the axioms and so-called self-evident truths
can be tested-I do not sayproved-by the same principle, under its negative form, as the principle of contradiction.   Thus,
suppose one says I+2 is not equal to 3, then, of course, it is
equal to some other number, say 4, and we have the equation,
I1+24.  Resorting to the process before used, we get for
I+2,    -I4-I+, which we call A  or three, then for 4 we get
I-I<-I —r, which is evidently not A, or not three, and  we
have A is not A, or three are not three.
Or take the axiom "the whole is equal to the sum of the
parts." It is allowable for all the purposes of mathematics,
though not always elsewhere, to say that "the whole is the
sum of the parts" and  "the sum of the parts is the whole."
The two terms of the proposition denote the same thing; and
therefore, they may be used (in mathematics) the one for the
6
12[ 
LIfVE QUE,Sll'OlS.
other. They may even replace one another, and be predicated
of each other in an identical proposition. This I say, is always true in mathematics, but not necessarily or even usually
so elsewhere. In ontology the statement implies the fallacy of
divisions and composition. All the members-or parts of a
committee, are not the committee, nor yet equal to it, except
when they are assembled together, organized and acting as a
Committee.
I have thus far spoken only of mathematical truths and have
drawn all my illustrations and proofs from that source. But
there is another great department of truth; and if our principle of identity and contradiction does not carry us into that, it
is of comparatively little use to us.
Mathematics deals with objects irrespective of their individual characteristics; it deals with them as unites only. Ontology, on the other hand; deals with them as individuals; and as
individuals, they must be distinguished from one another by
essential properties, and included in species and genera.
Hence, they must have essentia, differentia and accidents, separable and inseparable. And all reasoning concerning them
must be based on their properties, while in mathematics, the
propertiesare never taken into account.
Again, mathematics neither proves nor assumes the existence
and reality of anything.  It deals purely with hypotheses, and
the conditions and laws under which objects as zndzviduals may
exist and aclt. It does not assume that there is a triangle or any
object in triangular form, actually in existence anywhere.  It
only says, that if there is such an object it must have three
sides, "the sum of its angles must be equal to two right angles," and the sines of any two of its angles must bear a constant ratio to their corresponding opposite sides, etc.
122 
TIIE TEST OF TR UTILt.
But in ontology, the very first question in the chronological
order of knowledge is, "does anything exist? " Is there a subjective reality that thinks and perceives?  Is there any outward
object, any external reality that is perceived and thought about?
Can any affirmation with regard to the existence and relations
of such objects be based upon or tested by the principles of
identity and contradiction?
This is really the question of practical importance. It is
the question that is fundamental to all philosophy, whether
physical or metaphysical.   And yet it is regarded as purely  a
metaphysical question, a question of transcendental Logic.
Let us take for example the words "perceive" and  "imagine."   "I perceive the table" before me.   This is ordinarily
understood to imply the objective reality of the table, as well
as the subjective reality of myself,  the  perceiving  agent.
Again,  "I imagine a man  crossing the street."  This does
not imply that I see him-does not imply that there is any man
crossing the streets, nor in fact, that there is any man or any
street, anywhere.   The assertion is purely subjective; it affirms
something with regard to myself, what I am doing or thinking
about. But it neither affirms nor (perhaps), implies anything
with regard to anybody or anything else; for I can imagine the
man crossing the street, even if there is neither street to be
crossed, nor a man to cross it.
Doubtless, there is an important difference between imagination and conception, the difference I think is this; in imagination, we think of things such as might be seen and felt,
by their sensible properties. We apply the word conception
rather to objects that have no sensible properties, as to classes,
species and genera. We may imagine the individual, but we
conceive of the class, the species or the genus.   Hence, we
can conceive of what we can not imagine.
123 
L1 HE QUESTIONS.
But between perception and imagination there is this further difference.   The one, perception, is derived from a transitive verb, and the other from a verb which is active only and
not transitive.  If I say "I imagine," I state a fact with regard
to my ovn mental condition, and if I go on  and  add  other
other words as "a man crossing the street," I am  still only
describing myself, what I am doing or thinking about. I am
really saying nothing of the man whatever, I do not even affirm or imply that he exists; but only that I am  thinking as
though he did.  And yet that thinking might go on  all the
same if he does not, and even if I know that he does not.
Not  so with perception, however.  I perceive  the table.
There must be an object perceived, or there can be no act of
perception. The verb is transitive, and requires for its completion an object acted upon, as truly as an agent acting. If I
eat nothing I do not eat. If I perceive nothing I do not perceive. Now suppose there is no table, and no object whatever,
then we replace the word "table" by the word " nothing" in
the above proposition,  and we have. "I perceive nothing."
Hence, if I perceive nothing, I do not perceive, the  act does
take place, there is no act of perception, whatever else there
may be.
Now, it seems to me, we have as clearly a case in which the
principle of identity and contradiction is as applicable as it is
to any of the synthetic propositions; or even to any of the mere
self-evident axioms in mathematics.  If the "table" be not a
reality, the proposition becomes " I perceive nothing," and to
perceive nothing is not to perceive the act does not take place
-the so-called act of perception is not an act of perception at
all.  Just as a so-called act of eating would not be an act of
eating if there was nothing eaten.
124 
ISE 7-EST OF TP UT1IL.
Let us takle another fundamental axiom in ontology, "Every
effect has had a cause."  I have spoken of this before, in making some remarks on  the metaphysics of John Stuart Mill.
I then called attention to the very significant fact that he replaces the word "effect" by the word  " thing," and proceeds
to discuss the axiom, as if it were "every thing must have had a
cause."  This substitution of one term for another is significant.  It will hardly do to suppose that Mr. Mill  consciously
and intentionally played off a trick, or attempted to, on his
readers.   He  was too shrewd, if not too candid  a man for
anything of that kind; and I certainly believe that he was too
honest and candid to entertain, for one moment,  the thought
of such a thing.  The only other hypothesis is, that with all
his sagacity, and all the attention he had given to the doctrines
he had undertaken to controvert, he had never really understood what he was attempting to refute.
It is not that "every /izng has or has had a cause;" that is,
every thing that we can imagine or conceive of or give a name
to. I know of no way in which such a proposition can be
proved. I do not know that such an attempt has ever been
made by any one who has had much experience, or penetrated
below the merest surface-thoughts in metaphysics.   But the
proposition " every effect has or has had a cause," is of a very
different character.  We speak of "effects" as things proiduced
and not as mere objects-whether of perception, imagination
or conception.  The  woid  "effect" implies more than  the
word "thing;" and it implies that we know more about an
object than is implied when we call it merely a thing.  It implies that we know that it has been  produced.  Otherwise  we
could not call it an effect; or in doing so we should be asserting of it what we do not know to be true.
125 
L1 lIVE QUESTIO7[ S.
\Vith this explanation I think there will be no hesitation in
admitting the truth of the axiom, and  in admitting also, that
its truth rests upon, and can be tested by the principle of identity and contradiction.   If things are effects, they have been
produced or caused, and if caused then they are effects and
had a cause.   Otherwise we have effects that are not effectsthings produced that have not been produced.
But see the difference. An effect ex vi termznzi must have had
a cause; and that cause was in existence as an object before it
acted as a cause, or at least before the effect come into existence,
if indeed, the effect be at all anything substantially and ontologically different from the cause itself.   Hence  a series; and
a retrocession from any effect at present existing, to a cause,
which is a First Cause, and not an effect at all, not caused by
anything whatever, a substantial reality, an uncaused cause.
And this is, at least, a thzing, an objective substance, if not  a
Personal Cause or Creator.
If, therefore, we know anything as an effecl, we know of it,
that it had a cause.   But it may be said this will not help us
much.   Perhaps not, this is only a matter of opinion and personal estimate.   I do not know that it is very pertinent to the
question before us.   But it does help us to the conclusion  that
if there be any thing, fact or event, which zis an effect, there
was an object before it somewhere, and somewhen as a cause,
which is not an effect but a cause, a cause only, a first cause,
even the First Cause.
