R      I||            Ii|     ||lBUHR  8
* ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~" =- - -  - ~  4A l  'n  I *  i j.w!r T                  i l *I IX11Ii..A..  B  A.  ll.41!'@ ASI 'rIn
la39     0 X    10   9 _
0*.9r
















The CONQUEST of the P HILIPPINES








The CONQUEST of the PHILIPPINES
by the UNITED STATES
1898-&g25
by
MOORFIELD STOREY
and
MARCIAL P. LICHAUCO
"Personally I think;t is a fine and hogh tning jor a 'nation to
have done such/ ar deed 4our work in tk, Philippine 't with SUth
a purpose. fteuit.e::an.,j t i n t  Jit wth bi /ith  If we act si~
that the nati- w:w: rst4iert:, urs to have made e defidte promise,
then we should li-zef u t up e,4 romis,. The Ph,'i ">- s. from a
military statnd/ointe.,te a sO* S m,, of weakness ': '  T 'hs presen
administration i. p  iy8w. /.'..i;itlv  -  /  g, Oanf' 'action has rendered itditffcult to hiold tCem against any serious
foreign foe. 5These being the circumstances, the islands should at
an early moment be given their independence without any guaranty
whatever by us and without our retaining any foothold in them."
THEODORE ROOSEVELT.
G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS
NEW YORK                 LONDON
tptr tKtikerharker frtra
92.6




~:-   f   al*  ( j. t....
Copyright, 1926
by
Moorfield Storey
and
Marcial P. Lichauco
Made in the United States of America




PREFACE


THIS book has been prepared in order to lay
before the people of the United States the facts
relating to the conquest of the Philippines.
The government of the United States rests
upon the self-evident truths that "all men are
created equal," that is, with equal political
rights, and that "governments derive their just
powers from the consent of the governed," or, in
the words of Abraham Lincoln,-"No man is
good enough to govern another without that
other's consent. I say this is the leading principle-the sheet anchor of American republicanism."
As if anticipating what would be said in justification of the policy in the Philippines, the same
great American said: "These arguments that
are made that the inferior race are to be treated
with as much allowance as they are capable of
enjoying, that as much is to be done for them
as their condition will allow,-what are these
arguments? They are the arguments that kings
have made for the enslaving of the people in all
ages of the world. You will find that all the
v




vi


Preface


arguments of kingcraft were always of this class:
they always bestrode the necks of the peoplenot because they wanted to do it, but because
the people were better off for being ridden..
Turn it every way you will,-whether it come
from the mouth of a king as an excuse for enslaving the people of his country, or from the
mouth of men of one race as a reason for enslaving
the men of another race,-it is the same old
serpent."
In 1898 every good American believed in the
principles thus announced and in recognition of
this belief President McKinley in his message to
Congress urging the declaration of war against
Spain used these words: "I speak not of forcible
annexation for that under our code of morals is
criminal aggression."
To emphasize this principle and to remove all
doubt as to the purpose of the United States the
Senate on April 20 passed the so-called Teller
Resolution declaring that "the people of Cuba
are and of right ought to be free and independent," and that "the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise
sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said
island (of Cuba) except for the pacification
thereof, and asserts its determination when that
is accomplished to leave the government and
control of the Island to its people."
How happens it that with these convictions




Preface               vii
and these high purposes the United States proceeded to conquer the Philippine Islands and
to hold them for more than twenty-five years
against the will of their people?
President McKinley assured his fellow-countrymen that "our priceless principles undergo
no change under a tropical sun." How happened
it that they did change?
It is the purpose of this volume to answer
these questions and to show how the American
people were led by false statements and systematic suppression of truth to believe thatthe
Islands came into their possession "unsought by
the fortune of war," and that, in consequence,
they became responsible for the government of
the Filipinos in the effort to fit them for independence, and that they have since been
governed wholly for their own benefit and not
for America's, while as a matter of fact their
conquest and retention were due to the influence of a comparatively few men who, caring
nothing for American principles or the interests
either of the Filipinos or their own countrymen,
have sought to make money for themselves at
the expense of both.
It will become apparent that this policy has
not been approved by the people of the United
States nor their representatives in Congress
with full knowledge of the facts, but has been
devised and carried through by the Executive




viii
* * 
Vlll


Preface


in the exercise of usurped powers. Today the
same influences are at work seeking to prevent
the fulfillment of the promise made in the Jones
Bill and to make permanent the retention of
the Philippine Islands because a few Americans wish to make money. It has even been
urged that the United States should deny the
Filipinos independence because some of the
Islands are well-adapted to the cultivation of
India rubber, and the question is whether
America's "priceless principles" and solemn
promise shall be abandoned in order to make
rubber cheaper.
The people of the United States must indeed
be blind if with the history of Ireland before
them, they believe that the Filipino nation will
continue to submit and regard with placid indifference this cynical repudiation of our national promises and national principles. The
weapons which labor now uses against its fellowcountrymen at home are quite as effective
abroad and will be used.
Not in the interest of the Filipinos only,
therefore, but far more in the interest of the
United States, should the control of the Philippine Islands be abandoned. Well did Lincoln
say, "Those who deny freedom to others deserve it not themselves, and under a just God
cannot long retain it," and well did Whittier
say the same thing in the lines:




Preface                   ix
That laws of changeless justice bind
Oppressor with oppressed;
And close as sin and suffering joined,
We march to fate abreast.
MOORFIELD STOREY,
MARCIAL P. LICHAUCO.
LINCOLN, MASSACHUSETTS
October 20, 1925








CONTENTS
CHAPTER                                   PAGE
I.-THE CUBAN INSURRECTION...    3
II.-THE PHILIPPINE SITUATION BEFORE THE
AMERICAN CONQUEST...  20
III.-THE BEGINNING OF THE CONQUEST.  33
IV.-FILIPINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS PRIOR TO
AUGUST, 1898..                   44
V.-CONQUEST BY TREATY..  66
VI.-CONQUEST BY FORCE OF ARMS..  88
VII.-PROGRESS OF THE WAR... 101
VIII.-CONDUCT OF THE WAR... 126
IX.-THE CAMPAIGN OF 1900... 156
X.-THE TAFT POLICY ANALYZED.. 181
XI.-THE TAFT POLICY IN PRACTICE.. 209
XII.-THE ATTITUDE OF PRESIDENT COOLIDGE 229
XIII.-AN APPEAL TO REASON... 255


Ai








The Conquest of the Philippines by
the United States
1898-1925


I




I




The Conquest of the Philippines by
the United States
1898-1925
CHAPTER I
THE CUBAN INSURRECTION
IT has been customary to attribute the outbreak of the Spanish American war to the
deplorable situation existing in the island oft
Cuba, for the cruel methods by which Spain
sought to suppress the local insurrection had
indeed excited the sympathy of Americans who
wished to end the horrible conditions that
existed there. But the desire for intervention
in 1898 was by no means the first manifestation
of interest on the part of the United States.
On the contrary, many years ago America
and Spain had been on the verge of war over
this tempting possession, and it was only the
influence of conservatives in both countries that
had prevented a more frequent recurrence of such
strained relations. To understand the inter3




4    Conquest of the Philippines


vention of 1898, therefore, it is necessary to
look back and recall the attitude of American
statesmen in former years upon the Cuban
problem.
We first find that fully a century before the
war of 1898 Cuba had already been an object
of concern to the United States. Jefferson
had coveted it, declaring that its possession by
Great Britain would imperil the future of the
Republic, and John Quincy Adams had con->
tended that the laws of political gravitation
would inevitably draw the island to the Union.
In 1825 Henry Clay declared that America
would not permit the occupation of Cuba by
any other 'power than Spain, while Daniel
Webster as Secretary of State subsequently
went to the extent of assuring Spain that the
entire naval and military forces of the United
States would aid her in maintaining her possession of Cuba (1).
At that early period it was the fear that Cuba
might fall into the hands of France or England which caused such concern in the United
States. A change in this attitude occurred in
the middle of the nineteenth century and must
be considered with more care. American historians have aptly described this period as one
during which the young Republic began to
feel more keenly her growing power, and the
relations which she maintained with foreign




The Cuban Insurrection


5


nations were characterized by the spirit of
expansion which a few years before had brought
about the annexation of Texas, the Oregon controversy, and the Mexican war (2).
This was also the period when American
diplomacy took a vigorous attitude in the Far
East. In 1853 the Japanese government was
forced to open her doors to American commerce
and the world. In the following year, Mr.
Marcy, the American Secretary of State, went
so far as to attempt the annexation of Hawaii,
while troubles with Mexico and Great Britain
were pushed to a successful termination.
These difficulties, however, were trifling compared with the problems of expansion in the
South. The annexation of Cuba in particular
had been desired ardently by the southern
states. "If we hold Cuba," wrote one enthusiastic supporter of this movement, "we would
hold the destiny of the richest commerce that
has ever dazzled the cupidity of man. And
with that commerce we can control the power of
the world" (3).
The Washington government did not ignore
such pressure. It, therefore, directed the American representative at Madrid to sound the
Spanish government on this matter, but the
latter soon made it clear that "sooner than see
the island transferred to any power, they would
prefer seeing it sunk in the ocean" (4). Despite




6    Conquest of the Philippines


such a determined opposition on the part of
Spain the desire to annex Cuba gave rise to
frequent filibustering efforts. Finally in 1852,
as if to put an end to this uncertain situation,
England proposed a tri-partite agreement by
which Great Britain, France and the United
States should mutually renounce any purpose or
design of annexing Cuba. To this proposition,
however, America declined to bind herself on
the ground that her peculiar interest in the
island did not warrant it (5).
This attitude continued until 1854 when an
extraordinary incident temporarily put an end
to it. It happened that in that year the Secretary of State directed three of the American
ministers in Europe to prepare some statement
of the policy of the United States in regard to
Cuba. The three American officials designated
were the ministers to Spain, France, and England,-Soule, Mason and Buchanan, respectively. They met at Ostend in the summer of
1854, and there drafted a manifesto to the effect
that:
1. Spain ought to sell Cuba to the United States.
2. That Cuba was necessary for the safety of
slavery in the southern states of the Union.
3. And that if Spain refused to sell Cuba and the
internal peace of the Union was threatened,
then "by every law, human and divine, we




The Cuban Insurrection


7


(U. S.) shall be justified in wresting it (Cuba)
from Spain if we possess the power."
This clearly meant forcible annexation justified by the doctrine that "might makes right."
In transmitting the document to Washington the
American minister Soule further added that the
time was most appropriate in which to declare
war on Spain, inasmuch as England and France
were involved in the Crimean war and hence
would be unable to interfere with the conquest (6).
When the contents of this manifesto were
made known in the United States, however, the
plan was severely condemned by the northern
states and the Republican party, the avowed
enemies of slavery. The administration soon
became convinced that forcible annexation in
this matter would not receive the support of
the entire nation and the proposition was,
therefore, dropped.
The Republican platform of 1860 contained
this statement,
That the maintenance of the principles promulgated
in the Declaration of Independence and embodied in
the Federal Constitution "that all men are created
equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain inalienable rights; that among these are life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness; that, to secure




8    Conquest of the Philippines


these rights, governments are instituted among men
deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed," is essential to the preservation of our
Republican institutions.
After the Civil War, however, the United
States again narrowly escaped hostilities with
Spain. It should be remembered that during
the Civil War Spain had recognized the Southern Confederacy and this did much to augment
the feeling of animosity towards the decaying
empire. Many thought that Spain should be
punished for having showed friendly interest
towards the rebels. The opportunity to do so
came in 1869. In that year Cuba was seething
with revolt. Although the progress of the insurgents was slight, they found many sympathizers
in the United States, chief among whom was
General Rawlins, the Secretary of War, who
persuaded General Grant to sign a proclamation
recognizing the belligerency of the insurgents.
This proclamation was then handed to Mr.
Fish, the Secretary of State, with orders to seal
and issue it. Mr. Fish, however, knew better
than to do this, for he realized that conditions
at the time did not warrant such drastic action.
He therefore put the paper away quietly and
with the subsequent restoration of order in Cuba
it was forgotten. President Grant never spoke
of the matter again except to thank his able




The Cuban Insurrection


9


Secretary for having pigeonholed the proclamation (7). The agitation for some action in
behalf of the rebellious Cubans, which had made
itself felt in the press as well as in the halls of
Congress, was later finally ended by a definite
announcement of the President that the Administration would maintain an attitude of nonintervention (8).
The years that followed, however, again
brought frequent attempts by private Americans interested in Cuban commerce to secure
a more aggressive attitude at Washington.
They resorted to fillibustering in order to draw
the nation into war, and only the mature judgment of the Secretary of State prevented illadvised intervention (9).
It must also be remembered that during this
period the grievances of the Cubans against the
home government were numerous and wellfounded. The native planters found themselves placed at a disadvantage in their dealings
with their best customers, the United States,
which consumed 62 per cent of their sugar crop.
This was owing to the duties placed by the
Spanish officials upon all American grains entering Cuba, a measure which naturally provoked
similar restrictions on Cuban products entering
American ports. Further grounds for complaint were found in the fact that the creoles of
the island were allowed no share in their govern



Io   Conquest of the Philippines


ment, no chance to protest officially against
treating Cuba like a "milch cow which Spain
seemed to wish to exhaust." Add to this the
corrupt and complicated administration saddled
upon the Cuban producers; the disgraceful fortunes accumulated by Captains General; and a
budget augmented to cover numerous expenses
of Spain entirely disconnected with Cuba, and
it is easy to understand why Cuba's proverbial
loyalty which had withstood a heavy strain for
many years now began to fail.
It is only surprising that the final bid for freedom was so long delayed. It came at length in
1895, but as in the earlier insurrections, it was
as clear that the Cuban "patriots" could not
take Havana as that the royal forces could not
pacify the entire island. Without aid from
America it was very unlikely that the insurgents
would have realized their aim within any reasonable time. The future could only promise a
continuation of petty guerilla warfare which
naturally afforded no prospect of settlement or
peace. In the meantime the economic interests, not only of Cuba but also of the world,
and especially of the United States, were sure
to suffer. Let not the disinterested American
be entirely deceived. Bitter as was the indignation in the public mind at the Spanish atrocities, it must be apparent that this irritation was
greatly increased by the pecuniary interests




The Cuban Insurrection


II


which America had and hoped to have in the
struggling island beside her. As Professor Keller of Yale put it, it was
because the interests of the United States were so
extensive that irritation in this country waxed.greater, and gradually metamorphosed itself into the
forfn of a crusade against misgovernment and oppression.
When General Weyler began his notorious
reconcentration camps in 1896, intervention was
again averted by the narrowest of margins.
Congress on April 6 passed a resolution recognizing the belligerency of the insurgents but
President Cleveland ignored it, choosing to
protest through  diplomatic  correspondence.
When President McKinley assumed office these
protests were renewed through the same channels but it soon became evident that nothing
tangible could be accomplished by diplomacy.
Two later incidents also no doubt hastened
the aggressive attitude of the United States.
One was the indiscretion of the Spanish minister at Washington in writing a letter to a personal friend in which he described the American
President as a soft-handed politician, "and a
bidder for the admiration of the crowd." Somehow, this letter was "surreptitiously if not criminally obtained" and later published, and it
naturally created a profound feeling of indigna



12   Conquest of the Philippines


tion (10). It required more than the mere recall
of the Spanish minister to cover this diplomatic
blunder.
The second incident was the blowing up of
the battleship Maine as it lay in the harbor of
Havana. No definite cause has yet been discovered for this mysterious explosion which
destroyed two hundred and fifty American lives,
but at the time an investigation made by officers
of the United States, in which the Spaniards were
not allowed to take part, reported that the
destruction was caused by a mine. War spirit
could no longer be restrained. "When the
Maine was blown up in Havana Harbor," said
Roosevelt, "war became inevitable" (11). Add
to this the fact that public sentiment had been
stirred up by a sensational press which, in the
words of the historian Rhodes had "manipulated the real news, spread false reports, putting
all before their readers with scare headlines"(12),
and we cannot wonder at the war fever which
swept the continent. "Every Congressman,"
said Boutelle of Maine, "had two or three newspapers in his district, most of them printed in
red ink, shouting for blood" (13).
In perfect accord with the attitude of the
nation, therefore, President McKinley, whose
conduct in this matter had been flawless, sent a
message to Congress recommending intervention in behalf of Cuba and humanity. "Our




The Cuban Insurrection


13


people," he said, "have beheld a once prosperous community reduced to comparative want,
its lucrative commerce virtually paralyzed, its
exceptional productiveness diminished, its fields
laid waste, its mills in ruins and its people perishing by tens of thousands from hunger and
destitution."  Thus did the President lay bare
to that august body the situation of the Cubans,
a situation which he said, "shocked the sensibilities and offended the humane sympathies" of
the American people.
A more than ready Congress thereupon passed
the Resolution introduced by Senator Teller of
Colorado declaring among other things that
"the people of the island of Cuba are, and of
right ought to be, free and independent," and
that "the Government of the United States
does hereby demand that the Government of
Spain at once relinquish its authority and government of Cuba and withdraw its land and
naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters."
This virtually meant war, but the Congress
also took particular care to stipulate
that the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction
or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that
is accomplished to leave the government and control
of the island to its people (14).




14   Conquest of the Philippines


It is doubtful if an actual war had ever been
begun with a purpose more lofty and humane or
with a clearer declaration of that purpose.
The outcome of the war every one knows.
Spain was driven from the island and the United
States was left to fulfill her promise of giving the
Cubans the government and control of their
island. But now, in the face of this sacred
pledge to recognize the independence of Cuba,
a campaign for the retention of that island went
on quietly and patiently.
There has been no lack of counselors [said Senator
Hoar] to whisper in the ear of the President and
Senate and House the dishonorable counsel that we
should hold Cuba, without regard to our pledges or
our principles, and that the resolution of the Senator
from Colorado was a great mistake.
This movement for the retention of Cuba,
however, did not prosper and happily for the
sanctity of America's word, steps were immediately taken for the establishment of a government which could be handed down intact to the
Cubans. This was begun early in 1899 and by
July, 1900, a constitutional convention was
called to frame and adopt a constitution for
the people of Cuba, and, "as a part thereof, to
provide for and agree with the Government of
the United States upon the relations to exist




The Cuban Insurrection


I5


between that government and the Government
of Cuba."
What these relations were to be was a question which naturally arose in Washington, and
Congress speedily decided the matter by the
so-called "Platt Amendment" defining America's relations with Cuba. This act, passing
under a most unpretentious designation, may
be said to be one of the most important documents in the history of the nation. Let us see
why.
At the time of the intervention in Cuba the
United States was only too eager to absolutely
pledge herself to establish the independence for
which the unhappy Cubans had been fighting. This unqualified promise was given readily and sincerely. No doubt it was made to
remove the apprehension of conservative Americans as well as Cubans. But conditions had
changed in 1901. Then the possession of
Porto Rico, of Guam and the Philippines was
more than certain. Certainly there was more
to be said in favor of retaining Cuba than for annexing those far-flung possessions in the Pacific.
But to annex Cuba was virtually impossible,a definite pledge to recognize her independence
made in the hectic days of '98 barred the way.
And so under Roosevelt's administration America kept her word and withdrew from Cuba.
But she kept her word with a very important




I6   Conquest of the Philippines


qualification in the Platt Amendment, which
virtually meant no Cuban independence after
all. Already commercial advantage was overcoming conscience and principle.
The United States had promised to quit Cuba
when "pacification was accomplished." Here
was an elastic condition which could be interpreted narrowly. She could under that phrase
have stayed on the island indefinitely troubled
only by the never-ending contest between good
faith and pecuniary interest. Instead America
chose to protect herself by means of the Platt
Amendment which briefly provided that (1)
Cuba should not enter into any agreement with
foreign powers which might tend to impair her
independence; (2) that no debt should be contracted which could not be paid out of the
island's current revenues; (3) that the United
States might intervene to preserve Cuban independence, enforce the treaty obligations imposed by the treaty of Paris, and insure a government able to protect property and life; (4) that
all acts performed by the American government
during its brief occupation were to be validated;
(5) that Cuba was to sell or lease to the United
States sites for two naval stations; (6) and that
by way of further assurance that these provisions were to be followed strictly Cuba should
embody them all in a treaty with the United
States.




The Cuban Insurrection


I7


The strictness and exactness of these provisions will more clearly appear on a careful reading of the amendment itself, paragraphs (1)
and (3) in particular being the most exact.
These provisions meant that the United States
virtually retained complete control of Cuba's
foreign relations. The right was also reserved
to her whereby she might intervene in the island
government in order to correct any conditions
which in her judgment were considered unsatisfactory. The two naval bases which she reserved for herself on opposite sides of the island
were the best evidence of her power to exercise
such absolute control.
Of course, Cuban statesmen were not blind
to the exact purpose of the amendment. They
protested that the provisions virtually destroyed
the independence which had been promised
and which America now said she was granting.
But they were informed that the acceptance of
the amendment must be unqualified and so with
bad grace they were finally forced to yield (15).
Judged superficially, however, the Cuban
venture might well appear to have been an act
of altruism on the part of the United States.
After all, the Cubans got more than they could
ever have got from Spain, although their liberator did really profit from the enterprise as well.
Before leaving the story of the Cuban occupation, however, it is well to give a parting




i8  Conquest of the Philippines


thought to the arguments which induced nationwide sentiment to favor intervention.    When
America intervened Spain held the island by an
indisputable title. She controlled its cities, its
ports, and its coast, and maintained in them an
organized government. It is true that some
of the Cubans had been for years in unsuccessful revolt, but they had no organized government which had any claim to be recognized as
such. Yet when America declared war upon
Spain she avowedly declared that Cuba was,
and of right, ought to be free and independent.
Why? Only because in the judgment of the
people of the United States, Spain's title had
been forfeited by her cruel method of dealing
with the Cubans. With this thought constantly in mind we can approach the story of
the Philippine adventure.
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER I
1. The American Nation-A History, vol. xxv.
Latane, America as a World Power, p. 4.
9. The American Nation, etc., vol. xviii.
Parties and Slavery, by T. C. Clarke, p. 75.
3. Clark, ibid., p. 81.
4. House Exec. Doc., 32d Cong., 1st Sess., 121, p. 58.
5. Sen. Exec. Doc., 32d Cong., 1st Sess., No. 1, p. 74,
76; 2d Sess., No. 63.
6. Clarke, Parties and Slavery, p. 87.
7. Dunning, Reconstruction-Political and Economic, p.
172.




The Cuban Insurrection                19
8. Ibid., p. 172.
9. See the Virginius case, for example.
10. Day, Foreign Relations, p. 680 and p. 1007.
11. Roosevelt, Autobiography, p. 232.
12. Rhodes, The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations,
p. 55.
13. Boston Herald, October 23, 1898.
14. Foreign Relations, 1898, liv.
15. Powers, America Among the Nations, p. 116.




CHAPTER II


THE PHILIPPINE SITUATION BEFORE THE
AMERICAN CONQUEST
IT is difficult to understand the situation existing in the Philippines when the first gun was
fired in Manila Bay without first turning back
the pages of history for a brief period. Much
can be conveyed to the reader, however, in explaining the grievances of many decades against
the colonial government, by saying that the
Spanish system in the islands was essentially
the same as that followed in her South American
possessions, including the island of Cuba. What
differences there may have existed were purely
of degree,-the atrocities committed in the
Oriental colony being the worse (1). In the clerical predominance, in the power of the Church,
in the baseness of its industrial and economic
organization and the shallowness of the governmental machinery in every branch,-the situation in the Philippines was the exact replica of
that found in Cuba.
Prior to 1872, some thirty-four major and
20




Situation Before American Conquest 21


minor revolts against the foreign authority had
already taken place in different localities of the
archipelago. Most of them were short-lived,
and practically all had been suppressed by the
better-trained Spanish regulars, though not without much bloodshed and extreme cruelties. It
was between the years 1868-72, however, that
the new era in the Philippines really began.
It was then that the storm broke as a result of
three important and closely allied events occurring almost together.
The first was the opening of the Suez canal
which brought the Islands closer to Europe.
This bond was supplemented later by the laying of the commercial cables, so that the Philippines learned to think with the rest of the
world. The proverbial Oriental content with
despotism now gave way to the yearning for
self-expression, for nationalism, and for freedom.
The second was the continuation, but in a
more flagrant form, of racial discrimination
between the Spanish born whites and the native
Malays. This was specially manifested by the
removal of Filipino priests from their parishes
to make way for the Spanish Recollets. The
indignation that swept the Filipino laymen at
this act which they considered unjustified is
difficult to measure. But it marked the day
when they began to harbor thoughts against the
Spaniards which they dared not speak aloud.




22   Conquest of the Philippines


The third event which wrought considerable
changes in the Islands was the founding of the
short-lived Republic in Spain, for it was between
these years that Queen Isabella was overthrown
and the Spanish radicals gained the ascendancy.
The movement was short-lived, but during that
brief period many radical and progressive officials
had come to Manila and planted in the minds of
the natives some new and startling ideas about
democracy, equality and practical self-government. Furthermore, these newly arrived officials bluntly and openly pointed out the shortcomings and autocracy of the clergy who, it
must be remembered, were the most hated and
feared representatives of Spain (2).
It is not surprising, then, that all the ancient
grievances of the past now received an added
airing. In the face of it, however, the friars
kept up their courage and when the downfall of
the Spanish liberals again placed them in a position where they could wreak vengeance, they
immediately did so. The wholesale arrests, the
garrotings, the cruel punishments inflicted after
the most flagrant of mock trials have been recounted too often to be repeated here. Suffice
it to say that the most unspeakable instruments
of torture employed in the days of the Inquisition were revived and used. Wholesale deportations followed to the Carolines, to Jolo, Balabac, Ceuta, Fernando Po, the Ladrone Islands,




Situation Before American Conquest 23


and even to far away Africa. Many men,
members of wealthy Filipino families, succeeded
in escaping to Europe where they could air
their pleas for better government with safety.
There were also wholesale executions, and
much innocent blood was sacrificed. Among the
victims of this sad episode were three beloved
Filipino priests, one of whom was so old and so
feeble that he was carried to the scaffold. The
evidence of mutiny against them all was so
doubtful that the Roman Catholic Church
stubbornly refused to degrade them. The Archbishop was so thoroughly convinced of their
innocence that he allowed them to wear their
priestly robes to the gallows.
This policy of wanton cruelty, instead of inspiring the natives with fear, drew them together. A new nation was here conceived,
and the time came when the Filipinos, instead
of looking towards Spain as the land to which
they owed allegiance, turned to the Philippines
as the true father-land. All this occurred in
1872.
In the years that followed the movement
grew. The native exiles living in Spain and
other continental countries, drawn together by
a common grievance and a common desire to
better the fate of their countrymen, founded
societies and established newspapers in which
they recounted their wrongs and asked for




24   Conquest of the Philippines


reforms. Many of them were joined by their
sons who came for their education, but felt that
they were also charged with a sacred mission for
the good of their country as well as of Spain.
Many writings of these men were secretly circulated in the Philippines where they had a considerable influence. The most important was
undoubtedly a novel written by Dr. Jose Rizal,
a native Filipino then studying in the University of Heidelberg. Noli me Tangere it was
called and it depicted the evils of the friar system in the Islands and the injustice that resulted
from it. This novel which was smuggled into
the Islands became the Uncle Tom's Cabin of
the movement, and Rizal rose to the prominence
which he richly deserved. The book was, of
course, condemned by the Spanish officials and
native houses were searched in the hope of locating copies and punishing their owners. Yet
most of the available copies circulated secretly
for years: truly a remarkable proof of Filipino unity.
In 1892, fully knowing the danger which a visit
to the Islands meant, the gentle idealist returned
to the Philippines.  Shortly after his arrival
he formed a "Philippine League." The predominating idea of this society was of the peaceful
type, for it sought merely educational, moral
and economic progress. In fact, it was too mild
a plan for many Filipinos. Nevertheless, the




Situation Before American Conquest 25


Spaniards seized the only Filipino leader who,
more than any other malcontent, stood for peace
and cooperation with the Spanish government
and exiled him to the southern island of Mindanao. It was sheer blundering stupidity, for
by doing it they raised the already venerated
leader to a pinnacle difficult to exaggerate (3).
With Rizal as an exile in distant Mindanao,
the other native leaders now abandoned all
thought of securing reform  through 'peaceful
methods. They turned to direct action as the
last resort. A small secret society under the
leadership of Andres Bonifacio was formed, and
it soon became the most powerful insurrectionary body in the Islands. It was called the
"Katipunan," and its doors were opened to
both rich and poor alike. To the many thousands of able-bodied Filipinos who joined it,
the society was almost like a new religion. It is
worth while to examine the ideals taught to the
Neophytes. Here were some of them:
All men are equal, regardless of the color of their
skin.
The life which is not consecrated to the cause of
justice is a tree without shade, even though it may
not have a poisonous root.
Good practices solely for personal benefit, and not
from a desire to do good, are worthless.
The true holiness is charity, love for others, and




26   Conquest of the Philippines


adjusting one's acts according to the good and the
reasonable.
One may have more than another in riches, wisdom or beauty but in manhood all are equal.
Always preserve a high sense of honor, for the word
of the honorable man is sacred.
Waste not time; riches lost may be recovered, but
time, once lost, never returns.
Defend the weak, and fight the oppressor.
In Life's thorny road, the man is the guide of his
wife and children, and if he teaches them evil, evil
will they practice.
The greatest man is not the king nor he with a
high bridged nose, nor white skin, nor the priest who
represents God; but he is really noble who, born in
the forest, possesses no language save his native
tongue, and yet is moderate in speech and careful to
uphold his dignity and his honor. This man is a
patriot and knows how to defend his country.
When this country is radiant with the light of
liberty and we are all united as brothers, then will
the pains of the past be rewarded (4).
Despite the strict oaths of secrecy taken by its
members, however, the Spanish authorities got
wind of the society. The report was spread that
the Katipunan meant to massacre the entire
population. The friars in their delirious anxiety
could now do but one thing-ask the civil
authorities for more power and greater activity by the police with the consequent increase




Situation Before American Conquest 27


of arrests. In order to gain information from
the suspected, the most horrible methods of
torture were again employed. Men were hung
up by their thumbs, their bones were crushed,too often they were mutilated for life.
It was just about this time that Dr. Rizal,
becoming dissatisfied with the violent methods
planned by the revolutionists, petitioned the
Spanish government that he be sent to the feverstricken camps of Cuba where he might serve in
Her Majesty's army as a physician. The Governor-General granted Rizal's petition. Before
he reached Manila, however, the rebellion had
begun. Nevertheless he was allowed to continue his journey to Spain where he planned to
join the army for Cuba.
But as if the enmity of the friars could not
otherwise be appeased, Rizal was detained
when he reached Suez, arrested and brought
back to Manila. A new    Governor-General,
chosen by the friars, now sealed his fate. Following another mock trial at which the Filipino
martyr was not even allowed to choose his
counsel, he was led to his execution and in the
presence of a howling, cheering Spanish crowd
killed by a volley. There were comparatively
few Filipinos present. Most of them were in
their homes, praying for the man about to be
sacrificed on the altar of freedom.
The volley of musketry which rang out that




28   Conquest of the Philippines


early December morning in 1896 sealed the fate
of Spain forever in the Philippines. The nation
which had been conceived in 1872 was now
born. The circumstances of Rizal's death were
so dramatic, the ideals for which he labored so
noble, and his innocence of complicity in the
existing revolution so clearly manifest, that
the native multitudes were inspired as if by a
second crucifixion.
One can only wonder that the final outbreak
did not occur sooner. Two months before
Rizal's execution, for example, the Spaniards
caused the arrest of numerous Filipinos in Vigan,
a province which up to that time had not revolted. These men were shipped to Manila in
the holds of vessels like pieces of merchandise,
their hands and feet being tied securely. On
arrival at the capital the victims were hauled
from their dingy hole by derricks and dumped
into a filthy crowded jail where many died of
suffocation. In other parts of the archipelago,
this process of extermination continued. Day
after day, night after night, men and women
were dragged out of their homes and sent to
prison for inspection.
This ghastly business could not continue forever, and even the home government awoke in
time to recall Governor Poltaveja and send in
his place a more peaceful administrator, General
Primo de Rivera.   Governor Rivera wanted




Situation Before American Conquest 29


peace, and he immediately offered an amnesty
to all who would lay down their arms within a
specified time. The Filipino leaders, conscious
of their inability to cope effectively with the
Crown forces, which had recently been reenforced, and being desirous of assuring the welfare
of their country, thereupon issued a proclamation in which they stated the conditions under
which they would agree to lay down their
arms. This document must be examined with
care. It demanded:
1. Expulsion of the friars.
2. Parliamentary representation, freedom of
the press, religious toleration, administrative
and economic autonomy.
3. Equal pay and equal treatment for Spanish and insular civil officers.
4. Restoration of all friar lands to their
original owners.
5, No more banishments.
6. Legal equality for all classes.
The Spanish governor promised to fulfill all
these requests and as a further guarantee of his
good faith offered to pay the leaders of the
Katipunan who were to be banished to a foreign
land the sum of $400,000.00. After negotiations
which lasted several months, the so-called
"Pact of Biac-na-bato" was signed, and Aguinaldo with thirty-four other leaders sailed for
Hongkong. "No definite time was fixed during




30   Conquest of the Philippines


which these men were to remain away from the
Philippines; and if the promises made by Spain
were not fulfilled they had the right to return" (5).
The old slander that Aguinaldo sold out the
revolutionary movement for a bribe has been so
thoroughly exploded by the best of authorities,
that it requires uncommon audacity to repeat
it (6).
The fact was, however, that Governor Rivera
was trying to steer a middle course. He issued
a scathing denunciation of the friars, but failed
to recommend their removal. It did not take
long for the Filipinos to realize that none of the
expected reforms were forthcoming. New insurrections immediately broke out in different
sections of the archipelago. In the island of
Cebu, 400 miles south of Manila, the rebels
raided the city and besieged the Spanish forces
in their citadel. In northern Luzon the revolt
quickly gained impetus. All this occurred, of
course, in the absence of their recognized
leader, Aguinaldo (7).
Conditions had reached such an acute state
on February 22, 1898, forty-nine days before
the United States declared war on Spain, that
the American consul, Williams, stationed in
Manila, sent the following significant dispatch
to the State Department in Washington:
Conditions here and in Cuba are practically alike.
War exists; and battles are of almost daily occur



Situation Before American Conquest 3I


rence. Prisoners are brought here and shot without
trial, and Manila is under martial law. The Crown
forces have been unable to dislodge a rebel army
within ten miles of Manila, and last Saturday, February 19, a battle was there fought. A republic is
organized here as in Cuba. Insurgents are being
armed and drilled, are rapidly increasing in number
and efficiency, and all agree that a general uprising
will come as soon as the Governor-General embarks
for Spain, which is fixed for March (8).
Into this turbulent arena of war and organized
revolt Admiral Dewey sailed with his squadron,
and with a few well-directed shots destroyed the
Spanish fleet without the loss of a single life.
The wires of the world vibrated with the startling news of his victory and the conquest of the
archipelago had begun.
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER II
1. A. G. Keller, Colonization, p. 358.
2. Blair and Robertson, vol. lii, p. 118.
3. Foreman, The Philippine Islands, p. 533.
Austin Craig, Life of Rizal.
C. E. Russell, The Hero of the Filipinos.
4. F. D. Laubach, The People of the Philippine Islands,
p. 104.
5. Findings of the Report of Schurman Commission,
vol. i, p. 171.
6. See 55th Cong., 3d Sess., S. D. 62, pt. 1, p. 421.
Aguinaldo's bribery was exploded by Governor Rivera
himself in the Spanish Senate on June 11, 1898,




32     Conquest of the Philippines
when he said that Aquinaldo undertook to submit
if the Spanish government would provide for the
widows and orphans of the insurgents. Rivera
then added that the other promises he had made,
he thought later not expedient to keep. (Reference to this in Cong. Rec., vol. 56th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 2, p. 1334. Proceedings of Senate.)
7. Report of American Consul General Williams, Sen.
Doc., No. 62, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 221.
8. Sen. Doe., No. 62 (1898), p. 319.




