THE REIGN OF LAW,




Let knetFm e   growfromn mGore fon jttr
But more of reverence in uzs dwell;
That mind and soul, according well,
Mrar 7make one mus.ic as before,
Czar v'vzaa o a # 6,;9N za~~ii~rto,




BY THE DUKE OF ARGYLL.
F3OURTH AME RICAN EDITION.
NEW YORK:
GEORGE  ROUTLEDGE  &  SONS,
4I6 BROOME STREET.
I873.








PREFACE TO THE FIFTH  EDITION.
I N preparing a Fifth Edition of this work,
I have to acknowledge the favour-far
greater than I expected-with which it has been
received. The argument which it maintains is
at variance with the philosophy of some of the
most active and popular thinkers of the time;
and on a few important points it deviates from
the view commonly adopted by men with whom
I am  more generally  agreed.  Some adverse
comment was therefore not only to be expected
but desired.  Most sincerely do I thank those
who, in numerous Journals and Reviews, have
undertaken this duty, for the uniformly courteous
and even kindly spirit in which their criticisms
have been expressed.




vi       PREFACE TO THE FIFTHI EI)ITIOL-T.
In this Edition no alteration has been made
involving any change of principle or opinion.
Here and there words have been added or removed according as individual passages appear
to have been misunderstood.  Throughout sonime
of the chapters substantial additions have been
made in reply, direct or indirect, to my principal
opponents, whilst discussions, more detailed than
were suitable for the text, have been committed
to Notes at the end of the volume.
These additions and Notes have reference chiefly
to the following< articles which appeared in review
of the " Reign of Law: "Ist. An Article, by Mr. Alfred R. Wallace, in
the Qzlua'iery  Y ournzal of Scienzce, for October
i867. This article is in defence and illustration
of Mr. Darwin's " Theory on the Origin of Species."
The eminence of Mr. Wallace as a Naturalist, the
extent of his researches in some of the most reimarlkable Faunas of the world, and the fact that,




PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION.      Vii
before the publication of Mr. Darwin's book, he
had come to kindred, if not identical conclusions,all render him peculiarly competent to defend the
"Theory," and to present it in the strongest light.
I have therefore added to the text several passages
suggested by the challenge he makes, and by the
reasoning he employs. A further discussion of his
paper will be found in Note A.
2d. An Article, by Mr. George H. Lewes, in the
Forltnigklzy Xeview, for July, I867, dealing with
the main argument and conclusion of this work
from the well-known point of view of the " Positive
Philosophy."  Wherever in the text there seemed
a fitting place for doing so, I have inserted passages which deal with the reasoning of his paper,
or with the same reasoning as it appears in a more
systematic form in the Prolegomenla to Mr. Lewes's
"History of Philosophy."
3d. An Article in the Dublin Review, for April
i867, which I am permitted to attribute to the




Viii     PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION.
learned editor of that periodical, Dr. Ward. The
more special object of his adverse comment is the
view I have taken of the doctrine of Free Will —
a doctrine which Dr. Ward, with some warmth,
accuses me of having virtually abandoned whilst
professing to defend it. A slight alteration in the
text may perhaps help to remove some objections,
which rest entirely upon a misunderstanding of the
sense in which particular words are used.  But
behind and beyond any misunderstanding of this
kind, there lies apparently a substantial difference
in respect to which my view remains unaltered.
This difference will be found discussed in Note F,
at the end of the volume.
4th. An Article in the Conltemporary Review,
for May I867, by  Mr. J. P. Mahaffy.  With
reference to his observations, as well as to those
of some other critics, I have somewhat expanded
several passages which deal with the Supernatural,
and with the various relations in which miracles




PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION.       ix
have been conceived to stand towards the "Reign
of Law." I have also, in a special Note (G), replied
to a criticism in this paper, referring to the subject
of Necessity and Free Will.
Other Notes have been added in illustration or
support of various passages in the text.
As regards the intention I had at one time
entertained of adding  a chapter on "Law  in
Christian Theology," further reflection has only
confirmed me in the feeling that this is a subject
which cannot be adequately dealt with in such
a form.  I can only again ask my readers to
remember that although some ideas which belong
to this subject, or touch it at various points, cannot
be, and have not been, avoided, yet the desire and
intention to postpone it, in so far as it was possible
to do so, has left blanks which every careful eye
must see.
IWVERPARAY, atn. i868.








PREFACE TO TTHE FIRST EDITION.
OME portions of this work have already
appeared at various times in the EdlizbzUtrg Revizo,-, in Good [W~ords, and in Addresses
to the Royal Society of Edinburgh during the
years in which I had the honour of being President of that Body. The deep interest of the
mnatter dealt with in those Papers has induced
me to expand them, to add new chapters on
other aspects of the same subject, and to publish the whole in a connected form.
Among many other deficiencies which may be
observed in this Volume, there is one which
demands' explanation, lest a serious misunder.
standing should arise.  I had intended to con.




X11      PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.
clude with a chapter on " Law in Christian
Theology."  It was natural to reserve for that
chapter all direct reference to  some of the
most  fundamental facts  of  Human  nature.
Yet without such reference the Reign of Law,
especially in  the "Realm  of Mind," cannot
even  be  approached  in  some  of  its  very
highest and most important aspects.  For the
present, however, I have shrunk from entering
upon questions so profound, of such critical inmport, and so inseparably connected with religious
controversy. In the absence of any attempt
to deal with this great branch of the inquiry,
as well as in many other ways, I am painfully
conscious of the narrow range of this work. I
can only offer it as a very small contribution
to the discussion of a boundless subject.
INVERARAY October, I866,




CONTE N TS.
CHAPTER I,
THE SUPERNATURAL,
Paga
The term  Supernatural employed in different and contralictory senses...                                         i
The Natural casting out the Supernatural...     3
Nature, in its widest sense, to be understood as including all
causal agencies, especially Man's Mind and Will...  5, 6
Man's agency the most Natural of all agencies...          7
Mal's Mind and Will regarded as belonging to the Supernatural.......,  8
Relation of Man's agency to the physical laws of Nature.    I I
"Supernatural " power-Is it Power independent of the use
of means?............. 
Relation of God to the rules of His Government called
" Laws "..............     I5
Mansel's position, that a Miracle is a Superhuman work..   I8
Gibbon's attempt to account for the spread of Christianity by
Natural causes.........             20
Preservation of the Jews by means employed to effect a
Divine Purpose..............                          ib.
Nothing in Religion incompatible with the belief that all
exercises of God's power, ordinary and extraordinary, are
effected through the instrumentality of means.          22
Principal Tulloch's view of Miracles.....,..   23
Locke's idea of Miracles.......                      24
The great truth he misses. o..       o...   25




xiv                     CONTENTS.
Page
Truths and Difficulties of Religion - their type in the course
and constitution of Nature..               o    26
Guizot's argument, that Manl is the result either of Material
forces or Supernatural power........                 27
The Development hypotheses...........      29
No distinction in Scripture between Natural and Supernatural  30
" Silent Members " in animal frames........    32
Perception of Correspondences as much a fact as the sight
or touch of the things in which they appear....   33
Fertilisation of Orchids... c..      37
Intention the one thing which Darwin sees.....   38, 39
Orchids in all their marvellous forms developed out of the
archetypal arrangements of Threes within Threes  -. -  44
Ideas of Order based on Numerical Relations nleet us at
every turn in Nature........    49
The distinction drawn between the Natural and the Supernatural a distinction artificial, arbitrary, and unreal..    5o
Belief in the existence of a Personal God essential to all Religion...........                  51
Decay of many Creeds and Confessions through dissociating
tie doctrines of Christianity from the analogy of Nature.  52
CHAPTER IL
LAW: ITS DEFINITIONS.
Reign of Law in the world around us and within us    o  55
Importance of looking sharply on Forms of Words professing
to represent scientific truths-........   56
Religion and Science closely connected....         57
The Instinct which seeks for harmony in the truths of Science
and the truths of Religion a higher Instinct than the disposition which pretends there is no relation between them.  58
The idea that Prayer to God is only a good way of preaching
to ourselves....... e




CONTENTS.                        XV
Page
Essence of the belief in Prayer, that the Divine Mind is accessible to supplication, and the Divine Will capable of being
moved thereby..........                       6I
Law, human and Divine, the authoritative expression of Will
enforced by Power........                   64
The FIVE different Senses in. which Law is habitually used:First, as applied to an observed Order of Facts...    65
Secondziv, to that Order, as involving the action of some
Force, or Forces, of which nothing more may be known.  ib.
7Tiir'ly, as applied to individual Forces, the measure of
whose operation has been more or less defined..  ib.
FozrtZly, as applied to those Combinations of Force which
have reference to the fulfilment of Purpose, or the discharge of Function...ib.
Fzyti/y, as applied to Abstract Conceptions of the Mind.  /b.
These great leading significations circle round the Three great
questions Science asks of Nature-the What, the How, and
the Why........             b.
The Three Lawrs of Kepler the simplest illustration of Law
applied in the First Sense.......   66
An observed Order of Facts can only arise out of the action
of some compelling Force.....  68
Law of Gravitation the great example of Law in the Third
Sense.,.....,,,.,    69
The "Verifiable Element"  l.    ~..,... 0  70
Laws in the first three senses explain nothing, save that the
order of subordinate phenomena is due to Force....  72
Law of Gravitation the best example of what Law is, and
what it is not........ e....   ib.
Languages grow according to rules of which the men who
speak them are unconscious..76
WVhat happens around us in Nature the result of different
and opposing Forces nicely balanced.....        i&
Principle of Adjustment as the instrument and result of Purpose always reached at last in the course of every physical
inqu irY............  e    0...         




Xvi                      CONTENTS.
Page
Law in the highest Sense - Combination for the accomplishment of Purpose....       79
Some Philosophers say the question " Why?" should never be
asked...  ib.
The facts of Adjustment and of Function constitute not Filal
but Immediate Purpose........               e.  8
The Function of an organ is its Purpose....e..   82
Doctrine of Contrivance and Adjustment not so metaphysical
as the doctrine of Homologies.......  83
Impossible in describing physical phenomena to avoid phraseology moulded on our own conscious Personality and Will.  go
Ultimate fact of Astronomical Science not the Law of Gravitation, but the Adjustment between that Law and others
less known.......                         92
Revolution of the Seasons depend on a multitude of Laws,
Astronomical, Chemical, Electrical, Geological, &c.....     93
Chemical Science rich in illustration of Forces in mutual Adjustssent..............    9'6 Theine " and " Strchnline" differ from each other only in
the proportions in which they are combined...    95
How our Wills exercise a large and increasing power over the
Material World.........                    97
Laws of Nature immutable only in one Sense...          ib.
Laws of Nature employed in the System  of Nature in a
manner precisely analogous to that in which -we employ
them —E-xamples furnished in the Shells of 13arnacles and
in the Menai Bridge........99
Purpose never attained in Nature save by the enlistment of
Laws as instruments....... 
Battery of the Torpedo compared with Man's Electric Battery  Ior
The Puzqose what we know in the Battery of the Electric Fish  104
We forget that Man's workls, no less than Nature's, are done
through the means of Law......    I 07
FIpktM  meaning of Law-the designation of some purely Abstract Idea, as, for instance, the First Law of Motion in
Mechanics... e.   e.. a             a     o  IV8




CONTENTS.                      Xvii
Page
This Law never operates in itself, but is complicated with
other Laws, producing a corresponding complication in
result............   o.  9
Suggestions of Materialism lie thickest to the eye on the surface of things rather than below it......       II3
Physical Science cannot do more than widen the foundation
of intelligent Spiritual beliefs........    14
The modern idea of Law known instinctively to Man since
first he made a Tool and used it as the Instrument of Purpose................
Two great enemies to Materialism; one rooted in the Affectons, the other in the Intellect.........    115
Transcendental character of the results of Physical research.  I6
All Nature's realities are in the region of the Invisible... Ig8
Life, according to Huxley and Carpenter, the Cause of Organization..........                     ib.
Material Force, a force which acts on Matter....     r 9
Our Conceptions of Force traced to their fountain-head.  I2o
Force of Gravitation regarded by Herschel as " the direct, or
indirect, result of a Consciousness, or a Will, existing somewhere      ".. o......... 122
The idea of a Personal Will apart from the Forces which 
work in Nature, is said by some men to be a mere Projection of our own Personality into the world beyond. e 123
A Watch the abode of a " Watch-force.....        I24
The greatest mystery of all-the analogy between Man's
works and the Creator's...   a                       1.. e25
CHAPTER IIIL
CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY ARISING OUT OF THE REIGN
OF LAVW.
Necessity of Contrivance for the accomplishment of Purpose. 126
Contrivance in the Navigation of the Air....     a a a 129
"'The Way of an EagleintheAir"....           eo  /b.
b




Xvi.1                   CONTZEN'TS.
Page
Force of Gravitation the principal Force in flight....   13o
Resisting Force of the Atmosphere the next Law appealed to  I3I
Elasticity and reacting Force of the Air another Law..   I 32
Great Force of a downward Blow from a Bird's Wing. o.  134
Convex and Concave Surfaces required in Wings...       136
The Feathers must underlap each other......   ib.
HIow the power of forward Motion is given to B irds  e.  138
This theory of Flight may he tested by the eye...  139
Experiment with a I-eron's stretched Wing.....    140
Why no Bird can fly backwards.......  ib.
The heavier a Bird the greater its possible velocity....    I44
Erroneous notion of Birds having Air-cells for the inhalation
and stowage of heated Air...........    I45
What Forces the movements of flying animals are governed by  I46
Birds whose Wing is adapted for diving and flight.... e 48
Wings rather long than broad in Birds of great powers of
flight..............  I 5C
A long Wing nothing but a long Lever.......    151 I
Description of the Albatross sailing or wheeling round a
sllip............   I 54
Sharp-pointed Wings also possessed by such Birds. ib.
WVhat sharpness, or roundness, of Wing depends on         56
On what the propelling power ofa Bird's Wing depends.  I57
How B3irds can remain stationary in the Air.....       I59
Use of the Tail in Birds.....  i62
How Birds turn in flight........  I63
HIumming Birds the most remarkable examples of the machinery of flight...........  i66
Adjustments to Purpose in a Wing-feather.... e5 3  
Why Man has failed in Air Navigation... e              170
CHAPTER IV.
APPARENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE SUPREMACY OF PURPOSE.
Structures of which we cannot see the use.1..        I72
Mr. Darwin's cu'ious mistake about Green Woodpeckers.   1 76




CONTENTS.                        X[X
Page
Adapted colouring in Nature for purposes of Concealment    1 I77
Only employed under certain conditions......    178
The Green Woodpecker does not come under these conditions  I79
Strongly contrasted colouring in Woodpeclkers...    ib.
Birds amongst whom the assimilated colouring prevails..  I81
Purpose of Concealment in the Woodcock's plumage..       I82
In the Snipe                                               1........'1...  84
Insects in which imitation, with a view to Concealment, extends to Colour, Form, and Structure....ib.
Beauty in Nature a Purpose, an Object, and an End...  I88
Ornament as much an End in the Workshop of Nature as in
the Jeweller's Workshop..........    I9
Instance in Nature where Ornament takes the form of Pictorial Representation............              92
In many Animal structures, perh-llaps in all save one, there are
parts the presence of which cannot be explained... I94, I95
Those aborted limbs parts of a universal Plan....    I96
A Plan of this kind itself a Purpose.........    197
African Notion that the Ostrich's toes correspond to Man's
thumb and forefinger.............   I98
Aborted Wings of the Ostrich really correspond to the Fi'/ngvs
in Man........                                 I99
Homology in Structure and Analogy in Use......            ib.
Original conception of the framework of Organic Life has its
last development in Man.......... 201
In Nature, Use must be interpreted as including Actual Use,
Potential Use, and Ornament...... 202
CH.APTER V.
CREAT'rION BY LAW.o
Law, according to Physiology, is never absent as a Servant o 2o8
A like Order in the existing World, and in the past Histoly
of C reation..                                  A  " 2 clg




XX                       CONTENTS.
Page
Gradual Modification of Type in Animals.......    21r
No knowledge of the Forces to which the phenomena of Life
can be traced..........     213
Development Theory in its earlier forms......    214
Consequences of hiding our Ignorance of the causes of Phenomena by declaring them the result of Law.....    2I7
Darwin does not profess to trace the Origin of New Forms to
any definite Law.......                          ib.
Darwin's Theory not a Theory on " The Origin of Species"   2I9
His Theory incurs the risk of being self-condemned.   220
Humming~ Birds as exhibiting Mysteries of Creation..    221
Absolute Distinctiveness from all other Families of Birds.    222
Bond that unites all the forms of this Family......  223
"Centres of Creation" as regards Humming Birds...   225
Differences generic and specific between Humming Birds.  226
Plan in which mere Variety has been an aim......    228
No connexion between the tHumming Bird's splendour and
any Function essential to life.....   229
"Coquette" Humming Birds..........233
Curious example in I-lumming Birds of Variety for Ornament's
sake......                     ib.
Mere Beauty and mere Variety for their own sake....    235
"Natural Selection" does not account for the origin and
spread of Humming Birds..........    236
Each new Variety must be born Male and Female... 237
Possibility of new Births being the means of introducing new
Species................   239
Principle of "'Natural Selection" has no bearing on the
"Origin of Species"....0 e e.. o. a. 240
"Correlation of Growth"'..                o,     241
Correlation of Growth in the Inorganic world.. a    242
Correlation of Growth having reference to Mental Purposes. 245
Mr. Darwin has not pointed out clearly the distinction between these two kinds of Correlation.......          246
Wonders of Correlation revealed by Disease and Malformatiolnt &C. a o    e 0  e e e 0 a     o.o      e a   a a 247




CONTENTS.                        XXi
Pago
Correlation between the internal Structure of the Teeth in
Animals and the Structure of distant portions of their
frame................. 248
One Force directs the Form and Structure of every Organism  249
No conception of any Force emanating from external things,
and moulding the Structure of an Organism in harmony
with themselves............    251
Forces of Organic Growth worked under rules of close Adjustment to external conditions. - Examples of this in
Ducks, Gulls, and Divers.......... 252
More correlated Correlations.-Wing-feathers and Auricularfeathers in Birds.............    254
New Species can be created only by a Creative Will giving to
Organic Forces a foreseen direction......    256
Scientific men, in seeking expression  for ultimate ideas
arrived at by physical research, are forced to borrow the
language of mechanical invention.........    ib.
Mr. Darwin presenting under one phase two Ideas radically
distinct................. 258
"Adherence to Type " and " Correlation of Growth" not in
the nature of Physical Causes but of Mental Purposes..   259
Correlation of Growth, in the sense of external adaptations,
the most general of Nature's Laws......      260
The only Senses in which we get a glimpse of Creation by
Law.....                                                  26I
No reason why Inheritance should produce Organisms unlike,
or only very partially like, each other....   264
Affinities and Differences between Man and the Lower
Animals.......                                    ib.
Theory of Creation by Birth clashes with the Theory ot' 4Natural Selection"........          267
No fictions in Nature, and no bad jokes...   26S
Some essential Resemblances between all forms of Life, e  ib.
The two Theories of Man's Origin.....   269
We see the Purpose, not the Method.....    271
All ultimate Truth beyond the reach of Science. o    o.  272




S:XH1                   CONTENTS.
Page
The Reign of Law-the reign of Creative Force, directed by
Creative Knowledge, worked under'the control of Creative
Power, and in fulfilment of Creative Purpose.....   273
CHAPTER VI.
THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND.
Phenomena of Mind under the Reign of Law....  274
One Force in Nature the Source and Centre of all the rest,
and all governed by Principles of Arrangement purely
Mental; we know nothing directly of the ultimate Seat of
Force in any form; the nearest conception we can have of
it is derived from our consciousness of Vital Power...  275
If these conclusions be true, it need not surpris'e us to see
that Law, in the same Sense, prevails in the phenomena
both of the Material world and of the world of Mind...    ib.
The Mind not conscious of its dependence on Material
Organs........ 277 6'No Series of Facts more complete and conclusive than the
chain connecting the functions of the Brain with the phenomena of Mindl.....0 0 r. 279
Thought not to be confounded with Brain......    ib.
Phrenology mere Confusion of Thought..    o    280
Physiology can never be the basis of Psychology.         282
Connexion between Mind and Brain a Law only in the Senise
of Law as applied to " an Observed Order of Facts".. 283
Severe Thinking attended with expenditure of Force... 284
Difficulties from misconception of what Matter is and the
Forces we call Material..........                 285
Large class of phenomena connected with Mind, of which
Consciousness does not inform us..... 286
Men often impelled by MIotives they are unconscious of.    287
H.-Iow we can detect the action of Forces which have told
upon our Minds.............    289
Origin of Ideas; how far due to Experience or to Intuition  it.




CONT'ENTS.                      Xxiii
Page
tMuscular Contractions of two dinds.........    292
Almost certain that the Mind has automatic faculties and
others which work independently by Experience....    293
Intuitive Power of mumerical Computation......   ib.
In discussing the Origin of Ideas, there is great want of Definition in the use of terms......... 295
An Idea is as it were an organic Growth: —its Materi-lls
from the external world, its Structure from within...   296
Intuition in the Young of the Lower Animals, whlen removed
from their Parents..........                 297
In Birds, which have comparatively no Infancy.     o o   ib.
Inheritance bf Physical and Mental qualities.... 300
Orderly progress of Events in the history of Nations... 3oi
The aggregate of Motives, or Forces, which move the Mind,
may be called the Laws which determine Human Action
andl Opinions........                          303
The Lower Animals moved by fewer Motives than Men, and
Savages by fewer Motives than civilized Men.....  304
Difficulty of predicting Conduct proportional to the number
and kind of Motives............. 305
Secret of the boundless Difference between hMan and the
highest Animals below him........... 306
Man never free from relations pre-established between the
Structure of his Mind and the System of Things in which it
is formed to move.......                   307
Real Progress on the question of Necessity and Free WVill. 308
Still clearer Definitions needed..........    309
Perfect Knowledge must be perfect Fore-knowledge..      312
Spiritual Antecedents"............                   313
Reconcilement of Freedom of Will with the idea of Causation...........                       314
Mr. Mill's contradictory positions as to the Interference of
Will..................    315
Comte on " Changeable Will"........  319
Stability of Character inseparably connected with a,variable
Will....... *.. 0 0   320




XX1V                     CONTENTS.
Page
An "' Arbitrary" or a " Capricious" Will.......    320
To operate on Human Character we must place it under
favourable outward Conditions.....            322
CHAPTER VII.
LAW IN POLITICS.
Direct appeals to the Reason, or the Feelings, of men, useless
when those faculties have not been placed under favourable
Conditions...............    324
How tfr these Conditions are subject to the Control of Will
through the Use of Means..........                  325
The Collective Will of Society operates on the Conduct of its
members in two Ways-by Authority, and by altering Conditions...............    326
True Conception of Natural Law founded on the Progress of
Physical Investigation..........   i.
Plato's odious Conception of Human Society......        327
Aristotle occasionally and almost unconsciously resorts to true
methods of Scientific Reasoning......... 328
Why he missed the great Secret of modern Political Science. 330
Necessity of groping among little and common things a hard
lesson for the Intellect.........        33
Forces in Human Nature so constant that they affect the great
majority of men.............. 332
IHow these are to be controlled.. a.          ib.
The word "Natural".                 Q...... 333
Laws founded on a right exercise of Reason are Natural Laws
in the best and highest sense.......... ib.
The most difficult Problem in the Science of Government.. 334
Two great recent Discoveries in this country in the Science of
Government................  ib
The one great Error of Ancient Systems of Political Philosophy  335
Hfow opposite the doctrine of modern Politicians....  ib.
Law of Spain, prohibiting Gold from leaving the country.. 336




CONT'ENTS.                     XXV
Page
Essential idea of the Old Commercial Policy......    337
Of the New.........             ib.
Adam Smith's Denunciation of Laws restricting free Interchange in the Products of Labour and in the free Employment of Labour itself...;...0  338
Connexion of the work of James Watt and Adam Smith.   339
Watt's reduction to obedience of one of the most tremendous
Forces of Nature...............   340
How Adam Smith's work was harder than James Watt's.  34
Watt's history a signal illustration of the Follies of Restriction.............     342
Order of Progress in Mankind-Long Ages of comparative
Silence and Inaction brought to an end by shorter Periods
of almost preternatural Activity. —Illustrations  3..    343
Statute of Apprenticeship in the time of Adam Smith..   344
Spinning and Weaving in I 76o.....   345
How the Survivance of the Ancient domestic Industries became no longer possible.......           346
Beginning of the Factory System....... 347
System of Apprenticeship in the earlier Mills...    348
Physical Degeneracy, Mental Ignorance, and Moral Corruption
in the Factories........  b.
The first Factory Act, introduced by the elder Sir Robert
Peel................ 349
Abandonment of the Apprenticeship System..... 350
Exhausting and demoralising Labour in Factories by Children  351
The great Parliamentary Debate: How far it is wise or legitimate to interfere for Moral ends with the Freedom of the
Individual Will............    352
In what Sense the Children's Labour was "free" and was
c "ot free"........  o......              353
Arguments, founded on the Constancy of Natural Laws,
against Legislative Interference with the "freedom" of
Individual Will..........    354
The supporters of Restriction themselves ignorant of the
fundamental Principles at issue......    355




XXV1                    CONTENTS.
Page
The true doctrine of Necessity exemplified in the conduct of
Emprnloyers and Employed........ 356
Antagonism between Natural Law and Human Law. o.   ib.
Results to be attained only by the higher Faculties of our
Nature imposing their W~ill in authoritative Expressions of
Human Law.5...............     358
The Factory Acts the first Legislative Recognition of a great
Natural Law..............  36o
Double Movement in Legislation since the First FactoryAct. 361
Principle on which the great counter-movement depends..  363
Progress in Political Science nowhere happier than in Factory
Legislation................   364
Example how External Conditions and Mental Character can
be affected powerfully by positive Institution.....  366
Adjustment in the Realm of Mind by setting one Motive to
counieract another........           36
How new Motives may be evoked.......   369
The Spirit of Association-a Force in the Realm of Mind. 370
The Law of Competition.........            372
Good effected by Combination a higher Good than that resulting from Factory Legislation.........  i.
Combination, an Appeal to the Law of Contrivance; —the
Power of Adjustment..........   373
Sources of irror which pervert the Aims of voluntary Associationll...........       374
lHistory of Combination among the Working Classes untillately a sad history of Misdirected Effort......  ib.
Difficulties of our time to be met by unshaken Faith in great
Natural Laws and in the free Agency of Man to secure by
appropriate means the working of those Laws for good. 376
The Law of Inequality not to be violated with impunity..  377
Substantial economic Advantage secured wherever the Hours
of Labour are reduced without a corresponding Reduction
in Waes..........     378
The very attempt of the Working Classes to govern through
Combination their own Affairs is an Education in itself.  38o




CONTENTS.                      XXVii
Page
Nature a great Armoury of Weapons and Implements for the
service and use of Will......, r            382
As regards the great Science of Politics, men still, as it were,
only at the break of day........    383
We look on the Facts of Nature and Human Life through the
dulled eyes of Custom and Traditional Opinion.... 384
Natural Openness and Simplicity of Mind characteristics of
the individual men who have exerted the most powerful Influence for good on Society......      i.
Power of the Agencies which the whole Constitution and
Course of things offers to Knowledge and Contrivance.. 385
Instinct on her own narrow path a surer Guide than Reason  386
Some Causes no longer in existence which produced the Overthrow of the great historical Nations of Antiquity....  387
Memorable Examples, in the last and present generations, of
the Reign of Law over the Course of Political Events..
Modern Civilization presents the phenomena of Development
and Growth........                    388
The most certain of all the Laws of Man's Nature  O.      ib.
This the Law to which Christianity appeals.....    389
An immense satisfaction to know that the Result of Logical
Analysis but confirms the Testimony of Consciousness, and
runs parallel with the Primoeval Traditions of Belief.     39o
Our Freedom a Reality-not a Name........                 ib.
Laws of Nature come visibly from One pervading Mind.     391
Their Purposes best fulfilled when made the Instruments of
intelligent Will and the Servants of enlightened Conscience  ib.
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
The Swift.....,.......  facz.g 1x47
Wing of Gannet...  a.........  54
Wing of Golden Plover.......            56
Sparrow-Hawk-Merlin-Kestrel Hovering.e O  o    6l








THE REIGN OF LAW.
CHAPTER I.
THE SUPERNATURAL.
T HE Supernatural-what is it?  What do we mean
by it?  How do we define it?  M. Guizot 1 tells
us that belief in it is the special difficulty of our tilethat denial of it is the form taken by all modern assaults
on Christian faith; and again, that acceptance of it lies
at the root, not only of Christianity, but of all positive
religion whatever. These questions, then, concerning the
Supernatural, are questions of first importance.  Yet we
find them seldom distinctly put, and still more seldom
distinctly answered. This is a capital error in dealing
with any question of philosophy.  HIalf the perplexities
of men are traceable to obscurity of thought hiding and
breeding under obscurity of language.  "The Super66L'Egtlise et la Societe Chretienne ell IG5I," ch. iv. p. 19.
B




2                TH-'E REIGN OF LAW.
natural" is a term  employed often in different, andt
sometimes in contradictory, senses.  It is difficult to
make out whether MI. Guizot himself means to identify
belief in the Supernatural with belief in the existence of
a God, or with belief in a particular mode of Divine
action.  But these are ideas quite separable and distinct.
There may be some men who disbelieve in the Supernatural only because they are absolute atheists; but it is
certain that there are others who have great difficulty in
believing in the  Supernatural, who are not atheists.
What they doubt or deny is, not that God exists, but that
He ever acts, or perhaps can act, unless in and through
what they call the "Laws of Nature."  M. Guizot,
indeed, tells us that "God is the Supernatural in a
Person."   But this is a rhetorical figure rather than a
definition.  He may, indeed, contend that it is inconsistent to believe in a God, and yet to disbelieve in the
Supernatural; but he must admit, and indeed does
admit, that such inconsistency is found in fact.
Theological and philosophical writers frequently use
the Supernatural as synonymous with the Superhuman.
But of course this is not the sense in which any one can
have any difficulty in believing in it.  The powers and
works of Nature are all superhuman-more than Man
can account for in their origin —more than he can resist
in their energy-more than he can unlderstand in the0i




' HE SUPERINATURAL~                  3
effects.  This, then, cannot be the sense in which so
many minds find it hard to accept the Supernatural; nor
can it be the sense in which others cling to it as of the
very essence of their religious faith.  What, then, is that
other sense in which the difficulty arises? Perhaps we
shall best find it by seeking the idea which is competing
with it, and by which it has been displaced.  It is the
Natural which has been casting out the Supernatural —
the idea of Natural Law, —the universal reign of a fixed
Order of things.  This idea is a product of that immense
development of the physical sciences which is characteristic of our time.  We cannot read a periodical, or
go into a lecture-room, without hearing it expressed.,netimes, but rarely, it is stated with accuracy, and
with due recognition of the limits within which Law can
be said to comprehend the phenomena of the world.
But generally it is expressed in language vague and
hollow, covering inaccurate conceptions, and confbunding
under common forms of expression ideas which are
essentially distinct. The mere ticketing and orderly
assortment of external facts is constantly spoken of as if
it were in the nature of Explanation, and as if no higher
truth in respect to natural phenomena were to be attained
or desired.l  And herein we see both the result for which
1 Those who have followed the course of recent speculation will
recognise this sentence as intended to describe the characteristic
l1 2




4                  THE REIGN OF LAW.
Bacon laboured,  and the danger against which Bacon
prayed.  It has been a glorious result of a right method
in the study of Nature, that with the increase of knowledge the "human family has been endowed with new
mercies."  But every now  and then, for a time at least,
from   "the unlocking  of the gates of sense, and the
kindling of a greater natural light, incredulity and intellectual night hzave arisen in our minds."l
But let us observe exactly where and how the difficulty
arises. The Reign of Law in Nature is, indeed, so far
as we can observe it, universal.  But the common idea
of the Supernatural is that which is at variance with
Natural Law, above it, or in violation of it.  Nothing,
however wonderfutl, which happens according to Natural
Law, would be considered by any one as Supernatural.
The  law  in  obedience  to  which  a wonderful thing
happens may not be known; but this would not give it a
supernatural character, so long as we assuredly believe
principle of the Positive Philosophy. I am glad to observe that so
competent a judge as Mr. George H. Lewes says of it:-" Although
not, perhaps, the most dignified or explicit statement of the Positive
point of view, this may be accepted as essentially correct."-Forta ig-tly Review, July I867.
1 " This also we hunil)ly beg, that human things may not prejudice such as are Divine, neither that from the unlocking of the gates
of sense, an.d the kindling of a greater natural light, anything of
incredulity or intellectual night may arise in our minds towards
Divine mysteries."-I" The Student's Prayer." SBceon's Works.




THE SUPERNATURAL.
that it did happen according to soue law.  Hence, it
would appear to follow that a man thoroughly possessed
of the idea of Natural Law as universal, never could
admit anything to be supernatural; because on seeing
any fact, however new, marvellous, or incomprehensible,
he would escape into the conclusion that it was the
result of some natural Law of which he had before been
ignorant.  No one will deny that, in respect to the vast
majority of all new  and marvellous phenomena, this
would be the true and reasonable conclusion.  It is not
the conclusion  of pride, but of humility of mind.
Seeing the boundless extent of our ignorance of the
natural laws which regulate so many of the phenomena
around us, and still more of so many of the phenomena
within us, nothing can be more reasonable than to conclude, when we see something which is to us a wonder,
that somehow, if we only knew how, it is " all right "all according to the constitution and course of Nature.
But then, to justify this conclusion, we must understand
Nature in the largest sense, —as including all that is
6' In the round ocean, and the living air
And the blue sky, anbd in the mind of mranz." 1
We must understand it as including every agency which
we see entering, or can conceive from analogy as capabie
T "Tintern Abbey. "-Wordsworth.




6               TI-TE REIGN OF LAW.
of entering, into the causation of the wo-rld. First and
foremost among these is the agency of our own Mind
and Will.  Yet, strange to say, all reference to this
agency is often tacitly excluded when Awe speak of the
laws of Nature. One of our most disting fisbed living
teachers of physical science' began, not long ago, a
course of lectures on the phenomena of Heat by a rapid
statement of the modern doctrine of the Correlation of
Forces —how the one was convertible into the otherhow one arose out of the other-how none could be
evolved except from some other as a pre-existing source.'"Thus," said the lectuier, "we see there is no such thing
as spcntaneousness in Nature."  What!-not in the
lecturer himself?  Was there no "spontaneousness " in
his choice of words-in his selection of materials —in his
orderly arrangement of experiments with a view to the
exhibition of particular results?  It is not probable that
the lecturer was intending to deny this; it simply was
that he did not think of it as within his field of view.
His own Mind and Will were then dealing with the
"laws of Nature," but they did not occur to him as forming part of those laws, or, in the same sense, as subject
to them.
Does Man, then, not belong to Nature? Is he above
X Professor Tyndall




THE SUPERNATURAL.
it-or merely separate from it, or a violation of it?  Is
he supernatural? If so, has he any difficulty in believing
in himself? Of course not. Seif-consciousness is the
one truth, in the light of which all other truths are
known.  Cogito, ergo sunm, or volo, ergo sumz —this is the
one conclusion which we cannot doubt, unless Reason
disbelieves herself.  Why, then, are the faculties of the
human mind and body not habitually included among tile
"laws of Nature? "   Because a fallacy is getting hold
upon us from a want of definition in the use of terms.
"' Nature " is being used in the narrow sense of physical
nature.  It is conceived as containing nothing beyond
the properties of Matter.  Thus the whole mental world
in which we ourselves live, and move, and have our
being, is excluded from it. But these selves of ours do
belong to Nature.  At all events if we are ever to
understand the difficulties in the way of believing in the
Supernatural, we must first keep clearly in view what we
intend to understand as included in the Natu-al.  Let Is
never forget, then, that the agency of Ma-n is of all others
the most natural-the one with which we are most
familiar-the only one, in fact, which we can be said,
even in any measure, to understand.  When any wonderful event can be referred to the contrivance or ingenuity
of Man, it is thereby at once removed from the sphere of
11Ae Supernatural, as ordinarily understood.




8                THE REIGN OF LAW.
It must be remembered, however, that we are now
only seeking a clear definition of terms; and-that provided this other meaning be clearly agreed upon, the
Mind and Will of Man may be considered as separate
from "nature," and belonging to the Supernatural.  This
view is taken in an able treatise on  " Nature and the.Supernatural," by Dr. Bushnell, an American clergyman.)
Dr. Bushnell says:-" That is supernatural, whatever it
be, that is either not in the chain of natural cause and
effect, or which acts on the chain of cause and effect in
nature, from without the chain." Again: —" If the processes, combinations, and results of our system of nature
are interrupted or varied by the action, whether of God,
or angels, or men, so as to bring to pass what would not
come to pass in it by its own internal action, under the
laws of mnore cause and effect, such variations are in like
manner supernatural."  There is no other objection to
this definition of the Supernatural, than that it rests upon
a limitation of the terms " Nature " and " natural," which
is very much at variance with the sense in which they
are commonly understood.  There is, indeed, a distinc.
tion which finds its expression in common language between the works of Man and the works of Nature.  A
honeycomb, for example, would be called a work of
1  Nature and the Supernatural, as together constituting the one
System of God." By Horace Bushnell, D.DI. Edinburgh, I86o.




THE SUPERNATURAL.                  9
Nature, but a steam-engine would not.  This distinction
is founded on a true perception of the fact that the
Mind and Will of Mar belong to an order of existence
very different from  physical laws, and very different
also from  the fixed and narrow instincts of the lower
animals. It is a distinction bearing witness to the universal consciousness that the Mind of Man has within
it something of a truly creative energy and force —that
we are in a sense " fellow-workers with God," and have
been in a measure'"made partakers of the Divine
nature."  Nevertheless, it would be using the word in a
sense very different from that in which it is generally
accepted, were we to call the steam-engine a supernatural work.  Yet it does answer strictly to the definition of Dr. Bushnell in being "the result of natural
Law  varied by the action of men."  It is made by
"acting on the chain of cause and effect in nature from
without the chain."  But then, be it observed, that under
the same definition all the contrivances of Nature become
Supernatural the moment they are conceived as the work
of a Mind using what we call the elements of nature for
the accomplishment of its designs.  If, for example, it is
open to us to conceive that such a creature as a Bee
cannot have been made out of those elements " by their
own internal action," then we must regard both this
creature and the wonderful products of its instinct as




10             THE REIGN OF LAW.
belonging to the Supernatural. The honeycomb and the
steam-engine would thus come under the same category —
with this only difference, that the mind which made the
steam-engine, being connected with a Body, is visibly
known to us, whereas the 1Minid which made the Bee is
withdrawn from sight. But both can be equally regarded
as the result of Mind "C acting on the chain of cause and
effect fiom without the chain."  Nor can we stop here.
The same process of analysis will carry us farther in the
same direction. We often speak, as Dr. Bushnell does
here, of the elementary forces of Nature as "' acting" by
themselves.  But there is no other meaning in these
words than an expression of the fact that we neither see
nor understand the connexion of those elementary forces
and lMind. But this ignorance of ours affords no manner
of presumption that such connexion does not exist. On
the contrary, though the manner of that connexion be
unknown, it is much more conceivable to us that some
connexion does exist than that it does not. If therefore
the distinction between the Natural and the Supernatural
be the distinction between that which is and that which
is not the work of Mlind, then it becomes a purely arbitrary distinction. It assumes that we can distinguish
between cases in which the properties of matter work
under the direction of Mind, and other cases in which
they work "of themselves."  But this is a line which we




THE SUPERNATURAL.               I 
draw for ourselves. There is no reason to suppose that
it has any reality in the constitution of things.  It is not
in those things, but in the point of view from which we
regard them, that the distinction lies. We have only to
change that point of view, and the distinction vanishes.
All Nature becomes Supernatural, because all her
elements, both in themselves and in their combinations,
are only conceivable as first established, and then employed by the powers of Mind.
But if this definition of the Supernatinal displeases
us, as tending to confound distinctions which we had
thought were clear, let us take another definition.  Let
us take the Natural in that larger and wider sense, in
which it contains within it the whole phenomena of
Man's intellectual and spiritual nature, as part, and
the most familiar of all parts, of the visible system of
things.  This is a definition  more consonant with
common language. In all ordinary senses of the term,
Man and his doings belong to the Natural, as distinguished from the Supernatural.
We are now from  another point of view coming
nearer to some precise understanding of what the
Supernatural may be supposed to mean, But before
we proceed, there is another question which must be
answered-What is the relation in which the agency of
Man stands to the physical laws of Nature?  The




I 2             THE REIGN OF LAW.
answer, in part at least, is plain.  His power in respect
to those laws extends only, first to their discovery and
ascertainment, and then to their use. He can establish
none: he can suspend none. All he can do is to guide,
in a limited degree, the mutual action and reaction of
the laws amongst each other. They are the tools with
which he works-they are the instruments of his Will.
11n all he does or can do he must employ them.  His
ability to use them is limited both by his want of knowledge and by his want of power. The more he knows of
them, the more largely he can employ them, and make
them ministers of his purposes.  This, as a general rule,
is true; but it is subject to the' second limitation just
pointed out. Our power over Nature does not necessarily keep pace with our knowledge of her Laws.. Man
already knows far more than he has power to convert to
use. It is a true observation of Sir George Lewis,' that
Astronomy, for example, in its higher branches, has an
interest almost purely scientific. It reveals to our knowledge perhaps the grandest and most sublime of the
physical laws of Nature. But a much smaller amount of
knowledge would suffice for the only practical apples
cations which we have yet been able to make of these
laws to our own use. Still, that knowledge has a refiex
"' Astronomy of the Ancients," p. 254.




THIE SUPERNATURAL.              13
influence on our knowledge of ourselves, of our powers,
and of the relations which subsist between the constitution of our own minds and the constitution of toe
universe. And in other spheres of inquiry, advancing
knowledge of physical laws has been constantly accompanied with advancing power over the physical world.
It has enabled us to do a thousand things, any one of
which, a few generations ago, would have been considered supernatural. Nor can it be said that this judgment of their character would have been erroneous.
These things would have been superhuman then, though
they are not superhuman now. The same lecturer who
told his audience that there was nothing spontaneous in
Nature proceeded, by virtue of his own knowledge of
natural laws, and by his selecting and combining power,
to present a whole series of phenomena —such as ice
frozen in contact with red-hot crucibles-which certainly
did not belong to the "ordinary course of Nature."
Such an exhibition a few centuries ago would, beyond
all doubt, have subjected the lecturer on Heat to painful
experience of that condition of matter. Nevertheless the
phenomena so exhibited were natural phenomena-in
this sense, that they were the product of natural laws.
Only these laws were combined in action under extraordinary conditions, and these conditions were governed
by the purpose and design of the lecturer, which design




14              TH_1TE REIGN OF LAW.
was "spontaneous," if there is any meaning in the word.
In like manner, if the progress of discovery is as rapid
during the next four hundred years as it has been during
the last period of the same extent, men will be able to
do many things which would now appear to be " supernatural." There is no difficulty in conceiving how a
complete knowledge of all natural laws would give, if
not complete power, at least degrees of power, immensely
greater than those which we now possess. Power of this
kind, then, however great in degree, clearly does not
answer that idea of the Supernatural which so.many
reject as inconceivable. What, then, is that idea? Have
we not traced it to its den at last? By "supernatural"
power, ldo we not mean power independent of the use of
means, as distinguished from power depending on knowledge —even infinite knowledge-of the means proper to
be employed?
This is the sense-probably the only sense-in which
the Supernatural is, to many minds, so difficult of
belief.  No man can have any difficulty in believing
that there are natural laws of which he is ignorant;
nor in conceiving that there may be Beings who do
know  them, and can use them, even as he himself
now uses the few laws with which he is acquainted.
The real difficulty lies in the idea of Will exercised
without the use of means-not in the idea of Will




THE SUPERNATURAL.               x5
exercised through means which are beyond our know.
ledge, or beyond our reach.
Now, have we any right to say that belief in /zis is
essential to all Religion?  If we have not, then, it is
only putting, as so many other hasty sayings do put,
additional difficulties in the way of Religion. The rela.
tion in which God stands to those rules of His government which are called " laws," is, of course, an inscrutable
mystery to us. But the very idea of a Creator involves
the idea not merely of a Being by whom the properties
of Matter are employed, but of a Being from whose WMill
the properties of Matter are derived. This, indeed, is
the proper work of Creation, as nearly as we can form
a conception of it. It is true that in forming this
conception we pass beyond the bounds of our own
experience, because "we pass from that in God of
which there is an image in Man, to that which is distinctive of God as God."  But this we muLst do in
forming any idea of a God at all.  We must conceive
the Creator as first giving existence to the means,
and theIn using them for the accomplishment of ends.
"We cannot conceive of the original relation of this
Universe to God as that of an infinite multitude of laws
to an infinite Mind, having (only) perfect knowledge
of them, and using this knowledge in turning them to
account, in accomplishing designs of infinite wisdom.




IY 6              THE REIGN OF LAW.
TAe cannot conceive of infinite wisdom thus, as it were,
finding infinite resources already existing."   All this is
true. But those who believe that God's Will does govern
the world, must believe that ordinarily, at least, He does
govern it by the choice and use of means,-which means
were a.gain pre-established by Himself. Nor have we any
certain reason to believe that He ever acts otherwise.
Extraordinary  manifestations of His Will-signs and
wonders-may be wrought, for aught we know, by similar
instrumentality-only by the selection and use of laws
of which Man knows and can know nothing, and which,
if he did know, he could not employ.2
1 I am glad to be able to quote these passages from one of my
earliest and most valued friends, the Rev. J. McLeod Campbell.
They occur in an Introduction to a new edition of his work on the
"Nattre of the Atonement" (Macmillan and Co. I867)-an Tntroduction marked by characteristic depth of thought and feeling.
2 This chapter, originally published as an article in the Edinbzuirgh
Review for Oct. I862, has been referred to in the remarkable work
of Mr. Lecky on "The Rise and Influence of Rationalism in
Europe," (vol. i. ch. ii. p. I95 note,) as conveying " a notion of a
miracle which would not differ gezes''icazZy from a human act, though
it would still be strictly available for evidential purposes." I am
quite satisfied with this definition of the result. Beyond the immediate purposes of benevolence, which were served by almost all the
miracles of the New Testament, the only other purpose which is ever
assigned to them is an " evidential purpose "- that is, a purpose
that they might serve as signs of the presence of superhuman
knowledge, and of the working of superhuman power. They were
performed-in short-to assist faith, and not to confound reason.




THE SUPERNATURAL.                1 7
Here, then, we come upon the question of miracleshow we understand them? what we would define them
to be?  The common idea of a miracle is, a suspension
or violation of the laws of Nature. This is a definition
which places the essence of a miracle in a particular
method of operation. But there is another definition
which passes over the question of method altogether,
and dwells only on the agency by which, and the purpose
for which, a wonderful work is wrought. ~" WVe would
confine the word miracle," says Dr. M'Cosh,l "to those
events which were wrought in our world as a sign or
proof of God making a supernatural interposition, or a
revelation to AMan."  The two most essential conditions
in this view of a miracle, are that it is a work wrought
by a Divine power for a Divine purpose, and is of a
nature such as could not be wrought by merely human
contrivance. This definition of a miracle does not necessarily exclude the idea of God working by the use of
means, provided they are such means as are out of
human reach.  Indeed,- in an important note (p. 149),
Dr. MICosh explains that miracles are not to be considered "as against Nature" in any other sense than
that in which " one natural agent may be against another
-as water may counteract fire."  This eminent writer
I " The Supernatural in relation to the Natural." By the Rev.
James M'Cosh, LL.D. Macmillan, Cambridge, I86z.
C




IS             TTHE REICN OF LAW.
has approached the subject by the right method, because
he has addressed himself first to the solution of the one
question which is an essential preliminary to all subsequent discussion: —':  low much is contained in the
Natural? " Not until this question is answered, can the
Supernatural be defined.  Yet the answer given by Dr.
M'Cosh shows the inherent and the insuperable difficulty
which attends the giving of any answer at all.  "In this
world," he says, "there is a set of objects and agencies
which constitute a system or Cosmos which may have
relations to regions beyond, but is all the uwhile a sezfconcz zLed sphere, -wilh a spazce around it-an i slland so
/far se5taraled from  other lanzds. This system  we call
Nature" (p.  oxi).  This definition of the Natural is
perhaps as accurate and as full as any that can be given.
It assumes, however, that the boundaries of the Natural
are known.  Put the essential difficulty of separating
between the Natural and the Supernatural is thisthat the boundaries of the Natural are nzot knownthat we cannot trace the shores of this "island"- that
evenr if we could see any distinct separation between
them  and the space around them, we have not explored the "island" itself completely, and therefore we
cannot say of any agency working therein, that it comes
from beyond the Sea.. Mr. Mansel, in his "Essay on
Miracles," adopts the word "superhuman" as the most




THE SUPERNATURAL.                     19
accurate expression of his meaning.  Hie says, ("A super.
human authority needs to be substantiated by superhuman evidence; and whiat is szperhmcUan is miraczllous." 
It is important to observe that this definition does not
necessarily involve the idea of a " violation of the laws of
Nature."  It does not involve the idea of the exercise of
Will apart from  the use of means.  It does not imply
any exception to the great law of causation.  It does not
involve, therefore, that idea which appears to many so
difficult of conception.  It simply supposes, without any
attempt to fathom  the relation in wbhich God stands to
His own "laws," that out of His infinite knowledge of
these laws, or of His infinite power of making them  the
instruments of His Will, He may and He does use them
for extraordinary indications of His presence.2
The reluctance to admit, as belonging to the domain
of Nature, any special exertion of Divine power for
1 "Aids to Faith," p. 35. In another passage (p. 2I), Mr. Mansel
says, that in respect to the great majority of the miracles recorded
in Scripture, "the supernatural element appears... in the exercise of a personal power transcending the limits of man's will.
They are not so much szpermZterial as sui-zhuman."
2 I agree with Mr. J. TM. Campbell when he  says, in the Intro.
duction already quoted, "It appears to me that we do not know
enough to say, as regards anything transcending our knowledge of
Law, in which way we should view it —wihether as belonging to the
system of Law, but to a region of it out of our sight, or as outside
of that system, and as having the same immediate relation to God
which the system of Law ultimately has." —P xxxv.
C 2




20               THE REIGN OF LAW.
special purposes, stands really in very close relationl
ship to the converse notioi, that where the operation
of natural causes can be clearly traced, there the exertion of Divine power and Wiill is rendered less certain
and less convincing. This is the idea which lies at the
root of Gibbon's famous chapters on the spread of
Christianity.  He labours to prove that it was due to
natural causes. In proving this, he evidently thinks he
is disposing of the notion that Christianity spread by
Divine power; whereas he only succeeds in pointing
out some of the means which were employed to effect
a Divine purpose.  In like manner, the preservation
of the Jews as a distinct People during so many centuries of complete dispersion, is a fact standing nearly,
if not absolutely, alone in the history of the world.  It
is at variance with all other experience of the laws
which govern the amalgamation with each other of different families of the human race.  The case of the
Gipsies has been referred to as somewhat parallel.  But
the facts of this case are doubtful and obscure, and
such of them as we know involve conditions altogether
dissimilar in kind.  It is not surprising, therefore, that
the preservation of the Jews, partly from  the relation
in which it stands to the apparent fulfilment of Prophecy, and partly from the extraordinary nature of the
fact itself, is tacitly assumed by many persons to come




THE SUPERNATURAL.                 21
strictly within the category of miraculous events.  Yet
in itself it is nothing more than a striking illustration
how a departure from the " ordinary course of nature"
may be effected through the instrumentality of means
which are natural and comprehensible. An extraordinary resisting power has -been given to the Jewish
People against those dissolving and disintegrating forces
which have caused the disappearance of every other
race placed under similar conditions.  They have been
torn from home and country, and removed, not in a body,
but in scattered fragments, over the world.  Yet they
are as distinct from every other people now as they were
in the days of Solomon.  Nevertheless this resisting
power, wonderful though it be, is the result of special
laws, overruling those in ordinary operation.  It has
been effected by the use of means.  Those means
have been superhuman-they have been beyond human
contrivance and arrangement.  l'nut they belong to
the region of the Natural.  They belong to it not
the less, but all the more, because in their concatenation and arrangement they seem to indicate the purpose
of a living Will seeking and effecting the fulfilment of
its designs. This is the manner after which our own
living wills in their little sphere effect their little objects.
Is it difficult to believe that after the same manner also
the Divine Will, of which ours is the image only, works
and effects its purposes?




22              THE REITGN OF LAW.
Our own experience shows that the universal Reign
of Law is perfectly consistent with a power of making
those laws subservient to design-even when the knowledge of them is but slight, and the power over them
slighter still.  How much more easy, how much more
natural, to conceive that the same universality is compatible with the exercise of that Supreme Will before
mwhich all are known, and to which all are servants!
What difficulty in this view remains in the idea of the
Supernatural? Is it any other than the difficulty in believilng in the existence of a Supreme Will-in a living
God?  if this be the belief of which M. Guizot speaks
when he says that it is essential to religion, then his
proposition is unquestionably true.  In this sense the
difficulty of believing in the Supernatural, and the difficulty of believing in pure Theism, is one and the same.
But if he means that it is necessary to religion to believe in even the occasional' violation of law,"-if he
means that without such belief, signs and wonders cease
to be evidences of Divine power,-tlhen he announces a
proposition which cannot be sustained. There is nothing
in. Religion incompatible with the belief that all exercises of God's power, whether ordinary or extraordinary, are effected through the instrumentality of means
-that is to say, by the instrumentality of natural laws
brought out, as it were, and used for a Divine purpose.
To believe in 1!Ic' existence of miracles, we must indeed




THE SUPERNATURAL,                  23
believe in the Superhuman and in the Supermaterial.
But both these are familiar facts in Nature.  We must
believe also in a Supreme Will and a Supreme Intelligence; but this our own Wills and our own Intelligence
not only enable us to conceive of, but compel us to
recognise in the whole laws and economy of Nature.
Her whole aspect "answers intelligently to our intelligence-mind responding to mind as in a glass."'  Once
admit that there is a Being who-irrespective of any
theory as to the relation in which the laws of Nature
stand to His Will-has at least an infinite knowledge of
those laws, and an infinite power of putting them to usethen miracles lose every element of inconceivability. In
respect to the greatest and highest of all-that restoration of the breath of life which is not more mysterious
than its original gift-there is no answer to the question
which Paul asks, "Why should it be thought a thing
incredibie by you that God should raise the dead?"
This view of miracles is well expressed by Principal
Tulioch:
"The stoutest advocate of interference can mean
nothing more than that the Supreme Will has so moved
the hidden springs of nature that a new  issue arises
1 "Beginning Life: Chapters for Young Men on Religion, Study,
and Business. Chap. iii., Tlue Supernatural." By John Tullocbh
D.D. Principal of St. Mary's College, St. Andrew's. Edinburgh,
I86o. P. 29.




24              THE REIGN OF LAW.
on given circumstances.  The ordinary issue is supplanted by a higher issue. The essential facts before
us are a certain set of phenomena, and a Higher Will
moving them.  How moving them? is a question for
human definition; but the answer to which does not
and cannot affect the Divine meaning of the change.
Yet when we reflect that this Higher Will is everywhere reason and wisdom, it seems a juster as well as
a more comprehensive view to regard it as operating
by subordination and evolution rather than by'interference' or'violation.'  According to this view, the
idea of Law is so far from being contravened by the
Christian miracles, that it is taken up by them and
made their very basis. They are the expression of a
Higher Law, working out its wise ends among the
lower and ordinary sequences of life and history. These
ordinary sequences represent nature-nature, however,
not as an immutable fate, but a plastic  medium
through which  a Higher Voice and Will are ever
addressing us, and which, therefore, may be wrought
into new issues when the Voice has a new message,
and the Will a special purpose for us." 1
It is well worthy of remark, that Locke, who laid
great stress on the Christian miracles, as attesting the
authority of those who wrought them, declines, nevertheless, to adopt the common definition of that ill
"BegiDning Life," &c. pp. 85, 86. By John Tulloclh, D.D,




THE SUPERNATURAL.               25
which miraculous agency consists.  A miracle then,"
he says,1 "I take to be a sensible operation, which,
being above the comprehension of the spectator and,
in his oipinion, contrary to the established course of
nature, is taken by him to be Divine.'"  And in reply
to the objection, that this makes a miracle depend on
the opinions or knowledge of the spectator, he points
out that this objection cannot be avoided by any of
the definitions commonly adopted; because "G it being
agreed that a miracle must be that which surpasses the
force of nature in the established steady laws of cause
and effect, nothing can be taken to be a miracle but
zehat is jzudged to exceed those laws.  Now every one
being able to judge of those laws only by his own
acquaintance with nature, and his own notions of its
force, which are different in different men, it is unavoidable that that should be a miracle to one man
which is not so to another."  In this passage Locke
recognises the great truth, that we can never know
what is above Nature unless we know all that is
within Nature.  But he misses another truth, quite as
important,-that a miracle would still be a miracle even
though we did know the laws through which it was
accomplished, provided those laws, though not beyond
human knowledge, were beyond human control. We
might know the conditions necessary to the performance
L C "A Discourse on Miracles."




26             THE REIGN OF LAW~
of a miracle, although utterly unable to bring those
conditions about. Yet a work performed by the bringing about of conditions which are out of human reach,
would certainly be a work attesting superhuman power.
Nevertheless so deeply ingrained in popular theology
is the idea that miracles, to be miracles at all, must
be performed by some violation or suspension of the
laws of Nature, that the opposite idea of miracles being
performed by the use of means is regarded by many
with jealousy and suspicion. Strange that it should be
thought the safest course to separate as sharply and as
widely as we can between what we are called upon to
believe in Religion, and what we are able to trace or
understand in Nature! With what heart can those who
cherish this frame of mind follow the great argument of
Butler?  All the steps of that argument-the greatest in
the whole range of Christian philosophy-are founded
on the opposite belief, that all the truths, and not less all
the difficulties of Religion, have their type and likeness
in the "constitution and course of Nature."  As we
follow that reasoning, so simple and so profound, we
find our eyes ever opening to some new interpretation of
familiar facts, and recognising among the curious things
of earth, one after another of the laws which, when told
us of the spiritual world, seem so perplexing and so hard
to accept or understand. To ask how much further this
argu-ment of the " Analogy " is capable of illustration and




THE SUPERNATURAL.                 27
development, is to ask how much more we shall know
of Nature. Like all central truths, its ramifications are
infinite-as infinite as the appearance of variety, and as
pervading as the sense of oneness in the universe of God.
But what of Revelation?  Are its history and doctrines incompatible with the belief that God uniformly
acts through the use of means? The narrative of Creation is given to us in abstract only, and is told in two
different forms, both having apparently for their main,
perhaps their exclusive object, the presenting to our
conception the personal agency of a living God. Yet
this narrative indicates, however slightly, that room is
left for the idea of a material process. " Out of the dust
of the ground;" that is, out of the ordinary elements of
Nature, was that Body formed which is still upheld and
perpetuated by organic forces acting under the rules of
Law. Nothing which Science has discovered, or can
discover, is capable of traversing that simple narrative.
On this subject M. Guizot lays great stress, as many
others do, on what he calls the Supernatural in Creation, as distinguished from the operations now visible in
Nature.  "De quelle fagon et par quelle puissance le
genre humain a-t-il commence sur la terre?" In reply to
this question, he proceeds to argue that Man must have
been the result either of mere material forces, or of a
supernatural power exterior to, and superior to Matter.
Spontaneous generation, he argues, supposing it to exist




2 8             STHE REIGN OF LAW.o
at all, can give birth only to infant beings —to the first
hours, and feeblest forms of nascent life, But Man-the
human pair-must evidently have been complete from the
first; created in the full possession of their powers and
faculties. "C'est a cette condition seulement qu'en apparaissant pour la premiere fois sur la terre l'homme aurait
pu y vivre-s'y perpetuer, et y fonder le genre humain.
Evidemment l'autre origine du genre humain est seul admissible, seul possible. Le fait surnaturel de la creation
explique seul la premiere apparition de l'homme ici-bas.'
This is a common but not a very safe argument. If
the Supernatural-that is to say, the Superhuman and
the Supermaterial-cannot be found nearer to us than
this, it will not be securely found at all. It is very difficult to free ourselves from this notion that by going far
enough back, we can "find out God" in some sense in
which we cannot find Him now. The certainty not
merely of one, but of many successive Creations in the
history of our Planet, and especially of a time comparatively recent, when Man did not exist, is indeed an
effectual answer to the notion, if it be now ever entertained, of " all things having continued as they are
since the Beginning."  But those who believe that the
existing processes of Nature can be accounted for by
"Law," may believe that those processes were also
commenced by the same vague and mysterious agency.
To accept the primeval narrative of the Jewish Scrip.




THE SUPERNATURAL.               2 9
tures as coming from authority, and as bringing before
us the personal agency of the Creator, but without purporting to reveal the method of His work,-this is one
thing. To argue that no other origin for the first parents
of the human race is conceivable than that they were
moulded perfect, without the instrumentality of any
means,-this is quite another thing. The various hypotheses of Development, of which Darwin's theory is only
a new and special version, whether they are probable or
not, are at least advanced as affording a possible escape
from the puzzle which M. Guizot puts. These hypotheses
are indeed destitute of proof; and in the form which
they hlave as yet assumed, it may justly be said that
they involve such violations of, or departures from,
all that we know of the existing order of things, as
to deprive them of all scientific basis. But the close
and mysterious relations between the mere animal frame
of Man, and that of the lower animals, does render the
idea of a common relationship by descent at least conceivable. Indeed, in proportion as it seems to approach
nearer to processes of which we have some knowledge, it
is, in a degree, more conceivable than Creation without
any process,-of which we have no knowledge and can
have no conception.
But whatever may have been the method or process
of Creation, it is Creation still.  If it were proved
to-morrow that the first man was "born" from some




30               THE REIGN OF LAW.
pre-existing Form of Life, it would still be true that such
a birth must have been, in every sense of the word, a new
Creation. It would still be as true that God formed him
C" out of the dust of the earth," as it is true that Tle has
so formed every child who is now called to answer the
first question of all theologies.  And we must remember
that the language of Scripture nowhere draws, or seems
even conscious of, the distinction which modern philosophy draws so sharply between the Natural and the
Supernatural.  All the operations of Nature are spoken
of as operations of the Divine Mind.  Creation is the
outward embodiment of a Divine idea.  It is in this
sense, apparently, that the narrative of Genesis speaks of
every plant being formed "before it grew."  But the
same language is held, not less decidedly, of every ordinary birth. "Thine eyes did see my substance, yet being
imperfect.  In Thy book all my members were written,
which in continuance were fashioned, when as yet there
were none of them."  And these words, spoken of the
individual birth, have been applied not less truly to the
modern idea of the Genesis of all Organic Life. Whatever mav have been the physical or material relation
between its successive forms, the ideal relation has
been now clearly recognised, and reduced to scientific
definition. All the members of that frame which has
received its highest interpretation in Marn, had existed,
with lower offices assigned to them, in the animals




THE SUPERNATURAL.                3I
which flourished before Man was born. All theories of
Development have been simply attempts to suggest the
manner in which, or the physical process by means of
which, this ideal continuity of type and pattern has been
preserved. But whilst all these suggestions hlave been
in the highest degree uncertain, some of them violently
absurd, the one thing which is certain is the fact for
which they endeavour to account.  And what is that
fact?  It is one which belongs to the world of Mind,
not to the world of Matter. When Professor Owen tells
us, for example, that certain jointed bones in the Whale's
paddle are the same bones which in the Mole enable it
to burrow, which in the Bat enable it to fly, and in Man
constitute his hand with all its wealth of functions, he
does not mean that physically and actually they are the
same bones, nor that they have the same uses, nor that.
they ever have been, or ever can be, transferable from
one kind of animal to another.  He means that in a
purely ideal or mental conception of the plan of all Vertebrate skeletons, these bones occupy the same relative
place-relative, that is, not to origin or use, but to the
Plan or conception of that skeleton as a whole.
Here the Supermaterial, and in this sense the Super.
natural, element, —that is to say, the ideal conformity and
unity of conception, is the one unquestionable fact, in
which we recognise directly the working of a Mind with
which our own has very near relatiois.  Here, as else.




32              THE REIGN OF LAW.
where, we see the Natural, in the largest sense, including
and embodying the Supernatural; the Material, including
the Supermaterial. No possible theory, whether true or
false, in respect to the physical means employed to preserve the correspondence of parts which runs through all
Creation, can affect the certainty of that mental plan and
purpose which alone makes such correspondence intelligible to us, and in which alone it may be said to exist.
It must always be remembered that the two ideas, —
that of a Physical Cause and that of a Mental Purpose,are not antagonistic; only the one is larger and more
comprehensive than the other. Let us take a case. In
many animal frames there are what have been called
"silent members "'-members which have no reference
to the life or use of the animal, but only to the general
pattern on which all vertebrate skeletons have been
formed. Mr. Darwin, when he sees such a member in
any animal, concludes with certainty that this animal is
the lineal descendant by ordinary generation of some
other animal in which that member was not silent but
turned to use.  Professor Owen, taking a larger and
wider view, would say, without pretending to explain /,ow
its presence is to be accounted for physically, that the
silent member has relation to a general purpose or plan
which can be traced from the dawn of Life, but which
did not receive its full accomplishment until Man was
horn.  This is certain: the other is a theory.  The




THE SUPERNATURAL.               33
assumed physical cause may be true or false. But in any
case the mental purpose and design —the conformity to
an abstract idea-this is certain. The relation in which
created Forms stand to our own mind and to our understanding of their Purpose, is the one thing which we
can surely know, because it belongs to our own consciousness.  It is entirely independent of any belief
we may entertain, or any knowledge we may acquire,
of the processes employed for the fulfilment of that
Purpose.
And yet scientific men sometimes tell us that "we
must be very cautious how we ascribe intention to
Nature. Things do fit into each other, no doubt, as if
they were designed; but all we know about them is
that these correspondences exist, and that they seem to
be the result of physical laws of development and
growth." Very likely; but how these correspondences
have arisen, and are daily arising, is not the question, and
it is immaterial how  that question may be answered.
Do those correspondences exist, or do they not? The
perception of them by our mind is as much a fact as the
sight or touch of the things in which they appear. They
may have been produced by growth-they may have been
the result of a process of development,-but it is not the
less the development of a mental purpose. It is the end
subserved that we absolutely know.  What alone is




34              THE REIGN OF LAW,
doubtful and obscure is precisely that which we are told
is the only legitimate object of our research,-viz., the
means by which that end has been attained. Take one
instance out of millions. The poison of a deadly snake
— let us for a moment consider what this is. It is a
secretion of definite chemical properties which have reference, not only-not even mainly-to the organism of
the animal in which it is developed, but specially to the
organism of another animal which it is intended to destroy. Some naturalists have a vague sort of notion
that, as regards merely mechanical weapons, or organs of
attack, they may be developed by use,-that legs may
become longer by fast running, teeth sharper and longer
by much biting. Be it so: this law of growth, if it
exist, is but itself an instrument whereby purpose is fulfilled. But how will this law of growth adjust a poison
in one animal with such subtle knowledge of the
organisation of another that the deadly virus shall in
a few minutes curdle the blood, benumb the nerves,
and rush in upon the citadel of life?  There is but
one explanation —a Mind, having minute and perfect
knowledge of the structure of both, has designed the
one to be capable of inflicting death upon the other.
This mental purpose and resolve is the one thing which
our intelligence perceives with direct and intuitive
recognition. The method of creation, by means of which




TIHE SUPIERNATURAL.                 35
this purpose has been carried into effect, is utterly
unknown.
It is no answer or objection to this view that poisons
exist also in plants and minerals where no similar adjustment to function is perceived.' Even in these cases there
are wonderful relations between our own human frame
and many poisons of the mineral and vegetable world
which render them invaluable agents in the mitigation
of suffering and the prevention or removal of disease.
It is impossible to believe that these complicated relations of action and reaction between things separated
apparently from each other by the whole width of being,
have been the result of forces with which Mind and
Prevision have had no concern.  But even if the use
of such poisons were absolutely unknown-even if that
use lay, which it does not, beyond thle possibility of our
conception,-this would not deduct by the value of a
fraction from  the certainty of a conclusion which is
founded on different conditions.  The relations of adjustment between a given number of elements are none
the less a certain fact because similar elements may be
found elsewhere without any such adjustment being
visible to us.  It is the very fact of their not being, "To what intention are we to ascribe the poisons liberally distriluted through plants and minerals?" asks Mr. G. II. Lewes in
his review of this work.-_ii-;g1Z "ly R'evicw, Jully i867, p. 1oo.
D2




36              THE REIGN OF LAW.
separate but combined in the one case which justifies
and compels a conclusion different from that which
arises in the other case. This is the law of evidence
on which we act and judge in other matters with conviction which is both intuitive, and capable of being
confirmed by the rules of reason. And this reply is
applicable to all objections of the same kind. Those
portions of the system of Nature which are wholly dark
to us do not necessarily cast any shadow on those
other portions of that system which are luminous with
inherent light.  Rather the other way.  The shining
tracts which thus reflect the light of Reason and of
Mind send abundant rays into all the dark places round
them.  The new  discoveries which Science is ever
making of adjustments and combinations, of which
we had no previous conception, impress us with an
irresistible conviction that the same relations to Mind
prevail throughout. It matters not in what department
of investigation inquiry is conducted, it matters not what
may be the Philosophy or Theology of the inquirer.
Every step he takes he finds himself face to face with
facts which he cannot describe intelligibly either to him.
self or others, except by referring themn to that function
and power of Mind which we know as Purpose and
Design.
Perhaps no illustration more striking of this principle




TIHE SUPERNATURAL,                  37
was ever presented than in the curious volume published
by Mr. Darwin on the "' Fertilisation of Orchids."l  It
appears that the fertilisation of almost all Orchids is dependent on the transport of the pollen from one flower
to another by means of insects.  It appears, further, that
the structure of these flowers is elaborately contrived, so
as to secure the certainty and effectiveness of this operation. Mr. Darwin's work is devoted to tracing in detail
what these contrivances are.  To a large extent they are
purely mechanical, and can be traced with as much
clearness and certainty as the different parts of which
a steam-engine is composed.  The complication and
ingenuity of these contrivances almost exceed belief.
6 "Moth-traps and spring-guns set on these grounds,"
might be the motto of the Orchids.  There are baits to
tempt the nectar-loving Lepidoptera, with rich odours
exhaled at night, and lustrous colours to shine by day;
there are channels of approach along which they are
surely guided, so as to compel them to pass by certain
spots; there are adhesive plasters nicely adjusted to fit
their probosces, or to catch their brows; there are hair
triggers carefully set in their necessary path, communicating with explosive shells, which project the pollen1 "On the various Contrivances by which British and Foreign
Orchids are fertilised by Insects." By Charles Darwin, F.R S.
London, I862.




33                TIIE REIGN OF LAW.
stalks with unerring aim upon their bodies.  There are,
in short, an infinitude of adjustments, for an idea of
which I must refer my readers to Mr. Darwin's inimitable powers of observation and description-adjustments all contrived so as to secure the accurate conveyance of the pollen of the one flower to its precise
destination in the structure of another.
Now  there are two questions which present themselves when we examine such a mechanism  as this.
The first is, What is the use of the various parts, or their
relation to each other with reference to the purpose of
the whole?  The second question is, How were those
parts made, and out of what materials? It is the first of
these questions-that is to say, the use, object, intention, or purpose of the different parts of the plantwhich Darwin sets himself instinctively to answer first;
and it is this which he does answer with precision and
success. The second question,-that is to say, how
those parts came to be developed, and out of what
6" primordial elements" they have been derived in their
present shapes, and converted to their present usesthis is a question which Darwin does also attempt to
solve, but the solution of which is in the highest degree
difficult and uncertain.  It is curious to observe the
language which this most advanced disciple of pure
naturalism instinctively uses when he has to describe the




THE SUPERNATURAL.                 39
complicated structure of this curious order of plants.
" Caution in ascribing intentions to nature," does not
seem to occur to him as possible.  Intention is the one
thing which he does see, and which, when he does not
see, he seeks for diligently until he finds it. He exhausts
every form of words and of illustration by which intention
or mental purpose can be described.  "s Contrivance "" curious contrivance "-" beautiful contrivance,"-these
are expressions which recur over and over again.  Here
is one sentence describing the parts of a particular
species: ", the Labellum is developed into a long nectary, in order to attract Lepidoptera, and we shall presently give reasons for suspecting that the nectar is
pzrposeZy so lodged that it can be sucked only slowly, in
order to give time for the curious chemical quality of the
viscid matter setting hard and dry."   Nor are these
words used in any sense different from that in which
they are applicable to the works of Man's contrivance —
to the instruments we use or invent for carrying into
effect our own preconceived designs. On the contrary,
human instruments are often selected as the aptest illustrations both of the object in view, and of the means
taken to effect it.  Of one particular structure, Mr.
Darwin says: "This contrivance of the guiding ridges
may be compared to the little instrument sometimes
1 p. 29.




