DUf l.' Z G~~~~~~~~~~~~~r ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r i I'll EIT l~Paij f., A 1 --: ^ - - - - - - - - I PiI Il71I I' irl~~!lr, Illl,,~i!i~'i''!iil'l'l~I,11,11M II -1r III IM TIT Gbr, 1/, I :::t -k,i ~,I,~~;: *$P iilBI;;I ii ii ~;: "r I THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT AN EXAMINATION OF MR.' CLEVELAND'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE REVOLUTION OF 1893 BY J. A. GILLIS I I BOSTON LEE AND SHEPARD PUBLISHERS to MILK STREET I897 COPYRIGHT, 1897, BY LEE AND SHEPARD All rights reserved THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT ROCKWELL AND CHURCHILL PRESS BOSTON THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT No act of Mr. Cleveland's administration has met with such severe criticism as the course which he adopted toward the Sandwich Islands at the time of the dethronement of the Queen in 1893. No epithets have seemed sufficient to characterize his "base and ignoble policy " - a policy claimed to have been unscrupulous in itself, and opposed to all republican and democratic ideas. So constant has been the abuse lavished upon Mr. Cleveland, so persistent has been the misrepresentation of facts, that not only those of opposite politics have believed the charges against him, but some of those who have supported him in general, have thought that there must have been some cause for the abuse so freely bestowed, and have supposed that there was at least one blot upon a record otherwise unblemished. It is intended to make some suggestions as to the real character of the proceedings in question. It is not proposed, of course, to make an exhaustive inquiry into the events preceding the so-called "revolution " resulting in the overthrow of the Queen's government, nor to ask whether this government was a good or bad one, or whether the action of the Queen was such as to justify her dethronement. To do that would require too great a space and might prove a weariness to the reader; but attention will be called to the letters and statements of the parties active in the overturn of the Hawaiian throne, which will show that this event occurred with the conni 4 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT vance and assistance of the American minister and was aided by the presence in Honolulu of United States troops, who were called on shore from the United States ship "Boston," then lying in the harbor, ostensibly for the purpose of protecting life and property, but really for the purpose of protecting the revolutionists, while the " revolution" was going on. It will be specially noticed that the letters and statements which are relied upon to show this will be those of the chief actors, or of those whose interests lay upon their side; some testimony of the officers of the United States navy will be offered, but otherwise no statements of those interested upon the Queen's side, nor even of those who might be fairly regarded as disinterested, will be presented. No special effort will be made to defend or explain Mr. Cleveland's action, except by offering the facts as gathered in the manner alluded to, and by showing what that action was; and the reader will form his own judgment as to whether or not Mr. Cleveland's course was controlled by reason and justice, and dictated by a true regard for American honor. In February, 1893, a report was made upon the following resolution of the United States Senate: Resolved, That the Committee on Foreign Relations shall inquire and report whether any, and, if so, what, irregularities have occurred in the diplomatic or other intercourse between the United States and Hawaii in relation to the recent political revolution in Hawaii, and to this end said committee is authorized to send for persons and papers and to administer oaths to witnesses. This report is published as a public document, entitled "Hawaiian Islands. Report of the Committee of Foreign Relations, United States Senate, with accompanying documents," 1 in two volumes, which contain also the testimony 1The figures in the text refer to a list at the close of this volume, in which references are made to the pages of this Report. THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 5 taken before the committee, that taken by Mr. Blount in Honolulu, and various papers, official and otherwise, pertaining to the Hawaiian Islands. It is unnecessary to say that the statements made by the parties testifying on the one side and the other are wholly contradictory upon nearly every important point. In order to understand the course of events at Honolulu it is necessary to take into view the ideas and sentiments of Mr. John L. Stevens, the United States minister at the Sandwich Islands. It will appear most clearly that Mr. Stevens regarded himself as having a mission, that mission being to bring about the annexation of the islands to the United States, which he was ready to promote and recommend at all times and seasons. To show this a few citations will be given. He was appointed in June, 1889, and arrived in Honolulu on the twentieth of September of that year, and on the seventh of October he writes to Mr. Blaine:1 I am much impressed by the strong American feeling pervading the best portion of the population, and which is especially manifest among the men of business and property. On the 20th of March, 1890, he writes again to Mr. Blaine:2 The actions of the department of State afford conclusive evidence of the interest which the government of the United States has long taken in the affairs of the Hawaiian Islands. That these tendencies are of great importance to the future development and defence of American commerce in the Pacific hardly will be questioned. To secure the influence over them which the United States so long has considered its right and duty to maintain, some decisive steps must soon be taken which, in the past, were not of pressing necessity. For more than half a century the American Missionary Board, with the agencies and influences in its control, has served as a strong fortress to the United States in these islands. The large financial contributions, amounting to nearly one million of dollars, which that organization obtained through innumerable 6 TIlE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT channels of American benevolence and religious zeal, and the large number of educated and resolute agents which it sent to these islands, secured an influence over the ruling chiefs and native population which held them as firmly to America as a permanent military force could have done. But a change of facts and circumstances in recent years is bringing near the time when this well-sustained power must be strongly reenforced. In a large and increasing degree other influences have come in to counterbalance and relatively to decrease the American missionary influences. Shall American civilization ultimately prevail here? The near future is to show conclusively that only the strong pressure and continual vigilance of the United States can enable American men and American ideas to hold ascendency here and make these islands as prosperous and valuable to American commerce, and to American marine supremacy in the North Pacific, as the isles of the Mediterranean have been and are to its adjacent nations. On the 20th of August, 1891, he writes:3 The best security in the future, and the only permanent security, will be the moral pressure of the business men and of what are termed " the missionary people," and the presence in the harbor of Honolulu of an American man-of-war. But as earloy as the first of December, without fail, the month preceding the election, and for sometime thereafter, there should be a United States vessel here to render things secure. I have strong reluctance to being regarded an alarmist, but with due regard to my responsibility I am impelled to express the opinion that a proper regard for American interests will require one ship here most of the