CHAPTER III


THE BEGINNING OF THE CONQUEST
THE people of the United States were allowed
to believe that it was a piece of good fortune
that Dewey's fleet was in Asiatic waters. As a
matter of fact the capture of Manila had been
planned long before the Maine was destroyed
and the Spanish war begun.
On the afternoon of December 30, 1994, a
discussion was held in New York City under
the auspices of the League for Industrial Democracy. The subject chosen was American Imperialism, and among the principal speakers on the
occasion was the well-known banker, Otto H.
Kahn, who spoke on "The Myth of American
Imperialism." Feeling, no doubt, the tremendous significance of his words as a denial that
such a force existed, no time was lost in reproducing the address in full, to be widely distributed later by the so-called "Committee of
American Business Men."
Mr. Kahn's address as printed covered
twenty-six pages. Less than half a page is
33




34   Conquest of the Philippines


devoted to the Philippine situation, however,
and it is interesting to read how he dealt with
the subject. He said:
Owing to the limitation of the time available, I
cannot enter into the matter of America's ownership
of the Philippines, except to point out that it came
to us as an unforeseen incident of the SpanishAmerican war, unsought and decidedly unwanted, but,
having come, it involves a national responsibility
which, in self-respect and in duty, we are bound to
discharge, and of which we cannot divest ourselves
until it is fairly discharged.
This was a sweeping generalization, and yet it
was a statement representing the widespread
belief today among the Americans unfamiliar
with the earlier years of American occupation.
Let us, therefore, make a closer examination
of that period, so inadequately understood at
the time but which can now be studied soberly
and with fuller knowledge.
Although when war was declared American
thought and purpose were limited to Cuban
emancipation, it became apparent that it was
impossible thus to limit her action. War knows
but one law. The enemy must be attacked and
destroyed wherever possible. Hence the prompt
occupation of Porto Rico followed, though
Porto Rico had not revolted, for the thought of
driving a misgoverning country from one island,




The Beginning of the Conquest 35


and leaving her in another close by where a
similar situation might later exist was clearly
indefensible.
Granting that Spain was to be driven out,
what was to be done with Porto Rico? Of
course, Cuba was to have her freedom,-she
had been promised that. But Porto Ricosomehow the analogy did not fit. The island
was smaller, there had been no revolt, and
there was great need of a naval station in that
locality. But why go further? Only idealists
questioned the wisdom of doing it, any other
nation would have done it, and so.-..  W.ell,
that is the way that empires grow!
But there were also the Philippines. And
only six hundred miles away lay Admiral Dewey
with his fleet loading coal in Hongkong. What
a piece of good fortune for the American cause.
It was but a matter of hours before Dewey received the order to sail and destroy the enemy
fleet.
And yet the most remarkable thing about this
naval victory which immediately thrilled the
American nation from coast to coast and placed
the Philippines definitely on the map was that
it did not come unsolicited or unpremeditated.
It had been planned months before. Let us see
how and why.
When the possibility of war with Spain became generally accepted, Admiral Dewey was




36   Conquest of the Philippines


in the Gulf of California in command of the
Narragansett. As a true naval expert the
thought of taking the Philippines came to him.
If war with Spain is declared, the Narragansett will
take Manila [he said]. In command of an efficient
force in the Far East, with a free hand to act in consequence of being so far away from Washington, I
could strike promptly and successfully at the Spanish
forces in the Philippines.
This was in the fall of 1897 (1). He thereupon
sought the command of the Asiatic squadron,
and with Mr. Roosevelt's aid obtained it (2).
Thus it was that while the indignation of a
sympathetic American public was daily increasing at the atrocities in Cuba, Dewey was quietly
but efficiently fitting his squadron, firmly determined to capture Manila (3). He sailed on December 7, 1897, more than two months before
the destruction of the Maine, with the eyes of
the naval authorities watching him with interest. While lying at anchor in Hongkong
there was flashed to him on February 25, 1898,
the following significant cable from the then
Assistant Secretary of the Navy:
DEWEY, Hongkong:
Order the squadron except the Monocacy to Hongkong. Keep full of coal. In the event of declaration of war with Spain, your duty will be to see that




The Beginning of the Conquest 37


the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic
coast, and start offensive operations in Philippine
Islands. Keep Olympia until further orders.
(Signed) ROOSEVELT (4).
And yet this was six weeks before war was
declared.
The results of the battle in Manila Bay are
well known. It literally electrified the American nation. The significance of such a gallant
victory could not be over-estimated in the eyes
of her citizens. What a horizon had been
opened! The stage was set for the beginning
of America's manifest destiny,-entry into world
politics,-into world power. This was but natural. In the words of Henry Watterson, it
was
the natural impulse of a people full of exultation and
pride over the completeness, without precedent in
naval war, of the victory that Dewey had achieved
with a skill and intrepidity that conferred splendor
upon American arms. It was the spontaneous outburst of simplest patriotism to ask that that flag so
valiantly planted, might float there forever in
memory of the heroes who raised it (5).
There were also challenging voices, urging
that the flag should remain.
Who dares halt it now [cried Senator Beveridge], now
when history's largest events are carrying it forward,




38   Conquest of the Philippines


now when we are at last one people, strong enough
for any task, great enough for any glory destiny can
bestow? Blind is he who sees not the hand of God
in events so vast, so harmonious, so benign.
But glory and power were not the only incentives. If in the face of a sacred pledge to Cuba
there had not been wanting counselors who
urged the retention of the island for its commercial pos:;ibilities, their numbers were now augmented as the movement gained momentum.
There was a glamour of romance in the entire
project and the spell was difficult to resist. As
the Hon. Frank A. Vanderlip, then Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury, aptly put it in
1898,Together with the islands of the Japanese Empire,
since the acquirement of Formosa, the Philippines
are the pickets of the Pacific, standing guard at the
entrances to trade with the millions of China and
Korea, French Indo-China, the Malay Peninsula,
and the islands of Indonesia to the south. Australia
may even be regarded as in the line of trade.  The
possession of the Philippines by a progressive, com- 
mercial power, if the Nicaragua Canal project should be
completed, would change the course of ocean navigation
as it concerns a large percentage of the water-borne traffic of the world. The project is alluring. In the undeveloped resources of the Philippines the sanguine
radicals see a great opportunity for our genius.
They recognize that in a decade we might make a




The Beginning of the Conquest 39


change greater than has been wrought since Magellan's discovery until the present time. They see
great development companies formed to cultivate
tobacco and sugar by modern methods, others
formed to test the richness of the unknown mineral
deposits, and still others to develop transportation or
to reap the treasures of the forest.
And so this gentleman, who stood high in the
councils of the administration, finally concluded:
We thus see with sudden clearness that some of the
most revered of our political maxims have outlived
their force [and then adds], a new mainspring...
has become the directing force... the mainspring
of commercialism (6).
Thus began and thus was fostered the campaign for the retention of the Philippines. As a
distributing centre, with half the population of
the world living within a radius of 3500 miles
from Manila, the possession of the islands was
indeed "alluring."
In that proud hour of nation-wide rejoicing
accompanied by the vast commercial possibilities which victory had disclosed, the American
multitude failed to hear the voice of the Filipinos. To the former annexation meant, and
could now mean only annexation like the previous acts of American expansion. No thought




40   Conquest of the Philippines


was here given to the wishes of the eight million
natives in the Islands who, under the rule of
Spain, had taken part in thirty-six distinct
uprisings as a protest against the cruelties and
injustices from which they had suffered in the
same manner as had the Cubans.
There had been, of course, vague reports of
a revolution then existing in the Philippines
just as one had been existing in Cuba. Could
not the Islands be turned over to the revolutionists? True, there had been no definite
promises such as those made to a nearer neighbor, but should not Spain's title, if any, be forfeited for the same reasons that her claims to
Cuba were being ignored? The Americans
whose interests in the occupation sprang purely
from altruistic and sympathetic motives thought
that the Filipinos were entitled to the same
treatment as the Cubans. Could the Filipino
rebels have organized an island government of
their own? If not, would an American protectorate for a limited number of years have been
more plausible? These were natural inquiries,
but any reports which might to some extent have
answered these questions were not forthcoming.
The islands were too far distant,-half the people
of the country did not know where they were.
Of course, there were those who also believed
with good reason that the intervention in Cuba
was actuated by purely altruistic motives



The Beginning of the Conquest 41


that of a helping hand to a weaker nation.
Thus, the venerable Senator Hoar, writing
many years afterwards about this agitating
period, said,
I believed then, and I believe now, that it was our
duty to deliver them (the Philippines) from Spain,
to protect them against her, or against the cupidity
of any other nation until the people could have tried
fully the experiment of self-government in which I
have little doubt they would have succeeded (7).
But there were also those who, in a spirit
of evil ambition, had already decided to retain the Philippines, if retention would benefit
the United States. On August 2, 1898, a commissioner was appointed by the Secretary of
State to "investigate and report on financial
and industrial conditions in the Philippine
Islands." This was eleven days before the
capture of Manila. The report that followed
by Commissioner Edward Harden and which
was sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, covered the field examined as well as the existing
conditions permitted. It spoke of the present
situation of Philippine industry and predicted
the future possibilities that awaited the hand
of a modern expert. That regarding Manila
hemp, the leading industry of the Islands, specially deserved attention.




42   Conquest of the Philippines


Manila hemp [said the report] is used in the manufacture of cordage of a superior class. For ships'
purposes it is superior to any other material considering its cost and wearing qualities.... It is
found nowhere else in the world.... There is a
great future for this product. There are vast tracts
of uncultivated land... where it flourishes with
greatest vigor, and all that is needed is capital and
enterprise to open it up (8).
Not apparently content with the preliminary
investigations conducted by these executive
departments, the President himself decided to
take a hand. He therefore dispatched the following cable to Admiral Dewey on August 13,
the day after the signing of the protocol ending
hostilities:
DEWEY, c/o American Consul:
The President desires to receive from you any important information you may have of the Philippines,
the desirability of the several islands, the character of
their population, coal and other mineral deposits,
their harbor and commercial advantages and in a
naval and commercial sense which would be the
most advantageous.
ALLEN, Secretary (9).
Of course, these proceedings were not made
known to the public at that time. This powerful minority in order to fulfill their imperialistic




The Beginning of the Conquest 43
aims had already embarked on a program unique
in its nature and fraught with hazardous consequences, as events later proved. Briefly, their
plan was to conceal their well-devised scheme of
retention, and should such project be forcibly
exposed,-to justify it, all the while pretending
to be working solely for the good of the Filipinos.
Their real feeling was, however, bluntly expressed by Mr. Denby of McKinley's first Philippine Commission when he said:
The cold practical question remains: will the possession of these islands benefit us as a nation? If
they will not, set them free tomorrow and let their
peoples, if they please, cut each other's throats (10).
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER III
1. Dewey, Autobiography, p. 168.
2. Roosevelt, Autobiography, p. 231.
Dewey, Autobiography, p. 168.
3. Dewey, Autobiography, p. 170.
4. Dewey, Autobiography, p. 179.
5. Henry Watterson, History of the Spanish American
War, p. /77.
6. Frank A. tanderlip, Century Magazine, Aug., 1898,
cited in Sen. Doe. 62, pt. 1, 55th Cong., 3d Sess.,
p. 561.
7. Hoar, Autobiography of Seventy Years, vol. ii, p. 315.
8. Sen. Doc. 169, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., 1898.
9. See Appendix, Bureau of Navigation Reports, p. 122.
10. The Forum, Feb., 1899, "Why the Treaty Should be
Ratified."




CHAPTER IV


FILIPINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS PRIOR TO
AUGUST, 1898
AGUINALDO was in Singapore when America
declared war on Spain. The American consul
at that port, Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, tells in his
own words what this incident meant to him
Being aware [said Mr. Pratt] of the great prestige of
General Aguinaldo with the insurgents, and that no
one, either at home or abroad, could exert over them
the same influence and control that he could, I determined at once to see him.
An interview followed and it was arranged that
if Admiral Dewey, then at Hongkong with his
squadron should so desire, the Filipino leader
would join him at that port and arrange a plan
of cooperation with the American forces (1).
Pursuant to this understanding, Mr. Pratt immediately telegraphed to Dewey as follows:
44




Relations Prior to August, 898


45


Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come
Hongkong arrange with Commodore for general cooperation insurgents Manila if desired. Telegraph.
To which Admiral Dewey (then a Commodore) immediately replied:
Tell Aguinaldo come as soon as possible.
But by the time the Filipino leader reached
Hongkong the future Admiral had been given
his papers and was steaming towards Manila
Bay. In heralding the coming of the Americans, however, the insurgent leaders at Hongkong sent to the Islands a manifesto addressed
to the Filipinos proclaiming the benevolent
mission of the invaders, and urging them not to
heed the appeals of the Spaniards to oppose the
Americans. The proclamation read thus:
COMPATRIOTS: Divine Providence is about to
place independence within our reach. The Americans, not from mercenary motives, but for the sake of
humanity and the lamentations of so many persecuted people have considered it opportune to extend
their protecting mantle to our beloved country...
At the present moment an American squadron is
preparing to sail to the Philippines....  The
Americans will attack by sea and prevent any reenforcements coming from Spain.... We insurgents must attack by land.... There where
you see the American flag flying, assemble in number; they are our redeemers!




46   Conquest of the Philippines


Aguinaldo's proclamation a few days later
was of the same tenor:
Filipinos [he said], the great nation, North
America, cradle of liberty and friendly on that account to the liberty of our people... has come
to manifest a protection... which is disinterested towards us, considering us with sufficient
civilization to govern by ourselves this our unhappy
land.
It has always been a question whether or not
a promise to grant the Filipinos their freedom
in the manner that Cuba had been promised hers
was made. American officials, Dewey included,
vehemently deny having made such promise,
while the Filipinos and a few later American
students of history stoutly maintain the contrary. Assuming that no promises were made
by properly accredited agents of the American
government, it is certain that the revolutionists were led by the action of the American
forces in the Philippines to believe that the
United States would give them independence.
Their frame of mind as a result of the early
assurances received from the American consuls
at Singapore and Hongkong may be gathered
from the tone of the following letter written
by Consul Wildman of Hongkong to Aguinaldo:
Do not forget [he said] that the United States undertook this war for the sole purpose of relieving the




Relations Prior to August, 1898 47


Cubans from the cruelties under which they were
suffering and not for the love of conquests or the hope
of gain. They are actuated by precisely the same
feelings for the Filipinos (2).
When Aguinaldo arrived in Manila on the
American gunboat McCulloch which Dewey
had expressly sent to Hongkong to bring the
Filipino leader, he immediately went to see
Dewey. The latter at once urged him to start
cooperation.  "Go ashore and start your
army," he told the Filipino (3). Aguinaldo did
the rest. "He began operations towards Manila," said Dewey, "and did wonderfully well.
tie  whipped  the  Spaniards  battle  after
battle...." And  so   Dewey's   protege
worked, under the constant advice and encouragement of the American commander. At
that time, of course, the American land forces
had not arrived, and were not due to arrive for
several months. In the meantime the Filipino
army was daily expending its power and risking
the lives of its men in this aggressive land campaign. This accounts for Admiral Dewey's great
concern in aiding them. Let the Admiral testify
to this: "I knew what he was doing-driving
the Spaniards in-was saving our troops" (4).
Further testimony of this active cooperation
between the two forces is amply furnished by
the Admiral.




48   Conquest of the Philippines


They looked on us as their liberators [he testified
before the Senate committee (5)]. Up to the time
the army came he (Aguinaldo) did everything I requested. He was most obedient; whatever I told
him to do he did. I saw him almost daily (6).
The reason which prompted the American
representative to act so cordially is best described in his own words:
I was waiting for troops to arrive [testified Dewey]
and I thought that the closer they (the Filipinos)
invested the city, the easier it would be when our
troops arrived to march in. The Filipinos were our
friends, assisting us; they were doing our work (7).
And when asked how strong a force Aguinaldo
had under his command, Dewey added: "They
could have had any number of men; it was just
a question of arming them. They could have had
the whole population" (8).  These declarations
took place before an investigating committee of
the Senate in 1902, but that the war department
in Washington knew of the cooperation between
the two forces is clear from the official dispatches sent by Dewey from the scene of battle
Thus, hardly had Aguinaldo landed to organize his forces when Dewey cabled to the
Secretary of the Navy as follows:
May 20, 1898:
Aguinaldo, the rebel commander in chief, was
brought down by the McCulloch. Organizing forces




Relations Prior to August, I898 49


near Cavite, and may render assistance which will
be valuable (9).
Just how valuable this assistance proved to be
has been shown by Dewey's statements in the
preceding pages. It took three and a half
months for the American Army to arrive on the
scene of action and in the meantime the telling
dispatches of Dewey now survive to inform us
what the Filipino activities actually meant.
Thus, a dispatch of June 6 says:
Insurgents have been engaged actively within the
province of Cavite' during the last week; they have
had several small victories, taking prisoners about
1800 men, 50 officers; Spanish troops, not native (10).
Six days later, June 12, comes another telegram from Dewey:
Insurgents continue hostilities and have practically
surrounded Manila. They have taken 2500 Spanish
prisoners, whom they treat most humanely. They
do not intend to attack city proper until the arrival
of the U. S. troops thither; I have advised (11).
A week later and another telling dispatch is
sent to Washington:
I have given him (Aguinaldo) to understand that I
consider insurgents as friends, being opposed to a
common enemy.... He has gone to attend a
I Cavite is five miles across the bay from Manila.




50   Conquest of the Philippines


meeting of insurgent leaders for the purpose of forming a civil government. Aguinaldo has acted independently of the squadron but has kept me advised
of his progress which has been wonderful. I have
allowed to pass by water, recruits, arms and ammunition and to take such arms and ammunition
from the arsenal as he needed. Have advised frequently to conduct the war humanely, which he has
invariably done.
And then follows this convincing statement:
In my opinion these people are superior in intelligence and more capable of self-government than
the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both
races (12).
But as a forerunner of the breach which was
shortly to follow comes the testimony of Dewey
that upon the arrival of the American army,
instead of seeing him daily as he had done in
the past, he "had not much to do with him
after the army came" (13).
Although the Admiral had thus lost interest
in Aguinaldo's cooperation, however, it soon
appeared that the commander of the land
forces, General Anderson, who had arrived earlier on the scene of action, thought differently.
Addressing Aguinaldo on July 4, 1898, he said:
GENERAL:
I have the honor to inform you that the United
States of America whose land forces I have the honor




Relations Prior to August, 1898


51


to command in this vicinity...has entire sympathy and most friendly sentiments for the native
people of the Philippine Islands.
For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations with you and to have you and your
people cooperate with us in the military operations
against the Spanish forces.
(Signed) Gen'l T. M. ANDERSON (14).
Assuming, however, that no promises of independence were made in writing by properly
accredited agents in the name of the American
government, it is certain that the Revolutionists were led to believe that the United States
planned to do for the Philippines what she was
then actively doing for Cuba. As General
Anderson aptly put it in describing the situation at that critical period:
Whether Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt (of
Singapore), Wildman (Hongkong) and Williams
(Manila) did or did not give Aguinaldo assurances
that a Filipino government would be recognized, the
Filipinos certainly thought so, probably inferring
this from their acts rather than from their statements (15).
Laboring under such a belief the flag of the
Philippines was formally unfurled and independence proclaimed amidst elaborate ceremo



52   Conquest of the Philippines


nies at Cavite on June 12, 1898 (16). This was
exactly two months before the American forces
of occupation finally entered Manila. Events
moved rapidly. The Revolutionary government issued its proclamation providing for a
temporary constitution, until it could be replaced
by one formally drawn by delegates from the
archipelago formally assembled. In the words
of the document itself, its purpose was
to abolish with a firm hand the inveterate vices of the
Spanish administration, substituting a more simple
and expeditious system of public instruction for that
superfluity of civil service and ponderous, tardy and
ostentatious official routine (17).
Accompanying this provisional constitution
whose main object was "to struggle for the independence of the Philippines until all nations
including Spain, shall expressly recognize it, and
to prepare the country for the establishment of
a real Republic," was a presidential message
from Aguinaldo. This is a noteworthy document for it clearly mirrored the true aspirations
of the Filipinos. It concluded as follows:
Thus they have constituted a revolutionary government with wise and just laws suited to the abnormal conditions confronting them, and which at
the proper time will prepare them for a true republic.
Thus, taking for its only justification the right, for its




Relations Prior to August, 1898 53


sole aid, justice, and for its only means honorable
labor, the government calls upon all its Filipino sons
without distinction of class, and invites them to
unite solidly with the object of forming a noble
society ennobled, not by blood or pompous titles, but
by labor and the personal merit of the individual,a free society where there is no place for egotism and
personal politics which wither and blight, nor for
envy and favoritism which debase, nor for charlatanry and buffoonery which cause ridicule.
No other course is possible. A people that has
given proof of fortitude and valor in suffering and in
danger, of industry and learning in time of peace, is
not made for slavery. These people are called to be
great, to be one of the strong arms of Providence in
directing the destinies of humanity. These people
have sufficient energy and resources to recover from
the ruin and humiliation in which it has been placed
by the Spanish government and to claim a modest
but worthy place in the concert of free nations.
Given at Cavite, June 23, 1898.
(Signed) EMILIO AGUINALDO (18).
The march of events continued. On June 27
rules for the conduct of executive business were
announced. On July 25, the members of the
Cabinet were named, and the Congress assembled in the town of Malolos on September
15. The Revolutionary Government was now
ready to merge into the Republic. Thus it




54   Conquest of the Philippines


came about that on August 6, one week before
the occupation of Manila by the American
forces, Aguinaldo as President issued an address
to the foreign governments in which he stated
that his revolutionary government was then
the ruling power in fifteen provinces of the
island of Luzon, where complete order and perfect tranquillity reigned under the administration of civil authorities duly elected for that
purpose, and that the Filipino army was then
holding 9,000 Spanish prisoners of war who
were being treated according to the rules of
war (19). This proclamation was substantiated
by a secret investigation conducted at that time
by Major Bell with the purpose of ascertaining
the strength of the Filipinos in the event that
General Merritt had trouble with them (20).
"There is not a particle of doubt," concluded
Major Bell, "that Aguinaldo and his leaders
will resist any attempt of any government to
reorganize a colonial government there" (21).
And who was this man Aguinaldo, the recognized leader of the Filipino cause? Let John
Barrett, the strong supporter of the powers
that be, give a picture of the Filipino and his
successes. Writing from the scene of action,
having personally known the Filipino and having seen him put aboard the American gunboat
at Hongkong for the direct purpose of going
to Cavite to organize an army and make war




Relations Prior to August, I898 55


upon the Spaniards in cooperation with the
American forces, Mr. Barrett continues thus:
After his arrival at Cavite he organized with wonderful rapidity a provisional government, and in a
short time had an army which was capturing Spanish
outposts with the frequency of trained regulars...
The impression went abroad among the masses of
the people that Aguinaldo had arrived to establish
an independent government, and that the Americans
would assist him. The actual working of his government under the guns of our ship was sufficient
evidence to them of our approval.... These influences had a tremendous effect. Before Aguinaldo
had been in Cavite a month he not only had more
soldiers than he could arm, but contributions of large
sums of money, with unlimited amounts of rice and
other raw food supplies brought in by the people for
the support of his Army.
Of the Congress, Mr. Barrett says:
By the middle of October he had assembled at
Malolos a Congress of one hundred men....
These men whose sessions I repeatedly attended,
conducted themselves with great decorum and
showed a knowledge of debate and parliamentary
law that would not compare unfavorably with the
Japanese Parliament. The executive portion of the
government was made up of a ministry of bright
men who seemed to understand their respective
positions.




56   Conquest of the Philippines


The army of Aguinaldo seems to have been
the greatest of his achievements in the estimation of Mr. Barrett.
He had over twenty regiments [wrote Mr. Barrett]
of comparatively well-dressed soldiers carrying
modern rifles and ammunition. I saw many of these
regiments executing not only regimental but battalion and company drill with a precision that astonished me.... The people in all the different
towns took great pride in this army. Nearly every
family had a father, son or cousin in it. Wherever
they went they aroused enthusiasm for the Filipino
cause (22).
Such an estimate of Aguinaldo is largely corroborated by those Americans who directly
came in contact with him. Thus Mr. Jacob
Schurman, President of the First Philippine
Commission, characterized him as having
enjoyed the confidence of the insurgents and their
sympathizers and abettors... in virtue of his
patriotic services, his attested honesty and his remarkable gift of surrounding himself with able coadjutors and administrators (23).
"He (Aguinaldo) was the incarnation of the
feelings of the Filipinos," adds General MacArthur (24).
It is difficult to understand the success of
the insurgent forces against the better trained




Relations Prior to August, I898 57


Spaniards otherwise than by ascribing it to the
unusual intelligence on the part of their leaders
and the firm determination of the people. Six
weeks before the American occupation of Manila, for example, John T. McCutcheon, reporting for the Chicago Record narrated the march
of events in a special dispatch dated the 24th
of June, as follows:
All during the week following there was constant
evidence of the strife that was being waged between
Cavite and Malate....  Imus, Bacoor, Las Pinas
and Paranaque were captured in less than a week
notwithstanding the fact that the Spaniards had
splendid guns and ammunition in unlimited quantities, supported by five mountain batteries and rapid
fire guns.... Over in Cavite the calm passionless statements of great victories that Aguinaldo
gave us were being substantiated every day for
hundreds and hundreds of Spanish soldiers were being
marched in and placed in prison!...  Closely
following the remarkable insurgent successes in
Cavite Province, where the whole district had been
captured in eight days, came stories of other successful operations in Pampanga Province; Macabebe
and San Fernando were captured and the great
Spanish General Molet fled in terror to Manila.
Over one thousand Spanish soldiers had been taken
prisoners and their arms given out to natives as
quickly as possible.... Our respect for the insurgent prowess had grown a great deal, for by June
30 they had taken almost every province in Luzon,




58   Conquest of the Philippines


with the exception of isolated garrisons and were
hammering away at the doors of Manila (25).
By August the insurgents had surrounded
the city with fourteen miles of trenches, the
water and food supply had been cut off, internal trade paralyzed and the inhabitants of the
unfortunate city reduced to horseflesh diet.
Such was the result of a three and a half months'
blockade with Dewey guarding the harbor
and the Filipinos closing in by land (26). So
closely were the Filipinos besieging Manila
that when General Anderson arrived with his
land forces to commence offensive hostilities he
was compelled to request from Aguinaldo permission to occupy a part of the Filipino fighting line and trenches (27).
Capitulation of the city turned out to be a
mere matter of form under these circumstances.
Through the Belgian consul, M. Andre, stationed in Manila, Commodore Dewey and General Merritt arranged with the Spanish commandants for the surrender of the city. There
was to be no real fighting, no resistance except the
display of a white flag after the firing of a few
shots to save the delicate honor of the Castilians. But one thing the Spaniards demanded,
and that was that no Filipino troops were to
enter the city. To this arrangement the Americans agreed (28). General Anderson, there



Relations Prior to August, 1898 59


upon, notified Aguinaldo to forbid his troops
to enter the city. The unpleasant information
was naturally received with indignation, for it
meant that the Filipinos must lie in their
trenches and watch all the glory of the capture
fall to thousands of American troops whose contribution to the victory had consisted in their
amiable presence on the American transports
that had brought them from San Francisco.
Further than this, until the treaty of Paris
was decided upon the Filipinos had no way of
knowing whether the Americans were to turn
them back to Spain or set them free. If it was
to be the former then the Revolution would
continue and it was natural that the Filipinos
should wish to be in possession of the capital
city.
Fearing as he had reason to fear, that the
order to stay back would not be obeyed, General Anderson sent his troops to hold the main
bridge into the city with no other purpose
than to fire, if necessary, upon their late friends.
As Anderson himself put it in addressing Aguinaldo: "Unless your troops are withdrawn beyond the lines of the city's defences before
Thursday, the fifteenth instant, I shall be
compelled to resort to forcible action" (29).
The situation was very critical [said General Greene].
Our soldiers believed that the Filipinos had fired




60   Conquest of the Philippines


upon them and the Filipinos were almost beside
themselves with rage and disappointment. The
friendly relations we had with Generals Rtcart and
Noriel alone prevented the conflict with them then
and there (30).
But if the break between them had been averted
in August, it failed to end the tension between
the two armies.
It is now worth while to view the situation as
it stood at that time.
We held Manila and Cavite [said General Anderson] the rest of the Island (Luzon) was held not by
Spaniards but by the Filipinos. On the other islands
the Spaniards were confined to two or three fortified
towns (31).
Even these were later captured by the natives
also, so that General Otis adds:
Thus, in December, 1898, we find that in northern
and southeastern Luzon, in (the islands of) Mindoro,
Samar, Leyte, Panay and even on the coast of Mindanao and in some of the smaller islands, the aggressive Tagalog present in person and, whether
civilian or soldier, supreme in authority (32).
Shortly after the occupation of Manila, two
officers of Admiral Dewey's squadron, with the
latter's permission, made an intimate inspection
of the interior of the island to bring back a




Relations Prior to August, 1898


report of which Admiral Dewey himself said
that iti contained "the most complete and
reliable information obtainable in regard to the
present state of the northern part of Luzon."
This report was forwarded to Mr. Long, the
Secretary of the Navy and, in response to a
Senate resolution may be found reported in
Senate Document 196, 56th Congress, 1st Session, bearing date of February 26, 1900.
Messrs. Sargent and Wilcox, the two officers in
question, spent two months in their travels
and they saw and heard even more than that
which was reported by the commanders from
Manila.
As a tribute to the efficiency of Aguinaldo's government and the law abiding character of his subjects [wrote Mr. Sargent] I offer the fact that Mr.
Wilcox and I pursued our journey through in perfect
security and returned to Manila with only the most
pleasing recollections of the quiet and orderly life
which we found the natives to be leading under their
new regime (the Filipino Republic).
The travellers also had an opportunity to
witness some of the ceremonies inaugurating
civil government under the new-born republic.
They describe those which occurred in the province of Caaygan as follows:
The Presidentes of all the towns in the provinces were
present at the ceremony.... Colonel Tirona




62   Conquest of the Philippines


made a short speech.... He then handed the
staff of office to the man who had been elected governor of the Province. This officer also made a
speech in which he thanked the military forces and
assured them that the work they had begun would
be perpetuated by the people, where every man,
woman and child stood ready to take up arms to defend their newly won liberty and to resist with the
last drop of their blood the attempt of any nation
whatever to bring them back to their former state of
dependence. He then knelt, placed his hand on an
open Bible, and took the oath of office.
There is a variety of feeling among the Filipinos
[adds Mr. Sargent] in regard to the debt of gratitude they owe the United States. In every town we
found men who said that our nation had saved them
from slavery and others who claimed that without
our interference their independence would have been
recognized before this time. On one point they were
united, however, viz. that whatever our government
may have done for them, it has not gained the right
to annex them.
Of course, it must be remembered that all
this region outside of Manila and its environments was "terra incognita" to the thousands of
American soldiers stationed in Manila and to
the millions of Americans at home. That is
why with the help of the censored press during the war that followed, American public
opinion utterly failed to realize what an efficient government the Filipinos had established




Relations Prior to August, I898 63


several months before the treaty of Paris. The
first intimate glimpse accorded the volunteer
army of occupation occurred in the fall of the
following year when that peaceful territory was
finally overrun by the invading army of the
greatest republic in the world.
No one can read the evidence here presented
without seeing that the representatives of the
United States in the islands and the government in Washington knew that the Filipinos
believed that the United States would give
them independence and in that belief were
helping the Americans; that while their help
was needed nothing was done to disturb that
belief but, on the contrary, pains were taken
not to disturb it, if not indeed to encourage it,
and the Filipinos were allowed to fight the
battles of the invaders. Among gentlemen, or
in a country where the principle of estoppel is
recognized, such conduct would be held equivalent to a binding promise.
Can the "great nation    North America"
afford to adopt a lower standard of decency?
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER IV
1. Note: Consul Pratt's official report regarding this
early state of the Filipino-American relations is
preserved in Sen. Doe. 62, part 1, 55th Cong., 3d
Sess., 1898-99, pp. 341 et seq.
2. Cong. Rec., April 17, 1900, p. 4287.




64   Conquest of the Philippines


3. From Dewey's statement to the Senate Committee
-see Sen. Doc. 331, part 3, p. 2928.
4. Sen. Doc. 331, part 3, p. 2928.
5. Ibid., p. 2934.
6. Ibid., p. 2967.
7. Sen. Doc. 331, part 3, p. 2936.
8. Ibid., p. 2940.
9. See Navy Dept. Report, 1898, App., p. 100.
10. Ibid., p. 102.
11. Ibid., p. 106.
12. Ibid., p. 103.
13. Sen. Doc. 331, part 3, pp. 2928 and 2956.
14. See Sen. Doe. 56th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 208.
15. "Our Rule in the Philippines," North American Review, Feb., 1900, p. 272.
16. See Justice George Malcolm's Philippine Government,
p. 124.
17. Sen. Doc. 62, pp. 432-437; quoted also in Foreman's
The Philippine Islands, 3d, 1906, p. 448.
18. Quoted in Millet's Expedition to the Philippines, p. 49.
Foreman's The Philippine Islands, 3d, 1906, pp. 454,
455.
19. Sen. Doe. (1898), No. 208, p. 99.
20. Sen. Doc. 62, 1898, p. 379.
21. Ibid., p. 380.
22. John Barrett in the Review of Reviews, July, 1899.
23. Philippine Affairs-a Retrospect and Outlook, address
by Mr. Shurman before members of Cornell Univ.
24. Statement before Senate Committee, Sen. Doc. 331,
1902, p. 1926.
25. Note: These accounts are substantiated by Official
Reports. See War Dept. Rep. 1899, vol. 1, part 4,
and Otis Report, p. 13; also Report of Shurman
Commission, vol. 1, p. 172.
26. War Dept. Rep. 1899, vol. 1, part 4, p. 13.




Relations Prior to August, I898 65
27. Latane, America as a World Power, p. 85; also Cong.
Record, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., Proceedings in the
Senate, Jan. 11, 1900, p. 769.
28. See Dewey's Autobiography, pp. 273, 274, for a carefully guarded account of these arrangements.
29. Sec. of War Annual Rep. 1899, I, part 4, p. 9.
30. See Charles B. Elliott's The Philippine Islands,
Chapter XII, "Capture of Manila," p. 317.
31. North American Review, Feb., 1900.
32. Report of Gen. Otis for Aug. 21, 1899; also quoted
in Harper's History of the War in the Philippines,
p. 99.