410              TI-IE REIGN OF LAWIV
used for guiding a thread into the eye of a needle."
Again, referring to the precautions taken to compel the
insects to come to the proper spot, in order to have the
"pollinia" attached to their bodies, Mr. Darwin says:
"Thus we have the rostellum partially closing the mouth
of the nectary, iZe a trap _p/aced in a run for ganme,-and
the trap so complex and perfect e" 1 But this is not all
The idea of special use, as the controlling principle of
construction, is so impressed on Mr. Darwin's mind,
that, in every detail of structure, however singular or
obscure, he has absolute faith that in this lies the ultimate explanation. If an organ is largely developed, it
is because some special purpose is to be fulfilled. If it
is aborted or rudimentary, it is because that purpose is
no longer to be subserved.  In the case of another
species whose structure is very singular, Mr. Darwin had
great difficulty in discovering how the mechanism was
meant to work, so as to effect the purpose.  At last he
made it out, and of the clue which led to the discovery
he says: "The strange position of the Labellum perched
on the summit of the column, ought to have shown me
that here was the place for experiment. I ought to have
scorned the notion that the Labellum was thus placed for
no good pur~pose.  I neglected this plain guide, and for a
long time completely failed to understand the flower." 2
ra, 30.            2 P. 253.




THE SUPERNATURAL,                   4I
An attempt has, indeed, been made to explain away
Mr. Darwin's language in such cases as " metaphorical." 
But this explanation is powerless to expel from that
language the inference it involves.  Indeed, it is an
explanation which only repeats the same idea in another
form.  The very essence of a metaphor is that it expresses the resemblances of things. But it is in seeing
the resemblances, and in seeing the correlative differences
of things, that all knowledge consists. This perception
is the raw material of Thought — it is the foundation of
all intellectual apprehension. In proportion as resemblances are complete, the language which expresses those
resemblances is the language of truth. Such language
very often carries within it the most certain conclusions
which are accessible to reason.  One mind looking at
the workings of another mind  can see likeness of
agency only by recognising likeness in the processes of
thought.  That likeness can only be expressed in words
which convey the idea of it to other minds.  But in
this sense all language is metaphorical.  The commonest
words we use to indicate ideas are essentially metaphorical, bringing home into the world of Mind images
1 Quarlterly YozurnaZ of Science, Oct. I867. "' Creation by Law,"
by Alfred Wallace. " Mr. Darwin has laid himself open to much
misconception, and has given to his opponents a powerful. weapon
by his continual use of metaphor in describing the wonderful co.
adaptations of organic beings."-P. 473.




a4               THIE REIGN OF LAW.
derived from  material force, and carrying forth again
into the outward world conceptions born of that mental
power which alone is capable of conceiving. In one
aspect, all human speech is what the Poet calls it,
"s Matter-moulded forms of speech." 1 In another aspect
it is all spirit-mouldled, since we can only think of
1Matter in the light of those impressions which it has
power to make on Mind. All language is thus but a
system of signs whereby we express the analogies-the
differences and resemblances perceived by us in those
two great departments of Nature of which the union and
the separation are both imaged in ourselves-that is, in
the union and in the difference of the Body and the
MIind. The most absolute certainties we can ever know
are only known by the translation of ideas or conceptions
from one of these departments to the other, and the
language in which these certainties are expressed carries,
and must carry, signs of this origin in itself.  The question, therefore, in respect to Mr. Darwin's language, is
not whether it is'l"metaphorical "-that is, whether it
applies to material phenomena conceptions derived
from the world of Mind. This, of course, it does, and
in the nature of the case it must do.  But the question
is, whether the correspondence it expresses between the
order of thcse material phenomena and a known order
d'In Memnoriaml) xciv,




THE SUPERNATURAL.                43
of Thought is or is not a real correspondence, and
one, therefore, indicating the known effects of a known
originating cause.
And here it is well worthy of observation, that
although Purpose and Intention are, of course, involved
in all mental operations, yet the conception of contrivance is not the only mental conception which, in
like manner, is recognised as constituting the order of
natural phenomena.  Other conceptions equally familiar
to the mind of Man are instinctively recognised by all
Naturalists who bring high intellectual powers into that
contact with Nature which consists in close and thoughtful observation of her facts. Other mental conceptions,
such as those of Number and Proportion, are then found
to emerge, and make an ineffaceable impression on the
mind which sees them.
Thus, when we come to the second part of Mr. Darwin's
work, viz. the Homology of the Orchids, we find that the
inquiry divides itself into two separate questions,-first,
the question what all these complicated organs are in
their primitive relation to each other; and, secondly,
how these successive modifications have arisen, so as to
fit them for new and changing uses.  Now, it is very
remarkable that of these two questions, that which may
be called the most abstract and transcendental-the
most nearly related to the Supernatural and the SupeFr




44              THE REIGN OF LAW.
material-is again precisely the one which Darwin is
able to solve most clearly. We have already seen how
well he solves the first question-What is the use and
intention of these various parts?  The next question is,
What are these parts in their primal order and conception? The answer is, that they are members of a
numerical group, having a definite and still traceable
order of symmetrical arrangement. They are expressions of a numnerical idea, as so many other things —
perhaps as all things-of beauty are. Mr. Darwin gives
a diagram, showing the primordial or archetypal arrangement of Threes within Threes, out of which all the strange
and marvellous forms of the Orchids have been developed, and to which, by careful counting and dissection,
they can still be ideally reduced. But when we come
to the last question-By what process of natural consequence have these elementary organs of Three within
Three been developed into so many various forms of
beauty, and made to subserve so many curious and
ingenious designs?-we find nothing but the vaguest and
most unsatisfactory conjectures. Let us take one in.
stance as an example. There is a Madagascar Orchis —
the " Angrecumn sesquipedale " —with an immensely long
and deep nectary. How did such an extraordinary organ
come to be developed?  Mr. Darwin's explanation is
this The pollen of thllis floer can only be removed by




TiIE SUPERNATURAL.              45
the proboscis of some very large Moth trying to get at
the nectar at the bottom of the vessel. The Moths with
the longest probosces would do this most effectually;
they would be rewarded for their long noses by getting
the most nectar; whilst, on the other hand, the flowers
with the deepest nectaries would be the best fertilised by
the largest Moths preferring them. Consequently, the
deepest-nectaried Orchids, and the longest-nosed Moths,
would each confer on the other a great advantage in the
" battle of life."  This would tend to their respective
perpetuation, and to the constant lengthening of nectaries and of noses. But the passage is so curious and
characteristic, that it is well to give Mr. Darwin's own
words:As certain Moths of Madagascar became larger,
through natural selection in relation to their general
conditions of life, either in the larval or mature state,
or as the proboscis alone was lengthened to obtain
honey from the Angrncum, those individual plants of
the Angrmecum which had the longest nectaries, (and
the nectary varies much in length in some Orchids,)
and which, consequently, compelled the Moths to insert
their probosces up to the very base, would be the best
fertilised. These plants would yield most seed, and the
seedlings would generally inherit longer nectaries; and
so it would be in successive generations of the plant and




46                 THE REIGN OF LAW.
Moth.  Thus it would appear that there has been a race
in gaining length between the nectary of the Angrmcur
and the proboscis of certain Moths; but the Angraecum
has triumphed, for it flourishes and abounds in the
forests of Madagascar, and still troubles each  ijoth to
insert its proboscis as far as possible in order to drain
the last drop of nectar...... We can thus," says Mr.
Darwin, "par/ially  understand  how  the  astonishing
length of the nectary may have been acquired by successive modifications."
It is indeed but a "partial" understanding.'  How
came this Orchis to require any exact adjustment between the length of its nectary and the proboscis of an
insect?  This is not a general necessity even among the
Orchids.  "In the British species, such as Orchis Pyramidalis, it is not necessary that any such adjustment
should exist, and thus a number of insects of various
sizes are found to carry away the pollinia, and aid in
the fertilisation." 2 This would obviously be the most
favourable condition for all Orchids in the battle of life.
Does not the hypothesis, then, begin by assuming the very
i The passage which follows I have added to meet the objection
taken by Mr. Wallace, that I have "not shown what point the
explanation fails to meet." A sample only of such points can be
given here. See also Note A.
2' Creation by Law."  G. A. R. Wallace.   auranal of Sciene,
October r367, p. 475.




THE SUPERNATURAL.                    47
condition of things for which it professes to account?
We must start with this Madagascar Orchis already in
possession of a larger nectary than other species, and
with a structure already depending on particular Moths
also already existing, and already provided with probosces of nicely adjusted length.  If the nectaries began
first to lengthen, how came the 3Moths not to leave
them for other flowers?  And if, on the contrary, they
began to shorten, how came they not to be favoured
and resorted to by other Moths of a smaller size?  Can
we assume that somehow there were always ready some
Moths still larger to favour the longer variety, and that
somehow also there were no smaller Moths to favour the
shorter?    Why should the race in tihis pvarlicular spccies
be always in the direction of nectaries getting longer,
and not rather in the direction of nectaries getting
shorter? Obviously the same hypothesis might be so
turned as to account for either result with equal ease,
and therefore it does not account at all for one of
those results as against the other.  And then there is
1 Mr. Wallace sees no difficulty whatever in making any supposi.
tion of-this kind which the Theory may require.  "Now let us
start," he says, " from the time when the nectary was only half its
present length, or about six inches, and was chiefly fertilized by a
pspecies of Moth which aApeared at the time of the fanlats flozcer'iuff
and cl.'eaxto tQis-ads was sl nt mme &nhh"-t4 i-bid, p. 4 75.




43              THEI-I  REIGN OF LAW0
a larger question than any of these which remains
behind.  How came Orchids to be dependent at all
upon insects for fertilisation?  It cannot be argued
that this is a necessity arising mechanically from the
nature of things, because, as we are truly told by an
eminent naturalist who warmly supports the Darwinian
hypothesis, "exactly the same end is attained in ten
thousand other flowers" which do not possess the same
structure.1  But what is the bearing of this fact upon
the theory?  Is it not this-that the origin of such
curious structures, and complicated relations, cannot be
accounted for on any principle of mere mechanical
necessity? Elementary forces may indeed always be
detected, for they are always present. But the manner
in which they are worked irresistibly suggests some
directing power, having as one of its aims mere increase
and variety in that ocean of enjoyment which constitutes the sum of Organic Life.  Some idea of this
kind, however unconsciously, however reluctantly conceded, lurks in every form  of words in which the
facts of science can be generalised to the mind. Thus
we find Mr. Wallace himself saying, in the same paper
in which he regrets the language of Mr. Darwin, that the
conception he prefers is, that the " contrivances" referred
to "are some of the results of those general laws which
I II Creation by Law," p. 474.




TIlE SUPERNATURAL.                49
were so co-ordintated at the first introduction of Life upon
the earth, as to result necessarily in the utmost possible
development of varied forms." Eliminating the word
"necessarily," which, if it has any meaning, does not
apply, as we have seen, to the case of the Orchids, this
language presents an intelligible idea.  It satisfies the
mind precisely in proportion as it brings into view,
however distant, the attributes of Mind, and gives us a
glimpse of " the reason why." The pIroduction of variety
in beauty and in enjoyment is the pur'pose which those
words suggest.  In like proportion is Mr. Darwin's
language the truest and the best.  His explanations
of the mechanical methods by which a wonderful
Orchis has come to be are indeed, as he himself says,
with great candour, "partial" and partial only.  How
different from  the clearness and the certainty with
which Mr. Darwin is able to explain to us the use and
intention of the various organs! or the primal idea of
numerical order and arrangement which governs the
whole structure of the flower! It is the same through
all Nature. Purpose and intention, or ideas of order
based on numerical relations, are what meet us at every
turn, and are more or less readily recognised by our
own intelligence as corresponding to conceptions familiar
to our own minds. We know, too, that these purposes
and ideas are not our own, but the ideas and purposes
of Another —of  lne whole manifestations are indeed
Ers




53              TTIE  REIGN OF I,AVu.,
superhuman and supermnaterial, but are not'supernatural," in the sense of being strange to Nature, or in
violation of it.
The truth is, that there is no such distinction between what we find in Nature, and what we are called
upon to believe in Religion, as that which men pretend
to draw between the Natural and the Supernatural.  It
is a distinction purely artificial, arbitrary, unreal. Nature
presents to our intelligence, the more clearly the more we
search her, the designs, ideas, and intentions of some
66 Living Will that shall endure.
When all that seems shall suffer shock."
Religion presents to us that same Will, not only working equally through the use of means, but using means
which are  strictly analogous —referable to the same
general principles-and which are constantly appealed
to as of a sort which we ought to be able to appreciate,
because wve ourselves are already familiar with the like.
Religion makes no call on us to reject that idea, which
is the only idea some men can see in Nature-the idea
of the universal Reign of Law- the necessity of conforming to it-the limitations which in one aspect it
seems to place on the exercise of Will,-the essential
basis, in another aspect, which it supplies for all the
functions of Volition. On the contrary, the high regions
into which this idea is found extending, and the mattera




THUE SUPlERNATURAL.               51
over which it is found prevailing, is one of the deepest
mysteries both of Religion and of Nature. We feel sometimes as if we should like to get afove this rule-into
some secret Presence where its bonds are broken.  But
no glimpse is ever given us of anything, but " Freedom within the bounds of Law." The Will revealed
to us in Religion is not-any more than the Will revealed to us in Nature-a capricious Will, but one with
which, in this respect, " there is no variableness, neither
shadow of turning."
We return, then, to the point fromn which we started.
M. Guizot's affirmation that belief in the Supernatural is
essential to all Religion is true only when it is understood in a special sense.  Belief in the existence of a
Living Will-of a Personal  God-is indeed a requisite
condition.  Conviction " that He is " must precede the
conviction that " He is the rewarder of those that diligently seek Him." But the intellectual yoke involved
in the common idea of the Supernatural is a yoke which.
men impose upon themselves.  Obscure thought and
confused language are the main source of difficulty.
Assuredly, whatever may be the difficulties of Christianity, tzis is not one of them, —that it calls on us to
believe in any exception to the universal prevalence and
power of Law.  Its leading facts and doctrines are
directly connected with this belief, and directly suggestive of it. The Divine mission of Christ on earth-e




52              THE REIGN OF LAW.
does not this imply not only the use of means to an
end, but some inscrutable necessity that certain means,
and these only, should be employed in resisting and
overcoming evil?  What else is the import of so many
passages of Scripture implying that certain conditions
were required to bring the Saviour of Man into a given
relation with the race He was sent to save?  "It behoved Him... to make the Captain of our Salvation
perfect thlrough suffering."  "It behoved Him  in all
things to be made like unto His brethren, taict He might
be," &c. —with the reason added: "for in ta/zt He Himself hath suffered being tempted, He is able to succour
them that are tempted."  Whatever mnore there may be
in such passages, they all imply the universal reign of
Law in the moral and spiritual, as well as in the material w-orld: that those laws had to be-behoved to beobeyed; and that the results to be obtained are brought
about by the adaptation of means to an end, or, as it
were, by way of natural consequence from the instrumentality employed. This, however, is an idea which
systematic theology generally regards with intense suspicion, though, in fact, all theologies involve it, and
build upon it.  But then they are very apt to give
explanations of that instrumentality which have no counterpart in the material or in the moral world. Perhaps
it is not too much to say that the manifest decay which
so many creeds and confessions are now suffering, arises




THE SUPIRNATURAL.                  53
mainly from the degree in which at least the popular
expositions of them dissociate the doctrines of Christianity from  the analogy and course of Nature.  There
is no such severance in Scripture-no shyness of illustrating Divine things by reference to the Natural. On
the contrary, we are perpetually reminded that the laws
of the spiritual world are in the highest sense laws of
Nature, whose obligation, operation, and effect are all
in the constitution and course of things.  Hence it is
that so much was capable of being conveyed in the fcrm
of parable —the common actions and occurrences of
daily life being often chosen as the best vehicle and
illustration of the highest spiritual truths.  It is not
merely, as Jeremy Taylor says, that "all things are full
of such resemblances," —it is more than this —more
than resemblance.  It is the perpetual recurrence, under
infinite varieties of application, of the same rules and
principles of Divine government,-of the same Divine
thoughts, Divine purposes, Divine affections. Hence it
is that no verbal definitions or logical forms can convey
religious truth with the fulness or accuracy which belongs
to narratives taken from  Nature-Man's nature and life
being, of course, included in the term:
64 And so, the Word had hreath, and wrought
With human hands the Creed of creeds." 1
1 Tennyson's "In Memoriam."




TIlE REIGN OF LAW.
The same idea is expressed in thle passionate exclamation of Edward Irving:-" We must speak in parables,
or we must present a wry and deceptive form  of truth;
of whlich. choice the first is to be preferred, and our Lord
adopted it.  Because parable is truth veiled, not truth
dismermbered; and as the eye of the understanding
grows more piercing, the veil is seen through, and the
truth stands revealed."  Nature is the great Parable;
and the truths which she holds within her are veiled,
but not dismembered.  The pretendcd separation between. that which lies within Nature and that which lies
beyond Nature is a dismemberment of the truth.  Let
both those who find it difficult to believe in anythilng
which is " above" the Natural, and those who insist on
that belief, first determine how far the Natural extends.
Perhlaps in going round these marches they will find
themselves meeting upon common ground. For, indeed,
long before we have searchled out all that the Natural
includes, there will remain little in the so-called Supernatural which can seem  hard of acceptance or beliefnothing which is not rather essential to our understand.
ing of this otherwise "unintelligible world'3




CHAPTER IL
LAW — ITS DEFINITIONS.
T'HE  Reign of Law-is this, then, the reign under
w- Which we live?  Yes, iin a sense it is. There
is no denying it. The whole world around us, and
the whole world within us, are rI'lted by Law.  Our
very spirits are subject to it-those spirits which yet
seem  so spiritual, so subtle, so free.  H-low often in
the darkness do they feel the restraining walls —bou1-x(s
within which they move-conditions out of Mwhich they
cannot think! The perception of th-is is gr-owing in
the consciousness of men.  It grows with the growth
of knowledge; it is the delight, the reward, tie goal
of Science.  From Science it passes into every domain
of thought, and invades, amongst others, the Theclogy
of the Church.  And so we see the men of Theology
coming out to parley with the men of Science,-a white
flag in their hands, and saying, "6 If you will let us alone
we will do the same by you.  Keep to your own province, do not enter ours.  The Reign of Law which




5 6              THE REIGN OF LAW.
you proclaim, we admit —outside these walls, but not
within them:-let there be peace between us." But
this will never do.  There can be no such treaty dividing the domain of Truth. Every one Truth is connected with every other Truth in this great Universe
of God. The connexion may be one of infinite subtlety, and apparent distance-running, as it were, underground for a long way, but always asserting itself at
last, somewhere, and at some time.  No bargaining, no
fencing off the ground-no form of process, will avail
to bar this right of way.  Blessed right, enforced by
blessed power! Every truth, which is truth indeed, is
charged with its own consequences, its own analogies,
its own suggestions. These will not be kept outside
any artificial boundary; they will range over the whole
Field of Thought, nor is there any corner of it from
which they can be warned away.
And therefore we must cast a sharp eye indeed on
every form of words which professes to represent a
scientific truth. If it be really true in one department
of thought, the chances are that it will have its bearing
on every other.  And if it be not true, but erroneous, its
effect will be of a corresponding character; for there
is a brotherhood of Error as close as the brotherhood
of Truth. Therefore, to accept as a truth that which
is not a truth, or to fail in distinguishing the sense in




LAW;-ITS DEFINITIONS.             5 7
which a proposition may be true, from other senses in
vwhich it is not true, is an evil having consequences
which are indeed incalculable. There are subjects on
which one mistake of this kind will poison all the wells
of truth, and affect with fatal error the whole circle of
our thoughts.
It is against this danger that some men would erect
a feeble barrier by defending the position, that Science
and Religion may be, and ought to be, kept entirely
separate;-that they belong to wholly different spheres
of thought, and that the ideas which prevail in the one
province have no relation to those which prevail in the
other. This is a doctrine offering many temptations to
many minds. It is grateful to scientific men who are
afraid of being thought hostile to Religion.: It is grateful to religious men who are afraid of being thought to
be afraid of Science.  To these, and to all who are
troubled to reconcile what they have been taught to
believe with what they have come to know, this doctrine affords a natural and convenient escape.  There
is but one objection to it-but that is the fatal objection-that it is not true. The spiritual world and the
intellectual world are not separated after this fashion:
and the notion that they are so separated does but
encourage men to accept in each, ideas which will at
last be found to be false in both. The truth is, that




53' THE REIGN OF LAWE
there is no branch of human inquiry, however purely
physical, which is more than the word " branch" implies; —none which is not connected through endless
ramifications with every other, —and especially that
which is the root and centre of them all. If lIe who
formed the mind be one with Him who is the Orderer
of all things concerning which that mind is occupied,
there can be no end to the points of contact between
our different conceptions of them, of Him, and of
ourselves.
The instinct which impels us to seek for harmony
in the truths of Science and the truths of Religion, is
a higher instinct and a truer one than the disposition
which leads us to evade the difficulty by pretending
that there is no relation between them.  For, after all,
it is a pretence and nothing more.  No man who
thoroughly accepts a principle in the philosophy of
Nature which lhe feels to be inconsistent with a doctrine of Religion, can help having his belief in that
doctrine shaken and undermined.  We may believe,
and we must believe, both in Nature and Religion,
many things which we cannot understarnd; but we cannot really believe two propositions which are felt to be
contradictory, It helps us nothing in such a difficulty,
to say that the one proposition belongs to Reason and
the other proposition belongs to Faith, The endeavour




LAW;-ITS DEFINITIONS.               5$9
to reconcile them is a necessity of the mind. We are
right in thinking that, if they are both indeed true, they
can be reconciled, and if they really are fundamentally
opposed, they cannot both be true.  That is to say,
there must be some error in our manner of conception
in one or in the other, or in both.  At the very best,
each can represent only some partial and imperfect
aspect of the truth.  The error may lie in our Theology, or it may lie in what we are pleased to call our
Science.  It may be that some dogma, derived by
tradition from  our fathers, is having it; hollowness betrayed by that light which sometimes shines upon the
ways of God out of a better knowledge of His works.
It may be that some proud and rash generalisation ol
the schools is having its falsehood proved by the vioience it does to the deepest instincts of our spiritual
nature,-to'Truths which wale to perish never!
Which neither man nor boy,
Nor all that is at enmity with joy,
Can utterly abolish or destroy." 1
Such, for example, is the conclusion to which the
language of some scientific men is evidently pointing,
that great general Laws inexorable in their operation,
I " Ode to Immortality, from the Recollections of early Child,
hood. "-Wordsworth.




60              THE REIGN OF LAW.
and Causes in endless chain of invariable sequence,
are the governing powers in Nature, and that they leave
no room for any special direction or providential ordering of events. If this be true, it is vain to deny its
bearing on Religion.  What then can be the use of
prayer?  Can Laws hear us?  Can they change, or can
they suspend themselves? These questions cannot but
arise, and they require an answer. It is said of a
late eminent Professor and clergyman of the English
Church, who was deeply imbued with these opinions
on the place occupied by Law in the economy of
Nature, that he went on, nevertheless, preaching high
doctrinal sermons from the pulpit until his death. He
did so on the ground that propositions which were contrary to his reason were not necessarily beyond his faith.
The inconsistencies of the human mind are indeed unfathomable; and there are men so constituted as honestly
to suppose that they can divide themselves into two
spiritual beings, one of whom is sceptical, and the
other is believing. But such men are rare-happily
for Religion, and not less happily for Science. No
healthy intellect, no earnest spirit, can rest in such selfbetrayal. Accordingly we find many men now facing
the consequences to which they have given their intellectual assent, and taking their stand upon the ground that
prayer to God has no other value or effect than so far




LAW — ITS DEFINITIONS.                6I
as it may be a good way of preaching to ourselves. It
is a useful and helpful exercise for our own spirits, but
it is nothing more. But how, can they pray who have
come to this? Can it ever be useful or helpful to be.
lieve a lie? That which has been threatened as the
worst of all spiritual evils, would then become the conscious attitude of our "religion," the habitual condition
of our worship. This must be as bad science, as it
is bad religion.  It is in violation of a Law the highest
known to Man-the Law  which inseparably connects
earnest conviction of the truth in what we do or say,
with the very fountains of all intellectual and moral
strength. No accession of force can come to us from
doing anything in which we disbelieve. Such a doctrine will be indeed
" The little rift within the lute
That by and by will make the music mute,
And ever widening slowly silence all." 1
if there is any helpfulness in Prayer even to the
Mind itself. that helpfulness can only be preserved by
showing that the belief on which this virtue depends is
a rational belief. The very essence of that belief is
this —that the Divine Mind is accessible to supplication,
and that the Divine Will is capable of being moved
I "Idylls of the King —Vivien."-Tennyson.




0(;2             THE REIGN OF LAW.
thereby.  No question is, or indeecd can be, raised as
to the powerful effect exerted by this belief on Ailan's
nature.  That effect is recognised as a fact.  Its value
is admitted; and in order that it may not be lost, the
compromise now offered by some philosophers is thisthat although the course of external nature is unalterable, yet possibly the phenomena of Mind and character
may be changed by the Divine Agency.  But will this
reasoning bear analysis? Can the distinction it assumes
be maintained?  Whatever difficulties there may be in
reconciling the ideas of Law and of Volition, they are
difficulties which apply equally to the Worlds of Matter
and of Mind.  The Mind is as much subject to Law
as the Body is,  The Reign of Law is over all; and if
its dominion be really incompatible with the agency of
Volition, Human or Divine, then the Mind is as inaccessible to that agency as material things.  It would indeed
be absurd to affirm that all Prayers are equally rational
or equally legitimate.  Most true it is that'"we know
not what we should pray for as we ought."   Prayer
does not require us to believe that anything can be dloi-ne
witihout the use of means; neither does it require us
to believe that anything will be done in violation of
thle Universal Order.  " If it be possible," was the
qualification used  in  the most solemn  Prayer ever
uttered ulpon Earth.  What are and what are not legin




LAW;-ITS DEFINITIONS.              63
timate objects of supplication, is a question which may
well be open.  But the question now raised is a wider
one than this-even the question whether the very idea
of Prayer be not in itself absurd-whether the Reign
of Law does not preclude the possibility of AWill affecting the successive phenomena either of Matter or of
Mind. This is a question lying at the root of our
whole conceptions of the Universe, and of all our own
powers, both of thinking and of acting.  The freedom
which is denied to God is not likely to be left to Man.
We shall see, accordingly, that precisely the same denials
are applied to both.
The conception of Natural Laws-of their place, of
their nature, and of their office-which involves us in
such questions, and which points to such conclusions,
demands surely a  very careful examination at our
hands.
What, then, is this Reign of Law?  What is Law, and
in what sense can it be said to reign?
Words, which should be the servants of Thought, are
too often its masters; and there are very few words
which are used more ambiguously, and therefore more
injuriously, than the word "Law."  It may indeed be
legitimately used in several different senses, because in
all cases as applied in Science it is a metaphor, and one
which has relation to many different kinds and degrees




64              TIHE REIGN OF LAW.
of likeness in the ideas which are compared. It matters
little in which of these senses it is used, provided the
distinctions between them are kept clearly in view, and
provided we watch against the fallacies which must arise
when we pass insensibly from one meaning to another.
And here it may be observed, in passing, that the metaphors which are employed in Language are generally
founded on analogies instinctively, and often unconsciously, perceived, and which would not be so perceived
if they were not both deep and true. In this case the
idea which lies at the root of Law in all its applications
is evident enough.  In its primary signification, a " law"
is the authoritative expression of human Will enforced by
Power. The instincts of mankind finding utterance in
their language, have not failed to see that the phenomena
of Nature are only really conceivable to us as in like
manner the expressions of a Will enforcing itself with
Power. But, as in many other cases, the secondary or
derivative senses of the word have supplanted the
primary signification; and Law is now habitually used
by men who deny the analogy on which that use is
founded, and to the truth of which it is an abiding witness. It becomes therefore all the more necessary to
define the secondary senses with precision. There are
at least Five different senses in which Law is habitually
used, and these must be carefully distinguished:



LAW;-ITS DEFINITIONS.             6 5
First, We have Law as applied simply to an observed
Order of facts.
Secondly, To that Order as involving the action of
some Force or Forces of which nothing more may be
known.
Thirdly, As applied to individual Forces the measure
of whose operation has been more or less defined or
ascertained.
Fourthly, As applied to those combinations of Force
which have reference to the fulfilment of Purpose, or the
discharge of Function.
Fifthly, As applied to Abstract Conceptions of the
mind —not corresponding with any actual phenomena,
but deduced therefrom as axioms of thought necessary
to our understanding of them.  Law, in this sense, is a
reduction of the phenomena, not merely to an Order
of facts, but to an Order of Thought.
These great leading significations of the word Law all
circle round the three great questions which Science asks
of Nature, the What, the How, and the Why:(I) What are the facts in their established Order?
(2) How-that is, from what physical causes,-does
that Order come to be?
(3) Why have these causes been so combined? What
relation do they bear to Purpose, to the fulfilment of
iltention, to the discharge of Function?




6 6               THE REIGN OF LAW.
It is so important that these different senses of the
word Law should be clearly distinguished, that each of
them must be more fully considered by itself.
The First and, so to speak, the lowest sense in which
Law is applied to natural phenomena is that in which it
is used to express simply " an observed Order of facts "that is to say, facts which under the same conditions
always follow each other in the same order.  In this
sense the laws of Nature are simply those facts of
Nature which  recur according to a rule.   It is not
necessary to the legitimate application of Law in this
sense, that the cause of any observed Order of facts
should be at all known, or even guessed at.  The Force
or Forces to which that Order is due may be hid in total
darkness.  It is sufficient that the Order or sequence of
phenomena be uniform and constant.  The neatest and
simplest illustration of this, as well as of the other senses
in which  Law  is used, is to be found in the exact
sciences, and especially in the history of Astronomy.  It
is nearly 25qo years since Kepler discovered, in respect to
the distances, velocities, and orbits of the Planets, three
facts, or rather three series of facts, which, during many
yearsi of intense application to physical inquiry, remained the highest truths known to Man on the phenoI The II Third Law" of Kepler was made known to the world
in I619. Newton's'r!Principlia"  appeared in I687.




LAW; —ITS DEFINITIONS               67
meona of the Solar System.  They were known as the
Three Laws of Kepler.  It is not necessary to describe
in detail here what these laws were.  Suffice it to say,
that the most remarkable among them  were facts of
constant numerical relation between the distances of the
different  Planets from  the Sun, and the length of their
periodic times; and again, between the velocity of their
motion and the space enclosed within certain corresponding sections of their orbit.  These Laws were
simply and purely an "Order of facts" established by
observation, and not connected with any known cause.
The Force of which that Order is a necessary result had
not then been ascertained.  A very large proportion of
the laws of every science are laws of this kind and in
this sense.  For example, in Chemistry the behaviour of
different substances towards each othier, in respect to
combination and affinity, is reduced to syste-m under laws
of this kind, and of this kind only.  Because, although
there is a probability that Electric or Galvanic Force is
the cause, or one of the causes, of the series of facts
exhibited in chemical phenomena, this is as yet no better
than a probability, and the laws of Chemistry stand no
higher than facts rwhlich by observation and experiment
are found to follow certain rules.
But the ascertainment of a law  in this Fiist and
lower sense leads immediately and instinctively tbo llLh
F 2




63              THE REIGN OF LAW.
search after Law in another sense which is higher.  An
observed Order of facts, to be entitled to the rank of
a Law, must be an Order so constant and uniform as
to indicate necessity, and necessity can only arise out
of the action of some compelling Force.  Law, therefore, comes to indicate not merely an observed Order of
facts, but that Order as involving the action of some
Force or Forces, of which nothing more may be known
than these visible effects. Every observed Order in
physical phenomena suggests irresistibly to the mind
the operation of some physical cause. We say of an
observed Order of facts that it must be due to some
"5 law," meaning simply that all Order involves t'-e idea
of some arranging cause, the working of some Force or
Forces (whether they be such as we can further trace
and define or not) of which that Order is the index and
the result. This is the Second of the five senses speci.fled above.
And so we pass on, by an easy and natural transition, to the Third sense in which the word Law is used.
This is the most exact and definite of all. The mere
general idea that some Force is at the bottom of all
phenomena, which are invariably consecutive, is a very
different thing from knowing what that Force is in respect
to the rule or measure of its operation. Of Law in
this sense the one great example, before and above all




LAW;-ITS DEFINITIONS.             69
others, is the Law of Gravitation, for this is a Law in
the sense not mierely of a rule, but of a cause —that is,
of a Force accurately defined and ascertained according to the measure of its operation, from vwhich Force
other phenomena arise by way of necessary consequence. Force is the root-idea of Law in its scientific
sense. And so the Law of Gravitation is not merely
the "observed order" in which the heavenly bodies
move; neither is it only the abstract idea of some
Force to which such movements must be due, but it
is that Force the exact measure of whose operation was
numerically ascertained or defined by Newton - the
Force which compels those movements and (in a sense)
explains them.  Now the difference between Law in
the narrower and Law in the larger sense cannot be
better illustrated than in the difference between the
Three special Laws discovered by Kepler, and the One
universal Law discovered by Newton. The Three Laws
of Kepler were, as we have seen, simply and purely
an observed Order of facts. They stood by themselves
— disconnected,-their cause unknown.  The higher
Law, discovered by Newton, revealed their connexion
and their cause. The " observed Order" which Kepler
had discovered, was simply a necessary consequence of
the Force of Gravitation. In the light of this great Law
the " Three Laws of Kepler" have been merged and lost,




70               THE REIGN OF LAW.
When the operations of any material Force can be
reduced to rules so definite as those which have been discovered in respect to the Force of Gravitation, and when
these rules are capable of mathematical expression and
of mathematical proof, they are, so far as they go, in
the nature of pure truth.  Mr. Lewes, in his very
curious and interesting work on the'" Philosophy of Aristotle," has maintained that the knowledge of Measure
-or what he calls the "verifiable element" in our
knowledge-is the element which determines whether
any theory belongs to Science, strictly so called, or to
Metaphysics; and that any theory may be transferred
from Metaphysics to Science, or from Science to Metaphysics, simply by the addition or withdrawal of its
"verifiable element."  In illustration of this, he says
that if we withdraw, from the Law of Universal Attraction, the formula, "inversely as the square of the distance, and directly as the mass," it becomes pure Metaphysics.  If this means that, apart from  ascertained
numerical relations, our conception of Law, or our
knowledge of natural phenomena, loses;all reality and
distinctness, I do not agree in the position. The idea
of natural Forces is quite separate from any ascertained
measure of their energy.  The knowledge, for example,
that all the particles of matter exert an attractive force
upon each other, is, so far as it goes, true physical




LAW; —ITS DEFINITIONS.              71
knowledge, even though we did not know the further
truth, that this force acts according to the numerical
rule ascertained by Newton.  To banish  from  physical Science, properly so called, and to relegate to
Metaphysics, all knowledge which cannot be reduced
to numerical expression, is a dangerous abuse of language.
Force, ascertained according to some measure of its
operation —this is indeed one of the definitions, but
only one, of a scientific Law.  The discovery of laws
in this sense is the great quest of Science, and the
finlding of them  is one of her great rewards.  Such
laws yield to the human mind a peculiar delight, from
tile satisfaction they afford to those special faculties
whose function it is to recognise the beauty of numerical
relations.  This satisfaction is so great, and in its own
measure is so complete, that the mind reposes on an
ascertained law of this bind as on an ultimate truth.
And ultimate it is as regards the particular faculties
which are.concerned in this kind of search.  When we
have observed our facts, and when we have summed
up our figures, when we have recognised the constant
numbers,-then our eyes, our ears, and our calculating
faculties have done their work.  iBut other faculties are
called into simultaneous operation, and these have other
work to do.  For let it be observed that laws, in the




72              THE REIGN OF I.AW.
first three senses we have now examined, cannot be said
to explain anything except the Order of subordinate
phenomena.  They set forth that order as due to Force.
They do nothing more. Least of all do laws, in any
of these three senses, explain themselves.  They suggest a thousand questions much more curious than the
questions which they solve. The very beauty and simplicity of some laws is their deepest mystery. What
can their source be?  How is their uniformity maintained?  Every law implies a Force, and all that we
ever know is some numerical rule or measure accord.
ing to which some unknown Forces operate. But
whence come those measures-those exact relations to
number, which never vary? Or, if there are variations,
how comes it that these are always found to follow
some other rules as exact and as invariable as the first?
And as there can be no better example of what Law
is, so also there can be no better example of what it is
not-than the Law of Gravitation.  The discovery of
it was probably the highest exercise of pure intellect
through which the human mind has found its way. It
is the most universal physical law which is known to
us, for it prevails, apparently, through all Space. Yet
of the Force of Gravitation all we know is, that it is
a force of attraction operating between all the particles
of matter in the exact measure which was ascertained by




LAW;-ITS DEFINITIONS.               73
Newton, —that is_-" directly as the mass, and inversely
as the square of the distance."  This is the Law.  But
it affords no sort of explanation of itself.  What is the
cause of this Force —what is its source-what are the
media of its operation-how is the exact uniformity of
its proportions maintained?-these are questions which
it is impossible not to ask, but which it is quite as impossible to answer.  Sir John Herschel, in speaking of this
Force, has indicated in a passing sentence a few questions out of the many which arise:-" No matter," he
says, "from what ultimate causes the power called gravitation originates —be it a virtue lodged in the sun as its
receptacle, or be it pressure from without, or the resultant
of many pressures, or solicitations of unknown kinds,
magnetic or electric, ethers or impulses," I &c. &c.
HLow little we have ascertained in this Law, after all!
Yet there is an immense and an instinctive pleasure in
the contemplation of it. To analyse this pleasure is as
difficult as to analyse the pleasure which the eye takes
in beauty of form, or the pleasure which the ear takes in
the harmonies of sound.  And this pleasure is inexhaustible, for these laws of number and proportion
J)ervade all Nature, and the intellectual organs which
hlave been fitted to the knowledge of them  have eyes
A Herschel's " Outlines of Astronomy, " fifth edition, po 323.




74               TXIE REIGN OF LAW.
which are never satisfied with seeing, and ears which are
never full of hearing.  The agitation which overpowered
Sir Isaac Newton as the Law of Gravitation was rising
to his view in the light of rigorous demonstration, was
the homage rendered by the great faculties of his nature
to a harmony which was as new as it was immense and
wonderful.  The same pleasure in its own degree is felt
by every man of science who, in any branch of physical
inquiry, traces and detects any lesser law.  And it is
perfectly true that such laws are being detected everywhere.  Forces which are in their essence and their
source utterly mysterious, are always being found to
operate  under rules which  have  strict reference to
measures of number,-to relations of Space and Time.
The Forces which determine chemical combination all
work under rules as sharp and definite as the Force of
Gravitation.  So do the Forces which operate in Light,
and Heat, and Sound.  So do those which exert their
energies in Magnetism  and Electricity.  All the operatibnS of Nature-the smallest and the greatest-are performed under similar measures and restraints. Not even
a drop of water can be formed except under rules which
determine its weight, its volume, and its sla.pe, with
exact re-ference to the density of the fluidl, o the structure of the surface on which it may be formed, and to
lh1e pressure of the surrounding atmosphci'e.  Then that




LAW;-ITS DEFINITIONS.            75
pressure is itself exercised under rigorous rules again.
Not one of the countless varieties of form which prevail
in clouds, and which give to the face of heaven such
infinite expression, not one of them but is ruled by
Law,-woven, or braided, or torn, or scattered, or
gathered up again and folded,-by Forces which are free
only "within the bounds of Law."
And equally in those subjects of inquiry in which
rules of number and of proportion are not applicable,
rules are discernible which belong to another class, but
which are as certain and as prevailing. All events,
however casual or disconnected they may at first appear
to be, are found in the course of time to arrange themselves in some certain Order, the index and exponent of
Forces, of which we know nothing except their existence
as evidenced in these effects. It is indeed wonderful to
find that in such a matter, for example, as the development of our Human Speech, the unconscious changes
which arise from time to time among the rudest utterances of the rudest tribes and races of Mankind, are all
found to follow rules of progress as regular as those
which preside over any of the material growths of
Nature. Yet so it is; and it is upon this fact alone that
the science of Language rests-a science in which all
the facts are not yet observed, and many of those which
have been observed are not yet reduced to order; but




76              THE REIGN OF LAW.
in which enough has been ascertained to show thal
languages grow, and change from generation to gene,
ration, according to rules of which the men who speak
them  are wholly unconscious.  It is the same with all
other things. And as it is now, so apparently has it
been in all past time of which we have any record.
Even the work of Creation has been and is being carried on under rules of adherence to Typical Forms, and
under limits of variation from them, which can be dimly
seen and traced, although they cannot be defined or
understood. The universal prevalence of laws of this
kind cannot therefore be denied.  The discovery of
them is one of the first results of all physical inquiry.
In this sense it is true that we, and the world around us,
are under the Reign of Law.
It is true, but. only a bit and fragment of the truth.
For there is another fact quite as prominent as the
universal presence and prevalence of laws-and that is,
the number of them which are concerned in each single
operation in Nature. No one Law-that is to say, no
one Force —determines anything that we see happening
or done around us. It is always the result of different
and opposing Forces nicely balanced against each other.
The least disturbance of the proportion in which any
one of them is allowed to tell, produces a total change
in the effect. The mlore we know of Nature, the inore




LAW;-ITS DEFINITIONS.               77
intricate do such combinations appear to be.  They can
be traced very near to the fountains of Life itself, even
close up to the confines of the last secret of all-how
the Will acts upon its organs in the Body. Recent
investigations in Physiology seem to favour the hypothesis that our muscles are the seat of two opposing
Forces, each so adjusted as to counteract the other; and
that this antagonism  is itself so arranged as to enable
us by acting on one of these Forces, to regulate the
action of the other. One Force —an elastic or contractile Force-is supposed to be inherent in the muscular fibre: another Force-that of Animal Electricity
in statical condition-holds the contractile Force in
check; and the relaxed, or rather the restful, condition
of the muscle when not in use, is due to the balance so
maintained. When, through the motor nerves the Will
orders the muscles into action, that order is enforced
by a discharge of the Electrical Force, and upon this
discharge the contractile Force is set free to act, and
does accordingly produce the contraction which is
desired.l
Such is, at least, one suggestion as to the means
employed to place human action under the control of
1 This theory of muscular and nervous action is set forth with
much ingenuity and force of illustration in "Lectures on Epilepsy,'"
&c., by Challes Bland Radcliffe, M.D.




7 8             THE REIGN OF LAW.
huimnan  Wiil, in that material frame which is so wonderfully and fearfully made. And whether this hypotihesis
be accurate or not, it is certain that some such adjustment of Force to Mechanism is involved in every bodily
movement which is subject to the Will.  Even in this
high region, theiefore, we see that the existence of
individual laws is not the end of our physical knowledge.  What we always reach at last in the course of
every physical inquiry, is the recognition, not of individual laws, but of some definite relation to each other,
in which different laws are placed, so as to bring about
a particular result.  But this is, in other words, the
principle of Adjustment, and adjustment has no meaning
except as the instrument and the result of Purpose.
Force so combined with Force as to produce certain
definite and orderly results,-this is the ultimate fict of
all discovery.
And so we come upon another sense-the Fourth
sense, in which Law is habitually used in Science, and
this is perhaps the commonest and most important of
all. It is used to designate not merely an observed
Order of facts-not merely the bare abstract idea of
Force-not merely individual Forces according to ascertained measures of operation-but a number of Forces in
the condition of mutual adjustment, that is to say, as combined with each other, and fitted to each other for the




LAW V —ITS DEFINITIONS.            79
attainment of special ends. The whole science of Animal
Mechanics, for example, deals with Law in this sensewith natural Forces as related to Purpose and subservient
to the discharge of Function.  And this is the highest
sense of all —Law  in this sense being more perfectly
intelligible to us than in any other; because, although
we know nothing of the real nature of Force, even of
that Force which is resident in ourselves, we do kno-w
for what ends we exert it, and the principle that governs
our devices for its use. Thllat principle is, Combination
for the acconmplishment of Purpose.
Accordingly it is, when natural phenomena can be
reduced to Law, in this last sense, that we reach something which alone is really in the nature of an exp!anation~ For what do we mean by an explanation?  It is
an unfolding or a "making plain."  But as the human
mmind has many faculties., so each of these seeks a satisfaction of its own. That which is made plain to one
faculty is not necessarily made plain to another. That
which is a complete answer to the question What, or to
the question How, is no answer at all to the question
WThy. There are somre philosophers who tell us that
this last is a question which had better never be asked,
because it is one to which Nature gives no reply.  If
this be so, it is strange that Nature should have given us
the faculties which impel us to ask this question-ay,




80             THE REIGN OF LAW.
and to ask it more eagerly than any other. It is, indeed,
true that there is a point beyond which we need not ask
it, because the answer is inaccessible. But this is equally
true of the questions What, and How. We cannot reach
Final Causes any more than Final Purposes. For every
cause which we can detect, there is another cause which
lies behind; and for every purpose which we can see,
there are other purposes which lie beyond.
And so it is true that all things in Nature may either
be regarded as means or as ends-for they are always
both-only that Final Ends we can never see. For, as
Bishop Butler truly says in his "Analogy,"l 1  We know
what we ourselves aim at as final ends, and what courses
we take merely as means conducing to these ends. But
we are greatly ignorant how far things are considered by
the Author of Nature under the simple notion of means
and ends,-so as that it may be said this is merely an
end, and that merely means, in His regard. And whether
there be not some peculiar absurdity in our very manner
of conception concerning this matter, somewhat contradictory, arising from an extremely imperfect view of
things, it is impossible to say." This is indeed a wise
caution, and one which has been much needed to check
the,abuse of that method of reasoning which has been
1 Butler's "Analogy," chap. iv,




LAW;- ITS DEFINITIONS.            8x
called the doctrine of Final Causes. When Man makes
an implement, he knows the purpose for which he makes
it-he knows the function assigned to it in his own intention. But as in making it there are a thousand chips
and fragments of material which he casts aside, so in its
final use it often produces consequences and results
which he did not contemplate or foresee. But in Nature
all this is different. Nature has no chips or fragments
which she does not put to use; and as on the way to
her apparent ends there are no incidents which she did
not foresee, so beyond those ends there are no ulterior
results which do not open out into new firmaments of
Design. Of, nothing, therefore, can we say W;ith even
the probability of truth that we see its Final Cause; that
is to say, its ultimate purpose. All that we can ever see
are the facts of Adjustment and of Function, and these
constitute not Final, but Immediate Purpose.  But a
purpose is not less a purpose, because other purposes
may lie beyond it. And not only can we detect Purpose
in natural phenomena, but, as we have already seen, it is
very often the only thing about them which is intelligible
to us. The How is very often incomprehensible, where
the Why is apparent at a glance.- And be this observed,
that when Purpose is perceived, it is a " making plain"
to a higher faculty of the mind than the mere sense of
Order. It is a making plain to Reason,. It is the reduc.
-a




82               THE REIGN OF LAW.
tion of phenomena to that Order of Thought which is
the basis of all other Order in the works of Man, and
which, he instinctively concludes, is the basis also of all
Order in the works of Nature.
And here it is important to observe, that although
this general conclusion, like all other general conclusions, belongs to the category of mental inferences, and
not to the category of physical facts, yet each particular instance of Purpose on which the general inference
is founded, is not an inference merely, but a fact.  The
function of an organ, for example, is a matter of purely
physical investigation.  But the function of an organ
is not merely that which it does, but it is that which
some special construction enables it to do.  It is, not
merely its work, but it is the work assigned to it as an
Apparatus, and as fitted to other organs having other
functions related to its own.  The nature of that Apparatus, as being in itself an adjustment for a particular
purpose, is not an inference from  the facts, but it is
part of the facts themselves.  The very idea of Function is inseparable from  the idea of Purpose.  The
Function of an organ is its Purpose; and the relation
of its parts, and of the whole to that Purpose, is as
much and as definitely a scientific fact as the relation
of any other phenomenon to Space, or Times or
Number




LAW; —ITS DEFINITIONS,             83
This distinction between Purpose as a general inference and Purpose as a particular fact, has not been
sufficiently  observed.  The just condemnation  pronounced by Bacon on the pursuit of Final Causes as
distorting the true Method of Physical Investigation,
has been applied without discrimination to two very
different conceptions.  Even Philosophers who believe
in the Supremacy of Purpose in Nature have been willing to banish this conception  from  the Domain of
Science, and to classify it as belonging altogether to
Metaphysics or Theology. Thus in the very able Harveian Oration for i865 by Dr. H. W. Acland, he says,
—'" Whether there be any Purpose, is the object of
Theological and Metaphysical, but not of Physical in.
quiry."'   And again, "The evidence of intention is
metaphysical, and depends on probabilities.  It is not
positive.  It is inferential from mainy considerations."2
I venture to dissent from  these conclusions.  They
involve, I think, a confounding of two separate questions. The nature and character of the intending
Mind-this is indeed a question of Theology; but not
tile existence of intention. Neither in any restrictive
sense of the word can it be called Metaphysical.  Even
as a general doctrine, the doctrine of Contrivance and
2 P. 61.                2 P. 63,




84              THE REIGN OF LAW.
Adjustment is not so metaphysical as the Doctrine of
Homologies; and when we come to particular cases
there can be no question whatever that the relation of
a given Structure to its Purpose and Function comes
more unequivocally under the class of physical facts
than the relation of that same Structure to some corresponding part in another animal.  It is less ideal,
for example, —less theoretical  less metaphysical-to
assert of the little hooked claw which is attached to
the (apparent) elbow of a Bat's wing, that it was placed
there to enable the Bat to climb and crawl, than to
affirm of that same claw that it is the "homologue" of
the human thumb.  Yet who can deny that this doctrine of Homologies has been established as a strictly
scientific truth? There is a sense, of course, in which
all Knowledge and all Science belongs to Metaphysics.
Mere classification, which is the basis of all Science,
what is it but the marshalling of physical facts in an
Ideal Orders-an arrangement of them according to the
relation which they bear to the laws of Thought? But
this does not constitute as a branch of Metaphysics,
the division of animals into Genera, and Families, and
Orders. And what relation can physical facts ever have
to Thought so directly cognisable or so susceptible of
Demonstration as the relation of an animal organ to
its purpose and function in  the animal economy?




LAW;-ITS DEFINITIONS.              85
Whether Purpose be the basis of all natural Order or
not is a separate question.  It is at least one of the
facts of that Order.  Combination for the accomplishment of Purpose therefore in particular cases, such as
the relation between the structure of an Organ and its
function, is not merely a safe conclusion of Philosophy,
but an ascertained fact of Science.1
This question has acquired additional importance
since the revival in our own day, and with new resources, of that old philosophy which assumes to banish
from  the domain of Knowledge no small part of the
richest and surest acquisitions of Reason. That Philosophy must. be tested by a rigid analysis of thought
and language. This is the weapon with which the assault
is made, and it is by the same weapon better handled
that it can alone be met.  An arbitrary limitation of
the word "'knowledge," to a particular kind of knowledge, can only be tolerated on condition that the
arbitrary nature of the limitation be constantly kept in
view. in like manner the word "verification" may be
confined to a particular kind of proof applicable only
to a particular class of truths.  So again, in regard
to "Metaphysics," it may be considered with reference
to its subject-matter as denoting a particular branch of
I See Note B.




86              THE REIGN OF LAW.
inquiry-such as Psychology-or as a method of investigation which may be applied equally to all subjects
which furnish the mind with the materials of thoughlt.
But we must watch against the substitution of one of
these meanings for another; and against the jtgglery by
which men first use Metaphysical Analysis to pull down
conceptions which they dislike, and then denounce
Metaphysics as incapable of establishing any conclusions on which we can rely.  The fact to which I have
previously referred,' is a fact of immense significance,
that one of the most able supporters of the Positive
Philosophy in England relegates to Metaphysics the great
scientific fact of Physical Attraction, when it is considered
apart from its numerical relations. But if this be considered Metaphysics, then let it be remembered that
many of the most certain truths we know belong to the
same category. From a similar point of view, it might
be argued, and it has actually been argued, that Number
and all numerical relations are purely abstract conceptions of the mind,- having no other reality than as
there conceived.2  The same reasoning may be applied
to all our most fundamental conceptions-without which
Science could not evcn begin her work. The existence
of Force under any form, of which the existence of Mattex
X P. 7o.           ~ See Note C.




LAW;-ITS DEFINITIONS.                 87
is only a special case, may be regarded as a purely
metaphysical conception.  It is sutiely a comfort to
find that, if all ideas of Plan  and of Design in the
Adjustments of Organic Life are to be condemned as
Metaphysical, they stand at least in goodly company
among the necessities of Thought. Mr. Lewes, indeed,
himself confesses that " Science finds it indispensable
to co-ordinate all the facts in a general concept, such
as a Plan." 1  But he pronounces it one of the " Infirmities of Thought" to "realize the concept." But no
accurate thinker ever " realized " such an idea as a'Plan "-that is to say, no one ever conceived it as
existing by itself, separate from  an intending Mind.
Mr. Iewes complains that "Matter and  Force are
mysterious enough" without a "new mystery of Architectural Plan, shaping AMatter and directing Force." 2
But, substituting here "Mind" for Plan, it may surely
be argued that, if Science finds it "indispensable'" to
co-ordinate all the facts in some such general concept,
this is of itself a proof that the element so introduced
does not add to the mystery, but helps to remove it.
Even if it be an "artifice of thought," it can only be
resorted to as rendering the facts not less but more
conceivable.  And this it plainly does by appealing to
I II History of Philosophy," Prologue, p. lxxxvi.  8 Ibid.




83              THE REIGN OF LAW.
an agency having known power in the production of
analogous phenomena. The instinctive wisdom which
lies in this "infirmity" of the mind becomes more
apparent when we turn to the efforts of an acute intellect to cast such infirmities away. The most abstract
metaphysical conceptions are substituted for those which
are denounced: the only difference being that, whilst
the old conceptions are intelligible as connecting the
Phenomena by a link of thought which the mind can
feel and follow, the new conceptions are unintelligible
because they try to describe facts without any reference
to the ideas they involve. No new light-nothing but
denser darkness-is cast on the phenomena of Organic
Life by calling "Life the connexus of the organic
activities." 1 Yet meaningless words are heaped on each
other in the desperate effort to dispense with those conceptions which can alone render the order of Nature
intelligible to us. Thus we are told again, that "The
Organism is the synthesis of diverse parts, and Life is
the synthesis of their properties;" 2-and again, that
"Vitality is the abstract designation of certain special
properties manifested by Matter under certain special
conditions."3 Surely there is more light in the old
reading: —" Finding," says Mr. Lewes, "in an organism
History of Philosophy," p. 1xxx.  s Ibid. p. lxxxiii
- Ibid. p. lxxxiv.




LAW j —ITS DEFINITIONS,                89
a certain adjustment of parts, which may be reduced to
a plan, we are easily led to conceive that this plan was
made before the parts, and that the adjustment was
determined by the plan."   No  doubt!  This is the
easiest conception, and it is the easiest because it is
most conformable to the laws of Thought; and that
which is the most conformable to the laws of Thought
is that which makes -the nearest approach to absolute
Truth attainable by the Mind.
The universal prevalence of this idea of Purpose in
Nature is indicated by the irresistible tendency which
we observe in the language of Science to personify the
Forces, and the combinations of Force by which all
natural phenomena are produced. It is a great injustice
to scientific men-too often committed-to suspect them
of unwillingness to accept the idea of a Personal Creator
merely because they try to keep separate the language
of Science from  the language of Theology.1  But it is
I A remarkable instance of this injustice has been lately brought
to light. Professor Huxley, in an article in the Fortnighflly Review,.
had used one of those vague phrases, so common with scientific men,
about the "'unknown and the unknowable" being the goal of all
scientific thought, which not unnaturally suggest the notion that all
idea of a God is unattainable. A writer in the S5ectaZor accordingly dealt with Professor Huxley as avowing Atheism, and wag
rebuked by the Professor in a letter published in the Spectator of
Feb. Io, x866. Professor Huxley says: "I do not know that I
care very much about popular odium, so that there is no great merit




90                 THE REIGN OF LAW.
curious to observe how this endeavour constantly breaks
down-how  impossible  it is  in  describing  physical
phenomena to  avoid the phraseology which identifies
them with the phenomena of Mind, and is moulded
on  our own  conscious  Personality  and  Will.  It is
impossible to avoid this language simply because no
other language conveys the impression which innumerable structures leave upon  the mind.  Take, for example, the word " contrivance."  IHow could Science
do w;vithout it?  How could the great subject of Animal
lMAechanics be dealt with scientifically without continual
reference to Law  as that by which, and through which,
special organs are formed  for the doing  of  special
work?   What is the very  definition  of a machine?
Machines do not increase Force, they  only adjust it.
The very idea and essence of a machine is that it is
a contrivance for the distribution of Force with a view
in saying that if I really saw fit to deny the existence of a God,
I should certainly do so, for the sake of my own intellectual freedom, and be the honest Atheist you are pleased to say I am. As
it happenas, hEwever, I cannot take this position with honesty, inasmuch as it is, and always has been, a favourite tenet of mine,
that Atheism is as absurd, logically speaking, as Polytheism." On
the subject of miracles, in the same letter, Professor Huxley says,
that " denying the possibility of miracles seems to me quite as
unjustifiable as speculative Atheism."  The question of miracles
seems now to be admitted on all hands to be simply a question
of evidence.




LAW; —ITS DEFINITIONS.              91
to its bearing on special purposes. A man's arm is a
machine in which the law of leverage is supplied to
the vital force for the purposes of prehension. We-,..
shall see presently that a bird's wing is a machine in
which the same law is applied, under the most comrn
iplicated conditions, for the purpose of flight.  Anatomy
supplies an infinite number of similar examples.  It is
impossible to describe or explain the facts we meet
with in this or in any other branch of Science without
investing the "laws" of Nature with something of that
Personality which they do actually reflect, or without
conceiving of them as partaking of those attributes of.Mind which we everywhere recognise in their working
and results.
We may, again, take the Forces which determine the
Planetary motions as the grandest and the simplest illustrations of this truth of Science.  Gravitation, as already
said, is a Force which prevails apparently through all
Space.  But it does not prevail alone.  It is a Force
whose function it is to balance other Forces, of which
we know nothing, except this,-that these, again, are
needed to balance the Force of Gravitation.  Each
Force, if left to itself, would be destructive of the
Universe.  Were it not for the Force of Gravitation, the
centrifugal Forces which impel the Planets would fling
them off into Space.  Were it not for these centrifugal!Forces, the Force of Gravitation would dash them




92              THE REIGN OF LAW.
against the Sun. The orbits, therefore, of the Planets,
with all that depends upon them, are determined by the
nice and perfect balance which is maintained between
these two Forces; and the ultimate fact of astronomical
science is not the Law of Gravitation, but the Adjustment between this law and others which are less known,
so as to produce and maintain the existing Solar System.
This is one example of the principle of Adjustment;
but no one example, however grand the scale may be on
which it is exhibited, can give any idea of the extent to
which the principle of Adjustment is required, and is
adopted in the works of Nature. The revolution of the
seasons, for example-seed-time and harvest-depend on
the Law of Gravitation in this sense, that if that law
were disturbed, or if it were inconstant, they would be
disturbed and inconstant also. But the seasons equally
depend on a multitude of other laws,-laws of heat, laws
of light, laws relating to fluids, and to solids, and to
gases, and to magnetic attractions and repulsions, each
one of which laws is invariable in itself, but each of
which would produce utter confusion if it were allowed
to operate alone, or if it were not balanced against
others in the right proportion. It is very difficult to form
any adequate idea of the vast number of laws which are
concerned in producing the most ordinary operations of
Nature. Looking only at the combinations with which
Astronomy is concerned, the adjustments are almost




LAW -ITS DEFINITIONS.               93
infinite. Each minutest circumstance in the position,
or size, or shape of the Earth, the direction of its axis,
the velocity of its motion and of its rotation, has its
own definite effect, and the slightest change in any one
of these relations would wholly alter the world we live in.
And then it is to be remembered that the seasons, as they
are now fitted to us, and as we are fitted to them, do not
depend only on the facts or the laws which Astronomy
reveals. They depend quite as much on other sets of
facts, and other sets of laws, revealed by other sciences,
-such, for example, as Chemistry, Electricity, and
Geology.  The motion of the Earth might be exactly
what it is, every fact in respect to our Planetary position
might remain unchanged, yet the seasons would return
in vain if our own atmosphere were altered in any one
of the elements of its composition, or if any one of the
laws regulating the action were other than it is.  Under
a thinner air even the torrid zone might be wrapped in
eternal snow.  Under a denser air, and one with different refracting powers, the Earth and all that is therein
might be burnt up. And so it is through the whole
of Nature: laws everywhere-laws in themselves invariable, but so worked as to produce effects of
inexhaustible variety by being pitched against each
other, and made to hold each other in restraint.
I have already referred to Chemistry as a science full
of illustrations of Law in the First and simplest sense —




94              THE REIGN OF LAW.
that is, of facts in observed orders of recurrence. But
Chemistry is a science not less rich in illustration of Law
in the Fourth sense-that is, of Forces in mutual adjustment. Indeed, in Chemistry, this system of adjustment
among the different properties of matter is especially intricate and observable. Some of the laws which regulate
Chemical Comibination were discovered in our own
time, and are amongst the most wonderful and the most
beautiful which have been revealed by any science.
They are laws of great exactness, having invariable relations to number and proportion.  Each elementary
substance has its own combining proportions with other
elements, so that, except in these proportions, no
chemical union can take place at all.  And when
chemical union does take place, the compounds which
result have different and even opposite powers, according
to the different proportions employed.  Then, the relations in which those inorganic compounds stand to the
chemistry of Life, constitute another vast series in which
the principle of adjustment has applications, infinite in
number, and as infinite in beauty. How delicate these
relations are, and how tremendous are the issues depending on their management, may be conceived from
this single fact,-that the same elements combined in one
proportion are sometimes a nutritious food or a grateful
stimulant, soothing and sustaining the powers of life;
whilst, combined in another proportion, they may be a




LAW;-ITS DEFINITIONS.             95
deadly poison, paralysing the heart and carrying agony
along every nerve and fibre of the animal frame. This is
no mere theoretical possibility.  It is actually the relation, for example, in which two well-known substances
stand to each other-Tea and Strychnia.  The active
principles of these two substances, " Theine " and
"Strychnine," are identical so far as their elements are
concerned, and differ from each other only in the proportions in which they are combined. Such is the power
of numbers in the Laboratory of Nature!  What havoc
in this world, so full of Life, would be made by blind
chance gambling with such powers as these!  What
confusion, unless they were governed by laws whose
certainty makes them capable of fine adjustment, and
therefore subject to accurate control! IHow fine these
adjustments are, and how absolute is that control, is
indicated in another fact-and that is the few elements
out of which all things are made. The number of
substances deemed  elementary has varied with the
advance of Science; but as compared with the variety
of their products, that number may be considered as infinitesinially small; whilst the progress of analysis, with
glimpses of laws as yet unknown, renders it almost
certain that this number will be found to be smaller still.
Yet out Qf that small number of elementary substances,
having fixed rules, too, limiting their combination, all the
infinite varieties of organic and inorganic matter are built




96              THE REIGN OF LAW.
up by means of nice adjustment.  As all the faculties of
a powerful mind can utter their voice in language whose
elements are reducible to twenty-four letters, so all the
forms of Nature, with all the ideas they express, are
worked out from a few simple elements having a few
simple properties.
Simple! can we call them so? Yes, simple by comparison with the exceeding complication of the uses they
are made to serve: simple also, in this sense, that they
follow some simple rule of numbers. But in themselves
these laws, these forces are incomprehensible. That
which is most remarkable about them is their unchangeableness. The whole mind and imagination of scientific
men is often so impressed with this character of material
laws, that no room is left for the perception of other
aspects of their nature and of their work. We hear of
rigid and universal sequence-necessary-invariable;-.
of unbroken chains of cause and effect, no link of which
can, in the nature of things, be ever broken. And this
idea grows upon the mind, until in some confused
manner It is held as casting out the idea of Purpose
in creation, and inconsistent with the element of Will.
If it be so, the difficulty cannot be evaded by denying
the uniformity, any more than the universality, of Law.
It is perfectly true that every law is, in its own nature,
invariable, producing always precisely and necessarily
the same effects,-that is, provided it is worked under




.AW;-ITS DEFINITIONS.            97
the same conditions. But then, if the conditions are not
the same, the invariableness of effect gives place to
capacities of change which are almost infinite. It is by
altering the conditions under which anlly given law is
brought to bear, and by bringing other laws to operate
upon the same subject, that our own Wills exercise a
large and increasing power over the material world.
And be it observed —to this end the uniformity of laws
is no impediment, but, on the contrary, it is an indispensable condition. Laws are in themselves-if not
unchangeable —at least unchanging, and if they were not
unchanging, they could not be used as the instruments
of Will. If they were less rigorous they would be less
certain, and the least uncertainty would render them
incapable of any service. No adjustment, however nice,
could secure its purpose if the implements employed were
of uncertain temper.
The notion therefore that the uniformity or invariableness of the Laws of Nature cannot be reconciled with
their subordination to the exercise of Will, is a notion
contrary to our own experience. It is a confusion of
thought arising very much out of the ambiguity of language. For let it be observed that, of all the senses in
which the word Law is used, there is only one in which
it is true that laws are immutable or invariable; and
that is the sense in which Law is used to designate an




98             THE REIGN OF LAW.
individual Force.  Gravitation, for example, is immutable in this respect-that (so far as we know) it never
operates according to any other measure than "directly
as the mass, and inversely as the square of the distance."
But in all the other senses in which the word Law is
used, laws are not immutable; but, on the contrary, they
are the great instruments, the unceasing agencies, of
change. When, therefore, scientific men speak, as they
often do, of all phenomena being governed by invariable
laws, they use language which is ambiguous, and in most
cases they use it in a sense which covers an erroneous
idea of the facts. There are no phenomena visible to
Man of which it is true to say that they are governed by
any invariable Force. That which does govern them is
always some variable combinations of invariable forces.
But this makes all the difference in reasoning on the
relation of Will to Law,-this is the one essential distinction to be admitted and observed.  There is no
observed Order of facts which is not due to a combination of Forces; and there is no combination of
Forces which is invariable —none which are not capable
of change in infinite degrees. In these senses —and
these are the common senses in which Law is used to
express the phenomena of Nature-Law is not rigid, it
is not immutable, it is not invariable, but it is, on the
contrary, pliable, subtle, various. In the only sense in




LAW; —ITS DEFINITIONS.            99
which laws are immutable, this immutability is the very
characteristic which makes them  subject to guidance
tlirough endless cycles of design. We know this in our
own case. It is the very certainty and invariableness of
the laws of Nature which alone enables us to use them,
and to yoke them to our service.
Now, the laws of Nature appear to be employed in
the system of Nature in a manner precisely analogous
to that in which we ourselves employ them.  The
difficulties and obstructions which are presented by one
law in the way of accomplishing a given purpose, are
mnet and overcome exactly on the same principle on
w-lhich they are met and overcome by Man-viz., by
knowledge of other laws, and by resource in applying
them,-that is, by ingenuity in mechanical contrivance.
It cannot be too much insisted onI, that this is a conclusion of pure Science. The relation which an organic
structure bears to its purpose in Nature can be recognised as certainly as the same relation between a machine and its purpose in human art.  It is absurd to
maintain, for example, that the purpose of the cellular
arrangement of material in combining lightness with
strength, is a purpose legitimately cognisable by Science
in the Menai Bridge, but is not as legitimately cognisable
when it is seen in Nature, actually serving the same use.
The little Barnacles which crust the rocks at low tide,
H 2




100               TIIE REIGN OF LAW.
and which to live there at all must be able to resist the
surf, have the building of their shells constructed strictly
with reference to this necessity.  It is a structure all
hollowed and chambered on the plan which engineers
have so lately discovered as an arrangement of material
by which the power of resisting strain or pressure is
multiplied in an extraordinary degree. That shell is as
pure a bit of mechanics as the bridge, both being structures in which the same arrangement is adapted to the
same end.
Small, but a work divine;
Frail, but of force to withstand,
Year upon year, the shock
Of cataract seas that snap
The three-decker's oaken spine." 1
This is but one instance out of a number which no
man can count.  So far as we know, no Law —that is,
no elementary Force-of Nature is liable to change.
But every Law of Nature is liable to counteraction; and
the rule is, that laws are habitually made to counteract
each other in precisely the manner and degree which
some definite result requires.
Nor is it less remarkable that the converse of this is
true: no Purpose is ever attained in Nature, except by
the enlistment of Laws as the means and instruments ot'1 "Maud. 




LAW; —ITS DEFINITIONS.             101
attainment.  When an extraordinary result is aimed at,
it often happens that some common law is yoked to
extraordinary conditions, and its action is intensified by
some special machinery. For example, the Forces of
Electricity are in action, probably, in all living Organisms, but certainly in the muscular and nervous system
of the higher animals.  In a very few  (so far as yet
known, in only a very few animals among the millions
which exist, and these all belonging to the Class of
Fishes), the electrical action has been so stored and
concentrated as to render it serviceable as a weapon of
offence.  Creatures which grovel at the bottom  of the
sea, or in the slime of rivers, have been gifted with the
astonishing faculty of wielding at their will the most
subtle of all the powers of Nature.  They have the
faculty of" shooting out lightning " against their enemies
or their prey.  But this gift has not been given without
an exact fulfilment of all the laws which govern Electricity, and which especially govern its concentration and
destructive force.  The Electric Ray, or Torpedo, has
been provided with a Battery closely resembling, but
greatly exceeding in the beauty and compactness of its
structure, the Batteries whereby MI.an has now learned
to make the laws of Electricity subservient to his will.
There are no less than 94o hexagonal columns in this
Battery like those of a bees' comb, and each of these is




102              THE REIGN OF LANV.
subdivided by a series of horizontal plates, which appear
to be analogous to the plates of the Voltaic Pile.  The
whole is supplied with an enormous amount of nervous
matter, four great branches of which are as large as the
animal's spinal cord, and these spread out in a multitude
of thread-like filaments round the prismatic columns,
and finally pass into all the cells.' This, again, seems
to suggest an analogy with the arrangement by which
an electric current, passing through a coil and round a
magnet, is used to intensify the magnetic force. A corn
plete knowledge of all the mysteries which have been
gradually unfolded from the days of Galvani to those of
Faraday, and of many others which are still inscrutable
to us, is exhibited in this structure.  The laws which are
appealed to in the accomplishment of this purpose are
many and very complicated; because the conditions to
be satisfied refer not merely to the generation of Electric
force in the animal to which it is given, but to its effect
on the nervous system of the animals against which it is
to be employed, and to the conducting medium in which
both are moving.
When we contemplate such a structure as this, the
idea is borne in with force upon the mind, that the need
of conforming to definite conditions seems as absolute a
I Owen's'Lectures on Comp. Anat." vol. ii. (Fished).