Nor does the extreme views of the Positivists help us much.
They would deny causality altogether, discontinue the use of
of the words " cause" and " law" as implying somethinrg that
we know nothing about.  They would substitute "sequence"
and "order," for cause and law.  Well: sequence implies one
126 
I7 HE TES - O-F TR UTHJ.
before the other, and whien there is a series or sequence, there
must have been one before which there was no "other"-a
First One, therefore, call Him or it what we will. \We tack/
of infinite series indeed, but they- are infinite onlv in theory.
Every series existing in fact had a first term, and has had a last
one too, though that which is last to-day may not be so tomorrow.
But do you ask why not apply the rule to the First Cause
also?  I answer, because we know Him  only as Cause. WVe
know nothing of Him that implies that He is an effect. And
besides; there must be somewhere an zncaused Cause —a cause
that existed before there was any effect. Otherwise there could
have been no effect; and no such seqence or relation, would
have been possible, or even conceivable. The very relation or
conception, even, of cause and effect implies a first Ciuse or
an uncaused Cause.
I do not propose in these Lectures to go into the detail of
this method, or to explain, at length, how we are to reduce
our propositions to a form  that will exhibit their relation to
this principle.  I have done something towards it in the book
already referred to.  But I doubt if it is worth while to draw it
out with as much of form and detail as has been done in the
case of Arithmetic and Algebra.   Here, as there, we must depend upon concurrent insight, and the assent which we can
command by the exercise of it, as we go along.  There'can be
no mere machine-logic in the case, no  assent to conclusions,
merely because certain approved formula have been used.
I will, however, give a few illustrations.  Grammar  and
Logic sustain about the same relation to this higher method in
Metaphysics as Arithmetic and Algebra do to the higher MAathematics. I will therefore give an illustration or two from each.
127 
LIVE QUES-IO7NS.
I. It is a law of Grammar that all verbs which are transitive
in their active form or voice, take a passive form or voice.  In
this form the direct object of the active verb becomles the subject of the passive verb, as if " I see the table," "the table is
sayn."  I will give an application of this law bye-and-bye.
By another law of Grammar any noun following the preposition "of," may, with the preposition, be made into an adverb
qualifying, the verb, if the preposition is immediately preceded
by one; or into an adjective qualifying the noun, if that be the
word next before the preposition. Thus "ships of iron," are
iron ships."  This is important in testing Sir William Hamilton's theory of perception.   ie holds that we  are conscious
of the perceived object, and that that object is some propertyv
etc.  Thus I am conscious of the whiteness of the paper.   If
so, "' of whiteness," is either an adverb, denoting some qualitv
of the act of consciousness; or an adjective qualifying the
subject-the I.  And in either case, what we regard as objective realities, are only subjective modes, or modes of modes,
states and conditions of ourselves, as Berkeley  and  Hume,
Fichte and Hiegel have taught.
2. I give one or two examples from Logic. As the first, take
the law that for any term or word used to denote an object the
definition may be substituted.   Thus, whenever  we have  the
word triangle, we may replace it by the words "three-sided figure." Professor Tait for example, has just proposed to define
force as the rate at which any thing moves.  This may be  a
good n:e7suire of force, but replace the word "force" by this
definition, wherever it occurs in his essay, and we shall see at
once that the definition will not answer; we shall have a force
that is not a force.
But the most comprehensive and the most important of all
128 
7-1IE LTEST 0  TR UTI.
changes are those that come from the application of Aristotle's
dictum. From this it results that for any distributed term we
may substitute a lower term, or qualify the one already in use
by a modal, and for any undistributed term we may substitute
a broader and more comprehensive one, or omit any modal or
adjective that qualifies it.
Let us now recall an illustration which I have just used, and
vwhich I promised to take up again.   "I see the table," therefore, the table is seen.  Now "seen," being predicate in an affirmative proposition, is undistributed.  It denotes also a mode
in which the table is said to exist.   But the summum   genus
includes all modes or forms of existence, and isirrespective of
any.  If now I take from the proposition " is seen," the word
"seen," I enlarge the sphere of the predicate, as we have just
seen we have a right to do; and as by taking it away, I leave
no part of the predicate behind, I really substitute for it a symbol of the summum genus, and we have the "table is."  That
is, it exists as a substance, or a thing, in some mode, not now
designated.
See now the importance of this.  It follows that the ZnsZeiale object of perception canu.ot be, as the philosophers have
generally held, the properlzes of objects, or properties at all
For, suppose we have "I see redness,"' redness" is a property,.  And  we have "I see a property."  But if' I see a
property," "the property is seen," and if it is seen, it is, it exists as a something, is not a proaer/y of anything, it is a substance rather.  Hence, if properties are perceived they are not
properties, for whatever is perceived must be something, and
not the mere property of anything, The moment we speak of
them as properties, we pass them over into the category of substantial realities, that may be seen. WVhat we call properties
129
6* 
LI1 VE Q UESTIOXS.
are not properties, if they are what we actually see in the acts
of perception.
I have said that we can test the self-evident axioms by this
principle. WVe can not prove them in the ordinary sense of the
word, since for the most part, if not always, they have no middle term that can come, or be placed, between their subject and
predicate. Ilence, as I understand, the propriety of calling
them sel-evident; their truth is evident to insight without any
process of deductive reasoning, without the intervention of
any middle term.
In fact, all reasoning can be reduced to formula in which
there are the two Premises, Major and Minor; and, unless one
or both of them aie conclusions of some previously formed
syllogism, the Major Premise will be a self-evident axiom; and
the Minor, either a definition, adopted ex concessis, or a proposition based on an act-of perception, an elementary and simple observation of fact.
Hence we have clearly pointed out the two elements of
knowledge; observation, including sense-perception and consciousness-the sensation and reflection of Locke-and selfevident axioms, based on insight, as I have explained it, and
propose to call it. This takes the place of the ideas of Plato
and Descartes; the schemata of Kant; the original suggestion
of Brown, and the a pfriorz' ideas, or spontaneity of Cousin. It
is an element which neither Locke, nor Hamnilton, nor  Mill
recognized at all.  And,  of course, it is not recognized by
Comte; nor is it recognized by any of the speculators in the
physical sciences, whose theories we have been discussing, as
Spencer, Huxley, etc., including all of those who think they
can explain the phenomena of the physical Universe, without
recognizing any thing more than matter, and the forces of
matter.
111)0 
TlE TEST OF TR UTII.
And I think we have seen, that the principle of identity and
contradiction, applies not only to the synthetical propositions
in mathematics, but also, and fully as well, to certain primary
truths in ontology, and in fact to all the fundamental  axionms
of the aposlerzori sciences.  In most cases it is not necessary
to carry the reduction and transformation of the proposition
until it reaches and is expressed in, the exact form A is A, or A
is not A; any more than mathematicians have found it necessary to follow out their demonstrations to their ultimate form
and last statement.   They usually stop and are satisfied when
they come into full view of them, with clear insight and perfect certainty of the end.   \We may do the same; although, as
I have insisted, we can in all cases, reduce the truth to the one
form of expression; or show the absurdity, if there be any, by
the other. And in regard to absolute truth extending into the
domain of philosophy, giving a foundation for ontology, that
affirms the reality of external objects and gives a basis of absolute truth for all the physical sciences, the application-is, I apprehend sufficiently manifest, even without the formal reduction of their statements to the principle we have been discussing. The principle is there, it extends its support to them all.
It is enough if we can see it.  The formal statement of it may
be needed for theoretical or rhetorical purposes, but no such
statement of it is necessary for any practical purposes whatever.
131 
LECTURE VI.
The topic that remains  for discussion is Real Causes.  It
seems to me to be preeminently tle question  of our age.  As
early as the thirteenth century, William of Occam, put in his
caution against  "multiplying entities, beyond any  necessity
for them," non?mul/hlecazda stunil enha  pr/er necessizalem.   And
four centuries later, the great Newton, found the same necessity for protesting against the multiplication of unreal causes.
