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THE DEGRADATION
OF OUR
REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM,
AND ITS
R E F 0 R M.
BY J. FRANCIS FISHER.
PHILADELPHIA:
C. SHERMAN, SON & CO., PRINTERS.
18 6 3.








THE DEGRADATION
OF OUR
REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM.
WHATEVER may be the result of the bloody war now raging,
it is presumed there is no one who does not see that it has
already given such a shock to our republican institutions, that
they will require great and important modifications, if not a
reconstruction from their very foundation.  Many changes
must be made, both to give the requisite strength to the general Government, and to prevent that strength being abused;
to consolidate the restored or diminished confederacy, and, at
the same time, to save our local institutions, our personal
liberties, from extinction; above all, to guard us, if possible,
from the evils we have experienced in our system of election
for National offices, especially, that of President of the United
States; evils which will be greatly augmented in the inevitable
consequence of the present war, —the enormous military power
of the Executive.
In the happy days of the past, our countrymen seemed determined to shut their eyes to the rapid decay of public virtue
in their representatives, whether in executive or legislative
office; and, because our prosperity'was unchecked, wealth
every day rewarding industry and ingenuity, and our population swelling with unprecedented speed, they were disposed




to set all this to the credit of our admirable system of Government; fondly believing that, if their Legislatures were corrupt
and their Chief Magistrates the tools and slaves of party, it
was the strongest proof of the vigor of our Republican Institutions which could bear it all. Not perceiving that, in the
degeneracy of our public men, and the debased tone of public
morality, we were daily losing the virtues which are the only
true supports of Democracy, —that the framework of our institutions was rotting away, the foundations of our Republic
undermined, and the real buttresses of liberty destroyed.  It
is only now, when civil war has almost shaken the whole fabric
to pieces, when our country is overwhelmed with difficulties of
all sorts, and humiliated by defeats, and still more by the
causes of them, that doubt and dismay are spreading throughout the land, and those who always confided in Democracy
begin to doubt its ultimate success.
In this state of the popular mind, a hearing may be had for
one, who has for a long time studied our Institutions by the
light of History, and the tests of contemporary results; and
who thinks he sees wherein they have failed, and the causes
of the failure.  These he will expose, with a plan of reform
which, if capable of execution, seems to promise a restoration
of the pristine virtues and honor of the Republic.
The following pages are presented to the public without hesitation, but with a good deal of diffidence.  Every citizen who
thinks he can say aught that will promote the good of his
country in times of doubt and difficulty, should give utterance to the results of his reflections, however crude; for others
may work them up, or they may suggest to superior minds
better means of attaining the same end, either approximating
or in opposition to his own.
It may be, that the same or similar plans have presented




themselves to others, and have been rejected as impracticable.
Where the evils to be remedied are so flagrant, it seems hardly
credible that some such scheme as the one to be proposed hereafter, has occurred to none of the many ingenious minds, who,
for a. long time, have been earnestly watching the working of
our system of representation with sad misgivings.
But, if it has ever appeared in print on this side of the Atlantic, it has never met the eye of the writer. The work of
Mr. Thomas Hare, which was procured after reading the high
commendation of it, by Mr. I. Stuart Mills, in his work on
Representative Government, printed last year, leads to the belief that he was the first European writer who, perceiving the
evil of electing legislative bodies by majorities, suggested the
remedy, by requiring the full complement of votes for each
member, and uniting the minorities.
His work is admirably reasoned; and, although it seems
absurd to add the commendation of an unknown writer to the
high praises it received from Mr. Mills, it may be said that
his arguments seem unanswerable, and nothing better could
be done than to call for an American reprint of them, if it
were not, that being based on English experience only, they
leave the case imperfectly stated, or rather, not sustained by
the overwhelming evidence the history of our country can
give; and that his plan for voting, if practicable in England,
would be utterly impossible here. This plan will be noticed
hereafter.
The conclusion has therefore been adopted, without pretending to philosophical method, to accumulate the evidence
to be had in America of the dangers, corruptions, and degradations of our representative system; and; as clearly as possible, to explain a method of reforming it by a mode of voting
less complicated and unmanageable than that suggested by
Mr. Hare,-a mode to which it seems the chief objection would




be, the opposition it would receive, not from those who would
use it, but from those who have abused the existing system to
their own purposes, viz., the large and powerful class of politicians.
The formation of this scheme, may be dated back some
seven or eight years, in the course of which time, it has been
often opened to various friends, and once, at least, in 1857,
drawn out in a full plan of voting; but the conviction that it
would be scouted by those who control public opinion, by all
whose business it is to manage parties and carry elections, and
perhaps set down as a Utopian project by patriots and statesmen, postponed its completion.  The present state of our country at least gives a hope that it will not be rejected without
consideration, and the approbation bestowed in England on
the plan of Mr. Hare, inspires a belief that this contemporary
creation of an American may also have its merits.
The differences are so essential, as to relieve the author of
any charge of plagiarism, even without the preceding explanation.
If in England, where universal suffrage and an equal apportionment of votes, according to numbers and equal territorial
divisions, has not yet been introduced, it is found that the system
of electing by majorities, in large constituencies, is so far
from being fair and impartial, that it really tends to disfranchise a large part of the inhabitants of every district, and
that, so far from giving to the great centres of commerce and
manufactures, where the nearest approach to our system exists,
the advantage over the much-abused borough representations,
it generally procures for them members of the least weight
for character and abilities of all in Parliament,-it may well
induce a pause by the advocates of universal suffrage as the
panacea for all political evils.
This result may be a great surprise to the enthusiastic re



former who has convinced himself that nothing but evil can
come from aristocratic rule, and that it is only necessary to
give an equal share of political rights to every inhabitant of
a country, to call forth universal intelligence and secure good
government for all; but many wise men in our country, where
the system has had a fair trial, have come to an opposite result.
Little is understood in England of our system  of caucus
and primary elections, by which party nominations are managed and by which a few men who devote themselves to politics by profession (men little known beyond their own sphere,
and very little respected there), organize all the initiatory steps
towards a nomination of candidates, and so skilfully manage
their forces by a system of secret understanding and pledges,
that it is impossible for any one to be presented to the public
as a candidate, except the one selected by them in secret conclave.  This is the inevitable result of our system, and it
may be asserted, that it is not the consequence of the neglect
of these primary meetings by those who have the largest interest at stake, and who, by their intelligence, education, and
social standing, ought to have most weight among their fellowcitizens. Their attendance at these meetings might have a
sort of ephemeral success, but it would only result in carrying
the machinery a little more out of sight, and perhaps, rather
aggravating the evil.
These primary party meetings, being governed in nothing
by law or principle, but controlled entirely by party tactics,
and worked for the sole benefit of those who manage them,
would, as soon as they failed to attain the ends of these professional politicians, be sure to be packed by men selected in
secret places; and we should again be forced into the old track,
be obliged to submit to the dictation of a class of men the
least trustworthy, who have thus juggled out of sight all but




8
a single candidate, whom we must take, or be sure of a defeat
by our opponents.
This system of nomination has the additional disastrous
effect of disgusting a large number among our most respectable
and intelligent citizens. They find that both parties have
presented for their suffrage men whom  they cannot trust,
perhaps know to be dishonest, and vote for neither. This
again gives great advantage to the political managers, and
often throws the election into the hands of an actual minority,
even when there are only two candidates in the field.
In England there are rarely three candidates for a single
place, and Mr. Hare goes into a calculation to show that even
where the votes are fairly polled, and the majority clearly,
ascertained, the candidate is by no means sure to represent
his supposed constituency; and this is, for greater reason, true
in our country, where a still larger number always abstain from
voting. He maintains what we well know by our experience,
that those who have voted against the member returned, are
as effectually disfranchised as if they had been excluded by
law from the polls; and their wishes, representations and interests are utterly without weight till the period of the next
election.
The members constituting the House, are of course governed
by a party majority, which majority is again controlled by a
majority of their own party members, generally the most violent and extreme of all. In this country we have no independent middle men in our legislative assemblies; no centre
droit and centre gauche, ready to check extreme measures either
of government or opposition. The leaders of the party carry
everything-none dare resist. An independent member is impossible.  This is the necessary consequence of our American
system, and the result is an Oligarchy the worst and most
unprincipled of all,-an Oligarchy of demagogues, in which a




9
certain show is made of carrying out popular views and wishes,
but these views and wishes are the very suggestions of their
leaders, who well know how to blind their constituents and
stimulate their passions, and who, by the fiction of representing a majority, impose the weight of force and the terrorism
of numbers, and often carry legislative measures which have
the reluctant assent of the more honest and moderate of their
colleagues, and which, if presented to the unbiassed judgment
of the constituents of their own party, would probably be
reprobated and rejected.
One among many of the evil consequences of this system
is the want of stability in the policy of the Government. The
party in the ascendant is sure, however small its preponderance of votes, to carry out their programme to the last letter;
and this is sometimes the most politic course for those who are
ready to sacrifice their country to the success of their party;
but it is nevertheless difficult to preserve this ascendency beyond
the current term of office; for the party defeated at the polls,
swollen by the addition of the discontented members of the
successful one, or those of a third division previously voting
on neither side, or for a third candidate, is often quite sufficient
to displace the small majority before the next election.
The consequence is a new scramble for offices and spoils,
and very often an entire revolution in measures, in which stability of purpose is almost as important as a wise financial or
political policy.
But of all the evil consequences of this unstable possession
of power, the most obnoxious is a party measure peculiar to
our country, invented, it is said, by one of the early Democratic Governors of Massachusetts, from whom it has its appellation, —Gerrymandering. A more unprincipled scheme,
and one more opposed to the true principles of Democracy,
never was imagined or put in practice; its object being so to




