ELEMENTS OF LOGIC;
TOGETHER WITH AN
INTRODUCTORY VIEW
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL,
AND A
PRELIMINARY VIEW OF THE REASON.
BY
HENRY P. TAPPAN.
NEW YORK:
D.  APPLETON  A ND   CO M PANY,
346 & 848 BROADWAY.
M. DCCC.LVI.
OF
:o 
ENTERED, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1855, by
D. APPLETON & COMPANY,
In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Southern
District of New Y ork. 
P R E F it C E.
TtIE work here undertaken differs somewhat in its
scope and design from systems of Logic which have
hitherto been given to the world. The Aristotelian
Logic is simply the method of deduction; and, as
such, it is complete. Subsequent works, in so far
as they have been strictly logical, have closely
copied the great master, and have confined themselves to an exhibition of the deductive principles
and processes.  Now, the deductive method comprehends merely the laws which govern inferences
or conclusions from premises previously established.
These premises may, in their turn, be inferences
from other premises, and so on, to a certain extent;
and just so far this method is all sufficient.  But it
is evident that the evolution of premises and conclusions, and conclusions and premises, must have a
limit. There must be premises which are not conclusions from other premises, but which arise in
some other way. Now, a complete and adequate
f o o 
PREFACE.
Logic ought to exhibit this other way likewise: it
ought to inform us how the most original premises
arise, and upon what basis they rest.
Other methods, indeed, have been abroad in the
world, but without being systematically propounded
as parts of Logic. Thus, the Platonic philosophy
really contains a Logical development of the most
original forms of human thought, springing out of
the intuitive faculty.  And the Novum Organumrn
of Bacon contains a logical exposition of the method
of establishing first principles through the observation of phenomena.
Both Plato and Bacon have had many able disciples and expounders; and both are daily coming
out into a broader and clearer light, not as opponents, but-to adopt the thought of Coleridge-as
the opposite poles of one great and harmonious
system.
The present attempt, therefore, is to make out
the system of Logic under its several departments;
and to present it not merely as a method of obtaining inferences from truths, but also as a method of
establishing those first truths and general principles
which must precede all deduction.
With all humility, I acknowledge my indebtedness to the great thinkers who have preceded me.
I have of course read as well as thought; and my
thinking and reading are naturally blended together.
With this acknowledgment, may I be permitted to
go on with my work, without stopping to note nar
4 
PREFACE.
rowly in my own mmind, or to remark to my reader,
when I am drawing from original, and when from
other sources?  I ought, perhaps, in justice to myself, to remark, that the entire plan of this work
was struck out several years since, and different
portions of it written before Professor Whewell's
and Mr. Mills' elaborate and suggestive works had
fallen under my eye.
That Logic really embraces all the parts which
I have assigned to it, I think will fully appear in
the sequel. It is that branch of philosophy which
expounds the laws of the Reason as the faculty of
truth and reality.
The view which I have taken of Logic, will justify the prolegomena. I give the Introduction to
Philosophy in General, in order to point out the
relative position and importance of Logic in a philosophical system. And I give the Preliminary View
of the Reason, because, since this is the faculty
which reasons, or logicizey, I deemed that such a
view, if given both clearly and briefly, would be
satisfactory in this place.
5  
CONTENTS.
PART I.
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
AGE
15
SECTION I. —Definition of Philosophy..............................................
IL-Distinction between the Phenomenal and the Metaphe               nomenal..............................................................
III.-Of the Reality of the Metaphenomenal............................
IV. -The Objective and the Subjective..................................
V.-Reason and Sense......................................................
VI.-Sensualism and Transcendentalism................................
VII.-Ideas and Laws....................................
VIII.-Primary and Secondary Phenomena..............................
IX.-Antecedence in Time and in Necessary Existence..............
X.-Ideas the last Authority of all Judgments or Knowledges....
XI.-Divisions of Philosophy..............................................
I. Metaphysics......................................................
Comprehending
Psychology....................................................
Dynamics......................................................
Anthropology.................................................
Ontology.......................................................
II. Nomology; comprehending
The Morale....................................................
Esthetics.......................................................
Somatology....................................................
Logic...........................................................
-- 0 o
23
27
32
39'
42
50
58
60
64
70
71
73
74
75
80
ib.
82
83 
CONTENTS.
PAGE
86
89
91
92
95
99
103
108
SECT. XII.-Of the Relations between Philosophy and the Sciences and
Arts.................................................................
Geometry.......................................................
Sciences of Discrete Quantity...............................
Natural Science................................................
Conditional and Unconditional Science....................
Art..........................................
XIII.-Reason, the Organ of Philosophy...................................
XV.-Criteria of a True Philosophy.......................................
PART II.
PRELIMINARY VIEW OF THE REASON.
SECTION I.-General Introductory Considerations respecting the Reason.., 123
II.-Outline of the Ideas and Functions of the Reason............... 129
III.-Explication of Ideas................................................... 138
-  IV.-Explication of the Functions of the Reason....................... 143
V.-Does Logic comprehend all the Functions of the Reason?.... 144
PART III.
LOGIC PROPER.
BOOK I.
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
SECTION I.-General Laws of the Evolution of Ideas........................... 148
I[. Metaphysical Ideas; comprehending
I. Subject and Objective Exteriority.......................... 155
II. Time and Space............................................... 156
III. The Infinite and the Finite................................ 159
IV. Quantity........................................................  ib.
V. Quality.......................................................... 165
V1. Relation......................................................... 167
VII. Modality....................................................... 172
Ii. — Nomological Ideas; comprehending
I Law................................................................ 177
8 
CONTENTS.
PAGE
II. Matter and Spirit.............................................. 178
III. Perfection...................................................... ib.
IV. Right and Wrong................................................ 180
V. Freedom and Responsibility.................................. 182
VI. Personal Identity.............................................. 183
VII. Immortality................................................... 184
VIII. The Beautiful, comprehending
Symmetry...................................................... 187
Grace............................................................ 188
Regularity, Uniformity, Variety........................... ib.
Determinate Form........................................... 189
The Sublime................................................... 190
Melody.......................................................... 191
Harmony.......................................................  ib.
IX. The Useful...................................................... 196
X. Centralization and Diffusion................................. 198
XI. Affinity and Repulsion........................................ 199
XII. L     ife.............................................................. ib.
XIII. Polarity..................................................... 200
XIV. Instinct....................................................... 201
XV. Regularity, Uniformity, Variety, Symmetry, and
Determinate F o r m....................................... 202
XVI. Identity, Difference, Resemblance....................... 203
XVII. Design, Final Cause, Means and End................. 205
XVIII. Truth........................................................ 207
XIX. The Philosophical Idea.................................... 209
XX. Intuition....................................................... 210
XXI. Involution and Evolution.................................. 211
XXII. Analysis and Synthesis................................... 213
IV.-Primary Sensuous Cognitions, or Cognitions of the Exterior
Consciousness..................................................... 219
V.-Primary Subjective Cognitions, or Cognitions of the Interior
Consciousness............................................... 222
VI.-Axioms.................................................................. 224
Metaphysical Axioms................................................. 226
Nomological Axioms............................................. 228
VII.-Of the Characteristics of Axioms in general...................... 235
VIII.-General Relations of Axioms........................................ 240
IX.-Definitions.............................................................. 243
1*
9 
CONTENTS.
BOOK II.
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
PAGE
SECTION I.-Introduction............................................................. 249
II.-Causes and Laws...................................................... 252
III.-The Human Reason, as related to the Objective World........ 259
IV.-General View of Classification....................................... 262
V.-Principles determining the Induction of Phenomena in Clas                 sification....................................................... 265
VI.-Distinction between a General Fact and an Absolute and
Fixed Law......................................................... 276
VIL-The Logic of General Facts.......................................... 283
Principles of Elimination:
I. General Difference with Uniform Agreement in One
Point.......................................................... 288
II. General Agreement with Uniform Difference in One
Point........................................................... 289
III. Elimination by Corresponding Quantities and Inten                      sities........................................................... 291
IV. Elimination of the Terms of a Sequence, in order to
determine which is the Antecedent and which the
Consequent................................................... 294
VIII.-Inductive Logic of Universal and Necessary Laws.............. 303
IX.-The Logic of Art....................................................... 315
BOOK III.
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
SECTION LI.-Introduction............................................................ 318
II. —Analysis of Propositions.............................................. 320
III.-Of Propositions, as opposed to each other........................ 325
IV.-Of the Conversion of Propositions.................................. 328
V.-Propositions constructed into Syllogisms.......................... 332
VI.-Of Moods and Figures................................................ 347
VII.-Of the Reduction of Syllogisms..................................... 351
VIII.-Of Modal, Hypothetical, and Disjunctive Propositions......... 354
IX.-Hypothetical Reasoning.............................................. 357
X.-Of the Dilemma....................................................... 362
XI.-Of the Sorites........................................................... 365
XII.-Application of the Deductive Formula............................. 368
10 
CONTENTS.
PAGE
SEC. XIII.-Of Fallacies.
Fallacies of Deduction................................................ 377
Comprehending
I. Fallacies in the Formula...................................... 378
II. Fallacies in the Matter....................................... 380
1. Ambiguous Middle.......................................... ib.
2. Fallacies relating to the Connection between the
Matter of the Premises and that of the Conclusion. 383
Fallacies of Induction; comprehending
I. Fallacies of Observation....................................... 393
II. Fallacies in Determining General Facts.................. 396
III. Fallacies in Inducting Laws................................ 398
Fallacies in respect to Intuition..................................... 399
BOOK IV.
DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
SECTION I.-Nature of Proof............................................................. 403
II.-The different kinds of apr/ori and  posterwon Proof........... 408
III.-Of the Nature of the Relation between Antecedents and Con                sequents............................................................. 413
IV.-Of Degrees of Evidence............................................... 416
V.-Of Testimony.......................................................... 430
VI.-Circumstantial Evidence............................................. 436
VII. -Argument from Progressive Approach............................ 443
VIII.-Proving by Example.................................................. 446
IX.-Reasoning from Experience.......................................... 451
X.-Reasoning from Resemblance and Analogy..................... 454
XI.L-Demonstrative Proof.............................. 462
XII.-Calculation of Probabilities and Chances......................... 463
11  
PART I.
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF PHILOSOPHY
IN GENERAL.  
PART I.
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
SECTION I.
DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY.
THE term PHILOSOPHY in common usage has obtained an
indefinite and often an improper application. When employed alone, and without relation to any specific subject,
it is generally supposed to refer to natural science: and
thus a Treatise, or Essay, or Lecture, on Philosophy, would
be expected to embrace something relating to Mechanics,
Astronomy, Chemistry, Electricity, or Magnetism.
Some undoubtedly would go beyond this; and regard
the term in its higher applications, as expressing something
in relation to the doctrines of the intellectual and moral
powers: or they would simply identify it with Metaphysics,
a term no less vague and obscure to common apprehension.
It is to be expected that the affirmation will at first
appear to many paradoxical, that Mechanics, Astronomy,
Chemistry, &c., are not branches of Philosophy: but in the
end it will appear perfectly just. Philosophy indeed holds
a close and most important relation to these sciences: they
are grand results of philosophy; but they are not philosophy itself. And even Metaphysics, general and compre 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
hensive as it is, does not comprehend all philosophy-it
only forms one of its important divisions.
In defining philosophy, we may go on to say, that it is
the Scientia Scientiarum-" the Science of Sciences; as
its object is to explain the principles and causes of all things
existing; and to supply the defects of inferior sciences,
which do not demonstrate, or sufficiently explain their
principles." * Or we may call it the " Science of the Universal and the Absolute." But this is not enough. It
would be like defining Astronomy as the "Science of the
Heavens." A definition may be just, and yet by reason
of its dry, general, technical, and elaborate form of expression, may fall short of the true end of all definition, viz.,
to lead the intelligence to a clearer insight and a more perfect comprehension.
-PHILOSOPHY is a word formed from the Greek 4tXovoOta. It primarily expresses a mental affection-a love of
knowledge or of wisdom.
It cannot be questioned that such an affection is inherent in the human mind. It appears in feeble infancyit stimulates the activities of the busy prattling child it
forms the wakeful earnestness and joy of youth-it stirs
nobly in manhood-it decays not with the decay of age.
It is a moving spirit even in savage life, and shows man,
when lowest, as still above the brute. This impulse TO
KNOW, this restless CURIOSITY, is connected with the whole
development of humanity in Science, Arts, Government,
and Religion. Co-existent with this love of knowledge is
the love of external action. Hence, the development of
humanity appears not only in the cultivation of the intelligence and the consequent unfolding of the sciences; but
also in the construction of implements and machinery, and
* Ed. Ency.
16 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
in the changes and improvements wrought upon the face
of Nature. The eager love of knowledge, and the no less
eager love of action-the impulse TO KNOW, and the impulse TO DO-these are elements spontaneously at work in
human nature, and may be appropriately termed philosophical elements.
Let us conceive of that period when the Heavens and
the Earth were finished, and man was created and placed
in the Earth its inhabitant and lord. Then he had the
same faculties which he now possesses; and the Earth was
under the government of the same physical laws which
govern it now; but his faculties were undeveloped, and
science and art had not yet appeared; and the Earth,
whatever modifications it might be capable of, stood as it
came from the hand of the Creator, in uncultivated beauty.
But man, as he walks abroad upon the Earth, with all the
endowments of intelligence and feeling, observes the Heavens and the Earth, exercises thought, generalises, and
forms conclusions. What is working within him, impresses its form upon all outward things:-the forest is
levelled, and cultivated fields appear; the mountain and
the valley feel the touch of his hand, and put on new appearances; he opens a way across rivers, and covers the
ocean with fleets; where rivers are wanting, he creates
them; he digs into the crust of the Earth, and brings up
minerals and appropriates them; he calls into being a
thousand useful arts; he scatters over the face of the
Earth convenient habitations, and crowds them together
into cities. But not only does he change the face of the
Earth, and put to his uses its various materials-he also
establishes government, administers law, and awards justice: he speaks eloquence into being; poetry born in his
heart, is expressed in flowing numbers; he perfects sound
17 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
into music; he takes the chisel, and from the marble
quarry spring up forms whose beauty is divine; and majestic temples, which seem born with them as their fit
habitation; he takes the pencil, and dipping it in the
colors of heaven, imitates every form of life, and advances
beyond Nature herself: he affirms, reasons, and believes;
draws out pure abstractions from his thought; advances
into Nature, and searches out laws for her phenomena;
and thus builds up systems of science: he invents a method
of analysis, and, in the laboratory, compels Nature to reveal her more secret processes; and, not content with this
world, the light of heaven, which has lighted him to his
labors here, he seizes upon as his minister, and makes it
reveal to him the worlds from whence it has travelled.
Still more-from these finite forms, he ascends up to the
INFINITE; he is a worshipper of GOD, and an expectant
of immortality.
"Imagine a being who had been present at the earliest
days of the universe, and of human life; who had seen the
external surface of the Earth, as it came forth from the
hands of Nature, and looked upon all the beauty of those
ancient times; who had seen the beautiful forms which
Nature presented, and heard the melodious sounds which
she then uttered; in a word, a being who had been a spectator of the first exhibition of the primitive world, and
who should return at the present day amidst the prodigies
of our industry, our institutions, and our arts; would it
not seem to him in his astonishment as if he no longer
recognized the ancient dwelling-place of man; as if beings
of a superior order had transferred their abode to the
Earth and had metamorphosed it?" *: Or contemplate an
* Introduction Generale A rlHistoire de la Philosophie, par M. Cousin,
Lec. I.-Linberg's Translation.
18 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
epitome of the whole mighty development of mind in a
single individual, appearing first on the shore of this world
a feeble infant, and in less than a century assuming the
character of a Newton, a Leibnitz, a Milton: and as an
illustration of the changes made in the condition of the
world by human invention and skill, take the history of
Mechanics, of the Needle and the Telescope.
In contemplating these developments and changes,
what enquiry springs up, yea, irresistibly springs up, in
the mind? Do we not ask, how all this came to pass, and
why the developments and changes came up under these
particular forms?  Do we not ask, why did man change
the face of the Earth?  Why did he create government?
Why did he give birth to science and art? Where and
how did the development of his mind begin; and how did
it proceed? What are the laws of his thought, the
ground of his knowledges and beliefs, the forms of his reasonings, and the methods of his investigations? What
are the laws of his emotions and passions? What are the
capacity and force, and what the laws of his will?
Enquiries like these evince the workings of the philosophic spirit; they are found under some form, in some
degree, in every human mind.  Few, indeed, take in that
whole field of enquiry, which embraces the complete development of humanity; but whether in the child, or in
the adult, in the savage, or in cultivated man, you perceive
questionings after the origin and reason of things-after
efficient and final causes-an earnest prying of the mind
into something beyond mere visible and tangible forms,
you there perceive the workings of the philosophic impulse
-the ltXoaoota.  This is the DAWN OF PHILOSOPHY.  The
impulse TO KNOW and TO DO, the elements of philosophy
spontaneously at work in the mind, lead forth the develop
19 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
ments and changes above mentioned. The enquiry after
the causes and reasons of these developments and changes,
after they have in any degree taken place, is the higher
form of the 4tXo~o-la, and leads forth the mind to the
construction of philosophy as a system. Under the first
form, the mind appears intent upon its objects, thinking,
feeling, doing, and making its inherent energies to appear
in external effects. Under the second form, it turns back
upon itself,-that is, makes itself its own object by an act
of reflection, and finds out its own reach and limits, its
own aims and laws.
,T)tXoaooa, from expressing the impulse TO KNOW and
the consequent causal activity of man, and from expressing, after the development of humanity has taken place,
the impulse to seek after the laws and principles which
have governed this development, comes to express these
laws and principles themselves. These laws and principles, like the simple desire of knowledge, act spontaneously
in the development of humanity. They are in the highest
sense philosophical elements of our being, inseparable from
it, and energizing as a plastic power within, and as such
distinguishable from philosophy as an expressed system
without, laid down in books, or in the lectures of the
schools. The frst, of course, gives birth to the second, as
thought gives birth to language.
In that early period of humanity to which we have adverted, it could not exist as a developed system: it was
then in man as a light and a power, under which he thought
and acted, but upon which he did not reflect: Thus the
idea of the useful, led him to change the face of nature
and to originate the ordinary arts: The idea of justice,
led him to constitute government and law: The idea of
the beautiful, led him to the creations of painting, sculp
20 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
ture, music, and poetry: The inherent laws of his intelligence, guided him in his reasonings; he believed, because
he could not disbelieve, and faith appeared in him like a
sublime and divine instinct: When he looked out upon
the phenomena of the world, he assigned them causes,
because he could not think of them without this relation:
And from finite being, his mind necessarily rose up to the
conception of the Infinite Being-he became a worshipper
under the energy of a spontaneous and irresistible idea.
At length reflection began-when it began we know
not, but its beginning was the birth of philosophy as a
system developed and recognized. By the act of reflection,
or self-consciousness, the mind turns back upon itself, and
makes itself the object of its own contemplations.  All the
phenomena of the mind, are presented in the field of its
consciousness;-the sensations which are caused by the
external world-the affirmations of the reason-the volitions-must all alike appear there, in order to be known.
There is an ordinary consciousness which belongs necessarily to every man; but reflection is a special and voluntary consciousness, and thence called a philosophic consciousness, which appears only when the mind becomes the
object of its own observation by an act of self-determination.
Now in the exercise of this philosophic consciousness,
the mind questions itself respecting the grounds of its
knowledge and its faith-respecting the forms of its thinking, and the modes of its investigation-respecting the
grounds of its decisions in arts, morals, government, and
religion: it makes those very enquiries which we recognize in ourselves, when, reviewing the progressive development of humanity, we are struck with wonder and admiration at what man has accomplished, and at what man has
21 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
himself become. The results of these enquiries form systematic philosophy.
Let us sum up here the preceding observations, so as
to present a succinct definition.
1. Philosophy, from 4too-otoa, expresses the inherent
desire of knowledge in the human mind; and as closely
connected with this, the desire of action. Under the impulse of these desires man begins to acquire knowledge;
and to exert his causality in appropriating the materials
supplied him from the earth-in working in various arts,
and in modifying the face of nature.
2. After a time he begins to reflect upon the development of his mind, the facts he has observed, and the
works of his own power and skill: and now the ltXoo'ot'a,
or love of knowing, takes a new direction, and impels him
to search out the causes, laws, and forms of the various development of his own being.
3. These causes, laws and forms really existed subjectively, inseparable from himself, before he began to make
them the object of his thought and curious inquiry: and
they, as the first principles of his being, and as governing
its manifestations, are the substantial elements of philosophy.
4. These first principles of his being are known through
reflection, or self-consciousness; and when stated methodically, under proper divisions, and with clear definitions
and expositions, form Didactic Philosophy.
The term't'Xoo'ola, which at first expressed only the
desire of knowledge, or love of truth spontaneously working in the human mind, is thus employed to express all the
grand results of this high and glorious impulse.
22 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
SECTION II.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PHENOMENAL AND THE
METAPHENOMENAL.
CONsCIOUSNESS is the common  field of all our mental
activity. All our sensations, our perceptions, thinking,
and reasoning, our imaginations and fancies, our emotions,
passions, determinations, and volitions, alike appear, and
are recognized here. These affections of our being are not
the movements of an insensate mechanism: we know them
in their going on, and we know ourselves as the SUBJECTS
of them.
Now there is an important distinction to be drawn here.
The distinction between the immediate objects of consciousness, and those objects which, although known, or at least
supposed to be known, yet lie without the sphere of consciousness. The immediate objects of our consciousness
are phenomena, and these only are phenomena; while those
objects which, by supposition, lie beyond immediate consciousness, are metaphenomenal.
What are the immediate objects of consciousness, or of
what are we immediately conscious? This is the first
enquiry.
Let us begin with our sensations. The sensations are
affections of our inner being, and unquestionably are the
immediate objects of consciousness. But there are many
perceptions and judgments which come up to,iew in connection with the sensations, which, together with their
23 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
objects, are entirely distinct from the sensations.   The
bare sensations are those of color, of sound, of fragrance,
of taste, of touch, of heat and cold, of titillation, and of
pain and pleasure. In these are contained what are commonly called the secondary qualities of matter: but this
designation cannot be made from the bare sensations.
We  have in the sensations mere internal experiences, or
movements of our own inner being. We are not conscious
of matter, distance, space, substance, or cause;-we are
conscious of sensations only. We may be conscious of the
action of other faculties of our being, affirming or perceiving the existence of body, distance, space, substance, and
cause; but the bare sensations are no such affirmation, or
perception. I think it must be plain to every mind that
will reflect a little, that if we had only the sensations
above mentioned, we should have no knowledge of an external world whatever.
The same conclusion must be drawn with respect to
the primary qualities of matter. These are extension and
resistance. But resistance to immediate consciousness is
only an internal experience, and extension only a repetition
of this experience. There is nothing in this experience to
give us a knowledge of any thing external: time, space,
substance, and cause, are not contained in a mere inward
experience, a mere modification of our own being. In the
primary qualities, therefore, we have no immediate consciousness of an external world. It thus appears, in general, that we have an immediate consciousness only of certain affections or modifications of our own being. What
immediately appears to us, what we immediately know,
are these affections. These are truly the phenomenal. If
there be an external world,-if there be substance, space,
time, and cause,-they are not phenomenal, or immediately
24 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
recognized in the consciousness, nor do they come directly
from the sensations.
Let us suppose, then, that we have faculties by which
we can know an external world, and by which we can
know  substance, time, space, body, and cause, either
through the sensations, or independently of them; then,
with respect to these faculties, the enquiry arises also, what
are the immediate objects of consciousness?
The faculties themselves are not the immediate objects;
nor are the objects perceived, and the truths affirmed, the
immediate objects: simply the acts of these faculties are
the immediate objects of consciousness. Thus in perceiving any external object, as a house or a tree, I am not immediately conscious of the house or the tree, but of sensations of color, and of the act of perceiving. The external
object does not come into my consciousness, but only the
sensations and perceptions, and these are simply movements
of my own being. Indeed, my own being, as a substance
endowed with faculties of feeling, knowing and willing, is
not immediately presented to my consciousness: I am conscious only of certain phenomena, and of acts of judgment
connecting the phenomena with external objects and internal faculties.
In processes of deep thinking and reasoning, the same
holds true. In studying out some mathematical theorem,
for example, the recondite mathematical relations,-the
necessary and absolute truths are not immediate objects of
consciousness;-but the acts of attention, the acts of
thinking and reasoning-the modifications of my own being in order to know and comprehend, and in knowing and
comprehending. The mathematical relations, the necessary
and absolute truths, do not come into consciousness as
phenomena,-the acts and modifications of my own being
. 2
25 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
are the phenomena, while the relations and truths are
metaphenomenal.
Again, God is invisible:  He is neither as a substance
addressed to the senses, nor is he manifested to the consciousness as a modification of our interior being; but still,
if known at all, he must be known by these modifications:
He is not the phenomena of consciousness, but known
through them.
Here, then, we have the broad and clear distinction between the phenomenal and the metaphenomenal. Sensations, emotions and passions, acts of perceiving, judging,
reasoning and imagining, acts of choice and volitionthese, as the immediate objects of consciousness, are phenomenal; but the causes of sensation, emotion, and passion, the objects and truths perceived, affirmed, or deduced,
the objects of the imagination, of choice and volitionthese, not being the immediate objects of consciousness,
are metaphenomenal.
26 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
SECTION III.
OF THE REALITY OF THE METAPHENOMENAL.
THE reality of the phenomenal is not questioned. That I
have certain sensations, perceptions, emotions passions,
and volitions, this is immediate knowledge and consciousness: but whether the objects of these acts and experiences
of my being have a real, positive, and independent existence, this may be and has been questioned, and even denied: The reality of the metaphenomenal has been questioned and denied.
It will be readily granted by all, that by the imagination we can create objects which are unreal; and that in
our actual perceptions we are often mistaken, and seem to
perceive what we afterwards discover to have no reality, or
to be a very different object from what we thought it to be.
But, beyond all this, it has been contended that there is no
objective reality whatever;-that the tree and the house
which I now see, and which everybody sees, has no existence out of, and independently of, the perception of which
I and everybody are immediately conscious; and the same
of all objects, whether external things, or internal truths.
It is undeniable that men generally believe in the reality of the metaphenomenal; nay, that only a few speculative philosophers, have ever denied it.
Now, the aim of philosophy is to explain the actual
development of our being, of all that man has thought
27 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
and done. Hence even the errors of man must be explained. If, therefore, men have erred in their belief in
the reality of the metaphenomenal, it must be shown both
that it cannot exist, and how men have come to entertain
this universal but erroneous belief
Those who believe in the reality of the metaphenomenal
are indeed required, as philosophers, to show, how it is legitimately attained: but, on the other hand, those who
deny this reality, in opposition to a common sentiment,
are justly required to explain this common sentiment.
The denial of the metaphenomenal had its origin in a
mode of explaining the attainment of it. Its reality was
at first assumed as unquestionable; but the explanation
given, finally developed the denial as a legitimate consequence.
The cardinal principle of this mode, was the assumption that the mind could perceive only by coming in contact
with the object of perception, in accordance with a supposed axiom, nihil agit, nisi curn, et ubi est, nothing can act
except when and where it is. This principle was suggested
by an apparent law in physics, viz.: that one body can act
upon another only by actual contact. The truth of this
law is now disputed, and even the impossibility of an actual
contact between the particles of bodies firmly believed.
But if the law were unquestionable in respect to physics,
on what legitimate grounds can it be taken as a law of
equal appropriateness and validity in explaining the perceptions of the mind? That the mind can perceive only
by coming in contact with the objects of perception, must
be a mere assumption. Besides, by the physical analogy,
the mind perceiving as well as the object perceived must
be material.
Having assumed the law, however, the great aim now
28 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
naturally became to explain how the contact between
mind and its objects takes place.
In the first place, it was plain that mind and the external material objects do not immediately come in contact.
The mind perceives, therefore, not the material objects
themselves, but certain representations of these objects,
which were variously called species, forms, images, and
ideas. But what are these representative forms? Various
were the explications. The old Aristotelians held that
they are made up of fine material particles which enter
the different organs of sense, and form themselves into the
required image in the brain, and that there the mind
comes in contact with them.
After the age of Des Cartes, this theory was abandoned;
and the image or idea was spoken of as an impression
made upon the brain like that made upon wax by a seal.
Here no material particles were received into the brain
through the organs of sense; but, impressions being made
upon the organs from without, images were shaped upon
the brain corresponding to the external objects.
It is evident that the representative image once admitted, must become a fruitful subject of speculation.
These speculations, however, all tended to one result-a
result proclaimed in part by Berkley, and fully by Hume
-namely, that above mentioned, the denial of the metaphenomenal.
If we know only the representative images affirmed to
be in the mind, then we can have no legitimate knowledge
of any thing out of the mind; for, as in all our attempts
to approach exteriority, we are met merely by these images,
they are all that we  can possibly attain to.  Hence,
Berkley, on this principle, cannot be confuted, when he
affirms, "The existence of a body out of a mind perceiv
29 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
ing it, is not only impossible, and a contradiction in terms,
but, were it possible, and even real, it were impossible that
the mind should ever know it."-Hume is equally consistent in his sweeping affirmation: "Now, since nothing is
ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all
ideas are derived from something antecedently present to
the mind, it follows that'tis impossible for us so much as
to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas and impressions. Let us fix our attention
out of ourselves as much as possible; let us chase our
imaginations to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the
universe; we never really advance a step beyond ourselves,
nor can we conceive any kind of existence but those perceptions which have appeared in that narrow compass.
This is the universe of the imagination; nor have we any
idea but what is there produced."
The denial of the metaphenomenal appeared under two
forms:-First, that of Idealism. Here the facts of immodiate consciousness were taken as the only universe, " the
universe of the imagination." Secondly, that of Materialism.  Here the representative images were merely considered as arising from material objects, and impinging
upon material organs, and thence affecting the brain, or
sensorium. What now is the soul which receives the next
impression but a finer form of matter, and what are its
sensations and ideas but a movement of the internal organism?
There is a class of philosophers, and Reid may be placed
at their head, who endeavor to dissipate the dogmas of
both Idealism and Materialism by the stern voice of Common Sense. Every man believes in the metaphenomenalin objective reality and truth; therefore, it exists for every
man. Here common sense pauses: but the philosophical
30 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
impulse still urges to the enquiry, Is there not reality in
opposition to Idealism and Materialism? Is there no.t reality independently of a mere subjective persuasion? The
first are forms of a philosophy which, on its received principles, demonstrates conclusions in opposition tQ general
belief.  And is the general belief incapable of explaining
itself by demonstrating the reality of its objects? Must it
merely doggedly affirm itself in opposition to the philosophical diagrams paraded before it? And shall the united
efforts of the human mind end in the birth of two great
parties, both occupying absurd positions-the one affirming, "I prove, although I do not believe; " and the other,
"I believe, although I cannot prove?"  May we not prove
and believe, and believe and prove?
It is now evident, I think, that the cardinal aim of
philosophy must be to reach the metaphenomenal. If the
existence of the metaphenomenal can be demonstrated,
then the facts of consciousness, the phenomenal, are accounted for.
31 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
SECTION IV.
THE OBJECTIVE AND THE SUBJECTIVE.
IN determining the actual development of our being, in
its various relations, we find ourselves at once introduced
to two forms of being: the SUBJECTIVE, and the OBJECTIVE. The subjective, under its simplest and most unique
form, is myself; and the objective, under its most general
form, comprehends whatever is not expressed in the term
me, or nyself.  Again, the simple subjective, myself, becomes objective, when, in an act of self-consciousness, I
make it the object of my thought. And again, the objective general, or whatever is not myself, must be subdivided
into the purely objective and the subjective general. The
purely objective is that which is not only not myself, but
totally unlike myself-different in kind-having no properties in common.   The subjective general is that which,
embracing myself, is like myself-the same in kind-having
properties in common: a distinction of personalities, of
laws, causalities, and sympathies-but yet agreeing in being connected with personalities, in implying the presence
of mind, and in being capable of being referred in kind to
the finite and the infinite mind.
I will explain: I have developed to my own consciousness a thinking principle, a will or free causality, and various emotions and passions; and these, either as constituting or as being inseparable from my own personality,
32 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
constitute the simple subjective. Now, I conceive of other
personalities like my own, each being to itself the simple
subjective;-and of these distinct personalities I conceive
oi one as the Eternal and the Infinite, while all the others
are finite of various degrees.
Now, all these personalities come under the denomination of the subjective general. They are all of one kind,
and each one is capable, by an act of self-consciousness, of
making itself the simple subjective, and of considering all
else in relation to itself as objective; and capable of even
making itself an object to itself.
Besides these distinct personalities, which are directly
like myself, and palpably of the same kind, there are other
forms of the subjective, which, however, are ultimately resolvable into the former. The vegetable and animal life
-the forces and laws of the material creation, chemical
affinities-the informing power of animal and vegetable
physiology, that power by which every animal and every
plant is produced invariably after its own kind, from the
vitalized seed;-these forces, laws, affinities, and informing
powers-these busy workers and co-workers-these wise
and exact regulators of the whole natural world-what are
they? There is design and causality here which cannot
be conceived of without mind:'Whether the mind be in
the material masses, formative and governing by direct influence and immediate presence; or whether it have invisible, unconscious, and incomprehensible agents, makes not;
mind is here as the seat of power, and the fountain of law.
If all that is personal belong to the subjective genera],
then also must these laws and forces belong to the subjective general likewise; for,- although they do not directly
appear as personalities, because giving us no manifestation of self-conscious determination, still they cannot
33 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
but be involved in some way in such personalities, since
their explication and conception is impossible in any other
way.
But what is then the pure objective, or that which can
in no sense be subjective? Whatever is directly known by
the senses, or by the muscular organism, is purely objective.
I see and smell a flower-that is, I have certain sensations, which arise from the correlation between my senses
and a certain substance lying in space and exterior to
myself. Now, I say not that I could form the judgment
here expressed, without subjective principles; but the exterior substance which I name a flower in expressing this
judgment, I conceive of not as life, but as a product of
life, and upheld by life; not as a formative power, a
forma forrmans, but as a substance informed, a forma
forrmata.  Again, a ball is tossed towards me, and I catch
it in my hands.  In doing this, I have the sensation of
hardness, or, in other words, I experience a muscular resistance. Now, here again, I do not say that I could
have formed this judgment without subjective principles;
but the ball, or body, I conceive of not as itself a resisting
cause, or as a gravitating power, but as that in which such
a cause and power are habitant; and while cause and
power belong to the subjective, I cannot but assign the
gross material phenomena to the purely objective. They
are not me, nor like me: they are not life, or formative
power: they are not a force or a law.  "In the material
sense of the word Nature, we mean by it the sum total of
all things, as far as they are objects of our senses, and consequently of possible experience-the aggregate of phenomena." * All that is exterior to me, and phenomenal
* Coleridge.
34 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
to the outer senses, and which does not account for and
explain itself as, for example, effects require causes to
explain them,-is purely objective.
But not only are all material phenomena purely objective; all phenomena of consciousness which are known
merely as acts or movements of the thinking, willing, and
sensitive faculties-that is, all which comes into the consciousness through the outer senses, and thence called seisations; and all which is presented in the activities of the
internal faculties, the perceptions, reasonings and imaginations, the acts of memory and fancy, and the volitions,
emotions, and passions, are objective likewise.
The distinction between the subjective general, therefore, and the pure objective, is co-extensive with the metaphenomenal and the phenomenal.-But in this point of
view, it is a distinction in the kind or nature of the particulars compared.   The metaphenomenal is subjective,
because it is that upon which the development of our being
ultimately rests: the phenomenal is objective, because it
is that in which the development of our being appears actually taking place.
The development of the Intelligence must ultimately
rest upon ideas, principles, or first truths. In the process
of this development, appear its perceptions, reasonings,
imaginations, and so on.
The development of the Will must ultimately rest
upon the laws of the Reason. In the process of this development appear choices and volitions.
The development of the Sensitivity must ultimately
rest upon the laws of the Reason, likewise. In the process of this development appear the various sensations,
emotions, and passions. When the subjective is fully
attained,-that is, when all principles are known, all laws
35 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
obeyed, all fitting sensations, emotions, and passions
brought out and regulated by reason, then the development of our being is complete. While this development
is going on, the phenomenal, or the purely objective, is
thrown out.
But, although the phenomenal is always and only
objective, we have seen that the subjective can also become objective; but this last distinction does not, like the
former, arise from a difference in kind, but merely from a
change of position or relation. Every intelligent personal
subject can make all else objective to itself-nay, can make
itself objective to itself, by an act of reflection.
To sum up the preceding distinctions, we have all possible forms of being embraced under the subjective and
the objective, as follows:
1. The subjective simple, or myself;
2. The subjective simple, taken as objective to my
self;
3. The objective general, or whatever is not myself;
4. The objective general, divided into the subjective
general and the pure objective;-the first comprising
whatever is metaphenomenal-the second whatever is phenomenal.
The distinctions made and explained above, give us
the leading philosophical conception, and enable us clearly
and: sibcinctly to state the leading problems.   The leadinlg; philosophical conception is that of explaining  the
development of my being.  Now  this development presents me-,
First,- thse phenomenal, or what appears to my immediat:e cotsciousness:. This consciousness I can divide into
t"he-xt er':'that Which contains mere sensations; and
ethe t:.nt/:;'tthtt w lihidh contains the movements of my
36 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
own faculties. Now, all these phenomena, whether of the
exterior or interior consciousness, constitute the pure ob jective,* because they lie before the reflective power.
Secondly, I have the metaphenomenal, or that which
lies beyond the phenomena: and this admits likewise of a
twofold division.   The  metaphenomenal in the world
without, which is to account for the sensations; and the
metaphenomenal within, which is to account for the acts
which take place upon the sensations. Now, the metaphenomenal without and within, constitutes the subjective t
general, because it lies under and sustains the phenomenal
as the ground of its possibility.
Hence we announce a main problem in philosophy,
namely: To determine the validity and the forms of the
subjective, and to show its relations to the objective.
Again, in the development of my being, the earliest
conviction at which I arrive is the Ego sum, I AM.  Now,
starting with this conviction, I find that all which I know,
I know not only in the field of my consciousness, but also
in the determination and activity of my personality. I find
thus, that I am a simple, unique subject, lying in some
sort under all being whatever, determining the mode and
extent of its cognizance, and even its reality.
Hence we announce another problem in philosophy, no
less important than the preceding, namely: To determine
objective reality; or the reality of the objective general,of that which is not myself.
The first problem is disputed by the sensualists, or
those who derive the materials of all cognition from experience. The second is disputed by the idealists, or those
who, like Berkley and HIume, deny the possibility of know
ing an external world.
tf Sub and jaceo.
37
* Ob and jaceo. 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
Once more: The subjective simple which attempts to
reach the objective general, attempts also to reach itself.
This it can do only by making itself an object to itself.
Hence arises a new and unique form of knowledge through
the power of reflection or self-consciousness; and thus we
have the problem: To determine the faculties and laws of
the simple subjective.
These three problems cover the whole field of Philosophy, as will be apparent when we come to consider its
cardinal divisions.
38 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENER1AL.
SECTION V.
REASON AND SENSE.
IN the present developed state of my faculties, I know myself as Body and Spirit. Spirit is the subjectivity within,
which thinks, feels, and wills. The body, the material tabernacle of the spirit, is a part of the great system of external nature: it is the same, mechanically and chemically; and it lives and decays like all other living things.
What is its relation to the spirit? It is the curious and
wonderful mediator between matter and spirit. Through
the nerves, distributed into five external senses, and
through the muscular organism sometimes called the
"sixth sense" and the sense of resistance, nature reaches
the spirit. What is the product of this union? Sensations, and nothing more. No thought, no knowledgesimply an experience of sound, color, sapidness, fragrance,
touch, and resistance. But the cognitive faculty within
is not unfurnished. It is prepared to know the world,
from whence the sensations arise; and it is prepared to
know itself.  Sensation conditionates the reason in two
ways:
First-In sensation, in common with all the subjective
faculties, it wakes to self-conscious activity. It here begins to live its knowing and thoughtful life.
Secondly-Sensation furnishes materials of cognition;
39 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
or signs which the reason appropriates readily and familiarly, in reading the external world.
The lower faculty, as it were, sings a joyful matin song
under the window of the reason; then this glorious power
awakes, and looking out, recognizes the reality, beauty, and
laws of God's works, and the Great Maker himself; and
then, turning back upon itself, sees there the image of the
Divine wisdom and love. In knowing the world, the mind
is developed, and all its faculties brought into exercise;
and as consciousness necessarily accompanies every internal
movement, the mind is likewise revealed to itself.
The first knowledge of both spirit and nature is spontaneous. Afterwards, comes the period for philosophical
reflection upon the one, and philosophical observation
upon the other; and then, psychology and natural science
are born. 
As our faculties become unfolded in their relations
with nature, important changes take place.  The sensations and muscular resistance, which originally could directly of themselves give us no knowledge, are now
transformed into apt and familiar signs of all external
bodies, forms and qualities. The different shades of light
and color, now associated with bodies, forms and qualities,
readily represent them, and we seem to know every thing
by the eye.  It is now almost an universal sense.  So also
the different sounds received by the ear, enable us to distinguish persons, things, places, and distances. The same
principle applies to all the senses. The reason has appropriated them all, and made them such quick and familiar
servitors of knowledge, that we now seem to have an immediate perception of the outer world.   On  the other
hand, Reason, having from the first activity of the sense
which opened the play of the mental powers, entered upon
40 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
its career and unfolded itself to itself, is now no longer dependent upon sensuous experience as occasions of intellection. It can now retire within itself, and think with closed
senses. Memory and Imagination now wait upon it, to
supply it with facts and images; and within its own
depths it has opened fountains of pure, absolute, and necessary truth.
As the body is thus the mediator through which the
outer world reaches the spirit, so also it is the mediator
and instrumentality through which the spirit reaches the
external world, and impresses itself upon it. One set of
nerves obey nature, and give sensations to the spirit.
Another set of nerves obey the spirit, and move the muscular organism. The tongue and the hand are the two
great instruments by which the mind does its work without.  The arts of industry and beauty-all the changesall the improvements which the spirit hath made in the
great field of nature, it hath made by the tongue and the
hand.
What, then, is humanity, but spirit conditionated on
the one hand in its incipient activity, and in its knowledge
of an external world, by sensuous impressions? And conditionated on the other hand, in the exertion of its causality
and plastic power, by an apt material instrumentality?
41 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
SECTION VI.
SENSUALISM AND TRANSCENDENTALISM.
WE now arrive at the point of departure of two great systems of philosophy. Taken under their modern developments, Locke may be said to represent the one, and Kant
the other.
Sensualism, concentrating its thought in the sensuous
conditions of knowledge, loses sight of the truth that they
are merely conditions; and goes on to expound them as
the primary and radical elements of knowledge itself.
Hence the utmost development of the human intelligence
presents us only the combination and expansion of these
elements. The reason is absolutely incapable. of arriving
at any truth whose generating or constitutive elements
have not first entered the senses. The senses thus become the sources and measure of all knowledge.
Transcendentalism begins with sensation no less than
sensualism. Kant opens his great work with the affirmnation, "That all our knowledge begins with experience,
does not admit of a doubt."  But then transcendentalism
does not make the sensations, the radical, generating and
constitutive elements of knowledge; but conditions, under
which the cognitive faculty begins to act, and suggestions,
upon which, by its own force, and according to its own
ideas and laws, it forms cognitions.
The views which the two systems entertain respecting
42 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
the primordial state of the mind, differ widely.  Locke represents the state of mind before sensation takes place by
a sheet of white paper, and Hobbes by a slate, in which
there is no idea or element of knowledge, but merely a
susceptibility of being written upon. To this view all the
adherents of this system conform.
Transcendentalism represents the mind as having the
possibility, the scope, the law and the form of all knowledge within itself. Whatever the mind be, whatever its
faculty of knowing, and with whatever elements it be
primordially furnished, it is easily conceivable that in the
act of knowing it brings this faculty and these elements to
bear.  Now, in order to determine the reach of the cognitive faculty, and whether the mind really have primordial
elements of knowledge, we need only examine our actual
knowledges.  The sensations can easily be analyzed: and
if they be the primary elements of knowledge, they will
appear every where in the composition and deduction of
thought: for every mere composition must preserve the
original elements, and can show nothing absolutely new;
and every deduction must keep within the measure and
kind of the starting points.
But if in our actual knowledges, there be found elements which, so far from belonging to the sense, appear
in their nature and characteristics to transcend the utmost
capacity of the sense, then these elements unquestionably
lay claim to a higher origin. And if these elements, when
disintegrated from our complex knowledges and held up
before the reason, are readily recognized and reaffirmed by
this faculty as necessary, universal and absolute, then may
they legitimately be claimed as the product of this faculty
alone.
Now the sensations are those of the eye, consisting of
43 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
light and color; of the ear, consisting of the various
sounds; of smelling and tasting, consisting of odor and
sapidness in their endless varieties; of touch, consisting
of simple and uniform impressions upon the nerves wherever they are distributed; of muscular resistance, consisting of hardness and softness, smoothness and roughness;
and, in the last place, the sensations of pleasure and pain,
and of titillation.
But our actual knowledges bring to view substance,
cause, time, space, truth, justice, and many other ideas of
similar characteristics-ideas which no analysis of the mere
sensations can ever unfold. And while these ideas can be
brought under the observation of the senses, even now that
they are known, no more than they could at the first be
evolved out of them, to the reason itself they are intuitively true, universal, and necessary.
When we speak, therefore, of transcendental truth in
the just philosophical sense, we speak of nothing doubtful,
but of that which both in itself is most certainly known,
and in its relations makes all other knowledge possible.
The application of the term transcendental is convenient and appropriate, because it is descriptive. It
tells the simple fact, that the human mind, while it is
susceptible of impressions from without by means of the
organs of sense-impressions which conditionate its first
development, and afford materials for an important department of its knowledge,-nevertheless contains within
itself those elements of truth, those forms of knowledge,
those first principles of all thought and reasoning, which
transcend the reach of the senses. The lower faculty is
connected with that corporeal organism, through which
spirit communes with nature. It occupies the sphere appropriated.to it, and does its work well.  The higher
44 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
faculty of the pure Reason has its sphere also; and is just
as capable in its sphere of announcing primordial truths,
the forms of perception, and the laws of reasoning, as the
sense in its sphere is of giving forth sensations.
From this it is evident that the metaphenomenal and
subjective identify themselves with the transcendental.
Locke is a great and venerable name; and no one may
speak lightly of him. But an excessive veneration has led
some who disclaim sensualism, to claim for his doctrines
certain saving clauses in those passages where he speaks
of Reflection as one of the sources of ideas.
There is no school of philosophy that might not be ambitious of retaining, as an authority, such a man as Locke;
and one cannot well conceive how any thing less than a
supreme and honest love of truth could influence any one
to dispense with his authority.
For my part, I can say from my heart that I admire
and love Locke. His clear and penetrating intellect, his
good sense and manly candour; his strong English heart,
his pure English style; and his decided moral and religious
principles, always quietly about him like the coat he wears,
like the air he breathes, like the familiar tones of his common discourse, and the prevailing. expression of his honest
face,-altogether I admire and love him.  And notwithstanding the errors of his system, I shall continue to read
and admire and love him.
Locke refers all our knowledge to two sources, Sensation and Reflection.  The latter, as he defines it,: is undoubtedly the interior consciousness,-it embraces the
operations of the mental faculties:  and the former is
equivalent to the exterior consciousness. All that appears
* Book II., ch. 1, ~ 4.
45 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
to us, therefore, appears in the consciousness;  and all
which there appears, consists of the simple sensations, and
the operations of the mind, and whatever is revealed in or
by the operations of the mind. Now so far the Transcendentalist will go with Locke; so far there is no difference
whatever.   But when we come to consider the mental
operations themselves, we find the great point of departure
of the two systems. According to Locke, the mental faculties, when they go into action, not only begin conditionally
and in point of time with sensation, but they also derive
all the materials and elements upon which their activity
is expended, from sensation, and the conscious experiences
of the mental activity itself. The sensations, together
with the acts of "perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different actings of our own minds," are the first radical elements from
which all possible knowledges are formed.
Now, the introduction here of the ideas of reflection or
the interior consciousness, by no means changes the character of the system; for these, no less than the sensations,
are merely phenomenal. The operations of the mind, as
well as the sensations, are conditions of knowing the transcendental truths. Thus the succession of thought, as well
as the succession of sensations, is a condition of knowing
time. Indeed, the most important truths are revealed
upon condition of the experiences of the interior consciousness. But recollect that the contents of sensation and reflection, while to the transcendentalist they are mere conditions of conceiving time, space, substance, power, and so
on; to Locke and his school they are the simple ideas or
elements out of which these, and all the most abstruse
truths are compounded, or drawn.*
* Book II., chl. 12, ~ 1 and ~ 8.
46 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
The transcendentalist can say that sensation and re flection, or the exterior and interior consciousness, are the
only sources of our knowledge; understanding by this that
all that we know we know either upon the experience of
sensations, or in the acts of knowing, of which we are conscious; but this is a very different thing from making the
sensations and the acts of knowing the materials or elements out of which all that we know is compounded. I
have already distinguished between the mere act of knowing and that which is known, calling the first the phenomenal, and the second the metaphenomenal; and just as
broadly as that distinction are the two systems to be distinguished. Sensualism merges every thing into the phenomenal: Transcendentalism transcends or passes beyond
the phenomenal, and reaches the universal and necessary
truth, the- substantial and real being;-that which is the
rational ground of all phenomena, without which they
could have had no existence, and without which, now that
they exist, they cannot be explained and accounted for.
Men generally, and even most philosophers, in daily
thought and occupation, are more with the phenomenal
than the metaphenomenal, and thus from the familiarity
of use, the phenomenal comes to be regarded as more unquestionable and certain than truths of pure reason. I
think, however, that a little quiet thinking must dissipate
this illusion from every mind.  How do we reach the phenomenal, that is, our sensations and the operations of our
mental faculties? Is it not simply by a form of knowing,
-namely, consciousness?  Now, if there be a form of
knowing adapted to the metaphenomenal, why do we not
know this as well as the phenomenal? But there is such
a form of knowing, namely, Intuition, or the direct perception and insight of Reason; and we are conscious of
47 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
the exercise of the function implied in this form-we are
conscious of knowing by intuition. Is not the act of intuition, of which we are conscious, as valid as the sensation of which we are conscious? Nay, more, is not the
truth, which we are conscious of knowing in the exercise
of the intuitive function, as valid as the conscious act by
which it is known? To immediate consciousness, as a
form of knowing, we refer sensation and the operations of
the mental faculties.   To  the intuition of reason, as
another form of knowing, we refer the transcendental
truths. This is the whole account of the matter. The
sensualistic school will insist upon it that the objects of
immediate consciousness alone are the elements of knowledge-while the transcendental school affirm that the
fundamental elements are found beyond immediate consciousness.
But the principles on which transcendental truths are
denied, involve the denial of all objective reality whatever,
beyond immediate consciousness. It is not merely the
ideas of pure reason, which lie beyond immediate consciousness; all the pure mathematics transcend it likewise. Nay, the entire outer world transcends it; for all
must allow, that not the received objects of the external
world are immediate objects of consciousness, but only
the sensations supposed to arise from these objects. Indeed, in this very way were Berkley and Hume led to
deny all objective reality, out of consciousness.   It is
plain that they deduced their doctrines legitimately from
the system of Locke.
I conclude here by remarking, that the denial of the
metaphenomenal as that which transcends immediate
consciousness must involve the destruction of all philosophy.
If we are shut up to mere phenomena, we can account for
48 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
nothing. We have only to observe, classify, and name;
to mark a ceaseless involution and evolution, where nothing
absolutely begins, and nothing can be truly finished.
Thus the whole field of human thought becomes a panorama of shadows.
3
49 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
SECTION VII.
IDEAS AND LAWS.
THE word "idea," according to the usage of Locke, expresses whatever we are immediately conscious of. The
word "idea," according to the usage of Plato, expresses
what we cannot be immediately conscious of.  In the
usage of Plato, however, "idea" does not express any
thing transcendental of consciousness in the external
world, but only the metaphenomenal, lying in the mind
itself. And here we see at once the fallacy of all that
Locke has said respecting innate ideas. Taking the word
in his usage, that ideas cannot be innate, is a truism; for
nothing is more evident, than that mere sensations and
acts of the mind, that is, mere phenomena, cannot be
innate-they exist only as they appear in the consciousness. His reasoning, therefore, does not reach the point
in debate. On the other hand, "ideas," in the Platonic
usage, cannot but be innate, since the word expresses
those primordial laws of knowing, thinking and reasoning,
and those necessary and absolute elementary truths which
are inseparable from the mind itself.
In order to form a clear conception of ideas in the
Platonic, or transcendental sense, let us recuti to the distinction of the subjective and the objective. The subjective simple, or mind, is directly opposed to all supposed
forms of being, lying out of mind, and comprised in the
50 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
phenomena of sensation, and whatever in the exterior
world is connected with their production. It is the op position of the spiritual subjective, myself, and the un spiritual objective, exterior to myself.   Now, the true
Platonist or transcendentalist views every thing existing
beside mind, as made by mind, after the laws of mind,
and primarily for mind.
It is a kindly doctrine, and to be heartily received,
that one design of the great Creator, in forming the
countless tribes of animals, was to multiply the forms of
enjoyment. Every sensitive creature hath its sphere of
life, its bountiful provisions, and its term of happiness.
But irrational creatures comprehend neither the world in
which they subsist, nor the curious workmanship of their
own organism. The world, in its wise designs, its exact
order, and its beautiful forms, is not made for them. It
is made for them only in respect to the gratification of
their mere animal wants. But under all these higher
points of view, it is obviously made for rational beings.
Our physical constitution, indeed, finds its fitting provisions and accommodations in the world; but we are not
confineda to these. To us, the world is a vast and sublime
exhibition of design, skill, causative and regulative force,
harmonious relations, and beautiful forms.
We can conceive of a period when there was as yet
no creation, and the Creator dwelt alone in the immensity
of his being. Now we cannot but believe there was
arrayed before his mind, every possible form of being,
every possible constitution of a universe, every possible
variety of life; and there, also, lay the map of the worlds
which were ordained actually to be. In his mind was all
the science and art, according to which, the Universe was
to be bodied forth: and there, too, was  that creative
51 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
energy, which had but to exert itself, and Creation would
stand forth in all its glory and magnificence. Now the
preconceived laws, forms and relations of the universe, as
they lay in the Divine mind, are a part of the Divine
ideas. Viewed in relation to the Eternal Reason, as giving
the original thought and law, they are ideas simply.
Viewed in relation to the Divine imagination, as giving
forth definite forms and relations, they become ideals,
models, or archetypes. Divine ideas, as the originating
thoughts and archetypes of worlds, cannot be exhausted
in the actual creation, for God is infinite. Again, there
must be in the Divine mind thoughts and conceptions
which do not take their embodiment in material forms
Such are those which relate to pure science and moral government. Whatever thus lies in the Divine mind, constitutes the Divine ideas.
Suppose the infinite mind to constitute another mind
like itself. This mind, of course, must be finite; but
inasmuch as it is mind, it must have the same ideas, according to its measure, which are found in the Divine original.
These ideas, perhaps, could not be given in a fully
developed state, that is, drawn out into all their consequences and applications; for this would appear to border
upon the infinite; but given in their elementary state, to
be unfolded by the active and free thought of the being
thus gloriously constituted. Such a being may be con ceived of, as existing without a body and organs of sense
-a pure spirit; and although thus without sensation, and
supposed even to have no knowledge of a real world, in
its pure thoughts and imaginations it might have, not only
mental activity, but emotions of beauty and grandeur ex quisitely delightful. For such emotions even now are
awakened in our minds without calling in the aid of im
52 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
mediate sensation, when in dreams, and esthetical efforts
of the imagination, we are entertained with forms of great ness and beauty beyond the power of mere sense to reveal.
But now, suppose this being to be introduced to the actual
creation,-would not the possibility of its knowing and
comprehending it, arise from the correspondence between
the outward reality and the ideas within? Would it not
understand the real world, just so far as it had the preconceived law and archetype within? At least, to a being
destitute of sensation, no other possible way could exist.
Let us, then, make another supposition, namely:-That
a being be constituted like the Divine mind; but instead
of existing as a pure spirit, that it be connected with a
material body, with organs of sense-this body itself
forming a part of the system of things without; and
that its relations to this body are such that it cannot
become conscious of existence, nor begin the play of its
powers until sensations are produced within, by corporeal
impressions without. Shall the law of perception and the
forms of knowledge now be changed, because sensuous
conditions are demanded for their development? It is
impossible-and inconceivable. The originating power and
law of thought must still remain in the spirit, to which
they of necessity belong. This last new form of being, is
new only in respect to the conditions of its beginning to
act, and the mode and conditions of its communication
with the external world; while the possibility, and the
determinate form of its knowing, still lie in its inherent
spiritual faculties, and its necessary and constitutive ideas.
The universe represents the Divine thought; and now it
cannot but represent the thought given likewise to this
highly endowed creature, whom we recognize as man himself.
53 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
When man, therefore, was placed. upon the smiling
outspread earth, and beneath the bright starry heavens,
he did not find himself a stranger and out of place. His
mind and heart responded to the works of his Creator.
His spirit drank in the living beauty of all things, because
he was formed to know the beautiful.  He saw the wise
design of Creation, because he himself was endowed with
a designing mind. He searched and found out the order
of the heavens and the earth, and the great and all-regulating laws, because the principles of science, the foundations of law, were laid in his own intelligence. We have
a striking illustration of this mutual adaptation and harmony in the science of mathematics. This science is
drawn directly from the reason of man. By this science
he is enabled to measure the planets. The Great and
Divine Mathematician made the universe according to
these lofty and exact principles. He then gave his creature the capacity to construct this pure and unerring
science; and thus man has a ladder by which he can
mount from earth to heaven.
If ideas of the reason are embodied in the external
world, determining its forms, relations, and movements,
what do they become when thus embodied? The answer
is given in one word-LAWS.  Force or power has its origin
in the Divine causality; but that which appropriates,
compounds, directs, and governs force, is Law, answering
to the Divine idea. All ideas do not become laws, regulating Force in the exterior sphere of their manifestations.
Some ideas give the law to perception, and determine our
knowledges:-others give the law to the fine arts, and
determine the forms of the beautiful: others, again give
the law to the free casuality or the responsible will, and
determine moral rectitude. But these all go out into
54 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
some form of law. Law and idea are thus the same.
Viewed in respect to the reason, originating, conceiving,
and projecting, we speak of the idea: viewed in respect
to the sphere of determinate movement and action, we
speak of the law.
Now, if the object of science be to ascertain the laws
of the universe, we see how it depends upon, and must
grow out of, philosophy.
There is a period in the development of mind in relation to external nature, when observation and thought first
awake. It is a period of spontaneous communication
between the soul and nature, springing up from the relation between the ideas within and their embodiment without. A voice from without calls to the soul within, and
the soul joyfully answers back. In the very impressions
made upon the sensitivity by nature, the occasion appears
when the ideas are required, in order to know and comprehend. The reason is noticing carefully, and struggling to
comprehend: in the very effort of earnest thought it perceives ideas, vaguely, perhaps, at first, and immediately
carries them out to nature as a tentative law. The first
efforts to assign laws to nature, and to expound her great
system, may be crude and imperfect, wild and imaginative,
because observation is limited, and reason only partially
developed; but the process is the same in kind, at the
dawn of science, and at its glorious noontide. It is the
union of ideas and observation. This first period may be
called the TIME OF AWAKENING.
The second period is the TIMIE OF PROPHECY. The
mind now realizes in clear and decided reflection, what it
wants. It proceeds, therefore, to make out the system of
nature by mapping out the related bodies, their forms,
magnitudes, and relations, and assigning them forces and
55 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
laws. In this work the mind is prone to become intoxicated by its first glimpses of the grand mechanism of the
world, and to imagine that the great discovery is completed: here, then, it pauses, and gives itself up to dogmatizing. In reality it has only arrived at a theory, or a
tentative system of nature: it has made prophecies more
or less clear, but nothing yet is established.
The third period is THE TIME OF ELABORATE OBSERVATION, EXPERIMENT, AND CALCULATION.   Dissatisfied
with preceding results, and yet taking advantage of them,
the mind now sets itself at work afresh. It endeavors to
think more profoundly, to reason more logically, and thus
to escape from empty conjectures and fallacies. Now it
aims to observe more extensively and accurately, at the
same time reducing its observations to an exact and convenient classification: and not content with the facts of
nature as they present themselves of their own accord, by
ingeniously contrived experiments it forces out new and
more curious facts from the hitherto silent and veiled
bosom of nature. Now, too, it diligently cultivates pure
science, that it may construct formula for the solution of
the problems which come thronging in.
The fourth period is the TIME OF DETERMINATE SCIENCE.   Now  imaginary conceptions, and the ideas of
merely possible systems, are set aside, and the true idea
finds its corresponding law.
Thales belongs to the first period; Pythagoras and
Ptolemy to the second; Copernicus, Kepler, and Tycho
Brahe to the third; Newton and La Place to the fourth.
In the amazing advance which has been made in determinate science, and in perfecting methods of investigation, the four periods in respect to any new subject may be
56 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
said to be passed through in one generation and in the lifetime of one philosopher.
Natural science will then only be completed when all
the phenomena of nature shall be reduced under a universal causality, and assigned to fitting laws known in their
conformity to ideas. Then the ideas and the laws will, as
it were, stand face to face, and the phenomena be the intelligible words which pass between them.
The Mathematical, Moral, and Esthetical Sciences are
formed in the same way. The ideas of the reason project
the forms and relations, and give the laws. The perfection of these sciences lies in their conformity to the absolute ideas.
3*
57 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
SECTION VIII.
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY PHENOMENA.
WE shall begin with the exterior consciousness. The primary phenomena are the simple sensations.  These are in
themselves incapable of projecting themselves beyond the
sphere of consciousness. But when the ideas are added to
them, moulding and appropriating them by the laws of
perception, then they become merged into positive judgments respecting bodies, in space with forms, qualities,
distances, magnitudes, and movements.   The sensations
now habitually are not thought of as simple affections of
the sensitivity; but whenever they arise, the mind is busy
in noticing the goings on of the world in space. Hence,
when we speak of phenomena in this developed state of
perception, we mean not the mere sensations, but the actual appearances and changes of bodies, of which the sensations have now become such apt and familiar signs that
we lose sight of their original simplicity and bareness.
Just as in language, when we hear the familiar and appropriate sounds, or see the familiar symbols, we seem at
once to be present to the world of thought and imagination.
Now the phenomena transferred from the sensitivity,
and characterized and classified as the phenomena of an
outward world, constitute the secondary phenomena of the
exterior consciousness.
A  similar transformation takes place in the interior
58 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
consciousness.  Here the primary phenomena are simple
acts, or movements. But the ideas here also add themselves to the phenomena, and we come to know a subject
-a  personality, endowed with power, intelligence and
freedom. The mere phenomena could not carry themselves back into spiritual reality, but of themselves would
remain a bare flow of appearances through the field of the
consciousness, without telling the fountain from whence
they came, or whither they were tending. But in the very
giving forth of the phenomena in the consciousness, the
ideas make their appearance under the form of an intuitive
perception and affirmation; and then the mnind knows itself as spirit endowed with reason, power and freedom,
and perceives design and law in every movement. Thenceforward there are no more bare phenomena; but it is the
reason, knowing, designing, and commanding; the will
exerting causality; the sensitivity alive with emotion and
passion; the glorious mind exerting itself in its proper
sphere. The acts and affections of definite powers are the
secondary phenomena of the interior consciousness.
The above distinction is an important one; for men
generally think of phenomena under their secondary form
in the developed state of the mind:  many, therefore,
might fall into some confusion when the phenomenal is
represented as lying wholly in the field of consciousness,
under its primary presentation.
59 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
SECTION IX
ANTECEDENCE IN TIME, AND IN NECESSARY EXISTENCE.
THIS is what Cousin styles Chronological, and Logical
Antecedence.
The first is the antecedence of the primary phenomena
the second, the antecedence of ideas.
To a mind not placed under sensuous conditions, the
phenomena of the interior consciousness would alone claim
antecedence in time. To man, who is mind under these
conditions, the phenomena of the exterior, as well as of the
interior consciousness, claim this antecedence. Did the
phenomena alone exist, no question respecting necessary
existence could arise; but in the actual manifestation of
ideas within the sphere of thought, this question cannot be
avoided.
The distinction here held up to view is very important,
and really not difficult to comprehend. In the actual development of our being, the primary phenomena obviously
must first appear in the order of time; for sensation is the
first awakening of conscious existence, phenomena are the
immediate objects of consciousness, and consciousness is
the first form of knowledge. The knowledges to which we
attain through the consciousness of phenomena, are presented under the form of judgments or affirmations made
by the ReaSon. But these judgments, as acts of the Reason, are phenomena of the interior consciousness; as phe
60 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
nomena they must rest upon something antecedent; but
this something antecedent is not sensation, for sensation
stands only in the relation of a condition, and does not
contain the elements of the judgments. Upon analysis,
these elements are found to be ideas.  Ideas, then, must
have the antecedence of necessary existence. Mere sensation, in a particular form of being, may exist without involving antecedent ideas in the sphere of that being; but
judgments or knowledges formed upon the basis of ideas,
necessarily involve their prior existence; and as ideas
can be traced to nothing higher, their antecedence must be
that of necessary existence.
Sensations demand a previous necessary existence, only
as all phenomena demand antecedent causality. But the
phenomena of the interior consciousness, in addition to
this, demand a constructive reason.
- Sensations are known before cause is known; and yet
as without an antecedent cause they could not have existed, so neither could they have been known under the
causal relation, without the antecedent idea of cause.
Affirmations of the reason appear, before the reason and its
ideas come into the field of reflection; and yet, had not
these had a necessary prior existence, the affirmations
would not have been possible.
Experience is the conditionating starting point in the
order of time. Ideas are the determining starting point in
the order of rational judgments.
Experience marks the time when the knowledges begin.
Ideas alone make the knowledges possible. Experience is
the dial-hand which tells the hour of the mind's morning
when it awakes to thought. Ideas necessitate the movement of the dial-hand itself.
Again: As the sensuous experiences of the exterior
61 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
consciousness conditionate the reason in the order of time
in the development of those ideas by which it knows the
external world; and as the experiences of the interior
consciousness conditionate it in the order of time in the
development of those ideas by which it knows the intellectual world: while, on the other hand, in the order of
necessary prior existence, ideas determine all the knowledges arrived at: so, likewise, the particular judgments
formed respecting objects in either world, conditionate the
universal truths in the order of time; while these truths,
in the order of necessary prior existence, determine the
particular judgments.   For example:  in the external
world the particular judgment that a given body is in
space, precedes in time the universal judgment that every
body must be in space; while the universal judgment
comprehended in the ideas of space and substance, must
have had a prior necessary existence in order to make the
other possible. And in the interior and intellectual sphere,
although the affirmation that all phenomena must be assigned to causality, would not have been formed until a
particular instance of causality had appeared; still, in the
order of necessary prior existence, the universal truth must
have been embraced in the inherent idea of causality, or
the particular judgment assigning a particular phenomenon
to an appropriate cause, would have been impossible, as
having no basis on which to make its appearance.
To sum up the whole in brief: In the development of
our being, the phenomenal as to time precedes the metaphenomenal; in necessary existence, the latter precedes
the former. The phenomenal is first known, but it could
not be known at all in its actual state, unless the metaphenomenal had had a prior existence: and as the universal belongs only to the metaphenomenal, the universal and
62 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
particular come into the same conditionating relations.
The particular is first known, and yet it could not be
known at all unless there had been a necessary prior existence of the universal. The phenomenal, are first appearances in time: the metaphenomenal, cause them by a
necessary spontaneous power. The metaphenomenal existed out of the relation of time, and independently of it;
when the phenomena were given in this relation, then the
condition was supplied, under which, the metaphenomenal
could be apprehended by an act of knowing standing in
this relation also.
63 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
SECTION X.
AUTHORITY OF ALL JUDGMENTS OR
KNOWLEDGES.
A JUDGMENT or knowledge is an affirmation of the reason.
When expressed in language, it becomes a proposition;
because, it then passes beyond the sphere of the individual
consciousness, and is propounded to general thought.
Every proposition consists of a subject and predicate.
The subject is that of which the affirmation is made. The
predicate is that which is affirmed of the subject. The
affirmation is either positive or negative; that is, an affirmation of agreement or disagreement.
Fixing the mind upon the question of agreement or
disagreement, it is evident that there are only two ways in
which it can be determined,-namely, by deduction or by
intuition. If by deductions then the subject and predicate
are compared by means of a third or middle term, with
which they both agree; or with which one disagrees, and
the other agrees. This forms the syllogism, which will be
analysed hereafter. But a question arises, respecting the
agreement of the two terms with the third, respectively:
Is this known by deduction or by intuition? If by deduction, then we have had a previous comparison subsidiary
to the one in hand. But, again, how was the agreement
seen in this previous comparison,-by deduction, or by intuition? If by deductiou, then there must have been a
64
IDEAS THE LAST 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
comparison still more remote. Thus, A agrees with B,
because they respectively agree with C. But A agrees
with C, because A and C respectively agree with X. And
B agrees with C, because they respectively agree with Y.
Again, B agrees with Y, because they respectively agree
with Z; and so on.
It is manifest that this series of retrogressive deductions
cannot be continued ad infinitum. We must at last arrive at a point where the agreement is seen, without a
middle term, by direct insight or intuition.   We  thus
arrive at what is generally called a FIRST TRUTH,-a truth
which neither admits of nor requires a demonstration.
Such are the axioms of geometry. HIere, then, is a resting-place of thought-here is an absolute authority. The
axiom is authoritative, because it is drawn out of the pure
reason, and permeated with its ldeas.  For, plainly, the
axiom could not be formed, if the reason were not furnished
with the ideas of relation, eqality, and identity. The reason, out of its own thought, and by its own authority,
forms the axiom. A succession of comparisons thus conducts us upward to the idea as the last authority.
Let us next view the subject and predicate separately.
The subject can be thought of without the predicate; and
the predicate without the subject;-each being a distinct
cognition. Now the question may be started, How do we
come by each distinct cognition introduced into the comparison? And here it may appear upon analysis, that
each is the result of a previous comparison; and still further, the terms which enter into this previous comparison,
may themselves be drawn from a comparison lying still
farther back. But) as in the former case, the series of
comparisons must at length come to an end, and we must
arrive at cognitions which are obtained without a compari
65 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
son of foregoing cognitions. Take, for example, the proposition, Every body is in space. We have here the cognition of body, and that of space: Now, if it were granted
that body is derived from a preceding comparison, it is
plainly impossible that space could be thus derived. In
space, then, we have a simple original cognition. The
same must appear in tracing back every cognition. These
first elements of thought, whatever they be, must be the
foundations of all the subsequent cognitions. If, according
to Locke, these first elements were merely the phenomena
which form the immediate objects of consciousness, they
undoubtedly would be the foundations of all the subsequent
knowledges, as he has represented them.
According to the transcendental system, however, the
original elements are ideas or simple intuitions of the pure
reason, given upon sensuous conditions, but not formed out
of them.  The truth of the latter system appears upon
the last analysis of our knowledges, since this analysis
does not give us bare phenomena of the interior and exterior consciousness, but ideas, as the constitutive elements.
We may next view the subject and the predicate in
their particular relation to each other. Here propositions
take a two-fold designation. They are either Analytical
or Synthetical.
First, the Analytical.:*  Here the subject contains the
predicate; and, in the form of the proposition, the predicate is wound out of it. Nothing more is really said in
the predicate than what is implied in the enunciation of
the subject; but for the purpose of definition or explanation, that which is implied in the subject, is stated fully
and clearly.  For example:  when  we say, Body is ex
* AvaAvc, to unwind or unraveL
66 
PIIILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
tended, the predicate extended affirms nothing more than
what is implied in Body, for body is inconceivable without
extension. The immediate basis of every analytical proposition must, therefore, be the cognition expression in the
subject. Then the question comes up next, What is the
basis of the cognition itself? And here, as before, we are
carried back to some original element lying in the reason,
or in the sense, or in both. But as the sense cannot supply the constitutive elements of the cognition, but only its
condition, we are inevitably led to assign the idea of reason
as the last authority and basis of all propositions of this
class.