time in 1892. On the 8th of February, 1892, he writes:4 There are increasing indications that the annexation sentiment is growing among the business men, as well as with the less responsible of the foreign and native population of the islands. The present political situation is feverish, and I see no prospect of its being permanently otherwise until these islands become a part of the American Union or a possession of Great Britain. THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 7 At a future time, after the proposed treaty shall have been ratified, I shall deem it my official duty to give a more elaborate statement of facts and reasons why a "new departure " by the United States as to Hawaii is rapidly becoming a necessity, that a "protectorate" is impracticable, and that annexation must be the future remedy, or else Great Britain will be furnished with circumstances and opportunity to get a hold on these islands which will cause future serious embarrassment to the United States. Again in a long and elaborate letter to Mr. Foster, Secretary of State under Mr. Harrison's administration, we have the following:5 [Confidential.] UNITED STATES LEGATION, HONOLULU, NOV. 20, 1892. SIR: Fidelity to the trust imposed on me by the President, the Department of State, and the Senate requires that I should make a careful and full statement of the financial, agricultural, social, and political condition of these islands. An intelligent and impartial examination of the facts can hardly fail to lead to the conclusion that the relations and policy of the United States toward Hawaii will soon demand some change, if not the adoption of decisive measures, with the aim to secure American interests and future supremacy by encouraging Hawaiian development and aiding to promote responsible government in these islands. Directly and indirectly, the palace probably costs the little kingdom $150,000 per year. A governor, at $5,000 a year, acting in harmony with the responsible men of the Legislature, would be far better for the islands than the present monarchical Government. In truth, the monarchy here is an absurd anachronism. It has nothing on which it logically or legitimately stands. As a crown colony of Great Britain, or a territory of the United States, the Government modifications could be made readily, and good administration of the laws secured. Destiny and the vast future interests of the United States in the Pacific clearly indicate who, at no distant day, must be responsible for the government of these islands. Under a territorial government they could be as easily governed as any of the existing territories of the United States. 8 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT The men qualified are here to carry on good government, provided they have the support of the Government of the United States. Why not postpone American possession? Would it not be just as well for the United States to take the islands twenty-five years hence? Facts and obvious probabilities will answer both of these interrogations. Hawaii has reached the parting of the ways. She must now take the road which leads to Asia, or the other, which outlets her in America, gives her an American civilization, and binds her to the care of American destiny. To postpone American action many years is only to add to present unfavorable tendencies and to make future possession more difficult. Then, after pointing out the injury to the sugar planters by reason of the McKinley bill, he says: Unless some positive measures of relief be granted, the depreciation of sugar property here will continue to go on. Wise, bold action of the United States will rescue the property-holders from great loss, give the islands a government which will put an end to a worse than useless expenditure of a large proportion of the revenues of the country, using them for the building of roads and bridges, thus helping to develop the natural resources of the islands, aiding to diversify the industries, and to increase the number of the responsible citizens. One of two courses seems to me absolutely necessary to be followed: either bold and vigorous measures for annexation or a customs union," an ocean cable from the Californian coast to Honolulu, Pearl harbor perpetually ceded to the United States, with an implied but not necessarily stipulated American protectorate over the islands. I believe the former to be the better, that which will prove much the more advantageous to the islands, and the cheapest and least embarrassing in the end for the United States. To-day the United States has five times the wealth she possessed in 1854, and the reasons now existing for annexation are much stronger than they were then. I cannot refrain from expressing the opinion with emphasis that the golden hour is near at hand. So long as the islands retain their own independent governmrent there remains the possibility that England or the Canadian Dominion might secure one of the Hawaiian harbors for TIHE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 9 a coaling station. Annexation excludes all dangers of this kind. Which of the two lines of policy and action shall be adopted, our statesmen and Government must decide. Certain it is that the interests of the United States and the welfare of these islands will not permit the continuance of the existing state and tendency of things. Having for so many years extended a helping hand to the islands and encouraging the American residents and their friends at home to the extent we have, we cannot refrain now from aiding them with vigorous measures, without injury to ourselves and those of our "kith and kin,/ and without neglecting American opportunities that never seemed so obvious and pressing as they do now. I have no doubt that the more thoroughly the bed-rock and controlling facts touching the Hawaiian problem are understood by our Government and by the American public, the more readily they will be inclined to approve the views I have expressed so inadequately in this communication. In a letter to Mr. Foster, Jan. 18, 1893 (the day after the revolution), having given an account of the transactions of the 16th, he writes as follows:6 All is quiet here now. Without the sacrifice of a single life this change of government has been accomplished. Language can hardly express the enthusiasm and the profound feeling of relief at this peaceful and salutary change of government. The underlying cause of this profound feeling among the citizens is the hope that the United States Government will allow these islands to pass to American control and become American soil. A commission of citizens, duly accredited, will go by the steamer that takes this despatch to Washington, to state the wishes of the P>rovisional Government and of the responsible people of the islands, and to give a complete account of the existing state of things here. And February 1, he writes:7 "The Hawaiian pear is now fully ripe, and this is the golden hour for the United States to pluck it." Finally, in the "North American Review" for December, 1893, Mr. Stevens winds up a long article in favor of annexation as follows: 10 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT To say that we do not need the Hawaiian Islands as a security to our immense future interests is but the babble of children or incompetent men. It is blindly and recklessly to ignore the logic of inimitable circumstances and to scoff at the plainest teachings of history. No! America cannot get rid of her future responsibilities if she would, and all attempts to do so will be at the cost of her future generations. In the light of these inexorable truths of what is most sacred in Christian civilization, in behalf of a noble American colony holding the advanced post of America's progress, I cherish the faith that the American people, the American statesmen, thoughtful of America's great future, will settle the Hawaiian question wisely and well - will see to