A 399720 ~i: ii d i: Our E~~~~~~.....V a i w ww, e 5 I~~i~t 1 I ~ t- } kfit Ai ~~~~ 4 a.', 'i i. JOH N.R.SPEARS 1. 'L: '.. '4... sHed, i'.- . -,1, I j p r~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~........... OUR NAVY IN THE WAR WITH SPAIN BY ^ JOHN Rr"SPEARS AUTHOR OF "THE HISTORY OF OUR NAVY," ETC. WITH MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED ILLUSTRATIONS NEW YORK CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 1898 i/ k 11 COPYRIGHT, 1898, BY CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS CONTENTS PAGE INTRODUCTION...... XVii CHAPTER I. THE DEMAND FOR INTERVENTION I Efforts to Subjugate the Insurgent Cubans that had Degenerated into a Pitiless War of Extermination Wherein even Women and Children were Deliberately Starved to Death-Where Intervention was a Duty and Non-intervention not only Cruel but Dastardly. CHAPTER II. TEACHING SPAIN TO DESPISE US. 8 When our Sense of Honor was so Low that American Ships were Seized on the High Seas by Foreign Men-of-war and we Permitted the Aggressor to Change the Real Issue-American Citizens Shot to Death Without Trial and an American Consul Confined to his Office by an Armed Guard-Two Striking Pictures of Spanish Diplomacy in the Histories of the Aspinwall and the Virginius. CHAPTER III. THE WHITE SQUADRON.. 25 Money Grudgingly Provided for a New Navy-The Advisory Board-A Frigate, Two Corvettes, and a Despatch-boat-What "Junketing" Did for the Navy-Discouraging the Younger Officers While Demanding Increased Service. CHAPTER IV. ARMORED CRUISERS AND BATTLESHIPS........ 43 Building of the Ill-fated Maine-The New York as an Era Maker -Our Battle-ships that had Part in the War with Spain were not Wholly Free from Mistakes-The Beginning of our Industrial Independence-The Hessian Plans for Cruisers. v vi CONTENTS PAGE CHAPTER V. TREACHEROUS DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE..... 61 Our Early Efforts to Remove Anarchy from Cuba-The Maine Sent to Havana to Protect Americans-The Undisputed Conclusion of the Court of Inquiry Regarding the Loss of the Maine. CHAPTER VI. THE DAYS JUST BEFORE THE WAR..... 8I A Display of Power that was Without Effect Because of Spanish Obstinacy-$5o,ooo,ooo for Defence-A Fleet of Auxiliary War-ships -How we Learned that we Must Depend on our own Ship-yardsSampson in Command-A Combination that Gave the Rest of the World Pause. CHAPTER VII. THE WAR MESSAGE... 103 Summary of Reasons for American Intervention in Cuban Affairs -Aggravating Proof of Work of Spanish Spies and Spanish Insincerity-Diplomatic Relations Ended-Threatening Movements of War-ships. CHAPTER VIII. FIRST SHOT OF THE WAR. 115 Capture of the Spanish Merchantman Buenaventura by the Gunboat Nashville-His Flag Hoisted in Honor of the Fine American Squadron Betrayed Him-Official Proclamation of the Blockade of Cuban Ports. CHAPTER IX. BRAVE WORK ALONG SHORE. 126 Cutting Cables Within Ninety Feet of the Beach at Cienfuegos Under the Fire of I,ooo Spanish Soldiers-Wounded who Suffered in Silence lest Groans Unnerve their Shipmates-The Winslow at Cardenas-A Torpedo-boat Sent to Cut a Gun-boat from the Piers of a Well-defended City-A Tale of Rare Heroism and Resourcefulness -Remarkable Tests of Courage in the Face of Superior Forces Afloat-Returning Fire from the Shore-At Matanzas and Cabanias. CHAPTER X. DEWEY AT MANILA... 154 Good Work of the Baltimore's Men Aided by the British in Hong Kong-Precautions on the Way to Manila-A Night Attack on our CONTENTS Vii Squadron-The Scene at Dawn-When Montojo Became Desperate -Wretched Use of Mines and Torpedo-boats-A Striking Exhibit of the Repose of Conscious Power-Christening of the Baby Battle-ship -Spanish Views of the Conflict. PAGE CHAPTER XI. SAMPSON'S FIRST SEARCH FOR CERVERA....... 194 A Squadron with the Speed of a Ton-of-coal Barges Sent in a Chase of Twenty-knot Spanish Cruisers-The Bombardment of San Juan de Porto Rico-Work of Inexperienced Men that Showed their Mettle -Another Vain Cruise to Nicholas Channel. CHAPTER XII. THE OREGOr'S FAMOUS RUN.213 A Race Against Time, 14,700 Miles Long with Never a Break or a Loss of a Turn of her Wheels-Men who Worked for Twenty-four Hours at a Stretch More than Once in that Cruise -A Boiler-maker in a Live Furnace-Shots that Gave Life to Fainting Firemen-Alongshore Signal Service. CHAPTER XIII. SCHLEY'S CRUISE TO SANTIAGO 22I Reasons for his Delay at Cienfuegos-Stopped Twenty Miles from his Destination and then Started Back to Key West-Break on the Collier-Dash of the Marblehead —When Schley saw Cervera's Ships at Anchor Within Easy Range-A " Reconnaissance " at a Range of from Four to Five Miles-A Blockading Squadron Ten Miles from Port-Acts of Auxiliary Cruisers Described. CHAPTER XIV. THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO. 239 Disposition of the Squadron-The Story of Hobson's Futile Bravery-It was Another Proof that Culture and Cool Courage go Hand in Hand-The Forts Bombarded-Good Work of the Vesuvius. CHAPTER XV. THE MARINES AT GUANTANAMO 259 Our First Armed Force to Maintain a Hold on Cuban Soil-The Blay Captured by the Marblehead and Yankee-It was Hot Work for a Week-The Spaniards in the Brush-Assault on a Funeral Cortege -Spanish Woods Station Captured, and Caimanera's Fort Destroyed -A Torpedo in the Propeller of the Texas-Good Health of this Force on Shore. viii.. Vlll CONTENTS PAGE CHAPTER XVI. AUXILIARIES AND NAVAL MILITIA......... 275 The Spook Fleet and its Effect on the Movement of the ArmyLanding at Baiquiri-Killed by a Shell on the Texas-Two Good Fights Against Odds off San Juan de Porto Rico-The St. Paul and the Yosemite with Their Untrained Crews were a Credit to the Naval Officers in Charge of Them-First American Flag Raised over Cuban Soil-Good Work Alongshore. CHAPTER XVII. DESTRUCTION OF CERVERA'S SQUADRON... 291 Luck was with the Spaniards, in a Way, for Two of our Big Ships had Left the Blockade -Their Smoke had Excited our Suspicion and our Lookouts were Alert-Quick Work with the Torpedo-boats and Two Cruisers-Eulate's Vain Effort to Catch the Brooklyn-A Record Race in Naval Warfare that Established the Fame of the Bull Dog Oregon-How Wainwright's Day Came at Last. CHAPTER XVIII. SEAMEN OF THE SQUADRONS CONTRASTED....... 324 Story of Spanish Treachery on a Good Ship They had Surrendered to us-Captain Chadwick's Remarkable Skill in Handling the Newz York-Our Men as Life-savers-Undaunted in the Presence o( Fire and Exploding Magazines-Atrocious Conduct of Cuban SoldiersThe Squadrons Compared-Reward of a Commander who Breaks Down Through Overwork. CHAPTER XIX. CAPTURE OF GUAM AND MANILA.....343 A Bombardment that was Mistaken for a Salute-The EmperorWilliam Germans were Inclined to Make Trouble, but Dewey was a Good Diplomat as Well as a Fighter-Our Friends, the BritishNotable Voyage of Two Monitors. CHAPTER XX. SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO AND AFTERWARD....... 350 Deadly Accuracy in Firing at a Target Five Miles Away and out of Sight Behind the Hills-Our Ships at Manzanillo, and a Poetic CONTENTS ix Tribute to Three of Them-The Capture of Nipe-When Ensign Curtin of the Wasp Demanded and Obtained the Surrender of Ponce by Telephone. PAGE CHAPTER XXI. OUR NEW NAVAL PROGRAMME. 365 Vessels that were in the Ship-yard when the War Began-Twostory Turrets and Broadside Batteries-Smokeless Powder in Future, with Guns that for the Moment will Lead the World-Ships to Replace the Maine-The New Monitors-A Tale of a Torpedo-boat on the Blockade-A Splendid Flotilla to Come-A Word About the Naval Academy. C LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS REAR ADMIRAL GEORGE DEWEY,.. Frontispiec PAGE REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM T. SAMPSON,. Facing I GOVERNOR-GENERAL WEYLER,.... 3 SAGASTA,.... II WALL AT SANTIAGO WHERE CREW OF THE VIRGINIUS WERE SHOT,..... 21 LAUNCH OF THE UNITED STATES STEAMSHIP RALEIGH, 29 PROTECTED CRUISER ATLATA,......35 DESPATCH-BOAT DOLPHN,.......37 THE WHITE SQUADRON AT SEA,.. 39 WILLIAM C. WHITNEY,...44 PROTECTED CRUISER CHARLESTON,. 45 SECOND-CLASS BATTLE-SHIP MAINE,....47 ARMORED CRUISER NEWY YORK,... 50 BENJAMIN F. TRACY,...... 54 A BARBETTE BEFORE IT IS INSTALLED,... 55 ONE-POUNDER ON A BATTLE-SHIP'S SUPERSTRUCTURE,. 57 PROTECTED COMMERCE-DESTROYER COLUMrBIA,. 58 CRUISER COLUMBIA ON DRY DOCK,... 59 THE MAINE ENTERING THE HARBOR OF HAVANA,.. 65 THEODORE ROOSEVELT.... 67 HON. JOHN D. LONG,..... 68 CHART OF HAVANA HARBOR,... 70 CAPTAIN SIGSBEE,...... 71 xi xii LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS PAGE THE WRECK OF THE MAINE, 73 COURT OF INQUIRY ON THE DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE, 77 ARMORED CRUISER BROOKLYN... 87 SECOND-CLASS BATTLE-SHIP TEXAS,.. 89 PROTECTED CRUISER NEW ORLEANS..... 94 ARMSTRONG GUN ON THE NEw ORLEANS,.. 96 A SIX-INCH GUN ON THE NEW ORLEANS,..97 ADMIRAL SICARD,....... 98 CAPTAIN ROBLEY D. EVANS,..... 10I GUN-BOAT NASHVILLE,. 16 CAPTAIN MAYNARD,....... II7 TORPEDO-BOAT FOOTE,....20 CAPTAIN CHADWICK,. 122 THE FIRST PRIZE OF THE WAR, BUENAYVENTURA,..124 CHART OF MATANZAS BAY,...29 THE BANCROFT AND HELENA ON THE BLOCKADE,. 131 A COLT RAPID-FIRE GUN,... 138 LIEUTENANT J. L. PURCEL,..... I39 CHART OF CARDENAS BAY,..... 146 LIEUTENANT JOHN B. BERNADOU,... 48 CONNING TOWER OF THE WINSLOW, SHOWING EFFECT OF SHOTS COMING THROUGH FROM OPPOSITE SIDE,. I49 ENSIGN BAGLEY,...51 CAPTAIN CHARLES V. GRIDLEY,......157 CHART OF MANILA BAY,.... 62 PROTECTED CRUISER OLYMPIA,. 1.65 ADMIRAL MONTOJO,..... 69 PROTECTED CRUISER BALTIMORE,. 173 PROTECTED CRUISER BOSTON,.. 177 PROTECTED CRUISER RALEIGH,......80 GUN-BOAT CONCORD,...... 82 MANCEUVRING OF THE FLEET AT THE BOMBARDMENT OF SAN JUAN,...... 99 UNPROTECTED CRUISER DETROIT,... 201 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS xiii PAGE UNPROTECTED CRUISER MONTGOMERY,.. 205 SAMPSON'S SQUADRON IN NICHOLAS CHANNEL. (Drawn by L. A. Shafer from Diagram by John R. Spears),.. 208 CAPTAIN CHARLES E. CLARK,... 213 FIRST-CLASS BATTLE-SHIP OREGON.....217 COMMODORE WINFIELD S. SCHLEY... 222 CHART OF CIENFUEGOS,... 223 MAP OF CUBA,.229 THE MAYFLOWER ON THE BLOCKADE,. 235 CAPTAIN C. W. JUNGEN,......237 LIEUTENANT HOBSON,....... 243 THE MERRIMAC IN THE ENTRANCE TO SANTIAGO HARBOR, 245 THE SPANISH PRISONERS EXCHANGED FOR HOBSON,.. 247 HOBSON'S MERRIMAC CREW IN THE AMERICAN LINES,. 251 CAPTAIN F. A. COOK,...254 CAPTAIN F. J. HIGGINSON,... 255 AUXILIARY CRUISER YANKEE,..... 257 PORT GUANTANAMO, OR CUMBERLAND HARBOR,. 262 PICKET SENTRY ON GUARD DUTY,..... 264 DR. JOHN BLAIR GIBBS,....... 265 TENTS OF OFFICERS ON THE BEACH,.... 266 WITHIN THE TRENCHES AT CAMP MCCALLA,... 268 A SPANISH CONTACT MINE PICKED UP BY THE PROPELLER OF THE TEAS,.......272 WATCHING THE BOMBARDMENT OF BAIQUIRI,.. 277 SHOT-HOLE IN PORT BOW OF THE TEXAS MADE BY A SIXINCH SHELI,........ 28I SHOT-HOLE STARBOARD HAMMOCK BERTHING, MIDSHIPS IN THE TEXAS,....... 282 LIEUTENANT VICTOR BLUE,...... 288 FIRST-CLASS BATTLE-SHIP MASSACHUSETTS,... 292 CHART OF SANTIAGO HARBOR,... 295 ADMIRAL CERVERA,.... 297 FIRST-CLASS BATTLE-SHIP INDIANA,..... 299 xiv LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS PAGE RICHARD WAINWRIGHT,. 302 CONVERTED YACHT GLOUCESTER,..... 303 THE BURNING OF THE SPANISH SHIPS,. 305 INFANTA MARIA TERESA,.....309 THE SISTER SHIPS ALMIRANTE OQUENDO, INFANTA MARIA TERESA, AND VIZCAYA,.... 313 THE BOW OF THE ALMIRANTE OQUENDO,...317 VIZCAYA AGROUND AT ASERRADEROS,..321 CAPTAIN JOHN PHILIP,...... 323 HEAVILY ARMORED CRUISER CRISTOBAL COLON, THE BOW OF THE VIZCAYA,.. RELIEF, HOSPITAL SHIP, FIRST WARD-THE RELIEF,. SHOT-HOLE IN THE SMOKE-STACK OF THE BROOKLYAN, SHOT-HOLES IN THE BERTH-DECK OF THE BROOKLYN, TWO-TURRET MONITOR, MOANADNOCK.. THE REINA /MEURCEDES AS SHE LIES AT THE ENTRANCE TO SANTIAGO HARBOR, A SIX-INCH GUN ON THE AFT-DECK OF THE AUXII.IARY 325 33I 334 335 338 339 347 351 Hisr,...... 354 COMMODORE JOHN C. WATSON...... 356 ENSIGN CURTIN,..... 359 SUWryANEE, VIXEN, AND Sr. LOUIS AT SIBONEY,. 361 PORT OF MANZANILLO,........ 363 CAPTAIN D. DELEHANTY,..... 364 FIRST-CLASS BATTLE-SHIP ALABAMA,..... 367 FIRST-CLASS BATTLE-SHIP KEARSARGE,... 371 ELLIPTICAL TURRET OF THE FIRST-CLASS BATTLE-SHIP ALABAMA,......... 374 PLAN AND VERTICAL SECTION THROUGH ELLIPTICAL TURRET AND BARBETTE,. 374 BOILERS OF THE KEARSARGE,.....375 OUTLINE DIAGRAM OF A FLOATING STEEL FORT CALLED A BATTLE-SHIP,...... 376 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS xv P.CE CAPTAIN CHARLES O'NEIL,.... 377 THE EVOLUTION OF THE SIX-INCH GUN,.. 379 DIAGRAM SHOWING THE ARMOR PROTECTION OF A BATTLESHIP,.....380 KRUPPIZED ARMOR-PLATE SHOWING EFFECT OF A SIX-INCH PROJECTILE WEIGHING IOO POUNDS.. 382 DECK PLAN OF THE INDIANA, MASSACHtUSETTS, AND OREGON, 383 LOADING THE AMMUNITION-HOISTS FOR THIRTEEN-INCH GUNS ON THE INDIANA,... 385 RAMMING HOME THE CHARGE IN A THIRTEEN-INCH GUN, 385 THE NEW FIRST-CLASS BATTLE-SHIP MAINE,...387 FITTING A SIX-POUNDER ON THE MANGROVE,... 390 CHART SHOWING POSITIONS OF THE SHIPS OF ADMIRAL CERVERA'S SQUADRON, AND THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES FLEET IN THE BATTLE OF JULY 3, 1898, OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA,..End of Volume 1 INTRODUCTION THE principal object held in view, while writing this history, was to give, within convenient limits, an account in every way truthful of those events of our war with Spain in which our navy had a part. And it seems proper to say here, first of all, that among the many remarkable features of this war few are more cheering to the student of history than the promptness with which the Administration spread before him the material that he needed. And not only was the material furnished promptly; it was also given almost in full. The official reports of the commanders of our ships, as well as of our squadrons, have been made public almost as soon as received by the Navy Department. The reports have been in every case at once modest and yet detailful statements of what had been done. Further than that, and better than that, from the point of view of a student of history, so many despatches relating to such disputed matters as xvii xviii INTRODUCTION the conduct of the battle off Santiago have been printed, that no point of importance is now unsettled. It is possible to assert that this history has been taken, in all important matters, directly from official sources. As to parts of the narrative not taken from official reports and despatches the principal source of information has been in the accounts written by naval officers for such periodicals as Scribner's, the Century, Harper's, the Army and Navy 7ournal, and the Army and Navy Register. The people of the United States are greatly indebted to those officers who contributed, over their own signatures, to the general knowledge of what was done, and to the Navy Department, as well, for relaxing the rule that ordinarily prevents a naval man's appearing in print. I have also had a number of letters from and personal interviews with naval officers whose work I have described. In addition to these sources of information I have had recourse in a few cases to what has been written by newspaper reporters. It is with extreme regret that I find a word of explanation regarding the accuracy of the newspaper reports necessary. A time ought to come, and so it will come, when every reporter's sense of honor will be so strong that it will be as difficult to find a misstatement in a daily. INTRODUCTION xix paper as it is to find one now in a reputable monthly magazine. But that time is not yet here, and so I must say that I know every reporter whom I have quoted to be a trustworthy writer except one whom I do not know personally, the reporter of the London Mail, whose interview with Admiral Montojo is given; but I know the managing editor of the Mail, and his character warrants the use of that report in any history. Perhaps it may not be amiss for me to add here, that a very interesting feature of the war was the presence of many newspaper despatchboats in the operations around Cuba. No such work as they did was ever known before in the history of naval wars. And I know that the ~reporters so engaged were, with a few exceptions, unwearied and fearless in energy and enterprise, and were entirely sincere and faithful to the readers of the papers represented. I speak from actual knowledge in this matter, for I was myself one of the reporters during the earlier months of the conflict on the Cuban coast. If any inaccuracies be found in this history, they are blunders and not due to a lack of trustworthy sources of information. But to give a truthful narrative of the events of the war is not quite all that I have attempted here. It seemed necessary to review briefly XX INTRODUCTION the events in the history of Cuba that compelled us to interfere in the affairs of another nation. And this was the more necessary for the reason that we had been more or less involved in the trouble between Spain and her " ever faithful " island of Cuba. It has been no pleasant task to recount even briefly the facts regarding Spain's rule in Cuba, and still less so the bearing of the affairs of the General Lloyd Aspinwall and the Virginius on the conflict just ended. But unless I have labored in vain, the reader must see that these accounts could not be omitted. Perhaps while perusing them it will be seen that undue patience and forbearance in international dealings, as in dealings between men, sometimes come to be considered an evidence of weakness; that dignity and firmness, backed even by physical force, are absolutely necessary if we would preserve peace and do right, especially when dealing with those who are weak and greedy and shifty. As to the facts in the cases of these two ships, they were taken from an account of the Aspinwall, written for Scribner's Monthly by one connected with the administration then in power, and from a message of the President (Ex. Doc., No. 30, 43d Cong., ist Sess.) containing all the documents and much other matter relating to the Virginius. INTRODUCTION xxi Further than that I have given a short, but what I believe to be an adequate, account of the growth of our navy from the inception of the White Squadron. It is a matter that deserves attention for more reasons than one, but is needed here in order to help us comprehend the ability of our naval men. To describe the heterogeneous squadron with which Sampson went to San Juan, is to show his resourcefulness. The squadron of protected cruisers which Dewey took to Manila had a battle-ship task to accomplish in attacking ships and forts at once; but what it lacked in armor-plate was made up by the Harveyized grit of its commanding officer and crews. On the whole here is a story the facts of which, however told, must stir the heart of every American who has red blood in his veins. It was a war to bring peace where anarchy reigned. We sought the enemy in his own chosen arena. We met him man-fashion, and we literally swept him from the seas. Four of the finest armed cruisers and two of the best torpedo-destroyers in the world, with nearly a score of lesser war-ships were driven to the rocks or sunk out of sight, while hundreds of their crews were killed. And yet in all that work we lost one man killed, and less than a score wounded, while the damage done to our xxii INTRODUCTION ships did not disable even so much as a single gun for one minute. Nor was our work in blockading and attacking shore batteries much less brilliant or much more destructive to us. There was never a war, afloat or ashore, like this. J. R. S. I .. j.~i,X mg, j~~, Ijg.Ej... *i.~ li i iii iliiii.. i i. i i W i i i i ii,...,............,...,,.. Ux. j~~.ji...j ji.. jj.,,.j, j jj.. j........ jjii Relrl:dllfa W 11 illI OUR NAVY IN THE WAR WITH SPAIN CHAPTER I THE DEMAND FOR INTERVENTION EFFORTS TO SUBJUGATE THE INSURGENT CUBANS THAT HAD DE. GENERATED INTO A PITILESS WAR OF EXTERMINATION WHEREIN EVEN WOMEN AND CHILDREN WERE DELIBERATELY STARVED TO DEATH-WHERE INTERVENTION WAS A DUTY AND NONINTERVENTION NOT ONLY CRUEL BUT DASTARDLY. THE student who is looking for the origin of our war with Spain must go back as far as I814, the very year in which the Spanish bestowed upon the island of Cuba the appellation of "the ever faithful." Spain had been overrun by the armies of Napoleon, and a Napoleon had been placed upon her throne, but Cuba had proved faithful to the Spanish r6gime, and when the Spanish line once more entered the Madrid palace therewas as sincere rejoicing in Cuba as in any district of Spain. Cuba was at this time in an especially prosperous condition. The cultivation of sugar and tobacco had but recently been introduced. A valuable class of citizens had come to her-the industrious French who fled from the negro revolutionists of Santo Domingo. The tremendous crops raised on virgin soil by slave-labor were sold at I 2 THE DEMAND FOR INTERVENTION enormous prices. The Spanish Government looked at the prosperity of the colonists with the eyes of greed only. " In spite of the highsounding title of 'Faithful Cuba,' bestowed on her generous island. sons, Spain subtly reverted to her old methods, and used their country as a conquered El Dorado, the quickly developed resources of which she was determined to turn to her selfish account, regardless of possible consequences. The Cubans, however, who had learned many things since the opening of the century, soon showed a distinct disinclination to submit to this process." Nor was it misrule alone that roused the antagonism of the Cubans, for though they were all of Spanish descentand so far as the social leaders were concerned, of unmixed blood-they were treated as inferiors by the Spanish officials, who came out to wring fortunes from the island, and what was infinitely worse, the Cuban ladies were contemptuously called pelareas, or "croppies," a term originating in their fashion of wearing cropped or short hair. The Spanish repaid Cuban loyalty not only with increased taxation, but they added personal insult and contempt to financial injury. The Spanish system, first shown in its perfidy in I814, reached a climax of cruelty under Governor-General Weyler, known as "the Butche-," who landed at Havana on February CZ~~~~~~~~~~ PM C C 0 C CR 4 THE DEMAND FOR INTERVENTION thousands of innocent planters were murdered and robbed. But Weyler went still farther than that, for he compelled a few wealthy planters to take troops to their plantations, and there support them, while all other inhabitants, no matter how impoverished they might be, were compelled to concentrate themselves in the garrisoned towns. These people brought from the farms were called reconcen/rados. A few-here and there a family-were able, after mortgaging their land, to raise enough money to buy food. The small landholders, the Guajiros, who held a few acres only, and lived from hand to mouth, together with the laborers or peons, were without any resource for obtaining even the commonest articles of food, save only as the rich gave them in charity. In this way tens of thousands of helpless people were brought to the garrisoned towns, to sit down in idleness, leaving the fields to lie uncultivated and the supplies of vegetables to cease. In short, this was an order for the starvation of perhaps half the population. For the men who came to town one may feel but little pity. It was often said that if they lacked the courage to go to the mountains and join the insurgent bands in the fight for independence they deserved no sympathy. That is an iron dictum, but if it be accepted, there yet remain the thousands of women and children THE DEMAND FOR INTERVENTION 5 who could not fight and who were not perm1itted to cultivate the soil-who were compelled to lie down and die. Of the atrocities perpetrated by the Spanish soldiers in bringing these unfortunates to the towns-how unarmed men were shot for the pleasure of seeing them quiver and die, and how women were outraged-no adequate account has ever been given nor ever can be, nor ever ought to be. The foraging ants that ravage the tropics in search of insect prey are not as cruel as Weyler's soldiers were, for the ants instantly kill their victims, while Weyler's were reserved for the,slow torture of starvation, where mothers were compelled to look upon dying children and children upon dying parents, helpless to avert the fate that awaited all. However much the numbers of the Cuban army were exaggerated in the public prints of the United States during 1896 and 1897, the stories of the suffering under Weyler were never half told, simply because no man was able to portray them as they were. Words failed. Having garrisoned the important towns, built block-houses along the railroads, and two lines of tiny forts connected by barbed-wire tanglements (trochas) clear across the island, Veyler sat down to watch his victims die. The country that he controlled was what lay within range of his Mauser rifles, and not a yard more. The 6 THE DEMAND FOR INTERVENTION insurgents, though in small bands, and wretchedly armed, ranged the interior at will. Of systematic effort to hunt the insurgents from their retreats, there was absolutely none, and the forays that were made at rare intervals were worse than useless for the intended purpose, for they resulted in little more than the devastation of the plantations visited, while every injury done to Cubans was sure to bring reprisals in some form. The Spaniards did manage to kill two or three leaders. Jose Marti and General Maceo became victims. But no head was made in wiping the insurrection away. The only thing accomplished was the all but utter prostration of every form of peaceful industry throughout the island, and the gradual extinction, by cruel starvation and murder, of such of the Cubans as came within the Spanish power. The English author of "Cuba, Past and Present," who refers to us as " the easily excited Americans," on "the very verge of hysteria," in speaking of Weyler, says: "His desperate struggle to stamp out the revolt seems to have driven him to frenzy. He might be Caesar Borgia come to life again. He conceived it his duty to extinguish the civil war at any cost, and he used the self-same methods which made the fame (or shame) of Hernando Cortez. Since the days of Alva the THE DEMAND FOR INTERVENTION 7 horrors he perpetrated have rarely been equalled in human history." That was in Cuba, an island, lying just ninety miles off our coast, and entirely "within the economic orbit of the United States." Its prostrate people appealed to us for help. At that cry some who dreaded the influence of war, and the results of interfering with any matter beyond our own borders, replied that the Cubans were as cruel as their masters, which was true; that they were incapable of self-government, which seemed altogether probable; and that therefore we ought not to interfere. But others-characterize them as you will-replied: "If what you say of the Cubans be true, then we must interfere if it be only to drive from the Americas the barbarous government that could produce such a people." And when these spoke the nation and the civilized world applauded. "There must be a stage in misgovernment which will justify the interference of by-standing nations," wrote Mr. Anthony Trollope, while in Cuba fifty years ago. And to this may be added the words of John Ruskin in his essay on "War:" "I tell you that the principle of non-intervention, as now preached among us, is as selfish and cruel as the worst frenzy of conquest, and differs from it only by being not only malignant but dastardly." CHAPTER II TEACHING SPAIN TO DESPISE US WHEN OUR SENSE OF HONOR WAS SO LOW THAT AMERICAN SHIPS WERE SEIZED ON THE HIGH SEAS BY FOREIGN MEN-OF-WAR AND WE PERMITTED THE AGGRESSOR TO CHANGE THE REAL ISSUE-AMERICAN CITIZENS SHOT TO DEATH WITHOUT TRIAL AND AN AMERICAN CONSUL CONFINED TO HIS OFFICE BY AN ARMED GUARD-TWO STRIKING PICTURES OF SPANISH DIPLOMACY IN THE HISTORIES OF THE ASPINIVALL AND THE VIRGINIUS. How we tried to restore order in Cuba before we resorted to armed intervention shall be told farther on. It is necessary to relate first two incidents in what is known as the ten-year war between the Spanish and the Cuban insurgents. Two American ships were seized by the Spaniards under circumstances that warranted war on our part, but we showed extreme forbearance in both cases, with the result that the Spaniards came to regard us with a hearty contempt. There is an old proverb which says, "when you clinch the devil you must use your claws." It applies here. If we had been firm in asserting our rights in 1869 and 1873 we should have had no war in 1898. 8 TEACHING SPAIN TO DESPISE US 9 On the morning of January 21, I869, the American steamer Colonel Lloyd Aspinzuall, while on her wray from Port-au-Prince to Havana, found herself within five miles of the Cuban coast in a deplorable condition. She had weathered a gale that had lasted for three days, but the seas had swashed across. her decks, poured down her hatches, drowned her fires and choked her pumps. Only by extraordinary efforts in bailing had she been kept afloat. But the sea had gone down at last and heading away. on her course, she was making fair progress, when at noon she was overhauled by the Spanish warship Hernanz Cortes, and boarded by an armed force. The Cubans were at that time engaged in what is known as their "ten years' struggle for liberty," and the Spaniards patrolled the Cuban coast to head off filibustering expeditions. The Corles was one of the patrol boats. To the Spanish officer, Captain McCarty brought the ship's papers, but the officer said: " I cannot examine them. My orders are to take you to Nuevitas." Captain McCarty protested, saying that he was " the bearer of despatches of the utmost importance for the Government of the United States," and for the American Admiral (Poor) in command of the station, then in Havana, but to Nuevitas he was obliged to go with an armed force on board. There he was detained io TEACHING SPAIN TO DESPISE US six days, with his papers sealed in a trunk by the Spanish officials, when he was ordered to proceed to Havana still under guard. This he refused to do unless his papers were returned to him, and the result of his refusal was that the Spanish steamer San Francisco towed him there. Here he and all his crew were still held as close prisoners on board until February I3thin all twenty-three days after the ship was seized, before he was allowed even to communicate with the American Consul. So it was not until she had been under Spanish guns for a month that our Government learned of the outrage. Secretary of State Fish replied to the Consul's formal notice by telegraphing: "Report particulars, and if seized on the high seas demand immediate release." As she had been seized more than a marine league from shore, the demand was made. The Spaniards simply ignored it. The seizure was by no means the first of its kind, though because of the fact of Government despatches being on board, it was the most aggravating. However, the State Department waited until February 26th, when the formal protest of Captain McCarty was received by mail, and then it made a demand on the Spanish Minister at Washington, Don Lopez Roberts, for reparation, adding to the demand these words: "This Government trusts that your Govern ~i:::::::::::: -:::::::::- 1 ic 15pn iri I~ f rs ~s *r a rr rii -~ a Is *I*I s* *r i "I lrlp... rr' acir Fi ce z, ili II\ (aP: ir I F~i~i~ ZI s tC. 1 ~ II n? i~sr " I* rs-r ir Iss" LdT j;l) ijr i i d ~c —r is F7 * irri , c. rxi~ ~ (31: irrrjis uri I, irrS Irr Err icxi ti ii I I PSI wr;ia ~ i~I crs 'iri i j OBL ii~ C1~i ~ C r;~1 h issi Cli g 1 rr i ii sgsi ~if c , Jr,I a jsls ; " i~ i, ci;; t B ~ "" li xrl.~ II; I 13 1 P tj~ issi I11"I r-ii:"" Iri ~i j jss, ")II? 131 ( k a - ba r i [il"i "x; iI~ ~ 1~1~~ El I,,~ D rs*. ii u n Irs * P i a " Irr" e a,'E II/ rrr [115 r r Pi ii 062 1"" 1414 i "~I"] i, """ - -j: L6EE E ~rii Y, Ui rrr E ii i i i i i rxx i 1-i y i~ i ii 12 TEACHING SPAIN TO DESPISE US At that Sickles, on April 8th, called on Prime Minister Sagasta, who replied that the case was "undergoing examination in the prize court." To this Sickles replied that the United States could not recognize the jurisdiction of a prize court unless a state of war existed between the Spanish and the Cubans. If such a war did exist, the United States would be obliged to recognize the Cubans as belligerents, and this would soon be done. To this Sagasta replied that "the decision of the court will be given with all possible promptness." And that was about all the satisfaction Sagasta would give him, though Sagasta did at last promise to release the steamer. Meantime the Aspinwall\was lying beside the Spanish flag-ship in Havana. She was under guard all the time and her crew were not permitted even to wet down her sides to keep the sun from starting the calking from her seams. After three weeks of this confinement the Spaniards brought a force on board to search her bunkers. The coal-handlers did not complete their search the first day, so that night they put an armed guard over the bunkers. At that Captain McCarty put his own crew to guard the Spanish guard and so prevent their sneaking arms into the bunkers during the night. This fact is of importance, not alone as show TEACHING SPAIN TO DESPISE US I3 ing the Spanish character. It shows that McCarty believed his own Government would be likely to ignore the real principle of the case if arms were found on board. Whether she had arms in her bunkers or not had nothing to do with the main principle in the case, for the Aspiinwall was an American ship and she had been seized on the high seas in time of peace. The Spaniards knew that they had no right to take her, but they were trying to establish a precedent, following which they might take ships wherever found when carrying arms to the insurgents in Cuba, and in their contempt for the Americans they thought they should succeed. As a matter of fact their feeling in this matter was well-nigh justified. Having waited a week for Sagasta to fulfil his reluctant promise to release the steamer, Minister Sickles, on orders from Washington, called once more to learn why nothing was done. This was on April I4th. Sagasta replied that the local authorities at Havana had said that they " had no power to take the case out of court." At that Sickles declared emphatically that the United States Government considered the holding of the Aspiiwall in a prize court an acknowledgment on the part of Spain that a state of war existed, and that belligerent rights would, therefore, be accorded the insurgents forthwith. Having said that, 14 TEACHING SPAIN TO DESPISE US Sickles was about to withdraw when Sagasta stopped him and said: '' The council of ministers decided yesterday to release the vessel forthwith on receiving from you a formal demand in writing for her surrender as an American vessel bearing official despatches." The written demand was made the same day, and it contained, shameful to relate, the words about her having official despatches on board. Spanish diplomacy succeeded in evading the real principle at issue. They released her on the ground that she carried those despatches. They did not concede that they had no right to seize an American ship on the high seas, and, more than that, they did not release her forthwith, as Sagasta promised to do, but waited thirteen days longer. The Colonel Lloyd Aspinwall was held with her crew as prisoners on board for ninety-eight days, all told, before the guard was withdrawn. Even then Admiral Poor, who, with the old Severn and the monitor Sangzis, was in Havana, felt obliged to send the Aspinwall to Key West without waiting for badly needed repairs, lest the rampant volunteers of Havana destroy her under his guns. Close in the wake of the Aspinwall casecame that of the Virginius. The principles involved were much the same in both cases, but in the Virginius case American citizens were TEACHING SPAIN TO DESPISE US 15 cshot t- rdeth on h rNAa den orf a Spaish Q- iliary,Jlt I V u-. tl.ll L.A LJ I IIA-L. t.l I lt 1-. JI A-,. I "I %J,, F tLIIlOl IIIIIIsialy officer, and the Spaniards, with their agents and friends in this country, set up-the claim that she was really a Spanish ship. It appears that the Virginius was originally an English ship built to run the blockade during our civil war, that she was captured while engaged in her nefarious traffic, that she was sold as a prize in I867, but reverted to the Government because she was not paid for, and that on August 20, I870, she was sold to John F. Patterson for $9,800 cash. She was then lying at Washington. In September she was brought to New York and thoroughly overhauled and repaired. On October 4, I870, she cleared for CuraSao with a cargo of one hundred and seventy barrels of bread, two boxes of saddlery, and four boxes of clothing, the whole of the value of $1,430, and the next day while going down the beach below Sandy Hook she overhauled the tug Virginia Seymour, and took from her twenty Cubans, of whom the leaders were General M. Quesada, his secretary, Adolfo Varona, and Seniors Eloy Camacho and Domingo Mora. It is certain that Patterson had complied with the law to the satisfaction of our Government officials, and that the papers of the Virginius were in proper form, but Patterson had violated the law-he had purchased the ship for the I6 TEACHING SPAIN TO DESPISE US Cuban Juntain New York, and turned her over to Quesada, a Cuban. And thereafter she remained under the control of Quesada, although she had various Americans, from time to time, serving as captain. The Virginizus reached CuraSao on October i5th. A few days later came the schooner Billy Bulls, and next day after her arrival she and the Virginzizs went out to sea, where the Bulls transferred some hundreds of cases of arms, ammunition, and equipments, with four brass howitzers, to the Virginizus, after which the Virginiuzs went to Puerto Cabello and entered into an agreement with Guzman Blanco, the Venezuelan leader, by which Quesada was to help Blanco in a revolution then in progress, in return for which Blanco was to aid the Cuban insurgents later on. Under this agreement part of the arms and ammunition were landed for Blanco's use and a part placed on a gun-boat belonging to Blanco, after which the Virginizts towed the gun-boat out to sea and stood by while it captured a small fleet of armed coasting schooners belonging to Blanco's enemies. The Virginius also towed the captured vessels to port. When Blanco's triumph was assured the Virginizts reshipped the arms, etc., and with a force of Cubans and Venezuelans sailed from Puerto Cabello, on June 14, 1871, and made a success TEACHING SPAIN TO DESPISE US 17 ful Illlding of the expedition at Boca de Cabeiio on the south coast of Cuba. During this time her first captain had left her and the chief engineer had served as captain, with Eloy Camacho as navigator. The Spanish faction here claimed that Camacho was the captain, but this was not so. It is true, however, that Quesada's wishes were always followed. The Virginius next went to Colon and remained there several months. There Francis Bowen took command, in April, 1872. At that time a band of fifty Cubans was in Colon awaiting opportunity to go to Cuba. The American man-o'-war Kansas was in the harbor, and so was the Spaniard Pizarro. On May Ist, the. Virginius sailed for Carthagena under sealed orders, and by direction of the American consul the Kansas escorted her from port to prevent an apprehended attack from the Pizarro. The fact that the Kansas did this is proof sufficient that the papers of the Virginius were all in proper form at this time. The Kansas, of course, would not have protected a pirate, nor would she have had anything to do with a Spanish merchantman. Meantime, while at Aspinwall, the Virginius had run in debt, and Captain Bowen gave a bottomry bond for $Io,ooo to Mahl Brothers, merchants, to secure it. The fact that there 2 IS TEACHI-NG SPAIN TO DESPISE US was no communication with Patterson, the nominal owner, is considered good evidence that he had no financial interest in her. And that is to say the ship was continually handled in violation of the laws of the United States. Eventually the- ship reached Maracaibo (August I, I872), where a new crew, with Charles Smith, an American, as master, took charge, and then legal proceedings were begun on the bottomry bond for the sale of the ship, and she was sold at auction for $i7,500. Quesada's secretary, at this time, a man named Alfaro, bid her in in the name of a Caracas Englishman, and it was proposed that she hoist the British flag; but when it was learned from the British consul that a British man-o'-war was ready to seize her as a pirate in case that was done, Alfaro prevailed on the local authorities to nullify the sale, and she was kept under her original papers. It appears from the testimony in the case that during all this time the American consuls, in the ports where she called, knew that the Virginius was being handled exclusively in the interests of the Cuban insurgents. Indeed, Captain Smith testified that the consul at Maracaibo said to him, "Why don't you get rid of that damned pirate? She is nothing but a pirate, and you will get caught, by and by, and they will hang you." But the fact is the forms TEACHING SPAIN TO DESPISE US 19 of law were complied with, so far as her papers showed. The proof that her papers were kept in order is to be found also in the fact that when she returned to Colon in May, 1873, Captain Reid, of the Kansas, was still willing to protect her. Lieutenant Autran of the Spanish man-o'-war, Pzzarro, wrote to Reid, insisting that the Virginius was liable to capture, on the ground that she belonged to Cuban insurgents, and had committed an act of hostility to Spain in landing armed forces on Cuban soil. He ended his letter by asking "whether the Virginius was entitled to fly the American flag?" and Reid replied that she was, and that he should protect her "at all hazards." Autran at first said he would fight it out, but he changed his mind and merely requested that the Virginius be sent to New York, where the Spanish Government might proceed against her in our courts. Whether this request should have been granted or not does not appear from the papers (see H. of R., Ex. Doc. No. 30, 43d Cong., ist Sess.). Certainly that would have saved much trouble, but the request brings out clearly the fact that Spain had a good remedy for every evil that she suffered through the deeds of the Virginius. Because the Virgiznius was flying the American flag and was protected by our man-o'-war, Spain had only to make a claim and prove the facts, to recover heavy 20 TEACHING SPAIN TO DESPISE US damages from us. Further than that our courts would have punished every American guilty in the matter, that could be reached by them. Spain did not act on that proper claim, but the career of the filibuster was rapidly drawing to an end. On July 5, 1873, loaded with arms and men for the Cubans, she sailed from Colon escorted by the Kansas, made a good landing and reached Kingston, Jamaica, in safety. There Captain Joseph Fry, an American citizen, took command, a number of Englishmen as well as Americans were shipped as members of the crew, war material and many men were taken on board, and on October 23, 1873, she sailed once more. She had cleared, in due form, at the American Consulate for Port Limon, Costa Rica; but she went to the Cuban coast, where she fell in with the Spanish gunboat Tornado. Turning her about, her crew fled, literally, for life, back toward Jamaica. For eight anxious hours they held their way, with hope steadily failing, and then they surrendered. That was at io o'clock at night on October 31, I873. They were at that time eighteen miles from the east end of the British island. The Tornado carried the Virginius to Santiago, where crew and passengers, one hundred and fifty-five in number, were placed in close confinement. On November 4th the Spaniards 0-1 C C I~~~~~~~~~~~M rm~~~~~~~ 22 TEACHING SPAIN TO DESPISE US patch which the consul sent to his superiors was held back for two days, the consul was insulted in a variety of ways while in the discharge of his duty; and, when the hour came for the slaughter of the prisoners, he was confined to his office by two armed guards who were placed at his door. It was claimed by the Spanish sympathizers in the United States that the local authorities went ahead in their bloody work unauthorized by the Madrid government. The truth was, that the local authorities were in constant communication with Havana, the Havana newspapers were full of the facts, the editorials exulted in the slaughter, and the whole matter, news and editorial, was cabled to Madrid, where it appeared in the papers from day to day. It was not until the i3th that Madrid interfered, and the interference then was due solely to fear of what Great Britain would do. A ship flying the American flag was seized on the high seas, carried into a Spanish port, and fifty-three of her people shot to death on the order of a Spanish military officer. Although General Grant was then our President, the official news of the outrage on our flag did not seem to stir the Administration to any special activity. Indeed, because General Daniel Sickles, our Minister at Madrid, was emphatic in his demands he was recalled. A TEACHING SPAIN TO DESPISE US 23 protocol was eventually signed, by which Spain was to be allowed to submit evidence that Cubans owned the Virginius. The outrage on the flag and the outrage on American citizenship in the slaughter of Americans among the crew were brushed aside, and the whole matter was eventually settled by the return of the ship and the payment, after years of waiting, of a few dollars per head to the relatives of the murdered men. It was freely charged at the time that the Spaniards used money in Washington to bring about this result. This charge was probably untrue, but quite as sorrowful were the appeals made in the newspapers opposed to war. For these said of our warships, " there is not among them a seagoing vessel fit to contend with the Spanish frigates." ' We could raise men enough to rid the island (Cuba) of the volunteers and regulars in a few weeks, but how should we get at the volunteers and regulars?" "As we now stand, it is hard to say where the fighting would be after we went to war." So ran the appeals to fear; so strove the peace-at-any-price party to cultivate cowardice. But enough of that. It has been worth while mentioning it at all only because to recall it is to help to save us from such shame in the future. Further than that, a considerable squadron 24 TEACHING SPAIN TO DESPISE US of such ships as we had was gathered at Key West during the negotiations, and the condition of the ships when brought together was such as to compel public consideration of the needs of the navy. The Virginius affair was in a way, too, like that of the Chesapeake before the War of 1812. It served, though remotely, to prepare us for a war for a principle. Moreover, as our attitude in the Chesapeake affair did but degrade us in the eyes of the aggressor, so our management of the Virginius case increased the contempt of the Spanish people for whom they were pleased to call "the American pigs." CHAPTER III THE WHITE SQUADRON MONEY GRUDGINGLY PROVIDED FOR A NEW NAVY-THE ADVISORY BOARD-A FRIGATE, TWO CORVETTES, AND A DESPATCH-BOATWHAT "JUNKETING" DID FOR THE NAVY-DISCOURAGING THE YOUNGER OFFICERS WHILE DEMANDING INCREASED SERVICE, ALMOST a quarter of a century passed away before the anarchy in Cuba again roused our people to thoughts of war. It was, on the whole, a period of remarkable prosperity for us as a nation. What breadths of prairie lands and mountain valleys were settled! What deserts were reclaimed! What wondrous resources were developed! Indeed it was in this period that we achieved, at last, industrial independence of the world, and that, if we look at it rightly, was second only to the political independence we had obtained so long before by force of arms. The bearing these statements have upon a history of the naval war with Spain shall be explained at once. It was because of our commercial greatness that the Spaniards believed 25 26 THE WHITE SQUADRON us a nation of money-getters who would not fight lest we lose dollars, and so they were led to rush blindly into a war where disaster inevitably awaited them. Another view of the matter is not less instructive. The building of a new navy was the most important step taken in all those years for the achievement of industrial independence. Moreover it was because of our industrial independence that we were able to bear the shock of war with scarce an added throb in the arteries of commerce. There was never a moment when anyone doubted our ability to pay in gold the expenses of the war, and the depreciation of even "wild-cat securities" was no greater when war came than is known in times of peace and over-expansion of credit. But before entering upon the story of our navy in the war with Spain it is necessary to tell what kind of a navy we had when the war began, and how we got it. It will help us to understand how it was that swift destruction fell upon our enemies, while we escaped, if the expression may be allowed, with losses so insignificant as to excite universal wonder. There was a time (i865) when the American navy, in ships as well as men, was the most powerful in the world, but it was neglected, and even treated by legislators as a means for dishonest gain, until it became the world's THE WHITE SQUADRON 27 standard of inefficiency. Indeed it had deteriorated so far by I873, only eight years after our civil war ended, that even Spain's navy was well-nigh a match for it. But a worse degradation awaited it. The need of improving it was made apparent by the Virginizus affair, and yet the peril of the nation served only to invite the Secretary of the Navy to an act that was the most disgraceful in the history of the Department. He deliberately began to build new ships under the false pretence that he was repairing old ones. Physically the seapower of our navy, if we may use Mahan's adaptation of Ruskin's term, reached its lowest ebb in I873. We did in succeeding years add a few vessels to the force, but they were built under circumstances that destroyed self-respect, and they were in no point superior to other ships already in existence. As a whole the tide of the navy still ran ebb, leaving the mudflats bare, and it was not until June 29, I88I, that anything was done for a real rehabilitation. On that date a board, called the Rodgers board because Rear Admiral John Rodgers headed it, was appointed to consider the state of the navy and report what action ought to be taken by Congress in the matter. As a matter of fact but one vessel, the Ammen ram, was built out of all that this board recommended. But it is a significant 28 THE WHITE SQUADRON fact that public opinion was prepared for the appointment of such a board by the writings of naval officers on naval matters before it came into existence, and, although the ships it recommended were not built, its statement that new ships were imperatively needed received respectful consideration. The Navy Department had been smirched,'but the honor, integrity, and ability of the personnel of the navy had never been doubted for a moment. In eight years our force afloat descended from the highest place to the lowest, in spite of the remonstrances of the naval officers; but they were not wholly disheartened. They continued their appeals to the public, using the pen as vigorously and efficiently as they have always used gun and sword, and at the end of another period of eight years they turned the tide. As a result of the Rodgers report, Congress, in the following year (1882) inserted this paragraph in the naval appropriation bill approved on August 5th: "Any portion of said sum not required for the purposes aforesaid (in the general uses of the Bureau of Construction and Repair) may be applied toward the construction of two steam cruising vessels of war, which are hereby authorized, at a total cost, when fully completed, not to exceed the amount estimated by I I I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ THE WHITE SQUADRON 3I ~ 1_ - I - T -_. I A I Tl I I the late TN aval Auvisory Board for such vessels, the same to be constructed of steel, of domestic manufacture.... One of said vessels shall be of not less than 5,000, nor more than 6,000 tons displacement, and shall have the highest attainable speed.... One of said vessels shall be of not less than 4,300, nor more than 4,700 tons displacement." It was also provided that the vessels should have full sail-power. The Secretary of the Navy was directed by the same act to appoint a naval advisory board of five naval officers "without reference to rank, and with reference only to character, experience, knowledge, and skill, and two persons of established reputation and standing, as experts in naval and marine construction, to be selected from civil life." Further than that the Secretary was directed to advertise for models and plans to be submitted by anyone, practically, and last of all was a paragraph saying that any sum left over from the appropriation for the Bureau of Steam Engineering might be applied to building engines for the ships so authorized. In this grudging fashion-never in the history of our nation was a great work undertaken more grudgingly - we prepared to build the new navy. Meantime Mr. William E. Chandler had become Secretary of the Navy. By his appoint 32 THE WHITE SQUADRON ment Commodore R. W. Shufeldt, Chief Engineer Alexander Henderson, Commander J. A. Howell, Lieutenant Edward Very, and Naval Constructor F. L. Fernald, with Messrs. Henry Steers, ship architect, and Miers Coryell, Marine Engineer, were organized as the Advisory Board. Assistant Naval Constructor F. T. Bowles was detailed as Secretary, while Passed Assistant Engineer C. R. Roelker, and Assistant Engineer H. P. Norton, were ordered to give their services in the actual work of designing ships and machinery. Assistant Naval Constructor. Richard Gatewood, of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, was also employed. The work of preparing plans for a new navy worthy of the nation, that was given to these gentlemen, was a task the magnitude of which has never been properly appreciated. It was not alone that without real experience in modern war-ship building they were expected to turn out something superior to all that the unbroken activity of European nations had produced; they had to do their work under the carping criticism of a people ignorant of the subject in hand, grudging in the matter of granting funds, and strongly suspicious of the honesty of the administration that was to give out the contracts. The underhanded and dishonest work done in the building previously THE WHITE SQUADRON 33 described, now came back to plague the men who were sincere and honest in their intent and actions. Not only did the acts of Robeson delay the beginning of a new navy by ten years; they clogged the work when it was begun, so that the progress made was exasperatingly slow for four years longer. Having authority to do something the Advisory Board cast about to see what ought to be done first, and at once perceived that with the resources of the country it was rather a question of what they might do. Congress fad authorized one cruiser of a size to compete with the best then afloat, and one of a more moderate size; but it was apparent that we did not have the men and facilities to construct a worthy ship of the largest size. We had allowed Europe to do "the experimenting for us," but we found that it was impossible after all for a nation to serve an apprenticeship by proxy. So the Advisory Board very properly recommended that instead of building the big and expensive cruiser, we try our 'prentice hand on something smaller and more nearly within our capacity. The matter was taken to~Congress, where the discussions were humiliating to one who has a pride in the navy; but by the act of March 3, I883, authority was obtained for building three small cruisers and a clipper despatch-boat. 3 34 THE WHITE SQUADRON Under date of April 28, I883, Secretary Chandler 'invited proposals for one cruiser of 4,500 tons, two of 3,000 tons each, and a despatch-boat of i,5oo tons. Because these were to become the first of our new navy, as full a description of them as may be understood by a reader unversed in sea-craft should be given as a matter of record. The largest ship of the four has been described as a steam frigate. She was planned to have guns on two decks, the upper of which, called the spar deck, was to carry four eight-inch rifles; and the lower, or main deck, two five-inch and eight six-inch rifles. She was to be 325 feet long, 48.2 feet wide, and to draw 19 feet of water. Her engines were to develop 5,00oo horse-power, which, with twin screws, should drive her fourteen knots per hour. Nine athwartship bulkheads were provided to make water-tight compartments, to keep her afloat, though one or two were flooded. A double bottom was placed under the machinery. A protective deck of steel armor one inch and a half thick, and curved over her vitals, was to keep out shot; while the coal, nine feet thick when her bunkers were full, was to provide an additional protection. When finally built, she was named the Chicago. That was the very best ship we could hope to build then, although England had fourteen-knot battle 36 THE WHITE SQUADRON an eight-inch gun which, because of the position of the barbette and the shape of the superstructure was to have a wide sweep on both sides as well as over the ends of the ship. Besides these great guns three six-inch rifles were to -be provided for each broadside, and one on each side could be used for fore or aft fire as well. This plan, according to Admiral Simpson, "is an innovation that was very startling to the conservative mind; but the more familiar the idea becomes, the more apparent becomes the increased offensive power of the ship." "It is not unfashionable now," says Bennett, "to criticise harshly that board for not knowing everything that experience has taught since, but its work speaks well enough in results for the thoroughness and the earnest endeavor of its members to do the best possible for the service in the beginning of its new life." As a matter of fact one of them was to speak for herself in actual battle. The Boston was at Manila. It was provided that the ships must be made "of steel of domestic manufacture," the specifications as to quality meaning that it should be of the best known to the world at that time. A considerable technical knowledge of steamengines is nee ed to fully understand the re ........................................... 