Secondly, the Synthetical..:.  Here the subject does not
contain the predicate, but the latter contains a distinct
cognition, which is added to the former for the enlargement
of the thought.  For example: when we say, every body
gravitates, or has wediglt, the predicate is not contained
or necessarily implied in the subject, for body, as a resisting and extended substance, is a possible cognition before
the knowledge of gravity is attained; and this gravity is
a new cognition, attained and joined to the former, in
some other way. Now, there are but two ways by which
the new cognition can be attained, viz.: by observation,
or by intuition. Hence arises the distinction of synthetical
propositions into a posteriori and (4 priori.
That every body gravitates is a synthetical proposition
a posteriori, because we gain the cognition contained in
the predicate by observation, or sensuous experience projected into the outer world, and revealing the secondary
phenomena. But even this predicate does not find its ultimate authority in the observation itself, since the obser
* ~vit'"07r,, to put together.
67 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
vation could not have been moulded without the a priori
cognitions of space, cause, and substance.  The a posteriori
only gives us the sensuous fact which appears first in a
succession in the relation of time; while the a priori gives
us the constitutive idea.
Synthetical propositionsa priori are those whose  predicates are attained by direct intuitions, and without the
intervention of any sensuous experience.  For example:
Every phenomenon must have a cause.  Here, not only is
the predicate not unwound from the subject, but no observation of phenomena in any succession whatever can afford
any suggestion or type of it. The phenomena reveal only
phenomena to observation:  but these being given, the
reason supervenes and reveals the idea of cause by its own
insight and authority. Hume, indeed, very consistently
affirms that there is no cause demanded or really existent,
because he admits no elements of thought beyond the phenomena themselves. But unless we adopt this bare statement  for philosophy it cannot be called-we must make
the synthesis of cause in the above axiom, by intuition of
reason alone-that is, either the predicate is nothing, and
the proposition absurd, or the basis is an a4 priori principle.
It appears, then, from the preceding analysis of propositions, that whether we consider them in the comparison
of the subject and predicate, of which they are composed,
or in the deduction of the terms taken separately, or in
the particular and interdependent relations of the two
terms, we are inevitably in the last result led to the ideas
of the reason as the last authority on which they rest.
But inasmuch as every form of knowledge and belief, when
expressed in language, takes the form of a proposition, it
must follow that the ultimate basis of all knowledge and
belief must be the ideas of the reason.
68 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
In making our last appeal to Reason, we are not wanting in reverence to the Great God our Maker. On the
contrary, we are bowing before him with the profoundest
homage: for the ideas revealed in our reason, are there
implanted by Him-are his own voice within us. And
when by holy prophets he sends us a special revelation beyond and above that which is given naturally in the constitution of our reason, we receive it, both because it
claims to come from the Infinite Reason by attending
signs and wonders addressed to the sense, and because it
contains everywhere, in its great truths, provisions and duties, the resplendent marks by which we cannot but recognize its source. It is as if, seeing with a clear vision the
whole pathway up to the vestibule of Heaven, when the
gate of Heaven itself is opened upon us we know that we
are witnessing no illusion, for although new visions burst
upon us, we feel assured they are those to which such a
pathway must lead us.
69 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
SECTION XI.
DIVISIONS OF PHILOSOPHY.
THE pure objective depends upon the subjective-the phenomenal upon the metaphenomenal. Hence the latter, as
sustaining and accounting for the former, becomes the material of philosophy.
Now, in the most general conceptions which we form
of the subjective and metaphenomenal, we have,
First: SUBSTANCE, endowed with faculties or functions,
and causes or forces.
Secondly: LAWS, or that which determines and regulates the manifestations and movements of the first.
Philosophy in relation to the first, in accordance with
old usage, we shall call METAPHYSICS.~
The second,-if we may venture to frame a term-we
shall call NOMOLOGY.t
I.L-METAPHYSICS.
Metaphysics treats of that which, as actually existent
and productive or creative, lies beyond the physical, or the
merely phenomenal. I think, feel, and will: What is
that which thinks, feels, and wills? What is that which
* MeT:C 4,vGLFC?, i.e., beyond the physical.
+ Nouo  AXoyos, i. e., the doctrine of law.
70 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
lies beyond the mere phenomena of the thoughts, feelings,
and volitions?  Again: through my senses, and my muscular organism, I attain to an exterior world, whose forms
I call material. What lies under or beyond these primary
and secondary qualities, and these various forces? What
accounts for these changes-these perpetual modifications?
In the development of my being, I am presented with the
physical or phenomenal; and the enquiry is, What is the
metaphysical or the metaphenomenal, which is to account
for my development in this direction?
The answer to these enquiries is given by PsYCHOLOGY,
DYNAMICS, ANTHROPOLOGY, and ONTOLOGY.  These may
be considered as the divisions of metaphysics, and subdivisions of philosophy.
PSYCHOLOGY.
Psychology  is that part of metaphysics which accounts
for all the phenomena of consciousness, in so far as they are
modifications or manifestations of the subjective simple.
In Psychology, we have the whole being of man given
in its inherent powers and faculties, and in its relations to
God and the world. In Psychology, we effect the analysis
of the reason, and arrive at its eternal and absolute ideas.
In Psychology, therefore, we find the basis of Logic, Esthetics, Morals, Politics, and Religion, and of Science
generally. That the above is strictly true, any one may
realise to himself by reflecting upon the operations of his
mind, when endeavoring to attain to any knowledge whatever, or when endeavoring to execute any thing, or when
disciplining himself to any state or condition of the pas
*?ux- Aoyos, the doctrine of the soul.
71 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
sions. All his thinking, purposing, and willing, and all
his discipline of the passions, lie within his consciousness,
and are inseparable from himself.   Whatever he may attain to as really exterior to himself, becomes his, only by
some modification of himself in relation to it.
What is the psychological method? It is to examine
the facts of consciousness, and by these to arrive at the
faculties and compass of our being. It is by facts of consciousness that we arrive at every thing; and yet there
can be no facts of consciousness without bringing to view
the simple subjective. My aim may be to arrive at something belonging to the subjective general, or at something
belonging to the purely objective, but still, I, the simple
subjective, am there permeating the whole-I am there
thinking, imagining, remembering, comparing, generaliziuig, reasoning, determining, exerting causality, or putting forth emotions and desires: and whatever else I may
arrive at, I do not arrive at it without a further development of my own faculties, without knowing something
more about myself. Indeed, I do not only in this way
perpetually see myself, however I may be engaged, but
my own faculties assume to me the importance of measuring to me the universe: I can know only upon condition
that I have the faculty of knowledge; and however
abundant may be the objects of knowledge, the number
and perfection of the cognitions must depend upon the
capacity and vigor of the cognitive faculty.
But although Psychology, as embracing the science of
our mental constitution and its faculties, embraces in some
sort all science, since whatever is known, is known by these
faculties, and since in every act of knowing, feeling, or
doing, these faculties are brought to light,-still it is
clearly distinguishable, as a particular branch of Philoso
72 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
phy. It is strictly the doctrine of the mind as a distinct
entity-the doctrine of the simple subjective:-in fine, it
is self-knowledge.
When through the phenomena of the mind we have
arrived at a knowledge of the faculties of the mind, together with their characteristics, their distinction, their
relations, and their unity, we have arrived at Psychology.
DYNAMICS.
Dynamic *: Philosophy treats of the life and working
powers of nature. On every side we see the forms of a
universal life-in the myriads of the animal and the vegetable tribes. Everywhere, also, powers and energies are at
work, in large masses and in small, as presented in the
vast forms-of astronomy, in the winds and tides, in magnetism and electricity; and in the minute forms of chemical affinities. It is impossible for us to reflect upon the
productive life of nature, and the forces at work in nature,
without enquiring after their origin, their dependency,
their centre.  In this enquiry the mind is irresistibly led
upward to the infinite and absolute life, and the infinite
and absolute power. Dynamic philosophy ends its enquiry
in God, who filleth all in all.
We have before us the distinction between the phenomnenal or purely objective, and the metaphenomenal or subjective. We have also the subjective as embracing the
energies of thought, will, and feeling, as found in myself,
and in other beings like myself, both of the finite and infinite degree; —and the energies, life, and forces at work
in material masses, those masses which are extraneous to
* Avval,At, energy or force.
4
73 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
me, and known to me by their correlations with the sensitivity as given through the five senses, and by muscular
resistance.
Now it is plain from this, that Dynamics expresses in
relation to this life and energy working in extraneous material masses, what psychology expresses in relation to the
faculties working within the substance of the mind. Assuming here the distinction between material and immaterial substance, we may say of Psychology that it treats
of the faculties or powers which produce or develope the
phenomena given in connexion with immaterial substance;
and of Dynamics, that it treats of the faculties or powers
which produce or develope the phenomena given in connexion with material substance. In both we begin with
the phenomenal, and arrive at the subjective as accounting for the phenomenal. We may sum up the whole by
saying, that Psychology respects the subjective faculties
of the mind; Dynamics respects the subjective powers of
matter.
ANTHROPOLOGY.
Anthropology * takes up man in the union of his spiritual and simple subjective.being, with a physical and animal life and organism.
View man in his mere animal nature and functions,
and he appears different from all other animals. The
spirit within, modifies, enlarges and ennobles the animal
without-he is the most glorious and interesting of all
animals.
This animal nature is also affected variously by the
external world with which it is linked, and, indeed, of
* AvOpw7ros and Aoyoy, the doctrine of humanity.
74 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
which it forms a part: climate, natural scenery, food, and
employment, all act upon it. It is thus modified at the
same time by the spirit within, and by influences from
without.
On the other hand, the animal thus closely communing with spirit, reacts upon the spiritual sphere. The
most susceptible point of this reaction is the sensitivity,
through which the emotions and passions become strikingly
modified. In every theatre, therefore, of human passion
-in social life, in government, in war, in commerce, in
the arts of beauty, you may see the influences of the external nature.   But inasmuch as man is a unity, this
modifying action cannot be exerted upon his sensitivity,
without reaching in some form and degree his entire being;
so that his thinking and reasoning, his free activity, and
even his moral character, gain a tone from the objects
which surround him, and show the complexion of the sun
which shines, and the atmosphere which breathes upon
him.
Anthropology is thus a union of Psychology and that
part of Dynamics which informs the science of physiology.
Indeed, as actually cultivated, it is hardly a pure philosophy, but rather a mixture of philosophy, physiology and
natural history. In its determining elements, however,
it is strictly philosophical.
ONTOLOGY.
After having considered the life and forces belonging
to the pure subjectivity of being, as distinguished from
the phenomenal or the pure objective,-we come next to
consider the sUBsTANCE of being. The idea of substance,
like the ideas of time and space, of cause, and of right and
wrong, is intuitively given in the reason.
75 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
Upon the observation of phenomena, we not only assign them causes and laws, we also assign them substance.
Substance is therefore metaphenomenal, and belongs to
subjectivity in general; and hence the consideration of
substance forms a part of philosophical speculation.
Metaphysics, as relating to substance, is ONTOLOGY.:
To Ontology belong such questions as the following:
-What is substance?  Is substance distinguishable from
its properties? Do substance and properties necessarily
imply each other? Is the relation between substance and
properties to be distinguished from the relation between
cause and effect? What are the distinctions and relations of spiritual and material substance? Is the soul
material? Is God in his substance identified with the
world, or is he extra-mundane? What are the relations
between infinite and finite substance? Is space substance
or attribute? Is it to be referred to matter or spirit, or
is it independent of both? Does the omnipresence of God
suppose his essence of substance to be diffused through all
space?
Questions of Ontology do, undoubtedly, exist in the
human mind; and because they exist, they require an
answer. No question of the mind is to be arbitrarily set
aside. If its aim be an impossibility, it must be proved
to be so, but as long as a hope of its solution remains, it
must remain as a question. Now, a great many vain and
idle questions have come up in Ontology, but it was philosophy itself that exposed them, and set them aside. On
the other hand, many questions of the very last importance are presented here. Whether the soul be material
or immaterial; whether God be identified with the world,
* OvTos and Aoyos, the doctrine of essential being.
76 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
or be extra-mundane, are not trifling questions, as the
history of philosophy abundantly shows.   If Ontology
could arrive at nothing positive, its negative decisions
would for ever give it an important place in philosophy.
We have distinguished the subjective and the objec tive; the latter the phenomenal, the secondary and de pendent-that which consciousness directly recognizes, and
which requires to be accounted for, by referring it to something antecedent: The former, the metaphenomenal, primary, independent,  not directly recognized by the consciousness, and which does not in like manner require to
be accounted for.
The subjective general is that which accounts for the
pure objective. This is their relation. Thus the will accounts for all choices and volitions; and is subjective in
relation to them taken as the objective. Thus the sensitivity, in connexion with its external correlates, accounts
for all the sensations; and is subjective to them taken as
the objective. Thus the reason accounts for all acts of
perception, knowing, and reasoning; and is subjective to
them taken as objective. Thus the extraneous physical
powers account for all the phenomena of matter; and are
subjective to them taken as the objective.
In considering the relation of the subjective to the objective, we say generally as above, the former accounts for
the latter. But the enquiry may still come up, How, or
* I do not mean here to exclude the fact, that both the powers of our own
minds, and the extraneous physical powers, require and are dependent upon the
First and the Infinite: I mean only the inherent and constituted sufficiency of
these in relation to their proper phenomena.
77 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
under what forms, does the former account for the latter?
Is it sufficient to say it accounts for the latter simply as
the subjective?   May not the subjective itself be presented under different relations to the objective? Unquestionably, there are two different relations which may
be named and distinguished, viz. the relation of SUBSTANCE
AND PROPERTIES, and the relation of CAUSE AND EFFECT.
The subjective may be taken as either substance or cause;
the objective may be taken as either property or effect.
Cause is self-determined, creative, and contingent activity.
Substance is fixed, and, relatively at least, necessary existence. Cause can be thought of as having potentiality
to a variety of effects, without being connected with any
particular effects as its necessary manifestations.   Substance cannot be thought of without implying certain properties as its necessary and fixed manifestations. Effect
begins to be after cause exists. Property is co-existent
with substance from its beginning. Effect is related to
cause contingently.   Property is related  to substance
necessarily.
Again: Substance cannot be given without involving
in some way the idea of cause. If it be finite substance,
it is caused. If it be infinite substance, causality is conceived of as inseparable from its unity. Universally, immaterial substance or mind involves causality. Material
substance, besides being itself caused, is the vehicle or
medium of the manifestations of causality, either directly
or indirectly: directly, if physical powers be taken as
proper causality; indirectly, if they be taken as the properties of substance. On the former hypothesis, the
Divine causality absorbs the supposed physical, and is allpervading and omnipresent. On the latter hypothesis,
the Divine causality is taken as having produced a certain
78 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
form of substance, that is, material, different from the
Divine substance, and constituted with these physical
forces, as fixed and inseparable properties. On the former
hypothesis, matter is represented as inert until permeated
by activities; on the latter, it is inseparable from activities.
For example: on the former, gravity is distinct from matter as a cause, and interfused by special constitution;
on the latter, matter cannot be conceived of without
gravity, nor gravity without matter. But not only does
substance involve the idea of cause; cause also involves
the idea of substance. Cause cannot be separated from
mind, and mind cannot be conceived of without substance.
This is true both of Will, directly recognized as such, and
of physical powers, when taken as causes proper.
Taking the Subjective, then, as divided into Cause and
Substance; and the Objective, as divided into Effects and
Properties, the latter springing from the former, and being
accounted for as existent, by being referred to the former,
the enquiry arises, hTow do the latter spring from the
former, or what regulates the action of cause, and the
development of substance?
II.-NOMOLOGY.
This at once introduces us to the Doctrine of Law, or
NOMOLOGY, which is the second grand division of philosophy. Nomology treats of the ]aws, according to which
the subjective ought to cause effects and develope properties. It also explains the possible violations of these laws.
Nomology is divided into the MORPALE; ESTHETICS;
SOMATOLOGY; and LOGIc.
79 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
THE MORALE.
This comprises the laws which ought to govern the
Will-the laws of duty, the laws which command what is
due-what ought to be done in moral relations. If all
causality is resolvable into Will,: then the MORALE is related to all creations, whether by the infinite cause, or by
finite causes.
The laws of duty, however, must be distinguished from
the rules of art. The first enjoin upon us what ought to
be done in our moral relations, or in our relations to mind,
embracing what is due to ourselves, to others, and to God.
The second, point out how any rational, ingenious, useful,
or esthetical design is to be effected.
ESTHETICS.
Esthetics t may be briefly defined the'P]hilosophy of
the Beautiful.' As the Morale relates to the will, so this
relates to the sensitivity. As the Morate determines what
ought to be done in the moral relations; so this determines
what ought to please, or what is really agreeable to the
sensitivity in its unperverted and rightly developed condition.
There is in some sort an interchange between the
Morale and Esthetics. Esthetics lays down the rules of
the fine arts to the executive will. The Morale enjoins
upon the sensitivity the proper moral emotions and desires.
Esthetics comprises the principles and laws of the
beautiful, or of the agreeable, or of taste, (for all this
variety of designation has obtained,) not only in relation
* Doctrine of the Will, p. 294.
t ALaOteI's, perception or sensibility.
80 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
to the actual, but also in relation to the possible. That
which may be is known, and the influence of its beauty
felt, as well as that which is.
When man awakes to existence, his eye beholds the
beautiful, the sublime, the graceful, the proportionate,
the congruous; and his ear perceives melody and harmony,
with the joy, the ecstasy of one recognizing the thoughts
of his own spirit, the reflected forms of his own being.
The splendors of the heavens above him-the scenery of
the earth around him, are not strange to him; he knows
them in himself, and he knows himself in them. But he
cannot rest in these delightful contemplations. The fountains of his thought open and enlarge beyond the world
which his senses have recognized. It would seem as if
this world were presented him to call out the activities of
a being, of which it cannot be the measure.
Hence, man creates: he creates in statuary, painting,
music, architecture, gardening, poetry, and romance. He
does not confine himself to imitations-he creates. His
creations are not only of that which is possible in this
world, but of that also which it requires a more perfect
constitution, both physical and moral, to realize; and thus
in his thought he knows other worlds. Salvator Rosa gives
us nature as she is, with only finishing touches of the
ideal; but Milton, in his "delicious Paradise," introduces
us to a creation not indeed opposed to nature, but requiring nature under a more genial clime, in more glorious
worlds.::*'
In poetry, and in the fine arts, generally, the ideal of
the mind is indeed never perfectly expressed. The poet
and the artist labor to make visible the thought upon
* Doctrine of the Will, pp. 130 and 131.
81 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
which they dwell in rapture; but they never satisfy their
own earnest aspirations, —they have a vision which they
cannot reveal to others; and they find that the world, as
presented them, not only is not the measure of their being,
but also that all the efforts of art cannot make its forms
and materials even truly representative of that being;
and the perfectly beautiful remains with them as a pure
idea, of which they have only been enabled to give a dim
reflection.
In Esthetics the human mind seeks to solve the mystery of the arts; it enquires after their origin, their laws,
and their method; and seeks to comprehend their reach,
and the grounds of their limitations.
This is that beautiful philosophy which leads us far
back into the spirit of man, there to find the true Castalian spring, and there to converse with the " Sacred
Nine" as living and real inspirations
SOMATOLOGY.
Somatology:' holds a relation to Dynamics similar to
that which the Morale, Esthetics, and Logic hold to
Psychology; it comprises the necessary laws which govern
the changes and motions of bodies, as the former do the
necessary laws which govorn the mental activities.
It is difficult, however, in its present development, to
represent Somatology as a branch of pure philosophy, and
to distinguish it clearly from the Science of Nature. In
the Morale, there are necessary and absolute laws of the
good; in Esthetics, of the beautiful; in Logic, of intuition
and ratiocination: but can we say with the same positive
*:waara and Aoy7o, the doctrine or law of bodies.
82 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
ness, that there are necessary and absolute laws for determining the relations and changes of bodies? The application of the pure mathematics in solving the problems
which arise respecting bodies; the limitations which are
fixed to the possible laws of forces now  existing-for
example, the necessity that the centripetal force should
vary inversely as the square, and not inversely as the cube
or any higher power of the distance; the fact that great
minds, like Newton's, preconceived before they calculated
-indeed, that all minds must preconceive before they
calculate; and the necessary conception that, amid indefinite variety there still must exist fixed laws, go to show
that absolute and necessary laws must somewhere exist
in respect to bodies, and that of course Somatology must
be a possible and real philosophy.
The difficulty in the way of determining with exactness this branch of philosophy, arises from the vast compass of nature, and the indefinite diversity admissible.
It cannot be doubted, however, that Somatological ideas
in the form of prophetic suggestions, direct the investigations of science. These ideas unite with phenomena in
the inductive process through which science is determined.
These were the preconceptions of Newton in determining
the law of gravitation; and of Davy in inventing the
safety-lamp.
LOGIC.
In the Greek, Ao7o~ expresses the faculty of reason
or intelligence.  Ao7ytLoua[ and'vXko,?lo/-a are the verbs
expressing the action of this faculty; the latter being
particularly appropriated to express this action in drawing conclusions from premises, that is, syllogizing or proceeding according to the law and formula of the fvkkoyte
83 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
,uo,, the Syllogism.  Ao7ylc  (T'XY7? or er,'        understood), expresses the science and art of Reasoning, or
LoGIC.
Ao7Lyc, or Logic, has, indeed, been represented as a
mere art, or at least limited to such forms of representation as to convey the impression of a mere art. It is
plain, however, that under its highest acceptation, it must
refer to philosophical principles; for if in relation to any
part of our being we are stimulated by the (PXo~oqLa to
enquire after the laws and the method of its action and
development, we are thus stimulated in relation to the
Xo7o%, or reason.
The Reason is the faculty of knowledge in general.
Logic expresses in relation to the Reason, what the Morale
expresses in relation to the Wtill, and what Esthetics expresses in relation to the Sensitivity.  Reason perceives
and knows; seeks and arrives at truth. But what are
the laws which regulate its perceptions? What are the
methods which it pursues in seeking after truth? What
are the ultimate grounds of its knowledges and beliefs?
When we have answered these questions, we have Logic
completed as a branch of philosophy.
Logic takes precedence. of all the other branches of
Nomology. The others are all dependent upon it. Laws,
whether belonging to the morale, esthetics, or somatology,
are all based upon ideas of the reason. But Logic determines the legitimate processes and characteristics of ideas
themselves. Again, wherever the reason acts, there must
be laws to determine and regulate its action. Logic,
therefore, is co-extensive with these laws, for the province
of logic is the laws of the reason. But as reason acts
wherever there is intellection, it acts in every department
of philosophy; and hence logic permeates the whole.
84 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
Logic permeates, but does not absorb the whole.
Logic is present to give laws to thought, investigation,
and ratiocination; but these laws are universal and irrespective of the particular subjects. Each subject, therefore, still retains its distinctive position, characteristics and
aims. Psychology still aims to determine the faculties of
the mind; Dynamics, the forces of nature; Anthropology,
the union of man and nature; Ontology, the reality and
distinctions of substance; the Morale, the laws of duty;
Esthetics, the laws of the beautiful; Somatology, the
laws of bodies. These do not sink into Logic; but as
Reason is the universal organ of philosophical construction,
Logic is everywhere present as the light and atmosphere
of thought.
85 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
SECTION XII.
OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY, AND THE
SCIENCES AND ARTS.
PHILOSOPHY and Science are often employed as identical
terms. Philosophy, indeed, is science; and science, if not
pure philosophy, is closely connected with it. The word
science is strictly used in the sense of systematic knowledge in relation to a given and defined subject; and as
in every such system, particular phenomena are accounted
for and explained, the science puts on very much of the
air of philosophy.   But what, then, marks the distinction?
One obvious distinction is this, that philosophy is conversant simply with principles; while in a science, principles are applied to a particular subject. In the science of
nature, for example, the philosophical ideas of cause and
effect, of substance and properties, and general somatological laws, are applied to a particular class of phenomena.
The science begins with the phenomena, as the conditions of its development: and when the phenomena are
reduced under common causes and laws, then the science
is determined and fixed. But philosophy is taken, to account for the phenomena in the general. First: by
affirming that there must be causes and laws: Secondly,
by laying down in logic the principles of induction, inves
86 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
tigation, and deduction: Thirdly, by conceiving somatological causes and laws, and applying them tentatively to
the phenomena.
The subjective and the objective make up the sum of
all knowledge, actual or possible. Philosophy finds its
elements in the subjective, so that the determination of the
subjective is the determination of philosophy. Science is
conversant directly with the objective; but it proceeds by
the aid of the subjective. Its aim is to distinguish and
generalize the objective into particular spheres, under particular causes and laws.
We will suppose the subjective to have been determined-we will suppose the mind to know its own faculties, substance, and laws-and to know the external world
in its substance, forces, and laws. In making this supposition, we do not mean to imply that the subjective is thus
antecedently and primarily completed before science begins.
On the contrary, the developments of philosophy, the constructions of science, and the inventions and workings of
art, all go on together. But for distinctness of conception,
and in order to show forth clearly the relations as well as
the differences of the two, we may make this supposition.
In making this supposition, I bring myself into possession
of Psychology, Dynamics, Anthropology, Ontology, Esthetics, the Morale,  Somatology,  and Logic.   I have
named my reason, will, and affections-I have distinguished material and immaterial substance-I have conceived of the universal life in nature-of powers and forces
-and of laws regulating their action.   I have in the
Morale distinguished the just, the benevolent, and  the
true; in Esthetics, I have conceived of the absolute laws
of beauty, proportion, and sublimity; in Somatology, I
have determined the necessary laws of bodies; and in re
87 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
lation to the Reason, I have laid down the formulas of a
rigid logic.
Now, what is the passage from the purely subjective to
the objective? We shall endeavor to give the answer.
Science is divided into the pure, exact, universal,
and absolute, and the mixed, contingent, limited, and
variable.
The  first embraces  the  pure  mathematics.    The
mathematical sciences are pure, because incapable of being
formed out of sensible representations. They are exact,
because never falling short of, and never transcending the
principles and axioms on which they are based. They are
universal, because never admitting of exceptions.   They
are absolute, because it is inconceivable that, in any relation, or by any power, they are capable of being changed.
Natural science, on the contrary, is mixed, because,
although admitting, nay, demanding the application of
the principles of exact and pure science, still it has such
material properties, and properties so foreign to the pure
science, as to prevent the strict application of these principles. Body is in space, and assumes forms in its conformations, and moves  through lines in performing its
revolutions, which, in the way of analogy, may be called
geometrical; and these forms and lines may be taken as
grounds of many important conclusions deduced by means
of geometrical principles; but the mathematical astronomer knows fuill well, and takes care not to neglect the difference, between the pure and absolute geometry of his
mind, and the rough sphericity of the planets, and the
jagged lines of their orbits. If geometry were a philosophy, then its difference from, and its relations to, natural
science, would form an intelligible illustration of the distinctions and relations of philosophy and science.
88 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
GEOMETRY.
Geometry, however, is a science, and our first aim is to
distinguish it from philosophy, as well as to show its relations to philosophy. The philosophy upon which geometry
is constructed, comprises ontology and logic. But ontology
enters into it only so far as space is concerned. That
space is not body, that it is infinite and necessary; the
definitions of the point, of lines, surfaces, and solids, all
belong to ontology in the determination of their absolute
separation from substance, and their independent and unchangeable verity.
The point is a conception of absolute and indivisible
unity. But although a unity, perfect and absolute, it
cannot be called a quantity; it is, on the contrary, the
absolute negation of all quantity; it is not length-it is
not breadth-it is not thickness; but it is where quantity
begins. We assume this point in space, by our thought,
and then quantity is supposed to be formed in one direction; and the least departure from the point, in one
direction, forms the line or simple extension. This line
must of necessity be curved or straight. Then quantity is
supposed to be formed in two directions; and the least
departure from the point in two directions forms length
and breadth, or surface. Surface, likewise, must of necessity be either plane or curved. Then, again, quantity is
supposed to be formed in three directions; and the least
departure from the point, in three directions, forms length,
breadth, and thickness, or the solid. Solid, again, must
of necessity be composed of plane or curved surfaces.
Quantity, as thus conceived of, is exact quantity, because
it has absolute limitations.
This conception of quantity is a pure ontological con
89 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
ception of the reason-not ontological positively as defining a particular substance, but negatively as defining a
quantity absolutely independent of substance.
Having the pure quantity thus given, we may now begin to use it for the purpose of scientific construction.
And now come in the other philosophical elements, viz.:
-those belonging to Logic.  There are, 1. The axiomsthe conceptions of agreement and difference-of equality
and inequality-of a whole and its parts-of measure and
proportion. 2. The deductive formula.
As far as the conception of space, of the point, of the
pure quantity, and of the logical elements goes, we have
simply philosophy. But when we proceed to construct
out of this pure quantity a variety of definite figures, and
to consider their particular relations, and to apply to them
the logical axioms and formula, for the purpose of eliciting
particular conclusions in the form of regular propositions
or theorems, we give birth to determinate science. It is
true, indeed, that the conclusions of geometry are universal and absolute, and therefore it cannot be questioned
that geometry is a most philosophical science; but, nevertheless, it is justly considered a science, inasmuch as antecedent principles are applied to a particular material or
subject, which principles are true, wholly independently
of the subject to which they are applied. All the axioms
and the logical formula, are manifestly of this character;
and the conceptions of a point, and of pure quantity beginning there, although more immediately connected with
the geometrical constructions, are, nevertheless, independent and general:-A  point-a line-a surface —a solid,
may be thought of independently of all particular forms,
relations, and propositions.
While thus the philosophy and the science are distinct,
90 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
the relation between the two is most intimate and important. The philosophy may exist without the development
of the science; but the science cannot be formed without
the philosophy. The philosophy does not require the
science, either to account for it, or to make it more plain;
but the science refers directly back to the philosophy as
its only basis, and affording the only means of its explication.
SCIENCES OF DISCRETE QUANTITY.
Arithmetic and algebra, in like manner, have their
philosophical basis.   They do not begin with absolute
unity in forming their quantities; the idea of unity as a
philosophical idea, is antecedent to, and independent of,
these quantities; but although their unit, always assumed
and ever variable, cannot represent the absolute and invariable unit, still it has its origin as a conception of unity
in the absolute and pure idea. IHIere, also, we have universal axioms, conceptions of abstract quantity, of equality,
difference, measure and proportion, and logical formula.
When we come to apply these antecedent and independent
elements of thought, and primary conceptions, to the relations of a particular class of quantity-to discrete quantity, for the purpose of arriving at particular solutions and
thee,rems, we construct a science; and, indeed, we may
be almost said to invent an art-an art of representing
quantities and relations, of giving deductions in detail, and
of solving problems.
Here, again, the distinction between the philosophy
and the science is clear, as well as the intimate and important relations between the two. It must be evident,
also, that the same philosophical ideas and principles,
give birth to distinct sciences, as in the case of geometry
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INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
and arithmetic.   The  distinction of these sciences is
grounded upon the distinction of their subject matter.
The subject matter in both is quantity; but in one it is
continued quantity; and in the other, discrete quantity;
or the one is quantity, beginning at an absolute limit, and
increasing itself by extension in space; the other is quantity beginning with any assumed unit, and increasing or
diminishing itself indefinitely, by addition and division.
In the one, we consider the relations of figures formed of
lines and surfaces; in the other, the relations of numbers,
as abstract and universal quantities, capable of representing any real quantities whatever, on condition that these
quantities be divisible into units. In respect of both, we
have the same general ideas, axioms and logic.
NATURAL SCIENCE.
I shall take this as a general designation, embracing
Mechanics, Astronomy, Magnetism, Hydrostatics, Physical Dynamics in general, Chemistry, and so on.
I do not intend to convey the idea, that every thing
thus embraced under this designation, is strictly scientific; there is much that is' still theoretic. I comprise them
all under this designation, because they refer to phenomena,
which in their psychological relations are of one kind. All
these phenomena, are phenomena of sensation, or of muscular resistance, which is closely connected with sensation.
The quantities of geometry and arithmetic, and of the
pure mathematics generally, have an existence wholly independently of the senses; but all the forms, movements,
and phenomena generally, of natural science, are made
known in the consciousness by the correlations of external
substance with the senses, or by a resistance to the mus
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PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
cular organism.   By careful and repeated observations,
that is, by addressing our senses to their correlative objects without,-by investigations and experiments,-we
acquaint ourselves with the various sensuous phenomena,
and their characteristics.   These phenomena are next
classified by resemblances and differences, and by common
relations; and are attempted to be explained by the assignment of causes and laws. In making this assignment
we may at first merely hypothesise the causes and laws:
the system built up in this way is merely a theory, and
not demonstrated science. A theory is taken up for the
time being, with the understanding that it is subject
either to be confirmed, or to be wholly set aside, accordingly as more extended experimentsand observations shall
enable us to decide. A science has for its basis, not mere
hypothetical causes and laws, but causes and laws demonstrated and fixed.
Now, in constructing a natural science, we have recourse both to philosophy and to pure science.
1. We have recourse to philosophy. Ideas of time and
space;-of substance and attributes;-of cause and effect;-of law;-of quantity, relation, measure, and proportion; ideas of distributed life and distributed causality;
of central, and diffusive movement; distinctions of the subjective and the objective, and of personal and impersonal
manifestations; the conception of generic wholes, and
specific differences; ideas of unity, multiplicity, and totality; the relations and distinctions of the finite and the
infinite; a knowledge of logical formulae; a knowledge of
mind, as the seat of all power, wisdom, design, and government-all work together in the scientific construction.
It is impossible to step forth into this wide field of natural
phenomena, without having metaphysical and nomologi
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INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
cal questions crowded into the mind; and every attempt,
whether to build up a theory or a science, is made upon
the basis, and in the light of philosophy.   These first
ideas, principles, and distinctions, are presumed by every
one;-the mind elaborates science under their spontaneous
influence, even where they are not defined and comprehended in known, philosophical systems.
2. We have recourse to pure science, or the mathematics. The mathematics are the science of pure quantity
-of simple extension from the absolute point; and of
abstract number. But physical bodies take upon themselves forms analogous to geometrical forms; and move in
lines analogous to geometrical lines: their distances, magnitudes, densities, temperatures, attractions, velocities,
times, &c., are capable, also, of being represented comparatively by numbers.   It is evident, therefore, that
mathematical principles may be employed in the determination of physical relations and laws. But still, should
conclusions drawn on mathematical principles respecting
bodies, assume the perfect geometrical form of bodies, or
regard them as pure and exact quantities, there would,
of necessity, be error in the conclusions. The mathematics are conversant with pure space and abstract number;
but body has properties entirely foreign and peculiar.
Hence, in the determination of physical science, there is
not an absolute, but a conditional application of mathematical principles. It is thus that the mixed mathematics are produced.
It thus appears, in natural science, that the mnaterial
of the construction is that part of the objective, embracing
the sensuous phenomena; that the ultimate grounds of
the construction lie in pure subjectivity or philosophy;
that the preparations for the construction are experiment,
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PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
observation, and classification; and that the immediate
organon of the construction is the mathematics. Deductive and inductive logic are, indeed, employed in the construction, but not as an immediate organon; they are a
part of the all-penetrating and governing philosophy-the
deductive logic pervading the mathematics throughout,
and the inductive appearing in the determination of every
general principle from particular observations.
Let us now sum up the preceding observations. PHILOSOPHY is the knowledge of the subjective, the absolute,
the primary, and the universal;-SCIENCE is the knowledge of the objective within particular spheres, under
philosophical conceptions, and with laws determined in
relation to particular phenomena.  Philosophy is complete without phenomena: Science must be constructed
out of phenomena. Philosophy comprehends: Science is
comprehended.
CONDITIONAL AND UNCONDITIONAL SCIENCE.
Geometry can have no relation to phenomena of the
exterior consciousness-it cannot be constructed out of
these phenomena.   But to the phenomena of the interior
consciousness it is related-it is constructed out of these
phenomena. We have seen that after the formula of
logic, the idea of space, and the conceptions of a point,
and of quantity, in one, two, and three directions are
given, as the necessary and the absolute;-the mind proceeds to construct certain definite figures in space, and to
consider their relations in the light of the principles already developed; and so, also, with respect to discrete
quantities, it proceeds to the formation of signs and symbols as representatives of these quantities and their general
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INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
relations; and proposes to itself various problems for solution. This particular and definite action of the intelligence presents us the phenomenal of the interior consciousness.
The principles and conceptions above referred to, are
independent, primary, and necessary; and the action of
the intelligence in comprehending them as knowledges, is
accounted for only in the fact that they are essential and
inseparable elements of thought. The intelligence cannot
think without logic: it cannot form cognitions upon sensation, without space-and the very idea of space involves
the point absolute, and extension in three directions;
mnimber-as the one-the many-the total-is no less a
necessary element. The intelligence within its actual relations and conditions cannot go into action without them.
But it is not necessary that it should go on to form the
triangle, the circle, the sphere, the polyhedron, and problems in discrete quantity; when it does so, it presents
phenomena to the interior consciousness which demand to
be accounted for by something antecedent; and when the
antecedent principles are appealed to, these phenomena
become a material out of which exact and pure sciences
are constructed.
Reflection will show the analogy between this case and
that of natural science, in its relation to the exterior consciousness. Cause and effect, substance and attributes,
space, law, designing and governing mind-we cannot
suppress the ideas of these amid the phenomena of nature,
the intelligence cannot form its simplest cognitions independently of them. Neither could the objects of our cognitions be supposed to exist without these. But these
primary ideas and principles can be supposed to exist
without our particular cognitions and their objects. Now,
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PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
our cognitions of the external world, by our sensations,
are the phenomena, which, by philosophical principles,
and the organon of the mathematics, we form into natural
science. In the same way, by philosophical principles,
and by logic in particular, do we form pure and exact
science from our cognitions of these forms of space, and
numerical problems. The science in both cases lies in
the determination of particular laws governing particular
relations.
In the case of the pure and exact science, the law is
absolute and unalterable: but this arises from the nature
of the object of the cognition:-forms in space, generated
from the absolute point, and abstract numbers, are ojects
given in the pure reason, and are, therefore, as absolute
and unchangeable as the reason itself: but bodies in space
are objects given in sensation, and because contingent, are
capable of indefinite changes. While, however, the present constitution of bodies remains, the laws demonstrated
of their particular relations must remain.   In the one
case, the law determined is universal in the particular relations of the quantities, unconditionally, because the quantities themselves are absolute: in the other case, the law
determined, in the particular relations of the quantities,
is universal, conditionally, because the quantities themselves are contingent.
This, obviously, lays a ground for a distinction of the
sciences.
I. —UNCONDITIONAL AND ABSOLUTE SCIENCE.
This embraces, as we have seen, the pure mathematics.
* The secondary phenomena: vide Sec. VIII.
5
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To this may be added the science of ethics, or the
determination of particular laws for the particular relations which moral and responsible beings stand in to God,
to each other, and to inferior beings. As these relations
are immutable, so the science formed by the application
of general philosophical principles to the phenomena
appearing in them, must be immutable likewise.
The science of the civil law, or jurisprudence, is also
to be ranked among unconditional sciences, because, based
upon immutable moral relations. The distinction between
ethics and jurisprudence is simply this; Ethics is the science of right and wrong, in its application to the relations
of moral beings universally; jurisprudence, in its application to these relations as they appear under a particular
government, in a particular state. The laws of ethics
belong to man as man; the laws of jurisprudence belong
to man as the citizen of an organized commonwealth. In
the constitution of government, man cannot lose his inherent nature, and, consequently, cannot be lawfully compelled to violate any principle of necessary rectitude; but,
still, in the constitution of government, he, as a moral
being, comes into peculiar and marked relations. It is,
indeed, true, that in the utmost scope of ethics, jurisprudence would be comprehended within its definition.
The usage which has distinguished the two sciences, has
not separated or opposed the cardinal principles.
II.-CONDITIONAL SCIENCE.
This exists on condition that the relations of the phenomena remain unchanged. All the natural or physical
sciences are of this description. The great laws of As
0
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PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
tronomy, for example, accurately determined as they are,
and forming a stupendous and glorious body of science, ate,
nevertheless, science, only while the constitution of the
universe remains as it is. Let the relations of the phenomena be changed, and the present science is destroyed.
Now, it is plainly conceivable that changes might take
place, to an indefinite extent. We can set no bounds to
Omnipotence in modifying the forms of physical being
and the constitution of planetary systems. The distinctions of right and wrong, the nature of truth, justice, and
benevolence, can be changed no more than God himself
can be changed; but our thought does not attach the
same immutability and necessity to natural forces and laws.
ART.
We h,ave defined Philosophy-we have defined Science
-and shown the relation of the former to the latter;
but it remains to define Art, and to show the relation
which the first two hold to it.
Art, in common usage, is confined to express the exertion of human causality for the modification of bodies according to principles and rules.
The most enlarged idea of art is given in the work
of creation itself, by the Almighty and Allwise Creator.
The creation everywhere exhibits design, law, and skill.
We may, therefore, without any figure of speech, call God
the first and Great Artist and Mechanician. He created,
arranged, and finished, according to principles and rules
which his own exhaustless intelligence supplied. The
variety, the number, the nice and elaborate perfection, the
beauty, benignity, and glory of his works, exceed not only
our actual knowledge, but the utmost flight of our im
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INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
agination. From the glimpses which astronomy furnishes
of the extent and the continual advance of creation, we
are irresistibly led to the conviction, that the mind will
fild new objects to observe and admire, throughout its
immortality.
Human art is comparatively a feeble, yet a beautiful
copy of the Divine. God formed the substances together
with their properties, upon which human skill is exercised.
He fixed the laws under which this skill must accomplish
its ends. We imitate the beauty of nature, or improve
upon it, only by observing these properties and laws. If
we attempt to do violence to them, we are not long waiting for a rebuke of our folly, and a demonstration of our
weakness. But if we fall in with the suggestions of nature,
and work according to the principles and rules on which
she has been constituted, then the arts of utility and
beauty will appear, rich and manifold, and the human will
become both a co-worker with the Divine, and an instrument of completing its projections.
Now, in analyzing humnan art, we are led to perceive
its connexion with both philosophy and science.
1. With philosophy. This appears in the ideas under
which it works. There is, in the mechanical or useful
arts, generally, the idea of utility itself-the idea of improving upon the actual forms and arrangements of nature,
and of adapting them more perfectly to our wants, actual
or fanciful.  This idea is the forecasting thought, and the
propelling energy of the reason itself, and hence is an element of pure philosophy.
In the fine arts appear the ideas of proportion, grace,
symmetry, congruity, and harmony-forming the complex
idea of beauty. This idea leading to all improvements
upon the beauty of the existing forms of nature, as in
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PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
landscape gardening, for example; and to the creation of
new forms of beauty, as in statuary, architecture, painting, music, and poetry, has its origin also in the pure
reason, and is, therefore, a philosophic element.
2. With science. Science being the determination of
the laws governing the relations of phenomena, as they
spring forth in succession from causality, the artist, when
he undertakes a work, either of imitation or creation, is
bound, in the use of materials, and in the arrangement
of parts, to observe these laws. He not only works under
the inspiration of pure ideas, or, in other words, the conception of the ideal, but working in the field of nature,
he works in obedience to her material constitution-her
fixed properties and laws. In architecture, he works under
ideas of proportion, congruity, grace, and dignity; but,
at the same time, he must regard the properties of his
materials, and pay the utmost respect to mechanical laws.
In musical composition, he is, indeed, led on by the ideas
of melody and harmony; but in producing and arranging
the sounds which form the material of the art, he cannot
dispense with physical laws. Similar illustrations may be
given in relation to the other fine arts.
That the mechanician, and the inventor of arts of
utility, base their operations upon scientific laws, requires
no illustrations.
RULES OF ART are explicit specifications, expressed
clearly in language, and by diagrams, and numbers, with
respect to form, measure, proportion, combination, and
adjustment. They lay down in simple terms how the
causality must execute a given work. They direct the
application of physical skill.
An individual may be a crude philosopher, and raw
and uninstructed in science; but still, he may, by long
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INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
practice, acquire the skill of obeying rules of art. The
philosophy and the science implied in the rules, and from
which the rules were deduced, he is incompetent to explain, and does not even comprehend; but skilfully and
readily adjusting his physical instrumentality under the
simple directions of the rules, he rears the stately temple,
or fashions and arranges the curious machinery of the
watch.  Such men are mere copyists or mechanics.
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PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
SECTION XIII.
REASON, THE ORGAN OF PHILOSOPHY.
PHILOSOPHY is the knowledge of mind and nature in their
faculties, forces, substances, and laws; and the knowledge
of truth conceived of as independent of all being.
Science is the knowledge of phenomena, as accounted
for, reduced under, and regulated by, these faculties, forces,
substances, and laws. Art is reproduction, imitation, and
creation, by human causality and skill, under the light and
authority of philosophy and science.
Phenomena, or the purely objective, are the immediate
experiences or objects of consciousness; and are either experiences of the action of pure reason, and simple choice
and volition, or of sensations depending upon correlative
objects without.
The metaphenomenal, or -the subjective general, are
the realities of being and truth, which do not form the
immediate experiences of consciousness, but are known
mediately through these experiences.
Philosophy relates to our whole being: but in constructing philosophy as a system, our whole being does
not form the organ of this construction. Philosophy is
not a creation of the will: nor is it an outflow of the
emotions and passions. There is but one faculty which
can claim to be the organ of philosophy, and that is the
REASON.
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INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
The Reason is the faculty of all perception, whether
by immediate intuition, or by mediate representation or
deduction; whether of the interior or the exterior consciousness; whether of the past, the present, or the future;
whether of the actual or the possible, or of the probable
or the impossible; whether of phenomena, or of being and
truth; whether of cause or law. All perception and all
knowledge belong to this one faculty.
Now that the Reason should perceive the movements
or phenomena of the other faculties, and assign them their
laws in the Esthetics and the Morale; and that it should
perceive all forms of being and truth taken as objective to
itself, - a to present no difficulties. But how does the
reason, while perceiving all else, perceive likewise its own
acts or phenomena; and while giving out the laws of the
other faculties, give out, likewise, its own laws, thereby
constructing Logic?
The difficulty here presented, it will be perceived,
consists in the fact that the reason must perceive its
own phenomena, while, in order to develope phenomena
itself, it is engaged in perceiving something objective to
itself; it must give out the laws which regulate its own
movements, while, in order to develope these laws, it is
engaged in determining laws for some other faculty, or in
some similar exercise upon that which lies without its own
immediate subjectivity. How can I observe my own perceptions and thoughts, and the laws which regulate my
perception and thinking, when the acts of perceiving and
thinking imply that the reason is intent upon objects?
And if the reason be supposed to withdraw itself from
objects for the purpose of examining itself, then, again,
how can the reason examine itself without calling itself
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PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
into action by fixing itself upon objects-which is a recurrence of the same difficulty?
The difficulty is to be answered by simply appealing to
the fact-the fact of consciousness. In the very act of
thinking or perceiving, and when I am drawing conclusions, or forming cognitions, I am conscious of these acts.
The reason has this twofold capacity of knowing phenomena, and being, and truth, external to its own subjectivity; and of knowing, at the same time, its own acts
and its own subjectivity in these acts. This is spontaneous
and necessary self-knowledge.
The deduction of the laws of its own operations, and
the construction of logic, can be effected only by reflection
or philosophical consciousness.
The reason, when it perceives, thinks, or ratiocinates,
does so under the consciousness of its own acts, and under
convictions of the reality and truth of its operations. Its
development begins and goes on to an indefinite extent
spontaneously, before it pauses to look back upon its
course, in order to trace out the laws of its own movement.
In this way, not only had cognitions of an outward world
been formed, and many admirable principles in morals,
law, and government, been determined, but even geometry
itself had been carried to a high degree of perfection,
before logical investigation had become ripe. It is, therefore, not merely by attending to our thinking and reasoning in their going on, that we arrive at the laws of logic.
In the actual developments of the reason appearing in
works of science and art, and in all the institutions of
society, there are, as it were, diagrams and charts which
the reason can inspect for the purpose of ascertaining its
own laws. But, then, even in inspecting these, it renews
in the consciousness the original processes; and does not
5*
105 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
really intermit the exercise of its remarkable function, of
knowing the laws of its own movements, while these movements are actually going on in reference to that which is
objective to itself. These diagrams and charts are of the
utmost importance, because they render reflection more
easy, by presenting the work of investigation and deduction as already completed. Under these circumstances,
the renewal in the consciousness of the original processes
is effected with no great effort, and thus the reason is enabled to bend its strength to acts of reflection and philosophical insight. The difference may easily be conceived
of, by supposing Euclid to have engaged in determining
the abstract and universal laws of deduction during his
first efforts at geometrical construction; or to have completed his geometrical construction under the spontaneity
of the reason, and then to have reflected upon the operations of his Ieason in this construction, for the purpose of
eliciting universal laws of deduction.
Taking the reason, then, as the organ of philosophy,
how are we to decide when we have attained a genuine
philosophy? This question, undoubtedly, is of the highest
importance, for a great many spurious philosophies have
appeared. In these prolegomena to my main purpose, I
have no opportunity to enter into minute elucidations; I
am only indicating thoughts. It would be no ordinary
undertaking, by itself, to determine the criteria of a true
philosophy:-What, then, can be accomplished in a few
pages! But as an artist, where he is not in a condition
to give a finished work, can still, by a few lines and
touches, give an intelligible and striking outline, so at
least as to attract contemplation, to stir up thought, and
to make the beholder desire a perfect picture, or rather to
go and examine the original,-be it a quiet scene of hills
106 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
and plains and flowing rivers, or of wild rocks and woods
and cataracts, or the noble ruins of an old and mysterious
temple; so here, a few hints and rough-hewn thoughts
thrown out may serve a good end, by leading ingenious
readers to put forth their thoughts afresh, and perhaps to
correct their past conclusions.
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INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
SECTION XIV.
THE CRITERIA OF A TRUE PHILOSOPHY.
ALL that is secondary to philosophy, and dependent upon
it, of course requires no other ground. Philosophy accounts
for and explains every thing beside itself-it is the final
authority.
Hence, there is an empirical way of testing a philosophy. There are a multitude of knowledges abroad among
men, generally received and believed-nay, received and
believed so confidently, that he who should question their
reality, would be regarded as destitute of common sense,
and unfit for the duties and responsibilities of society. A
philosophy which appears to uphold these favorite convictions-to be the ultimate and unquestionable ground of
them, is taken as a well-attested philosophy.
Now, I would not utterly reject these empirical criteria.
They have their use, an eminently practical use, and one
adapted to the people at large. There are, for example,
certain convictions of a moral and religious nature, which
widely pervade the human mind, and are the very life of
the common social system. Men are tenacious of these,
and that for the best of reasons, viz., the close connexion
in which they stand to all that is most dear and valuable.
It is just and worthy in human nature to cling to any philosophy which clearly appears to sustain high and invaluable beliefs.
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PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
But, while making these admissions, we must still insist
upon other criteria, lying farther back, and which, indeed,
are implied in those which we have above adverted to;
and that for two plain reasons: First, The empirical criteria can have no legitimate authority in themselves. This
is evident, since the secondary knowledges are assumed to
establish that, without which they could have no reality.
The secondary knowledges by hypothesis require an ultimate basis-they are not self-evident, they are not necessarily true; but their ultimate basis consists of philosophical
principles, and the very principles which they are employed
to establish. Now, we may not prove an antecedent by a
consequent, and that, too, when it is granted that this
consequent requires for its own basis the very antecedent
which it is taken to prove.
And if it be admitted that those irrepressible and firm
spontaneous convictions to which we have alluded, are an
authority and basis in themselves,it will be found upon an
accurate analysis that the spontaneous convictions do not
arise from the phenomenal and secondary, but from the
absolute and primary, which penetrates and sustains the
phenomenal and the secondary. For example: One man
is observed giving another man a' purse of money, and the
observer has an irrepressible and firm conviction that the
act is right. By why has he this conviction? Because,
by supposition, he knows that it is given in benevolence,
or in payment of a just debt. Now, the payment of a
debt cannot be taken to prove the principle of justice, nor
the giving of money to prove the principle of benevolence;
but the principle of justice commands the payment of the
debt, and the principle of benevolence, the relief of the
needy. From observing the benign influences of certain
acts, I may commend that philosophy which elevates them
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INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
into immutable moral principles; but then these benign
effects require the existence of such principles in order to
account for their manifestation. By inducting phenomena
we may arrive at a principle, but the principle arrived at
must have had a pre-existence in order to render the phenomena possible. It must not be forgotten that philosophy is incorporated with our proper being; and enlightens,
guides, and determines us even when we do not recognize
it by reflection, and are too unlearned to name it as formally laid down in systems.
To one untaught in systematic philosophy, a very
natural prejudice would spring up in favour of some philosophy named to him, if he were informed that it lay at
the bottom of his warmest and noblest feelings and beliefs;
but it is perfectly plain that this philosophy, if, in reality,
lying at the bottom of these mental phenomena of the individual in question, would really be that which gave rise
to these phenomena.   This individual may be satisfied
with it, from its supposed connexion with his beliefs and
sentiments; but it could never be legitimately determined
by such criteria. WVe must determine independently of
the individual, whether his beliefs have a true basis; that
is, whether they are philosophical or unphilosophical:
hence the proper criteria must be independent of the phenomenal of the individual mind.
Secondly, The empirical criteria cannot be legitimate
in determining the truth of a philosophy, because, in themselves they do not, in the first place, sufficiently provide
against the introduction of error; and in the second place,
it is a matter of history that errors have actually been introduced in this way.
In the first place, they do not in themselves sufficiently
provide against the introduction of error. Opinions and
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PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
beliefs may be connected in the human mind with many
other particulars besides an innate philosophy. They may
be connected with prejudices of nation, family, and sect;
with pride, ambition, favorite pursuits and pleasures. If
an innate philosophy always governed our opinions and
beliefs, then they would always rise above, and be inde pendent of, these other connexions. But so far from this
being the case, these other connexions do often exclusively
determine them, and in spite of the innate philosophy.
It is plain, therefore, that if actual opinions and beliefs are
to settle our philosophy, it will not only have an ultimate
basis beyond itself, which is absurd in the very enunciation,
but this ultimate basis also, will be just as various, muta ble, conflicting, and impure, as human passions them selves. It is impossible, then, in this way, to settle what
is a true philosophy.
But, in the second place, it is a matter of history, that
errors have been introduced in this way. The instances
of Galileo and Abelard, may be taken as types of a multitude that might be sought out and adduced. Both were
severely persecuted for resisting philosophies which had
their origin in the prejudices of a learned unthinkingness;
and in the pride and ambition of a corrupt hierarchy.
The current opinions demanded different philosophies from
those broached and expounded by these great apostles of
freedom of investigation and thought.
Every man holds certain opinions in common with his
nation, his family, his political party, or his religious sect.
Are these opinions all based upon sound philosophy? No
one would contend for such an absurdity. These opinions
conflict with each other; they cannot, therefore, all be true.
But if the mere strength of an opinion, and the zeal in advancing it, are to be taken as among the sure criteria of
III 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
philosophy, then we shall establish a multitude of philosophies at war with each other, and all upon an equally
secure basis.  Philosophy is a word of such awful and momentous import and authority, that both he who advocates
old opinions, and he who attempts to introduce new ones;
both the venerator of unchanging institutions, and the reformer and revolutionist; both orthodoxy and heresy;
both bigotry and liberalism, will be ambitious of its titles,
and of marching under its banners.
From this Babel-like confusion of tongues-from this
light rendered murky by the dust and steam of furious
conflicts, we must retire to a calm and elevated region,
where quiet thought has its home; and where the " light"
is "dry" and pure.*:
In introducing the criteria of a true philosophy, I will
name one thing-not, perhaps, really ranking among the
criteria strictly defined, but yet, the invariable attendant
of such a philosophy: It is the quality which characterizes the spirit of the philosophy. Philosophy is truth,
nothing but truth, and truth immutable, arrayed in the
glory and majesty of her own eternity. Now, that philosophy, which has developed itself in a mind which loves,
fears, and adores truth, with a filial spirit; which takes
up its cross and follows truth with an entire devotion;
which counts all things else, whether they be the prejudices of family, sect, or nation-or old titles of honor won
in the service of powerful and honored creeds and dogmas
of the church or of the schools,-but loss, for the excellency of the knowledge of truth-counting truth all gain,
and confiding in her with heartiness, fearing no evilswilling to endure all trials, and joyfully and certainly ex
* "Lumen siccum."-Bacon.
112 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
pecting a satisfactory and peaceful end,-that philosophy
recommends itself at once to respectful and earnest attention, and gives promises which cannot well deceive us. For
as God hath made the mind for the apprehension of truth,
and hath set forth before it a world of glorious truths for
it to apprehend, so we cannot but hope, nay, feel a strong
confidence, that an ingenuous spirit, looking out after the
marks of truth, humbly, purely, and freely, as the eye,
tired of the darkness, looks out for the morning light, will,
according to the harmonious constitution given it, find her
resplendent presence, and be accepted as her oracle, to
make known her laws.
It is worthy of remark, also, that a preparation of
mind is necessary, as well for the study of philosophical
principles announced, as for undertaking an announcement
of them. A genuine philosophical spirit is the pre-requisite of good learners, as well as of good teachers.   The
want of this, indeed, has been the great obstacle to the
inculcation of truth in all ages of the world.
There always have been men of ingenuous and honest
minds, and designed by Heaven to be the lights of their
age, whose teachings, if the multitude had listened to,
there would have been a wide diffusion of wholesome knowledge and pure morality. Thus would the philosophy and
ethics of Socrates, as an example among the heathen, and
the sublime revelations of prophets and apostles among
the chosen people, have revolutionized society, by destroying
old, stagnant errors, and bringing in rational and heavenly
truths. But it hath ever been the folly of men, that although having eyes to see, and ears to hear, and understandings to perceive, they have chosen old traditions, and
familiar errors, before new instructions, simply because
these instructions demand at the first an honest confession
113 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
of ignorance, or impose new labors, or are opposed to
dearly cherished prejudices and passions. Bacon, in his
great work, has exposed these enemies of new investigations, and revolutionizing truths, where they lie in the
human heart.  The " Idols of the Tribe," or those prejudices which belong to infirm human nature generally; the
" Idols of the Den," or individual prejudices-the idiosyncracies of the man; the "Idols of the Market-place," or
the prejudices connected with set forms of speech in the
announcement of opinions and dogmas-where venerable
phrases are mistaken for grave truths; the "Idols of the
Theatre," or prejudices connected with wild and startling,
but idle theories. When these "Idols" are worshipped
by the philosopher, he can make no new discoveries, unless
by accident, and then hle will be prone to distort them.
When they prevail among the people,-that is, the reading people, those who are seeking for information in different ways, and with different degrees of interest,-solid
and rational truths can gain friends but slowly, and are
liable to be silenced by the authority of public opinion, the
rebukes of the church, or even by the force of civil law.
It holds true in philosophy, as well as in religion, that
the sower may go forth to sow, and sow none but good
seed, and yet if the hearers be impracticable, the labor
will be in vain, and the precious seed will be lost; and it
is only in the good and honest heart that truth finds a
proper soil, in whose rich depth she sends forth her roots,
and springs up an immortal fruit.
In proceeding to the direct enquiries respecting the
criteria of a true philosophy, we cannot well avoid adopting as a leading thought, the subject of the preceding section, " Reason the Organ of Philosophy."  If reason construct philosophy, she must be immediately conversant
114 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
with these criteria; and as she is the faculty of all knowledges, she must be the last authority in determining them.
But where shall these criteria be sought for? We
have shown that they cannot be empirical. Experience
may be the condition of their development-may suggest
them; but they, in themselves, must be subjective. Philosophy is subjective and metaphenomenal. The criteria
of a true philosophy must be subjective and metaphenomenal likewise. It is evident, therefore, the criteria must
be sought for in the pure Reason itself.
I will begin with Logic as an illustration.  Logic gives
the laws of all ratiocination. But how do I know when I
have, in this respect, attained a true philosophy? I do
not go to the common, concrete reasonings of men on various subjects. They may confidently believe their current
conclusions-they may deem them of the utmost importance: but the aim of Logic being to test the legitimacy
of these conclusions, it cannot go to them as criteria.
What, then, is my only remaining resource? Why, to go
to the Reason itself, and ask it whether these principles
can be otherwise than true-whether their falsity is conceivable, or possible?  The Reason gives the answer, from
its perfect insight or intuition; and beyond this, there
can be no appeal.  Is there any other way of determining
the truth of the " dictum d! omni et nullo?"  Whatever
be the philosophical conception-whether substance, cause,
proportion, harmony, space, or time;-whatever be the
philosophical law-whether of Esthetics or the Morale, or
belonging to Logic,-its reality and truth can evidently
be settled only by an appeal to the Reason. What the
Reason intuitively perceives, and undoubtingly affirms,
must be reality and truth.  The only legitimate way of
arriving at philosophy, is to question the Reason: and so,
115 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
likewise, the only true method of testing any system
claiming to be philosophy, is to bring it in its parts, its
relations, and in its constituted wholeness, under the review of the Reason, as the faculty of intuition-of original
insight.
I may remark here, that we are claiming in the determination of philosophy, no more than what the mathematician claims in the determination of his science. How
shall we test the definitions and axioms of Geometry-except by a direct appeal to the intuition of Reason? Nay,
in every step of the long chains of reasoning drawn out
from these definitions and axioms, the exact relations and
dependencies defy the possibility of error, by submitting
themselves to the intuition of Reason.
There is such a thing, then, as appealing directly to
Reason, and receiving a reply of more authority than the
hearing of our ears, or the seeing of our eyes; since what
is generally received as the most exact and unquestionable
of all the sciences, continually holds it up to our view.
If it belong to the mathematics, much more must it belong to philosophy, which furnishes the ultimate grounds
even of this science.
Philosophy, when taken up according to a true method,
becomes rigid, exact, authoritative. It is only when wandering from this method, thai vague and mutable theories
and fancies, which belong neither to heaven nor earth, but
which seem grotesquely to partake of both, become philosophies, falsely so called. Indeed, so rife has this tribe
of vain and fanciful theorists ever been, that we might adduce in illustration of the emptiness which may belong to
a current opinion, the very general opinion, that philosophy is but an ever-changing mysticism, which every new
adept may mould to his peculiar fancies.
116 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
There have been two classes of men, called philosophers,
in all ages. The one, very numerous, and composed of
these vain theorists. The other, generally embracing the
few, and plainly distinguishable from the former, first, by
elevating philosophy from a mere deduction from experience, or a mere expedient created to answer an end, to
the dignity and permanency of a system formed out of the
primary and intuitive perceptions of pure Reason; and,
secondly, by the identity of the system itself, exhibiting
clearly that the same conception of philosophy, and the
same method, was transmitted from age to age, if not in
books, yet in the elemental working of the human mind
itself; and showing the true philosopher to be a most
natural and genuine, although a rare manifestation of humanity.
The criteria are all embraced in the fact of the Reason's authoritative affirmation.  They are capable, however, of receiving a specific enunciation.
I. A philosophical truth, in its very nature, is incapable of being defined and demonstrated by any thing going
before. The aim of philosophy is, as the ultimate ground
of knowledge, to define, demonstrate, and account for that
which in its nature is incapable of standing alone, and requires something antecedent to define, demonstrate, and
account for it. There must be such primary truths, for
if there were not, there would be an infinite retrogressu8
of thought in the labor of defining and proving; there
would be no ultimate ground for the repose of enquiry.
II. A philosophical truth must be perfectly clear, and
attended with no doubtfulness. It is incapable of being
defined and demonstrated, both because it is primitive,
and because there really is nothing clearer than itself by
which to define and demonstrate it. For example, the
117 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF
idea of space is incapable of being defined and bemonstrated, not only because there is nothing before it, which
comprehends it, and therefore adequate to defining it, but
also because it is in itself eminently clear and certain.
That space exists, I affirm with the utmost confidence.
If I attempt to represent space by body, or to attain to its
utmost stretch by the multiplication or enlargement of
bodies, my mind soon becomes confused; but this confusion arises, not from any obscurity inherent in the idea of
space, but from the absurd attempt to represent that under the phenomena of the senses, which is not attained by
sensation, and is indeed antecedent to, and independent
of, all phenomena.
III. A philosophical truth is a pure intuition of the
Reason. It must be seen without doubtfulness-it must
be -affirmed with a positiveness which admits of no
rational questioning in the mind in which it developes
itself. But these characteristics belong only to intuitive
truth.
IV. Philosophical truths being in a high and peculiar
sense, elements of thought, cannot remain unproductive
where thought is going on. Hence, a philosophical truth
must make its appearance'somewhere in the development
of humanity. If we seek for it, we shall find it. This
cannot well be confounded with the empirical criteria,
against which objections have already been urged. These
criteria suppose us to begin with phenomena as the basis
of the philosophical construction. Here, on the contrary,
we begin with the truth as an affirmation of the Reason,
and seek for its manifestations. This criterion is especially useful to those who seize a truth because it fills
the mind with a sort of inexpressible delight, and kindles
it into a lofty enthusiasm, without calmly bringing it un
118 
PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL.
der the eye of the Reason. It will serve to dissipate this
enthusiasm and delight, and to bring about a sober-mindedness, to call upon such, to search for the manifestations
of the supposed truth in the actual phenomena of consciousness.
V. Philosophy cannot legitimately present itself under
the form of isolated truths. Reason is one; and hence it
developes its truths woven into a system, and constituting
UNITY. That construction, therefore, cannot be received
as legitimate, which does not exhibit the most perfect
agreement with itself.  It will be faulty if its parts appear confused, so that there is manifest difficulty in determining whether any system is aimed to be constituted;
or if the parts being clearly brought out and arranged,
they fail to work together, and are incoherent.
VI. Philosophy accounts for all phenomena; it accounts even for error. Not that the error is the birth of
the Reason, for this is manifestly absurd; but that, Philosophy is adequate to giving an explanation of the
grounds, the possibilities, the causes, and the modes of
error. A true philosophy, therefore, as a system, will account for the universe as a system. Of course, the reason alone can judge whether the'one accounts for the
other. We are thus brought back to its simple authority.
The criteria above given must speak for themselves.
I believe a careful reflection will lead to their approval in
the mind of every genuine and candid philosopher. If all
who have engaged in the work of philosophical construction, had governed themselves by these criteria, there
would have been little difference among them; and the
world, long ere this, would have witnessed philosophy
taking ILer stand as the Scientia Scientiarum, and possessing at least all the clearness and exactness which are
119 
INTRODUCTORY VIEW, ETC.
claimed by many sciences dependent upon her. But when
men  are determined to preserve their "Idols" at all
events; they are prepared either to discard philosophy
altogether, or to make her the mere tire-wonman of their
prejudices and accidental and floating opinions. A theory
in physics, a dogma in speculation, a creed in religion, a
name or a degree in a mutable world, are permitted to
give the leading thought; and hence they seek not for
philosophy herself, but only to philosophise ingeniously
and speciously, in order to satisfy the forms of truth while
they preserve the body of error. They are willing to impose upon themselves,-why, then, should they scruple to
impose upon others?
120 
PART II.
PRELIMINARY VIEW OF THE REASON.  
PART II.
PRELIMINARY VIEW OF THIE REASON.
SECTION I.
GENERAL INTRODUCTORY CONSIDERATIONS RESPECTING
THE REASON.
THE Reason can be comprehended only by a being endowed with reason. That which knows all things else,
must know itself likewise. The very idea of objective
knowledge implies self-knowledge
The faculty of knowledge can be known only through
acts of knowing in the consciousness. What are these
acts? The answer is easy, for there is nothing more familiar to consciousness. You know this book, this chair,
this table; you know this mathematical demonstration;
you know this law of nature-the gravitation of bodies;
you know this rule of morals-love thy neighbor as thyself; you know what happened yesterday-that the sun
rose and set; you know what will happen to-morrowthat the  sun  will rise and set; you know the ideal
beauty of a statue or a landscape; you know axioms,
first principles, and generalizations; you know space and
eternity. If you ask, What is it to know? I reply, Look 
PRELIMINARY VIEW OF
within yourself-you read there directly what it is. What
other answer can you desire-what other answer can you
obtain?
If you ask, What is the Reason? I reply, it is that
which knows -the knowing substance, if you please; or,
it is yourself, as far as you are a knowing being. In all
this, it is evident that we do not advance beyond thefact
of knowing, and the conception of the faculty of knowledge in general.
But what, then, is the aim of psychological investigations with respect to the Reason? Does not the whole
enquiry end in the simplicity and obviousness of the fact
of knowing?
It is, indeed, true, that whenever, and in whatever
relations, the Reason is exercised, there is a perpetual recurrence of this fact: a perception is a knowledge; an
axiom is a knowledge; a demonstration is a series of
knowledges; and all the relations of the parts in the
making up of the whole ratiocination, are knowledges.
But there must arise, upon the general fact of knowing,
many enquiries respecting the various forms, the conditions, the limits, the relations, the characteristics, and the
certainty of knowledge; the knowledge of the actual, as
distinguished from the knowledge of the possible; the
relative determination of knowledge by the inherent
powers and forms of the reason, and by the objects of
knowledge themselves; knowledge, primitive and intuitive, and knowledge secondary and deductive. All these
and the like enquiries must be related to the psychology
of the Reason.
The Reason may be regarded in certain points of view,
as the cardinal faculty of the mind. It is by knowledge
and in knowledge that we live and move and have our
124 
THE REASON.
being.  That I am-that there is any being whateverand all the interests, relations, aims, and laws of being,
can be possible determinations, only on the supposition
that this faculty exists.
Hence men generally are prone, in representing mind,
to speak of it simply as an intelligence.  Let Reason be
supposed to be extinct, and all other faculties are virtually
extinct likewise. Emotions and passions are dependent
upon perceptions for their existence. The Will, although
a cause, and self-determined, could not go into action
without objects and aims of action.*   But the Reason,
on the contrary, can be supposed to exist without emotions,
passions, and volitions. Intelligence, like a pure "dry
light," is conceivable without consequential emotions and
volitions; but emotions and volitions, without intelligence,
are inconceivable.
The Reason, in its full development, presents us
various forms or offices, which by some philosophers are
represented as distinct mental faculties. Consciousness,
sensation,. perception, judgment, abstraction, conception,
attention, imagination, fancy, and memory, have all been
analysed as distinct faculties. In the actual constitution
of the mind, some of these faculties, so called, show
largely, when analysed, the action of the Will. This is
true particularly of attention, abstraction, and fancy.
But as far as they express intelligence, I take them to be
all comprehended in the Reason. These are not properly
intellectual faculties; but the intellectual faculty, under
its different modes, and in its different relations. This I
shall presently exhibit. In the outset, let us accustom
ourselves to look upon the Reason as one. It indeed
* Doctrine of the Will, p. 138,
125 
PRELIMINARY VIEW OF
exercises various offices; it perceives, it judges, it draws
conclusions, it imagines, fancies, and remembers; but it
is still the same faculty-it is, in all these, the one and
indivisible Reason.
The Reason, as the faculty of knowledge, must have a
peculiar constitution-it must be constituted for its office
it must be constituted to know. But it cannot know,
unlees there are objects of knowledge-unless there is
something to be known: and that which is to be known,
must likewise have its peculiar constitution and properties.
Now, if, on the one hand, the Reason does not make its
objects in the very act of knowing them; so likewise, on
the other hand, the objects do not make the Reason in
the very act of being known. The Reason and its objects
may exist in relation to each other, but they exist also
independently of each other.   I speak now of finite
Reason.
In the Divine and Infinite Reason, all possible forms
of being and truth must have pre-existed in conception
or idea, before any actual development or creation appeared
in time or space:-And whatever actual existence or development there ever has been, must be consequential to
the forecast, as well as to the causality, of the Divine
mind. But in the constituted and finite Reason, there is
no dependence of its objects for their existence, upon itself.
