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A HISTORY OF
THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
A STUDY IN HISPANIC
AMERICAN POLITICS




BY CHARLES E. CHAPMAN
THIE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA. 1916
A HISTORY OF SPAIN. 191.8
CATALOGUE OF MATERIALS IN THE ARCHIVO
GENERAL DE INDIAS FOR THE HISTORY OF
THE PACIFIC COAST AND THIE AMERICAN
SOUTHWEST. 1919
A  HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA: TIlE SPANISH
PERIOD. 1921


--
LL_,




A HISTORY OF
THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
A Study in
HISPANIC AMERICAN POLITICS
BY
CHARLES E. CHAPMAN, PH.D.


jQrto porVk
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
1927


All rights reserved




COPYRIGHT, 1927,
BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY.
Set up and printed.
Published February, 1927.


Printed in the United States of America by
J. J. LITTLE AND IVES COMPANY, NEW YORK




,r  -  / '-{  -. 7 a
I  i.i  fs
PREFACE
WHEN asked to write a one-volume history of Sicily the
historian Freeman is said to have replied that he would do
so provided he might first bring out a four-volume work,
which he did. The writer could have wished that he might
have engaged upon a similar detailed study of Cuban history before attempting the single volume presented here, for,
brief as is the period covered by this survey, the amount of
material available is beyond the capacity of any one individual to absorb quickly, and aids in monographic studies are
all but entirely lacking. Each chapter might well have been
written out to the extent of a volume, and then the task of
synthesis into the shorter work would have been simple and
sure. All things are relative, however, and three years of
this writer's time were as much as he could spare. So he
prepared his condensations as he went along, and offers his
twenty-seven volumes in one at the first publication.
The task was not so hard as it might otherwise have been,
because the student of Hispanic America "recognizes" Cuban
history. The conclusion is soon irresistible that here is Hispanic America as one may have met with it in Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, or Venezuela,-each one different from the rest, but all possessing the underlying similarity
of Hispanic traditions. That accounts for the sub-title of this
volume, for in studying Cuban politics one finds the politics
of all the countries to the south. One may never have set
foot in Cuba, but if he has lived in Colombia, Costa Rica,
Honduras, or elsewhere below the Rio Grande, the story will
v




vi


PREFACE


come home to him like an experience of his own. There
might almost, indeed, be another sub-title, which could read:
"A study in United States diplomacy." Here, certainly,
there is something more than the Spanish War and the
Platt Amendment. The man who is acquainted with the
Caribbean world will meet with much that he has encountered already in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua,
Panama, or even Mexico.
This work aims to tell the whole truth, instead of a mere
fraction. And admittedly, since this is a political history,
the "whole truth" often may be disagreeable to those who
would avoid straight speaking. For politics is one of the
least amiable phases of the Hispanic heritage. It was bad
enough in Cuba under Spain. One may well raise the question whether it has not been yet worse under the republic.
A patriotic Cuban asked that question of himself in the presence of the writer, and answered sadly in the affirmative,
for taxes are far higher now, with less service rendered,almost to the point of no service at all. To be sure, there
is plenty to criticize in the politics of all countries, but'there
are degrees of difference. It is doubtful if the most notorious
political rings in the United States, for example, whether in
national, state, or municipal affairs, have gone as far in bad
practices as the usual government in Cuba, and certainly
none of the presidential administrations in the north can
even closely approximate the evils that developed in the rule
of three out of the first four Cuban executives.
There are many who regard Hispanic character as hopeless,
at least from the standpoint of government, and none more
readily assert this than Hispanic Americans themselves.
They feel that they are the victims of their inheritance.
Foreigners may reach the same conclusion, to the accompaniment of unfavorable comparisons with other peoples. This




PREFACE


Vii


writer admits the problem, but not the conclusion. There is
a handicap of evil political traditions that the Cuban, like
other Hispanic Americans, is obliged to overcome. There is
the further handicap of a lack of political training. Cuba
has had but the experience of a single generation in government. How does that compare with the centuries of practice
in the background of Anglo-American life? Certainly there
is an excuse for political evils, but is there anything which
gives promise of something better? Most assuredly! Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay have their imperfections, but one
cannot study their history without realizing that they have
made remarkable political progress over a century of independence. People of Spanish blood have gone to non-Hispanic countries, and their children have grown up with the
sterling qualities of the land of their adoption in equal degree
with those who were descended from the native-born. The
point is important, for it is a refutation of any notion that
the Hispanic heritage on its evil side is changeless.
Cuba, far from being hopeless politically, is somewhat
more promising than most of the republics of Hispanic
America. To begin with, she is free from handicaps that
hold many of the others back,-a disagreeable climate, difficulties of communication, distance from the best markets, or
lack of wealth to apply to her social, political, economic, or
intellectual needs. Furthermore, there is no such serious
racial problem as some of the Hispanic American republics
suffer from, no exaggerated militarism, and no unbearably
overdeveloped individualism. /Not to go into more detail,
it may confidently be asserted that Cuba already has the
elements within her own body politic that could make government attain to the level of decency that most other factors
in Cuban life have already reached. Indeed, encouraging
reports have come to hand that give reason to hope that the




viii


PREFACE


initial steps may already have been taken since the inauguration of General Gerardo Machado as President on May 20,
1925. The administration of an honest and able President
must be the preliminary to a development of political rectitude. If Machado is such a man he may indeed fail, but,
even though failing, render a service to Cuba and make his
own name the greatest in the history of the republic. One
good President, however, is merely a detail in all that must
be accomplished. The people themselves must be transformed, and bad traditions banished. This is possible, but
it takes years to accomplish it. At present there is no foundation in social unity to ensure the maintenance of respectable self-government. The Cubans will fight for their
country and die for it in a national emergency, but at other
times the bonds of family and self-interest surpass those of
the loyalties due the state.
This matter very deeply concerns the people of the United
States. The relations of this country with Cuba are possibly
more important than those with any other Hispanic American republic, not even excepting Mexico. Cuba far outranks
the others in the value of United States investment and
trade. Strategically, Cuba is the key to the United States
and to the greater part of the Western Hemisphere. These
things aside, however, the United States under the Platt
Amendment and Permanent Treaty has a special duty and
obligation toward Cuba. If affairs are not going satisfactorily there, it is at least open to question whether this
country is not in a measure to blame. From many standpoints, therefore, the people of the United States cannot
afford to be ignorant of Cuban history.
The public has a right to know an author's relation to
his volume. In Shaw's Fannie's first play, one of the dramatic critics refused to express an opinion until he knew who




PREFACE


ix


wrote the play, remarking that if it had a good author it
was a good play, and if a poor author it was a poor one.
Whatever the judgment may be about the present writer he
has at least had an experience that should have given him a
chance to learn something of Hispanic life in general and
Cuba in particular. For eighteen years he has devoted himself continuously to Hispanic and Hispanic American history.
During this time he lived nearly two years in Spain, a year in
Chile, spent another six months in South America, and made
a number of shorter trips which have enabled him to visit
every country of Hispanic America except Paraguay. In 1916
and 1920 he made brief visits to Cuba. In 1924 he was there
on two different occasions for a total of nearly half a year,
gathering material for this volume and traveling through the
island. The writer is not conscious of any bias, except such
as may be imputed to him as an American. This, however,
should have scant weight, as he is firmly convinced that what
is best for Cuba is also best for the United States in the
relations between the two countries. The idea of writing the
volume developed from the importance of the subject, which
seemed for the moment to be heightened by the conduct of
the Zayas government during the somewhat hectic days of
1923. The writer believes that he is rendering Cuba a service
by speaking out frankly, as a Cuban himself would. By so
doing he hopes to contribute to an aroused public opinion
that may in the future make the evils he describes impossible.
If he hits hard, it is not because of malice, and if he has made
mistakes, he sincerely regrets them.
When the writer began this volume he hoped to avoid the
nuisance of excessive footnoting, which some regard as the
hallmark of scholarship. Reasonably ample bibliographical
notes appear at the end of most chapters, and the subject
as a whole is discussed, the writer hopes adequately, in his




PREFACE


"Essay on authorities." It proved impossible, however, in
a field so lacking in monographs to avoid making a number of
citations within the chapters, although the amount of this
type of impedimenta is cut down to moderate proportions.
As matters are, the scholar will have no difficulty in finding
his way, and the general public will not be annoyed.
The writer of this volume is solely responsible for the
matter it contains. Nobody else is accountable for it in
whole or in part, except as statements are attributed to different individuals through the medium of footnote citations
or quoted paragraphs. A debt of gratitude is due, however,
to a great many persons for help, but especially to Francisco
de Paulo Coronado and Carlos Trelles, heads respectively
of the National Library and the Library of the House of
Representatives, both in Havana. These men and the members of their staffs very generously furnished the writer with
every facility for carrying on his investigations. All students
of Cuban history owe a great deal to Trelles, in particular,
because of his important bibliographical work, without which
this writer could not have finished his task.
CHARLES E. CHAPMAN
June 3, 1926.




CONTENTS


PAGE
PREFACE......                      V
CIAPTER
I THE PEARL OF THE ANTILLES......             1
II THE OLD REGIME, TO 1895......    25
III THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA, TO 1895...      45
IV  THE CUBAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, 1895-1898.  73
V THE UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNMENT, 1898 -1902..........96
VI THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC.... 126
VII THE BEST YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC: ESTRADA
PALMA, 1902-1905.... 152
VIII THE REELECTION OF ESTRADA PALMA.....         176
IX  THE REVOLUTION OF AUGUST.....   195
X   THE MAGOON ADMINISTRATION, 1906-1909.       226
XI THE RESTORATION OF CUBAN GOVERNMENT... 247
XII THE MOST TYPICALLY CUBAN PRESIDENT: GOMEZ,
1909-1913...... 270
XIII POLITICAL HAPPENINGS OF THE GOMEZ ERA... 297
XIV   MENOCAL BEGINS, 1913-1916.....         318
XV   THE ELECTIONS OF 1916.... 346
XVI THE REVOLUTION OF FEBRUARY... 362
XVII GOING DOWN: MENOCAL'S SECOND TERM, 1917-1921   386
XVIII ZAYAS AND CROWDER, 1921-1923... 413
XIX   CORRUPTION AND REMONSTRANCE, 1923-1924.. 450
XX   EXIT ZAYAS, 1924-1925..... 481
xi




xii                 CONTENTS
CHAPTER                                      PAGl
XXI THE CONSTITUTION AND CONGRESS.....505
XXII THE FUTILITY OF THE LAW IN CUBA..... 526
XXIII THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT LOTTERY..... 547
XXIV  CUBAN ELECTION EVILS........564
XXV   SOCIAL FACTORS IN CUBAN LIFE......581
XXVI MATERIAL AND INTELLECTUAL CONDITIONS.. 609
XXVII THE FUTURE OF CUBA: A QUESTION..      638
ESSAY ON AUTHORITIES..........657
INDEX............677


MAP
CUBAN PLACE NAMES....


Endpaper




A HISTORY OF
THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
A STUDY IN HISPANIC
AMERICAN POLITICS








A


HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
CHAPTER I
THE PEARL OF THE ANTILLES
JUST off the coast of Florida, about a hundred miles from
Key West, lies the island republic of Cuba, the "Pearl of the
Antilles." Reasons without number have combined to make
this an attractive spot, but to the people of the United States
the course of affairs in Cuba has come to possess an especially
vital interest. The very nearness of this island to the Atlantic shores of the northern republic has been an important
factor in the relations of the two countries. Cuba controls
the Caribbean Sea, and so commands not only the approaches
to Panama but also a great part of the two American continents. In consequence a very close and peculiar political
connection between the United States and Cuba has developed. Cuba has a guarantee of American protection, but
must keep her house in order or be liable to an intervention
of the United States. The possibility of such an intervention
has in recent years been brought unpleasantly to the fore by
political happenings in the island republic. There are many
angles other than the political that attract the attention of
Americans. Cuba is extraordinarily rich, the real "gold
mine" of Hispanic America, though the "gold" comes indirectly through agriculture and commerce. American investment and trade in Cuba are phenomenal in amount, while
other countries share in Cuban economic activities in only
1




2


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


a somewhat lesser degree. Socially, too, Americans and
Cubans mingle more freely than most other peoples of different lands. Thousands of tourists from the United States
enjoy the delights of Cuba in the winter, and in the summer
there are other thousands of Cubans who visit the United
States. Young men and young women of Cuba frequently
enroll in American schools. In fine, the relations of the two
countries are about as close as they can be without having
the same flag. It is probable that there are many regions
within American political boundaries that do not have such
an intimate connection with the country of which they form
a part as does the rich Caribbean isle.
Cuba is long and narrow, seven hundred and sixty miles
in length from east to west, and some twenty-five to a hundred and twenty-five miles in width, with an area about the
same as that of Pennsylvania. Short stretches of water separate it from Florida to the northwest and Haiti to the east,
and through these passes the greater part of the traffic of the
Caribbean Sea. Most of the island is comparatively level,
but there are some mountains in the province of Pinar del
Rio in the extreme west, and the easternmost province,
Oriente, is quite rugged in parts. The other four provinces
are not so completely flattened out as popularly supposed.
Mount Tarquino on the southern coast, not far from Santiago (the capital of Oriente), rises sheer up from the sea to
an altitude of some eight thousand four hundred feet. Not
only is Cuba the "Pearl of the Antilles," but it is also the
"Isle of a Hundred Harbors." There are over thirteen hundred long islets, or "keys," off shore, and these form a bulwark
for the numerous mainland ports along the two thousand
miles of coast. Nature has been unusually kind to this tropical isle. It has a remarkable wealth in fruits, flowers, plants,
and trees. On the other hand, animal life is limited. There




THE PEARL OF THE ANTILLES


3


are a great number and variety of birds, and plenty of serpents and insects. The island derives its principal wealth
from the fertility of the soil. Cuba is by far the greatest
sugar-producing country in the world, and most of the sugar
consumed in the United States comes from Cuba. Tobacco
is also an important crop, and Cuban tobacco is usually reputed to be the best in the world. Delicious fruits, though
less important as an item of export, are raised in considerable
quantities for local consumption.
An idea has developed outside of Cuba that the climate is
good only from January to the end of March. But in point
of fact, though south of the Tropic of Cancer, Cuba can
hardly be said to have a tropical climate at all. The temperature in the eastern states of the United States is often
higher than that of Cuba. The highest ever recorded at
Havana was 98~, in August 1899, and the lowest was 47~ in
January 1901. The normal extremes in that city are from
60~ to 92~, and the average temperature in the four hot
months, June to September, is about 80~. The climate of
the island as a whole has been described as "remarkably
moderate and uniform, due to the influence of the prevailing
winds, the equalizing effect of the surrounding ocean, and to
the fact that the long axis of the island extends east and
west." The ocean breezes as a rule are indeed quite moderate, but in the fall of the year there is sometimes a moment
of anxiety over the possible danger from cyclones in the Caribbean. Cuba has a dry season from December to April, and
rains from May to November. Despite a rainfall of from
fifty to sixty inches a year, the island is often troubled from
a scarcity of water, as it runs too quickly into the sea. But
the engineering problems involved in overcoming this situation are by no means insuperable. Cuban health records
make an even better showing than the climate. On the basis




4


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


of the death rate, Cuba has ranked as high as second in the
world, with a little over twelve deaths to the thousand.
Australia alone has had a better mark. The normal rate in
the United States is over fifteen. Cuba's standing in this
particular is a recent development. Prior to the twentieth
century the death rate was very high, due primarily to the
ravages of yellow fever and malaria, but these diseases were
stamped out during the American occupation of the island
from 1898 to 1902. There has been some falling off in recent
years from normal healthfulness, because of governmental
laxity in matters of sanitation, but it would seem that the
patient is too strong to be very seriously affected.
The population of the island, over three millions, is far
greater in proportion to area than that of most Hispanic
American republics. And yet it is remarkably lacking in
density when one considers Cuba's extraordinary wealth. It
is about sixty-five to the square mile. England has a rate
approximately six times as much, and Belgium about nine
times. The normal development of the republic, with a
growing economic variety, should eventually permit of a
much greater population,-possibly as many as fifteen millions. There are many negroes in Cuba, but fewer than is
usually supposed by foreigners. It is said that less than
thirty per cent are colored. There may be some "optimism"
in this estimate, but it cannot be far from the truth. At any
rate, the white population is gaining rapidly through immigration, for Cuba is one of the most favored lands among
European peoples, especially Spaniards, who are in search
of New World homes. Climate and economic productivity
are not the only attractions Cuba has for the foreign visitor
or home-seeker. It is a country with a highly developed civilization. The island is extraordinarily well equipped with
railways built by private capital. Ordinary roads, however,




THE PEARL OF THE ANTILLES


5


due to the unsatisfactory workings of government, lag unnecessarily far behind, though much more numerous than
in most other Hispanic American republics. There are hospitals and schools and the other accompaniments of up-todate, modern life, although the political handicap is too often
manifest. But government, the one weakness in Cuban
armor, comes into the life of the average individual in a comparatively small degree. So life in Cuba, on the whole, offers
a wide range of opportunity and delight.
The capital and largest city of the republic is Havana, with
a population of 363,506, according to the latest census, that
of 1919. Next in order are Santiago with 62,083, Camagiiey,
41,909, Matanzas, 41,574, and Cienfuegos, 37,241. Eighteen
other cities have populations of from ten to thirty thousand.
Havana has an importance even out of proportion to its
size, for, as in most Latin countries, the capital tends to
absorb all currents of life in the land as a whole.' That
too is almost the only city which tourists ever know. Thousands gather there in the winter to enjoy a warm clime and
the exotic flavor of Cuban life. Though Havana is on a site
that is very nearly level to the eye, it has an attractive approach from the sea. Some of the finest buildings and streets
in the city are along the waterfront, and the surf beats high
against the sea-wall which protects the driveway known
popularly as the Malecon. At the eastern edge of the entrance to the bay is a promontory surmounted by an imposing castle. This is the Morro, a famous Spanish fortress of
a bygone day, now used as a Cuban national military school
and as a maritime signal station. Just beyond that is the
1If Who's who in America and that there is a wide geographical disCubans of to-day may be considered tribution in the northern republic,
as accurately representing the more while in Cuba there are very few who
distinguished persons in the United do not reside in Havana. Cf. infra,
States and Cuba, it will be noticed p. 589.




6


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


more formidable and more gruesome, if less imposing,
Cabanas fortress. The entrance to the bay is very narrow,
seemingly not wider than a good throw from the boat's deck
to either side. Inside, it broadens out, but is at no point
very large. There seems to be an extraordinary activity in
the port, due in part to the fact that many vessels anchor
in the bay and discharge or load their cargo to the accompaniment of much Latin shouting and the comings and goings of numerous small craft. The western shore, on the side
toward the city, is well lined with docks, and the visitor from
the United States will come in about at the point where the
"Maine" was sunk in 1898, and there, or just beyond, his
boat will tie up.
There are virtually three Havanas. The "old" city goes
west from the bay to the Parque Central and the broad
avenue called the Prado, which runs out of it toward the
ocean shore on the north. The "new" city is west of that.
At some indeterminate point still farther west is the modern
residential section for the wealthy and the moderately wellto-do. While everything about Havana will seem odd and
strange to the American on his first trip abroad, the experienced traveler will recognize that it is really a conglomerate
of Spanish and American influences. One will find much
that is Spanish in the old city. To be sure, the greater business interests are located there, but off the main streets there
is a typical Hispanic hodge-podge of warehouses, small shops,
hotels, restaurants, crowded tenements, and an occasional
wealthy home, with perhaps all varieties in a single block.
Here too are the cathedral, fort, and the old plaza, or central
square, that are among the surviving reminders of the
Spanish past. Streets are so narrow that wheeled traffic is
required to go but one way. They are paved with cobblestones. Sidewalks are rarely wider than the space required




THE PEARL OF THE ANTILLES


7


by one man. And yet there is a busy flow of pedestrians
striving to make some progress while dodging the equally
busy flow of automobiles. By far the best known streets in
this section are those called popularly "Obispo" and
"O'Reilly,"-"popularly," because these streets, in common
with most others in Havana, have official names on the signboards that differ from those in common use. The presence
of an "O'Reilly" in Havana is accounted for by the rule of
a famous governor of that name during the eighteenth century. These two streets are teeming with life, noise, and
action. They are occupied in the main by first-class retail
shops, cafes, and restaurants. Shops open wide to the sidewalk, euphemistically so-called, and people eat, drink, bargain, and sit in the barber's chair to the unrestricted gaze
of all. During hot weather many great awnings, or canopies,
are put out, suspended high up and reaching across the
street. These are often gaily decorated, and help give an
impression of the whole as of a bazaar. But window displays, goods, and one-price methods are like those in the
United States.
The Parque Central and the Prado form a boundary line
between the old city and the new, but have a character all
their own. They are the tourist centre par excellence.
There, or in the immediate vicinity, are the more widely
known large hotels and the high-priced restaurants with
"American food" and copious "ex-American" drink. This
region is also a centre for Cuban life, with imposing clubhouses, the principal theatres, and some locally patronized cafes. The Prado is a magnificent broad avenue, with
a shaded parkway down the centre. This is crowded with
strollers in the early evening hours, while the smooth roadways on either side are alive with automobiles. Indeed, the
old plaza stroll of Spanish life has been wholly displaced by




8


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


the American machine. With it, too, has gone that delightful and perfectly proper custom in Hispanic lands of young
women glancing frankly at the young men. The Cuban
young woman has adopted the American manner, but in so
doing has gone farther than her neighbor to the north, for
she never "looks." Oddly enough, this is true even of the
women of the street. Other imitations, if such they are,
show a similar variance in degree. For example, powder and
paint have been adopted with rather too much "enthusiasm"
by Havana belles, who are, nevertheless, very pretty as one
sees them in the evening in their light but attractive attire.
At the end of the Prado, by the ocean front, just across from
the Morro, is a band-stand and consequent gathering-place
for the public on nights when the band plays. Thence proceeds another broad avenue, the Malec6n, running west,
just back of the sea-wall. The sea often runs high along the
water-front, beating with great volumes of spray against the
wall. Sometimes the force of wind and wave carries the
water over the wall, putting the Malec6n very nearly kneedeep in water. Along this street, too, are a number of fine
residences.
In many respects the "new" city is much more Cuban, if
not exactly Spanish, than the old. There are great shopping
districts in the new city that the tourist rarely visits but the
Cuban frequents perhaps more often than Obispo and
O'Reilly. In the late afternoon Galiano (officially Italia)
and other streets going out of it toward the Parque Central
are thronged with shoppers and casual strollers, including
bevies of good-looking senoritas. Here lives a great part
of what might be called the middle-class population. And
here, as in outlying streets of the old city, are a number
of moderate-priced restaurants, serving good Spanish food
and wholesome Spanish wines at phenomenally low prices.




THE PEARL OF THE ANTILLES


9


The old foreign resident in Havana and the traveler who is
familiar with the Spanish tongue will usually prefer this
section to the tourist-ridden centre.
The Vedado and other residence districts to the west are a
twentieth century development and an outgrowth of American influences, for a well-to-do residence section, as such, is
not at all typical of Hispanic life. It is a region of magnificent private homes, a convincing bit of testimony of the
wealth and perhaps also the extravagance of the upper ranks
of Cuban society. Foreign business men, too, quite generally
live in this section. The exotic touch, to the American
visitor, is in the character of the edifices, grounds, and streets.
There is often a fantastic richness in architectural forms that
is foreign to American taste, but not inappropriate in a
warm country like Cuba. The grounds are more likely to
be a riotous but luxurious confusion of plants and walks than
given to grassy lawns. Often they are hidden from the
public by high walls. The streets are lined with trees, but
are usually quite wretched in other respects, perhaps deepfurrowed with the rains and utterly unkempt. Bare lots
next to a princely palace may serve as dump-heaps. This is
a seeming incongruity that is in fact rather typically Hispanic, and one looks behind it to find the responsibility
therefor in the neglectful hand of government.
Havana is a city with "atmosphere." It perhaps resembles Mexico more than other Hispanic American cities on
account of its blend of American and Hispanic influences.
But it has more wealth, more activity, and more tourists by
far than the Mexican capital. The American has an entering wedge in that he recognizes, though perhaps dimly, much
that he has already known. Business blocks are after the
American pattern. Big business itself is usually Americanowned. The merchandise one buys comes mainly from the




IU        A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
United States. Sanitation and external cleanliness are more
nearly in accord with American conditions than they are with
their Spanish prototypes. And finally, in addition to the
thousands of Americans in Havana, one will meet few
Cubans who do not speak at least a little English. The
very nearness of Cuba to the United States keeps the American from feeling that he has strayed utterly away from home.
And yet, the Hispanic flavor of Cuban life is never lost.
This gives tang and sparkle to the whole.
Though it covers a considerable area, Havana is a city of
easy communications. There is an excellent, wide-reaching
street-car service, with a five-cent fare. Ford motor cars are
everywhere, and will carry one or two persons for twenty
cents, with an increased tariff for longer rides. In the winter
the tourist agencies have great automobiles for suburban
trips. Havana has its "sights" for visitors, like any other
city. One of the most curious is the cemetery (Cemeterio
Colon), which is of interest because of certain peculiar customs to be observed there. Funeral processions may be
very elaborate, with a gaudy, red and gold, horse-drawn
hearse, around which are a number of liveried outriders. This
is distinctly a part of the Spanish heritage of Cuban life. At
one place in the cemetery is a huge pile of human bones.
Enquiry develops the fact that it is the practice to rent
graves, and when the family of the deceased fails to meet the
recurring payments his bones are removed from the ground, d'
to make room for a more profitable customer. T-he market<,)
in Havana is somewhat odorous, but interesting. There is 
an amazing variety of products, especially fruits, many of
which are unknown to the foreigner, and there are also many
different kinds of vegetables, fish, and other things for the
human palate. Some of the customs, too, differ from those
in vogue in the United States. For example if one wants




THE PEARL OF THE ANTILLES


11


chicken, he does not necessarily have to buy the whole bird,
but may order a liver or a leg, or any part or portion he
desires. Aside from visits to the cathedral and various government edifices, old and new, one may find interest in
trips that yield something in modern Cuban life. One sees
more in a cigar factory than the making of cigars. For example, there is the professional entertainer who reads newspapers or stories to the workmen at their toil. Out in the
country one may visit a sugar estate. Across the bay the
Morro and Cabanias, with its dungeons, are worth a visit.
West of Vedado is the beach at Marianao, where the water
is so buoyant that all who wish may float. In another part
of Marianao is the Country Club, which has an excellent golf
course. Across from the club-house is the Casino, famous
for its entertainment in the winter season. More important
than all of these places in themselves is the life of the people
that one may encounter anywhere.
The old city and the shopping districts of the new are the
animated part of Havana in the morning. In the hot midday hours there is comparative quiet everywhere. In the
late afternoon and early evening the Parque Central and the
Prado awake. Thousands of human beings put in an appearance there, and at night there are tens of thousands. From
the noise, one gets the impression that they never go to bed,
and indeed there is considerable activity up to as late as two
in the morning. Those who are not riding or walking seat
themselves in the wide-open cafes, and watch the passers-by
or, more likely, engage in spirited discussions.  Havana
cafes are after the European fashion, unlike anything in the
United States. One may use them as a club, or as a place
in which to read the newspaper, staying as long as one likes,
all for the price of a cup of coffee.  One is not limited to
coffee. Almost anything that is edible or potable is to be




12


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


had. The American visitor in a burst of preliminary enthusiasm not infrequently orders beer, wine, the Cuban daiquiri,
or other alcoholic beverages, but he has an opportunity to
try many a concoction that he would not get at home, though
quite within the law. Such, for example, is the delicious
piia, or pineapple drink, served strained (colada) or not
strained (sin colar), as desired. The ensalada, made of
fruits, soda-water, and pomegranate juice, is another.
Drunkenness, it may be said in passing, is not a Cuban habit;
the Cuban drinks in moderation, but rarely to excess. If a
man is seen staggering along the street or in other ways making him self unpleasantly conspicuous, it is an odds-on bet
that he comes from the prohibition country to the north.
Havana offers a variety of entertainment to the tourist,
and has indulgent laws that permit him to squander his
money in games of chance.    The bull-fight ended with
Spanish rule, and has not returned. So too, cock-fights and
the government lottery came to an end, but they are now
back in all their pristine glory. In the winter there is horseracing at an excellent track within the limits of Marianao,
west of Vedado. And the already-mentioned Casino has as
its most conspicuous feature all those advantages that have
made Monte Carlo famous. The numerous Spanish population of the city takes delight in jai-alai, or Basque ball, a
remarkably skilful and beautiful game which is a sort of
glorified tennis and hand-ball on a large scale. This game
is played at night. Then too there are the scores of American
"movies," with the same heroes and heroines one sees in the
United States. In the daytime an American may enjoy his
game of baseball, for the Cuban professional league has its
season in the winter. And it is "real" baseball that is played.
reams of American major league ball-players have often met
defeat at the hands of Cuban teams. Years ago the Cincin



THE PEARL OF THE ANTILLES


13


nati team of the National League signed two players who
were regarded at the time as "freaks," simply because they
were Cubans. These men were Marsans and Almeida. Both
proved to be good players, and one of them, Marsans, was
among the greatest outfielders of his day. Since that time
Cuba has furnished almost as many players to American
professional leagues as most American states.2
January, February, and March are the three great tourist
months. They are indeed an ideal time from the standpoint
of climate. One need have no fear, either, of insect pests,
for mosquitoes and flies have all but disappeared from the
Cuban capital since the automobile replaced the horse. But
the presence of so many tourists is not without disadvantages
for those who would glady dispense with the company of a
few thousands of their fellow-countrymen. Hotel accommodations are sometimes insufficient to take care of the
inflow.  Profiteering at once makes itself felt, and the
American-owned hostelries are no better on this score than
the rest. The writer recalls a time in 1920 when some hotels
were charging as much as twenty-five dollars a night, merely
for a room, but a better housing situation is rapidly being
developed. Petty profiteering at the expense of the notoriously simple-minded (from the standpoint of travel)
American tourist is widespread, if not universal. Unless he
has some knowledge of Spanish or of prices he may pay a
few pennies extra for what he buys. During nine months of
the year, however,-out of tourist season,-it is little or no
handicap to be a citizen of the United States.
If there is one city outside of Havana that the tourist will
probably visit it is likely to be Matanzas. One may make
the journey in a little over two hours on either the United
Railways or the Hershey Line, the latter an electric rail' Cf. infra, pp. 606-607, n. 26.




14


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


way. The name "Hershey" recalls a widely known American sweet chocolate, and rightly so, for it is to this same
company that the railway belongs. A little less than half
way to Matanzas the line passes through the Hershey sugar
estates, winding in and about the grounds at the mill as if to
give the passengers a better view. The scenery along this
route is about as fine as any in Cuba, although the ingredients
are simple enough: a rich green color,-with now and then a
tree of blazing red,-the graceful royal palms, sugar fields,
and a succession of valleys. The near-by hills that shut in
the valleys give this trip a character that distinguishes it
from the comparative level of other railway vistas in the
island. The Hershey plant is typical of the larger American-owned mills of Cuba. Everything about the place is
spic and span,-good mill, ball-field, neat cottages, and attractive grounds.
The ideal way to approach Matanzas is from the sea.
There is an ample bay running east and west, with a wide
opening to the north at the eastern end. Boats handle cargoes through the medium of lighters in the bay. The city lies
in a semicircle at the western end, rising with the hills that
surround the port. On the northern shore, beyond the Yumuri, are a number of large business plants of oil or molasses
interests. Beyond the San Juan, on the southern shore, are
some fine residences, also a hemp factory and the fields of
henequen on which it depends. The city proper lies between
the two rivers. In all three sections there is a wealth of
trees and shrubbery which combine to produce an attractive
setting. Next after Havana, Matanzas probably makes a
better appearance than any other city in the island. The
plaza is not large, but is well-shaded and pleasing to the eye.
Here, too, something of old Spanish custom obtains, for the
prettily dressed young women come out in the early evening




THE PEARL OF THE ANTILLES            15
to take the plaza stroll. There are two principal "sights"
in Matanzas. One of them, the view of the Yumuri valley,
the traveler on the Hershey Line will already have seen,
though not from such a point of vantage as is afforded from
the hills above Matanzas. It is pretty,-though perhaps not
more so than a hundred other such valleys. Far more worth
while are the caves of Bellamar at the opposite end of the
city, beyond the henequen fields to the east. The "mar"
(sea) in "Bellamar" is misleading, for the caves do not touch
the sea at all, so far as anybody knows. They consist of a
series of winding chambers, through which one may pass
with reasonable facility, as there are well-made paths and
electric lights to assist one on his way. A number of miles
of the caves have already been explored, without reaching
the end.   The casual visitor, however, will probably be
satisfied with considerably less than one mile. The main
interest is in the curious natural forms that the shining
white stalactites have taken. Scores of them have received
names which recall something they are supposed to resemble.
For example, there are the mantle of Columbus, the American eagle (with wings outstretched), the head of an elephant,
and a plethora of figures that remind of church architecture
or Catholic services.
A few tourists, especially those who enter Cuba at Antilla
in northern Oriente, pay a visit to Santiago.  Some others
make the trip by train from Havana. En route the most frequent stop is Camagiiey, where the traveler who has begun
his journey on the English-controlled United Railways proceeds thenceforth by the American-owned Cuba Railway,
though without change of cars if he is riding on the Pullman.
The Hotel Camagiiey, three minutes from the station, is in
itself quite interesting and unique. It was formerly a Spanish cavalry barracks, but no unpleasant survivals of its




16


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


former condition are apparent to the guest. What was once
an enormous corral is now filled in with walks and gardens,
around which are the quarters in a wide-reaching two-story
edifice. This hotel is one of the great gathering-places for
Americans in eastern Cuba, and a day does not pass but sees
a throng of them in the bar-room shaking dice for cocoanut
water, orangeade, Bacardi rum, cocktails, or beer. Many
who are employed by the Cuba Railway reside in this city
throughout the year, for Camagiiey is the principal centre
of that company's activities.
Camagiiey is a city that differs not a little "from the brag."
It is often described as a health resort, and that, no doubt, is
what nature intended it to be, but man, in the person of the
Cuban government, has allowed a condition to develop that
can be anything but advantageous to the health of the inhabitants. In this connection it is to be borne in mind that
it is the national government, not the local as in the United
States, that finances most municipal needs.  The dirt of
Camagiiey contrasts sadly with the comparative cleanliness
of Havana and Matanzas. The streets are fairly wide, but
are full of holes ranging from the moderate "chuck-hole" to
cavernous openings several feet deep. They are full of dust
or a varicolored mud, as the case may be, and there is an
all-pervading, dead odor about the town. Things might be
better if it were not that Camagiiey is on a level site, and in
consequence the rains cannot wash away the dirt. And yet
Camagiiey is a centre of wealth and the Cuban aristocracy.
It is almost incongruous to see so many attractive people in
such a dirty place. Dainty senoritas trip along the streets,
seeking a relatively clean spot on which to plant their expensively shod feet.  They are undeniably pretty, and
dressed in fashionable materials. And yet, people who live
in Camagiiey, native or foreign, enjoy the city, despite its




THE PEARL OF THE ANTILLES


17


external drawbacks. On the principle that one should never
"judge a book by its cover" it would seem that there is a
great deal of happiness in Camagiiey, owing to the delightful
quality of the people.
A better place, perhaps, than Camagiiey to get a real
touch of Cuban life would be Sancti Spiritus, which has a
population of 23,572. Sancti Spiritus, which is one of the
oldest towns in Cuba, is not on the main line at all, but can
be reached at the terminus of a branch which goes south
from Ciego de Avila, just before Camagiiey. First impressions take in the dirty, narrow streets and somewhat primitive hotel arrangements, but there are the honesty and fair
prices one encounters "off the beaten track" of tourist travel,
and the people are delightful,-simple, kindly, courteous,
and wholesome. As one young resident put it: "Everybody
in town was good, until the railway came. Since then some
bad people have come to the city, and a few good ones have
gone away." Most of the people never leave Sancti Spiritus,
however, but remain there, as did their fathers, grandfathers,
and great-grandfathers before them. And why not? Everybody "knows everybody," they see one another daily in the
ample plaza, and all are happy.
But Camagiiey and Sancti Spiritus are not places for the
ordinary tourist, who will usually see no more of the former
than the twenty-five minute train stop will allow and will
not take in the latter at all. He certainly will not have seen
Cuba, however, unless he has visited Santiago. This is a
city that is surpassed only by Havana in importance and
historic interest, and it has some features that are in marked
contrast to those one finds at the capital. It is a little over
five hundred miles from Havana, a distance which the express train covers in approximately twenty-four hours.
There is not a great deal that is striking in car-window




18


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


scenery en route. It consists mainly of a level plain, dotted
with royal palms and with miles and miles of sugar estates,
interspersed with bits of pasture. The old-time forests,
"murdered" to make way for sugar, have for the most part
gone, though many stumps mark where they stood. Here and
there, besides the palms, however, are other beautiful trees,
standing alone. Among these is the jobo ("hobo"), which
resembles a wide-spreading oak, symmetrically shaved off
at the top. Another, of great beauty, but not so widespreading, is the ceiba, the so-called "national tree" of Cuba.
This is very graceful, growing to a good average height, with
a deep green, oak-like leafing. It is not until the province
of Oriente is reached that one sees any mountains at all, and
then they appear only in the dim distance until shortly before Santiago.
The human angle of the trip is perhaps more interesting
than the scenery. Americans and well-to-do Cubans divide
the Pullman, and are served rather meagre meals from the
buffet at one end of the car. First-class coaches are used by
whites and near-whites, and second-class almost wholly by
negroes. There are few towns of considerable size along the
way. The express train goes through Matanzas and Santa
Clara during the night, passes Ciego de Avila early in the
morning, and reaches Camagiiey just before noon. From
Camagiiey to Santiago there is nothing deserving the name
of city. Most places are sad, neglected villages, reeking with
mud or dust, inhabited mainly by negroes, whose homes are
"shacks," thatch-roofed or covered with corrugated iron.
Travel seems to be mainly on horseback, for the roads in this
section are notoriously boggy and uneven trails. The whole
day's ride convinces one, however, not only of the fertility of
Cuba's soil, but also of its remarkable availability. Given
good roads and a greater diversity of crops, and given, above




THE PEARL OF THE ANTILLES


19


all, a good government that renders a reasonable amount of
service, then the country will support millions of inhabitants
beyond those it now possesses.
The plaza in Santiago is typically Hispanic. Among the
buildings that surround it are the cathedral, the municipal
government building, two first-class hotels (the Casa Granda
[sic] and the Venus), a three-story club house, and a number
of shops. The plaza itself is a neat affair, covered with tiles,
and has a few shade trees and a number of benches. One
odd feature about the cathedral is that the part even with the
plaza is rented out for shops; the church proper is up one
story, entered from the side.  Santiago is a mountainous
city, rising along a sharp declivity from the water's edge.
There are a few docks at the port, but many large-sized
steamers handle their cargo out in the bay. Santiago is on
the eastern shore. The quite distant opposite bank is a
virgin green, and there are few habitations to the north.
It helps make an attractive picture, as the bay is surrounded
by high hills which almost deserve the name of mountains.
Going up into the city and beyond it to the northeast one
comes to the rich suburb of Vista Alegre, Santiago's Vedado.
Here there are several hundred fine homes, not Spanish and
not American, but with something of each style. Every place
has a yard, usually fenced in with an iron grating. Some
yards are planted to grass, and others have a profusion of
flowers, while still others combine both features, often with
a landscape garden effect. The houses have columned verandas, grated windows, tiled roofing, and at times a somewhat fanciful decoration. All are of one or two stories.
The streets in Vista Alegre are excellent, in contradistinction to those of the rest of the city.
The main parts of Santiago, while much better than most
cities of Spain and Spanish America, have certain defects.




20


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


There is a great deal of dust and dirt, streets are in need of repair, and there is an inadequate water supply. In all these
matters Santiago is the victim of the government. It is the
national government that is supposed to provide water for
the streets, but it does nothing. So the streets of Santiago
are sprinkled only when it rains. Fortunately, the sharp
slope of the city causes much of the refuse to be washed down
hill to the bay. For years, successive administrations have
promised Santiago an aqueduct, but the matter never gets
beyond an appropriation that is squandered in engineering
plans. Some politician and his lay partner, the "engineer,"
divide the monies between them. It is conditions such as
these that make one realize that Havana is not Cuba. On
the contrary, one often hears in Oriente that Havana is a
"parasite." As one man told the writer, with no little heat,
Havana has a population about six times that of Santiago,
but gets fifteen times as great an appropriation for sanitation. Moreover, it probably does get a larger percentage of
its appropriation,-with less in proportion for the politicians.
The streets of Santiago are wider than those of most Hispanic cities, but in other respects they follow type. Sidewalks are mere devices to keep one from being run over, by
leaning against the housewall above the curb. They are
from one to three feet in width. There are no yards, and
blocks are solid, with buildings but one or two stories high.
There are two trips one ought to take while in Santiago,
one up "Wood's Folly," and the other down the bay to the
Morro. The first-named is a road built by General Leonard
Wood while governor of Oriente in 1899. Almost without exception Cubans speak well of General Wood, but the building
of this road was regarded at the time as unwise. Time has
vindicated General Wood, however, in this as in almost everything else he did in Cuba. It is the best road in the vicinity




THE PEARL OF THE ANTILLES


21


of Santiago, even though it has gone a quarter of a century
without much in the way of repairs, and it is one of the
principal outlets to the north. The road is some nine or ten
miles long to the top of a hill beyond Boniato. In 1899 when
Wood built it the Cuban soldiers around Santiago were being
maintained at considerable expense, without any work to
do. He thought it would be better to keep them occupied,
believed that the hill (which is about nine hundred feet
high) might serve as a defensive point for Santiago, and felt
that it would make a suitable acclimatization camp for the
American soldiers. Today, the hill is perhaps the best place
from which to get a view of Santiago and the surrounding
country. From it one sees the city and the bay, but not the
entrance to the bay. There are mountains all about, notably
some high ones to the west.  Looking east of the city one
can easily reconstruct the American military campaign of
1898. At one place there is the cut in the range leading up
from Siboney, where the American troops landed.  From
there they proceeded part way around the city along the
eastern side to El Caney, which is not far beyond Vista
Alegre. Near there is San Juan Hill, made famous by the
charge of Roosevelt's "Rough Riders."
One must take a boat to go out to the Morro, for the
old Spanish road which once approached it from Santiago
has been allowed by the Cuban government to fall into decay. It is nearly an hour's ride by launch. On the way
there are a number of islands, strewn with summer homes,
many of them very rich,-evidence that some people in this
section have money. The entrance to the bay is very narrow, only two hundred and twenty yards across, while the
channel itself is but twenty-two feet wide. Two cannon on
the shore, partly buried in the earth, mark the spot opposite
which Hobson sank the "Merrimac." The Morro is one of




22


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


the most fascinating structures of its kind in the world.
It stands much higher than the one at Havana, on a steep
ascent that lacks little of the perpendicular. It has not
been kept up. So it is now a ruin, but is perhaps the more
impressive for being so.
For all the historic and scenic interest of Santiago, one
must turn to social factors for the most striking feature of
a visit to that city. Most of the people in Santiago,-and in
all Oriente for that matter,-are black, or partly black. In
Havana the negro is said to possess political, but not social,
equality. In Santiago he is more nearly on an equal social
plane with the whites than in most parts of the world. It is
not uncommon to see a white man and a negro arm in arm, or
dining or drinking together on terms of perfect intimacy.
The plaza stroll has become a colored function, with few if
any young women of white race in attendance. Many negroes are well-to-do. There is a finely appointed negro club,
just off the plaza from the Casa Granda. No white men are
admitted and no negroes of "low degree." On one occasion,
recently, when a member of the club brought a woman who
had worked in a menial capacity to one of the social functions of the club, everybody else left! The gaming at this
club is often for high stakes. It is said that as much as
twenty-five thousand dollars has been called for, for the
operations of a single night. Cuban negroes, indeed, are far
superior in many ways to the members of their race in the
United States. Except for the color of their skin, they do not
look or act like the American negro. They dress quite as well
and in as good taste as the whites. They are not loud or
insolent, and they are not thick-featured. Some of the girls
might even be called pretty. It is probable that they all
have some Spanish blood in their veins, however black they
may be. One wonders what is the basis of their well-being.




THE PEARL OF THE ANTILLES


23


Many are employed in the sugar industry, but they are not
among the mill-owners or rich planters. The only obvious
source of their wealth provides yet another indictment of the
government. The negroes dominate the vote in Oriente! So
it is the practice to give well-paying sinecures, called
"botellas" (bottles), to some negro who can deliver ten or a
dozen votes. If the stories one hears on every hand can be
believed, this is the mainspring of negro wealth in Oriente.
On the return from Santiago to Havana, one might well
make a detour for a visit to the fifth city of the republic, Cienfuegos, the population of which is 37,241. One changes cars
at Santa Clara, capital of the province of the same name, and
has ample time for a stroll through that small, not altogether
"comfortable," but interestingly typical city of the "neglected" kind. Cienfuegos is an important port, but is a place
the average tourist never sees. It has a particularly neat
business centre, one of the best in Cuba, with good streets
and a plaza, enormous in size and filled with attractive gardens, that has no equal in the island. Streets in outlying
districts are as full of holes and unkempt, however, as those
in the business district are smooth and clean. The life of
Cienfuegos is chiefly to be seen on the Avenida (Avenue) de
Independencia, which runs through the city, with a parkway
down the centre, and continues straight ahead several miles
along the bay to the land's end at La Punta (The Point).
The bay is of great size, and appears as if it were entirely
surrounded by land, with the entrance not visible from the
city, but it has no particular scenic charm, since there are no
mountains in the background. In the early evening hours
the parkway of the avenue is crowded with young people
taking the typical Hispanic American stroll. They seem to
prefer the avenue and its closer contacts to the greater space
and elegance of the plaza, but move to the latter whenever




24


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


there is a band concert. One sees much in Cienfuegos that
reminds him of Matanzas on the one hand or Santiago on
the other, but in the walk along Independencia their differences would seem to have merged, for whites and negroes
equally take part. One wonders whether this is a transition
stage toward an eventual appropriation of this custom by
the colored people. Old residents of Cienfuegos will tell you,
like those of Camagiiey and Sancti Spiritus, that they like
the city, and in this instance the casual tourist can more
readily see why they should.
There is a great deal more that the visitor to Cuba ought
to see, but when he has gone as far as the writer has carried
him  he will know    best what to    choose.  Much   in
Cuban economic life deserves more extensive study, such as
the sugar and tobacco industries and the railways. Investigations bearing upon sanitation or education will reward
those who are interested in either. One ought not to leave
the island without improving the easily obtained opportunity
of associating with Cubans, who will almost certainly possess those delightful qualities for which Hispanic peoples are
famous and perhaps also be able to speak with the Anglo-Saxon visitor in his own language. Finally, one may wish to
know why in the midst of such excellence the government
appears to be so unsatisfactory. That will necessitate his
making some study of Cuban history. Perhaps also that will
provide a clue for an understanding of the political regeneration Cuba must undergo if it is to become the model Hispanic
American republic that its resources and the calibre of its
people should entitle it to be.3
'Much of the social and economic more ample detail in chapters XXV
data touched briefly here is given in and XXVI.




CHAPTER II


THE OLD REGIME, TO 1895
ON October 28, 1492, Columbus discovered Cuba. Just
where he first touched the coast has never been determined,
though every considerable port from Baracoa to Nuevitas
has been suggested for the honor. Nineteen years later, in
1511, Diego Velazquez landed in the extreme east at Baracoa,
and founded the first Spanish settlement in Cuba. Within
a comparatively short time thereafter he effected a conquest
of the island, and by 1515 there were no fewer than seven
Spanish towns, including Havana (though not at its present
site) and Santiago, which date respectively from 1514 and
1515. For a few years Cuba was a flourishing colony, but
suffered on account of the expeditions of Cortes, De Soto,
and others to Mexico and Florida, which gravely diminished
the resources of the island in man-power and wealth. From
that time forward for many years the history of Cuba was in
most respects that of the typical Spanish colony. Cuba had
the same autocratic political, economic, social, and ecclesiastical system that other colonies had, with the same bickerings of the different representatives of the king. The Indians
were killed off or died at such a rapid rate that negroes began
to be imported at least as early as 1523 to serve as laborers
in the mines and fields. Particularly noteworthy in the early
years, owing to Cuba's strategic position with reference to
Spain's mainland colonies, was the matter of international
relationships. Realizing that her empire in America would
be imperiled if she lost Cuba, Spain put forth all her strength
25




26        A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
to retain the "Pearl of the Antilles." Yet, French, English,
and Dutch pirates caused serious embarrassment by their
activities in Cuban waters in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. Smuggling made its appearance at the same time,
continuing in the eighteenth century and becoming the principal basis of the island's wealth.
Absolutism and centralization were the two key-words of
Spanish colonial government. The captain-general of Cuba,
a royal appointee, virtually had in his hands all functions
of government, and exercised them for the island as a whole
and also within local units. Other machinery limited his
powers to some extent, but rarely proved an insuperable barrier, for any great length of time, to his own predominance
in Cuban affairs, subject to the orders of the king. Even the
administration of the church, save in matters of faith, was
controlled by this official as vice-patron of the king, to whom
the popes had granted special powers in America. The economic life of the island was restricted in many ways. Only
such products could be raised as would not compete with
those of Spain. All commerce was required to be carried
on with Spain alone, and then only with a single Spanish port.
Spaniards, too, were given first place in the social life of the
island. The merest Spanish clerk was the social superior
of the wealthiest creoles, as the native-born whites were
called. This became most unpleasantly apparent when the
young women of Cuba married Spaniards instead of Cubans,
if the chance offered, thereby improving their social station.
In fine, Spain governed Cuba wholly for the benefit of Spain
and Spaniards. Cuba, "the ever faithful isle," was perhaps
more patient under these restraints than other parts of the
empire, but it is not surprising that a feeling of discontent
made its appearance that grew in intensity until the final
outburst at the close of the nineteenth century.




THE OLD REGIME, TO 1895


27


Undue trade restrictions, arbitrary and unscientific methods of taxation, and the virtual exclusion of Cubans from
government are the three most frequently mentioned causes
of Cuban discontent in the nineteenth century. During the
reign of the great Charles III (1759-1788) the Spanish government made some concessions to Cuba in the direction
of freedom of trade. Far more important, however, was the
actual, though illegal, freedom the island enjoyed in the frequently recurring periods of war between Spain and England. At such times Spain was unable to enforce the usual
laws of trade, owing to British control of the sea. In 1801
Spain opened Cuba to world commerce, but withdrew this
freedom in 1809. Trade with other lands continued in despite of law, however. Making a virtue of necessity, Spain
adopted a new policy in 1818, permitting foreign trade, subject to heavy export and import taxes and to certain discriminations in favor of Spain. The Cubans were far from satisfied
with the change, however. The system operated harshly at
times and was usually inconvenient. In particular there
was a growing demand for greater freedom of trade with the
United States, the island's best customer. Eventually, in
1891, a reciprocity treaty was made with the United States,
but in 1894 it was withdrawn, and the special advantages in
favor of Spain were restored. This was one of the immediate
causes of the revolution of 1895.
It is probable that the denunciations of Spain on account
of the amount and burdensome nature of the taxes have been
overdrawn, but their arbitrary and unscientific character can
hardly be denied. For example, the laws for the taxation
of real estate were not unjust and the rate not excessive,
but there was very unequal application of the laws in fact.
Favoritism and bribery were notoriously important considerations in assessing valuations. The number and variety of




28


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


taxes were another cause for complaint. With its eye on
easily collectible revenues the government made a point of
taxing necessities in every conceivable way. Thus, the right
of slaughtering was sold by the government, but there were
also taxes on each animal slaughtered and on dressed meat.
There were taxes on fuel, building material, farm produce,
and on horses used either for pleasure or in transportation
service. License fees had to be paid to the government by
lawyers, doctors, brokers, carpenters, shoemakers, and masons. There were taxes on theatres, concerts, balls, cockfights, and other forms of amusement. And there were stamp
taxes on legal documents. In all of these cases the application was more objectionable than the taxes themselves. The
arbitrary whim of an official and wholesale corruption, even
to the point of threatening taxation in order to elicit bribes,
were the real determining factors. And yet it is probable
that the fundamental dissatisfaction of the Cubans was because they objected to paying any taxes at all that were
imposed by Spaniards and not by themselves.
There were some Cubans who held political office under
Spanish rule, but almost invariably they were in a subordinate capacity. The captain-general, or (as he eventually
came to be called) governor-general, was a Spaniard, and he
appointed, or at least dominated, the other officials. Even
after provincial and municipal governments were provided
for in the nineteenth century, there was no real diminution
in his control of local units. The office of captain-general,
with its many perquisites, legal or otherwise, was a very
lucrative post. A few years usually sufficed to make the
incumbent wealthy, and it became the practice to change
this officer frequently, as if to give some new individual a
chance for the rich returns the position afforded. There were
136 captain-generals in all. Between 1859 and 1898 there




THE OLD REGIME, TO 1895


29


were thirty-eight, an average of more than one a year. This
also meant frequent changes of subordinates and a consequent upsetting of administrative stability. Political office
for the sake of the office-holder, with scant thought of its
place as a position of trust on behalf of the public, was
the firmly imbedded tradition of Spanish rule. The desire
for political office is almost "epidemic" among Hispanic
peoples, and the Cubans were no exception to the rule.
To be sure, they had ample cause for complaint. In any
event the time came when they wanted the jobs for themselves.
The evils of Spanish rule that have just been recited were
only a few out of many. No doubt a far stronger case on
this score could be made. It is not necessary to accuse Spain
of cruelty or crime, however, or even to insist too much on
her lack of forethought or incompetence. The revolution
was bound to come, whatever the nature of Spain's rule.
At best, Spain might have retained a shadowy title to
Cuba by an early grant of such virtual independence as
Canada, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand now enjoy, but even this is doubtful. A comparatively weak country like Spain could not offer the same prestige, protection,
and economic advantage that the relation to England gives
to the self-governing colonies of the British Empire. The
revolution came because Cuba had outgrown the Spanish
connection. Despite all the evils that may be cited against
Spain in her government of Cuba, that country is deserving
of more sympathy than blame. Spain did the best she could,
according to her lights. The most severe charge that can be
brought against her is not that she committed misdeeds that
forced the Cubans to rebel, but that she transmitted to the
Cubans themselves some of the worst evils in her own political life, evils that Spain would gladly have overcome if she




30


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


could have done so. In particular, she passed on to Cuba,
as to all Spanish America, the already mentioned unfortunate tradition that political office is for the private advantage
of the office-holder.
As early as the closing years of the sixteenth century the
creoles had begun to consider themselves Cubans rather than
Spaniards, although there was as yet no thought of a separation from Spain. On occasion they could express a vigorous dissent, however. One such instance occurred as early
as 1717. There was a proposal at that time to establish a
tobacco monopoly. A number of Cubans disapproved of the
plan, and some five hundred of them rose in arms. They
went so far as to capture Jesuis del Monte in the outskirts of
Havana, but were at length persuaded to retire to their
homes. Twice again, in 1721 and 1723, there were tobacco
revolts, but they were checked before they became serious.
In 1762 a British expedition captured Havana. The next
year the city was restored to Spain, but the brief English
occupation proved to be of the utmost importance in the
history of Cuba. There was a fleeting moment of freedom
of trade, revealing to the world for the first time and to the
Cubans themselves the wealth of the island when not hampered by restrictions. It served also to bring to Cuban attention the course of world affairs, overcoming to some extent
the narrow provincialism which had formerly limited their
intellectual horizon. From this time forward the revolutionary doctrines of the French philosophers had some meaning for the Cuban people. They took a lively interest in the
progress of the American Revolution and keenly followed
the events of the French Revolution at the close of the century. When the Spanish American Wars of Independence
began on the mainland in 1810 the Cubans had the issue of
separation from Spain squarely presented to them, but they




THE OLD REGIME, TO 1895


31


were not yet ready to sever the ties that bound them to
Spain.
A number of reasons account for this. Ever since the English occupation Cuba had been treated, on the whole, quite
liberally by Spain, and had been favored by a number of
worthy governors during the reign of Charles III. And
where the law fell a little short of Cuban desires in matters
of trade, the exigencies of the times had, nevertheless, permitted of commercial relationships that the law did not
sanction. So, as gauged by the ideas of the period, the
Cubans did not have a serious grievance. And yet they
probably would have joined their Spanish American
brothers if it were not that Cuba is an island. A rebellion
in Cuba had far less chance of success than on the mainland.
As the strategic key to Spain's possessions in the New
World, too, Cuba was more strongly held than the other
colonies, and the Spanish navy could prevent the island from
receiving any substantial help. As the wars continued, other
drawbacks developed. Some of the ideas of the revolutionists did not appeal to large bodies of the Cuban people. In
particular, they hesitated before Bolivar's pronouncement
for freedom of the slaves. This was due only in part to the
character of Cuban economic life, depending as it did on a
large and cheap labor supply. In addition, the Cubans had
almost before their eyes the gruesome scenes that had attended the winning of independence in the black republic
of Haiti to the east. There the whites had been killed off
by the negroes or forced to flee, and many of the exiles had
taken up their residence in Cuba. There were too many
negroes in Cuba for the people to be willing to risk emancipation. According to the census of 1817, for example, in a
total of about 688,000 inhabitants there were over 250,000
slaves and more than 115,000 free colored persons. Taken




32        A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
together, they represented more than half of the population.
Throughout the war period, however, there were many
Cubans who sympathized with the revolutionists and hoped
to bring about a separation from Spain. Most of them were
not in favor of Cuban independence, but wished to cast in
their lot with Colombia, Mexico, or the United States. A
number of secret societies were formed that favored a revolt.
Of these, the most famous was an organization whose principal activity was in the year 1823, known as the "Soles de
Bolivar," or, to give it its full name, "Soles y Rayos de
Bolivar" (literally, "Suns and Rays of Bolivar"). There
were now growing causes of grievance, too. Ferdinand VII
(1808-1833) had begun to restore some of the worst features
of the old colonial system, and the officials sent to Cuba
in recent years had been notoriously unscrupulous.  So at
length the Cubans felt that the time had come to declare
themselves, and a revolt was planned for August 16, 1823.
But the Spanish authorities had kept well informed through
their spies in the different organizations, and when the day
came, most of the leaders were arrested, while others saved
themselves only by fleeing from the island. Every possible
means was taken to break up the secret societies. Members,
when caught, were thrown into prison or executed. Temporarily, the authorities were fairly successful. On the other
hand, the desire for separation from Spain was never again
to die away in Cuba. The secret organizations continued to
exist, despite the watchfulness of Spanish officials, and outside the island an active propaganda against Spain was carried on unceasingly by those who had been driven from
their homes.
The bitterness of Cubans against Spain was g.reatly increased by the severity of the rule of General Miguel Tacon




THE OLD REGIME, TO 1895


33


(1834-1838), one of the most famous captain-generals Cuba
ever had. Tac6n is the man who planned and started the
Prado in Havana, among a number of notable public works.
Many stories have attached themselves to his name. On one
occasion, it is said, he sat in judgment over a wealthy but
profligate count, who had abducted a charming young
woman of the people. Being informed of the matter by the
betrothed of the young woman, a man of humble circumstances, Tac6n gave a decision in favor of the count, and had
him married to the girl on the spot. The count was ordered
to return to his plantation without his bride, and while on
his way he was killed by an emissary sent for that purpose
by Tacon. Thus was the young woman enabled presently to
get a husband of her choice, together with the estates of the
man who would have taken her against her will.
In 1836 a successful liberalist revolution in Spain restored
the Constitution of 1812, which provided, among other
things, for Cuban representation in the Spanish Cortes. A
certain General Lorenzo commanded the eastern department
of Cuba at this time, and he immediately proclaimed the
Constitution and called for an election of deputies, all this
without consulting Tac6n. Tac6n was furious when he heard
of it. He himself was an ultra-conservative monarchist, and
paid no attention to the new order in Spain. By a royal
decree of 1825 the captain-general had been empowered to
set aside any instructions from Spain, if it seemed to him to
the best interests of Cuba to do so. Tac6n proposed to take
advantage of this decree to prevent the Constitution of 1812
from having its normal force in Cuba. Meanwhile, he proceeded against Lorenzo, and met with success when that officer went to Spain to press his side of the case. Tacon came
down with a heavy hand on those who had supported Lorenzo. Scores of men of the most distinguished creole fam



34         A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
ilies were imprisoned or banished. Even the soldiers, who
had done no more than obey Lorenzo's orders, were punished
by sentences to hard labor. And when the Cuban deputies
reached Spain the Cortes refused to seat them, declaring
that the Constitution did not apply to Cuba, which was governed by special laws. Thus was Tac6n sustained, and the
Cubans supplied with a new grievance. It was brought home
to them that Spanish liberalism was no more liberal with
respect to Cuba than the most reactionary conservatism.
Tac6n, in Cuba, became even more severe in repressing opposition to his government. "I am here," he is reported as
saying, "not to promote the interests of the people of Cuba,
but to serve my master, the king." 1 This service he interpreted as best performed through a restoration of the old political rigors of the Spanish colonial system.
Tac6n's very success was probably of doubtful advantage
to Spain. Certainly it did not prevent the Cubans from plotting an uprising, and it did arouse a bitterness and desire for
vengeance that made for greater constancy in the eventual
patriot cause. In the United States there were a number of
Cuban juntas, or committees, and Cuban newspapers that
advocated revolt against Spain. Many Cubans in the United
States and in Cuba itself were in favor of an annexation of
the island to the United States. An annexation party (Partido Anexionista) was formed in 1848; a prominent society,
the Club Habanero, took the same stand in that year; a
Cuban annexationist paper, La Verdad, was published in
New York from 1848 to 1853; and the Cuban Council (Consejo Cubano) in New York declared for annexation in 1849.
In the early 50's there were a number of annexationist or1As usually written, Tacon is his rule, however, Spain was govalleged to have said, as stated here, erned by the queen-mother on behalf
that he was in Cuba to serve his mas- of her daughter, Isabella II.
ter "the king." During the period of




THE OLD REGIME, TO 1895              35
ganizations, such as the Order of the Solitary Star, the Cuban
Junta of New York, and the Junta of Havana, and El Cubano and El Filibustero were two Cuban papers published in
New York that favored annexation. Some few who would
have preferred independence regarded annexation as the only
practicable means of escape from Spain. Among these was
Jose Antonio Saco, the distinguished historian of slavery, one
of the greatest men the island has produced. Saco wrote in.1837:
"I have always wished that Cuba might be only for the Cubans, but,
now that perhaps that cannot be, we have no other recourse than to
throw ourselves into the arms of the United States. That is the idea
that it is best to diffuse and inculcate in the minds of all."
Out of this idea there developed the next serious effort
against Spain, in the L6pez conspiracies and expeditions of
1848-1851.
Narciso L6pez, the leader in this movement, was a native
of Venezuela who had risen to the rank of general in the
Spanish army on account of his services to the mother country in the Wars of Independence in Venezuela and against
the Carlists at a later time in Spain. He had taken up his
residence in Cuba, however, married there, and become devoted to the island and the interests of the Cuban people.
A man of liberalist tendencies, he at length resolved to promote a revolt against the arbitrary Spanish rule. An independent Cuba he did not wish, as he feared it might become
a negro republic after the Haitian pattern. But free Cuba,
like free Texas, might offer itself to the United States and
be accepted. That was what Lopez desired. The day for
the revolt was set for June 24, 1848. Meanwhile, L6pez had
gained assurances of aid from many Americans, especially
men of the southern states, who offered to provide him with
arms and ammunition. Owing to the vigilance of both the




36


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


American and Spanish authorities, however, it was impossible to get the supplies to Cuba on time. The plot was discovered, and Lopez had to make a hasty departure from the
country in order to escape capture. Arrived in the United
States, Lopez found a favorable atmosphere for the revival
of his plans. So he proceeded to organize an expedition. He
offered the command in turn to Jefferson Davis, Robert E.
Lee, and Governor Quitman of Mississippi. It is worthy
of note that each gave the matter serious consideration,
though declining in the end. So L6pez himself took charge.
Late in the spring of 1850 he set sail for Cuba, with a force
of nearly six hundred men, mostly Americans from the transAllegheny west, among whom were several officers who had
taken part in the Mexican War.
A landing was made at Cardenas, east of Matanzas, but it
proved necessary to fight a spirited battle with the Spanish
garrison. Lopez won, displaying great courage himself, but
he lost more than sixty men. This would not have been
serious if the Cubans had risen back of him as Lopez expected them to do. Many of them sympathized with the
undertaking, but doubted of its success. The tradition of
Spanish power was as yet too strong for the Cubans to risk
the wager of battle. And annexation to the United States
did not constitute so strong an appeal to Cuban patriotism
as would a cry for that independence which even the creole
followers of Lopez were not ready to espouse. So, when word
came that a Spanish army was approaching from Matanzas,
Lopez reembarked his forces. He himself would have liked
to try another landing, but his companions persuaded him
to put back for Key West.
Lopez had failed, but he was greeted in the United States
like a conquering hero. It proved impossible for the government to get a jury that would convict him or his companions.