CHAPTER V


CONQUEST BY TREATY
DURING the war the President had already
shown a shrewd instinct for trading, thus
expressed in his own words: "While we are
conducting war and until its conclusion we must
keep all we get; when the war is over we must
keep what we want" (1). Thus it was that when,
after less than four months of fighting the Spanish government acting through the good offices
of the French government finally decided to
ask for peace, she was, to say the least, taken
by surprise at the conditions imposed by the
victorious President.
When the desire for a parley was first brought
to the attention of McKinley he summoned his
Cabinet for a protracted conference to discuss
the terms of peace. Those relating to the
Philippines naturally elicited the most attention. Secretary Bliss seeing great commercial
opportunities in the Islands favored taking the
entire group. So did Attorney General Griggs.
Secretaries Gage and Long thought a naval
66




Conquest by Treaty


base would be enough. As for the Secretary of
State, Mr. Day, we quote Mr. McKinley's own
words. Commenting on the varying views of
his Cabinet which ranged from the retention of
the whole archipelago to one or two more
important islands, McKinley jokingly added,
"But Judge Day only wants a hitching post."
So much for the administration's early attitude regarding its benevolent and kindly intentions towards the Philippines (2).
In response, therefore, to the Spanish Minister's request for peace, a request in which that
able representative of the Queen Regent assured
the President and his administration that the
Spanish treatment of Cuban insurrection had
been adopted solely "to spare the great island
from the dangers of premature independence,"
Mr. McKinley submitted the following conditions for the suspension of hostilities:
First: the relinquishment by Spain of all claim to
Cuba and immediate evacuation of the island.
Second: the cession to the United States of the
'slands of Porto Rico and the other islands
then under the sovereignty of Spain in the
West Indies, and also the cession of an island
in the Ladrones to be selected by the United
States.
Third: that the United States was to be entitled
"to occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor
of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty




68   Conquest of the Philippines


of peace which should determine the control,
disposition and government of the Philippines" (3).
Spain was not alone in her denunciation of
these hard terms. The French ambassador,
M. Cambon, through whom the interests of
the Spanish government were being represented
in Washington, tried in vain to secure a modification of these terms, particularly that regarding Porto Rico which "he characterized as
evincing a spirit of conquest inconsistent with
the declaration of disinterestedness with which
the United States had commenced the war"(4).
It should be remembered also that these terms
were made two weeks before the final capture
of Manila. At this early stage it is already
evident that the President failed to recognize
in any way the existing fact that there was a
native uprising in the Islands and that a Philippine Republic had been proclaimed under it.
Five commissioners were appointed to negotiate the final treaty with Spain but it is significant to notice that three of them  were
avowed Imperialists (5) and already known to be
in favor of acquiring territories in the Far
East. These three were the Hon. Cushman
Davis, chairman of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, the Hon. William P. Frye,
member of the same Committee, and the Hon.




Conquest by Treaty


69


Whitelaw Reid, who had formerly held the post
of envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States to France.
Under such auspicious beginnings it was an
easy matter for the President to communicate
with sufficient tact the secret instructions which
were to guide the commissioners in Paris. These
secret instructions were prepared with great
detail and care and must be examined accordingly. In them, the President first expressed
in high sounding language the altruistic purposes with which the war had been waged.
It is my earnest wish [he said] that the United
States in making peace should follow the same high
rule of conduct which guided it in making war....
The lustre and the moral strength attaching to a
cause which can be properly rested upon the considerate judgment of the world should not under any
illusion of the hour be dimmed by ulterior designs
which might tempt us into excessive demands or
even into adventurous departure on untried paths.
These were fine words, indeed, but, they were
meant only for Cuba and not for the Philippines.
The Philippines [continued the President] stand
upon a different basis. It is none the less true, however, that without any original thought of complete
or even partial acquisition, the presence and success




70   Conquest of the Philippines


of our arms at Manila impose upon us obligations
which we cannot disregard. The march of events
rules and overrules human action... we cannot
be unmindful that without any desire or design on
our part, the war has brought us new duties and responsibilities which we must meet and discharge
as becomes a great nation in whose growth and
career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has
plainly written the high command and pledge of
civilization.
But that these were in fact but weasel words
to smooth the instructions which were to follow
now becomes evident. It bluntly appears in
the next paragraph when the President continued thus, "Incidental to our tenure in the
Philippines is the commercial opportunity to
which American statesmanship cannot be indifferent." And thus, by elaborate gradations
finally came the President's real demand expressed in these words, "The United States
cannot accept less than the cession in full right
and sovereignty of the island of Luzon" (6).
With these secret instructions in hand the
commissioners departed for Paris. There they
were joined by other American observers fresh
from their Philippine campaigns. Among them
were Admiral Dewey, General Merritt, Major
Bell and General Green who had come for the
purpose of presenting their statement to aid the
commissioners in their negotiations. The tenor




Conquest by Treaty


7I


of their reports was practically the same, holding that it would not be wise to return all of the
Islands or even a part of them to Spain, that
the cession of the archipelago would be a "good
business proposition" and that the Filipinos
would not offer much resistance to American
rule. How totally without foundation the latter statement was became evident during the
Filipino-American war. One of the opinions
submitted which no doubt produced a marked
effect on the later negotiations came from the
Belgian consul in Manila, M. Andre. His
statement was that:
The United States can assure a steady government
in these islands and in their hands the country will
increase in wealth, and will, in a short time, be able
to return to the United States the money laid out (7).
Thus it was that on October 26, before the subject of the Philippines was actually brought
to the attention of the Peace Conference, the
President cabled his commissioners to the effect
that recent information had convinced him
that the cession of Luzon alone was out of the
question and therefore, influenced as he said "by
the single consideration of duty and humanity,"
he directed that, "the cession must be of the
whole archipelago or none." "The latter," he
continued, "is wholly inadmissible, and the
former must therefore be required" (8).




72   Conquest of the Philippines


Now throughout these proceedings it is at
once apparent that no thought, no consideration, not even a voice was given to the Filipino people. A representative of the Filipinos,
Mr. Agoncillo, went to Paris and later to Washington to seek a hearing before the commission,
but the doors of both council chambers were
slammed in his face and the authorities in
Washington would not receive him. He could
obtain a hearing nowhere. The whole matter
was a business proposition, and the commissioners treated it accordingly. The secrecy
with which the President's designs were guarded
may be gathered from the fact that the "Papers
relating to the Treaty with Spain," which included also the private communications between
the chief executive and his commissioners, were
carefully concealed from the American public
until January 31, 1901, that is, after the Presidential elections of 1900 had been successfully
passed. Even then the papers only came to
light after having been extracted from the
jealous custody of the Executive by a Senate
resolution demanding them. They were then
published as Senate Document, 148, 56th Congress, Second Session.
It is one of the most significant features of
this conquest, that at the time when the great
issue was at stake neither the Filipinos who
were most interested in the outcome nor the




Conquest by Treaty


73


Americans who faced the parting of the ways
were ever taken into the confidence of the
Administration.
It is difficult to understand how the commissioners finally came to an agreement regarding
the Philippines. They could, of course, have
followed McKinley's claim and demanded the
islands by conquest. But such a position seemed
unwarrantable to the commissioners who wired
the President accordingly on November 3.
Furthermore, the Spanish commissioners feared
utter repudiation at home. To lose Cuba and
her possessions in the West Indies, "the last
memory of a glorious past," was sorrowful
enough, but to lose the Philippines as well was
indeed pitiful. But the President stood firm in
his demands for the entire archipelago, and so a
friendly concession was made whereby the title
to the Philippines was apparently bought, "the
United States to pay Spain the sum of twenty
million dollars within three months after the
exchange of ratifications of the present treaty."
Considering that the Islands had a total land
area almost equal to that of England, Ireland,
Scotland, and Wales, and a population of more
than seven million it was not a bad bargain at
all, and the President certained lived up to his
reputation for shrewdness and ability to drive a
good business bargain.
And in that manner was the President's orig



74   Conquest of the Philippines


inal intention fully accomplished. For in the
words of one of his own appointed commissioners, Mr. Davis, it was of the utmost importance that the United States should have a
"commanding commercial position" in the
waters of the East, "in view of the astounding
changes which the Chinese Empire has been
subjected to and is destined to further undergo."
I am interested that this country shall have its share
of trade of that great empire [he said]. California,
Washington and Oregon have scarcely more than
two millions of people. I want to see the commercial
development of that part of our country expand until
there shall be twenty millions of people there; and I
do honestly and sincerely believe, from all I have
studied and thought on the subject, that the retention of the Philippine Islands, and their adjustment
to our needs and destiny, is a necessary and indispensable step in the advancement to which I have so
alluded.
The well-known historian, James Ford
Rhodes, contributes much light to this chapter
of American history. "It is true," he wrote in
1922, "that McKinley was inconsistent in his
public words." For "in his message of December, 1897,he had said, 'forcible annexation.. 
cannot be thought of; that by our code of morality would be criminal aggression!"' And yet




Conquest by Treaty


75


"one cannot read the proceedings of the Peace
Commission in Paris," adds Mr. Rhodes, "and
see in any other light than that our taking of
the Philippines was 'forcible annexation"' (9).
The British press of that year, however,
showed the incongruity even more effectively.
A cartoon was presented entitled "Doctrine and
Practice" representing Dame Europe in a garden haughtily saying to an intruder, "To whom
do I owe the pleasure of this intrusion?" To
which the person addressed replies,-"Ma'am,
my name is Uncle Sam." And this rejoinder
follows, "Any relation to the late Colonel
Monroe?" (10)
It certainly would have seemed impossible
after all that had passed and the help which the
United States had asked and accepted from the
Filipinos as their allies, that the future of the
Islands should be determined without even
inviting a suggestion from their people as to
what should be the terms of peace. The United
States had always insisted that governments.
rest on the consent of the governed; the President had taken pains to assure the world that
"forcible annexation" was not to be thought of
as it would be "criminal aggression"; it had
even been insisted that "our priceless principles" could not change under "a tropical sun"
and that it was with no thought of gain but
solely for the good of the Filipinos and the sake




76   Conquest of the Philippines


of humanity that the American nation was fighting at all, and yet the Washington administration refused, not only to invite suggestion, but
even to receive and listen to the envoy whom
the Filipinos sent to express their views as to the
future of the seven million people who had
proved themselves most efficient allies and
whose help the American commanders had been
glad to invite and accept.
It is all a striking instance of the crimes which
have been committed in the name of liberty.
But although the President and his commissioners were highly satisfied with the treaty,
their work was far from accomplished. That
document had to be ratified and for that purpose all the forces and arguments and all the
enthusiasm which the President thought he had
found in a tour of the middle west were now
employed. The struggle for its ratification,
therefore, soon got under way but this fact must
be at once noticed,-that although the people
were being urged to stand behind the treaty
they did not and could not know what the
treaty really meant.
And this unfortunate situation was so because
to the political leaders of that time the provisions of the treaty meant one of several things.
To the majority the cession of the Philippines
if ratified meant that America was to be definitely launched upon a policy of colonial expan



Conquest by Treaty


77


sion. In the past the Federal government had
acquired territory on the continent, but in
such cases it had also meant eventual statehood by and with the consent of its inhabitants.
But the Philippine issue widely differed from
this. Not only had the Filipinos not been
consulted in the matter, but the administration itself had made it clear that it was not
prepared to favor the extension of American
citizenship to the natives (11).
Now, there were certain men in the Senate
who wished to ratify the treaty and yet were
opposed to a policy of colonization. Hence,
they proposed to amend it or to pass a resolution clearly stating that the Philippines would
ultimately, if not immediately, be given their
independence. A number of such resolutions
were therefore offered but they all failed to
pass.
Another group of Senators, though not perhaps strictly opposed to some other more reasonable policy of expansion, nevertheless objected
to the treaty as it then stood because it was an
injustice to the Filipinos. This element could
not understand why the Cubans should be'
treated differently from the Filipinos in the face
of an official statement made by Admiral Dewey
to the effect that "the Filipinos were better
fitted for self-government than the Cubans
were" (12). As Senator Mason ably put it,



78   Conquest of the Philippines


Tell me why we should adopt one plan for Cuba and
another for the Philippines? Do you say...
"We promised we would not steal Cuba, but we did
not promise not to steal the Philippines?" Do you
say, with Shylock, "Is it so nominated in the bond?"... Will you tell me please, how grand larceny
and criminal aggression in Cuba become high Christian civilization in the Philippines?
This powerful group of practical anti-imperialists, headed by such men as Senator Hoar, Carl
Schurz, and ex-President Harrison, stoutly maintained that the principles underlying the structure of the American republic were not compatible with the policy of holding colonies.
They urged the argument that the United States
could have no subjects under her suzerainty,
because she herself was composed of free citizens. And, finally, they attacked the administration's intention of governing a subject people
without the latter's consent.
A selfish element among the Senators also
had to be contended with. This group was made
up of those who feared that annexation of the
Philippines would eventually mean the introduction of the Filipinos in some form or another
into American life. The idea was apparently
repugnant to them. Such an attitude was no
doubt, however, a result of misinformation and
downright prejudice against Asiatics in general.
Senator McLaurin characterized the extent of




Conquest by Treaty


79


this feeling when he said that he was against
"the incorporation of a mongrel and semibarbarous population into our body politic," whilc
was "inferior to, but ak;  o tlo t  N T, ro:, in mroral
and  intellectual  -,i.Fe.s  -, i;': 2. cyfl, f.yL
self -g...
So iheavily laden was the atmosphere with
these objections against ratification, that it
became doubtful whether the administration
would be vindicated. It remained for Senator
Lodge with his fluent language and adroit
reasoning, and Mr. Bryan's mistaken policy to
swing the senatorial sentiment in the other
direction.
Senator Lodge's presentation deserves first
attention because of the open and high-handed
manner in which he presented his case. Briefly,
his attitude was that ratification did not necessarily mean annexation or colonization. The
time to decide the latter, in his opinion, was
after the treaty had been accepted.' This was
directly opposed to the prevailing view that to
accept the treaty meant to enter upon an era
of colonial expansion. But the Senator was
not to be daunted. He took as his weapon, and
he-followed as his method of attack, the road
which adroit diplomats and statesmen have
constantly followed when arguments have failed
them-the vanity of human nature.
Let the Senator's own words testify to this:




80   Conquest of the Philippines


When that treaty is ratified [he contended] we have
full power and are absolutely free to do with those
islands as we please, and the opposition to its ratification may be summed up in a single sentencethat the American people and the American Congress
are not to be trusted with that power and with that
freedom of action in regard to the inhabitants of
those distant islands. Every one of the resolutions
thus far offered on this subject is an expression of
distrust in the future and in our dealings with other
people. It is a well-meant effort to make us give
bonds to Fate by means of a Congressional resolution.
The resolutions which the Senator meant were
those declaring that the United States did not
intend to make a permanent colony of the Philippines, and that ultimately or immediately the
Filipinos would be granted self-government.
Could a more direct appeal to the vanity of
the American people have been made?
Suppose we ratify the treaty [continued the Senator] the islands pass from the possession of Spain
into our possession without committing us to any
policy. I believe we can be trusted as a people to deal
honestly and justly with the islands and their inhabitants thus given to our care (13).
It is well to recall this language of the late Senator in view of the contention being made




Conquest by Treaty


8i


today that Congress cannot alienate the Philippines. If the spokesman of the administration of 1898 insisted that the ratification of the
treaty would not commit the United States to
any policy with regard to the Philippines, and
that the Congress could later deal with the
Islands in accordance with the wishes of the
people, will Congress now repudiate the theory
which then prevailed and which largely induced
the Senate to ratify the treaty? Can the
United States afford to give her enemies this
new ground for distrust?
But let the Senator continue once more,"It is for us to decide the destiny of the Philippines, not for Europe, and we can do it alone
and without assistance." On another occasion
he made this most flowery statement,To the American people and their government I am
ready to intrust my life, my liberty, my honor and,
what is far dearer to me than anything personal to
myself, the life and liberty of my children and my
children's children. If I am ready thus to trust my
children to the government which the American
public create and sustain, am I to shrink from intrusting to that same people the fate and fortune of
the Philippine Islands?
Evidently it did not occur to the venerable
senator that these Filipinos were not to have a




82   Conquest of the Philippines


voice in the government which he praised so
eloquently and that, therefore, in the words of
Daniel Webster,No matter how easy may be the yoke of a foreign
power, no matter how lightly it sits upon the shoulders, if it is not imposed upon him by the voice of his
own nation and of his own country, he cannot and he
means not to be happy under its burden.
But the Senator's point had been made. He had
convinced many opponents of the treaty that
refusal to ratify unless accompanied by a statement of America's honest intentions meant a
distrust of America's honest abilities to give the
Filipinos a square deal. These men thought
that such a resolution would mean giving bonds
to Spain and to Europe for America's good
conduct.
A further element also entered into the
struggle which aided the administration in its
fight. It was Mr. Bryan's arrival in Washington urging the Democrats to ratify the treaty.
Like Senator Lodge, Mr. Bryan contended that
the treaty as it then stood did not commit the
country to a policy of colonization. That policy was to be decided in the coming elections
when the attitude towards the Filipino could be
more plainly expressed (14). And so confident
was the great commoner that the American




Conquest by Treaty


83


public would oppose indefinite if not permanent
annexation of the Islands that he was willing to
risk the issue until 1900.
The ratification of the treaty [he said] instead of
committing the United States to a colonial policy
really clears the way for the recognition of the
Philippine Republic.... Could the independence of the Filipinos be secured more easily by
diplomacy from a foreign and hostile nation than it
can through laws passed by Congress and voicing
the sentiments of the American people? If independence is more desirable to our people than a
colonial policy, who is there and what is there to
prevent the recognition of Philippine independence?
It is absurd to say that the United States can be
transformed from a republic to an empire without
consulting the voters (15).
Mr. Bryan may or may not have been justified
in taking this attitude, but he certainly failed
to foresee the nature of the campaign which his
opponents were to launch in order to vindicate
the President's Philippine policy.
While the discussions on the treaty were thus
rapidly coming to a close the situation in the
Philippines was constantly becoming menacing.
American transports bearing thousands of soldiers were being massed in Manila. The insurgents who, it will be remembered, had surrounded the city were being gradually pushed




84   Conquest of the Philippines


further and further back. In many instances
these advances by the Americans were also made
in violation of the protocol with Spain which had
declared that America was merely "to occupy
and hold the city, bay and habor of Manila
pending the conclusion of the treaty.  Generally these orders compelling the Filipinos to
make more and more humiliating withdrawals
were accompanied with gratuitous threats to
use force. What friendship had been left at
the time of the occupation had given way to
suspicion.
Perhaps no one more than Senator Bacon
realized the danger which these relations meant.
While there is not a declaration of war [he said]
while there is no avowal of hostile intent, with two
such armies fronting each other with such diverse
intents and resolves, it will take but a spark to
ignite the magazine which may explode.... They
(the Filipinos) are opposed to the occupation of their
islands by the United States troops [warned the
Senator] because of the apprehension that it is the
purpose of the United States government to maintain a permanent dominion over those islands; and
whenever, we shall by such resolutions as these, say
solemnly to the world that such is not our purpose,
there is no longer any danger or difficulty (16).
That such was also the view taken by the
Filipino leaders and observed by the American




Conquest by Treaty


commander was also clear. "They begged,"
said General Otis, "for some tangible concession from the United States government,
one which they could present to the people
and which might serve to allay excitement"
(17).
Two days before the vote was taken, however,
every attempt to declare America's real purpose
with regard to the Philippines had failed. On
that fateful day the hostilities between the
Americans and Filipinos against which Mr.
Bacon had warned his countrymen finally
broke out. The Administration immediately
claimed that the insurgents had treacherously
begun the hostilities, but even with this inducement to support the treaty, that document was
finally ratified with but one vote to spare.
But it was not yet too late to hear the protest
of the Filipinos even if it had been ignored for
so long a time. The opponents of colonization
immediately commenced their efforts to pass
their resolutions plainly putting the benevolent
attitude which the President and his supporters
had been so vaguely hinting at. That of Mr.
McEnery's supplemented by Mr. Bacon's
amendment was, in particular, the most clear
and reasonable of all. It read as follows:
RESOLVED, further, that the United States hereby
disclaim any disposition or intention to exercise per



86   Conquest of the Philippines


manent sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over
said islands, and assert their determination, when a
stable and independent government shall have been
erected therein, entitled in the judgment of the government of the United States to recognition as such,
to transfer to said government, upon terms which
shall be reasonable and just, all rights secured under
the cession by Spain, and to thereupon leave the
government and control of the Islands to their
people.
Surely, the issue could not have been more
plainly put. If the United States really intended and could be trusted to deal honestly
and fairly with the Filipinos, now was the time
to announce her policy. This resolution still
gave the United States a wide latitude of discretion as to when the Filipinos could have their
cherished freedom. Even Senator Lodge should
have had no apprehension in the matter. There
were here no bonds to be given to Europe, no
distrust in the good faith and judgment of the
American people. The resolution merely sought
to decide whether the Filipinos would at some
distant time in the future eventually be granted
that which had been given to Cuba. But this
resolution also failed to pass and in its failure
the true purpose of the Administration was
made clear. The vote was a tie and the casting
vote of the Vice-President was cast against
it.




Conquest by Treaty


87


REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER V
1. Olcott's Life of McKinley, vol. ii, p. 165; also James
F. Rhodes' The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations, p. 100.
2. Olcott's Life of McKinley, vol. ii, p. 63.
3. Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 820.
4. Elliott, The Philippines, Ch. XIII, The Treaty of
Peace, p. 322.
5. Rhodes, The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations, p. 102.
6. Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 907.
7. Sen. Doc. 62, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 389.
8. Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 935.
9. Rhodes, The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations, p. 107.
10. See Punch for Aug. 6, 1898.
11. Kalaw The Case for the Filipinos, p. 45.
12. Navy Dept. Rep., 1898, App. p. 103.
13. Speech in U. S. Senate, Jan. 24, 1899.
14. Hoar, Autobiography, vol. ii, p. 332.
15. Speech at Democratic banquet, St. Paul, Minn,
Feb. 14, 1899.
16. Con. Record, Jan. 18, 1899, p. 1899.
17. Otis' Report, p. 82.




CHAPTER VI


CONQUEST BY FORCE OF ARMS
THE last chapter took us to the day when the
Senate of the United States, with one vote to
spare, finally ratified the treaty. But seven
weeks before that momentous occasion the President had already started on his career of usurpation which finally ended in war. On December 21, 1898, he issued a proclamation which he
caused to be broadcasted in the Islands. At
that time the United States had no title to a foot
of land in the Philippines, and whether it would
have depended on the ratification of the treaty
which was bitterly opposed by many leaders of
the Republican party. Until this treaty was
ratified the protocol of August 13 remained in
force which by its terms merely provided that
the United States forces should occupy "the
city, bay and harbor of Manila, pending the
conclusion of the treaty." None the less the
President began his proclamation by saying
that,
88




Conquest by Force of Arms


89


the destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of
Manila by the United States squadron commanded
by Rear-Admiral Dewey followed by the reduction
of the city and the surrender of the Spanish forces
practically effected the conquest of the Philippine
islands and the suspension of Spanish sovereignty
therein. With the signature of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain by their respective plenipotentiaries at Paris on the 10th instant, and as a result of the victories of American
arms, the future control, disposition, and government
of the Philippine islands are ceded to the United
States. In the fulfillment of the rights of sovereignty
thus acquired and the responsible obligations thus
assumed, the actual occupation and administration of
the entire group of the Philippine Islands becomes immediately necessary, and the military government heretofore maintained by the United States in the city,
harbor and bay of Manila is to be extended with all
possible dispatch to the whole ceded territory.
He concluded by urging the military administration to win the confidence, respect and affection
of the Filipinos,
by assuring them in every possible way that full
measure of individual rights and liberties which is the
heritage of free peoples, and by proving to them that
the mission of the United States is one of "benevolent
assimilation" substituting the mild sway of justice
and right for arbitrary rule.




90   Conquest of the Philippines


The President's language thus made it clear
that he considered the conquest of the Philippine Islands as practically complete, that the
United States now owned them and could deal
with them as it would and that it did not offer
them any voice in their government, much less
the independence for which they had struggled
so long and which they thought the United
States had fought to give them.
The President also went on to say:
All persons who, either by active aid or by honest
submission, cooperate with the Government of the
United States to give effect to these beneficent purposes will receive the reward of its support and protection. All others will be brought within the lawful
rule we have assumed, with firmness if need be, but
without severity so far as possible.
Bearing in mind that this Proclamation was
issued seven weeks before the treaty was ratified, what did the President assert by it? Simply
this-in substance he told the Filipinos:
You are ours, the control of your public property and
the revenues of your state are ours, the use and
management of your public means of transportation
and conveyance are controlled by our authority and
while we mean to rule you with benevolence, nevertheless you must accept our sovereignty in order to




Conquest by Force of Arms


9I


receive our support and protection, for if you fail to
do so the armed forces of the United States will compel you to submit.
The Filipinos realized this; it was not difficult
for them to see what the United States really
intended, notwithstanding the honeyed phrases
of the proclamation. The American commander
in Manila, General Otis, also realized it, and
knowing the stern resolve of the people to assert
their independence he took the liberty of censoring the proclamation by cutting out the
words "sovereignty" and "immediate extension of authority."  Unfortunately the proclamation got out by mistake in its original form
and served to increase the tension between the
two armies.
In accordance with this proclamation, the
American forces in Manila gradually extended
their occupations beyond the city limits, forcing
the Filipino army to retire farther and farther
from its original lines. As long as the Filipino
forces yielded gracefully to these illegal advances
they certainly had a right to feel that no organized attack would be made upon them. But on
February 4, two days before the treaty was ratified the American lines were again extended
into the outlying territory.
That night an American sentry seeing a Filipino on the newly occupied sector challenged




92   Conquest of the Philippines


him. What transpired is best stated by this
same American private.
I yelled, "Halt!"... The man moved. I
challenged him with another "Halt." Then he immediately shouted, "Halto" to me. Well, I thought
the best thing to do was to shoot him. He dropped.
Then two Filipinos sprang out of the gateway about
fifteen feet from us. I called "Halt" and Miller
fired and dropped one. I saw that another was left.
Well, I think I got my second Filipino that time.
We retreated to where our six other fellows were and
I said, "Line up, fellows, the niggers are in here all
through these yards." We then retreated to the
pipe line and got behind the water workmain and
stayed there all night. It was some minutes after
our second shots before Filipinos began firing (1).
General Otis described the outbreak in his
official report in very much the same manner.
He said:
An insurgent approaching the picket (of a Nebraska regiment) refused to halt or answer when
challenged. The result was that our picket discharged his piece (killing the Filipino) when the
insurgent troops near Santa Mesa opened fire on our
troops there stationed.... During the night it
was confined to an exchange of fire between opposing
lines for a distance of two miles.... It is not
believed that the chief insurgents wished to open hostilities at that time (2).




Conquest by Force of Arms


93


It has never been even suggested that this
exchange of fire caused any casualties (3).
That the Filipino leaders did not desire an
outbreak has also been substantiated from
numerous reliable sources since then. Thus
Charles B. Elliott, a defender of the American administration, writing as late as 1916
says:
The Filipinos at that particular hour were unprepared for attack or defense. The expected battle
came when they were off their guard, most of the
higher officers being absent in Malolos (4). [While]
the American authorities in Manila, having taken a
more positive stand... let loose the dogs of war
they had been holding ready (5).
The next day General Aguinaldo sent a member of his staff under a flag of truce to interview
General Otis and to tell him that the firing of
the night before had been against his orders
and that he wished to stop further hostilities.
To bring this about he proposed to establish a
neutral zone wide enough to keep the opposing
armies apart. But to this request Otis replied
that the fighting having begun must go on
"to the grim end" (6). This refusal was followed by an attack on the Filipino forces which
lasted all day and resulted in killing some three
thousand natives.




94   Conquest of the Philippines


These incidents reviewed by a Senate Committee of which Mr. Lodge was the chairman
make other facts stand clear. General MacArthur was questioned as follows:
SENATOR PATTERSON: The question is whether
the Filipino troops made any attempt to advance upon American troops that night (Feb.
4) or that morning (Feb. 5). You have no
knowledge of anything of that kind?
GEN. MACARTHUR: I have no knowledge of that
kind and I presume it was not so becauseSEN. PATTERSON: The result of that advance was
the killing and wounding of more than 3000
Filipinos and, I suppose, their utter disorganization?
GEN. MACARTHUR: It resulted fortunately in a
great victory for the American arms.
SEN. PATTERSON: And from that time forward
the war has gone on?
GEN. MACARTHUR: It has been in progress ever
since (7).
Now, why did the American commander
thus receive the request for parley, and why
did he begin the war? Certainly, the incident
of the night before was one that might well have
been dealt with at a friendly conference. The
discharge of the firearms was a mistake, an accident, at the most the act of an individual.
Certainly it was nothing that would justify a




Conquest by Force of Arms


95


war, so that when Otis not only refused Aguinaldo's message but also attacked and killed
thousands of Filipinos in one day, he acted
either with or without orders. When General
Otis made a report of this engagement to the
War Department he said it "was one strictly
defensive on the part of the insurgents and one
of vigorous attack by our forces" (8).
The Constitution of the United States strictly
provides that Congress alone may declare war.
That body certainly had not done so, and no
one familiar with the feeling in the United
States at this time can believe that Congress
would have declared war on their Philippine allies. The Filipinos had done nothing
but help the Americans, and if there were any
of the latter who were hostile to the natives
they were those who, intending to rob the Filipinos of their country, feared that they would
encounter resistance. Only one conclusion is
possible-the bloody war that followed the
attack of February 5 was caused by an act of
usurpation.
It may be going too far to say that the attack
on the Filipino army was ordered by McKinley,
but this much is clear, that he never expressed
any disapproval, and that when in dealing with
the existing hostilities he told the American
people that there would "be no useless parley,"
he made himself a party to the usurpation.




96   Conquest of the Philippines


The reader will no doubt ask,-what was the
significance of this outbreak, what did it accomplish for the President and his administration?
Senator Patterson of Colorado ably described
the situation in these words:
That attack of February 4 and 5 [he said] became
an absolute necessity for the success of the imperialistic marplots at Washington. The treaty was before the Senate. It had been agreed that a vote
upon it should be taken on February 6. It was
known to everyone that there were lacking two votes
of the number required to ratify it. The Filipinos
were praying that its ratification would be defeated,
for then the treaty would be amended so that Spain
would relinquish sovereignty over the Philippines as
it had provided for Cuba. The Filipinos had all to
gain by preserving the status of the armies as it was
before February 6. The imperialists had everything
to gain by precipitating a conflict (9).
This question may also well be asked-why
did General Otis call the Filipinos "insurgents,"
and why was that term constantly employed by
the administration in Washington throughout
the war? On the day when the battle of February 5 was fought the Filipinos were encamped on
grounds assigned to them by the American commanders as their late allies. Following the accidental shooting of two Filipinos by American
sentinels and an unauthorized exchange of shots




Conquest by Force of Arms


97


between the lines the American forces had
launched a "vigorous attack," killing thousands
of men who had resisted in a "strictly defensive"
manner. When this attack was made the treaty
was before the Senate and the United States
had no title whatsoever to the Island. The
Filipinos on the other hand certainly had the
right to live in their own country and to defend
themselves when attacked. Yet the skillful
use of the word "insurrecto" in 1899 and during the years that followed carried an entirely
false impression to the people of the United
States. It was deception, pure and simple.
Of course, this outbreak had to be justified
by the administration in reporting it to the
American people. Three different means of
deception were therefore adopted. The first
was to assert positively that the treacherous
Filipinos were to blame for the outbreak. "The
first blow was struck by the inhabitants," said
Mr. McKinley, "they assailed our sovereignty,
and there will be no useless parley, no pause, until
the insurrection is suppressed and American
authority acknowledged and established" (10).
On another occasion he went on to say, "We
never dreamed that the little body of insurgents
whom we have just emancipated from oppression,-we never for a moment believed that
they would turn upon the flag that had sheltered
them against Spain" (11).




98   Conquest of the Philippines


The second was to draw a veil of secrecy over
the Philippine events and to establish a censorship of the press. How vigorously the censorship was enforced may be easily inferred from
the fact that the staff correspondents of the leading American papers in Manila united in a
statement to the American people.
We believe [they said] that owing to official dispatches from Manila made public in Washington,
the people of the United States have not received a
correct impression of the situation in the Philippines.... The censorship has compelled us to participate in these misrepresentations by excising or
altering uncontroverted statements of fact, on the
plea as General Otis stated, that "they would alarm
the people at home" or "have the people of the
United States by the ears."
Of course, the Manila censor would not permit
such a dispatch to be sent from his office. The
protest was, therefore, sent by mail to Hongkong
and from there cabled to the United States. It
was published in the newspapers of this country on July 17, 1899 (12).
The American correspondent of the Associated Press, Mr. Robert M. Collins, more
graphically described the situation which confronted them.
Recently [he wrote in his letter of July 30, 1899, to
Mr. Melville Stone, General Manager] I filed what I




Conquest by Force of Arms


99


thought was the most inoffensive statement that the
business men who had appeared before the commission had advocated a retention of the existing system
of currency. The censor said, "I ought not to let
that go. That would be a lift for Bryan. My instructions are to shut off everything that could hurt
McKinley's administration" (13).
In this way, therefore, were facts being kept
away, not from the enemy, but from the people
of the United States who were being called
upon to sanction the conquest of the Philippines. In this way truth was suppressed.
The third method was to assert that only a
small fraction of the population was opposed to
American sovereignty.
Well, whom are we fighting [said the Secretary of
War Root]? Are we fighting the Philippine nation?
No! There is none. There are hundreds of islands
inhabited by more than sixty tribes, speaking more
than sixty languages, and all but one ready to accept
American sovereignty (14).
That this statement was also absolutely
unjustified will be shown in the next chapter.
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER VI
1. Statement of Private W. W. Grayson quoted by C. E.
Russell in The Outlook for the Philippines, p. 93.
2. Report: Maj. Gen. Commanding Army, 1899, vol.
i, pt. 4, p. 92.




Ioo  Conquest of the Philippines


3. Sen. Doe., 57th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 351, pt. 2 p.
1396.
4. Elliott, The Philippines, p. 452.
5. James LeRoy, The Americans in the Philippines,
(1914), ii, p. 16.
6. See Statement of General C. McC. Reeve, at that
time Provost Marshall of Manila, Cong. Record,
Jan. 11, 1900; Proceedings of the Senate, p. 770.
7. Sen. Doc., 57th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 331, pt. 2, p.
1356.
8. See Otis Report, 1899, p. 99.
9. Speech before Mass. Reform Club, June 6, 1902.
10. Speech at Pittsburg, Aug. 28, 1899.
11. Speech at Fargo, N. D., Oct. 13, 1899.
12. A copy of this protest may be found in the Review of
Reviews for August, 1899, pp. 137-8. It was signed
by John T. McCutcheon and Harry Armstrong representing the Chicago Record; 0. K. 'Davis and P.
G. MacDonnell, representing the New York Sun;
Robert M. Collins, John P. Dunning and L.
Jones, representing the Associated Press; John
Bass and William Dinwiddie, representing the
New York Herald; E. D. Skeene, representing the
Scripps-McRae Association; and Richard Little,
representing the Chicago Tribune.
13. Cong. Record, vol. xxxiii, Proceedings in the Senate,
Jan. 11, 1900, p. 768.
14. Speech before the Marquette Club of Chicago,O1ct.
7, 1899.