10
arrange the electoral districts as to neutralize the votes of the
opposing party, massing their votes together in some places
where their ascendency cannot be disputed, detaching counties,
townships or wards from their natural connection to destroy
an existing majority, or to create it where wanted to maintain
party ascendency; and all this without any regard to territorial connection, common interests, or any other consideration
but the control of votes.  This is so notorious and of such
constant practice, that it is unnecessary to enlarge upon it to
my American readers; it is one of the monstrous evils arising
out of our mode of electing by local majorities, which cries
out for reform,-a reform not easily to be obtained from the
class of men who govern us, and who consider this as a most
valuable part of their political machinery.
Desperate men clutch at any means of safety; and a party,
finding itself in a real minority, will often reconcile itself even
to the sacrifice of its own principles and the most sacred
guarantees of liberty and civil rights to secure their power.
This is most conspicuously plain in the mode by which votes,
outside of party organization, are bought; and, I am sorry
to add, by that political division heretofore calling itself
conservative, and claiming to contain within it the greater
part of the wealth, education, and respectability of the country.  The leaders, finding it difficult to contend against the
prestige of democratic name, secured to that great political
sect by Jefferson, its first prophet, and by Jackson, its second
incarnation, have been willing to ally themselves with those
extreme and often dangerous factions founded in fanaticism or
the basest instincts of man. Thus they have advocated by
turns Teetotalism, Antimasonry, Abolitionism, connived at the
Dorrite rebellion in Rhode Island and the Anti-rent movement
in New York, tolerated among them the disciples of St.
Simon, Fourier, and Fanny Wright, and, what perhaps was




11
worst of all, were willing to sacrifice the most sacred principles of liberty in an independent judiciary, the great result of
the Revolution of 1688 in our mother country, the great
achievement of those patriots who for centuries had been the
enemies and victims of arbitrary power,-power more dangerous, because more unscrupulous and tyrannical, when possessed by a party-najority than when held by one.
I do not give any credit to the so-called Democracy for rejecting or opposing these dangerous opinions and projects. It
would have been gratuitous mischief with them, for they generally had the majority at home, and were always kept in
check by the great party at the South, who could not jeopard
their own chartered interests by tolerating among their allies
any principle likely to undermine them; and who, with all
the evils of their social constitution, were generally free from
the pernicious influence of Socialism and Infidelity.
It is not easy to estimate the mischief which the existence
of a third party in the State can do, when the elections depend on simple majorities or pluralities.  Its leaders may be
honest and offer their votes to the party second in numerical
strength, provided it will adopt their social or political creed
and shibboleth; or, they may make a bargain for themselves,
and a share of offices and the spoils of victory may be a part
of their conditions; or if the minority party cannot make the
sacrifice, or rather advocate what would revolt all the intelligent and honest men of their political communion, the plurality, without any such sacrifice, may secure the victory by
encouraging a third nomination, which will work equally well
for their success, and the arrangements of such a bargain may
defy detection.
To present this point in a clearer view, I would cite an example from our history; one of those events in our national
life upon which depends, for weal or woe, a long series of con



12
sequences.  The result, as traced to the present point, is not
to be mistaken, and there is still behind the cloud we are passing through, a train of miseries not to be estimated now.
I speak of the Presidential contest, when Henry Clay
was defeated by James K. Polk. The decision was in the
hands of the Abolition party.  None knew better than their
leaders that Mr. Clay was at heart opposed to slavery; that
he had set his face resolutely against the acquisition of Texas
on the ground that it would extend slave territory and power,
and had pledged his opposition to it, and that this alone prevented his receiving enough Southern votes to ensure his election,  They knew, too, that every vote for a candidate of
their own was in effect given to the nominee of the slaveholders; yet they persisted in nominating and voting for Birney, which deprived Mr. Clay of the whole electoral vote of
New York, and thus ensured his defeat.
Thus the nation lost the last chance we have ever had of a
great President, and the best opportunity of putting the slavepower, as it is called, in its proper place. Had Texas been
excluded, the contest for the territories would have ended
there; and we can hardly doubt that, under the presidency of
such a man as Mr. Clay, whose temper was at the same time
so brave and conciliatory, and to whose course we owe so
much in appeasing controversy and settling difficulties, some
plan would have been devised not only for taking the question
out of the field of party controversy, but for the gradual removal of its worst features, and, with God's assistance, for its
eventual extinction.
But the first consequence of the election of Mr. Polk was
the annexation of Texas, an act fruitful of evils, and the war
with Mexico, which it provoked, and the spirit of aggression
and filibustering which it fostered, were unquestionably causes
of disease in our body politic, tending to its dissolution.




13
Could Texas have existed as a neighboring State, as an outlet
to all the violent and discontented vagabonds of the South,
and a market for all their surplus negroes, it would have been
a great gain to us; and the more power they acquired as a
separate nation, whether in friendship or at enmity with us,
the better. As a barrier to all future acquisition at the South,
and a receptacle for all the population, black and white, which
we could best spare, its very existence would have added
strength to our free institutions and purified them.
All this was said then, but -without effect upon those in
whose hands the decision rested, mlen who called themselves
friends of the negro and of universal liberty. Was it fatuity
or was it corruption?
This naturally leads to a consideration of our mode of nominating and choosing our highest magistrate, the President of
the United States; and here the perversions of our electoral
system will be found the greatest of a11.
It may have been expected by the wise and good men who
fraimed our Constitution, that'in devising this plan of choice
through electoral colleges, and giving to the whole work
an apparent solemnity and dignity which the occasion demanded, they would impress upon their fellow-citizens, to
whom this great trust and duty was committed, a solemn sense
of their obligation to their country and posterity. That the
gravest, wisest, purest men would be sought for, to meet in
conclave, and choose from among those of the nation most distinguished by their services, their talents, and their virtues,
one to whom all would bow as most worthy to conduct the
State. Now mark the result: In the first place, we have a
primary meeting organized and managed as those for common
elections, from which proceed delegates (whom no one would
trust in his own affairs) to a State caucus. This caucus appoints to the National Party Convention men with whom they




14
can make the best bargain for themselves.  The next step is
the party nomination for President, the most important of all,
taken under circumstances the most adverse possible to a good
selection.  Then the State election, by a doubtful majority,
in which citizens have only a choice between the nominees of
the great parties.  Finally, a meeting of the electoral colleges for dumbshow  and a dictated vote,-and this is the
nation's choice for its highest office, in many respects an uncontrolled dictatorship for four years. And who is the nation's choice for its highest office? A man of the finest abilities, the noblest character, the most distinguished services?
No! The man who is admitted to be superior to all, even
though he be leader of one of the great parties, will probably
lose the nomination of his own political allies, which will be
given instead to solme obscure politician of moderate abilities
and doubtful integrity.  The reason is, -that the former is
not, and the latter is an available candidate. A leading
statesman has excited jealousy, has committed himself to certain principles, has a settled policy and a firm will, and is not
to be dictated to. He cannot be moulded by those who
manage the nomination, will not engage to be their tool, or to
place in their hands his official patronage. He has his own
confidential adherents, and will select his advisers and high
officials from among them. Hie is, in a word, too proud a man
to truckle to these party managers, and too honest a one to
buy his election by the spoils of political victory. Such a man
will not do.
An available candidate may be one who has some source of
popularity independent of political services. A rough and
honest soldier, a rude backwoodsman who has raised himself
from the humblest condition, has sometimes fairer claims to
popularity than the statesman who has passed through a life
of political intrigue.  A popular sobriquet is better than a




15
title of honor to him. Old Tippecanoe, with his log cabin and
hard cider, old Rough and Ready, and " the honest Bargeman
and Rail-splitter," have alone in forty years achieved a victory
over the Democratic party.* In such cases, the corruptions
and malversations of a preceding administration may have
rendered statesmanship a suspicious qualification, and a reputation for honesty would therefore have the more influence,
while the rude tastes and jovial habits of the candidate in
former life might become additional sources of popularity.
Those who look out for such a candidate to offer to the people,
do not on their own account particularly desire ability, and
for them, honesty may be a very inconvenient quality if allied
with unreasonable firmness. They would rather rely on inexperience to submit in everything to their guidance, and indeed
such a candidate must naturally rely upon the friends to whom
he owes his success, and gladly promises to make all appointments by their advice.  A bargain is therefore made, which,
if he be an honest man, he will bitterly repent, and woe to
him if he break it. But these instances have been the exceptions, and are among the few successful efforts of the party
claiming for itself pre-eminent respectability.
The great Democratic party, which has controlled the nation with few intervals, has not had occasion to descend to
such resorts, but has generally nominated a man who has
enough political experience to know how to trim his sails to
the breeze; enough ability and dignity to fill the chair of
state without reproach; of easy principles, but true to his party
obligations, and to be relied on by the managers of the election that they shall have a full share of influence and patronage.
* So, too, with our gubernatorial candidates. The supporters of an antiDemocratic Governor of Pennsylvania showed in testimony of his qualifications his ill-writteii and ill-spelt receipts as a wagoner.




16
It is, unhappily, no defamation to assert that through the
whole process of our Presidential nominations, from the primary meeting which selects a member for the State caucus
up to the final vote in the electoral college, there is an uninterrupted intrigue and traffic for office and emolument, till, by
a triple distillation of corruption, we have presented to us as
a result, the only possible successor of George Washington.
It cannot be necessary to prove this to any one who has
watched the progress of a Presidential canvass, if that is the
proper name for a system contrived to render impossible the
intelligent selection and the honest choice of the whole people.
There still remains to be noticed the most monstrous perversion of the original design,-THE GENERAL TICKET, a system
which would seem to have been contrived for the express purpose of throwing the nomination into the hands of the veriest
political sharpers in the great States, to stifle all adverse
majorities in the several counties of these States, to override
the electoral colleges in the smaller States, and eventually to
place in office a man who has only a minority of the popular
votes, —it might be only a small minority,-and sometimes, as
in our last disastrous election, to give us a purely sectional
candidate elected by a bare plurality.
It requires but little reflection to perceive that, but for the
general ticket system, Mr. Lincoln would not have been
elected, and the rebellion of the South, wanting its pretext,
could not have occurred.
It is unnecessary to make further reference to the mode in
which are chosen the delegates to the great national party
convention for nominating a President, or to describe the
character of those who compose it, or the influences which
prevail there. It is notorious, that the delegation of each
State is managed and directed by one or more skilful tacticians, who have other things in view besides the honor of their