38 THE WHITE SQUADRON especially distinguish her from a big yacht, and as a yacht for. "junketing" parties she was hailed by the political opposition. In guns she was to carry but one six-inch rifle, backed by a few rapid-fire rifles, of an average of two-inch bore. She was named the Dolpkhin. It is a curious fact that the prejudice excited by the tales of junketing prevented, in the years that followed, the construction of any other vessel than this for carrying despatches in time of war. The people could not be made to see that such vessels would be needed, and so when war came we found ourselves in a plight, where we had to buy all the available yachts in our waters, paying enormous prices, and finding them at best makeshifts. Only the skill of our officers saved them from being really ridiculous. The bids sent in answer to this call are now chiefly interesting as showing the number of firms in the United States willing to undertake the work. Three firms on the Delaware River, two firms in New York City, one from Baltimore, one from Boston, and one from St. Louis answered the call. Mr. John Roach, who owned a shipyard at Chester, Pa., the Morgan Iron Works in New York, and controlled steel-making works at Thurlow, Pa., had found by experiment that he could produce steel of the required quality THE WHETIE l SQUAxDRO~Nl s 37I I fidi for her 1 ait71 H 12 1 b 11i e gi~bil 6011irl.64Ai full nd1 lLc pi tf Airi the Ijifidiflel 6ksto " has sev OIruu saving n M in1 < MA H 41HIl A1 2 lH2 Wll 1 i 122 40l c. o H t l in 411 | 11t lin if 1 be m 1 111d 11 111f1 f l2l 11117 C It THE WHITE SQUADRON 4I at a lower price than any of his competitors deemed possible, and he was therefore the lowest bidder. On the whole, the contracts were $3I5,000 below the next lowest bids, and $774,IO less than the estimates of the Advisory Board. Contracts for the Atlanta, the Boston, and the Dolph/in were signed on July 23, I883, and for the Chicago on the 26th. It is worth mention, too, that following the completion of these contracts Mr. Roach was obliged to contract with three iron mills besides that one at Thurlow for the production of steel for the work he was to do, and it was with the signing of these contracts that the industry of steel making first obtained a permanent foothold in this country. The year of 1883 is notable. For the interest of this history it is chiefly so because in that year the building of the White Squadron, as we afterward affectionately called our fleet, was actually begun. But it should not be forgotten that August 5, i882, was the day on which the first act for the building of the new navy was signed by the President. On the whole we are entitled, as a nation, to all the satisfaction we feel in recalling those days of small beginnings. But for the sake of the future, the reader, who has heard so often in this year of 1898 that it was the man behind the gun who brought us honor, should consider the following extract 42 THE WHITE SQUADRON from the report of the Secretary of the Navy for '883: "PERSONNEL OF THE NAVY. "The Act of August 5,-I882, provided for a gradual reduction in the number of officers of the navy until a standard should be reached corresponding to the necessities of the service. This gradual reduction is now in progress, and should be allowed to continue." In the very act that first provided for the building of war-ships fit to represent the American people, it was also provided that the younger officers of the navy-the very men in whom the country must of necessity trust when the new ships were completed should have their hope of promotion and fair reward for honest service cut off. CHAPTER IV ARMORED CRUISERS AND BATTLE-SHIPS BUILDING OF THE ILL-FATED MAIN'E-THE NEW YORK AS AN ERA MAKER-OUR BATTLE-SHIPS THAT HAD PART IN THE WAR WITH SPAIN WERE NOT WHOLLY FREE FROM MISTAKES-THE BEGINNING OF OUR INDUSTRIAL INDEPENDENCE-THE HESSIAN PLANS FOR CRUISERS. IT has been worth while describing the early work on the White Squadron in considerable detail, if only for the reason that to consider it well is to save our honest pride from degenerating into vanity. That there is danger of national vanity will appear when the story of the war is reached, but we may refer to one fact by way of illustration-the fact that we are loud in boasting about our marksmanship, although in the only battle where shots and hits were counted, we scored but three times in a hundred shots. Having made a beginning in the workc of building a new navy we held our course without deviation, though the speed was. very slow. 43 T Ihne Niaenci. of | lxg W i xthe urk in 11 AR lin(as I itf1 e fi gin n dui f in \ulrn \ V. uf W o I. r r f r Nta atid ahum w an asini tS \ hei t(dinu (f oiufi in Elk Tf Ig n I nundr* |ity eals i t theg... 2g=\ 4 to I..... 1u 4 6 a iMt " iEpj }nitsxl in INS ' 1ii I a Md it in snhln lEd C] ungliss tI( nifigivaitin e inn thati xni OR ii t U nl i snvik maim q in Si i inil inx f i nhiddntSWaS k~ Agnrl is slldp ard ninuheiriii and went ilkii ii fir ph lin fur thu nidW ships (fiis Iinthiniiil hiin hndd This is a Mnst imporl tt iii iiii IW in x miliiyiin iit uf F lIsians iaxxx d ikilli tx xag alt eiSt as great an uvil as x inpix ix dJ ihis iuixi ixi hunn, Fur ii sWas lnt Sn MIxnlI thim nix n sluh) ixf ilin hidghbat xitai=i ity that xvE ihnd nWudud as it xras the abilIty tx .................~~~ mr cr ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~,e ~~~~ rrr r~~~~~a I...........~~~~t" " ~ ~ ~~~~~ if~~~~~~~ C " """ ~~~~~................................. ~~ll~~~~i ~ ~~H EM raPlli ~~~~~~~iS ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ HH MMO HE~~~~~~~~~~~~~I im PIas"l 46 ARMORED CRUISERS AND BATTLE-SHIPS guns and the armor for the Miantonomoh were purchased in England. Whitney held back the contracts for steel until he had enough in hand to warrant a firm of steel-makers in this country erecting a plant to make the forgings here. On "the Ist day of June, I887, contracts were entered into with the Bethlehem Iron Company of Bethlehem, Pa., one of the largest and most enterprising of American steel manufacturers, under which the United States were guaranteed that within two and one-half years from the date of the contract, this country would have within its borders a plant equal to, and probably the superior of any in the world for the production of armor and the forgings for high-power guns." So says the Secretary's report for i888. The contracts with John Roach in July, 1883, prepared the way for the steel plates needed for steel hulls and for the ingots for the smaller sizes of guns. The contracts with the Bethlehem Iron Works created the plant by which we were enabled to armor and fully arm the hulls' that we were then already able to construct. Few dates of greater interest than these two are known to the history of the United States, for rot only did the contracts eventually enable us to produce naval ships unsurpassed by any in the world-they gave us industrial independence. - - ------- - ----------------- wd ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 2 07 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 48 ARMORED CRUISERS AND BATTLE-SHIPS She was 3 18 feet long and 57 wide, with a maximum draught of 22.5 feet. Her side armor was twelve inches thick, and she had two turrets, each eight inches thick, with barbettes, that is, solid steel breastworks or forts, built about their bases, that were twelve inches thick forward and ten aft. Her keel was laid on October I7, i888, and she was launched on November i8, 1890. For guns the Maine carried four ten-inch rifles in her turrets, and six six-inch guns in her broadside. She was also provided with four Whitehead torpedoes, which had come into use by the time she was launched. It was proposed that she carry small torpedo-boats-big launches that, as was supposed, might be of use at night, or even in time of battle-but the views of naval officers eventually changed as to the value of such small boats, and her torpedoboats were abandoned. By the time the M7aine was commissioned she was designated as a second-class battle-ship, and placed on the list with the Texas, that carried a single twelve-inch gun where the Maine carried two tens. The Mainze was never appreciated by the nation for quite her real worth, because before she was in commission the larger and much more powerful Indzana, Massachusetts, and Oregon were contracted for and so far advanced ARMORED CRUISERS AND BATTLE-SHIPS 49 that they overlshadoUwed the smaller ship. indeed, the Indiana was put in commission on November 20, I895, but two months and three days after the flag was hoisted on the Maine. But the Mazaze was in every way an honor to the flag she bore. As an American naval product she should have appealed especially to the people, but her intrinsic merits, as well as the advance she showed in our knowledge and skill in ship-building, were notable. Considered as an advance in war-ship building, the Maine carried twelve-inch armor where the Roach-built ships had an inclined deck one inch and a half thick. She carried ten-inch guns, to the others' eight-inch, and she could steam, in spite of her weight of guns and armor, at a speed of two knots faster than either the Atlanta or Boston. We can imagine, perhaps, what her efficiency was from the work the other second-class battle-ship, the Texas, did when the hour of trial came. The next of the new navy to receive notice is the New York, a remarkable ship in a variety of ways, but especially so for the reason that she was an era maker in war-ships. The New York was authorized by the act of September 7, I888, and that act was further noteworthy because we obtained frotn it the smaller cruisers Olympia, of 5,870 tons, the Cincinnati and Ralezigh of 3,213 tons each, the Detroit, A/ar4 M iii I2 n/;fiI/~y oif 21) tdfid uifi dIo Aniio AMAnn; of 2So ions oi rth as W hd inti w iili of lirx ya i lir \\n iididio iin the i ii iid d were now Ito tlieO lhn || i of rti ie lOlNl in jx hte clnlUl lion of tdie i. niX I hT tonli tnt was f iiio lii r IL. I i i i tht ii ofl i28 flill ii l ht l H 1)S iljili l dti t ane Th1 it 1 tre of tI hni ifiii i 90i | ain on-n Ito di at Ix any a inri inal of Shn W 38t5' fnnt long hby 61 'W'''Idn, ' toni al'1 Lllr~lS ~1"1112E111 2Sr1" 31...1-..~~~~ 2 S. ' 0 ~1. "BX~ I 1 1'112 1...l l l l rrl~....rlE. Ei~ 1~~jr i~ lI-~ X 12 $ r I ffi 5_x~i~~l _g~t~12 | 4~-~ C il i~i,g ~ x5t~..t~~lf~ g x11> I.lu>'11 r*1 1 uur llfrl.. 1. ARMORED CRUISERS AND BATTLE-SHIPS 51 maximum draft of 26.7 feet, and displaced, when ready for service, 81200 tons of water. She was driven by twin screws, and two sets of triple expansion engines were coupled to each shaft in such fashion that, when cruising, one of each set could be disconnected and the ship driven, with a small consumption of coal, by the other. The contract speed of the ship was to be twenty knots an hour, but the Government had adopted a policy long before of giving a premium for an excess of horse-power above contract amount, and in this case offered a premium of $50,00o for each quarter of a knot that might be obtained above the contract speed of twenty, exacting at the same time a penalty as great for falling below that speed. Quite as interesting as this advance in steam enginery-interesting especially in view of the influence of the old marline-spike sailors of the navy-was the fact that this ship, a real cruiser, was unprovided with sails. She did, indeed, have two masts, but a new nomenclature had come into use. They were not masts for spreading sails. They were "military masts," and were used for carrying tiny cannon, once called "murdering guns," high up above the smoke of battle; and they were also convenient as perches for lookouts and the display of signals. The Maine, on the other hand, was supplied with large sail-power. 52 ARMORED CRUISERS AND BATTLE-SHIPS For offensive operations the New York was supplied with two eight-inch guns in a bow turret, two more in a turret aft, and one on each side protected only with a shield. To supplement these great guns were twelve of four-inch calibre, besides a host of the " murdering guns." Now, because she was to be a real cruiser, it was not advisable to load her with heavy armor. On the other hand she was to be what may be called an all-around fighting machine and must carry some steel to keep out an enemy's projectiles. Accordingly a belt of steel four inches thick, to protect the water-line, was worked into her sides over a space ample to cover her machinery. To supplement this a steel deck, in the form of an arch, was built within the protective walls, beginning well below the waterline and rising up over all the machinery. This deck is six inches thick on the slope, and three inches thick on the flat top. A shot from an enemy to reach her machinery would have to pass through the four-inch belt on her sides and then penetrate the six-inch slope of the protective deck. And that could not be done by any shot, for the four-inch belt would explode the heaviest shot, and the arched deck is strong enough to stop the pieces. The turrets holding the big guns are five and a half inches thick, and each is protected with a ten-inch barbette. ARMORED CRUISERS AND BATTLE-SHIPS 53,-, Deci-be, ~ o., the ork a kJII LJCICIIIC U Ze? 1091, LIIC IVCW I Urt/IC WvS launched, and the 22d of the following May found her at sea on her official trial trip. If we consider its effect upon the navy and the nation, we shall look in vain for another day in all our history to compare with it, though the days of the famous race of the Cozstlittlion off the Jersey beach were somewhat like it. We had heard from time to time of the progress made in building her. We had read boastful descriptions of her plans, and we had learned, although wc did not realize it, that in offensive and defensive powers she was extraordinary; but some were doubtful. Even among the officers detailed to watch the trial, there was not a little doubt as to her full success, but when they gathered in the engine-room and with eager eyes watched the swift beating of connecting rods and the smooth whirr of shafts, and in the midst of the perspiring heat of the air, found the bearings cool and frictionless, while indicator cards showed such power as they had never seen before, their fears faded away. For four hours they kept their watch on engineroom and taffrail log and clock, and then, when the time was done, the whole crew broke into cheers that could not be restrained, while a blueshirted sailor clambered aloft to lash a broom to the masthead, for she had covered twentyone sea miles per hour during the whole trial. 0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 0'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~......................... - --------------------- - - - - - - - ----- - - - -...........................0 ..............7. OW 0 j.( Lu-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Mi.6-w-~ ~~~~~~~~~~~ Ml~~~~~~~~~~~ MN~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~A...................................................... 56 ARMORED CRUISERS AND BATTLE-SHIPS navies, although guns of sixteen-inch calibre are found there. These guns were naturally located in two turrets placed amidships forward and aft. Around each turret was placed a barbette, and from this barbette steel walls were drawn diagonally out to the sides of the ship in such fashion that each turret stood at the apex of a wedge formed by these walls. Reaching the sides of the ship, these walls were united with the side armor in an obtuse angle, and on each of the four angles so formed a smaller turret was erected. So there were two big turrets above the keel and four on the rails. In each of the four smaller turrets were placed two eight-inch guns, while along the side armor walls were located four six-inch guns. Little has been said so far about the so-called secondary battery, save to speak of them as "murdering guns." The secondary battery provided for these ships was in numbers, at least, the most remarkable ever sent afloat at that time. Going next to the engine-room, we find 9,738 horse-power provided to drive a hull that displaced 10,288 tons, and the speed obtained was I5.547 knots per hour. The armor varied in thickness in proportion to the estimated needs. The side armor protecting the machinery was I8 inches thick; in the main turrets, 15, in the - -------- - - - ----------- ---------------------- - - - .......................i MOM ~ ~J J ~;XIEr 1, lii r 1;P, ; err ~~li r Earl ~LI T A I rrr ipr, klri n ~~9 %91 " iaU ~,g bs iir: ~La I ~i" iss r;F';"'' iri i lsb.~ tl i,, iss, Irr 7ti r? ii i ts ii B ilS )~ri z, rxr? a~-~ I sr lliT IJ "")S*L L Cll,ixlr lirrii ~1~ aa i i Ci, 5 ~i i """ ""I lji *Ir i r I cl~ "1~ f I ariii ij i i~I EP a "j 1,iu ,,,..I i~ ii ~~t~t~ 6 J j r ~i,~xxxxi,~, i ~IJ~r r 11 5 iinrr ii F~;i,xxrai;,rr~r~riai: u n i*sr D 11111 I s.. rcli ';?" lli~ 5~i ~IPj a I Ei, PC Is ii i~r ixr ru in,, t Ilr I " " 5 i LPI a~ *" Iiiii jr"rxxr.88 i i i.i. ixa~,: 60 ARMORED CRUISERS AND BATTLE-SHIPS five, six, eight, ten, twelve, and thirteen inches, but when we had reached a muzzle velocity of 2,200 foot-seconds for our six-inch guns-2,200 foot-seconds for its best showing-we were obliged to rest for lack of appropriations, while England went on improving up to a velocity of 2,700 foot-seconds in some calibres. But that was not the worst of it either, for the breechblocks and cartridges were improved so that they had rapid-fire guns in their broadside batteries of the five-and-a-half and six-inch calibres, while we had in service nothing better than fiveinch. And in our broadside batteries, curiously enough, considering our traditions, we had fourinch and five-inch guns where the Europeans had.five-and-a-half, six, and six-and-a-half inch guns. Little more need be said here of ships and guns. With the New York and the Brooklyn (literally a greater New York) for our armored cruisers; with the Columbia and Minneapolis, built for commerce-destroyers and scouts; with a beautiful fleet of smaller cruisers and gunboats; with a small but very efficient flotilla of torpedo-boats, and with six monitors of which five were begun in the days of false pretence, but were finished in honest fashion, we supposed, in the year 897, that we had a sea-power that would insure peace. That we were mistaken-that we were not powerful enough to overawe a vain and foolish nation-is now well known to all. CHAPTER V TREACHEROUS DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE OUR EARLY EFFORTS TO REMOVE ANARCHY FROM CUBA-THE MAINE SENT TO HAVANA TO PROTECT AMERICANS-THE UNDISPUTED CONCLUSION OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY REGARDING THE LOSS OF THE MAINE. WHAT we as a nation actually did in answer to the Cuban appeal for help was to strive during two long years to fulfil our treaty duties toward Spain. There were Cuban committees in all our coastwise cities who raised funds, and at intervals sent expeditions to aid, the insurgents. There was no law under which our Government could prevent their raising money, but there was a law to stop filibustering expeditions, and in executing that law we spent thousands of dollars. 'We detailed naval as well as revenue ships to watch the filibusters. We did not stop all the expeditions, and the friends of Spain, ignoring the fact that with a force of more than a thousand ships we had been unable to prevent the work of blockade-runners during 61 62 DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE the Civil War, were quick to accuse us of neglecting our treaty duty. But the truth is we repressed the work of filibusters with such rigor that many of the friends of liberty cried " shame." To the English writer who called us "easily excited Americans," Uncle Sam might reply by paraphrasing the words of a much greater Englishman: " When I consider my opportunities, by God, I stand astounded at my own moderation." But even the prolonged patience of conscious power had to come to an end when the atrocities of Weyler became fully known. The condition of Cuba was a matter for long consideration in the Cabinet of President McKinley in 1897, and the result was that Minister Stewart L. Woodford said in diplomatic but unmistakable language to the government of Spain: " You must take Weyler out of Cuba or we will do it for you." Let no mistake be made when interpreting that demand. It was not a seeking for a fight. It was an assertion that we would have peace not only within but about our borders. It was an assault, but it was the assault of the sanitary officials of an international board of health. It was our first step in the name of humanity, and for the moment the Spaniards were willing to listen to an appeal to reason. Weyler was recalled on October 2, 1897, and he sailed from DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE 63 " —l.a n a n a ~ n n. /-,.,-b r...-:,.-.' r..-..1D....1 nu. - Ha..t..na onL the 3tvJLh..Captail-ne -llCrIl DBIlallu succeeded him. At the same time they promised to give Cuba some such a government as that in Canada. While the island was to remain Spanish territory the people were to govern themselves. With any other civilized nation this proposed change in policy would have brought peace. But Spain could not keep her promise. She had instituted changes in the government of Cuba in former years-she had even given the island representation in the Spanish Congress-without affording any relief to the people of the island. Indeed matters had grown steadily worse instead of better. The promise of an autonomous government as carried out was a sham. A later promise to give relief to the reconcentrados was a more infamous sham, because it provided for permitting the starving people to go out to plant when they had neither tools nor seed. And when some did straggle out to gather the spontaneous products of the earth the Spanish soldiers, responsible only to local officers, shot many of them to death for the pleasure they had in inflicting suffering, and to enable their officers to report victories over bodies of insurgents! In his first warning to the Madrid Government President McKinley set a date, December i, 1897, by which time some manifest progress must be made in establishing order in Cuba, 64 DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE lacking which a message would be sent to Congress recommending intervention-with arms if necessary. The Spanish Government replied that the time allowed was insufficient, and the date was changed to March I, 1898. Meantime, the knowledge that our Government would interfere was spread over the world, and the Cuban tories of Havana with the Spanish rabble began to menace the Americans resident there. The newspapers were particularly virulent in their remarks about Americans, and cartoons were circulated among those who could not read, in order to incite ill-feeling toward us. In short, there was a steady threat of war in the attitude of the Spanish toward our movements in the interests of peace in Cuba. McKinley and his Cabinet, among whom the active president of the Massachusetts Peace Society held the post of Secretary of the Navy, were determined that they would use every endeavor, consistent with the pacifying of Cuba, to maintain peace, but the threat of war could not be ignored. The North Atlantic Squadron was sent to the Florida Keys, early in January, for the winter's drill. The presence of our ships in such a place was a plain statement that we were in earnest in our demands for order in Cuba-that we were ready to support our demands with force. It was hoped and really be ~::,,?:::::::::::::I:::::::::::X::::::::::::::::III::I1"I1"X I;Hglii,, ~~ r,,,,,i"'" I: r, 811 ~,s, ~I;s 'I' 818i; s; rir ~irrl I ~s,~in~,:,,,l i" I: ili;i~;,,,,, s: ~r ~~II~ aalilni~lilliia,,,,,,i,i 1~~~~~~~ ~I, II~'~~;"'"~" iR~~il"';~il"'"P"P~ """"~ [."g~i~I8i-":ri:ill ~"~"~ ~""" s~~ inrrn.BIB.BiR'LPi: s s~~:b~~l,l;li " I 69 ~U"E~ I I~II E ~iiii a ba ~.~:,1. " "R, l'ili. rg.. ar ii I"ilQI lil 8' I ~l~iBilRIIB1 " "i;s sr. "".'!! ~I~~;u;;,R,; ~ ~,I! I ~nl"8'igg.ii" fii ~ix;ii fl s.,,,,, Ia Is Iqi I ~'"~" e ~s 1 i?, ~r,,, "' C 'A C X~ "~ I"~1: "' n'""liEiBR1:;lil d.;sn;iin~ m IUI~:ii,,,, rrnr / ~.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - --------------- — 2 --- —------- -- ----- -- ----— 7....... C) C)- - — ~~~~~~~~~~1 M C~C> C 2 - ( )C ) C~( C C) C(C~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~i Now ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~CC): W ) C -C M R C C)C0C ~ ) 07 n 140 ~~~~~~~~~~ A~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~t DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE 69 admitted he had written it, and resigned. Sefior Luis Polo y Bernabe took his place, with many fine words, but the incident increased the Spaniard's hate for the American, and decreased the chance of Spanish yielding to the demand for peace. As we look back upon the conditions of affairs in the two nations in those days, the contrast between the two peoples (not the officials) is instructive: the one was so vituperative, so ready in the use of adjectives expressive of contempt; the other so incredulous about the threat of war, and, withal, not a little amused by the antics of Spanish spokesmen. Our Government did, indeed, steadily prepare the navy for war, but it is significant of the mental attitude of our people that a bill for an increase of the army's efficiency failed to pass Congress. The Spanish sneeringly said we were absorbed in the pursuits of business, and they were right so far. They added that we would not, and could not, fight effectively, and the Bishop of Santiago de Cuba is said to have asserted that, with ten thousand men, he would land on our shores, march to Washington, and raise the holy emblems of his office along with the flag of Spain over what he supposed was an infidel capitol of an infidel people. He did, without doubt, believe what he said. The Spanish soldiers in Havana, to a man, believed 70 DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE it. They called us pigs, because that was more expressive of contempt, but they regarded us rather as they regarded a bull before the matador appears, sword in hand; and picadores were not lacking among the Spanish officers in Havana. Now, at this time many people in Havanaeven commissioned army officers-believed I RRO CASTLI Chart of Havana Harbor. that the Maine was our most powerful battleship, if not our only one, and there she lay moored to Buoy 4, where no man-o'-war had ever been moored, and but rarely a merchantship. There was a huge torpedo under her. It would be easy to explode it and thus seriously weaken the Yankee navy. At 9.40 o'clock on the night of February DESTRU~ECTION (.. TA MAINE 71 a hakie I dl 11-h- 11 I r >is high l ul it ofll bh IWil'r A..m:11d.nki. | wasV> * "i a mAY Ig Al 1 Alin fan igd a l.... flun. ghig ii al.m.......... ligt> f lwt * 1 a i 1114 hu ll 1i Ijl.... 1I41 — h~-S — -$ I ~ls -g.....~~I1.. i, ls X:X'".: 6fii1114 A1141 o nlicm Vural)iii ~ o u1 ihi Alit I 1 hi b h Iand the is h lilA l11 4 iii 1/ " i f|ili og 1) ithe w t A dA114 l 4111411 she b1> 41 1l l1 ili th 411411 li4A uppi 414 4 a1l d o14 Vul l th1Il e.14. 14 ll 11144er witte.I ki a fdwfire oin a in theg., j14to the 4 1 11>1 i I inn 41 111 11.4>1 411 i th vi i d 4>t>1 1144 114111e 1141 ie f the on)11 iAle 14 114 1 41.1. 72 DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE quartered aft, and so escaped its worst effects. With two exceptions they reached the upper deck and gathered about Captain Sigsbee, who was standing " cold as an iceberg " surveying the scene. But even as the last officer arrived-and their coming was the work of seconds onlythe order "Abandon ship" was given, and the survivors on deck entered the boats and began the work of gathering up those who, though burned and broken, were still able to keep afloat after they had been blown into the sea. They even found one man in the water who had been asleep in his hammock under the deck with his shipmates when the explosion occurred, and had been thrown up through the bursting deck and out into the sea unhurt The Spanish war-ship, Al5phonso XII., was lying near by, and so was the American merchant ship, City of Washington. To these ships and to the piers the survivors were taken, and the wounded sent thence to the hospital. Having taken care of all that survived, Captain Sigsbee wrote a brief dispatch to the Department, telling of the explosion and the plight of the survivors, and added these words: " Public opinion should be suspended until further report." When the reporter who carried this dispatch reached the shore, he found it thronged with Spaniards who were looking at the wreck and ,,;,;$~8~~i~i8:0:i IIg IIP~ ~8~ I n I~~~~ '1 I ~-~ a, ~:,;~'; ~~ i;,,,,, 'i ~~~ ' r:.C I sOiQ ~I a ii i-~.R':1:5i I 1 I~F ~~~ "1 ilQ~l I r r a n~:;; i~ I g r B s~Ii 81 I-.~~ -~;~;~~1 \~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE 75 IIUILUlgItIl 1IL Lilt lllOsL AL a v agat ll F AriLssiS13 of joy. " Hurrah for Spain!" " Death to the Americans!" "To-morrow we shall have good fishing in the harbor!" (referring to the dead sailors) were only a few of the shouts heard there. In the drinking-places that were the resorts of the army officers, the men who were ordinarily satisfied with beer or table claret were opening champagne by the basket. Next day an official count of the survivors was had. Captain Sigsbee found twenty-four officers (commissioned and warranted) and eighteen men uninjured, and fifty-nine men in the hospital. He reported the lost and missing at 253, among whom were Lieutenant Friend Jenkins, and Assistant Engineer Darwin R. Merritt. There was some discrepancy between the list of the crew as held by Paymaster Littlefield of the Maine, and that at the Navy Department, and there was for a time some doubt about the exact number lost. Then, too, some of the wounded died, but the total deaths were at last summed up at 267, including Lieutenant John J. Blandin, who, although apparently in fairly good health for some months after the explosion, developed disease of the spine and brain as a result of the shock, and died on J uly i 6, 1 898. As we recall the days following the destruction of the Maine, the state of mind throughout the nation seems astounding-for the appeal 76 DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE for a suspension of judgment made by Captain Sigsbee was everywhere heeded. Immediate preparations for an examination of the wreck were made by the Government, however, not only to recover the bodies of the dead, but to learn all the facts likely to show the origin of the explosion. Divers from our own fleet were sent to Havana, and the services of professional wreckers in New York were secured. Rear Admiral Sicard, commanding the squadron at Key West, on February I7th, appointed, as a Court of Inquiry, Captain W. T. Sampson, of the Iowa, Captain French E. Chadwick, of the New York; Lieutenant Commander William P. Potter, Executive Officer of the NVew York, and Lieutenant Commander Adolph Marix, as Judge Advocate. To entirely avoid offence to the Spaniards no armed ship was sent to look after the wreck; but on the Igth when the Spanish officials at Havana proposed a joint Spanish and American investigation into the loss of the Maine, the proposition was declined. The sittings of the Sampson Court were held in secret, and the members were entirely faithful in refusing to divulge what they had learned and determined, until they made their official report, which was transmitted to Congress by the President on March 28th. The important findings in this report were: "There were two explosions distinctly differ s~, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~.......................................................................~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~3...........~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~9r................. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r~~ SEEM~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-Ic I DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE 79 ent in character, with a very short but distinct interval between them, and the forward part of the ship was lifted to a marked degree at the time of the first explosion. The first explosion was more in the nature of a report, like that of a gun, while the second explosion was more open, prolonged, and of greater volume. This second explosion was, in the opinion of the court, caused by the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines of the Mainte. "At frame 17, the outer shell of the ship, from a point 11 feet 6 inches from the middle line of the ship, and 6 feet above the keel when in its normal position, has been forced up so as to be now about 4 feet above the surface of the water; therefore about 34 feet above where it would be, had the ship sunk uninjured. The outside bottom plating is bent into a reversed V-shape, the after wing of which, about 15 feet broad and 30 feet in length, is doubled back upon itself, against the continuation of the same plating extending forward. "At frame i8 the vertical keel is broken in two, and the flat keel bent into an angle similar to the angle formed by the outside bottom plating. This break is now about 6 feet below the surface of the water, and about 30 feet above its normal position. " In the opinion of the Court, this effect 80 DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE could have been produced only by the explosion of a mine situated under the bottom of the ship at about frame I8, and somewhat on the port side of the ship. "The Court finds that the loss of the Maine was not in any respect due to fault or negligence on the part of any of the officers or members of the crew of said vessel. "In the opinion of the Court the Maize was destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine, which caused the partial explosion of two or more of her forward magazines." The testimony taken by the Court was made public with the report. The result was that not only the people of the United States, but all fair-minded people throughout the world, were convinced beyond peradventure that the Maine and her men had been hurled to destruction by a deliberate act. They had chosen an hour, too, when the loss of life would be as great as possible, and yet so early that the spectacle might afford pleasure to a vast host of their compatriots. Nevertheless, while our flags were still at half mast in memory of the dead a Wall Street financier, a representative peace - at - any- price man, telegraphed an appeal for peace, in which appeared this question: " What is the loss of two hundred and fifty lives to a universal depreciation in values?" CHAPTER VI THE DAYS JUST BEFORE TIE WAR A DISPLAY OF POWER THAT WVAS WITHOUT EFFECT BECAUSE OF SPANISH OBSTINACY-$50,000,OOO FOR DEFENCE-A FLEET OF AUXILIARY WAR-SHIPS-EHOW WE LEARNED THAT WE MUST DEPEND ON OUR OWN SHIP-YARDS-SAMPSON IN COMMAND-A COMBINATION THAT GAVE THE REST OF THE WORLD PAUSE. A STORY told of " Fighting Bob" (Captain Robley D.) Evans, says that he was in the Navy Department one day, after the destruction of the Maine, and in the course of a conversation found opportunity to express his views as to what should have been done in the matter. He said: " If I had been in Admiral Sicard's place I would have taken my entire squadron into Havana harbor the next morning, and then I would have said to them, 'Now, we'll investigate this matter, and let you know what we think about it at once."' " If you had done that you would have been recalled and severely reprimanded," said Secre81 82 THE DAYS JUST BEFORE THE WAR tary Long, somewhat warmly. The captain's eyes twinkled, as he replied: "I don't doubt that, sir; but the people would have made me President at the next election." At that the Secretary is said to have winced a wee bit and turned the conversation to something else. Whether true or not the story illustrates the feelings of the majority of the naval officers after the murder of the Maine's crew. They think, even now, that war would have been avoided by the course of action laid down by Captain Evans, but the people, as a whole, did really suspend judgment until the report of the Sampson Court; that is to say, if the Court had reported an internal explosion only, the people would have believed it implicitly. But the chief facts that proved Spanish treachery became known before the seal of secrecy was placed on the lips of all naval officers connected with the investigation. Ensign W. V. N. Powelson, an expert in naval architecture, saw that the bottom plates of the Maine were above water and he learned that her keel was just awash. He told these facts to a personal friend and so they got into print. There was but one conclusion from those facts. The smile faded from the faces of our people, who had. been amused by Spanish braggadocio. The doubts disappeared from the minds of- those who had THE DAYS JUST BEFORE THE WAR 83 clung to the idea that the Spanish might have been, to some extent, justified in their policy in Cuba. There was still an idea that the Cubans, knowing well the effect such an outrage would have, might have placed the torpedo; not a few of the Americans who- have had 'dealings with the insurgents believe they were entirely capable of the atrocity; but, without exception, every American who was in Havana, and every other foreigner, for that matter, has said that the Spanish patrol of the harbor was entirely efficient, and that it was only by the action of Spanish officials that a mine could have been placed anywhere in the bay. In no considerable degree did what we call "fake" news or hysterical editorials influence the sober judgment of the people regarding their duty toward Spain. It was the spread of the real facts, the growth of actual knowledge of what the Spaniards in Cuba stood for and what they had done there, that forced the conviction upon us that we must drive them to the further side of the sea. The conviction was literally forced upon unwilling minds. The people w\ho knew the Cubans best, felt, and many of them said, that the whole hybrid race was not worth one good American life. While sitting on the hotel veranda at Key West, distinctively a Cuban settlement, a survivor of the Maine said: " If we do have to fight Spain, the first thing 84 THE DAYS JUST BEFORE THE WAR we'll do after we've licked her is to make her take Key West back," and the whole audience laughed heartily and approvingly. But when the laugh was ended it was agreed that the production of such a race on our borders was sufficient cause of war in itself. Further than that it was not the destruction of our battle-ship and the murder of our sailors, but it was the existence of a state of affairs where such an infamy was possible that compelled us to fight. By the handling of our war-ships we had endeavored to educate the Spanish into a knowledge that we had material of war fit for a conflict, but because we showed remarkable self-restraint after the destruction of the Maine -showed the self-restraint of a determined race instead of the froth of an impulsive onethey were convinced that our stock-brokers would rule us in the interest of preserving values. So the Spanish Government thought to set us running by a menace-they demanded the recall of Consul-General Lee. It was a very diplomatic demand in its form, but it was understood for what it was intended, and it was promptly refused. This menace was made on Saturday, March 5th. It was refused the same day, and on the following Monday the President, with the leaders in Congress, determined on an act that, it was hoped, would convince Spain of the entire hopelessness of THE DAYS JUST BEFORE THE WAR her course toward our people and the Cubans. On Tuesday, March 8th, a bill was introduced into both houses appropriating $50,000,000 for the defence of the nation. It was to be used by the President at his discretion, absolutely unhampered by any restriction. The bill passed unanimously and without debate. Now, at that time the Treasury had an available cash balance of $224,541,637. To fully understand what the act of Congress meant we must recall the fact that Spain at that time had been unable to pay her troops in Cuba for many months and that she had been a beggar at the doors of European money-lenders-had secured loans only at such sacrifices as are made to pawn-brokers. We were giving, as we supposed, an effectual answer to Spanish assertions that we were full of greed for money and devoid of manhood, but the fact that we appropriated only about one-fifth of our available cash was considered by the Spanish, rather than the potential energy of the sum appropriated. The fact that we had appropriated but one-fifth indicated, to their minds, that we were just what they had supposed us to be. In proof of this may be quoted an article from the leading Spanish illustrated periodical-La Illustracion -regarding our navy. It asserted that our navy was "manned by hirelings who calculate, while they are fighting, what their value, in cents, 86 THE DAYS JUST BEFORE THE WAR should be worth to them;" that it was a i navy without traditions of any kind," and that the ships were all poor imitations of European vessels, that our " tests of armor and other work were unsatisfactory," and that "it will be nothing remarkable, if, in a short time, we see all these vessels go to the rubbish heap."' It was soon apparent that the chief object in view when the $50,000,000 was appropriated would not be attained, and we at once began using the money not for a defence fund, as it was called, but to prepare for an aggressive war. The squadron at Key West at this time included the New York, Captain French E. Chadwick; Iowa, Captain William T. Sampson; Texas, Captain John W. Philip; Massachusetts, Captain Francis J. Higginson; Indiana, Captain Henry C. Taylor; Marblehead, Captain Bowman H. McCalla; Montgomery, Captain George A. Converse; Nashville, Captain Washburn Maynard; Detroit, Captain James H. Dayton; the Fern (transport), Captain William S. Cowles, and two or three torpedo-boats. To increase this force the monitors Puritan, Amphi/rite, Mzianonomoh and Terror were overhauled and ordered to Key West. The South American squadron under Captain Chester, which included the Cincinna/i, the Bancroft, and the Castine, started north. Two curious gun-boats that had upper - --------------------- 0 C 0 M C C o '~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C~~~~~P 88 THE DAYS JUST BEFORE THE WAR ings in Spain impelled the formation of what was called a flying squadron at Hampton Roads, for the protection of our coast in case the Spanish cruisers should force the fighting. Captain W. S. Schley was placed in command there, with his flag on the Brooklyn. The Massachusetts and the Texas were sent from Key West, and to these were added the unequalled flyers Miznneapolis and Columbza. That was a remarkable combination for a battle line, but it had its advantages in the way of a solid nucleus with the flyers for scouts. Meantime the conferences that had been held from time to time during the winter, between the Navy Department officials and the manufacturers of war material began to have practical results. An order for $2,800,000 worth of projectiles was placed in one day (March I2th), for instance. Then Captain Frederick Rodgers, Lieutenant-Commander J. D. J. Kelley, Naval-Constructor J. G. Tawresey, Chief-Engineer Albert F. Dixon and Lieutenant Nathan Sargeant were appointed as a board to charter and buy merchant ships and yachts that might be converted into men-o'-war of some efficiency. The