LAW;-ITS DEFINITIONS.              I03
necessity in making an Electric Fish as in malking an
Electric Telegraph.  But the fact of these conditions
existing, and requiring to be satisfied,-or, in other
words, the fact of so many natural laws demanding a
first obedience,-is not the ultimate fact, it is not even
the main fact, which Science apprehends in such phenomena as these.  On the contrary, that which is most
observable and most certain, is the manner in which
these conditions are met, complied with, and, by being
complied with, are overcome. But this is, in other
words, the subordination of many laws to a difficult and
curious Purpose,-a subordination which is effected
through the instrumentality of a purely mechanical contrivan.ce.
It is no objection to this universal truth, that the
machines thus employed in Nature are themselves constructed through the agency of Law. They grow-or, in
modern phraseology, they are developed. But this makes
no difference in the case-or, rather, it only carries us
farther back to other and yet other illustrations of the
same truth.  This is precisely one of those cases already
referred to, in which Causes are unknown, whilst Purposes are clear and certain.  The Battery of an Electric
Fish is both a means and an end.  As respects the
electric laws which it puts in motion-that is, as respects
the Force which it concentrates-it must be regarded




I04.            THE REIGN OF LAW.
as a means. As respects the organic laws by which it is
itself developed, it is an end.
What we do know in this case is why the apparatus was
made; that is to say, what we do know is the Purpose.
What we do not know, and have no idea of, is hzow it
was made; that is to say, what we do not know is the
Law, the Force or Forces, which have been used as the
instrument of that Purpose. When Man makes a voltaic
Battery, he selects materials which have properties and
relations with each other previously ascertained- metals
worked out of natural ores, acids distilled out of other
natural substances; and he puts these together in such
fashion as he knows will generate the mysterious Force
which he desires to evoke and to employ.  But how can
such a machine be made out of the tissues of a fish?
Well may Mr. Darwin say,' It is impossible to conceive
by what steps these wondrous organs have been produced."l  We see the Purpose. —that a special apparatus should be prepared, and we see that it is effected
by the production of the machine required; but we have
not the remotest notion of the means employed. Yet we
can see so much as this, that here again other laws,
belonging altogether to another department of Naturelaws of organic growth-are made subservient to a very
definite and very peculiar Purpose. The paramount facts
a 1" Origin of Species," p. x92, Ist edition.




LAW; -ITS DEFINITIONS.            IO5
disclosed by Science, however, in this case, are these:first, the adaptation of the animal tissues to form  a
battery; and, secondly, the Purpose or function of the
apparatus, when made, to discharge electric shocks.
There is indeed one objection to this method of
conception, which would  be a fatal objection if it
could be consistently maintained.  But all the strength
of this objection lies in the obscure terrors which a very
long word is sometimes capable of inspiring.  This
word is " Anthropomorphislm."  Purpose and Design, it
is said, is a human conception.  Unquestionably it is,
and so is all knowledge in every form.  We can never
stand outside ourselves.  We can never get behind or
above our own methods of conception.  The human
mind can know nothing, and can think of nothing except in terms of its own capacities of thought.  But
if this be fatal to our knowledge of any of the meanings in creation, it must be equally fatal to our having
any knowledge of the very existence of a Creator. Once
grant it to be true, " that if we are to apply our human
standard to the Creator in one direction, we must apply
it in all,"'-then it will follow that we cannot conceive
any Creator unless it be one as weak, and as corrupt,
and as ignorant as ourselves. If this be not bad logic,
as on the face of it it clearly is, then it is not "Theology" alone which goes by the board. The purest and
1 Mr. G. H. Lewes, Fortnightlz y Review, July I867, p. 109.




io6             THE RE, IGN OF LAW.
most naked Theism is equally destroyed.  If it can be
said with truth that "'the Universal Mind is essentially
other'than the Human Mind,"  so that no recognisable
relations can exist between them, then that Universal
Mind is to us as if it were not.  But those who take
objection to Anthropomorphism, are not generally prepared to follow it to this extreme conclusion.  Mr.
Lewes speaks of the sceptical philosophy he supports.as
"rejecting Atheism "-of Atheism being " an error which
it has not maintained," —of Atheism  being not only
rash, but "contradictory."2 But every conception of a
" Mind," even though it be described as " Universal,"
must be in some degree Anthropomorphic.  Our minds
can think of another mind only as having some powers
and properties which in kind are common with our own.
Nor is this objection avoided by any of the other
methods of conception which are devised to eliminate
from the Order of Nature one of the most patent of its
facts. The idea of natural forces working "by themselvres " is pre-eminently Anthropomorphic.  This is undoubtedly the way in which they seem to us to work when
we employ them.  The idea of those forces having been
so co-ordinated at the first as to produce " necessarily"
and "by themselves" all the phenomena of Naturethis is an idea essentially formed on those higher efforts,1 Mr. G. H. Lewes, Fortnigotl/y Review, July i867, p. Io9.
2 Ibid. p. 107.




LAW;-ITS DEFINITIONS.           107
of human ingenuity in virtue of which "'self-acting"
machines are made. It is quite true, no doubt, that
this is one aspect in which the adjustments and contrivances in Nature present themselves to us. But it
does not render this idea more Anthropomorphic, but
rather less when we add to it other conceptions —such
as the idea of a Mind which is the source of all power,
and -a Will which is present in all effects. There may
be other difficulties in the way of this conception, but
not the difficulty of Anthropomorphism.  From neither
of these conceptions, however, can we eliminate the
idea of Purpose and Design.
It is very difficult to divest ourselves of the notion,
that whatever happens by way of natural consequence
is thereby removed, at least by one degree, from being
the expression of WVill and the effect of Purpose. Wre
forget that all our own works, not less than the works of
Nature, are works done through the means and instrumentality of Law. All that we can effect is brought
about by way of natural consequence. All our machines
are simply contrivances for bringing natural Forces ifito
operation; and these machines themselves we are able
to construct only out of the materials and by application of the laws of Nature. The Steam-engine works
by way of natural consequence; so does Mr. Babbage's
Calculating Machine; so does the Electric Telegraph;




108            THE REIGN OF LAW.
so does the Solar System. It is true, indeed, that in
all human machinery we know by the evidence of sight
the ultim'ate agency to which the machinery is due,
whereas in the machinery of Nature the ultimate agency
is concealed from sight. But it is the very business
and work of Science to rise from the Visible to the
Invisible-from what we observe by Sense to what we
know by Reason.
And this brings us to the Fifth -meaning in which the
word Law is habitually used in Science,-a meaning
which is indeed well deserving of attention. In this
sense, Law is used to designate, not any observed Order
of facts,-not any Force to which such Order may be
due,-neither yet any combination of Force adjusted
to the discharge of function, but-some purely Abstract
Idea, which carries up to a higher point our conception
of what the phenomena are and of what they do. There
may be no phenomena actually corresponding to such
Idea, and yet a clear conception of it may be essential
to a right understanding of all the phenomena around
us. A good example of Law in this sense is to be found
ill the law which, in the Science of Mechanics, is called
the First Law of Motion. The law is, that all Motion is
in itself (that is to say, except as affected by extraneous
Forces) uniform in velocity, and rectilinear in direction.
Thus according to this law a body moving, and not




LAW;-ITS DEFINITIONS.             IO9
subject to any extraneous Force, would go on moving
for ever at the same rate of velocity, and in an exactly
straight line.
Now, there is no such motion as this existing on the
earth or in the heavens.  It is an Abstract Idea of
Motion which no man has ever, or can ever, see exemplified.  Yet a clear apprehension of this Abstract Idea
was necessary to a right understanding and to the true
explanation of all the motions which are actually seen.
It was long before this idea was arrived at; and for want
of it, the efforts of Science to explain the visible phenomena of Motion were always taking a wrong direction.
There was a real difficulty in conceiving it, because
not only is there no such motion in Nature, but there
is no possibility by artificial means of producing it.
It is impossible to release any moving body from  the
impulses of extraneous Force. The First Law of Motion
is therefore a purely Abstract Idea.  It represents a
Rule which never operates as we conceive it, by itself,
but is always complicated with other Rules which produce a corresponding complication in result. Like many
other laws of the same class, it was discovered, not by
looking outwards, but by looking inwards; not by
observing, but by thinking.  The human mind, in the
exercise of its own faculties and powers, sometimes by
careful reasoning, sometimes by the intuitions of genius




I I              THE REIGN OF LAW.
unconscious of any process, is able, from time to time,
to reach now one, now another, of those purely Intellectual Conceptions which are the basis of all that is intelligible to us in the Order of the Material WTorld.  We
look for an ideal order or simplicity in material Law; and
the very possibility of exact Science depends upon the
fact that such ideal order does actually prevail, and is
related to the abstract conceptions of our own intellectual
nature.  It is in this way that many of the greatest discoveries of Science have been made.  Especially have
the great pioneers in new paths of discovery been led to
the opening of those paths by that fine sense for abstract
truths which is the noblest gift of genius.  Copernicus,
Kepler, and Galileo were all guided in their profound
interpretations of visible phenomena by those intuitions
which arise in minds finely organised, brought into close
relations with the mind of Nature, and highly trained in
the exercise of speculative thought.  They guessed the
truth before they proved it to be true; and those guesses
had their origin in Abstract Ideas of the mind which
turned out to be ideas really embodied in the Order of
the Universe.  So constantly has this recurred in the
history of Science, that, as Dr. Whewell says, it is not
to be considered as an exception, but as the rule.o
1 Whewell's "History of the Inductive Sciences," 2nd edition,
vol i, p. 434. Speaking of Copernicus, Dr. Whewell says, in




LAW;-ITS DEFINITIONS.! I I
Here again it is very instructive to observe how "Law"
in this last sense is dealt with by the Positive Philosophy.
Scientific men are accustomed to reckon such Laws as
the First Law of Motion among the surest possessions of
pure Intellect, and the faculty by which they are conceived among the noblest proofs of its energy and power.
Positivism, on the contrary, regards such laws as mere
"artifices " of thought, and the Power by which they are
conceived not as a Strength, but as an " Infirmity" of
Mind.l  I do not deny that the process by whichl these
Abstractions are attained is a metaphysical process,-that
is to say, they are purely mental conceptions. But the
process which denies "reality" to these conceptions is
also purely a metaphysical process, with this only difference, that it is bad metaphysics instead of good. The
analysis which evolves these abstract Laws out of the
phenomena of Nature is an anaiysis which  truly coordinates the order of those phenomlena with an Order
another place: "It is manifest that in this, as in other cases of
discovery, a clear and steady possession of abstract Ideas, and an
aptitude in comprehending real Facts under these general conceptions, must have been leading characters in the Discoverer's mind."
-Vol. i. p. 389.
1 " Science is distinguished from common knowledge by its conscious employment of artifices which our infirmity renders indispen.
sable." Again, " Abstractionis one of the necessary (from infirmity)
artifices of research. "-Lewes' " Prologue," p. lxxxix.




TT2            THE REIGN OF LAW.
of Thought. The counter Analysis which pronounces
them to be mere artifices of Thought, and "preliminary
falsifications of fact," is an attempt to make Reason
disbelieve herself, and immerses us at once in the worst
kind of Metaphysics-that which has made the name
almost opprobrious-even the old Scholastic subtleties
of the Nominalistic and the Realistic controversy.
And now having traced the various senses in which
Law is used, we can form some estimate on the value of
those conclusions of which some men are so boastful and
of which other men are so much afraid. We can see
how much and how little is really meant when it is said
that Law can be traced in all things, and all things can be
traced to Law. It is a- great mistake to suppose that, in
establishing this conclusion, the progress of modern investigation is in a direction tending to Materialism. This
may be and always has been the tendency of individual
minds. There are men who would stare into the very
Burning Bush without a thought that the ground on
which they stand must be Holy Ground. It is not now
of wood or stone that men make their Idols, but of their
own abstract conceptions. Before these, borrowing for
them the attributes of Personality, they bow down and
worship. Nothing is more common than to find men
who may be trusted thoroughly on the facts of their own
Science, who cannot be trusted for a moment on the




LAW;-ITS DEFINITIO-NS.            I3
place which those facts assume in the general system  of
truth.  Philosophy must include Science; but Science
does not necessarily include Philosophy. There are, and
there always have been, some special misconceptions
connected with the prosecution of physical research. It
is, however, on the surface of things, rather than below
it, that the suggestions of Materialism lie thickest to the
eye. They abound among the commonest facts which
obtrude themselves on our attention in Nature and in
human life. When the bursting of some small duct of
blood upon the Brain is seen to destroy in a moment the
Mind of Man, and to break down all the powers of his
Intellect and his Will, we are in presence of a fact whose
significance cannot be increased by a million of other
facts analogous in kind.
Yet on every fresh discovery of a few more such facts,
there is generally some fresh outbreak of old delusions
respecting the forms and the Laws of Matter as the
supreme realities of the world.  But when the new facts
have been looked at a little longer, it is always seen that
they take their place with others which have been long
familiar, and the eternal problems which lie behind all
natural phenomena are seen to be unaffected and unchanged. Like the most distant of the Fixed Stars, they
have no parallax.  The whole orbit of human knowledge
shows in them  no apparent change of place.  No
I




114             THE REIGN OF LAW.
amnount of knowledge of the kind which alone physical
Science can impart can do miore than widen the foundation  of intelligent spiritual beliefs.  We think that
Astronomy and Geology have given to us in these latter
days ideas wholly new in respect to Space and Time.
Yet, after all, can we express those ideas, or can we indicate the questions they suggest, in any language which
approaches in power to the majestic utterances of David
and of Job?  We know more than they knew of the
magnitude of the Heavenly Bodies; but what more can
we say than they said of the wonder of them,-of
Orion, of Arcturus, and the Pleiades?1  WVe know that
the earth moves, which they did not know; and we know
that the rapid rotation of a globe on its own axis is a
means of maintaining the steadiness of that axis in its
course through Space. But what effect, except that of
increasing its significance, has this knowledge upon the
praise which David ascribes to that ultimate Agency
which has made the round world so sure " that it cannot
be moved? "2
And so of other departments of Science. Even the
modern idea of Law, of the constancy and therefore the
trustrworthiness of Natural Forces, has been known, not
indeed scientifically but instinctively, to Man since first
I Job ix. 9,           2 Ps. xciii. i.




LAW;- ITS DEFINITIONS.           II"
he made a Tool, and used it as the instrument of Purpose. What has Science added to this idea, except that
the same rule prevails as widely as the Universe, and is
made subservient in a like manner to Knowledge and to
Will?  In the enthusiasm awakened by the discovery of
some new facts, or of some new forces, and in the
freshness with which they impress the idea of such
agencies on our minds, we sometimes very naturally
exaggerate the length of way along which they carry us
towards the great ultimate objects of intellectual desire.
We forget altogether that the knowledge they convey is
in quality and in kind identical with knowledge already
long in our possession, and places us in no new relation
whatever to the vast background of the Eternal and
the Unseen.  Thus it is that the notions of Materialism
are perpetually reviving, and are again being perpetually
swept away —swept away partly before the Intuitions of
the Mind, partly before the Conclusions of the Reason.
For there are two great enemies to Materialism,-one
rooted in the Affections, the other in the Intellect. One
is -the power of THINGS HOPED FOR-a power which
never dies: the other is the evidence of THINGS NOT
SEEN-and this evidence abounds in all we see.  In
reinforcing this evidence, and in adding to it, Science is
doing boundless work in the present day. It is not the
extent of our knowledge, but rather the limits of it, that
b 




II6              THE REIGN OF LAW.
physical research teaches us to see and feel the most.
Of course, in so far as its discoveries are really true, its
influence must be for good. To doubt this were to doubt
that all truth is true, and that all truth is God's.
There are eddies in every stream-eddies where rubbish will collect, and circ'le for a time.  But the ultimate
bearing of scientific truth cannot be mistaken. Nothing
is more remarkable in the present state of physical
research  than what may be called the transcendental
character of its results.  And what is transcendentalism
but the tendency to trace up all things to the relation in
which they stand to abstract Ideas?  And what is this
but to bring all physical phenomena nearer and nearer
into relation with the phenomena of Mind? The old
speculations of Philosophy which cut the ground from
Materialism by showring how little we know of MIatter,
are now being daily reinforced by the subtle analysis
of the Physiologist, the Chemist, and the Electrician.
Under that analysis Matter dissolves and disappears,
surviving only as the phenomena of Force; which again
is seen converging along all its lines 4o:;ome common
centre-" sloping through darkness up to God."l
Even the writers who have incurred most reasonable
suspicion as to the drift of their teaching, give neverdherennysol's " In MIemoriam."




LAW;-ITS DEFINITIONS.             l17
less constant witness to what may be called the purely
mental quality of the ultimate results of physical inquiry.
It has been said with perfect truth that " the fundamental
ideas of modern Science are as transcendental as any of
the axioms in ancient philosophy.1 We have seen that
one of the senses in which Law is habitually used is to
designate abstract ideas and doctrines of this kind.  So
far from these doctrines and ideas having a tendency to
Materialism, they serve rather to bring inside the strict
domain of Science ideas which in the earlier stages of
human knowledge lay wholly within the region of Faith
or of Belief. For example, the writer of the Epistle to
the Hebrews specially declares that it is by Faith that
we understand "that the things which are seen were not
made of the things which do appear." Yet this is now
one of the most assured doctrines of Science,-that
invisible Forces are behind and above all visible phenomnena, moulding them in forms of infinite variety, of all
which forms the only real knowledge we possess lies in
our perception of the Ideas they express-of their beauty,
or of their fitness,-in short, of their being all the work
of "Toil co-operant to an End."
Every natural Force which we call a law is itself
invisible-the idea of it in the mind arising by way of
A Lewcs's s"t hilosophy of Aristotle," p. 66.




T I             THE REIGN OF LAW'.
necessary inference out of an observed Order of facts.
And very often, if not always, in our conception of these
_Forces, we are investing them  with the attributes of
Intelligence and of Will at the very moment, perhaps,
when we are stumbling over the difficulty of seeing in
them the exponents of a Mind which is intelligent and
of a Will which is Supreme.  The deeper we go in
Science, the more certain it becomes that all the realities
of Nature are in the region of the Invisible, so that the
saying is literally, and not merely figuratively true, that
the things which are seen are temporal, and it is only
the things which are not seen that are eternal. For
example, we never see the phenomena of Life dissociated from Organisation.  Yet the profoundest physi.
ologists have come to the conclusion that Organisation
is not the cause of Life, but, on the contrary, that Life
is the cause of Organisation,-Life being something —a
Force of some kind, by whatever name we may call
it-which precedes Organisation, and fashions it, and
builds it up. This was the conclusion come to by the
great artatomist Hunter, and it is the conclusion endorsed in our own day by such men as Dr. Carpenter
and Professor Huxley,-men  neither of whom  have
exhibited in their philosophy any undue bias towards
either theological or metaphysical explanations.  One
illustration referred to by these writers is derived from




LAW;-ITS DEFINITIONS.              I I9
the shells —the beautiful shells-of the animals called
the'" Foraminifera." 1  No Forms in Nature are more
exquisite.  Yet they are the work and the abode of
animals which are mere blobs of jelly-without parts,
without organs-absolutely without visible structure of
any kind.  In this jelly, nevertheless, there works a
"'vital Force" capable of building up an Organism  of
most complicated and perfect symmetry.
But what is a vital Force?  It is something which we
cannot see, but of whose existence we are as certain
as we are of its visible effects-nay, which our reason
tells us-precedes and is superior to these.'We often
speak of Material Forces as if we could identify any
kind of Force with Matter.  But this is only one of
the many ambiguities of language.  All that we mean
by a Material Force is a force which acts upon Matter,
and produces in Matter its own appropriate effects.  We
must go a step further therefore and ask ourselves, What
is Force?  What is our conception of it?  What idea
can we form, for example, of the real nature of that
Force, the measure of whose operation has been so
exactly ascertained-the Force of Gravitation?  It is
invisible-imponderable-all our words for it are but
circumlocutions to express its phenomena or effects.
1 "The Elements of Comparative Anatomy," (Huxley,) pp.
[o0 x I.




120              TIE REIGN OF LAVW.
There are many kinds of force in Nature-which
we distinguish after the same fashion-according  to
their effects or according to the forms of Matter inr
which they become cognisable to us.  But if we trace
all our conceptions on the nature of Force to their
fountain-head, we shall find that they are formed on
our own consciousness of Living Effort-of that force
which has its seat in: our own vitality, and especially
on that kind' of it which can be called forth at the
bidding of the Will.  In saying this I do not mean to
borrow from that false philosophy which pretends by the
exercise of reason to get behind all the intuitive convictions on which reason rests. It is in this way that men
have come to argue on what they call the " reality of
an external world." Even if there were no process of
reasoning capable of defending that reality, this would
not lend a reasonable character to doubts regarding it.
leason must start from some postulate-some primary
truths which cannot be denied.  But we need not assuime
the reality of an external world to be one of these.
Yet if it be not a first step, it is a second step hardly
distinguishable from the first.  Self-existence is of course
the truth which may be regarded as the first of all, but
in the very idea of Self the existence of that which is
Not-Self is necessarily involved.  In connecting, however, our conceptions of Force with the consciotusness




LAW;-ITS DEFINITIONS,             12 I
of Living Effort in. ourselves, we must guard against mistaking analogy for identity, and against confounding
together two items of knowledge which are quite distinct.
Correlative with the consciousness of Living Effort in
ourselves, and inseparable from it, there is the consciousness of Force acting on us, as well as acting
in us.  And this argument applies equally whether
Self be regarded as a perceiving Mind, or as a physical
Organism  through which Mind perceives.  Thus the
knowledge of an external world-that is to say, the
knowledge of external Force-stands side by side with
the knowledge of Self.  Nothing can be known except
as distinguished from other things; and all things which
are distinguishable from each other, are, in a sense, and
in the measure of that distinction, known. And so we
know the existence both of internal and of external
Force.  But if we come to ask ourselves farther questions, as to the nature and seat of Material Force, we can
only think of it in the terms of the Vital Force exerted
by ourselves.  If we can ever know anything of the
nature of any Force, it ought to be of this one.  And
yet the fact is that we know nothing. If, then, we
know nothing of that kind of Force which is so near
to us, and with which our own Intelligence is in such
close alliance, much less can we know  the ultimate
nature of Force in its other forms.




22              THE REIGN OF LAW,
It is important to dwell on this, because both the
aversion with which some men regard the idea of the
Reign of Law, and the triumph with which some others
hail it, are founded on a notion that, when we have
traced any given phenomena to what are called Natural
Forces, we have traced them farther than we really have.
W~~e know nothing of the ultimate nature, or of the ultimate seat of Force.  Science, in the modern doctrine of
the Conservation of Energy, and the Convertibility of
Forces, is already getting something like a firm hold of
the idea that all kinds of Force are but forms or manifestations of some one Central Force issuing from some
one Fountain-head of Power. Sir John Herschel has
not hesitated to say, that'" it is but reasonable to regard
the Force of Gravitation as the direct or indirect result
of a Consciousness or a Will existing somewhere." 1
And even if we cannot certainly identify Force in all its
forrs with the direct energies of One Omnipresent and
all pervading Will, it is at least in the highest degree
unphilosophical to assume the contrary —to speak or to
think as if the Forces of Nature were either independent
of, or even separate from, the Creator's Power.
It follows, then, from these considerations, that whatever difficulty there may be in conceiving of a Will
not exercised by a visible Person, it is a difficulty which
" 6 Outlines (of AstlronIloy," 5th e(l;tion, p. 291.




LAW;-ITS DEFINITIONS.            123
cannot be evaded by arresting our conceptions at the
point at which they have arrived in forming the idea
of Laws or Forces. That idea is itself made up out
of elements derived from our own consciousness of
Personality. This fact is seen by men who do not
see the interpretation of it. They denounce as a superstition the idea of any Personal Will separable from
the Forces which work in Nature. They say that this
idea is a mere projection of our own Personality into
the world beyond-the shadow of our own Form cast
upon the ground on which we look. And indeed this,
in a sense, is true. It is perfectly true that the Mind
does recognise in Nature a reflection of itself. But if
this be a deception, it is a deception which is not
avoided by transferring the' idea of Personality to the
abstract Idea of Force, or by investing combinations of
Force with the attributes of Mind.
We need not be jealous, then, when new  domains
are claimed as under the Reign of Law-an agency
through which we see working everywhere some Purpose of the Everlasting Will. There are many things
in Nature of which we do not see the reason; and
many other things of which we cannot find ollt the
cause; but there are none from which we exclude the
idea of Purpose by success in discovering the cause. It
has been said, with. perfect truth, by a living naturalist




124              THE REIGN OF LAW.
who is of all others most opposed to what he calls
Theological explanations in Science, that we may just
as well speak of a watch as the abode of a'"watchforce," as speak of the organisation of an animal as
the abode of a "vital Force." 1 The analogy is precise
and accurate. The Forces by which a watch moves are
natural Forces.  It is the relation of interdependence
in which those Forces are placed to each other, or,
in other words, the adjustment of them to a particular Purpose, which constitutes the " watch-force;"
and the seat of this Force which is in fact no one
Force,'but a combination of many Forces —is in the
Intelligence which conceived that combination, and in
the WVill which gave it effect.  The mechanisms dlevised
by Man are in this respect only an image of the more
perfect mechanism of Nature, in which the same prin
ciple of Adjustment is always the highest result which
Science can ascertain or recognise.  There is this difference, indeed,-that in regard to our works we see that
our knowledge of natural laws is very imperfect, andl
our control over them  is very feeble; whereas in the
machinery of Nature there is evidence of complete
knowledge and of absolute control.  The universal rule
is, that everything is brought about by way of Natural
A Lewes's "Philosophy of Aristotle," p. 87.




LAW; —ITS DEFINITIONS.          125
Consequence.  But another rule is, that all natural
consequences meet and fit into each other in endless
circles of Harmony and of Purpose.  And this can only
be explained by the fact that what we call Natural
Consequence is always the conjoint effect of an infinite
number of elementary Forces, whose action and reaction are under direction of the Will which we see
obeyed, and of the Purposes which we see actually
attained.
It is, indeed, the completeness of the analogy between
our own works on a small scale, and the works of the
Creator on an infinitely large scale, which is the greatest
mystery of all. Man is under constraint to adopt the
principle of Adjustment, because the Forces of Nature
are external to and independent of his Will. They
may be managed, but they cannot be disobeyed. It
is impossible to suppose that they stand in the same
relation to the Will of the Supreme; yet it seems as
if He took the same method of dealing with them
-never violating  them, never breaking them, but
always ruling them by that which we call Adjustment
or Contrivance.  Nothing gives us such an idea of
the immutability of T,aws as this! nor does anything
give us such an idea of their pliability to use. How
imperious they are, yet how submissive!  How they
reign, yet how they serve I




CHAPTER ILX
CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY ARISING OUT OF THE REIGN
OF LAW-EXAMPLE IN THE MACHINERY OF FLIGHT.
T HE  necessity of Contrivance for the accomplishment of Purpose arises out of the irmmutability
of Natural Forces. They must be conformed to, and
obeyed. Therefore, where they do not serve our purpose
directly, they can only be made to serve it by ingenuity
and contrivance. This necessity, then, may be said to
be the index and the measure of the power of Law.
And so, on the other hand, the certainty with which
Purpose can be accomplished by Contrivance, is the
index and the measure of mental knowledge and resource. It is by wisdom and knowledge that the Forces
of Nature-even those which may seem most adverseare yoked to service. This idea of the relation in which
Law stands to Will, and in which Will stands to Law, is
familiar to us in the works of Man: but it is less familiar
to us as equally holding good in the works of Nature.
We feel, sometimes, as if it were an unworthy notion of




CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY.           I27
the Will which works in Nature, to suppose that it
should never act except through the use of means.  But
our notions of unworthiness are themselves often the
unworthiest of all. They must be ruled and disciplined
by observation of that which is,-not founded on a
p7iori conceptions of what ought to be. Nothing is
more certain than that the whole Order of Nature is one
vast system of Contrivance. And what is Contrivance
but that kind of arrangement by which the unchangeable
demands of Law are met and satisfied?  It may be that
all natural Forces are resolvable into some One Force;
and indeed in the modern doctrine of the Correlation of
Forces, an idea which is a near approach to this, has
already entered the domain of Science. It may also be
that this One Force, into which all others return again, is
itself but a mode of action of the Divine Will. But we
have no instrauments whereby to reach this last analysis.
Whatever tho.e ultimate relation may be between mental
and material Force, we can at least see clearly this, —that
in Nature there is the most elaborate machinery to
accomplish  Purpose  through  the instrumentality  of
means. It seems as if all that is done in Nature as well
as all that is done in art, were done by knowiZg how to
do it. It is curious how the language of the great Seers
of the Old Testament corresponds with this idea. They
uniformly ascribe all the opergtions of Nature-the




I 28            THE REIGN OF LAW.
greatest and the smallest-to the working of Divine
Power. But they never revolt-as so many do in these
weaker days-fromn the idea of this Power working by
wisdom and knowledge in the use of means; nor, in this
point of view, do they ever separate between the work
of first Creation, and the work which is going on daily in
the existing world. Exactly the same language is applied
to the rarest exertions of power, and to the gentlest and
most constant of all natural operations. Thus the saying
that " The Lord by wisdom hath founded the Earth; by
understanding hath He established the Heavens,"-is
coupled in the same breath with this other saying, " By
His knowledge the depths are broken up, and the clouds
drop down the dew."I
Every instance of Contrivance which we can thoroughly
follow and understand, has an intense interest —as casting light upon this method of the Divine government,
and upon the analogy between the operations of our
own minds and the operations of the Creator. Some
instances will strike us more than others-and those
will strike us most which stand in some near comparison
with our own human efforts of ingenuity and contrivance.
There is one such instance which I propose to consider
in this chapter-the machinery by which a great purl Prov. iii. I9, 20.




CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY.           29
pose has been accomplished  in Nature-a purpose
which Man has never been able to accomplish in art,
and that is the Navigation of the Air. No more beautiful example can be found, even in the wide and rich
domain of Animal Mechanics-none in which we can
trace more clearly, too, the mode and method in which
laws the most rigorous and exact are used as the supple
instruments of Purpose.
4 The way of an Eagle in the air" was one of the
things of which Solomon said, that'he knew it not."
No wonder that the Wise King reckoned it among the
great mysteries of Nature! The Force of Gravitation,
though its exact measure was not ascertained till the
days of Newton, has been the most familiar of all Forces
in all ages of Mankind. How, then, in violation of its
known effects, could heavy bodies be supported upon
the thin air-and be gifted with the power of sustaining
and directing movements more easy, more rapid, and
more certain than the movements of other animals upon
the firm and solid earth? No animal motion in Nature
is so striking or so beautiful as the
" Scythe-like sweep of wings, that dare
The headlong plunge through eddying gulfs of air." 
Nor will the wonder cease when, so far as the
I Longfellow's "Wayside Tnn-Ser Federigo,"
K




130              THE REIGN OF LAW.
mechanical problem  is concerned, the mystery of flight
is solved.  If we wish to see how material laws can
be bent to purpose, we shall study this problem.
In the first place, it is remarkable that the Force which
seems so adverse-the Force of Gravitation drawing
down all bodies to the earth-is the very Force which
is the principal one concerned in flight, and without
which flight would be impossible.  It is curious how
completely this has been forgotten in almost all human
attempts to navigate the air.  Birds are not lighter than
the air, but immensely heavier.  If they were lighter
than the air they might float, but they could not fly.
This is the difference between a Bird and a Balloon. A
Balloon rises because it is lighter than the air, and floats
upon it. Consequently, it is incapable of being directed,
because it possesses in itself no active Force enabling
it to resist the currents of the air in which it is imrmersed, and because, if it had such a force, it would have
no fulcrum, or resisting medium  against which to exert
it.  It becomes, as it Were, part of the atmosphere, and
must go with it where it goes.  No Bird is ever for an
instant of time lighter than the air in which it flies; but
being, on the contrary, always greatly heavier, it keeps
possession of a Force capable of supplying momentum,
and therefore capable of overcoming any lesser Force,
such as the ordinary resistance of the atmosphere, and




CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY.            131
even of heavy gales of wind.  The Law of Gravitation,
therefbre, is used in the flight of Birds as one of the
most essential of the Forces which are available for the
accomplishment of the end in view.
The next law appealed to, and pressed into the service, is again a law which would seem an impediment in
the way.  This is the resisting force of the atmosphere
in  opposing any body moving through  it.  In this
force an agent is sought and found for supplying the
requisite balance to the Force of Gravity.  But in order
that the resisting force of air should be effectual for this
purpose, it must be used under very peculiar conditions.
The resisting force of fluids, and of airs or gases, is a
force acting equally in all directions, unless special
means are taken to give it predominant action in some
special direction.  If it is a force strong enough to prevent a body from falling, it is also a force strong enough
to prevent it from  advancing.  In order, therefore, to
solve the problem  of flight, the resisting power of the
air must be called into action as strongly as possible
in the direction opposite to the Force of Gravity, and
as little as possible in any other. Consequently a body
capable of flight must present its maximum of surface to
the resistance of the air in the perpendicular direction,
and its minimum of surface in the horizontal direction.
Now, both these conditions are satisfied (I) by the great
K2




132             THE REIGN OF LAW.
breadth or length of surface presented to the air perpendicularly in a Bird's expanded wings, and by (2) the
narrow lines presented in its shape horizontally, when
in the act of forward motion through the air. But some.
thing more yet is required for flight. Great as the resisting force of air is, it is not strong enough to balance
the Force of Gravity by its mere pressure on an expanded wing-unless that pressure is increased by an
appeal to yet other laws —and other properties of its
nature. Every sportsman must have seen cases in which
a flying Bird has been so wounded as to produce a rigid
expansion of the wings. This does not prevent the Bird
from falling, although it breaks the fall, and makes it
come more or less gently to the ground.
Yet further, therefore, to accomplish flight, another
law must be appealed to, and that is the immense elasticity of the air, and the reacting force it exerts against
compression.  To enable an animal heavier than the air
to support itself against the Force of Gravity, it must be
enabled to strike the air downwards with such force as
to occasion a rebound upwards of corresponding power.
The wing of a flying animal must, therefore, do some.
thing more than barely balance Gravity. It must be able
to strike the air with such violence as to call forth a
reaction equally violent, and in the opposite direction.
This is the function assigned to the powerful muscles by




CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY.          133
which the wings of Birds are flapped with such velocity
and strength. We need not follow this part of the pro.
blem further, because it does not differ in kind from the
muscular action of other animals. The connexion, indeed, between the Wills of animals and the mechanism
of their frame, is the last and highest problem of all in
the mechanics of Nature; but it is merged and hid for
ever in the one great mystery of Life. But so far as this
difficulty is concerned, the action of an Eagle's wing is
not more mysterious than the action of a Man's arm.
There is a greater concentration of muscular power in
the organism of Birds than in most other animal frames;
because it is an essential part of the problem  to be
solved in flight, that the engine which works the wings
should be very strong, very compact, of a special form,
and that, though heavier than the air, it should not have
an excessive weight. These conditions are all met in
the power, in the outline, and in the bulk of the pectoral
muscles which move the wings of Birds. Few persons
have any idea of the force expended in the action of
ordinary flight. The pulsations of the wing in most Birds
are so rapid that they cannot be counted. Even the
Heron seldom flaps its wings at a rate of less than from
I20 to i50 strokes in a minute. This is counting only
the downward strokes, preparatory to each one of which
there must be an upward stroke also; so that there are




134              THE REIGN OF LAW.
from 240 to 300 separate movements per minute. Yet
the Heron is remarkable for its slow and heavy flight,
and it is difficult to believe, until one has timed the
pulsations with a watch, that they have a rapidity approaching to two in a second.  But this difficulty is an
index to the enormous comparative rapidity of the fasterflying Birds. Let any one try to count the pulsations of
the wing in ordinary flight of a Pigeon, or of a Blackcock,
or of a Partridge, or, still more, of any of the diving sea.
fowl.  He will find that though, in the case of most of
these Birds, the quickness of sight enables him to see the
strokes separate from each other, it is utterly impossible
to count them; whilst in some Birds, especially in the
Divers, as well as in the Pheasant and Partridge tribe,
the velocity is so great that the eye cannot follow it at
all. and the vibration of the wings leaves only a blurred
impression on the eye.
Oui subject here, however, is not so much the amount
of vital force bestowed on Birds, as the mechanical laws
which are appealed to in order to male that force effective in the accomplishment of flight.  The elasticity of
the air is the law which offers itself for the counteraction
of gravity. But, in order to make it available for this
purpose, there must be some great force of downward
blow in order to evoke a corresponding rebound in the
opposite, or upward direction.  Now, what is the nature




CONTRIVANCE A IN ECESSITY.          1x35
of the implement required for striking this downward
blow?  There are many conditions it must fulfil.  First,
it must be large enough in area to compress an adequate
volume of air; next, it must be light enough in substance not to add an excess of weight to the already
heavy body of the Bird; next, it must be strong enough
in frame to withstand the pressure which its own action
on the air creates. The first of these conditions is met
by an exact adjustmlent of the size or area of the wing to
the size and weight of the Bird which it is to lift.  The
second and the third conditions are both met by the
provision of a peculiar substance, feathers, which are
very light and very strong; whilst the only heavy parts of
the framework, namely, the bones in which the feathers
are inserted, are limited to a very small part of the area
required.
But there is another difficulty to be overcome-a
difficulty opposed by natural laws, and which can only
be met by another adjustment, if possible more ingenious and beautiful than the rest.  It is obvious that if
a Bird is to support itseWlf by the downward blow of its
wings upon the air, it must at the end of each downward
stroke lift the wing upwards again, so as to be ready for
the next.  But each upward stroke is in danger of neutralising the effect of the downward stroke.  It must be
made with equal velocity, and if it required equal force,




i36             THE REIGN OF LAW.
it must produce equal resistance, —an equal rebound
from the elasticity of the air. If this difficulty were not
evaded somehow, flight would be impossible.  But it
is evaded by two mechanical contrivances, which, as it
were, triumph over the laws of aerial resistance by conforming to them.  One of these contrivances is, that
the upper surface of the wing is made convex, whilst
the under surface is concave.  The enormous difference
which this makes in atmospheric resistance is familiarly
known to us by the difference between the effect of the
wind on an umbrella which is exposed to it on the
under or the upper side. The air which is struck by a.
concave or hollow surface is gathered up, and prevented
from escaping; whereas the air struck by a convex or
bulging surface escapes readily on all sides, and comparatively little pressure or resistance is produced. And
so, from the convexity of the upper surface of a Bird's
wing, the upward stroke may be made with comparatively trifling injury to the force gained in the downward
blow.
But this is only half of the provision made against
a consequence which would be so fatal to the end in
view.  The other half consists in this-that the feathers
of a Bird's wing are made to zuider/ap eacjh olier, so that
in the downward stroke the pressure of the air closes
them  upwards against each other, and converts the




CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY.          137
whole series of them into one connected membrane,
through which there is no escape; whilst in the upward
stroke the same pressure has precisely the reverse effect
-it opens the feathers, separates them from each other,
and converts each pair of feathers into a self-acting
valve, through which the air rushes at every point.
Thus the same implement is changed in the fraction
of a second from a close and continuous membrane
which is impervious to the air, into a series of disconnected joints through which the air passes without the
least resistance-the machine being so adjusted that
when pressure is required the maximum of pressure is
produced, and, when pressure is to be avoided, it is
avoided in spite of rapid and violent action.
This, however, exhausts but a small part of the means
by which Law is made to do the work of Will in the
machinery of flight. It might easily be that violent and
rapid blows, struck downwards against the elastic air,
might enable animals possessed of such power to lift
themselves from the ground and nothing more. There
is a common toy which lifts itself in this manner from
the force exerted by the air in resisting, and reacting
upon little vanes which are set spinning by the hand.
But the toy mounts straight up, and is incapable of
horizontal motion. So, there are many structures of
wing which might enable animals to mount into the air,




:138             THE REIGN OF LAW.
but which would not enable them  to advance or to
direct their flight.  How, then, is this essential purpose
gained? Again we find an appeal made to natural
laws, and advantage taken of their certainty and
unchangeablenesso
The power of forward motion is given to Birds, first
by the direction in which the whole wing feathers are
set, and next by the structure given to each feather in
itself.  The wing feathers are all set backwards,-that
is, in the direction opposite to that in which the Bird
moves; whilst each feather is at the same time so constructed as to be strong and rigid toward its base, and
extremely flexible and elastic towards its end.  On the
other hand, the front of the wing, along the greater part
of its length, is a stiff hard edge, wholly unelastic and
unyielding to the air. The anterior and posterior webs
of each feather are adjusted on the same principle. The
consequence of this disposition of the parts as a whole,
and of this construction of each of the parts, is, that the
air which is.struck and compressed in the hollow of the
wing, being unable to escape thlrough the wing, owing to
the closing upwards of the feathers against each other,
and being also unable to escape forwards owing to the
rigidity of the bones and of the quills in that direction,
finds its easiest escape backwards.  In passing backwards it lifts by its force the elastic ends of the feathers;




CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY.                1139
and thus whilst effecting this escape, in obedience to the'law of action and reaction, it communicates, in its pas.
sage along the whole line of both wings, a corresponding
push forwards to the body of the Bird. By this elaborate
mechanical contrivance the same volume of air is made
to perform the double duty of yielding pressure enough
to sustain the Bird's weight against the Force of Gravity,
and also of communicating to it a  forward  impulse.
The Bird, therefore, has nothing to do but to repeat with
the requisite velocity and strength its perpendicular
blows upon the air, and by virtue of the structure of its
wings the same blow both sustains and propels it.'
The truth of this explanation of the mechanical theory
of flight may be tested in various ways.  in the first
place it is quite visible to the eye.  In many birds flying
straight to us, or straight from  us, the effect of aerial
resistance in bending upwards the ends of the quill
feathers is very conspicuous.  The flight of the common
Rook affords an excellent example-where the Bird is
seen foreshortened, In Eagles the same effect is very
I The upward stroke has no sustaining power, but has considerable propelling power; because some air, failing to escape
between the feathers, must always pass along the convex surface of
the wing, and, escaping backwards, must exert upon the ends of the
quills a similar reactive force to that which is exerted in the down.
ward stroke.




140             THE REIGN OF LAW.
marked-the wing tips forming a sharp upward curve.
I have seen it equally obvious in that splendid Bird the
Gannet, or Solan Goose; and when we recollect the
great weight which those few quill feathers are thus seen
sustaining, we begin to appreciate the degree in which
lightness, strength, and imperviousness to the passage of
air are combined in this wonderful implement of flight.
But perhaps the simplest test of the action and reaction of the air and the wing feathers in producing
forward motion is an actual experiment.  If we take
in the hand the stretched wing of a Heron, which has
been dried in that position, and strike it quickly downwards in the air, we shall find that it is very difficult
indeed to maintain the perpendicular direction of the
stroke, requiring, in fact, murch force to do so; and
that if we do not apply this force, the hand is carried
irresistibly forwayd, from the impetus in that direction
which the air communicates to the wing in its escape
backwards from the blow.
Another test is one of reasoning and observation. If
the explanation now given be correct, it must follow
that since no Bird can flap its wings in any other
direction than the vertical —i.e. perpendicular to its
own axis (which is ordinarily horizontal)-and as this
motion has been shown to produce necessarily a forward
motion, lw B2irdi can ever dy backwalaris, Accordingly no




CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY.             141
Bird ever does so —lo man ever saw a Bird, even for an
instant, fly tail foremost. A Bird can, of course, allow
itself to fall backwards by merely slowiezg the action
of' its wings so as to allow its weight to overcome
their sustaining power; and this motion may sometimes give the appearance of flying backwards,-as
when a Swift drops backwards from  the eaves of a
house, or when a Humming Bird allows itself to drop
in like manner from out of the large tubular petals of
a flower.  But this backward motion is due to the action
of gravity, and not to the action of the Bird's wing.
In short, it is falling downwards, not flying backwards.
Nay, more, if the theory of flight here given be correct,
it must equally follow that even standing still, which
is the easiest of all things to other animals, must be
very difficult, if not altogether impossible, to a Bird
when flying.  This also is true in fact.  To stand still
in the air is not indeed impossible to a flying Bird,
for reasons to be presently explained, but it is one of
the most difficult feats of winTgimansk/zif,-a feat which
many Birds, not otherwise clumsy, can never perform
at all, and which is performed only by special exertion,
and generally for a very short time, by those Birds
whose structure enables tlem  to be adepts in their
glorious art.
It cannot be too often repeated-because miscon'




142              THE REIGN OF LAW.
ception on this point has been the cardinal error in
human attempts to navigate the air —that in all the
beautiful evolutions of birds upon the wing, it is weight,
and not buoyancy, which makes those evolutions possible.  It supplies them, so to speak, with a store of
Force which is constant, inexhaustible, inherent in the
very substance of themselves, and entirely independent
of any muscular exertion.  All they have to do is to
give direction to that internal Force, by acting on the
external Force of aerial currents, through the contraction and expansion of the implements which have been
given them for that purpose.  Those who have watched
the flight of Birds with any care, must have observed
that when once they have attained a certain initial
velocity and a certain elevation, by rapid and repeated
strokes upon the air, they are then able to fly with
comparatively little exertion, and very often to pursue
their course for long distances without any flapping
whatever of the wings.   The  contrast between the
violent efforts required for the first acquisition of the
initial velocity, and the perfect ease with which flight is
performed  after it has been  acquired, is a contrast
described by Virgil in lines of incomparable beauty: —
"I Qualis spelunca subito commota columba,
Cui domus et dulces latebroso in pumice nidi,.Fcrtur in arva volans, platusumi-que csterrita; peIlnis




CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY.              1 43
Dat tecto ingentem; mox, aere lapsa quieto,
Radit iter liquiduln, celeres neque comemovet alas."
&z. lib. v. 213-I 7
Still more remarkable, as showing the power and the
value of weight in flight, is the fact that Birds are able
to resume rapid and easy motion not only as the result
of a previously-acquired momentum, but after " soaring"
in an almost perfectly stationary position. Nothing, for
example, is more common than to see Sea Gulls, and some
large species of Hawks, "' soaring " one moment (that is,
all the forces bearing on the Bird brought to an equilibrium, and all motion brought consequently to nearly
a perfect standstill), and the next moment sailing
onwards in rapid and apparently effortless progression.
Now, how is this effect produced?  If we only think
of it, the question ought rather to be, How  is it
ever prevented?  The soaring is a much more difficult thing to do than the going onwards.  It cannot
be done at all in a perfectly still atmosphere.  It can
only be done when there is a breeze of sufficient
strength.  Gravity is ceaselessly acting on the Bird to
pull it downwards: and downwards it must go, unless
there is a countervailing Force to keep it up.  This
force is the force of the breeze striking against the
vanes of the wings.  But in order to bring these two
forces to nearly a perfect balance, and so to "soar,"




1 44            TIlE REIGN OF LAW.
the Bird must expand  or contract its wings exactly
to the right size, and hold them  exactly at the right
angle.  The  slightest alteration in either of these
adjustments produces instantly  an  upsetting  of the
balance, and of course a resulting motion. The exact
direction of that motion will depend on the degree in
which the wing is contracted, and the degree in which
its angle to the wind is changed. If the wing is very
much contracted, and at the same time held off from
the wind, that motion will be steeply downwards. Accordingly  this is the action  of a Hawk  when it
swoops upon its prey from a great height above it. I
have seen a Merlin dash down from a great distance
with its wings so closed as to seem  almost wholly
folded.  The Gannet in diving for fish does not close
its wings at all, but turning them and the whole axis
of its body into the perpendicular, and thus allowing
its great weight to act without any counteraction, dashes
itself into the sea with foam..  But every variety of
forward motion is attained by different degrees of contraction and exposure, according to the strength of the
breeze with which the Bird has to deal.  The limit of
its velocity is the limit of its momentum, and the limit
of its momentum is the limit of its weight. The light,
ness of a Bird is therefore a limit to its velocity. The
heavier a Bird is, the greater is its possible velocity




CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY.            145
of flight-because the greater is the store of Force —or
to use the language of modern physics, the greater is
the quantity of "potential energy" which, with proper
implements to act upon aerial resistance, it can always
convert into upward, or horizontal, or downward motion,
according to its own management and desires.
It will be at once seen from this view of the forces
concerned in flight, that the common explanation of
Birds being assisted by air-cells for the inhalation and
storage of heated air, must not only be erroneous, but
founded on wholly false conceptions of the fundamental
mechanical principles on which flight depends.  If a
Bird could inhale enough warm air to make it buoyant,
its power of flight would be effectually destroyed.  It
would become as light as a Balloon, and consequently
as helpless.  If, on the other hand, it were merely to
inflate itself with a small quantity of hot air insufficient
to produce buoyancy, but sufficient to increase its bulk,
the only effect would be to expose it to increased resistance in cleaving the air. It is true, indeed, that the
bones of Birds are made more hollow and lighter than
the bones of Mammals, because Birds, though requirng
weight, must not have too much of it.  It is true, also,
that the air must have access to these hollows, else they
would be unable to resist atmospheric pressure. But it is
no part whatever of the plan or intention of the structure
L




546             THE REIGN OF LAW.
of Birds, or of any part of that structure, to afford balloonspace for heated air with a view to buoyancy.
And here, indeed, we open up a new branch of the
same inquiry, showing, in new aspects, how the uni zersality and unchangeableness of all natural laws are
essential to the use of them as the instrurnents of Will;
and how by being played off against each other they are
made to express every shade of thought, and the nicest
change of purpose. The movement of all flying animals
in the air is governed and determined by Forces of mluscuIar power, and of aerial resistance and elasticity, being
brought to bear upon the Force of Gravity, whereby,
according to the universal laws of motion, a direction is
given to the animal which is the resultant, or compromise,
between all the Forces so employed. Weight, as we
have seen, is one of these Forces-absolutely essential to
that result, and no flying animal can ever for a moment
of time be buoyant, or lighter than the air in which it is
designed to move.  But it is obvious that, within certain
limits, the proportion in which these different Forces are
balanced against each other admits of immense variety.
The limits of variation can easily be specified. Every
flying animal must have muscular power great enough to
work its own size of wing: that size of wing must be
large enough to act upon a volume of air sufficient to lift
the animal's whole weight: lastly, and consequently, the








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CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY.            147
weight must not be too great, or dispersed over too large
a bulk. But within these limits there is room for great
varieties of adjustments, having reference to corresponding varieties of purpose. To some Birds the air is almost
their perpetual home-the only region in which they find
their food-a region which they never leave, whether in
storm or sunshine, except during the hours of darkness,
and the yearly days which are devoted to their nests.
Other Birds are mainly terrestrial, and never betake
themselves to flight except to escape an enemy, or to
follow  the seasons and the sun.  Between these extremes there is every possible variety of habit. And all
these have corresponding varieties of structure.  The
Birds which seek their food in the air have long and
powerful wings, and so nice an adjustment of their
weight to that power and to that length, that the faculty
of self-command in them is perfect, and their power of
direction so accurate that they can pick up a flying gnat
whilst they are passing through the air at the rate of
more than a hundred miles an hour. Such especially are
the powers of some species of the Swallow tribe, one of
which, the common Swift, is a creature whose wonderful
and unceasing evolutions seem part of the happiness
of summer and of serene and lofty skies.1
1 For the form of the wing in this remarkable bird, see the beaud
tiful drawing here engraved from the pencil of Mr. Wolf.
i 2




148            THE REIGN OF LAW.
There are other Birds in which the wing has to be
adapted to the double purpose of swimming, or rather of
diving, and of flight. In this case, a large area of wing
must be dispensed with, because it would be incapable
of being worked under water. Consequently in all
diving Birds the wings are reduced to the smallest possible size which is consistent with retaining the power
of flight at all; and in a few extreme Forms, the power
of flight is sacrificed altogether, and the wing is reduced
to the size, and adapted to the function, of a powerful
fin.  This is the condition of the Penguins. But in most
genera of swimming Birds, both purposes are combined,
and the wing is just so far reduced in size and stiffened in
texture as to make it workable as a fin under water,
whilst it is still just large enough to sustain the weight of
the Bird in flight. And here again we have a wonderful
example of the skill with which inexorable mechanical
laws are subordinated to special purpose.  It is a necessary consequence of the area of the wing being so reduced, in proportion to the size of the Bird, that great
muscular power must be used in working it, otherwise
the Force of Gravity could not be overcome at all.  It
is a farther consequence of this proportion of weight to
working power, that there must be great momentum and
therefore great velocity of flight. Accordingly this is the
fact with all the oceanic diving Birds. They have vast




CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY.           I49
distances to go, following shoals of fish, and moving
from their summer to their winter haunts. They all fly
with immense velocity, and the wing-strokes are extremely rapid. But there is one quality which their
flight does not possess-because it is incompatible with
their structure, and because it is not required by their
habits —they have no facility in evolutions, no delicate
power of steering; they cannot stop with ease, nor can
they resume their onward motion in a moment. They
do not want it: the trackless fields of ocean over which
they roam are broad, and there are no obstructions in
the way. They fly in straight lines, changing their direction only in long curves, and lighting in the sea almost
with a tumble and a splash. Their rising again is a work
of great effort, and generally they have to eke out the
resisting power of their small wings, not only by the
most violent exertion, but by rising against the wind,
so as to collect its force as a help and addition to
their own.
And now, again, we may see all these conditions
changed where there is a change in the purpose to be
served. There is another large class of oceanic Birds
whose feeding ground is not under water, but on the
suiface of the sea. In this class all those powers of
flight which would be useless to the Divers are abso.
lutely required, and are given in the highest perfection, by




I50             THE REIGN OF LAW.
the enlistment of the same mechanical laws under different conditions.  In the Gulls, the Terns, the Petrels,
and in the Fulmars, with the Albatross as their typical
Form, the mechanism of flight is carried through an
ascending scale, to the highest degrees of power, both as
respects endurance and facility of evolution.
The mechanical laws which are appealed to in all
these modifications of structure require adjustments of
the finest kind; and some of them are so curious and
so beautiful that it is well worth following them a little
further in detail.
There are two facts observable in all Birds of great
and long-sustained powers of flight: —the first is, that
they are always provided with wings which are rather
long than broad, sometimes extremely narrow in proportion to their length; the second is, that the wings are
always sharply pointed at the ends.  Let us look at the
mechanical laws which absolutely require this structure
for the purpose of powerful flight, and to meet which
it has accordingly been devised and provided.
One law appealed to in making wings rather long
than broad is simply the law of leverage.  But this
law has to be applied under conditions of difficulty
and complexity, which are not apparent at first sight.
The body to be lifted is the very body that must
exert the lifting power.  The Force of Gravity, which




CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY.          I $I
has to be resisted, may be said to be sitting side
by side, occupying the same particles of matter, with
the Vital Force which is to give it battle. Nay, more,
the one is connected with the other in some mysterious
manner which we cannot trace or understand. A dead
Bird weighs as much as a living one. Nothing which
our scales can measure is lost when the Vital Force
is gone. It is The Great Imponderable. Nevertheless,
vital forces of unusual power are always coupled with
unusual mass and volume in the matter through which
they work. And so it is that a powerful Bird must
always also be comparatively a heavy Bird. And then
it is to be remembered that the action of gravity is
constant and untiring. The Vital Force, on the contrary,
however intense it may be, is intermitting and capable
of exhaustion. If, then, this Force is to be set against
the Force of Gravity, it has much need of some implement through which it may exert itself with mechanical
advantage as regards the particular pulrpose to be at-.
tained.  Such an implement is the lever-and a long
wing is nothing but a long lever. The mechanical principle, or law, as is well known, is this, —that a very small
amount of motion, or motion through a very small space,
at the short end of a lever, produces a great amount of
motion, or motion through a long space, at the opposite
or longer end. This action requires indeed a very intense




15 t2             THE REIGN OF LAW.
force to be applied at the shorter end, but it applies that
force -~ith immense advantage for the purpose in viewbecause the motion which is transmitted to the end
of a long wing is a motion acting at that point throughl
a long space, and is therefore equivalent to a very heasvy
weight lifted through a short space at the end which is
attached to the body of the Bird.  Now this is precisely
what is required for the purpose of flight. The body of
a Bird does not require to be much lifted by each stroke
of the wing. It only requires to be sustained; and when
more than this is needed —as when  a Bird first rises
irom  the ground, or from  the sea, or when it ascends
rapidly in the air-greatly increased exertion-in many
cases, very violent exertion-is required.1  And  then
it is to be remembered that long wings economise the
vital force in another way.  When a strong  current
of air strikes against the wings of a Bird, the same
sustaining effect is produced as when the wing strikes
1 The Albatross, when rising from tne sea, is described (" Ibis,"
July I865) as " stretching out his neck, and with great exertion oI
his wings, running along the top of the water for seventy or eighty
yards, until at last haring got sufficient impetus, he tucks up his
legs, and is once more fairly launched into the air."  The contrast
here described between the violent exertion required in first rising,
and the perfect ease of flight after this first momientum has been
acquired, is a striking illustration of the true mechanical princip!fs
of flight.




CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY.          153
against tile air.  Consequently Birds with very long
wings have this great advantage, that with pre-acquired
nlolentum, they call often for a long time fly wvithout
flapping their wings at all. Under these circumstances,
a Bird is sustained very much as a boy's kite is sustained
in the air. The string which the boy holds, and by
which he pulls the kite downwards with a certain force,
perforllls for the kite the same ofifces which its own
weight and balance and momentum  perform  for the
Bird. The great long-winged oceanic Birds often appear
to float rather than to fly. The stronger is the gale,
their flight, though less rapid, is all the more easy —so
easy indeed as to appear buoyant; because the blasts
which striate against their wings are enough to sustain
the bird with comparatively little exertion of its own,
except that of holding the wing vanes stretched and
exposed at proper angles to the wind. And whenever
thle onward force previously acquired by flapping be-.comes at length exhlausted, and the ceaseless inexorable
Force of Gravity is beginning to overcome it, the Bird
again rises by a few easy and gentle half-strokes of the
wing. Very often the same effect is produced by allowing tihe Force of Gravity to act, and when the downward
Imoimentum has -brought the Bird close to the ground
or to the sea, that force is again converted into an
ascending impetus by a change in the angle at which




I 54               TIE REIGN OF LAW.
the wing is exposed to the wind.  This is a constant
action with all the oceanic Birds.  Those who have seen
the Albatross have described themselves as never tired
of watching its glorious and triumphant motion:a'Tranquil its spirit seemed, and floated slow;
Even in its very motion there was rest."l
Rest-where there  is nothing else at rest in the tremendous turmoil of its own stormy seas i  Sometimes
for a whole hour together this splendid Bird will sail or
wheel round a ship in every possible variety of direction
without requiring to give a single stroke to its pinions.
Now, the Albatross has the extreme form of this kind of
wing.  Its wings are immensely long-about fourteen or
fifteen feet from tip to tip-and almost as narrow in proportion as a riband.2  Our common Gannet is an excel1 Professor Wilson's Sonnet, " A Cloud," &c.
2 The mechanical principle involved in the sufficiency of very
narrow wings has, I believe, been adequately explained in a very
ingenious paper read before the A4ronzautical Society, by Mr. F. iH.
Wenham, C.E. It is the same mechanical principle which accounts
for the narrow blades of a Screw Propeller having a resisting force
as great as would be exerted upon the whole area. of rotation by a
solid Disc. In the case of a flat body, such as the wing of a bird,
being propelled edgeways through the air, nearly the whole resisting and sustaining force is exerted upon the first few inchea
of tile advancing surface




Pr  a  ~~~~ e  ~~3                            K      ~~~                                  7- 1C;i ~~~








CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY.             5 5
lent, though a more modified, example of the same kind
of structure.  On the other hand, Birds of short wings,
though their flight is, sometimes very fast, are never able
to sustain it very long.  The muscular exertion they
require is greater, because it does not work to the same
advantage. Most of the Gallinaceous Birds (such as the
common Fowl, Pheasants, Partridges, &c.) have wings of
this kind; and some of them never fly except to escape
an enemy, or to change their feeding-ground.
The second fact observable in reference to Birds of
easy and powerful flight-namely, that their wings are
all sharply pointed at the end-will lead us still further
into the niceties of adjustment which are so signally displayed in the machinery of flight.
The feathers of a Bird's wing have a natural threefold
division, according to the different wing-bones to which
they are attached. The quills which form the end of the
wing are called the Primariies; those which form the
middle of the vane are called the Secondaries; and
those which are next the body of the Bird are called the
Tertiaries.  The motion of a Bird's wing increases from
its minimum at the shoulder-joint to its maximum at the
tip. The primary quills which form the termination of
the wing are those on which the chief burden of flight is
cast. Each feather has less and less weight to bear, and
less and less force to exert, in proportion as it lies nearer




156               TIHE REIGN OF LAW.
the body of the Bird; and there is nothing more beautiful in the structure of a wing than the perfect gradation
in strength and stiffness, as well as in modification of
form, which marks the series from the first of the Primary
quills to the last and feeblest of the Tertiaries.1 Now, the
sharpness or roundness of a wing at the tip depends on
the position which is given to the Ziongest Primary quill.
If the first, or even the second, primary is the longest,
and all that follow  are considerably shorter, the wing is
necessarily a pointed wing, because the tip of a single
quill forms the end; but if the third or fourth Primary
quills are the longest, and the next again on both sides
are only a little shorter, the wing becomes a round-ended
wing.  Round-ended wings are also almost always openended-that is to say, the tips of the quills do not touch
each other, but leave interspaces at the end of the wing,
through which, of course, a good deal of air escapes.
Since each single quill is formed on the same principle
as the whole wing —thlt is, with the anterior margin stiff
and the posterior margin yielding —this escape is not
a I owe to the accurate pencil of Mr. J. Wolf the accompanying
engraving of the wing of the Golden Plover, a Bird of powerful flight.
In this wing the gradation of the feathers is very perfect. It will be
observed that the first of the Secondaries, the eleventh feather from
the tip of the wing, is marked by a slight variation in the forml
of the margin.




I''~~~er
V$~Sr~ct~ <ik'O
I ~ 9  /( ifj,)1('
-   j         Kc~i;CI~~~~~~~~W OF/~                 GOL N PLOVEF








CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY.   7
useless for progression; but the air acts less favouralbly
for this purpose than when struck by a more compact set of feathers. The common Rook and all the
Crows are examples of this. The Peregrine Falcon,
the common Swallow, and all Birds of very powerful
flight, have been  provided  with  the  sharp-pointed
structure.1
The object of this structure, and the mechanical laws
to which it appeals, will be apparent when we recollect
what it is on which the propelling power, as distinct
from the sustaining power, of a Bird's wing depends.  It
depends on the reaction of the air escaping backwards —
that is, in the direction exactly opposite to that of the
intended motion of the Bird. Any air which escapes
from  under the wing, in any other direction, will of
course react with less advantage upon that motion. But
from under a round wing a good deal of air must necessarily escape aZongz thle rouztnded end-that is, in a direction
at right angles to the line of intended flight. All the
reaction produced by this escape is a reaction which is
useless for propulsion.  Accordingly, in all Birds to
which great velocity of flight is essential, this structure,
which is common in other Birds, is carefully avoided.
I The illustrations of Mr. Wolf will here again be the best explanation to the reader of the difference between the sharp and the
round structure, p. x56~




158            THIE REIGN OF LAW.
The Hawks have been classified as c"noble" or "ignoble," according to the length and sharpness of their
wings: those which catch their prey by velocity of flight
having been uniformly provided with the long-pointed
structure.  The Sparrow-Hawk and the Merlin are
excellent examples of the difference.  The SparrowHawk, with its comparatively short and blunt wings,
steals along the hedgerows and pounces on its prey by
surprise; seldom chasing it, except for a short distance,
and when the victim is at a disadvantage.  And well do
the smaller Birds know this habit, and the limit of his
powers.  Many of them chase and " haff" the SparrowHawk, when he is seen flying in the open, perfectly
aware that he cannot catch them by fast flying.  But
they never play these tricks with the Merlin. This beautiful little Falcon hunts the open ground, giving fair
chase to its quarry by power and speed of flight. The
Merlin delights in flying at some of the fastest Birds, such
as the Snipe. The longest and most beautiful trial of
w'ingmanship I have ever set1n was the chase of a Merlin
after a Snipe in one of the Hebrides.  It lasted as far
as the eye could reach, and seemed to continue far out
to sea. In the Merlin, as in all the fastest Falcons, the
second quill feather is the longest in the wing; the
other.s rapidly diminish; and the point of the wing looks
as S:~hLx  as a needle in the air.




CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY.           159
There is yet one other power which it is absolutely
necessary to some Birds that their wings should enable
them to exert: and that is, the power of standing still,
or remaining suspended in the air without any forward
motion.  One familiar example of this is the common
Kestrel, which, from the frequent exercise of this power,
is called in some counties the "Windhover."   The
mechanical principles on which the machinery of flight
is adapted to this purpose, are very simple. No Bird
can exercise this power which is not provided with wings
large enough, long enough, and powerful enough to sustain its weight with ease, and without violent exertion.
Large wings call always be diminished at the pleasure of
the Bird, by being partially folded inwards; and this
contraction of the area is constantly resorted to. But a
Bird which has wings so small and scanty as to compel
it to strike them always at full stretch, and with great
velocity in order to fly at all, is incapable of standing
still in the air.  No man ever saw a Diver or a Duck
performing the evolution which the Kestrel may be seen
performing every hour over so liany English fields. The
cause of this is obvious, if we refer to the principles
which have already been explained.  We have seen that
the perpendicular stroke of a Bird's wing has the double
effect of both propelling and sustaining.  The reaction
friom such a stroke brings two different forces to bear




i6o              THE REIGN OF LAW.
upon the Bird-one whose direction is upwards, and
another whose direction is forwards.  lHow can these
two effects be separated from  each other?  How can
the wing be so moved as to keep up just enough of the
sustaining force without allowing the propelling force to
come into play? The answer to this, although it involves
some very complicated laws connected with what mechanicians call the "parallelogram of forces," is practically
a simple one. It can only be done by shortening the
stroke, and altering the perpendicularity of its direction.
Of course, if a Bird, by altering the axis of its own body,
can direct its wing-stroke in some degree forzards, it
will have the effect of stopping instead of promoting
progression.  But in order to do this, it must have a
superabundance of sustaining force, because some of this
force is sacrificed when the stroke is off the perpendicular.  Hence it follows that Birds so heavy as to
require the whole action of their wings to sustain them
at all, can never afford this sacrifice of the sustaining
force, and, except for the purpose of arresting their flight,
can never strike except directly downwards,- that is,
directly against the opposing force of gravity. But Birds
with superabundant sustaining power, and long sharp
wings, have nothing to do but to diminish the length of
stroke, and direct it off the perpendicular at such an
angle as will bring all the forces bearing upon their body








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CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY.             I6 
to an exact balance, and they will then remain stationary
at a fixed point in the air.1
They are greatly assisted in this beautiful evolution
by an adverse current of air; and it will always be
observed that the Kestrel, when hovering, turns his head
to winzdu, and hangs his whole body at a greater or less
angle to the plane of the horizon.  When there is no
wind, or very little, the sustaining force is kept up by
a short rapid action of the pinions, and the long tail
is spread out like a fan to assist in stopping any tendency to onward motion.  When  there is a strong
breeze, no flapping is required at all-the force of the
wind supplying the whole force necessary to counteract
the force of gravity; and in proportion to the increasing
strength of the wind, the amount of vane which must be
exposed to it becomes less and less.  I have seen a
Kestrel stand suspended in a half gale with the wings
folded close to the body, and with no visible muscular
motion whatever.  And so nice is the adjustment of
position which is requisite to produce this exact balance
of all the forces bearing on the Bird, that the change
in that position which again instantly results in a forward motion is very often almost insensible to the eye.
1 Mr. Wolf's illustration of a Kestrel hovering shows accurately
the position of the bird when the action is performed in still air.
M




1 6 2THE REIGN OF LAW.
It is generally a slight expansion of the wings, and a
very slight change in the axis of the body.
And here it may be observed that the tails of Birds
have not, as is often supposed, any function analogous
to the rudder of a ship.  Birds which have lost the tail
are not thereby rendered incapable of turning.  If the
steering function had been assigned to Birds' tails, the
vane of the tail must have been set, not, as it is, horizontally, but perpendicularly to the line of flight.  But
a Bird's tail has in flight no lateral motion whatever.
It does, indeed, materially assist the Bird in turning,
because it serves to slop t1e way of a Bird when it
rises or turns in the air to take a new direction.  The
feathers of the tail are also capable of being depressed
unequally,-that is, more at one side than at the other;
and when the whole are spread out like the leaves of
a fain, this depression at one side is a means whereby
the Bird can exert against the air which is passing under
it greater muscular pressure upon one side than upon the
other, and can thus help the turning action of the wings.
Witlh a telescope I have seen this action of the tail very
marked in the soaring flight of the Buzzard, when the
Bird is wheeling round in spiral circles.  The tail contributes also largely to the general balance of the body,
which in itself is an important element in the facility
of flig!ht.  Accordingly, almost all Birds which depend




CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY.           E63
on great ease of evolution in flight —or on the power
of stopping suddenly, have largely developed tails.
This is the case with all the Birds of prey-with the
Kestrel in a conspicuous degree.  But there are some
exceptions which show that great powers of flight are
not always dependent on the possession of a large tail
-as, for example, the Swift.
Another explanation has been given of the means
by which Birds are able to turn in flight, which is a
curious example how preconceived theories founded
on false analogies will vitiate our observation of the
commonest facts in nature.  I do not know  of any
modern work that gives any account of the theory of
flight, which is even tolerably correct.  But in most
points an admirable account is to be found in the celebrated work of Borelli, "' De Motu Animalium."  On
the question, however, of steerage in flight, he gives a
solution which the most ordinary observation is sufficient
to contradict. Borelli is quite aware that the tail in Birds
has no such function as that which is usually assigned to
it, and he points out the true theoretical objection to
the possibility of its having any guiding power —viz.,
its horizontal position, and its immobility in the lateral
direction. But the theory which he himself propounds
is equally erroneous. It is this,-that Birds deflect their
course to the right or to the left, as rowers turn a rowM2




x64                THE REIGN OF LAW.
boat —by   striking  more  quickly  and  more  strongly
with  one wing than  with the other.l   To this theory
there are two objections-first, that as matter of fact
Birds can turn, and do turn, even to the extent of
describing complete circles in the air, without any flapping either of one wing or the other: and secondly,
that when Birds do flap and turn at the same time, not
the slightest difference in time  between the two wingstrokes can ever be  detected.  The beats of a Bird's
two wings are  always exactly  synchronous.   But the
first of these two objections is of itself quite sufficient
to disprove  the theory.  No  man  can  have watched
even for a moment the flight of the common Swallow,
and especially the flight of the Swift, without seeing it
perform   complete  gyrations  in  the  air without any
strokes of either wing.  The only change which can ever
be detected by the eye is a slight elevation on one side
1 Referring to a boat, he says:-" Si remi dexteri lateris celerius
quam sinistri aquami retrorsum impellant-semper prora revolvetur
versus sinistrum latus; ergo eodem modo dum avis in medio fluido
aeris innatat, volando asquilibrata in centro gravitatis ejus, si sola
dextra ala deorsum sed oblique flectatur, aerem subjecturn impellando versus caudam necessario ad instar navis mox memorate, permovetur latus ejus dextrm, quiescente aut tardius moto sinistro
latera. Ex quo fit, ut avis pars anterior circa centrumn gravitatis
ejus revoluta, flectatur versum sinistrum latus."-Borellu s "De
bMotu Animahulm," Pars Prima.  Propositio cxcix




CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY.                X65
of the whole body, and a slight depression of the other.
The depression is always on that side towards which the
bird is turning.  On the opposite side, that from  which
the Bird is turning, there is of course a corresponding elevation. Sometimes this is very obvious; but in general
it is so slight as to require close observation to detect it.
In the Albatross, when sweeping round, the wings are
often pointed in a direction nearly perpendicular to
the sea.' The effect of this, of course, is to expose the
two vanes at different angles to the aerial currentsand it must be remembered that in flight the balance
of all the forces employed is so extremely fine that the
most minute alteration  in the degree in  which they
bear upon each other will produce an immense change
in the result.  It is not surprising, therefore, that the
muscular movements which serve to turn  the axis of
a flying Bird from  one direction to  another, are very
I See a very interesting account of the flight of the Albatross by
Captain T. W. Hutton, in the "Ibis" for July i864. Captain
Hutton says: "' If he wishes to turn to thze rzigft, he bends his head
and tail slightly upwards, at the same time raising his left side.
lowerizng the right, in proportion to the sharpness of the curve he
wishes to make, the wings being kept rigid the whole time."  This
is the only paper I have seen on the flight of birds in which observation of the facts is not vitiated by some false preconceived theory
on their cause.  Captain Hutton has thoroughly seized the true
mechanical principles of flight.




x66             THE REIGN OF LAW.
often so extremely minute as generally altogether to
elude the sight. But in general terms, it may be said
that a Bird turns in flying essentially on the same principle as that on which a Man turns in walking.  It is
done in both cases by change in the direction of muscular pressure upon a resisting medium.  By an exquisite combination of different laws, and by mechanical contrivance in the adjustment of them, it has been
given to a Bird to find in the thin and yielding air a
medium of resistance against which its own muscular
force may act, as firm and as effective as that which
Man finds in the solid earth.
The Humming Birds are perhaps the most remarkable examples in the world of the machinery of flight.
The power of poising themselves in the air,-remaining absolutely stationary whilst they search the blossoms
for insects, -is a power essential to their life.  It is
a power accordingly which is enjoyed by them in the
highest perfection.  When they intend progressive flight,
it is effected with such velocity as to elude the eye.
The action of the wing in all these cases is far too
rapid to enable the observer to detect the exact difference between that kind of motion which keeps the Bird
at absolute rest in the air, and that which carries it
along with such immense velocity. But there can be
no doubt that the change is one from  a short quick




CONTRIVANCE A NPECESSITY.           i67
stroke delivered obliquely forward, to a full stroke,
more slow, but delivered perpendicularly   This corresponds with the account given by that most accurate
ornithological observer, Mr. Gould.  He says: "WVhen
poised before any object, this action of the wing is
so rapidly performed that it is impossible for the eye
to follow each stroke, and a bazy semicircle of indistinctness on each side of the Bird is all that is per-.
ceptible."  There is another fact mentioned by those
who have watched their movements most closely which
corresponds with the explanation already given-viz.,
the fact that the axis of the Humming Bird's body
when hovering is always h/zi/dy iiclizcd, so much so as
to appear almost perpendicular in the air.  In other
words the wing-stroke, instead of being delivered perpendicularly downwards, which would infallibly carry
the body onwards, is delivered at such an angle forwards as to bring to an exact balance the upward, the
downward, and the forward forces which bear upon the
body of the Bird.  Mr. Darwvin says, "'When hovering
by a flower, the tail is constantly shut and expanded like
a fan, tize body beiig kept in a nearly vertical position."
Mr. Wallace, another accurate observer, describes the
Humming Birds as " balancing themselves vertically
in the air."
These are a few, and a few only, of the adjustments




x63             THE REIGN OF LAW.
required in order to the giving of the power of flight;adjustments of organic growth to intensity of vital ibrce
— of external structure to external work-of shape in
each separate feather to definite shape in the series as a
whole-of material to resistance-of mass and form  to
required velocities; adjustments, in short, of law to law,
of force to force, and of all to Purpose. So many are
these contrivances, so various, so fine, so intricate, that a
volume might be written without exhausting the beauty
of the method in which this one mechanical problem has
been solved.  It is by knowledge of unchanging laws
that these victories over them seem to be achieved: yet
not by knowledge only, except as the guide of Power.
For here as everywhere else in Nature, we see the same
mysterious need of conforming to imperative conditions,
side by side with absolute control over the forces through
wlich this conformity is secured.  When any given purpose cannot be attained without the violation of some
law, unless by some new  power, and some new  machinery-the requisite power and mechanis-m are evolved
generally out of old materials, and by modifications of
pre-existing forms. There can be no better example of
this than a wing-feather.  It is a production wholly
unlike any other animal growth —-an implement specially
formed to combine strength with lightness, elasticity, and
imperviousness to air. Again, the bones of a Bird's wing




CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY.          I69
are the bones of the Mammalian arm and hand, specially
modified to support the feathers. The same purpose is
effected by other means in connexion with precisely the
same bones in the flying Mammalia-the Bats. In these
animals the finger-bones instead of being compressed or
soldered together to'support feathers, are separated,
attenuated, and greatly lengthened to afford attachment
to a web or flying membrane which is stretched between
them. In other ages of the world there were also flying
Lizards. But in all these cases the mechanical principle
is the same, and there has been the same ingenious
adaptation of material and of force to the universal laws
of motion.
On the earth and on the sea Man has attained to
powers of locomotion with which, in strength, endurance, and in velocity, no animal movement can compare.
But the air is an element on which he cannot travel-an
ocean which he cannot navigate. The Birds of heaven
are still his envy, and on the paths they tread he cannot
follow. As yet! for it is not certain that this exclusion is
to be perpetual.  His failure has resulted quite as much
from his ignorance of natural laws, as from  his inability
to meet the conditions which they demand. All attempts to guide bodies buoyant in the air must be fruit.
less. Balloons are mere toys. No flying animal has
ever been formed on the principle of buoyancy. Birds




170               THE IIEIGN OF LAW.
and P'ats, and Dragons, have been all immensely heavier
than the air, and their weight is one of the forces most
essential to their flight.  Yet there is a real impediment
in the way of Man navigating the air-and that is the
excessive weight of the only great mechanical moving
powers hitherto placed at his disposal.  When Science
shall have discovered some moving power greatly lighter
than any we yet know, in all probability the problem will
be solved.'  But of one thing we may be sure —that if
Man is ever destined to navigate the air, it will be in
machines formed in strict obedience to the mechanical
laws which have been employed by the Creator for the
same purpose in flying animals.2
1 The men of Science in France are ahead of th-e men of Science
in England upon this subject. There is a society established in
Paris which announces in its very title the true fundamental principle of flight-"'Socidte d'IEncouragement pour la Locomotion
acrienne au moyen d'Appareils PLUS LOURns que lAir."  The
false principle of Buoyancy is thus eliminated and banished from
the question.
2 I owe to my father (John, 7th Duke of Argyll) my knowledge
of the Theory of Flight which is expounded in this chapter. The
retired life he led, and the dislike he had of the work of literary
composition, confined the knowledge of his views within a comparatively narrow circle. But his love of mechanical science, and
his study of the problem during many years of investigation and
experiment, made him thoroughly master of the subject. In his
devices for testing and illustrating the truth of his Theory, he was
chiefly assisted by two very ingenious men, the late Mr. John Hart.,




CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY.                   17I
of Glasgow, and the late Mr. Robert Bryson, of Edinburgh.  The
result of his investigations led him to the opinion that until a lighter
rnoving power than steam is discovered, it will be impossible to
construct successfully machines for the navigation of the air.  I
shall only add, that having made ornithology a favourite pursuit,
I have been led during many years to test this theory by close
observation of the flight of Birds; and that from the manner in
which it fits into, and explains all the facts I have been always
more and more satisfied of its truth,




CHAPTER IV.
APPARENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE SUPREMAACY Op
PURPOSE.
Y ET, as we look at Nature, the fact will force itself
upon us that there are structures in which wre
cannot recognise any use; that there are contrivances
which often fail of their effect; and that there are others
which appear to be separated from the conditions they
were intended to meet, and under which alone their
usefulness could arise. Such instances occur in many
branches of inquiry; and although in the great mass of
natural phenomena the supremacy of Purpose is evident
enough, such cases do frequently come across our path
as cases of exception-cases in which Law does not
seem to be subservient to Will, but to be asserting a
power and an endurance of its own.
The degree of importance which may be attached to
such cases as a source of real difficulty, will vary with
the character of the individual mind, and its capacity of
lolding by the great lines of evidence which run through
the whole Order of Nature. It is with these cases as




APPARENT EXCEPTIONS.              173
with the local currents which sometimes obscure the
rising and falling of the tides.  When watched from
hour to hour, the greater law is clearly discernible by
well-mlarked effects: but when watched from minute to
minute, that law is not distinct, and there are waves
which seem like a rebellion of the sea against the force
which is dragging it from the land. The Order'of
Nature is very complicated, and very partially understood.
It is to be expected therefore that there should be a vast
variety of subordinate facts, whose relation to each other
and to the whole must be a matter of perplexity to us.
It is so with the relation in which different known laws
of Nature stand to each other; much more must it be so
with the far deeper subject of the relation which these
laws bear to the Will and the intentions of the Supremre.
But as cases of intention frustrated, of structure without
apparent purpose, of organs dissociated from  function
and from the opportunities of use, are sometimes sources
of difficulty, it may be well to consider this subject a
little nearer.  Let us look at it both in the light of
abstract reasoning, and also in the light of particular
illustration.
In the first place, then, we must remember that results
which may appear as exceptions to the attainment of one
Purpose may be nothing more than fulfilments of an.
other. This follows from the truth which has been dealt




174             THE REIGN OF LAW.
with in a former page,1 that we are " greatly ignorant,"
as Bishop Butler says, how far anything in Nature is to
be regarded as a means or as an end, and that ultimate
or final purposes we can never see. The difficulty hence
arising has often been represented as a fundamental objection to the whole doctrine of Intention. But this view
is founded on a very great, although a very natural confusion of thought. The perception of Purpose and Intention is inseparable from the perception of Adjustment
and Function as these are exhibited in Nature.  As such
it belongs to Knowledge. It is the perception of a relation between those phenomena and certain well known
phenomena of Mind. But to perceive a relation is not
necessarily to perceive all that this relation involves. To
perceive intention is a very different thing from perceiving all that is intended. Our own human experience
should make this distinction familiar to us. Many things
we do and many things we contrive are done and contrived with more than one intention. In the light of this
experience it is altogether irrational to regard as an exception to the attainment of Purpose in Nature the fact,
for example, " that of fifty seeds she often brings but one
to bear."  It throws no doubt or difficulty in the way of
our conviction, for example, that one purpose of seedAnte, p. So.




APPARENT EXCEPTIONS.              X 7
bearing in Plants is the reproduction of their kind,
because it appears that another purpose to:which that
seed-bearing is applied is the support of animal life.
The intention with which a grain of wheat is so constituted as to be capable of producing another wheat
plant, is not the less in the nature of Purpose because
it co-exists with another intention, that the same grain
should be capable of sustaining the powers and the enjoymenits of Life in the Body and in the Mind of Man.
On the contrary, the power possessed by most plants,
and by this plant especially, oi producing seed in a
ratio  far beyond that which would be required  for
one purpose, is the sure indication and the proof that
another purpose larger and wider was in view.  Yet the
seeds of corn which, as seeds, are destroyed when they
are converted into bread, may in that aspect be represented and regarded as " failures."  In reference to
this kind of failure, it has been actually argued that in
Nature "(the prodigality of waste is far more conspicuous than the wise economy of which so much is
said."l 1When applied to the case of the wheat plant
the fallacy is apparent, and would probably be admitted.
But this is only one example of a class to which an
infinite  number of other examples in Nature may be
I Mr. G. H. Lewes, Fortzigztly Review, July I867, p. z0o.




I76             THE REIGN OF LAW.
referred.  There may be, indeed, and there are, innunmerable examples where the meaning of like "' failures "
is not equally evident to us-some which may be
involved in utter and hopeless darkness-some which
may run up into the great master difficulty-that which
we are accustomed to call the " Origin of Evil."  But
the same argument applies to all. It is not that Purpose
and Intention solve all difficulties.  But it is that no
difficulty in perceiving what may be the purpose and
intention of a particular fact can affect the reality and
truth of that perception in other cases where no such
difficulty exists. Let us now look at the same subject
in the light of particular examples.
There is one explanation which, it cannot be doubted,
applies to many cases; and this is, the simple explanation that we often mistake the purpose of particular
structures in Nature, and connect them with intentions
which are not, and never were, the intentions really in
view. The best naturalists are liable to such mistakes. A
very curious illustration is afforded by an observation of
Mr. Darwin, in his "' Origin of Species."  He says that
"if green Woodpeckers alone had existed, and we did
not know that there were any black and pied kinds,
I daresay we should have thought that the green colour
was a beautiful adaptation to hide this tree-frequenting
bird from its enemies." Now, this introduces us to a




APPARENT EXCEPTIONS.            I77
very curious subject, and one as well adapted as any
other to illustrate the relation in which Law stands to
Purpose in the economy of Nature.
There can be no doubt that the principle of adapted
colouring with the effect and for the purpose of concealment, prevails extensively in various branches of the
Animal Kingdom. It arises, probably, like all other
phenomena, by way of Natural Consequence, out of
some combination of forces which are the instruments
employed. We have no knowledge what these forces
are; but we can imagine them to be worked into a law
of assimilation, founded on some such principle as that
which photography has revealed.  It is true that Man
has not yet discovered any process by which the tints of
Nature can be transferred, as the most delicate shades
of light can be transferred, to surfaces artificially prepared to receive them. Such a process is, however, very
probably within the reach even of human chemistry, and
it is one which is certainly known in the laboratory of
Nature. The Chameleon is the extreme case in which
the effect of such a process is proverbially known.
Many Fish exhibit it in a remarkable degree, changing
colour rapidly in harmony with the colour of the water in
which they swim, or of the bottom on which they lie. Tlhe
law on which such changes depend is very obscure: but
it appears to be a natural process, as constant as all other
N




178             THE RFIGN OF LAW.
laws are-that is, constant whenever given conditions
are brought together. It is possible that the effect may
be due to a cause which is well known to be capable of
producing somewhat analogous results. Even before the
days of Jacob and of Laban, it seems to have been
known that through the eyes of the female parent colour
can be determined in her young; and although this is
certainly not the law which commonly determines colour
-operating as it does, so far as we know, seldom, and
only in a small degree-it is quite conceivable that,
under special conditions, it is capable of being worked
as a great power in Nature.  But, then, these conditions
are not brought together except with a view to purpose.
For now let us see how this law, whatever it may be, is
regulated and applied.
One thing is certain: assimilated colouring is not
applied universally; on the contrary, it is applied very
partially.  Is it, therefore, applied arbitrarily-at haphazard, or without reference to conditions in which we
can trace a reason and a rule?  Far from it. The rule
appears to be this:-adaptive colouring, as a means of
concealment, is never applied (I) to any animal whose
habits do not expose it to special danger, or (2) to any
animal which is sufficiently endowed with other more
effective means of escape.
This is the higher Law of Purpose which governs the




APPARENT EXCEPTIONS.             179
lesser law, whatever it may be, by which assimilative
colouring is produced. Now, no man who had observed
this higher law could ever fall into the error of supposing
that the colour of the Green Woodpecker was given to it
as a means of concealment.  Few Birds are so invisible
as WVoodpeckers, because their structure and habits give
them other methods of escaping observation, which are
most curious and effective.  They have few natural
enemies but Man; and when in danger of being seen by
him, they slip and glide round the bole of a tree or
bough on which they may be climbing, with a swift,
silent, and cunning motion, and from behind that shelter,
with nothing visible but their head, they keep a close
watch upon the movements of the enemy. With such
sleight of feet, there is no need of lazier methods of
concealment.
Accordingly, in this family of Birds, the law of assimilation is withheld from application, and the most violent
and strongly contrasted colouring prevails. Jet black,
side by side with pure white, and the most brilliant
crimsons, are common in the plumage of the Woodpeckers. No birds are more conspicuous in colouring,
yet none are more seldoin seen. The Green Woodpecker
itself, with its yellow tints and crimson hood, contrasts
strongly with the bark on which it climbs. The purpose
of concealment being effected by other means, gives




I8o             THE REIGN OF LAW.
way to the purpose of beauty or of adornment in the disposition of colours. And in general the same rule applies to all Birds whose life is led among woods and
forests. Comparatively inaccessible to Birds of prey, they
exhibit every variety of tint, and the principle of invisibility from assimilated colouring is almost unknown.
It must always be remembered, that animals of prey
are as much intended to capture their food, as their
vlctims are intended to have some chances and facilities
of escape. The purpose here is a double purpose-a
purpose not in all cases to preserve life, but to maintain
its balance and due proportion. In order to effect this
purpose, the means of aggression, and of defence, or of
escape, must bear a definite relation to each other both
ip kind and in degree. When arboreal Birds leave their
sheltering trees, they are exposed to the attacks of
Hawks, but they have fair opportunities of retreating
to their coverts again; and the upward spring of the
disappointed Falcon in the air, when his quarry reaches
the shelter of trees, tells how effective such a retreat is,
and how completely it ends the chase.  On the other
hand, there is a great variety of Birds whose habitat
is the open plain-the desert-the unprotected shore —
the treeless moor-the stony mrountain-top. These are
the favourite hunting-grounds of the Eagles, and tihe
Falcons, and the Hawks. There they have free scope




APPARENTr EXCEPTIONS.             I8 
for their great powers of wing, and uninterrupted range
for their piercing powers of sight.  And it must be remembered, that even the slowest of the Hawks can
on such ground capture with ease Birds which, when
once on the wing, could distance their pursuer by superior speed, because the Hawk, sweeping over the ground,
takes the prey at a disadvantage, pouncing on it before
it can get fairly into the air.  Birds whose habitat is thus
exposed could not maintain their existence at all without
special means of concealment or escape.  Accordingly it
is among such Birds almost exclusively that the law of
assimilative colouring prevails.  And among them  it is
carried to a perfection which  is wonderful indeed.
Every ornithologist will recognise  the  truth  of the
observation, that this law prevails chiefly among the
Grouse, the Partridges, the Plovers, the Snipes, Woodcocks, Sandpipers, and other kindred families, all of
which inhabit open ground.  There can be no better
examples than the Grouse and the Ptarmigan of our
Scottish mountains.  The close imitation in the plumage
of these Birds of the general tinting and mottling of the
ground on which they lie and feed is apparent at a
glance, and is best known to those who have tried to
see C-rouse or Ptarnligan when sitting, and when their
position is indicated within a few feet or a few inches
by the trembling nostrils and dilated eyeballs of a steady




182             THE REIGN OF LAW.
Pointer-Dog. In the case of the common Grouse, as
the ground is nearly uniform in colour throughout the
year, the colouring of the Bird is constant also.  But
in the case of the Ptarmigan, it changes with the changing seasons. The pearly grays which in summer match
so exactly with the lichens of the mountain peaks, give
place in winter to the pure white which matches not
less perfectly with the wreaths of snow.
This is indeed a. change which requires for its production the agency of other laws than those merely
of reflected light, because the substitution of one entire
set of feathers for another of a different colour, twice
in every year, implies arrangements which lie deep in
the organic chemistry of the Bird. The various genera
of Sand-Grouse and Sand-Partridges which frequent the
deserts and naked plains of the Asiatic continent, are
coloured in exquisite harmony with the ground. Our
common Woodcock is another excellent example, and
is all -the more remarkable as there is one very peculiar
colour introduced into the plumage of this Bird which
exactly corresponds with a particular stage in the decay
of fallen leaves-I mean that in which the browns and
yellows of the Autumn rot away into the pale ashy
skeletons which lie in thousands under every wood in
winter. This colour is exactly reproduced in the feathers
of the Woodcock, and so mingled with the dark browns




APPARENT EXCEPTIONS.               183
and warnm  yellows of fresher leaves, that the general
imitation of effect is perfect. And so curiously is the
purpose of concealment worked out in the plumage
of the Woodcock, that one conspicuous ornament of
the bird is covered by a special provision from  the
too curious gaze of those for whose admiration it was
not intended.  The tail-feathers of the Woodcock can
be erected and spread out at pleasure like a fan,
and, being tipped on their under surface with white
of a brilliant and silvery lustre, set off by contrast with
an adjacent patch of velvety black, they then produce a
most conspicuous effect.  But the same web which on its
under surface bears this beautiful but dangerous ornament, is on its upper surface dulled down to a sombre
ashy-gray, and becomes as invisible as the rest of the
plumage.  These are all provisions of Nature, which
stand in clear and intelligible relation to the habits of
the Bird.  It rests all day upon the ground, under trees;
and were it not for its ingeniously adapted colouring, it
would be peculiarly exposed to destruction.  Man is
an enemy whose cunning inventions overcome all such
methods of protection, and the Woodcock, when in his
most rapid flight, is now an easier prey than in older
times when sitting on the ground.  But before fire-arms
had reached the perfection which has enabled us to
shoot flying Birds, the colouring of tile Woodcock served




X184             TILE REIGN OF LAW.
it in good stead, even against the Lords of the Creation.
In old times it required special skill and practice to see
Woodcocks on the ground, and the large lustrous black
eye which is adapted for night-vision was the one spot
of colour which enabled the fowler of a century anda half years ago to detect the bird. Thus Hudibras
has it:" For fools are known by loolifig wise,
As men find woodcocks by their eyes." 1
In Snipes, again, there is a remarkable series of strawcoloured feathers introduced along the back and shoulders, which perfectly imitate the general effect of the
bleached vegetable stalks common on the ground which
the Bird frequents.
There are other animals in which the principle of
imitation with a view to concealment is carried very
much farther than the mere imitation of colour, and
extends also to fo.rm  and structure.  There are some
examples of this in the Class of Insects, so remarkable
that it is impossible to look at them without ever fresh
astonishment. I refe r to some families of the Orthopterous order, and especially to some genera  of the.fanv/idt7f   and PhasJnidte.  Many species of the genus
iAfanis are wholly modelled in the form  of vegetable
a "4 Hudibras to Sidrophel," 79, So.




APPARENT EXCEPTIONS.               I 8
growths. The legs are made to imitate leaf-stalks, the
body is elongated and notched so as to siinulate a twig;
the segment of the shoulders is spread out and flattened
in the likeness of a seed-vessel; and the large wings are
exact imitations of a full-blown leaf, with all its veins and
skeleton complete, an(l all its colour and apparent texture.  There is somnething startling and almost horrible
in the completeness of the deception-very horrible it
must be to its hapless victims.  For in this case the
purpose of the imitation is a purpose of destruction, the
ifanzzlis being a predacious insect, armed with the most
terrible weapons, hid under the peaceful forms of the
vegetable world. It is the habit of these creatures to
sit upon the leaves which they so closely resemble, apparently motionless, but really advancing on their prey
with a slow and insensible approach.  Their structure
disarms suspicion.  Wonderful as this structure is, it
would be none the less, but all the more wonderfulI, if
it should arise by way of Natural Consequence from
some law of development or of growth.  It must be a
law of which at present we have no knowledge, and
can hardly form any conception.  But certain it is that
here, as in all other cases, the purpose which is actually
attained, is attained by a special adaptation of ordinary
structure to a special and extraordinary purpose. No
new  members are given to the ianfzis; there is no




Ii86            THE REIGN OF LAW.
departure from the plan on which all other Insects of
the same Order are designed.  The body has the same
number of segments, the legs are the same in number,
and are composed of the same joints; every part of this
strange creature which seems like a bit of foliage animated with insect life, can be referred to its corresponding part in the ordinary anatomy of its Class.  The
whole effect is produced by a little elongation here, a
little swelling there, a little dwarfing of one part, a little
development of another.  The most striking part of the
whole imitation-that of the "nervation" of the leafis produced by a modification, not very violent, of a
structure which belongs to all flying' Insects.  Their
wings are constructed of a thin filmy material stretched
upon a framework of stronger substance, as the sails of
a windmill are stretched upon a trellis-work of spars.
This fiamework is designed in a great variety of patterns
-more elaborate and more beautiful than the tracery
of Gothic windows.  In the Mantis this tracery, instead
of being drawn in a mere pattern, is drawn in imitation
of the nervature of a leaf. And imitative colouring is
added to imitative structure-so that nothing should be
wanting to its completeness and success.
It must always be remembered, however, that Contrivance in Nature can never be reduced to a single
purpose, and to that alone. Almost every example of




APPARENT EXCEPTIONS.               x7
it is connected with a number of effects which fit into
each other in endless ramifications of adjustment.  For
example, this imitative structure of the  aIzitidce serves
as well for their own protection from insectivorous birds
as for the procuring of their food in the capture of other
Insects.  And this, which is perhaps the subordinate
purpose in the case of the  aMztidna, emerges as the
main purpose in another family of imitative Insects, the
P/aswlzid,. These last are vegetable feeders, and their
imitative structure is, if possible, even more wonderful,
as it certainly is more beautiful.  In some species lhe
wings are not only made like leaves in form, in structure, and in general colour, but they are tinted at
different seasons of the year with the varying colours
of spring, of summer, or of autumn.  The fundamental
green is shaded off into browns, and reds, and yellows,
with a few of those crimson touches which are so comnmon in the " Pageant of the year."  There is one specimen in the British Museum where the imitative effect is
pursued, as it were, into a region of still more minute'and curious observation. The general aspect of suminer vegetation is much affected by the ravages of insect
life.  Minute larvae eat into the cuticle of leaves, and
mlark them  with various spots of bleached or faded
colour.  Now the specimen of Phas~ma I refer to has
its wing covered with spots which exactly imitate this




I58 oTHE REIGN OF LAW.
appearance of a larva-eaten leaf.  Can it be that this
effect is itself produced by a really similar cause-the
eating of some larval parasite into the tissue of the
wing?  If so, the combination of means to the prodluction of so wonderful an effect becomes only the
more bewildering in the endless vistas of adjustmlent
\lwhich are opened out. And there is another fact connected with these Insects which is as astonishing as any
other.  It is this-that the idea and purpose of imitation
is carried into  effect consistently and  perseveringly
through all the stages of the creature's metamorphoses.
The eggs are as perfect imitations of vegetable seeds as
the adult insect is of the expanded leaf.  In the larval
form they are like bits of stalk, or chips or cuttings of
leaves.
But although the laws which determine both form
and colouring are here seen to be subservient to use,
we shall never understand the phenomena of. Nature
unless we admit that mere ornament or beauty is in
itself a purpose, an object, and an end. Mr. Darwin
denies this; but he denies it under the strange impression, that to admit it would be absolutely fatal to his
own theory on the Origin of Species. So much the
worse for his theory, if this incompatibility be true.
There is indeed a difference, at least in words, between
the doctrine now asserted and the doctrine which Mr.




APPARENT EXCEPTIONS.            189
Darwin denies. What he denies as a purpose in nature
is beauty "' in the eyes of Man." But this evades thle
real point at issue.  The relation in which natural
beauty stands to Man's appreciation of it, is quite a
separate question, It is certain enough that the gift
of ornament in natural things has not been lavished,
as it is lavished, for the mere admiration of mankind.
Ornament was as universal-applied upon a scale at
once as grand and as minute as now-during the long
ages before Man was born. Some of the most beautiful forms in Nature are the shells of the marine Mollusca, and many of them are the richest, too, in surface
ornament. But, prodigal of beauty as the Ocean now
is in the creatures which it holds, its wealth was even
greater and more abounding in times when there was no
man to gather them. The shells and corals of' the old
Silurian Sea were as elaborate and as richly carved as
those which we now admire; and the noble Ammonites
of the Secondary ages must have been glorious things
indeed.  Even now there is abundant evidence that
although Man was intended to admire beauty, beauty
was not intended only for Man's admiration. Nowhere
is ornament more richly given, nowhere is it seen more
separate from use, than in those organisms of whose
countless millions the microscope alone enables a few
men for a few moments to see a few examples. There




90o             THE REIGN OF LAW.
is no better illustration of this than a class of forms
belonging to the border-land of animal and vegetable life
called the Diafomcacece, which, though invisible to the
naked eye, play an important part in the economy of
Nature.  They exist almost everywhere, and of their
remains whole strata, and even mountains, are in great part
composed.  They have shells of pure silex, and these,
each after its own kind, are all covered with the most
elaborate ornament —striated, or fluted, or punctured, or
dotted in patterns which are mere patterns, but patterns
of perfect, and sometimes of most complex, beauty.
No graving done with the graver's tool can equal that
work in gracefulness of design, or in delicacy and
strength of touch.  Yet it is impossible to look at
these forms —in all the variety which is often crowded
under a single lens-without recognising instinctively
that the work of the graver is work strictly analogous,
-addressed to the same perceptions,-founded on the
same idea,-having for its object the same end and aim.
And as the work of the graver varies for the mere sake
of varying, so does the work on  these microscopic
shells.  In the same drop of moisture there may be
some dozen or twenty forms, each with its own dis.
tinctive pattern, all as constant as they are distinctive,
yet having all apparently the same habits, and without
any perceptible difference of function.




APPARENT EXCEPTIONS.            19 
It would be to doubt the evidence of our senses
and of our reason, or else to assume hypotheses of
which there is no proof whatever, if we were to doubt
that mere ornament, mere variety, are as much an end
and aim in the workshop of Nature as they are known
to be in the workshop of the goldsmith and the jeweller.
Why should they not?  The love and desire of these
is universal in the mind of Man. It is seen not 1more
distinctly in the highest forms of civilized art than
in the habits of the rudest savage, who covers with
elaborate carving the handle of his war-club, or the
prow of his canoe. Is it likely that this universal aim
and purpose of the mind of Man should be wholly
without relation to the aims and purposes of his Creator?
He that formed the eye to see beauty, shall He not see
it? He that gave the human hand its cunning to work
for beauty, shall His hand never work for it?  How,
then, shall we account for all the beauty of the world —for
the careful provision made for it where it is only the
secondary object, not the first? Even in those cases,
for example, where concealment is the main object in
view, ornament is never forgotten, but lies as it were
underneath, carried into effect under the conditions
and limitations imposed by the higher law and the
more special purpose. Thus the feathers of the Ptarmigan, though  confined by the law  of assimilative




I92             THE REIGN OF LAW.
c~olouring to a mixture of black and white or gray5
have those simple colours disposed in crescent bars
and mottlings of beautiful form, even as the lichens
which they imitate spread in radiating lines and semicircular ripples over the weather-beaten stones. It is
the same with all other Birds whose colour is the colour
of their home. For the purpose of concealment, their
colouring would be equally effective if it were laid on
without order or regularity of form.  But this is never
done. The required tints are always disposed in patterns, each varying with the genus and the species;
varying for the mere sake of variation, and for the
beauty which belongs to ornament.  And where this
purpose is not under the restraint of any other purpose
controlling it and keeping it down as it were within comparatively narrow limits, how gorgeous are the results
attained! What shall we say of flowers-those banners
of the vegetable world, which march in such various
and splendid triumllph before the coming of its fruits?
What shall we say of the Humming Birds-whose
feathers are made to return the light which falls upon
them, as if rekindled from intenser fires, and coloured
with more than all the colours of all the gems?
There is one instance in Nature (and, as far as I
know, only one) in which ornament takes the form of
pictorial representation.  The secondary feathers in the




APPARENT EXCEPTIONS. Tg'
wing of the Argus Pheasant are developed into long
plumes, which the bird can erect and sprlad out like a
fan, as a Peacock spreads his train.   These feathel-s
are decorated with a series of conspicuous spots or
CC eyes," which are so colotu-red as to imitate the effect of
balls.  The shadows and the "high light" are placed
exactly where an artist would place them  in order to
represent a sphere.1   The " eyes" of the Peacock's
train are wonderful examples of ornanment; but they
do not represent anything except their own harmonies
of colour.  The "eyes " of the Argus Pheasant are like
the 1"ball and socket" ornament which is common in
the decorations of human art.  It is no answer to this
argument in respect to beauty, that we are constantly
discovering the use of beautiful structures in which the
beauty only, and not the usefulness, had been hitherto
perceived.  The harmonies on which all beauty probably depends are so mlinutely connected in N'ature that
C"use" and ornament may often both arise out of the
same conditions.  Thus, some of the most beautiful
lines on the surface of shells are simply the lines ol
their annual growth, which growth has followed definite
curves, and it is the "law" of these curves that is beaua t owe the observation of thi: curious fact to my friend Mr.
James Nasmyth, so well known as the inventor of the Steam
Hammer, and as a distinguished astronomer.
6




194              TIIE REIGN' OF LA,,
tiful in ourl eyes.  A gain, the forms of many Fish which
are so beautiful, are also forms founded on the lines
of least resistance.  The same observation applies to
the form  of the bodies and of the wings of Birds.
Throughout Nature, ornament is perpetually the result
of conditions and arrangements fitted to use and contrived for the discharge of function.  But the same
principle applies to human art, and few persons are
probably aware how many of the mere ornaments of
architecture are the traditional representation of parts
which had their origin in essential structure.  Yet who
would argue from this fact that ornament is not a special
aim in the works of Man?  When the savage carves the
handle of his war-club, the immediate purpose of his
carving is to give his own hand a firmer hold.  But any
shapeless scratches would be enough for this.  When he
carves it in an elaborate pattern, he does so for the love
of ornament, and to satisfy the sense of beauty.
There is, hovwever, another department of natural
phenomena which, much more than the one we have
been now considering, does at first sight suggest to the
mind the subordination of Purpose and the supremacy
of Law.  It is the department of Comparative Anatomy.
It is a fact now well known and universally accepted,
that in many animal structures, perhaps in all except
one, there are parts the presence of which cannot be




APPARENT EXCEPTIONS.             195
explained, from  their serving any immediate use, or
discharging any actual function. For example, the limbs
of all the Mammalia, and even of all the Lizards, terminate in five jointed bones or fingers.  But in many
animals the whole five are not needed, but only some one,
or two, or three. In such cases the remainder are indeed
dwarfed, sometimes almost extinguished; but the curious
fact is that rudimentally the whole number are always to
be traced.  Even in the Horse, where one only of the
five is directly used, and where this one is enlarged and
developed into a hoof, parts corresponding to the remaining four fingers can be detected in the anatomy of the
limb. Other examples of the same principle might be
given without number. Thus there are Monkeys which
have no thumbs for use, but only thumb-bones hid
beneath the skin: the wingless Bird of New Zealand, the
"' Apteryx," has useless wing-bones similarly placed: snakes
destined always to creep C" upon their belly" have nesertheless rudiments of legs, and the common " Slowworm "
has even the " blade bone" and C' collar bone " of rudimentary or aborted limbs: the Narwhal has only one
tusk, on the left side, developed for use, like the horn of
an heraldic Unicorn, but the other tusk, on the right
side, is present as a useless germ: the female Narwhal
has both tusks reduced to the same unserviceable condition: young whalebone Whales are born with teeth
02, 




196              TrHE REIGN OF LAW.
which never cut the gum, and which are afterwxarck
absorbed as eitirely useless to the creature's life.
At first sight it rmay appear as if these Aiwere facts not
to be reconciled with the supremacy of Purpose:-at
first sight, but at first sight Qnly.  For as we look at
them and wonder at them, and set ourselves to discover
how many of a like nature can be found, our eye catches
sight of an Order which had not been at first perceived.
Exceptions to one narrow rule such as we might have
laid down and followed for ourselves, they are now seen
to be in strict subordination to a larger rule which it
would never have entered into our imagination to conceive.  These useless members, these rudimentary or
aborted limbs which puzzled us so much, are parts of an
universal Plan.  On this plan the bony skeletons of
all living animals have been put together.  The forces
which have been combined for the moulding of Organic Forms have been so combined as to mould them
after certain types or patterns. And when Comparative
Anatomy has revealed this fact as affecting all the
animals of the existing world, another branch of the
same science comes in to conform  the generalisation,
and extend it over the innumerable creatures which
have existed and have passed away.  This one Plan of
Organic Life has never been departed friom since Time
began.




APPARENT EXCEPTIONS.             ]g97
When we have grasped this great fact, all the lesser
facts which are subordinate to it assume a new significance.  In the first place a Plan of this kind is in
itself a Purpose.  An Order so vast as this, including
within itself such variety of detail, and  malntained
through such periods of Time, implies combination
and adjustment founded upon, and carrying into effect,
one vast conception.  It is only as an Order of Thouglht
that the doctrine of Animal Homologies is intelligible
at all. It is a Mental Order, and can only be mentally
perceived.  For what do we mean when we say that
this bone in one kind of animal corresponds to such
another bone in another kind of animal? Corresponds
-in what sense?  Not in the method of using it-for
very often limbs which are homologically the same are
put to the most diverse and opposite uses.  To what
standard, then, are we referring lwhen we say that such
and such two limbs are homologically the same?  It is
to the standard of an Ideal Order-a Plan-a Type —a
Pattern mentally conceived. This sounds very recondite and metaphysical; and yet the habit of referring
physical facts to some ideal standard and order of
thought is a universal instinct in the human mind.  It
is one of the earliest of our efforts in endeavouring to
understand the phenomena around us.  The science of
Homologics, as developed by Cuvier and Hunter and




I98             THE REIGN OF LAW.
Owen and Huxley, is indeed an intricate, almost a
transcendental science.  Yet Dr. Livingstone found the
natives of Africa debating a question which belongs
essentially to that science and involves the whole principle of the mental process by which it is pursued.
The debate was on the question "whether the two toes
of the Ostrich represent the thumb and forefinger in
Man, or the little and ring-finger."''l  This is purely a
question of Comparative Anatomy. It is founded on
the instinctive perception that even between two frames
so widely separated as those of an Ostrich and a Man,
there is a commlon Plan of structure, with reference to
which plan, parts wholly dissimilar in appearance and in
use, can nevertheless be identified as "representative"
of each other: —that is, as holding the same relative
place in one Ideal Order of arrangement.
The recognition of this idea in minds so rude is not
the less remarkable from the fact that both sides in this
African debate were wrong in their practical application
of the idea to the particular case before them. Unity
of design amidst variety of form is so conspicuous and
universal in the works of Nature that the perception
of it could not possibly escape recognition even by the
rudest human mind, formed as that Mind is to see
t "LThe Zamlbcsi and its Tributaries," p. 424.




APPARENT EXCEPTIONS.               199
Order, and to worl-k for it, and to admire, it.  tut though
instinct is enough to give us the general idea, and to
trace it in a thouseand instances where it can hardly be
overlooked, yet it needs close and laborious study, and
high powers of analysis and of thought, to trace correctly the true Order and Plan through the fine and
subtle passages of Nature.  It would have astonished
those poor natives of Africa to be told, as is the truth,
that if they wished to find in the Ostrich the parts
corresponding to their own middle finger, or ring-finger,
or any other finger, they must look, not to the toes of
the Ostrich, but to her little aborted wings, which, though
useless for the purposes of flight, are still retained as
representing the wings of other Birds, and the forearms
of all the Mammals.
For here we come upon the interchange and crossing
as it were of two distinct ideas, which seem to stand the
one as the warp and the other as the woof in the fabrics
of Organic Life.  There is the idea of Hoinology in
Structure and the idea of Analogy in Use.  The one
represents the Unity of Design, the other represents
Variety of Function.  It might have been supposed that
these could not easily be reconciled-that where great
differences in use and application are essential, rigid
adherence to one pattern of structure would be an impediment in the way.  But it is not so.  The same




200              THE REIGN OF LAW.
bones in different animals are made subservient to the
widest possible diversity of function.   The same limbs
are converted into paddles, and wings, and legs, and
arms.  And so it is with every other part of the skeleton
and every other organ of the body.  Indeed it is difficult to say whether the law of unity in design, or the
law of variety in adaptation, is pushed to the greatest
length. There are some cases in which the adaptation
of form to special function is carried so far that all
appearance of common structure is entirely lost.  It
is very difficult, for example, to persuade persons ignorant of the principles of anatomy that the Whale and
the Porpoise are not Fish, that they breathe with lungs
as Man breathes, that they would be crowned if kept
long under water, and that, as they suckle their young,
they belong to the same great Class, Mammalia.  Living
in the same element as Fish, and feeding very much as
fishes feed, a similar outward form has been given to
them, because that form is the best adapted for progression through the water.  B3ut that form has been,
so to speak, pzu0 on round the Mammalian skeleton, and
covers all the organs proper to the Alammlalian Class.
Whales and Porpoises, notwithstanding their form, and
their habitat, and  their food, are as separate' from
Fishes as the Elephant, or the Hippopotamus, or the
Giraffe.




APPARENT EXCEPTIONS.                201
And when we remember that the immense variety
of Organic Forms in the existing world does not exhaust
the adaptability of their Plan, but that the still vaster
varieties of all the extinct creations have circled round
the same central Types, it becomes evident that these
Types have had from the first a Purpose which has been
well and wonderfully fulfilled.  As a matter of fact, we
see that the original conception of the framework of
Organic Life has included in itself provisions for applying the principle of adaptation in infinite degrees.  Its
last development is in Man.  In his frame there is no
aborted member.  Every part is put to its highest use:highest, that is, in reference to the supremacy of Mind.'
There are stronger arms, there are swifter limbs, there
are more powerful teeth, there are finer ears, there are
sharper eyes.  There are creatures which go where he
cannot go, and can live where he would die.  But all
his members are  co-ordinated with  one power-the
power of Thought.  Through this he has the dominion
over all other created things-whilst yet as regards the
type and pattern of his frame he has not a single bone
or joint or organ which he does not share with some one
or other of the Beasts that perish. It is not in any of
1 "Quid reliqua descriptione omnium corporis partium, in qu.
nihil inane, nihil sine causa, nihil supervacaneurn est?"-Cicero,
"De Nat. Deor.," lib. i, cap. 33,




202              THE REIGN OF LAW.
the parts of his structure, but in their combination and
adjustment, that he stands alone.
All these facts must convince us that we must enlarge
our ideas as to what is meant by Use in the Economy of
Natulre. In the first place, it must be so interpreted as to
include ornament  and in the second place, it must inclide also not merely Actual Use, but Potential Use, or
the capacity of being turned to use in new creations.
Of course this is one of the ideas which Philosophers of
the Positive School denounce as "Metaphysical."  But
here again their opposition is itself based upon metaplhysics, only upon metaphysics which are bad.  "Potential existence," says Mr. Lewes,' "is ideal not real."
"A fact is not a fact until it is accomplished.  Nothing
exists before it exists. This truism is disregarded by those
who talk of potential existence." So it is, and it ought to
be disregarded, because it has no bearing on the question.
May not the formation of a plan or conspiracy to murder
be " a fact" although the murder is not " accomplished?"
Is not, the capacity in the different pieces of a puzzle
of being fitted together, a fact-even when the pieces
are all huddled confusedly in a box? Is there no potential use in the udder of a cow-calf before it can have
had any calves of its own?  Is the idea of Potential
6 History of Philosophy," Prologue, p lxxxviii




APPARENT EXCEPTIONS.               20o3
use in all these cases an idea which has no "reality?"
Are they mere'"artifices of thought," or "preliminary
falsifications of fact?"  If the metaphysics  of Positivism
are available to establish this conclusion, they must be
equally available to condemn knowledge in all its forms
as "Ideal" and not "'real."  Bad metaphysics of this
kind are indeed, what Dr. Newman dreads the human
mind may be, a "' universal solvent," casting doubt on
the most certain of its own conclusions, and landing
itself in universal scepticism.
We have not far to go to find the same kind of reasoning, and the same methods of analysis, employed to
establish the converse proposition, that so far from
Potentiality having no existence, it is the only form
under which the existence of anything beyond ourselves
can be known to us.  No less eminent a thinker than
Mr. J. S. Mill reduces Matter itself, and the very idea
of the existence of an external world, to a "' Perimanent
Possibility of Sensation." 1 Nay, he is not sure —he only
sees some 1"intrinsic difficulties" in the way-whether
our knowledge of Self-existence may not be brought under
the same 6 Potential " category-as a mere " Possibility
of Sensation."2  In regard to Matter, Mr. Mill distinctly
says that so far from a mere Possibility having no real
3 6" Mill on Hamilton," chap xi.       Ibid chap. xii.




204              THE REIGN OF LAW.
existence, it is the only reality-the one thing which is
constant and abiding behind the flux and uncertainty
of actual sensations.  My own opinion is that the metaphysical process i)y which these opposite paradoxes are
arrived at is nearly as worthless in the one case as in
the other.  Of the two I prefer the paradox of Mr. Mill
to the paradox of Mr. Lewes —so far at least as the
reality of Potential Existences is concerned. But I prefer
it only in the very case to which Mr. Mill shrinks from
applying it.  I can think of my own mind or existence
as a " Possibility of Sensation " (whether " permanent "
or not). It is a method of conception indeed which
casts no light on anything, and it is highly artificial; but
at least it is not false. It involves no confounding of
two different elements of thought.  But I cannot transfer
the word or the idea of sensation from  myself to the
external things which cause sensation in me.  This
transfer involves a fundamental confusion of thought
and of language as the instrument of thought.l  But
such paradoxes are the natural result of one great error
-the endeavour to get rid of, or to explain away, or to
dissolve by analysis, such simple and elementary conceptions of the Mind as the idea of External Force and
of Causation, or the idea of Purpose and IntentCion;
I See Noie  Do




APPARENT EXCEPTIONS.             205
Matter may very well be conceived as "That which
produces, or has a Possibility of producing, Sensation in
Sentient beings." But this is a definition which involves
the idea of Causation. And if this be rejected as an
elementary conception, (or as a distinct conception,
whether elementary or not,) then the paradox of Mr. Mill
is the natural result.  In like manner, if the idea of
Purpose and Intention be repudiated, as representing no
"reality" in Nature, then the opposite paradox of Mr.
Lewes is reached along the same slippery and deceptive
ways. We know at least, as a matter of experience, that
we are capable of forming plans which exist as such
before they are carried into effect. We know too that
one plan may be large enough to include another, and
that even within the fractional limits of our foresight
we can provide for contingent as well as fbr actual
use. We can therefore easily conceive the existence of
the same kind of prevision in the Mind which works
in Nature, and we can easily understand how  the
apparent difference between actual and contingent use
should be greater in proportion as the Plan is larger,
and is designed to operate during vaster periods of
Time.
In this point of view rudimentary or aborted organs
need no longer puzzle us, for in respect to Purpose they
may be read either in the light of History, or in the light




20o6            THE REIGN OF LAW.
of Prophecy. They may be regarded as indicating always
either what had already been, or what was yet to be.
Why new creations should never have been made wholly
new;-why they should have been always moulded
on some pre-existing Forms; —why one fundamental
ground-plan should have been adhered to for all Vertebrate Animals, we cannot understand. But as a matter
of fact it is so. For it appears that Creative Purpose
has been effected through the instrumentality of Forces
so combined as to arrange the particles of organic matter
in definite formls: which forms include many separate
p)arts having a constant relation to each other and to
the vwhole, but capable of arrestment or development
according as special organs are required for the discharge
of special functions. Each new creation seems to have
been a new application of these old materials. Each
new House of Life has been built on these old foundations. Among the many wonders of Nature there is
nothing more wonderful than this —the adaptability of
the one Vertebrate Type to the infinite variety of Life to
which it serves as an organ and a home. Its basement
has been so laid that every possible change or addition
of superstructure could be built upon it. Creatures
destined to live on the earth or in the earth, on the sea
or in the sea, under every variety of condition of existence, have all been made after that one pattern; and




APPARENT EXCEPTIONS.             207
each of them with as close an adaptation to special
function as if the pattern had been designed for itself
alone. It is true that there are particular parts of it
which are of no use to particular animals.  But there is
no part of it which is not of indispensable use to some
member of the group; and there is one Supreme Form
in which all its elements receive their highest interpretation and fulfilment.  It is indeed wonderful to think that
the feeble and sprawling paddles of a Newt, the ungainly
flippers of a Seal, and the long leathery wings of a Bat,
have all the same elements, bone for bone, with that
human hand which is the supple instrument of Man's contrivance, and is alive, even to the finger-tips, with the
power of expressing his Intellect and his Will.  Here
again the Laws of Nature are seen to be nothing but
combinations of Force with a view to Purpose: combinations which indicate complete knowledge. not only
of what is, but of what is to be, and which foresees the
End from the Beginning.




CHAPTER V.
CREATION BY LAW.
E see, then, how the existence of Organs separated from Function, and of structures without
immediate use, find their natural place among all the
other phenomena of the world. They do not show that
" Law" is ever superior to Will, or can ever assert, even for
a moment, an independence of its own. On the contrary,
they show, as nothing else can show, the patient movements, and the incalculable years, through which material
laws have been made to follow the steps of Purpose.
But, then, let us remember this: these discoveries in
Physiology, though they are helpless to prove that Law
has ever been present as a Master, are eminently suggestive of the idea that Law has never been absent as a
Servant j —that as, in governing the world, so in forming
it, Material Forces have been always used as the instruments of Will.
Tt is no mere theory, but a fact as certain as any other
fact of Science, that Creation has had a History. It has
not been a single act, done and finished once for all,




CREATION BY LAW.                209
but a long series of acts —a work continuously pursued
through an inconceivable lapse of time. It is another
fact, equally certain, respecting this work, that as it
has been pursued in Time, so also it has been pursued
by Method.  There is an "observed Order of facts"
in the history of Creation, both in the organic and
in the inorganic world.  I speak here, however, of the
organic world alone, and chiefly of those higher Forms
which are the seat of Animal Life. In these, there is
an observed Order in the most rigid scientific sensethat is, phenomena in uniform connexion, and mutual
relations which can be made, and are made, the basis of
systematic classification. These classifications are imperfect, not because they are founded on ideal connexions
where none exist, but only because they fail in representing adequately the subtle and pervading Order which
binds together all living things. But the Order which
prevails in the existing world is not the only Order
which has been recognised by science. A like Order has
prevailed through all the past history of Creation. Nay,
more; it has, I think, been clearly ascertained, not only
that relations similar to those which now  exist have
existed always among all the animals of each contemporary Creation, but that Order of a like kind has connected with each other all the different Creations which
were successively introduced. In almost all the leading
P




2IQ             THE REIGN OF LAW.
Types of Life whiclh have existed in the different geological ages, there is an orderly gradation connecting the
Forms which were becoming extinct with the Forms
which were for the first time appearing in the world.  It
is still disputed by some geologists, whether we have
certain evidence that this gradation has been the gradation of a rising scale-of progressive Creations from
lower to higher Types. But this dispute is maintained
only on the ground that we cannot safely trust to negative evidence.  It is an unquestionable fact, that so far
as this kind of evidence can go, it does testify to the
successive introduction of higher and higher Forms of
Life. Very recently a discovery has been made, to which
Mr. Darwin only a few years ago referred as c"a discovery of which the chance is very small "-viz. of fossil
Organisms in beds far beneath the lowest Silurian strata.
This discovery has been made in Canada-in beds far
down, near the bottom even, of the rocks hitherto termed
"Azoic."  But what are the Forms of Life which have
been found here?  They belong to the very lowest of
living types-to the " Rhizopods."  So far as this discovery goes, therefore, it is in strict accordance with all
the facts previously known-that, as we go back in time,
we lose, one after another, the higher and more complex
organisms: first, the Mammalia; then the Vertebrata;
and now, lastly, even the AMollusca. It is in accordance,




CREATION BY LAW.              2I I
too, with another fact which has been observed before,
viz. that particular Forims of Life have attained, at particular epochs, a maximum development, both in respect
to size and distribution-the favourites, as it were, of
Creation for a time. These earliest Rhizopods seem to
have been of enormous size, and developed on an enormous scale; since there is good reason to believe that
beds of immense thickness are composed of their remains. All that is new in this discovery is the vast
extension which it gives in Time to the same rules which
had been already traced through ages which we cannot
number.
Then, there is another observcd Order. For each
Class of animal some definite Type or pattern has been
adhered to; and the modifications of that Type have
been gradual and successive. In many cases the science
of fossil remains enables us to trace the intermediate
Forms through which existing animals can be connected
with animals long since extinct. It must be remembered that the fact of this connexion is quite a separate
thing from any theory as to its physical cause. Professor
Owen pointed out some years before the publication of
Mr. Darwin's theory, the existence of fossil animals
which showed an increasing approximation to the forms
of the Horse and of the Ox: and he showed that this
approximation was related in Time, as it seemed to be
P2




212             THE REIGN OF LAW.
in Purpose, with the coming need of them for the service
and use of Man. These are the facts on which the idea
of "Creation by Law" is founded. Let us look a little
nearer what this idea is, and what it involves.  It is
an idea much vaunted by some men, much feared by
others. Perhaps it may be found, on closer investigation, that they are fearing or worshipping, as the case
may be, an idol of the inmagination.
It being certain that Creation exhibits an Order of
facts which can be so clearly defined and traced, it
follows, that at least in this first sense of the word,
Creation has been by Law. We are, therefore, led on
to the farther question, whether Law in any other sense
can be traced or detected in the work of Creation? Is
the observed Order which prevails in the organic world
an Order of which we can even guess the physical
cause?  Is it an Order which contains within itself any
indications of the Force or combination of Forces which
have been concerned in producing it?
In considering this question, there is one thing to
be observed at the outset.  It is certain that nothing
is known, or has been even guessed at, in respect to
the history and Origin of Life, which corresponds with
Law in its strictest and most definite sense. We have
no knowledge of any one or more Forces-such as the
Force of Gravitation, or of magnetic attraction and




CREATION BY LAW.               2I3
repulsion-to which any one of the phenomena of Life
can be traced.  Far less have we any knowledge of any
laws of the like kind which can be connected with the
successive creation or development of new Organisms.
Professor Huxley, in a recent work,' has indeed spoken of
" that combination of natural forces which we term Life."
But this language is purely rhetorical. I do not mean to
say that Life may not be defined to be a kind of Force,
or a combination of Forces.  All I mean is, that we
know nothing of any of these Forces in the same sense
in which we do know something of the Force of Gravity,
or of Magnetism, or of Electricity, or of Chemical
Affinity.  These are all more or less known, not, indeed, in respect to their ultimate nature, but in respect
to certain methods and measures of their operation.
No such knowledge exists in respect to any of the
Forces which have been concerned in the development
of Life. No man has ever pretended to get such a view
of any of these as to enable him  to apply to them
the instruments of his analysis, or to trace in their
working any definite relations to Space, or Time, or
Number.
Since, then, laws, in this most definite sense of the
word, have not been discovered in the existing phenoa 6 Elements of Comparative Anatomy," p..




214             THE REIGN OF LAW.
mena, or in the past history of Organic Life, let us look
a little closer at the ideas which these phenomena have
suggested to the mind of those who have speculated
on the Oribin and Development of Species.
There is one idea which has been common to all
theories of Development, and that is, the idea that ordi.
nary generation has somehow been producing, from title
to timle, extraordinary effects, and that a new Species is,
in fact, simply an unusual birth.  It is worthy of observation, that the earlier forms in which the theory
of Development appeared, did suggest something more
nie —ly approaching to a Law of Creation than is contained in the later form which that theory has assumed
in the hands of Mr. Darwin.  The essential idea of the
theory of Development, in its earlier forms, was, that
modifications of structure arose somehow  by way of
natural consequence from  the outward circumstances
or physical conditions which required them, and from
the living effort of Organism sensible in some degree of
that requirement.  Now, inadequate and even grotesque
though this idea may be as explaining the Origin of new
Species, it cannot be denied, that it makes its appeal to a
process which, at least to a limited extent, does operate
in producing modifications of organic structure. For
example, the same species of Mollusc has often a shell
comparatively weak and thin, or a shell comparatively




CREATION BY LAW.               215
robust and strong, according as it lies in tranquil or
in stormy water. The shell which is much exposed
needs to be stronger than the shell which is less exposed. But it is obvious that the mere fact of the need
cannot supply the thing needed, unless by the adjustment of some machinery for the purpose. How the
vital forces of the Mollusc can thus be made to work
to order, under a change of external conditions, we do
not know.  But we do know, as a matter of fact, that
the shell is thickened and strengthened, according as
it needs resisting power. This result does not appear
to arise from any difference in the amount of lime held
in solution in the water, but from some power in the
secreting organs of the animal to appropriate more or
less of it, according to its own need. The effects of this
power are seen where there is no difference of condition
except difference of exposure. It is said that they are
observable, for example, in the shells which lie on the
different sides of Plymouth Breakwater, —the sheltered
side and the exposed side.  The same power of adapta.
tion is seen in many other forms.  Trees which are
most exposed to the blast are the most strongly anchored
in the soil. Limbs which are the most used are the
most developed.  Organs which are in constant use, are
strengthened, whilst organs in habitual disuse have a
tendency to become weaker.




2 I6            THE REIGN OF LAW.
All thesc results arise by way of natural consequence.
How shall we describe them?  Shall we say that they
are the result of Law?  We may safely do so, remembering only that by Law, in this sense, we mean nothing
but the co-operation of different natural Forces, which,
Iunder certain conditions, work together for the fulfilment of an obvious intention.  01 the nature of those
Forces we know nothing; nor is it easy to conceive
how they have been so co-ordinated as to produce
effects fitting with such exactness into the conditions
requisite for the preservation of Organic Life. If there
were any evidence that by the same means new Forms
of Life could be developed from the old, I cannot see
why there should be any reluctance to admit the fact.
It would be different from anything that we see; but
I do not know that it would be at all less wonderful,
or that it would bring us much nearer than we now
stand to the great mystery of Creation. The adaptation
and arrangement of natural forces, which can compass
these modifications of animal structure, in exact proportion to the need of them, is an adaptation and arrangemient which is in the nature of Creation. It can only
ble due to the working of a power which is in the nature
of Creative power.
TWe are so accustomed to these and other similar phenornena, and so apt to hide our own ignorance of their




CREATION BY LAW.              217
cause, by describing them as the result of "Law," that
we forget what a multitude of natural Forces must be
concerned in their production, and what complicated
adjustments of these amongst each other for the accomplishment of Purpose. It is purely, therefore, in
my view, a question of evidence, whether this particular
law of adaptation has or has not been the means of
introducing new Forms of Life. There is no evidence
that it has. So far as we know, this power of self:
adaptation, wonderful as it is, has a comparatively limited
application; when that limit is outrun by changes in
outward conditions, which are too great or too rapid,
whole Species die and disappear.  Nevertheless, the
introduction of new Species to take the place of those
which have passed away, is a work which has been
not only so often, but so continuously repeated, that
it does suggest the idea of having been brought about
through the instrumentality of some natural process.
But we may say with confidence, that it must have
been a process different from any that we yet know-a
process not the same as that (obscure as that is) which
produces the lesser modifications of Organic Forms.
It has not, I think, been sufficiently observed, tnat
the theory of Mr. Darwin does not address itself to
che saine question, and does not even profess to trace
the Origin of new Forms to any definite law. His




2 I8            THE REIGN OF LAW.
theory gives an explanation, not of the processes by
which new Forms first appear, but only of the processes by which, when they have appeared, they acquire
a preference over others, and thus become established
in the world. A new Species is, indeed, according to
his theory, as well as with the older theories of Development, simply an unusual birth. The bond of connexion
between allied specific and generic Forms, is in his
view simply the bond of Inheritance.  But Mr. Darwin
does not pretend to have discovered any law or rule
according to which new Forms have been born from
old Forms. HTe does not hold that outward conditions,
however changed, are sufficient to account for them.
Still less does he connect them with the effort or aspirations of any Organism after new faculties and powers.
He frankly confesses that "our ignorance of the laws
of variation is profound;" and says, that in speaking of
them as due to chance, he means only " to acknowledge
plainly our ignorance of the cause of each particular
variation."  Again he says-" I believe in no law of
necessary development." 
This distinction between Mr. Darwin's theory and
other theories of Development, has not, I think, been
sufficiently observed. His theory seems to be far better
66 Origin of Species," p. 131 (first edition).  ~ Ibid. p. 351.




CREATION BY LAW.                2IR
than a mere theory-to be an established scientific
truth-in so far as it accounts, in part at least, for the
success and establishment and spread of new Forms
whe/zn they have arisen.  But it does not even suggest
the law under which, or by which, or according to which,
such new Forms are introduced. Natural Selection can
do nothing except with the materials presented to its
hands. It cannot select except among the things open
to selection. Natural Selection can originate nothing;
it can only pick out and choose among the things
which are originated by some other law. Strictly speaking, therefore, Mr. Darwin's theory is not a theory on
the Origin of Species at all, but only a theory on the
causes which lead to the relative success or failure of
such new Forms as may be born into the world.  It
is the more important to remember this distinction,
because it seems to me that Mr. Darwin himself frequently forgets it. Not only does he speak of Natural
Selection " producing" this and that modification of
structure, but he undertakes to affirm of one class of
changes that they can be produced, and of another
class of changes that they cannot be produced by this
process.1
Now, what are the changes for the preservation of
I II Origin of Species," p. 200 (first edition).




220             THE REIGN OF LAW.
which Natural Selection does, in some sense, account?
They are such changes, and these only, as are of some
direct use to the Organism  in the "struggle for exist.
ence." Any change which has not this direct value, is
not provided for in the theory. All structures, therefore, are unaccounted for-not only as respects their
origin, but even as respects their preservation-in which
the variations have no other value than mere beauty
or variety. Accordingly, Mr. Darwin is tempted, as
I have already had occasion to observe, to deny that
any such structures  xist in Nature.  Any theory of
which this denial is really a necessary part, is selfcondemned. Yet a theory may be good as accounting
for the preservation of some structures, although it fails
to account for the preservation of others. And so the
fact that Natural Selection cannot have operated on
structures of mere beauty and variety is no proof that
the theory of Natural Selection is false, but only that it
is incomplete. It does not account for the origin of any
structure; and it accounts for the preservation of only a
certain number. Surely, then, Mr. Darwin assigns to
his "law" of Natural Selection a range far wider than
really belongs to it, when, on the strength of it, he
denies that beauty for its own sake can be an end or
object in Organic Forms. He says-" This doctrine, if
true, would be absolutely fatal to my theory." Why




CREATION BY LAW.                221
should this be fatal to his theory, except on the supposition that Natural Selection gives a coin1zede account
both of the Origin of new Forms, (of which, in reality,
it gives no account at all,) and of their preservation,
of which it does give some account, but one which is
only partial?  I dwell on this, because it lies at the
very root of the question, how far Mr. Darwin's theory
can be said to suggest anything in the nature of a Creative Law of a kind to explain the Method which Ilis
been followed in the introduction of new Forms.
We may test this question by bringing to bear upon it
some particular example of specific variation.  I select
for this purpose one example, which will illustrate thbc
subject better than any abstract discussion.  It is the
case of the Humming Birds.
This group of Birds seems to exhibit, in the most
striking form, not a fewl of those mysteries of Creation
which at once tempt us to speculate on the Origin of
Species, and at the same time confound every endeavoui
to bring it into relation with any process which we know
or can conceive. In the first place, they are sharply
defined from all other forms in that Class of the animal
kingdom to which they belong. It is most difficult to
say what is their nearest affinity, and the nearest, when
it is found, is very distant. Secondly, they are abso.
lutely confined to one Continent of the Globe. In the




222             THE REIGN OF LAW.
third place, the various Species as amongst themselves
are very closely united, ranging, indeed, over a great
variety of forms, but for the most part connected with
each other by very nice gradations. In the fourth place,
there are, so to speak, some gaps in the scale, which
suggest that some Species have either been lost, or have
not yet been discovered.  In the fifth place, each of
these Species, however nearly allied to some other,
appears to be absolutely fixed and constant, there being
not the slightest indication of any mixture-of any
hybrid forms.  In the sixth place, there is the most
wonderful adaptation of special organs for the performance of special functions, and for the relation of
these organs to particular structures in the vegetable
kingdom. In the seventh place, there is a development,
for which, in extent and variety, there is no parallel in
the world, of structures designed apparently for mere
ornament, and entirely separate from any other known
or conceivable use.
A few words on some of these characters will show
their separate and joint bearinlg on the idea of Creation
by Law.
In the first place, then, the absolute distinctiveness
from all others of this Family of Birds, coupled with its
immense extent, gives the idea of some common bond,
some' physical cause, to which  such  an identity in




CREATION BY LAW.              223
physical characters must be due. This identity prevails
not only in such essential matters as the structure of the
bill and tongue, in the form of the feet and of the wings,
in the habits of flight, and in the nature of the food, but
runs also into some very curious details, as, for example,
in the number of feathers in the tail and in the wings,
which are constant numbers-adhered to even when
some of the feathers not being used even for ornament,
are reduced almost to rudiments. But under degrees of
(ivelopment' which are very variable, the number is
invariable.  This identity of structure is the more
remarkable from the immense extent of the group which
it characterises.,There are now known to science no
less than about 430 different species of Humming Bird;
and it cannot be doubted that many more remain to be
discovered among the immense forests and mountain
ranges of Central America.
Now, what is the bond that unites so closely, in a
common structure, all the forms of this great Family of
birds?  We think it a sufficient explanation sometimes
of the likeness of things, that they are made for a
common purpose. And so it is an explanation in one
3ense, but not in another. It gives the reason why
likeness should be aimed at, but not the cause or the
means through which it has been brought about. Sameness in the purpose for which things are intended, is




2 24            THE REIGN OF LAW.
a reason  ihy those things should be made alike; but it
is no explanation of the process to which the common
aspect is due. It is an explanation of the "why;" but
it is no explanation of the "how." Purpose is attained
in Nature through the instrumentality of means; and
community of aspect in created things suggests the idea
of some common process in the creative work. Thus,
the likeness which is due to common parentage serves
the most important purposes; but it is not the less the
result of a physical cause, out of which it arises by way
of natural consequence. The likeness of the Humming
Birds to each other suggests this kind of cause. It is
true that the organs which it principally affects are
specially adapted for a special habit of life. They are
fitted to enable the Bird to feed on the nectar, and the
insects which frequent the nectar of flowers, or the
leaves or bark of trees. But there are flowers and insects
in abundance in other quarters of the globe where there
are no Humming Birds.
And here we come on the curious facts of geographical distribution, —a class of facts which, as much as
any other, suggest some specific methods as having been
followed in the work of Creation.  Humming Birds are
absolutely confined to the great Continent of America with
its adjacent islands. Within those limits there is every
range of climate, and there are particular species of




'CREATION BY LAW.              225
Humming Bird a<tapted to every region where a flowering
vegetation can subsist. It is therefore neither climate
nor food which confines the Humming Birds to the
New World. What is it, then?  The idea of " centres
of Creation" is at once suggested to the mind. It
seems as if th6 Humming Birds were introduced at one
spot, and as if they had spread over the whole Continent which was accessible to them  from  that spot.
They are absent elsewhere, simply because from that
spot the other Continents of the world were inaccessible
to them. But if these ideas are suggested to the mind
by the general aspect of this family as a whole, they
are strengthened by some of the facts which we discover when we examine and compare with each other
the genera and species of which it is composed. There
is a beautiful gradation between the different genera
and the different species,-so much so, that it has
been found impossible to divide the Humming Birds
into more than two sub-families, from the absence of
sufficiently well-marked divisions. And yet on the other
hand, they cannot be arranged in anything like a continuous series, because some links appear to be missing
in the chain.
But these general facts terminate in nothing more
definite than a vague surmise. When we entcr farther
into details, we feel at once how little they lagre with
Q




226              THE REIGN OF LAW.
any physical law which is known or even conceivable
by us. If the likeness which prevails in the whole
group reminds us of the likeness which is due to community of blood, it is equally true that the differences
between the species are totally distinct, both in kind
and degree, from the variation which'we ever see
arising among the offspring of the same parents.  Let
us look at what these dififerences are.  The generic
and specific.distinctions between the Humming Birds
are mainly of two kinds,-ist, Differences in the form
of essential organs, such as the bill and the wings; 2f,
Differences in those parts of the plumage which are
Ipurely ornamental.  Now, of these two kinds of vatiation, the only one on which the law of Natural Selection has any bearing at all is the first. And on that
kind of variation, the only bearing which Natural Selection has is this-that if any Humming Bird were born
wiith a new form of bill, or a new form of wing, which
enabled it to feed better and to range farther, then that
improved bill and wing would naturally tend to be per-:)etuated by ordinary generation.  This is unquestionably true; but it really does not touch the facts of the case.
The bills and wings of the different genera do not differ
f:om each other in respect of any comparative advantage of this kind, but simply in respect to variety cor.
responding with the variety of certain vegetable Forms.




CREATION BY LAW.               227 
One form of bill is as good as another, but some forms
are adapted to some special class of flower.  Some
bills, for example, are formed of enormous length,
specially adapted to obtain access to the nectar chambers of long tubular flowers, such as the Bruzgmzsia.
Some, on the other hand, as if to show that the same
end may be attained by different means, obtain access
to the same flowers by a shorter process, and pierce the
bases of the corolla instead of seeking access by the
mouth. Some have bills bent downwards like a sickle,
adapted to searching the bark of Palm-trees for the
insects hid under the scaly covering; others have bills
curved in the opposite direction, fitted, apparently, to
the curious construction of some of the great family of
Orchids so immensely developed in the forests of Central
America. Some have bills equally well adapted for
searching a vast variety of flowers and blossoms, and
these, accordingly, migrate with the flowering season,
and, issuing from the great stronghold of the family
in tropical America, spread like our own summer Birds
of passage, northwards to Canada, and southwards to
Cape Horn, in the corresponding seasons of the year.
In contrast with these species of extended range, there
are many species whose habitat is confined, perhaps to
a single mountain, and there are a few which never have
been seen beyond the edges of some extinct volcano,
2




2238'UHE REIGN OF LAW.
whose crater is now filled with a special flora. Many of
the great mountains of the Andes have each of them
species peduliar to themselves.. On Chimborazo and
Cotopaxi, and other summits, special forms of Humming Birds are found in special zones of vegetation
even close up to the limits of perpetual snow. Again,
many of the Islands have species peculiar to themselves.
The little island of Juan Fernandez, 300 miles from the
mainland, has three species peculiar to itself, of which
two are so distinct from all others known, that they
cannot for a moment be confounded with any of them.'
It is impossible not to see, in such complicated facts
as these, that the creation of new Species has followed
some plan in which mere variety has been in itself an
object and an aim. The divergence of form is not a
divergence which can have arisen by way of natural consequence, merely from comparative advantage and disadvantage in the struggle for existence.  Bills highly
specialised in form are certainly not those which would
give the greatest advantage to birds which have equal
access to the abundant Flora of an immense Continent.
Some form of bill adapted to the probing or piercing of
all flowers with almost equal ease, would seem to be the
form most favourable to the multiplication and spread of
a Gould's' Trochilidx'"




CREATION BY LAWo              229
Humming Birds,  Continued approximation to some
common type would seem to be quite as natural a
change, and a much more advantageous kind of change
as regards advantage in the struggle for existence, than
endless divergence and special adaptation to limited
spheres of enjoyment. At all events, we may safely say
that mere advantage, in Mr. Darwin's sense, is not the
rule which has chiefly guided Creative Power in the Origin
of these new Species. It seems rather to have been a
rule having for its object the mere multiplying of Life,
and the fitting of new Forms for new spheres of enjoyment, according as these might arise out of corresponding
changes in other departments of the organic world.
If, now, we turn to the other kind of specific distinction between Humming Birds, viz., that which consists
in differences in the mere colouring and disposition
of the plumage, we shall find the same phenomena still
more remarkable. In the first place, it is to be observed
of the whole group that there is no connexion which
can be traced or conceived between the splendour of
the Humming Birds and any function essential to their
life. If there were any such connexion, that splendour
could not be confined, as it almost exclusively is, to one
sex. The female Birds are of course not placed at any
disadvantage in the struggle for existence by their more
sombre colouring.  Mere utility in this sense, therefore,




230             THE REIGN OF LANV.
can have had no share in determining one of the most
remarkable of all the characteristics of this family of
Birds. It is obviously beside the question to account,
as fMr. Wallace and Mr. Darwin do, for the beauty
of the Humming  Birds upon  the ground that the
males are thus rendered more attractive to the females.
This attractiveness can only operate as between different
individuals of the same species, since no one ever heard
of the females of a dull-coloured species wandering in
their affection firom  their rightful lords to the more
brilliant males of some other species.  Every animal,
however little beautiful it may be in our eyes, has
sufficient attractiveness as between the sexes to secure
the great object of the continuation of its race. Utility,
indeed, in a different sense, can be quoted with probability, as accounting for the comparative plain colouring of females in this and in almost all other genera of
Birds.  But then it is Utility conceived as operating by
way of motive in a Creative Mind, and not operating as
a physical cause in the production of a mechanical
result.  And here we find Mr. Wallace instinctively
testifying to this great distinction, and employing language which indicates the passage from  one order of
ideas to another. He says, "The REASON WHY female
birds are not adorned with equally brilliant plumes is
sufficiently clear; they would be injurious by rendering




CREATION BY LANV.                2 
their possessors too conspicuous during incubation."'
This is, no doubt, the true explanation of the purpose
which the plain colouring of female Birds is intended
to serve; but it is no explanation at all of the physical
causes by which this special protection is secured.
Those who, by special study, have laid their minds
alongside the Mind  of Nature in any of her Pro.
vinces, have generally imparted to them  a true sense,
so far as it goes, in the interpretation of her mysteries.  Let us then hear what Mr. Gould says on the
beauty of the Humming   Birds:-m" The members of
most of the genera have certain parts of their plumage
fantastically decorated; and in many instances most
resplendent in colour. My own opinion is, that this
gorgeous colouring of the Humming Birds has been
given for the mere purpose of ornament, and for no
other purpose of special adaptation in their mode of
life; in other words, that ornament and beauty, merely
as such, was the end proposed." 2  Different parts of the
plumage have been selected in different genera as the
principal subject of ornament.  In  some, it is the
feathers of the crown worked into different forms of
crest; in some, it is the feathers of the throat, forming
gorgets and beards of many shapes and hues; in some,
it is a special development of neck plumes, elongated
Quarerlty 7ournal of Scienzce, Oct. I867, p. 481.
G Gould's "'Trochilidae," Introduction.