The one was a metaphysician and aimed to restrict the pretensions of knowledge to realities.   The  other was a physicistthe greatest name, perhaps, in the whole history of the physical sciences.   And  he found it necessary, in the interest of
science to put men on their guard against referring to, as agents
and causes of observed phenomena in nature, what were  no
real cause, but only the enzh prxIer necessilalem, of the great
Medieval Nominalist.  And  now, as then, we find men  who
are inclined to trust in these unrealities, until they will not believe in either a soul within them, or a God above them.
I think it will be better, before proceeding with  the main
subject of this Lecture, to devote a few moments to theconsideration of another matter of great practical importance in its
bearing on the main subject now before us.   I refer to the law
of coordination in cognition. WVe have had our attention  already called to this principle, as that on which  HIerbert Spen
I
PREAL CA USEiS. 
Pt EAL CA USES.
cer has taken issue with Sir William Hamilton, asserting as
I-amilton had not done,  the existence and reality of what
Spencer calls the Noaumenon-and HLamilton had been content
to regard and call the Unknowable.
Of the reality of such a principle or law of intelligence,
there can be no doubt.  The only question is as to its nature
and the extent of its application.
We shall perhaps put ourselves in the best position  for understanding it and appreciating its nature and applications if
we begin with certain a poserzorz manifestations of it.
It has long been well known that the deaf have no "idea"
of sound, and that the blind have no "idea" of light or of
color. And with them, imagination is also limited accordingly.
They can not even inagine, the one of them how an object
looks, nor the other what sound or no/se it makes. All the sensible properties derived or derivable, from these senses are excluded for them from the domain of knowledge. They may
indeed, use the words and terms that are common in the vocabularies of those that can see and hear. But they attach no
meaning to them, or, at least, a very grotesque one; as when
the blind boy said he knew what the color red was, it was like
the sound of a drum.
But it has not been so generally considered that these unfortunates are just as deficient in the "ideas" of darkness and of
szience. The blind man can attach no10 more meaning to the
word darkness, than he can to those which denote light and
the various colors of the objects we see. The deaf man has
no more idea of silence than he has of sound, although he is
immersed in silence all the while, and that is the only thing in
that line of which he has ever had any experience.
In the cases cited the coordination may be regarded as be
133 
L1 LVE Q UESTIOAS.
tween two successive stages of the same object.   But in some
cases as we shall soon see, there must be two objects existing
and cog,nized at the same instant.   But it is rather a nice point,
perhaps, to determine precisely the limit to the powers of imagination in this respect.  Although I do not think that one
who had never seen a black object or a white one, could imagine an object of either of these colors, or these no-colors,
as we may happen to regard them, I am, nevertheless, inclined
to think that having seen objects of both of those colors, he
could imagine one of a color that is a mixture of the two,
some shade of gray, for instance.   So too,  I think with the
sight of red and blue, we could imagine violet; with red and
yellow he could imagine orange, and with yellow  and blue,
green, etc.
If now we generalize this, we come to the conclusion, that
we can not imagine any original element of knowledge, though
we can in imagination combine and compound any and all of
those that we have, possibly without limit.  In  this way we
can imagine objects of forms, sizes, proportions and combinations of parts, such as have never been seen and have never
existed.  And so, too, we can ascribe, in imagination, to objects real or imagined, properties, which they have not, and
never had, and which, perhaps, they could not have. And
finally, we can combine in imagination, as we can in fact by
mixing the pigments, such properties as we have, to make new
varieties and shades.  These, however, will be mixtures and
combinations of the simple and unresolvable properties. But
of the simple and unresolvable elements, we cannot imagine
any one, nor in any way, or by any mental process, have a
thought of it.
Looking at all the adjectives we have, we see at once, that
131 
REXAL CA USES.
they all, and in all departments of knowledge, admit of being
resolved into the two classes, already indicated, the one denoting what we call simple and elementary properties, such as the
colors, red, blue, etc, and the other denoting those which are
composite. Or, perhaps, we may have another class, which are
not objective at all, but only inferential.  Thus, 1 think, that
extension is unquestionably a simple property, such as could
not be imagined by one who had not cognized, by either sight
or touch, an extended object. But I think also that one who
had seen an extended object, could and would, by either insight or imagination, think of its divisibility, and perhaps he
could imagine it as being divided, without ever having seen
such an operation; simply because by his insight into the nature of objects as extended, he knows that they are all, and of
necessity, divisible. Extension and divisibilityare both of them
simple and elementary properties; they can neither of them be
resolved into others as we resolve orange into red and yellow,
gray into black and white, etc.  Extension is objective and
given in sense-perception.   But divisibility may, as I am  inclined to think, be a result of either a perception of the act
of division, or of an insight into the nature of extended objects.
And here I think we have the limit.   Every'property which
we ascribe to any object that is not resolvable into Iwo or more
simpler and elementary properhles, must have been derlived by some act
of cognzition. No such property can have been the result of any
act of mere imagination; and all olhers may have been originated in imagination or fancy.
This doctrine of coordination in cognition, will doubtless
need to be very carefully considered and cautiously guarded
before it can be safely put to practical use in determining the
extent and limit within which we are to believe in real cause.
13' 
LIVlE QUES7I1O0'S.
It lies at the very foundation; and can hardly becalled into use
except for the purpose of determining a very few fundamental
facts, such as are of the most elementary character.
I think that we could not perceive by the eyes at all, if there
were not more than one object in the field of vision at ihe same
lime, or at least two parts of the same object so diverse in color
or shade as to appear to the eye different in this respect.
It must also be carefully noted that I am  speaking, of the
orzaiozal act of cognition, rather than any subsequent act of recognition.  If one has cver seen a red object, he can ever afterward imagine any object to be red*, whether it be so or not.
So, too, he can have false perception, supposing that he sees
objects, that are red when they are of some other color, or
possibly there is no object at all.  But without having once seen,z
a red object it never happens even in the wildness of our wildest dreams, or in the madness of delirium that we transcend
this law.
And I think also, that we can go one step farther. I assume
at present, the objective reality of material things; and I assume that they produce in us the sensations by which we perceive them.  I know, of course, that there are those  who
doubt this doctrine.   I will attend to their view, in another
connection. And I think I shall be able to effectually dispose
of it when we come to it.
Assuming then that objects are external, and that they produce in us the sensations we preceive them by; these objects,
any two of them that are seen at any one time, must belong to
*Of course, I am aware of the fact, that even the power to imagine objects
by their colors, gradually disappears, in most cases, from those who  become
blind. But the fact is of no importance to the subject before us now.
136 
IDEAL CA USES.
a common proximate genus, that is, they must have  essentia
common to them both. If, for example, they are seen by the
eye, they must belong to the proximate genus, one of whose
essentia is visibility.  Then, they must differ in color; and
color becomes the differentia of the two coordinated objects.
Now we say that we see them, as two and discriminate them
by their color.   But the phrase "by their color," denotes a
cause or instrument-which, in the nature of the case, must
have existed in the order of time, before the act of discrimination could have taken place.  \Ve have then, in the sentence,
"I distinguish them by thEzir colors," three elements, (I) "we"
the agent, or the efficient cause, (2) "col,rs" the instrumental
cause, and (3)  ihe act of di'singuzshz'ig or  discriminatingwhich is a result or an effect of the two causes.  This act requires the combined action of the two causes, and of course,
therefore, it implies their reality and existence, before the act
could have taken place, so that without each and both of them
the act of perception could never have occurred at all. Hence
the color could not have been created in or by the act; for it
was necessary as a cause or instrument to the very existence or
performance of the act.
I am aware that these who have followed me in my remarks on the use of language, may object that I have been
speaking of color all along, as though it were an objective reality, a thing that could be seen-as being in fact a real cause.
