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THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS




I




THE FAR EASTERN
TROPICS
STUDIES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF
TROPICAL DEPENDENCIES
Hong ]tong, British North Borneo, Sarawak,
Burma, the Federated Malay States, the'
Straits Settlements, French Indo-China,
J-ava, tlie Philippine Islands. ' *   BY
ALLEYNE IRELAND, F.R.G.S.
Author of " Tropical Colonization"
"; Te Anglo-Boer Conflict," etc.


BOSTON AND NEW YORK
HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY
tbe Ilibeibe pret,, Cambribge
1905




COPYRIGHT 1905 BY ALLEYNE IRELAND
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Published April, zooS




PREFACE


IN 1901 I was appointed Colonial Commissioner of
the University of Chicago for the purpose of visiting the Far East and preparing a comprehensive
report on colonial administration in Southeastern
Asia.
The report is now in course of preparation and
will be issued in ten or twelve volumes by Messrs.
Small, Maynard & Co., Cambridge, Mass., during
the next four years.
The present volume is made up of two series of
articles written during my absence in the Far East.
One series appeared in " The Times " (London), the
other in ' The Outlook" (New York); and they
make, in the form in which they are now issued,
a group of studies on various phases of British,
American, French, and Dutch colonial administration and policy.
Of the limitations of these studies no one can be
more conscious than myself; but I am not without
hope that, in the great scarcity of books in the
English language on the subject of comparative
colonization, students of political science may discover in them something of interest.
If the reader should find that there are many
interesting questions which I have failed to notice,


4r noj858




vi


PREFACE


I can only say that it is impossible to include in
a single volume all that I hope to present in the
extended report to which I have referred. My
object has been rather to excite an interest in the
problems of tropical colonization than to attempt
a final disposition of those problems according to
my lights.
Judging from my own experience during fifteen
years of investigation in the field of colonial history
and administration, the statistical and bibliographical appendices at the end of this volume should
serve to smooth the path of any one who wishes to
pursue further the lines of thought suggested in
these studies; and I have introduced them in that
belief, even at the risk of appearing to overload a
book of short essays with the trappings of a scientific
treatise.
Although it is impossible for me to express fully at
present my appreciation of all the kind hospitality
and the valuable assistance which were extended to
me during more than two years' travel in the Far
East, I cannot allow this opportunity to pass without acknowledging my deep sense of obligation to
The Right Hon. the Marquess of Lansdowne, His
Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs; to The Right Hon. Lord George Hamilton,
formerly His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State
for India; to The Right Hon. Joseph Chamberlain,
formerly His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State




PREFACE


vii


for the Colonies; to M. Decrais, former Minister
of Colonies in France; and to Heer J. T. Cremer,
former Minister of Colonies in Holland, for the
kindness with which they interested themselves in
my work, to the extent of securing for me every
possible facility of travel and study in the various
countries and colonies with which they were officially connected.
Finally I must express my most sincere thanks to
His Highness Sir Charles Brooke, Raja of Sarawak,
to Sir Frank Swettenham, former Governor of the
Straits Settlements and High Commissioner of
the Federated Malay States, to Mr. E. W. Birch,
C.M.G., former Governor of British North Borneo,
and to Major-General Leonard Wood, U.. A., for
assistance without which my labors in the Far East
would have been in vain, and for hospitality which
added to the great interest of my work all the
charms of friendly companionship.
ALLEYNE IRELAND.
BOSTON, MASS., January, 1905.
NOTE. In order to avoid confusion in the reader's mind I may
mention that I am a British subject, and that where
I use the expressions " our colonial policy," " our Far
Eastern possessions," and so on, I am referring to
British policy, British possessions, etc.
A. I.




LITERARY NOTE
The new volume on studies in colonial administration has received unusual commendation from the London "Times." A number of
the chapters have appeared in that paper as
articles, and we give at some length the
"Times" description of his work.
"Mr. Alleyne Ireland's second article on
American Policy in the Philippines, which we
print to-day, brings to a close the extremely interesting and varied series of studies in tropical
administration which he has contributed to our
columns during thepast eighteen months. They
cover a very wide area and many different types
of aspiration and achievement. Mr. Ireland's
itineraries have carried him to those two great
Asiatic outposts of the empire, Singapore and
Hong Kong. He has visited the many shores
which radiate round Singapore as their trade
centre-the Malay Peninsula, French Indo
China, Java, and Borneo. He has been as far
westwards as Burma, and as far eastwards as
the Philippines. Almost every possible variety
of tropical government has presented itself to
him as he has passed successively under the
British, French, Dutch, and American flags;
and upon all he has brought to bear the keen
insight of an experienced observer, rejecting the
non-essential for the vital, and enriching his
survey with a great fund of comparative information."




CONTENTS


I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.


INTRODUCTORY 
HONG KONG.
BRITISH NORTH BORNEO
SARAWAK
BURMA 
THE FEDERATED MALAY STATES
THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS
FRENCH INDO-CHINA
JAVA.


~..   1
15
* i.. 37
61
*... 79.  104
*... 122.  145.... 160


X. THE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
XI. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
XII. THE ECONOMIC CONDITION OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS.
XIII. AMERICAN POLICY IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
XIV. CONCLUSION.......


186.198.220
238. 260


APPENDIX A. STATISTICS...          283
B. BIBLIOGRAPHY.. 303
C. TABLES FROM TH PHILPPINE CENSUS 315


INDEX


327




I
I




THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY
THE most common fault to be observed in all discussions of administrative questions is the tendency
to consider the introduction of some particular
method or the carrying out of some particular
reform as being very easy of accomplishment in
any place which is a long way off. It is the New
Yorker who sees no reason why London should
not be covered with a network of car lines; it is
the Londoner who can furnish you with a plan for
the reform of municipal government in New York.
The prevalence of this fault is easily accounted
for. We are all familiar with the limitations which
immediately surround us, and we are ever ready to
urge them as an excuse for things done or omitted;
but the limitations of a distant place always seem
vague and unreal, and, as a natural consequence,
the feasibility of any plan of administration appears
to increase as the square of the distance to the
point of application.
In the present volume an account is to be given
of administrative methods in a number of Far




2


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


Eastern colonies, and the subject is to be approached from the standpoint of the limitations
which are created by the local conditions prevailing in each dependency. But although in each
colony our analysis of the system of government
is to be accompanied by an account of the peculiar circumstances to which the local administration is adjusted, it is necessary, for the better
understanding of the matter, that a few general
considerations in regard to Colonial Government in
the tropics should be set forth.
The colonies which are to form the subject of
our inquiry lie in the tropics, and unless we develop clearly at the outset some of the fundamental
conditions of tropical life, we shall be hampered by
the necessity of explaining from time to time certain phenomena which may be accounted for once
and for all by a statement of some of the general
laws which govern civilization in the tropics.
The central idea from which we must start is
this, that all human conditions, all human history,
the whole expression of man in word and deed,
are the result of the interaction of nature and man,
of the animate and the inanimate - in other words,
that civilization is the product of geographical
environment. If we divide geographical environment into its unchangeable and its changeable
factors, we find the former to consist of climate,
the configuration of the land, and the nature of
the soil; and the latter, of the surface conditions,
which may be changed, for example, by affoiesta



INTRODUCTORY


3


tion, deforestation, or agriculture; the situation of
a country, the effects of which may be modified
by the introduction of railways, steamships, and
telegraph lines; the unhealthiness of a country,
which may be counteracted to some extent by
hygienic science.
The changeable conditions of geographical environment will form the proper subject of discussion when each colony is dealt with separately, for
we may then observe to what extent man has
improved the advantages and overcome the disadvantages of his natural surroundings; our present
concern is with the unchangeable factors, over
which man has no control, and which may therefore be regarded as the origin of those fixed limitations which we must always have clearly before
us when discussing any question which relates to
the government of tropical countries. If we draw
across a map of the world the northern and southern isotherm of 68~ Fahrenheit - that is to say,
a line passing through those places in the northern
and southern hemispheres which have a mean
annual temperature of 68~ Fahrenheit-we cut
off a belt of the earth's surface 3600 miles across,
lying roughly between 30~ north latitude and 30~
south latitude. This belt is called, for the sake of
convenience, the heat belt. In this heat belt lie
Mexico, the Central American Republics, the West
Indies, the greater part of South America, practically the whole of Africa, Arabia, India, Burma,
IndoLChina, the Malay Peninsula, the Malay Archi



4


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


pelago, Polynesia, and the Philippine Islands. Outside the heat belt lie the United States, the United
Kingdom, Canada, the greater part of Australia,
Central and Northern Asia, Japan, the greater part
of China, and the continent of Europe.
The extreme significance of this grouping becomes apparent when we reflect that, apart from
the work done by Europeans and Americans in the
tropics, the civilization of the heat belt has remained stationary for a thousand years, and that
the advancement of humanity during that period
has been carried on entirely by the inhabitants of
those countries which lie outside the heat belt.
Bearing in mind the elements which go to make
up our own civilization, - Western civilization,
so called,- it is most important to realize that
during the past five hundred years, to go no further,
the people of the heat belt have added nothing
whatever to what we understand by human advancement. Those natives of the tropics and sub-.
tropics who have not been under direct European
influence have not during that time made a single
contribution of the first importance to art, literature, science, manufactures, or inventions; they
have not produced an engineer, or a chemist, or a
biologist, or a historian, or a painter, or a musician
of the first rank; and even if we include half-castes
and such natives as have enjoyed European education, the list of eminent men in the domain of art,
science, literature, and invention, produced by the
heat belt can be counted on the fingers of one hand.




INTRODUCTORY


5


The point which I wish to emphasize is not that
the civilization we prize so dearly is better than
that of the heat belt, but that it is utterly different,
and that no student of colonial problems who fails
to adjust his observations to this overwhelming
disparity can hope to reach any true understanding
of the facts which fall under his notice.
It is necessary that we should examine the causes
which lie at the back of the great differences which
exist between tropical and non-tropical civilizations,
for, with our tendency to overlook the limitations
of places with which we are unfamiliar, there is
a danger that we may underestimate the difficulties
involved in reconciling these differences, and may
cheerfully follow the lead of those who believe that
the advanced state of knowledge in non-tropical
countries has destroyed the significance of the race
characteristics of tropical people so far as they
constitute an element in the general problem of
colonial administration.
The factor which comes earliest into play in the
development of peoples is the accumulation of
wealth, for, so long as any society is so situated
that each member must work year in year out to
obtain his food, clothing, and housing, there can
be no advance in knowledge and no real progress.
As soon, however, as there is an accumulated capital to draw from, some members of a society are
relieved from the necessity of constant physical toil,
and mental development begins. But in primitive
societies the accumulation of wealth is regulated




6


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


by two elements —the extent and nature of the
labor which a community puts into the soil, and
the extent and nature of the return which the soil
yields to the labor bestowed on it; and each of
these elements is the product of geographical environment.
It is clear that the climate of a country determines to a great extent the labor conditions which
prevail there. Thus, in extreme climates labor is
sure to be irregular; for, on the one hand, the
severity of the winter and the shortness of the
days, and, on the other hand, the intense heat and
the dryness of the soil in summer, render continuous
labor throughout the year impossible. This irregularity of labor is followed by the worst results, for
it produces a general condition of apathy and helplessness in the people, which, being transmitted
through centuries, acquires the rigidity of a race
characteristic. -I cannot refrain here from drawing
the reader's attention to a fact to which I have
frequently referred elsewhere - namely, our readiness to accept extreme cold as a bar to civilization
and our refusal to accord a similar influence to
extreme heat. Any limits we care to set to the
development of Terra del Fuego, on account of its
climate, will be received without remark; but if we
attempt to assign bounds to the progress of Mindanao, through which the heat-equator passes, a
thousand voices are raised in protest. But to take
up the thread of our argument. It is evident that
we must seek the beginnings of civilization in those




INTRODUCTORY


7


countries where, either from the nature of the
climate the labor conditions were favorable to the
production of a steadfast and thrifty people, or
where, from the nature of the soil, the return to
labor was very great and favored the easy accumulation of wealth. Under all circumstances, however,
the latter cause would work more rapidly than the
former, for it is produced by a direct action, whereas
the other is the result of a reflex action; or, as
Buckle has expressed it, "in one case the effect
depends on the relation between the soil and its
own produce —the operation of one part of external nature upon another; in the other case the
effect depends on the relation between the climate
and the laborer - that is, the operation of external
nature not upon itself, but upon man." Accordingly, as might be expected, we find that the earliest civilizations developed in the most fertile parts
of Asia, Africa, and America, in those countries
where the geographical conditions made possible
that accumulation of wealth which is the first condition of human progress. With low wages for
labor and high wages for capital, and with the mass
of people excluded from the right of land ownership, wealth accumulated very rapidly in the early
tropical states -India, Egypt, Peru, and Mexico
-and at a time when the non-tropical countries
were still sunk in barbarism these tropical States
enjoyed a comparatively high degree of civilization.
To-day it is the tropics that are in a state of




8


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


comparative barbarism, and it is in non-tropical
countries that we find the highest civilization. We
must not seek to account for this change on the
principle of the rise and fall of nations, and dismiss
the matter with the idea that another turn of the
wheel will effect another reversal of position. One
nation, one civilization, may fall, and another may
rise, but there is no resurrection of nations or civilizations; these changes fall within the orderly
process of evolution, and a type once discarded is
never revived.
It is clear that any civilization which is based on
the fertility of the soil and not on the energy of
man contains within itself the seed of its own
destruction. Where food is easily obtained, where
there is little need for clothing or houses, where, in
brief, unaided nature furnishes all man's necessities, those elements which produce strength of
character and vigor of mind are wanting, and man
becomes the slave of his surroundings. He acquires
no energy of disposition, he yields himself to superstition and fatalism; the very conditions of life
which produced his civilization set the limit of its
existence. Thus it happens that tropical man, having been moulded into a particular form by his
environment, having, in fact, after many centuries,
acquired his race characteristics, finds himself, when
confronted with new conditions, incapable of action
and helpless to defend himself. It is then that a
hardier race steps in, whether by accident or design,
and establishes a new dominion founded on princi



INTRODUCTORY


9


pies which the weaker race can neither understand
nor adopt.
If this has been the history of tropical peoples,
that of the non-tropical peoples has been exactly
opposite in every respect. In the temperate zones
civilization had its origin and man acquired his race
characteristics under conditions the very reverse of
those which prevail in the tropics. In the temperate
zones the three prime conditions of existence were
clothing, housing, and animal food; and these, so
far from being supplied by nature, could be obtained
only in a severe conflict with nature. Wild beasts
had to be slain that their flesh might serve for food,
their skins for clothing; forests had to be felled
and the earth itself robbed in order that wood and
stone might be obtained for the construction of
houses which would afford shelter from the cold of
winter. Man existed only by virtue of the extent to
which he rose superior to his surroundings. Under
such circumstances progress was slow; but it was
accomplished under conditions which left each generation a little more advanced than the last, which
improved the stock by killing off the inefficients,
and which gradually developed in man the resources
of his intellect. For non-tropical man nature was
not a mysterious power which ruled his life and to
which a blind obedience must be yielded; it was an
enemy which must be fought. Each success left
man emboldened and encouraged, and each obstacle
overcome made him more impatient of those which
remained.




10        THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
The history of Western civilization is the history
of man's emancipation from the tyranny of his
surroundings; that of tropical civilization is the
record of his enslavement. The significance of this
antithesis lies in the fact that whereas in tropical
civilization each succeeding day, by building up
a heritage of increasing weakness and dependence,
wrote failure in ever-darkening letters across the
page of history, each hour of Western civilization
marked some advance and yielded to man some
new augmentation of his powers.
Before drawing together the thread of our argument and applying our conclusions to the immediate matter under consideration - the problem of
the government of tropical people by non-tropical
methods - a few instances may be drawn from
history of the operation of the forces which have
been described above.
The first consideration which presents itself is
that no division of the earth's surface can be made
which is so mutually exclusive of types of civilization as that which puts mankind into a heat belt
and two temperate zones. If we make a division
east and west, and compare countries of like latitude, we obtain no violent contrasts comparable to
those obtained under the other division. Leaving
out such sparsely populated territories as Siberia
and South America, we see a high civilization in
the United States and Canada as well as in Europe;
and Russia presents points of similarity to China
as well as to Western Europe. If we take language




INTRODUCTORY


11


as our standard, it is found that English, French,
German, Spanish, Italian, Russian, give us no great
dividing line; that contributions to human advancement have been made for centuries in each
tongue; and that if we would secure a differentiation along this line we must compare the languages
of Europe with those of the tropics, arriving by
this method at our old division.
An interesting confirmation of our theory is furnished by the rise and decadence of Greece, Italy,
Spain, and Portugal as the great powers of the
world, and by the gradual northern movement of
the centre of the highest civilization. The climatic
conditions of those countries which lie in the south
of Europe are more nearly tropical than those of
the northerly countries, and consequently in them
civilization developed more quickly; but at a later
date, when the northern countries had reached, by
more tedious processes, a certain degree of civilization, they took the sceptre from their southern
neighbors, as the latter had taken it from Egypt
and Northern Africa; and for the same reason,
namely, that the climatic discipline of the country
to the north produced qualities of dominance.
To note but one more fact which bears on our
theory. It is interesting to recall that the tide of
conquest since the Middle Ages has, with very few
exceptions, run from north to south. The only
permanent conquests east and west in like latitudes
have been those in which an overwhelming superiority of numbers and resources has rested with one




12


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


of the parties to the contest, as for instance in the
partition of Poland and the conquest of North
America by France, Spain, and England. Yet
practically the whole of Africa, the whole of tropical America, and the greater part of tropical Asia
have been conquered and are to-day ruled by
northern nations or by persons having northern
blood in their veins.
I am aware that the above brief sketch of a
theory leaves many things unaccounted for; but
the broad outlines are, I hope, indicated with sufficient clearness to justify an application of the
principles which have been developed in the course
of our inquiry. Any nation which undertakes the
administration of a tropical territory is charged
with a twofold task - the formulation of a colonial
policy, and the determination of the means by
which that policy is to be carried out. On the most
important point of colonial policy there can be no
halting between two opinions. Having regard to
the entire dissimilarity of Western civilization and
that of the tropics, it must be determined at the
outset what ideals are to prevail in the system of
administration. In this matter the policy of all
nations has been the same. Where the majority of
the inhabitants of a colony belong to a civilization
differing greatly from that of the sovereign state,
the character of the administration has always been
determined by the ideals of the dominant power,
and native methods have been abolished. It is not
a mere question of excluding the natives from office




INTRODUCTORY


13


- Englishmen fill scarcely one fourth of the offices
in India, and Dutch officials are outnumbered by
native officials in Java- but of imparting a particular character to the system of government.
It may be taken for granted that in tropical
colonies controlled by Europeans or Americans,
Western methods of government will be insisted
on; and there remains then the problem of insuring
the continued existence of a government of Western character. In regard to this problem there exists the greatest diversity of opinion, and it is here
that the importance of a clear view of the origin
and permanence of race characteristics becomes
apparent.
When a tropical colony is first taken over, every
one is agreed that the new order of things must be
established under alien guidance; but opinion is
soon divided on the question as to whether the natives, having once been shown the Western method
of government, may be trusted, after a period of
tutelage, to accept the new ideals, or whether, from
the inherent differences in race characteristics, a
Western government can be maintained in tropical
countries only as long as white men are on the spot
to keep things in line. Those who hold the former
view are divided by the difference in their estimates
of the time which must elapse before the leadingstrings may be cast off; some consider it a question
of years, some of generations, others of centuries.
My own opinion, based on a consideration of the
facts referred to above and on observations made




14        THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
during a long residence in the tropics, is that we
may be right or wrong in assuming that our
methods, which were developed under conditions
differing most completely from those we are now
considering, are better suited to tropical countries
than those of native rule; but that of this there
can be no doubt whatever, that if native ideals are
to prevail, the substantial control of affairs must
remain in the hands of natives, and that if the
administration is to be conducted on Western lines
the control must rest with white men.
It is very easy to misrepresent a theory of this
kind, to call it an advocacy of despotism, to credit
one who holds it with a desire to oppress the natives
of the tropics and to destroy their civilization. But
it is a theory capable of a very different interpretation. It is one which, if accepted in good faith,
places upon the colonizing powers a solemn duty
and a grave responsibility for the honest and efficient administration of the affairs of people whose
development has reached the limits imposed by
inexorable natural laws. It is a theory which will
yield to any people the utmost degree of self-government consistent with the maintenance of a set
standard, which will foster every native institution
which does not endanger that standard, which will
hope against hope that help, guidance, and encouragement may within measurable time change that
which it has taken immeasurable time to produce.




CHAPTER H
HONG KONG
HONG KONG is one of the smallest colonies in the
British Empire, but in more than one respect it is
the most interesting. Its area is less than thirty-one
square miles;1 its population is equal to that of
Washington (300,000); yet in the year 1900 Hong
Kong stood at the head of all ports of the world in
the magnitude of its shipping. In tonnage entered
and cleared in 1900 Hong Kong surpassed Liverpool by five million tons, Hamburg by one million,
London and New York by about half a million
tons each. The exact figures were:
TOTAL TONNAGE OF SHIPPING ENTERED AND CLEARED IN THE
FOREIGN TRADE IN 1900.
Hong Kong............................ 17,247,023 tons.
New York............................. 16,797,700
London...............................  16,700,527
Hamburg..............................  16,087,673
Liverpool.............................  11,677,708
These figures appear the more remarkable if we
consider the history of Hong Kong. The Island
' The New Territory, a tract of land recently leased from
China and placed under the Government of Hong Kong, is not
included in the figures relating to the area and population of
Hong Kong.




16


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


was ceded to England by China in 1842, by the
Treaty of Nanking. At that time the population
of the Colony was about 5000, made up of pirates,
fishermen, farmers, and granite-workers, living in
huts made of baked-mud bricks, and holding no
intercourse with the outside world beyond Canton,
which lies ninety miles to the north.
This was sixty years ago, and to-day Hong Kong
has a population of 300,000 souls, a fine city for
its capital, splendid roads, schools, churches, banks,
hospitals, clubs, hotels, newspapers, electric light,
cable cars, -in short, almost everything which we
are accustomed to associate with the idea of an
advanced civilization, - while it is connected with
the outside world by cable and by the most extensive system of steamship lines which converge at
any single port in the world.
The transformation of Hong Kong forms one of
the most striking chapters in the history of the
white man's work in the tropics. It has not been
accomplished without the commission of many
grave errors of policy, due for the most part to
the persistent refusal of the British Government
to be guided by the views of the man on the spot;
nor can it be said that even to-day the interests of
the Colony are free from danger from the same
cause; but the record, on the whole, has been one
of brilliant success, and the administration of Hong
Kong, though by no means free from faults, is
a valuable object-lesson in the management of a
Chinese community on Western lines.




HONG KONG


17


The composition of the population of Hong
Kong has been determined by two causes —the
climate and the situation of the Island. The first
of these, acting as a general factor, made it inevitable that the mass of the population should be of
a colored race, for in no part of the tropics can
manual labor be performed by white men, and it
has always been found that, in places where the
laboring classes are composed of colored men, only
the very highest occupations will be taken up by
white men. A natural limit is thus set to the proportion of white men which can be supported by
any community in the tropics. The second cause,
acting as a specific factor, assigned to Hong Kong
a Chinese population; for if the climate predetermined a colored race, the situation of the island on
the threshold of China decided which race it was
to be.
The census returns of 1901 disclose the precise
effects of these causes:
CIVIL POPULATION OF HONG KONG IN 1901.
Europeans and Americans...  6,454, equal to 2.27 per cent.
Chinese................. 274,543  96.68
Others..................  2,978   1.05
It is clear that for a colony with such a population
any form of government which involves a general
representation of the taxpayers is impossible, for
less than two per cent. of the taxpayers are British
subjects, and more than ninety-five per cent. are
Chinese.




18


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


In the long experience of England in governing
colonies, a form of government has been evolved
to meet the case of a colony in which the population is made up of a handful of temporary residents belonging to the ruling race and an overwhelming number of natives. This is known as
Crown Colony government. Its essential feature is
the entire absence of any popular element in the
administration, and the direct control exercised by
the Colonial Office in London over all acts of the
local authorities; the theory on which it is based
is this, that, whereas a representative government
in Hong Kong which rested on a general franchise
would place the British residents under the heel of
the Chinese, a franchise which extended only to
white British subjects would put the mass of the
population and the great majority of the taxpayers
at the mercy of a handful of merchants, and that
under such circumstances the best way to secure
honest and efficient administration is to place the
control of affairs in the hands of a distant body
of trained officials.
The principles on which Crown Colony government rests are stated with clearness and brevity
in the following extract from Earl Grey's " The
Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration: "
Keeping steadily in view that the welfare and civilization of the inhabitants of the colonies and the advantage
which the Empire at large may derive from their prosperity are the only objects for which the retention of these




HONG KONG


19


dependencies is desirable, and believing also that there can
be no doubt as to the superiority of free governments to
those of an opposite character, as instruments for promoting the advancement of communities in which they can be
made to work with success, I consider it to be the obvious
duty and interest of this country to extend representative
institutions to every one of its dependencies where they
have not yet been established, and where this can be done
with safety; and also to take every opportunity of giving
increased development to such institutions where they
already exist, but in an imperfect form. But I believe that
in some cases representative governments could not safely
be created, and also that the same form of representative
institutions is by no means applicable to colonies in different stages of social progress. The principal bar to the
establishment of representative governments in colonies is
their being inhabited by a population of which a large
proportion is not of European race, and has not made such
progress in civilization as to be capable of exercising with
advantage the privileges of self-government.
Of such colonies Ceylon affords the best example. The
great majority of its inhabitants are Asiatics, very low in
the scale of civilization, and having the character and
habits of mind which have from the earliest times prevented popular governments from taking root and flourishing among the nations of the East. Amidst a large
population of this description there are settled, for the
most part as temporary residents engaged in commerce or
agriculture, a mere handful of Europeans and a larger
number (but still very few in comparison with the whole
population) of inhabitants of a mixed race. In such a
colony the establishment of representative institutions
would be in the highest degree inexpedient. If they were
established in such a form as to confer power upon the
great body of the people, it must be obvious that the




20


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


experiment would be attended with great danger, or rather
with the certainty of failure. If, on the other hand, the
system of representation were so contrived as to exclude
the bulk of the native population from real power, in
order to vest it in the hands of the European minority, an
exceedingly narrow oligarchy would be created, a form of
government which experience certainly does not show to
be favorable to the welfare of the governed. Were a representative assembly constituted in Ceylon, which should
possess the powers usually intrusted to such a body, and
in which the European merchants and planters and their
agents had the ascendancy, it can hardly be supposed that
narrow views of class interests would not exercise greater
influence in the legislation of the colony than a comprehensive consideration of the general good. To anticipate
that this would be the effect of placing a large measure of
power in the hands of a small minority implies no unfavorable opinion of the character and intelligence of the
European inhabitants of Ceylon, but only a belief that
they would act as men placed in such a situation have
generally been found to do.
In Mauritius, Trinidad, Santa Lucia, and Natal a
somewhat similar state of things exists; for although the
preponderance of the uncivilized races in these colonies
is far less overwhelming than in Ceylon, still, taking into
account the immigrants from India and Africa (whose
welfare is entitled to especial consideration), the inhabitants of European origin are but a fraction of the whole
population. Hence it appears to me that the surrender
of a large portion of the powers now exercised by the
servants of the Crown, and the establishment of representative legislatures, would not be calculated to insure
the administration of the government upon principles of
justice and of an enlightened regard for the welfare of all
classes in these communities. This end may, I believe, be




HONG KONG


21


far better attained by maintaining for the present in these
colonies the existing system of government, of which it
would be a great mistake to suppose that, because the
inhabitants are not entitled to elect any of the members of
the legislatures, it provides no securities against abuse.
Other influences are brought to bear upon the government of these colonies, which answer many of the objects
of a legislature of a representative character. In the first
place, in all of them, the press is perfectly free. The newspapers comment upon all the measures of the Government, not only with entire liberty, but with the most
unbounded license; and the force both of local opinion,
and also, to a considerable degree, of opinion in this country, is thus brought to bear upon all the measures of the
administration. Every inhabitant of the colonies is also
entitled freely to address to the Secretary of State any
complaints or remarks he may think proper on the measures of the local authorities, subject only to the rule that
such letters shall be transmitted through the hands of the
Governor (who is bound to forward them), in order that
he may at the same time send such explanations on the
subject as appear to him to be called for. This privilege
is largely exercised, and is the means of supplying much
useful information. It is hence impossible that the Secretary of State can be kept in ignorance of any errors or
abuses committed by the local authorities, while if he fails
to interfere when he ought, he cannot himself escape the
censure of Parliament. The greatly increased facilities of
intercourse with the colonies have of late years effected
a great practical alteration in the position of colonial governors; and whatever may have been the case formerly,
it undoubtedly cannot be alleged that Parliament is now
indifferent to what goes on in the colonies, or that faults,
real or imaginary, which may be committed in the administration of their affairs can hope to escape the ever-ready




22


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


criticism of an opposition eager to find matter for objection to the Government of the day.
The Government of Hong Kong consists of the
Governor, the Executive Council, and the Legislative Council. The Governor is appointed by the
Crown, and holds his office for five years. The
Executive Council consists of six official and two
unofficial members, presided over by the Governor.
Of the six official members five hold their seats ex
officio - namely, the gentlemen holding the offices
of Senior Military Officer, Attorney-General, Colonial Secretary, Director of Public Works, and Colonial Treasurer. The sixth official member is the
Harbormaster, who holds his seat by appointment.
The two unofficial members are appointed by the
Crown, through.the Secretary of State for the
Colonies. The meetings of the Executive Council
are not open to the public; but minutes are kept,
one copy of which is filed in the Colony, and one
in the Colonial Office in London. The work of the
Executive Council covers a very wide range of
subjects. The ordinary business may be divided
into seven classes: 1. Any matter in which the
Governor requires special advice - as, for instance,
when the heads of two departments of the Government differ in regard to some proposed measure
which affects both departments. 2. The granting
of leave of absence on half-pay to officials. 3. The
dismissal of public servants. 4. The discussion of
such legislative measures as it is proposed to lay
before the Legislative Council. 5. The considera



HONG KONG


23


tion of cases in which a capital sentence has been
pronounced on a criminal by the Supreme Court.
6. The reading of such confidential dispatches
from the Secretary of State for the Colonies as
the Governor may deem proper to lay before the
Council. 7. The making of regulations by the
Governor-in-Council, as provided by law, on such
subjects as quarantine, opium licenses, sanitary bylaws, and so on.
The Legislative Council of Hong Kong consists
of seven official and six unofficial members, presided
over by the Governor, who has an original and a
casting vote. Of the official members five are those
who have seats in the Executive Council, and the
other two are appointed. Of the unofficial members
one is nominated by the Hong Kong Chamber of
Commerce, and one by the Justices of the Peace
of the Colony; the remaining four are appointed
by the Crown, and of these one at least must be
a Chinaman. Members of the Legislative Council
hold their seats for six years, and are eligible for
reappointment.
The most important duty of the Legislative
Council is to pass the laws of the Colony. Any
member may introduce a bill; but any bill, vote,
or resolution, the object or effect of which may be
to dispose of or charge any part of the revenue of
the Colony, can be proposed only by the Governor
or with his express consent. The annual estimates
are discussed by the Legislative Council, and without its consent no money can be appropriated from




24       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
the revenue of the Colony. The meetings are open
to the public, and a local " Hansard" preserves
a verbatim account of the proceedings. The procedure of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong is,
in the main, that of the British House of Commons.
Those conditions which render impossible the
existence of a representative government in Hong
Kong forbid also the introduction of municipal
government in Victoria, the capital of the Colony;
and there is thus no imperium in imperio in the
Colony: everything- police, water-supply, lighting, sanitation —is administered by the Colonial
Government.
It was proposed some years ago to establish a
municipality in Hong Kong, and it is amusing to
find in the Sessional Papers of the Colony a letter
from a member of the Legislative Council opposing
the change on the ground that "the evils that
would spring from such a concession would destroy
all confidence in the administration of affairs, and
introduce the Colony to the municipal experiences
of New York and San Francisco."
We have seen what the system of government
is in Hong Kong, and we may now turn to the men
who administer it.
The Civil Service of Hong Kong is what is known
as a Cadet Service- that is, a service in which all
the high administrative appointments are reserved
for men who have passed the examinations prescribed for Eastern cadets.
An examination is held each year in London




HONG KONG


25


(open to all British subjects, white or colored) for
posts in the Home Civil Service, the Indian Civil
Service, and the Eastern Cadet Service- that is, the
Civil Services of Ceylon, Hong Kong, the Straits
Settlements, and the Federated Malay States. There
is only one examination, and successful candidates
are allowed to choose, in their pass order, the
service they wish to enter, until the vacancies are
exhausted.
Of the severity of these examinations Mr. A.
Lawrence Lowell, in his " Colonial Civil Service,"
says: " The examination papers are such as might
be set, in an American university, for graduation
honors or for a Ph.D. But it must be remembered
that they are prepared by men who have nothing
to do with the instruction of the candidates, and
hence are really more difficult than similar papers,
set by a professor to his own students, would be in
America."
The men who, after passing the examination,
select the Hong Kong service, are at once placed
on the pay-roll of the Colony at a salary of $1500
silver (equal to about $750 gold), and are then sent
to Canton for two years to study Chinese. During
this time they must pass four examinations in
Chinese, and failure in these is followed by dismissal from the service. Practically all posts in the
public service of the Colony, except those in the
technical services, are open to cadets, and it is understood that, as a rule, no one but a cadet can rise to
the highest posts.




26       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
The salaries of the colonial officials of Hong
Kong are high as measured by the standard of
official salaries in the United States; but they are
by no means too high if the paramount importance
of securing the best men for the colonial service is
considered. The salaries of the principal officials
are as follows, in silver dollars equal to about fifty
cents gold each: the Governor, $35,000; the
Chief Justice, $13,500; the Colonial Secretary,
$10,800; the Attorney-General and the Puisne
Judges, $8400 each; the Director of Public Works,
$7800; the Harbormaster, the First Police Magistrate, and the Captain-Superintendent of Police,
$6000 each.
As Hong Kong is a free port, and as the trade is
almost entirely a transit trade, no record is kept of
the nature and value of the cargoes which enter and
leave the harbor. The only guide, therefore, to the
financial condition of the Island is the annual return
of revenue and expenditure. The public revenue of
Hong Kong in 1901 was $3,973,578 (equal to
about $1,800,000 gold) - that is, $6 gold per head
of the population. More than four fifths of the
revenue comes under eight heads: assessed taxes
(equivalent to our municipal rates), $708,000;
opium monopoly, $687,000; spirit licenses,
$126,000; revenue stamps, $442,000; postage
stamps, $356,000; rent of Government land and
buildings, $555,000; profit on the issue of coinage,
$184,000; and water revenue, $169,000.
The accounts of the expenditure of the Colony




HONG KONG


27


show that out of a total expenditure of $4,000,000
only one million dollars went as personal emoluments. Of the remaining $3,000,000 more than
three fifths fell under the heads: public works
(roads, bridges, buildings), $700,000; military
contribution (a sum paid to England for the defense of the Colony and in consideration of the
assignment to the Colony as Residents of nearly
five thousand troops), $851,000; miscellaneous
services (chiefly incurred through measures of sanitation and the prevention of plague), $469,000;
police, $400,000; pensions and retiring allowances, $178,000; and charges on account of the
public debt, $162,000.
The task of administering the affairs of Hong
Kong is a peculiar and difficult one. It must be
remembered that very nearly ninety-seven per cent.
of the population is Chinese, and that from the
extraordinary difficulty of learning the Chinese
language the intercourse between the mass of the
people and those who are administering their
affairs is limited almost entirely to brief official
interviews. Fortunately, the Chinaman is, under
ordinary circumstances, a law-abiding citizen with
a wholesome respect for established authority. But
the population of Hong Kong is not normal in its
composition, for it contains an undue proportion of
criminals. This is due to its proximity to Canton,
and to the extreme mildness of the English criminal law as compared with that of China. As an
example of this we may take the punishment which




28        THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
would follow a third or fourth conviction of petty
theft in Hong Kong and in China respectively. On
the mainland an end would be put to the offender's
career either by rubbing quicklime into his eyes or
by crushing his ankle-bones so as to lame him for
life; in Hong Kong he would get a few months'
hard labor in jail. The result is that Hong Kong
has become a happy hunting-ground for hundreds
of criminals from the adjoining province of Kwangtung, and that the police force of the Colony costs
about $400,000 a year, or one tenth of the total
expenditure.
But although the Chinaman is not, generally
speaking, given to crime, he possesses certain characteristics which, from the standpoint of the colonial administrator, are even more difficult to deal
with. Foremost among these is his absolute indifference to sanitary conditions of life. We are
familiar with the idea of domestic animals living in
some little hovel in the poorest districts of Ireland,
and the picture is unpleasant even when we remember that during the day such animals will be out
of doors. A Chinaman, unless he is closely watched,
will keep pigs in the fourth story of a house in
which perhaps a dozen families live beneath him;
and on that fourth story, with its open-work floors,
the pig will live and move and have his being until
he changes his Saxon name for his French one.
Another thing which makes the Chinaman very
difficult to deal with is the complete organization
of all classes into guilds and secret societies, backed




HONG KONG


29


by the solid influence of the clan and family ties.
This social cohesion makes it almost impossible to
protect individual interests or those of the Colony
when these run counter to some habit or tradition
of the Chinese. For instance, one of my Chinese
servants commits an offense and I dismiss him.
One of two things will happen: either I will engage in his place, unwittingly, another member of
his family, a son, brother, uncle, or cousin, or, if
by some rare chance I detect the relationship and
refuse to engage the new applicant, I find it impossible to get a man in his place, for the union or
guild to which the dismissed servant belongs will
boycott me. It is the same in matters which affect
the community at large. A man is fined by a magistrate for committing some offense against the
sanitary laws; the fine is paid by the guild, and
the ends of justice are defeated.
The utter disregard of truth which is a marked
trait of the Chinese character, the entire absence
of any sense of shame when detected in a lie or in
a crime, the mutual distrust which pervades all
classes, the disregard of promises, the concentration
of the minds of the people on the single idea of
economy (which results, to give an instance, in a
perfect readiness to eat diseased meat if it is sold
a fraction cheaper than good meat), the incapacity
of the Chinaman to feel ordinary physical pain
(a peculiarity which has been mistaken by some
observers for a remarkable fortitude in bearing
it), the complete indifference to the misfortunes




30


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


of others - these things make the administration of
a Chinese community difficult in the extreme.
It is discouraging to find that, as far as one can
judge, three hundred and fifty years of contact
with the white man has made no appreciable change
in the Chinaman.
In talking over the matter with one or two
highly educated and widely traveled Chinese gentlemen in Hong Kong, I was told that, with the
exception of a mere handful of men in Hong
Kong and the Treaty ports, contact with Western
civilization had absolutely failed to change a single
trait in the Chinese character; that we are as much
hated and despised as ever we were by the mass
of the people; that as far as the present is concerned, the existence of powerful armed forces alone
insures the lives of the foreigners; and that, for
the future, the probabilities pointed to the total
exclusion of the foreigners from China. This they
all deplored; but it was their sincere conviction.
At the time I visited Hong Kong in 1902 the
administration was not in a very satisfactory condition. That this was to some extent the result of
a heritage of disorder and lack of system may be
gathered from a description of Hong Kong which
appeared in " The Times" as far back as 1859:
Hong Kong is always connected with... some discreditable internal squabble. Every official's hand is there
against his neighbor. The Governor has run away to seek
health or quiet elsewhere. The newspaper proprietors
were, of late, all more or less in prison or going to prison




HONG KONG


31


or coming out of prison, on prosecutions by some one or
more of the incriminated or incriminating officials. A dictator is needed, a sensible man, a man of tact and firmness.
We cannot be always investigating a storm in a teapot
where each individual tea-leaf has its dignity and its
grievance. - The Times, March 15, 1859.
In passing the following criticisms on the state
of the Colony as I found it in 1902,1 I wish to disclaim any intention of making a personal attack
upon any official; and no one who has spent four
months, as I recently did, in the Colony could fail
to be impressed, as I was, with the fact that in the
senior as well as in the junior ranks of the service
there are a few men of the highest ability and usefulness, nor could he fail to notice that such men
were few and not many. On my first arrival in the
Colony I found the Governor absent on leave,
the administration of the Government being in the
hands of the General commanding the troops. This
fact raises a question which I have often discussed
with colonial civil servants, - namely, the advisability of allowing a military officer, however competent in his own work, to take over the civil
administration of a colony. On general principles
it has always appeared to me - and in this opinion
I have the support of almost every colonial official
with whom I have discussed the matter - that the
proper officer to administer the Government in the
1 On my return to Hong Kong in 1904, several changes had
taken place in the higher ranks of the Government service, and
a marked improvement in the administration was to be observed.




32        THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
absence of the Governor is the Colonial Secretary,
and that, in cases when there are special reasons
why the Colonial Secretary should not be allowed
to act, the duty should devolve on the Chief Justice.
The training of a soldier almost always unfits him
for the duties of a civil administrator; and in Hong
Kong, where a number of vexed questions exist
between the military and civil authorities, it seems
ill advised to combine the highest military authority
and the highest civil authority in the person of
one official. During the three months immediately
following my arrival in the Colony three different
gentlemen occupied the post of Colonial Secretary,
and three different gentlemen acted as RegistrarGeneral. The reports of the Finance Committee for
1901 show that the attendance included an Acting
Attorney-General, an Acting Colonial Treasurer,
and an Acting Director of Public Works. The
service of the Colony has suffered greatly from the
evil of acting appointments, and a system should be
introduced under which it would not be necessary
to transfer so many officials from one department to
another whenever a senior official goes on leave.
Owing to the fact that there has been no official
of Hong Kong specially charged with the preservation of the colonial records or with the collection
of a suitable library for the Colonial Secretary's
office and for the Council Chamber, there is not
collected in any one place a complete set of the
printed records of the Colony; and although the
Council Chamber library contained a History of




HONG KONG


33


Dalmatia and Montenegro and a volume of Greek
Verses of Shrewsbury School, I found it unprovided
with a complete set of the Colony's "Official
Gazette," or with the Administration reports of the
other Crown Colonies. The system of indexing the
official correspondence of the Colony was one of utter
confusion. There appeared to be no recognized set
of finely subdivided subject-headings under which
documents could be classified with some approach
to uniformity, and the result is that a great deal of
time is wasted in searching for documents to which
reference becomes necessary from time to time.
Two circumstances have contributed very largely
to the unsatisfactory condition of the clerical work
of the Colonial Government,- one the inadequate
size of the Government offices, and the other the
employment of a large number of junior clerks,
Chinese and Portuguese, at salaries little better
than those paid to day laborers. After visiting
every Colony of importance in the British Empire,
except those situated in Africa, I can safely say
that the Hong Kong Post-Office and Supreme
Court are housed in the most wretched building
ever dignified with the name of a Government
office, and that the Colonial Secretary's department, the Public Works, and the Registrar-General's office are little better off. The Governor,
happily for himself, has one of the best Government houses to be found among the smaller Colonies, and, in addition, a charming summer residence
at the Peak. It should be a source of satisfaction




34        THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
to the people of Hong Kong that at last the Colonial Office has consented to the erection of a number
of new Government offices.
The matter of the junior clerks in the service is
one which will have to be faced if the service is to
be improved; and there appears to be but one satisfactory solution, and that is the increased employment of cadets. The service is a cadet service, a
system which has worked admirably in the Straits
Settlements. It is an expensive way of securing efficient colonial civil servants, and after the expense
has been incurred the result will not be satisfactory
unless the heads of departments set a better standard of work than has prevailed hitherto in Hong
Kong. But with the infusion of a more vigorous
spirit into the administration, and with an increase
in the number of cadets, those faults in the Government which have led to serious attempts to
secure a change in the constitution of the Colony
should be removed by a process of internal reform.
I have laid a good deal of stress on the inefficient
work of the clerical departments of the Government
and on defects in the machinery of administration,
for the reason that the experience of colonial
officials proves that, whereas bad work may occasionally be done where the general system is good,
it is the rarest occurrence that good work is done
where the general system is bad. Nothing has been
said of specific instances of bad work in the various
departments of the Government of Hong Kong,
because such criticisms would have involved a direct




HONG KONG                 35
reflection on the ability of individual officials. But
two instances may be cited in which a grave responsibility has rested on successive Governors and on
their advisers, and in which the interests of the
Colony have been sacrificed to official dilatoriness.
In 1894 a serious outbreak of bubonic plague
occurred in Hong Kong, and from that time onward the Colony has scarcely been free from it.
Notwithstanding the serious nature of such a visitation, it was not until 1901 that the Government
took the matter thoroughly in hand by calling for
a report on the subject from Professor W. J. Simpson; and a Public Health and Buildings Ordinance
was drafted as the outcome of Professor Simpson's
report and of the advice of Mr. Osbert Chadwick,
C.M.G., and of Dr. Francis Clark, Medical Officer
of Health, some eight years after the first outbreak
of plague. The other instance to which I refer
is the water-supply of the Colony. About twenty
years ago Mr. Osbert Chadwick, C.M.G., was
called upon to make a report on the water-supply
of Hong Kong. He supplied the Government with
a number of suggestions, which were only carried
out in part. During the first half of 1901 the
Colony was threatened with an absolute loss of its
water-supply. So grave had the situation become
in the Colony in April, 1902, that the water was
only turned on for half an hour daily, and water
had to be brought over from Kowloon in boats.
The suffering produced by a water famine in a
tropical country can scarcely be imagined by any




36


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


one who has not witnessed it; and it is one of the
first duties of the Government to protect the people
against such an occurrence. After an interval of
twenty years, Mr. Chadwick had to be again called
to the Colony to report once more on the watersupply.1
The general condition of the administration of
Hong Kong suggests a step, the advisability of
which cannot have failed to impress itself on the
minds of all those who are familiar with Crown
Colony government, the appointment, as servants of
the Colonial Office, of two or three Inspectors
of Colonies. The duties of such officials would be
to visit in rotation all the Crown Colonies and those
of similar type, like British Guiana and Jamaica,
and to investigate the work of the local officials.
The Colonial Office at present exercises a certain
supervision over the officials in Crown Colonies;
but it labors under the great disadvantage that
its investigations are conducted away from the spot
and by men who, however great may be their
ability, have as a rule no knowledge from personal
observation of local conditions. The men most
suitable for the work of Colonial Inspectors would
be those who had shown marked ability as Colonial
Secretaries in the Crown Colonies and in other
parts of our tropical empire.
As a result of. Mr. Chadwick's latest report steps are now
being taken to provide Hong Kong with an adequate watersystem.




CHAPTER III
BRITISH NORTH BORNEO
THERE is no portion of the British Empire in the
tropics which has been endowed in a higher degree
by nature with those things which, under the intelligent activity of man, spell wealth and success,
than British North Borneo. A rich soil, an ample
rainfall, a diversified surface of open plain and sheltered valley, a long coast-line, fine rivers, good
harbors, and a climate no worse than that of the
Malay Peninsula combine to make British North
Borneo an ideal spot for the founding of a prosperous State. Nor is this excellence of material confined to the land alone. From the administrative
standpoint the country is full of possibilities.
The native population is very small; the opposition
to the Government, since the death of Mat Salleh, is
no longer of a serious nature; there is no frontier
question; and, above all, the administration is, for
all practical purposes, absolutely independent alike
of arbitrary interference from outside and from
that more insidious evil of the tropics, the divided
counsels of an elected legislature.
The spectacle is that of a company of British
merchants in absolute control of thirty thousand
square miles of country, and free to adopt any plan
which may seem good to them for the development




38


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


of their property. It recalls the task of the East
India Company and of the Hudson's Bay Company, and serves to point the great advantages with
which the newer company entered upon its work -
facilities of communication with the outside world,
the absence of military problems, and freedom from
the difficult questions of policy raised by the existence of a very dense or of a very warlike population. In such circumstances one might reasonably
look for some striking success, for some remarkable
increase in the prosperity of the country; but up
to the present time no such results have followed
the acquisition of the country by the British North
Borneo Company. That success, great success, is
within the grasp of the directors must be clear to
any one who knows the country and has had an
opportunity of observing the fine administrative
ability of the present Governor, Mr. E. W. Birch,
C.M.G.; but if the future is to be measured by
the past, a grave doubt arises as to whether the
Company, having secured an administrator who
thoroughly understands the needs of the country
and the best methods by which they can be met,
will be content to give him a free hand, or will
still insist that Leadenhall Street is the real capital
of British North Borneo, and Sandakan merely
a point at the end of a telegraph line.
1 Since this was written Mr. Birch has had a difference of
opinion with the directors and has resigned. He now occupies
the post of Resident of Perak, one of the Federated Malay
States.




BRITISH NORTH BORNEO


39


Although our present concern is chiefly with the
condition and government of British North Borneo,
one or two facts in connection with the history
of the country are of sufficient interest to call for
a passing word.
In 1858 the famous East India Company ceased
to exist; its political and territorial rights passed
to the British Crown; its special trading rights
had disappeared some years before. It was generally believed that the day of great commercial
companies with the territorial powers of States was
over. In 1869 Mr. William Forsyth, writing of the
Hudson's Bay Company, said: "I have endeavored to give some account of the last of the great
proprietary companies.... It may continue to
exist as a trading company, but as a territorial
power it must make up its mind to fold its (buffalo)
robes around it and die with dignity."
The British North Borneo Company, therefore,
acquires a special interest for students of history
from the fact that its charter, granted in 1881,
marks the revival of the old discarded policy of
commercial companies endowed with territorial
authority, and because it is the oldest of that
group of companies which includes the Imperial
British East Africa Company and the British South
Africa Chartered Company.
Another point of historical interest is that the
greater portion of the territory of the Company
was originally acquired in 1865 from the Sultan
of Brunei, together with all sovereign rights, by




40


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


the American consul for Brunei, who forthwith
formed the American Trading Company of Borneo.
This Company, from one cause and another, failed
to do any good with its territory, and sold its rights
in 1877 to two Hong Kong merchants, Mr. (now
Sir) Alfred Dent and Baron von Overbeck, an
Austrian. This led to the formation of the British
North Borneo Company, which was incorporated
under Royal Charter on November 1, 1881.
Finally, it is a curious circumstance that the
charter should have been granted on the advice of
Mr. Gladstone and his Ministers, confirmed antiexpansionists. This incongruity was noted at the
time by Mr. A. J. Balfour, the present Prime Minister of England, who, in the course of the debate
in the House of Commons on the granting of the
charter, said:  This debate is, I think, the most
singular thing I have ever listened to in this House.
There have been a great many able speeches delivered in defense of Her Majesty's Government,
but these speeches have all come from this side of
the House.1 There have been several Jingo speeches
delivered here, but the most remarkable example of
them has come from the Treasury bench." 2
So it is seen that the Company is remarkable in
that it acquired its territory from an American
citizen, its charter from a Liberal Government, and
that the countenance afforded it by England
marked the reestablishment of conditions which
every one believed to have finally disappeared.
1 i. e. from the Opposition.  2 i. e. from the Liberals.




BRITISH NORTH BORNEO           41
In the last chapter some account was given of the
British Crown Colony of Hong Kong, and it is perhaps fortunate that the present chapter should deal
with the British Protected State of North Borneo
(better known as British North Borneo), for no two
colonies situated in the same part of the world
could possibly present to the student greater contrasts in every matter with which political economy
and sociology are concerned.
The former has a very small area and a very
large population; in the latter these conditions
are reversed. The area of British North Borneo
(30,000 square miles) is about equal to that of the
State of Maine; the area of Hong Kong (thirty
square miles) is less than that of the City of Indianapolis; but the former Colony has a population of
less than four persons to the square mile, the latter
a population of more than ten thousand to the
square mile. In the thirty square miles of Hong
Kong there are, excluding naval and military forces,
nearly seven thousand white people; in the thirty
thousand square miles of British North Borneo
there are less than two hundred. Hong Kong exists
only by virtue of its shipping, and agricultural interests are insignificant; in British North Borneo
everything is of the land, - tobacco, timber, indiarubber, gutta-percha, cocoanuts,- and one steamer
a week represents the foreign shipping of the
country.
A comparison of the populations discloses yet
greater differences. In Hong Kong ninety-six per.