17
country, and who well know how to secure at the same time,
every party and personal advantage. A man who can offer the
entire State ticket of twenty or thirty votes has carte blanche
for himself and his friends.
The rest of the business is simply a farce, got up in conformity with an obsolete programme. The electoral ticket is
taken without examination; the names on it are utterly unknown to the greater part of the citizens. If the requisite majority or plurality of votes can only be had, by fair means
or foul, the dumbshow is acted at the State capital, and the
great game is won.
It was not the intention of our Constitution, to give the
choice of President to the States, but to the people, or rather
the trusted and trustworthy delegates of the people of the
whole country; and that every section and every class of men
should, if possible, be fairly represented.  Were the Presidential electors chosen in each Congressional district by majorities, we should not indeed obtain a perfect consummation of
this wish, but there would be at least an approximation towards
it. Two results, however, of incalculable advantage would be
attained: first, the frustration of the mighty system of intrigue and corruption which now prevails; and, secondly, the
breaking up of the overwhelming power of the great States.
No large State could give its entire vote to one candidate; in
fact, each of the great parties would secure its own election
in every district where it had strength; and above all, neither
party could afford to be sectional, from the necessity of seeking some of its votes in opposite sections of the country. Thus
every question dangerous to the Union would be stifled, and
the pandering to local prejudice and local fanaticism, which
has brought about all our unhappy divisions, would be equally
reprobated by the politician and the patriot.
2




i8
Great space has been given to the subject of primary elections, of caucus nominations, and party management, because
these are the chief evils of our American representative system.  We have now to consider, as briefly as possible, the
operation of our actual elections.
It has been thought by many, who have based their opinion
on the result, that an electoral system which has tended and
still tends more and more to exclude from office the best men,
and to place in our National and State Legislatures a body of
political intriguers, among whom corruption is so prevalent as
to cease to be a reproach, must have its radical vice in the
character of the constituency; that, in fact, the suffrage is
too widely extended, and that some means must be found to
limit it by a qualification of property, especially in land.
" Those who own the country," say they, "should govern the
country." But there is good reason for asserting, that under a
Republican government, the first principle should be to extend
the suffrage to all who can appreciate it as an obligation, and
value it as a privilege. No inhabitants as a class, however
humble, should be debarred from an easy acquisition of the
right; but, in order to give the electoral privilege a value to
its possessor, he must owe it to some effort of his own, or have
inherited it from a worthy parent. It must be something
which the idle profligate vagabond, the criminal, the brawler,
and the sot have forfeited or never acquired. This prerogative of citizenship, he should hold as an honor, a badge of respectability, and every man worthy of possessing it will gladly
work for it, and try to use it to his own real advantage and
honor, and if so, to that of the community. The only tests
we have for this qualification, are material ones; but they may
and ought to be within the reach of any industrious man, and
should be various in form in order to give no undue advantage
to any kind of property or department of industry; thus, the




19
possession or lease of a small portion of cultivated land, the
sole tenancy of a dwelling-house, a small investment in public
stocks, the previous year's service in a salaried employment,
or a poll-tax to the value of at least a bushel of wheat or a
day's labor: these, or such as these, would give some guarantee of respectability, and the greater number who can present
themselves with such qualifications, the sounder and safer will
be our Republican Institutions.
To inspire an honest pride in the rank of citizen, we must
take care not to share it with those who are the objects of his
contempt, and the self-respect which will be felt by the poor
laborer, when he has established by his industry, his right to
a political equality with the richest of the land, will surely
give an impulse to higher aspirations, and often be the first
step to personal distinction.
Such a proposition as this, cannot be charged with aristocracy or exclusiveness; all that it asserts is this, That an inde,
pendence and a real interest in the prosperity of his country,
ought to be requisites in an elector, without which, he will
not put a just value on the franchise.  The class of emigrants, who have not thought citizenship worth their fee of
naturalization, and the native inhabitants who have valued it
below their poll-tax, are surely not worthy of the privileges
and that there are many such, is proved by these payments
being almost always part of a candidate's expenses.  How
much more is paid for individual votes, only those who manage
elections can tell. It cannot be supposed that bribery in this
form, is practicable to any great extent.
But there is a form of corruption much more injurious and
iniquitous, because the price stipulated is to be paid by the
successful candidate in the form of office or lucrative contracts
to those who have brought their influence to bear on the election.  There is a class of men in every populous district, espe



20
cially our cities, themselves of no great consideration, but in
positions which give them large influence over a number of
the humbler inhabitants. These men have it in their power to
offer to either candidate a certain number of votes, and so sure
are they of their commodity, that when there are a number
of offices to be filled at an election, they have been known to
traffic them to a candidate on one ticket, for as many votes for
an office on another ticket, in the success of which they felt
more interest; and of such uncertain domicile is this class
of votes, that those who contract to supply them often can
transfer a score or more of them from one electoral district to
another on the eve of an election. It is needless to enlarge
on the venality of this class of vote-brokers, but the purification
of the suffrage in the manner just proposed, would probably put
an end to the business, as the plan hereafter to be proposed for
a united suffrage would unquestionably do.  This class of men
can indeed only find an occupation in the large centres of population. There is, however, another class of working politicians,
both in town and country, whose services must be secured. The
orator of the tap-room, the needy lawyer of the county town,
who sp-ends his evenings at the store or tavern, doing the work
"of the candidate and party, deserves his reward and obtains
it.  He is indispensable under the present system, and may
-be a very honest man.
This reference to Our custom of voting at the same time for
a number of offices, recalls an omission in speaking of the
various corruptions in our nominating caucuses. In framing
these tickets, especially for county and corporation offices, it
cannot be pretended that the nomination is made with reference to the fitness of the person proposed. It is a pure bargain among the leading managers of the party, and in consequence, the greatest pressure is brought to bear on the electors
to give success to the whole ticket, and he is denounced as a




21
traitor to his party, who ventures to scratch from his ticket
the name of a man he knows to be dishonest, even if the office
he aspires to be one of the largest pecuniary trust.
This system of "bullying," is worse than bribery.  The
tyranny of opinion is often supported by violence: the chief
end of preliminary ward meetings in our large cities is to organize the party forces; and the great public assemblages or
mass meetings have no other conceivable object than to impose the overpowering influence of numbers,-the worst but
often the most successful of arguments.
In the mother country, the canvassing is conducted with
some corruption and some violence, but at least with a better
show  of fairness.  From  the opening meeting to the final
polling, the two candidates and their friends address all the
voters, and in the very animated scenes on the hustings, arguments are exchanged as well as jokes and taunts; at all
events, the whole constituency knows all that both sides
have to say for themselves.  It is, ill a measure, the same
thing in the Southern States. At the great political meetings called barbecues, as well as at the hustings, in those
States, where viva voce voting is maintained, the orators of
both sides are listened to, and the citizen, however humble, has
a better right to the conviction on which he votes, than the
well-educated inhabitants of a Northern town who has only
listened to a one-sided harangue, or taken his facts and his
principles from the party newspaper which is his daily reading.
It may be thought a somewhat bold assertion, that the respectable citizen who, when a great question is agitating the
passions of the nation, daily reads the newspapers of his own
party and none others, who avoids the society of those of opposite opinions, and has brought himself to believe that loyalty
consists in supporting every measure advocated by his party,
is not better fitted to give his vote intelligently, than the




22
humble and illiterate laborer who gets his notions of politics
in places of resort which the other would think disreputable.
But is not this very often the fact?
When the character of the leading newspapers is considered,
sold as they are to party; how with many of them every principle yields to considerations of policy; how truth is suppressed
or garbled, and falsehood unblushingly asserted; how villainous acts are palliated and bad men praised; how the Constitution is contemned and the law of nations and of war, as well
as every dictate of our holy religion, disregarded; how opinions
which to-day are advocated are repudiated on the morrow;* we
cannot help perceiving that the moral poison from this corrupted source must permeate the minds of those who make
such matter their daily food, till at last the distinction between
right and wrong is obliterated, and acts and opinions are
justified at which a little while before the conscience would
have stood aghast, and with which we may hope it will still be
shocked when the spell is broken.
The national heart cannot always be corrupted by unholy
passions; the national intellect cannot always be blinded.
Roused to action by unaccustomed distress and difficulties, it
will speak for itself, and demand other leaders and other
organs.  The truth mnust prevail.
The people are beginning to be convinced that those called
their representatives are unworthy of the great charge committed to them.  The reason is now to be told them,-that
they are not their representatives.  Can those represent a
people in any office with whose selection they have nothing to
do? Whom they have perhaps accepted as their candidates
- It is not intended to apply this character to the whole newspaper press,
although the number of independent journals is very snmall which always
dare to give utterance to their own convictions.




23
with reluctance, and only voted for under necessity and party
dictation?  Whose very nomination may have driven many
from the polls with disgust, and who were opposed from the
first by the votes of a large minority of worthy and intelligent
citizens, who distrusted their honesty or abhorred their political opinions and aims? And who still work against them,
in the hope of driving from power, at the next election, men
who, in their opinion, are ready to sacrifice their dearest
interests, and those of their country? Unquestionably, No!
And thus our boasted system of popular representation, which
the wisdom  of antiquity having failed to invent, it was reserved to our Anglo-Saxon ancestors to devise, has proved in
our hands a failure, a preposterous fiction.  No institutions
have stood long, which have a falsehood at their base,-nor
can ours.
If it were necessary, it would not be difficult to trace in the
vices of our representative system, here exposed, the causes of
all our National calamities; but we may accept as an established truth the utterance of the people's voice, now heard in
every quarter, that our political leaders are chiefly answerable
for the cruel and unnatural war now rending every tie which
common origin, a common religion, a common history, and
nearer and dearer relations than these, had been forming since
our ancestors sought on these shores a refuge from poverty
and oppression in other lands.
It is a false assertion that our diversities of climate and occupation and domestic institutions necessarily dissociated us
in feelings, in interests, and political objects; that we could
not live together in peace. Never were national institutions.
better designed for harmonizing and maintaining a great
people, and leading it on in a course of boundless prosperity.
Like the work of the Divine hand in the mechanism of the
heavens, and the contrivances of organic life; or, like the