So I have: but then, it must be remembered, that we often find
it convenient to continue to use terms and forms of expression
that grew out of an abandoned theory, long after we have
ceased to hold the theory.   \Ve continue to speak of sunrise,
as though we believed in the old ante-Copernican theory of the
cosmical motions. The only limit to the continued use of
such "survivals," is, that everybody shall understand them;
137 
LIVE Q UEST107VS.
and no body so use them as to mislead others, or necessarily
imply the old theory. And I think I have comnplied with
these conditions in this case. If we will replace the terms
"color," etc., by its proper logical equivalent, "colored  object," we shall find that the propositions are none the  less intelligible and consecutive on that account, although they will
doubtless be found to be much less acceptable to the accomplished rhetorician.
And I do not see but that these remarks, and this line of reasoning applies as well to acts of insight, as-to acts of sight,;or
to any other means than the eye.  We cannot see whether  by
sight, or by insight, what is not, and does not exist to be seen.
This law of coordination, it must be remembered, relates
only to the beginning of knowledge, and so, of course, only
to finite minds. It does not pertain to its retention or permanence. The blind that have once seen retain their ideas of
color a long time after total blindness. But if there be an Intelligent Being, who hasno beginning the law does not apply to
Ijim.
But it is time, and more than time, to come  to the more
immediate object of this Lecture, "real causes."
It is manifest that that cannot be a real cause, which is not
itself real.  The word "thing" is more comprehensive than
cause," just as man is more  comphehensive  than "Englishman," quadruped, than horse. An object may be a tlhing- an
object and not be a cause-or at least we can so think of it as
a thing-a substance. Or to apply a rule referred to in the
last Lecture, we have "AB is a cause."   But if AB is a cause,
it must be, and be something, a substantial something, in order to be a cause. Causality or causation is but a mode in
which things may exist.  And they may also exist in other modes
138 
IREAL CAUSES.
or at least out of that mode in som- other; although they can
not exist except in some mode.   If we say of anything  "it is
a cause," we may drop the word "cause" from the predicate;
and then we merely affirm that it is, it exists, is something.
To this there can be no real exception. There are only two
apparent exceptions.
The first is the case in which the predicate is a negative
term, or one with no intensity, as the logicians say —thus, "It
is nothing." This is really a negative proposition and hence
does not come under the rule at all.  But if we say " this is
space," "' this is substance," etc., as the predicate does not denote any object by its properties, or as existing in any mode,
the rule does not apply, and such cases constitute an apparent, but not a real exception, to the rule.
The other case is that in which the predicate is, an abstract
term, whether used in the singular or in the plural number.
As if we say' red is a color," "hardness is a property," or'" ductility and fusibility are properties of iron." These expressions
are apparent exceptions, indeed.   But they are not strictly true,
although in general and accredited use.  In strictness of speech
all we can say in such cases is, that "red is Ihe name of a
color," etc.  We are really speaking only of the word "red,"
and are giving to it a verbal definition. We are not speaking of
the thing at all.
Of abstract terms we can only give verbal definitions except
when we use them by metonymy.
But to our tests.  In the first place we may have a test from
the laws of language I have already described, which will show
what we have no right alpresent to regard as real causes.
We have no right to regard as a real cause, anything which
we cannot denote by a concrete term, nothi)ng in fact, which
139 
LIVE Q UlES7IONVS.
we denote by either, (i) an abstract term, or, (2) a negative
term, or, (3) by a mere etymological compound.   None of
these terms denote objects by what they are, or by what they
are known to do, or to be.
It is easy to apply this rule, and to test it also.  Suppose I
say, "matter is extended."  Is the word matter abstract, ccncrete, or negative?  If I put it into its adjective form and then
put after it the most comprehensive concrete term  that we
know of-the word thing-and say, "imalerial things are expanded," we see at once, that the proposition means the same
as before.  "M laterial things" are what we mean by the term
matter.  If we say "the mind thinks" and then  put the expression "a mental thing thinks," we have the same thought
expressed in another and less elegant form; "mental thing" is
just what we mean by the word "mind."
But suppose we sake another example and say' heat expands all things."  Is heat concrete and abstract?  Is it a real
cause or only an objectified abstraction? Try it and see;
"heated bodies expand others."  This is true, and is, I suppose what we meant to say by the use of the former expression
At any rate it is all that we know to be true, and all, therefore,
that we have any right to affirm.  But by "heated bodies" we
certainly do not mean the same as by the word "heat,"  Bodies
are things in themsqlves; heat is but a mode, condition or
property of a thing.
Now this method is perfectly good as far as it goes; and it
goes to this extent. Replace the noun by its adjective, and
place after it the name  " thing," and if we make thereby no
change in our meaning, the word must be regarded, at present, as concrete; and the thing denoted by it must be considered a real cause.   But if it changes the meaning, so that the
141) 
REAL CA USES.
proposition in one form is one thing, and something else in the
other, if it appears, in fact, to be speaking of one subject in
one form, and of another in the other, the term is abstract,
and does not denote what we actually regard as a real cause.
Hence the general proposition that whatever we denote by
concrete terms are, at present, and in our present state of
knowledge must be regarded by the common  sense of mankind, and to a considerable extent by the fundamental condi tions of thought, as real causes. And whatever is denoted by
either as an abstract or a negative term. is not so.
But this rule or test alone is not sufficient. WVe want something, that goes deeper into the subject than mere words.
I suggest the following tests, as in my  opinion, final and
complete.
I. In the first place, sense-perception is a test, and gives us
knowledge of true entities-real substances.
Whatever we perceive must be real-a real object, or it could
not be perceived. I think I have already sufficiently disposed
of the theories of those who hold that what we call objects are
but modes of ourselves; and of the theories also which teach
that what we perceive is only the properties of objects. On the
first hypothesis, perception could not take place. To perceive
nothing, is not to perceive. And on the other, what we call
properties, are made, for the occasion, at least, substances and
real properties.  To be seen, they must be-be something, and
not the mere properties of things.
They must be causes also: for perception, as contra-distinguished from imagination, implies sensation, and is conditioned by it. And in producing the sensations by which we
perceive them, objects act as causes, upon our organs of sense.
2. As a second rule or test, we have the following. We are
III 
LI VE QUESTIOA.S.
able to prove by insight into certain processes, the reality of a
cause or an agent, even when the cause or agent may not be
actually seen, and possibly cannot for one reason or another,
ever become an object of immediate cognition.
We have examples in the material world.  The case mo3t
commonly cited is that of the discovery of the planet Neptune.
An astronomer had observed a perturbation in the motions of
Uranus, and believing that there was a cause outside of the
planet itself, he computed thle indications which the perturbance gave; and on pointing the telescope to the place where
the cause had been indicated, Neptune was found. To-day
also, there are phenomena which prove the existence of planetary masses inside the orbit of Mercury, and so near the sun
that they have not been seen, and probably never can be seen
by any one on this earth.
But perhaps the chief value of this mode of proof depends
upon its enabling us to prove realities that have no sensible
properties.
Turning to consciousness: that is, a process of interior observation. It is expressed by a passive, or at least by an intransitive verb. We say "I am conscious." But we cannot
put any direct object, as the grammarians call it, after the word
"conscious."  It must be followed by the preposition "of,'
"conscious of." And the word that follows the preposition'
"of" is always the name of some mental act or state, as perceiving, rememnbering, willing, etc.  Even Sir William Hamilton in his unreserved devotion to his theory of cognition, never
ventured upon a solecism so absurd as that. He would say "I
am conscious of the table," which is certainly unusual, harsh
and contrary to fundamental laws. But he never ventured to
say,' I am conscious the table," as we do say, "I perceive the
142 
REAL CA USES.
table." I should regard this fact alone, as a sufficient refutation of Sir William's theory on this subject.
If we say, "I am conscious of perceiving," the limitation
or modal "perceiving," makes the expression equivalent to "I
am perceiving-conscious"-or,  "I-perceiving am conscious.'
