,z/;  
4
0   
NAATURAL TIHEOLOGY,
OR
THE-EXISTENCE, ATTRIBUTES
AND
GO(VERNMENT ()F GOD.
INCLUDING
THE OBLIGATIONS AND DUlTIES OF MEN,
DEMONSTRATED BY ARGUMENTS DRAWN FROM THE
PHENOMIEN-A OF NATURE.
BY
LUTHER LEE, D. D.
Professor of Theology and Biblical Literature in Adrian College,
Adrian, Michigan.
"The works of the Lord are great, sought out of all them that have
pleasure therein."
"The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament show  eth his handy-work."
SYRACUSE:
WESLEYAN METHODIST PUBLISHINO HOUSE.
186C).
I *
., ~ 
Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1866, in the
Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Northern District of
New York.
WM. J. Moss, PRINrTLR, ABURN,, N.Y. 
- /~- /i6 -8- j.
('0TT E' TNTS.
LECTURE i1.
THE SCIENCE DEFINED-ITS SCOPE AND UTIL  ITY,..............................
LECTURE II.
THE FIRST GREAT PRINCIPLE ESTABLISHED  SOMETHING MUST BE ETERNAL.......
LECTURE  III. 
THE VISIBLE UNIVERSE HAD A BEGINNING?..
LECTURE IV.
MATTER IS NOT ETERNAL-THE GEOLOGICAL
ARGUMIENT..................
LECTURE V.
MIATTER WAS CREATED,.............
LECTURE VI.
MARKS OF DESIGN WHICH NATURE REVEALS,.
LECTURE VII.
THE  ORIGIN OF LIFE................
i —-q
PA(lit.
7
I
'Z -1
I
,-P-.
19
27
36
46
e
60
68 
4                CONT.ENTS.
LECTURE VIII.
ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN FAMIILY,.......
LECTURE IX.
PHENOMENA OF THE HUMAN MIND.....
LECTURE X.
THE UNIVERSAL IDEA OF GOD,.......
LECTURE XI.
THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD............
LECTURE XII.
GOD'S MORAL CHARACTER,...........
LECTURE XIII.
GOD'S MORAL GOVERNMENT,.............
LECTURE XIV.
DUTIES WE OWE TO GOD,............
LECTURE XV.
RECIPROCAL DUTIES BETWEEN MEN,.....
LECTURE XVI.
DITTIES WHICH MAN OWES TO HIMSELF,...
LECTURE XVII.
CONCLUDING REMARKS,.............
97
79
. ill
118
130
148
159
166
176
183 
PREFACE.
This volume is the result of the Author's conviction
of the need of such a work. On being called to teach
in the department of Natural Theology, he found no
Text-Book in use in the Institution, and on inquiry,
none was found in the market, which appeared to be
sufficiently adapted to the instruction of a class in College, to justify its introduction. The consequence
was, the work of instruction was undertaken by means
of original Lectures. This process revealed what all
experienced teachers have found to be true; namely,
that it is difficult for most students to come to their
recitations with good lessons, from the hearing of a
Lecture, read to them one or two days previously,
without a Text-Book, that they can carry with them
into their private study. To remove this difficulty,
the Lectures, first read to a class, have been revised,
and published in this convenient form.
On the subject of merit, the Author will leave these
brief pages to speak for themselves, only stating that
they teach what he earnestly believes, and that he
intends nothing but' good in giving them to the
public.
It will be observed by every attentive reader, both
Christian and Skeptic, that it has been the Author's
design to elaborate a system of Natural Theology, in
1 
PREFACE.
harmony with Revealed Religion. This appears to
him to be best calculated to secure the two most
important ends to be reached by any systematic embodiment of the principles of Natural Theology.
1. If the effort shall prove a success, a clear exhibition of the harmony between Natural and Revealed
Religion, will remove much prejudice against Natural
Theology as a science, and exalt it in the estimation of
the Christian public.
2. Such an exhibition of Natural Theology will tend
to lead Skeptics, who are interested in the study of
Natural Religion, to examine the Scriptures, by which
they will be compelled to admit that the Scriptures
teach the truth, so far as Natural Religion reaches, or
that their boasted Reason plays falsely. The Author
is a believer in the Divine Inspiration of the Scriptures,
and has made them the subject of his most intense
study for half a century. Of course he cannot ignore
his Christian faith, in writing a small treatise on Natural Theology.
With these remarks, his work is committed to the
judgment of a candid public, hoping that it will be
found, as the Author intends it, to promote truth, and
supply a want in our Educational Interests.
LUTHER LEE.
ADRIAN COLLEGE, ADRIAN, Michigan, Jan. 1, 1866.
I
~ 6 
NATURAL THEOLOGY.
LE CTURE
THE SCIENCE DEFINED, THE FIELD IT OCCUPIES
MARKED OUT, AND ITS UTILITY INDICATED.
I. Th7e Science of Natural Theology Defined.
The word Theology is derived from two Greek
words, Theos, God, and Logos, Discourse; hence,
Theology denotes a discourse relating to God; but
in usage, it signifies the science which treats of the
existence, attributes, character and government of
God, including the obligations and duties of men
as God's creatures, and the subjects of his moral
government.
The word  Natural,  as a prefix to Theology,
stands opposed to Supernatural; hence, Natural
Theology is the science of God, as derived from the
revelations of Nature, without a supernatural revelation, such as is believed to be contained in the
Scriptures. If the Scriptures are true, and have
been derived in the manner which they claim for
I~ 
NATURAL THEOLOGY DEFINED.
themselves, they give us a supernatural Theology.
But any Theology which may be learned from the
works of God, without any such supernatural revelation as the Scriptures claim for themselves, is
properly called Natural Theology, because it is a
revelation of Nature, or a revelation of God in Nature. If the human intelligence cannot find God
revealed in some or all of the phenomena of Nature, there can be no such thing as Natural Theology. -If the human intelligence can find God revealed in all or in any part of the phenomena of
Nature, so much of God as is thus revealed constitutes the substance, extent, and limits of Natural
Theolo,y.  Natural Theology, then, supposes that
the works of God are a revelation of himself to the
human mind, and proceeds to demonstrate and interpret such revelation, by which process the science is elaborated.
From what has been said, it follows that the object of Natural Theology is to make us acquainted
with God, that we may know that He is, and what
are His attributes, character and government, and
what obligations we are under to Him This being
the case, the whole science is involved in two
questions, namely:
1. Is God so revealed in His works as to enable
the human intellect to gain, through this source,
with reasonable certainty, such a knowledge, in
kind and degree, as renders the science usefill and
important?
8 
FIELD OF INVESTIGATION.
2. If. God may be known through iis works,
that is, through what is known as the phenomena
of Nature, what and how much of Him may be thus
known?  These two questions appear to bring before us the whole subject of Natural Theology, and
to elaborate answers to them, is the task of him
who would construct a science on the subject.
II. The Field of Investigation marked out.
In prosecuting our inquiry after the truth of
Natural Theology, we shall find the whole field of
Nature open before us, and in this field must the
truth be found, if found at all. We are not limited
to any part of this field; its wide extent is open
before us, comprehensive of all the objects of human
knowledge. The proof may be found in the harmonious complex whole, or in any part or parts of
that whole; and in either case the conclusion will
be equally certain, if' the process of reasoning be
sound. As the same mind is not likely to comprehend all the departments of Nature to the same
extent, it must be expected that there will be divisions and classifications of the evidence, and that
each investigator will contribute his portion of the
proof from his own department of science.
1. Those principally devoted to the study of
Physical Geography will be most likely to find
proofs of the existence of God on the broad surface
of the earth. If they can see foot-prints of the
Creator, or marks of an Almighty forming hand
I$
9 
10     PROOFS IN PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY,
impressed upon the'face of the world, they.will report to us, as the result of their research, that there
is a God. If rocks talk in reason's ear of the hand
that moulded them; if brooks and rills sing, to the
reasoning soul of man, the praise of the Immortal
Spirit that bids their waters flow with unabating
fullness; if mountains are suggestive of the power
that reared them as Nature's watch-towers; if the
eye of reason can see the touch of a Divine hand in
the flowers that bloom, and in the golden fruits as
they ripen; and if the heart of gratitude conceives
the idea of a bountiful Provider, on sight of rich
and abundant harvests waving on hill and plain,
there is furnished from this department an array of
corroborating proofs conclusive of the existence of
God, provided the facts are clear, and the conclusions well drawn from the premises.
2. The Astronomer directs his way upward, and
wanders in thought amid celestial spheres, and as
he traces the rounds of revolving worlds, he notes
the response which world gives to world, and system to system; by which the motion of each is
modified, controlled, and perpetuated, and the grand
galaxy of worlds is held in its glorious array, and
rolled on in its cycles. If such a view of the universe suggests to the beholder a higher Power, leading to the conception of a Creator, who made and
governs the whole, there is developed the truth'of
Natural Theology; and Addison, when under the 
ASTRONOMY AND GEOLOGY.
influence of the conception, he uttered the following,
gave us not only poetry, but the truth of philosophy:
" The spacious firmament on high,
With all the blue ethereal sky,
And spangled heavens, a shining frame,
Their great Original proclaim:
"In reason's ear they all rejoice,
And utter forth a glorious voice;
Forever singing as they shine,
'The hand that made us is divine.'"
This is as good Theology as it would be if it
were derived from any other source, provided the
conception is the legitimate consequence of the contact of the knowing mind with these vast ethereal
objects of knowledge.
3. The Geologist is likely to dig for the great
truth of the Divine existence, and if he can find the
proof folded in the various strata, it is just as good
as though he brought it from above, provided his
premises are facts, and not assumptions, and' his
conclusions are logical deductions.
4. There is one department of Nature yet unnamed, in which search may be made for the great
idea. The Mental Philosopher may search within
himself, and in so doing, will find his own mind its
greatest wonder to itself.  The mind is a knowing
power, a power to know; and yet it does not know
itself. It knows itself to be a knowing power, and
yet it knows not what the power is that knows.  It
11 
PROOF IN MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
knows itself to be a spirit, because'it knows that
matter knoweth not.  It knows its owvn identity,
that it is the same continued self, because it knows
that that which now knows is that which knew in
time past; and yet what is the essence, the sub stance in which this same continued power to know
resides, it does not know.
The mind, in consciousness. knows its own
thoughts, and purposes, and feelings, and in knowing so much, it knoweth all its knowledge. It is
hid from itself under an impenetrable veil of mystery, which defies the gaze of its own piercing
eye, and yet looks out upon the world and sees
much, and gathers in its store of knowledge from
near and far. It walks through the earth in
thought, and ascends the milky way, and surveys the
heavens, and leaps from world to world, and so
comprehends the motions of the heavenly bodies for
a hundred years to come, as to tell the year, and
day, and hour, and minute, when each eclipse, and
other celestial phenomenon, will transpire. In a
word, the mind grasps this vast universe of worlds,
and wraps the whole up in one of its little complex
thoughts, which a mental Philosopher would call
an understanding notion, and holds the whole under
its own eye of reflection. If the mind, which I)ossesses such intellectual powers, does, in the exercise of these powers, awaken within itself the conception of a higher creative power, by which the
soul says to itself, there must be a- Creator, who
12 
UTILITY OF THE SCIENCE.
made me to know, and made all the objects of my
kniowledg,e, there is found a volume of Theology
within; provided the conception is the result of
the mind's own spontaneity, under the pressure of
its surroundings.
It is not affirmed that all that has been supposed
will be found in exact conformity with the above
outline; that would be to regard the question as
settled.  The design, thus far, has not been to
demonstrate the truth of Natural Theology, but
only to point out the field in which we are to
search for it, and open up the way so plainly that
we shall not wander from the right path, in our
investigations.
III. The Utility of the Science Defended.
In entering upon a consideration of this question,
it is proper to premise that there are three classes
of opinions to be met in the investigation, namely,
all Christians who receive the Scriptures as given
by inspiration of God, all Deists, who reject the
Scriptures as a Revelation from God, yet believe in
the existence of a Supreme Creator, and Ruler of
the Universe; and Atheists, who deny the existence of God, and admit of no intelligence higher
than their own.   These three classes, viewing the
subject firom such widely different stand-points,
sustain different relations to the question of utility,
and the question needs to be discussed with special
reference to each of the three separately.
1*
13 
UTILITY OF THE SCIENCE.
1. Is the Science useful, allowing Christianity to
be true?
There is not a uniformity of opinion on the sub ject. Some have assumrned, that if Natural Theology
be admitted as a Science, sufficiently comprehensive
and clear to render its study useful and important,
it must detract from the necessity, importance and
usefulness of the Scriptures. The argument is,
that the fact that God has given us a revelation of
His will in the Scriptures is proof positive that siiuh
a revelation is necessary in our circumstances, and
if a revelation is necessary, it follows that Natural
Theology is insufficient, and therefore unimportant,
if not useless, with those who possess the Scrip tures. This may appear plausible upon its face, yet
it admits of a sufficient reply.
First. The study of Natural Theology, if rightly
pursued, cannot fail to support and illustrate much
of the evidence by which we labor to support the
claim of the Scriptures to Divine Inspiration. Allowing all that is claimed for the Scriptures, still
the undeniable fact will remain, that many do not believe and never have believed and appreciated them,
and by such they are regarded as false or fabulous.
A portion of this class maintain the sufficiency of
Natural Theology, and urge it as opposed to and
contradictory of the Scriptures. This no Christian
can allow, and his only sure ground of defence
against it is, the study of Natural Theology, that
he may understand it, and make it talk its own
14 
UTILITY OF THE SCIENCE.
truthful language, and not allow it to be palmed
off as the voice of Nature, distorted by the blind
heart and false tongue of Infidelity. If God is
alike the Author of the material universe and of the
Scriptures, they must speak the same language, so
far as they speak on the same subject. God has
not spoken one thing through Nature, and some thing different and contradictory through the Scrip tures.  They may speak different truths, but can  not speak contradictory truths, for one truth cannot
contradict another truth. WVhere there is contra  diction, there is falsehood. All real science is truth,
and hence there must be perfect harmony between
Science and the Scriptures, upon the assumption
that the Scriptures are a revelation from God.  But
science is often imperfectly understood, and that
which has been regarded as science has, on further
investigation, been found to be error. Thus has
there often been contradiction between what was
at the time regarded as science and the teachings
of the Scriptures; and again and again has Skepti  cism brought forward its own scientific ignorance,
to refute the clearly demonstrated truths of Reve  lation; but in every case, further investigation has
developed a scientific error, or a misapplication of
truth, which has left our faith in the Scriptures
resting upon a firmer foundation than before. If
the Scriptures are a Revelation from God, their
voice must accord with the voice of Nature, so far
as they both speak on the same subject. If, then,
15 
16        SCRIPTURES STILL NECESSARY.
Natural Theology, on investigation, proves to be a
practical science, and is found to teach the same
truths that are taught in the Scriptures, so far as it
teaches anything, then will natural and revealed
religion not only harmonize, but will mutually sup port and explain each other; and the study of
Natural Theology may be of great service to the
cause of Scriptural religion
Second. If all be admitted that is or can be
claimed for Natural Theology, allowing its widest
range, it cannot, in the slightest degree, supercede
the necessity, or lessen the inmportance of the Scrip tures.  Allowing that Natural Theolo,gy can make
us acquainted with the existence of God, and our
general obligation to o)ey Him  in the light of the
simple relation existing between  Creator and created intellig,ences, it would not meet our religious
wants, and the Scriptures would still be necessary.
Our relation to God is not the simple relation
between a Creator and created intelligences. We
are revolted, fallen beings, redeemed, and under a
dispensation of grace, upon which subjects Natural
Theology does not and cannot teach, when all its
claims are allowed.  Our condition, as fallen beings,
requires a remedial system, in regard to which Natural Theology is necessarily silent, that system
being found only in the Gospel. It has now been
shown that Natural Theolo,gy may greatly assist
the cause of Revealed Religion, while, by no pos 
UTILITY OF THE SCIENCE.
sibilitv can it lessen its importance; and here let
the Christian aspect of the subject be dismissed.
2. Deists who reject the Scril)tures as a RevelcatioI from God, must admit the utility of Natural
Theology.
Deists, at least the better class of them, while
they deny the Inspiration of the Scriptures, believe
in the existence of God, and to some extent in
Natural Religion.  Natural  Theology is all -the
Theology they admit; and holding,, as they generally do, that the light of Nature is sufficient, they
must admit the utmrnost importance of the science of
Natural Theology, well systematized and clearly
developed. Such a system of Natural Theology
may be useful to them, not only by making them
better men, as Deists, but by leading them to embrace Christianity, by revealing to them the entire
harmony of Natural Theology, when properly understood, with PRevealed Religion.
3. NVatural Theology may beneft Atheists.
Atheists deny that there is any such being as
God, in the Theistic sense.  With them, Nature is
all. As they deny everything but what they are
pleased to call Nature, it is difficult to see how they
can be reached, except by arguments drawn from
Nature. They may be expected to contest the conclusions of Natural Theology, at every stage in the
progress of its development; yet are they bound to
investigate the subject, and cannot consistently re
17 
MAY BENEFIT ATHEISTS.
fuse to give it their attention, for two very obvious
reasons.
First. The principal issue is with them, and they
cannot, as honest men, refuse to meet it. Is there
a God, an Allwise and Almig,hty Being, before Nature, above Nature, and the Creator of Nature-?
Theists affirm, Atheists deny, and with themn the
issue is joined in Natural Theology.
Second. The appeal is to their only volume, Nature, and they must not turn away their ears when
we read their own book. If they will attend to the
argument, they may be convinced.
18 
LECTURE II.
THE PRINCIPAL ISSUE STATED-THE ARGUMENT
OPENED-THE TRUTH OF ETERNAL SELF-EX    ISTENCE ESTABLISHED-THE ADVANTAGES
OF THE POSITION POINTED OUT.
I. Tlte Principal Issue Stated.
The existence of God is the first great truth to
be established in the process of elaborating a system of Natural Theology. There are two forms of
error with which issue is joined, and which will be
overthrown by the establishment of this truth.
1. It takes issue with Atheism, which denies
that there is a God. This form of error has no system, and contains but one fundamental principle in
its creed, and that has only a negative existence.
That principle is, that there is no God. In the
place of the common belief in the existence of God,
it gives us nothing. To account for the various
phenomena which it cannot overlook or deny, it
sometimes talks of chance, sometimes of the efficiency of nature, and sometimes of the eternity of
matter. These assumptions need not be examined
and refuted at this point, as they will be over 
20        THE ISSUE WITH PANTHEISM.
thrown by the establishment of the fact that there
is a God.
2. The great affirmative proposition, that there
is a God, takes issue with all forms of Pantheism.
This name comes from two Greek words, ~Pan, all,
and TlIeos, God, literally, all God.  The doctrine
of Pantheismi' is, that nature is God, God is every
thing, and'every thing is God; every separate part
is God, while the whole complex universe is the supreme God. This system was originated by the socalled Greek Philosophers, in their heathen blindness, but it constitutes the warp and woof of mocldern Transcendentalism.
In opposition to these errors the Theistica] view
stands opposed, which is, that there is a God, who
is an eternal, almighty, intelligent Spirit, the Creator of all things besides Himself. The simple fact
that there is a God must first be established, and
then we shall have a ground on which we can show
His character.
II. The Argument Opened.
To furnish a ground upon which we can stand
and elaborate direct arguments in support of Theismn, it is necessary to establish the fact of eternal
self-existence somewhere,  as  a necessary truth.
Something is, and of necessity must be, eternal.
1. Nothing cannot produce something. This is so
self-evident that no one is likely to deny it. To
affirm that nothing can produce something, is to 
ETERNAL SELF-EXISTENCE.
affirm that nothing is something.  That which produces must be, must exist, and that which exists is
something, not nothing.  The word nothing, nothing, is exclusive of every thing, and implies the
absence of every thing, all matter, all spirit, all
action, and all power to act; and therefore nothing
cannot produce something.  To produce something
implies the presence of both power and action, but
nothing excludes them both; therefore, where notliing is, something cannot be produced.  If there had
once been nothing, no matter when, there never
could have been any thing.
The same result will be reached by the application of another self-evident truth. No one will, or
can, deny that every effect must have a cause, and
that it cannot transpire without the existence of
such cause; but nothing is not and cannot be a
cause, since it is exclusive of every thing, and therefore, where nothing is, there can be no cause of any
thing,. A cause is something and not nothing, and
as a cause is not nothing, nothing cannot be a cause.
The inevitable conclusion is, that where nlothing is,
nothing must remain, and something can never be.
If, then, there had ever been a time when there
was nothing, nothing would always have remained,
and there never would have been any thing. If,
then, there is now any thing, something.has always
existed, because something could not begin to
exist without the prior existence of something else as
its cause.  As a cause is something, and must exist
21 
SOMETHING NOW EXISTS.
before an effect can exist, to say that something
began to exist, when nothing existed, would be to
make the self-contradictory affirmation that something existed when nothing existed.
2. There is something, that is, something now
exists. The argument of Descartes proves this point,
though it came far short of filling the measure of
his proposed theory. He said, "I think, therefore,
I am."  Every rational person can affirm this with
the greatest confidence. Every person knows, in
consciousness, that he thinks, and his reason affirms
that that which thinks, exists and is something.
A class of Philosophers, called Idealists, have denied
the existence of a material world, external to the
human mind; but these intellectual dreamers have
been constrained to admit the existence of mental
phenomena, while they contend that nothing else is
certain. This admission is sufficient for the present argument, inasmuch as mental phenomena cannot exist without the existence of mind.   Mental
phenomena is something, and it implies the existence of mind, which is something, and its existence
implies a cause why the phenomena is developed,
when and what it is, and such cause must be something.  How futile is it, then, to insist that nothing
exists. No man can prove to himself that there is
absolutely.nothing in existence, he can do no more
than doubt, and that which doubts must exist. No
man can evade the fact of his own existence, for if
he denies it, by that very denial he proves it, for
22 
SOMETHING HAS ALWAYS EXISTED.
that which denies must exist. The second premise
in the argument is then proved, which is, that something exists.
3. Something must have always existed. This
conclusion follows from the two preceding proposi- 
tions, which have been established with absolute
certainty. Nothing cannot produce something;
something now is; therefore, something always was.
We have now reached a position in the argument
where it is certain that something has, and of
necessity must always have existed, and is eternal.
The question here is not, what is eternal, which is
eternal, whether little or much, or all, is eternal,
but simply that something is, and of necessity must
be, eternal, and so far, the preceding argument is
and must be, absolutely conclusive.
It is not pretended that the Theistic view of God
has been proved, nor even the Deistic view, but a
position has been established, upon which other
arguments can be built, bearing directly on the point.
III. The Advantages of the Position pointed out.
The simple point that something must be eternal,
which has been established, may, at first sight,
appear but a small gain, yet it will prove like an
elevated outpost, which, when taken, will silence
every other battery, and command the whole city.
1. The fact proved that something is eternal
gives us the advantage ground of self-existence, not
only as a possible thing, but as an absolute fact
23 
ADVANTAGES POINTED OUT.
existing in the elemental nature of some thing or
being.  That which always existed was never caused
to exist, and hence can have no cause of existence,
beyond such uncaused cause as exists in its own
eternal nature;  and that which has no cause of
existence, only what exists in itself, is, and must be,
self-existent. The argument proves, beyond the
power of a doubt, that self-existence is not only
possible, but that it has an embodiment in some
thing or being that really is.  This self-existent
something or being, whenever and wherever we
shall find and identify it, we propose to call God,
the Creator, the Jehovah. The advantage of the
position, in part, lies in the fact that it will preclude
future cavil as the argument progresses.  It being
proved that something is eternal, and consequently
self-existent, all filture cavil about the impossibility
and absurdity of self-existence is precluded, and we
may carry the principle forward in the argument,
and search out and identify the Eternal One, and
Atheism will be overthrown.
2. The position gained that something must be
eternal, will enable us to overthrow all forms of
Pantheism, and every other like ism, by simply
proving that Nature had a beginning.  If it can be
proved that the material universe had a beginning,
it will follow that there.was a cause for the beginning,, which existed before Nature, and which, itself,
must be uncaused and eternal, in which case Nature
cannot be God, and Pantheism will be proved false.
24 
ADVANTAGES POINTED OUT.
In connection with every index, which reason finds
in all the field of Nature pointing to a beginning,
she affirms, clearly and absolutely, that there was a
cause of that beginning, which was itself uncaused
and eternal, which annihilates the Pantheistic view.
3. The point proved that something must be eternal, will greatly assist us in our search after God,
and in identifying Him when we find Him revealed
in any of His works. We may trace backward
chains of causes and effects, as they are stretched
through the ages of the past, and may find footprints and hand-marks of the Great First Cause,
but He is not found in any succession of causes and
effects, for these rmust all have had a beginning, and
yet something is eternal, and that must be looked
for back of all successions.  Every succession of
cause and effect may point reason back to God, as
the great universal cause of all, but none of them
is God himself, for as He is eternal, He must exist
back of all successions. What we call time, is duration measured by the revolutions of the heavenly
bodies, hence time is known to man, only as duration measured and divided into periods by events,
and as wq trace the stream of ttme upward to its
source, the events by which it is measured and divided into successive periods must grow less, until
we reach the first event where time began, and here
we find the Great First Cause of all things, Himself uncaused, self-existent, dwelling in His own
eternity. All along the course of time, and in the
25 
ADVANTAGES POINTED OUT.
motions of the orbs that measure time, and in every
thing that time evolves, we may be able to find
proofs of the existence of an Eternal One, but Him
we find not in person or substance, in any thing that
had a beginning, in any thing that is marked by
change in any thing that increases the number of
its years, nor yet in any thing that shall have an
end. When, in thought, we follow backward the
indexes which time has set up along her course, to
point to her beginning, until we reach the place
where time herself was first evolved, as the worlds
wheeled into their orbits and formed the grand galaxy; here we pause in awe, and know that all
beyond is the Eternal One, dwelling in His own
infinitude of self-existence.
