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I:




Ca!
6   C? 
11 lt\-,
i o-7   Ii l -




.... -A
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
IN REGARD TO THE 
INVESTIGATION OF TREATY MATTERS.
In pursuance of a Resolution passed by the Assembly the
Committee on Foreign Relations met at the Foreign Office at
10 a. m., June 3rd, 1890, where the following proceedings
were had:
Committee present-Hons. A. Marques, J. T. Baker and H.
G. Crabbe.
Absent by consent-Hons. H. P. Baldwin and J. E. Bush.
The Chairman to Minister Austin.-Would you please give
this Committee the history of the Treaty negotiations, so as
to complete the written documents submitted to the House,
and thus enable the Committee to carry out the instructions
given to it through Hon. Macfarlane's resolution.
Mr. Austin.-What started the Treaty negotiations was,
v                          X" "


4'




2


principally my own impulse. I felt very anxious to get the
United States to spend money at Pearl River. which would
enhance the value of real estate in that district. I had a
good deal of private correspondence with Minister Carter,
and other people in Washington, to find out if it would be
practicable to obtain from the United States a treaty more
durable than the present one. The answers I received from
America concurred in stating that there was no probability
of the United States ever making an appropriation for expenditure in Pearl River in the present state of uncertainty of
our treaty relations, that might terminate in a few years, and
that no steps would be taken in it unless the United States
could obtain a guarantee of time, and be sure that the money
spent would not be rendered useless by the termination of
the present treaty. I thought it would be good for the country to obtain a treaty with America which would only terminate by mutual consent, and I wrote to Minister Carter to
ascertain the views of Mr. Blaine on the subject. Mr. Carter
came home, and I had a number of conversations with him
about the matter, and I rather think I started it myself-I
don't know that I did —either I did or he did, or some member of the Cabinet, it is rather indistinct, the idea that it
would be well if we could extend all of our treaties.
Q.-All of your treaties with other States?
A.-I mean with the United States, I am speaking solely
of the United States now, and that if we could do that probably they would then feel like going on and making such an
investment at Pearl Harbor as would be of a great deal of
value to this country, and develop property down there, and
property down between here and there; and we talked it over
a great deal, and Mr. Carter told me that he thought that Mr.
Blaine, and probably the President, although we have not as




3


much definite information of the views of the President as we
had of those of Mr. Blaine, except what we had through
Blaine himself. We thought Mr. Blaine himself would be
willing to make some extension of the treaties on reasonable
terms, and then it was suggested, on account of the Samoan
difficulties, which were cropping up, and seeming to be rather
serious, the interference there, that if we could get something
which had been tried for by every administration since the
country commenced most; that is, the guarantee of the independence of this country by the United States, it would relieve us from any furthdr consideration in the international
politics of the world, it would take us out of it, if it was understood that the United States had guaranteed our independence it could not be disturbed by anybody; and we talked
over the details considerably of a treaty, and we finally requested-some of us, probably myself-requested Mr. Carter
to draw a form of treaty which we would like to go over. He
(lid so, and it was in pencil, and we talked it over, and
changed it, and altered it, and figured about it very considerably. The Cabinet met him a number of times, and met and
considered this matter a number of times when he was not
present, I think, and the result was the Treaty, which is submitted in my papers there, after a great deal of talk and arrangement.
Q.-In relation to the clauses connected with military
matters?
A.-Mr. Carter said that he didn't know if we undertook
to put this Treaty through, that he didn't know that the
United States if they were going to guarantee our independence, would ask that the provision be put in the Treaty, that
they should be allowed to land troops if it should be neces



4
sary for the purpose of doing that, but they might, and I think
Mr. Carter said, that as a Hawaiian he would not consent
to anything of that kind, and that was the universal opinion
of the Cabinet, we all thought that would not do, that it was
not proper. And I think Mr. Carter said that it was not
probable that the United States would insist on anything of
the kind, but that they might suggest it, and I think I asked
Mr. Carter to draw up such a form as he thought the United
States would suggest, if they did suggest that thing, and he
did so, and then he drew another, there were two of them,
and we all-nobody either in the Cabinet or anywhere else
consented to it-we all simply opposed it, Thurston and
Ashford were quite savage about it, both of them, but we
were all opposed to it.
Q.-You were all opposed to the idea?
A.-We were all opposed to the idea of having any clause
in there to permit the landing of troops, and Mr. Carter was
also opposed to that.
Q.-Mr. Carter was opposed to it?
A.-Yes sir.
Q.-Was not he the one that suggested it?
A.-He suggested that the United States might, if we
negotiated with them, they might insist upon a clause of
that kind, and Mr. Carter said at the time that, if they did,
he would not consent to it as a Hawaiian, he didn't think it
was proper. At my request he drew up what it was possible
that the United States might present, and we immediately,
without any dissention of feeling whatever, decided that
none of us should recommend anything of the kind.
Q.-Was not the objection made in the Cabinet that with
such a clause the King might object to the Treaty altogether?




5


A.-I should think not, I don't remember anything of that
kind. I do remember that none of us would recommend it
to the King, and in the Cabinet we so told him.
Q.-And didn't Mr. Carter say that if the King objected to
the clause, it might be left out here and inserted in Washington?
A.-No sir, I never heard a word of that kind, I am certain there was never any such idea, Mr. Carter was opposed
to it as we were.
Q.-It was strange if he was opposed to it, he suggested
it?
A.-He did not. I told you he said in the negotiation of
these things the United States might raise a question of that
kind, but if they should raise a question of that kind he
would object to it, 'because I, as a Hawaiian"'-those are his
words, "cannot agree to it."
Q.-Will you kindly try to refresh your memory and say
what ideas were brought forth in support of that suggestion,
that the United States might at sometime raise a question
of that kind. Did Mr. Carter say that Mr. Blaine had made
such intimation?
A.-Oh, no; not at all, we were speaking generally of the
negotiations of treaties, and he said if we ask the United
States to guarantee our independence, it might be possible
that they may ask for the privilege to land troops, and he
said, I should not be willing to negotiate with them, to do
that, as a Hawaiian. We all agreed to that, and I said to
him, suppose you draw a form in which that thing might be
suggested by the United States, if they should, so that we
can talk it over, and he drew then two separate forms, lhe
said possibly they might do this way or that way, and we all
decided that we would not consent to it whatever, there is
no doubt in my mind whatever about that.




Mr. Crabbe.-Was there not some talk in regard to the
giving of Pearl River at the suggestion of the United States
for landing of troops?
A.-Excuse me, I don't think I exactly understand you.
Q.-Well, in the Treaty there is a clause in it about giving
the United States a coaling station at Pearl River, was not
there something said in that meeting, when Mr. Carter was
present, that would lead you to suppose that it was the intention of holding Pearl River up to the United States?
A.-No, sir; that idea was entirely new to me; you suggest
it now. Now, is the first time I ever heard it. As a matter of
course, if they have a coaling station there, they would land
their own forces at the coaling station naturally. I never
heard that suggestion before Mr. Crabbe, that is the first
time.
Q.-I thought perhaps it might have come up in that conversation.
A.-No, it did not, I know that it did not, not in that form
at all. Well, I next suggested it the thing to represent it to
His Majesty —but you have the Cabinet minutes of what was
presented there and the conversation that we had with Mr.
Carter, indicated that he thought Mr. Blaine would probably
be favorable to this arrangement, that he didn't know
how Congress would stand, or the feeling in relation to
them, he could not be able to tell that very much until about
the time of the assembling of Congress, to find out whether
Congress was in accord with the Administration, or whether
there were reasons why they could not agree or get it allowed,
and Mr. Carter was instructed in accordance with the matters, and you have his instructions there.
The Chairman.-Well, before going so far as the instructions, will you kindly tell me whether the matter was presented to the King the first time?




7


A.-The matter was presented to the King the first time in
Cabinet Council, and we went over there. We had a type-writer
copy of this proposed Treaty, and added to it, written over on
top, not to be copied in because it may be rejected, on one
sheet of paper, the two clauses about landing troops, one on
the left and one on the right; they were attached I suppose
by the type-writer clerk and added in there, and a blue pencil was drawn across it; and after reading it to the King that
clause was also read to him, and I remarked to him at the
time,-no, I think Mr. Damon said,-we read Your Majesty
this in order that you may know that we have considered
this matter in all its bearings, and we cannot recommend the
adoption of the clause, or anything of that kind; and I think
the King's remark was, why not, if the United States want to
land troops they will do it anyway; and the answer of the
Cabinet was, that weq fid'nt think it policy, and we did'nt consider anything of the kind, and that is not a part of our
proposed Treaty. Well, subsequently Mr. Damon, at the request of the King, I believe, sent that document over for me
to look over again, and the next morning we saw it in print,
and that last part of it, as clause six, to our great astonishment.
Q.-I suppose it would have been better if that clause had
been left here?
A.-If that clause was never part of the Treaty it would,
perhaps, have saved some ill considered feeling that people
should not have had. It was an unprincipled lie in calling
that ia part of the Treaty, which it was not, and after the explanations which were given still insisting upon it that that
was the Treaty, and that we were trying to get the United
States' troops to land here. Every member of this Cabinet,
ever since I have been in it, has been distinctly and clearly




pronounced against annexation, and in favor of the maintenance of the independence of this country. There never has
been, on the part of Minister Carter, or any member of this
Cabinet, since I have been here to this day, a question for one
moment of annexation, or of any interference with the independence of this country, unless you call it interference that
we were willing to agree if the United States guaranteed our
sovereignty against themselves as well as others, we were
willing to agree that we would not make any treaties without
their knowledge, not their consent, but their knowledge, we
were willing to do that. I should be willing to do it to-day,
perfectly willing; I think it would be the best for this country if that had been carried out, if the authority had been
sent forward to Mr. Carter in December. I believe that today we should have stood upon the same ground as American
property, and if they took off the duty and passed bounties,
we would have got the bounty. I believe that would have
been done if we had been ready to go in promptly in time,
but I think it is too late now.
Q.-If you thought it was so urgent to get the Treaty, and
when the Cabinet saw that the Treaty could not be obtained
before the meeting of the Legislature, why did not the Cabinet hasten the meeting of the Legislature instead of postponing it?
A.-We (lid not postpone it-it ordinarily would have been
on the 30th of May-we did hasten it.
Q.-The old form was on the 30th of April?
A.-Not under this Constitution. It has always been the
custom from time immemorial to take the last of the month,
and the reason is to give time to get in the reports. You see
now that the Minister of the Interior has not got in everything-it is not all printed yet, and the time was set a week




9


ahead in order that we might get at it; but there is nothing
for the Legislature to consider about the Treaty-if there
was, on account of the agitation in Washington, this Legislature could not negotiate a treaty-the Legislature cannot do
that. What we wanted was to get the thing gone over with
over there, lacking ratification here, and we directly stated to
the King that the responsibility was too much for any Minister to take to recommend a ratification of that without consideration of the Legislature, but that we wanted to get it in
shape to submit to the Legislature, and say to the Legislature, gentlemen, the United States is willing to do so and so,
is it best that we ratify and agree to that, or is it not-that
is what we wanted to get for the Legislature if we could.
Q.-Well, I see in your Cabinet minutes, the King in your
first meeting accepted it?
A.-He did, and subsequently he denied it.
Q.-Have you any more information to give us on that
subject?
A.-Well, that is all there is of it.
Q.-Well, you cannot give any more?
A.-There is no more of it, it is simply a matter of fact, it
is a question of veracity between His Majesty and three of
his Ministers.
Q.-Can you tell us what objection he made when he did
make his objection?
A.-Just what is stated there.
Q.-Nothing more?
A.-I don't recollect another word.
Q. —Have you any other information that you might give
us?
A.-The only information is recent, that, not having started any negotiation, and then this proposition for legislation
2




10


coming up in the United States, we have suspended of course
all negotiations, and Mr. Carter had entered, not exactly a
formal protest, but a notice in the Secretary of State's office
that that proposed legislation would be very inequitable to
this country.
Q.-When you started the Treaty the Cabinet was a unit,
was it not, all four of the Ministers adopted the idea of a
Treaty?
A.-Yes sir.
Q.-Will you kindly re-call your memory again and say
whether Mr. Carter first proposed these additional clauses
that were thereafter accepted by the Cabinet?
A.-The additional?
Q.-About landing troops?
A.-It never was accepted by anybody at any time
whatever, it was only put there simply as the form set up
that we might have to agree against, and there was not a single member of the Cabinet or Mr. Carter who would accept
anything of the kind at all, not one. If anybody has any
different knowledge on that subject, he will give it outside of
anything that occurred in the Cabinet.
Q.-I think that you received in March last a letter from
Mr. Carter, an official letter from Mr. Carter, number 38,
March 19th, 1889. I looked for it in the file and it is not
there?
A.-Perhaps you can find it in the letters that the Committee have.
Q.-But you have the Cabinet minutes?
A.-Yes, sir; I have such minutes as were kept, they were
generally written by Mr. Ashford and copied by me.
Q.-Are they in the book?
A.-Yes, sir.