THE OLD REGIME, TO 1895


37


Urged to organize a fresh expedition, he set about to do so.
Everything was in readiness in April 1851, but the matter
was brought to the attention of the United States authorities, who prevented the L6pez party from sailing. Many of
his followers felt, indeed, that there should be some assurances that the Cubans would rise, before another landing in
the island should be attempted. Leaders in Cuba were advised of this opinion, and they replied that they would start a
revolution between July 1 and 4. This was almost too early,
for L6pez was in no position to send aid by that time, owing
to the recent interference with his plans by the United States
government. Nevertheless, the uprising did take place as
promised. Under the leadership of Joaquin de Agiiero the
cry for Cuban liberty was raised in the public square at
Puerto Principe (as Camagiiey was then called), on July 3,
1851. Only fifteen of an expected four hundred patriots put
in an appearance on this occasion, and they were routed by
Spanish forces. But next day at a near-by town Agiiero was
more successful. Several hundred gathered there to listen to
the reading of a declaration of independence. Presently they
were attacked by Spanish troops, but drove them away.
Two days later the Spaniards were again defeated when they
made an assault on the patriot positions at Guanamaquilla.
Hopes of ultimate victory now ran high among the Cubans,
and the most optimistic messages were sent off to Lopez in
the United States. Immediately thereafter Agiiero made
the fatal mistake of dividing his forces into six bands of about
a hundred each. The Spaniards then caught them and beat
them in detail. Agiiero met death on the scaffold, and others
of his companions were shot.
Encouraged by the early messages he had received, L6pez
now prepared a second descent upon the island, discrediting
the rumors of Agiiero's later defeats. Early in August, with




38


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


a force of four hundred men, most of whom were Americans,
Lopez set sail. Just before starting, he was induced by information he received from Cuba to make his landing in
Pinar del Rio, west of Havana, instead of in the east in the
section where the recent uprising had taken place. This was
the first of a series of mistakes that were to prove disastrous
to the expedition. A landing was made near Bahia Honda,
some fifty miles west of Havana, but there were no Cuban
patriots to-reet them. Dividing his forces, L6pez began
a fruitless and pitiful search for the expected, but non-existent Cuban supporters. One portion of his command, under
Colonel William S. Crittenden, was captured and taken to
Havana. On August 16 fifty-two members of this party,
Crittenden among them, were shot! Lopez himself met
with one discouragement after another, and presently was
taken prisoner, along with the other survivors of the expedition. Sent to the scaffold, L6pez met death bravely, as
he had lived. "My death will not change the destinies of
Cuba," he said from the platform, just before he was executed. He was right. Cuba had need of a courageous example before it could take up arms with any hope of success.
Lopez had served that purpose.
For a while, following the defeat and death of L6pez, it
seemed as if the Cuban cause were hopeless. The New York
Times on October 18, 1851, gave its opinion that the charges
of Spanish oppression in Cuba must have been exaggerated,
since hardly any Cubans had risen in arms. There was great
discontent in fact, however, and the L6pez movement had
served as a spur to bring this out more clearly. Cubans and
Spaniards refused to associate with one another. There were
private collisions in which occasionally some lives were lost.
A number of students who were outspoken in their expressions against Spain were seized and executed. Nothing could




THE OLD REGIME, TO 1895


39


have been calculated to stir up Cuban hostility more than
this incident. Indeed, it has never been forgotten, and the
names of the boys who were put to death are now commemorated in a fine monument near the foot of the Prado in Havana. So at length Cuban feeling was at the fever point, and
it was certain that a fresh uprising would not lack supporters.
These were years of a strong liberalistic movement in
Spain, accompanied by the establishment of the principle of
constitutional government. At length, in 1868, Isabella II
(1833-1868) was dethroned, and a liberal monarchy set up
under Amadeo, a prince of the House of Savoy. Meanwhile,
a strong republican party had developed, and upon the resignation of Amadeo in 1873 Spain became a republic. The
experiment was unsuccessful, and in 1874 the Bourbons were
restored, in the person of Alfonso XII (1874-1885), but on
the basis of a limited monarchy. The course of events in
Spain could not fail to have their repercussions in Cuba. In
1865, for example, an organization of prominent Cubans demanded a constitutional, home-rule government, with freedom of the press, the right of petition, and the right of Cubans to hold office in Cuba and be represented in the Spanish
Cortes. Nothing came of these demands. Clearly Spain did
not intend to give Cuba a share in the liberal provisions that
were granted in the peninsula. Feeling in Cuba was more
intense now than formerly, because by this time the majority
opinion was in favor of Cuban independence, instead of annexation to the United States. As early as 1848, Saco had
come out for independence, opposing now the idea he had
once favored of joining the northern republic.
"I would like to see Cuba not only rich, illustrious, moral, and powerful,
but also Cuban and not Anglo-American," he said. "Cuba, our adored
Cuba, will one day be Cuba."'
'It is said that Saco later changed! is no longer any hope for Cuba exhis mind, remarking in 1866, "There cept in annexation."




40


A IIISTORY OF T1lE1 CUBAN REPUBLIC


Two years earlier he had made a strange prediction. He
asserted that the acute tyranny of Spain would eventually
compel the Cubans to revolt. Havana and the west would
not join the patriots in this war, and would even help the
Spaniards, while in the east there would be devastations and
assassinations in the name of war. The Cubans would fail
the first, second, and perhaps the third time, he said, but
finally would get outside help and win. Saco foresaw almost
exactly what was to happen. The L6pez expeditions may be
counted as the first Cuban effort, although they did not get
far enough to come within Saco's general description of the
wars. The Cubans were now ready for a second trial of arms.
On October 10, 1868, at the plantation of Yara in Oriente
a group of men declared the independence of Cuba from
Spain. That marked the beginning of the terrible Ten Years'
War. Under the leadership of Carlos Manuel de Cespedes
a provisional government for a Republic of Cuba was formed.
Even yet, many still hoped for annexation to the United
States. In 1869 Cespedes suggested to the Cuban agent in
New York that he should ask the Washington government
for annexation, and he himself wrote to President Grant to
the same purpose. Later that same year, prominent members of the Cuban Assembly of Representatives came out
for this idea. Meanwhile, however, it was necessary to consider the immediate needs of the war with Spain. One of the
first acts of the new government was to declare for an emancipation of the slaves. Unquestionably one of the moving
causes of this decision was a desire to obtain the services of
colored men in the patriot armies. And in fact they did make
up a large proportion of the soldiery. On April 10, 1869, a
Constitution for the new republic was drawn up, and Cespedes became president. This government was of necessity
self-constituted and roving, having many vicissitudes which




THE OLD REGIME, TO 1895


41


need not be followed here. Cespedes was succeeded in the
presidency by Salvador Cisneros (who, as a member of the
Assembly, had favored annexation), Francisco Aguilera,
Tomrs Estrada Palma (later, first president of the republic
after the winning of independence), and several others with
a somewhat shadowy claim to the honor. But the real story
of this period of Cuban history concerns the warfare in the
field.
When the revolution of Yara was proclaimed, the patriot
forces consisted of just 147 men, with not enough arms for a
weapon apiece. But the army grew literally over night, and
amounted to twenty-six thousand by the close of 1868. This
was a great change from the days of Lopez. Spain had far
greater resources, however, both in men and equipment. So
the Cubans began a guerrilla warfare which, while it won for
them few substantial advantages, was very difficult to suppress. There was no centre of operations, no territory definitely under patriot control, and, as Saco had predicted, it
was a war of destruction and murder, hardly touching the
west, then the richest part of Cuba, at all. Indeed, the commerce of western Cuba actually increased in amount over
former years. Santa Clara, Camagiiey, and Oriente were in
a continual turmoil, however. Life and property, especially
in the rural districts, were never safe, whatever one's opinions might be. Early in the war the Spanish authorities in
Oriente ordered the people to remain at their homes, on
penalty of death for any man found absent without an excuse. Unoccupied habitations were to be burned, while those
which were occupied were to fly a white flag. Women not
living in their own homes were to go to one or other of two
specified towns. The patriots replied by burning the estates
of Spanish sympathizers. These actions of the contending
parties were typical of the ruthless character of the war.




42


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


Eventually, MBximo Gomez, a native of the Dominican
Republic, came to the fore as the principal patriot leader.
His achievements at this time were to win for him the supreme command also in the final conflict of the century between Spain and Cuba. He gained a number of brilliant victories, but in 1875 was badly beaten at Puerto Principe
(Camagiiey), and this marked the turning-point of the war.
It dragged on, another three years, but degenerated into
something like banditry, with a motley throng of many races
and varying colors making up the patriot forces. Most of
the creole soldiers had by this time been killed, captured, or
driven into exile, while a number, convinced of the hopelessness of the cause, had withdrawn from the struggle, accepting Spanish terms. In 1877 Martinez Campos, one of the
ablest Spaniards of those times, became captain-general, and
in 1878 persuaded the Cuban leaders to lay down their arms.
By the Treaty of Zanjon, arranged by Martinez Campos and
G6mez, peace was declared, Spain promising a political amnesty, the emancipation of the slaves who had fought in the
Cuban cause, and various governmental reforms. Several
Cuban leaders refused to recognize this treaty, and continued
their operations. Among these were Calixto Garcia, already
a famous soldier and one of the Cuban presidents in the
closing months of the war, and Antonio Maceo, an able
mulatto, who was to become the greatest military leader in
Cuban history. Garcia was accompanied by the distinguished poet and patriot Jose Marti. All three of these men
were to win their principal fame in the next Spanish war.
There was some fighting to the close of the year 1880, an
outbreak in 1885, and at all times a great lack of security.
After 1880, however, the Cuban forces were more outlaws
than patriots. And yet the Treaty of Zanj6n was little more
than a truce. The Cubans had by this time determined on




THE OLD REGIME, TO 1895


43


independence, and irrespective of the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of the treaty they were certain to strike again at a
favorable moment. The years from 1878 to 1895 were virtually, therefore, merely a period of preparation for the
next war.
The Ten Years' War had cost some two hundred thousand
lives and seven hundred million dollars in property loss, ending in defeat for the Cubans. Several matters had played a
noteworthy part in bringing about the result. The Cubans
themselves were as yet by no means in agreement over the
desirability of a separation from Spain, let alone independence. Perhaps the strongest element in the Spanish armies
during the war were the bodies of "Volunteers," as the resident soldiery fighting on the Spanish side were called. They
played a part paralleling that of the Tories of the American
Revolution, but were a comparatively more powerful group
in Cuba than were the Tories of the United States. Another
factor of note was the failure of the Cubans to get that outside help which Saco had prophesied would be essential if
they were to win. A great deal of assistance was received
from citizens of the United States, but the American government held back, as will be told in the next chapter.
Nevertheless, as Saco also foresaw, the Ten Years' War
had been a necessary preliminary to the winning of independence. The Cubans needed to prove to themselves that
they could cope with the military power of Spain. And
they needed traditions of heroism and self-sacrifice as a
foundation upon which to rear a structure of patriotism that
would embrace all elements of Cuban citizenry. These
things the Ten Years' War had accomplished. When the
next conflict came the Cubans, far from being overawed by
the might of Spain, were confident of victory, and the sons of
the Volunteers of the previous war were, most of them, on




44            A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
the patriot side. They had learned that before all else they
were Cubans, and no hardships or privations were too great
for them to endure for love of country. And this time the
great northern republic did not hold back for long, but came
into the war, to decide the issue.3
3The best work on the beginnings Trelles, Biblioteca historica cubana,
of Spanish Cuba is Wright, Irene II, 142-176. Taylor, Charles Belden,
Aloha, The early history of Cuba, Spanish colonial institutions of Cuba
1492-1586, New York, 1916. Johnson, in the nineteenth century (M. A.
The history of Cuba, v. I-III, was thesis, 1925; Ms. in the Library of
most prominently used for the rest the University of California), is a
of the chapter, but a number of useful study of the period it covers.
valuable items were obtained from




CHAPTER III


THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA, TO 1895
FEW regions of the world have been more continuously a
matter of concern to the government and people of the
United States than the island of Cuba. Among the many
causes for this interest, that of the strategic importance of
the island in American affairs is deserving of first place. The
seal of the republic represents Cuba in the form of a key to
the Americas, stretching out from Florida on the one hand
to Yucatan on the other. This has been expressed in a recent
article as follows:
"Cuba, lying at important crossroads of Caribbean and Gulf trade
routes, commands the only two entrances to the Gulf of Mexico and one
of the chief passages to the Caribbean Sea... Thus it is in a position
to bottle up the Gulf ports of the United States and to jeopard that
nation's control of interoceanic canal routes. Furthermore, its many
large and easily defensible harbors could serve as unexcelled bases for
enemy ships engaged in blockading the ports or hampering the commerce
of the United States."'
The precise reasons for American interest in the strategic
position of Cuba have changed from time to time, but the
importance of the geographic position and character of the
island has continued, whatever the new conditions. Other
considerations making for close relations between the United
States and Cuba have been set forth in the same article, as
follows:
1 Whittlesey, D  S, Geographic view, v. XII, pp. 241-256, at 241;
factors in the relations of the United Apr., 1922.
States and Cuba, in Geographical re45




46


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


"To commerce the proximity of island to continent is of basic import,
for the short and cheap carriage between Cuban ports and those of the
southern and eastern coasts of North America has helped to make the
United States Cuba's best customer and one of the countries from which
it buys most heavily. The climatic contrasts between the two domains,
in conjunction with their proximity, have had further far-reaching
results. Cuba, lying in the path of warm rainy trade winds, produces
as its agricultural staples sugar and tobacco, besides cacao and tropical
fruits and nuts. These find a ready and constant market in the United
States, which in turn can supply Cuba with cereals, meat products, and
fabricated goods. Furthermore, the predominance of large-scale agriculture in Cuba opens an outlet near home for capital of American
investors who wish to keep an eye on their projects. Finally, the fact
that Cuban agriculture is chiefly of the plantation type resulted in the
use of negro slaves, and the island was entangled for years in the
perplexing slavery issue of the continent. More recently the mild Cuban
winters have attracted pleasure seekers from the rigorous climate of
northern United States, and Cubans in turn have spent their summers in
the northern Appalachians."2
Long before the United States came into being with the
Declaration of Independence in 1776, Cuba had inevitably
been a prominent factor in the international rivalries of
European powers in the Americas. Many a project was devised in England for filching the island from Spanish control,
but Spain clung tenaciously to Cuba, realizing how the rest
of her empire depended on it. English interest, meanwhile,
passed on to the American colonies, which were fully aware
of the importance of Cuba in their affairs. A Mr. Hamilton
proposed the conquest of the island by English colonial
troops in 1739, saying:
"If the Crown of England could become possessed of the Island of
Cuba, that Key of all America, no man of knowledge can denye but that
Great Britain, in that case must become possessed of the whole Trade
of the Spanish Empire; and if the simple Privilege of trading with these
People, upon very high terms, is now become one of the greatest Prizes
contended for by all the Powers in Europe, sure England will not neglect
'Whittlesey,  D  S, Geographic view, v. XII, pp. 241-256, at 241-242;
factors in the relations of the United Apr., 1922.
States and Cuba, in Geographical re



THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA, TO 1895


47


any opportunity which is offer'd of acquiring such a possession as must
Infallibly Secure that whole Invaliable trade to its Subjects alone."'
During the Seven Years' War, Governor Pownall of Massachusetts suggested an attack on Cuba, and when Lord Albemarle took Havana in 1762 there were a number of colonial
troops in his army. Both Spain and France insisted upon
the return of Cuba to the former in 1763, declaring that
peace would be of no avail without it. This may have been
a bit of good fortune eventually for the United States. As
one writer has put it,
"If England had held it during the American Revolution it would
doubtless have delayed the success of the American colonies. It was
there that many of the fleets which harmed England found a harbor.
If England had held Cuba after 1783, the United States boundary might
have been limited to the Mississippi."
In the years following the winning of American independence there was a great migration across the Alleghenies from
the Atlantic states.   The newly-founded western settlements had no outlet for their goods to compare with that of
water transportation down the Mississippi to New Orleans
and thence through the Gulf of Mexico. The acquisition
of New Orleans at the time of the Louisiana purchase
in 1803 served to relieve the situation only in part, for
the west was still at the mercy of any power that might
hold Florida or Cuba. As early as 1807 Jefferson remarked that in case of a war with Spain, Cuba might
"add   itself  to  our  confederation."   The   invasion   of
Spain by Napoleon in 1808 caused no little anxiety in
the United States on account of possible complications in
Spanish America. Gallatin wrote Jefferson that he was
8This quotation and others in this 10), of which this chapter is in the
chapter for which no citation is given main a summary.
are from the Callahan volume (cf. n.




48


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


afraid England might now try to get Cuba, saying its possession by either France or England would be a "drawback"
to the United States. "I shall sincerely lament Cuba falling into any hands but those of its present owners," he
added. With these views Jefferson was in entire agreement.
The western attitude about Cuba was squarely presented in
a letter to the Secretary of State, dated December 10, 1810,
by Governor Claiborne of Louisiana.
"There is nothing I so much desire," said Claiborne, "as to see the
flag of my Country reared on the Moro Castle. Cuba is the real mouth
of the Mississippi, and the nation possessing it, can at any time command
the trade of the Western States. Give us Cuba and the American Union
is placed beyond the reach of change."'
Jefferson was among the earliest and most enthusiastic
proponents of the acquisition of Cuba by the United States.
Late in 1808 he was visited by a Cuban deputation which
came to urge the annexation of the island to the northern
republic, now that Spain seemed to have passed over to Napoleon. Jefferson took no action, but just before he went
out of office in 1809 is alleged to have said, "We must have
the Floridas and Cuba." In later years he wrote many letters to Madison and Monroe, pointing out the importance of
Cuba to the United States. In a letter of 1809 to Madison,
for example, he suggested that Napoleon might be willing
to give Cuba to the United States to keep this country from
interfering with French plans elsewhere in Hispanic America.
"That would be a price," said Jefferson, "and I would immediately
erect a column on the southernmost limit of Cuba, and inscribe on it a
ne plus ultra as to us in that direction."
The same wish was often expressed by leading American
statesmen of the next fifty years. It was not so much that
'Cited in Perez, Luis Marino, Re- association, Publications, v. X, pp.
lations with Cuba, iri Southern history 203-214, at 203; July, 1906.




THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA, TO 1895


49


they desired Cuba for itself, as that they were afraid some
European power, as Madison put it, "might make a fulcrum
of that position against the commerce and security of the
United States."
The purchase of Florida in 1819, following the earlier acquisition of West Florida, added to the peace of mind of the
western states, but made the Cuban question all the more
acute, as the only surviving problem of its kind. For several
years before 1819 there had been frequent rumors that Spain
might cede Cuba to England. A large body of English public opinion favored such a settlement, and when it was evident that the United States was to get Florida this element
almost insisted that England take steps at once to acquire
Cuba. During July and August 1820 the London Morning
Chronicle ran a series of articles by Mr. J. Freeman Rattenbury, discussing the Florida purchase. According to him this
added vast strength to the United States, which needed no
longer to fear a secession of the trans-Allegheny country, and
it constituted a grave danger to British interests in the West
Indies. He suggested that Spain should turn over Cuba
to England as an indemnity for the harm the latter had
suffered by the transfer of Florida to the American republic.
England must now have Havana as a "depot of thunder"
to awe the United States, and if Spain would not cede Cuba,
then as a matter of self-defence England should take it by
force. "The apologists for the seizure of the fleet at Copenhagen could not want an excuse for this equally necessary
violence," he added.5 The London Times took the same
view. Referring to the proposed cession of Cuba to England as an offset to the acquisition of Florida, a writer in
'This is a reference to the British was done to prevent its falling into
seizure of the Danish fleet in 1807 the hands of Napoleon.
without a declaration of war. This




50


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


the Times insisted that "The two transactions are necessary
parts of the same whole, and must be, if possible, put out of
hand together." The much desired Cuban "compensation"
to England was not obtained, however. Whatever other considerations may have held back the British authorities at
this time, they well knew that they would meet with vigorous resistance by the United States.
For the next quarter of a century the United States was
constantly disturbed, nevertheless, by a fear that England
or France might get Cuba. There were rumors that England would give Gibraltar and cash for Cuba, that Spain
would turn over Cuba as security for a loan from England,
that the British and French fleets appearing from time to
time in Cuban waters (ostensibly to check piracy or, in
the case of English ships, the slave trade) were to be utilized in fact to seize the island, or that the Spanish Bourbons
might cede it to the Bourbons of France in return for military or financial assistance. On at least one occasion Spain
really was ready to cede Cuba to France. Hard pressed for
funds with which to carry on the Carlist War, the queen regent, Cristina, planned to sell Cuba, Porto Rico, and the
Philippines in 1836. The agreement had been made, and
was ready for signature, when the bourgeois French monarch,
Louis Philippe, haggled for a slight reduction in price.
Pushing the contract across the table he said that the reduction would have to be made, or the contract might as well be
thrown in the fire. Thereupon the Spanish envoy, who was
personally opposed to the cession, crumpled up the document
and threw it into the fire! Thus narrowly did the United
States escape a controversy over the Monroe Doctrine idea.
The United States was unceasingly vigilant to oppose any
such contingency. Indeed, its concern over Cuba had been
one of the principal factors leading to the enunciation of




THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA, TO 1895


51


the Monroe Doctrine. John Quincy Adams, the author of
that famous document, expressed his views about Cuba in a
letter he wrote on April 28, 1823, to our minister in Spain.
"Cuba," he said, "almost in sight of our shores, from a multitude of
considerations, has become an object of transcendent importance to
the commercial and political interests of our Union. Its commanding
position, with reference to the Gulf of Mexico and the West India seas;
the character of its population; its situation midway between our
southern coast and the island of St. Domingo; its safe and capacious
harbor of the Havana, fronting a long line of our shores destitute of
the same advantage; the nature of its productions and of its wants,
furnishing the supplies and needing the returns of a commerce immensely
profitable and mutually beneficial,-give it an importance in the sum
of our national interests with which that of no other foreign territory
can be compared, and little inferior to that which binds the different
members of this Union together. Such, indeed, are, between the interests
of that island and of this country, the geographical, commercial, moral,
and political relations, formed by nature, gathering, in the process of
time, and even now verging to maturity, that, in looking forward to the
probable course of events, for the short period of half a century, it is
scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba
to our federal republic will be indispensable to the continuance and
integrity of the Union itself. It is obvious, however, that for this event
we are not yet prepared. Numerous and formidable objections to the
extension of our territorial dominions beyond sea, present themselves
to the first contemplation of the subject; obstacles to the system of
policy by which alone that result can be compassed and maintained,
are to be foreseen and surmounted, both from at home and abroad;
but there are laws of political, as well as of physical gravitation; and if
an apple, severed by the tempest from its native tree, cannot choose but
fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural
connexion with Spain, and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only
towards the North American Union, which, by the same law of nature,
cannot cast her off from its bosom."'
In the same year Jefferson wrote:
"I have ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition which
could ever be made to our system of States...  Her addition to our
'U. S., House, Exec. Doe., 32d   121, pp. 6-7.
Cong., 1st Sess. (1851-1852), Doc. No.




52


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


confederacy is exactly what is wanting to advance our power as a nation
to the point of its utmost interest."
On the whole, however, the United States was satisfied to
see Cuba remain in the possession of Spain, a country that
was too weak to threaten the United States. A long line of
American Secretaries of State kept England and France constantly apprised of the fact that the United States would
resist an acquisition of Cuba by either of them, and advised
the Spanish authorities that they could count on the full
support of the American military and naval forces to prevent
a forced cession to another European country.
Realizing the attitude of the American government, England and France adopted a similar policy concerning Cuba.
Both wanted it if ever a propitious moment should favor
them, but in the meantime preferred Spain's retention of
the island to an acquisition by either of the other two powers
involved. According to a writer in the London Courier in
1825, Cuba was the
"Turkey of trans-Atlantic politics, tottering to its fall, and kept from
falling only by the struggles of those who contend for the right of
catching her in her descent."
The British government, however, seems eventually to have
become convinced that there was slight hope of an annexation to England. Cuban sentiment rejected the idea because
with England the island could be no more than a colony and
because of England's stand in favor of the emancipation of
slaves; many in England itself drew back on account of slavery, since it would cost heavily to bring about abolition
through purchase of the negroes from their owners; and finally there was the determined adherence of the United
States to the Monroe Doctrine as an obstacle in England's
path. So British statesmen for a while tried to persuade the




THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA, TO 1895


53


American and French governments to join with them in a
self-denying ordinance, guaranteeing the island to Spain.
France usually rejected these suggestions, but in any event
the United States would at no time have agreed to them.
Quite aside from the "no entangling alliance" principle, there
were few American statesmen who did not believe but that
Cuba would some day be a part of the United States, and
they were unwilling to bind the country indefinitely. As
John Quincy Adams put it in 1823, the United States had
no intention of playing a game of "grab," but the Cubans
might some day wish to "exercise their primitive rights,"
and seek admission to the Union, while it was certain that
they would not seek annexation to England. Therefore an
agreement with England meant only a pledge as against
the United States.
The Spanish American Wars of Independence introduced
a further complication. Apart from the question of independence, there was the added factor of Cuba's serving as a
base for Spanish attacks against the rebellious colonies.
Several times in the later years of/the war, plans were set
on foot to revolutionize the island or to send expeditions
from Colombia or Mexico to overwhelm the Spanish forces
there. In each case France, England, and the United States
opposed the idea. France, as a close ally of the Spanish Bourbons, was against it on every score. England and the United
States objected primarily because they feared that a Colombian or Mexican occupation could not be permanent, wherefore Cuba might fall into other hands. In particular, England feared the United States, and the United States feared
England, though each had some fear of France. The Washington authorities were also alarmed at the prospect of abolition in Cuba, because of the effect it might have on the
southern states. The American people were enthusiastically




54


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


in sympathy with the patriot cause in the mainland parts of
Spanish America, but Cuba occupied a special position calling for a different point of view. Indeed, it was the Cuban
question that caused the United States to delay in sending
delegates to Bolivar's Panama Congress of 1826. When at
length they were allowed to start, they received instructions
that were opposed to the separation of Cuba from Spain.
As already pointed out, Cuban opinion itself was not at that
time in favor of independence. Many wanted a separation
from Spain, but desired to join with Colombia, Mexico, or
the United States. Probably most of this element favored
annexation to the American republic. Cuban agents visited
Washington to urge the idea, and it was discussed in Cabinet
meetings. Some Americans wished to "take the goods the
gods provide us," John C. Calhoun among them, but the
wisdom of Adams prevailed in this instance as in so many
others. He was unwilling to risk British opposition, for if
England went to war about the matter her fleet would enable
her to get Cuba for herself, at least for many years. The
best policy was to let Spain keep the island until the United
States could get in, without risk of losing it.
The annexation of Texas in 1845 and the further annexations resulting from the Mexican War, 1846-1848, gave rise
to a new attitude in the United States with respect to Cuban
affairs. For a little over a decade, down to the outbreak of
the Civil War, the American people were in the grip of "manifest destiny." There was no longer any great fear of England or France, and southward expansion had its advocates
in all sections of the country. Cuba, primarily because of
its strategic position, was particularly desired. The Mississippi valley was not quite so much at the mercy of a
strong power in control of Cuba as formerly, for direct communications with the east by way of the Great Lakes and




THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA, TO 1895


55


the canals, but especially through the medium of railroads,
were rapidly being developed. A large part of western commerce still made its way through the gulf, past Cuba, however.   But the question of trans-isthmian routes to the
Pacific Ocean, especially to the newly-won golden California, It
had come prominently to the fore. Cuba now occupied the
same position with respect to the far west and Pacific coast
that it had held earlier to the Mississippi valley. On this
score a report by a naval expert, Lieutenant Dahlgren, is
interesting:
"The true and only key, however, to the defense of these shores, and
to the immense interest there collected, is the Havana. The island to
which it belongs enters its western extreme in the Gulf, leaving but two
passages for vessels, so narrow as to be comunanded with the greatest
facility; these are the great thoroughfares of trade and the mail steamers
from New Orleans to California and New York. Hence, if the use of
the Havana be even at the disposal of an enemy while in the hands
of a neutral Power, each and all of these interests could be with difficulty
defended, even by a superior naval force, and never guaranteed against
severe losses. While from it, as a United States port, a squadron of
moderate size would cover the southeast and Gulf coasts, protect the
foreign and inshore traders, and secure the lines from New York or
New Orleans to the Pacific States by way of the Isthmus, its occupation
would necessarily be the object of every expedition, military or naval,
preliminary to any attempt on the southern trade or territory."'
Already, too, plans were being broached for a canal in Central America or Panama, to which Cuba would have just as
important a relation as it did to California. These years,
therefore, were filled with projects for the acquisition of
Cuba, ranging from filibustering expeditions to proposals
for a purchase of the island. Presently, another factor made
itself felt that may have decided the issue against an American acquisition of Cuba: the slavery dispute in the United
States. The southern states began to regard "manifest des —;
'U. S., Cong. Globe, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. (1858-1859), Part I, p. 453.




56


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


tiny" as a medium for slavery extension, through which they
might build up their political strength against the onslaughts
of the abolitionists. Cuba was ideally suited to their purposes, not only because of its close connection with the
United States, but also because it was one of the few remaining regions where slavery existed. It was not long, therefore, before the early enthusiasm  of the north dwindled
away, until at length all desire for the annexation of Cuba
had passed.
James K. Polk, frank exponent of American expansion,
was not satisfied with the acquisitions of what had once been
Mexican territory. He distinctly wished to add the annexation of Cuba to his list of achievements. There was hardly
any concealment of his desire. Vice-President Dallas publicly toasted "the annexation of Cuba" in 1845, and a resolution was introduced in the Senate, late that same year, for
the President to open negotiations for the purchase of the
island. Polk was not willing to compromise the honor of
the government, however, and when asked to lend his support to a proposed Cuban revolution in favor of annexation,
he replied, as he sets forth in his diary,
"That if Cuba was ever obtained by the IU. S. it must be by amicable
purchase, and that as the President of the U. S. I could give no countenance to such a step, and could not wink at such a movement."
Polk also drew back before a parallel opportunity to acquire
Yucata'n, the great peninsula that juts out from southern
Mexico toward Cuba. That vast territory had for some years
been an unwilling member of the Mexican federation. It
drew out from 1829 to 1832, and did so again in 1841, but was
overcome in 1843. In 1846 Yucattin again resumed her independence, taking no part in the war between Mexico and
8Polk, James Knox, Diary (4 vols., Chicago. 1910), III, 476-477.




THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA, TO 1895


57


the United States. On the contrary, in the spring of 1848
the Yucatan authorities asked Polk's government to annex
their territory to the United States, hoping in that way to
protect the country from Mexico on the one hand and the
British in Belize on the other. Some of the people of Yucatin had considered an annexation to England, but Polk
was unwilling to see a transfer of the territory to any other
power, though not disposed to favor the Yucatan offer to
come under the American flag.
"From its vicinity to Cuba, the Capes of Florida, to New Orleans,
and indeed to our whole southwestern coast, it would be dangerous to
our peace and security if it should become the colony of any foreign
nation," he said.
Neither Polk nor his successors would lend any encouragement to L6pez or other promoters of violence in getting
Cuba, but Polk did take steps, as soon as the Mexican war 
was over, to secure Cuba by purchase. British activities in '
Central America were one of the reasons for his desire for an
immediate acquisition of Cuba, and he also feared that England still had designs on the island. This was pointed out
by Secretary of State James J. Buchanan, June 17, 1848, in a
long letter to Mr. Saunders, the American minister to Spain.
Minister Saunders soon became convinced, however, that
no Spanish government could survive a sale of Cuba to the
United States. The Spanish Minister of State told him that
"he believed it to be the feeling of the country, that sooner
than see the island transferred to any power, they would
prefer to see it sunk in the ocean." Defeated in the elections
of 1848, the Democrats were succeeded in 1849 by the less
imperialistic Whig administrations of Taylor (1849-1850)xJ
and Fillmore (1850-1853). Taylor might have been ready
to take over Cuba, but was not willing to go even to the
length of suggesting a purchase, holding that any such pro-.




58


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


posal must come from Spain. Fillmore, however, was doubtful whether the acquisition of Cuba would be desirable at that
time. It was during these administrations that the principal
efforts of Lopez were made, but no moment could have been
chosen when the help or the connivance of the United States
in aid of filibustering expeditions was less likely to be obtained.
The Democrats returned to power in 1853, and remained in the saddle until 1861. Pierce (1853-1857) and
Buchanan (1857-1861) were willing to go to lengths that
might have been successful if employed at an earlier time by
Polk, before the anti-slavery movement had gained full
headway in the north. Pierce announced in his inaugural
address that he would "not be controlled by any timid forebodings of evil from expansion," adding that "the acquisition
of certain possessions not within our jurisdiction" might become "eminently important for our protection, if not in the
future essential for the preservation of the rights of commerce and the peace of the world." Diplomatic posts abroad
were filled primarily with a view to the Cuban question.
Buchanan, Mason, and Soule were sent respectively to England, France, and Spain. Soule's appointment was not calculated to please Spain, for he had publicly favored the
Lopez expeditions, and was known to prefer the "Texas
game" as a method of acquiring Cuba rather than a purchase. He was received, however, though heartily disapproved by the higher Spanish officials and the press. It was
not long before an incident occurred in Cuba which gave him
a chance to exert pressure on the Spanish government.
There had been much cause for irritation in American
relations with Cuba. Aside from the legal restrictions on
American trade, the manner of enforcing the laws gave rise
to much annoyance. Whenever a complaint was made at




THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA, TO 1895


59


Havana, the captain-general was in the habit of denying
his right to handle diplomatic business, referring the American government to the Spanish minister in Washington or
the State Department in Spain. Officials in Spain or the
minister in the United States would then refer to one another
or set on foot an enquiry of the captain-general. As a result
there were exasperating delays and perhaps an evasion of the
issues involved. The most striking instance of this kind was
the "Black Warrior" affair of 1854. The "Black Warrior"
plied between Mobile and New York, stopping at Havana for
passengers and mail. The law required a manifest of the
cargo in such cases, but as it was a mere formality it had
never been asked for. The "Black Warrior" had a cargo of
cotton, but the captain, following the usual custom, made
no mention of it to the officials of the port. He was advised
presently that the cargo would be confiscated because he
had failed to comply with the law. Asking permission to
correct the manifest, he was refused, and abandoned the ship
with his officers and crew when the Spaniards came on board
to unload the cotton.
The above incident took place on February 28, 1854. Instructions were at once forwarded to Soule to demand satisfaction of the Spanish government. A somewhat acrimonious correspondence between Soule and the Spanish Minister
of State followed, during which Soule all but threatened war.
Meanwhile, the Spanish government made haste to settle
with the owners of the "Black Warrior," leaving the United
States with scant cause for complaint.  President Pierce
seemed willing for a time to go to war, but something occurred in another quarter to assure the opposition of the
north to the project. This was the Kansas-Nebraska legislation of 1853-1854. It is probable that the victory of the
slavery-extensionists in this issue was the principal stum



60


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


bling-block in the way of an acquisition of Cuba, whether by
purchase or by force, because of the now insistent opposition
of the north. The southern extremists were eager to bring
about annexation by filibustering expeditions, but neither
Pierce nor his secretary of State, Marcy, would countenance
that. Instead they proposed to use the vast body of American claims against Spain, including the "Black Warrior"
case, as a lever to bring about a voluntary cession of the
island. In this connection Soule was instructed to confer
with Buchanan and Mason. This brought on the somewhat
celebrated Ostend Manifesto.
The three American diplomats met at Ostend, Belgium, in
October 1854, and exchanged views. Soule had prepared an
elaborate document, and with this as a basis Buchanan wrote
the manifesto, which all three signed. It was in the form of
a report to Secretary Marcy, but gained its title of "manifesto" because it was given out for publication. It began
by urging the purchase of Cuba for not exceeding $120,000,000, going on to recite the advantages both to Spain and the
United States. To the United States, however, its "immediate acquisition" was of "paramount importance," and any
delay in getting it would be "exceedingly dangerous to the
United States." Taking up the question of a possible
Spanish refusal to sell, the authors of the document made
the following bold suggestion of policy, based on the principle that "Self-preservation is the first law of nature, with
States as well as with individuals":
"After we shall have offered Spain a price for Cuba far beyond its
present value, and this shall have been refused, it will then be time to
consider the question, does Cuba, in the possession of Spain, seriously
endanger our internal peace and the existence of our cherished Union?
Should this question be answered in the affirmative, then, by every law,
human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain if we
possess the power."




THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA, TO 1895


61


Though met with ridicule or denunciation in both Europe
and the United States, the Ostend Manifesto did not in fact
represent the attitude of the administration. It is now regarded as a clever political trick of Buchanan's to secure the
Democratic nomination for the presidency,-a trick that
worked. Marcy wrote Soule repelling the suggestion that
Cuba was necessary at that time to the self-preservation of
the United States, and to a friend in New York he expressed
his opinion in a letter of April 15, 1855, as follows:
"I am entirely opposed to getting up a war for the purpose of seizing
Cuba... The robber doctrine, I abhor. If carried out it would degrade
us in our own estimation and disgrace us in the eyes of the civilized
world... Cuba would be a very desirable possession, if it came to us
in the right way, but we cannot afford to get it by robbery or theft."'
The Ostend Manifesto made Buchanan acceptable to the
south, and he secured the Democratic nomination in 1856.
The Democratic platform had a strong plank in favor of the
acquisition of Cuba, while the newly-founded Republican
party stigmatized the Ostend Manifesto as "the highwayman's plea." In his speech accepting the nomination
Buchanan said that if he could settle the slavery question,
"and then add Cuba to the Union," he would be "willing to
give up the ghost," and let the Vice-President succeed him.
Buchanan won the election, but met with as little success
in his efforts to acquire Cuba as in settling the slavery
question in the United States. "Expansion is in the future
the policy of our country, and only cowards fear and oppose
it," he said on one occasion in 1858, but the "cowards" were
too much for the "brave" Buchanan. A bill was introduced
in the Senate in 1859 appropriating thirty millions, designed
as a first payment, to facilitate the acquisition of Cuba as a


Quoted in Moore, John Bassett, in Forum, v. XXI, pp. 288-300, at
The question of Cuban belligerency, 300; May, 1896.




62


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


state in the American Union at a price of not more than
$120,000,000. But the bill never got to a vote. Once again
a convention year, 1860, rolled around, and again the annexation plank appeared in the Democratic platform. This
time, however, the Republicans won, and the election of
Lincoln was followed by the great American Civil War, during which the long-fought Cuban question was very nearly
eclipsed from view.
Spain showed a tendency to favor the Confederacy during
the Civil War, granting rights of belligerency only sixty-six
days after the firing on Fort Sumter, but the battle of
Gettysburg ended any prospect there might have been for
her to extend effective aid. The north felt the lack of a
naval base in the West Indies, which the experts claimed
would have enabled her to bring the war to an end much
sooner. For this purpose, however, any one of a number
of places other than Cuban ports might later have been obtained, but the United States came out of the war with such
power that there was no immediate prospect of a conflict
with a foreign country. Indeed, a chance to acquire portions
of the Danish West Indies (since bought in entirety) was
allowed to pass. Furthermore, many of the issues that had
made for the American policy of an annexation of Cuba no
longer existed. Slavery had been abolished in the United
States, and a slave-holding Cuba was now certainly not
desired. Some few might have wished to acquire Cuba in
order to abolish slavery, but this argument was not very insistently put forward. Direct communication with the
trans-Allegheny west had long since developed on a considerable scale, and a few years after the war a railway to the
Pacific coast was completed. By the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty
of 1850, too, the United States was assured of participation
with England in the building and use of an isthmian canal.




THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA, TO 1895


63


All of these things made the possession of Cuba by the
United States less necessary than before. In Cuba a new
state of affairs now existed. A strong pro-Spanish party
wanted to keep conditions as they were, with slavery as the
cornerstone of Cuban institutions, while the Cuban party
leaned toward abolition, but favored independence rather
than annexation to the United States. American concern
about Cuba therefore entered a comparatively unimportant
phase. The United States urged Spain to take steps iooking
toward emancipation, which was eventually accomplished,
but met with little success in her efforts to promote American
commerce with Cuba or to get Spain to establish a more
liberal system of government. The Ten Years' War, commencing in 1868, inaugurated an active diplomatic era,
though divorced from desires of annexation or fears of England or France. The two latter powers, indeed, might no
longer have interposed serious objections to an American
acquisition of Cuba, so greatly had the situation changed.
As was to be expected, the American people sympathized
with the Cuban patriots in the Ten Years' War, very ardently at first, but less enthusiastically as the conflict dragged
out almost interminably and degenerated in character. Only
at infrequent intervals was there anything approaching a
desire for war with Spain. As for the United States government, it was faithful to its international duties toward Spain,
and was quite effective in preventing the despatch of help
from American ports to the Cuban insurgents. To be sure,
some boats escaped with shipments of supplies and occasional small parties of recruits, and large numbers of
Cubans who were engaged in an active propaganda against
Spain resided in the United States. Most of the war (1868 -1878) was coincident with the administration of President
Grant (1869-1877), whose personal sympathies were in favor




64


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


of the Cubans, though he gave them no material help. On one
occasion, in 1869, he signed a proclamation recognizing Cuban
belligerency, an act which would have been of inestimable
value to the insurrectionists, but Mr. Fish, the Secretary of
State, who disapproved of it, held up the document. Grant
was grateful when he learned that it had not been issued, for
by that time he realized that his action had been premature.
Thereafter he repeatedly opposed an accord of the rights of
belligerency. For example, he pointed out in his message
of June 13, 1870, that such a grant must depend on conditions showing a probability of success. The Cubans held
no seaports or considerable towns, had no established seat of
government, and no commerce or manufactures. There was
therefore no war in the international sense, however severe
the fighting might be.
The patience of the American administration was strained
to the breaking-point at times by Spanish practices. In
1869 the Spanish captain-general authorized the capture of
any vessel on the high seas, whatever the flag, if it were
carrying aid to the insurgents, and ordered that persons
found on such boats should be executed as pirates. The
United States denied Spain's right to take such action except
in time of war, intimating that a continuance of the practice
would be considered as a Spanish declaration of a state of
war in Cuba, which meant that the insurrectionists could
have the rights of belligerents. This brought about a quick
modification of the decree, not however before several American vessels had been seized. The fighting in Cuba was carried on in a most barbarous fashion by both sides, in course
of which grave damage and loss of life were inflicted upon
Americans. No protests could be made to the unrecognized
Cubans, although they lost a great deal of the world's
sympathies by their manner of conducting the war, but there




THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA, TO 1895


65


were frequent representations made to Spain, both on account of her inability to end the devastating conflict, and
because of the direct acts of her own soldiery or officials. In
1869 two Americans were captured with an insurgent force,
and were put to death after barely the shadow of a trial.
That same year the Cubans began a general destruction of
property, especially sugar estates, which entailed no small
loss to American interests. The Spaniards retaliated by
confiscating the estates of those suspected as Cuban sympathizers, and much American-owned property was seized. The
most flagrant disregard of American sentiment came up,
however, in connection with notorious "Virginius" affair.
The "Virginius" was a former American vessel that had
been purchased by Cuban sympathizers for use in conveying war supplies. In 1873 this boat, while flying the American flag, was captured either on the high seas or else in
British waters off Jamaica, and was taken into Santiago.
There, after a mockery of a trial, the captain of the "Virginius" and fifty-one others, largely Americans or Englishmen,
were shot. Ninety-three more probably owed their lives to
Sir Lambton Lorraine of the British man-o'war "Niobe."
"Shoot another Englishman or American," Lorraine informed the Spanish commander, "and the 'Niobe' will bombard the city." The executions stopped! This barbarous
affair was deprecated everywhere, and caused great indignation and excitement in the United States. For a time there
was a clamor for war. General Sickles, the American representative in Spain, was instructed to demand the punishment of General Burriel (the Spanish commander responsible for the outrage), indemnities to the families of the
deceased, and a salute to the American flag. Failing satisfaction, he was to ask for his passports. The Spanish government announced its willingness to accede to the first two




66


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


of these demands, but objected to the third, on grounds that
the "Virginius" had no right to fly the American flag, since it
was in fact owned by citizens of Cuba. General Sickles
pressed the American claims vigorously, but did not receive
the full support of the government. Spain had just become a
republic, and had been recognized as such by the United
States; so there was no wish to embarrass her too greatly
with American claims. The Attorney General of the United
States upheld Spain on the question of the flag. The salute
was therefore dispensed with. Eventually, after a year of
pressure, Spain paid an indemnity of eighty thousand dollars
for the heirs of the Americans who had been executed, but
General Burriel, far from being punished, as Spain had
promised, was promoted! Meanwhile, General Sickles had
resigned. The authorities at Washington had not disapproved of his conduct, but he himself had disapproved of the
government's vacillation "between extreme demands at the
outset and large concessions to Spain in the end."
Early in the war the United States offered her mediation in
the conflict, being moved to that end by the serious damage
occasioned to American interests, as well as by the dictates of
humanity. In 1869 the United States proposed the following terms as the basis for American mediation: an acknowledgment of Cuban independence by Spain; in return therefor, payment of an indemnity to Spain by Cuba; the abolition of slavery in Cuba; and an armistice, pending
negotiations. The first of these provisions was the principal
stumbling-block. Spanish statesmen were often able to contemplate the idea of Cuban independence, and General Prim
while he was virtual dictator in Spain distinctly favored it,
but they invariably insisted that Spanish honor would not
permit of this while the insurgents were still in the field; if
they would lay down their arms, Spain might consent to




THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA, TO 1895


67


independence, provided a majority of the Cubans wanted it.
This, however, was an impossible condition, as there was no
likelihood of persuading the Cubans to trust in Spanish
promises. The negotiations over mediation were continued
a while, but as no real progress was made they were presently
withdrawn.
Spanish public opinion was at no time in favor of Cuban
independence. Fear of reprisals against Spaniards, as well
as concern over the national honor, influenced them in their
opposition. Curiously enough, however, there were moments
when many Spaniards would have agreed to a transfer of
Cuba to the United States, in return for an indemnity and
commercial advantages. In 1870, for example, several Spanish newspapers, most of them republican, advocated the cession, asserting that it could be done without loss of honor,
as the insurrection was nearly suppressed. In this way, they
argued, Spain might obtain a much-needed sum of money,
and be relieved of the burden of managing Cuban affairs. To
the American who is accustomed to the somewhat wearisome
charges against the United States of an "all-grabbing"
imperialism, one further assertion of these Spanish journals
is interesting. They referred to a traditional American policy
against the acquisition of colonies, citing the frequent American refusals to take the Sandwich (Hawaiian) Islands and
the neglect to annex the Dominican Republic or the Danish
island of St. Thomas when they were offered to the United
States. The Spanish proponents of a sale were afraid that
the growing indifference of the United States to annexations
of territory might later make it impossible to sell Cuba to the
American republic.
Offers of mediation had failed, but still the war dragged on,
though the Spanish government ever insisted that it was
"about to end." Domestic troubles in the peninsula, how



68


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


ever, kept Spain from exerting her full force in Cuba. So
the United States, unwilling to suffer a prolongation of a
state of affairs so harmful to American interests, began at
length to consider an intervention. Having no intention of
annexing Cuba, the Washington authorities hit upon a device
that for a moment seemed likely to jeopardize that cornerstone of American foreign policy, the Monroe Doctrine.
Late in 1875 Secretary Fish wrote to the American ministers
at six of the European capitals, reciting the American grievances and suggesting the necessity for United States intervention unless Spain could be persuaded to end the war.
The European powers were requested to urge Spain to
stop it, thus avoiding the contemplated American action.
This closely approximated an association for the settlement
of an American problem, and when the House called on Fish
for his department files he seems to have realized that he
had made a mistake, for he suppressed some of the papers,
denying that any "correspondence" had taken place, though
admitting that he had sought the moral backing of Europe.
The answers received were in any event none too favorable.
The support of England was especially hoped for, but Lord
Derby, who certainly understood that something more than
silent approval was desired, told the American minister that
the British (government was not ready to bring pressure to
bear upon Spain, and so did not wish to act unless Spain were
willing. The answers of the other powers were even less
satisfactory, and Spain herself thoroughly opposed the idea.
Secretary Fish next applied directly to Spain. Without
going so far as to threaten intervention, he suggested, early
in 1876, a better observance by Spain of treaty relations, the
establishment of a more liberal and less corrupt government
in Cuba, the gradual emancipation of the slaves, and an
improvement of commercial facilities, together with a re



THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA, TO 1895


69


moval of the obstructions that hampered trade with the
United States. The Spanish authorities agreed to all of these
suggestions, though insisting that some time would be necessary to put them into effect. As now it did seem in fact as
if the war were "about to end," the United States was
virtually estopped from taking any further steps looking to
an intervention. The Carlist wars in Spain had just been
concluded, and the Bourbons firmly reestablished on the
throne. So it was possible to send considerable bodies of
troops to Cuba. The fighting continued nearly two years
more, but in 1878, as already related, an agreement was
reached between the contending parties in the Peace of
Zanj6n.
For a few years the main problem in the relations of Spain
and the United States was the fulfilment of Spanish promises. At the very outset of the Ten Years' War, in 1869,
Spain had agreed to bring about an emancipation of the
slaves in Cuba. During the war she was unable to do much
on this score, however, as the insurgents had taken a stand
for abolition, while the pro-Spanish element, on whom Spain
had to depend in carrying on the war, was opposed to it. A
law of 1870 provided for gradual emancipation over a long
period of years, but this act was virtually thrown into the
discard. Eventually Spain decided that there could be no
emancipation while the insurrection continued. Even after
the close of the war, abolition was for a time a football of
Spanish politics, but in 1881 a law for gradual emancipation
was again passed, and by 1886 slavery in Cuba came altogether to an end. Thus one of the promises made both to
the United States and to the Cuban chieftains at Zanjon was
fulfilled.
Another Spanish promise, to introduce good government in
Cuba, one feature of which was to be Cuban representation




70


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


in the Spanish Cortes, was also tardily fulfilled, but more in
appearance than in fact.  The constitutional rights of
Spaniards were extended to Cubans, but there was an inconsistent definition, in 1878, of the powers of the Spanish
governor-general. He was to have all the authority of a
captain-general of other days. So the old evils went on.
Offices were held by Spaniards as before, the governorgeneral named the representatives to the Cortes, and the
former corrupt and unscientific methods in taxation and
judicial procedure were continued. The debt occasioned by
the Ten Years' War was saddled upon Cuba. Just before
1895, for example, it is said that but $746,000 out of twentysix millions in taxes were employed on internal improvements. The remainder went to the Spanish army and administration and to payments on the debt. From about 1880,
therefore, an autonomist, or home rule, movement developed
in Cuba. Many who despaired of the possibility of a separation from Spain regarded this as the only solution for Cuban
ills. Beyond the growth of a strong autonomist party,
nothing was accomplished, for Spain was slow, as usual, to
meet the wishes of her colonists. Naturally, therefore, many
Cubans began to consider a fresh attempt to gain independence. The Ten Years' War had taught Spain nothing.
Americans and Cubans both were concerned over the
restrictive Spanish commercial policy and the annoying
methods of enforcing trade regulations. Seventy-five per
cent of Cuba's exports went to the United States, and were
paid for mostly in cash, because the Spanish tariff laws
hindered the purchase of American goods. In sixteen years,
1876 to 1891 inclusive, the United States bought Cuban products to the extent of some $924,000,000 worth, and sold an
amount valued only at about $189,000,000, leaving a balance
of trade against the United States that was in fact quite as




THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA, TO 1895


71


unfavorable to the Cubans as it was to the American merchants. It was cheaper to ship flour from the Mississippi
valley to Spain, paying a duty there, and thence back to
Cuba, than it was to send it direct to Havana. There
were similar burdensome duties on other articles that had to
be imported into Cuba, such as butter, lard, boots, and
calicoes, to mention only a few. Even such American goods
as were shipped in were always subject to exactions by grafting Spanish officials. Heavy penalties were inflicted for
mere verbal inaccuracies or failure to observe trivial requirements. In 1881, for example, an American cattle vessel,
which normally would have paid $14.90, was taxed $387.40,
because it had some lumber on board. An agreement was
made in 1884 removing some of the restrictions on American
commerce, but President Cleveland had to protest, in 1886,
that the treaty was not being observed. A reciprocity arrangernent was made in that year, but in 1890 Spain suddenly increased the duties on American goods. The United
States then offered Spain a more than usually broad reciprocity treaty, and there was a considerable Cuban agitation
in favor of it. So the Spanish government yielded, and the
new schedules were adopted in 1891. American commerce
with Cuba took an immediate jump. In 1894 the volume of
trade was $105,000,000, as against seventy-six millions in
1880. In that same year, however, the treaty was withdrawn.
Unsatisfactory commercial relations, such as those just
mentioned, together with a continuance of the old evils in
Cuba and the tardiness of Spain in settling American claims,
caused some Americans and many Cubans to wonder whether
annexation to the United States might not, after all, be the
most desirable outcome of the Cuban problem. John
Sherman visited Cuba in 1887, and was impressed by what




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A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


he considered to be the deplorable conditions there.      The
inhabitants were, almost to a man, in favor of annexation,
he said, but he felt that they were not ready for self-government, and was opposed to annexation. That same year the
Englishman Froude visited the West Indies, spending some
time in Cuba.
"The opinion of Cuba was and is that America is the residuary legatee
of all the islands, Spanish and English," he said, "and that she will be
forced to take charge of them in the end, whether she likes or not...
If I were a West Indian, I should feel that under the Stars and Stripes
I should be safer than I was at present from political experimenting."
Under President Cleveland (1885-1889) there was a momentary return of the traditional Democratic desire for the
annexation of Cuba. Some overtures for a purchase were
made to Spain, but were rejected. The next administration
took the opposite stand, however, and in this it probably reflected American opinion more accurately than its predecessor had, because of the strong social objection to incorporating Cuba, with its motley and ill-prepared population, into
the American Union. The United States wished for an end
to the bad situation in Cuba, but hoped for some way out
of it other than by annexation.
It was now time for Cuba to settle matters in her own
fashion. On February 24, 1895, the revolution began.
Spanish authorities looked on it as little more than a riot.
One officer said that he did not like the prospect of chasing
mountain goats. In fact, however, the "grito," or cry, of '95
was to be the death-knell of Spanish rule in the island.10
0 The principal work on this sub- The diplomacy of the United States
ject is Callahan, Cuba and interna- in regard to Cuba in Latane, John
tional relations, Baltimore, 1899. This Holladay, The United States and
is an exceedingly meritorious study. Latin America (New York. 1920), 83 -There is an excellent chapter entitled 143.