But by our insight into the nature of the process-perceiving, imagining, etc., we see that it is a process-a mere mode of
existence, and a process or mode only, not at all a substantial
thing; no real entity.  There must,  therefore, be something
that perceives, imagines, etc., or there can be no perception or
imagination.  Otherwise a mode is not a mode, and a process
is a substance that proceeds, and not a mere process. Hence,
the mind must be a real cause, in accordance with the opinion of all unsophisticated people, and in accordance also with
the usage of all languages.
It has been suggested that the phenomena of dreams first
led men to think of a soul or spirit within them as something
distinct from the body.   It is hardly possible that such  experience should not suggest the doctrine of a soul, at an early
period of human history, even if there had been nothing before to lead their thoughts in that direction. On awaking from
sleep the dreamer would be perfectly sure that his body had remained where it was when he went to sleep, and yet he would
remember that he had been in other places, and seen persons
that could not have been near his body, any more than his
body could have gone to them. Nothing more natural therefore, than the thought that there is a soul-a self-a something
within the body, which is not only unlike it, but which can
leave the body and exist in the exercise of conscious thought
and volition while the body lies insensible to all around, in
profound sleep.
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LIVE  Q UE'TI()7S.
But a more careful analysis leads me to doubt whether with out something previous to such experience, the doctrine of a
soul as distinct from the body, would have arisen.   Although
there can be no doubt that the experience both of dreams, and
of swooning or syncope, would do much to strengthen the
belief in the reality of a soul, and to modify the doctrine held
and taught concerning it, another method, it seems to me,
would more certainly lead men to think of the me —the eg9the self, as something distinct from all its surroundings, including even the body itself. The first effort to do a thing that we
cannot do, would suggest the idea of two antagonistic somethings, the one striving and trying, and the other counteracting
and resisting.  If I but try to lift a weight that I cannot raise
from the ground I become well aware that there are at least two
objects in the Universe, and that myself is one of them and
only one.   Or, again, if there is a pain in my finger, I become
conscious of both it and myself-the Afizer aches indeed, but
it is [ myse lfhal feel the pain. I feel it and not another; it is
myself and nobody else.
But how about the perceived object?  I have expressly reserved this question for consideration in this place.
We have already seen that if there is any act of perception
there must be a perceived object, which is a real entity, and not
a mere property of an object.
But is there an act of perception at all?
Of course, it will not be quite satisfactory to anybody who
proposes the question, merely to say, that we are conscious of
perceiving; for they do not deny this. They say we mistake
our opinion of the fact, for the fact itself.   We are conscious,
and we judge the act to be perception.
I waive the question whether in this case the distinction is
1144 
RIEAL CA USES.
well taken; I think in fact that it is not.   But conceding that
it is, I fall back on the law of coordination.
Perception as a mental act or state, has a differentia of its
own that distinguishes it from imagination, memory, etc., just
as red has a differentia that distinguishes it from white or blue,
etc. And as the man, who, although possessed of the sense of
sight to its fullest extent, had never seen an object that is red,
could have no "idea" of such objects, could attach no meaning whatever to the name denoting the color, nay, more, if all
men were and had always been like him in this respect, there
would be no names anywhere for such a color; so, precisely
so, if there were no acts of perception distinct from imagination, etc., and having that peculiar and special differentia of
perception, on account of which, we infer the existence of the
perceived object —we should have no name for the act of perception, no conception of it; and even the zuestzion whether
external objects exist or not, could never had occurred to man
— not even to philosophers in the profoundest or in the wildest of their imaginings.
And this for the general proposition that external objects
exist as we see them, and as the common sense of mankind
has always believed them to exist. But this conclusion does
not extend to any one particular object.  There is always the
possibility of false perception, by which we think we see an object when there is no object to be seen.  Hence the assertion of
the existence of any particular object is only a probable proposition-the probabilities amounting in most cases to a practical,
or as we say, a moral certainty, sufficient for all the practical
purposes of life.  But unless there were something in existence after the manner in which we suppose external objects to
exist, and unless we had actually perceived some one or more
7
145 
L1IVE QUE.S AONAS.
of them, there could be no belief in their existence-no
thought of them and no question about the existence of any
one of them at all.
WVhat we thus cognize or prove to exist must not only be
real as entiies-but adefuile as causes, also.  To be causes they
must be, as entities; and to produce their effects they must be -
adequate to their production.   Hence a knowledge of the effects is an essential part of the argument. If I see a piece of
white paper, I know that the object is capable of affecting the
retina of my eye, or I could not see it as an object at all. And
it must affect it in one certain way and not in any other, or I
should not see it as while.
So when Le Verrier predicted a planet from the perturbations
in the movements of Uranus, he assumed that Uranus was
mere matter, inert like all other mere inorganic masses and so
incapable of voznlary motion.  He  did not suppose that it
wandered out of its path spontaneously or of its own free will
and so he inferred the existence of another planet. He might
have supposed that there was soe perso   n that turned it aside.
He might have referred the phenomena to the immediate act
of God.  But he observed the law that precludes us from ascribing to the causes which we discover anything more than is
necessary to make them adequate to the observed effect.
I have said a good deal about intelligence and voluntary action in dumb animals. The subject is worth alluding to here,
for more purposes than one.  So long as we knew nothing of
reflex action-its nature and extent —there seemed to be no
adequate cause of the actions of animals, except mind or soul
within them, as there is in man.   But the discoveries made in
that line have entirely changed the ground of the argument.
We see now that the nervous system considered as a piece of
1 4) 
REAL CA USES.
mere material mechanism is adequate to all that animals do; and
hence the inference that they have mind and volition is creating a cause prxeer necesstzalem, altogether beyond the necessities of the case.
IHere then we must stop. Observation and Demonstration
are our two. and our only methods of proving or verifying the
existence of realities and real causes.
Observation is two-fold. Sense-perception for objects in the
outward world-the not-me-and Consciousness for the phenomena within-the me.
Demonstration by means of insightfromn observedfacts. The
limitation is important, for Demonstration in Ontology differs
from the process we call by that name in Mathematics; not at
all, perhaps, in the process itself; but widely in the starting
point.  In Mathematics we begin with a hypothesis or a definition and end in the establishment of a law or a condition of
existence. But in Ontology we begin with an observed fact.
First of all, the observed fact of consciousness.   From this we
prove the reality of the subject and the object-the perceiving
ego, and the perceived entity. And from either, as objects,
we may proceed to prove other objects, as well as truths and
laws concerning objects, which are based-not as in mathematics, on the mere possibility of their existence, without regard
to their properties-but upon their properties-treating them as
individuals, in classes, species and genera.
But we must stop here. The mere process of abstraction
creates nothing; it produces no reality. The object with which
we begin is a reality. This paper is white —the object is a reality-but "its whiteness" is not, though the paper is really
white.   The whzleness is neither substance, nor cause, nor yet
object.  It is a convenient fiction and nothing more.
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-LIVE Q UESO'IOA'S.
I do not think that the reverse of the argument from cause
to effect, although of inestimable value elsewhere, is of any
importance,  in this relation.   Doubtless, if we could ever
know that a Being was in the act of creation, in the sense of
making something out of nothing, we should know from that
act, that something was being created, and would exist thereafter as a real entity.  But in practical affairs, if we know, for
example, that the two gases-hydrogen and oxygen-are combining, we merely know that two substances-entities —are
about to exist in another form; but no new entity or sub
stance can be produced by that process, or by any other process
that man can institute.
Nor yet can hypothesis create anything. WVe can suppose or
assume the existence of entities at B,ill, and without limit.
And the process may be useful for certain purposes. But if in
doing so we create phenomena to be explained, or'imagine unreal causes to explain them, our theories will break down and
fail us if we go one step beyond the real entities and substantial causes already existing in nature.
The two classes of objects which chiefly occur to us are
' ideas " and' "forces."
No one is conscious of ideas. The assumption or hypothesis that there are such entities, was found convenient by Plato,
and has been continued in one form or another to our day.