Every form of truth, every form of being beside myself,
would have a perfect existence, although I did not exist.
And so, also, although there were no objects for my reason,
still, as a real intelligence, it would have its fixed and
perfect constitution. Its development would, indeed, be
impossible, but it would nevertheless be there, ready to
be developed whenever the required conditions should be
supplied. This may be illustrated by the analogy of a
126 
THE REASON.
grain of wheat, or the seed of any plant. Let it be laid
up in a granary, and there can be no germination; but
let it have soil, light, heat, and moisture, and there springs
up "first the blade, and then the full ear." But the seed
had its own life and peculiar forms before it was introduced
into the circumstances and conditions of germination.
The soil, heat, light, and moisture communicated no life,
or distinctive forms:-the seed, if wheat, was perfect
wheat in and of itself; if some other seed, it was of its
kind, perfect in and of itself.  The soil, light, heat, and
moisture, only supplied the circumstances and conditions
of its germination, growth, and fruit-bearing. So the
Reason; it is perfect in and of itself —it has its own life,
energy, and distinctive forms inherent, inseparable, and
independently of all exterior circumstances and conditions.
The presentation of objects through sensation, is like soil
to the seed; books, conversation, examples, the regular
discipline of schools, are like light, heat, and moisture:
these are requisite to its germination, growth, development, perfection, and fruit-bearing; but all that comes
forth of it, comes forth of its own forms, capacities, and
richness, as the Reason.
Now, it is very interesting and instructive to think of
the principle of life and the distinctive forms of seeds;
and by the aid of the microscope to look within its storehouse of wonders its preparations for endless propagation and increase! Surely, he who thus thinks and
examines, knows more of nature, attains to more truth,
than he who merely plants and eats, without seeking any
thing further.
But of how much higher moment, to comprehend, if
possible, the forms of our own intelligence!
Is it possible to attain to this-can I know the inherent
127 
PRELIMINARY VIEW OF
forms-the fixed and independent constitution of the
Reason? Can I find out with what preparations-with
what pre-constituted and adapted capacities, the mind
begins to know?
The earliest development of Reason must be spontaneous, like the germination of a seed sown in the soil.
There can be no self-direction and forecast before knowledge begins. But after Reason has gone out to an indefinite extent among its objects, after it has germinated,
sprung up, and increased toward perfection, unlike the
plant, it has the power of reflection, or of looking back
upon the process of its development, and of separating —
at least so far as to establish enquiries-between its inherent and pre-constituted forms and capacities, and the
circumstances under which they make their appearance.
It -has the power of doing in relation to itself, what it does
in relation to the plant.  Nay, may not its self-knowledge
be presumed to.be more perfect, since it knows the plant
by observation, while it knows itself in the interior and
most intimate consciousness?
The inherent and original forms and functions of the
Reason, can indeed be known only on condition of experience; but when known, they are seen to have an s
priori existence. They are not known a' priori, understanding by this that they are known independent of experience;-they are known through experience, but as in
their nature prior to it, or the experience would not itself
have been possible.
128 
THE REASON.
SECTION II.
OUTLINE OF THE IDEAS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE REASON.
THE pre-constituted forms or elements under which the
Reason forms cognitions, and assigns laws, are called
Ideas.
The capacities of the Reason to know in different
modes and relations, we shall call its Functions.
Ideas and Functions make up the constitution of the
Reason.
IDEAS.
The ideas may be classified in two ways
First: We may classify them as Ideas which determine our cognitions, and Ideas which determine our activity. Under the first head would be comprised the
Ideas of time and space, the finite and infinite, of cause
and substance, of quantity and quality, necessity and contingence, and the categories of purely cognitive ideas in
general.
Under the second head would be comprised   The Idea of Utility,-that which gives birth to human
industry and all its achievements.
Tile Idea of Right and Wrong,-that which gives
birth to Ethics, Law, and Religion.
The Idea of Beauty,-that which gives birth to the
Fine Arts.
6*
129 
PRELIMINARY VIEW OF
The Philosophical Idea,-that which leads man to attempt the explanation of his own development.
This classification, however, does not preserve its particulars entirely distinct, for the last class determine cognitions as well as activities.
We may therefore adopt a second method of classification according to the philosophical divisions given in Part
I., Sec. XI. We shall then have,
I. METAPHYSICAL IDEAS. II. NOMOLOGICAL IDEAS.
The first determine our conceptions in Psychology,
Dynamics, Anthropology, and Ontology. The second determine laws in the Morale, Esthetics, Somatology, and
Logic.
In this classification we accept all Ideas as cognitive
in their character; while the last division embraces those
only which have the additional remarkable characteristic
of becoming laws in the world of objective reality. *
FUNCTIONS.
I. INTUITION, or the function of primary and immediate knowledge.  Ideas, Axioms, and First Truths in general, are the objects of this function.
II. SENSUOUs PERCEPTION, or the function of forming
cognitions upon sensations or the phenomena of the exterior consciousness.
III. ABSTRACTION AND GENERALIZATION.   It is by
this function that the Reason, taking up the secondary
phenomena, first views particular qualities separately, and
then makes them the basis of extensive classifications.
The quality is abstracted, and then generalized as a com
* Vide Part I., Sec. VII.
130 
THE REASON.
mon sign; and its name becomes the name of the class.
Thus are formed genera and species. To this function we
are indebted for a clear and distinct knowledge of things,
and the formation of a ready and convenient language.
IV. JUDGMENT, or the function of perceiving the agreement or disagreement between two cognitions, united as
the subject and predicate.of a proposition.
V. INVENTION, or the function of finding out and applying principles and rules for the demonstration of theorems, the solution of problems, and the construction of
machines; and of making experiments for the determination of Science.   The imagination acts conjointly with
this, by calling up in the mind the images of diagrams,
and of models or archetypes of the outward construction.
VI. MEDIATE PERCEPTION, or the function of inferring
or deducing conclusions through a mediate cognition, as
formally exhibited in the syllogism.
VII. INDUcTION, or the function of examining and
arranging the secondary phenomena, so as to determine
their causes and laws, and thus to construct scientific
systems.
VIII. MEMORY, or the perpetuity of.knowledge.  The
Reason which knows, retains its knowledges. A faculty
of knowledge without this power would scarcely deserve
the name.
Perhaps memory is too identical with the simplest notion we can form of Reason, to be called a function; it is
rather an inseparable characteristic.
RECOLLECTION is more properly a function.  The act
of recollection is based upon memory. Its aim is to bring
a permanent knowledge within the field of consciousness.
The energy of the will in directing and holding the attention, is involved in this act.
131 
PRELIMINARY VIEW OF
Whatever we learn, we learn in certain relations, commonly termed association of ideas. Hence, when our past
perceptions re-appear, they appear in their original relations, or in relations nearly akin to them. Recollection
implies a dim foreshadowing of the knowledge to be recalled in some of these relations; upon this foreshadowing, the cognitive faculty is steadily fixed, until the whole
comes forth in distinct form and fullness.
ATTENTION, which some have set down as an intellectual faculty, is really the energy of the Will exerted over
the Reason in its several functions.
IX. IMAGINATION. Under its first and simplest presentation, this is the function of knowing objects which
have form, or sensible qualities generally, when the actual
sensations no longer exist. Thus in every act of memory,
and-in every conception of the distant, where the objects
were originally known through the senses, the imagination
revives the forms and sensible qualities.
Again, the Imagination appears as a mediatory function between the world of Ideas, and the world of the
Senses. The Imagination forms upon the Ideas, Ideals or
Archetypes, according to which the outward constructions
are fashioned and related.  Even in respect to the Divine
Mind, we cannot but conceive of this function as forecasting and foreseeing the Universe before the creative act
took place. The finite artist and mechanician-man, produces his works in the same way.
This appears in the Fine Arts, where the ideal conceptions of beauty and grandeur constitute the models or
archetypes of the forms which spring up under the chisel,
and upon the canvass, or which speak in poetry.  This appears in the inventions of the useful arts, and in scientific
discovery; for unquestionably, the imagination forms
132 
THE REASON.
archetypes of mechanical construction and scientific systems. The Idea is not always strictly followed, and hence
the Imagination degenerates into a fickle and wayward
Fancy. But, nevertheless, where the Idea does become
productive of scientific and mechanical results, this function must be employed.
Nor is the imagination excluded from the sphere of
moral conceptions. Whenever man in his various relations
and duties becomes the subject of thought, not only is the
Idea of right and wrong the determining power of thought;
but the ideals of character, also, under the different varieties of moral greatness and beauty, present themselves in
the imagination as standards with which to compare the
actual, or archetypes to direct the creations of genius.
The highest form of the imagination is the creative.
Here the pure Idea generates an Ideal, which, surpassing
the beauty of any natural form, inspires the artist to attempt a work of corresponding perfection. Whatever is
created, is created according to the Idea. The Imagination is the creative function of the same faculty-the Reason,-which gives forth the Idea.
The Imagination is thus the representative, the mediatory; and the creative function.
Let none be startled or offended, when it is said, that
man produces more beautiful proportions and forms than
nature. Nature and man are both servants of the Infinite
Mind of Beauty and Wisdom. The first works according
to fixed and necessary laws, without choice or consciousness; the second works according to the same laws, but
with choice and consciousness: the one shadows forth the
Divine attributes as the effect related to the cause; the
other is the very image of the Divine. Why should not
God, therefore, empower the thoughtful hand of man to
133 
PRELIMINARY VIEW OF
bring to light certain forms of beauty, which he has not
committed to the insensate mechanism of nature? Has
not the Idea of the Useful stimulated industry to make
nature more commodious and bountiful? And why may
not the Idea of the Beautiful inspire Art to make nature
more beautiful?
" God has not limited man's knowledge to that which
is; but has enabled him to perceive that which may be;
and when he proceeds to modify God's work, he is not a
trespasser and a violator, but a more noble instrumental
power, by which God gives his creation a higher finish and
a more perfect use." *
FANCY is arbitrary imagination, or imagination not
governed by the pure Ideas of truth and beauty. It presents us, therefore, not Ideals, but humorous and grotesque images, created by intentional violations of esthetical
laws, and incongruous and disproportioned combinations.
Beauty and truth have defined and perfect archetypes,
and therefore in given kinds, a limited variety; but fanciful creations can have no assignable limit, inasmuch
as their very being consists in sporting with all law and
rule. t
X. CoNscIousNEss, is.that function of the Reason by
which it immediately knows phenomena. I
Consciousness has an exterior and an interior direction.
In the former direction, it knows the phenomena of sensation; in the latter, the phenomena of the mental activities beyond sensation. In the exterior and interior consciousness, we have all phenomena whatever, for we have
comprehended here all the possible activities of our being.
If we enquire, Whence do the phenomena of conscious
* Doctrine of the Will, p. 130.
t Ibid, pp. 133, 134.: Vide Part I., Sec. II.
134 
THE REASON.
ness arise? the only rational answer that can be obtained
is, that they arise conjointly from the simple subjective,
and the objective general,-that is, when these form a
unition in knowing, feeling, and willing. There can be no
act of knowing,-that is, no phenomenon of knowing, unless there be both a faculty of knowledge, and an object to
be known, either in the world of pure Reason or of the
Sense, -at least, an object which shall be the foundation
of the cognitions of the knowing faculty: even dreams,
and the wildest imaginings, have some relation to objective
reality. There can be no sensations, unless there be both
a sensitive faculty and real correlative objects; and the
same with respect to emotions and passions. There can
be no volitions unless there be both a will or cause, and
objects and ends of causation.*
From this unition of the subjective and the objectiveunition, but not contact-the phenomenal appears, and is
immediately known by the Reason in its function of consciousness; and then follow all the other functions in their
due place and order.
SELF-KNOWLEDGE, the affirmation Ego surn, I AM, in
antithesis to the objective general-the not myself-is
often represented as a form of consciousness, and thence
called self-consciousness.  This, perhaps, is more justly
comprehended in the intuitive function, since the self is
not phenomenal, and therefore cannot be immediately recognized by consciousness.  It is true, however, that the
antithetical affirmation stated above, is the most primitive
of all affirmations:-in the very unition of the simple
subjective with the objective, by which a first phenomenon
is given, the Reason knows the two terms, and makes the
* Doctrine of the Will, p. 138.
135 
PRELIMINARY VIEW OF
affirmation; and with the consciousness of all subsequent
phenomena, the affirmation is continually renewed. There
is, therefore, a valid ground for representing self-knowledge
as a form of consciousness; and if properly explained and
distinguished, the representation is striking, inasmuch as
it expresses the intimate union of mind with itself when it
awakes to the knowledge of its own being.s~
REFLECTION, is a subsequent form of consciousness.
While the common consciousness is a spontaneous and
necessary recognition of phenomena, and a necessary selfknowledge, reflection is special and voluntary. In reflection, my immediate aim is to know myself; and it generally implies a proposing to one's self some particular
analysis of the mind. In order to affect this analysis, we
first reproduce a state of consciousness, or renew former
experiences by bringing into view the correlative objects
and then, in this state of reproduced consciousness, or renewed experiences, we awaken the reason to acts of close
attention and thought. This state of mind is exceedingly
complex: for the mind must at the same time keep before
it, the correlative objects which are to awaken the required phenomena, and bend itself to the work of examining the phenomena in their subjective relations.   But,
still, let it be remembered that it is complex only as all
thought and investigation are complex. In investigating
the objective world, we do really produce within ourselves
certain experiences or phenomena of consciousness, by
means of the senses, and while these exist, we apply to
them the Reason, in order to determine the forms and
laws of nature.
Spontaneous consciousness embraces our necessary and
* Doctrine of the Will, pp. 1, 2, 3.
136 
THE REASON.
natural experiences of the senses, and the mental acts
which necessarily and naturally arise in connexion with
them.
Reflection, or philosophical consciousness, embraces
the experiences produced intentionally in reference to
some knowledges to be attained of the subjective or the
objective.
137 
PRELIMINARY VIEW OF
SECTION III.
EXPLICATION OF IDEAS.
IN the "Introductory View of Philosophy in General,"
much has been said respecting Ideas, and I cannot but
hope some explication of them given in the natural unfolding of the line of thought there attempted. In bringing up this subject in this place directly, my aim is, if
possible, in a clear and simple way to give an answer to
what has always been regarded and treated as a very difficult question, viz.: What are Ideas? The difficulty
which exists, arises chiefly, I think, from the primordial
and predeterminative character of Ideas. Here all analogies must be exceedingly distant and imperfect, since
Ideas precede every form of cognition.  Thus when it is
said that Ideas are the moulds of the understanding, and
sensations the materials cast in them and taking form, we
have, perhaps, the most striking analogy that can be
found; but, nevertheless, how vague the resemblance between the plastic power of material moulds upon material
substances, and the action of the first elements of thought
in determining cognitions upon phenomenal conditions!
We have spoken of several Ideas incidentally in the
preceding pages, such as Time, Space, Substance, Cause,
Beauty, Right, and Wrong. Now, the Idea of Time is
not Time, the Idea of Space is not Space, the Idea of Substance is not Substance, and so also of the others.  Nor,
138 
THE REASON.
again, are the acts of knowing these Ideas, the Ideas
themselves.   That is, the Ideas are neither the realities
from which they are named, nor the acts in which the
realities are known. Time and space are realities; substance, as essential being, is a reality; cause is a reality;
the distinction between right and wrong is a reality; infinity and spirit are realities. They are, even although I
do not know them.   But how do I know them?   The
mere experience of sensations does not give them. The
Reason knows them by its own force or capacity. The
Reason begins to act only when the sensations are experienced; but it knows not only, by consciousness, the
sensations; it knows, by intuition, these necessary realities
likewise. But what is the force or capacity of the Reason
to know the metaphenomenal truths? We say, the Reason has in its own constitution as the faculty of knowledge,
ideas of time, space, substance, cause, beauty, right and
wrong, and so on; meaning by this, that the faculty of
knowledge is preconstituted to know these objective necessary realities; and that, that within itself which capacitates or adapts it to know each of them, is called the Idea
of this reality.
The word Idea itself contains no mystery or magical
power.  It is a word introduced by one of the greatest
philosophers who ever thought, and using, perhaps, the
most perfect language in which thought was ever expressed. We cannot find a better word for our purpose;
and there is, therefore, no good reason for diverting it from
its original use, or substituting any other in its place.
We have in the preceding Section divided Ideas into
the Metaphysical and the Nomological. The first express
the inherent capacity of the Reason to know the Reality
of Being; the second, its inherent capacity to know the
139 
PRELIMINARY VIEW OF
Reality of Law. Mere phenomena, apprehended by consciousness, do not give either. These phenomena, as we
have seen, arise from objective reality without, and subjective reality within. But what is the relation between the
pure Reason, with its Ideas prepared to know Reality,
and the phenomena known by consciousness which form
the conditions under which the knowledge of Reality begins? Recollect Reality is of two kinds: the Reality of
first and necessary truths and principles, relating both to
being and law; and the Reality of actual being, having
specific constitution and qualities, and reduced under determinate law. Now, under the constitution of humanity,
it is not intended that mind should attain to the Reality
of truths, principles, and laws, separately from the Reality
of actual being. As man is himself reason and sense -
a union of the two Realities above named,-it seems to be
designed that both shall be developed in his cognition,
consentaneously, and at the same time. The first and
second Realities are related to each other in so much as
the first is embodied in the second; and man himself being the type of this union, he knows the two in their
union. When he first awakes to consciousness, sensations
or phenomena of the exterior consciousness first meet him,
because thought in humanity is connected with physical
life, and this life reveals itself in sensation. These sensations arise from the action of exterior causes upon his sensuous organism-the world without thus makes its approach
to the Reason within. Here, then, is the occasion for cognition. If the mind had no cognitive power of its own,a power expressed by the word Ideas,-if it were a mere
passive recipient, then there would be a mere conscious
* Part I., Sec, V.
140 
THE REASON.
ness of sensations, and nothing more: but now these sensations are like telegraphic signals given from the outer
world, and the Reason has within itself the key or alphabet
wherewith to read them.   The Reason  can know  the
world without, because it can know the great truths and
laws-the first form of Reality-which are embodied in
the world without-the second form of Reality. The first
knowledges thus embrace, as we have said, the two forms
of Reality consentaneously.   The second could not be
known at all without the first-it would not be logically
possible. The first would not be known without the
second, because, in the constitution of humanity, mind is
imprisoned in its tabernacle, until the windows of the
senses be opened, and the signals of life and being come
rushing in.
Let me recur in this place to a thought thrown out in
my Introductory View, Section VII. The Great Creator,
before he formed the worlds, must have had the Ideas of
all truth and law, and all forms of being-Hie knew, and
then created. He foreknew all possible being, because he
had the Ideas of all possible being. Man, the finite mind,
knows after creation has taken place, and after he has received in his sensitivity, motions from  that creation; but
that he knows at all, arises from a Reason made in the
likeness of the Divine, and having pre-constituted capacities or Ideas adapted to primordial, universal, and necessary truths-the very truths in which the outer world,
indeed the whole world of created being, " lives, moves,
and has its being."
That man knows himself, is explained in the same
way. He has the Idea of subjective, as well as of objective reality: And as the motions given in his sensitivity
from without, and known by consciousness, give the call
141 
PRELIMINARY VIEW OF
to the Reason furnished with its ideas, to look without;
so the action of the mind itself gives the call to look
within also.
The two forms of Reality, which at first are concrete
and complicated, are afterwards submitted to Reflection,
and by Reflection distinguished.
It may, indeed, require a high effort of thought to
comprehend Ideas; but let this effort be made, and in
the whole range of philosophy there is nothing so clear
and interesting. Ideas are the elements of thought, the
elements of philosophy, because the elements of Reason
itself. A Reason without Ideas is an impossible conception. Ideas are the cardinal psychological explication of
the Reason
142 
THE REASON.
SECTION IV.
EXPLICATION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF THE REASON.
THE Reason, constituted with Ideas, goes into action. Its
great office is to know. But the objects of its knowledge
are not all of the same kind, do not stand in the same relations, nor under the same conditions.   Some of these
objects are truths absolute and necessary; some are phenomena variable and contingent; some are immediately,
while others are mediately perceived; some precede, while
others are gathered from observation; some are actual,
while others are only possible; some are in time present,
others in time past, and others again in time future;
some, in space, are contiguous to the senses, while others
are distant. Hence arises the necessity of considering the
Reason under different functions.   In its constitutive
Ideas, it is not only adapted to every variety of knowledge; it has, also, the power of searching out its objects
under every variety of condition and relation.   It can
know phenomena and truths, and the relations between
them; it can know immediately and mediately; it can
know in various relations of time and space; it can form
pure cognitions, and cognitions upon sensuous conditions;
it can go out to the actual, and conceive of the possible.
It has all these different functions. Its functions manifestly express the variety and scope of its activity.
143 
PRELIMINARY VIEW OF
SECTION V.
DOES LOGIC COMPREHEND ALL THE FUNCTIONS OF
THE REASON?
LoGIc has been defined in the general as comprising the
laws which determine and govern the activities of the Reason.*' Unless this definition receive limitations, Logic
evidently must reach to every function.  Limitations, however, exist, and the reason for them is palpable.
In one respect Logic, plainly, has general relations,
viz.: in so far as it determines the most original laws of
thought and cognition. t
But when we enter the domain of particular functions,
we find much that legitimately comes under other divisions
of philosophy.
Logic comprises those laws of the Reason which determine the processes by which it reaches the two forms of
Reality-the Reality of Truth and of Actual Being. This
is its separate, unique, and peculiar domain.
But memory does not describe a process by which new
truths are arrived at; it expresses simply the power of the
cognitive faculty to retain old truths, or truths already
gained. Hence it cannot belong to Logic. Recollection
is memory permeated by the will, imagination, and fancy.
It evidently can belong to Logic no more than simple
memory. It sometimes even becomes a mere art.
* Page 83.
144
t Page 84. 
THE REASON.
Imagination also gives origin neither to ideas, and
truths, nor to facts of reality. It is a mediatory, representative, and  creative function;  forming ideals upon
ideas, reviving the images of objects when the objects no
longer address the sense, and combining forms of unreal
beauty. Neither, therefore, does Logic comprise the laws
of this function.
It would, indeed, be possible to give Logic a designation so general as to make it embrace all the functions.
In this case Esthetics would cease as a separate branch of
Nomology. But the distinction between Logic, as limited
above, and Esthetics, is clear, natural, and convenient.
They both, indeed, relate to forms of knowing; but the
one determines the laws of knowing the real; while the
other determines the laws of mere imitation of the real,
and of knowing and projecting the possible.
Imagination, therefore, must be assigned to the nomological determinations of Esthetics.
Memory, considered as an inherent property of the
Reason, belongs to psychology simply. The whole doctrine
of the association of Ideas, which figures so largely in
treating of this function, amounts to this:-Whatever is
known, is known, not in an isolated way, but in various
relations; these relations themselves making up a part of
the objective reality. When, therefore, past perceptions
are renewed in the consciousness, whether they be objects
of the sense or pure truths, they must of necessity appear
in their appropriate relations.   Relations and parts of
thought are often presented accidentally, or suggested by
images of the imagination and fancy; and when so presented, they are, of course, apprehended by the cognitive
faculty, and the whole train of thought carried through,
or dismissed in its unfinished state, at pleasure.
7
145 
PRELIMINARY VIEW OF
Recollection, as a voluntary process, is, indeed, based
upon the memory. When, however, its object is pure
truth, there is often in reality a renewal of the process of
investigation or ratiocination, by which it was originally
arrived at. In this case, it is difficult to determine how
far the recollection arises from memory, or from the pure
reasoning power. There is a passage in Dugald Stewart,
which illustrates this remark. " Sir Isaac Newton, as we
are told by Dr. Pemberton, was often at a loss, when the
conversation turned on his own discoveries. It is probable
that they made but a slight impression on his mind, and
that a consciousness of his inventive powers prevented him
from taking much pains to treasure them up in his
memory."
In Newton's mind the original proofs were renewed
with little aid from memory.   And Stewart farther remarks, that generally, while men of little inventive power
trust to memory for the recollection of truths, men distinguished for this power are prone to rely upon it. What,
therefore, often appears to others as memory, is in reality
reasoning, and consequently comes under the laws of Logic.
The other functions, for the most part, come under the
determinations of Logic, inasmuch as they contain processes by which the two forms of Reality are attained.
It is not necessary, however, to give Logic the multifarious divisions of these functions. The functions often
co-work together; and there are a few general conceptions
of the ends of Logic which happily embrace them all.
Logic comprises the laws which determine the processes
of arriving at Reality-the Reality of Truth and of Actual
Being.
First, therefore, we must consider the laws of the most
146 
THE REASON.
original cognitions, both through pure intuition, and
through sensuous phenomena.
Secondly. The laws which govern the observation and
classification of secondary phenomena; and that inductive
process by which general principles are obtained.
Thirdly. The laws of deduction, or inference.
Fourthly. The laws of evidence, and the method of
proof.
This is the outline which, in the next Part, we shall
attempt to fill up.
147  
PART  III.
LOGIC PROPER.  
BOOK I.
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
SECTION I.
GENERAL LAWS OF THE EVOLUTION OF IDEAS.
IN the prolegomena comprised in the two preceding Parts,
many things were necessarily anticipated in an incidental
way. As, however, they were merely preparatory to my
main purpose, I may not mar the development contemplated in this Part, through an apprehension of appearing
sometimes to repeat what had already been announced.
Wherever this does happen, it will be found that a more
formal and scientific announcement is attempted.
On the subject of Ideas, also, it is somewhat difficult
to mark with precision what strictly belongs to Psychology,
and what to Logic. Ideas, regarded as the determining
powers of cognition, do certainly belong to the first; and
I have so endeavoured to treat of them in the explication
given in the preceding Part.  In this Part, besides giving
the general laws of their determination, I shall weave in
much respecting the mode and conditiontof their development, together with their characteristics, which may appear more justly to belong  to psychological disquisition 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
At one time, I had well nigh concluded to bring this all
into the'Preliminary View'; but farther reflection has
induced me to believe that I shall make a more simple
and satisfactory presentation of the subject, and, on the
whole, more philosophic, by comprising all these particulars
under Primordial Logic. Lest any should object to this
course, I thought it best to say thus much to shew that
the same thoughts had occurred to my own mind, and
that the difficulties had not been passed over without
consideration.
I. Humanity being the union of body and  spirit,the life of thought, and the physical life of the full-formed
and constituted being, in the present sphere, begin, go on,
and end together. Hence, even before birth, as Locke
affirms,* there may be incipient thought, because, there
is incipient sensation.
But although thought begins with sensation, sensation
is not the determinative power of thought. This power
lies in the Ideas of the Reason.
II. The first action of the Reason is spontaneous, and
unattended by reflection. Mind in humanity being finite
and dependent, hath not its starting point in itself. The
main-spring is energised by an invisible and infinite power.
But when it has reached a certain development, different
in different individuals, reflection begins, and it now
traces back the path through which it has run its course.
III. By reflection, it analyses the knowledges actually
attained, together with the simple sensations. By this
analysis it does not find the determining powers and forms,
nor even all the materials of thought in sensation: but it
finds certain conceptions which, when separated from the
* Book II., ch. 9, ~ 5. 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
sensations, are intuitively apprehended as universal, necessary, and absolute.
IV. These conceptions must have been given in the
dawn of cognition, as well as during the whole line of cognition, since cognition is impossible without them; and
yet they were not given before sensation, because, in the
first place, as above stated, the life of thought, and physical life showing itself in sensation, begin together; and in
the second place, the sensations are signals from the outward world of reality, that the time and occasion of thought
have arrived, and that the field of thought stands invitingly open.
V. Hence arises the distinction of antecedence in time,
and in necessary existence, or chronological and logical
antecedence.-:   The  sensations are first in time;  but
these absolute cognitions are first in necessary existence.
But although we speak of an antecedence in time as something that we can conceive of; it is so slight, that consciousness cannot appreciate it, for no sooner does the
sensation appear, than the absolute element is mingled
with it.
VI. The first cognitions, or judgments, which take
their expression in propositions, are not to be confounded
with Ideas. The Ideas are the determinative power of
cognition, which exists independently of all cognition.
When the phenomenal conditions of thought are supplied,
then the Ideas manifest themselves through the different
functions. They manifest themselves through consciousness in the cognition of subject and object; through the
imagination in the cognition of ideals; through sensuous
perception in the cognition of exterior substances, causes,
* Part L, Sec. IX.
7*
153 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
and laws.  That is, the Ideas determine to particular cognitions of an objective reality, to which the universal is
related-and in this way determine to the cognition of
the universal itself. For example, sensations of resistance,
of colour, and form, are given; upon this, the ideas of
substance, cause, and space, determine to the cognition of
a particular body, with its primary and secondary qualities;
and in determining to this particular cognition by the
function of sensuous perception, they determine at the
same time by the function of intuition, to the universal
and necessary cognitions of space, substance, and cause,
as comprised within the first and highest form of reality.
VII. In the evolution of the Ideas we have thus four
particulars: First, the phenomena of consciousness, as
conditions in time, and effects of objective reality thrown
within the sphere of the subjective simple; Secondly, the
cognition of particular objective realities; Thirdly, the
absolute and universal cognitions of the intuitive function
determined by the Ideas; and, Fourthly, the Ideas themselves. The Ideas are first of all in the antecedence of
necessary existence. The cognition of the universal in
like manner is the antecedent of the cognition of the particlar.   But in the antecedence of time  the reverse
order takes place. Reflection, analysing our actual cognitions first, separates the metaphenomenal from the
phenomenal in the particular; Secondly, it separates the
universal from the particular; and Thirdly, it evolves the
Ideas as the necessary grounds and antecedents in the
Reason itself, of every form of cognition.
154 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
SECTION II.
METAPHYSICAL IDEAS.
I.-SUBJECT, AND OBJECTIVE EXTERIORITY.
THE phenomena of the exterior and the interior consciousness are the antecedents in time. Among the phenomena
of the interior consciousness there is one class which have
the remarkable characteristics of self-determination and
freedom, showing themselves in the acts of attention, or
acts appropriating the cognitive faculty. All the phenomena of the interior consciousness appear, therefore,
either directly,-as in simple volitions,-or indirectly, as
in cognitions directed by volition, with these remarkable
characteristics.
On the other hand, the phenomena of the exterior
consciousness manifest themselves independently of this
inward, self-determining activity. They appear in me, but
are in no sense produced by me. Upon these phenomena,
the Reason is determined by the Ideas of Subject and
Object to cognize the particular subject myself, and an
exterior something not myself. From this particular cognition, as the initiative it cognizes the universal distinction of the interior subject and the exterior object.
Reflection now analysing the mental process, it becomes
evident that the Ideas of Subject and Object must have
had an antecedent necessary existence, or the several cog
155 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
nitions could not have appeared; since the bare phenomena,
whether of the interior or exterior consciousness, present
us, in themselves, not realities, but appearances only, as
the name intimates. The two classes of phenomena
mentioned above, with their different characteristics, are
the conditions on which the cognitions take place, but the
Idea can alone be the power which determines the form
of the cognition.
II.-TIME AND SPACE.
That part of our knowledge which is obtained through,
or by means of the senses and muscular resistance, is connected with the Ideas of TIME and SPACE. All the phenomena of body are given in space. All succession of
phenomena is given in time. It is impossible for us to
conceive of body without space. It is impossible for us to
conceive of succession without time. In order, therefore,
to know body, I must have the idea of space: and in
order to know succession, I must have the idea of time.
The ideas of time and space are simple and primary;
they can be resolved into nothing antecedent-they are
directly intelligible; they neither require, nor can receive
any definition.  Their characteristics are obvious.  They
are necessary, that is, they cannot be supposed not to be,
or not to have been; they are infinite; and they admit
of no representation that can be addressed to the senses.
It is impossible that they should have their origin in
sensation. Neither the secondary nor the primary qualities of bodies bear any resemblance to them. This book
which I hold in my hand, and the hand itself, are in
space; but clearly they are not space. Form and solidity
156 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
must be connected with space, and cannot be thought of
without space, but they have nothing in common with
space, and nothing analogous to space. Body, conceived
of under any modifications, and under any enlargement,
is still tin space, and totally distinct from space. The
characteristics of body are contingency, formn, and limitation-the very opposite of those of space.
Time, if representable at all under forms addressed to
the senses, must be representable by a succession of phenomena or events. But here we find the same opposition
of cardinal characteristics. Time, taken as simple duration-the sense in which I here employ it, is necessary,
without form, and unlimited-as simple duration it is
eternity. Any succession that may be given is contingent
-that is, it may be supposed not to be, or not to have
been; it is limited-it must have had a beginning, and
may have an assigned termination; and lastly, it may be
represented in space, by the revolutions of the planets and
a dial-plate. Succession must be in time, but is plainly
totally distinct from time.
As the cognitions of time and space cannot have their
origin in sensation, their origin must be assigned to the
pure Reason itself.
How do these cognitions arise in the Reason?  Are they
innate? The just reply is, that the Reason has no innate
or inherent power of forming or developing those ideas,
when the proper conditions are supplied. The conception,
or act of intelligence, cannot be said to exist before it appears in the consciousness.  But the Reason, undoubtedly,
in the potentiality of its substance, contains these ideas
as constitutive forms of thought: and with these forms is
prepared to give out true knowledges or judgments, whenever the sensations shall be supplied which form the occa
157 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
sions of its action. Sensations and muscular resistance
are conditional to the development of these ideas; but
the pure Reason is the origin of them.
Hence we affirm, that time and space are to be set
down as original and inherent forms of the Reason;meaning by this, that it is of the essential and necessary
nature of the Reason, to think and form cognitions under
these ideas; so that whenever certain conditions and occasions come up, the Reason moulds, as it were, into an
exact knowledge, the sensations which otherwise were
fleeting. If we were to suppose the Reason incapable of
developing the ideas of time and space, what would become of all our notions of the forms, magnitudes, motions,
and velocities of bodies?  What would become of the
notion of body itself? Time and space seem two very
simple ideas-and so they are: but how vast and momentous their relations and bearings!
When, however, we represent these ideas as inherent
forms of the Reason, we do not mean to affirm that time
and space have no existence independently of the Reason:
this would be contradictory to the Reason itself; for in
the development of these ideas, the Reason assigns time
and space an independent existence. Time and space
are necessary, absolute, and infinite, and are conceived of
as existing, although theie were no mind to recognize
them, and to contain their ideas as forms of its thinking
and knowing. Time and space are independent realities,
which do not impress themselves upon the Reason through
the sense; but the ideas of which, Reason potentially
contains within itself as the knowing power, and brings
out into consciousness, whenever sensations or any p)henomena appear there, whose causes hold to them an actual
relation.
158 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
III. —TIHE INFINITE AND THE FINITE.
The very judgment which the mind passes upon any
object of thought,-it is finite,-implies a conception of
the infinite: for how could it affirm,-it isfinite,-unless
it knew the infinite? If it be said that the finite is a
positive idea, and the infinite only negative of it; with
equal propriety, to say the least, we may call the infinite
the positive, and the finite the negative idea.
Does not the mind have a distinct and positive cognition when it affirms of any thing, it is infinite? Take
space for example: when the mind affirms that space is
infinite, does it not mean something more than that its
limits cannot be assigned? Truly we say, space can have
no limits,-it is necessarily and absolutely infinite.
When we can assign certain limits to an object, we
say simply it is finite; when we conceive that there must
be limits, while still we are unable to assign them, we call
it the indefinite; but when no limit is conceivable or admissible, we say, it is infinite.
Plainly, no phenomena, whether primary or secondary,
present us the infinite; it can be a cognition of pure
Reason alone. Phenomena, indeed, are the conditions,
but nothing more, since no multiplication of the finite can
realize the infinite. Now, when through reflection we
come to account for this judgment of the mind, we are
inevitably led to assign the Idea of the Infinite, in the
Reason: as the determinative power and only sufficient
ground.
IV.-QUANTITY.
Our knowledges are connected, also, with the idea of
QUANTITY. Quantity comprehends UNITY, MULTIPLICITY,
and TOTALITY, or, ONE, MANY, and ALL.
159 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
Unity is the foundation of every form of quantity.
Many is unity repeated indefinitely.  All is the total sum
of unities.
What is the idea of unity? Absolute unity is absolute
indivisibility.
In nature, there is no absolute unity in the sense of
absolute indivisibility-matter is continuously divisible.
In numbers, there is no absolute unity in this sense;every assumed unit is continuously divisible. But in matter, any body, any mass, or any organized system, may be
taken as a unity relatively to any supposed or real multiplication of such body, mass, or system: and in nambers,
any sum may be taken as unity relatively to any larger
sum of which it is a fractional part. Here, every unity
is made up of parts, and is itself but a part of some other
unity.  In matter, and in numbers, we have only parts
and wholes; and no absolute unity. In geometry, we
have the indivisible point, but this is not really quantity,
but the negation of a particular kind of quantity-that
is, extension.  It is where extension begins.:.'  A  line is,
indeed, often represented as composed of an infinite number of points; but the point in this case is really a degree
of extension indefinitely and immeasurably small; and
not a point which has neither length, breadth, nor thickness. A negation of all extension cannot be multiplied
so as to compose a line.
Infinite number is a contradictory idea; for number
precludes the idea of infinity, as well as the idea of absolute unity. Number may be continuously increased and
diminished: but it can never reach the infinite.
When infinity and unity are united in the same idea,
* Part I., page 78.
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we have absolute totality. Thus time ana space have
unity, in that they are incapable of division into integral
parts, or parts going to make them up: They are likewise infinite, and therefore are absolute totalities. God
is the One, and Infinite being, and therefore an absolute
totality.
There are successions in time, but they are not time.
There are bodies in space, but they are not space.
Figures having extension may be imagined as drawn in
space, but they are no integral portions of space, for space
cannot be divided into any number of such figures as shall
measure the whole of space. An indefinite variety and
number of beings may be comprehended within the being
of God as their cause; but they are not God, nor a part
of God: any possible multiplication of finite beings would
not make up infinite being.
Pantheism is contradicted by our very senses, in connection with our Reason; for this which we see, we can
divide, and multiply, and measure; and, therefore, if it
were a part of God, God would be capable of division,
multiplication, and measurement.
In our own minds we have absolute unity again. But
we have here only finite unity.  Consequently, we have
not absolute totality. There can be but one absolute
totality of being, that is, God. But what is this finite
unity which I affirm of myself- and how do I know it?
I am one in the idea which I cannot but have of my
spritual substance, and its inherent and inseparable attributes. In my consciousness I find that I think, I feel, I
choose, and I will.
In the first place, it is plain that this I, or myself, is
not capable of physical division-it cannot be distributed
into parts separated in space. Again: it cannot be logically
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
divided, that is, distributed into genera and species. It
is possible that its phenomena may admit of such a distribution; but the spiritual substance itself cannot be conceived of under any such distribution.
Neither can mind be numerically divided. It cannot
be identified with any abstract number; and since it cannot be resolved into physical parts, nor into mere extension, it cannot be represented by the relations and conditions of abstract numbers. Numerical multiplication and
division do not apply to it.
We may, indeed, have a numerical multplicity of
minds, and a numerical totality of minds; but this has no
bearing upon the question of the substance of the mind
itself.
A metaphysical division is equally out of the question,
for-such a division is, in itself, impossible. A metaphysical
division would imply either a division of the spiritual substance itself, or a division of the attributes from the substance: but'the first would reduce the mind to the conditions of body, and remove it from metaphysical consideration; and the last is metaphysically impossible, for
substance and attribute mutually and necessarily imply
each other, and cannot be. conceived of as divided.
It is to be remarked here, that time and space, and
God, being totalities, as well as unities, do not admit of
the idea of multiplicity. It is, therefore, only in ourselves
that we gain the idea of perfect unity, and yet admitting,
also, the idea of multiplicity, and of totality without
absoluteness.
Absolute unity, and multiplicity and totality based
upon it, and absolute totality, plainly, cannot be gained
from the senses. These give the continuously divisible
and multiplicabie.
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
Upon the experience of my own personality, in my
thinking, feeling, and doing, I affirm that I am one, that
I am neither a sum of parts which are separable units,
nor is it possible for me to become a sum of parts. A
collection of beings like myself will constitute multiplicity;
a complete collection will constitute totality: and upon
this judgment respecting myself, arises the judgment of
an absolute unity and totality A ONE AND ALL.
The origin of the cognition of absolute unity and
totality must, therefore, unquestionably be referred to the
pure Reason, as constituted with the determinative Idea.
But what is the origin of that unity which appears in
one and many of a kind, where the particular representing unity is itself divisible; and of that unity which appears in abstract numbers?
The relative and the limited must have its origin in
the absolute and unconditional. It is impossible that the
latter should have its origin in the former.
But by the senses, in the order of time, the relative
and limited are first given: and thus divisible and limited
unity, in material objects, is first given. But were the
mind unfurnished with the idea, or the potentiality of
the absolute conception, of unity, the impressions of the
senses could not lead even to the limited cognition: and
thus the absolute idea becomes the logical antecedent of
the limited cognition. This is a general exposition; the
following is the particular: Through the impressions received by the senses, I awake to the conciousness of my
existence-these impressions are the conditions and antecedents in time, of knowing, willing, and feeling. In knowing myself, I have the knowledge of a particular, finite,
but absolute unity-and this idea of unity, realized in myelf, is the immediate logical antecedent of the limited, im
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perfect and relative, numerical and physical unity. But,
on the other hand, the logical antecedent of the idea of
the particular unity, myself, is the absolute and infinite
unity, the ONE AND ALL.
Now, when we affirm that the idea of Quantity is a
form of the Reason, we mean that the finite Reason is so
constituted, that when it comes to know itself, it knows
itself as an absolute and finite unity, because it has the
power of conceiving of an absolute and infinite unity; it is
prepared to judge of itself as a unity and finite, in the 1potentiality of judging of a unity infinite as well as absolute.
The infinite comprehends the finite; the finite cannot be
augmented to the infinite. And so, likewise, when the
phenomena of sense are given, it is prepared, in this antecedent conception of unity, to form cognitions of material
and numerical unity. The material unity is concrete; the
numerical unity is abstract.
The conception of the divisibility of material unity
arises upon the experience that that which is assumed as
a unity, because standing alone in space, is separable into
parts, each standing alone in space; and as the assumed
material unity occupies and measures a portion of space;
and as the space occupied, taken as simple extension, is
capable of constant division in an endless approximation
towards the point absolute, so, likewise, the material unity
is conceived of under the same conditions. Continuous
divisibility is a struggling of the intellect after absolute
unity: and continuous multiplication is a struggling after
absolute totality. Numerical division and multiplication
bear to the material the relation of the abstract to the concrete.
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
V.-QUALITY.
Our intelligential activity developes also the idea of
QUALITY. The quality of propositions is the affirmation
or negation contained in them:-the nature or kind, that
is, the quality, of a given proposition, is, that it affirms or
denies the predicate of the subject.  But a proposition
only expresses or represents a judgment: and hence,
quality belongs to the judgment itself. Now, all judgments must be either simple or comparative. A simple
judgment is the mere affirmation or denial of the existence
of an object; a comparative judgment is the affirmation
or denial of agreement, relation, or connexion, between
two simple judgments; the one being the subject, and
the other the predicate. Comparative judgments do thus
evidently depend upon simple judgments: the simple are
primitive, or the first outgoings of the Intelligence; the
comparative are secondary and dependent. In the simple,
primitive judgment, the decision of the mind respects the
reality or the negation of the object of thought; and so in
the secondary judgment, the reality or negation of the
agreement of the two objects of thought compared. It
will thus follow, that under QUALITY, as the general category, are embraced the particular categories of Reality and
Negation. In addition to these, a third particular category must arise, which is in some sort a combination of
the two, and that is Limitation. Every reality of the
sensible world has its limitations. It is a reality, but
only within a certain limit, and at this limit, negation
takes the place of reality. It is plain, that without negation, this limit could not be conceived, as, without reality, it could not be demanded.
Now, let it be remembered, that the reality conceived
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
of by the intelligence is not the mere reality of the phenomena of consciousness, by which the world without, as
well as my own actual existence, are given;-It is the
reality of objects lying beyond the phenomena, and existing independently of them. If the intelligence were a mere
blank before sensation began; and if its whole capacity
and office were described as a mere receptivity of sensations; then there never could be in the intelligence any
thought of objective reality. Sensations are purely subjective affections: external causality and substance are
not contained in them; the reality of any being or thing is
not contained in them; not even is the reality of subjective
existence contained in them; for the mere sensations do not
contain the subject;-the sensations of seeing, hearing,
and smelling, for example, no more contain the I, or myself,
than they contain any external object: and even the
sense of resistance, as it is but an internal experience,
does not contain either subjective or objective reality.
It is true, that without sensations, the thought of reality would not arise in the consciousness, as, indeed, no
thought  whatever would  arise-no  knowledge-no experience. The sensations are conditional to the judgment
of reality. But, then whence comes the judgment of reality, whether objective or subjective? There is but one
answer that can be given. It is an a  priori judgment of
the Reason, or a judgment determined by an Idea.
Now, when we speak of Quality as an Idea of the Reason, we mean that the Reason is so constituted, that when
sensations are given, it on its part gives out the judgments
of reality, negation, and limitation-it does not, analytically, draw them out from the sensations, but, synthetically, affirms them upon the sensations. The judgment
of reality is its own, added to the experience of sensations.
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The mind is a receptivity of the sensations on-y; its own
inherent form of thought affirms the existence of a real
subject and a real object.
The judgment of reality appears first, chronologically,
in the particular and limited subject and object; but the
Reason, as the faculty of the universal, extends the judgment to universality, and affirms that all sensations must
be connected with subject and object-nay, that all phenomena of consciousness whatever must be thus connected.
The judgment of reality extends to all our thinking, feeling, and volition.
Again: the Reason, as the faculty of the absolute,
upon the particular and limited reality, conceives of the
absolute and unlimited reality, or the infinite.
VI. —RELATION.
RELATION is another category under which our knowledges appear. If relation were nothing more than juxtaposition, it would still follow that a' priori judgments
would be necessary, in order thus to comprehend objects;
-for time and space, which are a priori judgments, would
be necessary.  But relation is not mere juxtaposition.
Juxtaposition in space and time is, indeed, all the relation
which experience of the senses affords-immediate contiguity of objects, and immediate contiguity of changes,
forming succession. But when we reflect upon the objects
of knowledge, we conceive of them as having interior relations, which are not representable under the forms of
time and space.  These relations are three:
I. SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENTS, OR PROPERTIES. 2.
CAUSE AND EFFECT. 3. ACTION AND REACTION, OR REIIPROCITY BETWEEN THE AGENT AND THE PATIENT.
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
I. External objects are related to the human sensitivity in the production or development of sensations; and
are related to each other in the production or development of changes in form, appearance, and properties; all
these last being judged of again through the new sensations produced. The subject, also, is related to the consciousness in the development of many internal phenomena
within its field of view-as the phenomena of thinking,
feeling, and willing; besides those phenomena which are
marked as changes in external objects from thc agency of
the subject, such as the muscular movements, and their
extended sequents. Now, while nothing is immediately
presented to the consciousness but the juxtaposition of
the phenomena, there is an a priori synthetical judgment respecting the interior relation; and the object and
the subject, in respect of the changes connected with them,
are affirmed to be Substance and Cause. Thus the external objects, in their connexion with the human sensitivity, develope sensations which are commonly known as
the result of properties in these subjects; form and solidity receiving the designation of primary properties, because, without them, the objects cannot be conceived; and
heat and cold, sweetness. and sourness, fragrance, and so
on, receiving the designation of secondary properties, because, without these, the objects can be conceived, namely,
by means of the primary properties alone.
Substance and property are thus necessary to the conception of the objects, and mutually imply each other.
So, also, with respect to the subject and its thoughts,
volitions, and emotions-we cannot avoid taking the subject as substance, and as such developing its properties.
It is unquestionable, on the one hand, that unless the
bare phenomena of consciousness were given, the idea of
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substance and property could not make its appearance;
but, then, on the other hand, it is e qually unquestionable,
that this idea is not obtained by analysis of the pheno niena-sensations, emotions, thoughts, volitions. These
do not contain substance; but here, again, the synthetic
judgment, a' priori of the Reason, affirms the relation.
II. CAUSE cannot be developed from bare phenomena.
Phenomena are not cause, nor do they contain cause; but
the Reason demainads to account for their existence; and
in doing. this, gives again a synthetic a' priori judgment.
Those phenomena which connect themselves directly
with the properties of substance, as well as those which
are the immediate sequents of causality, must be referred
to cause; because all finite substance must be referred to
cause-cause absolute and infinite.   It is impossible,
therefore, to exercise thought without the judgment of
the relation of cause and effect.
The Idea of cause could not be developed, except upon
condition of phenomena. The phenomena form the antecedents in time.  But neither could the phenomena lead
to knowledges unless the Reason, in its own inherent capacity, contained the Idea of Cause as the idea of originating power.
The idea of causality is first given specifically in the
affirmation of the causality of the Will in every individual:
and then generalized by the Reason, as the faculty of the
Universal, into the axiom which connects cause with every
phenomenon whatever, past, present, or to come.
But the individual will, as a finite cause, presupposes
an infinite: I could not say of myself, I am a cause and
finite, unless I had already the idea of cause, and of cause
infinite. The antecedent condition, in the order of time,
being supplied, the true logical order of the development
8,.
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
must, therefore, be as follows: The Reason contains the
Idea of Cause, and, as the faculty of the absolute and the
infinite, forms the pure a priori cognition of an absolute
and infinite cause; and this is the basis on which I affirm of myself, I am cause finite; and the basis on which
I make any affirmation of causality whatever. As there
is infinite and absolute cause, so, likewise, there must be
infinite and absolute substance. Cause and substance are
inseparable.
III. The third particular is that of action and reaction,
or the reciprocity existing between two substances with respect to any change which takes place in one or both, from
their correlation. Thus, when one body impinges upon
another, as when a ball is thrown against a wall and rebounds, there is, plainly, an action of the ball upon the
wall, and a reaction of the wall upon the ball; and it is
in consequence of this reciprocity that the effect takes
place. When fire is applied to a combustible substance,
there is both an action of the fire upon the substance, and
a reciprocal action of the elementary particles of the substance, as they enter into new combinations and increase
the action of the fire, until its visible manifestations cease
in the entire consumption. In all chemical changes and
combinations, this reciprocity is exhibited. In the correlation of the human sensitivity with external objects, it
appears again. Indeed, in all the developments of substance and property, and of cause and effect, this reciprocity comes into view.
The conception of this relation is, that in the system
of reality and being, substances and properties conditionate the development of substances and properties; and
causes and effects conditionate the action of causes and ef
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PRIM3ORDIAL LOGIC.
fects; and causes and substances mutually conditionate
each other.
This relation obviously depends upon the ideas of substance and cause. But if substance and cause are synthetic and a'priori, then this relation must have an a priori
ground.
The relation, indeed, could never be known, without
the chronological antecedence of phenomena; but as the
phenomena do not contain the ideas of substance and
cause-as these last cannot be analytically evolved-so,
likewise, the phenomena cannot contain, and there cannot
be analytically evolved from them, this judgment of a mutual conditionating.
If we confine ourselves to bare observation, we not
only fall short of the idea of cause, and rest in mere succession unaccounted for; we also substitute the conditions
of the development of substance, and of the activity of
cause, for the ideas themselves. But when we admit the
synthetic a' priori judgments of the Reason to have their
place, then the distinction between the relation of mere conditions, is distinguished clearly from the relation of substances and causes to their developments and effects.
Finite substances and causes conditionate each other
the condition is not the substance nor the cause, and yet
the substance cannot reveal its properties, nor the cause
its effects, without the chronological antecedence of the
condition. Motives are not the causes of volitions, and
yet the Will cannot act without motives. Sensations are
not the causes of cognitions, and yet the Reason cannot
form cognitions without sensations, either in immediate or
remote antecedence. The wall or the pavement is not the
cause of the rebounding of the ball, but the rebounding
could not take place without it, or some similar condition.
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
But the distinctive idea of condition, given in respect
of the finite, although a logical antecedent of our particular cognitions, must itself have an absolute ground. The
relation of cause and effect, has its ultimate ground in
cause infinite and absolute: and the relation of substance
and property has its ultimate ground in substance infinite
and absolute. In like manner, the relation of reciprocal
action must have its ultimate ground in an infinite and
absolute concurrence. The movements of finite mind, and
the movements of nature, cannot at once be resolved into
movements of the infinite and the absolute, without  creating a system of Pantheism.   But all these movements
must be conditionated by the infinite and absolute-the
infinite and the absolute must concur with them. In this
way it holds true, that "in God we live, and move, and
have our being."
It appears, then, that RELATION, in its three-fold form,
is an Idea of the Reason.
From the sensations it cannot be educed; but the Reason, upon its own inherent fullness and capacity, forms
cognitions from the sensations, in the relations of substance
and property, cause and effect, action and reaction.  It
comprehends, evolves, and. employs the idea of relation,
when the appropriate phenomena require it.
VII.-MODALITY.
Modality contains,
POSSIBILITY AND IMPOSSIBILITY;
EXISTENCE AND NON-EXISTENCE;
NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCE.
Every thing which the mind conceives of, is conceived
of as possible or impossible; as existent, or non-existent;
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
as necessary or contingent. Mode has respect to causality
and substance. The enquiry of the mind is, whether a
given conception can be realized, or whether it is impossible to causality: whether it is actually existent, or not
whether it appears of necessity, or contingently? The
answer to this enquiry gives us the mode or manner of
the conception.
No one will deny that we can think of that which we
know to be impossible, as well as of the possible: that we
can think of that which does not exist, as well as of that
which does exist: that we can think of that which exists
necessarily, or of that which exists contingently.
But how do we come to think of the possible, contrasted with the impossible-the existent, contrasted with the
non-existent-the necessary, contrasted with the contingent?  Can these ideas be analytically derived from the
sensations, or are they synthetic, a' priori judgments of
the pure Reason?
I. The Possible and the Impossible.
Our sensations are simple, actual phenomena; they
are nothing more. Whether any thing beyond, or different from these sensations can exist, is a question which
the mind starts, and thus shows that it has an idea of the
possible; but this idea is not a sensation, nor can it be
comprehended within a sensation; it is something which
supervenes from the mind itself upon the sensations.
The idea of the possible cannot but imply its opposite,
the impossible; as the latter cannot but imply the former.
The idea of the possible and impossible shows the mind
leaping beyond the bounds of actual experience: so far
from being confined to the bare sensations, it is not even
confined to the cognitions of the actual, formed upon the
sensations; but multiplies forms of being in time and
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
space indefinitely, both of the possible, that is, such as in
accordance with rational laws might exist; and of the impossible, or such as imply a violation of all law, and therefore cannot be supposed to exist. It affirms, also, the inherent impossibility of certain conceptions, e. g., that 4+
5-=12.
II. Existence and Non-existence.
That we think of non-existence, as well as of existence,
is undeniable. And that we form conceptions of objects
under the mode of non-existence, as well as under that of
existence, is equally undeniable. A point which has neither length, breadth, nor thickness;  a line which has
length, but no breadth nor thickness; a cube which is
formed of six planes united at right angles, but without
solidity, and bodiless; the properties of a geometrical
arch without a possible realization in any material arch;
the conception of a shadow; the conception of empty
space; combinations of the imagination in endless diversity;  the conception of creation out of nothing;  and
again, the possible annihilation of creation-all these, and
the like conceptions, imply the opposition of existence and
non-existence, as a mode of thought.
But it is quite obvious'that non-existence could never
be contained in any mere sensation. As our sensations do
not directly give us reality, neither do they give us nonexistence. Here, again, we must refer to the pure Reason, which, from the fullness of its own ideas, gives out
cognitions and supplies the forms of knowledge.
III. Necessity and Contingence.
Two conceptions mutually imply each other, when the
one cannot be thought of or defined without the other.
It is thus with possibility and impossibility; with existence and non-existence; and again, with necessity and
contingency.
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
That these conceptions are in the mind is plain, because we are now speaking of them. That we are continually applying them is equally plain. There cannot
be more than one straight line drawn between any two
points-there cannot be-that is, it is impossible.  But
how impossible? Is it impossible, because there is no
power or skill adequate to draw more than one line?  No,
it is impossible in itself-it cannot be conceived of under
any conditions-it is necessarily impossible.
Again: we conceive of existence absolute and necessary, namely, the existence of God. God cannot be supposed not to exist, for if he did not exist, there would be
no existence whatever. We have thus necessary truth
and necessary being.
There are also necessary relations. The relation between the substance of any being and the attributes which
go to make up our conception of that being, is necessary.
The relation between Infinite Cause and the effects which
it wills, is necessary. So, likewise, the relation between
a finite cause determining itself to effects, and the effects
determined, is necessary when these are both in its constituted energy.
Necessity is absolute, when  there is no conceivable
condition. It is relative, when there is a conceivable condition. The being of God is absolutely necessary. Pure
mathematical truths are absolutely necessary.  The movements of the planets are relatively necessary; because
they continue to move upon condition that the system of
nature remains unchanged: but it is conceivable that it
may be changed.
The opposite idea of contingency is clearly applicable
likewise. That which is, but which may be conceived of
both as not having been, and as having begun to be, un
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
der the possibility that it might not be, is a contingent
existence. Hence, whatever is created, is contingent existence. Hence, also, all volitions are contingent.
The distinction between natural and moral necessity,
which has been frequently attempted, is absurd. Necessity is a simple idea, and entirely independent of the distinction between the natural and the moral. Besides, the
distinction between the natural and the moral cannot be
made out without implying the ideas of necessity and con
tingency; for that alone is moral which is free; and that
which is free cannot be necessitated. Hence, again, the
terms moral necessity are contradictory.
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
SECTION III.
NOMOLOGICAL IDEAS.
I AM reminded of the extensive field of thought I have
yet to travel over; and since under the preceding head, I
have been particular in illustrating the laws which determine the evolution of Ideas, it will be admissible under
the present head to bring the explication within narrower
limits.
I.-LAW.
Law manifests itself in the orderly succession and the
stated recurrence of phenomena.
Phenomena, as barely existent, demand causality.
The fixed relations and the uniform succession demand
Law. *  How beautiful and glorious to thought is Law!
Law governs the sun, the planets, and the stars. Law
covers the earth with beauty, and fills it with bounty.
Law directs the light, moves the wings of the atmosphere,
binds the great forces of the universe in harmony and order, awakes the melody of creation, quickens every sensation of delight, moulds every form of life. Law governs
atoms, and governs systems. Law governs matter, and
governs thought. Law springs from the mind of God,
travels through creation, and makes all things one. It
* Doctrine of the Will, pp. 28, 29.
8*
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
makes all material forms one, in the unity of system; it
makes all minds one, in the unity of thought and love.
The observations of the senses yield us only limited
successions and recurrences of phenomena.   These have
an antecedence in the order of time. But Law, eternal,
absolute, and universal, has antecedence in the order of
necessary existence, and is an Idea of the Reason. It is
the Idea of Ideas, under the Nomological conception.
II. —MATTER AND SPIRIT.
Is Spirit the negation of Matter? With equal force,
at least, we may say, Matter is the negation of Spirit.
Do we know one better than the other? Then do we know
Spirit best, for we ourselves are Spirit, and Matter is
without us. But neither Matter nor Spirit are contained
in the phenomenal.   Here, again, the phenomenal is
merely the condition, the antecedent in the order of time.
But Matter and Spirit is a general cognition founded upon
an Idea of the Reason. It is an Idea which comprehends
the whole actual and possible sphere of cause and law.
Whatever exists and is governed, is either matter or spirit.
III.-PERFECTION.
Where phenomena are compared-and by experience
we can compare nothing else-it is impossible to judge
even of relative perfection, unless there be in the mind
principles and archetypes with which in the first place to
compare the objects of experience. For how shall we say
of this particular, It is more beautiful than the other; or
of this, It is better, wiser, more just, unless there be in
the mind a conception and archetype of beauty, and a con
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
ception and archetype of the good and the just, by which
to determine the intrinsic character of each particular, in
order to judge of their comparative perfection? But the
conception of Perfection appears not merely in the comparison of qualities in particular objects. We think of an
absolute justice, truth, wisdom, and goodness, an absolute
beauty, an absolute order, harmony, and fitness. It is absolute law attaining an absolute development. We think
of God as Infinite Perfection-a form and measure of being
to which nothing can be added, and from which nothing
can be taken. But even in finite modes of being, we conceive of a Perfection which relatively to their archetypes,
is absolute. There is an absolute beauty of the human
form; an absolute truth and justice in human action; and
an absolute loveliness in nature, which, if not realized in
experience, is nevertheless represented in the imagination.
We may deny absolute perfection to the mode of being,
because it is finite: but we can represent it to ourselves
as filling out its measure, as reaching the excellence, glory,
and beauty of its archetype.
Now, so far from absolute Perfection, under the form
of the Infinite, being a presentation of the senses, not even
in finite modes is it such a presentation. Actual experience gives us the limited and variable phenomena, and
nothing more. But how do our minds come to leap beyond the actual realities of finite being, and to shape out
an unseen perfection of truth and beauty? How do they
ascend up to the conception of Infinite Perfection? There
is but one satisfactory solution: the Idea of Perfection in
the Reason.
Thus constituted, when the antecedent conditions in
time are supplied by experience, the Reason forms those
Ideal cognitions, through its function of the Imagination,
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
which inspire to works of art, to self-cultivation, and to all
great and good deeds; and stretching its eye beyond all
created being, sees the Infinite himself in his ineffable
greatness and beauty.
The Idea of Perfection thus attaches itself to the whole
sphere of human activity. It is the leading Idea. In the
particular development, however, we have several Ideas
which we shall proceed to consider.
IV.-RIGHT AND WRONG.
This antithesis is universally recognized. Men, indeed,
have disagreed as to the particulars to be placed under the
two terms-some placing under the first what others place
under the second; but the two terms themselves, as necessarily and absolutely opposed, is a universal conception:
all men think of Right and Wrong. There are, also, many
particulars which men agree in placing under the same
term of the antithesis: there is a code of ethics embracing
cardinal principles, which is well nigh universal.
Again: the diversities of sentiment which actually exist, can be explained in the same way that human error is
explained on subjects confessedly admitting of exact determination, namely, the want of sufficient education in
general, and the want of the requisite examination and
thought in respect to the particular subject, unbiassed by
prejudice and passion.
The Right has been confounded with the Usefil. The
Useful is an Idea, or it is a mere induction of consequences.
If the latter, then certainly it cannot be identified with the
Right.  By a bare induction of consequences, we can never
attain to an absolute and fixed judgment, since the induction can never be complete. But the judgment of Right
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and Wrong is absolute, fixed, and universal. The Reason
affirms that the two terms can never be transposed; and
where any particular has received a clear and positive assignment to one of the terms, no possible consequences can
ever change its character. Thus, lying, injustice, malice,
cruelty, blasphemy, adultery, murder, and many other particulars, have received an assignment which is seen to be
necessary and unalterable. And the same is true of the
opposite virtues.
But if we take the Useful as an Idea; the impossibility
of identifying it with the Right is equally apparent. Ideas
are distinguished by their aims. Now, the Idea of Utility
aims at the improvement of the external world, so as to
multiply the accommodations and comforts of man in his
physical relations.   But the Idea of Right and Wrong
aims to fix the great law of duty in respect to both God
and man, in the imperishable relations of moral obligation.
The one determines what will minister to physical comfort and enjoyment; the other determines simply what is
Right, in distinction from Wrong, irrespective of all physical comfort and enjoyment.   Nay, it commands  the
Right in opposition to physical comfort and enjoyment,
and exalts self-denial into one of the most glorious and
majestic forms of virtue. It indeed promises to persevering
virtue ample rewards in the ultimate issue; but it at the
same time reveals virtue as pursuing its end, charmed by
its own convictions and sweet consciousness, and in this
way alone gaining its title, and establishing its meritoriousness. The judgment of Right and Wrong then could be
derived from experience only as a distinct induction of
consequences, since Utility as an Idea transcends experience; but an induction of consequences being inadequate
to account for this judgment, with its actual characteris
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
tics of necessity and universality, we are here again led
to the conception of an Idea of Right and Wrong in the
Reason.
Phenomena comprising the volitions of a free and responsible being, together with their sequents, form the antecedents in time conditional to the development of the
Idea. Constituted with this Idea, no sooner does an act
of such a being appear in the consciousness, than the Reason affirms of it, it is Rig it or, it s Wrong.  Upon this
particular judgment, it forms the axiomatic judgment.
Every act of a free and responsible being must be Right
or Wrong: and thence proceeds by reflection to recognize
its own Idea.
The Idea of Right and Wrong, projected in the various
relations of humanity, determines a moral law for the government of human conduct. The highest determination
of a moral law is that made by the Divine Reason. A
moral law, thus determined, is called, in respect to its origin, Divine law. The human Reason, although it may
fail to determine, of itself, an adequate moral law, nevertheless, no sooner reads the Divine law with a clear and
open eye, than it beholds the marks of eternal and necessary truth, and bows to the august and awful authority.
The moral Idea within determines to the recognition without. The voice which speaks from Sinai, and the voice of
the Divine Word, who walked among men, find their
echoes within, in thoughts which seem to connect our
being with a past Eternity.
V.-FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY.
Right and Wrong can be affirmed of the acts of a free
and responsible being alone.
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
The conception of Freedom is involved in that of Contingence, which has already been considered.   A  free
being is one endowed with the power of contingent determination; that is, the opposite of a necessary determination.:'
Responsibility is involved in Freedom and Intelligence. A being who knows Law, and is capable of obeying or disobeying, is bound to account for his acts; and is
worthy of praise or blame, according to the account which
he legitimately renders. t
Freedom and Responsibility are affirmed by the Reason upon the consciousness of self-determining acts, because it is constituted with the Idea of Freedom and Responsibility.
The Reason, as evolving the momentous Ideas of Moral
Law, of Right and Wrong, of Freedom and Responsibility,
is technically called the CONSCIENcE.
VI.-PERSONAL IDENTITY.
The phenomena of consciousness present us, in themselves, neither Personality nor Personal Identity. They
are a bare flow of variable appearances. The personality
is the subjective simple, in whose consciousness all these
appearances pass along; and who knows himself both as
a cause and recipient of them. The identity of this personality is its unchanged substance and properties in all
time and circumstances, amid every variety of phenomenal
presentation. It is the conception of identical and indivisible oneness. The phenomena here again take ante
* Doctrine of the Will, Ch. II., Sec. III. and VII.
t Moral Agency, Ch. III., Sec. I.
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
cedence in time; while the unchanging subject holds the
antecedence of necessary existence.
When the conditional phenomena make their appearance, the Reason, furnished with the Idea of Personal Identity, knows itself and its cognates in their simplicity and
oneness. The cognition of Identity does not appear under
any limitation of time. The Reason affirms, What I
now am I always have been, and always shall be, in the
whole circuit of my being.
VII.-IMMORTALITY.
It needs no argument to satisfy any mind, that immortality cannot be a conception of experience. Indeed,
many affirm that it is not even a truth of philosophy, but
purely a doctrine of revelation. It appears to me that the
history of this doctrine affords unanswerable proof that the
conception of Immortality is developed in the human mind
independently of a Divine Revelation. But, if we grant
as a matter of fact, that it was not developed in the human mind until it was formally announced by Divine Revelation, it is nevertheless necessary that the Idea of Immortality should belong to the Reason, in order to make
the acceptance of the doctrine possible, unless it can be
shown to be comprehended within elements of thought
furnished by the senses. Whatever new doctrine is taught
us, must be contained under facts or principles, and forms
of thought which we already have. If, therefore, the sense
cannot give us the conception of Immortality-as confessedly it cannot-and if we have no constituted principle
or Idea within to give it, then the doctrine cannot be taught
us; just as a moral law cannot be taught us unless there
be a Reason or Conscience, furnished with Ideas of law and
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moral obligation, to respond to it, by forming the corresponding conceptions.
Some seem to entertain the very strange notion, that
Divine Revelation is dishonoured by granting to human
reason the possibility of arriving at the cognition of Immortality by its own innate powers. Now, it ought to be
recollected that the human reason is no less the work of
God than the written Word, and hence, that the acknowledgment of the glorious constitution of the former is doing
honor to God in the same sense as the acknowledgment of
the latter. The latter assumes that we have the former,
by appealing to it. The mission of Divine Revelation is
special, to renew to human thought truths which sensuality and sin had lulled to repose; and to bring to light
that extraordinary system of grace which could belong
neither to Logic nor to Observation; but which, when
brought to light, appears all over inscribed with those
moral characters which meet the moral Ideas as the light
meets the eye of the new-born infant-a blessed visitation,
for which it is prepared.
The above are strictly the Moral Ideas. We next
proceed to the Esthetical. These, also, are allied to Perfection as the leading Idea.
VIII.-THE BEAUTIFUL.
The PERFECT is the conception of the utmost development of Law in general.  Appearing in different spheres,
it takes different denominations.   In The Morale, it is
RECTITUDE; in Logic, it is TRUTH; in Somatology, it is
THE USEFUL; in Esthetics, it is THE BEAUTIFUL.
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The Useful relates to the physical sensibilities and
well-being of creatures that can enjoy and suffer.
The Beautiful relates to a peculiar class of emotions
belonging only to creatures endowed with Reason-a Reason constituted with Ideas determining to cognitions which
stand in a causal relation to the emotions.
The Useful determines the constitution, forms, and
relations of bodies in respect to physical life and enjoyment.
The Beautiful determines the forms, relations, and
properties of bodies in respect to its peculiar emotions.
These emotions are explained by referring simply to consciousness.
Emotions are clearly distinguishable from sensations,
in this, that the latter precede, while the former follow
cognitions. Emotions of beauty obviously, therefore, cannot arise out of simple sensations. A judgment of forms,
relations, and properties, intervenes between the two.
The simple cognition of objects which we pronounce
beautiful, is made on the general laws of sensuous perception. The question is, Why do we add the jugdment, they
are beautiful?
It may be replied, we experience the peculiar emotions
to which, likewise, we apply this epithet; and then, by
analysis, ascertaining the peculiar forms and qualities
which are invariably connected with these emotions, we
accordingly pronounce them the Objective Beauty.
Even according to this, the conception is not derived
from sensations, but from emotions. But the emotions
are preceded by cognitions, and these not merely the cognitions of the beautiful objects by the laws of ordinary
perception; but cognitions of those very forms and qualities as beautiful, which produce the emotions.  It is, in
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deed, true, that the experience of the emotions claim antecedence in time; and a particular judgment of beauty
assumes the appearance of a result of a mere analysis of
properties; but the conception which springs up in the
mind, is of the Beautiful as applying universally and determining the forms to which the emotions correlate.
We think of Beauty as a principle on which the Creation
was constituted and ordered. We are conscious of conceiving of a Beauty far transcending that which we behold. Nay, the Imagination forms ideals and archetypes
of specific forms unrealized in nature. The mind proceeds
still farther, and conceives of an Infinite and Absolute
Beauty.   The Beautiful, therefore, has its constitutive
Idea in the Reason.
The Beautiful is the generic form of the Idea. It is
the Perfect, determining outward forms, relations,  and
properties, in respect to the esthetical sensitivity. But
when we come to the particular spheres in which the Idea
goes out as Law, we find it under several specific forms.
The Beautiful is connected with the objects of two
senses, the Eye,* and the Ear.
The Beautiful in the World of the Eye becomes specifically:
1. SYMMETRY, or the proper relation of the parts entering into an organic whole, determined by a common
measure. Thus, the parts of the human body are symmetrical, when in size and form they seem to melt into a
visible harmony. Thus, too, the parts of a building are
symmetrical, when the dimensions, in relation to each
other, and the pillars and ornaments, in relation to the
* The Eye, of course, is assumed to have been informed by the muscular
resistance respecting distance and motion.
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
main structure, flow into one common unity and harmony.
Symmetry, as an Idea, determines the Ideals of the Imagination, which constitute the Archetypes of the Artist.
Mathematical ratios and proportions are employed to determine precise measures and rules of mechanical execution.
These, however, without the Idealized eye, would present
a stiff and ungraceful outline.