24
humbler work of man-in the great engines of manufacturing
industry, and the beautiful inventions of naval architecture,
such was the fitness of our National and State institutions to
work together, such the happy adaptation of checks and. balances (some of the most important of which consisted in the
very contrariety of our occupations and form of property) that
justice and equal rights were everywhere maintained; and it
is incredible that our great Republic should have subsisted for
more than seventy years without those very differences.
From many a difficulty with foreign nations, from many an
internal convulsion, from many a mischievous reform, we have
been saved by the opposing forces on one side or the other;
and, if our financial policy has not always been wise or just,
yet the sources of wealth were everywhere so great, the products, of agriculture so various and abundant, and our manufacturing industry and commerce so enormous, that we became
as a united nation the most self-sustaining people upon earth;
every department of labor furnishing and demanding the supplies of the other. But for the meddling fanaticism of a sectional party, working for years with insidious zeal, and the
hatred it naturally engendered, increased perhaps among the
indolent and thriftless portions of the Southern populace, by
envy of the greater prosperity of the North (sentiments on
both sides, which served as ready weapons to those whose only
object was to gain political power by stimulating prejudices
which they often did not share) there never would have been
a serious quarrel between North and South.
The opportunity was thus given through our vicious system of
representation to a few leaders on both sides, whose aim was
mastery or the disruption of the Union, to break up a Government ju'stly dear to great majorities in every division of
our country, and to inaugurate a war the end of which
no one can predict,-but which, whether it.be the subjuga



25
tion and forced submission of the South, or the breaking
up of our confederacy, may in its consequences be almost
equally deplorable. Under any circumstances, the working
machinery of our Constitution is broken down; the Government, as it is, cannot go on much longer.
What remedy is there?
Some persons seem to look to Military Despotism, which
history shows has been the ordinary refuge of a people from
Democratic misrule. But it is a desperate remedy, which
nothing but anarchy can justify.: It never can restore a
nation's healthful vigor-only preserve a paralyzed existence.
Our people are too good and sensible, too proud and brave
for this. They ought to be able to choose their rulers;
and surely could do so, if our present miserable machinery
for popular elections were cleared away.
Mr. Hare is believed to be the first writer who published to
the world the true principle of popular elections, viz., that
the person elected to a legislative office should represent a
totality. That his constituents should be voters among whom
there must be no opposition. That those who, according to
the system now prevailing, are in the minority, and not in
any way represented, should be able to combine with others
of common interests and principles, wherever they can be
found, and return a representative of their own.
His plan, which regards England alone, may be briefly explained as follows:
_Firstly. There must be secured a registry of all the qualified voters in the kingdom, and the number being ascertained,
this amount, or what perhaps would be practically better,
the largest number of votes ever given in a general election
must be divided by the number of representatives to be
chosen,-the product of this division being the number of




26
votes which each member of Parliament would represent, and
must really obtain, to secure his election.
Secondly. Every voter is to be supplied from the office of
General Registry with a certified ticket or voting paper,
on which he is to inscribe the name of the person he would
prefer as his representative, and add from the whole list of
candidates previously published, the names of those he would
select as his second and third choice, and as many more as he
pleases. The voting paper being handed in at the place of
election, they must be forwarded to the Registrar's Office for
examination, where all who have obtained the requisite number of votes by inscription on the first line of the voting
paper, will be declared elected.
As it is presumed that many gentlemen of distinguished
talents and popularity will be the first choice of a larger
number of voters than they require, their names are to be
stricken off as first choice on all the surplus, leaving another
name first on the list, which being collated with the remaining
voting tickets, will help to secure the election of another candidate. This process is to be continued until, if possible, the
whole number of representatives is made up.
The scheme is, it is thought, correctly described, without
entering into all the particulars; but it does not appear what
device is found out for filling the remaining seats, in case,
after the whole examination of voting papers, there are a
few which have not secured the full complement of votes.
It may be done either by taking majorities, or referring back
the voting papers for a new election.
It may perhaps be thought presumption to offer an opinion
as to the practical working of such a system of voting in
England. With their limited suffrage, it might be practicable;
but two serious objections occur. In so enormous a constituency-the whole body of voters in a country-few  can




27
know anything of the qualifications of the different candidates,
or even their political principles. After naming the first
choice, the other names will, in most cases, be dictated, or
selected on hearsay, or at haphazard; and if they are all to be
written, unless an officer at the polls inscribes them, bad penmanship would make difficulties, and great frauds would probab]y be practised on unlettered voters.
The second difficulty occurs at the Registrar's office, where
it is conceivable that many great frauds may be practised,
which we need not at present advert to. It would seem, at
first sight, very easy to count the voting papers and arrange
the voting lists according to the order' of preference by the
voters; though this indeed would require enormous labor and
an army of'clerks, with whom undoubted integrity would be
indispensable.  There would indeed be no doubt about the
election of those who have the full complement of votes on the
first line of the voting tickets. But when the names are to
be stricken off of the surplus tickets, from what tickets shall
they be erased?  For the second in order after the successful
candidate is not always the same. Are the clerks or the
registrar to have the right to decide who among the. " second
liners" shall have the vote?  Who shall select the tickets for
erasure?  This is an opportunity for favor and corruption
which cannot be admitted, and would be fatal to the honest
working of the system. Mr. Hare can perhaps suggest a
remedy; but as none now occurs to the writer, he will proceed to explain his own plan, which may have many defects
of its own, but is at least not liable to these objections.
As in the plan of Mr. Hare, it is necessary that the electoral lists should be made out for a certain time before each
election. This interval might be six months, when a full
alphabetical catalogue of all the qualified votes on the Regis



28
trar's lists should be made out, printed, published in the
newspapers, and the local lists affixed in public places.  For
three months after this, there should be given an opportunity to
claim the right of voting by those whose names are not on the
lists; after which, there should be no claim received or allowed.
The number of qualified voters in the whole of a State having
been ascertained, this number, or (as is suggested in Mr.
Hare's plan) that of the largest number of votes ever polled,
or a mean between them, must be divided by the number of
representatives allotted to the State in the national Congress;
or, in case of the State elections, by the number which fills
the quota of either house of Assembly. This number being
fixed as the constituency of each representative to be chosen,
he is expected to procure the full number of votes, or a very
near approximation to it; but with liberty to seek them anywhere within the limits of the State, among the qualified
voters. The reason why the dividend may safely be reduced
below that of the whole number of qualified votes, is that the
whole vote of a State is never given, and the proportion
abstaining can always be calculated with a great approach to
accuracy,
Inmmediately after the date of closing the Registrar's office
for claims, he should issue voting tickets or certificates of the
right of suffrage to every person entitled to it, a separate one
for every office he has the right to vote for, so prepared as to
guard against forgery or alteration.  This voting certificate is
not understood to be only an authority to the citizen to give
his ballot at the polls, but a ticket to be assigned to the candidate of his choice in writing before an officer appointed for
such purpose, as, for instance, a notary public. And this assignment might be made at any time within ten days of the
election, either at the notary's office, or, in case of inability
from sickness, at the house of the elector.




29
The next point to be considered is the nomination of candidates. For this we may find an example in England, where
primary meetings and all their abominations have been unknown. Any body of respectable citizens, whose names and
position might be expected to give weight to their recommendation, might meet in public or private and nominate a candidate to represent themselves and all others with whom they
were united in interest or in questions of public policy.
Thus we may suppose the great industrial divisions of our
country, the commercial, manufacturing, agricultural, or
mining interests would present their separate candidates; selecting from among men of the highest ability in the country,
those who will best sustain their cause in the public councils
of the nation, leaving them unpledged in other matters.  The
candidate being named, the meeting would then nominate a
canvassing committee consisting of fifty or five hundred members, whose names should be all immediately published, as well
as the proceedings of the meeting and their address to the
public.
The nomination might be made immediately after the publication of the electoral list, and the canvass at once commenced. This may be done as in England, by approaching
the electors at their homes, or addressing them at meetings,
explaining the objects of the nominating body, and giving assurances of the character and principles of the candidate,
procuring the promise of votes, and continuing their progress
through the country till their complement was made up, and
their work done. The electors would then present themselves
before the notary to assign their votes, and the election would
be complete.
From the great number of votes to be secured, it might
seem, at first sight, that the canvass would be peculiarly laborious, but the difficulty is not so great as it appears.




30
It being understood that immediately after the nomination
a publication is to be made stating the name, character, and
principles of the nominee, the names of the committee, and
the place of their headquarters or central office, at which all
who favor the election may be invited to hand in their names,
we may readily suppose a large number will be voluntarily
offered; moreover, the circuit of the committee need not be
very large, for, as the nomination is made by the representatives of some great interest or leading opinion, the field of
inquiry is much narrowed, if not entirely confined to citizens
of cognate principles or interests, so that the canvassers would
know exactly among what class of men to find their votes.
And here appears one of the chief recommendations of the
system, inasmuch as it tends to unite together all the grades
of society in the support of the same candidate; for the
moment a nomination is made of a gentleman of eminent
worth and abilities, who is to be the special representative of
one of the great interests of the country, he ought to be
equally secure of the support of the great proprietors, or
heads of the business, and of every one whose present maintenance and future hopes are involved in the success of that
great department, whether commerce, manufactures, agriculture, mining, or the various other subdivisions of industry.
The prosperity of commerce is not less important to the
merchant than it is to the ship-builder or chandler, the sailmaker, as well as the sailor, the truckman or the stevedore.
That of manufactures equally involves the mill-owner, the
machinist, the spinner, the weaver and the numerous bands
of operatives connected with the great establishments. Under
the proposed system of representation, it would become the
business of the heads of every branch of trade, not only to
show by argument to every one in their employ the identity
of their interests, but to prove it to them by affording the