Navy Department had some years before begun gathering data regarding private vessels flying the American flag, with a view of such an emergency as was now at hand, and Congress had helped on this work by pro '4 B... ~*.,y s rp 7: r c; ris iii r ii ;",B; a rr r x E~l r r II in "II I, I,;i I, hi I.i,, ~~:~;:;~,:;:ai~ O ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ THE DAYS JUST BEFORE THE WAR 91 viuditg for t Ll tilet tw\Vo British-buiit liners, New York and Paris, to our flag, along with the construction of those companion flyers, the Sl. Louis and SI. Paul in an American yard (the Cramp's). Here were four of the swiftest class of vessels in the world that could be chartered, ready for use, as soon as guns could be mounted on emplacements already prepared. This made an admirable beginning, but to them were added some dozens of smaller but very efficient boats, either purchased or chartered, of some of which we heard in actual battle, while a few vessels which the board rejected as worthless were sold to the Government in spite of the board, because their owners had influence. But while this altogether discreditable fact must be stated, in order that the shame of it may tend to prevent similar operations in future, it should be added that such dealings were far less numerous by count and, it is said by naval officers, less numerous in proportion to the whole number purchased, than appeared during the Civil War. Our patriotism was more apparent in this war, and our greed less. Of auxiliary " cruisers and yachts," the naval list of July, i898, contained thirty-eight; but that list is very misleading, as a reference to the squadron lists printed elsewhere in the list shows. In all, more than fifty vessels, ranging 92 THE DAYS JUST BEFORE THE WAR in size from yachts of little more than ioo tons up to the liners of I6,ooo tons displacement, were added to the navy, placed in command of naval officers, armed with guns suitable for their strength, and sent sooner or later where actual service was to be expected. To these fighting and despatch-vessels were added later a ship fitted as a floating hospital, the Solace; another as a floating machine-shop, the Vulcan, and a third fitted to distil fresh water from the sea, the Iris-most useful and well fitted for the purpose, every one. We also made" use of revenue-cutters and light-house supply-ships. That guns were found for these auxiliary fighting-ships, with ammunition to feed them was due in part to the foresight of Congress in appropriating money several years before to provide guns for such an emergency, and to the activity and efficiency of the ordnance officers in charge of the gun-factory at Washington-Captain Charles O'Neil, assisted by Lieutenants Frank S. Fletcher, Albert M. Beecher, and Isaac K. Seymour. And in connection with these converted merchantmen it should be said that the increased demand for seamen which came as they were commissioned was met to a large extent by the men of the naval militia, the citizen sailors, organized in various coastwise and lake towns THE DAYS JUST BEFORE THE WAR 93 for training as man-o'-war fighters. The skill as well as the cool bravery which these men showed afloat, as will be told farther on, made their officers proud of them. In this way several hundred guns, thoroughly effective in a fight with unprotected ships (sixpounders and larger), were sent afloat in the hands of men who could see through the sights, while a handful of the swiftest yachts purchased, such as the Mayflozver, with her speed of seventeen knots, were fitted with torpedotubes and named torpedo-boat destroyers. As compared with the real destroyers of which Spain made boast these looked rather ridiculous, for they were not only relatively slow but they towered in the air like tenement-houses. Nevertheless they served a useful purpose. Another plan for strengthening our defences was in ordering some of the old single-turret monitors of the Jason class into service at various ports-seven in all being found fit for use. They carried big smooth-bore guns, a weapon not in favor, these days, but entirely efficient against unarmored cruisers or converted merchantmen should Spain show sufficient enterprise to send such vessels to hover off our ports. The purchase and arming of merchant vessels went on exactly as our statesmen had foreseen, but one other and a very important resource in time of danger on which they had W X m m a X < W.X. *.................... W.,.,. X X H H X W1 g~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.................. em ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~- C11i~ X11J 29~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ CM m m N mi E........... E. j.g. | W............... #H @ X. *. X~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~........... C S rC V -C THE DAYS JUST BEFORE THE WAR 95 We also got an I,8oo-ton gun-boat, built in England in 1882 for Portugal. She was called Diogenes. Portugal did not complete the purchase, and her builders remodelled her on speculation and we got her-not at all a bad ship, but not a notable addition to the navy either. We named her the Topeka. The two cruisers were purchased by Lieutenant John C. Colwell, the Naval A/tachd in London. We sent Commander V. H. Brownson, whose reputation as a diplomat as well as a fighter is well established in the navy, to Europe to buy more, but there was nothing in the market, and we thereby learned that in future we must depend entirely on our- own resources-a good lesson learned at a small price. The purchase of the Brazilian cruisers was effected on March I4th. They are sister ships of the protected-cruiser class. There is a protective deck three inches thick on the slopes, and with full bunkers the coal gives some protection. Engines of 7,500 horse-power give a speed of twenty knots. The displacement is 3,600 tons, being somewhat larger than our own Cincinnati and Raleigh, with which they have been compared. In hull and machinery there is no great difference between them and our own designs, though they are about a knot swifter. But when we come to compare the 96 THE DAYR S YU ST RBEFORE 9EiE ANNEi Rinid a i roinindninis 41i141W nc.i ONES Bf1 Iifigh bRRIRfi ni fif~iR R ERrAWbr 16ug WRidd or ns a~re IMI b~ni~~1~ b r~n'iv RIw ping i'ir ha> a~~ inns,x~ Ir~~ vrlniiy~ I~ifiiish prnjrslibg frgirr 6R i'rg~dift R RhJ t was no apjnrrnilrl bay - (n ccz\ C 7 1; C 98 THIE Dv. a WS UrT BEtFORE TtE W AR iattor aninftt be exaggeratedf More War thireateliedi no alloxwxance for nava W tarte._ pratie was dinlon it was ootaioUY pratte WAS Is m ' (..;; I or ge SA r Udior be r oi..r xx. iti foil i a....... gu 11'"" '"": nowI in xriiar period of i B. forrmed. rae np1P los e E ery r month, in rirder I in?..g. to ake on Itris behind theI g the mit.kI.fil i tu vor? Tha Wxu be a reat s..linbi gues hoxt those rine shots xere to serve for aears tageopratiee! Bmagie a taphtr k ig hireif in iiiiig by fi ing hts a Even the gons of the rapfit iiatterie of fonrdneit am idh:itit xili W ere to se in lig a tot, onit ietOye later on, Were to bei fred lot twlit) five tIhis ii a year. Unit R..oo'elt rdlJsiatl iall thtehk The po ad roar of t ret -prair tif tOt e wlkii ig tM e day long xhr 1the i of nor droi The THE DAYS JUST BEFORE THE WAR 99 largest guns were not fired often with fullservice charges, more is the pity, but what is called sub-calibre practice-the firing of a onepounder rifle fitted into the axis of the big bore, by which the eye of the gunner was fairly well trained-was kept going steadily. Emphasis should be given to any statement regarding the work of Admiral Sicard before war began. We know now what "the man behind the gun" was able to do when the test came, and it should not be forgotten that it was Sicard who, to a great extent, trained the man. The training given our tars in the previous days of peace, though as good as that of other navies, was wholly inadequate if judged in the light of our naval traditions. And yet, during all those days of constant care and labor, the Admiral was suffering from a form of malaria due to the Gulf climate, and this at last overcame him so that he was obliged to give way. He was relieved from duty on March 24th, and Captain William T. Sampson, of the Iowa, who had served as chairman of the Maine Court of Inquiry, was placed in command of the squadron. Selecting the man who had convinced the world of the treachery of the Spanish in the Maine affair was a wise bit of diplomacy-an expression of supreme confidence in that Court of Inquiry. But there was a still more impor loo THE DAYS JUST BEFORE THE WAR tant reason for giving him the command, and that was his manifest fitness, as appeared in his record in every post he had held since entering the service. He had shown conspicuous bravery at Charleston, in the Civil War, where he faced a fire so fierce that he sent all of his men to cover while he alone stood exposed to pilot the ship (the Patapsco), and throughout his service in various bureaus of the Naval Department, as well as in command at sea, he had made a reputation as one who could be depended on in any situation. As a writer on naval subjects he was unsurpassed for breadth and lucidity, and it is not unlikely that a paper read by him before the Naval Institute, in I889, on "The Naval Defence of the Coast," was an important factor in the decision to select him. At any rate that paper established his reputation as a tactician. It is a notable fact that, although Sampson was fourth on the list of captains, and there were men of higher rank available, no protest was made when he was appointed. Captain Robley D. Evans took Sampson's place on the Iowa. To sum up the work in connection with the navy, during the weeks of peace following the destruction of the lMaine, it is apparent that we made every effort to strengthen our fleet and improve our men afloat-in short to prepare for war; and we were so successful that f igl C 1 1 111f 11s c i a A T rE Ei liereel El SiTe \E w, ISEe TI El Ai R11 lit ~iawere i i it a tiLh felix h L oif a illjiai o fice | Vif a fCIjrll. X VIt tod te hip l itr;'l~ ith theLo irs di.nid eif ouri- N16di'' thee 1 i r4o& T1eirX were confidfii t ii t li A 1 dibibbillaYiY li 46i European poweX r XXidig be fYiYfiiid ifl Xiii 1h31 XXI 91lfili d1 iii ie 1 I i(t h l SOit di th j i ey Iin i ll if 1111 Xwatfi lg m j. ed diiAil d1ii iit1 iL1 1.11 e iii i Yi fi ide 11 Y f1 ee.inec lg XIS El Yi ii Y111 ii X Yi iiii El Xdii AI i ed 3Y aY tl!#n!SgE~usjWaRE|tlttl lCtg 1i to2 THE DAYS JUST BEFORE THE WAR declaration of the British Government that the moment the combination was consummated, the whole British fleet should be placed at our disposal. The Anglo-Saxon race was at last united for a moment, and in their presence the rest of the world instantly bowed in submission. CHAPTER VII THE WAR MESSAGE SUMMARY OF REASONS FOR AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN CUBAN AFFAIRS-AGGRAVATING PROOF OF WORK OF SPANISH SPIES AND SPANISH INSINCERITY-DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ENDEDTHREATENING MOVEMENTS OF WAR-SHIPS. Now although the civilized nations of Europe were unwilling to combine against England and the United States, nothing could prevent Spain's fighting to save Cuba. As has been recently pointed out by Captain F. E. Chadwick, the Spanish are always stubborn in defence. Even Spanish officials, who should have known better, believed they still might win, and those who were hopeless of success were compelled to lead on to war in obedience to the popular demand, lest a civil war come upon them through an uprising of the Carlists. Spain had sent her beautiful 7,000 ton cruiser, the Vizcaya, to New York, to let us see what able ships floated her blood-and-gold banner. Later she sent a sister-ship, the Oquendo, to Havana, to cheer the hearts of her forces 103 1o4 THE WAR MESSAGE there. The two vessels lay there in the month of March, almost within hearing of the cheerful roar of our target practice at Key West. As we strengthened our squadron there, Spain protested on the ground that we were threatening her and trying to overawe the government in Cuba for the benefit of the insurgents, which was true so far as the charge of threatening her was concerned. As we did not withdraw any of our force, but steadily increased it instead, Spain retaliated, so to speak, by sending out a squadron, under Admiral Cervera, to the Canary Islands, during the latter part of March. The make-up of this squadron was a matter of speculation, at the time; but it eventually included four of the big torpedoboat destroyers like the Furor, three torpedoboats, with a supply ship, the City of Cadiz, and the cruisers Maria Teresa and Cristobal Colon. A report that the squadron had left the Canaries was received at Washington on April 2d. Meantime, reports had been flying about to the effect that the squadron was already in San Juan, Porto Rico. These reports tried the nerves of our naval officers not a little, for with seven efficient torpedo-boats in hand there was no telling what an able Spanish admiral might do. A direct request was made by a number of officers, who visited the President, for a THE WAR MESSAGE 10o blockade of San Juan to prevent the Spaniards entering there to refit, if they had not done so, and to hold them in if already there; but the President was not yet ready for war, and his conservatism was in the end justified. Then it was learned that the Spanish squadron had gone to the Cape Verde Islands, where the Vizcaya and the Oquendo joined them, and thereafter the rumors regarding it were so numerous and contradictory as to be absolutely bewildering. Meantime, it must not be forgotten that our squadron in the far East, of which the Olympia carried the flag of Commodore Dewey, had been considering at Hong Kong an attack on Manila, while our battle-ship Oregon had sailed from San Francisco on March i9th, bound to Key West by the way of the Straits of Magellan. The iteration and reiteration of the details of all the preparations for war stirred our people to a point where war and not peace was wanted. The battle-cry, " Remember the Maine" had been blazoned by the "jingoes," until the words danced before eyes that were loath to behold them. The evidence of Spanish atrocity and incapacity in Cuba was increased by the testimony of some of our own Congressmen, who went there to see for themselves. The demand that the President act on the report of the Maine Court of Inquiry grew rapidly Io6 THE WAR MESSAGE under all this, but he was still slow to acttoo slow to please a portion of our people. Nevertheless, a time came when action was inevitable. -A message reciting the condition of affairs in Cuba and our interest therein, was prepared, and it was to have been sent to Congress on April 6th, with a request that the whole matter be acted upon at once. And this would have been done but for an appeal from Consul-General Lee, at Havana, for enough delay to enable him to get the Americans then in Cuba safely away. The Spanish population was growing so wild as to endanger the lives of all Americans, even that of General Lee himself, although he steadily refused to believe himself in danger, when it was patent to all other intelligent Americans there. An exodus of Americans from Cuba followed. There were not many there-a few hundred in all, and most of these of Cuban birth-but on April gth the exodus was completed. On that day, General Lee called at the palace to bid adieu, officially, to CaptainGeneral Blanco. When he sent in his card, a porter came out and said Blanco was not well and could not receive callers. At that time the transport Fern, the survey steamer Bache, and the Plant Line steamer Olivette plying between Tampa and Havana were in port. General Lee hauled down the THE WAR MESSAGE 107 flag over the Consulate, turned the consular affairs over to the British consul, and at 11 o'clock, on April 9th, boarded the Fern. At about 5 o'clock that afternoon, the three steamers passed out of the harbor in a slow procession, with every passenger on deck looking with mixed amusement and regret toward the shore, where the Spaniards had swarmed to the water's edge and, frothing at the mouth in their frenzy, were hurling invectives at the ships and everyone on board. When it was learned that General Lee had reached the United States, the President sent (April IIth) to Congress the long-looked-for message on the state of affairs in Cuba. It was about six thousand words in length. It began with the words, " Obedient to that precept of the Constitution which commands the President to give, from time to time, to the Congress information of the state of the Union, and to recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient, it becomes my duty to address your body with regard to the grave crisis that has arisen in the relations of the United States with Spain." Thereafter he recounted the halfcentury of revolutions in Cuba, our efforts and expense in preventing the work of filibusters, the shocking results of Weyler's order of October 21, I896, concentrating the rural popu io8 THE WAR MESSAGE lation in the garrisoned towns, our contributions of food to the unfortunates, the deeds showing that the Spaniards were not making war on, but were exterminating the Cubans, our offers of friendly intervention and other peaceful acts to end the horrors, and the utter failure of Spain to heed us and to end them herself. The destruction of the Maine was treated only as one incident among many that proved the Spanish Government at once impotent and utterly vicious. It was undeniable that "the forcible intervention of the United States, as a neutral, to stop the war, according to the large dictates of humanity, and following many historical precedents, is justifiable on rational grounds." "The grounds for such intervention may be briefly summarized as follows," said the message. "First.-In the cause of humanity, and to put an end to the barbarities, starvation, and horrible miseries;now existing there, and which the parties to the conflict are either unable or unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say this is all in another country, belonging to another nation, and is, therefore, none of our business. It is specially our duty, for it is right at our door. "Second.-We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to afford them that protection and indemnity for THE WAR MESSAGE og9 life vhich no government there can or will afford, and to that end to terminate the conditions that deprive them of legal protection. " Third.-Right to intervene may be justified by the very serious injury to the commerce, trade, and business of our people, and by the wanton destruction of property and devastation of the island. " Fourth (and which is of the most importance)-The present condition of affairs is a constant menace to our peace, and entails upon this Government an enormous expense. With such a conflict waged for years in an island so near us, and with which our people have such trade and business relations, when the lives and liberty of our citizens are in constant danger, and their property and themselves ruined, when our trading-vessels are liable to seizure, and are seized, at our very door by war-ships of a foreign nation; the expeditions of filibustering that we are powerless to prevent altogether, and the irritating questions and entanglements thus arising-all these and others that I need not mention, with the resulting strained relations, are a constant menace to our peace and compel us to keep on a semi-war footing with a nation with which we are at peace." In conclusion, "the only hope of relief and repose from a condition which can no longer IIO THE WAR MESSAGE be endured is the enforced pacification of Cuba. In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests, which give us the right and the duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must stop. " In view of these facts and these considerations I ask the Congress to authorize and empower the President to take measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the Government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable government capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations, insuring peace and tranquillity, and the security of its citizens as well as our own; and to use the military and naval forces of the United States as may be necessary for these purposes. And in the interests of humanity, and to aid in preserving the lives of the starving people of the island, I recommend that the distribution of food and supplies be continued, and that an appropriation be made out of the public treasury to supplement the charity of our citizens." On the very day that this message was sent to Congress, the Spanish Government notified McKinley that an armistice would be proclaimed at once in Cuba. The notice said that every preparation had been made for placing THE WAR MESSAGE I II in operation the new autonomous government in a manner giving the widest liberty to Cubans. It was characteristic of the Spanish Government to delay this notice until the President's message was, figuratively speaking, in the hands of the messenger bound to the Capitol. The delay showed conclusively that Spanish spies knew exactly what the President was doing, and, further, that the offer of the armistice was deliberately held back to the last moment in the hope that the offer would not be necessary. It recalls forcefully the time when Minister Daniel Sickles demanded the release of the Aspinvall, and the evasions of Sagasta, who was then, as in this year, Prime Minister; and how, when Sickles turned to leave, saying the United States would at once recognize the Cuban insurgents as belligerents, Sagasta called him back to say that the Cabinet had, on the day before, decided to release the ship. In fact, the Spanish offer of an armistice at this time, and under such circumstances, is a last proof of the utter insincerity of the Spanish Government in all the proposals it had made for the reformation of Cuban affairs. The offer of an armistice did not stop the message. If it had any influence, it was simply to rouse further indignation. McKinley had asked for authority "to use the military and naval forces of the United States as may 112 THE WAR MESSAGE be necessary" to establish a stable government in Cuba. Various measures were proposed in answer to this request, and several days were consumed in discussing them; bu t it was a time when the nation demanded patriots in place of politicians, and Congress, as a whole, answered the demand. There were just enough small men who persisted, as politicians, to emphasize the fact, manifest in our history since the adoption of our present Constitution, that when a real peril threatens us, our legislators, as representatives of the people, brush aside all petty affairs and considerations to face the emergency man-fashion. On April I8th all differences were compromised and a joint resolution passed that, after reciting briefly the evils that compelled action, declared: "That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent. "That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters. "That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual ser U THE WAR MESSAGE I13 vite uf LII Unitcued oiSt ilt: llt 1ilia 1 of e several States to such an extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect. "That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people." The vote in the House stood 3 0 to 6. This act was signed by the President at I 1.24 o'clock on Wednesday morning, April 20, I898. Notice of this was sent to the Spanish Minister, Sefor Polo y Bernabe, who requested and received his passports at once, and at 7.20 o'clock that night he left Washington. An ultimatum to Spain was despatched, but it was a mere formality. While McKinley was signing the joint resolution, Prime Minister Sagasta was making a speech to the Spanish Cortes, saying: "To crown all, they have tried to throw against us a most infamous calumny, which fills all Spaniards with the holiest indignation against the villany of those who try to take away from us our indisputable sovereign rights over a cherished piece of Spanish territory. Acts, not words, are required. Let the present children of Spain answer in the same manner our fathers did when they were also wronged." 114 THE WAR MESSAGE Our ultimatum reached Madrid by cable on the 20th, but the Spaniards refused to receive it. On the morning of the 2ist our Minister there, Stewart L. Woodford, was informed that "the diplomatic relations which formerly existed between the two countries" were ended, and at II.45 the affairs of our legation were turned over to Secretary Barclay, of the British Embassy. A few hours later Woodford and all the American officials were en route from the country, and although a formal declaration of war by our Congress and the Spanish Cortes was delayed a day or two,- the.first gun of the war was fired at 7.02 o'clock the next morning, Friday, April 22, I898. CHAPTER VIII FIRST SHOT OF THE WAR CAPTURE OF THE SPANISH MERCHANTMAN BUENAVENTURA BY THE GUN-BOAT NASHVILLHA-HIS FLAG HOISTED IN HONOR OF THE FINE AMERICAN SQUADRON BETRAYED HIM-OFFICIAL PROCLAMATION OF THE BLOCKADE OF CUBAN PORTS. THE honor of firing the first gun in the war with Spain belongs to our gun-boat-unsurpassed in her class-the Nashville, Captain Vashburn Maynard in command. The circumstances in connection with the event were entirely unexpected in the squadron, but were interesting enough for record here, aside from the fact that they were connected with the first open act of hostility against the Spanish flag. During the days between the President's message in connection with the report of the Manine Court and the signing of the Cuban joint resolutions, the men of the squadron assembled at Key XVest had been, as a whole, pessimists in all conversations regarding the possibility of war. If the truth be told, they wished that war might come. Doubtless there 1 5 EA ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ CL ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ IA CL I 1111 11...i.l ilti o i is loi i i lilO i ii NV1711, xv I ct t.i.... I Xluotlw d Nf t L hel X'uii ifi klb. Hi.it i 11*7 1t11 ( i i jiwt ' Cotinoh lb ffitlit 1ll toe JI5lh w lilt first o llX of thgeri reortstX.of Xu Ithe m ~Bt te.of 1di-7I tlIie 1 11 t''71 i7 ll 6 ft tselilM (311 toii i l iiii thiifidiifiti M 'tl iitei fo1 Bt fo Io t11e iX1ld 6l iif tithe riioii lg t It IlA t Iiiiii i LX 11 Meii iei l S nit l.^ W X Xg S4g Mlt t lii t 711iifoil XX 0t111. wil fee 1. 0 Lilti 7110.l of 1171 litt XX 71 lalo gl 1171 *t ttsl Ell.)gX HH l(X tel aX(lte -|| et 1I8 FIRST SHOT OF THE WAR the usual hour for going off to the ships came (5 o'clock) the pier at the naval station showed a degree of life and cheer that had not been known there since the Virginius affair. The despatch that came to Admiral Sampson contained the definite order to sail, and along with it was the following proclamation, which the ship's printer struck off in circular form during the afternoon for distribution among the vessels of the squadron: BLOCKADE OF CUBAN PORTS BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. A Proclamation. Whereas, By a joint resolution passed by the Congress, and approved April 20, I898, and communicated to the government of Spain, it was demanded that said government at once relinquish its authority and government in the Island of Cuba, and withdraw the land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and the President of the United States was directed and empowered to use the land and naval forces of the United States and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States to such extent as might be necessary to carry said resolution into effect; and Whereas, In carrying into effect said resolution the President of the United States deems it necessary to set on foot and maintain a blockade of the north coast of Cuba, including ports of said coast between Cardenas and Bahia Honda, and the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba, aforesaid, in pursuance of the laws of the United States and the laws of nations applicable to such cases. An efficient force will be posted so as to prevent the exit of vessels from the ports aforesaid. Any neutral vessel approaching any of said ports, or attempting to leave the same without notice or knowledge of the establishments of such blockade, will FIRST SHOT OF THE WAR ii9 be duly warned by the commander of the blockading force, who will endorse on her register the fact, and the date of such warning, where such endorsement was made, and if the same vessel shall again attempt to enter any blockaded port, she will be captured and sent to the nearest convenient port for such proceedings against her and her cargo, as prizes, as may be deemed advisable. Neutral vessels lying in any of said ports at the time of the establishment of such blockade will be allowed thirty days to issue therefrom. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States to be affixed. (SEAL.) Done at the City of Washington, this 22d day of April, A.D. I898, and of the independence of the United States the one hundred and twenty-second. WILLIAM MCKINLEY. By the President. JOHN SHERMAN, Secretary of State. But while this was evidence that war actually existed there was no stir on the fleet that night to betoken the events of the next day. The flags were hauled down at sunset; the anchor watches came on duty; the usual off-shore guard went out to patrol the sea beyond the flag-ship; the night was entirely calm as to the weather and without unusual event as to the shipping. At daylight the New York, the Iowa, and the Indiana were lying at anchor off Sand Key light. The guard-boats Detroit and Nashville were steaming slowly to and fro several miles away to the south, while the Castine, Newport, Machias and a naval tug ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~......... Ei~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~7 HOME~~~~~~~~~~...................... ~~ ~7 FIRST SHOT OF THE WAR 121 and the whole squadron headedi slowly away toward Havana. The first turn of the propellers in aggressive action was made as the sun appeared. It was a solemn momenteveryone there knew that it was so, and yet few, indeed, seemed to realize the full importance of what was going on. The ships had been stripped for action for weeks, and they had been painted to the neutral tint of lead. There was no hustling at the guns nor any blare of trumpet even-there was no new sign of war save only as the signal flags on the New York gave orders to the other ships. To add to the peacefulness of the scene, there were two or three merchant vessels at anchor in the roadstead, here and there a tiny fisherman from Key West went beating about, and a couple of yachts, employed as newspaper despatch-boats, were near at hand, while off on the western horizon was seen the smoke of a merchant steamer bound along the usual route through the Gulf Stream to the North Atlantic. By 7 o'clock this steam merchantman had arrived so near to the squadron that lookouts with good glasses could see she was a black-hulled craft with two masts, and a single smoke-stack, while on her deck was a cargo of lumber that gave her a noticeable list to port. Our lookouts regarded her with idle curiosity, 122 FIRST SOT P THE WR biut thi e oCditfti 6f t el i ii at t Ifai t i being flild I Rh Uiiiitiri for the " r iiviu6kia iii rad ii a:11 1 as1 ~ ~ ~ i ta rthe p y.the eye wand his t tin t hi UEtl i a le l I es lit ftI flltili0 y.11 i C 2 l d # 1 i# t iU t #i#l 11 01121 # Ii f pt# and _.S3#3_ |2l ajd ltit by to 1'121111 i tMtlIg~ 021cr110 A ll1e glailt 171 lolp it ikit~' ~;i tiO3;l 1iglI tiv iVh hIhe bd ftig came nten seli f mC t-if iTT966lt f d a " upid MsT i 1ye a11 W1 IntS Ugii iU S v t t'te fbl0 1 1101 fi S 1hting ii. 21 Admit or S llii iii f i222 111g i. did 1121 A g# t iSfidif 1111 21 sa n FIRST SHOT OF THE WAR 123 4 — -L -__1.... 'I 1 to the ydiu abuoe is nead, and while yet they were travelling to the yard, the helm of the Nashville was put hard over to port and she turned sharp off to cross the merchantman's bow. When barely a ship's length from the squadron line, Lieutenant Dillingham, her executive officer, ordered Gunner Patrick Mallia to fire a blank shot from the after gun (a fourinch rifle) on the port side of the ship. The puffing smoke, the splash of the wad a hundred yards away, and the roar of the discharge mystified the merchantman. " What kind of a manoeuvre are those warships going through that one should do that?" he said to himself, as he held on his way, but before his propeller had turned over a dozen times more the gun spurted flame and smoke again and this time something went screaming away across his bows, clipping wave-crests as it sped, until it finally tumbled and disappeared a half mile beyond his ship. There was no mistaking that. A solid shot had been fired across his bows, and he clawed the air in his haste to stop his engine and get his flag down. Running down close to the Spaniard the Nashville sent Ensign Thomas P. Magruder with a prize crew on board. They found that she was the Buenavenzuria, Captain Lazarraga, of Bilboa, Spain, bound from Pascagoula, Mississippi, to Rotterdam, with $20,000 worth r H H c 33 3; 5z :3:3 33 33 5:3 - 33 333:3 333 C 333 33 (3:33 333:3:3:3 (p:3 (3 (33333 33-3 33:35 33:3 3-3:3 FIRST SHOT OF THE WAR 125 themselves unable to realize fully the import of the movement of the squadron were roused to a full sense of what it meant by the sight of the Nashville's flashing guns, and the echoes of that shot, as they were carried by the cable around the world, told the most unwilling listener that war with Spain was actually begun. CHAPTER IX BRAVE WORK ALONG SHORE CUTTING CABLES WITHIN NINETY FEET OF THE BEACH AT CIENFUEGOS UNDER THE FIRE OF I,000 SPANISH SOLDIERSWOUNDED WHO SUFFERED IN SILENCE LEST GROANS UNNERVE THEIR SHIPMATES-THE WIN4SLOWY AT CARDENAS-A TORPEDOBOAT SENT TO CUT A GUN-BOAT FROM THE PIERS OF A WELLDEFENDED CITY-A TALE OF RARE HEROISM AND RESOURCEFULNESS-REMARKABLE TESTS OF COURAGE IN THE FACE OF SUPERIOR FORCES AFLOAT-RETURNING FIRE FROM THE SHORE -AT MATANZAS AND CABANAS. IN proclaiming a blockade of the Cuban ports it was manifestly the belief of President McKinley that Spain had been waiting for us to make an actual display of force that would satisfy her honor so that she could then say she had held out until she had to face a vastly superior force. The extent of Spanish ignorance of our power-the fact that they really expected to conquer us, was, on the whole, inconceivable on this side of the water. Many naval officers, however, scouted what was denominated the "peaceful blockade." An immediate assault upon Havana was what they wanted. In fact, 126 BRAVE WORK ALONG SHORE 127..l__1. r.ls. -.....piaiin us ari an dsaulL UI iavana wvere inaue by Sampson and distributed among our ship commanders. These plans would have been carried out, and with entire success, too, but for the fact that our army was insufficient in numbers. We had been dominated by the idea that a regular army of more than 25,000 men might subvert the liberty of the other sixty millions of the nation-that even that handful was aristocratic and dangerous! At any rate, our army legislation had been based on some such ideas. The truth is we did not have enough men to protect our forts from deterioration, let alone adequately defend them from foreign attack, and we had, therefore, to depend wholly on our navy for aggressive action, until we could recruit, equip, and train an army to hold such territory as our ships might capture. Meantime, the rainy season was at hand in Cuba -the season of fevers deadly to all unacclimated sojourners. Weyler, the former Captain-General, in an interview, expressed the belief, founded on hope, that we would effect a landing and that half our force would die of fever. In view of all of the conditions there was but one thing that we could do, and that was to blockade the coast and wait for the healthy season, with the chance, meantime, that the Spanish would send over the fleet that I28 BRAVE WORK ALONG SHORE had so long threatened us from the islands off the African coast. Leaving the Nashville to care for the Buenaventura, Admiral Sampson conducted his fleet across the narrow water to the coast of Cuba, that was sighted about 4 o'clock in the afternoon. The land-fall was made ten miles east of Havana. As the blue line of Cuban hills hardened into view, a steamer was seen heading to the east along shore, and the New York went in chase. In the course of an hour the stranger was captured, and found to be the merchant steamer Pedro, of Bilboa, Spain, bound from Havana to Sagua. The next morning at about io o'clock, while the ships were stretching out in a line along the coast toward Matanzas, looking for the Alfonso XI., that was due to arrive with i,ioo soldiers, a steamer was seen, coming from the east, by the Marblehead, Cincinnati, and New York, in the order named, and all three closed in on her. As they approached within range she began firing, but before we were ready to shoot at her, a keeneyed lookout had seen that she was saluting our Admiral instead of firing hostile shots, and the 'New York substituted blank cartridges for those she had already prepared to use. It was an Italian man-of-war, bound to Havana. Meantime our squadron had been divided BRAVE WORK ALONG SHORE 129 to cover ports having railroad communication with Havana, as follows: Off Havana:-New York, Iowa, Wilnington, Helena, Dolphin, Mayflower, Vesuvius, Ericsson, Porter, and such auxiliaries as may be designated. Off Mariel:-Nashville, Castine, and auxiliaries to be designated. o t Chart of Matanzas Bay. Off Matanzas:-Ampzhilrite, Cincinnati, Dupont, Winslow, and auxiliaries to be designated. Cardenas:-Newport, Machizas, Foote, Cushing, and auxiliaries to be designated. Indiana, Marblehead, Detroit, and Mangrove, a separate division for special work, and to blockade Cienfuegos. This list of blockaders must have special 130 BRAVE WORK ALONG SHORE consideration. They were to close Cuban ports for the time being against all comers, including merchant ships having a speed of perhaps fifteen knots, and yet there was the Amphitrite, with a speed at best of ten knots, and to her were added the Puritan and Terror, of a like speed. This is not to criticise the Admiral. He had to use the ships provided, and his disposition of them met the entire approval of all foreign critics who considered the matter. What is desired is to point out that we had to use our coast defence monitors for blockading foreign ports, because our naval policy had failed to provide for the emergency that was thrust upon us, and that what the navy eventually accomplished was done by the ability of men who were compelled to work with inadequate tools. Not only did we use monitors and battleships on the blockade, we started in with four torpedo-boats. Only those who understand that a blockader should be able. to live outside of the blockaded port for weeks without renewing its supplies of coal, can understand the absurdity of calling torpedo-boats efficient blockaders-torpedo-boats built solely for sprinting dashes by night, or through the smoke of battle, and wholly unable to carry coal or other supplies for blockade work. Nor is that all. It was not only that we IQ 0C0 m~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ HM A~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~................ 132 BRAVE WORK ALONG SHORE and staves. She was bound to Barcelona. The Catalina was captured by the Detroit the same morning to the westward of Havana. Meantime a number of small coasting schooners and sloops were taken. They were of no account as prizes, but the actions of the captured crews were instructive. These men, in most cases, had been enrolled in the Spanish naval reserve, and the papers in the vessels proved it. As their crews saw these proofs in our hands that they were naval men, they became instantly and utterly dejected. Their hopeless grief was so manifest that our officers who talked the language questioned them as to the cause, and in every case learned that they all expected to be shot to death. That prisoners of war might have their lives spared was something unbelievable to these Spanish naval reserves. Nor was it the ignorant schooner-men alone who were distressed in that fashion, for when a boat with a Spanish army lieutenant named Pedro Fernandez on board was taken, off Matanzas, a little later, the officer at once gave up all hope of life. Assurances that he was entirely safe did not quiet him, and it was not until he had had a good breakfast in the ward-room of the flag-ship and had been conducted about the vessel, that he might see her power and the discipline of her crew, and had seen the marines drilled on the quarter-deck, and, finally, BRAVE WORK ALONG SHORE I33 was told that lie was to be paroled and sent ashore, that he was fully convinced of the difference between our treatment of prisoners and that to which he had been accustomed. Those who know the volatile nature of his race may imagine how he then expressed his thanks and appreciation of the courtesies shown him. To give in detail the incidents of the capt: ure of the numerous vessels taken in the first two weeks of the war would weary the reader. The work of capturing the smaller vessels failed to incite any special interest in the squadron after the first day or so, but when the torpedo-boat Foote was fired on by the shore-batteries as she was scouting about the harbor of Matanzas, Admiral Sampson determined to reply, and the men heard the news with pleasure. It was a peaceful blockade in its way, but the squadron would resist fire from shore. At noon on Wednesday, April 27th, the New York, the Puritan, and the Cincinnati steamed slowly into the harbor of Matanzas. The harbor is a bay of the form of a short-legged sock, with its mouth opening to the north and the foot pointing inland south of west. It is about three miles wide at the coast-line between Sabanilla Point, on the west, and Cape Maya, on the east, and perhaps five miles deep. It narrows to two miles between Point Gorda and the mouth of Canlamar River, where it 134 BRAVE WORK ALONG SHORE turns to the west. The old fortress, Morrillo Castle, stands at the river-mouth, and new works had been erected at Point Gorda. New sand-batteries were also erected at Cape Maya and on the west side near Sabanilla. Our squadron steamed in from the west, and as soon as it came within range, the Spaniards near Sabanilla Point opened fire. The fort over at Cape Maya joined in immediately, and their guns and projectiles made the welkin, but nothing else, ring. The New York returned the fire of the Sabanilla battery, the Puritan steamed over and bombarded the battery on Cape Maya, while the Cincinnati joined the Xewz York. These were the first shots, of the war fired at shore-batteries. The firing began, at a range of about three miles, at one o'clock. In twenty minutes the range was reduced to one mile and a half, and the batteries on both sides were silenced. The last twelve-inch shot from the Puritan was seen to strike and explode right in a puff of smoke where the Spaniards had just fired a gun, and the next instant that gun rose end over and end out of the cloud. Both batteries were silenced, but the extent of the damage done on shore is not now known. Our ships were not touched. Because our squadron withdrew, the Spaniards claimed a great victory, and on the night following they held public meetings in Matan BRAVE WORK ALONG SHORE 135 zas to raise money for improving the forts. The speeches, as reported next day in the Havana La Lucha, were full of patriotism. One gray-hairedcitizen declared he had previously secured passage for Spain, but "as soon as I learned that the port was blockaded, I cancelled my engagement, knowing honor demanded remaining to repel the insolent invaders of our cherished rights." The subscriptions to the defence fund, which were taken up following that speech, aggregated almost $2,500 in silver. This subscription deserves mentioning in connection with one at Havana, that was also strengthened by the appearance of our warships. They started out to raise money there to build a four-million-dollar battle-ship as a small token of their loyalty, and with the aid of a benefit performance at the leading theatre succeeded in raising, it is said, $7,850. The relation between the sentiments expressed by the loyalists and the amounts subscribed is instructive. The next incident of the blockade to be recorded is interesting for what followed, as well as in itself. The Marblehead and the Nashville were on the Cienfuegos blockade when, on April 29th, the Argonata, a Spanish steamer in the coasting trade, came along. She had slipped past the blockaders off Havana at 136 BRAVE WORK ALONG SHORE night, but she was nabbed by the Nashville. There were a lot of passengers on board, including a colonel of the Third Spanish Cavalry, who was a relative c Weyler's; his first lieutenant, surgeon-major, seven other lieutenants, and ten privates. The soldiers were held as prisoners of war, while the women and children, with other noncombatants, were sent ashore near the mouth of the harbor. This done, the Argonala was sent to Key West under Ensign H. C. Kuenzli, while the Nashville steamed around to the rendezvous of the Havana portion of the blockaders to report to Admiral Sampson. As it happened the Nashville was unable to find the flag-ship at the usual rendezvous east of Havana, because Sampson had gone to Key West, unknown to the other ships. Captain Maynard went cruising to and fro looking for the Newz York for some time in vain, and then had the luck to see a stranger instead. The Nashville was heading to the east at 7 o'clock when the lookout reported a steamer's smoke a little on the starboard bow. It was not a clear morning, and some time elapsed before the stranger could be seen distinctly, but all at once, -as if she were emerging from a fog bank, the lookouts saw that she was a war-ship with white sides and a yellowish smoke-stack. No flag could be seen, but it was certain that here was BRAVE WORK ALONG SHORE 137 a cruiser of at least twice the weight of guns and twice as many men as the gun-boat Nashville carried, and what was more, she was heading straight toward Havana. There could be but one opinion regarding her. She must be a Spaniard bound to run the blockade. As she was still well beyond range, there was ample time for the little Nashville to turn and run back to get help from one of the vessels off Havana, but not a soul on her thought of doing any such thing. A signal flag at the fore, indicating that the Nashville was looking for the Admiral, came down on the.run; they hoisted the Stars and Stripes in its stead, while the call for quarters rang through the ship. Within three minutes from the moment that the stranger was seen to be a war-ship the Nashville's men were at their guns with their necks craned toward the other ship, while one gunner was so eager for the work that he caressed his weapon like a sweetheart as he leaned from the port to look ahead. After all, it was no enemy, but a very good friend instead-the British cruiser Talbot, that displaces 5,600 tons to the Nashville's I,3 7 -a ship more than four times the size of ours, and carrying a battery many times more powerful. It was a characteristic incident in the history of the blockade. The tug Osceola, armed with one six-pounder and a machine gun (called a li3s BRAV WORK ALONG S[OR 166614aiR 1E 1 Wig ww til w C IE Ul CuiUl iiddr couruinfifl of Ii Liito idilwt J i EI 13ll6 thcAtlt thd of~ aJ I f ated AlO 11 ci. &~lr (-peated I could uml.A d middl6 Io MO: 6 conucIudlhe that f;lh Wath Sjan t th aed oduing col oay hake to be afl It thice t of thae ack i ser w e ld hack to Ipe ad otf" ihi cou~cttc~ ymtott 5 orf/ci uat l hrf. MI dotN a si ti ito id ciii/c hA idottc' gildtou'o to utako a hplItd h pit~o to It And oIttaod _atu~dos of tho utott Itodd tto puahtt ott f tlto I d t k ad li. t b X X uX 151661xX.)3.w glikkkW 45 -MI M IL~~~~~~~~~ 4'2 140 BRAVE WORK ALONG SHORE was armed with several fourteen-pounders, after the manner of the Spanish Naval Reserve, while she was credited with a speed of from thirteen to fifteen knots. Now, of all the ships on guard at Havana, the least efficient in speed and guns was the lighthouse supply ship Mangrove. The very qualities that made her admirable as a supply ship were against her. as a blockader. She was very fat and comfortable, with a top speed of eight knots. But she had been selected as a good boat for cutting cables, and she had two six-pounders on her bows. Having put to sea in a hurry, her crew had not been supplied with small arms, save only as Lieutenant-Commander W. H. Everett, her captain, and his lieutenants carried swords. Nevertheless, at 8 o'clock on the night of April 25th, when the lights of the Panama loomed out of the darkness, Captain Everett swung the Mangrove across her bow, and with a couple of shots brought her to. Then he borrowed a revolver, the private property of one of her crew, with which to arm Ensign Dayton, whom he sent as boarding officer. It is not uninteresting to note here, as illustrating how the hopes of prize-money faded, that the Panama was supposed to be worth some hundreds of thousands of dollars when she was captured. When she was sold she BRAVE WORK ALONG SHORE J41 brought $41,ooo, and this had to be divided with the Indiana, that came to supply a prizecrew after the Mangrove had held the Spaniard. As a matter of fact, the great majority of our naval officers would be glad to have the dividing of prize-money abolished in order to substitute some system of rewards like the giving of medals, or special rank, for notable services. They are of the " strange people," mentioned by Ruskin, " who have other loves than those of wealth and other interests than those of commerce." On the whole the story of the blockade during the first two weeks xwas, from a navy man's point of view, fairly interesting, even though there was nothing like a real naval battle. WVe had shut off the commerce of the island and had given the Spaniards a couple of tastes of Yankee shells. We had also cut out the cable leading from Havana to Key West, as a first step toward isolating Captain-General Blanco from Madrid. As a next step in this last work it was proposed to cut the three cables leading from Cienfuegos to Santiago de Cuba and thence to Jamaica and Hayti. The Marblehead, Captain B. H. McCalla, had been on the Cienfuegos blockading station for three weeks, while the Nashville, Captain Maynard, and the revenue cutter Windom, Captain S. E. McGuire, had come to assist, when on the Ioth of 142 BRAVE WORK ALONG SHORE May it was decided to cut the cables. The cable landing had been located by the little cable-house on the beach. Because of the shoal water inshore it was necessary to go in with several ordinary cutters (row boats) and two steam-launches to do the work, but the ships stood by to cover the party as well as might be. Lieutenant