26
4 
LECTURE III.
THE VISIBLE UNIVERSE HAD A BEGINNING,
I. The Issue Defined.
At this point in the investigation, a new issue is
raised. In the preceding argument the issue was,
is there something which is eternal, which always
existed, which never began existence; or did every
thing have a beginning; or is there nothing now?
It was demonstrated that something is eternal.
That being settled, a new one is raised, by taking
an advanced step in the general argument, which is,
what and which is eternal? is all eternal, or is
there an eternal Creator, who is the cause of all
existence except his own? This issue is between
Atheism and all forms of Pantheism, on one side,
and Theism on the other. Atheism and Pantheism
agree in affirming that the visible Universe is eternal, while Theism denies it, and affirms that there
is an Eternal, Intelligent Being, commonly called
God, who created the visible universe. The pres
i 
TIME AND ETERNITY.
ent argument regards only what is called the material universe. or matter.
II. Tine and Eternity Defined.
To bring the argument out distinctly, and ili its
full force, it is necessary to define Time and Eternity, and make plain the distinction between them.
The subject of eternity has been greatly mystified, by attempted definitions  and  explanations.
In these attempts, made by a number of able writers, two principal errors have been committed.
The first is that of attempting to form an abstract
notion of eternity, and then to treat of it and
explain it accordingly, as an abstract something, separate from God, as though it were a place where
God lives, or an element in which he lives. The
second error lies in confounding this supposed notion of eternity with our notion of time, as though
time were a part, and eternity the whole of the
same thing. All this can only serve to mystify and
produce-confusion of thought.  If time were a part
of eternity, " a fragment broken off from eternity,"
as one author has called it, then eternity must consist of parts, and cannot be infinite or unlimited,
as all agree that it is. No matter into how many
parts it be divided, whether two or many, and no
matter how large one part may be, and how small
the other, relatively to each other, it is a self evident truth, an intuition of reason, that no number.
of parts, each of which must be limited to be a part,
28 
TIME AND ETERNITY.
can, combined, constitute an infinite, unlimited
whole.  It is then certain that time, being divided
into limited periods, can'not be a part of eternity,
unless eternity also be a limited period, divided
into less periods. 
No abstract idea can be formed of eternity.
What is it in the abstract? It is not matter, for
matter is limited, bounded,.and divisible. It is not
spirit, for there is but one Eternal Spirit, and that
is the God of the Theist.  It is nothing which God
has created, for then it must have had a beginning,
and cannot be eternal, and of course not eternity,
as understood. It cannot be something separate
from the being of God, which was never created,
for then there would be two eternal natures, and
God cannot be the Creator of all things, since there
is this one thing, besides God, eternity, which never
was created.  It is clear, then, that there can exist
in the human mind no abstract notion of eternity;
it is indescribable, undefinable, inconceivable and
unthinkable; it is an absolute nonentity.
It may be asked how the idea got into the mind.
The reply is, it never did get into the mind, as an
abstraction; it'is not, never was, and never can be
in the mind. WVe have the word eternity, but it
represents no abstract idea. Webster defines the
word eternity to be "duration, without beginning,
or end," but this definition is a solecism, for duration implies both limitation and lapse, or a passing
onward, a continued increase of the whole period
2
29
4 
TIME AND ETERNITY.
of the duration referred to. Even Mr. Webster
defines duration to be, "continuance in time," and
when he adds, "everlasting'duration," as expressing
a shade of mneanting within his one definition, he
only affirms an endless continuance, but does not deny a beginning, which comes short of the common
notion of eternity. But should it be allowed that
eternity is endless duratiQn, or rather duration without beginning or end, a contradiction in terms, still
this is not definable, and is inconceivable, it is
unthinkable. We cannot form an abstract idea of
duration without beginning or end.  We can give it
no ground or form in thought, so as to hold it in
the mind as an object of attention and reflection.
It is not space, limited or infinite. It is'not place,
large or small. It is not a sentiment or a principle,
as right and wrong, or beauty and deformity. It is
not a principle or rule of action as a law.   It is not
body, and has no form, no locality, no extension, no
quality, and must be absolutely unthinkable as an
abstraction.  What, then, is eternity? and how is
it distinguished from time?
We give the only understandable definition of
eternity, when we say that it is one of the divine
attributes; that it is that element of self-existence, which renders the being of God without beginning and without end. The fact has been demonstrated, that something is eternal, by which is
meant, without beginning or end. The fact of eternity, in this sense, has been proved, or rather shown
30 
TIMIE AND ETERNITY.
to be a self-evident truth, an intuition of reason,
but the attribute or quality of eternity, exists in
God alone, and cannot be abstracted, and is unthinkable as an abstract notion.  Eternity enters
into our notion of God. We conceive of God as an
Eternal Spirit, almighty, all-wise, omnipresent, just
and good. Of such a being every one can conceive,
and form a distinct understanding notion of him,
embracing the above named attributes; the complex notion is clearly thinkable, while the manner
is incomprehensible and unthinkable. The attri-f
bute or quality of eternity exists in God himself
and exists nowhere else, has no existence in anyl
other being or thing, and hence is incapable of be-;
ing abstracted, and is unthinkable as an abstraction.
When we undertake to make an abstraction of eternity, and treat of it as a distinct being, thing, or
entity, existing separate from God, as an element in
which  He  has  His being, yet not Hirnself; the
mind becomes confuised and lost in its attempt to
explain what cannot be explained, to define what
cannot be defined, and to think what cannot be
thought.
We can now define time, and no one will fail to
distinguish time, and all that time has evolved,
firom eternity, and to note the whole as devoid of
the attribute of eternity.
Time is duration measured by the revolutions
of the heavenly bodies. Time is known to us only
by events. Our experience of successive sensible
31 
PRINCIPLES APPLIED.
events, events known to sense, in connection with
consciousness of personal identity or continued
sameness, gives us an idea of time, the lapse of
duration. Without events, no lapse could be perceived, and time would be unknown. The revolutions
of the earth upon its own axis give us day and
night, events by which time is measured. The revolutions of the earth around the sun, the centre of
our system of worlds, give us another and larger
measure by which time is divided into years.
III. TAle principles applied, and  the argument
finished.
It is obvious, from the definitions given, that the
visible universe is not eternal, that time, which is
known only in events, must have had a beginning
with the whole machinery by which it is measured.
The visible universe cannot have always existed,
because its revolutions are increasing in number, and
therefore must be limited, and must diminish as
they are numbered backward along the course of
time.  It would be folly to affirm that the earth
has made no more revolutions now, than it had when
the Pyramids of Egypt were built. If then less 
years had elapsed when the Pyramids were built
than at this date, there must have been still less at
a date as remote from that as that is remote from
this. Upon the same principle, the number of
years must continue to decrease, until the first revolution of the earth is reached where time began.
32 
HARMONY OF NATURE AND REVELATION.  33
The whole of time can be no more than a succession of days and years, limited in number. Time
being divided into parts, days and years, each limited, the whole of time must be limited. Every
part being less than the whole, must be limited, and
as all the parts are limited, the whole must be, for
no number of limited parts can make an unlimited
whole.  Time is then limited, and must have had
a beginning, and of course the visible Universe
must have had a beginning, and consequently cannot be eternal.
The question here is not, how old this earth is,
nor yet how old the Universe is of which it is a
part, whether six thousand years, or six hundred
thousand, or six hundred millions. As each revolution sustains to all the revolutions the relation of
a part to a whole, all the revolutions must be limited; and combined, can constitute but a limited
period; and as the existence of the orbs is measured by their revolutions, the whole system must
have had a beginning.
IV. Thus far Natural Theology testifies to the
truth of Biblical Theology.
In elaborating a system of Natural Theology, it
is no part of the work to vindicate the claims of
the Scriptures to Divine Inspiration, nor even to
expound them; but to show that Natural Theology
is in harmony with the teachings of the Scriptures,
is the legitimate and indispensable w6rk of him who 
34  HARMONY OF NATURE AND REVELATION.
would elaborate a system of Natural Theology,
with any hope of success, so far as the Christian
world is concerned. This shall be done, in connection with every fundamental truth which our Natural Theology is made to teach. Let it not be said
that there is a departure from the legitimate work
of teaching Natural Theology, when it is shown to
be in harmony with the Scriptures, by showing that
they teach the same thing.  Without such exhibition of a harmony between the two, either in the
work itself, or in the mind of the reader, the best
system of Natural Theology would fall powerless to
the ground, in the presence of every Christian
mind. The exhibition of such harmony is not to
establish the claims of the Scriptures, but rather to
vindicate Natural Theology against a prejudice
which may exist in the minds of some believers in
the Scriptures; but more especially to relieve it of
distortions and mis-applications of Infidels, by which
they have labored to array Natural and Revealed
Religion against each other.
After stating the reasons for the course to be pursued, it is proper to show that the conclusion reached
.by the preceding argument, is in perfect harmony
with the Scriptures. As Nature, by every revolution, affirms a beginning, so the Scriptures declare
that, "In the beginning, God created the heavens
and earth."-Gen. i. 1.
Psal. cii. 26. "Of old hast thou laid the foundation of the earth, and the heavens are the work 
HARMONY OF NATURE AND REVELATION.  35
of thine hands."  Rev. iv. 11.  "Thou  hast created all things." Chap. x. 6. "Who created heaven, and the things that therein are, and the earth,
and the things that therein are, and the sea, and
the things that are therein." The clear and undeniable teaching of the Scriptures is, that the visible
Universe had a beginning.  Its origin is pointed
out when it said, " These are the generations of the
heavens and the earth, when they were created, in
the day that the Lord God mnade the earth and the
heavens."-Gen. ii. 4. 
LECTURE IV
MATTER IS NOT ETERNAL.
In the preceding Lecture it was demonstrated
that the visible universe, as now organized, had a
beginning, but the  argument did not raise the
question whether matter  has or has not always
existed in some form.  The issue now raised is, Has
matter always existed in some form, or had it a
beginning.   This issue will be seen, at a glance, to
be a vital one, for if matter had a beginning, there
must have been a cause for that beginning, an
active, creative Power, which existed before matter,
and that creative power is the God of the Theist.
The issue is direct between Atheism and Theism.
It is the one great object of Atheists to annihilate
the God of t he Bible, believed by the Theist to be
an Eternal, Self-existent, Intelligent, Omnipotent
Spirit, who created all things. As it is so clearly
self-evident that something must be eternal, they
affirm the eternity of matter as the only means of
escaping the most terrible thought to them, that
there is an Eternal God, to whom they are
accountable for their conduct. 
CREATION OF MATTER.
I. The Position avails nothing to Atheism.
1. It overthrows their principal objection to Theism.  Atheists insist that it is impossible to conceive of an eternal God, who is uncaused, and who
never began to be; in a word, they affirm that we
cannot conceive of a self-existing being.  But when
they are pressed with arguments drawn from the
visible Universe, in proof that it had a Creator,
they forget their difficulty of conceiving of selfexistence, and affirm  that the Universe is eternal.
To say nothing of the inconsistency of this course,
it is an admission that something is eternal, and
self-existent, and leaves the issue a simple one on
the question, is the visible Universe eternal and
self-existent, or is there an eternal God who created it? This gives the Theist the,advantage of
all the marks of design which Nature reveals, which
design does not inhere in nature, as proof of the
existence of an intelligent designer, which advantage
will hereafter be pressed.
2. If it were admitted that matter is eternal, it
would not relieve the Atheistic view. It was demonstrated in the preceding Lecture, that time and
all that time has evolved, had  a beginnino, that
the earth performed a first revolution. This renders it just as necessary to suppose the existence of
God, as a means of accounting for that beginning
of time, that first revolution of the earth, as it
would be to account for the existence of matter,
2*
37 
CREATION OF MATTER.
upon the admission that matter is not eternal.
The admission of the eternity of matter does not
account for the present arrangement and mechanism of matter, as it exists in the machinery of the
Universe.   As this cannot have  been eternal, as
was proved, were it allowed that matter is eternal,
it would still be necessary to suppose the existence
of a God,  to account for the present forms and
arranged forces of matter.
3. It is much more consistent to suppose that
there is a God, who created matter, and gave it all
the formis it wears, by which we account for all
the marks of intelligence impressed upon it, which
intelligence matter itself does not possess, than to
assert the eternity of matter, as a means of refuting
the idea of the existence of a God; by which all
these marks of intelligence are left unaccounted for.
Until the signs of intelligence, seen in the arrangements and developed forces of matter are accounted
for, the existence of an intelligent Creator is just as
much a necessary truth, after affirning the eternity
of matter, as before; the Atheist therefore gains
nothing by this position.
II. The assertion that matter is eternal is an
assumption wvhich does not admit of the slightest
degree of proof.
1. If matter be eternal, there can be no history
of the fact; no record can reveal the origin of that
38 
CREATION OF MATTER.
which had no origin   Nor can the fact be known
that matter is eternal, if there be no Eternal God
to reveal the fact. If there be a God, as Theists
contend, and were matter eternal, God could reveal
the fact of the eternity of matter, and it might thus
be known; but denying the existence of God, as
Atheists do, they cannot pretend that the eternity
of matter can, by any possible means, be known.
2. While it is impossible to prove the eternity of
matter, if it had a beginning, that fact will admit
of proof. Whether any such proof exists, or does
not exist, it is entirely possible that such proof
should exist. If matter was created, a record of
that creation is a possible thing, whether any such
record does exist or not; or the fact of such creation might be communicated to nman by the Creator,
at any subsequent period  or matter might be so
arranged by the Creator as to show signs in itself of
having had a beginning.  It is therefore legitimate
to attempt to prove that matter had a beginning,
that it was created. In this issue, Theism occupies
an advantage-ground, and Atheism a disadvanrtageous position. The Theistic side of the issue
admits of proof; the Atheistic side does not admit
of proof.
III. The Issue explained as finally made up and
joined.
The issue in the present argument is made to
turn on a particular science, and the question is,
39 
CREATION OF 3MATTER.
what does Geology teach in regard to the creation
ocr eternity of matter? This issue has been raised
by Atheists, and pressed in such a form as to put
all Christians on the defensive.
1. Atheists being unable to prove that there is
no God, and equally unable to adduce the smallest
degree of proof that matter is eternal, occupy themselves with efforts to disprove and subvert the evidence usually relied upon as proof that the universe
is the work of a Creator, God. They make their
assault upon the Mosaic record of the creation of
the world.  As it must appear somewhat reasonable, that if there be a God who created all things,
there should be given to men, in some  way, an
account of that creation; and as there is no such
account which wears upon its face a semblance of
truth, save the Mosaic record alone, that must be
demolished, cost what it may. They have dug
deep into the earth, and claim to have discovered
from the different strata, each of which represents
a distinct period in the history of the earth, that
this world is much older than the Mosaic record
makes it.
2. In reply to this, Christians make it their first
work to defend their record.  In reply, they say:
(1.) The 5865 years, which is the age of the
world  at this writing, according to the  Mosaic
record, commenced with the life of Adam, the first
man.
(2.) If it be proved by Geology that the earth is
40 
CREATION OF MATTER.
much older, it is no impeachment of the record.
The record does not affirm that matter did not
exist long before  Adam.   The  record reads as
fOllows
" In the beginning God created the heavens and
the earth. And the earth was without form and
void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep.
And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the
waters." Gen. i. 1, 2.
How long the earth remained without form, and
void, with darkness upon the face of the deep,
before the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the
waters, the record does not pretend to say.  This
may all have passed prior to the commencement of
the six days employed in forming matter according
to its present arrangements. The world may have
lain in darkness, and void, or waste, as some render
it, before God's Spirit moved upon it, long enough
to account for all the changes which Geology indicates, and all this before the creation of Adam, with
whom our account of time has its date. This exposition regards the words following as an independent statement of God's first act of creation, in
which he created the material of the world, in a
state of chaos: "In the beginning God created the
heavens and the earth, and the earth was without
form, and void, and darkness was upon the face of
the deep."  This enunciates the first act of creation, and describes-the state that followed, as dark
and waste. The exposition also regards the words
41 
CREATION OF MATTER.
following as the announcement of the commencement of the six days' work, subsequently described:
"And God said, Let there be light, and there was
light." From this point of beginning, the work
proceeds until the whole is crowned by the creation
of man. How long the dark, and void, or waste
state existed, before the Omnific call for light, is not
revealed in the Mosaic record, and if Geology has
revealed that fact, it has only thrown so much light
upon that record, without contradicting or impeaching it.
The Mosaic record being defended, we may
attend to the final issue which the Atheist raises in
his Geological argument.   It is now narrowed down
to a single question, namely,  does the science of
Geology indicate that the substance of the earth,
matter, is eternal, or that it had a beginning'? On
this question the issue is now joined, and as the
Atheist raised the issue, and forced it upon us, he
cannot object to having his theory of the eternity of
matter tested by it, or demur at any of the conclusions legitimately drawn from the discoveries of
his favorite science of Geology.
IV. What does Geology teach? -The Argument
concluded -Matter proved to have been created.
Geology simply proves a succession of changes,
which the earth has undergone, and each change
must have had a beginning, and points to a preceding state, until the first changeowhicli science
42 
CREATION OF MATTER.
can detect is reached, and at that point the creative act must have transpired, as will be proved.
1. Hiuman remains are found only on or near the
surface of the earth, beneath which change after
change is clearly revealed in  successive  strata.
This proves, beyond a doubt, that the human race is
of recent origin, compared with the whole period of
the earth's existence. One thing is now settled,
and that is, man had a beginning, the human race
is not eternal.  Geology testifies that the  earth
existed, and that change after change was developed, requiring ages before man appeared.
2. As we descend towards the centre of the earth,
we pass strata after strata, each requiring ages in
the work of formation, until we pass below all animal remains. This makes two facts very plain.
First, animals existed long before man, and secondly, animals did not exist until long after the
earth existed. This proves beyond a doubt, that
animal existence had a beginning, and is not eternal.
3. Still passing' onward toward the centre, we
find strata after strata, each representing an age or
ages, until we reach a point below all vegetable
remains. This proves that the earth existed long
before vegetation existed, and consequently, that
vegetation is not eternal, but had a beginning.
There must have been a first plant and tree, or a
number of each, which did not spring firom  previously existing plants and trees.
4. Still descending, we pass the limits of strati
43 
CREATION OF MATTER.
fication, and stand upon the primitive rock, the
granitic mass, too deep for human exploration. This
primitive rock, the last in the order of geological
discoveries, is itself a crystallization, and must have
had a beginning, a process involving time, and a
completion.
5. The primitive rock, the last reached, is not
only a crystallization, but a compound, -and if we
apply chemical analysis to it, until we reduce it to
nature's simple elements, of which science has discovered between fifty and sixty, the end of scientific research will be reached, and we shall have
approached the point where God began the work of
creation, when he produced the elements, without
form, void and dark.
The protracted argument may now be summed
up in few words, and a final and certain conclusion
reached.  Every change which Geology proves to
have taken place, in the structure of the-earth, is
suggestive of a beginning; every strata bears upon
its face marks of its lineal descent firom the next
below, and each rock is traced to its parent rock,
until the ultimate rock is reached, and this being a
crystallization, must have had a beginning, and its
formations have transpired in time, and not in eter* nity. The whole process, if the teachings of Geol ogy are reliable, proves that there must have been
a beginning, a first state, and that was a state in
time, and not an eternal state.  If matter existed
from eternity, in the simple state supposed, or indeed
44 
CREATION OF MATTER.
in any state, there could have existed no cause for
change, and changes could never have transpired.
If a cause for change had existed in matter from
eternity, it would have acted from eternity, and
there could have been no beginning of change, as
proved. If no cause of change existed in matter
from eternity, no cause for change could ever trans pire, if there be no God, and matter would and
must have  remained  without change.   Matter,
therefore, by the testimony of science, is proved to
have had a beginning, and must have been created.
Moreover, all the changes which matter has under gone, are scientific changes, science herself being
witness. Science depends upon fixed laws, and law
supposes a law-giver, and that law-giver must be
W the Author of Nature, and the God of the Theist;
and the Atheistic theories of the eterniity of matter,
and of chance, and fortuitous circumstance, are all
exploded.  This is all in harmony with the teach ings of the  Scriptures, but  this fact must  be
demonstrated in the succeeding Lecture.
45 
LECTURE V.
MATTER WAS CREATED-ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS  THE SCRIPTURES TEACH IN HARMONY WIT II
THE VOICE OF NATURE.
I. The Previous Arqument-Additional Arguments proposed.
1. In the previous Lecture, Atheism was met upon
its own chosen ground, and vanquished with its
own selected weapon. It made its appeal to science,
and by its own favorite science it has been overthrown. But while Atheism has depended almost
or quite exclusively upon Geology for the overthrow
of the Christian faith, and has itself been overthrown by it, there remain various other considerations which prove with equal conclusiveness that
matter was created. Some of these shall be adduced in the present Lecture. These arguments
will not only refute Atheism, as such, but every
form of error which affirms or implies the eternity
of matter, or denies that it was created. This appears necessary, in order to clear the subject of every
embarrassment, as some Christian writers have
expressed themselves in an equivocal'manner on the 
CREATION OF MATTER.
subject, if not in a manner which implies the eternity of matter, and thereby yield up every argument
drawn from the visible Universe, in support of the
existence of God.
II. False Views corrected.
Before entering upon the direct line of argument,
it is proper to notice some views which have been
advanced, judgred tQ be erroneous. It may not be
affirmed that any Christian writer of note, has, in
so many words, affirmed that matter is eternal, that
God did not create it; but the following language
of President Mahan appears to overlook the fact
that God created the matter of the Universe.
"Does creation reveal its author as Infinite and
Perfect? Can an effect, acknowledged to be finite,
reveal its cause as infinite?  If so, this revelation
cannot be found in the mere extent of the Divine
works. Suppose that the creation of one world only
could have revealed its author as finite, how many
such worlds would it take to reveal Him as infinite?
Nothing short of a number absolutely infinite, which
is an absurdity.  It is the highest absurdity, therefore, to reason, as is commonly done, from the mrere
extent of creation, whichi is still acknowledged to be
finite, to the absolute infinity and perfection of its
Author."  Intellecttua Philosophy, page 454.
A few remarks will render the errors contained
in the above extract visible. The quotation has not
been made for the purpose of attacking the respected
47 
CREATION OF MATTER.
author, but because it represents a view of the subject which appears to diminish greatly the force of
any and all arguments drawn from the visible creation, if it will not overthrow them all, if fully
admitted.
1. It mistakes the true ground of argument in the
premises.  It is not common, as affirmed, to reason
from the extent of creation, in favor of the existence
of God, but from the fact of creation.  Creation in
any visible extent, gives evidence in favor of the
existence of an Infinite Creator, because reason cannot conceive that anything less than Infinity could
produce a small creation. If appeals are made to
the extent of creation, it is to move the mind by a
view of the greatness of the Divine display, rather
than as proof of the Infinity of the Creator.
2. The position is entirely unsound, that a finite
creation cannot furnish proof of an Infinite God.
It is admitted that creation, comprehensive of all
known worlds, is finite, yet it may furnish proof of
an Infinite Creator. Reason may affirm, intuitively,
that Infinite Power alone can create. Nothing short
of Infinite Power could create this one world we
inhabit; this world is not eternal, but was created;
therefore, there must be an Infinite Creator. The
supposition "that the creation of one world would
only have revealed its author as finite," is an absurdity on its face, because creation can be the work of
nothing less than Infinite Power. It is admitted
that if a finite power could create one world, the
48 
CREATION OF MATTER.
existence of no number of worlds could prove their
Creator Infinite; but the idea that a finite power
can create the one world, is an assumption in contradiction of reason, in support of which no proof
can be offered, of any kind or degree.
3. If it were true, as affirmed, that'" nothing short
of a number of worlds, absolutely infinite," could
reveal their creator "as infinite," no possible proof
can exist of Infinitude, and the Infinite is not and
cannot be revealed to the human mind.  If a finite
creation cannot prove the existence of an Infinite
Creator, it must be because Infinite proof is required
to establish the fact that there is an Infinite God.
If so, the fact of an Infinite God cannot be known
to man. -No adequate evidence can be adduced.
The human mind being finite, it can neither receive
or comprehend Infinite proof, and God cannot reveal
himself to man only by finite proof. God can make
only a finite revelation to the human mind, and the
revelation he has made, is no more than finite,
though it reveals the fact of an Infinite God. The
human mind may comprehend a revelation of the
fact that God is Infinite, while the infinitude itself
is incomprehensible, and remains unrevealed to, or
is hid from the mind.   It is on no other principle
that the existence of an Infinite God can be proved
to, and be comprehended by, the human mind, without
being itself infinite, and hence, to allow the position
that a finite creation cannot reveal an Infinite God,
-would be to allow that no proof can exist of the
49 
CREATION OF MATTER.
fact that God is Infinite, relatively to the human
mind.
4. The language quoted from President Mahan,
appears to overlook the fact, that God created the
matter of the universe; that is, produced it when
and where there was nothing prior to such creation.