/


11
Q.-I think the Committee would be pleased to see them,
A.-I don't think it best to show them to the Committee,
they are not an official record you know, they are merely
kept for the convenience of the Cabinet, and one member of
the Cabinet 'going back' on us it is not necessary for us to
give away our property.
Q.-You refuse to give it?
A,-I simply say to you as I look upon it now I don't
think it best, I don't think it proper, the minutes are very
imperfectly copied, generally mere memoranda and they are
not perfect, they are not kept as an official report at all.
There is no law whatever requiring that any be kept. I cannot find in this office a single minute of any Cabinet ever kept
here until I came.
Q.-To allow the Committee to do its work, the minutes of
the meetings of June, July, August and September are necessary; that is to say, during the time that Mr. Carter was here
would have been very interesting.
A.-Well I don't think that there is anything in them that
it would be right and proper that I should give the Committee. I think that whatever is in the Cabinet minutes during
that time belongs to the Cabinet. It is not an official which
takes our meetings and conferences together, but the
record is simply a memorandum kept of them that in order if
we refer back we can find what we did, said, or thought at the
former time.
Q.-And in the same way you don't consider that it would
be good, that it would be right, for the private communications that you receivedA.-Most certainly not. I am in correspondence with Mr.
Carter all the time.
Q.-On State matters any confidential letters,-I don't




12


know the usage here,-in other States all confidential letters
are to be kept confidential and belong to the State.
A.-And my letters are personal letters between me and
Mr. Carter.
Q.-But they are relating to Treaty matters?
A.-To Treaty matters and a dozen or a hundred other
matters, but that does not make them public property. Have
I not a right to a private correspondence? I certainly shall
decline to give up my private letters. You might ask for my
private letter book.
Q.-We make a difference between your private letters on
private affairs and private letters on public affairs.
(After search, letter of March 19th could not be found.)
Mr. Austin, (continuing). I will look for it. I suppose
they will be on file there, they ought to be. No, I distinctly
decline to give anybody my private letters on any subject, I
don't care what it is.
Q.-And you distinctly decline to give the minutes, —to allow us to read the minutes?
A. —Well, that is my present feeling about it. If you wish
I will consult my colleagues about it and see what they say.
There is nothing in there that would certainly make any difference. There is nothing in there except what I have stated
to you.
Q.-If there is nothing, what objection can you have to allowing us to read the minutes?
A.-Simply because they are not an official document and
don't belong to the Government or anything of the kind. It
would be simply a concession. I have got here a very considerable record of my dealing with His Majesty in relation
to the presentation of bills and things of that kind, which
is interspersed with the deaths of citizens, &c., a request for




13


a loan of his house to my brother up at —, and it is mixed
in together, and among them I have kept my private memorandum of the date I delivered bills to him, and the date
that he approved them, and all that. Would you call that a
public record.
Q.-Giving it to the Committee does not send it to the
public?
A.-That may be so, but suppose the Committee should
judge differently and think it ought to be published, then it
would go to the public wouldn't it? I am perfectly willing
to give you any other information in my power in relation to
this, but I distinctly decline to give you my private letters
unless I am compelled to, and I don't think anybody can
compel me.
Q.-I consider private letters on public matters are always
a public matter.
A.-Well, that is rather a singular conclusion.
Mr. Crabbe.-Would you object Mr. Austin to giving the
extract referring to the public matters from your private letters?
A.-Well, I might, perhaps, it would be a great amount of
work to go over all that time and pick it out, but I think I
could do it.
The Chairman.-When should we be able to know about
that letter No. 38?
A,-I don't know, I will see if I can find it. What letter
was it?
Q.-The formal letter from Mr. Carter on a treaty matter.
A.-I don't know, I should not wonder-it must be around
somewhere-will endeavor to find it, if I can, and as soon as
I find it I will let you know.
Mr. Crabbe.-In regard to that question I asked about




14


your private letters, if you can do it without too much trouble to yourself, we would be very much obliged to you to
give us an extract bearing on the Treaty.
A.-I will tell you what I will do, I will separate my private
letters carefully, the period which we are talking about and
look them over, and if I see anything bearing upon the Treaty
matter I will make an extraet, I would just as leave do that
for you, I would do that very gladly.
Here the Committee adjourned until 1:30 p. m.
AFTERNOON SESSION, June 3d, 1890.
Pursuant to adjournment, the Committee met at 1:30
p. m., in the Interior Office, where the following proceedings
were had:
Testimony of Hon. L. A. Thurston.
The Chairman.-I understand that you had a great deal to
do, in your official capacity, with the Treaty negotiations, and
we would like you to state to this Committee what you know
about the Treaty, how it was inaugurated, and what happened
on all occasions.
A.-As you stated, I have known of everything that has
been transacted from the beginning up, but as it covers a
great deal of ground, is there any particular point that you
wish me to come to?
Q.-You might tell us when it was that you first heard
about this Treaty.
Mr. Baldwin.-It is well to be brief, as we want only the
main facts, and the record is apt to be voluminous.
A.-I refer here to this reply which the Cabinet made to
the Committee which waited on them on the Treaty question.




15


As is therein stated, the subject of treaty revision had the
consideration of the Cabinet for a long time, certainly a year,
off and on, when action was taken. The reasons for desiring a
revision were several. One was the well authenticated statement, which was made to us, that the independence of the
Hawaiian Islands had been made the subject of discussion
among certain of the Great Powers within the year then last
past; and the fact, which was unquestioned, that we are now
almost the sole remaining independent power in the Pacific;
and, within the last year or two, especially, there has been
the greatest activity among the Great Powers in taking possession, either absolutely or under protectorates, of the
islands scattered all over the Pacific,-that was the first
reason.
The second was, that at the last session of Congress, just
prior to the Presidential election I think it was, there was
developed the proposition to either reduce or do away with
the sugar duty and to substitute a bounty in favor of American sugars. It seemed to us that it was wise to attempt to
forestall any such action by obtaining a treaty before any
legislation was had, which would have place us on the same
basis as American sugars with respect to any bounty, with
two things in view; first, that the fact that such a provision
was in the Treaty would serve as a very strong argument
against any such bounty being given should there be attempted
the repeal of the duty, because the argument in favor
of paying a bounty was only because the duties were to
be taken away. Without the bounty the probability is that
they would not seriously interfere with the duty if we could
get that into the Treaty, even though we never expected to
receive any actual bounty, it would work in that way to prevent the taking off the duty, that was the second point.




16


The third reason for desiring the revision now of the
treaty relations instead of waiting until the period had
elapsed for which it was to run, was that the experience at
the lapse of the last treaty in 1883, was that there would be
the most strenuous objection and opposition to our renewal
of the treaty relations on this same basis, or more favorable
to us, as we desired to get them, and it was unwise to wait
until the time was at hand when we would have to act, or
would be liable to have notice from Congress to terminate
the Treaty; that is, if we started in now with five years to
work in we would sometime during that five years, even if we
didn't strike it now, be more likely to come across a Congress and Senate which would be favorable to us then if we
waited until the end of the five years and then began operations,
because we might, before the end of that five years, find a
combination more favorable to us than after the expiration
of the five years.
The fourth reason was, that, as a matter of fact, we ascertained to our satisfaction that the present situation in Washington was probably the most favorable that would ever
come to us; certainly that ever had been since the original
treaty, in obtaining not only an understanding of existing
treaty relations, but of getting those points more favorable
to us than the existing treaty. The combination of facts
which produced this situation were, that for the first time in
many years, the Executive and both Houses of the Legislature of Congress were in possession of the same party, apparently all working harmoniously one with the other; one
reason for their working harmoniously being, that especially in the House that they were close to the minority,
the numbers of the majority were so close that they were
compelled, as a party, to act together to prevent themselves




17


from disintegrating, and that therefore any proposition that
was agreed to by the Executive and the Senate would probably be agreed to by the House of Representatives, and we
have had good reason to believe that the proposition which
we desired to make would meet the approval of both the
Senate and the Executive. There was some correspondence
back and forth between Mr. Carter and Mr. Austin, which I
presume you have had, I have not seen it from that day to
this.
Eventually Mr. Carter asked for a leave of absence to come
home, largely on account of his health, and partially in connection with this matter. When he came, —I think he arrived here in June,-when he arrived, Mr. Green was still a member of the Cabinet, but was sick abed, if I recollect right, but
I don't Think there was ever any discussion. I think Mr.
Green may have been down here once, and a very brief reference was made to it, but nothing in particular done. Later
on,-I won't attempt to give dates, —it was, I think, after the
Wilcox row, or it may have been just before it, it was along
in that portion of the year, Mr. Carter met the Cabinet formally and talked over the matter. At the first meeting there
was an hour or two discussion on the general situation of
these various subjects, —these various reasons that I have
given as to why we wanted to take action,-his ideas as to
the feasibility of carrying out treaty revision now being to
the effect that he considered it an extremely favorable opportunity, more particularly owing to the fact that Mr. Blaine
being in the Foreign Office there, and the fact that he is more
familiar with Hawaiian affairs than almost any other public
man in the United States, and has always from the very beginning, when we first began treaty operations for the Reciprocity Treaty, been the warm advocate of the Hawaiian Trea3.




18


ty, and of Hawaiian interests in every respect, and has withstood in every way, in his party, the attacks even of his own
party, and the fact that he was in a position of the greatest
importance in such a treaty revision, was one of the strongest
points for taking action now.
As the result of our discussion, Mr. Carter was asked,-I
don't remember by who, some member of the Cabinet, —to
put into shape his ideas of what the Treaty should be, he
having given a good deal of thought to the matter. We then
adjourned, and he put his ideas into shape; that was given
to Mr. Austin, and read over to the Cabinet, and by Mr. Austin given to me to have it put into type-writing; and I did
so, making five copies of the Treaty, one for each of the Ministers and one for Mr. Carter; and we then, after it was in
shape, held a second meeting, at which Mr. Carter was present, and the Treaty was gone over with, section by section,
quite a number of amendments were made, mostly verbal, so
that it was considerably marked up, interlineations made and
some things stricken out. I think that meeting occupied all
of two hours, an hour and a half or two hours, perhaps; and
when we had the matter finally in shape, as amended, my recollection of what then followed is this: I will interpolate
here; this original draft of the Treaty did not contain what
has been spoken of as the army clause, that which is entitled
the proposed addition of section four, it did not contain that.
My recollection of what took place is this: Mr. Carter said,
"Well we seem to have come to a conclusion as to what we
want; that is our amended draft. Now when I go on to
Washington, and we make our propositions, in all probability
they will not take our Treaty 'holus bolus' as we propose;
they may have some counter ideas which they will make
propositions concerning what the Treaty shall consist of, and




19


I should like, so far as possible, to know your ideas before
hand, before I go, as to what you would agree to." I remember that I said, for instance, What do you think they might
ask for? He said: —".I think that one point which they might
ask to have incorporated in the Treaty would be, that taking
into consideration that they were to guarantee our independence, they should have the right to land troops here for the
purpose of carrying out that guarantee in such way as they
might think was necessary. For instance, if they were to
guarantee us against the invasion of a foreign power they
should have the right to land troops to carry out that guarantee."  There was not much discussion about it, and he was
again asked to put his ideas, of what form they would ask
that, into shape. The amended draft of the Treaty was again
given to me to have put in type-writing, as Mr. Austin did
not have one in his office, and I had one down here, and was
given to me to make a clean copy of. I did so, and I forget
whether Mr. Carter sent to me direct the article entitled,
1" Proposed addition to section four," or whether he sent it
to Mr. Austin, and Mr. Austin sent it down here; anyhow, it
came to me in manuscript, and I had five copies of that 'proposed addition' struck off, together with five copies of the
Treaty as amended.
The Chairman.-I suppose you did not keep the original?
A.-I will look in my drawer. No, I did'nt keep the original draft, this is the second clean copy that was made.
Q.-I mean the original manuscript?
A.-No, I did not, it was destroyed. This is my second
clean copy that I made, I took the original, and the four copies were given around. We then, by appointment, met Mr.
Carter again at the Foreign Office. All these interviews were
at the Foreign Office, and I presented to eatch one a clean




20


copy, as amended, together with this proposed addition to
section four, which was fastened on the back as it is here.
We then went over the clean copy, as it had been amended,
section by section again, and agreed to the whole of it.
Q.-Agreed to the whole of it, including the proposed addition to section four?
A. —No, the whole of the Treaty as it stood. We then came
to the discussion of the addition of article four, and it was
discussed at some length, the discussion being, so far as I
recollect, almost entirely between members of the Cabinet,
and it was objected to from the beginning. It was several
days later, so that there had been opportunity for thinking
the matter over. I had bestowed considerable thought on it,
and it presented very strong objections to my mind. I remember the principle objection which presented itself to me,
and one which I spoke of strongly in the meeting, was the
fact that it would enable the Cabinet, for the time being,
whosoever they might be, to claim the active intervention
and assistance of any armed force to support them in any arbitrary course that they might want to carry on, on the
ground that they were the Government. You will notice the
wording of one of them: "If (which God forbid) the independence and sovereignty, or tranquil administration of the
Hawaiian Government should be threatened "- I claimed
that that would mean that any person here who might be attempting to resist some arbitrary action would be threatening the tranquility of the Hawaiian Government, and thereby
they would be entitled to claim the assistance of the American Government to put them down. In other words, it would
give them absolute power to call upon the United States
Government to carry out any arbitrary schemes that they
may have, legally or illegally, on the people who may oppose




21


them. After discussion, it was unanimously (by the members
of the Cabinet, Mr. Carter not indicating his desires) decided
that we would reject this clause in this way, it not having
been put forward by Mr. Carter, or considered as having been
something which we should put in, but it being for the purpose that if they should ask for anything of that kind at their
end of the line, that Mr. Carter was instructed here, beforehand, to refuse to negotiate it.
Q.-Any such business as that he should decline to agree
to it?
A.-If they should ask for certain additions, that he should
know beforehand that we would refuse absolutely here, he
would not waste any time in trying to beat around the bush,
but would simply then and there refuse to go on on that
basis; but if he knew that we didn't want it, but would be
willing finally to accede to their proposition, or something of
that kind, then he would temporize and attempt to get the
best that he could. Our instructions finally to him were,
that we should not accept anything of that kind, I then drew
through my copy and wrote the word "rejected." That is
exactly as it stood at that time, it remains still as a part of
the draft, showing what had been done.
Mr. Carter, after we had taken our vote,-I usually act
as Chairman of the Cabinet,-and it was unanimously rejected, Mr. Carter then said, "I concur entirely in your opinion
concerning this matter, I don't think we should accede to
any such proposition if they made it."
I think Mr. Carter went and talked with the King, —talked
over the whole subject, that we had got this thing entirely
into shape. Mr. Damon, who frequently is the medium of
communication between the Cabinet and the King, sometimes
Austin and sometimes Damon, took the draft over to the




22
King to look over. It was in the same situation as we had
considered it.
Mr. Crabbe. —Without taking that clause off?
A. —He did not take it off. Of course Mr. Damon reported
to us that he had not taken it off, he will speak for himself,
but I understood that he left this copy, including the rejected
proposition, with His Majesty.  We afterwards met in Cabinet Council and produced the Treaty,-the proposed basis of
Treaty-to the King, and I presume the minutes set forth.
what was done, I do not recollect now the exact details of it.
I do not know that I have much more to say beyond this
point, that up to this stage of it, from the beginning, as is
the usual course in Executive negotiations of treaties, it was
not intended that the matter should be made public, as it is
not etiquette-international etiquette.  Here a treaty is
simply in pendency of negotiation to make it public, and the
the sole intention was to advance the business to such a stage
that it could be brought up before the Legislature when it
should meet, as it is now, in Assembly for consideration; as I
considered, and all of us considered that it involved such
radical changes and departures from our prior treaty relations, that neither the existing Cabinet or any Cabinet should
attempt to commit the country to a course which would affect
it for all time; certainly very sensibly for a large number of
years, without the consent of the people through their Representatives, and that it was never the intention that any
treaty should be signed without the acquiescence of the Legislature. If we had not brought the matter forward to the
extent that protocols could be submitted to the Legislature
as giving what the two Governments had agreed they would
incorporate in the Treaty if it was passed, there would be
nothing, as there is now nothing, for the Legislature to act




23


upon, and our sole and only object was to get the matter
into such a condition that the Legislature could judge
whether or not it was best for them to debate such a treaty
or not, and whatever treaty we negotiated, whatever points
we brought up, we proposed to lay before the Legislature
aud advocate them openly.
One further point I think of; It is recited in the resolutions, so it is germain here, as to the position which the
Attorney-General has taken in the matter. Up until the
day on which we went before His Majesty in Council, I had
never heard the slightest objection on the part of the AttorneyGeneral to the Treaty, or any clause in it, other than the
general discussion that had been going on, and naturally we
had a great many meetings, including a great variety of subjects, and there had been a great many discussions, pro and
con, but it had been boiled down finally into this Treaty as
it stands, with the proposed addition rejected, and until that
day I had no intimation whatever the Attorney-General was
not in perfect accord with the balance of the Cabinet; in fact,
it was by his vote, as one of the Cabinet, that that final conclusion was arrived at. To my astonishment, when we met
in Cabinet Council to carry out the course which had beenThe Chairman.-Cabinet Council previous to Mr. Carter's
departure or posterior?
A.-It must have been previous; it was the one at which
he raised the objection; I would not swear whether it was
before or after.
Q.-I understand that the Cabinet was a unit at the start;
now the question is, when the split occurred whether it was
anterior to the Attorney-General's departure or since he came
back?
A.-The Attorney-General's! Oh, it was before, it was be