it that the flag of the United States floats unmolested over the Hawaiian Islands. Mr. Stevens's sentiments in regard to the Queen were no less pronounced than those in reference to annexation. As early as April 2, 1892, he begins to speak of her in the most disparaging terms. He says, ' For twenty years the palace has been the centre of corruption and scandal, and is likely to remain so as long as the Hawaiian monarch exists." His official correspondence is filled with remarks (which need not be quoted here) reflecting upon the Queen's private character, and indeed he finds it difficult to speak of her without some derogatory allusion.1 In his examination before the Congressional committee he makes these references time after time; he mentions the "semibarbaric Queen" and her "semi-barbaric court," and in speaking of her signing "iniquitous bills " he says, " Both she and the ring of adventurers who surrounded her expected there would thus be established a scheme to rob the people of millions of money." These expressions of Mr. Stevens's, both in regard to annexation and to the Queen, are here brought forward, not for the purpose of praise or blame, but that the reader may judge of his 1 Thus, for instance, in his letter of Oct. 19, 1892, he makes three, and in that of Oct. 31, 1892, four allusions of this kind. TIE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 11 state of mind, and may form an opinion as to what he would be likely to do in a contingency to which he refers in a letter which is now to be quoted. This letter to Mr. Blaine is dated March 8, 1892, about ten months before the Queen was dethroned, and commenced as follows: 8 UNITED STATES LEGATION, HONOLULU, March 8, 1892. SIR: In view of possible contingencies in these islands, I ask for the instructions of the Department of State on the following, viz.: If the Government here should be surprised and overturned by an orderly and peaceful revolutionary movement, largely of native Hawaiians, and a provisional or republican government organized and proclaimed, would the United States minister and naval commander here be justified in responding affirmatively to the call of the members of the removed Government to restore them to power or replace them in possession of the Government buildings'? Or should the United States minister and naval commander confine themselves exclusively to the preservation of American property, the protection of American citizens, and the prevention of anarchy? Should a revolutionary attempt of the character indicated be made, there are strong reasons to presume that it would begin with the seizure of the police-station, with its arms and ammunition, and this accomplished, the Royal Palace rand the Government building, containing the cabinet offices and archives, would very soon be captured, the latter building being situated about one-third of a mile from the police-station. In such contingencies, would it be justifiable to use the United States forces here to restore the Government buildings to the possession of the displaced officials? Ordinarily in like circumstances the rule seems to be to limit the landing and movement of the United States force in foreign waters and dominion exclusively to the protection of the United States legation, and of the lives and property of American citizens. But as the relations of the United States to Hawaii are exceptional, and in former years the United States officials here took somewhat exceptional action in circumstances of disorder, I desire to know how far the present minister and naval commander may deviate from established international rules and precedents in the contingencies indicated in the first part of this despatch. 12 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT It is not claimed that the revolution, foreshadowed in the above remarkable letter, was the one now in question, because the latter arose suddenly and upon an unexpected opportunity, but this letter is of great importance for several reasons: First, it shows that nearly a year before the events in question, and while the Queen was reign- ing in perfect peace and amity with the country which he represented, Mr. Stevens was contemplating the possibility of the surprise and overturn of the Government by "an orderly and peaceful revolutionary movement" (whatever that may mean), and was considering and inquiring whether he and the naval commander would be "' justified" in restoring the Government, or whether they should " confine themselves exclusively" to protection of American citizens and property and prevention of anarchy, being apparently in doubt which course should be pursued. Secondly, it points out what would be the " ordinary" rule; but as (in his mind) the relations of the United States to Hawaii are exceptional, he wishes to know how far he and the naval commander may " deviate " frno established international rules and precedent in the contingency named. The meaning of this suggested " deviation" will become more clear as we proceed. Finally, this letter practically writes in advance the history of the present revolutionary movement, but with one very important variation. Mr. Stevetls, looking to the future, and considering the course a revolution would be likely to take, presumes that it would begin with the seizure of the police-station with its arms and ammunition, which being accomplished, the remaining work would soon be done. The possession of the station-house would be an absolute prerequisite to a successful revolution, and it would naturally be the first point of attack. But the noticeable thing is that when the present revolution was attempted, the possession of the station-house, in which were the Queen's THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 13 troops, with their arms and ammunition, becomes a matter of no importance, and Mr. Stevens was ready and willing to recognize a set of men who had possession of the Government buildings only. This will be amply shown by his own letters, and it is very important to this inquiry that his attitude, as taken in this letter of March 8, ten months before the revolution, should be noticed and remembered when his subsequent acts and letters are examined. In 1893 the government of the Sandwich Islands was a constitutional monarchy. At the head was Queen Liliuokalani; there was a Cabinet consisting of four ministers, and a Legislature consisting of twenty-four members of the House of Nobles, and twenty-four representatives of the people. Members of both Houses were elected by popular vote, an educational qualification being necessary for all voters, and a property qualification for electors for nobles. The constitution then in force was adopted in 1887. Upon the fourteenth day of January, 1893, being Saturday, the Queen, for various reasons which need not be considered here, proposed to promulgate, and took some steps towards promulgating, a new constitution; an attempt which was no doubt in violation of the constitution then existing. More or less excitement and opposition resulted, and the attempt was abandoned; and on Monday notice to this effect was given, and at or about noon the following printed proclamation was circulated through the city: 9 BY AUTHORITY. Her Majesty's ministers desire to express their appreciation for the quiet and order which has prevailed in this community since the events of Saturday, and are authorized to say that the position taken by Her Majesty in regard to the promulgation of a new constitution was under the stress of her native subjects. Authority is given for the assurance that any changes desired in the fundamental law of the land will be sought only by methods provided in the constitution 14 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT itself. Her Majesty's ministers request all citizens to accept the assurance of Her Majesty in the same spirit in which it is given. LILIUOKALANI. SAMUEL PARKER, Minister of Foreign