This fact has been proved, and is about to be further
proved by additional arguments.  In the light of
this fact, the existence of creation, the existence of
one world, or many wor'lds, must reveal an Infinite
Creator. There can be, on the part of finite power,
no approach to the production of something, where
there is nothing. No matter how frequently, and
by what number you multiply any degreee of finite
power, while it remains finite, as it always must, it
can make no approach towards producing something
where  there is nothing; reason revolts at the
thought.  It is certain, then, that the creation of
one world, from nothing, or where nothing was,
must reveal the Creator as Infinite, to the eye of
reason.
III. Direct Arguments in Proof that God created
matter.
1. There is and can be no direct proof of any
kind or degree that God did not create matter, or
that it is eternal.
This was shown in the preceding lecture, so far
as Atheism is considered. It is only necessary to
add, in this place, that it cannot be pretended.
50 
CREATION OF MATTER.
that the Scriptures teach that matter is eternal, or
that God did not create it.
Some have asserted that there is an absurdity in
supposing that God could produce something where
there was nothing, as negative proof that he did
not create matter. This would be conclusive, if the
denial that God could create matter was well founded, but of that there is no proof, nor does the nature
of the case admit of proof.   To prove that, would
be to prove that Almighty power is not Almighty,
that unlimited power is limited. that infinity is
finite. Suppose we cannot conceive how God could
create something where there was nothing; still we
can conceive it possible that he should do it, just as
easily as we can conceive that he should give to
bodies of matter their forces, and so arrange those
powers as to suspend systems of worlds in empty
space, whirling from age to age with undiminished
momentum; or that he should give to the load-stone
its inexplicable power of attraction.
But there is real difficulty attending the opposite
view.  To suppose that matter is eternal, is to suppose that there are two separate, eternal, self-existent, independent entities, occupying the same
infinity. If matter is eternal, it must be selfexistent, and if self-existent, it must be independent, for that which is self-existent, cannot exist
dependently upon something else.
Here, then, is a difficulty at which reason must
stumble. It is not possible to believe that there
51 
CREATION OF MATTER.
are two eternal, self-existent, independent elements,
each occupying its own sphere of existence, as both
must, to be eternal, and yet that one should act
upon, modify and control the other. This is unreasonable, yea, impossible, because it is an absurdity,
a contradiction.  There is, then, not only no possible proof that matter is eternal, but the thing is an
absurdity, and therefore unthinkable.
2. Creation includes the production of spirit, as
well as matter, which cannot have existed from
eternity, as matter is supposed to have done. The
supposition is, that matter existed in a common
mass, or in a state of chaos, and that God's creative
work was that of separating, assorting and forming,
and arranging the several formations into the conmplicated and harmonious universe. This is in harmony with the divisibility of matter, but the principle is wholly inapplicable  to spirit, which  is
indivisible.
The Christian doctrine is, that there are angel
spirits, and that every human being is spirit in his
rational and moral nature. It is impossible that
all these spirits should have existed from eternity,
in a common mass, and that God divided that mass
into all these individual spirits, as he is supposed to
have divided and arranged matter in the formation
of the universe, as it now appears. Every angel,
and every human soul is one, and only one individual
being, incapable of division. It is not true that all
angels and all human souls are eternal; nor can it
52 
CREATION OF MATTER.
be pretended that there existed from eternity a
common mass of spirit, out of which God formed
them, as he is supposed to have formed the universe out of previously existing matter.   Each
angel, and each of the first two human souls, must
have been produced by separate acts of creation, in
each of which something must have been produced
where there was nothing. God has, then, in creating angels and human souls, produced something
where there was nothing; for he created all things
that are in heaven, and in earth, which includes
both matter and spirit. As it is clear that God did
produce spirits without a pre-existing element out
of which he formed them, there can be no ground
left on which to base a denial that he created matter. Moreover, he is affirmed to have created both
matter and spirit, without notice of any distinction
in the manner or sense in which it was done; and
as it is clear that in the creation of spirits, lhe produced the substance as well as the form, the conclusion is legitimate, that he created matter in the
same sense, and that in the creation of the universe,
he gave existence to matter, which did not exist
until His creative act called it into being.
3. The word create properly signifies the production of what did not before exist. It is not necessary to lumber the subject with Hebrew authorities,
any amount of which might be adduced. Two citations  will be  as good as more.  Gesenius, in defining
th    e          Hebrew word, bah-rah, renders Gen. ii. 3              3
so
53 
CREATION OF MATTER.
" which God created in making," and adds, " It'is
apparent that bah-rah implies the creation of something new, which did not exist." The word thus
defined is the word used where it is said, "God
created the heavens and the earth.'"
Roy defines the same word, bah-rah, thus: " He
created, caused to exist, spring forth, as the world,
from nothing."
It is not pretended that the word is not used in
an accommodated sense, to denote various formations
where there was no production of a new substance;
all words are sometimes used in an accommodated
sense, to denote less or more than their proper
sense; even the name of the Supreme Being is so
used. The thing claimed is, that had the inspired
writer designed to assert that God produced the
heavens and the earth from nothing, this is the
word he would have used.  There is no other one
word in the Hebrew language which so clearly and
forcibly expresses that idea.
4. The account of the creation of the heavens
and the earth, clearly implies that God produced
the matter of which they are composed. The process is described as consisting of several creative
acts in regular succession, until the whole work
was crowned by the production of man. The
first creative act, as described, could have accomplished nothing beyond the production of matter.
The words are: "In the beginning God created
the heavens  and the  earth."   This  can mean
54 
CREATION OF MATTER.
nothing, unless it be the production of matter. It cannot mean their formation out of previously existing matter, because no formation was
effected. The earth, as yet, had no form, and
therefore nothing could have been done beyond the
production of matter. After this first creative act,
it is said, "The earth was without form and void,
and darkness was upon the face of the deep." As
God's first creative act produced the earth without
form, there was an act of creation back of all form,
which could not have given form, and therefore it
could have done nothing but produce matter, which
was afterwards formed by other acts of the Creator,
successively described. Thus is it seen that the
Mosaic account of creation teaches that God created
the matter of the world, as well as to give it form,
which was done after the matter was created.
5. There is much force in the fact that in all the
accounts given of creation, and in all the allusions
to the visible works of God, there is not one intimation that anything uncreated ever existed, except
God alone, or that there was anything existing previously to creation, out of which God made the
world. Had the substance of the universe existed
from eternity, it is hardly possible that there should
be no allusion to the fact, in the various appeals to
God's mighty power and glory, as revealed in and
through the visible creation.
6. The idea that matter was not created, but
eternal, appears inconsistent with God's repeated
55
a 
CREATION OF MATTER.
and unqualified declaration of his absolute proprietorship in all things. If matter never was created,
but has always existed, it must be self-existent,
just as much so as God is, and must have existed
independently of God. Its existence must have been
as uncaused and unconditional as God's existence.
In no sense could God be said to have any proprietorship in matter if it be eternal, for in that case
it existed by itself and of itself, just as much so as
God did. All that God can claim as his, is the
forms and motions which he has impressed upon
matter; the substance is not his, and never can be,
since it is self-existent, in no sense depends upon
him for its existence, but is co-eternal with him.
If matter is eternal and self-existent, it must forever remain so, and must always possess an unconditioned existence, independently of God, whatever
forms and motions He may impress upon it.
But as we cannot conceive of matter as destitute
of its essential qualities, which qualities render it
capable of receiving and sustaining its forms and
motions developed in the machinery of the universe,
those qualities must be eternal also, if matter be
eternal. This view would give God no credit for
those qualities of matter which are regarded as
necessary; for if matter is eternal, all that is essential to matter must be eternal, and the conclusion
must follow, that the mechanical skill is all that
honors God in creation. It may be admitted that
God has displayed great mechanical skill, in the
56 
CREATION OF MATTER.
manner in which he has arranged the elements of
nature, which he found, with their necessary qualities and inherent forces, existing from eternity,
ready for his hand; but while this is allowed, the
claim of God must end here, without any merit for
the materials of which he constructed the universe.
Not one item of these materials did God furnish, if
matter be eternal.
7. The affirmation that God created the substance of the universe, which has been supported by
so many arguments, in this and the preceding Lecture; arguments which nature, reason and science
have affirmed, with their united voice, is no less
clearly and positively asserted in the Scriptures.
In this view, nature, reason, science and Revelation
harmonize. Of course, no labored biblical argument will be attempted, but enough shall be said
to show the harmony between Natural and Revealed
Religion in this particular.
"For by Him were all things created, that are
in heaven and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers, all things were created by
Him, and for Him; and He is before all things,
and by Him all things consist."-Col. i. 16, 17.
There are three points in this text worthy of
special attention.
(1.) It is comprehensive of the creation of angels,
and human  souls; indeed, of all spirits.  These
must have been created in substance, the essence of
57 
CREATION OF MATTER.
their elemental natures must have been produced,
as they could have had no pre-existence in some
unorganic form, as was shown in the second direct
argument above.
(2.) It is affirmed that "He was before all things."
All things include matter of all kinds; He was
therefore before all matter. But He could not have
been before matter, if matter always existed. God
himself could not be before matter, if matter is
eternal; matter, therefore, cannot be eternal, and
must have been created.
(3.) It is affirmed that "by Him all things consist." Here, again, all things include matter;
matter, therefore, consists by him. But if matter
is eternal, it must be self-existent, and consists by,
in and of itself, and cannot consist by Him.
"Through faith we understand that the worlds
were framed by the word of God, so that things
which are seen were not made of things which do
appear."-Heb. xi. 3.
On this text, two remarks only need be offered.
(1.) If the worlds were made of pre-existing
matter, that matter does now appear in the things
that are seen; which things were made of that preexisting matter; therefore, the apostle, by denying
that the things which are seen were made of things
which do appear, denies that they were made of
pre-existing matter.
(2.) No Greek scholar will deny that the most
proper rendering of the text is: " things that are
58 
CREATION OF MATTER.
seen were not made of things which did appear."
The idea is, that the visible creation, which is now
seen, was not made out of what then appeared,
what then existed, but out of what did not appear,
or exist, until God then and there created it.
It having been proved that God created matter,
as well as to give it the formhs it wears, and the
forces it develops, both reason and Revelation
affirm that the grand visible display is, to the
human mind, a revelation of the Divine Architect.
"The invisible things of Him from the creation
of the world are clearly seen, being understood by
the things that are made, even His eternal power
and Godhead."-Rom. i. 20.
This text overthrows the position taken in the
quotation reviewed in a previous portion of this
Lecture, that a finite creation cannot prove an' infinite God. The things that ares made, referred to
in the text, are finite, and yet the apostle affirms,
that by them are clearly seen and understood "His
eternal power and  Godhead;" and here Natural
and Revealed Religion speak with one voice, and
enlightened human reason responds, and confesses
both.
59 
LECTURE VI.
AN ARGUMENT FROM THE VISIBLE MARKS OF DE         SIGN WHICH NATURE REVEALS.
I. The Ground of the Argument stated.
1. Designs imply a designer, and contrivances
imply a contriver. No argument is necessary, and
no proof can be required, to cause men to believe
the above statement, which is the major proposition
of the argument.
Such is the nature of the human mind, and such
the spontaneity of human reason, that no person
needs to be told that there can be no design without a designer, and no contrivance without a contriver. Tell any ordinary mind that any given part
of a thing is less than the' whole, and that all the
parts are equal to the whole, or that two things separately equal to a third, are equal to each other, and
no proof will be demanded, for the simple reason
that the person hearing the statements, knows,
intuitively, that they are true, without proof or
process of reasoning.   So when  the  intelligence
recognizes marks of design anywhere, and in any
form, it knows, with equal certainty, that there is, 
MARKS OF DESIGN.
or has been, a designer. Also when the intelligence
apprehends what it recognizes as a contrivance, it
knows with absolute certainty, that there is or has
been a contriver. If a person should see what he
was sure was a human foot-print in the sand, he
would be equally sure a human foot had been there.
The major proposition, then, is self-evident, a
necessary truth, leaving no ground for difference of
opinion.
2. The visible universe reveals various marks of
design, and is itself, as a whole, and in many of its
distinct parts, a contrivance. This is the minor
proposition of the argument, and the one that will
be disputed, if any, and hence the one which demands proof. If this proposition be admitted, or
if it can be proved, it will follow that there is a
designer, a contriver, back of, and before Nature,
who, in forming Nature, has left the imprint of his
intelligence upon its face. This designer and contriver, being before Nature, must be the Eternal
One, the God of the Theist.
The first proposition being self-evident, if the
second be proved, it will follow by an irresistible
conclusion, that there is a God.
II. The Argument Illustrated and Verified.
The visible universe carries upon its face very
legible marks of design, and is itself a vast contrivance.
The argument need not be pushed into the
3*
61 
6MARKS OF DESIGN.
immensity of space, in search of the fixed stars, so
called; our own solar system is quite sufficient to
give it all the force of which its nature will admit.
Nor is it best that the argument should be thoroughly  and  exclusively astronomical.   Such  an
argument would necessarily be very conclusive with
those thoroughly learned in the science; but would
be too vast, and would draw its proofs from facts too
far beyond the common circle of human thought, to
be appreciated by any save such as have given more
than usual attention to sidereal studies. There is a
general knowledge of the machinery of the universe,
understood and believed by most persons, to which
an appeal can be made, as follows:
The child has seen the sun rise and set, has seen
the moon wax and wane, and has seen the stars
appear and disappear. The child looked upward
with emotions of beauty, sublimity and grandeur,
which it could not explain, as the shadows of a summer evening gathered around it, and as one star
after another came through its fancied canopy of
blue, like the lighting up of one candle after another,
until the whole heavens became one vast field of
bespangled glory.   That  child then asked,  who
made all those lights? and with its little mind burdened with what it had seen, and perhaps burdened
still more with the answer it had received in reply
to its question, it fell asleep, and on looking out, in
the morning, the stars were all gone, and it wondered where so many lights had hid themselves.
62 
MARKS OF DESIGNN.
It may be said, these are the unscientific wonders
of childhood, which riper years, aided by science,
will dissipate.   They are the unscientific wonders
of childhood, and therefore quite limited, obscure,
and somewhat vague wonders, which riper years,
aided by science, will bring out in more definite
form, and in higher and more awful grandeur. At
every step of progress in the path of science, from
childhood onward to the ripe scholarship of mature
years, wonders increase in number and magnitude.
Let the child learn that this earth is round, and
that it is suspended in space or hung upon nothing;
and that it rolls round once in twenty-four hours,
producing night and day, by rolling us alternately
from and to the sun.
Let the child learn that the moon is a smaller
body, in form like our earth, and that like our earth
it is hung upon nothing and rolls round, and also
passes round the earth once in about twenty-eight
days, producing all the changes observable in it.
Let the child then learn that this earth, with the
moon attending it, performs a journey round the
sun once in a little over three hundred and sixtyfive days and six hours, or one year: thereby producing all the seasons, Spring, Summer, Autumn
and Winter.
Let the child next learn that this earth is one of
thirteen worlds, several of which have moons like
this, and that they all whirl, and also all travel
round the sun like our earth.
63
O' 
MARKS OF DESIGN.
Let it also be demonstrated to the child, that
these worlds move, in their circuits round the sun,
at different distances from it; that the nearest to
the sun is thirty-seven millions of miles from it.
Also, that this earth moves at a distance of ninetyfive millions of miles from the sun, making its yearly
journey, five hundred and seventy millions of miles,
to accomplish which, it must fly at the rate of more
than sixty-five thousand miles per hour.
Let the child now understand that the most distant world from the sun performs a journey round
it of sixteen thousand eight hundred millions of
miles.
Finally, let the child, or rather the man -for
he must be approaching manhood by this timeunderstand that these thirteen worlds, of which this
earth is one, with their moons, move round their
center, the sun, as regularly as our sun rises and
sets, and  our seasons roll round.  No  clock, or
machine for measuring time, can be constructed by
human skill, which will run so exactly from age to
age, as this great clock, whose wheels are mighty
worlds. On this state of things, let the following
facts be considered:
1. There is, most clearly, an arrangement of
worlds in which part is adapted to part, and world
is adjusted to, and balanced against world, so as to
produce an exact equality of forces and counter-forces, by which all these worlds are propelled and held
in their own orbits. This is not accomplished by
64
x
'O 
MARKS OF DESIGN.
material guards, as railroad cars are made to keep
the track, but it is done in space, by an unseen
influence called attraction and repulsion, which
defies human scrutiny.
2. This machinery has run six thousand years,
according to the smallest calculation, while many
suppose it to be much older, and yet none of its parts
have failed; none of its motion has abated; none
of its momentum appears exhausted, and no irregularity has attended it. So far as is known, the light
and heat of the sun are just as intense as they were
a thousand years ago, and the great clock of time
has made no approach towards running down, as
all man-made clocks do and ever must. While all
man-invented lights and heat consume and waste
by their own action in lighting and warming surrounding bodies; and all man-contrived forces are
exhausted by the action of their own momentum,
the sun, and moon, and all the stars, give just as
much light as they ever did, and perform their revolutions in the same time they ever did, and all
their transits are marked by the same regularity
they were a thousand years ago.
3. While the above facts are undeniable, there
has been found in nature no power, no efficiency,
and no law which could have brought the parts of
the great machine together, much less have formed
its separate parts, so adapted to each other as to
constitute the complex perfect whole. No power
or law is found in nature which could restore the
65 
MARKS OF DESIGN.
harmony of the       machines if it were thrown out of
gearing.   If we deny the existence of a Creator, it
is not possible to imagine how this machine was
formed and'got together in such perfection. No
known power of nature could have produced it,
and no human intellect has yet been able to conceive even a hypothesis how it came to be as it is,
which can stand the test of reason for one moment.
Men may affirm' what they will, concerning their
own blindness on the subject, yet it must be impossible for any rational mind to contemplate the
machinery of the heavens, and understand its parts,
and the relation which part sustains to part, and
the adjustment of all its forces, without being conscious of the affirmation of reason within; that it
gives evidence of design, and that the whole is a
vast contrivance of a vast intellect.
Having passed, in our investigation, from the
unscientific view of childhood to the scientific view
of manhood,  the averment is proved, which was
made, that riper years, aided by Science, would
bring out the wonders of the child in more definite
forms and more awful grandeur. Wonders, and
increasing wonders rise to view at each step in the
path of Science, and are seen clearer in each increased
degree of scientific light. So great is the wonder
which a view of the Universe produces in the
rational mind, that reason can relieve itself of the
burden, only by taking shelter under the conclusion
66 
MARKS OF DESIGN.
that there is a God, an Infinite Creator, whose wisdom planned, and whose power built and upholds it.
The argument is now finished, and may be closed
by a statement of the propositions of which it is
composed:
First. Where designs are seen, there must be a
designer; and where contrivance is visible, there
must be a contriver.
Second. The visible Universe reveals clear marks
of design, and is itself a vast contrivance.
Third. There is, therefore, a designer and contriver, who must have existed before the Universe,
and who, by His intelligeuce, designed and contrived it, and by His power made it what it is.
That designer, and contriver, and builder, is God,
the Eternal One.
The above argument rests upon a very general
view of the material Universe, but there are particular portions, which reveal marks of design, and
constitute contrivances in themselves, as parts of
the great whole. It will be the object of a few
future Lectures, to elaborate arguments from some
of these detached portions of God's great work.
67 
LECTURE VII.
THE EXISTENCE OF GOD PROVED FROM THE
PHENOMENA OF LIFE.
I. Ground of the Argument Stated-Life  not
inherent in Matter.
1. Life is an undefinable, and inexplicable mystery. If the simple question be asked, what is life?
no one can give a direct, clear and descriptive
answer. Whence came life at first, and whither
does it go, when death transpires? Death, we
know, is the absence of life, and to die, we know, is
to cease to live; but what is that vital force which
we call life, no one can tell. Much of the phenomena of life, and much of the action of the vital force,
in the process of living, may be known and described,
but the life itself remains unknown, the most profound mystery to him who liveth.
2. One of the fiacts which may be known, in
regard to life is, that it is not inherent in matter,
and is no essential part or quality of matter.  It is
upon this fact that the present argument rests.
3. Life not being an essential property of matter,
yet existing in connection with matter, and in such
a manner that matter lives, or is alive, it follows 
PHENOMENA OF LIFE.
that life must be imparted to matter by a higher
power; and if there be a higher power than matter,
and all the life of matter, a power that has produced
life, and imparted it to matter, that power must be
God, and Atheism is overthrown.
That life is not an essential property of matter,
if not self-evident, becomes manifest upon the slightest observation. If life were an essential property
of matter, all matter would be alive, nor could there
be any such thing as death, or absence of life. We
know this is not the case, for we see live matter
and dead matter, and all living matter dies around
us. Life, then, is not an essential element of matter, but is imparted to it whenever matter passes
life.
4. The only possible resort of Atheism, at this
stage of the argument, to save itself from annihilation, is to affirm that life is the result of organization. This ground is often taken, and in proof, the
fact is urged, that life is found only in connection
with organized matter. It is admitted that life is
developed only in connection with certain organizations; but this does not relieve the difficulty in the
slightest degree, but rather increases it, as will be
made to appear.
II. The Main Point Proved-Life is not the.
result of organization.
1. No known combination of material elements
will produce either animal or vegetable life. A
69 
PHENOMENA OF LIFE.
plant may be analyzed, and all the parts of matter
it contains, and the proportion of each, can be ascer tained, and yet no human skill can put them
together so as to produce life, and thus originate
a living plant.
In like manner, an animal body can be analyzed,
and all the parts and properties can be ascertained.
All the organs of life can be examined, and their
functions pointed out, and yet the vital force, the
life, is something different from any or all of these.
These organs may all remain entire and intact, after
life has left the material organism.   Chemistry can
take the animal economy to pieces, and tell just
what and how many material elements compose it,
and in what proportion the parts are combined, yet
no known power can impart vitality to these combined elements; life must have a higher origin.
2. Life precedes organization, and therefore cannot be the result of organization. So far is life
from being the result of the organization of matter,
that it is clearly the power that produces the organization. When Atheists affirm that life is the
result of organization, they subvert the law of being,
by putting the cause for the effect, and the effect
for the cause. Life is the cause of organization, and
hence, the organization cannot account for the life,
but the life accounts  for the organization.   To
make the organization account for life, is to make
an effect account for the existence of its own cause,
which  is an absurdity.   Life, therefore,  can  be
70 
PHENOMENA OF LIFE.
accounted for only by supposing a higher power,
acting back of both organization and life, and that
higher power must be God.
The organization of the material elements of both
vegetable and animal bodies, commences in an embryo state, around its nucleus, life; life is the first
thing that acts, and it begins the process, and is
the vital and vitalizing power of assimilation, which
gathers to itself the appropriate material elements,
and completes the organization.   It is clear that
life precedes the organization, and therefore cannot
be produced by it. It is equally clear that life,
residing in the organization 4hich it has assimilated
to itself, by the same vitalizing and assimilating
power, repairs its waste, and, counteracts the tendency of all organized matter to decomposition, until,
having acdomplished its mission, it withdraws and
lets the organization return to its primitive elements.
It may now be regarded as settled, t,at life is
not an essential, inhering property of matter; and
is not the result of the organization of matter, and
hence it nust be conditioned upon some power distinct from and above matter, and if so, Atheism
must be false, and Theism must be true.
III. The conclusion reached above, verified by
another class of arguments.
1. Life of every kind is derived, transmitted, and
perpetuated by a succession of individual lives, each
71 
PHENOMENA OF LIFE.
life in the chain of succession being distinct, one
and indivisible. Life is not one whole identical life,
but the whole is composed of a succession of lives,
each constituting a distinct, whole, perfect life, by
itself. Every life, of every kind, is derived from a
prior life of its own kind. This succession of lives
is proof positive that there must have been a first
life of each kind, which was not derived from a
prior life, as all subsequent lives have been derived,
but which must have been the result of a pre-existing life-giving power, and that power is God the
Creator.
The Atheist will look in vain for a subterfuge
that will evade the above conclusion, in the oftrepeated affirmation, that life is the result of
nature's own spontaneity. Such an affirmation is
an assumption which is not, and cannot be sustained
by any kind or degree of evidence; while, on the
other hand, the well known operations of nature
contradict it. There are two facts which must
overwhelm this assumption of the Atheist.
(1.) No power or operative force of nature has yet
been discovered which can originate life; nature's
only power being to transmit it, when and where it
already exists.
(2.) Nature has never been known to produce
life, but only to foster and develop it, where, in
some form, it had been deposited. Nature has
never been known to produce or develop life, without a seed, a germ, a scion, or root, which contained
72 
PHENOMENA OF LIFE.
the vital principle of life. Under no circumstance
has nature been known to originate life, or develop
it, without the deposition of a germ, in some form.
If nature had ever been known to bring forth life of
any kind, and in any form, without a seed or germ,
Atheists would point to such facts with an air of
triumph, but in this nature responds not to their
views. Earth, air and water combined in any possible proportions, aided by the summer sun, has no
power to develop life, until the vital element has
been supplied, and the conclusion is, that there is
no inherent power in nature that can originate life.
2. The different kinds and forms of life which nature develops are distinct, the one from the other,
and never cross or blend.  The Atheist, on being driven by the preceding argument from his position, that
life is the result of nature's own spontaneity, may
attempt another subterfuge, by affirming that while
nature is never known to develop life, at once, in its
higher forms, the result is reached by its own law and
force of progress. The proposition stated above
overthrows this position. Nature has never developed any such law and force of progress. One uniform law governs all the operations of nature in her
developments of life; like produces like. Nature,
in the transmission of life, in every case, transmits
the kind of life she receives in the germ deposited
with her, preserving each succession of lives distinct,
the one. from the other. Climate and culture may
modify, but cannot originate what dia not exist in
73 
PHENOMENA OF LIFE.
kind in the parent. Here nature is true to her
trust; she never receives the germ of one kind of
life and responds by developing another kind of life.