C. M. Winslow was placed in command, with Lieutenant E. A. Anderson to assist, and volunteers were called for among the men, because of the great danger attending the work. At the call the entire force of all the ships volunteered, and selection had to be made from men who crowded and bulldozed each other in their anxiety to get to the front. After the beach with the thick brush back of it had been well shelled, the boats all ran in until within about two hundred feet of the sand, where the two launches stopped, and the row-boats went on until ninety feet from shore, where they were covered as well as possible by one-pounders on the launches. The Spanish had fled from the fire of the ships, but they came back when that was stopped-came at the end, a thousand strong, to low earthworks concealed in the brush, and armed with machine guns and one-pounders. Our launches opened fire on them, while our men in the cutters began fishing for the cables BRAVE WORK ALONG SHORE 143 lying oni te; sand in tII shoalll vat1rs. But IL was slow work getting hold of the cables, and slower still getting them up across the cutters where pieces could be chopped from them, and the Spaniards were gaining courage every minute. The fire from shore began at long range, but the range was decreased, and the rapidity increased as our work progressed. For a time their fire was wild, but by the time we had taken a length from one of the cables they had obtained the range. Finally one of the men at the oars was struck, but he held his place, and no one knew it until he fell in a faint. Then his mates saw a great pool of blood just under his thwart. He had been sitting there in silence bleeding to death, rather than risk alarming his mates by saying he was hurt. A few moments later another fell in like fashion, and then another and another. Not a man cried out, nor did any one even so much as wince, save as the blows of the shot made them shiver for an instant. Even when Herman W. Kuchneister, a marine, was shot through the jaw in a way to mutilate the lower part of his face frightfully, he did not so much as groan. For two hours and a half the men grappled and tugged and cut, under the fire of the Spaniards, who were lying behind breastworks and 144 BRAVE WORK ALONG SHORE concealed in the brush. Our ships were powerless to defend, because our men were within thirty yards of the beach, and the guns of the launches were inadequate to the work. The Spaniards were rapidly increasing in numbers, and at the last it was estimated that a thousand of them were furiously pumping their Mausers at our boats. The water about the cutters was splashed as in a tropical rain-storm, and Lieutenant Winslow, having cut two of the cables, reluctantly left the third, and took his men out of range. Then the Windom went in to avenge our losses. The Spaniards fled to a nearby lighthouse for shelter, but found it a hot corner. A four-inch shell toppled it over, and sent them in a wild cross-country race. The official report gave our loss as one killed -Patrick Regan-with two-H. W. Kuchneister and Ernest Suntzenich, mortally wounded, and six others, H. Henrickson, John J. Doran, John Davis, Robert Valz, William Levery, and Lieutenant Winslow were hurt more or less. Only one of the wounded died, however, and there were two others very slightly wounded. Winslow is a son of the Winslow who commanded the Kearsarge when she sank the Alabama. That was the first time in this war that our BRAVE WORK ALONG SHORE I45 mlen were under a fire that drew blood. It was the first time that any man in the expedition had ever been under an enemy's fire, good or bad. The commander's report very truthfully said that they behaved with "the utmost coolness and intrepidity." Veterans never behaved better. That was off Cienfuegos during the forenoon of May 1, I898. In the afternoon of the same day our men, with equal coolness, faced bloodier disaster at Cardenas. The Machias, under Commander John F. Merry, the Wilmi7ngton, under Commander Chapman C. Todd, the torpedo-boat Winslow, under Lieutenant John B. Bernadou, with the revenue cutter Hudson, under Lieutenant F. H. Newcomb, had been guarding the coast from Matanzas to Cardenas for some time, the rendezvous being off the mouth of Cardenas Bay. They had learned that three small Spanish gun-boats were lying at the piers in Cardenas, and the one question most considered by our crews, was how to get those vessels out for a fight. Under the circumstances the question was not easily answered. Cardenas Bay is simply a great shoal-water lagoon, say twenty-five miles long and six broad, that is shut off from the sea by a long peninsula on the west, and innumerable islands in an irregular chain. The 146 BRAVE WORK ALONG SHORE main channel has but ten and one-half feet of water in it at one place, and but fifteen feet in several miles of its course. So long as the Spaniards remained at the piers they were Chart of Cardenas Bay. fairly safe, because of the greater draught of the American boats and the intricacies of the channel, which was also mined. However, the torpedo-boat Foote had been used with success to draw the fire of shore batteries at Matanzas, and Commander Merry, BRAVE WORK ALONG SHORE I47 as senLior CCIcl, o tn vMay 9tn, sent the Winslow into Cardenas Bay to see what effect her presence would have on the gun-boats there. Dashing across the shoals until within a mile or so of the town, Captain Bernadou opened fire with his little one-pounders. The Machias followed to the chain of islands where the water shoals, and there awaited developments. The fire of the Winslow's onepounders, it may be said in anticipation of what is to be told of torpedo-boats farther on, was not especially effective against either the gun-boats or a shore battery near the town, while her torpedoes were entirely useless against the shore battery. However, she did exasperate the crew of a gun-boat until it steamed out in chase of her. Retreating slowly, the Winslow enticed the gun-boat out until within long range of the Machias. The men of the Machias were so eager that they couldn't wait longer, and the first round having landed a six-pound shell on the Spaniard, it made its best speed back to the piers. A channel mine was exploded near the Winslow, but no damage was done. On the morning of the IIth, a channel not often used was sounded out, and at i o'clock in the afternoon, the Wilmington, the Winslow and the Hudson passed this and steered up the bay toward the city, the Winslow leading r 1c o aa64 af bar Moml disught. On d ing within a iilc and i half of thu phesi the I I'i/miugloa istppdg and iwiudr to i adu t tit atie aof tdi Spanish a116 fuilly tiflrstand thu puiIl that tMu f'/W was ia f*d h Mhould hI Ii[ffidamn | l 1- ehuird ithat shce was hih~ af ito tit ea Maur rile ithe M NiMU v can peneff that t * c afftiriJa6 was hiftlf aind cluar that shc had to run toWard thu sun with the suns raM in the coy uf hc mnci that the ihtnc he wag t run wags a i and a half that hN Was ti cut out a guniAt tuil ith Barr Gnob tItn Wir and dulutaludd lnt aily bhy its ruw y ht Eiy thie druw of twa athdr gunoUats, nat In tauntian thiu lide farsus and that htur prey was tid up at the Pis aof a ity of f tlntigwlld hauses hlhiid whiuhfi tihu shar sliaters m wtIdd hIvu purfut Jrituijtli Nuurt Iftuluss, hlkrnadaitfand his twa OWNr fullt draucf thu U! /As/Z uhAd ffharI lf a fiijlk t mac wit hut i.iii and ali fauni ti if ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o reel f'csuut wlfing hut wt liiis af i tIe Wr d hurags that Wr hahblhiii aon the waves The 1htus seinud to be thcr to mark i cliannul thu itn L A1at~- t. for a towilwd btuty t he aW d ofE ithe i) ft p 6 d fire With ane accuacy that Th tilF . xr aa x xi n i grooup. 16ifaihagh lix Stapx ilad 'ri' it li't fifidi' Ian th e of1tf a ir ra fhi. S tire iihiafrCe tat in the ax af ahe i iey oirrxi iix tyia igal i'ad at it i d k ga~e l t((e CuX~ltN at t-e SSal|St t~aterlI I52 BRAVE WORK ALONG SHORE with his arms around it. Another man, crying, " Save me! Save me!" tumbled overboard, but was caught and hauled back. A half-dozen more were knocked about the narrow deck. And then came the Hudson to the rescue. She was a mere tug in size and model, and the fire of the Spaniards became, for the moment, more furious as they saw that they had made another accurate shot, but Captain Newcomb brought his vessel within reach, and Lieutenant H. Scott threw a tow-line to the Winslow. When it was fast the Hudson started away as deliberately as if she had hold of a lighter in New York Bay. The line parted, cut by a shot, it is supposed, but Newcomb made fast again, this time alongside the disabled craft, and towed her clear, while the Wilmington shot the Spanish gun-boats and battery to pieces, and fired the town with her shells. What losses were sustained ashore have never been definitely reported. Our own included Ensign Worth Bagley, John Barberes, oiler, G. Deneefe and George B. Meek, firemen, and E. B. Tunnell, cook, killed. The wounded were Lieutenant J. B. Bernadou, and William Patterson and Daniel McKeoun, seamen. The Winslow went to Key West under her own steam, and was repaired in a few weeks. BRAVE WORK ALONG SHORE 153 Bernadou was back in command after a brief sojourn in the hospital. It is a remarkable fact that nearly one-third the lives lost afloat in the war with Spain were destroyed by that one shell at Cardenas, while the lives lost in the two fights on that "bloody i th"-six-exceeded all other naval losses afloat or ashore throughout the war, excepting those of the marines at Guantanamo, who also lost six. Stirring as were the incidents of that fight at Cardenas one very significant fact-perhaps the most significant of the story-remains to be told. Bernadou, who was so cool and resourceful, has been conspicuous in the service as a student. As a linguist, he has translated a number of foreign naval papers for the use of our service. He has been an original contributor also to our naval literature, and at the same time has held a leading place as an expert in the manufacture of smokeless powder. It may surprise some to find what rule-o'-thumb sailors call " scientists" making such a record in battle, but the whole story of this war is full of such records. In fact, culture has made our officers at once physically braver and mentally more resourceful instead of enervating them. CHAPTER X DEWEY AT MANILA GOOD WORK OF THE RALTIMORE'S MEN AIDED BY THE BRITISH IN HONG KONG-PRECAUTIONS ON THE WAY TO MANILA-A NIGHT ATTACK ON OUR SQUADRON-THE SCENE AT DAWN-WHEN MONTOJO BECAME DESPERATE-WRETCHED USE OF MINES AND TORPEDO-BOATS-A STRIKING EXHIBIT OF THE REPOSE OF CONSCIOUS POWER-CHRISTENING OF THE BABY BATTLE-SHIP -SPANISH VIEWS OF THE CONFLICT. WE began our preparations for war in the hope that no more than a demonstration on the coast of Cuba would be needed to secure peace for that unfortunate island, but we were quickly driven by Spanish resistance into a conflict that flamed on opposite sides of the earth. Looking ahead to the growing warcloud, the Navy Department had ordered the Balltinore, near the middle of April, to leave Yokohama and join Commodore George Dewey at Hong Kong, with a view of sending the entire Asiatic squadron (except the antiquated Monocacy) thence to Manila. The Baltimore was commanded by Captain Nehemiah M. Dyer and Lieutenant-Commander 154 DEWEY AT MANILA I55 Gottfried Blocklinger was his executive officer. The ship reached Hong Kong on that Friday morning (April 22d) when Sampson led his squadron from Key West, and the echo of the Nashville's gun in capturing the Buzenaaventzfra was heard in Commodore Dewey's cabin on the Olympia in Hong Kong harbor. The capture of the merchant ship was an act of war that would travel like a tidal wave to break in blood on the beach at far Manila. There was need of the Baltzinore for instant service, and here she was in Hong Kong, but unfortunately foul-bottomed and short of coal and other supplies. To the dry-dock, therefore, Dewey sent her, and her captain and executive officer were the men for the hour; moreover, she was in a British port. Rarely in the history of navies has such swift work been done. At the end of forty-eight hours she had been docked, cleaned, painted, and floated again, and every needed article taken on board. That was accomplished by Sunday, April 24th, and it was remarkably lucky so, for on that day the Spanish Government issued its formal decree, declaring that war existed with the United States, and in consequence of the notice thereof which was telegraphed to neutral governments, the Governor of Hong Kong, as the representative of Her Majesty's Government, was obliged / i56 DEWEY AT MANILA to notify the belligerent Dewey to leave tne harbor. Under the rule, Dewey was allowed twentyfour hours in which to leave, but at 2 o'clock that afternoon the war-ships Boston, Captain Frank Wildes; the Concord, Captain Asa Walker, and the Petrel, Captain Edward P. Wood, sailed away. With them went the revenue cutter, Huegh McCulloch, Captain Daniel B. Hodgsdon (of the revenue service), which was assigned to despatch-boat service, and two transports, the Nanshau and Zafiro, which had recently been secured by Commodore Dewey with 3,600 tons of coal, and six months' supplies for the squadron between them. At io o'clock on Monday the' flag-ship Olympia, Captain Charles V. Gridley, followed by the Baltimore and the Raleigh, Captain Joseph B. Coghlan, sailed away also. Of the temper of the people our squadron left in Hong Kong, Gunner Joel C. Evans, of the Boston wrote (see Century for August, 898): "When we were leaving port for Manila the captain of the Immortalitd (British) shouted to Captain Wildes: 'You will surely win. I have seen too much of your target practice to doubt it."' Evans adds, "I believe the Russian, German, and French naval officers thought Spain would conquer." Uniting his forces at Mirs Bay, in Chinese lllllali1lall1lillllli1lillillilli r r iia biS i c irsli r r "i trJ P " 9s ~~ " i a D r~~,, f ii*irirULii I "* ";Lir. 1~-*11 r*ri II Ilclrl as I D " '" rri 1118 ri E " f " m I"%X"" ; all, ) J( IrS ri; - r 1 I if"i ~;; ~ii ~-~ P". Bn '"i c-is17 ~I 1xx, I" i~ 61xii I ji lr" i ~iii i~9~ rl;tsnir;: i ~~rr~rnri;rr. ~- pl ji; sisrnrxii~ I *lrl c -i rr k ii EEL 9 ji 11/ " rxlr issi jBPIIIABPI 1 iaa, F1" """" ~Irrl a Fiiiiri '4"? ipi jri "I I"" . *rrii C- w i pPI LIIII r~~~ i j ir i" "" :"" LL i... r" iV1 ~ i. "I ~~ iu Z-r " "511 _ p Mt CI (Y * - *i ~ "XI" Ci " 'i 1 lr ssi -~r IIBijl rIa~S*i ~d —i i r r I Id r 3~sr i~I irii c hj i~ "I adxr 1211 iri; i ~I rs, - V"j "' 1 31 " It rrr:ci rrt~ Wr I"uhi -~ ;xI? iz i~~ *x, ~21"/ i~a ru CCi " I ~ iJ1 i ~ " *- i 'U islr j-r r lirri llrr rrU "1"" ii t IJ xriirs ~irr is rj ii "" "-"" c 158 DEWEY AT MANILA tojo, was to come out to destroy the American squadron on the open sea. Dewey was in search of the Spanish squadron, and by making his landfall on the coast of Luzon in the morning he would have a Whole day for running down the coast, and so be in no danger of leaving the Spaniard concealed in some place behind him. The wisdom of so doing is apparent, even to a landsman who examines the chart of the island, for there are several hiding-places on the coast, Subig Bay, thirty miles north of Manila Bay, being especially adapted for what may be called a nautical ambush. Some preparations for a battle were made before leaving Hong Kong. The ships were painted lead color, for one thing, and some of the boats were swathed in canvas, and nettings were stretched to stop splinters. Moreover, the ammunition-tubes were armored, as far as possible, by winding chain cables around them. On the way over, the men, with few exceptions, had their hair cut close to their heads, both for the sake of coolness in a hot climate and to facilitate the work of the surgeon in dressing probable scalp wounds. Now that they were on the coast the crew went to work with axes on the woodwork of the ships. Cabin partitions were cut away, and with doors, trunks, chests, curios-everything that could throw a splinter when struck by a shot-was cast over I DEWEY AT MANILA 159 board, until the sea r..as strcwn for miles with the dgbris of beautiful and useful woodwork. Meantime, on finding the north coast clear, the Boston and the Concord were sent ahead at full speed to examine Subig Bay, and before thev/ re-ouTf sight the Baltimore was sent -support them in case the Spaniards should c1be there, but at 5 o'clock our entire squadron was in the bay and no enemy had been seen. Now, it was well known to Commodore Dewey that a telegraph station stood on Point Bolinao and that his presence on the coast had been known by the Spanish at Manila ever since his arrival. In order to fully appreciate what was done next it is necessary to consider the lay of the land in connection with this fact that the Spanish were not to be taken unawares. A look at the chart shows that Luzon Island lies north and south, as to its length, and that Manila Bay is roughly a four-sided body of water projecting inland from the southwest corner of the island. The mouth of the bay is about six miles wide. One mile off shore from the north point lies Corregidor Island, and the. water between this island and the south point is perhaps five miles wide. Now, Corregidor Island is a considerable body of land and, moreover, it rises six hundred feet above the sea. On its crest a battery of eight-inch mod I I60 DEWEY AT MANILA ern Krupp guns had been erected, while the south point of the bay was guarded by a similar battery erected on El Fraile Island, which lies perhaps a half mile from the beach. If well handled these guns might sink the best battleship afloat, the guns on Corregidor being especially well placed to deliver a plunging fire. Nor was that all, for reports said that the Spaniards had filled the channel with fields of torpedoes. Somewhere behind these formidable works lay the Spanish squadron, its officers waiting with guns loaded, no doubt, for the Yankees to come-the Yankees whose protected decks ranged fromnfour and three-quarter inches thick on the Olympia, down to three-quarters of an inch on the Concord. It was a battle-ship job to hunt that Spanish squadron, and Dewey had not one armored ship, properly so called, to aid him, but he had a plenty of Harveyized grit in his own heart and among his crews, and he thought that might serve instead of battle-ships. Calling his captains on board the flag-ship in Subig Bay, he gave them their orders, and then, at 6 o'clock, led the way down the coast at a speed that would bring him into the mouth of the wide channel of Manila Bay at midnight precisely. The other ships followed each other, with a hooded light on the taffrail of each for a guide to the one behind, the revenue cutter DEWEY AT MANILA 16I and the transports bringing up the rear of the war-ship line. In perfect silence the squadron drifted along through the night in a course almost due south until well below Corregidor Island, and then turned to the east and north, straight into the bay. The heights of the Spanish island loomed like a mountain in the night, but not a sign of alarm was seen there as the squadron turned into the bay until the firemen on the revenue cutter, just as she was turning, were obliged to stoke her fires. At that a blaze of flame and a shower of sparks arose from her funnel, for she was using the inflammable Japanese coal, and the sentries on the island saw the flare. A moment later they sent a rocket worming its way into the sky. An answering rocket arose from El Fraile instantly, while signal lights flashed for miles along the south shore of the bay. Then the quick flash of a great gun was seen on El Fraile, and a big shell with a roaring scream came hunting our ships. Instantly the Boston returned the fire with an eight-inch shell, "just to tell them they had seen us, surely," as Gunner Evans said, while the Concord fired two of her six-inch guns, and the McCulloch, which carried a few six-pounders, fired four times. That ended the firing on both sides, although the taffrail-lights must still have been within i62 DEWEY AT MANILA plain yiew of the forts. Thereafter the ships slowly worked their way up the bay, with most of the men sleeping beside their guns until day broke, when all hands were once more called to duty, and hard bread, cold meat, and coffee were served to them as a morning " snack." Chart of Manila Bay. The squadron at break of day lay seven miles due west from Manila city (see chart), and perhaps an equal distance northwest of the little sandy hook, marked Cavite-a sandy hook which partly encloses a small bight in the coast where were lying the ships of the Span DEWEY AT MANILA x63 ish Admiral stretched out in a line that began behind the hook and led away toward Manila city for nearly a mile. Not a Spanish ship had steam up-why should a Spanish admiral doubt the ability of the men in the forts down the bay to stop any Yankee squadron? Moreover, there were the forts on Cavite Point with their beautiful Krupp rifles to aid the Spanish ships, as well as guard the naval arsenal behind them, while over to the east, seven miles away, on the outskirts of Manila, were still other forts with Krupp guns, and the Yankee squadron must needs get within their range if a fight were really intended. The Yankees had passed the forts below, without doubt, but It was Sunday morning, May i, I898. At 5.I5 o'clock precisely the Spaniards opened fire with a big gun in a Manila city fort. Our sailors saw a huge puff of smoke and then a big projectile dropped into the water a mile or so from the flag-ship Olympia. At this time Commodore Dewey was standing on the Olympia's bridge, while Fleet-Captain Benjamin P. Lamberton, Flag-Lieutenant Thomas M. Brumby, Executive Officer Corwin P. Rees, and the Navigator-Lieutenant C. G. Calkins were with him. Captain Gridley was obliged to go into the armored conning tower, lest a chance shell sweep the bridge and leave 164 DEWEY AT MANILA the ship without an officer of high rank. The men had already cleared away the dishes used in their light repast and had returned to their guns. The air was motionless and the sea a perfect level. The rose light of dawn had suffused the eastern sky, but a faint haze in the dead air curtained off the Spaniards in the little harbor at Cavite, so that they were wholly invisible. But Dewey knew they were there (ten fighting ships besides transports and two torpedo-boats), and hoisting the old flag to fore and main peaks and the spanker-gaff or taffrail staff of every ship, he left the transports with the McCulloch in the middle of the bay, headed the Olympia off toward the northerly end of the bay, swung her around in a wide arc toward Manila on the east, and with his fighting squadron following him with the precision of a tow on the great lakes, he steamed straight at his anchored prey. A signal at the yard-arm read, "Fire as convenient." While yet he was several miles away the Spanish squadron appeared with colors up, and the fierce little gunners in the Cavite forts began to fire their big guns. The Spanish ships soon joined in, but Dewey held on his way into that hail of steel without reply, while his crews at their guns, "with set teeth and the smile that one sees so often on the faces of ROM.................................. MIN................................................................ HEM r I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I DEWEY AT MANILA i67 men in the prize ring," awaited the word in silence. At last, when a little more than two miles away from forts and anchored squadron, the Olympia swerved to the right (west), so as to pass the Spaniards broadside to broadside, and then, turning to the captain of the ship, Dewey said, quietly: "When you are ready, you may fire, Gridley," and Gridley passed the order to the eager gunners in the Olympia's forward turret. The two long eight-inch rifles there were already trained on the Spanish flag-ship, and as the order was heard they made quick reply. Two darting flashes in the midst of a rolling cloud of smoke were seen, and with a shivering roar the projectiles were hurled at the doomed Spaniards. "Almost instantly-it seemed like an echo -came the sound of the guns of the other ships" of the Yankee squadron. It was at exactly 5.35 o'clock that the first guns on the Olympia were fired. Our ships were slowed down as they approached the Spaniards to give our gunners a better chance. The headway was just about right to carry the guns of the leader clear of the smoke they made, and seeing this, and that the Yankees were now well within range, the Spaniards worked their guns with redoubled fury. To the crews of the transports 168 DEWEY AT MANILA it seemed that "never did spectators watch a more desperate game." The water on every side of our ships was cut and slashed into foam and spray, while the guns at Manila reached out to fill the air about the transports, as well as the fighting ships, with screaming shot. Passing the anchored squadron at a range of a mile and a half, Dewey led his ships in front of the forts on Cavite Point, and then turning slowly about, went back at them with the fresh batteries to starboard. He had given the Spaniards such punishment as they had never dreamed of, but they were fighting with the desperation of cornered cats, and their fire seemed undiminished. Indeed, as our squadron drew near once more, a huge mine-field was exploded a thousand yards or so in advance of the Olympia, and then, when it was seen that the mine had failed to do its work, the beautiful white flagship Reina Christina slipped her cable and came steaming out to meet the Olympia, rail against rail. Here, if ever, was uncircumspect valor-the clawing dash of the cat at the unrelenting bull-dog-but the guns of almost our entire squadron were turned upon her, and no flesh and blood could face the hell of bursting steel that was hurled upon her. Her sides were crushed in, her men melted away from their guns, and turning her about, Admiral Montojo her tYtu aaM " tel Ei A of the bf taut )nit iHet gar tla i'4tti c tc itidn tNd W tdAMEt.6 But as te eut ta r our s ofifid Wine of th e gande in titt i a X& aX faitfan itl tiat to I a an di I ti r tan eIlhtat taWilr t ti toie d A i it a a ekho Siits tE a ig pth dI tati a_ a1xt1 ta t at I it t tir t the tts X att at da at ) ai ta aa t. X ble k iiffi e d s iireXf tat Lt o taen aa td d 're>d Ifiat d tat' taltt tatfh ta ttid odi eie f to tX atetif l \lita tt O tt'aaide at tt tWin ttita taunt, oLL af tatta y Ittat' iatlt ax l nat I gti n li:dn, ian t t o g o lo tie in Oin. rtti. I1 tr t t a i tirh t at' rio tetA tat) KattttN aax tat /ta its MEi A t. tiet t firentl Vi ta Itgat in a te t l i, gatt ijim t tA) t~t As til ta a1at i~ a ta a aaftt fett I titHi Wttak ita aA ittatit afin a td tid s, ir e r-fi di fle! A. tatti ta I t ia I.~.'at L A ttn t 170 DEWEY AT MANILA ing at full speed, straight for the Olympia. Her large guns were turned upon them the moment they appeared, but without effect, for their speed was too great for such unwieldy weapons, and while yet our men were reloading the great guns, the torpedo-boats had arrived at a range of 800 yards. But there their careers ended. The lean secondary batteries-the murderous rapid-fire sixpounders-took up the fight, " the surface of the ocean burst into foam under the hail of shot" about the doomed boats, and then a cloud of white smoke or steam arose suddenly from the leader, and in an instant she sank out of sight. Whether her boiler was pierced or her torpedo exploded will never be known, for all hands on board of her perished. And when she sank her mate turned about and fled to the beach, where it was afterward found riddled, and splashed with blood. Steaming on to the east, our squadron turned back to pass the Spaniards a third time. They found the Don Antonio de U/loa in flames near the burning Spanish flag-ship, but her crew were still firing their guns. Her captain had nailed the blood and gold flag to the mast, and she sank under the renewed fire of our ships, with her colors flying, and her guns working till the sissing water entered their hot muzzles. Stripped naked to the waist, bare-headed and DEWEY AT MANILA I71 bare-footed, and with the perspiration streaking their smoke-grimed bodies, our men were working the guns with regularity and precision, while the enemy fought back in a frenzy. The Yankees laughed and cheered. The Spaniards sputtered and screamed. The Castillo was now spurting flames from every hatch. The Lombardic griffin was closing its claws about the poisonous dragon. Five times in all our ships steamed across the Spanish front. The tropical sun had come up in a cloudless sky to heat the dead air over the sea. For two hours our men with tense nerves had worked in the choking smoke about their guns, and in the magazines and the stoke-holes where the temperature varied from 116~ up to more than I50~. Even the brawniest of Yankee sailors could not stand that work for many hours and keep his work up to the highest quality. The Commodore, with his iron frame, was still fresh and fit, but he remembered his men. Why should he exhaust them utterly? He would stretch out and rest for a time, while the dragon writhed broken and pierced in the clutch of his claws. The signal to cease firing fluttered aloft on the Olympia, and then she led the way out beyond the range of the big guns and stopped. The crews from below came upon deck, gasping for air in some cases, but with one glance I72 DEWEY AT MANILA at the burning wrecks off Carite Point they forgot their trouble, and with their hands in the air, or clasping one another about the neck, they found breath to cheer and shout for the old flag above them. And then when they quieted down because their voices were failing them utterly, the boatswains' whistles screamed a welcome call to breakfast. As Dewey retired the Spanish governor of the island made haste to telegraph to Madrid: " Our fleet engaged the enemy in a brilliant combat, protected by the Cavite and Manila forts. They obliged the enemy with heavy loss to manoeuvre repeatedly." The firing that was continued from the forts long after Dewey was out of range was characteristic of the race as that despatch was, but their vivas as they saw our ships retire were choked with tears when they turned to look at their squadron. It was at 7.45 o'clock that the Olympia led the line of battle off to a resting-place, and for three hours the men stretched out on deck, eating another bit of cold comfort, talking of what they had seen and done, and in many cases sleeping comfortably to make up for what they had lost the night before. At 10.45 the Commodore concluded that it was time to finish the morning's work, and sent the Baltimore in to renew the fight. WIN~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~...........i~~':;l:"III~:s~~~..................~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~,ii................................................. ~ ~ ~ ~.......................... ~ ~ ~,ii........... H ~.u..............~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~,:............ CL~~~~~~~~~~~;;........... ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~d 0 7.27. s5/ -- - ^ ~~ I I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ a a~~~~~ DEWEY AT MANILA 175 A refreshing breeze hlad come by this time, and with a lengthening cloud of smoke pouring from her funnels, the Baltimore ploughed through the dancing waves toward Cavite Point, making a magnificent picture in the eyes of the men on the other ships. So dense, indeed, was her aerial wake that she disappeared from their view, but in a few minutes (it was at II.I6 o'clock) the ringing reports of her guns told the story of her arrival within range. Then the Olymnpia and the Concord went in to help her. After a little time the Boston, the Raleigh, and the Petrel came to take their places, and the two divisions thus formed in our squadron alternated in the attack. Nor was this the only change made in the tactics. In the morning the ships in one long line had steamed to and fro across the enemy's front, but now the ships ran in until a mile and a half from the forts, stopped, took the range carefully and then opened a fire so deadly that almost every shot struck home. The morning's fight had been directed chiefly at the Spanish ships, but now the Commodore was determined to reduce the fort. At the range taken even our six-pounders were available-not that they could penetrate a sand fort, but they could hurl their vicious projectiles through the embrasures and drive the Spaniards from the guns there, while our big 176 DEWEY AT MANILA projectiles came to dismount the guns and destroy the works on every side. However, the remaining vessels of the Spanish squadron were by no means ignored. Their flag-ship had been already destroyed, and the hulks of three others were blazing as the second part of the battle began; but the smaller vessels- especially the gun-boats-were still making a fight, hopeless though it must have seemed to their crews. They had one slight advantage in this, that the water about Cavite Point was too shoal for our cruisers, and seeing this, Captain Wood, of the little gun-boat Petrel, steamed boldly in where our cruisers could not go. He carried but four six-inch guns, two on a side, and they were of the old slow-firing style at that, but he proved the Roman dictum, that a short sword would serve when close to the enemy. The Petrel was named the Baby Battle-ship for her effective work in Cavite harbor. Ship after ship was set on fire or driven ashore by her close-range fire. In one case a Spaniard hauled down his flag, and a boat was sent from the Petrel to bring the vessel out of the little harbor. But before the boat had covered a third of the distance, the treacherous devils opened fire on it. Exasperated by the infamy, the boat's crew returned on board and a fire was directed at that vessel that sank her with all on board. ............~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1..1............~ ~ ~ ~~............ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~1 MEE~~~~~~~~~~~~~~lli.......................... S S S SHE ~ ~ ~............~................~; ~.......... ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ir~rn;~l ~~ ~ ~ s............~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1.......................................~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~T.............~..........iB I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I I DEWEY AT MhANIILA 179 -L It fV JllilluutsL tlLt 12 OtcIUK ile nosIon got so far in shore that her stern dragged into the bottom of the bay, and for a time it held her fast; but while steadied by the mud, Gunner Evans declares (see Century for August) that her forward eight-inch gun dismounted three guns in the Spanish fort, and those three were the only ones left in commission when she grounded. For an hour and a half- from i. 16 A.M. until I2.30 P.M. (see Dewey's report)-the Spaniards sustained the slaughter afloat and ashore, and then their blood and gold banner gave place to one of white. The signal "cease firing" was spread on the Olymnpia, and as the smoke of battle drifted off down the bay, our squadron made the welkin ring with their cheers of victory. The Olympia and one or two others had drawn off before that event, leaving the Petrel to complete the work in the harbor, and the Boston to that outside. "The Spanish lost the following vessels: Sunk, Reina Christina, Castillo, Don Antonio de Ulloa, burned, Don Juan de A ustria, Isla de Luzon, Isla de Cuba, General Lezo, Marquis del Duero, El Correo, Velasco, and Isla de Mindanao (transport); captured, Rapido and Hercules (tugs), and several small launches," says Dewey's report. And to this he adds: "I beg to state to the department that I doubt - ------------------- - ---................. - - --- ------ - - - - - ---- MM a~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1 tit~~~~~~~~~~~~C C C)C) C)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ DEWEY AT MANILA I81 efficient aid. Lieutenant Brumby, Flag-Lieutenant, and Ensign E. P. Scott, aide, performed their duties as signal officers in a highly creditable manner. Caldwell, Flag-Secretary, volunteered for and was assigned to a subdivision of a five-inch battery. Mr. J. L. Stickney, formerly an officer in the United States Navy, and now correspondent for the New York Herald, vol- unteered for duty as my aide, and rendered valuable service. I desire specially to mention the coolness of Lieutenant C. G. Calkins, the navigator of the Olympia, who came under my personal observation, being on the bridge with me throughout the entire action, and giving the ranges to the guns with an accuracy that was proven by the excellence of the firing." To compare our squadron with that of the Spaniards only is entirely unfair to our sailors, for the Spanish squadron, though inferior to ours, was protected by the great guns of the Cavite forts and those of the forts at Manila which were just seven miles away. Some of the guns were eight-inch and some ten-inch Krupps having a muzzle energy according to Brassey's " Annual," of 14,050 tons-a gun that is about twice as powerful as the best on Dewey's ships, the eight-inch guns of the Olympia having a muzzle energy of 7,498 tons. The exact number of the guns in the Spanish forts has not been given in any of the reports from our apfetard iin ti l asaiers tnn a ti n 6 fnili But if Wd irofa rt lit lIn i 6i~4ittldc i li loill did nsrt Wifliii range ef diii sIihri btttdfito for ii fitidt1ht ligr of lighte ig it but r tifius din I * rl aw gI iaUnt euinn l ie On*ifit ht Ign sit tchlTt?i - l eiuu uttatitt tat te gli alit l um t r Dt s tuas coffithidU But we kirrhir flidd ordid " gorrili iMCtit nus "of a I it illtidthdjim any on our s aips," it ('itin ilunds Mid that nur ships L_ DEWEY AT MANILA I83 were within easy range of these guns during the entire fight. It is certain that in weight and physical power of guns there was no superiority on our side, while the-Spaniards had the advantage in the solid platform of their fort guns. However, here is a table giving the list of the Spanish ships, with the number of men and guns, as reported by Brassey's "Annual," an unbiassed British work printed before the war: THE SPANISH SQUADRON. Vessel. Class. Tons. U. I i ______ _ I L1 ~ ~ ~~I Reina Mlaria Christina. Castillo..... Don A ntonio de Ulloa. Don Juan de A ustria. Velasco..... Isla de LuIsla de Cuba. General Lezo. Elcano..... Mfarquis del Duero. Isla del Alindanao. Steel cruis- 3,970 er. W o o d e n 3,342 cruiser. Cruiser... I I, 30 Cruiser.. I1,130 Cruiser... 1,152 280 246 210 210 210 200 200 157 '57 x57 Q Z Armament U 370 Six 6.2-inch (Hontoria), two 2.7 -inch, three 2.2-inch quick-firing, two I.5-inch, six 3-pounders, two muzzle-loaders. 300 Four 5.9-inch (Krupp), two 4.7 -inch, two 3.3-inch, four 2.9-inch, eight quick-firing, two muzzleloaders. 130 Four 4.7-inch (Hontoria), two 2.7 -inch, two quick-firing, five muzzleloaders. 130 Four 4.7-inch (Hontoria), three 2.2-inch quick-firing, two 1.5-inch, five muzzle-loaders. 173 Three 5.9-inch (Armstrong), two 2.7-inch (Hontoria), two muzzleloaders. 160 Four 4.7-inch (Hontoria), four 6. pounderquick-firing, two 3-pounders, two muzzle-loaders. x60 Four 4.7-inch (Hontoria), four 6 -pounder quick-firing, two 3-pounders, two muzzle-loaders. 97 Two 4.7-inch (Hontoria), one 3.5 -inch, two quick-firing, one muzzleloader. xi6 Three 4.7-inch (Hontoria), two | quick-firing, two muzzle-loaders. 98 One 6.2-inch muzzle-loader (Palliser), two 4.7-inch smooth-bore, one muzzle-loader....... Unreported. — i~~~. - Gun-boat.. I x,o3o Gun-boat.. Gun-vessel. Gun-vessel. Despatchvessel. Auxiliary cruiser. - - 1,030 524 524 500 4,195 376-5 184 DEWEY AT MANILA The following in the same detail is THE AMERICAN SQUADRON. Vessel. Class. Tons.: v. g Armament. e U Olymfia... Protected 5,870 340 450 Ten 5-inch rapid-fire, four 8-inch cruiser. breech-loaders, fourteen 6-pounders and seven i-pounder rapidfire, four Gatlings, one field-gun. Baltimore.. Protected 4,413 327 386 Four 8-inch breech-loaders, six 6 -cruiser. inch breech-loaders, four 6-pounders, two 3-pounders, two i-pounder rapid-fire, four 37-mm. Hotchkiss, two Colts, one field-gun. Raleigh.... Protected 3,213 300 313 Ten 5-inch rapid-fire, one 6-inch cruiser. breech-loader, eight 6-pounders, four I-pounder rapid-fire, two Gatlings, one field-gun. Boston....... Protected 3,000 271 278 Six 6-inch breech-loaders, two 8 -cruiser. inch breech-loaders, two 6-pounders, two 3-pounders, two I-pounder rapid-fire, two 47-mm., two 37-mm. Hotchkiss, two Gatlings. Concord.... Gun-boat... 1,710 230 194 Six 6-inch breech-loaders, two 6 -pounders, two 3-pounder rapidfire, two 37-mm. Hotchkiss, two Gatlings. Petrel...... Gun-boat.. 892 76 122 Four 6-inch breech-loaders, two 3 -pounders, one I-pounder rapidfire, two 37-mm. Hotchkiss, two Gatlings. "Reports show that at the end of the engagement less than half the ammunition in the magazines of the ships had been discharged, and Admiral Dewey's command was in condition to participate in another battle after it had finished with the Spanish force in Manila Bay," says the Army and Navy Journal. "The Baltimore, according to the report of her commanding officer, expended only 73 eight-inch shells, and the Boston only 48 of the same calibre, making an average of 20 projectiles for each gun. A larger number of DEWEY AT MANILA i85 six-inch shells were fred, the Batzimore discharging I75, the Boston 162, and the Raleigh 53. The Ralezgh discharged 34I five-inch shells; 410 six-pounders were fired by the Baltimore, 220 by the Boston, and I37 by the Ralezgkz. The Baltimore fired 169 three-pounders, and the Boston 420, and the Ralezgh Ioo." Admiral Montojo had gone out of the bay some time before our squadron arrived, intending, he said, to meet Dewey on the open sea, but he must have taken a second look at the table of guns on board our ships and have considered that maybe the reports, current in Spanish periodicals, about the Yankees being incapable of fighting were somewhat exaggerated. Anyway, he returned to the protection of the boasted forts at Cavite, but only to find them impotent to save his squadron, though armed with "several" guns of the best European make and of larger calibre than ours. The Spanish official account of the battle says: "The Americans fired most rapidly. There came upon us numberless projectiles, as the three cruisers at the head of the line devoted themselves almost entirely to fight the Christina, my flag-ship. A short time after the action commenced one shell exploded in the forecastle and put out of action all those who served the four rapid-fire cannon, making splinters of the forward mast, which wounded the helmsman on the bridge. In the meantime another shell exploded in the orlop, setting fire to the crew's bags, which they were fortunately able to control. The I86 DEWEY AT MANILA enemy shortened the distance between us, and rectifying his aim, covered us with a rain of rapid-fire projectiles. " At half-past seven one shell destroyed completely the steering-gear, another exploded on the poop, and put out of action nine men. Another destroyed the mizzen-mast head, bringing down the flag and my ensign. A fresh shell exploded in the officers' cabin, covering the hospital with blood, destroying the wounded who were being treated there. Another exploded in the ammunition-room astern, filling the quarters with smoke and preventing the working of the hand steering-gear. As it was impossible to control the fire, I had to flood the magazine when the cartridges were beginning to explode. "Amidships, several shells of smaller calibre went through the smoke-stack, and one of the large ones penetrated the fireroom, putting out of action one master-gunner and twelve men serving the guns. Another rendered useless the starboard bow gun. While the fire astern increased, fire was started forward by another shell which went through the hull and exploded on the deck. " The broadside guns being undamaged, continued firing until there were only one gunner and one seaman remaining unhurt for firing them. "The inefficiency of the vessels which composed my little squadron, the lack of all classes of the personnel, especially master-gunners, and seamen-gunners, the inaptitude of some of the provisional machinists, the scarcity of rapid-fire cannon, the strong crews of the enemy, and the unprotected character of the greater part of our vessels, all contributed to make more decided the sacrifice which we made for our country. " Our casualties, including those of the arsenal, amounted to three hundred and eighteen men killed and wounded." Admiral Montojo, in an interview with a reporter of the London Mail soon after the battle, said: " The Reina Christina and Don Juan de Austria, as you know, were old cruisers; the Castillo was a wooden cruiser, DEWEY AT MANILA 187 but was unable to steam, owing to the breaking down of her engines. The Don Antonio de Ulloa and the Velasco were helpless, and were undergoing repairs off the arsenal. The Olymspia, Baltimore, Raleigh, and Boston engaged my flag-ship in turn about 5.30, attracted by my flag. I recognized the necessity of getting under way and slipped both anchors, ordering the other ships to follow my example. Although we recognized the hopelessness of fighting the American ships, we were busy returning their fire. The Reina Christina was hit repeatedly. " Shortly after 6.30 I observed fire on my ship forward, and our steering-gear was damaged, rendering the vessel unmanageable. We were subjected to a terrific hail of shell and shot. The engines were struck and we estimated we had seventy hits about our hull and superstructure. The boilers were not hit, but the pipe to the condenser was destroyed. A few moments later I observed that the after part of the ship was on fire. A shell from an American ship had penetrated and burst with deadly effect, killing many of our men. My flag-lieutenant said to me: "'The ship is in flames. It is impossible to stay on the Christina any longer.' "He signalled to the gun-boat Isla de Cuba, and I and my staff were transferred to her and my flag was hoisted. Before leaving the Christina my flag was hauled down. My flag-ship was now one mass of flames. I ordered away all boats I could to save the crew. Many of the men jumped overboard without clothing and succeeded in reaching shore, several hundred yards away. Only a few men were drowned, the majority being picked up by the boats. " Before jumping overboard Captain Cadarse's son, a lieutenant on board the Christina, saw his father alive on deck. but others say that as the Captain was about to leave, a shell burst over the ship and killed him. We estimate that fifty-two men were killed on board the Chrstinza and about one hundred and fifty wounded. The chaplain was killed, and the assistant physician, the chief engineer,and three officers were wounded. The boatswain and chief gunner were both killed. In the CasLillo only about fifteen men were killed, but there were many wounded, both on the Castillo and the Don 7Juan de Austria, on which i88 DEWEY AT MANILA thirteen men were killed. Altogether, so far as we know at present, four hundred men were killed and wounded on our ships. " As soon as I transferred myself from the Reina Christina to the Isla de Cuba all the American shots were directed upon the Isla de Cuba, following my flag. We sought shelter behind the pier at Cavite, and, recognizing the futility of fighting more, I prepared to disembark, and gave orders for the evacuation of the remainder of the ships. The Cast'llo had been on fire from end to end for some time, and was, of course, already abandoned. The Ulloa was also burning. My last signal to the captains of all vessels was 'Scuttle and abandon your ships.' " Admiral Montojo was wounded in the left leg by an iron splinter, and his son, a lieutenant, was wounded in the hand by a shell splinter. The Admiral said he directed the fight from the bridge of the Reina Christina, which was not protected. A letter from Past-Assistant Engineer E. L. Beach, of the Baltimore, published in the New York Sun, says: *Every shot fired from our fleet was most deliberately, coolly, and pitilessly aimed. The Spaniards fired an enormous number of times, but with apparently the most impracticable aim. Shells dropped all around our ship; we were in action for over four hours; hundreds of shot and shell fell close to us. Only five or six pierced us and they did no damage. "The damage done by our ships was frightful. I have visited all of the sunken Spanish ships, and, had I not seen the effects of American marksmanship, I would hardly give creditto reports of it. One smoke-stack of the Castillo, a 3,300-ton Spanish ship, was struck eight times, and the shells through the hull were so many and so close that it is impossible that a Spaniard could have lived on her deck. The other large ship, the Reina Christina, was perforated in the same way. We did not employ much tactics, because there wasn't much need for them. There were the enemy, and we went for them bullheadedly and made them exceedingly sick." DEWEY AT MANILA 189 That is Lt say, LhL Opalidllds wevre wiped utL, while in our squadron, the shell that did the most distressful damage exploded in the private room of Ensign John S. Doddridge on the Boston and ruined its looks. While a few shot from the Spanish ships struck ours, not one from the forts did so, and the whole damage our vessels received was utterly insignificant. Three shots hulled the Olympia, but did no damage beyond cracking a plate or two. Dewey's report on this matter says: I am happy to report that the damage done to the squadron under my command was inconsiderable. Several of the vessels were struck and even penetrated, but the damage was of the slightest, and then squadron is in as, good condition now as before the battle." Admiral Montojo's statement regarding the loss of life on the Spanish side was given in detail some days later. The Spanish then reported that they had 78 killed on the ships and 23 on shore, a total of ioi, while 235 were wounded afloat, and 45 in the fort-a total of 280. This gives 381 killed and wounded. On our side eight men were slightly wounded. They were all on the Baltimore, and were hurt by a 4.7-inch shot that came in on the gundeck. The men were struck by the debris of a box of fixed ammunition that was exploded I90 DEWEY AT MANILA by this shell. They were: Lieutenant Frank W. Kellogg, and.Ensign Noble E. Irwin, with M. J. Buddinger, R. L. Barlow, R. P. Covert, VV. O'Keefe, R. Ricciardelli, and E. Snellgrove, of the crew. In addition to these, Boatswain's Mate Heaney, of the Olympia, had his fingers crushed by the recoil of a gun. Mention might be made, too, of the fact that the man at the wheel on the Boston had one cheek skinned by a flake of dried paint that ivas knocked from the ship's fore-mast by a shell that did not explode. It is said that when this shell came howling at the ship, everybody on the bridge except Captain Wildes involuntarily dodged. The Captain was using a palm-leaf fan and smoking a cigar at the time. He stopped waving the fan for a moment as the shell struck the mast, grinned at the junior officers, said, "We were lucky, gentlemen," and then once more began to wave the palmleaf. In considering this battle the engine-room must not be forgotten. In the old days the men behind the guns were also obliged to look after the motive power as well-after the sails. In these days the motive power is below the deck, and a host of men must stay there in a temperature running from I25~ up to 160~, and keep the wheels turning. And their work is even harder in advance of the battle than it is DEWEY AT MANILA I9I during the artiul rnmhbat fnr fh whorle cor plication of machinery must be adjusted to a pitch that will show the right timbre, no matter what rude call may come from the man on the bridge. That Dewey's ships were manceuvred at will without break or mistake, was due to the fact that able engineers stood at the throttles. The list in Dewey's fleet was: Olympia, James Entwistle; Baltimore, John D. Ford; Raleiglz, Frank H. Bailey; Boston, Richard Juch; Concord, George B. Ransom, all chief engineers, and Petrel, Past-Assistant Engineer Reynold T. Hall. And then there was Paymaster John R. Martin, of the Boston, who, having no place at a gun, and no wounded to carry to the surgeon, lighted a spirit-lamp, and made coffee which he carried to those who were working hardest. His mental attitude was typical of that of the entire crew. Many a year had passed since an American naval officer had had command in a battle between squadrons of ships. It has happened that on the occasions in our history where we have engaged an enemy with a squadron the commanding officer has been, with few exceptions, without previous experience in such a position. Dewey had been under fire as a lieutenant in the Mississippi Valley, and he won distinction at Port Hudson and Donelson 192 DEWEY AT MANILA ville-but Manila Bay was the first scene of his work as a commanding officer in a squadron battle. His success recalls the famous message of Perry on Lake Erie. In recognition of Dewey's achievement, Secretary of the Navy Long cabled: "The President, in the name of the American people, thanks you and your officers and men for your splendid achievement and overwhelming victories. In recognition he has appointed you Acting-Admiral and will recommend a vote of thanks to you by Congress as a foundation for further promotion." The name of Admiral Dewey was on the lips of the whole people within a day, and within a week the show-windows of every town blossomed with his portrait. The people saw and appreciated their hero-a most significant fact in the eyes of one who loves his country. For who shall estimate the influence of the hearty healthful cheer that swept across the nation when the story of Manila was told. Many comments on the battle of Manila have been written by naval men. Of them all none is so valuable as those which point out the fact that while the Spaniards were utterly reckless of danger, the Americans showed cool courage; where the Spaniards fought in a DEWEY AT MANILA 193 frenzy of rage, the Americans made and maintained the attack with deliberate and relentless determination. The difference is in the blood, and the hope of the world lies in the racial distinction that was there manifested. 