II. GRAcE.-Grace appears in motion. Graceful lines
are those which a beautiful, animated body naturally and
spontaneously describes in space, from the moving power
energizing within. Grace is symmetry in motion. Nevertheless, the expression of Grace does not always demand
actual motion; it appears no less in attitude. But this
always relates to motion. It expresses the point where
motion has ceased, and where motion is just about to
begin.  There is Grace in a motionless statue, because the
attitude expresses the motion which has been, just as it is
passing into the motion which is about to be. This grace,
this moveable beauty,* is the life of painting and sculpture. A dead body has a heavy, painful beauty, because
every muscle is relaxed. There is here a total and final
cessation of motion, and no prophecy that it shall begin
again.
III. REGULARITY, UNIFORMITY, VARIETY.-Regularity
is the indication of law, and is opposed to confusion and
disorder. Uniformity expresses the recurrences and relations which indicate the presence of extended system, and
is opposed to isolation and accidental production. Variety
expresses the multiformity and richness of the beautiful.
These three are ever united in beautiful productions. There
is no beauty in a straight line,-it has regularity and uni
* Schiller.
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
formity, but no variety. But a curved line, as it possesses
all, is beautiful. A simple color cannot be called beautiful: for example, look at colors as disposed in a paint-box.
Nor yet is a confused jumble of colors beautiful. It is
when beheld in connection with form, and regularly blended,
as in the flowers, the foliage, the rainbow, and the'human face divine,' that they claim to be beautiful. The
great system of Nature is constructed upon these Esthetical Ideas.
IV. DETERMINATE FORM.-All forms are composed of
straight or curved lines.   The curved line is beautiful.
The spiral line is a composition of curves. The straight
line, in its simplicity, is indifferent, or it is the line of
utility. When two or more straight lines are joined together in the construction of regular forms, the esthetical
properties begin to appear. But, what determines the different forms of bodies and the lines of their motions?
Unquestionably, somatological necessities and laws enter
extensively into the determination. The world is made as
it is, because it is designed for use. This is one solution,
but not of itself sufficient. It is not difficult to show how
mere use might be attained without a.thousand particulars
which appear both in the works of God and man.   Man is
but copying the Great Maker, when he aims to make
beautiful, as well as useful. The union of the two is the
perfection of the universe. The Idea of the determinate
form of beauty, in the mind of God, evolved all the varieties of beautiful form in the creation. These forms are not
arbitrary; nor are they merely the best for use; they are
the proper forms of the beautiful likewise. The human
:eason hath the same Idea; and hence, it both recognizes
he beauty of actual form, and projects new forms of beauty
n the creations of Art.
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
V. THE SUBLIME.-This is usually embraced under
Esthetics. The fundamental Idea, however, is not the
Beautiful, but the Infinite. Strictly, esthetical properties
are gained, when the Infinite unites itself to the Beautiful,
or to the higher Idea of the Perfect. This, indeed, is the
common form; and hence the reason why the emotions of
grandeur and sublimity are assigned to Esthetics. Infinite
Beauty-Infinite Perfection,-these are the highest sources
of the Sublime.
Sublimity and grandeur are scarcely distinguishable ill
the emotion. In the natural world, usage has applied the
one to the lofty, and the other to vast extent.
Those objects of either kind which awaken the emotion,
are objects which suggest the conception of the Infinite, by
reason of their magnitudes, or the amazing power, wisdom,
or-perfection which they display.
The Moral Sublime can be traced to the same element.
Prometheus upon the rock, fills the mind with a sense of
its own greatness and nobleness; and we think on in the
long track of our immortality until we seem lost in infinite
being.
The objects and beings of our experience cannot reveal
to us the Infinite directly; but when presented under
forms of indefinite greatness-a greatness which surpasses
the ordinary standards of comparison-the mind instinctively springs forward to meet the realization of its own Idea.
It seems to see the skirts of the glory of the Infinite.
Majesty and dignity belong to the same category.
They are expressions of mental power and greatness, in the
corporeal person of man. In the Arts of Sculpture and
Painting, they are capital qualities.
Thus far with respect to the World of the Eye. W(
proceed to the beautiful in the World of the Ear.
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
Beauty unquestionably relates to sound. The emotions of sweet music and of the sight of loveliness, melt
together into one harmonious emotion.
The esthetical qualities of sound are manifested in
three ways: in Music, in Language, and in Tone.
Beginning with Music, we have,
I. MELODY.-As a constitutive Idea, it determines the
cognition of beauty in the relations of sounds flowing on in
succession; the laws which are to govern the succession;
and the movements of the Creative function in endless
musical production.
II. HARMONY.-The Idea of Harmony determines the
cognition of beauty in two or more successions of sound
flowing on in the same time; the laws which govern their
union; and the creative function in new and varied productions.
Sensations cannot give the judgment of melody and
harmony. If the judgment were derived from the mere
sensitivity, it would belong to the emotions. But emotions are always preceded by cognitions; and the cognitions must have their determinative Idea.
LANGUAGE has sound for its material. The Idea of
melody determines the construction of Language likewise.
This appears in the selection of elementary sounds, their
combination into syllables and words, and the arrangement
of words in propositions. Smoothness, euphony, elegance,
and energy of style, all proceed from this Idea.
RHYTHM, whether in music or verse, is comprehended
in the general Idea of melody. It expresses the relative
proportion of sounds as measured by time.
VERSE is language, which, while used as the proper
vehicle of thought, and retaining its laws as such, is
DArought into the highest form of melody, of which the
capacities of the constituent sounds will admit.
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
TONE, In music, respects the intervals of sound, and is
comprehended under the general Idea of melody.
TONE, in speech, comprehends the universal language
of thought and passion, superadding itself to the articulate
and conventional sounds of language; and contains the
esthetical properties of Oratory. Accent, emphasis, and all
the infiexions accompanying the expression of thought;
majesty, melody, tenderness, and force, accompanying the
words of passion, make up its varieties.
We here end our outline of the Esthetical Ideas. It is
by these that we know and enjoy the beauty and sublimity
of Nature. It is by these also, as the powers of creative
thought, that all the wonders of art are produced.
The Ideas which follow next are the Somatological.
In the general philosophical classification already given in
Part I., I have adverted to the difficulties attending the
determination of this class of Ideas.* What follows I wish
to be regarded as an indication, or an attempt, rather than
a pretension to be a complete evolution. Besides, a full
development of this very extensive subject, were it possible, would inevitably lead me to transcend the proper
limits of an elementary treatise.   A  strictly primordial
logic, also, requires mainly the laws which regulate the
determination of Ideas, and not their application, except
so far as may be necessary for the purpose of illustration
and a clear understanding.
Before giving Somatological Ideas, we ought to suppose the Dynamical Ideas already to have been deter
* Pages 82, 83.
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
mined. But a reference to the Metaphysical Ideas will
show that no further determination has as yet been at tempted, save those included under the category of Rela tion. By reflecting, however, we shall perceive that
every form of Dynamical Conception is embraced by this
Category. All movement and change lie in cause produ cing effects, in substance developing properties, and in
action and reaction. Advancing into the world of bodies,
we are introduced to various classes of secondary pheno mena; and these, while generally connected with the
Cardinal Ideas above named, are still farther, in their
peculiarities, conditional of the development of particular
Dynamical Ideas.
The most important particular Dynamical Ideas, are
the Idea of centripetal and centrifugal forces; the Idea
of polarized forces; the Idea of chemical affinity and repulsion; the Idea of vital powers, or the grand Idea of
LIFE, as the organific power; and the Idea of instinctive
activity. All these are powers and forces recognized in
the Science of Nature. When I speak of the Ideas of
these powers and forces, I mean that they are not determined by the mere observation of phenomena; but that
the Reason contains within itself the constitutive elements
which grasp, distinguish, and arrange the phenomena, and
reduce them under their respective powers.
Cause conceived of in its universality is metaphenomenal, known on condition of phenomena. If, then, there
be specific causes, they likewise, as causes, must be metaphenomenal, and therefore capable of determination only
by the supervention of Ideas.
Cause, however, is an Idea of the utmost simplicity.
It is that which accounts for actual existence, and all
changes or phenomena.
9.
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
The diversity of causes apprehended and described
under Dynamics arises from the diversity of the phenomena.*:.  But in reality have we, under all this diversity, more than one cause in nature-a cause universal?
Admitting this, the diversity of phenomena arises from
the various spheres in which cause acts, and the various
laws which direct and govern its activity. And then, in
evolving the Idea of Cause simply, we have really given
all necessary consideration to pure dynamical philosophy;
and what remains to us legitimately, is the evolution of
the Somatological Ideas, or the Ideas which go forth into
the world of bodies, and give the law to all its forms, relations, and changes.
All Ideas have some form of reality answering to
them, although not adequate to them. The great law of
their development is, that the reality must first move certain phenomenal conditions in the consciousness, and then
the Ideas come forth to determine cognitions and laws.
There may be in the human Reason, Ideas yet undeveloped, because the realities to which they relate have
not yet come within the field of Experience. And especially may this be true in respect to the world of bodies
where there is such vast diversity and possibility. Mind
does not penetrate matter as it penetrates itself. Hence
the laws of bodies appear under two kinds or degrees:
THEORETICAL AND POSITIVE LAW.
The first is the conception of a possible constitution
of bodies, and one which will embrace and account for a
certain number of the phenomena presented. But the
* Doctrine of the Will, pp. 30-32 and 294.
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
Mind still remains in doubt, first, whether its conception
be realized in any system, or be a mere appearance;
secondly, whether, if realized, the elements of universal ity and necessity can be connected with it. While these
doubts remain, it is relatively to the Mind-judging, a
Theory, or a mere view taken for the occasion.
When we speak of possible systems, we speak according to a limited observation. We think of vast diversity
and possibility only in particular spheres. In the great
universe there may be but one possible system determined
by absolute and necessary laws, comprehending the whole,
and yet permeating the minutest particulars: and all
that we see may be but parts of this grand system, appearing imperfect in particulars, because these are imperfectly seen in their separation from the whole. Space is
thus the infinite field in which the Infinite Being plants
the perfect elements of worlds, which, under perfect and
necessary laws, are led forth to perfect developments in
long successions in Infinite Time.
But if there be a diversity of principles possible, on
which worlds can be projected into being, and linked together on this extended scale, must we not believe that
the Infinite and Perfect Being has chosen the best?  Can
his work be less than the best and the perfect?
The absolute and perfect laws -if such they be-which
are embodied in the Creation, must have their corresponding Ideas in the Divine Mind; and therefore, as far as we
are constituted to apprehend them, must have their corresponding Ideas in our minds likewise.
According to this view, every law realized will appear
under the characteristics of universality and necessity.
The first it certainly must have, and the last can be suspended only upon the question, whether Somatological
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
laws in the Divine determination are of fixed and absolute
perfection, or are arbitrary, and of various degrees of perfection. And again, on the other hand, every conception
of law appearing under these characteristics, even if supposed not to be realized in any known system, must find
its reality somewhere,-either in some other part of space,
or in some other period of time;-it must be a prophecy
of the distant or the future. But such a prophetic Idea
could be developed only in connexion with some form of
reality in some degree symbolising with it. Could this be
called Theory?  I think the mind would repose in it as
something higher than Theory. Newton's mind grasped
the great law of gravitation before he verified it. He did
not yield to it as the actual law of our system, until he
had verified it: but it always seems to me to have lain
in his mind from its first conception, as a law which must
find its verification somewhere. It was a law penetrated
by an Idea.
Theory strictly is an ingenious conjecture-a tentative
act-a feeling after a law, determined by the mere nascent
development of an Idea, and serving the purpose of generalizing the phenomena, reducing them to order, and preparing them for exact.and proportionate expressions.
This is exemplified in the Theory of Atoms, employed to
represent the determinate proportions of chemical affinities.
In attempting an enumeration of cardinal Somatologi cal Ideas, I shall begin with
IX.-THE USEFUL.
I have already introduced this Idea in distinguishing
between it and the Beautiful. It comprehends the final
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
end of Material Creation in respect to creatures endowed
with natural sensibilities-with the capacity of physical
enjoyment and suffering. The Useful, as an Idea, reaches
to the perfect constitution and development of the world
under this point of view.
The universe, as far as presented to our observation,
does not fully meet this Idea. When we reflect upon the
character of the Great Creator, and the beneficent designs
which every where appear, taken in connexion with the
glorious prospects opened to our view in Divine Revelation, we must believe that the universe is constituted upon
this Idea, and that all things are tending to its realization.
Nay, may it not be already realized in other parts of the
vast whole; and is not the Christian's heaven those perfected worlds?
This Idea' has stimulated human industry to work its
wonders. Man finds the world a rude uncultivated wilderness before he begins to exert his industry. He fills it
with comfortable dwellings, transforms it into smiling
harvest fields, appropriates its mineral resources in a
thousand useful arts, and even controls its powerful elements, to accomplish his designs. He refines and multiplies his wants, and by contriving to'gratify them, multiplies his enjoyments.
God has made his highly endowed creature the skilful
instrument of perfecting for kindly uses, a world which he
has filled with ample resources. Human industry has not
yet attained its limit: the resources of the world are not
yet exhausted: this beneficent Idea has new wonders yet
in store.
The world was made under the Idea of Utility, as one
of the constitutive elements; and the improvements
which are in progress, whether by physical laws in their
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
necessary development, or by human industry, are governed by this Idea. But this Idea is general and comprehensive; and gives only the most general form of
Somatological law.   We  have yet to enquire into the
Ideas which determine its interior forms, relations, and
qualities.
X.-CENTRALIZATIONX AND DIFFUSION.
The Idea of Centralization is that of perfect dependency and union. The conception of body involves the
conception of parts and a whole. But no whole is possible without centralization.
If there were but one vast Whole existent, a law of
centralization would be sufficient. But if distinct wholes
are to be arranged into a system with mutual relations
and dependencies, and with one common and universal
dependency constituting the unity of the system; then
there must be likewise a law of diffusion, harmoniously
opposing itself to the law of centralization, and preventing
a universal consolidation. This is the grand Idea upon
which the universe is constituted. Gravitation, or the
Centripetal force and law,'is the great principle of centralization;-the Centrifugal force, the great principle of
diffusion.
That it is an Idea, and not a mere theoretical conception, cannot well be questioned; for the characteristics of
universality and necessity seem plainly to belong to it.
In the wide space, beyond the utmost limits of observation, whatever worlds and systems may there exist, we
believe, under all the force of a commanding Idea, to be
arranged and governed on these two stupendous and allsufficient principles.  The history of science shows the
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
constant tendency of the human Reason to the evolution
of this Idea: and now that it is evolved, no other can be
admitted as the Idea of the Universe.
XI.-AFFINITY AND REPULSION.
This is akin to the preceding, and perhaps comprehended within it. There is this important distinction,
however, which is obvious: centralization and diffusion
relate to cosmical masses; whereas, affinity and repulsion
relate to the constitution of the generic and specific varieties of the particular and minute masses which enter into
the great wholes which are governed by the former.
Affinity is of two kinds: First, the cohesion of homogeneous matter; secondly, chemical affinity. The first is
permanent affinity, existing independently of change;
the second takes place through change.
Rellulsion is likewise of two kinds: First, mechanical; secondly, chemical. The first relates to the motion
of bodies by mechanical force; the second, to the motion
of chemical decomposition.
No less universal and necessary is the principle of Affinity and Repulsion, than that of Centralization and
Diffusion. One is the Idea of the great harmonious and
all-comprehending system; the other, the Idea of the
minute and interior composition of the forms and orders
of particular bodies.   One determines the laws which
grasp the wholes, without respect to their interior constitution; the other determines the laws of this interior
constitution.
XII.-LIFE.
Life is the Idea of the Organific power. Organic
bodies are distinguished from inorganic in three ways:
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
First, they possess determinate, generic, and specific
forms, which remain unchanged amid the ceaseless flux of
the particles which enter into them.   Secondly,  the
actuating or moving power here tends to an unceasing
change of particles; while mechanical forces tend to
equilibrium, chemical to composition or to decomposition,
and then pause. Thirdly, in inorganic bodies accretions
are made either by a simple cohesion of homogeneous
matter, or by a simple union of particles, determined by
inherent affinities; while in organic bodies, a new power,
acting from within, resists cohesion and affinities; and,
by a process of assimilation, projects, as from a centre,
distinct particles metamorphosed into substances of qualities and forms determined by its own inward law.
Wonderful is the law of life! Under the myriad
varieties of vegetable and animal bodies, it still preserves
its identity. Observation gives us only the phenomena:
the law is metaphenomenal.  We think of it too as a law
universal and necessary.   It springs therefore from an
Idea of the Reason.
XIII.-POLARITY.
Polarity, as thus far determined, is magnetic, electric,
chemical, crystalline, and optical. It is the conception
of disturbance, repulsion, and separation, produced by the
attempted union of like kinds; and of harmony and repose, produced by the actual union of unlike kinds.
That an Idea lies behind all the observations which
have been made respecting polarity, determining their
processes and results, is manifest: and that the conception of polarity, as an attempted expression of the Idea,
has been the guiding star to the most eminent philoso
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phers in their investigations in magnetism, electricity,
chemistry, crystallization, and light, is abundantly attested: nevertheless, it does not yet appear, notwithstanding the confident assertion of Schelling, that the
conception fully embodies the Idea, and leads it forth to
the determination of a universal and necessary law. As
yet, it is a theory, like a thin and almost transparent
cloud, with the sun behind it.
XIV. —INSTINCT.
In vegetables we have vital forces, and the law of life,
in its beautiful and wonderful variety of manifestation.
fn animals, as the genus, we have life and instinct.  In
mnan, the thinking species, we have life, instinct, and
spirit. Instinct and spirit manifesting themselves in the
sphere of observation, are not organific, but motive. Vital
forces produce motion, but it is the motion of the organific
process. Instinct and spirit produce muscular activity in
the accomplishment of an end.
The motion produced by spirit, or voluntary motion,
belongs to psychology: Instinctive motion belongs to somatology. Instinct is not volition, it is the shadow of volition in the animal sphere. In both activities, ends are
proposed, intelligential ends. In volition, the ends are
deliberated upon and estimated by the agent himself, and
selected by an act of freedom. In instinct, the ends are
proposed by the infinite and all-governing intelligence,
just as ends are proposed by this intelligence for all the
movements of nature: and then the activities of the animnal are determined to these ends by necessary laws manie%sting themselves in the constitution of the animal, un4:ccompanied by deliberation and exclusive of choice. The
9*
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
all-comprehensive law of the mere animal nature is instinct. It is a universal and necessary law, governing a
mode of being, and springing from a constitutive Idea.
XV. REGULARITY, UNIFORMITY, VARIETY, SYMMETRY,
AND DETERMINATE FORM.
These have already been considered in their esthetical
relations. They exist likewise in somatological relations.
They bear a relation to the useful, analogous to the relation which they bear to the beautiful. They all necessarily result from determinate and yet diffusive law. This
appears palpably in the action of centripetal and centrifugal forces, in vital forces, and in crystallization.
In the absolutely perfect, they will not appear in conflicdt under the two Ideas of Beauty and Utility. In the
actual nature submitted to observation, they do appear in
conflict. In the arts cultivated by man, this conflict is
constantly experienced; for example, in the form and apportionment of buildings. The Grecian Temple is a pure
development of beautiful symmetry; a commodious dwelling-house is a development of useful symmetry. There is
a constant struggle in human art to unite the two; and
they appear together, in consequence, in a union of compromise.
The determinate form of nature viewed on a grand
scale, as in the shapes of the planets, the line of their orbits, and the vast arrangements of the starry heavens, present us a perfect union of the two Ideas. It is only in the
details of the particular orbs that we perceive the opposition, and especially in the sphere of human activity. In
these details, we judge under the light of Astronomy and
Geology, that a mighty progress is making from lower to
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
higher states. The intelligential activity, too, in being
brought to task itself in the field which it occupies, is at
the same time developing its own greatness, and reaching
forward to its ultimate destiny.
XVI.-IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, RESEMBLANCE.
Identity and Difference are antithetical conceptions.
Resemblance is the union of the two, in two or more objects compared together.   Personal Identity is the same
ness of the individual being in substance and essential properties, taken in different and indefinitely distant times
and places.
In material particles or parts, there is no necessary
identity, for matter, under the forces and laws of nature,
is liable to indefinite change. The identity of bodies is an
identity of certain forms and qualities, admitting differences in other forms and qualities. Here an identity of
substance cannot be considered, for the reason above stated
-the constant flux of matter.
Identity and Difference actually existing in nature,
lays the ground for the classification of bodies into genera,
species, and individuals. Generic forms and qualities are
those which are the most general and comprehensive; thus
animal for example, embraces only the forms and qualities
which distinguish all animals from all other living organisms. But in man, forms and properties are added which,
as differentia, distinguish him from all other kinds or
species of animals, and, at the same time, identify all the
individuals of his own species: while in the individual man
George, or Thomas, forms and properties are added which
distinguish him from every other individual of his kind,
and of course identify him with no one.
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
It has been said that genera and species are names of
general conceptions, which we may form and vary at pleasure; and that consequently they have no corresponding
realities. It is indeed true that we have no such living
and real being as animal, comprising only generic forms
and qualities; and no such living and real being as man,
comprising only specidqc forms and qualities.  It is true,
also, that we can widely vary our classifications by uniting
together different particulars under new points of agreement. But let it be recollected, that the words animal
and man do express forms and qualities which really exist:
The forms and qualities indicated by animal are found
really existing in every particular animal; and the forms
and qualities indicated by man, are found in every individual man. And when we vary our classifications, we are
still conversant with realities, for our classification still corresponds to real identities and differences. We indeed
view them in different relations, and invent new names to
represent our new views; but, nevertheless, we cannot
view them out of actually existing relations.
The truth is, that the determinate forms and qualities
of bodies exhibit both identity and difference; and these
in their universality constitute the possibility of all classification.   If there were all difference, there would be all
variety, and of course no classification. On the other hand,
if there were all identity, there would be no variety, and
here again no possibility of classification.  Identity enables
us to bind together in classes and systems: Difference
enables us to separate the classes, systems, and particulars:
so that, when we view parts, we still assign them their
general relations: and when we view wholes, we still distinguish and comprehend the particulars which go to make
them up. We thus know the harmony and variety of the
Universe.
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
If any one were to remark, that universal identity
would not be incompatible with some diversity, inasmuch
as the identical forms and qualities might be presented in
different relations of time and space; it would be sufficient
to reply, that as we should in this case have continually
the same recurring perception, we in reality would be unable to distinguish different points in space, and different
periods in time.
On the other hand, if any one were inclined to merge
identity into mere resemblance, by calling it the most perfect resemblance, he might be convinced of the utter inipossibility of this conception, by reflecting, that resemblance cannot be constituted without identity.   There
must be sameness in some forms or qualities, to enable us
to bring them together; and the union of points of sameness with points of difference, in fact, makes resemblance.
The conception of Identity and Difference, and their
common relation in resemblance, is a universal and necessary conception. We extend it not only to what we see,
we know it must pervade all worlds. As a necessary somatological conception, it must find in the reason its corresponding and constitutive Idea.  Hlence  when phenomena are given as the required conditions and antecedents
in Time, the Reason under this constitutive Idea-the Idea
from which sprang forth the perfect system and the manifold variety of the Universe-begins to cognise resemblance,
to classify the objects of perception, and to seize upon the
,lorious unity reigning amid the glorious diversity.
XVII.-DESIGN, FINAL CAUSE, MEANS AND END.
These are only different ways of expressing the same
:dea. The great Architect of the Universe forecasted his
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
design; this design, contemplated by himself, is the final
cause of the Creation; and the Creation itself is a great
system of means and ends, in which the means are ends,
and the ends means, in a long chain of linked and harmonious subordination, and all connected with an ultimate
end which is not a means, upon which the eye of God reposes in infinite and quiet delight.
This Idea of the Infinite Reason, is found also in the
human reason. Hence nothing is more natural and spontaneous than the enquiries which the mind makes after
final causes in the structure of plants and animals, nay, in
the whole order of Creation.
As a principle of philosophical research, the conception
of Final Causes has been adopted chiefly in respect to organised bodies, because here more manifest and certain;
and here unquestionably it has achieved stupendous results, of which the labors of Cuvier alone are a sufficient
attestation.
The conception of final causes, like other universal and
necessary conceptions, accepts the observations of the senses as its condition and antecedent in time; but it can rest
upon an Idea of the Reason alone as its constitutive element. Phenomena fleeting and apparently irregular and
confused, are grasped by this idea and reduced to orderly
and beautiful relations. And it is not only in fields of observation actually presented, that it arranges and composer
phenomena, and educes system; as a watchful and expec
taut eye, it is ever looking about to find phenomena tha
shall fall in with its own preconceptions. It is a necessar,
prophetic thought, which wanders through the universe
Where no observation can reach, it has full assurance
there is design.
I here close my view of Somatological Ideas. Howeve
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
brief and imperfect, it will answer the end I have in view,
namely, Logical Construction.
I will complete this outline, with the Logical Ideas.
XVIII.-TRUTH.
Truth is an antithetical idea: its opposite is Falsehood.
The great aim of the Reason is Truth: and Logic comprises the Laws which govern the Reason in its searches
after, in the processes by which it arrives at, Truth.
Truth in itself is identical with the highest form of
Reality-with absolute and necessary Reality; and it is
the parent of all other reality-the Reality of actual objective Being. The Ideas, and the necessary and universal
conceptions which immediately spring out of them, are the
essential body of Truth: Actual Being is the exterior
embodiment of Truth. Hence Truth is that in which the
Reason ultimately, necessarily, and securely reposes.
When the Reason, contemplating Ideas and necessary
conceptions, and their exterior embodiment in the constitution of the Universe, gives the judgment of Truth, it
does so under the great Idea of Truth. Mere phenomena
contain no truth, because they contain no reality, and consequently they cannot contain the judgment of Truth.
The phenomena being given as conditions or occasions antecedent in time, the Reason under the Idea of Truth
forms the conception of the subjective and objective Realities-it affirms that they are true.
Falsehood is the opposite or negative of Truth, with
the appearance or pretension of being Truth. In the highest-the pure region of Truth, Falsehood cannot well find
place. Ideas, and primary absolute conceptions, have such
decided characteristics that it is difficult to imagine how a
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
falsehood can disguise itself in their habiliments. They
are necessary, universal, and intuitively clear. How can
a falsehood put on the appearances of these? The very
supposition seems to involve an absurdity. If it were so,
could we ever have a certain and infallible test of truth?
Is not this the great distinction between a presumed truth
and a presumed falsehood, that when carried up to the
primary conceptions and their determining ideas, the first
quietly flows into these as a congenial essence, while the
latter is repelled and flows back to seek its home elsewhere?
The necessity, the universality, the intuitive clearness, of
the conception, are what give it the character of absolute
Truth. Unless it attain these characteristics it cannot be
absolute Truth; and when it does attain them, it cannot
but be absolute Truth. Falsehood here then must be excluded. In this pure region, a mind may mislead itself
by bringing along with it the gross prejudices, the wild and
baseless theories, which it has collected in a lower region,
and dogmatically investing them with the attire of Truth.
But it is a wilful act-the act of a professed Sophist and
Sectarian. But to the humble, sincere, open-eyed, and
pure-hearted child of Truth, falsehood can find no entrance among these primary ideas and principles. It is
in the lower region itself-the region of observation, induction, and deduction, of human will and human passion,
that falsehood finds a wide and natural field to walk in.
Here the sense may be deceived by appearances, and the
intellect amused and led astray by "' Idols of the Tribe,
the Den, the Market-place, and the Theatre."
But in whatever region of Knowledge the Reason takes
its stand, Truth is its great and legitimate object. The
Idea of Truth is the spring of all its activity.
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
XIX.-THE PHILOSOPHICAL IDEA.
This is the Idea of accounting for the development
and progress of humanity in science, art, government, and
religion. It is the Idea of accountingfor every thing perceived or thought of
Enquiry supposes that the mind cannot rest satisfied
with phenomena, whether of immediate consciousness, or
taken in their secondary state, and representing the actual
objects and events of the external world. No enquiry
would indeed be made, if there were no phenomena presented. But why is not the mind satisfied with its sensations, and spontaneous and natural perceptions? Why
does it raise enquiries respecting causes and laws? Not
only is the Idea of Cause and Law here presumed, but
also the Idea, that if causes and laws can be assigned, the
phenomena will be accounted for. This restlessness of the
human mind, when dealing with mere phenomena; this
conception, that there must be causes and laws; this firm
conviction, that science is gained, when the causes and
laws are determined; and this quiet satisfaction in the result-all show the working of the philosophical Idea, or
element of our being.
That this is an Idea, cannot be doubted, for it is both
necessary and universal.   The Reason affirms that all
phenomena are to be accounted for; and that the principle of every phenomenon really and necessarily exists, or
the phenomenon would not be possible.
The connection between this Idea and the preceding is
very close: and some, at first thought, may even look
ipon them as identical. There is, however, one obvious
Distinction: Truth embraces all absolute and necessary priniples, and, although gained upon phenomenal conditions,
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
it may be contemplated separately from all phenomena:
the philosophical Idea, on the other hand, always connects
itself with phenomena, as determining the activity of the
Intelligence in respect to them. Truth is the cardinal
Idea of Primordial Logic; the philosophical, the cardinal
Idea of Inductive Logic. Truth is the simple Idea of the
primal and absolute authority; the philosophical, the Idea
of reducing every thing under that authority.
XX.-INTUITION.
Intuition has already been represented as one of the
functions of the Reason-the function of immediate insight. Now, connected with this function, is the Idea of
the perfect and the absolute authority of such an insight.
Hence we assign the name of the function, to express the
corresponding Idea. Thus the Reason, by the function of
Intuition, perceives, directly, that there are three, and
only three, dimensions in space. Such is its immediate
and necessary perception.  Now, this is a particular perception, or one instance of Intuition: but, upon this one
instance, or upon any similar instance, there appears the
universal affirmation, that Intuition is an absolute and
perfect law of cognition,-that whatever is known by Intuition, is ultimately and certainly known. All axiomsall first principles, and all primary sensuous perceptions,
are thus legitimated. But the universal affirmation, or
conception, itself reposes upon an Idea of the Reason,namely, the Idea of Intuition, as the primal and highest
and most authoritative form of Cognition. This Idea
permeates Primordial Log,ic, and governs all its particular
determinations.
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
XXI.-INVOLUTION AND EVOLUTION.
Besides Intuition, there are two other forms of cognising truths or realities. These are Induction and Deduction. In the inductive form, we cognise universal truths
through particular phenomena in which the truths are
embodied. In the deductive form, we cognise particular
truths through universal truths which comprehend them,
and out of which they are evolved. The two forms, in
relation to each other, may be represented under the following formula:
a, b, c, d, &c. are X
Induction Z is a, b, c, d, &c.
Therefore Z is X.
Z is X
Deduction  a, or b, or c, or d, &c. is Z
Therefore a, or b, &c. is X.
The first is an involution of inducted particulars, into a
general expression. The second is an evolution of the
general expression to a particular determination.
According to these formuilm, it is evident that the
Induction must precede the Deduction, and that the latter is a return to the elementary particulars of the former.
If the mind be supposed to be placed at the point of
observing the particulars, then, by the Inductive formula,
it arrives at the general expression. If the general principle, or expression, be already gained by a previous Induction, and the mind be placed at this point, then it can
perceive each particular through the Deductive formula.
But here the question may be started, what value is
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
there in the Deductive formula, since it is a mere return
to particulars which were grasped by the Inductive at the
outset?
First. There is a more perfect comprehension of the
general truth when viewed under the two forms, in their
reciprocal relation.
Secondly. The Induction, as an inference, does not
measure itself by the Induction, as a mere bringing in of
the facts. The grounds of the general inference, made
upon the limited col]igation, will be hereafter explained.
But this general inference upon the limited colligation, is
the fact which shows the necessity of deductions, subsequenit to the induction which establishes the general principle from which the deductions are made; for, since all
the particulars were not really brought in and colligated,
the general principle, when once established, becomes an
authority for conclusions respecting particulars not originally inducted.
Thirdly. The Deductive formula does not invariably
connect itself with the Inductive, as above exhibited.
General principles are not universally the result of Inductive inferences, but are often a priori and intuitive.  The
first principles of morals. and mathematics are palpable
instances. These principles are established as a' priori
and intuitive judgments; and then sciences, vast, complicated, and momentous, are evolved by the Deductive
formula.
Fourthly. In the practical affairs of life, there are received principles which are constantly applied by all men,
without instituting anew enquiries respecting their origin
and basis. Indeed, multitudes who are capable of applying the principles, are unfitted for the investigations
through which they were originally obtained. This practi
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
cal application is made in a series of deductions, which,
although not assuming, in the common language of men,
the syllogistic form, nevertheless admit of being reduced
to it.
These considerations are sufficient to show the value
of the Deductive formula.
The fundamental Ideas of the Inductive and Deductive formulae, and of the modes of cognition which they
represent, are Involution and Evolution.   On the one
hand, the Reason does not contemplate any phenomenon
or fact apart and isolated. It must be colligated with
some other fact, and these again with others, and so on
until we have a mass of facts bound together in the unity
of system, and involved in a great central law.
On the other hand, when the Reason seizes upon any
law, axiom, or-first principle, it does not contemplate it
as dormant, unproductive, or ever revolving within itself.
It feels impelled by its own Idea to look out for an exterior sphere in which the great truth shall unfold itself
in manifold varieties.
The Reason takes these two directions necessarily and
universally; and hence manifests here again the determinative power of Ideas.
XXII.-ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS.
According to a general definition, Synthesis is the con,eption of the composition of systems-of systems of
truth according to logical principles and formulae; and
iystems of bodies according to natural and mechanical
aws: while Analysis is the conception of the decomposi;ion of systems reversing the order of the Synthesis, and
.unning back in the chain of principles, formulae, and
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
laws. Geometry is a completed synthesis of principles
and consequences. When taught, the synthetical order
is observed-the pupil being instructed how to put together the several theorems in a way to show their dependence upon the axioms and definitions, and upon preceding, demonstrations constantly accumulating in the progress
of the synthesis. A watch, also, or any piece of machinery, when its separated parts are taken up and put
together according to the laws of the mechanism, presents
us a synthesis. On the other hand, we may begin with
the remotest deductions of Geometry, and enquire upon
what grounds they rest; these grounds, in part at least,
will prove to be other propositions deduced from something
still going before: in this way we may continue to unwind
the whole concatenation of dependent demonstrations
until we arrive at the self-evident principles.  So, likewise, we may take in pieces the latch in the order of the
mechanical dependency, until we arrive at the main-spring.
We thus accomplish an analysis. He that has a perfect
knowledge of Geometry, and of the watch, can readily
synthesise or analyse both; and the same kind of knowledge enables him to do one or the other. To one ignorant
of Geometry, and just setting out to gain a knowledge of
it, the synthetical mode is the true and certain mode; for
every step here is made according to established principles
and demonstrations, which are continually evolving. Here
the analytical mode, by constantly referring to previous
demonstrations which are not yet comprehended, is liable
to produce perplexity and confusion. In respect to the
watch, also, an ingenious learner would more safely make
experiments in putting together than in taking apart.
In the construction of scientific systems, and in
mechanical constructions, a synthesis of the parts neces
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
sarily precedes an analysis of the whole. The natural
mode of constructing is likewise the natural mode of learning. But where wholes are presented us, as in pieces of
machinery which are strange to us, and in natural organisms such as animals and plants, and in the subtile combinations of chemical affinities, analysis of necessity precedes synthesis. In such cases analysis cannot at once
proceed with the nice accuracy of geometry and the watch,
where the geometer and the mechanician know precisely
where to begin, and how to separate, because they know
the beginning, the continuity, and the completion of the
systematic and the organic wholes before them. Instead
of this, many tentative, and even destructive and futile
experiments are made before the laws and the harmony
of the construction appear.
Analysis and Synthesis do not correspond to Induction
and Deduction, but precede or accompany them. In geometry there is, in the progress of the evolution, a constant
synthesis of axioms, definitions, previous demonstrations,
and new forms and relations. The whole putting together
must be made accordingly to a rigid logic: but nevertheLess, there is an ingenuity exercised in the combinations
lnd ordering of the parts, for the purpose of eliciting
onclusions or evolving proof, which is not provided for in
the rules of deduction. This belongs in reality to another
.unction of the Reason, which we have named Invention.*
Analysis precedes Induction with experiments which
re often the starting point; and then accompanies it, by
evolving in the continued experiments new and important
)henomena.
Synthesis also accompanies Induction, arranging and
* Supra, p. 131.
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
combining the discovered truths so as to form a compact
and harmonious system.
Analysis and Synthesis are thus subsidiary to Induction and Deduction. The Inductive Function is striving
to see the general truth through the manifold particulars
in which it is manifested, in the unity of system. The
Deductive Function is striving to see the particular and
remote conclusions comprehended in the general truth, in
the unity of system also. The Inventive Function, by
its analysis and synthesis, presents the requisite media of
the Inductive and Deductive cognitions, and preconceives
and suggests the systematic construction.
All these functions are related in their operations to
the Intuitive Function, as will appear in subsequent developments.
- Analysis and Synthesis, considered as Ideas in the
Reason, are certainly nearly akin to, if not identical with,
the Ideas of Involution and Evolution. If the Ideas be
regarded as Identical, then Analysis and Synthesis are
only conceptions under the common Ideas distinguishable
from Induction and Deduction by the characteristics above
given.
It appears to me, however, that Analysis and Synthesis
are distinct Ideas determining Invention; while Involution
and Evolution determine Induction and Deduction. Involution and Evolution are Ideas which determine the
conception of phenomena running together and colligated
in general laws, and general laws reciprocally governing
the development of phenomena; and the conception of
particular truths and conclusions comprehended in genera]
truths, and general truths evolved into the particular
truths and conclusions. But Analysis and Synthesis.
taken as Ideas, determine the conception of a system oi
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
laws governing a system of bodies-where the whole implies constituent parts, and the parts imply an harmonious
whole; and the conception of a system of truths, where
each particular truth with the long chain of consequences
which it involves is interlinked with other truths and consequences, constituting the unity of absolute science, and
where the particular truths and consequences ultimately
lead back to pure intuitions.
It thus becomes plain how Analysis and Synthesis aid
Induction and Deduction. Wlhile inducting facts for the
purpose of finding a law in relation to any subject of enquiry, there must be some preconception or Idea to guide
in the selection of phenomena, and the form of the experiments: and now the Inventive function is busy in
arranging and combining, and in various tentative suggestions.  But what governs the Inventive function?  Is it
not the great Idea of System, where constituted wholes
and constitutive parts are reciprocal; or, in other words,
is it not Analysis and Synthesis? And so again, when
engaged in demonstrating theorems, and solving problems,
the Idea of the wide-spread relations of truths and principles-the Idea of their synthetical and analytical capacity-determines the Inventive function in searching for,
and finding, the material of the ratiocination.
The same appears also in our reasonings on moral and
all practical questions. We find arguments, because,
under the Ideas of Analysis and Synthesis-the Ideas of
the wide-spread and systematic relations of truth-we
know where to look for them.
It is sufficiently obvious that the Ideas of Analysis
and Synthesis are necessary and universal. Whatever be
the scope or the subject of our reasoning, they inevitably
make their appearance. Nor is it conceivable that any
10
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
course of reasoning can be conducted independently of
them, since truth, in its very nature, is analytical and
synthetical.
I here close the outline of Ideas. Next in order will
be the consideration of axioms, and of primary cognitions
and definitions-those which belong to the Intuitive
Function. We shall thus complete Primordial Logic.
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
SECTION IV.
PRIMARY SENSUOUS COGNITIONS, OR COGNITIONS OF
THE EXTERIOR CONSCIOUSNESS.
THE primary sensuous cognitions, in general, are those
which are formed intuitively by the Reason, respecting
the exterior world, through the force of its constitutive
Ideas, and upon condition of sensuous impressions in the
exterior consciousness.
When these impressions are received in the exterior
consciousness, the Reason, under the Idea of objective
exteriority,*:. conceives of an outer world.  This is its first
sensuous cognition.
Exerting the muscular activity under the Idea of our
personal causality, and experiencing a resistance in this
outer world, we now, under the Ideas of cause, space,
limitation, and substance, cognise body. In this cognition
are involved at once what are commonly called the primnary qualities of body, namely, hardness or resistance,
extension and form. They are primary, because they comprise the necessary contents of the cognitions. Indeed,
the cognition is now complete. Secondary qualities are
-ognised in particular bodies through the appropriate
)rgans, under the Idea of Cause, or of determinate law.
* Supra, p. 155.
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
When body is known, then the sensations of which we
are immediately conscious, are referred to causes inhering
in bodies, or to their specific constitution, correlating with
the human sensitivity.
The cognitions of body involving the primary qualities,
are thus primary sensuous intuitions.
The knowledge of specific forms, of relative magnitudes, and of relative distances, implies acts of memory, in
connecting the successive impressions made upon the muscular organism, in handling bodies, and in locomotion.
There are also various acts of calculation, and inferences
from comparison.
Introduced into the external world, phenomena now
put on their secondary  form: we are no longer engaged
with the simple sensations of our being, but with the
realities from which they spring; and which, in the case
of the secondary qualities of bodies, we name from the
very sensations which they supplant in our habitual
thought.
Next in the order of this development of sensuous cognition, is to be noticed the remarkable transfer which is
made of the knowledge originally belonging to the muscular organism, as the medium, to the organs of the secondary qualities, and, as chief of these, to the eye. The
colors of objects, and the varieties of light and shade, become early associated with the primary qualities of bodies,
with their specific forms, relative magnitudes, and distances; so that, the simple sensations of color become
such ready and familiar signs of the external world, that
we now know every thing by the eye alone.  Next to the
eye, in importance, is the ear, in this acquired system of
* Supra, p. 59.
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
signs. The other senses, however, play a part by no means
insignificant.
Thus, by the power of Ideas, man steps out from his
internal sensations into the world which is correlated to
him; and so appropriates these sensations, that every act
of consciousness becomes an act of observation.
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PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
SECTION V.
PRIMARY SUBJECTIVE COGNITIONS, OR COGNITIONS OF THE
INTERIOR CONSCIOUSNESS.
THESE are the cognitions which are formed intuitively by
the Reason, respecting the simple subjective, through the
force of its Ideas, and upon condition of the phenomena
which arise from the subjective activity.
When these phenomena are recognised in the interior
consciousness, the Reason, under the Idea of subject,*
conceives of the simple subjective, or the Me.
Under the appropriate Ideas, we are next determined
to cognise the Me as the spiritual substance, antithetical
to the material substance which we have cognised without.
Here the same remarkable transfer of phenomena,
which we have noticed in the preceding Section in respect
to bodies, takes place in respect to the spiritual being.t
Having cognised the subject, we no longer think of bare
phenomena of the consciousness, but of effects and manifestations of spiritual faculties; and the intelligence, causality, and sensitivity which constitute our triune being, are
known and distinguished. The Ideas of personality, Right
and Wrong, Freedom, Responsibility, and Immortality,
now clothe this being with lofty and glorious attributes;
and through the simple consciousness of interior phenomena,
as conditions, we have the intuitions of self-knowledge.
t Supra, pp. 56, 57.
222
* Supra, p. 155. 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
It will be understood both in respect to sensuous, and
to subjective intuitive cognitions, that when I undertake
to point out their progressive development; and the transfer of phenomena from the consciousness to the objective
and subjective realities-thus associating the phenomena
with the causes which produce them, instead of viewing
them in the field of their immediate manifestation,-I
nevertheless do not mean to aver that this progressive development and this transfer are really recognised in the
consciousness in relation to successive and marked periods
of time; but only to indicate the logical order and relations
of the facts. In the very dawn of our being in the world
of the senses, our faculties open their play unitedly and
harmoniously; and ere we begin to exercise reflection, we
find ourselves in a world already realized. But when we
attempt to know ourselves, we must of necessity represent
to ourselves in clear propositions the logical order of the
cognitive development. In doing this, we assume periods
of time corresponding to the order of this development for
the sake of distinctness, while yet, in relation to time,
there was actually simultaneity.
223 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
SECTION VI.
AXIOMS.
AxIoMs * are those truths which depend neither upon Induction, nor upon previous deductions; but which are intuitively cognised under determinate Ideas.
It is evident that before deductions are possible, there
must be judgments expressed in propositions. Now these
judgments must of necessity be resolved either into intuitions, or into Inductions. If into the latter, even then,
in the last result, we come to intuitions, since all facts of
observation, whether belonging to the interior or exterior
consciousness, must ultimately rest in simple intuitions.
The consciousness of phenomena, if regarded as a form
of perception, is manifestly immediate and intuitive. But
beyond this, the primary sensuous and subjective cognitions, as we have seen, are intuitive likewise. The Real
is not an induction from the phenomenal: The latter is a
condition; the former an Intuition.
But Axioms, while they are independent of Induction
and Deduction on the one hand,-on the other, must not
be confounded with the primary cognitions whether sensuous or subjective.  These primary cognitions relate to
the Reality of Being; axioms relate to the Reality of
Truth. t A primary cognition expressed, becomes a pro
* Greek'Al, pa, Authority, Worth.  Hence, an established principleone the authority of which cannot be called in question.
t Supra, p. 140.
224 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
position which affirms existence. Thus a primary sensuous cognition expressed, becomes an affirmation of the
existence of bodies and their qualities: and a primary subjective cognitive expressed, becomes an affirmation of the
existence of the simple subjective with its faculties and
functions.
But an axiom is a proposition expressing a judgment
of universal and absolute truth-of truth which indeed
holds important conn.exions with actual Being, when actual Being is given; but which, nevertheless, is no less
true, if being be not given, or only hypothesised. For example, the axiom, If equals be added to equals, the sums
will be equal, is a truth no less, if there be no actual
Being.  And the axiom, every body must be in space, demands merely a hypothesis of body, and not an affirmation of the existence of body. It is true, indeed, that the
mind does not proceed to form axioms antecedently, in the
order of time, to judgments of actual Being; * but still,
when the axioms are formed, they are seen to have a
necessary and independent existence, and a logical antecedence.
Axioms are determined immediately by Ideas.  The
judgments which they express are the first judgments of
Truth; and they in themselves are the first propositions
of Truth.
Axioms may be classified, according to the philosophical divisions above given, into the metaphysical, and the
nomological. The Reason, with its Ideas entering into the
world of Reality, forms not only its cognitions of that which
is, conceived of as mere facts of existence, but affirms also
truths universal and absolute. The Reason again, by its
* Supra, pp. 60 and 140.
10*
225
0 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
Ideas, not only determines the laws which actually govern
the Real, but here likewise makes universal and absolute
affirmations respecting the necessary forms of law.  These
axiomatic affirmations reach the spheres of determinate
science, and constitute the starting points of the scientific
construction.
METAPHYSICAL AXIOMS.
I. AXIOM OF SUBSTANCE AND ATTRIBUTES.-The Reason not only cognises particular substances and attributes,
but upon such particular cognitions as the chronological
conditions, makes the universal affirmation, Every substance implies attributes, and every attribute implies substance.
II. AXIOM OF CAUSE, AND EFFECT.-The Reason first
cognises a particular cause upon certain phenomenal conditions; and then upon this particular cause, taken in its
turn as a condition, it affirms the axiom, Every phenomenon implies a cause.
III. AXIOM OF BODY AND SPACE.-Body is a primary
sensuous cognition; but no sooner does the cognition take
place, than the Reason affirms, Every body must be in
space.
IV. AXIOM OF TIME AND SUCCESSION.-The cognition
of some particular succession is the conditional starting
point; upon this the Reason affirms, Every succession
must be in time.
V. AXIOM OF THE FINITE AND THE INFINITE.-Time
and Space and the Deity are cognised under the Idea of
the Infinite. In the antecedence of Time, the limited and
finite are indeed first cognised; but it is only by the Idea
of the Infinite that it becomes possible for us to affirm of
'226 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
any thing, It is finite. Thus a particular instance of the
Finite becomes to us a condition of the judgment of the
Infinite. The axiom which immediately follows this judgment in the order of Time is, Every Finite imTlies the Infinite.
VI. AXIOM OF THE OBJECTIVE AND THE SUBJECTIVE.
-The Subjective and Objective are cognised on the condition of particular phenomena, and their relations seen
in particular instances. But here again the Reason affirms, Universally the Objective implies the Subjective.
VII. AXIOM OF UNIVERSAL BEING.-The Reason cognises matter and spirit in the particular, and then goes on
to affirm, All being must be either matter or spirit.
These are the fundamental and most general metaphysical axioms. My object, however, in the above, as
well as in what follows, is not to give a complete enumeration of the axioms, but only so far as shall serve to illustrate their peculiar characteristics, and the law under
which they are determined. The characteristics of axioms
are manifest: they are, absoluteness, independency, and
universality. The law of their determination is equally
clear; they are affirmed by the Reason, under the comprehension and force of its Ideas. In the general view already given of the evolution of Ideas, * the axioms will be
recog,nised in the separation of the universal from the particular. In the order of time, we have the phenomenal,
the particular, and the real, before we have the Axioms
and Ideas; but when we have arrived at Axioms and
Ideas, we perceive that in necessary existence they claim
antecedence.  Ideas determine those universal judgments
of truth which are expressed in axioms; and these univer
* Page 154.
227 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
sal judgments make the particular cognitions logically possible. For example, although I cognise a particular body
in space, before I affirm the axiom, Every body must be in
space, nevertheless, the potential existence of this judgment in the Reason constitutes the possibility of the particular cognition. This two-fold order,-the order of actual development in time, and the order of logical determination,-is the all-important principle to be kept in
mind.
NOMOLOGICAL AXIOMS.
I. AXIOM OF UNIVERSAL LAW.-The Idea of Law determines this axiom, in the same way that the Idea of
Cause determines the axiom of Causality. When particular phenomena are given, the Idea of Cause determines
to the assignment of a particular cause; and then upon
this determines the affirmation, Every phenomenon must
have a cause: so here, likewise, when particular phenomena are given, the Idea of Law determines to the assignment of some law; and then upon this determines the
affirmation, Every phenomenon must have a law. The
Reason does not admit the possibility of chance. No-Law
is as great an absurdity as -No-Cause. A violation of law
is conceivable only in the case of free, and therefore moral,
agents;;*: but even here the violation takes upon itself a
form of law-a law of evil.
II. AXIOM  OF THE  UNIFORMITY  OF  NATURE.-Involved in the Idea of Law is that of order, harmony, and
system. Order, harmony, and system are the developments of law.  The Reason, therefore, not only affirms on
the presentation of phenomena, there must be law govern
* Moral Agency, Chap. VII., Sec. 1.
228 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
ing them; but still farther, these phenomena, thus governed, must present uniform recurrences and adjusted relations. The judgment thus formed is as universal and
absolute as law itself. The axiom which has obtained as
the expression of this judgment is as follows: Nature i8
uniform in her operations.  By this axiom, we are led to
bring together the homogeneous phenomena under the
laws; and to expect with certainty the reappearance of
phenomena.
III. AXIOM OF UNIVERSAL DESIGN.-This Axiom is
determined by its appropriate Idea, and is as follows:
Whatever exhibits marks of design, is the work of an Intelligent Creator.
The Ideas of Law and Design being developed, upon
the condition of particular phenomena, the Axiom is
thereupon immediately affirmed by the Reason, and becomes thenceforth the starting point and guide in all subsequent observations and experiments. This Axiom lies
at the foundation of the so-called d posteriori argument
for the existence of a God.  Hence the ultimate basis of
this argument is an a priori principle.  But the ultimate
basis of all cognition and ratiocination is, as we have seen,
composed of a' priori principles.
IV. AXIOM OF THE CORRESPONDENCE OF IDEAS AND
REALITY.-Every Idea implies a Reality of Actual Being
or of Truth; and every Reality of Actual Being or of
Truth, implies an Idea.  Every Idea developed is developed in connexion with some form of Reality, *: in the effort of the Reason to grasp Reality. On the other hand,
let us place ourselves in the world of Reality, and all our
attempts at rational explanation lead us back to the Con
* Supra, Part II., Sec. 3.
229 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
stitutive Ideas. *: Now, upon the particular instances of
this two-fold movement, the Reason supervenes with the
universal affirmation which we have given above. All
Ideas must attach themselves to Realities. All Realities
must correspond to Ideas. It is the cardinal Axiom of
pure Philosophy.
V. MORAL AXIOMS.-I have given the cardinal moral
Idea, namely, the Idea of Right and Wrong; but have
not, for obvious reasons, entered into an explication of the
particular Ideas of Justice, Benevolence, and so on, contained under it. It would, in like maaner, transcend the
objects of this elementary Treatise to attempt, in detail,
a presentation of the Moral Axioms. I will only remark,
that the Divine Code announced at Sinai, and afterwards
expounded and exemplified by the Redeemer of men, is
in -truth a collection of the fundamental Moral Axioms.
They are indeed given under the form of laws, but they,
at the same time, contain the affirmation of great and universal truths, uttered by the Infinite Reason, and responded to and re-affirmed by the Reason of every moral
being.
VI. ESTHETICAL AxioMs.-These are determined by
the Idea of Beauty, and comprise the first principles. of
Esthetical Science and of the rules of Art. I will adduce
only two or three. These will answer the end of illustration. And I propose nothing further.
1. Beauty of every species and form has its Ideal or
Archetype in the Imagination.
2. Every particular form of Beauty presents a union
of regularity and variety. 
3. Nature and Art are homogeneous; but the former
does not limit the latter.
* Supra, Part L, Sec. 10.
230 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
VII. SOMATOLOGICAL AxioMs.-A complete exhibition
of these would strictly belong to a Philosophy of Nature.
Here, also, I am aiming only at an illustration of the great
law of determining Axioms by the Ideas of the Reason.
1. Axiom of the Inertia of Bodies.-This Axiom is
determined by the Idea of Matter, as a passive, and not a
self-moving substance. Our actual experience is limited;
nay, as to one part of the Axiom, we have no experience
whatever, namely, that a body, when put in motion, will
continue to move on for ever in the line of the impulse,
tnle8ss it meet with resistance from another force: for we
have no example of a body moving on without meeting
with a resistance, tending either to bring it to a state of
repose, or to change the direction of its motion. Besides,
the universality and absoluteness of the entire affirmation
must carry it beyond the possibility of experience.
2. Axiom of Action and Reaction.-The equality of
reaction to action in an opposite direction, is an affirmation
of universal and necessary truth, and therefore transcends
the reach of experience. It is determined by the Idea of
Relation under the third form.::*
3. A4xiom of the Centre of Gravity. That every body
has its centre of gravity, or a point,' around which, when
supported, all the parts of the body are balanced by the
gravitating force, is unquestionably a universal and necessary conception. By mere experience it could not be determined; nor has any one ever attempted to determine it
by experience. On the other hand, the Ideas of Action
and Reaction, and of Centralization, cannot but determine
it. It is a truth with which we begin our investigations
in Nature, and of which no subsequent experience renders
us more certain and confident.
* Supra, p. 171.
231 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
It will be seen by reflecting upon these and other
axioms, which might be adduced from mechanical science,
that the order of development is as follows:
First. The Reason, by its function of consciousness,
comes, in the order of time, in connection with the phenomena of the external world.
Secondly. Its constitutive Ideas now form the original
sensuous cognitions.
Thirdly. Thus introduced to particular Realities, the
Ideas determine the universal judgments, which, when expressed in clear and convenient language, become axioms.
VIII.-AxioMs OF PURE ScIENCE.-These belong to
the Mathematics. They are universal and intuitive affirmations of the Reason respecting the two forms of quantity,
namely, continued and discrete.*:
- The most remarkable of these Axioms are those generally laid down in mathematical treatises as Axioms of
Equality and Inequality. The Ideas which determine
these Axioms are Quantity, Identity, and Difference.
Unity, multiplication, and diminution are the fundamental conceptions of the Science of Numbers: and these
are contained in the Idea of Quantity. Equation is the
fundamental conception of Geometry and Algebra; and
this is given in Identity. Proportion, as an equation of
ratios, is embraced by the same conception: and Ratio is
but a comparison of quantities in respect to a common
unit.
What remains to be remarked respecting axioms of this
class will naturally come up under the following section.
* Supra, p. 92.
232 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
IX.-LOGICAL AXIOMS.
Axioms of this class relate to the processes of the Reason in general in its truth-seeking activity. We have seen
that there are three cardinal forms of this activity, Intuition, Induction, and Deduction. Logical Axioms, therefore, may be classed under three corresponding heads.
AXIOMs RELATING  TO IXTUITION.-1. Whatever the
Reason intuitively knows, it knows under the characteristics of Universality and Necessity. Intuitive truths are
universal, that is, true without any exception; and necessary, that is, their opposites are impossible.
2. Whatever is known intuitively neither requires nor
admits of demonstration.   Demonstration always  presumes something going before which is already known.
An endless retrogression of demonstrations is an absurdity.
There must be some first truths which do not require demonstration; and which, because they are first, do not
admit of demonstration, since there is nothing by which to
demonstrate them.
3. Whatever is known intuitively must reach beyond
any induction of particulars, and be antecedent to them
in the order of necessary existence.  All induction is to
us unavoidably limited, and must be led on by some antecedent and guiding principle. Induction without a purpose does not belong to philosophy.
AXIOMS RELATING TO INDUCTION.-Axioms relating
to Intuition properly belong to this division of our Treatise. Axioms relating to Induction cannot be discussed
here without anticipating what properly belongs to the
next division. I shall, therefore, adjourn any statement
of them.
AXIOMS RELATING TO DEDUCTION.-The reason above
233 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
given applies to this class of Axioms likewise. I shall accordingly adjourn them to the appropriate division, only
remarking, that the  "Dictum de omni et nullo,"-that
whatever is ag2rmed or denied of any term distributed,
or, taken universally, is affirmed or denied of every particular comprehended under it,-which Aristotle employs
for explaining the validity of Deduction,-is a cardinal
Axiom of this class.
234 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
SECTION VII.
OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF AXIOMS IN GENERAL.
THESE characteristics have appeared in the course of the
preceding section; they are Universality, Necessity, and
Logical Antecedence to Induction and Deduction. My
principal object in presenting them in a separate section,
is to meet certain objections which have been urged against
them.
It has been said that Axioms are merely statements of
general observations. For example, that "Every body
must be in space," means nothing more than that "Every
body," as far as observation goes, is in space;" and that
the Axiom, "If the same or equal quantities be added to
equal quantities, their sums will be equal," and all the
other Axioms of Equation, are merely of the same nature
-expressions of general observations unattended by any
exception. Here, it will be perceived, that universality is
merged into generality; the necessary into the inconceivable; and absolute truth into phenomenal conditions.
That " Every body is in space" is thus merely a fact in
the experience of all men; and it is inconceivable that any
body should not be in space, because no fact of this kind
has ever appeared in human experience. And if it be affirmed in opposition to this, that our thought at least surpasses our observation when passing beyond the possibility
of actual observation-beyond all visible stars,-we think
235 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
that if bodies be there also, they must there also be in
space;-then it is replied that we make to ourselves in
this case an imaginary representation of facts, which are
merely copies of real facts, and that we are thus still in
the region of observation -The imagination takes the
place of the sense,. and wherever it goes, it only represents
facts of the sense;-wherever it goes, it still makes for itself locality and particular facts. It does not fill immensity,
nor grasp the universal,-it is only extending observation,
and multiplying facts in another way.
The above is the argument fully stated. The answer
does not appear to me difficult.
First. Before we can determine the validity of Axioms
as necessary, universal, and intuitive truths, we must determine the validity of Ideas. Have we ideas of Space,
of -Necessity, of the Infinite, and so on? It does, indeed,
seem, that if we have any positive cognition whatever,
space is such an one. Equally positive is our cognition of
its characteristics. Space is necessary and infinite, and
having no limits, it has no form. And when we affirm
that it is infinite, we do not mean to express merely our
incapability of conceiving of limits; but the utter impossibility of limits. And, again, when we affirm that space
is necessary, we do not mean to express merely our incapability of conceiving of no space, but the absolute being
of space independently of all conception whatever. To
make all cognitions personal and relative-deriving their
characteristics from the individual constitution, is'to deny
to Truth any independent and absolute foundations. Then
are we, for aught we know, only entertained with shadows,
and without any fixed certainty of Reality. But we cannot yield to such doctrines; because we have that within
us which assures us of their falsity. Our cognitions are
236 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
facts, which are explained, and can only be explained by
referring to the Ideas of the Reason.
Secondly. It has been shown in the preceding pages
that the primary phenomena are simple sensations and affections of our own being revealed to consciousness; and
that they assume their secondary character as manifestations of Reality, only through the supervention of Ideas.
Without Ideas we should never attain substance, cause, or
law, nor the exterior sphere of their manifestation. The
very cognition of Body, therefore, depends upon Ideas
which assign it substance and qualities, connect it with
causes, and give it limits, and form and place. Not even
a particular body can be cognised in space without Ideas.
Now, when we have the Idea of Space and the Cognition of Body with their opposite characteristics, the Reason
cannot but affirm'Every Body must be in space.' It is
by no means an affair of observation and induction-it
does not depend upon looking at this body and that body,
in order to see whether they really are in space, and
thus from multiplied observations drawing a general conclusion: On the contrary, no sooner do we cognise Space
and Body, than we affirm absolutely and necessarily,
'Every Body must be in space.' So. far from requiring
imagination beyond actual observation, actual observation
itself is anticipated.
The same reasoning will apply to all other Axioms.
Take the Axiom,'If equals be added to equals, the sums
will be equal.' This Axiom is not a general conclusion
from repeated trials and observations; but no sooner have
we cognitions of Quantity, Identity, and so on, under the
Corresponding Ideas, than we make this and the kindred
/ffirmations as universal and necessary affirmations. Here,
again, instead of multiplying observations by imaginary
237 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
cases, we pause for no observation whatever, but directly
determine the Axioms by the Ideas.
Take another Axiom:'If two straight lines intersect
or cross each other, they can never meet again; but if produced, must go on diverging for ever.' Now, having formed
the conception of two straight lines, drawn in space in the
position above stated, we require no observation along the
course of their production, either actually or by the imagination, in order to gather facts for a general conclusion:
the instant the thought is fixed upon the lines at the point
of intersection, the affirmation is made under the characteristics of Universality and Necessity.
The distinction between a conclusion gained by extended
and careful observation, and a truth which at once flashes
upon the mind-between the result of a long drawn out
induction, and. an immediate determination of the Reason,
-is clear and palpable. The phenomenal conditions, under
which such a truth is given, are easily separable from the
truth itself; since they neither contain nor measure it: for
example, the sensation of hardness which is conditional to
our cognition of Space, neither contains nor measures
Space. Again, the universality of such a truth is clearly
distinguishable from the generality of an observation; for
the truth is affirmed without admitting the possibility of
limits or exceptions, as that'Every body must be in
space;' but an observation, as that of the rising and setting of the sun, and that of the rising and falling of the
tides, admits of the possibility of limits and exceptions.
Omnipotence can change the whole order of the system;
but not even Omnipotence can form a body not in space
Once more, the inconceivableness of a fact, and the necessity of a Truth, are also clearly distinguishable. A fact it
inconceivable, when it is both removed from the sphere of
238 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
our observation, and unlike any fact which has come under
our observation. Thus a person residing within the Tropics, and who has never seen ice, cannot conceive of freezing
water. The Cartesians rejected the Newtonian doctrine
of the gravitation of bodies, on the ground that it is inconceivable that a body can act where it is not. Their
error lay in adopting a theory of causality which made the
causal activity a matter of sensuous conception.   The
Newtonian doctrine is inconceivable as a sensuous fact, if
causes act only in the contact of material particles. But
the doctrine was to be determined on other grounds than
the possibility of observing the attractive force itself. A
necessary truth, on the other hand, is not received, because
it is conceivable as an observed fact, nor because its oppoite is simply inconceivable: It is received because it is
absolute and fixed as a cognition of the Reason, and its
opposite impossible.   That' Every body  must  be in
pace, that'Two straight lines cannot enclose a space,'
.re necessary truths, because seen by intuition to be such
hat their opposites are impossible. You may say, if you
,lease, that their opposites are inconceivable, taking this
erm in an intense and superlative sense, and, indeed,
!lentifying it with the impossible: but the term is objec;onable, because ambiguous, and liable to confound pure
,tuitions of the Reason with facts of observation.
239 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
SECTION VIII.
GENERAL RELATIONS OF AXIOMS.
I. Axioms, in themselves, primary universal and necessary intuitive truths, are related as logical antecedents to
universal and necessary deductive truths. The science of
Geometry affords us a perfect and stupendous example of
this relation.
II. Axioms are related also as logical antecedents tc
our cognitions. The Axiom'Every body must be ir
space' offers an illustration.  When we come to cognis,
any particular body, we of necessity must cognise it ispace;  but we can cognise it in space only upon th,
ground of the Axiom,'Every body must be in space.
As the idea of space is the logical antecedent of the cog
nition of the body, so also the universal affirmation is th
logical antecedent of any particular designation, for a par
ticular designation implies the general truth. The sense
tion of resistance is the antecedent in time-the conditio
or occasion of the cognition of both body and space: an
as comprehending the cognitions in their relation to eac
other, appears the Axiom,'Every body must  be  i
space.' The same course of remark applies to the Axiom
'Every phenomenon implies a Cause,' and'Every ph
nomenon implies a Law,' and other similar Axioms.'I
240 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
attempt to establish these Axioms by induction, is for ever
to travel in a circle, since every fact inducted implies the
Axioms themselves.
III. Axioms either take immediately the form of
Laws, or determine Laws. As instances of the first, we
may adduce the great moral laws announced at Sinai. I
have already referred to these. Every one of these utters
a universal and necessary moral truth. Duty as here presented is not arbitrary, but rational.
In the department of Physics, we have a striking illustration in the Three Laws of Motion. The first Law is
the Axiom of the inertia of bodies, the Axiom itself being
determined by the Idea of Cause: The second law is the
Axiom of Effects proportioned to their causes, and is determined by the same Idea: The third law is the Axiom
of Action and Reaction. These are Axioms, because universal and necessary truths determined by ideas.
They are universal, for no exception is admissible;
they are necessary, for the Reason affirms the impossibility
of their opposites. They are true on a mere hypothesis
of bodies. But when taken in their relations to actually
existing bodies, they become actual primary laws.
All primary laws are Axiomatic: but there are seconlary laws which proceed from the Axioms. All ethical
!aws for the specific regulation of human conduct, and all
:ivil jurisprudence, are thus derived.
All the secondary laws of Physical Science are dependnt, in like manner, upon the primary Axiomatic laws.
iere, too, the Mathematics are applied, inasmuch as the
notions, magnitudes, distances, times, weights, and forces
I bodies are representable either as continued or discrete
uantities.*:'
* Supra, pp. 92-5.
11
241 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
I have already shown* that science in general is constructed out of phenomena by the aid of Ideas and Axioms.
In the pure Mathematics, the phenomenal material belongs
to the interior consciousness-that is, is given in reflection
-and comprises particulars comparatively few in number,
simple, and definite.
In physical science, on the contrary, the phenomena
belong to the exterior consciousness, that is, are given in
sensation, and are various, complicated, and multitudinous.
In the latter, therefore, observation and experiment, nice,
laborious, and extensive, are required. And here it is
that Inductive Logic receives its widest and-most important application.
* Part I., Sec. XII.
242 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
SECTION IX.
DEFINITION.
"THE end or scope of all definition, is to make any given
object clearer, plainer, and more distinct to the Intelligence. Adopting the usual division of logicians, we represent definition as either nominal or real. A nominal
definition is merely substituting one name for another,the name substituted being supposed to be better understood. A real definition aims to explain the nature of the
thing, by enumerating its parts, assigning its classification,
pointing out its substance, describing its properties and
relations, or fixing its limits and distinctions.
"A  real definition may  be accidental or essential.
When accidental, it explains merely those accidents or
properties of an object which are not constitutive of it,
and without which it can be conceived;-for example, the
name, time, place of birth, and employment of an individual, are accidents. When essential, it explains the
essence and properties of an object which are constitutive
of it, and without which it cannot be conceived;-for example, mind and body are essential parts of an individual
man.
"Again:  an essential definition is logical, when it assigns the object its place, under generical and specific
classification. Thus man is logically defined an intellectual animal-animal being the genues, intellectual the
243 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
differentia, or that which distinguishes him essentially
from all other animals.
"An essential definition is physical, when, where the
objects admits of it, the physical parts are enumerated,
meaning by physical parts those which are presented to
the observation of the senses.
"An essential definition is metaphysical, when it assigns essence and properties to the object, which are metaphysical-meaning by metaphysical that which is not
known by observation of the senses, but by intuition of
Reason;-for example, Man is a 8piritual being; body is
a resisting substance. From this it appears that a logical
definition is dependent upon antecedent, physical, and
metaphysical definitions.
"Now, it is plain, that in order to define, we must
have some prior conceptions by which to define. In a
mere nominal definition, we must have a prior word already better understood than the word we are about to
define. In a real definition, we must already have a clear
knowledge of the essences, properties, and accidents we
may make use of for this purpose. A definition, therefore, which we are at this moment framing, must be preceded either by definitions already made, or by conceptions which do not require or admit of antecedent definitions.
"When present definitions presume antecedent definitions, these antecedent definitions must be preceded by
other antecedent definitions, or by conceptions which do
not require or admit of antecedent definitions. We must,
therefore, in all cases, at length come to conceptions which
do not require or admit of antecedent definitions; for a
retrogression of definitions ad infinitum, is an absurdity.
" These starting points of thought-these primary
244 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
conceptions and beliefs, are logically necessary to account
for, explain, and define all our other knowledges. They
are like the light, which, while it reveals all objects of
sight, can find nothing by which it itself can be more
plainly revealed. That we cannot analyse light proves
nothing against its existence: we know it must exist, because we see all things by means of it. Indeed, we must
affirm in general, that whatever is clearest to our minds,
and really best known, must be incapable of explanation,
definition, or demonstration: for if these were required in
reference to the objects supposed, then it would follow
that there must be something beyond these still clearer,
and still better known, namely, that by which the explanation, definition, or demonstration is to be effected,which is contrary to the hypothesis." *
The distinction above made between a nominal and a
real definition is palpable; for to give the signification of
one word, by means of another more familiar, is widely
different from pointing out what is designed to be expressed by the word itself. But inasmuch as a real definition is designed to point out what is expressed by the
word itself, it has been contended that no definition can
properly be said to explain the nature of a thing; but
only to determine the appropriation of a word: Thus, to
define Man is not to point out the nature of man, but to
show what is intended to be expressed by it.
Now it seems to me that to determine the appropriation of a word is equivalent to defining the nature of the
thing for which the word stands. Take the usual definition of a circle, for example:-' A circle is a figure contained by one line, which is called the circumference, every
* Doctrine of the Will, Ch. II., Sec. 1.
245 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
point of which is equally distant from a common point
called the centre.' Here it is evident that the word circle
cannot be defined, or, in other words, its appropriation determined without explaining that foi which it stands. In
the course of this real definition we give also two nominal
definitions, when we call the containing line the circumference, and the common point the centre. We may also
nominally define a circle by saying,'it is a figure bounded
by a circumference.' But taken together as above, we
have a real definition of circle. In this definition we have
Lundoubtedly an intuitive cognition expressed; for in defining a circle it is implied that it is an actual magnitude.
We may indeed define that which has no real existence,
as a griffin, a centaur, or a harpy; but then it is understood that we are referring to imaginary beings.
Real definitions, in so far as they contain or imply
judgments of truth, are authoritative. This is true of
geometrical definitions, with the exception of those which
are merely nominal.'A surface is that which has length
and breadth without height or thickness,' is a real definition, because it points out and affirms two dimensions in
space; and it is authoritative just to the extent of this
affirmation.  Strictly nominal definitions can be made out
only by synonymes or by a circumlocution.
A real definition is complete or incomplete. It is complete, only when all that is comprehended by the word
which represents the object of thought is expressed. Thus
that'Man is a rational animal' is a real definition, but
still an incomplete one; for the object of thought represented by the word'Man' comprehends more than is
expressed by the genus'Animal,' and the differentia
'Rational.'