'24


fore this point that I speak of; he raised the point there
which we had discussed in the Cabinet, and which I was favorable to at first. This is an argume'nt which struck me forcibly, that while their treaty rights,-their present treaty
rights in Pearl River,- were not derogatory to our interests,
they were evidently a point which they thought a great deal
of, and that so long as we held control of that we had something in our hands which they wanted, which they did'nt
have, which we could use as a make weight in getting something from them, and, consequently, if we could hold back
the extension of the entire Treaty, as it stands now, until we
got the free trade clause,-that is, mutual free trade for all
articles,-and make the continuation of the Pearl River clause
subject to our getting free trade, that we would then have an
argument, have something to give them which they wanted,
and which we were not giving them for nothing. That, after
being discussed at great length in the Cabinet, I was finally:convinced that it would not be well to attempt to impose that
as a condition of extending the treaty as it stands now, and
it was understood that without that being put indefinitely in
the instructions, Mr. Carter was to attempt to get that; but
it was not intended to have that appear officially on the face
of the Treaty, or in the instructions, and was so understood
by us all. Whlen we came to have this interview with His
MaIjesty, the Attorney-General raised this point, and I don't
think that he raised any other than that this Pearl River
clause should be made subject to our obtaining of a free trade
clause, and it was a surprise to me that he should raise the
point there after we had discussed it so fully, and understood
that it was not to be embodied therein; that he should raise
it there before his Majesty, as it is the rule I believe everywhere to prevent any divergence of counsel before the King;




25
either the Cabinet should not advise anything at all, or advise it unanimously; but, as he insisted on the point, it was
agreed to that that should be embodied in the instructions to
Mr. Carter, that he should attempt to put that in as a condition of the Treaty, but that he should not, if they refused to
do that, allow that to block the entire Treaty.
A.-That is this, that he should attempt to make the extension of our present treaty clause regarding Pearl River
conditional on their granting us free trade, and if he found
they would not consent to it, not to allow that to block the
entire proceedings.
Q.-That was agreed upon in the Cabinet Council?
A. That was agreed upon in Cabinet Council. That was
the only point the Attorney-General made, and so far as anything occurred until after his return, I never heard the slightest expression of disapprobation from him of the Treaty
either before or after. It was put in in deference to his
making the point, and we were put out at him that he should
make the suggestion in the way that he did, although it was
a point which I myself was favorable to originally, but I
didn't want to make it one of the conditions in the instructions. When the Cabinet adjourned we came back here into
my office at that time and I spoke to him about it, and he
said that he had spoken to Mr. Austin and Damon just before he went over, and he objected to having the thing going
on without that clause, although he had not spoken to me.
It was the first intimation I had of the thing, but he said
that his opinion was acceded to, and he said nothing further
objectionable to the Treaty or in objection to the instructions
sent on to Mr. Carter. And in accordance with the instructions assented to by His Majesty, instructions were sent by
Mr. Austin to Mr. Carter to proceed on the lines of the
4




Treaty as set forth. I have not seen it from that day to
this. That is since September 24th. Then, shortly after
that, there was the publication of the draft of the Treaty,
and the meeting at the Chinese Theatre.
Mr. Bush. —On the 26th that was?
A.-On the 26th. I remember there was a Committee appointed to wait on the Cabinet, and they did so. The written
reply was made on the 4th of October. In substance, the explanation was made to them which I now make to you to-day,
more particularly to the objections made to clause four I
made to them, Mr. Ashford being present at the meeting and
taking part in the conversation with the Committee. I talked part of the time in English and part of the time in Hawaiian.
Q.-Did Mr. Ashford make any statement to the Committee himself?
A.-He spoke some, I don't remember how much; I know
that he spoke, and was in accord with whatever I said.
Q.-Did he make a statement to the Committee of the history of it, as you have?
A.-As I say, I did most of the talking, as they were nearly all natives, and some of them didn't understand English
though some of them did. I talked to them in Native and
English; and Austin, Ashford and Damon also talked to them.
I think I did the translating for them.
Q.-Was Mr. Damon here too?
A.-Yes, sir. The statement was made to them at length,
in the words which I have given to you, except as the matters were fresh in my memory; I went into more detail than
I have at present, and they were informed that a reply in
writing would be given to them at as early a date as it could
be put into shape. I have a copy here of the reply that was




27


given in writing, and I would state in connection with thiswith the statements that Ashford made, that this, as it pur —
ports to be, is a reply of the Cabinet, although signed by Mr.
Austin, being Foreign Affairs matter; and this reply was put
in shape in this manner: It was agreed among us, after the
Committee had withdrawn, that each one of three of the Ministers (Mr. Damon said that he didn't care to), Mr. Austin,
Mr. Ashford and myself, each to draft off a form of reply. The
object of the Cabinet was to get the ideas of each single one
into as good shape as we could, and we accordingly did -so.
That caused a delay of several days, and we then met and the
drafts of reply of Austin, Ashford and myself were read, each
one in full, to the Cabinet. Mr. Ashford's I know was a great
deal longer than Mr. Austin's or mine, and covered the full
ground, making, practically, the same statement; they all
embodied the same subject matter, and it was then given to
me to boil down into one, to take the sentiments of the three,
and, to a great extent, expressions used are, here and there, in
the very language taken from all three of those original
drafts. The drafts were boiled (lown in this way, and presented at a subsequent meeting of tie Cabinet, and, with
some few corrections and amendments, suggested by the
members, that form which is here, which was published, was
then adopted by all the members of the Cabinet, including
Mr. Ashford. That was on the 4th of October.
Mr. Crabbe.-You were all in accord at that time?
A.-Yes, sir. Perhaps if you have not looked at this lately (showing extract from Advertiser of 14th October, 1890).
This Cabinet meeting was the only Cabinet meeting we have
had with the King before Ashford went away, which I have
described here. It was on the 24th (ay of September that
we met that Committee and made a verbal statement to them,




28


in which Mr. Ashford took part. There was no suggestion
made then, either publicly or privately, of any discord on his
part, not one word from Mr. Ashford contrary to any point
therein suggested, or any suggestion on his part as to anything different from what there was in the Treaty, any desire on his part that there should be anything different in
the Treaty, or any suggested addition or objection thereto.
Mr. Baldwin.-Have you got those original documents'?
A.-No, they were rough manuscript and as a matter of
course they were not kept; I presume they were destroyed
along with other accumulations of manuscript.
Q.-Do you remember what Mr. Ashford said in his reply
on the subject of those amendments to article four?
A.-Amendments?
Q.-Yes, do you remember what he said in regard to the
Cabinet consultation on that?
A.-No, I cannot recollect.
Q.-Did he or did he not corroborate your statement of
your consultation on the subject?
A. —Most certainly, there was absolutely no question.
Q.-This reply alludes to your conclusions in regard to
that?
A.-It does in this way. Here was the difficulty that we
all the time labored under in this public statement: While
we did not wish to say that this and this is the form that we
are proposing to negotiate with the United States, owing to
the discourtesy of officially stating what we were proposing
to do before the other side had even seen what we proposed
to do, therefore it was in refutation of the prior draft published, we thought to publish what the actual draft was, but
it was decided not to on that ground, that it would be discourtesy before the other side had seen it, to go and officially




29


proclaim what we did mean, and it would amount to such and
such a thing if we said that such a such a section published
was not so, and therefore it was decided to cover the ground
in this way, " The Cabinet for more than a year has studied
carefully many reasons for and against the points submitted
for negotiation, and has taken counsel with others both connected and unconnected with the Government, and has considered the situation on all points, some of which have been
proved and disproved. Any statement* stating more or
other than above indicated which may have been published
are unfounded and incorrect." That is, we stated everything
that was in the Treaty in substance, which does not state
that army clause, and then said all that it has stated that we
were trying to do is unfounded; that by implication covers
that clause. That was I think subsequent to the departure
of Mr. Carter with the instructions which Mr. Ashford had
sent, and this was to take place after the action that we had
taken as embodied in the draft and instructions, and Mr.
Carter would accomplish these purposes and they were unanmously approved by the Cabinet, as you will see by the minutes, Ashford not being here. Ashford left here on the 16th
November and returned on the 18th of March, the Cabinet
Councils, you will see, note when he was not present. During
all of Mr. Ashford's absence from here we received only two
communications from him, neither of which were official.
One was a personal note to Mr. Damon from San Francisco,
simply announcing his arrival and good health, and the other
from Boston to Mr. Austin, simply a personal note, not official. And although he left here to be gone only one steamer
lie didn't return from the 16th of November until the 18th of
March, and we heard absolutely nothing from him during all
that time, although his brother and other people received




30


statements on the subject of steamship, cable ajid treaty relations with Canada, one letter of which Mr. V. V. Ashford
published, and we received papers containing interviews with
Mr. Ashford on these various subjects which involved the
most vital matters of public policy and the policy of this
(Government and which should not have been treated of by
him, in anyway, without consulting first with the Cabinet and
acting by the authority of the Cabinet.
Upon Mr. Ashf l's return he gave us little or no information as to what he had been doing, although we gathered now
and( then from him that he had been in consultation with Sir
John McDonald, of the Canadian Cabinet, and that he had
been the guest of the Directors of the Canadian Pacific Railway; that lie had had a private car on that line, and had
traveled all over their line. He very early manifested an opposition to the Treaty, and an opposition to going on *with
negotiations, and almost before we heard from him at all
there began to appear, in several newspapers, intimations of
things that were going on in the Cabinet that could have
come from nobody but a member of the Cabinet, and statenments in favor of Canadian connections as against those with
the United States, which there was no difficulty in tracing to
Mr. Ashford, as they were frequently word for word the arumnents which he had used in the Cabinet upon the same
subject, more particularly one long article which appeared in
the Bulletin on the subject, even down to the words in italics,
were the very points which he had put forward in discussing
the matter with the Cabinet.
Mr. Baldwin.-Favoring the Canadian Treaty?
A.-To this effect, if we could get a treaty from the United
States, all well and good-if we could not, all well and good,
that we had Canada to fall back upon, dilating more par



31


ticularly upon the powers and wealth of the Canadian Railroad.
*   Q.-State, briefly, the final version of the Treaty proposed
to His Majesty?
A.-We had numerous arguments with Mr. Ashford, consultations of the Cabinet, in which he made no objections.
He began, after he came back, to throw out the first intimation that ever came from him of any objection to the point
guaranteeing our independence, using arguments against it.
We then said to him; well, suppose we do this; suppose we,
leave the independence clause out, there seems to be a difference of opinion on that among members of the community, it
is then simply a question of commerce. Is it more -advantageous for us to do one thing, or more advantageous for us,
in a monetary point of view to do another thing, in connection with the Treaty revision? This is properly a question
of dollars and cents, is not that so, Mr. Ashford? He said:
"Yes, that is so."  We then said, we won't argue that thing,
as we say it is a good thing and you say it is not, that is a
question of dollars and cents which the business men have a
greater monetary interest in than you and I here, and it is a
question vitally affecting their pockets; they are the men
who will know whether or not they are going to be best served by one course or another; suppose we submit that question to the representative business men here, simply as to the
dollars and cents view of it, as to whether it would be more
advantageous from a money point of view, for us to take one
point of view or the other. At first he objected, but finally
consented, which finally resulted in a meeting, which was not
as was then stated, called fpr the purpose of discussing the
general advisability of a treaty or no treaty, but with the object of getting the business views of the business men as to




32


the dollars and cents side of it; as to whether or not it would
be more profitable for this country to have that Treaty or
not. That resulted in a vote being taken by those business 
men in favor of the business point of view, in favor of a revision of the existing treaty. We then discussed the matter
over with Mr. Ashford, and he, although he had agreed that
it was a dollars and cents question and that we should take
the advice of the business men upon that subject, then declined to acquiesce, as though there had been no meeting, and
said he proposed to reserve to himself the right to act as he
saw fit.
The question then arose as to whether we would recommend the sending of a commission authorizing Mr. Carter to
proceed to negotiate the preliminary matters of the Treaty,
but he would not say whether he would advise it or not. I
said to him, I think we have the right to know beforehand,
before we go before His Majesty, whether you are going to
advise one way or the other, you know what the custom has
always been with our party; now, is it logical for members
of the Cabinet to reserve to themselves the right to advise as
they please when they go before the King without informing
their colleagues? He admitted that it was not so, but he
didn't see what help there was for it; he didn't wish to advise against the other members of the Cabinet, if he could
help it, and he said he would think the matter over and let
us know in a day or two, and he accordingly did. We then
had another meeting, and this subject was brought up, and
he then stated, after considering the situation, he would not
advise us what advice he would give the King, whether he
would advise him to send the commission or not, or whether
he would advise him anything.
We accordingly went over to see the King in that way, and




33


I suppose you have read the minutes there, that he (Mr.
Ashford) did advise him (the King) not to do it, we having
in the meanwhile for the purpose of getting the thing started
decided to drop out the independence clause, and after that
was dropped out it was presented to the King; and he was
asked to sign a commission authorizing Mr. Carter to enter
upon preliminary negotiations subject to return here and approval by the Cabinet and His Majesty of the commercial
clause of the Treaty only, that is section four, I believe. Mr.
Ashford, at the interview, advised His Majesty not to sign it,
the other members advising him to do so, it being specifically and plainly stated to His Majesty at the time that it
was not the intention to have this in any way final, that it
was subject in any event to his approval and the approval of
the Cabinet upon its coming back, and we proposed before
asking him to sign, or final action, to submit it to the Legisture anyhow.
Q.-Submit it to the Legislature before he signed a commission?
A.-No, there would not be, until there was a return from
Mr. Carter, or something which the two (overnments were
willing to agree on, there would be nothing to submit to the
Legislature, therefore, the idea, was on receiving from Mr.
Carter the draft of the Treaty which the two parties had
agreed upon there to submit that, subject to any amendments
which the Government here might make to the Legislature.
The Chairman.-Is that the end of your remarks?
A.- I don't think of anything else now.
Q.-Was it you that originated the idea of altering or
modifying the Treaty?
A.-Which do you mean?
Q.-The very start of the idea?
5




34


A.-Which point do you mean?
Q.-Modifying the actual treaty.
Mr. Baldwin.-The present treaty.
The. Chairman.-The present treaty.
A.-I really cannot tell you, it came up,-it was a subject
which rather grew, but who the one was who first mentioned
the subject I could not tell, it came up and one thing led to
another, and it was a matter which grew in importance.
Q.-Was it suggested by any of the Ministers?
A.-I could not say whether it came from the Cabinet or
Mr. Carter, or any individual member of the Cabinet.
Q.-You don't remember, sometime in April, a Cabinet
meeting in which was read correspondence from Mr. Carter
on that matter?
A.-April last year?
Q.-April, 1889?
A.-I remember there was correspondence from Mr. Carter on the subject, I could not give the date, it was during
the fore part of 1889,
Q.-You cannot remember whether the suggestion of a
treaty came from Mr. Carter or whether it had already been
started here?
A.-I think it was this way. We stated in our reply, and,
as I stated here, the general subject has been under consideration, off and on, informally, for a year or more past.
Q. —For a year or more past-excuse me-before this letter of Mr. Carter's?
A.-Say for six months prior to the time I am speaking
of, when the thing finally came to a head along in September. I think for some time prior to that, and what brought
us into contemplation of it as a subject for consideration were
these letters, which we received from Mr. Carter in the