Cousin assumes their reality, as enhlzes zn the mind, as the basis
of his Philosophy, and of his argument against Locke.  And
yet he says in that very course of lectures, (Lecture X, second
series,) "there is nothing real but tlhings, and the mind wzilh zts
operations, that is, its judgments." Whatever liberty of construction we may give to the words "its operations," we certainly
must exclude ideas from their scope. And yet Cousin not only
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REAXL CAUSES.
speaks of our having ideas, but of our being conscious of them
and of their being immediate objects of consciousness. Certainly such expressions are not well considered. Nobody is
conscious of having the zdea of space, for example.   He  is
conscious only of thznkzng of space, conscious as Cousin says,
"of the mind and-its operations," when thinking of it. Ideas
then, may be a convenient hypothesis, but they are no substantial entities, no real causes.
And  so with  "forces."  If we speak of real  things as
"forces," as wind, water, steam, etc., there can be no objection to the use of the word-for they are real entities.  But
when we speak of light, anrid heat, and gravity, etc., as real
forces, we are transcending the limits of known  reality.   The
words as derived from adjectives and verbs by abstraction.   We
know of no light as distinct from a luminous body, of no heat
as distinct from a heated- substance, of no gravity when there is
no gravitating mass.
The claim is sometimes put forth that we have a right to-regard certain objects as realities, on account of the use we can
make of them'as means of explaining phenomena that-we certainly do observe. Nay, it is said that we cannot understand
certain phenomnena, as the transmission of lightand heat, without them.  Well, this fact may demonstrate ourinfirmity; it can
hardly prove their existence as substantial entities. When
such statements are made I cannot help thinking that we had
better stop and consider whether we have not already committed one error in supposing light and heat to be entities that
need transmission, or that can be transmitted at all.
One of our leading scientific men says,  "In this long history of animal life, I have said nothing of what Life itself
really is,...  because I know nothing."   But he has
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LI VE ( UESTIONS.
done something, though he does does not appear to know it.
He has made it an entity-a real cause.   No wonder, therefore,
that as a real entity he knows nothing about it, for as such it is
nothing; it is only a mode, and as a mode of existence, or of
an entity it is as intelligible and as well comprehended perhaps,
as any other mode.  As an entity-a real cause-it is nothing
and of nothing-nothing is all that can be said.
And thus I differ from the Realists so-called, in not ascribing reality to abstractions, and from the Nominalists in recognizing the mind as a real cause; and, as implied in the observed
phenomena of both mind and matter, as we shall see more
fully bye-and-bye, the existence of a Supreme Being, who is
real without being material, and substantial without being extended.
\What we shall ascribe to mind will vary with the progress of
knowledge. It is vastly less now than it was before the discovery of the nature of reflex action. But it may be, and I think
it most likely that it will be, much more hereafter than it is
now.
But of one thing we may be certain.  Men who have well
considered the subject-men who are entitled either to have,
or to express, any opinion on the subject-will consider the
mind as a concrete reality-a substantial thing a vera causa
No one will define it as only "the series of his own states of
consciousness."  No one will speak of it as only "a phase of
nature's order," or as " a force produced by nervous action."
I think no definition better than Hamilton's is likely to be
found, "Mind is to be understood as the subject of the various
"internal phenomena of which we are conscious-or that sub"ject of which consciousness is the general phenomenon"or manifestation rather, "Mind can be defined only from [by]
150 
1$3.~1',4 (A S.
"its manifestations," we can describe it only as an agent-by
that which it does, and not at all as an object or by what it is.
I am inclined to think, however, that it will be regarded  as
the immedzatle object of consciousness-though I have not so
treated it in these Lectures.   If so, the expression  "I am
conscious of perceiving," will be regarded as equivalent to " I
am conscious of self-perceiving or perceiving-self." And the
preposition "of," will take after it, a concrete term.
I do not intend to discuss here what is sometimes called the
autonomy of the brain and nerve cells.  A  nerve cell as soon
as it begins to exist is a   zking structure; and  in all living
structures, as long as lhy hiVe, there are chemical changes going, on. I do not deny-on the contrary, it seems to me likely, not to say certain-that these changes which are thus going on, may occasion acts that are precisely like reflex action
in their character, though not really so in their origin.  This
kind of autonomous activity, may constitute a large part of the
active life of men and animals. And it is in fact often spoken
of and called spontaneous activity.  It is indeed, the "spontaneity" that we find in nature, and the only fcorm of spontaneity we find there.  But it is after all subject to physical  lawssuch as we see everywhere in chemical action. It is not the
spontaneity that we become conscious of in ourselves.
The history of the origin and development of these two coo6rdinate ideas, the ideas of spontaneity and inertia, is interesting and instructive in more ways than one.
From the earliest stages of human life. men were conscious
of spontaneous activity in themselves and their own actions.
Naturally they ascribed this kind of activity to all things else.
We see the effect of this alike in the pantheism of the early
Hindoo nations and in the fetichism of all the Mongol and
1.51 
Ll  V'E Q UTESI IO~S.
Negro races, and the tendency to it among those who are low est in intellectual culture, everywhere.   Without this fact the
religious history of man is incomprehensible and inexplicable.
The same tendency to ascribe spontaneity to all things around
us, still remains as the chief support, in my estimation, of the
common belief in the voluntariness of the actions of dumb
animals.
Its recognition among the students of physical science was
as we have seen abundantly in the course of these Lectures,
the chief obstacle to the progress of those sciences, all through
the Greekl period as well as during the Mliddle Ages.  Their
division of motions into the two classes, "natural" or those
that are in a straight line, and those that are contrary to nature
or not in a straight line, implies the admission, though not the
consciously adopted belief, that those bodies that moved in
curved lines had some voluntary power of changing and directing their movements in their own way.  Hence, by the admission of an unireal cause the), failed to find the real nature of
curvilinear;notion.
And the doctrine of the inertia of all mere matter was not
fully realized until the time and labors of Newton.   I do not
find the word "I;,zer/z" in use in this sense before the time of
Klepler. And he is said to have been the first to use it at all.
The doctrine was not recognized in chemistry until a still later
period.  And until this fact of the inertia'of all matter  was
distinctly recognized and made the basis and actual cornerstone of all Physical Sciences, no one of them was placed on
its proper foundation, or could make satisfactory progress.
But there must be the two, inert matter and spontaneouslyacting agents, especially the latter, actually existing somewhere;
or wve should have had no such word, no such.conception; any
152 
REAL CA USES.
more than in a world where all the people are blind and have
always been so, there could be words denoting light and darkness and the various colors which distinguish the objects we see
around us.
And again, as already intimated in these Lectures, I think
that the fact of motion and change ill nature implies a Beginning-or, perhaps I had better say a Beginner-who is not material. Each change is an effect; and its immediate cause was
also an effect of something before it. And thus we have a series running back indefinitely.  But a series without a first term
is an impossibility. And, moreover, the first term is never produced as the succeeding terms are, or in accordance with the
law of the series.  It must have had a cause and a law of its
own,  and  peculiar to itself.   Otherwise it would not have
been the first term at all.
I see not how we can escape the necessity of admitting the
existence of a Supreme Being somewhere. If, as we have just
said, this series of phenomena in nature had a beginning,, there
must have been a Supreme Being, a First Cause to cause it to
begin.
But on the supposition that it had no beginning it is eternal.
And with time enough, all things that are possizble the bad and
the worst, as well as the good and the best, must become real
also; unless there is a Supreme Being, a Sovereign  Ruler to
prevent it. And must not an Infinite Beinog, if he did not exist at first, be among the things already produced? Surely such
a Being is conceivable, and therefore possible.  It will not do
to say'not yel"; for eternity is long enough  for all things
that are in themselves possible.  There must have been time
enough for all things whose existence does not imply a contradiction in terms, many times over-:n fact, any number of
7*
153 
LIVE QUES,I()S.
times, already.  If, therefore, there was no God at first, as a
Creator and Lawgiver, there must have been one produced by
this very process of evolution and development long, ago, as a
necessary result. I see no way of escaping this conclusion.