81
best possible wages, and perhaps giving a special interest inl
the profits; moreover, to secure their regard by kind attentions and considerate treatment.  By these means, mutual
good feeling and dependence would be created in the fairest
possible way, and a sort of sentiment aroused analogous to
clanship.  Political economy would cease to be a matter of
cold calculation. The hard-hearted mill-owner, the ill-paid,
disheartened and debased operative would be replaced by
workmen and employers who know and trust each other, —
sharing prosperity and adversity without envy or discontent,holding the same views of politics and government, and in the
choice of their representatives always united.
In taking the great industrial interests of our country as
the chief bonds of union, and the most probable and efficient
combinations in nominating for representative offices, I do not
forget that there are other and much higher principles actuating men, even in their views of government; for although
almost all our legislation has reference to property, and the
chief machinery of administration is for its protection, yet
there are also some other and higher ends, affecting our religious and moral natures, which it may be possible to promote
or establish by government means. That these would be overlooked or neglected by the eminent men we may suppose
elected by the great industrial bodies of the country is not to
be supposed. Religion, education, science, art, all not only
aid the success of each department, but, being essential to
human progress and the happiness and honor of life, they
would be peculiarly the objects of encouragement in assemblies, where men of the highest education and worth would
take the place now occupied by political adventurers.
But the popular mind does not always work with regularity,
and sometimes refuses to run in the old track, though that
lead to success and prosperity. At times our citizens, or a




32
portion of them, appear to forget their own interest, and even
their duties, and, embracing the opinions of the enthusiastic
reformers of society, insist on carrying into action their newly
learnt principles.  Let, then, the apostles of social and political reform be heard; let them even have a place in our legislative assemblies, if they can secure the requisite number of
votes; let the advocates of emancipation, or temperance, or
antimasonry, or agrarianism make their nominations, canvass
for votes, and, if they can, elect their member; but let them
not combine with any other organization, corrupt the principle
of representation, and purchase, by the transfer of their votes,
the advocacy of projects which have no affinity with the principles of the great industrial parties forming themselves in
their neighborhood.
Should the representatives of these opinions obtain an
election, they would have the best opportunity of advocating
them. They would be listened to by the first minds in the
country, and it might be that the reforms they urge would in
some manner or to some extent be adopted; or, having been
confuted and rejected in the great council of the nation, representing, as it would do, the whole people, they would sink
with their advocates into insignificance and silence.
But we must now return from this digression to the plan
of voting, which has not yet been fully developed.
The quota of electoral tickets having been completely made
up and assigned to the member elect, he will retain them until
he presents them to the official of the House to which he is chosen, as his unquestioned and unquestionable certificate of election. Should he have had the offer of a larger number of votes
than is necessary for his election, he has only to suggest their
transfer to some other candidate of similar views and principles who had not yet made up his complement.  In this man



33
ner, the minorities would coalesce until *they formed complete
constituencies.
Thus far, each elected member would represent a whole, and
by the process above described, we may reasonably conclude
that most of the places would be filled; but as it is hardly
possible that the whole number of members should be elected,
each with the full complement of votes he is supposed to represent, it is to be considered in what way the seats still vacant
from a deficiency of votes are to be filled.
It would probably be as near an approximation as need be
to the principle of the above scheme of voting, if those candidates who had received the greatest number short of totality
of votes should be declared elected, provided they presented
the tickets of two-thirds of the number of their constituency;
and if at last, in consequence of the number of candidates,
there should still be a place unfilled by a member qualified
by such a vote, a new election should be called, at which the
voting tickets which had not been effective at the previous
election might be again used according to the system above
described.*
An advantage which is almost certain to accrue from this
system, would be the extinction of bribery, or the purchase of
votes.  The great number of votes to be procured would almost
render it impossible, and the facility of obtaining them  in any
a It might be objected to this plan, that it would only work well in the
larger States, at least in the elections for Congress; that in the smaller, it
would be impossible to secure a totality vote. In that case, a majority of
two-thirds might be accepted as the nearest possible approach; or the candidate might be permitted to seek his votes in the bordering States; for the
members of our lower House of Congress represent people, and not territory; and with certain limitations, the State boundary might be as little
regarded as that of a county; for interest and opinions, not neighborhood,
are the real bonds of union in a constituency.
3




34
district, would make it altogether unnecessary; for if bribery in
a limited constituency, as in the English elections, where the
parties are the richest in the land, is ruinous to the candidates,
how would it be possible with us, in a constituency of more
than ten thousand votes?  Moreover, it is only in elections
by majorities that the doubtful votes command a price.  Here
we should not have a scale to be turned, but a measure to be
filled, and a large field to gather from. The very publicity of the record would be a safeguard; and if there were
still a doubt, an oath might be administered to candidates or
constituents, that the vote was neither given nor received under
threats or promise of reward.  Under the present system,
there is great facility of corruption, and owing to the secrecy
of the vote, detection is nearly impossible.
The secret ballot must be of course abandoned; but instead
of this being a sacrifice of independence, it would rather secure
it. The elector (especially if the simple standard of respectability were established which has been before suggested),
would regard his vote as a duty to his country, and perform it
without fear or favor; and so far would he be from dreading
the intimidation of an employer, that this system would tend
to produce such unison of feeling between the latter and all
his workmen, that they would rarely wish to vote differently.
The record would, moreover, be a bar to treachery and all secret influences, and a vote of which the voter should be ashamed,
will never be given by him.
While the radicals in England have been contending for the
ballot, true reformers in America would rather return to the
honest and manly system of voting viva voce; being convinced
that wherever there is secrecy there may be fraud, and that so
far from the laborer being at the mercy of an offended employer, intimidation if practised will be from the masses, and
capital, not labor, the victim.  Only the demagogue, whose in



85
fluence is secret and who works in dark places, would retain a
system favorable to his intrigues.
The abolition of the system of electoral districts would remove
another popular fallacy. If land or the owners of land were
alone represented in our Legislative assemblies, there might
be some meaning in returning members from these divisions of
territory; but, since it is the people who inhabit it whose wishes
are to be carried out, whose rights secured, whose interests
protected and prosperity advanced, it is difficult to see how
one man can represent such discordant elements as constitute
the population of any crowded district, especially a large town
or city. In a rural district alone can a population be found
united in interest, and experience has shown that even among
them is often found a greater divergence of opinion upon political matters, than in a population given exclusively to any
other form of industry.
A greater tyranny cannot be conceived than to force a large
part of any population, even if it be only a minority, to commit the utterance of their wishes and the guardianship of their
interests in the National or State government, to a man they
cannot trust, and whose enmity they have won by the bitterness
of a party contest. In no way can this be avoided but by the
adoption of some such system as the one proposed in this essay,
and by Mr. Hare.
It is not to be supposed that such a change in our system
of representation could be carried without opposition; but no
one can honestly say that it is less Democratic than the one it
is intended to supersede, unless Democracy consists in putting
power into the hands of a few men.  Here, all would vote on
terms of perfect equality, the electors uniting voluntarily in
the choice of members of their own selection, really representing their interests. No vote would be nullified, and on
the contrary, every citizen would be really represented by the




36
man of his choice; frauds in elections would be impossible,
nor could any question of electoral returns come before the
Legislature to be decided, as it always is, by a strictly party
vote.
But of all the advantages arising from the change, the greatest would be in disuse of political caucus, and the end put to
primary elections; which together form  a system  so full of
fraud, so incapable of correction, that it must be destroyed, or
it will utterly eradicate all public virtue, entirely undermine
every principle upon which free institutions are based, and
leave us nothing but the knife to eradicate the cancer in our
body politic, with small hope indeed of surviving the operation.
If the electoral system, working with such disastrous effect
for more than our generation, has not altogether degraded us
as a nation, rendering it nearly impossible for a highminded
man to enter into politics, or soon destroying his sense of
honor by the associations and practices he must tolerate; and
leaving no other course for honest ambition but the acquisition
of money, a career itself most sadly corroding to the higher
sentiments of our nature; if there are still among us a class
of independent, patriotic gentlemen; or printers, shoemakers,
and blacksmiths, like the Franklins, Shermans, and Greenes
of our Revolution, such a system as the one proposed would
give them place in our national councils, and invest them with
authority to speak as no other representatives could speak,
with honesty and boldness, fearing no reproach, and checked
by no base party consideration; representing totalities, they
would be sure to be sustained while they support the true
interests of their constituents; truckling in nothing to those
they despise, they would legislate according to their conscientious convictions, for the good of their country; and, when
the decision on a great question was made, all must submit to




37
the will of the real majority of the nation, speaking by their
true delegates. Owing their places to no corrupt bargain or
base concession, they would be incapable of corruption in
their legislative office. Sustained by the whole body of their
constituents, who had really chosen them as their organs, they
would feel the conscious dignity of men worthily invested with
supreme power, and use it only for'their country's good,
identified as it would be with their own honor and lasting
fame.
Is this a dream-a fantastic and impossible idea?  Let it
not be hastily rejected as such; for it is a scheme to retrieve
the honor and honesty of our legislative assemblies, the corruption and degradation of which is the disease our Republic
is dying of. Something must be done, or our institutions will
speedily perish.
But the greatest of all the problems submitted to us as a
nation is still unsolved,-the possibility of electing the Chief
Magistrate of a great Republic without corruption and without
violence; the invention of a scheme for selecting among all
our people a man worthy of the exalted honor and the mighty
trust.
If the system of nominating and electing proposed in this
essay, for members of Congress, could be applied to the choice
of Presidential Electors, we might reasonably hope for the
creation of Electoral Colleges consisting of men of character
and influence, not the nominees of politicians, or the representatives of party; and, in that case, we should have an
effectual realization of the views of those great and patriotic
men who framed our Constitution, and whose work has been
so lamentably perverted by their descendants.
If we adopt the present basis and proportion of electoral




38
votes, every elector, corresponding to the representative in
Congress, must in the same way obtain a totality vote; and
the two Senatorial Electors (as they are sometimes called)
might be chosen by the Legislatures of each State; thus varying the mode of election, and giving another chance for a
good choice.
When assembled in the Electoral Colleges, each elector
should give his independent vote, to be counted as such in the
general return,-the object being, as before stated, to frustrate the intrigues of State politicians, and render a sectional
candidate impossible.
As this system of counting the individual votes in the general return is more likely to result in a failure to secure at first
a majority to any candidate, than the present system, the
Electoral Colleges might meet again after the interval of one
month; and, if it be found that the election has failed fromn
the number of candidates, a new election might be made, with
the choice narrowed to the three candidates who had obtained
the highest number of votes at the previous election.  This
would appear to be safer than to trust the second election to
the House of Representatives, as in our present system.
As experience has shown that many evils arise from a long
interval between the election and inauguration of a President,
the first meeting of the Electoral Colleges might be fixed on
the first of December, the second on the first of January;
which it is presumed would leave time enough for the President elect to make his preliminary arrangements before the
fourth of March.
While it might be hoped that this change of system would
result in the formation of such Electoral Colleges as the
framers of our present Constitution expected, and that our
people, in trusting to a body of their fellow-citizens an office
of such high responsibility and dignity as the election of Presi