35


spring, before that it had been kind of a floating subject of
consideration.
Q.-Don't you think that the suggestion came from Mr.
Carter by his saying that he had met Mr. Blaine, and Mr.
Blaine had made certain representations to him?
A.-I won't undertake to say what was in those letters unless I can look at them. All that I recollect is that the letters which we received from Mr. Carter about that time was
what brought the matter up for definite consideration, more
than the general consideration.
Q.-Was it decided at that time that the propositions from
Mr. Carter were adopted, and the result was to authorize him
to start negotiations with Mr. Blaine, and then to come here
in June and report it?
A.-No, there was no authorization whatever.
Mr. Baldwin.-Authorization of what?
The Chairman.-For submitting the matter to Mr. Blaine
and coming over here and discussing the question afterwards
with the Ministers here. You are sure of that?
A.-I am sure that there was no authorization sent to
him.
Q.-When'Mr. Carter came here and first of all discussed
the matter between the four Ministers and himself, he was
asked to draw a rough sketch of what he thought would be
the best wording of the Treaty?
A.-Yes, sir.
Q.-When he suggested that clause, or when that clause
was suggested, what is called the addition to article four, can
you remember how that started, whether it started here,
from the observations of some of the members, or of himsel?
A.-I stated quite fully how that came about already, it




36


was in this way: that the first meeting at which he was present,Q.-I am referring only to the addition.
A.-We held the first meeting, at which there was a general discussion, and he was asked to draw up a draft; the
second meeting a draft was presented, which I had put in
type-writing, and we discussed it. The draft did not contain
the separate clause. We discussed it and made amendments;
then Mr. Carter said, "This is what we want now, but there
may be points which may be brought up by them when I am
negotiating, points which the United States may want, and
which I ought to have your instructions on, so far as I could
forestall them." Then I said, your ideas would be what, for
instance? He said, " they may want some clause in relation
to landing troops."  Here the suggestion was made to him
that as we were going to have another meeting, that he
should then present what his idea would be that they would
ask.
Q.-Now, when you say that he said that the United States
might present some objections, didn't he, so far as you can
remember, didn't he say that you knew here that Blaine
would ask for such a thing of that kind?
A.-No, I am very certain that he didn't say anything of
the kind.
Q.-Don't you think that if you reflected that you might
remember of telling something of the kind to some persons
here?
A.-No, sir!
Q.-Now, at those Committee meetings didn't someone,
perhaps yourself, suggest that this additional clause might
be dropped for this reason, that when submitted to the King,




37


the King would object to it and that would jeopardize the
whole Treaty?
A.-I think very likely I did.
Q.-Then do you remember whether Mr. Carter didn't suggest that that clause might be taken out for the present, not
submitted to the King and inserted in Washington if it was
necessary?
A.-No, sir; there was never any suggestion of anything
of the kind.
Q.-You don't remember?
A.-Yes, I do remember, I remember the thing was unanimously rejected, and I then and there wrote this word "rejected" across the face of it, in which opinion Mr. Carter
concurred; that if they should make any such proposition as
a condition on which we should base a revision of the Treaty
that we should refuse to negotiate on the basis of that.
Q. —Was not it you, yourself, that started the objection
against that clause, and was seconded in that objection by
another member, whilst Mr. Carter kept on announcing that
it ought to be adopted, and other members of the Cabinet
coincided with him?
A. —No, sir; I remember distinctly that that was not so.
Q.-Eventually the Cabinet got to be unanimous upon the
question, but at first you started the objection, you were followed and for sometime the other members and Mr. Carter
himself were supporting the motion?
A.-I don't think they were; I don't think it was supported
at all. There never was any active support of it. As I
stated, it was not, from the every beginning, considered in
any way as being a point which we wanted or which we were
considering as to whether we should put into the Treaty; we




were simply discussing whether, if they propose it, whether
we would consider it.
Q. —You said just now that Mr. Carter talked several times
to the King about the Treaty, are you aware whether he
submitted the additional clause to the King; that is to say,
whether he talked to the King about this additional clause
outside of what the King saw afterwards in that draft?
A.-I am not aware-I don't know, sir-I don't know what
lie said except what he told us, which was simply in general
terms. I don't remember of his going into details with the
King so far as I know, he told us that he talked in general
terms with the King, anything further than that that took
place between himself and His Majesty I don't know.
Q.-Then the Cabinet was unanimous in refusing the additional clause; it is not correct that some of the members
stuck to that clause until after the mass-meeting?
A.-No, sir; at the first meeting at which it was brought
up it was settled finally and definitely, and was never considered thereafter, as being a subject of discussion.
Q.-Then the King, in Cabinet Council in September, previous to Mr. Carter's departure, assented to the Treaty as it
stood then, with all the articles except the addition-he assented to the Treaty?
A. —Yes, sir.
Q.-Then in December he objected to the Treaty?
A.-Yes, sir.
Q.-Could you kindly tell us what you can attribute that
objection to?
A.-That is beyond my depth.
Q.-Any reasons produced?
A. —The reasons which govern His Majesty's mind are past
finding out. He not only objected to it, but denied that he




39


had ever seen it before, and denied that he had ever assented
to it, or that the Cabinet had ever agreed to it, and he never
heard of the thing, that it had been hatched up by outside
parties, and was attempted to be railroaded through without
his knowing anything about it. Naturally, under the circumstances, there was not much discussion about it, the Council
dissolved, and he gave as a specific reason that the AttorneyGeneral was not present, and he would decline to consider
any such important measure as that without the full presence
of the Cabinet.
Q.-Mr. Carter didn't say then that he got his idea of what
he asked from Mr. Blaine?
A.-No, sir.
Q.-Did he mention any advice from here, from some one
here?
A.-No, sir.
(This article was published on the 4th or 5th of October.)
Testimony of Hon. S. M. Damon.
The Chairman.-We understand you had certain knowledge of the negotiations about the Treaty. You had the Cabinet position when the first negotiations were started?
A.-Yes, sir; I joined the Cabinet on the 20th, I think, of
July.
Q.-But the first start of negotiations was much earlier
than that?
A.-They might have been before.
Q.-Well, I suppose the best thing would be for you to
kindly give us some statements of how the negotiations were
discussed?
A.-I joined the Cabinet on or about the 20th of July, and




40


then followed the affair of the end of July. Then later in
August or September the subject of the renewal of the Treaty
came up, and Mr. Carter was present and we members of the
Cabinet, and it was if I remember right, spoken of-talked over
-among us once or twice before it was reduced at all to
writing, and then to make the matter more clear, more defiiite, it was suggested that the matter be reduced to writing,
and that Mr. Carter be asked to place the subject in form,
that we could discuss it more intelligently and more to the
point. Mr. Carter, I believe, had been brought into knowledge of the basis of the different points which had been
talked over. Then it was recommended that it be put into
the type-writer, and I think Mr. Thurston's clerk put it into
the type-writer, and each one received a copy, and it was read
over article by article, we talked it over backwards and forwards, and this is the original copy that was given to me.
Here is the so-called proposed addition to Article 4. This
was stricken out immediately on being read, it was unanimously agreed among us that those clauses never could be
a:ssented to, that it was positively against our interests in
every way to assent to those articles, and the different clauses
were gone over one by one, and there is one clause with reference to free trade was gone into exhaustively, and one of
the members of the Cabinet proposed that the Pearl River
matter should be made-that is, if they didn't grant us free
trade that we should hold back the Pearl River clause, that
I remember was one of them. Then the Article 4 was talked
over at a great deal of length, and the article in which we
give to the United States the prior right to treaties-to the
knowledge of any treaties-was also discussed. I understood it then and have understood it since, the idea was that,
if the United States should guarantee our independence, to




41


prevent any complications that they should have a knowledge
of whatever treaties was made, not with the idea that they
should control the treaties, but to prevent their complications
with other nations, that before treaties were promulgated they
should have a knowledge of them.
Mr. Baldwin.-What about that clause?
A.-That clause was agreed to at that time, and, subsequently, in the amended Treaty, which was proposed to the
King some months later, that clause, Article four, was dropped; the more it was talked of the more a feeling arose that
that clause was considered not essential to the Treaty itself,
and it was dropped. I think I have also got that copy.
The Chairman. —Let me understand you whether this additional clause was brought in with the rest of the Treaty, or
whether it was brought separately, afterwards?
A.-This proposed Article four?
Q.-Yes, sir.
A.-It was brought in at the beginning; this is the original
copy of all, but those were my pencil marks through it at the
time; we settled that day, when it was read, that it should
be dropped.
Q.-Can you kindly tell us how these additions were suggested?
A.-They were suggested in a general conversation, and
the idea was whether, if the United States should suggest
that this should be a part of the Treaty, whether we would
assent to it or not. That, I believe, is the explanation.
Q.-Then that was a suggestion, made by Mr. Carter, as
being then possible; a thing that might happen?
A.-It was whether, if the United States should request it,
it would be agreed to.


6




42


Mr. Bush.-Who made the suggestion-the Cabinet, Carter
or did it come from Washington?
A.-I think it was Mr. Carter; I did not understand all the
way through that any of these propositions were from Washington —not to my knowledge.
Q.-You did not understand that?
A.-No, sir.
Q.-You never heard Mr. Carter say that Mr. Blaine had
suggested them?
A. —No, sir; all I understood him to say was that they had
been submitted to him.
Mr. Baldwin.-What did he say? That Mr. Blaine might
urge it?
A.-If the subject was brought up there, he wanted to know
if the Government here would assent to such a clause in case
it was asked.
The Chairman.-You do not remember what made him
think that it might be asked?
A.-No, I do not remember; it was marked on the top,
merely ' proposed addition to the fourth Article."  That
week, or immediately while these negotiations were going on,
I called on the King and told him, as he knew at the time,
that the subject of a Treaty was being talked of, and I brought
him a copy immediately, as soon as it was reduced to writing, and the Treaty being talked of; and I said to him, Your
Majesty I have brought this also to make everything perfectly clear to you, and that there shall be nothing hidden between us; I have also showed you what was talked of at the
meeting, but which we have agreed shall not be a part of the
Treaty; and I wish you to perfectly understand everything
that we have talked of. And I said, I have drawn my blue
pencil through there at the time. He made the remark at the


1,  " ~ i,   1   ~ I  I ~ ~ -.- - _ _ _ _  - -, 




43


time: "( Why, Mr. Damon, leave those out," or, "leave that
out?" I said it would be contrary to the good sense of this
country; I did'nt think it would be a proper thing to do, and
the Cabinet had left the matter with him; and, later, it was
published, and he made some pencil memoranda here about
the law of 1886 being 21% instead of 18%. He also made
some other memoranda on it, and later all memoranda was
sent to me. In relation with His Majesty, I have always
endeavored to keep him posted, with the consent of my colleagues, upon any matters of importance that have been before us.
Mr. Baldwin.-Did you, or did you not, forget to take it
off when you left there?
A.-Certainly, I said as I told him I have shown you to.let you know everything that we do, and I said this part
that I have drawn my blue pencil through was agreed upon,
that so far as the thing was proposed it could not be a part
of the Treaty.
The Chairman.-You say that the Cabinet unanimously
agreed to drop that section. Was this unanimity obtained at
once, or only after discussion?
A.-I think that same day, as soon as we received our
type-written copies.
Q.-Didn't some one present the argument that-perhaps
it might be Mr. Damon himself-if such a clause as that was
submitted, to the King it would jeopardize the whole Treaty,
because he would have nothing more to do with it?
A.-I don't remember any such talk.
Q.-How did Mr. Carter stand about the clause, did he
discuss it at all?
A.-He didn't push it at all.
Q.-You don't remember hearing him say that if you




44


"found them objectionable here, they might be dropped here
and revived later in Washington," if necessary?
A.-Not to my knowledge, I never heard of it?
Q.-That Treaty was discussed in the Cabinet Council in
the presence of His Majesty before Mr. Carter left, so that
Mr. Carter could obtain the necessary powers?
A.-Certainly.
Q.-Now I understood you to say just now about the
question of Pearl River-I think that you said, it was decided in the Cabinet that it might be better not to give up
Pearl River unless you were sure of getting what I shall call
the commercial part of your Treaty?
A.-That, one of the members of the Cabinet brought up.
Q. —In the private meeting or before the King?
A.-I think in the private meeting and also in the meeting
over there.
Q.-Yes, I think I am aware that some one brought it before the King, but had that been discussed already in your
Councils?
A. —I think it was talked of when we were over at the
Palace. I think the idea was that we had not a great deal
to offer and we should hold on and not-that is, that we
should make as much of what we had to offer as was possible,
that was the idea.
Mr. Crabbe. —Make as good a bargain as you possibly
could?
A.-Make as good a bargain as we possibly could; yes,
that was the idea.
The Chairman.-When was this suggested?
A.-I think at one of the subsequent meetings, not at one
of the first meetings.
Q.-It was suggested, so far as you remember, in the private meeting of the Cabinet?




45


A.-Yes, sir; I think it was; I think Mr. Carter was present, if I remember right.
Q.-Then His Majesty accepted the Treaty as it was submitted, except of course with the additional clause that you
referred to, that Mr. Carter was empowered to see what he
could do in that line in Washington?
A.-I think that he agreed to the proposition in a general
manner when it was-The matter was first talked of in the
morning, I think he agreed in a general manner to it. I
think that the Cabinet Council minutes state that he agreed
to it in the beginning, but then after the opposition was
raised here he changed his mind. I don't think he was always favorable in his own mind to the latter part of Article
four.
Q.-About the Treaty?
A.-That is, giving notice of the treaties.
Q.-Who was it that suggested the idea, if he was not favorable?
A.-I think it was submitted to him in writing, if I remember right; I had one or two conversations with him on the
subject.
Mr. Baldwin.-You, personally, alone?
A.-Yes, sir; I could not tell positively when, but I think
I had one conversation with him on this matter, perhaps it
was the time that I talked this over, but I formed the impression that he was opposed to that part.
Q.-Did he vote for the Treaty, as a whole, in the Cabinet
Council, when you had your first Cabinet Council?
A.-I think that was before, I could not say; he gave his
general assent to having the Treaty written, and having our
Treaty extended; I think, perhaps, Mr. Carter had written to
him.