42


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


cent. of the people are Chinese —a race used to
the life of cities, saturated with a political theory
entirely democratic in all essentials, possessing a
great literature and a native system of philosophy,
a race moulded to a social form more completely
developed, more minutely defined, and more unalterably fixed than that of any other country in the
world. In North Borneo, on the other hand,
scarcely fifteen per cent. of the population is
Chinese. The mass of the people belong to three
native tribes - Bajau, Duslm, and Murut. The
Bajaus are a race of sea-gypsies - pirates turned
fishermen, under British guidance; the Dusuns are
a coast folk living in small villages or kampongs
by the shore and along the foothills; the Muruts
are a half-savage tribe in the far interior.
These people differ greatly from one another in
many important respects, but from the administrative standpoint they have this much in common,
that they have no written language, no cities, no
wealth, and that the internal relations of each tribe
are purely feudal in character.
To close our comparison, it may be pointed out
that the brilliant career of Hong Kong, granted the
maintenance of law and order, has not been due
in any great degree to excellence of internal administration, but to the fortunate position of the
Colony as affording a good harbor at the southern
gate of China. British North Borneo is too young
to have had a career as yet, since the State is
scarcely twenty years old; but it is abundantly




BRITISH NORTH BORNEO


43


clear that its present condition has nothing to do
with extraneous causes, and that the future of the
country rests entirely on the single question of
wise and skillful administration.
The principal questions which the Government
of British North Borneo is called on to face rest
upon three main factors - two of local origin, the
need of immigration and the general nature of the
country, which together comprise the problem of
development per se; and one of an extraneous
nature - namely, the declared wishes of the shareholders of the Company, which may or may not
coincide with the best interests of the country itself
as viewed from the purely administrative standpoint.
The story of how the Company has faced its
task of finding the capital, the population, and the
administrative skill for the conduct of its enterprise may be preceded by a description of the general form of the Government.
The limitations imposed on the Company by
its charter (1881) and by its deed of protectorate
(1888) are of such a nature as to interfere in the
smallest degree with matters of internal administration. They are the following:
1. The Company must remain British in character and
domicile; and all the members of the court of directors, as
well as the Company's chief representative in Borneo,
must be British subjects.
2. The Company is not permitted to transfer any of
its rights without the express permission of the British
Government.




44         THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
3. Foreign relations are to be conducted through the
British Government or in accordance with its directions.
4. Perfect religious freedom to be allowed to all persons
living in the territory.
5. The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
has the right to dissent from or object to any part of the
proceedings or system of the Company relative to the
people of Borneo; and the Company is bound to act upon
any suggestion founded on such dissent or objection.
6. No general monopoly of trade may be set up.
7. The appointment of the Governor of British North
Borneo is subject to the approval of the British Government.
Within these bounds the rule of the Company is
purely autocratic. The Governor is free to introduce such laws as may appear to him suitable for
the needs of the country; and in so far as he
is given a free hand by the Company he alone is
responsible for general success or failure.
Apart from the absolute independence of legislation enjoyed by the Company, there is nothing
unusual in the organization of the Government of
British North Borneo. The country is divided into
districts, and in each there is stationed a district
officer who acts as magistrate and tax-collector. The
immediate superiors of the district officers are the
Residents, of whom there are three, one at Papar,
on the west coast, one at Tawao, on the east coast,
and one at the port of Kudat in Marudu Bay,
in the north of the Island. The work of the Residents and district officers is subject to the review
of the Judicial Commissioner and of the Finance




BRITISH NORTH BORNEO


45


Commissioner, whose offices are in Sandakan on
the east coast, and finally to the approval of the
Governor.
In traveling about the country I was much impressed by the excellent tact and administrative
ability displayed by the Government officers. They
spoke the language of the people, showed an
interest in their affairs, were at all times accessible
to everybody who wished to make a complaint or to
ask for advice or assistance, and appeared in every
way to command the respect and good will of the
natives. In the discharge of their duties the district officers are assisted by the.native chiefs, who,
on condition of remaining loyal to the Government,
retain their titles and are paid fixed allowances.
The general effect of my observations was that the
people were governed rather by force of personal
influence than by the power of legislation, that the
judicial relations were based upon wise and tolerant
equity more than upon mere precise law, and that
a perfectly friendly understanding existed between
the Government and the natives.
Unlike the old East India Company, the British
North Borneo Company does not conduct any
trade on its own account, but confines itself to the
administration of the country. The local revenue
and expenditure accounts possess, therefore, this
interest, that they exhibit the work of the Company in so far as it is a matter of profit or loss to
the shareholders.
The paid-up capital of the Company is, roughly,




46


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


$3,500,000 (gold), and there have been issued
bonds and debentures to the amount of $2,000,000
(gold), on which five per cent. per annum interest
is payable. The proceeds of the issue of the debentures are to be devoted to the completion of the
State Railway on the west coast and to other reproductive works. The general financial situation of
the country is at present this, that, over and above
the expense of administration, the revenue must
meet a charge of $200,000 (silver) as interest on the
debentures before any dividend can be declared on
the paid-up capital. As, up to the present time, the
Company has never paid a higher dividend than
two per cent., it is clear that, unless all profits are
to be swallowed up by the payment of interest
on the debentures, the revenue will have to show
a substantial increase in the near future.
The latest complete figures for revenue and expenditure are those for 1903. The total revenue
for that year was $906,310 (silver), equal to about
$5.20 United States currency per head of the total
population. Of the total amount, seventy per cent.
was raised from customs duties ($279,594, silver)
and revenue farms ($365,503, silver). About sixty
per cent. of the customs revenue is raised from
duties on imports, and forty per cent. from duties
on exports. The imports consist of the usual articles
- cloth, cutlery, wines, spirits, tobacco, glassware,
lamps, kerosene, and so on; the exports which contribute most to the revenue are tobacco, timber,
gutta-percha, and india-rubber, edible bird's-nests,




BRITISH NORTH BORNEO


47


and dyestuffs. The revenue farms consist of the
monopolies of the right to sell opium and spirits,
to keep gambling-houses and pawnbrokers' shops.
These monopolies are sold to the highest bidder,
who is always a Chinaman.
The question of the opium and gambling licenses
is one which has been hotly debated in England
from time to time; but out in the Far East public
opinion has always been practically unanimous in
favor of such monopolies. If three hundred years
of contact with China has taught one lesson more
thoroughly than another, it is that no legislation,
no measures of repression, however severe (and
much has been attempted from time to time in this
direction), can turn the Chinaman from opiumsmoking and gambling. I have no desire to advocate indulgence in these vices; but as a thousand
voices are ever ready to condemn a policy which
enables a State to draw a revenue from them, it
seems advisable, for the better understanding of the
matter, to say a few words on the other side.
As far as I am aware, no one has ever tried to
make people believe that gambling and opiumselling are licensed in many Far Eastern countries
because it is hoped by that means to eradicate
those vices; the reason why they are licensed is
because the sale of the monopolies produces a good
revenue. But although eradication is impossible,
a certain degree of control may be effected by
granting to some one person or firm the opium and
gambling monopoly. The effect of the monopoly,




48


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


as far as control and regulation are concerned, is
this: the holder of the monopoly secures his rights
only on payment of a very large sum of money,
and retains them only for so long as he strictly
adheres to the Government regulations. It thus
comes about that, in British North Borneo, for
instance, the Government has been able to put an
end to two great evils which always exist in the
absence of licensing, namely, gambling and opiumsmoking by minors, and the use of clothing, tools,
and other property for gambling-stakes or for the
purchase of opium. No person except an adult
male is allowed to purchase opium or to visit a
gambling-house, and nothing except current coin
can be staked or used for the purchase of opium.
It may be suggested that if regulation to this extent can be secured under the system of licensing,
it could be secured otherwise. But there is this
vital difference between the license and the nolicense system, that in the former case the opium
and gambling farmer will, in the interest of his
own monopoly, use every means in his power to
prevent opium-smoking and gambling except in
his own saloons, and to enforce the Government
regulations under which his monopoly is granted;
whereas in the latter case all attempts to suppress
or regulate must be made through the agency of a
paid Chinese police force, an agency which has been
proved, after repeated experiment, to be utterly
unreliable. Considerations of space prevent further
remarks upon this subject at present; but I may




BRITISH NORTH BORNEO           49
add that in Hong Kong and in the Straits Settlements, where gambling is not only not allowed,
but is a matter for severe punishment, the vice is
more prevalent and is accompanied with worse results than in almost any other places under European government in the Far East.
The expenditure returns call for little comment.
The expenditure falls under two main heads, that
on Revenue Account and that on Capital Account.
The latter represents the cost of Railway and Telegraph Construction, Public Works and Buildings,
Government Vessels, Guns, Arms, Instruments, etc.
The financial position of the country is shown
by comparing the revenue with the expenditure on
Revenue Accomnt, and such comparison shows that
until within recent years there was an annual
deficit, and that this has changed to a small annual
surplus which has permitted the declaration of a
dividend of two per cent. on the paid-up capital.
The past policy of the Company appears to me
to have been marred by two great defects; and it
may be suggested that each of these has arisen
from a hope or expectation, never perhaps openly
expressed, but ever present in the minds of at least
a considerable proportion of the directors and
shareholders, that the country would be taken over
by the British Government. The first of these
defects is the attempt to secure interest on the
paid-up capital of the Company by means of raising a surplus revenue from taxation, and without
embarking upon commercial enterprises in the




50


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


country, which might be expected to return a legitimate trade profit. It might be said that the plan
of the Company was to pay for the cost of the
administration of the country out of taxes levied
chiefly upon industrial enterprises, and that it was
hoped that the expansion of trade would in a few
years afford a surplus revenue which could be
devoted to the payment of dividends to the shareholders - if the dividends were large, it would pay
to keep the country; if they were small, the country could at least be. offered to the British Government as a self-supporting concern. It became evident as time passed that the ordinary sources of
revenue would not suffice to provide any considerable dividend for the shareholders, and that, if the
country was even to be made self-supporting, additional taxes would have to be imposed. Taxation
was accordingly increased, and during the past
year or two a small dividend has been declared.
The result, however, has been achieved only at an
enormous sacrifice of the permanent interests of
the country. To take one instance, I may mention
the import duty on rice. It is not a heavy duty;
it can scarcely be expected to yield more than two
or three thousand pounds a year; and yet it is a tax
so evil in its operation that it has had the effect of
driving hundreds of people from the country, and
of materially increasing the bad repute of British
North Borneo amongst the Chinese. The view
taken by the Chinaman in regard to the tax is
that, rice being the staple food of himself, his




BRITISH NORTH BORNEO


51


wife, his children, his dog, and his cat, to tax it is
to make every member of his household, from the
master down to the master's pet monkey, contribute
to the public revenue. To impose a tax like this in
face of the opposition of the entire Chinese community, in a country whose future depends entirely
on the ability of the Government to secure and
retain a large Chinese population, indicates a blindness to the real interests of the country which is
difficult to account for in a directorate which contains gentlemen who are supposed to be familiar
with the local conditions of the Company's territory.1
The tax has been defended along two lines, one
general and one specific. It is clear that, if the Company is to dispose of its territory to the British
Government, the amount to be paid for it would
be greatly increased if it could be handed over
as a paying concern; and the directors may defend
their financial policy by saying that, as their first
duty is to the shareholders, any step calculated to
improve their position is justifiable on that ground
alone, the accepted view being that an immediate
sale of the territory to the British Government at
a good price would be better for the shareholders
than a long struggle, of doubtful issue, to make
the country a direct source of profit. The specific
plea in favor of the rice-tax has a certain appearance of excellence. It is ridiculous, say the riceThe rice-tax has been abolished since the above was written.




52


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


taxers, that a country so well suited to the cultivation of rice should import rice. The country should
grow its own rice, and the only way to bring this
about is to tax the imported article. But this argument cannot be offered in sincerity. If it was really
the aim of the Government that the country should
grow its own rice (a matter really of little importance, or at any rate of little urgency, in view of
the proximity of Borneo to great rice-growing
countries), the end could have been achieved by
paying a small bounty on rice culture, a policy
which would have encouraged the immigration of
Chinese, stopped the Chinese exodus, and provided
for its own cost by automatically increasing the
value of the opium and gambling monopoly, the
annual rent of which depends entirely on the number of Chinamen in the country. I may dismiss
the matter by saying that no official in North
Borneo with whom I spoke on the subject approved
of the rice-tax, and that repeated representations
have been made to the Directors with a view to
securing its repeal. The matter is important, however, as an indication of the policy of the Company.
The Company appears to me to have signally
failed in its attempts to formulate a sound financial
policy, and thus far it seems to have been scarcely
more successful in its plans for the development
of the country.
During the first few years of the Company's rule
a certain amount of exploration was done by Witti,
Hatton, and Pryer, with the result that a rough idea




BRITISH NORTH BORNEO           53
was obtained of the possibilities of the country in
the direction of mining and agriculture; but the
work was never carried out as it should have been,
and it was only in 1902 that mineral prospecting
was undertaken on a large scale. The early investigations, however, served to establish two points beyond all doubt - namely, that the two great needs
of the country were population and means of communication; and it must always have been clear to
those on the spot that without these things success
of any kind was impossible. Steps were taken to
establish a steady flow of Chinese immigration from
Hong Kong and the China coast ports, and during
the eighties some thousands of Chinamen entered
the country. The Government appears, unfortunately, to have taken no care that the Chinese coolies
should be well treated by their employers, and tales
of ill treatment were carried back to China, the
effects of which are still apparent in the general
disinclination of the Chinese to emigrate to British
North Borneo. Further, the tide of immigration
having set in, the Government took no steps to provide work for the immigrants. It could not be expected that private enterprise would be able at once
to absorb the supply of laborers; but the Government, instead of taking advantage of the glut in the
labor market to push ahead with Public Works,
allowed hundreds of the coolies to remain idle in
the ports, until in desperation they returned to
Hong Kong or China, thoroughly out of patience
with the country. The effect of this was disastrous.




54       TTHE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
Not only were the most necessary Public Works
neglected at a time when the supply of labor would
have made them easy of accomplishment, but the
country got a bad name amongst the very class of
people whose good opinion it was most necessary to
secure. Having once obtained a steady supply of
Chinese, the Government should have kept them
occupied until the growth of agricultural or other
industries allowed them to be drafted off to private
employers. But this was not done, and by the nineties the Government found itself short of labor
for the construction of roads and other much-needed
works, and prospective settlers were turned from
their purpose because of the evident lack of a labor
supply. The mismanagement of the immigration
question is the more difficult to understand from
the fact that the Government must have known that
an influx of Chinese would always pay for itself by
increasing the rent of the opium and gambling
monopoly (about one third of the total revenue of
British North Borneo is derived from this source),
and that the revenue could suffer no greater disaster than that which would follow an exodus of
Chinese, or even a falling off of Chinese immigration.
Turning now to the other great question, internal communications, the policy of the Company is
only to be explained on the theory that the Directors wished to make British North Borneo attractive
to the British Government in its capacity as a possible purchaser. The history of colonization has
many lessons to offer to the student, and none




BRITISH NORTH BORNEO           55
more emphatic than this, that for an undeveloped
country, and especially for a country of dense
forests, the first great need is good roads; the
second, the utilization and improvement of existing
river communications. After twenty years of the
Company's rule British North Borneo cannot boast
twenty miles of good roads, and, with the exception
of a rare visit from a steam launch, river communication is what it was under the Sultans. The Company has, however, spent about ~200,000 on the
construction of a railway on the west coast, and
about ~50,000 on a telegraph line connecting
Sandakan with the cable station of the Eastern
Extension Company at Labuan. In regard to the
telegraph line, it must be looked on, as far as the
interests of the country itself are concerned, as a
luxury pure and simple, which might well have
been left until some of the pressing needs had
been met; but " telegraphic connection with London" sounds well, and might be expected to appeal
to the sensibilities of the British Government.
The railway is another matter, and its construction raises two important questions -the wisdom
of spending such a large sum of money on coast
communication, which was already secured by sea,
when access to the interior was still unprovided
for; and the manner in which the work has been
carried out. On the question of policy there must,
of course, be differences of opinion. The general
view in British North Borneo and amongst business men in Singapore and Hong Kong- a view




56        THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
with which I find myself in complete accord - is
that the money spent on the railway could have.been infinitely better employed, having regard to
the real interests of the country, in making good
roads into the interior from the chief towns, in
purchasing launches for river service and coast
communications, in the encouragement of immigration, and in the establishment of new industries,
objects on which money has indeed been spent,
but in entirely inadequate amount. The oft-quoted
instance of the railways in the Federated Malay
States is not applicable to British North Borneo;
for in the Peninsula roads came first, then population, then trade, and then the need of railways.
And the railway policy was not adopted until the
working of minerals had yielded such an enormous
revenue that the railways could be constructed,
not only without the aid of borrowed money, but
actually from current Treasury surpluses.
But, if there are two opinions about the policy
of constructing the West Coast Railway, there is
but one opinion throughout Borneo in regard to the
manner in which that policy has been carried out.
I did not go over the whole line, for, although the
section from Jesselton to Beaufort was taken over
from the contractors as a working line in the
middle of 1902, parts of it had already been washed
away or otherwise rendered useless before the end
of the year; but of the twenty or thirty miles over
which I did travel, I can safely say, with some
experience of out-of-the-way railways in the tropics,




BRITISH NORTH BORNEO


57


that a more outrageous piece of work never passed
under my notice. Engineers may find the proper
technical terms for what I saw, but it was, in fact,
this, - that the line was full of unnecessary curves;
that where rock was available in abundance for
ballasting, earth and jungle rubbish had been
used; that where everything pointed to the need
of culverts, unbroken earthen embankments were
waiting for certain destruction by the floods of the
northeast monsoon; that every third sleeper, instead
of holding up the track, hung loosely suspended
from the rails; that heavy timbers across rivers had
been so carelessly laid that it had become necessary
to hammer in chips of wood beneath them in order
to secure the support of the piers. Yet I am told that
the line was built by a great firm of English contractors; aided by the advice of a distinguished and
highly-feed consulting engineer, that the work had
to be done to the satisfaction of the Company's engineer in Borneo, and that it was, in fact, actually
passed by him. It is difficult to understand how
a railway which bends out of shape when the sun
shines and slides down hill when it rains ever came
to be taken over as a completed railway. Expert
independent opinion has been obtained on the railway, and the verdict is that it will cost at least
~10,000 even to put the line in such order that a
train may be safely run from one end to the other,
and that to make it in any sense a real working line
an expenditure of ~100,000 will be necessary. If,
as many people believe, the railway was useless and




58        THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
unnecessary in the present general condition of
Borneo, and was intended merely for what the
Chinese call "look-see," it should at least have
been well enough built to deceive a non-expert observer.
One cannot help feeling that thus far the management of British North Borneo has been a failure, and that this has been due, not to defects of
local administration, but to an utterly mistaken
policy on the part of the Directors, a policy which
has been wrong, whether the motive behind it has
been the genuine development of the country or
merely its decking forth as an attractive object for
sale.
A word, in conclusion, about the future of the
country. As I have said before, the land itself is magnificent. For tobacco, india-rubber, gutta-percha,
and timber the soil is unsurpassed, and there may
be valuable mineral deposits similar to those of
neighboring Sarawak. If the Company will seriously face the situation, there is no possible doubt
that for British North Borneo there is a brilliant
future, and for the shareholders a splendid reward
on their investment. In its Civil Service the Company is singularly fortunate. It was a great surprise to me to find that, with the very small salaries
paid to its servants, the Company had been able to
secure a class of men of such excellent quality as are
the majority of the local officials - capable, hardworking men, young, eager, and thoroughly interested in their duties. But this is not enough where




BRITISH NORTH BORNEO


59


the general policy is bad; and certain things are
absolutely necessary if failure is to be turned into
success. The idea that the British Government would
ever take over the country at a price satisfactory to
the shareholders, unless real financial independence
had been achieved, should be definitely abandoned,
and attention should be turned to the single object
of advancing the development of the country. The
hope of dividends should be set aside for some
years at least; the revenue should be cut down to
the lowest figure which would suffice for the expense of administration and the payment of interest on loans; the capital of the Company should
be increased and a large sum devoted to the construction of roads, the purchase of small steamers,
the encouragement of immigration, and the fostering of new industries; grants of land should no
longer be made without adequate guarantee that
cultivation is to follow within reasonable time, but
with such guarantees grants should be made generously.
Finally, the Directors should be content to leave
the method of development entirely in the hands
of the Governor. They have got a man exactly
suited to the task, a man who has seen the making
of the Federated Malay States at close range as
one of the makers, and whose training has been
fortified by constant association with Sir Frank
Swettenham, the ablest administrator who has
been in the British Far East since the days of Sir
Stamford Raffles. Five years of work on lines such




60        THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
as Mr. Birchl would lay down, five years unhampered by the cry for dividends, should serve to
place British North Borneo amongst the most successful of British settlements in the tropics; but
the result can only be achieved by a constant
unity of purpose and a complete and unwavering
confidence in the man to whom the task is intrusted.
See note on page 38.




CHAPTER IV


SARAWAK
I HAD occasion some years ago to write for the
"Atlantic Monthly" 1 an article on ' European
Experience with Tropical Colonies." At its conclusion are to be found the following lines from
Froude, quoted in support of the argument in
favor of personal rule in the tropics: "Find a
Raja Brooke [of Sarawak] if you can.... Send
him out with no more instructions than the Knight
of La Mancha gave Sancho - to fear God and do
his duty... The leading of the wise few, the
willing obedience of the many, is the beginning
and end of all right action. Secure this and you
secure everything. Fail to secure it, and, be your
liberties as wide as you can make them, no success
is possible." For the past two months 2I have been
in Sarawak, traveling up and down the coast and
into the interior, and working in Kuching, the
capital. At the end of it I find myself unable to
express the high opinion I have formed of the
administration of the country without a fear that
I shall lay myself open to the charge of exaggeration. With such knowledge of administrative
Atlantic Monthly, December, 1898.
2 This was written in January, 1903.




62


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


systems in the tropics as may be gained by actual
observation in almost every part of the British
Empire except the African Colonies, I can say that
in no country which I have ever visited are there
to be observed so many signs of a wise and generous rule, such abundant indications of good
government, as are to be seen on every hand
in Sarawak.
The present Raja, or King, of Sarawak, is an
Englishman, Sir Charles Johnson Brooke, G.C.M.G.,
head of an old county family, and a descendant,
through the female line, of the Stuarts. The story
of how he has come to occupy the position of absolute monarch over a territory as large as England,
situated in the out-of-the-way island of Borneo, and
peopled by Dyaks, Malays, and Chinese, reads like
the wildest fiction rather than sober historical fact.
In the years following the restoration of Java
to the Dutch the Malay Archipelago fell into a
most disturbed condition. Dutch authority was
severely shaken; England was unwilling to assume
any further responsibilities in the Far East; and the
historical Dutch policy of fomenting the internal
dissensions of the native governments, in order to
weaken the general opposition to white rule, bore
abundant fruit. Into this part of the world came,
in the thirties, James Brooke, a young military
officer of the East India Company, who had retired
from the service after distinguishing himself in the
Burmese War of 1824, and who had been rendered
independent by inheriting a large fortune from his




SARAWAK


63


father in 1835. Inspired by a strong spirit of adventure, Brooke determined, after carefully studying the general condition of the Malay Archipelago,
to devote his energies to the amelioration of the
life of the native Borneans. His original intention
was to secure his footing by means of trade, and
then to work on the minds of the native rulers.
The ambition of wealth he never had for a moment;
and, indeed, he subsequently spent the whole of
his large private fortune on his reform schemes in
Sarawak.
Writing of the objects he had at heart Brooke
said: cc It is a grand experiment, which, if it succeeds, will bestow a blessing on these poor people;
and their children's children shall bless me. If it
please God to permit me to give a stamp to this
country which shall last after I am no more, I shall
have lived a life which emperors might envy. If
by dedicating myself to the task I am able to introduce better customs and settled laws, and to raise
the feeling of the people so that their rights can
never in future be wantonly infringed, I shall indeed
be content and happy." But on his arrival in
Borneo he found a condition of affairs which, while
rendering his original plan of action impossible, led
to the solution of the difficulties along another line,
and to the fulfillment of his hopes.
At the time of Brooke's arrival in Borneo the
territory of Sarawak was under the rule of Omar
All, the Malay Sultan of Brunei, but its affairs
were actually administered by the Sultan's uncle,




64


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


Raja Muda Hassim.1 On reaching Sarawak it was
learned that a formidable rebellion had been in
progress for more than three years, and that there
was little prospect of peace. So evil was the condition of the country that Hassim entreated Brooke
to remain in the country and take over the Government, offering him as a reward all the trade of the
place. This proposal was declined, but Brooke
offered to give what aid he could to bring the civil
war to an end; and, putting himself at the head of
a small force of Europeans, he actually succeeded,
after a few months' fighting, in restoring peace.
His first task, on the conclusion of hostilities, was
to prevent a wholesale massacre of the surrendered
rebels, and in this he was successful.
The reward conferred on Brooke for his part in
suppressing the rebellion was a mere permission to
trade with the people. Although this was a very
small matter, it was accepted without complaint;
and there matters might have rested had it not
been for an incident which brought about a crisis
in the affairs of Sarawak. The Governor of Sarawak under the Raja Muda Hassim was a Malay
chief named Makota; and the recent rebellion had
been largely brought about by his misgovernment.
After the conclusion of peace Brooke took every
legitimate means of increasing his influence with
the Raja Muda, in pursuance of his original intention of securing improvement in the Government.
But when it became evident to Makota that Brooke
1 Raja Muda is the Malay equivalent for Heir Apparent.




SARAWAK


65


was supplanting him in the counsels of the State
he commenced a series of underhand attacks on
Brooke's influence, and these failing, he finally
attempted to poison the whole English community.
Through the indiscretion of a subordinate the plot
was discovered; and Brooke immediately brought
matters to a head by laying the facts before the
Raja Muda and demanding that justice should
be done. The affair ended in the degradation of Makota and the appointment of Brooke as Governor
of Sarawak in his place. This was the beginning
of the Brooke rule in Sarawak. The grant of the
Governorship was approved by the Sultan, and,
after some years, arrangements were made under
which the Sultan conferred the Government of
Sarawak in perpetuity on Sir James Brooke (he was
created a K.C.B. by the late Queen in 1848), and
in 1863 the independence of the country was formally recognized by the British Government.
Five years later the first Raja Brooke died. His
biographer, Sir Spencer St. John, tells us that
towards the end of his life the Raja wrote: "In
spite of trials and anxieties, calumny and misrepresentation, I have been a happy man, and can pillow
my head in the consciousness of a well-spent life
of sacrifice and devotion to a good cause."
Such are the bald facts about the origin of the
Brooke rule in Sarawak. But if we read between
the lines we see that these facts form the record
of one of the most romantic and remarkable episodes to be found in the whole annals of the white




66


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


man's work in the tropics. A young Englishman
goes out to the Malay Archipelago, and visits a
country which ninety-nine men out of a hundred
would have avoided, on account of its disturbed
condition. He interferes in what may be regarded
as a domestic brawl, and, contrary to the universal
experience of mankind, both parties to the dispute
are satisfied in a few months to see handed over to
him as a gift the very country which each, at the
time of his entrance upon the scene, was striving
to secure for itself. The origin of the Brooke rule
in Sarawak is, however, the least remarkable element in the story. That which arrests the attention
of the student and sustains his interest in the affairs of the little kingdom is the unbelievable success which has attended the policy of the first Raja
Brooke and of his successor, the present Raja. The
difficulties to be overcome at the outset, before any
kind of permanent order could be brought out of
the prevailing chaos, were apparently insurmountable, and might well have discouraged the stanchest and most persevering of men. For generations
the Dyak and the Malay had been enemies. To the
Mohammedan Malay the Dyak appeared merely as
a barbarous infidel, whose country was the just spoil
of the faithful. His religion, since it was not Mohammedanism, was false; his political organization
was beneath contempt; his language simply a crude
patois, with no written expression; his social customs were abominable; it was clearly, from  the
Malay standpoint, a race to be used as long as it




SARAWAK


67


would submit, to be exterminated as soon as it
resisted.
The Dyaks, on the other hand, regarded the
Malays as their tyrants and oppressors, the people
who had come over the sea to rob them of their
country, to destroy their customs, to grind their
faces with exorbitant taxes, which they often had
the power to collect, whatever may have been.their
right to impose them. On either side there was
a long record of murder and outrage. Until these
opposing factions were reconciled and brought
into a common and voluntary submission to the
Government, nothing could be done to advance the
prosperity of the country or to lay the foundations
of a permanent system of administration. By what
exercise of tact, firmness, and wisdom this delicate
task was accomplished by the first Raja Brooke
may be gathered from the fact that within a few
years of his accession to the throne the Malays and
Dyaks were living peaceably side by side all over
the country, and that from that day to this there
has never been anything in the nature of a serious
rupture between the two races.
For an ordinary man, placed in the position in
which Raja Brooke found himself after the pacification of Sarawak, there would have existed a
powerful temptation to stop short at providing
the country with a moderately good Government,
whilst deriving from its administration a fair return
on the investment of his time and talents. The
temptation to embark on such a policy would have




68        THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
been the greater from the obvious facility with
which it could have been carried out. The Government which had been displaced was so utterly bad
that any change whatever must have appealed to
the people as an improvement; and, by introducing a wise system of taxation, the revenue of the
country could have been doubled, whilst creating,
by the removal of harsh and objectionable methods
of collection, a popular impression that it had been
halved. To Raja Brooke these considerations, so
far as we can judge by his actions, never presented
themselves. From the very commencement he devoted himself completely to the task of providing
Sarawak with the best possible Government that
could be devised, and to equalizing the incidence
of taxation. So far was he carried by his sense of
responsibility to the people thus strangely fallen
under his rule, that he sacrificed his entire private
fortune in paying the expenses of administration and in setting the country on the fair road to
prosperity.
The first Raja Brooke reigned for twenty-six
years (1842-1868), and was succeeded by his
nephew, Sir Charles Johnson Brooke, G.C.M.G.,
who still occupies the throne.
It became clear as soon as the new King took
over the reins of Government that he intended to
adopt as his model the liberal and enlightened policy of the late Raja. As early as 1870 the present
Raja published in the " Sarawak Gazette " his views
as to the method of government best suited to the




SARAWAK


69


needs of his people. This early pronouncement of
policy was drawn forth by a rumor which had
reached the Raja's ear that certain persons regarded with disfavor his intention of presiding as
Chief Justice at the sittings of the Supreme Court.
It is true that in the condition of civilization with
which we are familiar the idea of a King or President fulfilling judicial functions is repugnant to
the public sense of the true attributes of a judiciary.
But the conditions in Borneo are absolutely different; and the Oriental mind is quite familiar with
the idea of the highest judicial and executive functions being combined in one person, is familiar in
fact with no other system. The Raja expressed
himself as follows on the point -and it may well
be noted that the liberal view he advances as to
the relation between the superior and the inferior
races is one which we have persuaded ourselves,
through a perverted application of history, to be
the monopoly of those peoples who live under republican institutions. " Our chief success," he says,
"has been owing to the good feeling existing between ruler and people, brought about by there
being no impediments between them; and the nonsuccess of European.Governments generally in dealing with Asiatics is caused by the want of sympathy
and knowledge between the ruler and the ruled,
the reason being the distance and unapproachableness of the leader. If I am to exclude myself from
court I must necessarily withdraw myself from hearing the complaints, either serious or petty, of my




70


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


people, who would then be justified in drawing an
unsatisfactory and unhappy comparison between
myself and my uncle, who was de facto the slave
of his people, and left the country under my charge
expecting me to carry out his policy."
The organization of the Government of Sarawak
is simple in the extreme. At the head of everything is the Raja, a monarch more completely autocratic than any other in the world, since for him
the two great restraining forces of absolute monarchy- the existence of turbulent anti-dynastic
factions and the very strong influence which is
always exerted by a powerful hereditary nobility
-do not exist. The Government, then, is purely
despotic in form. But it is a despotism which has
shown itself, up to the present time, to be of the
most benevolent kind, inspired by motives of the
most sincere unselfishness, and guided ever by an
earnest desire to advance the true interests of the
people, even when the pursuance of such aims has
involved, as has very frequently been the case, great
sacrifices on the part of the ruler.
I cannot better exhibit the general character of
the policy which guides the administration of Sarawak than by quoting a short passage from the
"Sarawak Gazette" of September 2, 1871. The
policy therein laid down by the present Raja has
been faithfully followed for thirty years, and the
results have more than justified it.
The common mistake Europeans make in the East is
to exalt Western civilization almost to the exclusion of




SARAWAK


71


the native system, instead of using them as mutually corrective.
There are two ways in which a Government can act.
The first is to start from things as it finds them, putting
its veto on what is dangerous or unjust, and supporting
what is fair and equitable in the usages of the natives, and
letting system and legislation wait upon occasion. When
new wants are felt it examines and provides for them by
measures rather made on the spot than imported from
abroad; and to insure that these shall not be contrary to
native customs, the consent of the people is gained for
them before they are put in force.
Progress in this way is usually slow, and the system is
not altogether popular from our point of view; but it is
both quiet and steady; confidence is increased; and no
vision of a foreign yoke to be laid heavily on their shoulders, when the opportunity offers, is present to the native
mind.
The other plan is to make here and there a clean sweep
and to introduce something that Europeans like better in
the gap. A criminal code of the latest type, polished and
revised by the wise men at home, or a system of taxation
and police introduced bodily from the West is imposed,
with a full assurance of its intrinsic excellence, but with
too little thought of how far it is likely to suit the circumstances it has to meet.
The form of administration has grown up with
the country, and is such as the experience of half
a century has shown to be suited to the local conditions. There are two State Councils -the General Council and the Supreme Council. The former
consists of the Raja, and of the following Government servants, native and European, who are all




72


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


members ex officio: the Divisional Residents, the
Residents of the Second Class, the Commandant of
the Forces, the Treasurer, the Principal Medical
Officer, the Datus, and all native chiefs holding
office under the Government. This body meets
once in three years, unless especially summoned for
specific reasons. Its functions are of a purely advisory or consultative nature, and the Council was,
in fact, instituted for the purpose of keeping the
Raja informed of the general condition of public
opinion in the country districts and out-stations,
and of advising him in regard to any important
changes which it might be proposed to make in the
general policy of administration. On the occasions
of these triennial meetings the Raja makes what
is practically a Speech from the Throne, in which
the condition of the country is reviewed; and the
leading members of the Council also speak.
The General Council serves its purpose admirably, since it keeps all the members of the Administration in touch with the Raja and with one
another; and it contributes greatly to that state of
good feeling between natives and Europeans which
is the fundamental characteristic of the Sarawak
State. It is, however, the Supreme Council which
really administers the affairs of the country. This
1 There are four Datus - the Datu Bandar, or Senior Chief;
the Datu Muda, or Junior Chief; the Datu Hakim, or Chief
Mohammedan Magistrate, and the Datu Emaum, who is the
head for the time being of the Mohammedan religion in Sarawak.


I
I




SARAWAK


73


Council consists of the Raja, the Resident of the
First Division, and the four Datus. It is provided
that the European members must never outnumber
the native members. The General Council meets
once a month, and all proposed laws are laid before
it, as well as such administrative matters as are not
purely of a routine nature. In order to endow this
brief description of a unique legislature with some
degree of reality, I print here the official report of
a meeting of the Sarawak Supreme Council, which
was held just before my arrival in the country:
SUPREME COUNCIL.
Present,
His Highness the Raja, G.C.M.G.
The'Resident of the First Division (the Honorable C. A.
Bampfylde).
The Datu Bandar (Haji Bua Hassan).
The Datu Muda (Abang Mohamad Kassim).
The Datu Hakim (Haji Mohamad All).
The Datu Emaum (Haji Amin).
A meeting of the Council was convened this day. His
Highness the Raja informed the Members he had what he
considered an important matter to lay before them in
reference to the future supply of timber for building
purposes. At present large quantities of different kinds
of woods were being felled immediately in the vicinity of
the principal town for export; and a trade had sprung up
which threatened to despoil the forests of all the best and
most useful woods necessary to the inhabitants of a growing town. At this end of the State, where so much wood
is now being worked for export, the country is comparatively narrow, being only a few miles in depth to the




74


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


boundary with Netherlands territory; and in this narrow
strip of land large quantities of valuable timber have also
been destroyed by generations of Dyak farming. What
there is left should be preserved as far as possible for local
use, for were these woods, even the commonest of them,
once worked out, the inhabitants of this town and the
neighborhood would be put to the greatest inconvenience.
His Highness now proposed that all woods in the for-.
ests lying between Tanjong Datu and the right bank of
the Sadong River shall be preserved for the use of the
inhabitants, and that after six months from the present
date the exportation of timber from any part within the
above mentioned limits shall be prohibited.
This was carried unanimously.
No other matters were brought forward.
F. H. DALLAS,
Acting Clerk of Supreme Council.
For administrative purposes Sarawak is split up
into divisions under the charge of Residents. These
officers are assisted by one or more Englishmen
and by a small staff of natives. The duties of the
Resident are manifold. He must see to the collection of the revenue, to the administration of justice,
to public works, and so on; and, above all, he
must be at all times accessible to the people. The
Dyaks have the strongest objection to doing the
smallest thing without first indulging in long and
tedious palavers. The discussion about the business
itself may occupy, perhaps, ten minutes; but it must
be preceded by an almost interminable interchange
of polite nothings. These interviews; however, are a
most important element in the administrative system,




SARAWAK


75


for it is no exaggeration to say that the average
Dyak had rather submit, after due palaver had
and obtained, to some important measure of which
he himself disapproved, than acquiesce in the
most trivial matter of obvious utility without being
afforded a chance of talking with the Government
officer for hours about the monsoon, or the best
shape for a boat's prow, or the proper color to
be worn if a certain relative (presently in robust
health) should chance to die.
The chief characteristic of the administrative
methods of Sarawak is the emphasis laid by the
Raja on the necessity of maintaining the closest
personal relations between the rulers and the ruled,
and the subordination to this end of mere clerical
work.
Thus it happens that although the student finds
in Sarawak a very small amount of official literature,
yet he observes that each official is intimately conversant with all the affairs of his district, can tell
you the history of almost every family, knows
everybody by sight and nearly everybody by name,
and is prepared at a moment's notice to talk to one
about the approaching marriage of a daughter, to
another about the prospect of a successful gutta
expedition into the interior.
All officials in Sarawak are chosen personally by
the Raja on the occasions of his visits to England;
and it is curious to note that, with two exceptions
(a Scotchman and a Frenchman), every man in the
service is an Englishman. There is a further fact




76


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


worthy of record that, whether it be to the advantage of the country or not, the population of Sarawak does not include a Jew or a lawyer.
That Sarawak has prospered greatly under its
present ruler is shown by the following figures:
1870.    1903.
Value of foreign imports.......... $1,328,963 $5,959,720
Value of foreign exports........... 1,494,241  7,512,440
A certain proportion of the increase disclosed in
the above figures is apparent rather than real, and
is due to the fall in the value of the silver dollar;
but even allowing for that, the foreign trade of
Sarawak has more than trebled during the past
thirty years.
The principal articles of export in 1903 were:
Gold, $1,784,600; pepper, $2,733,301; gutta and
india-rubber, $761,000; and sago-flour, $766,463;
which together represented three quarters of the
total value of exports.
In the import trade rice is by far the most important item, being represented in 1903 by a value
of $1,041,065, or nearly one fifth of the total
value of imports. Other items were, cloth of various kinds, $746,104; tobacco, $256,000; opium,
$284,000; kerosene oil, $172,725; and sugar,
$134,643.
The future prosperity of Sarawak appears to be
well assured. Valuable gold deposits exist, and
these are being worked by the Borneo Company,
Limited, which, if it has wasted twenty years in
finding out the value of its properties in Sarawak,




SARAWAK


77


is now making up for lost time by introducing the
most modern mining machinery and by employing
a competent staff of scientific men to carry out its
plans. As far as agriculture is concerned the pepper
and sago of Sarawak command the highest price in
the open market; and the demand for these commodities is constantly increasing. It is important
to realize, in this connection, that nearly all the
labor of the country is performed by Chinese immigrants, the native Dyak and Malay population
being quite useless for industrial purposes, from
strong disinclination to steady work of any kind.
The impression of the country which I carry
away with me is that of a land full of contentment
and prosperity, a land in which neither the native
nor the white man has pushed his views of life to
their logical conclusion, but where each has been
willing to yield to the other something of his extreme conviction. There has been here a tacit
understanding on both sides that those qualities
which alone can insure the permanence of good
government in the State are to be found in the
white man and not in the native; and the final control remains, therefore, in European hands, although
every opportunity is taken of consulting the natives
and of benefiting by their intimate knowledge of
the country and of the people.
Nothing could better serve to exhibit at once the
strength and the weakness of a despotic form of
government than the present condition of Sarawak,
for if it be true that the wisdom, tolerance, and




78


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


sympathy of the present Raja have moulded the
country to the extraordinary state of tranquil prosperity which it now enjoys, the power of an unwise
or wicked ruler to throw the country back into a
condition of barbarism must be admitted as a necessary corollary. The advent of such a ruler is, however, in the highest degree improbable. The succession is guaranteed by the British Government;
and the Raja Muda, Charles Vyner Brooke, has
been educated with the fact of his eventual inheritance of the throne constantly in view. The future
rulers of Sarawak will no doubt be as carefully
trained; and if the wise custom which has hitherto
prevailed, of assigning to the Heir Apparent responsible administrative duties in the country districts, is continued, there is no reason to doubt that
the Brooke rule in Sarawak will confer in the future
as it has done in the past the greatest benefits upon
the country and its inhabitants.




CHAPTER V


BURMA
THERE is no portion of the British Empire, East
or West, which possesses greater attractions for
the lover of romance than the Indian Province of
Burma. The country which inspired Mr. Kipling's
"Mandalay" and Mr. Fielding's "Soul of a
People" needs no word of mine to emphasize a
fascination which, unlike the appeal of other lands,
increases with familiarity and grows deeper day
by day as the borrowed impression of the printed
page gives way to the delighted observation of the
traveler.
The Burmese administrative system as it exists
to-day is the product of a constant adjustment of
the machinery of Government to the peculiar needs
of a country whose geographical situation has
created an embarrassing confusion of diverse conditions and conflicting interests. Although the
area of Burma is only 239,000 square miles, it
has a length, almost due north and south, of
twelve hundred miles. The southern portion of the
country lies on the seaboard of the Bay of Bengal,
in only ten degrees of north latitude; and the
northern portion is far inland, above the Tropic
of Cancer. The climate is further affected by the




80        THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
great variation in the surface conditions of the land.
A few figures will serve to show the remarkable
climatic conditions of the country. The corrected
returns for 1900 show that, in a territory smaller
than the State of Texas, one town, Tavoy, registered a rainfall of two hundred and thirty-five inches,
and another, Mandalay, only twenty-five inches,
the figures being normal in each instance. The
temperature returns are scarcely less interesting. In
December, 1900, Kyaukse in Upper Burma experienced a heat of ninety-seven degrees Fahrenheit,
while at Bhamo, only two hundred miles to the
north, a temperature of forty-nine degrees was
recorded. In Bhamo itself the temperature during
December, 1900, ranged between eighty-two degrees and forty-nine degrees Fahrenheit.
The population has responded to the great diversity of environment, and to the manifold variety of
manners and customs attributable to this cause
the geographical situation of the country has contributed an amazing complexity of racial types.
Burma has land frontiers with Bengal, Manipur,
Assam, Yunnan, the Chinese Shan States, French
Indo-China, the Siamese Tai States, and Siam
proper; and the interior of the country is cut up
by a network of mountain ranges into innumerable
isolated districts. These conditions have produced
an abnormal multiplication of tribes, sub-tribes,
and clans, so that more than one third of the population of the administrative area of Burma is nonBurmese.




BURMA


81


The distribution of indigenous races in Burma
at the Census of 1901 was as follows:
Burmese......... 6,508,682  Tailings..........  321,898
Shans............  787,087  Chins.............  179,192
Karens..........  717,859 Taungthus........ 168,301
Arakanese........ 405,143 Kachins......... 64,405
The returns show fifteen other indigenous races.
Some idea of the difficulties involved in administering the affairs of Burma may be formed from
the fact that the Kachins, the least numerous of
the non-Burmese indigenous races, are divided into
five tribes and sixty-two sub-tribes, each with its
own manners and customs, and each depending on
the Government to watch its peculiar interests.
The absorption of Burma by the British Indian
Empire occupied sixty years. It commenced with
the war of 1824, which was brought about by
frontier troubles between Bengal and the Burmese
district of Arakan. The next step was the war of
1852, which arose out of the refusal of the Burmese King to make reparation for repeated outrages on British subjects. By these two wars the
territory now known as Lower Burma passed under
British rule.
After a peace of thirty years' duration, England
and Burma found themselves at war again in 1885.
The immediate cause of this war was a quarrel between the King of Burma and the Bombay-Burma
Trading Company in regard to a heavy fine imposed on the corporation for alleged frauds in




82        THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
timber-exporting - a charge the truth of which
the Company has always denied. The Indian Government sided with the Company, being satisfied
that the fine was, in fact, nothing but an attempt
to levy blackmail. Arbitration was suggested from
Calcutta and rejected at Mandalay, and finally war
broke out. But the real causes lay beneath the surface. Through the gross cruelty and misgovernment of King Thibaw the central authority had
lost control of the remoter provinces, and a chronic
condition of disorder oh the frontier of British India threatened the peace of that country. Repeated
attempts were made to open friendly diplomatic
relations with the Burmese Court, but these overtures were met in a hostile spirit; and at last, when
the Indian Government discovered that King Thibaw was conducting secret intrigues with the
French, the treatment of the Bombay-Burma Trading Company was used as a convenient occasion for
bringing matters to a head. The war commenced
in November, 1885, and lasted less than a month;
and on January 1, 1886, Upper Burma was added
to the British Indian Empire. King Thibaw and
his two Queens, Supayagyi and her sister Supayalat,
were exiled to Ratnagiri Fort in the Bombay Presidency, and an end was made of a rule which had
been little but one long record of treachery and
bloodshed. It is not without a sigh of regret that
the student of Burmese history closes the book
with the conviction strong upon him that of all the
cruel and bloodthirsty intriguers who combined to




BURMA                   83
produce the downfall of the Kingdom of Ava, the
most wicked, the most relentless, the most cruel,
was the fair Supayalat.
The task which confronted the new Administration was one of extraordinary difficulty, and the
story of how all obstacles were overcome and the
country brought to a state of tranquil prosperity
possesses an added interest from the fact that the
conditions to be met bore a striking resemblance to
those which the United States was called upon
to face in the Philippines after the fall of Manila.
Seven years of Thibaw's rule had plunged the country into a state of inconceivable disorder. The Government officials had lost the respect and confidence
of the people; the country was overrun by armed
bands of dacoits; agriculture was at a standstill;
native industries were fast disappearing before a
growing sense of insecurity of life and property;
a dozen chiefs in various parts of the country were
striving to set up independent governments; and
the King, who had not once quitted the palace
grounds in the seven years of his reign, had neither
the desire nor the power to restore order.
Such was the condition of affairs when the
British took over the country. A definite policy
of pacification was immediately inaugurated, the
central idea of which was to secure absolute control of the more readily accessible parts of the
country, to occupy a central zone in which civil
administration could be securely established and
recuperative measures commenced under the most




84        THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
favorable conditions, and, with this zone as a
nucleus, to work outwards as occasion offered.
Instead of dispatching numerous disconnected columns out into the hills in search of armed bands,
the military force was, for the time being, concentrated around the administrative centre; and later,
when the established-security of the pacified zone
justified an extension of military operations, the
principle was adopted that no place should be occupied unless it could be permanently held and provided with open communications with the main
territory. The tactical basis of this policy was
that no attempt should be made to enforce submission to the new Government in any district until
the authorities were prepared to afford the natives
perfect security against reprisals on the part of the
irreconcilables.
Instead of immediately providing Burma with
a Lieutenant-Governor, a Legislative Council, and
the administrative machinery which the size of the
country and its commercial importance would have
justified on grounds of equity, the Indian Government very wisely left the pacification of the country
and the earlier stages of its development to a Chief
Commissioner and a competent staff of subordinates. The effect of this was to endow the local
Government with a quality of flexibility which, in
the unsettled state of affairs, was of far greater
importance than mere mechanical precision, and
to admit of action being taken immediately on
a thousand matters which, under the more formal




BURMA                   85
regime of a Provincial Government, would have
awaited reference to Calcutta and possibly to London. It was not until 1897 that the Chief Commissionership of Burma was raised to a LieutenantGovernorship, an act which placed the Province in
all essentials on a level with the Provinces of India
proper.
Except in one important particular - the financial status of the country -the Government of
Burma is similar in form to that of a Crown Colony.
Measures passed by the local legislature are subject to the review of the Central Government in
India and finally to the approval of the Secretary
of State for India; and no work involving the
expenditure of any considerable sum of money
may be undertaken without the express permission
of the home authorities being first obtained.
The most interesting feature of the administrative system of Burma is the use made by the
Government of native headmen as tax collectors
and petty magistrates. In 1901 there were in the
whole of Burma no less than 18,505 of these native
officials. The regulation under which the headmen
are employed simply establishes a modernized form
of the village system which, in Burma as in India
proper, has been the basis of the indigenous administration from time immemorial.
The village systems of Upper and Lower Burma
differ in some respects, and the following description refers to the system now in force in Upper
Burma. The guiding principle of the village system




86        THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
is that, in addition to the personal responsibility
under the law of each citizen for his own acts, there
exists a collective responsibility ofa village in regard
to certain specified matters - in brief, the individual
is the legal unit, the village the administrative unit
recognized by the Government. The more serious
responsibilities of the villages relate to three offenses
- harboring criminals or failing to take reasonable
measures to prevent their escape, the suppression
of evidence in criminal cases, and cattle theft; and
in regard to these offenses a fine may be imposed
on any or on all of the inhabitants of a village.
The action of the Government in fixing a collective
responsibility in these matters has the force of
ancient custom. The regulation in regard to cattle
theft may be taken as an example. It is known as
the Track Law, and rests on a usage established
by the Institutes of Manu (500 B. c.), a body of
law adopted by the Burmans at least as early as the
fourteenth century of our era. The principle of the
Track Law is that if the track of stolen cattle can
be traced into the limits of any village, the inhabitants must carry the track on beyond the village
boundary, or produce the cattle, or make good the
loss. Although this has been the law in Burma for
centuries, it is only since the British occupation
that it has been rigidly enforced. The effectiveness
of the law is much greater than might be supposed
by any one unfamiliar with Upper Burma. The
whole country is divided into villages - the word
being used to describe not merely a collection of




BURMA                   87
houses but also all the adjacent land used by the
inhabitants-and where one village ends another
begins. The country is thus split up into clearly
defined areas of responsibility, and wherever stolen
cattle may happen to be at any moment, they must
be within one of these areas. Each village is interested in carrying the tracks on beyond its boundary,
and it is seldom that a cattle thief succeeds in
avoiding capture. The law operates in a similar
way in regard to fugitive criminals; and the only
condition precedent to the successful working of
the law is that accurate surveys of the country
should establish the village boundaries.
Important as the village system is as an aid to
the operation of the Criminal Law, its chief value
lies in the administrative work performed through
its agency. In each village the Government appoints a headman, whose official title is ywathugyi.
The duties of the headman are too numerous even
to be enumerated here. As the eye of the Government the headman must keep the nearest white
magistrate informed in regard to the commission of
any serious crime in his village, of the presence
of notorious receivers or vendors of stolen goods,
of the passage through his village of any person
whom he knows or reasonably suspects to be a
dacoit, robber, escaped convict, or proclaimed offender, of the likelihood of a failure of the crops,
of an unusual rainfall, of the appearance of epidemics, and so on. As the hand of the Government
the headman must search for and arrest persons




88


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


suspected of criminal offenses, resist unlawful attacks
made upon his village, keep open his communications with adjacent posts, furnish guides, supplies of food, means of transportation for police,
troops, or Government servants passing through
his village (all of which must be paid for at fixed
rates by the person making the requisition); furnish labor at a fair rate of pay for making and
repairing roads or for other public works; act as
Revenue Collector, Registrar of births and deaths
and other vital statistics, prevent or extinguish fires,
and enforce the sanitary regulations laid down by
the Government. All headmen are vested with
authority to try any person accused of assault,
petty theft, and other minor offenses, and some are
especially empowered to hear small civil suits. In
addition to the duties outlined above, a headman is
expected to perform a thousand small offices either
for the Government or for the people of his own
village.
Although the pay of a headman is very small,
the position is eagerly sought after by the better
class of natives, for here, as elsewhere in the Orient,
it is considered a great distinction to hold an appointment under the Government. Apart, however,
from the pay, and from those intangible advantages
which appertain to official rank, certain substantial
benefits fall to the lot of a headman and his family.
For instance, the sons or male heirs of village headmen may claim free education in all Government
or Municipal schools; the Government undertakes




BURMA


89


to provide for the family of any headman who loses
his life in the performance of his duties; and a
headman is entitled to hold as much as twenty-five
acres of land free of any revenue charges. For the
guidance of headmen the Government issues the
most elaborate instructions in regard to the proper
steps to be taken in various contingencies. The following extracts from the " Rules for the Defense
of Villages" afford an interesting illustration:
Rule 1. Every able-bodied male inhabitant of a village
shall provide himself with (a) a spear, or bamboo six feet
long, pointed at one end as a spear, (b) ten billets of heavy
wood each one cubit long and two and one half inches in
diameter, (c) five torches made of rag soaked in kerosene
oil and fastened to sticks pointed at one end, so as to allow
the torch being fixed easily in the ground.
Rule 6. Those parties detailed to watch the entrances to
the village shall, if the dacoits 1 have not already entered
the village, endeavor to prevent their ingress to the utmost
by hurling billets of wood at their heads and showing a
determined front to the dacoits, holding their spears at the
charge till the ywathugyi with his body of fighting men
arrives on the scene.
Rule 9. The ywathugyi should cheer his men on to the
attack and should keep beating his gong to let every one
know where he is.
Rule 13. Old men and women should be ready with
pots of water to put out fires should one break out in
the village during an attack by dacoits; no one is to run
away.
i A dacoit is a gang-robber. Dacoity in Burma, which is now
of very rare occurrence, corresponds to the ladronism of the
Philippines, as the word is now understood in Manila.