She never receives the seeds of the herbaceous plant,
and develops the woody shrub or tree. She never
receives the filbert and develops the oak. She never
receives the acorn and develops the pine. So she
never receives the deposit of vegetable life of any
kind, and in response, throws out animal life, even
of the lowest grade. Under her care, vegetable life
never progresses into animal life. And so with
every kind of animal life, she preserves each distinct.
Under her care, no kind of life progresses beyond its
own nature, to be lost in another and a higher kind.
There is no progress from one kind of life to another.
Under nature's faithful charge, every kind of life
sends forth its own stream, like itself, and each
branch of life runs on its own rounds of succession,
without crossing or intermingling with other successions of life. Herbs never progress into trees,
vegetable life never progresses into animal life, and
one kind of animal life never progresses into another
and higher kind of animal life.  Oysters never
become fish with fins; reptiles never rise above
reptiles; fishes never become bipeds, or quadrupeds,
and never drop their fins and scales, and don feathers and wings, and become fowls of heaven; and
brutes never progress into men.
If the Atheist could produce one clear case of a
deviation from these laws, he would pretend, at
74
0I 
PHENOMENA OF LIFE.
least, to consider his cause gained, but he finds not
one fact in all the realm of nature. Suppose it had
been known, no matter how long ago, that pine
trees grew from acorns, that apple trees grew from
filberts, that petted toads feathered out and became
hens and ducks; that children had been known to
grow as fruit upon some plants or trees, and to
drop off like ripe fruit, in full developed infancy
or suppose oysters. had been known to become fish
without shells, and with fins and scales; and fish
had been known to turn into mermaids, and mermaids had improved into real human beings; and
suppose all this had clearly resulted from nature's
own progressive force, the Atheist would give a
shout of triumph over the revelation of such facts.
But there is no such illustration found amid all the
operations of nature. Nature has never been known
to develop life, without first receiving the deposit of
the vital principle, in each case, and then she has
only developed the kind of life, the vital power of
which she received. This all proves that the first
life, of each kind, must have had an origin, distinct
from, and above nature, and to account for that we
must fall back upon the Theistic belief in the existence of God.
IV. The Argument summed up and concluded.
1. The following points have been proved:
(1.) Life is not inherent in matter, as one of its
essential qualities, but is something added to it
75 
PHENOMENA OF LIFE.
whenever matter is vitalized, or may be said to live,
or to be alive.
(2) Life is not the result of organization. The
organization of matter does not originate life, but
the presence, vitalizing and assimilating power of
life, originates the organization.
(3.) Life, of each kind, exists, not as one whole,
but in a succession of individual lives, each a distinct identity, and indivisible.
(4.) There is no known power in nature which
can originate life, only as the medium of transmission from a pre-existing life; and nature never has
been known to develop life, without the deposition
of a germ in some form.
(5.) Life is not developed by any force or law of
progress in nature, by which the lower forms of life
are improved into the higher, but each kind and
form is preserved distinct, and maintains its identity
from age to age.
2. From the above facts in regard to life, which
have been established beyond a doubt, the conclusion follows irresistibly, that life, in each of its distinct forms, had a beginning. There must have
been a first life of each kind. To say that life had
no beginning, in view of the above facts, is to outrage one's own common sense. We never saw or
heard of vegetable, or animal life, that had no beginning; and from the points proved, or from what
is seen and known of life, reason makes the undeniable deduction, that every plant, and every tree, and
76 
PHENOMENA OF LIFE.
every animal, and every human being, that ever
lived, began to live, and that, therefore, there was
a beginning of the first life of each kind. No matter how far you carry your reasoning backward along
the chain of successive lives, with the facts proved
before the mind, it is not possible, at any remote
period in the past, to think of the life of a plant,
tree, animal or man, that had no beginning. Finitude, or a beginning, and end, is so impressed upon
each life, in all visible successions of life, that he
who pretends to believe that once there lived a
plant, tree, animal or man, whose life had no beginning, does violence to his own reason.
3. The fact now established, that life had a
beginning, entirely overthrows Atheism, and establishes     Theism. Atheism  does  not  and  cannot
account for that beginning of life which has been
proved. Indeed, Atheism can account for nothing,
for its fundamental principle, that there is no God,
no Creator, precludes the possibility of a beginning
to any thing, as it precludes all cause for any thing,
and renders everything necessarily eternal, which
the eyes of the Atheist must tell him is false. He
sees things beginning and ending, living and dying,
all around him every day, and yet in his madness
adopts a theory which implies that there is no first
cause f     or anything.  It is, then, impossible for an
Atheist to account for the beginning of life, which
has been proved; and yet, to deny a beginning is
to affirm that there exists a series of lives, perpet              4
77 
PHENOMENA OF LIFE.
ually increasing in number, which had no beginning,
which is to affirm a mathematical impossibility.
On the other hand, for the Atheist ito admit that
life had a beginning, is to admit that there was a
cause for that beginning, and that cause must have
existed prior to the beginning of all successions of
life, and hence, could itself have had no cause, and
must have been eternal and creative, and of course,
is the God of the Theist. Thus is it not only
proved that there is a God, but the idea of God is
rendered universal, and is revealed as a necessary
idea of reason, in the presence of the five facts which
have been established, concerning life.  The idea
that there is a God, a Creator, cannot be escaped
without affirming that life commenced without a
cause, or that nothing produced it, or that a limited
and increasing series of lives had no beginning; each
and all of which is impossible; and as neither of
these can be true, the other only possible thing must
be true-there is a God, the author and source of
life.
A word only is necessary to show that the Scriptures teach, on this subject, in harmony with the
voice of nature.  Israel's ancient bard, in his song
to the God of the Bible, sang, "With THEE is the
fountain of life."
78 
LECTURE VII.
THE EXISTENCE OF GOD PROVED FROM THE EXIST         ENCE OF THE HUMAN FAMILY.
The following argument rests upon the fact that
physical humanity cannot be rationally accounted
for, only upon the hypothesis that there is a God
who created a first man and a first woman, from
whom all other human beings have descended by
natural generation.
The plan of the argument is to state all the conceivable methods of accounting for the existence of
humanity, as it is, and then to prove that they are
all impossible, or false, except the Theistic one,
stated above. If the premises are made sufficiently
broad, to comprehend all conceivable methods of
accounting for the existence of our race, and the
reasoning on each point be clear and conclusive, the
argument will be demonstrative.
There are but four conceivable methods of accounting for the existence of the human family, three of
which have sometimes been resorted to by Atheists,
and the fourth is the Theistic mode, by supposing
a Creator, God. These four methods shall now be
examined. 
O)RIGIN OF hUMANITY.
I. The Theory of Eternal Generation.
This assumes that the human race had no beginning, and, of course, that there never was a first
man and a first woman, and that the race is eternal.
In opposition to this theory, it is affirmed that it
is impossible, a contradiction upon its face, and that
there must have been a first man and first woman,
who did descend from a previously existing man and
woman.  In support of this denial of the assumption of eternal generation, the following considerations are urged
1. It was proved in Lecture III, that time, and
all that is evolved in and by time, had a beginning,
which is comprehensive of the race of human beings;
it must, therefore, have had a beginning.
2. It was proved in Lecture V, from the developments of Geology, that the human family is more
recent than the earth, vegetables and animals,
human remains being found only on or near the surface of the earth.
3. It was proved in the last Lecture that life
had a beginning, which is comprehensive of the
position that the race of human beings had a beginning.  It was shown that life is not one whole, but
a succession of individual lives, and that succession
necessarily involves a beginning.
4. Humanity is known to us only as possessirrg a
limited existence, with a beginning and an end, pertaining to each individual of the race. Every indi
80 
ORIGIN OF HUMANITY.
vidual known to us, personally or by history, began
to be, and has ceased or must cease to be. Now,
what is true of all the individuals, must be true of
the race composed'of such individuals.  In  the
light of these facts, it is impossible to conceive of
the race as having had no beginning. To suppose
a race of beings without a beginning, composed of
individuals, every one of which has a beginning and
an end, is simply to suppose an impossibility.
5. It is impossible to conceive of our race as having had no beginning, without conceiving of, at
least, one man and one woman which had no beginning.  This must be more difficult of conception,
and harder to believe, than the Theistic idea of a
Creator.
But to suppose a man and woman once existed,
who had no beginning, is to suppose that they were
eternal, and consequently self-existent. If they
were self-existent, they had no cause of existence,
only what was in themselves, and that must have
been an eternal cause; and hence, it must have
ever remained a cause; and the conclusion is undeniable, that the eternal father and mother of our
race must be alive somewhere upon the earth.
Such eternal self-existent persons could not die,
since the only cause of their existence is an eternal
cause, and in themselves. And if there be no God
to take them away, they must now be living upon
the earth. Would it not be worth a search, to find
and look upon the venerable pair wh6 never began
81 
ORIGIN OF HUMANITY.
to be, and to hear, in their own words, the history
of their immortal round of life in the midst of this
world of their dying children.
The argument need be pushed no farther,-reason repudiates such a hypothesis,-as a method of
accounting for the origin of our race. It is impossible to believe it; it must, therefore, be dismissed
as absurd and false.
II. The Progressive Theory.
This theory assumes that there is in nature a
progressive force, by which the higher and more perfect forms of being have been developed from lower
forms by the action of nature's own law of progress.
According to this theory, humanitv had its origin in
the oyster, or some other half-animal, half-vegetable
existence, and that half-animal, half vegetable something,, was developed from vegetable life, and that
again sprang by the force of nature from inorganic
matter.
In reply to this theory, the following considerations are offered:
1. If all were allowed that is claimed for nature's
progressive law, it would not account for the origin
of our race, but only throw the first cause further
back, leaving it unexplained. If man sprang from
an oyster, the question arises,- from whence came
the oyster?  There must be just as much difficulty
in accounting for the race of oysters, as for the race
of mnen.  If it be said the oyster sprang from inor
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ORIGIN OF HUMANITY.
ganic matter, two questions arise, which the theory
leaves unanswered:
(1.) Where did the matter come from?
(2.) What was the cause of the change in matter,
fron] an inorganic to an organic state, from an inanimate to an animate state?
The theory furnishes no answer to these questions.
If it were assumed that the matter was eternal, the
assumption would imply that a first change from an
inorganic to an orgranic state would be impossible,
because it could have no cause.
2. There is no such law of progress in nature.
This is an assumption, not only without proof, but
in the face of positive proof. Nature has never
revealed the slightest sign of such a law of progress,
not one fact has ever occurred to suggest its existence. On the other hand, nature has ever been
uniform in her operations, acting under one undeviating law of conservatism, by which every thing
is pI)reservedl in its own identity and nature, and
held in its own rounds of succession, like descending from like.
3. This theory has been exploded and entirely
overthrown in p)receding Lectures:
(1.) In Lecture III. it was proved that the present form of the material universe had a beginning.
While that argument was elaborated in view of
time, as measured by the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, the principle is comprehensive of the
present argument, as it most clearly involves a begin
83 
ORIGIN OF HUMANITY.
ning to every form that nature wears, and a cause
for such beginning. Nature, in the form of humnanity, must have had a beginning; even if it be by
progress, it must have had a beginning, and a cause
for that beginning of progress.
(2.) In Lecture IV. and V, it was proved that
matter is not eternal, but that it was created and
had a beginning, which entirely overthrows the progressive theory.  If matter was first created, nothing is gained by the progressive theory, since the
existence of a Creator is then proved, which will
equally account for the existence of man.
(3.) It was proved in Lecture VII, that animal
life had a beginning, in which argument the progressive theory was directly met and overthrown.
What was there proved of the life of men, must
be equally true of the material organism in which
that life inheres. These arguments need not be
repeated; this reference to them as applicable to
the progressive theory is sufficient, and it stands
distinctly and conclusively overthrown.
III. Thte Accidental Theory.
This theory supposes the first of the race to have
happened by chance; that, without the action of
intelligence, the fortuitous coming together of the
required parts of matter, produced a man. This
may be regarded as the Atheist's last resort, and
hence, if he be overthrown here, his defeat is complete and final. Let us, then; test this last and
84 
ORIGIN OF HUMANITY. 
strong hold of Atheistic Infidelity. It must have
required a combination of concurrent accidents to
-produce the race of humanity  in  this way, too
numerous and vast to admit of belief.  The following
outline presents but a part of what must be required.
1. The frame-work of the human body consists
of about two hundred and fifty bones. These are
all so framed together as to make a perfect whole.
And so perfect is the whole, that the following
statements are true, beyond doubt
(1.) The framle is so complete that no bone could
be added which would improve it. 
(2.) No bone could be removed which would not
impair it.
(3.) No bone could be altered without damage,
so perfectly are all the bones fitted together
(4.) No two bones could change places without
darmage to the frame, so perfect is the whole arrangement, and so exactly are all the bones fitted to each
other, and each fitted for its own place.
2. The bones are all framed together in such a
manner, and the joints so constructed, as to give
the greatest strength where most strength is needed;
as to favor rapid motion where quick motion is most
needed; and slow motion where slow motion is most
needed;  and so as to retard or prevent motion
where easy and free motion would impair and weaken
the structure. The particulars of what has been
stated might be pointed out, but it is unnecessary,
the facts are so obvious.  Such is the frame-work
4 7''i
85 
ORIGIN OF HUMANITY.
of the human body, and if the argument was left
here it would be conclusive, for it is impossible to
suppose that it could come into existence without
an intelligent, designing cause. There are so many
adaptations, presenting such a combination of contrivances, as to set skepticism at defiance. Two hundred
and fifty bones, most of which present two distinct
adaptations, each end being adapted to its fellowbone. Then each of these adaptations involves
another adaptation, being adapted to perform  a
given motion, and to perform it by means which
will, at the same time, prevent other motions, which
would interfere with the general design of the structure.  Can reason conceive all this possible without
an intelligent authored Never; and he who affirms
it, affirms without consideration, or falsifies his own
convictions. But, as yet, we have only the opening
of the artgument before us, and will proceed.
3. The bones, above noticed, are all tied together
in a manner which proves it to be the work of intelligence. They are not all fastened together in the
same way.
(1.) Where little or no motion is required, they
are fastened more firmly, as though they were
framed and pinned together.
(2.) Where limited motion is required, they are
united by cartilage, sometimes called gristle.
(3.) Where extended and easy motion is required,
they are united by ligaments, which are less confining and allow of ready and free play.
86 
ORIGIN OF HUMANITY.
(4.) All the joints, where two bones are united,
are lubricated or oiled with a very slippery fluid,
called sinavia. The secretion of this fluid is provided for in the joint, which is no less an evidence
of design, and no less a contrivance, than the oil
can, always kept at hand by him who runs a machine.
4. The frame being completed, the whole is
securely covered with a peculiar membrane, called
the periosteum. This answers a two-fold purpose.
(1.) It nourishes the bones by means of the ves
sels which pass through it for that purpose.
(2.) It serves as a ground upon which the muscles and tendons are set. it being firmly attached
to the bones, and the muscles and tendons being
firmly attached to it, it holds them from breaking
loose by their powerful action.
5. The bones are filled with an oily substance
called marrow, upon which their life, health and
strengffth, appear to depend.
6. The frame being finished, there must be added
the locomotion power, for the bones are only levers,
and can act only as they are acted upon. To effect
this, the whole is filled out with flesh and handsomely covered with skin, which adds form and
beauty to the whole. The flesh constitutes the
muscles which move the bones. The large and full
muscles taper off at each extremity into a cordy,
powerful substance, called tendons, which are firmly
attached to the bones. By the contraction and
relaxation of the muscles, the bones are moved,
87 
ORIGIN OF HUMANITY.
and the machine is started and made to operate.
But the muscles are not self-moving, but act only
as the ropes and belts of a machine, which connect
the working parts with the working power.  There
is another power that acts upon them.
7. The nerves are a most wonderful contrivance.
They appear like fine, white cords or threads, and
when traced to their source, are found to issue from
the brain, and from its elongation, called the spinal
marrow.- The trunks of the nerves are divided and
subdivided, until, in their most minute forms, they
reach every part of every extremity. There are two
classes or sets of nerves.
(1.) One class of these nerves gives the power of
sensation, which renders us capable of feeling.
They are, hence, callel nerves of sensation.
(2.) The other class of nerves gives the power of
motion, and are called the voluntary nerves, or nerves
of motion,  They act upon the muscles at the bidding of the will, and cause them to contract and
relax, by which the bones move and the whole
machine is made to operate.
8. The human machine, as described above, is
further provided with a reproductive apparatus,
by which its wastes are supplied, but for which it
would soon fail. This department is too multifarious to be described, in detail, in this argument.
A mere outline will answer every purpose, so far as
the force of the argument is concerned.
(1.) The stomach, which first receives the food
88 
ORIGIN OF HUMANITY.
we eat, is a wonderful apparatus, with its appendages. It has the power of reducing what it receives
to a common substance, and of assimilating it to
the various parts of the organism, adding bone to
bone, flesh to flesh, substance to like substance, in
every part of the body.
(2.) The blood is a principal agent in this reproductive process. It is formed, principally, from
what is eaten, but, in part, from the air that is
breathed.  To effect the repairing of the system by
means of the blood, it is sent coursing through every
part in vessels called arteries, and is returned to its
starting point in another class of vessels called veins.
(3.) The blood is propelled through its course by
the powerful action of the heart, an organ exactly
contrived for that purpose.
(4.) Along the'course of the blood there are numberless absorbing vessels which take up from the
blood, as it passes, the substance which every part
of the body requires. Each of these vessels takes
up just that material from the blood which the part
demands for which it acts, and rejects all the rest.
The blood being thus robbed of its vital qualities, it
is returned to be renewed for another round. The
blood is renewed from two sources, as has been intimated, namely: from the material prepared by the
stomach from the food that has been eaten, and
from the air that is breathed.
(5.) To effect the renewal of the blood by means
of the atmosphere, a breathing apparatus has been
89
.W 
ORIGIN OF HUMANITY.
prepared. The lungs constitute the most important
organ of the breathing machine. The lungs are so
constructed as to admit a large quantity of air, and
by their action they receive and expel it constantly,
from the beginning to the end of life. The blood
returning exhausted is passed through the lungs,
and thereby brought in contact with the air that is
breathed, and absorbs the oxygen of the air, by which
it is vitalized and changed from a dark to a light red.
The air is exhaled, minus its oxygen, and fresh air is
again inhaled, and so the process goes on until death
takes place. In this breathing machine the lungs
and the air are adapted to each other, and the air and
the blood are adapted to each other. If the lungs were
not so constructed as to receive the air, give off its
oxygen to the blood and expel the remainder, breathing, would be impossible or useless. If the air was
not composed, as it is, of twenty-one parts of oxygen
and seventy-nine parts of nitrogen, it would not subserve the purposes of animal life, and the lungs would
be useless, or would inhale death. If the air was
differently compounded, it would be a fatal poison.
The wonderful system of reproduction, with its
numerous organs, may be summed up under three
heads or divisions:
The first is the Laboratory, by which elements
are prepared for the support of the system.
The second division embraces the absorption apparatus, by which the prepared elements are taken up
and made a part of the organism.
90 
ORIGIN OF HUMANITY.
The third is the discharging system, by which all
unnecessary matter is thrown off, and thereby the
overloading of the system is prevented. This relates
not only to the rejected portions of what is eaten,
but also to the worn-out parts of the body itself,
which has to be re-placed with new matter.
9. The human system is also supplied with a sensation machine, which is no less wonderful, and no
less reveals a design. The nerves of sensation were
named while treating of the locomotive power, but
they must now be looked at as the ground-work of
the sensation apparatus. These nerves, which have
their seat in the brain, and which terminate in the
several local organs of sense, constitute a wonderful
machine for seeing, hearing, feeling, tasting and
smelling. It will be sufficient to name the visual
apparatus. Vision is the result of the wonderful
eye, and the wonderful light, and their wonderful
adaptation to each other.
The eye is a wonderful thing, in itself. It is too
complicated to admit of a minute description in a
Lecture like this, without occupying too much time.
(1.) There is a collection of different kinds of
matter, the right kinds of matter, the right quantity of matter, and the right proportionate quantity
of each kind.
(2.) There is, next, the form of the eye, which
constitutes its adaptation to receive the light in the
right quantity, and to produce the figure and color
91
il-, 
ORIGIN OF HUMANITY.
of the object emitting or reflecting that light upon
the retina.
(3.) Then there is the relation which the two eyes
sustain to each other, being so placed as to give
the right angle to bring the light that enters each
eye to a focus at the right point, so that one act of
vision is the result of the action of both eyes, and
that vision is rendered stronger by the united action
of the two eyes in the act of seeing.
(4.) Finally, we have the place in the body which
the eyes occupy. There is no other place in the
body where they could be set with the same advantage.  They are set high up in the structure, so as
to place them out of the way of the more active
portions of the frame, and out of the way of the
material objects upon which we expend our greatest
physical exertion.  They are set in fiont, as it is
more necessary to see where we are going than to
see where we have been, and yet so as to enable us
to see on either side if there be a better way than a
strait line before us.
The eye, then, as an apparatus for seeing, is too
wonderful to be the result of anything less than a
master intellect acting from design, carrying out the
ideal which existed in the intelligence before an eye
was formed of matter. A camera obscura is an
apparatus which represents the eye. The images
of external objects are received through a double
convex glass, and are exhibited in their native colors on some white surface placed within the machine,
92 
ORIGIN OF HUMANITY.
in the focus of the glass. This- illustrates the philosophy of vision, so far as the structure of the eye
and the action of light are concerned.
To suppose that this camera obscura was not
designed, and contrived, and adapted to the light,
by intelligence; to suppose that it was formed by
crystalization, or that it grew as a fruit, or that it
came into being without any previously existing
cause, would be less absurd than to suppose that
the first pair of eyes grew in the head of the first
manil without the action of intelligence. But suppose this great accident did occur, that the first two
eyes were a mere accident, still a greater accident
must be supposed, which is, that the first two eyes
happened to select their location in the head and
not elsewhere, happened to get in such relation to
each other, and in so happening, without design or
intelligence, they happened to produce a universal
and unvarying law, by which all eyes have followed
their example in selecting for themselves the same
position in the body. To believe all this, must
require a much larger degree of credulity than is
required to believe that there is a God who formed
the eye.
(5.) But the eye itself does not give us vision
without light. The wonderful eye would have happened in vain, if there had happened to be no light,
or if light had happened to be unsuited to the eye.
Light, we know, is adapted to the  eye, as the
medium of vision. It is a wonderful -element, but
93 
ORIGIN OF HUMANITY.
little understood. White light is said to be a compound of seven different colors, yet in its purity it
is invisible, while it renders everything else visible
upon which it falls.  Did light happen to be, and
to be just what it is? If so, by what a profound
accident did this world escape the fate of unbroken
darkness, tliough full of accidental eyes.
In the above outline of physical huin:nity, only
a part of its wonderful machinery has been revealed;
it is proper, therefore, to make a comprehensive
statement of what cannot be given in detail.
10. The human organism, as a compound whole,
is composed of more than ten thousand parts, the
want of any one of which would impair, if not ruin
the whole machine. It must have been a tremendous accident that produced so many adaptations,
so many concurrent facts in so small a compass.
The existence of one human body, as it is, involves
more than ten thousand adaptations of part to part,
within itself, besides the adaptation of the whole to
an end, and its adaptations to external surroundings, as the lungs to the air, the eyes to the light,
and the ear to the atmosphere, to produce hearing.
11. But this number of concurrent facts must be
doubled, to give existence to the race.  There must
have been two human beings, one man and one
woman, if no more, to originate the race, the human
faminilv. There must have been two such tremendolis accidents as has been described, each involving
more than ten thousand coincident facts, a failure
94 
ORIGIN OF HUMANITY.
of any one of which, out of the more than twenty
thousand, would have defeated the present result.
12. In the concurrence of the two tremendous
accidents, another must have occurred, which is,
that one, by accident, was a man, and the other, by
accident, was a woman.  But for these accidents,
there would have been no race of human beings.
13. S-ill an)th3r accid(ent must have occurred,
which is, tlhat by accident, the two accidents happened so near together, in point of time, that they
both lived at the same time. But for this accident,
which m-le them cotemporary, there would have
been no race, even had this wonderful and powerful
agent, called accident, produced a thousand men,
and as many more women, so remote from each
other as not to live at the same time.
14 There must have been yet another accident,
which is, that by accident, it happened that the two
accidents happened to occur at or so near the same
place on this wide earth that the accidental man and
the accidental woman accidentally found each other.
But for this last named accident, all the other accidents might have occurred a thousand times in portions of the earth remote from each other, without
giving existence to the race of mankind.
15. One more most profound accident must have
occurred, to make out the case, which is: all these
numerous and great accidents must have occurred
so as to place themselves and their immediate and
remote results, under a fixed law, by the action of
95 
ORIGIN OF HUMANITY.
which the race has ever since been developed and
perpetuated; so that since those first great accidents, nothing in this matter has been left to, or
occurred by accident. If the history of humanity
recorded, now and then, a like accident; and if one
or two had undoubtedly occurred in our own times;
it would greatly strengthen the faith of those who
believe that the original production of humanity was
an accident; but such accidents have never been
repeated. As impossible as it is to believe all this,
it must be believed, and much more of the same
kind, if the existence of God, the Creator, be denied.
The argument need be pushed no further. Reason
repudiates the supposition of such an origin of
humanity, as absurd, and a thousand times more
unreasonable than the Theistic belief in the existence of God, who created all things.