46


Mr. Bush.-He was willing to have a renewal of the Treaty,
I)ut he was unwilling after he saw this Treaty, he was.doubtful; you are satisfied that he was doubtful in his mind as to
this Treaty?
A.-After the matter was reduced to writing; not in a positive out and out manner.
Q.-You understood enough from his conversation to feel
that he didn't assent to it?
A.-He never says very much to me any way, you have to
make your own inferences.
Q.-You are satisfied, and from all your conversation with
him, you infer that he was not satisfied?
A.-After this part was submitted to him in writing, and
he had some time to look it over, I felt that he was not
pleased with that part; but I think that was subsequent to
his previous agreement, to his general intent.
Q.-In a general way?
A.-Yes, sir.
Mr. Baldwin.-That previous agreement, in which you
agreed to it in Cabinet Council, did you?
A.-Yes, sir.
Mr. Bush.-Why submit it in this form; the King gave his
consent, if I understand you right, to receive the thing in this
shape?
Mr. Baldwin. —Was it in shape before it was discussed?
Mr. Bush.-It was not in written form, was it?
A.-I want to refer to the minutes for that? I may say
this, that after this was submitted to His Majesty, that it
was after, or subsequent to it, that he didn't like this part
of it; I won't say now when it was, whether it was before or
after.
The Chairman.-However, he allowed the Cabinet to give




47
particular instructions to Mr. Carter to consider the matter
in Washington?
A.-Mr. Carter left before he was finally asked to give positive instructions.
Q.-Then the King was asked?
A.-Let me see; His Majesty agreed to it, and then Mr.
Carter left, and I think positive instructions for him to proceed were sent by letter, if I remember right; but I think
when Mr. Carter left that it had been agreed upon-that is,
verbally.
Q.-With the King?
A.-With the King; and then when we had our Cabinet
Council to forward MIr. Carter the formal instructions.
Mr. Baldwin.-Did you have a copy of the Treaty then as
it was before the Cabinet Council?
Mr. Bush.-What was the basis of that understanding
before Mr. Carter's departure; was it in writing or print, or
was it simply the action of the Cabinet verbally?
A.-I think it must have been, because Mr. Carter saw
these before he went, and so this must have been submitted
to him.
Q.-To the King?
A.-Yes, sir.
Q.-Then it was possible that the King had seen a copy of
this before you had presented your copy?
A.-No, I don't think so.
Q.-When did this copy reach the King?
A.-I think within a day or two days after it was printed.
Mr. Baldwin.-That is before you took action on it?
A.-I am a little confused to positive dates as to that, but I
know that he agreed to it verbally and that later, after Mr.
Carter had gone, that we had asked him for positive instruc



48


tions, and he declined; I think the excitement of the riot
came up between those two times.
The Chairman.-Do you remember if he had any reasons
for declining in December, when he refused?
Mr. Bush. —There was one reason there that lie didn't like
the clause.
The Chairman. —Yes, but did he bring that up or (id he
say that he had not seen that draft before?
A.-He didn't allude to it, I don't think he said much
about it except to decline.
Q. —Didn't he deny it?
A. —Oh, yes, he said he denied having assented to it before
Mr. Carter left.
Q.-Well, in fact, from what you have just said it does not
seem that he was even asked to give a formal assent.
A.-Before Mr. Carter left?
Q.-Before Mr. Carter left?
A. —Before Mr. Carter left he was asked to approve of the
Treaty, and as I remember now, he did approve of it, but
when we came to get his written approval, something that
Carter could act on, he positively declined to accede to it.
Mr. Bush.-What was the basis of your requiring his approval, was it something tangible or something verbal?
A.-You have that very clearly set out in the minutes of
the Cabinet Council, in which we asked to have authority to
have Mr. Carter act.
Mr. Baldwin. —That is what he decided in Cabinet Coun(il?
Mr. Bush.-In what form was it placed?
A.-You will see the original document that he was asked
to sign, which is in the Foreign Office, I suppose, to-day.
Q.-Was the original form of the sense of that Treaty as




49


it is here, or the words in the instructions, he was asked to
sign?
A.-The minutes are here; they must have in the Foreign
Office the exact document that he was asked to sign.
Q.-Then it was in written form?
A. —It was in the nature of-in law you would say —it was
in the nature of a giving power of attorney to act.
Q.-You were asking him to give his consent to a power
of attorney to act upon certain conditions?
A.-Yes, sir.
Q.-Were those directions laid before him in writing, or
in print, or in what shape was it; or was it simply verbally
given to him, so that he, in a general way would say, well,
go ahead, and make the Treaty according to your own statements?
A.-I am very positive that the second Treaty asked for
was attached to the authority that he was asked to sign, that
I am positive of; and the letter of instructions that went
with his authority, I think, was submitted to him about the
same time, and the draft of the Treaty, the second draft, with
this clause left out, was attached to the authority that the
King was asked to sign later.
Q. —The first?
A.-The first I think was in the nature of a letter to Mr.
Carter, which was submitted to him; I think it was in the
nature of a letter, I won't be sure.
Q. —Then that letter must have embodied the views of the
Cabinet?
A.-Yes, sir; it embodied the views of the Cabinet.
Q.-Have you any idea to what extent it embodied with
the views of the Treaty in whole, or in part, or simply the
substance of the Treaty?
7




50


A.-It was very full; it was very clear.
Q.-It is a nice point of course to say that His Majesty
approved of the thing which was not in full, upon a general
understanding, it was not put in full?
A.-I don't think it went as far as that, it is recalling
something many months ago.
Q.-You say that just prior to Mr. Carter's departure a
draft of the Treaty was placed before the King and he finds
something in the fourth Article, and shortly a change takes
place in his mind?
A. —He agrees to it, as I remember, in the beginning and
then, subsequently, he changes his mind and denies ever
having agreed to it.
Mr. Baldwin. —Well, that agreement was at Cabinet Council I suppose, was it not?
A.-Yes, sir.
Q.-He knew what you proposed did he not?
A.-He knew all the articles.
Mr. Bush.-You see from the date of that memorandum
from the Department, it states the 27th; the 27th was the
date that the steamer sailed, so that the instructions were
given on the eve of the departure of the steamer to Mr. Carter. Now, had any action been taken on the. Treaty as prosented in the form that you have testified to?
A. —Well, Mr. Carter I know was here when this was typewritten.
Q.-And informally presented to the King?
A.-That is before this meeting, so that he had opportunity to see it, I think, before this Cabinet meeting.
Q.-When was it that you held a Cabinet meeting before
Mr. Carter's departure?
The Chairman.-The 24th.




51


Mr. Bush.-Was it in printed form in the Cabinet discussion, or type-written form?
A. —It was. Some of those little points have passed out of
my mind, I know. I read those miuutes over at the time, and
those minutes were correct at the time; they were read over
very carefully.
Q. —Had the King any copy of that writing besides the one
that you showed him?
A.-Not that I know of.
The Chairman.-Did you leave that copy with him?
A.-I left my copy with him, and received it back some
days later.
Q.-Don't you think that some members of the Cabinet
were still favorable toward the adoption of that clause?
A. —You mean the proposed article?
Q.-Yes, sir.
A. —No, I don't think so. No, immediately it was proposed they thought it would not answer.  As soon as it
was reduced to writing we said, immediately, it was not
right.
Q. —What was the idea of showing it to the King if it had
been dropped?
A. —It nmiht have been that I was to blame in it, but I
have been accustomed all my life, in business relations with 
my partners, to tell them everything connected with the whole
business, and it is part and parcel of my nature, and in coming into the Cabinet I treated His Majesty on the same footing, and if there was anything of importance I gave him a frank
statement of it; and I don't think, from my entrance to the
Cabinet, in all my conversations with him, that he has ever
had any occasion to complain of my not being perfectly frank
with him.




52


Mr. Bush.-Do you think that your frankness has had anything to do with leading to difficulties that have checked negotiations?
A.-No, sir; I didn't think about it.
Q.-Don't you think that the publication of that Treaty
has had something to do to check the negotiations?
A.-It might; a newspaper has a great deal of influence.
Q.-But, really, don't you think so?
A.-It is stated in one of Mr. Carter's letters here that the
feeling and sentiment of the people and King did help it. I
think, at the first blush, the publicatioil of it might have
dpne so, but on mature reflection that the people have generally thought that it was not a Treaty which was inimicable to
their rights.
Q.-I mean the first time; didn't you suppose that this
had that effect in the United States; that it has created a
check on the part of the powers of the States in joining as
readily as they would have done if that had not been printed; that the Natives in general were against the Treaty, that
is, that they had so expressed themselves.
A.-As I said before, at the first blush, the publication of
it, when people were more or less excited, was that it had a bad
influence; but, after reading it over, on more mature reflection, they saw that it was a Treaty that was not inimicable to
their rights.
Q.-What is your opinion in regard to the intention of the
United States at the present time to treating on the subject?
A. —Well, I could tell you frankly in two words, too late.
Q.-What would be the disposition of the United States if
it was not too late?
A.-I think that the present Administration in Washingtion is very kindly disposed towards this Government. The




53


President and Mr. Blaine are very kindly disposed towards
this Government, and they wouldn't attempt anything which
they thought that people here are opposed to, that I feel
quite sure of.
Q. —Then, if you believe it is too late, I suppose you admit it to be unnecessary to make any move in regard to the
Treaty?
A.-I don't think there is any possibility, with the present
feeling in Washington for a change of tariff and free sugar;
that it would be wise on our part to attempt it at present.
Mr. Thurston, I think, was the first one to bring up this in the
Cabinet, that " The negotiation of a treaty was too serious a
matter to be entrusted to any four men that ever drew breath
in the Sandwich Islands."  He promulgated the idea. He
said, "I don't believe, and it is not right, that the Constitution or that the laws should give the right to any four men
to negotiate a treaty without the consent of the Legistature
and the people having a voice in the matter," that was his
own idea and he adhered to it faithfully all the way through.
Q.-Can you explain the reason why there was such a
pressure brought on the King when the Legislature was
about to convene?
A.-It was simply this, that these proctocols might be
sent to Washington to ascertain the ground on which a treaty
could be negotiated, and refer it back to the Legislature.
Q.-Could not that be done without considerable pressure
on the King, to send documents giving power as it were, that
was as much vested in the Legislature as it was in the King
and Council?
A.-You know, as well as I do, that they would not attempt to carry on the legislation without the proper documents.




54


Mr. Baldwin.-You say it was the intent to get this into
shape to present to this Legislature?
A.-To present to this Legislature.
Mr. Bush.-Whether the authorization went beyond its
power or didn't?
A.-No, that was not the idea.
Mr. Crabbe. —Mr. Baker wishes to ask a question. He
says, " Was there any undue influence used towards the King
whereby he might be induced to giving his assent to this
Treaty?"
A.-This was done: It was impressed on his mind, very
strongly, that it was his duty to take the advice of his Cabinet, that this might be sent to Washington, to be referred
back here; Ias the minutes of our Cabinet Council state, the
language was good, and the language was strong; it is there
almost word for word. We felt that it was a serious time,
that it was for the welfare of this country and for all concerned; it was necessary that something should be attempted
with reference to our treaty relations, right then and there,
to be submitted to this Legislature, and it all hangs on that
point. I think myself, if we had you gentlemen to talk with
at the time, and to advise, we could place it as it was placed
before him, that it would be as clear to your minds as it is
to mine. Certainly all that was given to Mr. Carter never
would have bound this Government twenty-four hours. I am
free to say that in regard to our Cabinet Councils, and as
the language is there expressed, it was emphatic. What is a
Cabinet for unless they, when the critical time arrives, have
the courage to sit up and do their utmost, what they consider for the best interests of the country.
Mr. Crabbe.-Do their honest duty?
A.-Do what they consider their honest duty. To the




55


eyes of those who are not in harmony with them it may appear that they are carrying beyond their power, but any Cabinet to make itself of any avail has got to make itself have
some weight; it has got to assume responsibilities which it
is put here for, and if the Legislature does not approve of it,
that is with them, but, while it is here it must assume responsibilities.
The Chairman.-From the start, Mr. Damon, you were favorable to the Treaty as it stands, and I suppose you reflected
over it a great deal. Did you ever reflect if a treaty would
be of any good in case there were such changes in the market
as would take away all tariff?
A.-Yes, I have thought of that, and it was explained as
carefully as it could be explained to His Majesty. The idea
was that, when you place yourself in such close connection
with the United States, that with all their wants, which this
country would assist in supplying, that if one avenue of profit failed, it being such an immense country, such an immense
growing population, that we might have some other outlet;
and it is very much, as it is, with a young man going into a
business firm as a clerk. He goes in, and his beginning may
be very small, but he places himself in contact with avenues
which he does not see in the beginning, and is in a position
to avail himself of everything which turns up, and with a
market like California and Oregon there are articles that
we could raise here, such as wool and fruits, etc., the fibres
of different kinds, that we could supply even if sugar failed,
to have something else, to have a perpetual market to go to,
and every success that the United States has the wave would
reach us in some way or the other, and that was the broad
basis on which I planned my ideas. I think that this country will live to see the day when there will be other avenues




56
than simply sugar, for our school reports show that we have
got a few over 10,000 children in the schools, and I should
feel very sorry to know that we were educating all those children to hoe cane.
Q. —In connection with that idea, what was the reason for
suspecting that this conclusion of the Treaty would be reachted just now when the Treaty, that we have now, is not going
to be terminated for four years?
A.-Mr. Carter gave us the idea that this Administration
is so favorable to us, and that in another year this Senate or
al part of it would have passed out of existence, and that the
coming one may not be so favorable, we don't know whether
it would affect us or not. Mr. Blaine and President Harrison have shown themselves very kindly disposed towards
this country, and their relations with Samoa have been notorious in the way of assisting that country, and we thought
that now is the time to strike and try anyway to make the
blood strike, it is our duty to do it, that is the idea.
Mr. Baldwin.-Mr. Damon has said, as he recollects, he is
not quite sure whether the Treaty was in the printed form
or not when presented to His Majesty in the middle of Sep.
tember, the first Cabinet Council, but he remembers that it
was in the shape of a letter of instructions. Is there any
objection to my asking Mr. Damon whether this is the letter
of instructions?
The Chairman.-Certainly not.
Mr. Baldwin.-Just look over it? (Handing document to
witness.)
A. —I think that must be it, because it was read over and
re-read several times.
The Chairman.-In Cabinet Council?
A.-No; after the letter was read, we read it over, at least
Mr. Austin read it.




57


Q.-In the presence of the King?
A.-No; I don't think this letter-this is dated the 27th.
Q.-If I understand Mr. Baldwin's question it is, if you remember that that letter was read to the King after his assent
was asked, in the shape of reading that letter?
A.-I think this followed his general approval of the Treaty
negotiations.
Mr. Baldwin.-This states that, " I am instructed by His
Majesty to proceed and ascertain whether the United States
Government is willing to negotiate," etc.
The Chairman.-I suppose you are not aware whether the
first suggestions of changing the Treaty were made by the
Ministers, or whether they originated with Mr. Carter?
A.-Leaving out the Article four?
Q.-I mean anterior to that?
Mr. Bush.-What originated the idea of changing the old
Treaty and having this revision?
A.-That must have come in before I joined the Cabinet.
The Chairman. —You have not heard whether it was suggested by Mr. Carter or not?
A. —That came in before I joined.
Q.-Did you never hear anything about it?
A.-No, sir.
Mr. Bush.-Was the Government aware of any change in
the tariff of the United States prior to this?
A.-Only what we read in the newspapers-that had not
come up so positively. I think this change is the approval
expressed by the people of the United States.
Q.-How? Had not the Government information from
Mr. Carter of the likelihood of an intention to change the
tariff?