90


0 THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


Rule 14. All villagers to be told that in case they are
captured by a gang of dacoits and the villagers come to the
rescue, they must throw themselves flat on the ground to
avoid being hit by missiles flung at the dacoits.
It will be readily understood that a system of
this kind possesses many advantages in a country
where the members of the dominant race belong to
two classes only - Government servants and business men.
The number of white men in the Government
service is kept down; the natives secure a fair
share of patronage; and the Government enjoys
the confidence of all classes. Thus, although the
final control rests always in the hands of a white
man, the native is governed in all ordinary matters
by one of his own race, and the appearance of foreign domination is avoided. The excellent state of
feeling which exists between the rulers and the
ruled in Burma is due in no small degree to the
fact that the Government yields to its most humble
native official the same courtesy and respect which
it exacts on his behalf from those under his authority.
The Civil Service of Burma is part of the general
Civil Service of India, and is recruited under the
English rules. It has been conceded generally by
Imperial observers that the Indian Civil Service represents as fine a class of men as are to be found
in the whole British Empire, and that in no service
is there a higher standard of efficiency, a more unselfish devotion to duty, or a more complete freedom




BURMA                   91
from the reproach of official corruption. The great
defect in the Indian Civil Service, from the standpoint of recent criticism, is that the officials are
falling out of touch with the people because the
insatiable appetite of the secretariats for statistical
returns chains the administrators to their desks
when they should be. out in their districts. I am
inclined to the opinion that those who blame the
Indian Government for its increasing rigidity, for
its gradual sacrifice of individual contact in the
interests of mechanical precision, overlook an important element in the situation.
The declared policy of the Indian Government
is to educate the natives, to make them think for
themselves, to induce the people at large to take an
interest in the moral and material progress of their
country, to change, in fact, the Oriental disposition
in its two most rigid characteristics - the hatred of
change, and the abhorrence of civil or political responsibility. Now, whether this be a wise or a foolish
policy, it is quite clear that the individuality of the
people cannot be developed if the Government is to
retain that paternal character which it inherited
from the Company.
Under the old system the Government did the
governing, and the people, having been used to
the arrangement for thousands of years, were content that it should be so. To-day the world is full
of the idea of government for the people, by
the people, and we have done our best to fill the
Indian bazaars with the motto. But paternalism




92        THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
and democracy cannot march side by side. Under
the former dispensation it is a virtue that the
administrator should exert his personal influence to
secure the aims of the Government; under the
latter the exertion of such influence may easily
become a vice.
If it is felt that the successful administration of
Indian affairs must rest in the future (as it has in
the past) on the individual character and influence
of the British officials, the first thing to be done is
to abandon the idea of an India governed by the
popular voice; and the reestablishment of the personal relations between the people and their rulers
will follow as a natural result. But if democratic
ideals are to be followed, if the cry is to be " India
for the Indians," it is vain to regret the days when
a man could go into a district and fashion it after
his mind. If the governing is to be done by the
people themselves, the best kind of Government
official is the precise, accurate, and honest office
machine. You may have in an Oriental country
strong individuality in the Government; it is barely
conceivable that you may produce strong individuality in the people; but you cannot have both in the
same place at the same time.
No one who has had occasion to study the principles and practice of Indian administration can
have failed to observe that in regard to almost
every question, whether of policy or method, which
has come before the Indian Government, the most
conflicting views are held by those most competent




BURMA


93


to form a judgment. Frontier policy, taxation, the
employment of natives in the higher branches of
the Civil Service, famine relief, plague prevention,
municipal government, education - in fact, all matters which affect the welfare of the Indian peoples
have been so thoroughly discussed by the most able
men in India, European and native, that it has
become impossible for an outsider to express any
opinion on Indian affairs which shall not appear to
a considerable number of thoughtful people to be
ignorant, hasty, or prejudiced.
The general conditions of Burma and the isolated
position of the Province in relation to the rest of
India combine to render somewhat less difficult
than would be the case in regard to the Peninsula
the task of dealing in a short chapter with some of
the more interesting aspects of local administration;
and as Burmese affairs are generally approached
by Indian writers from the standpoint of Indian interests, the provincial point of view may be adopted
with advantage in the present essay. Although
Burma enjoys some substantial advantages from her
political and administrative subordination to India,
it is impossible for the impartial observer to satisfy
himself that the price paid is not excessive, or, indeed, that the whole connection is not anomalous.
It is true that the three Burmese wars of 1824,
1852, and 1885, which added Burma to the British
Empire, were undertaken in conformity with our
general Indian policy and were directed from Calcutta; but the same may be said of the operations




94        THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
which led to the conquest of Ceylon and to the formation of the Straits Settlements; and these two
possessions are now independent Crown Colonies,
although the former was once attached to the Presidency of Madras, and the latter was actually until
1867 a Presidency of India, taking rank with Madras
and Bombay.
That Burma should have remained under the
Indian Government, notwithstanding the precedent
afforded by the treatment of the Straits Settlements
and Ceylon, is probably due to the fortuitous circumstance that the conquest of Burma was followed
by a long period of military operations before the
final pacification of the country was achieved. The
effect of this was that the civil administration grew
up side by side with a military occupation which
could be more conveniently directed from Calcutta
than from London; and by the time the Civil Government was firmly established throughout the
Province, Burma had come to be regarded as part
of India. Beyond the obvious interest of India in
controlling the finances of the largest and richest
Province of the Indian Empire, there exists no
good reason why Burma should not be a Crown
Colony.
To deal first with the natural conditions which
seem to justify the desire, almost universally expressed in the Province, for separation from India.
Every argument which has been rightly advanced
for the welding together of the States of the Indian
Peninsula under one central Government carries




BURMA


95


with it an application per contra for the exclusion
of Burma from such a union. In the Peninsula
the problem in its broadest terms has been that
of uniting under one general rule a dense population distributed over an immense area and richly
endowed with every attribute which makes for
political and social disintegration. In no part of
the world have differences of race and religion,
operating throughout the span of human history,
produced a complexity of interests, a rivalry of
ambitions, an intensity of caste prejudice at all
comparable with those which exist in India. It is
an open question whether our rule has done anything towards modifying this class antagonism;
but it is certain that the evils which were formerly
attached to this state of things have been in a
great measure checked, and that this result has
been achieved very largely through the policy of
centralization which has placed in the hands of the
Viceroy and his advisers the power of directing
the internal affairs of India as a whole.
But to keep Burma attached to this school of
States is to misunderstand the position which the
country occupies in relation to its neighbors, to
ignore the social and religious conditions of the
Province, to add unnecessarily to the administrative
burden of the Central Government, and to make
the transaction profitable only by inflicting an obvious injustice on the people whose interests are
supposed to be well served by the political tie.
Socially, religiously, and politically Burma is the




96        THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
exact opposite of the Indian Peninsula. Of the inhabitants of the Province nearly ninety per cent.
belong to one religion (Buddhism), nearly eighty per
cent. speak one language (Burmese), and since the
time of Alung Paya (1755) the country has been
governed by one central authority. There is nothing, therefore, in the internal conditions of Burma
which demands a political connection with India;
and as a mere matter of administration it is probable that Burmese interests have suffered to a considerable extent from the fact that administrative
measures have been c passed upon " in Calcutta by
officials having no knowledge of the Burmese or
of their country.
It may be suggested that Burma would lose
rather than gain by having its affairs regulated
from London instead of from Calcutta. But it is
the very proximity of India to Burma which gives
the Indian official a false idea that he has a local
knowledge which makes him peculiarly fit to deal
with Burmese problems. Residence in India, however, implies no special familiarity with Burma;
and the difference between the Government of
India and the Colonial Office as the controlling
authority of Burma would lie in this, that the
former, from over-confidence in its opinions, is
ready to interfere with Burmese administration,
whereas the latter, conscious of its own lack of
local knowledge, would be prepared to accept the
advice of the Burmese Government in regard to
proposetl measures. If the matter be approached




BURMA


97


from the standpoint of external relations, it becomes
clear that, so far from the Indian connection being
a benefit to Burma, it is a distinct disadvantage,
since it takes the Province out of its proper political and geographical setting and attaches it artificially to India. Burma is separated from India
by the most formidable natural barriers, and,
although land communication is possible with Bengal and Assam, the sea and not the land is, and
must always remain, the highway between the
Province and the Peninsula.
As a matter of fact Burma belongs to the ChinaMalay group of States and not in any way to the
Indian system, and the future of the Province lies
in its relations with China, Siam, and the Malay
Peninsula rather than in the growth of its intercourse with India. The history of the past twenty
years shows how greatly British interests in the
western borders of the Far East have suffered
through the treatment of Burma as a province of
India. The encroachments of France in Siam and
in Southwestern China, which represent the outcome of a policy as perfectly justifiable from the
French standpoint as a policy of opposition would
have been from that of England, have been carried to a successful issue only because the Indian
Government has allowed itself to forget, in its preoccupation about trans-Indus affairs, that a strong
trans-Salween policy was called for by Imperial
interests in no degree less important than those of
the Indian Northwest.




98


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


What concerns the Province of Burma, however,
more than the political effect of her subordination
to India is the serious drain on her resources.which
is involved in the payment of a great part of her
annual public revenue into the Calcutta Treasury.
Twenty years ago this matter was hotly debated in
Burma, and the Rangoon Chamber of Commerce
passed the following resolutions:  That the
Chamber shall convey to the Local Government
an expression of its deep dissatisfaction with the
manner in which the revenue of the Province of
British Burma is appropriated. The Chamber is
of opinion that a much larger proportion of the revenue should be spent in the Province." (Meeting
of July 29, 1884.) It appears from a letter which
was addressed at this time by the Chamber to the
Chief Commissioner, and from memoranda on Public Works expenditure drawn up by Sir Charles
Crosthwaite and by Sir Charles Bernard, when, in
turn, they occupied the post of Chief Commissioner,
that Public Works in Burma were in a very backward and unsatisfactory condition, owing to the
inability of the Provincial Government to devote
a sufficient portion of the public revenue to the
carrying out of much-needed works; that only.
one district (Tharrawaddy) in the whole of British
Burma was fairly provided with roads; that at
least one district (Arakan) was practically without
roads; that Burma paid a far heavier tax per head
of her population than any other Province of the
Indian Empire; and that she yielded to the Impe



BURMA


99


rial Treasury a larger surplus per head of her population than any other Province. The attention of
the Government of India was drawn to these complaints, and a long and able reply was written by
Sir David Barbour. A careful perusal of his letters
leaves one with the impression that he made a very
clever defense of a very poor case. His arguments
were calculated to show that something had, after
all, been done for Burma, rather than to explain
why more had not been done; and his references
to the question of how far the public revenue of
Burma should be used for the general purposes
of the Government of India afforded no ground for
a hope that a greater proportion would be devoted
in future to the needs of the Province.
The Burmese war of 1885-86 diverted public
attention from these grievances; and as a considerable proportion of the cost of the campaign fell
on the Government of India, the agitation in favor
of local expenditure of local revenue lost much of
its strength. A further reason for the disappearance during some years from the field of local politics of the question of the Indian payments was
that the annexation of Upper Burma fulfilled hopes
which had been long entertained by the mercantile
community of Lower Burma, with the result that
public sentiment generally was more hopeful as to
the future of the Province. But in recent years the
matter has been taken up again. When I visited
Burma in 1903, I found that a strong feeling
existed in official as well as in unofficial circles that..:-'..




100       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
the Province was being unfairly treated in its financial relations with India, and that in separation
from the Indian Empire lay the only hope of a
proper development of the extraordinary resources
of the country.
If anything were needed to increase the public
dissatisfaction with the Provincial Settlement (the
term applied to the arrangement under which the
finances of Burma in their relation to India are
adjusted), it would be found in the method by
which the Imperial share of the revenue is assessed,
and in the fact that the Government of India will
allow no papers to be published setting forth the
grounds on which the amount of the assessment
is fixed. The assessment, instead of following the
natural line of an appropriation of a stated proportion of the total public revenue of Burma, is based
upon a division of the revenue under each separate
item into Imperial and Provincial percentages.
Thus, under the Provincial Settlement covering the
five years ended March 31, 19022 land revenue is
one third Imperial and two thirds Provincial; salt
revenue is equally divided; stamp revenue is one
fourth Imperial and three fourths Provincial; and
so on. Expenditure is treated in the same manner.
Some classes of expenditure are met entirely from
the Provincial share of the revenue; others are
divided in varying proportions between Imperial
and Provincial. The clumsiness of this arrangement
is obvious, but it is one which falls in with the
Indian system of accounting, which is probably
*i   *"~  *' *  n




BURMA


101


more complicated, and with less reason, than that
of any other modern State.
The question of Burmese relations with India is,
however, a much larger one than that of the mere
annual payment of some millions of rupees into
the Indian Treasury. That matter could be settled
without difficulty by Burma's agreeing to pay to
India, in the event of separation, a military contribution similar to that paid by the Straits Settlements and other colonies to England; and this
could be fixed at a figure which would cover all
actual expenses incurred on Burma's account by
the Indian military establishment. To any person
who has not had occasion to go over the ground,
a suggestion that Burma should be made a Crown
Colony creates a picture of the disruption of the
Indian Empire, and lays the person making it open
to the charge that he regards Burmese affairs from
the local instead of from the Imperial point of view.
If I were not convinced that British Imperial interests would be better served by the severance of
Burma from India than by the continuance of the
present tie, I should be the first person to find in
the Imperial advantage of the connection a sufficient
reason for the patient endurance by the inhabitants
of Burma of whatever evils the furtherance of a
great cause should impose on them. The fact is,
however, not only that the interests of the Indian
Empire are in no way bound up in a political connection with Burma, but that the interests of the
British Empire in the Far East have suffered greatly




102       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
in the past, and are likely to suffer still more in
the future, from the linking of Burma with India
instead of with the Malay Peninsula, to which
Burma belongs historically and geographically. If
Burma were to pass under the control of the Colonial Office, the position of England in the Far East
would be greatly strengthened. The British sphere
of influence in the territories lying between India
and China embraces the whole of Burma and the
Malay Peninsula, and British administration is today continuous from the Kachin country on the
Chino-Tibetan frontier down to Singapore, with the
exception of a few small Native States between
the most southerly point of Burma and the most
northerly point of Perak. Every interest of these
countries demands that their affairs should be directed in conformity with some definite and coherent policy; but as the responsibility is divided
between the India Office and the Colonial Office,
there has been weakness and confusion where there
should have been unity and strength. A united
Malayan Empire, comprising Burma, the Federated
Malay States, and the Straits Settlements, controlled
by one department of the Home Government and
treated as the physical base of our Far Eastern policy, would carry with it advantages which it would
be impossible to over-estimate. It would further
the development of Burma and it would relieve the
Government of India of a good deal of administrative work; but its most important effect on British
Imperial interests would be the unification and




BURMA


103


strengthening of our policy in regard to Siam and
China, by the creation of a powerful British federation along the line which divides Eastern from
Far Eastern politics.




CHAPTER VI


THE FEDERATED MALAY STATES
IT is an interesting illustration of the peculiar political character of that mass of States known as the
British Empire that in the three Protectorates which
have fallen under my observation, of which the
Federated Malay States is the third, the relations
between the sovereign and the subordinate power
differ as widely as it is possible for political relations to differ if the thread of a political connection
is to remain unbroken.
Sarawak is a British Protectorate; and in the
internal affairs of Sarawak the British Government
has absolutely no voice whatever. Except in regard
to its foreign relations that State is as independent of the British Government as the Argentine
Republic is of that of Russia.
British North Borneo is a British Protectorate;
yet the only points of internal administration in
regard to which the British Government exercises
any control are that the Governor of the territory
must be appointed with the approval of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and that laws relating to the management of the natives are subject
to the approval of the British Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs.




THE FEDERATED MALAY STATES         105
Finally, the Federated Malay States are a British
Protectorate;. and here not an officer above the
rank of a junior clerk is appointed, not a law is
passed, not a penny raised by taxation or expended
in the public service, except with the consent of the
British Colonial Secretary in Downing Street.
The origin of British rule in the Malay States is
an interesting study, because it represents territorial
acquisition (or a degree of control which in fact
amounts to that) under circumstances which have
always seemed to practical men of action to justify
the event, but which to the arm-chair traveler, to
the long-distance philanthropist, have always afforded, and still afford, material for painful sermons
on the inherent wickedness of all strong nations
and the inherent goodness and rightmindedness of
all weak native races.
It is a conflict of theories which can never be
reconciled, because one side argues from conditions
as they are and always have been, the other from
conditions as they ought to be and never have been
— in a word, from the opposite standpoints of observation and speculation.
The Federated Malay States consist of the Sultanates of Perak, Selangor, the Negri Sembilan, and
Pahang, and they form, together with the protected
State of Johore, the Hinterland of the Straits Settlements. Their present importance lies in the fact
that they furnish the world with more than two
thirds of its total tin supply. As a general indication of the rank into which they fall as part of the




106       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
British Empire it may be mentioned that their annual revenue is equal to that of Ceylon, exceeds
that of Hong Kong and the Straits Settlements
added together, and is nearly double that of the
whole of our West African Colonies. The Straits
Settlements were acquired piecemeal between 1786
and 1824, and remained under the Government of
India until 1867, when they were constituted a
Crown Colony. Before the term of the first Governor sent out by the Colonial Office expired it became clear that in order to put an end to the piracy
which had made the Straits of Malacca notorious
amongst seamen, and to protect the Settlements
from those evils which are invariably attached to
a condition of anarchy and misrule in a neighbor's
territory, some form of interference in the affairs
of the native States would have to be resorted to.
In 1873 Sir Andrew Clarke was appointed Governor of the Straits Settlements; and he carried
out with him instructions to inquire into the state
of affairs in the Malay Peninsula and to report
thereon to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
On his arrival in Singapore, however, he had to
face a situation which called for immediate action.
Trade was at a standstill, open piracy brought him
a daily record of peaceful merchants murdered
within sight of the Settlements, in the native States
the faction fights of the Chinese miners had reached
a climax in an attack upon a police station in British
territory, and public opinion was unanimous in its
demand for some decisive step which would relieve




THE FEDERATED MALAY STATES


107


the Colony from the imminent peril of the disturbances in the Peninsula spreading to the Chinese
in the Settlements.
With a true instinct of statesmanship Sir Andrew Clarke perceived that any course of action
which confined itself to the mere punishment of
the pirates and the pacification of the Chinese
miners by a demonstration of force, but which
stopped short of some substantial guarantee of
future security, would involve all the difficulties
and would yield none of the advantages which
might be expected to follow a settlement of a per.
manent nature. Whilst taking all needful measures
for the safety of the Colony and for the capture
of the pirates, he formulated a plan, in complete
defiance of such instructions as he had received,
and proceeded to carry it into immediate execution.
Instead of the report which the Colonial Office was
expecting, he forwarded a treaty with the Sultan
of Perak which inaugurated a new policy in the
Peninsula. By the Treaty of Pangkor (January 20,
1874) Sir Andrew Clarke deposed one Sultan and
placed another on the throne; he provided for the
appointment of a British Resident at the Court of
Perak and of an Assistant Resident at Larut in the
mining district; and by the tenth article - which
runs, " The collection and the control of all revenue
and the general administration of the country to
be regulated under the advice of these Residents"
- he assumed entire direction of the Government
of Perak. These proceedings received the approval




108       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
of the Colonial Office; and by the end of 1874 the
Residential System had so far progressed that, in
addition to a Resident and an Assistant Resident of
Perak, there had been appointed, by agreement
with the native rulers, a Resident and an Assistant
Resident in Selangor and an Assistant Resident in
Sungei Ujong (which now forms part of the Negri
Sembilan). But in the following year Mr. Birch,
the Resident of Perak, was murdered, under the
authority of the Sultan and with the connivance of
most of the Perak chiefs; and a punitive expedition
was sent into the country. The Colonial Office
immediately executed a complete volte-face, and Sir
Drummond Jervois, wlo had succeeded Sir Andrew
Clarke, was severely censured for having undertaken a grave departure from the declared policy
of Her Majesty's Government. But the Governor's
dispatches written in defense of his conduct show
that, as a matter of fact, he had advanced in no
important particular beyond the position which had
been assumed by Sir Andrew Clarke with the final
approval of the Imperial authorities.
The Colonial Office would listen to no excuse;
and under the pretext of bringing the Governor
back within the lines of his predecessor's policy,
new instructions were issued which entirely discredited the work of Sir Andrew Clarke and put
the relations between the Colony and the native
States for all practical purposes exactly where they
had been before that gentleman first undertook
their adjustment. These instructions were explicit.




THE FEDERATED MALAY STATES         109
The government of Perak by British officers, in
the name of the Sultan, was forbidden; the duties
of the Residents were limited to "the giving of
influential and responsible advice;" and the Resident of Perak was warned that " the Residents have
been placed in the native States as advisers, not
as rulers, and if they take upon themselves to disregard this principle they will most assuredly be held
responsible if trouble springs out of their neglect
of it." If these instructions had been strictly adhered to in practice, the Residents would have found
themselves in a position in which, whilst achieving
nothing towards the accomplishment of those administrative reforms which it was the principal
object of the British Government to secure, they
would have been called upon to suffer the indignity
of the constant and open failure of their efforts in
that direction. For even if the Sultans had been
sincerely desirous of setting their States in order
and of establishing an administrative system based
on scientific principles, the peculiar character of
the social structure rendered the task an impossible
one if the instruments for its performance were to
be sought amongst the Malays themselves.
Malay society was divided into two classes, one
containing all those who could claim to have Royal
blood in their veins, the other containing everybody
else. One class monopolized all offices under the
State and absorbed everything in the nature of
public revenue —the term being understood to
include whatever sums any one of the Royal blood




110       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
could extort upon any pretext and by what means
soever from the commonalty, even to the employment of torture. The members of this class recognized no responsibilities except to those of their
own rank; the official glance was blind to everything beneath the level of its eyes. To the other
class was given the monopoly of labor and of payment of taxes, the former always an unpaid service
when performed for the State or its officers, the
latter knowing as its only limitation the paying
capacity of the person taxed. The native rulers had
the right of compelling all female children to pass
through the Royal harem; and by force of custom,
and from the utter defenselessness of one class in
face of the other, the desire of the petty chiefs was
law throughout the Peninsula for the women folk
of the common people. Behind all this was the
system of debt-slavery under which not only a
debtor, but his wife and children to their most
remote descendants, were condemned to hopeless
bondage. In these circumstances it was clearly to
be seen that whilst on the one hand the nobles,
through whose agency alone a single reform could
be introduced under a system of mere advice, might
be expected to offer a solid opposition to any change
which would curtail their privileges, on the other
hand, no help or support could be looked for from
the mass of people in whose interest the reforms
were to be effected.
Although the States on the western side of the
Peninsula enjoyed under their native rulers a some



THE FEDERATED MALAY STATES


111


what better government than that under which those
on the eastern side suffered, yet the following description of the administration of Pahang, written
in 1888 by Mr. J. P. Rodger, C.M.G., at that time
Resident of Pahang,' serves as a graphic description of what the native States were before the
appointment of British Residents:
A system of taxation under which every necessary as
well as every luxury of life was heavily taxed; law courts
in which the procedure was the merest mockery of justice,
the decisions depending solely on the relative wealth or
influence of the litigants, and where the punishments were
utterly barbarous; a system of debt-slavery under which
not only the debtor but his wife and their most remote
descendants were condemned to hopeless bondage; an
unlimited corvee, or forced labor for indefinite periods and
entirely without remuneration; the right of the Raja to
compel all female children to pass through his harem -
such are some of the more striking examples, although the
list is by no means exhaustive, of administrative misrule in
a State within less than twenty-four hours of Singapore.
The condition of the Pahang ryot may be briefly expressed
by stating that he had practically no rights, whether of
person or property, not merely in his relations with the
Raja, but even in those with his immediate District
Chief.
With that fuller knowledge of the conditions
in the native States which followed the appointment of the Residents, a perfectly clear issue arose
for the consideration of the British Government.
1 Sir J. P. Rodger (K.C.M.G., 1904) is now Governor of the
Gold Coast Colony in West Africa.




112


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


Having discovered that the mere presence of an
advising agent at the native Courts would be
completely ineffective in so far as any substantial
reforms were concerned, or for the achievement of
those ends which the Sultans had in view when
they asked for the appointment of British Residents, two possible courses of action presented
themselves.
The British Government might have withdrawn
its Residents, on the ground that they were performing no work of permanent usefulness, and
might have accompanied this action by a warning
to the native rulers that if they did not, on their
own initiative, relieve the Straits Settlements of the
dangers incident to disorder in the Peninsula, the
British Government would step in with its own
forces, put an end to the unsatisfactory conditions,
and exact such guarantees for the future as might
appear necessary.
The alternative was to extend gradually the
powers of the Residents, to increase the European
staff, and, while interfering as little as possible with
the social customs of the people, and not at all with
their religious affairs, to secure step by step the
complete control of the Administration.
Of these two policies the British Government
wisely adopted the latter. It has been carried out
with infinite skill and tact, and with results, as will
be shown later, which place the work done by the
British in the Malay Peninsula on a level with
the finest achievements of a race which has had




THE FEDERATED MALAY STATES


113


a greater and wider success than any other in the
field of colonial administration.
The work of reducing the Malay States to some
kind of order, of establishing a proper judicial system, and of initiating a policy which should open
up the country and afford that protection to life
and property which capital demands as a condition
precedent to its employment on a large scale, was
carried out principally under the advice and guidance of Sir Hugh Low, who was Resident of Perak
from 1877 to 1889. But already in these years the
man whose brilliant abilities and dominating personality were destined to carry the Malay States to
the high level of prosperity and good government
which they enjoy to-day was exerting a marked
influence on the Administration. One of the earlier
appointments in the Peninsula had been that of
Mr. (now Sir) Frank Swettenham to the Assistant
Residentship of Selangor. His rise in the service
to Resident of Selangor in 1882, to Resident of
Perak in 1889, to Resident-General in 1896,/.o
Governor of the Straits Settlements and  iigh
Commissioner of the Federated Malay S' ces in
1901, covers the whole period of the successful
accomplishment of those social and administrative
changes which have placed the Malay States on a
footing of equality with the best governed portions
of the world. By the year 1884 slavery had been
abolished throughout British Malaya; in 1888
Pahang, the largest State in the Federation, accepted a British Resident; in 1895 the small States




114       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
forming the Negri Sembilan were placed under one
native ruler; and in the following year the four
States - Perak, Selangor, the Negri Sembilan, and
Pahang - were combined in a Federation for the
purpose of mutual assistance, continuity of policy,
and uniformity of administrative methods. In
these proceedings Sir Frank Swettenham played the
most important pait. His perfect command of
the Malay language, his unrivaled knowledge of the
Malay character, and his rare talent for moulding
men and measures to his purpose fitted him in
the highest degree for the delicate task of reconciling conflicting interests and soothing petty
jealousies, and enabled him, whilst avoiding the
appearance of giving undue support to any of
the actors in the drama of dangerous rivalries in
which he found himself playing the leading role,
to gain by means of unimportant concessions everything which was really essential to the success of
his plans.
I regret that considerations of space forbid me
to enlarge upon the work of the Residents; for,
whatever may have been the benefits which have
resulted from the masterly handling of questions
of policy and principle by Sir Frank Swettenham,
no success could have been achieved unless he had
been backed up by the silent, ungrudging, persistent
toil of those into whose hands he committed the
execution of his plans. It is this kind of work,
which goes on steadily year after year, receiving
no support from public applause and very little as




THE FEDERATED MALAY STATES        115
a rule from official approval, that really deserves
our highest praise and sympathy.
The position of the Federated Malay States is
rendered peculiar from two circumstances-one
that the greater part of the world's tin supply is
drawn from these States, the other that the native
Malay population absolutely refuses to perform
manual labor under any conditions whatever.
In 1901, out of a total export trade valued at
$71,350,000, tin represented $61,689,000, or more
than eighty-six per cent. of the whole.
The total revenue of the States in the same year
amounted to $20,550,000. If from this sum we
deduct such items as railway, postal, and telegraph
receipts, fines and fees of court, reimbursements,
interest on State bank balances, land sales, and fees
of office, we get down to a revenue from taxation
proper of $16,500,000. Of this sum, tin, produced
entirely by Chinese miners, paid as export duty
$8,439,000; and the opium, spirit, and gambling
licenses realized $3,726,000, of which sum fully
ninety-five per cent. was eventually paid by the
Chinese miners.
So we find in the Federated Malay States this
extraordinary condition of affairs, that out of a total
revenue from taxation of $16,500,000, raised in
a Malay country, $12,000,000, or nearly seventyfour per cent., is secured from the industry of
Chinese immigrants and from their vices.
As far as my own observation extends, I should
say that the Malay of the Peninsula is the most




116


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


steadfast loafer on the face of the earth. His characteristics in this respect have been recognized by
every one who has come in contact with him. He
will work neither for himself, for the Government,
nor for private employers. He builds himself a
house of bamboo and attaps, plants enough rice to
fill out the menu which stream and forest afford
him, and for nine tenths of his waking hours, year
in and year out, he sits on a wooden bench in the
shade and watches the Chinaman and the Tamil
build roads and railways, work the mines, cultivate the soil, raise cattle, and pay the taxes. As
all his desires are completely satisfied by this kind
of life, you can make no appeal to him for industry.
The Resident-General, in his annual report for
1901, says: "The Government, with a system of
taxation which barely touches the Malay, raises
a large revenue and incurs a large expenditure in
developing the resources of the country by means
of roads, railways, irrigation works, and so forth.
But the labor force engaged in their execution is
supplied almost entirely by foreign coolies under
the superintendence of foreign engineers and
superintendents. The Malay, with his rooted disinclination to steady work of any kind, will neither
give his work to the Government undertakings,
nor to mines or plantations. It is difficult even to
induce him to serve as a policeman. With the
advantage of a splendid climate the natives might
grow rice and rear stock for the ready market




THE FEDERATED MALAY STATES        117
provided by the Chinese miners; but this they
have failed to do, and a large part of the fishing
industry even is in the hands of the Chinese.
Domestic servants, washermen, messengers, gardeners, and grooms are foreigners."
What a picture of a people! Too lazy to be
policemen - too lazy to fish!
The Federated Malay States have not been exempt from the operation of that economic law which
decrees that when in any country which contains
economic supplies of which the world stands in need,
and the working of which will afford a reasonable
profit to capital, the natives refuse to work, a flow
of immigration will set in composed of persons of
alien races who are willing, for a fair wage, to bring
to the aid of Nature the industry of man.
Taking the figures of the Census of 1901, and
omitting from our calculation the State of Pahang
(the economic development of which has only just
commenced), we find that the three remaining States
of the Federation had a population of 570,454
exclusive of floating population and prisoners, and
that of this total 61 per cent. were foreign immigrants, chiefly Chinese, and only 39 per cent. were
Malays.
The lesson contained in these figures is too obvious to require comment.
In like circumstances, a Government will always
be faced with the labor problem, and it admits of
only three solutions. If the natives refuse to work,
as they have refused in all times in every tropical




118


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


country the development of which has been undertaken by Europeans or Americans, the first alternative is to abandon the country and thus rob the
world of that economic contribution which it has
a right to expect from every territory which Nature
has endowed with economic resources; the next is
to adopt the method which made Java the most
flourishing of all tropical colonies, that is to say,
force the natives to work by prescribing a certain
number of days of labor in the year for each native
and visiting a default with severe penalties; and
the final alternative is to leave the native alone
and bring in outsiders who will do the work.l
Passing now to the system of administration in
the Federated Malay States, we find conditions not
differing greatly from those which exist in a British
Crown Colony. Each State is governed by a State
Council composed of the Sultan, the British Resident, the Secretary to the Resident, a number of
Malay chiefs, and one or more prominent Chinamen to represent the interests of the Chinese community.
As the members of the Council hold their seats
by appointment and not by election, and as no law
is submitted to the Council for enactment until it
has been approved by the High Commissioner (a
position which attaches to that of Governor of the
Straits Settlements) and by the British Secretary of
State for the Colonies, it is evident that there is
1 The labor problem in the Malay Peninsula is discussed at
some length in the next chapter.




THE FEDERATED MALAY STATES          119
here no greater independence of legislation than is
enjoyed in a Crown Colony.1
The existence of the Resident-General and the
Federal officers is an advantage which the Crown 
Colonies do not possess. The Federal Establishment
consists of a Resident-General, a Federal Secretary,
a Judicial Commissioner, a Legal Adviser, a Commandant of the Military Forces, a Commissioner
of Lands and Mines, a Director of Public Works,
a Commissioner of Police, a General Manager of
Railways, a Secretary for Chinese Affairs, an Inspector of Prisons, an Inspector of Schools, and
a Government Pathologist.
The Resident-General is really an Executive
Council of One, and he is also the official adviser 
to the High Commissioner. Most of the other
members of the Federal Staff, in addition to the
performance of their specific duties in connection
with strictly Federal work, act as advisers in their
several departments to the officers in the service
of the separate States.
Not the least important result of the appointment of the Federal Staff has been the gradual
introduction of that uniformity of administrative
methods and that continuity of policy without
which Federation would have failed of half its usefulness.
At the present time the administrative force of
the Federated Malay States is recruited under the
1 For a description of Crown Colony Government, see Chapter II, pp. 18-24.




120


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


cadet system, the examination, which is identical
with that for the Indian Civil Service, being held
in London each year. But in the early days a Civil 
Service had to be created in block; and I may say,
with no disparagement of the cadets, who after
a few years' training, make excellent officials, that
no one could visit the States to-day without being
struck by the remarkably high character of that
section of the Civil Service which was recruited
by selection before the introduction of the cadet
system. In no part of the world with which I am
familiar have I seen men more devoted to their
work, more closely identified with the success of
the administration, or more keenly interested in
everything which relates to the progress and development of the States in whose service they are
laboring.
And what has British rule achieved for the Malay
States? It has given the native security of life
and property; it has abolished slavery and the exaction of unpaid labor; it has established permanent
land titles; it has provided free education and free
hospital treatment and medicine for all; it has
exterminated piracy; it has put an end to the recurrent scourges of smallpox and cholera; it has
constructed over a thousand miles of metaled road;
it has built out of current revenue three hundred
miles of railway  which carried nearly four million
1 The sum expended on the construction and equipment of
the Federated Malay States Railways up to and including 1902
was about $23,000,000 (silver).




THE FEDERATED MALAY STATES        121
passengers in 1902, and earned in ten years a net
revenue of over seven million dollars; it has, perhaps unwisely, left the native practically untaxed;
it has afforded ample opportunity to the Malay of
entering the Government service and of acquiring
wealth by the exercise of ordinary industry; it has
raised the revenue of the States from $400,000 in
1875 to $22,500,000 in 1902; it has in the same
time increased the foreign trade of the States from
$1,500,000 to $127,000,000; it has kept the
peace and maintained the law.




CHAPTER VII


THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS
THE last day of the sixteenth century saw the incorporation of the English East India Company,
and two years later its great Dutch rival was established. For the next two hundred years the history
of Southeastern Asia is filled with the incidents of
a great struggle between the Dutch and the English for the mastery of the Malay seas; and it was
not until the beginning of the nineteenth century
that the withdrawal of England from Java and
Sumatra and the cession of Malacca by Holland
laid down the definite principle of British supremacy in the Peninsula and Dutch supremacy in the
Archipelago.
The past century has produced no material
change in the relative positions of the two Powers,
and each has occupied itself with the peaceful
development of its own territory. Not the least
interesting feature of the results which have been
obtained is the spectacle which is afforded of brilliant success attending two policies diametrically
opposed to each other in every detail of principle
and application.
As the Dutch work in Java will be the subject
of separate treatment, it is sufficient to point out




THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS


123


at present that the keynote of the Dutch policy
was monopoly and exclusion, that of the English
policy free trade and free immigration, and that
while the former has given Holland one of the
finest agricultural colonies in the world, the latter
has added to the British Empire one of its greatest
trade depots.
The Straits Settlements consist of the Islands
of Penang and Singapore, Province Wellesley, the
territory of Malacca, and a few small islands, and
they lie on the eastern shore of the Straits of
Malacca, the great highway for all ships seeking
the Far East by an easterly course. The strategic
importance of the Colony will be recognized at
once by any one glancing at a map of the world.
It is seen that the Indian Ocean is divided from
the China Sea and the Pacific by the Malay Peninsula, and by that garland of isles which swings
from Sumatra to Port Darwin in northern Australia.
If, coming from the west, you wish to reach any
port above the equator and beyond the one hundredth degree of east longitude, you must pass
through the Straits of Malacca or take a thousandmile detour to make the passage of the Straits of
Sunda, which separate Sumatra from Java.
Some idea of the magnitude of the stream of
commerce which flows through the ports of the
Straits Settlements may be gathered from the fact
that there entered and cleared in the Colony during
1902 more than fifty thousand vessels, of a total
burden of seventeen millions of tons.




124       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
Within a thousand-mile radius of Singapore, the
capital of the Straits Settlements, lie the whole of
the Malay Peninsula, Siam, the southern provinces
of French Indo-China, Borneo, Sumatra, Java,
Celebes, and the lesser islands of the Archipelago.
For this immense area Singapore is the trade centre;
and the importance of this commerce may be
gauged by the fact that the value of the imports
and exports of the Colony reached in 1902 a sum
of ~62,000,000, an amount greatly in excess of the
total value of imports into the whole of our American and West Indian colonies, including Canada,
in the same year.
The administrative system of the Straits Settlements presents nothing of distinctive interest to the
student of political science. It is a Crown Colony
government of the ordinary type, and as such its
chief claim to notice is that in the thirty-five years of
its subordination to the Colonial Office it has escaped
the gubernatorial inflictions with which some of our
Colonies - Barbados, Trinidad, Mauritius, and
Hong Kong, for example - have been visited from
time to time. But what the system itself lacks in
point of special interest may be found in a consideration of some of the administrative problems with
which the local Government has been confronted.
The question of currency reform and labor
supply have presented elements of peculiar difficulty, and a discussion of them falls naturally into
place in the present volume, since the former constitutes a serious factor in the financial policy of




THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS


125


every colony having a detached monetary system,
and the latter represents the most vital economic
problem common to all tropical and sub-tropical
countries, whether they are politically dependent or
independent.
The fall in the rate of exchange of silver as compared with gold, a phenomenon due to causes
entirely beyond the control or prevision of the
Straits Government, has reduced the gold value of
the local silver dollar from about 3s. 9d. in 1882
to Is. 7d. in 1902. This downward movement of
exchange has been continuous over a number of
years, but it has been subject to violent fluctuations
from day to day; and in discussing the general
effects of a declining and unstable currency emphasis must be laid on the fact that the different
economic interests of the Colony have been very
differently affected according to whether the controlling factor for any particular interest has been
the absolute decline in the value of the dollar or
the fluctuation in its value from day to day, the
latter condition operating within the sphere of the
falling gold value of silver, and with such force
that a loss due to the general movement of silver
over a considerable period might, under certain conditions, be counteracted by successful speculation
on the daily rate of exchange. For instance, the
banks have benefited greatly from the element of
daily fluctuation, and the merchants have suffered
greatly from the same cause, because the former
with their special facilities of information have been




126


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


able to speculate more successfully on the rise and
fall of the dollar than the latter, and for the reason
that from the magnitude of their capital they have
been better able than the merchants to accept risks
and.to sustain losses. In the mutual relations between the banks and the merchants two important
factors give the former a great advantage in all
transactions based on a fluctuating currency - one
is that, the rate of exchange being much more
sensitive than the price of merchandise, those who
deal in money alone carry their risks for a shorter
period and can effect adjustments much more frequently than those who deal in merchandise as well;
and the other is that in exchange operations, the
necessities of the merchants being always more
urgent than the necessities of the banks, the latter
are in a better position than the former to resist,
within certain limits, a rising market when they
are purchasing and a falling market when they are
selling.
It is more difficult to trace the precise effect
on the mercantile interests of the Colony of the
simple decline in the gold value of the local dollar,
considered apart from the question of daily fluctuation. The mercantile community of the Straits
Settlements may be divided into two classes, one
containing the great wholesale houses, which conduct both an export and an import business; the
other containing the retailers, chiefly Chinese, who
may be regarded as the agents for the purchase
and sale of that portion of the imports which is




THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS


127


retained for home consumption and of that portion of local products which is not required for
export. The division is imperfect because the two
classes are not mutually exclusive, and for other
reasons, but it is accurate enough to serve as the
basis of some general considerations. The trade returns of the Colony for 1902 show that the import
trade was evenly divided between gold-standard
and silver-standard countries - $156,379,000 from
the former and $154,731,000 from the latter —
but that the value of exports to gold countries
was nearly three times as great as that of exports
to silver countries - $210,000,000 to the former
and only $72,000,000 to the latter. Under these
circumstances it may be assumed that as the wholesale traders of the Colony paid out on a gold
basis $155,000,000 for their imports, and received
$210,000,000 on a gold basis in return for their
exports, the fall in the dollar, in so far as it had
a direct effect on the transit trade, yielded to the
merchants a profit on the larger sum as against
a loss on the smaller; in other words, the falling
dollar has injured the merchant as an importer
from, and has benefited him as an exporter to, gold
countries. Turning now to the retail traders, it
seems probable that they have gained more from the
fluctuation in the dollar than they have lost from
the fall in its value. In regard to most commodities,
except such as have a well-known and customary
price, the dealers have generally been able to raise
the retail price, in sympathy with a rise in the




128       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
wholesale price, and they have always done so when
they have found it possible, whereas they have
never lowered their prices until competition has
compelled them to do so.
To sum up the situation as affecting the mercantile interests of the Colony, it may be said that the
only undoubted gainers from a fluctuating dollar
have been the bankers, and in a very small way the
retail dealers; that whatever advantages the merchants may have been able in special instances to
secure from this cause have been more than offset
by the uncertainty which it has introduced into all
commercial transactions, by the growth of speculative business, and by the discouragement which the
risks of a fluctuating currency offer to the investment of capital; and that in the great majority of
cases the fluctuation in the dollar has made it more
difficult and more expensive for the merchants to
finance their operations. On the other hand, part
of what the merchants have gained as exporters to
gold countries, from the fall of the dollar, they have
lost as importers from gold countries; and there
is no reliable evidence that a low dollar has greatly
stimulated the trade between silver countries.
If we approach the question from the standpoint
of the interests of the producers and the consumers, we find that what has been a benefit to
the former has been a serious source of loss to the
latter. As far as the producers of the Colony are
concerned (and we may properly include those of
the Federated Malay States), the fall in the value




THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS


129


of the dollar has been a distinct temporary advantage, for nearly the whole export of local produce
goes to gold countries, and in consequence the producers receive to-day more dollars for any given
quantity of their produce than they would have
done ten or twenty years ago if sold at the same
sterling market price. The advantage has accrued,
however, from several contributing causes. In regard to tin, which is by far the most important
local product, one effect of the low dollar has been
this, that, as the wages of the laborers have not
risen as fast as the value of the dollar has declined.
the dollar profits on the sale of tin have increased,
and another, which has had a very important bearing
on the prosperity of the tin-miners, is that, as the
cost of production has been lowered, in relation to
the sterling price of tin, by the relatively smaller
proportion of the total receipts which has been paid
out as wages, the mine-owners have been placed
in a more advantageous position than formerly in
regard to the competition of Cornwall and Australia. It must be noted, however, that the price
of tin is fixed in Europe and America, and, whether
resting for the moment on speculative operations
or on the usual basis of supply and demand, is
entirely independent of the rise or fall in the local
dollar. It is clear that the increased production of
tin which has followed the increased profits due to
a falling dollar has done much to bring the supply
of tin nearer to the point of demand, and that a
fall in price may occur which will more than offset




130       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
in the future such advantages as have arisen in the
past from the high price of tin and the low rate of
exchange. The same may be said of all local produce - namely, that a temporary advantage has
been reaped from the fall in the dollar, but that
in the long run the uncertainty of dollar prices and
the tendency to overproduction more than counterbalance the profits from this cause.
As far as the community at large is concerned,
regarded as a composite whole made up of individual consumers, the fall in the dollar has been
entirely a loss, and in many cases a very serious
loss. The day laborer and the salaried employee
have both suffered, but the hardship has been
greatest for the latter class, since it includes the
chief consumers of imported goods. It is no exaggeration to say that for the salaried employee, European, Chinese, or Eurasian, the cost of living has
doubled during the past twenty years, and that, after
long service, a large number of persons find themselves, despite the normal increases in their salaries,
in a worse financial position than they were at the
time they took up their work in the Colony. So
great has been the distress from this cause that the
better class of employers have placed some portion
at least of the salaries of their servants on a sterling
basis. But, notwithstanding this, the salaried employees have suffered seriously, both from the decreased purchasing power of the dollar and from
the depreciated value of their savings.
The advisability of a reform in the currency of




THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS


131


the Colony has been discussed from time to time
during the past ten years, and early in 1903 the
question was investigated by a committee, of which
Sir David Barbour, one of the most eminent authorities on finance, was the chairman. After collecting a great deal of evidence the committee
reported in favor of the adoption of a gold standard by the Straits Settlements, the Federated Malay
States, and Johore, but refrained from making any
suggestion as to the value at which the new dollar
should be fixed. Steps are being taken to carry out
the recommendation of the committee; and the
change from a silver standard to a gold standard
is being accomplished by the introduction of a new
dollar, which the local Governments will undertake
to maintain at a fixed ratio to the British sovereign
and by the demonetization of the British and Mexican dollars now in circulation.
In face of a conflict of interests such as exists
in the Colony between the banks and the merchants, the producers and the consumers, and between the trade with gold countries and the trade
with silver countries, it is of course impossible to
effect a serious change in the monetary system without inflicting at least a temporary loss upon some
one; and the matter resolves itself, therefore, into
a question of the degree of advantage or disadvantage to be anticipated from the altered conditions.
Viewed in this light there is no doubt that the balance of advantage will rest with the larger interests
of the Colony. The element of speculation which




132


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


hitherto has affected the trade with gold countries
will be transferred to the trade with silver countries - that is to say, from the larger trade to the
smaller. The advantages which the banks have
reaped from fluctuations in exchange will be taken
from them, and the disadvantages which fell from
the same cause to the lot of the merchants will be
removed. But as the capital of the banks is small
when compared with the total capital invested in
the businesses of the merchants, it is again the
larger interest which will be benefited.
Finally, the general interests of the Colony as
represented by the Government and the Muncipalities will be well served by the introduction of the
gold standard, on the one hand, because these
bodies have heavy gold obligations to discharge
for salaries of officials and the payment of pensions, and, on the other hand, because the large
Government and municipal loans which it may be
necessary to raise from time to time can be floated
on a gold basis at a low rate of interest without
the fear, which would always exist under a silver
standard, that a fall in exchange might increase
the liabilities in regard to payment of interest and
repayment of capital.
One of the most important Bills laid before the
Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements during 1903 was the Immigration Amendment Ordinance, which it is hoped will so stimulate Indian
immigration as to relieve the Government and the
planters from the difficulties into which they have




THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS


133


fallen through the scarcity of labor. Before passing
to a consideration of the local aspects of the labor
question it is necessary to sketch briefly the general outlines of existing labor conditions in tropical countries, since there is no subject, outside the
domain of theology, which has given birth to such
an enormous controversial literature as have the
rights and wrongs of tropical labor. Since the
abolition of slavery the constant efforts of tropical
employers to secure satisfactory labor conditions
have proved that, except in those countries in which
there exists a pressure of population, the natives
of the tropics will not lend themselves to steady
labor of any kind, and that the effect of increasing wages is to reduce, and not to augment, the
local labor supply. If we exclude India, Java,
Barbados, Cuba, Porto Rico, and a few unimportant
islands, the tropics may be described as an immense
forest in which the population is so small in relation to the area and natural resources of the land
that there exists no necessity for any native to work
for hire. Up to the point when he wishes to gratify some acquired taste in food, drink, or clothing
the tropical man is furnished by the sea, the rivers,
and the jungle with everything he needs at a very
small expenditure of energy - usually his wife's.
If we grant for the moment that under these circumstances the tropical man has a perfect right to
live a life of idleness, even if we join ourselves
with that section of the British and American public which is constantly applauding his exercise of


<?




134


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


the right, as though it were a crowning virtue in
him, we cannot close our minds against the fact
that the sloth and indolence of the tropical races
have yielded an abundant harvest of political and
economic consequences. In regard to the former
it is sufficient to point out that every tropical country of any present importance is under the control
of men with European or North American blood
in their veins.
The circumstance which instantly attracts our
attention when making a survey of the tropics from
the economic standpoint is that only in those countries which are colonies or dependencies of the
Great Powers does there exist a condition of development bearing any appreciable relation to the resources of the land. Thus the independent States
of tropical America and the kingdoms of Siam and
Abyssinia -which are the only parts of the tropics
which are not colonial dependencies- are practically unreclaimed spaces, slightly chipped at the
edges by coffee or rubber estates or by timber concessions. An examination of the economic position
of all tropical colonies reveals a fact of the highest
importance in regard to the labor conditions of
those countries -namely, that, with the exception
of Java, Barbados, Porto Rico, Cuba, and India,
where there is a pressure of population, there is not
a single tropical colony of any commercial importance in which the work is not being done by imported laborers. In order to make this point quite
clear I give a list of the colonies and protectorates




THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS


1t35


where the labor supply consists wholly or partially
of imported Chinese or East Indians: British
Guiana, Trinidad, Mauritius, Fiji, Ceylon, the
Straits Settlements, the Federated Malay States,
British North Borneo, Jamaica, Sarawak, Sumatra,
the British South African Colonies and to these
we may add Queensland, which gets its labor from
the Pacific Islands; New Caledonia, which imports
Annamites; and French Indo-China, with its
Chinese labor. There remain the Colonies in Equatorial Africa, Dutch and French Guiana, New
Guinea, the Philippines, and a few unimportant
islands here and there, and there does not exist
amongst them one of which it can be said that in
relation to the capabilities of the land economic
development has really commenced. The following
figures illustrate the degree of economic progress
which has been reached in the various countries to
which reference has been made. Of the independent
tropical States, Brazil exports per head of her population produce to the annual value of ~1 10s.;
Venezuela, ~1 15s.; Guatemala, 15s.; Siam, 10s.;
of the colonies in which there is a pressure of population, Java exports per head of her population
10s.; Porto Rico, ~1 15s.; Barbados, ~4 15s.;
and of the Colonies employing imported labor,
Hawaii exports ~26 per head; Queensland, ~18;
the Federated Malay States, ~8 10s.; Trinidad,
~8 10s.; Mauritius, ~8; British Guiana, ~6; and
Fiji, ~4 10s. The average for the seven countries
not employing imported labor is ~1 13s. per head;




136


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


of those employing imported labor, ~11 7s. per
head. I do not claim for these figures that they
are more than approximately accurate; but the
differences which they disclose are far too great to
be materially affected by the small factor of error
due to insufficient or faulty returns of trade and
population. In order to emphasize the significance
of these figures, it may be noted that the value of
exports, which gives no trustworthy measure of the
economic development of non-tropical countries,
affords a fairly accurate indication of the industry
of tropical races. The altered application lies inthis, that in countries where the standard of living
is very high the trade of the home market is infinitely greater than the export trade, whereas, in
countries with a very low standard of living the
conditions are reversed.
It is clear from what has gone before that, with
the few exceptions named, there is not a single
tropical country which possesses a local labor supply sufficient, under existing labor laws, to carry
on the work of economic development; that only
those countries which import labor from outside the
tropics or from densely populated tropical countries
have made any appreciable progress in agricultural
or other industries; and that, broadly speaking,
the work of the tropics is being done to-day by the
Chinaman, who is a non-tropical man, and by the
natives of British India, both races being driven
to the task by the severe economic pressure which
exists in their respective countries. Up to the pre



THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS         137
sent time it has been found that where education,
other than industrial or technical, has been most
liberally provided, the natives do the least work,.
and that when wages are doubled the few local
laborers adjust themselves to the new conditions
by working half-time.
The census of 1901 shows that there are in the
Straits Settlements more than 200,000 Chinese and
more than 50,000 East Indian immigrants resident
in the Colony as laborers. Little need be said of
the Chinese. They flock readily to any country
where work may be had at fair wages; they will
submit to any sanitary regulations which the Government cares to enforce; and they are as a rule
peaceful and law-abiding. All they ask is that in
their leisure hours they may be allowed to gamble
and smoke opium. There has probably never been
a Chinese riot in any European Colony unless a fall
in wages, a rise in opium, or the introduction of
new gambling laws has interfered with the full
enjoyment of the two Chinese recreations. The
importation of natives of India into the Straits
Settlements has a curious legislative history. In a
Colony which has been provided with Governors of
exceptional ability, and which has always enjoyed
the advantage of an efficient and conscientious
Civil Service, the very excellence of the general
administration throws into sharp relief the unsatisfactory treatment which the labor question has
received at the hands of the Government. Beginning with Ordinance 9 of 1875, there were passed




138       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
in the course of fifteen months four Immigration
Acts, each repealing its predecessor. Another Bill
was introduced in 1881, but did not reach a second
reading, another in 1882, another in 1884, another
in 1889, another in 1892, another in 1897, another in 1899, and finally there is the Bill now
in operation. All this legislation has been marked
not only by an entire absence of definite aim on
the part of the Government, but, as far as the last
three Bills are concerned, by an unaccountable failure to adopt any of the more important recommendations of the Labor Commission of 1890,
which presented a report of exceptional interest
and value, recommendations which were in the
main supported by the Labor Commission of 1896.
The necessity for special labor legislation in
the Straits Settlements has arisen from the simple
cause that the local labor supply is entirely inadequate for the purposes of agriculture and for the
service of the public works of the Government and
of the Municipalities. The chief importers of Indian
labor have been the planters, and their dissatisfaction with past conditions has rested on two grounds
— first, that the supply has been insufficient, and,
secondly, that under the existing labor laws they
have been unjustly deprived of their laborers, who
have been taken from them either by the planters
of the Malay States, by the Governments of the
Settlements and the States, or by the Government
and Municipal contractors.
The question of initial supply is almost entirely




THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS          139
one of the system of recruiting and of the rate of
wages offered; and it is generally admitted that the
former is extremely unsatisfactory and that the latter
is too low in face of the rates paid in Ceylon and
Burma, both of which countries draw their labor
from India. But the fact is that a supply of labor
which would be amply sufficient under a proper
system of regulation after arrival would prove inadequate under the conditions which have hitherto
prevailed. The new law provides for a considerable
increase in the minimum legal wage of contract
laborers, and the business of recruiting is handed
over to a commercial company in Southern India on
certain fixed terms and subject to the inspection of
an official of the Straits Government, who will reside
in India for six months each year. It is difficult to
believe that a permanent solution of the recruiting
problem will be found along these lines. As long as
the supply of coolies is a matter of commercial speculation it is certain that abuses will arise in the
methods of recruiting; and further, when a number
of employers are competing in the same market
a commercial company will always take advantage
of the competition thus created to advance its own
interests at the expense of its clients. The probabilities are that sooner or later the Governments of
the Straits Settlements and the Malay States will
find it necessary to adopt the system of recruiting which is used with the most satisfactory results, by Trinidad and British Guiana. The Governments of those Colonies maintain an Emigration




140


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


Department in India under the control of an official whose duties are confined to the securing
and forwarding of laborers. The Colonial Government makes all the arrangements and pays all the
expenses up to the time when the laborers are
handed over to the planter, and it secures itself
against loss by making the repayment of immigration charges the first obligation on the planter's
assets.
Most of the planters in the Straits Settlements
and the Federated Malay States have had their
training in British Guiana or in Ceylon, and in
consequence the conditions under which the Indian
labor is imported into the Malay Peninsula resemble
those prevailing in one or the other of those
colonies.
In British Guiana the system is one of indenture.
There is a definite contract between the planter
and each coolie, and the law sees that each party
fulfills its obligations towards the other. It is a system with which I am familiar from personal observation, and I have described it in detail elsewhere.'
It has worked excellently, but against the great
advantages which it affords to the planter, to the
coolie, and to the Colony generally, there must be
set the considerable expense involved in its maintenance. The coolie lands in British Guiana under
a contract, signed before his departure from India,
to labor for a fixed period, and on arrival in the
Colony he is simply handed over by the Govern1 Tropical Colonization, Chapter v.




THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS


141


ment to his employer. The latter is protected
against the loss of his coolie's labor by a provision
in the law which imposes a fine of forty-eight gold
dollars on any person who attempts to engage
another man's coolie, and an additional fine of two
dollars a day in respect of any success which may
have attended his efforts.
In the Straits Settlements the coolie is imported
at the expense of the planter, under a promise that
on arrival in the Colony he will enter into a labor
contract. It is true that if he refuses to keep his
promise he renders himself liable to fine or imprisonment; but to secure a conviction under the law
requires time and expense, and at the end the
planter is left without his laborer. Provision is
made for the punishment of coolies who desert
from an estate when under contract to remain on
it, but the penalties fall entirely on the coolie and
leave untouched any person who may have enticed
him away. It is clear, therefore, that, whereas in
British Guiana the planter incurs no expense until
the coolie is actually on his estate under contract,
the planter of the Straits may go to the trouble
and cost of importing a coolie and may then fail
to secure his labor. Moreover, under the British
Guiana law the penalty for employing another
man's coolie is heavy enough to operate as a complete check, whilst in the Straits no such security
is afforded to the employer. It is perhaps superfluous to add that in the Straits, as in Guiana, the
interests of the coolies are carefully safeguarded




142       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
by the Government, and that they are effectively
protected against ill treatment at the hands of
their employers.
The other system under which Indian labor is
imported into the Malay Peninsula is moulded on
that in force in Ceylon. Its chief characteristic is
that the planter deals with a native " kangani," or
recruiter and headman, and has no contract under
the Immigration Ordinance with the individual
coolie. A kangani is sent over to India with instructions to recruit a certain number of laborers,
the planter making the necessary money advances.
On his return the kangani and his gang are employed by the planter on such terms as may be
arranged between them. It is a system of " free"
labor as opposed to one of " contract" labor; and
the protection of the coolie, instead of resting, as
it does under the Immigration Ordinance, in the
special inspection and control of the Government,
lies in the fact that no kangani or planter can
afford to be unpopular either in the Colony or on
the recruiting ground when a keen competition
amongst employers affords the coolie an ample
latitude of choice.
As far as I could gather from conversations with
employers of labor in the Colony and in the native
States, a good deal of dissatisfaction still exists in
regard to the local labor conditions. There seems
to be a general feeling that if the Government
undertook to import all the labor it needed
for Public Works and ceased to compete with the




THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS


143


planters in the open labor market the latter would
be quite content to make their own arrangements
for the importation of such labor as they might
require, without the concurrence of the Government.
In concluding this chapter I cannot refrain from
making some reference to the controversial aspects
of the labor problem in the tropics. Both in England and America there exists a considerable body
of opinion which is opposed to the employment of
contract labor in the tropics. The chief argument
advanced is that there is no need for it, since the
natives can be educated to understand the dignity
of labor, or, failing that, can be taught new wants,
the gratification of which will call for steady work.
When it is pointed out that universal experience has
proved the utter falsity of these conclusions, recourse is had to the old cry that "contract labor"
is simply a polite name for "slavery." I am not
concerned to deny that under a weak Government,
or where there is not a conscientious Civil Service,
contract labor may, by the existence of abuses,
bear some resemblance to slavery; what'I wish to
maintain is that where there exist a strong Government, a good Immigration Law, and an efficient
staff for the enforcement of its provisions, the contract laborer is more secure in the enjoyment of
all his rights and privileges than he would be if he
had not voluntarily entered into an agreement with
an employer. Perhaps the most violent attack which
has ever been made on the contract labor system
was that undertaken by Sir George William Des




144       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
Vceux when he was a magistrate in British Guiana.
It resulted in the appointment of a Commission of
Inquiry; and if any one is interested to observe
how the most explicit and detailed assault to which
the system of contract labor in the tropics has
been subjected ended in an utter failure to substantiate any of the serious charges laid at the door
of the planters, the magistrates, and the Government officials, I commend to him the report of the
Des Vceux Commission of 1870, which contains
some 1600 pages of evidence on this very important subject.




CHAPTER mII


FRENCH INDO-CHINA
AT the beginning of the nineteenth century France
had already been engaged for more than two hundred years in colonial enterprises.
In the Old World the genius of Dupleix and
the bravery of the great Admiral Suffren had all
but given her India; and in the New World that
immense territory lying east of a line dropped from
Hudson's Bay to the mouth of the Mississippi
would have been hers if the efforts of Champlain
and D'Iberville had received adequate support from
Paris.
East and West, however, the story was one of
grand achievement almost achieved, of a great failure which might easily have been a great success.
The net result, the final outcome, of two centuries
of effort was that in 1815 France possessed Martinique, Guadeloupe, R6union, a few scattered
trading-posts in India, and the little fishing settlements of St. Pierre and Miquelon.
During the first half of the nineteenth century
little was done to extend the over-sea possessions
of France. The Revolution, which had been preceded by a hundred years of warfare, had been
followed by the Napoleonic campaigns, and the
country was thoroughly exhausted.




146


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


In 1850 the colonies of France occupied an area
of 200,000 square miles and held a population of
less than 3,000,000.
But the passion for territorial expansion, which
had remained dormant after Waterloo, was slowly
reviving, and at the conclusion of the Franco-Prussian War France embarked once more upon a
policy of colonial conquest.
The second half of the nineteenth century added
more than four million square miles and more than
fifty million inhabitants to the French Colonial
Empire - an area greater than that of the United
States, a population more numerous than that of
Great Britain.
Of all the French colonies, Indo-China is at once
the most important and the most successful. It
consists of the Colony of Cochin-China and the i
Protectorates of Cambodia, Annam, Tonkin, and
Laos; it occupies an area of 270,000 square miles
and contains about 20,000,000 inhabitants. The
conquest of the country occupied nearly thirty-five
years, Cochin-China having been acquired in 1861,
and Tonkin, which was made a French Protectorate
in 1884, finally pacified in 1897.
Fifteen years ago the evil condition of French
Indo-China was the favorite theme of every
French writer who found himself out of sympathy
with the growing colonial ambitions of France.
Even those who advocated a policy of French expansion in the Far East and hoped to find in Further
India some compensation for the loss of that great




FRENCH INDO-CHINA


147


empire which had been created by the genius of
Dupleix were forced to realize that the founding
of an important Asiatic colony at the end of the
nineteenth century presented difficulties differing
in character but not in magnitude from  those
which had been encountered in earlier times.
The mere acquisition of Indo-China, notwithstanding the increased disparity between the fighting capacity of the Asiatic and of the European
which has followed the application of science to
modern warfare, had proved a difficult and costly
undertaking. But the military problem, which
affected simply the occupation of the country, had
been completely thrown into the shade by the administrative problem; and the working out of the
latter was to determine whether the Colony should
be a source of strength or of weakness to the
mother country, a profitable or an unprofitable investment from the standpoint of the general interests of France. At first there appeared to exist no
reasonable ground for any hope that France was
destined to be more successful in Indo-China than
she had been elsewhere. Frenchmen showed no
desire to emigrate to the Colony or to invest their
capital in its industries. Such interest in its affairs
as found expression from time to time in the French
Press rested almost entirely upon political considerations; and the French people at large were
too much occupied with the dazzling prospect of
extending French influence in Africa to spare
a moment's thought for the unexciting task of




148


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


developing the resources of territory already under
their flag in Asia.
In the early nineties the actual state of French
Indo-China was sufficiently discouraging. During
the eight years 1887-95 France had been called
upon to cover deficits in the Local Budgets to the
extent of forty millions of francs-an amount
which brought the total cost of the Colony to the
mother country in the thirty-five years which had
elapsed since Admiral Rigault de Genouilly destroyed the forts of Saigon to the enormous sum
of 750 millions of francs, roughly to ~30,000,000.
In 1896 it became necessary to raise an IndoChinese loan of eighty millions of francs in order
to discharge pressing obligations and to meet the
cost of important public works of which the Colony
stood in urgent need. In the domain of administration the conditions were most unsatisfactory.
Very few of the French officials possessed a competent knowledge of the native languages; the
Civil Service was recruited largely under a system
of direct transference from the Home Service and
by the temporary appointment of military and naval
officers, with the result that many important posts
were filled by men who not only had no special
familiarity with the people and the institutions of
Indo-China, but were completely ignorant of the
general principles of colonial government. The few
men who were really competent to formulate the
policy and to direct the administration of the local
Government were frequently passed over by the




FRENCH INDO-CHINA


149


Colonial Office in order that places might be found
for the relatives and friends of persons having
strong political influence in Paris. Perhaps the
most significant symptom of the mismanagement
of the Colony's affairs was that the people had lost
confidence in the administration of justice and had
practically ceased carrying up important civil disputes for settlement by the Courts.
In the year 1893 Tonkin, in which civil government had been in operation for seven years, was still
in a state of disorder and was patrolled by military
columns; in Annam and in Cambodia the French
Protectorate was merely nominal, and no French
administration existed; Laos had just been acquired; and Cochin-China, the only Province in
which there was any effective civil establishment,
was beginning to agitate for separation from the
Colony. To complete this sketch of French IndoChina as it was in 1893 (and I may mention that
my facts are taken exclusively from French sources)
it is only necessary to add that a stagnant local
trade was almost entirely in the hands of foreigners,
and that, of the external commerce of the Colony,
the share of France was less than one fifth.
It is not enough to say that French Indo-China
is to-day one of the most important Colonies of
France, that it has attained a degree of prosperity
which the most ordinary prudence in the direction
of its affairs should suffice to increase from year
to year; in order to do justice to the remarkable
progress which has been made in the past decade,




150


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


emphasis must be laid on the fact that there is no
record of any Colony whose whole character has
been so completely changed in so short a time. The
commercial changes, though interesting in themselves, are the least important of those which have
taken place, and they may be briefly dismissed.
The value of the total exterior commerce of the
Colony increased from 162 millions of francs in
1893 to 400 millions in 1902. Of these sums, the
share of France increased from 30 millions, or less
than one fifth, to 148 millions, or more than one
third. It is true that a certain proportion of these
increases may be attributed to the importation from
France on Government account of large quantities
of material for Public Works; but, on the other
hand, the exports of the Colony doubled in value in
the ten years under review, and the value of the
exports to France increased very nearly fourfold.
In the same period the value of the coasting trade
rose from 54 millions of francs to 156 millions.
But it is the administrative reforms effected since
1897 which have the chief claim on our attention,
for they represent, both in regard to their operation
and the manner in which they were introduced,
a new and highly significant element in the colonial
expansion of France.
In December, 1896, M. Paul Doumer was appointed Governor-General of Indo-China. He found 
the offiee one of comparative insignificance; he
left it five years later one of the most important
and active posts within the gift of the French Gov



FRENCH INDO-CHINA


151


ernment. Shortly after his arrival in the Colony he
formulated a programme of reforms, of which the
principal items were:
1. The improvement of the financial situation of IndoChina, and the creation of a financial policy suited to the
country and its needs.
2. The pacification of Tonkin.
3. The organization of a Government-General.
4. The completion and the reform of the administrations of the Protectorates.
5. The extension of the influence of France and the
development of its interests in the Far East, particularly
in the countries adjoining the Colony - that is, in Siam
and China.
Of these matters, the organization of the Government-General was at once the most difficult
and the most urgent. Before 1897 the GovernorGeneral administered the affairs of Tonkin, but he
did not govern Indo-China; his duties were chiefly
local, and he had at his command neither the staff
nor the financial resources for exercising any general control over the administration of the territories
forming the Colony. M. Doumer laid down the wise
principle that it was the function of the GovernorGeneral to govern the whole of Indo-China, but to
administer no part of it; and the first of his reforms
was the delegation of his administrative powers in
Tonkin to a Resident Superior. He was then free
to turn his attention to the formation of a General
Government and to the creation of a budget for its
support.




152


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


The first step was to constitute a Legislative
Council, and for this purpose the Superior Council
of Indo-China, which had never been much more
than a name, and had actually ceased to exist after
the formation of the Council of the Protectorate of
Tonkin, was re-created and endowed with extensive powers. It consists at the present time of the
Governor-General, the Military Commander-in-Chief 
of Indo-China, the Commander-in-Chief of the
French Naval Squadron in the Far East, the Secretary-General of  Indo-China, the LieutenantGovernor of Cochin-China, the Residents Superior
of Tonkin, Annam, Cambodia, and Laos, the heads
of departments of the Government-General, the
President of the Colonial Council of Cochin-China,
the Presidents of various Chambers of Commerce
and Agriculture in the Colony, four native members,!
and the Chief-of-Cabinet of the Governor-General, 
who acts as its secretary. This body passes the general budget and the local budgets and advises the 
Governor-General in regard to local legislation and
on such matters as he may lay before it. For the I
better dispatch of business there are four commit- I
tees of the Superior Council. The first deals with 
military and naval affairs, public works, railways,
commerce, and agriculture, the second with legislation and administrative organization, the third with
the budgets, the fourth with other financial matters;
and there is in addition a permanent commission
which acts as an Executive Council.
The building up of a General Government occu



FRENCH INDO-CHINA             153
pied the Governor-General and the Superior Council
for more than two years. The general services
placed under the direct authority of the GovernorGeneral are the military and naval services, the
judiciary, the departments of civil affairs (corresponding to a Ministry of the Interior), financial
control, excise and customs, public works, agriculture and commerce, posts, telegraphs, and telephones, and the Cabinet of the Governor-General,
which is a central department composed of four
bureaus, -political, administrative, military, and
secretarial. Viewed from the administrative standpoint the Government-General of Indo-China resembles in a general way the Federal Government
of the Malay States, but it is more elaborate, and
in the Superior Council it possesses a legislative
body which does not exist at present in the Malay
Peninsula.
In order to provide for the expenses of the
newly-created Government a general budget was
instituted in 1898. The principle on which the new
budget was, so to speak, carved out of the various
local budgets was this, that money raised from
indirect taxes should go to the former and that the
latter should depend on direct taxes.
The budgets for 1904 balance at the following figures: General budget, sixty-five millions of
francs;. Cochin-China, ten millions; Tonkin, ten
millions; Cambodia, five millions; Annam, five millions; and Laos, two millions, - a total of ninetyseven millions of francs, roughly ~3,800,000.




154       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
The most radical changes have been effected in
the organization of Indo-China by the above reforms. The independence of the local Governments,
which had been allowed to reach a degree at once
absurd and pernicious, have been wholesomely
restricted; the divided and conflicting activities of
the five States have been coordinated and unified;
and whilst there has been introduced in regard to
those matters which concern the common interests
of the Colony a centralization of control, affairs of
a purely local character, which from the varying
local conditions would suffer from rigid uniformity
of treatment, have been left entirely in the hands of
the local administrations. The full significance
of this transference of powers becomes apparent
when it is recalled that, whereas before 1898 each
territory of the Colony controlled its own revenue
and expenditure, the budgets of 1904 assign sixtyfive millions of francs to the General Government
and only thirty-two millions to the five subordinate
Governments.
Considerations of space forbid an analysis of the
important changes in the public services which have
accompanied these alterations in the political structure of Indo-China; nor can more be said of the
other items of M. Doumer's reform programme
than that, where complete success has not yet been
achieved, the path of achievement has been clearly
indicated.
That the administration of justice has been improved; that a better tone prevails in the civil


4




FRENCH INDO-CHINA


155


services; that the nominal protectorate over Cambodia, Annam, and Laos has been converted into
an efficient control; that many grave abuses have
been removed; and that the reputation and prestige
of the Colony have greatly advanced during the
past few years, is admitted even by those to whom
the drastic methods of M. Doumer have given the
greatest offence.
The broad facts which stand prominently forthare that Indo-China has at last become self-supporting and that France, so far from having paid anything during the past five years towards the maintenance of the Colony, has actually received from
the Colony more than forty millions of francs by way
of military contribution -results which have been
obtained whilst the rate of taxation has been kept
within reasonable bounds.
I have said above that the events of the past
decade in Indo-China represent the growth of a
new and significant element in French colonization.
To those familiar with the over-sea history of
France the spectacle of the Governor-General of a
French colony effecting radical reforms in the face
of strong local opposition is as novel as it is refreshing. That the home authorities should have
given a free hand~to M. Doumer in Indo-China
and to General Gallieni in Madagascar and that
these gentlemen should have retained their posts
long enough to carry out their plans must appear
little less than miraculous to any one who knows
how much political intrigue lies beneath the surface




156


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


of French colonial life. This mixing up of colonization and politics is the rock on which nearly
every French colonial enterprise has been wrecked;
and even if it could be shown that the work of
M. Doumer was worse than his worst enemy believes it to have been, it would still be an extremely
healthy sign, as far as the colonial policy of France
is concerned, that he should have been allowed to
do it.
The most superficial student of colonial administration could easily find material for an unfavorable criticism of Indo-Chinese affairs. The tariff
regulations are obnoxious, and they have greatly
retarded the economic development of the country;
there are far too many Europeans in the Government service; the lower ranks of the European
staff are filled with men of inferior character and
ability; the police organization is inefficient. If I
have laid no stress upon these defects and upon
others equally apparent, if less serious, it is because
the colonial shortcomings of the French have been
so continually pilloried for the delectation of the
Anglo-Saxon public that the story of reform has
appeared more attractive to me, from considerations
of novelty as well as of justice.
No one could visit Indo-China to-day without
carrying away with him a great respect and admiration for the genius which has been displayed in
beautifying the country whilst covering it with
public works of the highest excellence and utility.
It has been noted time and again by writers on




FRENCH INDO-CHINA


167


French colonization that the French are not a
colonizing people in the sense in which we apply
the term to the English.
There has never been a time in French history
when colonial enterprise has been a national movement. The acquisition of Colonies has always
ministered to the French love of glory and display;
there has never existed in the French character
anything to which the hard, unromantic work of
colonial development could make an appeal.
The student of British Imperialism can scarcely
fail to observe that English colonization in the
nineteenth century was largely a question of making
a virtue of a necessity. The law of primogeniture
detached the younger sons from the family estates;
in a lower rank of society the pressure of population acted as a powerful stimulant to emigration;
thousands no doubt left England to find a more
congenial climate.
In France these motives for taking up colonial
life have been entirely lacking. A  country in
which the law of inheritance gives every man,
woman, and child a vested interest in the soil, in
which the number of the population is nearly
stationary, a land endowed in a higher degree
perhaps than any other with everything which
goes to the making of an attractive place of residence, can offer its Colonies but little in the way of
colonists.
It was Bismarck, I believe, who described the
colonial affairs of the three Great Powers in the




158


THE. FAR EASTERN TROPICS


epigram, "England has colonies and colonists;
Germany has colonists but no colonies; France has
colonies but no colonists."
It is abundantly clear that Frenchmen are unwilling either to seek a livelihood in the French
Colonies or to invest their capital in colonial industries. That a certain number of Frenchmen have
been induced by the payment of enormous subsidies to various enterprises to go to the French.
Colonies, and to take their capital with them, does
not alter the fact that there is little emigration to
"France-beyond-the-Sea " which does not rest in a
greater or less degree upon State aid in one form
or another.
So with Indo-China, the reforms of M. Doumer,
which have accomplished so much in the direction
of improving the administration and finances of
the Colony, have done very little towards satisfying
its greatest needs- French colonists and French
capital.
What remains to be done is to throw the Colony
open to foreign enterprise, to remove the pernicious
customs regulations, and thus to give others an
opportunity of undertaking the work of development which the French seem unwilling or unable
to carry out.
With others to lead the way, and with achieved
success to reason from, the Frenchman might be
persuaded to follow. Even if this hope were not
realized, the general advantages which would result
from the investment of large foreign capital would




FRENCH INDO-CHINA              159
in themselves be sufficient to bring great prosperity
to what is potentially one of the finest Colonies in
the world.




CHAPTER IX


JAVA
WHrN the Dutch people entered the field of colonial enterprise, at the beginning of the seventeenth
century, the Spaniards and the Portuguese had already been engaged for more than a hundred years
in the work of Asiatic and American discovery, and
they had divided the globe into two hemispheres
of exploitation, the Western falling to Spain, the
Eastern to Portugal - an arrangement which was
sanctioned by a Papal Bull of Pope Alexander the
Sixth.
Both in regard to the motives from which they
entered upon this new phase of national activity,
and to the methods which were adopted for carrying out the nation's policy, the Dutch represented
influences which differed completely from those
which had hitherto directed the course of modern
colonization.
The Portuguese had been inspired by the pure
spirit of adventure and exploration; and the origin
of the colonial empire of Portugal is to be sought
rather in the personal tastes of Prince Henry the
Navigator than in any national desire for territorial
expansion. It is true that at a later date commerce
became the chief motive for the extension of Portu



JAVA


161


guese authority beyond seas, but it was not until
the influence of the early explorers had died out
that Portuguese colonization assumed the character
of a trade investment.
Spain commenced her career as a colonial power
by the acquisition of the Canary Islands in the middle of the fifteenth century; but it was the discovery of the New World by Columbus, the Genoese
sailor, under Spanish patronage, which led to the
first substantial additions to Spanish territory. Until
within comparatively recent times trade had no place
in the colonial undertakings of the Spaniards; the
driving force of their empire was supplied by the
missionary's zeal for the soul of the heathen, and
by the greed of the adventurer for the precious
metals.
In the sixteenth century a large Oriental trade
had sprang up under the Portuguese flag, and the
Dutch cities of Antwerp and Amsterdam, supplied
by Dutch ships through the port of Lisbon, had
become the distributing centres for Northwestern
Europe. About the middle of the century the Dutch
commenced their great revolt against Spain for
national independence, and in 1579 the United Provinces were proclaimed a Republic. Although the
war with Spain involved a great expenditure of men
and money, the new Republic was able to maintain
itself so long as its connection with Portugal gave
it the handling of the Oriental trade. But in 1580
Portugal was annexed to the Spanish Crown, and
five years later the Spaniards seized and confiscated




162


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


all Dutch ships lying in Spanish and Portuguese
harbors.
This act presented a clear issue to the Dutch
people. Either they must submit to the destruction
of their principal source of prosperity, or they must
break the Spanish monopoly of Oriental commerce.
The former course meant nothing less than national
ruin; the latter could be accomplished only by
going to war with Spain in the Eastern seas, and
engaging in the wholesale trade with those countries which hitherto they had reached through the
medium of Portugal.
The people rose to the occasion, and at the close
of a struggle which lasted seventy years they found
themselves masters of the East Indian Islands, and
one of the foremost colonial powers of the time.
One of the most striking characteristics of Dutch
colonial enterprise is the entire absence, throughout
almost the whole range of Dutch colonial history,
of any spirit of Imperialism or any desire for territorial aggrandizement. Forced into a career of
colonial adventure by the threat of commercial
extinction, the Dutch made the most determined
efforts to confine their colonial establishments in
the East within the compass of a few fortified trading-posts; and although, in common with all other
nations, they discovered that there existed between
the spirit of independent native rule and the spirit
of commerce an antagonism which made conquest
the only practicable road towards trade intercourse,
they steadily resisted every extension of their au



JAVA


163


thority which was not absolutely necessary, and
acquired territory only when the clear alternative
was presented of abandoning their warehouses.
The nineteenth century-which added more than
three million square miles to the colonial empire of
France, and twice that area to the British dominions; which saw the creation of a German colonial
realm, with an area of a million square miles, and
the addition of 130,000 square miles of over-sea
territory to the United States - made to the Dutch
colonial empire, as it was at the end of the Napoleonic wars, the single important contribution of
Sumatra. The Imperialism which gave to France
Suffren and Dupleix, to England Hastings and
Clive, finds no place in the annals of Dutch expansion; in that long record the greatest names are
those of Daendels, who adapted to Dutch undertakings in Java the native institution of forced
labor, and of General van den Bosch, who organized the culture system in the Island. This lack of
great military achievement in the story of Dutch
intercourse with Java, so far from detracting from
its interest, endows it with a peculiar attraction
for the student of colonial affairs; for it affords
the spectacle first of a great trading corporation,
and later of a national Government devoting its
whole energy to the purely administrative measures
which were deemed essential for the accomplishment of the aims of a definite and unchanging
policy.
The Island of Java was the first acquisition of the




164


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


Dutch, and it has remained to the present day their
most important Colony. It has an area of 50,554
square miles (about equal to that of England), a
population of 30,000,000 (somewhat less than that
of Italy), and its external trade reached a value in
1901 of $119,000,000 gold-nearly equal to that
of the external trade of Cuba.
The Dutch established themselves in Java during
the early years of the seventeenth century, and
Batavia, which has always been the capital of
Netherlands-India, was founded in 1619.
In order to understand the peculiar circumstances
under which the Java trade was created, some reference must be made to the native organization
which existed in the Island at the time of the Dutch
occupation.
After fourteen hundred years of Hindu domination Java succumbed in the fifteenth century of our
era to a Mohammedan invasion, and when the
Dutch arrived in the Island they found it split up
into a number of small States under Mohammedan
rulers, most of whom were nominally the vassals of
the powerful Sultan of Mataram in Central Java,
but who, in point of fact, maintained an absolute
rule over their districts.
The natives were simply the slaves of their
rulers; they enjoyed no property rights either in
the land or its produce, and from this cause alone
the Dutch found it impossible to enter into direct
commercial relations with the people themselves.
The only alternative was to deal with the Sultans,




JAVA


165


and here the Dutch were confronted with two serious obstacles - one, that some of the Sultans preferred to trade with the English, who had secured
certain privileges in the Island; the other, that the
utter unreliability of the native rulers in matters of
trade introduced into all transactions an element
of uncertainty which constantly threatened the
Company with serious losses.
By the conquest of the Sultanates and the establishment of Dutch authority it was hoped that the
English competition could be killed and the trade
placed on a satisfactory footing. Accordingly, in
1618, the State of Jacatra was conquered, and by
the middle of the seventeenth century nearly one
fifth of the Island was under Dutch control.
Under the Dutch East India Company, which controlled the affairs of Java until the end of the eighteenth century, the sole object of the administration
was to secure the greatest possible profits to the
shareholders; and when the Dutch State supplanted
the Company as the directing authority this object
remained paramount to all others, the nation merely
taking the place of the shareholders as the beneficiary body. It was not until after the constitutional changes of 1848 had crowned the efforts of the
Liberal party in Holland that Dutch colonial policy
began to lose its quality of ingrained selfishness;
it was only in 1876 that the last contribution was
made from the Treasury of Batavia to that of The
Hague; it was not until 1903 that a law was
passed in Holland providing that in future the




166       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
Dutch Indies should enjoy the whole of their local
revenue.
The history of the Company's rule in Java (1602 -1795) discloses two facts of great significance in
relation to the control of tropical dependencies -
one, that the difficulties under which the Company
labored during the greater part of its existence,
and its final complete downfall, were due to faults
in the Dutch administrative methods; the other,
that the great hardships and sufferings which the
natives endured until within recent times were occasioned by the vices inherent in the native organization. These two sets of failings reacted upon
one another in the course of time, and each aggravated the evils produced by the other; but the
broad fact remains that in the contact between the
natives and the Dutch each side paid the penalty
of its own peculiar defects. The object of the Dutch
was trade; the affairs of the Company were regulated by a committee of tradesmen in Holland and
administered by a staff of tradesmen in Java. In
these circumstances it might have been expected
that, in so far as the business of the Company related to merchandise, it would be conducted on
principles not less intelligent than those which
guided the commerce of those days, and that, in so
far as it related to government, it would be committed to the guidance of men specially qualified
to undertake the definition and execution of a wise
policy. In regard to each of those matters the Company failed lamentably. Unable to enforce its mo



JAVA


167


nopoly of the Eastern trade to the extent of killing
foreign competition (a measure for which the action
of other nations afforded ample precedent, and the
trade conditions of the period some reasonable
excuse), it made it completely operative as far as
its own countrymen were concerned. It rejected
the advice of Governor-General Coen, who favored
a free immigration of Dutchmen to Java in the
capacities of planters and small traders, and thereby
lost an opportunity of eliminating the native middleman and of throwing the burden of production
on men whose interests would always lie in the
direction of a rapid development of the Island's
resources; advantages which would have relieved
the Company of many of its political difficulties,
and would still have left in its hands the complete
monopoly of the trade with the mother country.
But it is in the domain of internal administration
that the Company's rule in Java exhibits the greatest faults of policy and mechanism. It became clear
at the very outset that, owing to the peculiar local
conditions, the application of all measures having
as their object the collection of trade products for
shipment to Europe would have to be intrusted
almost entirely to native agents. To have attempted
any close control or supervision by Dutch officials
would not only have defeated the main purpose of
the Company, by depriving the native middleman
of that opportunity for extortion which alone
caused him to exert the necessary pressure upon
the cultivator, but, in order to have been in any




168


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


degree effective, would have involved an expense
quite beyond the ability of the trade to bear. The
obvious course to pursue under such conditions was
to offset the evils which lay in the necessity of employing an incompetent and dishonest native organization by appointing men of ability and integrity
to handle the trade as soon as it came under direct
Dutch control, and by concentrating the energy
and intelligence of the local administration in an
effort to secure the greatest possible quantity of
the best possible products for the European market. By adopting the short-sighted policy of paying the lowest salaries which would secure the
services of any person out of work in Holland, the
Company destroyed its only chance of permanent
success. It is almost incredible that a great enterprise such as that which the Company had undertaken in Java should have been placed in the hands
of men the great majority of whom received salaries of less than ~100 a year, half of which was
held in Holland as deferred pay until the completion of the term for which the official was engaged.
The Governor-General himself received a salary of
~1200 a year, less than that of the present Second
Secretary of the General Post-Office in London.
The effect of this parsimony was twofold - on
the one hand, the Company failed to secure the
class of man which its difficult position most urgently demanded; on the other, the utterly inadequate salaries made incompetence probable and
dishonesty certain throughout the service. The




JAVA


169


Company itself has thrown the best side-light on
the character of its own servants. In order to check
the extravagance in vogue amongst the officials in
Java, it passed sumptuary laws forbidding the
wearing of jewels, prescribing the kind of carriage
in which officials might travel, and limiting the
number of horses which might be attached to the
vehicle - extraordinary precautions to be taken for
the discipline of men drawing pay equal to ~50
a year. When it was found that these regulations
failed to bring the officials to a due sense of their
official poverty, the Company changed its tactics,
and, instead of trying to check dishonesty by restricting the uses to which stolen money might be
put, estimated the amount which each of the higher
officials was stealing, and then made him pay into
the Government Treasury a certain proportion of
it. It is not necessary to go beyond the general
character of the Company's administration to find
a cause for the bankruptcy which overwhelmed it in
1793.
Before passing to a consideration of the native
organization through which the Company reached
the Javanese cultivator, attention may be directed
to a truth which the growth of morbid altruism in
recent times has done much to obscure. Current
literature in England and in the United States, in
so far as it has dealt during the past decade with
questions of colonial government, has shown an
increasing tendency to emphasize the arbitrary and
oppressive character of white rule in the tropics. It




170


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


is true that this criticism has been made for the
most part by men who have had little or no experience of colonial life, and whose studies have been
generally confined to ferreting out isolated instances
of misgovernment for the purpose of condemning
colonial enterprise; but it has, nevertheless, exerted
a considerable influence on public opinion, especially in America. The plain fact, which is familiar
to every one who has made a study of native institutions in the tropics, is that, with very few exceptions, each European Government which has been
established in the tropics since the beginning of the
seventeenth century, however selfish, brutal, and
ignorant it may appear when compared with the best
extra-tropical Governments of the same period, has
been wise, liberal, and beneficent in comparison
with the native Government which it replaced.
When the Dutch arrived in Java the native
organization was such as to exclude the possibility
of conducting any trade with the individuals forming the population. The country was split up into
a number of native States under the rule of Mohammedan Sultans, and in these States trade hardly
existed. Under the native custom, which deprived
the people of every property right in the soil and
its produce, production was confined to supplying
the barest necessities of the cultivators and the
deliveries of food, cloth, and other commodities
exacted by the Sultans and their officials. The
natives, who were oppressed by the operation of
a rigid system of debt-slavery, and whose time was




JAVA


171


eaten up by the demands of their rulers for freelabor services, could be reached only through the
medium of the Sultans; and at first the Dutch
attempted to found a trade by entering into agreements with the Sultans for the delivery, at fixed
prices, of certain quantities of products suitable for
the European market. But it was found in practice
that only by conquering the Sultans and placing
them under Dutch control could they be induced to
fulfill their agreements, and thus the trade grew
pari passu with the spread of Dutch authority.
The system which was then introduced supplied
the trade products in two ways, by means of " contingents" and "forced deliveries." The former
were certain quantities of products paid by the
native rulers to the Company as tribute; the latter were further quantities of products called for
by the Company, which the native ruler had to
find and to sell to the Company at a price agreed
upon. It is seen, therefore, that the trade rested
upon a political rather than upon an economic basis.
Although attempts were made from time to time
to limit the authority of the Regents (the title
which the native rulers held after their submission
to the Company) and to save the cultivators from
oppression, it may be said that the custom of the
Company was to leave the whole control of production to the native organization, and to interfere
only when the supply of products fell short of the
amount demanded. The relation between the Directors in Holland and the cultivators in Java was




172       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
established in the following way: The Directors
informed the Governor-General as to what products
were required in Holland; the Governor-General
instructed the Regents to furnish them as " contingents" and "forced deliveries;" the Regents,
acting as the agents of the Company in its capacity
as lord of the soil, distributed the land to the
cultivators on the condition of their supplying
the products demanded by the Company; and the
cultivators grew the crops. The cultivator0suffered
chiefly because the demands made upon him by the
Company increased at every stage of their transmission down the line of the native organization,
until they provided handsome returns for each native
official who handled the delivery of the products
up the line to the Company's receiving agent.
It is impossible to gain any insight into the financial affairs of the Company during any period of
its existence. Not only was the utmost secrecy
observed in regard to all transactions, not only were
the shareholders themselves kept in complete ignorance of what was going on in the Indies, but two
sets of books were used, one relating to the Company's affairs in India, the other to its home operations, and between these no balance was ever struck.
We know that the Indian accounts were always
carelessly, and often dishonestly, kept, and that no
efficient audit was ever carried out; we know that
in some years dividends were declared when there
were no profits, and that in other years no dividends
were declared when profits were made; we know




JAVA                    173
that during the seventeenth century the Company's
trade generally yielded a profit, and that during the
eighteenth century a decline in prosperity occurred
which culminated in the bankruptcy of 1793. But
beyond these general facts little accurate information of any importance is available.
In 1795 the administrative functions of the Directors were assumed by the State, and three years
later the Dutch East India Company was finally
abolished. Its epitaph has been written by the
eminent Dutch publicist De Louter:
To the day of its downfall the Company remained faithful to its origin. It was a company of brisk and energetic
tradesmen, who, with profits as their lode-star and greed
as their compass, obtained, through the chance of events,
absolute control of one of the most beautiful and fertile
regions of the earth, and unhesitatingly sacrificed it to
their low ideals.1
The history of Dutch administration in Java
since the downfall of the Company falls naturally
into three periods —the transition period from
1795 to 1816, during which, as an incident of the
Napoleonic wars, the Island was for five years under
British rule; the period of Crown control from
1816 to 1848; and the reform period, which commenced in 1848, as a result of the constitutional
changes in Holland, and has continued down to
the present time.
Although the first of these periods is full of
1 Handleiding tot de Kennis van het Staats-en Administratief Recht van Nederlandsch-Indie. Fourth Edition, p. 59.




174


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


interest, because it includes the work of Marshal
Daendels, and of Sir Stamford Raffles, the Lieutenant-Governor during the British occupation, it
does not lend itself to precise treatment in a short
essay; and its character is that of all periods of
transition, in regard to which the student of later
conditions seeks rather to learn what general principles were evolved through the strife of conflicting
theories and influences than to gain any deep insight into the process of interaction. Two residual
principles of the transition period exerted a profound influence on the course of Dutch policy in
Java. One was laid down in the instructions of the
State Commission, which was appointed in 1802
to report on the condition of Java and to suggest
the best measures for its future government - that
the object of the Dutch Government in its relations
with Java was to secure the greatest possible benefit to the trade of Holland and the greatest possible
advantage to the finances of the mother country.
The other principle was that on which Marshal
Daendels founded his whole administration, namely,
that in extending their sovereignty the Dutch
should exact from the people all those feudal services which had formerly been yielded to the native
rulers; in other words, the utilization of the native
institutions of forced labor and State ownership
of the soil.
It was during the administration of General van
den Bosch and his successors that these principles
found their most complete expression in the mea



JAVA


175


sures of the Government. Of these the most important was the culture-system, which was introduced by van den Bosch in 1830, and remained
for nearly forty years the chief concern of the
local administration. The theory on which the
system rested was this: Instead of paying to the
Government, as formerly, two fifths of their main
crop as land rent, the cultivators should place at
the disposal of the Government one fifth of their
laboring hours and as much of their land as could
be cultivated by that amount of labor. The Government would pay a fixed price for the products
delivered to it and would bear the loss due to bad
crops when the cause was other than the neglect
of the laborers. The advantage which van den
Bosch hoped to reap from the system was that
valuable products suitable for the European market
would be grown under skilled European supervision
and would yield a handsome profit, after all expenses
of administration and purchase had been discharged; the advantages he promised the cultivators were such as would arise from an intelligent
direction of their labor in the cultivation of crops,
for which, even at the low rate offered by the Government, they would receive a much larger return
than from the sale of their ordinary rice crop.
In order to make the system a financial success,
it was necessary to enlist the active sympathy of
the higher class of natives, and to make it worth
the while of the Dutch officials to exert a constant
pressure on the native organization. To achieve




176       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
these ends an important change was made in the
position of the native rulers. Formerly the practice had been to alter the title of each Sultan whose
territory was conquered by the Dutch to that of
Regent, and to allot him a salary as a servant of
the Crown. Van den Bosch secured the assistance
of the Regents by restoring to them part of the
powers and privileges which they had enjoyed as
petty rulers, and by assigning to them the control
of large tracts of land in place of salaries. These
concessions were well calculated to bring the Regents into line with the Government's policy; for
the former meant an increase of prestige, and the
latter carried with it the power of taxation and the
resumption of the old feudal rights over the people.
The land grants, moreover, were not confined to
the Regents, but were carried as far down the line
of the native organization as they were likely to be
of advantage. As far as the Dutch officials were
concerned, their help was secured by the payment
of a percentage on the value of all crops raised in
their districts, and by a tacit understanding that as
long as the yield of export products was maintained
at a high figure they would not find their general
conduct subjected to a very close scrutiny.
It would be difficult to exaggerate the evils which
arose from these causes alone. Small as had been
the control exercised by the Dutch over the treatment of the cultivators by the Regents, it had represented a certain restraint which was now wholly
removed. The abuses of power by the Dutch offi



JAVA


177


cials had stopped at the point where their interests
clashed with those of the Regents; these interests
were now reconciled by the advantages which each
side hoped to enjoy under the culture-system; and
the faults of the lower native organization, instead
of being checked to some small extent by an opposition of the two controlling authorities, were intensified by their conjunction in a common cause.
In order to understand the relation between the
lower native organization and the culture-system,
it is necessary to describe the former in some detail. It is impossible within a brief compass to separate its functions in connection with the land-tax
(which was the principal resource of revenue in the
districts where the forced cultures were not undertaken) from those which it performed as the administrative machinery of the culture-system; and
there would be little significance in the differentiation, for the abuses of the land-tax administration
differed only in form, and not in principle, from
those of the culture-system. The conquered Sultanates which formed the Dutch territory in Java
had been ruled by the delegation of authority from
the ruler to a host of officials. In the long line
from the Sultan down to the village headman two
fundamental principles had always been observed,
one that each official assumed and exercised as
great a degree of authority as he dared, the other
that responsibility worked upwards and never downwards.
The great bulk of the people of Java lived in




178       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
village communities of two kinds. In the eastern
and western extremities of the Island the village
community was a self-governing unit, in which
the principle of election governed the choice of the
petty officials. In the rotation of office the people
enjoyed a very real protection against the grosser
forms of oppression; and although the taxes which
were collected by the headman on the orders of the
officials of the General Government were generally
very heavy, the villages at least enjoyed the privilege of managing their own internal affairs. In
Central Java, where the culture-system was most
firmly established, the village community was organized on an entirely different basis. In this
region the officials of the central native Government, instead of receiving pay from the general
revenues of their districts, as was the custom elsewhere, were assigned the control of the land, in
consideration of an annual payment to the Sultan's
treasury. As the control of the land invested the
local officials with all the rights of Government,
they were able to exploit their districts with the
most merciless severity. All the powers which related to the collection of taxes and to the exaction
of forced labor were sublet by the higher district
officials to subordinate agents, who, in turn, sublet them to the petty officials in immediate contact
with the natives.
Under this system the highest bidder became
the actual master of the people; and he used his
authority for the sole purpose of extorting the




JAVA


179


largest contributions in money, kind, and labor,
which could be secured without driving the cultivators to exercise the only right they had -that
of emigration. It is not difficult to understand how,
with a native organization of this kind, the culturesystem, which in- principle was free from any oppressive features, became in practice an intolerable
burden upon the cultivators.
When all allowance is made for the corruption
of the Dutch officials, which affected the economic
interests of the Dutch Government to a much
greater extent than it did the social and political
interests of the natives, it is clear that the greatest
evils of the culture-system arose from the character
of the native organization through which it was
applied, an organization which had been developed
before the advent of the Dutch, and for which they
cannot be held responsible. It is very easy to blame
the Dutch Government for its failure to reform the
native organization at least to the extent of removing its most glaring faults; but the difficulty of
effecting any radical changes in native institutions,
which have gradually grown up in the course of
centuries, and become part of the native life, is
generally underestimated by those who have never
had occasion to observe how often it is the case
that the lower class of natives in the tropics prefer
to endure the worst kind of oppression at the hands
of their fellow countrymen rather than have improvements effected by the introduction of reforms by
outsiders. It is true that the Dutch never made any




180       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
determined and enduring effort in the earlier days
of their rule to reform the lower native organization; it is certain that, if such an effort had been
made, it would have been rewarded with very small
success. The culture-system, with all its faults,
achieved the object for which it was introduced.
In the thirty-five years of its full operation it contributed to the treasury of Holland more than
~40,000,000, representing chiefly profits on the
sale of Government coffee and sugar, and this
after paying all the expenses, civil and military, of
Netherlands-India.
The reform period in the history of Dutch administration in Java dates from the Dutch Constitution of 1848, which took the control of colonial
affairs from the absolute power of the King and
vested it in the Dutch Legislature. It was not, however, until 1854 that the " Regeerings-Reglement"
was passed, which laid down in detail the objects
of Dutch rule in Asia, and prescribed the form of
government for Netherlands-India. The changes
which have taken place in Java during the past
fifty years amount, in fact, to a revolution in the
ideals and methods of the Government. The Dutch
policy, from having been one of the most selfish
and conservative of all times, has become liberal
and progressive; the higher administration, which
was formerly corrupt and inefficient, is now capable
and honest; the native organization has become the
subject of close study by the Dutch officials, and
although the time has not yet sufficed to remove all




JAVA


181


its ingrained faults, a steady and constant pressure
is being exerted in the direction of reform; and
with the opening up of the country by means of
roads and railways, and through the spread of education amongst the natives, this pressure is producing effects which would have been impossible in
the old days.
The forces of change have been drawn from
many sources. The reform and gradual abolition of
the culture-system was due in no small degree to
the publication in 1860 of Dekker's " Max Havelaar," which brought home to the Dutch people
some of the evils which had arisen through the
abuse of the system. The establishment of regular
steam communication and of telegraphic connection with Europe, though it has encouraged an
undue interference from home in the details of
administration, has tightened the chain of responsibility between the local officials and their superiors in Holland. The care which is now exercised
in the selection and training of colonial officials and
the increase which has been made in their salaries
(which are still lower than they should be) have
attracted a better class of men to the service. But
behind these causes of improvement lie the growth
of popular sentiment in Europe in favor of a more
liberal spirit in colonial enterprise and the quickened sense of responsibility of the Colonial Powers
towards their subject races.
I can deal here with only two features of the
present Dutch policy in Java - land-tenure and




182       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
Civil Service. The central principle of the landlaw of Java is that all land, other than the comparatively small area sold outright to Europeans
and Chinese in the early days, is the property of
the State. In the application of this principle free
play is allowed for the operation of the native customs in regard to land-tenure, with the result that
all agricultural land, with the exception noted
above, is held on hereditary leasehold tenure by
individuals, or in communal holdings. The latter
form of tenure was greatly extended during the
period of the culture-system, because it enabled
the Government to deal with the village, instead
of with the individual, as the unit of administration - an arrangement which effected a great economy in supervision, by throwing the responsibility
on to the shoulders of the village headman. The
assessment of the land-tax for the individual holdings follows the method adopted in British India.
A careful survey is made of each holding, the value
of the crop is estimated, and a tax, varying between
six and twelve per cent., is levied, according to
circumstances. In the case of land held under
communal tenure, the land-tax is assessed in a
lump sum on the village lands, and the headman
distributes the burden amongst the villagers. The
most important feature of the land-law of Java is
the extraordinary strictness with which land sales
and land leases between private individuals are regulated. Natives may sell their tenure-rights to one
another, but the sale of tenure-right by a native to




JAVA                   183
a European, or to a foreign Asiatic, is absolutely
prohibited. It is a regulation maintained for the
purpose of protecting the native from the loss of
his vested interest in the land, and it has been
completely successful. It is a policy which differs
radically from that of almost every other nation,
but there is no reason to doubt that to its enforcement may be attributed in great part the prosperity
and contentment of the Javanese peasantry. In
the leasing of land to Europeans and to foreign
Asiatics a difference is recognized between land
already under cultivation by natives and uncleared
or waste land. The leasing of cultivated land from
natives is hedged about with the most harassing
restrictions, and, although the regulations in regard
to waste land are more liberal, it is generally felt
that the Government has gone too far in its desire
to protect the native, and has thereby retarded the
development of the country.
The basis of the present regulations for the
Civil Service of the Dutch East Indies is the law
of 1864, which has been modified during the past
forty years only in some minor details. The effect
of this law is that no one is appointed to an administrative post in the Dutch East Indies who has not
passed the grand examination for officials. This
examination is divided into two parts, a preliminary
and a final, and covers only the history, geography,
ethnology, laws, institutions, and customs of Netherlands-India, and the Malay and Javanese languages. The feature of the examination which at




184


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


once strikes the student is the exclusively local
character of the required subjects, and this is
brought into greater prominence by the fact that
the general education of the candidate is considered satisfactory if he has graduated from a high
school. In this respect the examination differs
completely from that for our own Indian Civil
Service, in which the open competitive examination
relates entirely to the general education of the candidates - in a range of subjects as wide apart as
Greek history, animal physiology, moral philosophy, and analytical jurisprudence —and knowledge
of local institutions, laws, and languages is demanded only in the final examination, after the
candidates have been selected for appointment. The
difference in principle between these two methods
is much greater than appears at first sight. Under
the Dutch system, as was pointed out by a special
commission in 1899, the candidate gains a knowledge of local detail which is not enough for practical use, and yet could be acquired with much less
trouble on the spot, and there is no guarantee of
diversity of training, general education, or character. The English system requires these three
qualities as a preliminary endowment, and leaves
the study of detail to be pursued in India. From
the standpoint of the candidate there can be no
question as to which is the better method; for in
Holland the candidate who is unsuccessful finds
himself out of employment, with no other equipment for a career than a knowledge of a great




JAVA


185


many things which can be of no possible use to
him except in the service which he cannot enter.
In England a candidate who fails in the open competitive examination suffers no hardship beyond
his failure, for he is in precisely the same position
as any student who has followed the ordinary
course of a University education.
In dealing with the administration of Java during
a period of three centuries within the narrow limits
of this chapter, it has been impossible to do more
than indicate the general lines of development, and
it has been necessary to pass over a number of exceptions to my general statements, both in the field
of Government policy and in that of individual
character and conduct, simply because they were
exceptions. I cannot refrain, in conclusion, from
paying a tribute of respect to the General Secretariat of Java. It is undermanned, it is underpaid, it is burdened with an incredible mass of
detail, owing to the extreme centralization of the
Government, yet in no Colony which I have visited
have I seen more perfect methods of work, a more
thorough system of records, or a more intelligent
appreciation of the functions which belong to a
colonial secretariat.