Affairs. W. H. CORNWELL, Minister of Finance. JOHN F. COLBURN, Minister of the Interior. A. P. PETERSON, Attorney- Genercl. IOLANI PALACE, Jan. 16, 1893. In the meantime, on Saturday the 14th,'0 some persons met at the office of Mr. W. 0. Smith, a prominent lawyer of Honolulu, and after some discussion organized themselves as a meeting, of which Mr. Smith was secretary, and a committee of nine, afterwards increased to thirteen, was appointed to form plans for action, call meetings, report any time at their discretion, and be called a Committee of Safety. It is asserted that at that time there was some serious apprehension that disorder might follow the attempt of the Queen to promulgate the new constitution; that there was an intense feeling of uncertainty, and a fear that danger to the community was very imminent. The claim has been made throughout by Mr. Stevens and the parties engaged in the movement that the action of the Queen caused great consternation, that there were grave apprehensions of disorder and riot, and that there was great cause to believe that life and property were in danger. Thus Mr. W. C. Wilder says: n At the request of many citizens, whose wives and families were helpless and in terror of an expected uprising of the mob, which would burn and destroy, a request was made and signed by all of the committee, addressed to Minister Stevens, that troops might be landed to protect houses and private property. THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 15 All this is denied upon the other side, who claim that the city was amply protected and perfectly safe, and they describe the condition of affairs in much detail. Fortunately we have a test, as will be seen hereafter, in the actions of the revolutionists themselves, as to what was their real belief upon this subject. The following supplementary statement made to the Committee on Foreign Relations, by Mr. C. Bolte, who, as well as Mr. W. C. Wilder to whom he refers, was a member of the Committee of Safety and of the Provisional Government, will perhaps show whether these two gentlemen and others were overwhelmed with consternation, or whether they welcomed with enthusiasm the advent of the golden opportunity: 12 The answers which I have given to Mr. Blount's question,!I) ~ "When was for the first time anything said about deposing or dethroning the Queen?" might lead to misunderstanding in reading this report. I desire, therefore, to hereby declare as follows: Wrords to the effect that the Queen must be deposed or dethroned were not uttered to my knowledge at any meeting of the Committee of Safety until Monday evening, Jan. 16, 1893; but at the very first meeting of citizens at W. O. Smith's office on Saturday, January 14, at about 2 P.M., or even before this meeting had come to order, Paul Neumann informed the arriving people that the Queen was about to promulgate a new constitution. The answer then given him by Mr. W. C. Wilder, by me, and by others was: That is a lJ ~ very good thing and a splendid opportunity to get rid of the whole old rotten Government concern and now to get annexation to the United States. Paul Neumann thought that that might be going a little too far. At the second meeting at W. O. Smith's, between 3 and 4 P.M. on Saturday afternoon, Jan. 14, 1893, when the Committee of Safety was appointed, sentiments of the same nature, that this is a splendid opportunity to get rid of the X|i ~ old regime, and strong demands for annexation, or any kind of stable government under the supervision of the United States, were expressed. Therefore, even if the words that the Queen must be deposed or dethroned were not spoken, surely the sentiment I w 16 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT that this must be done prevailed at or even before the very first meeting, on Jan. 14, 1893. Mr. Stevens had been absent from Honolulu for about ten days on a trip to Hilo, one of the Hawaiian Islands, in the United States ship-of-war " Boston," and returned on Saturday, January 14, the day when the proceedings in question commenced; and communication was at once opened with him by the revolutionists, and was continued from day to day, as the progress of events is traced in the statements of the revolutionists themselves. Attention is now asked to the following extracts from the statement of Mr. W. 0. Smith, at whose office a meeting had been organized, as stated above, and a committee of thirteen, to be called a Committee of Safety, appointed. After giving the names of the committee, he says: 13 After further delay, almost immediately the others present were requested to retire, and the committee held a meeting. The situation was briefly discussed -the imminence of danger and the safety of the city; what action should be taken for protection was the main subject of discussion. And in view of the fact that at the station-house there was a large armed force, and at the barracks, and that nearly all of the arms were in possession of the supporters of the Queen, and there was no organization at the time outside of those forces, and it was simply unknown how many arms were available, the question was at once discussed whether a protectorate should not be sought from the United States steamship-of-war "Boston; " that question was, of course, first raised, whether the United States would render assistance, or what their attitude would be, and then a special committee, consisting of L. A. Thurston, W. C. Wilder, and H. F. Glade, were appointed to wait upon Mr. J. L. Stevens, United States minister, and inform him of the situation, and ascertain from him what, if any, protection or assistance could be afforded by the United States forces for the protection of life and property, the unanimous sentiment and feeling being that life and property were in imminent danger. By that time it was so dark that I lighted the electric light. We had to have light before we concluded our meeting and deliberations. THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 17 The probabilities of what the Queen would do were discussed; there was no certainty in regard to that, excepting that she would indoubtedly persist in her revolutionary intentions; what would be done, how soon martial law might be declared, or any other course would be taken, what steps would be taken, we simply could not tell, and after discussion Mr. Thurston made the following motion: "That steps be taken at once to form and declare a Provisional Government. " The seriousness of the step was considered, but it was decided unanimously by the committee that some such steps had got to be taken for protection of life and property, and it was then, and after Mr. Cooper's statement in regard to his visit to the "Boston," that the committee consisting of Thurston, Wilder, and Glade were appointed to meet the American minister, and were instructed to report the next morning at 9 o'clock, at a meeting to be called at the residence of W. R. Castle. I went home about dark or a little after, and just had dinner, when Mr. Thurston called at my house on Iris way home, asking me to meet the committee and one or two others at his house at 8 o'clock. I went there and found Mr. Thurston, W. R. Castle, F. W. Wundenberg, A. S. Hartwell, S. B. Dole, and C. L. Carter. Mr. Thurston stated that the committee had waited upon the American minister, and that he had said that the United States troops on board the ' Boston"' would be ready to land any moment to prevent the destruction of American life and property, and in regard to the matter of establishing a Provisional Government, they of course would recognize the existing Government whatever it might be. Mr. Thurston stated to Mr. Stevens the proposition that was under consideration, of establishing a Provisional Government, and in case those steps were taken, he asked Mr. Stevens what his attitude would be, and Mr. Stevens had told him whatever Government was established, and was actually in possession