)efinitions are varied according to different ends pros
246 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
posed. The definition is always adequate when it meets
the end proposed.  To define'Man' as a' rational animal' is sufficient in ordinary classification to distinguish
him from all other animals. According to a distribution
which Cuvier made of the species of the Animal Kingdom, he found it necessary to define'Man' "a mammiferous animal having two hands." Both definitions are real,
because giving in part what really belongs to Man: both
are incomplete, considered in respect to the whole subject
'Man;' and yet both are adequate when considered in
respect to their particular ends. Indeed, what are techiically called definitions must of necessity, in numerous
instances, be incomplete, either from our imperfect knowledge of the subject, or from its manifold richness; so
that to give a complete definition would be equivalent to
a scientific disquisition.
In Geometry, and in all absolute science, the definitions are complete. They express a complete and perfectly clear cognition, and give a name to the object of the
cognition. That'a straight line is the shortest distance
between two points,' and that'a curve line is one which
changes its direction at every point,' are cognitions clear
and full, while the objects of the cognitions are distinctively named. Were not this the case, the definitions
could not be received as a basis of the exact and rigid
scientific construction.
There is one enquiry which yet remains. What distinguishes an Axiom from a real Definition?  An Axiom
has been shown to be a universal and necessary truth determined immediately by Ideas. A real definition is the
explication of a cognition represented or expressed by
some particular word or phrase. Cognition may be primitive and intuitive, or secondary and derived, If the latter,
247 
PRIMORDIAL LOGIC.
it plainly cannot be axiomatic. But suppose it be the
former, like the definitions of Geometry? Then, in this
case, it is unquestionably authoritative as an original intuition:-the definitions of a straight and of a curve line,
of a circle, of a triangle, of a right angle, of a parallelogram and so on, must be rigidly adhered to in all the subsequent demonstrations; but still they are only cognitions,
of certain magnitudes. Now, an Axiom does not respect
any particular magnitude, but comprehends all alike.
Thus when it is affirmed that'things which are equal to
the same thing, are equal to each other;' that,'if equals
be added to equals, the wholes will be equal,' no respect
is had to any particular magnitude or quantity: the
Axioms are true alike of all Geometrical magnitudes, of
all real quantities, or of quantities represented generally
under Algebraic Symbols. We have thus a very plain
distinction-the distinction between an original intuitive
cognition in relation to a particular subject, and a universal judgment limited to no particular subject. The definition of a circle is authoritative, but it is so only in relation to a circle; while the Axiom, " If equals be added to
equals, the wholes will be equal," is so manifestly universal, and independent of any particular subject, that it not
only appears just as clear in the general expression as in
the particular, but really takes logical antecedence in the
general expression, and determines by its authority the
truth of the particular.
I here complete the view I proposed to take of Primordial Logic. Next in order is Inductive Logic. Before
we can proceed to Deduction, we must have truths and
principles from which to deduce. These are furnished
by Intuition and Induction. Hence the two corresponding forms of Logic.
248 
BOOK II.
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
SECTION I.
IN T RODUC TION.
IT is sometimes said, that to an Omniscient Being neither
Induction nor Deduction are necessary; but that to such
a Being all truth and knowledge are intuitive. Induction
and Deduction indeed are not necessary to an Omniscient
Being, considered as indispensable means of knowledge.
Such a Being must have the power of seeing all truth
directly. It is told of Newton that his mind grasped the
conclusions of Geometry without laboriously passing through
the usual process of reasoning. This indicated a mental
energy superior to that of men in general. But, nevertheless, the truths and knowledges, at which we arrive by
Induction and Deduction, do not stand in the same relation to the mind with intuitive truths. An intuitive
truth is not only-in respect to the mode of knowingseen directly; —it is also seen to be true in itself-true
independently of all antecedents. But a deductive truth,
even if-in respect to the mode of knowing-seen to be
true without passing through the deductive process; still,
11* 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
if a reason be given for its truth, and it be minutely
analysed, it must to every mind be seen to be true, not in
itself and independently of all antecedents, but true,
because something going before and upon which it depends,
is true.   So also an inductive truth, although known
directly by the power of an Omniscient mind, must be
known in all its relations and dependencies; otherwise it
is not truly and perfectly known. It thus appears, that
when we speak of Intuitive, Deductive and Inductive
truths, we refer not merely to modes of knowing, but to
the intrinsic character of the truths themselves.
What, then, are those truths and knowledges, which
are arrived at in the way of Induction? In other words,
what is the field of Induction?
The field of Induction is that in which we find the
secondary phenomena.
The primary phenomena are simply the conditions of
the primary cognitions.   In these we attain objective
reality. Then, the phenomena-thenceforward recognized
as the phenomena of objective reality-become the materials of Induction.
Phenomena have Cause and Law as necessary antecedents. The phenomena do not by generalization make up
the Cause and Law; but the Cause and Law are the
ground of the phenomena. The mere classification of
phenomena under Resemblance and Difference, for the
purpose of affixing a common name, is widely different
from assigning them Cause and Law. In attempting to
account for the resemblance and difference, we of course
have to proceed to Cause and Law; but the classification
itself gives us neither the one nor the other.
In the Divine Mind, cause and law existed before phenomena were developed. Here was the actual necessary
250 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
antecedence.   The mind which conceived and created,
conceived and created from its own plenitude. The Divine
Mind, therefore, foresaw the phenomena in the cause and
law which it contained within itself. The phenomena
must have been connected with cause and law in the
Divine Conception, since the connexion is necessary to the
completeness of the knowledge. But here we see that
the order of knowing is identical with the order of neces
sary existence.
It is conceivable that the Divine Being might have
constituted finite minds with such lofty powers as directly
to know the causes and laws of the Universe, and through
them the appropriate and necessary phenomena. Now,
that these causes and laws are attained, phenomena
through them can be known in regions of space where the
eye has yet made no observations, and predicted in periods
of time lying far away in the future.  And these lofty
minds, in possession of the causes and laws by a superior
intuition, might in like manner grasp the phenomena
springing out of and depending upon them. But man is
not a being thus constituted. The order of his development presents us-First, simple sensations: Secondly,
the realization of the objective world by Ideas appropriating the sensations: Thirdly, the observation of the phenomena of this objective world in order to determine its
causes and laws. Now, under the last, we have the field
of Induction as before stated: and the great point to be
determined is, how by the observation of phenomena the
causes and laws are arrived at.
251 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
SECTION II.
CAUSES AND LAWS.
TEE philosophical distinction between Cause and Law is
perfectly clear. Cause is that which accounts for the existence of being and phenomena: Law is that which accounts for the order and relations of being and phenomena.
Cause may be divided into two grand classes, spiritual
or mental, and physical; the former presenting two grades,
the infinite and the finite, the latter presenting the finite
only.
Now, in philosophical strictness, the only enquiry that
can arise here respecting Cause is, Whether the physical
cause is really distinct from the spiritual. In respect to
all our enquiries into the constitution of the objective
world, every end is answered by granting at once-First,
that in every finite intelligence there is a proper Cause
which accounts for all the voluntary acts: Secondly, that
in the universe of matter all causality is resolvable into
the First and all-comprehending Cause. Physical causes,
viewed in philosophical simplicity, are invisible powers lying behind the phenomena of the universe. Whenever we
attempt to classify these, we in reality classify only the
phenomena which are received as the signs or expressions
of the Causes.:
* Phenomena, and phenomena alone, are classed into genera and species
on the grounds of resemblance and difference. We, indeed, speak of a mag
252 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
What are ordinarily termed physical causes are merely
phenomena which are stated and invariable antecedents,
or fixed conditions of other phenomena: for example, the
sun and moon in the changes of the tide; visible fire in
combustion; water and steam as propelling powers, the
conjunction of substances in chemical changes; light, heat,
netic cause, a healing cause, a consuming cause, and so on; but these differentia really refer to the phenomena;-the phenomena of magnetism, of healing, and of combustion, all differing from each other; but Cause is one simple
Idea, the Idea of that which accounts for the possible and actual existence of
these various phenomena. Indeed, we can conceive of the same cause as producing them all; as when we conceive of the Divine Being as the universal
and sole Cause. This plainly is possible: and in the case of second causes we
do actually attribute a vast variety of phenomena to one cause; the phenomena
being capable of being reduced to genera and species, while the cause retains
all its simplicity.
" Human power, taken under any point of view, is one of perfect simplicity; it is nothing that can be described under any form; it can neither be
physically separated into parts, nor logically distributed into genera; it always
manifests itself by volition; and yet how various are the phenomena produced
-the phenomena of which volition is the immediate antecedent!
"There may, however, be differences in degree; one cause may produce
a greater variety of phenomena than another; and thus, causes which produce
certain phenomena, and act in relation to certain substances only, may be
conceived of as simply limited in power without implying difference in kind.
If, for example, I were gifted with the power of regulating my digestive functions, or the circulation of my blood, or of moving my ears after the manner
of a dog or a horse, it would argue no new power differing in kind, but merely
the extension of my causality My volition now is limited to the movement
of certain members, and cannot influence others; if I could move my ears as
I do my hands, then my volition would do one thing more than it is now
capable of doing.
"Again, water is known to hold salt in solution: Now, if we were to suppose water to have the additional power of dissolving wood and holding the
potassium in solution, we would not be altering in our conception the nature
:r kind of solvent power in water:-We would only be enlarging that power.
t is manifest that if we had made the experiment of the solvent power of
Later only upon sugar, we might with as much reason conjecture that, if furher tried, it would dissolve wood, as that it would dissolve salt."-Doctrine of
te Will, pp. 31, 32.  See also p. 301.
253 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
air, and moisture in vegetation, and so on. In making
out a science of nature it is immaterial, as before intimated, what we conceive the invisible and real causes to be;
or whether we conceive of only one universal cause producing all this variety of effect. On the other hand, the
very determination of such a science depends upon observing the order and relations of the phenomena. But
the order and relations of the phenomena do not truly belong to cause, but to law. Hence the aim of Induction,
when expressed with philosophic precision, is not to arrive
at causes, but to arrive at laws. Thus in gravitation, the
great enquiry did not so much respect the nature of the
cause, as the.fact of the regulated central determination
of bodies. The expansion of steam is a phenomenon; and
other phenomena are connected with it as invariable consequents: We know there must be cause lying behind
the phenomena-of this we are satisfied-whether it be a
physical cause, distinct and measured in its own sphere,
or the all-pervading universal Cause: but the great points
of interest to us in science and practical mechanics are
the order and relations of the phenomena;  in other
words, the law which governs the evolution of the phenomena.
If the undulatory theory of light be established, the
interest of the thing does not arise from having arrived at
an ultimate cause; but in having gained new phenomena
with wider relations and more comprehensive laws. An
ultimate cause we have not attained; the ethereal undu
lations precede the sensations of light, and the presenc.of the sun precedes the undulations; and thus we have 
succession of related phenomena;-while enquiries stil
arise respecting the correlation of the sun and the all-per
vading elastic ether which may bring to light other ante
254 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
cedent phenomena. The real enquiry then is, not after
the ultimate cause of light, but after the whole succession
of inter-dependent phenomena connected with the sensation under all its phases. Throughout the whole succession of phenomena there is cause acting, cause developing
the phenomena; but that which we seek after-the
characteristics of phenomena, their order and relation, is
comprehended by law. We can conceive of one universal
cause producing from its own fulness every variety of
phenomena; but this variety itself denotes diversity of
design and therefore diversity of law.
The attraction of gravitation draws bodies towards the
centre of the earth. Suppose it were ascertained that an
exceedingly subtile ether exists between the particles of
matter, having in itself a central determination by which
all bodies are-made to tend toward the centre: Then indeed we should have a new class of antecedent phenomena;  but the tendency of bodies towards the centre
would be no more explained than before, as far as cause is
considered; we would only be carried one step farther
back in our observations; and we might now institute enquiries respecting the force acting upon or in the particles
of the subtile ether. Unquestionably, however, were such
an ether discovered, we should enlarge our view of the
laws and order of creation.
To revert to the theories of light. By the common
theory, luminous particles are supposed to be thrown off
in straight lines from the luminous body, the phenomena
of this emission being the antecedent phenomena deemed
sufficient to account for the consequent phenomena. By
the undulatory theory, the sensation of light and all the
phenomena are supposed to find their sufficient antecedent
phenomena in the undulations of the elastic medium;
255 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
that is, the ethereal undulations being granted as the invariable antecedent to the sensation of light, and the cessation of these undulations as the invariable antecedent
of darkness or the absence of this sensation, then the
movement of these undulations will serve to explain all
the phenomena of vision. In both theories we have in
part a hypothesis of phenomena, and in part a statement
of actual phenomena; and the object in both is so to connect the hypothetical with the actual as to exhibit not the
cause of the actual phenomena, but the law.  That light
consists of fine particles thrown off from luminous bodies
and moving in straight lines with an inconceivable velocity,
is a theory which legitimately connects itself with the phenomena of reflection and refraction as exhibited in speculums, prisms, lenses, and so on. These phenomena can
also be legitimately connected with the undulations of the
imponderable medium.  Other phenomena, however, are
deemed by philosophers to be legitimately connected only
with the last theory. But in neither theory do the hypothesised constitute the cause of the actual phenomena,
but only the required conditions of their manifestations.
If now we conceive of the great and all-comprehending
Mind designing to produce the phenomena of light and
vision, whether by his direct agency, or by second causes
permeating and acting in material substances, then the
manner in which different substances are related to each
other, and the fixed order and dependency of the phenomena, become to us the exponent of the law, which the
Great Designing Mind ordained for his own efficiency, or
for the governance of the secondary powers.   The two
theories present us in part, two different orders of phenomena, and hence two different laws of light and vision.
In the minute and complete determination of these laws,
256 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
so far as the conception of quantity comes in, the mathematics, as the science of quantity, is employed to give the
expressions.
What then is law? Is it only the invariable succession of phenomena? May the Creator, by his omnipotence, fix the succession of phenomena in any order he
pleases, and is this fixed and arbitrary succession the law
of Nature?
Law is not arbitrary in the morale. Hence that succession of phenomena which comprises the conduct' of responsible beings can be right and fit only when conformed
to one law.
Equally clear is it that the law of the Beautiful is not
arbitrary.
But how stands this question in Somatology? This is
the point now to be considered.
In the first place, in any system of bodies there can be
no room for arbitrary laws, so far as the conditions of the
system bring the bodies under mathematical formula.
And bodies, since they must have magnitudes and determinate forms, and be related to each other, and have motion as the resultant of forces, cannot escape these formula.
It is inconceivable and impossible, that a universe of bodies
should have been constituted in violation of the principles
of the science of quantity.
In the second place, the very notion of arbitrary law is
absurd. Law is the work of the Reason-the necessary
outflow of its Ideas. The will may institute arbitrary
-ules, as the word arbitrary indicates. The Will may
violate the  Reason;  but the institutions of arbitrary
.hoice in opposition to Reason, or in the mere freakishless of Fancy, are not to be dignified with the name of
aws, in the high and proper sense,
257 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
In the third place, arbitrary choice cannot be ascribed
to Infinite [ntelligence. He who is the Fountain of truth,
law, beauty, benignity, and order, cannot be thought of as
creating the universe otherwise than under the light of
his Eternal Ideas. And when we come to look into his
works, we find everywhere the resplendent marks of law:
and the farther our observation penetrates, the more
varied, resplendent, and positive do these marks become.
The axiom, " that every phenomenon presumes a law,"
or that every phenomenon is the result of intelligent design, is affirmed by the Reason in the clear insight that
Infinite Intelligence, and not arbitrary choice, decided the
system of Nature.
There might indeed have been a variety of systems
governed by laws more or less benign and perfect, a conception which we allow in the various theories by which
we attempt to express the laws of given phenomena; but
nevertheless, we are constrained to believe that an infinitely perfect Intelligence could not but have projected
the best possible system, taking it in all its relations.
When we look therefore into Nature, we expect not only
to find laws properly so called; but we expect also to find
the wisest and most benign laws.
258 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
SECTION III.
THE HUMAN REASON AS RELATED TO THE OBJECTIVE
WORLD.
tHE great and all-wise Being, who constituted the outer
.~orld, constituted also the Mind which is to investigate its
aws. The Mind does not go to its work unfurnished.
[ade after the likeness of the Creator-after the likeness
If that Reason- from whose Ideas all law sprang forth;onstituted therefore with Ideas, and thus having sources
f law within itself, it cannot go out into the world where
-w is embodied and realized, without waking up the
}orious recognition.  Having eyes to see, the light which
*ours in upon it seems not a strange, but an expected and
cnial visitation. The human mind is prepared to know
world which had its origin in mind.. As an artist comrehends the works of art, so does the mind of man com.ehend the works of God.
I have already, in the preceding Parts, said so much
the Ideas of the Reason, that I need here barely allude
the subject, or call it up again only so far as to apply it
the matter in hand.
The development of the Ideas, as we have seen, does
)t take place separately from Reality; but when the re ity is present in relation to which they are to act, then
ey manifest themselves.   The manifestation is spon
259 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
taneous-the earnest outflow of the mind to reach its
proper objects.
In the first place, Ideas of cause and law, and of consequent system and order, Ideas psychological and somatological, as soon as phenomena are given, determine the
mind to undertake investigation, and hold up the objects
to be attained.
Then, inasmuch as Ideas comprehend the constitution
of the universe, just so far as in the presence of the conditionating and quickening Reality they are developed,
does there appear a prophetic power of the Intellect preconceiving, suggesting, theorizing, and sometimes, as in
the case of Newton, seeming to grasp at once the great
system of things. It is impossible to express the extent tc
which the spontaneous inspiration of Ideas carries the
mind, or all the modes of their action. Like the forma
tion and growth of a common Language in masses ot
mind, like the development of Music without rules of ar
in popular tunes, or the growth of Poetry from rude bal
lads to the Iliad of Homer, like the spontaneous invention.
and discoveries of man before he began to philosophisc
from the results we feel assured there is law exact an,
beautiful; but still, as in. the fine vibrations of the air, an
in the more subtile oscillations of the ethereal medium o
light, no representation is possible: The movement lies 
far behind all ordinary and familiar forms, and is so muc
more delicate and subtile than any thing we are accu.
tomed to handle, to speak of, or to represent, that we ca
find nothing by which to convey it. In the germinatio
and growth of plants, how many fine influences are
work of which the physiologist presents us no diagra.
and which he can command by no formula; so likewise
mind, the germs of thought, their first springing fort
260 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
and their infinite and beautiful complexities in reasoning,
invention, memory, imagination, and taste, while exhibiting in their result the commanding presence of law, surpass the finest skill of the analyst.
The superior power which some minds display in inductive reasoning may be accounted for mainly by the remarkable degree in which they are endowed with three
qualities, Clearness, Candor, and Patience. Clearness of
rmnind, the result of exact and laborious discipline, prevents
uncertain, confused, and inapposite observations and experiments, and leads to accurate and sound judgments
Dandor purifies the mind from all "idols," and makes it
n honest truth-seeker.   Patience disposes to undistracted
.ttention, quiet and protracted thought, cheerfulness in
Undertaking labors, perseverance in overcoming difficulties,
_nd willingness- to wait until investigation shall ripen the
arvest of knowledge.
But Ideas not only impel the philosopher to undertake
ivestigation, and suggest the route he is to pursue, and
)reshadow the results at which he is to arrive,-they also
termine the Method of Investigation.
There are three particulars in relation to which this
'ethod requires to be expounded:
I. The induction of phenomena for the purpose of
assifying them into genera and species.
II. The induction of phenomena for the purpose of
riving at the expression of a general fact, or a general
der of sequence, but without determining a fixed and
)solute law.
III. The induction of phenomena leading to the de— mination of a fixed and absolute law.
261 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
SECTION IV.
GENERAL VIEW OF CLASSIFICATION.
CLASSIFICATION is dependent upon abstraction and generalization.   When  phenomena  are realized under  their
secondary form, the first impression must be that of an
undistinguished totality.  By abstraction the mind fasten
upon a particular quality or feature, and separates it fron
the mass. This quality, or feature, is then noted in othe.
objects; and at length generalized as a common sign fo.
the whole class to which it belongs. In the next place,.
name is given to the common sign, which thenceforth bc
comes the name of the class.  When  there is but on,
quality generalized, the class must be exceedingly general
and described in great incompleteness. As we add o0
qualities, we narrow the limits of the class, and at th
same time describe with greater completeness.
The most general arrangement of classes is that 0GENUS and SPECIEs.  The Genus, or kind, expresses onl
the particular, or particulars, in which all the species corn
prehended under it are identified.  The Species, or tJ
particular forms of the kind, express all of the Genu:
and in addition to this, the differentice, or points of diffe
ence between one species and another. The Genus is th,
divided into Species by the addition of qualities. Eve-.
Species is made up, in the last analysis, of INDIVIDUAT
262 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
An individual is that which admits of no farther division,
because all the qualities belonging to the object are supposed to be indicated by the name assigned to it. The
above may be conveniently represented as follows:
Genus=The common Essence or Quality.
Species=Genus + Differentia.
Individual=Genus+Differentia+Accidents.
By Accidents are meant the individual peculiarities.
We will illustrate by an example:
Genus Animal=The common property or essence by
which animals are distinguished
from vegetables.
Species Man=Animal+Rational.
Individual Cesar —Animal+Rational-All the quali                         ties which distinguished Caesar
from all other men, and made
him particularly Caesar.
There are different orders of Genera; for a genus may
je a species*: in relation to some higher genus, while a
Venus truly in relation to orders comprehended under it.
I'hus Animal may be said to be a species of Creature,
inderstanding by Creature any thing created; Fegetable
,eing another species of creature. The distinction thus
rises between a Maximum and a Proximum Genus,faximum denoting a genus which is not a species, and
'roximnum a genus next above a species, but yet not the
ighest genus. It is evident, however, that in our Classication we are not necessarily limited to a certain number
f divisions: on the contrary, we can multiply them acerding to our convenience.  Hence we find naturalists
Taking Orders and Classes, in addition to Genera and
pecies.
* Species here is taken in an imperfect sense.
263 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
Classification is either NATURAL, SCIENTIFIC, or ARBITRARY.
I. NATURAL CLASSIFICATION. This is that spontaneous Classification which appears in all language, independently of scientific investigation. Thus all the
objects of nature, as Animals, Vegetables, and Metals, in
their different kinds, and all the products of human art,
are distinguished and classed.
II. SCIENTIFIC CLASSIFICATiON. This is the result of
scientific and elaborate investigations, and appears in books
of Science and Natural History. The terms here employed are invented for the purpose, and are generally unintelligible to the vulgar, because remote from common
use.
- Scientific Classification is strictly natural, also, in one
point of view; that is, it is conformed to the actual Sytem of Nature. Natural spontaneous Classification arisefrom that striking, palpable, and outside view of Nature
which all men readily and unavoidably take: ScientificClassification arises from a more intimate and curious, an.
an interior view of Nature, determined by philosophica
aims and principles, formally laid down and refiecte.upon.
III. ARBITRARY CLASSIFICATION. This is an inten
tional violation of natural identity and difference. I
consequently is altogether distinct from the two precedin
forms of Classification. It is an incongruous and grotesqul
assemblage of particulars produced by the sportive fans
for humorous and witty effect.
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INDUICTIVE LOGIC.
SECTION V.
PRINCIPLES DETERMINING THE INDUCTION OF PHENOMENA
IN CLASSIFICATION.
IDEAS of Identity and Difference, Ideas of Synthesis and
Analysis, belong to the common human mind, and impel
it, whether spontaneously and without reflection, as in the
first form of Classification, or whether through reflection
and investigation, as in the second form, to classify and
distinguish the objects of perception. The world without,
-nade after the Ideas of the Divine Architect, derives
orom these Ideas its diversity and unity. And here, again,
',he mind of man, made after the likeness of its great
Driginal, is prepared to read this diversity and unity.
I'he Identities and Differences of all created things, the
,eautiful variety amid perfect system and order, find
ithin our reason the key of interpretation.   We do not
eally classify: the Classification is already made in the
onstitution of the world;  We only read and compreend it.
And even Arbitrary Classification has its law within
urselves; for it is only the nice perception of natural
nd rational identity and difference which enables us to
iake those violations of congruity which produce the
lmnorous and ludicrous effect.  Hence we find that minds
the most delicate and perfect structure are most keenly
12
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INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
alive to genuine wit and humor. In Addison, we have
a striking exemplification of this fact.
After pointing out the Ideas which lead us to classify
all, it still remains to explain the principles on which
the different classifications arise.
The conception of general Classes, such as Genera,
comprehending other Classes such as Species, the conception of divisions and subdivisions, until we arrive at
Classes composed barely of individuals, naturally arises
out of the Idea of the unity and variety of system. But
the particular question to be determined is, How do we
select the distinct characteristic of the Genus and the
Species? In other words, Why, amid many identities
and differences, do we fix upon the particular ones?
I. We have seen:.- that the Idea of Determinate
Form, both esthetically and somatologically, enters into
the structure of all things.  Hence the identities and
diversities of the world appear in the forms of things a
limited in space.  Nothing is more obvious to the commor
eye than these, and therefore no classification springs ur
more readily and spontaneously. Thus animals and plantare known, distinguished, arranged, and named.   Th
Idea of Determinate Form within the human mind pre
pares and predisposes it for the actual knowledge of th.
generic and specific forms of nature. The conception (the determinate formis of objects, however, is connecte,
with that of interior functions and properties; and eve
in the most unreflective and spontaneous judgments, th
two are not entirely separated.  Thus  the distinctic
between the animnate and inanimate never lies wholly;:
form, but in the Idea of Life, as an organific power dete
* Pages 189, 202.
266 
INDUCTIVE  LOGIC.
mining the difference. And, again, the distinction between animals and plants never lies wholly in the form,
but in sensibility, locomotive activity, voluntary appropriation and skill, and various functions belonging only to
the former. There is, in fine, a conception of different
laws governing these different forms of life.
Specific identity may be defined by the form alone.
It is the Identity of the outline drawn and limited in
space, and the Identity of proportion and of mechanism,
making together one distinct picture for the imagination.
Generic Identity, on the contrary, lies not in the collective outline of form, but in the outline of capital parts,
and in connection with this, in the oneness of relations,
ends, and functions.
The Individual embodies the generic and specific
identities, and superadds all the lineaments, shades, and
expressions, which combined constitute the finished and
unique picture.
II. Another ground of Classification is found in the
Identities and differences of the order of antecedence and
sequence of phenomena.   The important ideas which
govern here are Cause and Law. But nevertheless we
have not in the mere classification, the determination
specifically of causes and laws, but only the arrangement
mnd naming of phenomena, from  the fact that they
Jniformly precede as immediate antecedents certain other
)henomena, or uniformly succeed them as immediate
;-quents.
This, like visible form, is a principle of ordinary
lassification: for although the uniformities imply Law,
nd would not excite attention unless the Idea of Law
.ere in the mind, still they are not contemplated in paricular reference to Law, or with a view at once to es
267 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
tablish Law, but simply to obtain a convenient arrangement and nomenclature. Such a classification is indeed
subsidiary to the determination of Law-a preparatory
process of the highest moment.   We  have a striking
exemplification of its importance, as well as of its mere
subsidiary character, in the history of Chemical Science.
Experiments were multiplying from the age of the
alchymists, and the observed uniformities of the phenomenal sequence as they continually became enlarged and
modified, suggested new classifications and new terms.
The facts were thus preserved, disseminated, and handed
down; philosophical meditation had distinct objects before
it; new investigations had their obvious starting points;
and a widening avenue of knowledge gave still more inviting prospects. But it was reserved, at a late period, for
Dalton and Faraday to propound Theories which, if indeed
still theories, approach very near the line where theory
merges into law, and proclaims the ultimate end of human
thought attained.
III. The highest ground of classification is the con
ception of a fixed law comprehending and governing thephenomena.
The determinate forms of bodies spring from somr;
law, whether somatological or esthetical, or from a unioi
of both; and the uniform sequences of phenomena havi
likewise their law somewhere. Now, before any law i
distinctly conceived of, the classification, as we have repre
sented, takes place by the mere marks of likeness and un
likeness in form, and the mere correspondency of th
sequences.   Thus arise the classifications which obtai
commonly among men, and which are expressed in tl
general terms of ordinary language. Thus also arise th.
earlier classifications of Science, while, by various tent.
268 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
tive efforts, it is groping its way to stupendous and sure
results. But no sooner have conceptions of general and
fixed laws become developed, than the human mind
attempts classifications from a higher point of view.
Now the law which is conceived of as binding together
the widely diffused and multiform parts of an extended
system, gives the generical designations; while the species
show the complete unfolding of formative powers, whether
by a plastic force impressed from without, or by an organific energy acting from within. If the laws which govern
the widely extended systems in their unity, and those
which control the specific developments in their completeness, be accurately discovered, then the classification will
attain its highest perfection. And just, as under theoretical conceptions, an approximation is made towards the
point of accurate discovery, will an approximation be
made towards a perfect classification-a classification
which at the same time is the most philosophical and the
most natural.
The history of Natural Science affords us abundant
illustrations of the progress of classification.   I have
already referred to Chemistry.   Botany  and Zoology
afford perhaps the most striking illustrations, since on
Account of the multitude of particulars, classification
)ecomes at once an object of paramount importance.
the earlier classifications in these sciences were formed
)y arranging the particulars according to their external
)arts. Hence they were merely descriptive; and as
Description must vary according to the accuracy and
ariety of the observations, new systems were continually
ppearing, and endeavoring to supplant one another.
linneeus, by introducing the sexual principle, henceforth
ave to the classification of plants a phytomological
269 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
character, and advanced Botany to the dignity of determinate Science. Cutvier accomplished a similar reformation in Zoology.  With  him  the interior organization,
as manifesting a wise and harmonious design, became the
great object of research. Under this great Idea he not
only arranged the tribes of animals at present existent,
but even called forth into beautiful and rational symmetry,
the fossil and fragmentary remains of ancient and extinct
generations. It was the apprehension of the rational
design and of the organific law, which led these great
philosophers to their invaluable and immortal achieve —
ments.
Having distinguished the cardinal principles of classification, we may next proceed to enquire particularly into
the distinctive characteristics of genus and species.
I have already remarked, that we are not necessarily
confined to the particular classes of genus and species.
In reality, wherever a number of particulars have any
common characteristic, they may be classed together on
this ground. And so also, on the other hand, any point
of difference between particulars may be assumed as a
ground for separating them, and seeking for them some
other distribution.  But  we  have seen that there are
principles, which, amid the vast number of possible
classifications, demand a limitation; and even spontaneously constrain the common mind to conform to it.
Besides genus and species, which have universally obtained,
and which therefore seem to be a most natural division,
we have Orders of a widely comprehensive characterincluding genera; and again, Orders of a limited charac
ter, included under species. The comprehensive orders
however, are only a higher description of genera, and th,
limited orders a variety of the species; so that an exposi
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INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
tion of genus and species must include the main principles
of logical division.
I shall begin with Species. In respect to form, I have
already defined species, a completed picture for the imagination. If we take the species on the higher ground of
law working in the interior organization, the same conception of completeness becomes the governing conception.
In the species we have the completed organization.
Every individual, of course, is a completed organization.
But the individual contains no organism, powers or properties, which do not belong to the species. Indeed,
every individual may be taken as a representative of the
species to which he belongs; and the species is but a collection of individuals identified in the whole organism,
and in all the powers and properties which go to make up
the distinct and complete being under its organific and
determining law.  The individual is justly said to be distinguished from the species only by accidents, and not by
essential constitution and properties.  These accidents
are either circumstantial and separable, that is, they
stand around the individual, describing locality, position,
and exterior relations generally, but forming no part of
the essential being; or they are modifications of the
essential and constitutive organism and properties of the
species. The clear conceptions of Identity and Constitutive Law enable us to compare and limit the species;
and the equally clear conception of difference enables us
to detect those higher modifications which do not affect
the identity of the species, and only form the accidents
which serve to distinguish the individuals. These con"eptions are developed under their proper Ideas in the
process of making comparisons of phenomena. There is
thus the union of a certain tact acquired by experience,
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INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
and of rational a priori determination. It is this union
which makes classification truly philosophical.
The orders formed under species.are based upon modifications more remarkable, yet not destructive of the palpable identity of the species.
Genus differs from species in this, that while the last
expresses a completed organization, and all the essential
properties, and is capable of full representation in the individual, the former comprises only a part of the organization and properties, and cannot take the individual as its
representative.  It is true, indeed, that the common mark
by which several species are united under one genus,
must be found in every individual of the several species;
but then it appears in the individual in the unity of all
the parts, while in the genus it is abstracted from them.
-The all-important inquiry here is, what shall govern
us in the selection of the generic mark? Having a clear
conception of species as determined by the identity of the
constitutive law of the complete organization, and of the
essential properties, we now, under the idea of system,
proceed to consider the relations between the several
species.   Here identities are also perceived;  and it is
possible to select any one of them as the generic mark.
But suppose an identity be perceived in a certain number
of instances, with respect to a particular mark, how can
we be certain of its universality? We cannot be certain
of its universality, unless it be a mark which is the exponent of a universal law. The occurrence of the mark in
a great number of instances, and to the extent of our observation, would lead us to suspect the presence of a law;
and therefore the selection of this mark as a generic desig:
nation becomes a convenient and wise expedient, until we
are enabled to reach a higher ground. A proper generic
272 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
classification then cannot be based upon a trivial and
doubtful mark. It must be one, which, by its importance
and prevalence, points at least towards a law. But where
the law is gained, there the generic mark becomes permanently fixed, and there alone. We may take as an illustration, the generical distinction between the animate
and the inanimate. Here the great Idea and the laws of
life are the ground of the distinction; and here we are assured that it is fixed unalterably. Of equal clearness and
fixedness is the distinction between the animal, and the
vegetable, because we comprehend clearly the peculiar
laws of their organizations. And so universally, wherever
we perceive a common mark in several species, which
stands as the exponent of a law working in all these
species, there we have the sure and proper element of the
genus.
As several species are embraced by a genus under a
common mark, so again several genera may be embraced
by a higher genus under a common and more comprehensive mark. This mark is the exponent of a higher and
more comprehensive law, binding together laws, which,
in their particular spheres, govern and explain the phenomena.  The human mind is ever intent upon system,
and hence is ever seeking for higher generalizations. By
-ynthesis, it aims at a universal unity, and by analysis,
levelopes unity into constituent parts harmoniously coligated.
From the foregoing, I think it must be clear that clas;ification has its starting-point in Ideas of the Reason;
nd that definite laws already known, or the theoretical
onception of laws, form the determining principles.
These principles undoubtedly obtain an expression in the
-)rm of axioms and definitions, which, if they have not
12*
273 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
been formally laid down, have nevertheless, as current
and generally understood judgments, formed the immediate authority and guide of all just and philosophical classification.
A statement of the leading axioms and definitions belonging here will close this part of our subject.
I. Every universal is made up of particulars identified
either in their determinate form, or in their cardinal pro —
perties, or in their organific or constitutive law, or in all
conjointly.
II. Every particular is comprehended within a universal by the identity either of determinate form, or of cardinal properties, or of organific or constitutive law, or of all
conjointly.
III. Species is the identity of determinate form, cardinal properties and organific or constitutive law, conjointly, where all these exist in the subject, so that every
particular is essentially complete in the description of its
species.
IV. Genus is the identity of several species in a cardinal form, property, or law, which comprehends them in
the unity of system.
V. The unity of nature lies in identity; the variety of
nature lies in difference.
VI. Where difference consists in the opposition of determinate forms in the organisms compared, and in essential properties, while at the same time there is an identity
in some constitutive law comprehending all alike, there
arises the distinction of species.
VII. Where the difference consists in the oppositior
of determinate forms in the organisms, and of essentia
properties, without identity in some general comprehend
ing law, there arises the distinction of genera.
274 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
VIII. Where several genera are comprehended within
an order or higher genus, the identity which binds them
together, appears also in the several species under each
particular genus; but then it appears alone in the higher
generalization, leaving behind in the lower classes the other
points of identity.
Scholium. Species is an identity throughout.   Genus
is an identity in part. As the points of identity diminish,
the generalization advances. Thus from the individual we
advance to the species, from the species to the proximum
genus, from the proximum to the maximum.   The universal law sits like a sovereign in lofty state, regulating
all; but having under it a multitude of subordinates,
which it binds together in an intimate and harmonious
co-working.
275 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
SECTION VI.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN A GENERAL FACT AND A FIXED
AND ABSOLUTE LAW.
THE relation between Ideas and Laws has been treated of
in a preceding Part.'  If the views there presented are
just, then that alone is entitled to the name of law which
finds its correspondent and basis in an Idea. Moral laws
thus answer to the Ideas of right and wrong, freedom and
responsibility, personal identity, and immortality. Esthetical laws answer to the Idea of the beautiful, under its
different modifications. And so, likewise, somatological
laws must answer to their appropriate Ideas. This I have
attempted to exhibit under Primordial Logic. The characteristics of Ideas are necessity and universality ill their
proper spheres. Hence the axioms, definitions and laws,
must be necessary and universal likewise in their proper
spheres.
The Intuitive Function, in connection with sufficient
observation, perceives these laws. The law is seen to comprehend the facts of observation, and thus to be the law of
the facts; while, as a law, it is seen to be universal and
necessary.
Now, on the other hand, a general fact is the merstatement of a series of facts, appearing to the extent of
* Part I., Section VII.
276 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
our observation in a uniform relation of sequence. We
may proceed to give a theory, or even to determine a law
of the facts; but this is another affair. Taken as a mere
general fact, the series is neither theory or law.
But the enquiry may here be made, How, then, does
a general fact differ from generalization under genus and
species? Generalization is a grouping of phenomena on
the ground of identity in one or many particulars, for the
purpose of assigning a common name, which may thenceforth be employed in our thinking and reasoning, as the
sign of all contained under it. But the general fact is the
affirmation of the identity itself as a truth belonging to
the whole class of things contemplated. The identity
affirmed in the general fact, however, is not always the
one upon which the generalization is based. For example:
upon the observation of certain identities and differences
we have classed certain animals under the terms sheep, ox,
deer. Upon a farther observation of these animals, we
find that they are deficient in the upper cutting teeth, and
that they ruminate. We extend our observations, and we
find that all animals, deficient in the upper cutting teeth,
ruminate.   Now, upon these identities we may class together all these animals as ruminating animals.   But the
general fact is the affirmation that all sheep, oxen, deer,
and so on-that is, all animals already classed by certain
identities and differences-have this additional identity,
of being deficient in the upper cutting teeth; and again,
that all animals thus deficient, ruminate. So, also, in
chemistry, we call all substances which change vegetable
blues into red, acids; and those which change them into
green, alkalies; but the general fact is the affirmation
that all acids, and all alkalies, possess these respective
properties; and again, that acids and alkalies neutralise
277 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
each other. In the general fact is contained the affirmation of a uniform order of sequence, upon which we may
base a classification or not, as we please, e. g. when we observe that the animals above described ruminate, we
are under no necessity of classing them as ruminants: but
whether we do so or not, the general fact remains. In
fine, in the one case we are aiming simply to arrange and
name: in the other, we are affirming a truth and the
semblance of a law. To name all animals which have the
above-mentioned characteristics, ruminating animals, is
plainly different from affirming, generally, all animals
which want the upper cutting teeth ruminate.
I call the general fact the semblance of a law, for the
general fact, as such, is not a law. But, nevertheless, it
answers the most important ends in calling before the
mind the stated connections existing between phenomena.
" Bakewell, the celebrated cattle-breeder, observed, in a
great number of individual beasts, a tendency to fatten
readily; and in a great number of others, the absence of
this constitution: in every individual of the former description, he observed a certain peculiar make, though
they differed widely in colour, &c. Those of the latter
description differed no less' in various points, but agreed
in being of a different make from the others. These facts
were his data: from which, combining them with the
general principle that Nature is steady and uniform in her
proceedings, he logically drew the conclusion, that beasts
of that specified make have universally a peculiar tendency
to fattening." *'  This was  the general fact at which
Bakewell arrived, a fact of great practical moment to all
cattle-breeders. But as announced by him, it was no law,
* Whateley's Logic, Book IV., ch. ii., ~ 2.
278 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
because connected with no Idea. Now let us suppose that
the peculiar make was one connected in respect to climate,
food, &c., with the freest and most genial development of
the organific power of life; and also, that it combined the
finest esthetical proportions, so that the conclusion might
have been announced as follows:-The most genial culture
gives the highest animal beauty, and the highest animal
beauty is connected with the highest animal utility, exhibited in strength, activity, and a tendency to fattening.
Should we not here be advanced beyond a general fact to
the conception of a universal law, and that because we
have brought in points of consideration connected immediately with Ideas?
That bodies fall to the earth, was a fact of general observation before Newton saw the apple fall; and as a general fact, it was of eminent and daily use among men; but
it was not until this general fact had been elaborated in
the mind of Newton that it became the exponent of a law.
But what gave to gravitation now the characteristics of a
law?  Was it not the Idea of centralization-the Idea of
the universal and necessary arrangement of matter in order to form a system? The centrifugal law is no less
based upon an Idea; for the Reason sees with intuitive
certainty that without a diffusive movement harmoniously
united with the central movement, matter could not exist
in space in separate masses.:
Chemistry has, until very recently, been a science of
general facts, and, therefore, an imperfect science. Now,
the great advance made by the combined labors of Dalton,
Davy, and Faraday, and especially by the investigations
and acute reasonings of the last, are just an advance from
* Supra, p. 198.
279 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
a mass of general facts to a comprehensive law, developed
under the force of an Idea: at least, it is a near approximation to such a result. The identification of chemical
and electrical attractions is a lofty generalization. But
the Idea and the law are indicated, if not fully expressed,
in the conception of Polarity, *:' or, to use Faraday's language, in the conception of "an axis of power having
equal and opposite forces." In the law of gravity and of
the centrifugal force, we have the law of the cosmical
masses: in Polarity, or the "axis of power," we have the
dawn at least of the law which governs the interior constitution of bodies. These are the great laws of the universe.
The method of arriving at general facts is the empirical method. It is the method of the earlier processes of
science, and preparatory to the determination of laws.
On many subjects the human mind has not advanced beyond these general facts. This is true of medicine, for example. From accident and investigation, certain substances
have been found to possess a remedial effect; until at
length something like general rules have been instituted
for the treatment of various diseases. The whole history
of Therapeutics exhibits a conflict of theories, and a mass
of conjectures often sagacious, but more frequently wild
and loose. The subject is one of extreme difficulty, on
account of the multitudinous influences which have to be
taken into the account. Even at the present day, more
reliance, perhaps, is to be placed upon individual experience, judgment, and tact, than upon any established
general principles.   Curious and hopeful generalization
may have been made, but no law has as yet appeared.
* Supra, p. 200.
280 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
But the defect in Therapeutics is not merely the want
of laws, but the want of clearly ascertained general facts;
for were it certainly known that certain substances could
expel disease, for instance, as certainly as that a particular
breed of cattle fatten easily, we should obtain practical
rules of the highest value.
General facts, when once established by a sufficient
number of experiments, show the presence of law, although
the law has not yet attained to an expression, and they
may, therefore, be applied as authoritative. Numerous
chemical compositions and decompositions were settled as
unquestionable facts, before the later great chemists appeared. Rules of practical mechanics obtained before the
laws of the science were discovered. On all subjects open
to common observation, the uniform order of sequences has
been noted among the multitude and general facts have
been attained with more or less accuracy.
But notwithstanding the many beneficial results arising
from spontaneous observations of the uniformities of Nature, it must be confessed that errors have likewise arisen
in this way.   Observations  may  be defective in many
ways: They may be made hastily and inaccurately; they
may not be sufficiently varied, nor often enough repeated;
and they may be made under prejudice, with an excited
imagination, or with a concealed, obstinate determination
to arrive, at all events, at a particular conclusion. These
defective observations have been so rife in Therapeutics,
that the word empiricism has in common usage become diverted from its original and just meaning, and is applied
to express those loose and baseless methods of treating disrase which are enveloped in mystery, at once to excite the
magination of the multitude, and to conceal their own ab;urdity. Popular beliefs, also, in dreams and omens, are
281 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
only another form of empiricism, or loose and insufficient
observation. And yet, even these errors show the noble
constitution of the human mind; for it is the strong sense
of law which creates the tendency to draw general conclusions, wherever uniform sequences appear.
The importance of establishing principles and rules of
observation in view of arriving at general facts and laws,
is apparent to every one. This, indeed, comprises, in the
main, the Logic of Induction. To this we shall now proceed. In the first place, we shall speak of observation in
respect to general facts; and in the next place, in respect
to laws. The distinction between the two which I have
attempted to draw, I think, will not be misconceived.   It
may, indeed, be summed up as follows: General facts are
the uniform sequences of phenomena-or the uniform dependence and involution of phenomena, so that a given
consequent cannot exist without a certain antecedent, nor
a given antecedent without involving a certain consequent:
Law, in distinction from the orderly sequence itself, is that
which governs it and accounts for it, and without which
the sequence would not have been possible.
282 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
SECTION VII.
THE LOGIC OF GENERAL FACTS.
THE great Francis Bacon, the first who labored at a full
exposition of the Inductive Philosophy, himself signally
failed in all his attempts to give an exemplification of its
principles. The catalogues of facts which he has left are
of little or no value.  The reason is obvious:  The  facts
are heterogeneous, mixed, scattered, casual, and often
trivial. The observations appear to have been governed
by no principle, no definite aim, no prophetic thought, in
fine, by no Idea. As the observation of facts and ideas
are both demanded in a philosophy of Nature, so the
omission of one or the other must be fatal to any attempt
to arrive at such a philosophy. Bacon exposed the errors
of those who had attempted this work by Ideas alone.
He himself failed, because he attempted it by observation
alone.
The point now distinctly before us is to ascertain the
true logical grounds of deciding when phenomena have a
real and fixed connection, as antecedent and consequent,
so that we may affirm, as a general fact, that they are thus
connected.
The connection of phenomena, as stated antecedent
nd consequent, is the exponent of law.  Hence, we are
Ietermined to the observation of orderly sequences as
iaturally presented, and to make experiments in order to
283 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
enlarge the field of observation by the Idea of law. If we
do not find the law itself, we shall find its beautiful manifestations-we shall know at least that we are dwelling in
the light of its countenance.
The Idea of law gives rise to the axioms of universal
law and of the uniformity of Nature.*  These axioms are
like the voices of the Idea, ever speaking to our thoughts
as we search about and pry into the phenomena of Nature.
Thus, then, in seeking to establish general facts, we
are looking out for the uniformities of Nature.
The phenomena which we examine and compare, must
stand in the one or the other of the two relations of antecedent or consequent, for phenomena are in a continual
flux, and conditionate one another in this way, the same
phenomena being consequents of antecedents, and antecedents to consequents.  The flux of phenomena, however,
is not a lengthening chain of succession, ever presenting
new particulars, but is composed of cycles, where the end
returns into the beginning: and the complexity of Nature
presents us cycle winding within cycle, cycle crossing
cycle, and all in perfect harmony; for not only are the
particulars of each cycle related, but cycle also is related
to cycle in the unity of one vast system. The acid which
is itself a consequent of the union of two simples, returns
by one cycle into these simples again; and by another relation, becomes an antecedent in another cycle, and aids
its movements, as in double elective affinity.   General
facts, therefore, may be more  or less extensive.   The
perpetual relation of a particular antecedent and consequent is in itself a general fact; an established cycle
of antecedents and consequents is a general fact; and
* Supra, p. 228.
284 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
the established connexion between different cycles is
another form of general fact. But the principles are the
same which govern the whole; for the observation in all
is the observation of recurring antecedents and consequents.
There is one thing here worthy of being remarked,
namely, that when we are seeking for the stated consequent of an antecedent, we may employ experiment as
well as observation, since being already in possession of the
antecedent, we can place it in different relations in order
to see what consequents are connected with it; but that,
on the contrary, when we are seeking for the stated antecedent of a consequent, we can employ observation only,
for the consequent being subsequent to the antecedent,
we cannot place it in different relations in order to see
how it arises, since it already is; and, therefore, we have
to watch for new instances where the consequent in question is presented together with its proper antecedent.
Our object being to establish the fact of uniformity, it
is necessary to settle, as a preliminary question, how many
instances are demanded to this end.  As Nature is governed throughout by exact law, if it can be shown, in respect to any succession, that a given consequent does take
place when a certain antecedent is present, all other antecedents being excluded, then if there be only one instance,
this one is sufficient to establish the fact of the sequence.
Suppose, for example, that we exclude, in the combustion
of a metal, all antecedents but oxygen gas, then it becomes
ertain, upon the axiom of the uniformity of Nature, that
the presence of oxygen is a condition of this phenomenon.
But it does not appear from this that oxygen is a general
ondition of combustion.  We may, therefore, proceed to
)bserve and experiment other combinations, excluding
285 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
oxygen-and if we find that in all such instances no combustion takes place, then, and not until then, we infer that
oxygen is a general and indispensable condition of this
phenomenon. Here one instance is not sufficient, since,
although oxygen is a supporter, there may be other substances which act in the same way. When several instances
concur, the conclusion becomes strong; and when all
known observation and experiment give the same result,
no doubt is any longer entertained, for the uniformity
seems now fully developed. The case in which we determine that oxygen is a condition of combustion, and the
case in which we determine that it is a general condition,
are widely different, since one instance is sufficient for the
first, whereas the induction must be extended in the
second.: Wherein lies the distinction between the two
cases? Is it not that in the first case we take a given
antecedent, and excluding from it all other antecedents
we observe it in circumstances where, if any consequent
ensue, it alone can be the condition and antecedent of
that consequent; while, in the second case, we take a
given consequent, and observe it as it occurs in a variety
of circumstances, in order to see whether in all these circumstances there is a general difference, and but one uniform point of agreement, and that point the presence of
the oxygen?
Here, then we see the greater advantage we possess in
following the sequence from the antecedent to the consequent, than in the reverse order.  In the first, having the
antecedent, we can, as before remarked, by experiment
* Oxygen, for some time, was considered the only supporter of combustion
This was the general fact until subsequent discoveries brought to light othe
supporters of combustion. In no general fact, therefore, do we attain the neceo
sary-this belongs only to law.
286 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
place it in different circumstances and isolate it; but in
the second, we cannot experiment, but must merely observe the instances in which the consequent appears in
connection with an antecedent: and here the circumstances
may be so numerous as to require many comparisons in
order to detect the particular antecedent required. But,
on the other hand, the antecedent itself may be complex,
and require analysis in order to determine the force of the
different elements. Where this analysis is possible, so
that we may separate the elements, we can reduce the
experiment again to the utmost simplicity. If we have
established that common air is necessary to combustion,
and afterwards find that combustion takes place in another
gas different from common air, we may be led to enquire whether this gas is present in common air; and
when by analysis we have arrived at the composition of
the atmosphere, we may test the elements in order to
determine whether one element alone is the condition of
combustion.
But it often happens that we cannot analyse the complex antecedent. For example, a certain remedy appears
to be efficacious  in a particular disease; now, if all the
Circumstances are precisely the same in any other case of
'he disease, the remedy may here be expected on the gen-ral uniformity of Nature to be equally efficacious.  But
he complexity of the antecedents creates a two-fold diffiulty.  Do we have such a perfect knowledge of all the
~ircumstances in the first case-the constitution of the in.ividual, the influences of regimen, &c., the nature of the
isease itself, and the force of the recuperative power of
ature, as to be confident to what extent, or even if at all,
ie remedy is to be taken as an antecedent to the
covery? And if all this were granted, is our knowledge
287 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
of all the circumstances in the second case sufficiently
minute and accurate to enable us to decide upon the
identity of the two cases? Now, it is evident that where
antecedents are thus complicated, observations and experiments need to be multiplied in order to arrive at a general
expression in any degree satisfactory.
It appears from the preceding remarks, that the number of instances necessary to enable us to decide upon a
prevailing uniformity, depends upon our success in eliminating all the antecedents and consequents foreign to the
particular sequence we are contemplating. If, in the case
of the treatment of disease, we can eliminate every thing
but the disease and the remedy, then we shall at once be
in a condition to decide upon the sequence. We shall
proceed, therefore, to consider the
PRINCIPLES OF ELIMINATION.
I. GENERAL DIFFERENCE WITH UNIFORM AGREEMENT
IN ONE POINT.-Here we suppose several instances of conjoined antecedents to be brought under observation, in
each instance, all the antecedents being different but one.
N-ow, if in all these instances a particular consequent uni
formly appears, then we infer the general fact that the unvarying antecedent is connected with the unvarying con
sequent.   Two instances thus agreeing would, on th.
axiom of uniformity, lead us to a conclusion. This con
elusion, however, attains its greatest force only where th.
agreement is verified by general observation and experi
ment, that is, by all the observation and experiment, nc
only of the individual philosopher, but also of the whol
fraternity engaged in the same course of investigation
Thus, if in several combinations of elements, all differin
288 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
except in the single circumstance of the presence of oxygen, and if in all these an acid is uniformly produced,
then we would conclude, under the conditions above laid
down, that oxygen is the acidifying element.
The same principle applies to the observation of an
unvarying sequent appearing amid varying sequents:
here, if the antecedents generally appear irregular and
indeterminate, but among these there is one antecedent,
which, in all the observed instances, is uniformly present,
then we infer that it is connected with the unvarying sequent.
There is another mode of applying this principle,
which, wherever it is possible to combine it with the preceding, makes the elimination far more perfect. Suppose
that, after having determined, in several instances generally unlike, the connexion of an unvarying antecedent
with an unvarying consequent, we are able next to compare instances which are also generally unlike, and agree
only in the uniform absence of the particular antecedent
iioted before, and in the absence of the corresponding
onsequent, or in the absence of the consequent and the
-bsence of the corresponding antecedent,-then we have
ere an indication of uniformity tending  to the same
eneral result. By the first mode of applying the princi.le, we eliminate all the unlike and varying antecedents
nd consequents from the particular antecedent, and con,quent on the ground of their unvarying co-presence:
~y the second, on the ground of their unvarying joint abonce.
II. GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH UNIFORM DIFFERENCE
, ONE rOINT.-By this principle, we effect a complete
'imination.  There are three modes of applying it.
First  Let there be a number of antecedents and con
1,3
289 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
sequents conjoined: remove one of the antecedents, the
consequent which disappears with it is its particular consequent. Or if we observe the disappearance in some instance of one of the consequents, and find that a certain
antecedent has also disappeared, then we infer again the
sequence of the two. In the first case, we may experiment as well as observe; in the second, we can only observe; since we can compel the disappearance of a consequent by the removal of its antecedent, but we cannot
act upon the antecedent through its consequent. Where
we repeat the experiment or the observation, and in every
instance remove, or note the disappearance of, the same
element, and in every instance find that the same corresponding antecedent or consequent is likewise wanting,
we of course confirm the general fact by a wider induction.
Second: Let there be several antecedents attended
with certain consequents; and among these let there be
introduced a new antecedent, the new consequent which
now appears we infer to be in sequence with the new an
tecedent. Let this be repeated in other instances, and if
wherever we introduce the particular antecedent the sam,
consequent uniformly appears, and there only, then th
elimination of all foreign influences is complete, and th,
sequence under investigation firmly established.
On the other hand, if, among several phenomena,
new phenomenon should make its appearance, and if, upo
examination, a new antecedent should be found to be alpresent, then a connexion between the two would be ir
ferred. If, in repeated instances, the same concurreun
takes place, nothing seems wanting to the elimination.
Third: Let there be a number of antecedents, pr,.
senting complicated effects, concurrent, opposing, or ind,
290 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
pendent of each other. If, upon examination, we can
trace certain of the consequents to particular antecedents,
then we may at once subduct these consequents with their
antecedents from the sum total. What remains now, becomes the subject of new investigations; and thus we may
successively eliminate antecedents and consequents, until,
we will suppose, only one consequent remains. Now, if
there be only one antecedent also remaining, then we infer its connexion with the consequent. This remaining
consequent is what Sir John Herschel calls the residual
phenomenon. I borrow from him the following illustration: "The return of the comet predicted by Professor
Encke, a great many times in succession, and the general
good agreement of its calculated with its observed place
during any one of its periods of visibility, would lead us to
say that its gravitation towards the sun and planets is the
sole and sufficient cause of all the phenomena of its orbitatial motion; but when the effect of this cause is strictly
Calculated and subducted from the observed motion, there
is found to remain behind a residual phenomenon, which
would never have been otherwise ascertained to exist,
.nich is a small anticipation of the time of its re-appear-nces, or a diminution of its periodic -time, which cannot
,e accounted for by gravity, and whose cause is therefore
o be inquired into. Such an anticipation would be caused
,y the resistance of a medium disseminated through the
elestial regions; and as there are other good reasons for
Relieving this to be a vera cau8a it has therefore been aseibed to such a resistance." 
III. ELIMINATION BY CORRESPONDING QUANTITIES AND
,TENSITIES.-Antecedents and sequents may be brought
* Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy, p. 156.
291 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
under the conception of Quantity; and as Quantity has
its exact science, antecedents and sequents are reducible
to precise expressions. Now, there are certain antecedents
which never entirely disappear, and therefore we cannot
effect an elimination on the preceding principles. For instance: heat is always present, so that we can never determine by actual experiment what consequent would disappear if heat were entirely withdrawn. But if, by changing the quantity of heat, we find corresponding changes in
the consequents, then we know, as before, that a sequence
exists. We do not remove the antecedent, nor change the
essential order of the sequence,-we only modify the antecedent, and uniformly a like modification takes place in a
stated consequent. Thus, we notice, in the first place,
certain changes in our sensations with respect to heat and
cold; then, observing quicksilver, we see that as our sensations of heat increase in intensity, a corresponding expansion of its bulk takes place, and that, as our sensations
moderate, its bulk contracts, and that this contraction regularly goes on as the cold becomes more and more severe,
until at length we make out an exact scale of temperature
Now, having determined that quicksilver regularly ex
pands and contracts, as the temperature increases or de
creases, we apply the scale to the observations we mak.
upon other metals, and then upon bodies indiscriminately
and thus the general fact appears, that all bodies are ex
panded by heat, and contracted by a loss of heat.  In th
same manner, we may determine that all bodies, when pu
in motion, will continue to move until brought to a stat
ofrest by an opposing force, taking this in the light of
general fact:  We continue to remove obstacles, and,
the obstacles are removed, the time of the continuatic
of motion is increased, and thus, although we can nev,
292 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
remove all obstacles, we may infer that if all obstacles
were removed, the body would continue to move on for
ever.:
" Sound consists in impulses communicated to our ears
by the air. If a series of impulses of equal force be communicated to it at equal intervals of time, at first in slow
succession, and by degrees more and more rapidly, we
hear at first a rattling noise, and then a hum, which by
degrees acquires the character of a musical note rising
higher and higher in acuteness, till its pitch becomes too
high for the ear to follow. And from this correspondence
between the pitch of the note and the rapidity of succession of the impulse, we conclude that our sensation of the
different pitches of musical notes originates in different
rapidities with which their impulses are communicated to
our ears." t   There is another form of the method to be noticed.
We may succeed in removing entirely the antecedent, but
the consequent, instead of disappearing with it, may only
andergo some modification,-perhaps a mere change in
the degree of its intensity. If this modification of the
consequent be uniform, then we cannot but infer a real
sequence; but inasmuch as the consequent is modified
)nly, and does not disappear with the removal of the anecedent in question, it must be consequent to some other
ntecedent or antecedents also.  This, then, becomes a
-ase of compound sequence; and the only way to arrive
t the several antecedents is by tentative experiments, in
* I introduce this merely as an illustration of the process of elimination
,der the principle laid down.  The proposition is really an axiom-a univer-l and necessary affirmation, determined by the idea of matter itself.-Vide
'pra, pp. 158 and 219.
t Herschel's Discourse, p. 153.
293 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
which we eliminate successively various circumstances of
the phenomena, or introduce new circumstances. In this
way we enlarge our knowledge of the antecedents, or at
length, by making the phenomenon disappear in conjunction with the eliminations, ascertain the entire compound
antecedent.
IV. ELIMINATION OF THE TERMS OF A SEQUENCE, IN
ORDER TO DETERMINE WHICH IS THE ANTECEDENT, AND
WHICH THE CONSEQUENT.-Phenomena may be invariably
concomitant, and therefore be known to have a fixed connexion, as antecedent and consequent, but the order of the
sequence may not at once appear. Now, inasmuch as the
causal influence acts through the antecedent to the production of the consequent, it follows that a consequent can
be made to disappear, or be modified only by the elimination or modification of the antecedent. Hence, if in attempting to eliminate or modify one of the terms of a sequence, we hit upon the consequent, we shall soon find
that it is the consequent, by being compelled to introduce
an antecedent in order to accomplish our purpose:
whereas, if we hit upon the antecedent, we shall remove
or modify it without introducing the other term, and its
removal or modification,' immediately acting upon thr
other term, will show the order of sequence.
We have an illustration of this in the Theory of Dew
by the late Dr. Wells, and which Sir John Herschel, i,
his Discourse already referred to, introduces as throu,hout
" one of the most beautiful specimens of inductive experi
mental enquiry lying within a moderate compass." *
MWe propose dew as a phenomenon whose invariable.
antecedent we would ascertain.  " In the first place, w
* Ibid, &c., pp. 159-163.
294 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
must separate dew from rain and the moisture of fogs, and
limit the application of the term to what is really meant,
which is, the spontaneous appearance of moisture on substances exposed in the open air when no rain or visible
wet is falling. Now, here we have analogous phenomena
in the moisture which bedews a cold metal or stone when
we breathe upon it; that which appears on a glass of
water fresh from the well in hot weather; that which ap'pears on the inside of windows when sudden rain or hail
chills the external air; that which runs down our walls,
when, after a long frost, a warm, moist thaw comes on:
all these instances agree in one point, the coldness of the
object dewed, in comparison with the air in contact with
it." In the above we have an illustration of our first
principle, there is here a general difference with uniform
agreement in one point.
But with respect to night dew, is this the real antecedent? "Is it a fact that the object dewed is colder than
the air? Certainly not, one would be at first inclined to
say; for what is to make it so? But the analogies are
cogent and unanimous; and, therefore, we are not to discard their indications." The similarity of the consequents
argue a similarity of the antecedents. In this case, to
settle the question, we have only "to lay a thermometer
in contact with the dewed substance, and hang one at a
little distance above it, out of reach of its influence. The
experiment has been therefore made; the question has
been asked, and the answer has been invariably in the
affirmative.   Whenever an object contracts dew, it is
colder than the air. Here, then, we have an invariable
Concomitant circumstance." But is cold the antecedent
Dr the consequent of dew? The vulgar prejudice would
,hake it the consequent. "We must, therefore, collect
295 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
more facts, or, which comes to the same thing, vary the
circumstances; since every instance in which the circumstances differ is a fresh fact; and, especially, we must
note the contrary or negative cases, i. e. where.no dew is
produced."
"Now, 1st, no dew is produced on the surface of
polished metals, but it is very copiously on glass, both exposed with their faces upwards, and in some cases the
under side of a plate of glass is also dewed; which last
circumstance excludes the fall of moisture from the sky
in an invisible form." Here, then, according to our second
principle of elimination, is a general agreement with a
difference in one  point, namely, the substance of the
material. But what relation have the metal and glass to
the invariable concomitant circumstance of cold in the
production of dew? Have we removed  the dew, and
thus prevented the cold in the case of the metal, or have
we removed the cold and prevented the dew? Unquestionably the latter; for the metal being a good conductor
of heat, has continually brought the heat from within
itself, or from the earth beneath, upon its surface, while
the glass, being a poor conductor, has suffered its surface
to become  cooled.   "This done, a scale of intensity
becomes obvious. Those polished substances are found
to be most strongly dewed which conduct heat worst
while those which conduct well resist dew most effectually."
We have thus determined that cold is the antecedent of
dew, and not dew the antecedent of cold.
The same fact is confirmed by other striking experiments. Thus, rough surfaces, which radiate heat most
freely, are most copiously dewed, the substance remaining
the same. Again, substances of a loose texture, such as
cloth, wool, eider-down, cotton, velvet, &c., contract dew
296 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
more readily than substances of a close texture, such as
stones, metals, &c., and the former are precisely those
which are selected for clothing, since, on account of their
feeble conducting power, they do not carry away the heat
from the skin to the air.
" Lastly: among the negative instances, it is observed
that dew is never copiously deposited in situations much
screened from the open air, and not at all in a cloudy
night; but if the clouds withdraw, even for a few minutes,
and leave a clear opening, a deposition of dew presently
begins, and goes on increasing." This remarkable fact
shows the same order of sequence. " Those surfaces which
part with their heat outwards most readily, and have it
supplied from within most slowly, will of course become
coldest, if there be an opportunity for their heat to escape,
and not be restored to them from without.  Now, a clear
sky affords such an opportunity.  It is a law well known
to those who are conversant with the nature of heat, that
heat is constantly escaping from all bodies in rays, or by
radiation, but is constantly restored to them by the
similar radiation of others surrounding them. Clouds and
surrounding objects, therefore, act as opposing causes, by
replacing the whole or a great part of the heat so radiated away, which can escape effectually, without being replaced, only through openings into infinite space."
We are thus led to the general fact, that any surface
" cooling by radiation faster than its heat can be restored to it by communication with the ground, or by
counter-radiation, so as to become colder than the air,"
:ondenses the moisture of the air upon itself in the form
of dew.
Herschel remarks, "In the analysis above given, the
.rmation of dew is referred to two more general pheno             13*
297 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
mena: the radiation of heat, and the condensation of invisible vapor by cold. The cause (antecedent) of the
former is a much higher enquiry, and may be said indeed
to be totally unknown; that of the latter actually forms a
most important branch of physical enquiry. In such a
case, when we reason upwards till we reach an ultimate
fact, we regard a phenomenon as fully explained; as we
consider the branch of a tree to terminate when traced to
its insertion in the trunk, or a twig to its junction with
the branch; or rather, as a rivulet retains its importance
and its name till lost in some larger tributary, or in the
main river which delivers it into the ocean." Now, the
ultimate fact upon which all enquiry reposes can, in respect
to cause, be nothing less than the Divine volition; and
the ultimate fact in respect to law can be that law only
which rests immediately upon an Idea. We may continue, by observation and experiment, to enlarge our knowledge of the order and relations of phenomena-of antecedents and consequents indefinitely, reaching from one antecedent to another; but no mere antecedent phenomenon
gives a place for the repose of thought. The radiation of
heat, and the condensation of vapor by cold, are antecedents to the formation of dew. Could we now discover
their antecedents, we should only have new phenomena
calling for other antecedents again. We thus accumulate
general facts, but we want still the centralising, all-comprehending, and necessary Law.   An infinite series of
sequences there cannot be. But if the ultimate fact be a
mere antecedent like the other antecedents, that is,
uniformly preceding its consequent, and having no distinguishing characteristic except that of being the last,
then must enquiry cease here by a mere arbitrary decision
of the Deity or of Fate. It does not cease because the minci
298 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
feels satisfied, but because it is permitted to go no farther.
But if the ultimate fact be not a phenomenon, but a law,
affirming, in the light of Ideas, what must be, not a thtng
of observation, but an intuitive thought, then indeed must
enquiry cease, not by a necessity of compulsion, but by a
necessity of pure Reason itself.
I have already remarked that the flux of phenomena
is not to be represented as a lengthening series of particulars, which, as it runs back, is ever evolving some new
antecedent, until we reach an ultimate phenomenon; but
that, on the contrary, this flux goes on in cycles where the
end runs into the beginning.' In a series of the first
kind, the ultimate fact would be either an unconditional
phenomenon, which is contrary to the nature of phenomena; or it would be law as we have defined it, removed
from the sphere of phenomenal development; whereas the
rational conception of law demands that it be everywhere
present, permeating the whole development. But, in a
series of the second kind, all the phenomena are both
conditionated and conditionating, and the law, as from a
centre, radiates into the whole cycle, filling out and governing the whole.
It ought to be remarked here, also, that theory applies
to general facts as well as to law. In the latter application, the conception has already been given.t In the
former application, we mean by it the hypothesis of an
antecedent general fact for the purpose of conditionating
a known fact, and thus enabling us to give a more full and
rational explication of the whole series under consideration. As instances, we may cite the undulating theory
of Light; and Dalton's theory of Ultimate Atoms. In
* Supra, p. 269.
299
t Supra, p. 194. 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
both instances, we have antecedents hypothesised and
connected with actual phenomena. We hypothesise, in
order to supply undiscovered parts of a cycle of phenomena, the parts which are known suggesting those which
are unknown: or the unknown facts may be hypothesised
on the basis of a theory or a law, which, already comprehending the known facts, demands certain other facts to
complete the cycle.
In making observations, we may hit upon any part of
a cycle of facts, and thence be led through the relations
of antecedents and consequents to other parts. Herschel
remarks, in respect to the induction in the case of dew,
"Had we no previous knowledge of the radiation of heat,
this same induction would have made it known to us,
and, duly considered, might have led to a knowledge of
many of its laws." That is, any part may serve as a good
starting point.  " In the study of nature," he adds, " we
must not, therefore, be scrupulous as to 71ow we reach to
a knowledge of such general facts: provided, only, we
verify them carefully when once detected, we must be content to seize them wherever they are to be found." *
Now, it is because the development of phenomena moves
in a cycle that we may begin at any point indifferently,
since, beginning wherever we please or happen to, we
cannot lose the connected particulars. If we go back
from consequent to antecedent, the last antecedent becomes
the consequent of the first consequent, which, relatively
to it, becomes an antecedent; and if we go from antecedent to consequent, the last consequent becomes an ante-:
cedent to the first antecedent, which, relatively to it,
becomes a consequent.
* Supra, p. 174.
300 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
Were the cycles of phenomena completed, then ob  servation and experiment would have done their work in
respect to establishing general facts; then the uniform
antecedents and consequents would all be known.
I shall close this section by summing up the cardinal
points.
I. The governing ideas are Cause and Law.
II. The leading axioms are those of Universal Law,
and of the Uniformity of Nature.
III. The last named axiom may be conveniently ex panded into two particular axioms:
1. Like antecedents involve like consequents.
2. Like consequents imply like antecedents.
IV. General facts may be determined to an indefi nite extent before the law is arrived at, but whenever
a law is arrived at, or a theory adopted, the cycle of
facts may be enlarged or completed by their necessary
demands.
V. Hypothesis relates either to fact or to law. Hypothesised laws are theories.
VI. In the observation of phenomena we must be both
general and minute; noting all the phenomena, and all
their characteristics.
VII. Uniform antecedence and sequence of phenomena, the semblance and exponent of law, is determined
by a method of elimination which excludes whatever is
foreign to the particular relation to be determined.
VIII. The formulae of Inductiont comprehends every
mode of elimination, since it determines the general expression of the uniform sequences.
IX. When general facts are attained, they may be
* Supra, page 228.
301
t Page 211. 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
verified by returning to the particular instances from
which they were derived, or by multiplying instances.
There are often accidental and unlooked-for verifications,
which are of great weight, because they seem like a spontaneous testimony of nature.
302 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
SECTION VIII.
INDUCTIVE LOGIC OF UNIVERSAL AND NECESSARY LAWS.
LAWS are determined in two ways, either directly in the
form of axioms; * or indirectly, through an induction of
facts. The ultimate determining power in both cases lies
in Ideas of pure Reason.
We have seen that even Ideas and Axioms demand
phenomenal conditions for their development; but this is
widely different from that induction of facts which at the
first leads us to uniform antecedents and consequents, and
in the end to universal and necessary laws.
The axiomatic forms of law appear in the most original laws, such as the laws of Logic itself, and The Moral;
but the great laws of Nature, those which comprehend
the interior constitution of substances, and the constitution of systems of bodies, are laws arrived at by Induction.
The Idea of Law, that sublime Idea so quickening to
thought, leads on all observation and experiment, whether
the result be merely general facts of uniform sequences, or
universal and necessary laws. Uniform sequences are the
exponents of law; hence, in seeking for them, we are
really seeking ultimately for law. In the progress of our
research we pass from one generalization to another more
* Supra, p. 242.