CHAPTER VII


PROGRESS OF THE WAR
THE war went on for years, but the vigor and
ferocity with which it was carried on by the
able commanders of the American army have
unfortunately never been fully comprehended
by the public. This was largely due to the
attempts of those in political office to minimize
the importance of the struggle and to convince
the people at home that the enemy was but a
small fraction of the native population. Bearing in mind the statement of Secretary Root,
therefore, we can appreciate the true progress
of the war as shown by the war records in
Washington. Thus:
On February 10, six days after the firing of
that fatal shot which plunged the nation into
war, General Lawton succeeded in dislodging
an army of 4,000 Filipinos from Caloocan, on
the outskirts of Manila. It was at this point,
too, that General MacArthur came to realize
the stupendous task that lay before his army.
IO0




102  Conquest of the Philippines


When I first started in against these rebels [he said]
I believed that Aguinaldo's troops represented only a
fraction.... I did not like to believe that the
whole population of Luzon... was opposed to us,
but having come thus far, and having been brought
much in contact with both insurgents and amigos, I
have been reluctantly compelled to believe that the
Filipino masses are loyal to Aguinaldo and the government which he leads (1).
The island of Luzon alone at that time had a
population of over three and a half million.
Four hundred miles south of Manila lie the
Visayan Islands, one of the richest groups of
the archipelago. Early in December, 1898,
General Miller in command of an expedition
composed largely of fresh arrivals from San
Francisco had previously sailed for Iloilo, the
largest city of the Visayas. Arriving there and
finding the Filipinos supreme in command, he
had courteously asked them to permit his troops
to land. This request had been refused. Another request had followed on January 1, 1899,
accompanied by a copy of McKinley's Benevolent Proclamation claiming sovereignty over the
archipelago. The Filipinos immediately asked
if the American commander carried instructions
from Aguinaldo, saying that they could do
nothing without orders from their recognized
leader "in cases affecting their Federal Government."




Progress of the War


I03


I have the honor to notify you [said the Filipino
leader in these islands hundreds of miles from
Manila] that, in conjunction with the people, the
army, and the committee, we insist upon our pretentions not to consent... to any foreign interference without express orders from the central government of Luzon (that is, the Government headed by
Aguinaldo)... with which we are one in ideas, as
we have been until now in sacrifices (2).
And with regard to the claim of sovereignty
made by McKinley seven weeks before the
treaty was ratified, this is what the Filipinos in
Iloilo said in another dispatch to General
Miller:
The supposed authority of the United States
began with the treaty of Paris, on the 10th of
December, 1898. The authority of the Central
Government of Malolos (the seat of Aguinaldo's
government) is founded in the sacred and natural
bonds of blood, language, uses, customs, ideas (and)
sacrifices (3).
Here were bits of real eloquence substantiated
by acts coming from Filipinos four hundred
miles south of Manila. Compare these with
Secretary Root's statements about the "sixty
tribes" and "sixty languages" and what conclusion are we forced to draw?
In the face of this stubborn resistance General




I04  Conquest of the Philippines


Miller with his several thousand troops had,
therefore, decided not to land, but instead
picked up anchor and set sail for Manila.
The President's benevolent proclamation in
Iloilo, as well as in Luzon, had thus completely
failed.
Following the outbreak of February 4, however, Miller again returned with his troops, and,
with the assistance of the armed vessels Baltimore and Petrel finally captured the city. Then
followed the occupation of Cebu, the third
largest city of the archipelago.
During the month of March the so-called
"Visayan Military District" was organized and
placed under the command of General Miller.
This district included the southern islands of
Panay, Negros, and Cebu, by far the richest
sugar lands of the archipelago. On the thirtyfirst of the same month, General MacArthur
entered the town of Malolos where, for several
months, Aguinaldo's seat of government had
been located. One month later he succeeded in
driving the main body of Aguinaldo's army from
that vicinity, and the march northward began
in earnest. General Lawton in command of
another army moved on a parallel line thus forming a big wing which captured and swept everything before them. A base for military operations was established also in San Fernando,
forty miles north of Manila (4).




Progress of the War


105


During the summer months that followed
the army of the American expeditionary forces
was replaced largely by fresh recruits. By
October the northern advance was again
launched with greater severity towards the
great plain of Luzon where Aguinaldo was still
supreme. General Lawton with his vastly superior forces again swept everything before him.
Generals Wheaton and MacArthur also followed
in almost parallel lines, and by November 19
the main body of the Filipino army was forced
to scatter. Some managed to return south
where they joined the insurgents of that region.
Aguinaldo himself succeeded in evading the net
and escaped through Wheaton's lines. After
fleeing further northward he sought refuge in the
mountains along the eastern coast (5).
Having accomplished his task, General Lawton turned south in order to break the line of
communication between the northern and southern armies of the Filipinos. He succeeded in
this mission also but sacrificed his life in a battle
just twelve miles from Manila.
The new year 1900 marked the beginning of
a fresh series of campaigns. General Bates
began by launching an aggressive drive in the
province of Cavite, southwest of Manila. In
the following month, February, General Bell
sailed to the southern islands to capture the
provinces of North and South Camarines and




Io6  Conquest of the Philippines


West Albay where the Filipino forces had been
swelled by a number of those defeated in the
north. Similar expeditions were sent to the
Visayan islands and garrisons established everywhere. A total of four hundred different army
posts was the final outcome of this campaign(6).
In June of this same year, General MacArthur, believing that the backbone of the
Philippine army had been broken, recommended
a proclamation of amnesty. This was issued
by the President on the twenty-first, but it
soon became evident that although unable to
fight in the open as an army, the Filipinos were
determined to continue the uneven struggle by
guerrilla warfare.
With Aguinaldo in full retreat, the amazing
thing is that he was not overpowered sooner.
The following account of the defeat of one of
his loyal forces, as reported by American eye
witnesses, may give the reason why.
It was a great fight that was fought away up on
the trail of lonely TilaN Pass on that Saturday morning of December 2. It brought glory to Major
Marsh's battalion of the Thirty-Third volunteer infantry who were the victors. It brought no discredit
to the little band of sixty Filipinos who fought and
died there. Sixty was the number that, at Aguinaldo's orders had come down into the pass that morning to arrest the onward march of the Americans.
Seven were all that went back over the pass that




Progress of the War


107


night to tell Aguinaldo that they had tried and
failed. Fifty-three of them were either killed or
wounded. And among them, the last to retreat, we
found the body of young General Gregorio del Pilar.
We had seen him cheering his men in the fight.
One of our companies crouched up close under the
side of the cliff where he had built his first intrenchment, heard his voice continually during the fight
urging his men to greater effort, scolding them, praising them, cursing, appealing one moment to their
love of their native land and the next instant threatening to kill them himself if they did not stand firm.
Driven from the first intrenchment he fell slowly
back to the second in full sight of our sharpshooters
and under a heavy fire. Not until every man around
him in the second intrenchment was down did he
turn his white horse and ride slowly up the winding
trail. Then we who were below saw an American
squirm his way out to the top of a high flat rock, and
take deliberate aim at the figure on the white horse.
We held our breath, not knowing whether to pray
that the sharpshooter would shoot straight or miss.
Then came the spiteful crack of the Krag rifle and
the man on horseback rolled to the ground, and when
the troops charging up the mountain side reached
him, the boy general of the Filipinos was dead.
We went up on the mountain side. After H company had driven the insurgents out of their second
position and killed Pilar, the other companies had
rushed straight up the trail, and never stopped until
they were far up above the clouds and there was no
longer an insurgent in sight. As we went up the




Io8  Conquest of the Philippines


trail we passed dead Filipino soldiers. We counted
ten in all. Some had been shot several times. We
found bloody trails that led to places on the edge of
the cliffs, where wounded men had either jumped or
fallen off. We passed the second intrenchment high
up on the trail. It was built of heavy rocks well
banked with earth. Just past this a few hundred
yards we saw a solitary figure lying on the road.
The body was almost stripped of clothing, and there
were no marks of rank on the blood-soaked coat.
But the face of the dead man had a look I had never
noticed on the face of other dead men in insurgent
uniform on the field of battle, in the wake of an
American firing line. The features were clear cut
and the forehead high and shapely. I decided the
man must have been an insurgent officer. A soldier
came running down the trail.
"That's old Pilar," he said, "we got the old rascal.
I guess he's sorry he ever went up against the ThirtyThird."
"There ain't no doubt about its being Pilar," rattled on the young soldier. "We got his diary and
letters and all his papers, and Sullivan of our company's got his pants, and Snider's got his shoes, but
he can't wear them because they're too small, and a
sergeant in G. Company got one of his silver spurs,
and a lieutenant got the other, and somebody swiped
the cuff buttons before I got here or I would have
swiped them, and all I got was a stud button and his
collar with blood on it."
So this was the end of Gregorio del Pilar. Only
twenty-two years old he managed to make himself a




Progress of the War


I09


leader of men when he was hardly more than a boy,
and at last had laid down his life for his convictions.
Major Marsh had the diary. In it he had written
under the date of December 2, the day he was killed:
"The General has given me the pick of all the men
that can be spared and ordered me to defend the pass.
I realize what a terrible task is given me. And yet I
feel that this is the most glorious moment of my life.
What I do is done for my beloved country. No
sacrifice can be too great."
A private sitting by the fire was exhibiting a handkerchief. "It's old Pilar's. It'sgot'Dolores Hoses'
on the corner. I guess that was his girl. Well, it's
all over with Gregorio."
"Anyhow," said Private Sullivan, "I got his pants.
He won't need them any more."
The man who had the general's shoes strode
proudly past, refusing with scorn a Mexican dollar
and a pair of shoes taken from one of the private insurgent soldiers. A private sitting on a rock was
examining a golden locket containing a curl of a
woman's hair. "Got the locket off his neck," said
the soldier..
As the main column started on its march for the
summit of the mountain a turn in the trail brought
us again in sight of the insurgent general far down
below us. There had been no time to bury him. Not
even a blanket or a poncho had been thrown over
him.
A crow sat on the dead man's feet. Another
perched on his head. The fog settled down upon us.
We could see the body no longer.




Io Conquest of the Philippines


"We carved not a line and we raised not a stone,
But we left him alone in his glory."
And when Private Sullivan went by in his trousers,
and Snider with his shoes, and the other man who had
the cuff buttons, and the sergeant who had the spur,
and the lieutenant who had the other spur, and the
man that had the handkerchief, and another that had
his shoulder straps, it suddenly occurred to me that
his glory was about all we had left him (7).
In fairness to the sober thought of the Americans, however, it should be stated that the
body of the Filipino general was later rescued
from those who were despoiling it and buried
with full military honors. Over his humble
grave the American soldiers erected a stone
bearing this convincing testimony:
GENERAL GREGORIO DEL PILAR
KILLED
AT THE BATTLE OF TILA. PASS
DECEMBER 2, 1899
COMMANDING AGUINALDO S REAR GUARD
AN OFFICER AND A GENTLEMAN
It was no doubt just such instances of bravery and personal sacrifices that finally led General Lawton to say:
Taking into account the disadvantages they have
to fight against in arms, equipment and military




Progress of the War


III


discipline,-without artillery, short of ammunition,
powder inferior, shells reloaded until they are defective, inferior in every particular of equipment and
supplies,-they are the bravest men I have ever seen.... What we want is to stop this accursed war.... These men are indomitable. At Bacoor
bridge they waited until the Americans had brought
their cannon to within thirty-five yards of their
trenches. Such men have the right to be heard. All
they want is a little justice" (8).
This brief but colorful record of the first
stages of the conquest, and the disastrous defeats of Aguinaldo's army are seldom questioned. But it has often been asked why, seeing that victory over American arms was virtually impossible, the Filipinos should have
persisted in sacrificing their lives and their
fortunes by carrying on such an unequal struggle.
The answer was properly given at that time by
Apolinario Mabini, the intellectual leader of the
revolution, the Alexander Hamilton of that
epoch. He thus expressed the sentiments of his
countrymen:
The Filipinos realize that they cannot expect any
victory over the American forces; they are fighting to
show the American people that they are sufficiently
intelligent to know their rights despite any pretense
to hide these rights with able sophistry...
The Filipinos maintain their fight against the




12  Conquest of the Philippines


American troops, not because of an especial hatred,
but in order to show to the American people that, far
from being indifferent as to their political situation
they know how to sacrifice themselves for a government which assures them their individual liberty
and which governs them in conformity with the
wishes and the needs of the people. They have been
unable to avoid that fight, owing to the fact that they
have been unable to obtain from the American government any kind of formal and clear promise regarding the establishment of such a kind of government (9).
In order to show that the Filipinos were not
by nature of a warring disposition and that
they were anxious to have peace and understanding, Mabini continued thus:
The present condition and state of war deprives
the people of the chance to manifest freely their aspirations; therefore the Filipinos desire most ardently
that the Congress of the United States provide for
some means to listen to them before adopting a
resolution that would mean a definite decision regarding their future...
I confidently hope that when the Americans and
Filipinos have come to know each other better, not
only will the present conflict come to an end but also
future ones will be avoided. The opinion prevailing
among the impartial part of the American nation appears to tend toward adhering to its old traditions
and the spirit of justice and humanity, which con



Progress of the War


I 3


stitute at the present time the sole hope of all upright
Filipinos (10).
In the spring of 1901 finally occurred the most
important incident of the war. This was the
dramatic ruse which culminated in the capture
of Aguinaldo. It will be remembered that ever
since the beginning of the campaign the leadership of Aguinaldo was undisputed. The capture of that great leader, therefore, meant everlasting glory to the American soldier brave
enough to perform such an exploit.
The opportunity to attempt such a deed came
when an officer of General Funston's district in
central Luzon intercepted a messenger from
Aguinaldo bearing dispatches to one of his generals in that locality. The message directed
the Filipino General Lacuna to send some reinforcements to Aguinaldo's camp. Here was
the golden opportunity. Why not impersonate the reinforcements called for? The plan
was submitted to General MacArthur and
adopted by him.
The American commander thereupon secured
a company of Macabebe Filipino scouts for the
purpose. These Macabebe scouts had been
loyal to the Spanish military regime and when
the Americans came they sided with the invader.
They came from a small district in Pampanga
province, the population of which at that time




I 4  Conquest of the Philippines


was a little over 25,000. In every respect
they were pure blooded Filipinos, as later events
proved, and the American commanders took
advantage of this to deceive the wily Aguinaldo.
On March 6th the U. S. Vicksburg slipped
quietly out of Manila Bay bearing the members
of the enterprise. Outside the American commanders of whom there were four, no one had
been told of the nature of the expedition. Once
they were aboard, however, the Macabebes
were told to discard their American uniforms
and made to dress in such fashion as to most
resemble a tired and haggard insurgent command. It was necessary to land over a hundred miles from Aguinaldo's camp, as the
smoke from the vessel might have attracted the
attention of some peasant or insurgent lookout
who would sound the alarm. General Funston's account of the precautions taken in this
expedition offers the most convincing proof
that outside of a few natives, such as the Macabebes who had accepted American sovereignty,
the rest of the native population as late as 1901
were hostile to the United States and loyal to
Aguinaldo.
The party landed at night with all the ship's
lights screened, and the Vicksburg sailed away
immediate!y agreeing to meet them at a nearer
point eleven days later. Thence started the
march through a hostile territory. The




Progress of the War


II5


friendly Macabebes had been carefully drilled
in the part they were to play, and the stories
they were to tell in the villages that they passed.
The story was to the effect that on their march
cross country to join Aguinaldo they had encountered a small party of Americans drawing
maps of the outlying country. A skirmish followed and after killing and wounding some of
them they had succeeded in capturing the five
Americans whom they were now bearing to
Aguinaldo as prisoners of war.
As the party marched through the villages
they were, therefore, received with pride and
honor, the natives never suspecting that they
were feeding and guiding the enemy, a convincing proof that all Filipinos look alike and
do not differ from one another in appearance
any more than a Massachusetts man does from
a New Yorker. General Funston in his account
of this enterprise later took particular painsto
say that the village officials and insurrectionists
whom they encountered were very humane and
courteous to himself and the other four American "prisoners" (11).
When within eight miles of Aguinaldo's camp,
quite exhausted from the long march, the
leader of the Macabebe troop, a certain Hilario
Tal Placido, sent a note in advance to Aguinaldo
saying that he had halted his command at the
beach for a short rest as they were exhausted




116  Conquest of the Philippines


from their long march and very much in need of
food. The message also requested that some be
sent to them. The food came, and Aguinaldo's
capturers were elated to find that the leader
did not suspect the fate that awaited him.
Then came one of the emergencies which
American wit had to encounter. Just as the
final march was about to begin word came from
Aguinaldo that the American prisoners should
be left behind in charge of some of his guards.
This was no doubt a precaution to prevent the
Americans from knowing the exact location of
the insurgent camp. After a hurried whispered
conversation Funston directed the Macabebes
under the command of Placido to go ahead and
leave them behind, but to later send a forged
order from Aguinaldo directing that the "prisoners" be sent up to the camp after all. This
ruse was successfully accomplished also and
Placido finally reached Aguinaldo's presence, the
American "prisoners" lagging a short distance
behind and out of sight. Aguinaldo's neatly
uniformed guard of fifty men presented arms as
Placido entered the insurgent leader's office
and while the Macabebes were nonchalantly
forming a cordon around the guard, Placido
entertained the President with his story of the
march across the country. Then when he saw
that the moment had come he went to the window and by a prearranged signal ordered the




Progress of the War


II7


Macabebes to open fire. So unexpected was the
attack that it succeeded in overpowering the
guards.
Almost immediately after giving the order
Placido, who was a very stout individual, turned
and grabbed Aguinaldo, who weighed one hundred and fifteen pounds, threw him down and
sat on him until General Funston and the rest
of the Americans arrived. After a short rest
the party hurriedly covered the remaining eight
miles to a certain point in the coast where the
Vicksburg had agreed to meet them. The rest
of the trip by water was uneventful and in due
course of time they reached Manila.
Aguinaldo was taken to the Palace to confront General MacArthur without a soul in
Manila knowing about the successful ruse. The
Filipino leader was most graciously treated and
housed by General MacArthur. He was treated
more like a guest than a prisoner of war, although, of course, he was watched night and
day by a commissioned officer. It was most
important that the leader be kept alive for his
influence in quelling the revolution was sorely
needed.
During the three weeks' confinement of the
great leader, therefore, everything was done to
convince him that further resistance was impossible. Everything that the Americans had
done and the attitude they were taking was




II8  Conquest of the Philippines


carefully explained to him, so that he might
realize the inflexibility of America's purpose to
remain in the islands for "the good of the Filipino," whether they liked it or not. The programme explained to him was wittily described
by an Englishwoman when she said that it was a
plan
to have lots of American school teachers at once set
to work to teach the Filipino English and at the same
time keep plenty of American soldiers around to
knock him on the head should he get a notion that
he is ready for self-government before the Americans think he is (12).
A quaint scheme indeed and "one characteristic
of the dauntlessness of American energy" (13).
And so Aguinaldo bowed to the inevitable.
On April 19 he took his oath of allegiance and
at the same time issued a proclamation recommending the abandonment of further resistance. Among other things he said:
The time has come, however, when they (the
Filipinos) find their advance along this path (the
path of their aspiration for freedom) impeded by an
irresistible force.... Enough of blood, enough of
tears and desolation.... By acknowledging and
accepting the Sovereignty of the United States, I believe I am serving thee, my beloved country. May
happiness be thine (14).




Progress of the War


II9


The capture of Aguinaldo, in the estimation
of General MacArthur was "the most momentous single event of the year," inasmuch as he
"was the incarnation of the insurrection" (15).
When the news of his dramatic capture was first
received in Washington, Funston was immediately raised to the rank of Brigadier-General,
a convincing testimony that the Washington
authorities knew Aguinaldo's importance.
Although the surrender of the Filipino leader
was a severe loss to the Filipinos, however, the
war went on in full if not with increasing ferocity. Filipino forces were active in the southern
islands of Mindoro, Samar, Cebu and Bohol.
This condition was deemed sufficient to justify
the establishment of the notorious reconcentration camps, the hideous cruelty of which had
precipitated the Cuban war (16). For the
island of Samar, the Filipinos had to contend
with General "Hell Roaring Jake Smith," so
called because of his methods of conducting
"civilized warfare" (17). We shall make General
Smith's acquaintance later on.
The province of Batangas, not over sixty
miles south of Manila was also seething with
rebellion. The official reports from the army
files tell us graphically what measures were
taken to force the native population to submit to
American arms. General Bell was in charge
of this district. His Circular Order No. 22, to




I20  Conquest of the Philippines


be found in Senate Document 331, 1902, p. 1628,
read as follows:
To combat such a population, it is necessary to
make the state of war as insupportable as possible,
and there is no more efficacious way of accomplishing
this than by keeping the minds of the people in such a
state of anxiety and apprehension that living under such
conditions will soon become unbearable. Little should
be said. The less said the better. Let acts, not words,
convey the intention.
If we compare this official order with President McKinley's benevolent proclamation instructing the military administration to win the
confidence, respect and affection of the Filipinos, the contrast presented is extraordinary
to say the least.
General Bell's Christmas Day product is
even more convincing. His report of December 26, 1901, read as follows:
I am now assembling in the neighborhood of 2,500
men who will be used in columns of about fifty men
each. I take so large a command for the purpose of
thoroughly searching each ravine, valley and mountain peak for insurgents and for food, expecting to
destroy everything I find outside of towns. All ablebodied men will be killed or captured.... These
people need a thrashing to teach them some good common sense; and they should have it for the good of all
concerned.




Progress of the War


121


No official estimate of the number of people
killed by such measures throughout the islands
since the beginning of the war has ever been
made. General J. M. Bell, however, made the
estimate that in Luzon alone one-sixth of the
native population had been wiped out as a consequence of the war (18). Luzon then had a
population of over three and a half million, and
one-sixth of that number meant 600,000 men,
women and children. How many of these were
killed by powder and lead? General Bell himself gave a suggestive answer when he said as a
part of the same statement that:
The loss of life by killing alone has been very great
but I think that not one man has been slain except
where his death served the legitimate purpose of war.
It has been thought necessary to adopt what in other
countries would probably be thought harsh measures.
A Republican Congressman who visited the
islands in 1902 confirmed these estimates in an
interview published in the Boston Transcript of
March 4. Said he:
You never hear of any disturbances in Northern
Luzon; and the secret of its pacification is, in my
opinion, the secret of pacification of the archipelago.
They never rebel in northern Luzon because there
isn't anybody there to rebel. The country was
marched over and cleaned in a most resolute man



122  Conquest of the Philippines


ner. The good Lord in heaven only knows the number of Filipinos that were put under ground. Our
soldiers took no prisoners, they kept no records; they
simply swept the country, and wherever or whenever
they could get hold of a Filipino they killed him.
The women and children were spared, and may now
be noticed in disproportionate numbers in that part
of the island.
The army song of that period vividly typified
the feeling of the soldier towards the Filipino.
Sung to the tune of "Tramp, tramp, tramp,"
the refrain was as follows:
Damn, damn, damn, the Filipino,
Pock-marked kodiac ladrone, (copper colored thief)
Underneath the starry flag
Civilize him with a Krag (rifle)
And return us to our own beloved home (19).
Although no very careful estimate of the total
casualties has been made, it is certain from the
records, official and semi-official, that the Filipinos killed in battle far outnumbered the American losses. Judge Blount's examination of the
available war records showed a ratio of sixteen
Filipinos to every one American killed (20).
Commenting on this disparity in the numbers
killed the famous American historian Latane
adds that it "cannot be attributed to the supe



Progress of the War


123


rior marksmanship of the American soldiers; it
was due rather to the fact that the Filipinos were
in many cases not armed with rifles, and in some
cases perhaps, to the ruthless slaughter of the
wounded" (21).
Considering the fact that the general belief
among the American people was that their presence in the islands was merely for the purpose
of helping the Filipino, it is indeed astounding
to learn how this conquest was being carried
along in their name. But did the administration in Washington cherish a similar purpose?
We would do well to look for light on this
subject.
On page 96, Volume II, of Olcott's Life of
McKinley, which is the standard biography of
that President, there appears a facsimile of a
memorandum written in Mr. McKinley's own
handwriting and recording a conversation which
he had with Admiral Dewey. The piece of
paper used by the President was of the White
House stationery, and it bore the date of October 3, 1899.
"What is our duty?" was one of the President's questions. And as Admiral Dewey
answered, McKinley wrote his memorandum,
as follows:
"Keep the Island permanently. Valuable in
every way."
Then followed questions regarding the num



124  Conquest of the Philippines


ber of troops and ships needed for this permanent occupation.
And as if to assure himself of his position, the
President finally asked:
"Should we give up the Islands?"
And then follows this grim reply:
''Never-never. "
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER VII
1. Statement of MacArthur to an American war correspondent and published in the New York
Criterion of June 17, 1899; subsequently corroborated by MacArthur himself in his testimony
before the Senate in 1902. See Sen. Doc. 311, pt.
2, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1942.
2. War Dept. Report, 1899, vol. i, pt. 4, p. 64.
3. Sen. Doc. 208, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., 1900, pp. 54-5.
4. Sec. War Annual Rep., 1899, I, pt. 4, pp. 115 et seq.
5. See Cong. Rec., 57th Cong., No. 331, 1st Sess., p.
1986, for an account of this flight.
6. Sec. War Annual Rep. 1900, I, pt. 4, p. 560.
7. Dispatch from Richard Henry Little, special correspondent of the Chicago Tribune and published
in the Chicago Tribune of Feb. 4, 1900. Also reprinted in the Lincoln Republican Booklet, p. 14.
8. C. E. Russell, The Outlook for the Philippines, p. 94.
9. M. Kalaw, The Case for the Filipinos, p. 79.
10. Note: Mabini was later captured by the Americans
in Dec., 1899, and deported to Guam for two
years.
11. Funston's article, "Capture of Aguinaldo," in Scribner's Magazine, Nov., 1911.




Progress of the War              125
12. Blount, American Occupation of the Philippines, p.
340.
13. Ibid.
14. For a full copy of this proclamation see War Dept.
Report, 1901, vol. i, pt. 4, p. 100.
15. War Dept. Rep., 1901, vol. i, pt. 4, p. 99.
16. Sen. Doc., 57th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 331, p. 1606.
17. Latane, United States as a World Power, p. 98.
18. Note: Gen. Bell's estimate as it appeared in New York
Times of May 3, 1901; quoted in the U. S. Senate
by Mr. Hoar and never contradicted.
19. Blount, American Occupation of the Philippines, p.
270.
20. See Blount's Estimate, p. 241.
21. Latane, United States as a World Power, p. 97.




CHAPTER VIII


CONDUCT OF THE WAR
A WAR of conquest under tropical skies if carried
on with scrupulous regard for the rules of civilized warfare should not differ from any other
struggle, no matter how bitterly contested.
Examination of the casualties in the fiercest
struggles of the nineteenth century, for example,
show always a striking similarity between the
proportion of men killed and the men wounded
on the field of battle. Generally this ratio is
six to one, or at least five to one, that is to say,
for every one man killed in battle five or six
victims are wounded.
Thus, for example, in the great Boer War
this ratio is substantially borne out. At the
battle of Magersfontein there were killed, 171;
wounded 691; at Colenso, killed 50; wounded
847. In all the battles waged in British East
Africa from October, 1899, to June, 1900, killed
2518; wounded 11,405 (1).
If we go back a few years and examine the
126




Conduct of the War


127


greatest battles of the Civil War, the ratio is
even more accurately shown. Thus, at Antietam where the Federal forces attacked, there
were killed 2,010; wounded 9,416; at Fredericksburg where the attack was made under a withering fire of rifle and cannon, killed 1,180; wounded
9,028; at the three day battle of Gettysburg,
killed 2,834; wounded 13,709; at Cold Harbor
where the carnage was frightful, killed 1,905
wounded 10,570 2).
Thus it is seen that in no war where the usages
of civilized warfare have been respected has the
number of killed approached the number of
wounded more nearly than in these figures.
The proportion as shown remains constantabout five wounded to one killed.
Turn now to the Philippine campaign where
the aim of the military administration was to
be one which would "win the confidence, respect
and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines (3). What do the official war records
show? Almost the reverse, that is to say that
for every Filipino wounded in battle, five were
killed. Thus, in northern Luzon whose people,
said Secretary of War Root, "received us
(United States) with open arms," the official
records show that 1,014 Filipinos were killed
and only 95 wounded (4). Losses by guerrilla
warfare in southern Luzon are almost as convincing. There were, from November 1, 1899,




128  Conquest of the Philippines


to September 1, 1900, 3,227 killed and only 694
wounded. About 2,800 surrendered during this
period.
What do these comparative figures of killed
and wounded mean? How may they be accounted for? General MacArthur attempted to
give an explanation at the time. He said it
arose "from the fact that our soldiers are
trained in what we call 'fire discipline,' that is,
target practice. In other words, they know
how to shoot." (5) But with the same breath
he freely admits that "the Boer is the best
individual marksman in the world." (6)
Is it to be believed that the best marksmen in
the world, opposed to English soldiers who
notoriously fought in the open, killed only one
in four of the men they hit, whereas the Americans in numerous skirmishes killed every man
they hit, and on an average nearly five out of
six? The absurdity of such an explanation is
heightened by the report of the Inspector-General
of the Division, Colonel Garlington, who during
the campaign testified that:
Target practice has been, from the necessities of
the case, almost entirely neglected. This important
part of the modern soldier's education should receive
prompt attention, and be vigorously prosecuted. At
present the army is largely composed of new men
without practice or skill in shooting (7).




Conduct of the War


129


What then is the real explanation? It is
found in the statements from the Americans
engaged in the contest, officers as well as soldiers. These signed statements were published
in the newspapers of America and they all
severely indicated the brutality with which the
war was being conducted.
Among the first descriptions to reach this
country was that from L. F. Adams of Ozark,
Missouri. Referring to the first battle of the
war, that of February 5, he said:
In the path of the Washington regiment and Battery D of the Sixth Artillery there were 1,008 dead
niggers and a great many wounded. We burned
all their houses. I don't know how many men,
women and children the Tennessee boys did kill.
They would not take any prisoners.
More reliable testimony is furnished by the
American war correspondents stationed in the
islands. It will be remembered that these men
had previously joined in a protest denouncing
the censorship of Manila dispatches. The General Manager of the Associated Press ordered
an investigation and the reply from one of the
correspondents, Robert M. Collins, contained a
statement of a conversation held between General Otis and the protesting correspondents
en masse. The following is but a sample of it.
Said Mr. Collins:




13o  Conquest of the Philippines


In that connection we reminded him that the
stories of looting in soldiers' letters home had been
little, if any exaggerated. Davis and Bass told him
they had personally seen our soldiers bayonetting
the wounded, and I reminded him that the cutting
off of ears of two American soldiers at Damariscotta
had been merely retaliation for similar mutilations of
(lead Filipinos by the Americans.
(No one could possibly tell stronger stories of the
looting and blackmailing by our soldiers than Otis
has told although he charges it all to the volunteers.)
There has been according to Otis himself, and the
personal knowledge of everyone here, a perfect orgy
of looting and wanton destruction of property and
most outrageous blackmailing of the natives and
Chinamen in Manila, and various incidents like the
shooting down of several Filipinos for attempting to
run from arrest at a cock fight.
Here was then a statement by well-known
correspondents. It was no anonymous slander. The witnesses were ready. Now was the
time to investigate, to punish the offenders and
to institute a reform. But what was done?
Nothing so far as the public records show.
The first investigations which finally resulted
from the innumerable letters coming from the
soldiers themselves, was the case of Charles
Brenner, a private in a Kansas regiment. Speaking of the battle of Caloocan, he wrote to his
mother:




Conduct of the War


I3I


Company I had taken a few prisoners and stopped.
The colonel ordered them up into line time after
time, and finally sent Captain Bishop back to start
them. Then occurred the hardest sight I ever saw.
They had four prisoners and didn't know what to do
with them. They asked Captain Bishop what to do;
and he said, "You know the orders," and four natives
fell dead (8).
What did the military authorities do about
this accusation as shown by the official records?
On June 10, 1899, or four months after the
statement was made, Brenner's letter was
referred by General MacArthur's order to the
inspector general of the division for investigation. What did this investigation show? It
showed the testimony of several other witnesses
that Captain Bishop had admitted giving the
orders, that several others had heard the order
given by some one, while one witness (Private
Putnam) testified that he with others, had done
the shooting. Captain Flanders testified that
he ordered the prisoners to the rear, and heard
some one give the order to shoot them.   A
lieutenant heard some one say (he thought at
the time it was Captain Bishop) "Kill them!
damn it, kill them!" Another witness testified
that on the day of the battle, "word was passed
along the line that orders were to take no
prisoners" (9).
Now at least, an investigation had been made




I32  Conquest of the Philippines


and the facts found as a result of it were then
reported to the highest authority in the Islands.
This investigation conclusively showed at least
three things:
1. That a crime had been committed-i.e., the
killing of the prisoners.
2. That Private Putnam admitted having done
the shooting itself but said that he had
done it in obedience to the orders from
his superior officer, Captain Bishop.
3. That the remaining evidence incriminating
Bishop was very strong.
Arraigned against all this was Bishop's denial,
in the form of a written statement, that he had
given such orders.
What steps were taken to punish the guilty
parties? This much was done. General Otis
believing Captain Bishop's denial at once recommended that young Brenner, whose letter had
brought about the investigation be court-martialled "for writing and conniving at the publication of the article which brought about this
investigation" containing a false charge against
Captain Bishop (10). In other words, Otis proposed to punish the soldier whose statement led
to the discovery that a crime had in fact been
committed, instead of finding and punishing the
criminal.
Nor was this all. Otis further recommended




Conduct of the War


I33


that Private Putnam, the man who had admitted
that he shot the prisoners, be tried also by court
martial, thus urging the punishment of a private
for obeying orders but letting the man who gave
them go free.
But if Otis had been so tactless in his acts,
he was after all saved from the folly of what
he proposed to do. The Judge Advocate,
Lieut. Col. E. H. Crowder, to whom these
recommendations were sent, knew better than
to follow them up. He therefore wrote to Otis
on July 3, 1899, urging that the matter be
dropped, saying:
I am not convinced from a careful reading of this
report that Private Brenner has made a false charge
against Captain Bishop. It is certain that the evidence is far from conclusive that he did so.
Nor would the Judge Advocate prosecute
Private Putnam for slaying the prisoners because, he said, Putnam's defense "would be
the lawful order of his superior officer." "If
put on trial," added the Judge Advocate, "it is
probable that facts would develop implicating
many others." Hence followed his advice to
this effect, "I doubt the propriety of this trial,
and am of the opinion that considerations of
public policy sufficiently grave to silence every
other demand require that no further action be
taken in this case" (11).