CHAPTER IV


THE CUBAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, 1895-1898
WHY did the last war for Cuban independence commence
when it did? It is customary to recite a long list of causes,
all of which may, indeed, have had their share of weight.
There were the oft-given promises of reform, but a continuance of old evils. The world panic of 1893 may in a sense
be said to have "caused" the outbreak of war. The price of
sugar fell, and, as always happens in such an event in Cuba,
it was followed by acute economic distress. The people
looked to the government for help, but, as one writer has
put it, they might as well have looked "at the moon." It
is doubtful whether the authorities could have provided any
noteworthy assistance, but they seemed to have taken the
opposite course in 1894, when they cancelled the reciprocity
treaty with the United States. But to say that the panic
of 1893 or the various specific grievances of the Cubans were
the vital factor in the background of independence would
be like insisting that the murder of Sarajevo caused the
World War of 1914. Indeed, it is all too easy to overemphasize the harshness of Spain. Veteran residents of
Cuba in the foreign colony usually speak favorably of the
days before '95. The following is a sample comment by an
American who lived in Cuba in the early '90s:
I "The Spanish period was an Acadia. Don't you believe the stories of
Spanish oppression. Furthermore, the Spaniards were the ones who
paid the taxes, as they were the principal element in business." /
73




74        A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
This may be an exaggeration in the opposite direction, but
in point of fact it is not necessary to belabor Spain in connection with the outbreak of 1895. The war came because a
great many Cubans wanted independence irrespective of the
character of Spanish rule. The only way Spain could have
prevented it would have been by a free grant of complete
home rule at the least, and probably of independence. The
war started at the precise time it did, because of the organizing genius of Jose Marti, famed Cuban patriot and poet, the
hero and martyr of the revolution.
Cuban opinion was not more than usually hostile to Spain
in the years just prior to 1895, despite the discontent over
economic and political affairs. Possibly the majority among
the educated classes would have been satisfied with autonomy
for the island, though there were widely differing views as to
the form it should take. In 1895 the Spanish government
enacted a Cuban home rule law which may very well have
been a sincere attempt to meet the Cubans part way. It
was provided that the island was to be ruled by the governorgeneral (still to be appointed by the king) in conjunction
with an insular Council, all of whose members were to be
Cuban inhabitants, half of them appointed by the crown,
and the other half elected by the Cuban people. Obviously
this left control in the hands of the king, but it was only with
difficulty that the Spanish loyalists in Cuba would consent
to even this much of the home rule principle. The law was
passed in February 1895, but never went into effect, for in
that same month the revolution began. After all, the law of
1895 was merely an incident of no particular importance,
for the revolution had really "begun" at least as far back as
1868. The defeat in the Ten Years' War and the failure of
subsequent uprisings represented a mere interruption of the
program in the minds of the leaders of the movement. They




THE CUBAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, 1895-1898


75


were waiting for a favorable opportunity to strike again.
Certainly this was true of men like Jose Marti and Tomas
Estrada Palma, who were the moving spirits in the background of the revolt.
Marti, though a mere youth, had been deported by the
Spaniards as a dangerous revolutionary at the outbreak of the
Ten Years' War. Returning to Cuba after the war, he was
again arrested, following several anti-Spanish addresses, and
was sent to a Spanish prison. He escaped, and made his way
to the United States, where he devoted himself henceforth to
the cause of Cuban freedom. Estrada Palma had been taken
prisoner by the Spaniards at the time when he was President
of the revolutionary government in the Ten Years' War, and
had been immured in a Spanish prison until after the treaty
of Zanj6n. Refusing to accept the amnesty of the Spanish
authorities, he went to the United States, and became the
principal of a boys' school at Central Valley, New York. In
1892 Marti reorganized the Cuban Junta in New York City,
with Estrada Palma as its president. Other clubs were
formed subordinate to this in various parts of the world, but
especially in Florida, where a great many Cubans were congregated. There were sixty-one such clubs at Key West and
fifteen at Tampa. Funds were solicited for the cause, especially from Cubans in the United States, many of whom
contributed a tenth of all their earnings. Much money was
also given by Americans. Beyond question, the enthusiasm,
spirit, and magnetic personality of Marti were the chief
factor in the success of the Junta. He traveled about the
United States and the Caribbean countries inspiring veterans of the previous war to lend their support to a new
enterprise and gathering funds. All seemed to be in readiness in 1894, but the United States government seized the
three vessels that the Junta had equipped. A little while




76


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


later the revolution was formally launched with the "grito"
of Baire, near Santiago, on February 24, 1895.
Marti himself had proceeded to the Dominican Republic
to enlist MIlximo Gomez, Cuban generalissimo of the previous
war. On April 11 these two men, with a few companions,
landed in eastern Cuba. It was not intended that Marti
should remain in the island, as he could render much greater
service in foreign countries, but it seems that the intrepid
leader wanted at least a taste of fire, before resuming his
diplomatic tasks. So far, the revolt had made only moderate
progress. There had been outbreaks in several provinces,
but they had gathered headway only in Oriente. Another of
the famous veterans of the past war had taken the field in the
person of that daring and capable mulatto, Antonio Maceo,
who had proclaimed a provisional government, with Estrada
Palma as President, G6mez commander-in-chief of the army,
and Marti diplomatic agent abroad. Satisfied that a reasonably good beginning had been made, Marti left Gomez in
May, andl went south with an escort of fifty men, hoping to
get to Jamaica and from there to the United States. A
guide betrayed him to the Spaniards, who ambushed Marti's
party and killed them to a man. Thus perished the acknowledged Father of Cuban Independence. It seemed at the
time like an irreparable loss, but it may well have been a fortunate, if lamentable, accident,-fortunate, because it gave
the revolution the stimulant of a hero and a martyr,-fortunate possibly for the later republic and for Marti's own
fame, since it prevented him from risking his reputation in
the whirlpool of partisan politics, leaving him as perhaps
the one figure of the Independence era, concerning whom all
Cubans can unite in expressions of love and praise. And in
the meantime the work he could have done was capably per



THE CUBAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, 1895-1898


77


formed by Estrada Palma and his aides in New York.
Marti's real task, that of organizing and inspiring the revolution, was already accomplished.
And yet, at the time of Marti's death an unbiased observer would hardly have conceded the Cubans much prospect of success. With some thirty-three thousand soldiers already in the island, Spain might easily, as in fact she lid, send
two hundred thousand more. The Cubans could not muster
nearly so many. Indeed, they probably did not have more
than twenty-five thousand men in the field at any one time
during the war. Their total enrollment for the entire threeyear conflict, including those who were killed and those who
served but a part of the time, with perhaps also a great many
names that did not belong on the list at all or that represented only a very slight military service, was 53,774. In
other respects, as well, the resources of Spain were far superior, while the Cubans themselves were by no means unanimous for independence, though the revolutionary current was
stronger than before. The unthinking masses, responding
only to their feelings, were desirous of independence, and so
too most of the professional class, although there were many
of this group who hesitated to cast in their lot with the
revolution, as they did not feel confident of Cuban success.
Conservative families were as a rule opposed to the movement, but the younger men among them, including the sons
of the autonomists or of the loyalists of other days, tended
to look with favor upon the patriot cause. Furthermore,
there were as yet no racial or other partisan questions to
disturb the internal unity of the movement. On the other
hand, the merchants and the clergy, both of which groups
were made up very largely of Spaniards, were unalterably
opposed to independence, and property-holders in general




78


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


(including the proprietors of the sugar and tobacco estates)
leaned rather to Spain, or at least to autonomy, than to the
revolution.
Spain failed to make proper use of the advantage she
possessed, however. Her military strategy was almost unbelievably bad, based on principles of defensive warfare
rather than the attack, which the circumstances seemed to
call for. An attempt was made to occupy and hold all
prominent cities, while numerous fortified posts in the rural
districts also received a considerable quota of troops. In
particular, the Spaniards expended vast sums and great effort in long lines of entrenchments, called trochas, the entire
width of the island, from north to south. In consequence,
the Spanish army was scattered, and failed to get the benefit
of its great preponderance in numbers. So the Cubans were
allowed to choose their own time and place in which to
fight. Furthermore, the Spanish army of nearly two hundred thousand men was made up almost wholly of infantry,
though cavalry would have been a far more useful medium
for coping with the guerrilla warfare of the insurrectionists
under the tropical sun of Cuba. A well-known American
military expert has held that the very size of the Spanish
army was a handicap, as there were so many soldiers that
they got in one another's way, raised up grave problems in
the matter of supplies, and put an unnecessary strain on
Spain's financial resources. According to him, an army of
sixty thousand men, of whom twenty-five thousand should
have been cavalry, might have suppressed the insurrection in
less than a year, if Spain had taken the aggressive and had
possessed a single general worthy of the name. In addition
to her military errors, Spain made political mistakes that
drove large numbers of Cubans into the ranks of the patriots.
The ultra-conservative Spanish party brought discredit on




THE CUBAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, 1895-1898


79


the autonomists and other proponents of liberal reforms by
calling attention to features of their program that resembled
the tenets of the revolutionaries. It became necessary for
each individual to decide whether to be wholly for one side
or wholly for the other, and many chose therefore to fight
against Spain rather than for her; indeed, many were virtually forced into the arms of the insurrectionists in order to
save their lives. Harsh measures of the Spanish authorities
accounted for still further accessions to the insurgent forces.
Spanish policy and Spanish leadership were bad, but the
fighting itself was desperate, as the soldiers on both sides
were amply endowed with courage. The war was less than
two months old when Spain's "greatest general" became the
governor and commander-in-chief in the island. This was
Martinez Campos, the victor in the Ten Years' War and a
man of tremendous prestige as the "king maker" who had restored the Bourbons to the throne and very nearly dominated Spanish politics ever since. Martinez Campos began
his work by building trochas to confine the Cuban operations to Oriente, and promised to end the insurrection in a
hurry. To his chagrin, however, Gomez and Maceo broke
through his fortified lines almost as they pleased, and other
bands of insurgents rose up behind them. Indeed, it may be
said that the arrival of Martinez Campos marked the turning-point in the war, but in favor of the Cubans, not against
them.
The Cubans had more than held their own in Oriente
against the Spanish captain-general, but in the fall of 1895
they started upon the most spectacular campaign of the war.
The plan was to carry the struggle to every province of the
country, instead of leaving the east to bear the whole burden
of the conflict. So Gomez broke through the trocha into
Camagiiey, and was presently followed by Maceo. Then




80


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


came a series of startlingly brilliant operations that took the
patriots through Camagiiey, Santa Clara, Matanzas, Havana, and Pinar del Rio, with the hardest fighting of the war
going on almost within gunshot of the capital. G6mez and
Maceo rarely counted more than ten thousand men in their
commands, while the Spanish forces vastly outnumbered
them. Nevertheless, in scores of pitched battles, the Spaniards were defeated. Gomez showed great military abilities
in his conduct of affairs, but the skill and courage of Maceo
were so astonishingly remarkable as to capture the attention
of the entire world. He seemed to range at will between the
provinces of Havana and Pinar del Rio, breaking into one
or the other, despite trochas and Spanish armies. His once
great prestige utterly lost, Martinez Campos was recalled to
Spain in January 1896, but Cuban victories, especially of
the spectacular Maceo, continued to be the order of the day.
In December, however, the great mulatto leader was killed
in battle, and from that time forward the balance began to
swing toward Spain.
From the very first, the war had been one of destruction
on a great scale, like its predecessor, the Ten Years' War.
G6mez declared that if the Spaniards would not give up
Cuba, then he would make it worthless to them. That might
induce them to leave, he said, since they were in the island
only for what they could get out of it. In keeping with this
policy, he issued two orders in 1895 to the effect that nobody
was to engage in any commerce with towns in Spanish possession or raise any sugar, since these things would in fact
redound to the advantage of Spain. Laborers, too, were
forbidden to work in sugar factories. The penalties for infractions of these orders was destruction of one's property and
death. Indeed, the desire to make these commands operative in all parts of Cuba was one of the primary reasons for




THE CUBAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, 1895-1898


81


the invasion of the west. This was no mere threat, either,
but was enforced, at great cost to the offenders. Other
properties, too, that might be of aid to the Spaniards were
put to the torch. The Spaniards were not behindhand
with severe measures in furtherance of their own cause. It
must be said for Martinez Campos that he followed a comparatively mild and conciliatory course, but his successor,
General Valeriano Weyler, was a man of different stamp,
with a record for cruelty in the Ten Years' War. He proceeded to confirm and increase his former reputation until he
attained to very nearly world-wide notoriety as "Butcher"
Weyler. The keynote of his methods was his so-called reconcentrado  (reconcentration) policy. All Cubans (men,
women, and children) were ordered to move into garrisoned
Spanish towns or concentration camps, and no civilian was to
go into the rural districts without a passport. The penalty
of death and forfeiture of one's property was imposed for
failure to observe these orders. The real effect was that
Weyler met Gomez more than half way in a process of starving out the island. People crowded into the cities or camps,
where there was nothing for them to do and no provisions
supplied to keep them alive. So they died by the thousands.
It is said that fifty-two thousand perished in the province
of Havana alone. Indeed, what with the reciprocal policies
of Gomez and Weyler there was very little destructible
property left standing, while misery and distress were
general.
If Cuba could have been removed from the current of the
world's news, Weyler might have succeeded in overwhelming
the insurrection in course of time. But he had not taken
into account how he was creating sympathy for the Cuban
cause in other countries, especially in the United States.
Even so, he might have won, if his generalship in the field




82


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


had been equal to his harsh treatment of non-combatants.
The tide had, indeed, turned toward Spain since the death of
Maceo, but the patriots were still fighting grimly. G6mez
in Camagiiey and Calixto Garcia (another famous veteran
of the previous war) in Oriente were able to make a showing,
though the conflict died down in the west. Meanwhile,
public opinion against Spain rose to such a pitch in the
United States as to make Spanish retention of the island as
unacceptable to the vast body of the American people as to
the Cubans themselves. Demands for intervention in the
name of humanity were being made, long before President
McKinley finally issued the call. So Weyler, too, failed,
and late in the year 1897 he was recalled to Spain. The last
chapter in Cuba's struggle for separation from Spain was now
about to be written, and the "outside help" which Saco
foresaw would decide the issue was on the verge of bringing
itself to bear.
The real Cuban political leader after the death of Marti
was Tomas Estrada Palma, at the head of the Cuban Junta
in New York. There was, indeed, a somewhat shadowy
patriot government in Cuba. The Cuban Assembly, composed of delegates from the Cuban army, elected Bartolome
Maso, an insurgent leader in Oriente, as President in May
1895, with Estrada Palma as delegate-at-large to the United
States and other countries. Independence was formally declared on July 15, and in September a constitution for the
self-styled Republic of Cuba was drawn up. This provided
for a Council of six members, with all the functions of government in its hands. The President of this body was
Salvador Cisneros, former Marquis of Santa Lucia (a title he
had sacrificed when he joined the Cuban forces in the Ten
Years' War), and Mas6 was Vice-President. Later Mas6
became President. Practically, however, this organization




THE CUBAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, 1895-1898


83


was a mere instrument of Gomez, the commander in the
field. It maintained headquarters for a time in the Cubitas
Mountains in northern Camagiiey, signing its pronunciamentos from there, which led certain political humorists in the
United States to refer to it as a "government in the woods."
Estrada Palma in New York had a more important work to
do. Funds were collected by him, and expended for war
material and recruits for the Cuban army. Expedition after
expedition was sent away to Cuba. Many others were prevented from sailing, because of the vigilance of United States
officials, who were faithfully endeavoring to enforce the neutrality laws, however little their heart may have been in the
task. Still others ran afoul of some vessel of the Spanish
navy. Enough got through to destination, however, to bring
invaluable aid to the patriots. Quite as important a work
was done, too, in disseminating propaganda on behalf of
Cuba and in representing the patriots before the United
States government. No man could have handled these
delicate matters any better than Estrada Palma, who commanded respect for his unimpeachable integrity as well as
for his ability and unselfish love of the Cuban cause.
As the year 1897 drew to a close, prospects of Cuban success were none too flattering in the island itself. Weyler had
indeed left Cuba, and had been succeeded, November 1, 1897,
by General Ram6n Blanco, a man of more humane impulses
than his predecessor. On orders from the Spanish government, which was desirous of placating the United States and
thus avoiding intervention, he announced a program of reform, including the abolition of Weyler's reconcentrado
policy and the establishment of Cuban home rule, with most
of the functions of government in the hands of an elected
legislature. Nevertheless, despite the liberal sound of the
law for Cuban autonomy, it was stated that "the supreme




84


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


government of the colony shall be exercised by a governorgeneral," to be appointed by the crown. This was much the
same language as that employed for the British government of Canada, but nobody expected that the phrase would
be interpreted in the same way. It was improbable that
Spain meant to give any really great measure of home rule to
the Cubans. In any event, the law came too late to affect
the course of affairs. Spain's sun had set. Meanwhile, the
warfare went on in desultory fashion into the year 1898,
without anything of consequence being done.
The law for the autonomist government went into effect
on January 1, 1898, and an executive council was appointed,
but the new regime had by no means a rosy path. The
Autonomists and the Reformists (a Spanish group) accepted
it, but the die-hard Spaniards in the Constitutional Unionist
party were uncompromising in their opposition. They organized demonstrations against Blanco and home rule, and
even against the United States and the Americans in Cuba.
The American consul-general became alarmed, and requested
that a war-vessel be sent to Havana to protect American citizens in case of an emergency. A former American consulgeneral advised against it, fearing that some untoward incident might develop out of the hostility of Spaniards in Cuba
to the United States. Nevertheless, orders were given for
the "Maine" to proceed to Havana, and in due time she came
to anchor in the harbor of the Cuban capital. Some days
later, on February 15, 1898, the "Maine" was mysteriously
blown up. While never definitely proved just how it happened, the evidence seemed to point to an explosion from
the outside, possibly the act of some over-wrought Spanish
sympathizer. From this time forward, there was no possible
way of stemming American insistence that Spanish rule in
Cuba must end.




THE CUBAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, 1895-1898   85
The blowing-up of the "Maine" is by no means to be considered the cause of the United States entry into the war.
One must look much farther back than that. The traditional
interest of the northern republic in Cuba's fate has already
been reviewed. The government at Washington could not
be indifferent to the course of affairs in the island. Naturally,
popular opinion in the United States favored the Cubans,
but with only a faint idea at first of any American participation in the conflict. American sympathy began to be reflected presently in various resolutions that were proposed in
Congress,-for an enquiry into conditions in Cuba,-for a
recognition of belligerency,-for intervention,-and even for
recognition of Cuban independence. At length, in April
1896, Congress passed a resolution recognizing Cuban belligerency and proposing a tender of American good offices
on the basis of independence for the island, but leaving it to
the President's decision whether the resolution should be
carried into effect. President Cleveland felt that there was
as yet no basis in international law for a recognition even
of belligerency, but began negotiations with Spain for the
enactment of reforms which might satisfy the Cubans. Estrada Palma let it be known, however, that the Cubans
were not interested in anything short of independence.
As the United States elections approached in the fall of
1896 the Cuban question had reached a stage where it could
not be disregarded. By this time there was an overwhelming popular sympathy for "Cuba libre" (free Cuba). With
a strategic advantage in their hands, as the party out of
power, the Republicans put a plank in their platform stating that since Spain had "lost control of Cuba" and was
"unable to protect the property or lives of resident American citizens," the government of the United States "should
actively use its influence and good offices to restore peace




86


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


and give independence to the Island." The Democratic
platform extended "sympathy" to the Cubans in their struggle for independence. Cleveland devoted a long paragraph
to Cuban affairs in his annual message of December 1896.
After mentioning a number of reasons for American concern, including the nearness of Cuba to the United States,
an American investment of from thirty to fifty millions
in the island, and a volume of trade that had reached
$103,000,000 in 1893 and ninety-six millions in 1894, he went
on as follows:
"When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the insurrection
has become manifest, and it is demonstrated that her sovereignty is
extinct in Cuba for all purposes of its rightful existence, and when a
hopeless struggle for its reestablishment has degenerated into a strife
which means nothing more than the useless sacrifice of human life and
the utter destruction of the very subject-matter of the conflict, a situation will be presented in which our obligations to the sovereignty of
Spain will be superseded by higher obligations, which we can hardly
hesitate to recognize and discharge."
Weyler's harsh policies occupied the attention of the press
during 1897, and animosity toward Spain and sympathy for
the insurgents were at fever heat. Considerable sums of
money were collected by the Red Cross for the relief of victims of the reconcentrado policy. In his first annual message, in December 1897, President McKinley had this to
say of Weyler's system:
"It was not civilized warfare; it was extermination. The only peace
it could beget was that of the N;ilderness and the grave."
Going on, the President remarked that the "near future will
demonstrate" whether the United States should take action
concerning Cuban affairs, holding that it must work out in
a recognition of belligerency or independence, or in an in



THE CUBAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, 1895-1898


87


tervention against both sides, or in favor of one side against
the other.
"I speak not of forcible annexation," he added, "for that cannot be
thought of. That, by our code of morality, would be criminal aggression."
Events now moved rapidly. Popular opinion in the
United States called for action, but McKinley held back.
The "Maine" was despatched to Havana in January 1898,
as already stated. Shortly afterward, on February 9, 1898,
it came to light that the Spanish minister, Dupuy de Lome,
had written a letter to a friend in which he used insulting
language about McKinley, calling him a "would-be-politician who tries to leave a door open behind him while keeping on good terms with the jingoes of his party." Though
a private communication, this letter had in some way reached
the hands of the Secretary of State. Dupuy de Lome hastened to resign in order to forestall his recall, but the uproar
over this incident was out of all proportion to its merits. It
had by no means died down, when on the 15th of the same
month the "Maine" was destroyed with a loss of 264 men
of its crew. Only those who lived through those times can
realize the tremendous outburst of excitement that swept
the United States when news of this event was received.
Whatever the truth may have been, the American people
held Spain responsible, either directly or by culpable neglect,
for this disaster. In the writer's opinion there was no moment in the United States during the recent World War
when enthusiasm for the cause approached the furore of
'98. People nearly went out of their heads in a wave of
patriotic feeling that was mingled with a call for vengeance
against Spain. "Remember the Maine" speeches and "Remember the Maine" buttons were the order of the day. And
loud were the complaints because McKinley "couldn't be
kicked into a fight."




88


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


McKinley held out for a time in the face of the clamor
for war, trying to adjust the situation. Eventually, on
March 27, he issued what amounted to an ultimatum, demanding that Spain consent to an armistice until October 1st
(to permit of negotiations for peace), revoke the reconcentrado policy (still in operation, despite Blanco's announced
intention of abolishing it) and institute relief measures for
those in the camps, and permit the United States to be
final arbiter in case Spain and the Cubans should not have
reached an agreement by October 1st. It will be observed
that no reference was made to a recognition of Cuban independence. Spain virtually rejected these demands when
she replied, March 31, with a counter-proposition. She
agreed to end the reconcentrado system, but suggested arbitration to fix responsibility for the destruction of the
"Maine,"-an utter impossibility in the existing state of
American opinion. The idea of an armistice was opposed
until such time as the new autonomist legislature, which
was to meet on May 4, could arrange for that and also an
honorable peace, "it being understood that the powers reserved by the constitution to the central government are not
lessened and diminished." This seemed to be only another
example of the familiar dodging of Spanish politicians. So,
despairing of any settlement that would be acceptable to the
Cubans and the American people, McKinley decided to submit the question to Congress. That meant war!
The President's message to Congress was all ready, when
on April 10 new proposals were received from Spain, who
announced an armistice and a willingness to grant Cuba
the same sort of self-government that Canada enjoyed,
though still insisting on arbitration of the "Maine" affair.
Much point has been made of this Spanish message by those
who have wished to find fault with the United States or




THE CUBAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, 1895-1898


89


the McKinley administration. It has been said that it
amounted to an acceptance of the March 27 note and that
McKinley, nevertheless, suppressed it, thus bringing on a
war that might have been avoided. A meeting of foreign
ministers-at Washington on April 14 went so far as to hold
that it met the demands of the message of March 27. It
would seem, however, that any fair consideration of the situation would not sustain the charges against McKinley. The
meeting of the foreign ministers represented a German maneuver, growing naturally out of the world politics of that
day, a factor that need not be explained here. The amnesty
proclamation was limited as announced by General Blanco
in Cuba, who stated that it was to continue at the pleasure
of the Spanish authorities; in any event, it was rejected by
the Cubans, who replied, through Maximo Gomez, that Spain
must consent to evacuate the island before they would accept an armistice. And, certainly, McKinley did not suppress the Spanish note, for he mentioned it in his message
to Congress, though briefly, in a few lines added to the message as already prepared. Furthermore, quite aside from the
legal principle that a counter-offer is equivalent to a rejection, this would not have been acceptable as an answer
to the American note of March 27; the note of April 10 failed
to meet the American proposals in several particulars, and in
its insistence on the "Maine" arbitration injected an issue
that could not possibly be allowed. The truth of the matter
was, that war was inevitable. The marvel is that McKinley
had been able to hold it off so long.
McKinley's message to Congress was submitted on April
11. In it he reviewed events in Cuba, and reached the conclusion that intervention was justified, but specifically declared that a recognition of independence was inexpedient.
Then came the heart of the message in the following terms:




90


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


"The long trial has proved that the object for which Spain has waged
the war cannot be attained. The fire of insurrection may flame or may
smoulder with varying seasons, but it has not been and it is plain it
cannot be extinguished by present methods. The only hope of relief
and repose from a condition which can no longer be endured is the
enforced pacification of Cuba. In the name of humanity, in the name
of civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests which give
us the right and the duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must
stop. In view of these facts and of these considerations, I ask the
Congress to authorize and empower the President to take measures to
secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the government
of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable government, capable of maintaining order and
observing its international obligations, insuring peace and tranquillity
and the security of its citizens as well as our own, and to use the military
and naval forces of the United States as may be necessary for these
purposes... The issue is now with Congress. It is a solemn responsibility. I have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition
of affairs which is at our doors. Prepared to execute every obligation
imposed upon me by the Constitution and the law, I await your action."
The key-word in this stirring message was the one which
called for an end to the war in the name of "humanity."
The term was received with something like derision in European countries, which were then engaged in one of the greatest eras of expansion that the world has ever known. It
was "obvious" to most of the world that the McKinley message was a mere excuse for the conquest of the island. Anyone familiar with American interest in Cuba throughout the
nineteenth century will, of course, recognize that the United
States had a very substantial concern over the island that
well-informed members of the executive branch of the government could not fail to take into account. Nevertheless,
Americans in general, including their representatives in Congress, had little knowledge of the importance of Cuba to
the United States, and the appeal in the name of "humanity" in fact represented the overwhelming sentiment of the
American people. This was reflected in the action of Con



THE CUBAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, 1895-1898


91


gress in the famous Joint Resolution of April 20, which empowered the President to use the army and navy to bring
about a relinquishment of Spanish authority in Cuba. The
Senate at first wished to go beyond the recommendations
of McKinley by recognizing the Cuban republic, but, when
the House refused to concur (as a result of the personal
intervention of the President, who "in effect compelled the
omission from the resolution"),l the following oddly worded
paragraph was nevertheless retained:
"That the people of the island of Cuba are and of right ought to be
independent."
A further expression of American disinterestedness was added
in the shape of the Teller Amendment, as follows:
"That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention
to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except
for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is
accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to
its people."
It will be necessary to revert to these paragraphs later, in
connection with the establishment of the republic.
The passing of the Joint Resolution amounted to a declaration of war, and hostilities commenced soon afterward.
The powers of continental Europe were for a time disposed
to lend at least moral support to Spain, but England came
out strongly for the United States. That ended Spain's only
remaining hope of escape from the dilemma. And yet, though
Spain's expulsion from the island was now virtually sure,
there was strangely little enthusiasm in Cuba. G6mez
wished that no American troops might be landed there, unless perhaps some artillery, of which he was greatly in need.
He did desire help in the form of shipments of ammunition


lSee statement of John Bassett Moore, quoted infra, pp. 643-645.




92


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


and the prevention of supplies from reaching the Spaniards.
No doubt, the Cubans wanted the credit of winning their
own independence, but they also almost certainly believed
that an American intervention would mean a transfer of
Spanish sovereignty to the United States. The language
of the Joint Resolution, for all that it seemed to promise,
was not reassuring, for it had been the habit of various
European powers during the previous quarter of a century
to make sounding phrases the preliminary of a conquest.
And what reason was there to expect any other course of
action from the United States? There was no idea of resisting the great northern republic, but there was little wholehearted support of the American campaign. This attitude
continued, even after the American forces were landed in
Cuba, and was a source of no little surprise to the invaders,
who expected to be received with open arms.
This is not the place for the details of the war. On May
1st Admiral Dewey won a fine naval victory at Manila Bay,
and this was followed by an American occupation of the
Philippines. Later on in May the major part of the Spanish
fleet was blockaded in the Bay of Santiago, Cuba, and toward
the end of June an American army was landed near that
city. It is worth noting, with an eye to later events in the
era of the republic, that Theodore Roosevelt played a prominent part in this campaign as second in command of the
"Rough Riders" regiment, an organization recruited by
Roosevelt himself and made up largely of western cowboys.
Another man who was destined to fill a great place in Cuban
history was at the head of this regiment, Roosevelt's friend,
Colonel Leonard Wood. Other matters of greater import
from the standpoint of the war, as such, may here be passed
by. The Spanish fleet attempted to run the blockade on
July 3, but was utterly destroyed. Two weeks later, on




THE CUBAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, 1895-1898


93


July 17, the Spanish army in Santiago surrendered.2 Meanwhile, too, the American forces had entered Porto Rico, and
presently they conquered that island.
Spain was now ready for peace, and on July 26 sent an
enquiry to the United States through the French government to find out upon what conditions the war might be
brought to an end. The President replied, naming the following terms as a preliminary to negotiations for peace:
1. The "relinquishment" by Spain of all claim of sovereignty over or title to Cuba, and her immediate evacuation
of the island.
2. In lieu of indemnity, a cession to the United States by
Spain of "Porto Rico and other islands now under the sovereignty of Spain in the West Indies, and also the cession
of an island in the Ladrones."
3. The retention of Manila by the United States until it
should be determined in the treaty of peace what disposition was to be made of the Philippines.
Spain accepted these terms, rather unwillingly, and they
were presently embodied in more ample form in the protocol
of August 10. The provisions of the protocol virtually repeated the paragraphs just recited, except that more ample
provision for the evacuation of Spain's possessions in the
West Indies was made in a new article. Article five of the
protocol concerned the appointment of peace commissioners, and article six called for an armistice immediately following the signing of the protocol. The document was signed
on August 12.
On October 1st, five commissioners from each country met
at Paris, to draw up a definitive treaty of peace. There
'It is a temptation to tell more whom have since taken up their resiabout the Santiago campaign, espe- dence in Cuba. They pretty genercially from the standpoint of Amer- ally take much of the glamor away
ican participants therein, many of from the story.




94


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


were several controversial points, but the work was carried
on so expeditiously that everything was ready by December
10. Of particular interest was the discussion over the meaning and effect of Spain's "relinquishment" of Cuba. In the
earlier negotiations the Spanish minister of State had written
a communication (presently forwarded to the American Secretary of State) that Spain was ready to accept "absolute
independence, or independence under an American protectorate, or annexation to the United States, preferring annexation, because this would guarantee better the security of the
lives and property of Spaniards who resided or had estates
there." The answer of Secretary Day set forth that the
United States did not share Spain's apprehensions over Cuban independence, but in the disturbed condition of the
island felt that it might need aid, which the American government was disposed to give. The Spanish commissioners
in Paris must have felt that this left the question open, for
they endeavored to get the United States to annex Cuba,
but the American commissioners were unwilling to entertain
any such proposition.3 This drew forth the following eulogy
from Luis Estevez Romero, the later first Cuban VicePresident:
"It should be said very emphatically in honor of the American
commissioners that few times in political history has there been a
grander inflexibility, rejecting all insinuations, all advances, all offers
of the Spanish commissioners for the United States to keep Cuba. The
honor of their nation forbade it."'
It was decided that the United States should for the time
being act as a trustee of the island, and take responsibility
"for the protection of life and property." Another clause
of the treaty provided that on the termination of American
3See statement of John Bassett  4Quoted in Martinez Ortiz, I,
Moore, quoted infra, pp. 643-645.  112.




THE CUBAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, 1895-1898


95


occupancy the United States was to "advise any government
established in the island to assume the same obligations."
One of the most difficult matters was the question of the
Cuban debt, which had been incurred by Spain very largely
as a result of the war in Cuba. Spain wanted Cuba to take
over at least a portion of this debt, but the American commissioners were adamant in refusing to saddle it upon them.
So Spain had no recourse but to yield. Among non-Cuban
features of the treaty were the acquisition of Porto Rico,
Guam, and the Philippines by the United States; a payment i
of twenty million dollars was made for the Philippines. Rati- i
fications came later, and the treaty was proclaimed on April
11, 1899, the anniversary of McKinley's message of the year
before.
Cuba's separation from Spain was now accomplished, but
independence was yet to be attained. That was to be a question of the fulfilment of its pledges by the great republic of
the north.5


'The materials for a study of the
war of 1895-1898 are, of course, vast
in amount.   Trelles, Biblioteca, I,
404-478, and II, 1-86, has several hundred items on this period alone. In
addition, there are quantities of documents in United States government
publications, as also, no doubt, in
those of Spain and other European
countries, to say nothing of papers
still existing in manuscript form only.
For a rapid survey, Johnson, IV,
1-117, and Latane, John Holladay.
The United States and Latin America.
(New York. 1920), 125-136, are worthy
of note, and Robinson, Albert Gard

ner, Cuba and the Intervention, 2
ed. (New York. 1910), 31-49, 66-83,
is particularly helpful.  Among a
number of interesting accounts by
American eyewitnesses are volumes
of Frederick Funston (later a distinguished soldier in the American
army),  Richard   Harding  Davis,
Grover Flint, George Clarke Musgrave, and Charles Melville Pepper.
For the American military campaign,
perhaps the best work is Sargent,
Herbert Howland, The campaign of
Santiago de Cuba, 3 vols., Chicago,
1907.




CHAPTER V


THE UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNMENT,
1898-1902
DURING the closing months of 1898 Spanish rule in Cuba
still existed legally, but the only effective work being done
was in Oriente, where General Leonard Wood (recently promoted from a colonelcy) was in charge as the representative
of the American military occupation. There he had already
begun to "make things hum," showing extraordinary energy
and efficiency. Conditions in Oriente were very bad. People
were dying by the thousands from disease; there was little
or no work to do, and starvation was adding its quota to the
toll of the dead; sanitation was in an indescribably wretched
state; and local government in its various forms-administration, justice, education,-had virtually ceased to function.
General Wood's earliest measures were in the nature of what
might be called "first aid." He took care of the sick, and
fed the starving; made the city of Santiago more habitable;
reestablished the municipal governments and the courts;
started a program of public works, especially the building of
roads, in part in order to give employment to men out of
work; and he saw to it that people of the rural districts were
supplied with tools and food and sent back to their farms.
Presently he was able to stamp out epidemics of smallpox
and yellow fever, to found schools, and put local government
on a firmer basis, reinforced by his organization of a body
of rural guards. In fine, by the close of the year, the territory
under his jurisdiction was, as one of his most bitter critics
96




THE UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNMENT, 1898-1902 97
has admitted, "orderly, peaceable, and self-sustaining." The
exceptional character of his achievements in Oriente made
General Wood a national figure in his own country as well
as renowned in Cuba. In the language of Theodore Roosevelt, he had proved himself a "model administrator." It was
certain that his services would be called upon again.1
General Blanco did not remain to the end of Spanish rule,
but turned over his command to General Adolfo Jimenez
Castellanos, who formally surrendered the government to
the American military governor, General John R. Brooke,
on January 1, 1899. It was not possible by that date to
repatriate all the Spanish troops in the island, but by February the evacuation was complete. In the last few months
of their occupation the Spanish authorities, naturally, paid
very little heed to problems of administration, and many
officials took an interest only in salvaging what they could
for themselves, after which they deserted their posts and
returned to Spain. Referring to the condition in which they
left public buildings one writer has said:
"They looted and gutted them of everything that could be removed.
They destroyed the plumbing and lighting fixtures. They broke or
choked up the drains. They left every place in an indescribably filthy
condition. There was nothing in all their record in Cuba more unbecoming than their manner of leaving it."'
The general situation in Cuba at the outset of American
rule was about as bad as it could be, except in Oriente, where
Wood's measures had already made themselves felt.       The
rest of the island was in much the same state as that in
Oriente had been in the summer of 1898, except that affairs
were even worse off in western Cuba, owing to the greater
'For a vigorous brief account of administrator, in Outlook, v. LXI, pp.
Wood's services in Oriente, see Roose- 19-23; Jan. 7, 1899.
velt, Theodore, General Leonard  'Johnson, IV, 133.
Wood: a model American military




98


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


severity of the war in that section. Famine and disease were
everywhere. Children wandered about like wild animals,
without parents or homes. Referring to the sufferings of
the people in the cities, a Cuban writer, Martinez Ortiz, has
drawn a gruesome picture:
"Those poor people, without any help, had exhausted their resources,
and put hands to any kind of food. The most unclean and repugnant
animals were devoured with delight, and were hunted for with frenzied
zeal. Roots, branches, and herbs were also utilized. Women and hungry
children looked in the mangers of the horses in the forces of cavalry
encamped in the streets, to find the abandoned grains amidst the dirt
in order to eat them raw, and seeds and cuttings of fruits were also
gathered as precious discoveries. Frequently, despite the efforts of the
police to stop them, they bore away pieces of the remains of animals
that had died of contagious diseases. Those unfortunate human beings,
thus left to themselves, were the relics of what had once been the country
people brought into the concentration camps by General Weyler."'
Steps were at once taken by the United States government to
alleviate the distress. A method of food distribution was established that proved very effective. It is said that in Havana
alone there were twenty thousand people dependent on this
bounty to save them from starvation. Nor was this all.
There was an utter lack of sanitation. Whole streets were
so choked with filth as to be almost impassable, and there
was "no public building... in a fit state for use." For example, over twelve hundred cubic yards of rubbish were
removed from the custom-house alone. The work of cleaning up streets and buildings was undertaken at once, and
good results were quickly obtained. The situation in the
custom-house may also serve as an illustration of the disorganization in governmental affairs. The records had been
either removed or destroyed, and there was not a stick of
furniture in the place. By a personal appeal to his Spanish
'Martinez Ortiz, I, 15.




THE UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNMENT, 1898-1902 99
predecessor the United States official in charge managed to
get a chair and desk for himself. The personnel was made
up of a few Spaniards, but was altogether inadequate, as
most of those formerly stationed there had left or resigned.
So too with the post-office, in which not so much as a cent
of money or a single stamp was found. Naturally, the
treasury was bare, but, fortunately, there was scarcely anything owing by the state, thanks to the insistence of the
United States that Spain herself should be responsible for
the Cuban debt. There was an issue of about two million
dollars in Cuban insurgent bonds, and, rather more important, the promises that had been made to pay the soldiers
for their services in the war.
Out in the rural districts matters were just as bad. Cuba's
whole life depends upon agriculture, especially the raising
of sugar, but both local and world conditions militated
against the economic prospects of the island at the time.
Sugar is not a crop that will take care of itself, but requires
an expensive equipment in the way of machinery, domestic
animals, and labor. Most of the sugar-mills had been destroyed, however, and hunger and the vicissitudes of the
war had caused a virtual disappearance of beasts of burden.
And just then, too, European countries were paying subsidies
to promote the beet-sugar industry, and the United States
had raised up a tariff wall for the same purpose.
Such was the state of affairs when the United States military government began its work. It was under instructions
to prepare the people of Cuba for self-government, bring
about conditions which would make the founding of a republic possible, and establish them in such a sound manner
as to ensure an orderly and successful maintenance of Cuban
rule. The United States assumed "military" control, but
not in the sense in which the word had been employed under




100


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


Spain. Nearly all the officials-ninety-seven per cent, it has
been stated,-were Cubans, who were given important tasks
to perform and not a little responsibility. One of the principal criticisms of General Brooke was that his "Cuban
appointees made a tool of their chief," in consequence of
which it was often said that the "American governor reigns,
but the Cuban Secretaries govern." A kindly critic, such as
Martinez Ortiz is entitled to be called, has written that "he
was even of a somewhat better stamp, perhaps, than was
fitting for a man in such a high post in that difficult and exceptional situation." On one occasion, indeed, when there
was some talk in the United States of replacing the military
government with civilian rule, there was an uproar in Cuba
until assurances were received that no such change would
be made.
One of the greatest difficulties that the military government was to encounter was that of the inevitable friction
between alien rulers and a nation which had fought for independence and wanted to have its expected benefits bestowed
upon it at once. Perhaps no two peoples ever get on together
in complete friendliness under such conditions, for differences
of language and habits are sure to cause misunderstandings,
even when other circumstances do not contribute to the same
end. The average American of that day expected the Cuban
to be grateful to the United States for the aid given in defeating Spain, to say nothing of the "glorious opportunity"
of coming in contact with American institutions. But the
Cubans, as so often happens in the case of a people experiencing their first taste of freedom from absolute rule, tended
toward radicalism, and forgot any gratitude they might have
had in their impatience over the delay in their attainment
of independence. If they knew of Cuba's importance in
the foreign relations of the United States, they did not care




THE UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNMENT, 1898-1902 101
about it, except as it might have served to make them suspicious of the northern republic. And, finally, if the provincialism and lack of experience of the American people in
anything like colonial affairs are added to the unpreparedness of the Cubans for political life, it is not surprising that
an already difficult situation was rendered yet more perplexing. It will be necessary to refer again to the attitude of
the Cuban revolutionaries toward the United States, but it
should be borne in mind in the meantime, as a factor in the
background of the achievements of the intervention.
General Brooke was at the head of Cuban affairs during
almost all of 1899, until succeeded by General Wood in December. It fell to his lot to take the initial steps in resolving
the chaotic conditions in the island and reconstructing the
governmental machinery. By the month of June the most
pressing of the relief work in the shape of supplying food
and medicine to the stricken people was well in hand. The
Cubans were entitled to praise in this connection, for many
of them went back to their farms, and met the situation
as best they could, helping one another, too, so that a crop
might be raised. Often a single plow served a number of
farms, and for lack of horses or mules the men harnessed
themselves to it, to draw it, at least after a fashion, through
the soil.
One of the most troublesome problems in the first year of
the occupation was the handling of the Cuban military forces.
They were still under arms, and not inclined to disband until
they should receive pay for their services during the war.
G6mez had suggested that sixty millions might be given to
the men, to cover their pay and also the losses they had
suffered. The plan of division showed a rather wide disparity between the amounts to be given to privates on the
one hand and generals on the other. The former were to get




102


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


from six to seven hundred dollars, and the latter from seven
to twelve thousand! The United States authorities pointed
out that this would necessitate a large loan, greater than
the existing resources of Cuba could stand, and might therefore prolong the American occupation indefinitely. It was
essential to the success of the intervention to bring about
the disbandment of the Cuban forces; so the United States
offered a free gift of three million dollars, out of the surplus
remaining over from the amount Congress had appropriated
for the war; it was suggested that this might be distributed
in equal portions to the men who could prove their service
and would turn in their arms. G6mez at first resisted the
plan for demobilizing the army, as he had been inclined to
keep it until the United States should relinquish the island
to the Cubans themselves, but he was at length persuaded
to accept the American project.
The lesser officers were furious when they heard of what
G6mez had done. They had maintained their Assembly of
delegates of the Cuban army since early in the war, but this
had begun to make its voice heard only in the days since the
fighting had stopped. At this time the Assembly was in the
control of three men who represented a current of opposition
to the United States. Two of these, Manuel Sanguily and
Juan Gualberto G6mez (a negro), were noted orators, while
the third, Fernando Freyre de Andrade, was a man of great
personal and family prestige. Under the influence of these
three men the Assembly came out uncompromisingly for
the bonus as originally proposed. There was a great deal of
excitement, and, no doubt, some little trepidation in Washington lest the Cubans might "fly off the handle" into revolution, but the Assembly itself saved the situation by its
own exaggerated acts. In a burst of emotion it deposed
Maximo G6mez as commander-in-chief. This turned the




THE UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNMENT, 1898-1902 103
sober-minded citizenry against the Assembly, for the old
general was one of the great heroes of the war. Realizing
that they had made a mistake, the leaders of the Assembly
made an effort to get the authorities in Washington to
change their views about the bonus, but were unsuccessful.
So the Assembly met for the last time on April 4, and dissolved itself. Meanwhile, the demotion of Gomez had not
been recognized by the United States, and had been disavowed in a meeting of Cuban generals. Negotiations for
the distribution of the three million dollars were continued
with Gomez, and presently an agreement was reached to pay
each soldier who had been in service prior to the end of hostilities the sum of seventy-five dollars. Thereupon, the Cuban
army grew suddenly from about thirty thousand to fortyeight thousand men, but an investigation of the records reduced the number to 33,930, each of whom surrendered his
arms, received his money, and went his way. With the Cuban
army disbanded, the military government was able to proceed more surely to the accomplishment of its objects.
One of the important tasks was the reconstruction of governmental machinery. The military governor, supported by
his Cuban Secretaries, was the supreme authority, and under
him were other American generals at the head of affairs in
the provinces. These were later replaced by Cuban governors. The extension of General Wood's system of rural
guards in Oriente to all parts of the island was a helpful supplement in the maintenance of order. Incidentally, too, this
gave employment to a great many former soldiers of the
Cuban army. It was particularly necessary to set up governments in the municipalities, as a beginning in training
the people to handle their own affairs. Pending elections,
to be held later, a number of Cuban officials were put into
office, with more power than their predecessors had pos



104


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


sessed under the centralized system of Spain. Other steps
were also taken to develop municipal government, but more
particularly during the rule of General Wood, at which point
they may better be taken up.
Some of the other achievements of General Brooke's administration may be summed up briefly. There was an immediate need of revenue; so the custom-house was put in
working order, and new taxes, notably excises on liquors,
were introduced. By the end of the year the government
could show revenues of fifteen and a half million dollars,
which was quite satisfactory, as expenditures were two millions less. But the balance of trade still ran heavily against
V the island. The taking of a census was deemed essential to
an understanding of the problems the government had to
face; so this was done in the fall of 1899. The results, while
not so bad in some respects as had been anticipated, were
none too flattering. In a population of a little over a million
and a half, approximately two-thirds were white, and only
about one-third of negro or mixed race, together with a small
number of Chinese. Nearly twelve per cent of the people! were of illegitimate birth, due largely to the habit of forming
unions without the expense of a marriage ceremony.     No
fewer than sixty-six per cent were illiterate, which led Elihu
Root, the United States Secretary of War, to say that
"If sixty-six per cent of the people were to continue illiterate, the
permanence of free constitutional government could hardly be expected,
and a definite ascertainment of the facts emphasizes the urgent necessity
for popular education."'
Naturally, therefore, something was done to establish popular education, but not a great deal was accomplished before
the end of the year. Encouragement of foreign capital might
'Extract from the report of the  Root, 193.
Secretary of War for 1900, quoted in




THE UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNMENT, 1898-1902 105
have proved helpful to bring the island out of the grip of
economic depression, but it was politically desirable that
there should be no hint of exploitation by American pro- 
moters. So in 1899 a bill passed Congress, called the Foraker 
Law, to the effect that no franchises should be granted during the United States occupation. A number of other policies
also had their beginning under General Brooke, but were
carried so much farther by his successor that they may more
appropriately be dealt with in connection with the next
administration.
On December 13, 1899, President McKinley appointed
General Wood to succeed General Brooke as head of the
United States military government in Cuba, and ten days
later the last-named departed from the island. His administration was to be somewhat overshadowed by the achievements of General Wood, but was nevertheless praiseworthy.
As La Discusion said in its issue of December 15, 1899,
"It may be asserted that the honesty of the present government is
so conspicuous that nobody has dared to think that influence could be,
acquired over its members through use of money."'
This is a fair sample of the comments that have been made
about his government. As Martinez Ortiz has put it,
"It is enough for the fame of General Brooke to say, with entire truth,
that no act of his merited censure."'
General Wood, who had already won his spurs as an administrator by his work in Oriente, now took charge. The
writer just quoted above has this to say of the new governor:
"Still a young man, he was barely approaching thirty-nine years of age.
He was tall of stature, likeable in appearance, and Herculean of complexion. When he shook hands he pressed the hand of the other man
Quoted in Martinez Ortiz, I, 96.
'Ibid., I, 98.




106         A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
so hard that it hurt. A finished example of a very strong people, there
shone forth in his face a certain boldness and confidence in his own
strength. One divined, on seeing him, that there was no situation,
however difficult it might be, capable of making him lose his absolute
self-command."'
General Wood was, indeed, of a somewhat different stamp
from his likeable and rather easy-going, if also able, predecessor. He was a veritable human dynamo, moving surely and
swiftly from one task to another. A tireless worker, he
took his rest "doing gymnastic exercises or playing some
game calling for rapidity of movement and muscular force."
If Brooke allowed his Secretaries to dominate him, Wood
"essayed autocracy," so his most bitter opponent says, and
"made tools of his Cuban appointees," but yet it has to be
admitted that he "met with notable success in his effort."
Indeed, the very attacks of his enemies are one of the best
sources of information to show the extraordinary greatness
of his record. At present one hears only praise when General
Wood's name is mentioned, but he had plenty of enemies, or
at least plenty of criticism, at the time. Through it all, he
was imperturbable and composed, not deviating an iota from
the line of conduct he had marked out for himself.
General Wood was instructed to prepare Cuba as rapidly
as possible for an independent republican government and,
meanwhile, to arrange for an efficient administration of justice and a good school system. The President left him to
work out the details. Wood went to work with his customary
energy, and saw to it that the holders of government jobs
put in the full time at their tasks, which was something new
in Cuban experience.8 He then proceeded with his series of
' Martinez Ortiz, I, 99.      early, and go away almost at night.
8 A popular bit of doggerel, poking There is no time for luncheon or anyfun at Wood's ordinance, ran as fol- thing  but to write... Whoever
lows: "Don't stop to take a drink; wishes a government job for himself
don't expectorate; don't scratch your- is one who wishes to die."
self or smoke; arrive at work very




THE UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNMENT, 1898-1902 107
reforms. Naturally, many of these were going on at the
same time, but they reached at least a reasonably successful
stage one after another. Indeed, one of the characteristics
of the Wood government was that something new was hap-./
pening all the time, with each fresh action obviously a step
nearer independence. There is high authority to the effect
that this was one of the important factors in keeping the
country in order at all, as suspicion of American policy was
given scant opportunity to develop. It will, however, be
more convenient to take up General Wood's activities according to subject-matter, abandoning strict chronology.
One of the objects of the government was the reorganization of the department of justice. There was a prevailing
American notion that the Spanish laws were bad and ought
to be changed, but Wood had been forewarned that the
trouble was not so much in the law as in its administration.
And indeed, broadly speaking, the law itself (which was
the same as that of Spain, with a habeas corpus act, bill of
rights, and other worthy features) was good enough, though
outworn in many particulars and not altogether applicable
under the new conditions growing out of the separation from
Spain. The governor realized that this law was far better
for the Cubans than any unfamiliar United States innovation
could be, and left it undisturbed, in the main, except for a
body of constructive legislation to fit the changed situation.9
There was a vast reform of judicial practices, however. General Brooke had already established a judicial hierarchy, with
a Supreme Court at the top, six provincial superior courts
(audiencias), and courts of first instance and municipal
courts, together with a police court (after the United States
pattern) in Havana. General Wood made improvements in


9For some comment on this p. 515, n. 10.
phase of General Wood's work, see




108


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


the entire organization, and extended the system of police
courts to all parts of the island. Many evils had existed
under Spain. Judges performed their work at their own
homes, and their clerks at theirs, perhaps in another part of
the city. There were no fixed salaries, but merely fees growing out of litigation. Consequently, judicial service became
little more than a matter of commerce in fees. If there were
no fee, there would be no business. There was no thought
of moral wrong about it. As one of the United States officials in Cuba put it, "It was difficult to say what official was
free from it." It had become a tradition, which "has left
its effect on these people," and it "will probably take some
years to completely change the wrong ideas with which many
office-holders seem to have become imbued."
General Wood's reform of the judiciary came to a head
with his order of December 31, 1900. In this he decreed that
judges and other court officers should be put on salary, and
fees abolished. Buildings were to be provided for the
handling of judicial cases, doing away with the former haphazard practices, and the various court positions subordinate
to the judge were to be awarded as a result of competitive
examinations. Much attention was given to the police courts,
to relieve the higher courts of the volume of lesser business
and avoid the law's delays. Another American innovation
was the provision of lawyers for the poor. The careful preparation and keeping of records were insisted upon, and stenographers began to be employed for the first time. An attempt
was made to introduce the jury system, but this proved a
failure. Hispanic peoples everywhere show little willingness
to pass judgment on one another, especially in case~ involving human weakness. Furthermore, it was difficult to get
juries, as professional men were exempt, and the percentage
of illiteracy was so high that not many others were available.




THE UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNMENT, 1898-1902 109
So juries were abandoned, and tribunals of three, five, or
seven judges substituted, to pass on both law and fact. As
part of this same general reform a great deal was accomplished for the betterment of prisons. When taken over by
the military government they were in a state that was nothing less than monstrously bad. Prisoners were herded in
together, young and old, of both sexes, in the midst of utter
filth. Many had been put in prison years before, and forgotten, without ever having been brought to trial. Some six
hundred were released at once, either because the evidence
of criminality was not sufficient or because they had already
been in prison long enough. Later, others were pardoned,
until about a thousand in all had been given their freedom.
Regular prison inspections were instituted, and prisoners
were segregated according to their crimes, while cleanliness,
elementary education, and the ideal of a prison sentence as
a means of reform (rather than merely as a punishment)
were introduced.
By the end of the intervention the Department of Justice
had gained "respect and confidence" and was "honest and
highly efficient," according to General Wood. On the other
hand, an American critic of General Wood denies that the
governor had established "confidence" in the courts, and
insists that the Department of Justice was no better at the
end of the military government than at the beginning. This
was unquestionably an exaggeration, though, as a Cuban
writer puts it, "a long road has been traveled since then, and
even yet it is not possible to say that the judicial branch is
swimming in rosewater." It may fairly be said that the
situation was satisfactory while General Wood was in control and that many of his reforms were of permanent utility,
but he could not change traditions,-not in two years and
a half; so corruption and inefficiency were again to make




110


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


their presence felt in the later and present-day administration of justice.10
From the very first, steps were taken to make ready for an
eventual independent Cuban government, but these may be
treated more conveniently in the next chapter. Something
may be said here, however, about political developments in
the municipalities. General Brooke had installed governments in the 138 municipalities of Cuba, but it could not be
said that they were a flattering success. It has been asserted
that the newly appointed Cuban officials took some seventy
per cent of the revenues for themselves, thus proving that
colonial traditions still lived. General Wood introduced a
much more sweeping reform. Under Spain the municipalities had enjoyed no autonomy in fact, but had been managed from Havana. The authorities at the capital, too,
had paid officials out of the general treasury. With the natural Anglo-Saxon feeling that local government is the foundation-rock of democratic institutions General Wood issued an
order, in 1901, to the effect that municipalities must henceforth pay their own officials and police. That necessitated
local taxes and, therefore, a reassessment of values in the
whole country. All Hispanic peoples hate direct taxation,
and the Cubans were no exception. There was plenty of
criticism, but the governor went ahead with his plan. As
part of the work, fifty-six unnecessary municipalities were
suppressed. In this connection it must be borne in mind
that the term "municipality" in Cuba is more nearly equivalent to "county," as used in English, than it is to "city" or
"town." 11
'1For a discussion of current evils, population are often confusing to an
see chapter XXII.             American. Thus the municipality
" As it is customary for a Cuban might have several times the populamunicipality to have the same name tion of the city.
as its principal city, the statistics of




THE UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNMENT, 1898-1902 111
By the end of the United States military rule the municipalities were not, indeed, self-supporting like an American
city, for the public schools, hospitals, and sanitation work
were being taken care of by the general government, but they
were paying all other expenses. Naturally, there was a great
deal of local corruption and incompetence, and General Wood
frequently intervened in such cases, especially in Havana.
At any rate, the new system was a considerable advance
over what had existed before, and has been retained by the
republic in all its essentials. However much corruption and
inefficiency may have developed in recent years, a local government organization was turned over to Cuba that was in
good working order at the time.
One of the chief interests of the United States in Cuban
affairs was in the development of a good school system.
This and sanitation were, perhaps, the objects of General
Wood's greatest activities, and the two of them were responsible for a considerable proportion of the government's
expenditures. As for education, there was everything to
do, with little foundation to build upon. There had been a
public school law under Spain, but the system was one in
name only. About all there was of real education was what
might be obtained in private schools. There were some public
schools, but they were conducted in a way that was "corrupt
and inefficient." Teaching positions were a matter of traffic.
There were few or no school-houses, and pupils, if any, went
to the house of the school-teacher, if he had one and was at
home! A school law was first enacted just at the end of
General Brooke's administration, on December 6, 1899. This
had been drawn up by an American named Alexis E. Frye,
whom Brooke had appointed Superintendent of Schools, and
provided for the opening of primary and grammar schools
by December 11, or as soon thereafter as possible.




112       A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
No complaint could be made of Mr. Frye's work on the
score of activity. He had already founded some six hundred
schools in the few days before General Wood's induction into
office, and continued thereafter at such an amazing rate
that he had mustered a total of 3313 before the new governor called a halt. The trouble was, that there had been
rather too great a desire to make a record for numbers, and
too little thoroughness in getting the schools ready for actual
work. One might wonder how, in any event, Mr. Frye had
been able to establish so many, but an understanding of Hispanic character will make this clear. Among Hispanic peoples,-and certainly this was the case in Cuba, -lt is customary to look upon the government as powerful, rich, and./ alien, wherefore anything that can be obtained from it is
just so much clear profit." So the Cubans were enthusiastic
for schools, because the government was paying for them
(though, according to this law, the local government), and
they meant jobs for teachers, rents for buildings, and sales
of school furniture. It was necessary to discard a great many
of the schools founded by Mr. Frye, but enough more were
established, this time on a more substantial basis, to bring
the total about to the maximum previously obtained.
A new school law, prepared by Lieutenant Mathew E.
Hanna of the governor's staff, was put into effect in 1900.
Lieutenant Hanna had once taught school in Ohio, and so
used the school law of that state as the basis for his work.
It was provided, however, that the general government
should support the schools, as they had proved to be a plaything of local politics during the brief tenure of the 1899
law. The system was expensive, taking nearly a fourth of
the revenues (approximately four millions in seventeen for
the first year of operation). The unit cost per pupil at the
outset was about $26.50, compared with $22.50 for the




THE UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNMENT, 1898-1902 113
United States as a whole. It is well to bear in mind, however, that the cost in many states was far higher, but the
average was pulled down by a low rate in the southern states,
some of which expended only about $8.60. The initial cost
of equipment was necessarily a heavy item, and it was
deemed wise to pay good salaries, so as to attract the best
elements in Cuba. The teachers were Cubans. Americans
were not used, so as to avoid the all too easily kindled suspicions of a possible "Americanization" program. Besides,
it was important to train Cubans, as they would have to be
relied on when United States control should be withdrawn.
A great impetus to the teaching profession was given when
Harvard University, of which General Wood was an alumnus,
extended an invitation for a number of Cuban teachers to
spend the summer of 1900 at the northern institution. Nearly
fifteen hundred teachers availed themselves of this opportunity, of whom nine hundred were women. All their expenses were paid, and the whole affair was a great success.
The following year two hundred more Cuban teachers spent
the summer at Harvard. Higher education was provided
for, through the medium of the already existing University
of Havana and six high schools, or institutes, one for each
province. The University at that time had ninety-six professors and 406 students, and its equipment was scanty and
"almost worthless." The professors were doing "little or
nothing"; so nearly all were dismissed. The new professors
were required to win their posts by competitive examinations, and up-to-date scientific apparatus was installed in
the different departments. It remained, for the time being,
a typical Hispanic American university, giving degrees in
medicine, law, engineering, and arts and architecture. A
normal school, a school for orphans, a correctional school for
boys, and another for girls were also founded. Private schools




114


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


still continued, but were required to submit to government
supervision.
The immediate result of the educational reforms was very
gratifying. There was an enrollment of 256,000 in the
schools. After the first enthusiasm, however, this fell off to
about 160,000, with an average attendance of 125,000, or
seventy-eight per cent. The educational gain over the past
was in any event very great, and many of General Wood's
reforms have since been retained, even though there has
been a falling off in administrative fervor concerning education in recent years.12
Rivaling education in the amount of attention it received
and surpassing every phase of the military government's
work on the score of positive achievement was the matter of
sanitation. This was a subject in which General Wood had
a peculiar interest, for he himself had taken a degree in
medicine at Harvard, and had entered upon his military
career as an army surgeon. The authorities at Washington
were also deeply concerned, in part because of the national
habit of cleanliness, but also because the southern parts of
the United States were in constant danger from epidemics
having their origin in Cuba, especially the terrible yellow
fever. Martinez Ortiz sums up the problem the intervention
government had to face, as follows:
"Nobody had occupied himself with public hygiene for many years
back. During the War of Independence the lack of observance of sanitary rules reached its height. The island had managed to attain to a
universal reputation for unhealthfulness, and yellow fever had obtained
letters of naturalization in its ports. It was a constant threat to
foreigners, and its annual victims were counted in many thousands. The
cities, dirty beyond all exaggeration, were equal in that respect to those
of the Turks. In Havana itself La Punta and all the littoral of
San Lazaro, where the picturesque walk and the elegant buildings of
Cf. infra, pp. 592-596.




THE UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNMENT, 1898-1902 115
the Avenida del Golfo beautify it, were converted into an immense
dung-hill, infected and bad-smelling. In private houses, with very few
exceptions, even in those of well-to-do or wealthy families, there were
black, open wells, without any protection, that filled the air with malarial
poisons and stench.""
The early tasks in the way of sanitation were comparatively
simple. The cities were cleaned up. More than that was
necessary, however, in order to combat sickness, especially
yellow fever. Cuba was overrun with this, and the precise
cause of it was not known, but it was believed to be a filth
disease. An epidemic broke out in Santiago while General
Wood was governor of Oriente in 1899. He thereupon
plunged into a campaign of cleaning, burning, and disinfecting, put the inhabitants under martial law, and segregated
those showing symptoms of the fever. That worked at Santiago, and the epidemic stopped, but the same measures
would not have been practical in so large a city as Havana.
In 1900 Havana was caught in the grip of a yellow fever
attack, much to the surprise of the authorities, for the city
had just been cleaned up and was perhaps cleaner than most
cities of the United States. It seemed obvious to General
Wood, therefore, that the accepted views as to the origin of
yellow fever were wrong. So he appointed a commission,
headed by Dr. Walter Reed, to enquire into the matter.
There was living in Cuba at this time a physician named
Dr. Charles John Finlay, Cuban-born (1833), of English
parents, who some years before had advanced the theory that
yellow fever was transmitted by the bite of the stegomyia
mosquito. At the request of Dr. Reed, General Wood resolved to give Finlay's idea a trial, and commenced a series
of experiments that was to produce remarkable results. As
a preliminary, two American doctors, Dr. James Carroll and
U Martinez Ortiz, I, 23-24.