232             THE REIGN OF LAW.
into frills and tippets of extraordinary form and beauty.
In a great number of genera the feathers of the tail are
the special subjects of decoration, and this on every
variety of plan and principle of ornament. In some,
the two central feathers are most elongated, the others
decreasing in length on either side, so as to give the
whole the wedge form. In others, the converse plan is
pursued, the two lateral feathers being most developed,
so that'the whole is forked aftecr the manner of the
common Swallow. In others, again, they are radiated
or pointed and sharpened like thorns. In some genera
there is an extraordinary development of one or two
feathers into plumes of enormous length, with flat or
spatulose terminations. Mere ornament and variety of
form, and these for their own sake, is the only principle
or rule with reference to which Creative Power seems to
have worked in these wonderful and beautiful Birds.
And if we cannot account for the differences in the
general style and plan of ornament followed in the
whole group, by referring them to any sort of use in the
struggle for existence, still less is it possible to account,
on this principle, for the kind of difference which
separates from each other the different species in each
of the genera. These differences are often little more
than a mere difference of colour. The radiance of the
ruby or topaz in one species, is replaced perhaps by
the radiance of the emerald or the sapphire in another.




CREATION BY LAW.               233
In all other respects the different species are some.
times almost exact counterparts of each other. As an
example, let me refer to the two species figured by Mr.
Gould as the Blue-tailed and the Green-tailed Sylphs;
and also to two species of the "' Comets," in which two
different kinds of luminous reds or crimsons are nearly
all that serve to distinguish the species.
A similar principle of variation applies in other genera,
where the amount of difference is greater. For example,
one of the most singular and beautiful of all the tribe is
comprised within the genus /;op2ihrnis, or the " Coquettes."  The principle of ornament in this genus is,
that the different species are all provided both with
brilliant crests, and with frills or tippets on the neck.
The feathers of these parts are generally of one colour,
ending in spots or spangles of another; the spangles
being generally of metallic lustre. There seems to be a
rule of inverse proportion between the two kinds of
ornament. The species which have the neck plumes
longest have the shortest crests, and vice versa&. In the
shape and structure of all essential organs there is hardly
any difference between the species.
One very curious example of variety for the sake of
ornament may be mentioned in connexion with this
wonderful family of Birds. It is a law-in the sense of
an observed order of facts-regulating the ornament of
Humming Birds, that where white is introduced into the




234              THE REIGN OF LAW.
colouring of the tail feathers, it is not applied to the
central feathers, but is confined to the marginal feathers
on either side.  There is, however, one species (Urosicte Bengzamizi), recently discovered, which affords the
only example yet known of a departure from this rule.
It is a species in which white is one of the principal
ornaments of the Bird, and is' used in places where it
can be placed in conspicuous contrast with the darkest
tints. Tufts and lines of purest white shine among the
greens and violets of the neck and head; whilst, in
exquisite harmony with this, the four central feathers of
the tail are alone dipped, as it were, in a solid glaze of
the same white, and the marginal feathers on either s/de
are kept wholly dark.  Then, as if to mark with emphasis the meaning of this departure from the ordinary
rule, it is a departure confined to the ornamented sex;
and the Female Form of the same species follows the
ordinary law —-white being introduced in the marginal
feathers, and in these alone.
Now, what explanation  does the law of Natural
Selection give —I will not say of the origin, but even of
the continuance and preservation - of such specific
varieties as these?  None whatever.  A crest of topaz is
no betterin the struggle for existence than a crest of
sapphire.  A firill ending in spangles of the emerald is
no better in the battle of life than a frill ending in
the spangles of the ruby.  A tail is not affected for the




CREATION BY LAW.              235
purposes of fliijiht, whether its marginal or its central
feathers are decorated with white. It is impossible ato
bring such varieties into relation with any physical law
known to us. It has relation, however, to a Purpose,
which stands in close analogy with our own knowledge
of Purpose in the wtorks of Man. Mere beauty and
mere variety, for their own sake, are objects which we
ourselves seek when we can make the Forces of Nature
subordinate to the attainment of them. There seems to
be no conceivable reason why we should doubt or question, that these are ends and aims also in the Forms given
to living Organisms, when the facts correspond with this
view, and with no other. In this sense, we can trace a
creative law,-that is, we can see that these Forms of
Life do fulfil a purpose and intention, which we can
appreciate and understand.
But then it may be asked, has this purpose and intention been attained without the use of means? Have no
physical laws been used, whereby these new forms of
beauty have been evolved, the one from the other, in a
series so wonderful for its variety in unity, and its unity
in variety?  I ala not now seeking to answer this question in the negative. All I say is, that the physical laws
which are made subservient to this purpose are entirely
unknown to us. That particular combination of a great
many natural laws, which Mr. Darwin groups under the




236             THE REIGN OF LAW.
name of Natural Selection, does not in the least answer
the conditions which we seek in a law to account for
either the origin or the spread of such creatures as the
various kinds of Humming Birds. On the other hand, if
I am asked whether I believe that every separate Species
has been a separate creation-not born, but separately
made-I must answer, that I do not believe it. I think
the facts do suggest to the mind the idea of the working
of some creative Law, almost as certainly as they convince us that we know nothing of its nature, or of the
conditions under which it does its glorious work. Our
experience of the existing Order of Nature is, that the
young of each species repeat the form and the colours of
their parent, and that even where variations occur, they
are inconstant, and tend to disappear.  We have no
knowledge, for example, that from the eggs of the Bluetailed Sylph a pair of Green-tailed Sylphs can ever be
produced. We have no reason to believe that a species
of oZaLor)zis with a tippet of emerald spangles, can ever
hatch out a pair of young adorned with spangles of some
other gem. And yet we cannot assert that such phenomena are impossible, nor can it be denied that, as a
matter of speculation, this process is natural and easy of
conception, as compared with the idea of each Species
being separately called into existence, out of the inorganic elements of which its body is composed.




CREATION BY LAW.               237
Such new births —if they do take place-would perfectly hlfil, I think, the only idea we can ever form of
new creations.  For example, it would appear that every
variety which is to take its place as a new Species must
be born male and female; because it is one of the facts
of specific variation in the Humming Birds, that although
the male and female plumage is generally entirely dif.
ferent, yet the female of each Species is as distinct from
the female of every other, as the male is from the male
of every other. If, therefore, each new variety were not
born in couples, and if the divergence of Form were not
thus secured in the organisation of both the sexes, it
would fail to be established, or would exhibit for a time
the phenomena of mixture, and terminate in reversion
to the original type.  Now here again we have the
emphatic declaration of Mr. Gould, that among the
thousands of specimens which have passed through his
hands, from all the genera of this great family, he has
never seen one case of mixture or hybridism  between
any two Species, however nearly allied. But this passage is so important, that I quote it entire.  "It might
be thought by some persons that four hundred species of
birds so diminutive in size, and of one family, could
scarcely be distinguished from each other; but any one
who studies the subject, will soon perceive that such is
not the case.  Even the females, which assimilate more




a238            TTHE REIGN OF LAWV.
closely to each other than the males, can be separated
with perfect certainty; nay, even a tail-feather will be
sufficient for a person well versed in the subject to say to
what genus and species the Bird from which it has been
taken belongs. I mention this fact to show that what
we designate a Species has really distinctive and constant characters; and in the whole of my experience,
with many thlousands of Humming Birds passing through
my hands, I have never observed an instance of any
variation which would lead me to suppose that it was
the result of a union of two species. I write this without bias, one way or the other, as to the question of the
Origin of Species, I am desirous of representing Nature
in her wonderful ways as she presents herself to my
attention at the close of my work, after a period of
twelve years of incessant labour, and not less than
twenty years of interesting study."'
If, therefore, new Species are born from the old, it
is not by accidental mixture; it is not by the mere
nursing of changes advantageous in the battle of life;
it must be from the birth of some one couple, male and
female, whose organisation is subjected to new conditions corresponding with each other,'and having such
force of self-continuance as to secure it against reverI Gould's "Trochilide, " Intr: luction,




CREATION BY LAW.                239
sion. It matters not how small the difference may be
from the parent Form; if that difference be constant,
and if it be associated with some difference equally
constant in the female Form, it becomes at once a new
Species. There are some cases mentioned by Mr. Gould
which may possibly be examples of the first founding of
a new Species. In the beautiful genus CynaanzSzls, he tells
us that there are some local varieties near Bogota, in
which the ornament is partially changing from blue to
green; and it is a curious fact that this variation appears
to be taking effect under the direction of some definite
rule or "law,"-inasmuch as it is only the eight central.
feathers of the tail which are tipped with the new colour.
Mr. Gould expressly says of one such variety from
Ecuador, that it possesses characters so distinctive as
to entitle it, in his opinion, to the rank of a separate
Species. The very discussion of such a question shows
the possibility of new births being the means of introducing new Species. But my object here is simply to
point out that Mr. Darwin's theory offers no explanation
of such births, either as respects their origin or their
preservation, neither does it even approach to tracing
these births to any physical law whatever.  It fails
also to recognise, even if it does not exclude, the relation which the birth of new Species has to the mlental
purplose of' producing mere beauty and mere vailnty.




04O             THE REIGN OF LAW.
Nevertheless it may be true that ordinary generation
has been the instrument employed; but if so, it mnust be
employed under extraordinary conditions, and directed
to extraordinary results.
It will be seen, then, that the principle of Natural
Selection has no bearing whatever on the Origin of
Species, but only on the preservation and distribution
of Species when they have arisen.  I have already
pointed out that Mr. Darwin does not always keep
this distinction clearly in view, because he speaks of
Natural Selection "producing" organs, or "adapting"
them. It cannot be too often repeated that Natural
Selection can produce nothing whatever, except the
conservation or preservation of some variation otherwise originated. The true Origin of Species does not
consist in the adjustments which help varieties to live
and to prevail, but in those previous adjustments which
cause those varieties to be born at all. Now what are
these?  Can they be traced or even guessed at?  Mr.
Darwin has a whole chapter on the Laws of Variation;'
and it is here, if anywhere, that we look for any suggestion as to the physical causes which account for
the Origin as distinguished from the mere Preservation
of Species. He candidly admits that his doctrine of
I "Origin of Species," chap. v.




CREATION BY LAWV.               241
Natural Selection takes cognisance of variations only
after they have arisen, and that it regards those variations as purely accidental in their origin, or, in other
words, as due to chance. This, of course, he adds, is a
supposition wholly incorrect, and only serves "' to indicate plainly our ignorance of the cause of each particular
variation." Accordingly, the Laws of Variation which
he proceeds to indicate are merely, for the most part,
certain observed facts in respect to Variation, and do
not at all come under the category of Laws, in that
higher sense in which the word Law indicates a discovered method under which Natural Forces are made
to work. There is, however, in this chapter, one Law
which approaches to a Law in the higher sense. Mr.
Darwin, whilst candidly confessing our profound ignorance of the cause or origin of varieties, yet groups
together a great class of facts as connected by a tie
which he calls the "Correlation of Growth."  Now what
is this law-this observed Order of facts?  It is, that
variation in one part of an organism is, as a rule, accornpanied with corresponding variations in other parts,
oand especially in those parts which are "homologous,"
that is to say, which occupy the same relative place
in the general Plan.'This, however, is but a very imperfect definition of
the vast Order of mysterious facts which are covered
R




242             THE REIGN OF LAW.
by the words, "Correlation of Growth."  The funda.
mental idea which these words express is an Idea of
wider and  deeper significance in Nature, than Mr.
Darwin seems to have perceived. There is a correlation between all natural organic growths; that is to
say, that any variation of form in a single part has a
constant relation to other variations of form in some
other part or parts of the same organism.  But "relation" is a vague word. There are many kinds of "relatior"-there are indeed an infinite variety of kinds.
What is the kind of relation that we detect in Correlated Growths?  It is not until we ask ourselves this
question that we discover what a deep question it ishow endless are the avenues of thought and of inquiry
which it opens up.
First, one relation which we detect in all variations of
organic growth, is simply the relation of symmetry. This
kind and degree of Correlation of Growth prevails even
in the world which we call Inorganic.  The corresponding sides and angles of a crystal, for example, may be
said to be correlated together.  The nature of this relation is geometrical and numerical. It is a relation having
reference to invariable rules of number.  As regards its
physical cause, all we can say is, that it is the resutlt of
forces whose property it is to aggregate the particles of
matter in definite forms, which forms are symmetrical



CREATION BY LAW.               243
that is to say, they are forms having an axis with equal
developments on either side.  Correlation of Growth,
tlherefore, in this sense points to the work of Forces, one
of whose essential properties is Polarity-that is, equal
and similar action in opposite directions.  Now, this
kind of Correlation of Giowth may be traced upwards
fromi simple Minerals through all the infinite complications of the organic world.  It is unquestionably the
basis of many of the Correlations of Growth prevailing
in Plants and Animals.  It is seen in the symmetrical
arrangement of all vegetable and of all animal Forms.
A central axis is traceable in them all; and the Bilateral
or Radiated arrangement of their subordinate parts is
one of the most fundamental and universal of all the
Correlations of Growth.
This is one, but it is one only, of the Correlations of
Growth which are constantly observed. It would lead
us to expect that any change of form on one side of an
animal would be accompanied by an exactly corresponding change on the other side: so that limbs on one side
of the central axis, if changed at all, would change in
exact and symmetrical accordance with the limbs on
the opposite and corresponding side. This, accordingly,
is one of the Correlations of Growth most constantly
observed.
Now, it will be seen that Correlation of Growth, in




244            THE REIGN OF LAW.
this first and simplest sense, runs alongside, as it were,
of Correlation in another and higher sense. The relation
between two equal and opposite growths, which is a
relation, in the first place, of simple symmetry as between
themselves, is always accompanied by another relation,
in the second place, of correspondence or fitness as
between these growths and external conditions. An
organism which is developed unsymmetrically, unequally,
would be not only ugly in its form, but it would be
maimed and imperfect in its functions. Here, then, we
see one kind and one idea of Correlation rising above
another. Two growths might be correlated as regards
each other, and might yet be wanting in any corresponding correlation of fitness and of function towards outward things. But the first of these two kinds of correlation would be useless without the last. And this last
is obviously the higher and more complex Correlation of
the two. It is higher, not only in the sense of being
more complex, but as involving an idea which lifts us
at once from a lower to a higher region of thought.
Growths correlated as between each other according to
mere symmetry of arrangement suggest nothing, except
the work of Forces with inherent Polarity of action. But
growths correlated with things outside the organism in
which those growths occur,-and which can exert no
physical effect upon it,-suggest at once the operation




CREATION BY LAW.                245
of Forces working under Ad justl salt ":nwitlh a viewV to
Purpose.
When we see a Mineral salt crystallisitng urllder the
power of a Voltaic Current, we see Correlation of Growth
in its simplest form, and in visible connexion with its
immediate cause.  The particles of salt are marshalled
in a constant Order —an Order, the principle of which is
some central axis, with branches and branchlets grouped
around it in equal and exquisite arrangement.  Wonderful as this arrangement is, it suggests no other question to the mind than that which may be asked in respect
to the ultimate nature and source of Polarity in Magnetic
Force. But whenwe see two growths in an organism which
not only are correlated to each other with reference to a
centre, but are correlated also to external things with
reference to Function, we see something which raises
questions altogether different in kind.  We have passed
at once from the region of the What, and the How, into
the region of the Why.  The one kind of Correlation
has reference to Physical Causes, the other kind of correlation has reference to those Mental Purposes which
Physical Causes are made to serve. These two kinds of
Correlation are perfectly distinct.  They are as distinct
as the correlation of equal pressures which a given
volume of steam  exerts upon the opposite sides of a
boiler is distinct fiom the correlation between that pres.




240             THE REIGN OF LAWV.
sure and its conversion into the driving-force of cranks
and wheels, with all their adaptations for running on the
rails, or for paddling in the sea. They are as distinct as
the correlations of force developed in a Voltaic Battery
are distinct from the adjustments which convert those
forces into the means of communicating Thought.
2Mr. Darwin  has not pointed out this distinction
clearly. Indeed, he does not seem to have had it in
his view. He groups under one name,-the Correlation
of Growth, -tw-o classes of Phenomena, which are indeed always combined in fact, but which are entirely
separate in idea.  Correlation of Growth, in one sense,
is that law of vital force which secures that any change
in the shape of one limb in an animal shall be accompanied by a corresponding change in all the other limbs.
Correlation of Growth in the other sense, is that adjustment of vital forces to the contingencies of external
circumstalnce,  which secures that all the changes which
do take place shall be changes adapted to the discharge
of new functions-to the fulfilment of new conditions of
life-to command over new sources of enjoyment.
Keeping, then, clearly in our view the distinction
between these two different kinds of Correlation of
Growth, let us look at the phenomena actually presented
in the aspect and history of Organic Forms, as respects
both these kinds of Correlation.




CREATION BY LAW.                  247
As regardls the first kind of Correlation, I have re.
ferred to the law of Bilateral Symmetry as the simplest
and imost obvious illustration.  It is a law  which at
once connects itself with the idea of Polarity of Force.
But though this be one kind of Correlation, almost
universal, and may very probably be the foundation of
every other, there are many Correlations of Growth
between which and mere Polarity there is no visible
connexion.  The truth is that all the parts of an organism are bound together as one whole by a pervading
system of correlations as intricate as they are obscure.
When the organism  is in health, and all its parts are
w-orking in harmony, the wonder of these correlations
is not perceived.  But they are brought out in a marked
degree by the phenomena of disease, and also by the
phenomena of monstrosity or malformation.  The' synmpathy" which the most distant and apparently unconnected parts of an organism show with each other, when
one of them is affected by disease, is the index of correlations whose nature is utterly beyond the reach ol
our anaton:y.  It is the same with malformations.  Mr.
Darwin mentions one case of curious unintelligible correlation —viz., that a blue iris is associated in Cats
with deafness; and, again, that the tortoise-shell colour
of the fur is associated with the female sex in the salme
animal.  In like manner the bright colours, arnd the




240'8           ITHE REIGN OF LAW.
more conspicuous ornaments of plumage in Birds, are core
related with the male sex.  So likewise are vocal organs
withl the wonderful gift of song.  In many insects the
diffe-erences of form which are correlated with the differences of sex, are far greater than the differences which
separate species and even genera.  There are insects of
which the male is a fly, whilst the female is a worim.
Tlhere are many other cases of correlation between
different growths in respect to which the nature and
source  of the connexion is equally unknown.  For
example, the complex stomachs of the Ruminant Order
are uniformly associated with a. particular form of hoof
Sometimes correlations the most constant and invariable
are at the same time the most subtle and the most
secret, because they are hid under other growths which
are not so correlated, and which produce total diversities of outward aspect. One very curious class of cor..
relations is the correlation between the internal structure of the teeth in animals, and the structure of other
very distant portions of their frame.  There lately was,
for example, in the Zoological Gardens, a little animal,
the Hyrax, not unlike a Rabbit in general appearance,
and very like it in habit.  It is the "Cony" of Scri.pture.  Now this little animal will be found on exami.
nation to have limbs which do not terminate in a foot
like a Rabbit, but in a divided hoof of peculiar form.




CREATION BY LAW.              249
This hoof is in miniature like the hoof a Rhinoceros.
If next we examine the teeth of the Hyrax we shall
find that the materials of these teeth are also combined
in the same manner, and after the same pattern as the
teeth of the Rhinoceros. So it is with other parts of
the same two animals. Along with the teeth and the
hoofs there are certain other shapes of bones which
seem to be under the same bond of likeness. Now
these are Correlations of Growth between different
parts of the same animal, and between the corresponding parts in two different species.
The conception, then, which we are led to form by
this kind of Correlation between organic growths, is
more complex than we had at first supposed. Mere
Polarity of Force, leading to equal and opposite arrangement of subordinate parts, is not enough to satisfy the
facts.  This, indeed, may continue to be the type
to which our thoughts refer, and by which we are
helped to some more adequate idea of the facts. But
the general impression left on the mind is this-that
some One Force directs the form  and structure of
every organism, so that any change in one part of it
is but the index of changes which run visibly or invisibly throughout the whole. The growths between
which we detect a correlation, are not really separate
things connected only by the few correspondences which




250             THE REIGN OF LAW.
we may be able to detect, but are part and parcel of
one operation, the result of one Force, exerting its
energies through channels which we cannot see, and
according to laws of which we can form but a distant
and faint conception.  The truth is that Correlation in
this sense is involved in the very word "' Growth."
Each part of every structure which is the result of
growth must be correlated to every other part. This
is essential to the very idea of growth, and to the very
idea of an organism due to growth.  When, therefore,
Mr. Darwin says that one of the laws on which variation of form  depends is Correlation of Growth, he
simply says that variations of Growth depend on growth
-for all growths must be correlated.
But Correlation in this sense helps but a little way
indeed in conceiving  the origin of a new  Species.
There might be the most minute and perfect harmony
between the changes effected in an animal newly born
without those changes tending even in the most remote
degree towards the establishment of a new  Form  of
Life. In order to that establishment there must be
another correlation, and a correlation of a higher kind.
There must be a correlation between those changes
and all the outward conditions amidst which the new.,
Form is to be placed and live. If this correlation fails
the new Fo-nn will die.  Yet, so far as we can see, this




CREATION BY LAW.                25 51
kind of correlation is without any physical cause.  It
is not necessarily involved, as the other kind of corre
lation is, in the very idea of Growth. On the contrary,
it is not only entirely separable in thought, but, as we
see in monstrosities, it is sometimes separated in fact.
We have no conception of any Force emanating from
external things which shall mould the structure of an
organism  in harmony with themselves.  Mr. Da'win
freely confesses this, and says that many considerations
" incline him  to lay very little weight on the direct
action of the conditions of life" in producing variety
of Form.  We can conceive, dimly indeed, but still we
can conceive, how  in the Humming Birds a special
form of Wing shall be correlated with a special form
of Bill. But we have no conception whatever how a
special form of Bill should be correlated with a special
form  of Flower from  which the Bill is to extract its
food. Mr. Darwin has shown how an improved Bill,
when once produced, will be preserved  by finding
external conditions to which it is adapted.  But he
has not shown, and he frankly confesses he has no
idea, how the adapted variation of Bill cones to be
born at all.
Yet it is this higher and more complex Correlation
which is the most constant and the most obvious of all
the facts of Nature, In these facts we see that the




2  THE REIGN OF IAW.
forces of Organic Growth are worked under rules of close
adjustment to external conditions; and that particular
shapes which might seem inseparably associated, if we
looked at one Genus or one Family alone, are at once
disjoined where different adaptations to Function are
required. Let us take another example from the great
Class of Birds. If we were to look only to the family
of the Alza/tice (Ducks and Geese), we might suppose
that there is a constant Correlation of Growth between
webbed feet and spoon-shaped bills. But the real and
efficient Correlation of Growth in this case is not between the spoon-bill and the web-foot, but between both
of these and certain external conditions of life.  The
web-foot is correlated to an aquatic habitat: and the
spoon-bill is correlated to spoon-food. And accordingly
this association of form in foot and bill is at once dissolved where different external functions require a sepa..
ration.  In the Gulls, the Fulmars, and the Petrels, the
web-foot is retained, because action upon the element of
water is still required; but the correlated form of bill
vanishes, and shapes altogether different are given,shapes adapted, that is correlated, to different kinds of
food, and to different methods of capture.
Again, there is another great family of Birds where
some of the same forms are correlated with other forms
entirely different, because of the different external Cot



CREATION BY LAW.                253
relations which are required by Function.  In the Divers
the web-foot is mounted upon a flattened leg-bone, with
the sharp edge set "fore and aft."  Now what is this
Correlation of Growth? It is, first, the Internal Correlation of those parts to each other, but secondly and
principally, it is the External Correlation of both to their
function of propelling under water. The form of the
foot is correlated to the function of opposing the largest
possible area of resistance to that medium, exactly
where, for the purpose of swimming, the maximum of
resistance is required; the knife-shaped  leg-bone is
correlated to the function of opposing the least possible
resistance, precisely where, for the same purpose, the
minimum  of resistance is required.  In Australia we
have, in the Ornlzitorynzchas paradoxus, the webbed leet
correlated with the Duck-shaped Bill in an animal which
does not belong to the Class of Birds at all.
There is another case of what may be called Correlated Correlationsl, which brings out very clearly the distinction which is so important in the philosophy of this
great subject. Feathers are a kind of covering peculiar
to the Class of Birds.  Under every variety of modification they have one fundamental plan-a central shaft ot
quill to which lateral filaments are attached.  Now there
is a vast range of correlations between the different
kinds of feather and the different Families or Species,




25 4             THE REIGN OF LAW.
and between different parts of the body in the same
Species. But there are two Correlations of Growth in
respect to feathers which are constant.  In all cases,
(excepting, of course, the Wingless Birds,) the feathers
which grow from the fore-arm  and finger-bones, constituting the Wings, are comparatively long, strong, tapering, elastic, and with thin lateral filaments, which filaments are closely hooked together by means of minute
teeth fitting, into each other, so that the whole shall form
one continuous surface or web.  This is a Correlation of
Growth between one particular kind of feather, and one
particular member of the body, which, in all Birds
capable of flight, is constant, and amounts to a universal
Law.  Now let us contrast this with another Correlation
of Growth which is equally constant.  On the side of
the head of all Birds, there is a patch of feathers of
peculiar structure, with fine and slender shafts, and with
the lateral filaments not hooked together as in the other
case, but, on the contrary, always separated from  each
other-the whole series forming a fine and open network
spread over the surface which they cover and protect.
These feathers cover the orifice of the ear, and are called
the auricol!ars. They are correlated with the curious
passages, the finely hung clapper-bones, and all the
elaborate mechanism of that organ. Such are' the Internal Correlations.  But they are intelligible only when




CREATITOi BY LAW.              255
considered in the light shed by other correlations which
are external. The wing feathers with close continuous
webs are correlated to the laws by which the passage of
air may be prevented-the auricular feathers, with open
unconnected webs, are correlated to the laws by which
the passage of sound may be rendered easy. The one
set of feathers are adapted to the active function of
evoking and resisting atmospheric pressure by striking
strong, yet light and elastic blows, upon the air-the
other set of feathers are adapted to the passive function
of allowing the free access of the waves of sound into
the passages of the ear. These are but a few examples
out of millions. Throughout the whole range of Nature
the system of Internal Correlation is entirely subordinate
to the system  of External Correlation.  Forms or
growths which are inseparably joined with each other in
one group of animals, are wholly divorced from each
other in another group; whereas Forms which have
correlations adapted to external conditions, are repeated
over and over again across the widest gaps in the scale
of Natural affinity.
If, then, it be true that New Species are created out of
small variations in the form of Old Species, and this by
way of Natural Generation, there must be some bond
of connexion which determines those variations in a
definite direction, and keeps up the External Correla.




256            THE REIGN OF LAW.
tions jarijassu with the Internal.Correlations. Natural
Selection can'have no part in this. Natural Selection
seizes on these External Correlations when they have
come to be. But Natural Selection cannot enter the
secret chambers of the womb, and there shape the new
Form in harmony with modified conditions of external
life. How, then, are these external correlations provided
for beforehand? There can be but one reply. It is by
UJtility, not acting as a Physical Cause upon organs
already in existence, but acting through Motive as a
Mental Purpose in contriving organs before they have
begun to be. And where obvious utility does result,
the only connecting Bond which can be conceived as
capable of maintaining the Internal Correlations in
harmony with the External Correlations, is the Bond of
Creative Will giving to Organic Forces a foreseen direction. It is, in short, precisely the same bond which
in all mechanism  produces Structure in harmony with
intended Function.
Hence it is that scientific men, in seeking expression
for the ultimate ideas arrived at in the course of Physical
research, find themselves compelled to borrow the language of Mechanical Invention. There is no other language which conveys an impression of the facts, or of
the tie by which the facts are connected with each
other. In the first chapter of this work I have had




CREATION BY LAW.                  257
occasion to point out how true this is of Mr. Darwin's
description of the Orchids, and of the curious functions
of their structure. The correlations there are all external.  But the same result appears in every other
department of Science.  In a remarkable paper on the
"Constitution of the Universe," Professor Tyndall has
occasion to speak of the non-luminous rays of heat
emitted by all incandescent bodies,-rays which, though
intensely hot, are altogether insensible to the eye.  Now
the Retina of the eye is a piece of mechanism lwhose
Correlations. are essentially External. It is the expansion of a special nerve whose function it is to be sensitive
to certain particular vibrations, and to no other vibrations whatever.  Light itself, therefore, is discovered to
be merely a relative term —a word, in short, denoting
nothing but an external Correlation between the Retina
and vibrations of a certain kind and quality.  Now what
is the language which Professbr Tyndall is constrained
to use in explanation of facts so difficult of conception?
It is the language of Mechanism, of mental Purpose anld
Design.  " It is not," he says, " the size of a wave which
determines its power of producing light; it is, broadly
speaking, tie filzess of thze reiave to thze Retfia.  The
ethereal pulses must follow each other with a certain
rapidity of succession before they can produce light, and
if their rapidity exceed a certain limit, they also fail to




258              THE REIGN OF LAW.
produce light. T7e Retina is a/fzftzed, if I may use the
term, to a certain ra7ngle of vibrations, beyond which, in
both directions, it ceases to be of use."  These are
indeed wonderful Correlations which reveal to us fittings and adjustments of which we had no previous
conception: lut they give us no glimmering even, of
knowledge  as to the physical causes which have "'attuned" a material organ so as to catch certain ethereal
pulsations in the external world, and to make these the
means of conveying to Man's Intelligence the enjoyment
and the power of sight.
It will be seen, then, that when Mr. Darwin speaks of'
the Law of Correlation of Growth as a Law which determines va-riataion in orga-nic growths, he is really presenting to us under one phase two separate ideas which are
radically distinct.  One is the idea of different growths
in the same organisDm, corresponding with each other
in respect to arra —1ngement,-or in respect to texture,
or in respect to form,-or to soime other point of cormparison.  The other idea is that these growths (each and
all) correspond with the conditions of external nature in
such a way as to fit them for the disclharge of Function
with some new adaptation, and consequently with some
new adva.ntag-e.  In one aspect the Law of Correlation
of Growtlh is (or at least may probably be) a Law in the
strictest sense of the word; that is to say, the resuilt




CREATION BY LANW.                 259
of a Force acting; according to its own definite modes
and measures of operation.  But the Law of Correlation
of Growth in the other aspect, is a law  only in the
sense (s) of an observed order of facts; and (2) of
that Order depending on Adjustment with a view  to
Purpose.
Many naturalists have spoken of the facts of organic
likeness as sufficiently accounted for by referring them to
Adherence to Type.  Mr. Darwin complains that this
phrase, as an explanation of organic likeness, is no
explanation at all, but amounts only to a re-statement of
the facts in another form of language.  TJhis is true; but
it is equally true of his own phrase of Correlation of
Growth.' " Adherence to Type " is not in the nature of
a Physical Cause, but in the nature of a Menrtal Purpose.
It is no explanation, therefcre, to those fiaculties of the
mindi which seek for Methods of operation.  In like
manner " Correlation of Growth," in the only sense in
which it is possible to connect it with the Origin of
Species, is not a Physical Cause, but a Mental Purpose.
The physical means by which that purpose is secured
1 Mr. Wallace traces the whole Darwinian theory to six "genera'
laws of the simplest kind-laws which," he emphatically adds,
" are in most cases mere statccments of admzittd facts."  Again he
says, "This series of facts or laws are zmere rftatements of whazat iJ
th/e condiion of nature. "-7ournal of Science, No. XVI. p. 472.
S2




260             THE REIGN OF LAW.
remain as dark as ever; and such of them as are conceivable by us, are seen, like all other physical forces,
working to order, subject to direction, and having that
direction determined by foresight, forethought, and contrivance.
Correlation of Growth, in the sense of external adaptations, may be said to be the most universal of all the
Laws of Nature.  But it accounts for the Origin of
Organic Forms only in the same sense in which it
accounts for the origin of all other phenomena, which in
their result exhibit adaptations, or fittings into use and
service.  Let us take, as an example, the origin, nature,
and capacities of Coal. That substance is correlated in
a truly wonderful manner with the needs, the powers,
and the capacities of Man. It contains within itself, in
a form condensed and portable, a store of physical Force
of incredible amount. The particles of one pound weight
of it are held together by a Force which, when liberated
and applied in the form of heat, is capable of lifting one
million times its own weight to the height of one foot.1
No other substance known to Man is to be compared
with this as a furnisher of Force.  This is its function in
the world. It is a function relating to Man's mechanical
and inventive powers; and coal has been rendered
I "~The Coal Question."-W. S. Jevons, I865.




CREATION BY LAW.               261
capable of discharging this function by processes of preparation which began millions of ages before Man was
born. But these External Correlations are a result arising
by way of natural consequence out of certain physical
causes working to order, that is to say, out of Internal
Correlations of Growth between Solar Heat and Vegetable Structure, and again between these and the causes
which occasion interchange between sea and land. No
explanation so definite as this can be given of the
method in which Vital Forces are made to evolve a new
Form of Life. But even if such explanation could be
given, it would render no account at all of the fittings of
that Form into the outward requirements of its life.
These are Correlations which in their very nature belong
to Mind, are the work of Mind, and are intelligible only
in the light of Mind.
I do not represent this conclusion as one necessarily
adverse to Mr. Darwin's Theory on the Origin of Species.
It is a conclusion which he would probably be willing to
accept. I only desire to point out in how very limited
a sense that Theory can be said to trace Creation to a
"Law" at all, and how entirely inadequate that Theory
is to account by any physical cause for the Origin of
Species.
The only senses, therefore, in which we get any
glimpse of Creation by Law are these-Ist, That the




2 6 2           THE REIGN OF LAW.
close physical connexion between  different Specific
Forms is probably due to the operation of sonme
Force or Forces common to them all; 2;, That these
Forces have been employed and worked, with others
equally unknown, for the attainment of such ends as
the multiplication of Life, in Forms fitted for new
spheres of enjoyment, and for the display of new kinds
of beauty.
Is there anything in this conclusion to conflict with
such knowledge as we have from other sources of the
nature and working of Creative Power?  I do not know
on what authority it is that we so often speak as if
Creation were not Creation unless it work from nothing
as its material, and by nothing as its means. We know
that out of the " dust of the ground "-that is, out of the
ordinary elements of Nature-are our own bodies formed,
and the bodies of all living things. Nor is there anything which should shock us in the idea that the creation
of new Forms, any more than their propagation, has
been brought about by the use and instrumentality of
means. In a theological point of view it matters nothing
what those means have been. I agree with M. Guizot,
when he says that " Those only would be serious
adversaries of the doctrine of Creation who could affirma
that the universe-the earth, and Man upon it-have
been from all eternity, and in all respects; just what they




CREATION BY LAW.                   263
are now."'  But this cannot be affirmed except in thie
teeth of facts which  Science has clearly ascertained.
There has been a continual coming-to-be of new Forms
of Life.2 This is Creation, no matter what have been the
laws or forces employed by Creative Power.
The truth is, that the theory which fixes upon Inheritance as the cause of organic likeness, startles us
only when it is applied to Forms in which unlikeness
is more prominent than resemblance.  The idea, for
example, that the different kinds of Pigeon, or of Humming Birds, have all descended through successive variation from  some one ancestral pair, whether it be true
or not, would not startle any one.  Yet, if this be true,
we must be prepared for the same surmise extending
farther. The advocates of Development urge that Time
is a powerful factor. They say that if changes small,
but constant enough, and definite enough, to constitute new Species, can and do arise out of born varieties,
it is impossible to fix the limits of divergence which
may be reached in the course of ages.  It does not
follow, on the other hand, that there is no such limit
I "M  ditations sur l'Essence de la Religion Chretienne," p. 49.
2 d'We discern no evidence of a pause or intromission in the
creation or coming.to-be of new plants and animals."-I-lzsLanccs
of the Power of God as manifested in Hlis Anzmal Creation, by
Professor Owen.




264             THE REIGN OF LAW.
because we cannot fix it. It does not necessarily follow
that because we admit the idea of the Rock-dove, and
the Turtle-dove, and the Ring-dove being all descended
from  one ancestral Pigeon, we are bound to accept
the idea of the Whale, and the Antelope, and the
Monkey being all descended from some one primeval
Mammal.  Mr. Darwin says, truly enough, that Inheritance " is that cause which alone, as far as we positively
know, produces organisms quite like, or nearly like, each
other."  But this is no reason why we should conclude
that Inheritance is the only cause which can produce
Organisms quite unlike, or only very partially like each
other.  We are surely not entitled to assume that all
degrees and kinds of likeness can arise only from this
single cause.  Yet until this extreme proposition be
proved, or rendered probable, we have a sound scientific basis for doubting the application of the theory,
precisely in proportion to the unlikeness of the animals
to which it is applied.
And this is the ground of reasoning, besides the
ground of feeling, on which we revolt from the doctrine as applied to Man. We do so because we are
conscious of an' amount and of a kind of difference
between ourselves and the lower animals, which is, in
sober truth, immeasurable, in spite of the close affinities of bodily structure.  Yet the closeness of these




CREATION BY LAW.               265
affinities is a fact; and it may with truth be said that
in contrast with the gulf of separation in all resulting
characters, these affinities are among the profoundest
mysteries of Nature.  Professor Huxley, in his work
on " Man's Place in Nature," has endeavoured to
prove that, so far as mere physical structure is concerned, "the differences which separate him  from the
Gorilla and the Chimpanzee are not so great as those
which separate the Gorilla from the lower Apes."  On
the frontispiece of this work he exhibits in series the
skeletons of the Anthropoid Apes and of Man.  It is
a grim  and grotesque procession.  The Form  which
leads it, however like the others in general structural
plan, is wonderfully different in those lines and shapes
of Matter which have such mysterious power of expressing the characters of Mind. And significant as those
differences are in the skeleton, they are as nothing to
the differences which emerge in the living creatures.
Huxley himself admits that these differences amount
to "an enormous gulf,"-to a' divergence immeasurable
-practically infinite."  What more striking proof could
we have than this, that Organic Forms are but as clay
in the hands of the Potter, and that the "Law" of
Structure is entirely subordinate to the " Law " of Purpose and Intention under which the various parts of
that structure are combined for use P




266             THE REIGN OF LAW.
But Science will continue to ask, even if she never
gets an answer, WVhat is the community of physical
cause which produces this community of resulting structure?  The fact which it is most difficult to disengage
from the theory of Development, or, in other words,
from the theory of Creation by Birth, is the existence of rudimentary or aborted organs; the existence
of teeth, for example, in the jaws of the Whale-teeth
which never cut the gum, and which are entirely useless
to the animal. We have an inherent conviction that
this must have some use in the future, —that is, in some
organism to be born from this one,-or else it must
have had some use in the past,-that is, in  some
organism from which this one has descended.  In either
case the powver of Inheritance is suggested to the mind.
We think instinctively of the existence of some Derivative
Form in which these teeth have been, or are to be turned
to use. It is only fair towards the Theory of Creation
by Birth, to admit that it does explain the existence
of useless organs in a sense in which no other Theory
explains them, It would be almost a necessary consequence of Creation by Birth, that there must be
stages in which the ultimate use of new Forms could
not be yet apparent.  And if mere beauty or variety
were in themselves objects which Creative Power sets
before itself, then, also, we might expect to meet with




CRE ATION BY LAW.             267
modifications of structure having no other apparent
use. Both these explanations, however, exclude Mr.'
Darwin's idea of Natural Selection; because this is a
process which can never operate, except through the
agency of actual use and disuse, upon organs already
existing and capable of discharging function. The only
theory of Creation by Birth which really does afford
some explanation of the facts, is a theory which assumes
modifications of structure to be entirely independent
of the effect of actual use or disuse. Mr. Darwin himself candidly admits that in flowers, at least, the forces
of Correlated Growth do "modify important structures
independent of Utility, and therefore of Natural Selection."  This admission must be extended to all organic
growths. There must have been a time with all of them
when they began to be; and, therefore, a time before
Natural Selection had room to play. These considerations, however, only serve to put a higher interpretation
on the Theory of Creation by Birth. They do not condemn it.
One suggestion, indeed, has been made on this subject which I think it is impossible to accept. When
men were yet unwilling to admit the existence of life
and death upon the globe so long before the creation of
Man, it used to be- said that fossils were only "sports of
nature."  So in our own day, I have heard it said that




263             THE REIGN OF LAW.
rudimentary organs are merely intended to satisfy that
condition of our finite minds in virtue of which we are
unable to conceive Creation, except in connexion with
some History and Method of growth. And so, as a
condescension to this weakness, aborted members are
given to suggest a HIistory which was never true, and a
Method which was never followed! Now of one thing
we may be sure, that there are no fictions of this kind
in Nature, and no bad jokes.  Whatever natural things
really point to, they point to faithfully; and the conclusions really indicated are never false.  Abortive
organs mean s:omething, and they mean it truly.
Still, there is no proof that Inheritance is the only
cause from  which such structures can arise.  In the
inorganic world we know that not mere similarity, but
absolute identity of form, as in crystals, is the result of
laws which have nothing to do vwith Inheritance, but.of forces whose nature it is to aggregate the particles of
matter in identic shapes.  It is impossible to say how
far a similar unity of effect may have been impressed on
the forces through which vital Organisms are first started
on their way. There are some essential resemblances
between all Forms of Life which it is impossible even
in imagination to connect with community of blood by
descent.  For example, the Bilateral arrangement is
common to all Organisms, down at least to the Radiata,




CREATION BY LAW.               269
and in this great class we have the same principle of
Polarity developed in a circle.  Again, the general
mechanism of the digestive organs by which food is
in part assimilated and part rejected, is also common
through a range of equal extent. Indeed, it may be
said with truth, that never in all the changes of Time
has there been any alteration throughout the whole
scale of Organic Life, in the fundamental principles
of chemical and mechanical adjustment, on which the
great animal functions of Respiration, Circulation, and
Reproduction, have been provided for.1  These are
fundamental similarities of plan, depending probably
on the very nature of Forces which necessitate these
adjustments in order to the production of the phenomena of Life-Forces of which we know nothing, but
which we have not the slightest reason to suppose to
be due to Inheritance. Other similarities of plan may
depend on the same laws, equally unconnected with
Inheritance by descent.
Inheritance, indeed, has been suggested as the cause
of organic likeness, mainly because there is a difficulty
in conceiving any other. But there is at least an equal
difficulty in conceiving the applicability of this cause to
Man.  We have already seen2 that M. Guizot lays it. Agassiz' "Geological Sketches," p. 41. London, I86o.
2 Ante, page 28,




270             THE REIGN OF LAW.
down as a physical impossibility that Man —the human
pair-can have been introduced into the world except
in complete stature-in the full possession of all his
faculties and powers.  He holds it as certain that on no
other condition could Man, on his first appearance,
have been able to survive and to found the human
family. Even those who question whether this argument
is entitled to the rank of a self-evident physical truth,
must admit that it is at least quite as good as the
opposite assertion, that any origin except the origin of
natural birth is inconceivable.  Where our gnorance
is so profound, no reasoning of this kind is of much
value.  There is undoubtedly much to be said in
support of M. Guizot's position.  Certainly, Man as a
mere animal is the most helpless of all animals. His
whole frame has relation to his mind, and apart from
that relation., it is feebler than the frame of any of the
brutes. All its members are Correlated amongst each
otih:er with the functions of his Brain, so that action may
follow upon Knowledge-so that embodiment may be
possible to Thought. Yet in its plan and structure his
frame is hornologically, that is ideally, the same as the
firame of the brutes-organ answering to organ, and
bone to bone.
The words'Adherence to Type" are words expresosiye of an Idea, of a Purpose, which we see fulfilled in




CREATION BY LAW.               271
Organic Forms.  But this purpose must have sought
its own accomplishment by the use of means, and the
question of Science always is, what were these means?
Love of beauty is equally a Purpose which we see fulfilled in Nature, but in the case of the Humming Birds
this has been accomplished by giving to their plumes the
structure of'"Thin Plates,"-a structure which decomposes light and flings back its prismatic colours to the
eye. Fitness and special adaptation is another of the
purposes of Creation, but this also is attained through
the careful arrangement, and pliability to use, of physical
laws.  In like manner, "Adherence to Type" is the expression of a fact, or the statement of a Purpose, which,
like all the other purposes fulfilled in Nature, invites to
an investigation of the instrumentality employed.  We
see the Purpose, but we do not see the Method. We see
the purpose, for example, in the wonderful adaptability
of the Vertebrate Type to the infinite varieties of Life
to which it serves as an organ and a home.  Science
should be allowed without suspicion or remonstrance to
pursue her proper object, which is to detect, if she can,
what the method of this work has been.  There is no
point, short of the last and highest, at which Science
can be satisfied, Her curiosity is insatiable.  It is a
curiosity representing man's desire of knowledge.  But
that desire extends into regions where the means of




272               THE REIGN OF LAV..
investigation cease, and in which the processes of Veri.
fication are of no avail.  A.bove and behind  every
Detected Method in Nature there lies the same ultimate
question as before,-What is it by which this is done?
It is the great mystery of our Being that we have
powers impelling us to ask such questions on the history
of Creation, when we have no powers enabling us to
solve them.  Ideas and faint suggestions of reply are
ever passing across the outer limits of the Mind, as
meteors pass across the margin of the atmosphere, but
we endeavour in vain to grasp or understand them.
The faculties both of reason and of imagination fall back
with a sense of impotence upon some favourite phrasesome form of words built up out of the materials of
analogy, and out of the experience of a Mind, which,
being finite, is not creative.  We beat against the bars
in vain.  The only real rest is in the confession of
ignorance, and the confession, too, that all ultimate
physical Truth is beyond the reach of Science.1 It is
1 I have slightly altered this passage as it stood in the earlier
editions, because, although the context clearly indicates its reference to Physical truth, it has been quoted by Mr. Lewes as granting
all that the Positive Philosophy demands. There is a sense, of
course, in which it may be said that no Truth knowable by man
can be "ultimate."  That is to say, there is no Truth even conceivable, respecting which we imight not ask, or desire to task, fart lerguestions. But there is no use in appearing to agree with those




CREATION BY LAW.                    273
probable that even the nearest methods of Creation,
though far short of ultimate truths, lie behind a veil too
thick for us to penetrate.  It is here surely, if it is
anywhere in the sphere of natural investigation, that the
Man of Science may lay down the weapons of his
analysis, and say, "I do not exercise myself in great
matters, or in things which are too high for me." 1
There is at least one conclusion which is certain,
namely, this-that no theory in respect to the means
and method employed in the work of Creation-provided such theory takes in all the facts-can have the
slightest effect in removing that work from  the relation
in which it stands to the attributes of Will.  All such
theories are, and can only be " simply questions of how
the Creator has worked." This is the confession made
in respect to Mr. Darwin's theory by one of the most
competent of its supporters.2  Creation by Law-Evolution by Law-Development by Law, or, as including all
those kindred ideas, the Reign of Law, is nothing but
the reign of Creative Force directed by Creative Knowledge, worked under the control of Creative Power, and
in fulfilment of Creative Purpose.
from whom in reality I so widely differ. The definition of Truth
which Mr. Lewes would consider "ultimate," and therefore unat.
tainable, is very different from the definition which I should give,
anl( have given.                       1 Psalm cxxxi.
2 Mr. Wallace.-2)zrwluza of Science, No. XVI. p. 473
T




CHAPTER. V.
THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND.
HEN we' pass from the phenomena of Matter
to the phenomena of Mind, we do not pass
from under the Reign of Law. Here, too, facts do
range themselves in in observed Order: here, too, there
is a chain of cause and effect running throughout all
events: here, too, we see around us, and feel within us,
the work of Forces which have always a certain definite
tendency to produce certain definite results: here, too,
it is by combination and adjustment among these Forces
that they are mutually held in check: here, too, accordingly, special ends can only be accomplished by the
use of special means.
But then the question immediately occurs to uscan we speak of Law, or of Force, or of "cause and
effect," as applied to the phenomena of Mind, in the
same sense in which we speak of them as applied to
the phenomnlena of Matter? Is it only by distant analogy, or as expressing ideas really the same, that we
use the same terms of both?




THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND.   275
Undoubtedly the first thought which suggests itself to
the mind is, that a material Force and a moral or intellectual Force are essentially different in kind,-not
subject to conditions the same, or even similar.  But
are we sure of this?  Are we sure that the Forces which
we call Material are not, after all, but manifestations of
mental energy and Will?  We have already seen that
such evidence as we have is all tending the other way.
The conclusions forced upon us have been these:-first,
that the more we know of Nature the more certain it
appears that a multiplicity of separate forces does not
exist, but that all her forces pass into each other, and
are but modifications of some One Force which is the
source and centre of the rest: secondly, that all of themn
are governed in their mutual relations by principles of
arrangement which are purely mental: thirdly, that of
the ultimate seat of Force in any form we know nothing
directly: and fourthly, that the nearest conception we
can ever have of Force is derived from our own consciousness of vital power.
If these conclusions be true, it follows that, whether
as regards that in which Force in itself consists, or as regards the conditions under which Force is used, it need
not surprise us if in passing from the material world to
the world of Mind, we see that Law, in the same sense,
prevails in the phenomena of both. Put as this is a
T2




276              THE REIGN OF LAW
subject of much difficulty, and of much importance, it
may be well to examine it a little nearer.
The first and most palpable form in which we see that
Mind is subject to Law, is in its connexion with the
Body.  A'nd this connexion is so close that we know
neither where it begins nor where it ends.  The extent
and nature of it can be known only by the same kind of
reasoning and observation by which we attain to any
knowledge of the external world. For indeed our Bodies
seem part of the external world to us. We see their
form as we see the form of other things, but we do not
see their structure, neither do we feel it, nor can we
arrive at it, except as a matter of obscure and difficult
research.  It is literally true that some of the most
distant objects in the Universe are more accessible to
our observation, and in some respects more intelligible
to our understanding, than the material frame in which
we live.  Man had discovered much concerning the circulation of the Planets before he had discovered anything
concerning the circulation of his own blood.' Yet so near
is the current of that blood to him, so much is it a part
of himself, that when it stops, in an instant "all his
thoughts perish."  Nevertheless, the Mind is not conscious of its own dependence on material organs. Even
X Kepler and Harvey were contemporaries; but Copernicus hald
preceded them by nearly a hundred years,




IN THE REALMl OF MIND.           277
in respect to those exertions of the Will which are'expressed in movements of the Body, we are conscious only
of the Will, and of the Will being exerted with success;
but we are entirely unconscious of the machinery which
intervenes between the intention and the accomplishment of the act intended. Such movements of the
Body appear to us as if they were direct acts of Will.
Yet nothing can be more certain than that the communication is not direct but indirect-and even elaborately
circuitous. It is only when the ropes and pulleys are
broken that we discover how that which we call our Will
can only run in appointed channels-which channels are
material, and are laid down upon a plan, like conducting
wires, as if for the conveyance of a material Force.
Nor does it end here-this close connexion between
Mind and Matter. So far from being less close, it seems
to be only closer and closer when we pass to mental
operations in which no apparent movements of the Body
are concerned. In the exercise of pure Reason, in
passing from one mental conception to another, when by
an effort of our Will we turn our attention to a new
question, and in the twinkling of an eye pursue a fresh
train of thought,-above all, when our affections go forth
towards those who are the objects of them-in all these
operations, if anywhere, we feel as if we were free from
mechanism- from  " organs "-from Matter in any form.




2 73            TIIE REIGN OF LAW
So it seems till we are brought face to face with the
terrible phenomena of disease. Then our delusion is
dispelled, and we know how frail we are.  Then we
find that the same stroke which paralyses the movement
of a limb, may paralyse, not less effectually, all the
powers of Reason, of Memory, and of Will. And the
Affections, —what becomes of them? These too, which
seem so purely spiritual, we find out to be dependent on
material structure.   Every physician  knows that a
frequent consequence of cerebral disease is a total
change of character. There is no symptom of insanity
more common than the growth of dislike and aversion to
those who, in health, had been the most loved on earth.
Change of every kind and degree in the character and
structure of Mind is the immediate result of corresponding changes in the structure and substance of the Brain,,.
The pure may become impure; the loving may become
malignant; the simple-minded may become stuspicious;
the generous may become engrossed with self; the
strong-minded may become imbecile,-the whole man
may be broken down, and may live for years without
consciousness and without emotion.  How  painfully
does the Brain sometimes indicate its functions! What
is it in the aspect of Idiotcy, in many of its forms, which
we instantly recognise, and never can mistake?  In that
low, pinched, and retiring brow, we see instinctively tlhat




IN THE REALM OF MlIND.          279
Reason cannot hold her seat. These facts do not stand
alone. Not only are there some parallel facts, but all
thle living world is full of them. The whole range of
animal creation, from Man down to the Reptile and the
Fish, testifies to the universal law of an ascending scale
of mental capacity being coincident with an ascending
degree of cerebral organisation.  No series of facts,
tending to the establishment of any physical truth, is
more complete or more conclusive than the chain which
connects the functions of the Brain with the phenomena
of Mind.
But here, again, let us beware of the fallacies which
may arise from a failur.~ to recognise the exact import of
the words we use. In the ears of many it sounds like
Materialism to say that Thought is a function of the
Brain. But it has been already shown in a previous
chapter that Function is merely the word by which we
describe that work which any given piece of mechanism
has been adjusted to perform. The Power, or Force,
rwhich is developed by means of an " organ," is not
identical with that organ, nor with any of its parts, nor
with the materials of which it is composed, nor even
with its mechanism as a whole. It does not follow, for
example, that Electricity is identical with the tissues of a
fish, because it is developed out of the battery of a Torpedo or a Gymnotus. Yet it is true that the develop



280             TIHE REIGN OF LAW
ment and discharge of Electricity is the "c function" of
those Fish-organs.:-that is to say, this is the work which
they have been adjusted to perform. Still less do we
confound Thought with Brain when we acknowledge the
fact that Brain in our Organism is inseparably connected
wdith the power of thinking.
Yet inferences as false as this, and very nearly related
to it, have actually been drawn by eminent men from the
facts of cerebral action. Thus it has been declared that
a knowledge of Brain, under a name which is in itself a
failacy - Phrenology — is the only sure foundation of
Mental Science. This is a mere confusion of thought,
even if the phrenological mapping of the Brain were as
certainly correct as it is really doubtful. That particular"
faculties of the Mind may be connected with particular
portions of the Brain, is not in itself more difficult to
understand or to believe than that the Mind, as a whole,
is connected with the Brain as a whole.  Whether it
be so or not is a question purely of observation and df
fact. But this, at least, is certain,-that the different
faculties and affections of the Mind must be discriminated from each other before it is possible to assign to
them a local habitation.  The Mind must be mapped
first, and then its Organ. No additional knowledge is
given to us of any one mental faculty, by proving that it
is connected with some special bit of the mysterious




IN THE REALM OF MIND.             28KE
substance of which that organ is composed. Love is
Iove, and nothing else; Hatred is Hatred, and nothing
else; Reverence is Reverence, and nothing else; the
pure intellectual perception of a Logical Necessity is
itself, and nothing else;-however clearly it may be
proved that each of these is a function of some separate
region of the Brain. When the Phrenologist, taking in
his hand a human skull, and lifting its upper cover, tells
us that the oval of convoluted matter which is thus exposed to view "manifests the moral sentiments," what
light does he throw on these? The moral sentiments!
what do these include? The power of seeing Moral
PEauty, and of loving Truth-the sense of Justice, and
the desire of serving in her cause-Conscience and
Benevolence, Charity and Faith-all that is best and
noblest in the human spirit-these are 6" manifested " in
that bit of Matter! What new  information does this
give us on the nature or the office of those glorious attributes which are the joy of Earth and Heaven?  None
at all. They are just what we knew them before to be.
Phrenology is no longer popular, as it once was, among
Physiologists. Its mapping of the Brain is now generally admitted to be imaginary. But the fundamental
error of the Phrenological School did not lie merely, or
even mainly, in any mistake as to the mapping of the
Brain. It lay in the idea that a Science of Mind can be




282             THE REIGN OF LAW
founded in any shape or form upon the discoveries of
anatomy. Their error lay in the notion that Physiology
can ever be the basis of Psychology. And this is an
error, and a confusion  of thought, which  survives
t'hrenology.  A pT ofound interest indeed attaches to
every new  fact which connects together the parallel
phenomena of' Mind and of Organisation.  But it is the
phenomena of Mind, and it is these alone, of which we
are directly cognisant, and it is from these that we must
start as the, basis of all Psychological research. This is
true even of those phenomena of the mind which are
most purely animal. Sensation, for example, may be
traced with absolute demonstration to certain nerves.
T'his may throw a new light on the method by which
Sensation is rendered possible; but it throws no new
light whatever upon what Sensation is. It is that which
we know and feel it to be, and it is neither more nor less
since the knife of the anatomist has laid bare the
channels along which it comes.  Still more is this true
of the Intellectual Powers. Yet there are Philosophers
who appear to think that some new light is cast upon
Sensation when they call it an affection of the "O Sensory
Ganglia;" that Thought is in some measure explained
when it is called " Cerebration," and that the Laws of
Intellect are reduced to scientific expression when they
are described as the working of the " Cerebral Ganglia."




IN THE REALM OF MIND.            283
all this is a nmere idle play on words. It is an attempt to,
put that first which must be last, and that last which
must be first. The general fact of the dependence of
Mind on a Bodily organisation is a fact which contains
within itself all the lesser facts of Physiological discovery.  They are not, and they cannot be, new  in
kind.  They do not even help us to conceive how,
through any mechanism, the power of Thought can be
evolved. Still less do they give us any new view of that
which Thought, in itself, is.
This connexion, therefore, between Mind and Brain,
although it is a universal "law" of our being, is a law
recognised by us only in the sense in which Law is
applied to "an observed Order of facts."  But like
every other Order of this kind, it implies a Force or an
arrangement of Forces out of which tle Order comes.
It implies, too, that this arrangement of Forces is necessary to the evolution and play of mental faculties in the
form in which they are possessed by us. Consequently
these faculties are seen taking their place among all the
other phenomena of the world. They are seen to be
under the Reign of Law in this largest and highest sense
of all-that they depend upon Adjustment, and that
adjustment so delicate that the slightest disturbance of
it deranges the whole resulting phenomena of Mind.
Mind, as developed in us, has its very existence and




284.              THE REIGN OF LAW
working dependent on imperative physical conditions,
which conditions are met only by elaborate contrivance.
We have no knowledge what the Forces are which
demand this obedience, and which call for this contrivance. We have even an insuperable difficulty in
conceiving what they can be. It almost seems as if
there were a barrier in the very nature of our minds
against the possibility of conceiving how any combination of material forces can either result in Mind,
or can be necessary to the working of its powers, or
can be concerned even in giving it an abode.'  "We
cannot conceive," says Dr. Andrew  Cornbe,'even in
the remotest manner, in what way the Brain-a cornpound of water, albumen, fat, and phosphate saltsoperates in the generating of Thought." And yet there
is one experience which brings the fact of this close
connexion within the direct recognition of Consciousness.  We know and feel that the act of severe thinking
is attended with the expenditure of Force.  The close,
steady, continuous application of the mind to any subject requiring the exercise of ol r higher intellectual
1 " Aperta simplexque mens, nulla re adjuncta quce sentire possit,
fugere intelligentire nostroe vim et notionem videtur."-Cicero, "Dce
Nat. Deor." lib. x. c. iI.
This is true only in one sense. It is very far from being true,
that the connexion between Mind and Matter is a necessity of
thought.




IN THIE REALM OF MIND.           285
faculties, is well known to be "Chard worlk." Without
causing any bodily movement of which we are con.
scious, it produces, nevertheless, bodily exhaustion. It
occasions the expenditure of a physical force, or at least
of a force for which we have no other name.  It is not
uncommon for men of great age to be able to exert
undiminished powers of mind for one or two hours, and
then to lapse into comparative imbecility.  Thus the
exertion of the Brain is like the exertion of a muscle,
and is attended with the same effects. There is fatigue;
and with excessive fatigue the power of motion stops.
Yet such facts as -these only puzzle us-they do not
help us to any clear idea of the nature or manner of
a connexion which is indeed incomprehensible. WVe
know of Mind only as itself, and as nothing else. The
difference between it and all other things seems infinite
and immeasurable. No doubt this difficulty, or at least
part of it, arises not from any misconception as to what
Mind is, (for of this our knowledge is direct,) but from
a misconception as to what Matter is-and what the
Forces are which we call material. Close analysis of
the phenomena of Nature, and of our own ideas in
regard to them, has already prepared us to believe, that
these Forces which work in Matter and produce in us
the impressions from which we derive our conceptions of
it, are themselves immaterial, and can be traced running




286             THE REIGN OF LAW
up into a region where they are lost in the light of Mind.
The Christian doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body
sanctions and involves the notion that there is some
deep connexion between Spirit and  Form  which is
essential, and which cannot be finally sundered even in
the divorce of Death. The affections hold to this idea
even more firmly than the intellect.  Hence the noble
and passionate exclamatiori of the Poete' Eternal Form shall still divide
The Eternal Soul fiom all beside,
And I shall know him when we meet." 1
But this first sense in which IMind is under the Reign
of Law-that is, its dependence on the Body, prepares
us for yet other senses in which it lies under the same
dominion. The very fact that the Mind is itself unconscious of its dependence upon Matter, and of the manner
and conditions of its connexion with "s organs," teaches
us that there is a large class of phenomena connected
with Mind, of which we should be entirely ignorant if we
trusted to the direct evidence of Consciousness alone.
This ought not to inspire us with any distrust of Consciousness in those matters in which it is a competent
and indeed the only witness. But there is a large class
of phenomena of which  Consciousness properly so
I Tennyson's "In Memoriam," -No. xlvL




IN THE REALM OF MIND.             207 7
called, that is, the direct perception of the Mind of its
own present workings, does not inform us. The Mind
looking in upon itself sees itself only, and does not see
either the mechanism through which it is able to work
at all, nor many of the forces which operate in it and
upon it. These, some of them at least, can only be
arrived at by the same processes of reasoning and
observation which we apply' to the external world, and
by which we ascertain the action and reaction of involuntary agents.
There is nothing of which it is so difficult to persuade ourselves as of this. In the apprehension of
Consciousness the sense of Will is so strong within us
that it blinds us to the insuperable conditions which
limit both what we will and what we do. That our
Wills, of whose freedom we are conscious, should often
be determined by influences of which we have no consciousness at all; that our opinions should as often be
the result of causes and not of reasons; that our
actions should follow a course marked out by conditions which we fail to recognise as having any determining effect upon them-these are conclusions against
which we are apt to rebel-as depriving us of a part
of our free and intelligent agency.  Hence the indignation with which men resent being told that they
have been impelled by lmotives other than the motives




288              THE REIGN OF LAW
which are avowed, and other than the motives which
are consciously entertained.  Yet the  fact of their
being so  impelled is often perfectly plain  to those
around them.  The reply, however, is always ready:
C"You seem  to know my motives, and the causes of
my conduct better than I know  them  myself,"-as if
the proposition so stated were evidently absurd.  But
it is, on the contrary, a proposition which may well
be true.  Bystanders very often see the forces telling
upon our AVill much more clearly than we see them
ourselves. It is possible, indeed, by a vigorous effort
of self-analysis to see all that others see, and a great
deal more.  Those who are able really to look in upon
themselves, can often detect the influences which have
been acting on their minds, colouring their opinions,
and determining their conduct in a degree which the
higher faculties would be glad to disown and disavow.
There is nothing more wonderful in the constitution of
our minds than the power we have of standing aside,
as it were, for a time, from the ordinary channel of our
own thoughts, and of looking back upon their currents
coming down from the hills of Memory and Association
to join their issues in our present life.  But this sort of
looking in upon ourselves, and treating ourselves as a
subject of natural history, is to all men a difficult, and
to most men an impossible, operation.  They have




IN THE REALM OF MIND.            289
neither time for it nor thought for it. The conscious
energies of the Will are so near us, and so ever present
with us, that they shut out our view of the forces which
lie behind. Yet there are some facts common in the
experience of all men which may help us to a conception of the truth. One of these is the fact of Mind
growing with the growth of years-a fact determined
by the recollection of childhood, of youth, and of
maturity.  By comparing ourselves with ourselves at
former periods of life-by the memory of feelings, and
of opinions, and of methods of thought which we have
outgrown and left behind us, we can detect thel action of
forces which have told upon our minds —traces, in short,
of the laws to which they have been subject. Some of these
laws have been nothing more than laws of physical growth
-the conceptions of the Mind undergoing a develop.
ment consequent on the growth of our material Organism.
Another fact bearing on the same question, but which
is more easily observed in others than in ourselves, is
the frequent determination of mental qualities by hereditary trasnsmlission.  The famous question, as to the
Origin of our Ideas, and how far they are due respectively to Experience, to Association, or to Intuition, has
been discussed by Metaphysicians with far too little
reference to the organic phenomena which are so closely
related to the phenomena of Mind.  It is not true,
U




290              THE REIGN OF LAW
indeed, that Psychology is subordinate to Physiology;
but it is true that these two are so intimately connected,
that neither is independent of the other.  Man is not
a disembodied Spirit, but a Being whose mental powers
are subject to the laws of a material organisation. And
so it is that almost every fact in Physiology has an
intimate bearing on some question  or other in the
Philosophy of Mind.  No better illustration could be
given than one which arises out of this question of
the Origin of our Ideas. In one of the many formulae
of expression to which Mr. J. S. Mill has reduced the
assertion that Experience is the source and origin of
all our thoughts and actions, he is obliged to except
from the sweep of that assertion the voluntary movements of the Body.  He says, "We bring about any
fact, other btan our ownz  muZsc/lar conractions, by means
of some other fact which experience has shown to be
followed by it."'   Now  let us observe the immense
significance which attaches to this exception.  Why is
Mr. AMill compelled to make it?  Because he mixes up in
one assertion two propositions which are totally distinct,
one being true universally, and the other being true only
partially.  The first proposition is, that all facts which
we can "bring about," must be so brought about by
I 1 Augaste Comte and Positivism," by J. S. Mill, p. 7,




IN THE REALM'I OF MIND.          291
the use of means. This is true universally. The second
proposition is, that we are guided to the knowledge of
those means by Experience alone. Now, this last proposition is not true, as Mr. Mill is obliged to confess, of
the whole class of facts which are brought about by vital
effort. But the muscular contractions of the Body are
no exception whatever to the mere general affirmation
that all actions must have a cause, or in other words,
must be brought about by the use of means. Exceptions they are, however, to the affirmation that the
nature of those means is made known to us by Experience.  The sentence, in so far as it asserts the
universal Law of Causation, might have been so framed
as to require no abatement or exception whatever.
"We bring about any fact by means of some other fact
which we know either by experience or by nztzitionz
to be followed by it."  In this form the sentence is
absolutely true, and applies to " our own muscular contractions," as well as to every other action. But philosophers who support the doctrine of Experience do not
like the word " intuition;" and though they cannot do
without it altogether, they use it as seldom as they can.
They feel very naturally, and very truly, that if Intuition
be admitted in regard to the ultimate phenomena of
Volition, the idea will not easily be dispelled that Intuition may extend also to the ultimate phenomena of




292             THE REIGN OF LAW
Thought. Now the muscular contractions of the Body
stand at the very fount and origin of all we do; and it
is more thlan probable that analogous movements of the
Brain stand as near to the origin of all we think.
The bearing of this question on the Philosophy of
Mind cannot be mistaken.  The muscular contractions
of the Body are of two kinds-one kind is constant,
automatic, and lasting with the duration of life itself.
The other kind is intermittent, voluntary,' and capable
of being destroyed whilst the Consciousness, and the
Intelligence, and the Will are still in use. Both these
kinds of action are rendered possible by the use of
means: but it is only in the case of one of them
that those means are placed at the bidding of the Will.
Yet it is not Experience which teaches us how to use
those means. It is purely Instinct or Intuition. We
are not even conscious of tile very existence of the
means which we employ, and the profoundest researches
of Science do not even yet give us the faintest notion
what tleir ultimate nature is. No experience whatever
is required to teach a child how to extend its limbs or
bow to exert its voice. Nevertheless, neither of these
things can be done except through the use of means.
The only difference between these actions and actions
of a more complicated kind is, that the appropriate
means are resorted to and cnillpaoycd by Intuition.




IN THE REALM OF MIND.            293
The Will which moves the limbs, and moves them
through the use of a complicated machinery, is born
with the Organisnm of which that machinery forms a
part, and has an instinctive knowledge how to use it.
Now, it is against the analogy of Nature to suppose
that this great class of facts respecting the powers of
the Body are without some corresponding facts respecting the powers of Mind.  Indeed, all vital plienomena of this kind are in themselves necessarily phenomena both of Body and of Mind. The close connexion
which exists between the two, and the inseparable
analogies which unite all their workings, render it therefore almost certain that the Mind is to be regarded as
having both kinds of movement which the physical
Organism possesses-that is, faculties which are automatic in their action —and other faculties which, though
subject to direction by the WVill, yet work upon the
materials presented to them in a manner strictly intuitive and independent of all experience.
And as the abnormal phenomena of disease, or of
malformation, often throw an important light on the
structure of the body, so do certain abnormal intellectual
phenomena give us strange glimpses occasionally into
the powers of Mind. Among those phenomena, none
are more curious than the intuitive powers of numerical
computation which a few individuals have possessed.