CHAPTER X


THE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
To the student of comparative colonization the
entrance of the United States upon a career of
over-sea expansion presents none of the elements
of abnormality which chain the attention of those,who, while attributing to the institutions of the
American Government and to the character of the
American people peculiar qualities which invalidate
every argument based upon the universal experience of other nations, approach the subject from
the standpoint of an American history isolated
from the general progress of mankind. It is a
matter of plain fact that in the whole of recorded
history there cannot be found a single instance of
a nation which, having reached a certain stage of
economic development, has not embarked upon
enterprises of territorial expansion, that this phenomenon in the growth of nations has persisted in
all climates and under every form of government,
that it is common to all races, and that it has been
associated with every form of religion, heathen or
Christian, of which we have any knowledge. It is
not too much to say that no single element in the
human character has done more to mould the
destinies of mankind than this intimate relation




ACQUISITION OF THE.PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 187
between intellectual and physical vigor and territorial expansion. With these facts in view the
impartial observer finds it more natural to link
the over-sea expansion of the United States with the
continuous chain of human evolution than to regard
it as an abnormal sequel to a hundred years of
local history.
In order to understand the course of American
policy and administration in the Philippines it is
necessary to emphasize the perfectly normal character of the undertaking, and to insist that, in so far
as the problem of the Philippines concerns the
Philippine people, it has presented at no stage a
single important feature for which the experience
of other nations does not afford a parallel. Those
questions which relate to the constitutionality or
otherwise of the whole relation between the United
States and the Philippine Islands, or of any particular administrative measure, concern the American
people alone, and are of no interest whatever to
the Philippine natives; and my estimate of American action in the Islands is based not upon any
adjustment to an American standard of political
principle or conduct, in regard to which there appears to be no small conflict of opinion in the
United States, but upon its relation to the economic, social, and political welfare of the Philippine
Islands.
When Philippine affairs are thus severed from
their unnatural connection with American home
politics, and are approached as a problem in




188


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


which the end sought is simply the achievement
of the greatest good for the Philippine people,
the inquiry is raised from the plane of political
bickering to that of national statesmanship, and
the discussion loses that quality of acerbity which
invariably obscures the point at issue, and, in
administrative matters, usually paralyzes the constructive forces of the authority finally left in
control.
Under the terms of the Peace Protocol of August 12, 1898, the United States was authorized
to " occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of
Manila, pending the conclusion of a Treaty of
Peace which shall determine the control, disposition
and government of the Philippines;" and under
the terms of that Treaty, concluded on December
10, 1898, Spain ceded to the United States the
archipelago known as the Philippine Islands. But
in the interval which elapsed between the battle
of Manila Bay on May 1, 1898, and the signing of
the Peace Protocol on August 12, American action
in the Philippines assumed definite shape, and the
occurrences of that period have exerted the most
profound influence upon the whole Philippine situation.
I should be content to pass over the events which
preceded the Treaty of Peace as faits accomplis
were it not that the policy pursued by the United
States under its rights as a belligerent, and later
under the status established by the Peace Protocol,
is marked by those very characteristics which are




ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 189
so strikingly apparent in the conduct of affairs
after the Treaty of Peace had given the United
States full power to proceed in all respects as her
statesmen might deem proper. Almost every act
of the United States in the Philippines, except
those of a purely military nature, from the date of
the battle of Manila Bay down to the present time,
has been characterized by what may be called from
one standpoint independence and originality, or,
from another standpoint, blindness to local conditions and contempt for universal experience.
This attitude of detachment, alike from the insular environment and from the historical example
of three centuries of the failures and successes of
others in a similar field, has been the most influential factor in American relations with the Islands;
and in order to make the point clear, and to show
the continuity of this element in American policy
from the very commencement of the Philippine
affair, it is necessary to deal briefly with the earlier
phases of the Philippine problem.
At the beginning of the year 1898 it was a matter of common knowledge in the Far East that
Aguinaldo and his principal adherents, who had
left the Philippines in 1897 under the terms of the
Treaty of Biac-na-Bat6, had decided that the promises of refornm, which constituted the Spanish obligation under the Treaty, had not been performed,
and that the Philippine Junta had decided to commence another revolution at the earliest favorable
moment. Aguinaldo himself never made the slight



190


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


est attempt to conceal the motive of the proposed
revolution, namely, the achievement of political independence for the Philippine Islands; and it is
impossible to suppose that the American consuls in
Singapore and Hong Kong were not fully aware
of his intentions in this respect at the time when
the former (Mr. Spencer Pratt) " sought him out.. as the man for the occasion," and sent him
to Admiral Dewey, and the latter (Mr. Rounsevelle
Wildman) accepted the post of Honorary Treasurer
of the Philippine Patriotic League and drafted the
Proclamation which Aguinaldo issued on his arrival
at Cavite.
Aguinaldo was taken in an American transport
to Manila, was given arms by the American authorities, was allowed to seize Spanish arms in
Cavite, and was encouraged in every way to start
his insurrection; and these things were done after
he had publicly issued a proclamation declaring his
intention of establishing an independent Philippine
Republic. Even if we accept General Anderson's
statement (" North American Review," February,
1900) that as late as July, 1898, Admiral Dewey
was not aware that the Americans would hold the
Philippines if they were captured, and assume that
up to that time the Admiral believed that the policy
of the United States would be to grant independence to the Philippines, the early treatment of
Aguinaldo was a deplorable mistake.
What Admiral Dewey's action amounted to was
this, that without any definite information as to




ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 191
what the policy of the United States would be if
the war with Spain involved the capture of the
Philippines, he conveyed to the Islands, under circumstances which implied an official recognition of
the purposes of the insurgents, the one man who
could most seriously compromise the situation, and
whose declared aim, if successfully carried out, could
only have one of two results, either the recognition
of Philippine independence or a war between the
United States and the new Republic.
It is true that neither Admiral Dewey nor any
other responsible agent of the American Government ever gave Aguinaldo an explicit assurance
that the United States would recognize Philippine
independence; but in the absence of any declaration of an opposite intention, and in view of the
circumstances under which the war with Spain had
been undertaken, and having regard to the support
and encouragement given to Aguinaldo by high
American officials after he had declared in unmistakable terms, and in the most public manner possible, his opinion that the Americans had come to
give the Philippines an independent government,
it is impossible to accuse Aguinaldo of having put
a strained construction upon the attitude of the
American officials, or of importing into their acts
a significance which could not be fairly attributed
to them.
Up to the middle of June, 1898, there appears
to have been no official declaration, public or private, of the policy which the United States intended


0




192


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


to pursue toward the Philippines; but on June 16,
Mr. Day, the Secretary of State in Mr. McKinley's
Cabinet, wrote a dispatch to the United States Consul in Singapore which contained a definite statement of the views of the Administration on the
subject of Philippine independence. In the course
of this communication Mr. Day said: ' This Government has known the Philippine insurgents only
as discontented and rebellious subjects of Spain,
and is not acquainted with their purposes..
The United States in entering upon the occupation of the Islands... will expect from the inhabitants, without regard to their former attitude
towards the Spanish Government, that obedience
which will be lawfully due from them. If, in the
course of your conferences with General Aguinaldo, you acted upon the assumption that this
Government would cooperate with him for the furtherance of any plan of his own, or that, in accepting his cooperation, it would consider itself pledged
to recognize any political claims which he may put
forward, your action was unauthorized and cannot
be approved."
The first question which naturally arises in regard to this declaration is, Was the policy here
outlined communicated to the American naval and
military commanders in the Philippines or to Aguinaldo himself? I have been unable to find any evidence that Mr. Day's statement received any greater
publicity than was afforded by the correspondence
files of the American Consulate in Singapore; in



ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 193
deed, there is strong presumptive evidence that it
never reached the Philippines through any official
channel, for throughout the latter part of 1898
Aguinaldo repeatedly sought to obtain a declaration of American policy in regard to independence,
and as late as September 8, General Otis informed
him, "I have not been instructed as to what policy
the United States intends to pursue....
The relations between Aguinaldo and the American commanders prior to June 16 fall into an entirely different category from those which existed
after that date, for the former represented the personal judgment of individual officers acting largely
on their own responsibility, whereas the latter rested
on the responsibility of the authorities in Washington, who had formulated a definite policy and were
in a position to control the action of their local
representatives in conformity with it. It is most
difficult, therefore, to reconcile the actions of the
military commanders in the Philippines after June
16 with the declaration contained in Mr. Day's dispatch to the effect that no recognition of any kind
would be given to the political ambitions of Aguinaldo. I have space only to give two instances of
the extraordinary nature of the attitude of the military authorities toward an insurgent general whom
the United States had decided not to recognize.
On August 8, 1898, General Anderson wrote,
"General Emilio Aguinaldo, Commanding Filipino Forces: Will Your Excellency consent to my
occupation of the intrenchments facing Blockhouse




194       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
No. 14?.." On October 14 General Otis wrote,
"General Emilio Aguinaldo, Commanding Filipino Revolutionary Forces: General, it is my desire
to place it [a convalescent camp] at a locality which
would not inconvenience any organization connected
with your forces... and to the emergency of
this anticipated proceeding I respectfully invite
your consideration and ask your assistance should
execution become necessary."
The Philippine situation developed rapidly during
the latter half of 1898, and in February of the following year the political aspect of affairs, which
had been marked by steadfast progress on the part
of Aguinaldo in strengthening his military position
and in extending his Government in Luzon and in
several other islands, and by a constant repetition
on the part of the Americans of vague assurances
that the intentions of the United States were highly
benevolent, and a careful avoidance of any act or
declaration definitely favorable or adverse to the
specific question of Philippine independence, was
completely changed by the outbreak of war between the two armies. This eventuality had been
foreseen for some weeks by each side, and the most
ingenious devices were resorted to by the Filipinos
to throw the responsibility of the first act of hostility on the shoulders of the Americans. As a
matter of fact, the war was commenced by the
Filipinos, but only after the American soldiers had
submitted, with a self-restraint that cannot be too
highly praised, to every indignity and insult which




ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 195
could be expected to provoke an attack on their
part, and it had consequently become clear that if
the Filipinos were to get the war started before
large reinforcements arrived from the United
States, they themselves would have to assume the
offensive.
The determination of Aguinaldo to fight the
Americans was perfectly natural, in view of what
had taken place since the battle of Manila Bay.
The confidence which he had at first reposed in the
Americans had given way, as months passed without any recognition of his Republic, to suspicion
and distrust; and by the beginning of 1899 it was
realized by the Filipino leaders that whatever the
intentions of the Americans were, they were not
such as to encourage the hope for an independent
native Government. The only thing lacking to
establish completely this view was a definite statement from the United States, and this was forthcoming on January 4, 1899, in the form of a
proclamation from General Otis (his amended version of the President's instructions to the Secretary
of War) which finally disposed of Aguinaldo's
Government by announcing the assumption of the
governing power by the United States. After the
publication of this proclamation war was inevitable;
and the fact that the Filipinos commenced the
fighting has no special significance.
The salient feature of American policy up to this
point is the apparent neglect of the Government to
regard Aguinaldo and his revolutionary programme




196       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
from the only point of view which could promise
any guidance in the circumstances. In dealing with
Aguinaldo, after his arrival in the Islands had
placed him in touch with his supporters, the question which should have presented itself to the
American authorities was not whether his actions
justified a belief that he was incapable of maintaining an independent Government, not whether his
political mistakes or inefficient administration would
afford a good argument expost facto for the American assumption of the Government, but whether, in
view of the determination arrived at on June 16, as
set forth in Mr. Day's dispatch, that the insurrectionary movement was not to be recognized, Aguinaldo was or was not capable of offering substantial
resistance to the American plans. But notwithstanding the frequent reports forwarded to Washington by the military commanders to the effect that
Aguinaldo was actually in control of practically the
whole of the Islands, and that he had not only
placed himself in a strong military position, but had
established a Civil Government which was in fact
administering the affairs of the Islands, there is no
evidence in the material thus far made public that
any attempt was made to negotiate with the insurgents or to discover whether an arrangement could
not be arrived at which would yield to each party
so large a proportion of its extreme objects as to
afford a basis for common action.
It is known now, and might easily have been
known at the time, that there was a conservative




ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 197
element amongst Aguinaldo's advisers sufficiently
powerful to have counteracted the influence of the
war party if the United States had given it any
sort of encouragement prior to the outbreak of
hostilities. Nothing of the kind was done, and the
policy which was pursued was to disregard the
obvious facts in regard to Aguinaldo's ability to
offer a serious resistance to the American assumption of the Government, to take an entirely independent course of action, and to allow a similar
privilege to the Revolutionary Government.
That the war in the Philippines could have been
avoided by the exercise of the most ordinary
prudence, that it could have been avoided if the
advice of any British, French, or Dutch Colonial
Governor in the Far East had been asked and acted
upon, there can be no possible doubt; and it is not
less certain that if the Philippine Commission which
arrived in Manila shortly after the commencement
of the war had been given the power to act, instead
of only the power to talk, the war need not have
lasted three months. Considerations of space prevent me from dealing with the conduct of the war;
and I must dismiss the subject by saying that if in
its political aspects it was little but a long succession
of errors, in its practical operations it disclosed a
devotion and heroism on the part of the American
officers and troops which place the campaign on
a level with the most striking achievements of the
white races in tropical warfare.




CHAPTER XI


THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
IN entering upon the control of a tropical dependency in the Far East, as an unavoidable consequence of the destruction of Spanish authority in
the Philippine Islands during the war of 1898, the
United States assumed a very serious responsibility
towards the seven million people who had formerly
been the subjects of Spain.
The problems which confronted the new Government were manifold and intricate, and they were
greatly complicated by the fact that the difficulties
which always arise when the affairs of one race are
administered by the officials of another had been
intensified by three centuries of Spanish misrule.
The Philippine Commission, which was sent out
to the Islands by the late President McKinley early
in 1899 to inquire into and to report on the general
conditions existing there, and to suggest measures
for the future government of the Islands, arrived
in Manila on March 4, 1899, one month after the
outbreak of hostilities between the American forces
and those of Aguinaldo, the head of the Revolutionary Government of the Filipinos.
The Commission was not invested with any authority to intervene in the military situation, and




GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 199
after spending a month in the Islands, it issued
a proclamation setting forth the principles on which
the United States intended to proceed in its relations with the Philippine people.
The proclamation, dated April 4, 1899, is of
great importance to the student of Philippine history, for it declared in an authoritative manner both
the objects of the American Government and the
methods by which they were to be attained. It laid
down the cardinal principle that " the supremacy of
the United States must and will be enforced throughout every part of the Archipelago, and those who
resist it can accomplish no end other than their own
ruin." And it stated that " the aim and object of
the American Government, apart from the fulfillment of the solemn obligations it has assumed toward the family of nations by the acceptance of
sovereignty over the Philippine Islands, is the wellbeing, the prosperity, and the happiness of the
Philippine people, and their elevation and advancement to a position among the most civilized peoples
of the world."
These ends were to be secured by reform in all
departments of the Government, in all branches of
the public service, and in all corporations closely
touching the life of the common people; by effective provision for the establishment of schools; by
making domestic and foreign trade, agriculture, and
other industrial pursuits the objects of solicitude
and fostering care; by the construction of roads,
railroads, and other public works; by the introduc



200       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
tion of a sound system of taxation, under which" it
is believed that the needs of the Government will
in a short time become compatible with a considerable reduction in taxation;j and by the establishment of an honest and efficient Civil Service and
Judiciary.
The changes here outlined were to be effected
while granting to the Philippine people " the most
ample liberty of self-government which is reconcilable with the maintenance of a wise, just, stable,
effective, and economical administration of public
affairs, and compatible with the sovereign and international rights and obligations of the United States."
The American Government in the Philippine
Islands was wholly military until September 1,
1900, when the military Governor was relieved of
the legislative power, which was transferred to the
Philippine Commission of which the Hon. William
H. Taft was President. On September 1, 1901, the
civil executive power was also transferred to the
Commission, and that body was enlarged by the
addition to it of three Filipino members.
Before passing to a consideration of the structure and working of the Philippine Government
I wish to make clear a point which is of some importance in relation to any adverse criticism of the
American Philippine Administration.
During the time I was in the Islands, in the
early part of 1904, I met a great number of
American officials, and in my intercourse with
them, an intercourse which was marked throughout




GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 201
by the greatest courtesy and frankness on their
part, I was constantly brought face to face with
two facts - one, that with very few exceptions the i
members of the Civil Service were animated by an
honest and sincere desire to do the best thing for
the general welfare of the Islands; the other, that 
side by side with this excellent intention there 
existed an ignorance of the broad established facts |
in relation to tropical administration, and an absence of information as to the work of the European nations in the neighboring Colonies, which
could scarcely fail to impair most seriously the usefulness of the most conscientious and hard-working
official.
The effect of this mental condition of practically
a whole Government has been twofold. On the one
hand, it has involved a groping about for satisfactory solutions of the most elementary problems of
administration, which have finally been solved, after
great waste of time and energy, along lines already
laid down by other nations; and on the other
hand, and this is a far more serious matter, it
has deprived the Government of any standard of
comparison for its work. To give a single example:
I was shown in the Philippines some of the most
wretched roads I have seen in fifteen years of
colonial travel, and was asked with pride whether
the English had ever done anything like that for
the benefit of their colonial subjects; and when
I replied that you could travel a thousand miles in
an automobile in the Federated Malay States on




202


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


roads as good as the Massachusetts State roads, my
statement was met, if not with absolute incredulity,
at least with the last degree of surprise. It was the
same thing in a hundred matters. Had any nation
except the United States ever given the natives of
a Colony any voice in their own government, or
given them an honest judiciary, or a good watersupply, or an efficient police force, or ever governed
a Colony with any other object than deriving revenue from it? And so on through the whole range
of colonial administration! It is obvious that if
a body of men, from lack of comparative knowledge,
honestly believe that the work they are doing is
better than that of all others in the same field, the
prospect of improvement originating within the
administrative hierarchy is reduced to a minimum.
The evil is one which could easily be removed in
the case of men as intelligent and quick-witted as the
average American in the Philippines. If, instead
of going straight from San Francisco to Manila,
the higher officials were ordered to go out by way
of Suez, taking a trip through Egypt, Ceylon, and
the Malay Peninsula on the way, they would arrive
in the Philippines better equipped for useful work
than they now are even after some years of residence in the Islands. The experience would not
only help toward that breadth of view which is so
essential in approaching questions of administration in the tropics, but would give them a sufficient
knowledge of the conditions of other Colonies to
serve as a standard of comparison for their own




GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 203
work. Nearly all the faults of administration in
the Philippines are due to one of two causeseither the pernicious influence of American home
politics on Philippine legislation, or the narrow
vision of the local officials. It is perhaps too much
to hope that the former can be removed, but with
the elimination of the latter element the evil effects
of the former would be greatly lessened.
The present structure of the Philippine Government differs in some material respects from that of
any other tropical dependency of one of the Great
Powers.
Although at first sight it appears to afford a
larger measure of participation to the people of the
Islands than can be found elsewhere, the local
conditions under which the Government operates,
which are inflexible to a degree that can scarcely
be appreciated by any one who has not visited the
Islands, give the practical working of the Administration a fairly close resemblance to that of a
British Crown Colony Government shorn of some
of its most important advantages.
The Philippines belong to a clearly defined type
of tropical countries. They have a high mean annual temperature and a low social and economic
development; their internal trade is insignificant;
they depend for their economic welfare on an
export trade resting on agricultural industries;
nearly all the manufactured articles used in the
Islands are imported; the native labor is entirely
inadequate for the development of the natural re



204


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


sources of the country; the great majority of the
people are of the usual lazy, indolent, and thriftless character which distinguishes the native of the
tropics; there is a small educated class, but nearly
ninety per cent. of the population cannot read and
write any language, European or native.
As the industry of a people bears a very close
relation to their political condition - effective political institutions of an advanced type being found
only in countries of advanced industrial development: a low economic condition being invariably
accompanied by a low political status - the following figures supply a rough standard by which to
measure directly the economic position and indirectly the present political capacity of the Philippines in relation to countries possessing a climate,
commerce, and population sufficiently similar in a
general way to afford a fair basis for comparison.
It must be borne in mind that in tropical countries, where the internal trade is always insignificant,
the value of exports gives a very accurate index
to the industry of the people. Basing my calculations on the latest available statistics, the following
figures are approximately correct: Value of exports
per annum per capita of population in the Philippines, $5; in Ceylon, $8.50; in Porto Rico, $12;
in Sierra Leone, $19; in the British West Indies,
$20; in Mauritius, $24; in Java, $25; in British
Guiana, $30; in the-Federated Malay States, $44.
It is seen from the above figures, which disclose the economic efficiency of nine tropical areas




GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 205
dependent on one or another of the Great Powers,
that the Philippines are in a very low stage of
economic development. The inference might naturally be drawn that the Philippine people are less
able to direct their political and administrative
affairs than are the inhabitants of any of the colonies included in the comparison. But this view
has not commended itself to the United States;
and in a country which is poorer, chiefly from lack
of industry in the people, than almost any other
tropical country not under purely native rule, inhabited by people certainly not more intelligent
than those of the other tropical dependencies referred to above, there has been established a Government more expensive than any other Colonial Government in the tropics, and much more dependent
for its efficiency on the cooperation of the nativesf
J[Broadly speaking, the American policy in regarc
to the control and development of the Philippine
is the exact opposite of that adopted by every othe
nation, in that political development has been take
as the standard of attainment instead of industria
development, in opposition to the universal experi
ence of mankind, that the latter has always precede
the former.>
It may be true that it has been advisable from
the standpoint of American home politics to place
the cart before the horse in this manner, but the
consequences will be disastrous to the welfare of
the Islands. Lord Curton, in a recent speech on
Indian affairs, has put the matter in a nutshell:




206       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
" I do not think," he said, "that the salvation of
India is to be sought on the field of politics at the
present stage of her development; and it is not
my conception of statesmanship to earn a cheap
applause by offering so-called boons for which the
country is not ready, and for which my successors,
and not I, would have to pay the price."
I propose now to compare the structure of the
Philippine Government with that of some of the
British colonies and dependencies in the Far East.
The Government of the Philippine Islands rests
with the following bodies, - the Municipal Councils, the Provincial Governments, the Philippine
Commission, and the Congress of the United States.
The Philippine Municipality corresponds to the
New England township, and there are in the Islands
623 Municipalities, and in connection with them
about 3600 Presidents, Secretaries, Treasurers, and
Clerks, and about 8000 Councilors. All the municipal officials are elected by the people; and any
male person of twenty-three years or over, having
six months' residence in the Municipality, may
vote, provided he held prior to August 13, 1898,
any one of certain offices under the Spaniards, or
owns five hundred pesos' worth of real estate, or
pays thirty pesos or more in taxes, or speaks, reads,
and writes English or Spanish.
The Philippine Municipality is simply an advanced type of the village government in Burma,
Indo-China, and other Eastern countries, and represents an adjustment to the new conditions of the




GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 207
old Spanish municipal organization. These Municipalities would be admirably suited to the needs
of the country if the people possessed any political
capacity, for, in theory, they raise and disburse
money locally for local purposes connected with
the daily life of the natives. But the account given
of their work in the Philippine Commission's Report
for 1903 is most discouraging. The Hon. William
H. Taft, writing as Civil Governor, says: ' By
law the Council of a Municipality is obliged to
devote a certain part of the income of the towns to
schools, but in too many instances it has developed
that, in the anxiety to secure his own salary, the
President has induced the Council and the Municipal Treasurer to appropriate from what are properly school funds to pay the salaries of municipal
officials. The truth is that the Municipal Governments have not been as satisfactory in their operations as could be wished. By the misuse of the
school funds, already referred to, the native schoolteachers have been compelled to go without their
salaries. The Municipal Police have also gone unpaid, and in many instances had not been made
efficient because they were used as the personal
servants of the Municipal Presidents."
It is when we turn to the Provincial Governments
in the Philippines that we find the first radical and
important difference between American methods
and those of other countries. Under the Provincial
Government Act provision is made for the formation of Provincial Boards consisting of a Provin



208       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
cial Governor, elected for a two years' term by the
Municipal Councilors of the Province in joint convention, and the Provincial Supervisor, and the
Provincial Treasurer, appointed by the Philippine
Commission. At the present time there are forty
Provincial Governments in the Islands. The principal duties of these Governments are to levy taxes
within certain limitations, to collect all taxes due
in the Province, whether on account of Municipal,
Provincial, or Insular levy, to direct the Provincial
Public Works, and to supervise the Municipal Administration.
It is clear that the Provincial Government affords
no real representation of the people, since two out
of the three members of the Provincial Board are
appointed by the Commission; and in this respect
the Provincial Government embodies the central
principle of Crown Colony Government, namely,
that the control of affairs rests with appointed, and
not with elected officials. But while the system,
owing to its non-representative character, does
nothing toward educating the people in self-government, it sacrifices the two great advantages of
Crown Colony Government, for the element of personal influence is lost where a biennial election
regulates the office of Governor, and the administrative authority is weakened when it resides in an
official trinity instead of in the person of one man.
There is thus change where permanence is most
needed, and division of power where efficiency is
best promoted by its concentration.




GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 209
The existence of the Provincial Governments
cannot be defended on political grounds, for they
possess no political attributes; and in so far as
they are administrative. machines they perform
functions which could be more efficiently and more
economically discharged by a single Government
official with powers similar to those of a DeputyCommissioner in Burma. The difference between
the duties performed by that official and those of
the Provincial Boards in the Philippines lies in two
points only. The Deputy-Commissioner is vested
with judicial and magisterial powers, neither of
which pertains to the Provincial Boards; and in
regard to public works, he is relieved by the Public
Works Department of the General Government of
such duties as fall in that matter to the Provincial
Boards. In each respect the advantage lies with
the Burmese system.
In a country in a stage of development as low
as that of the Philippines or Burma, where the
political and administrative capacity of the people,
if it can ever reach a useful proportion, must take
many generations to develop, the addition of magisterial and judicial powers to the authority of the
administrator facilitates the work of Government
by simplifying the settlement of small civil disputes
and the punishment of lesser crime, and serves a
most useful purpose by bringing the chief official
in charge of each district into close touch with the
daily affairs of the people. As all the judicial and
magisterial acts of the Deputy-Commissioner are




210       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
subject to the review of his administrative superiors,
and may be made the subject of appeal to the
higher courts, there is little danger of an abuse of
power. In the matter of public works it is obvious
that the Central Government, from its wider knowledge of the general plans for the opening up of
the country and from the greater resources at its
command, is better able than a Provincial Board to
control and direct public works in conformity with
some scheme of development laid down by a body
of experts which the Provincial Governments could
not afford to employ.
But it is in the higher branches of the administration that the structure of the Philippine Government exhibits its greatest weakness and its sharpest
contrast to other dependent tropical governments.
It is a universally recognized trait of tropical peoples
that they yield their truest loyalty and their best
aid in governmental matters when there is at the
head of affairs one man in supreme power, whether
he be King, Sultan, or Governor. This characteristic, so far from being due to the growth of white
domination, is the product of uncounted centuries
of native development, before white men ever came
into contact with the native Governments; and in
attempting to build a tropical Government on the
theory that so-called "popular" institutions can
ever recommend themselves as an ideal to the
natives of a tropical country, the fact is overlooked
or ignored that, in the thousands of years during
which the natives of the tropics were left to them



GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 211
selves, to develop whatever political institutions
appeared best suited to them, there was never
established a single government which was not
purely autocratic in character.
When we attempt to force democratic institutions
or corporate government upon tropical peoples we
simply assume, without any warrant whatever, that
we know better than they do what form of government is best for them. Now not only does the
government of the Philippines by a Commission
violate the very first principle of successful administration in the tropics by dividing into seven parts
the prestige and authority which the natives expect
and desire to find in one man; but owing to the
dependence of the Commission upon a Legislature
thousands of miles away, already overburdened
with its own affairs, and composed of men who,
however able they may be, have neither the time
nor the opportunity of gaining any first-hand information in regard to problems of tropical administration, that confidence which should exist between a people and their Government is noticeably
lacking in the Philippines, where it is perfectly
well understood by all intelligent people that the
Commission governs the Islands only in so far as it
is allowed to do so by Congress.
Shorn of any real authority to determine independently the measures best suited to the needs of
the Islands, compelled to legislate with one eye
on the American public and the other on Congress,
driven to adopt an apologetic tone in regard to all




212


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


measures which are likely to arouse public sentiment
in the States, the Philippine Commission can neither
command the respect of the people nor carry on its
own work according to the plain needs of the situation. It has been stated very frequently that as
a matter of fact Congress has sanctioned every Act
submitted to it by the Philippine Commission. This
is perfectly true; but it is not due to Congress
adjusting its mind to Philippine legislation, but to
the Philippine Commission adjusting its legislation
to the mind of Congress.
It is not easy to discern the motives which led to
the adoption of a Commission as the governing
power in the Philippines. In Cuba General Leonard
Wood, as a one-man Government, had achieved one
of the most brilliant administrative feats of which
the history of white rule in the tropics bears record.
It was a piece of work which can only be appreciated
at its true value by those who are familiar with the
extraordinary difficulties with which General Wood
was confronted - difficulties immeasurably greater
than those which have been encountered in the
Philippines —and with the statesmanlike manner
in which they were met and overcome.
With this striking success before it, it is difficult
to understand why the Government of the United
States should have afflicted the Philippine Islands
with a Government which, in its structure, violates
every principle that led to such excellent results in
Cuba.
The Reports of the Philippine Commission show




GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 213
very clearly the evil effects which result from the
Congressional control over Philippine affairs. I select
two typical instances - one affecting the relations
between the Islands and the United States, the
other referring to a question of local internal policy.
In the Commission's Report for 1901 occurs the following passage: "If Congress reduce by fifty per
cent. the United States duty on tobacco, hemp, and
sugar... such generosity would much strengthen
the bonds between the Filipino and American
people, and it is earnestly recommended." In their
Report dated November 20, 1902, the Commissioners say: " We respectfully urge the reduction
of at least seventy-five per cent. of the Dingley rate
of duties upon goods imported into the United
States from the Philippine Islands." Finally, on
December 23, 1903, the Commission recommends
that Congress enact "legislation which shall reduce
the tariff on sugar and tobacco imported from the
Philippine Islands to not more than twenty-five
per cent. of the present Dingley rates on tobacco and
sugar imported from foreign countries." Notwithstanding these repeated appeals on a matter of the
most vital importance to the Islands, Congress has
neglected to relieve Philippine commerce of its most
oppressive burden.
One of the most serious obstacles to the development of the Philippine Islands is the law passed by
Congress in 1902 limiting the area of public land
which may be sold to a corporation to 2500 acres.
With a limit of this kind it is impossible to attract




214 ~


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


capital for investment in agricultural enterprises,
for, with the disadvantages of the country in the
matter of transportation facilities and labor supply,
it is only by operating on a large scale that any one
can hope to secure a fair interest on his investment.
The Commission has clearly recognized the necessity
of greatly increasing the area of land that may be
sold to corporations; and in their Report of November, 1902, and again in their Report of 1903, the
Commissioners urge that the maximum be raised to
25,000 acres. This has not been done, and the
facts represent a pernicious interference in a matter
which is of purely local interest, which should be
left to the discretion of those on the spot who are
familiar with the local conditions.
The question of the authority of Congress to
control the affairs of the Philippine Islands, and
the use to which that authority is put, bring me to
the last point I am able to discuss in regard to the
structure of the Philippine Government. The reference of every Act of the Commission back to Congress is in itself a serious defect in the Philippine
Government, for it hampers the Commission in its
legislative work by introducing considerations other
than those which relate to the simple need or
efficacy of any particular measure; but the fact
that Congress directs legislation affecting many of
the internal affairs of the Islands is a much greater
evil.
The practice of other nations is radically different in this respect from that of the United States.




GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 215
I may take a British tropical country as a typical
instance. In the Straits Settlements, for example,
all measures for the government and administration
of the Colony are passed by the Governor and his
Council, and become law when approved by the
Crown. This approval of the Crown is, in fact,
a reference to the Colonial Office in London, the
Crown always acting on the advice of its Principal
Secretary of State for the Colonies. It is evident
that the reference of colonial laws to a Colonial
Office rests on a principle exactly opposite to that
on which they are referred to Congress, for the
Colonial Office staff is made up of men who are
specialists in matters of colonial administration,
and the law is thus passed upon, not by men who
have no knowledge of or interest in colonial affairs,
but by men who have devoted themselves for years
to the study of the very questions with which
colonial legislation is concerned. Not only does
this system insure a consideration of the law from
the standpoint of colonial interests alone, but it
enables the Governor to frame his laws in full security that they will be passed upon without any
reference to home politics in the sovereign State.
Of all the questions which arise in regard to the
control of tropical dependencies, the most important one, without doubt, is that of the selection of
the officials who are to carry into effect the administrative measures of the Government.
It is far better, in fact, that the policy of the
Government should be unsound and its execution




216


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


placed in the hands of capable men than that wise
and benevolent measures should be committed to
the hands of incompetent agents.
Sound character rather than brilliant intellect is
the thing most to be desired in a colonial administrator; and the object which all examinations for
a Colonial Civil Service should chiefly aim to secure
is that the selected candidate should possess a liberal education such as is usually associated with
breadth of view, a tolerant habit of mind, a reliable mental balance, and unimpeachable integrity.
The regulations of the Philippine Civil Service
are based upon an entirely different view, and the
examinations can have no effect whatever beyond
insuring that each member of the service can read
and write and has an education about equal to that
of any high-school graduate.
In order to show that, as a matter of fact, the
examination for the Philippine Civil Service, except
in so far.as it relates to languages, does little more
than exclude persons who cannot read and write,
I give the following extracts from the official manual, covering the examination for what is termed
"the most difficult grade:"
Spell the words Philippines, qualify, principle, civilization.
On April 7th a Manila merchant desires to obtain
$1440. For how much must he give his note due September 14, without interest, to obtain the required sum when
discounted at a bank at the rate of 9 per cent. per annum?
Name five American statesmen who died before 1850.




GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 217
In what country is each of the following: Vera Cruz,
Oporto, Madras, the Bosphorus, Lake Maracaybo?
The only other required subjects in which competitors are examined, except the language tests,
are letter-writing, penmanship, and copying from
plain copy and from rough draft.
Compare this with the following extracts from
the syllabus of the Civil Service of India, showing
the extent of work required in the preliminary
examination in a few of the subjects which may
be selected by the competitors:
English Language: A general acquaintance with the
works of Chaucer, Langland, Spenser, Shakespeare,
Milton, Dryden, Pope, Gray, Collins, Johnson, Goldsmith, Crabbe, Cowper, Campbell, Wordsworth, Scott,
Byron, Keats, Shelley, Coleridge, Bacon, Sir Thomas
Browne, Cowley, Bunyan, Swift, DeFoe, Addison, Burke,
and Macaulay.
Mathematics: Algebra, Euclid, Geometrical Conic
Sections, Plane Trigonometry, Plane Analytical Geometry, Differential and Integral Calculus, Statics, Dynamics
of a Particle, Hydrostatics, Geometrical Optics.
Political Science: Analytical Jurisprudence, Early Institutions, Theory of Legislation, Comparative Politics,
History of Political Theories.
Sanscrit Language and Literature: Translation from
Sanscrit into English and from English into Sanscrit, History of Sanscrit Literature, Sanscrit Grammar, and Vedic
Philology.
From the candidates who pass the preliminary
examination there are selected, in the order of
merit, such number as are required for the vacant




218


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


posts in the service. These selected candidates
are put on probation for one year, and are then
examined in the following compulsory subjects:
Indian Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code,
the principal vernacular language of the Province
to which the candidate is assigned, and the Indian
Evidence Act and the Indian Contract Act. In addition the candidate must pass in one of the following subjects: The Code of Civil Procedure, Hindu
and Mohammedan Law, Sanscrit, Arabic, Persian,
History of British India, or the Chinese Language.
In the Introduction to his " Colonial Civil Service" Mr. A. Lawrence Lowell, Professor of the
Science of Government at Harvard, has gone to
the very root of the matter, and I cannot do better
in bringing this chapter to a conclusion, than quote
his words:
The Colonial Civil Service must therefore be a lifelong career. The career must be begun young, and that
for two reasons. First, because it is only in youth that
new languages and a comprehension of strange civilizations can be acquired rapidly and well; and, second,
because if the selection of colonial officials is made after
men have begun to be established in life, those who have
already shown an ability to succeed will not abandon an
assured career for another in which, though the reward
is great, success is problematical. The men who will
apply will be those whose previous ventures in life have
not been the most fortunate; and the Colonial Service
cannot afford to accept the failures in other vocations.
During the few months I spent in the Philippines early this year I met a large number of Amer




GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 219
ican officials. I found them almost without exception well disposed toward the natives, and anxious
to do their best for the good government of the
country; but the number of men among them who
had any qualification such as one finds in the
members of the Indian Civil Service was very small.
If the Philippine Civil Service is to become a
really efficient corps of administrators, it can be
accomplished only by making the entrance examination so severe that only men of exceptional
capacity can pass it, and by making the service so
attractive in the matter of pay and pensions that
men of exceptional capacity will be anxious to
compete for vacancies.




CHAPTER XII


THE ECONOMIC CONDITION OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS
THE specific problem which presented itself to the
American Government, when it decided to establish
popular political institutions in the Philippine
Islands, was the introduction into a community
whose social and political conditions were the product of the superimposition of mediaeval European
ideas upon tropical tribalism, of an administrative
system representing five centuries of growth beyond
the mediaeval stage, and depending for its success
upon a homogeneity of which scarcely a trace existed
in the Islands.
In carrying this policy into effect the Americans
have been hampered by two serious adverse influences - one the complete saturation of the native
mind with the Spanish idea of Colonial Government, the other the disorder which has prevailed in
the Islands since the American occupation.
Perhaps the worst feature of Spanish rule in the
Philippines was the pernicious influence exerted
upon the civil administration by the monastic orders; and a perusal of the numerous documents
relating to the insurrection of 1896 leaves the
reader with a clear conviction that the greatest




ECONOMIC CONDITION OF THE PHILIPPINES 221
evils of which the Filipinos complained were those
which arose from the peculiar position in relation
to the Government occupied by the so-called friars
- members of one of the four Orders of Dominicans, Augustinians, Franciscans, and Recolletos — and that, in all probability, if there
had been no friars there would have been no insurrection.
We are so accustomed to the spectacle of the
Church and the State working in completely different spheres of action that it is difficult for us to
realize the gross abuses which occur when members
of religious orders are vested with wide administrative powers, when, in fact, the civil authority which
regulates the temporal affairs of the people is
wielded by the same person who controls their
spiritual destinies.
The evils which arose from this concentration
of power in the person of the Spanish friar in the
Philippines cannot be exaggerated. The attitude
of the Filipinos on the subject is concisely expressed
in the following extract from a letter written by
Aguinaldo to General Otis: "These priests have
been for a long time the absolute masters of the
life, honor, and property of the Filipinos. For this
reason it is a widely known and notorious fact,
recognized by all foreigners who have studied Philippine affairs, that the primary causes of the
Philippine revolution were the ecclesiastical corporations which have robbed the country, preventing
progress and liberty."




222       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
Some idea of the complete mastery exercised
over the Filipinos by the friars may be gathered
from an enumeration of the functions which the
friars performed in the scheme of administration.
In the township which constituted his parish, the
friar was Inspector of Primary Schools, President
of the Health Board and of the Board of Charities,
Inspector of Taxation, and President of the Board
of Works. He was Censor of the Municipal Budget,
Inspector of Prisons, President of the Board of
Statistics, and a member of the Board for Partitioning Crown lands. He supervised the election of the
police force, controlled the issue of the certificates
of character with which each man had to be provided under the Spanish law, and, as censor of
the plays, comedies, and dramas performed in the
native dialects at the numerous fiestas, he exercised
important power over the only channel through
which, in the absence of newspapers, public opinion
could be reachedj
The determination of the American Government
to effect a complete separation of Church and State
in the Philippine Islands meant that the whole structure and working of the administration would have
to be changed from top to bottom. It was to be
expected under these circumstances that although,
on the one hand, the liberation of the people from
the rule of the friars would remove many causes of
discontent, yet, on the other hand, the assumption
of all the details of administration by American
officials unacquainted with the Islands and their




ECONOMIC CONDITION OF THE PHILIPPINES 223
people could scarcely fail to introduce other causes
of dissatisfaction, resting, it is true, no longer upon
official oppression strengthened by a very intimate
knowledge of the people and their affairs, but upon
the sudden introduction of new ideals and methods
of Government with which the people were entirely
unfamiliar, under the guidance of officials of foreign race and speech, whose best efforts would be
seriously handicapped for many years by lack of
local knowledge.
But the difficulties which have arisen as a result
of the governmental methods of the Spaniards have
been intensified by the failure of the Americans to
preserve order in the Islands.
During the course of the war between the United
States and the Philippine Republic which was established by Aguinaldo after he had been taken to the
Islands by Admiral Dewey, the country was thrown
into a deplorable state of disorder, far worse than
need necessarily have resulted from the existence
of hostilities, by the failure of the Americans to
realize the cardinal importance of exacting no
loyalty or adherence to American authority until
they were fully prepared to afford ample protection
to the natives against reprisals from their fellow
countrymen who remained hostile to the United
States.
Numerous instances are recorded of the occupation of towns and villages which were held only
for a few days or a few weeks and were then abandoned to the revenge of the insurrectos.




224       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
The natives were thus placed in a very difficult
position, one which it was highly impolitic for the
Americans to force upon them. If they refused
to assist the American troops in the way of food
and other supplies, labor, and so on, they were
immediately treated as insurgents; if they gave
any assistance, and were afterwards deprived of the
protection of an American garrison, insurrecto
troops would attack the place, sack it, and kill
a large number of its inhabitants.
Thus, while this method of warfare accomplished
little towards the discouragement of those who
were in open insurrection, it created the greatest
bitterness among those who, either from necessity
or from preference, were inclined to accept the
American occupation.
If the Province of Manila had been taken as a
nucleus and the American control gradually extended
outwards over the whole of the Islands, the condition of order would have been infinitely better
to-day than it actually is.
The prevalence of ladronism, or armed robbery
and outrage, which has continued down to the
present time, is a direct result of the lack of concentration in the American plans for the complete
pacification of the Islands.
To gain an idea of the actual state of the Islands
in the matter of public order, it is only necessary to consult the records of the Philippine police
force.
The Insular police force consists of two bodies




ECONOMIC CONDITION OF THE PHILIPPINES 225
of men, the Philippine Constabulary and the Philippine Scouts, each body recruited from the natives
of the various Provinces and officered partly by
natives, partly by Americans. The cost of the Constabulary falls on the Insular revenues; that of the
Scouts is paid by the United States.
The latest available figures in regard to the work
of the police force are those for the fiscal year
1903, and they disclose a sufficiently discouraging
state of affairs. During 1903 there were 5351
separate expeditions against outlaws, of which 357
resulted in engagements. The number of outlaws
killed was 1185, and the number captured 2722.
When it is noted that these figures do not include
the military operations of the army, which was
engaged in serious fighting in Mindanao and Jolo,
it is seen that the Islands were in a state of considerable disorder in 1903; and at the time of my
visit to the Philippines early in 1904 there were
no indications that conditions in this respect were
improving.
In dealing with the economic affairs of the Philippines it is necessary to bear the above facts
in mind, for a sudden change of administrative
methods and a continued prevalence of disorder
have exerted a marked influence upon the general
condition of the Islands.
The value of merchandise exported from the
Islands in the calendar year 1903 was $32,000,000,
gold, as compared with an average during the fiveyear period 1892-96 of $22,000,000. These figures




226


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


represent a substantial increase, and, if allowed to
stand without analysis, they constitute a very effective reply to the widespread complaints that the
Islands are in a deplorable state of commercial
depression.'
If, however, these figures are subjected to a close
scrutiny their significance is entirely changed.
With an export trade of $32,000,000 the Philippine Islands are called upon to pay $12,500,000
for the expense of the Insular Government; in
other words, for every $100 worth of produce
exported from the Islands the General Government
costs $40. If to this we add $2,500,000 collected
in the Islands for Municipal and Provincial Government, the ratio of expenditure on Government
account to value of exports is raised to forty-six
per cent.
That a country should have to pay forty-six per
cent. of the value of its total industrial product, excluding a comparatively insignificant internal trade
in local produce, for the privilege of being governed,
is obviously absurd; and although a dependent
tropical Government is always expensive, from the
fact that the administration is very much better
than could arise naturally as a product of native
activity, that of the Philippines is much more
expensive than it should be.
1 It is interesting to note in this connection that the value of
exports for the fiscal year 1904 shows a decrease of three million dollars (gold) as compared with the value of exports for the
fiscal year 1903.




ECONOMIC CONDITION OF THE PHILIPPINES 227
Comparing the cost of Government, on the basis
adopted above, with that of five British dependencies in various parts of the tropics - Ceylon, Barbados, British Guiana, Trinidad, and the Federated
Malay States - the average is twenty-seven per
cent. as against forty-six per cent. in the Philippines.
But this does not close the comparison. In the
British dependencies every charge connected with
the Government, whether of a civil or a military
nature, is paid by the local Government; in the
Philippines all military expenses are paid by the
United States; and the Islands do not even pay
for their own police, for the 5000 scouts who do
police work, as a body supplementary to the Philippine Constabulary, are on the Army pay-roll. The
fact is that if we add together the sums paid by
the people of the Philippines and by the people
of the United States in connection with the control
and administration of the Philippine Islands, the
total reaches a sum greater than that of the whole
value of the export trade of the Islands.
The $32,000,000 worth of exports from the
Philippine Islands in 1903 was made up of $22,000,000 worth of hemp, $4,000,000 worth of
copra, $3,000,000 worth of sugar, and $2,000,000
worth of tobacco and cigars, leaving only $1,000,000 to cover the value of all other exports. Hemp
and copra show a great increase during the past
few years; tobacco and sugar a decrease, the exports of the latter having fallen from an average of




228


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


493,000,000 pounds for the five-year period 1891 -95 to 166,000,000 pounds for 1904. Hemp and
copra are crude products which do not require high
cultivation or steady labor for their production,
while sugar and tobacco need constant attention
during their cultivation and the most careful treatment during their manufacture.
The growth of the Philippine export trade during
the past few years is thus seen to have rested entirely on those products which are least dependent
on labor conditions, and it is clear that the falling off in sugar and tobacco production, though
due to some extent to other causes, is attributable chiefly to the unsatisfactory state of native
labor.
The whole future of the Islands lies in the solution of the labor problem; and the outlook is not
encouraging. A great deal has been written about
the Filipino as a laborer, and the widest divergence of views exists as to whether he is a tolerably
good workman, as tropical labor goes, or is an
utterly unreliable and worthless creature as far as
any development of the Islands is to rest on his
efforts.
An examination of these conflicting opinions
shows that, with very few exceptions, all favorable
comments on Philippine labor come from the towns,
the unfavorable ones from the country; and the
fact is of great importance, for it lies at the root
of the whole labor question in the Islands. In the
towns, Philippine labor is chiefly employed by the




ECONOMIC CONDITION OF THE PHILIPPINES 229
Government, the Army, and transportation concerns, that is to say, by persons who are not engaged in producing anything for sale; and in the
country districts the employment is agricultural.
It is clear that the former class of employers is
placed in an entirely different relation to Philippine
labor from the latter class. The Government and
the Army can afford to pay an absurdly high rate
of wages because the money wherewith to pay the
laborers is the product of taxation and not of the
labor itself; the transportation concerns, like the
Manila-Dagupan Railway, can pay very high wages
because they can adjust their rates to meet their
expenses.
But the agriculturalist is in a very different
position. He is producing something for sale in
the European or American market in competition
with other producers of similar commodities; and
any considerable rise in the rate of wages makes it
impossible for him to conduct his business at a
profit, for the price obtained for his product is not
regulated by the labor rates of the Philippines, but
by the general rate of wages in all countries producing the same class of commodities. It is clearly
impossible for a sugar or tobacco grower in the
Philippines, who must pay from thirty to fifty cents
as daily wages for his labor, to compete successfully
with the planter of Java or Sumatra, who pays
from fifteen to twenty-five cents a day. The effect
of the high wages paid by the non-producing employers in the Philippines has not only raised the




230       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS.
rate for agricultural labor to an impossible figure,
but it has absolutely drained the country districts
of their best labor, for in the Philippines, as elsewhere, the average laborer would rather work in or
near a town than in the country for the same rate
of pay.
Even some of the Government works in the
country districts cannot secure a satisfactory supply
of labor, though abnormally high rates, far beyond
what private employers can pay, are offered.
The engineer in charge of the Benguet Road, a
Government undertaking, has given, in his annual
report for 1903, a description of Philippine labor
which I should say, from my own observation,
might be applied fairly to all Philippine labor out.
side the towns. " In general terms," he says, " the
native laborer has proved himself on his work to
be idle, shiftless, and stolidly indifferent, approaching his work with no degree of intelligence or
judgment, of a deceptive and treacherous character,
wantonly careless and frequently maliciously destructive, uninterested in and indifferent to his
work, unwilling to learn and impossible to teach..*. The Filipino has proved himself more expensive than white labor, and, one might say, is
practically valueless."
The present labor position is this, that of the
total population of the Islands there may be found,
perhaps, five per cent. who are fairly good laborers;
but these laborers have been drawn into the service
of the non-producing employers by the attraction




ECONOMIC CONDITION OF THE PHILIPPINES 231
of high wages and town life, leaving in the country
districts only a very small number of very poor
laborers who demand a higher rate of wages than
could have been obtained a few years ago by the
best labor in the Islands.
The suggestion that unskilled Chinese labor
should be introduced into the Islands has met with
violent opposition in the United States; and native
opinion in the Philippines is divided on the question. It is quite useless in this place to go into the
subject on its merits,' for there is no evidence in
any of the documents issued by those people in the
States who are opposed to the measure, that any
knowledge of Chinese labor or of the Philippine
Islands is considered an essential to the formulation
and expression of very decided opinions on the
subject.
Although the Philippine Commission officially
declares against the importation of unskilled Chinese
labor, two native members of the Commission and
one American member assured me that they were
convinced that Chinese immigration was the only
hope for any development of the Islands; that
they were in favor of it; but that the utter futility
of expressing an official view to that effect was
so well appreciated that they had made no stand in
the matter.
That the natural resources of the Philippine
Islands can never be made accessible for the use
1 I have discussed the question of imported contract labor at
great length in my Tropical Colonization.




232       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
of mankind without the aid of imported labor is
a simple fact which rests on the universal experience of centuries of work in the tropics; the contrary view, in so far as it rests on anything that
has any bearing whatever on the welfare of the
Philippine Islands, is based on a fantastic estimate
of what a Filipino could do if he were something
which he is not, but which, it is hoped without
a shred of reason, he may some day become,
-a steady-working, industrious citizen.
The probable effects of the introduction of unskilled Chinese labor are concisely presented in Professor Jenks's admirable Report to the Secretary of
War, dated 1902: " It is believed that such a measure would result, with here and there an individual
exception, not at all to the disadvantage of the
Filipino, but in the long run decidedly to his benefit through improved business conditions in the
Islands, which would furnish to him not merely
a better market for his produce, but also a better
opportunity for engaging in the kind of work for
which he is best fitted and which most closely accords with his tastes."
In regard to the admission of skilled Chinese
labor, the Philippine Commission has placed itself
on record as being in favor of its admission under
proper restrictions. It is perhaps needless to add
that Congress has not given the Commission the
authority which it asked for in this matter.
I may illustrate the effect of Chinese exclusion
in the Philippines by relating an occurrence which




ECONOMIC CONDITION OF THE PHILIPPINES 233
was described to me by one of the Philippine Commissioners. A capitalist came some time ago to
Manila and approached the Commission under the
following circumstances: he wished to establish at
Manila a great shipbuilding and repairing industry;
he wanted to build a dry dock capable of taking
the largest ship afloat, and to erect an extensive
plant for all kinds of marine engineering. As there
are very few skilled workmen in the Philippines
capable of doing the work which this man required,
he asked permission to bring in several thousand
Chinamen, giving a bond that he would take them
out of the country after a certain time. He promised to employ a Filipino to work with each Chinaman, and to dismiss the latter and take him out of
the country as soon as the Filipino was able to do
the Chinaman's work.
He pointed out that at the end of a few years
a great industry would have been established and
some thousands of Filipinos trained as skilled mechanics.
He was informed that the law would not allow
him to bring in his Chinamen; and he accordingly
betook himself and his capital elsewhere.
Incredible as this appears to be, if one is asked
to believe that the United States has the welfare
of the Philippines at heart, it is only in keeping with
the whole attitude of the Government in regard
to the development of the Islands.
Since the American occupation many hundreds
of people have been to the Philippines, anxious to




234~


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


invest capital there in mining, timber, or other industries. To-day there are not half a dozen such
persons to be found in the Islands. They have been
driven away either by the existence of laws which,
to use the expression of the Philippine Commission
itself, are " practically prohibitory upon such enterprises," or else by the cry that in seeking to invest
capital in the Islands and give employment to such
Filipinos as care to work they are trying to exploit
the Islands.
The question is a very much wider one than the
mere development of the Islands. It amounts practically to this, that unless foreign capital is encouraged to come to the country to build up industries,
one of two things must happen: either the whole
scale of Government expenditure must be cut down
until the cost of administration is somewhere near
the capacity of the natives in their present state of
industry to pay, or else a considerable proportion
of the cost of Government must be borne by the
United States, for it is impossible for the country
to continue to bear the rate of taxation which it is
now called on to support unless a great increase
takes place in the industrial output of the Islands.
One may argue round and round a situation of
this kind and predict all manner of evil from the
introduction of a thrifty and hard-working population, and all manner of good from the imminent
translation of the Filipino, through education, into
a sturdy, industrious person, but nothing can obscure the fact that if the Filipino is to be given




ECONOMIC CONDITION OF THE PHILIPPINES 235


good government some one must pay for it, and
that there are no indications whatever that under
the present policy the Islands can find the money
under any system of taxation which stops short of
extortion.
From the standpoint of an investigator who desires to inform himself accurately of the condition
of the Philippines and of their Government the
Reports of the Philippine Commission, on which he
must depend for much of his information, are in
some respects most unsatisfactory. The Report for
1903 covers about 3000 pages. It does not contain any general itemized statement of the whole
cost of the government, showing the amounts spent
on Public Works, and other important items of
expenditure. There is, indeed, a "Recapitulation
of Disbursements," but even after one has reduced
its various items to a common currency (some being
given in United States currency, some in Mexican),
and added together the disbursements on account
of the fiscal year 1903 and those on account of
previous fiscal years (which are given separately),
very little is disclosed as to the real nature of the
expenditure.
If one refers back to the original tables on which
the Recapitulation is based, it is only to be confronted with a four-column statement in two currencies, and to find that an unexplained item,
"Contingent Expenses," conceals everything which
the student is most anxious to discover. For instance,
under the heading " U. S. Philippine Commission "




236


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


(Report for 1903, part 3, page 431), it is seen that
$21,067 United States currency and $189,924
Mexican currency were disbursed in 1903 on
account of the fiscal year 1903, and $26,184
United States currency and $156 Mexican currency
on account of prior fiscal years, or a total of
$47,251 United States currency and $190,080
Mexican currency. But of these sums no less
than $24,096 United States currency and $60,022
Mexican currency are lumped under the heading
"Contingent Expenses."
On the following page of the Report, under
the heading " Bureau of the Insular Treasurer," the
total expenditure appears as $26,338 United States
currency and $229,795 Mexican currency, and of
these sums $25,253 United States currency and
$103,623 Mexican currency have no other explanation than " Contingent Expenses." This continues
through the whole of the financial statement, and
reduces the Report in this matter to a mere burlesque of an account of the Government expenditures.
I cannot go into the character of the Reports at
greater length at present; suffice it to say that in
a long familiarity with the Reports of many Governments I have never seen one which says so much
and tells so little as that of the Auditor of the
Philippine Islands.'
1 Since this chapter was written Congress has passed legislation which should have the effect of improving the economic
conditions of the Islands to some extent. The Philippine Gov



ECONOMIC CONDITION OF THE PHILIPPINES 237
ernment has been authorized to guarantee interest on bonds to
be issued to aid the construction of railroads; and also to incur
a bonded debt of $5,000,000 for public improvements; and the
Municipalities of the Islands have been authorized to borrow
money for use in Public Works up to 5 per cent. of the assessed
value of property in each Municipality.