303 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
extensive and comprehensive, until at length we seem to
reach an ultimate generalization, and this we call the
great and ultimate law. But it is not the great and ultimate law simply because it is at present the ultimate
point of investigation; it may be only the most general
fact, or an antecedent the most remote, which we have as
yet reached. To make it law, something is required in
its own intrinsic nature, as exhibited to the eye of Reason.
Law, taken on its highest ground, lies in the pure Idea;
taken under its highest manifestation, it is the determinate purpose or design of the Creative Mind. And in its
sphere; in relation to its appropriate phenomena, it is
universal and necessary. Thus the great moral law in its
sphere, that is, responsible being; in relation to its appropriate phenomena, that is, the conduct of responsible
being, is universal and necessary: it is the law without
exception and in every instance; and it is the necessary
law, no other being admissible. It lies originally in the
Idea of Right and Wrong; it appears as the wise design
in the Creative Mind which bodied forth this noblest
form of being; and it gives birth to every rule of moral
action.
So also in Somatology, law taken on its highest ground
lies in the pure Idea; taken under its highest manifestation, it is the determinate purpose or design of the Creative Mind. In its sphere-Ce. g. the interior constitution
of bodies or their arrangement into system, in relation to
its appropriate phenomena-c. g. the changes of bodies in
composition and decomposition, or their motions in masses
through space, it is universal; and, considered as the
wisest and the best,* it is necessary.  Now, that upon
* Part I., Sect. VII. Also, Part III., pp. 194, 195.
304 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
which the Reason fastens when it becomes satisfied that a
law is attained, is the correspondence between the outward generalization and its own Idea, and the presence in
the generalization of the characteristics of universality and
necessity. Thus, Gravitation is an ultimate generalization; but it is more, for the Reason perceives its correspondency with its own Idea of Centralization,*:' and therefore judges not only that it is the ultimate generalization
actually attained, but also that there is no other beyond it
that can be attained, and affirms that it is the law, and
the necessary law, of all systems of bodies.
The logical process by which we arrive at universal
laws is akin to that by which we arrive at general facts.
Indeed the establishment of general facts is a part of the
process. The principles, therefore, laid down in the preceding Section, are applicable here also.
It is impossible to prescribe the number of general
facts which are demanded as conditions of the determination of a universal law. Sometimes the law is preconceived at a very early stage of the investigation; such
was the fact in the case of Newton in respect to gravitation. Although believed to be a law, it can, under these
circumstances, be received only as a hypothesis, until verified in numerous and decisive applications.   But the
secret conviction, the earnest hope, and the indomitable
purpose of investigation, inspired by the conception from
the beginning, proves it to lie deeper in the soul than a
fortunate guess or an enticing fancy.
The verification of a law hypothesised is strikingly
illustrated in Physical Astronomy.   "The law, for example, which asserts that the planets are retained in their
* Page 198.
305 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
orbits about the sun, and satellites about their primaries,
by an attractive force, decreasing as the square of the distances increases, comes to be verified in each particular
case by deducing from it the exact motions which, under
the circumstances, ought to take place, and comparing
them with the fact. This comparison, while it verifies in
general the existence of the law of gravitation as supposed,
and its adequacy to explain all the principal motions of
every body in the system, yet leaves some small deviations
in those of the planets, and some very considerable ones in
that of the moon and other satellites, still unaccounted
for; residual phenomena, which still remain to be traced
up to causes. By further examining these, their causes
have at length been ascertained, and found to consist in
the mutual actions of the planets on each other, and the
disturbing influence of the sun on the motions of the satellites." *:  And thus these residual phenomena turn out an
additional verification of the law of gravitation.
In other instances the law dawns slowly, and is preceded by many vague and inadequate hypotheses, which
have to be overcome before the true light can shine clearly.
And when it begins to shine, hypotheses appear, which indeed are more or less ingenious and satisfactory, but still
indecisive. And thus there appears a gradual convergence
from many points to the all-comprehending law. But
when the law is attained, whatever be the process by
which we attain it, it is known to be the law by its sufficiency in respect to the phenomena to be explained, by its
universality and necessity, and its echo to the Idea of thc
Reason within.
There is also to be remarked a difference in the men
* Herschel's Discourse, p. 166.
306 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
tal constitution, by which a superior degree of the intui tive function seems to be awarded to some individuals.
These are the chosen interpreters of nature. By a sudden
and wonderful leap they are seen to pass from a limited
induction to a stupendous conclusion. With a prophetic
power they seem to foretel the law, which, before ordinary
minds, lies only as the result of an immense and laborious
observation. The mere experimenter and observer collects
facts, but does not gain laws. On the other hand, a mind
of high intuitive energy cannot make itself independent
of experiment and observation; for those high prophecies
require the verification of facts. It is the union of the
two which makes the finished philosopher of nature, for it
is the union of the two which constitutes the true Inductive Logic. And indeed, where these high gifts are found,
we may generally expect a corresponding skill and diligence in collating facts; for the mind that can penetrate
the laws of nature under her simplest manifestations, will
be prone to seek the fullest confirmations of these laws
from observation and experiment.
In the discovery of laws there is so much that appears
like inspiration, and indeed so much that is really inspiration, if Reason be the inspiration of the Almighty in man,
that to lay down exact logical rules and formulae designed
to govern and represent the process of discovery, would
appear puerile in the attempt, and prove impracticable if
attempted.
The great principle, however, can be clearly expressed.
It is that which has already been alluded to, namely, the
union of Ideas and Observation. It is the force and light
of the cardinal Ideas of Cause and Law which at first impel and guide us in investigation. Ideas of Time and
Space open to us the possibility of succession and arrange
307 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
ment. But, beyond this, the laws which govern the world,
inasmuch as they had their origin in the Divine Mind,
cannot be strange to us.  While, therefore, the perceptive
and inductive functions are busy in collecting facts, the
mind is intensely meditative, and intuition is awake.
Now it is that the Ideas which are to spring forth into
law are quickened and called upon. The orderly and uniform sequences of phenomena are noted;-these we have
called the exponents of law. Generalization follows generalization. Hypotheses are framed. Observation is enlarged, and rendered more exact by experiment.   The
Reason conceives more and more clearly. All that lies before it in the phenomenal world, having proceeded from
the Divine Ideas, is ready to meet corresponding Ideas in
the human mind.  At length the required Idea is developed, and it projects itself into the external world as the
law of the phenomena.
It will be perceived that we have limited the term law
to the universal and necessary. In common usuage the
term is applied to uniform sequences in general. The
former is the strictly philosophical use.   While we are
looking at particular sequences separately from the universal law, or in ignorance of it, it may perhaps be convenient to call them laws of nature; but when viewed in
connexion with the law, they are seen to be only forms of
its manifestation or exponential facts. For example, it
might be called a law of wood, and of vegetable matter
generally, to float in water,-and of metals and minerals,
to sink; a law of vapour to rise, in the atmosphere; a law
of water, to flow down descents of any degree,-and of bodies generally, to roll down declivities when moved off
their balance; a law of the tides, to rise and fall; a law
of the pendulum, to preserve a determinate vibration; and
308 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
so on. But when the law of universal gravitation is understood, then these particular laws, so-called, are perceived to be mere uniform sequences determined by the
universal law.
And here we may understand the difference in the intelligent apprehension, between uniform sequences and
universal laws. All these particular laws, taken in themselves as uniform sequences, are mere arbitrary facts.
We come to know them familiarly; and, indeed, we seem
to understand them, because we are accustomed to their
appearance; but still, all we can say of them is, that such
is the order of nature. But when we can refer them all
to one universal law, we gain a deeper and more satisfactory insight. Now we perceive a unity and simplicity in
nature which awakens admiration, like that which we experience when we view a grand and perfect mechanism.
But still more, we now perceive the great comprehending
law to be a universal and necessary law-the law of the
universe springing from an Idea. Nothing is so intelligible as Ideas, for they are the elements of the Reason itself, " the light of all our seeing." In the Idea of centralization we perceive how the universe must be constituted, and in the law of gravitation we find the realization of the Idea. Equally satisfactory is the law of centrifugal force, as the realization of the Idea of Diffusion. *:
The human intellect has oftentimes expended its force
in hypothesising new and more remote antecedents, instead
of directing itself through an induction of unquestionable
facts to the discovery of a law.  Des Cartes hypothesised
vortices as antecedents to the primary phenomena of the
planets in their revolution about the sun, and of the
* Page 198.
309 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
satellites about the planets. And Bernoulli attempted,
in accordance with this hypothesis, to explain the elliptical
form of the orbits by the shape of the planets, acting like
the rudder of a boat in the stream of the vortices. But
how were the vortices themselves to be explained? A
mere multiplication of the antecedents only threw the
difficulty farther back without overcoming it. Nay, more;
it introduced new difficulties, in the necessity of sustaining
the hypothesis.
Chemistry, the science of material elements and their
mutual relations in the composition and decomposition of
bodies, was, until a late period, a mere collection of uniform sequences. As such, it was of immense practical
importance. And as the facts of chemistry had to be
elicited  by  nice,  ingenious,  and  difficult,  and  often
dangerous experiments, the discovery of a new fact often
formed an epoch in the science, and conferred a just and
lasting- fame on the discoverer.   But still the facts stood
out to view simply as facts, unexplained by any central
and comprehensive law. They indeed revealed a beautiful
and benign constitution of nature-they connected themselves with the idea of paternal wisdom and goodness; but
this was accounting for them only under a moral aspect.
The same wise and benign ends might perhaps have been
reached equally well by a different constitution. What
was required, was the intellectual purpose growing necessarily out of an Idea, and projecting itself in the outer
world as the all-pervading law of the interior constitution
of bodies.
I have already had occasion to refer to the stupendous
results to which the genius of Faraday has conducted us.
In these results, chemistry attains to simplicity and unity.
All chemical changes are now made to appear under one
310 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
great law, by whatever name we call it, whether of Polarity
or of Electrical Induction. Behind the law there lies an
Idea.*: Neither the Idea nor the law have as yet reached
a full development, but to this point we are evidently
tending. The Idea must be an Idea of the pure Reason,
related to the elemental constitution and changes of bodies
analogously to the Idea of centralization and diffusion in
its relation to the masses of constituted bodies; and the
corresponding law must comprehend and govern in its
sphere, analogously to the law of gravitation in its sphere.
In Faraday we perceive, in an extraordinary degree, the
union of the most exact, elaborate, and extensive experimentation with Ideal conceptions. It is a union of the
Senses with the world of the Reason; like the union of
those opposite polar forces by which he solves the mysteries of his favorite science, and brings to light the order
and harmony of Nature in her elements.
The application of the mathematics to the expression
of physical laws arises from the fact that the subjects of
these laws are real quantities, such as magnitude, motion,
time, and distance.   For example,  gravitation implies
inotion, and motion is related to space; the intelligible
expression of the law, therefore, requires its expression in
the relation of space.
Ere we close this part of our investigation, we must
'eturn for a moment to the cyclical order of phenomena,
,nd the central position of law. Receiving this, at least,
;,s a convenient, if not a purely rational conception, it must
)e evident that the law, as law, cannot be absent from
.ny point of the phenomenal movement; but is like an
,idefinite number of radii drawn from the centre to the
* Page 200.
311 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
circumference, which are many, and yet, in their perfect
identity, one; so that we may regard the circumference as
formed either by the extremities of an indefinite number
of equal radii projected from a common centre, or by the
extremity of one of the radii revolving about the centre.
Now, suppose our observation were fixed upon only one
point of the circumference, we might account for its existence by conceiving of it as merely the extremity of a
straight line: or, suppose we were to observe several points
in curvilinear juxtaposition, then we might account for
them by conceiving of an angle of which the whole arc
formed the measure. But as our observation became more
extended, we might be led to the conception of a circle,
and then every point would be explained in reference to it
alone, and the particular straight line and the particular
angle would pass out of thought in the wider generalization. Now, our first conclusions were true, but they did
not contain the whole truth; and when the whole truth
is ascertained, we no longer require our first conclusions.
In like manner, in a cycle of phenomena, our observation
is fixed at first upon a certain antecedent and consequent,
and we name the particular end of the uniformity, a law.
Here indeed is no error, for the law from the centre
radiates into this particular uniformity, and is the true
source of it. But, inasmuch as the particular sequence
in question is only one of a wide circle of sequences, we
require the law of the whole ere we have the sufficient
law of the part.  This law of the whole permeating every
part explains every part; and like the centre and radii of
a circle, is a conception of pure Reason based upon a,
Idea.
The Reason in its Ideas enjoys a perfect and quie
cognition; and when phenomena are explained by laws
312 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
which again are explained by Ideas, then we have reached
the clearest light, and the highest satisfaction of knowledge.
The leading Axioms and definitions of the Inductive
Logic of Universal and Necessary Laws, so far as implied
in the foregoing, may be summarily stated as follows:
I. Every particular phenomenon is both an antecedent
and a consequent, taken in different relations; and, as a
part of a harmonious whole, is comprehended by a law,
II. Every law is the projection of an Idea.
III. Observation and experiment supply the orderly
sequences of phenomena, and thus conditionate the development of law; but the law itself, with its characteristics of universality and necessity, is a conception of the
Reason.
IV. A rational hypothesis is an effort to find a law by
tentative acts;-it is feeling after a law by ratqonal forethought, if haply we may find it.
V. Observation and experiment, without a rational
hypothesis, is like a man groping at objects at random
with his eyes shut. But even rational hypothesis, unaccompanied by the former, is only felicitous dreaming.
VI. Inasmuch as the world of the senses was created
by the Divine Reason from its own Ideas; and inasmuch
as the mind of man is made after the likeness of the
Divine MIind, therefore can it truly be said to know the
world of the senses only so far as, like the Divine Mind,
;t finds its Ideas there projected.
VII. Hence the Science of Nature can be determined
only by a union of Sensuous Phenomena with Ideal Coneptions.
VIII. The criteria of a law are, its sufficiency in
* Part I., Section X,
14
313. 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
respect to the phenomena, its characteristics, viz., universality and necessity, and its correspondence to an Idea.
IX. Law implies Cause. Cause is present wherever
law is manifested. Law expresses the rational plan, the
wise and fit developments of Cause.
a
314 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.,
SECTION IX.
THE LOGIC OF ART.
ART depends upon the Inventive Function.*:   There is a
Logic of Science; is there also a Logic of Art?
Art exists before Science. Sometimes it is the effect
of accident. Generally, in its earlier stages, it is the
effect of human wants inspiring an unreflecting ingenuity
to empirical efforts.  Art, in its highest state, is an effect
of ripened science.
Pure accident and empiricism reach art by mere felicities. But even where there is no science, there is often
exhibited an ingenuity and skill which impress us as a
manifestation of high and extraordinary powers. Men of
this mould seem to invent by a sort of inspiration. They
seem prepared for every difficulty, and arrive at results
the most curious with wonderful ease and tact. These
instances are found both in the mechanical and the fine
arts. There must be here an exceedingly vigorous spontaneous development of Ideas, together with a nice and
quick observation, and a vivid imagination.
There is, therefore, a true Inductive Logic, leading
virtually to important conclusions, although they be not
stated in the form of distinct propositions.  These conclusions really direct the hand of the mechanician and
* Page 231.
315 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
the artist. They are not reflected upon as universal principles, and therefore are not elaborated into a scientific
system; they appear to the individual as something
belonging to him, something that answers his special purpose, and with this he remains content. In his use they
soon become reduced to mere rules of art. This natural
and spontaneous Logic plays an important part in- the
development of humanity; and that which we call Genius,
and which so proudly overcomes all obstacles, presenting.
us the unscientific but skilful mechanician and artist; or
leading onward the untutored, as in the case of Ferguson
and Corregio, and a multitude of others, to the loftiest
eminence of science or art, is chiefly a natural logical
power, lying in the proper union of Ideas and external
observations-a union of the Ideal and the sensuous.
Unite with this the highest form of the imagination, and
you have the most splendid form of genius: for it is the
imagination which from Ideas creates those ideal representations which constitute archetypes of all that man
accomplishes of the great, the beautiful, and the sublime.
Where all the lights of science are enjoyed, invention
exhibits a chain of the nicest reasoning, both inductive
and deductive. The latter form of reasoning appears
indeed in the cases above mentioned; but more remarkably
here, inasmuch as the invention sets out with principles
already ascertained.  In its progress it may have to make
many inductions, and to exert that high prophetic power
which gives birth to rational hypotheses. Indeed, the
imagination is here also tasked in ideal representations of
mechanism. The steam engine from its conception to its
present state, exhibits a constant series of scientific inventions springing from a rigid logic.
One of the most beautiful instances of scientific in
316 
INDUCTIVE LOGIC.
vention is Davy's safety-lamp. Here conclusions were
drawn from established scientific principles; new inductions were made; a hypothesis formed; an ideal of the
invention represented in the imagination, from whence an
external model or diagram could be produced; and thus
every thing was made ready for that simple effort of
mechanical skill which completed the great achievement,
-great as a work of the intellect, and no less great as a
merciful visitation to poor and laboring men.
317 
BOOK  III.
DEDUCTIVE LOGIO.
SECTION I.
INTRODUCTION.
WE  have hitherto been engaged with the Logic of First
Truths, General Facts, and Universal Principles and Laws.
We are now to consider the Logic of drawing inferences
from a comprehending or containing Whole, to particulars
concluded under it. In Inductive Logic, particulars were
shown to be involved into universals: In Deductive Logic,
we must show that universals may be evolved into particulars.*:   Deductive Logic implies, 1. That some first truths,
general facts, and universal principles have been established: it implies, therefore, a considerable advance of human knowledge. 2. It implies that a cultivated language
exists, one adequate to express truths, principles, and
facts, in clear and precise propositions.
It is, therefore, with propositions that we begin in Deductive Reasoning. These propositions may themselves
* Pages 211-213. 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
be conclusions drawn from antecedent propositions, or
they may be primary and underived. They may be analytical or synthetical; and synthetical a' priori or a posteriori. *: But the manner in which they may have been
obtained is not taken into account in the particular deduction with which we may be engaged. Neither do we take
into account the subject matter of the propositions; this
is referred to particular sciences. If the subject matter
be pure quantity, it is referred to the mathematics; if it
be composed of natural phenomena, it is referred to physiology, natural philosophy, or chemistry, and so on. In
considering any branch of science, or any subject whatever,
we may have occasion to make many deductions-these
may be a means to one end: but in each particular deduction we have only to pay regard to the proper relation
between those propositions which form our premises, and
the conclusion we deduce. This part of Logic, therefore,
aims to express a universal form of deduction,-one that
shall apply to every subject indifferently.
* Vide Part I., Sec. X.
319 
DE0) DUCTIVE  LOGIC.
SECTION II.
ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITIONS.
A JUDGMENT is an affirmation of the mind. When expressed in language, it becomes a proposition, because it
is then propounded to general attention. Every proposition consists of a subject and a predicate. The subject is
that of which the affirmation is made; the predicate is
that which is affirmed of the subject.
The affirmation is either positive or negative; that is,
an affirmation of agreement or of disagreement. *
The subject and predicate are collectively called
terms. Each term expresses an object of thought complete in itself.
That which connects the terms together in a proposition, is called the Copula. This copula must always be
Is in positive propositions; and Is NOT, in negative. The
reason is obvious, viz., that the verb to be enters necessarily into the simple and direct form of affirmation. In
the ordinary forms of language, propositions do not, indeed, generally employ the substantive verb; but they
are always capable of being reduced to this form, by using
a participle or an adjective, in connection with the verb:
e. g. " Cesar conquered," may be reduced to the form,
"Ceesar was victorious," in which the copula appears. A
* Supra, p. 64.
320 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
term may consist of one or of several words. No single
word is capable of being a term in itself, except a nominative noun, because no other word, in itself, expresses a
complete object of thought. The infinitive mood of the
verb is not an exception, for this is really a noun: e. g.
"To be loved is to be happy:" i. e.
Pred.
is    a state of happiness.'
When the adjective appears as a predicate, the noun,
of course, is understood in connection with it. Where a
term consists of one word, it is called a simple term;
where it consists of several, a complex term.
Sometimes no little circumlocution is necessary, in order to reduce a proposition, consisting of complex terms,
to its exact form: e. g. " If he starts to-day, he will probably arrive the day after to-morrow:" i. e.
Sub.
"The event of his starting to-day
Pred.
n event which makes it probable he will arrive the day after to-morro."
-an event which makes it probable he will arrive the day after to-morrow.'
Again: " I am sure he said so: " i. e.
Sub.                                     Pred.
"The thing referred to by' so,'    is       what I am  sure he said."
Simple terms are singular or common.  A  singular
term stands for an individual, and can be predicated only
of itself.  A common term stands for many, and, of course,
can be predicated of many.
Propositions are categorical or hypothetical. The former is an unconditional affirmation; the latter a conditional.
14*
321
Sub.         -          -, "              - I
11 The state of being loved 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
Propositions are distinguished again by Quality and
Quantity.
The Quality of a proposition refers to its positive or
negative character: e. g. "A horse is a quadruped," is
positive; "A covetous man is not contented," is negative.
We must be careful to distinguish between a strictly negative proposition, i. e. one which connects the negative
particle with the copula, and one which contains a descriptive negative particle in one of its terms: e. g. "He
was conversing with a man not like the one you describe,"
is positive; "He was not conversing with a man like the
one you describe," is negative. Sometimes it is convenient to transfer the negative particle from the copula to
one of the terms, and thus to change the negative form
for the positive:- e. g. " Man is not perfect" is equivalent
to "Man is imperfect."
The logical use of the negative particles must be distinguished from those uses which obtain in the familiar
idioms of conversation. In the latter, they sometimes not
only deny, but affirm the contrary: e.g. the remark sometimes playfully made, " He is no fool," is intended not
merely to deny one kind of quality, but to attribute no
common share of the opposite kind; whereas, in the logical use, the negative particles simply deny, and never imply, an affirmation of the contrary.
The Quantity of a proposition expresses the extent of
the affirmation or negation.   When  the predicate  is
affirmed or denied of the whole of the subject, the proposition is universal; when it is affirmed or denied only of
a part of the subject, the proposition is particular: e.g.
"All men are mortal," " No miser is happy," are universal; "Some men are prudent," "Some animals are not
sagacious," are particular.
322 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
Propositions, as positive, and negative, and universal,
and particular, are distributed into four kinds. These
are generally, for the sake of brevity, represented by the
symbols A, E, I, and 0. And since Deductive Logic
considers the form of propositions, and not the matter, we
may conveniently represent the subject and predicate by
symbols.  The whole, then, may be represented as follows:
A, Universal afrmative.  Every X is Y;
E, Universal negative. No X is Y;
I, Particular affirmative. Some X is Y;
0, Particular negative. Some X is not Y.
In conversational idiom, when we affirm a part, we intend to deny the remainder. Thus, when we say, " Some
of the company have arrived," we intend to signify that a
part have not arrived. But, in logical language, on the
contrary, we intend to signify no more than we express.
Thus, when we say some X is Y, we do not mean to imply
that some X is not Y; this may or may not be, and no
doubtful form of predication is admissible.
Indefinite propositions,  e. g. "Birds  have wings,"
"Food is necessary for life," " Fish live in the water,"
are those whose quality is left unexpressed. These do not
belong to the province of Logic, for here no proposition
can be indefinite, but to that of Rhetoric.  The truth is,
that indefinite propositions never appear in correct writing
-unless the intention be to mislead-except where, from
the connection, or from the well-known nature of the matter, every reader at once is able to supply the true quantity.  Thus, when it is said "Food is necessary to life,"
the writer is sure he will not be misunderstood; otherwise,
he ought to supply the quantitive particle.
Where the subject of a proposition is a singular term,
the proposition is reckoned among universals, because the
323 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
whole subject is spoken of: e. g. " Socrates was an Athenian philosopher," means the whole of Socrates.
Propositions may be universal, without having both
their terms taken universally: e. g. when it is said, "All
horses are quadrupeds," the term " horses" is taken universally, but not the term "' quadrupeds;" for it is not
true that all quadrupeds are horses: but in the proposition, " No merciful man will abuse dumb animals," both
terms are taken universally; for, in excluding merciful
men from that class who abuse dumb animals, we do also
exclude the latter from the former. In the other example,
although all horses are affirmed to be contained in the
class "quadrupeds," this does not imply that all quadrupeds are contained in the class " horses." In particular
affirmative propositions, it is evident that neither term is
taken universally: e. g. " Some undeserving men are
prosperous."
In particular negatives, the subject plainly is not taken
universally; but the whole of the predicate being excluded
from the subject, must be regarded as taken universally:
e.g. " Some good men are not prosperous."  Here the subject enters only partially; but the predicate composed of
the class " prosperous," is entirely excluded from the subject " Some good men." When any term is taken universally, it is technically said to be distributed. Employing the symbols already introduced, the whole can be presented at one view.
A, X is Y.  Subject distributed.
E, X is Y.  Subject and predicate distributed.
I, X is Y.  Neither term is distributed.
0, X is Y.  Predicate distributed.
324 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
SECTION III.
OF PROPOSITIONS AS OPPOSED TO EACH OTHER.
PROPOSITIONS are opposed to each other when the subject
and predicate remain the same; and they differ in quantity or quality, or in both.
I. Opposition in quantity.  A is opposed to I; and E
to 0. The nature of this opposition is such, that A being
affirmed, I must be affirmed likewise; and the same in
respect to E and 0: and the denial of I and 0 respectively involves the denial of A and E; but the denial of
A and E does not involve the denial of I and 0.
This results from the axiom, That the affirmation of
the universal is the affirmation of the particular: and the
negation of the particular destroys the universal; but the
negation of the universal does not destroy the particular.
II. Opposition in quality.  A is opposed to E; and I
to 0. The nature of this opposition is such that A being
affirmed, E must be denied; but I being affirmed, 0 is
not to be denied; and vice versa. The denial of A or E
does not involve the affirmation of the other; but the denial of I or 0 does involve the affirmation of the other.
This results from the following axioms: 1. A universal positive and a universal negative being contraries
throughout their whole extent, cannot both be true. 2.
A particular positive and a particular negative being con
325 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
traries within limitation, may lie upon different parts of
the same field, and therefore both be true. 3. The denial of a universal of one quality does not legitimate the
affirmation of a universal of the opposite quality, since
both universals may be false, and the truth lie only in
the particulars: but both the particulars cannot be false,
for then both the universals would be true.
III. Opposition in both quantity and quality. A is
opposed to 0; and E to I. The nature of this opposition
is such that A being affirmed, 0 must be denied; and E
being affirmed, I must be denied; and vice versa. And
again: A being denied, 0 must be affirmed; and E being denied, I must be affirmed; and vice versa.
This results from the axioms:
1. Opposition in quantity and quality, inasmuch as it
excludes all agreement, amounts to positive contradiction,
so that the affirmation of one form of the proposition cannot be less than the destruction of the other form.
2. The opposition of a universal positive to a particular negative, or of a universal negative to a particular
positive, constitutes a perfect alternative,-the denial of
the one being the affirmation of the other.
The most general form of this axiom is as follows: To
deny a positive, is equivalent to affirming a negative;
and to deny a negative, is equivalent to alrming a positive. In this form, quantity is not taken into the account;
but the introduction of the idea of quantity modifies the
expression of the axiom, since to deny a universal positive, is not to affirm a universal negative, inasmuch as
this may also be false, i. e., the universality may be false;
but it is to affirm a negative, i. e., the negative must be
true in some form; and therefore, as it is not necessarily
true in the universal form, it remains that it must be true
326 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
in the particular form: and so also of denying a universal
negative in relation to a particular positive.
The following table presents the whole at one view:
AFFIRMING iS equivalent to DENYING and AFFIRMING.
A             -          E, 0,   =        I,
E             =         A, I,   =         O0
I             =          E,
0             =         A.
DENYING i8 equivalent to AFFIRMING and DENYING.
A             =         O0,
E             =          I,
I             -         E, O,       =     A,
0             =         A, I,      =       E.
327 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
SECTION IV.
OF THE CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS.
A PROPOSITION iS converted by the transposition of its
terms: i. e., the subject becomes the predicate, and the
predicate the subject.
The proposition as given, is called the exposita; when
converted, it is called the converse.
The law which governs the conversion of propositions is
as follows: No converse may assert more generally than
the exposita. This law results from the axiom, that, A
consequence cannot transcend its premises.  Hence, what
is affirmed in the exposita of a part only, cannot, in the
converse, be affirmed of the whole. The application of
this law is very evident.
1. Universal affirmative.  A, X is Y, does not distribute the predicate, but only the subject: all the X's are
in the Y's, but the Y's may contain more than X's; and,
therefore, from the affirmative, every X is Y, we can only
affirm some Y is X; i. e., as much of the Y as answers tc
the X.
2.  Universal negative.   E, X  is Y  distributes the
predicate as well as the subject. If there is No X in Y
then, consequently, there is No Y in X.
3. Particular a rmative. I, X is Y distributes neithe
one nor the other: If only Some X is Y, then only Sor.
Y is X.
328 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
4. Particular negative. 0, X is Y distributes only
the predicate: only some X's are not contained in the Y,
but all the Y's are excluded from the some X's in question. Hence, a simple conversion cannot take place; for
this would distribute the X, and, of course, make it to assert more generally than the exposita: From some X is
not Y. we cannot infer some Y is not X, for then, by the
converse, all the X's are excluded from the some Y's in
question. It is true, indeed, that some Y is not X may,
in some instances, be consistent with fthe exposita some
X is not Y, but it is consistent, not as the converse of this
form, but as a deduction from another form of the proposition: e. g., "Some soldiers are not brave men," is consistent with the exposita, "Some brave men are not
soldiers; " but the first is not true, as the converse of the
last, which plainly it is not; but as the contradictory of
the universal affirmative, "All soldiers are brave men,"
this contradictory, from our knowledge of the matter, being
first denied.
In like manner, the several forms A, Y is X; E, Y is
X; I, Y is X, may be consistent with 0, X is Y, in particular instances, where the matter is such as to admit of
it. But legitimate conversion takes-place independently
of the matter. According to a strict exposition of the
orm, therefore, a particular negative exposita has no converse. A negative proposition, however, may be changed
nto a positive, by connecting the particle of negation
w-ith one of its terms: e. g.,
Sub.                     Pred.
"Some brave men    are   not soldiers,"
.ny be converted as a particular positive, thus,
~S~~ub.   ~       Pred.
"Some not soldiers   are   brave men."
329 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
Here the exposita and converse are identical, and may
be represented under the bare form thus, some X is not Y;
converse, some not Y is X. Where the particle of negation is a component of the term which it affects, the conversion, by a particular positive, is peculiarly graceful:
e. g., " Some good men are not fortunate;"  converse,
" Some unfortunate men are good men."
To deny a negative being equivalent to affirming a
positive, we may convert a positive, under a form of negation or contraositzion: e. g., "Every poet is a man of
genius."  This is equivalent to "No poet is not a man of
genius;" which may be converted by "He who is not a
man of genius is not a poet." t
The following table contains the different kinds of conversion under the bare form:
CONVERSE.
I, Y is X,
E, Y is X,
I, Y is  X,
I, not Y is X.
By contraposition.
— Y =    E,not Y isX.
Some universal positive propositions, such as defini
tions, for example, have convertible terms, i. e., exactl
equivalent terms, and, in this case, are said to admit of
universal positive as a converse: e. g., "All equilatere
triangles are equiangular; " but to state this strictly, w;
should say,  "All the equilateral triangles are all th
* Whlateley's Logic, Book II., ch. ii., ~ 4.
330
EXPOSITA.
A, X is Y
E, XisY
I, X is Y
0O X is Y
A, X is Y 
DEDUCTIVE L(}GIC.
equiangular triangles." And so, again, the example, "A
good government is that which has the happiness of the
governed for its object," and which also seems to admit of
conversion by a universal positive, if stated strictly, becomes,  "All the good governments are all those which
have the happiness of the governed in view." But these
propositions need not be considered universal, for, in
the first example, we are speaking not of "all triangles,"
but only of some triangles, i. e., those which are "equilateral:" and in the second example, we are speaking,
not of "all governments," but only of some governments,
i. e., "good governments." We may, therefore, convert
them by particular positive propositions, as follows:
"Some triangles, i.e., the equilateral, are equiangular."
"Some triangles, i e., the equiangular, are equilateral."
"Some governments, i.e., the good, have the happiness of the governed in view."
"Some governments, i.e., all which have the happiness of the governed in view, are good governments." *
* Whateley's Logic, ibid.
331 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
SECTION V.
PROPOSITIONS CONSTRUCTED INTO SYLLOGISMS.
A SYLLOGISM * is the formula of the most direct and simple
deduction possible.
Let X is Y represent, as before, any proposition. If
the agreement of X and Y is directly perceived, then intuition supersedes the necessity of deduction: but if it
cannot be perceived directly, then we must enquire for a
medium. Now, suppose this medium to be Z, and that
we perceive by intuition, or as the result of a previous deduction,t that X and Y respectively agree with Z, then
we infer that they agree with each other. We have thus
the formula of positive conclusions
X is Z,
Y is Z,
therefore
Xis Y.$
The axiom which determines this formula is the following: If two terms agree with one and the same thira
term, they agree with each other.
Again:  Let X  is not Y represent any proposition irwhich disagreement is affirmed between two terms. If
this disagreement be not intuitively perceived, we mus
once more seek for a medium through which to deduce it
* Vide supra, p. 84.
332
t Pages 64, 65.
t Page 211. 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
Let Z, again, be that medium; and suppose that either,
by intuition, or as the result of a previous deduction, we
perceive that X agrees with Z, but that Y disagrees with
Z; then we infer that X and Y disagree with each other.
We have thus the formula of negative conclusions:
X is Z,
Y is not Z,
therefore
X is not Y.
The axiom which determines this formula, is the following: If of two terms, one agrees, and the other disagrees with the same third term, they disagree with each
other.
If the two terms both disagreed with the third term,
no inference could be made, because no relation could be
established between them.
The above axioms are really axioms of pure science.*
They apply rigidly to the formula of deduction, because
this formula is wholly independent of the matter of propositions.
It is evident that the syllogism can have neither more
nor less than three terms. If it had two terms, there would
be no deduction, but merely a proposition. If it had four
terms, it would have one term more than is required for a
3imple deduction; and this fourth term would either be
*rrelevant, or would be a term in another link of a chain
)f deduction. A chain of deduction may be of an indefiite length, as in geometry, for example, where the whole
;cience is a chain of deduction from the axioms and pri.ary definitions; but the links of the chain must each
onsist of the syllogism,-this being necessarily the everecurring form.
* Vide supra, p. 232.
333
t 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
As the syllogism, or formula of deduction, has three,
and only three, terms, so also it has three, and only three,
propositions. Two of the propositions contain the comparisons of the two terms, respectively, with the third
term. The third proposition contains the comparison of
the two terms with each other, in which their agreement
or disagreement is inferred. The term with which the
two are compared is called the middle term; the term
compared with the middle in the first proposition, is called
the major term; the term compared with the middle in
the second proposition, is called the minor term.   The
first two propositions are together called the premises8
and the last proposition is called the conclusion. The
proposition which contains the major term, i. e., the first,
is called the major premiss; and that which contains the
mntor term, i. e., the second, is called the mninor premiss.
But now the question arises, what determines the
order of comparisons, or the major term, and the major
premiss? Before we can answer this, several principles
must be considered.
1. It is evident that if all the terms were distributed,
it would be quite immaterial how we arranged the premises. If all X be contained in all Z, and all Y be con
tained in all Z, then X and Y cannot be otherwise thar
compared through Z, in their whole extent.
2. If the middle term be not distributed, then th
two terms or extremes cannot be certainly compare(
through it, for one of them might agree with one part oi
it, and the other with another part, and thus no relatio
between them be established: but a distribution of th
middle in one of the premises is sufficient, for if or.
extreme has been compared to the whole of the middY:
term, and the other to only a part of it, a relation 
334 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
evidently established between them, since every part of
the middle term, in this case, presents the extreme compared with the whole of it, to the extreme compared with
a part of it.
3. Hence it appears, again, that where there are two
particular premises, no legitimate conclusion can be drawn;
for we shall then have either an undistributed middle, e. g.
Some Z is X,
Some Yis Z;
or we shall fail in establishing a relation between the two
extremes; for the only case of a distributed middle with
particular premises, is where the middle term is the predicate of a particular negative, e. g.
Some Z is X,
Some Y is not Z,
in which some Z and X being first affirmed to agree, and
then some Y only being excluded from Z, it cannot follow
certainly that some Y is not X, since some other part of
X may not agree with Z, and some other part of Y may
agree with Z, for particulars of opposite qualities may
both be true; and thus the conclusion is left wholly inlefinite.
4. But the case is widely different where one of the
)remises is universal, and the middle term is distributed,
-.g.
All Z is X,
Some Y is Z;
,ere all Z being contained in X, the some Y contained in
must be contained in X also.  Again: in the premises,
No Z is X,
Some Y is Z,
inasmuch as the whole of Z is excluded from X, and some
~ is contained in Z, it follows that some Y is not in X.
335 
- DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
Hence if one of the premises is a universal, it is sufficient if only the middle term be distributed, and this takes
place when the universal premiss is E, or when, if it be
A, the middle term is the subject.
5. We may not distribute in the conclusion a term
which has not been previously distributed in a premiss,
for this would violate the cardinal axiom, that A  consequence cannot transcend its premi8es.
6. From two negative premises no inference can be
made; for, since in this case both extremes disagree with
the middle term, we cannot know, by means of this term,
whether they agree or disagree with each other.
7. If one of the premises be negative, the conclusion
must be negative also. Here one of the extremes is
affirmed to agree, and the other to disagree, with the
middle term, and consequently they must disagree with
each other.
8. If one of the premises be particular, the conclusion
must be particular also; for, although the whole of one
extreme is compared in the universal premiss with the
middle term, yet, as in the particular premiss, only a par'
of the other extreme is compared with the middle term
only a part of the first can be compared with the secon(
in the conclusion.
9. Where there are two universal positive premises
we cannot draw a universal conclusion, if the two extreme:
are both predicates in the premises, for then they are bot]
undistributed: e. g.
All Z is X,
All Z is Y,
therefore
Some Y is X.
The ambiguity of the middle term is a fallacy arisin
336 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
from the matter, or the peculiar use of words, and there fore is not to be considered here, where we are discussing
the pure deductive formula.
It is evident that only four different conclusions can
be drawn, viz.: A, E, I, and 0; now the premises which
are to determine these conclusions must be constituted in
accordance with the above principles. Let us consider
them in order.
I. A universal afirmative conclusion.  This can be
drawn where all of one extreme can be inferred to be contained in the other. It is not necessary that the containing extreme should itself be distributed; it may contain
the other extreme, and a great deal more; all which is
necessary to the universal conclusion is, that all of one
extreme should be affirmed to be contained in the other.
Now, as the middle term must be distributed, it must be
the subject of one of the premises; and as one of the
extremes must be distributed, it must be the subject of
the other premiss; and again, as it is the only extreme
distributed, it must be the subject of the universal conAlusion.   And, once more, as the middle term is the
nedium of comparison, it, on the one hand, must embrace
-he whole of one extreme, and, on the other hand, must
Lself be all embraced by the other extreme.   The followrng arrangement of the terms is the only one which comirises all the conditions of a universal conclusion:
A, Z is X,
A, Y is Z,
A, Y is X.
Hence the major term is here the one which contains
we middle, and the minor is the one which is contained
the middle.
* Barbara.
15
337 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
We might arrange the premises thus:
A, Y is Z,
A, Z is X,
A, Yis X,
but the major premiss is generally placed first.
II. Universal negative conclu,sion.  Here the two extremes are universally denied of each other. Hence there
is only one possible arrangement of the terms, viz.: so
that one extreme shall be universally excluded from the
middle term, and the other extreme universally contained
in it, as follows:
(2.)
E, X isZ,t
or      A, Y is Z,
E,   Y isX.
The only difference between the two syllogisms above,
is the conversion of the major premiss, in the last.
Or we may express the same thing thus:
(3.)
A, X is Z,+
E, Y is Z.
E, Y is X,
AE
or        E,
E,
The only difference between the last two is the conver
sion of the minor premiss, in the second. And the only
difference between the first and the last two is, that thextreme which, in the first two, is excluded from th.
middle term, in the last two is contained in it; and th
extreme which, in the first two, is contained in the middl
term, in the last two is excluded from it.
* Celarenit.      t Cesare.         $ Camestres.
338
(!.)
E, Z is X,;~
A, Y is Z,
E, Y is X,
(4.)
X is Z,~
Z is Y.
Yis X.
t Camenes. 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
But it is evident that all these different forms satisfy
the conditions required, and are virtually the same.
As to the title of the extremes, the term which
becomes the subject of the conclusion is generally called
the minor term, and that which becomes the predicate
of the conclusion, the major term. In a universal negative conclusion, however, this is of no account, inasmuch
as it is simply convertible.   It is quite  immaterial
whether we express the conclusion by E, Y is X, or E,
Xis Y.
Indeed, the 2, 3, and 4 forms may all be easily reduced to the first: the 2, by simply converting the major;
the 3, by simply converting the minor, and making it to
change places with the major, and then simply converting
the conclusion; and the 4, by transposing the premises,
and simply converting the conclusion.
III. Particular ajfrmative conclusion.  This conclusion is drawn where one of the premises is a particular
affirmative, or where both premises are universal affirmatives.
1. Where one of the premises is a particular affirmative, all of the middle must be contained in one extreme,
and some of the other extreme in the middle, or, which
amounts to the same thing, since a particular affirmative
is simply convertible, some of the nzmiddle in the other extreme. The form which directly presents this is the following:
(1.)
Z is X,
Y is Z,
Yis X.*
* Darii.
339
A,
I,
11 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
The deduction here is manifestly valid. There are
three other forms, viz.:
(3.)
A,  Z is X,t
I, Z is Y,
I, Yis           X.
All these evidently fulfil the required conditions.
Here, again, the 2, 3, and 4 forms may be reduced to the
first: the 2, by simply converting the major, transposing
the premises, and then converting the conclusion; the 3,
by converting the minor; and the 4, by transposing the
premises, and converting the conclusion.
Scholium. It will be remarked that the change of the
forms, by conversion of propositions, and the transposition of the premises, does not alter the current of the
deduction. We have seen ~ that a proposition, when lawfully converted, asserts no more than it did before: the
transposition of the premises obviously does not change
their character, nor their relation to each other; and
since, when this transposition is made, what was before
called the major becomes the minor term, and vice versa,
the conclusion is converted, to correspond to it.
2. Where both premises are universal affirmatives.
Here, either both extremes are predicates, and of course
undistributed, or one only is a predicate, and- undistributed.
There are then two forms:
t Datisi.
~ Supra, See. IV.
340
(2.)
I Z is X *
I I
Al Z is YY
I) Y is X.
(4.)
I X isZ+
A z is- y
II y is X.
'-' Disamis.
$ Dimaris. 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
(6.)
A,X is Z,t
A, Z is Y.
I, Y is X.
(5.)
A, Z is X,*
A, Z is Y,
I, YisX.
These also can easily be reduced to the first: the 5,
by converting the minor premiss into I; and the 6, by
transposing the premises, and simply converting the conclusion.  After the transposition, we consider A, X is Z,
as I, X is Z, for only the particular is required for the
conclusion. Indeed, these forms are quite unnecessary,
since a particular affirmative conclusion requires only one
universal premiss; and two universals, arranged as above,
cannot form the premises of any thing more.
IV. Particular negative conclusion. We have seen
that from two particular premises no inference can be
drawn, not even where a particular negative, of which the
middle term is the predicate, and consequently distributed,
is one of the premises. Nor, again, can any inference be
drawn from two negatives. One at least of the premises,
therefore, must be a universal, and only one of them a
negative. If there be two universal premises, the extreme
contained in the universal positive must be a predicate,
so that it be not distributed, for if both extremes were
distributed, then the conditions of a universal negative
would be fulfilled. From this it follows that we can draw
a particular negative conclusion only in the three following ways:
1. The whole of one extreme must be excluded from
the middle term, and some of the other extreme must be
contained in it. There are six forms in this division:
t Bramantip.
341
* Darapti. 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
(3.)
E, Z is X,+
A, Z is Y.
O. Y is X.
(2.)
E, X is Z,t
I,   Y     is Z,
OO,   Y    is X.
(6.)
E, X is Z,~
I, Z is Y.
O.,Y is X.
(5.)
E, X is Z,ll
A, Z is Y,
0, YisX.
2. The whole of one extreme must be contained in
the middle term, and only some of the other extreme excluded from it. In this the preceding is reversed. Here
is only one form, viz.:
(7.)
A,X is Z,**
O. Y is Z,
O, Y is X.
3. Some of the middle term must be excluded from
one extreme, and the whole of it contained in the other
extreme. Here also is only one form, viz.:
(8.)
o, Z is X,tt
A, Z is Y,
O, Yis X.
Every one must perceive, upon a little reflection, that
these three divisions embrace all possible negative conclusions.
Here, again, all the forms can be shown to be identical
in their principle, by reducing all the others to the first
* Ferio.      t Festino.      $ Felapton.       ~ Feriso.
~ Fresison.         ** Baroko.           tt Bokardo.
342
(I.)
E Z is X *
I) y is Z
01 y is X.
(4.)
E Z is Xl~
I Z is Y7
0) y is X.
11 Fesapo. 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
form. 2 is reduced by simply converting the major; 3, by
converting the minor into I; 4, by simply converting the
minor; 5, by simply converting the major, and converting
the minor into I; and 6, by simply converting both the
major and minor. In these the mode of reduction is
obvious and easy. 7 and 8 are reduced in a manner more
circuitous: In 7, the major term must be changed by contraposition, and the minor changed into I, by connecting
the negative particle with the predicate,* thus:
A, X is Z, by contraposition t        E, not Z is X,
O, Y is Z. by connecting the particle I, Y is not Z,
O,Y isZ,                 "        "  O,Yis X.
In 8, the minor is changed into E, by double negation,
and is not converted as before; the major is converted
into I, as before; the premises are then transposed; and
lastly, the conclusion, by a double negation and conversion,
is made to correspond legitimately as well as inform with
the premises, thus:
0, Z is X converted into              I, not X is Z,
A, Z is Y by double negation becomes E, Z is not Y.
Transposing these premises we have 5IE, Z is not Y,
I, not Xis Z.
Then 0, Y is X, by double negation )
and conversion gives the proper  0, not X is not Y.
conclusion 
* Vide Section IV.
t Contraposition supposes a previous double negation; it is a simple conversion, after a change has been made by this negation, e. g. E, X  is not Z is
the double negation, and then by conversion, E, not Z is X.
343 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
As this is somewhat complicated, I will give an illustration:
0, "Some oppressed men are not discontented;
A, All oppressed men are wronged;
Therefore
0,  Some wronged men are not discontented."
This, when reduced as above, becomes
E, "No oppressed men are not wronged;
I,   Some not discontented are oppressed men;
O, Some not discontented are not not wronged."
This may also be reduced to the first form of the particular positive, viz, to A, I, I, by converting the minor
term and the conclusion into I, by connecting the negative
particle as before, and then transposing the premises, thus:
0, Z is X conve' ed and transposed to minor I, not X, is Z
A, Z is Y transposed to major                   A, Z is Y
0, Y is X converted                         I, not X is Y
A, All oppressed men are wronged;
I, Some not discontented are oppressed men;
I, Some not discontented are wronged!;
From the foregoing analysis, it appears, that there are
but four original distinct syllogisms, comprising the four
possible conclusions, viz., A, A, A; E, A, E; A, I, I;
and E, I, 0, as arranged under the first form of each kind;
-all the other forms being capable of a legitimate reduction to these primary forms.
* Whately's Logic, Book II., Ch. iii., ~ 5.
344 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
At the beginning of this section we considered the two
primary axioms of pure science which determine the general formula of Deduction. But in analysing this formula
under the ideas of quantity and quality, we find another
axiom developed. In every form of the syllogism one of
the extremes is more comprehensive than either the other
extreme, or the middle term; and the middle term comprehends this other extreme, whether it be the whole or a
part of the class to which it belongs, thus:
All Z is X,
All, or, some Y is Z,
therefore we may infer
All, or, some Y is X.
Hence, it appears, that what is affirmed of Z, viz.,
that it is comprehended by X, must be affirmed of Y also
to the extent that it is comprehended by Z. So far with
respect to Quantity.
With respect to Quality, the middle term is always
universally affirmed, either to be comprehended by, or to
be excluded from, the first extreme; and the other extreme
is in whole or part affirmed to be comprehended in the
middle term, thus:
All, or, no Z is X,
All, or, some Y is Z,
therefore we may infer
All, or, some Y is, or is not, X.
Here, again, what is affirmed of Z, viz., that it universally does, or does not, agree with, or belong to X, must
be affirmed of Y also, to the extent that it is comprehended by Z.
15*
345 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
Now all this is evident; and the axiom which forms
the basis of it, is the Dictum de omni et nullo of Aristotle,
viz., Whatever is affirmed or denied of any term distributed, (i.e. taken universally,) is affirmed or denied of
every particular comprehended under it.
346 
DEDUCTIYE LOGIC.
SECTION VI.
OF MOODS AND FIGURES.
THE Mood of a Syllogism is determined by the quantity
and quality of the three propositions which compose it,
and is represented by the corresponding symbols; thus,
A, A, A, expresses the mood of the syllogism which gives
a universal positive conclusion; and so with respect to the
others.
The Figure of a Syllogism refers to the situation of the
extremes in the premises with respect to the middle term.
Now, obviously, there are but four variations that can be
made, viz., the middle term must be the subject in both
premises; or the predicate in both; or the subject of the
major, and the predicate of the minor; or the predicate
of the major, and the subject of the minor. The following
table presents their several relations:
(2.)
Xis     Z,
Yis    Z,
Yis X.
Now as there are four kinds of propositions, A, E, I,
0, and three are appropriated to each syllogism, all the
possible ways of combining them must be sixty-four. For
four different majors multiplied into four different minors,
and these again into four different conclusions, is a combination of four, three times, 4x 4 x 4=64. Regarding it
347
(1.)
Z isxl
Yis Zi
y is X.
(3.j
Z is Xi
Z is yl
Yis X.
.(4.)
X is Zi
Z isy 2
y is X. 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
as a mere arithmetical problem, since the sixty-four Moods
can be each stated in the four different Figures, we shall
have in all 4 x 64=256 varieties of the syllogism. The
arithmetical determination, however, although noticed by
logicians, is of very little use. We find out in this way the
utmost limit of the syllogisms, but we are not aided, in the
least, in discriminating between the true and the false.
This discrimination can be made only on the principles
laid down in the preceding section; and which have there
been applied to determining the legitimate and required
syllogisms, independently of the apparatus of Moods and
Figures. And yet, after having completed this analysis,
there may perhaps be some convenience in employing
Moods and Figures in distinguishing the different forms.
The legitimate forms, we have seen, are in all nineteen-; of which, one only is used for universal positive conclusions, four for universal negative, six for particular
positive, and eight for particular negative conclusions.
These are found in the different Figures. That figure
which embraces the four cardinal forms, is called the first.
All the other forms, we have seen, can be reduced to these
cardinal forms.
The following lines have been contrived to aid in committing the Moods to memory; and to present, at one
view, the mode of reducing the secondary Moods to the
primary:
Fig. 1.  bArbArA, cElArEnt, dArI, fErlOque pri            oris.
Fig. 2.  cEsArE, cAmEstrEs, fEstInO, bArOkO, se            cunda.
Fig. 3. tertia, dArAptI, dIsAmIs, dAtIsI, fElApt            On, bOkArdO, ErlsO, habet: quarta in            super addit.
348 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
Fig. 4. brAmAntIp, cAmEnEs, dImArIs, fEsApo,
frEslsOn.
In the above, the initial letters b, c, d, f, denote the
mood of the first figure to which the secondary mood must
be reduced: e. g. In brAmAntIp the b indicates that it
is to be reduced to bArbArA:: and so of the others.
The capital letters denote the moods; s, denotes the
simple conversion of the proposition which precedes it; p,
the conversion per accidens of the proposition which precedes it, i. e., the conversion of A into I, or of I into At;
m, (rmutandi) that the premises must be transposed.
Baroko and Bokardo are names given in reference to
Reductlo ad impossibile; a method of reduction employed
by some, particularly in respect to these moods. The B
denotes that the new mood is to be formed in Barbara;
and the K, that for the proposition immediately preceding it, the contradictory of the conclusion must be substituted. These moods, however, have in the preceding sections been reduced in the ordinary way.$
* If reduced to Barbara, it of course is true in Dari.
t This last occurs in Bramantip only, and here not because a particular can
legitimately be converted into a universal, but because the new arrangement of
the premises requires a universal conclusion. The transposition of the premises
places the mood in the 1st Fig. and it becomes Barbara necessarily.
t The kind of arguments to which the different moods are in their nature
best adapted, is an investigation of very high interest. I have not entered
upon it in this treatise. Perhaps I shall undertake it hereafter. In the absence of any thing original to offer, I take the liberty of appending the following striking remarks from Dr. Whately's excellent work. They are given in a
note at the foot of one of the pages of Book II., Ch. III., ~ 4:
" With respect to the use of the first three Figures (for the fourth is never
employed but by an accidental awkwardness of expression,) it may be remarked,
that the First is that into which an argument will be found to fall the most
naturally, except in the following cases:-First, When we have to disrove
something that has been maintained, or is likely to be believed, our arguments
349 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
will usually be found to take most conveniently the form of the Second Figure,
viz. we prove that the thing we are speaking of cannot belong to such a Class,
either because it wants what belongs to the whole of that Class (Cesare), or because it has something of which that Class is destitute (Camestres); e. g.'No
impostor would have warned his followers, as Jesus did, of the persecutions
they would have to submit to;' and again,'Au enthusiast would have expatiated, which Jesus and his followers did not, on the particulars of a future
state.'
"The same observations will apply, mutatis mutardis, when a Particular
conclusion is sought, as in Festino and Baroko.
"The arguments used in the process called the' Abscissio Infiniti,' will in
general be the most easily referred to this Figure.
"The Third Figure is, of course, the one employed when the Middle term
is Singular, since a Singular term can only be a Subject. This is also the form
into which most arguments will naturally fall that are used to establish an objection (Enstasis of Aristotle) to an opponent's Premiss, when his argument is
such as to require that Premiss to be Universal. It might be called, therefore,
the Enstatic Figure. E. G. If any one contends that'this or that doctrine
ought not to be admitted, because it cannot be explained or comprehended,'
his suppressed major premiss may be refuted by the argument that' the connection of the Body and Soul cannot be explained or comprehended,' tc.
"A great part of the reasoning of Butler's Analogy may be exhibited in
this form."
350 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
SECTION VII.
OF THE REDUCTION OF SYLLOGISMS.
REDUCTION of Syllogisms is of two kinds, Ostensive Reduction and Reductio ad impossibile.  The aim in both
kinds, in respect to Syllogisms, is to prove the validity of
the secondary forms.
I. Ostensive Reduction.-Here the proof is made out
by showing the identity of the secondary and primary
forms; and this is done by actually changing the secondary
into the primary, without making them assert more, or,
differently from what they did before.
This change is effected by conversion of terms, and
transposition of premises.  But it has been fully shown
that these do not effect either the kind or the extent of
the predication. When the secondary are reduced to the
primary form, the proof is made out, because these forms
are a direct expression of the Dictum de omni et nullo.
II. Reductio ad imlpossibile.-By this method we prove
the validity of a secondary Syllogism as a form of reasoning, by showing that if we grant the premises, the conclusion cannot be false. For that in all cases must be a valid
form, by which, from true premises, we cannot draw a false
.onclusion.
The method is simply this: Since by the opposition
)f propositions, every proposition must be true if its con;radictory be false, and false if its contradictory be true,
351 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
we take the contradictory of the conclusion of the Syllogism or form in question, and construct with it, as a
premiss in connection with another unquestionable premiss, a new Syllogism in the first Figure. Now if the
new conclusion thus deduced be false, then the assumed
premiss must be false, for there is no question respecting
the validity of the form in the first Figure; and if the assumed premiss be false, then the original conclusion of
which it is the contradictory must be true: e. g. Let us
take Baroko:
A, X is Z,
0, Y is Z,
0, Y isX.
If this conclusion be not true, its contradictory is true,
viz., A, Y is X. Let us, then, construct a new Syllogism
with this contradictory as a premiss, in the first Figure.
This we can do by merely substituting it for the minor
premiss in the above Syllogism; we shall then draw a conclusion in Barbara, thus:
A, X is Z,
A, Y is X;
therefore,
A,'Y is Z.
Now it will be perceived that this new conclusion is
the contradictory of the original minor premiss, -and the
premises it will be recollected were granted; hence it
must be false; and being false, the new premiss is false,
and this being false, its contradictory, the original conclusion, must be true.
All the secondary forms may be tested in the same
way, e. g. Feriso.
E, Z is X,
I, Z is Y,
0, Yis X.
352 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
Substituting the contradictory of the conclusion A, Y
is X, for the major premiss, we form the following Syllogism in Darii:
A, Y is X,
I, Z isY;
therefore,
I, ZisX.
But the new conclusion contradicts the original major
E, Z is X; consequently it is false; and being false, the
new premiss is false, and this being false, its contradictory, the original conclusion, must be true.
353 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
SECTION VIII.
OF MODAL, HYPOTHETICAL, AND DISJUNCTIVE
PROPOSITIONS.
I. Modals.-These propositions do not differ in form from
what are called pure categorical propositions. X is Y
represents both. The modality is merely a peculiarity of
the matter, and consequently does not pertain to the pure
logical formula. Besides, in the matter itself, modal propositions can be so disposed as to become pure categoricals.
This is effected by attaching the modal words to the subject or the predicate. E. G. "It is probable that all
knowledge is useful," i. e.
"All knowledge    is   probably useful."
Again:
"It is possible that he may arrive to-morrow; " i. e.
Sb.
"His arrival to-morrow
"1 His arrival to-morrow
A subject and predicate may each be expressed by
several words, but this cannot affect the form.
II. Hypotheticals.-These are propositions which con
tain a hypothesis in one of their terms, and are therefor(
like Modals capable of being reduced under the categort
cal form. Where the force of the reasoning lies in the
354
Sub.
Pred.
Pred.
is        possible." 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
hypothesis the case is widely different; but it is evident
that this is not the fact in Examples like the following:
Every Z is X or p,
Every Y is Z;
therefore,
Every Y is X or p.
The aim here is not to conclude which of the two Y
is, whether X or p: but only that Y is X or p.
III. Disjunctives.-These are a kind of compound
propositions, consisting of several categoricals, one of
which is affirmed to be true; e. g. A is either B or C or
D. Now if we can deny all but one, then that one is
true; or if we can affirm one to be true, then the others
are false; thus, But A is not B or C; therefore A is D:
or A is D, therefore it is neither B nor C.
A Disjunctive proposition, however, is capable of being
reduced like a Modal to a pure categorical, thus:
Pred.
is       D;
AllAnotBor 
All A not B or a
Or,
Pred.
is C.
AllA      I
All A not B or D
A Syllogism with such propositions contains the usual
i'brms; e.g.
Every A not B or C is D.
All Z is A not B or C.
Therefore, all Z is D.
" It is either Spring, Summer, Autumn, or Winter;
)ut it is neither Spring, Autumn, nor Winter; therefore
t is Summer," i. e.
Every season not Spring, Autumn, or Winter, is
lummer.
355
Slab.
Sub. 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
The present season is a season not Spring, &c., therefore, the present season is Summer.
When we affirm one to be true, and infer the falsity
of the others, the same reduction may be made; thus:
No A being D is B or C,
Z is A being D,
Therefore, Z  is not B or C.
No season being Summer, is Autumn or Winter, &c
The present season is a season being Summer; therefore, &c.
Or, again, a Syllogism of this kind may be put into
the form of a conditional, thus:
If A is not B or C,
Then A is D, &c.
It is evident, therefore, that the preceding kinds of
propositions require no new formula, but lie within the
principles already established.
356 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
SECTION IX.
HYPOTHETICAL REASONING.
A CONDITIONAL proposition consists of an Antecedent and
A Consequent, each of which is a distinct proposition,e. g.,
Anedent.
" If the Scriptures are not wholly false,
Consequent.
f - A___._.~
They are entitled to respect."
If    Y is Z,
Then Y is X.
There are two rules generally applied in hypothetical
easoning.
1. If the Antecedent be granted, the Consequent is
Granted also; e. g.,
If   Y is Z,
Then Y is X.
But Y is Z,
Therefore, Y is X.
2. The Consequent being denied, the Antecedent
iust be denied also.
If    Y is Z,
Then Y is X.
But Y is not X,
Therefore, Y is not Z.
357
Antecedent. 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
The first rule is founded upon the obvious principle,
that a false Antecedent or Premiss cannot yield a true
conclusion. The second rule is founded upon the no less
obvious principle, that an Antecedent or Premiss must be
false, which yields a false conclusion.
But, from the falsity of an antecedent, we cannot infer
the falsity of the consequent, for the consequent may flow
out of some other antecedent which is true: e. g.,
If    Y is Z,
Then Y is X.
Now, suppose Y is Z to be false, still Y is X may be
proved by some other antecedent, e. g., Y is P.
Hypothetical reasoning really differs from categorical,
only in that, one of the premises is a hypothesis. The
formula and all the principles are the same. If Y is Z,
then Y is X: this is an affirmation that if one proposition
be granted, another must be granted also. But, one proposition alone cannot authorize an inference. We here
then have only part of an argument, viz.: the conclusion
and one of the premises. Which premiss have we, and
can we supply the other?  There is no difficulty.  Th(
conclusion always contains the minor and major terms 
the other premiss contains the middle, together wit'
either the major or minor. Now, if there be a term i.
the antecedent or premiss, the same as the subject of th.
consequent or conclusion, then the given premiss is th.
minor premiss; but if the same as the predicate of thconsequent, then the given premiiss is the major. And i,
either case, in order to supply the wanting premiss, w.
have only to connect the middle term with that term oi
the conclusion which is not found in the given premiss cantecedent: e.g.,
358 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
If   Y is Z,
Then Y is X.
Here the wanting premiss, obviously, according to the
above, is the major, which supply, and we have the following syllogism:
Z is X,
If   Y is Z,
Then Y is X.
Or we may state it thus: It is affirmed, that if Y is
Z, then Y is X: but why does it follow, that, if Y is Z,
Y is X also?  The answer to be given is, Because Z is X
-if Y is contained in Z, then Y must be contained in
X also, because Z is contained in X.
"If the Scriptures are not wholly false, then the
Scriptures are entitled to respect."
But, why does this follow?  Because, "Whatever is
not wholly false, is entitled to respect." Or, "Every
book of pure morality and heavenly promises, &c., not
wholly false, is entitled to respect: "
"If the Scriptures are such a book, not wholly false,"
"Then the Scriptures, &c."
Take another case: in which the minor premiss is
wanting:
If   Z is X,
ThenY is X.
The antecedent here must be the major premiss, because it compares the middle with the predicate of the
* The suppression of the minor premiss, and the construction of a conditional out of the major and the conclusion, gives that case in which the antecedent and consequent have a different subject, and which, by some, is supposed
to involve peculiar difficulties. See Whately's Logic, Book II., Chap. iv., ~ 6,
note at the foot of the page.
359 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
consequent or conclusion.  We  can easily supply  the
minor: The affirmation is that, If Z is X, then Y must
be X also. But, why must this follow? Because Y is Z.
"If whatever exhibits marks of design is the work of
an Intelligent Creator;
"Then the universe must be the work of an Intelligent
Creator." But why?
Because, "The universe exhibits marks of design."
In ordinary language, all reasoning is usually in an
Enthymematic form; i. e., one premiss is suppressed;
because, when one premiss and the conclusion are stated,
the mind, generally, readily supplies the other. Thus
the syllogism just above, usually appears, in ordinary language, with the major suppressed; since when it is affirmed that, " The universe must be the work of an Intelligent Creator, because it exhibits marks of design,"
every one assents on the ground that, " Whatever exhibits
marks of design, must be the work of an Intelligent
Creator."
What therefore is called by logicians, a Conditional
Proposition, is nothing more than an enthymeme, with
the given premiss hypothesised. And to grant the antecedent, is merely to remove the hypothesis. The hypothesis has nothing to do with the pure logical form, for, that
we ever hypothesise is owing to considerations lying wholly
in the matter or subjects of our reasoning. And to reduce
a conditional, we have only to supply the suppressed
premiss.
The validity of the Rules before given, now, also,
appears clearly to arise out of the nature of the syllogism.
To grant the antecedent, is to grant the consequent,
because, since the suppressed premiss is of course granted,
not being hypothesised, to grant the antecedent is to
360 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
remove the hypothesis from the other premiss, and consequently to remove all doubtfulness from the argument.
And to deny the consequent, must be the destruction of
the argument, since it is equivalent to granting the contradictory of the conclusion, and consequently denying
the premises.
16
361 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
SECTION X.
OF THE DILEMMA.
A DILEMMA is formed by bringing together several Conditional Propositions, so that different antecedents shall
have the same consequent; or, different antecedents shall
have different consequents; or, the same antecedent shall
have different consequents.
I. Different Antecedents with the same Consequent.
If A isB,   And if AisC,   And if A isD,
Then A is X,       then A is X,      then A is X, &c.
Now, if the matter be such that we can disjunctively
grant the antecedents, thus:
But, A is B, or C, or D; then it must follow that
A is X.
II. Different Antecedents with different Consequents.
If A is X,         fAisY If A is Y  If A is Z,
Then A is B,       then A is C,     then A is D.
Now here again, if the matter is such that we cannot
disjunctively grant the antecedents, then we must disjunctively grant the consequents likewise: thus:
But       A is X,or Y,or Z.
Therefore A is B, or C, or D.
III. The same Antecedents with different Consequents.
If A is B,
then A is Y,
362
If A is B.
Then A is X,
If A is B.
then A is Z. 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
Now, if we perceive from the matter, that the common
antecedent admits of all these consequents, then of course,
by granting the common antecedent, we grant all the con sequents.
Where we grant the antecedent, and establish the
consequent, the dilemma is called constructive.
But where we deny the consequent, and destroy the
antecedent, the dilemma is called destructive.
We have already remarked in the preceding section,
that the hypothesis arises from the peculiar character of
the matter of the proposition; for the logical form supposes the connection between the subject and predicate to
be certain. And so here again the possibility of disjunctively affirming the antecedents, or of disjunctively denying the consequents, lies in the peculiar character of the
matter. The force and keenness of the dilemma, as a
weapon in debate, arises from the matter also, and from
many relations and circumstances of which the forensic
disputant knows how to avail himself: e. g., An individual
may be so situated that his words, or conduct, or both,
justify two or more inferences unfortunate for himself;
from one or the other of which he cannot escape. He
must admit one fact or the other, and either is an antecedent involving a stinging consequent. We have here
described the second kind of Dilemma, and of which the
several antecedents are the "horns": e. g., " If AEschines
joined in the public rejoicings, he is inconsistent; if he
did not, he is unpatriotic; but he either joined or not
therefore he is either inconsistent or unpatriotic."
From the denial of one or the other of the consequents,
we necessitate the denial of one or the other of the antecedents; and. this proves no less forcible than the other
mode. Thus we may state the preceding example in the
-363 
DEDIJCTIVE LOGIC.
following manner: "If ZEschines is consistent, he did
not join in the public rejoicings; if he is patriotic, he did
join in them: but he either joined or not; therefore he
is either not consistent, or not patriotic."
The first kind is forcible taken in the constructive
mode; for here the individual who is the subject of the
dilemma is involved in several facts, so related, that some
one must be admitted, and any one leads to the torturing
inference.
The third kind is the weakest, and perhaps ought not
to be considered a dilemma at all. Having only one antecedent, it wants the "horns." In the constructive
mode, it is merely a conditional, in which the antecedent
involves several consequents; and this is common to many
conditionals, without yielding any peculiar advantage in
debate. On the other hand, there is no point in disjunctively denying the consequents, since the denial of any one
of them destroys the common antecedent, so that the
whole force of the argument is found in one of the simple
conditionals.
Where the dilemma has the subject of the consequents
different from the subject of the antecedents, the antecedents are major premises. This is obvious from what was
shown in the preceding section.
Since the dilemma is merely a combination of conditionals, it may be resolved into these again, and each conditional reduced to the complete syllogism, by supplying
the suppressed premiss.
364 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
SECTION XI.
OF THE SORITES.
THIS is an abridged form of an argument consisting of
several Syllogisms. It is either categorical or hypothetical.
I. Categorical Sorites.-This is so arranged that the
predicate of the first proposition is the subject of the
second, and the predicate of the second the subject of the
third, and so on.  In every new proposition a new predicate appears; and in the last proposition it is inferred
that the first subject agrees with the last predicate; e. g.
AisB, B is C, CisD, D is E; therefore A is E.  It is
evident that in the same manner the last predicate may
be affirmed of all the intermediary subjects. The truth
of the argument is evident.  If all A  is contained in B,
and all B in C, and all C in D, and. all D in E, then all
A, B, and C must be contained in E likewise.
By carefully inspecting the Sorites, we shall perceive
that the first proposition of the series is a minor premiss,
and all the other propositions major premises, except the
last, which is a conclusion; so that we have here parts of
several Syllogisms, which are so related that the conclusion of the preceding becomes the minor premiss of the
succeeding; and the Sorites is constructed by suppressing
all the minor premises but the first, and all the conclusions but the last; thus:
365 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
(1.)                (2.)
B is C,             C is D,
A is  B,            A is C,
Therefore A is C,  Therefore A is D,
D is B,              (3.)
Therefore A is E.             D is E,
A is D,
Therefore A is E,
The Sorites is formed of the Primary Syllogisms, i. e.
those of the first Figure, because in this, inasmuch as it is
the natural form of the Syllogism, no change by conversion or otherwise has to be made in the propositions in
transferring them from one Syllogism to another, which
will be the case in the other figures, since the middle term
is continually changing; e. g. In Darapti the 1st Syllogism would be,
B is C,
B is A, and then the next Syllogism is C is D,
Some A is C,                             Some A is C,
Some A is D,
Which is Darii; and this can be prevented only by converting A is C.
It will be perceived, also, that the first and last propositions of a Sorites alone can be Particular; for the
major premiss in the first Figure is always universal, but
the minor term and the conclusion may be particular.
Where a Sorites has a Negative Conclusion, only the
last term of the series, before the Conclusion, can be negative.  Thus, A  is B  B is C,C is D, and No  D  is E,
therefore No A is E.  Otherwise we should have two Negative Premises in the Syllogisms.
II. Hypothetical Sorites.-This consists of a series of
Conditionals, so related and arranged, that the Consequent
366
Ais B.
B is C,
C is D,
D is E,
A is E, 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
of the first becomes the Antecedent of the second; and
the Consequent of the second, the Antecedent of the third,
and so on; and then, by granting the first Antecedent,
we grant the last Consequent, and indeed all the Consequents, thus: If A is B, then A is C, and if A is C, then
A is D, and if A is D, then A is E; but A is B, therefore A is E.
By denying the Consequents successively, we of course
deny the Antecedents; and this forms the destructive
Sorites. The Conditional can, as before shown, be reduced
to complete Syllogisms; and then the Syllogisms will be
found to be related in the same way with those of the
Categorical Sorites, viz., the conclusions of each preceding
Syllogism being the minor premiss of each succeeding one.
The only difference, then, between the two kinds, lies in
the hypothetical character of one of the premises in the
last kind.
A Sorites may be constructed either by suppressing
the major or minor, just as conditionals in general.
Scholium.-It appears from the preceding Analysis of
Hypothetical reasoning under all its different modes, that
it involves no new formule or principles. Every kind of
Deduction therefore is comprehended by the Dictum de
omni et nullo, and the axioms of agreement and disagreement. The fundamental Ideas are Evolution, Identity
and Difference, Quantity and Quality.
367 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
SECTION XII.
APPLICATION OF THE DEDUCTIVE FORMULA.
THE greater part of human reasoning is of the Deductive
kind.  The number of first principles and general truths
is comparatively few, but their application is infinite.