134  Conquest of the Philippines


This recommendation was acted upon by
Otis. The War Department in Washington
followed Otis' advice and the record stands showing that the highest authorities declined to punish proven acts of barbarity not because the
guilt of the accused was in doubt but because it
was probable "that facts would develop implicating many others"; not because there was no
reason, but because there was too much reason.
Nay, the Commander-in-Chief had even actually proposed to punish the witness (Brenner)
who had made the crime known, and let the
criminal go free. Is it not also probable that
this latter mark of severity against the unfortunate Brenner made itself felt throughout the
army, and that the word was passed along the
ranks, "Whatever you see, it is not safe to
tell!" The strange thing is that soldiers did
continue to tell with increasing frequency.
During this sad episode of the conquest, however, there were some convictions of both enlisted men as well as officers. Rule No. 44 of
General Order 100 strictly provides that
all wanton violence committed against persons in the
invaded country; all destruction of property not
commanded by the authorized officer; all robbery, all
pillage or sacking even after taking a place by main
force; all rape, wounding, maiming, or killing of such
inhabitants,-are prohibited under penalty of death




Conduct of the War


I35


or such other severe punishment, as may seem adequate for the gravity of the offense.
If the guilty party is an officer, his punishment
should naturally be as severe as the military law
permits, for misconduct by one in authority is
more pernicious and harmful. The Secretary of
War's own memorandum of February 17, 1901,
therefore, will be taken and examined (19).
This choice list compiled and made accessible
to the public showing the trials of forty-four
men, ten of whom were officers, opens to us only
so much of the proceedings as the Secretary
permits us to see. What does it show?
Of these ten officers, one was tried and convicted for "firing into town and looting." Under
General Order No. 100 Rule 44, such an offense
is generally punishable by death. But in this
case the officer was sentenced to-a reprimand.
The second officer, Lieut. Bissell Thomas, of
the 35th Volunteer Infantry, was convicted for
assaulting prisoners and cruelty. The Court
furthermore said that the accused's acts were
"very severe and amounted almost to acute torture" and that they "cannot be too much deplored nor too emphatically denounced." He
was sentenced to a "reprimand" and a fine of
three hundred dollars.
The third officer was convicted of "looting
and encouraging the same," and the fourth of




136  Conquest of the Philippines


"permitting looting." Both were sentenced to
-a reprimand.
The next two officers were convicted of "torture by causing natives to be hung by the neck
for ten seconds."  The culprits here were a
Lieutenant Perkins and a Captain Brandle. In
Brandle's case (13) the Court found as a fact
that he did hang two Filipinos by the neck for
ten seconds each on May 26, 1900. Disliking
the word "torture," however, the Court substituted the words "inflict mental anguish upon,"
as if hanging by the neck were physically delightful. Here was an absolute case of torture found
as a fact, yet when the time came for the sentence his brother officers sentenced him to-a
reprimand. Which shows how little indignation was felt by the other officers of the army.
The case of Lieutenant Perkins was very similar. He too was found guilty of hanging two
natives by the neck in the same fashion. But
the military court not only changed the accusation of "torture" to "mental anguish," but also
imposed a sentence of "a reprimand."
The last conviction was that of First Lieutenant Brown of the 2d Infantry who was found
guilty of "killing a prisoner of war." This was
clearly a plain case of murder, but the sentence
meted was dismissal from the service and imprisonment for five years. This punishment
looks severe in the light of the others, but the




Conduct of the War


I37


record of the case does not stop here, for on
January 27, 1902, this sentence was commuted
to a loss of thirty-five places in the army list
and the forfeiture of one-half pay for nine months.
Outside of that the accused was permitted to
regain his position in the army.
The remaining three officers tried were acquitted.
Here then were seven convictions of officers
standing high in the records of the army, convictions of looting, torture and murder. Here
were crimes justly punishable by death in ordinary cases, and yet under tropical skies they
resulted in five reprimands, one fine and a
reprimand, and one loss of numbers and half
pay for a few months. What did this record
say to the rest of the army,-what effect could
it have produced in checking similar offenses
during the campaigning?
This comedy of errors is magnified when we
consider the military orders current at that
time. On March 19, 1899, no less a personage
than General Otis himself, having found it
necessary to give more explicit orders for the
conduct of his army, issued the following
warning:
Commanding generals of divisions will make renewed efforts to impress upon the troops of their
commands the necessity of exercising the greatest




138  Conquest of the Philippines


vigilance to insure the protection of private property,
not only in this city, but wherever they may be
quartered or acting.... The burning or looting
of houses or buildings of any description or the abuse
of unarmed citizens will be punished with the utmost
severity known to military law (14).
These were indeed strong words,-on paper.
For the specific cases we have just touched show
that when a few months afterwards Lieutenant
Capp fired and looted a town he received "a
reprimand," (15) while Lieutenant Ellison
"for looting and encouraging looting" also
received the same punishment (16). "The utmost severity known to military law," indeed!
From the latter part of 1900 until 1902 no
other officer seems to have been convicted,in fact only one was tried and he for having
improper relations with native women. On
April 15, 1902, however, we find an order for
the court martial of General Smith. Here was
a sensational case surely. What do the records show?
General Smith had been in charge of subduing
the island of Samar and his first step had been
to install a system of reconcentration. For the
benefit of those unfamiliar with this drastic
term, it should be explained that reconcentration
(as practised by Weyler in Cuba and the American commanders in the Philippines) means the




Conduct of the War


I39


establishment of a certain prescribed zone or
place where the people of a district may be
herded together. The establishment of this
zone is announced by proclamation or otherwise some days in advance and all persons must
leave their homes and come within this area,
there to remain until further orders. All persons found outside that zone are then treated as
public enemies.
Such a method of putting down a rebellion is
naturally attended with great hardships. Crops
are left to ruin, homes are deserted, and the
peaceful as well as the active suffer alike. It
was the establishment of such camps in Cuba
with the attendant horrors that finally led to
the Spanish American War. How the practice of reconcentration affected McKinley when
the Spaniards practised it in Cuba, may be expressed in his own words:
It was not civilized warfare [he told Congress], but
a new and inhuman phase happily unprecedented
in the modern history of civilized Christian people.... It was extermination. The only peace it
could beget was that of the wilderness and the grave.
"The steps of the White House are slippery
with the blood of the reconcentrados," said
Roosevelt. And yet in the Philippines, however, three years after the Filipino-American




140  Conquest of the Philippines


war was begun and a year after civil government was supposed to be established under the
just administration of Governor Taft, and no
person supposed to be deprived of "life, liberty
or property without due process of law," reconcentration camps began to flourish.
But General Smith was not tried for establishing these camps, for they were also used in
other provinces of the archipelago. In fact, as
late as June 1, 1903, the civil government in
Manila, headed by Mr. Taft, passed a law
permitting the establishment of such camps (17).
Smith's difficulties instead came about as a
result of the method by which he enforced
obedience to these orders.
It happened that on November 4, 1901, the
Manila Times, an American daily, gave an
account of the progress of the military arm in
Samar, which then had a population of 250,000.
It stated that General Smith had been in that
little island for ten days and that his strong
policy was already making itself felt. To
continue,
He had already ordered all natives to present
themselves in certain of the coast towns saying that
those who were found outside would be shot and no
questions asked. The time limit had expired...
and General Smith was as good as his word. The
policy of reconcentration is said to be the most effec



Conduct of the War


I4I


tive thing of the kind ever seen under any flag. All
suspects including Spaniards and half-breeds were
rounded up in big stockades and kept under guard.
This news item was published in Manila.
Surely, it must have come to the attention of
General Chaffee or the War Department at the
time. But were any steps taken to investigate or to stay the hand of General Smith?
None. Nothing was done until February 4,
of the following year, 1902, when this statement was brought to the attention of the United
States Senate as a result of a petition signed
by ex-Senator Edmunds, S. L. Clemens (Mark
Twain), some thirty-six professors of the University of Chicago and many other notables in
private life. These gentlemen asked that the
matter be investigated and that such practices,
be stopped. Surely the Secretary of War could
not plead ignorance to this demand from responsible citizens. But did he take any positive
action to investigate or to stop these practices?
So far as the record shows, none! The order to
try General Smith by court martial was not
given till April 15.
The real gravity of the Smith offense would
apparently seem to be worse than that pictured in the newspaper item. To quote from
Secretary Root's letter to the President on
July 12, he stated that Smith had given




142  Conquest of the Philippines


the following oral instructions:
"I want no prisoners. I wish you to kill and burn:
the more you kill and burn the better you will please
me," and further, that he wanted all persons killed
who were capable of bearing arms and in actual
hostilities against the United States, and did in reply
to a question by Major Waller asking for an age
limit, designate the limit as ten years of age.
It will be observed that in this accusation
by the Secretary, which is grave enough on its
face, the Secretary interpolated the words,
"in actual hostilities against the United States,"
after the phrase "capable of bearing arms."
But the dispatches which came from Manila in
the course of the trial which were never questioned clearly refute that mitigating phrase.
For General Smith's counsel was quoted as
saying,
General Smith did give instructions to Major
Waller to "kill and burn" and "make Samar a
howling wilderness," and he admits that he wanted
everybody killed capable of bearing arms, and that he
did specify all over ten years of age, as the Samar
boys of that age were equally as dangerous as their
elders.
The accused bore his trial like a man. He
admitted giving the orders. He did not seek to
excuse them on the ground that his words were




Conduct of the War


I43


reckless talk,-on the contrary, he sought to
justify them. On the solitary question, therefore, of whether or no he had given the order the
reviewing officers of high rank found him guilty
and sentenced him "to be admonished."
Even the Boston Transcript, one of the
strongest supporters of the Washington administration, could not refrain from saying that
this sentence was "the very lightest penalty
that could be awarded for such an offence
against humanity and the laws of war," adding
that had the President done no more "the proceedings of the court martial would have been
about aS effective as firing a blank cartridge
against an armed enemy."
The representatives of the army upon the court
martial were, however, satisfied with this blank
cartridge.
When these results were transmitted to the
Secretary of War, surely there was an opportunity for him to show manly indignation at
General Smith's inhuman order. But instead
of that he sought to justify the leniency of the
court on the ground that Smith did not really
mean what he said and that his subordinates
so understood it. This might conceivably sound
probable having come from a man like Mr. Root
were we not confronted with official reports from
Smith's subordinates in the course of the campaign showing how they really interpreted the




144  Conquest of the Philippines


command of their superior officer. Said Major
Waller on November 23, 1901 (18):
On the march to Liruan the second column, fifty
men, under Captain Bears, in accordance with my
orders, destroyed all villages and houses, burning in
all one hundred and sixty-five.... I wish to go
southward a little, destroying all houses and crops,
and, if possible, get the rifles from Balangiga. This
plan has been explained to the General (Smith), meeting
his approval (19).
This, when viewed in the light of a subsequent
endorsement by General Smith himself to the
effect that the aforementioned Major Waller
"carries out my wishes loyally and gallantly,"
and recommending that he be awarded another
brevet, speaks for itself.
Fire and looting, killing to exterminate, refusal
to take prisoners of war,-there are some of the
outrages we have found from such official records as are opened to us. What else do we find
from other independent and official sources?
The Weir charges are the first to attract attention among the many available.
On the tenth of April, 1901, Andrew K. Weir,
a private in the Fourth Cavalry, wrote a letter to
his uncle, charging Lieutenant Frederick Arnold
and Sergeant Edwards of his regiment with
outrageous cruelty to a Filipino prisoner who
was stripped naked, given the water torture in




Conduct of the War


145


the most revolting manner, whipped and beaten
unmercifully while he was down, kicked, strung
up by the thumbs and then his ankles tied and
his feet jerked from under him. Young Weir
was an eye witness of this cruelty and complained to Lieutenant Arnold, who told him:
When I give a man to Sergeant Edwards, I want
information. I do not know how he gets it; but he
gets it anyway.
Weir also charged Arnold with cutting a
strip from the man's ankle, attaching it to a
piece of wood, and then coiling the flesh up his
shin bone; with having an old man held under
water until he was unconscious; with tying several times a man to a saddled horse with a few
feet of slack, and then making the rider gallop,
dragging the victim if he could not keep up.
For all these charges, Weir said that he had
witnesses.
These serious charges were eventually brought
to the attention of the War Department. The
matter was thereupon referred for investigation
to the inspector general of Northern Luzon.
This officer, Captain P. W. West of the Fifth
Infantry, subsequently turned in his findings
on August 27, 1901, reporting a mass of testimony proving that Weir's charges were true. 
The inspector general also added:




146  Conquest of the Philippines


I believe that a thorough investigation into this
matter will substantiate the charges made by Private
Weir, that prisoners were treated in a cruel and
harsh manner, and that Lieutenant Arnold winked
at this treatment.
Here certainly was an instance where the
preliminary reports of an army investigator
largely substantiated the charges. But although
this report was sent to the Secretary of War on
August 27, 1901, he omitted to send it along with
his other reports to the Senate on February 17,
1902. The matter would probably have been
entirely ignored had not Senator Culberson
introduced a resolution asking for these papers.
Senator Lodge came to the rescue of the administration, however, by expressing his wish to find
out whether a court martial had been ordered.
A few days later Secretary Root answered by
saying that a court martial had been ordered
for Edwards, the sergeant, but not for Arnold,
the Lieutenant, but neither he nor anyone else
friendly to the administration offered to say
when this was done. The only inference that
can be drawn is that no court martial had been
ordered until Senator Culberson's motion forced
them to do so.
The most unfortunate result of these hideous
crimes and the laxity of the discipline with
which they were combatted, was the moral




Conduct of the War


I47


effect it had on the American soldiers, failing
as it did to check the progress of such inhuman
acts under tropical skies. Take the water cure,
for example, which was widely used in order
to force the native prisoner to divulge information.
An extract in the New York Evening Post of
April 8, 1902, describes this method of conducting war most vividly as in distinct violation
of the Articles of War.
Says the letter:
But the water cure! If the tortures I've mentioned are hellish, the water cure is plain hell. The
native is thrown upon the ground, and, while his
legs and arms are pinned, his head is raised partially so as to make pouring in the water an easier
matter. An attempt to keep the mouth closed is of
no avail; a bamboo stick or a pinching of the nose
will produce the same effect. And now the water is
poured in, and swallow the poor wretch must or
strangle. A gallon of water is much but it is followed by a second and a third. By this time the
victim is certain his body is about to burst. But he
is mistaken, for a fourth and even a fifth gallon are
poured in. By this time the body becomes an object frightful to contemplate. While in this condition, speech is impossible, and so the water must be
squeezed out of him. This is sometimes allowed to
occur naturally, but it is sometimes hastened by
pressure, and "sometimes we jump on them to get




148  Conquest of the Philippines


it out quick," said a young soldier to me with a smile
-a young soldier, a mere boy hardly ten years out
of his mother's lap.... Does it seem possible
that cruelty could further go? And what must we
think of the fortitude of the native when we learn
that many times the "cure" is twice given ere the
native yields? I heard of one who took it three
times and died.
How often does it happen? is a natural question.
No one knows. A sergeant told me he had seen it
taken by between two and three hundred, by as
many as twenty sometimes in a day. Another had
seen eighty. An officer saw four, but knew of its
happening two hundred times.
Another phase of the subject merits our attention,-the effect upon the American. The unconcerned way in which the soldiers and civilians speak
of the water cure, the exulting way in most cases,
is the saddest phase of all... These things are
not lovely, but they are true.
Indeed, what more evidence of this is needed
than that even an army judge advocate like
Captain Glenn ordered such a water cure and,
on being court-martialed and found guilty, was
sentenced to pay a fine of fifty dollars, which is
one half the fine that may be imposed for spitting
on a public street car in Boston!
All these charges and convictions, all these
reliable accusations, as well as the official copies
of the orders given by General Bell in Batangas




Conduct of the War


I49


and General Smith in Samar directing that the
war be conducted in the most rigorous manner
possible were known to the Secretary of War.
And yet, as if to calm the public conscience
which was beginning to hear the cries of agony
from the unfortunate victims of military conquest, the Secretary of War issued an official
statement on February 17, 1902, to the effect
that:
The war in the Philippines has been conducted by
the American army with scrupulous regard for the
rules of civilized warfare, with careful and genuine
consideration for the prisoner and the non-combatant, with self-restraint, and with humanity never
surpassed.
Nor was that all. Two months later in his
speech at Arlington on Decoration Day, the
President himself said:
Determined and unswerving effort must be made to
find out every instance of barbarity on the part of
our troops, to punish those guilty of it, and to take,
if possible, even stronger measures than have already been taken to minimize or prevent the occurrence of all such instances in the future.
What must we think of these words?
Here, then, were two statements carefully
and deliberately planned. Coming as they




150  Conquest of the Philippines


did from two of the most responsible administrators of the nation, the statements circulated
widely and served to restrain other indignant
citizens from making fruitless protests. The
masses throughout the country also took these
statements at their face value for it was easy to
believe ill of one's enemies and well of one's
kin. But even such records only as the administration chose to open to us and the censored
dispatches from Manila tell an entirely different
story.
And now to view the product of American
conquest, quietly and with sobriety. The sudden "imperialistic impulse of 1898-1900," as
Viscount Bryce aptly called it, had come to an
end (20). What had it achieved? What was
the future? What was to be done with the
Philippines?
No one better than Senator Hoar realized
the true import of the situation. The following retrospect, perhaps, gives the most illuminating view of the problem. Said Mr. Hoar
to the imperialist members of the Senate
Chamber:
When Aguinaldo said he did not want war to go
on, and that it went on against his wish, he was told
by our General that he would not parley with him
without total submission. My friend from Wisconsin declared in the Senate that we would have no talk




Conduct of the War


I51


with men with arms in their hands, whether we were
right or wrong. The responsibility of everything
that has happened since, which he must have foreseen if he knew something of history and human
nature, rests upon him and the men who acted with
him.
We cannot get rid of this one fact, we cannot escape it
and we cannot flinch it. You chose war instead of
peace. You chose force instead of conciliation, with
full notice that everything that has happened since
would happen as a consequence of your decision.
Had you made a declaration to Aguinaldo that you
would respect their title to independence, and that
all you desired was order and to fulfil the treaty and
to protect your friends, you would have disarmed
that people in a moment...
Instead of that, gentlemen talked of the wealth of
the Philippine Islands, and about the advantage to
our trade. They sought to dazzle our eyes with
nuggets of other men's gold. Senators declared in
the Senate Chamber and on the hustings that the
flag never should be hauled down in the Philippine
Islands, and those of you who thought otherwise
kept silent and entered no disclaimer.... What
your fathers said when they founded the republic;
the Declaration of Independence; the great leaders
of every generation; our century of glorious history,
were appealed to in vain. Their lessons fell upon
the ears of men dazzled by military glory and delirious with the lust of conquest. I will not repeat
them now. My desire is simply to call attention to
the practical working of the two doctrines-the doc



I52  Conquest of the Philippines


trine of buying sovereignty or conquering it in battle,
and the doctrine of the Declaration of Independence.
For the last three years you have put one of them
in force in Cuba and the other in the Philippine
Islands. I ask you to think soberly which method,
on the whole, you like better. I ask you to compare
the cost of war with the cost of peace, of justice with
that of injustice, the cost of empire with the cost of
republican liberty.... You have tried both, I
hope, to your hearts' content.
Gentlemen talk about sentimentalities, about
idealism. They like practical statesmanship better.
But, Mr. President, this whole debate for the last
four years has been a debate between two kinds of
sentimentality...
You, my imperialistic friends, have had your ideals
and sentimentalities. One is that the flag shall never
be hauled down where it has once floated. Another
is that you will not talk or reason with a people with
arms in their hands. Another is that sovereignty
over an unwilling people may be bought with gold.
And another is that sovereignty may be got by force
of arms, as the booty of battle or spoils of victory.
What has been the practical statesmanship, which
comes from your ideals and sentimentalities? You
have wasted six hundred millions of treasure. You
have sacrificed nearly ten thousand American lives,
the flower of our youth. You have devastated
provinces. You have slain uncounted thousands of
the people you desire to benefit. You have established reconcentration camps. Your generals are
coming home from their harvest, bringing their




Conduct of the War


153


sheaves with them, in the shape of other thousands of
sick and wounded and insane to drag out miserable
lives, wrecked in body and mind. You make the
American flag in the eyes of a numerous people the
emblem of sacrilege in Christian churches, and of
the burning of human dwellings, and of the horror of
the water torture..
Your practical statesmanship [added Mr. Hoar]
has succeeded in converting a people who three years
ago were ready to kiss the hem of the garment of the
American and to welcome him as a liberator, who
thronged after your men after they landed on those
islands with benediction and gratitude, into sullen
and irreconcilable enemies, possessed of a hatred
which centuries cannot eradicate.
And then came this prophecy of the future:
This war, if you call it war, has gone on for three
years. It will go on in some form for three hundred
years, unless this policy is abandoned. You will undoubtedly have times of peace and quiet, or pretended submission. You will buy men with titles or
officers or salaries. You will intimidate cowards.
You will get pretended and fawning submission.
The land will smile and smile and seem at peace.
But the volcano will be there. The lava will break
out again. You can never settle this thing until you
settle it right (21).
Men and women of today may ask on reading
these pages, "Why revive these nemories that




154  Conquest of the Philippines


we would fain obliterate? Why add fuel to the
feeling of hostility which the Filipinos may have
against us today?" The answer is because no
American today can deal with the Philippine
problem as it now stands without knowing also
the history of the conquest, for what American
representatives have done in the past may be
done again. It is because with all this history
behind him, the President of the United States
still asserts that the islands came to us "unsought."
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER VIII
Note: The facts related in this chapter have been
largely collected from the hearings held before a
Senate Committee in 1902 in response to a Senate
Resolution to investigate the affairs relating to
the Philippines. Senator Lodge, friend of the
administration, was made chairman of this committee and the record which was presented before
it has been recorded in three volumes covering
over 3000 pages. (Sep. Doe., 57th Cong., 1st
Sess., No. 331, pts. 1-3.) References to this
record, which the American historian, Latane,
calls "a most humiliating one," are cited as
"Evidence." Italicized statements are the author's.
1. Capt. J. P. Wisser, U. S. A.-The Second Boer War,
see Appendix.
2. Campaigns of the Civil War, Statistical Record, p.
213.




Conduct of the War                I55
3. McKinley's Instructions to Secretary of War, Dec.
21, 1898.
4. Report of I,ieut. Gen. Commnanding army, 1900, pt.
3, p. 232, for months of April, May, June and
July, 1900.
5. Evidence, p. 894
6. Ibid., p. 897.
7. Report, War Dept., June 30, 1901, p. 143.
8. Evidence, p. 1429.
9. Ibid., p. 1432.
10. Ibid., p. 1420.
11. Ibid., p. 1447,.
12. Sen. Doc. 205, pt. 1, p. 42.
13. Evidence, p. 2108.
14. Sen. Doc. 205, pt. 1, p. 37.
15. Ibid., p. 42.
16. Ibid., p. 42.
17. Act 781, Sect. 6, Philippine Commission.
18. Evidence, p. 1603.
19. Ibid., p. 1605.
20. American Commonwealth, p. 579.
21. From a Speech in the Senate, May 22, 1902.




CHAPTER IX


THE CAMPAIGN OF 1900
A FAIR estimate of the strained relations existing between Filipino and American in 1900 is
easily gathered from the account of what had
gone before. On the part of the Filipinos it
may safely be said that there was never any
faltering, any concealment of what they wanted.
They knew what they were struggling for, and
at all times and places, by proclamation, by
acts, and otherwise, they had made it plain that
independence was the goal to attain which they
had pledged their lives, their fortunes and their
sacred honor (1).
The policy of the Washington administration,
on the other hand, had been so vague and so
evasively expressed that the public itself did
not know what it was. Those officials who had
been most solicitous with regard to the welfare of the Filipinos and the benevolent aims
of the American people were the first to combat
any attempt to express by Congressional action
what these purposes were to be.
In deference to the state of American public
156




The Campaign of I900


157


opinion, therefore, and in preparation for the
coming presidential elections of 1900, Mr.
McKinley sent two commissions to the islands.
One went early in 1899 and arrived there only
to find that the war of conquest was on. The
second commission headed by Mr. Taft arrived
a year later, while the American forces were still
giving Aguinaldo a chase through the mountain
fastnesses of Luzon. This commission was
charged with the duty of laboring for the peace
and prosperity of the Islands, "in the firm hope
that through their labors all the inhabitants of
the Philippine Islands may come to look back
with gratitude to the day when God gave victory to American arms at Manila."
Both of these commissions were appointed by
the President, without asking Congress to
authorize either, to define its duties or to fix
the commissioners' salaries. They were, therefore, the representatives of Mr. McKinley,
responsible to him, and paid out of the public
funds as he saw fit. This has been the sad
feature of this phase of the Philippine venture.
The commissions went to the Islands, not for the
purpose of reviewing the findings of the Paris
Peace Commission and thus righting any wrongs
that had been committed, but to represent
President McKinley who in the approaching
elections was definitely committed to the justice
of the policy which had taken the Islands




158  Conquest of the Philippines


for the benevolent purposes so vaguely expressed
two years before.
This policy of President McKinley was based
on the assumption that Filipinos were unfit for
self-government. It was a pity, therefore, that
such an able person as Mr. Taft should have
come, not to decide on the Filipino's capacity
for independence, but rather as an advocate of
the President. "Well, we are in it, and now
we must do the best we can." Of all stages in
this long conquest of the Islands, this has been
the most deplorable, for all dealings with the
Filipinos have been based on the proposition
that they are unfit to take care of themselves.
Consequently all measures of self-government
granted to them by an altruistic Congress are
mere "privileges," and so become a standing
affront to the intelligence of the native. And
the more power and latitude given to the Filipinos to assert themselves, the more dissatisfaction is there bound to occur in their dealings
with a sovereign power which assumes to make
such grants on the grounds of benevolence alone.
As an American observer has aptly put it,
government and governed thus get wider apart as
the years go by, and the raison d'etre of the former
being the mental deficiencies of the latter, it must,
in self defense, assert those deficiencies the more offensively, the more vehemently they are denied (2).




The Campaign of 900o


I59


Now the hope of the administration in Washington was to prove that the stubborn resistance of the Filipinos was not as great as was
claimed by the military authorities. From the
beginning, therefore, the Taft Commission tried
to reconcile the subjugation of the Philippines
with the liberation of Cuba. Surely no more
difficult task could have faced them. Nevertheless, they hoped with all the ardor and
benevolence of the President himself that the
Filipinos were in fact praying for American
sovereignty. And the wish became father to
the thought, with the result that friction between Mr. Taft and the military authorities
who had for two years been pouring powder and
lead into the enemy's camps and receiving a
goodly amount in return, now began to threaten.
Mr. Taft's message of optimism and goodwill regarding the Philippine situation is still
well-known. "A great majority of the people
long for peace and are entirely willing to accept
the establishment of a government under the
supremacy of the United States," he reported
to the Secretary of War in November, 1900 (3).
Said report was naturally circulated immediately throughout the length and breadth of these
United States to the glory and triumph of the
President's administration. But it so happened
that the Secretary of War during those hectic
days was also receiving official reports from the




I60  Conquest of the Philippines


military men in the field of battle which led him
to admit four years later, when no further harm
would result from it, that in 1900 (sixteen days
after the Taft Commission arrived in Manila),
"over 70,000 American soldiers from more than
500 stations held a still vigorous enemy in
check" (4).
General MacArthur was the official most
apprehensive of the true warlike conditions
existing in the Islands. While Mr. Taft was
crying, "Peace! peace! the    Filipinos want
peace," General MacArthur was cabling an
entirely different story to Washington.
Wherever throughout the archipelago there is a
group of insurgent army [he wrote to the Secretary
of War], it is a fact beyond dispute that all contiguous
towns contribute to the maintenance thereof. In
other words, towns regardless of the fact of American
occupation and town organization are the actual
bases for all insurgent military activities.... Indeed it is now the most important maxim of Filipino
tactics to disband when closely pressed and seek
safety in the nearest barrio; a manceuver quickly
accomplished by reason of the assistance of the people
and the ease with which the Filipino soldier is transformed into the appearance of a peaceful citizen (5).
Further cold military facts.concerning the
stubbornness of Filipino resistance are contributed by the General.




The Campaign of I900


i6I


The success of this unique system of war depends
upon almost complete unity of action of the entire
population. That such unity is a fact is too obvious to
admit of discussion. Intimidation has undoubtedly
accomplished much to this end, but fear as the only
motive is hardly sufficient to accountfor the united and
apparently spontaneous action of several millions of
people. One traitor in each town would effectually
destroy such a complex organization (6).
Secretary of War Root knew of this side of
the picture also, but he took care not to reveal
it to the voting public, at least not until the
elections of 1900 had been safely met. Yet
he did not ignore these ominous warnings. In
reply to General MacArthur's request that
nothing be done to diminish his armed forces
unless absolutely necessary, he sent his assurances through the Adjutant General in the following convincing dispatch:
Secretary of War directs (that) no instructions from
here be allowed (to) interfere or impede (the) progress
(of) your military operations which he expects you
(to) force to successful conclusion (7).
And as if these precautionary measures were
not sufficient there followed shortly after this
grim inquiry to General Wood in Cuba:
WOOD, Havana: Secretary of War is desirous to
know if you can give your consent to the immediate




162  Conquest of the Philippines


withdrawal (of the) Tenth Infantry from Cuba.
Imperative that we have (the) immediate use of
every available company we can lay our hands on for
service in the Philippines.
Signed: CORBIN (8).
Thus it was that while the American people
were being happily and successfully pacified
with Mr. Taft's optimistic reports endorsed by
the Secretary of War, the latter was also acting
in full cooperation with the military representatives in the Islands urging MacArthur to force
the natives to really plead for peace by employing the more customary and efficacious arguments-powder and lead.
In the light of these events, therefore, it was
but natural to suppose that the question of
imperialism would be the main issue in the
presidential campaign of 1900. Everything had
pointed that way. It is therefore interesting to
compare the attitude of the Republican party
at the beginning of the campaign with the attitude adopted a year before in order to secure
acquiescence in the treaty. Attention has been
called to Senator Lodge's argument for ratification that the treaty only gave the American
people power to determine the fate of the
Philippines, but did not commit them to any
policy. This position was accepted and endorsed by the President and his Cabinet. In




The Campaign of I909


I63


pursuance of this he told the American people
ten days after the ratification that,
The whole subject is now with Congress; and Congress is the voice, the conscience, and the judgment
of the American people. Upon their judgment and
conscience can we not rely?... Our priceless
principles undergo no change under a tropical sun.
They go with the flag.
Secretary Long also sought to emphasize this
compliance of the President with the laws of the
land by saying that if the treaty had been
rejected it would
have taken out of the hands of the people and put
into the hands of one man, the President, absolute
authority over the Philippines, limited only by the
indefinite scope of what is called the war power,
wielded by a purely military arm holding a naked
sword. Think of that for imperialism. It is a great
credit to the President [he concluded] that, like
Julius Caesar and George Washington, he has refused this offer of a "kingly crown." On the contrary, the good old democratic plan has been adopted
of putting the disposition of these Islands into the
hands of the American people who will duly express
their will through their representatives in Congress
assembled. I have no doubt the President is delighted to have the elephant off his hands and on
theirs (9).




164 Conquest of the Philippines


These were indeed fine words yet the events
which followed after they were uttered showed
how little was meant by them. For after the
treaty was ratified Congress was not consulted
as to what should be done with the Philippines.
No extra session was called to consider this very
important question. Nay more, when the next
regular session of Congress convened on December 5, 1899, the President said in his message:
It does not seem desirable that I should recommend at this time a specific and final form of government for these islands. When peace shall be restored, it will be the duty of Congress to construct a
plan of government which shall establish and maintain freedom and order and peace in the Philippines.
The insurrection is still existing; and, when it terminates, further information will be required as to the
actual condition of affairs before inaugurating a
permanent scheme of civil government.... As
long as the insurrection continues, the military arm
must necessarily be supreme.
This was a distinct invitation to Congress
to leave the "elephant" on his hands, and the
invitation was accepted. But it will be observed that the question of holding the islandsthe question upon which the Senate divided
equally, the question which the treaty left
open-was treated by the President as settled.
His words were: "The Islands lie under the




The Campaign of 900o


i65


shelter of our flag. They are ours by every title
of law and equity. They cannot be abandoned."
Who settled this question? Not Congress
which had never considered it. It was the
President by his proclamation of December 21,
1898, six weeks before the treaty was ratified.
Thus did the President assume the "kingly
crown" which his Secretary had praised him for
declining. With this "crown" the President
sanctioned a war without the authority of Congress, he refused to parley, and he told Congress
that the question was not open for their consideration and would not be until the conquest
by arms had been completed. What wearer of
a "kingly crown" could more despotically
have dealt with a question of such vital importance to two nations? The voice, the conscience
and the judgment of the American people had
thus been stifled, and now the President was
brought to judgment.
Senator Lodge had also forgotten his words
employed during the debate for ratification.
Gone were the Senator's honeyed phrases about
the good judgment and sense of the American
people in giving the Filipinos their just dues.
We make no hypocritical pretense of being interested in the Philippines solely on account of others,
[he now told the members of the National Conven



I66  Conquest of the Philippines


tion]. While we regard the welfare of these people
as a sacred trlst, we regard the welfare of the American
people first. We believe int trade expansion.
Although these dreams of military glory and
commercial advantage were still dazzling the
eyes of men, however, the leaders were not sure
that the voting public would sanction such sentiments as those of Senator Lodge. It was
well-known that in the ranks of the ruling party
itself, there were strong dissenters, such as Senators Hoar and Bacon, and men like Boutwell,
Hepburn, Henderson, Harrison, Edmunds, Reed
and many others prominent in Republican
circles. The list of eminent citizens opposed to
a policy of colonization, furthermore, was to
say the least full of potential power as the campaign which they led had gained a marked number of supporters. To name only a few of the
more noted leaders there were Carl Schurz,
Grover Cleveland, Andrew Carnegie, Jane
Addams, Wayne McVeagh, Champ Clarke,
Thomas Mott Osborne, Jacob Gould Schurman
and a host of others.
Therefore, when the moment came to openly
announce their platform, the Republican leaders adopted this sugar-coated promise with
regard to the Philippines:
Our authority could not be less than our responsibility, and wherever sovereign rights were extended




The Campaign of 1900


I67


it became the high duty of the Government to maintain its authority; to put down armed insurrection
and to confer the blessings of liberty and civilization
upon all the rescued people. The largest measure
of self-government consistent with their welfare and
our duties shall be secured by law.
The real issue of permanent or indefinite
retention was thus evaded. However, it was
really not necessary to openly assert it, for inasmuch as the Islands were said now by the
President to be unconditionally annexed to
the United States by virtue of the Treaty of
Peace without any reservation whatsoever, a
mere continuation of the present status really
held no promise of ultimate freedom to the
Filipinos.
Wise Republicans had realized this and they
made the best use of it. By thus stating their
policy, they were placed on the defensive with
regard to the imperialist issue. Instead of
openly having to assert it they merely had to
check any attempt or movement to alienate the
possession of the Islands, which they declared
had been unconditionally annexed to the nation
by the terms of the treaty of Paris.
We can understand this situation better by
comparing the status of the Filipinos in the eyes
of the Republican party with that of the Cubans.
In 1900 American control in Cuba was, it will be




i68  Conquest of the Philippines


remembered, still in effect. The control of the
government was not delivered to the Cuban
people until May 20, 1902. But in the meantime the Cubans were from the very start "free
and independent" and a truly sovereign people,
-the presence of American control being merely
temporary for the purpose of "pacification."
The Filipinos were, on the other hand, to remain
subjects of the Americans for how long no one
knew,-or at least no one would tell. In the
meantime they were to be given only the "largest measure of self-government which shall be
consistent with their welfare and our duties."
The "our duties" here referred to the duties,
so-called, of an absolute, sovereign power
vested in the tender hands of an alien Congress
sitting ten thousand miles away and in no way
representative of, or responsible to the people
whose liberties and rights lay in their hands.
The platform, therefore, connoted absolute
ownership-ownership secured through a treaty
with Spain. Hence to them there was no such
thing as a war going on against the Filipinos.
The fighting going on under the tropical skies
was but "an armed insurrection" against the
"legal authority" of the United States. As the
President himself had described it a few months
before: "There is a rebellion in one of the Islands
now, but it will be put down as we put down all
rebellions against the United States" (10).