294             THE REIGN OF LAW
There are well attested cases of this power in virtue of
which the mind reaches the result of difficult calculations
by a species of Intuition-that is to say, without any
consciousness of the process by which that result is
made apparent to the Mind. This is not a'proof that
there is no process, but only that it is a process gone
through as a machine goes through a process-that is,
according to its own pre-adjusted laws of Motion. Perhaps, indeed, this process may not be different in kind
from the process by which the average mind reaches the
most elementary of arithmetical truths. The product of
one and one, or of two and two, may be self-evident to
all of us only in the same way in which the product of a
long series of figures may be self-evident to minds with
an abnormal gift of the arithmetical faculty. Thus the
distinction breaks down between self-evident truths and
truths which are not self-evident. A truth may be selfevident to one mind which is not self-evident to another,
but may require, on the contrary, a laborious process of
verification. And does not this again, lead us to see
how entirely dependent are the phenomena of Mind
upon the power of special Faculties, and how this power
is itself dependent on the Adjustments of Organisation?
In the world of Physics, we know that we are surrounded
by movements which never make themselves sensible to
us —pulsations which excite in our eyes no sense of light




IN THE REALM OF MIND.            295
-and others which excite in our ears no sense of sound,
-and all this for want of adjusted organs. And so it
would seem as if the Mind of Man were an Instrument
attuned only to a certain range of knowledge, but as if
within that range it were capable of finer and finer adjustments to the harmonies of Truth. These cannot make
themselves heard where there is no organ to catch the
sound.  Nor could that organ translate them  into
Thought into that conscious apprehension of which
an Idea essentially consists,-had it not its own preadjusted relation to the Verities of the World.
It must be remembered, however, that in the discussion
of such questions as to the Origin of our Ideas, there
has been a great want of definition in the use of terms.
Are fear, and love, and hatred, and anger, and jealousy,
and remorse, and joy,-are these " ideas," or are they
only conditions or powers of mind? If by Ideas we
mean those imaginings which, as the very word implies,
involve 1"images" of external things, it is certain that
contact with external impressions, and, in this sense,
Experience, is essential to the formation of them. But
if by Ideas we mean the elementary passions, or if we
mean even those peculiarities of thought-those special
tendencies of mind which lead us to view things in some
particular light rather than in others, and which constitute the essential distinction between the ideas of




296             THE REIGN OF LAW
different men-if, in short, we include in the term anything which belongs to the Thinking. Faculty itself, or
anything of the method according to which it works up
the raw material of Thought-then it is equally certain
that Ideas in this sense are born with all of us, and
that Imitation, and Experience, and Association, do but
pour their material into moulds already cast for their
reception.
But in reality here, as in many other questions, the
rival disputants have each had some portion of the truth.
They have been both right and both wrong. An Idea
is not a simple, but a composite thing. It has not one
origin, but a plurality of origins. An Idea is, as it were,
a fabric of which the threads come from the spinner, and
the weaving from the loom. Or it is, as it were, an
organic growth, of which the materials are supplied fromn
the external world, and the structure from the world
within. There are many elements in every Idea which
come, and can only come, from without.  There are
other elements, and among them the Formative Power,
which come, and only can come, from within. The
Mind stands in pre-established relations to the things
around it-bound to them by the infinite adjustments
which may be called External Correlations of Growth.
Out of these relations it is not itself, nor do its powers
possess the materials whereon to work. We cannot




IN THE REALM OF MIND.            297
conceive a mind having no points of contact with the
external world.  From that world must co-me all the
exciting causes of Thought and of Emotion. But the
form into which these are cast —the tissue into which
these are woven-the force by which Ideas become a
Power-all, in short, that constitutes Thought as distinguished from the things about which we think-all this
comes from, and belongs to, the Mind itself.
Among the lower animals, young ones, taken from
the litter or the nest, and brought up under conditions
wholly removed from the teaching of their parents,
whether by imitation or otherwise, will reproduce exactly
all those habits of their race which belong to their
natural modes of life. Many of these habits, perhaps it
may be safely said all of them, imply Ideas-that is to
say, they imply instincts; and instincts are in the nature
of ideas-that is to say, they belong to the phenomena
of Mind. And of this there is another indication in a
fact which at first sight may seem trivial or irrelevant.
It has been often said that one great difficulty in reasoning on this subject, is the inaccessibility to observation
of the mental condition of all infant creatures. But
even if this were more true than it really is, there are
some creatures, not low in the scale of creation, of whicis
it may be said that, comparatively, they have no infancy
at all. These are the Gallinaceous Birds in general,




298'ITHE REIGN OF LAW
and some Species in particular. They come forth from
the egg perfect miniatures of their parents, and with
minds as fully equipped with parental instincts as their
bodies are provided with feather or their wings with
quills.  Antecedent to all experience of injury, they
exhibit fear, and not only fear, but fear of the proper
objects. They will flee when they see a hawk, and they
will carefully avoid a stinging insect. In Europe the
young of the Woodgrouse or Gelinotte are able to fly
from the moment they break the shell. In Australia,
and the great group of islands which connect Australia
with the Asiatic continent, there is a still more curious
example of the same fact. There is a Family of Birds
(AeJao dide) of which the young are hatched, not by
the incubation of the parents, but by the heat of fermentation generated in earthen mounds, scraped together
for the purpose.  From  the moment the young are
hatched they feed themselves, and run, and fly, and
roost on trees, as if the world on which they have just
opened their eyes had been long familiar. It is said,
indeed, that the Parent Bird watches the Hatching
Mound, and is ready to escort the chicks upon their
first appearance in the surrounding scrub.  But the
recognition of the Parent by the young, and the answer
to her call, are the most remarkable of all among these
proofs of inIsitive ideas. " As a moth emerges from a




IN THE REALM OF MIND.               299
Chrysalis, dries its wings, and flies away, so the young
Telegallus, when it leaves the egg, is sufficiently perfect
to be able to act independently.'  Nor is this all; the
curious instinct by which the Bird prepares an artificial
Incubator for its young is an instinct born with it-an
Innate Idea expressing itself in congenital habits of
body.  The chick of another Species of this singular
family of Birds, the Megapode, was found in confinement to be incessantly scraping up sand and gravel into
heaps, and the rapidity and power with which it effected
this operation is described with astonishment by its
captor.
These may seem far-fetched illustrations, and of slight
value in so dark a subject; but let us remember that
there are no solitary facts in Nature. There are indeed
extreme cases,-extreme examples of universal laws,that is to say, of laws whose operation is ordinarily
restrained within narrower limits.  But there is no fact
standing really alone —not one which is not bound to
the whole Order of Nature by deep analogies. That
any creatures should be ushered into life so completely
organised and furnished as the young of the Gallinaceous
Birds and of the Megapodes, is a fact of immense significance in the phenomena of Organic Life.2
X Gould's " Birds of Australia."       2 See Note E.




300             THE REIGN OF LAW
In Man analogous facts appear, modified by his
infinitely wider range of character, and the infinite
degrees in which the different elements of Mind are
capable of being mixed in him.  But although these
conditions greatly complicate the result, the general
phenomena are the same. Orphans, who have never
had any opportunities of acquiring, by imitation, the
peculiarities of their parents, will often, nevertheless,
reproduce these peculiarities with curious exactness.
This is a familiar fact, and how much this fact implies!  Even when the inheritance is merely some
congenital habit of body, or some trick of manner, it
may, probably, imply some resemblance deeper than
appears. For the Body and the Mind are in such close
relationship, that congenital habits of Body are sure
to be connected with congenital habits of Mind. But
the inheritance is very often, so far as we can see,
purely mental. How often do we recognise the tone,
character, and the very turn of thought of dead friends,
in the conversation and conduct of their children! The
innate tendency to look at things in the same point of
view, is evidenced in the reproduction of the same
mental combinations, of the same images, of the same
opinions, in short, of the same ideas. Cases, more
remarkable than others of this kind, attract our attention, and we at once recognise ideas as innate which are




IN THE REALM OF MIND.            30r
so obviously determined by the forces of hereditary
transmission.  But we forget how often these laws of
inheritance must be working invisibly where they never
break ground upon the surface. And thus it is brought
home to us how the Mind may be subject to laws of
which it is unconscious —how its whole habit of thought,
and the aspect in which different questions present
themselves to its apprehension, are in a great measure
determined by the mysterious forces of congenital constitution. And what is true in one measure of the individual mind, is true, also, in other measures, of whole
families and of races of Men.
But the laws of Material Organisation are not the only
laws to which Mind is subject. Obscure as these laws
are, there are others which are obscurer still. What we
cannot see in detail, we can see in the gross. What we
cannot recognise in ourselves, we are able to recognise
in others. We can see that the actions and opinions
of men, which are the phenomena of Mind, do range
themselves in an observed Order, upon which Order we
can found, even as we do in the material world, very safe
conclusions as to the phenomena which will follow upon
definite conditions. And when we go back to former
generations —to the history of nations, and the progress
of the human race —we can detect still more clearly an
orderly progress of events. In that order the operation




302             THE REIGN OF LAW
of great general causes becomes at once apparent. On
the recognition of such causes the Philosophy of History
depends; and upon that recognition depends not less the
possibility of applying to the exigencies of our own time,
and of our own society, a wise and successful legislation.
But what are these causes, and what is the nature
of those "laws" to which voluntary agents are unconsciously obedient?  Is man's Voluntary agency a delusion, or is it, on the contrary, just what we feel it
to be, and is it only from misconception of its nature
that we puzzle over its relation to Law? W. speak, and
speak truly, of our Wills being free; but free from what?
Tt seems to be forgotten that Freedom is not an absolute
but a relative term.  There is no such thing existing as
absolute freedom-that is to say, there is nothing exist-,
ing in the world, or possible even in thought, which is
absolutely Alone-entirely free from inseparable relationship to some other thing or things. Freedom, therefore,
is only intelligible as meaning the being free from some
particular kind of restraint or of inducement to which
other beings are subject. From what, then, is it that
our Wills are free?  Are they free from the influence of
motives? Certainly not. And what are motives? A
motive is that which moves, or tends to move, the mind
in a particular direction. Like all other words which
are used to describe tie phenomena of Mind, it is taken




IN THE REALIH OF MIND.             303
from  the language applicable to material things, and
suggests the analogies which exist between them.  It
belongs to the profound but unconscious metaphysics
of Human Speech.  That which moves the Mind in a
particular direction is best conceived of as something
which exerts a force upon it, and the aggregate of such
forces may, in a general sense, be called the laws which
determine human action and opinions.
But here we come upon the great difficulty which
besets every attempt to reduce to system the laws or
forces whicl. operate on the Mind of Man.  It is the
immense, the almost boundless variety and number of
them.  This variety corresponds with the variety of
powers with which his Mind is gifted. For pre-established
relations are necessary to the effect of every force,
whether in the material or in the moral world.  Special
forces operate upon special forms of matter, and except
upon these, they exert no action whatever. For no force
can operate exceptWhere there are pre-established relations between its energies and the things upon which its
energies are to work.  The Polar Force of magnetism
acts on different metals in different degrees, and there is
a large class of substances which are almost insensible
to its power. In like manner there are a thousand
things that exercise an attractive power on the mind of
a civilised man, -:hich wotcld exercise no power whatever




304             THE REIGN OF LAW
upon the mind of a savage. And in this lies the only
difference between subjection to Law under which the
lower animals are placed, and the subjection to Law
which is equally the condition of Mankind. Free Will,
in the only sense in which this expression is intelligible,
has been erroneously represented as the peculiar prerogative of Man. But the Will of the lower animals
is, within their narrow spheres of action, as free as ours.
A man is not more free to go to the right hand or to the
left than the Eagle, or the Wren, or the Mole, or the
Bat. The only difference is, that the Will of the lower
animals is acted upon by fewer and simpler motives.
And the lower the organisation of the animal, the fewer
and simpler these motives are. Hence it is that the
conduct and choice of animals —that is, the decision
of their Will under given conditions-can be predicted
with almost perfect certainty.  Their faculties, few in
number and limited in range, are open only to the small
number of forces which are related to them; and in the
absence of higher faculties accessible to other motives,
these few attractions exert a determining effect upon
their Will.'
Accordingly we may see that, in proportion as there is
an approach among the lower animals to the higher
faculties of Mind, there is, in corresponding proportion, a
I See Note F,




IN THE REALM OF MIND.             305
difficulty in predicting their conduct.  Perhaps the best
illustration of this is a very homely one-it is the effect
of baits and traps. Some animals can be trapped and
caught with perfect certainty; whilst there are others
upon which the motive presented by a bait is counteracted by the stronger motive of caution against danger,
when a higher degree of intelligence enables the animal
to detect its presence. Yet the Will of the cunning
animal is not more free than the Will of the stupid
animal, —nor is the Will of the stupid animal more subject to Law than the Will of the cunning one. The
Will of the young Rat, which yields to the temptation of
a bait, and is caught, is not more subject to Law than
the Will of the old Rat, who suspects, stratagem, resists
the temptation and escapes. They are both subject to
Law in precisely the same sense and in precisely the
same degree-that is to say, their actions are alike determined by the forces to which their faculties are accessible. Where these are few and simple, the resulting
action is simple also; where these are many and complicated, the resulting action has a corresponding variety.
Thus the conduct of animals is less capable of being
predicted in proportion as it is difficult or impossible to
foresee the nature or number of the motive forces which
are brought to bear upon the Will. Man's Will is free in
the same sense, and in the same sense only. It is subx




306             THE REIGN OF LAW
ject to Law in the same sense, and in the same sense
alone. That is to say, it is subject to the influence of
motives, and it can only choose among those which are
presented to it, or which the mind has been given the
power of presenting to itself.'
But in this last power we touch the secret of that
boundless difference which separates Man from  the
highest of the animals below him. There is such a gulf
between the faculties of his mind and those of the lower
animals, that the forces acting on the human spirit become, by comparison, innumerable, and involve motives
belonging to a wholly different class and order. He is
exposed, indeed, to the lower motives in common with
the beasts. But there are others which operate largely
upon him which never can and never do operate upon
them.  Foremost among these are the motives which
Man has the power of bringing to bear upon himself,
arising out of his power of forming Abstract Ideas, out
of his possession of Beliefs, and, above all, out of his
Sense of Right and Wrong. So strong are these motives
that they are able constantly to overpower, and sometimes almost to destroy, the forces which are related to
his lower faculties.  Again, among the motives which
operate upon him, Man has a selecting power. He can,
as it were, stand oult from among them,-look down from
a See Note G.




IN THE REALM OF MIND.            307
above them,,- compare them among each other, and
bring them to the test of Conscience. Nay more, he can
reason on his own character as he can on the character
of another Being,-estimating his own weakness with
reference to this and the other motive, as he is conscious
how each may be likely to tell upon him. When he
knows that any given motive will be too strong for him,
if he allow himself to think of it, he can shut it out from
his mind by "keeping the door of his thoughts."  He
can, and he often does, refuse the thing he sees, and hold
by another thing which he cannot see. He may, and he
often does, choose the Invisible in preference to the
Visible. He may, and he often does, walk by Faith and
not by Sight. It is true that in doing this he must be
impelled by something which is itself only another
motive, and so it is true that our Wills can never be free
from motives, and in this sense can never be free from
"Law."  But this is only saying that we can never be
free from the relations pre-established between the structure of our minds, and the system of things in which
they are formed to move. From these, it is true indeed,
that we never can be free. But as a matter of fact, we
know that these relations do not involve compulsion. It is
from compulsion that our Wills are free, and from nothing
else' and for this freedom we have the only evidence
we can ever have for any ultimate truth respecting the
Y 2




308              THE REIGN OF LAW
powers of Mind-the evidence of Consciousness —that
is, the evidence of observation turned in upon ourselves.
The discussions of many centuries seem to have resulted, at last, in some real progress upon this vexed
question of Necessity and Free-will. That progress lies
mainly in a clearer definition of terms. The most eminent living philosopher who represents the doctrine,
commonly called the Doctrine of Necessity, repudiates
that name as incorrect, expressly on the ground that the
word Necessity, as commonly applied, signifies compulsion. Undoubtedly it does; and if this meaning be
repudiated, then the word is not used in its ordinary
and legitimate sense. This, indeed, Mr. Mill confesses,
whilst yet he casts upon his opponents the blame of a
misunderstanding, which assuredly lies with those who
do not employ ordinary words in the ordinary signification. "' The truth is," he says, "that the assailants of
the doctrine (of Necessity) cannot do without the associations engendered by the double meaning of the word
Necessity, which in this application signifies only invariability, but, in its common evnployment, cov/zu/sion." 1
He believes, therefore, in Necessity only in the sense of
Invariability. But if the doctrine which Mr. Mill favours
has suffered from one ambiguity, it seeks to shelter itself
1 "Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy," by J. S.
lMil, p. 492, note.




IN THE REALIM OF MIND.             309
under the protection of another ambiguity much more
deceptive. If there is a double meaning in the word
Necessity which has exposed the Necessitarian doctrine
to unjust objections, it is equally true that there is a
double meaning in the word Invariability which lends to
that doctrine an undue advantage. Invariability can be
predicated of mental action in this vague general sense
-that all the movements of Mind must invariably arise
from some motive. But this is a kind of " Invariability "
which admits of any amount of variation.  For, as
in the language of this philosophy, Necessity does not
mean  compulsion, so by Invariability, as applied to
the phenomena of Mind, nothing more is meant than
that, in respect to mental action, there is an " abstract
possibility of its being foreseen."  "'If," says Mr. Mill,
(" necessity means more than this abstract possibility of
being foreseen; if it means any mysterious compulsion,
apart from simple invariability of sequence, I deny it
as strenuously as any one."1
But now let us insist, as in such subjects we are
bound to do, on still clearer definitions. We shall find,
in the first place, that the "abstract possibility" of
foreseeing mental action depends on nothing less than
such absolute knowledge of character and of motive
1 "Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy," p. 517. See
Note H.




3I0               THE REIGN OF LAW
as can belong- to God alone.  We shall then find, in
the  second  place, that this  favourite  phrase,  "invariability of sequence," is as ambiguous as others of
the same class. It does not mean that any particular
sequences  are  invariable, but only  that there must
always be some sequence-that it is invariably true
that everything which happens has proceeded from something as a cause, and leads to somezinzg as a consequence. But this is a proposition which evidently, when
reduced to its true dimensions, has no adverse bearing
whatever on the doctrine of Free Will.  The " abstract"
possibility of foreseeing mental action depends on these
two propositions: first, that where all the conditions of
that action are constant, the resulting action will be constant also; and, secondly, that absolute and perfect
knowledge of the whole of those conditions would carry
with it sure foreknowledge also of the choice to which
they lead. But surely this is not only true, but something very like a truism.l There is nothing to object to
1 Mr. Mansel, following other philosophers on this point, reduces
the modified doctrine of Necessity to this identical proposition,
" that the prevailing motive prevails." Mr. Mill's reply is altogether
unsatisfactory.-Examination of Sir W. Harnmilto's Philosophy,
pp. 518, 519.
I cannot help adding here-although the observation has reference
to another subject-that Mr. Mill appears to me to have exposed
with great force and clearness the verbal fallacies involved in Mr.
DMansel's work on the "Limits of Religious Thought," and espe



IN THE REALMI  OF MIND.             3IX
or deny in the doctrine, that if we knew everything that
determines the conduct of a man, we should be able to
know what that conduct will be.  That is to say, if we
knew all the motives which are brought by external
agencies to bear upon his mind, and if we knew all the
other motives which that mind evolves out of its own
powers, and out of previously acquired materials, to bear
upon itself; and if we knew the character and disposition of that mind so perfectly as to estimate exactly
the weight it will allow to all the different motives
operating upon it, —then we should be able to predict
with certainty the resulting course of conduct.
This is true, not only as an abstract conception, but as
a matter of experience in the little way towards perfect
knowledge along which we can ever travel. We can predict conduct with almost perfect certainty when we know
character with an equal measure of assurance, and when
we know the influences to which that character will be
exposed. In proportion as we are sure of character, in
the same proportion we are sure of conduct.  Yet we
never think of the Will being the less free, because we
can predict its course. What we know in such cases is
simply the use which, under given conditions, will be
cially in the lise he makes of such forms of expression as "The
Absolute," "The Infinite," &c. —See the chapter (vii.) on "The
Philosophy of the Conditioned as applied by Mr. Mansel to Relic
gion," in the same work.




312             THE REIGN OF LAW
made of freedom. There is no certainty in the world of
Physics more absolute than some certainties in the world
of Mind. We know that a humane man will not do
a uselessly cruel action. We know that an honourable
man will not do a base action. And if in such cases we
are deceived in the result, we know that it is because we
were ignorant of some weakness or of some corruption;
that is to say, we were ignorant df some elements of
character. But we never doubt that, if those had been
known, we could have foreseen the resulting lapse. Perfect knowledge must therefore be perfect foreknowledge.
To know the present perfectly, is to know the future
certainly. To know all that is, is to know all that will
be. To know the heart of Man completely, is to know
his conduct completely also; for " out of the heart are
the issues of life."  So far from this conclusion being
dangerous or hostile to any part of the Christian system,
it is a conclusion which enables us, in a dim way, not
merely to hold as a Belief, but to see as a necessary
truth, that there can be no chance in this world,-and
how it is, and must be, that to the All-seeirg and Allknowing the Future is as open as the Present and the
Past.  But none of these ideas involve the idea of compulsion; and the absence of compulsion is all that can
be meant by Freedoml.
And as by Freedou:, we do not mean freedom froum




IN THIE REALM OF MIND.            313
motives, so neither do we mean that any of the phenomena of Mind, any more than any of the phenomena
of Matter, can arise without " an antecedent."  In this
sense there is no contradiction between the doctrine of
F'ree Will and the amended doctrine of Necessity.  Man
is subject to the law of Causation in this sense, "that
his volitions are not self-caused, but determined by
spiritual antecedents in such sort that when the antecedents are the same, the volitions will always be the
same."1  But this word " antecedent" is one of the
many vague words in which metaphysicians delight.
The highest antecedents which we can ever trace as
determining conduct, are to be found in the constitution of mind itself. Love is an antecedent, so is Reverence, so is Gratitude, so is the Hunger after Knowledge,
so is the Desire of Truth. So also is the action of
other Spirits upon our own. Higher than these-further
up the chain of Cause and Effect-we cannot go. And
yet we need not conceive of these as "' Final Causes,"
nor does the doctrine of our Free Will assign to the
human Mind  any self-originating power.  Man has
nothing which he did not receive.  Such freedom  as
his Will possesses has been given to him, and given
him, too, as we have dimly seen, by the employment
and by the device of means. It is a power belonging
" 6 Mill on IHamilton," ppP 492, 493.




3t4               THE REIGN OF LAW
to his structure, and derived from  Him  by whom  that
structure has been devised.
"Our Wills are ours, we know not how."
The power which  in  health we possess of preferring
one motive to all others, whilst yet the influence of
those others may be strongly felt, is a power which
like every other, must have its own 1" antecedent" —
that is to say, its own cause, and its own purpose. But
these are to be found in the Adjustment from which the
power arises,-in  the Mind by which that adjustment
has been contrived, and in the Purposes which it reveals.
The freedom  of Man's Will is not more mysterious,
when it is exerted in directing the Mind to one motive,
and averting it from another, than when it is exerted in
turning the Body to the right hand rather than to the left.'
The difficulty of reconciling, in one clear Order of
Thought, the idea of the Freedom  of our own  Will
with the idea of Causation, is not really so great a diffii The whole of this passage on Necessity and Free Will has
been severely criticised in an article in the Duliin Revieze for April
i867, as involving a practical abandonment of the very doctrine
which I profess to defend. The argument there maintained seems
to me altogether erroneous; and I have seen no reason to alter the
text in any material point. The subject, however, is so important
in itself, and so interesting as regards the history of Philosophy,
that I have thought it right to deal with it in a separate note (F)
already referred to.




IN THE REALM OF MIND.                315
culty as the use of ambitious and ambiguous language
has made it appear to be.  There are two sentences
in Mr. J. S. Mill's work, on the Philosophy of Comte,
which afford the best possible illustration both of the
true doctrine on the relation in which Will stands to
Law, and of the false doctrine into which it may be
merged by the ambiguous use of words.  In one passage Mr. Mill defines the Positive as distinguished from
the Theological Mode of Thought to be-" that all
phenomena, without exception, are governed by invariable laws, wil/  ze,hzic'  no vo/i/ions eilher natzural or
szvernalztcal izleifere."l  It is at least satisfactory to
find in this sentence so clear an avowal that the idea
of free Divine Volition in the region of the SupernauLral,
and the idea of free Hluman Volition in the region of
the Natural, stand on the same ground, are exposed to
the same intellectual difficulties, and are both equally
denied by the new  Philosophy.  But as a definition  of
the Positive mode of thought it stands in curious contrast with another passage of the same work, in which
Air. Mill says that "the Theological mode of explaining phenomena was once universal, wit/  the exception,
dozubtless, of the familiar fcts zeh/ich being even t/hzez seeen
to be coatrol/able by humanz l.W/ill belnized already  o the
Positive lMode of YEo2ulgr/hIt." 2
a "'Aug. Comte and Positivism," p. I2.   2 Ibid. pp. 31, 3Z




3rG              TI-IE REIGN OF LAW
These two sentences involve, on the face of them,
contradictory positions.  The one affirmss that no volitions can interfere with the laws which govern phenomena, and that the recognition of this is the very essence
of the Positive Philosophy.  The other affirms that the
Positive Mode of Thought is involved in the very idea
of facts being controllable by human Will.
It is not, perhaps, very important to ask which of
these two sentences gives the most accurate description
of the Positive Philosophy; but it is of much importance to ask which of these two positions is nearest to
the truth?  Beyond.all doubt, it is the last.  If the
Positive Philosophy were content with the assertion that
the power of WVill over facts depends on the invariability of Laws-that is, on the constancy of Natural
Forces-it would be sound enough. And so, the second
of the two sentences I have quoted sets forth the central
idea of that Philosophy in its most favourable light.  But
in the first of those two sentences we have a concentration of all that is erroneous in Positivism, and at the
same time a typical example of the ambiguities and
obscurities of language on which the fallacies of that
Philosophy depend. There is hardly a single word in that
sentence which is not ambiguously used. " Phenomena "'
and "facts," 4"govern " and "control," and " interfere
with," are all used in ambiguous senses; whilst, as usual,




IN THE REALM OF MIND.               3 17
the words " Law" and " Invariable," are used not only
ambiguously, but unintelligibly.  In order to test these
ambiguities we have only to compare the two sentences
together. "'Phenomena" in the one sentence seems to
correspond with "facts" in the other.  Yet, we have
this result, —that "phenomena" are governed by Invariable Law, whilst "facts " are controllable by human
Will.  It would appear, then, that the "phenomena"
which are governed by Law cannot be the same with the' facts," which are controllable by Will:-or else, if they
be the same, then there must be some essential distinction between " controlling" and " governing."  What
is this distinction?  It is not defined, or even suggested.
Then, again, if no volitions can;'interfere with " Laws,
how can volitions "control " facts?  If Will controls
facts, and yet can't "interfere with" Laws, how is the
control over facts exercised?  What is the relation between the Laws which no volitions can " interfere with,"
and the "facts" which volitions do actually "control?"
Can Will control facts, which again are governed by laws,
(in some sense or other) either by interfering with those
laws, or controlling them?
If it were possible to get any definite meaning out
of this confusion of words, perhaps it might be said
that Will can " control" Law, but cannot " interfere
with" it.  There is at least a glimmering of the truth in




318              THE REIGN OF LAW
this.  But no man could gather from  those two senm
tences of Mr. Mill what the truth is, although, after all,
the truth is plain enough, if only some care be taken
to confine definite words to some sort of definite meaning.  If by Laws are meant the elementary Forces of
Nature, and if by "interfering " with them is meant any
power of altering their own essential energies —then it
is true that no volitions of ours can interfere with them.
But then it cannot be too often repeated that, in this
sense, phenomena are NOT governed by Invariable Laws;
because phenomena are never the result of individual
Forces, but are always the result of the conditions
under which several Forces are combined, and these
conditions are always variable.  If, again, "interference"
means or includes the power of setting Natural Forces
(Laws) to work under new  conditions, then it is the
reverse of truth to affirm  that they cannot be "interfered" with.  Man controls facts only because (in this
sense) he can, and he does, interfere with Laws. His
volitions can, and do, govern those combinations of
Force which are the immediate cause of all phenomena.
There is no fault in philosophical discussion more
pestilent than that of using common words in some
technical or artificial sense, without any warning to the
reader, (often apparently without any consciousness on
the part of the writer,) that ideas fundamentally involved,




IN THE REALM OF MIND.            319
in the ordinary use of the word, are eliminated and set
aside. We have seen one instance of this in the word' necessity," emptied of its meaning of compulsion.  We
have andther example in the use made of such words as
"changeable," and others of a like kind. Thus Mr.
Milll quotes, with approbation, a remark of Comte, that
"'our power of foreseeing phenomena, and our power
of controlling them, are the two things which destroy
the belief of their being governed by changeable Wills."
All through this sentence there run the same confusions
which have been pointed out in the two sentences
already quoted. But there is, in addition, another confusion which has a special bearing on the subject of this
chapter.   Phenomena which  can  be controlled are
phenomena which can be changed.  There is no other
meaning in the words. The assertion, therefore, is, that
the changeability of phenomena through human agency
is a fact which must destroy our belief in the changeability of the human Will itself. The sentence thus rendered is, of course, either pure nonsense, or else must be
dependent for a rational sense upon some artificial
meaning being attached to the word "changeable."  A
Will under the guidance of some settled principle-that
is to say, following habitually some prevailing motives —
I "Auguste Comte and Positivism," p. 48.




3 20            THE EREIGN OF LAW
might, by a certain licence of language, be called an
unchangeable Will. But this has nothing to do with that
kind of changeability which can alone concern the
power of altering and controlling material phenomena.
Stability of character, whether moral or purely intellectual, is not only compatible with a variable WAill, but
it is inseparably connected with it. No man can pursue
one rule of conduct under changing conditions unless he
himself retains his own capacities of change.  He cannot control phenomena without changing them, and he
cannot change phenomena without'changing his own
course of action; and a change in the course of action
is a change in the course of Will.
That which is really at the bottom  of all this ambiguity of language, is a constant endeavour to get rid
altogether of an essential element in the very idea of
Will,-to reduce it to something different from that which
we all know and feel it to be. The word Will is indeed
retained in the Positive vocabulary, but some other word
is generally inserted before it, to prejudice the common
understanding of it, or to impart some element of meaning which can with more plausibility be denounced.
Thus the Will which is denied in Nature is often described as an "arbitrary" Will or a "ccapricious " Will.
But surely these qualifying epithets do but add to the
confusion. It is true, indeed, that the Will we see in




IN THE REALM OF MIND.              321
Nature is not a capricious Will. But this is not the
question.  The question is, whether there is, or is not,
such a thing possible as caprice in Will. If there be
such a thing as caprice, then the existence of it, and the
power of it " to control phenomena," cannot be denied.
If there be no such thing, then "capricious" is of no
meaning as an epithet applied to Will. Caprice implies
not only changeableness, but, so to speak, a double
degree of changeableness-a changeableness which has
no rule or reason in its shiftings.  It is a fact that there
are human Wills of this character, and the mischief they
have done in the world arises from the power they possess, in common with all other Wills, of changing
phenomena after their own unreasonable nature.  The
truth is, that if the human Will can be described as unchangeable, then there is no such thing as changeability
even conceivable in thought. There is no contrast so
absolute between any two different forms of Matter, as
there is between two different states of the same Mind.
There is no transition in Nature fiom one physical condition to another so absolute or so radical as the trans.
ition to which human character is subject when it
passes under the power of new convictions.  There is
no change like the change from hatred to affection, from
vice to virtue, from evil to good. And this change in
Mind is the efficient cause of a whole cycle of other




,32^2           THE REIGN OF LAW
changes among the phenomena which the human Will
can and does alter, regulate, and control.
There is, then, not much real difficulty after all in disengaging the great facts of our own Free Will from the
verbal confusions of the Positive Philosophy. Nor will
the same methods of solution fail us when we apply them
to the further question, — How far, and in what sense, are
our own volitions themselves subject to law-that is, to
the influence of Adjusted Forces? For as one great
consequence of the Reign of Law over material things
is the necessity of resorting to the use of appropriate
means for the accomplishment of Purpose, so does the
same necessity arise out of the same conditions among
the phenomena of Mind. If we wish to operate upon
human action, we must go to work by presenting to the
Will some motive tending to produce the action we
desire. Above all, if we seek to operate not merely on
individual actions, but upon that which mainly determines conduct, viz. human character, we must direct our
efforts to place that character under outward conditions
which we know to have a favourable effect upon it. In
the material world we should be powerless to control any
event if we did not know it to be subject to laws-that
is, to Forces which, though not liable to change in
essence, are subject to endless change in combination and
in use. The same impotency would affect us, if in the




IN THE REALM OF MIND.              323
moral world also definite conditions had not always an
invariable tendency to produce certain definite results.
It is a mere confusion of thought and of language which
confounds the "invariability" of "Laws," either moral
or material, with the denial of the power of Will to vary,
alter, and modify in infinite degrees the course of things.
It is the fixedness of all Forces in one sense which constitutes their infinite pliability in another. It is the unchanging relation which they bear to those mental faculties by which we discover them and recognise tLem, that
renders them capable of becoming the supple instruments
of those other faculties of Will, of Reason, and of Contrivance by which we can work them for altered and
better purposes.




CHAPTER VIi.
LAW IN POLITICS.
A T first sight it may be thought that the means
by which we can operate on the Wills of individual men, and of communities of men, are contained
within a narrow compass, and are such as to be all,
if not within easy reach, at least within easy recognition.
And it is true that some methods of operating on the
minds of men we do know instinctively, just as in the
material world we know by the first rudiments of intelligence how to accomplish a few physical results. But
experience and observation teach us, although they teach
us very slowly, that direct appeals to the reason, or direct
appeals to the feelings of men, are entirely useless, when
those faculties have not been placed under conditions
favourable to their exercise in a right direction. And as
in the material world, the knowledge we have acquired of
the powers of Nature, and of the methods of turning them
to use, has been slowly gained in the lapse of ages, and
as all we discover does but reveal how much we have yet
to know; so in the immense world of the Mind and




LAW IN POLITICS.             325
Character of Man, our knowledge of the methods by
which it may be well and wisely governed, has advanced
only by slow degrees. There is a boundless field of discovery still open to those who investigate the laws which
govern the development of our nature. When we look
at the high degrees of excellence which that nature so
often attains under favourable conditions for the growth
and exercise of its better powers, and when we contrast
this with its stunted and distorted growth as exhibited
among large portions of Mankind, it becomes a question
of deep and endless interest to know how far these conditions are subject. to the control of Will through the
use of means. If such means can ever be devised,
it must be by knowledge, first of the elementary forces
which have a constant operation on Human Character,
and secondly by contrivance in so combining them as to
make them operate in the direction we desire. And it
is in this search that we discover the intimate blending
and inseparable connexion between mental and material
laws-that is, between the forces which operate on the
material frame and the forces which operate on the
Mind and Character of Man.
And here we come on a great subject-the function
of Human Law as distinguished from  Natural Law.
Just as the Will of the individual can operate upon
itself by the use of means, some of which are known




326             THE REIGN OF LAW.
instinctively, whilst others are found out by reason; so
can the collective Will of Society operate upon the
conduct of its members in two ways —first, directly by
authority; and secondly, indirectly by altering the conditions out of which the most powerful olatives spring.
This last is a principle of government, which has been
distinctly recognised only in modern times, and which
admits of applications not yet foreseen. The idea of
founding Human Law upon the Laws of Nature, is an
idea which, though sometimes instinctively acted upon,
was never systematically entertained in the ancient world.
Indeed, the true conception of Natural Law is one
founded on the progress of physical investigation, and
growing out of the habits of scientific thought. It was
long before Man came to apprehend the prevalence of
Law in the phenomena of Matter; and it was still
longer before he could even entertain the notion of
Natural Law as applicable to himself.  The ancient
lawgivers were always aiming at standards of Political
Society, framed according to some abstract notions of their
own as to how things ought to be, rather than upon any
attempt to investigate the constitution of human nature
as it actually is. It was a mistake in the science of
Politics analogous to that which Bacon complained of
so bitterly in the science of Physics.  Men were always
trying to evolve out of their own minds knowledge which




LAW  IN POLTlTICS                327
could only be acquired by patient inquiry into facts.
How worse than useless this method is, received an
illustration in ancient philosophy still more striking than
in ancient legislation.   Fortunately for mankind, no
actual legislators have ever been quite so foolish as
some philosophers. Perhaps, all things considered, the
most odious conceptions of Human Society which the
world has ever seen, were the conceptions of an intellect
certainly among the loftiest which has ever exercised its
powers in speculative thought. Plato's Republic is an
Ideal State, founded. on abstract conceptions of the
mind, and one of its leading ideas is the destruction
of Family Life, and the annihilation of the family affections. And yet this result, odious and irrational as it is,
was arrived at from reasoning which is not in itself
odious, but which is false, chiefly because it takes no
account of the facts of Nature.  The welfare of the
State was to be the one object of desire in every mind.
All separate interests and affections were to be suppressed, and amongst these the very idea of special
property in Wife or Child. The highest type of man
was to be bred by the Republic as the highest type
of dogs and horses is bred by an intelligent owner.'
Such are the humiliating results of abstract reasoning,
I "The breeding' is regulated, like that of noble horses or dogs,
by an intelligent lproprietor."-Grote's " Plato," vol. iii. p. 2o3.




3 28             THE REIGN OF LTAW.
pursued in ignorance of the great Law, that no purpose
can be attained in Nature except by legitimate use of the
means which Nature has supplied. For as in the material
world, all her Forces must be acknowledged and obeyed
before they can be made to serve, so in the Reallll of Mind
there can be no success in attaining the highest moral ends
until due honour has been assigned to those motives
which arise out of the universal instincts of our race.
Accordingly it is remarkable that the system of ancient
philosophy, which for so many ages continued to rule
the tho ughts of men-the philosophy of Aristotle-owes
almost all the strength it has in Politics as in other
matters, to occasional and almost unconscious resort
to the true methods of scientific reasoning and investigation. Aristotle founds his adverse criticism on Plato,
where it is most successfil, upon the actual facts of what
men, under specified conditions, naturally do, and think,
and feel.  From these facts he argues justly as to what
they would do under the artificial restrictions of a theoretical philosophy. When, for example, he argues against
communism, and in favour of private property, upon the
ground of the watchfulness and attention which selfinterest produces in the conduct of business,l and when
lie adds, " It is unspeakable how advantageous it is that
I ducdAAov 8' ertL66aorrovr cWs.9-oS MtPov iadTov -rou e p LpoVTOfro
-~" Aristot. Pol." Bk. ii. c. 5,




LAW  IN POTlITICS.                 329
a man should think he has somethlingl which he may call
his own, for it is by no means to no purpose that each
person should have an affection for himself, for //at is
naltura," 1 he touches the very root idea of the modern
science of Political Economy. He touches it, but he
does not grasp it. It is a line of argument which is
never consistently maintained; and  though there are
perpetual appeals to " nature "-to  that which is "anatural"-to that which nature teaches-no definite meaning can be attached to these expressions; and dogmas
are laid down as "naturial" which are purely abstract
and metaphysical conceptions. Nature is called as a
witness, and then the witness she gives is condemned
and put out of court. Industry is occasionally praised,
whilst the means and the motives to industry are systematically despised.  The exercise of any mechanical
employment, or the following of merchandise, is condemned in  an  Ideal Government as  "ignoble  and
destructive to virtue."2  A  maritime situation is reconmended, because of its convenience in enabling a city
to receive from others produce which its own country
1 ETL bE IcaI rpbs'sov,)v  &durov'o 8-ov 8tacpE'pEL TO YOlifLY'Idyv'TV
1  ap o r   -aqC7v T7'V 7rpos auT'v avwrs E'XEL ptPiazV EglcaoTSr, aAX' bEre'
7oTo pvollc0cv. -— 1k. ii. c. 5.
2 oS0TE ldcvavaov  io'V our' dyopTaov 6Ee lW Nrois  roALtras' ade vms
-yap  ro'01toos BioS Kal rrpos pETm)v v7r evavwrlos.-Bk. vii. c. 9. In
Mr. Congreve's edition, 13k. iv. c. 9.




330                TIHE REIGN OF LAW.
does not afford, and to export those necessaries of life
of which it has more than  plenty.  This looks like a
perception of the soundest maxims of Commerce.  But
in the next breath, the whole richness and blessing of
Commerce, as an element of civilisation, is repudiated
and destroyed by the stupid and selfish maxim that a
city must traffic to supply its own wants only, and not
the wants of others; "for those who make themselves
into an open market for every one, do it for the sake of
revenue; but if a State ought to have no part in this kind
of gain, neither ought it to furnish such a mart."'
It is surely wonderful that such a mind as that of
Aristotle should have supposed that it was either possible, or, if possible, desirable that the benefits of traffic
should all be on one side; nor is it less wonderful that,
with his hands, as it were, upon the spot, and touching
with his very fingers the foundation-facts, he should yet
have failed to feel and to seize the great secret of modern
Political Science-the links of Natural Consequence in
which the blessedness of Commerce lies. But all this
comes of thinking that we can be wiser than Nature,
and of failing to see that every natural instinct has its
1 aUT, 7&yap?pAropav, cdXX' ob Tro-s aiXots E   at TLar?'v 7roXtv. or 8f
rapEXovrYEs Opas abTobs 7racrL, dTyopav Trpoodov Xapzv cravTa 7rpdTT0V0'ov'
7. bE p  WEt rMAiEl TOLV'o.S Ek.s XELXei 2rEOPECZas, oi).' ~? Ardjpiov 85
IEsrGrjOaL TOLOUTrov.-Bk. vii. C. 6.




LAW IN POLITICS.              33x
own legitimnate field of operation, within which we cannot
do better than let it alone. It comes from the notion
that we canl arrive at that -which ought to be, without
taking any note of that which actually is.
The bondage under which all true Science lies to fact
-the necessity of groping among the detail of little and
common things-this is a hard lesson for the human
Intellect to learn-conscious as that Intellect is of its
own great powers-of its own high aims-of its own
large capacities of intuitive understanding.  But it is a
lesson which must be learnt.  There are no short cuts in
Nature. Her results are always attained by Method.
I-er purposes are always worked out by Law. So must
ours be. For our bodies and our spirits are both parts
of the great Order of Nature; and our Wills can attain
no end, and can accomplish no design, except through
knowledge and through use of' the appropriate and
appointed means. Nor can those means be ascertained
except by careful observation, and as careful reasoning.
It is a hard thing to know all the forces which operate
even on our own individual minds; and it is a much
harder problem to understand the forces which arise out
of the complicated conditions of human society. But
the very idea of Natural Law as affecting mankind is
founded on the possibility of tracing in human nature the
existence and operation of forces which under given corn,




332             THE REIGN OF LAW.
ditions do actually determinll the course of human conduct in particular directions. Amongst these forces there
are a certain number which are constant, or at least so
constant that they may be calculated upon as certainly
affecting the great majority of mankind.  These are
chiefly the motives which arise out of our physical constitution-the desires and'affections which are common
to the race.  To follow these motives-to be actuated
by them-is, therefore, natural.  And yet to follow these
motives exclusively, may, and generally does, lead to
great evils, often to calamities, sometimes to destruction.
How, then, can these motives be controlled?  Only by
appealing to other motives-to forces lying in the higher
regions of the mihid, and placed there like the forces of
external Nature, to be at the disposal of the Intelligence
and the Will.
Are, then, these higher motives not also natural?-are
they above nature?-are they supernatural? It would
really seem as if this were the idea involved in the distinction which is so vaguely drawn between that which is
said to be natural and that which is said to be not
natural —between Natural Law and Positive Institution.
Yet Reason, and Conscience, and Fancy, and Imagination, and Belief, or whatever other faculties may direct,
wisely or unwisely, the course of legislation, are all
equally natural to Man. They are all as much parts of




LAW IN POLITICS.                333
his mental constitution as the desires and instincts to
which the term natural is usually confined.  There is no
extravagance of the individual Will-there is no folly of
blind and irrational legislation which has not been the
fruit of some part or another of Man's nature. I dwell
on this only because it is important here, as in other
cases, to attach a definite meaning to the words we use,
and especially to a word which plays so important a part
in the language both of Philosophy and of Politics.
It appears, then, that, as applied to human conduct,
we mean by "natural" conduct that which men are
prompted to pursue rather by instinct and impulse than
by calculation of consequences and by reason.  Human
Laws, or Positive Institutions, as being the result of
deliberation, stand contrasted with Natural Law in this
sense, and in this sense alone.  For as Reason and
Reflection are natural to Man, and are as important
parts of his nature as the highest of his instincts, so Laws
founded on a right exercise of that Reason are Natural
Laws in the best and highest sense of all.  Laws, however, whether in this sense natural or not-that is, whether
founded on a right or a wrong exercise of reason —are
always intended to act as restraints on the actions of
individuals, and to interfere with the motives by which
their conduct' would be otherwise determined. This
restraint may be said to be artificial as opposed to the




334             IHE REIGN OF LAW.
natural restraints of:he indi- -lual reason; and this, perhaps, is the distinction mnost generally intended when the
natural conduct of men is contrasted with their conduct
under the control of Positive Institution.  But as the
motives which determine individual conduct are not
always reasonable motives, so it is clear that what men
naturally do is no sure test either of what they ought to
do, or of what they ought to be allowed to do. It is
their nature, under certain conditions, to do all that is
bad and injurious to themselves and others.  Hence it
is the most difficult of all problems in the Science of
Government to determine when, where, and how it is
wise to interfere by the authority of Law with the motives
which are usually called the natural motives of men.
The question is no other than this: How far the abuse
of those motives can be checked and resisted by that
public authority whose duty and function it is to place
itself above the influences rwhich, in individual men, overpower the voice of reason and of conscience?
No more signal illustration has been ever given of the
relation be-tween Natural Law and Human Law —of the
circumstances in which Natural Law may be trusted, and
of those in which it absolutely requires to be controlled —
than the illustration afforded by the history of Legislation in our own country within the present century.
During that period two great discoveries have been made




LAW IN POLITICS.,35
in the Science of Government: the one is the immense
advantage of abolishing restrictions upon Trade; the
other is the absolute necessity of imposing restrictions
upon Labour. The rise, the growth, and the final acceptance of these two ideas as the basis of practical
Legislation, is a history so curious, and having such close
relation to the subject of this chapter, that I propose to
deal with it somewhat in detail.
Since the dissolution of the Greek and Roman Commonwealths, no nation has acted on the one great error
of all the ancient systems of political philosophy-that
the natural desire of men for the accumulation of wealth
is an evil to be dreaded and repressed.  So far as this
goes there is a sharp and striking contrast between the
spirit of ancient and of modern policy. The great object
of the ancient policy, says Dugald Stewart, " was to
counteract the love of money and a taste for luxury by
positive institutions, and to maintain in the great body
of the people habits of frugality and a severity of manners.  The decline of States is uniformly ascribed by
philosophers and historians, both of Greece and Rome,
to the influence of riches on national character; and
the laws of Lycurgus, which, during a course of ages,
banished the precious metals from Sparta, are proposed
by many of them as the most perfect model of legislation
devised by human wisdom.  How opposite to this is the




336              TIHE REIGN OF LAW.
doctrine of lm odern politicians   Far from considering
poverty as an advantage to a'State, their great aim is to
open new sources of national opulence, and to animate
the activity of all classes of the people by a taste for the
comforts and accommodations of life."l  This is true,
and has been true more or less of all the modern nations
of the world.  But although they ra ver held the absurd
doctrine that Nature was wrong lwhen she taught men to
desire wealth, they (lid hold the doctrine, hardly less
mischievous, that Nature was incompetent to teach them
how best to acquire it.  It would be difficult to say.whether the law of ancient Sparta, prohibiting gold from
ever coming into the State, was worse than the law of
modern Spain, which prohibited gold from ever being
allowed to leave it.  It is certain that the Spanish law
was at least the more irrational of the two. If a State
wishes to be poor, it is not absurd to prohibit the making
of money.  But if a State wishes to be rich, it is mere
stupidity to prohibit the natural use of the medium of
exchange.  Yet this law of Spain is only an extreme
example of the system and the theories which governed,
until the other day, the legislation of all the nations of
Europe, and which still largely prevails amongst them.
I "'Account of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith," by
Dugald Stewart.-" Collected Works of Dugald Stewart," vol..
p. 57.




LAW  IN POLITICS.                3 3 7
It was no oratorical exaggeration,-  but a stict and
literal description of the truth, when MIr. Gladstone saidcl
of the old commercial policy tha:t it was " a system of
robbing and plundering ourselves."  And how was it so?
What was the essence of its error?  These questions are
best answered by another.  What was the central idea of
the new system which has superseded the old one?  The
essential idea of these new opinions cannot be better
given than in the words of Dugald Stewart: " The great
and leading object of Adarn Smith's speculations is to
illustrate the provision matde by Nature in the principles
of the human mind, and in the circumstances of man's
external situation, for a gradual progressive augmentation
in the means of national wealth; and to demonstrate that
the most effectual plan for advancing a people to greatness is to maintain that order of things which Nature has
pointed out; by allowing every man, as long as he observes the rules of justice, to pursue his own interest in
his own way, and to bring both his industry and his
capital into the freest competition with those of his
fellow-citizens."2
Adam Smith found Positive Institutions regulating and
restricting natural human action in two different directions.  There were laws restricting free interchange in
In his Speech at Glasgow, Oct. I865.
Account, see p. 72.
z




3 38            TIHE REIGN OF LAW.
the products of labour: and  there were other lavs
restricting the free employment of labour itself.  He
denounced both.  Labour was deprived of its natural
freedom by laws forbidding men from  working at any
skilled labour, unless they had served an apprenticeship
of a specified time. It was also deprived of its natural
freedom  by monopolies, which prevented men from
working at any trade within certain localities, unless
allowed  to do so by those who had  the exclusive
privilege.  The first mode of restriction prevented labour
from passing freely from one employment to another, even
in the same place.  The second mode of restriction prevented labour passing freely from place to place, even in
the same trade.  Both of these restrictions were as mischievous, and as destructive of their own object, as restrictions in the free interchange of goods. They both
depended on the same vicious principle of attempting to
obtain by Legis;!ation results which would be more surely
attained by allowing every man to sell his goods or his
labour when, where, and how he pleased.  The labour of
a poor man was his capital.  He had a natural right to
employ it as he liked.  And as for protecting the community from bad or imperfect work, t/zat would be best
secured by unrestricted competition.  The natural instincts and respective interests of producers and consumers would secure mutual adaptation. Perfect freedom




LAW IN POLITICS.              3 39
of exchange in goods, the products of labour, and perfect
freedom in the application of labour itself-this was the
rule to follow. Natural Law was the best regulator of
both. Such were the doctrines of Adam Smith, then new
in the world.
It is not a little remarkable that, during the same years
in which Adam Smith was working out his memorable
Inquiry, other minds, working in a very different department of human thought, were preparing events which
were to bring to a speedy test how far these doctrines of
Natural Law were true absolutely, or true only under
limitations, which he did not foresee. When Adam
Smith was lecturing with applause in Glasgow from the
chair of Moral Philosophy, James Watt was selling
mathematical instruments in an obscure shop within the
precincts of the same University. It may seem as- if no
two departments of human thought are more widely
separated than those in which these two men were working. One was a region purely mental. The other was a
region purely physical. The one had reference to the
Laws of Matter. The other had reference to the Laws
of Mind. Yet the work of James Watt and the work of
Adnam Smith were inseparably connected, not only as
involving analogous methods of investigation, but as
showing in their result the blending and co-operation of
mental and material laws.
Z2




340             TIHE REIGN OF LAW.
It was the labour of Watt to reduce to obedience,
under the power of Mind, one of the most tremendous
Forces of Nature, and this he did through many years of
curious inquiry, and of laborious contrivance. He found
only a rude and imperfect mechanism through which this
great Force had been misdirected and dissipated and lost.
He collected it in fitter vessels; he led it into smoother
channels; he opened for it doors of passage, through
which the rushing of its escape did for him what he
wanted it to do. Other forces, which before had conspired against it, were so guided as to work along with
it, not only in perfect harmony, but in close alliance. He
made, in short, its invariable energies subject to the
variable conditions of Adjustment. And so, he governed
it and controlled it, and handed it over to the Human
Family as the servant of their Will for ever.
The work of Adam Smith was not dissimilar in its
relation to the Reign of Law. It was his labour to prove
that in the rude contrivances of Legislation, due account
had not been taken of the natural forces with which it
had to deal. He showed that among the very elements
of human character there were instincts, and desires, and
faculties of contrivance, all of which by clumsy macl-linery had been impeded, and obstructed, and diverted
from the channels in which they ought to work.  He
could not, however, test his reasoning as the Invcintor




LAW IN POLITICS.             341
could, by continual experiment. He had to rely on abstract reasoning, and on such verification as could be
drawn from the complicated phenomena of the Body
Politic. In this respect the work of Adam Smith was
harder than the work of Watt. And why it was harder
is a question which it may be well to ask. It is not surprising that the methods of applying to our own use the
Powers of external Nature, should be matter of difficult
research. But it may well seem strange that the forces
which have their seat within ourselves-in the Mind and
Character of Man-should be so unknown to us as to
require careful reasoning and observation before we know
how to use them with success for the attainment of our
ends. Yet so it is. The conscious energies of the Will
are ever tempted to march directly upon objects which
can only be reached by circuitous methods of approach.
And so the WAVealth of Nations, and the skill of Crafts,
and the success of Trade, had all been hindered by the
measures designed for their protection. The promptings
of individual interest had been checked and thwarted and
driven into channels less fruitful than those which they
would have naturally found.
On the other hand, the discovery of the Steam Engine,
like every other weap'on placed at the disposal of Mind,
gave a new stimulus to the motives, and a new form to
the conditions, by which the conduct of thousands was




34~              THE REIGN OF LAW.
determined.  Little did the brilliant Professor know thalt
the discoveries of his humble friend would yet, in their
results, serve to limit the conclusions of his own Philosophy.  In the meantime, all that he knew of Watt and
of his personal history seemed to be, and really was, a
signal illustration of the follies of restriction. For no
other reason than that he had not been born in Glasgow,
WTatt could not legally sell the products of his ingenuity
and labour in that City.  The spirit and the laws of
corporate monopoly rigidly excluded him; and the company of " Hammermen" insisted on the exclusion being
maintained, for fear of " loss and skaith to the Burgesses
and Craftsmen of Glasgow, by the intrusion of strangers."I
The working-classes themselves were among the most
strenuous supporters of a system wlich diminished the
value by restricting the area of their labour. Fortunately
the University had privileges of its own, which, withill
its own property, excluded the jurisdiction of a Municipality and a Craft not more ignorant or more selfish
than their contemporaries at the time.  It may well be
supposed, that Adam  Smith's opinions on freedom  of
labour must have been influenced by personal observation of the working of such laws in the case of a man
who, though still obscure, was even then appreciated by
those who knew him for ingenuity and resource.
R Smiles' "Life of Watt," p. IO5.




LAW IN POLITICS.              343
In looking at restrictions such as these, there was
nothing thei to suggest to Adam Smith the consequences
which might arise from  the entire freedom  of labour,
when that labour was placed under new conditions.  lie
had no knowledge, and he could then have no conception, what these new conditions were to be. Yet
they were being silently prepared and determined in the
very years in which he spoke and wrote. His friend Watt
was a principal agent in the great impending change.
Eut VWatt was not alone.  Other minds were working
at the same time whose labours were to match with
a curious fittingness into his. Indeed, the work which
was going on in those years is only one example of a
law of which many other examples may be found. It
is an order of facts observable in the progress of Mankind,;that long ages of comparative silence and inaction
are broken up, and brought to an end, by shorter periods
of almost preternatural activity.  And that activity is
generally spent in paths of investigation, which, though
independent, are converging.  Different minds, pursuing
different lines of thought, find themselves meeting upon
common ground. Suclh, in respect to literature, was the
period of the Revival ~of Learning: such, in respect to
Religion, was the period of the Reformnation: such, in
respect to the abstract sciences, was the period of Tycho
]Brahe, of Galileo, and of Kepler.  Hardly less memo.




344             THE KEIGN OF LAW.
table than these, certainly not less powerful, as affecting
the condition of society, were those few years in the last
quarter of the eighteenth century, which were marked by
such an extraordinary burst of Mechanical Invention.
Hargreaves, and Arkwright, and Watt, and Crompton,
and Cartwright, were all contemporaries. They were
all working at the same time, and in the same direction.
Out of their inventions there arose for the first time
what is now known as the Factory system; and out
of the Factory system arose a condition of things as
affecting human labour, which was entirely new in the
history of the world.  The change thus effected is a
signal illustration of the relation in which Natural Law
stands to Positive Institution in the realm of Mind. Let
us look for a moment at its history and results.
The Common Law of England had placed no restrictions upon labour. The only restrictions which existed
arose either from the special monopolies of Corporate
Bodies, or from the General Statute of Apprenticeship.
This statute had been passed in the reign of Elizabeth.
It provided that no man should work at any craft on
his own account until he had served an apprenticeship
of seven years. But the Statute of Apprenticeship being
in derogation of common rights, had always been construed strictly by the Courts of Law; and so it had come
to pass that two great rules of limitation had been




LAW IN POLITICS.             345
applied to it. First, it was held to apply only to such
crafts of skill as were known at the time of its being
passed; and secondly, it was held not to apply at all to
rural districts, but only to market towns. From these
two rules of limitation, it resulted, first, that all trades
and employments were free which had arisen since the
commencement of the seventeenth century, and, secondly,
that even the older crafts were free also if they were prosecuted outside the boundaries of towns.
Such was the condition of the law when the inventions of Adam Smith's contemporaries brought into
existence employments which were entirely new, and
opened them to that unrestricted competition, the
advantage of which he had laid down as a universal
doctrine.
Spinning and weaving were not new. They were as
old as the memory of Mankind. But the simple mechanism by which these arts were prosecuted were almost
equally old, and had undergone little change and little
improvement.  In 17 6o the Spinning-Wheel, and the
common Loom, as used by the people of Yorkshire,
were little in advance of the implements for the same
purpose which had been in use beyond the reach of
History. The Spindle which is depicted on the monu.
ments of Egypt was, until a few years ago, familiar in
the Highlands.  The essential feature of this ancient




,406             Tl'Ei RETIGN OF LA-V.
industry, so far as its effects upon social conditions are
concerned, was that it was separate and not gregarious.
It did not interfere with, but rather was congenial to,
Faimily Life, for thousands of years,
"Maids at the Wheel, the Weaver at his Loom,
Sat blithe and happy." 1
But the pressure of new necessities had arisen, and
these could be met only by new inventions.  Tovwards
the middle of the eighteenth century, the greatest dcifficulty was experienced by weavers and spinners in England in maintaining their position in the markets of the
world.  It is curious how each new mechanical invention
gave rise to the necessities out of which tile next arose.
The invention of the Fly Shuttle in weaving, so early as
1733, seems to have given the first impulse to all that
followed.  By means of this invention the power of
weaving overtook the power of spinning.  An adequate
supply of yarn could not be procured under the ancient
methods of that most ancient industry.  New conditions
gave rise to new motives, and new motives called into
play the latent energies of Mind.  The time and the
cost of collecting the products of so many scattered
labourers enhanced unduly the cost of manufacture, and
I Wordsworth's noble sonnet" Nuns fret not at their convent's narrow room."$




LAW IN POLITICS.              347
even when the remuneration was reduced to the lowest
point compatible with existence, that cost was still too
high. Something was imperatively required to econornise the work of human hands-some more elaborate
contrivance to make that work go further than before.
And so Hargreaves' invention arose, not before the time.1
And when his Spinning Jenny had been invented, a still
1more elaborate and powerful combination of mechanical
adjustments was soon perfected in the hands of Ark.
wright.2  When the Spinning Frame was invented, and
when Crompton's farther invention of the Mule Jenny
speedily followed,3 the new order of things had been
fairly inaugurated. The great change had colne, and the
survivance of the ancient domestic industries of so many
centuries was no longer possible.
And just as Hargreaves and Arkwright and Crompton
were inventing the new machines which were to be
moved, Watt was labouring at the new Power which
was to move them. But meanwhile before the Stearn
Engine had been made available, the Factory system
had begun under the old motive-power of Water; and
here it is very curious to observe how each stage in the
progress of discovery bad, by way of natural consequence, its own special effect on the conduct and the
Wills of men. Very soon the course of every mouaI 1765-7.        2  769-7i.    a    x787.




34t8           TiHE RE!TGN OF LAW.
tain stream  in Lancashire and Yorkshire, was marked
by Factories. This again had another consequence. It
was a necessity of the case that such Factories must
generally be situated at a distance from pre-existing
populations, and, therefore, from a full supply of labour.
Consequently they had to create communities for themselves. From  this necessity, again, it arose that the
earlier mills were worked under a system of Apprenticeship. The due attendance of the requisite number of
"' hands " was secured by engagements which bound the
labourer to his work for a definite period.
And now for the first time appeared somle of the consequences of gregarious labour under the working of
Natural Laws, and under no restrictions from Positive
Institution.  The millowners collected as Apprentices
boys and girls, and youths and men, and women, of all
ages. In very many cases no provision adequate, or
even decent, was provided for their accommodation.
The hours of labour were excessive.  The ceaseless
and untiring agency of machines kept no reckoning of
the exhaustion of human nerves.'The Factory system
had not been many years in operation when its effects
were seen. A whole generation were growing up under
conditions of physical degeneracy, of mental ignorance,
and of moral corruption.
The first public man to bring it under the notice of




LAW IN POLITICS.               349
Parliament with a view to remedy, was, to his immortal
honour, a master manufacturer, to whom  the new in.
dustry had brought wealth, and power, and station.  In
I:802 the elder Sir Robert Peel was the first to introduce
a bill to interfere by law with the natural effects of unrestricted competition in human labour.  It is characteristic of the slow progress of new ideas in the English
mind, and of its stiong instinct to adopt no measure
which does not stand in some clear relation to preexisting laws, that Sir Robert Peel's bill was limited
strictly to the regulation of the labour of Apprentices.
Children and young persons who were not Apprentices
might be subject to the same evils, but for them  no
remedy was asked or provided.  The notion was, that
as Apprentices were already under Statutory provisions,
and were subjects of a legal contract, it was permissible
that their hours of labour should be regulated by positive
enactment.  But the Parliamlent which was familiar with
restrictions on the products of labour, and with restrictions of monopoly on labour itself-which restrictions
were for the purpose of securing supposed economic
benefits, would not listen to any proposal to regulate
"free " labour for the purpose of avoiding even the most
frightful moral evils.  These evils, however great they
nmight be, were the result of "'natural laws," and were
incident to the personal freedom  of Employers and




q50             THE REIGN OF LAW.
Employed.  In the case of Apprentices, however, it was
conceded that restriction might be tolerated. And so
through this narrow door the first of the Factory Acts
was passed.  It is a history which illustrates, in the
clearest light, the sense in which human conduct, both
individually and collectively, is determined by Natural
Law.  If Watt's Steam Engine had been invented earlier
-if mills had not been at first erected away from the
centres of population, in order to follow the course of
streams —if consequently the evils of the Factory system
had not begun to be observable in the labour of Apprentices, there is no saying how much longer those evils
might have been allowed to fester without even an assertion of the right to check them.  The Act of 1802,1
though useless in every other sense, was invaluable at
least in making this assertion.
Meanwhile Watt's great invention had been completed.
And now a new cycle of events began, arising by way
of natural consequence out of the Reign of Law. When
the perfected Steam  Engine became applicable to mills,
it was no longer always cheaper to erect them  in rural
districts; on the contrary, it was often cheaper to have
them in the towns, near a full supply of labour, and a cheap
suppl.y of itel.  With this change came the abandon1 42 and 43 Geo. III., cap. 73.




LAW INt P)OLITiCS.              351
ment of the system of Apprenticeship. It was now " free"
labour which more and more supplied the mills. But
this only led to the same evils in'an aggravated form,
Children and women were especially valuable in the
work of mills. There were parts of the machinery which
might be fed by almost infant "' hands."  The earnings
of children became an irresistible temptation to the
parents.  They were sent to the factory at the earliest
age, and they worked during the whole hours that the
machinery was kept at work. The result of this system
was soon apparent.  In 1815, thirteen years after he
had obtained the Act of i8o2, Sir Robert Peel came
back to Parliament and told them that the former Act
had become  useless-that mills were now  generally
worked, not by water, but by steam-that Apprentices
had been given up, but that:he same exhausting and
demloralising labour, from -iv1-ch Parliament had intended
to relieve Apprentices, was the lot of thousands and
thousands of the children of the free poor.  In the
~ollo-,inhg year,.i86, pressing upon the House of Corra
mons a new  measure of restriction, he added, that
unless the Iegislature extended to these children the
same protection which it had intended to afford to the
Apprentice class, it had come to this-that the great
mechanical inventions which were the glory of the age
would be a curse rather than a blessing to the country.




352              TiHE REIGN OF, LAW.
These were strong words from a master manufacturer;
but they were not more strong than true.1
Thus began that g'eat debate which in principle may,be said to be not ended yet: —the debate, how far it
is legitimate or wise in Positive Institution to interfere
for moral ends with the freedom of the individual Will?
Cobbett denounced the opposition to restrictive measures
as a contest of "Mammon against Mercy."  No doubt
personal interests were strong in the forming of opinion,
and some indignation was natural against those who
seemed to regard the absolute neglect of a whole generation, and the total abandonment of them  to the debasing effects of excessive toil, as nothing compared with
the slightest check on the accumulations of the Warehouse.  But the opposition was not in the main due
either to selfishness or indifference.  False intellectual
conceptions-false views both of principle and of fact
-were its real foundation.  Some of the ablest men in
Parliament, who were wholly unaffected by any bias of
personal interest, declared that nothing would induce
them to interfere with the labour which they called
" free." Had not the working classes a right to employ
their children as they pleased?  Who were better able
to judge than fathers and mothers of the capacities
1 "Hansard Parl. Deb." vols. xxxi. and xxxiii.-Sir Rebert's
Speech ou Motion for a Committee, April 3, i8I6.




LAW IN POLITICS.                 353
of their children?  Why interfere for the protection of
those who already had the best and most natural of
all protections?  Such were some of the arguments
against interfering with free labour.
Now in what sense was this labour free?  It was free
from  legal compulsion-that is to say, it was free friom
that kind of compulsion which arises out of the public
Will of the whole community imposed by authority upon
the conduct of individuals.  But there was another kind
of force from which this labour was not firee-the force
of overpowering motive operating on the WMill of the
labourers themselves.  If one parent, more careful than
others of the welfare of his children, and moved less
exclusively by the desire of gain, withdrew his children
at an earlier hour than others from Factory Work, his
children were liable to be dismissed and not employed
at all.' On the other hand, motives hardly less powerfiil were in constant operation on the masters.  The
ceaseless, and increasing, and unrestricted competition
amongst themselves,-the eagerness with which human
energies rush into new  openings for capital, for enterprise, and for skill,-made them, as a class, insensible.
to the frightful evils which were arising from that comrn-' This was very forcibly explained, both by Sir Robert and by hi,
son, Mr. Peel, in the debate of Feb. 23, I818.
A A




135 4           THE REIGN OF LAW.
petition for the means of subsistence which is the ima
)eliling motive of labour.
Nor were there wanting arguments, founded on the
constancy of Natural Laws, against any attempt on
the part of Legislative authority to interfere with the
"freedom" of individual Will.  The competition between the possessors of capital was a competition not
confined to our own country. It was also an international competition.  In Belgium  especially, and in
o ther countries, there was the samle rush along the new
paaths of industry.  If the children's hours of labour were
curtailed, it would involve of necessity a curtailment also
of the adult labour, which would not be available when
left alone. This would be a curtailment of the working
time of the whole mill; and this would involve a corresponding reduction of the produce.  No similar reduction of produce would arise in Foreign mills.  In competition with them  the margin of profit was already
small. The diminution of produce from restricted labour
would destroy that margin. Capital would be driven to
countries where labour was still free from  such restrictions, and the result would be more fatal to the interest of the working classes of the English towns than
any of the results arising from the existing hours of work.
All these consequences were represented as inevitable.
They must arise out of the operation of invariable laws,




LA'W- IN POLITTCS.              3 55
Such were thie arnguments — urged in every variety of
form, and sullportecd by every kind of statistical detail
— by which  the first Factory Acts were vehemently
opposed.
And, indeed, in lookingii back at the debates of that
time, we cannot fail to see that the reasoning of those
who opposed restriction on Free Labour met with no
adequate reply.  Not only were the supporters of restriction hampered by a desire to keep their conclusions
vwithin the scope of a very limited measure; not only
were they anxious to repudiate consequences which did
legitimately follow from  their own premises; but they
were themselves really ignorant of the fundamental
principles which were at issue in the strife.  Their conclusions were arrived at through instincts of the heart.
The pale faces of little children, stunted and outworn,
carried them  to their result across every difficulty of
argument, and in defiance of the alleged opposition of
inevitable laws.  And yet, if the supporters of the Factory Acts had only known it, all true abstract argument
on the subject wan- their own. The conclusions to which
they pointed were as true in the light of Reason, as
they felt them to be true in the light of Conscience.
The truth is, that some of the finest distinctions in
Philosophy were then for the first time emerging on tlll
stage of Politics.  The newest debates of Parliainci:
A A 2




356             THE REIGN OF LAW,
were circling, unconsciously round one of the oldest
disputations of the Schools. A question of practical
legislation had arisen which involved one of the most
difficult problems in metaphysical analysis. On the one
hand, Freedom was asserted for the Will under conditions and in a sense in which it did not exist. On the
other hand, Freedom was denied to the Will in a sense
in which the instincts of humanity testified to its presence, and to the possibility of its being exerted with
effect. The true Doctrine of Necessity was exemplified
in the conduct of Employers and Employed-that conduct being determined in a wrong direction by the force
of overpowering motives. The false Doctrine of Necessity was exemplified in the argument, that this conduct
could not be changed under the force of higher motives
asserting themselves through the Will of the Community
in the form of Law.
The antagonism  which was and still is so often
assumed between Natural Law and Human Law, or in
other words between Natural Law and Positive Institution, is an antagonism which may indeed exist, and does
very often exist.  But it is also an antagonism which
may be eliminated, and must be eliminated, if Legislation
is ever to be attended with permanent success. It is,
alas, a Natural Law that men should be thoughtless, and
selfish, and reckless of moral consequences, when they




LAW IN POLITICS.               357
are bent exclusively on material results.  But when the
consequences of this conduct have been brought home to
their convictions by the force of imminent danger or of
actual calamity, it is a law not less natural that th!ey
should take alarm, that they should retrace their steps,
and that by walking in another course they should bring
about conditions of a better kind.  The Laws of Alan
are also Laws of Nature, when founded on a true perception of natural tendencies and a just appreciation of
combined results.  On the other hand, Human Laws
are at variance with, or antagonistic to the Laws of
Nature, when founded either on the desire of attaining
a wrong end, or on the attempt to reach a right end
by mistaken means.  In either of these cases Positive
Institution and Natural Law become opposed, and thus
a bad contrivance in Legislation, like a bad contrivance
in mechanics, comes always to some dead-lock at last.
Time and Natural Consequence are great Teachers in
Politics as in other things.  Our sins and our ignorances
find us out. Both in conduct and in opinion Natural
Law is ever working to convict error, to reveal and to
confirm the truth.l
And so it was that the sad phenomena of Factory
labour were beginning to indicate the great difference
1,'Opinionum enim commenta delet dies; naturla judicia con,
fni:at." —Cicero,-" De Nat. Deor.'" lib. ii. c. 3;




358              THE REIGN OF LAW.
between the results of perfect freedom  of exchange inl
the products of labour and the results of perfect freedom
of competition in Labour itself. Perhaps that difference
ought to have been foreseen, for the cause of it is plain
enough.  There are certain results for the attainment of
which the natural instincts of individual men not only
may be trusted, but must be trusted as the best and
indeed the only guide.  There are other results of which
as a.rule those instincts will take no heed whatever, and
for the attainment of which, if they are to be attained
at all, the higher faculties of our nature must impose
their Will in authoritative expressions of Human Law.
In all that wide circle of operations which have for their
immediate result the getting of wealth, there is a sagacity
and a cunning in the instincts of labour and in the love
of gain compared with which all legislative wisdom is
ignorance and folly.  But the instincts of labour, having
for their conscious purpose the acquisition of wealth, are
instincts which, under the stimulus and necessities of
modern society, are blind to all other results whatever.
They override even the love of life; they silence even
the fear of death.  Trades in which the labourers never
reach beyond middle life-trades in which the work is
unilifbrmly fatal within a few years-trades in which those
who follow theml are liable to loathsome and torturing
disease-all are filled by the enlistment of an unfailing




LAW IN POLITICS.               359
series of recruits.  If, therefore, there be some things
desirable or needful for a Community other than the
acquisition of wealth,-if mental ignorance, and physical
degeneracy, be evils dangerous to social and political
prosperity, then- these results cannot and must not be
trusted to the instincts of individual men.  And why?
Because the few motives which bear upon them, and
which consequently determine their conduct, have become almost as imperious as the motives which determine the conduct of the lower animals. Observers whose
duties have called them to a close investigation of the
facts, have never failed to be impressed with those facts
as the result of Laws against which the individual Will
is unable to contend. Overpowering motives arise out
of the conditions of society —out of the force of habit —
out of the helplessness of poverty —out of the thoughtlessness of wealth-out of the eagerness of competition
-out of the very virtues even of industrial skill.  These
constitute an a.ggregate of power tending in one directiona,
which make the resulting action of Mind as certain av;
the action of Inanimate Force. " Thus," says Mr. Baker,
one of the most experienced of our Factory Tnspectors,
" most of the workshops of this great commercial country
Fare found to have fallen into h/ze ilzevilable /Iack of colnpA:li/izJe illulustry, when unrestricted by law,-namely, to
cheapen prices by the employment of women and chil,




36o                THE REIGN OF LAW.
dren in the first instance, and then to increase produlctioid
by protracted hours of work, without much regarl  to
age, to sex, or to physical capability." This is the result
of Nature-of Nature, at least, such as ours now is.  aut
it is the result of that Nature with all its nobler powers
allowed to sleep. Power to control such evils has been
given to Man, and he is bound to use it. "' Free labour,
even in a free country," as lMVr. Laker says, " requires the
strong arm  of the law  to  protect it from  the cupidity
and ignorance of parents."'  And by the "' strong arm
of the law " is meant nothing but the law of Conscience
and of Reason asserting itself over the lower instincts of
our nature.  If under such conditions of society, higher
motives are ever to prevail, they must be supplied from
without, and  must be imposed  in  authoritative form
through the legitimate organs of Positive Inlstitution.2
And so the Factory Acts instead of being excused as
exceptional, and pleaded for as justified only under extraordinary conditions, ought to be recognised as in truth
the first Legislative recognition of a great Natural Law,
1 "Reports of the Inspectors of Factories, half-year Oct. I864,"
p. 84.
2 Bad as the consequences were of individual freedom under un.
restricted competition in the case of labour in factories, the results
Nwere still more horrible in the case of labour in mines. In S142 it
was found absolutely necessary to prohibit altogether the labour of
women and young children in mines and collieries.