39
dent, would take care that they were worthy of it; yet the prize
of the Presidential office is so high, its powers so great, its
patronage so enormous, that we cannot be sure it would not
be sought by bad men, and that every elector would be proof
against their seductions, and impenetrable by the lust of wealth,
or the temptation of office.
It would be well to provide against these evils, and to seek,
if we can, some mode of limiting the selection to men qualified
for office, by honorable and distinguished service elsewhere;
and at the same time so to diminish the patronage of office, as
to render corruption nearly impossible.
The first object might be attained by limiting the selection
of candidates to citizens who had at some time been Senators
of the United States, and had filled their seats in that dignified assembly for two years at least. This, it is thought,
would be attended with double advantage. It would greatly
increase the dignity and importance of that body, and secure
to the Presidential candidate some experience, not only in
legislation, but in statesmanship, while acting as a special
adviser of the Executive in diplomatic matters, and in considering his nominations for the great offices of the nation.
The Legislatures of the States, in appointing to the Federal Senate, would recollect that they were nominating to the
nation one of their fellow-citizens as a possible candidate for
the Presidential office, and would not lightly throw away the
advantage to be gained by a good selection, knowing that the
greater his virtues and abilities, the greater chance that this
high honor would redound to his native State; while the
members of the Senate would feel that the eyes of the whole
nation were specially directed to them, as the body from which,
or its former members, they must from time to time select
their Chief Magistrate.  Higher motives to a noble ambition,
a greater stimulus to patriotic service cannot be conceived.




40
This liberty of selection might be extended to all who had
filled the offices of Governors of the Federated States, and,
perhaps, some other high officials, especially in the Judiciary;
providing, only, that they are not in office at the time of their
nomination, the object being to secure ability and integrity
proved in the previous tenure of high office.
It would, indeed, be unwise to exclude the military professions from a chance of selection for the highest National
honors.  In war the noblest qualities are discovered, the best
abilities displayed.  Washington, Wellington, and Marlborough exhibited in their campaigns talents for diplomacy,
statesmanship, and general administration equal to their
military skill; and it would be well to invite from time to
time into our legislative counsels men whose great qualities
have already been exhibited in the tented field. In all the
great constitutional monarchies of Europe, many eminent
soldiers have seats in the legislative halls; and in the countries under despotic rule, the first offices of state are often
filled by military men. It is quite otherwise in our Republic,
cwhere, while we have abundance of generals and colonels in
Congress and our State Assemblies, they are men whose title
is only an empty pretension to military knowledge or service.
The attainments and experience of educated officers from
our military and naval professions, would often be invaluable
in the committees to which are assigned the affairs of war;
while the knowledge of the world, of which many have seen
much, and their high tone and bearing, would be a most desirable infusion into our legislative assemblies.  If officers of
the army and navy could be elected to Congress without resigning or losing grade in the service (merely relinquishing
for the time their pay and their progressive seniority), they
would form a great addition to our legislative strength; and if
appointed by their own States to a place in the National




41
Senate (an honor very likely to be conferred on those worthy
of it), they would thus be placed in the rank of candidates;
and should the voice of the Electoral Colleges call them to the
Presidential chair, they would not come into office without
some experience in the trade of statesmanship.
The last point to be considered is the patronage of office,
and its influence on elections.  Great as is this evil,-it may
be the greatest in our land, as affecting the honor of our
statesmen and the morality of our politics,-its removal seems
to be easy, if we have the will to do it.
The President, as the great executive head of the nation,
must be placed above this miserable business. There is not a
department in which it would not be a gain to him, as well as
to the nation, to place all appointments in other hands.
The highest functionaries of State, the Cabinet officers, and
the foreign representatives of the country must be under his
control; but the great departments of the army, navy, and
treasury might be entirely committed to permanent boards; at
which, if desired, the Ministers of State might preside, but
which might safely be trusted to fill the places for which they
best know the qualifications.  The Post Office need have no
connection with the Executive. The local postmasters indeed
might be safely left to popular elections.
If the nomination of the members of great departmental
boards be given to the Executive with the consent of the
Senate, there should be no power of removal except for misconduct or incompetence, verified before the Senate; and the
appointment of the inferior officers in their departments, including the whole military service, if requiring the assent of
the minister at its head, should be ever after beyond his control, except for similar causes.  In this way, great official independence and honor would be inspired, and high qualifications secured by education in the grades of office. In no other




42
country than ours are all the officials liable to displacement on
each popular election; and in no country on earth is there
such incompetence among them.
The nomination of the Federal Judiciary must, of course,
be left to the Executive; but if confirmation required a threefourths vote of the Senate, the appointment would be taken
out of party politics; while, if the courts had the power of
temporarily supplying vacancies on their own benches, they
would effectually stop all factious opposition to a good appointment.
The interpretation given to the constitutional powers of the
President in the early days of our Republic, when the character of Washington and his successor seemed to guarantee
us against appointments from corrupt or purely party motives,
was most unfortunate. It was not supposed possible that a
capable and faithful officer could be removed for a vote hostile
to the Executive, or to give place to one whose only merit was
his electioneering services to a new President; and the knowledge that occasional emergencies must arise calling for prompt
action, when the Senate could not be consulted, was, probably,
the cause of acquiescence in the peremptory power of removal.
The evil consequences of this concession were never fully
realized till the election of General Jackson, who first introduced the pernicious and tyrannical practice of punishing all
opponents in public places, and giving their offices to his
friends and supporters.  From  that time, parties in this
country became thoroughly corrupt. Men fought not for
principles but for offices and spoils. Implicit subservience to
the dictates of party was insisted on by its leaders. Our political caucuses and conventions became marts where principles and votes were sold for promises of office and contracts;
and the advent of a new President or Governor filled the Na



43
tional or State capital with hungry hordes,-imen without character or worth, claiming for themselves places of honor and
trust, to which they, of all men, were least entitled by tried
ability or honesty.
The framers of the Constitution of the Confederate States
have denied the power of removal from office by the arbitrary
will of the Executive; and it is to be hoped, whatever may be
the result of our national divisions, that this constitutional provision may be adopted by us.
A peremptory dismissal of a Cabinet officer or his confidential clerks is a necessary power. A temporary suspension
from office might be conceded to the great departmental boards,
or perhaps to their heads. A power of recall from foreign
missions may be necessary, but always to be submitted with
statement of causes to the Senate.  Here all control over the
tenure of office should end. Official integrity, the faithful and
intelligent performance of duty requires it; above all, the relief of our electoral system from the most extensive and flagrant
corruption demands it.
Take away this power, and our Electoral Colleges will be
relieved from every suspicion of baseness and intrigue. Choose
our electors in the manner previously suggested, and they will
unite in selecting for us, from all the nation, the men most deserving of our confidence by their public services and unquestioned abilities.  Party, as it is now understood, would be annihilated.  Great public questions would undoubtedly interest
and excite a great and free and intelligent people, and have
influence in elections, but in the choice of a First Magistrate,
we may be sure they never would be cheated into the election
of a man neither qualified for his place by his talents,4his education, his experience, or his integrity.
And what an accession of independence and dignity would




44
it not give to the Chief of our nation, placed above all base,
all party influences, and occupied solely with affairs of state!
We can hardly doubt his being actuated by the noblest patriotism in all his acts.  His influence in our legislative bodies
would be great, but always legitimate, for he could buy no votes
for his favorite measures; his foreign and national policy
would always be upright, for purely party considerations
would be impossible for a man so selected.
Personal dignity might always be expected, for his selection
would surely be made from the first men of the nation, and
his associations could never be degrading. No rowdy ruffian
with his troop of bullies could march triumphantly in the inaugural cortege, or force himself as a guest into the Presidential
mansion; no base intriguer could claim his patronage in reward
for services disgraceful to both.  While claiming no prerogative of birth, no advantages from wealth, rising as he might
well do from humble rank by successive stages of merit, he
would prove to the world that the widest Democracy can produce a gentleman, and knows how to honor him.
One of the evils of the existing system of election which
has been often remarked, arises from their firequency.  Hardly
is one election closed, before plans are laid for another. The
defeated party at once begins its assaults upon the newly
elected member, and both prepare with increased animosity
for a new contest.
This constant excitement is most unfavorable to a sound condition of the public mind on political subjects; and moreover,
as all citizens cannot give their time to this incessant political
warfare and intrigue, the work must needs be done by the
mercenary army of politicians of all grades, which our vicious
system has created and must continue to foster.
It has been proposed to diminish this evil by extending the




45
term of office both of our Chief Magistrate and also of our
political assemblies; but a little reflection. will show how eminently unfair and pernicious this extension would be under
our present system of electing by fictitious majorities.
Disfranchisecld as are all the citizens not voting for the successful candidate, —a class often embracing a real majority,
and still more frequently containing the largest proportion of
those whose education is the highest, and whose interests are
the greatest in the community, —utterly disregarded as are
all their rights anid wishes, even when unquestionably expressed, by the representative of their political enemies, who
is sure to take every advantage of victory,-the prolongation
of his term would be oppressive and tyrannical, giving time to
the unprincipled men who are the dictators of the party to
secure, if they can, by iniquitous legislation, the power
acquired by fraud, or to complete the ruin of the State by
misgovernment and plunder, before handing it over to their
political enemies. Those who have felt the misfortune and
disgrace of being constantly misrepresented in the national
Executive and councils; those who are aware of the irremediable mischief to be done, even in their present brief tenure of
office, by an unprincipled minority party, will never consent
to increase the evil by the prolongation of its power.
But adopt the system here proposed, of electing by totalities, and every objection to a prolonged term  disappears.
The member elect has no enemies in the rear.  He has no
battle to fight at home.  He really represents the whole body
of his constituents.  His selection is the very expression of
their wishes: he is sure to take counsel with and for them, and
to defend all their rights and interests.  The President elect
has been the choice of a real majority of the nation, —not
nominated by intriguers, but selected by men most capable
of judging of capacity and worth, and raised to office for