8




58


A.-The general impression was that they would reduce it
25% or 30%.
Q.-Then there was some understanding of the possibility
of the change?
A.-It may have been talked of, because two years ago, in
President Cleveland's Administration, they brought it up
in the House of Representatives then, and it was lost,
but we were expecting some change, but nothing so radical
as this.
Q.-In the view of those changes, do you think it was sagacious on the part of the Administration to endeavor to make
such concessions as was at first tried to be formulated here
in your Cabinet meetings, in your negotiations with the United States, in order to obtain certain privileges from the
States?
A.-While the idea of free trade between here and America
was a very important factor, we might take advantage of anything that arose in the way of trade between here and America; and another fact in my mind was, not anticipating the
entire reduction in this, as is talked of now, of 15%, or not
more than 25%  at the outside, that the people here might
make their own calculations ahead. I think there is nothing that has kept capital away from this country so much
as the idea that this Treaty is constantly going to to be terminated.
Q.-Don't you think that in making such a concession in
the Treaty, you would be actually closing out all the outlets
in the possible future of obtaining such redress to our commercial prosperity, as we would be barred from in case we
are limited to our neighbor?
A.-No, sir; our American neighbor is such a valuable
market, and it was such a prize to work for, the other mar



59


kets being so distant. Now the Canadian market has been
mentioned, but without a treaty it would be impossible for us
to send our sugar to Canada; there is 3,500 miles more of
carriage that you would have to pay for, that is quite heavy
as it is. You have got to carry your sugar into the center of
Canada —it takes you 3,500 miles further than to San Francisco, and the expense of carrying that distance is very great.
Then, again, you meet in Canada the beet sugar, and the other
sugars that come from the other countries, so that it is a very
slippery market to base any reliance on.
Q.-But, as the result has shown, it seems to me that to
go to work and bind us with some reasonable ground for believing that the Administration of America, or the parties in
power, would approve of such a thing as would tend to check
what we would hope for through a treaty concession would
not enable you to say that there was really a necessity of cutting us off from any other outlet except to the United States.
If we were bound to the United States, and we had no way of
getting out of it, and the benefits that we expected to receive
from them didn't turn out to be such, we would be placed in
a hole?
A. —We have got such a market to go to; if one thing
didn't pay another would. It is such an immense market,
and there are so many resources, that certainly it ought to
be so.
Q.-We have not got enough sugar to supply that market,
and it will take years to cultivate anything so as to meet the
emergency of those losses?
Mr. Crabbe.-Do you think there is a possibility of this
McKinley bill passing the Senate?
A.-I have asked a good many people that think they are
posted, and the only danger is that it is such a party




measure that they may want to have it carried through; and
they are hoping for news by the next boat-that is what they
are waiting for.
Mr. Bush.-In this settling of the treaty question, I have
never seen the matter placed, in its advocacy by any member
of the Cabinet, in any other light than that there were no other
considerations than the commercial prosperity, etc., never referring to the rights, to the general interest or welfare, of the
native people?
A.-I don't know as it comes exactly in that light; I think
a great deal of the natives. I have been making up a list of
the taxes that the Hawaiians have paid, and I find that they
have paid a larger proportion of taxes than any other nationality, except Americans,
Testimony of Hon, C. W. Ashford.
The following testimony was given by Attorney-General
Ashford at a meeting of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
held in the Legislative Hall on the afternoon of June 2nd,
viz:
Q.-Please state what you know of the negotiations on the
proposed Treaty?
A.-Some time in April, or possibly the latter part of
March, 1889, in one of the Cabinet meetings, the Minister of
Foreign Affairs read letters then lately received from Minister Carter. Some of these letters, as I recollect, were official
and some marked private, but all referred to treaty matters.
In these it was stated that Mr. Blaine had suggested to Mr,
Carter, that he (Blaine) wanted to remodel all their treaty
relations with Hawaii, so as to place the United States in the
position of guaranteeing the independence of these Islands;




01


and urged more particularly a proposition that the existing
treaties should be so extended and worded that they could be
terminated or modified only by mutual consent of the two
nations.
It was proposed (I think in the letters read at that time)
that the guaranty of independence should be worded or
modelled after a similar clause in a treaty which had existed
between the United States and one of the Republics of Central America, I forget which one.-Mr. Carter referring to
the volume and page where the clause could be found. It
was a volume of "American Treaties with Foreign Powers."
These letters contained also a suggestion that Minister
Carter be allowed to act upon and follow up the suggestion
made by Mr. Blaine, and so fix up the matter, as to be able
to come over to Honolulu in June, to talk with the Ministers,
and discuss various matters which could not be treated by
correspondence, and obtain their assent to the proposed
treaty in its details, while giving himself and his family a
holiday trip.
These propositions were discussed in several Cabinet meetings. To the best of my recollection, Mr. Green, being then
ill, was not present at these discussions, or, at most, not more
than one of such meetings. It was agreed to answer Mr.
Carter, expressing a general concurrence in his views and
suggestions, and urging him to have matters settled with Mr.
Blaine before coming to Honolulu, and to particularly impress
upon the American Secretary of State the necessity of coming to a decisive understanding, so that when Mr. Carter
should arrive in Honolulu he would be fully informed as to
the views and intentions of both Mr. Blaine and the U. S.
President, and be able to answer any objections or questions
concerning the proposed Treaty.




The Cabinet, at that time, was generally favorable to the
idea of a renewal of the existing treaties, with the idea of
thereby extending free trade and obtaining a participation by
this country in eventual sugar bounties. Furthermore, the
condition of affairs in Samoa made some of the Ministers apprehensive that something might be attempted against the
independence of the Hawaiian Islands, and they considered
that it would be a good idea to secure a guaranty of our independence by the United States.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs was thereupon authorized
to reply, in terms generally favorable, and ask Mr. Carter to
get a decisive answer from Mr. Blaine, and learn as much as
possible as to the views of the Administration. I believe that
considerable correspondence was afterwards exchanged on the
subject, before Mr. Carter's arrival here.
Mr. Carter arrived in June. I met him first in the Foreign
)ffice, and was most favorably impressed by him. Mr. Green
was sick at the time, and Cabinet meetings were held without him, in fact, to the best of my present recollection, Mr.
Carter did not meet the full Cabinet during the balance of
Mr. Green's incumbency.
After the subject had been fully discussed in private meetings of the Cabinet, Mr. Carter was requested to prepare and
bring in a draft of a treaty, as he understood and proposed
it, and such as he knew or believed would be in conformity
with Mr. Blaine's views.
In the next Cabinet meeting there was produced a typewritten draft of a treaty, which I understood to have come
from Mr. Carter, who was present; and to that document,
containing the full text, was appended, out of its sequence,
a separate page or appendix, type-written, as I recollect, in
two parallel columns, and headed or labelled ( Proposed Ad



63


ditions to Article IV." It was proposed to add whichever of
those two forms might be selected, at the end of Art. IV as
contained in the body of the draft.
After the whole Treaty had been read and discussed, the proposed "additions" were several times read and discussed, to
determine which of the two was the best. At that time I
distinctly understood that everything in the draft, both Treaty
and additions, came from Mr. Carter.
The whole draft was discussed at several Cabinet meetings
-at some of these meetings Mr. Carter was present and at
some he was not. The Cabinet at first were favorably impressed with the "additions," but gradually objections were
raised against the insertion of such a special clause, although
at that time the Cabinet was working harmoniously. I personally objected to such a clause as giving too much power
to any existing Ministry, who might use it to keep themselves
in office against the possible desire of the people. Mr. Thurston, the Minister of the Interior, soon coincided in that view.
As I now recollect, Mr. Carter was absent from the meeting
when our objections to those clauses became serious, and it
was agreed to have Mr. Carter present at another meeting for
the purpose of more fully discussing said clauses.
The matter was further discussed in Mr. Carter's presence,
and the objection was raised, I think by myself, that such a
clause might jeopordize the whole Treaty, as the King would
probably object to it, and might even refuse to sign such a
treaty. I then asked, at any rate, it was explained, by either
Mr. Carter or one of my colleagues, that said "additions" to
Article IV had been suggested in Washington; and the draft
of the proposed "additions" had been written on a piece of
paper separate from the body of the Treaty, because they
were intended for the perusal of the Cabinet only; that it




64


was not intended that the King should see them, and I afterwards understand that the King saw them only through inadvertence.
It was then thought that to prevent hostile comment, it
would be better to drop those proposed "additions," at least
for the present, and in consequence a blue pencil mark was
drawn through those additions-to the best of my recollection, in the case of each copy of the draft-four or five in all;
but I did not understand that the idea of inserting one or
the other of those "additions" was then finally abandoned,
notwithstanding the quite earnest objection then urged
against such a clause by at least two members of the Cabinet.
It was agreed that in the draft which should be shown to
the King neither of those clauses should appear; but the
proposed additions were finally repudiated in the answer of
the Cabinet to the Committee from the mass-meeting, held in
the Chinese Theater, September 26th. If that clause had
been finally abandoned by the Ministers previous to said
mass-meeting, I did not so understand it. I do not know of
any one outside the Cabinet, except Minister Carter, who proposed or urged either of those additions. Subsequently, in
the conference, held in the Foreign Office, in April, 1890, the
whole of Article IV was abandoned by the Cabinet.
At one of the discussions, in Cabinet, wherein it was suggested that the King would object to such an addition to Article IV, it was proposed by Mr. Carter that such addition
should be ostensibly abandoned in the instructions to be
given to him to negotiate, but that when he got to Washington, and drafted a treaty with Mr. Blaine, either one of those
additions should be inserted at the end of Article IV. Then
when the Treaty would have come back, with this clause in



65


eluded, and if the King should object to it as having been
unexplained to, and unauthorized by him, it could then be
explained and urged to His Majesty that such clause was the
natural and necessary sequence of the rest of the Treaty,
and that it had been insisted upon by Mr. Blaine, who was
unwilling to assume a guaranty of our independence, unless
such clause was inserted to enable him to make such guaranty effective.
The tenor of all these discussions may probably be found
in the minutes of the Cabinet meetings. These minutes, as a
general rule, were jotted down by myself, and transcribed by
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, into a book kept for the purpose, which book is kept in his safe. I cannot state positively that all of these matters found a place in the minutes,
though I know that some of them did, and think it probable
that they are all recorded or referred to there. Ma}ny things
said and done in those meetings were not placed on the minutes. Prior to my late return from America, it had been
customary for me to read from the book in question, at the
opening of each Cabinet meeting, the minutes of the last
meeting, as transcribed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs
from my notes.
At the Cabinet Council, held September 24th, 1889, I discussed the merits of the Treaty, as proposed by my colleagues,
and said I did not think it wise -on our part to extend the
Treaty without obtaining any compensation. We had little
to give, and that little consisted of an extension of the Pearl
Harbor concession to the United States. The Treaty was so
drawn that we would get nothing in return for that extension
except the continued right to send our sugar in the United
States free of duty. The second and third Articles, by which
it was proposed that we should participate in the United
9




66


States sugar bounties, and obtain free trade with the United
States, were made dependent upon legislation by Congress,
though some of the Ministers thought otherwise, with reference to the second Article, concerning bounties. My contention, therefore, was, tllat inasmuch as the extension of the
United States' rights in Pearl Harbor was practically all our
capital with which we could purchase the sugar bounties and
free tradle articles, we should reserve such extension until we
were certain of the proposed return, or compensation therefor. I urged that, as the United States were chiefly anxious
to perpetuate their rights in Pearl Harbor, they would be
much more likely to give us the legislation necessary to put
the sugar bounties and free trade articles into effect before,
than after, we had conveyed all that they wanted in the Pearl
Harbor. I argued that there was no certainty of our receiving siuch legislationf from Congress after we had given all we
hatd to give, and I objected to placing this country in the attitude of a beggar, at tlhe door of Congress, for privileges which,
by discreet management, might be obtained with certainty
land dignity at the time of our granting an extension of the
United States concession in Pearl Harbor.
My desire throughout had been to put th3 Treaty into effect, if at all, only as a whole, and not piece-meal. Thus, by
giving all that we were asked to give, and receiving all that
we expected to receive, at one time, effect would be given to
the entire proposition. But I was fearful that any other
course would redound to the ultimate disadvantage of Hawaii,
and lwas surprised at the.eagerness of my colleagues to push
the matter through as it stood.
At the Cabinet Council referred to, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs proposed that Minister Carter should be at once
autolorized to proceed with the negotiation of the Treaty as




67


drafted. In order to prevent such a course I explained some
of my objections thereto, with the result that a compromise
was reached at that meeting, by which the extension of the
Pearl River clause in the Treaty of 1887, would be made dependent upon legislation to put the free trade article into
effect.
My.understanding of the manner in which the proposed
"additions" to Article IV came to the knowledge of His Majesty is this, viz:
The present Minister of Finance, Mr. Damon, took over a
draft ol the Treaty to discuss it privately with His Msjesty.
Being requested to leave it with His Majesty, the Miinister
left the draft without taking the precaution to remove the
sheet containing the proposed "addition" to Article IV.
> June 5th.-Since meeting the Committee on this subjest, I
have found my copy of the original draft of the proposed
Treaty, and I find that I was mistaken in the statement that
blue pencil marks had been drawn through the "proposed
additions to Article IV." I now think that such marks were
drawn through those "additions" in our or more of the copies,
but not all of them, my own draft was not so marked.  v
C. W. ASHFORD.




I;
iF
'.
I$
'I' 
I






R"
i"


/


-COP hESPO               ~DEIACE
AND
MINUTES OF CABINET COUNCILS
[N RE
A Proposed New Treaty witk U1elnited gtata,
DEPARTMENT OF IFOREIGN AFFAIRS.
HONOLULU, May 28) 1889,.
HON. J. S. WALKER,
President of the Legislature, Aliiolani Hale.
MR. PRESIDENT:
in response to a Resolution passed by the Legislature on
the 27th instant, in the following words:
RESOLVED:
WHEREAS, serious differences have ai'isen between the repective members of the Cabinet with reference to the polic
o~f extending our Treaty relations with the United States of
America, and
WHEREAS, the Attorney-General has asserted in substance
over his own signature in the newspaper press of Honolul,
that such (lifferences were owing to an effort on the part of
his' colleagues i nthe Cabinet to contract Treaty relations
with the United States prejudicial. to the independence of
Hawaii ais a Sovereigni state, therefore be it Re-solved,
1st. That ther H~iuister of Foreign Affairs, ho', and he is,hereb iipstructed, to lay before this House with all c'onvel



2'


nient speed, the entire correspondence between his office
and the Hawaiian Miniister at Washington with reference
to such Treaty revision or extension.
2d. The entire correspondence, or copies thereof (in as
far as it has come to his knowledge or possession) between
the Departnent of State of the [ruited States of America
and with the Hawaiian Foreign office or the Hawaiian Minister at Washington, with reference to such Treaty revisiorn
or extension.
3rd. Copies of all Cabinet councils of the Hawaiian
Cabinet wherein or whereat such Treaty revision or extension has been discussed. Such correspondence and minutes
to cover the period from Jaiuary 1st, 1889, to the present
time.
[Signed]             JOHN W. KALUA.
May 27, 1890.
1 have the honor now to lay before this House:
I. The entire correspondence between the Foreign office
anld the liawaiian Minister at Washington, with reference
to such Treaty revision or extension.
2. No correspondence has come to the knowledge or possession of this office between the Department of State for the
United States of America and the Hawaiian Foreigi office
or the iHwaiian Minister at Washington, with reference to
such Treaty revision or extension.
3. (opies of all minutes of Cabinet councils of the Hawaiianl Cabinet, wherein or whereat such Treaty extension
or revision hlas been discussed, such correspondence and
milnutes coverirng the period from 1st of January, 1890, to the
present time.
I have the honor to be, sir
Your nost obedient servant,
JONA. AUSTIN.
Minister of Foreign Affairs.