116


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


Dr. Jesse W. Lazear, allowed themselves to be bitten by
mosquitoes that had previously gorged themselves on the
blood of yellow fever patients. Dr. Carroll caught the disease in a severe form, but eventually recovered. Dr. Lazear,
much to his own disappointment, did not contract it, and so
caused himself to be bitten again. This time the experiment
was a "success," for Dr. Lazear got the yellow fever and died!
Too much praise cannot be accorded to Carroll and Lazear,
and, as for Lazear, if ever a man deserved a martyr's crown,
he did.
Further experiments were now made on a larger scale,
with a number of men volunteering for the purpose. Two
rooms were prepared, under identical conditions so far as
the air and other things were concerned, except that mosquitoes infected with yellow fever were in one room, while they
were excluded from the other. The man in the room with
the mosquitoes caught the fever, but the other did not. A
number of men were put into another room in which matters
were as bad as possible, except that there were no mosquitoes;
the air was foul, and the clothing and other effects employed
by the men were taken from yellow fever patients who had
died. But not one of them got sick. Yet other ingenious
tests were made, until at length it was possible to announce
that yellow fever was transmitted by the bite of the female
of the species of the stegomyia mosquito. This must have
bitten someone infected with yellow fever, during the first
three days of the attack, and at least twelve more days would
have to have elapsed before it could pass the disease on to
another!
If the intervention had accomplished nothing else, this
one discovery would have made it worth while. Its value
to the world was incalculable, as it made it possible for the
first time to combat yellow fever with some prospect of suc



THE UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNMENT, 1898-1902 117
cess. As for Cuba, a war on mosquitoes began at once. Incidentally, too, this contributed to check malaria which had
also ravaged the island, as this disease was already known
to be transmitted by the bite of mosquitoes. Their breeding-places in stagnant pools were attacked with gasoline,
which proved effective. In his report of 1901 the sanitation
officer claimed that the number of mosquitoes in the island
at the end of the year was not more than a tenth of what
it had been at the start. One may wonder how the mosquito
"census" was taken, but in point of fact yellow fever had
been stamped out in Cuba. This achievement, together with
other measures contributing to the same general result, presently converted Cuba from a pest-hole into one of the most
healthful countries in the world. At the end of the United
States occupation in Cuba a comparison of the figures for
death from disease in the American army showed 20.26 per
cent in the Pacific islands, 4.83 per cent in the United States,
and only 1.67 per cent in Cuba. Furthermore, the idea of
sanitation was inculcated in the minds of Cubans, and,
though the government in recent years has at times shown a
reprehensible lack of attention to this matter, there has been
no relapse to anything approaching the bad situation existing
prior to 1900. Incidentally, the officer in charge of the sanitation campaign was a certain Major William Crawford
Gorgas, presently to win fame in the same connection in the
building of the Panama Canal and in aid to various stricken
regions of Hispanic America.
Not so spectacular as the war against disease, General
Wood's achievements in the domain of public works were
noteworthy. Much that he did was in connection with education and the health program. For example, hospitals and
charities were put upon an up-to-date basis. Under Spain
the intent had been humane, but the management bad.
| 




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A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


Necessary equipment was lacking, and unhygienic practices
were prevalent. All this was changed. Roads and bridges
were built, an extensive and efficient telephone and telegraph service was developed, the customs service was most
capably handled under the management of Colonel Tasker
Howard Bliss. The post-office was made to function in
first-class fashion. Indeed, with the expenditures on sanitation included, more money was put out for public works
than on any other branch of the service. This has led one
writer to make the following observations:
"Despite the complaints of American critics that too much money
was spent on schools in proportion to other things, therefore, it appears
that much less was spent on them than on public works. Perhaps such
complaints would have been less numerous and less bitter if General
Wood had been willing or able to give profitable contracts apd franchises
to American speculators." 14
There was one instance of graft on a large scale by Americans in the post-office, involving some of the higher officials
of that institution, including the director, Mr. Estes G.
Rathbone, who has been described as
"a person who was much 'set up' and full of importance, given to
'throwing the house through the window' in receptions and banquets.
He was very well connected in his own country, and had a close friendship with various of the most well-known chieftains of the Republican
party, then in power." "
Hardly anybody in Cuba imagined for a moment that
punishment could overtake a man so strongly entrenched as
Mr. Rathbone and his associates, but General Wood intervened personally in the matter, overcame a most formidable
opposition, and secured a conviction of the delinquents.
The manner in which this affair was handled more than
made up for the crime itself, so far as its effect on Cuban
1' Johnson, IV, 168.           "5 Martinez Ortiz, I, 130.




THE UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNMENT, 1898-1902 119


opinion was concerned. The barest understanding of Hispanic life will make it clear in any event, as Martinez Ortiz
has said, that "in Cuba itself the case never raised a dust
comparable to that produced in the United States." But
there was one after-effect that ought to be borne in mind.
This is expressed by the same Cuban writer as follows:
"The friends of these men never forgave Mr. Wood for his inflexibility
in the affair. As often as they could oppose him they did so furiously,
and despite his great influence they tried to put obstacles in the way of
his advancement and fame."'
Among innumerable other acts of the governor was his disposition of a difficult church question. The Roman Catholic
faith is virtually the only religion with any standing in Cuba
and all other Hispanic countries, but there is almost invariably a bitter opposition to the church as an institution (apart
from its beliefs) that Americans who have not lived in one
of the southern republics find hard to understand. In Cuba
there was a special local reason for hostility, as churchmen
had pretty generally espoused the cause of Spain. Three
issues were raised in attacks on the church, after the war
was over. There were proposals for confiscation of church
property, the secularization of cemeteries, and the replacement of church marriages by a civil function. Left to themselves, there is no telling how far the Cubans might have
gone, and it was fortunate for the church that an American
who was not a Catholic had the decision in the matter. The
church was allowed to keep its estates and retain its control
over cemeteries already in its possession, without being sub1 Ibid., I, 131. The writer has in part of grafters and those who wanted
his possession a number of statements improper concessions they couldn't
from veteran residents of Cuba to the get. Some Cubans were suspicious
same effect. For example, the follow- of him as an agent of the United
ing is quite typical: "The objections States, but admired him personally."
to General Wood were chiefly on the




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A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


jected to hostile regulation. Under General Brooke the Cuban
Secretaries did put through some measures against the
church,-for example, the civil marriage decree. Up to that
time church marriages alone were legal, and it was customary to charge rather high fees for the service. General
Brooke was prevailed upon to enact a law establishing civil
marriage for a fee of one dollar and making it the only binding ceremony. The church fought this law, and it was
changed in 1900 by General Wood, who decreed that a church
marriage (by any lawful sect) or a civil marriage should be
equally valid. As an illustration of the Cuban attitude
toward this law it is interesting to note that eighty municipalities, out of the then 107 existing, were opposed to the
change from the law of General Brooke, and so also were all
but one of the judges of the Supreme Court, the majority
of the judges in courts of first instance, and three of the six
Cuban governors of the provinces.
It is on the score of the economic situation that General
Wood's critics have endeavored to make the most capital
against him, trying to give the impression that the lack of
prosperity at this time was due to his administration. It
would seem that the complaints were hardly justified. In
the first place, Cuba was in the midst of a serious economic
depression, due to the ills that had befallen her in the war
and to the position of sugar in the world's markets. In
the second place, a great deal was done in order to assist
the island to get back on a satisfactory business basis. One
critic has pointed out, however, that only a little over a
million dollars was applied to agriculture, industry, and
commerce, out of a total expenditure of fifty-five millions
for the whole period of the intervention, while justice and
instruction (mainly education) received eleven millions, and
sanitation nine. Nevertheless, without counting amounts




THE UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNMENT, 1898-1902 121
devoted to the two last-named services, various sums were
spent that must have been of great assistance to business,
such, for example, as the nearly six millions for public works
and five for the rural guards. And certainly it is open to
question whether direct paternalistic aid to agriculture is
advisable. Anyway, it was a matter of choice with the
monies available, and it is quite generally admitted by the
Cubans themselves that General Wood, following instructions from Washington, chose well. The burden of proof
would still seem to be on his opponents.
It is impossible to be precise about the condition of commerce and industry under Spain, for "no reliance" can be
placed "on even official reports," and Spanish "methods"
were "nothing other than well-organized corruption," a bargain between importers and the custom-house officials, high
and low. Coffee, which was supposed to pay $12.15 per hundred kilograms, would be entered as corn, paying $2.40, and
sheet copper at $14 would come in as sheet iron at $2.90,
or pianos might enter as organs, at half the rate. There were
similar frauds in exports, on which duties were also collected.
An honest administration might have produced a far greater
yield. For example, exports of the fiscal year 1893-1894
were officially about a hundred million, and imports sixty,
with revenues of twelve millions, while a much smaller volume of trade under the United States military government,
with exports ranging from forty-nine to sixty-six millions
and imports from sixty-seven to seventy-four, yielded an
average of seventeen millions in revenues. Under American
rule Cuba was at first too poor to make much profit out
of commerce, but there was a "better condition" each year,
as the arch-critic admits, despite an unfavorable sugar situation. The sugar crop had fallen from an average of about
a million tons in the early nineties to some three hundred




122


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


thousand in the fiscal year 1897-1898.17 Imports were heavy,
as stocks of merchandise had been depleted during the war.
A provisional tariff, prepared just prior to the official close
of Spanish rule, went into effect on December 13, 1898, but
was succeeded by a more carefully worked out schedule of
duties in a decree of June 15, 1900. There was some criticism because certain United States products were favored,
though others were unable to compete with European goods.
Despite an increase in rates against the former group at a
later time, after the republic was established, the proportion
of Cuban trade with the United States was not then so great
as it has since become. Cuba imported from the United
States approximately $109,000,000 worth of goods out of a
total of $224,000,000, or less than fifty per cent, and exported $135,000,000 in $179,000,000, or over seventy-five
per cent, making a total volume of trade of some sixty per
cent. The government's revenues were almost wholly derived from customs duties. In a total of some fifty-seven
millions for the whole period of United States rule, less than
five millions were obtained from other sources. Incidentally, as already pointed out, all but about two millions
of the revenues were spent. The tariff was designed to produce just about the amount needed. There was no desire
to pile up a surplus. Possibly the authorities realized that
it would be politically dangerous, as was later amply to be
proved during the first presidential administration of the
republic.
Among the acts designed to help the business situation
may be mentioned the decrees to assist debtors. The island
was mortgaged up to approximately three-fourths its value,
and there was a general inability to pay, during the early
" Compare this with the four to times.
five million tons a year of recent




THE UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNMENT, 1898-1902 123
years of the intervention. In consequence both Brooke and
Wood issued mortgage decrees, which carried payments over
to 1901. A number of other debts, after due investigation,
were cancelled. It is worthy of note, too, as in some measure
reflecting the security of conditions during the intervention,
that there was not a single financial failure in the entire
period, despite the fact that a large proportion of business
was in the hands of the then hated Spaniards. A still further
example of indirect economic aid was in the encouragement
of railway building. At the close of Spanish rule there were
1135 miles of public lines and 965 that were privately owned,
the latter mainly by sugar companies operating between their
plantations and ports also owned by themselves. Most of
the railways were English-controlled, and nine-tenths of the
entire system was in the west. To develop the eastern provinces, since become the great sugar mart of the island, a
new line was built during General Wood's administration.
This was the Cuba Railway, running from Santa Clara to
Santiago. There was some difficulty in aiding this enterprise, because of the Foraker Law against concessions, but
it was held that it did not apply, since the company had
not taken a Cuban charter, but was incorporated in the
state of New Jersey. So the company was allowed to purchase a strip of land 450 miles long and thirty meters wide.
The permission was more easily given than taken advantage
of. Owners made extortionate demands for their property,
and newspapers and politicians attacked the project, many
of them hoping "to be paid for their silence or approval."
The aid of government was necessary if the road was to be
built at all; so on February 7, 1902, General Wood issued
a decree concerning railways, in which he applied the eminent
domain principle of Anglo-American law, allowing land to
be "denounced" and taken by public service companies, on




124


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


payment of an adjudged fair price. As a result, half of
Cuba, previously of scant value, was "opened to settlement
and to productive cultivation." 18 General Wood's critics
claim that his assistance to the Cuba Railway was in violation of the Foraker Law, though admitting the benefit
derived by the island. Certainly no "subservience to Wall
Street" cry could be raised in connection with his later railway law of April 28, 1902, however. In this, rates were
fixed at a much lower tariff than had been collected before.
For example, where passengers had been charged from seven
to twelve cents a mile, the fare was reduced to four and a
third to six cents. Other rates were in proportion to these,
designed to give a reasonable, but not excessive, profit. The
railways protested, but to no avail, and even the critics aver
that this was a "good law."
One more phase of the military government's work has yet
to be discussed,-that involved in the instructions to prepare Cuba as rapidly as possible for an independent republican government. This is so important that it merits
separate treatment.19


"For something further about the
building of the Cuba Railway, see
infra, pp. 617-618.
"Few   periods of recent United
States history have more ample materials upon them and are more
worthy of monographic study than
that of the military government in
Cuba from 1898 to 1902. Trelles,
Biblioteca, II, 87-99, for example, cites
128 items, mainly, but not wholly, of
Cuban and American origin. Of special note are the reports of the two
governors, Brooke and Wood, that of
the former in a single volume
(Brooke, John Rutter, Civil report,
Washington, 1900), but supplemented
by individual reports of the different
military governors of the provinces,
and that of General Wood in no fewer
than thirty-three great tomes (Wood,


Leonard, Civil report, 1899-1900, 12
vols., Havana, 1901; Civil report...
1901, 15 vols., Havana, 1902; Civil
report...1902, 6 vols., Havana,
1903).
Of secondary accounts the best, perhaps, is that of the Cuban historian,
Martinez Ortiz, which   is neither
hyper-laudatory nor afflicted with
any observable bias, in addition to
which it makes use of much worthwhile contemporary material and has
a Cuban atmosphere not apparent in
works by American writers. A close
rival to the work of Martinez Ortiz
is that of Albert Robinson, already
cited (supra, p. 95, n. 5). In many
particulars this is even more detailed,
and, despite the author's hostility to
General Wood, there are few volumes
in which the great achievements of




THE UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNMENT, 189-1902 125


that official stand forth more clearly.
The criticisms in this work are so obviously unfair or, in the light of subsequent events, so inaccurate that
they fail to make the impression that
was intended. Robinson visited Cuba
during this period as the representative of the New York Evening Post,
then managed by Oswald Garrison
Villard, since widely known as an editor of The Nation. Villard was a
virulent opponent of the United
States policy in Cuba and a personal
enemy of General Wood. Furthermore, Robinson was closely associated, while in Cuba, with the Rath

bone coterie, and he makes a weak
attempt to defend that official in his
book. Nevertheless, it is not hard
to separate the "wheat" from the
"chaff," and Robinson's volume is deserving of commendation.  Without
adding anything of special account,
Johnson, IV, 133-254, has an interesting story of this period.  Among
numerous articles, one by General
Wood himself (The mnilitary government of Cuba, in American academy
of political science, Annals, v. XXI,
pp. 153-182, Mar., 1903) is specially
worthy of note.




CHAPTER VI


THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC
ONE must go far back from the period of the United States
military rule for an understanding of the American attitude
concerning the establishment of a republic in Cuba. The
essential factor to bear in mind is that of the vital importance of the island to the United States strategically. Early
dreams of annexation had passed away, and in the popular
mind, reflected also in the halls of Congress, Cuba meant
no more than, for example, Venezuela. The administrative
branch of the government, however, whatever party might
be in control, soon became aware of the fact that Cuba held
out that "speck of war" for us that Jefferson had once feared.
Annexation to the United States was no longer necessary or
desirable, provided American interests might be conserved.
That proviso, however, was an unavoidable necessity of
American policy. McKinley realized this, and kept Congress from committing the United States too quickly to
Cuban independence. In his message to Congress of April
11 the President made no reference to a Cuban "government," but spoke of the war between "Spain and the Cuban
people," for the insurrectionists had not as yet been recognized even as belligerents.
Naturally, the American administration's attitude was not
received with whole-hearted enthusiasm by the Cubans in
the field. They were quite as little aware of the inevitable
position of Cuba in American policy as were the rank and file
of people in the United States, and, furthermore, they had
126




THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC


127


endured terrible hardships on behalf of independence, and
saw no reason why they should not have it at once. Any
thought about their own political inexperience very probably
did not occur to many of them, and if it had it would have
been rejected as a reflection on those who had risked their
lives to win freedom from Spain. So there was some friction
between Cubans and Americans, even before the war was
over. It seemed to the former that the American officials
in Cuba acted as if the Cubans were merely a side-issue in
the war. Not much attention was paid to the provisional
government of the insurrectionists, or even to Gomez or their
other military leaders. Calixto Garcia, who had participated
in the operations around Santiago, was not invited to be
present at the ceremonies attending the surrender of that
city, and General Wood was appointed governor of Oriente
without previously consulting the Cuban revolutionary authorities. A sensitive people like the Cubans could not fail
to be unfavorably impressed by treatment such as this. Naturally, there was no thought, at least for the time being, of
resisting the United States occupation. The Assembly of
the Cuban army met in November 1898, and set up a special
committee to look out for Cuban interests during the period
of American control. The provisional government was thereupon dissolved, but it was decided that the army, with G6mez
as commander-in-chief, should be retained.
Something has already been said about the Cuban suspicion of American intentions, despite the virtual promise
of independence contained in the Joint Resolution of April
20, 1898. Any number of incidents contributed to this, in
addition to the fact that annexation in that ultra-imperialistic age was the normally to be expected thing on the part
of a country with such a chance as the United States had.
Indeed, the altruistic fervor of early '98 was no longer mani



128


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


fest in the United States in nearly the same degree. People
in the street and those in high places were known to subscribe to the doctrine that "the flag, once raised, must never
come down." The Washington administration did not
swerve from its plans for Cuban independence, but the
Cubans could hardly be expected to know that or to put
much faith in official pronouncements, however strong. The
Cuban leaders accepted the American military government,
because there was nothing else they could do, but there was
not a little friction, right from the start. Early in 1899
General Calixto Garcia died. Ranking with Gomez and
Maceo as one of the three greatest military figures of the
Cuban wars, it was natural that his funeral should be a
grand and solemn affair. It was held in Havana in February, and was attended by thousands of people. It had
been arranged that the Assembly of the Cuban army should
march in the procession just behind the American authorities, but when General Brooke's carriage appeared it was
observed that he was followed by his staff and some of his
military escort. Thereupon the members of the Assembly,
under the leadership of Fernando Freyre de Andrade, withdrew, and were followed by many other Cubans in the line.
Indeed, it was necessary for the American soldiers to do the
honors at the interment of the old Cuban hero, as the Cubans
who had been designated for that purpose refused.
The scandal of the Garcia funeral had its counterpart in
numerous other incidents, all of which were indicative of a
certain lack of cordiality or confidence on the part of the
Cubans toward the American trusteeship. Something has
already been said about the relations of General Brooke
with the Cuban Assembly. This body claimed that it was
the only legal government in Cuba, and wanted an immediate withdrawal of the United States authorities. It was




THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC


129


not supported by conservative opinion in Cuba, however,
and when it deposed G6mez on account of his attitude over
the bonus issue it lost all standing, as already related, and
dissolved itself. It was clear, nevertheless, that steps must
constantly be taken in order to allay the all too ready suspicions of many of the Cubans. So one of the early acts of
of General Wood was to decree a law of elections, promulgated in April 1900. Several political parties had already
been formed, but up to this time they had had no real life.
As already pointed out, there was, at best, only a halfhearted hope that the United States would fulfil her pledges,
and, besides, there were no issues. Now, however, the
parties attained to a new-born vigor, and in casting about
for an issue hit upon the duration and character of the
American occupation. One of General Wood's cabinet officers, General Rius Rivera, went so far as to publish a letter
advocating the immediate recognition of Cuban independence, on the basis of the Joint Resolution, rejecting the
Treaty of Paris. General Wood reminded Rius Rivera that
it was not proper for his Secretaries to unbosom themselves
on certain subjects without first consulting him, whereupon
Rius Rivera resigned. Another incident of similar type,
serving in the same manner to stir up Cuban opinion over
the independence issue, occurred later that year when the
French government at first declined to allow the Cuban flag
to be raised over the building which was to house the Cuban
exhibit. This action was taken on the ground that it would
be an affront to Spain, as it would be tantamount to a recognition of a new nation. The United States government took
occasion once again to announce that it proposed to fulfil
its promise to make Cuba independent, and persuaded the
French authorities to permit of the raising of the flag. So,
for the moment, the restless elements among the Cuban




130


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


patriots were warm in their praise of the United States, putting by their suspicions until another day.
General Wood had called an informal meeting of notables,
prior to the enactment of his election law, to get their views,
at the same time submitting a plan prepared by Cuban officials under his direction. The majority favored a most
sweepingly democratic law as regards grant of the suffrage,
but the governor adopted the opinions of the minority,
which accorded with his own. It was provided that all
native-born Cuban men who were at least twenty-one years
old might vote, if they could read and write, or had $250
worth of property, or had served in the Cuban army during
the war. The secret ballot and other familiar American
features were also called for in the new law. The first trial
of the law was set for the municipal elections to be held in
June 1900. Among numerous parties in the field, three
were especially prominent. Two were immediate independence parties, differing only in leadership and locality, though
one of them, the Nationalists of Havana, professed to favor a
centralized republic, while the Republicans of Santa Clara
came out for states' rights. The former were supposed to
represent the friends of Maximo G6mez, while the latter were
charged with being affiliated with his enemies in the now
defunct Cuban Assembly. The leader of the Republicans
was a man who now comes prominently to the fore for the
first time, General Jose Miguel Gomez, a veteran of the two
wars and civil governor of Santa Clara. The third party,
the Union Democratic of Havana, represented something
quite different from the other two, worthy of special note
as indicative of the fact that not all Cuban society was impatient for immediate independence. Many of the members
of this group were one-time Autonomists, men who had been
the leading spirits among the Cubans in the interval be



THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC


131


tween the two wars, but who had lost caste for seeking home
rule under Spain instead of independence. Their feeling
was accurately expressed in the following comment of El
Nuevo Pais, which represented the Autonomist element:
"Cuba is not well prepared for absolute independence. It is necessary
to establish the government of this country in a way to bring about the
preservation of order and peace through conservative and evolutionary
processes."
This was the quite generally held idea of the conservative
classes, who made up the bulk of the Union Democratic
party. Some of them, perhaps, hoped for annexation to
the United States, or at least an American protectorate, but
the charges that were quite freely bandied about to the effect
that the whole party stood for these things were probably
not warranted. At any rate there was great bitterness against
this group on the part of the more radical Cuban elements,
-so much so, that the Union Democratic party presently
withdrew, expressing its disapproval of the election laws and
alleging corrupt practices on the part of its opponents.
The elections were held on June 16, 1900, and were peaceful enough. There were some claims of fraud, but, on the
whole, the result was probably reasonably fair. The Republicans elected every one of their candidates in Santa Clara
and Matanzas, but lost to the Nationalists in Havana. Elsewhere regional tickets prevailed. Despite the subsequent
somewhat improper conduct of the municipal governments
that were elected, it was felt that an acceptable beginning
had been made. The election was hardly "cold," when General Wood announced a fresh step in the direction of independence. Acting on orders from Washington, General
Wqod issued an order, on July 25, 1900, for the election of,
1 Quoted in Martinez Ortiz, I, 115.




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A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


delegates "to frame and adopt a Constitution for the people
of Cuba, and, as a part thereof, to provide for and agree with
the Government of the United States upon the relations to
exist between that Government and the Government of
Cuba." Robinson is probably right in saying the call was
issued in part to check the reiterated Cuban suspicions of
the United States. He also says that the date of the order
was timed so as to keep the Cuban issue out of the American
presidential campaign of 1900. Whether or not this is true,
it certainly must be considered probable; Republicans and
Democrats alike in the past quarter of a century have frequently subordinated national policies relating to Cuba and
other lands to the political situation in the United States.
In the present instance, however, the action of the Washington authorities was in accord with what had been determined upon from the moment of the American entry into
the war with Spain in 1898.
Naturally, the requirement for determining upon the
nature of relations with the United States "as a part" of
their own Constitution did not escape the notice of the Cuban
politicians, and many of them announced that they and
their parties would have nothing to do with the election of
delegates. Before election day, on September 15, 1900, they
had changed their minds, however, having in the meantime
received assurances that the terms of the order would be
modified. Thirty-one delegates were elected, apportioned
among the provinces according to population, with Havana
getting eight, Santa Clara and Oriente seven apiece, Matanzas four, Pinar del Rio three, and Camagiiey two. All the
delegates but one were members of the more radical revolutionary elements, the men who were prominent in the Nationalist and Republican ranks. Among their numbers were
men who were to be outstanding figures in the presently to




THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC      133
be formed republic, such, for example, as Gonzalo de Quesada,
General Emilio Nufiez, Manuel Sanguily, Alfredo Zayas,
Domingo Mendez Capote, Jose Miguel G6mez, and Juan
Gualberto Gomez. The Convention met for the first time in
Havana on November 5, 1900, on which occasion General
Wood read an order setting forth that the "first" duty of
the delegates was to "frame and adopt a Constitution," and
then "formulate what, in your opinion, ought to be the relations between Cuba and the United States." Afterwards,
"the Government of the United States will doubtless take
such action on its part as shall lead to a final and authoritative agreement between the people of the two countries to
the promotion of their common interests."
Without paying much attention to the matter of relations
with the United States, the Convention went to work to prepare a Constitution for Cuba, being left to its own devices
by General Wood, who made no attempt to intervene in its
deliberations. While no serious differences developed as to
the main features of the document, there were a number of
disputes over what seem to have been comparatively unimportant items. A phrase in the preamble about "invoking
the favor of God" raised quite a storm. Salvador Cisneros,
the much-esteemed one-time Marquis of Santa Lucia and a
former revolutionary President of Cuba, now seventy-five
years old, proposed to strike it out. Sanguily supported
him, asserting however that it was a matter of no importance one way or the other. Following an impassioned appeal for it by an eighty year old delegate named Pedro
Llorente, the phrase was allowed to stand. In like manner
there was an animated debate over the paragraph concerning religious worship. It was decided to do away with the
Spanish system of a state-supported church and permit of
freedom for all sects. These two matters are interesting




134


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


as an illustration of a certain aggressive attitude against
the church that is so common in Hispanic America. Furthermore, by definitely pronouncing for a separation of church
and state the Cubans rid themselves of an issue that has
disturbed the politics of many of their sister republics to
the south. The most bitterly fought paragraph of the Constitution grew out of a matter which proved to have no importance at all. This was the one concerning the qualifications for the presidency, and it turned on the eligibility of
Maximo G6mez, who, as already observed, was a native of
the Dominican Republic. The issue was whether the chief
magistracy should be restricted to native-born Cubans only
or whether the article should be framed in such a way as
to admit of an election of G6mez. On this issue the proG6mez Nationalists and anti-G6mez Republicans clashed.
In the end a clause was put in (now obsolete) that a naturalized citizen who had served ten years in Cuba's wars
might be eligible. Later, when the time came for a presidential election, the old general declined to allow his name
to be put in nomination. Possibly the most notable of the
other contested points before the Convention was the paragraph concerning qualifications for voting. On account of
the great number of illiterates and not too highly civilized
negroes in Cuba, some were in favor of restricting the suffrage, but the majority were not even willing to adopt the
limitations that had been imposed by General Wood in the
elections of 1900. So, except for insane persons and those
civilly dead, universal manhood suffrage was decided upon.
The Constitution was declared ready, and was signed by
the delegates on February 21, 1901. It was received without great enthusiasm, for many felt that the United States
would not accept it. Conservative elements outside the
Convention were not ready for a severance of the connection




THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC


135


with the United States, and many, doubtless, still hoped
for annexation. But the Washington authorities interposed
no objections to the document as it stood. Elihu Root, then
Secretary of War and therefore in charge of matters relating
to the military government in Cuba, remarked of it in his
annual report for 1901,
"I do not fully agree with the wisdom of some of the provisions of
this constitution; but it provides for a republican form of government;
it was adopted after long and patient consideration and discussion; it
represents the views of the delegates elected by the people of Cuba;
and it contains no features which would justify the assertion that a
government organized under it will not be one to which the United States
may properly transfer the obligations for the protection of life and
property under international law, assumed in the Treaty of Paris."
Nevertheless, the United States was not satisfied merely "to
prepare Cuba for self-government." The Washington authorities were interested also in the matter of "relations"
between Cuba and the United States, and the solution of
this problem was, it has been stated,
"To require from the Cubans guarantees for the conduct of their
government and to prevent the island from falling into the hands of
any other nation so that the United States would not be placed in a
worse position than before by reason of turning Spain out of the island.
This was accomplished by including in the Cubah constitution and in
the legislation of the United States and in a treaty between the United
States and Cuba the provisions known as the Platt Amendment."'
For convenience, the terms of this famous document may
well be set forth here:
"Provided further, That in fulfillment of the declaration contained in
the joint resolution approved April twentieth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight, entitled 'For the recognition of the independence of the
people of Cuba, demanding that the Government of Spain relinquish
' Comment of the editors of Root, Other quoted paragraphs given in this
Elihu, The military and colonial chapter without citation may also be
policy of the United States, 185. found in that volume.




136


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its
land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the
President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the
United States to carry these resolutions into effect,' the President is
hereby authorized to 'leave the government and control of the island
of Cuba to its people' so soon as a government shall have been established
in said island under a constitution which, either as a part thereof or in
an ordinance appended thereto, shall define the future relations of the
United States with Cuba, substantially as follows:
I. That the government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty
or other compact with any foreign power or powers which will impair
or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorize
or permit any foreign power or powers to obtain by colonization or for
military or naval purposes or otherwise, lodgment in or control over
any portion of said island.
II. That said government shall not assume or contract any public
debt, to pay the interest upon which, and to make reasonable sinking
fund provision for the ultimate discharge of which the ordinary revenues
of the island, after defraying the current expenses of government, shall
be inadequate.
III. That the government of Cuba consents that the United States
may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban
independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the
obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris on
the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the government
of Cuba.
IV. That all acts of the United States in Cuba during its military
occupancy thereof are ratified and validated, and all lawful rights
acquired thereunder shall be maintained and protected.
V. That the government of Cuba will execute, and, as far as necessary,
extend, the plans already devised or other plans to be mutually agreed
upon, for the sanitation of the cities of the island, to the end that a
recurrence of epidemic and infectious diseases may be prevented, thereby
assuring protection to the people and commerce of Cuba, as well as to
the commerce of the southern ports of the United States and the people
residing therein.
VI. That the Isle of Pines shall be omitted from the proposed constitutional boundaries of Cuba, the title thereto being left to future
adjustment by treaty.
VII. That to enable the United States to maintain the independence
of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defense,




THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC


137


the government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands
necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points, to be
agreed upon with the President of the United States.
VIII. That by way of further assurance the government of Cuba
will embody the foregoing provisions in a permanent treaty with the
United States."
It was not until after a bitter struggle of several months
that the Convention at length accepted these conditions.
The Convention did not consider the matter of relations until
after the Constitution had been completed, and then showed
an utter unwillingness to provide anything in line with the
inevitable requirements of the United States.      What the
nature of these would be was already known, for Secretary
Root had despatched a long communication on this score
to General Wood on February 9, 1901, which had been communicated to members of the Convention immediately upon
its arrival in Havana, on February 15. After reciting the
self-imposed duty assumed by the United States under the
Joint Resolution of April 20, 1898, and the obligations
toward Spain derived from    the Treaty of Paris to provide
for "protection of life and property" during the American
occupation and upon its termination to "advise any government established in the island to assume the same obligations," Mr. Root discussed the kind of'government that
should be set up in Cuba, and then went on to make the
following important comment on the score of relations: 
"It seems to me that no one familiar with the traditional and established policy of this country in respect to Cuba can find cause for doubt
as to our remaining duty. It would be hard to find any single statement
of public policy which has been so often officially declared by so great
an array of distinguished Americans authorized to speak for the Government of the United States, as the proposition stated, in varying but
always uncompromising and unmistakable terms, that the United States
would not under any circumstances permit any foreign power other than
Spain to acquire possession of the island of Cuba.




138


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


Jefferson and Monroe and John Quincy Adams and Jackson and
Van Buren and Grant and Clay and Webster and Buchanan and
Everett have all agreed in regarding this as essential to the interests
and the protection of the United States. IThe United States has, and
will always have, the most vital interest in the preservation of the
independence which she has secured for Cuba, and in preserving the
people of that island from the domination and control of any foreign
power whatever. iThe preservation of that independence by a country
so small as Cuba, so incapable, as she must always be, to contend by
force against the great powers of the world, must depend upon her
strict performance of international obligations, upon her giving due
protection to the lives and property of the citizens of all other countries
within her borders, and upon her never contracting any public debt
which in the hands of the citizens of foreign powers shall constitute an
obligation she is unable to meet...The United States has, therefore, not
merely a moral obligation arising from her destruction of Spanish
authority in Cuba and the obligations of the Treaty of Paris for the
establishment of a stable and adequate government in Cuba, but it
has a substantial interest in the maintenance of such a government.
We are placed in a position where, for our own protection, we have,
by reason of expelling Spain from Cuba, become the guarantors of
Cuban independence and the guarantors of a stable and orderly government protecting life and property in that island. Fortunately the
condition which we deem essential for our own interests is the condition
for which Cuba has been struggling, and which the duty we have assumed
toward Cuba on Cuban grounds and for Cuban interests requires.
It would be a most lame and impotent conclusion if, after all the
expenditure of blood and treasure by the people of the United States
for the freedom of Cuba and by the people of Cuba for the same object,
we should, through the constitution of the new government, by inadvertence or otherwise, be placed in a worse condition in regard to our
own vital interests than we were while Spain was in possession, and
the people of Cuba should be deprived of that protection and aid from
the United States which is necessary to the maintenance of their
independence."
Mr. Root then recited five provisions which the United States
felt that "the people of Cuba should desire to have incorporated in her fundamental law." Though in somewhat different phraseology, they were virtually the same as articles




THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC


139




one, two, three, four, and seven of the eventual Platt Amendment.
Opinion about these provisions was divided in Cuba. The
Convention did not like them, especially the articles about
intervention and naval stations for the United States. But
Conservative elements would have preferred even more.
The recommendations had been made by Secretary Root,
however, with full information of the situation. Not only
had he and General Wood kept in touch by correspondence,
but they had also gone over matters in conversations they
had had on visits of Root to Havana and Wood to Washington. Indeed, the Secretary's suggestions had been foreshadowed in President McKinley's annual message of December 5, 1899, in which he said:
"This nation has assumed before the world a grave responsibility for
'the future good government of Cuba... The new Cuba yet to arise
from the ashes of the past must needs be bound to us by ties of singular
intimacy and strength if its enduring welfare is to be assured. Whether
those ties shall be organic or conventional, the destinies of Cuba are in
some rightful form and manner irrevocably linked with our own."
General Wood's reply of February 19, 1901, to Root's long
communication of the 9th intimated that there was "no serious objection to any of the conditions excepting the Fifth,"
-the one about naval stations. There was some disapproval
of the intervention article, but the governor had informed
the Cuban political leaders that this "could not be modified
as it embodied the obligations which the United States had
assumed under the... treaty." Continuing, General Wood
said:
"In my opinion the demands are liberal, equitable and just and should
be insisted on throughout. It is very probable that we shall have to
exercise directly the intervention provided for under the Third Article






140


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


and it is certain that we should, were it not known in Cuba that in case
of lack of stability and failure to observe the provisions imposed by
the Treaty of Paris the United States would promptly intervene. Such
knowledge will probably act as a check on the government to come.
In reference to the Naval Stations: the objection to this seems to be a
matter principally of sentiment combined with a certain amount of
selfishness. Among the elements now dominating in the politics of the
island there is little or no gratitude for what has been done by the
United States. Among the bulk of the people there is a feeling of
appreciation and gratitude."
The governor then went on to make a strong argument in
favor of requiring the Cubans to maintain a good state of
sanitation, which accounts for the eventual inclusion of
article five in the already cited Platt Amendment.3
Presently, the opposition of the political class to the Root
proposals became much more active than General Wood
seems to have anticipated. At least one writer claims the
members of the Convention and their adherents were encouraged in this attitude by "the factional enemies of the
President in the United States," some of whom were false
to their Cuban friends in that they entertained a "deliberate
and malignant hope of precipitating an armed conflict between the two countries which would result in the conquest
and forcible annexation of Cuba." 4 At any rate, the Convention seemed willing to consider a modified acceptance
of the first and fourth articles suggested by Mr. Root, but
was clearly opposed to all the others. Meanwhile, there
was no change in the attitude of the Washington authorities. Senator Orville Hitchcock Platt, chairman of the important Foreign Relations Committee, remarked that Cuba
was free to adopt any Constitution she liked, but the United
States had guaranteed a stable government in the island,
and a Constitution was not in itself a sufficient guarantee.
'Letter quoted in full in Root, is quoted infra, p. 645.
186-187. The argument on sanitation  'Johnson, IV: 200; 202.




THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC


141


So the committee began preparing a measure about relations
which included not only the five suggestions of Mr. Root
and the one by General Wood, but also the other two articles
numbered six and eight. An interesting explanation of the
probable reason for including article six, which left sovereignty over the Isle of Pines in doubt, has been made by
Gonzalo de Quesada, who was a member of the Convention
and later Cuban minister to the United States. According
to him, it grew out of the Cuban opposition to the Root
proposals, especially the naval stations article. On this account some believed "that the Isle of Pines could be made
the basis of defence for American interests in the Caribbean
Sea, or that, if the Isle of Pines was found unsuitable —as it
was afterwards shown to be-for coaling and naval purposes,
it could be made the basis of negotiation for the acquisition
of other sites." 5 As for article eight, that was to provide a
form of insurance against a Cuban removal of the other
seven proposed articles from the Constitution.
The Platt Amendment, named for Senator Platt,-though
many have suggested that it might more appropriately have
been called the "Root Amendment,"-was an "amendment,"
not on account of its eventual place in the Cuban Constitution, but because it was an addition to the army appropriation bill before the United States Congress,-to the army
bill, as Cuba was being administered by the War Department. It was submitted to the Senate on February 25, 1901,
passed that body on the 27th, and passed the House on
March 1st. Opinion in the United States about it was very
much divided, and not wholly on straight party lines. To
many it seemed at first sight like breaking faith, and the
manner in which the bill had been put through, as a "rider"


6Quesada, Gonzalo de, Cuba's American review, v. CXC, pp. 594 -claims to the Isle of Pines, in North 604; Nov., 1909.




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A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


to an appropriation bill, with little discussion, was also
criticized.
/ In Cuba, conservative elements accepted the Amendment,
but the politicians boiled over for a while in a perfect furor
of opposition. The Convention rejected it by a vote of
twenty-four to two, and then sent a committee to Washington to negotiate about the matter. Meanwhile, Mr. Root
had endeavored to calm Cuban opinion by a statement to
the effect that no limitation of the new republic's independence was intended. Writing to Wood on April 3, 1901,
he said:
"You are authorized to state officially that in the view of the President
the intervention described in the third clause of the Platt Amendment
is not synonymous with intermeddling or interference with the affairs
of the Cuban government, but the formal action of the Government
of the United States, based upon just and substantial grounds, for the
preservation of Cuban independence, and the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty,
and adequate for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba
imposed by the Treaty of Paris on the United States."
Similar assurances were also given to the committee the
Convention had sent to Washington. These men were told
that there would be no use made of intervention except in
case of foreign or domestic disturbance, and that Cuba would
have entire control of her own affairs, foreign as well as
domestic, at other times. Some intimations were offered to
them that Cuba might get a favorable commercial treaty
after the Platt Amendment should have been accepted,
though the bill would have to pass Congress. And meanwhile, until the American proposals should be adopted, the
military government would go on. So on May 28, 1901, the
Convention accepted the Platt Amendment by a vote of
fifteen to fourteen, but added an interpretation of its own to
the document. The authorities in Washington came back




THIE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC      143
with a statement that the acceptance must be without qualifications. So on June 12, 1901, by a vote of sixteen to eleven,
with four members absent, the Convention adopted the
Amendment. In due time it was added as an "appendix" to
the Constitution, together with the Permanent Treaty embodying the first seven articles of the Amendment.6
It now remained for a Cuban government to be elected
which could take over control of the island's affairs. General Wood issued an order for the holding of a presidential
election on December 31, 1901. Meanwhile, municipal elections had again been held in which "the issue" was the Platt
Amendment. There were a number of frauds committed.
In Cienfuegos the anti-Platt Amendment candidate for the
post of alcalde, or mayor, made such strong representations to
the effect that his victorious opponent had stolen the election that General Wood sent one of his officers to investigate. It was expected that the winner would be sustained,
as it was believed that the governor was favorable to him,
but the decision went to the other man. This might have
been taken as fairly conclusive evidence that the United
States authorities would not try to impose their own preferences on the voters of Cuba. It seems that it was as yet
difficult for the Cubans to believe it, however, as the same
suspicious attitude was present in the ensuing national elections. The Nationalists would have been glad to back
Maximo Gomez as their candidate for the presidency, and
he might very probably have won the election, despite the
bitter hostility to him of some of the other political groups.
But Gomez did a thing that has few parallels in Hispanic
American history. He declined to run. "Men of war, for
war," he said, "and those of peace, for peace." Besides, he
'For a discussion of the meaning  see infra, pp. 638-647.
and reach of the Platt Amendment,




144


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


felt that he could render greater service to the country outside the presidency and partisan politics than in them, helping out with his counsel. With Gomez out of the reckoning
the two leading candidates were Tomas Estrada Palma and
Bartolome Mas6, both of whom had played prominent parts
in the two Cuban wars. Estrada Palma had won the respect
of everybody by his conduct as Cuban delegate abroad, during the revolution of '95-'98. He had been a most meticulously honest, careful, and capable administrator of the funds
that came to his hands, and by the austerity of his private
life and his seriousness of purpose had made an excellent
impression on leading Americans in furthering the Cuban
cause. Mas6 was of the likeable Hispanic type, but his
rather excessive generosity toward his friends and a certain
decline in mental powers somewhat unfitted him for the post
to which he aspired.7 Furthermore, he displayed great lack
of tact by coming out in a public onslaught on the already
adopted Platt Amendment.
It has often been said that Maso was the favorite of the
majority of the Cuban electorate, but Martinez Ortiz has
shown almost conclusively that such was not the case.8 In
the first place, Estrada Palma's own record was sufficient to
attract many votes. In addition, he had the support of
Maximo G6mez, the most popular man in Cuba, and, if that
were not enough, the backing of the Nationalist and Republican parties, the two most powerful political groups in the
island, to say nothing of the good will of the great northern
republic,-an important consideration in Hispanic lands,
which have an inherent respect for authority. Gomez paid
a visit to Estrada Palma in the United States before coming
out publicly in his favor. Asked to state his views on Cuban
affairs, Estrada Palma wrote a long letter in which he pro' Martinez Ortiz, I, 314.  'Ibid., I, 316-338.




THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC


145


claimed the need for economy in the new government, for
an advantageous commercial treaty with the United States,
and for pay of the army of the revolution, though without
putting too heavy burdens on the treasury. On the score
of the Platt Amendment "issue" he asserted that that document should be interpreted "in the most favorable manner
to the interests of Cuba and her sovereignty and independence,"-a vague phrase, but at least more tactful than the
outburst of Mas6 against the famous appendix. After a
little more negotiation the leaders of the two principal parties
announced themselves as satisfied, and signed a campaign
paper in his favor which they published to the country. It
is interesting to note the names of some of the signers, especially of those who were to be prominent in later years, including several who afterward turned on the man whom
they now were backing for the presidency. Jose Miguel
Gomez and Alfredo Zayas were among them. Other names
attached included those of Maximo G6mez, Domingo Mendez Capote, Manuel Sanguily, Emilio Nunez, Ricardo Dolz,
Martin Moruia Delgado, and Gonzalo de Quesada.
In October, Maso came to Havana, and published his own
program. This was a very different thing from that of
Estrada Palma,-inevitably so, no doubt, since Mas6 had
to seek adherents in various quarters in order to counteract
the powerful support that had gathered to the standard of
Estrada Palma. He made promises to elements that had
been to some extent neglected by the other parties,-to the
Spaniards, the old Autonomists, and the negroes. Presently
he objected to the constitution of the Central Board of
Scrutiny, which contained Nationalists and Republicans, but
no partisans of Mas6. Neither General Wood nor the Washington authorities would make any change in the Board
(which, indeed, had been created prior to the announcement




146


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


of Mas6's candidacy), although they assured him that the
election would be handled impartially. Not satisfied with
this, Mas6 and his friends announced that they would refuse to go to the polls. So, naturally, Estrada Palma had a
walk-over. Nevertheless, the vote was large, though General
Wood later remarked that the conservative elements took
too little interest in the election, and therefore had very
slight representation in congressmen and other officials of
the new government.
The work of the intervention was now very nearly done.
The first congress of the republic was called together on May
5, 1902, to give its official approval of the candidates that
had been declared elected. The following May 20 at noon
was set for the formal raising of the Cuban flag. Meanwhile, Estrada Palma had come to Cuba from New York,
going first to his old home at Bayamo in Oriente. From
there he made a veritable triumphal progress, to the accompaniment of dinners, speeches, and balls, across the island
to Havana. On the night of May 19 pandemonium broke
loose in Havana. Fireworks were set off, and people exhibited their enthusiasm to the full over the dawning of independence on the morrow. An impressive ceremony took
place at noon of the 20th, and when it was over the Cuban
flag was run up on the Palace. Immediately thereafter it
was unfurled also on the Morro,-as significant to the Cubans
as the fall of the Bastille had been to the French. Then,
indeed, there was excitement, noise, and a perfect frenzy of
patriotic ecstasy. Amidst it all, General Wood went off to
a vessel that was waiting to carry him to the United States.
The intervention was over. It had accomplished much.
Some issues, such as the question of tariff concessions to
Cuba, ownership of the Isle of Pines, and the selection of
naval bases for the United States, were yeteto be settled. But




THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC               147
these were details. Taken by and large, had the military
government been a success? According to overwhelming
opinion, both then and since, it was. Naturally, there was
friction at the time, growing out of the suspicion felt by the
more radical elements of Cuban society toward the United
States. On the other hand, the conservative classes, including the Spaniards, would have preferred annexation, or at
least an American protectorate, although they were afraid
to express themselves too strongly, as prevailing opinion
was contrary. No less competent an observer than the distinguished English statesman James Bryce expressed that
view.9 Still others in Cuba are said to have wished temporary
independence as a step toward eventual annexation as a
state. Writing at a much later time, at the close of the
United States intervention of 1906-1909, but with the work
of 1899-1902 perhaps even more prominently in mind, another well-known Englishman, Sir Harry Johnston, remarked
that
"The impartial traveller cannot but feel sincere admiration for the
results of American intervention in Cuba. Nowhere has the work of
the Anglo-Saxon been better done or with happier results." In fine, all
had been "carried out quietly, unostentatiously, honestly, and in a
manner to attract and conciliate the Cuban people. It has been an
achievement in the best 'Anglo-Saxon' style."10
Martinez Ortiz devotes an entire chapter to an appreciation
of the work of General Wood.
"Very rarely will history offer twenty-four months of administration
more fruitful than his," he said. "... If the government of General
Wood was very notable from an administrative point of view, from a
political point of view it was even more remarkable. It may be said
'Bryce, James, Some reflections on man's impressions of American rule
the state of Cuba, in North American in Cuba, in McClure's, v. XXXIII,
review, v. CLXXIV, pp. 445-456, at pp. 496-504, at 496 and 497; Sept.,
450-451; Apr., 1902.            1909.
10Johnston, Sir Harry, An English



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A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


that Cuba owes to him the constitution of its government in the form
in which it was established,-a form which permits it to go on strengthening itself... Beyond a doubt the permanent relations between Cuba
and the United States were prepared in the first place by Secretary Elihu
Root, but without the very effective aid of Mr. Wood things might
have taken a quite different course... He maintained himself relatively
aloof from intimate association with Cubans, but was accustomed
to do justice to the personal qualities of prominent and virtuous sons
of the country. Neither favors nor gifts had any place with him;
nobody dared propose to him an unclean piece of business or any sort
of participation of doubtful honesty in any affair whatever. His own
wealth did not increase a single penny while he managed the millions
of the treasury... Friends and adversaries, high and low, those who
were satisfied and those who complained, all joined at the conclusion of
his rule in this assertion: 'he was an honorable man!'""
Even such a carping critic as Albert Robinson says it was
"beyond question that... the United States left in Cuba an immeasurably better and surer foundation for a Cuban Republic than any
upon which the Cubans could have built had they succeeded, without
American aid, in expelling the Government of Spain." 
If this is so, it is impossible to withhold a great share of the
credit from General Wood. The Cubans, not even the comparatively hostile members of the political class, do not withhold that credit. One often hears the remark in Cuba that
if the people might elect the man they wanted for the presidency they would choose Leonard Wood. In fine, his reputation as one of the greatest, or possibly the greatest, of the
rulers the island ever had is so secure that presentation of
evidence to this effect would be a mere work of supererogation.
One question is often raised, however. Did the United
States get out too soon? There were many in the northern
republic, as well as in Cuba, who thought that the United


u Martinez Ortiz, I, 387-397.     and the intervention, 2 ed. (New
" Robinson, Albert Gardner, Cuba York. 1910), 346.




THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC


149


States ought not to have gone out at all. Still others,for example, Richard Olney, Secretary of State in Cleveland's second administration,-felt that Congress ought not
to have promised in the Joint Resolution to give independence to Cuba, pointing out that its action was taken with
undue haste, on the crest of a wave of sentimentality; nevertheless, although the "declaration of intention was not a
contract," 13 it was usually held to be a morally binding
obligation.14  Similar expressions of opinion were, and still
are, frequently offered in Cuba that the United States got
lout too soon. The writer has a number of statements to
this effect from veteran residents of Cuba, including Spaniards, Englishmen, and Americans as well as Cubans. The
following, from a Cuban, is typical of the group:
"The only unfortunate feature of General Wood's administration was
that it came to an end too soon. Against the advice of Wood himself"
and that of many prominent Cubans, President Roosevelt resolved to get
out before the American presidential campaign of 1902. He wished to
avoid the issue of imperialism as applied to the relations of the United
States with Cuba. Many Cubans have since felt that the United States
should have remained at least twenty-five years longer. The chief difficulty was that it was necessary to give full political rights to the
ignorant negroes, as they had made up a large part of the patriot armies
and therefore could not be refused equal treatment with others. If
another generation could have passed, a situation more in keeping with
Cuba's peculiar needs might have been developed,-perhaps like that in
the southern states of the United States,-and the Cuban people, in
general would have been much better prepared for government. In this
way many of the political evils from which the island now suffers could
have been avoided."
Somewhat the same idea was expressed by another person,
but in the form of a criticism of General Wood:
Comment of the editors in Root, reviews, v. XXII, pp. 708-712; Dec.,
185.                             1900.
14 For an interesting contemporary  " The writer has seen no direct evidiscussion of these points of view, see dence that Wood gave any such adWellman, Walter, The Cuban repub- vice, and doubts his giving it.
lic-limited, in American review of




150         A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
"The military government of Cuba should have been administered
in such a way as to prepare the people for early self-government. Did
Wood leave the people any better prepared to administer republican
government than he found them? Did he not, in fact, by precept and
example teach them autocratic rather than democratic government?
He had no Congress to restrain him, he dominated the judiciary by force
of character, and he accomplished his results primarily by such methods,
making little effort to elicit the cooperation of the people. The result was
that the ground was not prepared by him for institutional government,
but rather he employed the autocratic government which had preceded
and was to follow him. All else about Wood's record was good, and
speaks for itself."
The writer agrees with the assertions in this statement, but
differs as to the advisability of following another course.
In the intervention of 1906-1909 the method suggested was
to be tried, with disastrous results in loss of prestige for the
American authorities and no counterbalancing advantageous
effect on Cuban political practices. The truth is, an autocratic government alone could have been for the moment successful, for it was the only one which the Cubans could understand. In two years and a half it was no more possible to
impart to them any real conception of democratic, republican institutions than it would be to teach a wildcat to be
the playmate of a child. One has but to study the experiences of the other southern republics over a century of independence to realize that Hispanic political evils of an antirepublican character are too deep-seated to be uprooted
by anything but a long and painful process of correction.
There is another point of view, less often voiced, but
worthy of consideration. Would the militant Cuban political
group have endured a longer occupation without an uprising? A prominent American statesman of those times
once remarked to the writer that he hardly ever glanced at
his morning paper but that he expected to see a headline
that the Cubans had "taken to the woods."     A Cuban revo



THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC                151
lution could have been put down, but not without difficulty,
and almost surely it would have involved annexation of
the island to the United States, or at least an indefinitely
prolonged occupation. The American government was eager
to fulfil its pledges. The Cubans were not yet ideally
equipped for self-government,-far from it!       But they had
been carried along, from one step to another, just about as
far as they would stand American tutelage without resisting
it. So it was that
"On May 20, 1902, the world saw the unwonted spectacle of a country
living up to its solemn promise and turning over a coveted possession
to the inhabitants thereof in pursuance of a solemnly declared purpose,
the hauling down of the American flag, the symbol of sovereignty during
the occupation, and the unenforced, voluntary evacuation of Cuba Libre
by the American troops."" 
"Comment of the editors in Root, worthy among Cuban contributions
185. The Root volume and the works to Platt Amendment literature are
cited at the close of the preceding the volumes by Lopez Hidalgo and
chapter, especially Wood's reports Machado, used more particularly in
and the writings of Martinez Ortiz chapter XXVII.
and Robinson, are useful here. Note



CHAPTER VII


THE BEST YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC: ESTRADA PALMA,
1902-1905
THE United States government took over Cuba in 1898 -1899 at a time of terrible distress. It left the island, as General Wood put it, "a going concern." Furthermore, the
country was in the hands of perhaps the best man that could
be found, the new President, Tomas Estrada Palma. There
is hardly an incident of Cuban history since 1902 that is not
matter of controversy, but if there is anything on which
there is even an approach to a general agreement, it is that
Estrada Palma was honest and incorruptible. Despite the
fierceness of party feeling in Cuba, his political opponents
have rarely attempted to impugn the motives of Estrada
Palma himself, though alleging that he was mistaken in his
policies or else deceived by his friends. Born at Bayamo,
Oriente, July 9, 1835, he was nearly sixty-seven years of age
when he became President. Many assert that he was too
old, and some go so far as to say he had reached the point
of senility,-a charge that is extravagant to the point of
being silly. Omitting the obviously absurd characterizations, the following are typical of statements obtained by
the writer from opponents of Estrada Palma:
(1) "Estrada Palma was honest, and would have made an excellent
President of the United States, but he was too good for the Cubans."
(2) "Estrada Palma was a fine, honest, old man. The main trouble
with him was that he was too old. It was easy, therefore, for the
crooked politicians to 'put something over' on him. He was innocent
152




BEST YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC: ESTRADA PALMA               153
of any wrong-doing himself, but could not prevent his subordinates from
indulging in improper political practices."
(3) "Estrada Palma was a very good man, but a dreamer who trusted
everybody and could not believe that other people were not as unselfish
as himself."
(4) "Estrada Palma was a man who had never seen a thousand
dollars in his life until he became President, and he had lived away
from Cuba for so long that he was really not Cuban. So he economized
and built up a vast balance in the treasury, which was not the right
thing to do in Cuba."
On the other hand, those who praise Estrada Palma wholeheartedly are legion. The following comments are representative:
(1) "He had the lofty virtue of North American Presidents and of
many Presidents in South America. His has been the only such case
in our republican life. His life was exemplary. Virtue was his norm,
and honor his guide... Whenever people talk of the governors we
have had, one hears this exclamation: 'Don Tomas has been the only
good President.'"'
(2) "Cuba's first president, Don Tomas Estrada Palma, was a simple,
unaffected, democratic gentleman, too unsophisticated, possibly, for the
task before him. During the early part of his term in office he traveled
from his home to the executive offices in street cars, discussing affairs
of state and mundane matters with such of his fellow-travelers as cared
to address him."'
Martinez Ortiz says Estrada Palma was stubborn and obstinate, but despite a certain obvious lack of approval of the
new President he has drawn an attractively intimate picture
of him.
"Affable and courteous, he was in the habit of saying little, but of
having. his way. However many wished to 'measure swords' with him,
he vanquished them. Escobar says he always had ready a slight cough,
which attacked him at opportune moments when it was best not to say
anything, and with the affectionate phrase 'Sonny," which was habitual
'Perez, 4.                     in fact almost untranslatable, having
'Cuba, an American ward again?, a friendly but not undignified quality
in Independent, v. CXIII, pp. 35-38, for which there seem to be no words
at 35; July 19, 1924.            in English.
^"Hijito," literally "little son," but




154


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


with him, he overcame the opposition of the ablest men. 'This man
seems like rubber,' Sanguily exclaimed on a certain occasion, 'for when
one thinks he has put his fist in him up to the elbow, why, not at all,
for when one draws it away he remains as he was before.' Small in
stature, but erect and firm, he carried his years very well, and they
were already running on seventy. A slight 'tic' frequently obliged him
to close one eye. This and the ruddy color of his face gave his features
a certain mixture of firmness and kindliness which inspired respect.
By way of complement he had a white moustache that fell toward the
corners of his mouth and white hair that was always carefully combed."'
In fine, Estrada Palma was little, but honest, earnest, and
capable. He did not have the traits that appealed to the
Cuban masses, and was personally known to few people on
the island, but he was in every sense of the word a respectable
figure. It had not been necessary for him to affiliate with
any party in order to win the presidency, and he was not involved in the compromises that would have handicapped
almost any other man in that office. Furthermore, his own
prestige, on account of his lifetime services to the cause
of independence and his known rectitude of character, was
enhanced by the support Maximo G6mez had given him,
and even the reputedly benevolent attitude of the United
States was more a help than a hindrance, because of the
innate Cuban reverence for authority and power.
On May 26, 1902, the President delivered his first message
to Congress. After some preliminary remarks, in which,
among other things, he paid his respects to Presidents McKinley and Roosevelt and spoke of the "gratitude" which
Cubans owed the United States, he proceeded to make some
admirable recommendations for legislation, mainly in the
direction of enacting the supplementary laws called for by
the Constitution. He laid great stress on furtherance of
education, "for in reality the problem of Cuba's future lies


' Martinez Ortis, I, 313-314.




BEST YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC: ESTRADA PALMA


155


with the school." The keynote of the message was the need
for economy, avoiding every extravagance. On this score, 
though recognizing the justice of the claims for pay by the
soldiers of the War of Independence, he felt that an early
settlement could not be made. He also omitted any recommendation for a permanent army, beyond strengthening the
rural guards. "Public tranquillity and security rest on the
discipline of the country itself," he asserted.5 Indeed, he
is said to have remarked that Cuba should never have an
army, because military life had been the curse of most of
the revolution-ridden Hispanic American republics. This
was to prove something of a mistake. And it also showed
too great confidence in the stability of the Cuban people.
Estrada Palma was especially successful in his handling
of relations with the United States. There were several issues left over from the period of the military government.
One of these was the question of tariff concessions to Cuba,
which had virtually been promised by President McKinley.
Both McKinley and Roosevelt (who succeeded to the presidency after the murder of the former in 1901) did what they
could to get the American Congress to pass the necessary
legislation, and they were backed by such men as Elihu
Root, Senator Orville H. Platt, and General Wood. General
Wood, while still in Cuba, encouraged the holding of demonstrations in favor of a reduction of the United States tariff.
Roosevelt and Root publicly asserted that there was a moral
obligation involved, and insisted also that it was good political policy to set up an economically strong Cuba. The
matter came before Congress in 1901, but met with powerful
opposition, owing to the objections, so it is said, of the beet
sugar interests in the United States. Public opinion was in
favor of generous treatment of Cuba, and therefore Congress
Mensajes presidenciales, I, 5-8.