The Campaign of 900o


169


When the time came for the Democrats to
summon their forces, however, they failed to
meet the situation. True it is that the Convention proclaimed imperialism  to be "the
paramount issue of the campaign." Their platform with regard to the Philippines was also
particularly clear. Besides condemning and
denouncing the Philippine policy of the McKinley administration it further added these significant proposals:
We favor an immediate declaration of the nation's
purpose to give to the Filipinos:
1. A stable form of government.
2. Independence.
3. Protection from outside interference such as
has been given for nearly a century to the
republics of Central and South America.
The first two proposals certainly were reasonable enough if we are to believe that America's
mission in the Philippines was purely to aid
the Filipinos, and yet such a declaration has
never been made by the Republican party to
this day.
The failure to meet the issue of 1900 is found
in Mr. Bryan's insistent demands that the
silver question be also injected in the Democratic banner. This clouded the issue and
weakened their forces, for instead of giving
combat on the clean cut issue of imperialism




170  Conquest of the Philippines


which they could have easily shown was of
transcendant importance, Mr. Bryan diverted
an undue amount of attention to a discussion
of monetary standards. Further than this,
the injection of the latter question meant the
loss of full support by the gold Democrats as
well as anti-imperialist Republicans who, though
vehemently condemning the Philippine policy
of their President were unwilling to see their
country adopt a false and dangerous system of
currency. Prominent leaders of the campaign,
therefore, urged Mr. Bryan to change his views
but he stood firm (11).
And thus the issue was obscured. To the
conservative men of the country at large it
seemed a choice between free silver and an
undecided Philippine policy with full assurances on the part of the Republicans that God
who moved mysteriously had placed the Islands
in American hands in the interests of civilization and humanity.
We must not forget also the spectacular campaign of misrepresentation that swept the
country from the printed page and the stump.
This is what the Secretary of War, Mr. Root,
told a gaping public about the beginning of the
war. Said he:
On the night of February 4, the day before the
Senate approved the treaty, an army of Tagalogs, a




The Campaign of I900


I7I


tribe inhabiting the central part of Luzon, under the
leadership of Aguinaldo, a Chinese half-breed, attacked in vastly superior numbers our little army in
possession of Manila, and after a desperate and
bloody fight was repulsed in every direction (12).
And again:
The day was not then, but it came on the 4th of
February when a body of Filipino troops marched
under cover of night, swiftly and silently, through
our lines, regardless of the sentry's challenge, and,
when he fired, volleys of musketry and roar of cannon upon every side commenced the proposed destruction of our little army.
Compare such flagrant statements with the
official reports of General Otis given in a previous chapter (Chapter VI) and preserved in the
archives of the War Department and we have
an idea how far this defender of the administration deviated from the truth.
Here again is General Otis's report:
An insurgent approaching the picket [of a Nebraska
regiment] refused to halt or answer when challenged.
The candidate for the vice-presidency, Mr.
Roosevelt, also contributed a picture.




172  Conquest of the Philippines


The reasoning which justifies our having made war
against "Sitting Bull" [said the exponent of a
strenuous life] also justifies our having checked the
outbreaks of Aguinaldo and his followers, directed,
as they were against Filipino and American alike.... To grant self-government to Luzon under
Aguinaldo [he continued] would be like granting
self-government to an Apache reservation under some
local chief.
It was indeed a bold man who would say such
libelous words, and yet they were not uttered
on the spur of the moment at some political
rally. They are to be found verbatim in Roosevelt's letter of acceptance of his nomination for
the vice-presidency. Such a carefully prepared
document naturally went all over the country
and helped form the opinions of many who were
only too glad to believe ill of the people with
whom their country was at war.
But we must not forget the President. What
did he have to say relative to the Philippine
war?
The American people [he said] are asked by our opponents to yield the sovereignty of the United States
in the Philippines to a small fraction of the population-a single tribe out of eighty or more inhabiting
the archipelago. We are asked to transfer our
sovereignty to a small minority in the islands without




The Campaign of 900oo


I73


consulting the majority, and to abandon the largest
portion of the population which has been loyal to us
to the cruelties of the guerrilla insurgent bands, and
to this end repress the opposition of the majority.
It would have struck a disinterested inquirer as
singular that "a single tribe out of eighty," a
small portion of the population, had been able
to wage war so long against a powerful American
army and the "largest portion of the population
which had been loyal to us.
These so-called Philippine tribes have been
receiving such notoriety to this day that we
might as well pause now and see how much
weight should be given to these statements.
The existence of tribes has been decided by
ethnologists, who claim to see among the brownskinned natives certain differences which stamp
them into the category of tribesmen. Now,
even as early as 1901, men like Governor Taft
were vehemently maintaining that these differentiations were purely theoretical and of little
value.
The word "tribe " [he said], gives an erroneous impression. There is no tribal relation among the
Filipinos. There is a racial solidarity among them
undoubtedly. They are homogeneous. I cannot
tell the difference between an Ilocano and a Tagalog
or a Visayan.... To me all Filipinos are alike.




174  Conquest of the Philippines


Mr. Schurman, President of the first Philippine commission, representing McKinley in
1899, was just as earnest in his convictions.
Nothing could more unhappily describe... these
people than the word "tribe" [he said]. Let us
drop so misleading a term, and speak of them as
communities, and let us call the aggregate of these
communities the Philippine nation.
In 1903 a census of the Philippines was taken
by the American officials, and in comparing the
tables of this census with that of the United
States, we find these American representatives
saying, "Those of the Philippine census are
somewhat simpler, the differences being due
mainly to the homogeneous character of the
population of the Philippine islands" (13).
A report made by Senator Lodge himself, the
staunchest supporter of the administration, was
also procurable at the time the President made
these statements. This report, "Senate Document 171, 56th Congress, First Session," had
been prepared for the Committee on the Philippines. What did it show?
The inhabitants of the Philippines [said the report]
belong to three sharply distinct races-the Negrito
race, the Indoesian, and the Malayan race. It is
universally conceded that the Negritos are the disappearing remnants of a people which once popu



The Campaign of 900oo


I75


lated the entire archipelago [while now] but a few
scattered and numerically insignificant groups of
then remain..... It is believed that not more
than 25,000 (twenty-five thousand) of them exist in
the entire archipelago, and the race seems doomed to
early extinction.
The report also gave a table of eighty-four tribes,
so-called, by the scientists to whom we must owe
obedience. But these tables showed that
twenty-one of this number belonged to the
Negritos, so that one quarter of the President's
eighty tribes were described in the official report as "a few scattered and numerically insignificant groups" of a race "doomed to early
extinction." Both numerically and otherwise
they were and they continued to be as insignificant a part of the population as are the Norridgewock Indians in Maine or the Mashpees in
Massachusetts. But could these facts be gathered from the President's statements?
Taking now the next group, the Indonesian,
we find that Senator Lodge's report confined
this race to the island of Mindanao. Sixteen
tribes are classified under it, one fifth of the
President's eighty, and the whole number was
estimated also at 250,000. Thirty-seven of the
eighty tribes, therefore, contained only 275,000
out of a population of over 7,000,000 people. But
to turn to the report. The rest of the tribes, fortyseven in number, were Malays, and of these




176  Conquest of the Philippines


eight, including the Moros who were given as
100,000, numbered 6,350,000 people, leaving for
the other thirty-nine tribes about 375,000.  We
therefore, find that out of the eighty-four tribes
in the report, seventy-six contained only about
650,000. " Ay, in the catalogue ye go for men."
Of the rest, the six million three hundred and
fifty thousand, all were Malays, all were Catholics softened by three centuries of intimate contact with Spain, and they lived chiefly in Luzon
and the Visayan Islands, where the war was
waging in full vigor. From these official reports,
and those of Mr. McKinley's own witnesses,
Taft, Schurman and Lodge, what must we say of
the President's language?
In spite of these spirited pictures, however,
the campaign proved to be less exciting than
that of 1896 (14). Because of the confusing issues, party dissenters were numerous, and on
both sides also many more thousands, though
faithfully following the party banner gave it only
a half hearted support. Other thousands refrained from voting (15).
With the elections of 1900 out of the way,
however, and the novelty of the possession having waned, came America's second sober thought.
The changing mind of the American people
could not long endure the logic of the arguments
which both friend and foe of the administration
now put forward with somewhat friendly mod



The Campaign of I900


177


eration. Power, commerce, and military glory
ceased to be invoked as the arguments for the
indefinite retention of the Philippines. The
administration now defended its Philippine
policy on other grounds-namely, philanthropy.
It was urged that the duty of educating the
Filipinos, of teaching them the rudiments of
self-government and leading them out into the
bright sunlight of western civilization was the
mission of the American representatives in the
Philippines.
But there were also those who though happy
in feeling that the wave of imperialism was on
the wane nevertheless realized, that at bottom
the mischief was the same.
It is a significant concession to public opinion
[said Senator Carmack] that we no longer hear the
argument of greed and avarice and the hunger for
other men's possessions openly and defiantly proclaimed. I cannot help thinking [he added] that
something has been yielded and something gained
when the President of the United States no longer
talks of seizing "points of vantage" and no longer
defends our Philippine venture by glorifying England's despotic rule over subject races and her
bloody march to empire across the bodies and
through the blood of slaughtered people. It may
not signify any change of heart or of purpose, but it
shows a realization of the fact that the public conscience is awake, and it shows that the authors of this




178  Conquest of the Philippines


policy begin to understand that they cannot justify
"criminal aggression" by pointing to the profits of
the crime. It is a cheering sign that the second
sober thought has come, that the better nature of the
American people is again in the ascendant, when the
party responsible for a bucaneering war is compelled
to veil the grossness of its designs (16).
This second sober thought of America also
brought a marked innovation into the local prolems of the archipelago. Prior to 1901 the seed
of greedy imperialism among the Americans in
the Islands had already blossomed into full
bloom. Those then, were the days when men
talked of "the Empire." Life was gay and irresponsible for the white man, and many there
were indeed who felt and acted like petty kings.
Into this paradise of power and prestige now
came Mr. Taft as Civil Governor to recognize
the rights of the Filipino. Mr. Taft brought
with him into that new field something which
Filipinos had never seen to any marked degree
among the American civilians and military officers with whom they had come in contact. He
brought sympathy, courtesy and friendly understanding. He gathered around him those Filipino insurgents in 1901 who, having realized
the futility of their efforts to combat the American forces, had bowed to the inevitable and had
resolved to dedicate their efforts towards making
the best of the situation.




The Campaign of I9oo


I79


This was a great concession to the Filipinos
and they appreciated it. The new governor
gained popularity as the days went by, for as
each revolting province was whipped into submission Mr. Taft followed in the wake of the
army to institute civil government and promise
the natives that if they threw down their arms
they would have peace and local self-government. Thus it was that his resounding battle
cry of "The Philippines for the Filipinos " gained
in power as well as in volume as the new governor went about quietly conquering the population with words rather than with swords. And
in so doing he began a new programme which
meant, when carefully analyzed, a permanent
colonial system, maintained by the absolute
power of the United States until the Filipinos
become contented subjects. It meant and it
means today Philippine independence-never.
To that matter attention must now be directed.
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER IX
1. See Coolidge's America as World Power, p. 154.
2. Judge Blount, American Occupation of the Philippines, p. 294.
3. Report of Taft Philippine Commission, 1900, p. 17.
4. Sec. Root's Address at the 1904 Republican Convention, p. 62. Published by Blanchard & Co., N. Y.
5. MacArthur's Report, Oct. 1, 1900; also War Dept.
Rep., 1900, vol. i, pt. 5, pp. 61-62.




I8o    Conquest of the Philippines
6. War Dept. Rep., 1900, vol. i, pt. 5, pp. 61-62.
7. Correspondence Relating to War with Spain, vol. ii, p.
1226.
8. Ibid., p. 1249.
9. Speeches at the Home Market Club, Boston, Feb. 16,
1899.
10. Speech at Warren, Ohio, Oct. 18, 1899.
11. Stanwood, A History of the Presidency, 1897-1907,
vol. ii, p. 57.
12. Speech at Youngston, Ohio, Oct. 25, 1900.
13. Philippine Census, vol. ii, p. 9.
14. Latene, America as a World Power, p. 131.
15. World Almanac, 1901, p. 119.
16. Speech in the Senate, May 31, 1902.




CHAPTER X


THE TAFT POLICY ANALYZED
THE substitution of white duck in the place of
khaki and brass buttons as the dress of the
American official in the Philippines may be said
to characterize Governor Taft's manner of
quelling Filipino opposition and at the same
time reconciling the McKinley representations
with the actual state of affairs in the Islands.
Therefore he proposed to establish Civil Government in order to pacify the natives and to
assure the people at home that things were going
along as they should. Of course, this policy
was vehemently opposed by the military commanders whose real task was to combat the insurrection in some of the remaining islands. As
late as October 8, 1901, for example, while the
administration was publicly saying that the
American representatives were getting along
harmoniously, we find this significant telegram
from Washington addressed to the commanding
general in Manila,



182  Conquest of the Philippines


CHAFFEE, Manila.
I am deeply chagrined to use the mildest term
possible over the trouble between you and Taft. I
wish you to see him personally, and spare no effort
to secure prompt and friendly agreement in regard
to the differences between you. Have cabled him
also. It is most unfortunate to have any action
which produces friction and which may have a serious
effect both in the Philippines and here at home. I
trust implicity that you and Taft will come to agreement.
Signed: THEODORE ROOSEVELT (1).
These disagreements were the natural outcome of having two officials in the field-one
who wanted civil government because he believed in it, and the other who said there was no
place for civil government while several hundred
thousand inhabitants were being herded together in reconcentration camps.
Now, the term "civil government" is most
inviting. Although it does not necessarily imply
a government by the consent of the governed, it
at least distinctly negatives the idea of a government conducted by the military arm in a country of bleeding, prostrate and hostile people. To
be able to tell the public at home, therefore, that
there was civil government in the Philippines
was to put everyone in good humour. What if
General Bell and his army were searching every
ravine and mountain side in Batangas province,




The Taft Policy Analyzed


183


a hundred miles or so from Manila, armed to the
teeth and fully determined to kill "every ablebodied man in sight?"  What care that General
Smith was making Samar a "howling wilderness," ordering his subordinates to "kill and
burn,-the more you kill the better you will
please me?"   What matter that thousands
were being herded together in reconcentration
camps. Civil government it must be to please
the public at home. All disorders in the Islands
from that moment could be described as acts of
mere banditti. Of course this vicious situation
was not made known to the American people at
that time, but six years later, when the true
facts no longer affected the safety of the party in
power, there came this blunt confession by the
American Governor, General Smith. Said he in
his inaugural address:
While the smoke of battle still hung over the hills
and valleys of the Philippines, and every town and
barrio in the Islands was hot with rebellion, she (the
United States) replaced military with a civil rdgime
and on the smouldering embers of insurrection
planted civil government (2).
We are naturally curious to learn what kind
of government was thus being offered by Mr.
Taft and what was the nature of the policy back
of it. Under the new regime a civil governor in




184  Conquest of the Philippines


person of Governor Taft himself, took the place
of the military commander. Though not wearing gilt braid like the other potentates in Asia
he was absolute master of the central government, as will appear from the nature of his
powers.
The legislative branch was composed of the
so-called Philippine Commission. There were
originally five members, all Americans, appointed by the President of the United States
but drawing salaries in excess of that received
by American cabinet officers, and like all the
other expenses of the Government paid by
the Filipino tax-payers. This constituted the
central civil government. There were besides,
of course, a host of subordinate officers in executive and judicial positions, Filipinos and Americans alike, the latter holding the best paid offices. But for all purposes of government, the
Americans in the Commission, of which Mr.
Taft, as Governor, was entitled to be one, ruled
the destinies of the nation. They made laws
and administered them; they appointed and removed; they were the "civil government."
How absolute was the power residing in this
body may be shown by an incident related by an
American in the service of that government.
One of the laws passed by the Commission in
1901 (3) had provided that an American, in
order to qualify for a position in the Philippine




The Taft Policy Analyzed


I85


judiciary should be more than thirty years of
age, and should have the experience of a five
years' practice in American law courts. In
1903 President Roosevelt wished to give the
Hon. Beekman Winthrop a position on the
Philippine Bench. Winthrop, then a recent
graduate of the Harvard Law School, was under
thirty years of age. Judge Taft called his secretary, Mr. Ferguson, to acquaint him of this appointment. "Fergy," he said, in his good
natured manner, "make me out a commission
for Beekman Winthrop as a judge of First
Instance."
"You can't do it, Governor," his secretary
properly replied. "It's against the law. He's
not old enough."
"I can't, eh?" said the Governor humorously. "I'll show you. Send me a stenographer."
The stenographer came and the Governor dictated a new law, striking out the thirty year old
requirement from the old statute and inserting
twenty-five in its place. In addition to the requirement that the appointee must have practiced law for a period of five years, another
phrase was added, as follows: "or be a graduate
of a reputable law school" (4).
Secretary Ferguson was then summoned anew.
The governor told him to get the rest of the
members of the Commission. This was done




I86  Conquest of the Philippines


immediately, and within a few minutes the new
statute had been passed and made the law of the
land.
"Now," said Governor Taft good naturedly
to the law-abiding Ferguson, "make out that
commission" (5).
Although Mr. Winthrop with his Harvard
record did make a good judge, the incident is
narrated merely to show how absolutely five
Americans could make, publish and execute
Philippine laws. Even the English despots on
the mainland of Asia could not have exercised
more despotic power.
So much for the framework of Governor
Taft's civil government. Now what did it aim to
accomplish? In judging the Taft policy as announced by its founder it is well to remember
always that the statements of facts and conditions and the nature of the people dealt with
come from the lips of persons who are speaking
in their own defense and who in most cases were
possible candidates for higher offices in the future. Being mere men, they naturally tend to
present their own side of the case. In this matter, the men from whom we expect the desired
information, become advocates of the policy to
be examined rather than impartial reporters.
Now all that these high colonial officials then
said may have been true. Certainly, a majority
of their countrymen believed their statements,




The Taft Policy Analyzed


187


because they said them. Suppose the declarations had been false, —the American people
would have believed them just the same. It is
natural that what American governors say concerning the Filipino will be accepted as gospel
truth by their countrymen however little they
may believe the assertions of their rulers at home.
Past events in the history of this nation itself
have always shown that although statements of
presidents, governors and mayors in describing
their own administration are severely criticized
by those directly concerned, yet these same
people will accept the statements of their officers
abroad as gospel truth. Thus, after the Civil
War what the carpet-bag officers said was considered true, while the criticism  of eminent
Southerners was considered as "rebel talk."
And so this much can also be said of the futurethat no matter who the governor may be in the
Philippines, the declaration of the American
will be accepted in the United States rather than
that of a Filipino. This is the insurmountable
difficulty, for the side of the Filipino will, therefore, never be understood by Americans.
Let us, however, judge the Taft programme on
its face as the founder himself and those who
have since followed him characterize the policy.
In the first place, then, it is noticed that Mr.
Taft's programme was founded on one great assumption, namely, that the American people




i88  Conquest of the Philippines


were and would continue to be unselfish in their
attitude towards the Filipino, and hence that
they could be trusted to keep men in office who
would carry out this policy, no matter how absolute a power they might be able to wield from
that position.
Thus, Governor Taft clearly stated his first
position:
The people of the United States have under their
guidance and control in the Philippines, an archipelago
of 3000 islands, the population of which is about
7,600,000 souls. Of this 7,000,000 are Christians,
600,000 are Moros or other Pagan tribes (6).
Now, up to Mr. Taft's regime, there had never
been any talk at all in official circles about the
possibility of ever letting the Filipinos have their
independence. No such idea had ever been suggested by President McKinley, the man most
responsible for the acquisition of the Islands.
True it was that he had spoken of giving the
Filipinos "individual rights," and perhaps some
ultimate participation in their government, but
that the complete withdrawal of American
sovereignty should ever follow had not been
considered by him.
But in 1901 the imperialist flame had burned
itself out and America's second thought had
succeeded. Hence Judge Taft's purpose to im



The Taft Policy Analyzed


I89


prove the people and prepare them for the hour
of their liberation. Just when this independence was to be granted, however, no one could or
would tell. Mr. Taft, however, offered the solution of this intricate problem and we may believe his purpose has not changed since.
To put it briefly, Judge Taft insisted then and
insists even today, that upon the American
people rests the duty of solving the Philippine
problem, asserting also that they are capable of
accomplishing the task when the time comes to
decide upon it once and for all. In the meantime,-well, let Judge Taft himself speak:
As a friend of the Filipinos [he said] it is my
anxious desire to enlarge that class of Americans
who have a real interest in the welfare of the Islands,
and who believe that the United States can have no
higher duty or function than to assist the people of
the Islands to prosperity and a political development
which shall enable them to secure to themselves the
enjoyment of civil liberty (7).
All of this sounded well indeed, but note in
the first place that "civil liberty" does not mean
political liberty, far less independence. The
method by which this new structure was to be
achieved was also carefully stated by its founder.
"The first requisite of prosperity in the
Islands," he said, "is tranquillity, and this should
be evidenced by a well-ordered government."




I90  Conquest of the Philippines


How long this upbuilding would require,
Judge Taft was not sure then, but this much he
was willing to concede.
It may be that when the Filipinos have been transformed into a people capable of safely maintaining
an independent self-government they will ask it. and
then I have no doubt that it will be accorded them.
This promising remark, however, loses its
value in the light of the language which followed it.
It may be however [added Judge Taft] and I think
quite as likely that by that time the Filipinos will be
so well satisfied with the good resulting from a union
with the United States that they will prefer to maintain a relation like that which now binds Canada and
Australia to Great Britain, and that the United States
will then value its association with this pearl of the
Oriental tropics. But whatever the ultimate decision it is certain that the time cannot arise for a
considerable period, probably several generations.
Judge Taft thus advocated a policy of waiting
several generations which means indefinitely,
before the question could be decided. In the
meantime he would oppose permitting the Filipinos to talk or ask for their freedom for, he
said, "The Filipinos should learn the disadvantages that arise to everybody in the country




The Taft Policy Analyzed


I9I


from political agitation for a change in the form
of government in the inmmediate future."
During this wait of several generations, however, it is apparent from Judge Taft's words
that it was his hope that the United Sates would
really learn to value its association with "this
pearl of the Oriental tropics."
It is estimated [he temptingly told the New York
Chamber of Commerce] that not more than five
million acres of land are owned by natives in the
islands, and that remaining sixty-five million is
owned by the government.
That is, the United States government. Now
it so happened that soon after the acquisition of
the Philippines, the American Congress had
passed a law limiting the number of acres which
a company might buy. This was intended to
prevent a few Americans from monopolizing the
land. This limitation in Judge Taft's opinion
was "much too low for the cultivation of sugar."
However, "there is a provision in the law,"
added the Judge, " by which irrigation companies
may own stock in land companies, so that probably the limitations may be evaded if private profit
requires." Curious that such a suggestion should
have come from the highest officer of the land
charged with the duty of enforcing the law.
Here then, was Judge Taft's policy as he presented it in 1904, and as he would, no doubt, still




192   Conquest of the Philippines
present it today: The American people, a selfsacrificing and conscientious nation, having no
object in view save the benefit of the Filipinos,
should retain the absolute control of the Philippines indefinitely, or at least for several generations, meanwhile introducing education, sanitary improvements and other good things, all of
which were to be paid for by the Filipinos. In
due time the American people would decide, first
-whether they had proved themselves fit for
independence, and second, whether independence was good for them. The hope that the
Filipinos themselves would in due time lose the
desire for freedom was, of course, not to be
abandoned. During this long period of several
generations the Americans could and would in
fact be invited to acquire larger and larger interests in the Islands while the Filipinos would be
permitted such "civil liberties" as Congress
might choose to grant them.
Finally, as if to support the wisdom of this
policy and the reasonableness of giving the
Filipinos such limited freedom, Judge Taft finally
added: "To make the Declaration of Independence apply equally to the Filipinos as to
the American colonists, is to be blind to the
plainest facts and to sacrifice truth to an impossible dogma and a rhetorical phrase."
Each of these proposals will now be taken up
in order to show not only the fallacy of expecting




The Taft Policy Analyzed


193


to see the plan work out, but also to point out
the viciousness underlying the policy which Judge
Taft then believed to be right.
First, then, as to this "impossible dogma and
rhetorical phrase" known as the Declaration of
Independence. Did the framers of this document really mean it to apply only to the revolting colonists? Against Mr. Taft's word we
quote Abraham Lincoln's estimate of that
Declaration.
Its authors meant it to be [he said] as, thank God, it
is now proving itself-a stumbling block to all those
who in after times might seek to turn a free people
back into the hateful paths of despotism. They
knew the proneness of prosperity to breed tyrants, and
they meant that when such should reappear in this
fair land and commence their vocation, they would
find at least one hard nut to crack.
But Governor Taft did try to crack this nut
by confusing expansion with imperialism. He
said,
Since the foundation of our government the people
of the United States, that is the states as distinguished from the territories, have been engaged in
governing other people. We did it in the case of
Louisiana. We have done it in the case of every territory that was subsequently admitted to the United
States.




194  Conquest of the Philippines


finally adding that if this governing of other
people who have no voice in the government is to
violate the Declaration of Independence, then
"we have been violating the Declaration of Independence for a hundred years."
There is this to remember, however, in the
cases with which Governor Taft sought to justify
his action. The people of the United States beginning as a fringe of inhabitants on the edge of
a continent adopted a Constitution to which they
consented. This constitution gave to their
Congress control over the unoccupied land not
belonging to any state, and in the exercise of that
power Congress adopted the policy of letting
persons settle on this land and organize territorial government, and as the settlers became
sufficiently numerous in any region, that region
was admitted to statehood. To the establishment of this policy the people as a whole had consented beforehand, and every man who settled in
that territory did so with knowledge of that
policy. In the case of Louisiana, that huge
tract of land was acquired by treaty and by purchase, whereby the United States bound itself to
incorporate its inhabitants in the Union and to
give them all the rights of American citizens.
Contrast this with the Philippine situation of
1904 when Governor Taft made these statements or even with the situation today. In
those islands there were then some eight millions




The Taft Policy Analyzed


I95


of people who had resisted American sovereignty
until overcome by force of arms. United as a
people in desiring their independence, Mr. Taft
would refuse it to them because in the estimation
of those who had conquered them they were not
fit to govern themselves. Is it possible that so
able a lawyer as Judge Taft failed to detect this
difference between the American government of
territories and the government of Filipinos
against their will?
Still Mr. Taft seemed to be satisfied that it
was enough to give the Filipinos "civil liberties."
This, lie said, had been "secured to every man,
woman and child among the Christian Filipinos,"
these rights being equivalent to those "contained
in the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of the
United States except the right to bear arms and
the right to be tried by jury."
But was it true then, and is it true now, that
such rights as the Filipinos were given were
really equivalent to the Bill of Rights in the
Constitution? They were not rights-they were
mere privileges granted by an absolute foreign
power resting on an Act of Congress which could
be repealed at will. Was that freedom? A
free man is one whose rights are his and cannot
be taken away from him against his will. This
was instead an absolute government, in name by
the American people, and in fact by the President and his officers.




196  Conquest of the Philippines


There are those, however, who might say that
the course of events has since justified Judge
Taft's policy, and that creation of the Philippine Assembly in 1907 and the Senate in 1916,
are convincing proofs of this gradual extension
of liberty to the Filipinos. How much liberty
these measures really meant will be taken up in
the succeeding chapters. For the present-attention is focussed on Judge Taft's policy alone.
Let us assume, therefore, that Judge Taft's programme is faithfully carried out. The question
remains who is to decide when the Filipinos are
fit for independence? Certainly not the American residents in the Islands who, having invested their money there and having always
regarded the Filipinos as inferiors would naturally exert their utmost influence to perpetuate
American sovereignty. Governor Taft himself
distrusted these Americans for, as he told the
New York Chamber of Commerce,
The American merchants easily caught the feeling
of hostility and contempt felt by many of the soldiers
for the Filipinos, and were most emphatic in condemning the policy of the government in attempting
to attract the Filipinos and make them so far as
might be a part of the new order.
As for the organ of these American settlers
which is so frequently heard in the United States,
Judge Taft had this to say:




The Taft Policy Analyzed


I97


The American newspapers... also took the
tone of their advertisers and their subscribers and
hence it is that the American community in the
Philippines today is largely an anti-Filipino community, prone apparently in dealing with the natives
to call them names, to make fun of them and to deride every effort toward their advancement and
development.
Let the reader of today, therefore, read the reports of these papers and American residents
with a grain of salt, for they are not disinterested
and impartial judges.
Where, then, are we to find "the good sense
and virtue of the American people," which will
in time adequately and faithfully decide the
question? Can the Americans at home be entrusted with this task of deciding the destinies
of several million Filipinos? It is submitted
that they cannot do so, because nearly all, if not
actually all the elements necessary for a real
knowledge of the conditions existing in the
islands or for the creation of genuine sympathy
with the aspirations of the Filipinos, are sorely
lacking in the hearts and minds of the American
people.
First, as to a knowledge of the true conditions
in the Islands. Well, we remember the censorship during the war. One cannot forget also
that Governor Taft's own testimony before the
Senate Committee, when information was de



198  Conquest of the Philippines


sired in 1902, gave no idea of the true extent to
which torture, destruction and reconcentration
had been carried on in the attempt to conquer
the Islands. Men are human the world over and
whenever they speak of that which may reflect
on their personal positions they will put the best
face possible upon the matter so as to provoke
the least hostile criticism. When these men
speak, therefore, their administration as well as
the whole policy of the political party in Washington which placed them in power is put on
trial. Governor Taft himself, may have been
above temptation in these matters, but would
there be many like him?
This mental attitude on the part of the highest officials in the Islands and those most closely
connected with them is largely substantiated by
a confession made by an ex-official himself, the
Hon. W. Morgan Shuster, a former member of
the Philippine Commission. Writing in 1914 in
the January issue of the Century Magazine, he
said:
The records of our congressional committee and of
the War Department are filled with reports, speeches,
letters, testimony and statistics going to show what
the party then in power wanted the American people to
think about the Filipinos. If any one thought differently, he became at once, in official eyes, a dreamer,
an anti-imperialist, or a demagogue. His opinions
were taboo in high governmental circles, and he was




The Taft Policy Analyzed


I99


deemed an unsafe man to hold important office.
This was only natural and I recall it merely to show
how the opinion of the American people on the
question has really been formed.
Then followed this convincing statement:
The opinion of the ordinary American citizen as
to the Filipinos is largely influenced by the statements or the pronouncements of the very few men
in public life who have had, or were thought to have
had, exceptional facilities for knowing the real facts
and situation. Thus the views of ex-Presidents
Roosevelt and Taft, of ex-Secretary of War Root, of
Senator Lodge, of the different Philippine governors
and members of the Philippine Commission and of
the commanding generals who have served in the
islands have been the real source of "American
Public opinion."
As a matter of fact [confessed Mr. Morgan
Shuster] it is doubtful whether the views of any of
these gentlemen were reached in a strictly impartial
and judicial manner. With the possible exception of
Mr. Taft, they took up the subject as I did, with a previously formed conviction that the facts were going to
sustain the accepted government belief and policy, which
were that the Filipinos were not fit to be, and should not
of right be, independent, at least for a very long time to
come. How long few ventured to predict. It is
said that Mr. Taft when invited by President
McKinley to go to Manila as head of the Civil Commission, st-ated that he was opposed to our holding




200  Conquest of the Philippines


the islands. That, however, was before he had been
intimately connected with the administrative policies
already adopted, which were based on the opposite
belief.
How about the minor American officials?
How would they report the progress of the Filipino for self-government? Does the question
warrant an answer? Pray, how else than in the
same characteristic manner in which their superior officers approached the problem? Indeed how could they be expected to do otherwise?
On that side was their bread buttered! Time
has shown that many of these men did not stop
there, but have gone to the extent of deliberately misrepresenting conditions in the Islands.
While on leave of absence at home or having
permanently retired from Philippine service,
these men have launched a propaganda from the
speaking platform and the printed page wilfully
slandering the natives whom they detest.
Granting, therefore, that Americans at home
might conceivably wish to know the true facts
upon which to base the exercise of their good
sense and judgment, there are no means by
which they can easily learn them. This is the unhappy result of the intolerable situation where
one nation insists on governing another without
that other's consent. For outside of these official dispatches and perhaps a few other accounts




The Taft Policy Analyzed


201


by prolific writers of sensationalism and trash,
whose main object is to secure a wide circulation for their volumes, nothing from the side of
the Filipino can ever be forthcoming. The political retentionist sees to it that nothing is
printed except official dispatches and perhaps an
occasional report concerning Filipino incapacity.
The case for the petitioner is "crowded out by
the press of other matter," that the conspiracy
of silence may continue.
But the question which always remains is
whether the American people will ever take an
interest in the matter even if they do have
reliable information. Are they not so immersed in their own affairs, so busy in their
struggles to make money and so indifferent by
reason of the great distance separating them that
even the intelligent men have not and cannot
give the necessary time to understand the Philippine situation? If the people of the greatest
American cities accept corrupt and ignorant
government which affects them directly rather
than take the time and trouble necessary to improve it, what chance is there of their devoting
time to the affairs of an alien people thousands
of miles away?
The Filipinos can, therefore, only rely for
justice upon the American officials governing
them. Now against a foreign oppressor men
rely on armies and navies, but against domestic




202  Conquest of the Philippines


tyranny they can only raise the shield of a constitution. This restraint on arbitrary power is
the only protection of the individual against the
government which rules him. Great as is an
Anglo-Saxon's confidence in his fellowmen, for
example, he has employed in the past, and he is
today employing this device to protect himself
from being ridden by men of the same blood
and color as himself. The unwritten English
Constitution has grown up from the efforts of
English subjects to restrain English kings.
Americans have erected similar safeguards to
prevent American Presidents, governors, judges
and even legislatures from oppressing American
citizens.
If a citizen of Massachusetts needs protection
against his fellow citizens, if the American
people dare not give their President and Congress a power unfettered by a constitution, is it
not too clear for argument that the shield of a
constitution is far more needed by the Filipinos
to protect them from a government authorized
by men who do not know them and only learn
of them through the reports of others who present their side of the case most strongly and who
openly regard the natives as their inferiors?
But there is even another safeguard lacking
against which laws and even constitutions are
ineffectual when the true liberties of a people
are threatened. This is public opinion, the




The Taft Policy Analyzed


203


force which, more than anything else will restrain the rulers of every modern state. An
enlightened public opinion, however, can exist
only where the public is informed and when the
public is interested. Neither of these conditions can be relied upon in America's dealing
with the absolute government of the Philippines. The absence of the former has already
been treated in this and preceding chapters. Of
the latter it can safely be said that popular indifference and lack of genuine interest have characterized the occupation of the Philippines ever
since the establishment of civil government.
Once the novelty of the conquest had worn
away, it has been impossible to induce the American people to take more than a passing interest
in the conduct of Philippine affairs. The complaints of the Filipinos fall upon the ears of men,
who though supposed to judge them, know
nothing of them and care little to learn about
them. Say what you will of an American's intelligence, of his energy and high purposes and
fitness to govern himself, it is because he knows
not and cares not what is done in the Philippines
that he and his fellowmen are unfit to govern
the islands.
But the Taft policy, however, proposed and it
has in fact succeeded in its proposal, that these
inferior natives with whom the great body of
Americans would not care to associate, should be




204  Conquest of the Philippines


given only such measure of free government as
unenlightened and unsympathetic Americans
think them qualified to use, exercising in doing
so a power unfettered by any constitution and
unrestrained by any informed and interested
public opinion.
Now it may be that in the future as in the past,
a group of really disinterested Americans of high
calibre will take a serious view of their duty and
responsibility in the Islands-that is, the kind
of duty and responsibility that the Taft programme calls for. Such an instance occurred
shortly after the establishment of the Taft
regime when several thousands of Americans
signed a petition for Philippine independence.
Governor Taft described these men as "a number of excellent and prominent gentlemen."and well he might. Could not these "excellent and prominent gentlemen" be trusted
with the problem? Apparently not in Mr.
Taft's opinion, for he told the New York Chamber
of Commerce at the time when the petition was
presented that "the good people who signed the
petition" should not "intermeddle with something the effect of which they are very little able
to understand (8)."
Who were these men whose ability to understand the Philippine situation Judge Taft so
seriously questioned? The list included Cardinal Gibbons, Archbishop Farley, more than




The Taft Policy Analyzed


205


fifty bishops, more than sixty judges, a long
list of college presidents and leading educators,
such as Eliot of Harvard, Schurman of Cornell,
himself not without experience in the Philippines, and ex-President Cleveland. There were
also Andrew Carnegie, Charles Francis Adams,
Wayne McVeagh and thousands of other respected and prominent men in private life.
Here were the spiritual and the intellectual leaders of America. If they were "little able to
understand," to whom in the United States
could the Filipinos look for leadership in their
behalf? If these American leaders must not
"intermeddle," how can Judge Taft justify his
"abiding confidence in the power of the American people to reach a right conclusion?"
If, therefore, the Americans in the Islands as
well as the good and intelligent Americans at
home cannot be trusted, no one is left, unless
by "the good sense and judgment of the American people," Mr. Taft really meant the President, the Secretary of War, and their appointees,
who in the past have been indifferent to human
rights and only too ready to seek commercial
advantage.
It has been constantly urged, however, that
this "benevolent despotism," for that is what
the Taft programme really meant then and now,
was merely a step towards preparing the Filipinos for eventual independence. This argu



206  Conquest of the Philippines


ment is being used to this day, and will continue
to be so used by all those who seek to hide the
vicious character of their scheme. For this
method of dealing with the problem unfits rather
than prepares the Filipinos for independence.
The policy of Governor Taft, in the first place,
creates a new race problem because his position
rests entirely upon the assumption that the
Filipinos, being unfit to govern themselves,
should be governed by a race of superior people.
Everything, therefore, that the American officials in the Philippines say about the fitness of
the Filipino will be accepted as gospel truth by
the great majority. They will never take the
word of the Filipino against the word of the
American. The side of the Filipino will, therefore, not only never be understood in this country but will suffer greatly as the years go by because the more stubbornly the Filipino asserts
his fitness for self-government, the more vehemently will his caretakers in the Islands deny it.
The Taft policy moreover creates a far more
serious obstacle to independence, for during this
period of education paid for by the Filipino it
calls for the investment of large amounts of
American capital in the Islands hoping that in
that manner the Americans will, as the years go
by, learn to value truly " this pearl of the Oriental
tropics." Stripped of its sugar coating the Taft
policy is to keep the Islands for generations and




The Taft Policy Analyzed


207


to plant there in the meantime American citizens
and American capital. Now there is nothing
clearer in the history of all nations than the inevitable alliance between financial and political
power. Wherever capital goes it seeks to control the government in its own interest. If invested in a weak foreign state its owners seek to
own the government of that state or, failing in
this, exert their efforts to make the home government interfere and control it. This was the
origin of the Boer War. This laid the basis for
the Indian Empire, and like influences have inspired English, French, and German aggression
in Asia and Africa.
Such also are the vicious results which the
Taft programme insures. Every dollar of American capital implanted in those Islands becomes a
rivet which binds them to the United States, and
every American residing there learns to argue
soon enough against Philippine independence.
State it as you will, the Taft policy means indefinite retention maintained by the absolute
power of the United States until the Filipinos
become contented subjects. The "Philippines
for the Filipinos," degenerates into the "Philippines for the Americans," with as much liberty
to the Filipinos thrown in as is not inconsistent
with American interests. Well did Senator
Lodge say several years before, "We believe in
trade expansion."