3


A Cabinet council was held at Iolani Palace, Tuesday,
Septenber 24, 1889, at 1 o'clock p. In.
His Majesty presiding. All Ministers present.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs presented the matter of
instructing our Minister Resident at Washington to open
nlegotiation for an extension of our treaty with the United
States, to embody the following points in substance;
1. That all existing treaties andl conventions between
the two countries be extended subject to termination or
modification by mutual consent.
2. That the products of either country be embraced
within the bounty system, if any, by which the other seeks
to stimulate the growth or manufacture of such products.
3. That complete reciprocal free trade excepting opium
spirits and prohibited articles be put into effect between
the two countries.
4. That as an equivalent for the foregoing tle United
States shall positively and efficaciously guarantee Hawaiial
independence, autonomy and sovereignty.
5. The Treaty to remain ill force until abrogated or
modified by mutual consent.
It was agreed that Minister (garter should be instructed
to negotiate for such a Treaty. To ask for the embodiment
of the 1st, 3rd, alnd 4th prdposition indepeldelltly, and let
the 2d depend upon its merits separately.  But if he shall
be convilnced that the success of such Treatv as a whole is
loubtful in (ongress, he shall abanldon tie effort to carry
the 3rd proposition concurrently witi the 1st and 4th, the
2d and 3rd propositions to be inserted, but left to depend
upon congressional tand Hawaiiall legislation.
The council then adjourned.
[Signed]              JONA. AUSTIN.
Minister of Foreign Affairs.




4


A Cabinet council was held at Iolani Palace on Friday,
December 20th, 1889, at 10:30 a. n.
His Majesty presiding. Present L. A. Thurston, Minister
of the Interior, S. M. Damon, Minister of Finance, and
Jonathan Austin, Minister of Foreign Affairs.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs stated to His Majesty
that since talking with him on Saturday last, the Ministers
had carefully considered the subject of advising His Majesty to sign an authorization to Mr. H. A. P. Carter, our
Minister at Washington, to negotiate, conclude and execute
a convention with the United States, revising and extending our Treaty relations with that government, subject to
the final ratification of His Majesty, and that in view of the
desirability of being prepared to take advantage of any indications that such convention would probably receive favorable consideration by the United States Senate, such
authority should be granted, if in doing so we could be
guarded against any mnaterial changes being made in the
project for a Treaty which was agreed upon at the Cabinet
council of the 24th of last September, and that in order to so
guard, instructions had been prepared to send to Mr. Carter
with the authorization informing him that while we are
willing to concede any verbal changes or re-arrangements
of the position of sections, it was not intended that any
material changes should be mnade in the provisions of that
project, and that if any such changes were proposed or
deemed advisable, he should withhold his signature until
he could submit the same to this Government, and receive
its decision thereon. That the Cabinet in the belief that it
is desirable to hlave a definite statement of what the United
States Governmenlt is willing to agree to, for presentation to
the Legislature, advise His Majesty to sign the authorization here presented.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs also stated that Minister
Carter reported having conversed with the representatives
of England and Germany at Washington, who severally asts




5


sured him  that they were of opinionl that no European
nation would object to the proposed conventionl, and the
English Minister offered if desired to advise or assist Mr.
Carter in making the final draft of the Treaty. The Minister then read Mr. Carter's letter to the above effect.
The Minister of the Interior said that the responsibility
of making a Treaty to control our relations for so long g,
time, is too great to be assumed by any Ministry, and that
we desired to endeavor to have a definite proposition, which
we could submit for the consideration of the Legislature
before taking the responsibility of advising its ratification,
and that nothing could be binding upon us, or take effect
until ratified by His Majesty.
The Minister of Finance said that he also was especially
moved to advise His Majesty to sign the authorization by
the sense of great responsibility, and the necessity of being
prepared if possible to ask the Legislature to consider a definite proposal, and not being obliged to go before them
without a knowledge of what actual arrangenment could be
made.
His Majesty called attention to the absence of the Attoriney-General (who is now in the United States) as lea ving
the council incomplete, and said that he should decline to
sign the authorization. That lle was unwilling to trust Mr.
Carter. That the report of the opinions of the Enlglish and
German representatives at Washington hlad (no weight with
him, as they were in a foreign country, and did not know
the opinions of their home governments.   That he had
iever agreed to this proposal for a Treaty. That it had
been hatched up by outsiders without consulting hin.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs called his attention to the
fact that the draft was submlitted to him in council oni the
24th day of Septemiber last, and that the instructions to Mr.
Carter with the draft of the project were made with his full
assent.  His Majesty denied that that was so.




6


lThe Minister of the Interior stated that in accordance
with the advice of the Supreme Court, His Majesty had assented to the statement that the Government was to be conducted by the Cabinet who were solely responsible.
His Majesty said that the decision of the Supreme Court
related only to executive matters which meant the internal
affairs of the Kingdom. That it was his constitutional prerogative to make treaties, andI that it was not his duty to
sign a document presented by the Ministry in relation to a
Treaty if he had reasons satisfactory to himself for declining to do so.
The Minister of the Interior said that this was not the
first instance of His Majesty's refusal to conmply with the
advice of his Ministers, that the experience of the Cabinet
had been one continued struggle to get him to do his duty,
and that the history of such action on the part of Sovereigns
in the past had had the uniforin result of bringing disaster
tupon the Sovereign alld the country.  His Majesty said, I
am willing; let it come.
The Minister then said, Your Majesty distitictly refuses
to do your duty.
His Majesty answered, it is not my duty.  i have the colnstitutional right to decline to sign the document.
The council then adjourned,
[Signed]               JONA. AUSTIN.
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
A Cabinet council was held at lolani Palace on Thursday,
April 10, 1890, at 3 p. mn. His Majesty presiding. All Ministers present.
Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that the majority of the
Cabinet advised His Majesty to sign an authorization to
Minister Carter to negotiate and sign, subject to ratification,
a Treaty with the United States, being the same as that dis



7


cussed in August, t889, with the guarantee Article IV.
thereof eliminated. The Minister stated that he understood
the Attorney-General did not concur in this advice. Tile
Minister presented the proposed commission to Mr. Carter,
including a project of the proposed Treaty as a part thereof, which His Majestyread.
His Majesty asked the Attorney-General if lie joined in
the advice of the other members of the Cabinet and the
Attorney-General replied that he could not advise the King
to sign the commission as it now stands.
The matter was discussed by the different members. The
Minister of Interior took the ground that the King should
follow the advice of a majority of the Cabinet, where one
dissented, and in support thereof read the reply of three of
the Supreme Court Judges (all who are now in the Kingdoin) to an inquiry made by the Minister of Interior on behalf of a majority of the Cabinet, wherein those Judges express their opinion that a majority of the Cabinet are competent to advise, and that their advice should be followed.
The Attorney-General argued the merits of the proposed
Treaty, and gave his reasons for advising the King not to
sign the commission, and stating that the opinion of the
Judges of the Supreme Court is not in the slightest degree
binding, and is of no more effect than that of any other
three men of equal ability.
His Majesty expressed the opinion that it would be better
to defer this matter for the consideration of the Legislature
and declined to sign the authorization.
The Minister of Interior then asked His Majesty in view
of the opinion of the Supreme Court to sign the commission of H. F. Hebbard as Colonel of the Hawaiian volunteers.
The Attorney-General said, "I advise Your Majesty to
decline to follow the advice of the majority of the Cabinet,
and that of the Supreme Court."




8
His Majesty then said, that he should decline to sign the
coimmissionl until the Cabinet is unanimous.
The council then adjourned.
[Signed]              JONA. AUSTIN.
Minister Foreign Affairs.
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
HONOLULU, Septermber 27, 1889.
His EXCELLENCY HON. A. P. CARTER,
Washington, D. C.
SIR:-I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that
in view of the great importance of the commercial relations
now existing between the people of this country and the
people of the United States, and of the extensive vested interests, which have resulted from the operation of the treaties and conventions between the two countries, His Majesty and His Majesty's Ministers feel that if it is possible to
strengthen and extend those relations, an effort should be
made to do so at as early a date as shall be found practicaile.
Therefore, I aln directed by His Majesty to request that
Your Excellency will proceed to ascertain if the United
States government is willing to negotiate with us to that
end.
As a basis upon which such negotiations may be founded
you will direct attention to the following points.
I. The Treaty of Reciprocity now in force between the
two countries may be termiinated in a short time by either
of the contracting parties, and as the uncertainty of its duration is an important factor iln the consideration of any
who may desire to make permanent investments in this
Kingdom, it is advisable that the treaties now in force be




9


extended in such a manner that the consent of both gov-ernments shall be requisite for their modification or termination.
2. Certain articles, the growth and produce, or manufacture of each country are by virtue of the Comnlercial Treaty
of Reciprocity of 1875, admitted into the other country free
of duty, and while it is desirable that the list of articles so
admitted free of duty shall be retained or even increased
'the status of such articles in the country to which they are
admitted should be more definitely settled, and it should be
declared that they shall be treated in respect of ally bounties paid, or any exemptions or inmmunities, and in all respects precisely as if they were the growth, produce or
manufacture of the country to which they are so admitteld.
3. In view of thq desirability of extending the commercial benefits, the unity and good will of both parties, you
will endeavor to secure an agreenient which shall become
operative whenever the Congress of the United States and
the Legislature of Hawaii shall have passed the necessary
laws therefor to the effect that all articles, the growth, produce or manufacture of either country shall be admitted
into the ports of the other free of duty, and shall be on the
same footing in all respects as if they were the growth, produce or manufacture of the country into whose ports they
are so admitted. The operation of this clause should not
include opium or spirituous liquors of more than 18 per
cent. of alcoholic strength or any article which is, or shall
be prohibited from entry into either country by law.
4. In order to ensure to our people the tranquil and cotlstant enjoyment of the advalltages of tle Treaty relations,
and to foster and encourage the large interests which the
American people have acquired in Hawaii, the United
States Governmenlt should agree to guarantee positively and
efficaciously the perfect iiidepeuldenrce and autonomy of the
Hawaiian Goverlmnent in all of its domininlins and its rights
of sovereignty over such domtnilions.




I0


To avoid any danger of complication with other nations,s
His Majesty will agree that he will not mnake or negotiate
any Treaty, convention or agreement with any other Power
without the full knowledge of the government of the U[nited
States.
If Your Excellency shall find that the goverllnent of the
tUnited States is prepared to negotiate for an extension of
our existing Treaty relations, you will endeavor to ascertain
if the Congress of the United States can be expected to pass
at the coming Session, the laws nlecessary to give effect to
the 2d and 3rd points of the basis of negotiations as above
set forth, and if so will try to have a convention coverilng
all the points il the basis agreed to by Congress as early as
possible, the idea being to hold if practicable the aextension
of the right of the United States to enter Pearl River Harbour, su bject to the passage by Congress of whatever legislation may be required to secure to us the benefit of possible bounties and the extension of the free list.  We desire that these should, if practicable, be excepted from thee
effect of the proposed continuance of such treaties and conventions, the 2d/ Article of the Reci rocity Treaty of 1887,
the continuance of which we greatly desire be Inade depen(lent upon the passage of the laws coitemplatedl and referred
to in the third paragraph of these instructions.
Should you be convinced that this course is likely to endanger or to seriously delay the accomnplishument of any extension you will abad)on it, and devote your energies to
securing the ratification by the President, by and with the
advice attd consent of the Senate, of a convention embodying the foregoing basis of negotiation( with the usual clauses
of ratification and proclamation, and provision for amendment or modification at the instance of either party.
Enclosed herewith, I havti the honor to iallid you for
vour guidance a project for a convention in accordance
with these instructions.




11


His Majesty depending upon your well proven diplomatic
ability and your fidelity to your native land, is confident,that you will conduct the mission hereby confided to you,
with skill and with a full appreciation that no presentation
of this matter to the Senate will be advisable except upon
reliable assurarces that it will receive the consent of that
body.
With renewed assurances, etc., etc.,
JONA. AUSTIN.
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
[coPY]
The United States of America and the Kingdom of Hawaii recognizing the importance to both nations of perpetuating the peculiarly friendly relations now happily subsisting between them, and of protecting and giving permanence
to the imnprtant commercial and vested interests, which
have grown out of the Treaty relations heretofore established between the two nations, have solemnrly resolved and
agreeld upon the following articles.
ARTICLE I.
It is agreed that the treaties and conventions now in force
between the high contracting parties shall continue in force,
(notwithstandinlg any articles therein contained limiting
their duration, or providing for their termination) until
modified or terminated by mutual consent of the two governments. Provided, however, that the further extension
of Article II. of the Treaty between the United States of
America and His Majesty the King of Hawaii, ratified by
Hawaii on the 20th day of October, 1887, and by the United
States onl the 9th day of November, 1887, relating to the
grant to the United States of certain privileges in Pearl




j


12




river,. shall be subject to the passage by the United StatiEs'
Oongress and the flaw'~aiia n Legislature, of the laws con-,
teinpiated by Article III. of this Treaty, and the contiuniarnce in operation of such laws.
AWFI~LK VI`It is -agreed that all articlets, the- growth, produce or
mnanufactuire of the, Uniited States of America, which are,
entitled to be admitted free of (duty into the ports. of the~
Hawaiian Kingdom under the convention of comnmercial,
reciprocity, of July, 1875, shall be treated by the Hawaiian
Governmnent in respect of any bounties paid or of any exernptions or immunities, and in all other respects precisely,
as if'such articles were the growth, prodluce or ManUfactureof the Hawaiian Islanids, arid likewise, all articles, the
growth ardnntctro            ro'luee of' thie Rawaiiani fslands, which are admitted free of (duty into the ports of the
Unlite'd States of America under the convention of eomrnmercial reciprocity of July, 1.875, shall h-e treated by the govemn went. of the United States of America in respect of bounties, or of anly exemiptions or immunities of aniy kind, and
in all other resIpects precisely as if such articles were the
gotproduice or manufacture of the United States of
A Iflri'ca.
AiRTIC1 ],I I IL
It. is agreed that, whenever the Clongress of the Unlited
States of Atnerica and the Legislature of the, Hawaiian Lslanlds, shall h~ave passed the necessary laws providing therefor, all articles, thle (Yrowth, prodLuce arid manufacture of the,
Hawaiian Isands shall be ad mnitted i rito the po rts of the
United States free of dutty, Cand] ini voisider'a-tion thereof,
andi as anr equiivalent therefore, all artilese,-, the growth, produc. or mi-anufacAture of' thme United States of America shall








113


be admitted into the ports of the Hawaiianl Islands free of
duty, and all articles thus admitted into the ports of either
country free of duty, shall be treated in respect of bounties,
exemptions or immunities, and all other respects precisely
the salne as if of the growth, produce or Inanufactnre of the
eountiy into whose ports they are introduced.
The evidence that such articles are the growth, produce
or manlufacture of the exporting country, shall be the same
as required by the convention of commercial reciprocity
ietween the Hawaiian Kingdom and the United States of
America of July, 1875.
There shall be exempted from the operation of this article,
opium and spirituous liquors, meaning thereby, any liquids
of more than 18 per cent. alcoholic strength, alld any
articles which are or which shall be prohibited from entry
into the ports of either country, by the laws of that country.
ARTICLE IV.
In order to ensure to the Hawaiian Islands the tranquil
and constant enjoyment of the advlantages which have come
to them under existing treaty relations between the two
countries, an(t to protect the peculiar interests of the United
States of America in the Hawaiian Islands, the United
States hereby guarantees positively and efficaciously to Hawaii the perfect independence and autonomy of the Hawaiian Government in all its dominiions, and its right of sovereignty over such dominions.
The Hawaiian Governllent as anll equivalent for such
guarantee, and in order to enable the United States thus to
guarantee the sovereignty and independence of Hawaii efficaciously and without danger of colnplications with other
powers, agrees, that no treaties, conventions or agreements
shall be negotiated or made, between Hawaii and any other
power, potentate, or state without the full knowledge of the
governinentl of the United States.