IV. The Theistic Theory is the only remnaining one.
The Theist affirms that there is a God, who created a first man, and a first woman, from whom all
other human beings have derived their existence by
natural generation.
It has been shown that there are but four methods of accounting for the existence of the human
race, of which this last named is one. The three
former have been proved to be absurd, false, and
impossible; and the conclusion is irresistible, that
the fourth and last named must be true; there is,
therefore, a God, a Creator.
96 
LECTURE IX.
AN ARGUMENT FOUNDED UPON THE PHENOMENA
OF THE HUMAN MIND.
PRELIMINARY REMARKS.
We now enter a field of investigation different
from those that have been occupied in gathering the
facts which have constituted the basis of preceding
arguments. Arguments have been drawn from matter, in several.of its forms and relations, and notwithstanding it is destitute of intelligence, it has
been found to bear visible marks of intelligence
impressed upon it; seen in its arrangements, adap'tations, and in the contrivances into which it has
been formed by some unseen contriving, arranging
and organizing force.
In now turning to the investigation of mind, we
have a very different element to deal with, as mind
is not matter, and is not governed by the laws that
govern matter. Mind differs from matter as widely
as thought does from  the marble pillar.  The law
which governs mind differs from the law which governs matter as widely as the argument or motive
that sways the mind differs from the power of the 
MENTAL PHENOMENA.
rock, which crushes by its weight. The law which
brings the loosened rock bounding down the mountain side cannot be confounded with the law that
carries the man up the same mountain side, for the
sake of the prospect its lofty summit will afford.
The power to think, feel, and will are the most
wonderful of all powers, and lie so far beyond the
comprehension of the thinking mind itself, as to
awaken thoughts of a Higher Power, as the author
and source of intelligence.
It is not proposed to give a detailed analysis of
mental phenomena, for the purpose of developing
the evidence it might thus be made to contribute
towards proving the existence of God; a few leading facts only will be presented, which will render
the argument more simple, without materially diminishing its force.
The argument will be made to depend, mainly,
upon two facts, both fundamental in their nature.
1. Intelligence is not matter, is no quality of
matter, and matter is not intelligent.
2. While intelligence is not matter, and matter
is not intelligent, the two are so fitted to each ot her,
and so united in the human organism, as jointly to
constitute an intellectual machine, for knowing the
material world.
I. Intelligence is not matter, is no quality of
matter, and matter is not intelligent.
The thinking and knowing power in man, is
98 
MENTAL PHENOMENA.
spirit, and not matter. We call it spirit, soul, or
mind, but whatever we call it, it is distinguished
from the body, and hence it is not matter, not
material, but immaterial. This is a vital principle,
and if it can be established on natural and philosophical grounds, it will go far towards establishing
the existence of God as the Creator "of the spirits
of all flesh." So far as is known, all who admit the
immateriality, spirituality, and immortality of the
human soul or mind. also admit the existence of
God.
The bearing which this point has upon the question of the existence of God will be shown after the
fact in regard to the mind has been established.
It is a significant fact, that the distinction
between body and soul, matter and mind, is a universal idea. All men, in all ages, and in all lands,
have recognized a distinction between the body and
mind.   Men have never been in the habit of confounding the body with the knowing power which
resides in the body. While the idea of a distinction
between'body and mind is nearly or quite universally
existing as commonly among the ignorant and
unlettered as among the learned, philosophy has
reduced that distinction to a scientific certainty, by
noting the phenomena of each as so diverse as not
to be given by the same element.
We are now in a field of investigation where we
are required to reason from natural principles, and
this we can do only so far as science lights our path,
r
99
:.. -. 1. .'
I 
MENTAL PHENOMENA.
and we can reason only in the light of science as it
now shines, taking its clearest aspects, and using
all the light we have, until we can develop more.
What, then, does philosophy teach?
Philosophy teaches us that all we know of matter
or mind, is the phenomena they give us; and hence,
it teaches us, where we find two classes of phenomena, which are of such opposite natures as not to be
given by the same substance, we know there must
be two elements. On this principle, philosophy
draws a line between matter and mind. Mind is
that which perceives, thinks, knows, wills, feels,
loves, hates, and is joyful and sorrowful. Matter is
that which gives the phenomena of impenetrability,
inertia, extension, divisibility, figure, color, &c.
These two classes of phenomena cannot inhere in
the same substance, and hence, matter and mind
cannot be the same thing. To deny the distinction
between them is to set ourselves against, not only
the universal opinion of the unlearned world, but
against the world's philosophy, as held and taught
'by the most learned and wise. A few illustrations
of the principle involved will be sufficient on this
point.
1. The phenomena of volition cannot be given by
the same substance that gives  the phenomena of
inertia. VolitionD, which is a mental power, is the
power of self-action; but inertia, which is a quality
of matter, is the absence of the power of self-action
it being capable of acting only as it is acted upon.
100 
MIENTAL PHENOMENA.
It is therefore certain that mind and matter are not
the same thing.
2. The phenomena of intelligence cannot be
given by the same element that gives the phenomeina of extension, divisibility, figure, color, and inerertia. The power to know is and must be selfacting, and of.that which is self-acting, not one of
the qualities of matter can be affirmed.  The power
to know must be a simple and indivisible power, and
therefore cannot inhere in matter, which is divisible.
No one can contend that matter is intelligent,
unless upon one of two assumptions, neither of
which can be true.
(1.) The assumption that intelligence is an essential property of miatter, cannot be sustained.  If it
were so, every part and particle of matter would be
intelligent, and whatever is not intelligent, if any
such thing there be, cannot be matter. That which
is destitute of any essential property of matter cannot be matter.  All matter is not intelligent, does
not think, know and feel, and therefore intelligence
is not an essential property of matter.
(2.) The assumption that matter, not embracing
intelligence   as one of its essential properties, becomes
intelligent by having intelligence superadded to it,
cannot be    maintained on Atheistic ground.  If there
b e      no God, matter must be eternal, and if intelligence is not an essential property of matter, nothing
but matter originally existed, and there being no
God, there could be no intelligence to add to mat              5
. 101 
16
IMENTAL PHENOMENA.
ter, and no power to add it. Therefore, upon the
Atheistic theory, matter could never become intelligent by having intelligence superadded to it.
Mfatter could not add intelligence to itself.  The
idea that matter added intelligence to itself, must
suppose that intelligence existed outside of and
separate from matter, which overthrows the whole
theory of the intelligence of matter.
It is equally impossible that matter should originate intelligence within and of itself. As it is now
admitted that matter does not possess intelligence,
as an essential quality, it must be something beside
matter, and distinct fromn matter; and to say that
matter originates it, is to say that matter creates a
new thing, which did not before exist, and that this
new thing is created out of nothing, for it could not
create it out of itself.  To suppose that  matter
created intelligence out of itself, would be to suppose that it so changed itself as to cease to be matter. To suppose that matter, as an active power,
or cause, should use itself up in producing intelligence, another and distinct entity, is not only philosophically impossible, but if allowed, would prove,
after all, that it is not matter, but something else,
that is intelligent.
It is, then, certain that intelligence is not an
essential property of matter, and that it is not and
cannot be something superadded to matter. The
conclusion is undeniable, that intelligence is not
matter, and that matter is not intelligent.
49.I.
102 
MENTAL PHENOMENA.
3. The phenomena of memory proves that the
mind, which remembers, is not matter,.and is no
part of what is called the body.   Take as an illustration, a single mind, possessing the largest amount
of knowvledge, and there is no known philosophy
which will explain how such a vast storehouse of
ideas can exist in man, upon the assumption that
the mind is matter. Thoughts, ideas, knowledge,
and volitions are immaterial.; The objects of knowledge may  be material, but'the knowledge of the
object'is immaterial.   I behold a mountain, it is a
material object impressed upon  my sense through
the medium of vision, but the mountain is not in
my eye, and is not, in substance, in or on my brain.
I close my eyes, or turn away from  seeing the
mountain, and think of it, and it is not now, in
substance, in my mind. There is onrlv a tihought,
or notion of it, in the mind, embracing its size, form,
&c.  I saw it and it was then in my  mind  oily
in thought; I now remember it and it is not in my
mind, I have only a conception of it, I may have
seen a hundred mountains, and remnember them all;
I may have become learned in all thie sciences, and
reiietLiber their varied principles and their applications; I may have studied the history of all nations,
and be capable of remembering the origin and principal events attending each; and in addition to all
this, I can remember my own hitory,. emrbracing
most of the incidents that have occurred during my
life-journey of sixty years. \Where are all these
103 
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MIENTAL PHENOMENA.
matter that composes the body.  The body includes
organs f(-)r reception and discharge, and the process
of waste and renewal is perpetually going on, so that
the man of sixty years does not consist of the same
uimatter that constituted the youth of sixteen.
5. The l)henomena of conscience proves tthat the
minnd is no part of the body, and that it is not nmatteL.
By conscience, here, is meant that sense of selfapprlb)I-r)ation which we feel when  wve do what  we
believe to be right; and that sense of self-condemnation which we feel when we do what we believe
to be wrong. The simple question is, upon what do
these judgments of conscience rest?  What  is it
that feels self-approval or self-condeninationl?  It
is not the body, inot any I)art of the body.   Did any
man's feet ever feel guilty for carrying him astray?
or did any man ever blame his feet for not kee)ing
the right road?  Did any man ever feel guilt in his
hands for the unlawfutl acts they performed?  Did
any one ever believe his brains were guilty for his
evil thoughts, desires, and purposes?  Did any one
ever feel his tongue throb with guilt <ifter uttering
falsehood  to  men,  or blasphemy  against  God?
Everv one knows that no part of his body l)ears the
guilt of wrong-doing; guilt rests up tn the inner
man, the mind, the conscious soul.   The argument
triumiphs over all caviling and all sophistry; it is
what every one klnows of himself; it is the voice of
the soI], saying, "it is not the body, not the hands
105 
MENTAL PHENOMENA.
or the feet, but I, the soul, I did it, I am the
responsible agent, I am the guilty one."
It has now been established that intelligence is
not matter, and that matter is not intelligent, by
which the way has been prepared for another step
in the general argument.
II. The intelligent mind, which is not matter, is
so connected with and  adapted to  matter, as to
constitute, in conjunction wzith it, an intellectual
machine for knowing material things. I
The material part of this machine was considered
in the last Lecture.  The frame work was briefly
examined, and its leading parts and adaptations
pointed out.  As wonderful as the complex machine
appeared, it would be an inert, lifeless, useless thing,
without the mind that lives within it. The mind
is the engineer which runs this wonderful engine.
How complicated does the human organism appear,
when to the wonderful body there is added a spiritmind, which is so joined to the body as to live and
act in every part of it, and yet constitute no part of
it. This wonderful knowing power, the mind,
which can think the universe through and around
in a moment, is so confined within, and attached to
the body as to have no communication with the
material world without, only by using the body for
such communication.  The body is its instrument,
)bv which it gains a knowledge of material things.
It sees, hears, feels, tastes and smells through the
106 
MIENTAL PHENOMENA.
o(rgans of the body. All primitive ideas are derived
through the living organs of the body, by its contacts with the material world; and yet having
obtained a few ideas through this source, it can lockl
itself up in abstraction, and reason upon them independently of what is going on around and. outside of
itself.
Here we reach a fact that places the machinery
of humanity beyond the reach of any known science,
and beyond the ken of the mind's own knowing
power.  We know the fact, but the manner of that
fact is hid, and no science has yet been able to
approach the union of the material with the immraterial in man, so as to explain the nature of the ties
that bind them together. This is a mystery for
which Atheism furnishes no solution, and which is
solved only by supposing that there is a God. The
way is now prepared for taking another and final
step in the general argument.
III. Thte Intelligent Hiznd must have had an ~ntelligent Cause.
1. Atheism cannot account for the existence of
the first intelligent minds. We may allow, that in
natural generation, matter begets matter, and mind
begets mind; still it will not account for the first
two minds. It has been demonstrated that there
must have been a first man and a first woman, and
so there must have been a first two mrninds, or souls,
to animate the first two bodies.  Whence  came
107 
3IENTAL PHENOMENA.
these first minds?  Atheism answereth not, while
reason affirms that they must have had an intelligent cause, which did not exist if there be no God.
Nothing short of an intelligent cause could produce
intelligent minds. Allowing that matter existed, it
could not. have produced intelligence.  3Alatter is
not intelligent, has no intelligence in and of itself;
and therefore it could not produce intelligence; and
could not impart intelligence, for the simple reason
that it had none to impart.
Were it allowed, for the sake of the argument,
that the thirty thousand accidents necessary to the
accidental production of the human body actually
occurred, the mind would remain unaccounted for.
Mlatter could not produce intelligence in any colnce;vable manner.   One universal law governs; like
produces like  every effect must  have a cause,
which, in nature, corresponds to itself, and no cause
can produce an effect greater than itself; matter,
hlerefore, could not have produced mind.   To deny
this, would( break up the foundations of philosophy.
MIind, therefore, cannot be accounted for, if there be
no Creator.  The argument mnight be safely  ft leir hre,
for no sophistry can subvert its foundation, so
securely laid in universally admitted philosophy.
But further investigation will more fully expose the
aldsnrdity of every attempt to account for the existcnce of intelligence upon the Atheistic theory.
2. It was demonstrated in the preceding Lecture
that the ihumin )odyv mIust have had' an intelligent
108 
MIENTAL PEiNOMXENA.
Creator.  It was shown that the first humian bodies
could not have been eternal, could not have been
produced l)y any law of p)rogress in iiature, and could
not have been the result of accident.  But we have
now added to the body an intellectual machine, not
matter, but spirit; no part of it, but joined to it,
d-vwellinl, in it, lulin/g over it, acting ul)o)n it, and
caiisin, it- to act.  Tlhis mindi.is as much siuperior to
the b)od  as is thie engineer superior to the engine
he runs a(nd gui(les.  It is as much superior to the
b)ody as is the  )owver to think and know sll)uperior
to the comnl)licatious of a hand organ, which p)lays 
tune by having its crank turned, which a child can
do(.  If, then, the body gives such undeniable proof
of the existence of God, as was seen in the preceding Lecture; how  conclusive must the proof be,
arising from  the existence of the spirit-kno)win,machine, which resides in the body, andl controls it,
and runs it as its engine; and uses it as a whole,
or in its parts, as a means of securing its ends!
If accident or chance could not produce the body,
much  less could it produce  the mrnd,  with the
wonderful complications of its knowing, feelingl  and
willing powers.
3. But were it possible to conceive that accident
or chance gave existence to this wonderful machine,
for thinking, feeling,  and  willing, wve must add
another stupendous accident.   Two  stuch acc(idents
must hiave transpired near together, iaL it required
two souils for the two bodies.
5 ":,
109 
MENTAL PHENOMENA.
4. Yet another great accident must hae occurred, which is, that these souls so happened to be, as
to be suited to the two bodies which accident produced.  If either had happened to have  been a
little different, both accidents would have happened
in vain.
5. Another accident must have occurred, which
is, that the two souls took up their al)()de in the
human form, and not in the head of a donkey or a
babo)on.  If the whole matter was not under the
direction of a guiding intellect, as the Theist supposes, the two accidental souls might have found a
home elsewhere.  If one had found its home in the
head of a donlkey and the other in the head of a
balb)()n, thlere would have been no human race, as
it is.  We are, then, forced to the conclusion that
there is a God, who created both body and mind,
and so admiitbly adapted them to each other, vwith
all their compilications, and in this conception every
absurdity vanishes, and reason is disburdened, trandc
stands relieved.
110 
LFCTURCT  1, EF  X.
AN ARGUMIENT FROM THE UNIVERSAL IDEA OF GOD.
It cannot,be denied that the idea of God is uni-.
versal.  It developes itself among  all people, in
every land and age, and in everv rank in society.
No one will pretend to deny that the idea of the
existence of God prevails in all enlightened lands.
If a very ignorant and degraded people were found
on some remote island of the sea, far removed from
science and civilization, amnong whom we should fail
to discover the idea of God, it would not prove that
it did not exist in their minds.  It might he the
result of a failure so to comprehend each other's
mod(le of communication, as to understand the contents of each other's minds.  It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, on slight acquaintance, to
reach the contents of dark and degraded heatt.hen
minds, of whose language we  are ignorant, and
who have no knowledge of our language.   Yet this
idea of God is so prevalent and prominent, as everywhere to reveal itself in some form.
But there is another nmethod of reaching the universality of the idea of God. It cannot be denied
that all nations have had their religion; and the
idea of God is the first and fiudamental element in 
THE iDEA OF GOD.
religion.  Those who worship idols, and make their
deities, and carry them about their persons as a tal isman, regard them only as representations of the
Invlisible Power that rules the destinies of men.
The idea of God  may, therefore, be regarded  as
universal.  Atheism cannot account for this uni versal idea of God, which must be a universal false hood, if there be no God. They cannot deny it, it
is so) well klnowvn.  If they were to pretend that it
is not universal;. that some persons have been found
lwho have been destitute of it, they could tlhen only
cl,iim a niere exception, and the rule would stand,
ta mien,,enerally, have an idea of Goed.  When)ce
cuinie tliis universal falsehiood, as it miust be, if there
nl r, God?
It cannot be claimed that the idea is an accident,
1,)ecaese it is general.  To say that an idea so (geieral and uniform is accidental, is to insult our common sense.  Mioreover, it is clear that there can be
no accident in the matter. Every effect must have
a cause, Iancd every thought that men think must
1,:-e- a cause.  The philosophy of the mind reveals
thel li-tw bv which thought succeeds  thou,ght, andI
ves'ev thought has its pre-existingo cause  whry it
oceclrs as it does.  Why, then, does the tliouo'ht
Cccur in the human mind, that there is a God, if
theie be n)ne?  There are but six conceivabl)e wa-ys
in vwlbich the ide of God can have beeii produced
in the hiun mind, every one of vwhichl, if allowved,
will lead to the conclusion that there is a God.
112 
TAP  IDEA OF GOD.
1. It may be sup))osed that the idea has come
down fiomn the first man, having, been cormtunicated froin man to man, from faither to son, through
all lpast generations.  This is pcossible, but it suIl,poses that the first man  had a knowledg'e of God,
which he transmitted, and if so, there must be Ca
God.   If the first man did not commence his existence with this knowledge, in order to a transmission
of the idea of God, he nmust  have obtained it in
some one of the five remnaining sources, froni whlience
it may be derived.
2. It may have been derived from the Scriptures.
But this accounts for it, only ul)}n the assumption
that  the  Scriptures are a revelation  firomn  God.
They abound with the idea of God, but if ti hey are
n(ot from God, the idea of God focund in ihem is
only the idea of the several writers, and how they
came by the idea is left unexplained.   If the Scriptires iare inspired, there is a God; if they are not
inspired, the writers must  have got their idea of
God in one of the four remaining ways.
3. The idea of God may be  the result of the
ind's own spontaneity.   The human minld ma-y be
so constituted  as to  originate the  idea o-)f God,
within itself; as an original conception. It is not
dafrel that this is the case, but only that it is
p(, ssitle that it should be so.  Now, if this be the
oriiin of the idea of God, hlie who denies the existceoce of God, denies what his own internal convic  tios    i-im, an(i Tays false to his own nature.
113 
THE IDEA OF GOD.
4. If there be a God, it is possible that He should
make a revelation of the fact of His existence in
the mind of every rational being. Allowing that
there is a God, who is a Spirit, He must be able to
so act upon the human mind, as to produce a conviction of His existence. But this view does not
help Atheism, for it assumes the existence of God,
and though it is held by many Theists, it is not
urged as opposed to Atheism, but only introduced
as one of the conceivable methods of accounting
for the universal idea of God.
5. The universal idea of the existence of God,
may be a deduction of reason from the visible universe, as its premise. This is, certainly, a conceivable method of accounting for the existence of God,
and whatever may be thought of it, as the probable
origin of the idea, it has been held by many learned
and distinguished writers. Paul, who wrote about
eighteen hundred years ago, appears to have
expressed this view, when he said:  "The invisible things of Him, from the creation of the world,
are clearly seen, being manifest by the things that
are made, even His Eternal Power and Godhead."
But if this origin of the idea of God be allowed,
it milst be fttal to Atheism.   If reason deduces
the idea of the existence o)f God from the visible
universe, it must, in some way, contain upon its
fatce visible proofs of the Divine existence; and as
natuie cannot  be s-upl)osed to bear false witness,
there must be a Go(.
11.4 
THE IDEA OF GOD.
6. The idea of God may be suggested to the
ihuman mind, by his own convictions of the necessity
of a lligher and overruling Power.  It is a well known
fact that the greatest minds feel unequal to the
emergencies of their being.  Ignorance shrouds the
mind, where  knowledge  appears  indispensable
weakness is felt where strength  is required; and
doubl)t and uncertainty hangs over the future, just
where assurance and certainty are most desirable.
Indeed, wvitiout a God, the great problem of human
destiny is a painfuil uncertainty, without any possible rule by which it can be solved.  Man wakes up
to conscious existence, and finds himself the subject of wants, hopes and fears; often his hopes d(lisapploint hirnm; often his fears mock him. He asks
himnself, what governs human destiny?  I do not
goverln my own  destiny, for failure often attends
mv best efforts, and unforeseen events transpire
which blast my hopes, on one hand, and mock my
needless  fears on  the other.  Is  there  a Higher
Power, guided by intelligence, or does blind chanlce
direct my way from life's cloudy dawn to its dark
,c(- in(, down and then! -what then remains, when
life's dim lamp goes out in death? 0, that there
were a ruling Power, almighty, all-wise, just and
good; how a knowledge of such a ruling  Power
would relieve this burdened heart of mine! I feel
that it would be a blessing, if there were a God
it wohld relieve this feeling of orphanage, of homeless, friiendless insecurity. Reason within me affirms
115 
THE IDEA'  OF GOD.
that a God is necessary, and does reason affirm the
necessity of what is not and cannot be?  Is my
inmost soul false, and  does nature mock hersel.'?
It must be so, if there is no God, no ruling Power
and yet it cannot be, reason will not allow that whlat
is not and cannot be, is necessary; there is a Go(d..
It is not affirmed that the idea of God is ori,inated in this way, it is only given as one of thne possil)le methods of accounting for the idea, and(l he
wvho admnits it to be the true method, must },riove
false to his own nature to deny that there is a God.
The six only conceivable methods of accounting
ftor thie universal idea of God among lue), have now
J)een exoiiiined, and every one of them, if' almitted(,
will force us to the conclusion that there is a Go(d.
The aogumrent, then, is conclusive.   There fIee lbut
t~vo gr-ounds upon which an ar,guiuent of this kind
can  )be successfully assailed, neither of whicih is
availol])e in this case.
1. If it could be shown that the argument is not,
comp,relensive of all the conceivable ways in wliich
the idea of God might be originated, the argu'nent
would be overthrown, but no other method  can be
na1med.
2. If it could be shown that one of these metlhods might be true, without implying the existence
of God, the argument would fall; but this cannot
be (lone.
It is not necessary to demonstrate which is the
true method of accounting for the universal idea of
116 
THE IDEA OFI' GOu.
God; the force of' the argument does not depend
upon a              cknowld)e of which of the six methods is
the trul  ()one, but upon the fact that there is no
other mnethlod   that, therefore, it is and  1must be
one or all of the six.  It may be that thley are all
true methods, that each, by itself, is sufficient, and
would tgive the idea of God, provided it had not
been previously given in one of the other mnet,ods.
If so, the arg(nument is sound.  On the other hand,
if but one of them, no matter which, is a s,'ficient
and the true method of accounting for the id(ea of
God, the arg,ument is sound, since either of them,
if admitted, will force us to the conclusion that
there is a God.   The  argument,  then, imay  be
summed up thus:
1. There are'but six possible ways in which we
can account for the universal idea of the existence
of God.
2. If the idea of God be derived in either of
these six ways, then it follows that there is and
must be aI God.
3. Therefore, the universal idea of God, which
cannot be denied wlhen traced to its origin, furnishes
absolute proof that there is a God, and Atheism is
overthrown, and Theism is established.
Here we rest the argument for the existence of
God, and wA1ll proceed in a few subsequent Lectures,
to deImo)nstrarte His character, and bring what light
wve can to rhine on the path of' human duty.
117 
LECTURE XI.
THE ATTRIBUTES AND CHARACTER OF GOD.
Having concluded the argument in support of the
Theistic faith, and, as is believed, established the
fact that there is a God, it is proper to inquire into
his attributes and character.
It is not pretended that we can fully know and
comprehend the attributes and character of God.
That which fully knows and comprehends must be
equal to, if not greater than that which is known
and comprehended. One inquired, more than three
thousand years ago, "Canst thou, )by searching, find
out God? Canst thou find out the Almi,ghlty to
perfection?"
But while we may not presume to "find out God
to perfection," something may be known of God,
and it is our duty and privilege to know that something.  It is now too late to insist that nothing can
be known of God, for two very good reasons.
1. It has been demonstrated that there is a God,
and hence one thing is already known of God.  It
is known that God is.
2. In demonstrating the existence of God, other
ficts and traits have been necessarily brought to
lilght. It were not possible to demonstrate that 
ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.
God is, as has been done, without demonstrating
certain other facts in regard to the attributes and
character of God. The proof which has established
the fact that God  is, has, to a limited extent,
revealed to us what he is   But it is necessary to
makle a more distinct and classified exhibit of the
attributes and character of God, as they stand
revealed to the human mind, in the light of nature.