CHAPTER XIII


AMERICAN POLICY IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
THE corner-stone of American policy in the Philippines is education.
A perusal of the Reports of the Philippine Commission discloses the fact that, whilst the question
of education in the Islands has been approached
most frequently from the point of view of the
political development of the people, it has also been
felt that every problem in connection with the control and development of the Islands would find its
solution in the establishment of a complete system
of public instruction.
In the Report of 1900 the Commission says, "s It
is evident that the fitness of any people to maintain
a popular form of Government must be closely
dependent upon the prevalence of knowledge and
enlightenment among the masses."
The idea is carried still further by the Hon. Wm.
H. Taft in a recent article in " The Churchman."
"The chief difference," he says, "between their
[the English and the Dutch] policy and ours, in
the treatment of tropical people, arises from the
fact that we are seeking to prepare the people under
our guidance and control for popular self-government. We are attempting to do this, first, by




AMERICAN POLICY IN THE PHILIPPINES 239
primary and secondary education offered freely to
all the Filipino people.... Our chief object is
to develop the people into a self-governing people,
and in doing that popular education is, in our judgment, the first and most important means."
Before proceeding to describe what has been
done in the Philippines in the way of education,
I must point out that, as a matter of fact, there is
not a single British Colony in the tropics which
is not provided with a system of public instruction,
and that so far from the extent of educational work
in the Philippines being extraordinary and unique,
as Mr. Taft leaves his readers to infer, there are a
number of British Colonies in which the proportion
of school enrollment to the total population is
higher than it is in the Philippines.
I find myself unable to agree with the opinion
quoted above that education is the first and most
important step in the development of the capacity
of self-government in a people.
Apart from the obvious fact that the establishment of peace and order is the first duty of any
Government as well as an indispensable preliminary to all constructive administration, this theory
ignores one of the most universal traits of human
evolution as disclosed in the history of the growth
of institutions, namely, that political progress has
depended on industrial rather than on educational
development.
I doubt whether a single instance can be adduced
from the whole material of human history in which




240


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


a popular movement for increased self-government
has arisen as the result of the spread of education.
It is only necessary to refer to the three great
political movements of modern times - Parliamentary Reform in England, the French Revolution,
and the American War of Independence - to show
that economic and not educational factors are the
primary elements in political evolution.
In a word, you may find a high state of industry
where advanced political and educational conditions
do not exist; but the world does not furnish a
single instance of a country in a low state of industry in which any real, substantial progress in
education and politics has taken place.
Without wishing to detract in the smallest degree
from the just value of education I feel that to place
it before order and industry in the programme of
Government is to undertake a dangerous experiment
for which no hope of success can be based on the
past experience of mankind.
Having decided that the first need of the Philippine Islands was a school system, the Government
was confronted with the problem of providing instruction for many thousands of children speaking
a number of different native dialects, and of establishing normal schools for the training of native
teachers many of whom possessed but an indifferent
knowledge of English.
The problem was solved in the most radical manner by adopting English as the only language of
instruction. This step was taken on two general




AMERICAN POLICY IN THE PHILIPPINES    241
grounds, one that a common language was necessary
in order that there might be developed in the Islands
an effective public opinion capable of universal expression, the other that " English is the language
of free government; it is the language of AngloSaxon freedom; it is the language in which they
[the Filipinos] can read the history of the hammering out by our ancestors of the heritage of liberty
which we have had conferred on us."
The important place which education occupies in
the administrative scheme in the Philippines may be
gathered from the fact that one fifth of the whole
public revenue of the Islands is expended on public
instruction.
The expenditure amounts, in round figures, to
$3,000,000 annually, and this provides for about
seven hundred American teachers, distributed in
more than three hundred towns throughout the
Islands, and for upwards of three thousand Filipino
teachers, working in about two thousand schools.
Taking the population of the Islands at eight
millions it is seen that there is at present one teacher
for every two thousand inhabitants, whereas under
the Spaniards there was but one teacher to every
four thousand.
The school enrollment, according to the latest
available figures, is 263,000, with an attendance of
70 per cent. In other words, about 2.3 per cent.
of the total population of the Islands is attending
school.
It is interesting to compare these figures with




242       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
those relating to education in a few British Colonies in various parts of the tropics. The proportion of the total population attending school in
Barbados is 7 per cent., in British Guiana, 2 per
cent., in Jamaica, 6 per cent., in Ceylon, 5 per cent.,
in Mauritius, 3 per cent.
More important than the spread of primary education throughout the Islands is the establishment
at Manila of a Normal School with its useful branch
the Teachers' College, for it is in these institutions
that there must be developed the effective teaching
force of the future.
Experience in educating tropical races has shown
that although a European staff can turn out a small
number of brilliant pupils the slow work of leading
a native race along the path of instruction can be
most efficiently performed by native teachers.
In addition to the general scheme of education
outlined above, there have been established night
schools, high schools, normal institutes, a school of
telegraphy, and a nautical school; and it is intended
to organize an industrial department in connection
with each of the provincial schools of secondary
instruction.
Every effort is being made in the Philippines to
give the people whatever advantages may be attached to a wide diffusion of educational facilities;
but when it is reflected how small a proportion of
the Filipinos can ever be utilized outside the field
of manual labor until a great increase in industry
has provided work of a higher character, it is at




AMERICAN POLICY IN THE PHILIPPINES 243


least open to doubt whether the present attempt to
increase the literacy of the people is not premature.
Perhaps the most striking commentary which
has been published upon the educational work in
the Philippines is that contained in the Report of
the Secretary of Public Instruction for the year
1902:
"The people have been accustomed under their earlier
instruction to regard education as a means of putting
themselves in positions where manual labor is not required. Hitherto the Filipino youth has looked upon the
instruction of the schools as a means of preparing him to
become a teacher, a civil officer, a clerk, a lawyer, a physician, or a priest. That phase of education through which
the young man expects to become a skilled workman has
lain almost entirely below his horizon.... Whatever
progress, therefore, is made in industrial education must
be made in opposition to a strong prejudice; but this
prejudice is not thought of as invincible."
I may add in this connection that in fifteen years
of travel in tropical countries in which education
has been in operation for more than a generation,
I have observed no indication that the spread of
instruction has had the effect of making the natives
appreciate the dignity of manual labor. In fact for
every skilled workman turned out by the industrial
schools in the tropics the schools of general instruction have cast upon the country twenty men who
from the very fact of their education refuse absolutely to have anything to do with any employment
which involves manual labor.




244


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


But the question of education in the Philippines
must be approached not only from the standpoint
of the ultimate advantages which its advocates
claim are to result through its instrumentality, but
also from the point of view of its present cost and
the ability of the people to bear it; and we are thus
brought face to face with the problem of taxation
in the Islands.
In discussing this matter we are not hampered
by the necessity of discounting the oppressiveness
of a present burden by a presentation of conjectural
advantages in the future, as we are when the simple
question of education per se is the subject of our
inquiry.
Taxation must always be judged by two standards,
first by the relation which it bears to the wealth and
industry of the country, second by the return which
the people get for the money they pay out in taxes.
In a previous chapter I have dealt with the relation which taxation in the Islands bears to the wealth
and industry of the country, and have shown that
it is oppressively high.j We may turn, therefore, to
the question of what the people of the Philippine
Islands are getting in return for their contributions
to the Insular Treasury.
It is a sound principle of Colonial finance in tropical countries that as large a proportion as possible
of the total taxation should be devoted to reproductive expenditure, that is to say, to works which
will either increase the industrial activity of the
country and thus lighten the burden of taxation by




AMERICAN POLICY IN THE PHILIPPINES   245
increasing the wealth of the people, or which will
eventually pay for themselves and form a valuable
asset of the Government.
To the former class of works belong such undertakings as road construction, irrigation, forest conservancy, and the construction of good market
places; to the latter the installment of water-supply
systems, gas or electric lighting, and telephone service, and the construction of railroads, where these
things are not undertaken by private enterprise.
In order to disclose the general character of the
public expenditures in the Philippines I may compare them with those of the Federated Malay States.
In the Philippines out of a total expenditure of
$31,000,000 (Mexican) about 10 per cent. was devoted in 1903 to reproductive work. In computing
this sum I have included all items under the headings Forestry, Agriculture, Public Lands, Roads,
Bridges, Public Improvements, and Government
Laboratories.
The total expenditure of the Federated Malay
States in 1903 was $16,000,000 (Mexican), and of
this sum 56 per cent. was spent on works of the
character stated in the foregoing paragraph.
If the principles on which the expenditures are
apportioned in the Philippines differ completely
from those which guide the Government of the
Federated Malay States, the methods by which the
revenue is raised in those countries show a still
greater divergence of policy.
The total ordinary revenue of the Philippine




246


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


Islands during 1903, exclusive of refundable items,
was $28,000,000 (Mexican), and of this sum no less
than $22,500,000, or 80 per cent., was raised from
Customs duties, almost the whole burden falling
on merchandise imported for consumption by the
natives.
In the Federated Malay States the public revenue
for 1903 was $22,672,000 (Mexican), of which
$12,000,000 represented Customs duties, chiefly
export duty on tin; $3,600,000 receipts from Government Railways; and $3,600,000 licenses for
the manufacture and sale of opium, for the sale
of spirits, for the right to keep Chinese gamblinghouses, and to conduct the business of pawnbroking.
As Chinamen constitute the whole working force
of the tin-mines and are the sole patrons of the
opium-shops and gambling-saloons, and almost the
only consumers of spirits in the Federated Malay
States, it is clear that the greater part of the public
revenue of the States, exclusive of railway receipts
(of which, however, the Chinaman pays a very large
proportion), is derived from the taxation of tin (the
great exportable product of Chinese labor) and of
the personal vices of the Chinese population.
The pros and cons of taxing opium and gambling
I have discussed in a previous chapter. I am concerned at present with the effect which the presence
of Chinese laborers in a country has upon the incidence of taxation; and it is apparent that the
effect in the Federated Malay States has been to
leave the native Malay practically untaxed whilst




AMERICAN POLICY IN THE PHILIPPINES   247
a revenue has been raised sufficient to give the
country law and order, unexcelled means of communication, and a most efficient administration.
It may be said that revenue cannot be raised in
the Philippines as it is raised in the Malay States
because Chinese immigration is not sanctioned in
the Islands; but this simply brings us back to the
bald fact that the administration of the Philippines
is conducted at an expense entirely out of proportion to the ability of the people, in their present
state of industry, to bear, and that the Federated
Malay States afford an example of what the Chinaman can do to help a country out of an impasse of
this kind.
Of all the work which has been done by the
United States in the Philippines that which is most
deserving of praise, alike from the standpoint of
policy and of performance, is the work of the Board
of Health of the Philippine Islands and City of
Manila.
In carrying out the task of checking the spread
of preventable disease and of introducing sanitary
methods of living, the Board of Health has been
hampered by almost every difficulty which could
be expected to detract from the efficiency of its
efforts.
On the one hand it has been hampered by want
of funds and by inadequate or unsatisfactory laws,
on the other hand by a general opposition on the
part of the natives to the introduction of all sanitary improvements, an opposition which can only be




248       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
appreciated by those who have had occasion to observe the combined effect of the suspicion, distrust,
superstition, and fatalism with which all tropical
races meet any attempt to change their personal
habits.
Apart from the difficulties which are due to the
above causes innumerable obstacles to sanitary progress are to be found in the physical conditions by
which the people are surrounded. These are naturally most unfavorable in the towns. In Manila, for
instance, there is neither a proper system of sewerage nor an adequate supply of uncontaminated
water.
The present housing of the people presents its
own peculiar problems to the sanitary engineer:
In the cities the houses are of one of two types,
either loosely constructed buildings of light material, or masonry houses very solidly built in order
to withstand the shock of earthquakes. The objections to the former class of houses are that they are
highly inflammable, are far too crowded both as to
the number built on a given area and as to the
number of persons inhabiting them, and finally that
as they are built on posts which raise them above
the ground there is a strong temptation, which is
never successfully resisted, to use the space under
the house for a garbage heap.
The solid masonry houses are perhaps open to
even greater objection. They are badly lighted,
badly ventilated, and they are more overcrowded
and with worse results than the lighter structures.




S


AMERICAN POLICY IN THE PHILIPPINES 249
The work which has been done by the Board of
Health in face of the difficulties I have described
above deserves the highest commendation; and it
has only been achieved by the loyal cooperation of
all the staff and by the most severe and unremitting
toil in the teeth of a most discouraging indifference,
not to say hostility, of the mass of the people in
whose interest it has been performed.
The death rate of the Islands has been greatly
reduced by the application of scientific checks to
the spread of disease; the City of Manila has been
rescued to a considerable extent from its former
state of inconceivable filthiness; plans are being
made for giving the City a good water supply; and
the question of a radical treatment of the sewerage
problem is under consideration.
That many things are still lacking, notably hospital accommodation, is recognized by everybody;
but the Board of Health may well feel proud of
the revolution it has already effected in sanitary
matters. 
I pass now to the last and probably the most
important question of Philippine administrative
policy which I can discuss in the present volume -
the question of roads.
In a tropical country no single feature of practical administration is so sure an index to the general condition of the country as the extent and
character of the roads.
It may be said that from the days of the Romans
down to the present time the most successful col



250


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


onizers, whether success be measured by the advantages accruing to the sovereign State or those which
fall to the native population, have been those who
have made the best roads.
Without its splendid roads, many of which are
still in use in Europe, the Colonial Empire of Rome
could not have held together for a decade. British
India without its roads would be little better off
to-day than it was a century ago under its native
rulers, when the recurrent famines were left to
work complete destruction in the affected areas
because the lack of roads made it impossible to
transport grain from one district to another, and
when from the same cause the internal trade of
the country was hampered almost to extinction.
The reduction of India to a state of peace and
order unknown in its pre-British history, the suppression of dacoity and the immense development
of industrial prosperity in Burma, the astounding
growth of the Federated Malay States, the great
commerce of Java, the recent improvement in
French Indo-China, may be attributed more to the
influence of good roads than to any other single
agency.
Deprive a tropical country of its roads and you
produce an effect comparable only to that which
would follow in the United States the destruction
of every mile of railroad.
It is remarkable, therefore, that in the Philippines the Government should have allowed five
years to pass without doing anything of importance




AMERICAN POLICY IN THE PHILIPPINES    251
in the direction of covering the country with good
highways.
With the exception of the few miles of roads
constructed by the Army during the military occupation, and the extravagantly expensive Benguet
Road, which serves merely to give easy access to
the sanitarium at Baguio, I doubt whether the
American occupation of the Islands has resulted in
the opening up of a hundred miles of serviceable
roads available for wheeled traffic at all seasons of
the year.
This neglect is the more remarkable from the
fact that it must have been clear to the Government
almost from the commencement of its operations
that the two great needs of the country - peace
and prosperity - could never be attained until good
roads facilitated the movements of troops and the
transportation of commercial commodities.
A survey of the whole course of American administration in the Philippines leaves the student
of comparative colonization with a few very clear
and definite impressions of American colonial
methods.
That there has been an honest desire on the
part of the American Government to do what has
appeared to be in the best interests of the Filipino
people, there can be as little doubt as that the
majority of the American officials in the Islands
have been animated by a similar ambition.
But, from lack of experience and from a refusal
to attach any importance to the centuries of experi



252


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


ment through which the colonizing nations have
passed in their relations with tropical Asiatics,
almost every Government measure has had as its
foundation the assumption that what is good for
the United States is good for the Philippine Islands.
Thus a high tariff, an extended system of education, the exercise of political rights by the greatest
possible number of the people, the exclusion of
contract labor, and the application of the American
navigation laws, all of which appear to have the
approval of the majority of the American people as
component parts of their home policy, have been
transferred wholesale to a country which is separated from the country of the ruling power by every
circumstance of climate, race, and civilization.
The task which has been undertaken is, in fact,
to make an American out of a Filipino; and it is
a task for which few people who have had any
personal acquaintance with tropical races will be
prepared to predict even a moderate degree of
success.
It is not at all necessary, in order to discredit
this attempt, to paint the Filipino as a mortal of a
lower type than the American; it is not a question
of inferiority or of superiority, but of difference.
To expect that American institutions can find
a permanent home in the Philippines, after the
control of affairs has passed out of American hands,
is to disregard every natural force which has contributed since the beginning of the world to the
differentiation of racial types.




AMERICAN POLICY IN THE PHILIPPINES 253
That the Filipino is capable, if left to himself
and protected from outside interference, of developing in the course of time some such Government
and civilization as may be found to-day in the States
of Central America is a theory on which opposing
opinions may reasonably be entertained by honest
and competent observers; but that he can remain
in his present geographical environment, free from
the constant oversight of a non-tropical race, and
yet become, even in the course of ages, a creature
of schools, ballot-boxes, and free political institutions, is beyond any flight of an imagination which
is checked by the smallest knowledge of tropical
life.
If a disinterested critic of political and administrative measures confines himself to a destructive
analysis of his material, he lays himself open to the
charge of having accomplished an easy, useless, and
offensive task; if, on the other hand, he proceeds to
a constructive review of his facts, he may scarcely
hope to avoid the appearance of assuming an unwarrantable authority in affairs which concern him
only as an observer.
It appears to me that it is the duty of the critic
to accept the latter alternative, for constructive
1 Personally I see no reason to suppose that the Filipinos if
left to themselves could not establish and carry on a government
as good as that of Venezuela, for instance; but that under such
a government they would be very much worse off than they
now are under American control there can be no possible
doubt.




'254


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


criticism possesses this pleasing characteristic, that,
even in its most mediocre form, it may contain the
germ of' improvement.
Whilst claiming no greater authority for my
opinion than is commonly accorded to any one who
has spent a number of years in the close study of
any subject, I venture to add the following paragraphs as a proper sequel to what has gone before.
With the destruction of the Spanish authority in
the Philippine Islands, the responsibility for the
protection of the Islands and for the establishment
'of a stable internal Government devolved upon the
United States.
That neither of these responsibilities could have
'been discharged by handing over the Islands to
Aguinaldo and his masters is perfectly clear to
almost everybody who has the most ordinary familiarity with Far Eastern affairs in general, and with
the conditions of the Philippines in particular.
The only kind of Government which Aguinaldo
could have established would have been a military despotism masquerading under the guise of
a Republic; and for a large proportion of the
population it would have been as much a foreign
domination as the government of the Islands by the
United States. That such a Government would
have been corrupt and inefficient, notwithstanding
the presence of a small number of brilliant and
well-educated men, can scarcely be doubted in
view of what is now known of the political capacity of the Philippine people.




AMERICAN POLICY IN THE PHILIPPINES    255
The significance of this lies not in the disorder
and suffering which would have followed the establishment of a purely native Government, but in the
fact that the certain failure to protect foreign interests in the Islands would have involved the Government in disputes with the Great Powers, which
would have made it impossible to maintain the
territorial integrity of the Republic.
It has been suggested that this danger could
have been averted through the assumption by the
United States of a Protectorate over the Islands.
But if the Protectorate was to mean anything
beyond an impossible guarantee of responsibility
for the acts of the Republic, whether or not they
involved serious breaches of international law, it
would have to mean that the United States should
enjoy, in return for its own assumption of the responsibility, so large a measure of control as would
assure the avoidance of international complications;
but this would raise the Protectorate as a mere
guarantee of territorial integrity into a protectorate of internal control, and the object of giving
the Filipinos the effective management of their
own affairs would be defeated.
The demand which has been made in some
quarters in the United States for immediate Philippine independence is based upon several serious
misconceptions, easily accounted for in the case
of persons who are prepared to decide the fate of
a country without any first-hand knowledge of it or
of its inhabitants.




256


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


It has been assumed that the people of the Philippine Islands, as a whole, desired independence at
the time of Aguinaldo's insurrection, and that they
still desire it. The results of my own observations
in the Islands (which, I am aware, differ from those
of some investigators, whilst agreeing with those of
others) lead me to the conclusion that this is not
the case. Ninety-five per cent. of the people of the
Islands have never had the smallest wish for independence, and the fact that they fought under
leaders who used " Independence " for their battlecry simply means that the small body of men who
engineered the revolution exercised over the mass
of the people that control which in the circumstances led to the creation of an army, and would
have led in the event of success to the establishment of a despotic rule based upon the immemorial
habit of the tropical native to do what he is told
by his own native bosses.
The cry of "Independence" which was raised
in the Islands after Aguinaldo landed in 1898 was
largely of American manufacture, and it rests today on an American propaganda. I was unable to
find that it had any hold whatever upon the people
at large, and it appears to be confined to a small
number of persons who are as representative of the
Filipino people at large as the occasional man who
would make the United States a monarchy, or the
United Kingdom a republic, is representative of
American and British sentiment.
In regard to the fitness of the Filipinos for self



AMERICAN POLICY IN THE PHILIPPINES 257
government there appears to be an opinion in some
quarters, if I may judge from the mass of material
which has passed under my hand, that because the
Islands have produced, entirely through foreign
influence and education, a few men of high intellectual capacity, and because many of the native
employees of the Insular Government show themselves capable of good work under American direction, the element thus known to exist could carry
on a Government if left to itself.
Nothing could be farther from a true interpretation of the facts. Efficient government does not
rest upon intellect but upon character, and it is in
the high qualities of responsibility, unselfish devotion to the common interest, and executive ability
that the Filipino is most lamentably deficient.
Writing without any reference to the attitude
of political parties in the United States, the measures which appear to me to be immediately necessary to insure the welfare of the Philippines are
these:
1. The free entry of all Philippine products into
the United States.
2. The importation into the Islands, under proper
restrictions and safeguards, of such numbers of
Chinese and Japanese skilled and unskilled laborers
as may be desired by the Government or by responsible private parties.
3. The opening up of the country by means of
good roads.
4. The encouragement of American capital by




258


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


granting liberal terms to miners, planters, and
others willing to invest their money in industrial
enterprises.
5. The abolition of the Philippine Commission
and the Provincial Governments, and the substitution in their place of a Governor-General, who,
with the aid of an appointed Council composed of
Americans and Filipinos, should be empowered to
legislate for all the internal affairs of the Islands,
subject to the veto of some authority in the United
States.
6. The creation of an Insular Office in Washington, which should be run on non-political lines
similar to those of the Army and Navy Departments.
7. The transference of the control of all Public
Works, except such as fall to the Municipalities, to
the Insular Government.
Nature has done all she can to make the Philippine Islands one of the most fertile spots in the
world, one full of the richest possibilities. Until
their natural resources are developed, until a
healthy activity takes the place of the prevailing
lethargy of their people, the Islands can never
hope to have any political growth.
It is impossible to confer independence on a
people as one would present them with a public
library or a drinking fountain. If the ground is
not prepared, if the people are not fit for selfgovernment, the gift of independence simply means
the handing over of the country to the despotic




AMERICAN POLICY IN THE PHILIPPINES           259
rule of a small coterie of picked men, who, from
their foreign education and training and their race
identity with the natives, would find it easy to
establish an ascendency over the masses, which
would keep them in a state of political and economic slavery.
Whatever the future may hold for the Filipinos,
it is certain that to-day they have scarcely taken
the first step on that long road of industry and
self-discipline which alone leads to a sane and
wholesome national life.
NOTE. At the moment this volume goes to press the appearance of the final volumes of the Philippine Census
enables me to reproduce in Appendix C some of the
more important data relating to the Islands.
I find nothing in this new material which leads me to
modify anything I have written in the foregoing chapters.
I wish to draw the reader's attention to the Table of
Literacy, No. 5 in Appendix C.
My statements in The Atlantic Monthly and in The
Outlook to the effect that ninety per cent. of the population of the Philippines was illiterate (i. e. could not
read and write any language) have been severely criticised; and I have been accused of gross ignorance of
the facts.
The Census shows that as a matter of fact my estimate
was within four per cent. of absolute accuracy. It appears that of the total population of the Philippines
86.8 per cent. cannot read and write any language; and
that even if we leave out of the calculation all the wild
tribes, to the number of 647,740 persons, and all civilized Filipinos under ten years of age, the proportion of
illiterates is eighty per cent.




CHAPTER XIV


CONCLUSION
IN the introductory chapter I dealt briefly with
such general features of tropical civilization as
appeared to form a proper subject of consideration
before embarking upon a study of some of the
specific problems of European and American administration in the Far East; and in bringing this
volume to a conclusion it may not be out of place
if I attempt to trace in the mass of facts which have
passed under our notice some underlying unity of
purpose, some coherent principle of action, some
broad, general effects, as the cause or consequence
of the activities which have formed the material of
our inquiry.
The origin of Western rule in the various countries of Southeastern Asia suggests a number of
interesting comparisons and analogies.
In regard to the possessions of the four Powers
which have been discussed in this volume the motives
which lay behind their peaceful acquisition, or the
circumstances which led to their conquest, place
England and Holland in one category, the United
States and France in another.
At the time when England and Holland acquired
their first Asiatic possessions, in the seventeenth




CONCLUSION


261


century, the internal conditions of each country
were such as to make colonial expansion a natural
development of the forces which had been generated
by the progress of discovery and the growth of
commerce since the Middle Ages.
Each country found itself face to face with serious economic problems arising out of the rigid
monopoly of tropical trade which had been established by Spain and Portugal.
For the Dutch this monopoly meant nothing less
than national ruin from the moment when Portugal
passed under the Spanish Crown, and Spain, as part
of her war policy, closed to. Dutch ships the great
Oriental trade on which the economic welfare of
Holland depended.
In England the conditions were not less favorable to the idea of over-sea expansion. Already
the country was over-populated in relation to the
agricultural and industrial methods of the time, and
an exaggerated idea of the wealth and prosperity
of Spain and Portugal fostered the belief that in
tropical commerce lay the economic salvation of the
Kingdom.
To these causes of the commencement of an English trade with Asia may be added a national characteristic common to all peoples whose home is an
island domain or one which has occupied, during
any considerable period of the national growth, an
isolated position in relation to the general movement of human events, namely, a strong resentment
against any claim of superior or even of equal rights




262


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


made by any foreign power in regard to matters
touching the interests, real or. imaginary, of the
nation.
The existence of this characteristic as a great
national force may be traced with the greatest distinctness in the events of the past century. Isolated
China regards herself as the mistress of the world,
and she has fought half a dozen wars in support of
the idea; insular Japan has been quick to resent
the interference of Russia in matters which affect
Japanese interests on the mainland; the United
States, which was practically isolated from Europe
until within the memory of the present generation,
has given the world the Monroe Doctrine as an
expression of her intolerance of European influence
in the affairs of the American continent.
The inordinate development of this characteristic
in insular and in isolated countries is due to a
simple cause. The inhabitants of such countries
have never been compelled, as have the natives of
continental Europe, to live in intimate contact with
other people having national traits and national
policies equally developed with their own, and possessed of powers of action immediately applicable to
any purpose of the national will; and the absence
of this contact has relieved the insular and isolated
countries from the necessity of constantly adjusting
their policies to the standard of what they can do
rather than to that of what they wish to do.
In other words, they have never been compelled
to adopt give-and-take as the basis of their actions,




CONCLUSION


263


and they have, therefore, had little training in the
art of putting up with an international grievance
simply because of the danger of attempting to secure redress.
To the insular mind of the Englishman of the
seventeenth century the claims of Spain and Portugal to the sole right of navigation and trade in the
Eastern seas appeared an intolerable pretension;
and when the breach of that monopoly became a
question of national pride as well as one of national
profit we find England joining Holland in an invasion of Southeastern Asia and in the establishment of dependencies in that part of the world.
Such, in brief, was the origin of Dutch and
British rule in the Far Eastern Tropics, and to this
day their presence there rests almost entirely upon
economic considerations.
When we turn our attention to France and the
United States we observe that these countries have
become the neighbors of Holland and England in
the Far East through causes totally different from
those which have been described above.
Neither France nor the United States has been
driven to territorial expansion in Asia through
causes due to the pressure of population at home;
neither has had the excuse that the monopolistic
policy of other nations has compelled them to conquer Asiatic countries in order to find markets for
their manufactures or a suitable ground from which
to supply their demands for tropical products.
To the enterprise of France and of the United




264


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


States the vast area of the British Empire is still
as freely open as it is to the energy of Englishmen;
and although this liberality has been rewarded in
each case by a resort to every device which ingenuity could suggest as likely to injure the trade of
England, there was no prospect, when France occupied Indo-China or when the United States acquired
the Philippine Islands, that England intended fo
serve either country with a taste of its own policy.
We must seek to account for the presence of
France and the United States in the Orient on
other grounds than those of national necessity.
The case of the United States is simple in the
extreme; it may be summed up in the phrase
"expansion by accident;" for at the time of the
outbreak of the Spanish-American war no one in
the United States had any prevision that the conflict would result in the curious anti-climax of freeing one Spanish colony from a foreign yoke and
fighting a war with another Spanish colony in
order to bring it under a foreign yoke.
The presence of the United States in the Philippines is merely a bye-product of the liberation of
Cuba; and the antithesis established in the preceding paragraph is purely dialectical, for it represents an unforeseen and unavoidable consequence
of the Spanish-American war rather than any deliberate and prearranged departure from the national
policy.
The French conquest of Indo-China during the
latter half of the nineteenth century is one of a




CONCLUSION


265


long series of colonial adventures in the tropics,
which cannot be explained by reference to any
real need of the French people for tropical dependencies.
Viewed from  the historic standpoint French
colonial expansion is divided into two periods.
During the first of these France acquired her West
Indian possessions, and her foothold in India, in
the course of wars connected with various European
quarrels; and although there was, no doubt, behind
these wars some consideration of the value of tropical dependencies as such, their acquisition was
not undertaken because they represented favorable
areas for exploitation, but because their conquest
was a move in the great game of European politics.
But at the beginning of the nineteenth century
France had lost practically the whole of her Colonial
Empire; and the recrudescence of a policy of territorial expansion in Asia occurred at a time when
the causes which had led to the earlier colonial
movement had ceased to have any bearing on
national or on international affairs.
The moment for planting colonies of Frenchmen
in non-tropical countries, and thus securing a true
extension of the French nation, was past, for even
as early as the end of the Napoleonic wars, every
non-tropical portion of the world which was susceptible of conquest and settlement had been occupied by England or Russia or was clearly marked
(as in the case of Trans-Caucasia and Australasia)
for such occupation.




266       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
The only other material reason for colonial expansion, in the absence of a superabundant population, was the need of trade areas; and it was
a need which France had not yet begun to feel.
The French conquest of Indo-China cannot,
therefore, be attributed to the existence of any
material national interests which would have suffered if the country had remained independent or
had fallen under other foreign control; and the
French action in the matter rested rather upon a
mental trait of the French character than on any
material consideration which the nation at large
had in view.
The Frenchman is brave, patriotic, imaginative;
and he is filled with a very proper and justifiable
pride in the great achievements of his nation. To
men of this temperament the spectacle of other
countries constantly engaged in over-sea adventure,
in adding island to island and province to province,
and in reaping the rewards of exploration and warfare, could scarcely fail to prove an irresistible
temptation; and thus the history of modern French
colonization is that of the pride of rivalry, the joy
of emulation, and has little concern with the persistent pursuit of a serious end closely related to
the welfare of the nation.
If the origin of the Western Governments in
Southeastern Asia exhibits a variety of causes
operating towards the same result of alien control
of numerous tropical territories, the principles on
which these countries have been governed and the




CONCLUSION


267


methods of administration which have been adopted
in them are no less diverse in character.
These differences have been exhibited at some
length in previous chapters, and my present object
is merely to draw a few general conclusions which
suggest themselves from a study and comparison
of the facts already before us.
England and Holland established themselves in
the Far Eastern Tropics through the agency of
trading companies, and until the beginning of the
nineteenth century the government of these commercial outposts was in the hands of tradesmen and
investors in Europe.
It was not until the middle of the nineteenth
century that the effective control of the British and
Dutch dependencies in Asia passed to the legislatures of the Sovereign States in Europe, although the trial of Warren Hastings, from which
we date administrative reform in British India,
commenced in 1788, and the bankruptcy of the
Dutch East India Company, which threw the control of Netherlands-India into the hands of the
Crown, occurred in the last decade of the eighteenth century.
The abuses which marred the administration of
the Dutch and of the English East India Companies
present an interesting difference in their general
character.
The Dutch, up to the time when their Company
was abolished, had never exhibited any high qualities of colonial statesmanship; and the officials of




268


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


Netherlands-India occupied themselves chiefly with
such matters as appealed to the imagination of the
Directors in Holland.
The result is that the student finds little record
of action in the higher field of colonial government
and a vast literature of commercial transactions.
In this material evidence is not lacking of serious
evils in the local administration, and of severe
oppression of the lower classes by the native rulers,
who exacted from the people the amount of forced
labor necessary to secure the trade products required by the Dutch.
What oppression there was, what injustice befell,
what suffering was endured, concerned a people
who, for the purposes of historical record, were
inarticulate; and thus in the early accounts of
Netherlands-India there are no Warren Hastings
trials and no detailed revelations under the searchlight of European investigation.
In British India the whole circumstances were
entirely different. Here the record contains comparatively little about the Company's shop-keeping,
but is filled with the narrative of great and stirring
events.
The abuses of the Company's rule in British
India seldom touched the common people; they
affected the affairs of the most powerful native
princes; and each grievance, real or imaginary,
was magnified a thousand-fold before it reached
Europe, for the aggrieved person had the power as
well as the desire to make himself heard.




CONCLUSION


269


It is very easy, therefore, to fall into the common
error of believing that the Dutch East India Company was more humane in its dealings with the
natives than its English rival; but it must be remembered that the evils of administration in British
India, falling as they did chiefly on the upper
classes, left the natives at large better off in many
respects than they had been under their own rulers,
whereas in Netherlands-India the worst effects of
the system of government were felt only by the
lowest classes, which were the least able to defend
themselves or to leave a record of their treatment.
The gradual improvement of administrative
methods in the British and Dutch dependencies
in Asia is due to a number of causes. The growth
of popular interest in colonial affairs which has
followed the universal spread of newspapers and
magazines amongst the public; the eagerness with
which, under our modernized form of party government, the Opposition seizes upon any colonial topic
which can be turned to political account; the increase of colonial travel and the augmentation of
colonial trade which have occurred pari passu with
the improvement of means of communication; the
ability of instant protest and publicity at the seat
of government, which the submarine cable has
placed at the disposal of every colonial malcontent;
these factors have gone far towards removing all
serious abuses in the government of those tropical
dependencies which lie on or near the ordinary
routes of commerce.




270


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


But behind these elements of reform lies the mental development of the age, which has endowed us
with such a keen sensitiveness to injustice or harshness of any kind that no evil which is great enough
to reach the public conscience, through any one of
the numerous channels which are open to any one
who has a tale to tell, can long remain unchecked.
The United States and France embarked upon
their careers in Southeastern Asia at a time when
the principle of a just and tolerant rule over dependent races had already been adopted and applied
by England and Holland.
The French in Indo-China have based their rule
upon the utilization and control of the native institutions of government as they found them; and
although the improvements which have been effected
in the higher branches of the Government are of
recent date, there can be traced from the very first
a degree of sympathy with native ideas which is
apparent even when the acts of administration show
the greatest lack of adjustment to local conditions.
In the final moulding of a government in IndoChina the French enjoyed the advantage of combining with a democratic sentiment, no less real
than that of the Americans, some experience of
democratic institutions in the tropics- a valuable
heritage of their West Indian experiences -and
they have thus been spared the inconvenience and
disappointment which would certainly have followed
any attempt to found a democratic state on the
banks of the Mekong.




CONCLUSION


271


When we turn, finally, to the work of the United
States in the Philippines we are confronted with a
number of facts of the greatest interest to students
of comparative colonization.
The United States took up the task of administering the affairs of a tropical dependency so late in
the day that practically every important problem of
subordinate government in the tropics had already
been the subject of experiment, successful or otherwise, by one or more of the great Colonial Powers.
As far as any influence it has exerted on the
policy of the United States in the Philippines the
history of tropical colonization as a phase of the
national activity of England, France, and. Holland
might as well have remained unrecorded.
Each question, whether of principle or method,
which has arisen in the Philippines has been approached as though it were an absolutely new
problem, and the whole field of experimental administration has been thrown open to the ingenuity
of a rapidly changing corps of officials.'
1 In this connection it may be noted that two commissions
have been appointed to inquire into the work of other nations
in the Far East.  In completion of one of these Professor
Jenks issued an admirable Report, but his recommendations,
except in the matter of currency reform, have borne no fruit.
The other commission was intrusted with the task of reporting on the question of opium legislation in the various Far
Eastern Colonies. The Report has not yet been acted upon,
and it is impossible, therefore, to judge whether it will have
any effect upon Philippine legislation in the line of its recommendations.




272


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


In approaching the question of American administration and policy in the Philippines, from the
standpoint of what has already been presented to
the reader in this volume, it is very necessary at
the outset to emphasize the fact that none of the
countries which have been described in the previous
chapters is in any true sense a colony, and that the
whole significance of our data rests on the circumstance that there can never exist in any part of the
Far Eastern Tropics a population which is not, for
all practical purposes, completely tropical in its general character.
We have been dealing, then, not with colonies
but with dependencies;1 and the vital importance
of this distinction becomes more apparent when
we consider, on the one hand, the general trend of
1 Throughout this volume I have used the words "colony"
and "colonial " in the generally accepted, if inaccurate sense
of a dependent state or matters pertaining to a dependent state,
regardless of whether the territory referred to is in reality
a colony or a dependency. It is almost impossible to avoid this
use of words, for there is no adjective derived from the word
"dependency" which can be used in such phrases, for instance, as "colonial policy" where the matter is really one
relating to the policy towards a dependency. There is no such
thing, strictly speaking, as a tropical colony; but this use
of the word is sanctioned by custom. The exact phraseology
appropriate to the different conditions is " colony" for those
dependent states where there is or can be permanent white
settlement on a large scale, and " dependency" for those dependent States in which the population is and always must be
composed chiefly of natives of the tropics.




CONCLUSION


273


development in each class of territory, and, on the
other hand, the fallacies which have arisen in recent
discussions of American expansion from the confusion of ideas due to an insufficient appreciation
of the difference between the two kinds of subordinate countries.
The War of American Independence arose
through causes which had their origin in the inability or unwillingness of the British Government
to realize the difference between a colony and a dependency; and the most important result of that
war, as far as the British Empire was concerned,
was the firm and final establishment of that difference in the public mind.
The nineteenth century witnessed the full expression of the new idea in the growth of British
colonial policy. Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
South Africa, in a word all the subordinate Provinces of the British Empire, in which white men
are able to establish a permanent home, have been
granted responsible self-government in a form which
leaves them a mastery of their internal affairs as
complete as that which is enjoyed by the various
component parts of the United States.
But if the political destiny of non-tropical colonies is clearly indicated by the experience of the
great self-governing States of the British Empire,
that of tropical dependencies is not less surely revealed by the history of the government of tropical
races by white rulers.
In the whole range of British imperial experi



274


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


ence there cannot be found an instance of any territory in which white men cannot effect a permanent
settlement on a large scale where there has not
been established and maintained a strictly dependent form of government; and even in those tropical dependencies which enjoy a rudimentary system
of popular representation (such as British Guiana
and Jamaica) we find that the final word in all
matters of administration is spoken by the Colonial
Office.
The colonial history of France also affords an
excellent example of the evolution of dependent
governments; and it discloses a complete change
of practice as a result of actual experiment.
The older dependencies of France (Martinique,
Guadeloupe, and Reunion), which received their
constitutions at a time when the democratic enthusiasm of the French people was still in its first
vigor, were endowed with representative institutions; and practically every negro was given a vote.
Between this act and the growth of the new
Colonial Empire of France there intervened a period
of thirty years, during which an opportunity was
afforded of observing the operation of the liberal
constitutions of the old dependencies.
Every writer whose opinions have fallen under
my notice has placed himself on record in condemnation of the use to which the natives of the older
tropical dependencies of France have put the political power intrusted to them for the management
of their affairs. The history of these dependencies




CONCLUSION.275
has, in fact, been one of disorder, injustice, brutality, incompetence, and corruption.
These facts became matters of common knowledge in France; and in the new French dependencies not a single constitution has been granted
which places any effective control of the administration in the hands of the natives.
In the tropical dependencies of Holland, Germany, and Portugal the Government is entirely
under the control of officials of the Sovereign State.
Even when we turn to the over-sea possessions
of the United States we find that, as a matter of
fact, despite a great deal of talk about absolute
self-government and not a little self-complacent
oratory in regard to the wide liberality of American
policy as compared with that of the European
Powers, neither Porto Rico nor the Philippines has
yet been granted a constitution differing in any
material political feature from that of a British
tropical dependency.
Finally, at the time this volume goes to press, the
United States has found it necessary to assume control of the financial affairs of St. Domingo (one of
the so-called Republics which reared themselves on
the ruins of the Spanish Empire in America), which
has gone from bad to worse during two generations
of self-government.
The literature which treats the recent expansion
of the United States has already assumed the proportions of a library; but it is not necessary to go
very far afield in this material in order to discover




276


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


that a great number of writers have drawn their
arguments in favor of the establishment of independent self-government in the Philippines from
a mistaken application of the experience o.f the
British non-tropical colonies.
If Canada and Australia are capable of selfgovernment, why, we are asked, may not the Philippines look forward to a time when they too
shall enjoy the advantages of advanced democratic
political institutions?
To this query the facts which I have presented
above should furnish a convincing reply. The
reason why no such future is possible for the Philippines is that universal experience has shown that
the inhabitants of a tropical country, where the
native character has not been changed by a large
admixture of European blood, are not capable and
cannot be made capable of maintaining a political
system which can so administer the Government as
to avoid serious complications with foreign States
as a result of the disorder which is the invariable
accompaniment of purely native rule.
As far as I am able to judge, however, from
a perusal of the general current literature relative
to the question of American over-sea expansion, the
appeal to past experience as a guide to present
action is regarded by at least a considerable section
of the American public as doctrinaire and wide of
the mark.
Although no attempt is made to controvert the
overwhelming mass of facts which go to place the




CONCLUSION


277


Philippine Islands in exactly the same category
as all other tropical dependencies; although the
United States has had some experience within its
own borders of the political capacities of a tropical
race, which is for many reasons more favorably
situated than are the Filipinos for the enjoyment
of popular self-government; although South and
Central America, where the mass of the voters are
greatly superior to what will constitute the same
class in the Philippines, are speaking witnesses of
the incapacity of tropical peoples for independent
self-government, the American people seem prepared to accept hope rather than experience as the
basis of their policy; and the date has already been
fixed when the control of the Philippines is to pass
to a popular assembly elected by the natives of the
Islands.
A sober statement of an American view as to
the future of the Philippines appeared in the editorial columns of "The Outlook," on December
31, 1904, and a portion of this I reproduce: "c The
American believes that every race of man in every
land and in every climate can become in time 'a
creature of schools, ballot-boxes, and free political
institutions.' That is more than a political opinion
bred in the school of experience; it is more than
a political conviction born with the birth of the
Nation; it is a spiritual faith.... But no argument can change the conviction of the American
people that expenditures for an education which
makes men add more to the wealth of a commun



278


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


ity than expenditures which make roads, irrigating systems, forest conservancy, and good market
places. No arguments can shake their faith that it
is possible to make of the Filipino people a people
of schools, ballot-boxes, and free institutions. If
this is an ideal of the imagination, it is one to the
realization of which the American people have
committed themselves, and from their self-appointed
task 'The Outlook' does not believe any arguments derived from the experience of the past will
induce them to draw back."
As an ideal this leaves nothing to be desired;
as a practical question of what is possible and what
is impossible it lacks only a single hope of success
which can be founded on any fact in connection
with the history of tropical peoples.
It should not be overlooked that the experiment
of converting Filipinos into Americans is being
conducted at the risk and at the expense of the
Filipinos, and that what for the United States is
nothing more than a matter of interesting observation is for the Filipinos an affair of the most vital
importance, in which success can place them in no
better position than they would enjoy under an
enlightened form of colonial government, but in
which failure will plunge them into the most terrible political and social disorder.
The view of " The Outlook " which I have quoted
above represents a deliberate renunciation of the
lesson of history in favor of an appeal to a national
sentiment developed and fostered under circum



CONCLUSION


279


stances as widely different from any which have
ever existed or ever can exist in the Philippine
Islands as it is possible to conceive. It is the
expression of a faith great enough to move mountains; and it is a view which I can respect without being able to yield to it the smallest degree
of acquiescence.
But what can be said of the following opinion
which has recently come to me from a private correspondent, and which is typical of much that has
been written and spoken in recent years about Philippine affairs?  "There is something more than
facts - the ideal, and the human will, which is
inspired by faith in it....  What we did to Japan
was finer than what Warren Hastings or Sir Edward
Clarke' have done, and if we give up the Philippines and demand their neutralization we shall have
done a bigger thing than the centuries of English
colonization have accomplished."
There can be no argument about an opinion of
this kind, for the mental standpoint of my correspondent is as unassailable as that of the man who
says, "These two verses of Browning have done
more for the advancement of humanity than all
the triumphs of the engineer, the chemist, and the
surgeon."
1 I do not understand my correspondent's reference to Japan.
I cannot recall any occasion on which the United States had
the choice of retaining Japan as a dependency or of securing her
neutralization. The reference to Sir Edward Clarke is probably
intended for Sir Andrew Clarke.




280       THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS
No one who has lived in the United States, as
I have done, for five years, can have failed to be
impressed by the extraordinary progress of that
country of marvels or to have realized in how great
a measure the unbounded success of the American
people is due to a free and untrammeled growth
unhampered by any regard for tradition or precedent.
In a country situated like the United States,
enjoying a temperate climate, endowed as to the
people with irresistible energy, as to the soil with
inexhaustible resources, and, as a consequence of
these, with great wealth, the carving out of new
political ideals and new administrative methods is
one of the healthiest indications as well as one of
the best results of a vigorous national life.
But this wonderful growth of the United States
is the product, fundamentally, of a new and unparalleled phenomenon in history - the rapid expansion of a society composed of the most diverse
elements over a territory of the most varied resources, at a time when science had placed at the
disposal of man infinite capacities of progress which
were not available during the growth of the older
nations.
In attempting to transplant to the Philippines
their social and political institutions, products of
the unique conditions of the United States, the
Americans show a remarkable blindness to the
causes of their own development, for every natural
circumstance which has contributed to the growth




CONCLUSION                281
of a distinctively American civilization is wanting
in the Philippine Islands.
Everything points to-day towards a constantly
increasing interest in Europe and in America in
colonial affairs, and people appear to be awaking
to a realization of the importance of the tropical
regions of the earth as a source of supply for foodstuffs, metals, and other commodities of necessity
in our modern scheme of existence.
The future will no doubt witness a closer and
more intelligent study of colonization than has been
in vogue up to the present time; and if this volume
should in some small degree stimulate the public
interest in one of the most fascinating and useful
fields of investigation open to the student of political science, it will have served a good purpose.




''~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~




STATISTICAL APPENDIX
SHOWING THE AREA, POPULATION, FINANCES, TRADE
AND SHIPPING OF


Hong Kong
British North Borneo
Sarawak.
Burma 
The Federated Malay States
The Straits Settlements 
French Indo-China
Netherlands-India 
The Philippine Islands.  285
287....  *.   289....*~  *290....*  *.  292....*~  *294...  295..      297....  299




I




HONG KONG


AREA
80.5 square miles
This is exclusive of the area of the New Territory on the
Chinese mainland, leased to the British Government in 1898,
which has an area of 375 square miles.
POPULATION
Total civil population, Census of 1901
Europeans and Americans              6,431
Chinese                            274,543
Other nationalities                  2,931
Total                          283,905
Estimated population, 1904- 317,130.
To the estimate for 1904 may be added:
Military population                  8,500
New Territory                      110,000
HONG KONG FINANCES
The following table shows the fluctuations in the value of the
local dollar, in which all accounts are kept.
THE HONG KONG DOLLAR EXB BsMD IN U.. U. CUEMC
Highest   Lowest           Highest  Lowest
1894 54 cents. 46 cents.   1899 48 cents. 46 cents.
1895 54        46          1900 50        46
1896 54        50          1901 50        44
1897 50        42          1902 46        38
1898 46        44          1903 48        38
The above rates are calculated to the nearest cent.




286


STATISTICAL APPENDIX


Revenue and Expenditures in Local Dollars
Revenue  Expenditures     Revenue  Expenditures
1894 2,287,203 2,299,096  1899 3,610,143 3,162,792
1895 2,486,228 2,972,373  1900 4,202,587 3,628,447
1896 2,609,878 2,474,910  1901 4,213,893 4,111,722
1897 2,686,914 2,641,409  1902 4,901,073 5,909,548
1898 2,918,159 2,841,805  1903 5,238,857 5,396,669
Public Debt
Hong Kong has a Public Debt of ~341,799 sterling.
HONG KONG SHIPPING
Tonnage of shipping ENTERED, exclusive of junks in coasting trade
British    Chinese  Other Nations  Total
1894   3,889,852  1,862,216  1,223,147   6,975,215
1895   4,297,342  1,960,458  1,359,203   7,617,003
1896   4,382,546  2,129,727  1,538,812   8,051,085
1897   4,133,151  1,974,358  1,674,870   7,782,379
1898   4,362,837  2,077,116  2,014,030   8,453,983
1899   4,362,206  2,102,240  2,105,758   8,570,204
1900   4,588,610  1,741,397  2,296,607   8,626,614
1901   4,615,022  1,650,204  2,749,729   9,014,955
1902   4,786,401  1,788,349  3,292,736   9,876,486
1903   5,633,563  1,568,545  3,663,326  10,865,434
HONG KONG TRADE
Hong Kong is a free port and no complete returns of Imports and Exports are available. The trade of Hong Kong is
almost entirely a transit trade.