208    Conquest of the Philippines
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER X
1. Correspondence Relating to War with Spain, vol. ii, p.
1297.
2. Report of the U. S. Phil. Comm., 1907, pt. 1, p. 229.
3. Act No. 136, U. S. Phil. Comm.
4. Act No. 1024, U. S. Phil. Ccmm., Oct.10, 1903.
5. Incident related by Ferguson himself and narrated by
Judge Blount in The American Occupation of the
Philippines, p. 444.
6. Speech before the New York Chamber of Commerce,
April 21, 1904.
7. Ibid.
8. The Outlook, April 30, 1904.




CHAPTER XI


THE TAFT POLICY IN PRACTICE
MR. TAFT'S Civil Government was adopted on
July 4, 1901. What have been its most beneficent results since then, as proclaimed by the
American officials themselves? The first results were quite evident-more schools, better
roads, and an improved system of sanitation.
What did these mean?
"We have given them education and public
improvement," said the administration. Let
us state this more accurately. "We," the
benevolent American people have selected American teachers to teach Filipinos what "we"
choose, making the Filipino treasury pay for
such expenses. "We" have decided what improvements were needed, have effected such
improvements under the supervision of American office-holders, and have later presented the
bill to the native taxpayer. These American
officers, technical as well as administrative, have
been paid large salaries and the system has
naturally been most expensive to the impoverished islanders.
209




210  Conquest of the Philippines


From the way these material benefits have
been related to the Americans at home, however, one is led to assume that the improvements
effected have cost the American taxpayer a considerable amount. That the contrary is true
was baldly stated by Secretary of War Stimson
who in his report of 1912 said, "And the cost of
all this and of the much more that has been similarly done has been borne by the Filipino people
themselves."
Is not this method of improving a nation like
the rich man who tells his poor neighbor that he
ought to have a larger house, better furniture,
newer clothes, horses and carriages and forthwith orders them, but has them charged to his
neighbor without consulting him as to how these
bills are to be met? It is a form of charity easy
to the soi-distant benefactor but ruinous to the
unhappy neighbor. Surely if "we" insisted
upon teaching the Filipinos the American language, instead of propagating the already implanted Castilian tongue, "we" should at least
have defrayed that portion of the bill. Evidently this was a benevolence tinctured with
New England thrift. Was not this policy aptly
expressed at that time by Mr. Dooley when he
said:
In ivry city in this unfair land we will erect school
houses an' packin' houses an' houses iv correction;




The Taft Policy in Practice 211


an' we'll larn ye our language because 'tis aisier to
larn ye ours than to larn oursilves yours. An' we'll
give ye clothes, if ye pay f'r thim; an' if ye don't, ye
can go without. And whin ye're hungry ye can to
to th' morgue-we mane th' resth'rant-an' ate a
good square meal if ar-rmy beef. An' we'll sind th'
gr-reat Gin'ral Eagan over f'r to larn ye etiquette, an'
Andhrew Carnegie to larn ye pathriteism with blowholes into it, an' Gin'ral Alger to larn ye to hould
onto a job; an' whin ye've become edycated an' have
all th' blessings if civilization that we don't want,
that'll count ye one. We can't give ye anny votes,
because we haven't more thin enough to go round
now; but we'll treat ye th' way a father shud treat
his childher if we have to break ivry bone in ye'er
bodies.
The teaching of the English language, however, did accomplish something at the expense
of the Taft policy. It opened to the Filipinos
the history of the American revolution, the
Declaration of Independence. It opened to
them the words of Lincoln that "no man is good
enough to govern another without that other's
consent." And yet the Taft policy expected to
have these pupils as contented subjects for
generations, enjoying the contempt that was
daily being heaped upon them, loving to be
treated as an inferior people. How strange an
expectation!
Nor was this prophecy far fetched. Six years




212  Conquest of the Philippines


after the establishment of the Taft Government, one of his successors, Governor Smith,
was forced to point out with regret "the growing
gulf between the two peoples" and to say that
an era of ill feeling had started between Americans and Filipinos and, I hesitate to say it, "race
hatred" (1). And no wonder. Let Mr. Leupp,
a staunch supporter of the late President Roosevelt give an idea of the conditions then existing in
the Islands. Speaking of the American residents in the Philippines who, say what one will,
are the only Americans known to the majority
of Filipinos, he said:
These men are the loudest and most bitter in their
criticisms of the conduct of affairs. They disaprove most vigorously the friendly attitude of our
government towards the natives, and denounce the
policy of benevolent assimilation as preposterous and
visionary.... They object to the appointment
of so many Filipinos to office and instead of cultivating the good will of the native people and creating a
demand for American goods, they spend their time
and energy finding fault and making gloomy predictions.
The people here described have sent emissaries to
Washington to convince the authorities that things
are all wrong in the Philippines, that the iron hand
of white supremacy should replace the Taft policy of
"The Philippines for the Filipinos." What they
call a Chamber of Commerce in Manila is really an




The Taft Policy in Practice


2I3


organization for bringing about conditions more
favorable to the exploitation of the islands, without
reference to the welfare of the natives. The admission of Chinese labor is the first thing the chamber of
commerce wants in this program.
The relations between the "American element"
there and the Filipinos are most seriously strained;
the newspapers which cater to it never say a word for
the Filipinos, nor, for that matter, the civil government. The despicable "little brown brother" poem
has been widely circulated. It is about as true a
picture of the Filipinos as "the Leopard's Spots" is
of the negro in America. No one can read its fierce
arraignment of the natives and learn that it is almost
a national hymn with our soldiers here, and then
imagine that relations between the two races are
very cordial (2).
But for even better testimony, let these
American residents speak their own mind. At
a mass meeting held by them in Manila one
speaker expressing his belief that the American
government had been weak and vacillating,
added:
Now   I believe in "benevolent assimilation"
(which quotation was greeted with laughter). I
believe it so strongly that I would, if necessary, pin
it to these islands with the bayonet.
Then, referring to a celebration that the
Filipinos had had in which American and Fil



214  Conquest of the Philippines


ipino flags had been displayed, came this ambitious claim:
They (the Filipinos) did not realize that we, who
are here tonight, are the Government, and that that
government could not have been here without us,
and cannot stay here without us.... I believe
in peace and harmony. I always did, and when I
had a battalion of volunteers behind me I felt awful
peaceful.... I believe that if we could put about
one hundred thousand American troops here it would
be very peaceful (laughter), exceedingly so, and you
would not see any more Katipunan (Filipino) banners
eight or ten feet long, with their designs emblazoned
in silk, going along the streets with a little six cent
American flag carried underneath it. It would be
too peaceful for that.
So much for the bonds of friendship between
the two peoples. No wonder they have led to
further bickerings on the part of the American
residents whenever concessions have been
granted to the Filipinos. No wonder too that
when, in 1907, the Filipinos were finally granted
a Philippine assembly, they made that the occasion to renew their demand for independence.
Before the establishment of this Philippine Assembly it was virtually an act of disloyalty to
talk of independence. Mr. Taft himself had refused to permit the Filipinos to organize an
independence party. But with the veil of sup



The Taft Policy in Practice


215


pression removed in 1907, the agitation for a
complete separation was formally launched,
and has been kept up since with increasing
vigor.
What about the economic blessings given to
the country? As the fires of insurrection were
fnally suppressed, the Filipinos turned to their
chosen occupation-agriculture. The fields were
then in a ravaged condition as a result of the
prolonged period of war. The struggle had
reduced most of the provinces to a state of
misery. In his report of 1902, the Secretary of
War, Mr. Root, had acknowledged these catastrophes. He said,
The ills which have recently befallen the people of
the islands call for active and immediate measures of
relief. The people of a country just emerging from
nearly six years of devastating warfare, during which
productive industry was interrupted, vast amounts
of property were destroyed, the bonds of social order
were broken, habits of peaceful industry were lost..had a sufficiently difficult task before them to
restore order and prosperity. In addition to this,
however, the people of the Philippine islands have
within the past year been visited by great misfortunes. The rinderpest has destroyed about ninety
per cent of all their carabaos, leaving them without
draft animals to till their land and aid in the ordinary work.... The rice crop has been reduced
to twenty-five per cent of the ordinary crop.. 




26   Conquest of the Philippines


cholera has raged and is still raging throughout the
islands..
And yet on November 19 of that same year, the
President was telling the people of the United
States that "the islands have never been as
orderly, as peaceful or as prosperous as now"
(3), which statement properly induced Mr. Burrit Smith to say, "The President's prosperity
seems to be composed in nearly equal parts of
pestilence and famine." For indeed, the bare
comparison of the statement with the facts made
arguments superfluous.
As late as August 2, 1905, the Representatives of Batangas province addressed a letter to
Governor Taft to show the miserable condition
of the municipality of Balayan. The statistics
they offered showed that, whereas in 1896 the number of inhabitants in that district was 41,308, in
1905 the number had been reduced to 13,924.
There had been 19,500 hectares of cultivated
land in 1896-there were only 1,700 in 1905.
Other items had suffered even more, rice having
fallen from 39,020 to 12,500 cavanes, sugar from
520,000 to 12,300; maize from 110,000 to 10,000,
cows 3,680 in 1896, only 80 left seven years
later; oxen from 4,110 to 433; hens from 96,000
before the war to only 5,000 four years after
the establishment of civil government.  Consider what a story those figures tell.




The Taft Policy in Practice 217


In addition to these calamities there had been
placed upon the shoulders of the entire population an internal revenue tax, of which Professor
Paul S. Reinsch said:
Outside of Italy it would be hard to find a system
of taxation that so efficiently scours the whole field
of business. The merchants and professional men
of a country like the United States would look upon
it as a most unbearable burden.
In the light of these hardships, it would be
reasonable to expect that the economic policy of
the United States towards the Islands would be
guided by the desire to make them as prosperous as possible. And yet the first few years of
American legislation in this matter showed a
series of blunders which resulted in heaping
further hardships upon the already prostrated
people.
When the Islands were under the dominion of
Spain the native planters had had the benefit of
a limited Spanish market, but when the United
States sovereignty was extended to the archipelago this market was taken away, and in its
place nothing was given. The first tariff act
passed by the American Congress to regulate
the trade of the Philippines was that of March
8, 1902. It allowed Philippine products coming into the United States a reduction of 25%,




2I8  Conquest of the Philippines


from the regular Dingley rates. Governor Taft
realized how ineffective this reduction was, and
he pleaded very earnestly with Congress to
give his "Filipinos" something in lieu of the
privileges they had under Spain. But the sugar
and tobacco interests in the United States
checked his efforts because they were afraid that
Philippine products would endanger their domestic crops.
There were one or two "jokers" in this tariff
legislation of 1902 also that are already wellknown. One was the clause which abolished
the export tax on Philippine produce coming to
the United States. Among these native products
was the world-famous Philippine hemp. This
native product was at the time sorely needed in
the home markets, and the object of the law was
clearly to favor the exportation of this article to
the United States exclusively and thus defeat
the British and other foreign exporters in Manila
from getting their share of the article in question.
The method by which this was accomplished
was even more vicious, and really constituted
the big "joker" of the tariff act. It will be remembered that export taxes were collected on
Philippine produce as they left the custom house
in Manila. Now the levying of taxes on exports
is strictly prohibited by the Constitution of the
United States, but the Supreme Court at




The Taft Policy in Practice 219


Washington had said that the Constitution did
not extend to the Philippines. Among the
articles thus taxed was hemp, but the tariff law
of 1902 now said that if the hemp shipped from
Manila was proved to have been consumed in
the United States, then the export duties already paid would be refunded to the shipper in
order to give him the true benefit of a reduction.
This odd method of administering the law was
thus double-edged.  It not only gave the
American exporter a tremendous advantage
over his British rival, but it also favored the
American shipper over the Filipino planter.
This was so because when the native planter
sold his crop he was forced to sell it at the current price which assumed that an export tax
would be levied upon it. To an American shipper the recovery of this export duty later was a
matter of routine, as he could easily prove
through his American offices that the hemp was
in fact received and consumed in the United
States. But the Filipino planter or broker
dealing on a much smaller scale could not, without difficulty and expense, follow his few bales
into the markets of the United States and then
prove to the custom officials that the hemp was
in fact consumed there. The result of this
American legislation was apparent-only the
big fish, like the American Hemp trust, got the
benefit of this so-called favored reduction.




220  Conquest of the Philippines


Governor Taft and his commission saw the
injustice thus placed on the native planters, and
they earnestly besought Congress to remove
such legislation from the statute books of the
United States.
"These refundable duties," they said in their
report of 1904, "are in effect a gift of that
amount to the manufacturers of the United
States who use hemp in their operations" (4).
Their report of the following year was just as
earnest in its complaint.
"It is a direct burden upon the people of the
Philippine Islands," they said, "because it takes
from the Insular treasury export duties collected from the people and gives them to manufacturers of hemp products in the United States."
Surely this was a poor way to make the
Filipinos learn to value their association with
the United States, and Mr. Taft's commission
tried to impress the American Congress with
this consideration.
"It seems hardly consistent," they said, that
"with our expressions of purpose to build and develop the Philippine Islands...we are thus
enriching a few of our own people at their
(Filipino) expense" (5).
By 1906 the situation had not abated. When
the American Governor General Ide returned to
the United States he frankly said, "By annexation we killed the Spanish market for Philippine




The Taft Policy in Practice 221


sugar and tobacco, and our tariff shuts these
products from the United States, and today
both these industries are prostrated" (6).
It would be fruitless to examine in detail all
the steps taken by the powerful American elements at home and abroad to aid their own interests at the expense of others. Dr. Parker Willis,
Professor of Economics in the Washington and
Lee University, after making an exacting study
of the tariff laws, finally added this convincing
summary:
Wines were taxed in such a way as to discriminate
against the light Spanish beverages and in favour of
the Californian. Canned goods were taxed according to weights of the cans, a plan which favoured
Chicago and St. Louis producers as against English.
Beer was so rated that the American product shipped
in barrels was favoured against the beer of other
countries. Every effort was made to help the American and hamper the foreign shipper (7).
An even more scholarly discussion of these
discriminations was published in the Journal of
Political Economy for March, 1903.
And yet in the midst of these calamities and
discriminations, President Roosevelt was telling
the American Congress, that,
No great civilized power has ever managed with
such wisdom and disinterestedness the affairs of




222  Conquest of the Philippines


people committed by the accident of war to its
hands (8).
Mr. Taft realized the burdens which American interests, afraid of the so-called Asiatic
competition, were thus placing on the industries
of the Philippines. He, therefore, labored hard,
quietly and with infinite patience, and finally
after a campaign of nine years succeeded in convincing the sugar and tobacco industries in the
United States that a little Philippine produce
would do them little harm and would put the
Islanders in good humor. The Payne tariff law
was therefore enacted in 1909, permitting the
free entrance of Philippine produce up to certain
limits prescribed by the Act.
This relief was by no means satisfactory, however, for the new tariff proposed to continue the
tax on exports shipped to foreign countries from
Manila.   Well did the Hon. Oscar W. Underwood tell Congress:
When you put a tax on your people for engaging in
export trade, to that extent you lessen their ability
to successfully meet their foreign competitor, and
reduce the territory in which they can successfully
dispose of their surplus products abroad. Our forefathers in writing the Constitution of the United States,
recognizing the false principle on which the export tax
was based, put it in the fundamental law of the land
that the United States Government should not lay export




The Taft Policy in Practice


223


taxes. If we enact this law, we write into the statute
book for the Philippine Islands, legislation which is
little short of barbarous, legislation that no government
in the civilized world except Turkey and Persia, and
other second class nations countenance today (9).
The protest was vain, for the American hemp
interests won and the provision for an export
tax was adopted.    The Hon. Manuel Quezon
arguing for the repeal of this export tax two
years later, ably put forth this unanswerable
argument:
Although it has been decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States that the provisions of the
Constitution are not in force in the Philippines, I
have serious doubts as to whether said decision also
meant that this government has the power to enact
laws for the islands which are expressly prohibited
by the Constitution of the United States (10).
In 1909, a distinguished son of Boston, the
Hon. W. Cameron Forbes, assumed the position
of Governor General in the Philippines. He
was able, conscientious, and unselfish, and
thoroughly convinced that the Taft program
was justified, and, as an untiring worker, was
determined to make this policy a true blessing to
the Filipinos. During the four years that he
occupied that exalted position, he sacrificed his
health and his comfort in exchange for the con



224  Conquest of the Philippines


sciousness that comes from a job well done.
His extreme courtesy, his marked sympathy
for the aspirations of the Filipinos and his deeprooted interest in all affairs appurtenant to the
Islands made him a most gracious person to deal
with, and during his administration he made
friends readily and kept them for all time. Certainly, then, if the policy founded by Judge
Taft was the right one, no more admirable person could have been found to administer it. If
we must oppose him and criticize him, therefore,
we do so not on personal grounds but because
he pursued a policy which we believe was wrong
-because the undertaking in which he engaged
was hopeless.
Governor Forbes's inaugural address aptly
characterized his policy. Improvement in the
material conditions of the Islands and the people
was the keynote of his speech, and he declared
that capital was the greatest need of the country.
Capital [he said] demands a stable government.
Capital is not particularly interested in the color or
design of the flag, it wants just and equitable laws,
sound and uniform currency on the part of the government, just and fair treatment in the courts. The
faith of the United States is pledged that all of these
benefits shall be permanently assured to the Filipinos... There is not on the horizon discernible any
cloud which indicates the possibility of any kind of




The Taft Policy in Practice  225


disturbance in the present status of these Islands,
either from within or without, by war or insurrection.
The United States is strong, determined, fixed in her
policy and not to be dissuaded or coerced. The
development of the Philippines will proceed along
the lines originally set forth, strictly adhered to by
each successive administration and by the gradual
process in line of declared policy.... The government should offer every reasonable inducement
to capital and should make more liberal the land and
mining laws and lessen the restrictions which are at
present discouraging investors.
In a word, then, Governor Forbes's policy was
to introduce more capital from sources foreign
to the Philippines, and thus create material prosperity. To induce American and other foreign
investors to settle in the Islands it was also
his aim to assure these men that their investments would be protected by American control. His ideal was not, however, novel for it
was the deal also of many in his generation and
of those who had preceded him in office. This
policy is opposed, therefore, simply because it
creates an interest hostile to Philippine independence, because it makes separation more
difficult and more costly. It was capital which
brought on the Boer War, it was capital which
led to the conquest of India, it is capital which
promotes the aggression of the strong upon the
weak, and so to the policy of introducing ma



226  Conquest of the Philippines


terial improvements by foreign capital while the
Philippines are yet in a state of dependence,
their people are absolutely opposed.
If the Filipinos must be taught something
about Yankee ingenuity, let them be taught to
help themselves with their own resources, and
not with the money of others. Set before them,
as was set before the founders of the American
republic, "the glorious prospect of entire independence," that it may "breathe into them
anew the breath of life," as it did into the breasts
i   of those who have gone before them. And if
foreign capital must come into the Philippines,
as it will inevitably come, let it come when the
Islands are independent, so that it may settle as
it has settled in Mexico and Cuba with the full
understanding that it is the native government
upon which it must depend for security. This
policy, though investments may be slow at first,
will encourage foreign capital more and more
as the peoples of the world learn to look upon
the Filipinos as human beings anxious to contribute their modest share to the welfare of
mankind. Is this not infinitely better than the
policy which to this day tells the sensitive
Filipinos,no matter what you think, we shall act without regard to your wishes as we alone are fit to judge of your
ability; we alone will decide when independence is




The Taft Policy in Practice


227


good for you; meanwhile you shall have no voice in
your government save that which we choose to give
you.
How absolute the American control of the
Philippine treasury has been to this day was
stated in the leading editorial of the Boston
Transcript for September 24, 1925, from which
the following is a quotation:
The American people are brought to a crisis in
their and the government's relations with the Philippine Islands by the decision of the Philippine Supreme Court that rulings of the insular auditor are
not definitive, but may be appealed to the local
courts. The power of the Philippine auditor (an
American official) subject to that of the GovernorGeneral and the United States Secretary of War, is absolutely necessary to the maintenance of American
authority in the islands.... The present decision
has been promptly appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, and no doubt a prompt ruling will
be handed down from that tribunal. If it should sustain the Philippine decision, the decisive authority
of the American government in the islands would be
at an end, and the islands themselves might as well
be turned over to the Filipinos.
In other words one subordinate official with a
salary of six thousand dollars must have absolute control over the use which is made of taxes




228  Conquest of the Philippines


raised from eleven millions of people. What
nation would submit to such tyranny? How
would such an officer appointed by the Governor of New    York be received in Massachusetts?
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER XI
1. Speech before Manila Quill Club, Jan. 25, 1909.
2. New York Evening Post, June 11, 1904.
3. Speech at Memphis, Nov. 19, 1902.
4. Report of U. S. Phil. Comm., 1904, pt. 1, p. 26.
5. Report of U. S. Phil. Comm., 1905, pt. 1, p. 72.
6. New York Independent, Nov. 22, 1906.
7. Our Philippine Problem, pp. 274-5.
8. Message to Congress, Jan. 27, 1908.
9. Speech in House of Rep., May 18, 1909, See Cong.
Rec., p. 2009.
10. Speech in House of Rep., Aug. 19, 1911.




CIAPTER XII


THE ATTITUDE OF PRESIDENT COOLIDGE
To lessen the absolute power of the American representatives in the Philippines, and in
order to fulfill the promise of the Philippine
plank in the Democratic platform of 1912 which
had declared for an immediate declaration of
the nation's purpose "to recognize the independence of the Philippine Islands as soon as
a stable government" could be established,
Mr. Jones of Virginia introduced a bill in the
House of Representatives in August, 1914.
The bill which passed the House besides providing for a more popular and autonomous
form of government, contained a preamble
to the effect that it was and always had been
"the purpose of the people of the United
States to withdraw their sovereignty over
the Philippine Islands and to recognize their
independence as soon as a stable government
could be established therein."
When the bill was presented to the Senate,
however, the preamble was slightly changed.
Independence, according to the Senate bill was
229




230  Conquest of the Philippines


to be granted when, in the judgment of the
United States it would be "to the permanent
interests of the Philippine Islands." The question thus naturally arose when the bill was under
discussion whether the new proposal really paved
the way for independence.
Suppose [asked Senator Cummings of Iowa] that I
believe it would be better for the people of the Philippine Islands to remain permanently attached to the
United States as a state, with all the privileges of a
state or otherwise, would I not fulfill the promise or
assurance of the preamble in voting to retain the
Philippine Islands as a part of the territory of the
United States?
To this question, Senator Hitchcock who was
supporting the new preamble candidly replied,
"I presume the Senator would."
Interest was thus aroused by this sudden
revelation that the preamble as now worded did
not explicitly pledge independence after all. To
put an end to this uncertainty, and in order to
show the seriousness of the pledge which the
Administration wished to give the Filipinos,
Senator Clarke of Arkansas introduced an
amendment authorizing the President of the
United States to definitely "withdraw and surrender all right of possession, supervision, jurisdiction, control, and sovereignty" over the
Philippine Islands and requiring that the trans



The Attitude of President Coolidge 231


fer of possession and sovereignty be made absolute in not less than two nor more than four
years. The proposed measure also authorized
the President to acquire land sites desired by
the United States for naval and coaling stations
in the Philippines.
So strong was the feeling in the Senate in
favor of Philippine autonomy that this unexpected proposal, grave and far-reaching as it
was meant to be, was successfully carried. When
the final vote was taken the measure was accepted, the vote being fifty-two against twentyfour, the Democrats solidly voting for it and
carrying six Republican ballots as well. Never
had the Filipinos been as near their goal as on
this occasion. It was certainly the most decisive step ever taken by a branch of the American Congress.
When the news was cabled to the Philippines,
the Filipinos greeted their triumph with enthusiasm and hopes that the House would likewise vote favorably on the bill. It will be remembered that ever since the American occupation
of 1898 neither House of Congress had made a
definite statement of America's policy. When
the bill, as amended, was brought before the
House, however, it suffered another change.
It was found necessary to hold a conference
between the committees of the two Houses in
order to reconcile the varying views regarding




232  Conquest of the Philippines


the liberty to be granted the Filipinos. As
finally passed and enacted into law by both
Houses, the Jones Bill made the statement that
"it is and always has been the purpose of the
people of the United States to withdraw their
sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to
recognize their independence as soon as a stable
government can be established therein." In
order to speedily accomplish this purpose the
new law also granted immediately a larger share
of self-government in matters of domestic concern. The importance of this measure, however, which had the approbation of both Houses,
lay in the pledge which for eighteen years a
Republican administration had been able to
avoid. Now, however, not only was America's
word given, but a test had also been providedthat of a stable government. The problem of
the future must therefore be limited to the
question whether the Filipinos had succeeded
in establishing a stable government.
In accordance with the spirit of the new law,
Governor Francis Burton Harrison who had
succeeded Cameron Forbes in 1913 immediately
began to place Filipinos in charge of the administration as rapidly as possible, until the American
Governor General, the Vice-Governor, the Secretary of Public Instruction, the Insular auditor
and a few minor officials were the only Americans
left in office. But the theoretical sovereignty of




The Attitude of President Coolidge 233


the American people still remained, a sovereignty
based on force and certainly not sanctioned or
even acquiesced in by the Filipino people.
It would entail an endless array of facts and
figures to recount the progress and missteps of
the new regime. But a brief survey of the most
undisputed facts would show beyond a doubt
that the Filipinos were not forgetting what had
been taught them   by the "self-sacrificing"
Americans. Take the matter of schooling and
education. Under the Forbes administration
the attendance in public schools had reached
440,000, but in 1921, when Governor Wood
came to assume his duties he found that the
Filipinos had provided accommodations for over
1,100,000. Only 7,512,000 pesos had been spent
annually for education in 1913 when Governor
Forbes left; in 1921 over 22,000,000 pesos were
employed to provide for the increased attendance in schools. Of course the number of schools
rose in proportion as well, from 9,934 in 1913, to
5,944 in the course of Filipino administration,
while the number of Filipino teachers kept pace
accordingly-from 7,671 to 17,575.
In the field of transportation the material
progress effected was just as convincing. First
class roads increased from a total mileage of
2,035 kilometers in 1913 to 4,698, or an increase
of over 100 per cent in eight years. So with
inter-island coastwise traffic,-from 680 vessels




234  Conquest of the Philippines


with a net tonnage of 54,396, the number rose to
3,044 with a net tonnage of 99,376.
In 1913 there were no public dispensaries giving free medical treatment but within eight
years the Filipinos established over 800 such institutions. There were then also only two insular
and six provincial hospitals, but that was increased under Filipino "misgovernment" to
eleven insular and eleven provincial hospitals.
There was only one organization for infant welfare when the Filipinos took charge unhampered
by an American Governor General. Here was
clearly a large field for improvement as infant
mortality in the Islands had in the past been unusually heavy. They proved themselves equal
to the task, however, for by 1921 there were 615
institutions functioning for this purpose. Death
rates thus fell from 32.28 per thousand for the
periods of 1908-13, to 28.62 from 1914-19,
despite the fact that an epidemic of influenza
had ravaged the Islands in 1918.
During this significant period of Philippine
autonomy, of course mistakes were made as mistakes always are made by even the best of all
governments. We do not seek to excuse them or
to place responsibility for them upon the shoulders of the American Governor General who was
on the ground and who was responsible in numerous instances for unwise appointments. Suffice
it to say that marked progress was made during




The Attitude of President Coolidge 235


this period of trial, how marked will be shown by
the report of the investigation made by leading
Republicans-of which more anon.
It was no doubt in view of these marked advances and the evident capacity of the Filipinos
to manage their own interests that President
Wilson finally informed Congress that the
Filipinos had fulfilled the required condition set
before them.
Allow me to call your attention to the fact [he
told the Houses of Congress on December 7, 1920]
that the people of the Philippine Islands have succeeded in maintaining a stable government since the
last action of the Congress in their behalf, and have
thus fulfilled the condition set by the Congress as the
precedent to a consideration of granting independence to the Islands. I respectfully submit that this
condition precedent having been fulfilled, it is now
our liberty and our duty to keep our promise to the
people of those Islands, by granting them the independence which they so honorably covet.
If the future of the Philippine Islands had
been without regard to party fortunes in the
United States such a recommendation would undoubtedly have resulted in definite action. But
another political party assumed power on March
of the following year and the New Republican
President, Mr. Harding, almost immediately
sent a commission of his own to the Philippines




236  Conquest of the Philippines


there to make a study of the situation in order
to inform the new administration. In this action is clear proof of the difficulties that attend
the efforts of impartial Americans to learn the
exact state of affairs in the Islands, because
each administration in Washington views the
problem from a different angle and refuses to
trust the findings of the party which preceded it.
Two eminent Republicans, both of whom were
well-known to be against Philippine independence, were the chosen investigators. It might
properly have occurred to the President that
impartial men should have been sent, or that at
least one member of the commission should
have been in favor of independence. As it was
both General Wood and Governor Forbes who
had never changed their views in regard to
Philippine independence were made final arbitrators. No one need question the honest purposes of both men, as they stood high in the
estimation of their own fellow-citizens, but men
are human and when they have for years maintained a certain point of view they cannot approach the subject anew with an open or judicial
mind. The Filipinos, however, hoped that they
might after a more careful investigation change
their outlook.
The Wood-Forbes mission spent some six
months in the Islands. They brought back a
report recommending the continuance of Ameri



The Attitude of President Coolidge 237


can control. The commission stated that they
had found marked progress in the Islands, but
recommended nevertheless that the hour for independence had not yet come as the people
needed more time "to absorb and master the
powers already in their hands."
The field of government service was in particular the one in which the greatest progress
had been made.
We find [said the commission] that many Filipinos
have shown marked capacity for government service
and that the young generation is full of promise; that
the civil service laws have been in the main honestly
administered (1). In many positions they have
shown marked capacity and have done better than
could reasonably be expected of an inexperienced and
untried people. There are many holding high positions in the judicial, executive and educational departments who would be a credit to any government.
They are proud as they may well be, of the advance
they have made since the beginning of American
control of the Islands, for it can be safely stated that
no people under the friendly tutelage of another have
made so great a progress in so short a time (2).
We find [said the commission] that the legislative
chambers are conducted with dignity and decorum
and are composed of representative men (3).
These statements having been made by men
known to have been opposed to Philippine in



238  Conquest of the Philippines


dependence should be interpreted in the strongest light possible. Can they be applied also to
most of the state legislatures in America?
Nevertheless, the commission finally concluded by submitting the following recommendations:
1. We recommend that the present general status
of the Philippine Islands continue until the
people have had time to absorb and thoroughly
master the powers already in their hands.
2. We recommend that the responsible representative of the United States, the Governor
General, have authority commensurate with
the responsibilities of his position. In case of
failure to secure the necessary corrective action by the Philippine Legislature, we recommend that Congress declare null and void
legislation which has been enacted diminishing,
limiting, or dividing the authority granted by
the Governor General under act of Congress
No. 240 known as the Jones Bill.
3. We recommend that in case of a deadlock between the Governor General and the Philippine Senate in the confirmation of appointments the President of the United States be
authorized to make and render the final
decision.
The first general recommendation naturally
meant retention for another indefinite period of




The Attitude of President Coolidge 239


years,-a continuation of the Taft policy. The
other two meant the diminishing of powers already in the hands of the Filipinos. The American Congress has not acted on either of the
latter, but when General Wood was appointed
governor shortly after the submission of this
report it was evident to all that he would to a
large extent be influenced in the exercise of his
powers by the recommendations which he himself had made. Many there were, therefore, who
feared that a clash between him and the native
legislators was inevitable.
To put it mildly the attitude of the new Governor was that the Chief Executive being the
representative of American sovereignty was entitled to exercise an authority over the Philippines equal to or even more than that of the
President of the United States over his own
people, inasmuch as the Governor's veto is practically final, whereas that of an American president may be and is in fact frequently overridden
by a legislature. Nay, more, as we have seen
that the American auditor appointed by the
Governor was to have final authority over the
Philippine expenditures.
The claim of the Filipinos on the other hand
may be gathered from the words of one of its
greatest leaders, Senator Osmena.  Speaking
before the Philippine barristers, he expressed
Filipino sentiment in these words:




240  Conquest of the Philippines


The Filipinos know that theirs is now an autonomous
regime; that they and not the Governor General,
are being subjected to a test; that they and not the
Governor General are in duty bound to establish a
stable government here, and that they and only they
are committed to the task of hastening the day for
the granting of their independence. They, therefore,
have the right to follow and be guided by their own
leaders and to expect that their control in the government of their own country be real, ample and effective.... To surrender our present lease of governmental power or our control over internal affairs
for one reason or another, is not only sheer cowardice;
it is downright desertion of duty-treason against
the Nation (4).
Here then were two conflicting positions-the
Governor claiming for himself greater power as
an executive than that wielded by an American
president, and the Philippine legislature asserting that in matters of domestic concern they, as
representatives of the people and responsible to
them, should be the ones to decide the local problems of the day.
The legislative session of 1922-23 left little
doubt in the minds of men that the conflict
would not be long delayed.    Following the
resignation of the Philippine Cabinet and the
Council of State because, as the Filipino leaders
alleged, the Governor General was overriding
the clear law, the Filipinos decided to appeal




The Attitude of President Coolidge 241


their case to the American people. Knowing
how impossible it is for the Filipinos to arouse
the interest of Americans in these matters, they
hoped, nevertheless, that they might succeed in
laying their case before Congress. For that purpose they sent a commission to Washington
headed by Speaker Roxas of the Philippine
House of Representatives.
The Commission came to state that Governor
General Wood had been guilty of illegal and
arbitrary acts and that the irritation caused by
his course had led various Philippine leaders to
resign their official positions.
This event, [added the Filipino spokesman] grave
and serious as it is, once more demonstrates that the
immediate and absolute independence of the Philippines which the whole country demands, is the only
complete and satisfactory settlement of the Philippine problem.
About the time when this delegation took its
headquarters in Washington there was a bill
pending before the Committee on Insular Affairs favoring Philippine independence. The
Boston Globe of March 9, 1924, reported the
progress of this bill in these terms:
The United States House of Representatives Committee on Insular Affairs has this week voted to
report out a bill favoring Philippine independence by




242  Conquest of the Philippines


a vote of eleven to five. The Filipino representatives
in this country were jubilant. They felt that there
is a strong sentiment in the present Congress..
Just as the rejoicing was highest... President
Coolidge dropped a bombshell upon their festival of
hope.
Now, what was this bombshell with which
the President could defeat Filipino aspirations
without consulting Congress? It was an open
letter from the President addressed to the Filipino delegates in reply to their list of grievances
growing out of the intolerable situation in the
Islands. The President's letter was written
along familiar lines, but it must be considered
carefully, bearing in mind that it was published
just as the Insular Committee was proposing to
report a bill to grant the Islands their independence and, in the language of the New York
Times of March 14, "blocked any such bill in
Congress," and was intended to do so.
Said the President to the head of the Philippine Commission:
The extent to which the grievances which you suggest
are shared by the Filipino people has been a subject
of some disagreement. The American Government
has information which justifies it in the confidence that a very large proportion, at any rate, and
possibly a majority of the substantial citizenry of
the Islands, does not support the claim that there
are grounds for serious grievances.