And miracles too; for aught I can see.  If there was before
all else an Infinite Being, who created this world and gave it its
Iaw-even though that law were the law of evolution-the very
act of creating, of originating and starting it off, must have
been miraculous, in the only proper sense we can attach to the
word.   And whether He has interposed miraculously, or by way
of miracle since, is merely a question of history. The supposition
is possible, and perhaps, on the whole rather probable.
But if there were no such Being at the beginning as creator
and cause, then as we have just seen the very process of evolution and development must have produced one. And I
think that in the nature of the case there can be but One Supreme or Infinite Being. Spinoza has proved that. But He
must be a miracle-worker, else He is not infinite; Hle lacks one
attribute, the possession of which would add to His being, and
a miracle-worker would be greater than He. The very conception of such a Being implies superiority to nature, and
power over it.  He that did originate laws can suspend them
He that ordained gravity as the law of masses, can also, upon
occasion, ordain that gravity shall not act so as to draw down
too roughly, the sparrow that flutters and falls. He that gave
life and raised the unliving atoms to be a vital frame can certainly control that life, so as to suspend and restore it at pleasure.  He that is above all things, surely for Him there is noth
ing that He can not do. The only limit to His power is nonentity.  He can not do that which is nothing when it is done;
as, to make two hills without a valley between them, or a crooked
151 
REAL CA USES.
line that is shorter than a straight one between the same points.
Or is there no such Being? Why not? If this evolution has
been going on infinitely-if it had no  beginning, and its tendency is, as all admit and claim that it is, and has been  for
countless millions of years, upwards, it must have produced
such an Infinite Being an infinite time ago.  And  that, as it
seems to me is about the same as' In Mle Begz'izzig."
The recognition of this First Cause may be no necessity for
any branch of the Natural or mere Physical, Sciences. They deal
with second causes and intermediate stages and terms in this,
only not endlessly, long series.  For the man  of this nineteenth century who would write a history of Greece, it is no
matter whether the earth had a beginning to its existence or
not, or whether man has been living on its surface ten millions,
ten, or only six thousand years. In either case the period of
which he would write, and the events he would describe, are
too far from the beginning, to be influenced by any diversity
of views that may be held concerning it.
So with Natural Science.  The very idea of cause, and the
relation of cause and effect implies, indeed, a First Cause.
But then, we are so far from that first act of causation, that no
special influence can come from it upon the observations and
conclusions of to-day; if we confine ourselves to the appropriate sphere of science. But it is narrow-minded a-nd unphilosophical to hold, that because we have nowhere encountered
any First Cause, or any act of primary causation there can
have been none.  Many things must have happened on this
earth, the likes of which we have never seen.   The Universe
certainly has not always gone on as it is going now. At all
events it did not begin as it is now going. At the starting off
there was something unusual, a different order and another
155 
LIVE QUE,S7IONS.
Cause besides those that the Physicist now finds in his manipulations.
Nor will the hypothesis of alternating extremes-maxima and
minima of heat and cold, expansion and condensation, help
us much.  They are mere "dead poitns," where the Universe
comes to periods of "'complete equilibrium or rest" as Heibert Spencer calls them. For we must remember that we are
speaking of the Universe, the sum total of all things that exist.  And when zt comes to " equilibrium" or " rest," all its
parts and particles are inactive, and there can be no outside
mass of matter to act upon it, and set it in motion again. Its
own particles and parts have ceased to act on each other. There
is nothing to carry it through the maximum or the minimum,
where from condensation it should begin to expand, or from
expansion it should begin to condense. There must, therefore, be a Personal Agent somewhere outside of it-or in it —
to carry it through these points, or it would have remained in
the first one it reached, forever.  And, of course, if the Universe is eternal, such an one must have been reached long ago
so long that nobody can tell how long.
A cause there must be, then, and a First Cause. And He
must be not only real but adequate also. We cannot resolve
His nature into ideas, with Plato and the pantheists; for then
He would not be real. Nor vet can we resolve it into mere
abstractions and laws, with the materialists; for then He would
not be adequate. He must be intelligent or there would be no
order or comprehensibility in the Universe. He must be capable of volition and purpose; for before He acted there was
nothing to act on Iim as motive or cause.  And these —intelligence and power of choice-constitute Pensonality.
M\Iany object to ascribing personality to God, because as they
156 
RPEAL CA USES.
think, it implies limitation, localization, restraint, and perhaps
caprice and mere arbitrary rule. But all these are the mere
accidents of personality, as we see it manifested in our fellowmen.   Perhaps they are, all of them, inseperable from finite
personality anywhere.   But they are no attributes of an infinite
Person. Infinity, from its very nature transcends all these conditions and limitations. We may not be able to comprehend
it-we certainly cannot imagine it. And all our conceptions
of it, do the best we can, are undoubtedly inadequate and to
some extent anthropomorphitic-but some conception of it,
more or less adequate or inadequate we all have.
And He must be a Lawgiver also.  It is true that facts, in
nature, suggest a law; and, by induction we find that law.
But, in all contingent matter, law is only the realization  of the
will and purpose of some person, one who chose to have
things as they are, but might have chosen to have them otherwise; and His choice would have made them so. In necessary matter this personal influence not only does not appear,
-it is precluded.   But in all the inductive Sciences, what
the scientist finds, and all he can find, is an expression of the
will of a Personial Lawgiver.
To the views thus presented, few, if any, I apprehend, will
object.   Men object only when when  we  begin to talk of a
God Who can lay His commands on us- command us to do
things and punish us if we do them not. Here is the practical
difficulty, the grand sticking point, the insuperable obstacle at
which most unbelievers hesitate. But I do not appreciate the
force of the objection. It is certain that man often needs, for
his own good, to conform to laws, the reasons of which he cannot see until after he is either enjoying the fruits of obedience,
or suffering the enduring consequences of his mistakes.   Restraint is. better than the freedom that allows us to do wrong.
157 
LIVE, QUEST10-NOS.
Upon the natural order, there is certainly based a supernatural.  In the lower order-the order of Nature-the consequences of any violation of law follow surely and inevitably,
whether we know the law or not; the burnt finger smarts none
the less, whether we did or did not know that fire will burn.
But in the higher order-the Supernatural-no man feels shame,
remorse, or regret even, unless he knozvs that the act he has done
is wrong. Into this higher order we rise the moment we become capable of thought and voluntary action.   Here we enter upon a new state of discipline.  \Ve not only become ca
pable of knowing and comprehending higher laws, which
have no application or force below us, but we become responsible also for the knowledge and observance of them. The worst
of the pains, as well as the most cherished and characteristic
enjoyments of our lives in this world, and all our hopes of a
life hereafter, depend on the laws and conditions of that sphere.
They are found nowhere, not even the germ or prophecy of them,
in mere inorganic matter.  They do not enter into plant life.
The dumb animals know nothing of them. From man they
extend upwards, and reach a limit we know nothing of.  God
is above them, and "over all, blessed forever."
But none of the methods we have considered include among
the real entities, either the "ideas" and "faculties" of which
the psychologists have said so much, nor yet the  forces" of
which the physical philosophers make so much account at the
present day Their effects are never seen except in the presence of real causes, which are known to be indisputably such,
and which are sufficient to account for all the effects we see.
Hence, we must, at present, regard the hypothesis that assumes
that they are real causes or entities at all, as wholly gratuitous
and unwarranted by any principle of a sound philosophy.
158 
}iEAL CAUSES.
No immediate change in the use of language is, however, to
be expected.   Perhaps it is not to be desired   So long as
physicists use these abstract terms, as mere convenient metonymies-the fact that they are so used being well understood and
admitted by all, no harm can come of the use; and much is
gained by way of brevity and comprehensiveness of expression.