STATISTICAL APPENDIX


287


BRITISH NORTH BORNEO
AREA
31,106 square miles


POPULATION
Census of 1901


Europeans
Eurasians
Chinese
Japanese
Siamese
Arabs
Malays
Natives of India
Of Dutch Indies
Of Sulu
Sarawak l
Malays i


12,'
1,<
4
6,4


195    Natives of Borneo
40    Bajau
282    Brunei
149    Dusun
13    Dyak
29    Idahan
)71    Illanun
142    Kedayan
)60    Murut
371    Orang Sungei
67    Orang Padas
Tangaras
Tutong


10,885
6,767
33,456
542
862
320
2,612
12,230
4,784
6,784
474
190
104,525


TOTAL


The present population is estimated at 175,000. This estimate includes districts which were not reached by the Census
of 1901.
BRITISH NORTH BORNEO SHIPPING
Tonnage of shipping ENTERED at the Port of Sandakan


1894
1895
1896
1897
1898


42,212
44,583
60,000
95,300
98,832


1899
1900
1901
1902
1903


97,868
98,914
108,882
no returns
available




288


THE FAR EASTERN TROPICS


BRITISH NORTH BORNEO FINANCE
The following general facts about the finances of British
North Borneo are taken from the Balance Sheet of the British
North Borneo Company issued on December 31, 1903:
Authorized Capital      ~2,000,000
Capital issued             752,975
Issue of 5 o/ Debentures  200,000
Issue of 5 o% Bonds        200,000
Revenue and Expenditure in local dollars
The following figures for finance and trade are in local dollars which follow very closely the rate of exchange in Hong
Kong, for which see p. 285:
Revenue   Expenditure         Revenue   Expenditure
1894    316,069    329,527     1899   546,129    568,347
1895    349,414    397,184     1900   587,226    402,859
1896    411,699    496,015     1901   658,930    431,219
1897   437,028     574,490     1902   830,157    541,980
1898    505,369    633,051     1903   918,059    609,927
From 1900 onward a large portion of the Expenditure
has been charged to Capital Account. The expenditures thus
charged are for Railway and Telegraph Construction, Public
Works, Government Vessels, etc. These expenditures were
in 1902, 1,070,215 dollars; in 1903, 1,196,336 dollars.
TRADE OF BRITISH NORTH BORNEO
Value of imports and Exports in local dollars. Value of treasure
included
Imports   Exports             Imports    Exports
1894   1,329,066  1,698,543    1899  2,456,999  3,439,560
1895   1,663,906  2,130,600    1900  3,178,929  3,336,621
1896   1,822,188  2,473,753    1901  3,262,763  3,382,387
1897   1,887,498  2,942,293    1902  3,807,621  3,671,004
1898   2,419,088  2,839,845    1903  3,229,310  4,212,151




STATISTICAL APPENDIX
I


289


SARAWAK
AREA
50,000 square miles
POPULATION
No census has ever been taken. The population is estimated
at 500,000, consisting of Dyaks, Malays, Chinese, a few Europeans, Arabs, Natives of India, and of the Dutch East Indies.
SARAWAK FINANCES
Revenue and Expenditure in local dollars, which follow closely the rate
of exchange in Hong Kong, for which see p. 285
Revenue Expenditure       Revenue  Expenditure
1894 457,596 486,533     1899   851,438   843,230
1895 453,800 462,383     1900   915,966   901,172
1896 493,760 444,200     1901 1,046,318   953,818
1897 565,789 504,100     1902 1,192,039 1,139,287
1898 638,188 543,507     1903 1,391,612 1,277,558
PUBLIC DEBT
The Public Debt of Sarawak on Dec. 31, 1903, was $25,000.
SARAWAK SHIPING
Tonnage of vessels ENTERED in the foreign trade
1894      26,097        ' 1899      20,803
1895     25,052           1900      22,062
1896      26,222          1901      36,158
1897     22,403           1902      55,190
1898     22,503           1903      46,912
TRADE OF SARAWAK
Value of Imports and Exports in local dollars. Value of treasure
included
Imports   Exports          Imports  Exports
1894,86161,859 2,105,972  1899 3,281,609 4,467,006
1895 1,915,597 2,206,723   1900 3,848,679 5,217,036
1896 2,274,159 2,425,565   1901 4,404,644 5,900,925
1897 2,489,288 2,732,478   1902 4,959,720 6,796,588
1898 2,906,143 3,367,141   1903 5,849,629 7,512,440




290


STATISTICAL APPENDIX


BURMA
AREA
Burma Proper           168,573 square miles.
The Chin Hills          10,250
The Shan States        59,915
Total             238,738
POPULATION
Census of 1901
Burma Proper             9,252,875
The Chin Hills            100,305
The Shan States          1,137,44
Total               10,490,624
Population according to Religions
Religious data were not returned for 1,260,722 persons.
Proportion                Proportion
Number  per 10,000          Number per 10,000
Buddhist 8,223,071  8,910    Hindu   279,975   303
Animist   237,508    257    Christian 145,726  158
Mussulman 337,083     365    Others    6,539     7
BURMA FINANCES
The unit used in the statistics of finance and trade of Burma
is the rupee, equal to Is. 4d. sterling, or 32 cents U. S. currency.
Revenue and Expenditure of Burma 1
Revenue   Expenditure           Revenue   Expenditure
(In rupees)                     (In rupees)
1894 45,681,636  28,663,243     1899  75,184,680 45,975,994
1895 49,008,390  29,354,494     1900  78,624,281  51,345,687
1896 52,419,874  29,033,927     1901 85,764,911 56,069,742
1897 50,076,732  27,969,242     1902  86,935,538 58,580,745
1898 68,460,076  44,631,771     1903 96,905,643 63,287,232
1 These figures are taken from the financial statement published annually in the " Report on the Administration of Burma." They represent
the Gross Receipts and Expenditures, and they include the transactions
of the Rangoon and Moulmein Municipalities, of the Rangoon Port Trust,
and of the Rangoon Pilot Fund.




STATISTICAL APPENDIX


291


BURMA SHIPPING
Tonnage EINTERED at ports of Burma, in the foreign trade
These figures exclude entries from ports of India, which are
regarded as part of the coasting trade.
British     Foreign     Total
1894     426,850      79,132      505,982
1895     639,929      76,755      616,684
1896     547,365      96,051      643,416
1897     466,934      74,785      541,719
1898     504,386      95,076      599462
1899     618,603     105,345      723,948
1900     604,020     107,018      711,038
1901     579,128     100,771     679,899
1902     632,410     125,399      757,809
1903     returns not available
TRADE OF BURMA
Value of the total sea-borne trade of Burma, excluding transactions on
Government Account
Imports          Exports
(In rupees)
1894        98,594,075       114,058,201
1895        83,268,876       136,707,705
1896       102,200,971       141,146,432
1897        98,909,551      145,722,889
1898       114,493,022       163,561,893
1899       116,808,404      164,667,442
1900       125,865,444      186,434,440
1901       144,331,536      214,074,674
1902       138,930,649      188,945,167
1903       148,138,800       225,627,286




292


STATISTICAL APPENDIX


THE FEDERATED MALAY STATES
AREA


Perak
Selangor
Negri-Sembilan
Pahang
Total


6,500 square miles
3,200
2,600
14,000
26,300


Europeans
Perak         661
Selangor      487
Negri-Sembilan 140
Pahang        134
Total    1,422


POPULATION
Census of 1901
Eurasians Chinese  Malays
591 149,375  141,723
576 108,768   40,384
309   32,901  56,917
46    8,695  73,462
1,522 299,739 312,486


Tamils
34,710
16,748
5,526
1,227
58,211


Others
2,605
1,826
235
549
5,215


Total
329,665
168,789
96,028
84,113
678,595


Under "Tamils" in the above table are included other natives of India. The estimated population of the Federated
Malay States in 1903 was 801,240.
FEDERATED MALAY STATES FINANCES
In local dollars, which follow very closely the course of exchange in
Hong Kong, for which see p. 285


1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903


Revenue
7,511,809
8,481,007
8,434,083
8,296,687
9,364,467
13,486,410
15,609,807
17,541,507
20,550,543
22,672,567


Expenditure
7,162,396
7,582,553
8,598,147
8,795,313
11,110,042
11,499,478
12,728,930
17,273,158
15,986,247
16,219,872




STATISTICAL APPENDIX


293


PUBLIC DEBT
The Government of the Federated Malay States has no
Public Debt. It has never raised a loan.
FEDERATED MALAY STATES SHIPPING
Tonnage of vessels ENTERED, exclusive of native craft
Perak      Selangor  Negri-Sembilan  Total
1894     168,859     184,967     132,442    486,268
1895     161,611     194,617     106,910    462,138
1896     143,069     195,689      70,760    409,518
1897     131,986     180,221      51,906    364,113
1898     129,063     190,705      61,531    381,299
1899     128,137     158,231      92,461    378,829
1900     138,824     181,768     102,864    423,456
1901     157,409     211,113     158,935    527,457
1902     173,299     307,523     214,236    695,058
1903     returns not available
TRADE OF THE FEDERATED MALAY STATES
Value of Imports and Exports. In local dollars
Imports           Exports
1894       24,499,615        32,703,147
1895       22,653,271        31,622,805
1896       21,148,895        28,395,855
1897       25,000,682        31,148,340
1898       27,116,446        35,241,003
1899       33,765,073        54,895,139
1900       38,402,581        60,361,045
1901       39,524,603        63,107,177
1902       45,757,240        71,350,243
1903       47,790,059        80,253,944




294


STATISTICAL APPENDIX


THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS
AREA
Singapore                             247 square miles
Penang and Province Wellesley         600
The Dindings and Malacca              625
Total                          1472
POPULATION
Census of 1901
Europeans and Americans              5,058
Eurasians                            7,663
Chinese                            281,933
Malays                             215,058
Tamils and other natives of India   57,150
Others                               5,387
Total                          572,259
STRAITS SETTLEMENTS SHIPPING
Tonnage of vessels ENTERED (exclusive of Native Craft and vessels
under fifty tons burden) in the foreign trade and in trade between
the Settlements
1894    5,534,761        1899    6,595,075
1895    5,528,742        1900    7,238,185
1896    6,119,475        1901    8,146,221
1897    6,055,275        1902    8,529,316
1898    6,225,210         1903   9,213,846
STRAITS SETTLEMENTS FINANCES
Revenue and Expenditure in local dollars, which follow closely the rate
of exchange in Hong Kong, for which see p. 285
Revenue  Expenditure           Revenue   Expenditure
1894   3,904,774  3,714,620    1899   5,200,026  5,060,523
1895   4,048,360  3,782,456    1900   5,386,557  6,030,740
1896   4,266,064  3,957,090    1901   7,041,686  7,315,000
1897   4,268,385  4,437,516    1902   7,754,736  7,601,354
1898   5,029,689  4,582,951    1903   7,958,496  8,185,952




STATISTICAL APPENDIX


295


Public Debt
The Straits Settlements have no Public Debt.
TRADE OF THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS
Value of Imports and Exports. Value of treasure and value of trade
between the Settlements included. In local dollars
Imports             Exports
1894        224,151,292        186,786,064
1895        211,046,776        185,813,002
1896        211,478,247        184,297,580
1897        232,011,963        203,977,342
1898        258,723,991        221,985,559
1899        293,178,542        249,221,452
1900        325,251,448        274,454,820
1901        320,520,209 -      278,753,805
1902        362,935,000        314,035,000
1903        403,037,000        336,689,000
FRENCH INDO-CHINA
I know of no task more difficult than that of securing accurate and comprehensive data in regard to French Colonies.
That I am not alone in this difficulty will be seen from the
following passage from "Dix Annges de Politique coloniale,"
by M. J. Chailley-Bert.
He is recounting a conversation with M. Guillain, former
Minister of Colonies in France: "No country is so badly
informed on the subject of its Colonies as France. Let us suppose that you wish to present, in reply to some deputy, a statement of the actual condition at some given time, I will not say
of our whole Colonial Empire, but of one single Colony; you
may be sure that such a statement does not exist; that it will
take you forty-eight hours to prepare it, and that even then it
will involve, in all probability, telegraphing to the Colony.
With the exception of yourself, there is no one, not even the
best informed Frenchman, who could prepare anything accurate."




296


STATISTICAL APPENDIX


Although I was supplied very generously by the Government
of French Indo-China with documents relating to the condition
of that Colony, I have been unable to extract from them statistical information of the same degree of completeness and
accuracy as that relating to the other Colonies dealt with in this
Appendix.
AREA OF FRENCH INDO-CHINA
270,000 square miles
POPULATION
No complete census has been taken. The following figures
are from " L'Annge Coloniale " for 1899.


Cochin-China
Cambodia
Tonkin
Laos
Total


2,300,000
1,700,000
7,500,000
500,000
17,000,000


Whitaker gives the total population in 1904 as 22,500,000.


FRENCH INDO-CHINA FINANCES
Some of the financial and trade statistics are given in francs,
some in piastres, in the official records. In the following
tables everything has been reduced to francs. The franc is
equal to 9id. sterling, or 19 cents U. S. currency.


General Revenue and Expenditure, in francs.
Annual Budget.
Revenue
1899         44,402,000
1900         53,671,000
1901         57,495,000
1902         65,140,000
1903          63,756,000


Figures taken from the
Expenditure
44,395,700
53,652,940
57,455,000
65,106,000
63,756,000




STATISTICAL APPENDIX


297


The above table represents the finances of the Union or
Federation of French Indo-China. In addition each member
of the Union has its own local budget. The local budgets for
1903 show the following revenues:


Annam
Cambodia
Cochin-China
Tonkin
Laos


6,159,000 francs.
4,650,000
9,929,000
9,955,000
616,000


TRADE OF FRENCH INDO-CHINA
Value of Imports and Exports, in francs


1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902


Imports
68,088,060
89,018,496
81,084,040
88,182,991
102,444,346
115,424,493
186,044,387
202,477,670
215,162,998


Exports
103,510,661
96,296,151
88,809,575
117,234,062
127,510,979
137,937,288
155,600,385
160,608,377
185,266,589


NETHERLANDS-INDIA
(Commonly referred to as the Dutch East Indies)
AREA


Java and Madura
Sumatra
Dutch Borneo
Dutch New Guinea
Celebes
Other Islands


50,544 square miles.
161,612
212,737
151,789
71,470
88,248
736,400


Total




298


STATISTICAL APPENDIX


POPULATION
Census figures for 1900. These figures exclude members of
the Dutch Military and Naval Forces. The term " Europeans "
includes all half-castes registered as having white blood. The
figures under " Natives in the Other Possessions " are simply
a rough estimate.
Orientals other
than natives of
NetherlandsEuropeans Chinese Arabs  India   Natives  Total
Java and Madura  62,477  277,265 18,051  3,114  28,386,121  28,747,028
Other Possessions  13,356  260,051  9,348  13,536  7,000,000  7,296,291
Total, 75,833  537,316  27,399  26,650  35,386,121 36,043,319
NETHERLANDS-INDIA FINANCES
All accounts are kept in guldens. The gulden equals Is. 8d.
sterling, or 40 cents U. S. currency.
Revenue         Expenditure
(In millions of guldens)
1894             128.4            138.7
1895             131.2            139.5
1896             133.1            143.7
1897             130.4            148.6
1898             132.4            150.7
1899             142.6            144.4
1900             151.8            146.1
1901             149.3            150.0
1902             145.5            160.0
TRADE OF NETHERLANDS-INDIA
In guldens. Value of treasure included
IIPORT8
Government      Private         Total
1894     7,711,597    167,503,632     175,215,229
1895     8,185,091    153,345,203     161,530,294
1896     7,361,332    160,987,301     168,348,633
1897     5,172,145    176,533,403     181,705,548
1898     8,163,279    171,658,153     179,821,432
1899     4,530,029    186,792,241     191,322,270
1900     9,370,149    186,553,373     195,923,522
1901    10,653,558    218,575,511     229,229,069
1902    13,032,570    189,925,470     202,958,040




STATISTICAL APPENDIX


299


1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902


Government
17,022,361
22,281,009
14,325,256
18,305,874
13,560,199
14,944,387
26,954,304
20,217,325
18,347,107


EXPOBTB
Private
183,063,456
202,806,801
185,305,455
192,108,404
204,193,898
235,978,871
232,079,302
235,024,389
247,124,377


Total
200,085,817
225,087,810
199,630,711
210,414,278
217,754,097
250,923,258
259,033,606
255,241,714
265,471,484


THE PHILIPPINE       ISLANDS
AREA
In the following table the area is given of each Island which
has an area of 100 square miles or over. The figures are taken
from U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, Special Publication
No. 3, 1900.


Square Miles
Basilan         350
Bohol         1,439
Burias          163
Busuanga        328
Catanduanes    680
Cebu          1,742
Culion         117
Dinagat         259
Guimaras        176
Leyte         2,713
Luzon        47,238
Marinduque     287
Masbate       1,290


Mindanao
Mindoro
Negros
Panay
Palawan
Polillo
Samal
Samar
Siargao
Sibuyan
Jolo
Tablas
Tawi Tawi


Square Miles.
36,237
3,972
4,854
4,708
3,937
231
105
5,040
134
131
241
250
237


Total area of the Philippine Islands including the estimated area of some unmeasured Islands                  119,542 square miles.




300


STATISTICAL APPENDIX


POPULATION OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
Censs of 190


Province or
Comandancia
Abra
Albay
Ambos Camarines
Antique
Basilan
Bataan
Batangas
Benguet
Bohol
Bulacan
Cagayan
Capiz
Cavite
Cebu
Cottabato
Dapitan
Davao
Ilocos Norte
Ilocos Sur
Iloilo
Isabela
Jolo
La Laguna
La Union
Lepanto-Bontoc


Province or
Population    Comandancia     Population
51,860     Leyte             388,922
240,326     Manila City       219,928
239,405     Marinduque         51,674
134,166     Masbate            43,675
30,179     Mindoro            39,582
46,787     Misamis           175,683
257,715     Negros Occidental  308,272
22,745     Negros Oriental   201,494
269,223     Nueva Ecija       134,147
223,742     Nueva Vizcaya      62,541
156,239     Pampanga          223,754
230,721     Pangasinan        397,902
134,779     Paragua (Palawan)  29,351
653,727     Paragua Sur         6,345
125,875     Rizal             150,923
23,577     Romblon            52,848
65,496     Samar             266,237
178,995     Siassi             24,562
187,411     Sorsogon          120,495
410,315     Suriago           115,112
76,431     Tarlac            135,107
51,389     Tawi Tawi          14,638
148,606     Tayabas           153,065
137,839     Zambales          104,549
72,750     Zamboanga          44,322


Total population of the Philippine Islands


7,635,426


Of this number 6,987,686 are classified as Civilized, and 647,740
as Wild.




STATISTICAL APPENDIX


301


FINANCES OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
I have been unable to find any reliable statistics in regard
to the finances of the Philippine Islands during the period of
Spanish rule.
The following figures are taken from the Annual Reports of
the Philippine Commission.
Comparative Treasury Statement of the Philippine Islands for the
fiscal years ending June 30, 1899, 1900, 1901, 1902, 1903
United States Currency
Debit          1899   1900    1901   1902    1903


Balance due Government at
beginning of year
Total deposits on account of -
Customs
Refundable export duties
Post-Offices
Internal Revenue
Miscellaneous
Repayments to appropriations
Philippine pesos coined from
bullion purchased
Sale of certificates of
indebtedness
Relief fund voted by United
States Congress
City of Manila
Total Debit         3


369,479 2,023,417 6,222,912 5,955,006


3,083,650 5,682,265 9,127,005
18,000   95,015
245,215  522,575  932,484
134,716  545,869  622,224
446,586


8,408,085
70,714
100,217
268,111
601,751
3,209,354


9,177,379
521,824
103,358
212,831
1,175,420
4,064,171
1,600,000
3,075,390


3,000,000
1,067,871 1,577,416,463,581 7,138,189 13,286,734 19,949,018 30,502,798


Credit
Total withdrawals
Total net differences due to
change of official ratio of
exchange in conversion of
Mexican to United States
currency
Balance due the Government at close of year
Total Credit


1899      1900     1901      1902      1903
3,094,102 5,114,722 7,063,821 13,361,320 19,528,338
592,691   340,766
369,479 2,023,417 6,222,912 5,995,006 10,633,693
3,463,581 7,138,189 13,286,734 19,979,018 30,502,798


The following table shows the Revenue and Expenditure
of the Insular Government for the fiscal year 1903. These
figures include the revenue and expenditure of the City of
Manila, but exclude those of the Provincial Governments and
the amount of the Congressional Relief Fund. The Provincial




302


STATISTICAL APPENDIX


Revenues during 1903 amounted to $2,548,259 U. S. currency,
and the Congressional Relief Fund amounted to $3,000,000
U. S. currency.
Revenue and Expenditure of Philippine Islands, 1903
Debit       Credit
Ordinary revenue exclusive of all refundable items  11,506,535
Extraordinary revenues exclusive of all refundable items  586,194
Ordinary expenditures                                   8,992,139
Extraordinary expenditures                              3,564,976
Excess of expenditures over revenues.482,385
Total                                12,557,116  12,557,116
SHIPPING OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
Tonnage of shipping ENTERED in the carrying trade
1901     1,644,528      1903    2,354,742
1902     1,906,733      1904    2,471,293
The tonnage is not divided in the returns according to
nationality; but the value of cargoes is divided in this manner,
and gives the following results for imports during the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1904:
Value of imports brought                 u. S. dollars
in American vessels                    2,101,234
British vessels                    16,358,774
French vessels                        744,155
German vessels                      6,572,958
Spanish vessels                     4,879,778
Norwegian vessels                   1,218,238
All others                          2,428,343
TRADE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
Values in U. S. dollars
Imports               Exports
1900             20,601,436             19,751,068
1901             30,279,406             23,214,948
1902             32,141,842             23,927,679
1903             32,971,882             33,121,780
1904             33,220,761             30,250,627




BIBLIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX
SHORT LIST OF WORKS RELATING TO


Hong Kong
British North Borneo
Sarawak
Burma 
The Federated Malay
The Straits Settlemenl
Java 
French Indo-China.
The Philippine Island


* s. 305


305..         306......*.  307
States.....  308
bs......  308..  309....  310
s.....   311


General 


*  * *  *..0.. 312




I
I




HONG KONG


Eitel, Ernest John. Europe in China; the history of Hong
Kong from the beginning to the year 1882. London. Luzac
& Co. 1895.
Skertchly, Sydney B. J. Our Island. A Naturalist's Description of Hong Kong. Hong Kong. Kelly and Walsh. 1893.
Anonymous. A Hand-Book to Hong Kong. Hong Kong.
Kelly and Walsh. 1893.
Ball, J. Dyer. Things Chinese, or Notes on Various Subjects
Connected with China. London. Fourth Edition, revised
and enlarged. John Murray. 1904.
Chailley-Bert, J. The Colonisation of Indo-China. Translated
from the French by Arthur Baring Brabant. Pages 1-125
relate to Hong Kong. London. Archibald Constable and
Co. 1894.
Norton-Kyshe, James William. The History of the Laws and
Courts of Hong Kong, tracing Consular Jurisdiction in China
and Japan, and including Parliamentary Debates, and the
Rise, Progress, and successive Changes in the various Public Institutions of the Colony from the earliest Period to the
present Time. 2 vols. London. Fisher Unwin. 1898.
Cantlie, James. Hong Kong. In the British Empire Series.
Vol. 1. London. Kegan Paul. 1899.
BRITISH NORTH BORNEO
Roth, Henry Ling. The Natives of Sarawak and British North
Borneo, based chiefly on the MSS. of the late Hugh Brooke
Low, Sarawak Government Service. Preface by Andrew
Lang. 2 vols. London. Truslove & Hanson. 1896.
Carton de Wiart, E. Les Grandes Compagnies Coloniales Anglaises du xixe SiBcle. Pages 1-48 relate to British North
Borneo. Paris. Perrin et Cie. 1899.




306        BIBLIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX
Hatton, Joseph. " The New Ceylon." Being a Sketch of British
North Borneo, or Sabah. London. Chapman and Hall.
1881.
Pryer, Mrs. W. B. A Decade in Borneo. London. Hutchinson and Co. 1893.
Treacher, W. H. British Borneo: Sketches of Brunai, Sarawak, Labuan, and North Borneo. Singapore. Printed at
the Government Printing Department. 1891.
Anonymous. Handbook of British North Borneo. London.
William Clowes. 1890.
Anonymous. Views of British North Borneo, with a brief History of the Colony. London. The British North Borneo
Company. 1899.
Low, Sir Hugh. British North Borneo. In the British Empire
Series. Vol. 1. London. Kegan Paul. 1899.
SARAWAK
Roth, Henry Ling. The Natives of Sarawak and British North
Borneo. 2 vols. London. Truslove & Hanson. 1896.
St. John, Sir Spenser. Life in the Forests of the Far East: or
Travels in North Borneo. 2 vols. London. Smith, Elder.
1863.
St. John, Sir Spenser. Rajah Brooke. London. Fisher Unwin.
1899.
St. John, Sir Spenser. The Life of Sir James Brooke, Rajah
of Sarawak, from his personal papers and correspondence.
Edinburgh. Blackwood. 1879.
Jacob, Miss Gertrude. The Raja of Sarawak. London. Macmillan. 1876.
Templer, John C. (Editor). The Private Letters of Sir James
Brooke, K.C.B. 3 vols. London. Bentley. 1853.
Low, Hugh. Sarawak: Its Inhabitants and Productions. London. Bentley. 1848.
Charles Brooke. Ten Years in Sarawak. 2 vols. London.
Tinsley Brothers. 1866.
Mundy, Rodney (Capt. R. N.). Narrative of Events in Borneo
and Celebes. 2 vols. London. John Murray. 1848.




BIBLIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX


307


Keppell, George (Major the Hon.). Expedition to Borneo of
H. M. S. "Dido" for the Suppression of Piracy. 2 vols.
London. Chapman & Hall. 1846.
Keppell, George. Visit to the Indian Archipelago in H. M. S.
"Maeander." 2 vols. London. Richard Bentley. 1853.
Furness, W. H. (3d). The Home-Life of Borneo Head-Hunters. Philadelphia. Lippincott. 1902.
BURMA
Nisbet, John. Burma under British Rule -and Before. 2
vols. Westminster. Archibald Constable. 1901.
Ferrars, Max, and Ferrars, Bertha.   Burma.   London.
Sampson Low. 1900.
Hart, Mrs. Ernest. Picturesque Burma, Past and Present.
London. Dent. 1897.
Shway Yoe (Sir James G. Scott). Burma as it Was, as it Is,
and as it Will Be. London. George Redway. 1886.
Shway Yoe (Sir James G. Scott). The Burman: His Life and
Notions. London. Macmillan. 1896.
Laurie, W. F. B. Our Burmese Wars and Relations with
Burma. London. W. H. Allen. 1885.
Bird, George W. Wanderings in Burma. London. Simpkin,
Marshall. 1897.
Hallett, Holt S. A Thousand Miles on an Elephant in the
Shan States. Edinburgh. Blackwood. 1890.
Fielding, H. The Soul of a People. London. Macmillan.
1899.
Fielding, H. Palace Tales. New York. Harpers. 1900.
Cuming, E. D. In the Shadow of the Pagoda. London.
W. H. Allen. 1893.
Cuming, E. D. With the Jungle Folk. A Sketch of Burmese
Village Life. London. Osgood, Mcllvaine. 1897.
Smith, Julius. Ten Years in Burma. Cincinnati. Jennings and
Pye. 1902.
Cox, Hiram. Journal of a Residence in the Burmhan Empire.
London. John Warren. 1821.
Fytche, Albert. Burmah, Past and Present. 2 vols. Kegan
Paul. London. 1878.




308        BIBLIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX
Phayre, Sir Arthur. History of Burma. London. Trtlbner.
1883.
Colquhoun, A. R. Amongst the Shans. London. Simpkin,
Marshall. 1885.
Browne, E. C. Coming of the Great Queen: A Narrative of
the Acquisition of Burma. London. 1888.
O'Connor, V. C. Scott. The Silken East. London. Hutchinson. 1904.
Paske, C. T. Myamma. A Retrospect of Life and Travel in
Lower Burmah. London. W. H. Allen. 1893.
Snodgrass, J. J. Narrative of the Burmese War. London.
John Murray. 1827.
THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS AND THE FEDER
ATED MALAY STATES
Buckley, Charles Burton. An Anecdotal History of Old Times
in Singapore. 2 vols. Singapore. Fraser and Neave. 1902.
Collet, Octave J. A. L']tain. ]tude minibre et politique sur
les ttats F6d4rds Malais. Bruxelles. Libraire Falk Fils.
No date. (Published in 1902 or 1903.)
Innes, Emily. The Chersonese with the Gilding off. 2 vols.
London. Bentley. 1885.
Dennys, N. B. A Descriptive Dictionary of British Malaya.
London. "London and China Telegraph" Office. 1894.
Begbie, P. J. The Malayan Peninsula, embracing its History, Manners, and Customs of its Inhabitants, etc. Printed for the Author at the Vepery Mission Press. Madras.
1834.
Cameron, John. Our Tropical Possessions in Malayan India.
London. Smith, Elder. 1868.
McNair, F. J. A. Perak and the Malays, or Sarong and Kris.
London. Tinsley Brothers. 1878.
Newbold, I. S. Political and Statistical Account of the British
Settlements in the Straits of Malacca. 2 vols. London.
John Murray. 1839.
Bishop, Isabella L. Bird. The Golden Chersonese and the
way thither. New York. Putnam. 1883.




BIBLIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX


309


Clifford, Hugh. In Court and Kampong: Tales and Sketches
of native life in the Malay Peninsula. London. Richards.
1897.
Rathbone, Ambrose B. Camping and Tramping in Malaya.
London. Swan Sonnenschein. 1898.
Swettenham, Sir Frank. Malay Sketches. London. Lane.
1895.
Swettenham, Sir Frank. The Real Malay. London. Lane.
1901.
Clarke, Sir Andrew. Straits Settlements. In British Empire
Series. Vol. I. London. Kegan Paul. 1899.
Skeat, Walter William. Malay Magic. Being an Introduction
to the Folklore and Popular Religion of the Malay Peninsula. London. Macmillan. 1900.
Befield, H. Conway. Handbook of the Federated Malay
States. London. Stanford. 1902.
JAVA
Raffles, Sir Thomas Stamford. The History of Java. 2 vols.
London. Black, Parbury, and Allen. 1817.
Raffles, Sir Thomas Stamford. Substance of a Minute recorded
by the Hon. T. S. Raffles. London. Printed for Black,
Parry, and Co. 1814.
Raffles, Sophia (Lady). Memoir of the Life and Public
Services of Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles. By his Widow.
London. James Duncan. 1830.
Scidmore, Eliza Ruhamah. Java, the Garden of the East.
New York. The Century Co. 1897.
Wit, Augusta de. Facts and Fancies about Java. London.
Luzac. 1900.
Day, Clive. The Policy and Administration of the Dutch in
Java. New York. Macmillan. 1904.
Boys, Henry Scott. Some Notes on Java and its Administration by the Dutch. Allahabad. Pioneer Press. 1892.
Money, J. W. B. Java; or How to Manage a Colony. 2 vols.
London. Hurst and Blackett. 1861.
Worsfold, W. B. A Visit to Java. London. Richard Bentley.
1893.




310


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX


Zimmermann, A. Die Europaischen Kolonien. Fttnfter Band.
Die Kolonialpolitik der Niederlander. Berlin. E. S. Mittler und Sohn. 1903.
Chailley-Bert, J. Java et ses Habitans. Paris. Colin. 1900.
Leclercq, Jules.  Un Sejour dans L'Ile de Java.  Paris.
Libraire Plon. 1898.
Breitenstein, H. Einundzwanzig Jahre in Indien. Zweiter
Theil. Java. Leipzig. Th. Grieben's Verlag. 1900.
De Louter, J. Handleiding tot de Kennis van het Staats-en
Administratief Recht van Nederlandsch-Indie. 's Gravenhage. Nijhoff. 1895.
Reus, G. C. Klerk de. Geschichtlicher Ueberblick der administrativen, rechtlichen und finanziellen Entwicklung der
Niederlandisch-Ostindischen Compagnie. Verhandelingen
v. h. Batav. Genootschap. 1894.
Soest, G. H. van. Geschiedenis van het Kultuurstelsel. 3 vols.
Rotterdam. Nijgh & van Ditmar. 1869-1871.
Veth, P. J. Java, geographisch, ethnologisch, historisch.
Haarlem. De Erven F. Bohn. 1896.
Pierson, N. G. Koloniale Politick. Amsterdam. P. N. van
Kampen & zoon. 1877.
FRENCH INDO-CHINA
Doumer, Paul. Situation de l'Indo-Chine (1897-1901). Hanoi.
Schneider. 1902.
Salaun, Louis. L'Indo-Chine. Paris. Imp. Nationale. 1903.
Neton, Albdric. L'Indo-Chine et son avenir dconomique, avec
une preface par M. Eugene Etienne, president du Groupe
colonial. Paris. Perrin. 1904.
Anonymous. L'empire d'Annam et le peuple Annamite. Paris.
Alcan. 1899.
Lanessan, J. M. A. de. L'Indo-Chine francaise. Paris. Alcan.
1888.
Septans, Albert. Les commencements de l'Indo-Chine franVaise. Paris. Challamel ain. 1887.
Baurac, J. C. La Cochinchine et ses Habitants. 2 vols.
Saigon. Imprimerie Commerciale Rey. 1894 and 1899.




BIBLIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX


311


Raquez, A. Pages Laotiennes. Hanoi. Schneider. 1902.
Dubois, Robert. Le Tonkin en 1900. Paris. Socidte Franvaise d'Editions d'Art. 1900.
Norman, C. B. Tonkin; or France in the Far East. London.
Chapman. 1884.
Colquhoun, A. R. The Truth about Tonkin. London. Field
and Tuer. 1884.
Cunningham, Alfred. The French in Tonkin and South China.
London. Sampson Low. 1902.
Moura, J. Le Royaume du Cambodge. Paris. Leroux.
1883.
Nicholas, P. Notes sur la Vie frankaise en Cochinchine. Paris.
Flammarion. 1900.
Luro, J. B. E. Le pays d'Annam. Paris. Leroux. 1897.
Leftvre, E. Un voyage au Laos. Paris. Plon. 1898.
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
Martinez de Z4iAiga, J. Estadismo de las islas filipinas. 2 vols.
Madrid. Minuesa de los Rfos. 1893.
Foreman, John. The Philippine Islands. New York. Scribner. 1899.
Sonnichsen, A. Ten months a captive among Filipinos. New
York. Scribner. 1901.
Schurman, J. G. Philippine Affairs. New York. Scribner.
1902.
Doherty, David J. Conditions in the Philippines. (U. S. 58th
Congress. 2d Session. Senate Doc. 170.) Washington.
Govt. Printing Office. 1904.
Jagor, F. Reisen in den Philippinen. Berlin. Weidmann.
1873.
Sawyer, Frederic H. The Inhabitants of the Philippines.
London. Sampson Low. 1900.
Roosevelt, T., and Taft, Wm. H. The Philippines: The First
Civil Governor, by Theodore Roosevelt; Civil Government
in the Philippines, by William H. Taft. New York. The
Outlook. 1902.




312        BIBLIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX
Worcester, Dean C. The Philippine Islands and Their People.
New York. Macmillan. 1899.
Asensio, Vincente Llorens. Historia general de las Filipinas.
Madrid. Murillo. 1899.
Comyn, TomAs de. State of the Philippine Islands; being an
historical, statistical, and descriptive account of that interesting portion of the Indian archipelago. London. Printed
for T. and J. Allman. 1821.
Montero y Vidal, Jos6. Historia general de Filipinas. 3 vols.
Madrid. Tello. 1887-1895.
Philippine Information Society. Facts about the Filipinos. 10
pamphlets published between May and Sept. 1901. Issued
by the Philippine Information Society. 12 Otis Place,
Boston, Mass.
Navarro, Ed. Filipinas; estudios de algunos asuntos de actualidad. Madrid. Minuesa de los Rios. 1897.
Blumentritt, Ferdinand. The Philippines; a summary account
of their ethnographical, historical, and political conditions.
Chicago. Donohue. 1900.
Blair, Emma Helen, and Robertson, James Alexander. The
Philippine Islands, 1493-1903. Cleveland. The Arthur H.
Clark Co. 1903.
[A collection of important original documents mainly in
English translation. More than 20 vols. have already been
published, bringing the record down to 1624.]
GENERAL WORKS ON SOUTH EASTERN ASIA
The following works relate wholly or in part to the Colonies
dealt with in this volume, or to questions relating to the government of tropical dependencies, and cognate subjects.
Clifford, Hugh. Further India. New York. Stokes. 1904.
Wallace, Alfred Russel. The Malay Archipelago. London.
Macmillan. 1898.
Crawfurd, John. A descriptive Dictionary of the Indian Islands and adjacent Countries. London. Bradbury and
Evans. 1856. 




BIBLIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX


313


Earl, George Windsor. The Eastern Seas, or Voyages and
Adventures in the Indian Archipelago. London. W. H.
Allen. 1837.
Thomson, J. T. The Straits of Malacca, Indo-China, and
China. London. Sampson Low. 1875.
Norman, Henry. The Peoples and Politics of the Far East.
New York. Scribner. 1895.
Jenks, Jeremiah W. Report on certain Economic Questions in
the English and Dutch Colonies in the Orient. Washington.
Govt. Printing Office. 1902.
Mercer, W. H., and Collins, A E. The Colonial Office List.
London. Harrison. Annual.
Lowell, A. Lawrence. Colonial Civil Service. New York.
Macmillan. 1900. (Contains an account of the East India
College at Haileybury by H. Morse Stephens.)
Lewis, Sir George Cornewall. An Essay on the Government
of Dependencies. New Edition. Oxford. The Clarendon
Press. 1891. (Contains a valuable Introduction by C. P.
Lucas, C.B.)
Reinsch, Paul S. Colonial Government. New York. Macmillan. 1902.
Austin, O. P. Colonial Administration, 1800-1900. Washington. Govt. Printing Office. 1901. Contains a valuable
Bibliography of Colonization prepared by A. P. C. Griffin,
Chief of the Division of Bibliography in the Library of
Congress.)
Kidd, Benjamin. The Control of the Tropics. New York.
Macmillan. 1898.
Ireland, Alleyne. Tropical Colonization. New York. Macmillan. 1899.
Leroy-Beaulieu, P. P. De la colonisation chez les peuples
modernes. Fourth Edition. Paris. Guillaumin. 1898.
Lanessan, J. M. A. de. Principes de colonisation. Paris. Alcan. 1897.
Pety de Thozde, Ch. & R. Thdories de la colonisation an
XIXe sibcle, et r6le de l'Vtat dans le d6veloppement des
colonies. Bruxelles. Hayez. 1902.




I




APPENDIX C
TABLES FROM THE PHILIPPINE CENSUS
Table 1. Total Population, classified as civilized and wild  317
Table 2. Civilized Population, classified by color.. 318
Table 3. Civilized Population, classified by place of birth  320
Table 4. Civilized Male Population of voting age.. 320
Table 5. Civilized Population,.attending school.. 321
Table 6. Civilized Population, classified by literacy and
sex.                                  322
Table 7. Civilized Population, classified by occupations
and sex....... 324
Table 8. Civilized Population, classified under all occupations showing more than 5000 persons. 326




I




TABLES FROM       THE PHIIPPINE       CENSUS      317
TABLE I
Total population of Philippines, classified as civilized and wild


PBOVImCE O0 CoMADoANCUA.               TotaSl    Civilized.  Wild.
population.




PmHuIPnN     IBADS......................        7,635,426     6,987,686    647,740
Abra......................................             51,860        37,823     14,037
Albay..................................              240,326       239,434        892
Ambos Camarines.............................           239,405       233,472       5,933
Antique......................................         134,166       131,245       2,921
Basilan.......................................         30,179         1,331     28,848
Batan...........................          46,787        45,166       1,621
Batangas.................2.....5...      257,715       257,715
enguet....................................              22,745           917      21,828
Bohol........................................          269,223       269,223........
Bulacn......................................           223,742       223,327        415
Cagayn......................................          156,239       142,825      13,414
Cpiz........................................          230,721       225,092       5,629
Cavite........................................         134,779       134,779.......
Ceb......................................             653,727       653,727.......
Cottabato.1..............................             125,875         2,313     123,562
Dapitan...................................         23,577       17,154       6,423
Dlvao...................65,496                          20,224      45,272
Ilocos Norte.................178,995                      176,785       2,210
Ilocos BuT................................         187,411       173,800      13,611
nollo......................................        410,315       403,932       6,383
Isabela.......................                 76,431        68,793       7,638
Jo6.........................................           51,389         1,270      50,119
La Laguna..............................               148,606       148,606.......
La Uni6n.....................................         137,839       127,789      10,050
Lepanto-Bontoc...............................           72,750        2,467      70,283
Leyte........................................         388,922       388,922.......
Manila city.................................          219,928       219,928.......
Marinduque.................................            51,674        51,674.......
Masbate......................................          43,675        43,675........
Mindoro..................................              39,582        32,318       7,264
Miamis.......................................         175,683       135,473      40,210
Negros Occidental............................         308,272       303,660       4,612
Negros Oriental...............................         201,494       184,889      16,605
Nueva ]cija..................................          134,147       132,999       1,148
Nueva Vizcaya...............................           62,541        16,026      46,515
Pampanga....................................           223,754       222,656       1,098
Pangasinn..................................           397,902       394,516       3,386
Paragua......................................           29,351        27,493       1,858
Paragua   ur..................................           6,345         1,359       4,986
al.........................................            150,923       148,502       2,421
Rombl6n......................................            2,848       52,848........
Bsmar...................                 266,237       265,549        688
Siassi........................................         24,562           297      24,265
Sorsog6n.....................................          120,495       120,454         41
Surigao......................................         115,112        99,298      15,814
Tiriac........................................ 135,107   133,513       1,594
Tawi Tawi............................        14,638            93      14,545
Tayabas8..................     153,065       150,262       2,803
Zambales.....................................          104,549       101,381       3,168
Zamboanga...............................                44,322        20,692     23,630


I I


1 Comandancia is the Spanish word for military district. At the date of the census
the civil organization had not been extended to all parts of the archipelago and certain
districts were therefore returned as comandancias which have since become civil districts.
Sub-province of Tayabas.
3 Exclusive of sub-province of Marinduque.




Coo
em


TABLE II
Civilized population of Philippines, classified by color
BROWN.     MID.               YELLOW.                        WITE.               BrLAcx.
Total
PaOVINCE OR CONAnDAIoU.              popula-                --- 
tion.       Total.     Total.    Total.    Male.    Female.    Total.    Male.   Female.    Total.     0
1                       PHaIPPN      ISLLANDS.  6,987,686  6,914,880    15,419    42,097    41,071     1,026    14,271    11,450    2,821     1,019     H3
2   Abra..................................        37,823      37,773         6       29        29.........       15        14        1..
3   Albay.................................      239,434      237,114      579      1,227     1,225         2       294      258        36        220
4   Ambos Camarines....................    233,472     231,671      519      1,066     1,066.........      286       251       35         30 
5   Antique...............................       131,245     130,696       297       158      158.......       32        29        3         62
6   Basian...............................         1,331       1,226        48        44        44.........       13        11        2.........
7   Batan................................        45,166      45,030        38        27        27.......         70        56       141              r
8   Batangas.....................   257,715     257,095        78      232       225          7       269       233       36         41
9   Benguet.............................             917         815         6        12        12.........       84        75        9.........
10   Bohol.................................       269,223     268,890       152       153       153.........       28        24        4........
11   Bulacn...............................       223,327     222,583       309       372       364         8        60        48       123              Z
12   CagayAn...............................      142,825     141,435       217       924      915          9       233       198       35         16    N
13 C,   piz.................................  225,092  224,519   311       200       199         1        62        45       17.......
14   Cavite................................       134,779     133,483       150       852       827        25       291       229       62          3    0
15   Ceb..................................   653,727     651,276       883     1,170     1,163         7       372       312       60         26 I
16   Cottabato.............................   2,313       1,779       183       212       201        11       139       107       32......... 
17   Dapitan...........................17,154                 17,078        12        57        54         3         7         7.................     O
18   Dvao.................................         20224       20,093        60        19        19.........       52        49        3.........
19   Ilocos Norte...........................     176,785     176,463       132       114      114.........       75        46       291              CO
20   Ilocos Sur.............................     173,800     173,207       158       291       291.........      140       124       16          4
21   Iloilo..................................     403,932     401,113       622     1,603     1,583        20       590       462      128          4
22   Isabela................................       68,793      68,054       145       447       447.........      138       125       13          9
23   Jol6..................................        1,270.615       122       485       429        56        48        31       17.........


~




24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
3G
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51


La Laguna............................
La Uni6n.............................
Lepanto-Bontoc........................
Leyte..................................
Manila city...........................
Marinduque 1........................
Masbate...............................
Mindoro..............................
Misais...............................
Negros Occidental..................
Negros Oriental........................
Nueva Acija...........................
Nueva Vizcaya.........................
Pampanga.............................
Pangaaiinn............................
Paragua..............................
Paragua Sur..........................
Rizal..................................
Rombl6n...............................
S m ar.................................
Siass..................................
Sorsog6n...............................
Surigao................................
TArla.................................
Tawi Tawi.............................
Tayabas2..............................
Zambalea............................
Zamboanga...........................


148,606
127,789
2,467
388,922
219,928
51,674
43,675
32,318
135,473
303,660
184,889
132,999
1G,026
222,656
394,516
27,493
1,359
148,502
52,848
265,649
297
120,454
99,298
133,513
93
150,262
101,381
20,692




147.719     163
127,350     101
2,388      34
386,329     571
185,351   4,664
51,537      49
43,349     117
32,155      37
134,341     398
301,877     626
184,045     399
132,560     150
15,991      16
221,277     636
393,196     283
27,362     43
1,296      8
147,558     119
52,595      91
264,286     219
45       6
119,070     381
98,779     127
132,906    200
33       3
149,302    287'
101,035     146
19,240     618


526
203
11
1,786
21,838
73
134
70
531
849
330
183
1
562
724
39
35
525
128
825
239
844
320
325
62
479
128
643




523
202
11
1,785
21,105
70
134
69
531
846
328
180
1
550
714
39
35
520
128
822
190
840
317
320
47
478
120
621


3
1........
733
3
2
3.......ii
12
10.......'
49'"
49
4
3
1
8
22


195
94
34
234
7,943
15
71
55
202
307
62
72
18
149
263
29
20
283
34
212
7
157
56
65
159
61
191


155
84
31
194
6,136
12
61
49
188
259
57
58
18
118
218
25
17
220
31
200
144
61
44
2
148
42
150


40
10
3
40
1,807
3
10
6
14
48
6
14
i3i1
85
4
3
63
3
12
3
13
5
21
3
11
9
41


3
41...... i
2
232     g
lr
1    U
53
34........ i
60:
20.......ii
W
17    P
21    I.........   5i
---   b


_ __ __






i Sub-province of Tayabas.                                a Exclusive of sub-province of Marinduque.               C
Amongst the "Brown" and "Mixed" the sexes are very evenly distributed; the great preponderance of males amongst the "Yellow" and 
" Whites " is shown in the above table.                                                                                            5
q


C4
to




320 TABLES FROM THE PHILIPPINE CENSUS


TABLE II
Civilized Population of Philippines, classified by place of birth
Born in Philippine Islands               6,931,548
United States                        8,135
Other America                           83
Spain                                3,888
France                                 121
United Kingdom                         667
Germany                                368
Other Europe                           487
China                               41,035
Japan                                  921
East Indies                            241
Other Asia and Oceania                 108
All other countries                     84
Total civilized population   6,987,686
TABLE IV
Civilized male population of voting age (21 years and over)
Illiterate               1,137,776
Literate                   489,609
Superior education          50,140
Total                 1,677,525




TABLES FROM       THE PHILIPPINE       CENSUS      321
TABLE V
Civilized Papulation of Philippines attending school


Total
PsovicaB Oa COaDmCc.           _       -.
Male.   Female.


PLIPPINE    La    D................................           443,012         368,703
Abra.......................................,717           3,162
Albay...........................................            16,951          13,515
Ambos Caniarines.................................     13,607          10,780
Antique.............................................                 9,380           8,878
Basilan.................................,........                     48              45
Batan...............................................                 2,137           1,479
Batangas..............................                              10,229           8,503
Benguet..............................................1                                  35
Bohol.................................................               20,173          19,815
Bulacin.............................................                13,165          10,170
Cagay~u..7,435                                                                5,363
Cagayn..............................................  7,435         5,363
CApiz.............................................                   11,756           9,964
Cavite................................................               8,306           7,101
Ceb4..............................................                 48,957          45,647
Cottabato.............................................                  89              84
Dapitan..............................................                1,227           1,068
DAvao......................................878                                         657
Ilocos Norte.....................................11,105                              9,136
Ilocos Sur..........................................11,100                         8,886
Iloilo u............................................            25,884          22,924
Isabela..........................................4,018                    3,319
Jol6...............................................                     45              17
La Laguna............................................                8,610           6,504
La Uni6n...................................          11,146           8,355
Lepanto-Bontoc.......................................                  132             122
Leyte.................................................              27,326          24,155
Manila city............................................             10,809           6,509
Marinduque'.........................................                6,278           4,168
Masbate.............................................,18            2,606
Mindoro...........................................                   2,273           1,801
Misamis.........4.........................9,42                             8,508
Negros Occidental.....................................              13,663          11,465
Negros Oriental.......................................              10,020           9,100
Nueva icija..........................................                7,701           4,858
Nueva Vizcya..........................................                1,513           1,162
Pampanga............................................                 9,917           6,882
Pangasn..............................................31,343                 26,776
Praua..............................................              1,585           1,314
Paragua Sur.........................................               38              32
Rize al.........................................  6,934,058
Rombl6n......4...................................                    4,168           3,312
SAmar.............................                      12,834          10,624
iasai..............................................                12               1
Sorsog6n..........................................   9,733           7,852
Surigao...........................................8,229                               7,380
TArlac...........................................                    7,783           5,521
Tawi Tawi........................................                    3               2
Tayaba.............................................             11,312           8,987
Zambales........6........6091                                                        3,631
Zamboanga........................................1,664                               1,470
1 Sub-province of Tayabas.
S Exclusive of sub-province of Marinduque.




TABLE VI
Civilized population of Philippines 10 years of age and over, classified by literacy and sex


to


__


ILLTERATE.                                  LITERATE.
Population
10 years of      Ttal             an neither read  Can read but can-   Total        With superior
PaovnCE oR COMANDANCI.        age and          ot.              nor write.        not write.                       education.
over. _____-._ ______ ______ 
Male.   Female.     Male.    Female.   Male. Female.   Male. Female.   Male. Female.
I...,,,,,,                7


q
r
O
o


PMIIPz iE   ISLNDS.........


4,973,526


Abra...........................          26,103
Albay........................      174,820
Ambos Camarines...............  170,759
Antique..........................        89,109
Basilan..................1,025
Batan...........................         32,805
Batangas.........................       191,284
Benguet...........................           765
Bohol.............................       188,074
Bulacfn......................   161,825
Cagayin..........................  100,508
C&piz......      1...............       158,411
Cavite............................      102,188
Ceb.............................     439,927
Cottabato................           1,798
Dapitan.......................... 11,831
Dvao......................... 14,880
Ilocos Norte..............    122,321
Ilocos Sur.......................   123,588


F


1,738,213 2,232,726  1,311,852 1,450,241  426,361 782,484


I'


735,564 267,024:1l


I


-"


59,020


8,493
58,529
56,531
30,251
314
10,821
71,337
226
73,692
42,809
35,909
54,596
31,419
176,571
668
4,725
6,634
42,997
41,370


12,187     6,546
77,935    38,289
77,727    37,609
42,882    22,460
268       264
14,657     5,385
96,054    54,539
165       194
85,129    66,371
74,634    19,352
45,825    29,445
83,675    44,168
44,838    18,989
204,735   142,451
534       650
5,231     4,239
6,873     6,332
62,187    35,099
60,817    30,825


8,013
43,892
50,533
24,227
219
6,463
59,178
131
68,877
26,838
36,918
56,960
21,163
148,813
498
4,063
6,285
44,192
39,672


1,947
20,240
18,922
7,791
50
5,436
16,798
32
7,321
23,457
6,464
10,428
12,430
34,120
18
486
302
7,898
10,545


4,174   4,154
34,043  27,260
27,194  27,594
18,655  10,680
49     278
8,194   5,694
36,876  18,193
34     318
16,252  15,302
47,796  35,234
8,907  15,252
26,715  14,697
23,675  18,798
55,922  39,280
36     427
1,168   1,348
588    1,015
17,995  13,865
21,145  16,956


1,269     303
11,096   1,152
8,907     902
5,296     369
165      11
1,633     309
5,700   1,277
56      86
13,951     537
9,148   2,137
3,522     502
5,443   1,158
7,133     882
19,341   1,601
169     138
527      30
358     115
3,272   2,218
4,445   2,155


17,607    M
62 m
386 
221    E 
60    Z
3    t3
250    M
16 N
135
558    0
129    M
267    Z
231    Co
506  Cl
26    C
6
64
514
554




Iloilo.............................
Isabela.........................
JoI I..............................
La........................
La IU n6n.........................
Lepanto-Bontoo..................
Leyte.............................
Manila city......................
Marinduque I.................
Masbate.bate
Masbate..........................
Mindoro...........
Mlsamis..........................
Negros Occidental................
Negros Oriental..................
Nueva Ecija.......................
Nueva Vizcaya....................
Pampanga........................
Pangasinn.......................
Paragua.
Paragua B  ur......................
Rizal............................
ombl6n..........................
S    am............................
Tawi Taw...........................
8orsog6n............................
Burigao...........................
Trlao...........................
Tawl Tawi........................
Tayabas........................
Zambales.........................
Zamboanga.......................