of the Government building, the executive departments and archives, and in possession of the city, that was a de facto Government proclaiming itself as a Government, would necessarily have to be recognized. Everything had culminated in a few hours, we were laboring under intense feeling, and it was arranged that different ones of those present should begin drafting papers. Mr. W. R. Castle undertook to draft something in the nature of a brief historical statement, which would be for a preamble to the declaration. Mr. Thurston was to work upon the matter of the form of the Provisional Government. Judge Dole quietly stated that he was not pre 18 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT pared to take part in the movement, but that he would assist, at Mr. Thurston's request, in drafting the declaration. I was requested to draft papers to be submitted to the American minister requesting the landing of the troops, in case it became necessary. At a late hour we retired, and the next morning at 9 o'clock the committee of thirteen met at W. R. Castle's residence. The meeting continued until noon. The committee appointed to wait on the American minister made a report to the committee similar to the report made to us the night before. Among the various propositions and matters discussed was a matter of calling a public mass meeting, and it was decided to call a meeting at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the next day, Monday, to be held, if possible, at the old rifle armory on Beretania street, near the corner of Punchbowl street. At the meeting at Mr. Castle's there was considerable discussion in regard to when to have the mass meeting; some were in favor of having it on Sunday; a feeling, too, had been expressed at the meeting on Saturday afternoon that there should be a mass meeting called, and it was finally decided to hold it at 2 o'clock Monday. At that meeting [at Mr. Castle's], and the previous and subsequent meetings, most meagre minutes were kept, because of the possible danger of our being arrested, and of these records being used against us. The night before, Mr. Thurston requested Mr. Wundenberg to ascertain, as far as he could, what arms were available and how many men could be depended upon. Just at the close of the meeting Mr. Wundenberg came with Mr. Soper, and they reported that the prospect of obtaining arms was very discouraging, but that after making a thorough search of the town only about sixty stand of arms were found that were not in possession of the Government.1 After we adjourned, Mr. Thurston and I called upon the American minister again and informed him of what was being done. Among other things we talked over with him what had better be done in case of our being arrested, or extreme or violent measures being taken by the monarchy in regard to us. We did not know what steps would be taken, and there was a feeling of great unrest and sense of damlger in the community. Mr. Stevens gave assurance of his earnest purpose to afford all the protection that was in his power to protect life and li.e., the Queen's Government. THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 19 property; he explained the fact that, while he would call for the United States troops to protect life and property, he would not recognize any government until actually established. Sunday evening several of the parties met at Mr. Thurston's house. The next morning, Monday, January 16, there was a meeting of the whole committee at Mr. Thurston's office.l4 At this meeting a committee of five was appointed to wait upon the Queen's ministers, who had requested to see them. Mr. Smith resumes: The committee of five returned and reported that they had met the four ministers, and the ministers stated to them that they had no communication to make, and wanted to know what the committee wanted. They talked over the situation and showed our committee a proclamation signed by the Queen and the ministers, stating that she would never again attempt to force a new constitution. Before the meeting broke up the form of the request to the American minister in regard to the landing of the troops was adopted and signed by the committee of thirteen, requesting the American minister to land troops, and this request was signed by the committee of thirteen, and decided to be delivered to the minister to be held by him, but not to be acted upon until a further request was received from the committee. Then, after speaking of the mass meeting, at which he says there was a very large number of people, and at which Mr. Thurston spoke, he goes on: There was a short and earnest discussion of what was to be done; it was then nearly 4; our plans had not been perfected, papers had not been completed, and after a hasty discussion, the time being very short, it was decided that it was impossible for us to take the necessary steps, and we should request that the troops be not landed until next morning, the hour in the morning being immaterial, whether it was 9 or 8 or 6 o'clock in the morning, but we must have further time to prevent bloodshed, and Mr. Thurston and I were appointed to proceed at once to the American minister and inform him of our decision. We proceeded at once to Mr. Stevens's house, the United States Legation, stated the case to him, and he said that as a precautionary measure, and to 20 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT protect American life and property, he had ordered the troops to be landed at 5 o'clock, and that they would come. It was then decided to adjourn to meet at the house of Henry Waterhouse at 8 o'clock in the evening. The meeting broke up, and some of us went down to see the troops landed. Thurston gave up - sick. He had to go to bed. At 8 o'clock in the evening we met at Mr. Henry Waterhouse's. All of the members of the committee were present except Thurston, Castle, and Wilder, they all being ill. Mr. James B. Castle was present, taking the place of W. R. Castle, and C. L. Carter taking the place of Thurston. There were also present by invitation Alexander Young, J. H. Soper, Cecil Brown, H. P. Baldwin, and F. W. Wundenberg. Previous to this meeting, beginning with the meeting on Saturday afternoon, the suggestion of sending the " Claudine " to San Francisco with despatches to the United States Government was discussed, and at this meeting Monday evening it was moved that she be sent at once to San Francisco. The motion was amended that action be deferred until after the establishment of the Provisional Government. Amendment carried. At 10 o'clock the next day, January 17, the committee met at the office of W. 0. Smith; and Mr. C. L. Carter, on behalf of the committee, reported the names of those who had consented to go upon the Executive and Advisory Councils. It was voted that the Advisory Committee be increased from eight to thirteen, and additional names be suggested to the committee from whom they could select the five additional names. Various names were suggested. It was voted that the committee request Mr. Wilder to report if the " Claudine " could be chartered to go to San Francisco and at what cost. It was voted that the inter-island steamship companies be requested not to allow any vessels to leave for the other islands before 10 o'clock on the next day. At 11 o'clock the judge [S. B. Dole] came before the committee and stated that he would accept the position as chairman of the Executive Council. Then, after giving the names of the persons there, Mr. Smith adds: "During the meeting in the forenoon, Mr. S. M. Damon came in and reported that he had had an interview with the Queen in which he had advised her not to make resistance, but to submit, and that she would have every opportunity for presenting her claims." THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 21 Thus we learn, among other things, that immediately upon the formation of the Committee of Safety, and before any action whatever