154


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


with him, he overcame the opposition of the ablest men. 'This man
seems like rubber,' Sanguily exclaimed on a certain occasion, 'for when
one thinks he has put his fist in him up to the elbow, why, not at all,
for when one draws it away he remains as he was before.' Small in
stature, but erect and firm, he carried his years very well, and they
were already running on seventy. A slight 'tic' frequently obliged him
to close one eye. This and the ruddy color of his face gave his features
a certain mixture of firmness and kindliness which inspired respect.
By way of complement he had a white moustache that fell toward the
corners of his mouth and white hair that was always carefully combed."'
In fine, Estrada Palma was little, but honest, earnest, and
capable. He did not have the traits that appealed to the
Cuban masses, and was personally known to few people on
the island, but he was in every sense of the word a respectable
figure. It had not been necessary for him to affiliate with
any party in order to win the presidency, and he was not involved in the compromises that would have handicapped
almost any other man in that office. Furthermore, his own
prestige, on account of his lifetime services to the cause
of independence and his known rectitude of character, was
enhanced by the support Maximo G6mez had given him,
and even the reputedly benevolent attitude of the United
States was more a help than a hindrance, because of the
innate Cuban reverence for authority and power.
On May 26, 1902, the President delivered his first message
to Congress. After some preliminary remarks, in which,
among other things, he paid his respects to Presidents McKinley and Roosevelt and spoke of the "gratitude" which
Cubans owed the United States, he proceeded to make some
admirable recommendations for legislation, mainly in the
direction of enacting the supplementary laws called for by
the Constitution. He laid great stress on furtherance of
education, "for in reality the problem of Cuba's future lies


' Martinez Ortiz, I, 313-314.




BEST YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC: ESTRADA PALMA


155


with the school." The keynote of the message was the need
for economy, avoiding every extravagance. On this score, L
though recognizing the justice of the claims for pay by the
soldiers of the War of Independence, he felt that an early
settlement could not be made. He also omitted any recommendation for a permanent army, beyond strengthening the
rural guards. "Public tranquillity and security rest on the
discipline of the country itself," he asserted.5 Indeed, he
is said to have remarked that Cuba should never have an
army, because military life had been the curse of most of
the revolution-ridden Hispanic American republics. This
was to prove something of a mistake. And it also showed
too great confidence in the stability of the Cuban people.
Estrada Palma was especially successful in his handling
of relations with the United States. There were several issues left over from the period of the military government.
One of these was the question of tariff concessions to Cuba,
which had virtually been promised by President McKinley.
Both McKinley and Roosevelt (who succeeded to the presidency after the murder of the former in 1901) did what they
could to get the American Congress to pass the necessary
legislation, and they were backed by such men as Elihu
Root, Senator Orville H. Platt, and General Wood. General
Wood, while still in Cuba, encouraged the holding of demonstrations in favor of a reduction of the United States tariff.
Roosevelt and Root publicly asserted that there was a moral
obligation involved, and insisted also that it was good political policy to set up an economically strong Cuba. The
matter came before Congress in 1901, but met with powerful
opposition, owing to the objections, so it is said, of the beet
sugar interests in the United States. Public opinion was in
favor of generous treatment of Cuba, and therefore Congress
6Mensajes presidenciales, I, 5-8.




156


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


tried to dodge the issue, through delay or the proposal of
inadequate measures. After adjournments without action
in July 1902 and March 1903, Roosevelt called the Senate in
extra session to pass upon a treaty he had made. The Senate
ratified the treaty, but inserted an unusual provision that it
was not to have any effect until both houses of Congress approved it. The President then called Congress as a whole in
extra session, and the House passed the bill, but the Senate
allowed the session to expire without taking action! The
regular session was then at hand, and the bill finally passed
in December 1903. It called for a twenty per cent reduction
in duties by both countries on a number of products, including Cuban sugar and tobacco, but gave an even higher reduction on certain American products. There were some complaints at what seemed the extra favors accorded the United
States, but, as Martinez Ortiz points out, they served merely
to balance the difference in the volume of trade between the
two countries.6 In any event the slow and grudging response
of Congress to the demands of the situation was unfortunate.
To be sure, an anti-United States element in Cuba, including
men like Manuel Sanguily and Alfredo Zayas, had on political grounds opposed any kind of a commercial treaty with
the United States, despite the obvious economic advantages
to Cuba, but they were in a decided minority.
The matter of the naval bases in Cuba for the United
States was also settled in its main particulars during the
Estrada Palma administration. In November 1902 the
United States government suggested the cession of the bays
of Guantanamo, Cienfuegos, Bahia Honda, and Nipe.
Estrada Palma was successful, however, in cutting down this
demand, with the result that the treaty of 1903 included
stations bnly in the bays of Guantanamo and Bahia Honda,
6 Martinez Ortiz, II, 419-428.




BEST YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC: ESTRADA PALMA


157


and those not as an outright cession, but on a rental basis,
for such time as the United States might need them. Later,
the United States gave up its rights at Bahia Honda for
increased advantages in the bay of Guantanamo. This was
by the treaty of December 27, 1912. The United States now
has virtually complete control over a tract of land at Caimanera on the above-named bay.
Estrada Palma was also measurably successful in his negotiations over one other surviving issue,-that involved in
article six of the Platt Amendment, concerning title to the
Isle of Pines. Whatever may have been the underlying reason for including this provision in that document, the legal
basis for any United States claim grew out of article two
of the treaty with Spain. Article one had dealt with Spain's
relinquishment of sovereignty over Cuba. The main feature
of article two was the "cession to the United States...
of the Island of Porto Rico and other islands now under the
sovereignty of Spain in the West Indies." The question to
determine was whether the Isle of Pines should be regarded
as included in the "other islands" mentioned in the Spanish
Treaty. The Isle of Pines, which has an area of some eightyfour square miles, is about fifty miles south of western Cuba.
It had always been administered as part of the province of
Havana, and General Wood made no provision for any American management when he turned over the government to
Estrada Palma. The normal interpretation of the article in
the treaty of Paris would have been to apply it to the islands
around Porto Rico. But several complications developed.
The possibility of the inclusion of this clause in the Platt
Amendment as a means of pressure to bring about a grant
of the coaling stations has already been alluded to. It may
also have been believed that the island could serve as a
strategic base, pending the transfer of more suitable ports




158       A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
in Cuba itself. Perhaps the main factor holding up the treaty
developed, however, from one of those oddities of history
that can never be foreseen. Some real estate companies induced a number of Americans to settle in the island, playing
up the fact that it was "under the American flag," as well
as enjoying those advantages of a tropical isle that real estate
fancy could so readily depict. In a very short time the whole
island was virtually in American hands, though the majority
of the inhabitants were Cubans of the laboring class. According to the census of 1919 there were 4288 persons there,
of whom 3275 were Cubans or Spaniards and 953 of "other
and  unknown   citizenship,"-almost wholly  Americans.
These people wanted the island to be considered part of the
United States, and were always able to find champions of
their cause.
On July 16, 1903, the representatives of Cuba and the
United States signed a treaty in which the latter gave up
sovereignty over the Isle of Pines to the former. This treaty
was not ratified within the time that had been prescribed;
so a new treaty was signed on March 2, 1904, without any
limitations as to date of ratification. It was specifically
stated that the "relinquishment" was "in consideration of
the grants of coaling and naval stations" already made by
Cuba to the United States. The Senate failed to ratify it.
In April 1907, in a case involving payment of customs duties,
the Supreme Court of the United States held that the island
was at least de facto Cuban territory, since the United States
had never taken possession. Yet, on a vote in the Senate in
1908 the treaty was rejected. Repeated attempts were made
to revive it, always with the backing of the various Presidents
of the United States. President Coolidge's administration
was especially active on this score, and early in 1925 was
successful in its endeavor to procure a ratification of the




BEST YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC: ESTRADA PALMA                  159
treaty. Though this act of justice toward Cuba was reprehensibly long delayed, it must be said that the Isle of Pines,
all along, had been administered as a part of Cuba.7
In his handling of the domestic situation Estrada Palma
was to prove less successful, in the end, than he had been
in dealings with the United States, but his failure was due
primarily to the shortcomings of his people. It is perhaps
true that he would have made a better chief executive as
President of the United States than it was possible for him
to be as President of Cuba. To be sure, his judgment as
to certain of his administrative policies may have been open
to question, but his main difficulty was in getting effective
cooperation from the flock of politicians with whom he was
obliged to work. This was a time when the economic outlook was still very dark. The military government had left
little over half a million in the treasury.8 The sugar industry
'As Cuba's national pride has been now pending would be necessary to
very much aroused over the Isle of do that." This has been the stand of
Pines question, there is a vast litera- recent American statesmen, and notature upon it. Most of the items are bly of Secretary of State Hughes in
listed in Trelles, Biblioteca II: 94; the latest phases of the negotiations.
102-103; 208-209. A number of other Secretary Root's letter appears in full
pamphlets made their appearance too in U. S., 59th Cong., 1st sess. (1905 -late for inclusion in the Trelles bibli- 1906), ser. no. 4913, Senate Docs. no.
ography. One such is the following: 205, p. 11. This document, 277 pages
The title of the republic of Cuba to long, contains a-mass of material on
the isle of Pines, Washington, 1924. the subject. For a brief summary of
For an interesting article to the same the whole question the following
effect, see: Ortiz, Fernando, Cuba's items, both by the well-known intertitle to the isle of Pines, in Cuba nationalist James Brown Scott, are
review, v. XXIII, pp. 14-20; Dec., noteworthy:  The isle of Pines, in
1924. This article quotes a letter of American journal of international law,
Elihu Root, then Secretary of State, v. XVII, pp. 100-104, Jan., 1923; and
to the president of the American club The isle of Pines and the solidarity
of the Isle of Pines on November 27, of Pan-America, in  Advocate  of
1905, wholly in accord with the Cuban peace, v. LXXXVII, pp. 228-232, Apr.,
contention. According to Mr. Root, 1925.
the island "is not and never has been  Really $539,984.99. In a message
territory of the United States. This to Congress of November 3, 1902, Esis the view  with which President trada Palma referred to a communiRoosevelt authorized  the pending cation of June 27 to the House, in
treaty... Nor would a rejection of which he explained the difference bethe pending treaty put an end to the tween the sum he calculated and the
control of Cuba over the Island. A $689,191.02 in the report of General
treaty directly contrary to the one Wood. Mensajes presidenciales, I, 16.




160


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


and agriculture in general were in the doldrums, harassed
by competition with the subsidized beet sugar interests
abroad, by the failure of the United States to grant the much
needed reciprocity treaty, and by the continued prostration
of the Cuban fields that had been devastated in the war.
Yet Congress showed scant disposition to pass any laws
except those that gave a political or pecuniary advantage to
members of the governing class. There was considerable
criticism of Congress because its first activities were devoted
to procuring good salaries for office-holders, without any
prior discussion of the revenue-producing possibilities of
the republic. It seemed too indicative of the old colonial
spirit.9 The same thing appeared in the haste with which
the politicians proceeded to enact a bonus bill for the Army
of Liberation, as the veterans of '95-'98 were called. The
United States authorities had insisted on heading this off
during the military occupation, and Estrada Palma was
lukewarm, but no Cuban government could have avoided
this bill. It went through on the basis of a dollar for each
day of service to privates, which was little enough, but with
an extravagant sum for officers, running well into the thousands for those of higher rank. The obvious lack of a broad
culture in the majority of the members of elective bodies
was also a disturbing factor. The president of the House,
Pelayo Garcia, once remarked to Martinez Ortiz that he
hoped the next Congress would contain better material.
The latter replied with a prediction that, bad as this Congress
was, it would be many years before Cuba had a better. Unhappily the prediction came true. Cuba has never had a
good Congress, but, if "least bad" is equivalent to "best,"
then this first legislative assembly of the republic is entitled
to the last-given superlative. At any rate, it met regularly
'Barbarrosa, 14-18, and passim.




BEST YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC: ESTRADA PALMA               161
and accomplished something, though falling far short of
what the times demanded.
Under the heading "Progress of Cuba (1902 to 1905)"
Carlos Trelles has described Estrada Palma's government as
follows:
"Public instruction continued to be developed vigorously. The number
of schools, teachers, and children in attendance was almost the same as
in the epoch of his predecessor, General Wood, and a fourth part of
the budget went on being devoted to popular instruction. It was his
motto, inspired by the vivid example of the United States, that the
republic ought to have more teachers than soldiers; and the former
principal of the Central Valley school demonstrated from the heights
of power the great love he felt for public education and the instruction
of his people. Due to the brilliant results obtained by the Cuban
sanitation department the figure for mortality fell away to thirteen or
fourteen to the thousand. Our President surpassed the intervention
governors in the construction of roads, for they built ninety-eight
kilometres (from 1899 to 1901) and he 328. He continued, like them,
to foment white immigration, which began to increase in his epoch...
But the first of our Presidents (first in time and in quality) distinguished
himself most as an honest and economical administrator of the national
revenues. He governed with a budget of eighteen million dollars, out
of which he realized acts of great prowess, managing to save twenty-six
million dollars."~ This amount and something more he planned to devote
to paying off the loan of thirty-five millions which had been negotiated
in order to pay the Army of Liberation. At the time he took charge
of the government there was the sum of $689,000" in the treasury,
and he saved, as I said before, twenty-six millions... It may almost
be said, and this by way of the highest praise, that he surpassed his
two predecessors, who were two model governors and honorable in the
fullest sense of the word.""
This is high praise, though followed by Trelles with a condemnation of Estrada Palma in connection with the elections
of 1905. It is perhaps in one particular too high praise.
'1As is pointed out later, this  'Trelles, El progreso  (1902 a
amount was by no means all surplus, 1905) y el retroceso (1906 a 1922) de
however.                         la repiblica de Cuba, 6-7.
Cf. supra, n. 8.




162


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


Don Tomas may have saved too much. It is quite generally
asserted that the real cause of the revolution of 1906 was
the desire of the politicians to get at the millions in the
treasury. Furthermore, the surplus was more apparent than
real, as it was later found that obligations under the floating
debt of the republic would have more than swallowed the
whole of it, leaving a deficit. Either it was bad policy to
accumulate those millions, or else it was bad policy not to
spend them, at least for debts already accrued. The mistake, if such it was, was an honest one, however.
The keynote in Estrada Palma's domestic policy was
economy. This, coupled with honest administration and a
favorable turn in the general economic situation, helped him
to bring Cuba out of distress into remarkable prosperity. In
a message of November 3, 1902, at the opening of the second
session of Congress, he was able to point out no inconsiderable achievement already. A great deal had been done in
the building of roads, bridges, docks, lighthouses, and government buildings, together with repairs on previously existing public works and some dredging.13 This story was repeated on a greater scale in each succeeding message of the
President at the beginning of a legislative session, each April
and November. In every case the items of work were clearly
set forth, with the amounts expended upon them.14     On
November 3, 1902, the President also sent in his first budget
estimate to Congress. It called for a little less than fifteen
million dollars, with receipts estimated at seventeen millions
and a half. Discounting expenses involved in new governmental machinery, this asked for six million dollars less than
had been required during the last year of the intervention
government.5 In point of fact, however, it proved necessary
Mensajes presidenciales, I, 15-17.  'For the budget message, see
' Each of these messages is to be Mensajes presidenciales, I, 17-22.
found in Mensajes presidenciales, I.




BEST YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC: ESTRADA PALMA        163
to spend some $16,700,000, by far the smallest expenditure
for a single year in the history of the republic, and rivalled
only by Estrada Palma's second year, when about $20,400,000
was spent. The first year of the Estrada Palma government
was hardly a prosperous one, however. The evils already
described were as yet too powerful to be overcome, and there
was a great deal of criticism and pessimism over the agricultural outlook for the republic.1 It had even been impossible at the outset to negotiate a small loan of four million
dollars to aid agriculture. By the close of 1903, however, the
credit of the country was already so well established that
negotiations were well on their way for the loan of thirty-five
millions, with which to pay half of the debt which it had been
decided was owing to the soldiers of the Army of Liberation.
The law providing for this loan was passed in February 1903,
and was modified by another of January 1904. In the following February a contract for the loan was signed with the
New York house of Speyer and Company.
Perhaps the most noteworthy thing about the bonus law
was that a group of politicians and their associates took advantage of the situation to make a great profit for themselves. Some officials high up in the government so manipulated the payments as to delay them or else make the soldiers
feel that they were never going to get them, in consequence
of which they sold their certificates at a discount that ran
as high as fifty or sixty per cent.17 Estrada Palma himself
asserted that 26,103 soldiers, or approximately fifty per cent,
sold out at an enormous sacrifice.18 In addition, a number
of men were listed as veterans who had never served in the
field; the length of service of others was made to appear
1"For example, in most of the  "Message to Congress of Nov. 7,
thirty-eight articles in the primera 1904, in Mensajes presidenciales, I,
parte (first part) of Barbarrosa, 11-68. 108.
" Barbarrosa, 51.




164


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


greater than it was, so that the amount due, on the per diem
allowance basis, would be larger; the rank of many was
entered as superior to that to which they had attained, for
the same purpose of inflating the bonus check; and not a
few imaginary names were placed upon the rolls. One man
who was sent to prison for his part in these practices was
later to become vice-president of the Cuban House of Representatives during the presidency of Zayas.
Estrada Palma would have preferred to pay the army out
of savings from surplus revenues, but had been obliged on
account of political pressure to consent to an earlier settlement through the agency of the loan. With the loan become
a fact, however, he was eager to pay it off as soon as possible,
and accentuated his endeavors to create a surplus for this
purpose. A law of January 1904, for example, had authorized
the President to increase customs duties, from a minimum
of fifteen to a maximum of thirty per cent. Estrada Palma
proceeded to make collections at the maximum rate, and
continued to do so, though receipts were far outrunning expenditures. Meanwhile, too, other factors contributed to
the prosperity of the government and the country as a whole.
The commercial treaty with the United States was producing
beneficial effects; European countries were beginning to drop
their subsidies to beet sugar interests; the Cuban sugar crop
of 1903-1904 rose to 850,000 tons, as against 636,000 in the
previous year, and better prices were obtained for it; the
shortage of domestic animals was already made up; a number of minor industries, notably the manufacture of beer,
gathered a great impulse as a result of the higher tariff on
foreign goods; foreigners began to be attracted to the island,
and to invest their capital there; immigration, mostly of
Spaniards, increased from less than ten thousand in 1902
to more than fifteen thousand in 1903, twenty-five thousand




BEST YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC: ESTRADA PALMA         165
in 1904, and forty thousand in 1905; the balance of trade
in this period greatly favored Cuba; and the money put
in circulation through the Speyer loan stimulated business.
By October 31, 1904, there were nearly ten millions in the
treasury, of which some $6,700,000 was surplus over and
above the monies of the loan. In April 1906 the amount in
the treasury had reached approximately twenty-five million,
of which over nineteen either belonged to the loan or was
affected by special laws, leaving five and three quarters millions clear. Certainly there seemed to have been an amazing
advance from the small sums of early republican finance.
Nevertheless, as already pointed out, the surplus was presently to disappear, and the accumulation, anyway, was of
doubtful advisability. However that may be, the twentyfive millions were there and in good hands.
The national treasury was by no means the only institution to profit from the economic success of the Estrada Palma
administration. Each new budget raised the amounts devoted to directly beneficial expenditures of the government.
For example, the budget of 1902 gave less than three millions
to public works, while that of 1905 called for nearly five
millions and a half. Expenditures themselves were now
larger, reaching some twenty-six millions a year,l9 but receipts were running above thirty millions. There was a
quite general well-being in the country. Cubans began to
indulge themselves in luxuries that heretofore had been
denied them. In Havana, especially, new homes went up as
if by magic, and lands in the Vedado district which had gone
begging in 1902 at a dollar a meter were selling at seven
' Estrada  Palma  spent nearly y sociales, in Cuba contemporanea,
eighty-nine millions in his last two v. V, pp. 401-424, at 416-417; Aug.,
years, but thirty-five of it was the 1914. Guiral Moreno does not make
Speyer loan for the bonus to the sol- clear whether the $11,250,000 domestic
diers. Guiral Moreno, Mario, Nues- loan was also included in his estimate
tros problemas politicos, economicos of expenditures.




166       A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
or eight in 1905. The provinces, too, had recovered from
the war, and Camagiiey and Oriente were for the first time
becoming centres of colossal sugar enterprises. Interest rates
had fallen to ordinary levels, as compared with the usury
of earlier days. There had been no backsliding, either, in
attention to problems of health. Incidentally, at least one
item of government expenditure had been cut to the very
bone. The monies allotted to the "presidency," including
twenty-five thousand dollars as the salary of the President,
were $85,700 in 1902, but this sum was reduced until it
reached $62,390 in the budget of 1905,-an amount so small
that certain latter-day Presidents of Cuba would have despised themselves for taking such a mere bagatelle, even
under the heading of "gastos de representaci6n," or expenses
growing out of the social obligations of the office, an item, by
the way, that rarely appeared, and then only for comparatively small amounts, during the rule of Estrada Palma.20
In fine, from the standpoint of honest government and
good times there would seem to have been no more auspicious
moment than that in which Cuba found herself in 1905.
The future, too, held out much promise. Far from having
the mere "avarice" of a miser in piling up a surplus, "Don
Tomas" (as Estrada Palma is usually called) was on the
point of embarking upon a much enlarged program of public
works, together with improving the credit of the country
through a reduction of the debt. He proposed to put in sanitary tunnels in Havana and provide that city with the paving
it needed, paying the bill in cash obtained from surplus revenues, thus saving the country from a loan estimated at sixteen millions and a half. The extension and beautifying of
the Malecon boulevard at Havana and engineering works to
overcome the dangers from the floods of the Roque were
Cf. pp: 278; 464-465.




V"


BEST YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC: ESTRADA PALMA           167
other projects of his. On one occasion he bought up a million
dollars' worth of Cuban domestic bonds, a portion of an issue
of $11,250,000 which had been brought out in supplement
to the Speyer loan, to provide a further part payment of the
debt to the army. Political opponents brought all manner
of charges against him because he kept these bonds alive,
though depositing them in the treasury,-but when the same
people came into power under President Gomez the bonds
were reissued to the public! 21 Not least among other favorable indications in 1905 was the decision of the United States
to build the Panama Canal, which would inevitably put Cuba
along the course of a vast world trade. All was well,-except
that the defects of Cuban character had not yet had time to
cure themselves! Beneath the pleasing exterior of Cuban
affairs there was an ominous current that boded ill for the
republic. This found its principal opportunity for manifestation in the sphere of politics.
Economical as was Don Tomas, he could not avoid many
evils to which all governments are subject and for which there
was a particularly fertile field in Cuba. There were far more
government employes than were necessary,22 and the old
instinct for political plunder was very much alive. Frauds
were discovered in the custom-house at Santiago. Some officials lived in an unbecoming luxury; one of them, it is said,
managed to pay a debt of seventeen thousand dollars out of
"savings" from a salary of seven thousand a year over a
period of fifteen months, and that too without denying himTomds Estrada Palma: para la and four or five hundred thousand
historia, in Cuba, Nov. 4, 1909, and other Cubans who wanted these posiiLa "avaricia" de don Tomds!, in tions. Fifteen thousand of the govDiscusion, Feb. 11, 1911. Both quoted ernment posts were nothing but sine(with amplifications in footnotes) in cures. In a later article he speaks of
Velasco, respectively at 11-24 and 77- forty or fifty thousand employes as
79.                            "so many useless wheels of the ad'Barbarrosa says that there were ministrative machine." Barbarrosa:
seventy thousand job-holders in 1903, 32; 43; 53...




168         A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
self or his family any of the good things of life. Provincial
and municipal governments were notoriously inefficient and
corrupt; the President was obliged to intervene to check
some of their improper attempts to raise funds for themselves
through absurd taxes. And congressional activities left much
to be desired. It seemed to many that affairs were too reminiscent of colonial days. As one writer said, in making a
comparison between revolutionary Cuba and the republic,
"Between the past and the present there is an immense difference.
The former represented the sacrifice of everything on the altar of the
ideal; the latter, the shame of the country at the mercy of egoism. The
former, the love of Cuba; the latter, the philosophy of the stomach.""
By comparison with later times the evils were as a molehill
to a mountain, but they were important as a symptom of
Cuban political character and as a forerunner of darker days. i
Congress early showed a disposition to protect members
of the political coterie from punishment for crime. In 1903
Mariano Corona, a representative from Oriente, murdered
an opponent, whereupon Congress passed an act to save him,
on the basis of the constitutional paragraph concerning congressional immunity. Despite the President's veto the bill
became a law.24 Shortly afterward, the President was again
obliged to make use of the veto. Senator Morua Delgado,a mulatto, by the way,-introduced an act for the reestablishment of the lottery, discarded since Spanish days. The
bill was rushed through on a surprise vote, but Estrada Palma
had ready a surprise of his own, for he vetoed it in a notable
message (prepared beforehand) on the very day he received
it, January 6, 1904. In course of a long argument against
the lottery as an institution, he cited a number of well"Article of Joaquin Aramburu,  'For further consideration of this
quoted in Barbarrosa, 62-63. See also bill, see pp. 512-515.
ibid: 32; 36; 46-51.




BEST YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC: ESTRADA PALMA         169
known men of different countries against it, and among
others quoted Senator Morua himself, who had referred to
it in 1891 as "social gangrene." Concluding, he said:
"Last year, already, a law was on the point of being authorized for
the creation of public pits for cock-fights, a cruel, semi-barbarous, and
demoralizing spectacle. If the lottery should now become established
as a speculation of the state, we might be able to say that an insurmountable wall has been raised to separate the nation of which we
dreamed in the revolutionary epoch from that which really exists and
which appears to be inclined to retrograde in the direction of the
former metropolis."
This message raised up a furor in Congress.     Naturally,
Senator Morua felt aggrieved. Senator Manuel Sanguily
also turned against the President in all his eloquence.25 But
the veto was sustained.
In February 1904 the first elections under the republic
were held. The two principal parties reorganized themselves
for this event, with the idea of winning at all costs. Under
the leadership of Senator Ricardo Dolz of Havana and General Jose Miguel Gomez, governor of Santa Clara, the Republicans took on a somewhat conservative tendency under
the name Conservative Republican party. The Nationals
also appeared under a new name, that of the National Liberal
party.  There were no real issues in the campaign,-only
difference of leadership,-though the terms "Conservative'and "Liberal" were supposed to represent the political tendencies of the two groups. The National Liberals had as their J
chief plank "the abrogation of the Platt Amendment!" This
gave them good fuel for speeches. The word "Liberal" and
the supposed favor of General Maximo Gomez were other advantages they possessed. Meanwhile, Estrada Palma inclined toward the Conservative Republicans, though without
Sanguily, II, 395-411.




170


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


giving them any undue aid. The elections, in the language
of Emilio Terry, Secretary of Agriculture at the outset of
Estrada Palma's rule, were "a farce represented with less
shame than in the times of the colony." Each side proceeding to win wherever possible by means of what was
called "el copo," —a fraudulent device to deprive the minority
of its due representation.26 There was not even a pretence
of doing otherwise. The day of the elections passed off with
reasonably good order, but each party worked the copo,
especially in Havana and Oriente, where the National Liberals held sway, and in Santa Clara and Matanzas, which
were Conservative Republican territory. Specific irregularities were charged by each party as against the other. In
Pinar del Rio two provincial electoral boards functioned
independently. In Camagiiey the votes of twenty-three voting districts (colegios) were not examined at all, and those
of seventeen others were annulled. Senator Juan Gualberto
G6mez, of the National Liberal group, obtained many more
votes in Oriente than had actually been cast. On the returns for the whole country, however, it seemed that the
Conservative Republicans had won. Their opponents were
by no means ready to concede the victory, however.
When Congress opened in April 1904 the National Liberals resorted to a device which has since become almost the
norm of Cuban parlimentary procedure. The deputies of
their party absented themselves from meetings of the House,
and thus kept that body from gaining a quorum, as the
presence of two-thirds of the members was required by the
"The noun "copo" comes from the the majority not only elects its own
verb "copar," a military term signify- candidates but also elects others as
ing to cut off the retreat of an enemy. if of the minority, thus falsely gainIn politics the "copo" is applicable ing unanimous representation instead
only where the law calls for repre- of the proportion accorded by law to
sentation of minorities, as is the case a majority party.
in Cuba. By means of the "copo"




BEST YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC: ESTRADA PALMA    171
Constitution. Since the president of the House was a member of the National Liberal group, there seemed no way to
overcome the difficulty by compelling the attendance of absent members. For months the deadlock continued, despite
the impatience of the country. In particular, the veterans
were clamoring for legislation to enable them to get their
bonus, of which some details had still to be arranged. As
neither party wished to offend this powerful electoral element, a temporary solution was reached whereby the House
was constituted, for bonus purposes only, with the half of
its membership that had remained over from the previous
election, together with such new members as were veterans,this, despite the fact that the credentials of the latter had
not been duly approved and that many of them were quite
likely never to receive them, because of 'frauds in connection
with their election. With the bonus bills out of the way
the deadlock was resumed. Finally, in September, an ingenious, if also somewhat questionable, solution was reached
through a device called the "Quorum Dolz,"-the suggestion
of Senator Dolz a month before. The constitutional requirement meant that two-thirds of the members must be present
for the beginning of a legislative term, he contended, and
that thereafter regular meetings might be held, with or without two-thirds of the membership. Over the protests of the
National Liberals this view was adopted for the time being,
and as two-thirds of the members had been present for
the bonus legislation, Congress for a brief time resumed its
sessions, until the recess in October. Clearly the country
had gained very little from this Congress! And the whole
affair was an evil political augury for the future.
Meanwhile, Estrada Palma had lost not a little of the
political support with which he had begun his administration. Martinez Ortiz ascribes this to his habit of considering




172


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


those who did not agree with him or yield to his superior
position as his enemies. At any rate, it was impossible in
the fiercely partisan atmosphere of Cuba to keep on good
terms with everybody, especially in view of the pressure
for jobs and the desires of "higher-ups" to "administer" the
many millions that Don Tomas had saved. A number of
men aspired to succeed him in the presidency. Most insistent of these was General Jose Miguel G6mez, who held
the province of Santa Clara in his hand. Alfredo Zayas,
Domingo Mendez Capote, and General Emilio Niuniez (then
governor of Havana) were others that hoped some day
to reach that eminence. The last-named was reputed to
have the favor of General Maximo G6mez, who had become
somewhat cool in his relations with Estrada Palma and was
in any event opposed to plans for his reflection. Possibly
the old commander-in-chief was disappointed because the
President had shown no disposition to seek his advice about
the problems of the country.
As the year 1904 drew to a close, plans were in the making for the presidential elections of 1905. As the Conservative Republicans had made no headway in Oriente, it was
decided to form a new party, to be called the Moderates.
Dolz and Mendez Capote of Havana were the leaders in this
project. They were suspected of being lukewarm over the
presidential aspirations of Jose Miguel Gomez, and so their
political breathren of Santa Clara were cautions about committing themselves to the movement. Dolz and Mendez
Capote suggested that the new party should be organized
on the basis of equality of representation for each province,
expecting in this way to dominate it. The backers of Jose
Miguel insisted on representation according to the number
of members in Congress, which would have given them the
whip-hand. Over this supposed issue the party split,



BEST YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC: ESTRADA PALMA    173
though the real underlying issue was the candidacy of G6mez.
The Conservative Republicans of Havana went through with
their plan, and formed the Moderate Party. The Conservative Republicans of Santa Clara turned to the National
Liberals, yielding their former attitude about representation in return for an assurance of backing for G6mez, and
presently the new Liberal Party emerged as a result of the
fusion of these two previously hostile factions. A prime
mover in this arrangement was Alfredo Zayas, who became
president of the party. General Niuniez was not willing to
postpone his own aspirations to those of Jose Miguel G6mez,
and so retained the old name Nationalist for a following of
his own, hoping that his power as governor of the province of
Havana and the support of Maximo G6mez might pull him
through. On June 17, 1905, however, Maximo Gomez died
at Havana,-a great loss to the-country, for in the troublesome days that were to come G6mez was the only man in
Cuba who might have had influence enough to bring about
an adjustment. As for Niufiez, it killed his chances for victory. So presently he veered over to the side of the Moderates.
In due time the Liberals nominated Jose-Miguel Gomez
for the presidency and Zayas for Vice-President. The Moderates felt that they would be strongest if they could go to
the polls in their first campaign with Estrada Palma as a
candidate for reelection. While he had never been the type
of man to attract the rabble, he had the respect of the
country, and his achievements as President could not be
gainsaid. Business men in particular were enthusiastic over
him. But Estrada Palma hesitated to run. Many writers
assert, Martinez Ortiz among them, that he was really eager
for reelection, mindful of the fact that most of the great
Presidents of the United States had served two terms, but




174


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


for some time, certainly, Estrada Palma was seriously in
doubt. As one Cuban gentleman whose assertions merit
consideration said to the writer:
"Estrada Palma was persuaded to run for reflection by his followers,
who convinced him that his successors would spend the millions he had
accumulated. At first he did not intend to, and gave out an interview
to that effect, but recalled it before it was published. The point was,
that he hoped to save enough out of receipts to take up the thirty-five
million dollar loan, and then keep the bonds in the treasury, while
continuing to collect the same amounts of revenues to employ on education and public works. His followers persuaded him,-and it was
probably true,-that his successor would not retain his policy, but would
get his hands on the funds in the treasury for the use of himself and
his partisans."
This is very likely an accurate estimate of the situation. It
seemed as if the interests of the country had not yet been
sufficiently far advanced to risk a government in the control
of the average run of Cuban politicians. Gradually, therefore, Don Tomas turned towards an acceptance of a nomination by the Moderates. Disappointed over his inability
to get much-desired legislation from Congress, he had for
some time tended more and more to abandon his earlier
neutrality between the parties, in hopes of getting a working
majority, and presently, in February 1905, he affiliated
himself with the Moderates. This carried with it a certain
admission of duty to help that party, within proper limits,
in the forthcoming election. Eventually that was to involve Don Tomas in countenancing measures that were
far beyond anything he had contemplated. At length, he
agreed to run for the presidency, and though not formally
notified of his nomination until September 11, 1905, the
issue was fairly joined by the early spring of that same
year. Nobody could have foretold it at the time, but it




BEST YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC: ESTRADA PALMA


175


meant that the "best years" in the first quarter century of
the republic had already gone their way.27


"'The work of Martinez Ortiz (v.
II) remains the best that has yet
been published for this period.
Though a Liberal and a partisan of
Jose Miguel G6mez and not in sympathy with Estrada Palma, Martinez
Ortiz has, nevertheless, written an account which is remarkably fair. It is
also the only attempt at a complete
history of these years thus far made.
All other works touch this era merely


at odd points. A number of the volumes bearing primarily on the subject of the next two chapters are also
useful to some extent here. The Estrada Palma administration is still in
need of a monograph, however, which
shall avail itself of the Memorias, the
Diarios de sesiones, and the Mensajes presidenciales, as well as newspapers and other contemporary evidences.




CHAPTER VIII


THE REELECTION OF ESTRADA PALMA
WHAT caused the Revolution of August, as the uprising
of 1906 is called?  While that conflict was at its height Barbarrosa wrote as follows:
"Two impotent factions are at war in Cuba: the constituted power and
the armed revolution. In the background there is nothing more than
the interests of parties, ambitions for jobs. The conquest of the twenty
millions of the treasury!" L
The evidence to the same effect is so overwhelming in amount
that it can hardly be doubted that political and financial
considerations far outweighed principles.2      Back of that,
however, was the fact that the Cubans were as yet unprepared for self-government, and had something of the turbulence of Hispanic American character, with a none too
highly developed understanding of the consequences of their
acts. Fortunately, they had an exceptionally good man as
their first President, and the excellence of his government
postponed domestic strife for more than four years.
In a sense, however, Estrada Palma was a victim of his
own "excess" of goodness, in that he could not believe that
other people might be swayed by motives so much more
sordid than his own, and therefore took no steps to handle
1Barbarrosa, 65.              there was a surplus in the treasury,
2The writer has any number of and the politicians felt that they had
statements of the same character a better use for it than employing it
from persons who lived through those on Cuba's debts." In this instance
times. For example: "The revolution the word "better" was used somewhat
of 1906 broke out primarily because satirically.
176




THE REELECTION OF ESTRADA PALMA         177
a possible outbreak of civil war. His public documents are
replete with expressions of confidence in the "orderliness"
and "good sense" of the Cuban people,-at the very moment that a casual observer might have been more impressed
by an opposite tendency. In his message to Congress of
November 3, 1902, he said that "the most complete order
has reigned," attributing it to Cuban patriotism and love
of peace. Referring to the somewhat notorious elections of
1904, he remarked, on April 4 of that year, that there was
no disorder, despite political agitation and the fact that
there were 658 electoral complaints to the courts. Such
was the "good judgment of the Cuban people" and "their
obedience to the laws," however, that there was no violence.
The Cuban "love of order" in connection with the unchanging "tranquility" of the times, and "the sentiment which
generally prevails already among our compatriots of respect
for the law and love of our institutions" found their place
in messages of November 7, 1904, and April 3, 1905. Even
the excitement and violence of the electoral period in 1905,
while causing the President several moments of doubt, seemingly failed to shake his belief in "the good sense of the
Cuban people," which was able to rise superior to "party
jealousies," as he put it in his message of November 6, 1905.
As late as April 2, 1906, Estrada Palma was impressed by
the "cry of indignation" against those who had attacked
the barracks of the rural guard at Guanabacoa, asserting
it proved that nobody in Cuba could "promote disturbances
of a serious character such as may put our institutions in
danger." 3 Not until the revolution of August 1906 did the
rude awakening come. An extraordinary session of Congress
was called "on account of the serious disturbance of the
public order," and in his message of September 14 the Presi'Mensajes presidenciales, I: 15; 73; 105; 125; 139; 155.




178


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


dent was under the sad necessity of admitting that "it throws
doubt on the seriousness of our institutions," raising up "a
lack of confidence in our capacity for self-government" and
"putting the independence of the country in danger."4
Even before the events in connection with the election
of 1905 there were a number of violent disturbances, some
of them directed against the government. One of the earliest
incidents of this character was the general strike in the
capital in November 1902. It began with a walk-out of
laborers in some of the tobacco factories. Not realizing
the full implications of their acts and intent on gaining popularity, the alcalde, or mayor, of Havana and the national
Secretary of Government openly encouraged the strikers,
and were backed up in their attitude by a number of the
newspapers. Presently there were conflicts between the men
on strike and those of other factories who had not gone out.
The police arrested some of the strikers most prominent
in these incidents, whereupon the mayor dismissed the chief
of police and was sustained in his action by the Secretary
of Government. This so lowered the prestige of the police
and increased that of the strikers that the whole affair soon
took on alarming proportions. A general strike was declared
for November 24. The strikers decreed that business activity of every sort should stop for that day. This was
serious, and the Secretary of Government now found it necessary to call in the rural guards to assist the police in maintaining order. On the 24th there were numerous exciting
incidents. Hordes of laborers filled the streets. The street
railway company, a foreign enterprise, attempted to run its
cars, but was forced to desist. There were a number of
encounters between the laborers and the police, in which
several were killed and many more wounded. At length
'Ibid., I, 175.




THE RELECTION OF ESTRADA PALMA
THE REELECTION OF ESTRADA PALMA


179


the government got the situation in hand, but not without
difficulty. The offending mayor and the Secretary of Government lost their posts, and the chief of police was restored
to his position. So the matter ended,-but it had revealed
the dynamite in Cuban character.
The earliest of the attempts directed against the government was a plot at Guanabacoa, early in July 1903. This
was nipped in the bud,6 but on the 14th of that month
there was a seemingly insignificant uprising at Vicana, near
Manzanillo. Four men got possession of some arms, and
tried to raise a following on an "immediate pay of the army"
platform. The rural guards gave scant chance for this movement to get under way, for they captured one of the would-be
revolutionists on the 26th and killed the other three next
day.6 A somewhat more serious affair was an outbreak at
Sevilla, near Santiago, on September 13 of the same year.
The plan was to raise a band of four or five hundred men,
and hold up the President during his visit in that section, exacting from him assurances of an immediate payment of the
debt to the Army of Liberation. Some sixty or seventy men
got together for this purpose, but by September 22 all had
been captured or dispersed by the rural guards, acting in
conjunction with the governor of Oriente. Estrada Palma
said that the veterans were not behind this move and that
it caused a "cry of indignation" in all the island, besides
which it was lacking in any just basis, as the government
had done a great deal toward getting pay for the army.7
While the rebels of Sevilla were still out, there was an attempt to blow up the President's train near Palmarito.8
Such incidents as these were to take place with increasing
'Velasco, 18, n. 19.         Mensajes presidenciales, I, 55.
Ibid.; also Mensajes presidenciales,  'Velasco, 19, n. 23.
I, 55-56.




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A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


frequency after the inauguration of the electoral campaign
of 1905.
And yet Estrada Palma was not altogether deceived in
his people. His messages abound in remarks about the necessity of raising the social level of Cuba. He was disturbed,
too, by the fall in attendance at school, noting that it was
due in many cases to the "censurable desire of the parents
or guardians to utilize the children in their own service."9
And even when he praised his Cuban people, he also took
occasion to lecture them about good citizenship, just as if
he were still the teacher of Central Valley, talking to his
pupils. In an interview of September 4, 1905 (and, indeed, on other occasions), he made his oft-quoted remark:
"In Cuba we have a republic, but there are no citizens."10
One wonders whether the laudatory comments of the presidential messages did not represent, in part at least, a hope
of the schoolmaster that he might persuade the Cubans
to believe in themselves and thus help them really to become
as good as he told them they were. On the other hand,
there is the convincing evidence that he did not create an
army and was caught wholly unprepared for civil war when
it came. He had relied on good government and prosperity
as his safeguards, backed up by the connection with the
United States, being perhaps "overconfident as respects the
'self-acting' character of the Platt amendment.""
As already stated, Estrada Palma formally affiliated himself with the Moderates in February 1905. From that time
forward he was besieged with requests by leaders of the
party to take active steps to assist in winning the election.
* Mensajes presidenciales, I, 155,  ' Cuba in factional eruption, in
and, indeed, in various messages.  American review  of reviews, v.
'1Espigando: Sesi6n de espiritismo, XXXIV, pp. 387-393, at 389; Oct.,
in Prensa, Feb. 8, 1910, quoted in 1906.
Velasco, 34.




THE REELECTION OF ESTRADA PALMA


181


In particular, they wanted him to appoint a new Cabinet,
to be made up of men who were better adapted for an
election campaign than were those then in office, in that
they could be expected to check the illegal practices of the
opposition (the idea which appealed to Estrada Palma)
or perhaps indulge in some illegalities of their own, to win
at any cost (the firm intention of some of the Moderates).
It was a logical thing to do, involving no necessary impropriety. But the President hesitated. Members of the
existing Cabinet offered him their resignations on February
2, 1905. At length, he consented to accept them, and on
March 6 he did so. The great mistake of Estrada Palma
was, not that he changed the Cabinet, but that, on advice
of the Moderates, he appointed unsuitable men. This was
particularly true of the principal figure in the new Cabinet,
General Fernando Freyre de Andrade. This individual was,
indeed, "a man of courage and intellectual and physical
activity," but of an uncompromising and violent temperament, as he had shown himself to be while a leader of the
Cuban Assembly in the early days of the United States military occupation. Freyre was Secretary of Government.
Next after him in prominence was the new Secretary of Public Works, General Rafael Montalvo. Taken as a whole
the new Secretaries were soon referred to as the "Fighting
Cabinet" (Gabinete de Combate), a term which they later
explained on the ground that they were veterans of the War
of Independence, but which was generally understood at the
time as having a present and future application, with reference to the elections. The Liberals insisted it meant that
the Moderates were determined, by hook or crook, to win.
That interpretation was probably correct.
It was the opinion of William Howard Taft and Robert
Bacon, who were presently to serve as the dei ex machina




182


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


to bring an end to civil war, that Estrada Palma would in
all probability have been elected if no improper steps had
been taken. Their view is reinforced by that of the Cuban
historian Martinez Ortiz, who was a member of the Liberal
opposition in the exciting days of 1905-1906. The Moderates were resolved to take no chance of failure, however.
Freyre, whose department had control of the police and
rural guards, the supervision of municipalities, and the conduct of the elections, was to be the principal instrument
in winning the victory. The other Secretaries were to help
out, especially through pressure brought to bear on the
personnel subject to their orders,-an important factor in
a centralized state like that of Cuba, where family influence,
too, had a remarkably wide reach.
Freyre and his companions made use of machinery and
took advantage of acts for which the men who were now
Liberals were at least in part responsible. The existing
electoral law was based on that established by General
Wood, but it had been converted into a notoriously bad
instrument through an amendment which placed control
of the elections largely in the hands of the alcaldes, or mayors, of towns. The new law of December 25, 1903, called
for two elections, at the first of which the electoral boards
for the main election were to be chosen. These boards
were to handle the registration, and also act as judges of
the election and count the votes. The preliminary election
in each voting district was to be in charge of a delegate appointed by the mayor, who might therefore, if he were so
minded and had sufficient force, dominate the whole affair.
The author of the amendment to General Wood's law was
none other than Alfredo Zayas. Estrada Palma repeatedly
asked Congress for a new election law, notably in his messages to Congress of April 4, 1904, and April 3, 1905, but




THE REELECTION OF ESTRADA PALMA           183
despite the fact that it had given rise, as the President put
it, to "many abuses, acts of injustice, and frauds, and, what
is even worse, that the law should remain unfulfilled in
part in the province of Pinar del Rio," Congress did nothing.12 In like manner Estrada Palma, in message after message, asked Congress to enact the supplementary legislation
called for by the Constitution for a judiciary law (to provide,
among other things, for a regular method of attaining to
judicial positions and to promotion, and to guarantee judges
against removability)13 and for a law making municipal governments elective, but Congress took no action on these
requests, either. As a result, judges continued to be subordinate to the executive, appointable and removable at will,
while there had been no municipal elections since the departure of General Wood; municipal officials were therefore
held to be within the purview of the old Spanish law, which
placed removals and appointments unappealably in the hands
of the executive. Even the constitutional provision calling
for the representation of minorities had been given no effect,
though the President had called the attention of Congress
to the need of legislation on this score. General Freyre
now proposed to take advantage of these defects and omissions in the laws.
In the elections of 1905 not only a President and VicePresident were to be chosen, but also half the Senate and
half the House and the six provincial governors. Jose Miguel
G6mez and Zayas were soon nominated as the Liberal
standard-bearers, and presently Estrada Palma and Mendez
Capote were put up for the Moderates. Among the earliest
moves of the Fighting Cabinet was the wholesale dismissal
' Mensajes presidenciales, I: 73-74; claimed the right to function, but
126-127. The reference to Pinar del neither of which was recognized by
Rio bears upon the two provincial the government.
electoral boards, each of which  Ibid., I, 127.




184


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


of government employes not addicted to the Moderate cause.
Their places were filled with political partisans, who brought
with them the value of their family influence.14 Even schoolteachers were not exempt from the rule requiring service
to the party in power. But this was not enough. The key
to victory lay in controlling the local governments. So just
prior to the first elections in September, Freyre as Secretary
of Government dismissed the local officials in some twenty
or more municipalities. All of the men involved happened
to be Liberals, while Moderates were appointed in their
place. It is true that formal charges of incorrect administration were brought against the officials who were ousted,
and it is probably true that the charges in most cases were
well founded, but since only Liberal mayors were affected
and the things complained of had happened in sdme instances several years before, the whole move was obviously
political. Most of the removals took place in the provinces
of Santa Clara, Havana, and Pinar del Rio, too, where the
Liberals had their strongest following. These acts stirred
up an extraordinary amount of bitterness, and turned public
sentiment against the Moderates, for to people in the country
the local mayors and councillors were almost more important
than the President. Liberal leaders protested to Estrada
Palma, and he was able to convince them, according to
Martinez Ortiz, that many of these steps had been taken
without his knowledge or without any realization on his
part of the purely political motives behind them. One might
wonder at this, since the accusations were trumpeted forth
in the Liberal press, but the newspapers of Cuba make such
a habit of exaggerated statement that one could be pardoned
for not believing them. In any event the President did not


"Cf. pp: 319-320; 403; 565-566.




THE REELECTION OF ESTRADA PALMA


185


succeed in quelling the electoral enthusiasms of his all too
zealous Fighting Cabinet.
The Moderates were not alone to blame. The violence
of the Liberals justified the Moderates to some extent in
preparing to meet them. The island ran riot with incendiary
speechmaking on the part of the Liberals. In Congress
they not only lashed the government with their oratory,
but also prevented a quorum in the House, so that the
budget could not be passed. When the President thereupon
issued a decree putting into effect the previous estimates
until Congress should resolve the matter, they freely reminded him of the fate of Charles I of England and of
President Balmaceda of Chile. Talk of revolution in case
the Liberals should be "robbed" of victory-and defeat was
taken as the equivalent of robbery-was everywhere in the
air. The Liberal candidate himself gave voice to this threat
on more than one occasion. The Liberals had organizations,
too, certainly in Santa Clara and possibly in Pinar del Rio,
that were prepared to use force in gaining votes. On April 14,
1905, six congressmen stole a file of papers which formed
the basis of charges that had been brought against some
of the councillors of the ayuntamiento, or municipal council,
of Havana. They published an open letter proclaiming their
act, and defending it on the grounds of their profound conviction that the Fighting Cabinet was riding roughshod
over the laws. A little later, on July 22, 1905, the local
government building at San Antonio de-las Vueltas was
burned by Liberals in course of a riot. Obviously there
was need for some display of the iron hand on the part of
the government, even if it had not gone beyond the bounds
of propriety. The turbulence was not all on one side, but
on both.
As the day for the preliminary elections, September 23,




186


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


approached, acts of violence followed one after another until
there was something like a reign of terror. The government
was prepared to use the police and the rural guards, ostensibly to keep order and prevent electoral frauds, but really
to hinder the Liberals, many of whom were arrested. The
most shocking incident took place at Cienfuegos, which was
the principal fighting ground in Santa Clara, the most bitterly contested of the six provinces. Representative Enrique
Villuendas, who was the principal Liberal leader in that
city, had publicly charged the Moderates with all manner
of crimes in and near Cienfuegos, including a number of
shootings and the pardon of two murderers, one of whom
had been added to the police force of Cienfuegos and the
other to the rural guards! On September 22 he sent a
letter to G6mez in which he asserted that there were plots
against his life. A few hours later he was dead. Reams
of paper have been covered in writings on this incident,
with the idea of fixing responsibility for it on the Moderates
or the Liberals, as the case may be. It seems that a meeting of Liberal leaders had been called that day in Villuendas's
room at the Hotel Suiza, to see whether they should send
their followers out "to be killed" at the election next day.
The gathering was interrupted by a visit of the police, under
Chief Illance, who had come with an authorization to search
for arms and bombs. Exactly what followed cannot be
stated with certainty, but when it was over both Villuendas
and Illance had been killed, besides two others, while several
persons were wounded. The whole country was stirred up
over the incident. The Moderates were impressed by the
murder of the chief of police in course of an authorized
search,15 while the Liberals looked on the death of Villuendas


"For example, see message of Es- 1905, in Mensajes presidenciales, I,
trada Palma to Congress, Nov. 6, 139.




THE REELECTION OF ESTRADA PALMA


187


as a case of deliberate assassination and raised up the young
congressman to the category of a martyr to their cause.16
It will be observed that nothing has been said of issues
in this campaign. That is because there were none worthy
of the name. The Liberals, as the party out of power, did
indeed declare for the immediate abrogation of the Platt
Amendment, while the Moderates, with the disadvantage of
being the government party, could do no more than advo- j
cate eventual abrogation,17 but, obviously, this was nothing
but the familiar loud-noise "issue" of Hispanic American
politics, with its appeal to patriotism through an arraignment of the United States.     The nearest thing to a real
issue was the record of the government. On this score,
in an interview of September 4, 1905, Estrada Palma is
quoted as making the following statement about his platform:
"What better or more eloquent platform can there be than deeds themselves? The past is a guarantee and sure pledge of the future." 
The President then went on to tell of the financial achievements of the administration, and of the prosperity of the
country. The Liberals could not well meet Estrada Palma on
this ground, as the assertions of the President were, certainly
in the main, true. So it may safely be said that there
were "no issues worthy of the name." It was a battle of
personalities,-and of violence.
The day of the preliminary elections, September 23, 1905,
was filled with political "electricity," and it was evident
from  the first that a Moderate victory, by force if neceslThe most ample and most violent of reviews, v. XXXIV, pp. 424-430,
discussion of this incident is to be at 426; Oct., 1906.
found in Collazo, Cuba intervenida,  " Espafia, Gabriel Ricardo, Con el
29-84.                         jefe del estado: oyendo a Estrada
1 Brownell, Atherton, The Cuban Palma, in Discusion, Sept. 5, 1905,
e*ublic on trial, in American review quoted in Velasco, 34-35.




188


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


sary, had been provided for in advance. So the Liberal
leaders called off their followers shortly after noon. Naturally, the Moderates were overwhelmingly successful. In
many districts their candidates got more votes than there
were inhabitants. The electoral boards that had been chosen
then proceeded to draw up the lists of voters for the final
election, to be held on December 1st. They were so zealous
in the performance of their duties that they made up a
total registry of 432,313 voters, of whom at least 150,000
were mere fraudulent names. Their action was denounced
even by La Discusi6n, a leading Moderate journal, which
pointed out that the list of voters added up to approximately
a third of the population of the republic, "a monstrosity,
the paternity.of which should be denied by its various perpetrators, because it gives them the title of idiots." In the
same article La Discusi6n expressed its views as follows:
"The election leaders have shown such little brains in conducting their
schemes that they have made themselves ridiculous and foolish. The
schemes referred to were nothing more than to gain a victory at all
hazard, which could have been gained without going beyond the limits
of probability.", '
Freyre himself, when questioned later by Taft about the
surplus 150,000 names, admitted that it was "possibly true"
that they were fraudulent, adding that it was "impossible
to hold an election in Cuba without fraud," and suggesting
that the extra names were put on the lists by Moderate
registrars "merely out of a spirit of mischief" when they
heard that the Liberals were not going to register or to
vote. Of course, the Moderates had a walk-over in the elections of December 1st. The Liberals did not go to the
polls, and all Moderate candidates were elected.
g Quoted in Taft and Bacon, Re- (1906-1907), ser. no. 5105, House
port, in U. S., 59th Cong., 2d sess. Docs., 500.




THE REELECTION OF ESTRADA PALMA


189


The Liberals had not withdrawn with any idea of yielding
the plums of office. Their abstention from voting was a
familiar Hispanic American maneuver indicative of an intention to organize a revolution, and it was so understood
in Cuba. Months before the end of 1905 plots were being
formed, and there were several minor outbreaks. Between
November 21 and 27 there were armed uprisings in the province of Havana at Alquizar, La Salud, and Batabano, and at
San Juan and Martinez in Pinar del Rio. These moves were
premature. Many who had intended to join in them
"thought better of it" when the moment came. So the
government, by a slight show of force and an offer to forgive the insurrectionists, was able to restore order. A little
later, however, on the night of February 24-25, 1906, a band
of thirty or more broke into the barracks of the rural guards
at Guanabacoa (a considerable town in the outskirts of
Havana), killed two of the guards and wounded several others, and made away with a number of horses and a quantity
of arms. They expected that their audacious act would be
the forerunner of an insurrection, but the country did not
rise. The band was scattered, and most of the men were
captured and the stolen properties recovered. Estrada Palma
described the participants in this affair as "men of a very
low stamp, mostly illiterates,"20 but back of them were a
number of prominent Liberals, as also in the other outbreaks that had taken place. In this particular instance
Senator Moruia Delgado was probably the instigator.
Meanwhile, plots to overthrow the Moderates were being
formed, even though the methods to be employed were as 
yet uncertain. Some Liberals favored an intervention by
the United States as the guarantor of new elections. Among


' Message to Congress of Apr. 2,       155.
1906, in Mensajes presidenciales, I,




190


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


these was the Liberal candidate himself, Jos6 Miguel G6mez,
who made a visit to the United States shortly after the
elections of September 1905. There he gave out interviews
censuring the government of Estrada Palma in bitter fashion.
Under date of October 4, while in New York, G6mez said
in this connection:
"The United States has a direct responsibility concerning what is
going on in Cuba. Estrada Palma can continue at the head of the
government only by telling the people that in case of disorder or revolution the United States will immediately send troops to chastise the
insurrectionists and sustain his power. The United States is under the
duty of putting an end to this situation, which, if it continues any longer,
will oblige us to go to the government of Roosevelt with a petition for it
to do so. If the United States would intervene and insist that the presidential elections should be held honestly, it would prove that eighty per
cent of the Cuban people were Liberal.""
Again, on October 6, G6mez expressed himself as follows:
"In my judgment the moment has arrived for the United States and
Cuba to give an authentic interpretation to the Platt Amendment. That
interpretation ought to be literal or broad. In the latter case the United
States ought to assume a completely passive attitude, so long as the rights
that foreigners enjoy in Cuba are respected. As a man of peace, if the
decision were left to me, I would prefer the first solution, the literal
interpretation, although I have always besought for my country the most
absolute sovereignty in exercising the normal functions of the national
life. "
Diario de la Marina, in its edition of October 7, remarked
that Gomez was "in favor of having the government of the
United States mingle in the contests of Cuban parties as
an arbiter," and El Mundo observed, on the same day, that
he had stated that it was "the duty of the United States to
intervene." The events of the following year were to prove,
"Declaraciones del general J. M.  "'Mas declaraciores de Josd Miguel
G6mez, in Diario de la marina, Oct. Gomez, in Diario de la marina, Oct.
4, 1905, quoted in Velasco, 89-90.  7, 1905, quoted in Velasco, 27.




THE REELECTION OF ESTRADA PALMA


191


however, that the United States had no desire to take any
such step if it could possibly be avoided.
Congress met in April 1906, and one of its first duties was
to pass upon the elections of 1905. The Liberals still had
a number of senators and representatives, as only half of
the membership of Congress had been affected by the elections. These left-over Liberals protested against the validity
of the elections, but the Moderates stood firm. On one occasion the Liberal representatives, who had been outvoted on
a measure impugning the elections, left the chamber in a
body. As they were going out, one of them, General Faustino
Guerra, exclaimed: "There is nothing for us to do here;
we must seek justice somewhere else." The implication was
clear. And the man who made the remark, better known
by his nickname as "Pino" Guerra, was to strike the first
blow on behalf of the revolution. On May 20, 1906, Estrada
Palma took the oath of office for his second term. If the
Liberals had hoped for some favorable turn in affairs up
to this point, the way now seemed closed, except by revolution. The leading men of the party came together, therefore, and signed a formal revolutionary pact. One of the
signers was Jose Miguel G6mez. He had long since returned from the United States, announcing that he had
been employed by a group of capitalists to establish a great
sugar-mill. Presently, however, for reasons (possibly political) that are not exactly clear, he was asked to resign this
position. So he entered into the plan for the revolution,
and  "was the   soul of this movement." 23    Alfredo
Zayas was another signer.    A  Central Revolutionary
Committee was established, and the work of preparation
began.
The plan was to effect a coup d'etat, by seizing the police2 Lozano Casado, 13.




192


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


stations of Havana at a given hour and at the same time
attacking the palace to get possession of the person of the
President. In like manner the Vice-President was also to
be taken. It was hoped that the business would be finished
in a few hours, without any complications of civil war or
intervention. It was a project that had only a scant chance
of success. As Martinez Ortiz has said:
"To none of the conspirators was it unknown that in speed of action
lay the only possibility of not losing the game and occasioning a foreign
intervention." '
This is worthy of note, because it has been the habit of
Liberal writers to charge the Moderates with having been
"traitors" for eventually bringing in the United States. The
truth is, that on this score both sides were tarred with the
same brush. Failure of the plot meant almost certain civil
war, and would draw in the United States. In a letter
of September 27, 1905, to the president of the Liberal party,
renouncing his candidacy, G6mez himself bad remarked
that "armed strife would inevitably bring foreign intervention."25 And, indeed, intervention under the Platt Amendment was just what he had wanted in October 1905, as already stated. Later, some other leaders also came out openly
in favor of an American intervention for the supervision
of new elections; for example, "Pino" Guerra and Ernesto
Asbert, important chieftains in the provinces of Pinar del
Rio and Havana.26    And Zayas certainly accepted the intervention when it came. In a letter of September 26, 1906,
to Taft and Bacon he said:
"The Government of Cuba having granted to the United States the
right of intervention in accordance with Clause III of the Constitutional
" Martinez Ortiz, II, 608.  560.
"Quoted in Martinez Ortiz, II, "2Velasco, 26-27, n. 35.