LAW  IN POLITICS.                  36X
quite as important as Freedom  of Trade, and which like
this last, was yet destined to claim  for itself wider and
wider application.
Accordingly, since the year when the first Sir Robert
Peel pleaded the cause of Factory Apprentices, there has
been going on a double movement in Legislation, one a
movement of retreat, the other a movement of advance.
Step by step Legislation has retired from a Province once
considered peculiarly its own: step by step it has advanced into another Province within which the Schools
of Political Economy would have denied it a foot of
ground.   Since  I802, there have been passed a long
series of laws removing, one after another, all restrictions
which aimed at guiding the individual Will in its sharp
and sagacious pursuit of material wealth.   During the
same period there have been passed another long series
of Acts imposing restrictions more and more stringent on
the individual Will in its blind and;eckless disregard of
moral ends.'  In neither of these movements was Pai1 It was not till ISI9 that Sir Robert Peel succeeded in passing
an Act restricting the labour of unapprenticed children. This Act
(59 Geo. III. c. 66) is therefore, properly speaking, the first of the
Factory Acts-the first which affirmed the principle of restriction as
legitimately applicable to' Free " Labour. But this, as well as a
subsequent Act passed in I825, at the instance of Sir J. Iolohoure,
were practically inoperative fiom defective enforcing clauses.  It
was thus apparent that the State must charge itself not only acide




362               THE REIGN OF LAW.
liament impelled by the light of reason, but under the
blessed teaching which belongs to the Reign of Law.
False theory and mistaken conduct have been found out
by the working of Natural Consequence.  The abstract
reasonings of Adam Smith had indeed long before prepared the minds of a few to perceive the true theory of
unrestricted competition in the interchange of goods.
But as it needed the practical results of restriction-distress, discontent, and the danger of civil commotion-to
bring home to the national understanding the economic
error of the old commercial systems; so also as regards
the grievous results of unrestricted competition in human
labour, our only effective teaching has been that of hard
experience. The doctrines of Adam Smith, when applied
here, were a hindrance and not a help. The Political
Economists were, almost to a man, hostile to restrictive
legislation. They did not see what would be the working
of Natural Law upon the Human WVill, when that Will
was exposed to overpowering motives under debased
conditions of understanding and of heart. They did not
laying down the law, but also with the duty of seeing it obeyed.'
It was not till this great question was taken in hand by Lord
Ashley that any effectual measure was passed. His Bill became
Law in I833, as 3 and 4 Will. IV. c. Io3. Nothing but a stringent
system of Government Inspection was of any avail against the
powerful combination of motives, out of which the evils of the
Factory system arose,




LAW  IN POLITICS.                  353
see the higher Law which Parliament was asserting when
it was driven by sheer instinctive horror of actual results,
to  prohibit "'free" labourers from  disposing as they
pleased of the labour of their children.
To this hour the principle on which this great countermovement rests as regards our ideas of the legitimate
province of Legislation, has never been philosophically
treated.  The Laws on which it depends, and which it
does but recognise, have never been scientifically defined.
We are still in a state of tutelage-advancing with slow
and reluctant stepsl in the path indicated by the teachings of Natural Consequence.  The last Report on the
1 The steps here referred to are certainly becoming every year less
slow and less reluctant. Since this work was published, the " Factory Acts' Extension Act" of I867 has extended the provisions of
those Acts to all establishments which employ fifty persons; and the
" Workshop Regulation Act " of the same year, has carried the protection of the law into the precincts of "any room or place whatever in which any handicraft is carried on."  Nay more, it extends
that protection even to children who are working, not for wages at
all, but only "under a parent."  The principle of "State interference " is here carried to its utmost length. It is characteristic of
the cautious and tentative character of English Legislation that it
becomes gradually committed to great general principles, not through
any perception of the truth and value of those principles in the
abstract, but gradually, and through the compulsion of particular
necessities. And to the last possible moment the general application
cf such principles is always resisted. But no argument can be used
in favour of compulsory education, as regards children in "workl
sliops," which is not equally applicable to all children whatever.




364t             THE REIGN OF LAW.
Employment of Children shows that evils as bad as ever
existed before the passing of the Factory Acts, prevail at
this moment among large classes of our operative population, and demand again, as imperatively as before, all
authoritative interference of Positive Institution with the
freedom of the individual Will. The fact of such legislation has indeed gained a sort of silent acquiescence, and
some of the old opponents have admitted that their fear
of the results, in an economical point of view, has proved
erroneous.  But there is still no clear and well-grounded
intellectual perception of the deep foundations of principle on which it rests.  Nor is there among a large
section of Politicians any adequate appreciation of the
powerful influence it has had in improving the physical
condition of the people, and securing their contentment
with the Laws under which they live.
When, however, we think for a moment of the frightful
nlature of the evils which this Legislation has checked,
and which to a large extent it has remedied-when we
recollect the inevitable connexion between suffering and
political disaffection —when we consider the great moral
laws which were being trodden under foot from  mere
thoughtlessness and greediness-we shall be convinced
that if, during the last fifty years, it has been given to this
country to make any progress in Political Science, that
progress has been in nothing happier than in the Factory




LAW IN POLITICS.              365
Legislation.  The names of those who strove for it, and
through whose faith and perseverance it was ultimately
carried, are, and ever will be, in the history of Politics,
immortal names.  No Government and no Minister has
ever done a greater-perhaps, all things considered, none
has ever done so great a service. It was altogether a new
era in Legislation —the adoption of a new principle-the
establishment of a new idea. Nor is that principle and
that idea  even  now  thoroughly  understood.  The
promptings of individual self-interest are still relied upon
for the accomplishment of good which it does not belong
to them even to suggest, and which they can never be
trusted to pursue. Proposals for legislative interference
with a view to arrest some of the most frightful evils of
Society, are still constantly opposed, not by careful
analysis of their tendency, but by general assertions of
Natural Law as opposed to all legislation of the kind.
"You cannot make men moral by Act of Parliament "such is a common enunciation of Principle, which, like
many others  the same kind, is in one sense a truism,
and in every other sense a fallacy. It is true that neither
wealth, nor health, nor knowledge, nor morality, can be
given by Act of Parliament.  But it is also true that the
acquisition of one and of all of these can be impeded
and prevented by bad laws, as well as aided and encouraged by wise and appropriate le-islation,




366              THE REIGN OF LAW.
There is no doctrine in Physics more certainly true
than this doctrine in Politics-that every practice which
the authority of Society recognises or supports has its own
train of consequences, which, for evil or for good, can
be modified or changed in an infinite variety of degrees
according as that sanction is given or withheld.  Innumerable illustrations of this truth will arise wherever
we take the trouble to trace any social or political phenomena through the sequences of cause and effect from
which they come. Not unfrequently these illustrations
are of a melancholy kind, and give us much to think
of respecting the better understanding and the better
management of our complicated  nature.  Thus, for
example, there seems good  reason  to believe there
is a direct relation between the amount of life and property annually sacrificed by shipwreck, and the legislation
which recognises and sanctions Insurance to the full
amount of the value of ship and cargo. The cause of
this is obvious. Care for life is less eager and less wakefill than care for property.  This is true even when men
are dealing equally with their own property, and with
their own lives. It is still more true when they are
dealing not only with property which is their own, but
with lives which belong to others.  The inevitable effect
of such Insurance is therefore to relax the motives of
self-interest, which are the strongest incitemeuts to pre



LAW IN POLITICS.               367
caution.' Similar results appear in a thousand other
cases, both of laws still existing, and of laws which have
been repealed. The conduct of men depends on the
balance of motives which are brought to bear upon
them.  In supplying those motives, external conditions
and'mental character act and react upon each other.
Both of these can be affected, and affected powerfully,
by Positive Institution.
The restraints of Positive Institution are not, however,
the only means,-very often they are notthe best means
by which to lighten the overpowering pressure of particular motives upon the individual Will. For as the
Reason and the Conscience of the whole Political Community can interfere by the exercise of authority, so
also may adequate remedies be found in the reason and
the conscience of Voluntary Societies.  The external
conditions which tell upon the individual Will are themselves very often nothing but conditions depending on
the aggregate Will of those around us; and if upon
them, by any means, new motives can be brought to
bear, then the whole of those external conditions may
be changed. The language which is used in the name
of Economic Science constantly involves in this matter
I A curious and instructive Paper upon this subject has been
published by Mr. Edwin Chadwick, having been read before a
recent meeting of the Social Science Asociation.




368            THE REIGN OF LAW.
the same fallacy which has already been pointed out
in the language used in the name of Physical Science.
It is often said that the conduct and condition of men
are governed by invariable laws; and the conclusion
is that the evils which arise by way of natural consequence out of the action of those laws, are evils against
which the struggles of the Will are hopeless. But the
facts on which this conclusion is founded, are, as usual,
inaccurately stated. The conditions of human life and
conduct, like the conditions of all natural phenomena,
are never governed by those separate and individual
forces which alone are invariable, but always by combinations among those forces-which combinations are
of endless variety, and of endless capability of change.
Different motives arise out of the inborn gifts of character, and out of the conditions of external circumstance.
It is true, indeed, that there are in the mind of Man,
as there are in Nature, certain forces originally implanted, which are unchangeable in this sense, that they
have an invariable tendency to determine conduct in
a particular direction. But as in Nature we have a
power of commanding her elementary forces by the
methods of adjustment, so in the Realm of Mind we
can operate on the same principle, by setting one motive
to counteract another: and by combination among many
motives, we can influence in a degree, and to an extent




LAW IN POLITICS.               369
as yet unknown, the coinduct and the condition of
Mankind.
Nor are the resources of Contrivance limited to adjustment among the motives which arise only out of existing conditions.  New motives can be evoked and put
in action by the adopting of appropriate means.  The
mere frlunding, for example, of a Voluntary Society for
any given purpose, evolves out of the primary elements
of human character a latent force of the most powerful
kind; namely, the motive-the sentiment-the feeling-.
the passion as it often is, of the Spirit of Association.
This is a passion which defies analysis.  The cynic may
reduce it to a fofm of selfishness-and undoubtedly the
identification of the interests and the desires of Self
with the Society for which this passion is conceivea,
lies at its very root and is of its very essence.  It is
true, also, that it is a passion so powerful as to need
strong control-without which control it generates some
of the very meanest emotions of the heart.  Out of it
there has come, and there comes again and again from
age to age, a spirit of hatred even against good itself,
when that good is the work of any one who "follow eth
not us." It is a force, nevertheless, rooted in the Nature
of Man, implanted there as part of its constitution, and
like all others of this character, given him for a ptuIrpose,
and having its own legitimate field of operation.  No, is
BB8




370/            TIE REIGN OF LAW.
that field a narrow one. The spirit of Association is the,
fountain of much that is noblest in human character, and
of much that is most heroic in human conduct.  For all
the desires and aspirations of Self are not selfish. The
interests of Self, justly appreciated and rightly understood, may be, nay indeed must be, the interests also
of other men —of Society-of Country-of the Church,
and of the World.
And so it is that when the aim of an)y given Association is a high aim, directed to ends really good, and
seeking the attainment of them by just methods of procedure, the spirit it evokes becomes itself a new "Law"
-a  special force operating powerfully for good on the
mind of every individual subject to its influence. Some
pre-existing motives it modifies-some it neutralisessome it suppresses altogether-some it compels to work
in new directions. But in all cases the Spirit of Association is in itself a power-a force-a Law in the Realm
of Mind. What it can do, and what it cannot do, in
affecting the conditions of Society, is a problem not to
be solved so easily and so summarily as some dogmatists
in political philosophy would have us to believe. It is
a. question which, like so many others, is not likely to
be solved by ajbstract reasoning without the help of
actual experiment.  And this experiment is being tried.
The instincts of men, truer often than the conclusions




LAW IN POLITICS.              3 7
of philosophy, have rebelled against the doctrine that
they are the sport of circumstances. Yet finding by
hard experience that this is often true of the individual
Will when standing by itself, they have resolved to try
whether it is equally true of the Collective Will, guided
by the spirit and strengthened under the discipline of
Association. Hence the phenomena of Combination as
a means of affecting the condition of labour-phenomena so alarming to many minds, and certainly so well
deserving of attention. Let us look for a moment at
the important illustrations of the Reign of Law which
these phenomena afford.
A moment's consideration will convince us that the
same necessities of labour which were found to determine so fatally the condition of women and children, are
necessities which apply without any abatement to the
labour of adult men. They must be subject to the same
pressure of inducements. Nay, more, it is only through
them that this pressure can reach the women who are
their wives, and the children who are their children. If
overpowering motives did not equally determine the
conduct and condition of adult men, no legislation would
have been required for the protection of their families.
If a man is placed under such conditions that he c-.).n
not save his wife and child from exhausting labour, it
is certain that the same conditions will impose a like
BB a




37 2            THE REIGN OF LA~W.
necessity upon himself.  Nevertheless, Parliament has
resolutely and wisely refused to interfere on his behalf.
And why?  Because the argiiment is that the adult man
is able, or ought to be able, to defend himself. And so
he can; but how?  Only by combination.  The " law"
which results in excessive labour is the law of competition-that is, it is the attraction exerted upon the Wills
of a multitude of individual men by the rewards of
labour. The pressure of this attraction can only be
lightened by bringing those Wills under the power of
counter motives, which may induce them to postpone, to
some higher interest, the immediate appetites of gain.
And this is the work which Combination does. It comes
in the place of Positive Institution. Those who are under
it " are a Law uInto themseles."
Nor is it unimportant to observe that what Combination does for the protection of labour, it does better, and
with better consequences, than Positive Institution can
ever do. Men are driven to excessive labour, because if
they don't work excessively, others will. But it is the
effect of Combination that others won't. Under Positive
Institution they are not allowed. Under Combination
they are determined not. And as the forming of an
intelligent resolution, and the abiding by it; are higher
exercises of mind than the mere passivc obedience
to authority, so is the good effected by Combination a




.LAW IN POLITICS.             373
higher good than that resulting from Factory Legislation.
It tends to form and to strengthen character. It tends to
subordinate the present to the future, and the temporary
interests of Self to the permanent welfare of a Brotherhood of men. And this it tends to do in classes otherwise prone to follow only the impulse of the moment,
and to consider only the apparent interests of the individual.
These considerations should disabuse our minds of
the unjust and unreasonable prejudice against the principle of Combination which still betrays itself so strongly
in the language of many politicians. When the Working
Classes combine for the protection of their own labour
against the effects of unrestricted competition, they are
simply taking that course which is recommended alike
by ieason and by experience. It is the course which
Parliament has indicated as the right course both by
what it has itself done, and by what it has declined to do.
Nor can there be any greater mistake than to suppose
that this course involves necessarily any rebellion against
the laws of economic science. Combination is an appeal
to the most fundamental of all Natural Laws-to the law
of Contrivance-to the power of Adjustment-wielding,
through Reason and Conscience, the elementary forces
of Human Character. Of the constancy and "invariability " of these no doubt or denial is involved. Rather




374              TIIE RE1CN OF LAW.
the reverse. It is upon instinctive trust in that constancy
that all social and political Contrivance rests. And so
we need not be surprised to find that, through the organised efforts of communities of men, the evils which arise
by way of natural consequence out of the helplessness
and thoughtlessness of the individual Will, are evils
which to a large extent can be met and overcome.
But though all this is true, universally, of the principle
of Combination, it is very far from being true, universally, of the particular purposes to which Combination is
applied.  All the sources of error which have so long
perverted Legislation, are equally powerful in perverting
the aims, and in misdirecting the efforts of Voluntary
Association. If the upper classes, with all the advantages of leisure, and of culture, and of learning, have
been so unable, as we have seen them to be, to measure
the effect of the laws they made, how much more must
we expect errors and misconceptions of the most grievous
kind to beset the action of those who —through poverty
and ignorance, and often through much suffering —have
been able to do little more than strike blindly against
evils whose pressure they could feel, but whose root and
remedy they could neither see nor understand?
Accordingly, the history of Combination among the
Working Classes has, until a very recent period, been a
sad history of misdirected effort-of strength put forth




LAW IN POLITICS.             375
only in violence and disorder, and of the virtues of Brotlherhood lost in tyrannical suppression of all individual
freedom. Its heaviest blows have been often aimed at
the most powerful agencies for good. One of the very
earliest forms of Combination has been that which was
directed against the introduction and improvements of
machinery. The Working Classes have always encountered with jealousy and fear those triumphs of Mechanical Invention whose function it is to economise labomu
and to multiply the fruits of industry. It would be hard
to blame them. What class is there which can say with
truth that they have themselves bern able always to
follow with intelligent foresight the links of Natural Consequence through the darkness into which they so often
lead? For almost every great step in the advance of civilization plunges at first through some passage which seems
dangerous, or at least obscure. The happiest achievements of Contrivance have their own aspects of apparent
danger, and their own real incidents of temporary evil.
Every new machine displaces and disorganises pre-existing
forms of labour; and we have seen that, even in its
ultimate effects, the advance of Mechanical Invention
developed new dangers to the Working Classes-dangers
only to be avoided by measures which were not taken,
and by precautions which were not adopted.
It would be well if, from the past convicted errors,




376             THE REIGN OF LAW.
both of Legislation and of Combination, we could extract
some conclusions of general principle capable of helping
us in the difficulties of our own time. In looking at the
root of those errors, it would seem that, in order to avoid
them, two things are necessary-first, unshaken faith in
great Natural Laws; and, secondly, a faith not less
assured in the free agency of Man to secure by appropriate means the working of those laws for good. Thus,
the love of gain is an instinct implanted in the human
mind, and the endeavour to suppress it has always been
the violation of a Natural Law. In like manner, Mechanical Invention is a Law of Nature in the highest and
strictest sense.. The power of it and the love of it are
among the elementary forces of human character. Each
fresh exertion of it is, and must be, according to the con,
stitution and course of Nature —leading to higher and
higher fulfilments of the original Purpose of Man's Creation, which was, that he should not only inhabit the
Earth, as the beasts inhabit it, but that he should
subdue it.
So also combination is natural to Man.  The desire
for it and the need of it, grow with the growth of know..
ledge and with the increasing complications of Society.
It has now, for the most part, emerged from the stage of
rude ignorance which led to the breaking of machinery.
It is conducted, comparatively at least, with high intel



LAW IN POLITICS.              37 7
ligence, and aims for the most part at legitimate objects
of desire. Yet in the rebellion which has been roused
against the doctrines of Necessity, founded on false con.
ceptions of Invariable Law, there is a constant danger
lest the Spirit of Association should attempt to act against
Nature instead of acting with it. There is, for example,
a Law —an observed order of facts —in respect to iMan,
which the Working Classes too often forget, but which
can neither be violated nor neglected with impunity.
That Law is the Law of inequality-the various degrees
in which the gifts both of Body and of Mind are shared
among men. This is one of the most fundamental facts
of human nature. Nor is it difficult to see how it should
be also one of the most beneficent.  But it is a fact
against which the spirit of Combination is very apt to
assume an attitude of permanent insurrection. It is, of
course, the business and the function of Combination to
subordinate in some things the Individual to the Class;
and the temptation is to make that subordination exclusive and complete. Hence the jealousy so often shown
of wages measured by the amount of work performed.
This is a jealousy of the superiority of reward which is
naturally due to superiority of power, of industry, or of
skill. But these are things which God has joined together, and which no man or combination of men have a
right to put asunder.  It is a marriage made in the




378               THE REIGN OF LAW.
morning of the world, and in every step of humlan progress we see its blessing and its fruit.  If it be stupid
to break machines and to proscribe Mechanical Invention, it is not less stupid to be jealous of this primeval
adjustment between  the varying  energies  of human
character and the varying results which they are competent to attain.
This is not the place to enter in detail on the difficult
and complicated question as to the limits within which
Combinations can, and beyond which they cannot, affect
the rewards of labour. They have certainly succeeded
in limiting the hours of labour in cases where Legislation
could not well have interfered;  and wherever the hours
of labour are reduced without a corresponding reduction
in wages, a substantial economic advantage is unquestionably secured.   Equal confidence is expressed  by
many Associations, that as a matter of experience and of
fact, they have succeeded in establishing higher rates of
1 Of this the Baking Trade is a good example. The hours of
adult labour in this trade, under the effects of unrestricted competition, had come to be most injurious and oppressive. In Glasgow
and in Edinburgh this condition of things has been effectually remedied by a Combination, whose exertions were successful, without
(I believe) resort being ever had to the extreme measure of a Strike.
The Baking Trade in London is still afflicted by the same oppressive
hours of labour, because of the difficulty which has hitherto been
experienced in organising there any Combination equally complete.




LAW IN POLITICS.             379
wages than would have accrued under the system  of
u-nrestricted competition.  This may very well be true.
It is a truth which casts no doubt whatever on the
invariability of Economic Laws when these are rightly
understood. They are invariable in the same sense, and
in no other, in which all other Natural Laws are invariable.  That is to say, they represent tendencies in
human character determined *by motives, which tendencies are constant, and may surely be relied on as
producing always, under like conditions, their own appropriate effects.  It is upon this constancy that Combination must rely for any power it can ever have: and
it is the same constancy in the action of specific motives
which sets bounds to the power of Combination, beyond
which it can never pass. The same motive which impels
the Workman to secure an adequate reward for his
labour, impels the Manufacturer or the Trader to secure
an adequate reward for his capital, his knowledge, and
his skill. And although the desire of gain is not the only
motive, and is often not the strongest motive, which
Impels men to persevere in enterprises once begun, yet
if Combinations of Workinen should attempt to raise
wages so high as to trench upon the minimum rate of
profit which will induce men to carry on any given trade,
then by a natural consequence, not less certain than any
other, capital and enterprise and skill will be withdrawn




330             THE REIGN OF LAW.
from that trade, and those who depend upon it will be
the first to suffer.  Short, however, of this extreme result,
there is generally a margin of ground upon which Combination may act with more or less effect. It may prer
vent arbitrary or capricious changes; and as there are
practically many impediments in the way of men moving
their capital from one employment to another, Combination may compel them to submit to lower rates of
profit than would otherwise content them if those difficulties did not exist.
But to all these possibilities of influence there is a
limit in the nature of things-in Natural Laws —that is,
in the new motives which are brought into operation by
new conditions. What that limit is, it must always
be difficult to determine except by actual experiment,
It is enough here to observe that in this, as in every
other department of human conduct, men are being led
gradually to a knowledge of the truth by the teachings of
Natural Consequence.  It is by the experience of actual
results that we are taught both as to the objects which
are legitinmate objects of desire, and as to the proper
methods by wlich these may be attained.  The very
attempt of the Working Classes to govern through Comlbination their own affairs, and to determine their own
condition, is an Education in itself.  On the extended
scale in which that attempt is being made, it must




LAW IN POLITICS                381
accustom themll to consider great general causes, and to
estimate the manner and the degree in which these can
be effected by the methods of Adjustment. Last, not
least, it must lead them to study and to recognise the
moral duties which are indeed the most fundamental of
all Natural Laws. For it ought to be remembered, that
the first and most important object of Combinations is
one against which there can be no opposition founded
on the doctrines of Economic Science.  That object
is to secure for the Working Classes those provisions
against misfortune, sickness, accident, and age, which
are amongst the first duties of all organised societies of
merl.  How  far through such agency the causes of
pauperism may be successfully attacked, is a question
on which we are only entering.  In like manner, the
conditions and limitations under which Combination
may succeed in blending the functions and in uniting
the profits of Capital and of Labour-this also is a
question to be determined by Natural Laws, not yet
fully explored or understood. But enough is known,
and results sufficiently determinate have already been
secured, to convince us that in this great department
of Natural Law, as in every other, the Will of Man is
not powerless when its energies are directed by wisdom,
and when the choice of its methods is founded Upon
knowledge.




382             THE REIGN OF LAW.
This is, indeed, the great lesson to be learnt from
every inquiry into the constitution and course of things.
Nature is a great Armoury of weapons, and implements,
for the service and the use of Will. Many of them
are too ponderous for Man to wield. He can only look
with awe on the tremendous Forces which are everywhere seen yoked under the conditions of Adjustment —
on the smoothness of their motions, —on the magnitude
and the minuteness, on the silence and the perfection,
of their work. But there are: also many weapons hung
upon the walls which lend themselves to human hands
-lesser tools which Man can use. He cannot altel
or modify them in shape or pattern —in quality, or in
power. The fashion of them and the nature of themare fixed for ever. These are, indeed, invariable. ~ Only
if we know how to use them, then that use is ours.
Then also the lesser contrivances which we can set in
motion are ever found to work in perfect harmony with
the vaster mechanisms which are moving overhead.
And as in the material world no effort gives so fully the
sense of work achieved as the subjugation of somne
Natural Force under the command of Will, so in the
world of Mind no triumphs of the Spirit are happier than
those by which some natural tendency of Human Character is led to ihe accomplishment of a purpose which
is wise and good. It is for the gaining of these triumphs




LAW IN POLITICS.              383
that Man has been gifted with the desire of Knowledge,
and with the sense of Right, and with the faculties of
Contrivance. In such triumphs lie the aim and purpose
of all Natural Laws-for these they were all establishedfor these they all work, whether by way of encouragement, or of restraint, or of retribution.
Nothing is more striking in the history of Discovery
than the ages during which men have been blind to
the suggestions of Natural Law-suggestions which now
appear so obvious that we wonder how the interpretation of them could have been missed' so long. It is
very easy to feel this wonder concerning others; it is
much more difficult to remember that the same wonder
will certainly be felt concerning ourselves.  Such as we
now see to have been the position of former generations
in respect to things which they failed to understand,such, we may depend upon it, is precisely our own
position in regard to innumerable phenomena now constantly passing before our eyes. We may be sure of
this; and we ought to be as glad of it as we are sure.
For the world is not so prosperous or so happy as that
we should readily or willingly believe in the exhaustion of the means which are at our disposal for its
better guidance.  Especially in the great Science of
Politics, which investigates the complicated forces wnose
action and reaction determine the condition of Oraanised




384             THE REIGN OF LAW.
Societies of men, we are still standing, as it were, on:ly
at the break of cday. Our command over the external
elements of Nature is, beyond all comparison, in advance
of our command over the resources of Human Character,
Special causes retard the progress of knowledge in
this department of inquiry. Many problems so difficult
and intricate that they never can be solved except by
patient observation, patient thought, and yet more
patient action, are as yet hardly recognised to be problems at all. We look on the facts of Nature and of
human life through the dulled eyes of Custom and Traditional Opinion. And when some misery worse than
others forces itself upon the acknowledgment of the
world, men are slow to discover or admit their own
power over the sources whence such miseries come to
be. That which is needed to open our eyes to such
questions, is not mere intellectual power.  Rarer and
finer qualities have this work to do. Among the characteristics of the individual men who have exerted the
most powerful influence for good on the condition of
Society, no quality has been more remarkable than a
certain natural openness and simplicity of mind. Readiness to entertain, willingness to accept, and enthusiasm
to pursue, a new idea, have always been among the most
fruitful gifts of genius.




LAW IN POLITICS.              385
Is it vain to hope that the thoughtfulness and candour
which have been the natural inheritance of a few, may
yet be more common among all educated men? The
whole constitution and course of things would receive
an earlier fulfilment did we carry about with us an
habitual belief in the inexhaustible treasures which it
holds-in the power of the agencies which it offers to
Knowledge and Contrivance. For then the results of
Natural Consequence would be accepted for that which
they teach, and not simply submitted to for that which
they inflict.  The disorders of Society would not so
often be supinely regarded as the result of inevitable laws,
but would be seen as the fruit always of some ignorance
or of some rebellion; and so the exhilarating conviction
would be ours, that those disorders are within the reach
of remedy through larger Knowledge and a better Will.
We hear much now of the " blessed light of Science;" 1
and if the methods and conditions of Physical inquiry
were applied in a really philosophical spirit to Spiritual
Phenomena, the influence of Science for good would
be more powerful than it is. Meanwhile it is well to
remember that although readiness to accept a new idea
is essential to Discovery, it is equally true that new
dangers beset and surround all new aspects of the truth.
1 See a remarkable passage in the concluding pages of "Ecce
Iionlo.'"




386              THE REIGN OF LAW.
Paradoxical as it may sound to say so, this is a consequence
of the splendour of Man's endowments, of his freedom
from  direction,-of the swiftness and the subtlety of
his mental powers.  On her own narrow path Instinct
is a surer guide than Reason, and accordingly it is often
the higher faculties of tile mind which are the most
misleading.  The Speculative Faculty is impatient of
waiting upon Knowledge, and is ever as busy and as
ingenious in finding out new paths of error as in supplying new interpretations of the truth.  Hence in Philosophy the most extravagant errors have been constantly
associated with the happiest intuitions, and it has
remained for the successors of great men in another
generation to separate their discoveries from their delusions.  Hence also in Politics the great movements of
Society have seldom been accomplished without raising
many false interpretations of the Past, and many extravagant anticipations of the Future.' It cannot, indeed,
be said with truth that the calamities of Nations have
genc -ally arisen from too great play being given to novel
or theoretical conclusions.  Rather the reverse.  They
have arisen, for the most part, from too little attention
being paid to the progress of opinion, and to the insensible development of new conditions.
N1 "N os peres en I789 ont't' condamnes a passer des perspectives
du Paradis aux scenes de 1'Enfer."-Guizot, " L'Eglise et la Soci&ete4,
p. 2I3.




LAW IN POLITICS.              387
The question has been often raised, whether there is
any law of growth, of progress, and of decay prevailing
over Nations, as over individual Organisms. Whatever
the solution of this question may be, it is certain that
some causes are no longer in existence which produced —
not indeed the corruption, but-the final overthrow of
the great historical Nations of Antiquity. The epoch
of conquering Races destroying the Governments, and
reconstructing the Populations of the World, is an epoch
which has passed away. Whatever causes there may be
now of political decline are causes never brought to such
rough detection, and never ending in catastrophes so
complete. Yet, in modern days a condition of stagnation
and decline has been the actual condition of many Political Societies for long periods of time. It is a condition
prepared always by ignorance or neglect of some moral
or economic laws, and determined by long-continued
perseverance in a corresponding course  of conduct.'Then the laws which have been neglected assert themselves, and the retributions they inflict are indeed
tremendous.  In the last generation, and in our own
time, the-Old and the New Worlds have each afforded
memorable examples of the Reign of Law over the
course of Political events.  Institutions maintained
against the natural progress of Society have " foundered
amidst fanatic storms."  Other institutions upheld and
CC2




388 0           THE REIGN OF LAW.
cherished against justice, and humanity, and conscience,
have yielded only to the scourge of War.
It is in the wake of such convulsions that reactions of
opinion so often sweep over the Human Mind, as hurricanes sweep over the surface of the Sea. But whatever
new forms of error are begotten of reaction, it is a comfort to believe that there are always some steps gained
which arie never lost. No man can look back on the
history of modern civilisation without seeing that it presents the phenomena of development and growth. Nor
can it be doubted, surely, that whatever may be the
decline of particular Communities, the progress of mankind, on the whole, is a progress to higher and better
things. And if this be true, no particular exceptions
should shake our faith in the general rule that all safe
progress depends on timely recognition being given to
the natural developments of Thought. They can never
be resisted in the end, and they are most liable to take
erroneous directions when they are resisted long. For
this is among the most certain of all the laws of Man's
nature-that his conduct will in the main be guided by
his moral and intellectual convictions.  "All human
society is grounded  on a system   of fundamental
opinions."  Such is the Law arrived at by the newest of
modern Philosophies,' and it would be well if all its
The Positive Philosophy of Aug. Comte," by J. S. Mill, p. Ioxe




LAW IN POLITICS.              389
discoveries were as near the truth. This is the Law to
which Christianity appeals, and in which its very roots
are laid, when it asserts, as no other Religion has ever
asserted, the power and virtue of Belief. And in this
Law lies the error which those commit who imagine they
can hold by the Ethics of Christianity, whilst regarding
vith comparative indifference its History and its Creed.
This, too, is the Law which lends all their importance
to the speculations of Philosophy. False conceptions
of the truth, in apparently the most distant provinces of
Thought, may and do relax the most powerful springs
of action. Among these false conceptions of the truth,
none are now more prevalent than those which concern
the definition, and the function  and the power of
"< Law." Instead of regarding the Constancy of Nature
as incompatible with the energies of Will, we must learn
to see in it the most powerful stimulus to inquiry, and the
nost cheering encouragement to exertion.
The superstition which saw in all natural phenomena
the action of capricious Deities was not more irrational
than the superstition which sees in them. nothing but the
action of Invariable Law. Men have been right and
not wrong, when they saw in the facts of Nature the
Variability of Adjustment even more clearly and more
surely than they saw the Constancy of Force. They
were right when they identified these phenomena with




390             THE REIGN OF LAW.
the phenomena of Mind. They were right when they
regarded their own faculty of Contrivance as the nearest
and truest analogy by which the Constitution of the
Universe can be conceived and its order understood.
They were right when they regarded its arrangements
as susceptible of Change; and when they looked upon
a change of Will as the efficient cause of other changes
without number and without end. It was well to feel
this by the force of Instinct; it is better still to be sure
of it in the light of Reason. It is an immense satisfaction to know that the result of Logical Analysis does
but confirm the testimony of Consciousness, and run
parallel with the primeval Traditions of Belief. It is
an unspeakable comfort that when we come to close
quarters with this vision of Invariable Law seated on the
Throne of Nature, we find it a phantom and a dreama mere nightmare of ill-digested Thought, and of'" God's
great gift of speech abused." We are, after all, what we
thought ourselves to be. Our freedom is a reality, and
not a name. Our faculties have in truth the relations
iwhich they seem to have to the Economy of Nature.
Their action is a real and substantial action on the
Constitution and Course of things. The Laws of Nature
were not appointed by the great Lawgiver to baffle His
creatures in the sphere of Conduct, still less to confound
them in the region of Belief. As parts of an Order of




LAW IN POLITICS.              391
t-lings too vast to be more than partly understood, they
present, indeed, some difficulties which perplex the intel.
lect, aind a few also, it cannot be denied, which wring
the heart. But, on the whole, they stand in harmonious
relations with the Human Spirit. They come visibly
from One pervading Mind, and express the authority
of one enduring Kingdom. As regards the moral ends
they serve, this, too, can be clearly seen, that the purpose of all Natural Laws is best fulfilled when they are
made, as they can be made, the instruments of intelligent
Will, and the servants of enlightened Conscience.








NOTE A.-PAGE 46.
THE article by Mr. Wallace in the Joturia  o/
Science (No. XVI.) for Oct. I867, on  "Creation by
Law," implies much misconception of the whole drift
and aim  of the observations I have made on Mro
Darwin's "Theory of the Origin of Species."
Two separate questions arise in respect to that
Theory:ISt. Does it adequately explain the Physical Agencies
by which new Forms have come to be?
2d. Does it, even if successful in this explanation,
supplant or impair the argument for Purpose and
Design, as founded both on the results and on the
methods of Creation?
Of these questions, which are entirely distinct, the
last is by far the most important of the twoQ  and




394                  3NOTES.
this second question is the one which I have chiefly
dealt with in the "Reign of Law."  As regards the
first question, indeed, I have indicated my opinion that
the explanation of Physical Agencies is very far from
being complete, and that the hypothesis can always
be driven back to some starting point where the very
condition of things is assumed for which the theory
professes to account.  In this edition, and in answer to
Mr. Wallace's challenge, I have added some farther
indication of the difficulties which remain unsolved,
and indeed untouched.
But my main  argument has been  addressed  to
the second question, and has been aimed chiefly at
this conclusion —that even supposing the theory to
be established, so far as it can go, it cannot affect or
disturb the inseparable relation which exists between
the intricate adjustments of Nature and Mental Purpbse
-as their sole conceivable origin and cause. In respect
to this argument, Mr. Wallace virtually admits all
I have maintained, when he says,'"It is simply a
question of how the Creator has worked."   I have
said nothing of "incessant interference," of "continual
rearrangement of details," or of "the direct action of
the Mind and Will of the Creator." On the contrary,
I have said that no purpose is ever attained in Nature
ouvrzrnal of Science, p. 473.




NOTES.                    395
except by the enlistment of Laws as the means and instruments of attainment; 1 that although Law "is never
present as a master, it appears never to have been absent
as a servant," 2 that we have " no certain reason to believe
that God ever works otherwise than through the use of
means;" or, in other words, through the instrumentality
of those elementary forces or properties of matter and
of mind which we call " Laws."  The idea of " incessant
interference" is one which I hold to be essentially
erroneous. It involves the idea of natural forces
being agencies altogether external to, and independent of, the Creative Mind.  This is the very idea
to which Mr. Wallace himself gives expression in its
extremest form, when he limits the function of the
Creator to that of so co-ordinating general laws " at the
first introductionz of life upon the earth,"3 as that they
shall work " of necessity" and " by themselves" the results
we see. This is unquestionably the way in which they
appear to us to work. It remains true that "no man hath
seen God at any time."  But even this conception does
not make the word " contrivance" (to which Mr. Wallace
objects) less applicable to' the adjustments of-Nature.
On the contrary, it makes it more strictly and literally
applicable than any other conception, because it likens
the Creative process more closely to those methods
P.  oo00.     P. 208.    8 oaurnal of Science, p. 474.




396                     NOTES.
adopted by human ingenuity, to which the word contrivance specially refers. The highest efforts of that
ingenuity are precisely those in which natural forces are
made to work "necessarily" and "by themselves." Selfacting machines are the most ingenious machines of all.
The self-action of the " governor " in a Steam-engine is
the most beautiful of the contrivances by which the elementary expansive force of steam is made to do the work
of Will.  Mr. Wallace thinks it "Can extraordinary idea
to imagine the Creator of the Universe contriving the
various complicated parts of an Orchis, as a mechanic
might contrive an ingenious toy or puzzle." 1 But this is
precisely the idea he himself supports, when he reduces
the Creator's work to the first starting of the forces of
organic life, and to the foresight merely of the consequences which must naturally and necessarily arise from
their first co-ordination. This is an accurate description
of the method in which a mechanic contrives the most
ingenious self-operating machines. No doubt the idea of
Omnipresence, which is the distinctive idea of God's
work as distinguished from Man's work, is an idea which
it is difficult for us to grasp or to keep steadily in view.
I do not deny or dispute that "( self-action " is and must
be the aspect in which Nature presents herself to us.
It could not be otherwise, unless the Invisible were to
a1 7ornzal of Science, p. 474.




NOTES.                   397
become the object of sight and touch. But in proportion
as we appreciate the infinite intricacy of Natural Adjustments, in the same proportion do we estimate the
impossibility of conceiving them as the result of Me.
chanical Necessity, which indeed is an inadequate
explanation even of our own methods of operation upon
the material world.
Mr. Wallace's article is an excellent example of the
arguments used in support of the Darwinian theory, both
in their strength and in their weakness. Their strength
lies in the hold they have of the idea and of the fact
that Nature is one vast system of Invisible Forces in a
condition of mutual adjustment. Their weakness lies in
the idea that the methods of that adjustment can ever be
explained as the result of mechanical necessity, or of
the mere elementary properties of matter working "by
themnseyes,"




398                     NOTES.
NOTE B.-PAGE 85.
Although the distinction I have made between Purpose as a general inference, and Purpose as a particular
fact, is a distinction which seems to me to be clear
enough when it is pointed out; yet it may be well to
give some further illustrations here which could not be
conveniently added to.the text. What Positivists profess
to insist upon is, that in describing a scientific fact, we
shall not import into it ideas which it does not necessarily involve, and which are in the nature of inferences
from  the fact.  What we, their opponents, have an
equal right to insist on is this-that in  describing
scientific facts, the description must not exclude any
of the ideas which the facts do  involve, and  that
the full and adequate description of those facts be
not evaded in order to keep out an idea Xwhich the
describer may choose  to call an inference.  Let us,take an illustration. Let us suppose that we find a
tube placed anyhow in such a position that we can
look through it to the sky at night. We do so, and we
see a star. The facts may be such that this descrip.
tion fully exhausts them.  That the tube was intended




NOTES.                   399
to bear upon that particular star, or upon any star,
would be a mere inference. But now let us suppose
that, when we look again after some considerable interval
of time, we find that the tube still bears upon the
same star, and let us further suppose the saIne experi.,
ment repeated with the same result during some hours,
then we should not describe the fact fully by simply
stating that the tube bore upon the star. It would be
necessary, in order to exhaust the facts, to say that the
tube was so adjZsted as to follow the apparent motion of
the sidereal heavens, and so to counteract the natural
effects of the earth's motion as to keep its axis always
upon the same star.  Here instantly we have the language of intention, because the idea of intention is
inseparable from the facts. We might know nothing of
the method by which this adjustment is achieved —
nothing more of the Mlind that had devised the method
than the bare fact of the intention.  But that bare fact is
an essential part of the observed phenomena.  And the
same argument applies to the mechanism-if that also
were discovered-by which the adjustment is effected
between the axis of the tube and the apparent motion
of the star. That mechanism could not be fully described unless it were described as a mechanism so contrived as to bring' about the adjustment which is actually
effected.




400                    INOTES,
Take again another case, from the organic world. A
calf, or any other young animal, discovers by smell or
by accident, the fact that milk is contained inside a skin
or bag, and that, by applying its mouth or its tongue to
some opening, it can get at the milk. The whole fact
in this case is exhausted when we say that the calf gets
the milk. It is no part of this fact that the calf was
intended to get it. But when a calf goes for milk to its
mother's udder-when the lacteal glands of the cow are
recognised as an apparatus for secreting that milk, and
the teat for delivering it,-then the facts are not exhausted, the scientific description is not complete or
truthful, unless we use language importing this adjustmnent of apparatus to Purpose in the plan by which
nourishment is afforded to the young in all mammalia.
This idea cannot be expelled from science as a mere
"inference, " except on the same arguments of bad
metaphysics, as I hold them to be, by which also
the existence of Matter and of an External World are
referred to the same category




NOTES.                   4Oz
NOTE C, —-PAGE 86.
In illustration of the assertion in the text, that the
relations of Number, which are the very basis of all
"verifiable'" knowledge, may be reduced by similar
arguments to mere creations of the Mind, I may here
remind the reader of the passage which relates to this
subject in the famous argument of Berkeley: —
"d That number is entirely the creature of the mind, even
though the other qualities be allowed to exist without,
will be evident to whoever considers that the same thing
bears a different denomination of number as the mind
views it with different respects. Thus the same extension is one, or three, or thirty-six, according as the mind
considers it with reference to a yard, a foot, or an inch.
Number is so visibly relative and dependent on men's
understanding, that it is strange to think how any one
should give it an absolute existence without the mind.
We say one book, one page, one line; all these are
equally units, though some contain several of the others.
And in each instance it is plain the unit relates to some
particular combination of ideas arbitrarily put together
by the mind."-Prin. of Hum. ICno'wZ, Part I. ~ xii.
D n




402                   NOTES.
NOTE D. —PAGE 2o4.
Mr. Mill, in his "System of Logic" (Book I. c. iii.,
~~ 6, 7, 8), has told us that both of Bodies and of Minds,
"philosophers have at length provided us with a defi..
nition which seems unexceptionable." As regards Body,
this definition is-" The external cause, and (according
to the more reasonable opinion) the unknown external
cause, to which we refer our sensations." This definition, though very defective, is at least not erroneous.
It is necessary, however, to observe that the word
" unknown" cannot be accurately predicated of that
respecting which the very terms of the definition imply
that something is known. The definition of Body
is the definition of that which is known respecting it.
Three things are involved in this definition, as known
respecting Body; —these are (I) Externality, (2) Extension, and (3) Causation-that is to say. the power
of causing or exciting sensations in sentient beings.
Or perhaps  these  three items of knowledge may
be merged in one —the knowledge of Force acting
from outside upon us, and exciting sensations in us.
But this is knowledge.  When the wold "unknown"




NOT'ES.                   403
therefore  is inserted in the terms of the definition
given  by  Mr. Mill, it can  only mean that other
things still remain to be known respecting the nature
and properties of Body.  In this sense-that is, when
translated  into  "partially known" — no  philosopher
would deny the correctness of its application. The
definition of both Body and Mind is given by Mr.
Mill in another passage, which also, so far as it goes,
is unexceptionable.  " As Body is understood to be the
mysterious something which excites the Mind to feel, so
Mind is the mysterious something which feels and
thinks."  The same two fundamental ideas of Externality and Causation are here also implicitly and inextricably involved. Mr. Mill adds that the farther discussion
of this question belongs not to Logic but to Metaphysics,
to which science he leaves it.
Two chapters, accordingly, in Mr. Mill's "Examination
of Hamilton "(xi. and xii.), are devoted to a discussion of
the "( Psychological Tlheory of the Belief in an External
World," and of the question how far the same theory
nmay or may not be also applicable to Mind.  The
conclusion to which I have referred in the text is
the conclusion defended in the first of these chapters.  It is the conclusion of a Pure  Idealism-an
Idealism much more extreme than the theory of
Berkeley, It is true that Berkeley denied the existence
D D 2




404                    NOTES.
of Matter as a thing apart from  Mind-not, be it
observed, as a thing apart from  our  zinds, but as
a thing apart from  some mind.  But this was only
because he sublimed it into the action of another
Spirit upon  our own.  In  his system  the idea of
Causation was tenaciously retained. The very essence
of his argument was that our ideas mlust have a
cause-" some cause whereon they depend, and which
produces them and changes them." As this cause
could not be the ideas themselves (which ideas are all
that we know of matter), " it remained that the cause
of Ideas is an incorporeal active substance or spirit."l
This argument is repeated in several forms, as again
where he says,2 that men were "' conscious that they were
not the authors of their own sensations, which they
evidently knew were imprinted from wihzouzt, and which
therefore must have some cause distinct from the Minds
on which they were imprinted." ]But the Psychological
Theory of Mr. Mill involves all the weak points of the
Berkeleian theory with none of its strength. Mr. Mill's
formula is expressly framed so as to eliminate as much as
possible the idea of Causation, and to keep out of sight
the connexion which exists between our sensations and
that which excites them.  The attempt, indeed, is not
successful, because Mr. Mill caPlnot express himseif
a 6 Prin. of Hum. Know." ~ xxvi.  2 ibid. ~ lvi.




NOTES.                   4c0
through many colnseculttive sentences without assuming
the very ideas which he is trying to account for as a mere
product of more elementary conceptions. This has been
shown clearly, and with abundant illustration, in Dr.
/'Cosh's "Examination of Mr. J. S. Mill's Philosophy~"
Mr. Mill pleads upon this point that he must use common
language, but that the whole of this language has its own
special meaning under the Psychological Theory as well
as under the common Realistic Theory. This may be
true; but there are certain words which must have the
same meaning under all theories; and, in spite of his
efforts, he is compelled to employ words which show
that neither he nor any one  else  can  maintain
consistently a purely subjective conception of Matter,
-that is to say, a conception which dispenses with
an external agency or force.  He says, that "almost
all philosophers, who have narrowly examined the subject, have decided that Substance need only be postulated as a szqpport for phenomena, or as a bond of
connexion to hold a group or series of othzerwise unconnected phenomena together."  Mr. Mill goes on with
much simplicity: "Let us only then thinzk away the
support, and suppose the phenomena to remain, and to
be held together in the same groups and series by some
other qagency, or without any agency beut an izte-'nal lawand every consequence follows without Substance, for




406                    NOTES.
the sake of which Substance is assumed." 1 The demand here made upon us, to " t/ink asary " the support
of phenomena, is certainly made less formidable when,
in the next breath, we are told to t/zink it back agaiu
under another form of words, as "another agency," or
as an I internal law."
The same vain attempt to get behind ultimate ideas
may be traced in the word " Permanent," with which
Mr. Mill qualifies Matter considered as " A Possibility
of Sensation." The new formula is "A PervzczdeetZt
Possibility of Sensation." Why permanent? Permanent
means enduring.  But what has the element of Time to
do with it? The percipient minds are not permanent,
so far as the sensations of their existing organism is
concerned. In what sense, then, are the " Possibilities
of Sensation" permanent? What is it that is described
as permanent?  Not the sensations-not the individual
sentient beings.  What then?  Clearly the Power or
Agency which causes, or is capable of exciting sensations in organisms that are, or that are to be. Here,
then, we have the ideas of Externality and of Causation
brought back under the covering of Time. "' What is it
we mean," asks Mr. Mill, " when we say that the object
we perceive is external to us, and not a part of our own
X Appendix to chaps. xi. and xii. "Mill on Hamilton, 6th ed.
P. 246.




NOTES.                   407
thoughts? "  The reply to this question, in the first
Edition, ran as follows: " We mean that there zs in ozur
Perceptions something which exists when we are not
thinking of it, which existed before we ever thought of
it, and wozld exist if we were annii/hilaed."  In the
recent Edition, this reply has been altered so as to
avoid the obvious absurdity of supposing that things
which are conceived to exist only " in our perceptions,"
could nevertheless continue to exist "if we were annihilated."  Accordingly the reply now runs thus: "lWe
mean that there is concerned in our perceptions," &c.
Yes; but how concerned? As an exciting Force or producing Cause, and in no other way. Similar observations
apply to the word "Possibility," as applied in Mr. Mill's
Psychological Theory. Possible can only mean Potential. A Possibility of sensation must mean a Potential
Cause of sensation. And here, again, we have the same
fundamental ideas involved in the very language by
which it is attempted to evade them.
Mr. Mill appears to me to be equally unsuccessful in
starting fairly in this Psychological Theory-that is to
say, in the definition of postulates which steer clear
of involving the very ideas for which he professes to
account.  ilis first postulate is that the Human Mind
is capable of Expectation. Certainly; but what does
Expectation involve? It involves acts of Mcnlolry,




408                    NOTESo
and of Comparison, and of Reason.  In particular, it
involves, or at least he is not entitled to deny that it may
involve, the intuitive belief that actual sensations already
experienced arose from an external cause, and that the
same cause is capable of exciting them again. My belief
is that the mind cannot place itself in the attitude of
expectation without the presence of ideas which involve
the whole question in dispute.
I am disposed, therefore, to agree with Mr. Mill, that
the existence of an external material world cannot be
proved; —just in the same sense, and for the same
reason, that the proposition-" Things that are equal
to the same thing are equal to one another," cannot
be proved.
Mr. Mill thinks that, though the existence of an external
Material world cannot be proved, an external Immaterial
world can be proved —that is to say, the existence of
other minds can be proved.  I thihk he only succeeds
in showing that our belief in this existence can be
confirmed by corroborative evidence.  But such corroboration and  confirmation  is equally available in
support of the belief in the existence of Matter, considered as an External Cause of sensation. The truth
is, our knowledge of other minds is only reached through
our previous knowledge of Matter, and of the impressionsc;
it makes uuon us. My own mind, as; well as the mind




NOTES.                    409
of all the beings around me, is, or seems to be, inseparably connected with a Material Organization, and
there are no manifestations of Mind which do not come
to me directly or indirectly through material signs.
Mr. Mill has often warned us, and I accept the
warning, against the system of discussing metaphysical
questions, under the threat, as it were, that the conclus;ons to which we are opposed are inconsistent with
some one or more Theological Beliefs. We know that
the Ideal Theory, in the form at least which it took in
the hands of Berkeley, was put forward in the interests
of Religion.  "The existence of matter, or bodies unperceived, has not only been the main support of
Atheists and Fatalists, but on the same principle doth
Idolatry likewise, in all its various forms, depend.  Did
men but consider that the sun, moon, and stars, and
every other object of the senses, are only so many sensations in their own minds, which have no other existence
but barely being perceived, doubtless they would never
fall down and worship their own Ideas, but rather
address homage to that Eternal Invisible Mind which
produces and sustains all things."    Such was the
animating principle of the Bishop of Cloyne's famous
speculation.  I confess I have a profound distrust of
1 "'Prin. of Huml. Knowl." ~ xciv.




410                   NOTES.
all attempts to found the teachings of Faith upon the
principles of Scepticism. I am not tempted, in order to
escape the danger of Materialism, to deny the existence
of that, which I know by my own structure, and by
the structure of all around me, to be different from
Mind.  I am content to understand the world as my
own faculties have been co-ordinated with external
things to reveal those things to  me.  I look in
my friend's face, and I see the expression of power,
and of intellect, and of goodness.  These are attributes of Mind. I do not know how these attributes
can be shown forth so evidently in the colours and
in the lines of flesh and blood. But I do not try
to persuade myself that his' hand or his face are the
same things, either with the perceptions which they
excite in me, or with the emotions which they express
in him. I do not pretend to understand the nature of
the connexion between these Material Forms and the
qualities of Mind. But after their own diverse kinds and
measures they are both equally " real" to me. I will
not deceive myself by verbal quibbles-pretending to
be able to stand outside myself, and to prove by reason
that the very tools with which reason works are rotten
in her hands. There is but one sentence in these two
chapters of Mr. Mill's work which conveys any really
important truth. In regard to the existence of Matter,




NOTES.                  411
as well as in regard to the nature of Memory and of
Mind, we may indeed well say with him: "By far the
wisest thing we can do is to accept the inexplicable
facts, without any theory how it takes place; and when
we are obliged to speak of them in terms which assume
a theory, to use them with a reservation as to their
meaning."




412                   NOTES.
NOTE E.-PAGE 299.
When I wrote this passage in the text, I had not read
a curious note by Sir W. Hamilton in his edition of
Reid's Works.1 It is almost droll in its confession of the
puzzling significance of such facts, in respect to animals,
as those I have referred tb.  "Nothing in the compass
of inductive reasoning appears more' satisfactory than
Berkeley's Demonstration of the necessity and manner of
our learning, by a slow process of observation in comparison alone, the connexion between the perception of
vision and touch, and, in general, all that relates to the
distance and real magnitude of external things. But
although the same necessity seems in theory equally
incumbent on the lower animals as on man, yet this
theory is provokingly (!)-and that by the most manifest
experience-found totally at fault with regard to them;
for we find that all the animals who possess at birth the
power of regulated motion (and these are those only
through whom the truth of the theory can be brought to
the test of a decisive experiment), possess also from birth
the whole apprehension of distance, &c. which they are
a Vol. I, p. 182, note.




NOTES.                    413
ever known to exhibit. The solution of this difference
by a resort to instinct is unsatisfactory; for instinct is in
fact an occult principle-a kind of natural revelation,and the hypothesis of instinct, therefore, only a confession
of our ignorance: and at the same time, if instinct be
allowed in the lower animals, how can we determine
whether and how far instinct may not in like manner
operate to the same result in man? "
Well might Sir oW. Hamilton ask this question.  It is
one which Philosophers will find it hard to answer. My
own conviction is that more than half the "inductive
reasoning" by which men have pretended to account for
their intuitive perceptions is altogether unsound.  Man,
besides being man, is also an animal-and through his
animal organisation the mechanics of his mind are to a
large extent regulated on the same principles which regulate the lower Intelligences around him-that is to say,
by processes unconsciously pursued. This is the proper
definition of operations which are Instinctive; and, as
Sir WT. Hamilton observes, they may best be conceived
as the result of "Natural revelatiorn"




414                  NIOTES.
NOTE F.-PAGE 304.
In  the number of the Dub/in Rezview for April
1867, there is an article on "Science, Prayer, Free Will,
and Miracles," in which some portions of this work are
criticised.  With much of that criticism  I have every
reason to be satisfied. The main objection taken may be
stated in two sentences. I have said that (under certain
limitations as to the meaning of the words) the " abstract
predictability of human conduct" may be admitted without involving the denial of anything essential to the doctrine of Free Will. Dr. Ward denounces this concession
as absolutely fatal to that doctrine, and maintains that
in making such a concession, as well as in other more
direct forms of statement, my view comes to be "precisely identical with Mr. Mill's," which, nevertheless, I
am "professing" to oppose. This position he proceeds
to support by an elaborate argument, which I shall here
examine with all the care due to the gravity of the
question raised, and to the duty of using no language
upon such a subject which is not justified by as much
precision of thought as is attainable in regard to it.
As Dr Ward speaks upon this subject with some




NOTES.                    41.
warmth of feeling, perhaps I may explain at once that
he is mistaken in supposing that I am'"a Calvinist,"
in the sense of holding "the Necessitarian Doctrine."
I hold the doctrine of Free Will in the only sense
in which it is to me intelligible. I set the highest
value upon it; and in the result, though not in this
particular argument, I believe I agree with Dr. Ward
himself.  I am  willing to accept without reservation
the definition  which  he quotes from  certain Jesuit
theologians: "Potentia libera est qute, positis omnibus
requisitis ad agendum, potest agere et non agere.'
But Dr. Ward does not seem to observe that in this
definition the whole question in dispute may be covered
under'its contingent clause.  Everything depends on
the further definition to be given of " all the requisites
for action."  Is, or is not, the condition of the mind
itself to be considered as one of those "requisites?"
Is knowledge, and the possession of those motives
which knowledge gives, a "requisite " or not?  Do the
"requisites" intended, by the Jesuit definition, refer to
nothing more than the presence or absence of physical
constraint?  The truth is that such abstract definitions
go very little way in explanation of themselves. I have
asserted the freedom of the Will under several forms of
statement which are much more explicit, because much
more full and more detailed. Thus, I have said, " Among




416 i  NOTES.
the motives which act upon mind, Man has a selecting
power. He can, as it were, stand out from  among
them-look  down from  above them-compare them
among each other, and bring them to the test of conscience." This is freedom, if there be such a thing
conceivable in thought. But Dr. Ward's impetuous zeal
in favour of Free Will blinds him to certain truths which
are perfectly compatible with this doctrine, and which
not only must be admitted, but must be claimed, if we
are ever to wield against Necessitarians the weapon of
analysis.  The principal object of this work has been
to show that, in so far as science has successfully established in physics the idea of the Reign of Law, that idea
does not affect or traverse the Reign of Mind, and the
supremacy of Purpose.  In like manner, I think it
can be shown that in so far as Psychology can successfully establish the idea of Causation, as applicable to
Mind, that idea is perfectly compatible with the true
freedom of the Will. Dr. Ward says very truly, that the
Necessitarian doctrine has in all ages been embraced by
many powerful minds. This indicates that, in so far as
it is false at all, its falseness probably depends on some
partial aspects of truth mingled with the fallacies of
definition.  My own opinion unquestionably is, that
when Necessitarians have been compelled to disown
and abjure the idea of compulsion, their doctrine ceases




NOTES.                   417
to be the doctrine of Necessity at all in any legitimate
sense of the word. What I mean by freedom is freedoml from compulsion, and nothing else. When I say
that the Will is free, I do not mean that its moverxents
can be separated from the inducements internal and
external under which it moves.  But then I insist that
"Motive " shall have the widest meaning-that it shall
include such motives, evolved out of the very constitution of the mind itself, as " Love, and Reverence,
and Gratitude, and Hunger after Knowledge and Desire
of Truth."  Of course this is not given as a complete
list, but only a sample of the things which must be
claimed as "motives."  In this sense, not only is the
dcltermining power of Motive inseparable from the very
idea of AMind; but the higher is the quality of a mind,
the more certain and definite will be the motives of its
action.  By some strange confusion of thought, Dr.
WF ard seems to regard with horror the idea of the
Will being regarded as part of "the constitution of
the mind." This is a mere question of words. But
if by Will, Dr. Wizard does not understand a particular
power of mind, I do not know what he means.  To
analyse Mind at all, we must of course consider its
different powers as separate from  each other; but it
does not the less remain true that they are all parts
of one whole.  In  this point of view, Dr. Ward's
EE




41  8                 NOTES.
own definition of Free Will is far from clear. "The
Will, we maintain, has a certain power of deciding
for itself V hat weight it shall attach to motives."
Certainly, if the Will be understood as including the
Deliberative Faculty whose function it is to "c weigh." But
in coming to this decision it must be guided by something, which something may always itself be resolved
into another " motive."
And if this appears to be a mere play on words, I
grant it.  It is the very point and object of my argument to show that in so far as the Necessitarian doctrine has any apparent force, it does depend on mere
ambiguities of language.  For example-exclude from
the word " motive" all the influences which come upon
the spirit from the mind itself-from conscience, from
the action upon it of another Spirit, human or divineconfine the word "motive" (as many do, tacitly by
implication, though not consciously) to that class of
motives which come from external and material things,
-in short, confine it to the appetites or desires, then it
absolutely ceases to be true that the Will is determined
by "motives."  On the other hand, include in the word
"motive" all that can ever influence the mind, whether
from within or from without, then it ceases as absolutely
to be true that the Will can ever be "free" from such
motives. But then, in this sense, the Necessitarian doc



NOTES.                    41 9
trine resolves itself, as Mr. Mansel says, into the identical
proposition that 6"the prevailing motive prevails."  It
becomes perfectly harmless, because in reality perfectly
unmeaning.  Dr. Ward is very indignant that I should
represent my view as "a mere truism." But it is not
my own view, but the Necessitarian doctrine, when thus
reduced by analysis to its real value, which I have represented as a mere truism.
All these fallacies and confusions of thought arise, in
mly opinion, from neglect of the fact that freedom has no
absolute, but only a relative meaning.  Freedom  can
only mean "the not being bound," and bonds can only
consist in something binding.  Freedom of the Will can
only mean that the Will is free from compulsion.  If
Necessity does not mean compulsion, it either means
nothing at all, or nothing inconsistent with freedom
when properly defined and understood.
We now come to what is called the "Abstract predictability of human conduct." This is the phrase into
which Mr. Mill retreats, as containing the residuum of
truth which still belongs to the Necessitarian doctrine
after it has abjured the idea of compulsion. It is not my
phrase, or one which I approve of, because it involves a
great number of assumptions which lie, as it were, concealed within it. But I adhere to the opinion that, when
strictly defined, the idea it involves is perfectly capable
E E 2




420                    NOTES.
of being reconciled with the freedom of the Will. The
truth is, that it is capable of being resolved into the same
identical proposition as the Necessitarian doctrine in
other forms.
If by "abstract predictability" is meant that prediction would be possible under the conditions of complete, universal, and perfect knowledge, I do not see
either how it can be denied, or to what purpose it can
be affirmed. The proposition is that, if ALL the conditions were known which determine the Will in deciding
for itself, or " in giving weight to motives," the result of
that decision would thereby become also known.  Of
the Necessitarian doctrine expressed in this general
form, I have said, and I repeat, that it is "'very like
a truism."  But if it is useless as an affirmation, it is at
least not capable of denial.  Dr. Ward, however, does
deny it, and supports his denial by reasoning which is
clearly untenable, as an admission made by himself will
show. His idea seems to be, that no "predictable"
conduct can be "free;" that nothing which can be
abstractedly foreseen can be, the result of freedom. But
Dr. Ward does not, and cannot maintain this view consistently. He admits that, "'taking any given man at
any given moment, there are certain things so good, and
certain things so bad, that we may infallibly calculate
he will do neither the one nor the other."  Would




NOTES.                  42 
Dr. Ward then admit that as regards those " very bad,"
and those " very good," deeds, this man is not "free?"
Or does he think he escapes this difficulty, by putting
the man's conduct in the negative instead of the positive
form? As regards the action of the Will, no such distinction is of any avail. The not doing one thing is the
doing of another. The not doing a very good deed,
which he has power to do (" positis omnibus requisitis
ad agendum"), is willing not to do it. The not doing
a very bad deed is willing to do something else. If
then the conduct of the man in those cases "can be
calculated with perfect certainty," it is so calculable
only because knowledge of his character is convertible
into knowledge of the manner in which his Will is sure
to act. Is it not then a clear violation, both of the
ordinary and of t-he philosophical use of language, to say
that a man is not "free" to do a very bad act, because
we know certainly beforehand that his character, and the
motives on which he habitually acts, will prevent him
from doing it?
But then Dr. Ward proceeds to argue that though infallible calculation may be possible in respect to deeds
very good, and very bad, it will not be possible in
regard to deeds only a little good and a little bad. But
how does this greater difficulty arise? Is it not because
the number of motives telling on the Will is greater,




422                    NOTES.
more nicely balanced, and therefore less known? And
is not this difference precisely the kind of difference
which would disappear, if he could pass from  knowledge which is partial only, to knowledge which is
complete and absolute?  But whatever difficulty may
arise from imperfect knowledge is (as I understand the
phrase) eliminated by the word " abstract," as qualifying
"predictability."  No one asserts that prediction can
be founded on partial knowledge.  But the question
raised is whether even perfect knowledge of all the
elements of motive and of character can render predictable the conduct of a really Free Agent.  The
question is one involving a logical principle, which,
if applicable to the conduct of a Free Agent in any case,
must be equally applicable to his conduct in all cases.
If it is abuse of terms, or a confusion of thought, to.-firm that a man's Will is not free to do or not to do
very bad actions, because we can calculate infallibly the
decision of his Will in regard to them, it must be equally
fallacious to affirm that his Will would not be free in
regard to lesser degrees of vice and virtue if, in like
manner, we were able fron., perfect knowledge of his character to predict his conduct also in respect to them. The
doctrine of Free Will, like every other doctrine of Mental
Science, can only be defended by clear definitions of
-what it is. Its defenders have in my opinion established




NOTES.                    423
their case when they have compelled Necessitarians
to discard the idea of compulsion. All attempts to deny
that the Will is determined by " motives " are futile, and
only result in giving a seeming victory to those who have
in reality been defeated.
In order to illustrate what I mean, I will suppose a
particular case; and to comply with the conditions of
Dr. Ward's argument, it shall be a case where no determination, either very good or very bad, is involved.
I will suppose that in arguing with a friend on the
subject of Free Will, a plate of oranges is offered to
me. My friend tells me that "he knows which of these
oranges I shall choose." I tell him he cannot possibly
know this —that my Will is free, and therefore he cannot
predict my choice.  He insists upon it that he can.  I
then observe that one orange has a smoother skin than
the others, and is of a deeper yellow colour.  I then
recollect that I had once mentioned in my friend's
hearing that I considered a pale colour, or a rough
skin, as indications of sour or tasteless oranges; and
remembering this fact, I at once perceive that my friend
is calculating my conduct from a motive which, as he
knows, does habitually determine my choice of oranges.
I am conscious also that in this particular case I should
have been so determined —if this dispute had not arisen.
JBut in order to show my friend that my Will is really




424                   NOTES.
free from this power of "motive," I determine to exert
that freedom by choosing the palest, or the roughest
orange in the plate, and I accordingly do so. This is
an assertion of my Free Will-a practical denial of the
doctrine that I am the slave of "motives."  But is it
not clear in this case, that my conduct has been determined after all only by another and a stronger motive
than the one which usually acts with me in the matter
— even by the motive of proving to my friend that he
~was wrong, and that I was right?-a motive which is
strong with all men, and is supposed to have special
attractions for a Scotchman. And is it not equally clear,
that if my friend had had more perfect knowledge of
my character, and had known that I recollected the
former conversation, and could therefore guess the
grounds of his prediction, he might, and would have
been able to foresee correctly the new motive which
had thus arisen to overpower the other?  And finally,is it not equally evident that, if he had been able by this
extraordinary sagacity to predict my choice correctly,
the correctness of that prediction would not have implied the existence of any constraint on the freedom of
my Will, but, on the contrary, would have been founded
on his knowledge of my freedom to pass from the old
motive and to give effect to the new one?
A thousand different examples of the same kind might




NOTES.                   425
be given. That on which the Will finally determines to
act may always be called, and is always properly called,
a motive. And this is observable in respect to the whole
question, that precisely in proportion to the high qualities
of any *given mind-in proportion to its intellectual
power and its moral strength-in proportion to its keen
insight into the causes and tendencies of things, and its
appreciation of truth and righteousness-in the same
proportion will the distinction vanish in its eyes between
things " very bad," and things only a little bad. In the
same proportion, therefore, will its own conduct be
guided by definite and certain motives: in the same
proportion, finally, will that conduct become predictable,
because in the exercise of its freedom it is governed by
moral laws which never change.




426                  NOTES.
NOTE G.-PAGE 306.
Mr. Mahaffy, in his article in the Coniem/orary
Review, has taken objection to the breadth of meaning
which I have given in this passage to the word "6 motive."
He says, I have "surely fused together two opposite
theories under the ambiguous meaning of motive." This
is precisely what I have done, and what I meant to do.
I adopt all that I consider to be true in the so-called
Necessitarian Doctrine, which, when cleared from the
idea of compulsion, is no doctrine of necessity at all.
The residuum of truth is, that the Will must always act
on some motive. I have taken also all that is of any
value in the Doctrine of Free Will, which is-that among
the "motives" of the mind must be reckoned those
inducements which arise out of its higher, as well as
out of its lower faculties. But Mr. Mahaffy is, in my
opinion, clearly wrong when he objects to the word
" motive" being employed with this breadth of meaning.
His objection indeed is explained to be that the word
" motive " ought not to be applied to the " action of the
Will upon itself." But I have not so applied it, because
1 have no notion what " the action of the Will upon itself"




NOTES.                   427
means. Mr. Mahaffy gives a farther explanation of this
expression, when he speaks of the Will "creating principles of action for itself."  But I deny altogether that
the "creating" of anything is the function of the Will.
It is by an act of Will that we fix our attention upon any
given motive, or turn, on the contrary, our attention from
it. But if we are to analyse the mind at all, if for the convenience of thought and of discussion, we are to divide its
inseparable Unity into different powers, we must make the
division as logical as we can-that is, as consistent as
possible with definite ideas of distinct mental functions.
In considering the Will as a separate Power, we must
strictly confine it to what may be called the Executive of the Mind.  In this light it would be altogether
incorrect to ascribe the " creation" of any motive to the
Will. Motives of all kinds, both the highest and the
lowest, may rise, and do rise unbidden in the mind. It
is by an act of Will that we summon different motives
to the presence of the Deliberative Faculties, that we
cherish one and dismiss another, or determine to spend
thought and time in making our choice between motives
which are conflicting. But the Will cannot with accuracy be said to be the creator of motives. Intellectual
and moral conceptions, held together by the bonds of
Memory, are the fountains from  which the highest
motives come.  Mr. Mahaffy admits that "anything




428'                  NOTES.
brought to bear upon the Will fro; withoZt i/se/f even
from  the intellectual part of the mind, is a motive."
But according to my definition of the Will all motives
come equally from outside the Will, and assuredly I see no
ground for the distinction Mr. Mahaffy seems to draw
between the Intellectual and the Moral faculties.  In
denying the name of motive to those inducements which
comle from the affections or from the sense of right and
wrong, he imposes a restriction on the meaning of the
word which is not less inconsistent with common usage
than with philosophical accuracy. Affection and gratitude, the love of man and the love of God, are all surely
"motives" in the most proper sense of the term. Yet
Mr. Mahaffy asks, "Is it not an abuse of language
to say that the man who resists temptation by creating
within his breast a strong feeling of moral responsibility
is determined by motives? " To this question I reply
at once (passing over the question of the "' creation " of
motives) that it is no abuse of language, but, on the
contrary, the employment of language in its natural and
ordinary sense. On what principle is the love of knowledge (being intellectual) to be called a motive, if the
love of God is not?  On what principle is a desire
of producing physical results to be called a motive, if
the desire of attaining moral ends is denied the name?
No such distinction is tenable in a philosophical point




NOTES.                   429
of view, and no such distinction is known in the usual
and familiar employment of the word "motive."  Mr.
Mahaffy, however, in making this objection, has put his
finger upon the point on which the whole discussion
turns.  Like many other metaphysical questions, it
depends almost entirely on a definition of terms. If
the word " motive" be arbitrarily limited to mental
affections of one or two particular kinds, if it be confined to the lower appetites and desires, or even if it be
extended to the higher appetites of the Intellect, whilst
it is denied to the inducements of morality, of conscience, of Religion,-then it ceases to be true that the
mind is determined by motives alone. The result is
that the so-called "Necessitarian" Doctrine, in so far
as it is true at all, must not only exclude the idea of
compulsion, but it must include all that class of inducements, on the pre-existence of which, and on the power
of choice among them, the responsibility of the Will
depends.
The view presented in the text of the great question
of Necessity and Free Will does fuse together some
portions of the two opposite Theories which have so
long divided men's minds regarding it. But in this fusion
I do but follow the process pursued by Dante in a profound and beautiful passage of his " Purgatorio" (Canto
I8th). To Necessity he ascribes the existence and the




430                      NOTES.
power of Motive. Motives arise out of the relations
pre-established between the Human Spirit and all the
Influences by which it is surrounded. No other account
can be given of them. Dante sees no difficulty, as some
modem defenders of the Free Will doctrine do, in comparing the ultimate nature and origin of all our mental
desires with the nature and origin, equally inexplicable,
of the Instincts of the lower animals. Hear the lines,
not less musical in sense than they are in sound" Perb, la onde venga lo intelletto
Delle prime notizie, uomo non sape
E de' primi appetibili l'affetto;
Che sono in vol, sl come studio in ape
Di far lo mele."
To Free Will he ascribes the power of Counsel-of
deliberation and of choice among the motives which
thus arise from the very nature and constitution of the
Mind. This power guards the " Threshold of Assent:""6 Innata v'% la virth che consiglia,
E dell' assenso de' tener la soglia."
On this power depends the responsibility of con.
duct --
"' Quest' V'l principio 1U onde si piglia
Cagion di meritare in voi, secondo
Che buoni amori o rel accoglie e viglia.