293,961
60,349
1,069
113,660
87,605
1,710
271,380
187,276
35,987
28,543
23,220
93,492
214,039
127,427
94,630
12,066
159,172
268,249
19,680
1,119
113,344
35,678
186,718
235
86,485
69,096
92,510
84
110,387
69,293
14,341


105,817
18,606
379
31,501
26,736
681
101,292
45,464
12,279
10,691
8,419
37,109
90,547
54,199
30,533
3,451
44,395
92,146
7,756
439
35,953
13,950
78,278
111
26,760
28,110
31,538
59
27,153
21,708
4,361


135,847
22,162
280
48,940
42,129
676
114,629
47,079
16,943
12,709
10,396
38,516
91,822
58,903
43,372
4,903
73,116
123,701
9,696
354
50,208
16,368
85,331
32
34,416
30,678
42,388
9
43,505
31,999
5,265


74,444
16,820
379
21,367
18,030
537
79,239
80,604
8,229
8,346
6,680
32,287
76,053
48,752
20,910
2,730
25,984
67,806
6,851
397
19,239
12,044
70,007
107
14 883
24,363
23,313
59
19,147
16,578
3,461


70,205   31,373  65,642   36,392  15,905
18,041    2,786   4,121    8,111   1470
280................    361      49
30,254   10,134  18,686   24,374   8,745
26,295    8,706  15,834   15,043   3,697
587       44      89      330     123
77,280   22,053  37,349   36,508  18,951
25,747   14,860  21,332   70,083  24,650
11,320    4,050   5,623   4,971    1,794
8,800    2,346   3,909    3,923   1,220
7,141    1,739   3,265    3462     953
28,834    4,822   9,682   11,678   6,289
63,003   14,494  28,819   23,616   8,054
49,83    5,447   9,320    9,089   5,236
26,202    9,623  18,170   16,863   3,862
3,619     721    1,284    2,602   1,110
42,075   18,411  31,041   33,873   7,788
79,204   24,340  44,497   41,204  11,198
8,469     905    1,227    1,598    530
331       42      23      284      42
23,977   16,714  26,231  20,890    6,293
13,185    1,906   3,183   3,946    1,414
70,317    8,271  15,014  16,541    6,568
31        4       1       79      13
15,637   11,877  18,779   17,032   7,277
23,386    3,747   7,292   7,152    3,156
28,357    8,225  14,031   15,248   3,336
9................   13       a
26,281    8,006  17,224   28,362  11,367
22,663    5,130   9,466   12,547   3,039
3,293     900    1,972    3,154   1,661


I


6,971
528
8
949
1,245
20
1,307
12,578
295
166
137
267
2,391
184
2,086
91 
1,798
4,142
839
42
2,172
176
184
20
2,054
74
1,066
1,014
1,091
53


2,439
116
8
340
269
4 g
371
4,264   r109    M
48    C
17
69 
803
54 0
354 
17
621    H
5    t
700
21 
4
693    -
36    d
367.
291
244    M
10    0
tC
0n


-


I Sub-province of Tayabas.


2 Exclusive of sub-province of Marinduque.




TABLE VII


Civilizedpopulation of Philippines, classified by grand groups of occupations and sex




AGRICULTURAL     PROFESSIONAL      DOMESTIC       TRADE AND     MANUFACTURING    NOT GAINFUL, OB
AND PERS0NI,                  ~AND MECHANICAL
PURSUITS.  I    SRVICO        AND PERSONAL   TRANSPOBTATION. AD P    NI   L      UNKNOWN.
PROFIN~ OB COMA.~NDA.NCIAo  _SBEBRVICE.                                        PURSUITS.
PRoVca OB                           F COlD.MANCFaA
Male.   Female.   Male. I Female  Male. I Female.  Male. I Female.  Male. I Female.  Male.  Female.
t MA.NUFACTURING~~~~~


H
r
0


PHUPPN      ISLNDS......     1,163,777   90,286


Abra.......................
Albay........................
Ambos Camarines............
Antique.....................
Basilan.......................
Bata  n.......................
Batangas....................
Benguet......................
Bohol........................
Bulacdn......................
CagayAn....................
CApiz........................
Cavite........................
Ceb.........................
Cottabato....................
Dapitan......................
Dvao........................
Ilocos Norte..................
Ilocos Sur....................
Iloilo........................
Isabela.......................
Jo16.........................


8,460
30,497
20,394
11,699
255
2,909
54,790
224
44,869
25,467
33,496
20,752
22,901
113,529
266
4,112
4,465
42,185
27,415
53,442
19,764
4


105
1,990
812
179
1
397
1,330
19
326
1,446
23,770
864
423
2,829........
522
186
1,586
634
1,650
13,482


I


23,358
168
841
1,065
371
8
198
524
40
474
870
331
521
745
1,144
17
60
30
612
560
1,190
376
17


I




2,279
17
78
91
52
3
19
48
2
82
69
29
25
48
194
2
8
7
32
66
146
13
1




431,388
801
28,066
32,392
16,554
128
5,228
9,111
123
5,693
24,161
6,700
24,552
6,180
26,191
281
506
1,259
1,712
10,485
33,789
1,393
287


140,567
254
4,518
5,288
3,553
87
2,318
3,790
58
937
10,827
2,077
10,293
2,420
9,044
56
263
757
964
1,554
7,369
702
22




1:


150,989  75,566


249
3,307
4,363
879
61
492
5,079
41
5,702
3,643
2,358
1,762
3,254
9,429
273
83
131
806
2,973
11,036
971


252
526
641
146
6
1,737
3,731
4
285
8,417
587
528
4,647
8,420
2
2
5
482
717
1,508
133
7


621
3,960
9,091
2,139
83
4,798
6,368
74
8,051
10,825
1,804
7,956
8,617
16,871
162
129
328
2,311
6,605
16,900
645
73


4,969
23,331
23,168
19,839
71
627
43,495
88
6,580
14,640
4,590
39,205
13,269
77,720
4
1,206
712
32,267
21,863
58,596
268
1


243,081 716,589




1,484,059  2,465,747 
--— {H
8,337     13,590  M
51,985     90,335
48,824     87,343   d
30,706     45,128  m
190        438 
9,094     17,349  r
46,713     82,736 
113        131  I.
65,583    130,641  B
44,014     78,948 
28,135     38,948  M
47,204     71,430
24,852     47,423  Q
157,665    230,691  N
360        890 
3,919      6,344   i
4,228      8,116  Ci
36,785     57,043  rQ
35,941     64,987
81,636    136,670
12,969     18,077
180        396




282






La Laguna....................    20,741   3,91       728      48    11,162   5,945    4,010   5,197   10,026    6,409    26,651      55,098
La Un6n....................      21,730     229      403      30    6,291    1,173     881      286    3,302   21,570    29,668      42,226
Lepanto-Bontoc...............   249       12       25       2      411       78      49        8       58     323        494        758
Leyte....................    79,185   1,500    1,111     104    12,018   5,686    6,346   2,827    7,615   42,594    91,814     138,222
Manila city.................   2,605      86    2,827     481   36,060   11,784   41,020   3,729   21,191   13,075    27,956      59,114
MarinduqueI.................      8,109      63      135      19    3,632      331     406       57      828   5,671     12,182      20,241
Masbate......................     6,675      76      144       9    2,458      535     669       26    1,666   4,165     11,051      16,312
Mindoro......................     6,470      82      142      11    1,317      631     840      169      777   4,935      7,005       9,939   r
Misamis......................   29301      411      22       38      955    2,352    1,739     478    2,266   9,936     30,636      52,109   hj
Negros Occidental.......         67,862   1,737      623      59   21,766    4,564    6,788   1,188   12,430   27,888    60,850     108,005   0
Negros Oriental...........      30,467     659      350      36    15,323   4,068    1,601     789    3,471   24,440    41,096      62,589
Nueva   cija..................  30,018  2,369      467      19    4,065    4,272    1,518   4,260    2,458   4,395     28,403      50,765
Nueva Vizcaya...............    4,386      21      131       6      348       87      71        6       88     289      3,067       7,626 
Pampanga...................      34,902   4,848      886      62    5,501    7,559    6,382   8,787   18,416   16,021    43,949      75,343   0
Panginan...................      86,361   4,407    1,154      72    4,289    4,085    4,327   4,692   12,834  38,199     88,440     145,656
Paragua......................     4,799   1,356       48      11     1,367     513     399       21      654    1,751     6,080      10,494
Paragua Sur................        158                13              345       38      80        3       82      44        154        442    H
Rizal........................    11,924     321      667      34    14,241   5,571    5,379   6,266   16,668   11,224    25,561      50,646 0
Rombl6n...........       10,365     679      240      14     1,908   1,181     474       46      557    7,351    13,093      16,940   B
BAmar........................    59,520     591      472      23    8,289    1,661    2,640     362    4,717  41,855     69,588      86,841
Biassi................          4        1        1.             62        3      97        1       10       1         61         66
Borsog6n.....................    13,385     119      482      34    14,935   1,022    2,104     221    3,235   11,853    27,625      45,439
8urigao......................    21,695   2,547      328      37     3,170   1,327     674       48    1,461   6,787     23,412      37,912
Tdriac........................   27,858   5,165      392      16    6,760    3,379    1,490   2,116    2,132   4,449     28,861      50,896 
TawiTawi.................I                                          33       4       27......            7         13
Tayabas...             33,164   5,145      747      41    6,220    3,180    2,168     774    4,043   17,317    29,442      48,031
Zambales.....................    16,664   1,695      422      19    6,716    2,033     944      422    3,166   8,247     22,805      38,248    '
Zamboanga...................      3,381      25      115      22    1,154     364      802        4      626     291      4,685       9,223  z
1 Sub-province of Tayabae.                        Exclusive of sub-province of Marinduque. 
b
CA)




326 TABLES FROM THE PHILIPPINE CENSUS


TABLE VIII
Civilized population, classified by principal occupations. (All occupations showing more than 5000 persons, exclusive of U. S. Army.)
Farmers and Farm Laborers     1,236,327
Weavers and Spinners            569,906
Laborers not specified          384,400
Merchants                       137,311
Fishermen                       116,799
Launderers                       66,909
Seamstresses                     65,285
Servants                         54,523
Carpenters                       38,230
Cooks                            28,747
Sailors                          23,027
Matmakers                        22,272
Constabulary and Police          20,935
Distillers                       15,379
Herdsmen                         14,683
Coachmen                         14,610
Tailors                          14,201
Salesmen                         13,165
Hatmakers                        12,979
Clerks                           12,360
Bagmakers                        11,313
Cigarmakers                      11,036
Boatmen                           8,864
Musicians and Teachers of Music   8,661
Nipa-workers                      7,349
Embroiderers                      7,224
Potters                           6,125
Government Officials              5,950
Teachers                          5,362
Blacksmiths                       5,185




INDEX








INDEX


ABYssINIA, 134.
Africa, 3, 7; French influence in,
147; practically whole of, ruled by
Northern nations, 12.
Africa, Equatorial, 135.
Africa, Northern, 11.
Africa, South, 273.
Aguinaldo, 189-197, 221, 223, 254,
256; and Admiral Dewey, 190,
191; and General Anderson 193;
and General Otis, 193, 194; Aetermines to fight Americans, 195;
given arms, 190; government of,
194, 196, 254; military position of,
194; Philippine Independence, his
attitude on, 190, 191; proclamations of, 190; quoted on causes of
insurrection against Spain, 221;
relations with American authorities 190-196; taken to Manila on
U. S. transport, 190.
Alexander VI, Pope, 160.
Alung PayS, 96.
America, 7, 129.
America, Central, 277.
America, North, conquest of, 12.
America, South, 3, 10, 277.
America, Tropical, conquered and
ruled to-day by Northern nations,
12; economic condition of, 134.
American Colonies (British), 124.
American Colonial Methods, 251-253.
American Government in Philippines, 198-219, 238-259.
American Policy in the Philippines,
187-197, 199, 200, 205,238-259, 271 -281.
American Responsibilities in Philippines, 254.
American Soldiers in Philippines,
194, 197.
American Trading Company of
Borneo, 40.
American War of Independence, 240,
273.
Amsterdam 161.
Anderson, deneral, quoted, 190, 193.
Annam, 146,149; bibliography, 310,
311; budget of, in 1903, 297, in
1904, 153; population, 296; Resident Superior of, 152.


Annamites, 135.
Antwerp, 161.
Appendix, Bibliographical, 303-313.
Appendix C, Philippine Census
Tables, 315-326.
Appendix, Statistical, 283-302.
Arabia, 3.
Arakan, 81.
Arakanese 81.
Argentine Republic, 104.
Asia, 7.
sia, Central, 4.
Asia, Northern, 4.
Asia, Southeastern, 122, 260-281.
Asia, Tropical, greater part of, conquered and ruled by Northern
nations, 12.
Assam, 80.
Atlantic Monthly, 61,259.
Australasia, 265.
Australia, 4, 273, 276.
Bajau, 42.
Balfour, A. J., quoted, 40.
Barbados, 124, 133,134,135; cost of
government, 227; school attendance, 242.
Barbour, Sir David, and Burmese
finances, 99; and Straits Settlements currency, 131.
Batavia, 164.
Battle of Manila Bay, 188, 195.
Beaufort, 56.
Bengal, 80, 81.
Bernard, Sir Charles, 98.
Bhamo, 80.
Biac-na-Batd, Treaty of, 189.
Bibliographical Appendix, 303-313.
Birch, E.W., 38, 59, 60.
Birch, J. W. W.108.
Bismarck, quoted, 157, 158.
Bombay, 94.
Bombay-Burma Trading Company,
81, 82.
Borneo, 62, 63, 124. See also under
British North Borneo, and Sarawak.
Borneo, British North. See British
North Borneo.
Borneo Company, Limited, 76, 77.
Borneo, Dutch, area, 297.




330


INDEX


Bosch, van den, General, 163,174-176.
Brazil, 135.
British Colonial Policy, 273, 274.
British Colonization, causes of, 157,
260-263.
British Empire, 104, 106, 122, 163,
273; open to all nations, 264.
British Government, 16, 43, 44, 65,
104, 105; and British Ncrth
Borneo, 40, 43, 44, 104; and Federated Malay States, 105, 109, 111,
112; and Hong Kong, 16; and
Sarawak, 65, 104.
British Guiana, 135, 139, 140; cost
of government, 227; form 6f government, 274; its system of imported contract labor, 140, 141,
144; school attendance, 242;
value of exports per capita, 204.
British Interests in Far East, 62, 97,
101, 102, 103.
British North Borneo, 37-60; acquisition of; 39, 40; administration,
43, 44; area, 41, 387; bibliography,
305, 306; bonds and debentures,
46; British Governnment, extent
of its control, 43, 44, 104; census,
287; Chinese in, 50, 54; civil service, 44, 45, 58; commerce, 288;
compared with Hong Kong, 41 -43; description of, 37, 41-43; expenditure, 49, 288; exports, 46, 47,
288; finance commissioner, 45;
finances, 45-52, 288; foreign relations, 44; future of, 59, 60; gambling licenses, 47-49; government,
44, 45; Governor, 44, 59, 60; history, 39, 40; imports, 46, 288;
judicial commissioner, 44; Liberals in Parliament support granting of charter, 40; native chiefs,
45; officials, 44, 45, 58; opium
licenses, 47, 48; paid-up capital,
45, 46; policy of Government, 49 -60; population, 41, 42, 287; protectorate established, 43, 44; public debt, 46; railways, 55-58; revenue, 46-52, 288; rice-tax, 50-52;
river communications, 55; roads,
55; shipping, 287; statistics relating to, 287, 288; taxation, 49-52;
telegraph line, 38, 55 trade, 288.
British North Borneo dompany, 38;
charter of, 39, 43; finances, 288;
incorporation of, 40; policy of, 38,
49-60.
British Protectorates, 43, 44 104
105; character of, in British North
Borneo, 43, 44, 104; in Federated
Malay States, 105; in Sarawak,
104.


British Residents in Malay States,
107, 108,109, 114, 115.
British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 104.
British Secretary of State for the
Colonies, 104, 105 106, 118.
British  South  Airica  Chartered
Company, 39.
British West Africa, 106.
Brooke, Charles Vyner, Raja Muda
of Sarawak, 78.
Brooke, Sir Charles Johnson, Raja
of Sarawak, 61, 62, 66, 68-75, 78.
Brooke, Sir James, first Raja of
Sarawak, 62-68.
Brunei, Sultan of, 39, 63, 65.
Buckle, quoted, 7.
Bull, Papal, of Alexander VI, 160.
Burma, 3, 79-103, 139, 209; acquisition of, 81,82, 93; administration,
79, 83-103; Alung PayA, 96; Arakan, 81,98 Arakanese 81; area,
79, 290; Barbour, Sir David, and
Burmese finances, 99; Bernard,
Sir Charles, 98; Bhamo, 80; bibliography, 307, 308; Bombay-Burma
Trading Company, 81, 82; cattle
theft, 86; census, 290; Chief Commissionership created, 84; Chins,
81; civil service, 90, 91; climate,
79, 80; commerce, 291; Crosthwaite, Sir Charles, 98; Crown Colony Government suggested for,
94-103;   Deputy-Commissioner,
work of, 209, 210; expenditure,
290; exports, 291; finances, 98 -100, 290; French intrigues with,
82; frontiers of, 80; government
of, 84, 85, 91, 92; headmen of villages, 85, 87-89; history, 81, 82;
imports, 291; India, relations
with, 82, 93-103; indigenous races,
81; influence of geographical environment in, 79, 80; Kachins, 81;
Karens, 81; Kyaukse, 80; labor
supply, 139; language, 96, Lower
Burma, 81, 99; Mandalay, 80;
native headmen, 85, 87-89; pacification of, 83, 84; policy of government, 91, 92-103; population, 80,
81, 290; Provincial Government
created, 85; Provincial Settlement, 100, 101; public works, 98,
209; rainfall, 80; Rangoon Chamber of Commerce, 98; relations
with India, 82, 93-103; religion,
96, 290; revenue 290; roads, 98;
separation from India suggested,
93-103; Shans, 81; shipping, 291;
statistics relating to, 290, 291;
Supayagyi, 82; Supayalat, 82,83;




INDEX


331


Tailings, 81; Taungthus, 81 Tavoy, 80; temperature, 80i Thar
rawaddy, 98; Thibaw, King, 82,
83; track law, 86; trade, 291;
Upper Burma, 80, 82, 85, 99; village system, 85-88  war of 1824,
62, 81, 93; war of 1852, 81, 93;
war of 1885, 81, 82, 93, 99; ywathugyi (headmen), 85, 87-89.
Cadet Service, Eastern, 24, 25, 34,
120.
Cambodia, 146,149,153,155; bibliography, 310, 311; budget of, in
1903, 297, in 1904,153; population,
296 Resident Superior of, 152.
Canada, 4, 10, 124, 273, 276.
Canary Islands, 161.
Cavite, 190.
Celebes, 124.
Central American Republics, 3.
Central Asia, 4.
Ceylon, 19, 20, 25, 94, 106, 135, 139,
140,142, 202; cost of government,
227; school attendance, 242; value
of exports per capita, 204.
Chadwick, Dr. Osbert, 35, 36.
Chailley-Bert, M. J., quoted, 295.
Champlain, 145.
China, 4, 10, 16, 27, 28, 97, 103, 151,
262.
China Sea, 123.
Chinese, The; characteristics of, 27 -30, 42; exclusion from  Philip
pines, 231-233, 247 guilds, 28, 29;
in British North Borneo, 50-54,
135; in British South African
Colonies, 135; in Federated Malay
States, 106, 115-118, 135, 246, 247;
in French Indo-China, 135; in
Hong Kong, 17, 27-30; in Java,
182; in Philippines, 231-233, 247,
257; in Sarawak, 62, 77, 135; in
Straits Settlements, 126, 127, 135,
137; in Sumatra, 135; in tropical
countries as laborers, 136; secret
societies, 28, 29.
Chinese Shan States, 80.
Chins, 81.
Churchman, The, 238.
Civil Service; examinations, 24, 25,
120, 183-185, 216, 218; in British
North Borneo, 44, 45, 58; in
Burma, 90, 91; in Federated Malay States, 25, 120; in French
Indo-China, 148, 149, 154, 156; in
Hong Kong, 24-26; in Java, 168,
169, 181, 182-185; in Philippines,
200-203, 215-219; in Sarawak, 74,
75; Indian, 25, 90, 91, 120, 184,
217, 218, 219; Lowell, A. Law

rence, quoted in regard to, 218;
pensions, 219; salaries, 26, 168,
169, 181, 219.
Civilization, Early, development of,
5-7.
Civilization, Non-tropical, 9.
Civilization, Tropical, 3-12.
Civilization Western, 4, 10, 12.
Clark, Dr. Francis, 35.
Clarke, Sir Andrew, 106-108, 279.
Clarke, Sir Edward, 279.
Climate; influence of, 6; of Burma,
79, 80.
Clive, Lord, 163.
Cochin-China, 146, 149; acquisition
of, 146; agitates for separation
from Indo-China, 149; bibliography, 310, 311; budget of, in 1903,
297, in 1904, 153; Colonial Council
of, 152; Lieutenant-Governor of,
152 population, 296.
Colonial Administration, causes of
improvement in, 269, 270.
Colonial Finance, some principles of,
244, 245.
Colonial Office, London, 18, 36, 96,
102, 107, 108, 124, 215, 274.
Colonial Policy, 12; American, 187 -197,199, 200,205,238-259,271-281;
British, 273, 274; Dutch, 160, 165,
267-269; French, 145,146,155,156,
274, 275.
Colonies, British Secretary of State
for, 104, 105, 106,118, 215.
Colony and Dependency, difference
between, 272-276.
Columbus, 161.
Commercial Companies as Governments, 39 267.
Commons, House of, 40.
Congress and the Philippines, 211 -215.
Cornwall, 129.
Corvde or Forced Labor, 111, 163,
174 178.
Crosthwaite, Sir Charles, 98.
Crown Colony Government, 18-24,
118,119, 124, 203, 208.
Cuba, 133, 134, 164, 212, 264.
Culture System in Java, 175-180,
182.
Currency in Far East, 124-132.
Curzon, Lord, quoted, 206.
Daendels, 163, 174.
Day William R., 192, 193, 196.
De Louter, quoted, 173.
Debt-slavery 110, 111, 170.
Democratic Government in tropics,
210,2 211, 274, 275.
Dent, Sir Alfred, 40.




332


INDEX


Dependency and Colony, difference
between, 272-276.
Des Vceux, Sir G. W., 143, 144.
Des Vceux, Commission on contract
labor in British Guiana, 144.
Dewey, Admiral, 190, 191.
D'Iberville, 145.
Dingley Tariff and Philippines, 213.
Dollar. See Currency.
Doumer, M. Paul, 150-156, 158.
Dupleix, 145, 147, 163.
Dusun, 42.
Dutch, The; revolt against Spain,
161; in Java, 160-185; in the
Malay   Archipelago,  62,  122,
123.
Dutch Colonial Policy, 62, 122, 123,
160, 165, 267-269.
Dutch Colonization; territorial expansion no object of, 162, 163;
character of, 160, 162, 163; causes
of, 160-162.
Dutch East India Company, 122,
165-173, 267-269; abolition of,
173; administration of, 268, 269;
bankruptcy of, 169, 173; De
Louter quoted in regard to 173;
Directors of, 171, 268; dividends,
172; history of its rule in Java,
166-173; monopoly of Eastern
trade, 166, 167; objects of, 165,
166; parsimony of, its effects, 168;
shareholders, 172.
Dutch East Indies. See Netherlands-India.
Dutch Guiana, 135.
Dutch Legislature, 180.
Dyaks, 62, 66, 67, 74, 75, 77.
East India Company (British), 38,
39, 45, 62,122, 267; administration
of, 268, 269.
East India Company (Dutch). See
Dutch East India Company.
East Indians as laborers, 135, 136.
Eastern Cadet Service, 24, 25, 34,
120.
Education; in British Tropical Colonies, 239, 242; in Philippines, 199,
238-244.
Education and Politics, relation between, 239, 240.
Egypt, 7, 11, 202.
England, 12, 18, 122, 163, 164, 265;
origin of her rule in the Far East,
260-263, 267.
Environment, Geographical.   See
Geographical Environment.
Europe, 4, 10, 129.
Exchange, Rate of, in Far East,
124-132.


Far East, 62, 97, 101, 102, 103, 123;
British interests in, 62, 97, 101,
102,  103; currency,   124-132;
French expansion in, 146; French
interests in, 151.
Federated Malay States, 25,102,104 -121, 131, 135, 139, 140, 153, 245,
246, 247; administration, 113-115,
118-121, 153; area, 292; bibliography, 308,309; Birch, J. W. W.,
murder of, 108; British policy in,
106-109, 111, 112; British Residents 107, 108, 109, 114,115; British Rule, origin of, 105, 106-112,
results of, 120, 121; census, 117,
292; character of Malays, 115-117;
Chinese in, 106, 115-118, 246, 247;
cholera, 120; civil service, 25, 120;
Clarke, Sir Andrew, 106-108;
commerce, 121, 293; condition of,
under native rule, 109-111; corvde,
111; cost of government, 227;
currency, 128-131; debt-slavery,
110, 111, 113; education, 120; expenditure, 245, 292; exports, 115,
135, 204, 293; Federal officers, 119;
federation of, 114, 119; finances,
292; High Commissioner, 113,118,
119; history, 106-115; imports,
293; Jervois, Sir Drummond, 108;
justice, 111; labor, 110, 111,115 -118 139-140; Lart, 107; Low,
Sir Hugh, 113; Malay society, 109,
110; Malays, 115-117, 121; murder of J. W. W. Birch, Resident
of Perak 108- native rule in,
109-111; Negri Sembilan, 105,108,
114; Pahang, 105, 111, 113, 114,
117; Perak, 102,105, 107,108, 109,
113; piracy, 106,107,120; planters,
140; population, 117, 292; public
debt, 293; railroads, 120; Resident-General, 113, 116, 119; Residents, British, 107, 108, 109, 114,
115; results of Federation, 119;
results of British rule, 120, 121;
revenue, 106, 109, 110, 115, 121,
246, 247, 292; roads, 120, 201, 202;
Rodger, Sir J. P., quoted, 111;
Selangor, 105, 108, 113, 114; shipping, 293; situation of, 105; smallpox, 120; State Councils, 118;
statistics relating to, 292, 293;
Sultan of Perak, 107, 108, 109;
Sungei Ujong, 108; Swettenham,
Sir Frank, 59, 113, 114; Tamils,
116; taxation, 109, 110, 111, 116,
121; tin, 105, 115, 129, 130; trade,
121, 293; Treaty of Pangkor, 107.
Fiji, 135.
Filipinos, 194, 195, 205; as laborers,




INDEX


333


228-231; attempt to convert them
into Americans, 278; character of,
257; described, 204; political capacity of, 205, 253, 257; start
fighting against U. S., 194, 195;
their attitude towards education,
243.
Foreign Affairs, British Secretary of
State for, 104.
Forsyth, William, quoted, 39.
France, 12, 82, 97, 145, 146,147, 148,
149, 163; colonial expansion of,
145-148,150,163, 263-266; colonies
of, in 1815, 145, in 1850, 146;
commerce of with Indo-China,
149, 150; in India, 265; in IndoChina, 145-159; military contribution from  Indo-China, 155;
relations with Burma, 82; relations with China, 97, 151; relations
with Siam, 97, 151.
Franco-Prussian War, 146.
French Colonial Empire, 145, 146,
163; additions to, in second half
of nineteenth century, 146; area in
1815,145, in 1850,146; democratic
government in, 274, 275; difficulty
of securing accurate data relating
to 295, 296; lack of French capital and French emigrants, 158;
population in 1850, 146; Frenchmen and, 147,148.
French Colonial Expansion, 145-148,
150, 155,156-159, 163, 264-266; not
a national movement, 157.
French Colonial Policy, 145, 146,
155, 156 274 275.
French Indo-China, 80, 124, 145 -159; Annam, 146, 149, 152, 153;
Annamites, 135; administration,
148-156, 270; area, 146, 296; bibliography, 310, 311; Budget, General, 151, 153, 154, 296; Budgets,
Local, 152, 153, 154, 297; Cabinet
of the Governor-General, 153;
Cambodia, 146, 149, 153, 155;
Chambers of Commerce and Agriculture, 152; civil service, 148,
149, 154, 156; Cochin-China, 146,
149, 152, 153; commerce, 149, 150,
297; condition of, fifteen years
ago, 146, 147, in the nineties, 148,
149; conquest of, 146, 147 264;
cost to France, 148; Council of the
Protectorate of Tonkin, 152; Department of Agriculture and Commerce, 153; Department of Civil
affairs, 153; Department of Excise and Customs, 153; Department of Financial Control, 153;
Department of Posts, Telegraphs,


and Telephones, 153; Department
of Public Works, 153; Doumer,
M. Paul, his reforms, 150-156,158;
Executive Council, 152; expenditure, 154, 296; exports, 150, 297;
French trade with, 150; finances,
148, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 158,
296; future of, 158, 159; Genouilly, Admiral Rigault de, 148;
Governor-General of, 151,152,153;
Government-General, 151, 152,
153; imports, 150, 297; judiciary,
153; justice, administration of,
149, 154; lack of French capital
and French colonists, 158; Laos
146, 149, 152, 153; Legislative
Council, 152; military and naval
services, 153; military contribution to France, 155; police, 156;
population, 146, 296; progress of,
149, 154; public works, 156; reforms in administration, 150-156,
158; revenue, 154, 296; Saigon,
148; self-supporting at present,
155; statistics relating to, 295-297;
Superior Council of, 152, 153; tariff regulations, 156; taxation, 155;
Tonkin, 146, 149, 151, 152, 153;
trade, 297.
French Guiana, 135.
French Revolution, The, 145, 240.
French West Indies, acquisition of,
265.
Froude, James Anthony, quoted, 61.
Gallieni, General, 155.
Gambling; in British North Borneo,
47-49; in Hong Kong, 49; in
Straits Settlements, 49.
Gambling Licenses, in British North
Borneo, 47-49.
Genouilly, Admiral Rigault de2 148.
Geographical Environment, influence of; in Burma, 78, 80; on
development of civilization, 2-12.
German Colonization, 158,163, 275.
Gladstone, W. E., 40.
Government, Methods of; American,
in Philippines, 198-219, 238-259;
Crown Colony, 18-24; in tropical dountries, 13, 14, 169, 170, 210,
211; Western, 13,14,169,170.
Great Britain, 146.
Greece, decadence of, 11.
Grey, Earl, quoted, 18-22.
Guadeloupe, 145, 274.
Guatemala, 135.
Guillain, M., 295.
Hague, The, 165.
Hassim, Raja Muda of Brunei, 64,65.




334


INDEX


Hastings, Warren, 163, 267, 268, 279.
Hatton, Frank, 52.
Hawaii, 135.
Heat Belt of the World, 3,4; people of their characteristics, 4, 6.
Henry the Navigator, Prince, 160.
Holland, 122,123, 165, 180; constitutional changes of 1848, 165, 173,
180; Liberal party in, 165; origin
of her rule in the Far East, 260 -263, 267.
Hong Kong, 15-36, 41-43, 106, 124,
190; acting appointments, 32; administration, 27-36; area, 15, 285;
bibliography, 305; census, 285;
Chinese m, 17, 27-30; civil service, 24-26; clerical work, 33, 34;
commerce 286; compared with
British  rorth  Borneo, 41-43;
criminal law, 27, 28; criminals
27, 28; dollar, value of, during
past 10 years, 285; Executive
Council, 22, 23; expenditure, 27,
286; finances, 26, 27, 285, 286; government of, 17-24; guilds, Chinese, 28, 29; history, 16; junior
clerks, 33, 34; Legislative Council,
23, 24 municipal government, 24;
New Territory, 15; plague, 27, 35;
police, 27, 28; population, 15, 17,
285; progress of, 16; public debt,
27, 286; public works, 27; revenue, 26, 286; salaries of officials,
26; secret societies, 28, 29; shipping, 15, 286; statistics relating to,
285, 286; trade, 286; water supply, 35, 36.
House of Commons, 40.
Hudson's Bay, 145.
Hudson's Bay Company, 38, 39.
Imperial British East Africa Co.,
39.
India, 3, 7, 13, 82, 97 106, 133, 134
140, 142,145; Lord durzon quoted
on Indian affairs, 206; problem
of government in, 94, 95, 206; reform of administration, 267; relations with Burma, 82, 93-103;
relations with Straits Settlements,
106.
India Office, 102.
Indian Civil Service, 25, 90, 91, 120,
184, 217, 218, 219.
Indian Ocean, 123.
Indo-China, 3.
Indo-China, French. See French
Indo-China.
Indus, 97.
Industry and Politics, relation between, 204, 205, 239, 240,




Inspectors of Colonies, their appointment suggested, 36.
Institutes of Manu, 86.
Italy, 11, 164; decadence of, 11.
Jacatra, State of, in Java, 165.
Jamaica, 135; form of government,
274; school attendance, 242.
Japan, 4, 262, 279.
Jenks, Professor J. W., 232, 271.
Jervois, Sir Drummond, 108.
Java, 62, 122, 123, 124, 133, 134,135,
163-185, 229; acquisition of, 163,
164,165; administration, 163, 165,
166-169, 173-180, 181, 185; area,
164 297; Batavia founded, 164;
bibliography, 309, 310; Bosch van
den, General, 163, 174-176' British conquest of, 173, 174; changes
in, 180, 181; civil service, 168, 169,
181,182-185; Coen, Governor-General, 167; commerce, 164-168, 170 -172; "contingents," 171, 172; corvee or forced labor, 163, 174, 178;
Crown control over, 174-180; cultivators, 171, 172; culture-system,
175-180, 182; Daendels, 163, 174;
De Louter, quoted, 173; debtslavery, 170; difficulties of reform, 179; Dutch East India Company, 122, 165-173, 267-269; emigration thither of Dutchmen, 167 
exports, 135, 176, 204; feudal
services, 174, 176; finances, 165,
172; " forced deliveries," 171, 172;
forced labor or corvde, 163, 174,
178; General Secretariat, 185;
Governor-General, 167, 168, 172;
headmen of villages, 177, 178,182;
Hindu domination, 164; history,
164,165, 173- Jacatra, 165; land,
state ownership of, 174, 182; landtax, 177; land-tenure, 182 183;
Mataram, Sultan of, 164;   Max
Havelaar,"  160; Mohammedan
Invasion, 164; native organization, 164, 166, 170, 171, 177-180;
native rule, 164, 170, 171; native
States, 164, 165, 177; native Sultans, 164, 165, 176; natives, condition and treatment of, 170,
171, 178, 179; officials, Dutch, 13,
168, 169, 176, 177, 179; officials,
native, 177, 178; policy of the
Dutch in, 163, 174; population,
164,298; profits of culture system,
180; Raffles, Sir Stamford, 174;
reform, difficulties of, 179; reforms in administration of 173,
180, 181; regents, 172, 176; "Regeerings-Reglement," 180; rev



INDEX


335


enue, 177; salaries of officials, 168,
169, 181 state ownership of land,
174; Sultans, 164, 165, 176; taxation, 176, 178, 182; trade, 164 -168, 170-172; village communities, 177, 178.
Jesselton, 56.
Johore, 105, 131.
Jolo, 225.
Kachins, 81.
Karens, 81.
Kuching, 61.
Kyaukse, 80.
Kudat, 44.
Labor; Chinese, 50-54, 62, 77; in
British North Borneo, 53, 54, in
Philippine Islands, 203, 228-235;
in Malay States, 110 111, 115-118;
in Sarawak, 77; in Straits Settlements, 124, 125, 132-144; in the
tropics, 133-137,143,144; influence
of climate on, 6.
Labor, Forced. See Corvde.
Laos, 146, 149; bibliography, 310,
311; budget of, in 1903, 297, in
1904, 153; population, 296; Resident Superior of, 152.
Larut, 107.
Liberals in Parliament, action on
Charter of British North Borneo
Company, 40.
Lisbon, 161.
Low, Sir Hugh, 113.
Lowell, A. Lawrence, quoted, 218.
Luzon, 194.
Madagascar, 155.
Madras, 94.
Makota, Governor of Sarawak, 64,
65.
Malacca, 122, 123.
Malacca, Straits of, 106, 123.
Malay Archipelago, 3, 62, 63, 66,
122, 124; the Dutch in, 62.
Malay Peninsula, 3, 97,102,104-121,
122, 123, 124, 153, 202. See also
under Federated Malay States.
Malay Rule, 109-111.
Malay Society, 109, 110.
Malays, 62, 66, 67, 77, 115-117.
Mandalay, 80.
Manila, 188, 190, 197, 198, 202, 223,
241, 249.
Manila (Province), 224.
Manipur, 80.
Mann, Institutes of, 86.
Martinique, 145, 274.
Mardu Bay, 44.
Mat Salleh, 37.


Mauritius, 20, 124, 135; school attendance, 242; value of exports
per capita from, 204.
"Max Havelaar," 160.
McKinley, President, 192, 198.
Mekong River, 270.
Methods of Government. See Government, Methods of.
Mexico, 3, 7.
Mindanao, 6, 225.
Miquelon, 145.
Mississippi, The, 145.
Monroe Doctrine, 262.
Murut, 42.
Nanking, Treaty of, 16.
Napoleonic Campaigns, 145,163,173,
265.
Natal, 20.
Native Methods of Government, 12,
109-111, 164,170, 179.
Native Rule, 14, 109-111.
Natives, of tropics and non-tropics
compared, 4-9.
Negri-Sembilan, 105, 108.
Netherlands-India, 164, 180, 267 -269; area, 297; bibliography, 309,
310; finances, 298; population,
298 trade, 298, 299.
New (aledonia, 135.
New Guinea, 135.
New Guinea, Dutch, area, 297.
New Zealand, 273.
Non-tropical Civilization, 9.
Non-tropics and Tropics, natives of,
compared, 4-9.
North American Review, 190.
Northern Africa, 11.
Northern Asia, 4.
Officials, American, in Philippines,
200-203, 222, 223.
Officials, Dutch, in Java, 13, 168,.169, 177 179.
Officials, English; in British North
Borneo, 44, 45, 58; in Burma, 90,
91; in Federated Malay States,
120; in Hong Kong, 24-26; in
India, 13; in Sarawak 74, 75
Officials, rench, in Indo-China,
148, 149, 154, 156.
Officials, Native; in Bnrma, 85, 87 -89; in Java, 177, 178; in Philippines, 206, 257.
Omar Ali Sultan of Brunei, 63 65.
Opium C hinese use of, 137; in British North Borneo, 47, 48; in Hong
Kong, 26; in Philippines, 271; in
Sarawak, 76.
Oriental Trade, 161, 162. 261-263.
Otis, General, 193,194, 195, 221.




336


INDEX


Outlook, The, 259; on future of Philippines, 277-279.
Overbeck, Baron von, 40.
Pacific Ocean, 123.
Pahang, 105, 111, 113, 114, 117.
Pangkor, Treaty of, 107.
Papal Bull of Alexander VI, 160.
Papar, 44.
Paris, 145, 149.
Parliamentary Reform in England,
240.
Peace Protocol between Spain and
United States, 188.
Penang, 123.
Perak, 102, 105, 107, 108,109,113;
Sultan of, 107, 108, 109.
Peru, 7.
Philippine Census Tables, 315-326.
Philippine Commission, 197, 198,
199, 200, 206, 208, 211, 212, 213,
231, 232, 235.
Philippine Government compared
with that of other colonies, 206 -215.
Philippine Independence, 190-197,
255, 256, 258, 259.
Philippine Islands, 4, 83, 135, 186 -259, 271-281; acquisition of, 186 -197; administration of, 198-200,
203, 222; agriculture, 199, 214,
229; Aguinaldo, 189-197, 221, 223,
254, 256; American methods in,
251-253; American policy in, 187 -197, 199, 200, 205, 238-259, 271 -281; American soldiers in, 194,
197; Anderson, General, quoted,
190, 193; area, 299 Baguio, 251;
Battle of Manila Bay, 188, 195;
Benguet Road, 230, 251; Biac-naBat6, Treaty of, 189; bibliography, 311,312; Board of Health,
its work, 247-249; capital should
be encouraged, 257, 258; capitalists driven away, 234- causes of
insurrection against Spain, 221;
Cavite, 190; census, 259, 300,
tables of, 315-326; Chinese labor,
231-233, 257- Church and State,
separation of, 222; cigars, 227;
civil service, 200-203, 215-219;
civil service examinations, 216,
217; commerce, 199, 203, 225, 226,
227,228, 302; compared with other
countries as to industry, 204;
Congress and, 211-215, 236, 237;
constabulary, 225,227; copra, 227,
228; cost of government, 205, 226,
227, 234; Day, Secretary of State,
his policy, 92, 193, 196; Dewey,
Admiral, 190,191, 223; description


of, 203; disorder in, 220, 223-225;
economic condition, 203, 204, 205,
220-237; education, 199, 238-244;
expeditions against outlaws, 225;
expenditure, 226, 227, 234, 245, 246,
247, 301, 302; exports, 203, 204,
225, 226, 227, 302; Filipinos, 194,
195, 205, as laborers, 228-231,
attempt to convert them into
Americans, 278, character of, 257,
described, 204,political capacity of,
205, 253,257, start fighting against
U. S., 194, 195, their attitude towards education, 243; finances,
301, 302; friars, 221, 222; future
of, American view of, 277-281 
government compared with that of
other colonies, 206-215, 275  government of, 198-219, 275; Lemp,
227, 228; high schools, 242; history,
188-197; hospitals, 249; housing
of the people, 248; illiteracy, percentage of, 259; imports, 203, 302;
independence, question of, 190 -197, 255, 256, 258, 259; industrial
education, 242; industry, 199;
Insular Office, creation of, suggested, 258; insurrection against
Spain, 189, 220, 221  insurrectos,
223, 224;  Jenks, Professor, on
Chinese labor 232, on currency
reform, 271; Jolo, 225; judiciary,
200; labor, 203, 228-235; ladronism, 224, 225; land, limit on area
to be sold to corporations, 213,
214; legislation, 211,212, 236, 237;
literacy of Filipinos, 259; Luzon,
194; Manila, 188, 190, 197, 198,
202, 223, 241 249; Manila (Province), 224; Manila-Dagupan Railroad, 229; measures suggested for
improvement in, 257, 258; Mindanao, 6 225; monastic orders, 221,
222; Municipal Police, 207 M Municipal Presidents, 206, 207; Municipalities, 206, 207, 226, 237; natives,
187 188, 224; nautical school, 242;
night schools, 242- normal institutes, 242; normal school, 242;
officials, American, 200-203, 222,
223; officials, native, 206, 257;
opium commission, 271; Otis, General, 193, 194 195, 221; outbreak
of war with U. S., 194; Outlook,
The, on future of, 277-279; Peace
Protocol with Spain, 188; Philippine Commission, 197, 198, 199,
200, 206, 208, 211, 212, 213, 231,
232, 235, 258; Philippine Junta,
189; police, 224, 225, 227; population, 204, according to Provinces,




INDEX


337


300, civilized and wild, 317, classifled by color, 318, 319, by place of
birth, 321, by voting age and literacy, 320, by literacy and sex, 322,
323, by occupations, 324, 325, 326;
Pratt, Mr. Spencer, 190; primary
education, 242; proclamation of
First Philippine Commission, 199;
proclamation of General Otis, 195;
proclamation of independence,
190; Protectorate over, by U. S.,
255; Provincial Boards, 207, 208,
209; Provincial Government Act,
207; Provincial Governments, 206 -210, 226, 258; Provincial Governor,
208; Provincial Supervisor, 208;
Provincial Treasurer, 208; public
works, 199, 208-210, 258; railroads, 199, 237; religious orders,
221, 222; Reports of Philippine
Commission, unsatisfactory character of, 235, 236; responsibilities
of U. S. in, 254; revenue, 301,
302; revolution against Spain, 189,
220, 221; roads, 199, 201, 230, 249 -251, 257; sanitarium at Baguio,
251; sanitation, 248, 249; school
enrollment, 241; school of telegraphy, 242; schools, 199, 242;
scouts, 225, 227; shipping, 302;
Spanish rule in, 220-223; statistics
relating  to, 299-302  315-326;
sugar, 227, 228, 229; Taft, Wm.
H., 200, 207, 238; tariff of U. S.,
against Philippine products, 213;
taxation, 200, 208, 226, 234, 235,
244-247; Teachers' College, 242;
temperature, 203; tobacco, 227,
228, 229; trade, 199, 203, 225, 226,
227, 228, 302; Treaty of Biac-naBat6, 189; U. S. assumes governing power, 195; voters, 206; wages,
229,230; war party, 197; war with
U. S., 194,195,197; Wildman, Mr.
Rounsevelle, 190; water supply,
249; Wood, Major-General Leonard, 212.
Philippine, Junta, 189.
Philippine Republic, 190,195, 223.
Philippine War, 194, 195, 197, 223,
224.
Piracy, 106, 107, 120.
Poland, 12.
Political Institutions in tropics, 210,
211.
Politics and Education, relation between, 239, 240.
Politics and Industry, relation between, 204, 205, 239, 240.
Polynesia, 4.
Pope Alexander VI, 160.


"Popular"   Government for the
tropics, 210, 211.
Porto Rico, 133, 134, 135; value of
exports per capita, 204.
Portugal, 11, 160, 161, 162; and
Oriental trade in 16th century,
261, 263; decadence of, 11.
Portuguese Colonization, 160, 161,
275.
Portuguese The, 161, 162.
Pratt, Mr. Spencer, 190.
Province Wellesley, 123.
Pryer, W. B., 52.
Queensland, 135.
Race Characteristics, 6, 8, 9, 13.
Raffles, Sir Stamford 59, 174.
Railroads; in British North Borneo,
55-58; in the Federated Malay
States, 56, 120, 246; in Philippines, 199, 201, 237.
Raja Brooke (The First), 62-68.
Raja Brooke (the Present), 61, 62,
66, 68-75 78.
Ratnagiri Fort, 82.
Reform in Colonial Administration,
causes of 269, 270.
Reports of Philippine Commission,
unsatisfactory nature of, 235, 236.
Representative Institutions in the
Tropics, 19,20.
Responsibility of Colonial Powers
towards subject races, 14, 181.
Rdunion, 145 274.
Revolution, The French, 145.
Roads; importance of, 55, 249-251;
in British North Borneo, 55; in
Burma 98, 250; in Federated
Malay States, 120, 250 in French
Indo-China, 250; in India, 250;
in Java, 250; in Massachusetts,
202; in Philippines, 199, 201, 230,
249-251, 257.
Rodger, Sir J. P., quoted, 111.
Russia, 104, 262, 265.
Saigon, 148.
St. Domingo, 275.
St. John, Sir Spencer, 65.
St. Lucia, 20.
St. Pierre, 145.
Salween, 97.
Salaries; of officials in Hong Kong,
26; of officials in Java, 168, 169,
181.
San Francisco, 202.
Sandakan, 38, 45, 55.
Sarawak, 61-78, 135; Abang Mohamad Kassim, 73; administration of, 61, 62, 70-75; agriculture,




338


INDEX


77; area, 289; bibliography, 306,
307; Borneo Company, Limited,
76, 77; British Government, relations with, 104- Brooke, Charles
Vyner, Raja Miuda, 78; Brooke,
Sir Charles (Present Raia), 61, 62,
66, 68-75, 78; Brooke Sir James
(First Raja), 62-68; Chinese in,
77; civil service, 74, 75; cloth
imports, 76; commerce, 289; Dallas, F. H., 74; Datus, 72, 73;
Dyaks, 62, 66, 67, 74, 75, 77; expenditure, 289; exports, 76, 289;
finances, 289; future of, 78; General Council, 71, 72; gold, 76;
government of, 61, 62, 70; gutta,
76; Haji Amin 73; Haji Bua Hassan, 73; Haji Mohamad Ali, 73;
Hassim, Raja Muda of Brunei, 64,
65; history, 62-68; imports, 76,
289; india-rubber, 76; kerosene oil,
76; Kuching, 61 labor supply, 77,
135; Makota, Governor of Sarawak, 64, 65; Malays, 62, 66, 67,
77; Omar Ali, Sultan of Brunei,
63, 65. opium, 76; pepper, 76,
77; poficy of Raja Brooke, 68-71;
population, 62, 289; prosperity of,
76, 77; Protectorate, 104; public
debt, 289; Raja Brooke (The
First), 62-68; Raja Brooke (The
Present), 61, 62, 66, 68-75, 78;
RajaMuda Charles Vyner Brooke,
78; relations between Dyaks and
Malays, 66, 67; Residents, 72, 73,
74; revenue, 289; rice, 76; Sadong River, 74; sago, 76, 77;
Sarawak Gazette, 68, 70; shipping, 289, statistics relating to,
289; sugar, 76; Supreme Council, 71-73- Supreme Court, 69;
Tanjong Datu, 74; taxation, 68;
timber, 73, 74; tobacco, 76; trade,
289.
Sarawak Gazette, 68, 70.
Secretary of State for the Colonies,
British, 104 105, 106, 118.
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, British, 104.
Selangor, 105, 108, 113,114.
Shans, 81.
Siam, 80 97, 103, 124, 134, 135, 151.
Siamese Tai States, 80.
Siberia, 10.
Sierra Leone, value of exports per
capita, 204.
Simpson, Professor W. J., 35.
Singapore, 106, 111, 123, 124, 190,
192.
Slavery, 110, 111, 113.
South America, 3, 10, 277.




Spain, 11, 12, 161, 162; decadence
of, 11; her monopoly of Oriental
trade in 16th century, 261, 263.
Spaniards, 160, 161.
Spanish Colonization, 160,161.
Spanish-American War, 188, 198,
264.
Spanish Friars in Philippines, 221,
222.
Statistical Appendix, 283-302.
Straits of Malacca, 106.
Straits Settlements, 25, 34, 49, 94,
101, 102, 105, 106, 112, 113, 118,
122-144, 215; administration, 124,
215; area, 294; Barbour, Sir David, 131; bibliography, 308, 309;
census, 137, 294; Chinese in, 126,
127, 137; civil service, 25, 34, 137;
Clarke, Sir Andrew, 106; commerce, 123, 124, 127, 295; Crown
Colony Government established,
106; currency, 124-132; currency
reform, 130-132; effects of depreciating currency, 125-130; expenditure, 294; exports, 124, 127, 295;
finances, 294; gambling in, 49;
government of, 215; Governor of,
118; imports, 124, 127, 295; Indian Immigration, 132, 138-143;
Jervois, Sir Drummond, 108; kangani labor, 142; labor, 124, 125,
132-144; labor legislation, 137,
138; Legislative Council, 132; Malacca, 122, 123; Penang, 123;
planters and labor supply, 138;
population, 137, 294; Province
Wellesley, 123 public debt, 295;
relations with India, 94, 106; revenue, 294; shipping, 123, 294;
Singapore, 106, 111, 123, 124; situation of, 123, 124; statistics relating to, 294, 295; strategic
importance of, 123; tin, 129, 130;
trade, 123, 124, 127, 295.
Straits of Sunda, 123.
Suez, 202,
Suffren, 145, 163.
Sultan of Brunei, 39, 63, 65.
Sultan of Mataram, 164.
Sultan of Perak, 107, 108, 109.
Sunda, Straits of, 123.
Sumatra, 122,123, 124, 163, 229, 297.
Sungei Ujong, 108.
Supayalat, Queen of Burma, 82, 83.
Supayagyi, Queen of Burma, 82.
Swettenham, Sir Frank, 59, 113,
114.
Taft, Wm. H., 200, 207, 238.
Tailings, 81.
Tamils, 116.




IND


Tariff in U. S. against Philippine
products, 213.
Taungthus, 81.
Tavoy, 80.
Tawao, 44.
Terra del Fuego, 6.
The Times quoted, 30, 31.
Thibaw, King of Burma, 82, 83.
Tin, 105, 115, 129, 130.
Tonkin, 146; bibliography, 310,311;
budget of, in 1903, 297, in 1904,
153; condition of, in 1893, 149;
pacification of, 146, 151; population, 296; protectorate established
by France, 146; Resident.Superior
of, 151, 152.
Trade, Oriental, 161, 162, 166, 167.
Trans-Caucasia, 265.
Treaty of Biac-na-Bat6, 189.
Treaty of Nanking, 16.
Treaty of Pangkor, 107.
Treaty of Peace between Spain and
United States, 188.
Trinidad, 20, 124, 135, 139; cost of
government, 227.
Tropical Civilization, 3-12.
Tropical Colonies, economic progress
of various, 135, 204; labor conditions in, 134-137; methods of
government in, 13, 14; political
destiny of, 273-276.
Tropics, The; controlled by men of
European or of North American
blood, 134; economic progress of
various parts of, 135, 204; education in, 242, 243; labor problem
in, 133-137; natives of, compared
with those of non-tropical coun

'EX                          339
tries, 4-9; traits of people of, 210,
211, 276; white rule in, 169, 170.
Tropical peoples, political traits of,
210, 211, 276; incapacity for selfgovernment, 276, 277.
Tropics and Non-tropics, natives of,
compared, 4-9.
United Kingdom, 4.
United States, 4,10, 83,146,163, 186 -262, 23, 264; and Japan, 279; and
St. Domingo, 275; causes of progress in, 280; expansion,over-sea,
163,186, 187,262-264; policy in the
Philippines, 187-197, 199, 200, 205,
238-259, 271-281; expansion, territorial, 163, 186, 187.
Venezuela, 135, 253.
Village System, in Burma, 85, 87 -89; in Java, 177, 178.
War of American Independence, 240,
273.
Washington, 193, 196.
Waterloo, 146.
Wellesley, Province, 123.
West Africa, British, 106.
West Indies, 3, 124; value of exports per capita from British, 204.
Western Civilization, 4, 10, 12.
Western Methods of Government,
13 14, 169 170.
Wildman, Mr. Rounsevelle, 190.
Witti, 52.
Wood, Major-General Leonard, 212.
Yunnan, 80.




Ote ifiteroibe pre
ElectrotyPed andprinted by H. O. Houghtont  Co.
Cambridge, Mass., U. S. A.




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