46
merits and services proved in other capacities. In both cases
power may safely be trusted, for it will not be abused. In
both, a prolongation of office is not only convenient, but desirable.  As it would probably be renewed by re-election, there
is the best reason for prolonging the term.  Frequent elections, so essential under the present system, to protect private
rights and secure an expression of public wishes, would be
here unnecessary; and the evil of frequent changes and constant political agitation would be obviated, without encountering a greater evil,-the consolidation of party despotism.
This is believed to be the last topic to which it is necessary
to advert,-the evil of false majorities being mainly confined
to the choice of the members of our legislative bodies and the
Presidential election.
The executive officers of the various States and counties
must be elected by simple majorities; and whatever frauds
or abuses may exist in these elections, can be safely left for
correction to the Legislatures of the States, if they are fairly
chosen according to the principle here advocated.
It would be a trespass on the time and patience of the
reader of these pages, if more were added.
The monstrous evils of our present representative system
have been exposed, and a plan suggested, which, if practicable,
would seem  to promise a removal of all these evils.  It
would require very long and careful study to adapt it to a
practical working result. Difficulties may suggest themselves
demanding essential changes; and, although the machinery
for voting seems simple enough, there are numerous contingencies to be met with suitable contrivances.  Some of them
have already occurred to the writer; but it does not at present
seem necessary to suggest them.  It is sufficient now to de



47
velop a general plan, which it is hoped may be intelligible to
all. Like many other fair and promising schemes, it may be
a mere illusion; but if it turns other minds into similar
trains of thought, the result may be the discovery of some
method of electing, more practical, more efficient, and better
suited to our American people.
APPEND I X.
SINCE the preceding pages were printed, it has been suggested by several friends, that the plan proposed in them so
entirely revolutionizes our accepted mode of popular elections,
that it will not be generally understood without a more distinct and detailed explanation; and although this renders
necessary a repetition of many particulars, the advice is accepted by the author, who hopes to supply in the following
appendix, all that may be desired by those who are sufficiently
interested in his pamphlet to wish to read anything more on
the subject.
Three topics before discussed are recalled as preliminaries.
1. The Qualification of Voters.  Whatever may be the provisions for this object, it is only necessary that it should be
such as to render probable the respectability of the voter,
and his interest in upholding the institutions of his country.




48
2. The Secret Vote or Ballot must be abandoned.  The
reasons for this have been previously given.
3. The -Division of States into Districts for election to the
Presidential or legislative offices, must also be abandoned;
the least reflection showing that it is not land, nor the owners
of it, who form our constituencies, but the citizens generally;
and that the opinions, principles, and interests of the people,
which ought really to find expression in their representatives,
can never be expected to conform to any possible territorial
division.
These questions being put aside, the framework and machinery of the new electoral system will be presented as briefly
as possible.
1. In the first place, a Registrar-General must be appointed
in every State, with as many deputies in the different counties as may be necessary, with general and local offices of
record.
II. The duty of the Registrars should be to prepare a list
of all the qualified voters in the State, dividing them according to the residences in townships or wards, and arranging
their names alphabetically.  This should be a permanent record, of easy reference at the local and general registry
offices.
III. Six months before each general election, there should
be a publication of all the qualified voters on record; the lists
being printed in the local newspapers, and exposed in various
public places in every township or ward.




49
IV. After the publication, two or three months should be
given for additions or corrections, to be decided upon by the
Registrar; after which time no appeal should be heard, and
the lists closed. The names of the additional voters, if any,
should be published as above.
V. The Registrar's books being closed, and the whole
number of qualified voters being ascertained, the numerical
constituency of each member of the National or State Legislature may be determined, by using as a divisor the number of
places to be filled. But it is not necessary to count the
whole number of qualified voters; the largest number of votes
ever given in any previous election, with a proportional addition for the estimated increase of population, may be taken
as the aggregate; the quotient produced by the number of
representatives as a divisor, may be accepted as the whole
constituency of each member, to be procured by the candidate
in any part of the State.
VI. Immediately after closing the books of registry, a
ticket should be furnished from the Registrar's office to every
qualified voter, stating his right to vote for each member of
Congress or State Legislature, or any other elective officer, —a
separate ticket for each office.  The ticket might have some
such form as the following:
"John Doe is authorized to vote for member of Congress
(or other office), of which this ticket is his certificate. An
assignment by writing on the back is necessary to convey the
vote to the member of his choice."
Signed by the Registrar.
N. B. This ticket should be numbered and prepared in such
a way as to guard against a counterfeit.
4




50
VII. The ticket thus placed in the hands of an elector, is
not to be used at an ordinary polling-place, but regularly.
assigned to the representative before a notary public, or some
similar officer; the number and names being entered on a
record kept for that purpose, and the tickets so assigned are
to be handed to the member elect as his certificates, to be
presented and counted at the proper office of the legislative
fbody to which he is elected.
VIII. Several days (ten are proposed), should be allowed
for this assignment, previous to the closing of the election;
and it might not be found objectionable for the notary to receive the assignment of a vote at the house of an elector in
case of serious illness.
IX. No more votes would be required for or given to one
candidate than the number making the complement of his
constituency. Others which might be offered, could be passed
over by the advice of the member elect, or his committee of
canvass, to some other candidate representing similar interests
or principles.
X. As votes would coalesce in this manner, it is presumed
that the greatest number of places in the legislative body
would be filled by a totality vote.: The few seats not receiving
the full complement might be filled by those candidates
whose number of votes exceeds two-thirds of what constitutes
a perfect constituency; and if, in fine, in consequence of the
great number of candidates, there should still be a seat unfilled, a new election might be declared, at which all the voting
tickets not previously effective might be again used.
The most important part of the new scheme of election con



51
sists in the mode of nominating candidates, and, it is in this
particular that the great defect of our present system is to be
found.
The immemorial custom  of England, so different from our
own, has generally secured for her Parliaments the election of
the most eminent and capable men; for while it must be
admitted that in Great Britain, before the Reform of 1832,
the distribution of the suffrage was singularly unequal, and
the anomalies of the system so great as to exclude from the
polls a large number of competent and worthy voters, yet
Parliament has always contained and generally been controlled by men of the most distinguished talents and loftiest
patriotism.
The reason is, that in most cases the nomination of members has been in the hands of those best qualified to make ito.
The heads of the great industrial interests, or the leaders of
the great political parties are accustomed to meet, and having
agreed upon and nominated the fittest man to support their
interests, or advocate their principles, conducted the election
by canvassing committees appointed by themselves;: and whatever influences might be brought to bear upon. tihe electors,
and however often their votes were given by dictation, it may
be asserted, that except in the cases of the close corporations, and Scotch counties, which were the worst part of the
old system,* the candidate was never suspected of making a
l* it the frst, the constituency was vestedi in members of a selfelecting body of burgesses or freemen, few in number, and often non-residents, or having little interest or no property in the town or city, where a
large and respectable population was really disfranchised. In the second,
there was an extremely limited freehold suffrage, generally not a tenth of
the competent voters, and the inheritors of land had the extraordinary privilege of disposing of their property and retaining the votes attached to it 
so that sometimes, a family long dissociated from their hereditary possessions,




52
corrupt bargain to be fulfilled after the election by his influence in procuring offices or emoluments. It is only since
the extension of the suffrage in some of the largest centres of
population, that we hear a complaint of bad nominations,
owing to the combination of untrustworthy or corrupt men,
working like the managing politicians of America. As a consequence, the great metropolitan districts, and others of the
same nature, have been represented in the National Legislature by men eminent neither for ability nor personal worth.
This will not surprise any one who has closely watched the
system of nominations in America.
Without going further into this subject, which has been here
introduced, not with the view of holding up the English system
to admiration, but merely to prove that the plan for Nomination and Canvassing to be proposed is neither novel nor
untried, and to give a precedent of its successful working;
we may proceed to the details necessary to carry out the
scheme of voting by totalities, partially exposed in the preceding pages.
In the first place, it is proposed, that any number of respectable citizens, recognized as the heads of the great industrial interests, or the leaders of public opinion on any subject,
should meet, and by agreement among themselves, nominate
as their candidate for Congress or local Legislature, the
had the control of five or six votes, enough to turn a disputed election and
purchase any amount of ministerial patronage.
The rotten and nomination boroughs were far less objectionable; they often
ensured the representation of great interests in distant parts of the Empire,
which could in no other way have a voice in Parliament; still more frequently, were they the means of introducing young members of great ability,
who had not yet won fame and popularity. They were great anomalies in
the Constitution, but not without their advantages.