had been taken, the first thing thought of was the United States troops, the point being at once raised and discussed as to seeking a protectorate from the ship-of-war " Boston; " that a special committee of three was immediately appointed to wait upon Mr. Stevens, inform him of the situation, and ask what he would do; that on that first day (Saturday), before 8 o'clock in the evening, that committee had seen Mr. Stevens, and that a report of their conference with him was made by the special committee at a meeting of the Committee of Safety holden at Mr. Castle's house at 9 o'clock Sunday morning; that after this meeting adjourned, Mr. Thurston and Mr. Smith again called upon Mr. Stevens and informed him of what was being done, and talked over with him what should be done in case of their arrest; and, finally, that after a mass meeting a sub-committee was appointed to call upon Mr. Stevens, with the request that the troops should not be landed that night, the request, however, coming a little too late, as he had already directed the troops to be brought on shore. Mr. Smith's highly significant statement in regard to the large armed force at the station-house and barracks, and the fact that nearly all the arms were in the hands of the Queen's supporters, will not be overlooked. The following is the request which the committee had drawn up. It will be noticed that it appeals to the minister and the United States forces for assistance, and while it speaks of general alarm and terror it does not use the formula "protection for life and property," but asks for assistance and protection for "ourselves." It will be seen also what confidential relations existed between Mr. Stevens and the committee, when it appears that this most important paper was to be left in Mr. Stevens's hands, but 22 THtE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT action was not to be taken upon it till the committee should see fit to make a further request: 15 CITIZENS' COMMITTEE OF SAFETY TO MR. STEVENS. HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, HONOLULU, Jan. 16, 1893. SIR: We, the undersigned, citizens and residents of Honolulu, respectfully represent that in view of recent public events in this kingdom, culmtinatig in the revolutionary acts of Queen Lilioukalani on Saturday last, the public safety is menaced and lives and property are in peril, and we appeal to you and the United States forces at your command for assistance. The Queen, with the aid of armed force, and accompanied by threats of violence and bloodshed from those with whom she was acting, attempted to proclaim a new constitution; and, while prevented for the time fromn accomplishing her object, declared publicly that she would only defer her action. This conduct and action was upon an occasion and under circumstances which have created general alarm and terror. We are unable to protect ourselves without aid, and therefore pray for the protection of the United States forces. HENRY E. COOPER, F. W. MCCHESNEY, W. C. WILDER, C. BOLTE, A. BROWN, WVILLIAM O. SMITH, HENRY WATERHOUSE, THEO. F. LANSING, ED. SUHR, L. A. THURSTON, JOHN EMMELUTH, WM. R. CASTLE, S. A. MCCANDLESS, Citizens' Committee of Safety. Of the signers of this letter five were American citizens. Nothing could be more significant than this attempt testified to by Mr. Smith, to prevent the landing of the troops on Monday evening. If there was danger of riot THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 23 and disturbance, if general alarm and terror prevailed, if there was pressing need of the United States' assistance, why did this committee wish to deprive themselves of the surest means of safety? How is it possible to explain their action in this regard upon the supposition that the alarm and terror which they speak of really existed? What explanation could they give to the citizens whose "wives and families were helpless and in terror of an expected uprising of the mob," if any such there were? But it may be asked what harm could the committee have anticipated from the landing of the troops? Mr. Smith answers the question plainly enough. The mass meeting broke up sooner than the committee expected; they did not know what to do. They were not in readiness to take the final steps just yet: plans were not perfected, papers not drawn, and the coming of the troops might possibly have brought about a state of things which they could not anticipate, and for which they might not be prepared. So they went straight to the American minister, with whom they had left their written request, ready to be complied with when they said the word, but found that lie had already acted and they were too late. Mr, John A. McCandless, a member of the Committee of Safety and of the Provisional Government, in his testimony before the committee, goes into this matter a little more fully:16 Senator GRAY. — Was anything said in your meeting on Saturday, after your Committee of Safety was formed and you had cleared the room, about Mr. Stevens and the United States ship " Boston"1? Mr. MCANDLESS. - Yes; we talked that over. Senator GnAY. - So soon as your committee was formed? Mr. MCANDLESS. - Well, it was during the conversation. The CHAIRtMAN. - On Saturday? Senator GRAY. - Yes. Was anything said about the attitude of Mr. Stevens? 24 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT Mr. MCCANDLESS. - It was talked of - what his attitude would be. Senator GRAY. - Was anybody deputed to go and see him? Mr. MCCANDLESS. - Yes; I think there was a committee of one or two appointed on Saturday afternoon to have a talk with him, to ascertain what his attitude would be in the then crisis. Senator GRAY. - Did that committee report? Mr. MCCANDLESS. - The report was that there was no information; that he was entirely non-committal. Senator GRAY. - Who said that? Mr. MCCANDLESS. - Mr. Thurston, I believe. Senator GRAY. —But said he would protect life and property? Mr. MCCANDLESS. - Yes. Senator GRAY. -He did not say he was non-committal? Mr. MCCANDLESS. -Well, he was non-committal as to contending forces, but would protect life and property. Senator GRAY. - Was anything said by them that conveyed the idea to you that Mr. Stevens was hostile or indifferent to the movement of the Committee of Safety, or was without sympathy for it? Mr. MCCANDLESS. -I think not. Senator GRAY. - Anything at all? Mr. MCCANDLESS. - I think we felt this way, that without any encouragement from him we certainly had the sympathy of the American minister. Senator GRAY. - That was the general feeling, was it not? Mr. MCCANDLESS. - Yes. Senator FRYE.- A committee was sent to Minister Stevens to request him not to land the troops then? Mr. McCANDLESS. -Yes; we did not feel certain that night, and thought we would get our strength better in a day or two. Senator GRAY. - That the landing of the troops might bring on a crisis? Mr. MCCANDLESS. - Yes. Senator GRAY. - If you were not as well prepared as you thought you would be later? Mr. MCCANDLESS. - No, sir. Senator GRAY. - Had Minister Stevens been advised of the project for a Provisional Government and annexation to the United States? Mr. MCCANDLESS.- I do not know. Senator GRAY. - Do you know whether it was understood there that he knew what was going on? THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 25 Mr. MCCANDLESS. - Well, everybody knew it. Senator GRAY. - Did you not understand that he knew it - was not that your opinion? Mr. McCANDLESS. - It would be my opinion that he would know. Senator GRAY. - Do you not know, and did you not know then, that he did understand it? Mr. MCCANDLESS.- NO; I do not know it. Senator GRAY.