Many of them, and especially in Religion, Morals and Politics, have been spontaneously developed in the human
mind; and many others, the result of nice and laborious
investigation, have become current, through the means
which now exist for widely circulating knowledge. In the
constant expansion of knowledge by scientific men; and
the improvements of art by the ingenious and skilful; and
in the multiform practical duties of the general human
life, these first great principles and truths receive their
continual and diversified application. Hence there is no
department of knowledge, of art, or of duty, where Deductive Logic is not required.
But are Conclusions, in order to be legitimate, required to be drawn strictly according to the deductive
formula?  By no means, if we intend by this the formal
expression of every step of the reasoning. This is not
necessary, for many things are so plainly implied when not
expressed, that their formal expression would only encumber the style. But still, in every case of legitimate
inference no logical principle can be violated, and the lan
368 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
guag,e is capable of being reduced to the Syllogistic form.
Hence, whenever it is required to test the validity of in ferences, a resort to the Syllogism is decisive.
It would not be difficult to give here examples of the
application of the formula in testing deduction in a variety
of subjects. I at first intended this. Upon reflection,
however, I have concluded to limit these examples to one
subject, and this one eminently clear and beautiful. I
mean Geometry. My first plan would have tended considerably to swell a work, already, perhaps, transcending
the just bounds of an elementary treatise; besides, all the
ends of illustration will, I think, be found to be answered
by this one.
Demonstration is of two kinds, direct and indirect.
Direct demonstration is the deduction of a conclusion from
admitted truths and principles: indirect shows the truth
of a proposition by proving that its contradictory violates
admitted truths and principles. Geometry employs both.
It is a science *: of absolute certainty, for its fundamental
Ideas are clearly developed; its Axioms are perfect; t its
Definitions adequate and precise: its subject pure and
exact quantity; and its deductions are made with the utmost rigour.
After laying down its axioms and definitions, Geometry proceeds to make its deductions. The first deduction
must necessarily be made directly from the axioms and
definitions. But the next may employ the deduction already made as a basis, in connection with the axioms and
definitions, and so onward. Hence the field of deduction
is continually enlarging.
In constructing this science, much depends upon the
* Pages 89, 90.
16*
369
t Page 232 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
order of arrangement: for since propositions already demonstrated are employed in demonstrating others, it is
evident that one arrangement may be superior to another
in affording facilities for the progressive demonstration.*:
After the science has been constructed, it is highly
advantageous and beautiful, to reverse the order, and
trace back remote propositions through the connected
chain of demonstrations to the axioms and definitions.
In illustrating the application of the Deductive formula
in this science, I shall first take an instance of direct
demonstration. The proposition I have selected is the
following:
"A line which bisects the vertical angle of a triangle,
divides the base into two segments, which are proportioned
to the adjacent sides."
We have in this proposition, deductions both from
axioms, and from propositions previously deduced, so that
it will serve to illustrate both.
A C B is the triangle, and the angle at C is bisected
by the line C D.
Now to aid the deduction by bringing in other relations besides those simply presented in the triangle, we
produce a line A C, and draw B E parallel to C D, so that
the two lines thus added meet in E. We now have a
case of alternate angles included between two parallel
lines and an intersecting line, and this is our first
syllogism, as follows:
* Coro/laries are important links in the chain of demonstration. They are
propositions which in all cases require demonstration. In the usual definition
of a Corollary, it is said to be "An obvious consequence deduced from something going before."  But because it is "obvious," the deduction is not given,
but left to be supplied by the learner; and yet in some instances the deduction
of the Corollary is more difficult than that of other propositions where it is
formally given.
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DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
All alternate angles are equal;
But the angles B C D and E B C are alternate angles;
Therefore these angles are equal.
I
I/ ~~A
'D
But B C D  and A C D  are equal by construction;
and this leads to another syllogism, viz.:
B C D is equal to A C D,
E B C is equal to B C D,
Therefore
E B C is equal to A C D:
C D, as an equal, is contained in A C D,
B C, as an equal, is contained in B C D,
T. e. All B C D, as an equal, is contained in A  0 D,
All E B C, as an equal, is contained in B C D,
Therefore
All E B C, as an equal, is contained in A C D.
In the second deduction, the conclusion of the first
deduction is made the minor premiss: it will be remarked,
that this is therefore a case of the Sorites; but the Sorites
comprehends all cases where one deduction flows out of
another.
Or we may deduce it directly from the axiom, "Things
equal to the same thing, are equal to each other:" thus,
371
B 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
All things equal to the same thing, are equal to each
other;
E B C and A C D are things equal to the same thing,
viz. B C D;
Therefore they are equal to each other.
This is a syllogism of which the axiom forms the major
premiss. It is evident that in all cases of deduction
from an axiom, the axiom must form the major premiss.
Inspecting the diagram still farther, we perceive that
the angles A C D and C E B are an outward and inward
angle, opposite to each other on the same side of a line
A E, cutting the two parallel lines C D and E B; hence
their equality is inferred as in the first deduction; the
major premiss being here again a proposition before proved,
viz.2 "All outward and inward opposite angles on the
same side of a line intersecting two parallel lines, are
equal."
But we have just before inferred the equality of A C D
and E B C, therefore we infer again from the axiom
already quoted, and, in the same way, the equality of
CE B and E BC; thus,
All things equal to the same thing are equal to each
other;
C E B and E B C are things equal to the same, viz.
ACD;
Therefore, they are equal to each other.
We have now two angles of a triangle E B C, opposite
two of its sides, equal; we therefore infer the equality of
these sides from a proposition already proved, which here
again becomes the major premiss of the syllogism, thus:
"Every triangle equal in respect to two of its angles,
is equal also in respect to the two sides opposite these
angles;"
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DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
The triangle E B C is a triangle equal in two of its
angles, viz. C E B and E B C;
Therefore, it is equal in the two sides opposite these
angles, viz. the sides E C and B C.
Inspecting next the whole triangle A B E, we perceive
that it is a triangle having its two sides, A B and A E,
divided by a line C D parallel to its base E B; we can
therefore infer the proportionality of the segments of
the sides from a proposition already demonstrated, thus:
"Every triangle having a line drawn parallel to its
base dividing its other two sides, is a triangle whose sides
are divided proportionally;"
The triangle A B E is such a triangle;
Therefore its sides are divided proportionally, viz.
AD:DB::AC:CE.
But, if A C is proportional to C E, it must be proportional to C B, equal to C E;  for
E C is a proportional of A C; and
C B is E C; therefore
C B is a proportional of A C.
Hence A D: D B:: A C: C B.
The above analysis shows conclusively that the formula
of Deduction permeates geometrical demonstration.
Although, for the purposes of demonstration, it is not
necessary, generally, to draw out the whole deduction in
detail, still a better insight would be gained of Geometry,
and striking illustrations afforded of this part of Logic
if it were occasionally done. Indeed, by raising questions
respecting the axioms and definitions in order to show
their necessary and intuitive character, as well as by
analysing the demonstrations, the study of Geometry may
be connected with the highest parts of Logic, and be made
373 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
to embrace the whole, with the exception of Induction;
and this again may be happily connected with the whole
range of natural science. The study of science would
thus be placed on the most elevated grounds, and Science
herself be clothed with light as with a garment.
In the course of the preceding analysis we have referred to several propositions previously proved. Now we
might go back to these and analyse them in like manner,
until we should repose amid the axioms and definitions
and their governing Ideas. But this process has been so
amply, and I hope so clearly indicated, that I do not deem
it necessary. One of the propositions referred to, however, affords an illustration of the indirect mode of
demonstration, otherwise called the Reductio ad absurdum,
or the Reductio ad impossibile.  I will therefore proceed
to give an analysis of the demonstration of this one proposition more. The proposition is stated as follows:   "Every triangle equal in respect to two of its angles,
is equal also in respect to the two sides opposite these
angles."
If this be not true, its contradictory is true, viz.:
"Some triangles equal in respect to two of their angles,
are not equal in respect to the two sides opposite these
angles."
Let A B C be the triangle having its two angles A
and B equal.
Now if the contradictory be true, and the two opposite
sides B C and A C, are not equal, then of course one must
be greater than the other. Let us therefore suppose A C
to be the greater, and take A D, on A C, equal to B C.
Next join B D. Now we have a triangle A D B within
the triangle A B C; and, comparing them, we have, by
the contradictory, in the first triangle, side A D equal to
374 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
side B C, in the second; also the side A B is common to
both; also, by the hypothesis contained both in the proposition and the contradictory, the angle A in the first,
is equal to angle B, in the second. But it has previously
been shown in the chain of geometrical deductions, that
"Any two triangles having two sides and the included
angle in the one, equal to two sides and the included
angle in the other, are equal each to each." This we
assume as a major premiss; and then add as a minor,
" The two triangles A D B and A  B C, by the contradictory, are, two triangles having two sides and the included
angle in the one, equal to two sides and the included
angle of the other."  Hence  the conclusion, "The  two
triangles A D B and A B C are equal."
C
A..        B
Here we assumed the contradictory as a minor premiss
in connection with an unquestionable major. But what is
the conclusion? That one triangle, A D B, contained in
another triangle, A B C, is equal to its container; i. C.
That a part is equal to a whole. The conclusion then,
inasmuch as it violates the axiom, "A whole is greater
than any of its parts," is false.  But the fa]sity of the
conclusion must be traced to the falsity of one or both of
the premises, since the form is correct; but the major
was granted; therefore the falsity is in the minor; and
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DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
the minor being false, its contradictory must be true; but
the contradictory is the original proposition.
Illus rations of the Syllogism can be drawn from Geometry and from the Mathematics generally, to an indefinite extent. The above, however, will answer the ends of
a general and elementary work.
376 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
SECTION XIII.
OF FALLACIES.
A FALLACY is a false argument artfully constructed, with
the intent to deceive; or, unwarily stumbled upon, from
an ignorance of the Logical form, or of the subject under
consideration.
The full examination of this subject would lead us into
a wide field, and one in which all the principles of Logic
would have to be brought under review. The limits we
have judged fit to assign ourselves will prevent an examination in detail; but we hope, nevertheless, to present
the important points with sufficient amplitude.
In giving a division of Fallacies we must follow the divisions of Logic itself. We shall not, however, pursue the
same order: but as we have just now been engaged with
the Deductive Formula, we shall first consider the Falla3ies pertaining to this part, so as not to break the continuity of the investigation, and reserve what remarks we may
have to make on Fallacies pertaining to the other parts of
ILogic for the close of this Section.
FALLACIES OF DEDUCTION.
These are divided into Fallacies in th2e formula; and
'allacies in the matter.
The latter are not strictly logical; but inasmuch as
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DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
they lie in the matter of propositions employed in deduction, and where also a rigid adherence to the formula is
used to conceal the Fallacy in the matter, this appears to
be the most appropriate division to which they can be
assigned.
I. FALLACIES IN THE FORMULA.-These have virtually
been set forth already in the Analysis of the Formula in
Section V. Nothing more is necessary here than a summary view of them:
1. Undistributed Middle; e. g.
I, Z is X,
A, Y is Z,
A, Y is X.
Here, although all Y  is contained in Z, yet as only
some Z is contained in Y, and only some Z in X, that
part of Z which is contained in X may contain no part of
Y, and thus there can be no ground for an inference.
2. Illicit Process.-This designates the fallacy of distributing a term in the conclusion which has not been previously distributed in the corresponding premiss, and thus
drawing a conclusion beyond the data; e. g.
A, Z is X,
A, Z is Y,
A, Yis X.
3. Two Negative Premi8es.-Here, since both terms
are excluded from the middle, no comparison of them can
be made through it; e. g.
E, Z is X,
E, Y is Z,
4. Positive Conclusion, where there is a Negative Premiss; or a Negative Conclusion, where both premises ar.
positive.
5. Particular Premises. In all cases where both pre
378 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
mises are particular, we shall have an undistributed middle,
or an illicit process of the major or the minor term, or both
combined.
6. More than three terms plainly expressed.-This is
an attempt to combine two Syllogisms into one.
7. Inferring the falsity of the conclusion from that of
the premiss; or the truth of the _premiss from that of the
conclusion.
The first of these fallacies appears where, when an inadequate or false argument has been used to establish a
conclusion, and the argument having been successfully refuted, it is inferred that the conclusion is false; e. g. If it
be argued in favor of the immortality of the soul that all
men entertain a belief of it; admitting that the argument
might be refuted by adducing the instance of some nation
who manifest no conception of immortality, still this is no
ground fox concluding against the doctrine. The argument must go for nothing, but the doctrine of immortality
may still have a real and impregnable foundation. This
fallacy, indeed, identifies itself with the illicit process; e.g.
A, Z is X,
I, Y is Z,
I, Y is X.
Now, if the minor be refuted, as is supposed in the example above, then the argument will stand
A, Z is X,
0, Y is not Z,
0, Y is not X.
I-n which there is an illicit process of the major.
The second of these fallacies, viz., inferring the truth
)f the premiss, from the truth of the conclusion, is a case
)f undistributed middle; e. g. If from the truth of the
!oct,rine of immortality we infer its universal belief, thus,
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DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
"Whatever is universally believed is true. The doctrine
of Immortality is true. Therefore it must be universally
believed;" i. e.
A, Z is X,
I, Y is X,
I, YisZ.
The above, therefore, is not really a distinct branch of
fallacies in the formula, although at first view it might
appear to be so.
II. FALLACIES IN THE MATTER.
In this class of Fallacies, the formula is supposed to be
strictly observed.
1..AmbigHous Middle.-This fallacy consists in using
a word, as a middle term, which admits of two significations.  In the major premiss, the major term agrees with
the middle, taken in one of its significations; and in the
minor premiss, the minor term agrees with the middle,
taken in another signification; and then in the conclusion,
the minor and major are, according to the formula, inferred to agree with each other. The two extremes are,
indeed, compared with the same word, but with two very
different ideas; so that in reality we have two middle
terms; e.g.
"A pitiful man is beneath respect.
Howard, the philanthropist, was a pitiful man.
Therefore he was beneath respect."
Many words, however, are so settled in their significa
tion, that such fallacies cannot be successfully practised
with them. Perhaps the word _pitiful is one of these.
Logicians have distinguished several kinds of Ambigu
ous Middle:
Fallacia Figure Dictionis, in which the middle terni
is not precisely the same word, in form, in both premises
380 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
but so nearly akin that they may be assumed to have the
same meaning; e.g.
A designing man is unworthy of confidence.
This man has fornmed a design.
Therefore he is unworthy of confidence."
Many fallacies may be formed in this way; and the
slighter the shades of difference in the meaning of the two
kindred words, the more likely is the fallacy to pass undetected.
Fallacia Plurium Interroqationum.-This fallacy consists in asking several questions apparently the same, and
yet in reality of several different meanings, and therefore
admitting of several different answers.   The  question
forms one of the premises of the argument; and then,
when an answer is given, the sophist stands ready with
another premiss to make out a conclusion, which, because
unexpectedly opposite to what the one replying intended,
serves to embarrass, if not to confound, him; e. g. There
are cases in which we may strictly follow the statute law,
and yet be guilty of great injustice and cruelty. Now let
the question be asked, Is not a man justified when he
does that which is lawful? Here a reply would not be
likely to be given in the negative: and when given in the
affirmative, another premiss might be formed embodying
some act of oppression-as a landlord seizing the goods of
a worthy, but sick and unfortunate tenant; and then the
conclusion appended that the landlord is justified in
doing so.
Fallacy of Division and Comnposition.-In this fallacy
the middle term in one premiss is taken collectively, in the
)ther, distributively. If in the major premiss it be taken
.ollectively, and in the minor distributively, it is a Fallacy
)f Division; e. g.
381 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
"Five is one number;
Three and two are five; therefore,
Three and two are one number."
If in the major the middle term be taken distributively, and in the minor collectively, it is a fallacy of composition; e. g.
" Three and two are two numbers
Five is three and two; therefore,
Five is two numbers."
"There is no fallacy more common, or more likely to
deceive, than the one now before us; the form in which it
is most usually employed, is, to establish some truth, separately, concerning each single member of a certain class,
and thence infer the sense of the whole collectively; thus
some infidels have labored to prove concerning some one
of our Lord's miracles, that it might have been the result
of an accidental conjunction of natural circumstances.
Next, they endeavor to prove the same concerning another;
and so on; and thence infer that all of them might have
been so. They might argue in like manner, that because
it is not very improbable one may throw sixes in any one
out of a hundred throws, therefore, it is no more improbable that one may throw sixes a hundred times running.":
Fallacia accidentis.-In this form of the ambiguous
middle, the middle term in one premiss is used to express
merely the essence of a thing; and in the other premiss, to
express the same thing, together with its accidents; e. g.
"What is bought in the market is eaten;
Raw meat is bought in the market
Therefore raw meat is eaten."
In the major premiss we are considering edible sub
* Whately's Logic, Book III., ~ 11.
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DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
stances in general, without referring to their circumstances;
in the minor, we bring into view one of these substances
with its circumstances; and then infer of the latter what
was true only of the former.
There are many ways in which words become ambiguous; but the discussion of this subject does not properly
belong to Logic.  To reason well, a thorough knowledge
of some one language, at least, as the vehicle of thought,
is evidently indispensable; but the language in which our
ratiocinations are expressed, and the principles and formulve which are to govern and direct the reasoning process
itself, are two different branches of study.
2. Fallacies relating to the connection between the
matter of the premises and that of the conclusion.
The preceding head related to the matter of the middle
term as ambiguously expressed in the two premises. Now
as the same matter is expressed in the two premises, and
in the conclusion, inasmuch as the last compares together
the two terms, which in the former had been compared
with the middle term, it is obvious that Fa]lacies may
arise also in respect to the correspondency between the
representations of the premises and the conclusion, admitting the form to be correct and the middle term to be unambiguous.
Logicians have distinguished and given names to sev-ral forms of this Fallacy.
1. Petitio Principii, or, arguing in a circle.-In this
orm of the Fallacy in question, -the connection between
he premises and conclusion is such, that the premises
hemselves are dependent upon the conclusion; so that
he conclusion must first be assumed to be true, before we
an find premises to prove it.  This Fallacy, in order to
,e successful, must of course be artfully constructed, for,
383 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
when exposed, it is too gross to delude any mind for a
moment. Hence, much here depends upon obliquity and
obscurity of the language. To attempt to prove the existence of a God from the Sacred Scriptures must be a petitio
principii, since they profess to be a revelation from God,
and therefore assume His existence.
This Fallacy, however, is not by any means always an
intentional one.   Acute reasoners have sometimes very
honestly fallen into it.
Thus the famous argument used by many writers on
Moral Agency, to prove that the "Will is always determined by the strongest motive," is a notable instance of
this fallacy, where the reasoners were eminent both for
logical skill and moral integrity.:
"The will is always determined by the strongest motive." How do you prove this? "The will is always deternlined to some volition or other, and it is always
determined by motives, for they always are present." But
how does this prove that it is determined by the strongest
motive? " That must be the strongest which determines
it." Why? " Because it could not otherwise be determined." How do you know that? " Because it must bc
determined by the strongest motive."  It is evident thai
the very point to be proved is the point assumed.
2. False or undue assumption of premises.   Thi;
embraces those instances in which the premises, althougl
not dependent upon the conclusion, require to be prove,
before the reasoning can be admitted to have any force
In all cases of Deduction we have to begin with principle
already established; or if assumed at the beginning of
* One of the roots, if not the root, of this error, is the not distinguishing b
tween an order of sequence, and the principle of causality; between the ntives as uniform antecedents to volitions, and Will as itself, the cause of volitio
384 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
course of reasoning-as is sometimes  convenient-they
must, before the course is completed, be satisfactorily
proved.   It is, therefore, always an important enquiry,
whether the principles with which we begin are sufficiently
established to be made the premises of an argument. A
judicious and honest reasoner will be cautious in this re spect; but it is of the nature of sophistry boldly to assume,
and to supply by a show of confidence, the want of a true
or an adequate basis.
"' Sometimes men are shamed into admitting an unfounded assertion, by being confidently told that it is so
evident that it would argue great weakness to doubt it.
In general, however, the more skilful sophist will avoid a
direct assertion of what he means unduly to assume,
because that might direct the reader's attention to the
consideration of the question whether it be true or not;
since that which is indisputable does not so often. need to
be asserted: it succeeds better, therefore, to allude to the
proposition as something curious and remarkable; just as
the Royal Society were imposed on by being asked to account for the fact that a vessel of water received no addition to its weight by a live fish put into it; while they
were seeking for the cause, they forgot to ascertain the
fact, and thus admitted, without suspicion, a mere fiction."
There are several species of false assumption mentioned
by Logical writers, but as they all involve the same principle, we shall only give a brief summary of them.
Non causa, pro causa.  A false assumption of causes.
Here the facts are given, and assuming a cause for
them, we reason from it as a real and established connection.
A4 nou vera, pro vera.  This, if it differs from the
* Whateley's Logic, ibid. ~ 14.
17
385 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
preceding, is probably meant to designate a false assumption of facts, as in the anecdote of the Royal Society,
quoted above.
When causes and facts both exist, the connection between the two may be assumed on insufficient grounds:
it may be assumed either that the causes necessarily involve the facts, or that the facts cannot be referred to any
other antecedents. The first relates to the inherent nature of causes; the last to the necessary conditions of the
facts.
A  non tali, pro tali.  This is reasoning from a false
assumption of parallelisms; or from false analogies.
False assumption of references. This appears chiefly
in references made to the Holy Scriptures. Every passage
is authoritative. Hence, although a writer may find few
or none which in reality bear upon a favorite dogma, still a
mere array of the references strikes the eye; and if the passages are not examined, which, through the indolence of
human nature, is apt to be the case, the desired end of the
sophist is obtained.
,Assumption of probabilities.  When the premises are
each probable with a certain degree of probability, the
combined probability is assumed to be an addition of
probabilities, whereas it is only a probability of a probability.
If Z is only probably X, and Y is only probably Z,
then Y is probably X, not with an increasing, but with a
decreasing probability; e. g.
Z is probably (say 4)     X,
Y is probably (say 2)     Z;      therefore
Y is probably ( X 2=T62) X.
In a sorites the probability is still more weakened, and
weakened the more the sorites is extended. A cumulation
386 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
of arguments consists of arguments drawn from distinct
sources; this differs widely from arguments depending one
upon the other.
3. Igqnoratio elenchi, or irrelevant conclusion.-This
fallacy consists in connecting with given premises, not the
legitimate conclusion, but one which, although widely
different from it, shall, in the language, so resemble it, or
be so covertly substituted for it, that the deception goes
undetected by the reader or hearer. "Various kinds of
propositions are, according to the occasion, substituted
for the one of which proof is required. Sometimes the
particular for the universal; sometimes a proposition with
different terms; and various are the contrivances employed to effect and to conceal this substitution, and to
make the conclusion which the sophist has drawn answer
practically the same purpose as the one he ought to have
established."
"A good instance of the employment and exposure of
this fallacy occurs in Thucydides, in the speeches of Cleon
and Diodotus, concerning the Mityleneans: the former
(over and above his appeal to the angry passions of his
audience) urges the justice of putting the revolters to
death; which, as the latter remarked, was nothing to the
purpose, since the Athenians were not sitting in judgment, but in deliberation, of which the proper end is expediency."
Archbishop Whately, from whom the above extracts
are taken, has so admirably exhibited the different forms
of this fallacy, that I cannot resist the temptation of becoming still more largely his debtor. Indeed, on the whole
subject of Deductive Fallacies, I freely confess my indebtedness to him.
Argumentum ad hominem, &c.-" There are certain
387 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
kinds of argument recounted and named by Logical
writers, which we should by no means universally call
Fallacies; but which when unfairly used, and so far as they
are fallacious, may very well be referred to the present
head; such as the'argumentum ad hominem,' or personal argument,'argumentum ad verecundiam,''argumentum ad populum,' &c., all of them regarded as contradistinguished from'argumentum ad rem,' or, according
to others, (meaning probably the very same thing,)'ad
judicium.' These have all been described in the lax and
popular language before alluded to, but not scientifically:
the'argumentumn ad hominem,' they say,'is addressed to
the peculiar circumstances, character, avowed opinions, or
past conduct of the individual, and therefore has a reference to him only, and' does not bear directly and absolutely on the real question, as the'argumentu)rI ad rem'
does:' in like manner, the' argumentumn ad verecundiam'
is described as an appeal to our reverence for some respected authority, some venerable institution, &c., and the
' argumentumn ad populum,' as an appeal to the prejudices,
passions, &c., of the multitude; and so of the rest.
Along with these is usually enumerated'argumentum ad
ignorantiam,' which is here omitted, as being evidently
nothing more than the employment of some kind of Fallacy, in the widest sense of that word, towards such as
are likely to be deceived by it. It appears then, (to speak
rather more technically,) that in the'argumentum ad
hominem' the conclusion which actually is established, is
not the absolute and general one in question, but relative
and particular; viz. not that'such and such is the fact,'
but that' t7his man is bound to admit it, in conformity to
his principles of Reasoning, or in consistency with his own
conduct, situation,' &c.   Such a Conclusion it is often
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DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
both allowable and necessary to establish, in order to si lence those who will not yield to fair general argument;
or to convince those whose weakness and prejudices would
not allow them to assign to it its due weight: it is thus
that our Lord on many occasions silences the cavils of the
Jews; as in the vindication of healing on the Sabbath,
which is paralleled by the authorised practice of drawing
out a beast that has fallen into a pit. All this, as we
have said, is perfectly fair, provided it be done plainly,
and avowedly; but if you attempt to substitute this partial and relative Conclusion for a more general one-if you
triumph as having established your proposition absolutely
and universally, from having established it, in reality,
only as far as it relates to your opponent, then you are
guilty of a Fallacy of the kind which we are now treating
of: your Conclusion is not in reality that which was, by
your own account, proposed to be proved: the fallaciousness depends upon the deceit or attempt to deceive. The
same observations will apply to' argumentum ad verecundiam,' and the rest."
Fallacious refutation. This is the refutation of a proposition assumed to belong to an opponent; and thus
really an evasion of the point in dispute.
Nearly akin to this is the expedient of shifting one's
ground, by covertly adopting and discussing some other
question than the one taken ulp at the beginning.
"A practice of this nature is common in oral controversy especially; viz. that of combatting both of your opponent's premises alternately, and shifting the attack from
the one to the other, without waiting to have either of
them decided upon before you quit it."
We refer to the same head, " the very common case
of proving something to be possible when it ought to have
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DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
been proved highly probable; or probable, when it ought
to have been proved necessary; or, which comes to the
very same, proving it to be not necessary, when it should
have been proved not probable; or improbable, when it
should have been proved impossible.
Fallacy of Objections. This consists in " showing that
there are objections against some plan, theory, or system,
and thence inferring that it should be rejected; when that
which ought to have been proved is, that there are more
or stronger objections against the receiving than the rejecting of it. This is the principal engine employed by
the adversaries of our Faith: -they find numerous' objections' against various parts of Scripture, to some of which
no satisfactory answer-can be given; and the incautious
hearer is apt, while his attention is fixed on these, to forget- that there are infinitely more and stronger objections
against the supposition that the Christian religion is of
human origin; and that when we cannot answer all objections, we are bound in reason, and in candor, to adopt
the hypothesis which labors under the least. That the
case is as I have stated, I am authorised to assume, from
this circumnstance: that no complete and consistent account
has ever been given of the manner in which the Christian
religion, supposing it a human contrivance, could have
arisen and prevailed as it did."
Fallacy of proving part of a Question. The skilful
sophist having proved or disproved a part of the question,
by enlarging upon this, often succeeds in removing out of
view another part, perhaps the most important of all.
"This is the great art of the answerer of a book; suppose the main positions in any work to be irrefragable, it
will be strange if some illustration of them, or some subordinate part in short, will not admit of a plausible objec
390 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
tion; the opponent then joins issue on one of these incidental questions, and comes forward with'a Reply' to
such and such a work.
"Hence the danger of ever advancing more than can
be well maintained, since the refutation of that will often
quash the whole: a guilty person may often escape by
having too much laid to his charge; so he may also by
having too much evidence against him, i.e. some that is
not in itself satisfactory: thus, a prisoner may sometimes
obtain acquittal by showing that one of the witnesses
against him is an infamous informer and spy; though perhaps if that part of the evidence had been omitted, the
rest would have been sufficient for conviction."
Squpressing the Conclusion.  There are two ways of
suppressing the true conclusion: First, by omitting to
state the proposition you are to prove, at the beginning
of the argument; and then, after a long spun and elaborate argument, drawing a conclusion remote from the true
one, with a confident and plausible air. Secondly, by
omitting to give the conclusion altogether, but framing an
argument in such a way as to lead the hearer to draw the
wrong conclusion, which the sophist aims at. We have
a striking instance of this species of reasoning in Antony's
speech over the dead body of Cesar.
" Jests.  Jests are Fallacies; i. e. Fallacies so palpable as not to be likely to deceive any one, but yet bearing
just that resemblance of argument which is calculated to
amuse by the contrast; in the same manner that a parody
does, by the contrast of its levity with the serious production which it imitates. There is indeed something laughable even in Fallacies which are intended for serious conviction, when they are thoroughly exposed. There are
several different kinds of joke and raillery, which will be
391 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
found to correspond with the different kinds of Fallacy:
the pun (to take the simplest and most obvious case) is
evidently, in most instances, a mock argument founded on
a palpable equivocation of the middle Term: and the rest
in like manner will be found to correspond to the respective Fallacies, and to be imitations of serious argument."
Jests, however, are often very serious arguments, when
their effects are considered; for that which is turned into
ridicule, becomes, in some degree, an object of contempt,
or, at least, ceases to command respect and careful attention. They are also popular arguments, for they require
no thought, and afford a piquant amusement.
Fallacy of Epithets.  This appears in the disputes of
political parties and religious sects. The fallacy is of a
twofold character: First, the odious name may be fastened
upon an individual, or upon the party or sect to which he
belongs, with the utmost injustice: there may be merely
a seeming agreement arising from similar names and circumstances, without any real identity of principles; or
there may be an agreement only in points unimportant, or
even commendable; but, notwithstanding, when the hue
and cry is once raised, the multitude are prone to rush to
the chase, and join in the ferocious sport. Secondly, the
name itself may have become odious unjustly: it may be
a good name, darkened and marred by the prejudices and
persecutions of a benighted and bigoted age; but its character has become fixed in the popular apprehension, and
no one now stops to enquire into its origin or its principles: it is the symbol of enormous error, if not of crime,
and he who is adjudged worthy to wear it, may fail to
gain a second hearing. In this fallacy, the conclusion is
not generally concealed until the close of an argument,
and covertly applied; it is brought out at the beginning
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DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
in the epithet itself, and frequently supersedes the necessity of even the show of an argument.
We close here our view of the Deductive Fallacies.
It will be seen that those arising from the matter of the
propositions are numerous. It requires both mental discipline and tact to guard against and to detect them.
But one thing is evident, that a pure, benevolent, and
truth-loving spirit is the most effectual protection against
this species of false reasoning.
The fallacies which I next propose to consider, are
those of Induction and Intuition: fallacies belonging to
the two former parts of Logic, and therefore rather improperly introduced here. Notwithstanding this seeming
impropriety, I have concluded to do so, for the purpose of
making the whole subject of fallacies a unique portion of
the work. Besides, I propose to handle what remains
briefly, as it is not of a nature to require nor to admit of
an exposition running much into details. The common
human life is peculiarly the theatre of deduction, for it is
here that principles are applied or violated most extensively; it is therefore the theatre which presents most
abundantly both the opportunities and the temptations
of sophistry.
FALLACIES OF INDUCTION.
These are of three kinds: Fallacies of Observation,
Fallacies in determining General Facts, and Fallacies in
inducting Laws.
I. FALLACIES OF OBSERVATION.-We note here three
Fallacies:
First. Inadequate Observation. All the phenomena,
if possible, in relation to a given subject should be observed: and the mind should not rest content while any
17*
393 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
phenomena probably remain which, by any labor and diligence in observation and experiment, may be brought to
light. But human nature is prone to accept as sufficient
a set of limited but familar observations lying within the
immediate neighborhood of the individual. Men are, as it
were, divided into tribes dwelling in deep valleys; and
each tribe looketh upon its valley as the wide universe,
and the high mountains around as the horizon of being
and the impassable boundary of thought. This begetteth
narrow-mindedness, bigotry, and imperfect and crude
knowledges.  The philosopher passes over the mountain
tops, walks through valley after valley, converses with all
the different tribes, sees the same things as they appear
in different places; and thus prepares himself to learn the
general laws which govern God's creatures, and to enjoy
the- harmony and beauty of all things. Again, human
nature is impatient of the slow and persevering labor demanded in prosecuting observation and experiment. It
is far more pleasant to our natural indolence to take such
observations as force themselves upon us, and to leave the
rest to conjecture, than to endure the toil and restraint,
and wait for the results of thorough investigation.
Another form of this Fallacy appears where the observation, although extensive, is imperfect and hurried.
Such are the busy collectors of facts, the ambitious founders of lyceums and cabinets, who bring us abundance of
things and but little thought; who indeed manipulate,
but do not nicely examine.
Facts show the state of the world. He, therefore, who
does not look at all the facts, and examine their characteristics minutely, is not prepared to form sound judgments.  He may express opinions, but he is not entitled
to any authority.
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DEDUCTIVE LOGIC,
Secondly. The Fallacy of making Observation and
Ex]periments without a purpose, or a prophecy of the end
i~i the form of a rational hypothesis.
We have already alluded to the catalogues of facts
made by Bacon.:.'  These are an example of the Fallacy
under consideration. By the knowledge already attained
of the constitution of the world, and the spontaneous inspiration of Ideas awakened in profound and patient meditation, the mind when it comes within a new field of investigation is prepared and impelled to form some hypothesis of the order of sequences, if not of the ultimate law.
We call this a rational hypothesis, because it considers
laws already ascertained, and thoughtfully watches the
indications of the initiative phenomena Such a hypothesis at the early stage of investigation is necessary, in order to arrange the facts already gained, and to know where
to make further observations, and how to adjust experiments.
Without such a hypothesis, every thing is done at
random. It is indeed sheer empiricism-a trying of experiments like a blind casting of dice, with a wondering
and puerile curiosity to know what will turn up next.
Philosophical investigation foresees its end with more or
less clearness. Like Bunyan's pilgrim, it at least sees a
little shining light a great way off, and by keeping that
little light in its eye, it at length reaches the straight and
narrow way of Truth   When Newton saw the apple fall,
he formed his hypothesis; he thenceforward had a definite
and great end before him.
Thirdly. The Fallacy of making facts bend to favorite
theories.-When Theories are once formed, men are ever
* Page 284.
395 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
ready to become intoxicated with them. An ingenious
Theory is a proud effort of the Intellect, and, therefore,
not easy to be relinquished by its author; and the light
and order which it gives to facts which before appeared
complicated and inexplicable, soon brings it into general
favour with enquiring minds. Hence there springs up a
passion to apply it, and to make every thing accord with
it. Men begin to forget that it is a mere hypothesis,
which may or may not be true; and that, if not confirmed
by general observation, it must yield to some more perfect
conception. In this way they are often betrayed into
great absurdities. We have an illustration of this, in
the tenacity with which some chemists for a while adhered
to the Phlogistic Theory.
Now Truth and Philosophy alike demand that a Theory
shall be adopted, always with the tacit understanding,
that it is to be held in abeyance to farther discoveries.
And here the great Philosopher shows his greatness, in
that he becomes wedded to nothing but truth; and holding theories only as a means of truth, he is ready to
modify them according to the indications of new facts, or
even to renounce them when they cannot be verified or a
better light is obtained. Thus Newton, for a time, laid
aside the law of gravitation, while the calculations did
not appear to sustain it. But in the end he had his rich
reward.
II. FALLACIES IN DETERYWINING GENERAL FACTS.
First. Thefallacy of affirming a u,niform Sequence,
from a mere observation of coincidences.-This Fallacy
is very common.  The superstition of dreams and omens,
the empiricisms of medicine, and a thousand empty popullar maxims, all belong here.
Because two phenomena are found to be conjoined in
396 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
time and place, therefore, by this Fallacy, one is assumed
as the uniform antecedent of the other, and we are to
expect the recurrence of the one wherever we find the
other. Now, before we have a right to conclude that the
two are in uniform sequence, we must prove by experiment
that the given Consequent never takes place except where
the Antecedent in question is present; i. e. We  must
prove by Negative instances as well as Pos8itive. Upon
further examination, we may find the same Consequent
to coincide in time and place with a thousand other phenomena; but that alone can be its proper Antecedent,
wit out which it does not takeplace.  This indeed is the
Fallacy condemned in the memorable language of Bacon:
" Inductio quee procedit per enumerationem simplicem,
res puerilis est, et precario concludit, et periculo exponitur
ab instantia' contradictoria et plerumque secundum
pauciora quam par est, et ex his tantum modo quee presto
sunt pronunciat. At Inductio qua ad inventionem et
demonstrationem Scientarum et Artium erit utilis, Naturam separare debet, per rejectiones et exclusiones
debitas; ac deinde post negativas tot quot sufficiunt,
super affirmativas concludere."*'
.Secondly. The Fallacy of denying whatever has not
been found hitherto in the common observation of men, or
does not exist in generally received maxims.
This Fallacy is of the same nature with the preceding,
* "That induction which proceeds by a mere enumeration of instances, is
a puerile affair, and concludes precariously, and is exposed to danger from
contradictory instances, and for the most part it gives its decisions according
to fewer instances than is proper, and from those only which are then present.
But an induction that would be useful to the discovery and demonstration of
the sciences and arts, ought to distinguish nature through proper rejections
and exclusions, and then, after a sufficient number of negative instances have
been adduced, to draw the conclusion upon the positive ones."
397 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
and equally condemned by the language of Bacon. The
former affirms that those are proper Antecedents and
Consequlents which have been found together; the latter,
that none can exist beyond those which have hitherto
been found together. The one gives authority to untested
empiricism; the other denies any truth to exist beyond
it. The one consigns us to the despotism of bigotry and
ignorance; the other cuts us off from all hope in the
future. The one affirms the majesty of ancient authorities; the other denies all farther improvement.
In opposition to both, Philosophy affirms that she will
receive nothing which she has not tested by the principles
of human Reason; and that she will dare to receive every
thing which she has thus tested.
The above are the chief Fallacies, given in brief, which
belong to this division. They will be found upon reflection to comprise a violation of the Principles of Elimination laid down under Inductive Logic; for, the aim of
those principles is to provide a test for sequences in general, so that we may determine amid the mass of phenomena, which are properly related as Antecedents and
Consequents.
III. FALLACIES IN INDUCTING LAWS.
We have seen that the tests of a Law are its
sufficiency to account for the phenomena, its characteristics of universality and necessity, and its correspondence
to an Idea. Now we note as a Fallacy under this head:
First. The confounding of a general fact with a law.
-To establish a general Fact, is to establish a uniform
order of sequence in relation to certain phenomena; e. g.
the influence of the sun and moon upon the tides. The
law under which this particular sequence is comprehended
is the law of gravitation taken in connection with the
398 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
peculiar interior constitution of fluids, which causes them
to yield to an influence which does not affect the solid
parts of the earth in the same manner. It is common to
call the general facts laws; and thus the two lines of
investigation are not clearly distinguished. This, perhaps, is not so strictly a Fallacy in Induction, as a confusion in the end aimed at, and which may lead to fallacious inductions. A general fact viewed in itself is
contingent; it receives higher characteristics only when
viewed as an exponent of Law, and then of course is distinguished from it. But a perfect method of philosophising demands that it keep its true place in every stage of
the induction, and thus, instead of shutting up investigation, it becomes a means of leading it on to its last results.
Secondly. The great Fallacy, and one which has been
alluded to more than once in this work, is, the separation
of Observation and Ideas. This Fallacy has two modes,
accordingly as it reposes upon Ideas independently of observation, or as it employs observation independently of
Ideas.
The true logical development of Ideas takes place in
connection with the reality of Nature; and the laws of
Nature are discovered and expounded only in the light of
Ideas. The first mode of the Fallacy, therefore, shows
itself in splendid but obscure conceptions of the order of
Nature; while the other presents us collections of sequences
without system.
FALLACIES IN RESPECT TO INTUITION.
I have already remarked,* that in the sphere of Intuitive Truths falsehood cannot well find place, because
* Primordial Logic. Idea of Truth, pp. 207, 208.
399 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
the characteristics of these truths are so clear and decided;
and because if there be falsehood here, there can be no
absolute test of Truth. But, on the other hand, it cannot
be denied that affirmations have been made, apparently
with an intuitive positiveness, which afterwards have
been totally set aside; e. g. The celebrated philosophical
maxim, that, "A thing cannot act where it is not."
Even Newton, in order to escape the force of this maxim
in its bearing upon the law of gravitation, imagines a
subtle ether diffused through the space between the sun
and the planets, as a mediate cause; affirming that, "It
is inconceivable that inanimate brute matter should,
without the mediation of something else, which is not
material, operate upon and affect other matter without
mutual contact."   He even pronounces it " so great an
absurdity," that he cannot believe that any man, "who in
philosophical matters has a competent faculty of thiniking,
can ever fall into it."    And yet in our day the most
philosophical minds do not perceive it to be at all incredible that the sun and planets can act upon each other
through the intervening space without any medium whatever.
It would appear from this and similar instances that
might be adduced, that there are Fallacies in respect to
Intuition.  I say Fallacies in respect to Intuition, for
fallacious intuitions there cannot be. An Intuition carries
with it its own truth, it is necessary and absolute; to
deny it is to belie Reason itself, and to destroy the possibility of certainty. What was said, therefore, under the
"Idea of Truth," as above referred to, I conceive to be
impregnable.
* See Playfair's Dissertation on the Progress of Mathematical and Physical
Science.
400 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
But the question still remains, How are we to account
for Fallacies in respect to Intuition? If it be granted
that an intuitive truth cannot be disputed, how can a
false maxim put on, to appearance, the characteristics of
such a truth?
In the first place, there is to be remarked an ambiguity
in the word "'inconceivable;" it may be taken either
absolutely or relatively: the absolutely inconceivable is
the contradictory of all rational conception, and therefore
equivalent to the impossible; the relatively inconceivable,
on the other hand, is only the opposite of the particular
conceptions of an individual, of a class, or of an age.
Now nothing is more common than men adhering to even
wild and puerile maxims, and denying whatever lies
beyond the range of their immediate experience with the
utmost positiveness and pertinacity; this undoubtedly is
owing to the undeveloped state of their minds, and the
tyranny of prejudice.
This fallacy is one which we have already noticed
under a preceding head.:'  Philosophers, it must be confessed, have given us similar examples: having embraced
certain dogmas, and committed themselves to maintainthem, they manifest the utmost certainty of conviction,
and that too with great sincerity. It follows, therefore,
that in maintaining false maxims, men may assert with
great earnestness, and apparent strength of belief, and may
use the epithets "absurd" and "inconceivable," only
because of their education, prejudices, and point of view.
Now suppose these same men to be relieved from all these
hindrances, and to occupy the same relative ground that
we do, with whom their fondly cherished maxims are cx
* Page 398.
401 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC.
ploded, would it not be possible for them to believe as we
do? And would they not see that they had before
occupied a fallacious position, but that, now, they had
attained to the right one? While in error, we are often
very confident, and may be even so much so, as to think
that our judgments are intuitive; but when we really
attain the truth, then we see plainly enough that those
confident errors had not the strength and clearness of
intuition. We are now in a condition to make a comparison; before, we were not. Notwithstanding all the mistakes we may make, there is such a thing as perceiving
absolute truth, and knowing that we are right.
In the second place, we can account for these pretented intuitions by a want of development in the Ideas
which govern the sphere in which they appear. The
maxim above mentioned was founded upon an erroneous
conception of Causes; showing that the Idea of Cause
was not clearly developed in the minds of those who
advocated it. Now it is the clearer development of this
Idea which enables us to conceive of the mutual attractions of the sun and the planets without any medium in
the intervening space; nor can we ever again conceive
such a medium to be necessary.   All the Fallacies which arise in respect to intuition
have their origin unquestionably in a want of philosophical
development; for Philosophy is not merely a system of
truths and a law of method, but a state of the Reason
in man. Just as this development advances, does the
vision of Truth become brighter and brighter unto the
perfect day. But that perfect day is still to us an object
of hope, and ever shall be, until we reach that Uncreated
Light, in which we shall see Light itself.
* Primordial Logic, Sect. VII., and particularly p. 239.
402 
BOOK IV.
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
SECTION I.
NATURE OF PROOF.
WHEN we have arrived at judgments, we may state them
in the form of Propositions or Theorems, and then subjoin
to them the Logical Process by which they have been determined. This is called the order of Proof
Opposed to the order of Proof is the order of Investigation. When we are searching after Truth we pursue
the order of Investigation; we employ our Intuitions, or
the knowledge we may have already gained; we make observations and experiments; we compare; we generalize;
we meditate; we employ Induction and Deduction; and
when Truth appears, it appears as a Conclusion. The
truths at which we thus arrive are entirely new, or were
before but dimly seen as conjectures or theories.
When we undertake to prove a proposition, we either
know it to be true or false, or we are uncertain of its
character.
1. If we know it to be true, then we must be acquainted with the investigation upon which it rests; and 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
to prove it, will be only to subjoin that process of investigation, according to Logical formulae, or, at least, in strict
accordance with logical principles.
2. If we know it to be false, then we must see that it
is either deduced from false premises or is a false deduction. To prove it false, therefore, will require either an
exposition of its premises, or a statement of the fallacious
syllogism.
3. If we are uncertain of its character, we proceed to
test it. The method of testing it will depend upon the
nature of the proposition.
1. If the proposition affirm an Antecedent, we test it
by searching whether it stands as a necessary or probable
condition to the existence of any known Consequents. 2.
If the proposition affirm a consequent, we test it by
searching whether any known antecedents involve it. In
doing this we have to apply the principles of elimination
laid down in Inductive Logic.
We have here, then, two kinds of proof developed
which are defined according to the nature of the connection which they hold to propositions to be proved.
1. When the proof holds to the proposition to be
proved, the relation of Antecedent to Consequent, or of
Principle or Law to phenomena, as in its nature enveloping them,-it is called a priori; i. e. I prove that such
consequents, or such phenomena as the proposition affirms
to exist, must exist, because an antecedent or principle
exists which involves them.
In this case, when the argument is reduced to the
form of a syllogism, the antecedents or principles from
which we prove the phenomena or consequents, form the
premises: and the physical and logical sequences are said
to correspond.
404 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
2. When the proof holds to the proposition to be
proved, the relation of phenomena to law, or to necessary
condition; in other words, the relation of consequent to a
necessary principle or antecedent, it is called a posteriori;
i. e. I prove that the antecedent or principle which the
proposition affirms to exist, must exist, because phenomena
exist, which demand the former as the necessary condition
of their existence; in some cases as explaining the very
fact of their existence,- in others, the mode of their existence.
When the a posterrior argument is reduced to the
form of a syllogism, the phenomena or consequents constitute the premises, and the physical and logical sequences
are opposed.
These two methods of proving, although introduced
above in immediate connection with uncertain propositions, or those whose character remains to be tested, embrace likewise the preceding cases.  When  I am myself
certain of the character of a proposition, in representing
that character to another, that is, in proving it to him, I
must necessarily adopt one or the other of these methods,
according to the nature of.the proposition, as above stated.
This is manifest from a comparison of these methods
with the two great forms of reasoning, the Deductive and
Inductive.
To prove a priori is to prove a consequent from an antecedent, a phenomenon from a law, by showing that the
antecedent and law involve the consequent and the phenomenon. This corresponds to Deduction in its principle, for it is the containing whole determining the particular or particulars contained.
Again: To prove a' posteriori is to prove an antecedent from a consequent, a law from phenomena, by show
405 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
ing that the existence of the consequent or of the phenomena can be accounted for only by the admission of the
antecedent, or the law which the proposition affirms.
This corresponds to Induction in its principle; for it is
the particular or particulars determining the whole, as that
which comprehends them and contains the cause and law
of their being.
To prove, therefore, is to reverse the order of Investigation.
In the latter, we are searching after unknown truths;
in the former, we are seeking to establish known truths.
Both processes comprehend the same principles, and essentially the same materials; only, that in the order of
investigation, many steps are merely tentative, and give
no positive results; while in the order of proof, where the
whole of the preceding investigation is before the mind,
nothing but what is essentially constitutive of the argument is selected and appropriated. Where we test an
uncertain proposition, there are tentative steps, and investigation and proof are in some degree commingled.
The a priori method of proving must not be confounded with a priori principles.  The former assumes
antecedents, which involve the consequents to be proved
by them, without any reference to the logical property of
the antecedents. But when principles are designated as
a priori, we have direct reference to their logical property.  By an d priori principle, we mean a principle
which has not its origin in the sense, but in the pure Reason. Sense or experience is a necessary condition of its
development, i. e. the reason would not go into action to
develope the principle, were not an experience given as a
datum; but when the principle is developed, we  then
clearly see that the experience itself would not have been
406 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
possible had not the principle had a prior existence; e. g.
body and space, phenomena and cause-space and cause
being a priori revealed, upon condition of body and phenomena; but when revealed, we see there could have
been no experience of body and phenomena, had not space
and cause had a prior existence.   Ideas, and all first
truths and axioms, are, therefore, c priori principles.
407 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
SECTION II.
THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF A PRIORI AND A POSTERIORI
PROOF.
ALL the other forms of Evidence or Proof may be reduced
to the a priori and the c posteriori.
I.  Testimony.-This  belongs  to the a  posteriori.
The testimony given is a fact which demands as the condition of its existence the truth of what it affirms, unless
other conditions can be shown satisfactorily to account
for it.
II. Concurrent Testimony.-The concurrence is a fact
which can be accounted for, only by admitting the truth
of the testimony.
III. Argumentfrom progressive approach. e. g. the
law of vis inertice may be proved in this way. This is
likewise a posteriori proof.  The facts of the progressive
approach are supposed to be accounted for, only by admitting the existence of the law.
IV. Proving by example or fact is a posteriori, because it is establishing some point as the condition or necessary antecedent of the example or fact. Sometimes the
I priori is united with the _ posteriori; when, from inducted examples, we establish a principle, and then again
apply this principle to a particular instance.
The whole process is not usually put down, but we go
elliptically from the inducted examples to the particular
408 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
conclusion, suppressing the formal statement of the gen eral principle which intervenes in the mental process.
Simple reasoning from example is nothing more than
inductive reasoning.
V. Reasoning from experience.-This is reasoning
either from the past and present to the future, or from
the present to the past.   When we reason from the past
and present to the future, we show a priori what the fu ture must be fiom the causes which have been, and now
are, at work.   When we reason fromn the present to tlhe
past, we show a posteriori what the past must have been
from the facts now existing.
VI. Reasoning from resemblance and analogy.
1. Resemblance.-Resemblance is distinguished from
identity by admitted differences; identity excludes differenrces. Now, reasoning from resemblance is reasoning
either from the differences or the agreements of the two
parallel cases; i. e. the actually existing agreements are
shown to involve other points of agreement, or the actually existing differences are shown to involve other
points of difference.  This is done d priori, or a posteriori, according to the nature of the case; a' priori, when
the existing facts of resemblance or difference are antecedents to those which are to be proved from them; and a
posteriori, when the existing facts of resemblance or difference are sequences of those to be proved from them.
2. Analogy.-This is not direct or simple resemblance, but a resemblance of relations, or a resemblance
of circumstances in a common relation. In simple resemblance there are only two terms  in analogy, there are
three and four.
1. Where there are three terms, there is a relation of
two to a common third.  This is a resemblance of circqm
409 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
stances in a common relation. In this case, our object is
either-the analogy being granted-to prove circumstances
in one relation by resembling circumstances in the other
relation, or to prove the common relation or analogy itself, by the resembling circumstances. Where we wish to
prove circumstances in one relation by resembling circumstances in the others, the reasoning is a priori or a posteriori, according to the nature of the relation between the
existing particulars and those to be proved;-e. g. an
analogy is granted to exist between mind and body, as
respects education;-their development has a common relation to exercise. Now, there are many resembling circumstances in this common relation, and these circumstances may be made a basis of reasoning to the existence
of other circumstances of resemblance after the a priori or
a p6steriori method, as the nature of the connection shall
determine.
Where we wish to prove the common relation, or the
analogy itself, from the resembling circumstances, we proceed according to the a posteriori method.  The resem
bling circumstances are shown to require the analogy as
the condition of their existence;-e. g. Butler's Analogy:
here the common relation of Revelation and the Universe
to God is shown, from the resembling circumstances; and
objections to the first answered, by showing that similar
objections must lie against the second.
2. Where there are four terms, there is a resemblance
of relations. If this resemblance is granted, then we proceed a priori to prove results;-e. g. it being granted
that an analogy exists between the relation of a king to
his subjects, and of a father to his children, we may prove
a priori that a king must guard and guide his people, and
yield his personal interests to their wants
410 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
If we wish to prove an analogy of relations from facts,
we proceed a posteriori. The establishment of such an
analogy is like the establishment of a general principle by
induction; and the analogy thus established is employed
like a principle in reaching new conclusions.
Indeed, the analogy always contains a principle. In
the first case, that of a common relation of two terms to a
third, this third, on the a priori method, is the principle
enveloping the circumstances of the other two; and, on
the _ posteriori method, is the principle evolved from the
circumstances of the other two.  In the second case, that
of the resembling relations of four terms, when we proceed
a priori, we assume a principle which envelopes and ac counts for these relations; and when we proceed a poste riori, although we stop short, usually, when we have established so many circumstances of resemblance as, to
common and general apprehension, demand an analogy to
account for them, still the analogy itself is but the exponent of a principle. The same holds true with respect
to all reasoning from resemblance: the resemblance is
taken as the exponent of a law. In order to make this
plain, let it be remarked that in reasoning from simple resemblance, -i. e. of two terms, or from analogy of three or
four terms-there is always a comparison of certain circumstances in one term or relation to resembling circumstances in the other term or relation. Now, in the first
term, or relation,-that is, the one from which we reason,
-we find these certain circumstances to be connected a
priori or a posteriori with other circumstances; and then
passing over to the second term or relation to the resembling circumstances there found, we infer that these
must likewise be' priori or d posteriori, as the case may
'e, connected with other circumstances, like those other
411 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
circumstances referred to in the first. But why do we infer this? The answer is obvious. Nature is uniform in
her operations, and therefore the resembling circumstances
in the second term or relation form an exponent of the
same law operating here, which is known to have produced
those other circumstances in the first term or relation:i. e. on the a priori principle of the uniformity of nature,
as the ultimate basis of the reasoning, we assume the same
law to envelope both terms, or both relations.
The  same is true, when, from resembling circumstances, we aim to establish an analogy, or a strict resemblance. We then say, inasmuch as nature is uniform
in her operations, these resembling circumstances can be
accounted for only by referring them to the same law as
governing the two terms, or relations.
VII. Reasoning from axioms and definitions.-This
is usually called Demonstrative Reasoning, or simply Demonstration.  This reasoning is, plainly a' priori; for all
the conclusions are wrapped up in the axioms and definitions, and are, therefore, determined by them in a neces sary and absolute relation of consequents to antecedents.
The principles here, are necessary and a priori princi ples, and all the conclusions exhibit but their manifold
unfoldings.
412 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
SECTION III.
OF THE NATURE OF THE RELATION BETWEEN ANTECEDENTS
AND CONSEQUENTS.
WE have seen that all the different modes of proof are
comprehended under those two,-the a' priori and the d
posteriori. The d priori is the proof of a consequent by
an antecedent, which involves it.  The a posteriori is the
proof of an antecedent by a consequent, which demands it
as the condition of its own existence. But the question
must here arise, What is the nature of that connection
which exists between the two terms of antecedent and
consequent? It cannot be a mere juxtaposition in time
or space, because this juxtaposition may be arbitrary or
accidental, and therefore form no basis of certainty, or
even of probability. It is obvious that the connection
must be of a nature to demand the' existence of the one
when the existence of the other is granted. Hence, let it
be observed, that in our explication of the a_ priori and
the d posteriori, we were careful to point out this connection as a connection of antecedent and consequent, or of a
principle in necessary relation to comprehended particulars, or of a condition without which the consequent could
not have existed. But all these different forms of expression do really refer to relations of the same nature, viz.,
either the relation of cause and effect, or of law and phenomena, or of first truths and their necessary consequences.
413 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
When we attain to merely uniform sequences, as general
facts, the uniformity we assume to be comprehended by
some law and necessitated by it. Cause of course is allpervading, and therefore always implied; but is not the
great object of investigation, as has been before shown.:
The consequent, then, whether regarded as an effect, or a
particular comprehended under law, or an inference arising
from an axiom, is really contained in its antecedent; so
that the affirmation of the latter comprehends the affirmation of the former; and the existence of the formner
proves the latter, when, by applying  the principles of
elimination,t or by tracing upwards the necessary sequence,
it is shown that the former depends upon the latter.
A condition, without which a consequent could not
have existed, is not always an immediate antecedent; as
when we say of a tender plant, that it was destroyed, because the servant carelessly left it out of doors during a
frosty night. Here we do not assign the carelessness of
the servant as the immediate antecedent of the destruction
of the plant; but still, it was the immediate antecedent
of the exposure of the plant; and, had it not been left out
of doors, it would not have been destroyed. In this case,
there is a series of antecedents and consequents, all of
which are necessary to account for the effect; but, instead
of stating the whole series, we put down a remote antecedent as the condition of the last effect, and form thus an
abbreviated form of expression for the whole. But the
reasoning depends upon the relations we have given above.
The cardinal principles involved in the foregoing,
axiomatically expressed, are,
1. "Every phenomenon must have its cause and its
law."
* Supra, p. 254.
414
t Pope 288. 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
2. "Nature is uniform in her operations."
This uniformity is the uniformity of the action of
causes, as regulated by wise laws: and the uniformity of
nature, therefore, may be expressed as follows
"Like antecedents involve like consequents;" and
"Like consequents imply like antecedents;"'
Or, to give it a more general expression,
" Cause is immutably regulated in time and space;"
e.g. fire-gravitation-magnetism.
3. " Whatever is predicated of the Whole is predicated
of all the parts contained under it."
Upon these three principles all the different kinds of
proof above explained are based.
In all the different forms of the a posteriori, we prove
antecedents from consequents or phenomena. But, obviously, we cannot proceed in this proof; unless we assume
that "Every phenomenon must have its cause and its
law;" and  That law governs uniformly."
In the a priori, likewise, where we prove consequents
or phenomena by antecedents, we cannot proceed without
assuming that "Every cause is governed by law uniformly."
* Page 301.
415 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
SECTION IV.
OF DEGREES OF EVIDENCE.
THE terms necessary, possible, contingent, and impossible, refer to the nature of the connection between a
given antecedent and consequent.   The terms certain,
probable, and presumptive, refer to our knowledge of this
connection.
A necessary connection between the two is one determined by absolute law; e. g. the connection between an
Idea and an Axiom, as the Idea of space and the axiom
of the three dimensions in space; the connection between
an axiom and consequences deduced from it; the connection between the law of gravitation and the phenomena of
nature; the connection between the premises and conclusion of a syllogism; and so on.
A possible connection is one which no law absolutely
prevents; and which might take place by an adequate
power which we know to exist, but which, at the same
time, may not appear probable. It is therefore a contingent connection.
A contingent connection implies a law in relation to a
cause which may or may not be governed by it.  It is the
opposite of a necessary connection. There is no contin gency in the connection between natural causes and laws,
416 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
and their phenomena. Contingency is found only in the
connection between a Free Will, and motives consisting
of Moral Laws, Reasons, and Inducements.:*
An impossible connection, is one prevented by law;e. g. that a stone thrown into the air should remain suspended there, or that a mass of solid iron should float in
water, or that a part should be greater than a whole, or
that 2+2-=5.
Impossibility is of two kinds, logical and physical.
The first is a connection which would contravene Ideas
and Axioms, and laws founded in them. Such a connection is an impossibility in itself;-e. g. that a part is
greater than a whole, that there are four dimensions in
space, or that 2 4 2=5.  A physical impossibility is the
impossibility of any phenomena in contravention of physical laws. While these laws exist, or remain unsuspended,
their proper phenomena must take place. But Omnipotence may suspend or modify these laws. This of course
is a miracle or wonder.
The other set of terms, we have said, refers to our
knowledge of any supposed connection between an antecedent and consequent.
To an Omniscient Being there are no degrees of knowledge.  Such a Being sees, with the utmost clearness, the
necessary and the contingent, the actual and the possible.
To such a Being, all knowledge is certain. It is only to
the knowledges which belong to beings like ourselves that
the terms presumptive and probable can be applied; it is
only of such knowledges that degrees of certainty can be
affirmed.
There are then to us three kinds of certainty, according
* Doctrine of the Will, p. 62.
18*
417 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
to the nature of the connection between the terms which
are the object of proof.
First. Absolute certainty.   This is based upon the
necessary connection between the two terms.   Our knowledge of Ideas and Axioms is absolutely certain,-e. g.
time and space; that every body is in space. So also our
knowledge of deductions from axioms is absolutely certain,
as in geometry, for example. Our knowledge of the connection between the premises and conclusion of a syllogism
is of the same nature: this is sometimes called logical
certainty.
Secondly. Physical certainty. This is the certainty
which lies in the connection between established physical
antecedents and sequents, as exhibited in the phenomena
of gravitation, heat, chemical affinities, mechanical forces,
and-so on.
Now, the reason does not conceive of this connection
as necessarily fixed with an absolute necessity, because it
ultimately depends upon the Will of God; and the same
Will which ordained it, can change, suspend, or even annihilate it.
When, therefore, we affirm any thing to be physically
certain, we mean that our knowledge of it is based upon
physical, and not upon necessary relations.
Thirdly. Moral certainty. This is the certainty which
lies between the connection of Motive and Will. By Will,
we mean a self-conscious, intelligent and sensitive cause,
or a cause in a triunity with Reason and Sensitivity. It
is in the fullest sense a cause per se; that is, it contains
within itself proper efficiency, and determines its own direction.  By Motives, we mean the reasons and inducenents, in view of which the Will acts.*  In general, all
* Doctrine of the Will, p. 138.
418 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
activity proceeds according to rules, or laws, or reasons,
for they have essentially the same meaning: but in mere
material masses, the law is not contemplated by the acting
force; it is contemplated only by the Intelligence which
ordained and conditioned the force. In spirit, on the contrary, the activity which we call Will, is self-conscious,
and is connected with a perception and sense of the reasons and inducements, or ends, or motives of actions.
These motives are of two kinds:
* First. Those found in the ideas of the practical reason,
which decides what is fit and right. These are reasons of
supreme authority.
Secondly. Those found in the understanding and sensitivity; i. e., the immediately useful and expedient, and
the gratification of the passions. These are right only
when subordinate to the first.
Now, these reasons and inducements are a light to the
Will, and serve to guide its activities. The human conscience, which is but the Reason, under its practical function, in relation to the moral, has drawn up for the Will
explicit rules, suited to all circumstances and relations,
which are called ethtcs, or the rules. And so, on the other
hand, the understanding, by which we mean the Reason,
under its practical function, in relation to mere utility, has
formed rules of prudence or expediency. The law of the
sensitivity, taken in itself, is unique; it is simply "To do
whatever is most agreeable or pleasing to itself."
These various rules the Will is not compelled or necessitated to obey. In every volition it is conscious of a
power to do, or not to do.
In the moral harmony and purity of the soul, the three
kinds above named do not conflict with each other. The
right has utility as an ultimate and certain result. The
419 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
soul loves the right, in this state, because it is right, and
reposes quietly in hope of the consequences. And all the
passions find their highest gratification in obeying the law
of the right. Hence moral certainty, as to the actions of
moral beings, can exist only where the harmony of the
spiritual being is preserved in a perfect, or at least paramount degree: e. g. God, and good angels, and good men.
In God, moral certainty is perfect. His dispositions are
infinitely pure, and his Will freely determines to do right;
it is not compelled or necessitated, for then His infinite
meritoriousness would cease. Moral certainty is not absolute, because Will being a power to do, or not to do, there
is always a possibility, although it may be an infinite improbability, that the Will may disobey the laws of the
Reason.
-In the case of good angels, and good men, the moral
certainty is such, as to be attended with no apprehension
of a dereliction.
With respect to such men as Joseph, Daniel, Paul,
Howard, and Washington, we can calculate, with a very
high and satisfactory moral certainty, of the manner  in
which they will act in any given circumstances involving
the influence of motives..We know they will obey truth,
justice, and mercy,-that is, the first class of motives;
and the second, only so far as they are authorised by the
first.
If the first class of motives is forsaken, then human
conduct must be calculated according to the influence of
the second class.
Human character, however, is mixed and variously
compounded. We might make a scale of an indefinite
number of degrees, from the highest point of moral excellence to the lowest point of moral degradation, and then
420 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
our predictions of human conduct would vary with every
degree.
In any particular case, where we are called upon to
reason from the connection of motives with the will, it is
evident we must determine the character of the individual
as accurately as possible, in order to know the probable
resultant of the opposite moral forces which we are likely
to find.
We have remarked that moral certainty exists only
where the harmony of the moral constitution is preserved.
Here we know the Right will be obeyed. It may, however, be remarked in addition to this, that moral certainty
may be said to exist in the case of the lowest moral
degradation, where the Right is forsaken. Here the rule
is, "To do whatever is most agreeable," and " Whatever
is useful in- the immediate or temporal consequences."
The volition, indeed, in such instances seems merged into
a mere sense of present gratification. But, in the intermediate state, lies the wide field of probability. What
is commonly called the knowledge of 7tuman nature, and
esteemed of most importance in the affairs of human
life, is not the knowledge of human nature as it ought to
be, but as it is, in its vast variety of good and evil. We
gain this knowledge from consciousness, from observation,
and from history.  What human nature ought to be, we
learn from Reason and Revelation.
Will has already been represented as forming a triunity
with the Reason and the Sensitivity, and in the constitution of our being is designed to derive its rules and inducements of action from these. Acts, which are in the
direction of neither reason nor sensitivity, must be very
trifling acts; and therefore, although possible, we may
conclude they are very rare.  In calculating, then, future
421 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
acts of will, we may, like the Mathematicians, drop infinitesimal differences, and assume that all acts of the will
are in the direction of the reason, or of the sensitivity, or
of both in their harmony. Although the will is conscious
of power to do, out of the direction of both the reason
and the sensitivity, still in the triunity in which it exists,
it submits itself to the general interests of the being, and
consults the authority of conscience, or the enjoyments
of passion. Now every individual has formed for himself
habits and a character, more or less fixed. He is known
to have submitted himself from day to day, and in a great
variety of transactions, to the laws of conscience; and
hence we conclude, that he has formed a fixed purpose of
doing right. He has exhibited, too, on many occasions,
noble, generous, and pure feelings; and hence we conclude that his sensitivity, in a predominant degree,
harmonises with conscience. Or, he is known to have
violated the laws of the conscience from day to day, and
in a great variety of transactions; and hence we conclude
that he has formed a fixed purpose of doing wrong; and
that his sensitivity is in conflict with the reason.
In both cases supposed, and, in like manner, in all
supposable cases, there is plainly a basis, on which, in any
given circumstances, we may foresee and predict the volitions, and consequently the actions of men.
There is something " that is evident, and now existent,
with which the future existence of the contingent event
is connected." On the one hand, these predictions exert
no necessitating influence over the events, for they are
entirely disconnected with the causation of the events;
and, on the other hand, the events need not be assumed
as necessary, in order to become the objects of probable
calculations. If they were necessary, in any sense, the
422 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
calculations could no longer be merely probable; they
would, on the contrary, take the precision and certainty
of the calculation of eclipses and other phenomena based
upon necessary laws.
But these calculations can aim only at moral certainty,
because they are made according to the generally known
and received determinations of will in a triunity with the
reason and the sensitivity; but still, a will which is known,
also, to have the power to depart at any moment from
the line of determination which it has established for
itself. Thus the calculations which we make respecting
the conduct of one man in given circumstances, based
upon his known integrity, and the calculations which we
make respecting another, based upon his known dishonesty,
may alike disappoint us, through the unexpected, though
possible dereliction of the first, and the unexpected,
though possible reformation of the latter.
When we reason from moral effects to moral causes, or
from moral causes to moral effects; as, for example, in
testimony, where we reason from the fact of the testimony
to the motive which led to the testimony,-we cannot
regard the operation of causes as positive and uniform
under the same law of necessity.which appertains to
physical causes; because, in moral causality, the free will
is the efficient and last determiner. It is indeed true,
that we reason here with a high degree of probability,
with a probability sufficient to regulate wisely and harmoniously the affairs of society; but we cannot reason
respecting human conduct as we reason respecting the
phenomena of the physical world, since it is possible for
the human will to disappoint calculations based upon the
ordinary influence of motives; e. g. The motive does not
hold the same relation to will which fire holds to a com
423 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
bustible substance. The fire must burn; the will may
or may not determine in view of the motive.
Hence, the reason why in common parlance probable
evidence has received the name of moral evidence; moral
evidence being always probable-all probable evidence is
called moral.*'
Next after certainty, we must consider probability.
By the probable, we mean that which has not attained
to certainty, but which, nevertheless, has grounds on which
it claims to be believed. We call it probable orprovable,
because it both has proof, and is still under conditions of
proof, that is, admits of still farther proof.
That which is certain, has all the proof of which the
case admits. A mathematical proposition is certain on
the ground of necessity, and admits of no higher proof
than that which really demonstrates  its truth.   The
Divine volitions are certain on the ground of the Divine
perfections, and admit of no higher proof than what is
found in these perfections.  The  volitions of a good
created being are certain on the ground of the purity of
such a being, and admit of no higher proof than what
is found in this purity.
But when we come to.a mixed being, that is, a being
of Reason, and of a Sensitivity corrupted totally, or in
different degrees, then we have place not for certainty,
but for probability. As our knowledge of the future or
the past volitions of such a being can only be gathered
from something now existent, this knowledge will depend
upon our knowledge of the present relative state of his
reason and sensitivity. But a perfect knowledge of this
state is in no case supposable, so that, although our actual
* Review of Edwards on the Will, pp. 261-269.
424 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
knowledge of this being may be such as to afford us proof
of what his volitions may be, yet, inasmuch as our knowledge of him may be increased indefinitely by close observation and study, so likewise will the proof be increased.
According to the definition of probability above given,
therefore, our knowledge of the future or past volitions of
an imperfect being can only amount to probable knowledge.
The direction of the probabilities will be determined
by the preponderance of the good or the bad in the mixed
being supposed. But the state of the Reason itself must
be considered. If the Reason or Conscience be in a
highly developed state, and the convictions of the right
consequently clear and strong, there may be probabilities
of volitions in opposition to passion, which cannot exist
where the Reason is undeveloped, and subject to the
errors and prejudices of custom and superstition. The
difference is that which is commonly known under the
terms "Enlightened and unenlightened conscience."
With a given state of the Reason and the Sensitivity,
the direction of the probabilities will depend also very
much upon the correlated, or upon the opposing objects
and circumstances.:
We have spoken of Probability thus far only in reference to human volition and actions, since here is the
great field of probability. It evidently applies to other
subjects also: it applies wherever the connection between
an antecedent and consequent is contingent, or appears
to us to be so.
We have pointed out several terms which refer to the
nature of the connection between antecedents and conse
* Review ut supra, pp. 291-3.
425 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
quents, viz., necessary, consequent, possible, and impossible; and several others, which refer to our knowledge of
that connection, viz., certain, probable, and presumpntive.
Now these terms answer to each other. A necessary
connection of antecedents and consequents, or of any two
terms, is the ground of absolute certainty of knowledge.
In the connection of physical antecedents and consequents
there is a relative necessity, i. e., this connection is necessary while the system of nature remains unchanged; but
as such a change is possible by the Divine Will, the certainty of knowledge here is called physical and not
absolute.
An imnpossible connection involves the Idea of necessity. Hence, when a connection is seen to be impossible,
our knowledge that it will not take place is absolutely or
physically certain, according to the nature of the antecedents and consequents connected.
Answering to a contingent connection between antecedent and consequent, we have a probable knowledge.