The attributes of God are properly divided into two
classes, which it is somewhat difficult to distinguish
from each other, for wantof pro)er termns.  They may,
however, be distinguished by using a little circunmlocution.  They are, first, such as do not, necessa
rily, involve moral character, or moral right and
wvrong; and, secondly, such as do pertain to moral
character, or moral right and wrong. The first
nImed class will be made the first subject of investi(,ation.
I. God is Eternal, thIat is, He always existed,
an(i ahways will exist.
1. It was proved in the second Lecture, that
somethling is and must be eternal; and having since
)roved that there is a God, the Creator of all things,
it follows that He is the Eternal One.  This  positimn is already made sure, and we have the truth
tlhat God is eternal, as a starting point, and it gives
us a groind on which we can stand, and from which
wve can build out new argumrents, relatively to other
attribu,tes and perfections of His nature.
119 
ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.
2. Eternity, as an attribute of God, has been
defined as that element of self-existence which renders the being of God, necessarily, without beginni.ng, and without end.  God is, and always was,
and always will be.  This attribute distinguishes
God from everything else, so that there need be no
confusion, and no blending of elements with the
Divine, in the discussion of the subject upon which
we now enter.  God being eternal, nothing else is
or can be eternal; this attribute is IHis, and His
alone, and it is incommunicable. God may render
other things perpetual in existence, but he can
produce nothing of which it can be said it had no
beginning.
3. The eternity of God having been fully settled,
it is prop-er to remark, that this truth does not and
cannot exist alone. An eternal, self-existing being
must necessarily possess other attributes correspondin(g to this essential element of His nature, and
firom it we will  )roceed to demonstrate other attributes of the Divine nature. All that can be proved
to be a necessary consequence of the eteirnity of His
nature must now be admitted, as His eternity cannot be denied.
II. God is Omnipotent, or  ll1-powegful.
1. Tlhe omnipotence of God becomes a necessary
truth in the light of His eternity.  He who is eternal, and consequently existed before all thinngs, and
created (ll that exists beside himnself, is necessarily
120 
ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.
the source of all power.  There is not a power that
acts, not an ener,gy that stirs in all the universe, of
which God is not the author.  Nowv, as God has
produced all the powers that fill and stir the universe, animate and inanimate, lie must possess all
power in himrselt.  This power is unlimited.  It
will not be pretended, that in producing the universe, God has diminished his own power, that it is
now less than it was before He formed the worlds,
and hung them upon nothidg. That power, then,
which is conditioned upon nothing but itself, it
being eternal, and which can produce suchl    a universe as this without diminishing its own efficiency,
must be omnipotent, or an unlimited power.
2. The works of God furnisl-h a clear and practical
illustration of His power.  The worlds, and systems
of worlds, wvhich His hand has scattered through
space, testify of the power of Him who hung them
there. and who imparted to them their motions, and
conitinues to roll them round.
It has been ol)jected to this view, that as all the
workls of God are admitted to be finite, they cannot
prove the existence of an infinite power.   This may
al)pear iplausible at first view, but it is not conelusive.
(1.) It has been demonstrated that, in creating
the worlds, He produced the mnatter of which they
are composed.   This must settle the question  for
it musIst require infinite power to create fro,m nothing,
one Vworld, or any part of a world.  If it be admiit
121 
ATTRLIBUTES OF GOD.
ted that creation, as a mere formation, is not conelusive of the existence of infinite power, still, when
it is made to comprehend the production of matter
whlere there was nothing, the argum,nent is absolutely
conclusive.
(2.) It may not require a visible display of infinite powver to produce a conviction in the human
mind that such a power exists. Suppose I am presented with a hundred magnets, of which I have no
knowledge.   By  accident  I discover that one of
them attracts iron.  The question arises in my mind,
Avhether the power of attraction is peculiar to this
o()ne, or whether they all have the samre power.  This
I iundertake to test by experiment.  I try them one
by one, and find that each one, on trial, exhibits the
sfame 1)owevr.  Before I have tried fifty of them  I
an convinced beyond a doubt that the whole huindred have the power of attracting iron.   I have no
Inore doubt of it than I should have after testing
every one of them.   Such is the law of the human
mind.  On the same principle, a view of the worlks
of God, vitl()ut reaching infinity, may convince tile
mind that thie power that produced them is infinite.
It may be in accordance with the nature of reason,
to  ilirini, intuitively, on sight of such vast works as
the universe displays, that the power that produced
themu is infinite.
(3.) It may, after all, be a necessary principle of
philosophy, that 1)iroduces a conviction in the human
mind, that the visible creation, -tlhough finite, was
I —) 2 
ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.
produced and is upheld by an infinite power.  All
finite power exhausts itself by its own action.  Every
finite fibrce is diminished just in proportion to the
momentum it imparts to other bodies; yet it has
been seen that nature has lost none of its energy
during all of the thousands of years it has operated;
i'rom which reason may infer that the power that
rolls the world round is infinite.
The arguinent for the omnipotence of God may
be rested here, and it cannot fail to be regarded as
conclusive.
III. God is Omniscient, or All-wise.
1. The perfect wisdom of God, like His oInniijotence, becomes a necessary truth, in the light of
His eternity.  As God is eternal, and existed before
any other being existed, all wisdom existed ill Himi,
and mlust be of Him.  As God is the Creator of all
things, visible and invisible, He is the author of all
intelligence, and has kindled every light that glows
throughout the realm of space, widely dotted with
thinking and knowing minds.  As God is eternal,
His knowledge is conditioned alone upon His own
eternal knowing nature, while all other knowled,ge
is conditioned upon Himn, hence He is the source of
all knowledge, and nmust be all-wise.  As  He has
made everything, including all active powers, there
can be no object of knowledge which he did not
make, (,I' which does not result trom what lie did
miake; there can, theref;,re, be no object of know
.123 
ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.
ledge vwhIich He does not know; and He whlo knows
all there is to be known, must be all-wise.
2. The works of God give a practical illustration
of His wisdom. -W'hen we consider what has been
brought to) li,ght, in preceding, ar,gumnents, tlhat tie
pri,oduction of the first two humant  bein,gs involved
from  twenty to thirty thousand adapI)tations, and
then add the necessary adaptations of every separate
item of creation throughout  the vegetable and animal kingdoms, fromn the violet to the oak, and fioom
the gnat to thle elephant, and fromn the miinow to
the wihale; and then ascend to the heavens, an(l
conteml-late worlds tdapted to and balanced ag,ainst
woriics, with all thie internal ada, itations of each,
and re,aon will not anid cannot c()onceive that the
whole has been planned, arranged, comnl)rel-hende(d,
and executed by, a finite intelligence.  In view of
the state of things described, reason afil-ims the
existence of an all-wise mind.
!V.  God is Omnilpresent, or exists everywhere.
Wli\ciT it is aflirinoed that God exists everywhere,
it is not meant tlat i He reveals limself alike everywhiere, at all times.   Nor is it meant  that there
is nat a particular jlAlce sc,moewhere -I sapace', which
mav  be c'lled the seat.of His  eml)ire, and wlhere
HIe (liwells in a sense in whici IHe eloes not cldwell
everyvwhere.   Yet it is afLfirmed thlat God is ubiquitous, that  He  is in all places at the same  time.
T,iis has now  becomo a necessary trnth, in viiew of
124 
ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.
what has been established, and all that is required
is to show that it follows as a consequence of the
facts that have been demonstrated.
1. As God is eternal, He existed before all things,
when nothing but himself did exist; and when
nothing but God existed, there was nothing to
limit or bound Him outside of himself; He was
then the whole of being, and in the fullness of His
own existence, He filled all in all.
2. As God created all things, He must be where
all things are; as He could not create where He
was not, so nothing can exist where God is not.
As God is the creator of all things, the existence
of everything is conditioned upon Him, and of course
can exist only where He is.  The conclusion is, God
is everywhere, where there is anything. If, then,
God pervades all worlds, and every part of all
worlds, it cannot be denied that he pervades the
space between: them, and that surrounds them.
God cannot exist in two places at the same time
and not exist in and pervade all the space between
them. If, then, God exists everywhere, where anything exists, and pervades and surrounds all that
exists, He must be omnipresent, for beyond all that
exists there is nothing to limit His presence.
3. God has been proved to be omnipotent, and
from this His omnipresence becomes a necessary
consequence. No being can act where he is not,
and no being, less than omnipresent, can be in two
laces at the same time; but as God in omnipotent,
6
125 
ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.
he must be capable of exerting power everywhere
at the same time, and therefore He must be omnipresent, for He can exert power only where He is.
4. It has been proved that God is all-wise, and
from this it follows that He must be omnipresent.
Reason cannot conceive of perfect personal knowledge beyond the sphere of existence filled by the
knowing subject.  But it has been proved that God
knows all there is to be known, and, therefore, he
must exist everywhere where there is anything to be
known, and must be omnipresent.
V. God is immutable, unchangeable.
When it is affirmed that God is immutable, the
sense is not that there is no variety in His acts or
works, nor yet that there is no variety in the government which He administers over intelligent
beings. The particular awards of His administration may be conditioned upon the ionduct of the
subjects of His government, and that being various
there may be variety in His administration, and
still He be unchangeable.
By the immutability of God, is meant that He
is unchangeable in His nature and in the principles that govern His actions.  As He acts towards
one man, at any time, so will he act towards all men,
at all times, in view of the same state of facts.  No
one can deny that the simple element of goodness
or justice, would reveal a variety, when applied by an
immutable mind, to different states of facts. - Godl
126 
ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.
would have to change, to administer without variety,
in view of all unlike combinations of facts. Amid
all apparent variety, God remains unchanged and
unchangeable.
1. The immutability of God is a necessary truth,
in view of His eternity.  As God is eternal, and
self-existent, he can have no cause of existence, only
what is in himself, and eternal, like himself, and
hence there can be no cause of change in Him.  If
there were, or could be any cause of change in God,
it must;Me  an eternal cause, and to talk of an eternal cause of change is a solecism, an absurdity.
God, then, must be unchangeable in His own eternal nature. As God is eternal, existed before all
things, and created all things, there is no power or
force outside of himself by which He can be affected
and changed. He must, therefore, be and remain
eternally unchangeable.
2. The immutability of God is illustrated by the
uniformity of the operations of nature. The visible
universe appears to be under uniform and unchanging laws. All the operations of nature are now
carried on upon the same principle they ever have
been, so far as our knowledge extends. While perpetu4l changes are transpiring, they appear to be
effected by unchanging laws. Uniform laws appear
to produce all the changes which give useful and
pleasing varieties, causing nature to wear the aspect
of stability. If nature only revealed as much
caprice and eccentricity as man does, in his limited
127 
ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.
circle of action, it might be inferred that God rules
by a fluctuating impulse, and with an unsteady
hand, but such is not the case. If earth received
one kind of seed and responded by giving another;
if trees produced apples one year, cherries the second, and acorns the third; if the seasons sometimes
failed to find their places; if, now and then, winter
took the place of summer, and summer took the
place of winter; if the moon occasionally held on to
its full-orbed light, for a few weeks, without waning;
if the earth should occasionally change its motion, and
roll the other way for a few months, causing the sun
to rise in the west and go down in the east, it might
leave the impression upon rational minds that God,
like men, is changeable. But nature gives no such
hint, but, on the contrary, she is uniform in all her
operations, and works out and develops all her
changes in accordance  with fixed,   unchanging laws,
suggesting to the rational mind, that God, who
formed and governs nature, is an unchangeable
being, and with this accords the word by one of the
Seers, "I am the Lord, I change not."
What some have called the natural attributes of
God, in contradistinction from what they have called
his moral attributes, have now been considered.
They have been found to be five in number, and are
such as constitute God what he must be, to meet
the necessities of humanity, and secure the endorsemnent of enlightened reason. Mlore than this, you
cannot conceive God to be, in this direction.  Yo
128 
ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.
cannot conceive another attribute of the class, the
addition of which would improve his character, or
make Him'more efficient, or worthy of trust.  On
the other hand, not one of these attributes can be
ignored without destroying the very idea of God,
and rendering Him, if He is not annihilated, insufficient to meet the undeniable wants of humanity.
Such has God been proved to be, in the light of
reason, and by the force of necessary truths. It
is now only necessary to remark, such also is the
God of the Bible.
129 
LECTUlRE XII.
THE MiORAL CHARACTER OF GOD.
Having established the Theistic view of what
some writers have called the Natural Attributes of
God, attention must now be directed to what they
have.called his Moral Attributes. Moral is that of
which right or wrong may be affirmed, and hence,
the moral character of God is in issue in the present
Lecture.
As a starting point, it is affirmed that God is a
morally perfect being, just what he ought to be, and
what he must be to be God, and to fill the ideal of
human reason, as God.   Perfection, as here employed, is comprehensive of all conceivable moral
goodness, and exclusive of all moral evil. It may
be affirmed, then, that God possesses the attribute
of perfect moral goodness.
I. God is Perfect iq Goodness.
This attribute is considered first, because it is'
generic, and comprehensive of several more specific
attributes or moral qualities, which must be afterwards considered.   Such  will  stand  revealed  as
necessary truths, when it shall have been proved, 
ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.
beyond a doubt, that God is perfect in goodness.
This great truth, that God is perfect in goodness,
is proved by two argum,ents.
I. It is a necessary truth, in the light of the attributes of God, which have been already established
in the preceding Lecture.
Such are his Eternity, Omnipotence, Omniscience,
Omnipresence, and  Immnutability.   Such a being
must be perfect in goodness.
The argument, which is necessarily a little complicated in detail, may be stated, in substance, in
few words, and in simple form, thus    God must
be perfect, or imperfect, or neither; but he cannot
be imperfect, and cannot be neither; and, therefore, he must be perfect
1. God cannot be perfect and imperfect at the
same time. The words, perfect and imperfect, are
exclusive of each other, so that both cannot be true
of the same being or thing.  That which is perfect
is not imperfect, and that which is imperfect is not
perfect. God is not therefore perfect and imperfect,
but must be one or the other, perfect or imperfect,
and cannot be both.
2. God cannot be neither perfect nor imperfect,
but must be one or the other. As he is the intelligent cause of all things, the Creator of all finite,
intelligent beings, who possess mora(l natures, and
have conceptions of right and wrong, and whose conduct is right or wrong, God himself must be right
or wrong, good or evil. The contrary is impossible,
131 
ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.
unthinkable. God, then, is perfect or imperfect
he cannot be both, and cannot be neither.
3. If God is imperfect, it must be in one of two
ways: either by being a compound of good and
evil, or by being unmingled evil. God must be
perfectly good, unmingled good, or he must be unmingled evil, or he must be a mixture of good and
evil.
4. God is not exclusively evil, is not wholly malevolent. This has never been believed by any rational being, civilized or savage. There is too much
goodness displayed to admit of such a belief.  Miuch
goodness is visible, is an object of knowledge, and a
substance in experience on the part of all who enjoy
life. All who admit that God is, and that he is
the author of anything, admit that he is the author
of some good, and of course he is not exclusively
evil; is not wholly malevolent. That this world
was created by, and is under the control of a being
whose nature and disposition is unmingled malevolence, cannot be believed.
5. God cannot be a compound of good and evil,
part good and part evil. This is the only point in
the argument that can be contested, and here no
sufficient defence can be made against it. Keeping
in mind what God has already been proved to be,
the argument must be conclusive.
(1.) MIoral good and evil are opposed to each
other, and can never combine their power to produce the same act or result, so that it shall be the
132 
ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.
result of the power of both conjointly.  Good  can
produce nothing  but good, and evil can produce
nothing but evil.  On this state of things let it be
remarked:
(2.) An Almi,ghty Being cannot be, in any degree,
under the influence of two such conflicting forces
the one or the other must reign exclusively and
supremely,  or God  cannot  be Almighty.   Two
opposing forces cannot be Omnipotent, separately
considered, or as a conflicting whole.
(3.) An Infinite Being cannot consist of two such
opposing elements as moral good and evil, because
it would render Hiim less than Infinite. If God be
part good and part evil, the good and the evil must
both be limited and finite, and as two finites cannot
constitute one Infinite, both together must be finite,
and God cannot be Infinite.
6. If there be evil in the Divine nature, it must
be there as an eternal, essential, and necessary element, or it must be there by God's own voluntary
choice and act, neither of which can be true.
(1.) Evil cannot exist in the-Divine nature as an
eternal, essential, and necessary element, for the reason just assigned.  Itwould divide the Divine nature
into two opposite elements, and render God finite.
It cannot be, for the additional reason that imperfection implies ignorance, weakness, want, or deficiency.  But  as God is All-wise, Almighty and
Infinite, He can be neither ignorant, weak, wanting
or deficient; and, therefore, God cannot be imperfect.
6'
133 
ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.
(2.) Evil cannot exist in the Divine nature by
the voluntary choice and act of God. As evil is not
an eternal, essential, and necessary element of the
Divine nature, its introduction, at any time, would
imply an elemental change, which is impossible,
because it has been proved that God is immutable.
Evil, therefore, cannot have been imbibed by God's
own volition and act.
It is, then, clear that evil does not exist in the
Divine nature, as an essential and necessary element,
and that it does not exist by the choice and act of
the Divine mind; and, therefore, it does not and
cannot exist, at all, upon any possible hypothesis.
7. If it were supposable that good and evil might
both exist in the Divine nature, it would still be
manifest that they could not both so act as to produce practical results. It has been shown that they
are opposed to each other, and cannot coalesce;
that good tends only to good, and that evil tends
only to evil. To this add what also has been proved,
that God is Eternal, Almighty and Immutable, and
it must follow that, these conflicting forces cannot
receive impulse or strength from any source outside
of tle Eternal mind itself, from which one of three
things must appear certain.
(1.) The good would overcome the evil and
entirely suppress it, so that good only would proceed from God; or,
(2.) The evil would overcome the good, so that
evil only would proceed from God; or,
134 
ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.
(3.) They would counteract and counterbalance
each other and.prevent all moral action, so that
neither good or evil would proceed from God. In
neither case can it be maintained that God is both
good and evil.
The principle of the preceding arguments cannot
be applied to man; he being finite, ignorant and
weak, is liable to be affected by different and conflicting influences, and hence, he may develop goodness under this influence, and in this direction, and
evil under that influence, and in that direction.
With God, who is eternal, infinite and immutable,
it cannot be so, for there is no cause for what He is,
and what He does, outside of His own essential
nature. 
Here this argument reaches it close, and it may
be summed up in few words. The points which
have been established are as follows:
1. God nmust be perfect or imperfect, or neither
perfect or imperfect, because He cannot be both
perfect and  imperfect.  These points have been
made certain beyond a doubt.
2. God cannot be imperfect, as lie cannot be
wholly evil, and cannot be a mixture of good and
evil; cannot be evil, necessarily, and cannot be evil,
voluntarily; and, therefore, He cannot be evil at
all, in any way.
3. As God must be good, or evil, or neither, and
cannot be evil, or neither, he must be good, entirely
and supremely good.
135
I
I....:1.
. I 
ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.
II. The Goodness of God is Proved by His Works.
After the protracted argument, in which  the
supreme goodness of God has been demonstrated as
a necessary truth, it cannot be necessary to make a
labored effort in the present argument. It will, however, be a relief to turn the mind from its close
application to metaphysical reasoning, to contemplate a visible exhibition of the goodness of God,
everywhere glowing upon the face of nature.
It inay be affirmed that, throughout the whole
realm of nature, convenience, usefulness and beauty,
were consulted by the Divine Architect. In the
combination of these three elements in the visible
Universe, happiness was the end aimed at, and
mainly the happiness of man, the most noble creature and crowning glory of this mundane sphere.
Any number of particulars might be adduced in
evidence of the goodness of the Creator, but how
can it be necessary, since every eye can see, and
every ear can hear, and every hand can  pluck, and
every nerve can sense, and every heart -can feel, in
the midst of the universal  surroundings of Godgiven' and heaven-distilled goodness? Blind indeed
must be the eyes, deaf the ears, torpid the nerves,
and cold the hearts, that are not moved, and even
transported, by the goodness that nature everywhere
displays, and that do not, in thought, trace these
flowing streams of blessings up to their great source,
the Creator. Of such it mav be said
136
.I 
ATTRIBUTES OF GOT)D.
"Fools never raise their thoughts so high;
Like brutes they live, like brutes they die."
A few particulars may be properly named as specimens, which, thotugh it appear to lessen the view
by turning the mind from the comprehensive whole
to a very limited part, may serve to direct the
unpracticed into the right channel of thought.
1. The human body furnishes a good illustration
of the benevolence of the Creator, since every part
of it has its use, and promotes the usefulness of the
whole, and is so contrived as to yield the greatest
amount of happiness to the rational mind that dwells
within. The five senses, so called, are not only
exceedingly useful, but are all sources of enjoyment.
If it be urged that they are also instruments of
torture, the reply is sufficient.
(1.) The liability to suffering, so far as appears,
could not have been prevented without rendering
the system incapable of the enjoyment which is now
drunk in through these senses. Who would prefer
being blind, lest he should see something unsightly?
Who would be deaf, lest he should hear what would
grieve him?  Who would be without feeling, lest
he should sense pain?  Who  would be without
taste, lest something bitter or acrid should get upon
his tongue? Who would desire to have no olfactory organ, lest it should remind him of the presence of some offensive odor?
(2.) While pleasure is the natural result of the
137 
ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.
organs above named, pain is only the result of their
misapplication, perversion, distortion, or disease.
2. The human mind, no less than the body, is
formed with reference to its own usefulness and happiness. Mental phenomena is divided into three
general classes, as given by intelligence, sensibility
and will.
(1.) The wonderful intellectual powers of man
introduce him into the boundless fields of truth as
his pleasure grounds.
(2.) But for man's sensibility, that is, capability
of mental feeling, he would be incapable of intellectual pleasure. Now his soul vibrates with pleasure
at the sight of every object, beautiful, sublime or
grand; on the hearing of every euphonious sound,
especially where there is melody and harmony,- and
the world is full of music,- and so may every other
organ of sense be made to fill the mind with pleasure. The soul may lock itself up in abstraction,
and then stir itself with pleasurable emotions with
its own thoughts.  Memory delights the soul with
pleasing recollections of all the good that has been
enjoyed and is gone; hope stretches forward and
gathers joys from the future, and blesses the present hour with anticipations of all the good that is to
come. Thus, by means of memory and hope, the
past and future are made to pour their contents of
pleasure into the cup of present enjoyment.
(3.) The will is the helm of the soul, by which it
directs its own powers in accordance with the dic
138 
ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.
tates of its own intelligence, and by this means commands the sources of its own happiness.  But for
the will, the mind would have no self-control, and
could not direct itself to, or hold itself to drink
from the various fountains of enjoyment; and might
wander, hungry and athirst, without once blundering upon a fountain of pleasure, or crossing one oasis
in its own unguided, uncontrolled, and desolate
rounds of being.
If it be said that these same mental powers render us capable of misery, it is a sufficient reply to
remark:
First.   There could be no happiness without
them.
Secondly. There need be no misery with them;
misery is not a necessary result, but comes in consequence of an abuse or perversion of these powers.
Thirdly.   Those who raise the  objection that
these mental powers are sources of evil rather than
a blessing, would not be willing to part with them
in their own case, were it possible. Who would be
willing to have his own intelligence extinguished, to
prevent or to erase his knowledge of evil? Who
would be willing to have his sensibility removed
from his soul and be rendered.incapable of mental
feeling, lest he should feel mental anguish?  Who
would desire to have no will, to prevent his own willfulness or obstinacy of' disposition? Who would
be willing to have no power to will that which is
139 
ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.
right and good, lest he should will that which is
wvrong or hurtful?
This argument might be enlarged to any extent,
bv showing that in a thousand particulars the material world is adapted to man's mental powers for the
production of happiness, but the argument has been
pushed far enough to answer all practical purposes,
and the conclusion is, that God is perfect in goodness.
The only OUection Answvered.
The only objection which ever has or ever will be
urged against the entire view which has been given
of the goodness of God, is founded upon the fact
that evil, both physical and moral, does exist, and
that good and evil mingle in human experience.
Here the heathen have sometimes blundered; seeing
good and evil in the world, they concluded that
there was a good and evil principle in the Deity,
and that the good principle produced all the good,
and that the evil principle produced all the evil.
This has already been proved impossible. But in
further reply to the objection, let it be remarked:
1. Much of the evil complained of, undeniably
results from man's own wrong  actions, which are
voluntary on his part, and which he might avoid,
or from which he might refrain. This all men practically admit, by applauding or censuring their fellow-beings, as they judge their actions to be right
or wrong. If all men would do right, do as well as
140 
ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.
they might do, a thousand streams of evil would
be dried up.
2. If all the evils which result from the wrong
actions of men were removed, nothing would remain
which  could be proved  to be inconsistent with
supreme and universal goodness. In such case
there would be no moral evil, no crime, and no
guilt; and how much of physical evil would exist
in the shape of suffering attendant on the dissolution
of our physical organism in death, it may not be
possible to determine; yet it cannot be denied, that
if there were no violations of physical laws, physical
suffering would be much less than it is, and death
itself, occurring in old age, might be with such a
gradual wearing out of the physical organism as to
be attended by no dissolving pangs.
3. As it now is, it cannot be denied that the evils
which men sulffer, tend to restrain them from vice.
If there were no suffering connected with this life,
and especially none connected with vice, it is impossible to calculate how wicked our race would become.
The fact of life's ills, and of its certain and speedy
termination in death, mnay serve greatly to lessen our
attachment to this world, and thereby restrain our
evil propensities, and check our worldly ambition,
which too oft en, as it is, has desolated whole lands,
and caused nations to groan.