It may be, as already said, and for the reasons given, that
mere science has no need to take into account either a First
Cause, or the final causes of things. But Philoophy must take
account of both.  Science has no authority to deny, and  no
justification for denying their reality. \Whatever is possible
may be real. Only Omniscience can affirm a universal negative in contingent matter. No finite mind can affirm that there
is not an Infinite Mlind somewhere. Hardly can we say that He
is not at work in the phenomena around us, even those with
which we are most familiar and think we know the best-in the
gravitation, in the attraction and repulsion, the analysis and
synthesis, the successions and changes that make up the sum
of nature's phenomena.
Even while these pages are going through the press, one of
the foremost scientific men of our country says, "Light, Heat,
"Electricity and Magnetism, Chemical Affinity and Motion,
"are now considered different forms of the same Force; and
"the opinion is rapidly gaining ground that Life, or Vital
"Force, is only another phase of the same power." If by
"light" he means anything else than "' luminous bodies,"
and by "heat" anything but heated masses or molecules of
matter, and byv "life" anything besides living tissues and cells,
what he calls Force or Power can be nothing but God Himself, at work in those phenomena.
I am well aware bthat th, ignorant and superstitious are always
15,i 
LIVE QUESTIONS.
looking for " miracles" and "interpositions" in their behalf.
And the whole history of science is an illustration of the fact
that scientific discovery is constantly relegating what has been
regarded as "miracle," to "the order and course of nature,"
until scientific men have come to accept it as an axiom, that
there are no miracles now. It is well; for it teaches us to
trust to ourselves and to the laws of nature as being the chief
factor of that providence by which God governs the world. But
we cannot, and we do not forgo all trust or faith in Providence.
In the lowest and most ignorant it may take the form of superstition and fetichism, but in the more cultivated it becomes a
trust, not only in the order and course of nature, but in something Higher, over and above nature, something that guides,
and can help without "interfering."
The history of the doctrine and use of final causes is instructive. The scholastic Philosophy took note only of First
and final causes. Modern Science has been much occupied
with the consideration of second causes. It has claimed to be
able to get along without a First Cause-'-" the hypothesis of a
God" as scientists have called it, and has stoutly protested
against the recognition of any final causes. Final causes imply
an intelligent Personal agent. They account for phenomena
by referring to His will, and the purpose he had in ordaining
the phenomena. But strangely enough, the last evolution and
final outcome of this atheistic philosophy of nature, finds itself obliged to recognize final causes, under another name perhaps, as one of the indispensable elements of its explanation
of the phenomena  of  life and  living things.   In  Darwin's
theory of "A;alural Selechon," and  "The Struggle for Lfie,
with Survival of the Fittles," it becomes incumbent on him to
show how and why each feature that has been produced by his
1so0 
llEAAL CAUSES.
process is the fittest, or makes its possessor the fittest to survive.
But the very word''fittest" implies an end. a''final cause"a something to or for which it is "fittest."  And  the recognitionI of this final cause becomes indispensable as a part of his
explanation, and a means to it. The most forcible objections
to the theory, have come firom such cases as the sting of the
bee, the rattle of the snake, etc.  This last especially, is quite
a stumbling block to the advocates of this theory. They can
show no final cause for it, no reason or way in which it makes
its possessor more fit or likely to survive in the struggle for life,
than if he had it not. It appears to be a hindrance to him
rather. It looks, as Ae are at present informed, and according
to the best knowledge we have at our command, as though it
had been designed by some wise Providence, for no special use
to the snake, but rather in mercy, and with a benevolent design to man and animals, so that the snake could do them no
harm without first giving a warning to his victim.
The effort to escape this difficulty has led to the suggestion
of a correlation of parts and properties, such that two or more,
are or may he so united that the one cannot come without the
other; and while the one is good for the animal, the other is
bad, and yet on the whole, the usefulness of the useful one
predominates over the hindrance of the other. Doubtless there
is such a connection in some cases. There is inconvenience in
the weight of the elephant, but he could hardly leave his size
and strength without it.  But after all-this hypothesis fails in
many cases.
But with or without this doctrine the whole theory fails and
falls to the ground without the recognition of final causesends and purposes for which things exist-ends and purposes
that can have no reality without some one who purposed and
intended them..
......-.....
161 
LIVE QUESTIOQ-S.
It is certainly and old myth, if it is not a divine record that
man's earliest efforts after knowledge, was accompanied with,
if they did not proceed from, a disposition to unbelief and disobedience.   And from that day to this, there has been something of a natural antagonism between the two powers of
mind. Hence it is not at all surprising if we find those who
are constitutionally least inclined to believe and obey, making
themselves most conspicuous among those who engage in the
pursuit of science.
But there is morein  the soul than intellect-more in life
than merely to know. Poetry and Religion are necessary as
well as Science.  Man is not satisfied with facts and laws alone.
They are dry and hard-and in the language of the old heathen Epicurus, "inexorable."  Whereas man wants something
that is glowing with life, something that kindles imagination
something that inspires hope, even "the hope, " which as
Epicurus has said "comes only from prayer and the worship of
God."
I like to repeat the words of this old philosopher.  For heathen, sensualist, and materialist though he were, I have scarcely found anything in all my researches, preparatory to writing
these Lectures, that pleased me more.   Buddha is reported as
having said, "All of you who are in doubt, whether there is a
future life, had better believe there is one; you will then abandon sin and act virtuously, and if there should be no result,
such a life will bring a good name and the regard of men."
It seems to me, however, that the Greek philosopher, living
some three hundred years later, puts the matter still more
pointedly, when he says, " Wherefore it is better to follow that
which is told us of the gods, than to be slaves to fate, which is
all that the physical sciences can present us; for the former
.
162 
LI VE Q UEST10ITS.
gives us a hope that comes of prayer and the worship of God,
but the latter leave us to the necessity which is inexorable."
And yet, we have, as I think, a more sure Word of prophecy,
which says unto us, "' Come unto Me, all ye that labor and are
heavy laden, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon
you and learn of me; for I am meek and lowly in heart, and
ye shall find rest unto your souls. For my yoke is easy and
my burden is light."
And thus I bring to their Conclusion, my Lectures on the
History of Philosophy.   My plan has differed fiom that of
others, as you must have noticed, in that I have given the
opinions of the philosophers in Ihezr own wzords quoted at
length; giving you the best translation I could make when I
felt competent to make a translation, and when I did not I
have given you one that was made by a friendly hand. I have
also given you, along with the history of speculative opinions
an account of tha progress of the Natural Sciences  and of
Pure Mathematics as well.
The Ihistory of Philosophy, however, is but one Chapter in
the broader and more comprehensive subject, the Philosophy of
History. We see man beginning his career in an unreasoning,
unquestioning belief and awe, an "unconscious monotheism"
as Max Miiller calls it.  We see this with the eastern Aryansthe Hindoos —developing into a pantheism, while with the
more active Aryans of the West, as the Greeks. it becomes a
polytheism.   With the Mongolic and Shemitic races it takes
the form of a monotheistic personalism, with superstition,
fetichism and idolatry prevailing everywhere. Philosophy came
in afterward and began in scepticism and distrust of the prevailing theories and myths-seeking to establish Science in the
place of mere unreasoning credulity; and with this scepticism
163 
R6 EAL CA U,SES.
there came the relaxation of restraint, and something of a disregard of the inevitable consequence of wrong, doing.
But by the processes of investigation and analysis, the pursuit
of science itself brings us back to the original starting pointnot now, indeed, an "u4nconscious monotheism," but a theism,
consciously held and based on most impregnable foundations,
which asserts the existence of One God,-before all, over all,
and in all; Whose ways are in His works, and Whose will is
seen in the course of his Providence, in the History of the
World, and in the experience of each human heart. A God,
near and yet far off-known by all, and yet comprehended by
none-a God whose presence is law, and order, and peace,
and Whose fruition is eternal life and Heaven. And in the
course of this evolution, the two, science and religion must
again unite and be in harmony; Religion, accepting every
truth and fact of science, as a part of the divine administration;
and Science recognizing the truths of revelation as its necessary
complement and crowning glory.
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