We have indeed spoken of a moral certainty in respect
to the volitions of pure beings. But the nature of the
evidence in these cases is not changed. Moral certainty
still admits a possibility in the opposing scale; but the
grounds of belief are so stable and conclusive as to leave
no room for doubt. Generically considered, moral certainty is probable knowledge.
Again, answering to a possible connection between
antecedents and consequents, our knowledge is _presumptive. A possible connection is a contingent one, also; it
may or it may not be. The difference between this case
and the preceding, i e., where a contingent connection of
antecedents and consequents has a probable knowledge
answering to it, is as follows: In the preceding there is
426 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
always a certain amount of proof for or against the connection, with at least a possibility in the opposing scale.
Frequently the probabilities on either side are so rife, that
a nice judgment is required in determining the preponderance.
But where the connection is said to be merely possible,
there is no proof for or against, as yet, adduced; and then,
according to the point of view at which we stand in relation to it, we are said to have a presumptive knowledge
that the connection does or does not exist. As soon as
proof is adduced, a probability arises on one side or the
other.
But, while there is no probability, to which side does
the presumoption belong?  This, I have said, depends upon
the point of view at which we stand. And this point of
view must itself be determined on some fit principle; for
it is, by no means, a matter of indifference. Where a
question arises between two parties, it must necessarily be
so put as to involve an affirmative and a negative; and
the presumption will then be said to lie in favour of the
affirmative or the negative. Now the point of view is determined:
1. By the previous state of the question. If it has by
old opinions or established usage been settled in the affirmative or negative, then from this point must it be
viewed. Independently of all argument, and of all inherent probability, there is a presumption in favour of
the old opinion, and the established usage. He who attacks the question is said to assume the burden of proof;
and, unless he can bring proof to the contrary, the old decision must stand.
2. The point of view is determined by any natural
right which may chance to be involved in the question,
427 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
such as the right of life, liberty, property, character, and
freedom of opinion; e.g. A man arraigned as a criminal
is presumed to be innocent, until he is proved guilty. A
man in possession of an estate is presumed to be the owner,
until his title is invalidated by sufficient proof. Any ancient institution is presumed to be well founded, until its
principles can be shown to be false and mischievous; or it
can be shown, by fraud or violence, to have supplanted a
more ancient institution. In the latter case the burden
of proof falls upon the more modern, and the presumption
lies in favor of the more ancient institution. It happens,
sometimes, that those are called innovators, who are, in
reality, the advocates of what is truly ancient and venerable. If they prove this to be the fact, they, of course,
tranfer the burden of proof to where it justly belongs.
- Presumptive evidence must be distinguished from a
priori or antecedent probability. This last is strictly inherent probability, arising from a' priori or established
principle. Any fact or proposition possesses this kind of
probability, when it is a probable consequence of such a
principle; e. g. From the known character of an individual, there is an antecedent probability how he will act
under certain circumstances. There may be a moral certainty that he will do right; but the circumstances may
be such as not simply to involve a question of rectitude.
From the knowledge which we have of the circumstances,
in connection with the character of the individual, we
judge that an antecedent probability exists as to the manner in which he will act.
There is antecedent probability in favor of a Divine
revelation, arising from the character of the Deity and the
moral condition of man.
In making experiments in Natural Science, there is
428 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
often an antecedent probability of the results arising from
known antecedents.
In conclusion, we remark, that the evidence by which
we gain certain knowledge of the connection of antecedents
and consequents, or of any fact or proposition, is in general called demonstrative evidence. The terms demonstrative and demonstration are technically and particularly applied to mathematical reasoning. Moral reasoning may be
demonstrative in respect to moral truth; but not in respect to moral action. The evidence by which we gain
probable knowledge is called probable evidence; the highest degree of probability is called moral certainty. And
the evidence by which we gain presumptive knowledge is
called presumptive evidence.
We shall next proceed to apply the foregoing principles to the different kinds of evidence contained under
the two general divisions of the a. priori and the   p jposteriori.
429 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
SECTION V
TESTIMONY.
THIS is moral evidence, because it depends upon the human will. The highest certainty, therefore, to which
testimony can attain is moral certainty.
Testimony, as a species of evidence, must embrace very
extensive considerations of human nature, and of the influence of motives. Testimony, in any givel- case, is a
fact which must a posteriori be accounted for.  It is accounted for by referring it to the motives which led to it.
If it can be shown that the truth of the fact testified to,
is the morally certain ground of the testimony, then the
testimony proves the truth of that fact with a moral certainty. If the truth is the only probable ground, then
the testimony proves the probability of the fact to a degree determined by the character of the witness and the
circumstances in which he is placed.
But to proceed to a more particular exposition of this
subject   I. What circum8stances determine the truth of testimnony
with a moral certainty?
1. The character of the witness: if he have all the
qualities of a perfect moral being, then his veracity, under any circumstances, may be deemed morally certain.
Only one degree, at least, below moral certainty is the
430 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
veracity of such men as we have already referred to, viz.,
Paul, Joseph, Daniel, Washington, &c. We can hardly
conceive of a trial so severe as to lead such men to sacrifice their integrity.
2. Sufficient opportunities for observing the fact testified to, i. e. The fact must have been the direct and unquestionable object of sense or experience: " That which
we have heard-which we have seen with our eyes-which
we have looked upon (i. e. have steadily contemplated)
and our hands have handled-declare we unto you."
3. The witness must be a man of sane mind.
The first, however, may be regarded as including the
two last. A man of high and perfect moral character will
not testify to facts which he has not carefully and fully
observed: nor will he testify, if he is not conscious of
having been in a proper state of mind at the time they
were presented.
II. What circumstances determine the truth of testimony on grounds of mere probability.?
1. The last particular mentioned under the preceding
head is essential to all testimony; and the probability will
always be directly in proportion to the first two.
2. The probability established by testimony will vary
with the number and character of the motives under which
the witness testifies.
First. If the witness has an interest in the facts to
which he testifies, arising from pride, ambition, or the
gratification of any desire, or the fulfilment of any selfish
purpose which he is known to entertain, then will his
testimony in proportion be invalidated. Still, however,
the known character of the witness must be taken into the
account. The same motives relatively to one man will invalidate testimony to a greater degree than relatively to
431 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
another; i. e. the motive and the character must be taken
together, and the probability be accordingly deduced.
Secondly. If the motives be such as on principles of
self-gratification would lead the witness to testify contrary
to his actual testimony, then is the testimony strong in
proportion to. the motives; e. g. A man testifying to
facts at the expense of reputation-or worldly possessions
and honours-or of life.
III. Testimony in relation to opinion and in relation
to fact.
By opinion we mean a judgment of the mind, respecting a proposition as true or false.  Opinion is to be distinguished from absolute knowledge, as implying that the
proposition which is its object, is still debatable.
Testimony cannot establish the truth of opinions or
judgments.  Their truth can be established only on some
necessary principle of the Intelligence.
Testimony, as evidence, relates merely to matters of
fact. All, therefore, that a witness can testify to, in relation to opinions, is the fact that he or some other person
entertains such and such opinions. But the truth or
falsity of the opinions must be determined on other
grounds, and wholly independently of testimony.
A man may be of the highest integrity, and of sane
mind, and may sacrifice reputation and possessions, and
life itself, in maintaining his opinions, without affording
any evidence of their truth. His testimony only goes to
establish the fact that he believes the proposition in question, and that he believes it ardently and firmly.
Divine testimony is adequate to establish a truth as
well as a fact, because God is Infinite Reason, and the
very substance of truth. We believe, therefore, what
God affirms, although we may be incapable of deter
432 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
mining the truth, independently, on the principles of our
reason.
The testimony of good and wise men is entitled to
high consideration. But we do not ultimately and securely settle a point which they profess to believe, until
we have ascertained the grounds on which they believe.
The same principles of evidence are common to them and
to ourselves; if, therefore, they have believed on just
principles, we must be capable of perceiving them.
IV. Truth and Fact.-By fact, we mean phenomena,
-something which  we  know  by observation  merely.
Facts are of two kinds: 1. Facts of the Senses, or external observation. 2. Facts of the Consciousness, or internal observation.
By truth, we mean that which is arrived at by the
pure Reason;   We always assume observation as conditional to the exercise of Reason. But while observation
supplies facts, Reason supplies the principles under which
the facts are to be reduced. Now, whatever the Reason
supplies, whether in intuition or in deduction, we call
truth. From this comparison of truth and fact, it must
still more clearly appear that testimony cannot prove
truths or doctrines. Testimony is only an attestation of
what has been observed. Truths or doctrines can be
proved by reasoning alone.
V. Historical Evidence.-The leading feature of this
species of evidence, is testimony.
1. Where the historian relates what he has himself seen.
This is pure testimony, and must be judged of accordingly.
2. Where the historian relates cotemporaneous events,
upon the testimony of others. Here, in addition to what
has been laid down under testimony, we must take into
account:  First.   The  prejudices  and  antipathies of
19
433 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
country, party, and sect. Secondly. The philosophical
ability of the historian to investigate, compare, and deduce. Thirdly. The time and attention bestowed on the
work.
3. Where the historian depends for his information
upon the writings of others, and upon national monuments, records, and antiquities. Here the most various
and lofty qualifications are requisite. First. All the
qualities of a true witness. Secondly. Varied and profound erudition: viz. a knowledge of languages-of science
-of arts -of government;-great skill in antiquarian researches; and above all, original, all-comprehensive, and
penetrative genius, as a philosopher. Thirdly. Adequate
materials. A history is entitled to belief in proportion as
these particulars appear in its compilation.
VI. Concurrent  Testimony.-This  must  be distinguished from accumulated testimony, which is a mere
multiplication of witnesses. In concurrent testimony, on
the contrary, although the evidence be stronger, according to the number of the witnesses, yet the evidence itself does not lie in the qualifications of the witnesses; but
only in their concurrence.
Their concurrence, on-supposition, cannot be accounted
for, without granting the fact testified to; i. e. If the fact
did occur, then the concurrence was possible; if the fact
did not occur, then the concurrence was not probable, or
possible, as the case may be.
In the first place. It is plain that this evidence will
be strong, in proportion to the inmprobabilty of previous
concert. If previous concert can be shown to be impossible, then the evidence occupies one of its highest
grounds.
But, in the second place, although the probability, or
434 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
even possibility, of previous concert may be disproved, it
will still remain to be shown that the concurrence can be
accounted for only by the admission of the fact in question.
Now, if the concurrence can be accounted for in any
other way, it must be by showing, in the case of each witness, separately, that there were motives which were adequate to lead to the given testimony, without supposing
the reality of the fact testified to. This would of course
invalidate the concurrence. If the existence of such motives in the case of each witness should be shown to have
existed, there would of course be an utter annihilation of
the evidence: or, if the above be shown in the cases of
only a part of the witnesses, it must tend to destroy the
evidence. In all these cases the concurrence turns out a
singular fortuity.  Now, if in any given concurrence no
such invalidating or destructive circumstances can be detected, then it must remain as valid evidence.
VII.  Concurrent Testimony in relation to fact  and
opinion.-The principles above stated refer to concurrent
testimony, as evidence of facts merely.
Concurrent testimony, in relation to opinion, is mere
concurrence of opinion. Where this concurrence exists
without previous concert, it affords evidence of sincerity.
Where an opinion is thus concurred in by men of high integrity and wisdom, it is entitled to great consideration;
but ultimately it must rest upon principles, as forming
its only decisive evidence. This has been above shown in
discussing opinion in its relation to simple testimony.
435 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
SECTION VI.
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
BY circumstances, we mean, as the etymology denotes,
whatever stands around a principal.
Thus the circumstances of an individual comprise all
the particulars which make up his external condition.
Thus the circumstances of an event comprise all the particulars of time, place, action, modes, degrees, causes, and
effects; i. e. every thing attending upon it-accessory to
it-or every thing making up a description of it.
Now, circumstantial evidence in general takes place
where we adduce the circumstances which belong to a
principal, to prove the existence of that principal. But
what is the connection between circumstances and a principal which enables us to reason from the one to the
other? It must be something more than mere juxtaposition. An arbitrary and accidental connection cannot be
the foundation of reasoning. The connection then must be
that of necessary, or at least probable consequent to a
stated antecedent, or the connection of phenomenon with
cause and law: i. e. The principal being necessary to account for the existence of circumstances, its existence is a
posteriori proved from the circumstances.
In calling this circumstantial evidence, however, we
only give another name to the ordinary a posteriori rea soming.
436 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
Circumstantial evidence, as a really distinct kind of
evidence, is constituted by a concurrence of circumstances.
The circumstantial evidence above described is a mere
accumulation of a' posteriori proof,-a bringing together
of many effects, or consequents, to prove a common cause,
or antecedent. But the concurrence of circumstances or
facts is, in itself, a new and peculiar fact, independently
of the nature of the facts taken separately. Concurrent
testimony and concurrent circumstances are analogous.
In both kinds, the proof lies in the necessity of accounting for the concurrence. It is a phenomenon,-it must
have a cause.
That which as condition or cause accounts for the concurrence is proved by it, either with certainty, or with
more or less probability, as tle case may be.
Circumstantial evidence possesses the highest degree
of certainty when there is absolutely no other way of accounting for the circumstances, except by the admission
of the principal in question.
It possesses the highest degree of probabilty when although it be possible to conceive other ways of accounting
for the concurrence than the one adopted, still every one
of these is far-fetched, altogether hypothetical, and having
no known connection with any existent fact.
Where there are several ways of accounting for the
concurrence, and all have claims to probability, we must
of course weigh the opposite probabilities, and determine
accordingly.
Any given concurrence of facts cannot be set aside, as
of no weight, except by accounting for each fact separately, in its time, place, and relations, so as to make the
concurrence appear altogether fortuitous.
Reasoning from facts, merely, and reasoning from a
437 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
concurrence of facts, since they may both appear in the
same case, and in relation to the same facts, are apt to be
confounded. It need hardly be remarked that it is of the
utmost importance to discriminate between them, and to
present them each on its own independent basis.
Thie evidence admitted in a court of justice to prove
the guilt of a prisoner, must be positive, or at least
morally certain. Circumstantial evidence, therefore, regarded either as a collection of facts, or as a concurrence
of facts, can be admitted as decisive, only where the guilt
of the prisoner can be taken as the only way of accounting
for the facts, or the concurrence of facts: i. e. It is not
enough that it is the most probable way of accounting for
theim,-it must be the only probable way.
Where the rights of two parties are opposed, so that a
determination necessarily involves loss to one or the other,
as in a question respecting the title of an estate, the determination must, of course, be made according to the result of a comparison of probabilities, if no positive evidence
can be obtained.
In concurrent testimony, we have a number of witnesses coming together, without previous concert, and supporting each other's evidence. In concurrent circumstances, we have a number of circumstances coming together
without any previous contrivance, and supporting each
other in relation to a principal.
If the testimony be true, then this concurrence is what
we might have expected. If this principal exist, then the
concurrence of circuinstances is what we might have expected.
In addition to this, we have assumed that unless the
concurrence of facts can be proved to be fortuitous, by
showing how each fact came to happen in that precise
438 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
time, place, and relation, without requiring any connection
between the several facts; and that unless the concurrent
testimony be accounted for in the motives of each witness
separately, so as not to require the truth of their common
statement; and, we may add, unless it can be shown to
be fortuitous, as in the case of concurrent circumstances,
we are compelled to admit that antecedent or cause which
most clearly accounts for the concurrence. But there is
an objection made to this which requires attention, and
may compel us to prove our assumption.
It is as follows:
Any given phenomena brought into juxtaposition
must of necessity assume some order of arrangement. But
against any particular order there are chances indefinitely
great in number; and as the phenomena must come into
some order, it is plain they may come into one order as
well as into another; and hence they may as well come
into that regular and connected order which we call concurrence, as into one of utter confusion and want of connection." Says the objector, therefore, "What right have
you to assume this concurrence as proof of the principal to
which the facts seem to relate? I have an equal right to
assume the fortuity of the concurrence."
We have here, then, two assumptions directly opposed;
but one or the other must fall; both cannot be true.
Which shall stand? The objector may say, "Please
support your assumption." We may rejoin, Please to
support yours.  Now, we may both make  the attempt,
and may both fail in positively settling the question.
After all our discussions, there may appear something
plausible on both sides. In this case, he who can adduce
the greatest number of probabilities for his assumption,
must win the argument. In supporting our assumption,
439 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
we urge the fact, that at least in the great majority of
cases where there is concurrence, there is some cause directly and clearly producing it; e. g. Of all the books
ever made, we do not find that any were made by a fortuitous concurrence of the letters; of all the instruments
and machines that have ever been constructed, we do not
find any that were constructed by the fortuitous occurrence of the materials; and as to the phenomena of nature, we find, as our knowledge of natural philosophy and
chemistry is extended, that laws are brought to light
which explain them in all their multifariousness, and
leave us little or no place of appealing to fortuitous combination? As, then, we produce the greater number of
instances of this kind, we claim the greater number of
probabilities for our assumption. Indeed, the candid objector must be constrained to admit that he finds it very
difficult to bring a single instance where fortuitous combination explains concurrence and regularity.
This reasoning goes to show that a concurrence must
always have the balance of probabilities in its favor, as
connected with some principal which unites the facts in
the concurrence in opposition to the assumption of a fortuitous concurrence.
But here another question may arise: Whether reasoning from concurrence can ever possess the highest degree of certainty of any kind, as we have appeared in the
preceding pages to take for granted, where we say, " this
evidence possesses the highest degree of certainty when
there is absolutely no other way of accounting for the concurrence except by the admission of the principal in question," inasmuch as in every case there is a possibility of
fortuitous concurrence? This is a serious question, and
involves the possibility, although not the probability, of
440 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
every concurrence whatever,-even the creation of the
world being fortuitous. We may indeed comfort ourselves with the overwhelming probability that the world
is the work of design; but still are we prepared to
grant the possibility, however remote, of a fortuitous
creation?
We are not prepared to grant this.  We think we can
prove the impossibility of fortuitous concurrence, as well
as explain those cases which appear to be such.
In the first place, the axioms " Every phenomenon
must have a cause," and " Every phenomenon must have
a law," cannot be set aside. These are necessary principles of the reason. But concurrence is a phenomenon,
and, therefore, must have a cause and a law. Now if by
fortuity we mean to negate cause and law, then fortuity
is impossible in concurrence: and thus the question is
settled at once. In the second _place, those concurrences
which appear fortuitous are not really so; e. g. a cast of
dice: The dice have a certain position before they are
cast; a certain degree of projectile force is given them,
and the result is a certain concurrence of sides. Now in
this case there are causes definite and regular; but because we are unable to determine them with precision, we
call the result fortuitous. All cases of apparent fortuity
may be resolved in the same way. There are causes, and
they work regularly according to their nature, but we cannot penetrate their action. In any case of concurrence,
therefore, the question is not, as we have above allowed,
out of courtesy, to the objector, between the assumption
of cause and no cause; but whether a certain antecedent
accounts for the concurrence, or whether it is to be accounted for by some other.
Now, from our knowledge of antecedents and concur             19*
441 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
rences, there are some concurrences which we do generally
attribute to certain antecedents, because generally connected with them; e. g. The print of a man's foot in the
sand. This we should naturally attribute to the pressure
of an actual foot; but still, it is possible that it might have
been produced by the action of the waves. If produced by
the action of the waves. it has its definite cause, and is not
fortuitous; but it has in this case an unusual antecedent.
On an inhabited coast, we should affirm at once that the
probabilities greatly preponderate in favor of a man's foot
as the cause; but a man in the situation of Robinson Crusoe,
finding such a print upon the sea-shore, might be in doubt.
Now the only case where concurrence would afford the
highest certainty, is, as we have above affirmed, one in
which there is but one way of accounting for the fact-not
in 6pposition to fortuity, but in negation of the possibility
of other causes.
442 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
SECTION VII.
ARGUMENT FROM PROGRESSIVE APPROACH.
THIS belongs to the a posteriori form of proof, because we
ascend from facts to a law. If, however, the facts of the
progressive approach, introduced on the principle of causality, are the only elements of the proof, then we have an
ordinary case of induction; e.g. We put a ball in motion
on a ~ough surface, and its motion soon ceases; we put it
in motion on a smoother surface, and the motion is proportionally prolonged; and we find generally, that the
time of the motion is inversely as the resistance. Hence
we infer that if all resistance were removed, there would
be no change in the motion; i. e. From the uniformity of
a given number of facts, we infer an universal uniformity
of facts.
But are we certain, on the mere induction, that we
may not in actual experiment arrive at a point where the
phenomena  shall  be reversed?  where  the resistance,
after having been reduced to a degree lower than has ever
yet been attained, shall suddenly be greatly augmented?
Recollect we are merely deducing from known facts; and
the uniformity of nature on which we base our conclusion
respecting the unknown, is a uniformity which relates to
law in general, and not merely to the particular law which
we assume. There may, therefore, be a change in the
facts in the extended experiment, which shall require them
443 
THlE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
all to be reduced under another law in view of higher
points of uniformity. The suns which we before deemed
uniform, as fixed centres, may be found uniform as revolving about some higher and common centre.
The argument from progressive approach, therefore,
would not in itself absolutely establish the vis inertice of
bodies; although it might afford a high degree of probability. *
An argument has been drawn in favor of Christianity,
from the fact that in proportion as nations are enlightened,
their religious views approximate towards Christianity.
The argument in this case differs widely from the preceding, in respect to its subject, and is conclusive. The
cause or principle here is the human Reason. Now, we
conceive of this as uniform and continuous in its action;
i. e, as having fixed laws of action, and as inherently
active. Let it go into action, therefore, and it will act
in the direction of these laws, and continue to act, unless
counteracting and modifying causes are brought in.
Hence, as the Reason is the faculty of perceiving truth,
if we remove all obstructions, and give it its full play and
development, its perceptions must be taken as truth.
That religion, therefore, which the Reason adopts, when
thus developed and unobstructed, must be the true
religion.  And so also we must conclude that those perceptions which follow the progressive development of
Reason, must be perceptions approximating proportionally
towards truth. Now, if it can be shown from the history
of human opinions- the history of philosophy, that these
opinions have approximated regularly towards Christianity
with the progressive development of the Reason, then we
* Supra, p. 231.
444 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
have in this progressive approach the highest internal
evidence of the truth of Christianity. And the evidence
in this case is not a mere induction of facts, whose uniformity enables us, on probable grounds, to proclaim a
general fact; but that of a principle regularly developing
itself, and hasLening on to its certain issue. In this argument for Christianity, we first lay down the necessary
criterion of a true religion, viz. its correspondence with
the Reason truly and fully developed; and, as resulting
from this, the progressive concentration of the human
mind upon certain opinions, in proportion to its development. This forms our major premiss. Then, by historical evidence, and the evidence derived from philosophical
criticism, we establish the fact that Christianity is the
point upon which the human mind, in its progressive
development, thus concentrates. This forms our minor
premiss. The conclusion is then inevitable.
445 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
SECTION VIII.
PROVING BY EXAMPLE.
THE point to be proved is either a principle or a particular fact. If a principle, then the facts which go to establish it, are inducted, and this is nothing more than induction, employed in the order of proof.
If a particular fact, then the establishment of a
principle, although not appearing in the statement, really
intervenes in the mental process, and forms the ground of
the conclusion, in reference to the particular fact. In
both cases, the establishment of the general principle is
the cardinal part of the proof. It may therefore be
termed more appropriately, proving by Induction. This
differs from Inductive Investigation only in the order. In
Inductive Investigation, we begin with the facts, and
advance to the principle.  In Proof by Induction, we first
lay down the principle, or a fact which reposes upon and
presumes the principle, and then we induct the facts, or
examples, to prove it.
It is necessary, however, to recall in this connection
an important distinction, which applies both to inductive
investigation and to inductive proof. In Induction, we
do not bring together facts promiscuously. We make a
selection-we bring together only such facts as have some
connection with each other. They are alike either in form,
time, and place, or in their relations. But, why do we
446 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
bring only such facts together as are alike? I will answer,
by asking another question. Why do we bring facts
together at all? Obviously, to understand or to comprehend them.
But, if we wish merely to understand them by generalizing them under a common name, then we must, of
necessity, observe likeness, and, of course, difference.
And, if we wish to comprehend them by reducing them
under a law, then also must we observe likeness and difference, because our idea of a law, or cause, comprehends
uniformity,-and the uniformity of the effects must be
regarded as an exponent of the law.
When, therefore, we are seeking for a law by Induction, in the order of investigation, or when we are proving
by induction a law already laid down, we follow those
connections of the facts which presume a law.
Now, in inductive investigation, we do not always
succeed in finding the law. We are often compelled, at
least for a time, to stop short with a mere generalization
under a common name, and the announcement of a theory.
The generalization and the theory aid our farther investigations, and may enable us, eventually, to find the law;
but in them we have not arrived at certainty.
So also in the order of proof. The point to be proved
may not be a law, at the conception of which we may not
yet have arrived, but merely a general uniformity, or a
theory. The facts which we bring together are of course
limited, since induction, from its very nature, is never
complete. We are compelled, therefore, to infer the universal from the limited. This is illogical. The inference
must therefore be contingent. It may or may not be.
We apply, next, to the inference, the laws of probability.
What reason have we, in any given case, to infer an
447 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
universal uniformity from a limited observation,-e. g.
from the fact that the sun has risen, at regular intervals,
for five thousand years, what reason have we to infer that
he will always rise at the same intervals, supposing, of
course, that we have as yet ascertained no law of the
planetary movements?   It is because we feel assured
that the uniformity of the facts is the exponent of some
law, although the law be concealed; and upon the authority of law, uniform and continuous, do we infer the uni- -
versal from the limited. The particular and limited facts
are a condition on which a law is conceived of, and then
the inference is imbued with the whole energy, and
stretched to the whole compass of law. But, if the inference thus rests upon the conception of some law, why is
it not always characterized by certainty?
-When the conception is not merely of some law, but
arrives at a particular and certain law, then the inference
is certain,-e. g. when the law of the planetary move
ments is ascertained, then we are physically certain that
the sun will continue to rise at the same intervals. But,
until we have ascertained the particular law, although we
know from the uniformity there must be a law, and
although we may form a. shrewd theory, we cannot be
certain but that the uniformity observed is only a part of
some other and higher uniformity, where the law really
resides, and that this higher uniformity, in its wider cycle,
presents the particular uniformity which we have observed
as only one of a long succession where the facts are uniform under one characteristic for a certain period, and
then change and become uniform under another characteristic, and so on, throughout the whole succession; all the
different uniformities being held together by the law
which penetrates and concentrates all.-e. g. Let an Intelli
448 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
gence, whose existence numbers only a few days, like the
butterfly of the opening summer, have the term of his
being in those beautiful months: from the regular succession of sunshine and soft showers which he observes, he
concludes there must be some law; and taking the observed uniformity as the exponent of that law, he concludes
that the whole succession of climate is made up of sunshine and soft showers. While as yet he knows no particular and certain law of the planetary movements, he
knows not that the uniformity which he observes is only
one of a series of uniformities, under different characteristics, making up the cycle of the seasons: but let him
ascertain the law, and then he at once passes beyond the
narrow sphere of his inductions, and comprehends the
whole succession.
So also, had we not ascertained the law of the planetary movements, our own observation, as well as the observation of five thousand years, could not enable us
certainly to conclude respecting the futuire movements,
inasmuch as the whole five thousand years might be only
one of a succession of uniformities, under different characteristics, and attached to a higher system.
You now clearly perceive the distinction at which we
aim. The distinction between reasoning upon the basis
of a law, or upon the basis of a mere uniformity.
In the first, we infer, or we prove, with certainty. In
the second, our basis is also some law, but a law unknown,
and only theorised, and therefore our conclusions are only
probable.
This is a general statement. There are apparent exceptions; where a limited observation of uniformity seems
to enable us to conclude with certainty to the future and
universal uniformity. Indeed, there are cases where,
449 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
upon a single observation, we thus conclude: e. g. the
fusibility of a substance; the combination of substances
by elective affinity.
Upon such cases we remark:
1. The observation, although limited in the particular
case, is supported by more extended observations in similar or analogous cases.
2. The cases are of such a character that all the possible circumstances and relations that can be of any weight,
are embraced in the observation, though limited both as
to time and space.
3. The cases in which a succession of uniformities is
conceivable, and in which therefore certainty is attainable
only by the discovery of a law, are cases where we take
into consideration not the specific natures or powers, and
susceptibilities of substances, but general and extended
relations in time and space; whereas, in these other cases,
the specific natures or powers, and susceptibilities of substances, are what we particularly take into consideration.
Take the elective affinity of two substances, and apply to
it these principles as an illustration. 1. This is supported
by observations in numerous analogous cases. 2. All the
circumstances of the case, of any weight, are embraced
in our observation. No change of time or place can add
to or take from the completeness. 3. We are considering
only the specific natures of these substances, in no general relation, but simply in relation to each other.
450 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE,
SECTION IX.
REASONING FROM EXPERIENCE.
I. From the present to the past.-This, in the general
statement, is called a posteriori. We wish to ascertain
the past. We take the facts of the present, and, in accounting for them, call up the past. This presumes that
the past is the cause of the present. Regarded, however, more closely, this form of proof presents itself as
follows:
1. The facts of the present are accounted for by
referring them to causes-causes which are also present,
and now acting. But, causes are inherently energetic,
and are uniform; hence, since they existed in the past,
they must have produced effects like those which we now
witness. We thus draw the facts of the past from the
facts of the present, not by assigning the former as the
causes of the latter, but by referring both to common
causes, and then analogically concluding the past from the
present.
Thus we may prove the physical condition of the
ancient world; and, taking human nature as a cause, we
may prove its moral condition.
2. The distinction between moral and physical causes,
and between moral and physical certainty, must be borne
in mind. The former brings in the consideration of free
will, in connection with a vast variety of moral character,
451 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
and therefore gives birth to a vast variety of results,
while the latter is fixed and precise.
The physical condition of the ancient world, it is not
difficult to determine on well known and uniform general
principles. But, in order to determine the moral condition with any precision, we need data from history. There
is indeed a reciprocal action between history and general
moral principles, in reasoning: the latter often serving to
determine points of history otherwise doubtful; the
former supplying, leading, and determining facts to the
latter.
3. Laws have often a gradual, instead of an immediate
development. Thus a law, in order to complete its cycle,
may require ages. This appears in Geology and Astronomy, and in Politics and Philosophy.
Now, if we can ascertain that given and present facts
are a part of such a development, gradual and progressive,
then we have at once a chain by which we can a posteriori
ascend to the past as well as a'd priori descend to the
future.
II. From the present to the future.-Our present experience is connected with causes. If these causes are
known, on the uniformity of law, we predict the future.
The distinction between moral and physical causes,
and between moral and physical certainty above referred
to, is of equal importance here. On laws gradually
developing, no additional remarks are necessary.
The above proceeds on the supposition that we have
ascertained Laws. In many instances, however, we may
proceed merely on an uniformity more or less extensive.
The distinction given under Reasoning from Example
will apply here also, viz. That when we reason upon the
basis of mere uniformity, generally, our conclusions are
452 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
only probable: but when we reason upon the basis of a
law clearly ascertained, our conclusions are certain, morally
or physically, as the case may be.
Those instances where we reason to a past and a
future, uniformity upon a single experiment, or a very
limited experience, —e. g. the fusibility of a substancehave already been considered.
453 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
SECTION X.
REASONING FROM RESEMBLANCE AND ANALOGY.
RESEMBLANCE is defined as agreement in certain points,
and is thus distinguished from identity, which is universal
agreement, and excludes difference. Other things being
equal, the more numerous the points of agreement, the
closer the resemblance. Some points, however, are more
important than others. Agreement in a few important
points constitutes a closer likeness than agreement in a
multitude of unimportant or trifling points.
Resemblance is of two general kinds: First, Resemblance in properties. Secondly, Resemblance in relations.
Now, in reasoning from resemblance, we must of course
reason either from the resemblance of properties or of
relations. The first is called reasoning from direct or
simple resemblance. The second, reasoning from analogy.
In reasoning from resemblance, there are two terms.
In reasoning from analogy, there are three or four terms,
and two relations.
I. Direct Resemblance.-The object in this case is to
determine particulars of resemblance unknown to exist,
from known particulars; i. e. From known corresponding
properties, to reason to others which are unknown. One
property in a subject is seen to involve another, either
on the ground of uniform sequence or of law. Hence we
infer the agreement of two terms in properties, which are
454 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
involved in those which are known to exist. The reason ing is a' priori, when the unknown property holds to the
known, the relation of consequent to antecedent; and,
vice versa, the reasoning is a posteriori.
The probability of the reasoning obviously must be
determined by the nature of the connection between the
known and unknown; if it be a connection of mere stated
uniformity, the reasoning is generally only probable; if
it be a connection of law, the reasoning is certain. Caesar
and Buonaparte resemble each other in certain properties
-ambition, &c.  But ambition can be shown to involve
the love of supreme power, and the love of supreme power
involves attempts to gain the supremacy, if the time and
opportunity be auspicious: hence, Caesar and Buonaparte
may have the consequential points of resemblance, inas much as they have  the quality which involves  them.
Ths is a' piori; and the conclusion morally certain.
In arguing that the planets are inhabited, from their
resemblance  to this world,  we proceed  a posteriori.
From like provisions for social existence, we infer social
existence. We argue here to the motive or design. This
likewise is morally certain.
II. Indirect Resenmblance or A4nalogy.
1. Where there are two terms related to a common
third, we may call the two relations a common relation,
inasmuch as the common third is a cause of both, or at
least a uniform antecedent of both. In this case, when
the analogy is granted, and we reason from particulars of
one relation, or of one member of the common relation
to particulars of the other, our reasoning is probable or
certain; In t7he first place, according to the nature of the
connection  between  the common  third and the two
related terms: if it be only a connection of uniform
455
4 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
sequents, the reasoning is generally only probable; if of
Law, the reasoning is certain.
The reasoning is probable or certain in the second
place, according to the nature of the particulars from
which we reason: if they are particulars necessarily comprehended in the third term, the reasoning is certain: if
they be merely circumstantial, the reasoning will be
probable, according to the degree of uniformity. When
the third term is merely a uniform antecedent, and the
particulars of the relation likewise only circumstantial,
with more or less of uniformity, we shall have the case of
a probability of a probability.
When the analogy is to be proved from the resembling
particulars, we have substantially a case of simple a
posteriori reasoning. Each set of particulars is shown to
demand the common third as an antecedent. The principles, therefore, which apply to a' posteriori reasoning in
general will apply to this case.
2. Where there are four terms and two distinct, but
resembling relations.
What constitutes the analogy? The resembling relations? But this resemblance may be accidental. It
must be at least a uniform resemblance, therefore, that
constitutes the analogy. The particulars in one relation
must uniformly resemble the particulars in the other
relation. But this uniformity is an exponent of some
law. Whatever conclusion is drawn, therefore, must rest
upon this law as certainly ascertained, or as existing only
in theory, and accordingly will be a conclusion certain or
probable.
Now, this law must comprehend both relations, because
it explains the uniformity of the resemblance between
the two relations. But are not these relations themselves
456 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENC]E.
relations of antecedent and consequent, as respects the
two terms respectively, comprehended by some higher and
common term? It is even so. The two terms on either
side of the analogy are related as antecedent and conse quent; and then their relations exhibit resemblances
which must be referred to a higher law comprehending
and penetrating both; e. g. The seed of a plant, and the
egg of a fowl. The plant is in some sense the cause of
the seed-and the fowl in some sense the cause of the
egg. The two terms on either side have very slight direct
resemblances. And the two relations do not resemble
each other merely in being relations of cause and effect,
for they resemble a multitude of relations in the same
way. But the point to be nicely and strictly observed is,
that these two relations have particulars of resemblance
beyond their- general agreement with each other, and with
all other relations of cause and effect. What is this
agreement? It is this. The egg and the seed, besides
being effects the one of the fowl, the other of the plant,
contain alike the principle of generative lij/. Now, when
we reason from one to the other, we reason on the basis of
this common principle. Whatever particulars are necessarily comprehended in the action.of this principle, and
developed as such on one side of the analogy, may be concluded as likewise existing on the other side.
If the principle be only in theory, then the reasoning
cannot advance beyond probability. If the particulars
have only a uniform, and not a necessary connection, to
our perception, with the principle, the reasoning here
likewise is only probable. If both the preceding concur
in a given case, we have only a probability of a probability.
Not unfrequently in this kind of analogy the great
457
~o 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
object of the reasoning is to establish the analogy itself;
i e., Four terms being given, and two ternms respectively
being related each to each, constituting two relations, the
object of the reasoning is to bring these relations under a
common principle.  This may be done 4 priori, by showing that a principle exists which necessarily or probably
comprehends these relations; or, 4a posteriori, by showing that there are particulars of resemblance in these
relations which probably or certainly require the principle
to account for them.
This analogy thus established, as we have before shown,
becomes a general principle to these relations and forms
the basis of deductions. We have an illustration of this
in an argument adduced by phrenologists.
There is an obvious connection between the governing
and specific propensities of animals and their physical
structure: thus carnivorous animals may be distinguished
from graminivorous-the lion from the ox.
There is a connection likewise between the intellect
of man and his physical structure. His senses and his
brain are unquestionably connected with the development
of his intellect.
Now the object of the reasoning is to establish an
analogy; i. e., That the relations on either side are comprehended by the same principle or law. This, if established at all, must be established either 4 priori or 4 posteriori. If a priori, then we must find some principle or
law actually existing which comprehends these relations
necessarily, or at least probably. Is there any such principle? They are bound to show it. I cannot perceive
any.  If a posteriori, then we must find such particulars
of resemblance in the two relations as demand necessarily,
or at least probably, a common principle to account fobr
458 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
them. Are there such particulars of resemblance? Let
us see. In the first relation; i. e., between the animal
propensities and physical structure, we perceive that the
propensities have reference to ends which can be accom plished only by a physical structure directly adapted to
them. The thirst for blood demands the teeth and paws
of. the lion and tiger; palpably the nature cannot'be complete without these instruments. But are there any like
particulars in the relation between the intellect of man
and his senses, brain and skull, &c.? The senses and
brain are indeed conditional to the exercise of thought;
but are they the instruments of thought?   Can it be
shown that the senses and brain are to the intellect, what
the teeth and paws are to the propensity for prey? Can
it be shown from any particulars in this relation, that any
power of the mind requires a portion of the brain as its
instrument for accomplishing its end, just as the beast
palpably requires the strong jaws with all their furniture,
and the muscular legs and paws!
The relation between the intellect and the brain and
senses, contains no such particulars as the relation between
the animal propensities and the instruments which are
necessary to accomplish their ends.  Hence we cannot infer
that they come under the same law-hence we cannot
reason from one to the other.
A beautiful and familiar analogy, and one which aptly
illustrates analogy consisting of four terms, is that between
the human being at death and insect metamorphoses.
Here are the two relations, of the human being to death,
and of the caterpillar to its chrysalis.  In the latter case
we see the whole process, a dissolution of the caterpillar,
and the infolded germ of a higher being reposing for a
time within the chrysalis and there preparing for its new
459
I 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
form of life, and, when the hour arrives, bursting from
its shell a winged and gorgeous psyche, dwelling in the
sunbeams and feeding upon the aroma of flowers.   In
like manner the human being lies down to die; but in
this last case we do not see the whole process,-we cannot
by the microscope discover the wings of the immortal
form infolded in the "mortal coil;" nor do we see the
struggling psyche after it has burst its shell. The analogy,
therefore, does not present us many resembling circumstances in the two relations compared. But, nevertheless,
there are some points very striking. The death of the
caterpillar is not the extinction of the organific Life
within-that survives. And yet he who first witnessed
this metamorphosis, when he saw the worm die, and the
chrysalis formed, must have concluded that Nature in her
sportive and beautiful fancy had only given the frail and
insignificant creature a golden  tomb.    But  when  he
looked again, he saw a bright and spirit-like creature
struggling into a nobler life. We see thus, in Nature, an
apparent death only the precursor of another and  a
hiTherform of life.  Now take the human being, with all
his sublime capacities-capacities admitting of indefinite
improvement-and with'his actual conceptions of, and
longings after immortality, and does it not seem 4 priori,
a fit and reasonable thing that he should live again when
he appears to die? And if any should object to the conclusion, that all the circumstances of dissolution ought
to lead to a contrary induction, then we may reason from
the analogy of the butterfly, that in Nature an apparent
death is but the process through which a new and more
perfect form of life is produced.
The use of the analogy here is not to prove the
doctrine of immortality, but to answer an objection to it.
460 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
The principle which comprehends both relations is that of
LIFE, not as the product of organization, but as itself the
organific power. To this we may add the fitness and
harmony of the Divine design.
The above exposition of reasoning from Resemblance
and Analogy, suggests the following rules for conducting
this reasoning
First. Be careful to distinguish between direct resemblance and the resemblance of relations, and between the
analogy of three and that of four terms.
Secondly. Distinguish between important and unimportant resemblances. Those are unimportant which are
merely accidental. Every degree of uniformity claims a
corresponding degree of attention, because uniformity is
an exponent of law. Those resemblances which stand directly and unquestionably connected with law, are the
most important.
Thirdly.  Another rule commonly given is, not to
carry out our comparison of the terms or relations to too
many resemblances.
The resemblances evidently cannot be too numerous
if they all be important. This rule contemplates substantially the same point as the preceding. A comparison
is always carried out too far when it is carried out to unimportant points of resemblance.
461 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
SECTION XI.
DEMONSTRATIVE PROOF.
IN noticing the application of the Deductive Fornmula,*:  I
drew illustrations from Geometry. Geometry then is Deduction. But it is Demonstrative Proof also. The principles are the same-the process of reasoning the same.
The only distinction lies in the order of proof and the order of investigation already noticed.t He who first constructed Geometry proceeded of necessity according to the
latter order. Now, that it is constructed, the learner proceeds according to the former.
Indeed, where we lay down a proposition, and then
give the demonstration, we evidently only annomince beforehand the conclusion at which we are to arrive; and this
we are enabled to do, because in a previous investigation,
this proposition was found to be the conclusion of the very
chain of premises, or the sorites, which we now call the
demonstration.
Demonstrative proof applies to all subjects where our
deductions can be made from absolute principles.
* Supra, p. 370.
462
t Suprra, p. 403. 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
SECTION XII.
CALCULATION OF PROBABILITIES AND CHANCES
THE calculation of probabilities, is generally called the
calculation of chances, but improperly. Let us try to distinguish them. I have already defined the probable as
implying, both, that a certain amount of proof has already
been obtained for a given proposition, and that still more
is required for complete certainty. The possible, in distinction from this, exists where no proof has actually been
obtained, but where the proposition is of such a nature as
to admit of proof.*
Now, a proposition, while in the state of progressive
proof, shows probabilities on either hand. It is here that
a calculation is required, viz.: a calculation of the opposing probabilities, so as to determine the ratio of probability for the proposition in question;
Now, on the other hand, the calculation of chances
would be the calculation of possibilities, or rather of presumptions founded upon possibility. We have shown
above,t that where a presumption is said to lie in favor
of any proposition, there is always some principle which,
in reality, determines it. Some natural right claims to be
respected until positive reasons be given why it should be
set aside; or the sanctions of time and usage surround
* Supra, Section IV.
463
t Ibid. 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
the disputed point, and claim to hold it, until a higher
authority be adduced. Now, here is something of the
nature of probability. The fact that I am in possession
of an estate, is proof that I am the owner, until my right
is invalidated: and the fact of the existence of any institution, is proof in its favor, until it be proved to have had
its origin in fraud or violence. Presumption may therefore be called the lowest degree of probability, as moral
certainty is sometimes called the highest degree.
A calculation of pure possibilities, or chances, is impracticable, because there are no data.   In pure possibilities, all the terms are equally improbable, or without
proof, and hence there is no calculation by which one result may be shown to be more likely than another. For
example, in the cast of a die there are six possibilities,
and yet any one side is improbable, for no reason can be
assigned why it, in particular, should come up: there indeed is a reason lying in the position of the die,-the
manner in which it is thrown-giving it just such a direction, and such a degree of force; but it is unascertainable.
It may indeed be said that the probability in favor of a
particular side is one-sixth, because there are six sides to
the die; but this is not true, since it is possible that the
same side might come up successively many times.
What is called the calculation of chances, therefore,
is really the calculation of probabilities, either as probabilities simply, or under that form which we have termed
presumptions.   There are always data-something given
upon which we may base our calculations. This is amply
illustrated in insurance upon life and property. The term
of human life, under different climates, in different employments, and, taking as a point of departure, different
ages, has been made the subject of very extensive obser
464 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
vations, by which data have been accumulated sufficient
to enable us to calculate the probable number of years
still remaining to any individual, so as to affix to it a definite commercial value. The rates of insurance on houses
and ships are determined upon data acquired in the same
way. Here there is no chance or mere possibility, but
tangible proof. It is true, indeed, that the results calculated, may, in particular instances, fail of being attained; but this obviously arises from the fact, that our
data are necessarily limited, embracing only the more general and striking circumstances of the risks of human life,
by disease and accident, and of houses and ships, by fire
and tempests. We have not, in respect to these, determined any absolute law, nor even any stated and fixed sequences, for then we should have certainty; we have
only arrived- at certain aggregate sequences and a complexity of influences and laws, where we are liable to the
introduction of some new influence or law which may
change the whole state of things. And this is the reason
why the process is called a calculation of chances, since
men are accustomed, in common parlance, to call that
chance which happens unexpectedly; and we are here
calculating particular results in opposition to possible fortuities. Or, perhaps, a juster representation is, that presuming an end, we calculate the risks-in other words,
the probabilities, that it will not take place.
Indeed, there are just two orders in which the proof
may proceed: First. We may consider what antecedents
may exist in relation to a particular consequent, and which
of them is most likely to produce it. Secondly. The consequent may be one in whose favor the presumption lies,
so that the burden of proof rests with him who would dis
20*
465 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
pute it. In this case, probabilities are to be arrayed
against the consequent.
Under the first order there are obviously three possible
cases:
1. The several possible antecedents may not differ as
to the probability of their existence, but they may differ
as to the probability with which each one claims to be the
actual antecedent.   In this case, the ratio to be determined respects the immediate connection of antecedent
and consequent.
2. The antecedents may not differ as to the probability
of their actual antecedence, but, as to the probability of
their existence. Here the ratio to be determined respects
the antecedents themselves, and not their connection with
the consequent.
3. The antecedents may differ in both respects.  In
this case, the ratio of the probabilities will be as the product of the probabilities of the existence, and of the actual antecedence of the one, to the products of the same
probabilities of the other; i. e. the ratio of a probability
of a probability to a probability of a probability: e.g. suppose the probabilities of existence be as 5: 6, and the probabilities of actual antecedence as 3: 4, then the resultant
probability will be as 5: 8.
Under the second order, the same cases must occur.
This is the order of proof in insurances. The presumption
is always in favor of life and property; for the propagation and sustentation of human beings, and the accumulation and preservation of property, is the fixed and predominant order of things. He who insures them, can lose
only by their being lost. He therefore, under the given
circumstances, must calculate the probabilities, that antecedents exist which may occasion this loss; and if this be
466 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE.
granted, or rendered probable, then he must calculate the
ratio of the probabilities of the several antecedents.
There are cases which appear at first entirely fortuitous, but which afterwards are invested with probability,
through data acquired by sheer empiricism: e. g. nothing
appears more fortuitous than the casting of a particular
side of a die; and yet, by casting the die a great many
times, it has been found that a particular side returns with
a considerable degree of exactness, according to a certain
ratio.
We have not attempted, in this place, any thing like
a full explanation of the calculation of probabilities; for
this would lead us into the domain of Mathematics. We
have only aimed to state the leading principles as they
stand connected with the Doctrine of Evidence.
THE END.
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From C. S. HENRY, Professor of Philsosophy, History, and Belles-Lettres, in the
University of the City of New York.
Reid's Dictionary of the English Language is an admirable book fox the use of
schools. Its plan combines a greater number of desirable conditions for such a work,
than any with which I am acquainted; and it seems to me to be executed in general
with great judgment, fidelity, and accuracy."
From HENRY REED, Professor of English Literature in the University of Pennsyl                                vania.
"Reid's Dictionary of the English Langerage appears to have been compiled upon
sound principles, and with judgment and accuracy. It has the merit, too, of combining
much more than is usually looked for in dictionaries ~f small size, and will, I believe,
be found excellept as a convenient manual for general reference, and also for vpiou
purposes of education."
GRAHAM'S ENGLISH SYNONYMS,
CLASSIFIED AND EXPLAINED;
WITH PRACTICAL EXERCISES.  DESIGNED FOR SCHOOLS AND PRIVATE TUSION
WITfl AN INTRODUCTION AND ILLUSTRATIVE AUTHORITIES.
BY HENRY REED, LL D.
1 Vol. 12mo. Price $1 00.
This is one of the best books published in the department of lan
guage, and will do much to arrest the evil of making too eommon use
of inappropriate words. The work is well arranged for classes, and
can be made a branch of common school study.
It is admirably arranged. The Synonyms are treated with reference
to their character, as generic and specific; as active and passive; a
positive and negative; and as miscellaneous synonyms.
16 
D. APPLETON' CO., PUBLIStiERS.
HAND-BOOK OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
BY  G. R. LATHAM, M.D., F. R. S.
12mo.   400 pages.   Price $1 25.
This work is designed for the use of students in thei University annd
ITligh Schools.
"His work is rigidly scientific, and hence possesses a rare value.  With the wiede
spreading growth of the Anglo-Saxon dialect, the immense present and prospective
power of those with whom this is their' mother tongue.' such a treatise must be counted
alike interesting and usefill."- iVlitch,man and Reflector.
"A work of great research, mnich learning, and to every thinking scholar it will be a
olok of study.  The Germanic origin of the English language, the affinities of the Eng
ish with other languages, a sketch of the alphabet, a minute investigation of the etymoogy of the language, &c., of great value to every philologist"-Observer.
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE.
BY WILLIAM SPALDING, A. M.
ROFsOR OF LOGIC, RHETORIO, AND METAPIIYSIOS, IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS
12m.o.  413 pages.  Price $1 00.
The above work, which is just published, is offered as a Text-book
for the use of advanced Schools and Academies. It traces the literary
progress of the nation from its dawn in Anglo-Saxon times, down to
the present day. Commencing at this early period, it is so constructed
as to introduce the reader gradually ard.easily to studies of this kind.
Comparatively little speculation is presented, and those literary monuments of the earlier dates, which were thought most worthy of atten
tion, are described with considerable fulness and in an attractive
manner. In the subsequent pages, more frequent and sustained efforts
are made to alouse reflection, both by occasional remarks on the relations betweep intellectual culture and the other elements of society,
and by hints as to the theoretical laws on which criticism should be
founded. The characteristics of the most celebrated modern works are
analyzed at considerable length.
The manner of the author is remarkably plain and interesting,
almost compelling the reader to linger over his pages with unwearied
attention.
17 
D. APPLETON & CO., PUBLISHERS.
THE WORLD IN THE MIDDLE AGES.
AN HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY, with accounts of the origin and devel
opment, the institutions and literature, the manners and customs oi
the nations in Europe, Western Asia, and Northern Africa, from the
lose  of the Fourth to the middle of the Fifteenth Century;  acconspa      nied by complete Historical and Geographical indexes. By ADOLPrus
KmPEN, Professor of History, Greek, and German Literature in Frank     lin and Marshall College. 2 volumes, 12mo. 850 pages. Price $2.
ACCOMPANIED BY
AN HISTORICO-GEOGRAPHICAL ATLAS OF THE MIDDLE AGES.
Containing a Series of six General Maps, delineating the migration of the
Northern and Eastern nations, together with the States arising firom
their fusion with the ancient Roman  Empire in Europe, Western Asia,
and Northern Africa, from the close of the Fourth to the middle of the
Fifteenth  century.   Published from  the great  HISTORICO-GEOoGRAPHICAL
HAND-ATLAS  of CHARLES SPRUNER,  LL.D., Major  of Engineers  in the
Kingdom of Bavaria.   With a CONCISE EXPLANATORY DEsCRITION.   Folio.
Price, $2 50.
THE SAME WORK. 1 volume, folio, 232 pp., containing the Historical
Geography and the Atlas complete. Price $4 50.
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been felt by every student of history."-Evening Post.
'One of the most valuable contributions of the day to American literature.  It reflects
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"This work is one of a very high character, and is replete with valuable information."Phila. Inquirer.
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"A more valuable or important aid to historical reading and study has never appeared.". Y. Churchman.
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given to the public."-Prot. Ciurchman.
"The importance of this work is evident at a glance, and the extensive attainments and
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~' It is distinguished by great method, faithful research, and concise style. We have seldom met so much historical information so ably condensed.,"-Hartford Cobrant.
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subject.  Its arrangement is excellent, and its lucid descriptions and the ease with which it
can be consulted, must make it an indispensable book of reference.!'-Traveller.
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"This work evinces great and laborious researches on the part of the author, as well as a
indicious, succinct, and careful arrangement of his materials, and supplies a great desideratumn
in the study of history."-Boston Atlas.
"'his -ork will be found exceedingly valuable, not only for general reading, but as a textok ir ail our nigher institutions."-NV. Y. Observer.
53 
D. APPLETON & CO., PUBLISHERS.
ADVANCED C OURSE
OF
COMPOSITION AND RHETORIC
A Series of Practical Lessons  on  the  Origin,  History,  and Peculiarities
of the English Language, Punctuation, Taste, the Pleasures of the
Imagination, Figures, Style and its Essential Properties, Criticism, and
the various departments of Prose and Poetical Composition; illustrated
with Copious Exercises. By G. P. QUACKENBOS A. M. 1 vol. 12mo.
450 pages. Price $1 00.
The title of this work fully sets forth its scope and character. It is an
eminetly clear and practical text-book, and embraces a variety of important
subjects, which  have  a common  connection, and mutually illustrate each
other; but which the pupil has heretofore been obliged to leave unlearned,
or to search for among a number of different volumes. Claiming to give a
comprehensive and practical view of our language in all its relations, this
"Advanced Course" views it as a whole, no less than with  referenca to
the individual words composing it; shows how it compares with other
tongues, modern and ancient; points out its beauties; indicates how they
may best be made available; and, in a word, teaches the student the most
philosophical method of digesting and arranging his thoughts, as well as
the most correct and effective mode of expressing them.
Few works have received such unqualified commendations from the
press and the public.
"We think this an excellent treatise; excellent both for self-instruction and for the use ol
schools.  We are not familiar with any work of a similar character that is equally accurate and comprehensive."-N.  Y. Conm. Adv.
"It is admirably adapted to self-instruction as well as for the use of schools and colleges."N  Y. Daily Times.
"A carefully prepared and thorough educational text-book by an accomplished teacher "N.Y. Tribune.
"A skilfully prepared manual, clear and practical throughout."-ClChurchman.
"Prof. Quackenbos is well known as the author of numerous works of high standing In the
department to which the "Course of Composition" belongs.  The present work is thorough
in its treatment, and excellently arranged."-Southern Lit. Mfessenger.
"The pupil who studies this book, under the tutoring of a capable instructor, cannot fail
to become an efficient English   scholar."-Leldger, Lancaster, S. C.
GRAHAM'S ENGLISH SYNONYMES,
Classified and explained with Practical Exercises, designed for schools and
private tuition; with an introduction and illustrative authorities. By
HENRY REED, LL.I). 1 vol. 12mo. Price $1 00.
This is one of the best books published in the department of language,
gnd will do much to arrest the evil of making too common use of inappropriate words.  The work is well arranged for classes, and can be made a
branch of common school study.
The Synonymes are treated with reference to their character, as generic
and specific; as active and passive; as positive and negative; and as miscel
laneous synonvmes.
54 
D. APPLETON & CO., PUBLISHERS.
GILLESPIE'S LAND-SURIVEYING;
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL.
By W. M. GILLESPIE, A. M., C. E., Professor of Civil Engineering in Union
College; Author of  "Manual of Roads  and, Railways," &c.   1 vol. 8Svo.
400  pages.   With  four hundred  engravings,  and  a MAP  showing  the
Variation of the Needle in the United States.   (Nearly ready.)
This is the most complete, and, at the same time, fundamental work on
his subject ever published in any country. Among its leading peculiarities
e these:   1. ALL the operations of surveying are developed from onlyflve simple principles.
2. A complete system of surveying with only a chain, a rope, or any substitute, is fully
explained.
8. Means of measuring inaccessible distances, in all possible cases, with the chain along
are given in great variety, so as to constitute a Land Geometry. It occupies 26 pages, with
58 figures.
4. The Rectangular method of Compass-surveying is greatly simplified.
5. The Traverse Tables gives increased accuracy in one fifteenth of the space of tbe usual
tables.
6. The effect of the changes in the variation of the needle, on the re-survey of old lines, X
minutely illustrated.
7. Correct tables of the times of elongation of the North Star are given; those in common
use being in some cases nearly half-an-hour out of the way.
8. The adjustment of the engineer's Transit and Theodolite are here, for the first time,
fully developed.
9. Methods of avoiding obstacles in angular surveying. Occupy 24 pages, with 85 figures.
10 Topographical Mapping is fully described with illustrations.
11. LEaying out, Parting off, and Dividing up Land, are very fully explained, and illustrated
by fifty figures.
12. The most recent improvements in the methods of Surveying the Public Lands of the
United States, with the methods used for making "corners," are minutely described from
official authorities.
A double object has been kept in view in the preparation of the volume; viz, to make an
introductory treatise easy to be mastered by the young scholar or the practical man of little
previous acquirements, the only pre-requisites being Arithmetic and a little Geometry; and,
at the same time, to make the instruction of such a character as to lay a foundation broad
enough and deep enough for the most complete superstructure which the professional student
may subsequently wish to raise upon it.
The volume is divided as follows:  PART I. General Principles and Fundamental  Operations.-II.  Chain  Surveying-III.
Compass Surveying.-IV. Transit and Theodolite Surveying.-V.  Trigonometrical  Surveying.-VI. Tri-linear Surveying.-VILI. Obstacles in Angular Surveying-VIII.  Plane Table
Surveying.-IX. Surveying without Instruments.-X. Mapping.-XL  Laying out, Parting
off, and Dividing up Lands.-XII. United States' Public Lands.
APPENDIX.-A. Synopsis of Plane Trigonometry.-B. Demonstrations of Problems.-C.
Levelling.
TABLES.-Chords for Platting-Latitudes and Departures.
FIELD-BOOK FOR RAIL ROAD ENGINEERS
By JOHN B. HENCK. Civil Engineer.   One volume, with fifty eight Diagrama
pocket-book form, $1 75.
Containing Formulie for laying out Simple, Reversed, and Compound Curves, Paraboli,
Curves, Vertical Curves, Determining Frog Angles and Radii of''urnouts and Crossings, Lev
elling, Setting Slope Stakes, Elevating Outer Rail on Curves, Curving Rails, &c., &c.; togethei
v, ith many Miscellaneous Problems, and a New System of Earth-work.  Also, Tables of Radii
Ordinates, Chord and Tangent Deflections, Ordinates for Curving Rails, Long Chords, Elev&
tion of Outer Rail, Frog Angles, Properties of Materials, Magnetic Variations, Squares, Cube4
Square Roots and Cube Roots, Logarithms of Number, Logarithmic Sines, Cosines, Tangent$
and Cotangents, Natural Sines and Cosines, Natural Tangents and Cotangents, lRise per mile of
Grades.&                                      55
55 
D. APPLETON & CO., PUBLISHERS.
ANALYTICAL CLASS-BOOK OF BOTANY.
BY FRANCIS H. GREENE.
PART I.-ELE,MENTS OF VEGETABLE STRaUCTURE AND PHYSIOLOGY.   PART II.    SYSTEMATIC BOTANY. To which is added a Compendious Flora of tile
Northern States; with descriptions of more than 1000 different species.
Beautifully illustrated quarto. 1 vol. Price $1 50.
PRIMARY CLASS-BOOK OF BOTANY. Composed from First Part of
the Analytical Class-Book, and designed for the use of common schoo]l
and families. Illustrated quarto. Price 75 cents.
Extract fromt the Author's Preface.
"Having been for several years a Teacher of Botany, I have had considerable opportunity of experimenting on the happiest means of imparting
this delightful science. The importance of Pictorial Illustrations, systematically combined for regular exercises, early suggested itself. A new svstem
of teaching was thence wrought out, consisting of a set of diagrams nlmade to
illustrate Oral Lessons; and the plan was eminently successful. Those
Lessons and Diagrams are reproduced in the present work, with such extension and improvements as the written form, and the superior light and progress of the times, admit and demand.  ThIe illustrations are presented to
the eye in large groups, and are either immediately, or very nearly, associated with the corresponding portions of the Text. They are designed to be
used as regular exercises for study and recitation, tihe same as maps in Geography. They are, in fact, but a recapitulation of the text in another formand thus, while they repeat the idea, they also give a pleasing variety to
the lessons; and appealing from the eye to the mind, and the reverse, they
awaken the imost lively associations, tending to fix the impressions in the
memory."
THE ELEMENTS OF AGRICULTURE.
A book for young farmers, with questions prepared for the use of schools.
By GEORGE E. WARING, JR., Consulting Agriculturist. 12nmo. 288 pages.
Price 75 cents.
This is the latest publication on this subject, and all who have seen it
concede that for simplicity, terseness, and practical usefulness, it is the best
work on agriculture  which  has yet been written.   No farmer  or horticul
turist should be without it. The Legislatuire of Vermont, at its recent ses
sion, authorized the purchase by the St,,te of a sufficient number of copies t,
~ecuie a full attention toward  it, and made  provision for its general intro
juction into evely town and district school under its supervision.
Opizions of the Press.
"This is the work of a young student and farmer in the neighborhood of our city.  An
we defy any man or boy who can read the plainest English to run through this little volum,
without gaining from it a clearer, more consistent, more exalted idea of agriculture as a pur
suit, as well as a science, than he previously entertained. We fervently wish that it could
speedily find a place, not only in every school library but in every cottage in the land; for we
are sure its perusal would make farmers of many who are now sweltering and starving in cities,
and good farmers who are now afflicting the soil only because they must do so or famish."N.Y. Tribune.
"It is just what is needed in every town where a ten-acre lot is cultivated.'-N. Y. Timu
56
I 
1). APPLETON & CO., PUBLISHERS.
NEW AND COMPLETE SYSTEMATIC SERIES
OF
SCHOOL GEOGRAPHIES
By S. S. CORNELL IN THREE PARTS.
Each book being arranged on the same plan, and with special reference
to the wants and capacities of the class, or grade of scholarship for which it
is designed, the series is progressive and philosophical in its nature, and
practical in its operation.
CORNELL'S PRIMARY GEOGRAPHY.
SMALL QUARTO.   PRICE  50 CENTS.
One of the leading objects in the preparation of this work, was to make
it in every sense of the word what its title indicates, a "Primary Geography;" consequently only those branches of Geographical Science that admit of
being brought fully within the comprehension of the youthful beginner, have
been introduced into the present number of the series.
The youthful student is put in possession of a simple and easy method of memorizing the
contents of a map, by means of a carefully systematized set of questions.
The MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS ACCORD STRICTLY WITH THE CHARACTER OF THE LESSONS,
each map containing all that is taught in its accompanying lessons-and nothing more.
The work is illustrated by upwards of seventy suggestive designs, exquisitely drawn and
engraved( FOR TIIS BOOK.
The laps, twelve in number, are large, clear, and pleasing to the eye.
At desirable intervals, there is a systematic arrangement of promiscuous questions, designed
as a review of preceding lessons, by which teachers, parents, trustees, and others, may satisfactorily ascertain, at any stage of the pupil's advancement, what he knows of the science.
A PRONOUNCING VOCABULARY, containing the names of all the natural and political divisions used throughout the work, is appended.
The mechanical execution of the work is equal or superior to that of any other school-book
extant.
CORNELL'S INTERMEDIATE GEOGRAPHY
IS IN PRESS, AND WILL APPEAR AT AN EARLY DAY.
This book clearly explains the terms used in the Physical, Political, an( Mathematical
branches of the science, and contains a judiciously selected and carefully systematized amount
of Descriptive Geography.
It is also supplied with numerous appropriate and beautiful maps, and illustrated by a large
number of well-executed wood-cuts, comprising views of places, etc., never before presented
in any school work on the subject
CORNELL'S HIGH SCHOOL GEOGRAPHY AND
COMPANION ATLAS
ARE IN PRESS AND WILL SHORTLY APPEAR.
The Geography is arranged for the pupils of advanced classes in Public and Private
Schools. It has been prepared with much care to meet the requirements of the present
age. Countries to which political change, or the progress of civilization, or the march of
enterprise, has given new or increased interest, have been brought prominently forward, and
their social and political condition described from the most recent information and the most
"eliable sources.  This book is also ornamented with numerous useful and interesting woodcuts, executed in the highest style of the engraver's art.
The Atlas contains numerous large and elegant Maps, which oombine, in a high degree,
accuracy with beauty of execution.
57 
D. APPLETON & CO., PUBLISHERS.
HAND-BOOK OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE.
A HAND-BOOK OF ANGLO-SAXON ROOT-WORDS. 12mo. Price 50 ets.
A HAND-BOOK OF ANGLO-SAXON DERIVATIVES. 12mo. Price 75 cents
A HAND-BOOK OF THE ENGRAFTED WORDS OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE. 12mo. Price $1 00.
BY A LITERARY ASSOCIATION.
The following statement will enable the reader to see at once the merits and peculiarities of
the Hand-Book.
The English language consists of some eighty t,housand words, drawn from the five principal sources, viz.: from the Anglo-Saxon, Celtic, Gothic, French, and Latin and Greek, or
Classic languages.  Twenty-three thousand of these words are from the Anglo-Saxon.  The
whole twventy-three thousand words may be traced back to one thousand root-words. The
twoenty-two thousand have been formed by adding one or more root-words, or parts of them,
together. ilere are now of these twenty-three thousand Anglo-Saxon words, only some six
or seven thousand in good use. The remaining fifty- seven thousand words of the language,
may also be traced back to a few thousand root-words in the languages from which they have
been borrcowed.
Every child should be early taught the whole six or seven thousand choice Anglo-Saxon
words, because they are those continually used in the various occupations of life.  Fe;, scholars
can use more than six thousand of the words drawn from Celtic, Gothic, French, ad Classic
sources. But there is no reason why every pupil in our public schools should not be able also
to use them. Indeed, the three Hand-Books are so arranged that the six thousand choice
Anglo-Saxon words, and the six thousand choice words from other sources, may be acquired
asily inr one year.
But to teach the English language successfully, the teacher should have clearly before his
own mind, its origin, growth, elements, or sources of formation,  gramnmatical structure,
general history, and literatture. The following synopsis throws light upon the English
language.
I. Its origin. In 450 after Christ, the Angles and Saxons introduced into Great Britain
the Anglo-Saxon language, which is the mother tongue of the present English.
II. Its growth. The root-words of the Anglo-Saxon, which are few, have grown into
twenty-three thousand by the use of some eighteen prefixes, and twenty-five suffixes.   Six or
seven thousand only of these are now in good use.  Again some fifty-seven thousand words
have been introduced into it from several sources, but chiefly from the Celtic, Gothic, French,
and Classic tongues.  It embraces, in all, some eighty thousand words.
IlL Itsperiods of growth.  About 450 B. C., the Anglo-Saxon words were introduced
into Britain; prior to 600, many Celtic words; before the end of the ninth century, many
Gothic words; and at 1066, French words were intermixed; and since the revival of letters,
in the fifteenth century, a large number of Greek and Latin words have been incorporated with it.
IV. Its grammatical laws and history. The Anglo-Saxon or root element, not only
modifiea the words from the other languages, but gave them its own laws.  Hience the grammar of the English language should be built on the Anglo-Saxon basis, and not on the basis of
the Celtic, Gothic, French, or Latin and Greek.
V. Its literature. English Literature does not date back more than some six centuries.
Nay, all that is really valuable has been produced during the last three hundred years.
The  HIAND-BOOx OF ANGLO-SAxoN WORDS gives 1000 Anglo-Saxon root-words, with their
primary and secondary meaning, and teaches the use of them.
THE HAND-BOOK OF ANGLO-SAxoN DERIVATIVE WORDS.  It explains thie meaning of the
prefixes, suffixes, and terminations which change the 1000 root-words into derivatives. It
gives some 7000 of the choicest 23,000 words of Anglo-Saxon origin, with their meanings
and use.
THE HAND BOOK OF TIIE ENGRAFTED WORDS OF TEE ENGLISEI LANGUAGE gives 7000 of
the best words from the Celtic, Gothic, French and Classic tongues, with their meanings and
use.
Every thing valuable in the Thesaurus, Latham MacElligot, Lynn, and the Scholar's
Companion, will be found in these books, and arranged according to the growth of language
mad the laws of mind. The plan is simple and natural.
k.q. 
.). APPLETON & CO., PUBLISHERS.
CHEMICAL ATLAS;
OR, THIE CHEMISTRY OF FAMILIAR OBJECTS:
Exhibiting the general principles of the science in a series of beautifully
colored diagrams, and accompanied by explanatory essays, embracing
the latest views of the subjects illustrated. Designed for the use of
students in all schools where chemistry is taught. By EDWARD L
YOUMANS. Large quarto. 105 pages. Price $2.
The Atlas is intended to accompany the author's Class-Book; but it may
Oe employed with equal convenience and advantage in connection with any
of the school text-books.   It is to be used  in exactly the same manner as  a
geographical atlas. As the pupil proceeds with the work in hand, whatever
it may be, reference should be made to the diagrams as often as the subject
may require.  For example; when combining proportions, salts, combustion,
or compound-radicals are reached, the plates which illustrate these subjects
will be resorted to for assistance by those who possess the work. The text
contains  not  only full explanations  of the diagrams,  but it consists of a
series of essays or chapters upon the subjects illustrated.
The following expressions of opinion concerning the plan of illustrating Chemistry adopted
in the present volume, are from the most eminent teachers and scientific men in the country.
It will be seen that the testimonials refer to the Author's "Chemical Chart;" but as the
"Atlas" is a reproduction and improvement of that mode of exhibiting chemical facts and
phenomena, the commendations apply to this work with much greater force.
From the HON. HORACE MANN, President of Antioch College.
"I.think Mr. Youmans is entitled to great credit for the preparation of his Chart, because
its use will not only facilitate acquisition, but, what is of far greater importance, will increase
the exactness and precision of the student's elementary ideas."
Fron? DR. JOHNI W. DRAPER, Prof of Chemistry in the University of New York.
"It seems well adapted to communicate to beginners a knowledge of the definite combina.
tions of chemical substances, and deserves to be introduced into the schools."
"We cordially concur in the above opinion."
JOHIN TORREY, Prof of Chemistry in the College of Physicians & Surgeons, N. Y
WM. H.I- ELLET, Late Professor of Chemistry in Colulnbiat College, S. C.
From JAMES R. CHILTON, M.D., Ch7emist.
"It is a valuable means of readily imparting a correct knowledge of the nature of chemical
comnbinations."
From DR. THIIOMAS ANTISELL, Prof of Chenmistry in the Fermont Medical College.
"It will be found an invaluable assistant to both teacher and pupil."
Front PROF. GRAY, Author of Teot-books in Natus-al Philosophy and ChJnistry.
"The best means of illustration that I have seen; it would be especially useful to institu.
tIons not furnished with chemical apparatus."
From DR. ROBERT HARE, Emneritus Prof. of Chemistry in the University of Pa.
"The design is excellent, and I entertain the impression that it is well done."
From PROF. W. F. HOPKINS, of the U. S. Naval Academy, Annapois.
"The plan is admirably adapted to assist the teacher in communicating, and the learner in
receiving correct notions of the laws of chemical combinations.  I commend it to the patronage
vf schools and academies."
From RT. REv. ALONZO POTTER, LL.D., Philaddphia.
"The conception embodied in Mr. Youmans' Chemical Chart is a very happy and usefu
one, and the execution is evidently the fruit of much care and skill. I should think its intro
duction into schools in connection with the study of the first principles of chemistry wa
much to be desired."
From BENJAMIN SILLIMAN, LL.D., Prof. of Chtemistry in Yale College.
'The plan appears to be an excellent one."
59
N, 
l*