4, CHAPTER XI SAMPSON'S FIRST SEARCH FOR CERVERA A SQUADRON WITH THE SPEED OF A TON-OF-COAL BARGES SENT IN A CHASE OF TWENTY-KNOT SPANISH CRUISERS-THE BOMBARDMENT OF SAN JUAN DE PORTO RICO-WORK OF INEXPERIENCED MEN THAT SHOWED THEIR METTLE-ANOTHER VAIN CRUISE TO NICHOLAS CHANNEL. THE important business that had called Admiral Sampson to Key West, as mentioned in a preceding chapter, was nothing less than a search for the mystifying Spanish squadron that had been lying at the Cape Verde Islands for some time before the war actually began. Not only was it a mysterious squadron in its movements; to a large part of our alongshore population it was positively fearsome. And there was good reason, when the makeup of the squadron only is considered, for vigilance if not for alarm in our more weakly fortified harbors. The Spanish Admiral had at command three sister ships of a displacement each of 7,000 tons, each protected by a twelveinch armor belt, besides a three-inch protective 194 SAMPSON'S FIRST SEARCH FOR CERVERA r95 deck, and each armed with two eleven-inch guns, ten 5.5-inch guns, and the usual bristling host called the secondary battery. They were named the Almirante Ofuendo, the Infanta Maria Teresa, and the Vizcaya. To them was added the Cristobal Colon of about the same size, that was supposed to carry two teninch guns, ten six-inch, and six 4.7-inch. She did not have the ten-inch guns on board when the fight came, but her other guns were all of the quick-fire variety (as were the broadside guns of the other ships) and they made a most formidable battery. Moreover, every one of these ships was rated at twenty knots per hour. To aid these formidable cruisers there were supposed to be four of the latest style of torpedo-boat destroyers, each with a speed of thirty knots, and each carrying twelve-pounder rapid-fire guns; and while yet they were at Cape Verde there were also several ordinary good torpedo-boats. On April 29th this squadron sailed for American waters and our Government learned the fact. Where they would make a landfall was a question, for the whole United States coast was in a way open to attack. Nevertheless, the ever-important matter of coal and water would have to be considered by Admiral Cervera, and our strategists could guess that when the Spaniards reached this side these two sup 196 SAMPSON'S FIRST SEARCH FOR CERVERA plies would have to be obtained, and that a Spanish port would therefore be sought. On the whole, it was believed that San Juan on the north coast of Porto Rico would be the rendezvous of the Spaniards, and that they would arrive there soon after May ist. On this theory Admiral Sampson was ordered to take the best of his ships and go to San Juan to intercept the Spaniards before they got into port, if possible; if not, then he was to Deweyize them as they lay behind the Morro Castle, that guarded the entrance to the bay. At 7.30 o'clock on the night of May 4th the flag-ship New York, the battle-ships Iowa and Indiana, the monitors Amphitr'te and Terror, the cruisers Detroit and Montgomery, the torpedo-boat Porter, the armed-tug Wompatuck, and the transport Niagara, gathered off Cardenas on the north coast of Cuba, bound for San Juan de Porto Rico. When the purpose in view is considered, the composition of this squadron was most remarkable-in fact it was absurd. This is not to criticise the Admiral; he had to take what the nation had provided and the Navy Department would let him have. We had, indeed, the battle-ships Massachusetts and Texas in commission, but at the behest of such people as those New Yorkers who moved their silver SAMPSON'S FIRST SEARCH FOR CERVERA 197 ware to their country residences lest the Spaniards come and loot it, the Department had sent those two brave fighters to Hampton Roads for a coast-guard under the title of "Flying Squadron." So Sampson had need to be content with the Amphitrite and Terror instead. With eight-knot monitors he was to go in search of four heavily armed and well-armored cruisers, having a speed of twenty knots per hour. True, he had the New York of twenty-one knots, and two battle-ships equal to fifteen and seventeen knots, but neither of these, of course, could be permitted to run faster than the eight-knot monitors. An eight-knot squadron was going in chase of a squadron of twenty knots! And Cervera was actually coming with three destroyers, while Sampson had the one torpedo-boat only. Well, the seventeen-knot Iowa took the Amphitrite in tow, and the twenty-one-knot New York took the Terror in tow, and Sunday morning, the 8th, found the squadron off Cape Haytien, Hayti. Here, most fortunately, a dead calm prevailed, and the monitors were able to lie alongside the Niagara, and together refill their coal-bunkers, while the Porter lay outside of one of the monitors, and filled hers across the monitor's deck. The coaling was completed on Monday, May 198 SAMPSON'S FIRST SEARCH FOR CERVERA 9th, and thereafter the squadron, with the monitors in tow, went on with the chase of Cervera until 5 o'clock on the afternoon of the i th, being then less than fifty miles from San Juan. Admiral Sampson shifted his flag to the Iowa. He hoped and believed that the Spanish squadron was in San Juan, and he was going to force the battle from the deck of our latest battle-ship, with " Fighting Bob" Evans at his elbow. Thereafter, for ten hours the ships washed along toward the port. At 3 A. M. on Thursday morning, May i2th, the flickering electric lights of the city came into view with the lamp in the lighthouse tower shining above them. Then the Detroit steamed on to a post a thousand yards in advance of the flag-ship Iowa; she had a man over each rail swinging the lead to sound out the channel. The tug Wompatuck ran out to the west of the Detroit towing a small boat with a red flag which was to be anchored in ten fathoms of water off Cabras Island for a buoy to guide the squadron. And then came the fighting line, the Porter close under the shelter of the big Iowa, and the Indiana, the New York, the Ampzfitrite, and the Terror strung out at convenient intervals, and the Montgomery off the starboard quarter of the Terror, ready for a dash in on the westerly SAMPSON'S FIRST SEARCH FOR CERVERA 199 side of the harbor's mouth should the Spanliards appear. It was a most impressive spectacle as the squadron seemingly drifted through the gloom 1. I. \ ' ".\.... I \ C \ \ \ Manaeuvring of the Fleet at the Bombardment of San Juan. toward the city, and one who was there knows how the tiger feels as it creeps toward its sleeping prey. In the first flush of dawn, that soon came on apace, the city appeared out of the shades as a 200 SAMPSON'S FIRST SEARCH FOR CERVERA yellow-walled checker of houses spread over a low ridge lying parallel with the sea. At the east the ridge fell away into a sandy beach that lost itself in a swamp. Along the front of this ridge the trade-wind rollers broke in splashing masses against a precipitous wall-a wall that at the west rose into a bluff sixty feet high, and there, dark and frowning, stood the Morro Castle, at once a fortress and a hopeless prison. The channel to the harbor ran under this bluff. Over to the west lay Cabras Island and Fort Canuelo, on a smaller island, while back of all, terrace on terrace, rose the hills and mountains of the interior. While yet the night was.over the waters, the crews were called to a breakfast of cold meat, bread, and coffee. Then the galley fires were extinguished, and at 5 o'clock precisely the men went to quarters, and loosened and loaded the guns for action, while a few walked to and fro scattering sand on the decks so that they might have a good foothold even though they became flooded with blood. Then a signal fluttered to the yard of the Iowa and a moment later the Stars and Stripes appeared at every mast-head and at every other available point on all the ships. Even the Admiral's flag came down to be hoisted to a smokestack in order that Old Glory might float at the Iowa's truck. 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IE i::;li;i;;.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,i,~~,~ x. li~ '"""""""""""";~ i;l~lii'liiilil:iiii "~ bi _.o.~~n~inn........:....:...:i...r.....r... I II? '"""""""":8~ "iii""'i'! I 1~ I;: iii;lllr~r~r,~;;;;;:;;,n, '"'" ~r,~, ~s I"?; ~;lllll;i;il;8aIciiaaa~;i:;,,, 1:iililiigli ~~I~;;;;;;;~;;;;~;uaa""raaaalial: i: is 1 ~i,~n, o.i.....rr.................n~,i, "i"i-" iQlllililPPBiiillllP11BB8 " ~i:io~o~:i::lililili;:;:,:;:,:,:;:,:;:;;;;;l;l,;;:;;ililiiiiijillcAiililsss;i8lilll F ii~~ f ~,:,n,,i~,ii,,iaa~ral I,,,,,,,,, I;U:18:8:iiiiiliiiilB:llill;i;illlllIllli;iliillill iiiiiliiiiiiiiiililissiiliiXIiliss i~,,,,, ilililli lillilliiiiiliiiiiiili;i;iiii8iii,,,,,,,:;;,;.;;;I iio~r '""""""'"""""'"" i~::: I I e I I SAMPSON'S FIRST SEARCH FOR CERVERA 203 A little later the Detroit turned from the line on which she had steered and headed off to the east-parallel with the splashing breakers. The Wompatuck anchored her stake-boat 1,Ioo yards from the fort, and then, at 5.17 o'clock, at a range of I,400 yards, a lean six-pounder on the starboard side of the Iowa's superstructure called to the sleeping garrison of the old Morro. A moment later the eight-inch guns in the Iowa's forward turret on the same side awoke the echoes. Instantly the alert gunners on the Detroit took up the orchestral strain, and then came the thunder of the Iowa's twelve-inch guns, with the whirring roar of their shells, the distinct thud when the shells struck and the dull sounds when they exploded, all mingled with the sharp reports of the smaller rifles on the Detroit. Turning slowly around, the Iowa headed out to sea, giving place to the other ships in the line in their turn, each firing at will as she arrived opposite the stake-boat. For six minutes there was no reply ashore, and then an old smooth-bore on the parapet of the Morro hurled a big round shell that exploded in the air within a quarter of a mile of our flag-ship, to the amusement of the sailors. After that a couple of modern guns in a new sand fort on the crest east of the Morro began to reply, while another small battery east of that, and 204 SAMPSON'S FIRST SEARCH FOR CERVERA perhaps half a dozen guns at the extreme east end of the city joined in. These were six-inch and eight-inch guns of the best make, and the eager cry of their projectiles was just what our men needed to train their nerves for a battle with the enemy's ships to come weeks later. But there were no war-ships at San Juan, as our men had hoped. Three times our squadron ran in and shelled the forts of the city. In the first round the marksmanship displayed by the big guns' crews was deplorable, for the shells, as a rule, struck in the rocks at the foot of the cliff. But they got the range after that and knocked such clouds of dust from the old stone fort as obscured wide breadths of the city. Meantime, the smaller guns, especially those of the Detroit, had spattered the Morro with a rain of steel, driving all the gunners there to the bomb-proofs. As the armored ships turned out to sea in the first round, the Detroit headed over to the west parallel with the shore. She was within easy range of Mauser bullets, as well as of the old smooth-bores ashore, and the smooth-bores were effective against an unarmored ship like her. The Spaniards, thinking the others were fleeing, became furious in their efforts to sink her. The spectacle was enough to turn the heart sick, but her crew-well, Captain James H. Dayton stood on the end of the bridge as she turned under that fire, and with (oo mr ~ C (C ( C ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ C~~~~~~~7 206 SAMPSON'S FIRST SEARCH FOR CERVERA ships under the sea, but its gunners, unable to face the M/ontgomery, fled under cover like prairie dogs. The squadron was before the town for two hours. It was plain that a position could be taken just west of the Morro, out of range of the modern guns along the sea-front, where the city would be wholly at the mercy of our guns. The Spanish afterward admitted that they would have surrendered within an hour had we taken that position, although the real damage done by our shells was inconsiderable. But to take the town was useless so long as we had no men to land to hold it. As a matter of fact not one of our ships was fully manned, let alone providing a permanent landing party. The marksmanship of the Spanish gunners was worse than at Manila. There was a zone about two miles from their forts, where the majority of their shell fell. In crossing this zone the NVew York and the Iowa were struck by a shell each. Frank Widemark was killed on the New York, and Samuel Feltman, Michael Murphy, Michael Sprown, and William Rapp were wounded. They were all near the eight-inch gun on the port side. On the Iowa G. Merkle, R. C. Hill, and John Mitchell were wounded. A man on the Amphitrite died of the heat in the stoke-hole. No damage was done to any of our ships. II~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ II I way-apok m WeApeffift Widiffibus 'MORd Ell MENEM ~r~r~r~rnrirxi, iBIIBBBiB:ilPIBAs"BIIB:i 8:i'''i,'i:8 '~i ~'ii'' " "~i'llllllBirarsilr~~, I ~;;8;;~: iitra i~I! u!llil I riiars;riiiiiisi~:i;rr;a,,i,,,,,,l;i,, I illlBBgg; I _~,n~,~,~,~,rrrrrrrI,,~aasiirra, ,~,rirria~~~~,~,,~rnr nr ig I~+sr~rrsi;isr:, r I;i;;l;,l;:i~i;~i,~ii,,i,,,,,,;'illii; 1 '~~~;~;~;: ~ ~;';l~;~~;I;R~~is~l;iilsiEilis;E niiiaiir.~il~ iB israaarasiali~~ ii:s ~"'~'"'~~~""'"~~ I;B;niir:ii:""',,,,,,,, i8llliilil:lliQiIIIIIBlliiiBBillgil II IIIBlllgRspliiiilQ ~iXIUI;; ~l:li2xiEssl i~;~~;z~~~ ";i'i' —ail~aa,;;i~l.E~;;.pa~,i~;, ~;BARB ~i;n lailil::saaa~,iiiiauarl;al ~xxrri '"'"'""""'"'X~ hi;~rr;~;l,,iaiiiPc~;r';, E:;i~ri,;r iBi p;,,~? jil FI~~CIIIOI CCEEI 1171 " bi.irf ill"griii; ""I rr~. I I t SAMPSON'S FIRST SEARCH FOR CERVERA 211 "Cervera's fleet was not there; it was already two weeks out from the Cape Verdes; our squadron could move at very slow speed on account of the monitors; we were I,ooo miles from Havana, which had to be covered; the Flying Squadron, as far as we knew, was still north; we had no land force with which to hold the place, and no time to spare to await one if we were to look after Cervera-all those considerations made immediate movement westward imperative." So says Captain F. E. Chadwick, who was Sampson's chief-of-staff, as well as Captain of the New York, in a review of the navy's work written for Scribner's for November, I898. Back to Key West they went with the speed of a tow of coal barges. It was humiliatingnerve-destroying- but once Key West was reached (May i8th), the Flying Squadron was found there-at least the Brooklyn, Massachusetts, and Texas were there, and the St. Paul, auxiliary cruiser, under Sigsbee from the Maine, was with them. Here were ships for a squadron fit to search for Cervera, but a new complication had arisen. Cervera had actually reached American waters. He had coaled at Curaqoa, and gone north toward Cuba. The St. Paul was at once sent away to scout on the south coast of Cuba, while Schley, with the Brooklyn, Massachusetts, and Texas, was 2I2 SAMPSON'S FIRST SEARCH FOR CERVERA ordered to Cienfuegos on the south coast. The Iowa was sent a day later to join him there, for Sampson was convinced that Cervera would go either to Cienfuegos or come by the east end of Cuba to race through the blockade and enter Havana. Schley sailed on May i9th. Having sent Schley south, Sampson himself took the New York, the Indiana, the monitors Puritan, Miantonomoh, and Amph/itrite, with the cruisers Cincinnati, Detroit, Montgomery, and a host of gun-boats and auxiliaries, and cruised away to Nicholas Channel on the north coast. It was on Saturday, May 2ist, that he started east once more. In Nicholas Channel he awaited the enemy. But this cruise, like the other, was in vain. The Spaniards had proved once more the adage that the timid slink more dangers than brave men run. On May g9th Cervera had entered Santiago harbor with his four beautiful cruisers and two destroyers, the third destroyer that he had brought over the sea having gone to San Juan, Porto Rico. What was done when this fact was learned shall all be told in another chapter, save only that Sampson returned at once to Key West. When there a most welcome sight met his eyes, for the Oregon, all the way from San Francisco, had come (May 26th) to lend a hand in the work that was now to be done. 1>U -1 E NIN INAiNLIN N I F i NAi. i- N THR A O VE A T O FINTER IEEN-ALON WHIE -H32KAL roe~~k filrothi in F r an cuc E. tain ap derka - n in i kunol the aII fIitis _irbe given to Min oi xha kind of oifclr oir iierc are m r wa a hellili ilii i h r limficrda fmill nif 6al ac lt uam llai rj itl rvcr 1911 it rjail tat in ifi< i(i i 1 )5tse ur n tii N ii O she fi to Mik 6f 4;inSX utr tt1 it Ct ta g (X~tl2135W r,. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ^ 214 THE OREGON'S FAMOUS RUN teen days, and she had 60o tons of coal still on board when she arrived. A few trifling leaks developed about her boiler-tubes, but they were repaired without decreasing the speed of the ship. At Callao the machinery was entirely overhauled-cleaned and adjusted. While this was in progress the bunkers were refilled under the eyes of two cadet engineers, "who took twenty-four hours' watch at a time." The engineers were at work on the machinery for the same length of time without rest. Meantime, "it was evident that war with Spain was inevitable," and "to guard against any treachery on the part of Spanish sympathizers," sentries were doubled and armed to shoot, while steam-launches were manned with armed crews and kept patrolling about the ship all night. In the Straits of Magellan an increased speed was maintained, because a Spanish torpedoboat that had been in Montevideo was expected to appear from behind one of the many capes in the narrow waters; while the men stood at the rapid-fire guns to give her a hot' welcome. At Sandy Point, the Chilian settlement of the Strait, the machinery was again overhauled and more coal taken. Of the work here, Captain Clark wrote: "The spirit on board this ship can best be described by referring to instances such as the engineer-officers voluntarily THE OREGON'S FAMOUS RUN 21S doubling their watches when high speed was to be made, the attempt of men to return to the fire-room after being carried out of it insensible, and the fact that most of the crew preferred to leave their hammocks in the nettings" (i.e., go without sleep), " until they could get the ship coaled and ready to sail from Sandy Point." At Rio Janeiro they heard (on May 4th) that war had been begun, and of the work of Dewey at Manila. At Bahia, on May 8th, they put on their war paint, sailing the next day, and on the i8th they took on 240 tons of coal at Barbadoes. They were off Jupiter Inlet, Florida, on May 24th. Here, Captain Clark communicated with Washington. The Secretary of the Navy told him that if any repairs were needed to go to Norfolk, but if the ship was in order to go on to Key West. Two days later they cast anchor off Sand Key light at Key West. The Oregon was built at the Union Iron Works, San Francisco. That she should have stood, the strain of a race I4,700 miles long without a break, shows that not one dishonest stroke was given her in the building. That neither bearings nor boiler-tubes went wrong in all that strain was due to the watchful care and ability of Chief Engineer Robert W. Milligan, and his assistants. We used to hear, in the days of our naval decadence, the sneers 2I6 THE OREGON'S FAMOUS RUN of men who called themselves (and who were) practical men-sneers regarding the ability of our naval engineers. It was admitted that our engineers had "book-learning," but denied that they were practically efficient. But that was long ago, and it is mentioned here only to give a back-ground to the splendid achievements of the engineers of the Oregon. A.run of '4,700 miles with never a breakthat tells the story. An explanation of the fact that the Oregon, though well out from the Florida shore, while in Jupiter Inlet, was able to communicate im mediately with the Navy Department-was able to send reports and receive orders, is interesting. A "coast signal service" was organized under Captain John R. Bartlett, U.S.N., beginning on March i5th. Eighteen stations, manned by 3Io men, all told, were established. Each had a go-foot mast with a 40-foot yard, and a full set of day and night signals. These were connected with 1,443 life-saving stations, 850 lighthouses, and 33 weather bureau stations, by means of telegraph lines, and it was arranged so that the entire system could be placed in communication with Washington within half an hour-something that was repeatedly done in practice trials. The movements of our own vessels were thus observed while an effective lookout for the enemy was maintained. _I...illXXII. iii -r r L ie ~g fi3 rrs-e: r*i B13i sa; u1 i~i ~~~~ninrx~larrnnsl a L,,IX""I ~L ba I "i B L E r ~i: pi. Z " ei I rr r I 6 sB rar r i;i ,~,n~ I r, i~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ THE OREGON'S FAMOUS RUN 219 To further display the sort of spirit shown by our engine-room force, an incident in one of the minor alongshore actions, in which the Castine had part, must be related. In the midst of the work, while at full speed, and under forced draft, "a fierce hissing noise was heard inside one of the furnaces. A socket-bolt in a back connection at the farthest interior extremity of the furnace had become loose, springing a leak. The steam was pouring in upon the fire, threatening in a few minutes to put it out and stop the progress of the vessel, if it did not cause a terrific explosion. All in the boiler-room knew that unless this hole was stopped disaster was at hand. One of the boiler-makers, named Huntley, ordered the forced draft turned off and the fires banked (i.e., wholly covered over with coal). Taking a plank, he threw it in on top of the wet, black coal with which the fire had been banked," and then, in spite of the spurting steam from the broken joint, and the glowing hot furnace-roof above him, and the gases of the smothered fire beneath, he climbed in along that plank to the rear of the furnace and repaired the leak. "For three minutes he remained inside" in that hell hole, but when his friends drew him out fainting, he had accomplished the work. One more tale of the men who worked where the heat was never below I25~ shall be told. It 220 THE OREGON'S FAMOUS RUN was related of Milligan, of the Oregon, by Captain Clark, and it occurred during the most famous race of the war, to be described farther on. "The officers kept asking permission to fire," said Captain Clark, "so I told them to send one shot after the vessel. Just after the report of the shot the chief engineer, who had joined in shovelling coal in the engineroom, came up to me as black as anything could be, and begged that another shot be fired. He said his men were fainting down below under the heat and terrific strain, but if they could hear a few shots he was sure they would keep their strength." CHAPTER XIII SCHLEY S CRUISE TO SANTIAGO REASONS FOR HIS DELAY AT CIENFUEGOS-STOPPED TWENTY MILES FROM HIS DESTINATION AND THEN STARTED BACK TO KEY WEST-BREAK ON THE COLLIER-DASH OF THE MARBLEHEADWHEN SCItLEY SAW CERVERA'S SHIPS AT ANCHOR WITHIN EASY RANGE-A " RECONNAISSANCE " AT A RANGE OF FROM FOUR TO FIVE MILES-A BLOCKADING SQUADRON TEN MILES FROM PORT -ACTS OF AUXILIARY CRUISERS DESCRIBED. As already stated, Schley with his squadron sailed from Key West bound for the south coast of Cuba in search of Cervera on May i9th, the very day, as it happened, that Cervera entered Santiago. His flag-ship was the Brooklyn, and he took with him the Massackusetts, the Texas, and the auxiliary Scorpion. His sailing order, written by Sampson, contained this paragraph: "It is unnecessary for me to say that you should establish a blockade at Cienfuegos with the least possible delay, and that it should be maintained as close as possible." On the next day (May 20th), the Iowa, the Castine, and the collier Merrzimac, followed 221 .........................r *....................................... 222 S CRUISE TO ANTIAO. &d1A dvyuifid rdidrf to af hin it fiffudvvs Than at 3 olcl6 on i he in nig of Ma all the l AMhrttAcd too ca Iry ia fturtr erders,,,_. Ii, _w 011 tI te o i * I* cii ireprt) of e Iof l ite ipoant ]"_ i W W Ipat i idt |-Bl~l _-~~-~~i~~~~ g~I l~ *-ior I jai ohl pr. l} at aniiiho de Cubic four sh1ps aud thee torp lI li i at drstroyoAT If WI ar ksatisfied tiii t thle are not at (iv} nfu epos proOced With all dspatchl [hut cauiwtu)id to Santi ago Uc C ki aiid If thi c6fii c ii b thyird Idiokado lim l n iort It was aftor scidinil Mhi rdilr that SiamIsoI Weit to tlio coast of Ctba; aierd hid blg squadron aid WOEi to thi Nicholafs Ch(iaitm But heforc Icaring tie VicinitV of havana he sent thc aifitliary IAW awaG to SCdidy With a dulldicat of ordcr No. Bi ifid with theso iad ditional instructU iis I t i tlnugit the oiiloscd nstructons will reach you by a rkn, May a d. This waill onahilc y to ltAVE Imforo daylight (re L ~ ~ ~ Z Z ff K SCHLEY'S CRUISE TO SANTIAGO 223 TSarD.A p ver;nt+\t yurn Endt.. ol r 6"1%Ace,% VA IJ uiIJV LLLI/LJ L%- aL tJU Y 1.11 LtlLIJLI may not be noticed, and be at Santiago A.M. May 24th. It is thought that the Spanish Chart of Cienfuegos. squadron would probably be still at Santiago, as they must have some repairs to make and coal to take." It is important to observe that order No. 8 224 SCHLEY'S CRUISE TO SANTIAGO did not definitely tell Schley to go on to Santiago unless he was "satisfied they are not at Cienfuegos," but it is plain from these additional instructions, sent by the Hawk, that Sampson meant to have him go to Santiago immediately. Schley arrived off Cienfuegos late at night on the 2ist. At daylight the next morning and again at 8 o'clock he steamed within a mile and a half of the light-house, without drawing fire, and then the Scorpion was sent away to Santiago to learn what the big scouts, supposed to be there, had seen. When closest to land a reporter on the Texas (T. M. Dieuaide, of The Evening Sun, New York, who is known by the writer hereof as a trustworthy man) looked over the harbor from the lookout-perch and saw "a gray smoke-stack and the masts of two schooners." He saw no other ships. "Most of the officers of the squadron," says Dieuaide, "were firmly convinced that the Spanish ships were not inside. Commodore Schley was firmly convinced that they were." During this day (May 22d) the Iowa and the torpedo-boat Dupont joined Schley. On May 23d, Schley wrote to Sampson saying, definitely, "the Casline, Merrimac, and' Hawk arrived this morning." That was in a paragraph numbered 4. He then says (paragraph I): "In reply to your letter, No. 8, I SCHLEY'S CRUISE TO SANTIAGO 225 would state tha. t, I am y no means satisfied that the Spanish squadron is not at Cienfuegos. The large amount of smoke seen in the harbor would indicate the presence of a number of vessels, and under such circumstances it would seem to be extremely unwise to chase up a probability at Santiago de Cuba reported via Havana, no doubt as a ruse. " 2. I shall therefore remain off this port." Another letter of the same date reports the coming of the British steamer Adula, en route to Cienfuegos, ostensibly to get British refugees. Her captain told Schley he had heard at Jamaica that Cervera had left Santiago on May 20th. Commenting on this report, Schley says: "' Now, on Saturday, May 2Ist, when about forty miles southwest of this port, I heard, from the bridge of this vessel, firing of guns toward Cienfuegos, which I interpreted as a welcome to the Spanish fleet." On the morning of the 24th, the Marblehead, Eagle, and Vixen joined Schley. The lookouts of the squadron had seen three fires on a hill west of the port every night and three horses on the beach beneath the hill every day. McCalla, of the Marblelead, knew them to be a signal made by the insurgents, and he went to see them in person. He reported to Schley that they were trustworthy and that they said positively that Cervera's ships were not in the harbor. 226 SCHLEY'S CRUISE TO SANTIAGO Schley, in the afternoon of that day (May 24th), determined to obey the spirit of his instructions received by way of the Hawk on the 23d, and go on to Santiago. He left Cienfuegos soon after 6 o'clock. It illustrates the spirit of his men to tell that the Dupont, which had bumped a hole in her bottom on a coral reef, and had started for Key West for repairs, came back at full speed to beg permission to go along as soon as she read the signals ordering the squadron to Santiago. A plug would keep out the water well enough if a fight with Cervera was in prospect. The weather during the run of four hundred miles east was bad. At noon on May 26th the lookouts were able to see the Morro at the mouth of Santiago harbor, but at 5 o'clock in the afternoon Schley's squadron was still twenty miles away and the Morro could only be made out by means of glasses in the military tops. Before dark the scouts Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Yale joined Schley. Not one of these ships had seen Cervera's fleet, but Captain Wise of the Yale said to Captain Philip of the Texas: " I firmly believe Cervera is in Santiago harbor." He had expressed his belief to Schley before that, no doubt, although there is no explicit report of his having done so. But Sigsbee, of the St. Paul, reported that he had captured the British cargo-ship Restormel as she was en SCHLEY'S CRUISE TO SANTIAGO 227 tcring the harbor with a cargo of coal. The captain of the Restormel said he had been ordered to go to San Juan de Porto Rico with the coal, but if Cervera was not there he was to go on to Martinique, and in case Cervera had left Martinique he was to go thence to Santiago. It was in obeying these orders that he was entering Santiago. Dieuaide says that in the opinion of most of the officers of the fleet this confirmed the reports that Cervera was in Santiago. Nevertheless Schley's squadron remained where it was until after dark, and then, to once more quote Dieuaide, " occurred the most remarkable thing of the naval campaign. Almost without exception every man in the squadron expected that the next move would be a dash toward the harbor entrance to draw the fire of the forts, perhaps the ships-who knew? But while everybody waited under the greatest nervous tension that can be imagined, the Ardois signal lights on the Brooklyn began to twinkle. Three thousand men watched that signal with almost bated breath. Slowly the red and white lights unfolded the message, while everybody spelled it out letter by letter. And this was it: "' D-e-s-t-i-n-a-t-i-o-n K-e-y W-e-s-t a-s s-o-o-n a-s C-o-l-l-i-e-r i-s r-e-a-d-y v-i-a s-o-u-t-h s-i-d-e C-u-b-a a-n-d Y-u-c-a-t-a-n C-h-a-n-n-e-l. S-p-e-e-d n-i-n-e k-n-o-t-s."' 228 SCHLEY'S CRUISE TO SANTIAGO The Iowa was lying within hail of the Texas and Captain Evans shouted to Captain Philip: "Say, Jack, what the devil does it mean?" "Beats me," replied Philip. "What do you think?" "Damned if I know," Evans said; "but I know one thing-I'm the most disgusted man afloat." Let it be repeated that the squadron was at that time twenty miles from the Morro of Santiago and it had not been any nearer nor had any effort been made to learn whether Cervera was within or not. At 9. 5 o'clock that night the squadron did actually start back for Key West. The break on the collier was a bad one, but in his determination to get back to Key West Schley ordered the St. Paul to take her in tow. The St. Paul did so, and the squadron started, but the tow lines parted four times in succession. Then Schley ordered the break repaired so that she could go on under her own steam, but before the repairing was completed, the Harvard came from San Antonio, Jamaica, with orders for Schley to remain blockading Santiago no matter what happened. Schley had telegraphed the Navy Department that he was going to Key West for coal. While off Cienfuegos he had complained in his despatches about the difficulty of transferring coal from the collier to his ships on the open. 3 as o la 230 SCHLEY'S CRUISE TO SANTIAGO sea. His despatch of May 24th had this to say on the subject in connection with his orders to blockade Santiago: "I shall proceed to-morrow (25th) off Santiago, being embarrassed, however, by the Texas short of coal supply, and her inability to coal in the open sea. I shall not be able to remain off that port (Santiago) on account of general short coal supply of squadron. So will proceed to the vicinity of St. Nicholas Mole, where the water is smooth, and I can coal Texas and other ships [with] what may remain in collier." But now, instead of going to the near-by port at St. Nicholas Mole, as he had said he would do, he was leaving Santiago and the enemy's squadron, and going to Key West. A Washington despatch says that Schley's announcement of the determination to return to Key West " created consternation" in the Navy Department. Orders to remain were received by Schley on the morning of May 27th. The squadron was held idle where it lay when the Merrimac broke the tow line, but at I0.20 o'clock that night, the Texas, under orders from Schley, began coaling from the Merrimac and at I I o'clock next day (May 28th) she had taken two hundred and sixty-seven tons! The Merrimac had four thousand tons of coal on board. In the afternoon of the 28th the squadron SCHLEY'S CRUISE TO SANTIAGO 231 steamed within fifteen miles of Santiago, and then stopped while the Marblehead was sent scouting past the mouth of the harbor. It is asserted that in the performance of this duty the Marblehead, an unarmored cruiser, ran within less than a mile of the old Morro on the high point on the east side of the bay, and saw distinctly the majority of the Spanish squadron, the Colon lying between La Socapa battery and the Morro, while others were strung along up the bay at the usual anchorage intervals. Not one of these ships had steam at a working pressure, and it is possible, though not probable, that the fires were entirely extinguished in some of them. - The Marblehead made her run past the harbor on the 28th. At night Schley took his squadron in shore until the ships were estimated to be at a distance of eight miles from the Morro, and then at sunrise on the morning of the 29th, with the Brooklyn in the lead, the squadron swept in and across the harbor at a distance not stated, but the ships were close enough to enable every man on deck to see clearly into the mouth of the harbor with the naked eye. And every man on deck " definitely located " the Spanish squadron. " Right across the entrance of the harbor, but inside the Morro battery, lay the Colon, her white awnings glistening 232 SCHLEY'S CRUISE TO SANTIAGO in contrast with her black hull, easily distinguishable by her peculiar rig of military mast between smoke-stacks. A little farther in lay another cruiser, one of the Vizcaya class." With glasses it was easy to see the crews walking idly about their decks. Having had what an old sailor would call a severe look at the enemy, Schley steamed out to sea. The Spaniards did not fire a gunthey did not even beat to quarters on their ships. There was no necessity for their doing so..Going ten miles out to sea, Schley stopped and scattered his squadron in blockading formation. And there the squadron remained idle for two days. Meantime the New Orleans had come from Sampson's squadron. Then, on the 3ist, he determined on making what he reported as a "reconnaissance." The reporters called it "a battle lasting fifty-five minutes." Transferring his flag to the Massachusetts, Commodore Schley ordered the Iowa and the New Orleans into line, and soon after noon he left his blockading station and steamed in to attack the forts. Reports vary as to the location of his blockading station on that day -vary between six and ten miles off shore. At any rate it is certain that he steamed in to make the attack, and that when he had arrived at a range of 7,000 yards the Massachusetts SCHLEY'S CRUISE TO SANTIAGO 233 opened fire. A range of 7,000 yards is just forty yards short of four land miles. The batteries at once began replying, while the Colon joined them as soon as she could bring her men to quarters. Having passed across the mouth of the harbor at a distance of four land miles from the forts, our ships turned out to sea in a wide curve and once more passed across the mouth, this time at a range of 9,oo0 yards, or more than five land miles. A private letter from an officer of the Iowa to the writer hereof says, that the range of this round was more than five sea-miles-" more than ten thousand yards." Let it stand at five land miles, but this much is certain: The strain on the carriages of the Iowa's twelve-inch guns-the strain due to the extreme elevation that was necessary for the great range-almost disabled them. Only the Colon of the Spanish squadron had any real part in this battle, the others having gone behind Gorda Point. The Spanish report of this encounter said: "The American squadron, commanded by Commodore Schley, composed of large ironclads and cruisers, attacked the fortifications at the entrance of Santiago. Our ironclad, Cristobal Colon, closing the mouth of the port, and supported by the fire of the forts, repulsed the attack." 234 SCHLEY'S CRUISE TO SANTIAGO Schley's official report said: " Made reconnaissance this afternoon, May 3Ist, with the Massachusetts, Iowa, and New Orleans, to develop the fortifications with their character. The fire was returned without delay by the heavy batteries to the east and to the west of the entrance; large calibre, long range. The range was 7,000 yards; reconnaissance developed satisfactorily the presence of the Spanish squadron lying behind island near inner fort, as they fired over the hills at random. Quite satisfied the Spanish fleet is here." The italics are not in the originals. Having told the dates and described the manner in which Commodore Schley became " quite satisfied " of the presence of Cervera in Santiago harbor, some little space must be given to events elsewhere. The reports of Schley's movements reached Sampson as promptly as the make-shift despatch-boats could carry them, and Sampson hastened back from Nicholas Channel to Key West, where he could quickly communicate with Washington, and when there telegraphed (3 P.M., May 29th) "would like to start at once with New York and Oregon [for Santiago] arriving in two days. I can blockade indefinitely." Italics are not in the original despatch. Sec Zr M A Min ~~~r.r SZ 236 SCHLEY'S CRUISE TO SANTIAGO near the harbor entrance, but at 10.30 A.M. they shifted their moorings farther in and out of sight.... There was then a month of close blockade." To follow now the movements of the S/. Paul after she left Key West to scout for Cervera, we learn that she arrived off Santiago on May 22d and found the harbor unguarded by any American ship. As none of the Spanish ships was disposed to come out, Sigsbee threw overboard a target and proceeded to exercise his men (chiefly naval militia) with the fiveinch guns the ship carried. Both ship and target were within range of the forts, but the Spaniards looked on quietly while the green gunners proceeded to show their natural ability by shooting the target to pieces.,For three days the St. Paul lay quietly off the harbor, and then, on the 25th, the British steamer Restornel, with 2,400 tons of good Cardiff coal for Cervera on board, was seen ploughing along toward the harbor at a twelveknot gait. The St. Paul went after her in a hurry, and when she was within three miles of the Morro stopped her, as related above, and sent her with a prize crew to Key West. The most disgusted man afloat that day was the captain of the Restormel. He had not ended expressing his feelings when he reached Key West. That the Spaniards should have allowed an un ILEY'S CISE1111 1t SNuXIATO 2137 iiriuiuuil'i MiLlr uu ls WaSt oo inlgi l lit 1ifit i of an. itghinan furildiilduicirOC Wi the fhins fU filift iim ti. Sifiiag hitL Iiini he tl A t h tmuheg S K||t G 6 6,,i,;:dl:,...... ai nht U A n ih il huWn intlt't V'uidgi fibux ~hfiCii riii litf Winfibci made sn fififdlm i finigin Ihit >h 1 ailigh utfiiI iI t i 13 tiL 10 S inM Ai har iiiiiag tl. i.u LuM theiri t6 6 htwggigo he iffitsu Affibirfilifi grith RE AM WARM _ icrif Ait il 61k iltlti arnti ii hint1 fur iiHI thied mAl' Al lit' laruauililit u but ii' nih ttsi hn tfhn'k le- it i e lat L Slafitca 1ii ae u div' fl~il l LlI' t l Mal~ell AM 056 9fi thekril~ Nvere not Wrf kiddifirihtS ifgfi MUC (6ygfk fifiglgf f'hiiUhi 6OR ht li af Cet3l ra hiilunl} druifitht 16igt irate detsi the f119 itib~ 9MlIlt 238 SCHLEY'S CRUISE TO SANTIAGO turned her stern to the enemy. She was at work one-quarter of a- mile from the beach for fifty minutes. Going thence a few miles east to Guantanamo, the cable-cutters ran in there, and the Wompatuck got hold of a cable, but here the shore fire was hotter, while the St. Louis was unable to reach well with her little six-pounders, and she was compelled to order the Wormpatuck out. Captain Goodrich had to signal a second order before she abandoned the attempt. Jungen was from the Maine. Perhaps the most important fact about this cable-cutting expedition, is that the high-power cannon at Santiago were silenced by the sixpounders of the St. Louis, and the' threepounder of the Wompatuck. That is, the men were driven from their guns. The St. Louis fired one hundred and seventy-two shots, and the Wompatuck seventy-six. The Wompaluck was at work on the cable for fifty minutes on May 7th, and a total of two hundred and fortyeight of these tiny shells sufficed to protect her from the modern guns mounted on shore at the mouth of Santiago harbor, during that time. CHAPTER XIV THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO DISPOSITION OF THE SQUADRON-THE STORY OF HOBSON'S FUTILE BRAVERY-IT WAS ANOTHER PROOF THAT CULTURE AND COOL COURAGE GO HAND IN HAND-THE FORTS BOMBARDED-GOOD WORK OF THE VESUVIUS. ADMIRAL SAMPSON having reached the station off Santiago and found Cervera still within, at once planned to hold him there permanently. It is easy to say that he succeeded, but wholly impossible for anyone who has had no such experience to fully understand the strain that the work involved. Nevertheless, even a landsman can gather some idea of the situation from the facts. Here was a harbor, the entrance channel to which was but three hundred and fifty feet wide at the narrowest point, while the cliffs on each side rose two hundred feet or more above it. In the night-shadows of these cliffs, that entrance was a very black hole. WTithin this black hole lay four cruisers rated as twentyknot ships, with two destroyers that had made thirty knots-they could cover one sea mile in 239 240 THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO exactly two minutes. It was in the speed of these boats that the chief danger lay-the danger of a surprise. Who could tell at what minute of the night the lookouts would report the enemy's ships within easy torpedo range of ours? In this emergency the Admiral had two courses to pursue, if he were. to reduce the danger of a sudden night attack to the utmost limit. He could establish his squadron, which was soon increased to an ample number by the arrival of other vessels, in a wide arc off the mouth of the harbor at a distance of six miles or more. At that range he would be entirely safe from the guns on shore, and if an enemy's torpedo-boat came out, it would have to run across the high seas for at least twelve minutes before reaching one of our ships. In that time we should have many chances of picking her up by our search-lights. Another plan for corking the bottle-by this time Cervera was said to be "bottled up" in Santiago-was to close in about the mouth at night, and keep the channel brilliantly illuminated with the search-lights. This " was a bold thing to do," says Captain Chadwick; " but it was in keeping with the whole habit of mind of our Commander-in-Chief, whose idea, constantly expressed in speech and act, was to be in close touch with the enemy,' THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO 241 Accordingly the whole squadron closed in to a range of two miles and a battle-ship picket was established every night. That is to say, two battle-ships ran in shore until within a mile or less of the Morro. Inside of these, three small auxiliaries were lined across the harbor at a distance of perhaps a half mile from the Morro. Inside of them, and but a quarter of a mile from the beach, three steam-launches, each armed with a one-pounder and four marines with rifles, went prowling to and fro. As night came on one of the two battle-ships here lay with not a light showing, while the other turned her search-lights upon the harbor entrance. "The long and brilliant beam of light shone through the entrance and'over the intervening hills as far as Santiago, six land miles distant," says Chadwick. "Every detail of the narrow canion with cliffs two hundred feet high, forming the harbor entrance, was made visible as day, and the whole proceeding can only be properly described in the remark of the British Naval Attacha, who, on looking at it from the deck of the New York, exclaimed: "'What a d d impertinence!'" Of such a character was the blockade established by Sampson within three days after his arrival, and maintained until Cervera's squadron was destroyed. 