THE REELECTION OF ESTRADA PALMA


193


Appendix, it would seem but natural that the exercise of this right should
not be hindered or resisted by the Government of Cuba." "
The project of the conspirators needed secrecy as much
as speed. It also required considerable forces and ample
funds for arms and other uses. The men might have been
obtained, but secrecy, where so many were in the plot, was
impossible, and the financial resources of the revolution were
too slender to permit of rapid action. The government
was quite aware of the plans, and kept close watch over
Gomez and most of the other leaders. The revolution was
in the air. Indeed, it was almost shouted from the housetops, and few precautions were taken to keep the authorities from knowing what was going on. Estrada Palma himself was none too well informed. As Martinez Ortiz puts
it, "Many rumors of the revolutionary proposals were not
accustomed to reach the President, just as formerly those
referring to complaints for illegal acts did not do so." He
confided in the honesty of his government, the millions in
the treasury, and the general prosperity. He also had great
hopes of the new Congress, which might be expected to be
amenable to party discipline and to put through some muchneeded legislation. It was at this time, too, that he began
a series of public works, in which he was assisted by some
really laudable acts of Congress. And whether it occurred
to him or not, it appeared to be in the minds of other
Moderate leaders that the United States would provide the
force required to subdue any revolutionary outbreak. That
at least was the deduction of Taft and Bacon a little later
in 1906.
The much heralded "secret" of the coup d'etat never got
a chance for trial. Instead, the spark of revolution touched
7 Quoted in Taft and Bacon, Report, in Op. cit., 514.




194          A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
powder, and on August 16 "Pino" Guerra raised the standard
of revolt in Pinar del Rio. Little else could have been expected, but the Liberal leaders had been willing to take that
chance, and, indeed, a more serious one still. As Martinez
Ortiz has said:
"Perhaps the greatest error of the directors of the uprising was in not
taking sufficiently into account how dangerous it was, for the future
tranquility of the country and for the security of its institutions and
its nationality, to offer to the multitude that objective lesson: the facility
with which it was possible to overthrow a government which was without
sufficient force to guard property from depredations and make the
weight of its authority quickly felt.""
" Martinez Ortiz, II, 622. For gen- chapter, see note at the end of chaperal comment on authorities for this ter IX.




CHAPTER IX


THE REVOLUTION OF AUGUST
THE war was on! "Pino" Guerra was already under
arms. Gomez's principal panegyrist censures the redoubtable
"Pino" for starting the conflict, saying that the former Liberal candidate never intended to have a civil war,' but, as
already pointed out, no serious attention need be paid to
this assertion. It is probable, however, that Guerra acted
on his own initiative, or else on orders of General Carlos
Garcia Velez, titular head of the movement in the province
of Havana, and not by command of his immediate chief in
Pinar del Rio, Colonel Manuel Lazo, or of Gomez or Zayas,
in charge of the campaign as a whole. Alarmed by the
"Pino" Guerra revolt, the government acted swiftly. On
August 19 orders were issued for the arrest of the leaders.
General Jose Monteagudo (revolutionary commander for
the province of Santa Clara), General Castillo Duany and
Juan Gualberto Gomez (the leaders for Oriente), and Jose
Miguel Gomez himself were seized in course of the next
day or two, and taken to Havana. Zayas went into hiding
in the capital. A number of the less prominent conspirators
either were not caught in the first place or else escaped, and
presently they appeared in the field. Colonel Ernesto Asbert
and General Enrique Loinaz del Castillo raised bands in
the province of Havana. Eduardo Guzman, Orestes Ferrara,
and others put themselves at the head of columns in Santa
Lozano Casado, 14.
195




196


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


Clara. Camagiiey and Oriente participated only slightly in
the uprising, while in the loyal province of Mantazas there
was virtually no revolutionary activity at all.
In the other three provinces, however, the campaign gathered a momentum that was surprising to the leaders of the
movement themselves. To be sure, the government had lost
standing in the election, and had scant military resources
at its command, but those "who thought themselves to be
familiar with the conditions of Cuba" had "regarded the
government as established on the firmest basis." The American minister, Mr. Edwin V. Morgan (a man of unusual
ability in the American foreign service), had so little anticipated such an event that he was at this very time on his
vacation in the United States. Taft and Bacon ascribed the
success of the outbreak in part to a "natural tendency to
insurrection," growing out of "a long history of insurrection in Cuba," though they were also impressed by the loss
of moral force by the existing government. This was accentuated, they pointed out, by the fact that property in
the island was owned mainly by foreigners or by Cubans
who had no connection with politics. The politicians of both
parties were a group apart, lacking the stabilizing influence
of a property-holding class. This made it easy for any
insurrection to rob the government of active support among
conservative elements, as the insurrectionists, however weak
they might be in numbers, had an unlimited capacity for
destruction, especially since most of Cuba's wealth was
in such highly inflammable property as sugar estates.2
Martinez Ortiz, too, despite his condemnation of the government, freely admits that the rank and file of the revolutionists were "illiterates without landed property, desirous


'Taft and Bacon, Report, in U. S.,   no. 5105, House Docs., 456.
59th Cong., 2d sess. (1906-1907), ser.




THE REVOLUTION OF AUGUST


197


of adventure and novelty," for whom "all causes were good
if they gave an opportunity to 'do the August.' " 3
Aside from the police, who could not be trusted, as many
of them were in sympathy with the revolution, the government had only some six hundred artillerymen and three
thousand rural guards with which to combat its enemy,
and as the rural guards were distributed in small detachments throughout the island they were not in a position
to render much help. Steps were taken to raise an emergency
force of militia, but the recruits obtained were insufficient
both in numbers and in quality. Furthermore, the overwhelming sentiment of the country, even that of Havana,
favored the insurrectionists. Eventually there were some
eight or ten thousand rebels in the province of Havana,
and almost from the very first they threatened the capital
itself. There were six or eight thousand more in Santa
Clara, besides other scattering bands throughout the country.
They were ill-equipped and lacking in resources, but surpassed the government troops in strength. Living on the
country, they had respected foreign property in the main,
though there was no telling how long their leaders could
keep them in hand. Indeed, it was a question whether some
of the lesser leaders themselves would refrain from gathering in the spoil. There were several "battles," with scaht
loss of life, in most of which the government was defeated.
It was thus far more a "war of bulletins than bullets," as a
New York Sun reporter described it, but there was a general
feeling of insecurity and a fear of what might easily happen. Business came to a standstill,-so much so that the
problem of subsistence in the capital was serious. In other
'Martinez Ortiz, II, 622. To "do in Spain. Thus one "does the Authe August" is a Spanish idiom, grow- gust" who brings his plans to a head
ing out of the fact that August is the in a way to make a profit for himself.
time when the wheat crop is gathered




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A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


words, things were in a state of crisis. Something had to
be done,-and quicklyl
The veterans of the War of Independence had retained
their organization intact, and they now authorized some
of their leaders to take steps to effect a compromise between the two parties. The Constitutionalists, as the revolutionary leaders styled themselves, wanted the elections of
1905 thrown out. That was their basic idea, although they
also wanted a redress of various wrongs, such as those having
to do with the dismissals of municipal officials and other
government employes. At the opposite pole was the
government, standing on its dignity as the constituted authority and refusing to yield under the pressure of revolution.
Chief among the representatives of the veterans was General
Mario Menocal,4 a comparatively young man who had made
an excellent record, not only as a soldier, but also as an
engineer and as the organizer and manager of the great
sugar estate of Chaparra. He had an interview with Estrada
Palma on September 4, and suggested that all officials elected
in 1905 should resign, except the President and Vice-President, and that Estrada Palma should take it upon himself
to see that proper electoral and municipal laws should be
enacted and that the officials unjustly ousted should be restored to their posts. Without committing himself the
President for the moment seemed favorable. Four days later,
however, he rejected the proposals, root and branch. Nothing could be done until the insurrectionists should lay down
their arms, he said. Indeed, from this time forward he
could not conceal a feeling of impatience with reference to
Strictly speaking, Menocal's name the father's name (Garcia) only as a
should be rendered Mario Garcia kind of "middle name," it is no doubt
Menocal, but as the gentleman him- proper to let him have his own way
self prefers to be known by his about it.
mother's name (Menocal) and to use




THE REVOLUTION OF AUGUST


199


Menocal and his companions, who, he felt, should have
ranged themselves on his side from the first. Liberal
pamphleteers insist that Estrada Palma had "flirted" with
Menocal at the outset, merely to gain time for another
maneuver that he had in mind,-that of United States intervention under the Platt Amendment.5 Indeed, the President and his advisers had decided that no other course than
that was left to them. To compromise with the revolution
would destroy the dignity and moral force of the government, opening the way to future revolutions. To resist
meant certain defeat, for even at that moment Havana was
at the mercy of the insurrectionists. It seems probable, too,
that Estrada Palma expected the United States government
to stand behind him.
For a time, with the American minister away on vacation, the United States was inadequately represented in
Havana. The young secretary temporarily in charge of the
legation was hardly of the calibre to handle the situation.
On one occasion he caused a body of marines to be landed
in Havana, with Estrada Palma's consent. Next day they
were back on shipboard,-by order of President Roosevelt!
On another occasion, so it is said, he sent a cablegram to
Washington saying "Revolution spreading.  Everything
quiet." This was too much for President Roosevelt! HIe
got in touch with the American consul-general, Mr. Frank
Maximilian Steinhart, and told him to handle affairs, pending Morgan's return. Steinhart was a man of outstanding
ability. Born in Germany, he came to the United States
as a young man, and for sixteen years was a soldier in the
regular army, rising from the ranks to positions calling
for executive ability in clerical branches of the service. He
was transferred to Cuba at the beginning of the United
'For example, see Collazo, 113.




200


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


States military occupation, and was chief clerk of the government to the end of United States rule. Remaining thereafter in Cuba, he served as United States consul-general
from 1903 to 1907. At the time of the revolution of 1906
he was already one of the best-known men in the island,
acquainted with leading Cubans and thoroughly familiar
with the conditions and customs of the country. From this
time forward, down to the present day, Steinhart was to
be reputed the right-hand man of every United States minister to Cuba, and was to acquire for himself a vast fortune
in his business ventures in the country.
On September 8, 1906, Steinhart telegraphed to the State
Department in Washington, as follows:
"Absolutely confidential. Secretary of State, Cuba, has requested me,
in name of President Palma, to ask President Roosevelt send immediately
two vessels; one to Habana, other to Cienfuegos; they must come at
once. Government forces are unable to quell rebellion. The Government
is unable to protect life and property. President Palma will convene
Congress next Friday, and Congress will ask for our forcible intervention.
It must be kept secret and confidential that Palma asked for vessels.
No one here except President, Secretary of State, and myself know
about it. Very anxiously awaiting reply."'
Two days later he sent another message:
"President here worried because no reply received my message, and
asks war vessels be sent immediately."'
The same day Acting Secretary of State Bacon, in the absence of Secretary Root (then in South America), replied
to him that two ships were being sent, but remarked that
"The President directs me to state that perhaps you do not
yourself appreciate the reluctance with which this country
would intervene,"8 following this up with a letter of the
11th, saying that President Roosevelt believed "actual, im'Quoted in Taft and Bacon, Re-  'Ibid., 445.
port, in Op. cit., 444-445.       'Ibid., 445.




THE REVOLUTION OF AUGUST                201
mediate intervention to be out of the question." 9 On
succeeding days Steinhart sent more and more urgent
messages. On the 12th he transmitted a memorandum to
him by the Cuban Secretary of State to the effect that the
government was unable to withstand the revolutionists, also
saying
"President Estrada Palma asks for American intervention and begs
that President Roosevelt send to Habana with the greatest secrecy and
rapidity 2000 or 3000 men." 
In his cablegram of the 13th Steinhart said
"President Palma, the Republic of Cuba, through me officially asks
for American intervention because he can not prevent rebels from
entering cities and burning property." 
He further stated that Estrada Palma was resolved to resign
and turn over the government to the representative whom
the President of the United States might designate. Next
day he cabled that Estrada Palma, the Vice-President, and
all the Secretaries proposed to resign, which would mean
a condition of anarchy, as there would be no legally constituted power that could convoke Congress.12
The United States was indeed unwilling to intervene.N
Secretary Root was just completing a tour of South America
in an attempt to allay the suspicions of the southern republics about the supposed imperialistic designs of the great
republic of the north, and political considerations in the
United States, with a congressional election at hand, made
it desirable to avoid giving the slightest foundation for any
criticism on this score. Furthermore, it had long ago been
decided in Washington that the interests of the United
States were best served by the existence of an independent
Ibid., 445.                  "Ibid, 446.
10 Ibid., 446.                " Ibid., 446-447.




202


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


republic of Cuba. Yet Steinhart's messages made it apparent that something must be done. So as a first step,
Roosevelt sent an open letter on September 14 to Gonzalo de
Quesada, the Cuban minister to Washington. In it he urged
the Cubans to sink their differences, and announced his intention of sending his Secretary of War, William Howard
Taft, and the Assistant Secretary of State, Robert Bacon,
to Havana to aid the Cubans in reaching a peaceful solution. Among other things he also said:
"Whoever is responsible for armed revolt and outrage, whoever is
responsible in any way for the condition of affairs that now obtain, is an
enemy of Cuba... For there is just one way in which Cuban independence can be jeoparded, and that is for the Cuban people to show
their inability to continue in their path of peaceful and orderly progress.. Our intervention in Cuban affairs will only come if Cuba herself
shows that she has fallen into the insurrectionary habit, that she lacks
the self-restraint necessary to secure peaceful self-government, and that
her contending factions have plunged the country into anarchy.""
This letter, which was at once given out for publication,
created an excellent impression both in Cuba and in the
United States, and probably saved the revolution from entering a dangerously destructive stage. The insurrectionist
chiefs were getting impatient over the failure in the efforts
that were being made to effect a compromise. As Guzman,
one of their leaders, had said:
"If there is no satisfactory arrangement soon, I shall proceed to the
destruction of the railways and even of foreign properties." 4
Now, both sides were disposed to wait. The government
issued a decree suspending military operations throughout
the republic. Several of the opposition generals took similar
action, and the others at least engaged in no activities of
major consequence. The representatives of the veterans


Quoted in Ibid., 491-492.


" Martinez Ortiz, II, 635.




THE REVOLUTION OF AUGUST                  203
made one last effort to effect a compromise before the arrival of the American commissioners, but they accomplished
very little. Some, but not all, political prisoners were released, and Zayas was given permission to come out of hiding to act on behalf of the revolutionists. On the other hand,
the government insisted that it could not treat with rebels
in arms. And the insurrectionists, self-styled "Constitutionalists," would not lay down their arms without an annulment
of the 1905 elections,-for which course, incidentally, there
was no warrant in the Constitution. There was not a little
disappointment over the unwillingness of the two parties
to come together, but it was "too good to be true" that they
should have done so, as Enrique Jose Varona, the most
respected thinker in Cuba, pointed out in El Figaro on
September 23. As Varona put it,
"I have already said what is the attitude of the parties, which are
joint authors of this dishonorable convulsion. They are concerned with
nothing more than to make the best capital of the moment, at the cost
of the country, destined beforehand to fill the role of a propitiatory
victim. But what with greatest reason ought to cause us indignation is
to see that they talk only of the good of the country, the honor of the
country, the liberty of the country, and those who speak in this manner
are loosing upon the country that greatest calamity of the many that
afflict the miserable human species, war." "
Taft and Bacon, accompanied by the American minister,
reached Havana on September 19. They were the last hope
for a solution of the problem without formal intervention.
Anyone acquainted with Hispanic American character in
general and the Cuban situation in particular might have
felt safe in predicting that they were foredoomed to failure. Nobody could complain, however, of any lack of industry or effort on their part to bring about an adjust" Quoted in Martinez Ortiz, II, 675-  Varona, see infra, pp. 633-634.
677. For something further about




204


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


ment of affairs, though many have questioned the decision
they reached. Taft was the virtual head of the mission,
and was generally recognized as such. Speaking of Bacon,
Martinez Ortiz comments upon his "reserve" and "discretion" and the fact that "he did not let his thoughts appear,"
noting also that "one hardly ever heard a word from him,
except when he was answering some question of Mr. Taft."
Taft, on the other hand, was "loquacious," and had "a
perpetual smile," besides which he had an enormous prestige as a leader in American national life. The very morning of their arrival the two commissioners paid a visit to
the President, and were much impressed by their conversation with him. Estrada Palma acquainted them with the
main features of the situation, and suggested that they confer with Mendez Capote and Zayas, as representatives of
the Moderates and Liberals respectively. The rest of the
conversation was described in the report of Taft and Bacon
as follows:
"This was in substance all of the conversation, except a long and
interesting statement which the President made of his efforts to teach
his people the knowledge of self-government which by twenty years of
residence in the United States he had acquired from association with
the American people, of his successful handling of the finances of the
Cuban Government, of the economy of expenditure in his administration,
of the encouragement he had given to the investment of foreign capital,
and of the consequent prosperity which had come to Cuba during the
four years of his incumbency as President. He manifested an intense
interest in the large balance which there was in the treasury, and the
greatest regret that that balance was likely to be much reduced by
the extravagance of expenditures required in the efforts made and making
to suppress the insurrection. He said that he had insisted upon the
maintenance of all the guaranties of civil liberty under the constitution,
and had declined to suspend them until the insurrection had proceeded to
a point where it could not be avoided; that for six months he had been
made aware of the plotting which was going on against the government,
but that so great was the prosperity and the comfort of the people, and




THE REVOLUTION OF AUGUST


205


so successful had his government been in arts of peace, he declined to
take rigorous steps against the conspirators, for he had not supposed that
such an insurrection as had occurred was possible. He deplored what
he regarded as a lack of gratitude and patriotism on the part of those
who were supporting the insurrection, and gave us a number of instances
tending to show that the leaders of the insurrection were moved only by
the basest of purposes-by a pecuniary greed and for office. His demeanor was dignified and earnest, the evidences of his sorrow were
touching, and what he said made a deep impression on us." '
Taft and Bacon accepted the invitation of Minister Morgan to reside at his home in Marianao, nine miles from the
centre of Havana. This gave them something of a neutral
position, as Marianao was in possession of the government,
while there were insurgent posts across a bridge about a
thousand yards from the Morgan home. They now proceeded at a phenomenal rate of activity to interview everybody who might throw light on what had happened in Cuba
or suggest to them what course should be followed. They
frequently communicated with Mendez Capote and Zayas,
as also with men who were, or had been, Secretaries in
Estrada Palma's Cabinet. They talked with congressmen,
revolutionary generals, the representatives of the veterans
associations, bankers, merchants, manufacturers, planters,
and, indeed, men of prominence in all branches of life in
the island, including foreigners as well as Cubans. ConsulGeneral Steinhart was of the greatest assistance to them,
as he "was better acquainted with conditions and public men
than any other American whom we could have consulted."
Several other Americans were in constant attendance upon
the two commissioners, and gave them invaluable aid. Inevitably Taft and Bacon reached one conclusion early in
the enquiry: that the procedure of the government in connection with the elections of 1905 had been fraudulent. The
"Taft and Bacon, Report, in Op. cit., 449.




206


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


testimony of Freyre himself, already mentioned, was conclusive on this score.
Any American will readily understand the enormous influence this fact was bound to have on the commissioners,
and there was perhaps nobody in Cuba who expected them
to believe that the election had been honest. There were
a great many people, however, who thought they would
in any event back the government. The commissioners
themselves would have preferred to do that, as is clearly
apparent from the correspondence between Taft and Roosevelt. For example, in a long cablegram of September 21
Taft said:
"If the present government could maintain itself, or if it had a moral
support or following which would be useful in case of intervention, Bacon
and I would be strongly in favor of supporting it as the regular and
constitutional government, because the election was held under forms of
law and has been acted upon and recognized as valid, but the actual
state of affairs is such that we would be fighting the whole Cuban people
in effect by intervening to maintain this government." 1
So, presently, it was perhaps natural that Taft and Bacon
reached practically the same conclusion that Menocal had,
before them.   As early as September 21 the Moderates
had formally agreed to accept the arbitration of the American commissioners, provided the insurrectionists should first
lay down their arms, and Mendez Capote had given assurances that all the issues in dispute could be adjusted if
only the dignity of the government might be conserved
by its not being required to treat with armed rebels. Zayas
was also empowered by the Liberal party, by the Central
Revolutionary Committee, and (after a somewhat spectacularly arranged meeting at Marianao) by the insurrectionist generals themselves to act on behalf of the opposition.
" Quoted in Ibid., 469-471, at 470.




THE REVOLUTION OF AUGUST


207


Zayas consented to the Taft and Bacon suggestions, essentially like those of Menocal,-for the resignation of all officials elected in 1905 except the President and Vice-President,
for the needed electoral, municipal, and judiciary laws and
a civil service law covering government employes in general, and for a specified date in the near future for new
elections,-but felt that he was not authorized to consider
the matter of a prior laying down of arms by the Constitutionalist forces, although he did make a futile enquiry of
the generals as to whether they would accept any such
arrangement. So Taft came to the conclusion, influenced
no doubt by his findings concerning the elections, that
the government should waive this point, and continued the
negotiations thenceforth on the basis of the compromise
proposals themselves, without reference to the arms question.
That meant that his mission as one of arbitration was over
almost as soon as it began, for Estrada Palma and the Moderates were adamant on that score.
Matters now moved swiftly. The seeming changes in the
situation were, as Taft almost daily described them, "kaleidoscopic." In fact, nothing changed! The issue was sure:
intervention or civil war. Consistently with the stand they
had taken, Taft and Bacon did what they could. Roosevelt in the United States rendered them great assistance,
despite his distance from the controversy. At times, indeed, it seems as if his judgment of events were better
than that of his emissaries in the field; at least that is an
impression one is likely to get from a reading of his correspondence with Taft. On one occasion he said:
"It is undoubtedly a very evil thing that the revolutionists should be
encouraged and the dreadful example afforded the island of success in
remedying wrongs by violence and treason to the Government... I do
not have much hope that with the example before them of such success




208


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


in an insurrection the people who grow discontented with the new government will refrain from insurrection and disturbance some time in the
future." '
On another occasion when Taft was inclined to reject a solution which some of the Cuban leaders had proposed, because
it lacked any constitutional basis, Roosevelt came back quite
characteristically:
"Upon my word, I do not see that with Cuba in the position it is we
need bother our heads much about the exact way in which the Cubans
observe or do not observe so much of their own constitution as does not
concern us... I do not care in the least for the fact that such an
agreement is not constitutional." 1
None of the devices that were tried had any real chance of
success, however. So the story may be quickly passed in
review. 
The commissioners first announced their suggestions for
a compromise, minus the disarming of the insurrectionists
factor, on September 24. As already mentioned, Zayas accepted it, though disliking some features; by this time he
was ready to follow Taft and Bacon almost to any length,
for their stand concerning the elections and the arms question had generally been accepted as a great Liberal victory,
for which Zayas might hope to claim much of the credit.
Taft himself recognized the existence of this opinion, as
he pointed out in a cablegram to Roosevelt on the 26th,
though he failed to see where it was justified.    Mendez
Capote and Estrada Palma, both of whom the commissioners
talked with on the 24th, were of the opinion that the compromise was a mere temporary expedient that would not
last more than a few months. By some accounts the meeting with Estrada Palma was rather stormy. At any


'"Quoted in Ibid., 478.


" Quoted in Ibid., 480-481.




THE REVOLUTION OF AUGUST


209


rate, the President "declined to assist in or accept the compromise, as offensive to his personal dignity and honor, and
announced his intention irrevocable to send his resignation
to Congress."20  Taft and Bacon in a long communication
of the same date begged him to reconsider; a telegram
from Roosevelt of the 25th (corrected in some parts by the
commissioners) also urged him to accept the compromise or
to propose some other; but Estrada Palma could not be
moved. In replies of the 25th and 26th respectively Estrada
Palma reiterated his irrevocable decision to resign. Taft's
messages about this time began to exhibit great impatience
with Estrada Palma and the Moderates, and Martinez Ortiz
remarks that he even lost his smile. He was convinced
that the Moderates preferred intervention to the plan he
had suggested, and was surprised and chagrined that they
should do so. The Moderates held a meeting on the 25th,
and rejected the compromise, and so, naturally, the Liberals
formally accepted it on the 26th. The Moderates were
now planning, as Taft called it, to "scuttle" the government,
through the resignation of all executive officials and the dissolution of Congress without electing a successor, thereby
forcing a provisional government. Even the Liberals generally favored intervention, too, Taft declared, "because they
can earn their victory in the holding of new elections."
Both sides were eager to have it appear, however, that the
other party had caused the intervention. There were some
Moderates and Liberals who were still eager to avoid that
outcome, however, and there were various impossible proposals, such, for example, as that Menocal, Sanguily, or
Zayas be put in as temporary President, with or without
due congressional authorization. At a meeting of leading
Moderates on the 27th some excited individuals went so
'Taft to Roosevelt, Sept. 26, 1906, in Ibid., 475-477, at 476.




210       A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
far as to propose forcing the intervention of England or
Germany through the simple device of destroying the property of subjects of those countries. Fortunately, nothing
came of these suggestions.
Congress assembled on September 28. The Liberals had
held a preliminary meeting to decide whether they should
attend. Fearful lest the government might put up a Moderate to succeed Estrada Palma, Zayas at first opposed having the Liberals present themselves, but the contrary opinion
of Sanguily prevailed. The President offered the resignations of his Secretaries and then his own, while Mendez
Capote also resigned the vice-presidency. A motion was
passed asking the President to reconsider, but it was a
foregone conclusion that he would not do so. The session
was then suspended until nine that night. Following Estrada Palma's expected refusal to reconsider, there was a
meeting of the Moderates to determine whether they should
go to Congress again to solve the presidential succession,
or remain away and thus break the quorum. Finally, by
a vote of twenty to sixteen they decided to remain away.
Liberal writers make a great point of this, holding that it
established their case, that the Moderates caused the intervention, but one would have to be simple-minded to consider these charges seriously. The Moderates wanted intervention, yes, but so also did the Liberals, though as clever
politicians they did not object to making as much capital
as they could. They had won a victory, but wanted to
clinch it for the future.
Congress did not meet again, and there was nobody to
convoke it. So Cuba was without a government. In consequence, on September 29, 1906, Taft published a proclamation (previously submitted by cablegram to President Roose



THE REVOLUTION OF AUGUST


211


velt) taking over control on behalf of the United States.
Following is the proclamation:
"PROCLAMATION
To the people of Cuba:
The failure of Congress to act on the irrevocable resignation of the
President of the Republic of Cuba, or to elect a successor, leaves this
country without a government at a time when great disorder prevails,
and requires that, pursuant to a request of President Palma, the necessary
steps be taken in the name and by the authority of the President of the
United States to restore order, protect life and property in the Island of
Cuba and islands and keys adjacent thereto, and for this purpose, to
establish therein a provisional government.
The provisional government hereby established by direction and in
the name of the President of the United States will be maintained only
long enough to restore order and peace and public confidence, and then
to hold such elections as may be necessary to determine those persons
upon whom   the permanent government of the Republic should be
devolved.
In so far as is consistent with the nature of a provisional government
established under the authority of the United States, this will be a
Cuban government, conforming, as far as may be, to the constitution of
Cuba. The Cuban flag will be hoisted as usual over the Government
buildings of the island. All the executive departments and the provincial
and municipal governments, including that of the city of Habana, will
continue to be administered as under the Cuban Republic. The courts
will continue to administer justice, and all laws not in their nature inapplicable by reason of the temporary and emergent character of th6
government will be in force.
President Roosevelt has been most anxious to bring about peace under
the constitutional government of Cuba, and has made every endeavor to
avoid the present step. Longer delay, however, would be dangerous.
In view of the resignation of the cabinet, until further notice the
heads of all departments of the central Government will report to me
for instructions, including Major-General Alejandro Rodriguez, in command of the Rural Guard and other regular government forces, and
General Carlos Roloff, treasurer of Cuba.
Until further notice, the civil governors and alcaldes will also report
to me for instructions.




212


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


1 ask all citizens and residents of Cuba to assist in the work of
restoring order, tranquillity [sic], and public confidence.
WM. H. TAFT,
Secretary of War of the United States,
Provisional Governor of Cuba.""
"Was the war just?" Martinez Ortiz asks, and answers his
own question by saying "Surely not." Whatever his errors
in the realm of politics, Don Tomas had been a good administrator, and had given the country a great prestige
abroad. The Liberals were willing to risk a civil war, with
its attendant destruction and possible loss of independence,
to put G6mez in his place, not because G6mez was likely
to prove a better President, which was improbable, but simply because they wanted him. "The mistake of Don Tomas
was in delivering himself body and soul to the Fighting
Cabinet and not knowing how        to restrain it."  Even the
incorrect political action of the Moderates had its explanation, if not an excuse, and that is well expressed in the
already oft-quoted report of Taft and Bacon, as follows:
"The truth seems to be that General [Freyre de] Andrade and those
who sympathized with him in the plan which he pursued had become
convinced that the universal-suffrage clause of the constitution and the
holding of elections according to the constitution and the law, with the
Cuban electorate in its present condition of ignorance, would produce
such instability in the government as to prevent the growth and the
development of the country on the prosperous lines which had been
realized under President Palma, and that it was necessary in the best
interests of Cuba to secure for him a solid support in both Houses of
Congress in order that the proper policies might be followed. The
difficulty which they did not fully realize in adopting such a plan was
the necessity for a strong force to suppress the resistance and insurrection
which those who were to be deprived of the right to take part in the
government might find it possible to initiate." '
Quoted in Taft and Bacon, Re-     Ibid., 455.
port, in Op. cit., 486.




THE REVOLUTION OF AUGUST                 213
The revolution showed that the Moderate leaders had
judged their people aright, even if they had not taken proper
precautions, possibly because they placed too much reliance
on United States help under the Platt Amendment. For
example, the Liberals of Santa Clara, the backbone of the
conspiracy, were fighting not so much for Cuba as for Jose
Miguel G6mez and themselves. They had once been Moderates, but broke with that party over an issue that they
yielded without discussion in forming the union with the
National Liberals, who consented to the nomination of
Gomez. The revolutionists in the field were made up of
the least stable elements in Cuban society, who had gone
to the war as if to a picnic, without the slightest idea of
the ruin and misery that might follow, and not least of all
to themselves. Not only did they live on the country like
robber bands, but they also appropriated horses for themselves and even took possession of the funds in some municipal treasuries as spoils of war, being encouraged in these
acts by their own generals. With some exceptions the generals themselves, as well as their soldiery, were enough to
induce horror in Mr. Taft. On one occasion Roosevelt was
a little worried lest the resignation of the regular government might make it necessary under the Platt Amendment
to substitute the hitherto insurrectionary party. Taft commented on that, on September 26, in this fashion:
"The even remote possibility suggested in your telegram of last night,
that under any possible hypothesis the Platt amendment may require
the present insurrectionary force to be treated as a government de facto
makes me shiver at the consequences. It is not a government with any
of its characteristics, but only an undisciplined horde of men under
partisan leaders. The movement is large and formidable and commands
the sympathy of a majority of the people of Cuba, but they are the
poorer classes and the uneducated. The Liberal party, which is back




214


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


of the movement, has men of ability and substance in it, but they are
not titular leaders of the insurgent forces in whom such a government
de facto must vest if in anybody.""
Again, remarking on the failure to agree upon a Cuban provisional government, in anticipation of the resignation of
Estrada Palma, he said, on September 28:
"I am confident the provisional government... would probably
have involved immediate appointment of insurgent generals to office, a
circumstance most grave in itself." h
In fine, as to the question about the revolution of 1906
that most interests Cuban publicists, the determination as
to which side was wrong, the writer would conclude that
both were. He would be inclined to sympathize with the
underlying motive of Moderate leaders, but to condemn
them  for stupidity. As for the Liberals, barring considerations of technical correctness in political maneuvering, there
is little or nothing to say in their favor.
A much more interesting question is the judgment on the
Taft mission. Martinez Ortiz says "The American commissioners proceeded in the only way they could," and he approves all they did. Many others are not so sure. One
thing certainly was accomplished by the sending of the mission, and that was the stopping of the civil war before
it reached a ruinous stage. That was the only success that
could be claimed, but it was a great one. As for the compromise they suggested, the following is the calm view of
Estrada Palma, written on October 10, 1906, in a private
letter to a friend, but published in the press of Cuba the
following November:
"The course of making a pact with the insurgents in arms was the
worst which could be considered. Even supposing that the different rebel
leaders and the directors and instigators of the movement arrived at an
" Quoted in Ibid., 475-477, at 477.  " Quoted in Ibid., 481.




THE REVOLUTION OF AUGUST


215


understanding among themselves and that they agreed with the Government upon the fundamental bases for terms of settlement, the secondary
problems which would afterwards arise would be so many and so
difficult to decide, in view of the weakened if not lost moral force of
the legitimate authorities and in the absence of other authority that
might settle differences, these problems would, I repeat, be so many and
so difficult that they would cause the country to remain for many months
in constant agitation with results as pernicious as war itself. From the
moment the Government treated with the rebels it placed itself on an
inclined plan of interminable concessions, initiating an era of successive
insurrections, and putting the stability of future governments on a frail
basis. I could never consent to be an accomplice in such evil in exchange
for being permitted to continue to occupy the Presidential chair of the
Republic... When I saw the insurrection take serious proportions my
soul was overcome with profound disenchantment, contemplating the
patient and glorious work of four years overthrown; and I irrevocably
resolved to resign the Presidency, to abandon completely public life and
to seek, in the bosom of my family, the certain refuge against so many
deceptions. But before carrying out this intention, so grateful to my
desires, it was absolutely necessary to make a last sacrifice on the altar
of my country. It was not possible that I leave the Government in
criminal hands; in the hands of those who had dealt a fatal blow to the
credit of the Republic and the good name of the Cuban people. The
conscience of a superior duty, one of those duties which cause the heart
to bleed and give rise to unpopularity and hate, imposed upon me as
the only measure of salvation, the necessity of acquainting the Washington Government with the true situation of the country, and with the
lack of means of my Government to give protection to property, and
to say that I considered that an occasion had arisen for the United
States to make use of the right granted them by the Platt Amendment.
I did so, consulting few people, since it was not a time to expose myself
to contradiction in order to seek partners in this responsibility, but to
assume the responsability [sic] entirely, with the firmness of a legitimate
conviction and the courage which always accompanies acts inspired in
the most sterling patriotism... I have never feared to admit, nor am
I afraid to say aloud, that a political dependence which assures us the
fecund boons of liberty is a hundred times preferable for our beloved
Cuba to a sovereign and independent republic discredited and made
miserable by the baneful action of periodic civil wars.""


" Quoted in Republic of Cuba, Re- from October 13th, 1906 to December
port of provisional administration 1st, 1907, pp. 12-15, at 13, 14, and 15.




216


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


A little nearer the event was a brilliant essay by Enrique
Jose Varona, published September 30.
"There has occurred in Cuba... precisely the contrary of what it
was reasonable to expect," said Varona... "The government of the
United States, acting through the illustrious delegates of its distinguished
President, after a very rapid investigation has sanctioned the complaints
of the insurrectionists of Cuba... and has proposed them as the basis
for an agreement to the government de jure of this republic. In a word,
the government of the United States has exacted of the government of
Cuba... that it abdicate before an armed insurrection."
Varona then went on in a calm and unimpassioned way to
account for this unexpected event, and decided that the
Cubans themselves were authors of their own misfortunes,
primarily because they had given too much attention to
politics and too little to a development by Cubans of the
economic possibilities of the island. In consequence, Cuba
was "a factory governed by Cubans and exploited by foreign capital." The one thing capital wanted was peace,
for the protection of its investments; it was not interested
in arguments about right and wrong. The insurrectionists
had discovered the Cuban "heel of Achilles" in their ability
to destroy foreign property. The avoidance of any such
contingency was the real basis for the decision of the American commissioners.26
It cannot be denied that there was not a little warrant
for this point of view. Roosevelt and Taft were certainly
J much concerned, and properly so, over the protection of
foreign property. There was a moment when charges were
being bandied about in the American press that business
interests had provoked the outbreak, with the idea of forcing
intervention and possibly annexation. Roosevelt directed
Taft to enquire into that. There was no basis for these
' Varona, Enrique Jose, El talon de  Sept. 30, 1906.
Aquiles, in Figaro, v. XXII, p. 490;




THE REVOLUTION OF AUGUST


217


charges, however. Foreign capitalists would indeed have
preferred American control, but the immediate certainty of
ruin in an insurrection found no palliative in the roseate
prospect of the general good under an American government
of the future,-after their particular properties had been
destroyed. That is equally as true today as it undoubtedly
was in 1906. Once the revolt began, business men wanted
intervention as soon as possible, but were afraid to speak
in a loud voice, as their estates were at the mercy of the
contending factions. In this connection it should be borne
in mind that American business men in Cuba by no means
occupied a position by themselves. As Martinez Ortiz points
out, it is almost certain that European insistence would have
compelled American intervention sooner or later, for the
interests of Europeans were imperilled, equally with those
of Americans; so the United States would either have been
obliged to drop the Monroe Doctrine to let Europe come
in, or else go in herself. It would be interesting to know
just how much pressure was brought to bear, especially
by England and Germany. Certainly Secretary of State
Root referred very pointedly to this factor in a conversation with General Rius Rivera in the fall of 1906, and
President Roosevelt's annual message on December 4 remarked that the representatives of foreign countries might
have asked their governments for an armed intervention
if the United States had not taken it uponr herself to act.
It should be remembered, too, that this was before the
World War, when the relative position of the United States
was very different from what it has since become; the
United States was not nearly so free to do as she pleased
in 1906 as she might be today.
The foreigners, whether American or European, were not
alone in desiring intervention. It is probable that most




218        A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
wealthy Cubans at that time and very likely the small
merchants and regular business employes would have preferred, above everything else, annexation to the United
States. That was not true of the politicians, as a rule,
but Taft several times spoke of the Moderates,-many of
them certainly,-as eager for annexation. With respect to
them he may have been deceived, through an imperfect
understanding of Hispanic character. More likely what
they really wanted was to keep their opponents from victory at all costs. Even at the sacrifice of their country?
Yes, in Hispanic America. There is a Spanish refrain which
runs as follows:
"En Espafia con gusto quedamos ciegos,
Si le saltan un ojo al compafiero."
Freely rendered, this might be translated "In Spain we
gladly become blind, if we can get one eye of our opponent."
There is a lot of Hispanic character in that, and it applies
in Cuba,-and to Liberals, Moderates, or any group.     As
for the masses, they hardly knew what they did stand for,
and did not comprehend it if they did. They were instinctively for free Cuba, but they were also for Gomez, for
insurrection, for anything! They could not grasp consequences. They could only feel.
To sum up, the more stable elements in Cuban society,
both native and foreign, objected first of all to the outbreak
of the war. Once it began, they hoped that the United
States would stand by the existing order, strengthening the
hands of the Estrada Palma administration, and they still
criticize Taft and Bacon for not doing so.27   When that
"There were many contemporary cism, see Barbarrosa, 88. The writer
articles in Cuban, American, and also has a number of statements from
European periodicals to this effect. men who continue to hold that
For a somewhat violent Cuban criti- opinion.




THE REVOLUTION OF AUGUST


219


procedure was not taken, they wanted intervention, and
many would have preferred to have it permanent. Under
the same circumstances today, the United States would almost certainly uphold the de jure government, as was done
by Wilson in 1917 and by Coolidge in 1924, because it has
been discovered that that is the simplest way to avoid complications, while serving also to check civil war. Whether
such a course is morally right is not the question here;
on that score the writer has some doubt. But in 1906 the
problem of Cuban insurrection, under the republic, was
unfamiliar. Indeed, the United States was just experimenting with a new Caribbean policy growing out of the
building of the Panama Canal. It was a normal and an
honest thing to do to send the Taft mission. And, once
on the ground, it was difficult for the commissioners to
take any other position than they did.  If the enquiry
had never begun, the United States might have supported
a guilty government, as she did in 1917 and 1924, but not
after she had taken cognizance of wrongs. It is sometimes
said that the circumstances were different in 1906, because
the Cuban government formally invited intervention, which
later governments did not d6. That is true, but the fact is
overlooked that the invitation was not accepted. Every
effort was made to keep the Taft mission from having the
appearance of an intervention. Taft himself said that
Roosevelt "ignored" Estrada Palma's request.28 When the
intervention came, with the proclamation of September 29,
it came, not as a result of official request, but because there
was no Cuban government at all. The defect, if any, was
cured by the general acceptance with which the sending
of the commissioners and the declaration of the interven"Taft to Roosevelt, Sept. 28, 1906, 483.
in Taft and Bacon, Report, in Op. cit.,




220       A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
tion were received by all factions in Cuba. In fine, the
Taft mission ended the civil war. It did not do anything
else,-except to provide a valuable lesson for the future.
One other matter remains to be discussed. What became of Estrada Palma?  Is it true that he had "compromised his fame"? The writer thinks not, and is inclined
to regard him as greater in adversity than even at the height
of his power. Don Tomas went to his downfall, without
rancor or recriminations. He praised the Taft proclamation of September 29, and said it was the only possible
solution under the circumstances. When he prepared to
leave the palace and go to Matanzas, Taft offered him a
battleship, which Estrada Palma declined in a simple and
gracious note. It was not in keeping with the modesty
or dignity of this man that he should have accepted any
such conveyance. On October 2 he and his family took
the train for Matanzas. A little over four years earlier he
had come to Havana amidst the plaudits of the nation.
Now he left with hardly anybody to bid him good-bye. Estrada Palma did not complain. There was no bitterness in
this man. There was none in his already quoted letter of
October 10. In fact, in all his life one finds nothing that
was mean or unlovely to detract from the beautiful and
unselfish idealism of his character. Early in the Ten Years'
War his mother was captured by some Spanish soldiery who
treated her in such a brutal and inhuman manner as to cause
her death. Shortly afterward, the Cuban force to which
Estrada Palma belonged captured some Spanish volunteers.
They were about to be put to death, when Estrada Palma
interceded for them. Reminded of the barbarous way in
which the Spaniards had treated his mother, he replied:




THE REVOLUTION OF AUGUST


221


"The memory of my mother is too sacred for me to stain it with a
sentiment of vengeance." '
There was nothing of the "eye for an eye"-or even "two
eyes for one"-in that!     Indeed, Estrada Palma always carried around with him, to the moment of his death, a handkerchief of his mother's that was bound around her head
at the time the body was discovered. He regarded it as a
sacred relic.30  It was this same Estrada Palma who accepted a loss of all his property after the Ten Years' War,
rather than sacrifice his principles. As he put it himself,
"Presently came the Revolution of Yara, and all my property was
embargoed, I being the only Cuban whose estates were not returned by
the Spaniards, for they exacted from me as a condition precedent that I
should adhere to the pact of Zanj6n or return to the island, and I was
never disposed to accept such terms, for it seemed to me lacking in
decorum that I who had been taken prisoner while President of our
revolutionary government should for material reasons submit myself
again to the government of Spain." 
On the other hand, once he began to earn a little money as
proprietor of the Central Valley School, he mortgaged his
house at that place in order to contribute to the funds for
the revolution of 1895.32
Estrada Palma's stay in Matanzas was comparatively
short. Soon he took his way back to the old home at Bayamo
in Oriente, for with the winning of independence his estates
had been restored to him. There he lived in the utmost
poverty, but uncomplaining still. The following excerpts
are from letters he wrote to a friend, Jorge Alfredo Belt,
"Cruz, Carlos Maria de la, H'echos in Velasco, 11-24, at 12.
hist6ricos de la vida de don Tomas  " Estrada Palma to Jorge Alfredo
Estrada Palma, in Velasco, 107-119, Belt, July 5, 1908, quoted in Cruz, Op.
at 109-110.                      cit., in Velasco, 107-119, at 113-114.
o Tomas Estrada Palma: para la  a"Cruz, Op. cit., in Velasco, 107-119,
historia, in Ct"ha, Nov. 4, 1909, quoted at 117.




222


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


who had been his private secretary during all his presidency.
In one of these, dated August 29, 1907, after explaining his
failure to finish a letter to Belt that he had begun before,
he went on:
"In truth the conditions to which I see my family submitted are so
hard and my economic problem is so serious that I need to employ all
the effort of a strong will in order not to give up in the struggle I am
obliged to sustain with the difficulties of an unfavorable situation, which,
without my being able to foresee it, was awaiting me in the last years
of my life... It will be enough to tell you that I have seen with
anxiety that the only funds on which I have been able to count were
diminishing rapidly, those proceeding from the sale of my house at
Central Valley, for as there is no demand for cattle, I have had to put
hands on that money in order to perform work and labor of an unavoidable character at this estate, which has been so long uncared for.""
Again, on September 1, 1907:
"For my part, if it were not for the fears which my pecuniary problem
occasion me and my seeing my wife and children deprived even of
those simple comforts of a modest position, I assure you that I would
consider all the aspirations of my life realized." 
And this, most touching of all, on October 3, 1907:
"When I see my wife obliged to get up very early to prepare the coffee
for the family,... when I see my daughters doing all the interior work
of the house, including that of sweeping and washing the floors, when
I consider that Cubans of a very modest position support their children
in schools inside or outside the island and that for me it is not possible
to do so, since I have to keep my two youngest boys at my side, for
lack of means with which to send them to get a professional education,
however modest it may be,-when I contemplate all this I ask myself:
what crime have I committed, or what is the sin, in punishment of which,
despite my having worked all my life, I find myself at the end of it, when
the weight of years is bending my body upon the sepulchre, I find myself,
I say, in such a precarious and difficult situation?""
" Quoted in Velasco, 47-48.    even modest circumstances not to
"Ibid., 48.                    have servants to do menial labor, for
" Quoted in Ibid., 50. In this con- the cost of house service is extraornection it must be borne in mind that dinarily little.
in Cuba it is unusual for families of




THE REVOLUTION OF AUGUST


223


There are more letters of the same sort. But the above
are enough. On November 4, 1908, at 11.45 at night, Tomas
Estrada Palma died at Santiago. On the 6th as his body
was about to be covered with earth Colonel Rafael Manduley del Rio, governor of Oriente, pronounced these words:
"The man whom we leave here, like every human being, had defects
and virtues; like every human being, he made mistakes. But his defects
and mistakes were as nothing compared with those virtues which he
demonstrated as a loving son, faithful husband, affectionate father, and
exemplary citizen. If he was a model in his private life, he was a model
also in his honored public life; that is the mirror in which all Cubans
ought to look, those that hear me and all the generations of those to
come." N
Though it is a pity to say it, Estrada Palma died just
in time,-only a few months before the end of the American
provisional government. Governor Magoon forthwith issued
a decree, on November 7, 1908, granting a pension of five
thousand dollars a year to his widow and fifty dollars a
month to each of his minor children (two daughters and two
sons) until they should reach their majority.37 It is more
than doubtful whether the dire straits in which his family
found itself would have been relieved if the Liberal government that went into office the following January had then
been   in  power.    Indeed, Liberal vindictiveness against
Estrada Palma for a time pursued him with relentless fury,
seeming all the more ignoble by comparison with the gentle
virtues of the fallen Don Tomas. Just prior to his death hostile politicians were encouraging squatters to settle upon his
lands, to despoil him of what he had.38 Even toward the
dead they showed their spite. The first issue of stamps of
Quoted in Tomas Estrada Palma: Belt, July 5, 1908, quoted in Honpara la historia, in Cuba, Nov. 4, 1909, rando al caido: palabras de Estrada
in Velasco, 11-24, at 20-21.    Palma, in Discusisn, Nov. 4, 1910, in
"Decree in Velasco, 87.        Velasco, 43-54, at 50-51.
"Estrada Palma to Jorge Alfredo




224


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


the G6mez era, 1909-1913, bore no effigy of Don Tomas.89
The oil portrait of the former President was taken down and
put in a corner, though in 1911 Sanguily, then in the Cabinet,
had the grace to restore it to its place.40  Perhaps the most
striking incident of this sort took place on the first anniversary of Estrada Palma's death. On November 4, 1909, a
group of students went to the palace to request President
G6mez to fly the flag at half mast, out of respect for Estrada
Palma. They failed to see the President, but did have some
conversation with Orestes Ferrara.     Ferrara is a man of
whom much good may be said, but not always. This was
one of the times when he did not show at his best, reviling
the first President before those who had come to do him
honor. Thereupon, the students of the high school (instituto) and university went on strike, absenting themselves
from classes out of protest against the words of Ferrara. On
the 8th Ferrara withdrew them, and the students went back
to work.41
One writer has said that Don Tomas just missed being
the Washington of his country. But did he?       Cuba today
has not yet progressed far enough to appreciate a man of
Estrada Palma's stamp. If the republic is to last, however,
it must have more men after the model of this fine figure,
worthy to stand beside the great men of all countries in all
times. If Cuba lives, Estrada Palma may yet be acclaimed
her Washington,-or her Estrada Palma, which is quite
enough.42
"Velasco, 39-41, 95-97, quoting  "As usually happens in the case of
newspaper items of Prensa, Mar. 12, events that attract widespread atten1910, and Cuba, Sept. 27 and Sept. tion, especially where some element
28, 1909.                      of controversy is involved, there is a
"Velasco, 44, n. 51.          vast literature on the subject of the
'Velasco, 25-30, quoting newspaper elections of 1905 and their sequel, the
items in Prensa, Nov. 7 and Nov. 9, revolution of 1906. Naturally, the
1909.                          invaluable Trelles is replete with




THE REVOLUTION OF AUGUST


225


items. Perhaps no one thing is quite
satisfactory, however. By all odds the
best and fullest account, despite a not
too marked Liberal leaning, is the already oft-cited Martinez Ortiz (v. II).
Easily next in rank is the Taft and
Bacon Report concerning their findings and experiences in Cuba in 1906.
One of the best features of the Report is its inclusion of the correspondence of the commissioners and other
useful contemporary evidences. It is
at least mildly hostile to Estrada
Palma and the Moderates, presumably because the commissioners' advice to them was not taken. It also
omitted "a few sentences containing
expressions of opinion regarding persons and things which it is not wise
or prudent at this time... to make
public." The correspondence between
Roosevelt and Taft has an interest
all its own, reflecting the different
temperaments of those two gentlemen, quite apart from Cuban history.
Velasco, Estrada Palma, was exceedingly useful on isolated phases of Es

trada Palma's career, and is quite well
done on the score of technique, making a good showing of authorities.
Barbarrosa, El proceso de la republica, is useful, but inclined to endless
objection and extravagance.   This
confines itself mainly to the problems
of Cuban agriculture. Collazo, Cuba
intervenida, is a Liberal pamphlet,
containing several essays on this
period, to explain why the intervention came. It is so violent and extreme that it is more interesting as a
study in Cuban political psychology
than as a basis for the epoch of which
it treats. There is an abundance of
articles in American periodicals for
the events of 1905-1906, but few of
them  are particularly useful, except
as a reflection of American opinion.
Several Cuban articles, however, are
somewhat more important. Naturally,
the public documents of Cuba and
the United States have much worthwhile material. These years still need
further study.




CHAPTER X


THE MAGOON ADMINISTRATION, 1906-1909
THE republic did not cease to exist with the publication
of Taft's proclamation of September 29, 1906. That document made it clear that the country was to have a Cuban
government, under the Cuban flag, though temporarily in
the hands of the United States. The action of the United
States met with very nearly unanimous approval; it was
obvious that it had been undertaken, not in response to the
much vaunted "Yankee imperialism," but unwillingly, and
it promised a respite from strife and insecurity. If there
were criticisms, they were for the failure to back the Estrada
Palma government, or else because the United States would
not take over a more thoroughgoing control than she proposed to do under the terms of the Taft proclamation. On
this score the following from a Spanish journal, El Pais of
Madrid, is interesting:
"As Spaniards we smart from the wounds once inflicted on us by
the Yankees... Now, however, their intervention in the case of Cuba
seems worthy of applause. If Cuba be annexed to the United States as
an autonomous State peace will be safeguarded there and progress
guaranteed." 
This accurately represented the sentiments of the thousands
of Spaniards in Cuba, who were pro-United States, not from
any love of the northern republic, but because they wanted
peace for the sake of business. Others of the property-owning, tax-paying class, whether Cubans or foreigners, felt
Quoted in How intervention was of reviews, v. XXXIV, pp. 530-532, at
brought about, in American review 531; Nov., 1906.
226




THE MAGOON ADMINISTRATION, 1906-1909


227


the same way, though not disposed to give public expression
of their views, from fear of violence when, or if, the United
States should withdraw.2 Even the politicians were not unhappy over the turn of affairs, for it had not cost the country
its independence and was believed to be the best way out
of a bad situation. The Liberals felt that they could make
capital out of it by charging it to the Moderates, while the
latter were "always in favor of intervention... though
they had sought to escape responsibility for it." 3
For the time being, Taft acted as governor, and busied
himself in solving the more immediate problems connected
with the reestablishment of order. Two thousand United
States marines were landed at once, and stationed most of
them at Camp Columbia, seven miles west of the centre
of Havana. A little later, 5600 men under General James
Franklin Bell disembarked at the capital, and were distributed to various parts of the island. It was the plan to
employ them "as a background to give confidence," using
the rural guards for the suppression of disorder. The most
pressing thing Taft had to settle concerned disarming and
disbanding the insurrectionist forces and the no less difficult
task of discharging the national militia, which in some instances was "even more unruly and less disciplined than
the insurgents."  For the latter, the revolutionary committee agreed that they should lay down their arms, restore
any property they had taken, and return to their homes,
on the understanding that the United States provisional
government would carry out the settlement that Taft and
Bacon had suggesed, in so far as it might now be applicable
under the changed conditions. The disarming program was
'Cf. Weightman, Richard Coxe,  'Taft and Bacon, Report, in U. S.,
Cuba's American governor, in Amer- 59th Cong., 2d sess. (1906-1907), ser.
ican review of reviews, v. XXXIV, no. 5105, House Docs., 465.
Pp. 556-559, at 559; Nov., 1906.




228


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


"a ticklish business," but was well in hand in the course of
two weeks. Only one serious hitch developed, and that had
to do with the surrender of the "property which was taken
by them for military purposes," or, as Taft said, "substantially only the horses."
Even the most prominent leaders of the insurrectionists
had sanctioned the appropriation of horses wherever they
might be found. When it came to restoring them, the authorities ran into the difficulty of proving ownership, as well
as the very evident desire of the possessors to retain them
for themselves. So it was decided to let each man in the
insurgent forces take his horse back home, with a certificate
describing the animal and showing his right to keep it until
the owner should establish his claim. The certificates, however, were allowed to read in Spanish as if title were vested
in the temporary holders, and the men of the Constitutionalist forces so understood them. Taft claimed that
General Frederick Funston, one of his aides, was responsible
for this mistake, though adding with somewhat less enthusiasm that he himself was "to blame for not exercising
closer supervision." It was decided that the men should
keep the horses, leaving owners to get damages from the
government. This may have been the only practicable solution, but it certainly had very little to commend it. It has
been considered as putting the stamp of official approval on
an orgy of horse-stealing. Martinez Ortiz says that "many
young men of good society" afterward went prancing around
on fine steeds which they had taken from some poor farmers
who had not joined the government forces in the conflict or
had perhaps even voted the Liberal ticket. As for Funston,
he was immediately relieved, and it was believed by many
that it was because of his handling of this affair. Still others
describe the whole incident as indicative of a too great in



THE MAGOON ADMINISTRATION, 1906-1909


229


clination on the part of Taft himself to appease the revolutionists. At any rate, whether necessary or not, it avoided
one pregnant possibility of trouble.
Taft released all political prisoners on the day of his
proclamation, and followed this up a few days later with an
amnesty for crimes committed in connection with the revolt.
The Liberals had wished to exclude those responsible for
the death of Villuendas, and the Moderates could not forgive
the Liberals implicated in the attack on the rural guards at
Guanabacoa, but Taft made no exceptions. Still another
pressing matter came up over the distribution of political
patronage. The insurrectionist leaders wanted Taft to put
Moderates out of office and replace them with Liberals, but
they were advised "that it was not the intention of the
provisional government to oust faithful public servants to
make places for Liberals," but were assured that Liberals
would be preferred whenever vacancies occurred, "until an
equality was restored" in the number of jobs held.
With the principal features of the immediate settlement
now out of the way, Taft was called back to Washington.
Meanwhile, a new governor had been selected in the person
of Charles Edward Magoon. Several names were proposed,
and in Cuba it was hoped that General Wood might be
designated, but Martinez Ortiz says that Taft swung the
balance in favor of Magoon. Magoon arrived on October
9, and on the 13th formally took over the government,
issuing a proclamation in which he announced that he would
strictly adhere to the policy of Secretary Taft, bringing about
"the restoration of the ordinary agencies and methods of
government under the... Cuban Constitution" as soon
as might be practicable. A further assurance that Magoon
would follow the course that Taft had laid down was provided in that he was made subject to the United States Sec



230


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


retary of War, an office that Taft continued to hold, although affairs in Cuba were to be conducted as for a civil
rather than a military government.
Magoon was to rule Cuba until the end of the intervention,
in January 1909. No man in the history of the republic
has been so universally condemned. The following is a
sample comment of a type one frequently finds in Cuban
writings:
"Magoon is a magnificent example of Yankee honor: gross in type,
rude of manners, of a profound ambition, avid of constant rapines. He
falls like a buzzard on the treasury of Cuba and devours it. He falls like
a hurricane of administrative immorality upon everything and infects it
all; he is a Jew who fondles gold like a sweetheart."'
This is obviously more a reflection on the author-and indeed on the Cuban people who read such "stuff," since the
above is by no means unique-than it is on Magoon.             A
similar characterization, with slightly more point and a
touch of rough humor, is the following in an item entitled
"Portrait of Mr. Magoon":
"Intellectually: a star without light. As an orator, ordinary; as a
lawyer, the only suit he knew how to win in Cuba, with the assistance of
politicians in Washington, was that of the millions of Estrada Palma
accumulated in the treasury.
Morally: a man of wax. Pliant and amiable with all. Nevertheless,
he was an astute diplomat and a waster of the money of the republic.
Sober and simple in his habits, at times he liked tobacco and champagne.
Physically: a merchant of Broadway, New York. Tall and fat, with
a massive abdomen. Small eyes, a pleasant smile, and a round face like
a California apple.
The favorite pleasures of Mr. Magoon while he filled the post of
provisional governor of Cuba were a good table for his friends, drives in
an automobile in the morning, and a shower-bath at night." 
Even the more serious-minded Cuban writers attack Ma'Lozano Casado, 17. There was worse the farther it went.
still more to this statement, and it got  6 Barbarrosa, 88-89




THE MAGOON ADMINISTRATION, 1906-1909              231
goon. Varona says it was Magoon "who began to write
the annals of the dilapidations of the Cuban treasury." C
Trelles condemns him    without reserve,7 and Martinez Ortiz
weighs him in the balance and finds him wanting, though
with that fairness so characteristic of him he gives praise
for some of the achievements of the Magoon administration
and says that Magoon may not have taken a single cent for
himself from   the public funds.8   A still more serious thing
is that the charges have gotten into the Cuban school-books,
and are being taught as part and parcel of the "patriotism"
ordinarily inflicted on the infant mind in all countries. One
such item is the following:
"The government of Mr. Magoon was very wasteful. He not only
expended the whole public income each year, but he also spent twelve
million dollars which he found in the treasury that had been economized
by Don Tomas. Mr. Magoon was prodigal with pardons, and although
he attended to the development of public works these were often not
completed in due form. The administration of Mr. Magoon left a bad
memory and a bad example in the country."'
This is in a book in which but twelve pages are devoted to
the period of the republic and in which the somewhat notorious grafting of the G6mez era (1909-1913) gets but a line
of gentle censure, as an addendum to much praise, and other
Cuban administrations are treated in laudatory fashion, with
[the "soft pedal" on criticism.1' Similar statements are made,,not only by other Cubans, but also by Americans and foreigners in general.   But the surprising thing is that upon
6Varona, Enrique Jose, Discurso  'Guerra y Sanchez, Historia eleleido... la noche del 22 de diciemr mental de Cuba, 243-244.
bre de 1921, in Academia nacional de  " Incidentally, the Cuban schoolartes y letras, v. VI, pp. 239-246, at children who read this book are
240.                             taught that the Platt Amendment was
7For example, in Trelles, Carlos "contrary to what had been agreed
Manuel, El progreso (1902 a 1905) y upon in the Joint Resolution of the
el retroceso (1906 a 1922) de la re- Congress of the United States of
publica de Cuba, 8-9.            April 19, 1898." Ibid., 239.
'Martinez Ortiz, II, 847-857.