53
person best fitted, in their opinion, to sustain their interests
or principles.
Secondly. With the announcement of the nomination, it is
understood that there should be publishled an address to their
fellow-citizens, declaring their views and wishes, and describing the character and services of their candidate.
Thirdly. At the same time, the nominators will appoint a
canvassing committee, consisting of any requisite number,
and composed of men of honor, character, and respectability,
whose names should also be published.
7Fourthly. They will establish a central office, or headquarters, at which all qualified voters approving the nomination, may be invited to hand in their names.
All this should be done, if possible, immediately after the
first publication of the lists of qualified voters.
Fifthly. The canvass may then begin; conducted as it is in
England, by printed appeals and addresses at public meetings; but especially, by personal application to the voters,
who might be sought in any district of the State, but would
be chiefly looked for among those who are united in interests,
or common political opinions.
Sixthly. A list of those offering their names at the central
office, or promising their support to the members of the committee, being kept, as soon as the number forming the constituency is complete the canvass will be finished; and no
other act would be requisite for the perfection of the election,




54
except the assignment of the voting tickets, as previously described, before a notary public.
The only contingency to be provided for, now occurring to
the writer, is the case of vacancy of a seat by death or resignation.  To meet this difficulty the following plan is proposed.
It will be recollected that at the assignment of the voting
tickets before the notary, a list is to be kept of the numbers
and names. The voting tickets should also be preserved by
the officer of the Legislative body to whom they have been
counted out, as the certificates of election.  This renders it
perfectly easy to supply the original holders with fresh tickets
to be used for the new election. Now, although we may suppose great unison of feelings and principles still to exist in a
constituency which has voted unanimously, we cannot expect
that the agreement on a new choice will be so perfect. At
the new election, two-thirds or even a majority of the votes
might suffice to return a member for the unexpired term; and
this practically would be attended with no inconvenience, for
the new member would undoubtedly represent the same interests as his predecessor.
This completes the whole scheme for electing to legislative
offices. A plan so entirely untried under Democratic institutions, may in its working develop defects; but at first sight,
it seems to meet and obviate all the objections to the present
system.
Its execution would unquestionably be facilitated by a
diminished constituency; but the impolicy and unfairness of
excluding any men, or class of men, from an easy acquisition
of the right of suffrage, is frankly admitted by the writer.
He would, therefore, propose an augmentation of the members




constituting our legislative bodies, which would have the same
effect in facilitating the canvass.
If our National Congress consisted of men nominated and
elected in the manner proposed, there would be no apparent
objection to increasing its number to four hundred members,the advantages being, besides the greater facility of the canvass, a better chance for the representation of the different
interests and opinions existing in the country, a greater number of men of intelligence and worth to be expected in the
legislative council, and a diminished chance of party division
and control.  Cabals and their projects would be more likely
to. be frustrated and exposed, and many iniquitous measures,
such as are now carried through with a high hand, would not
be attempted. The incalculable advantage of having in our
legislative bodies members really independent, and above corrupt or even honest party influences, must be admitted; and
the increase of the numbers would probably tend to this most
desired end.  The six hundred members of the HIlouse of Commons are not thought too many in Great Britain; and the
numerous members of the Legislature of Massachusetts may
well compare in intelligence, dignity, and honesty, with any
smaller body in our country. This completes the whole plan
for electing to legislative offices.
In the preceding treatise, it was proposed that the Presidential electors should be nominated in the same manner, and
the canvass conducted on the same principles; and although
it may be admitted -that a fitter body of men could not be
found to make the choice of our chief magistrate than those
who might be elected in this manner; yet it must be recollected
that the principles moving a citizen in his choice of the President are not the same, and there appears something incongruous in giving the choice to the representatives of partial




56
interests or of circumscribed opinions; and a canvassing committee for a Presidential elector would hardly address themselves to the same interests or feelings.
If this objection be thought important, we might return for
the choice of President to the system of separate district
elections; when, if a majority of two-thirds were required in
each district, we would approach a perfect expression of the
National preference, which never can be obtained with the
general ticket.
But there is another plan to be considered, still better
calculated to give to local minorities their proper weight,
which in the choice of the President, is one of the greatest
objects sought for in the reform of our electoral system.
In South Carolina, and perhaps some other States, the
choice of the Presidential electors has been conferred on the
local Legislature; and such a duty might safely be trusted to
a State Legislature, provided the members have been elected
on the principle of totality representation, and were debarred
from giving a majority vote, and thereby reviving in another
form the general ticket, which should in no plan, and in no
shape be tolerated. The mode proposed is very different.
Let the members of both houses of the Legislature be divided by the number of Presidential electors to which the
State is entitled, and the quotient might represent the number
of members to whom might be committed the choice of one
Presidential elector, the members combining according to their
affinities for that purpose. Thus, supposing the number of
Presidential electors allotted to any State were thirty, the
number of the State Senate fifty, that of the Lower House
one hundred. If we divide the united number one hundred
and fifty by thirty, the quotient five will represent the members of the Legislature having a right to combine and choose
one Presidential elector. It will be perceived that in this




57
way there will be an opportunity given to all the different
interests and political opinions, as represented in the Legislature, to combine in parties of five, and choose one elector of
their own principles; and the influence of minorities would in
this way be felt as much as if the matter were submitted to
the popular vote in any manner which could be contrived.
There is, however, an apparent difficulty in this matter,
arising from the fixed number of our legislative bodies, not
often affording an equal dividend so as to leave no fractions;
but an easy mode of obviating this presents itself, by increasing (for this occasion only), the number of the legislative
electors, if they may be so called, by the addition of two or
three members at most, either nominated by the Governor,
or elected by a majority of both houses.  The number thus
made up, could be divided as above proposed into equal quotients, and the result would be the choice of Presidential
electors with as much fairness and probability of fitness, as
could be attained or desired.
No further remarks on the subject of the election of our
Presidents need be added, to what has been already written
in the body of this essay.
These pages are presented to the public with little expectation of general approval.  If they attract attention, they may
subject the writer to severe criticism; but if the questions he
proposes are honestly discussed, he will be satisfied; and if
any one of his suggestions should be adopted by his countrymen, he will be amply rewarded.




The Philosophly  of  o1tur  Condition  as a
ation.
T'o the Editor of the Boston Coureiei:   It has often
been asserted thl;t there is no tyranny like that of a
I)emnocratic iainjority; because, being  utterly irresponsible,  and poss-esing at the same time the au
thority of law, anid the force of numbers, it must
iieeds be irresistible.  It may be so: but at least it
lhas no motive to overtiurn the Cohstitution which
confirms its privileges, and can  afford to be tolerant
ald even. just.  On the other hand, it is a minority
party, when soiletinmes by an imperfect elective systell it comes-into power, which is under strong teiuptations to use illega.l and violent mlerns to secure its
pelrmanence.   So with  as  elective Chief 3Tagisirate, if regularly lho,~Uen by a, real mlajority of the
l ntion,  he C:  Ilte 1o othe   object than to rule
justly, to inaintain the laws and Constitution, and to
pturSile in all respects the honlor and welfare of the
people.  But when a plurality  vote elects a third
candidate, or the wvorkinng  of a.genieral ticket systeml
enqbltes a conil)iiation of dellma.gog'ues to place in ofJCns 111i who iiever could have been elected by a fair
vo,,1, atlthougllh l;laced according' to law in the chair
of State, he is inl fact no represenit tive of the people,
only indeed of his party; andli, owing  everything to
those who manaiged his election. is bound to use all
his power for party purposes, and secure, it' possible,
the peipetuation of their rule.  To this allother considerations y ield.   The l'w and the Constitution, if
offering obstructions, must be sacrificed; opposition
out down by violence; wosx provoked to gain the
ontrol of lilitary force, to bie used less against rebels or a foreign enemy than against legitimate opponents at home.
The velry weakness of the ptlarty is the cause of its
tyraannical usurpations.  All history shows that it is
not the legitimate monarch who is the tyrant, nor
the party in leg'islative body really representing the
wishes and interests of a majority of the people that
is w.illino to overturn the fundaiental laws of their
counitry, but those who, knowing that they are not
sustained by their countrymen, feel that their tenure
of office is insecure.  These, whether mlonarch, noblesor dea.gogues, alre the reial traitors, who, have
ing tenmporary 1oasession of the public treasure, and
the commlla.ld of' the military force, can and will use
them to oive permanence to their power, and save
thelsoselves fromlll   erited ilnishment and disgrace.
Their own donination and(l saety aie paramount  to
all other consicerations.
These truths are most forcibly expressed in a work
written in Spain about twenty years ago, by the
Rev. Janes Ba lmes, a clergynian of the Church of
liome, entitled' European Civilization, or Protestintinsi  antd Catholicity Comlpal ed.  It hats been
traiislated into I'rench and Enilish, and has already
reached the sixth edition in this country.  TIhe quotations are fromll pages 126 and:303:
"Periods of  revolution havee ai  this distinctive
chasracter-t1he tyranly qof the inlterests of public acIthoriity oer  pr.'ivate  tllf'eres.  Never is this power
feebler or less lNsting'; but never is it miore violent,
more mad.  lEverything is sacrificedl to its safety or
its vensgeance.  The shade of its enemies pursues it
a1nd makes it continually tremble; its own conscience
torments it a.nd leaves it no repose.  The wieakness
of its oroanieation,  its unstable position, warn it at
every step of' its anpproaching' fall, andl in its impotent
despair it mlakes the convulsive eiforts of one dying- in
aigony.  VWihat, then, in its eyes are the lives of citizeins, ii thle- excite  the               mos t remote
suspicion'   If the blood of thousands of victiams could
plrocure for it a moment of' security, and add a few
dalys to its existence,'Perish my enemies,' it says;'this is requiried -for the safiety of the State,' (that is,
for msine).''Stripped of the reason and justice which it would
flin inmoke in its own support, it seeks for both in the
very necessity qof'poer —a social necessity which is alIwyivys visible —and it proclailns that the safety of the.peopl7c is the supreme casire.  Tllen the property and
lives of individuals are nothing-they are annihiated in the presence of the bloody spectre wvhicI
arises iin the inidst  of society.  Armed waith lorce,
antd  ssurriounded by guards aind setitfolds, it says,'I:tin the puiblic power: to me is confided the safety of
the people.  It is I who wattch over the interests ot
society.; 




And Igalin:
"Popular  liberties   are  not  endan-gered   by
the  strong   safeguards  surrounding  the  legitiniancy of the govermningo  power.  On the contrary,
reason,  history,  and  experience  teach  that alt
illegitimate  powers are  tyrannical.    Their ille -
gitiinacy necessarily carries weakliness  along  with
it, and it is not the strong but the weak powers
whlich oppress the people.  lleal tyranny consists
in the person governing   talig ca.re of his own instend of the public interest. Now, this is precisely
what tikes place when, feeling  himisell'weamk aen d tottering, lie is forced to guaid a.nd protect himself. 1-is
olject is then no longer society, lut himself. Instead
of thinlhing how  lie may Obenefit those over whom
he rules, lie only studies and calculates beforehand
the utility lie Imay derive forou  his own measures.  I
hl've sni d in another pice,  anid.I repevat, that in
looling  over hlistolry,  me find  continually this import-.nt truth wmitten in letters of' llood —Wo to the people goverined by a power iwhichL is obliged to think of
its own preservation' A  lfundamental truth in po.litice.l science, and mwhich has, nevertheless, been lam-entably overlooled in imodern times.'
Thiis is a true picture of despotism,  whether exer.eised by' single usurplel, or a cabail, successful i:.
aettin' mnastery in a. republic.  Mleay it not he  se?
sentied to our countryinen for their instruetion