- It was not talked about? Mr. MCCANDLESS. - Oh, it was discussed, certainly. Senator GRAY. - In what respect was it discussed? Mr. McCANDLESS. -It was discussed in respect to what would be the attitude of the American minister. Senator GRAY. - Was it thought his attitude would be sympathetic or unsympathetic? Mr. McCANDLESS. - There were doubts about that. Senator GRAY. - Were there any doubts that Mr. Stevens sympathized with the movement? Mr. MCCANDLESS. - Yes. Senator GRAY. - Did you doubt it? Mr. MCCANDLESS. - It was doubted that much that we requested him, after we requested the troops to be landed, not to have them landed, for fear it would precipitate a crisis. Senator GRAY. - Had you any doubt at that time in regard to Mr. Stevens's sympathies with this movement? Mr. MCCANDLESS. - I do not think there was any serious doubt in my mind about it, although I was one of the members who took the side that we would stand a better show on Monday afternoon not to have the troops landed. Senator GRAY. - When did you want them landed? Mr. MCCANDLESS. - Well, I thought they had better be let alone. The idea prevailed that they had better be let alone, and when the crisis came he would land them himself. Senator GRAY. - Then it was your idea it would be better not to have them landed? I see it stated here that the proposition of the committee was that they should be landed the next morning at 9 or 10 o'clock. When did you think they should be landed? Mr. MCCANDLES. -I do not think there was a time stated. We thought it was better to let them stay there because the crisis would be precipitated. Senator DANIEL. - What were you afraid of in that crisis? Mr. MCCANDLESS.- The Queen's forces. Senator DANIEL. - That they would suppress the revolution? Mr. MCCANDLESS. - Yes; might attempt it. 26 TIIE IAWAIIAN INCIDENT Senator DANIEL. - Do you think they could do it? Mr. MCCANDLESS. - I do not think so. Senator DANIEL. -- Did you then think so? Mr. MCCANDLESS. - We did not think so Monday morning. The idea prevailed that the troops had better be left alone, and that when the crisis came he would land them himself! What language could better express the confidence which the committee felt in the friendly zeal of the American minister; or better show the real opinion of the committee as to the probability of an uprising of the mob? The following is an abstract from a statement made for the Congressional Committee by Mr. W. C. Wilder: 17 For ten days prior to noon of Saturday, January 14, the day that the Queen attempted her revolutionary act, the United States steamship "Boston," with Minister Stevens on board, had not been in port. There had been no revolutionary meetings or conferences; such a thing had not been thought of. There had not been any consultation with Minister Stevens with regard to the matter, though of course he must have seen what a perilous condition the country was getting into. There were several meetings at the office of W. 0. Smith that day, after the attempted promulgation of the new constitution. 1 was not present at the first impromp)tu gathering; at that meeting I was named as one of the Committee of Safety. A telephonic message was sent to me to meet the committee that evening, and again we met at his office. The only business done besides talking over matters was the appointment of the committee to canvass and report what arms and ammunition and how many men could be secured. Another committee was appointed, of which I was a member, to call upon Minister-resident John L. Stevens to discuss the situation. We went at once and talked over the whole matter, and we asked what his course would be should we take possession of the Government and declare a Provisional Government. Mr. Stevens replied that if we obtained possession of the Government building and the archives, and established a Government, and became, in fact, the Government, he should of course recognize us. The matter of landing the troops from the "Boston " was not mentioned at that meeting. The United States troops came duly to hand at about THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 27 5 o'clock Monday afternoon. Lieut. Lucien Young, of the " Boston," tells of the landing and the subsequent march. After speaking of drills on shore, he says: 18 We had one of the best battalions I have ever seen. The CHAIRMAN. What is the strength? A. Three companies of blue jackets; one of artillery and one of marines, making one hundred and fifty-four all told, and about ten officers. Senator BUTLER. - How many marines? A. Thirty-two, I think. The CHAIRMAN. - What time did you leave the ship? A. About 5 o'clock - I suppose about quarter of 5. We were ordered to land at 4, and our battalion was gotten together immediately after dinner, which was between 12 and 1. That was Monday, the 16th. The CHAIRMAN. - I want to know if any troops left the ship before the detachment which you commanded. Mr. YOUNG. - No; we landed in a body. The CHAIRMAN. - You went first? Mr. YOUNG. - Yes. The CHAIRMAN. - That was 5 o'clock in the evening? Mr. Yo UNG. - Five o'clock in the evening. We got the men armed and equipped for heavy marching order - knapsacks and double belts of cartridges holding from 60 to 80 rounds. And I had the caisson filled, taking in all about 14,000 rounds of calibre.45 for the rifle and Gatling, 1,200 rounds of calibre.38 for the revolvers, and 174 common explosive shells for the revolving cannon. Each one of these belts carried from 60 to 80 rounds. About 3 o'clock Minister Stevens came on board and was in consultation with Captain Wiltse. Q. Where was the company ordered to go? A. We had no definite point at all. We landed at Brewer's wharf and marched up to the corner of Fort and Merchant streets, where the Consul-general's office was, and there left a marine company which was to protect the American Legation and Consulate. The rest of the battalion turned and marched down King street in front of the Palace, and as we passed the Palace the Queen was standing on the balcony, when we gave her the royal salute by drooping the colors and four ruffles on the drums. We passed the Palace two hundred and fifty yards, and there waited until we could find some place to go into camp. We made an effort at first to get the old armory near the landing, so as to be near our base of supplies and throw out 28 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT pickets in case of emergency. But we failed to get that, and then tried to get the Opera House. They were the only two buildings near the centre of the town, and not being able to get them we went to the yard of a white man named Atherton, and there we bivouacked under the trees in the rain until 9.30 P.M., when the aid to Captain Wiltse reported they had secured a little hall in the rear of the Opera House, known as Arion Hall, which is used as a Mormon temple now, I believe. We marched there and went into camp. Thus the United States troops are settled for the night. In the meantime, on Monday, a protest had been made against the landing of the troops by the governor of Oahu, the island on which Honolulu is situated, as follows:'9 OFFICE GOVERNOR OF OAHU, HONOLULU, Jan. 16, 1893. SIR: It is my duty to solemnly protest to your Excellency against the landing this evening, without permission from the proper authorities, of an armed force from the United States ship " Boston." Your Excellency well knows that when you have desired to land naval forces of the United States for the purpose of drill, permission by the local authorities has been readily accorded. On the present occasion, however, the circumstances are different, and ostensibly the present landing is for the discharge of functions which are distinctly responsible duties of the Hawaiian Government. Such being the case, I am compelled to impress upon your Excellency the international questions involved in the matter and the grave responsibility thereby assumed. While solemnly protesting to your Excellency against this unwarrantable proceeding to which I have referred, I have the honor to remain, Sir, Your Excellency's obedient and humble servant, A. S. CLEGHORN, Governor of Oahu. His Excellency JOHN L. STEVENS, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, United States