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A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


investigation the charges are not borne out by the facts.
Like all governments, that of Magoon had its critics who
may have been right in questioning its policies, but two
things come out for the student who will look beneath the
surface: Magoon was an honest man; and as provisional
governor of Cuba he merely reflected Secretary Taft, whose
honesty, certainly, will not be impugned by anybody of
ordinary mental balance.
The evidence in proof of Magoon's honesty is too bulky a
file for insertion here, but the main facts may be set forth
briefly. Charles E. Magoon was born in 1861 in Steele
County, Minnesota. His family was like a million others
in middle-class American life,-sound and wholesome, but
in modest circumstances financially. Magoon, however, attended the University of Nebraska, and presently became a
lawyer at Lincoln, the capital of that state. In conjunction
with a Mr. J. W. McDonald he engaged extensively in real
estate transactions, and accumulated a fortune of approximately a hundred thousand dollars. Magoon was primarily
a law student, interested more in legal abstractions than
in the direct practice of his profession, however. So in 1899
he accepted a somewhat obscure position as a law clerk in
one of the subordinate divisions of the War Department in
Washington. His knowledge of law soon attracted the attention of Elihu Root, then Secretary of War, who put him
to work reconciling the emergencies of the United States
military rule in Cuba with the Spanish legal system there.
He handled the same problem in connection with the Philippines, and published his findings in 1902 in a bulky volume
entitled Report on the law of civil government in territory
subject to military occupation by the military forces of the
United States. His success in these tasks seemed to fit him
for employment in United States relations with Hispanic




THE MAGOON ADMINISTRATION, 1906-1909


233


American peoples, and consequently he was appointed governor of the Panama Canal Zone in 1905. In 1906 he was
about to be sent to the Philippines as legal aide of the American governor, when the Cuban situation arose. Magoon
seemed to be just the man that was required. It was expected at the time that some purely legal questions had to
be solved, such as those of the proposed electoral and municipal laws, after which there would be an early withdrawal
of United States rule. Perhaps no man in America was better acquainted with Cuban law at this time than Charles
E. Magoon.
Magoon's private fortune must still have been about the
same as it was when he left Lincoln. In 1904 he made a
will, in which he left property worth approximately a hundred thousand dollars. As governor of Cuba he was painstakingly, almost picayunishly, honest in his handling of all
funds for his personal use. On a salary of $1400 a month, he
saved about ten thousand dollars for the twenty-seven
months of his stay. He also bought two hundred shares of
Havana Electric Railway common stock, then selling at
about fifteen, but since become a valuable property. That
was all he ever acquired in Cuba, and every penny was
legitimate. In all the thousands of charges against Magoon,
not one has ever been proved; indeed, the writer has yet
to run across a single specific charge of dishonest action on
the part of Magoon. After his departure from Cuba, Magoon lived until his death in Washington. Cuban writers
point to the fact that he was never again employed in the
United States service, making much of Taft's failure to give
him an official post when he became President in 1909.
While it is true in a certain sense that Taft "abandoned"
Magoon, it was not for the reasons ascribed. He had not
been attached to any regular organization, such as the army




234


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


or the diplomatic corps; so there was no reason to employ
him unless his services were desired. On the other hand,
there was a very good reason for not employing him, in that
his health had become impaired. He had become very stout,
and was no longer fit for much active effort. So he lived
in Washington in the most simple and inexpensive way.
Indeed, far from enjoying any ill-gotten spoil from his career
as governor of Cuba, he did not have enough income to live
on. He felt that he could not resume the practice of law,
but received substantial help from an old-time friend, Robert
J. Flick of Kansas City, Missouri, whom Magoon and his
mother had taken in hand as a youth and given a start to
which Flick ascribed whatever he had "grown to be." When
Magoon died in 1920, he left an estate of $86,595.04,-or
less than he had when he went to Cuba.
The writer has numerous statements contributing to the
defence of Magoon's name, a number of them from men of
established reputation such as General Pershing, General
Crowder, and (as a representative Cuban who can speak
from first-hand knowledge) Manuel Landa, the last-named
Acting Head of the Department of Justice during Magoon's
rule and now President of the Civil Section of the Audiencia
(or Superior Court) of Havana. Other equally well known
men have contributed statements, but do not care to appear
in a controversy, while still others who lack outstanding fame
have, nevertheless, given important evidence. It may be
well to leave this topic with a brief quotation from a letter
of General Pershing, written in a burst of indignation when
he was informed that a certain "professor" was "attacking"
the name of Charles E. Magoon.ll  In this connection it
UThe "professor" was at that time seemed to be some very damaging
in the midst of the anti-Magoon cur- evidence, later disproved.
rent, and had just received what




THE MAGOON ADMINISTRATION, 1906-1909


235


should be borne in mind that Pershing and Magoon grew
up together, and were something like "chums" during all
their life, keeping up an intimate correspondence. General
Pershing's letter follows:
"I am horrified at what you say with reference to these insinuations
about Magoon... I suppose I knew Charlie about as well as did any
of his friends, and I know as well as I know anything that he was as
honest as the day is long. So far as his having a fortune upon retirement
from the Governorship is concerned, he accumulated whatever he had,
long before he went to Cuba, and as I remember it before he came to
Washington. He was always thrifty and dealt to a certain extent in
real estate, and I know that on one occasion he made something between
$80,000 and $100,000 on one deal with a friend of his who is
now dead. So all of this is unfair, unjust and untrue... The whole
thing makes me very furious, as I know of no man who was a more
sincere friend and patriot, or more devoted to the service of his country
than was Governor Magoon, and I do not believe that he was ever
capable of doing a dishonest thing."1'
The fact that Magoon was honest does not mean necessarily
that he was a great man or that the provisional government
is to be defended on every score. Nevertheless, it was responsible for a very considerable achievement, and its shortcomings were due more to policies in Washington than to any
fault of Magoon, though it is also probably true that the
combination of Elihu Root and Leonard Wood would have
been more successful. The story of Taft's abandoning Magoon on account of the latter's bad record is the more unreasonable because Taft as Secretary of War was about as
much the real governor of Cuba as was Magoon. Magoon
was not a natural leader and administrator like Wood; he
was, rather, the hard-working clerk who tries faithfully to
execute superior orders, without much initiative of his own.
Magoon and Taft were in constant communication, not only
by correspondence, but also through three trips of Magoon
"Pershing to Crowder, Sept. 16, character of the above, written with1924. General Pershing later offered out thought of publication (for which
to prepare a more formal and detailed consent was later secured), appeals
statement, but the obviously genuine to the writer as more suitable here.




236


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


to Washington and one visit of Taft in Havana.        If there
was anything radically the matter with Magoon's administration Taft did not have to wait until 1909 to find it out.
The program of the provisional government was that
which Taft had devised before he left Cuba in 1906. It was
a good program, but two things prevented it from working
out to the best advantage. In the first place, it was not possible in the short period of rule of the intervention authorities to overcome evils that were so deep-rooted as to be
traditional. And in the second place, it is probable that too
mild and ingratiating a policy was pursued. Why this course
was taken, if the assumption that it was is correct, cannot
be asserted positively. The obvious defence would be that
it was advisable, to smooth over the differences that had developed from the revolution of 1906. It will be recognized
by most Hispanic American students, however, that it was,
perhaps, not the best calculated to produce an enduring
achievement in Cuba. Cubans, like many Hispanic American peoples, respect and respond to authority much more
certainly than they do to soft-handed kindliness.13
The main tenet in the program of the provisional government was that of holding an honest election and turning the
island back to its people as soon as possible. This involved
much else. As Taft and Bacon said in their report to President Roosevelt:
"We thought that it would be wise to have a commission, consisting
of an equal number of Moderates and Liberals, with at least one
American on it, to prepare needed laws on the subject of municipalities,
elections, independence of the judiciary, and the classified civil service,
according to the merit system, so that these laws might be enforced and
adopted by Congress, as a matter of course and of previous agreement
after they had been settled by the commission." 1
" For an interesting statement sug- aspirations for the presidency, see
gesting that the Taft-Bacon compro- Wright, 181-185, 191-192.
mise and the policy of the Magoon  "Taft and Bacon, Report, in Op.
government were based on Taft's cit., 461.




THE MAGOON ADMINISTRATION, 1906-1909


237


This was virtually the platform of the Magoon government,
lying in the background of the establishment of the Advisory
Law Commission, which was responsible for much of the
best work of this period. Unfortunately, however, other conditions would not stand still and wait for the Commission
to complete its labors. Cuba had to be ruled in the meantime, and a great variety of economic and administrative
problems dealt with, if not solved. It may be well to take
up some of these first.
It is the habit of Cuban writers to tell of the twelve million
or the thirteen million or the twenty-five or twenty-six million that Don Tomas had saved, and then go on to say that
Magoon swallowed that sum, whatever it was, and all the
revenues, increased expenditures unnecessarily, and left an
enormous deficit.15 On the assumption of the government
by Taft there was in fact something less than fourteen millions in the treasury,16 but, of this, more than four million
was already pledged for specific purposes, and all of the rest
was affected by legislation of the Cuban Congress calling
for some $350,000 more than the entire fund. The acts of
Congress were mostly for much needed public works, for
which, it later proved, the amounts appropriated were entirely inadequate. For example, a number of roads and
bridges were authorized at an estimated cost of $20,286,500,
but the appropriation was only $4,879,609. In other words,
there was an actual deficit of considerable proportions, not a
surplus, in the Cuban treasury when the provisional government began, and it seemed at the outset as if this might be
vastly increased through an expected falling off in revenues
and an unavoidable jump in expenditures. One item that
For example, in Barbarrosa, 71-87. mits of the possibility that Magoon
Curiously enough, however, in one himself did not take any graft.
ordinarily so unbridled in his com-  ' Variously stated as $13,625,539.65,
ment, Barbarrosa several times ad- $13,775,186.44, and $13,848,747.16.




238


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


had to come out of the funds of the provisional government
was the settlement of the bill for the revolution of 1906.
This was estimated as of October 31, 1907, with most of
the amounts already known, as $8,634,116.64,-substantially
what it eventually proved to be. This was after a very considerable paring down of claims.17 In addition to claims
for damages, some of the other items in this bill were the
following: an increase in the rural guards from a complement of 3020 men to 5305, subsequently reduced, but only
to 5170 at the earnest solicitation of Cuban leaders, and
later raised to 5243; a small increase in the artillery force
which alone constituted the regular army; cost of the more
or less useless Estrada Palma militia (over two million and
a half); and various kinds of military equipment. This
failed to account for a number of items in the indirect cost
of the revolution. It did not include the transportation and
maintenance of the Army of Cuban Pacification, as the
American forces in Cuba were called. The mere rental of
quarters had passed $850,000 by October 1, 1908. Another
item was the additional cost involved in a bi-lingual government, requiring an expensive American officialdom and
numerous translators. All in all, it is probable that Cuba
paid at least ten million dollars to overthrow the Estrada
Palma government, which would have retired anyway some
four months later than the intervention came to an end.
The expense growing out of the revolution was by no
means the only extraordinary item that the Magoon government had to pay. There were a number of prior claims that
had accrued in earlier years, but for which Congress had
"TFor example, 15,027 claims for account of horses and mules carried
damage inflicted by the insurgent off by the insurgents. The total asked
forces were reduced from the $3,803,- was $653,027.20, with $296,508.84 al385.55 asked for to $1,389,827.39. In- lowed.
eluded in this were 6,557 claims on




THE MAGOON ADMINISTRATION, 1906-1909


239


made no appropriation, such, for example, as mail-carrying
contracts aggregating more than two hundred thousand dollars. A somewhat larger sum went into the purchase of certain properties from the church. These had been confiscated
by the Spanish government in 1842, and utilized for administrative purposes,-for the custom-house at Havana, the
Havana institute (or high school), and other public uses.
The church put in a claim for these properties during the
United States military rule which was allowed, but gave
options for their sale to the government. The Cuban Congress did not act on the options, despite the recommendations of Estrada Palma, but continued to occupy the properties. These were bought by the Magoon administration
for approximately a million and three-quarters. Cuban
writers denounce this as a virtual gift to the church, and
certainly it is improbable that any Cuban government would
have paid for them,-such is the hostility to the church,but the debt was an honest one. It may have been paid
with a too generous sense of fairness, but even that is doubtful. Among other extraordinary expenses were the following
considerable sums: an item of nearly four hundred thousand
dollars that had been voted by the Cuban Congress for certain needs of the provinces; nearly five hundred thousand
in the preparation of a census; and six hundred and fifty
thousand in connection with the elections for a Cuban
government.
And still this was not all. In October 1905 yellow fever
reappeared in Cuba, and due to the unsanitary condition
of the cities and towns and ineffective health administration
of the local authorities it became a serious problem by the
opening of the Magoon era. It was decided to have the
national government take entire charge of sanitation, which
involved an outlay of more than a million dollars extra a




240


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


year, as well as another million for the special work of
extirpating the disease. By February 1908 yellow fever had
again been banished from the island. An unforeseen and
expensive disaster turned up in the shape of unusually heavy
rains in October 1906, culminating in a cyclone on the 17th.
It caused a vast amount of damage to crops and forests and
also in the cities, involving a loss of millions. Bataban6 was
swept by a tidal wave. The schooner "Elvira" was thrown
high and dry on the reefs of the Malecon at Havana. This
also cost the government considerable sums in the work of
relief and repair, though the indirect expense to the country
was greater. Meanwhile, business conditions were very unfavorable. The revolution had impaired Cuba's credit, resulting in a call for payment of private indebtedness which
was accentuated by the financial stringency developing from
the world panic of 1907. This made it hard to finance the
Cuban crops, though the Magoon government eased over
the situation by lending five million dollars to Cuban banks
out of sums in the treasury. During these years, too, the
agricultural situation itself was bad. Despite the damage
from rain and cyclone the sugar crop of 1906 was heavy, but
the price was low. In 1907 there was a drought and a small
crop, though at a good price. The 1908 crop promised well,
but the G6mez administration was to reap the benefit from
that. The tobacco crop of 1907 did not "cure" rapidly, and
was of poorer quality than usual. It reached the market
just as the panic began, and therefore could not be sold.
Conditions in 1908 were again excellent for tobacco,-but
for G6mez, not Magoon.
Added to the above difficulties was the unpleasant aspect
of labor questions. The dry season, from November through
April, is the time when sugar is being harvested and there
is plenty of work for everybody. In the rainy season, May




THE MAGOON ADMINISTRATION, 1906-1909


241


through October, there is little to do in the sugar fields, and
then jobs are hard to find. The bad crop situation made
this a more than usually difficult period to handle. Magoon's
public works program responded in part to the necessity of
occupying what would have otherwise been a large idle class.
Trouble came, too, from those who did have jobs, but were
not satisfied with them. The propensity of the Cuban laborer to go on strike had frequent illustration in these years.
The cigar-makers started the ball a-rolling in February 1907,
with a demand for a ten per cent increase in wages. It was
not until August that the issue was settled, in favor of the
strikers. Then other strikes followed, galore. There were
strikes of railway employes, masons and others of the building trades, stevedores, cart-drivers, waiters, and cooks.
Naturally, these affairs were bad for business, to say nothing
of the violence connected with them. Spanish governments
of the past had handled strikes in military fashion, taking
the side of the employers, but it will be readily understood
that no American government would be likely to do that.
For one thing, there was the American labor vote to consider!
On the other hand, the requests of Cuban labor leaders for
deportation of strike-breakers were denied. Among yet
other bad business conditions that the Magoon government
had to face was a paralysis in the cattle industry. By the
close of 1908 the difficulties had been corrected, and a prosperous season was in sight.
In view of the foregoing it is not surprising that expenditures were more considerable than under the economical Don
Tomas. Cuban critics make a great point of this, but under
the circumstances the increase was not great. For the three
year period from July 1, 1906, to June 30, 1909, including the
exciting and expensive last months of Don Tomas and nearly
half a year of Jose Miguel, a total of about $121,000,000




242


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


was expended, or an average of about forty millions a year,
as against an average of about twenty-six millions in the
two fiscal years preceding July 1, 1906.18 This was not a bad
showing in comparison with the Estrada Palma era, and it
was much better than the average of any later administration. Furthermore, the sums expended paid for a great deal
more than the things that have been mentioned already, plus
the ordinary running expenses of government. In addition,
Magoon embarked upon a program of public works that was
admittedly greater than any which had been undertaken
before, though criticized on the score of imperfections in the
works themselves.
Unquestionably there was a need for improvement in the
means of communication, especially through the building of
roads, and also for other forms of public works. Railway
mileage was not great enough to take care of traffic, and
freights were high; the heavy rains made any roads but
good ones an expensive medium of communication; many
crops, especially in the case of tobacco (which found a favorable growing-place in the pockets of hills), were difficult of
access, except by roads; there were only 610 kilometres of
roads in the island,19 whereas the near-by island of Jamaica,
one-fifth the size of Cuba, had 10,113 kilometres; there were
at least forty good ports in the island, but only six were
serviceable for ocean-going vessels, and all needed dredging
or other improvements; many new public buildings were
required, while old ones called for repairs; other aids were
also much wanted. Furthermore, in addition to giving employment for constructing these things, it was hoped that
they would promote trade and commerce and tend to pre18The figures given here are taken  "9Of these, 256 were built under
from Guiral Moreno, Mario, Nuestros Spain, and the remainder by the
problemas politicos, econ6micos y United States military government or
sociales, in Cuba contempordnea, v. by Estrada Palma.
V, pp. 401-424, at 416-417; Aug., 1914.




THE MAGOON ADMINISTRATION, 1906-1909    243
serve public tranquillity. Indeed, without the roads the
country might be tied up any time by a railway strike, a
contingency that threatened the tobacco crop of 1907 for a
time.
A great many difficulties had to be overcome through lack
of proper equipment and personnel, but by August 1907 the
work was started. A little over a year later, on September
30, 1908, Magoon was able to report that 570 kilometres of
road had been completed (including 120 bridges), while 395
kilometres more were under construction, of which 195 would
be finished, making a total of 765, by the end of the intervention and the remainder by the end of the fiscal year on
June 30, 1909. Altogether, the provisional government had
by September 30, 1908, expended $13,361,406.70 on roads
and bridges, or 55.35 per cent of the entire amount devoted
to public works, and another $1,109,282.38, or 4.63 per cent,
on harbors, and $378,032.14, or 1.58 per cent, for lighthouses
and buoys. Not to go into detail on other matters, Magoon
increased the roads of Cuba 124.6 per cent above what they
were when he took charge, or 158 per cent if those left to be
completed in the first few months of the G6mez regime may
be included. The value of his work may be illustrated by
the case of a road which tapped the territory of seven sugar
estates in Matanzas. The cost of getting sugar to port was
reduced in this instance from ninety cents a bag to fifty.
Among other expenditures under the heading of public works
were $4,415,468.05 for sanitation, $2,033,724.81 for the construction, improvement, or repair of 156 government buildings, and $1,464,041.95 for water supply and drainage. In
addition to smaller sums for other purposes expended by the
Department of Public Works, some of the lesser matters were
taken care of by other departments,-for example, work on
hospitals, jails, and rural guard barracks in the Department




244


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


of Government. Much of the work was of the sort that
would be done by local governments in the United States,
but that was not possible on the existing basis of municipal
revenues in Cuba. It is worthy of note, too, that most of
the public works undertaken were in response to legislation
by Congress in the time of Estrada Palma. For example,
of the $22,958,659.36 expended in the Department of Public
Works, no less than eighty-eight per cent was based on congressional appropriations or on authorizations for services
for which inadequate sums were provided, leaving only
$1,660,506.41 worth due wholly to the initiative of the
provisional government.
Cuban writers admit the volume of Magoon's achievements in the realm of public works, but make numerous
charges tending to detract from any credit to him on account
of them. None of these are precise enough to merit attention, except that the works, more especially the roads, were
extravagantly but poorly constructed, and did not last. In
the absence of any better precise evidence concerning these
charges the following statement made to the writer by an
American who built one of the roads may be worth noting:
"The handling of road-building was in charge of Colonel W. M. Black,
who was absolutely honest. The trouble with the roads was that too
great an attempt was made to make a record for mileage. So, only
certain portions of the roads were really very good. The rest was left
for President G6mez to finish, but G6mez wished to make a record on
his own account, with the result that Magoon's roads were allowed to go
to rack and ruin. The newspapers charged vast corruption at that time
in connection with these roads, but I know personally that the charges
were untrue."
Magoon himself recognized that the roads would not last unless kept in repair, and he established what he intended to
be a permanent force for attending to the work. In Cuba,
however, "roads" is a word used like "patriotism" in many




THE MAGOON ADMINISTRATION, 1906-1909


245


countries as a purely political device. Unfortunately it is
to the advantage of a politician for his predecessor's roads
to be bad and for those built by himself to make a showing
in mileage and at least temporary serviceability. Magoon's
roads may have been good or they may have been poor, but
in either case they were doomed. Politics, plus heavy rains
and the narrow-tired, two-wheeled Cuban cart, were sure
sooner or later to account for them.
Obviously, since the Magoon government began with a
deficit it was necessary to pay for a large part of expenditures
out of revenues. Fortunately, and contrary to expectation,
receipts from the custom-house were greater than ever down
to February 1908, when the current set in the other way.
The large sugar crop of 1907 and the stimulus of the public
works program (through import of equipment and the free
spending of amounts earned in wages) were helpful factors,
as also was the considerable amount of travel to the island
in these years. The financial misfortunes of 1907, however,
when coupled with the political deterrent of a formal announcement of the intended withdrawal by the United States
not later than February 1909, at length overcame the prosperity of the custom-house. Nevertheless, by December 1,
1908, all works were paid for to November 1, 1908, and expenditures for the remaining months were ordered curtailed.
In his message to Congress of April 5, 1909, President Gomez
said that he found $2,809,479.08 in the treasury, with obligations amounting to $11,920,824.54, leaving a deficit of $9,111,345.46. Not all of this was chargeable to the provisional
government. There was one item of $1,613,019 on credits
granted by previous governments.20 Assuming that these
figures are correct and that the other debts had been incurred by the Magoon regime, it would mean a debit of some
o Mensajes presidenciales, I, 201.




246


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


seven millions and a half for which it was responsible, which
is a long way from the vast amounts usually tossed off lightly
by critics of Magoon as the deficit from his rule.21 Furthermore, it compared very favorably with the situation that
confronted the provisional government at the outset. An
expert accounting of the books of the Estrada Palma and
the Magoon administrations might even show that the latter
saved something, for the actual deficit with which it began
may well have been greater than the one it left. In any
event, the Magoon deficit meant little or nothing, for every
barometer of business life pointed clearly to an era of prosperity under Jose Miguel. And in the background of that
prosperity when it arrived were the achievements of the Magoon government, which overcame a series of financial ills
that in consequence were spared to the next administration.22
" Barbarrosa says in one place that  " For authorities on this chapter,
the deficit would perhaps be "seventy- see comment at the end of chapter
two million" and in another "nearly XI
seventy." Barbarrosa: 77; 84.




CHAPTER XI


THE RESTORATION OF CUBAN GOVERNMENT
THE criticisms of the Magoon government on financial
matters have very little foundation in fact. Its handling of
political questions may in some particulars be less worthy of
approval, but in certain of them it deserves unstinted praise.
Especially is this so in the field of legislation. The great
body of Cuban law consisted of'provisions enacted for the
Spanish peninsula, subsequently extended to Cuba, and
there modified by royal orders or by orders of the military
government of the United States or laws of the Cuban Congress. Most of it was monarchical in type and directly contrary to the spirit of the excessively liberal Cuban Constitution. The Cuban Congress, however, was too little informed
about legislative matters and too busy with political discussions to enact the supplementary laws that were needed
to give the Constitution its full effect.1 This failure of Congress was one of the important causes in the background of
the revolution of 1906, and it had to be remedied in certain
particulars before the government could be turned back to
the Cuban people. It was impossible to do the work through
the medium of the Cuban Congress, as Taft and Bacon had
gone on record to the effect that the rights of membership
of those elected in 1905 had been vitiated by fraud, and had
1For a general discussion of this department of state and justice, in
subject, see chapter XXI. An ad- Republic of Cuba, Report of provimirable statement of the legislative sional administration from October
problem of the Magoon government 13th, 1906 to December 1st, 1907, pp.
is Crowder, Enoch Herbert, Report of 119-139.
247




248


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


made the resignation of these men one of the tenets in their
peace compromise. That left but half a Congress,-not
enough for the legal quorum of two-thirds. So it was decided that the provisional government should dispense with
Congress. On December 3, 1906, Governor Magoon formally
vacated the places of the congressmen elected in 1905, and
took over responsibility for legislation himself. On December 24, 1906, Magoon appointed a body called the Advisory
Law Commission to make the necessary studies on legislative matters. It consisted of nine Cubans and three Americans, with Colonel Enoch Herbert Crowder as the presiding
officer.2 The achievements of the Commission were due primarily to Colonel Crowder, whose record as an indefatigable
worker is now well known. This was the man who was later
to raise the American army for the World War and who has
since become United States ambassador to Cuba. From this
time forward he was to play in important part in the affairs
of the republic. The Commission was charged with the duty
of preparing five laws suggested by Taft and Bacon, concerning elections, provinces, municipalities, the judiciary,
and the civil service, but it later proved necessary to enact
yet others.
Both the municipal and the provincial law of Cuba were
based on Spanish laws of 1878, with subsequent modifications which made no substantial change. As a result, a great
deal of confusion developed, for, while the Constitution provided for a most broad local self-government, the Spanish
law gave a supervisory control, amounting to centralization,
to the general authorities in Havana. Since Congress had
enacted no satisfactory legislation, the inconsistent Spanish
'Best known among the Cuban The other two Americans were Judge
members were Alfredo Zayas and Otto Schoenrich and Major Blanton
Juan Gualberto G6mez, the latter C. Winship.
being secretary of the commission.




THE RESTORATION OF CUBAN GOVERNMENT


249


law prevailed over the Constitution, and had been made use
of by the Estrada Palma administration. One of the difficulties over the municipal law came up in connection with
taxation. The municipalities lacked resources to enable
them to carry on functions ordinarily exercised by local governments in the United States. This was remedied to some
extent by opening up new avenues of income. On the other
hand, the excessively broad local autonomy that might have
been interpreted as granted by the Constitution was limited
by prescribing the exact forms of taxation which were to be
regarded as not in conflict with the tax system of the national government, with which the Constitution forbade the
municipalities to interfere. The inunicipal law was promulgated on May 29, 1908, and put in force on October 1st by a
decree of September 21. In this instance, as also in the case
of other laws, the Commission first published the document
to the country, afterward making some revisions in response
to criticisms and suggestions. As a supplement to the municipal law it was deemed necessary to prepare two other
laws. These two, the municipal tax law and the municipal
accounting law, were duly drafted, therefore, and put into
effect also as of October 1st by decrees of September 21.
The provincial law was a more difficult problem, for the
provincial government of the Constitution was really an
anomaly of Cuban life. There had been provinces under
Spain, but merely as administrative subdivisions of the central government. Furthermore, the municipalities answered
all the needs of local government, for they took in not only
the towns but also the surrounding country, much like an
American county. So with the national government on the
one side and the municipalities on the other, there was little
for the provincial governments to do. They voted appropriations for minor public works and a few scholarships, but




250


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


with the single exception of the province of Havana (where
the difference was very slight) more was expended on provincial salaries than on public works; for example, the total
budget of 1906-1907 for Pinar del Rio was $46,320, of which
$31,280 went in personnel, $5,000 in public works, and the
rest on scholarships! But the provincial governments were
in the Constitution; so about all the new law could do was
to cut down the excessive number of employes and reduce
the pay of provincial councillors to a per diem allowance.
This law also was promulgated on September 21, 1908, to
go into effect October 1st.
In preparing a judiciary law the Commission found that
it was so involved with other laws of the republic that there
was not time enough during the term of the intervention
to do much more than try to protect the courts from interference by the executive. The judicial system was based on
a Spanish law of 1891, which made the courts subordinate
to the governor-general, while the Constitution made them
independent. As Congress had neglected to legislate on the
matter, the republican government had followed the Spanish
law. Local affairs were involved, for the Constitution had
provided that disputes between municipalities or provinces
and the executive should be settled in the courts, but the
executive had overawed the judges. The new law endeavored
to correct this situation, and also provided for the intervention of the Supreme Court in appointments to lesser judicial
bodies above the rank of municipal court. Revisions of the
civil code, criminal code, code of civil procedure, code of
criminal procedure, and commercial code (based on Spanish
laws of 1889, 1879, 1885, 1889, and 1886) could not be completed, as experience in Porto Rico and the Philippines had
shown that many years would be needed for the work, but
some study of the subject was undertaken, and Colonel




THE RESTORATION OF CUBAN GOVERNMENT


251


Crowder recommended that the reestablishment of the republic should be under "adequate guarantees that this work.. shall be prosecuted to as speedy a conclusion as is possible." 3  Minus these desirable adjuncts, the judiciary law
was promulgated prior to the end of the intervention, on
January 27, 1909.
Among other important laws that were enacted, growing
out of the work of the Commission, was a civil service law
after the pattern of the one in the United States.4    A great
many laws were still needed, but the Commission had no
time to prepare them.5 The immense amount of labor that
went into the work of the Commission has been barely more
than hinted at here.     And unfortunately the careful provisions of the laws it made had later to be administered
by men to whom laws and the Constitution were as nothing
"among friends," in consequence of which the evils they were
designed to correct continued as before. It was worth something, however, to get the laws on the books.
The most important work of the Commission was considered to be the preparation of an election law, under which
elections could be held as a preliminary to bringing the intervention to an end. A law was drafted which aimed to meet
the various improper practices that had developed, as well
as to put into effect the provisions of the Constitution. Comment on the law need not be given here.6 It was ready by
December 30, 1907, but was first published for criticism, and
Crowder, Op. cit., in Republic of the executive power, a law of armed
Cuba, Op. cit., 139. These laws, how- forces, a drainageand irrigation law,
ever, have yet to be enacted. Cf. a telephone law, a notarial law, a
infra, pp. 515-520.             mortgage law, and a game law. Other
'For a list of the laws of this period laws of the Magoon era are listed in
in supplement to the Constitution Republic of Cuba, Report of prothat still survive, see infra, pp. 516-517. visional administration from DecemOther laws dating back to Spanish ber 1st, 1907 to December 1st, 1908,
times, but redrafted by the Commis- pp. 99-101.
sion and not put into effect or since  5 See infra, p. 517.
changed fundamentally were a law of  6 It is considered infra at pp. 568-574.




252


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


later promulgated on April 1, 1908. Following a trial of the
law in the provincial and municipal elections of August 1st,
it was modified and promulgated anew on September 11.
One of its main features was a careful registration of voters.
This involved the taking of a census in order to find out who
were entitled to vote. Under the direction of Victor Hugo
Olmstead, an American, the census was taken between September 30 and November 14, 1907. The work was very well
done, and by February 1908 the results were ready. It appeared that there were 419,342 voters in a population of
2,048,980, but efforts of party managers later raised the list
of voters to 466,745,-a rather high percentage, but one
which seems not to have occasioned any criticism. The
secondary results of the census were, of course, interesting.
Population had increased some thirty per cent from the
1,572,845 of the census of 1899 to 2,048,980. There were
1)074,882 males to 974,098 females; 1,428,176 whites to
620,804 people of color; 725,894 at least ten years old who
were literate (which meant little more than that they could
sign their names), against 643,615 who were not, but a majority of those eligible to vote were in the latter group!
Among 228,741 foreign-born, 185,393 were Spaniards, 11,217
Chinese, and 6713 Americans.
The expectation at the outset was that the intervention
would be a brief affair,-just long enough for elections to be
held to put a Cuban government in control. It was at first
believed that the elections might take place on January 1,
1907, but the date was advanced by general agreement to
May 1907, to ensure tranquility until the sugar crop could
be harvested, and later still further advanced, owing to the
immense amount of preliminary work that had to be done.
The failure to see how prolonged the intervention would
be may have given rise to some of the practices for which




THE RESTORATION OF CUBAN GOVERNMENT


253


the Magoon government has been most criticized.          It has
been charged in particular with having been too indulgent
with the politicians, especially in the giving of jobs and the
grant of pardons.7 The Liberals had made a great pretence
of fighting for principles, not for jobs, but they gave neither
Taft nor Magoon much peace in their efforts to get the
plums of office. They appointed a committee, dominated
by the revolutionary generals, to indicate whom they wished
to be named.8    Later this committee was reconstituted so
as to be made up equally of the three principal parties which
took the field for the 1908 elections, and its suggestions were
taken by the Magoon government. When posts were open,
the committee decided what palrty should get the appointment, leaving the party selected to name the man. Frank
Steinhart, whose "information and experience were especially helpful in handling political matters," acted as chairman of this committee, and, indeed, as Magoon's right hand
man in kindred questions.
This would have been very well, but it is quite generally
asserted that Magoon gave a number of soft jobs for purely
political purposes, in order to keep turbulent spirits from
stirring up trouble. While it is difficult to get precise evidence on this score, it is more than probable that the post
of secretary of the Advisory Law Commission, given to Juan
Gualberto Gomez, was such a position, and it is quite likely
that there were others. It was a policy that may have seemed
For example, in Barbarrosa, 83.  'The names of the Liberal cornVarious other charges are too little mittee read almost like a catalogue
backed up by evidence or too trivial of the generals of the war. "Pino"
to merit extended comment.  One Guerra was president; Eduardo Guzsuch concerned permits to foreigners man vice-president; Ernesto Asbert
to practice pharmacy. See Barbar- secretary; and Alfredo Zayas, Jose
rosa, 76, and Republic of Cuba, Re- Miguel  G6mez, Juan  Gualberto
port of provisional administration Gomez, Tomas Recio, Demetrio Casfrom December 1st, 1907 to Decem- tillo Duany, Jose Monteagudo, and
ber 1st, 1908, pp. 94-96.       Carlos Garcia V6lez were the others.




254


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


for the moment best calculated to keep the peace, but it was
a great mistake; it gave the Cubans a handle that they were
not slow to grasp, and in recent years they have been prone
to excuse existing corruption on the ground that Magoon
introduced the "botella," as these appointments are called.9
The claim is of course absurd, in that the botella under other
names had probably been employed almost from the day the
Spaniards set foot in Cuba. The United States authorities
should have realized, however, that the Hispanic American
memory of any American administrative impropriety is long
and almost gloating.    It would be interesting to know     if
Secretary Taft was cognizant of these appointments. If he
were not, it must have been because he turned a deaf ear
toward Havana, for they were denounced noisily in Cuba.
On the score of the government's prodigality in this respect
Martinez Ortiz says:
"The government... opened its hands and let loose the purse-strings
without any consideration whatever. It had no other idea than that of
pleasing the 'Committee on Petitions,' great provider of jobs. Mr.
Magoon did not know how to say 'No'; he always answered 'Amen,'
and signed the papers... The governor defended himself from his
critics by saying he was doing nothing but accede to the requests of
the great Cuban politicians. He washed his hands of the matter; he
could not stop to be proper when those who were most interested were
desirous of throwing the house through the window."10
From this it appears that the "great Cuban politicians" provided the initial impulse for these bad practices, but that
does not excuse the provisional government. It is somewhat
amusing, though, that the crimes of the said great politicians
have been forgotten, while those imputed to Magoon go on
forever.
On the score of pardons, too, it is probable that there was
The word botella, or bottle, is used with rich milk for the political baby.
on the analogy of the nursing-bottle,  0 Martinez Ortiz, II, 853.




THE RESTORATION OF CUBAN GOVERNMENT         255
some justice in the criticisms against Magoon. It would
seem that he granted an excessive number, again yielding
too easily to the importunings of politicians. There was
some excuse in the disorder of the times (though political
crimes were pretty well taken care of through the medium
of amnesties) and especially in the severity of the Spanish
law, which gave a trial judge no option for leniency in imposing sentence, if technical guilt were established. Thus,
the executive in Cuba acted as a kind of final court of
appeal, rather than as in the United States, where the pardon is in some sense a derogation of law, instead of a recognized part of legal procedure. Magoon pointed out that
General Wood and Estrada Palma also granted a great number of pardons, but confused amnesties with pardons, and
did not take into account the special circumstances (already
described) attending the jail-delivery in the era of General
Wood. As for Estrada Palma he issued but very few individual pardons, though a number of delinquents were freed
by amnesty bills.11 The number issued by Magoon is not
clear. Magoon said there were 1110 pardons in 5183 petitions that had been acted upon up to September 30, 1908,
but presumably included in this calculation those who were
amnestied.12  Trelles claims he gave 1140 pardons, mostly
for common crimes.13 And Fernando Ortiz says Estrada
Palma pardoned an average of six a month, to forty-six for
Magoon.14 It is all too probable that the Magoon government, possibly on instructions from Washington, was, not
corruptly, but mistakenly, pursuing the too gentle policy
with which it has so often been accused.
See infra, pp. 538-539.     3 Trelles, El progreso (1902 a 1905)
Republic of Cuba, Report of pro- y el retroceso (1906 a 1922) de la revisional administration from Decem- puiblica de Cuba, 9.
ber 1st, 1907 to December 1st, 1908, '"Ortiz, 15.
pp. 87-94.




256       A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
When these things are said, all else must be placed on the
credit side of the Magoon government's account. Even its
enemies acknowledge that it maintained order and gave the
country two honest elections.15 In the background of this
accomplishment was the American Army of Cuban Pacification, commanded in turn by generals James Franklin Bell,
Theodore Jonathan Wint, and Thomas Henry Barry. After
the departure of the marines, whom Taft had caused to be
landed before the regular army came, the American forces
ranged in numbers from 5300 to six thousand men, stationed
at many different posts in the island. They were not called
upon to do any fighting, but were a moral force tending to
check possible major disturbances. The principal work in
the suppression of banditry and political conspiracies was
left to the rural guards. The increase in the numbers of
this body has already been alluded to. It was also necessary
to restore its prestige, which had been damaged by its use as
a political agency in 1905. An effort was made to confine its
activities to the rural districts, leaving the local police to
handle disorder in the towns. By 1908 the credit of the
guards was so thoroughly reestablished that their conduct
was praised by all parties. Provision was also made for a
permanent army, separate from the rural guards, in a law
of armed forces, prepared by the Advisory Law Commission.
It was felt that a military establishment might be good insurance against an outbreak such as had occurred in 1906.
Tle appointment of a commander-in-chief for the army was
one that was considered too delicate for the incoming Cuban
government to solve, as there were too many generals with
an eye on the job. So one of the last acts of the Magoon
government was to take this responsibility upon itself.
"Pino" Guerra was selected, and Jose Monteagudo was
" For example, Barbarrosa: 81; 83.




THE RESTORATION OF CUBAN GOVERNMENT


257


named to head the rural guards. Somewhat earlier, in May
1908, "Pino" Guerra was given a trip to the United States
and France to witness army maneuvers. Possibly the provisional government thought it was much safer, for the time
being, for this gentleman to get his military education outside of Cuba rather than in it.
The rural guards did not lack work to do, though at all
times able to cope with whatever situation arose. There were
several minor outbreaks which endeavored to dignify themselves with the name of revolution. One such occurred late
in 1906 near Rancho Veloz, province of Santa Clara. An
uneasy spirit named Arturo Mendoza started another in
Santa Clara early in 1907, and lTfbano Guerra went out in
Oriente in October of that year. These disturbances were
all easily taken care of. Seemingly more serious for a time
was a conspiracy headed by the self-styled "General" Mazo
Parra, aided by Lara Miret, Juan Ducasse, and other "generals." Maz6 was a notorious revolutionist in the Caribbean
world. He had fought on the patriot side for a while in the
Cuban war of '95-'98, and then deserted to the Spaniards.
General Wood and Estrada Palma denied him admittance
when he sought to return to Cuba, but he was allowed to
land in the island during the summer of 1907. Straightway
he organized a plot, with wide ramifications, for the overthrow of the provisional government, planning on the destruction of foreign properties and the killing of Americans
as a first step in the uprising. The Magoon government
kept in touch with the movement, and arrested the conspirators on September 26, the day before the time set for the
insurrection. In addition to the above-named affairs there
were a number of marauding bands to attend to, but the
rural guards did their work so well that banditry had virtually
ceased to exist by the end of the intervention.




258


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


Cuban public men were less concerned over the economic,
legislative, or administrative reforms of the Magoon government than over the question of the political succession.
A new party situation had developed. The Moderates met
on November 3, 1906, and formally dissolved their organization. An attempt was then made to form a party on the
basis of a reform of the Constitution in the direction of conservatism. At first the movement broke down, because it
was recognized that no party could hope to win an election
on such a platform, even though intelligent men recognized
the desirability of the changes proposed. Meanwhile, from
the very beginning of the intervention there was trouble in
the Liberal camp. The Liberals had gone into the Revolution of August on the basis of leaving presidential candidacies for later decision, which seemed to imply that the
Gomez nomination was at least subject to change. The
majority of the Liberal leaders now proposed to drop G6mez,
hinting that he had been captured somewhat too easily in
1906, and at the same time praising Zayas, whom they put
forward for the presidency, claiming that he had won a victory for the Liberals in his handling of the negotiations with
the American commissioners. G6mez still had his partisans,
and they belittled the "victory" of Zayas which had been
followed by intervention. The quarrel became bitter, and
occasioned much embarassment to the provisional government in its endeavor to award political jobs to Liberals.
Right at the start of Magoon's rule it seemed impossible to
get either faction to consent to appointees for Cabinet Secretaries who belonged to the other group. On this account,
at Taft's suggestion, Magoon made the chief clerks of departments acting heads, with an American adviser who was
virtually in charge. Later it was necessary to appoint Americans as temporary governors of the provinces; for the Cuban




THE RESTORATION OF CUBAN GOVERNMENT               259
politicians could not agree on candidates among themselves.
And there was a lot of bickering over the lesser jobs, for
G6mez would not recognize the nominees of the original,
Zayas-controlled Liberal committee. It was on this account
that the committee was later reconstituted.
This dissension among the Liberals caused a revival of
hope among conservative elements for the founding of a new
party, and in this they were encouraged by Magoon. Cuban
writers insist that the United States authorities wanted to
see a Liberal victory in the elections, as in some manner
justifying the stand taken by Taft and Bacon, but a split in
the Liberal party afforded no prospect for self-congratulation, and so the government hoped for a conservative opposition that might force the Liberals to come together. At any
rate, there were fresh meetings of men of conservative leanings, and by early summer of 1907 the Conservative party
was formally launched. It insisted it had no connection
with the old Moderate party, and, of course, it had a platform, which included the proposed constitutional changes,
though leaving them for an indefinite future. In point of
fact, however, it was clearly understood that the election
was to be fought on the basis of personalities, not principles.
As Magoon put it,
"There was no discussion of platforms or of differences of principles
but the campaign was based entirely on the records of the parties and
the personality of the candidates. There being no political issues as
understood in the United States, the political speaker is confined to the
personal merits of his candidate and lack of merit of the candidate of the
opposition; in order to enthuse his auditors he appeals to their patriotism,
invokes the spirits of Marti, Maximo Gomez, Maceo and other names
dear to the Cuban people and declares that he preserves in his mind and
heart the spirit that actuated them.""
Republic of Cuba, Report of pro- tic utterances" against the United
visional administration from Decem- States, may be taken as the norm of
ber 1st, 1907 to December 1st, 1908, Cuban political speeches, both in 1908
p. 67. This, together with "bombas- and ever since.




260


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


On April 8, 1907, Secretary Taft visited Havana for a twoday stay, and took occasion to give a decision on the election
date question. All parties agreed that the originally suggested early dates would be impracticable, and were not only
willing, but eager, to have the intervention continue until
such preliminary matters as the census and the municipal
and electoral laws were satisfactorily resolved. This speaks
volumes for their confidence in President Roosevelt and
the United States! Taft decided that there should be two
elections, one for municipal and provincial officials, and
the other for those of the national government. Neither
was set definitely, but it was understood that the first would
be held as soon as practicable, presumably in 1908, and the
second soon afterward. A gentle warning was given that
they must be conducted peacefully, if the intervention were
to end at all. The same admonition had already appeared
in public statements of Roosevelt and Root, and was repeated by the former in his annual message of 1907. By the
spring of 1908 there were three principal parties in the field,
the two Liberal groups and the Conservatives. The followers of G6mez, known popularly as "Miguelistas," called
themselves the "Historic Liberals," claiming that the election of 1905 was no election and that therefore G6mez was
still the true Liberal candidate. The Zayas supporters, or
"Zayistas," retained the name "Liberals," on the basis of
the lapse of the Gomez candidacy and the superior claims
of Zayas. Each group made formal nominations. The Conservatives preferred to await the result of the local elections
before putting a presidential ticket in the field. There were
yet other parties, but none was important at this time. One
of them was later to attain to great prominence, the so-called
Independent Party of Color, formed in 1907 by Evaristo
Estenoz, a negro who had been an insurrectionist general in




THE RESTORATION OF CUBAN GOVERNMENT


261


the uprising of 1906. Leading colored men, such, for example, as Senator Moruia Delgado, denounced this party,
pointing out that it might mean a race war and that foreign interests would never consent to the existence of another black republic in the Caribbean. So the negroes had
nothing to gain by it.
Eventually the local elections were set for August 1, 1908,
and the national elections for November 14. As the former
approached, the two Liberal groups demanded that the provincial governors be relieved of their posts, lest they act
unfairly in favor of the Conservatives. These governors
had been elected in 1905, but had been left in office, together
with the councillors elected at the same time, so that the
provincial governments could be kept up on some sort of
legal basis. In the spring of 1908 the term of office of half
of the councillors, those elected in February 1904, expired,
leaving only the half elected in the fall of 1905. So it was
decided to ask for the resignations of these councillors and
the different governors. Accordingly, they were relieved,
and, as already mentioned, succeeded by American army officers, who seem to have given entire satisfaction. The elections of August 1st passed off without disagreeable incident,
-except that the Zayistas suffered a grievous disillusionment. They ran a poor third. The Conservatives won the
governorship of three provinces, to two for the Miguelistas,
and one for the Zayistas, while each party got respectively
twenty-eight, thirty-five, and eighteen mayors, with one
going independent. Altogether, sixty per cent of the vote
was cast, and it was clear that the two Liberal groups, if
united, would have had a vast majority over the Conservatives. The men chosen at this election went into office on
October 1st, at which time the new municipal and provincial laws were put into effect. The municipal officials




262


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


were the first that had been elected since 1901, for
the failure of Congress to enact a municipal law had left
no legal basis for an election during the Estrada Palma era.
The elections of August 1st were recognized as fair, and
accepted by all parties. It was now clear, however, that a
divided Liberal party could not win. So an arrangement
was made whereby G6mez was to become the joint candidate
of the two groups for the presidency and Zayas for the vicepresidency. Each group maintained its own organization,
but agreed on a distribution of offices. The Conservatives
could not believe that the fusion would carry all members
of the two parties, and now entered the final campaign with
enthusiasm, formally nominating General Menocal and
Rafael Montoro on August 24 as their standard-bearers.
Menocal has already made his appearance in these pages.
Montoro had been an Autonomist and Spanish sympathizer
in the nineties, but was a man of recognized ability and
prestige. Again there was an exciting campaign, fairly conducted, and this time the united Liberals won. They elected,
not only G6mez and Zayas, but also all twenty-four senators, and fifty-one representatives as against thirty-two, on
a vote of 201,199 to 130,256. In all, seventy-one per cent
of the vote was cast. The best of order prevailed, and leaders
of the defeated party congratulated their opponents on the
victory. The holding of these elections had entailed an enormous amount of labor, what with instruction in the new law,
preparation of election equipment, and the maintenance of
order. Colonel Crowder, as acting head of the Central Electoral Board, had everything in charge, and, as Magoon put
it, a large share of the success of the two elections was due
to his indefatigable energy. Magoon was very enthusiastic over the whole affair, but Martinez Ortiz points
out that the elections proved nothing, as they were under




THE RESTORATION OF CUBAN GOVERNMENT


263


American supervision. And in point of fact it is probable
that Cuba has never had such well conducted elections,
either before or since. It was generally admitted that they
were in all respects correct. Martinez Ortiz says the United
States authorities hoped G6mez would win, but did nothing
to incline the balance in his favor,17 and that, undoubtedly,
should be the verdict of history.
It was time to wind up the accounts of the intervention.
There were many who regretted that it had to end at all.
Magoon commented in his 1907 report on the discussions
going on advocating annexation to the United States, and
wondered if there might be some way to stop this talk.
"Doubtless the desire to be brought under the jurisdiction
and direction of the Government of the United States continues to prevail among the large alien contingent and a
small number of Cubans who own property and fear a recurrence of disorder," he said.18  Martinez Ortiz remarks the
existence of this feeling as a result of the various uprisings
of 1907, which caused some people to lose faith in the
future.19 And an article in Lippincott's for January 1908,
signed "An English Resident," urged the United States to
keep the island, saying that "sooner or later" the Cubans
would have to be governed "from Washington." 20 The distinguished American journalist Henry Watterson was representative of another group that doubted Cuban ability at
self-government, but felt that the Cubans ought to have
their chance to try it.21
'Martinez Ortiz, II, 807.      "In explaining his lack of con'Republic of Cuba, Report of pro- fidence in their political character,
visional administration from October Watterson first spoke favorably of
13th, 1906 to December 1st, 1907, pp. some of the Cuban leaders, and then
34-35.                         went on as follows about the people
"Martinez Ortiz, II, 798.    lower down: "But, the riff-raff;
The problem of Cuba, in Lip- Lord, the riff-raff; injin, nigger, begpincott's  monthly  magazine,  v. gar-man, thief, -'both m o n g r e l,
LXXXI, pp. 142-144; Jan., 1908.  puppy, whelp and hound, and cur of




264


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


The problem of the prosperous alien class, which lacked
confidence in the republic, was indeed considered by the provisional government. At one time it thought of imposing
Cuban citizenship on all foreign residents in a blanket act.
This raised a storm of protest from Cuban and foreigner
alike. The foreigners did not wish to lose their right to the
protection of their home governments or to be injected into
island politics, and as for the Spaniards both they and the
Cubans felt that not time enough had passed to allay the
bitterness of the War of Independence era. Both elements
also protested when it was proposed to give foreigners the
vote, without citizenship. In this connection it was pointed
out that foreigners were in the majority among those of
voting age in many cities, including Havana itself. A compromise was arranged whereby they might stand for election
to municipal councils, though not permitted to vote.
There was never any doubt about the intention of the
United States to withdraw from Cuba, whatever some of the
residents of the island might have desired. Taft had at
one time assumed that it would be fifteen months from the
time of the completion of the census before the United States
would get out, which would have brought the end of the
intervention in April 1909. But Roosevelt, desirous, no
doubt, of winding up this affair during his own term (which
expired in March 1909), gave orders early in 1908 that Cuba
should be turned over to her own officials not later than
February 1, 1909, but sooner if possible. Eventually the
date was set for January 28, 1909, the anniversary of the
birth of Marti. On January 2, 1909, Magoon issued a call
for the newly elected Congress to meet on the 13th. As part
low degree'... When the pie is cut, 'Cuba libre,' in Havana Post, Jan. 29,
when the offices are filled, what of the 1909. Most assuredly there was somerejected ones? Will each turn con- thing more than doggerel in these
spirator?" Watterson, Henry, Again lines!




THE RESTORATION OF CUBAN GOVERNMENT


265


of his decree he enacted laws tending to prevent the old
quorum-breaking evil.22 This part of his message was not
very well received, and many congressmen said they would
later make short work of it, which they did. In the absence
of any congressmen except the half of the Senate (elected in
1903) whose terms expired in April 1910, a full number of
senators and representatives had been chosen, instead of the
usual half. To bring the situation into accord with the Constitution, the representatives drew lots for the two and four
year terms, and senators were elected for periods ending in
1913 and 1917, with the latter not taking their seats until
the "lame ducks," or "senators of the reserve," as they were
called in Cuba, should vacate them in 1910. The two houses
organized with Moruia Delgado, a "reserve" senator, as president of the Senate for the time being, and the brilliant Italian-born Orestes Ferrara as president of the House.
The day of withdrawal, January 28, 1909, passed off with
the normally to be expected ceremonial and enthusiasm.
Some of the declarations of Magoon's final message are all
that need be noted here. He pointed out that the President
of the United States understood that article two of the Permanent Treaty prohibited Cuba from assuming or contracting
any public debt in excess of that already existing, without
the approval of the United States, and in this connection he
stated that it was the final and conclusive resolution of the
provisional government that all claims of the Army of Liberation had been satisfied by legislation already enacted and no
fresh indebtedness on this score would be recognized. Thus,
one raid on the treasury was settled, and as the Magoon pronouncement had all the force of a condition precedent to a
restoration of Cuban government the famous appendix to
the Constitution was just so much the more reinforced. That
'For the terms of this section of the decree, see infra, p. 512.




266        A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
same day, Magoon departed from Cuba on a United States
cruiser. He left amidst-for the moment-much plaudits.
The city of Havana made him an "adopted son," and newspapers praised him-for the moment! Later, the chorus
started a different tune, and nobody tried to drown it out.
So it gathered momentum, and became an established hymn
of scorn, if not of hate. Watterson said that the Magoon
government, though benevolent, seemed oppressive to the
Cubans, who would have preferred to be ruled by Spain
rather than by the United States. This was probably true.
What the Cubans really objected to was, not the shortcomings of Magoon, real or alleged, but the fact that he was an
American, embodying the methods and spirit of American
rule. A Spaniard might have committed twice as many
errors and a Cuban ten times as many, without getting half
the criticism; there would have been plenty at the time, but
it would have been forgotten ten years later. Only a man
like General Wood, with a Root-Wood policy, could weather
the storm. So the charges against Magoon are primarily
a medium for the expression of a racial emotion. Jose
Miguel G6mez was actually to commit the various crimes
imputed to Magoon, and Jose Miguel is now a national hero,
while Magoon remains anathema.
In point of fact Magoon rendered excellent service, subject to the limitations in political policy that have already
been mentioned. As Watterson put it,
" "Magoon, the Magician, is the proper name for him. His work here
has been far-reaching. It has been all-embracing. It has caused two
blades of grass to grow where but one had grown before." He found
Cuba "clouded by the smoke of burning property and military campfires. He leaves it echoing with the hum of industrial activity and overspread by the aroma of nearly one hundred mills grinding day and
night." 8
Watterson, Op. cit.




THE RESTORATION OF CUBAN GOVERNMENT


267


It could hardly have been otherwise, for Magoon had as his
aides a number of men who have since proved themselves
in yet larger fields of activity. Two of these demand special
mention, Frank Steinhart and Colonel Crowder. Common
gossip always associates the name of Steinhart with the
supposed iniquities of the Magoon administration.  The
writer has often heard Magoon referred to as "Frank Steinhart's office boy."  Charges are also made that Steinhart
owed his later financial success as the head of the Havana
Electric Railway Light and Power Company to valuable
franchises improperly given to him by Magoon. This
charge may easily be disposed ofA The one franchise acquired by Steinhart during the Magoon era was for an extension of the street railway system. This was awarded
only after study and favorable recommendation by Colonel
Crowder,-and anybody who questions the integrity of
Enoch H. Crowder is not going to get very far! Steinhart
was, not "the boss," but a big help to Magoon, who in his
two annual reports warmly expressed his appreciation of
Steinhart's services. Steinhart's knowledge of the customs,
people, and personages of the country was of invaluable
assistance. To be sure, he was associated with the system
employed in awarding patronage, but he did not inaugurate
that policy, and probably Magoon did not, either.  His
practical aid to Magoon was certainly one of the prime
factors in the maintenance of order under the provisional
government.
In the case of Colonel Crowder there has never been any
question about the disinterestedness of the services he rendered. As Martinez Ortiz says of him in connection with
what he did on the Advisory Law Commission:
"He was a tireless worker, always at the anvil. He did not rest, day
or night. Well earned were the eulogies which were given in his honor.




268


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


All the other members of that body did their duty. But Colonel
Crowder was its soul,-its driving will."'2
Crowder was not only president of the Commission. As
supervisor of the Department of State and Justice he was
also virtual head of this important branch, and he was the
legal adviser of the other departments, besides having the
management of the successful elections of 1908. Magoon's
reports several times singled him out for special and enthusiastic praise. And, indeed, Crowder failed-if he failed
at all-only in that he may have placed too high a rating
on Cuban political capacity. His legislation, with ordinarily
honest administration, should have been waterproof, but
later experience was to show that it wasn't. The basis is
still there for good government, however, when, or if, it
comes, and Crowder's manifold other services to Cuba, both
in the Magoon era and since 1919, entitle him to the respect and the gratitude (which he may not get) of the Cuban
people.
Martinez Ortiz, who made no such thoroughgoing study
of this period as he did of the Wood and Estrada Palma
years, aims as usual to be fair in his estimate of the Magoon
regime, praising it for its taking the census, the legislation
of the Advisory Law Commission, its maintenance of order, the correct handling of the elections, and its achievements in the realm of public works. He condemns it for extravagance and the job-giving and pardon evils. Sydney
Brooks, writing from the standpoint of an observer, but
not an investigator, says of the Magoon rule: "Its sole
merit as a Government was that it kept the peace."25 That
is a bit ungenerous, but undoubtedly it is the really greatest
thing that can be said of it from the standpoint of history.
Martinez Ortiz, II, 849.  nightly review, v. XCIV, pp. 796-806,
"2Brooks, Sydney, Cuba, in Fort- at 802; Nov., 1910.




THE RESTORATION OF CUBAN GOVERNMENT                    269
It tried to do more, and succeeded for the time being, but
it could not make its Cuban successors maintain its roads
and bridges or give effect to its laws. It kept the peace, and
turned back the government to the Cuban people on a working basis. That is perhaps its epitaph. And for that much
at least, it deserves credit.26
' By all odds the most important that is so conspicuous of it elsewhere.
source for the period of the provi- The Taft and Bacon Report, used so
sional government are the two Re- extensively in chapter IX, has a direct
port volumes of Governor Magoon, bearing on the beginnings of the inof 1907 and 1908. They contain a tervention, and is an always imporwealth of data on all phases of the in- tant factor in the background. This
tervention.  Martinez Ortiz (v. II) is a favorite period for treatment in
is less noteworthy for this period than periodical articles, some of which
for the earlier years of his work. He have interesting material, though few
seems to be hurrying to a finish, and or none embody any real investigais interested only in the Cuban politi- tion. A good monograph might well
cal succession. Subject to that limita- be written on the provisional governtion his treatment has the same high ment.
qualities of judicial-minded fairness




CHAPTER XII


THE MOST TYPICALLY CUBAN PRESIDENT: GOMEZ,
1909-1913
IF THERE might be an honest vote in Cuba to determine
who had been the most popular President, Jose Miguel
G6mez would assuredly get first place. This would not be
because of any particularly great achievements of his administration, and most certainly it would not be on account
of its integrity, a characteristic that very few of the G6mez
supporters themselves would claim for it. G6mez is popular
though his improprieties are well known and quite generally
admitted. One explanation of this is that he more nearly
resembled the typically likeable Cuban than any of the
other men who have attained to the presidency. And, furthermore, though his faults would have made him an impossible figure in the higher political ranks of the United
States, he had virtues, too. Whatever may be said against
him, there is also much that is in his favor.
Born in the important and thoroughly Cuban old town
of Sancti Spiritus on July 6, 1858, and member of an old
Cuban family, G6mez received the equivalent of a high
school education, and then, in 1875, joined the insurrectionists in the Ten Years' War. He also went out in the
minor uprising of 1879, and became a lieutenant-colonel.
From 1879 to 1895 he remained in Sancti Spiritus, occupied
with the affairs of his father's estate. On the outbreak of
war in 1895 he put himself at the head of the Sancti Spiritus
brigade in the patriot army and rose rapidly until he be270




MOST TYPICALLY CUBAN PRESIDENT: GOMEZ, 1909-1913  271
came a major-general. It does not appear that he played
an outstandingly prominent part in the conflict. At any
rate, his services were confined to his native province of
Santa Clara, in which he became a virtual political chief,
as well as a military leader of some renown. He surrounded
himself with a number of brilliant young men, who were
later to be among the most prominent backers of his aspirations for the presidency and to become leaders in the Liberal
party,-men like Orestes Ferrara, Gerardo Machado, Carlos
Mendieta, and Jose Monteagudo.  After the war Gomez
was a prominent-but not too prominent-member of the
Cuban Assembly,%and presently became civil governor of
Santa Clara under the United States military administration.
He was also a member-somewhat in the background-of
the Constitutional Convention, and was elected governor of
Santa Clara under the republic., There he built up his
political fences to such effect that almost the entire province
was in the Republican party he founded there. Hints are
not lacking as to some departure from "the proprieties"
while Gomez held this post. One well-known Cuban publicist accuses him of organizing a gang of bullies to win
elections for him by force, and hints that people mysteriously disappeared if they stood in Gomez's way and
that cattle also were appropriated to repair the Gomez
fortunes.' He was quite often looked upon as a provincial
cacique of the familiar Hispanic American type, and the
favorite epithet applied to him in the presidential elections
of 1908 was that of "tyrant," based on the record imputed
to him as ruler of Santa Clara. His connection with Cuban
affairs from the time of his entry into the lists for the presidency in Estrada Palma's time has already been told.
Opinions differ as to his manifestation of merit, or lack of it,
'Vasconcelos, 11.