NOTES.                        43 1
The passage closes with these beautiful and striking,
lines:"a Color che ragionando andaro al fondo
S'accorser d'esta innata libertate;
Per6 moralit& lasciaro al mondo.
Onde pognam che di necessitate
Surga ogni amor, che dentro a voi s'accende;
Di ritenerlo e in voi la potestate."
It would be difficult to give so much philosophy iu
fewer words.




43 2                  NOTES,
NOTE H.-PAGE 309.
In the last edition of Mr. Mill's work (I867), he has
made an addition to the sentence quoted in the text,
so that it now runs thus:-" I deny it as strenuously as
any one, in the case of human volitions, but'I deny it
just as munich of all otherlphenomena." If Mr. Mill means,
by this addition; to imply that he can deny compulsion
(for example) in the behaviour of a billiard-ball, when
it is struck, "just as much" as he can deny it, of the
behaviour of a man when he is insulted, he renders his
previous explanation valueless, and restores again to the
doctrine of Necessity that very element of meaning which
he professes to disclaim.  Compulsion is predicable of
the effects of Physical Force exerted upon Matter, in a
sense in which it is not predicable of the effects of Moral
or Intellectual inducements exerted upon Mind. This is
precisely the distinction which Necessitarians are perpetually confounding; and so long as they do confound
it, their doctrine is justly open to the objection implied
in the name usually assigned to it. Even if it be true,
as Mr. Mill holds, that we have no other idea of
Physical Causation than that of uniform and invariable




NOTES.                   433
sequence,-no idea of Necessity in Causation,-still it
remains true that Compulsion is, apparently'to us.
involved in the effects of Physical Forces upon Matter,
in a sense in which it is not involved in the effects
of "Motive" upon Miind.








INDEX,
ABORTED Limbs in various ani-    how Watt sulbjected the inmals, 194-5; Member, no, in     variable energies of Steam to
man, 201; Organs, to be read     the variable  conditions  of,
either in the light of History,  340; Variability of, in the
or of Prophecy, 205; Organs,    facts of Nature, 389.
existence of, the fact most diffi-   Adjustments of Organization,
cult to disengage from  the      phenomena of Mind mediately
Theory of Development, 266.      dependent on, 294.
Abstract Conceptions, Law as   Affections, the, dependent on
applied to, 65; Men's Idols'  material structure, 278.
nowadays their own, I I2.      African Savages debating a great
Acland, Dr. H. W. on "Pur-         Homological Q: ~stion, I98.
pose," 83.                     Agassiz' Geological Sketches,
"Act of Parliament, you cannot     269.
make men moral by," in what  Air, Navigation of the, a beausense a truism, in what a fal-    tiful example of Animal Melacy, 365.                       chanics, 129; Elasticity of, the
Adapted Colouring in the Ani-      Law which, in the flight  f
mal Kingdom, 177, et seq.       birds,  counteracts  gravity,
"Adherence to Type," in the        132; French scientific men 
nature of a Mental Purpose,     advance of English  on the
259; these words express a      subject of  locomotion  in,
Purpose fulfilled in Organic     I70.
Forms, 270.                   Albatross, the  mechanism  of
Adjusted Organs, Man's want    flight in, i50; the flight -)f,
of certain, 295; Forces, how   described, 152; how it sails or
far our Volitions are subject   wheels round a ship, I54.
to, 322.                      Ammonites, great beauty of, 189.
Adjustment, Principle of, no   Analogy between the operation3;
meaning except as the result    of God and the operations of
of Purpose, 78; fundamental     men's minds, illustrated by
Principles of, never altered    every known instance of Co:nthrough the whole scale oi    trivance, I28.
nlrganic Life, 269; as applied   Analogy in Use and I-Iomolcgy
to the Mental Faculties, 283;   in Structure, I99.
FF2




436                          INDEX.
Ancient Lawgivers always aim-        to, I2; Sir J. Herschel's Outing at Standards of Political     lines of, 122.
Society, 326.                   Atheism, false charge of, against
Andes, the, species of Humming       Professor Huxley, 89.
Birds peculiar to, 228.-        Atmosphere, the, resisting force
Azngraecum   Sesquipedale;  see      of, to a body moving through
Madagascar Orchis, 44.            it, I3I.
Animal Creation, the Power of   Automatic Faculties in Mind as
God as manifested in; Pro-        well as in Body, 292.
fessor Owen's work quoted,  "4Azoic" Rocks, the Rhizopods
263.                               discovered near the very lowAnimals, a definite Pattern for      est of, 2Io.
each class of, 211.
Antecedents, no  phenomena,                      B.
mental or physical, without,
313.                            Backward flight in a bird, why
Anthropoid Apes, skeletons of,    impossible, I40.
265.                            Bacon quoted, 4.
Apprenticeship,  earlier  mills   Baking Trade, the, in Edinburgh
worked under a system  of,        and Glasgow, good effects of
348.                              combination in, 378.
Apteryx, useless wing-bones in,   Bats' finger-bones, how modified,
t95.                               I69.
Archetypal arrangement in Or-   Beauty, love of, a purpose we see
chids, 44.                        fulfilled in Nature, 271.
Argus Pheasant, 193.              Being, the great mystery of our,
Aristotle, Philosophy of, 328-       272.
330.                            Beliefs, intelligent spiritual, only
Arkwright, 344, 347.                 widened  by the progress of
Ashley, Lord, first effectual mea-   Phvsical Science, 11 4.
sure on the Factory Question   Biblical Narrative oft Creation,
passed through the exertions       the, room  left in  it for a
of, 362.                           Material Process, 27.
Asiatic Deserts, Sand-grouse of,   Bilateral Arrangement of Ortheir colouring, 182.              ganisms, 247.
Assimilative Colouring not ex-   Bird, a, and a Balloon, difference
tended to Woodpeckers, I79.        between, I30.
Association, conditions  under   Birds, aerial evolutions of, made
which the spirit it evokes be-     possible by weight, not buoycomes a new " Law," 370.          ancy, 142; condition of the
Associations, higher  rates of       atmosphere  indispensable to
wages established under, than     the  soaring of, I43; bones
under  unrestricted  competi-      of, lighter and more hollow
tion, 378.                         than those of mammals, I45;
Astronomy,  according to  Sir        stationary power of, on what
G. C. Lewis, an interest almost   it depends, I6o; the HIumpurely  scientific  belonging      ming, furnish  the most re



INDEX.                         437
markable examples of the ma-     colour in, associated with the
chinery of flight, 166; species  female sex, 247.
of, amongst which the law of  Causation of the World, the,
assimiiative colouring almost    agency of Man's Mind and
exclusively  prevails,  I8I;    Will, the first and foremost
bright colours and  conspi-    agency in, 6.
cuous ornaments ill male, 247.   Central America, Orchids in the
" Blessed Light of Sciences" the,  forests of, 227.
385.                           " "Cerebration," philosophers who
Bodies, our, seem  part of the     fancy Thohght is explained by
external world to us, 276.       calling it, 282.
Body, Congenital Habits of the,   Cerebral Organization, ascending
connected  with  Congenital      scale of, coincident with asHabits of the Mind, 300o         cending scale of Alental capaBody Politic, the, Verification    city, 279.
drawn by Adam  Smith from    Chadwick, Mr. on Insurance of
the  complicated  phenomena      ships and cargoes as relaxing
of, 34I1                         the motives of self-interest,
Borelli's erroneous  theory  of    366.
steerage in flight, i63.       Chameleon, the, I77.
Brain, the, no additional know-   Chance, no such thing as, a neledge gained by proving the      ccssary truth, 312.
connexion between  any one   "C hangeable Wills," Comte's
mental faculty and a special     confused idea of phenomena
bit of, 280; changes in the      not  being  governed   by,
substance and  structure of,     3I9.
cause  of  changes  in the   Chemical Combination, laws of,
character of the Mind, 278;      amllongst the most wonderful
how Thought is a Function        and beautiful, 94.
3f, 279; exertion  of, like   Children in Factories, liable to
the  exertion of a Muscle,       dismissal if properly cared for
285.                             by their parents, 353.
Butler, Bishop, on our ignorance   Christian miracles, the idea of
of God's notion of means and     Law made the very basis of,
ends, 80o.                       24.
Butler's, Bishop, position, that   Christianity, what lies at its root,
all the truths and difficulties of  according to M. Guizot, I;
Religion have their type in      Gibbon's attempt to account
Natures, 26.                     for the spread of, by natural
causes, 20; does not require
C.                    a belief in any exception to
the universal prevalence of
Carpenter, Dr. on Life prece-      Law, 5I.
ding Organization, II8.        Cicero, De Nat. )eer, 20I, 284,
Cartwright, 344.                   357Cats, blue iris in, associated with   Circulation of the Blood not disdeafness, 247;  tortoiseshell    covered before the discovery




438                        INDEX.
of much concerning the circu-    plied, 374; its history amongst
lation of the Planets, 276.     the Working Classes, until reCivilization, Modern, its deve-    cently a sad history of mnislopment and growth, 388.        directed  effort, 374; desire
Classification, the marshalling of    for, and need of, grows with
physical facts in an ideal order,    the growth of knowledge, and
the basis of Science, 84.       with the increasing complicaCoal, how correlated with the     tions of society, 376; business
needs and powers of man,        of, in some things, to subor260; these external correla-    dinate  the individual class,
tions of, arise out of Internal  377; what sets bounds to,
Correlations, 26I.              379; most important objects
Cobbett, on the opposition to      of, amongst the first duties of
the restrictive measures which   organized society, 38I; conwere proposed by Sir R. Peel    ditions under which it may
the Elder, 352.                  blend the functions, and unite
Cogilo, ergo sumln, 7.            the profits, of Capital and
Colour, power in fish to change    Labour, a question to be derapidly, I77; determined in    termined  by Natural Laws
young animals through the        not yet explained or undereyes of the female parent, I78.    stood, 381.
Colouring, adapted, in the Ani-   Combinations of Force, having
mal Kingdom, object of, I77;     reference to the fulfilment of
apparent rule under which ap-    Purpose or the discharge of
plied, 178; assimilated, not     Function, 65.
extended, as Mr. Darwin fan-   Combinations, limits of, as afcies, to Green Woodpeckers,    fecting rewards of Labour,
I79.                             378.
Combe, Dr. A. on our ignorance   " Comet " Hummiing Bird, 233.
of how the Brain operates in   Commercial Policy, Modern, its
generating Thought, 284.         central idea, 337.
Combination and affinity in Che-   Common Words, pestilent fault
mistry, laws of, 67, 94.         of using themn in an artificial
Combination,-in Nature, for the    sense, 3I8.
accomplishment of Purpose,   Community of Aspect in created
79; this an ascertained fact in  Things, what  it suggests,
Science, 85; and adjustment      224.
as regards the phenomena of  Comparative Anatomy, Profesthe Mind, 274; coming in         sor Owen on, I02; Professor
the place of Positive Institu-   Huxley on, I 9.
tion, 372;  resort  to,  for   Competition, International, bethe protection of labour, re-    tween Capitalists, arguments
commended  by reason  and        based on, 354.
experience, 373; all this true   Competition, the " Law " of, reuniversally of the principle of,    suits in excessive labour, 372.
but not true universally of the   Competitive Industry, inevitable
particular purposes to which ap-  track of, 359.




INDEX.                         439
Comte, Auguste, on "Change-   Contrivance, the word, impossiable Wills," 319.                bility of dispensing with it in
Conditions, favourable, useless-   describing  physical pheno.
ness of direct appeals to men's  mena, 9o; what is? 127; in
faculties and feelings when      Nature, never reduced to a
these have not been placed       single Purpose, I86; happiest
under, 325; external, which      achievements  of the, have
tell on the individual Will,    their own aspects of apparent
are but conditions depending     danger, 375.
on the aggregate Will of those   "Coquette"  Humming  Bird,
around us, 367.                  the, Principle of ornament in,
"Coney" of Scripture, the, 248.    233.
Congenital Constitution, charac-   Correlation of Growth, the, Mr.
ter of Mind determined by,       Darwin's idea of, 241; has a
30I.                             deeper significance than this,
Conscience, how  man, unlike       242; in another and higher
the lower animals, can bring     sense, 244; in its simplest
his motives to the test of, 306.  form, and in visible connexion
Consciousness, direct evidence     with its immediate cause, 245;
of, large class of phenomena     having reference to certain
beyond the, 286.                 mental purposes, 245; two
Conservation of Energy, modern     entirely separate  classes of
doctrine of, I22.                phenomena grouped by Mr.
Constancy in Nature not incom-     Darwin  under the name of,
patible with the energies of    246; general impression left
Will, 389.                       by the observance of organic,
Constitution  and   Course  of     249; required in the establishThings, the whole, under what    ment of a new form of Life,
conditions it would receive an   250; high and complex, the
earlier fulfilment, 385.         most constant and obvious of
Constitution of the Universe,      all the facts of Nature, 251;
the, man's faculty of Contri-    apparent,  between  webbed
vance, the nearest analogy by    feet and spoon-shaped bills,
which to understand, 390.       252; real, between both these
Contractions,  muscular,  two      conditions and external conkinds of, stand near the origin  ditions of Life, 252; between
of all we do, 292; of the       a particular kind of feather
Brain, probably stand near the  and a particular member of
origin of all we think, 292.    the body, in all birds capable
Contrivance, in Orchids, to be    of flight, 254; in all birds,
traced as clearly as in the dif-    between the auricular feathers
ferent parts of a steam-engine,  and the ear-bones, 254; In37-                              ternal, in Nature, entirely subContrivance  and Adjustment,       ordinate  to  External, 255;
doctrine of, not so metaphy-     External correlation between
sical as the doctrine of Homo-  the Retina and  certain vilogies, 83.                      brations, 257; as connected




440                        INDEX.
with Origin of Species, 259;  Creative Power, the rule which
Forces of, in flowers, indepen-  seems to have guided, in the
dent, as Mr. Darwin admits,      origin of New Species, 229.
of Natural Selection, 267;   Creeds, decay in, resulting from
inference from this admission   dissociating in  the popular
concerning, a time before Na-    exposition of them  the doctural Selection had room  to    trines of Religion fiom  the
play, 267; External, between    analogy and course of Nature,
the Mind  and the Things        52.
around it, 296.               Crompton, 344, 347.
Correspondences, perception of,   Custom and Traditional Opinion,
as much a fact as the sight, or  on the facts of Nature and
touch, of the things in which    Human Life, as seen through
they appear, 33.                the dulled eyes of, 384.
Cotopaxi, special forms of Hum-   Cuvier's Science of Homologies,
ming Birds, peculiar to, 228.    197.
Creation,-of Man, the, out of   Cyozantzhs Humming  Bird, or"the dust of the ground," an    nament in the, changing from
indication  of the  personal    blue to green, 239.
agency of God, 27; the embodiment of a Divine Idea,                  D.
30; ~work of, carried on under
rules of adherence to Typical   Darwin, Mr. his conclusion as
Forms, 76; history of, "an      to "silent members," 32; his
Observed Order of Facts" in,    work on the fertilization ot
209; by  Law, idea of, on       Orchids, 37; answers  the
what founded, 212; adaptation  question of  Intention  with
and arrangement of Natural      precision  and  success, 38;
Forces, in what sense of the    fails to solve the question, out
Nature  of,  216;  idea of      of' what  " primordial elecentres of, suggested by the    ments" the parts of the Orgeographical distribution  of   chis were developed, 38; idea
Humming Birds, 225; by Law,     of special use as the controlonly senses in which we get a   ling principle of construction
glimpse of it from the theory   never absent from his mind,
of Natural Selection, 261;      40; his reduction of the forms
spoken of as not Creation,      of Orchids to the archetypal
unless it work from  nothing    arrangement of Threes within
as its material, and by nothing  Threes, 44;  cannot conas its means, 262; doctrine of,    ceive how  a voltaic battery
only possible serious adver-    can be made out of the tissues
saries of, 262; by Birth, how    of a fish, 104; his curious
it explains the existence of     mistake  concerning  Green
useless organs, 266; nearest     Woodpeckers, I76; his remethods of, probably behind a    ference to the discovery of
veil too  thick  for man  to     " Rhizopods " near the bottom
penetrate, 273.                  of "Azoic" Rocks, 2Io; his




INDEX.                         441
theory of Development sug-   Development,  Hypotheses of,
gests less of anything  ap-     the, in the form which they
proaching to a Law in Crea-     have as yet assumed, are detion than  did  the  earlier    prived of all scientific basis,
theories, 2I4; his theory of    29; theories of, what they have
Development, to what extent     simply been, 31;  theories,
an established scientific truth,    idea common to  all, that a
219; his theory  self-con-      new species is simply an undemned, 220; claims for it    usual birth, 214; Mr. Dara wider range than belongs to   win's theory of, difference beit, 220; mere advantage, in    t-ween it and other theories of
Mr. Darwin's sense, not the     development, 2I8; of Man's
rule in the Origin of New       Nature, boundless discoveries
Species in Humming Birds,       open to those who would in229; his theory does not ac-    vestigate the laws governing
count for the origin or spread  the, 325;  and  growth of:
of Humming Birds, 234; offers   Modern Civilization, 388.
no explanation how new Births   Diatomnacce, I9o.
may be the means of intro-   Digestive Organs, the, Mechanducing New Species, 239; his    ism of the, extends through a
theory on Natural Selection     long range of Creation, 269.
has no bearing on the Origin   Discovery, outbreak of old Deof Species, 240; admits that    lusions on every fresh, I13;
the doctrine of Natural Selec-    the most striking thing in the
tion " takes cognizance of Va-   history of, 383.
riations only after they have   Disease brings out correlations
arisen, and regards Variation    not perceived in health, 247.
as  due to  chance," 240;   Divine  Government,  Divine
groups under the name " Cor-     Thoughts, Divine Purposes,
relation  of  Growth"  two      and Divine Affections, rules
classes of phenomena, en-       and principles of, 53.
tirely separate in idea, 246;   Divine Will, the ONE FORCE,
shows how an improved Bill,     perhaps, in itself a mode of
once produced, will be pre-     action of the, 127.
served, 25I; on the phrase   DivingBirds, Correlation in, 253.
"'Adherence to Type," 259;
on Inheritance, what it is, 264.            E.
Decaying fallen leaves, imitation
of, in the Woodcock's plu-   Economic  Error of the Old
mage, I82.                      Commercial Systems, 362.
Design and  Mental Purpose,   Economic Science, Combination
exhibited in the Correlation of    involves no Rebellion against
the Retina with certain vibra.    the Laws of, 373.
tions, 257.                   Economists, Political, hostile to
Detected Method in Nature, the     Restriction, 362.
Ultimate Question, above and   Electric Ray, or Torpedo, an
behind every, 272.               instance of an extraordinary




442                         INDEX.
result produced by a common      minds knowledge only to be
law  yoked  to extraordinary     acquired  by patient inquiry
conditions, IO; Fish  and       into, 326.
Electric Telegraph, absolute   Factories, effects of "free" lanecessity of conforming to de-   bour in, 35I; Labour  of
finite conditions in making      children in, in what sense
each, I02; Telegraph, the,       "free," 353; ill what sense
Babbage's  Calculating  Ma-      not "'free,"  353; Owners
chine, the Steam Engine, and     of, powerful motives in operathe Solar System, all work by    tion on tile, 353; Inspectors
Natural Consequence, 107.        of, in I864, 359.
Everlasting Will, the, some pur-   Factory  System, the, how  it
pose of it to be seen working    arose, 344; Act of I802, in
everywhere, 123.                 what sense invaluable, 350;
Experience, Association, or In-    Acts, false intellectual contuition, origin of our ideas     ceptions at the bottom of ophow far due respectively to,     position to, 352; Acts, the,
289; Mr. J. S. Mill on, 290.     the first Legislative recognition
Explanation, the mere ticketing     of, a great Natural Law quite
and orderlyassortment of exter-  as important as Freedom  of
nal facts, not, 3; what it is, 79.  Trade, 360; Legislation, ProExternal Correlations provided     gress of Political Science in
beforehand by Utility, 256;      nothing happier than in, 364;
Elements of Nature, our com-     Combination effects a higher
mand over the, in advance of     good than that resulting from,
our command  over the re-        372.
sources of Human Character,   Fallacies, Verbal, of Mr. Man384.                             sel exposed by Mr. Mill, 3Io.
"Eyes " in the wing of the   False Theory and mistaken ConArgus Pheasant, compared to      duct found out by the working
the " ball and socket " orna-    of Natural Consequence, 362.
ment in Art, I93.              Feather, Wing, a production
wholly unlike any other aniF.                   mal growth, I68.
Feathers, of a bird's wing, threeFact, Purpose not an Inference     fold division of the, 155; one
merely, but a, 82; Purpose as    fundamental plan in, 253.
a general Inference, and as a   Final ends not to be seen, So.
particular, distinction between   Fish, power of many, to change
them not sufficiently observed,  colour rapidly, I77.
83.                            Flight, the true Theory of, may
Facts, the, of Function, consti-    be tested by the eye, I39.
tut6 not Final, but Immediate   Fly Shuttle in Weaving, invenPurpose, 81; Man controls,       tionl of the, the impulse it
only because he interferes with  gave, 346.
Laws, 318; Men always try-   Flying Animal, no, lighter than
ing to evolve out of their own   the air it moves in, 146.




INDEX.                         443
ForaCmirifera, IIg.               has been more  or less deForce, or Forces, an Observed     fined,  or  ascertained,  65;
Ordcier of Facts is the Index   Law  in  its  most habitual
and the Result of the work-     sense; as Natur!1, related to
ing of some, 68; the Law of     Purpose, and subvervient to
Gravitation is that, the exact    the discharge of Function, 79;
measure of whose operation      irresistible tendency in the lanwas numerica-lly ascertained    guage of Science to personify,
by Newton, 69; each, if left    89; no phenomena visible to
to itself, would be destructive  man governed by invariable,
of the Universe, 91; what is    but by variable combinations ol
it? II9; the idea of, traced    invariable forces, 98; Conto its Fountain Head, I20;      vertibility of, modern doctrine
ONE, all Natural Forces re-     of the, I22; Natural, Law
solvable perhaps into, I27;    in what sense the co-operation
this, perhaps, in itself a mode  of, working together for fulof action of the Divine Will,    filment of obvious Intention,
127; of Gravitation, the most   216;  Vital, how  made to
familiar of all Forces in all    evolve a new Form of Life,
Ages,  I29;  this  Force,       261; all, in their mutual re.
chiefly that concerned in flight,    lations, governed by principles
I30; or Forces, to which the    of arrangement purely Mental,
phenomena of Life can be        275; Material, manifestations
traced, no knowledge of the,     of mental Energy and Will,
212; a, emanating from Exter-    275; apparent barrier against
nal things, and moulding the    our conceiving how any comstructure of an organism  in    bination of, can resuli in mind,
harmony with themselves, no     284; Material, misconception
conception of, 251; Furnisher  of, 285; Immaterial, working
of, no substance comparable    in matter, 285; Bystanders
as a, to Coal, 260; One, the    often see the, telling on our
source and centre of the rest,  Wills, more clearly than we
275; ultimate seat of, the, we  do ourselves, 288; Action of,
know nothing directly of, 275;  on  our minds, how  to  be
nearest conception of this de-    traced, 289; aggregate  of
rived from our own conscious-   what, may be called the Laws
ness, 275; or Power, developed  which deterrmne human action
through an organ, not identi-    and opinions, 303; or Laws
cal with that organ, 279;       which operate on the Mind,
or Forces, implied  in  an      exceedingly difficult to reduce
"Observed Order of Facts,"    them in their boundless variety
283; Expenditure of, in severe    to system, 303; our Volitions
Thinking, 284.                 how far subject to adjusted,
Forces, Correlation of, modern    322; the fixednzss of all, in
doctrine of the, 6; Law  as     one sense, cor stitutes their inapplied  to  individual,  the   finite  pliability in another,
measure of whose operation      323; of Nature, _one of the




444                        INDEX.
most tremendous of the, re-     gress at last on the vexed
duced to obedience by Watt,     question of, 308.
340; Separate and Individual,  Freedom, a relative term, not an
in Man and Nature, alone in.    absolute, 302.
variable, 368; Combinations   Freedom  of Exchange, in the
of these, of endless variety    products of Labour, results
and  endless  capability  of    of, compared  with the rechange, 368.                    suits of perfect freedom  of
Foreknowledge, Perfect know-      competition in Labour itself,
ledge must be perfect, 312.     358.
Form, of Life, new, correlation   Freedom of Man's Will not more
required in the establishment   mysterious in directing the
of a, 250; such correlation, as  Mind to one motive, and difar as we can see, without any  verting it from another, than
Physical cause, 251; and       in the turning of the Body
Spirit, the connexion between,    to the right hand rather than
sanctioned by the doctrine of    the left, 3I4.
the Resurrection, 286.        Fulrnars, mechanism of flight in,
Forms, Typical, work of Nature     I50.
carried on under rules of ad-   Function, definition of, 279; of
herence to, 76; of Life, suc-   Coal in the world, 260.
cessive introduction of, higher   Function of an Organ, the, its
and higher, 210; allied, spe-   Purpose, 82.
cific  and generic, bond of
connexion between them, 218.
Forward Motion, the power of,
how given to birds, I38.      qalileo, period of, 343.
Fossil Remains, what Forms to   Gallinaceous Birds, sort of wings
be traced in, 2II; Animals,    in, I55; comparatively no inapproximating to the Forms      fancy in, 297; fact of immense
of the Horse and the Ox, Pro-   significance connected with,
fessor Owen on, 211.            299.
Fossils designated "the Sports   Gannet, the, divingfor fish, I44.
of Nature," 267.              Genesis of Organic Life, modern
Free Agency of Man, faith re-    idea of the, 30.
quired in the, to secure the   Geographical  distribution   of
working for good of great        Humming Birds, 224.
Natural Laws, 376.            Gipsies, case of the, not paFree Labour, those who opposed     rallel with that of the Jews, 20.
restrictions on, met with no   Gladstone's, Mr. description of
adequate reply, 355; advo-    the old Commercial Policy,
cates of Restiiction on, igno-  337.
rant of the principles at issue,   God's Will, extraordinary manib
355.                            festations of, how they may be
Free Will, erroneously called      wrr-om:ght, I6.
the peculiar Prerogative  of  God, operations of, and of Men's
Man, 304; and Necessity, pro-   Minds, light thrown on the




INDEX.                        445
analogy between  them   by      only serious adversaries of the
every known instance of Con-    doctrine of Creation, 262; on
trivance, I28.                  the introduction of the human
Gold, laws relating to, in An-     pair into the world, 269; on
cient Sparta and in Modern      misconceptions of the Past,
Spain, 336.                     and false anticipations of the
Gould, Mr. on the action of the   Future, 386.
wing in Humming Birds, 167;
on the reason for the gorgeous
colouring of those birds, 23I;
his description of ditto, 233;
on the absence of Hybridism    Hamilton, Sir William, examibetween any two Species of    nation of the Philosophy of,
HIumming Birds, 237; on cer-    by Mr. J. S. Mill, 308, et seq.
tain local varieties near Bo-   Hargraves, 344, 347gota, whose  ornament'  is   Hawks, classified as "noble,"
changing  colour, 239; his      or "ignoble," I58.
"' Birds of Australia," 299.   Hebrides, remarkable chase of a
Government, Divine; see Divine    Merlin after a Snipe, in the,
Government.                     I58.
Government, principle of, only   Hereditary   Transmission   of
recognised in modern times,     Mental Qualities,  289; of
326; the  Science of, two       Innate Ideas, 300.
great discoveries made  in,   Heron's Wing, curious experiduring the present century,     ment with  an outstretched,
334.                             I40.
Gravitation, Law  of, the dis-   Herschel, Sir John, quoted, 73,
covery of it the highest exer-    I22.
cise of pure intellect through   Homology, of Orchids, 43; in
which the Human -Mind has       Structure, and  Analogy in
found its way, 72; the most     Use, 199.
familiar of all Forces in all   Homologies, doctrine of, docAges, I29; the chief Force      trine of Contrivance and Adin flight, I30.                 iustment not so metaphysical
Grote's " Plato," 327.            as the, 83; Science of, as deGrouse, feathers of the, close    veloped by Cuvier, Hunter,
imitation in, to the tinting    Owen, and Huxley, an intriand mottling of the ground on   cate, almost a transcendental,
which they lie, I8I.            Science, I97.
Growth, Correlations of; see   Horse, the, "silent members"
Correlations of Growth.         in, I95.
Growth, Progress and Decay,   Hudibras quoted, 184.
whether any Law of, in Na-   Houman Action and Opinions,
tions as in Individual Organ-   aggregate of Forces which mtay
isms, 387.                      be called Laws which deter.
Guizot, M. on the Supernatural,   mine, 303.
I, 2, 22, 27, 29, 51; on the   Human  Character, elementary




446                        INDEX.
Forces  having  a  constant     Organization,  i8; lrhetorical
operation on, 325.              designation of "Life" in his
Human Law, function of, as dis-    "Elements of Comparative
tinguished from Natural Law,     Anatomy," 213; frontispiece
325; Law, idea of founding      to  his  "Man's  Place  in
it on the Laws of Nature never  Nature," 265.
systematically entertained  in   Hybridism  unknown  between
the Ancient World, 326.         two  species  of  Humming
Human Society, odious concep-      Birds, 237.
tions of, in Plato's Republic,   Hyrax, or " Coney," the, teeth
327.                             and hoofs of, resemble those
Human Instincts, and faculties     of the Rhinoceros, 248.
of Contrivance, impeded by
clnumsy machinery, 340.
Human Labour, Factory System                  I.
as affecting, 344.
Human Spirit, Natural Laws in  Ideas, in what sense born with
harmonious relation with the,    us, 296; formation of, all that
39I.                            comes from the Mind itself in
Humming Birds, the most re-    the, 297.
markable  examples of the   Identic Shapes, Forces which
machinery of flight, i66; pe-   aggregate particles of matter
culiarities of, 221; their dis-    in, 268.
tinctiveness from   all other  Idols, Men's, nowadays their
families of birds, 222; geo-     own  abstract Conceptions,
graphical distribution of, 224;  112.
divisible only into two Sub-   Immediate Purpose, Facts of
families, 225; generic and       Adjustment and of Function
specific  differences  between  constitlte not Final, but, 8I.
these, 226; species of, pecu-   Imponderable, the Great, r15 
liar to Cotopaxi, to Chimbo-   Incubator, Artificial, prepared
razo, Juan  Ferdandez, &c.      by the Megapode, 298.
228; a curious example of  Individual Force, Law  immuOrnamnent for Ornament's sake,    table only as an, 97; Will,
233; the Creation of sepa-      Laws against which, cannot
rate species of, suggests the   contend,  359;  Will,  the,
idea of some Creative Law,      helplessness and thoughtlessof the nature and conditions    ness of, to a great extent to
of which we know  nothing,       be overcome, 374.
236.                          Inductive Sciences, Whewell's
I-ulllting  Grounds of Eagles,     History of the, IIo.
Falcons, and Hawks, 80o.      Inequality of Men, in the sense
Hutton, Captain, on the flight    of gifts of Mind and Body, 377of the Albatross, I65.        Inheritance, bond of, according
Iuxley, Professor, false charge   to Mr. Darwin, 218; Theory
of Atheism  against, 89; his    of, when it startles us, 263.
assertion that Life precedes  Inorganic Compounds, relations




INDEX.                          447
of certain to the Chemistry of    Philosophy  often  associated
Life, 94.                         with the happiest. 386.
Inspectors of Factories, Reports  Invariability, doubie meaning of,
of, 360.                          in  the  Necessitarian  PhiloInstinct, or Intuition, not Expe-   sophy, 309; of Sequence, an
rience,  teaches  us  uncon-      ambiguous phrase, 3Io.
sciously how to use the ma-   Invariable Law, Phenomena not
chinery causing Muscular Con-     governed by, 318; Vision of,
tractions, 292.                   on the  Throne  of Nature,
Instincts of the nature of Ideas,   390.
297; Natural, when  to  be   Invention, Mechanical, Scientific
trusted, 358; when the Higher     Men forced to borrow the lanFaculties must impose their       guage of, 256; triumphs of,
Will on the, 358.                 regarded often with fear and
Institution, Positive, Authorita-   jealousy  by  the  Working
tive Interference of, with the    Classes, 375; a Law  of Nafreedom  of the  Individual       ture in  the  strictest sense,
Will, still required in Fac-      376.
tories, 364.                    Invisible, the, all the Realities
Institutions, Positive, stand con-  of Nature are in the region
trasted with Natural Law in       of, IIS.
one sense only, 333.
Intellect, Laws of, Philosophers
who fancy they are reduced to
scientific expression when described as the working of the   Jelly, blobs of, without parts, or
cerebral ganglia," 282.  organs, or visible structure,
Intention, exhibited in the me-     Vital F orce in, I I9.
chainism of Orchids, the ques-   Jevons, Mr. W. S. on the Coal
tion Mr. Darwin sets himself      Question, 20o.
to answer, 38; Obvious, Law    Jews, preservation  of  the, a
in what sense meant as the co-    striking illustration of deparoperation of Natural Forces,      turefrom the ordiuary course of
working together for the ful-     Nature effected through Nafilment of, 2I6; and Purpose,     tural means, 20.
the Law of Structure entirely   Job on the Stars, II4.
subordinate  to the Law  of,  Juan Fernandez, three species of
265.                              Humming Birds peculiar to,
Intuition, Origin of our Ideas      228.
how far due to, 289; a word
not liked by supporters ot the                 K.
doctrine of Experience, 291.
Intuitions, Copernicus, Kepler,   Kepler. three Laws of, 66.
and Galileo guided in their   Kestrel hovering, I6I.
profound conceptions ofvisible   "Knowing  how to do it," in
pIhenomenea  by,  I IO;   the     Nature as in Art, all done
most'. extravagant errors in      seems done by, 127.




448                        INDEX.
L.                   they circle round, 65; neatest
illustrations of, used in the
Labellum  in Orchids, its use,    first sense, to be found in
40.                              Kepler's Three Laws, 66; in
Labour, Restrictions  on, de.    the second sense, the index
nounced by  Adam   Smith,        and result of the working of
338; Children's, in Factories,    some Force, or Forces, 68; of
in what  sense  "free," in       Gravitation defined, 69; in its
what not "free," 353; in-       highest sense, as Natural Forces
stincts of, when blind to all    related to Purpose, and subresults save money-making,      servient to the discharge of
358; resort to Combination      Function, 79; a, only immufor the protection of, recom-   table as an Individual Force:
mended by Reason and Ex-        97; the term, as used to de.
perience, 373; Rewards of,    signate  an  Abstract Idea,
Limits within which Combi-    I08; illustration of this in
nations can, and beyond which   the "First Law of Motion,"
they cannot, affect the, 378.    Io8; in what sense meant as
Ianguages  grow  and change       the co-operation of Natural
by rules of which the men       Forces working together for
speaking  them  are  uncon-    the fulfilment of Obvious Inscious, 76.                     tention, 216; difference beLaw, Idea of, made the basis of    tween that to which the Lower
the Christian miracles, 24;    Animals are subject and that
highest, known to Man, 6I;    to which Man is subject, 304.
the word, in its primary sig-  Laws-of Nature, Man's Milnd
nification, 64; FIVE, different    strangely excluded by Professenses in which the word is    sor Tyndall from  the, 6; if
habitually used-first, as ap-   not unchangeable, could not
plied to an Observed Order of    be used as instruments of Will,
Facts; secondly, to that Order  97; Natural, unchangeable.
as involving the  action of    ness and universality of. essensome Force, or Forces, of    tial to their use as instruments
which nothing more may be       of Will, 146; or Forces, the,
known; thirdly, as applied to   [ which operate on the Mind,
individual Forces, the mea-    exceedingly difficult to  resure of whose operations has    duce them  to system, 303;
been more or less defined    interference with,  the only
and ascertained; fourthly, as   way in which Man can conapplied to Combinations of    trol Facts, 318; against which
Force  having  reference  to, Individ al Will cannot conthe fulfilment of Purpose or    tend, 359; Economic, invariathe discharge of Function;      bility of, rightly understood,
fiftf/dy, as applied to abstract  379.
conceptions of the  MI:nd-   Lecky, Mr. on the Rise and
these five great leading sig-   Influence of Rationalism  in
nificationb of,'  * questions  Europe, I6.




INDEX.                         449
Legislation, Wise and Successful,    done through the means of
on the recognition of what    Law, 107; and the Lower
causes it depends, 302; double  Animnals, amount and kind of
movement in, ever since the     difference between, spite of
First Factory Act, 36I.         close affinities of bodily strucLeverage, Law of, as applied to    ture, 264; and  the highest
Wings, 150.                     Animals below  him, secret
Lewes, Mr. G. HI., 70, II17, I24,  of the boundless  difference
204.                            between, 306; in what sense
Lewis, Sir G. C., on Astronomy,   subject to the Law of CausaI2.                             tion, 313; Reason, Conscience,
Life, the Cause of Organization,  Imagination, Belief, as much
II8; Leading Types of; in       a part of, as his desires and
Geological ages, an orderly    instincts, 332; Combination
gradation in, 210; Origin of,    natural to, 376.
nothing known or guessed at  Mankind, Combination, among
in, corresponding with Law      many Motives, a means of inin  its strictest sense, 212;    fluencing, to an extent as yet
New Forms of, if developed      unknown, the conduct and
from the Old, the working of    condition of, 368; progress of,
Creative Power, 216.            to higher and better things,
Living Effort, our conceptions     388.
of Force formed from our own   Mansel's, Mr., " Essay on Miraconsciousness of, 120.          cles," 18; his Limits to ReLizards, Flying, in other Ages    ligious Thought, its Verbal
of the World, I69.              fallacies, exposed by Mr. J.
Locke, quoted, 24.                 S. Mill, 310.
Longfellow, Professor, I29.      Mantis, strange  imitation  of
Vegetable growths in the body
of the, I84.
M.                 Marine Mollusca, beautiful shells
of, I89.
Machine, Idea and Essence of  Material,  World,  increasing
a, 90.`        power exercised over the, by
McCosh, Dr., on the Super-         Man's Will, 97; World, they
natural in relation to the Natu-  and the World of Mind, Law
ral, I7.                        in the same sense prevails in
Malformation,   Correlations      the phenomena of both, 275;
brought out by, 247.            Frame, in which we live, some
Man, Is he Supernatural? 7.      of the most distant objects of
Man's agency, relation of, to the  the Universe more accessible
Physical Laws of Nature, II.    to our observation and intelMan and tile Lower Animals,    ligible to us than, 276; Struccommon Relationship of, by       ture, our Affections dependent
descent, at least conceivable,   on, 278.
29.                            Materialism, Suggestions of, lie
Man and Nature, works of both    thickest on the surface of




450                        INDEX.
things, 1I3; two great ene-   Mill, Mr. J. S., his admission
mies to, in the heart and the    that our muscular contractions
intellect, I15.                  are not the result of " ExpeMatter, Immaterial Forces work-    rience," 290; Comments on
ing in, 285.                    this admission, I6, 291, etseq.;
Means, God governing the world     on the meaning of the word
by the choice and use  of,       "Necessity," 308, 309; his
I6; and Ends, our ignorance     use of the vague word "Anof God's notions of, 80.         tecedent," 313; his definitiosn
"Measure," inaccurately termed    in " Auguste Comte and Posithe "verifiable element" in    tivism," of the Positive as
our knowledge, 70.               distinguished from the TheoMechanism  of Orchids, Inten-      logical Mode  of Thought,
tion exhibited in the, 39; of    315;  dissection  of  these
Flight in the Albatross and in   phrases,   316,  3I7;   on
Seagulls, I50.                   "Changeable Wills," 319.
Megapodes, Innate Ideas in the,   Mind and Will of Man in one
298.                            sense "separate " from "NaMemory often paralysed by the      ture" and belonging to the
stroke which paralyses a Limb,   "Supernatural," 8.
278.                          Mind, Character of, expressed in
len, in what sense " fellow-       lines and shapes of matter,
workers with God," and made      265; Phenomena of, an ob"' partakers of the Divine Na-  served Order of Facts in the,
ture," 9.                       274; the, unconscious of its
NMental Purpose and Physical      dependence  on  the  Body,
Cause, ideas of, not antago-    277; first to be mapped, and
nistic, 32; and Resolve, the    then its Organ, 280; and Orone thing  our Intelligence     ganization,  parallel  Phenoperceives with direct and in-   mena of, 282; and Brain,
tuitive recognition, 34; Pur-    connexion between them  reposes, Correlation having re.    cognised as a Law by us only
ference to certain, 245.       - in thie sense of an " Observed
Mlferlin, a, swooping on its prey,  Order of Facts," 283; the, to
I44; chase of a, after a Snipe  be regarded as having, like
in the Hebrides, I58.           the Body, Automatic FaculMetaphors, the, employed  in    ties, 293;  Phenomena  of,
Language, generally founded     words used to describe the,
on Analogies instinctively and  suggestive of analogies be.
often unconsciously perceived,    tween Mental and Material
64.                             things, 302; influences which,Method of Nature, proper object  attract the Polar Force comof Scienceto detect, if she can,  pared to, 303; and Character
the, 27I.                       of Man, knowledge of, how
MlMetliods, some, of operating on  it may be governed, to be obMen's Minds known to us    tained only by slow degrees,
instinctively, 325.             325; Human, Love of Gain




INDEX.                         451
an instinct implanted in the,   Nations,  calamities  of, their
376; openness and simplicity    origin in the insensible deof, great characteristics of    velopment of New Conditions,
Men who have exercised an       386.
influence for good on Society,   Natural Consequence, way of,
384.                            Steam Engine and Solar SysMineral Salt, crystallising under    tem both worked by, IO8.
a Voltaic current, Correlation   Natural Forces, Idea of, quite
of Growth  in  its simplest    separate from  the ascertained
form, 245.                      measure of their energy, 70;
Miracle, a, commonlyunderstood     found to operate under rules
as a suspension or violation of  having  strict reference  to
the Laws of Nature, I7.          Space and Time, 74; must
Miracles, when they lose every     be conformed to and obeyed,
element of inconceivability,     126.
23; Christian, idea of Law   Natural Law, Common Idea of
made the very basis of the,    the Supernatural as at variance
24; the idea of, performed by    with, above, or in violation of,
the use of means, regarded by   4; True conception of, on what
many with jealousy and sus-    founded, 326; the idea of, as
picion, 26.                      affecting mankind, on what
Modern  Policy and  Ancient,    founded, 33I; in what sense
striking difference between the  contrasted with Positive Inspirit of, 335;  Politicians,    stitution, 333; Law, Signal
great aim  of, to open new      illustration in  England this
sources of national opulence,    century of circumstances in
336; Political Societies, stag-  which, may be trusted, and
nation and decline the actual    of those in which it required
condition of many, 387.          to be controlled, 334; and
Mollusca, the, Vital Forces in,    Positive Institution, antag6n.
made to work to order, 215.     ism between, 356; ever workMonkeys, " Silent members"         ing to convict error and conin, I95.                         firm  truth, 357; working on
Muscles, the seat of two oppos-    the Human Willwhile exposed
ing Forces, 77.                  to overpowering motives and
Muscular  Power, great con-        under debased conditions of
centration of, in the Organism  the understanding  and  the
of Birds, I33.                  heart, 362.
Natural Laws, founded on the
N.                   right exercise of Reason in
the highest and best sense,
Narwhal, the, Aborted Germ         333; best  fulfilled  when
in, I95.                         made the instruments of in.
Nasmyth, Mr. James, on the         telligent Will, and the servants
shadows and " high light " hil   of cnlightened Conscience, 39 I.
the " eyes " in the wind of the   "Natural Selection" can do
Argus I'lPheasant,  93.          notling except with the mlate.
0 Q2




45 2                       INDEX,
rials presented  to it, 219;    vance, I27; Mechanics of,
what it accounts for and what    highest problem in, I33; Pulit does not account for, 220;    pose of particular structures
the only point, with reference    in, often misconceived, 176;
to the Sub-Families of Hum-     Laboratory of, process in the,
ming Birds, on which it has     by which natural tints can be
any bearing, though it does    transferred to substances prenot touch the facts of the      pared to receive them, 177;
case, 226; does not account    Facts of, High and Complex
for the origin or spread of    Correlation the most constant
Humming  Birds, 236; real    and obvious of all the, 251;
bearing of, 240; seizes on Ex-    no fictions or bad jokes in,
ternal Correlations, but can-    268; no short cuts in, 331; a
not enter the womb and shape    great Armoury for the use of
the New Form  in harmony        Will, 382; Man's command
with the modified conditions     over the external elements of,
of External Life, 256; ope-    in advance of his command
rates only through the agency   over the resources of Human
of use and disuse on organs     Character, 384; Man's, most
already existing, and capable   certain of all the Laws of,
of discharging function, 267;    388.
Selection, idea of, excluded   "Necessity,"  Progress at last
by the theory of Creation by    on the vexed question  of,
Birth, 267.                     308; Rebellion against the
Nature, Power and Works of,       Doctrines of, founded on false
all Superhuman, 2; glorious    conceptions of Invariable Law,
result of a right method in the  377.
study of, 4; what, in  the   New   Forms,  Mr.  Darwin's
largest sense, to be understood  Theory, how far it suggests
as including, 5; in the nar-    anything of the nature of Crearow sense of Physical Nature,    tive Law to explain the intro7; and the Supernatural, Dr.    duction of, 221.
Bushnell on, 8; Man's, Phe-   New  Species, a, according to
nomena of, included in the      Mr. Darwin, simply an unterm  "Natural," II; ordi-    usual birth, 218; Creation of,
nary course of, I3; the Su-     has followed some  plan in
perhuman and the Superma-       which variety is in itself an
terial, familiar facts in, 23;    aim, 228; a, must be born
the Great Parable, 54; Uni-     male  and  female, 237; of
versal Presence of combina-     Humming Birds, if born from
tions of Force in, 76; Rela-    the Old, how they must be
tion of an Organic Structure    born, 238.
to its Purpose in, 99; com-   Newton, Sir Isaac, his agitation
parison illustrative of this be-  on discovering the Law  of
tween the MAenai Bridge and     Gravitation, 74.
the Shells of Barnacles, 99;   Numerical Computation, Intuione vast system  of Contri-    tive Powers of, 293; Rela



INDEX.                         453
tions, Ideas of Order based     together as one whole by a
on, meet us in Nature at        pervading system of Correlaevery turn, 49.                 tions, 247.
Organisms, Inheritance the only
cause which can produce,
O.                   quite like or nearly like each
other, 264; Bilateral ArrangeOrchis, the  Madagascar,  its     ment common to all, down to
long and deep nectary, how      the Radiata, 268; New, no
developed, 44.                  knowledge of the Laws conOrchids, Fertilization of, 37;     nected with the Creation or
Intention in the mechanism      development of, 2I3.
of, the question  Mr. Dar-   Origin of New Forms, Darwin's
win sets himself to answer,      Theory does not profess to
38; Labellum  in, its use,    trace to a definite Law the,
40; large Family of, in the      217; of our Ideas, how far due
forests of Central America,      respectively  to  Experience,
227.                            Association,  or  Intuition,
Observed Order of Facts, an,       289; clear definition of terms
implies a Force, or arrange-    greatly required in the discusment of Forces, out of which    sion of such questions as the,
the Order comes, 283.            295.
Order, a subtle and pervading,   Origin of Species, the true, in
binding together all Living     what it consists, 240; only
things, 209; of Nature, the,     sense in which we can get
very complicated, the Mind      from  the Theory of the, a
perplexed by the vast variety   glimpse of Creation by Law,
of subordinate Facts, I73;    26I; New Species, rule which
of Thought, the  basis  of,seems to have governed Creaall other Order in the works    tive Power in the, 229.
of Man and of Nature, 82.     Ornament in Nature. in itself a
Organic Forms, Mr. Darwin's        Purpose, I88; was so before
denial that Beauty for its own  Man was born, 189; for Orsake can be an end in, I88;     nament's sake, the rule in
Growth, symmetry to be de-    reference to which Creative
tected  in  all variations of,  Power seems to have worked
242; Growths, general im-       in Humming Birds, 232.
pression left by the obser-   Ornament and Use; see Use and
vance of Correlation between,   Ornament.
249; Life, never any altera-   Orlzit/zoryncUs Paradoxus, 253.
tion in the whole scale of, in   Owen, Professor, on the Mental
those principles of Chemical    conception of the Plan of all
and Mechanical adjustment on    Vertebrate Skeletons, 32; on
which Respiration, Circulation,    the Battery of the Electric
and Reproduction have been      Ray, IOI; on Fossil Approxprovided for, 269.              imations to the forms of the
Organism, Parts of an, bound      Horse and the Ox, 211.




454                        INDEX.
P.                  ledge of the Force or Forces
to which the, can be traced,
Parable, why so much can be        212-;  of  Mind,  the,  an
conveyed in the Form of, 53.     Observed  Order of Facts,
Parliament, refusing to regulate   274;  Law  in  one  sense
"Free Labour," 349; Combi-    prevails in the, both of the
nation indicated as the right    Material and Mental world,
course by, 373.                 275; never the result of inPauperism, in how far to be at-    dividual Forces, but always
tacked through Combination,      of the  variable  conditions
381.                            under which several indiviPeel, Sir Robert, the Elder, the   dual Forces are  combined,
first to interfere by law with   3I8.
unrestricted  competition  in   Philosophy of History, on the
Human Labour, 349; his Bill    recognition of what causes it
limited to the regulation of     depends, 302.
the labour of Apprentices,   Phrenological  School, funda349; presses a new measure       mental error of the, 28I.
of Restriction, 35I.          Phrenology, a name which is
Penguins, I48.                     itself a fallacy, 280.
Peregrine Falcon, sharp-pointed   Physical Cause and Mental Purstructure of wing  in  the,     pose, Ideas of, not antagonisI57.                            tic, 32.
Perfect Knowledge, the little   Physical Cause, Correlation in
waywe can evertraveltowards,    the establishment of a New
31I.                             Form of Life, so far as we call
Personal Agency of God, the        see, without any, 250.
Creation of Man " out of the   Physical Forces all working to
dust of the ground " an indi-    Order, 260.
cation of the, 27.            Physical Laws of Nature, relaPersonal Will, the Idea of, sepa-    tion of Man's agency to the,
rable from the Forces which      11; advancing knowledge of,
work in Nature, in a sense the   accompanied with  advancing
projection of our own Per-       power  over  the  Physical
sonality, I23.                   World, 13.
Personality and Will, impossi-   Physical Science, advances in,
bility of describing any facts    can  only widen  intelligent
in Science without investing     Spiritual Beliefs, II4.
the Laws of Nature  with,   Physics, World of, Certainties
9I.    I                        in the world of Mind as absoPetrels, Mechanism of flight in,    lute as any in the, 312.
I50.                          Physiological  Discovery, the.Phiasmca in the British Museum,   Dependence  of  Mind  on
Specimen of, with wings spot-    Bodily Organization, a fact
ted like a larva-eaten  leaf,    containing within itself the
x87.                            lesser facts of, 283.
Phenomena of Life, no know.   Physiology,  recent Investiga.




INDEX.                          455
tions in, as to the Muscles, 77;   Prayer, real Essence of, 61.
every fact in, its  intimate   Primeval Traditions of Belief,
bearing on some question of    immense satisfaction to know
the Philosophy of Mind, 290.      that Logical Analysis confirms
Planets, the, much discovered       the testimony of Consciousness
bly man concerning the circu-     and  runs parallel with the,
lation of, before he discovered   390.
the circulation of the blood,   Problem, the most difficult of
276.                             all, in the Science of GovernPlants, basis of many Correla-      ment, 334tions of Growth in, 243.        Progress of Mankind, order of
Plato's Republic, 327.              facts observable in the, that
Polar Force of Magnetism, 303.   long ages of silence and inPolarity, in Magnetic Force, ul-    action  are broken  up  and
timate nature and source of,      brought to an end by shorter
245-                              periods of almost preternatuPolarity, Principle of, developed   ral activity, 343.
in  a circle in the Radiata,   Protection, a hindrance to the
265.                              Wealth of Nations, the skill
Policy,  Modern  Commercial,        of Crafts, and the success of
Central idea of, 337.             Trade, 34I.
Political Society, Ancient Law-   Psychology   and  Physiology,
givers always aiming at stand-    neither independent of the
ards of, 326; Events, me-         other, 290.
imorable Examples in the last   Ptarmigan, close imitation  in
alld present generations of the   the Plumage of the, to the
Reign of Law over the course      mottling of ground, I8I.
of, 387-                        Purpose, the only thing we can
Positive Institution, and Natural   surely know in the relation
Law,  antagonism  between,        of Created Forms to our own
356; Combination coming in        Minds, 33; Principle of Adthe place of, 372.               justment no meaning except
Positive Philosophy, the word       as the result of, 78; Function
Will, how used in, 320.           of an Organ. its, 82; as a
Positivism, a sentence the con-     general inference, and as a
centration of all that is erro-   particular fact, distinction beneous in, 316.                    tween them  not sufficiently
Posterity's  wonder  respecting     observed, 83; in Nature atourselves, 383.               tained  only by the  enlistPotential Use in Nature, 202.       ment of Laws as Means, Ioo;
Power, Law in its primary sig-      instance of this in the Electric
nification,  the  authoritative   Ray, where an extraordinary
expression  of Human  Will    result is produced by a comenforced by, 64; of God, Pro-     mon Law voked to extraorfessor Owen's Instances of the,   dinary conditions, IOI; Conas manifested in his Animal    trivance necessary for the acCreation, 263.                    complishment of, Iz6; Con.




456                        INDEX.
trivance in Nature never re-    so far as we can see it, Uniduced  to  a  single,  I86;     versal, 4; Universal, perfectly
of the One Plan of Organic      consistent with a power of
Life,  I96;  how  Material      making those laws subservient
Laws follow  the steps of,    to design, 22; the, the reign
208; Mental, Correlation of      of Creative Force, directed by
Growth having reference to       Creative Knowledge, worked
a certain, 245; Correlation of    under the control of Creative
Growth in the only sense we      Power, and in fulfilment of
can connect it with the Origin   Creative Purpose, 273.
of Species not a Physical cause   Religion, Nothing in, incombut a Mental, 259; and In-      patible with the belief that all
tention, the Law of Structure   exercises of God's Power are
entirely subordinate to, 265;    effected through the instruonly, to be detected in the      mentality of Means, 22, 50;
adaptibility of the Vertebrate   or Nature, the Will of the
Type to the Infinite varieties   Supreme either in, one in
of Life, 27I.                   which "there is no variableness," 51; and Science, DocR.                   trine that they  should  be
thought separate  open  to
Radcliffe's, Dr. Theory of Mus-    one fatal objection, 57; discular and Nervous Action,       astrous effect of the belief in
77.                             their separation, 58.
Radiata, the, 268.               Research, Physical, TranscenReason, Doctrine that things       dental character of the results
contrary to, were not beyond     of, I I6.
his faith, held by a late eminent  Restrictions on Labour, great
clergyman  of the  English      discovery of the absolute neChurch, 60o; and Imagination,   cessity of imposing, 335; from
falling impotently on analogy    Trade, immense advantage of
and conjecture in endeavour-    removing, 335.
ing to get at Nature's method,   Restriction  on  Free Labour,
272; paralysed by the same       those who opposed, met with
stroke which paralyses a limb,   no adequate reply, 355; Ad278;  and  Feelings, direct      vocates of, ignorant of the
appeals to the, entirely useless    fundamental  principles  at
when these faculties have not    issue, 355.
been placed under favourable   Resurrection,  Connexion  beconditions, 324; onwhatpath     twedn Spirit and Form sancInstinct a surer guide than,     tioned by the doctrine of the,
386.                             286.
Regions where means of investi-   Retina, external Correlations of,
gation cease, and processes of   257.
Verification are of no avail,   Rhizopods  of enormous size
271.                            found  near the bottom' of
Reign of Iaw, the, in Nature,      " Azoic" Rocks, 210,




INDEX.                          457
Rudimentary Organs, said to be   Seasons, Revolutions of the, deintended merely to suggest a      pendent on a multitude of
History whlch-was never true,     Laws, each of which would
and a Method which was never      produce utter confusion if not
followed, 268.                    balanced against others in the
right proportion, 93.
Seers, great, of the Old TestaS.                   ment, correspondence of their
language with a great modern
Sand-Grouse of Asiatic Deserts      Scientific Idea, I27.
and their colouring, I82.       Self-consciousness the Truth in
Sand Partridges of ditto, i82.      the light of which all other
Science, the great Quest of,    truths are known, 7.
7I: Classification  the basis   Self-evident Truths, and Truths
of, 84; Astronomical, ulti-       not self-evident, breakdown
mate fact of, 92; included in    of the distinction between, 294.
Philosophy, I I3; the "under-   Sensation, no new light thrown
standing by Faith " mentioned     on, because Sensation can be
by the writer of the Epistle      traced to certain nerves, 282.
to the Hebrews, now an as-   "Sensory  Ganglia,"  Philososured doctrine of, I 17; Proper   phers who think  they cast
object of, to detect the method   new  light on Sensation  by
of Nature, if she can, 271;       calling it an affection of the,
True, bondage under which it      282.
lies, 331:  of Government,   "Silent members"  in Animal
two great discoveries made in     Frames, views on the subject
the, during the present cen-      by Mr. Darwin, 32; deeper
tury, 334; of Politics, the,      and wider views of Professor
still in its infancy, 383.        Owen on, 32.
Sciences, Physical, remarkable   Silurian Sea, Old, richly carved
product of the immense deve-      shells  and  corals of  the,
lopment of the, 3.                I 89.
scientific Truth, a sharp eye to   " Slowworm,"  the  Common,
be cast on  every form  of        "'Blade bone" and "Collar
words professing to represent,   bone " of,-" aborted limbs"
56; Men who, though trust-    in, 195.
worthy on the facts of their   Smiles' Life of Watt, 342.
own science, are nsot to be   Smith, Adam, 337 et seq.; work
trusted on the place of those     of, inseparably connected with
facts in the general system of    the work of James Watt, 339;
truth, II2.                       not dissimilar to Watt's work
Scripture, Language of, nowhere    in its relation to the Reign of
conscious of a distinction be-    Law, 340; opinions influenced
tween the Natural and the         by personal observation of the
Supernatural, 30.                ill-treatment of Watt by the
Seagulls, Mechanism  of flight      "Burgesses and Craftsmen of
in the soaring of, I43, 50$o.     Glasgow," 342; doctrines of,




458                       INDEX.
where a hindrance, not a help,  ment familiar in the High362.                           lands until a few years ago,
Snakes, rudiments of Legs in,     345.
I95.                         Spinning Jenny, the, coming
Snipe chased by a Merlin in the   to economise the work  of
Hebrides, 158.                 human hands, 347.
Snipes, Feathers of, imitating   Spinning Wheel in Yorkshire
the colour of bleached vege-    in 1760, 345.
table stalks, I84.            Spontaneousness of Nature, no
Society, Sanction of, given, or   c,such thing as, according to
withheld, its influence  for    Professor Tyndall, 6; illuso
evil, or good, 366;  desire    tration of " spontaneous" deand  need for Combination       sign in the Professor's own
grows with the growth of    mind, I3.
knowledge and with the in-   Statute of Apprenticeship  in
creasing  complications  of,    Watt's time, 344.
376; openness and simplicity   Steam Engine, Discovery of the,
of mind great characteristics   a new stimulus to the mind's
of those men who have ex-    motives, 34I.
erted an influence for good on,   Stewart's, Dugald, account of
384; disorders of, the fruit    the Life  and Writings of
of ignorance  or rebellion,     Adam Smith, 337385.                          "Strong Arm  of the Law,"
Solar System, the, like the      what it really is as proposed
Steam Engine, works by way     by Mr. Baker, the Factory
of  Natural  Consequence,    Inspector, 360.
108.                         Structure, Bodily, Affinities beSpace and Time, can we say    tween the, of Man and that of
more of their wonders than      the Lower Animals, amongst
was said by David and Job?      the profoundest mysteries of
114.                           Nature, 265.
Spain, Modem, prohibition of  "Struggle for Existence," the,
gold from leaving the State,    of Organisms, 220.
336.                          Stunted and distorted growth in
Sparrow  Hawk  chased  and        large portions of mankind, in
"chaffed" by little  birds,    how far these conditions are
158.                           subject to the control of Will
Sparta, Ancient, Law of, pro-    through the Use of Means,
hibiting gold from ever coming  325.
into the State, 336.          Superhuman, much that was
Species, the Preservation and     once thought, not thought so
Distribution of, when  they     now, 13.
have arisen, the real bearing   Superhuman  and  the  Superof the doctrine of Natural    material, the, familiar facts in
Selection, 240.                 nature, 23.
Spindle,  the,  on  Egyptian   Supernatural, Belief in the, esmonuments, a similar instru-    sential to all Religion, an




INDEX.                       459
assertion true only in a special  Time, said to be a powerful
sense, 5I.                     Factor, 263.
Supreme Will and Supreme In-  Torpedo, number of Hexagonal
telligence in  the Laws of    columns in the battery of the,
Nature, our ownl Wills and     IOI.
Intelligence enable us to con-  Trade, immense advantage of
ceive of a, 23.                abolishing Restrictions on, 335,
Swallow,Common, sharp-pointed    success in, hindered by Protecstructure of Wing in the, 157.    tion, 34I.
Swift, the, dropping, not flying   Triumphs, for which man has
backwards,  4I; its wonder-    been gifted with knowledge,
ful and unceasing evolutions,  a sense of right, and faculties
147-                          of Contrivance, 383.
Sylph Humming Bird, the, 233.  Truth, every one, connected with
Symmetry a relation we de-    every other Truth in  the
tect in all variations of Organic  Universe, 56; Ultimate, beGrowth, 242.                   yond the reach of Science,
272.
T.                Tulloch, Principal, quoted, 23.
Tycho Brahe, 343Tails in Birds, I62.           Tyndall, Professor, quoted, 6,
Taylor, Jeremy,  on  Resem-    257.
blances, 53.                 Type, or Pattern, a definite, for
Teachers in Politics, Time and   each class of Animal adhered
Natural  Consequence  the    to, 2I1.
great, 357.                  Typical Forms, work of CreaTennyson's Idylls of the King,    tion carried on under rules of
61; Maud, Ioo; In Memo-    adherence to, 76
riam, 53, I16, 286.
Ferns, Mechanism of Flight in,             7.
I50.
"Theine,"' and "Strychnine,"   Ultimate Question, the, What is
identical in elements, differ    it by which this is done? lies
only in the proportions in    above and behind every dewhich they are combined, 95.    tected Method in Nature, 272;
Theology, Systematic, an idea    Force, seat of, we know nowhich it regards with sus-    thing directly of, 275.
picion, 52.                  Unconscious  Metaphysics  of
"THINGS HOPED  FOR," the         Human Speech, 303.
Power of, a Power which   Unity of Design amid Variety
never dies, II5.               of Form, a universal feature
Thought and Emotion, exciting    in Nature, I98.
Causes of, must come from the   Unknown and Unknowable, the,
external world, 297.           result to Professor Huxley of
Threes within Threes, Arche-    using this vague phrase, 89.
typal Arrangement of, in Or-   Universe, question lying at the
chids, 44.                     root of our conceptions of the,




46q                        INDEX.
63; constitution of the, Man's    finite varieties of Life, 206,
faculty of Contrivance  the      271.
nearest analogy by which to   Verities of the World, a pre-adunderstand the, 390.             justed relation to the, 2950
Unusual Birth, an, Idea common   Virgil, quoted, 142.
to all Development Theories   Vital Force, the Great Imponthat a New Species is simply,    derable, 151.
21I4.                         Vital Power, the nearest concepUse and Ornament in Nature    tion we can ever have of Force
may often arise out of the       derived from our collsciousness
same conditions, I93.            of, 275.
Useless Organs, how explained   Volitions, our, how far subject
by the Theory of Creation by     to Adjusted Forces, 322.
Birth, 266.                   Voltaic Battery, Mr. Darwin
Utility, acting through Motive     cannot conceive how a, can be
as a Mental Purpose, the pro.    made out of the tissues of a
vider beforehand of external    fish, I04.
Correlations, 256; Correlated   Voltaic Current, Mineral Salt
Growth  in  Flowers,  the        crystallizing under a, correForces of, according to Mr.    lation  of  growth  in  its
Darwin, modify structures in-    simplest form, 245.
dependent of Utility,  and   Voluntary  Society, the  mere
therefore of Natural Selec-    founding of a, the powerful
tion, 267.                      latent force it evolves, 369.
V.                              W
Variability of Adjustment in tile   Wages, Economic Advantages
facts of Nature, 389.            gained when hours of labour
Variable Combinations of  zn-      are reduced  without  corre.
variable Forces, Phenomena       sponding reduction in, 378.
governed by, 98.               Wallace, Mr. his description of
Variation, Laws of, Mr. Darwin     Humming  Birds  balancing
confesses "our ignorance of    themselves in the air, I67.
the Laws of Variation is pro-  "Watch  Force," and'Vit:l
found," 218; so-called Laws      Force," analogy between them
of, for the most part simply     precise and accurate, I24.
observed Facts in respect to   Water, the Old Motive Power,
AVariation, 24I.                 Factory System begun under,
Variety  in itself an object in    347.
the creation of New Species,   Watt, James, 339, c seq.
228.                           Wealth, views of the accurnmuVelocity of Flight, the heavier a  lation of, in Ancient Political
bird the greater its possible,   Philosophy, 335; of Nations
I44.                             hindered by Protection, 34I1
Vertebrate Type, Purpose in the   Wenham, Mr. F. H. on the
adaptibility of the, to the in.  Mechanical Principle involved




INDEX.                          46 I
in tlie sufficiency of very nar-  paralyses a limb, 278; the,
row Wings, I54.                   its instinctive knowledge, how
Whales, Teeth in young, which       to use the Organism born with
never cut the gum, 195.           it, 293; in the Lower AniWhat men naturally do, no sure      mals, acted on by fewer and
test of what they ought, or       simpler motives than Will in
ought to be allowed, to do,       Man, 304; Men's, "free" ill
334.                             one sense, and in one only,
Whevwell, Dr. on the leading        305; a Variable, indispensaule
characters in  the minds of       to stability of Character, 320;
great Scientific Discoverers,     the  Human,  if unchangeI10o.                             able, then  no  such  thing
Will, Man's, instruments of, 12;    as changeability conceivable,
real difficulty  in  the  idea    32I; of Society, collective,
of, exercised without the use     two ways in which it operates
of means, I4; God's, extraor-     on the conduct, 326; conscious
dinary manifestations of, how     energies of the, ever tempted
they may be wrought by the        to march directly on objects
use of Laws of which Man          only to be reached circuitously,
knows nothing, I6; God's,         34I; Individual, Laws against
seeking and effecting the ful-    which it cannot contend, 359;
filment of designs as our living  Natural  Law   working  on
Wills in  their little sphere     Human,  362;  Individual,
effect their little objects, 21;  Authoritative Interference of
I-Iuman, Law  in  its  pri-       Positive Institution with the
mary signification, the autho-    freedom  of, still required as
ritative expression of, enforced  regards Factories, 364; Indiby Power, 64; Man's, increas-     vidual,  external  conditiulls
ing power exercised by, over      which tell on, often nothing
the Material World, 97; the       but conditions depending on
Everlasting, some Purpose of      the aggregate Will of those
it to be seen working every-      around us, 367; Energies of,
where, I23; relation of, to       Constancy of Nature not in.
Law,,and Law  to Will, in        compatible with  the, 389;
Man's works and in God's,         Change of, the efficient cause
126; Unchangeableness and         of numberless other changes,
Universality  of the Natural      390o.
Laws essential to their use as   Wills, conclusions regarding our,
instruments of, 146; cases in     against which we are apt to
which Law  does not seem          rebel, 287; our, not free from
subservient to, I72; mani-        motives, 302; free from com.
fested  in  Material Forces,      pulsion, and from nothing else,
275; circuitous communica-        307.
tion between  direct acts of   Wilson's, Professor, Sonnet, "A
the, and movements of the         Cloud," 154.
Body, 277; the, often para-   Wing, Bird's, pulsations in a,
lysed by  the stroke which        usually impossible to count;




462                          INDEX.
instances  in  the Partridge,      wing of the Golden Plover,
Pheasant, Blackcock, Pigeon,       I56; his illustration of a Kes.
and Diver, 133; Bird's, down-     trel hovering, I6I.
ward blow of a, indispensable   Woodcock's Plumage, the, coto flight, I35; convex and con-    loured  like decaying  fallen
cave surfaces of a, indispen-      leaves, I82; Tail Feathers casable to flight, I36; sort of,     pable of forming a beautifully
required by Birds which seek      tinted fan, I83; lustrous black
their food in the air, I47;        eye betrayed it to the fowler,
peculiarity of, in Divers, I48;    I84.
peculiarity of, in Birds which   Woodpeckers, Law of Assimilafeed on  the surface of the        tive Colouring  not extended
sea, I49; peculiarity  of, in     to, I79.
Birds of great and  long-   Words, which should be the sersustained  powers of flight,       vants of Thought, too often its
150; a long, the implement        masters, 63.
used by the Bird's Vital Force   Wordsworth on Nature, as inagainst the force of Gravity,      cludiing all "in the Mind of
I5I; threefold division of the   Maln," 5; his Ode to Immor.
feathers of a Bird's, I55;       tality, 59.
sharpness of a, on what it   Working Classes, always regard
depends, I56; a Rook's, an        with fear and jealousy those
example of what, 157; Bones       triumphs of mlechanical inven.
of a Bird's, the bones of the     tion which tend to the econo
Mammalian arm  and hand,          mising of labour, 375; Coln.
I 69.                             bination amongst the, an Edu" Windhover,"  machinery  of         cation in  itself, 380; Men,
flight in the, I59.                Combination the only means
Wings, Bird's, Law of Leverage       by which adult working, can
appealed to in, I5o; sort of,      defend themselves, 372.
in Gallinaceous Birds, I55;
Birds with short, I55; Birds                   Z.
with  short anld  blunt, how
they catch their prey, I58;   "Zambesi and its Tributaries,'
Humming Bird's, amazingly          Dr.   Livingstone's   work,
rapid motion of, r66.              quoted, I98.
Wolf, Mr. J. his drawing of the