14
ARTICLE V.
It is agreed that this convention shall be ratified by the
['resident of the United States, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate thereof, and by His Majesty the
King of Hawaii, and the ratifications exchanged as soon as
possible, and: upon such exchange of ratifications and proclamation thereof by the President of the United States and
the King of Hawaii, the stipulations thereof shall go into
effect with the exception of the third article which shall go
into effect upon some date to be agreed upon after the Congress of the United States, and the Legislature of the Hawaiian Islands shall have passed the necessary laws to give
effect to its provisions.
ARTICLE VI. 
The present convention shall remain in force until modified or terminated by mutual consent. A conference for
the purpose of considering the modification or termination
of this convention, or any of the conventions or treaties
between the two high contracting parties shall be held at
the capital of one or other of the two countries for such
purpose at any time within six months after either of the
high contracting parties shall have given formal written
notice to the other of its desire to hold such conference.
[LETTER BOOK, PAGE 297.]
HONOIrrLU, December 1, 1889.
HON. H. A. P. CARTER:SIR:-In acknowledging Your Excellency's despatch No.
45 of 9th of November ult., reporting your various interviews with Mr. Blaine on the subject of the proposed amplification of existing Treaty stipulations, I am not, sur





15


prised to learn that the widely spread reports of the hostility of His Majesty and the native people to anly guarantee
of their independence, have excited a degree of surprise out
of all proportion to their merits. The fact is, as you may
know from observation during your recent visit to this
Capital, that such opposition as there is, is personal rather.than popular, factious rather than genuine, and, I am able
to assure you is not shared by His Majesty, who, I have
reason to believe, will extend to you that assurance under
his own hand. You will therefore be better able to reply
to such reports in the future. They are set on foot, and
disseminated by parties of no great weight, politically or
otherwise, and are now in fact nothing more than a device
to secure the more ignorant and unthinking voters, in the
forthcoming elections, and I am inclined to believe that the
very originators themselves are becoming discredited even
amongst their own followers, though of course their avowed
organs in the Press still endeavour to fan the flame.
I have, etc.


I


[Signed]


JONA. AUSTIN.
Minister of Foreign Affairs.


[LETThER BOOK PAGE 512.]


HoNOLULU, May 3; 1890.
HLON. H. A. P. CARTER:SIR:' — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of
Your Excellency's despatch No. 60, of the 26th of March last
reporting your conversation with Mr. Blaine, regarding the
rTreaty proposals in the course of which you told him that
no powers to act om) the matter had reached you, and that
you presume(d none woul(l be sent till after the meeting of
the Legislature.
I now beg to inform you that His Majesty and the Cabinet
Ministers have not decided to authorize the negotiation of




16


any extension of Treaty, and probably no action looking to
such authorization will take place before the meeting of the
Legislature, which is called for its biennial Session on the
21st instant.
I have, etc.
JONA. AUSTIN.
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
WASHINGTON, D. C., November 9, 1889.
To His EXCELLENCY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu.
SIR:-With reference to Your Excellency's despatch of
September 27th, which you kindly handed to me in person
on leaving Honolulu, and the instructions therein contained,
I beg leave to report that shortly after mry arrival here I
called on Mr. Blaine and was very cordially received. I
stated verbally to him that I was under instructions to present to him some amplifications of present Treaty stipulations, he replied that he had seen something in the press
regarding such a matter, but did not know whether it was
true or not, and that whenever I was ready to present them
he would give them careful consideration; Mr. Blaine made
courteous enquiries regarding their Majesties.
On Thursday last, I called again to consult with Mr.
Blaine as to the presentation of the proposals, and he asked
me to defer the whole matter for another week when he
would see me and discuss the matter. I did not ask any
reason for the delay as there is of course plenty of time before Congress meets, and on our part there is no reason for
pressing the matter at this time.
I would say, however, that it has been extensively reported here, that His Majesty and the native people are opposed to any guarantee of their independence, and this has
excited some surprise.




17
To one or two prominent gentlemen I have explained that
at the time of the demonstrations alluded to in the papers,
a false idea existed as to the nature of the proposals.
There will of course be opposition to such a guarantee by
the United States, and it will only be given as a favor to
Hawaii, and will hardly be given unless it is understood
that it is the wish of the King, Governmtent alld people of
Hawaii.
The Charge d' Affairs of Gernmany was (calling onl me a
few days ago and mentioned the matter sayilng that he did
not think his government would take any notice of it at all,
but asked ue if we were moved in the matter by anly apprehensions of interference from other powers. I told him
not at all, but that a certain class of politicians ill our country were constantly exciting the prejudice of our people
against the Untited States by declaring that the United
States had designs upon our independence, and that the
foreign representatives at the Islands seemed to share in
that erroneous idea, and that we thought it better to have
the attitude of the United States authoritatively defined by
Treaty engagements.
He said that of course no other nation could have such interests in Hawaii as the United States; (and le thought that
was generally understood among EuropeanL nations.
My time is much occupied by the Maritime Coinference,
but I shall carefully prepare papers to presellt to the Secretary of State regarding these proposals which are inot new
to this country; Mr. J. J. Jarves when negotiating the
Treaty of 1849, at this Capital having urged with great persistence that such a guarantee be giveni, alld Mr. W. H.
Lee and Mr. E. H. Allen having at different times presented
reasons why. it should be done, ulder instructions from Mr.
R. C. Wyllie. It may be said to have been thp aim of Hawaiian Diplomacy since the fornmationl of the Government,
and enlisted the patriotic endeavors of the Kamehamehas




18


and their Ministers. The Samoan dlifficulty has rmade apparent that it would be wiser for the United States to define.
its position by Treaty, and it would be strange if HawaiiansE
should now oppose the consummation of an idea which has;
for over forty years been held desirable for Hawaii.
I have, etc.,. etc.
[Signed]               H. A. Pl CARTER.
WASHINGTON, D. C., November 28, 1889.
To His EXCELLENCY MINISTER OF FOREI(GN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu.
SIR —Since I last wrote to Your Excellency I have not
been fortunate enough to have received any of your valued
letters.
I have represented to the Honorable Secretary of State
that while willing to follow his wishes in any way with
reference to the preliminary negotiations necessary to
Treaty revision, we should like the opportunity to judge of
the probable action of the Senate upon our propositions,
and found that it accorded with his own wishes, we have
therefore postponed any further action till after the assembling of the Congress. Mr. Blaine did not seem to
think much time need be taken for negotiation, for if the
principles of our proposition were to be accepted, he thought
them well expressed, my own thought, however, is, that
when the convention is framed by the experts in the State
Department, in the negotiations to be had, we shall find
some changes in wording suggested, while my authority as
Minister is sufficient for these preliminary acts, I shall need
full and special powers to sign a completed Treaty to be
sent to the Senate, and I leave it with Your Excellency to
decide whether to send them to me before the draft is completed or not.




Any Treaty would, of course, require final ratification at
h~onoluluc.
*   *
I have, etc.
[Signed]               IH.. A. P. CARTER.
0o -Y]
H.AWAIIAN LEGATION, WASHINGTON, D. C.
December, 26, 1889.
To HIs EXCELLEEN CY MINISTER OF FOREIG:N AFFAIRS,
Hono1lu'~
SIR:-Aks to propositions looking to modification of treal
ties, we are still awaiting the action of Congress on Tariff,
bounties anid other treaties which are to go before it.
The attitude of the Senate towards the admninistration
will le defined ii its action on a Ha[ytien treaty recently
negotiated, and I think it much wiser to wait till we can
judge inore correctly of the course Congress would be likely
to take with our propositions before pressing them upon the
ad ministration.
I have, etc.
[Signed]            H. A. I'. CARTER.
[TEL EGRAM.]
Hon. -H. A. P. Carter, Washington, D. C., November 7,
1889, to His Excellency Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hono'




20


lulu, received November 19th, Hawaiian Consul General,
San Francisco. "Reported opposition of King and people
operates against success."
[copY]
HAWAIIAN LE(GATION, WASHINGTON, D. C.
February 20, 1890.
To His EXCELLENCY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honolulu.
SIR:-In regard to the proposed extension of Treaty relations between Hawaii and the United States, nothing has
been done beyond an informal conversation with Mr. Blaine
ill which he again, in general terms, iexpressed his opinion
that our propositions as published were fair as a final adjustment of the relations which should subsist between the
two countries. I said that if we ever came to serious negotiations, I might want to modify the article regarding our
pledge not to negotiate treaties without the knowledge of
the United States, and limit it to treaties affecting our relations with the United States. Mr. Blaine said, he would
not object to that as far as he was concerned, he said he
had no desire to disturb in any way our relations with
other countries, but only to render more permanent existing relations between the United States and Hawaii, and to
aid in maintaining Hawaiian Independenlce.
I spoke to the Secretary in regard to the Tariff on sugar.
pointing out that if the duty was to be wholly taken off, it
would materially lessen our advantages under the Treaty,
he cdold not say what Congress would do, but thought that
was a contingency not likely to occur, though the duty
might be reduced.
I asked Mr. Blaine when he would be willing to consider
seriously our propositions and to confer regarding them, and




21
he said that he had some other matters now pending which
would occupy his time till the end of March, and about
that time, if we desired to present them formally, he thought
he could be ready to give them careful consideratiol, and
hoped that we would arrive at some advantageous conclusions.
If we are to do anything about the matter, I think, we
should be ready about that time or we shall be too late for
this session of Congress.
I have, etc.
[Signed]           H. A. P. CARTER.
[coPY]
HAWAIIAN LEGATION, WASHINGTON, D. C.
March 26, 1890.
To His EXCELLENCY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Honollut.
SIR:-I called on Mr. Blaine this morning, and told him
that no powers had reached me regarding the Treaty proposals, and that I presumed that none would be sent till
after the meeting of the Legislature of Hawaii, and that
some opposition existed at Honolulu regarding the propositions.
Mr. Blaine said that he did not wish it understood that
the United States Governmlent were urging them at all,
that he had regarded them as beneficial to Hawaii and desirable to her, and that the only reason for negotiation at
this time was in order to place them before the Senate in
good time before the close of the Session, but that if we were
not ready or did not want to take any further action in regard to the matter, we could let it go. He was in favor of
perfect free trade between"the two countries, and supposed
that the guarantee of our independence would set at rest
any doubts in regard to the attitude of the United States




22


towards the Hawaiian Governmenlt, and if we come to take
that view, he thought action had better be taken d(uring
this Congress, but that perhaps we could not do anything
lefore next fall.
I have, etc.,
[Si nle(t]           H. A. P. CARTER.
[co 'Y]
Telegram from His Excellency Hon, H. A. P. Carter,
April 24, 1890. Received by this Departmept, May 2d.
To AUSTIN, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HONOLULU.
Care D. A. McKinley, Hawaiian Consul.
"Shall respectfully point out that proposed Legislation
will violate Treaty. Hope it may be prevented."
H. A. P. CARTER.
HAWAIIAN LEG:ATION, WASHINGTON, D. C
To His EXc1ELLENCY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS:SIR:-I called oni Secretary of State this morning, and
left with him a paper to the following effect:
"The Hawaiian Minister called on the Secretary of State
to point out that some proposed Legislation in Congress on
the sugar tariff, would violate the equity of the treaties existing between Hawaii and the United States, unless Hawaiian sugars were admitted to share in the proposed bounties to be paid on American sugar.'
" That the obvious intent of the treaties was to put Hawaiian sugar upon the same footing as American grown sugar,
and that the effect of the proposed Legislation would be to
remand Hawaii to a positionl having 1no advantage over
non-reciprocti  atiog tins."




23


Mr. Blaine at first demurred to my leaving anything in
the form of a demurrer with him, assuring me that lie did
not think that any such proposition regarding the sugar
tariff would become law, but I told him that while I would
not proceed to the length of a protest against a near legislative proposition, I did deem it a duty to put on record a
paper which would show that there was no silent acquiescence on lny part.
In accordance with this action on my part, I have sent a
telegram to Your Excellency in care of Consul McKinley
informing you that I had taken such action which telegram
I am in hopes will reach the steamer sailing May 3rd.
I told Mr. Blaine that pending the consideration of such
legislation, we of course could not make any propositions
looking to the extension of the existing treaties.
I have, etc.
[Signed]           H. A. P. CARTER,
HAWAIIAN LEGATION, WASHINGTON, D. C.
May 16, 1889.
To His EXCELLENCY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS:SIR:-   * * * I send herewith a copy of the Tariff
Bill now pending in the House of Representatives, and have
marked certain passages which will be of interest to our
subjects and residents; on page 97 you will notice a Section
providing that the Act shall not impair any existing rights
under any Treaty.
I took especial pains to see that this Sectiol was not
omitted so that whatever equitable rights we had should
not be impaired. Treaties do not in this country, as with
us, prevail over any legislation inconsistent with their provisions.
Here, they are of no greater force than anll Act of Congress, and the latest Act prevails, it was therefore of impor



24


tance to us that this clause should be in each tariff Act
passed by the Congress, and I have taken great pains to see
that it was not omitted.
In the Congressional Record sent you, dated May 11th,
page 4,629, you will see the speech of Mr. Gear, dealing
with our Treaty in its relations to the Tariff, Mr. Gear does
not desire the abrogation of the Treaty, but proposes by
legislation to abrogate all the advantages of Hawaii while
retaining those of the United States.
I have, etc.
[Signed]             H. A. P. CARTER,
WASHINGTON D. C.,
May 16, 1890.
TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS:"You may be certain that I shall make every effort to
avert the injustice to Hawaii, which would be involved in
the proposed legislation on sugar tariff. I think we shall
lhave effctual advocacy in the Senate."
[Signed]           H. A. P. CARTER.!/!i!t




I




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