4. Death itself, which worldly minded men regard
as the greatest of all human ills, may be, for all
we do or can know from the light of nature, the
141 
ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.
greatest good that can overtake humanity. There
are pervading all minds, thoughts of a future state,
and if there be a future life, death itself, with its
dark and dreaded surround(lings, must be the passage
through which we enter upon that life; and if it
were divested of all the fears and terrors with which
conscious guilt has armed the dying hour, death
might not be regarded as a positive evil.  But as it
is, death may be a very useful admonition to the
living, and a blessing to such of the dead as live in
accordance with the dictates of their own intellectual
and moral nlatutres. These views are not given as
Christian Theology, but only as Natural Theology,
the deductions of reason from what is seen and known
of God through His works, and the conclusion is,
that God is good, without mixture of evil, and that
what real evil there is in man's experience is the
result of his own erratic course, in wandering from
the way of right, and the path of duty.
Having now established the fact of the Divine
goodness, a ground has been secured in which other
attributes can be seen as necessary truths.
II. God is just.
We cannot conceive that God is otherwise than
just, since it has been proved that He is perfectly
good. No unjust being can be perfectly good, as
goodness is comprehensive of justice, and hence, as
God is perfectly good, he must be just.
1. Justice is that virtue which gives to every one
142 
ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.
just what is due.   To withhold what is due, what
may be claimed as a right, would be unjust, but to
bestow more than can be claimed of right, is not
necessarily unjust.  We  see a man withhold from
his fellow man what is his, and we say he is unjust;
and we see another man bestow upon his less fortunate fellow man, not only what is his right, but
even what he could not claim as his right, and we
say he is more than just, he is generous, he is
benevolent, and we approve of his conduct.  We
do not think of accusing him of injustice, because
he bestows more than strict justice could claim.
The reason is, what he gives more than justice
requires, is his own, and he has a right to dispose
of it in the way he does. The same is true of God's
administration.
2. Justice requires such retribution for evil deeds,
and such only, as is for the benefit of the whole.
Reason cannot approve of purely vindictive punishment, nor can it be made to appear from what we
can see and know of the Divine administration, that
God ever inflicts such punishment. Justice could
not allow a whole social compact to suffer damage,
including the innocent, for the purpose of securing
the evil doer from the painful consequences if his
own wrong acts. Justice demands that the wicked
suffer so much for their sins as the general good
requires. It appears to be upon this principle that
God has established the laws of nature, which govern both matter and mind.
143 
ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.
It is better for the idle to suffer hunger, than
that they should reap a harvest without sowing
better for the whole.
It is better for the whole community, that the
glutton, the drunkard, and the debauchee should be
afflicted with disease, than that men should be able
to practice these vices with impunity. The same
must be true of God's punitive administration;
Godl's goodnessand justice must unite to inflict such
punishment on evil doers as the good of all demands.
So much, reason affirms, and so much, justice must
require, and \vill administer, either in this world or
in the next, or in both.
III. God is trthtful.
A statement, to be true, must be in conformity
to what has been, what is, or what will be, as it
may refer to the past, the present, or the future.
Truthfulness may be predicated of actions as well
as of words. Truth and falsehood may be acted as
well as spoken.
As God has been proved to be perfect in moral
goodness, He must be truthful, as not to be truthful would render Him imperfect. No argument
can *be necessary to establish  this point.  It is
morally impossible that God should possess entire
moral goodness and not be truthful. The truthfulness of God may be regarded in two points of lighlt.
1. If God has made, or ever shall make a revelation
to men, it must be true.  The Bible professes to be 
ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.
a revelation of the will of God to man, but it is not
the work of Natural Theology to decide whether it
does contain such a revelation or not; it can only
affirm that if it be a revelation from God, it must
be true.
2. The truthfulness of God must be revealed in
the complete harmony of His works, so far as we
can comprehend them. There can be no contradiction between one truth and another truth, hence,
what are called the laws of nature must be a perfectly harmonious code in themselves, and would so
appear, if we perfectly understood them.  This gives
to science absolute validity.  Reason never asks the
question, is science true? It knows that it is true. It
only asks the question, what is science? or is this
science? or does science teach this or that?  Men
often misapprehend the laws of nature, or mistake
the teachings of nature, and when they do, they falsify
science, or understand as science what is not science.
All real science is the voice of God speaking through
His works, and must be true, for God could no
more act a falsehood than he could speak one. Two
thling,s are, then, certain; first, all science is true
and secondly, no two sciences can contradict each
other.  W'here reason can detect a contradiction, it
knows there is falsehood; and when the laws of
nature, or two sciences appear to contradict each
other, there is and must be a misapprehension of
the teachings of nature.  This view of the truthfulness of God is undeniable, in the light of reason,
145 
ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.
and here we leave this attribute, without further
remarks.
IV. God isforbearing, or long-suffering.
By this is meant, that God does not punish
offenders so soon as they offend, and to the extent
their offence deserves.  It is not affirmed  that God
does not finally punish the guilty according to their
demerit, but only that He forbears, at least for a time.
This fact is a matter of experience, or it is deducible from what is seen and known by observation.
1. Men do wrong, and deserve punishment. This
statement rests upon  the universal conviction of
mankind. The idea of ri,lght and wrong is a iuniversal idea. It is not confined to Christians, or
civilized communities, but is common to all classes,
even the wildest of savages, and the darkest of
heathen, have their ideas of right and wrong. Men
differ widely as to what is right and what is wrong,
but they all agree that some things are right, and
that some things are wrong; that some actions of
men are right, and others wrong. Some few may
be found, who, to sustain a theory, will deny that
men are responsible for their actions, or that they
render themselves guilty and ill-deserving, by what
is called wriong in human conduct; but such, if
any there are, are a small fractional exception of
mankind, and affirm what is so at variance with
their own  and  everybody else's convictions,  that
their affirmations weigh nothing, as an argument.
j46 
ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.
Moreover, let any one trespass upon what they call
their rights, and they will be as loud as any in their
complaints of wrong, and will insist as strongly
upon the guilt of the offender. The Universal conscience of mankind declares that there is guilt and
ill-desert, where there is intelligent and voluntary
wrong-doing.
2. Justice does not at once overtake the wrongdoer; at least, in many cases it does not, and often
it delays long, as men reckon time. In all such
cases, God bears with them, or forbears to punish
them, and he must be forbearing or long-suffering.
So far, known facts talk, but beyond this, unaided
reason sheds but little light. The doctrine of pardon is not taught in nature, and hence is unknown
in Natural Theology. The fact of forbearance does
not prove or ensure a pardon, because there may
be a reason for delay, in the divine perfect knowledge,
and reason cannot know that judgment will not be
mneted out in the future. If it could even be known
that no punishment is awarded evil-doers in this
lifeb, it would not prove that God overlooks or pardons sin, since He may punish it in a future state,
for all that reason can know, without a revelation
of the mind of God on the subject.
All, then, that can be known from the state of
facts before us is, that God is forbearing, and here
let the subject rest; and here the argument on the
subject of the moral attributes of God is closed.
147 
LECTURE XIII.
GOD'S MiORAL GOVERNMENT.
What remains to finish our Science of Natural
Theology, is to point out the obligations and duties
of men, as they stand revealed to the human understanding and conscience, in the light of all that has
preceded.
Before attempting to exhibit specific duties, certain preliminary principles must be considered, by
which a ground will be revealed, in which these duties can be seen, and their claim be more forcibly
felt.
I. God is, and can but be, a Moral Ruler.
A moral government is a government maintained
over mind, as mind, and not over matter, or over
mind as matter. Physical and moral government
are so distinct from each other as not to be confounded. The distinction is recognized by all rational minds. A physical government is the government of force over matter, in which the governed
object has no part, no choice, no responsibility, no
merit, no blame.  No  man  ever thought a rock
praiseworthy for rolling down hill, or censurable for 
MORAL GOVERNMENT.
bruising his limbs, if he stood in the way of its
descent.
A moral government is a government over mind,
which possesses intelligence, moral sensibility, and
will, rendering the governed free in, and responsible
for, his actions. Such a government is a government by motives, which act, not as gravitation in
the rock, but which, while it moves the mind to act
in a given way, Ieaves it free to act in that way or
in some other direction. This fact will be more
fully noticed under a subsequent division.
That God is a moral governor is a necessary truth,
in the light of what He has been proved to be.
1. God is intelligent, is all-wise, and hence coinprehends all causes and all effects, firom beginning
to end, and must know all the consequences of both
virtue and vice, to individual actors, and to the
whole moral system.
2. God has been proved to be perfectly good, and
perfectly just. These attributes have been so clearly
and irrefragably established, that nothing need be
added on the subject, more than to apply the facts
to the case in hand.
3. In view of the fact that God is perfect in wisdom, goodness and justice, reason cannot conceive
that He is indifferent to the conduct of His rational
creatures, by which their happiness and misery are
affected.  To suppose this, would be to attribute to
God conduct which is universally condemned in
mankind. Every person is held responsible to wish
7
149 
MORAL GOVERNMENT.
well to his fellow beings, by the universal judgment
of mankind, and simple indifference is regarded as
a moral defect, or crime.  Reason, then, cannot
attribute the same state of mind to God.
The goodness of God must interest Him in the
happiness of His creatures, and His justice must
take cognizance of the relative actions of men, as
men are just or'unjust to their fellow men.
4. As God is not an indifferent spectator of the
moral conduct of men, so he cannot be a passive
beholder of His own moral universe, everywhere
alive with activity, for weal or wo.  Just what, how
much, or in what manner, God should do to prevent
wrong and misery, and to promote right and happiness, reason cannot determine, because it cannot
know all the facts, and all the consequences, as God
comprehends them; yet this does reason affirm, that
God must do all that He can do, consistently with
His own perfect nature, and the greatest good of
His whole moral universe. That a perfect God
should do less than this, it is not possible for reason
to believe.
5. No valid objection can be urged against these
views, growing out of the  fact that wrong  and
misery do exist. It cannot be proved that God
could prevent the wrong and misery that exist,
without preventing the right and happiness that
exist.  The theory now being elaborated, assumes
that man is a free moral agent, which fact shall soon
be proved beyond a doubt. Until the point is
150 
MORPAL GOVERNMENT.
reached, let it be taken for granted. None but such
a moral agent can perform a morally right or wrong
act, and hence, none other could be the subject of
a moral government; and such a moral agent is and
can but be capable of abusing his moral freedom,
and of producing sin and miserv. Without freedom,
by which wrong can be done, there could be no
moral action, no moral virtue, no moral nature, no
moral government. God stands justified in the light
of reason in creating just such a race of beings, on
the following ground.
(1.) God could produce no other race of beings
that could glorify Him as rational beings, be virtuous and lappy, and constitute the subjects of a
moral government under Him.  Without the freedom and power of will which renders evil possible,
there could be no moral character, and hence no display of God's moral character, in creation and government, no moral obedience, no worship, no praise,
and rational happiness, based upon virtue. No obedience, no worship, and no praise is valid in the
sight of God which is not free, and which is not
chosen; and the power to choose, and the act of
choosing, imply the possibility of a different choice
and a different course of action. The power to obey,
worship, and praise God, cannot exist without the
power of refusing to obey, worship and praise Him.
The power to do right, in a moral sense, cannot exist
without the power to do wrong. It is absolutely
unthinkable.  No man can think of the power to
151 
MORAL GOVERNMENT.
p)erformn morally right actions without power to per fobrm morall]y wrong, actions. We can think of a
disposition to do right without a disposition to do
wrong; or we can think of a disposition to do wrong
without a disposition to right; but the power to
do right and to do wrong inhere together in man's
moral nature.
2. God may have seen that any other race of
beings, possessing the same elements of anl intellectual and moral nature, would render themselves
just as perverse and miserable as the human family
has done. When man first sinned, God may have
seen that nothing would be gained by exterminating
him  and creating another race, with the  same
mental and moral nature.  This, certainly, is all
possible, and no one can prove that it was not so.
Allow that it was so, and the Divine mind chose
between withholding His creative power, and retaining within His own eternal being, all knowledge, all
moral goodness, and all rational happiness, or of diffusing them abroad through a wide-spread moral
system, with the liability to, or even certain knowledge of all the evils that pervade the moral universe. So far reason safely conducts us; and upon
the state of things now reached, let one remark more
be made.
(3.) The all-wise mind may know that such a
moral system, notwithstanding all the evils that
attend it, will, ultimately, result in more good, and
rational happiness to the great whole of moral being,
152 
MORAL GOVERN\MENT.
than it will in wrong and misery. If all this is so,
the great Author of the moral universe stands vindicated in the light of reason, whatever evils may
be seen and felt.
The main proposition under discussion is, that
God is, and can but be a moral Ruler, and that He
does maintain a moral government over His intelligent creatures. The fact has been proved, and the
objection founded on the existence of evil, has been
thoroughly answered, and the way is prepared for
another step in the main argument.
II. JIan is and can but be a Subject of God's
Moral Government.
This, of course, has been implied in demonstrating, the fact that God is a moral governor, but
there is a weight of direct proof which needs to be
considered.
1. Mian's relation to God clearly brings him within
thedivinejurisdiction.  Ifmanwas a childofaccident,
an offspring of chance, the question might be raised,
whether or not accident or chance must not possess
the right to govern him. Even if chance produced
man out of matter that previously belonged to God,
a metaphysical lawyer might contend that the
change was so great, and that it so affected the
identity of the property as to render God's claim
doubtful, if it does not vitiate it altogether.  But
there is no ground for any such cavil; it has been
proved that God created all things, and is the
153 
MORAL GOVERNMENT.
absolute proprietor of all things. God being the
Author of humanity, the Creator of both body and
mind, with all their powers, He  has  a right to
govern, and the supreme jurisdiction must be His.
2. Man  clearly possesses  those powers  which
make him accountable for his conduct, and constitute him a fit subject of a moral government.
(1.) SIan possesses intelligence; he is a knowing
power, and perceives, conceives, understands, judges,
and reasons. Without this intelligence, man would
not be accountable, and could not be governed, only
as matter, or at most as a brute, by force.
(2.) s[an, in the exercise of his power to know,
has a knowledge of right and wrong.  This knowledge is absolutely universal among men; all men
know that some things are right, and that some
things are wrong.  They often misjudge, and judge
differently in regard to which is right and which is
wrong, but all agree that some things are right, and
that some things are wrong; and all agree in some
things relatively to what is right and what is wrong,
and this is sufficient to render them accountable,
and to bring them within the jurisdiction of a moral
government.
(3.) Men have moral susceptibility, which causes
them to feel a pleasing self-satisfaction, when they
do what they believe to be right; and self-dissatisiction, or condemnation, when they do what they
believe to be wrong. This element is called conscience, in common language. Some have called it
154 
MORAL GOVERNMENT.
a moral sense, It is better called a moral susceptibility, in this place, because it is a capability of
moral feeling, and which causes the mind to feel as
above stated, when its own idea of right and wrong
is applied to its own actions. This is universal, for
though it manifests itself much stronger in some
than in others, all feel more or less of it. Sometimes the sense of guilt deepens into remorse, more
terrible than bodily suffering. If this proves no
more,  it proves  that all men  think themselves
accountable for their conduct, whatever their pretended creeds may be.
(4.) Men are endowed with the power of willing,
or of free choice. As this is a vital truth, a brief
statement of the principal proof shall be given.
'First. The  very common, if not the universal
convictions of mankind, furnish strong proof that
the will is free. WVe know this conviction exists in
our own minds, and we see undeniable signs of its
existence in others. This conviction of mankind
has impressed itself upon all languages. Our plain
English word, will, with its equivalent in all known
languages, denotes a free, self-acting and selfdeciding power of the mind. If it does not signify
this, no definition ever has or ever can be given of
it, as a simple power or activity of the human mind.
It can be nothing else that is definable.
So with all its derivations, as willful, willing, and
several others. Deny the self-acting power of the
will, and such words have no definable sense.
155 
MORAL GOVERNMENT.
The same is true of all its synonyms, such as, to
determine, to resolve, to purpose. These and like
words have no definable meaning, as mental acts, if
the will is not a free self-acting power of the mind.
If, then, the idea of free choice has impressed
itself upon all human languages, it must be a universal idea. The will is defined to be, "that faculty of the mind by which we determine either to do
or to forbear an action; the faculty which is exercised in deciding among two or more objects, which
we shall embrace or pursue."   Deny that we have a
self-determining power in the will, and this standard definition is exploded, and we shall determine,
forbear, and decide nothing. If the will is not free,
the power that determines is not in or of the mind;
it is no faculty of the mind, as the definition
affirms.
Secondly. The universal consciousness of mankind
also proves the freedom of the will. Consciousness
is the knowledge which the mind has of its own
acts and states. When a man thinks, he knows
that he thinks, when he experiences mental feeling,
he knows that he feels, and when he wills he knows
that he wills. No man is conscious of any restraining or controlling power by which his choice is rendered unfree. Every man, when he wills, feels and
believes that he acts freely, and that he might will
differently, and of this feeling and belief he is conscious.
Ttircdly. Every man's conscience bears witness
156 
MORAL GOVERNMENT.
within him, that he acts freely, that his will is unrestrained. Conscience has been explained. When
men do what they believe to be wrong, they feel
guilty, but they always discriminate between free
and necessary actions, between intentional and unintentional actions. A man performs a given act in
obedience to the decision of his will, and he feels
guilty; in another case, he performs the same act,
securing the same result, but without the decision
of his will, by accident or by some irresistible force
that moves him, and he feels no guilt. Herein conscience furnishes absolute proof that the actor
believes that his will is free, whatever his wordy
declarations may be on the subject.
Fourthly. All men practice upon the assumption
that the will is free, whatever their pretended belief
is on ttie subject. It has been shown that all muen
have their ideas of right and wrong. When they
see a man do what they call a wrong act, they
blame him; in which they act upon the assumption
that he acted freely, and might have acted differently. Also, all men, in judging of the actions of
other men, discriminate between voluntary and
involuntary  acts;  in which they  act upon  the
assumption that the will is free, in what are called
voluntary acts.
It has been fully proved that men are accountable for their conduct, and, of course, accountable to
God.   God is a moral Ruler, and man a fit subject
for moral rule.
7"
1517 
MORAL GOVERNMENT.
The way is now prepared for the great question,
namely: What does God require of men? If this
can be answered, man's duty will stand revealed.
In view of all. that has been proved, it will not be
denied that it is God's right to command, and man's
duty to obey. The will of God, in whatever way
it is made known, so far as it is known, must be
man's supreme law.
It is not pretended that the light of reason, in
our circumstances, is sufficient to discover all that
it is desirable and needful for us to know. Such an
assumption would render a revelation, such as is
supposed to be contained in the Scriptures, unnecessary. But while the writer entertains no doubt of
the Divine origin of the Scriptures, and of their
necessity, in order to sufficient religious knowledge,
it is not his work in this place, to vindicate the
claims of the Scriptures, on one hand, or to show
the insufficiency of Natural Theology on the other.
It is undeniable, from what has been proved, that
some duties may be known in the light of reason,
and to point out such duties is the work that
remains to be done.  Man being, as has been proved,
a responsible moral agent, and sustaining a relation
to God as his Creator, and to man as his fellowcreature, his duties must be of three classes, namelyv: such as regard God directly, such as reg,ard his
fellow-men, and such as regard himself. But tile
consideration of these duties must be reserved for
another lecture.
158 
LECTURE XIV.
THE DUTIES WE OWE TO GOD.
The duties we owe to God have been explained to
be such as have primary reference to Him. These
duties are now to be inquired after, as they may be
apprehended by Reason.
I. Reason affrms that it is our duty to seek all
possible knowledge of God; to know  God to the
extent He may be known by us.
1. The idea of God having been developed in the
mind must be the most important of all subjects
which come within the range of human knowledge.
For any man to admit that there is a God, and then
to deny that it is his bounden duty and highest interest to know what is to be known of God, is to insult
his own reason.
2. The knowledge to be sought of God embraces
a knowledge of His character, what He is, and what
His will is concerning us.
3. This duty is discharged only when all the
means of knowing God within our reach are
exhausted.
(1.) The principal means must ever be mental
I 
DUTY TO GOD.
application to the subject; the will should hold the
intellectual powers to think, to reflect, and deeply
to study the subject.
(2.) Every source of light must be investigated,
and all possible knowledge drawn therefrom. The
works of nature are a wide field for thought to
explore.
As God is All-wise and Omnipotent, it cannot be
reasonably denied that He can make in any way He
pleases, through men or otherwise, a special revelation of His will concerning mankind. This must
impose on the human mind the solemn duty of
investigating whatever claims to be a revelation
from God, so far as to reach its most enlightened
and entirely honest decision concerning the validity
of such claim. If reason decides against such claim,
with such decision duty ends in that direction; if
reason decides in favor of such claim, its contents
must be studied and followed as the rule of duty on
all subjects of which it treats. All this is too reasonable to be denied. The rule, of course, demands
a thorough investigation of the claims of the Christian Scriptures, by all men to whom they become
known. If men cannot believe the Scriptures, after
a thorough and candid investigation, they must
hold themselves open to conviction, and ready to
receive any revelation which God may see fit to make
of His will.  In view of the undeniable facts that
have been developed concerning God, in preceding
Lectures, for men to assume that God cannot or will
160 
DUTY TO GOD.
not make a revelation of His will to men, and then
refuse to consider the claims of everything presented
as a revelation, is most unreasonable. God must be
able to make a revelation of His will, and if He has
not done it, He may do it. Natural Theology, then,
does and must teach that it is the duty of men to
seek for a knowledge of God and of His will, in the
diligent use of all possible means of such knowledge.
II. Reason affirms that it is our duty to love God.
1. As God now stands revealed perfect in goodness, Reason affirms that He ought to be loved by
all His intelligent' creatures.
2. In view of the relation we sustain to God, as
the workmanship of His creative skill, the subjects
of His upholding and preserving care, and the recipients of His continued bounty; Reason affirms that we
ought to love Him.
3. In view of the capacity and tendency of the
human soul to love, by which the affections seize
upon and love minor and perishable things, Reason
affirms that we ought rather to love God, or to love
Him with a more ardent and life-controlling love.
To deny this, would be to falsify reason.
III. Reason ajfirms that it is our duty to worshiop
God.
1. Worship is here used in a very, general sense,
to comprehend honor, adoration, thanksgiving and
praise.  These are mental activities, and constitute
161 
DUTY TO GOD.
the moral elements of worship, without which all
forms and attitudes of worship can have no value in
the sight of God. True worship is both intellectual
and emotional, and stirs the soul with a joyful feeling,. in proportion to the clearness of the view
obtained of the Divine character, and the intensity
of the love with which the object of worship is
regarded.
2. Worship will be varied in its combinations,
and in its spirit and visible manifestations, according to the clearness and correctness of the views,
general intelligence, and refinement of the worshipers. Christian worship, tempered as it is by the
firm belief that God is reconciled in Christ, through
whom Divine mercy and grace flow to every believing heart, is likely to be  mild, gentle, peaceful,
soothing and tranquilizing.  Heathen worship, performed by rude and undisciplined minds, full of error
in regard to the character of God, is likely to wear
a rougher exterior, and to stir the darker passions of
the soul. In Christian worship, love, gratitude and
praise, are likely to predominate; in heathen worship, fear, awe, dread, admiration and wonder, are
likely to be the ruling elements.
3. The worship of God stands confessed as a duty,
by the almost, if not quite, universal convictions of
mankind. In Christian lands there may be found
one in a thousand, perhaps not more than one in ten
thousand, who will deny that there is a God, and
who will, consequently, deny all religion and all wor
162 
DUTY TO GOD.
ship, but it is probable such falsify their owr conlvictions. But most men will admit that they ought
to worship God. Even Deists, and men who repudiate Christian worship, say they worship God in
their way, that they adore Him in their hearts.
If we pass to the heathen nations, we shall find
temples, and altars, and religious rites and forms of
devotion, and worshipers.  Their worship  is rude
and very unreasonable, but it furnishes no less proof
of the commnon conviction of mankind, that God
ought to be worshiped.
IV. Reason a rms that it i8 our duty to make
.rayer to God.
Prayer is the language of want, which is felt by
all rational human beings, and which is reasoaable
and appropriate to be addressed to God when He
stands revealed to the mind as an Infinite, Benign,
and Overruling Power. Prayer is associated with
worship in the practice of all religions, but it is of
such vital importance, as to entitle it to be noticed
as a specific duty.
2. As God is the admitted author and giver of all
good things, and as we are dependent recipients of
His bounty, nothing can be more reasonable than
that we should, in a reverential and worshipful
manner, Ask Him for such things as we desire, and
as we believe He is willing to give.
3. Such an association, in the mind, of asking
with receiving, held there by the daily exercise of
16.3 " 
DUTY TO GOD.
prayer, must be promotive of devotion,  gratitude
and trust.
4. The fact that prayer is common to all religions,
and has ever been, in all lands and ages, cannot be
accounted for only by supposing that it is a dictate
of reason, or that it results from the spontaneity of
man's religious nature.
V. Reason airms that it is our duty to trust in
God.
1. In our own consciousness of ignorance and
weakness it appears so natural to trust, where intelligence affirms help and safety, reason has but little
to do in the premises, more than to affirm the trustworthiness of God. When other things appear
equal to the intelligence, so self-distrustful is humanity, that trust in God appears like the impulse of
nature, grasping for life, safety and happiness.
2. It is universal in human experience, and hence,
it must be true in the philosophy of our religious
nature, that men feel themselves able to trust in
God, with an assurance proportioned to their own
consciousness of having done the will of God.