242 THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO Now although the battle-ships took turns in this work, and it was reasonably certain that no projectile from the shore could pierce a vital part of anyone of them, their upper works, where the crews were obliged to sleep on account of the temperature, were made of such thin material that even a well-directed shell from a smooth-bore, might have been dropped among the sleepers on the pickets. As a matter.of fact, the Spaniards never fired a cannon at the night pickets, but they peppered the launches with-Mauser rifles, and it was expected that they would use their cannon-there was never an hour of the night, when the men on watch were not looking for the flash of a modern gun on shore. "Anxiety for their men told heavily" on the officers from the first night-the night of June Ist, after Sampson had arrived. Sampson foresaw this immediately on arrival, and his first effort to relieve the strain made the name of Hobson known throughout the world. After reaching Santiago and taking one look at the narrow entrance to the harbor the possibility of sinking a ship there, to effectually close it, and so prevent Cervera's exit, was apparent to many of the officers of the squadron. Sampson, knowing the width of the channel, had considered the plan of sinking a ship in it while he was lying in Nicholas Channel, and in ITIE BLOCKADE rOF NTIO 243 idtoffik endMWith h twe titdhe SWrnlry nord the u Odnr (ii the auk dayk hrniRhrd smitigian Sanlmnnd hegan tin a ties iu l h Tthre waghe. MlL TjciC Shlid fil been Wd 1 t t ihe G - rllnmeli at a i aratilnnIg sinkihur W into the lifainnl Xrrrel ifnlldkiairyij feir was pni il harf'' Hl Iid pa nl ihr AleMink In watch tinn wnrrikingi in tarinal wiar andl wMite a riirf ihrrrnn f.r tlh dlnrf Of hig hInran. File knnwldgr nf ships fthid hhn unig W hen hefir Mii d lthe raner-hndrr n thu e Mid Hi; thit the tImIwIfI Idf. Aliot tI hundre d ie wrr iiIpnI in emipini ihi lia atin e'rrI' aall ihairntd hr rIM sInft n lr i faur ii Wig iiilnf1idd in MMn It in Jnn hi fr ili nrol Iil irnllng hisM Yi i sillinl lofir il was lrissarv in~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~*1*t1rtr~ b 8 X X f yl f~~~i 244 THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO to fit her with torpedoes that would sink her instantly, when the time came, and this took so long that day had arrived on the morning of June 2d, before she was ready. Hobson was anxious to go then, but the Admiral ordered him to wait. Meantime a crew of six men had been selected from among the hundreds that crowded aft to volunteer. They were Daniel Montague, Chief Master-at-Arms of the New York; George Charette, Gunner's Mate, first class, of the New York; J. E. Murphy, Coxswain on the Iowa, John P. Phillips, a machinist, Oscar Deignan, Coxswain, and Francis Kelly, a water-tender, all of the Merrimac. To this crew of six men Coxswain Rudolph Clausen, of the New York added himself by eluding the vigilance of the officers. Admiral Sampson refused to allow any other officer to go on the expedition, or any more men than were actually needed, on the ground of the extreme danger of the undertaking. He was not going to waste any lives. At 3 o'clock on the morning of June 3d, these men headed away for the harbor. A steam-launch from the New York, under Naval Cadet Joseph W. Powell, followed to pick up the crew of the Merrimac, should they succeed in getting away from her after performing their work, in either the row-boat or the life-raft that had been provided for them. h ix ui IdO lCKEO SANd I 4A It Wag a 66E irf Eidi Isthbtthseitd M i d fib iiuls iso tix it nag lkiidevl eMUM thid lxxe bx,,de i h i e ilie ivn sxu sihe n ixx l Ii li ix d V4 a e I xx Aili.i ii te i.fi n h i ie en dng flis f.t~lth ha lkifididge 'f A k i Sidg WtfiX O N&l dEW tEW Whlhi thd 96fitifidig ME! th6 Hoops e s X X X X XaI a T.. forii osii dthf Wih t69ofW& Ii MCA%~ ~ ~ ~.hi mis.t66biid iaitfkfd apparbift~~~~~jr; f~~~f Afiv Of ths~6 ifidd to had ffibifigh~~~~~~~~~~~~ 246 THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO that adventure, and yet they had eagerly volunteered for it, and one had stowed himself away on board without permission! Nor was the chance of Cadet Powell and his men much better, for it was his duty to follow the Merrimac to the mouth of the harbor, where he, too, would be as easy a target as the men on the ship, and there to wait until after daylight. Getting his bearings by the outlines of the Morro against the sky, Hobson drove the old ship into the centre of the narrow channel. A hell of flame leaped out on both sides as she passed the Morro, while the Vizcaya, that was on guard just around the bend, began firing with her broadside battery. The Spaniards thought we were coming with our squadron to force the harbor, and all the guns, big and little, that would bear, and many that would not, were fired with feverish rapidity. Immediately the shots began to reach the ship, but no vital damage was done, and she held on her way until opposite Estrella Point. Then the time to sink her had come, and Hobson pressed the electric button. Three of the torpedoes that were placed at her water-line exploded, tearing open her sides. The man at the anchor cut it loose, bringing up her head just opposite the point, while her stern swung slowly around with the tide. It seemed for a moment that she must sink, I j ME w: 4 5 | Ii.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~i | - - X~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~9 X. A~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~nr 11 I THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO 249 as they wished, right across the channel, but she filled so slowly, that she lay lengthwise of the channel and well at one side before she finally struck the bottom. In describing what followed Hobson said afterward: " We were all aft, lying on the deck. Shells and bullets whistled around. Six-inch shells from the Vizcaya came tearing into the Merrimac, crashing clear through, while the plunging shots from the fort broke through her decks. " 'Not a man must move,' I said; and it was only owing to the splendid discipline of the men that we all were not killed. We must lie there till daylight, I told them. Now and again one or the other of the men lying with his face glued to the deck and wondering whether the next shell would not come our way, would say, 'Hadn't we better drop off now, sir?' but I said, 'Wait till daylight.' It would have been impossible to get the catamaran anywhere but on to the shore, where the soldiers stood shooting, and I hoped that by daylight we might be recognized and saved. " It was splendid the way those men behaved. The fire of the soldiers, the batteries, and the Vizcaya was awful. When the water came up on the Merrimac's decks the catamaran floated amid the wreckage, but she was still made fast to the boom, and we caught hold of the edges and clung on, our heads only being above water." 250 THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO At daylight the fire ceased and a Spanish launch came toward the wreck. Hobson and his men agreed to try capturing her and running for the open sea, but as she drew near a dozen marines aimed their Mausers at the Yankee heads, and Hobson saw that,-in Western parlance, they had the drop. "'Is there any officer in that boat to receive a surrender of prisoners of war?' I shouted. An old man leaned out under the awning and waved his hand. It was Admiral Cervera. The marines lowered their rifles, and we were helped into the launch. "Then we were put in cells in Morro Castle. It was a grand sight a few days later, to see the bombardment, the shells striking and bursting around El Morro. Then we were taken into Santiago. I had the court-martial room in the barracks. My men were kept prisoners in the hospital." So ran Hobson's story. Admiral Cervera was so much impressed by the gallantry of the Merrimac's crew that he sent an officer under a flag of truce to tell Admiral Sampson that all were uninjured and well, and that they should be well cared for. They were imprisoned in the Morro until after the first bombardment, when they were removed for safety to Santiago. Hobson and his men were exchanged after a time (July 7th), and Hobson was sent north to arrange for work to be described farther on. II n I i,,.r.E~ a I S: 1;; L a ";P se "i r p,,8 I I E p r ~~ 1. n , ri; i, ii 4. I Ir THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO 253 1. tll % l V CLIL% 113 YV IIIsho11 11,.L. V e,,L,' V,ll ' V i. I 1l were notable, New York showing an especial appreciation by a public meeting in his honor. At the risk of what may appear as a monotonous repetition it must be said that the significance of these demonstrations, like those following the victory of Admiral Dewey, was in this, that they proved the capacity of the people to appreciate real heroism. Dewey was honored because the people were able to appreciate a great sea captain; Hobson because they knew a courageous man when they saw him. But that is not all that is to be said of Hobson and Powell, for they are simply representative men among the younger officers of the navy. A hundred others in the squadron were heart-sick because they had no such opportunity, and opportunity was all that was lacking to.give us a hundred records like that of Hobson and Powell. And there is one other fact about Hobson that is of importance. He has always been known as a typical student. He is what the old-fashioned sailor would call a " scientist." The Merrimac having failed to sink as intended, Captain Chadwick says, "it was at once determined to injure the batteries so that a battle-ship might lie in close. This led to an attack on the batteries during the morning of June 6th. The ships formed in line at 6.40 o'clock. The careful reader will note that 2H iTHE. BLOCKZADiE OF SANTIiAGO jndoni n arrl e Ba _R a.d iin:18. a111 et s IPOnt s 1 O the fsoniditio in;inn tin \h ififi i nuts ih anz 11k M o ati HI an thi Lrgo; ~ o j. in o r h xx } sid: he de2tA iii R'tanids X (, With (1i fionnodor Sx h I y inn Lc~ /i~~l '~~ carge of tlin dix tin thes i / FJ p Oi a t a Iof it F and the Abcihiioo iinthxF apt on iI aDeic hb ide. On a x frong at a fiang of go on Yarks the Ad(S) ni Ok 60jhisei(5i t Iki ttld With a shot Sii~rli di.ij i t ifnK d 6) L thi 6 69C hi IL 11i bu the AM0 MO o. OL WhA nh fi WL A Wl i ix ific nil fit M6n L n a Ln AL. Outr Ce Id iy'niiiL Iihil nvoi ilai Iwinln I lili AtnnA i urynIlt i ani Ldnfinlk morning ILfi the at lung sL SCaH L M iiii d lin l uinnA) uinaufi~i Afidi Li iiiwfi miodfliei I s o i n L itul Iun t Ii uil i r at uunuii~fli. Aim la mm lin l thelink ito i 1uni-i~, hun ln 1mm te. to the ji dd ul AM d te fl A t eri mu mift ui th ul l)h i iiieUill W i i tiS i f l Ii 256 THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO for when the New Orleans fired, only a flash was seen. She carried smokeless powder and there was no white cloud hanging about her to interfere with the men who were looking through the sights on her guns. This is a most important matter. We plume ourselves on the excellence of the work of our sailors,.but we do not give them the full credit that they deserve, for we compelled them to fight with guns that were not the best, and with powder that was as bad as any, if not the worst, in the world. According to. Sampson's report, the firing began at 7.30 o'clock and ended at io. The Spaniards woke up soon after it began and gave a fine exhibit of fireworks-an exhibit that served to strengthen the nerves of our men, even if it did not do any damage. The newspaper reports of the battle all mentioned the dash of the auxiliary Yankee with her Naval Militia crew, and of the Suwanee. The Yankee and Texas kept firing from their stern-guns long after the squadron was ordered out to sea. The Spaniards reported sixteen men from the Reina Mercedes, including her second officer and an ensign, killed, and one officer and eleven sailors wounded, while two Spanish artillery lieutenants and one private were killed and three officers and twenty-one soldiers were wounded among the land force. A number of our shells passed over the hills, and fell in the THE BlLOCkA: OF SANTIAGO 257 of ilarAsix 1 fifi111 A l >a ielfel~ii ud iboXbe..The butit did bar Sn or'e r. bt Meb funr rert oflted fuLHL Wud l fta Sb t waS Wi erd by thb enery 1at1 n thin uEf enb bia dbic fi b Wi a oc udo dutly It 11111 ll Id -~ uid tbuu bx Ipl ulr a luackj aflur tihea 1 u 1 11h M iftasdki (ere lfll jubd l 1 1 idL Gli Lu Iibdif irulions bMlon d IN WN15 lhe 11 uuuu wV il. LThe guhe of. all 1 1.be aer rIO -fa2 L g IalXgra 1 dellaufiric guns ridicd lF the tIbhe au duliug t1W *ra. N.XX. A uI k } aptain MAuN k IaNS i~ ~ ji~~~filccj~~ 0i~~t l0bi~aall a~fl 258 THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO " The watch described was varied frequently at night by the coughing up (for so it sounded) of a gun-cotton projectile from the Vesuvius, the explosion of which at times shook the earth for a radius of miles. I remember one of her earlier efforts, when lying asleep on the transom of the chart-house forward (my usual night resting-place)... I awoke conscious of a heavy jar to the whole ship's structure, which must have been transmitted from the point where the shell landed through the earth and up through the three hundred fathoms of water on the surface of which we were lying.. There is no question of the terrifying effect of these shells upon an enemy; so long as they were expected the men at the batteries remained away from their guns and under cover; and there is also no question of their great destructiveness. They ploughed great pits in the earth, and had they fallen fairly in a battery must have put the guns hors de combat for a time, at least." The shells she fired contained two hundred and fifty pounds of gun-cotton, and men who saw where they landed say that "they made holes like the cellar of a country-house." Could a new Vesuvius be built and armed under designs from Washington, we should have a ship for attacking land batteries that would be a real terror. CHAPTER XV THE MARINES AT GUANTANAMO OUR FIRST ARMED FORCE TO MAINTAIN A HOLD ON CUBAN SOILTHE BAY CAPTURED BY THE MAfRBLEHEAD AND YANKEE-IT WAS HOT WORK FOR A VEEK-THE SPANIARDS IN THE BRUSH -ASSAULT ON A FUNERAL CORTEGE-SPANISH WOODS STATION CAPTURED, AND CAIMANERA'S FORT DESTROYED-A TORPEDO IN THE PROPELLER OF THE TEXAS-GOOD HEALTH OF THIS FORCE ON SHORE. HAVING given the Spanish batteries at Santiago harbor mouth an effective and discouraging proof of the skill of the naval gunners, the next care of the Admiral was to secure a harbor where any of his ships in need of coal or repairs might lie in safety regardless of the weather. For the hurricane season was at hand, and a shelter for these purposes was absolutely necessary to maintain the efficiency of the squadron on the blockade. And a harbor of the kind needed lay'forty miles away to the east-Guantanamo Bay. It was a much better place for coaling ships than the Sand Key Roads at Key West, to which Schley had proposed to return to coal his squadron. A num259 260 THE MARINES AT GUANTANAMO ber of islands divide this bay in such a way as to form an inner and an outer harbor, but the outer bay affords a safe anchorage, while the water is deep (six fathoms or so) near shore, in places, and ships may even come almost to the beach. On June 7th Admiral Sampson sent the Marblehead and Yankee to take possession of the outer bay-an honor which the Yankee received because her crew had run in so close to the batteries and had shown so much persistence in the bombardment on the 6th. The story of this war, it may be said, in passing, shows that the officers who displayed the most aggressive appetite for fighting and adventure were the ones who saw most real service. As the two war-ships approached the entrance of the harbor they received a warm fire from a battery on shore near the telegraph station, while, a gun-boat came out to lend a hand. But when McCalla and Brownson turned their guns loose, the gun-boat fled to the inner harbor, and the men of the battery to tall timber on the far side of the hill. It was only a skirmish, but it gave us a harbor as useful as was Port Royal to the Federal forces in the Civil 'Var. Here the Marblehead remained until June Ioth, when a landing was effected by a force of marines. At the outbreak of the war-on THE MARINES AT GUANTANANMO 26I April 22d-the first battalion of marines sailed from the Brooklyn navy-yard on the transport Panther, Captain G. C. Reiter, for Key West. The battalion was under Lieutenant-Colonel Robert V. Huntington. It included five infantry companies of o03 men and officers each, and an artillery company (four three-inch rifles) of 117 men and officers. These were landed at Key West and remained there until Cervera was found, when they were at once forwarded to Santiago for the purpose to which they were now devoted. On the morning of June Ioth the Panther took them to Guantanamo Bay. The Oregon, the Yankee, the Yosemite (Captain W. H. Emory, with the Michigan Naval Militia to man her), the Scorpion, Captain J. P. Merrell; the Dolphin, Captain W. H. Lyon, and the storeship Supply, Captain R. R. Ingersoll, were also of the expedition. The bay was reached soon after dinner. There was no opposition from the shore, and to the inspiring strains of " There'll be a Hot Time in the Old Town To-night" the men pulled ashore in the small boats of the squadron. The landing was just inside the eastern point of the harbor. ColorSergeant Richard Silvee, of Company C, raised the gridiron flag over the ruins of a blockhouse on the hill at 2.0o o'clock. The blockhouse had been eviscerated by the fire of the 262 THE MARINES AT GUANTANAMO Marblehead and Yankee on the 7th, but the flag-staff was still standing. To prevent possible infection by yellow fever, an abandoned fishing - village on the Port Guantanamo, or Cumberland Harbor. point, and all other houses in the vicinity, were burned, and then the camp was established on the top of the bare hill overlooking the bay where the remains of the Spanish 'block-house stood. The encampment was THE MARINES AT GUANTANAMO 263 ~ — 1 7tff-S_ 1 LI:. L 4t.I-k-., InalleUd Ca.tlll) 1 cVCallai ill hoI of ilLte ',Irlgetic captain of the Marblehead. The naval forces afloat and ashore were enthusiastic over the landing. To the honor of landing the first armed force on Cuban soil the marines added that of the first fight ashore with the Spaniards. The Spaniards had withdrawn from the beach through fear of the ships, but they merely retired to the brush beyond the coast-range hills and there awaited, in force, for what they deemed a favorable time for an attack. During the ioth the marines were hard at work all day landing supplies and getting their camp in order, and they were tired enough to sleep soundly that night. Nevertheless, the Spaniards waited until the afternoon of the i th. But when, at about 5.30 o'clock, they did get ready, the Spaniards were for once persistent enough to keep our men heated up for almost a week. The trouble began immediately after a grizzled old Cuban ally came into camp on the run to say that the Spaniards were upon us. Three Mauser bullets followed the Cuban into camp. At that time some of our men were still at work in the camp, while fifty or so were bathing in the bay at the foot of the hill. As the firing began the bathers ran, half-naked, up the hill to join the command. Meantime, Colo 164 THEt NFARINES AT CVANTANAMUO j)Vc~isio3f aiid ruguhfil>fo 6f Voliffrifig; fififi be 9vu11099~ ihhlQ the buiig Wbx'ibb tie Spaui'i lt ba i~t'u lit'e buanis ini search'i uf lilt' eet'mp' In haf fuher tis fii \ a overfor th piuulut'flg~ 6 buldm xi'idu uud ffif i ilt' i d fculg'pArat' retlurutd iI Ltt'td lu' uf illts u me-PrN'ut't thb sky, and the S0fdlhll'ti fi'tu ii u'uby inils; I a TH I vNIr E ini AT iiii iIAIND MD Mle. I lit utifl a Ete mit t int lt bediffif MR~IELL grutin oi ini Mindt 'on ni it. a nlt -ij biii *iiiif litd ii tl I (I nit i r i I nd t t ruitiutln bn hit alt Eils. ig ui in MieI nife ft * irgtI and Wxrt il i git ii di I I 1 Vailtai e Big e n l afi2Tit 2d 2 JtS6 g a l. t t6tI6tk in un inrtuniinn t Rd rnt W Nd it ini by iK Sbdifigii Di JthI1i Ill n etal lad killed Whlid walllkin frtni ieK lingi iltAiif ain( i flI rteiaiii nfl l|lt bklthininkt bnil it id IK> lited talIha lid xaf kiled by a dant frinm ili arnnii ii tic camp;! with dtltanng ant vir1ig i hi a 1f ititnt 8i Tliv near day (SnilAiNda Jonni ilL) MEMO to a ita sr dlatv lva he iv bv atinl tint gesx tae tis fifiit day rk ia ln i ai saw tIntng til axa -lia iii liu t inIl# fi flIt gill dtlntdtd hni lnti tMnWAE in tvtC It i tIh I paliaruds tuirmt in all nn lii in i ait xt unlv day utnge IT aspiftnvd tdia t o Stilm lvd td ained tihi Cabiin iiick of biflniii KttiiA Wnsh 1t iituLut boitn itl ftn ig t Kirt i the Wlt . 2 4 iii i ~C I a sn infi f1fgh M d Wi t bi Me x.icdc fN1Uwliv|rI Pu Sjxt ialii 4e> liriape giukclwsi puxmdur cefrlf idgu The rtteI We11 t ||f Ulm Ain|cran>s wag; Phrfwufrc, xrcehPn ig at ri;h cril ota f the sps did not Sunl In b Irdia d te paic6 far9kinene it ois Plkly tldeuy w Prcfid wipAd nut the nariris Ai it tras; tin nf UUP mcii-Sur11a1ittdjnr11 (fn111 and11 PHOi1 I1 TaM rrtad Py nur inuni nib 6f xhidP thu panty S tl Te ship i I in fyiar-rindingif th the a~me. tat Pad nuns>' fnr un a, tnk a and uin L~~~~~~~~ u THE MARINES AT GUANTANAMO1 267 the fighting by shellinlg tlhe ibush, but,Lnothing seemed effective in driving off the musquitolike attack. In the course of the day funeral services were held over the bodies of the dead. Chaplain Jones.of the Texas, officiated. That a funeral service was in progress was obvious to everybody who could see the cortege, but the gathering of the men about the graves merely incited the Spanish to the fiercest onslaught of the day. It was not that they charged on our men then or at any time. They never did make a charge, though there were 2,000 of the Spaniards around the bay at one time. But they fired more vigorously during the funeral than in any other part of the day. A party of them located on the west side of the bay, from whom nothing had been heard theretofore, began working their Mausers then, although their shots fell into the bay. Exasperated by such an infamous attack, our men went at the Spaniards with a will that for a time sent them skulking. A couple of Colt's machine guns had been landed, and these now began to sputter. Their shots flew like the water from a hose-in a steady stream, and whenever the gunners were able to locate a Spanish group, that group vanished; nevertheless it was like striking into a cloud of Adirondack punkies. 0 268 THE ARlES AT GUAN.WNAMl ft ran1fi thi M tLe c ar nd the Kere| asi bh zit i INs If idu WiAS Vl jdul hI hu O ShS uf tiulh Ui ulh1hei hau ani r ehur usur ihu uh11011l vor ithi Ii hullst II ulAffi huillgs Riifftiul thw heaui to hlll in dit hlh,l1111 1f uoh fihitn gut tnc voripAl Ilhds the Rlus of tifl me lil 10 U as faot as the tiu uiUl i i ii I lit itth t ||L AtS that lootd cit ohlL JIi t li t tI it th dlys of 6l1itfi thul n the Att ertrutns rosu suute e tt y ten mIt glr lld hgits Iii Ils Wt asht but iuu hufut iI thiig itL ihi On 1IDir the onlig Wea # in fiuih tie mutitfoyh IIt Iwas retiitt i iith No iui IS llt Oi l It A1 tt oiSe bht it L THE MARINES AT GUANTANAIMO 269 was wearing beyond any man's power of description. There was no rest either by day or night, and the marines at last saw that they were obliged either to clean out the Spanish forces from the entire region, or abandon the landing altogether. Fortunately it was learned from Cuban scouts that the Spaniards had a fighting base back between the camp and the sea. They had there a big water-tank with a windmill to pump water from a well into it, while a heliograph on a ridge served to keep open communications with the Spanish fort at the town of Caimanera on the upper bay. To capture this station was of the utmost importance, because there was no other drinkingwater available for the Spanish nearer than the Caimanera fort. On learning this fact (it was on the i4th), the marines went out in force. They found the Spaniards all through the brush, calling to one another from ridge to ridge by imitating the cuckoos of the region (as they had been doing since the Ioth), but no decided stand was made until the crossing of a couple of trails near the Spanish signal station was reached. Even here the Spanish soon fled and were chased over the hills toward the sea, where the crew of the Dolpzhin saw them and drove them back. The Spaniards, supposing that to surrender was to be killed anyway, ran hither and 270 THE MARINES AT GUANTANAMO thither, buffeted by different companies of marines and the despatch-boat, while a small company of Cubans helped the fight with amazing good-will and courage. The Cubans at last captured a Spanish lieutenant with seventeen men, and the chase ended. Then some estimate of the losses sustained by the Spaniards was had. This officer said 68 men had been killed and about 200 wounded that day alone. That their losses during the three days were much larger than those figures is certain. Our scouting parties found many bodies, but there was one sign of the dead that was everywhere present over the brush and that needed no inspection for confirmation. Tile sky was specked over with the black-feathered buzzards, and these gathered in flocks and came down swiftly to almost every place in the brush to which our fire was directed. The buzzard called to the land-crab and said, "We be of one blood-ye and I. Good hunting, all you below!" And the land-crabs replied "A full gorge to you! Come! " Following the destruction of the Spanish base of operations in the woods came an attack on the Caimanera fort facing the upper bay. Captain John Philip of the Texas had charge of this expedition, and he was helped by McCalla of the Marblehead and Delehanty of THE MARINES AT GUANTANAMO10 27I the Suwanee. The Texas brought to, facing the fort at Caimanera, at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of June 15th, and opened fire with twelve-inch guns at a range of 2,400 yards. The other ships soon joined in, and after two or three shots that fell short, almost every one landed in the fort or the town. In reply the Spaniards fired three ineffectual shots and then fled. The fort was destroyed. A remarkable incident in this little expedition up the bay was the discovery that the channel was mined. The engineer on watch in the engine-room of the Texas observed that one propeller had fouled something. An examination showed that it had picked up a harbor mine and jammed it against the sternpost. It was taken up on deck, where it was found to be of the kind designed to explode by contact. It was loaded and primed, but the barnacles had grown so thick on the contact plungers that they had failed to work. Two other torpedoes of the kind were knocked from their moorings by the Marblehead, and a dozen or so were taken up altogether later on. With the destruction of the Spanish station in the woods and the Spanish fort at Caimanera the troubles of the marines came practically to an end. The Spaniards had had enough. But the marines remained as a guard over our naval base until the end of the war, living on r c7 cc cc cc k 0 *0( C Cc - c O 00 ccc cc cc cc C 0 cc 0 THE MARINES AT GUANTANAMO 273 uo thle oiccrs of the Marine Corps, " it has not lost a man through sickness. The number of sick has at no time been more than two and one-half per cent. "The marines landed at Guantanamo, only a few miles distant from Santiago, occupied the same soil, fought in trenches, and endured almost, if not quite, as many hardships 'as the soldiers. The marines have not complained of anything, and apparently have had no cause for complaint, as they were provided for in the best manner possible. Their health was carefully watched and the result speaks for itself. "The officers had nearly all had experience in tropical countries, and they carefully watched the diet of the soldiers, the drinking-water, and everything that conduced to their comfort and welfare. When the tents were pitched the floors were put together and placed on rocks, a rock at each of the four corners, raising the floor slightly from the ground. This prevented the soldiers from coming into personal contact with the soil, and permitted proper drainage and ventilation of the tents." To the honor of commanding our first armed force to make and maintain a landing in Cuba, Colonel Huntington added that of taking care of his men in a way unsurpassed in the history of the war. " From the establishment of the Marine 274 THE MARINES AT GUANTANAMO Corps to the present time, it has constituted an integral part of the navy, has been identified with it in all of its achievements, ashore and afloat, and has continued to receive from its most distinguished commanders the expression of their appreciation of its effectiveness as a part of the Navy."-Report of House Committee on Naval Affairs, 39th Congress, 2d Session. CHAPTER XVI AUXILIARIES AND NAVAL MILITIA THE SPOOK FLEET AND ITS EFFECT ON THE MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY-LANDING AT BAIQUIRI-KILLED BY A SHELL ON THE TEXAS-TWO GOOD FIGHTS AGAINST ODDS OFF SAN JUAN DE PORTO RICO-THE ST. PAUL AND THE YOSEMITE WITH THEIR UNTRAINED CREWS WERE A CREDIT TO THE NAVAL OFFICERS IN CHARGE OF THEM-FIRST AMERICAN FLAG RAISED OVER CUBAN SOIL-GOOD WORK ALONGSHORE. ON June 20th came the army under General Shafter to land near Santiago, and, by capturing that city, compel the surrender or destruction of the Spanish squadron in the harbor. The naval opportunity of destroying the squadron as they lay in the mouth of the harbor in sight of the sea had been lost. The narrow and tortuous channel (remember it was but three hundred and fifty feet wide) had been filled with mines. The land works guarding the channel had been strengthened by landing guns from Cervera's ships. A dash into the harbor was now absolutely out of the question. But the army had been preparing for an invasion for weeks. The President's call for volunteers 275 276 AUXILIARIES AND NAVAL MILITIA had produced the cheering spectacle of thousands of men crowding each other in their anxiety to enlist-thousands more than were needed. Many of these, with regulars to show them the way, had been gathered at Port Tampa, Florida, with a fleet of transports to carry them. An army of Io,ooo men was ready to embark by the 6th of June-one ship-load did embark in fact, but was recalled-when a curious thing happened. What has come to be known as the "Spook Fleet" was sighted by Captain W. H. H. Southerland of the auxiliary cruiser Eagle, in the Bahama Channel on the north coast of Cuba. At 9 o'clock at night, on June 7th, the Eagle's lookout reported a light and five minutes later another was seen. The Eagle went in chase and in a little time saw a squadron of four vessels. The Eagle was within a mile of these four vessels, for a half hour, but none of them answered her night signals. The Eatle then hastened to Key West and reported the facts. Shortly after her arrival the Resolute, Captain J. G. Eaton, came in and reported what were apparently the same four ships in the same locality, and on the same night. These reports stopped the embarkation of the Io,ooo men at Tampa. The New Orleans and three other vessels were on that night en route to Santiago, but the fact that two of --------------------------------------............................................. MUM OFF sil"Affidmi. it OWNHU Mi 22. agm m ai i.. mitmob tF.wwa)k to~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. * v - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' AUXILIARIES AND NAVAL MILITIA 279 our shins failed tn aet respnnnse to their signals was deemed good proof that the ships seen were Spaniards watching for our transports. The Spaniards had had the cruisers Isabel Hr., and the Alfonso XII., the destroyer Terror and a number of gun-boats at San Juan de Porto Rico. It was entirely possible that these should have gone out to look for our transports. Anyway, the sailing of the army was delayed until the I4th, when I6,887 men got away, instead of Io,ooo, and the event showed that every man who went was needed. But the identity of the four ships, called spooks, remains unsolved at this writing. That four real ships were seen is, of course, not doubted. The two crews could not have been mistaken. As it was easy enough for lookouts to miss seeing the signals of the Eagle and the Resolute, it is probable that the ships seen were the New Orleans and her consorts. On the arrival of the army off Santiago it was determined to make the landing at Baiquiri, a little port seventeen miles east of Santiago, where there was an iron.pier, formerly used by an American firm for the shipment of iron ore obtained from a mine back in the country. There was also a beach fit for small boats in calm weather and a railway ran parallel with the beach to the vicinity of the Santiago Morro. 280 AUXILIARIES AND NAVAL MILITIA There was a block-house and a fort guarding the pier, and because the Spaniards were expected to make a stout resistance, a feint of landing at several.places was ordered. Accordingly on the morning of June 2 ist, the Texas, Captain John Philip, the Scorpion, Captain Adolph Marix, and the Vixen, Captain A. Sharp, went to Cabaias, a landing-place a few miles west of Santiago; the Eagle, Captain W. H; H. Southerland, and Gloucester, Captain R. Wainwright, to Aguadores; the Helena, Captain W. T. Swinburne, Bancroft, Captain R. Clover, and Hornet, Captain J. M. Helm, to Ensefada de los Altares, and the New Orleans, Captain W. M. Folger, Detroit, Captain T. H. Dayton, Castine, Captain R. M. Berry, and Wasp, Captain A. Ward to Baiquiri. The coal transports were sent to Cabanias to carry out the feint. there, but when the real attack on the shore batteries was begun it became apparent that no force of consequence was gathered anywhere to resist a landing. Very little reply was made to our bombardments east of Santiago, and 3,000 men were landed in small boats at Baiquiri the first day without special incident. However, the Texas in carrying out orders to attack the batteries west of the harbor shelled the Socapa battery, where some modern rifles from the Spanish squadron were mounted. The Spaniards replied, and near the end of the ut _auFu a.~.o the Puu bew ltdudtg thruti the ljate that NY% j Sfl ti 111 all t1 it i tei o tt oi JI I ti la an I helf tid de l tit thll a t de sa tn XV i i6t Xig ht:t s9cH ifiruch the plating Ot the fattlt i aioe tf the khip, hitigiog i sotiluXh#tatlatt tta t ht addl The rtemattitg troops Xerei all lIdtidii IT thlt X16datriort the Wpatstth U ratitg d ii MOMrd EIad hbt ptejupaiftg to dirt iur iteiitttt e i rhtt of 6061itre Xi N 6fu a oflXX' i ti the l h t ft IbAMEII ou Wag thte ilhigiltip to ulhl hfo:iiN ttit t ti aitltthtllh hDcXaVc It 1 ici rtant, ttoXV, tiXit tltoi 2 AUXILIARIES> AND NAVAXL AMLIATL SKICHMM wa notfiiOt M A let Wo annihilati dg MOthu V fkuu Asni tint Mut did evuftufiy Pa the S t As a to tits Wu igatusud What wu allud n6t East! ern tSqadlfttrt fu an attauh nit the 6nast of tinif of Wtidh s-ndthitg is said fartohr nt, f*n h eudu that the S iad had the dt~itrny1 e i dJrr aid XXXd urd tltruu 6thiu fight& tit Titii at t Jn du MMt W on during all th ot tf Ittittis Was uat fhergttun h At.Lrii iat.i itpnad as s iutas ilucnd sparl ~~.'1 1'."_LE AUXILIARIES AND NAVAL MILITIA 283 a vessel, lihe Ulorde d Lth pUl blUIkaded. I The St. Paul, Captain Sigsbee, was chosen, because she was at once a good fighter and swift enough to carry news quickly to Santiago, should that be necessary. She reached her destination on June 22d, and had a fight on hand before the day was over. As told by the War Budget, a periodical printed on the St. Paul, the story runs: " We came off the port early on the 22d. The weather was fair, the trade wind blowing fresh from the eastward and raising somewhat of a sea. At about 12.40 the third-class cruiser Isabel I., or one of her class, came out and, steaming under the Morro until she was abreast of the batteries, commenced edging out toward us, firing at such a long range that her shots were ineffective. As her purpose evidently was to put us within fire of the batteries we took but little notice of her, lying still and occasionally sending in our largest shell at her to try the range. Soon afterward she dropped to the westward and the torpedo-boat destroyer Terror, or it may have been her sister ship the Furor, was sighted steaming along shore under the batteries. Captain Sigsbee watched her for awhile and worked along with her in order to separate her from the cruiser and keep her in the trough of the sea if she came for us. She then circled to get up speed and headed for us, firing straight as far as direction went, but her shots fell short. When within range of our guns the signal "Commence firing " was made, and for several minutes we let fly our starboard battery at her at from 5,500 to 6,00o yards, the shells striking all around her. This stopped her; she turned her broadside to us, and her fire soon ceased. She then headed inshore to the southward and westward, going slow, and it was evident to all on board that she was crippled, drifting well leeward of the main harbor entrance. Off the Morro she flashed some signals to the shore, and afterward a tug came out and towed her into the harbor. " All this time the cruiser was firing at us, and some of her 284 AUXILIARIES AND NAVAL MILITIA shots and those of the Terror fell pretty close. The cruiser followed the Terror back toward the port, and soon afterward was joined by a gun-boat, and the two steamed under the batteries to the eastward. But when the St. Paul, making an inshore turn, seemed to be going for them, they returned to the harbor and we saw no more of them. " The Spaniards seemed to have settled this whole matter in advance, as they wished to have it, for the townspeople came out on the bluffs to see the Yankee driven off or sunk, and the cruiser flew an ensign at her gaff almost as big as a maintopsail. "The Isabel is bark rigged and carried four 4.7-inch breechloading rifles, four 2.7-inch breech-loading rifles, eight machine guns, and two torpedo tubes. The Terror has two fourteenpounders, rapid fire; two six-pounders, rapid fire; two onepounders, automatic Maxims, and two torpedo tubes. Length, 220 feet; estimated speed, 28 knots. " We know that the Terror was struck three times, and that one shot entering the engine-room killed an engineer and fireman. And from what we regard as trustworthy information, we are inclined to think that she was seriously damaged, requiring the assistance of tugs to keep her afloat." The story is especially interesting because it shows how well Yankee Jack can write as well as how he can fight-shows the grade of intelligence of our man before the mast. The physical superiority of the Spanish force was great enough to have made victory easy for them, and they were so sure of it that the captain of the Terror made a speech in the plaza of the town before he went out in which he gave the enthusiastic audience the details of his plans for bringing the Yankee into port. On June 28th the Porto Ricans saw another fight off San Juan, wherein the odds against us AUXILIARIES AND NAVAL MILITIA 285 were still greater; in fact the handling of our ship, the Yosemite, Captain William H. Emory, was extraordinary. When morning came, that day, many rain-squalls were drifting alongshore with the trade wind, reducing the range of vision so much that a Spanish transport, the Antonio Lopez, with supplies for the town, was able to get within two miles of the Yosemite before she was seen. At that time the Yosemite was slowly circling off the harbor, at a distance of five miles westnorth-west of the Morro. The Lopez was heading in from the west, but on discovering the Yosemite she turned south toward the land, intending to skirt the reefs, and get under cover of Fort Canuelo, on the west side of the harbor. The moment the Lopez was sighted the Yosemite dashed ahead at full speed, the men were sent to quarters, and in a few minutes they began firing their five-inch guns at a range of two miles. At that the guns of the Morro and Canuelo began to belch, and, curiously enough, they got and kept the range. And then came the cruisers the Isabel If. and General Concha from the harbor to aid in the attack. These two ships had seven guns of 4.7-inch calibre between them, besides smaller ones that were entirely effective against any ship like the Yosemite, and their fire combined with that of the 286 AUXILIARIES AND NAVAL MILITIA forts was hot enough to have warranted Emory in seeking deep water at once. Moreover, the Yosemite was manned by inexperienced men (the Michigan Naval Militia). Nevertheless, the Yosemite held her course to head off the Lopez until she drove her hard on the reef, six miles from the Morro, and then she went hunting the Spanish war-ships, only to see a torpedoboat coming from the harbor at full speed, sneaking along shore as if to get behind her. By this time, however, the Yosemite had the range of the cruisers, and they turned back in haste, though keeping up a steady fire. Then the Yosemite had a chase after the torpedoboat, but it got behind the stranded Lopez apparently uninjured. At that the Yosemite opened once more on the Lopez, giving it, all told, two hundred fiveinch shells, besides some six-pounders, and setting it on fire, after which the Spanish cruisers were driven out of sight behind the Morro. What with the forts, the cruisers, the torpedoboat and the Lopez the Yosemite had a call for dextrous manoeuvring that was unique in this war. The Lopez was wrecked, but the Spaniards asserted that they saved twelve of the fifteen guns she was bringing, besides some ammunition. They got it from the wreck after the Yosemite was ordered away. The Yosemite AUXILIARIES AND NAVAL MILITIA 287 kept her battie-fiags flying all day, as she cruiseu off the Morro, in hope that the Spaniards would come out with their repaired Terror, and the other fighters seen in the morning, but it was a vain hope. If anyone had doubted the efficiency of our auxiliary cruisers manned by naval militia, the work off San Juan in June dispelled it entirely. With our naval officers in command, a few experienced seamen for petty officers, the auxiliaries did work that was within its limits quite as creditable as that done by the regular fighting ships. The genius of the nation can very well rest on the deeds of these emergency men for its reputation. There were a couple of minor incidents in the naval history of the month on the Cuban coast that should have mention here. The auxiliary Yankee had a little brush with a gunboat and a shore battery at Cienfuegos, in which one man, S. B. Kennedy, was wounded. Lieutenant Victor Blue, of the Szuwanee, who had made a landing some time before on the north coast, to communicate with Gomez, the Cuban general, now made a complete tour of Santiago Bay, in order to locate exactly the Spanish squadron. For this he was especially commended by Secretary Long. And then there was the hoisting of the first American flag on Cuban soil some weeks earlier, that has been so far overlooked. During 388 AXILIAIS ND E M \V e e i S the mcooth of MAE the blocklidi ATI ic tititiod cl Icilx ht o g ccl tithot stoxllto ii ri 6i I -lid ~~...~~ ~ to Lp a (f i ot I...X.... S B f xlig n xi ix > Ebb i off 1I e trI IxaI Ia i_ U~ aiht t ho mciddle id th liftifit t MAE fei the I h ex o ti hitice cci islaid off that bya ofili irry f cik x io thd >iarxaitotsli ipi ou of garffiinsii, hut thi Spaaiii ad altififeih tu EhaW tfio theiwit tie gcidta)citt ihitc aotu xhifidld ho thu oina t huh e eidcody fiiii wrcs ahaifld t Aso itictc xci tio tk thol Miuaii fifto thu 1htckadce had hac otiaittiind ii. xtitzt idexxl inf ixf bcat Wii W tat tiit dh etiiduixi rtiearl tifi.i Two ntiih t 1 did manae to slih ct of in Ai ciii a otrif ci the e tiitt isi soe dig atet xi wsit of atitgao.s Asd ttt this ltpct it II x iiitltits fic its8Aihor of or Vosgg Wa ulet11 O it totli all idt I r th e i oftIt rwi ps of t Ieo AUXILIARIES AND NAVAL MILITIA 289 blockade-runners at 'W\iimington during our Civil War, it is seen that our work on the Cuban coast was excellent. And it was the dreariest, most wearying, most heart-breaking work of the war. In addition to the blockade work proper, a number of expeditions of Cubans who wished to join the insurgents were landed, with ample supplies, under the guns of our vessels. Then, to return to Santiago, Admiral Sampson had to report that Lieutenant Harlow, with two launches, one of which was commanded by Cadet Powell and the other by Cadet Hart, made a survey of the little harbor at Cabiaas on the 17th, and were "subjected to a heavy and continued fire at short range." The launches were struck seventeen times. The Vesuvius ran into Santiago channel one night, passing clear around the sunken Merrimac to learn her exact position. Curiously enough, the Spanish did not see her on this trip. On the whole, however, so far as decisive work was concerned, our ships in American waters had a quiet time for a month after Sampson reached Santiago. Neither the blockade, nor the fights off San Juan, nor the bombardments of the forts at Santiago (one of which occurred on July 2d) had any marked influence in ending the war. Nevertheless, our unre 290 AUXILIARIES AND NAVAL MILITIA lenting persistence was having some effect, and our army was closing in on Santiago. We at least had the Spaniards everywhere on the defensive, and their situation was everywhere perilous. Cervera had been corralled, if we may use a Rough Rider's term, and he had now to choose between tamely submitting within and making a wild dash through the narrow gate. And when he had considered the matter from every point of view-how at night the Yankee squadron was close in, but by day was farther off; that the Yankee battle-ships were slow and his cruisers fast; that while the Yankees were superior in weight, his destroyers, in the excitement of battle, might reduce the preponderance; that if he remained all would be lost, but if he ran he might save some-when he had considered all this and had discussed it with his captains he could come to but one conclusion: a dash for the open sea had to be made. CHAPTER XVII DESTRUCTION OF CERVERA S SQUADRON LUCK WAS WITH THE SPANIARDS, IN A WAY, FOR TWO OF OUR BIG SHIPS HAD LEFT THE BLOCKADETHIEIR SMOKE HAD EXCITED OUR SUSPICION AND OUR LOOKOUTS WERE ALERT-QUICK WORK WITH THE TORPEDO-BOATS AND TWO CRUISERS-EULATE'S VAIN EFFORT TO CATCH THE BROOKLYN-A RECORD RACE IN NAVAL WARFARE THAT ESTABLISHED TIE FAME OF THE BULL DOG OREGONV-HOW WAINWRIGHT'S DAY CAME AT LAST. WHEN the morning of Sunday, July 3d, came, the conditions off-shore were much more in favor of the Spanish Admiral than he had had any reason to hope for. The battleship sentinels of Sampson's fleet during the fore part of Saturday night were the Massachusetts and the Texas, but some time after midnight the Massachusetts, being short of coal, was ordered away to Guantanamo to replenish her bunkers. She left the squadron at 4 o'clock; we had one less battle-ship than usual to guard the harbor when daylight came. Worse yet, in view of the accredited speed of the Spanish ships, we were also to be lacking the aid of our swift armored cruiser, the flag291 i~~iiil ~i~2222222 0 ~ ~ rt, Bii~ 2:2 -~~~~~~~ 7222 ~~~~~~~~ ~~~Oo iffidf iix xx if *i df _.i tt xxf ii it thiht xx 'ihl o _nehoi x oi the faet that ho had ai tiiidiv adidt the x ox nix i x lx a atid Mhort tanilgo " his oinx liat totil 1 li t xfryoti i I g fiixl xxlthin txa'fty tiloS6 iile ft hiln the hamtswel tuo odi ipald he x wxxude aea haid for a tiatullo pixx inltfig thd lox1 noi th iatshi airi thired skie Xirix e Jo~t in Miltd saae hot fricix d1 kitt-Ce lix1 toae ids 1 xas froma otto xif iho sakioei hip"i Thesx ae lips xKit the hlxno if that 'lins fixi hoAi it x fisi for it was lint if Mie laixrst 'oze nad 'it ~a IOx the ildoitior thill hilldalltpo xfttlOg it in txxf alitd QI!vn she e! 1l1g1tit '! in ittel lih of the ddiKVLX X ANA \IIK fiat thudr Otif fr tita il-latluirt tc no wise nogaCd Et hying 1.\ a I h.ai Itch thc d111 -t rlsr l.Nit................ ocf of h 5i c pacd thrcg i 1ail Il.1Xio 1tt h elidf ex - fir Ir XccWii... il x Lad l.l J:I. f1I ''i' r il ''1 fa111 r Af'i P ii th1 a;' x i dadi:11 cl 1tlt GOT th t ali Ji L the in Ali V T )t~t~X \ t trl CE gt()t 1CR tt~t t t S ~ J 304 DESTRUCTION OF CERVERA'S SQUADRON have been killed or badly wounded, while the beams were ripped and torn, the bulkheads were shattered," and, what was infinitely worse, the fire-main was cut by the fragments of the shell before they passed out on the farther side of the ship. To the destructive effect of these shots was added the damage done by two twelve-inch shells that entered below the berth-deck, making one widened hole where they entered, exploding and completely wrecking the after torpedo compartment. With these huge projectiles came a hail of five-inch and four-inch and six-pounder shells so numerous and so deadly that it is impossible to follow them in detail, but when they burst amid her splintering decks and bulkheads there was no water to quench the quick-spreading flames. Her men, driven from their guns by the sandstorm blasts of our ships, turned inboard to face death in a form still more terrible. There were piles of cartridges in the paths of the flames that were sure to explode; but worse than all that-worse even than the hurtling projectiles from our nearing ships-the fire was leaving the crew no foothold to stand upon. They had literally to choose between remaining where they would be burned alive and running for the beach, where they might have some hope of escape by swimming ashore. "i3 1~~~~'~' I'I~:I:I:IAA:E:I:I:Ijil:jB:E~,e ~~I~ r~a~la,:l~ralP js8ii'':::88$iB 1 ~sO.~.pi"lWl"lll,,'iW'iilAAW IPi"il x,, a,~,~I, '""" n:;;s;,;i; ~iil' '""'""""""'""""""'"' '"'""""ii""''"""''"":RIIIBBiiii:,,,, i ~I,.i;;i ~i~ix~ alaiiiil ~i~al~ii;l;iiiii;:ii x" ,,,,, I,,:,,,,p;s:Inli~ IalliAB:Bo,llPg::?.n bill: ~rE a iiil~i~ix~l~liln i~",i ~"':""':i,.,,,,,,,.ii'UUi Ilsrll "'"'"""""";~I,I~~ s:;;~;r~n:,~:;, i#riap8.;ici %.s~l;;. ~I:;:II~I' ~8~,,,, ~:s st:ii: i:8:I" H:~' r I ;l:~:i,,~'~i' ~'~sP;~ I;l~'ii; 8,, '~r;l~;':,~8''ii ii~;~i~;;iil~l;;l;l;lsli Ijiiiii'~i,'' ii i~~s,'~is~,i, ~ ';A;lil:l~il: ~s ~ii~ E ~":;:s Ilsp: r ii HI I~ -~ 'ji '"'"";'"'""~ s ~"~8li~il'881 ~lp " '; '""'"81iAI;I:~ I[jI~riii:B~r'i;~I r:a: 1 ~""' r: ""BirB",sl I~,~,An:.II,, ra I:al '~~ se~;,183riili sB;I"' r It vr ~;'BiW'~W:I:,ill,, ~il"~r ri3 ~:::r11'11111[81~p'ii,,[I a~1 III sir~e~ ~I:,:E t? xg~ $i ii' 11;,,,,,ra: IBllii.I.lsl,,,,,, _,, i;iQ iaib sillls;ili ""~~riu, ':ij8::~:n:I~ ~I il""l~a, I;IBinnR;il' 'iB~I P#11[111 ~"ix"" r ea; "H"lli";l: ";i'~RI'" ~~n,,,,~ ~s~a;il~ O:ii gorja 81:il~liT,:~il -:~~i" ra, 1111 ss 1iPUo1: UU1; 1 liX ;i8i' ~,e~ ~:;BR. ~rr,~,sR U11::,,,,,,, I[[#,,,,, ~n ~i ~iii?.;I Ilrlil I;illliiilil,,,,,.;. ~~~i~i~~ s;81:l ~.;i'p~ I,;'lls:,'s ~"i~.:IOBB.BgP ''"""'"; 1;1~8~1 sxi~ ~i~j,.. ~ r,: IB:I,,, :A'U 1'" A,, rii,iB: PIB;1:Ai 18" 3i;~il~,;~~ ~1~I;- "iil "" i";"; r~~j;;:.n~~l~ iiiWBI:~81..r,, Iii.iZ ~I ~lr " "':..i:,,,,,,,,,,I,, ~,;;, ~1 ~~" ii raai ";""';'"" ~arraaaaaaIraaaiiaaiia lilBPBPsIBBsmlplPRPPBIPIPBBiiiili i~rs~,,lr~rn ~xxxH"IIII B,"98, r 1111,11 I I I DESTRUCTION OF CERVERA'S SQUADRON 307 With helmcl aport the Maria l eresa was headed for the land, and at io.I5 o'clock she drove, with fire reddening every port, and with a pall of smoke wrapping about her, hard and fast on the rocks "at Nima, six and one-half miles from Santiago Harbor entrance." She was still within the range of the shore batteries that had been worked in a futile frenzy to save her. It was then that the heart of a typical Yan kee naval officer appeared. The Texas, in her swift pursuit of the flying Spaniards, passed the stern of the Teresa as she struck the rocks, and our tars, with natural impulse, began to cheer. But Captain Philip, though the Teresa was wrapped from view in smoke, saw the horror upon her decks, and, turning to his men, said: "Don't cheer. The poor devils are dying." Meantime the full-steam rush of the other Spaniards had carried them past our battle-ships, because to get our boilers steaming at top pressure had been a work requiring time. Nevertheless, the last of the cruisers-the Oquendowas well within our closing coil as she turned -so close, indeed, that never in the history of naval wars was a ship subjected to such a fire as that which flamed about her. For a time nearly every gun that would bear from four mighty battle-ships was aimed at her, and the effect "was terrific." Even as she came out an eight-inch shell struck the hood over 308 DESTRUCTION OF CERVERA'S SQUADRON the forward eleven-inch gun barbette, passed through, exploded instantly, and killed every one of the gun's crew. Three others struck her broadside, passing clear through above the armor belt. Still another pierced the side of the after broadside torpedo-room, and in bursting exploded the head of the torpedo there, and killed all of its launching crew. Another, probably from the Indiana, if its course be considered, "struck under the gun-deck, directly below the conning tower, ranging forward across the deck. Still another crashed through the superstructure, in front of the forward smoke-stack. These were the courses of the larger shells. Of the five-inch and smaller no account can be given, the number was so great, and as her crew testified afterward, it was the whizz and sting of the small projectiles -even of the six-pounders-that drove them wild. For these beat the roll of the deathmarch on the sides of the ship and piercing through, killed so many that blood swashed about the deck like water, and flowed in streams from the scuppers. And then, as on the Maria Teresa, came the flames among the splintered bulkheads to complete the work of horror, and no man could stand longer at his post. Turning in the wake of the stricken flag-ship, the Almnirante Oquendo drove flaming to the beach, and IR~'l ~. | I | I I I I I I _..