The Attitude of President Coolidge 243


But does a general statement of this sort
carry conviction? From whom did the information come? What is meant by "substantial
citizenry?"  What did the President mean by
"the American Government"? Lincoln said it
was a "government by the people," but the
people had not received such information nor
had Congress, their chosen representatives. If
there was any reliable information why did not
the President make it known to the people or to
Congress? Surely, if the President would not
rely upon the unanimous voice of the Philippine
legislature, a legislature which, in the opinion of
the Wood-Forbes Report is "composed of representative men," it was imperative that the President give the people the information which he
had received, in order that they might judge its
value. The question is a question for the people
-not for Mr. Coolidge alone.
The President went on to say also that, "a
considerable section of the Filipino people is
further of the opinion that at this time any
change which would weaken the tie between the
Filipinos and the American nation would be a
misfortune to the Islands." What is this considerable section? What is the evidence of such
a feeling? The President has no right to act
upon information which he will not disclose.
It has been years since the desire for independence by Filipinos was firmly established.




244  Conquest of the Philippines


Every year since the organization of the Philippine Legislature in 1916, and before that the
Philippine Assembly in 1907, a resolution has
been adopted unanimously asking the Congress
of the United States to grant independence.
There is not a single dissenting vote in the
Houses when this matter is brought up. All
political parties in the Islands are for immediate
independence and they vie with each other in
their efforts to secure their country's freedom.
There is not a single man in the Philippines who
can be elected to office if he does not advocate
independence. Even the Wood-Forbes Report
substantiated this attitude, for they "found
everywhere, among the Christian Filipinos
(which compose ninety per cent of the population) the general desire for independence." If
the President, therefore, had evidence to the
contrary upon which he could safely rely, it
should have been published. It is a familiar rule
of law that "fraud lurks in general statements"
-"Dolus latet in generalibus."
But the President went on instead to speak of
the altruism of the United States in helping the
Filipinos.
A great responsibility came unsought to the American
people [he said] referring to the period of 1898. It
was not imposed upon them because they had yielded
to any designs of imperialism or of colonial expansion.




The Attitude of President Coolidge 245


The fortunes of war brought American power to your
Islands, playing the part of an unexpected and welcome deliverer.
This claim that the Islands came to the United
States unsought by the fortunes of war has been
dealt with in earlier chapters of this volume.
It was not to be wondered, however, that the
President should have again alluded to this
period of the conquest in such a high-handed
manner. This method was adopted by McKinley twenty-seven years before and it has since
been handed down intact and accepted by the
American people, because they have always been
too busy to look at the sources of information
or to even examine with a grain of salt these
statements though made by men presenting
their side of the case and defending the policies
for which they are responsible.
But the most naive suggestion in the President's letter was his statement to the commission
and, through them to the Filipino people, that
they would "do well to consider most carefully
the value of their intimate association with the
American nation." These were Governor Taft's
words nineteen years before when he expressed
the hope that the Filipinos would learn to value
their connection with the United States, while
the United States would then also appreciate
this "pearl of the Oriental tropics." Do not both




246  Conquest of the Philippines


these suggestions look toward permanent retention?
Is it not also safe and reasonable to assume
that ever since 1898 the Filipinos have carefully
considered the possible value of a permanent or
even an indefinite connection with the United
States? Is it not clear that having so considered it they have unequivocally expressed for
the last twenty-five years their ardent desire to
terminate these relations? What, therefore, did
the President expect to gain by urging them to
reconsider a question which they have already
studied and on which their attitude has never
varied?
Even with the presence of the American flag
in the Islands today the archipelago is one of
the most poorly protected lands in the world.
Any considerable force can easily overthrow
the scanty representation of American arms in
the Islands, and it is absurd to believe that the
American people would permit a President or a
Secretary of War to send the forces necessary to
protect eleven millions of "inferior" people.
Nor have the Filipinos forgotten that when their
peace was last endangered during the World
War, orders were given to the American military and naval forces to leave the Islands in the
event of a threatened attack.
What respect does the President pay to the
solemn promise made by the government of the




The Attitude of President Coolidge 247


United States in the Jones Law that as soon as
the Filipinos had established a stable government they should be granted their independence? Here is a promise and a test to decide
when independence should be granted. The
Filipinos have contended that this test has been
satisfied by them. President Wilson upheld
this contention and President Coolidge added
some support to this when he said in his letter
that:
In education, in cultural advancement, in political
conceptions and institutional development, the
Filipino people have demonstrated a capacity which
cannot but justify high hopes for their future.
But the President stated his conclusion, nevertheless, that
there had not been thus far a full realization of the
fundamental ideals of Democratic government.
There have been evidences of a certain inability or
unwillingness to recognize that this type of governmental organization rests upon the theory of complete separation of the legislative, executive and
judicial functions. There have been many evidences
of a disposition to extend the functions of the legislature and thereby curtail the proper authority of the
executive,
which under the veil of generality means that
the Governor General and the Philippine legis



248  Conquest of the Philippines


lature have disagreed. Such disagreements are
not rare in the realm of American national and
state government, but it has never been suggested that they were proof of political incapacity on the part of the legislatures or of infallibility on the part of the President. Is the
President entitled to make this opinion of his,
with no statements of the facts on which he
relies, binding on two nations? Are not his fellow-citizens entitled to weigh the "evidences"
to which he refers?
In a word, therefore, we find the President
brushing aside the test of a stable government
made by Congress in 1916 and substituting in
its place several tests of his own, such as a legislature acting in entire harmony with a Governor
appointed by him but paid out of the taxes
raised from the Filipino people. Wherein does
the President get the authority to make this
test? How many independent nations in the
world today can establish the clear recognition
of the separation of powers which the President
wants the Filipinos to achieve before independence is granted them? Even in the United
States the relative weight of each department in
the Federal government varies from time to time
and in no other country in the world does the
American experiment prevail-and yet they are
all independent.
Suppose the President's test is applied to him



The Attitude of President Coolidge 249


self. Where does our constitution give him the
power to determine the future of eleven millions
of men and their relations with the United
States?  Wllo gives him the right to decide
whether their government corresponds with the
American ideals or not? Did not the Supreme
Court of the United States unequivocally declare that the "Constitution of the United States
did not follow the flag"' into the Philippines, as it
does in the American territories? Did not
even McKinley himself announce from the beginning of the occupation that America had no
intention of applying her own theories of government in the Islands, but intended rather to
insure the welfare of the Filipinos with due respect for even their "prejudices if necessary"?
(5) The powers which the President now exercises are not executive. They are legislative
and the President usurped them to prevent Congress from exercising its legitimate right to
decide the Philippine issue.
The relations of the United States with the
Philippines are peculiarly a subject to be dealt
with by Congress. This was asserted at the outset of the occupation and has never been questioned. What right has the President to interfere
with their deliberations and seek to impose his
opinion upon them? History repeats itself, and
as the Islands were acquired and held and a
war declared by the President, without consult



250  Conquest of the Philippines


ing Congress, so now the Executive usurps the
function of Congress and would continue the
occupation of the Islands because he approves it.
This new and impossible test set by the President really meant and will continue to mean unless changed, that the promise made by an
American Congress in 1916 can be treated as "a
scrap of paper" in order to give place to a policy
which gives the Filipinos no hope of independence as long as an excuse may be found by the
President for holding that the government of the
Islands is not what it should be, or that it does
not correspond with his ideals. Apply such
tests to the American cities and which would be
left to govern itself?
For the sake of clarity let us again state the
problem in the Philippines as it arose in 1923 and
as it exists today. General Wood and the Filipinos have been and continue to be at issue, the
latter asserting that the Governor's course has
been arbitrary and lawless. History has invariably shown that when a military officer is placed
in civil authority he is apt to irritate the people
over whom he is placed. Here was an issue-is
it not reasonable to suppose that an impartial
tribunal should have settled the problem? The
least partial tribunal to which the Filipinos
could state their case was Congress, but the President took it into his own hands, and has assumed
to decide it without action by Congress.




The Attitude of President Coolidge 251


It is a fundamental fact in the government of
one people by another that the governing power
stands by its own representatives, believes in
them and is determined to sustain them. And
so the President sustained his representative on
this occasion. He told the complaining Filipinos
that he had "full confidence in the ability, good
intentions, fairness and sincerity" of General
Wood, and pronounced him, "a hard working,
painstaking and conscientious administrator,"
finding no evidence that he had "acted with any
other than the purposes of best serving the real
interests of the Filipino people."
What do these words mean? Only that the
President approves his appointee. But General
Wood may have had one idea as to the "real interest" of the Filipinos, and the Filipinos a very
different one. He may have sincerely adopted
what he considered the proper means, and yet in
the judgment of others they may have been improper. A man may be "hard working, painstaking and conscientious" in the pursuit of what
he thinks is good for a population, and yet be an
unsuccessful administrator lacking sympathy,
wisdom and tact.
Are there not in the United States differences
and deadlocks between "conscientious, painstaking and hard working" Presidents and Congresses; between Governors of "ability, good
intentions and fairness" and state legislatures,




252  Conquest of the Philippines


and between mayors and councils in the most
progressive cities of America? When a President is tried on articles of impeachment as was
Andrew Johnson, when members of a Cabinet
are forced to resign because of blundering stupidity or dishonesty, when elected governors are
sent to the state penitentiaries for dishonest practices, do such catastrophes prove that the
country is not fit for self-government?
No one need question the honest purposes of
the President or of General Wood, but the principles on which the American government was
founded are eternal, and consistently with them
the fate of a nation cannot be decided by a few
men. The New York Times of March 14,
1924, gives a glaring example of the practice
which in 1898 permitted a few men to conquer
the Islands. The dispatch in question came from
Washington and described a "conference in the
office of the Secretary of War" which, the paper
said, "may have an important hearing on Philippine independence as several American business
men who have interests in the Philippines attended."  A list of these business men was
given. One had "extensive interests in the
Islands," another was "a member of the Chamber of Commerce," a third had "large sugar
plantations" and a fourth was a "hemp importer." With these were joined Secretary
Weeks, General McIntyre and Ex-Vice-Gov



The Attitude of President Coolidge 253


ernor Gilbert, the latter being one of the strongest
advocates of indefinite control. Here were a few
Americans with private interests at stake met to
advise the Secretary of War as to what should be
done in the Philippines, and although there were
several Filipino officials in Washington at that
time, not one was present.
Is it not wiser and safer to leave the question
in the hands of the representatives of the American people, and let the issue be settled after open
debate in Congress, rather than permit the
President to dispose of the Islands according to
the counsel of men whom he believes "able to
give the best advice" but whom he does not
name, or by secret meetings between the Secretary of War and interested American business
men?
Just as President McKinley deliberately settled the fate of the Islands without consulting)
Congress in accordance with the desires of a
few selfish Americans who believed in trade expansion, President Coolidge in March, 1924,
blocked favorable action by Congress in behalf of the Filipinos and, at the behest apparently of a few American capitalists, undertook to
settle the future of the Philippines for many
years to come. The letter of the President was
but one step in this well-conceived scheme to
hold the Islands permanently, or at least until
the interest of these trade expansionists no




254    Conquest of the Philippines
longer warrants the maintenance of "a door to
the commercial markets of the Far East." The
plan will succeed, unless the American people
realize in time what "benevolent assimilation"
really means.
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER XII
1. Wood-Forbes Report, p. 45.
2. Ibid., p. 18.
3. Ibid., p. 45.
4. Speech on Dec. 7, 1923, Manila
5. Instructions to first Philippine Commission.




CHAPTER XIII


AN APPEAL TO REASON
THE arguments of those, who would retain the
Islands purely for so-called benevolent motives,
today consist mostly in prophecies of disaster.
These men claim to see the downfall of all that is
good in the Philippines in the event of American
withdrawal. Suppose we view the record which
the Filipinos have made within the last quarter
of a century. We need not do this in detail, as
that would demand too much time and space,
but we can view the work as the American critics
themselves have seen it.
An examination, therefore, would show that
the record of the Filipinos has been like that of
every other nation in the world for a similar
period of time. There has been unwise legislation and excellent legislation. There have been
ill-advised appointments as there are in every
country on earth, but there have also been admirable choices for administrative and judicial
positions. The people have regularly held their
elections with earnestness but with fairness, and
255




256  Conquest of the Philippines


with orderly conduct. Said Governor General
Wood to the Philippine Legislature in 1922:
I congratulate you and through you the Filipino
people, on the orderly and lawful conduct of the recent elections which, notwithstanding the keenness of
the struggle and the appearance of a strong new party
in the field, were conducted with due regard to the
rights of the candidates and with the absence of
fraud and irregularity which would be a credit to
any people.
Of course, the Filipinos have made mistakes.
There have been errors in the conduct of their
affairs, and these, sad to relate, have been meticulously picked out, enlarged, colored and
blazoned before the American public by the retentionists who would fain base their campaign
for indefinite control on the ground that the natives are incapable of governing themselves.
But on the whole, what does the record show?
The Wood-Forbes mission after spending six
I months in the Islands making the most exhaustive investigation for a report to a Republican
President said, "no people under the friendly
tutelage of another, have made so great a, progress in so short a time" (1). The Filipino
)progress in the estimation of the late President
H arding "is without parallel anywhere in the
> world" (2). Are these testimonials not convinc



An Appeal to Reason


257


ing enough? Must there be absolute perfection? Must there be a Utopia in the Islands?
But there are those who would say that this
progress has been due entirely to the "constant
support and supervision at every step by
Americans." This is a great assumption. That
is what every teacher is apt to think of a pupil's
achievement, but the pupils seldom agree and
they generally have a right to think differently.
The good schools, the good roads, the good
water, the improved sanitary conditions-how
were they achieved? At the outset the Americans contributed advice and direction-the Filipinos contributed the money and the labor.
Now practically all four elements are contributed by the Filipinos themselves. If more
American advice is needed in the future along
these lines, this advice can be secured by paying
for it as has been done in the past, but it will
then be cheaper because there will be none of
the heavy expenses attending American administration. This is what Asiatic nations like
Siam have done, and they have achieved success
and prosperity and have also maintained their
honor as well.
It was Mr. Taft who at one time said that to
confer independence upon the Filipinos would
Pe "to subject the great mass of their people to
he dominance of an oligarchical and probably
xploiting minority." Where have the Filipinos




258  Conquest of the Philippines


been all these years? For a long time they were
under the domination of five oligarchs, the
American Commissioners, and with the passing
of years that number was reduced to one-the
American Governor General under no responsibility to the people over whom he rules. This
kind of oligarchy has been a stubborn factthe Filipino "oligarchical minority" is a pure
fancy.
That there will be leaders among the Filipinos is undoubtedly true, just as there are
leaders and "bosses" in the political circles of
the United States, and these leaders, like all
leaders, will be a minority of the people, but they
will at least be men of the same blood, the same
aspirations, and the same traditions as their followers. These leaders will at least understand
their constituents and have respect for them and
sympathize with them, which is a very different
thing from the government of millions of people
by a few foreigners who look down upon the governed as members of an inferior race, and upon
that assumption rest their right to govern.
Well did Mr. Curry of New Mexico, who served
eight years in the Philippines as governor of three
provinces, finally say:
The government which the Filipinos will establish
may not be approved by the ordinary American
citizen, but it will suit the Filipinos themselves.




An Appeal to Reason


259


And that is the final test. The best government for any people is the government which
they like.
Let us examine even more closely, however,
the prophecy that if given entire independence
the Filipinos would "fall a prey to the strongest
of the sectional aggregations." What does that
statement mean? It means only that the strongest party will carry the elections, and the defeated party like all defeated parties here and
elsewhere will bewail the fact that the country
has become a "prey" to the officers in power.
These prophecies are the familiar weapons of
political contests. They do not frighten the
Filipinos and they should not frighten Americans.
There is also the prophecy among retentionists that the Filipinos, if independent, will give
up all that is good and take to mutual slaughter
as the best way to settle their domestic difficulties. This argument is absurd. Filipinos have
learned that good water is healthy and that good
roads are useful, and they have no more desire
to die of disease or to be killed in battle than
peaceful Americans have. The instinct of selfpreservation is as strong among them as it is
among the Anglo-Saxons.
The Philippine schools which received such
great impetus under early American guidance,
why did they become so pronouncedly success



260  Conquest of the Philippines


ful? Why are there more than a million children attending schools today? It is because the
Filipinos have sent their children there to be
taught. What made them do this? No law has
compelled it. The children went and studied
because they wanted to learn-Americans did
not implant the desire in their breasts. It was
already there in 1900 and it will remain there
when America has gone.
How is the rest of the world today faring in
this matter of self-government? Are there not
nations all over the world governing themselves,
not as the United States would have them, but
as they themselves prefer? Nor are the eyes of
the American people free from beams. We have
only to read the morning paper to see things
proposed and too often carried out by American
governors, legislators, and statesmen, municipal, state and national, that more intelligent
Americans deplore. And yet the remedy for
these evils is not to invite some more successful nation to come and govern the United
States, but to let the parties in error correct the
abuses themselves. Well did President Eliot
say:
(  "Political freedom  means freedom  to be
feeble, foolish and sinful in public affairs as well
as freedom to be strong, wise and good."
And this is true of all freedom-individual or
political. If the Filipinos should quarrel, there



An Appeal to Reason


26I


fore, which they have not yet done where the
national independence of their country has been
concerned, let the nation now free, whose way to
freedom has not been made through dissension
and folly, through bloodshed and civil war, cast
the first stone.
But does bloodshed and civil war necessarily
threaten the future of a Philippine republic?
Too often it has been said that anarchy would
inevitably ensue if the United States left the
Islands. Let us look at this closely. When the
American troops reached the Islands in 1898,
there was no anarchy and the Filipinos were
governing themselves. But more blood was shed
in the Filipino-American war that ensued than in
the three hundred years of Spanish oppression.
There is no reason to think that Asiatics are more
prone to civil war than Europeans. Turn the
pages of history! The War of the Roses, the
English Revolution and the wars with Scotland
and Ireland occurred while the British nation
was in the making. Gettysburg and Antietam,
Fredericksburg and Cold Harbor-do not these
names mean something to Americans? Are
there not gray-haired men even today who remember the days when Americans killed their
brother Americans on the field of battle? Remember that, and then bear in mind that Asiatic
nations have endured as long as the memory of
men extends, undestroyed by civil war. Why




262  Conquest of the Philippines


then should it be assumed that the Filipinos
would develop a passion for slaughtering each
other which would exceed the measure allowed
to civilized nations?
Nor is this all. The history of the Philippines
has shown that its people are natural repubicans possessed of the democratic spirit, and
he more recent pages of their history are illumined with the most eloquent proofs of their
unity. Whenever or wherever the opportunity
has been presented to them they have availed
themselves of it by an attempt to establish a republic. When the American people first became acquainted with the Filipinos the latter
were engaged in a fight for national independence. When success seemed within reach they
set up not a Tagalo Republic, or a Republic of
Luzon, but a Philippine Republic established by
representatives from the Islands. They did not
then draw a separate constitution for each province but instead prepared a constitution for the
whole group of islands, and when the national
hymn was composed by the revolutionists it was
addressed not to any portion of the archipelago
but to the whole adored fatherland. There is
not a region in the whole archipelago which has
not been sprinkled with the blood of its inhabitants in their struggle for the liberty of their
country. "They could have had any number of
men," said Admiral Dewey in 1898, "it was just




An Appeal to Reason


263


a question of arming them. They could have
had the whole population."
A great deal of harm has been done by Americans who misrepresent the true condition of the
Philippines, that of calling the Filipinos tribesmen in particular being the most current infamy. The Filipinos know that to this day they
are being thus discredited by innuendo if not
by direct misrepresentation. They know that
the majority of Americans in the Islands look
upon them with undue authority and hardly
concealed contempt. This attitude is not new
to an Anglo-Saxon and where there is political
mastery as well, the feeling of superiority is
augmented. All this is, of course, offensive to
the Filipino and it is an offense which seriously
threatens the respect and the admiration which
they have for all liberty-loving and democratic
Americans.
Assuming, however, for the purposes of argument, that the American administration has
governed well, what is there to assure the continuance of good government under their supervision? The whole policy of today which was
really begun by Mr. Taft is founded on the assumption that the American people are and will
continue to be unselfish toward the Filipino, and
that they can be trusted as well to keep men in
office anxious to carry out this unselfish and altruistic policy. Is this view compatible with




264  Conquest of the Philippines


human nature as justified by the experience of
the American people at home? Have they forgotten the Tweed Ring and the Teapot Dome,
to give only two illustrations?
There will always be in the future, as there
has been in the past, a body of Americans
anxious to make money and hoping to find it in
the Philippines. There will always be governors
naturally solicitous for the success of their administration and unwilling to disclose the facts
which might lead to criticism or condemnation.
They will always tell some of the Americans at
home, as Mr. Taft told some thousands of "excellent and prominent gentlemen," not to intermeddle because they are "very little able to
understand" the situation. And then, of course,
there will always be the great body of the goodnatured but over-busy American people knowing little and caring less about their distant subjects and believing what Americans say about
them because the latter are of their own flesh
and blood. How many, how many indeed, are
the Americans today who, on finding a small
headline in some obscure corner of the daily
newspaper to the effect that the "Filipinos want
independence," casually dismiss the subject by
remarking, "Oh well, they shall have it when
they are ready."
It is in that manner that the good-natured
American prides himself on the fair dealing which




An Appeal to Reason


265


Filipinos are to receive from people of an alien
race. Why do not these Americans pause a moment to consider whether their own house is in
such good order, and whether they are willing to
trust their own countrymen in matters concerning the life and the destiny of their own country.
Do they not see their own officials, judges, mayors,
governors and legislators directly opposed to
public opinion and severely criticized in the
newspapers and on the stump? So little is their
trust in their own elected officers that they do
not in many jurisdictions permit these men to
occupy their positions for even a brief period of
time without the additional safeguard of the recall, the initiative and the referendum, or a
provision against re-election.
When we find representatives of a defeated
political party in America prophesying all sorts
of evil because their opponents, men of the same
blood, color and ability as themselves, are placed
in power by a majority vote,-when Americans
will not trust Americans at home, how can the
good-natured citizen, with nothing at stake in
the Philippines, confidently hope that men can
be trusted with absolute power over millions of
aliens whom they consider their inferiors, and
where there is no public opinion which they may
fear, no American press to criticize them, no initiative, no referendum, no recall? Does the
graft which disgraces every city in the United




266  Conquest of the Philippines


States disappear in the Philippines? Men are
essentially selfish, and power is always used to
benefit him who wields it.
There is another argument, however, which
has been constantly urged by retentionists as
well as by well-meaning Americans to the effect that an independent Philippines would
}become a prey to Japanese aggression and commercial exploitation. What are these arguments
worth? It is well for these kindly Americans to
first consider certain significant facts concerning
Filipino-Japanese relations.
In the first place, then, it must be remembered
that the Japanese and Filipinos always have
maintained the best of relations. Both peoples
respect each other, both nations sympathize
with one another. Japan has also every desire
to gain the abiding confidence of the Filipinos
for, as the leader of the Far East, she wants all
the other smaller nations to look upon her as
their champion and their defender. She can,
therefore, ill afford to make any move which
may create the enmity of eleven million people.
Nor has Japan shown any desire to make the
Philippines a "hitching post" as Secretary Day
of McKinley's cabinet had openly advocated
twenty-seven years ago. Although Filipino doors
have been open to Japanese immigration in the
past, less than seven thousand have availed
themselves of it, the tropical climate of the




An Appeal to Reason


267


archipelago being extremely distasteful to
them.
Assume, however, that Japan does cherish
secret intentions against Filipino autonomy,
there is this to be considered,-that a Japanese
base on Philippine waters would be a direct
threat to British supremacy in that corner of the
world. Hongkong is thirty-six hours by passenger steamer from Manila, Borneo almost
touches the island of Palawan, Singapore is but
a step away, and even Australia may well be
considered to be on the direct line of trade. Is it
conceivable then that Great Britain will permit Japanese occupancy without raising a hand
of protest? And it is currently known that English statesmen wield a mighty influence in the
foreign affairs of the Japanese Empire.
Japan has, furthermore, made it clear through
the utterances of her acknowledged statesmen
that if a proposal to neutralize the Philippines
were made she would be among the first to affix
her seal to such a binding covenant. Now these
covenants of neutralization are, of course, not
final, and they cannot guarantee for all time the
security of the archipelago. But this much is
certain,-that promises of that nature become
sacred in the eyes of the world and if openly
repudiated turn friends into foes. Where the
interests of other nations become endangered,
who having relied upon such promises, as well




268 Conquest of the Philippines


they might, have acted upon them, repudiation
makes war justifiable. Well did Japan herself
herald her participation in the World War in
these words:
We of Japan took up arms against Germany because a solemn treaty was not to us " a scrap of paper"... We are in the war, we insist on being in it, and
we shall stay in it because earnestly, as a nation and
as individuals, we believe in the righteousness of the
cause for which we stand; because we believe that
only by a complete victory for that cause can there
be made a righteous, honorable and permanent
peace, so that this world may be made safe for all
men to live in, so that all nations may work out their
destinies untramelled by fear (3).
And the Filipinos believe in the Japanese word
even if the Congress of the United States apparently does not. Both peoples also realize that
they have everything to gain by maintaining an
attitude of friendship and cooperation because
their economic interests demand it, Japan being
essentially a manufacturing nation and the
Philippines thriving purely on agriculture. And
as peoples of the Far East they have additional
reason to stand on good terms, that they may
present a direct front to Anglo-Saxon aggressions.
What now of American exploitation in the
Philippines? Early in 1924, the American
Chamber of Commerce in Manila issued for the




An Appeal to Reason


269


third time a little pamphlet which was widely
distributed in the United States. It was entitled, the Philippine Problem Presented from
a New Angle. After elaborately building an
argument to the effect that the Philippines can
never be given their independence by Congress
because they are as much a part of American
domain as California and Louisiana, and hence
can only be alienated by a constitutional amendment, these boosters of Philippine trade presented the following tempting considerations to
the American public at home.
They said:
1. No unconditional promise of independence
has ever been made [to the Filipinos] even in the
preamble to the Jones Bill (4).
2. We are here by right, we are here by conquest
and we have a title by conquest and a title by purchase (5).
3. We are here as possessors, and we are here as
sovereigns; we are here as owners and controllers of
absolute sovereignty (6).
4. The Philippines are larger than New England
and Pennsylvania combined.... They are United
States territory..  [and are] inalienable by
Congress (7).
5. The American people own 63,000,000 acres of
public domain in this territory (8).
6. Your Philippine territory is the base for your
trade with China (9).




270 Conquest of the Philippines


7. This portion of the world is the great arena of
future commerce (10).
8. Hard fibre! Magic phrase of commerce! The
product that beckoned the first Yankee clippers to
Manila! In its Philippine territory the United
States holds exclusively the premier hard fibre region
of the world, sole source of Manila hemp that binds
the homeland harvests and outfits homeland ships.
The homeland requires two-thirds of all Manila
hemp grown in this territory and none of merchantable quality grows elsewhere (11).
9. In this territory homeland farm products find
a growing annual market. And so with homeland
manufactures (12).
10. Think about this territory; learn about this
territory; tell your Congressmen to lay off of this
territory as to base attempts to withdraw or curtail
your sovereignty! (13)
11. Take a national view of this territory; endorse the organized territory movement. We need
such an act (14).
12. "Vizualize!" (15)
And so on ad infinitum,
(Signed) THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
These statements need no comment. They
are self-incriminating and constitute in the face
of all fair opposition the strongest arguments
why the Philippines should be free. This movement on the part of the American business men
in the Islands was, of course, not new. In the




An Appeal to Reason


271


past as in the present, they have been one of the
most fruitful sources for the propagation of misinformation regarding Filipino incapacity. Can
the statements of Americans in the Philippines
be worth a whit, in the face of this evidence?
Let the American public, therefore, be warned
for the drive has not abated. Today we find
business interests and even public men openly
advocating the retention of the Islands, not indefinitely but for all time, in order that the
American nation may ride on inflated wheels.
America will never let the Philippines go [said Congressman James Begg to the Filipinos during his visit
to the Islands a few months ago]. She cannot...
Much of America's future prosperity is intertwined
with the future of the Far East. The Philippines are
America's outposts in the doorway to the Orient.... America is now on the ground. Our troops
are here, our flag is here (16).
Do the American people sanction these views?
If they do, then they should say so openly and
frankly,-it would be more humane and less
cowardly. If they do not, and we believe that
the latter is the truth, then it is time that an
overwhelming public sentiment should make itself felt against these imperialists and thus destroy the greatest menace which lies in the path
of Filipino autonomy, of Filipino freedom, of
Filipino life itself.




272   Conquest of the Philippines
But there is an even deeper reason why delay
may prove fatal. Today, the United States is
the greatest nation in the world of men. But
that distinction has also been enjoyed by other
nations as well, who then felt so secure and so
confident in their positions that no one dared
prophesy the ruin which the future held in store
for them. Persia, Greece, Rome, Spain-where
are they today?
When the French historian Guizot asked
Lowell how long the American republic would
last, he replied, "As long as the ideas of the men
who founded it continue dominant." These
ideas are indeed the foundation of the American
government, and whatever weakens them endangers the life of the Republic.
There are today certain domestic problems
which threaten the security of the nation and
which Americans must definitely settle among
themselves. There is the question of restraining the power of capital and suppressing the excesses of labor; there is the task of hindering the
immoderate usurpation of governmental powers
by a minority, and there is the nation-wide effort to inculcate in the minds of the masses the
necessity of obedience to law. To meet these
problems the American people must have a
deeply-rooted faith in their institutions and a
passionate love of justice.
They cannot, therefore, afford to insist that




An Appeal to Reason


273


the American Declaration of Independence was
not meant to apply to the Filipinos; they cannot repudiate the words of the men who framed
that document when they said, "Let it be remembered that it has ever been the pride and
boast of America that the rights for which we
contended were the rights of human nature";
they cannot govern millions of men in a foreign
land where the constitution does not protect
them,-and still hope to preserve in full strength
that faith in the equal rights of men which is the
soul of the American nation.
Truly did Froude say,
If there be one lesson which history clearly teaches, it
is this, that free nations cannot govern subject provinces. If they are unable or unwilling to admit their
dependencies to share their own constitution, the
constitution itself will fall to pieces, through mere
incompetence for its duties.
This, then, is an appeal to reason,-if a Federal
Union cannot live half slave and half free, can it
live with millions of men denied a voice in the
government which controls them?
How long will the people of the United States
assert a right to a foreign country conquered confessedly by "criminal aggression" and held by acts
carefully kept from their knowledge through misrepresentation, concealment and what Mr. Lodge
called "hypocritical pretences" of altruism?




274  Conquest of the Philippines


The people of the United States consider themselves sensible, keen and benevolent. Can they
read the record presented in these pages and not
resent the things which have been done in their
name and insist upon a new assertion of the
great principles upon which their government
rests?
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER XIII
1. Wood-Forbes Report, p. 11.
2. Reply to Second Independence Mission.
3. Speech of Viscount Ishii, Ambassador Extraordinary
of the Imperial Japanese Mission before the
United States Senate, August 29, 1917.
4. Philippine Problem Presented from a New Angle,
published by American Chamber of Commerce,
Manila, 1924, p. 8.
5. Ibid., p. 10.
6. Ibid., p. 10.
7. Ibid., p. 75.
8. Ibid.,
9. Ibid.,
10. Ibid.,
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Philippine Free Press (an American weekly), July 18,
1925.




I




I Atirf / -   A  /  /  I 7 -7




I




' UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process
Nx itralizinri agent: Magnesiumrxl Oxide
'Treatrment Date: DEC -D1
ii90    02240     6477        PreservationTechnologies
^ ~3 9yU I0  VC-^- 7.A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION
I,.T -hce~;n t-'on  [r?
xi-;n.,trry  'icwnhi.p,  A 1fi0'i4 -THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
GRADUATE LIBRARY
DATE DUE


J U L 14 i3


BR1 3bSR
10/01 M-01!-i  a"
















1| |
| | 
I t