The attention which has been devoted to the
above named five specific duties, as due to God, is
not to be understood as implying that there are no
other duties of the same class.  Somne of them are
generic, comprehending  other specific duties unnamed, and all of them may imply other duties, so
that when one is admitted, the other must be.  Yet
.164 
DUTY TO GOD.
the above outline is sufficient for all practical purposes. If men will embrace these duties in the
earnest sincerity of their hearts, they will not wander fatally, for want of a more exhaustive list of the
duties they owe to God.
165 
LECTURE XV.
RECIPROCAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS  BETWEIN
MAN AND MAN.
The subject of the present Lecture is the duties
whichl  man owes to his fellow-man.  These can be
revealed and comprehended, as a branch of Natural
Theology, only in the light of the reciprocal rights
and obligations between man and man.
Rights and obligations are always reciprocal, as
seen by the eye of reason.
If one man has a right to live, all other men must
be under obligation to let him live, and no other
man can have a right to do what, or to withhold
what will prevent his living.
If one man has a right to the possession and use
of any thing, all other men must be bound to leave
him in the undisturbed possession and enjoyment of
the same.
If one man has a right to any enjoyment, physical or mental, all other men must be under an obligation to allow him to enjoy the same undisturbed.
No two rights and no two obligations can exist in
opposition to each other; and the rights and obligations of different persons, so far as they are related
t 
NATURAL RIGHTS.
to each other, never conflict, but are always correlative and reciprocal. All this is self-evident, an intuition of reason.
The natural rights of men, then, furnish a ground
in which may be seen all relative duties between
man and man.
I. AU1 men have a right to life, or a right to live.
Life is not the gift of man, nor is it selftorig,inated on the part of those who live. Under God it
has its origin in nature, and hence, the right to live
is a natural right,  and belongs equally to all men.  When it is said that the right to live is a natural
right, it is not meant that life cannot be forfeited.
He who makes it his business to destroy life, cannot have a right to live. The interests which the
murderer destroys are as great, and may be greater,
than are destroyed in his own loss of life; and lihe
being the wrong doer, it is right that he should sustain the loss, rather than the innocent.  If the
alternative be presented, of taking the life of a man,
or of allowing him to destroy the lives of the unoffending,, it must be right to take' his life, and hence,
it would be wrong to let him live at the sacrifice of
the lives of the innocent. With this exception, all
men have a right to live, and man's natural right to
life is a universal idea, recognized by all men. The
sufficient proof of this is found in the fact that all
men consider murder a crime, and always have, in
all lands and ages of the world.
167 
NATURAL RIGHTS.
It is true, some will kill their enemies, but this is
done upon one or the other of two grounds. They
either do what their own convictions tell them  is
wrong, or they act upon the assumption that the
enemy they kill has forfeited his life. The test of
the principle is not found in the fact that some men
justify, or pretend to justify the killing of enemies,
but in the fact that the universal judgment of
humanity condemns the killing of friends, or even
the innocent. This admitted universal right of all
men to live, gives us a ground in which certain
duties are revealed.
1. It is the duty of every man to allow every
other man to live. It is every man's duty to refrain
from all actions which will destroy or endanger the
life of his fellow-being.
2. It is the duty of every man to do what he can,
without too great danger to his own life, that may
be necessary, to preserve the life of his fellow-being.
The universal judgment of mankind would condemn him who should allow his fellow to die by fire,
or water, or cold, or hunger, or a wild beast, or the
hand of an enemy, or sickness, when he commanded
the means of preventing it.
3. It is the duty of every man to leave his fel
low-being in possession of whatever he has that is
essential to his life; and to bestow upon him whatever he has, not essential to his own life, which his
fellow has not and which is essential to his life.
The right to life is paramount, and must not be put
168 
NATURAL RIGHTS.
on a par with any other right. A man may not
elevate his right of property to a par with his fellow's right to life. It would be but little better
than murder to withhold food from a man dying of
hunger. It may not be said that a man, having
only food enough to preserve his own life, would be
under obligation to divide with his starving neighbor, because two lives would be lost instead of one;
but, if he has enough to preserve both lives, he is
bound to divide, even if it be at the expense of pain
ful hunger.
4. As men may not withhold what is essential to
the life of another, so men must have a right to
take what is essential to life, without regard to the
right of ownership vested in others, provided that
they do not take what is essential to to the life of
the owner.   A  man may take food, a horse, a boat,
or whatever is essential to the preservation of his
life, and the universal judgment of mankind will
justify the deed.
II. The right to Personal Liberty is recognized,
by reason, as a natural and universal right.
1. Liberty, like life, may be forfeited. WVhen a
man so abuses his liberty as to endanger the rights
of others, his liberty is forfeited, and may be rightfully taken from him.   But  this proves nothing
against the right of personal liberty as natural and
universal.
2. That man's natural right to liberty is univer
169 
NATURAL RIGHTS.
sally held is obvious, from the fact that he who
deprives a fellow-being of his liberty, is required,
by the universal sense of humanity, to render a reason for his conduct. An insufficient reason has too
often satisfied; and yet, no reason ever satisfied
any one which did not, in his judgment, amount to
a forfeiture of the right of' liberty on the part of
,him vwho is deprived of it.  This proves that the
right to liberty is held to be universal.
Was not liberty held to be a natural and universal right, no enquiry would be made how men
have forfeited their liberty; that is, forfeited what
they may never have had; but rather an explanation would be demanded, how every free man came
by his liberty.
3. While some men appear to have been convinced that it was right for them to deprive certain
other persons of their liberty, no man ever was or
ever can be convinced that he is rightfully deprived
of his liberty, unforfeited by his own crime.
The cringing slave feels not only the love, but the
right of liberty within him.   While his limbs are
bound, his mind, his thoughts, are free; and within
he reads his right to be free written in the elements
of his own conscious soul.
4. Corresponding to the universal right of personal liberty, there is an obligation of duty, binding
every man to allow all others to enjoy and exercise
their liberty unrestrained, so long as they do not so
exercise it as to encroach on the rights of others.
170
I 
NATURAL RIGHTS.
III. The right to acquire, possess, and use property for one's otvn benefit, is recognized, by reason,
as a universal righit.
1. The only limitations to man's right to acquire
and use property, are two.
(1.) He may not do it by any act which is incompatible with his duties to God.
(2.) He may not do it by any act, or to any
extent, which is incompatible with the equal rights
of his fellow-beings.
2. The right in question, under the above nanmed
limitations, is a universal idea. It has been recognized, in some form and to some extent, among all
l)eople, in all lands, and through all ages.
3. The universality of the right of property is a
necessary consequence of the right of life, which
has been demonstrated.  The right of life involves
a right to all that is essential to the maintenance of
life, which is comprehensive of food, raiment and
shelter, and the means of acquiring them.
4. The right of property involves the obligation
of honesty, the duty of dealing honestly.  It is
every man's duty to leave his fellows in possession of
what is theirs, unless he obtains it with their consent, and for an equivalent. To obtain it by falsehood, deception, fraud, by theft or force, is wrong,
and is so regarded by all men. The rudest hunter
that ever pursued game in forest, knows within himself, just as well as the wisest philosopher, that the
171 
NATURAL RIGHTS.
game he has fairly taken is his, and that no other
hunter has a right to dispossess him of the same,
but with his consent, for an equivalent.
IV. It is the right and duty of every man to
acquire, maintain, and preserve a good moral character.  A man's character is himself, what he is,not wvhat he is thought to be.
1. The right to have a good character involves an
obligation binding every man not to harm the character of his fellow-man.   He violates this obligation who, by any means, make his fellow-beings
worse. This may be done in various ways.
(1.) By persuading them, directly, to do evil.
(2.) By throwing temptations in their way which
are likely to lead them astray.
(3.) By persuading them that right is wrong, and
that wrong is right.
(4.) By corrupting their minds with error.
(5.) By exciting and provoking their evil passions
and propensities.
N,o man can rightfully perform an act, or utter a
word, by which he exerts an influence on his fellowmen, which is calculated to make them worse.
2. The obligation in question is not exclusively
negative in its force.  It requires right action, no
less than it forbids wrong action. The common
relation which all men sustain to God; and the
relation which each sustains to the community of
which he is a member, and the advantages which
172 
N A'TURAL RIGHTS.
each derives from the community, lay every man
under obligation to put forth all reasonable efforts
to promote the good of the community.   He who
injures his fellows, iajures the community; and he
who makes his fellows better, makes the community
better.  Men, then, are not only bound not to harm
their fellows, but also to make all reasonable efforts
to make them better. This may be done in several 
ways, of which the two following are principal ones:
(1.) By direct persuasive arguments to do right,
to practice virtue.
(2.)  By  the example  and(l influence of  right
actions.  He who practices virtue in a community
does muchl to improve others.
V. All men have a 4:igAt to a good reputation, so
.far as trutth and fair dealing will give it to them.
A  nman's reputation is whvat he is thought to be, not
what he really is; and every man has a right to
be thousght to be as good as he is.
1. A man's reputation for what honesty, integrity, knowledge and skill he has, is as much his as
the farm he owns, the house he has built, the money
he has in the bank, or the hat upon his head.  His
reputation is as much a means of obtaining the
necessaries of life, and of acquiring property, as is
his axe, his hloe, his plow, or his harrow.
2. A man's right to such a reputation as his real
character will warrant; implies an obligation binding other men  to allow him  to enjoy it,, ninjureA
8
17'3 
1NTATURAL RIGHTS.
by them.   Slander, falsehood, or misrepresentation,
relatively to our fellow-beings, by which their repu-,
tation is injured, is a crime against them.
4. The obligation reaches still further, and binds;
a man to correct an evil report of his neighbor,
which he knows to be false or unjust.
VI. Anoth1er  co7ipreltensive  class of  duties  is
composed of such cas depend upon the sex of  our'
race.   Th7ese duties, ini their  oi,tline at  least, are
utnderstood  an,d practiced among all nations andT
tribes of men.
1. Chastity is, to some extent, regarded as a virtue, and practiced in all lands and amnong all tribes
of men.   There are many and fearful exceptions,
but as a whole, they are perhaps as common among
civilized nations as among  the wild children of
nature.   But the point is, that the duty is everywhere known, not that it is practiced. The duty
of chastity is not only personal, but also social,
rendering seduction, and all that leads to it, a crime
against a fellow-being, and against the community.
2. The marriage institution, and relation of husband and wife are known to exist, to some extent,
among all nations. Not, indeed, anywhere in absolute perfection and purity, but everywhere sufficiently to prove that the idea is universal; so that all
corruptions may be a departure from known duty,
or the result of a failure to know what might be
known on the subject.
174 
NATURAL RIGHTS.
3. The relation between parents and children
is recognized by all people, and the duties depending
upon the relation are responded to, to some extent.
The destruction of young children and the leaving
of aged and infirm parents to die neglected, are exceptions, even among the darkest of heathen, while
they do sometimes occur among the most enlightened people. Such violations of the law of nature are
more noted because they are seen and felt to be
most unnatural.
175 
tLECTU-RE XVI,
THE DUTIES WHICH HUMANITY OWES TO ITSELP.
I. Self-respect is a duty wvich7 all menfeel that
they owe to themselves, howtever far they may come
short of disch7targing it. Thlis mental activity may
show itself in bad taste, and put on the airs, and
hang out the signs of pride and vanity, yet there is
such a thing as just self-respect, founded upon a
consciousness of self-worthiness
1. Men respect or disrespect others as they
regard their character or conduct to be worthy olr
unworthy; and they can but regard themselves by
the same rule.
2. It may be affirmed that every person knows
that he ought to maintain self-respect, by so conducting himself as to deserve it. All men desire
the respect of others, and it is not possible that we
should not feel bound to maintain that respect for
ourselves which we wish to receive from others.
3. We may deceive others into a respect for us,
but our respect for ourselves, whatever visible airs
we may put on, must be according to what we
really conceive ourselves to be, A consciousness of 
DUTY TO SELF.
self-worthiness is the basis of true self-'respect.  The
wldest savage reproaches himself, and feels degraded,
when he deceives and injures his equal, or betrays
his friend; and he knows that something better is
due from him to his own being, to himself.
II. Sef-Cztltirec is a duty which is aqrgned by
every wan's inteligenice.  By culture, p7hysical and
zental improvement  is gneant, not mnoral improve.7ze2t, in this I)actce.
1. Physical and mental culture aim afan increase
of knowledge and skill. These, in some form, and
to some extent, are regarded as desirable, by all
men, and all feel it a duty to acquire them.
2. Knowledge and sklill are essential to the maintenance of life, which is nature's own impulse.
3. Alen, finding themselves possessed of powers
capable of improvement, and adapted to subserve
the ends of life, in proportion as they are improved,
cannot be entirely ignorant of their duty to cultivate, improve and develop such powers. Reason
itself must commend it.
4. It must not be expected that self-culture will
be manifested to the same extent, and in the same
direction and proportions by all. In proportion to
the degree of ignorance and savage wildness, will
culture take a physical direction, because, in such a
state, more dependence is placed upon  physical
strength and skill, for safety, and the means of living; but in the wildest state, klnowledge is regarded
177
0 
})UTY'   TO  SELlI.
as desi-rabcle, is sought as a duty, and enjoyed as a
maeans of hap)piness.   To deny this would be to ce -
traditclt  thie universal convictions of mankind.   ko
clegree of neglect in the premises can prove the
absence of a knlowledge of the duty, because men
alre knownv, often, to neg,lect what they know  and
confess t-) be their dluty.
III. The?nct;,itenicnce of  mnoral   rectittude  is  a
Idivcl,sc'cs(, At?/,:ozwcn ctdicfelt by all mzen; not only
,,s a cdl_tl lo Gocd <zdl to the  too,)at system or com~c[Ct, b-?t c0 (I?ty to sef, to ogie's ozvwn-being.
1. All men hlave a knowledg,e of right and wron-C.
This -was sufficintly lproved and illustrated in lecture XIII., wh;ile treating of man as a subject of
God's moral government.  Every man has a judgment of what is rig,ht and what is wrong, in -humnan
conduct   and( everv man  has a conscience, which
utters an approving voice within him, ilhen lie does
what his joudgment pronounces right; and utters
the voice of condemnation, w'lhen he does what his
judgneieit pronounces wrong.   These facts pertain
no less to the unlearned, and even the savage, than
to the educated and the philosopher.  Every man,
therefore, feels and knows, that it is his duty to
refrain from what his judgment tells himn is wrong,
and to do what his judgmnent tells himi is right, and
thereby to keep himiself innocent, free firom guilt.
Everv man knows that when he does what his judgment tells,inm is wrong, and brings condemnation
1)78 
Iiti(t'~rnaeiit. so  i    tGcoris,C',,lnc;  ai-id that tlie coiiscienceG Is a'tlv,a-s tou    t {) th  iu~~cl-  nu- Iini ts awvar(1s,
!,,less-in', where tl-). JuclJiiic-,t a}V)i,oves, at(ql( )~is
wflic,-,-,e  th,,e j1T(,,flienlt  co-Wems        aV      re  -l'so~
tultthat the jucl,,Yiieii~ ii.aY, be i-iisilifori ied that
all  Ii~-tcts mc-tv not, I-,,ave h~een                  uii~t (lc1-i  its
nji~ ancl th-Iat  it, is lai:~,elT' ~ &cted h5enet)
Thsexi,)al.is NvlI-v iiien- (,Iitff  inl judgrii,ent  conicern —i
wU   \hat is rig't-t a,,-,, v.,ron,().   Tlic, idea of  Il    n
r~~~~~1()u(1~~~~~~~ t~o ih    tl SOi e) ~   1  c'1'i   nt c
i~esl,oii-ci           to -Lieti t 1 C., C'          h  I o I'LI,
Lo  L                     -i e~p     OU, t 110   iroii~r  and
I'    ~ ~   o~nmI1~~is.   ~~te n~~ o does iis.
,IL1  tIII 111(wil1 10~ UIC             loes il~rnn
t~~~~~~~~~~,Ine                           and ti,,eru-n
CI Iii~~~tnanitv   C  ~ai(I'c a 
i_)  iUTY   TO  S E Ll
fuil effort.  This arises from two sources, nanliely 
evil propensities wvitllin, andC evil influences without.
These l)ropensities ought to be subdued, and these
influences oug,ht to be resisted) aiid this is lnown.
and felt b-y all mren.
He who yields to tempc)tationi, ol ail evil influence,
condemns himself for hiis own weanh.essl  he knonows
hle ought to resist.  Also, be who is under the con —
trl of ]-is evil pIropensities, feels himiself degraded'
he knows'he ouc,Lt; to subdue tlhem.
4. 3Ioral rectitude is a state of thle heart, lying
back of overt actions.  A manii can no more app)rove
if evil thloughts, desires and 1)urposes, thlan he can
()f tlhe acts  lwhich  sl,ing  ftinoi  them.  He who
inu'u.i,es and cherishes them, k!nows  that lie comies
short of his duty to himselft and deg,radcles himself
no less than vwhen hle commits an overt wrong act,
Here we-, bIring  t(o  view what  moral  rectitude
tlcmaunids in practice..
(i.") All impoure thoughts, and thoug'hts of pride
aind va nity, should-be resisted and expelled fromi the
m~ind.
(2.) The spirit and temp-er of anger shouLld not
be induilged, but be suplressed, subdued, and rooted
out of the soul.
There is t just feeling of resentment, and even
indignation,,   v hicli may  be awakened  by  great
\vrlng,, but it ImusI be Ikept wvithiln  he min(d's con —
trol.  The nmoment that it is allowed to rise above
c(ntrol, and itself controls the mind, it becomes a
f E(-) 
DUTY TO SELF.
crime, and the man is degraded in his own judg-,
ment.
(3.) The spirit and disposition of revenge should
never be cherished, but resisted and subdued.
There is a distinction between the noble sentiment
of public justice and the low, mean, cowardly and
degrading crime of private and personal revenge.
This difference is recognized by all minds.
(4.) Selfishness and covetousness are known and
felt by all to be degrading crimes. The crime,
however, does not consist of the simple love of gain,
or of possession, which may be right, but in desiring
that which rightfully belongs to another. When
self-love seeks, or even desires to gratify itself by
invading the rights of others, it becomes a degrading crime, whicl universal humanity instinctively
condemns.
(5.) Envy, which is a feeling of discontent, regret,
)ori mortification, on account of the success and happIiness of others, is a degrading crime, and should
never be harbored in the mind of him who would
maintain moral rectitude.
(6.) A fretful, peevish, complaining, murmuring
disposition, in view of such ills as our foresight and
skill cannot prevent, is unworthy of a noble mind,
and inconsistent with the highest development of
moral rectitude. Nearly allied to this are those
discouraging, cowardly, despondir,ng feelings under
which too many minds quail in life's battleQ  Our
own reason demands of us that we employ all the
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I,U'TY TO S.1EL.
foresight and skill we can command, to prevent and
evade evil, and then, that we bear, with a manly
courage and fortitude, all the ills of our allotment.
Less than this is a coming short of the duty we owe
to ourselves, to our owni well-being
-82.
I 
LECTUREE XVII.
CONCLUDING RE3IARKS.
There is a pleasure in searching out truth, though
it cost hard study; and in learning and knowing
there is happiness; and yet there is satisfaction in
reaching the end of labor in any given direction.
This satisfaction is now to be realized in the termination of these Lectures on Natural Theology,
which must here be closed by a few general remarks.
I. The scol)e whichi  has beets givein to the Scicice
demacnds a brief notice.
1. It has been broad enough to comprehend all
the fundamental principles of Natural Theology.
It is not pretended that all has been said that might
be truthfully said, but miore, probably, would not
make the science any more certain, any more easily
comprehended, nor yet any more useful. It is not
practicable to push any subject to its utmost limits.
It may be that all truth is so connected, that any
one great truth might lead to a discovery of all
truth, if our reasoning powers were clear and
strong enough to trace the connection, and our intellectual grasp sufficient to seize and hold the
whole. No one truth exists alone, and if our mental 
CONCLUDING( REMARKS.
vision was clear enough, it might appear that any
one great truth being known  to the mind, it might
be traced back to another truth as its antecedent,
and forward to anothier truth as its consequent.
Then these two new truths, obtained from the one,
might in like manner, the one be traced back to
another antecedent, and the other forward to another
consequent, and so on, ad infnitum.  To this view
add the fact that we have no rule of measurement
by which we can determihe any precise limits to
human reason, and it will appear obvious that it is
not practical to push the science of Natural Theol ogy to an extreme and definite limit. Many other
truths might, doubtless, be safely inferred from those
which have been demonstrated, but enough has been
done to settle the science upon a firm foundation,
and it is better to leave it there than to push it out
to rest upon what may be regarded as doubtful
inferences.
2. W'hile the scope which has been given to the
science is sufficiently broad and comprehensive to
embrace the fundamental truth on the subject, it
has been kept within the range of necessary truths
or such as can be clearly and certainly inferred
from them.
Nothing has been assumed, and nothing has been
left to rest upon less than demonstrative argument.
The whole frame-workl has been wrought within the
ken of reason, and can no more be doubted than can
the affirmations of reason. No one principle, fuinda
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CON-CLUDING REMARKS A.
mental to the science, as it has been elaborated in
these Lectures, can be named, which reason does not
affirm to be a necessary truth, or a fair deduction
from one.
II. WThile i't is maintained that all the principles
which have  been advanced  lie within the scope of
9-eason, it is not pretended that all men know and
?tncderstand them, thotyht it might be difficult to
igove that they do not.
1. Any want of regard for the truths that have
been stated, and any visible neglect of the duties
that have been named, cannot prove that they are
not understood; for the reason that mnen often fail
to regard admitted truth, and to perform admitted
duties.  Men even ignore truths because they do
not wish to obey them, and deny duties because
they do not wish to do them.
2. If it could be proved that many are ignorant
of the truths and duties which have been developed
in the system, it would not prove that the system
is false, that those truths and duties are not founded
in nature, and capable of being known by reason.
It is an undeniable fact, that men generally do not
know all that they might know in their circumstances.  What men are found to know on any subject, be it much or little, is no proof that they might
not know more.  That the heathen world, generally,
might have known more of God, and of their duty,
had they always made a knowledge of God and of
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4 
CONCLUDING REMARKS.
their dutv the one great end of life, cannot be dolll)ted.  In the light of this fact, let it be remarked,
that the theory of Natural Theology which has been
advanced does not rest upon what men know, but
upon what, in the nature of things, they might
know. This view clears the theory of every objection in this direction.
III. Shotbd(  any one raise an objection to the
Science, ats it has been elaborated, on the ground that
it is  an exhibition of Christian Theology, rather
than Nctt,'la Theology, a sufficient reply may be
ofe ied in few iordcs.
1. If the objection comes from a believer in the
inspiration of the Scriptures, the objection itself is a
compliment  which he pays to Natural Theology.
Hie has before him a system of religious truth and
duty which he affirms is a revelation from God, and
on reading Natural Theology, he confesses that, as
far as it goeS, it is in perfect harmony with the
teachings of His inspired Book.  This is just as it
should be, just as it must be, to have both Revealed
and Natural Religion true. The only objection that
can be urged in this direction, by a believer in the
Scriptures, is that the doctrines and duties of the
system which has been presented, are only matters
of Revelation, and have not been, and cannot be
demonstrated by reason in the light of nature.   But
it is too late for this objection now, the thing has
been done; and( the Christian, while he cannot
186
I 
CONCLUDING REMIARKS.
eftite the arguments by which Natural Theology
has been demonstrated,  is constrained to confess,
that, as far as it goes, it is in harmony with the
Scriptures.  This is enough; it is not pretended
that it teaches all that is taught in the Scriptures
2. If the objection is urged by one who does not
believe in the inspiration of -the Scriptures, the
objection itself is a compliment which he pays to
the Scriptures. That Nature teaches all that has
been embraced in the system of Natural Theology,
contained in these Lectures, cannot now be denied;
the arguments  are finished, and reason has pronounced them sound, and to affirm that it is identical with Christianity, as far as it goes, is to admit
that the Scriptures teach the truth.
IV. A dnitting the entire trut7h of the system,
and the soundness of all the argutments by which it
has been suipp)orted, it does notfill the  neasure of
zman's religious wants, and hence does not supersede
the Scriptures, in which those vwants are snorefully
met.
1. The immortality of the human soul may be
demonstrated by arguments having their foundation
in nature, yet it cannot be pretended that as clear
views of a future state can be derived from nature
as from the Scriptures.
2. The doctrine of rewards and punishments, or
of divine retribution, graduated according to the
conduct of men, is a doctrine of reason; but it can
187 
CONCLUDING REMARKS.
not be denied that the Scriptures give a much
clearer view of the subject than nature.
3. The existence of sin in the world, and the
depraved state of human nature, cannot  be hid
from the eye of reason, or unknown in the experience
of men  yet the Scriptures pour a flood of light on
these subjects, beyond what man, in his circumstances, would ever possess without them.
4. The doctrine of the resurrection has never been
recognized as taught by nature, upon which subject
the Scriptures speak directly and clearly
5. Nature, with all her lights and tongues, is
dark and silent on the great mediatorial system,
which the Gospel reveals.  Nature cannot teach on
this subject, because her lights were all created, and
her tongues all commenced their play before this
system of grace was developed or needed.  The
science of salvation through a Mediator, having its
necessity in the apostacy and corruption of humanity, which occurred after the creation, cannot be
revealed in and through nature.  This is revealed
only in the Gospel, and here Revealed Religion
triumphs over Natural Religion, without subverting
it, as far as it goes. Here the end is reached, and
if all that has been said shall be the means of leading one human wanderer, through the channels of
truth which nature reveals, to the altar of Christianity, where the fountain of salvation is ever open,
and ever flows full and free, the end will be gained,
and the labor more than paid beyond computation
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