~~~~~~ii i 1111111 - 1 ~~~~~~1111 l- lg, l- mg l.,,EE,, *~1 igiB~~~............... 11|1 I I~ ~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ DESTRUCTION OF CERVERA'S SQUADRON 311 striking at full speed, shved her nose hih on the rocks, while her stern settled down and with a crash she broke in two amidships. She had reached the land but a half mile west of her sister ship, the Maria Teresa-she was still within long range of a modern gun at the harbor entrance. It was exactly 10.20 o'clock, that she turned toward the beach. In just forty-nine minutes from the time we saw the bow of the first Spanish ship, we had utterly destroyed the two torpedo-boats and driven half of the cruisers ashore. But two cruisers yet remained afloat, the Vizcaya and the Colon, and these were making a most desperate struggle to elude the clawing grasp of our squadron. From her location two and a half or three miles west of the harbor and two miles off shore when the Spaniards were seen, the Brooklyn was in the position of honor-the position wherein she, better than any other of our ships, might meet and destroy the flying cruisers. They had turned to the west, following closely the shore line, and must needs pass her, even if she remained in place, within a mile and a half. Calling for full speed ahead, Commodore Schley steamed toward Morro Castle, while the skilful crew worked their guns with cool precision, until the Maria Teresa was in flames, beaten to death. 312 DESTRUCTION OF CERVERA'S SQUADRON At that moment Captain Eulate, of the Vizcaya, seeing the fate that awaited him if he did not do more than his flag-ship had done, put his helm over and turned out to meet the Brooklyn, gun-muzzle to gun-muzzle, man fashion. Doubtless, too, he intended to ram her, if possible, and the supreme moment of the battle had come. As the Vzzcaya turned out to sea, Schley found himself for the instant heading inside of her-heading so as to reach in between her and the beach, and he concluded that if he continued on that course the Vizcaya would soon arrive so nearly abreast of him that she might use her ram, or at any rate a torpedo. To escape this danger he ordered the Brooklyn's helm hard a port-he brought up his ship so as to head straight at the Vizcaya, then crossed her bow at a distance too great for a torpedo, and continuing on the curved course, swept out to sea, with stern toward the Spaniards until entirely safe from both torpedo and ram. He did not attempt to make any use of his own torpedoes or well-built ram, but heading to the west, maintained a course nearly parallel with that of the Spaniards, and at a distarce from them estimated at two miles. Seeing that he had then no hope of overtaking the Brooklyn, plucky Captain Eulate headed the Vizcaya back to her old course ~c~~8n~:'iW888'i,, r I ".;l;i~i S'~" Eii~;l I ir 5=i ii ~1:,~ ru ~;syir:isair~:ititi ~i~i ri-i ziZ 1. a% r I "t ~L iEiS e8pr - Ir; re (~~~~gHi" f, CB; Ea, iiil~ ii n rah"EcD?i c es 8"L ir I ri;.. ~sii, _,i ur I isa ~x ~ 1, 9 I I"" p I DESTRUCTION OF CERVERA'S SQUADRON 315 along the beach and drove her ahead, hoping to escape the death-storm coming from the lowering battle-ships off his seaward quarter. The Indiana, because of her location, was left out of the fight when the last of the Spanish cruisers had been lost to sight in the cloud of battle, but the Oregon, the Iowa, and the Texas, with their growing pressure of steam, had been able to keep the range and even to close in. The Iowa's dash made men on our other ships think her Captain, " Fighting Bob " Evans, would succeed in ramming one of the flying cruisers, and the cruisers escaped that fate only because the Iowa had been so far out at sea when they appeared; but they could not escape her guns. And then there was the Texas. She had been called the "hoodoo" of the navy, because of many accidents she had endured, but now Captain John Philip, drove her toward the remaining Spaniards on a course that brought her to an easy range of the Vizcaya, while his guns' crews made her side flame unceasingly. Last of all to be named, but never last in the service, came the Oregon. She had been lying farther to the east than any of our ships, save the Indiana, but with a burst of speed that astounded the whole squadron, she swept down to the westward as if to cross the track of the flying enemy. Beginning with the 316 DESTRUCTION OF CERVERA'S SQUADRON Maria Teresa, as it led the way, and turning to the other two-the Vizcaya and the Oquendo -as they reached out to bear the brunt of the battle, she quickly joined with our other ships to annihilate the whole blood-and-gold squadron. By the time the Teresa and the Oquendo had been driven to the rocks, the Oregon had arrived at a close range with the Vizcaya. Indeed, after the Vizcaya had chased the Brooklyn out to sea, she had need to make haste in getting on her old course lest she suffer, at the bow of the Oregon, the fate she had hoped to inflict upon the Brooklyn. And the Texas was, as said, not so far away that her guns would not reach, while the Brooklyn's gunners, now that that ship had turned to parallel the course of the Vizcaya, were driving their shells into the Spaniard with unequalled accuracy, in spite of the range, and the end of Eulate's pride was soon at hand. He had suffered from the fire of the Indiana and the Iowa in passing, but now the mortal blows were coming chiefly from the Oregon and Brooklyn. Not many were needed, it seems, for only three eight-inch, and four five-inch shell holes were found in her afterward, though two other holes may have been either five-inch or four-inch. The five-inch shells were all from the Brooklyn, for no other ship there had fiveinch guns. Of the eight.inch shots no one can ""I '" ~~;,a r r p _i r Z r a r B L li' iar iP I r i E:itl ff j" r 9~ ~iil iii.I,iiiiiilil i E C L iiI: rs ;;; I DESTRUCTION OF CERVERA'S SQUADRON 319 tell which ship fired them, except that the one which struck just under the bridge and ranged forward must have come from a ship behind her, and was probably from the Oregon. But the large shells, as in the case of the other two, were really less distressful than the hail of smaller shot, and to the terror and loss that they inspired and inflicted was added the hell of flame that the shells started in the riven woodwork. Eulate had won the honors of the day on his side, by driving the Brooklyn from his path, but he could not endure, nor could he escape, the storm that was upon him. Like the Teresa and the Oquendo, the Vizcaya was stricken like a deer on the runway, and staggering from the cramping wounds, turned aside to find a death-bed. It was at I I.05 o'clock that she turned and at I I. 15 her engines gave their last beat in landing her on the beach. She had sustained the flight for fifteen miles and rested at last, where her remains still rest, at Aserraderos. But one of the Spaniards now remained afloat -the sleek, foxy Colon. She had skimmed along the beach inside of her bolder associates, and protected by their hulls, as the torpedodestroyers should have been, had escaped with scarce a wound. And now that the Vizcaya was gone, she headed away for the west-to 320 -DESTRUCTION OF CERVERA'S SQUADRON Cienfuegos, to Havana-to any hole that would give shelter from the baying hounds that were upon her trail. That was a record race in the annals of naval warfare. It was then that Milligan of the Oregon, went down into the stoke-hole to lend a hand beside the red-striped men who shovelled coal till the ship reached a speed of eightteen knots, though the pressure of forced draft and the climbing heat made each breath a gasp and each effort a weakening pain. It was then that the impatient junior officers begged for one shot until Captain Clark allowed it, and Milligan, black with coal, came upon deck to thank the captain, and say that his men were fainting below, but if they could hear a shot now and then they could live through and keep her going. She was only a fifteen-knot ship in design, but now, in spite of the strain of the long voyage from the Pacific and in spite of the marine growths upon her bottom, with the bulging, roaring foam piled to the golden crest of her cut-water, she held her own with the flying pride of the Spanish navy. And as she fired, the half-ton shells from Lieutenant Eberle's thirteen-inch guns struck nearer and nearer to the chase, so that hope fled faster than the whirling screws could drive it. For forty-eight miles the Spaniard held her N WafiVdi ztl IhLh IEi K KituK Utahn th 0he bithi the tattled id khi~e afidtv ik I 61i bt ~e i Fl it it ~N~ Idi tiiiiii tim 'n Au I I:. Apt di~n IE~ ~l iu~i~a In a juii ithtlat jun u r;xx nil then inaingl ini lIm Iwiu iutiuu lx tile qnuunn- MWNM Me fifaio h lund t idii I OnIuut tI Makelnn jatulii gnknnallxiegnu aill. 1Ml lthat 1 ImI fdi n ( ifi tIml t iunih rh I Wdetun V6t6 All ftu lift umtAif lig diim ini Mid tltck Vd iaWHO OfufbA>i. 16it I MeeksuFE xi u u Autifi hut CHAPTER XVIII SEAMEN OF THE SQUADRONS CONTRASTED STORY OF SPANISH TREACHERY ON A GOOD SHIP THEY HAD SURRENDERED TO US-CAPTAIN CHADWICK'S REMARKABLE SKILL IN HANDLING THE NEWA YORK-OUR MEN AS LIFE SAVERS-UNDAUNTED IN THE PRESENCE OF FIRE AND EXPLODING MAGAZINES-ATROCIOUS CONDUCT OF CUBAN SOLDIERS-THE SQUADRONS COMPARED-REWARD OF A COMMANDER WHO BREAKS DOWN THROUGH OVERWORK. IN gathering up the loose ends of the story of the battle off Santiago it seems best to begin at the end and work backward. In this way we at least get one interesting view of the character of the enemy we whipped. Adolphus Kentreres, in an interview after the battle, is reported as saying: "The projectiles of the Oregon began reaching us at i P.M., and that, together with the fact that it was not possible to fight with the after guns on account of the Colon's lack of large calibre pieces, and the certainty of being overhauled by the whole American squadron in a few hours, left no other remedy 324 ril:I L rlillil 8 E, 5, r: $ I b B; t~ a pi I s i~I, Dj 1 i Eii b e5 EIIAsil ur r r 8; Ir.a ~r o ig :R "I:B a ~x if, I g gj iCi'l"l ;; n: s~:CI~ I;EBB J:II L 3r I I% t Bi:~;;~~;"ir ~I 1"818,1 " r~,18; rr i iP L1 rnrn I a ys or i~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I. I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SEAMEN OF THE SQUADRONS CONTRASTED 327 than to run ashore in order to avoid useless sacrifice of life." Whether he said it or not, it is true as far as it goes, but it does not tell, and no Spanish officer has yet told, the important part of the story. When the Colon turned to the shore her flag was hauled down and from that moment she was our ship. She was in perfect condition, having been hit by but eight unimportant shots; so far as known she had surrendered because of what her captain expected, not what the ship had received. Well, there was our ship in the hands of our prisoners, and they were driving her on the rocks, not to save their lives, as in the case of the other beaten ships, but to destroy the property they had surrendered to us through fear of losing their lives. And on to the shelving beach they drove her full speed. But that was not all. When once she was beached her engineer's crew were sent to open and break the sea-valves, and so let in the water to make sure of the treacherous work they had already begun. She was boarded by Captain Cook (with others) from the Brooklyn, to whom she was formally delivered. There is a story told among naval officers that when our men boarded the Colon they were met by the Spaniards with open wine-bottles in hand, and desired to drink, and that this was a ruse to keep our men from going below to close the broken sea 328 SEAMEN OF THS SQUADRONS CONTRASTED valves. It is added that the ruse succeeded in making some delay. Although this delay was contrary to the regulations we may be permitted to hope that the story is true. There were the Spaniards masking the destruction of our ship under the guise of hospitality, and there stood our men, easily blinded, because it was impossible for them to conceive such treachery even in a Spaniard. Once we found she was sinking every possible effort was made to save her, while the Spaniards looked smilingly on. The ships that gathered near the Colon were the Oregon, the Brooklyn, the Texas, the New York, the Vixen, and the Resolute. The Vixen, though but a converted tug, had gone through the fight with six-pounders working, and was almost in at the death. The Resolute, Commander J. G. Eaton, was too far away at the start, but he followed the leaders to the end. As night came on the long waves worked the Colon loose from her resting-place, and she was sliding slowly off to sink into deep water, when the New York steamed in, and putting her bow against the stern of the Colon pushed her around and upon the beach once more. Captain Chadwick handled his big cruiser with the ease and certainty that a harbor captain handles a tug-boat. As an exhibition of nautical skill and resourcefulness the act was unique. Nevertheless, the Spanish for the time suc SEAMEN OF THE SQUADRONS CONTRASTED 329 ceeded in their purpose, for the Colon filled, and then turned over on her starboard side leaving only a part of her port quarter exposed. And there she lies at this writing (December I, 1898), curiously enough, at the very spot where the ill-fated Virginius was going to land her filibustering expedition on that fatal night in I873. How the New York was found in the vicinity of the beached Colon is soon told. She had travelled away for eight miles on her mission to enlighten the general commanding the army, when the lookouts discovered that the blockaders and the forts at Santiago were in conflict, and that something enveloped in a cloud of smoke was just without the harbor. What that something was they could not see, but they could imagine well enough, and around turned the flag-ship with her engine-room bells jingling for full speed, and her crew hastening to obey the call to quarters. By the time she was half around they could see that Cervera was coming out. Never in the history of our navy were men more broken-hearted with disappointment. A determined, almost a desperate dash for a chance to join in the fight was made, and she arrived in time to make two long-range shots at the torpedo-boat destroyers and two at the Oquendo. Ensign Powell said afterward that he saw one of these four-inch shots 330 SEAMEN OF THE SQUADRONS CONTRASTED strike one of the torpedo-boats, and there is no reason to doubt his eyesight. It was not the only shot that struck it, even among the larger projectiles; but it helped in the swift work of destruction. Passing on swiftly in the wake of the flying Spaniards, the New York steadily gained on the leader-the Colon, and her crew had a growing hope of yet getting a shot at the cruiser when the last Spanish flag came down, and the fighting was ended for that day. One more word must now be said of the Oregon. The prolonged labor of Captain Clark had broken his health, and after the battle he was condemned by a board of surgeons to leave his ship to recuperate. And that meant, really, that as a reward for his splendid services his pay was cut from $4,500 a year to $2,800. The work of our men as life-savers was as worthy of praise as it was in battle. "So long as the enemy showed his flag they fought like American seamen; but when the flag came down they were as gentle and tender as American women," wrote Captain Evans. To this may be added the fact that they were required to show, and did show, as much bravery in the work of rescue as they did when behind their guns. When it was certain that only the Colon was afloat, and that the Oregon, Texas, and the I X"' ~I" "L "Irs "" ~;ci~ ~21 I L ~x; st ~B es ~Er,~ B ir 2z aj. r s I SEAMEN OF THE SQUADRONS CONTRASTED 333 Brooklyn were in hot chase, the Iowa turned to the blazing wrecks on the beach. So did the Gloucester when the destroyers were out of the way, while the Indiana was equally prompt in the humane work. And then the Ericsson, that was following with hot foot in the trail of the Colon, was ordered to turn ashore instead. There was need enough for all the help that could be given-need in one way at the wreck of the Vizcaya that is almost unbelievable. For she had run ashore at Aserraderos, where many Cubans were camped, and as her crew leaped from her burning deck unarmed to try for life in the breakers, the Cubans came to the beach and began to shoot the helpless sailors. It was atrocious-almost as atrocious as the acts of the Spaniards in shooting every Cuban they caught before we intervened, and in starving and slowly torturing the unresisting reconcentrados. But when our men arrived in small boats the shooting stopped instantly, and then began the heroic task of saving the wounded from the blazing decks. There was "Fiddler" Trainor, as he was called by the newspaper reporters, a man of the Iowa-an average man among scores of others. He "shinnied" up a rope to the rail of the Vizcaya, although her plates were red with the glowing heat, and dragging three terrorized Spaniards from the upper deck, tum 4-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~4 ICS OM ~ - 44- 4 ~/ ZZ Tfib h 1'1 ME1:thed x;I Vf lV {AL ithe trix> n11r Stub Hik itui tiifsus Sib Is xlii & 1 f i h d s rVhi S r ui ts DE i / ffi irSS MraIui iS UR s dj5 21S d Wdi s bUSb Wih Is e >M i sisfu + Sitst tiE i Sf dS it R I xxiit\sb A xgx ti di ss id ifftbtifsi xx is itiiti. i l bs sib x it U tiss Vii iiii iiuVVo thu R / t. LsI 336 SEAMEN OF THE SQUADRONS CONTRASTED It seems enough to merely mention the spectacle the burning ships afforded. Rarely has it happened that men of this day have seen a warship burn, but at Manila we saw a squadron on fire, and here off Santiago were two ships half a mile apart blazing fiercely, while a third was but a narrow span farther away. And when to the flame-splashed clouds of smoke arising from the three was added the volcanic blast of the exploding magazine on the Oquendo -who can adequately describe the scene? And there were heavy explosions of ammunition on all the three stranded Spaniards. I think the destruction of the Maine was then, at last, avenged man-fashion. The following table, from the Army and Navy yournal, is believed to be a fair estimate of the number of guns engaged on each side: UNITED STATES. SPANISH. i3-ir [2-in 8-in 6-in 5-ir 4-in 6-p 3-P I-p Mac ch................ 4 lch................ 4 ch................ 8 ich.............. 7 ich rapid-fire guns... 6 ich rapid-fire guns... 3 ounders............ 47 ounders............ 4 ounders............ 4 hine.............. 8 Total.......... I 19 The Vixen is not included. I -inch............. 6 6-inch rapid-fire guns.... 5 5.5-inch rapid-fire guns.. 15 4.7-inch rapid-fire guns.. 3 12-pounders........ 4 6-pounders............. 2 I-pounders............ 5 Hotchkiss, Rev. Cannon, 37 m m................. 21 Max.-Nord......... 4 Machine..... 7 Total.......... 9.. 9I SEAMEN OF THE SQUADRONS CONTRASTED 337 To determine the quantity of metal thrown, take the time allowed from fire to fire for the thirteen-inch gun as a unit; then in that length of time the weight of metal from each thirteeninch gun would be I,Ioo pounds; from four guns, 4,400 pounds. The allowed time from fire to fire for the thirteen-inch is 320 seconds, and for the twelve-inch it is 300 seconds; hence the weight of metal thrown by the twelve-inch in 320 seconds is 3,613 pounds. These quantities for other calibres are found similarly. Hence we have for the American guns: I3-inch............. 4,400 4-inch rapid-fire guns.. 1,584 12-inch............. 3,613 6-pounders........... 7,520 8-inch............. 12,000 3-pounders........... 384 6-inch............ 1,778 i-pounders........... 720 5-inch rapid-fire guns. 3,840 Total weight thrown in 320 seconds, 35,839 pounds. Total weight thrown per minute, 6,720 pounds. In determining this quantity for the Spanish guns, the same time allowances are used. The weights of projectiles are for common shell; the time unit is 300 seconds, being the interval from fire to fire of the United States twelveinch gun. i -inch............. 3,516 4.7-inchrapid-fireguns. 1,440 6-inch rapid fire guns 3,750 6-pounders......... 3,150 5.5-in. rapid-fire guns 10,277 I-pounders and R. F. G. goo 12-pounders......... oo Max.-Nord.......... 300 Total weight thrown in 300 seconds, 24,133 pounds. Weight thrown per minute, 4,827 pounds. SEAMiN 3OFl TiL SUADLRNS CNTRASTLD I,Wii be RoU that tic Melii ihici cach per Initi waxs A6ao F6 l< this i apprxifikicltcy dl 139 ig i it ccfu xtib tvhe fr of iliiidd Iibbi ghips iiiid of i_ i.grcdxh aujj ji d this I Iigulrl i uci'ii couiii ld iot alo account f =or hi in HOx gr lth diiiiy xxas appcar on._ilo a fiiiithU. Tic Spanii xrcr W sxx'px ft~ro thc sca Our shipsg rr'ccivd onl.................... h Sp s l i i l |i h # 2 K s K K K K K2'2 0 K v K K K K 2K' KKK , KK K K JK K K 2 KK. K KKKK K K KKK K K K - K K' K KQ K KCK K QKK K KK(ThK KK K K K KK K K 340 SEAMEN OF THE SQUADRONS CONTRASTED ures on their side can never be given, but a good estimate places their original force at 2,125 men, of whom nearly one-third were killed and the others made prisoners. On a survey of the wrecks it appeared possible to save the Maria Teresa and the Colon. By the unwearied efforts of Naval Constructor Hobson, who returned to New York for wrecking apparatus, the Maria Teresa was floated in October, taken to Guantanamo, there partly repaired, and then sent North. En route a gale was encountered, and she was abandoned by her crew because her commanding officer thought she was about to sink. A few days later she was found on a coral reef off Cat Island, one of the Bahamas. Instead of sinking she had drifted sixty miles to a resting-place, and there she lies at this writing (December I, I898). As an inspiration to our people, especially to our seamen, any one of these ships was worth twice the cost of a new one of equal power. It was a spirit of parsimony that allowed even the broken-backed Oquendo to lie on the rocks. She should have been taken off piecemeal, if need be, and at any cost, to be put together again and set afloat under the Stars and Stripes. The talk about the expense of saving these ships makes one wonder whether the Spaniards were wrong after all in their SEAMEN OF THE SQUADRONS CONTRASTED 341 favorite appellation when describing us. The bravery of Hobson on the Merrimac was magnificent, but in his work on the wrecked ships, though it was in vain, he set an example that should stir the patriotism of his country long after he is dead. A word only of the lessons we learned at Santiago seems necessary. The first tells of the deadly nature of wood in the construction of a war-ship. The second tells of the value of quick-firing guns-that we must develop, as soon as possible, long, high-power, quick-firing seven-inch or eight-inch guns for the broadside of our battle-ships, with ammunition hoists able to keep them supplied with cartridges. The third is the need for speed in our battleships, and that is one we have taken to heart. The fourth is the need of sheathing our ships with wood and copper to keep the bottoms clean. Last of all is the lesson of the gunner's school. We had practised well at the target while at Key West, and our relative excellence when compared with the Spanish was well-nigh a hundred to one. But actually we fired more than 6,000 shots, and when we came to count the shot-holes in the wrecks we found a record that is shown by the following table compiled by the Scientific American from the official report of the Survey Board: 342 SEAMEN OF THE SQUADRONS CONTRASTED Number of Hits on each Vessel.. Il U Size of Gun. oer. 6-pounder.... 17 43 13 4 77 42 1.83 i-pounder.... 2............... 2 13 o. 15 4-inch........ I 7 4 2 12 3 4.00 5-inch....... 3 3 7 I I5 6 2.50 6-inch.... I I...... I 3 7 0.43 8-inch...... 3 3 5...... 12 8 0. 67 12-inch........ 2................... 2 6 0.33 13-inch........ 8...................... 8 o.oo Totals...... 29 57 29 8 123 103 To reach that number-one hundred and twenty-three hits-we counted even the tiny holes our six-pounders made in the smokestacks. Of course many hits were made in the burned up wood-work and on parts of the ships that were under water when our survey was made. But since we won a sweeping victory we may soberly face the facts. We made no more than three effective hits out of a hundred shots. And only two of our largest shots hit at all. What would we say of a trap-shot who killed but three birds out of a hundred? CHAPTER XIX CAPTURE OF GUAM AND MANILA A BOMBARDMENT THAT WAS MISTAKEN FOR A SALUTE-THE EMPEROR-WILLIAM GERMANS WERE INCLINED TO MAKE TROUBLE, BUT DEWEY WAS A GOOD DIPLOMAT AS WELL AS A FIGHTER -OUR FRIENDS, THE BRITISH-NOTABLE VOYAGE OF TVO MONITORS. THE destruction of Cervera's squadron was the death-blow to Spanish power in America. The capture of Santiago and the conquest of Porto Rico were thereafter matters requiring brief time and small effort. But meantime something had been done on the Pacific. An expedition to aid Dewey at Manila was planned immediately after his great victory at Cavite and the capture of the forts at the mouth of the bay gave him full control of the water there. He might have taken Manila at any hour, but he had no landing force to control it if he took it, and that such a force was absolutely necessary for the safety as well as the control of the city, appears from a consideration of the fact that the Island of Luzon, like 343 344 CAPTURE OF GUAM AND MANILA Cuba, was in great part overrun with a horde of insurgents, whose character was as low as Spanish cruelty and greed had been able to make it. Even the hospital at Cavite had tobe protected by our marines from insurgent outrage after we had driven away the Spanish forces. Command of the forces to be sent to Manila was given to Major-General Wesley Merritt, and the first division of his troops, numbering over 2,500, sailed from San Francisco on May 25th, convoyed by the cruiser Charleston, Captain Henry Glass. The expedition sailed by the way of the Ladrone Islands, arriving there on the morning of Monday, June 2oth. A little fortification, called Fort Santa Cruz, was found on a coral-reef at the mouth of Guam's Harbor (San Louis d'Apra), and the CharlesIon, on passing in, bombarded it, in the hope of having a small fight, but without avail, and she steamed on unmolested to the usual anchorage. Then came a small boat with the Spanish flag flying bravely above its stern, where were sitting Lieutenant Garcia Guiterrez, of the Spanish Navy, Captain of the Port; Sefior Romero, health officer, and Francisco Portusac, a native of the island, who had been naturalized in the United States and had now come out to greet his countrymen and act as interpreter. But no interpreter was needed, CAPTURE OF GUAM AND MANILA 345 for Captain Glass speaks Spanish, and to him Lieutenant Guiterrez said (vide the account of 0. K. Davis, in New York Sunt): "You will pardon our not immediately replying to your salute, Captain, but we are unaccustomed to receiving salutes here and are not supplied with proper guns for returning them. However, we shall be glad to do our best to return your salute as soon as possible." The reply of Captain Glass was short and surprising. " What salute?" he asked. The Spaniards looked at each other with raised eyebrows. It was odd that Captain Glass should ask such a question. "The salute you fired," they responded together. " We should like to return it and shall do so as soon as we can get a battery." Captain Glass smiled. " Make no mistake, gentlemen," he said. "I fired no salute. Our country is at war with yours. When I came in here I saw a fort, and I fired a few small shells at it to unmask it, and see if there was any response." The Spaniards were astounded. They had heard nothing of the war. Don Jos6 Marina, Governor of the group, was brought from Agana, the capital, and with the garrison of two companies of soldiers was taken to the squadron; and on Monday, June 2ist, Old Glory 346 CAPTURE OF GUAM AND MANILA replaced the Spanish ensign over the group. On July ist, the expedition reached Manila Bay. Meantime Dewey had had some trouble in Manila Bay owing to the attitude of Admiral Diedrich, commanding a squadron of five warships sent there by the German Emperor. People who know what good citizens our German-Americans have been always, were unable to understand, at first, this act of Emperor William, but those who had met Germans in foreign countries knew all about the feeling which business antagonisms have created in German minds, both in Germany and elsewhere. The very fact that German-Americans are good Americans makes the Emperor-William Germans hate us. Admiral Diedrich disregarded the harbor regulations established by Dewey, by sending his launches scouting around the bay at night. He sent a ship (the Irene) to interfere with the attack of the insurgents on a Spanish post in a neighboring port (Subig Bay), and Dewey was obliged to send a couple of our ships there to drive the Germans away. He carried Captain-General Augustin to Hong Kong when that official was relieved of command by the Madrid Government and so prevented our taking an important prisoner. Finally, when we had increased our force by sending out the monitors Monadnock and Monterey CAPTUREC OF CU AND MANIL 347 (a fintabib Vage tfln by the way, thuogh the MoAw ek 1did nut arrive in timeU and by raLif FEr liand fuire to to6;6 men ad We ere readt tou take the cdtyx he oine wlith two Flrenidh si in getting uot uf ur range on une rdE of the bay while the Eng ish And the apanee AE to r se of the aer ad l u cT e. ut. r it 5 I 5 5 I x fcIS The 1 ltsoibr shtips WereBW ii NiW >aid ttWt r. ur EUL tjoin witt or if thle dertt rs itf iffA M lbdIn fadC WerFe as eidexxhe critig rit xxii the bit ish xvet Ptr 9teadf fst friens T hr icrit wddd tlteir giltiuttn as the Lican I mpti inrrxtsed his at isanda, te1 there ig no fjottshn Germans cutsyIpehd lx xC ic tire cc MaItem On Jul1 tvth a so cod fcr~e uf Ameticans 348 CAPTURE OF GUAM AND MANILA arrived, and on the 25th, a third, with General Merritt himself in command. On August 4th came the monitor MIonlerey, Captain E. H. C. Leutze. The Monadnock, Captain W. H. Whiting, had been delayed, but she was expected any day, and preparations for an attack were made. The accession of General Jaudenes to the command in place of Augustin-a squirming Spanish effort for delay-was somewhat successful, and action was postponed from time to time, although there was some fighting in the trenches, until August i3th. Then Dewey ranged his ships before the Spanish forts, and at 9.30 o'clock in the morning the Olympia opened the battle. The firing lasted for over an hour, but there was no reply from the Spanish guns, and at Io.50 we stopped to ask by signal if the city had surrendered. They replied by asking for a conference. This was granted, with the result that the Olymfpia was able to signal at 2.30: "The enemy has surrendered." Flag-Lieutenant Thomas M. Brumby, of Admiral Dewey's staff, hoisted the American flag over the surrendered city. The navy's loss in the operations at Manila was nothing. The army saw some fierce little conflicts in the trenches, but the losses were small. It is not too much to say that Admiral Dewey, by his firmness, patience, and diplomacy in dealing CAPTURE OF GUAM AND MANILA 349 with the Germans, and with the insurgents (who were to an exasperating degree obstreperous), and last of all with the Spaniards, showed his greatness as a commander quite as much as he did in that splendid dash when he destroyed the Spanish squadron. CHAPTER XX SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO AND AFTERWARD DEADLY ACCURACY -IN FIRING AT A TARGET FIVE MILES AWAY AND OUT OF SIGHT BEHIND THE HILLS-OUR SHIPS AT MANZANILLO, AND A POETIC TRIBUTE TO THREE OF THEMTHE CAPTURE OF NIPE-WHEN ENSIGN CURTIN OF THE lWASP DEMANDED AND OBTAINED THE SURRENDER OF PONCE BY TELEPHONE. ALTHOUGH the Spaniards in Santiago very quickly learned that Cervera's squadron had been destroyed, they showed a disposition to continue a stubborn resistance rather than an inclination to surrender, and in proof "of this is the fact that late on the night of July 4th they sent their 3,ooo-ton cruiser Reina Mercedes to add to the obstruction made by the Merrimac in the channel inside the Morro. And it should be said here, that their stubbornness was due to a knowledge of the growing weakness in our army through the effects of fevers. They were not sure their torpedoes could keep Sampson out now that their squadron was gone. It happened that night that the Massachusetts and the Texas were on guard, the Massachusetts 350 SURRENDER L SANIAGO AND ALER 351 uagng hur wiferhIight ouD the haiDnnh1 mnd the nAGN ]yilg tby in the dUufufi~k It Wa a mat ter of IEN AGonD the blhkkdU that the muia Gho MhEu Mlt thu tARM ut the duaiutuh glttr 1; 5 iii __ h aaiii fa r i ubuHm mimq Itd umthueguns thtf thu MlrAN6 Uth ttleu ufiu tit h DtUbliRthI __ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ML 352 SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO AND AFTER experience. The Mercedes soon drifted, unmanageable, to one side of the channel, and grounded and sank, leaving a part of her deck still above water. She was hit by five of our largest shells. The soldiers in the forts were on duty for the occasion, apparently, for they returned our fire as vigorously and as ineffectively as ever. An eight-inch shell from a mortar did fall on the Indiana, passing through to the berthdeck, where it exploded, with the effect of showing that eight-inch shells weighing but two hundred and fifty pounds are useless for such work. However, a fragment did dent the ward-room punch-bowl somewhat, and it was carefully preserved and mounted in silver, for use as a cover to the bowl it had so nearly ruined. Another ship that was lost to the Spaniards about this time was the Alphonso XII. She sneaked from Havana on July 6th, but was headed off at Mariel, twenty-five miles west, by the Castine, Captain R. M. Berry, and overhauled by the Hawk, Captain J. Hood, the Prairie, Captain C. J. Train, and the Badger, Captain A. S. Snow, in the order named. She was driven ashore and set on fire by the attack. She was of about three thousand tons displacement, and had no mean battery (six six-inch and two three-inch guns), but she was no match for our auxiliaries. Her crew escaped ashore. SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO AND AFTER 353 On July ioth, our squadron bombarded the city of Santiago. There had been truces and conferences between our land forces and the Spanish without avail, and the non-combatants were finally warned out. Then the New York, the Brooklyn, the Indiana, and the Texas, ranged up facing the hills, set their guns for a range of 9,ooo yards and began firing on the city they could not see, but whose location was accurately plotted on the chart. In all one hundred and six shells (chiefly eight-inch) were fired, and all but three fell in the city. It is admitted that the terrible accuracy of this fire convinced the Spanish General Toral that he could not hold out much longer. The ships could with absolute certainty destroy the whole city. On July I8th, at 7.30 o'clock in the morning, the Wilmington, with Captain C. C. Todd as senior officer, led the Helena, Captain W. T. 'Swinburne, Scorpion, Captain A. Marix, Hist, Captain L. Young, Wompatuck, Captain C. A. Jungen and the Osceola into the harbor of Manzanillo, that is found some distance west of Santiago. A right brave attack had been made on this port by the Hist, Captain Lucien Young, with the Hornet, Captain J. M. Helm, and Wompatuck, on July ist. They faced five well-armed gun-boats, besides pontoons armed with six-inch muzzle-loaders, and succeeded in in~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~iJ I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 19P 2< Z - 4: CA rd a 42 U I n2 Cl En C thr irrC Cr* CQQ0 C~ C iic " ~ - SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO AND AFTER 355 sunk, and the Estrella de Guantanamo, the Guardian, and the Sentinel Delgado were shot to pieces. Whereat, inspired by the brave deeds of the smaller auxiliaries in the first fight, Mr. Frank Taylor, an enthusiastic contributor to the Army and Navy Journal, broke into song: Why do our battle-ships scour the main, What need of big cruisers to thrash old Spain, When we have a surplus of Yankee pluck And the Hist, the Hornet, and WIomfpatuck? The Spaniards scoffed at our " Navy of tugs," Manned by ignorant sailors and thugs; But a different tune is sung since they struck The Hist, the Hornet, and 1Vomnzfiatuck. A toast to brave Jungen, Helm, and Young, May their praises long and loud be sung: One foot on the table, boys, " Here's luck," The Hist, the Hornet, and Wompatuck. No attempt was made to reduce the batteries. As usual we suffered no losses, although at the last our ships had closed in to a half range for field-pieces. Following the destruction of Cervera's squadron our new flying squadron, or Eastern squadron, as it was officially designated, was organized for a raid on Spain's coast, as an answer to her threat to send Camara's squadron to Manila. The Newark, Captain A. S. Barker, was made the flag-ship, and the Iowa and Oregon, with seven auxiliaries and transports were 356 SURRN)ER OF SANTIAG) AN FTER kdfcU. 1'nnnnndun 3 n.n... put 4dddd Cibifffiddgi jXfif s Watson NOS put i in ofonand instuad Of Shlc} On jnMy a St; a raid Wag nrada 6n Nip; 6n. 'M 7 X yo a on y ogpnsttu: t. utniago. Id /l. o g i/fY thei Jof I a / ka aptatn of ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ T iih astpWith the inz~Cpti f1 If SY atlt a. 11~ ~ ~ ~~~~~ I mil d thuiX~ IBule 1 r1 yptstitatt ssatItit of Pui lih drf 'lla Fp ',,.ard \vau yS~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~j pu,,r- VXfiS ~g'gX stEoto rStttP n 5 tni f ttileli iN11ryt utattE X tD mX~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~and;~ ta 91"[l fin Situ itaitnul asl thu oA tUtIun thu fots ugYa tring iun Spattd t t o aons Pte theu t u yu wsN Wu rtnu Y iir ruLa Yf a a ao ali Spanift rup thu f itin. aaoftfiatd~it66k yin hi navy; ande is F-mah gst-re if *=L _ oda iDe ja nsa apd iE:li lartadd With a ldtter fnt rfaa aadlifeuy tnmunat icrl wbiti a nataided 360 SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO AND AFTER the surrender of the port and city, and he wore his side-arms, and an expression in which there was no trace of pity. "The Captain of the Port informed him that the military commander was at Ponce, but that he might be persuaded to surrender if the American naval officer would con descend to drive up to Ponce, and make his demand in person. The American officer fairly shook and quivered with indignation. 'Zounds,' and ' Gadzooks,' and ' Damme, sir,' would have utterly failed to express his astonishment. Had it come to this, then, that an ensign, holding the President's commission, and representing such a ship of terror as the Wasp, was to go to a mere colonel, commanding a district of 60,000 inhabitants? "'How long will it take that military commander to get down here, if he hurries?'" demanded Ensign Curtin. The trembling Captain of the Port, the terrified foreign consuls, and the custom-house officials thought that a swift-moving cab might bring him to the port in half an hour. 'Have you a telephone about the place?' asked the Napoleonic Curtin. They had. "' Then call him up and tell him that if he does not come down here in a hack in thirty minutes and surrender, I shall bombard Ponce.' " ~:::::::::,i! u3i ~ I I f Iraaa~iaa ~~,,s,~,~,~~,~,,-, ~iara ~iai;iion~aiis:,iii i r I r9 I cl,ri sb~~rr I SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO AND AFTER 363 "This was the Ensign's ultimatum. He turned his back on the terrified inhabitants and returned to his gig. Four hacks started on a mad race for Ponce, and the central office of the telephone 4S rang with hurry calls. "On his way out to the ship, Ensign Curtin met Command- So er Davis on his. Port of Manzanillo. way to the shore. Commander Davis looked at his watch. 'I shall extend his time another half hour,' said Commander Davis. Ensign Curtin saluted, sternly, making no criticism upon this weak generosity of his superior officer, but he could afford to be magnanimous. He, at least, had upheld the honor of the navy, and he will go down in the history of the war as the middy who demanded and obtained a surrender by telephone. "General Miles landed in the morning after Curtin had taken the place, and Mr. Curtin came ashore in the same boat with us. We asked him if he had already landed, and he replied, modestly, that he had, but he spared the 04 ~ -0 w P ~ ~ I S 0e 7 et j:3 47 37~~~~~t En37 pq C CHAPTER XXI OUR NEW NAVAL PROGRAMME VESSELS THAT WERE IN THE SHIP-YARD WHEN THE WAR BEGAN -TWO-STORY TURRETS AND BROADSIDE BATTERIES-SMOKELESS POWDER IN FUTURE, WITH GUNS THAT FOR THE MOMENT WILL LEAD THE WORLD-SHIPS TO REPLACE THE MAINE-THE NEW MONITORS-A TALE OF A TORPEDO-BOAT ON THE BLOCKADE-A SPLENDID FLOTILLA TO COME-A WORD ABOUT THE NAVAL ACADEMY. THE breath of the sea comes once more to inspire the American nation as it did after the War of 1812. We began in halting fashion and under the spur of necessity, in the days after the Revolution, to build a navy. We were in the old days so full of the harbor-defence idea that we wasted much of our resources, but we did get a few ships afloat that were typical of our genius-got them afloat just in time to save the honor of the people. So in these late years we began in a way that was worse than halting to create a sea-power. We were still possessed with the idea that the way to resist aggression was to retire within our protected 365 366 OUR NEW NAVAL PROGRAMME waters, and shoot at the off-shore enemy; the porcupine was still cherished rather than the eagle as a war emblem. Nevertheless, we did get commissioned just enough modern ships of war-enough when they were supplemented by half-antiquated monitors and many converted merchantmen-to enable our seamen to show their skill and valor. In a way, our inferiority in ships and guns, as compared with the best of European construction, was to the advantage of our sailors, for they swept the enemy from the sea in spite of all. We destroyed more than a score of the enemy's ships, including a squadron of the best kind of cruisers, all in open battle, and we lost just one man killed in doing it, where they lost more than a thousand. Never before was such work known in naval warfare, and yet it was done with material that was not the best in the world. But when the whole truth is told we had done somewhat better than has appeared so far in this history, in the way of building a navy. For only those vessels have been described that had actual part in the fighting. We had laid down in the ship-yards five battle-ships, not yet described, at least two of which would have carried the flag to sea within six months, had the war lasted that much longer, and the three would have been ready within a year. These are the Kearsarge and the Kentucky in one ia I~~!~~,,~,~l;i,~,,,~,;;sanr, I "t _iE.l.il.i. i.ililiiiiiiliiii.!iiiiiiiiil!i.! I rs;rns,~;nr~;i " I,, iilll:,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ~rnrs~rnnr ~ll11,l,xs1,,,*,*,*~ix*il i"d,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,i"""ii""'i'"',,,,,,,,,,,., l;li;lll'~iilllll;iliiilli BQiii;':illl i il ~ '...:liiiiiii:iliiil~.1..1. I o ~ssniirr~is ~iaarn ba B ~~,~,~rr,~ ~isl~ :,'~;~;~;'~,iil;l,~~;~~:iiQ'iiililllsBlil:;allgg:i:;8ili'iiiiii;iill:11;8liis r. a iil a ru ~iraaar~;,aaliaal ~;iaaiaa~iii ii ~rnrnr ii iBii:8iili rr, _,,, ra; I I ~d E [ii; ~re rii, n,r ~rr ia if; ~Sb i "xi ; rr iiilillliillilililili!liiliiiiiiiiilli i, I r; Iliilriilillill,:ilili.,,,,,,,,,,, iarnrsii, ai. """ *F ~a ~issas~;l:aar*ii~*rral Lir.,-ra I OUR NEW NAVAL PROGRAMME 369 class, and the Alabama, Illinois, and Wisconsin in another. It is important to note the date when two of these ships were authorized by Congress, for the Kearsarge class was ordered on March 2, I895, and yet they were not ready for the emergency that came upon us three years later. WVe might, in a case of distress, build a battleship in a year, as England has done, but the old motto of "slow and sure" is better, and we must look ahead for the needs of our navy in these days, when we must go to the crucible for steel, instead of to the forest for timber, if a ship is wanted. The Alabama class was ordered on June 10, I896. All of these five new ships are of one size in the hull —368 feet long, 72 feet wide, and with a maximum draught of perhaps 27 feet, when full loaded for sea. The Department places the displacement at 11,525 tons, when twothirds loaded, but the fact is, when ready for battle, if ever they see real service, the displacement will probably be considerably more than 12,000 tons. Horse-power (Io,ooo) to drive them sixteen knots is provided for, but we hope that they will do half a knot better, at least. So far they are alike. In guns there is a remarkable difference. In arming the Oregon class we were somewhat over-burdened with the 370 OUR NEW NAVAL PROGRAMME home-defence idea. We piled four turrets for eight-inch guns on each, along with the thirteen-inch gun turrets, for the purpose of increasing the weight of metal thrown. We thought we could thus throw two thirteen-inch shot and four eight-inch in a round either ahead or astern, while double that number could be thrown in a broadside, besides two six-inch shot and a hail of the smaller projectiles that, as we now know, are so tremendously effective against unarmored superstructures. But we were mistaken. It was at once seen to be impossible to fire the eight-inch guns fore and aft, because the blast of the gases would penetrate the openings in the thirteen-inch gun turrets, to the excruciating distress, if not the destruction of the men there. Stops are now placed on these turrets, so that the guns cannot come nearer than an angle of ten degrees to the keel. 0 In the Kearsarge class we tried the plan of building two-story turrets-a small turret for two eight-inch guns above the big turret for the two thirteen-inch guns, and we have every reason to believe that the system will work admirably. Although this gave us but four eightinch guns where the Oregon has eight, we shall be able to fire as many guns of the two calibres in a broadside as the Oregon, and we shall fire two eight-inch dead fore and aft, where the a 81:iiUa"i8P~iipi 8ii'p.l;p,,:Paililil.iiliiiiiP;lill r, 'I na E L r r d,l~iiiiriri;riilii:iiiii:l:l I'l~lilil'l'l~;'l:l~ 1~ ''1'":1'1:1 I:i:l:l:l:":l:"iiii:1'1:1:1 I~l'i~l:i: bil i~,,~+issr ca, scs I" I ir 'iiB i;ii ~sillrl ~s? r 91 1? i;, ',,,,,,, A -i"ii " :"""l'w "'" ~~~R 1~ ralia 181"a 1 8i I OUR NEW NAVAL PROGRAMME 373 Oregon cannot fire one of that calibre. Ve have saved the weight of two turrets and of four eight-inch guns, apparently, in the design of the Kearsarge class, besides increasing the effective arc of the larger guns. What we saved thus we used in broadside guns. We put in fourteen five-inch rapid-fire guns where the Oregonz carries but four six-inch guns-a very great increase in effectiveness, especially in case of such a battle as that off Santiago, where guns of eight-inch calibre and less did about all the work. In designing the Alabama class we abandoned the eight-inch guns altogether, on the theory that they are better replaced with the six-inch rapid-fire guns. The Alabama class will carry fourteen of the six-inch rapid-fire guns in broadside, with two turrets of two thirteen-inch guns each. This brings us to a brief consideration of the very latest development in guns, to which only mere references have been made hitherto. When we first began building modern rifles we quickly placed our weapons beside the very best in the world, but when I897 came we were practically at a standstill, with a six-inch rapidfire gun that had a muzzle energy of 3,200 tons; an eight-inch slow-fire gun with a muzzle energy of 8,oii tons, and a thirteen-inch gun with a muzzle energy of 33,627 tons. With U374 E NEW NAVAL PROGRMME guons f thaEt efidieiny we swept the Spanisi fromh the sab hut we would hetter keep lea of w~i~~~e~~eu the f of1g para did And not imincW ~udi i With oither Iaiopean peAo ples Foi ri the - -ii ^. dlmi i i se - f f. s ix irh,ui k fire A> ifi S* H '* }'i 'o ai n fFlan_ i;- i toai and Oi the Gminkans he eifsi the rapidire prinipli' in guns up ti the c6dre ofA2 iIhe The f-term rais —nr i Ienis Picti'R illy tMa the gufi _f So t wh ipl ~~~~~~~~~~_If l..|-1 376 OUR NEW NAVAL PROGRAMME j[...,can be fired nearly hurlrlSfive times where the slow breechloaders are fired once. But what was of still greater mo1 a l ment was the de^ j -. velopment of the I, twelve-inch gun as j^^7 the largest weapon c for a battle-ship. We have thirteen/^^. - /> inch guns for our S ^| k~ Alabama c lass.?. They weigh 60.5 Z m^ R XLL, tons and their muzI^ Sm <.E zle energyis 33,627 L k r tons. The contem5 poraneous British, twelve -inch gun __ V> I: has a muzzle enct k ergyof 44,500 tons, although it weighs but 50.25 tons.: I Y Yr Observe the saving.^ A o7 I in weight of gun as well as the enormous increase in i'1 'power, for with the OCRN NE:W NANVAL, vatgni P377 g saeing 4 di tiricun xonn in wcbi nlf gnne tbvru is aiii il itnow ilig itof it |a Enn t lthe manigtore of itN lagcr caliitrin. or Bnr oni of ihiC war has cari a iiew era for oar a a XXltf the r a iafr the onedan i. i ifile we hitohed aefrt the ir tlCof the f Wre e e roided t forit o ioie otat t to B dinf a t Vlie ei tr hi iAt thle end of itt n fr e vere oiim ieti, irhitl pr istol for diios tit iaieW iaNly dibifent fra tei dAodiaME eflaftl a opee 1f sietn iNis n nn of irit to Biioh eihuih oii aet riinf dohe niitl iapidf iit lnaders Wtree hwerig nit tie t t tiiie fififistris titog itg tofa tiifgn th ir the trt derfalr ireetatfor but y tuie het Oib N. 378 OUR NEW NAVAL PROGRAMME to the need of speed in battle-ships, and at last, after the beast had curled there for more than ninety years, we took down the porcupine from the truck of our naval flagstaff and replaced it with the eagle. We threw overboard, so to speak, the idea that to cruise about our own coasts in slow, thick-armored, heavily armed ships was the best way to preserve peace, and we adopted the idea which Commander McCalla stencilled on the superstructure of the Marblehead-the idea that the best protection against an enemy's fire is an efficient fire of your own. We came to see that battle-ships fit for aggressive war were the best for coast defence, and we contracted for ships of a speed of eighteen knots, and a coal capacity sufficient for a fighting voyage to-well, say to any part of the world where a Subig-Bay incident may occur. But that is not all to be said of them. We have been overhauling our gun construction. Captain O'Neil, while driving the naval gunfactory day and night to produce war material, found time to design new guns, from the fourinch up, and to plan a smokeless powder-factory at Indian Head, for which Congress provided the money. We will begin with the powder. As now made our powder is not only smokeless, but it has raised the muzzle-velocity of the old one Six-inch cast-iron gun, brecch renforced by extra thickness only. Sixr-inch cast-iron r4/le, breech reenforced by wrought jacket sweated on. Projectilefor a modernt six-inch gun, weighit, too pounds, powder, 5o pou(nds. Projectilefor an old-time six-inch smooth-bore, weighzt, 32 pounds. Irodern six-inch rifle showtig extra reenforccments. The Evolution of the Six-inch Gun. (Relative proportions are shown by'the diagrams.) 