of America. To which Mr. Stevens makes the following reply the next day, Tuesday: 2 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 29 UNITED STATES LEGATION, HONOLULU, Jan. 17, 1893. SIR: Yours of yesterday, the 16th, regarding the landing of the United States naval forces in Honolulu, is received. I have carefully read its terms and import. My responsibility as the United States minister plenipotentiary at this critical time in Hawaiian affairs it is impossible for me to ignore. I assure you that in whatever responsibility the American diplomatic and naval representatives have assumed or may assume, we shall do our utmost to regard the welfare of all present and interests concerned. Yours sincerely, and with the kindest consideration, JOHN L. STEVENS. Hon. A. S. CLEGHORN, Governor of Oahu. This landing of troops upon a foreign shore not only without permission, but even against the protest of the authorities, and in defiance of a Queen who was recognized as such by these very troops themselves, was a deliberate and flagrant act of war, unless justified by an actual necessity for the protection of American life and property, and carried out with perfect sincerity and good faith. Perhaps nothing could show Mr. Stevens's utter contempt for the Hawaiian Government more clearly than his neglect to give Governor Cleghorn the slightest intimation as to his purpose or motives in taking so extreme action upon the governor's own soil. Of course all parties concerned in this landing of the troops have felt the necessity of dwelling upon and magnifying in every way the need of protection to "life and property," and it may be well in this connection to call attention to a very significant fact. At the time now spoken of there were in Hawaii representatives of England, Germany, Austro-Hungary, Italy, Russia, Spain, The Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Mexico, Chili, Peru, and China. It might be fairly presumed that these gentlemen would be solicitous for the protection of "life and 30 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT property." Yet while Mr. Stevens is supposed to have been in a state of the most nervous anxiety about danger to life and property, there is nothing in the whole course of the 2,200 pages of the committee's Report, in all the voluminous examinations and interviews, which shows, or in any manner indicates, that any of these ministerial or consular officers felt any anxiety, or were otherwise than perfectly tranquil during the four days of the revolution.' That the English minister was disposed to look at the whole matter in a somewhat humorous light will appear hereafter. It is seen that the troops marched through the streets of Honolulu, passed the Palace, and went to the United States Legation and Consulate; for the protection of both these places, - where American citizens would be likely to seek refuge in case of a riot or hostile demonstrations, -a company of marines, thirty-five in number, was thought sufficient. The remainder of the forces then marched to the land of one Atherton and finally to Arion Hall. Why was this place chosen? Arion Hall is a building lying in the rear of the Opera House, so-called, which is south of the Palace grounds and about two hundred yards distant from the Palace. It is west of the Government building, and is separated from it only by a narrow street. The question asked above is answered by Mr. Stevens:21 Senator FRYE. - As a matter of fact, is Arion Hall, so far as American property is concerned, - and I mean by that, of course, residences as well as anything else, - a reasonably central location? Mr. STEVErNS. - A reasonably central location. Senator Fr-YE. -.Do you know of any place large enough, other than that, for quartering those troops in the city of Honolulu? Mr. STEVENS. - Not obtainable. I had thought of another on my own street. If Arion Hall had not been gotten we 1 With the exception of H. F. Glade, German consul and Austro-Hungarian consul, who took part in the mass meeting. THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 31 would have tried another hall, which was nearer me, but the owner was not there. Senator FRYE. - The only purpose you had was to place the troops where they could be protected during the night? Mr. STEVENS. - Yes; and where they would be useful in case of fire. Lieut. De Witt Coffman, commanding a company in the battalion of troops landed, testifies as follows:22 Senator GRAY. - Was there, to your knowledge, any other building suitable for the use of the troops of the " Boston " than the Opera House and Arion Hall? Mr. COFFMAN. - Yes. Senator GRAY.- Where? Mr. COFFMAN. - On Nuuana avenue, a little more than half-way between the United States Consulate and the American minister's residence. Senator GRAY. - What sort of building was that? Mr. COFFMAN. - It was a large, three-story brand-new hotel, and unoccupied. Senator GRAY. - Do you know who owned it? Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. John Thomas Waterhouse, who was present while our troops were standing in the street waiting to find out where Mr. Atherton's was. Senator GRAY. - Do you know whether that building was obtainable? Mr. COFFMAN. - I have no doubt in the world that it was obtainable. Senator GRAY. - Is that simply an opinion? Mr. COPFMAN. - That is my opinion. Senator GRAY. - Did you hear Mr. Waterhouse say anything about it? Mr. COFFMAN. - I heard Mr. Waterhouse say that he was glad to see the troops, and marched down in front of us after we had halted. He said, U I am glad to see this," and passed on in front of our troops, as much as to say he was glad to see our troops. Senator GRAY. - He owned that hotel building? Mr. COFFMAN. - Yes. Senator GRAY. - Is the situation of that building in a more thickly built up part of the town? Mr. COFEMAN. - I cannot say more thickly built up; but there are fine residences around there, and it is more accessible to the business portion. 32 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT Senator GRAY. - Was it nearer to what you considered the property of American citizens than Arion Hall? Mr. COFFMAN.- Yes. Senator GRAY. -More so, or how? Mr. COFFMAN. - It was nearer to the residence portion, which was the part which would be attacked in any incendiary work to go on. Senator GRAY. - Will you point on that map where it is? Mr. COFFMAN.- 011 Nuuana avenue. Senator GRAY. - You say it is on Nuuana avenue, a little more than half-way between the United States Consulate and the United States Legation? Mr. COFFMAN. - Yes. (Indicating on diagram.) There is Nuuana avenue; that is the Legation; it is about here - the house is not down here. Senator GRAY. - It was a new and unoccupied building? Mr. COFFMAN. - It was a new and unoccupied building. Senator GRAY. - Large enough to have accommodated your force? Mr. COFFMAN.- Yes. Senator GRAY.- Did any one suggest the use of that building? Mr. COFFMAN. - Yes; I did myself. Senator GRAY. - Where and when? Mr. COFFMAN. - When the troops were drawn up -- I think first when they were drawn up in the street, and certainly afterward, when we were waiting for a place to go. Senator GRAY. - Whom did you suggest it to? Mr. COFFMAN. -To the officers in general. About the 27th of February, 1893, Admiral Skerrett, of the United States Navy, arrived at Honolulu in the United States flagship "Mohican." He looked over Arion Hall and its position relative to the other buildings, and made the following report: 3 ADMIRAL SKERRETT TO MR. BLOUNT. U.S.S. " BOSTON," FLAGSHIP OF THE PACIFIC STATION, HONOLULU, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, May 20, 1893. SIR: I have examined with a view of inspection the premises first occupied by the force landed from the U.S.S. " Boston," and known as Arion Hall, situated on the west side of the Government building. The position of this location is in the rear of a large brick building I W-E *.a Palace. GovernmentBuilding. ii — l