380 OUR NEW NAVAL PROGRAMME I;; hundred pound projectile from 2,200 feet per second (our very best) up to 2,600, while the new (: ~ designs of guns, by lengthening _Q hn- - S the bore and increasing the size i1 of the powder-chamber, inI,! crease the velocity up to 3,000 foot-seconds for all calibres. To consider now the new.i ^ i twelve-inch gun as the largest; | weapon for our battle-ships, we m find that it weighs 53 tons, or t^ P iB I Io05 tons less than the thirteen0I Ainch gun, and yet it has a strikr ing energy of not less than L 48,000 tons, or nearly 15,000 1 E | j1 tons greater than the thirteenQ... inch we have built for our Alaj, bama class of ships. And it EU E i s must be kept in mind that with It C3 this tremendous increase of power has come a great increase in the amount of ammunition the ship can carry, and a greatj ^ er ease of manipulation, with a:cl inconsequent increase of precision. _Ice, We have designed rapid-fire,,: eight-inch guns with a proporit: tionate increase of power, and OUR NEW NAVAL PROGRAMME 381 the new style six-inch guns in the broadside of the newest ships will have a muzzle energy but a little under that of the eight-inch on the Oregon, while in real effectiveness, due to the speed and precision with which they can be fired, they will far surpass the old eight-inch. We hope we may not seem offensive when we say that the effectiveness of our new guns, all things considered, is for the moment ahead of the world. With their speed and ability to make long voyages, and the power of their guns, our latest battle-ships will replace the Maine in a way worthy of the nation. They are to be named Maine, Mzssouri, and Ohio. But the end is not yet in sight in the race for improvement in guns. The use of segments or staves for the core of the gun and to withstand the lengthwise strain, with square wire wound around them to withstand the centrifugal strain-this system has shown wonderful results, both here and abroad. The small size of the segments and of the wire insures an enormous elastic limit in the parts of the gunsay twice that of the old style of forged cylinders and jackets —while the possibility of flaws is eliminated absolutely. It is presumptuous for a landsman to prophesy in such a matter, and yet it may be said here that a time is likely to come when ten-inch rapid-fire guns in the turrets and eight-inch rapid-fire guns in the broad sid* ill 6io Mtheamnt of a battVe Of a oolfutO a word be si or ought to be sid Though the use of amor is unddiy necessarin thes tughtof it rilifinted in i the rit of a cowad i-ithe heai of soin ohdime warriog who tnd a hildd or a cot of m al hEcasy lhe was afraid to met the.nemy with InR hrad to 11 Mililn OUR NEW NAVAL PROGRAMME 383 towers make brave men. Let us send our cadets to sea in torpedo-boats rather than battle-ships. We have used armor up to a thickness of eighteen inches, but now we can make it sufficiently effective with a thickness of but twelve or fourteen at most. This is particularly pleasing in two ways. In the first place we save much weight on the turrets and belt, which we are able to use for protecting our.(At g s soire as oriay prposed. For d g s (Aft gfits s$hoO mattximum fire as originally proposed. Forzward guns show maximum fire as finally nodified.) Deck Plan of the Indiana, axssachusetts, and Oregon. broadside guns, and in adding to the power of the machinery. In the second place it shows us that our steel-makers, on whom we depend for our ships, are unsurpassed. We have come to a state of industrial development where we are building warships for Russia and Japan, and supplying plates for a builder of merchant ships at Belfast, Ireland, as well. We can make the best quality of steel at a price to compete with the whole world, thanks to the change of policy toward our navy that was 384 OUR NEW NAVAL PROGRAMME inauzgurated at the inception of the White Squadron. As a concession to the timorous souls who shiveringly carried their silver from New York to their country homes lest the Spaniards come and loot the town, we have ordered four harbordefence monitors. It is not quite a sheer waste of money, even though a very light sea destroys the monitor's accuracy of fire. With the six already in commission we will have enough smooth-water fighters to give every needed aid to the forts about our largest harbors, and give a blockading force, should one ever come, something to think of. They are to be 225 feet long, displace 2,700 tons, draw I2.5 feet of water and are to be armed with two of the twelve-inch guns just described, with four four. inch rapid-fire guns, besides enough smaller ones to stand off torpedo-boat attack. Of vastly more importance to the service was the appropriation for torpedo-boat destroyers and torpedo-boats. Sixteen of the destroyers are under contract, with twelve of the smaller boats. An interesting chapter might be written on the work of the torpedoboats in the war with Spain. Some newspaper men of the class who shoot before the breechblock is closed, announced that the war with Spain, and especially the battle off Santiago, had proved the torpedo-boat worthless. The OUR NEW NAVAL PROGRAMME 385 statement was distinctly and viciously untrue. One incident shall suffice to prove it untrue. In the blockade of Havana, Lieutenant John C. Fremont of the Porter, as he has told in Harper's s\ for November, ('K - I898, ran the ~ Porter under the M stern of the New York,and thence __ alongside to a Adapted/rom the "Scientific American," byporm,alongside to a s/on. range where he Indiana-Loading the Ammunition-hoists for Thirteen-inch Guns. had her dead beyond peradventure, being all the time well convinced she was a Spanish cruiser instead of his own flag - ship, and nothing but > wi j - - ~ -I the fortunate dis-.( i - - -' covery that the. A * cruiser had three smoke-stacks instead of but two, Adaptedfrom the 1c..-..:asallth e.Span iards had, preRamming Home the Charge in a Thirteen-inch Gun. vented his sinkvented his sinking her then and there. The New York's lookouts did not see him until he had made 386 OUR NEW NAVAL PROGRAMME the squadron signal three times; they failed, because the Porter was shrouded in the New York's smoke, and the quality of the signallamps was poor. It was the moment of greatest peril that came to any of our ships in the whole war. The men who guarded the mouth of Santiago harbor, and, under the strain, came to see torpedo-boat ghosts -the men who fired at a hole in the rocks, and at a trade - wind swell, and at a railroad-train ashore, each time thinking they saw a torpedo-boat-these men speak of the night "demons of the sea" with respect. We are to have a flotilla, modest in numbers, but of the best quality. The destroyers are to displace about 325 tons and show a speed of thirty knots, while the others are smaller in design and are rated at twenty-six knots, quite ample for the purpose. There is one thing we might do for the improvement at once of the navy and the whole nation-we might make the Naval Academy free to all American boys who could pass the examination, and would serve in the navy before the mast, as need required, a reasonable number of years. We might fill every petty office and post on board ship-man every machine, as well as every gun with graduates of our Naval Academy. If we retained the present course of instruction-rather if we improved on it stead ~illi [' liiiiiliiliilii:iiiiiii:i;iii;i:.:i::'::':::':' ~~,~.~,. '~ "~ rr 1 ~+rrnrr~rn;~;sn~r~r~rrrrr~r~ri;rr~r:;l,,,;;liiiliil;isiiis;iiiiiii;lili a? ~ri;nrnrnrnrnnir IABiillipp;; r;;;l; Ilis;r i,,i TXEi Illi ~'" ii~ iiil,,, ~;Ei n re I ii, r r~ "IUiUI I 1 ii ~r~i;,, lii I~ii iB al II "'"",,;;;; 'A II IAla1 iicil ~RII rx ri r: i:lii~ I II"' iS, H~ri I;i gi, 1: a lep 5,: — I % r ii i~1 '"; 111 R";PIIIIIIBIIIIIPIIPIBgIBII:lllliiiQ i "~l~II81181PIIII1IPII11IBIIIBiiBII ~iiB"IPP8iBBBi,:,iii.iiil88i; 8,88"iWsP;;B;:;iW8ii i~ M1 Ix,~,~xxi~~xii~l:IIE,rE, X j 6lil' iiQIBBlslllsllBIII1IIIBliiBIP8lilB; I~ iisrr;~;;srr~r~;;;;;;;siri;i;rrrr;i; ' liliiilliiiilllliiiiiililililiii!!lil '!"""!""'"""""''""'!""''" n ~ iiiiil;ilssll~i;ll;l;ll;ili;ili a~ iirrll ~i~*rral:uaia~il~;i~s r~srirsrrrrr-rnr~r I OUR NEW NAVAL PROGRAMME 389 ily —we should then have crews of a grade of intelligence and self-respect hitherto undreamed of. In leaving the service, as the graduates who failed to get commissions might do, they would carry with them a training that would make them superior citizens, and we should soon have in them a naval reserve worthy of the name. We should remove absolutely the un-American barrier that now rises between the forecastle and the cabin. When we think of it we know that a chief function of Government is the education of the young. A time ought to come, and so it will come, when every man who wears the naval uniform shall be known as an educated gentleman. But this is only to mention what is yet a long way ahead. It would.cost much money to enlarge and maintain such a naval academy as would be required then, and we shall not use our national revenues for any such chimerical purposes as educating sailor-men until after we have finished improving the mouths of the Cattaraugus and the Cheesequakes Creeks. To sum it all up, looking ahead as well as backward, we can see that we are not to have the largest navy in the world-we shall never need that-but we are to rank well in numbers and with the best in quality; never again shall our navy be quoted as the standard of inefficiency. 399 OUE NEW NAVAL EPRetAMME ationts were ohhe~d a to renoit to a hther of men he.fore nvder e hlb he etved Where anarehy rirgedhot bf let tN fase the troth. Tere eas no Mtie war And if we Will consider ourilve s well as tie pevmde whm we lHeW nkh we Mhafihd that the Wra as waged, Wig Weiniigh ian Ionmaied 1hleing ft n etteri to a tndern tile than to Eteld to the degrading intl nenee of nosdid 411 niitfir We had get Oip as nor Irer the man who had made his pilehy legaled theift. we hnid osed nithag antI nio veitisimenits And 3thien eame Waf and fOl L............ 3 X XX Xa 3 L;33~ 3 X 33X333; 2 Ag31 j iA ilv;1;1C1 t3 ES3S 3 ~/{l3!M 3Lf 1a,133Xr 1 E3 3 g f 3133;31 3i 1lt iX3f WfEl3 g11;lCh~ a~i~~r ~~~gF #X~~1~i jEh1~Jl l 2~( ~13~ Qte#r.| OUR NEW NAVAL PROGRAMME 391 one brief span we brushed aside the muck and cheered men for what they were, and not for what they possessed. That alone was worth the pain, but it was not all. By the Civil War we wiped away the curse of human slavery, and disintegrating States were blended into one great nation. With all its horror the effect of that war upon our people was most beneficent. And through the war with Spain we have been reminded that blood is thicker than water, and have learned that there can be no permanent peace on earth, and no substantial progress in real culture, until the one race that fully comprehends the meaning of Liberty and Justice is dominant beyond dispute. I INDEX Aguadores, attack on, 280 Alabama authorized, 369; armament, 373, 376 Alfonso XII. at Havana, 72; wrecked, 352 Alfonso XIII. at San Juan, 279 Almirante Oquendo, 194, 95; attempts to escape, 298; destruction of, 307 et seq. Alverado, Spanish gun-boat, 360 Ammen ram, the, 27 Ammunition, amount expended at Manila, 184, 85; at Santiago, 337, 338 Amphitrite ordered to Key West, 86; off Matanzas, 129; her unfitness, 130; ordered to San Juan, 96; in tow of the Iowa, 197; in battle line, i98 Anderson, Lieutenant E. A., at Cienfuegos, 142 Anglo-Saxon Race united, I02 Annapolis at Nipe, 356 Antonio Lopez attacked by the Yosemite, 285 et seq. Argonauta captured by the Nashville, I36 Armor, improvements in, 382 et seq. Army, at the outbreak of the war, 127 Army of Occupation, delay of, 276 etseq.; at Santiago, 290 Army and Navy Journal quoted, 84, I85, 336 Atlanta, plans of, 35 et seq. Augustin, Captain-General, leaves Manila, 346 Autonomy in Cuba a failure, 63 Auxiliary Navy, the, 88 et seq., 92, 287 Bache at Havana, Io6 Badger overhauls the Alfonso XII., 352 Bagley, Ensign Worth, of the Winslow, killed at Cardenas, I51 Bailey, Frank H., Chief Engineer of the Raleigh, at Manila, I9I Baiquiri, landing of the Army at, 279, 280 Baltimore, plans of, 45; joins Commodore Dewey, 154, 155; sails for Manila, I56 et seq.; at Subig Bay, I59; renews the fight, 172 et seq.; ammunition expendcd by, 184, I85; casualties on, 189, 190 Ba;zcrofi, gun-boat, 49; ordered north, G6; at Ensefiada de los Altares, 280 Baker, Captain A. S., of the Newark, in the Eastern squadron, 355; at Manzanillo, 364 Bartlett, Captain John R., organizes a coast signal-service, 216 Battle-ship era, the, 54 et seq. Battle-ships, our first, 55, 56; time required to build, 369; new ones building, 366 et seq.; need of greater speed in, 378 Beecher, Lieutenant Albert M., at the Washington gun factories,92 Bernabe, Senior Luis Polo y. succeeds Dupuy de Lome at Washington, 69 393 394 INDEX Bernadou, Lieutenant John B., of the W/inslow, at Cardenas, I44 et seq.; wounded, 150, I52; standing as an officer, 153 Berry, Captain R. M., of the Castine, at Baiquiri, 280; heads off the Alfonso XII., 352 Blanco, Captain-General, succeeds Weyler, 63 Blandin, Lieutenant John J., died of injuries received on the Maine, 75 Blockade of Cuba proclaimed, I8, II9; a peaceful one not popular, 126; the only thing we could do, 127; disposition of ships for, 129, I30; effects of, 141 et seq.; of Havana, 288 Blocklinger, Lieutenant-Commander Gottfried, of the Baltimore, 155 Blue, Lieutenant Victor, of the Suwanee, his tour of Santiago Bay, 287 Boston, plans of, 35 et seq.; leaves for Manila, I56 et seq.; sent to Subig Bay, i59; returns the fire from El Fraile, i6; in the battle of Manila, 175; aground, 179; ammunition expended by, 184, I85; struck by a Spanish shell, 189 Bowen, Captain, of the Virginius, I7 Bowles, Asst. Naval Constructor, F. T., Secretary of Advisory Board, 32 Brooklyn a greater New York, 60; flag-ship of the flying squadron, 88; at Key West, 211; ordered to Cienfuegos, 212; in the attack on Santiago, 254, 255; position in the blockade, 293; advantages of, 3II; in the battle of Santiago, 312; her effective fire on the Vizcaya, 316; helps in the capture of the Colon, 321; struck by shot and shells, 339; bombards Santiago, 353 Brownson, Captain of the Yankee, at Santiago, 254, 255 Brumby, Flag-Lieutenant Thomas M., at Manila, 163, 18; hoists the American flag over Manila, 349 Buenaventura, first prize of the war, 122 et seq. Cabafias, attack on, 139 Cables, cutting of, 14, 142 et seq., 237, 238 Caimanera fort, attack on, 270 et seq. Calkins, Lieutenant C. G., of the Olympia, Navigator, at Manila, 163, I8I Caldwell, Flag Secretary at Manila, I8i Camachi, Sefior Eloy, Cuban leader, I5; Navigator of the Virginius, I7 Camp McCalla, 263 Cardenas, blockade of, 129; the fight at, I45 et seq.; lives lost there, 153 Castillo destroyed by Dewey, I7I, 179 Castine ordered north, 86; on the blockade, 129; joins the Flying Squadron, 221; at Baiquiri, 280; heads off the Alfonso XII., 352 Cavite Point, forts on, I63, I64; reduced by Dewey, I75; batteries of, 182 Cervera, Admiral, ships of his squadron, I94, I95; enters Santiago Harbor, 212, 231, 232; his kindness to Hobson and his men, 250; his attempted flight, 297; destruction of his fleet, 298 et seq. Chadwick, Captain French E., of the New York, on the Maine Board of Inquiry, 76; his article on the navy, 2II; sees the Spanish ships in Santiago Harbor, 235, 236; at Santiago, 254, 255, 293, 328 et seq.; on the effects of the shots from the Vesuvius, 257, 258; his handling of his ship, 328 Chandler, William E., Secretary of the Navy, 31 Charette, Gunner's-mate George, in the Merrimac's crew, 244 Charleston, plans of, 45; sent to Manila as convoy, 344; captures Guam, 345 INDEX 395 Chester, Captain, in charge of the run for freedom, 319, 320; runs South American Squadron, 86 ashore, 320; scuttled by her Chicago, plans of, 34, 35 crew, 327 et seq. Cienfuegos, cutting of the cables Crosley, Captain W. S., of the at, 141 et seq. Leyden, raises the Stars and Cincinnati, cruiser, 49; ordered Stripes at Cardenas, 288 north, 86; on the blockade, I29; Cuba, valued by Spain only as a at Matanzas, 136; at Ponce, 358 source of revenue, 2; the conCit, of Washington, survivors of dition of, a sufficient cause for the Maaine taken to, 72 war, 83, 84, 185, i86 Clark, Captain Charles E., of the Cuba, Spanish gun-boat, burned, Oregon, remarkable run of his 354 ship from San Francisco to Key Cuban Army numbers exaggerated, West, 213 et seq.; at Santiago, 5 254, 293, 30o e seq.; compelled Cubans, revolts of, 3 to leave his ship by ill-health, Cubans made what they are by 330 Spain, 7 Clausen, Coxswain Randolph, Curtin, Ensign, of the Wasp, his stowaway on the Merrimac, 244 demand for the surrender of Clover, Captain R., of the Ban- Ponce, 359 el seq. craft, at Ensefiada de los Altares, Cushing, on the blockade, 129 280 Davis, Captain C. H., of the Dixie, Coghlan, Captain Joseph B., of the escorts transports to Porto Rico, Raleigh, leaves for Manila, i56 357 et seq. Davis, Richard Harding, his " The Colonel LloydAspinwall, American Cuban and Porto Rican Camsteamer, seized by the Spaniards, paigns " quoted, 357; his account 9-14 of the surrender of Ponce, 359 Columbia, commerce-destroyer, 60; et seq. with the flying squadron, 88; Dayton, Captain James H., of the escorts General Miles to Porto Detroit, at Key West, 86; coolRico, 357; shells Juanica, 358 ness of, at San Juan, 205; at Concord leaves for Manila, I56 et Baiquiri, 280 seq.; sent to examine Subig Bay, Dayton, Ensign, sent as boarding 159; replies to the fire from El officer to the Panama, i40 Fraile Island, i6; in the battle Deignan, Oscar, in the Merrimac's of Manila, 175 crew, 244 Converse, Captain George A., of Delehanty, Captain D., of the the AMontgomery, at Key West, Suwanee at Santiago, 254; at 86; at San Juan, 205 Manzanillo, 360 Cook, Captain Francis A., of the Delgado Perada burned, 354 Brooklyn, at Santiago, 254, 312 DeLome, Dupuy, Spanish Miniset seq. ter at Washington, his letter Corregidor Island, 159; defences regarding President McKinley, on, I6o 68; resigns, 69 Cowles, Captain William S., of the Detroit, 49; at Key West, 86; on Fern, at Key West, 86; at Nipe, the blockade, 129; captures the 356 Catalina, 132; before San Juan, Cristobal Colon sailed without her 198; in the bombardment, 203; largest guns, 195; discovered at effectiveness of her small guns, Santiago, 231; replies to the fire 204; her narrow escape, 204; at of Schley's ships, 233; comes Baiquiri, 280 out of the harbor, 298, 30I; her Dewey, Commodore George, sails 396 INDEX for Manila 156 et seq.; his plan of attack, 157; without a battle-ship, i60; enters Manila Bay, 6I; leads the attack, I63 et seq.; "When you are ready, you may fire, Gridley," I67; his conduct of the battle, I68 et seq.; gives his men a rest, I7I et seq.; the fight renewed, 172 et seq.; tactics used by, 175, 176; his report of the battle, I79 et seq.; his ships in range for five hours, 182; strength of his squadron compared with the Spanish, 182 et seq.; damage done to his ships, I89; his debt to his engineers, I9I; early naval experiences, I9I; his success like that of Perry's, I92; receives the thanks of the President and the American people, ib.; his trouble with the German Admiral, 346; bombards defences of Manila, 348 Diedrich, Admiral, interferes at Manila, 346, 347 Dieuaide, T. M., reports, says the officers of Schley's fleet were convinced that Cervera was not at Cienfuegos, 224; the fleet expected a dash into Santiago Harbor, 227 Dillingham, Lieutenant, executive officer of the Nashville, I23 Dispatch-boats, need of, in the war with Spain, 38 Dixie escorts transports to Porto Rico, 357 Dixon, Chief-Engineer Albert F., on the auxiliary navy board, -88 Doddridge; Ensign John A., of the Boston, shell exploded in his room, I89 Dolphin, dispatch-boat, plans of, 37, 38; prejudice against, 38; on the blockade, I29; in the attack on Santiago, 254; at Guantanamo Bay, 261, 269 Don Antonio de Ulloa, bravery of her crew, 170 Don Juan de Austria, burned at Manila, 179 "Don't cheer, the poor devils are dying," 307 Dupont, in the blockade off Matanzas, 129; joins the flying squadron, 224; damaged on a reef, 226 Dyer, Captain Nehemiah M., of the Baltimore, at Hong Kong, 154; at Manila, 159, 172 et seq. Eagle joins the flying squadron, 225; reports a strange fleet, 276; at Aguadores, 280 Eaton, Captain J. G., of the Resoluzte reports a strange fleet, 276 El Correo burned at Manila, 179 Ellis, Chief-Yeoman George H., of the Brooklyn, killed at Santiago, 339 Emory, Captain W. H., of the Yosemite, at Guantanamo, 26I; his fight with a Spanish fleet off San Juan, 285 et seq. Engineers, heroism of, I50o I7I; conduct of, during the battle of Manila, I90, 191; splendid record on the Oregon, 213, 214; spirit of, shown, 214, 219, 220'; how they worked at Santiago, 320 Ensefiada de los Altares, attack on, 280 Entwistle, James, Chief Engineer of the Olympia at Manila, Ig9 Ericsson on the blockade before Havana, 129; lives saved by, at Santiago, 333, 334 Espanola, Spanish gun - boat, burned, 354 Estrella de Guantanamo shot to pieces at Manzanillo, 354 Eulate, Captain, of the Vizcaya, his dash for the Brooklyn, 312; compels her to change her course, ib.; his plucky effort to escape, 315 Evans, Captain Robley D. (" Fighting Bob "), of the Iowa, story of, regarding the Maine, 8I, 82; his remarks on receiving Schley's order to sail for Key West, 228; at the bombardment of Santiago, 254; his efforts to ram one of the Spanish cruisers at Santiago, 315 INDEX 397 Everett, Lieutenant - Commander ting of the cables at Santiago and W. H., of the jMangrove, capt- Guantanamo, 237, 238 ures the Panama, 140, 141 Grant, General, his lack of aggresFern, at Key West, 86 sive interest in the Virginius afFernald, Naval Constructor, F. L., fair, 22 32 Gridley, Captain Charles V., of the Filibustering expeditions, our ef- Olympia, sails for Manila, i56 et forts to prevent them, 6I, 62 seq.; goes into the conning-tower, Fish, Hamilton, Secretary of State, I63 his demands, regarding the seiz- Guam, capture of, 344, 345 ure of the Colonel Lloyd Aspin- Guantanamo Bay, losses at, I53; wall, II, I2 the cables cut at, 238; marines Fletcher, Lieutenant Frank S., his at, 259-376 good work at the Washington Guardian shot to pieces at Mangun factory, 92 zanillo, 354 Flying squadron, formation of the, Gun-fire, remarkably small number 88 of hits in the fight at Santiago, Folger, Captain W. M., of the New 342 Orleans, at Baiquiri, 280 Guns, numbers engaged on both Foote, off Cardenas, 129; fired on squadrons at Santiago, 336; our while scouting, 133 slow progress in the making of Ford, John D., Chief Engineer of large ones, 58-6o; latest develthe Baltimore at Manila, 191 opments in, 373 et seq. Fremont, Lieutenant John C., of Hall, Passed Assistant-Engineer the Porter, his article on torpedo- Reynold T., of the Petrel, at boats cited, 385 et seq. Manila, x9I Fry, Captain Joseph, of the Vir- Hampton Roads, head-quarters of giznius, 20; executed by the the flying squadron, 88 Spaniards, 21 Harlow, Lieutenant, surveys the Furor wrecked by the Gloucester, harbor at Cabanas, 289 302 Hart, Cadet, under fire in Cabanas Gatewood, Assistant Naval-Con- Bay, 289 structor Richard, 32 Harvard brings orders to Schley General Concha whipped by the to remain at Santiago, 228 Yosemite, 285 et seq. Havana, American residents of, General Lezo burned at Manila, threatened, 64; attitude of Span179 iards in. toward the destruction Gibbs, Dr. John Blair, killed at of the M]aine, 72, 73; blockade Guantanamo, 265 of, 129 Glass, Captain Henry, of the Hawk, sent to join the flying squadCharleston, takes Guam, 344, ron, 222, 223; overhauls the Al345 fonso XII., 352 Gloucester, the, at Aguadores, 280; Helena, gun-boat, ordered to Key position of, before Santiago, 293; West, 87; on the blockade, 129; in the battle, 302; receives the captures the MiguelJover, 131; surrender of Admiral Cervera, at Enseiada de los Altares, 280; 335; escorts transports to Porto at Manzanillo, 353 Rico, 357; shells the Spanish at Helm, Captain J. M., of theHornet, Juanica, 358 at Ensefiada de los Altares; 280: Goode, Sergeant-Major, killed at at Manzanillo, 353 Guantanamo, 266 Henderson, Chief-Engineer, 32 Goodrich, Captain Casper F., of Hercules, captured at Manila, 179 the St. Louis, assists in the cut- Herman Cortes, Spanish war-ship, 398 INDEX seized the Colonel Lloyd Aspin- hits the Vizcaya, 301; falls bewall, 9 hind in the chase, 315; struck Higginson, Captain Francis J., of by an eight-inch shell, 352; in the Massachusetts, at Key West, the bombardment of Santiago, 86; at Santiago, 254, 35I, 352; 353 escorts General Miles to Porto Insurgents, no systematic efforts Rico, 357; his report of the work made by Spain to hunt them, 6 of the navy at, 358 et seq. Intervention, demand for, I-7 lfist at Manzanillo, 353, 360 Iowa, 58; at Key West, 86; beHobson, Assistant Naval Construct- fore Havana, 129; bound for er Richmond Pearson, put in San Juan, i96; tows the Ampahicharge of the Merrimac, 243; trite, 197; in battle line, 198; takes her into Santiago Harbor, begins the attack on San Juan, 244 et seq.; discipline of his 203; casualties on, 206; joins men, 249; taken prisoner, 250; the flying squadron, 22I, 224; made a public hero, 253; his at Santiago, 232, 233, 254, 293, efforts to save the Spanish ships, 301, 3I5, 333, 339 340, 34I Irene, German war-ship, at Manila, Hodgsdon, Captain Daniel B., of 346 the Hugh McCulloch, sails for Iris,'distilling ship, 92 Manila, I56 et seq.; in the bat- Irwin, Ensign Noble E., wounded tle, I6I et seq. at Manila, 9go Hood, Captain J., of the Hawk, Isabel II., 279; whipped by the overhauls the Alfonso XII., 352 Yosemite, 285 et seq. Hornet, at Enseiiada de los Altares, Isla de Cuba, Admiral Montojo, 280; at Manzanillo, 353 transfers his flag to, 169; burned, Howell, Commander J. A., 32 I79 Hudson, at Cardenas, I44 et seq.; Isla de Luzon burned at Manila, rescues the Winslow, I52 179 Hugh McCulloch, at Manila, I6i Isla de AMindanao burned at MaHunker, Captain J. J., of the An- nila, I79 napolis, at Nipe, 356 Jaudenes, General, succeeds AuHuntington, Lieutenant - Colonel gustin at Manila, 348 Robert W., in command of ma- Jenkins, Lieutenant Friend, killed rines at Guantanamo, 26I et seq.; on the Maine, 75 his care for his men, 273 Jones, Chaplain, of the Texas, Illinois, authorized, 369; arma- holds a funeral service under fire ment of, 373, 376 ~ at Guantanamo, 267 Infanta Maria Teresa, 194, 195; Jorge Juan sunk at Nipe, 356 the first of the Spanish ships out Jose Garcia, Spanish gun-boat, at Santiago Harbor, 297; fires at burned, 354 the Brooklyn, 298; destruction Juanica, landing of the troops at, of, 303 et seq.; floated, but lost 357 et seq. in a gale on the way north, 340 Juch, Richard, Chief Engineer of Ingersoll, Captain R. R., of the the Boston, at Manila, 191 Supply, at Guantanamo, 261 Jungen, Captain Carl, of the WonmIndiana put into commission, 49; patuck, helps cut the cables at mistakes in, 58; at Key West, Santiago and Guantanamo, 237, 86.,at Cienfuegos, 129;ordered 238; at Manzanillo, 363 to San Juan, I96; ready for bat- Kansas escorts the Virginius from tle, I98; on the morning of July the harbor of Colon, 17, 20 4th, 295; heads for the Morro, Kearsage, authorized, 369; double 298; fires on the Teresa, ib.; turrets of, 370; advantages of,373 INDEX 399 Kelley, Francis, one of the Merrimac's crew, 244 Kelley, Lieutenant-Commander J. D. J., on the auxiliary navy board, 88 Kellogg, Lieutenant Frank W., of the Baltimore, wounded at Manila, 190 Kentreres, Adolphus, of the Colon, his account of the battle of Santiago, 324 Kentucky authorized, 369; double turrets of, 370; advantages of, 373 Key West, the squadron gathered at, 86 Kindelberger, Assistant-Surgeon, of the Olympia; commended by Dewey for remaining with his ships though relieved, ISo Kuenzli, Ensign H. C., takes the prize Argonauta to Key West, I36 Lamberton, Captain Benjamin, of the Olympia, I63; commended by Dewey, 80o, I8i Lee, Consul-General, his recall demanded, 84 Leutze, Captain E. H. C., of the Monterey, arrives at Manila, 348 Leyden tug at Cardenas, 288 Long, John D., Secretary of the Navy, his efforts in behalf of peace, 67 Lyon, Captain Henry W., of the Dolphin, at Santiago, 254; at Guantanamo Bay, 26i McCalla, Captain Bowman H., Commander of the Marblehead, the legends about his ship at the beginning of the war,. 54, 55; at Key West, 86; at the cutting of the cables at Cienfuegos, 41; assures Schley that the Spanish fleet was not at Cienfuegos, 225; at Santiago, 255; at Guantanamo Bay, 266, 262, 268 McCarty, Captain of the Colonel LloydAspinwall, protests against seizure of his ship, 9; held as a prisoner, 10 Maceo, General, killed by the Spaniards, 6 McGuire, Captain S. E., of the Windom, at the cutting of the Cables off Cienfuegos, 141, 144 Machias on the blockade of Cardenas, 129; in the fight at, I45 et seq. Mackenzie, Captain M. R. S., of the Miayflower, 235 McKinley, President, his first warning to Spain, 63, 64 Magruder, Ensign Thomas P., boards the Buenaventura, 123 Mail, the, of London, interview with Admiral Montojo quoted, x86, I87 lfaine, the first armored ship of American design,47; plans of, 48, 49; never appreciated, ib.; an honor to the flag,. 49; compared to earlier ships, ib.; her large sail-power, 5I; sent to Havana, 67 et seq.; believed to be our most powerful ship by the Spaniards, 70; moored at a strange buoy, 70; blown up, 71 et seq.; number of men lost, 75; court of inquiry appointed, 76; the official report on, 76, 79 et seq.; her destruction a deliberate act, So; her condition as revealed by Ensign Powelson, 82; destroyed through Spanish connivance, 83; destruction of, avenged, 336 Maine, the new, 377 et seq., 381 Manila, Dewey's victory at, 154 -I93; the city taken, 348 et seq. Mangrove on the blockade, 129; captures the Panama, 140 Manzanillo, reduction of, 363 et seq. Marblehead, 49; at Key West, 86; on the blockade, 129; joins the flying squadron, 222, 225; discovers the Spanish fleet at Santiago, 231; in the attack on Santiago, 255; takes possession of Guantanamo Bay, 260, 262, 268 Maria Ponton burned, 354 Mariel, blockade of, 129 Marines, the, at Guantanamo, 261 et seq.; the first armed force on Cuban soil, 273 Marix, Lieutenant - Commander Adolphe, of the Scorpion, ISC; Judge Advocate of the Maine 400 INDEX court of inquiry, 76; at Manzanillo, 353; at Cabanias, 280 Marquis del Duero burned at Manila, 179 Martin, Paymaster John R., of the Boston, at Manila, I9I,M4assachusetts, 57; defects in, 58; at Key West, 86; in the flying squadron, 88; held at Hampton Roads, 96; at Key West, 2I; ordered to Cienfuegos, 212; sails to the south of Cuba, 221; goes in to attack the Santiago forts, 232; in the attack on Santiago, 254; helps sink the Reina Mercedes, 351, 352; escorts transports to Porto Rico, 357; at Ponce, 358 Matanzas, blockade of, 129; defences of, I33, 134; bombardment of, I34, 139 Mayflower in the blockade before Havana, 129; joins Sampson's fleet, 235 Maynard, Captain Washburn, of the Nashville, at Key West, 86; at Cienfuegos, 141 Men behind the guns, preparation of, for their work, 99; types of, 138 Menell, Captain J. P., of the Scorpion, at Guantanamo, 261 Merrimac, collier, joins the flying squadron, 221; made ready for her entrance into Santiago Harbor, 243 et seq.; her crew, 244; her mission accomplished, 245 et seq. Merritt, Assistant-Engineer Darwin R., lost on the Maine, 75 Merritt, Major-General Wesley, in command of the forces sent to Manila, 344 Metal, amount thrown by both squadrons in the battle of Santiago, 337, 338 Miantonomoh, guns and armor of, bought abroad, 46; ordered to Key West, 86 Miles, General, arrives at Santiago, 357; sails for Porto Rico, ib.; success of his expedition, 358 et seq. Milligan, Chief-Engineer Robert W., of the Oregon, his fine record, 215; kept steam up in the Oregon ready for a dash, 294; goes into the stoke-hole of the Oregon to lend a hand, 320 Minneapolis, 60; in flying squadron, 88, 226 Mirs Bay, Dewey assembles his fleet at, 56, 157 Missouri, the, 377 et seq., 381 Monadnock, sent to Manila, 346, 348 Monitors, new ones ordered, 384 Morrillo Castle, at Matanzas, 134 Morro Castle, at San Juan, 200, 203; at Santiago, Hobson and his men confined in, 250 Montague, Chief Master-at-arms Daniel, one of the Merrimac's crew, 244 Monterey, goes to Manila, 347, 348 Montgomery, cruiser, 50; at San Juan, I96, I98, 205 Montojo, Spanish Admiral in command at Manila, I58; loses his flag-ship, I69; transfers his flag to the Isla de Cuba, ib.; expected to meet Dewey in the open sea, I85; an interview with, regarding his ship, I86, I87; his report on the loss of life on the Spanish side, I89 Murphy, Coxswain J. E., on the Merrimac, 244 Nanshau, transport, with Dewey's squadron, I56 Nashville, at Key West, 86; off Mariel, 129; captures the Argonazta, I36; overhauls the British cruiser Talbot, 137; assists in the cutting of the cables at Cienfuegos, 141, I42 National vanity, danger of, 43 Naval Academy, a wider use of, suggested, 386 et seq. Naval militia, their good work in the war, 256, 286 Naval officers, value of their writings in educating public opinion, 28 INDEX 401 Naval strength, its dependence cape from being blown up by the upon ship-building facilities, 47 Porter, 385 et seq. Navy, new, beginning of the, 27 Niagara, transport, I96 et seq.; building new ships un- Nipe, raid on, 356 der false pretences, 27; results North Atlantic Squadron, at Key of the Rodgers report, 28; diffi- West, 86; disposition of ships culties to be overcome, 32; our for blockade duty, I29 first steel ships, 34 et seq.; cruis- Norton, Assistant Engineer H. P., ers and battle- ships, 43-60; ordered to assist in designing plans for ships bought abroad, new ships, 32 44; imperfections in, 45; home- Ohio, 377 et seq., 381 made steel provided for, 46; the Olynpia, sails for Manila, i56 et Mlainze one of the first important seq.; in the battle of Manila, i63 ships, 47 et seq.; the New York etseq.; struck by Spanish shells, and other cruisers, 49 et seq.; I89; in the attack on the city battle-ships, 54 et seq.; power of Manila, 348 of, not appreciated by Spain, 60; O'Neil, Captain Charles, his good new ships building, 266 et seq. work at the Washington gun Neville, Lieutenant, at Guantana- factory, 92; his improvements in mo, 266 guns and powder, 378 Newark, flag-ship of the Eastern Oregon, battle-ship, 57; errors in, Squadron, 355; at Manzanillo, 58; her remarkable run from San 364 Francisco to Key West, 2 I3-220; Necomb, Lieutenant F. H., at joins Sampson's fleet, 235; in Newcombs, Lieutenant F. H., a the attack on Santiago, 254; goes Cardenas, I44 et seq.; goes to, 2 the rescue of the Wtislowv, 52 Santiago, July 4th, 293; kept her New Orleans, joins Schley at Santi- steam,p July 4th, 293; kept her ordered into line for an steam up expecting a chase, 294; ago, 232; ordered into line for an fires a gun announcing the comattack, 232; in attack on Santiago, 255; her effective fire, 256; the battle, 3i, 3, 26; her the battle, 30i, 315, 316; her at Baiquiri, 280 race after the Colon, 320, 32; Newport, ordered to Key West, member of the Eastern Squadron, 87; on the blockade, I29 355; defects in the type, 370 New York, 49; contract for, signed, O, he adventure with the Osceola, her adventure with the 50; plans of, 50, 51; her mili- New Orleans, 138; at Manzantary masts, ib.; armament of, 52; ill, 353, 360 launched, 53; her official trial, Paanaa, captured by the Manib.; her fine performance, 53, 139, 1 54; at Key West, 86; captures Panther, takes marines to Guanthe steamer Pedro, I28; before tanamo Bay, 26 Havana, 130; at the bombard- Paris, American liner, transferred ment of Matanzas, I34; returns o the Na the fire at Cabiaias, 139; starts to the Navy, 9 for San Juan, i96, I97; takes Patterson, John F., purchaser of for San Juan, 196, 197; takes ilnius for the Cuban the Terror in tow, 197; in battles for the Cuban line, 198; casualties on, 206; Junta, I5 in the attack on Santiago, 254 Pedro, prize captured by the New et seq.; away from the fleet on York, I28 the morning of July 4th, 293; Pelayo, Spanish battle-ship, 281 returns and joins in the chase of Personnel of the Navy, high standthe Colon, 328 et seq.; fires on ing of, 28; act concerning the Santiago, 353; her narrow es- advancement of the, 42 402 INDEX Petrel, leaves for Manila, 56 et seq.; in the battle, 175; called the "Baby Battle-ship," I76 Philip, Captain John W., of the Texas at Key West, 86; at Santiago, 254, 255; shells the Socapa battery, 280; " Don't cheer, the poor devils are dying," 307; gives public thanks for victory, 323 Phillips, John, on the Merrimac, 244 Pillsbury, Captain John E., of the Vesuvius at Santiago, 257, 258 Pizano, Spanish man-o'-war, at Colon, 17 Pluton, sunk at Santiago, 302, 303 Ponce, capture of, 358 et seq. Poor, Admiral, at Havana, 9, 14 Porter, on the blockade of Havana, I29; ordered to San Juan, 196; ready for battle, 198; joins Sampson's fleet, 235; nearly torpedoes the New York, 385 et seq. Porto Rico, occupation of, 357 et seq. P o t t e r, Lieutenant-Commander William P., of the New York, on the Maine court of inquiry, 76 Powder, the great value of the smokeless kind, 378 et seq. Powell, Cadet Joseph W., in charge of the launch sent to pick up the crew of the Merrimac, 244, 246; with the survey party at Cabafias, 289 Powelson, Ensign W. V. N., his discovery regarding the condition of the Maine, 82 Prairie, overhauls the Alfonso XII., 352 Prisoners of war, those taken in Spanish ships expected to be shot, 132 Prize money, naval officers would have the dividing of, abolished, I41 Prizes, capture of, 128 et seq. Protocol, the, signed, 364 Purcell, Captain J. L., of the Osceola, I38; at Manzanillo, 360 Puritan, ordered to Key West, 86; her unfitness for blockade duty, 130; at the bombardment of Matanzas, I34 Purissima Concepcion, sunk at Manzanillo, 354 Quesada, General M., 15 Rainy season in Cuba, the dangers of, 127 Raleigh, cruiser, 49; sails for Malila, 156 et seq.; in the battle, I75; ammunition expended by, I85 Ransom, George B., chief engineer of the Concord, at Manila, 191 Rapid-fire guns, value shown at Manila, 170; at Santiago, 341 Rapido, captured at Manila, i79 Reconcentrados, the, 4; Spain's promise to relieve, a sham, 63 Rees, Executive Officer Corwin P., with Dewey, 163 Reid, Captain, of the Kansas, his attitude toward the Virginius, I9 Reina Christina, destroyed at Manila, i68, 169 Reina Mercedes, sunk at Santiago by the Massachusetts and the Texas, 35I, 352 Reiter, Captain G. C., of the Panther, 26I Resolute, at Santiago, 301 Restormel, captured by the St. Paul as she was taking a cargo of coal to Santiago, 226, 227 Roach, John, builder of the Chicago, Atlanta, Boston, and Dolphin, 41 Roberts, Don Lopez, Spanish Minister at Washington, o1; his reply to Secretary Fish, ii Robeson, Secretary of the Navy, his influence in retarding naval progress, 33 Rodgers, Captain Frederick, a member of the board for the purchase of auxiliary ships, 88 Rodgers, Admiral John, head of the board appointed to consider the needs of the Navy, 27 Rodgers Board, the, 27; results of the report of, 28, 31; recom INDEX 403 mendations by, 33 et seq.; value of the new navy, 36 Roelker, Past-Assistant Engineer L. R., ordered to assist in the designing of new ships, 32 Roosevelt, Theodore, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, his energetic preparation of the Navy for war, 67 St. Louis, American liner, transferred to the Navy, 9i; helps in the cable-cutting at Santiago and Guantanamo, 237, 238 St. Paul, American liner, transferred to the Navy, 91; at Key West, 2II; sent on scout duty, 212; joins the Flying Squadron, 226; takes the Merrimac in tow, 228; guards the entrance of Santiago Harbor, 236; blockades San Juan, 283; her fight with the Terror, 283 et seq. Sampson, Captain W. T., of the Iowa, member of Maine court of inquiry, 76; his "Naval Defence of the Coast," I5O; plans for an assault on Havana made by, 127; his search for Cervera, 194; ordered to San Juan, i96; his ill-assorted fleet, 196, 197; transfers his flag to the Iowa, 198; formation of his squadron, 198, 199; sends up the signal for attack, 200; the bombardment, 203 etseq.; his ships not fully manned, 206; his slow return to Key West, 21 I; goes to the Nicholas channel in search of Cervera, 2I2; his order to Schley regarding the blockade of Cienfuegos, 221; notifies Schley that the Spanish squadron is probably at Santiago, 222; sends further order to Schley to go to Santiago, 223; hurries to Santiago, 234, 235; his plans to hold the Spanish fleet, 239 et seq.; ordered Schley to sink the Sterling in the harbor, 243; decides to use the Merrimac, ib.; bombards Santiago, 254 et seq.; his report of the engagement, 256; disposition of his fleet on the morning of July 4th, 291 et seq.; leaves the fleet to visit General Shafter, 293; joins in the chase of the Colon, 328 et seq.; bombards Santiago again, 353 Sands, Captain J. H., of the Columbia, escorts transports to Porto Rico, 357 San Francisco, Spanish steamer, towed the Colonel Lloyd Aspinwall to Havana, 10 San Juan, supposed to be the objective point of Admiral Cervera, 196; the city from the sea, 200oo; bombardment of, 203 et seq.; would have surrendered if the attack had continued, 2o6; blockaded by Admiral Sampson, 282 Santiago, cutting of the cables at, 237, 238; blockaded by Admiral Sampson, 239-258; bombardment of, 254 et seq.; mines in the harbor, 275; disposition of the fleet on the morning of July 4th, 291 et seq.; the destruction of Cervera's fleet, 297 et seq.; bombarded by the fleet, 353; surrender of, 350 et seq. Sargeant, Lieutenant Nathan, on the auxiliary navy board, 88 Sa zgus, 14 Schley, Captain W. S., in command of the Flying Squadron, 88; ordered to Cienfuegos to look out for Admiral Cervera, 211, 212; sails for the south of Cuba, 221; arrivesoff Cienfuegos, 224; convinced that the Spanish squadron was in the harbor, 224, 225; leaves for Santiago, 226; his unexpected order to sail for Key West, 227; makes no effort to learn whether Cervera was in Santiago Harbor, 228; complains of difficulties in coaling, 229; ordered to remain at Santiago, 230; takes his fleet nearer shore, 231; steams back to sea, 232; steams in to attack the forts, 232; his report of, 234; declines to meet the Vizcaya on even terms, 404 INDEX 312; his chase of the Vizcaya, 316 et seq. Scientific American, quoted on the number of shot-marks on the Spanish ships, 341, 342 Scorpion, converted yacht, goes to the assistance of the Nashville, I38; with the Flying Squadron, 321; sent to Santiago for news, 224; at Guantanamo Bay, 261; at Cabanas, 280; at Manzanillo, 353 Scott, Ensign E. P., at Manila, 181 Scott, Lieutenant H., throws a towline to the disabled Winslow, 152 Search-light, test of, at Santiago, 351 Secondary batteries on our first battle-ships, 56 Sentinal Delgado, shot to pieces at Manzanillo, 354 Severn, United States ship, 14 Shafter, General, leaves to take possession of Santiago, 275 et seq.; delayed by reports of a strange fleet, 276 et seq.; wanted the Navy to force Santiago channel, 292 Sharp, Captain A., of the Vixen, at Santiago, 254; at Cabanias, 280 Sheathing for ships, need of, 341 Shufeldt, Commodore R. W., member of Advisory Board appointed by Secretary Chandler, 32 Sicard, Rear Admiral, appoints a board of inquiry to investigate the destruction of the Maine, 76 Sickles, General Daniel, United States Minister at Madrid, calls on Sagasta in the Colonel Lloyd Aspinwall case, 11, 12; his final demand, I3, I4; recalled on account of his demands in the Virginius affair, 22 Sigsbee, Captain Charles D., of the Maine, 67; his despatch regarding the destruction of his ship, 72; transferred to the St. Paul, 2I I; reports capture of the Restormel, 226, 227; his fight with the Terror off San Juan, 283 et seq. Silvee, Color-Sergeant Richard, raised the Stars and Stripes at Guantanamo, 261 Smith, Charles, master of the Virginius, I8 Smokeless powder, the great value of, shown, 256 Snow, Captain A. S., overhauls the Alfonso XII., 352 Solace, hospital-ship, 92 Spain, early origin of the war with, I; fortunes made by her officials in Cuba, 2; cruelty of her soldiers, 5; thought we wouldn't fight, 26; attitude toward our efforts in Cuba, 64; contempt for the United States shown, 8, 24, 69, 70; treachery of, revealed in the Maine case, 82, I84; her financial condition at the beginning of the war, 85; her opinion of our Navy, 85, 86; stubborn in defence, 103; ignorance of our power, 126; her rule in Cuba, 156-I62; her squadron at Manila, x83; gunnery of her troops at San Juan, 206; loss at Santiago, 339, 340; end of her power in America, 343 "Spook Fleet," the, 276 Steers, Henry, ship architect, member of Advisory Board appointed by Secretary Chandler, 32 Stickney, J. L., correspondent of the New York Herald, commended by Dewey for service at Manila, 18I Subig Bay, strategical advantages of, 158 Sun, the, quoted on the battle of Manila, I88 Supply, store-ship, at Guantanamo Bay, 261 Sutherland, Captain W. H., of the Eagle, reports a strange fleet, 276, at Aguadores, 280 Suwanee, in the attack on Santiago, 254; at Manzanillo, 360 Swinburne, Captain William T., of the Helena, captures the Mziguel Jover, 13I; at Ensefiada de los INDEX 405 Attares, 280; at Manzanillo, Torpedo-boats, value of, tested, 384 35 et seq. Talbot, British cruiser, overhauled Tracy, Secretary of the Navy, his by the Nashville, 137 instructions regarding the new Target-practice, value of, proved battle-ships, 54 at Santiago, 341 jTrain, Captain J. C., overhauls the Tawresey, Naval Constructor I. G., Afonso XII., 352 on the Auxiliary Navy Board, 88 Trainor, " Fiddler," of the Iowa, Taylor, Captain Henry C., of the rescues sailors from the Vizcaya, Indiana, at Key West, 86; at 333 Cienfuegos, I29; at San Juan, Trochas, the, 5 98S; at Santiago, 293 et seq., Velasco, Spanish war-ship, burned 353 at Manila, 179 Ten-Year War, the, 8, 9 Very, Lieutenant Edward, memTerror, ordered to Key West, 86; ber of Advisory Board, appointed unfitness of, for blockade duty, by Secretary Chandler, 32 130; in the fleet ordered to San Vesuvius, on blockade duty before Juan, 196; taken in tow by the Havana, 129; her value shown New York, 197; in line for bat- at Santiago, 257, 258; runs into tie, I98 Santiago channel to investigate, Terror, Spanish torpedo-boat, at 289 San Juan, 279; whipped by the inius affairthe, -2 St. Paul, 283 et seq. Virginia Seymour, tug that took Texas, her foreign plans had to be Cubans out to the Virginis, i5 radically altered, 45; built at Cubans out to the Norfolk, 47 her efficiency proved Vixen, joins the Flying Squadron, Norfolk, 47; her efficiency proved the value of the Maine, 49; at 225 at Cabanas, 280; before Key West, 86, 21II; with the Santiago, 293; in the battle, 328 Flying Squadron, 88, I96; or- Vzaa the, 95; res on the dered to Cienfuegos, 212; sails errmaC, 246; follows the to the south of Cuba, 221; in Maria Teresa out of Santiago the attack on Santiago, 254; at Harbor, 298; hit by a shell from Guantanamo, 266; picks up a the Indiana, 301; makes a dash mine with her propeller, 27X for the Brooklyn, 312; runs shells the Socapa battery at Ca- ashore, 3I9; rescue of her crew, bafias, 280; struck by a six-inch 333 shell, 281; her position before Volunteers, their quick response to Santiago, 293, 294; signals that the President's call, 275, 276 " the fleet's coming out," 296; Vulcan, repair ship, 92 in the battle, 307, 315, 316; helps Wainwright, Captain Richard, of sink the Reina Mercedes, 35I, the Gloucester, at Aguadores, 352; bombards Santiago, 353 280; in the battle of Santiago, Todd, Commander Chapman C., of 302 et seq. the Wilmington, in the fight at Walker, Captain Asa, of the ConCardenas, 145; in the attack on cord, leaves Hong Kong for MaManzanillo, 353 nila, I56 et seq.; in the battle, Topeka, at Nipe, 356 i6i, I75 Toral, General, Spanish command- War, our preparations for, 64, 67; er at Santiago, 353 might have been avoided, 82; Tornado, Spanish gun-boat, takes $5o,ooo,ooo appropriated for dethe Virginius to Santiago, 20 fence, 85; money used for agTorpedo-boat destroyers, new ones gressive purposes, 86; declared building, 384 by Spain, i55; with Spain a 4o6 INDEX necessity, 390; message, the, 703-114 Ward, Captain A., at Baiquiri, 280; at Nipe, 356 Wasp, at Baiquiri, 280; at Nipe, 356 Watson, Commodore John C., in command of the Eastern Squadron, 356 Weyler, Governor-General of Cuba, known as the Butcher, 2; beginning of his rule, 3; cruelty of, 6; effect of his atrocities on our Government, 62; his reliance on the ravages of the Cuban climate, I27 White Squadron, the, 25-42 Whiting, Captain W. H., of the Monadnock, arrives at Manila, 348 Whitney, Secretary, went abroad for plans for new ships, 44; his work in building up the home steel industry, 45, 46 Wilder, Captain Frank, of the Boston, leaves for Manila, I56 et seq.; volunteers to remain in command of his ship at Manila, though relieved, i80; his coolness under fire, 190 Wilmington, ordered to Key West, 86; before Havana, 129; at Cardenas, 145 etseq.; at Manzanillo, 353 Windom, at the cutting of the cables off Cienfuegos, 141, 144 Winslow, Lieutenant C. W.,, in command of the cable-cutting expedition at Cienfuegos, 142; wounded, 144 Winslow, on the blockade off Matanzas, 129; at Cardenas, 145 et seq.; disabled, I50; rescued by the Hudson, 152; casualties on, 152; goes to Key West under her own steam, 152 Wisconsin, authorized, 369; size of, ib.; armament of, 373, 376 Wise, Captain, believed Cervera to be at Santiago, 226; escorts troops to Porto Rico, 357 Wompatuck, ordered to San Juan, 196; ready for battle, 198; at Manzanillo, 353 Wood, Captain Edward P., of the Petrel, sails for Manila, I56 et seq.; takes his ship in close to the batteries at Manila, 176 Wood, dangers of, on war-ships, 341 Woodford, Stewart L., Minister to Spain, demands Weyler's removal, 62 Wounded, care of the Spanish, at Santiago, 335 Yale, auxiliary cruiser, joins the Flying Squadron, 226; escorts troops to Porto Rico, 357 Yankee, in the attack on Santiago, 254 etseq.; at Guantanamo, 261, 262; at Cienfuegos, 287 Yosemite, auxiliary cruiser, at Guantanamo, 261; her fight with the Spaniards off San Juan, 285 et seq. 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