272


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


in those years. One of his later political sayings was that
"to provoke revolutions is to commit the worst crime and
the greatest infamy," 2 but he seems to have had different
views in 1906. To be sure, his own part in that affair was
not very spectacular, and at least one writer says he "let
himself be caught," though "later gathering in the fruits of
victory" for himself.8
All accounts seem to agree that G6mez was an extraordinarily likeable person,-a simpdtico in the fullest sense of
that delightful Spanish word. Martinez Ortiz, a G6mez
supporter, describes him as follows, having reference to his
Santa Clara days:
"General Gomez had the complexion of a robust man, attractive
features, a friendly manner in conversation, and a character that was
affectionate at the same time that it was energetic. Whoever had dealings
with him found it difficult to resist him, for he possessed in the highest
degree the gift of winning good-will. Just a few words from him gained
what the long arguments of others would not have attained. Without
conspicuous knowledge, he was endowed with a most sagacious talent and
an exact perception with which to measure the intelligence and understanding of others. He assimilated what he heard, with marvellous
facility, and was accustomed to follow the opinion of the majority, but
not without imposing his own in many cases, though always by indirect
and gentle means. Of simple habits and likes, he kept his house open
at all hours, and was accustomed to pass the hours of rest in familiar
conversation or in games for pleasure and recreation, amidst the discussions of those who were playing cards and the jokes of the spectators,
who never failed to be there, back of the table."'
Much to the same effect was the pronouncement of another
friend, Gualberto Hernandez:
"General G6mez... is neither a tribune nor a publicist, nor can he
be said to have a clear comprehension of the great social problems that
stir the world. But on the other hand he possesses an enormous force:


Quoted in Pardo SuArez, 124.
Perez, 7.


'Martinez Ortiz, II, 410.




MOST TYPICALLY CUBAN PRESIDENT: GOMEZ, 1909-1913  273


an intuition as to means and formulae and an exact, precise understanding of men."'
Naturally, G6mez's eulogistic biographer, Lozano Casado,
has many good things to say of his idol. "He possesses
the miracle of smiles," he said, and quoted other prominent
men who made remarks of the same tenor. For example,
Ernesto Asbert spoke of his "courteous manner" and his
"irresistible attraction". Even Zayas, his perennial rival,
had remarked on his "great political brain", and called
him a "model for tolerance of spirit". Juan Gualberto G6mez
was quoted by Lozano as follows:
"He is a man of clear understanding and powerful suggestion. Moreover he has a broad, tolerant, magnificent spirit, very well tempered for
meandering through the labyrinth of the politicians, without mistaking
the way. He is what may be called a great leader of crowds."'
These statements are indeed representative of what people
say of G6mez in private conversation, but they almost invariably refer to him, too, as a "ruined planter" before he
became President and as having utilized his high office to S
build up a great fortune for himself through the medium /
of graft. The same men may also claim that he indulged
in graft as governor of Santa Clara before he became President, but it is certain that he built up no great fortune
there. Nearly all, however, will admit that he did not take
everything for himself after he became President, but accomplished much good for the country. The following are
sample statements of men who were neither partisans nor
opponents of G6mez:
(1) "Both G6mez and his wife were simple country folk, and G6mez
has always been very popular in Cuba. And he did a lot of good. The


sHernandez, Gualberto, Anepigrafo,  Lozano Casado, 7-15.
in Lozano Casado, 4.




274


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


two pieces of graft for which he was most criticized were useful undertakings: the exchange of the water-front lot for the Villanueva lands
within the city, and the Ports Company bill."
(2) "Each ruler of the past three (G6mez, Menocal, and Zayas) has
been worse than the one before. That is why G6mez now seems like a
saint. He was a poor man when he entered the presidency, and wealthy
when he left it. But he accomplished a lot. And he never spent more
than forty-eight millions a year."'
One thing certainly may be said concerning G6mez in his
k administration of the republic.      He was lucky!     It is customary in all lands to ascribe good times or bad to the
government, whether the government in fact has much
to do with the situation or not. This is more than usually
absurd in Cuba, where prosperity or depression depends
primarily on the amount of the sugar crop and the price
it brings,-something that is to a considerable extent independent of governmental action. G6mez went into the
presidency at a most favorable moment, and did not have a
single bad year economically. To be sure, there were occasional uncertainties of weather and the usual cyclones
each year, though none of outstanding import.8 On the
other hand, labor disputes were not nearly so prominent
as they had been in the Magoon era, and crop and revenue
conditions were generally good. Nowhere is this more clearly
brought out than in G6mez's various messages to Congress
at the opening of a legislative session.9 The nearest thing
-to a political policy that G6mez had was to give the country
an administration that would be favorable to business.        As
7There is one statement about 1, 1912.  Most people who knew
G6mez that might present him in a G6mez deny this, however, and the
peculiarly distasteful light in certain writer is convinced that it is not true.
parts of the United States. That is,  8For references to cyclones, see
that though of a good family he had Mensajes presidenciales, I: 273; 304;
a strain of negro blood in him. Cf. 310.
Wright, 94; also, The insurrection in  'For example, see Mensajes presiCuba, in Outlook, v. CI, p. 238, June dencialW, I: 227; 253; 273; 319; 343.




MOST TYPICALLY CUBAN PRESIDENT: GOMEZ, 1909-1913    275
he himself once said, "In my program of government I put
economic interests above every other public question," 10 an
assertion that he repeated in various messages. Undoubtedly
he did encourage business, assisted by a number of really
worthy men who at one time or another were in his Cabinet
or in Congress. And, as set forth in one of the statements
quoted above, even the measures involving graft had also
some possibility in them of benefit to the republic. On
the other hand, it was not nearly as economical a government as its much criticized predecessor, though almost a
model by comparison with later years. At the beginning of
G6mez's rule his private secretary gave out that it was
the plan to effect great economies in public expenses and
not resort to any loans.ll Some savings were now and then
effected in one direction, but they were more than offset by
extravagances in another,*and the promise to seek no loans
was not fulfilled.l2 x
One considerable increase in expenditures came about
through an addition to the budget for the army. Gomez
was resolved that nobody should do to him what he himself had done to Estrada Palma. The Magoon government
had passed a law for a permanent army, but left it to the
incoming Cuban administration to work out the details
and organize the forces. This was one of the first things
with which G6mez concerned himself. In a long message
of February 25, 1909, he asked for a large appropriation
for the new army, and in numerous later messages called
for legislation to build it up to a yet more formidable state.
Eventually it consisted of about five thousand men, in three
10 Message to Congress, Nov. 1, 1909, New York Journal, quoted in Barin Mensajes presidenciales, I, 227.  barrosa, 95.
' Declarations of Jose Lorenzo Cas-  ' For repeated criticisms of Gomez
tellanos to a representative of the on this score, see Barbarrosa, 95 et
seq., passim.
3




276


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


regiments of infantry, a considerable body of artillery, and
a regiment of cavalry, together with the rural guards, which
were presently incorporated into the permanent army.
There were also various auxiliary units, including a military
academy at the Morro Castle across from Havana and even
a small navy.13 Even though in all likelihood a Cuban
army would be used only against other Cubans, this measure of G6mez was no doubt wise, as an anchor to windward
in times of disorder. Even the navy proved its value in
course of the race war of 1912.14 It was too much to expect
that there should not be some improprieties in certain features of military and naval administration, however. For
example, quite apart from charges of extravagance, there
were criticisms on account of the excessive number of officers 15' and for the introduction of what was deemed to be
a bad precedent in a liberal retirement and pension system,notably liberal for those in the higher grades.'6 Furthermore, so it is charged, great care was taken to see that
the army, from general to private, should be made up of
G6mez Liberals.l7
The only loan contracted by the G6mez administration
' was for the sum of sixteen millions and a half. This had
been authorized by the Magoon government for sanitary
tunneling in Havana and Cienfuegos and for paving the
streets of the first-named city and construction of an aque/ duct for the latter. This had first been planned by Estrada
Palma, who proposed to pay for the work out of surplus
revenues, but the sudden end of his government had de13Among numerous Gomez mes- message at the opening of a session
sages on military and naval affairs, of Congress.
see Mensajes presidenciales, I: 184-  ' Mensajes presidenciales, I, 386.
190; 261-263; 313; 313-314; 333; 366-  "Gonzalez Lanuza, 615-616.
373; and extensive paragraphs in each "lBarbarrosa, 114-115.
"'P6rez, 8.




MOST TYPICALLY CUBAN PRESIDENT: GOMEZ, 1909-1913    277
layed the project. G6mez early announced that he would
set aside a portion of the revenues for the purpose, without resorting to a loan,18 but it was only a few weeks
later when the loan was contracted with the New York
house of Speyer and Company, in June, at a discount of
twelve per cent, though with a coupon rate of only four
and a half per cent, yielding a little more than fourteen
millions and a half. This sum was presently expended,
and G6mez reported in 1912 that some thirteen millions
more would be needed to finish the work!      He therefore asked for authority to negotiate another loan,19 but
his term came to an end before any action was taken.
The extravagance of the G6mez government in providing
political plums made itself manifest in numerous ways. The
diplomatic service was unnecessarily expanded. This was
criticized by an individual whose opinions in this period
are more than usually entitled to weight, Jose Gonzalez
Lanuza, at that time a representative in Congress.20 Gonzalez Lanuza, though a member of the Conservative opposition, was a man of such high character and disinterestedness that he rose above party considerations in his discussion
of events. Some others were less kindly in their comments.
For example, Barbarrosa said that the Cuban diplomat was
appointed "only in order that he may wear his uniform
at court functions".21 He might also have remarked on
the important work he did in drawing his pay! In like
manner administrative jobs in Cuba were multiplied. It is
said that G6mez had posts for all his intimate friends, who
were popularly called his "cuneros," or "foundlings",22 a
'8 Message of Apr. 5, 1909, in Men- 352-353; 363.
sajes presidenciales, I, 195-210, at 202.  Gonzalez Lanuza, 625-626.
19 Messages of Apr. 12 and June 28,  2 Barbarrosa, 123.
1912, in Mensajes presidenciales, I:  Perez, 8.




278


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


term in Cuban political slang which meant that a man had
no relation by birth or residence to the region in which he
aspired to office, owing his candidacy solely to the support
of the political machine. Of course, too, places had to be
given to a legion of henchmen in payment of political
promises.2
The budget of the presidency jumped enormously over
what it had been in the time of Estrada Palma. As compared with the $62,390 allotted in 1905, Gomez got $148,120
in the budget of 1910-1911. A comparison of some of the
items of expense is interesting. Personal service in the palace
cost $7,740 under Estrada Palma, and $14,620 under Gomez;
the secretariat increased in cost from  $11,950 to $56,700;
the item for "various" expenses rose from $600 to $15,000,quite "various", it would seem; and there were other items
that had not appeared in Estrada Palma's time, entered as
"unforeseen expenses" $12,000, and "secret expenses" $25,000.24  Presumably these amounts included the expenditures for the rich furnishings that were introduced into the
palace, but probably not the cost of Gomez's fishing excursions and trips to Cayo Cristo, which he made in a
coast-guard vessel of the Cuban navy.25 But this was not
all. Later the President received $105,000 for "secret expenses", and ran through this sum in less than six months,
and there was a deficit of $26,000 in the expenditures of
his secretariat.26
It must not be imagined because of these evils (and
more yet to be related) that the G6mez government is to
23Barbarrosa, 101. Barbarrosa also  24Barbarrosa,  130.  Barbarrosa
noted that an exceptional number of makes numerous charges, possibly in
positions had been given to a horde an exaggerated vein, as to just how
of suspiciously well dressed women these sums were employed. Barbar"in order to prove that we are more rosa, 93 et seq., passim.
gallant than the Yankees." Barbar-  "Ibid., 100.
rosa, 119.                      "Ibid., 113.




MOST TYPICALLY CUBAN PRESIDENT: GOMEZ, 1909-1913  279
be unqualifiedly condemned. Indeed, its shortcomings were
to be multiplied many times over by the administrations
that succeeded it. The great evil of it was that it putX
the bad Spanish traditions again in the saddle, and so
opened the way to a recurrence of the old corrupt political
practices, despite a great deal of good that it accomplished.
Nor was Gomez alone responsible. He had an all too ready
following in other branches of Cuban government, national,
provincial, and municipal. Even if absolutely faultless
himself he probably would have failed to hold the politicians
in check, just as Estrada Palms had. So he might be excused altogether but for one thing: in Cuba one may expect
so little from other governmental agencies, save for a few
upright men here and there, that the President is almost
the only hope for a beginning in ways of political rectitude.27
Aside from their bad acts in association with the executive,
there were numerous peccadillos of other bodies on their
own account. Quite apart from graft, congressmen managed
to procure for themselves the equivalent of sixty dollars a
day, what with salary and "extraordinary expenses", for a
period of some eighty days of work,28-provided they in fact
turned up for the sessions. Far worse, because of the utter
uselessness of these agencies in themselves, were the extravagances of provincial councils.29 And one might run through
the other branches of government and find the same conditions.
Each of the four Gomez budgets was considerably larger
than any of those of his predecessors, but expenditures far
outran budgets, in an effort to keep up with receipts. Including the product of the 1909 Speyer loan, the latter
averaged about forty-six millions a year for the entire
' See chapters XXI-XXIV, in described.
which the comparative worthlessness  "Barbarrosa, 116.
of other political agencies is amply  'Ibid: 98; 172.




280


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


G6mez term. Expenditures were almost exactly the same.~8
Evidently Jose Miguel had no idea of piling up a surplus
to tempt the revolutionaries. In his various budget messages
he was at great pains to explain why larger sums were
needed than had been required by Magoon, calling attention to new governmental services that had been established,
but these state papers have only a certain academic interest,
for uses were speedily found for any revenues that turned
up over and above budgetary requirements.81 The wealth
in receipts,-mainly through customs duties, as before,was in one sense an index of the prosperity of these years,
but it has been characterized as more a manifestation of
governmental good fortune than of the economic well-being
of the people.32 Nevertheless, some of the acts of the G6mez
administration must have had permanently beneficial effects
and others were at least temporarily helpful. A great deal
was done for the betterment of communications. If G6mez
let the roads of his predecessors go to ruin, he did build a
number himself,-although most of them have in their turn
been allowed to revert to a useless state.38 Of more enduring value was the assistance given to railway-building projects. Right at the outset of his administration, he took
steps in this direction. In his message to Congress of April 5,
1909, he censured Estrada Palma for not building railways
when he had money in the treasury and a law of July 5, 1906,
which would have enabled him to proceed. As for himself,
" Guiral Moreno, Mario, Nuestros  ' Numerous G6mez messages deal
problemas politicos, economicos y in some detail with road-building.
sociales, in Cuba contempordnea, v. See especially Mensajes presidenciales,
V, pp. 401-424, at 416-417; Aug., 1914. I: 203-204; 233; 241; 265; also openThere are three budget messages ing messages of a session. The item
in Mensajes presidenciales, I: 214-217; at page 265 concerns the proposed
237-241; 284-285. These do not show building of the central highway from
forth the detail as to proposed ex- end to end of the island, a project
penditures.                     which has always been one of the re"Barbarrosa, 106. See also infra, sounding "phrases" of the politicians
pp: 626; 630-633.               of the republic.




MOST TYPICALLY CUBAN PRESIDENT: GOMEZ, 1909-1913      281
"relying on the support of Congress and, above all, the aid
of Divine Providence", he proposed to build the first of the
lines formerly authorized,-one running from Marti on the
Cuba Railway in western Oriente, south to Manzanillo, and
thence east to rejoin the main line at San Luis, north of
Santiago. For this purpose he offered the Cuba Railway
six thousand dollars a kilometre to build the line. In due
time it was finished, adding greatly to the capital resources
of the republic. G6mez also interested himself in the building of other lines included in the law of 1906, and suggested some new ones, such, for example, as a railway from
Nuevitas to Caibarien. Many kil)metres of track were laid
in Gomez's time and others in ensuing years in accord with
the plans he made.34
The following may be named as among the other beneficial economic acts of the Gomez administration: the suspension or reduction of the duties on the export of sugar
and other Cuban products; the lowering of duties on machinery for agriculture and railways; aid in the development
of a Cuban manufacture of such things as soap, shoes, paper,
food products, and beer by raising the duties; the encouragement of immigration; and legislation favoring the building
of long-distance telephone lines, which formerly had been
restricted by a Spanish law of 1890 to a length of ten miles.
About some other acts of G6mez there are two opinions as
to whether any particular benefit was derived from them.
There was considerable legislation and large appropriations
for the building of an aqueduct to supply Santiago with
water,-something that has yet to be done in a really satis34The announcement of the con- 197. There are frequent other refertract for the Manzanillo branch was ences to railway-building in the Menin the message of Apr. 5, 1909, in sajes presidenciales. See especially in
Mensajes presidenciales, I, 195-210, at I, at 227-228.




282


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


factory way. And there was not a little expended on public
buildings, improvement of cities, and port works.85
Very few of the other measures of the government can
honestly be characterized as helpful to the republic. Now
and then, there was a gesture as of conferring some benefit
upon labor. Some homes for laborers were built in a suburb
of Havana. G6mez sent a message to Congress recommending the founding of a popular university for laborers.36 His
most famous connection with labor legislation, however, was
his veto of a law requiring employers to ensure their workmen against accident, a measure which he had at first
favored.37 Apparently the real idea back of this bill was
to provide an opportunity for graft, under the guise of a
benefit to labor. The point was, that the law required the
insurance company to be a Cuban corporation then in existence. El Siglo, a Conservative daily, charged that G6mez
had intended to control the Cuban company that was to
get the contract, "but, hearing the protests of the country,
he preferred to reject the law, knowing that he was casting
aside an opportunity to make a comfortable profit." 38 In
a sense this is somewhat to his credit, at least in comparison
with his successors, who would not have given much heed
to public opinion.
Whatever may be said against G6mez on the score of bad
legislation is chargeable in equal or perhaps greater degree
against Congress. As already stated, there were a number
of worthy men in Congress, but that body had deteriorated
even from the none too highly recommendable quality of
the earlier Congresses of the republic,-not nearly approaching, however, the depths that have more recently been
"Naturally the G6mez sections of  8Dec. 11, 1911, in Mensajes presithe Mensajes presidenciales and the denciales, I, 334.
Memorias abound in references to  "7Aug. 28, 1912, in Ibid., I, 374.
these achievements.             Quoted in Lozano Casado, 35.




MOST TYPICALLY CUBAN PRESIDENT: GOMEZ, 1909-1913           283
reached. G6mez several times recommended the enactment
of laws that were still needed to supplement the Constitution,39 but if this was a really serious request it at least got
little or no attention from Congress. Congress was interested
in other things,-in political maneuvers and in matters
where there was some tangible advantage for congressmen.
The first four laws of the restored Cuban republic that were
discussed in the House are indicative of the character of
Congress. One was a political spoils act which "deprived
mayors (alcaldes) of their proper and legitimate functions."40
Another restored cock-fighting.41 A third was a notorious
amnesty bill. And the fourth wag the even more notorious
lottery law. The two last-named are so important in the
history of the republic that they have been reserved for
special treatment elsewhere, along with yet other amnesties
and another lottery law of the Gomez period,42 but something may be said here of the cock-fighting bill.
Restoration of the cock-fight was almost in the nature
of a G6mez campaign pledge. This had been a traditional
"sport", if such it may be called, during the Spanish period,
especially in the rural districts, where it was so highly favored that it was very nearly the end and aim of all
existence. Naturally, it was repugnant to the American authorities of the military government, and General Wood
outlawed it. It had no chance of getting back under Estrada
Palma or Magoon, but with Gomez it was different. Prior
'Notably in his message of Apr. first law promulgated by the Gomez
4, 1910, in Mensajes presidenciales, I, administration. Cf. n. 41.
253-257, at 254. See also message of  'The  Conservative  daily, DisApr. 3, 1911, in Ibid., I, 303-311, at cusion, named this as the first law
303.                            of the new republic. Article quoted
0 Speech of Santiago Cancio Bello in Havana Post, Feb. 9, 1909. Cf. n.
on Feb. 20, 1909, in Republica de 40. The Discusion item refers merely
Cuba, Camara de Representantes, to the presentation of the bill, for it
Diario de sesiones, for Feb. 19-20, did not become a law until the fol1909. Cancio Bello said this was the lowing July.
In chapters XXII-XXIII.




284


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


to the elections of 1908 there were popular manifestations
on behalf of a restoration of this favorite pastime, whereupon the G6mez campaign managers hit upon a plan to
take advantage of this sentiment, without coming out openly,
however, in advocacy of the cock-fight. At the suggestion
of General Monteagudo they adopted as their party emblem
a rooster on a plow. Professedly this was a symbol for
"vigilance and work", but the masses understood it as a
promise of their old sport. Undoubtedly it gained thousands of votes for the Liberal candidate. Magoon was
hardly out of sight when the bill was introduced. It was
taken up in the House on February 1, 1909. The opposition
was unavailing, and on July 3 the bill became a law.
Its principal paragraph was brief and to the point:
"All dispositions which are opposed to cock-fights are
derogated".43
A number of other bills belonging in a similar category
were promptly introduced. In hopes that it might be accepted as a substitute for the more barbarous cock-fight,
General Wood had authorized the playing of jai-alai, a
beautiful Spanish game, which had the same gambling features, however, as the sport whose place it took.44 In G6mez's
time the concession ran out, and it came up for renewal.
Jai-alai had, indeed, won a place for itself, but only in
Havana, with its great Spanish population, where alone it
was possible to get an adequate financial return that would
justify the considerable expenditure required in erecting a
suitable edifice. The jai-alai matter appeared in a so-called
"tourist" bill, on the basis of providing attractions for visitors
from the United States. Liberals like Martinez Ortiz and
Conservatives of the stamp of Gonzalez Lanuza were op

"Republica de Cuba, Coleccion      ^ For a description of this game,
legislativa, v. XXVII. pp. 5-6.    see infra, p. 606, n. 25.




MOST TYPICALLY CUBAN PRESIDENT: GOMEZ, 1909-1913          285
posed to it,45 but the majority, including men of both parties,
were in favor of it. As it eventually passed Congress it
proposed to authorize both jai-alai and horse-racing, with
betting allowed, for a period of thirty years. Apparently
some graft was involved, as no provision was made for
auctioning off these valuable rights. There was an outcry
against the bill that went beyond the walls of Congress,
and so Gomez vetoed it.46      Under a later administration,
however, both games were to find their way into the capital.
Even a bull-fight bill appeared early on the calendar of
Congress, but that game had never gained a great foothold
in Cuba, and it was beaten when it came to a vote. A
project for a Cuban Monte Carlo got a little farther on the
way, passing the House in 1910, but it met with so much
criticism that it was rejected in the Senate.47 In more recent
years, howeyer, it has come into being in the famous Casino
of Marianao (near Havana), to say nothing of the numerous
"clubs" maintained by politicians. In opposing the cockfight bill, Gonzalez Lanuza made a keen estimate of the
meaning of this type of legislation.
"Today," he said, "we have voted the totality of the project which
authorizes cock-fights. Tomorrow we shall vote a project for the
authorization of the national lottery. The bulls are on the point of
coming out of the pen... And so, distinctly, we are reviving a past
against which our fathers rose and against which we ourselves also rose. So it appears that our national conscience is declaring that the
social state befitting this people was that which we formerly had, save
for one difference: that then we did not hold public office."4
In yet one other even more reprehensible form the Gomez
era "distinctly revived the past", and that was, as already
45For a speech of the Conservative 380.
representative, see Gonzalez Lanuza,  Article on Cuba, in New interna853-855.                        tional year book... for the year
"4Message to the House, Mar. 6, 1910, pp. 196-197, at 197.
1913, in Mensajes presidenciales, I,  Gonzalez Lanuza, 865-866.




286


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


stated, in bringing back the old tradition that government
existed for the benefit of the office-holders, who must be
expected to miss no reasonably good opportunity to improve
their own fortunes at the expense of the state. This reached
out into all branches of the service, and perhaps was at its
worst, because without redeeming feature, in the case of
those in the lower ranks of the legislative field, who made
little more than a moderately good living out of it, since
the chance to do better by themselves was not afforded.
Scores of instances of graft by congressmen, provincial or
municipal councillors, judges, and minor administrative
officials might be given in a detailed story of the period.
Here, however, there is space only for a comparatively brief
treatment, and it is best, therefore, to take this up in connection with the man who profited the most, eve? though he
might have taken more than he did and though he advocated
few measures that did not also have in them some possibility
of advantage to the country itself. That man was President
G6mez.
Gomez gained a great fortune out of the presidency.
Vasconcelos called him "the ruined planter who made himself a millionaire from night to morning, and not by the
sweat of his brow".49 A recent article in an American periodical has the following to say about G6mez and graft:
"It may be that General Gomez personally was belefited more than
the government from these transactions... General Gomez entered
the presidency as a poor man. He owned a farm in Santa Clara Province
so covered with mortgages that if disposed of at forced sale he would
have been left penniless. While President his salary was $25,000 a year.
Nevertheless, when he left office in 1912 [sic] he constructed a white
stone palace on the Prado at a cost in excess of twenty-five thousand
dollars, and found investments in mines or sugar estates for about eight
millions more. His business acumen displayed itself late, but was
M Vasconcelos, 18.




MOST TYPICALLY CUBAN PRESIDENT: GOMEZ, 1909-1913  287


efficacious during the time he was chief executive. When reduced to
private life it became somewhat atrophied, and he died three years ago
in New York practically a pauper again." "
Any number of references to the same effect might be given.51
Even the friends of Gomez rarely, if ever, go to the pains
of denying that he profited from his office, and not infrequently they admit it. In his foreword to the Lozano
Casado eulogy of Gomez, Gualberto Hernandez applauded
Gomez for the graft that had allowed a number of Cubans
to build shining white, new homes in Jesius del Monte, a
suburb of Havana.52     It is of a piece with Cuban psychology
that he did not seem      to realize that the benefits which
G6mez had conferred on these few individuals had been paid
for at the expense of the mass of other less fortunate Cubans.
At the end of his term    El Mundo came out with a detailed
and flattering summary of Gomez's achievements, but then
went on as follows:
"While all this will appear on the 'Credit' side of the governmental
account of General Gomez, on the 'Passive,' or 'Debit,' side they will
speak vaguely of certain measures or acts of his administrative conduct,
consisting mainly in sanctioning laws voted by Congress in spite of the
opposition of a part of public opinion,-measures or acts which it
censured, but which (because of their littleness and insignificance),
though they might have been worthy of vituperation, would not obscure
and will not diminish the brilliance and value of the important items of
the 'Active' account." "
6Cuba, an American ward again?, retroceso.. de  la repiblica  de
in Independent, v. CXIII, pp. 35-38, Cuba, 10).  Naturally, Barbarrosa
at 35; July 19, 1924. The price of the overflows with references on this
palace on the Prado was given as two score, and there are numerous other
hundred and fifty thousand in the contemplrary writings of the same
original manuscript of this article tenor. Among these may be men(which the writer saw). Evidently tioned the following article by a
there was a misprint from the "$250,- prominent Lileral politician of those
000" of the manuscript.           days: Loinaz del Castillo, Enrique,
aFor example, note the imputation El pillaje nacional, in Mundo, Nov.
of graft contained in the writings of 26, 1909.
such respectable figures as Varona  ' Hernandez,  Gualberto,  Anepi(De la colonia a la republica, 247) grafo, in Lozano Casado, 3-5.
and Trelles (El progreso... y el  "Quoted in Lozano Casado, 85.




288


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


One of the most remarkable estimates of G6mez appears
in a volume entitled Tiburon (Shark), employing the nickname most commonly applied to Jose Miguel. This was
written by Lieutenant-Colonel Avelino Sanjenis, who was
private secretary to the President during virtually his entire term. The American reader will not sympathize greatly
with the main point of Sanjenis,-apparently that he had
been badly used because Gomez "did not give me even the
most meagre crumb of bread in that splendid banquet of
four succulent years", in consequence of which Sanjenis lost
money, rather than made it,-but the book is all the more
valuable in that the author mentions graft only incidentally.
He aims to stay by his thesis, resisting any inclination to
"satisfy the voracity of the public" through giving "an inexhaustible wealth of data" which he possessed on the
scandals of G6mez's administration.54 Nevertheless, stray
references constantly creep into the account. Some of these
are worth quoting. For example:
"The characteristic thing about General Gomez, as everybody knows,
is his selfishness. Deaf to the requests of friends, avid of wealth,
obstinate and tenacious in acquiring it, he employed all means, including
the sacrifice of his most intimate associates, to improvise a fortune.""
And again:
"From the ostentation and opulence manifested by General Gomez
since the termination of his presidential functions the public has gathered
how enormous is the fortune of the hero of Arroyo Blanco, calculated by
those who know about it as some eight millions of dollars."
Sanjenis went on to tell of G6mez's "splendid voyage of
pleasure" in Europe, the building of his palace along the
Prado, the stocking of his cattle-farms with valuable animals, his purchases of costly works of art, and the "oriental
pomp" in which the whole family lived.56
'Sanjenis: 12; 215-216.        "Ibid., 198-199.
"Ibid., 12.




MOST TYPICALLY CUBAN PRESIDENT: GOMEZ, 1909-1913  289
The financial advantages that come of being a President
of Cuba were well illustrated in the case of certain business deals that Gomez entered into in association with
Sanjenis, though it would appear that these particular deals
were unprofitable. Gomez was allowed to subscribe to the
stock of one company at eighty per cent of par. In another company he got some shares free and others at twentyfive per cent of par. In both instances others were being
required to pay the full face value of the shares.57 If there
may have been a semblance of legitimacy in transactions
of this character, there certainly, was none in scores of
others where G6mez and his associates profited at the expense of the country. There is not space enough here to
give details about any but the most famous instances of
graft in the G6mez era, but some of the other improprieties
charged against the administration-quite probably with injustice in some instances-may at least be named. Following is a catalogue of acts in which graft is said to have been
involved: the purchase of vessels for the national navy;
the loan bill; certain dredgling projects (in addition to those
of the Ports Company); the construction of the railway
from Jicaro to Mor6n; the monopolization of the collectorships and other operations in connection with the national
lottery; the fraudulent introduction of foreign cattle for
stocking G6mez's own estates, making him the richest cattleman in the country; the construction of the presidential
palace; the rental of buildings for public service; auctions
for arms, cannon, horses, and other materials of the army;
the Territorial Bank project; sales of old iron; the telephone
company concession; the auctions for road-building and
other projects; the construction of Havana Bridge; the pro"5Ibid: 157; 164.




290


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


ject for renting the Vento aqueduct; the Jicotea aqueduct
contract; the Columbia Camp affair; the sewage and paving
of Havana contracts; and innumerable other concessions,
subventions, contracts, and pardons.58
The first of the major graft bills in the history of the
republic, and one of the two most notorious deals of the
Gomez administration, was the exchange of the Arsenal
lands for those of Villanueva, both in Havana. The Arsenal
lands, 109,474 square meters in extent (according to the
statement of the President), lay along Havana harbor, and
were the property of the government, while the Villanueva
tract, of 43,418 square meters, belonged to the United Railways, an English company, and was almost in the centre
of the city, along the southward extension of the Prado.
There were some rumors about an exchange of these properties from the outset of Gomez's presidency, and by the middle of April 1909 the main features of the project were
given out to the public. On the 19th of that month G6mez
directed a somewhat flowery message to Congress about it,
pointing out how his plan would be a long step in the
direction of beautifying the capital and inviting Congress to
join with him "in a great work which will be an imperishable
and glorious memorial of my presidential period". According to him it was an exceptionally favorable deal for the
republic, as the Villanueva lands had a "mudh greater
value" than those of the Arsenal district, besides which
tie English company had agreed to spend not less than a
'Most of these are alluded to in of this period. See chapter XXII.
Sanjenis, 145-147. See also Barbar- One amnesty bill, passed in March
rosa: 112; 116. According to Trelles, 1913, was so objectionably broad in
"In the matter of pardons President its terms that United States SecreG6mez left Mr. Magoon far behind, tary of State Bryan protested against
for he granted eighteen hundred of it, whereupon G6mez vetoed it.
them." Trelles, Op. cit., 10. In a Trelles, Biblioteca, II, 116.
similar category were the amnesties




MOST TYPICALLY CUBAN PRESIDENT: GOMEZ, 1909-1913           291
million and a half in building five docks for the government and an incinerator to dispose of the refuse of the
capital. The railway would then remove its terminal station from Villanueva, and the government would erect a
number of beautiful public buildings at a total cost of
some six millions and a half. Among these were to be a
presidential palace, a congressional building, and edifices
for the departments of state, justice, government, and public
instruction, besides several lesser works. The message concluded with an expression of G6mez's "enthusiasm for the
project".59
The vastness of the plan was enough to stir the imagination, and for a moment it was received with almost as much
"enthusiasm" as that which Gomez professed. Very quickly,
however, people began to look beyond outward seeming
and to feel that it was startling primarily on account of
the stupendous amount of graft involved.60 Barbarrosa
ridiculed Gomez's remarks about the profitable character
of the deal. As he put it, somewhat sarcastically: "The
Arsenal is worth very little. Villanueva, much. Cuba gains
a few millions, therefore, thanks to English innocence."
Previously he had charged, however, that the Arsenal was
worth several millions more than Cuba got for it.6' One
estimate in a conservative American publication held that
the Arsenal was worth four millions more than Villanueva,
and calculated its area as far larger proportionately than
In Mensajes presidenciales, I, 211- the 28th the editor was doubtful.
213.                             And on the 29th, in a "Villanueva not
' For example, the editorials in the needed" article, it was pointed out
Havana Post from Apr. 15 to Apr. 29, that there was no necessity for giv1909, are an interesting illustration. ing up the valuable Arsenal lands for
In the article of the 15th it seemed Villanueva, as the government owned
as if the greatness of the project had other suitable tracts where the dequite taken the editor's breath away. sired  public buildings might be
On the 23d an editorial gave its erected.
stamp of approval to the deal. By  e Barbarrosa, 114-115.




292


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


would appear from the figures given above. Indeed, the
transaction was so notorious that the United States government is said to have expressed its disapproval.62 Gomez
and Congress were not to be turned aside, however, though
the bill did not become a law until July 20, 1910. It was
substantially in the same terms as the President had suggested.63 From the standpoint of results obtained by the
government no deal of the G6mez era was a more complete
failure than this famous exchange. The ragged skeletons of
some of his proposed public buildings for "beautifying" the
city were erected, and then the work stopped. So Villenueva
remains to this day an eye-sore in the centre of the city,
rather than a place of beauty,-all too "imperishable," and a
"memorial" to something very different from the "glory" of
the genial but nimble-fingered Jose Miguel. And yet, apart
from the graft, the deal was not such a bad one. It was a
good thing to get the railway a little away from the centre
of the city and to beautify the Villanueva district in the
way G6mez had planned. Jose Miguel cannot be blamed
for the failure to finish the work.     That is an episode of
the era of his successor, Menocal.     Menocal several times
asked Congress for funds to complete the construction, but
without success. There are those who claim, however, that
these requests were not sincere and that Menocal himself
prevented the completion of the task, as a political argumpnt against his predecessor in office.
aArticles on Cuba, in New interna- appointed four experts on behalf of
tional year book... for the year the government.  Apparently they
1910, pp. 196-197, at 197, and Ibid caught the spirit of the deal, for they...for the year 1911, pp. 205-206, at put in a bill for their services of
206.                             $29,800 apiece, or a total of $119,2001
'In Republica de Cuba, Coleccion This was a bit too much for G6mez,
legislativa, v. XXIX, pp. 421-424. who sent a message to Congress about
One of the paragraphs of the law it. Message of Feb. 3, 1911, in Mencalled for a formal valuation of the sajes presidenciales, I, 296.
two tracts, for which purpose Gomez




MOST TYPICALLY CUBAN PRESIDENT: GOMEZ, 1909-1913  293
The other of the two most widely heralded scandals of
the Gomez era was the celebrated Ports Company concession
for dredging a number of the harbors of Cuba. As this attained to most of its peculiar fame through the action
taken by the Menocal administration, it is perhaps best
to discuss it there. It remains to deal with the political
aspects of the Gomez era, which merit a chapter to themselves. First, however, something may be said here on the
more intimate aspects of the President's life-all of it from
the biography of Lozano Casado.
"In all my life," Gomez once remarked, "I have been
jovial in spirit, with a smile on my lips." This was in part,
it would seem, the result of deliberate design, for in telling
of his manner of receiving visitors he speaks of causing a
smile to light up his face. "I study men", he said, "as
others study/ books". That, he remarked, was fundamental
to government. As President he ruled according to conditions as they were in Cuba, and not in pursuance of a
general plan that an Englishman might have considered
right. As a good politician he kept in touch with those
things that such a man needed to know. While at breakfast he read, not only the insults or eulogies of the local
press concerning himself, but also and more particularly
what people in the provinces were saying. And the last
thing he did at night was to make entries on a chart which
enabled him to keep informed daily of the changes in the
population of the island. At times Gomez displayed remarkable cleverness in turning the intended thrust of an
opponent back on the man who gave it,-though one wonders whether it might not have been Ferrara who provided
him with the language. One such occasion came up in
connection with Ricardo Dolz, who had been an influential
figure in Estrada Palma's time and was accused by the




294


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


Liberals of being partially responsible for the United States
intervention of 1906. Dolz wrote a letter about the veteranist question,64 saying that if he were President he would
solve it inside of forty-eight hours. This letter, dated November 29, 1911, was published. Two days later G6mez
wrote to Dolz, and also gave out his communication to the
press. In the guise of politeness, but with an admirable
touch of irony, G6mez invited Dolz to come and tell him
what to do, and on no account to wait until he should
become President, implying that the delay might then be
permanent. He wound up by saying that Dolz might have
more energy than he, but he preferred the kind of reflection which might save the republic instead of delivering it
to the foreigner. An even more amusing communication
was one he wrote to a man who has since become President, General Gerardo Machado, at the time the latter
withdrew from G6mez's Cabinet in protest over the reilectionist plans of the President.65 Machado's letter, dated
April 23, 1912, was long and flowery, in somewhat too
beauteous a form, seemingly intended for the general public more than for Gomez. And, indeed, it was at once given
out to the press. The following is an excerpt from the
President's reply of the 25th, written in the intimacy of
the second person singular:
"People who, like you and I, are not writers or accustomed to offer
our prose to the public are apt to fall into the temptation of making ours
what others write for us, and on reading and re-reading it we soon find
the conception of another so charming and sensational that we wind
up by thinking it our own. Notwithstanding this, I shall take as yours
the things you say to me... Up to yesterday everything was going
along admirably in the republic according to the official reports you gave
me on the 23d, and on the following day our people have suffered such


'See infra, pp. 306-308.            respondence are discussed infra, at
The political bearings of this cor- pp. 313-314.




MOST TYPICALLY CUBAN PRESIDENT: GOMEZ, 1909-1913   295
a complete change and the social order has been so modified that a
horrible catastrophe appears to threaten us. What has happened to
produce so violent a transformation? I know of nothing other than
your resignation from the Cabinet."
As Gomez told it himself, he was in the habit of getting
up at six o'clock in the morning. After a visit to the palace
barber, he went through some exercises, took a shower bath,
and had a light breakfast at half past seven of fruit and
coffee. It was at this time that he looked over the newspapers, afterward reading a book until nine. At nine he
went to his office, looked over his correspondence, answered
some letters and gave directions how to answer the others,
and received his Secretaries and the various individuals
who had been granted an audience. Between visits he wrote
his own daily impressions, which, however, he never intended to publish. At twelve o'clock he took his almuerzo,
or heavy breakfast, as the Hispanic noon meal is called,
and afterwards slept for an hour. Then he glanced at the
afternoon papers and played billiards, a game that he very
much enjoyed, and later read books until six. At that hour he
dressed for the evening and received private visits until dinner-time, which was usually at eight. Dinner over, he played
tresillo, a game of cards (involving gambling and requiring
much skill), in which he regarded himself as quite expert.
Then, after his already mentioned excursion into demography, he retired. His occasional fishing trips to Cayo Cristo
have already been mentioned.   He also acquired a fine
country estate which he called "Finca America", to which he
retired from time to time. According to his opponents, who
dubbed this place "the palace of the thousand and one
nights", he lived there in oriental splendor, but Lozano
Casado insists that there was no ostentation there of any
sort.




296           A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
Such was the life of Jos6 Miguel Gomez, one of the most
attractive, if also by no means the best, of the figures in
the history of the Cuban republic.66
' For this account of G6mez's daily at the end of the next chapter for a
life, see Lozano Casado, especially at discussion of materials in general conpp. 36-41, 45-59, and 90-95. See note cerning Gomez's presidency.




CHAPTER XIII


POLITICAL HAPPENINGS OF THE GOMEZ ERA
THE principal question about which everything political
revolved in the G6mez period was whether Jose Miguel
would seek reflection in 1912.     If one could have relied
upon his public statements there) was no reason to believe
that he would. He had agreed to support Zayas in 1912 at
the time when the two branches of the Liberal party joined
together for the elections of 1908,1 and in the platform
which he published to the country in September 22 of that
year he spoke against reelection.2   In a statement of January 28, 1911, he said:
"I wish to have the honor of being the first who is opposed to his
own reelection; I wish to give that example to my people. That is what
I understand to be prudent, foreseeing, and patriotic."'
And in a public letter of April 25, 1912, to General Machado
he again remarked that he was not a candidate.4
This was one of those instances, however, where all the
world knew that a "changed situation" would arise to make
him become a candidate, in case he could conveniently arrange it.  Anyway, he allowed his friends to support him
for the.nomination, and the Zayas wing of the party broke
away from him because of the moral certainty that G6mez
1Though not published at the time, Liberals in December 1912, quoted in
this agreement was a matter of corn- Lozano Casado, 73-75, at 75.
mon knowledge. Later, G6mez him-  'Martinez Ortiz, II, 808.
self openly admitted it. G6mez,  'Quoted in Trelles, Biblioteca, II,
Manifiesto (Public declaration) to the 112.
4Quoted in Lozano Casado, 54.
297




298


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


intended to run for a second term. It is true, too, that there
were moments of something mildly like persecution of
Zayas followers, and it is said that the United States government warned G6mez not to seek reelection.5         Even after
that, it is claimed, he persisted, and assertions are made
that the revolutionary tendencies during his administration had more than a little encouragement from the President, who hoped that the "necessities" of the situation might
require him to reside in the palace for another four years.
The evidence of G6mez partisans to the same effect,-at
least in private conversation,-is also so overwhelming in
amount that it may be considered a fact that the President's anti-reelection promises meant nothing at all.     This
fits in with the political happenings of the period.
Surely there was little cordiality or team-work between
G6mez and Zayas during the former's presidency. G6mez
lived up to the pact of 1908 in appointing four Zayas partisans to his Cabinet and several more to other high posts,
but there were some protests over the distribution of the
lesser jobs.6 G6mez supporters rarely, if ever, had a good
word for Zayas,7 and the President himself expressed a very
unfavorable opinion of his rival, admitting his own opposition to him in 1912, despite earlier promises to support him,
for the "situation had changed."8     The most famous incident illustrating G6mez's "disapproval" of Zayas partisans
'came up in connection with the outstanding figure of the
6 Kennedy, W     M, The revo- announced. See Havana Post, Jan.
lution in Cuba, in Living age, v. 28, 1909.
CCLXXVI, pp. 463-468, at 467-468;  'Lozano calls him an "apostate,"
Feb. 22, 1913. Also, Vasconcelos, 13- and refers to his "Machiavellism" and
14.                             his "diabolical machinations."  LoOn the very first day of Gomez's zano Casado, 18.
term it is said that Zayas protested  8G6mez to Ferrara, July 15, 1912,
against some of the dismissals from  quoted in Lozano Casado, 68, and
office that the President had already G6mez, Manifiesto, also in Lozano
Casado, 73-75, at 75.




POLITICAL HAPPENINGS OF THE GOMEZ ERA          299
Revolution of August, General "Pino" Guerra, now become
commander-in-chief of the Cuban army. "Pino" was known
to be a Zayas follower, and the affair was complicated by
the fact that General Monteagudo, who was perhaps nearer
to Gomez than any other man, wanted the headship of
the army for himself. For the time being, Monteagudo
commanded the rural guards, which were maintained as a
separate body. Personally, "Pino" and Gomez were very
good friends, and the former often went to the palace to
have a game of cards or billiards with his chief. On the
night of October 22, 1910, as he was leaving the palace
after the usual friendly game, he was attacked and fired
upon by some assassins, who had been hired for this purpose, so it is said, by Gomez himself. The intended victim
was not killed, but was wounded in the leg. Shortly afterward he resigned his command, and, as already related, was
succeeded by General Monteagudo, under whom the rural
guards were added to the regular forces.
It is impossible to prove G6mez's connection with this
incident, but it was one of those things that everybody
knew and admitted. The following is a statement made to
the writer by a G6mez partisan,-one of several that might
be given:
"G6mez was afraid that 'Pino,' as head of the army, might influence
the elections or even start a revolution in favor of Zayas. He therefore
tried to get rid of him decently by offering him a rich mission to Europe.
But 'Pino' refused to go. So something else happened! The names of
those who attempted to kill 'Pino' were perfectly well known. The case
against them was not 'proved,' however, although everybody knew it was
true and that G6mez was back of it."
Naturally, G6mez expressed great "indignation", and an
"absolute confidence" that the guilty would be punished,9
'Message to Congress of Nov. 7,  273-283, at 274.
1910, in Mensajes presidenciales, I,




300


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


but the only man who ever suffered on account of this
crime was "Pino" Guerra himself. This incident, which is
almost incomprehensible to the Anglo-Saxon mind, has had
many parallels in Hispanic American lands, and seems not
to have detracted from the eventual popularity of Gomez,
though it hurt him at the time. Indeed, no less a person
than Guerra himself later deserted Zayas and became a
follower of Gomez!10
This was not the only instance of executive violence in
this period. It has been charged that there were also plots
to assassinate a number of other opponents of Gomez,'1 and
one other case attained to a fame that even surpassed that
of the Guerra affair. That was the shooting of Manuel
Lavastida. Lavastida had been a captain in the rural guards
until ousted on February 1, 1909, presumably on account
of political opinions he had held in the campaign of 1908.
Thereupon, according to G6mez, he began to conspire against
the government, influencing a number of the men he had
formerly commanded to follow him in his designs. He
was arrested at Placetas, Santa Clara, on the night of
March 15-16, but was shot and killed the following night
when he attempted to escape,-according to the government
account.  Meanwhile, on the 16th, Sergeant Francisco
Cortes of the rural guards and seven others, all of them
connected with the Lavastida plots, were reported to have
gone out in an insurrection at Taguayab6n, Santa Clara.
'General Monteaguado immediately directed a pursuit, and
the men were taken prisoners on the 18th. They denied
any attempt at revolution, saying that they had run away
because they had been informed that they were going to be
killed.


"Perez, 7.                        connection in Sanjenis, 145, and some
"Several men are named in this others in Barbarrosa, 112.




POLITICAL HAPPENINGS OF THE GOMEZ ERA


301


The Lavastida affair, otherwise Taguayab6n revolt, caused
a furor in the country. A great body of the public inclined
to the view that Lavastida had been deliberately murdered.
The Havana Post remarked that it savored of Diaz, the celebrated Mexican dictator.12    And the passage of years has
not changed people's opinions. Even so unimpulsive a writer
as Carlos Trelles has said that Lavastida was killed "by order
of the government." 13    The uproar over the event was so
great that the men who had been responsible for the death
of Lavastida were tried by court-martial, but were exonerated
two weeks later. At the same time, Cortes and his companions were put on trial, and condemned to death. There
was some expectation that G6mez might commute the sentence, but the President's message to Congress of April 5
made it clear that the men could hope for nothing from him.
He said that Cortes had joined Lavastida because he had not
been promoted to a captaincy to which he aspired, though
he was "utterly without culture and even lacking in good
manners." The sequel was told to the writer by a man of
recognized authority in the following terms:
"After Cortes and his companions had been condemned to death, a
decision was rendered by the Audiencia'1 of Santa Clara in June 1909
setting them free, on the ground that they had done nothing but 'take
to the woods' because they were afraid they were going to be killed. One
judge dissented on a minor point, holding that they were guilty of carrying arms, contrary to law, and therefore ought to be fined. G6mez was
furious, because this made the decision of the military tribunal, which
had practically been dictated by him, appear ridiculous. He did indeed
let the men off, but took revenge on the judges. The judiciary law of the
Magoon era, providing (among other things) for the irremovability of
judges, was to go into effect the following month. So G6mez took advantage of the opportunity that was still open to him as a matter of
law, and removed all of the judges, except the one who had voted for a


' Editorial of March 18.
"Trelles, Biblioteca, II, 113.


14 That is, the highest provincial
court.




302


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


fine, and he was transferred to another province. Several of these judges
have since attained to eminence, however, as members of the Supreme
Court." 
G6mez's action in the Guerra and Lavastida affairs was
the sort of thing that many had expected of him when they
characterized him as a "tyrant" at the time of the electoral
campaign of 1908. On that occasion he had felt it necessary
to disarm suspicion by announcing in his platform that if
he were elected "the executive would have to maintain itself
within the limits that the Constitution and the laws have
fixed for that power." 16 Once in office, however, he showed
the normal Hispanic American tendency to dominate all
branches of the government,17 though at no time remotely
approaching the extremes of some of the petty tyrants of the
Caribbean mainland. To be sure, Gomez was merely following tradition in acting as he did, and nobody has better
expressed the habit of the Cuban people of looking to the
executive for everything than has Gomez himself.18      For this
same reason the President was also the principal target of
the critics, who rightly or wrongly assailed him with all the
facile vindictiveness that Cuban writers have at their command. Gomez has often been praised for his patience in the
face of these attacks, but there were times when he actively
resented them.'9 This manifested itself especially in his relations with the press and the law courts.
In February 1910 the editors of La Prensa and El Gordo
15 Gomez gives a detailed account of  "T Note on this score Varona, A los
the Lavastida affair in his message to Conservadores, one of Siete circuCongress of Apr. 5, 1909, in Mensajes lares: 1910 a 1913, in De la colonia
presidenciales, I, 195-210, at 196-197. a la repiblica, 247-250.
The newspapers were filled with corn-  lMessage to Congress of Nov. 1,
ment for a month or more, and sev- 1909, in Mensajes presidenciales, I,
eral pamphlets of Leandro Gonzalez 227-236, at 227.
Alcorta (cited in Trelles, Biblioteca, '1 Gomez frequently alluded to these
II, 113) were published denouncing criticisms in his messages. For exthe action of the government.    ample, see Mensajes presidenciales, I:
' Quoted in Martinez Ortiz, II, 807. 227; 254; 255; 304; 401.




POLITICAL HAPPENINGS OF THE GOMEZ ERA


303


were put in prison on account of articles that had appeared
in their papers, and just prior to that time the editors of El
Comercio, La Politica C6mica, and Verdad y Justicia (of
Regla) were fined. The editor of Cuba was cited for trial,
but refused to appear on the ground that as a congressman
he was immune from arrest. In most of the other instances,
too, the offending articles had been written by congressmen,
and under current interpretations of the law the editors
should not have been held liable. Gomez went so far as to
attempt to influence the law courts to render decisions that
would allow him to wreak vengeance on his critics,20-this
in addition to his many appointments of judges "who make
public profession of their political faith and boast of the
most perfect submission to their party and those who govern
in its name." 21 To assist him in his battle with the newspapers G6mes had a "law of national defence" introduced
in Congress, signed by Ferrara and others of his partisans, on
January 31, 1910, the object of which was to muzzle the press.
Every newspaper in Havana except El Triunfo, the government organ, protested against the bill, and presently it
was withdrawn.22 There may very well be some sympathy
for Gomez in his procedure in this matter, for the excesses
of the Cuban newspapers, hiding behind congressional immunity, are notorious.23 Later, when he could do so with
a show of grace, since his term was then coming to an end,
Gomez sent a message to Congress suggesting that some
limitations be set to this privilege, referring particularly to
its abuse in the slanders of the press.24 It is not likely that
he expected any action from Congress, however, and certainly none was taken.
"Velasco, 32-33, n. 42-43.   "Cf. Varona, Op. cit., 248.
Varona, Op. cit., 248-249.   "Message of Feb. 10, 1913, in Men"Velasco, 31, n. 41.       sajes presidenciales, I, 401.




304


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


One of the earliest political problems of the President was
to bring about a fusion of the two Liberal groups that had
for a time fought each other in the campaign of 1908. The
arrangement between them on the eve of the presidential
elections amounted simply to an agreement to give government jobs in equal proportions to each faction, but otherwise each was to maintain its own organization. Gomez
was eager for a union of the two groups so that there might
be harmony between the legislative and executive branches
of the government. So in February 1909 he called a meeting
of the two wings of the party, at which time the differences
between them were ironed out,-though more in outward
seeming than in fact. G6mez formally announced the restoration of the single party organization in his message to
Congress of April 5, 1909.25 It was generally understood
that one of the most important articles of the agreement was
that Zayas was to be the party's candidate in the elections
of 1912.
Meanwhile the incoming administration had pounced on
the spoils of victory like a buzzard on its prey. Thousands
of men were thrown out of office, to make room for the
favorites of the winning party. This procedure caused not
a little misgiving in neutral and non-political quarters. As
Barbarrosa expressed it, "The idea of putting new people in
the place of honest functionaries who have been rendering
/good service would not occur to any serious government
which wished to introduce a plan of economies." 26 Naturally, the Conservatives protested, both for political reasons and because so many of their own partisans had been
swept out of office by the flood of new appointments. La
Discusi6n came out early in February 1909 in a bitter ar" In Mensajes presidenciales, I, 195-  X Barbarrosa, 96.
210, at 196.




POLITICAL HAPPENINGS OF THE GOMEZ ERA


305


raignment of the administration on this and other scores.
No enquiry had been made as to the merit or length of
service of public employes prior to the removals, it asserted,
and the handling of government business,-for example,
in the custom-house,-had been considerably disturbed as
a result of the numerous dismissals. It also charged that
civilians had been appointed to the army and that G6mez
partisans had been jumped over the heads of others, while
some of the appointments to the higher positions in the military bureaucracy were obviously political in character.7
Even the Zayistas protested at fiFst against the separation
of some of the office-holders from their places.28
It was only to be expected, in a country where the government job is so important a factor in the general scheme
of life, that there should have been considerable dissatisfaction among those who had lost their posts and also among
the thousands of others whose self-styled "just aspirations"
had not been gratified. And in Hispanic countries political
dissatisfaction quite easily translates itself into violence and
revolution. The G6mez administration had its full share
of these experiences. The Lavastida affair has already been
mentioned. On July 25, 1910, General Vicente Miniet went
out on what he probably intended to be a combined Conservative and veteranist revolution against the party in
power, though his act was condemned by La Discusi6n and
leading Conservatives and veterans. Miniet had but a handful of followers,-perhaps about seven,-and was captured
at an estate in El Caney, near Santiago, two days later.
Curiously enough his captor, a certain Lieutenant Castillo,
had been wounded and taken prisoner at precisely the same
place when he went out in the uprising of 1903.29 Another
Quoted in Havana Post, Feb. 9,  'This account was taken from the
1909.                      files of Discusion for July 1910.
' Havana Post, Feb. 1, 1909.




306


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


affair of the same sort took place when on July 3, 1911, General Guillermo Acevedo attempted to get up a revolution
in the province of Havana. This met with no more success
than the Miniet uprising had. Rather more serious was a
movement launched in August of that year by the veterans'
association, under the leadership of General Emilio Nuniez.30
The veteranist movement arose in part out of a sincere
desire to rid the country of the evils that had developed
under the Gomez administration, but it was interwoven from
the first with political considerations that soon came to be
perhaps the principal element involved. General Nuniez,
ever an influential figure in military circles, had not by any
means put aside his aspirations for the presidency, and very
likely hoped to attain to his ambition through the aid of
the veterans. In a circular of September 5, 1911, the National Council of Veterans declared among other things that
"neither traitors nor guerrillas" ought to be allowed to rule
the destinies of the state, hitting at office-holders who had
been Spanish sympathizers at the time of the War of Independence. This was followed by open threats that unless
these men retired from office they would be hanged, and any
judges who allowed indictments therefor would be hanged
also. Neither General Niunez nor the National Council of
Veterans authorized these violent pronouncements, but by
their silence or vague answers to direct queries they virtually
gave them countenance. At length the whole country was
o Another so-called revolutionary pear that Gomez was so watchful and
attempt was the "Conspiracy of the so capable in the face of revolution
trunk" of September 1910. A trunk and conspiracy that he was the one
was discovered filled with arms, and real man for the presidency in the
the impression was allowed to go out coming election of 1912. The "great
that they had been collected in con- trunk mystery" became one of the
nection with a proposed revolution jokes of Cuban public life. Kennedy,
against G6mez. Later, so it is said, W      M, The revolution in
it was found that the trunk had been Cuba, in Living age, v. CCLXXVI,
filled with old muskets by a Gomez pp. 463-468, at 467; Feb. 22, 1913.
official. The idea was, to make it ap



POLITICAL HAPPENINGS OF THE GOMEZ ERA


307


in an uproar, and it seemed as if another revolution might
occur. At this point the United States took a hand in the
game. On January 17, 1912, Secretary of State Knox sent
a note to the government of Cuba, saying that the situation
caused the United States "grave concern," intimating that
the laws should not be "defied" (in the way threatened by
the veteranists), and remarking that Cuba ought to prevent
any development which might compel the United States
government "to consider what measures it must take." This,
clearly enough, was a threat of intervention. There was an
initial splutter of fury when this communication was published in Cuba, and General Niunez is said to have declared
that the veterans would "fight to the death" against any
interference by the United States. Calmer views at length
prevailed, for the politicians feared that the United States
might never get out of the island if she came in again. So in
March 1912 the veterans' organization reached an agreement
with the government whereby the campaign against officeholders was dropped and the veterans consented to act merely
as a beneficial association for their own members and to aid
the authorities as supplementary guardians of the peace.
The veteranist movement did not fail altogether in its
program. A number of officials did fall on account of it, including two Cabinet members. Many of the government
officials against whom the veterans objected were civil service appointees, but Congress was prevailed upon to pass a
measure suspending the civil service law for eighteen months,
-so it would not protect these men. Furthermore, army
officers openly attended the veteranist meetings, despite a
law forbidding them to take part in political affairs. It must
not be thought, however, that all the veterans were solidly
behind the Nufiez movement. Many opposed it from the
first, on account of its violence and because they recognized




308


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


the political maneuver involved, while others went no farther
than to desire the suggested reforms. Nevertheless, it is
more than probable that there would have been a civil war,
if it had not been for the action of the United States.31
Gomez avoided a revolution in connection with the veteranist movement, but was not so successful in what seemed
likely at one time to prove a far more dangerous affair. This
was the famous race war of 1912. Reference has already been
made to the formation of the Independent Party of Color in
1907. The leaders of this group, Evaristo Estenoz (founder
of the party) and Pedro Ivonet felt that not enough political
favors were being accorded colored men, in view of their
services. To be sure, they had contributed very materially
in the war against Spain and in the Liberal victory over the
Conservatives. Negro leaders asserted that they had furnished eighty-five per cent of the soldiers in the war of '95 -'98,32 and it has been claimed that they constituted seventyfive per cent of the voters.33 These estimates are surely too
high, as approximately two Cubans in every three
are white, but certainly the negroes had provided a majority of the Army of Liberation and most of them
voted with the Liberal party. Furthermore, the Liberal
politicians had been very generous with their promises
to negroes in 1908, but short on fulfillment in 1909. At
the same time, as no less a person         than   Enrique Jose
'Naturally, the newspapers carried LXXII, pp. 170-171, Jan. 25, 1912;
columns each day about the vete- and Forbes-Lindsay, Charles Harranist campaign. Trelles, Biblioteca, court Ainslie, Curbing Cuba, in InII, 115, cites a number of other items, dependent, v. LXXII, pp. 185-186,
including the two following: Secades, Jan. 25, 1912.
Manuel, La justicia en Cuba, 2 vols., 32 The insurrection in Cuba, in OutHabana, 1912-1914; and Suarez Vera, look, v. CI, p. 238; June 1, 1912.
Luis, General Emilio Niunez, Habana,  " Wigdil, Walter, Addition without
1915. Other mention worthy of note division= revolution, in Independent,
includes: Sanjenis, 282-309; A warn- v. LXXII, pp. 1352-1356, at 1352;
ing note to Cuba, in Independent, v. June 20, 1912.




POLITICAL HAPPENINGS OF THE GOMEZ ERA


309


Varona later pointed out, the negroes had no great cause
for complaint. In a country where they were a minority of
the population and possessed but a scant fraction of the
national wealth and culture, they had received equal rights
with white men, and the fact that they had fought for Cuba
did not necessarily entitle them to government positions,
as aptitudes for the tasks of peace were different from those
of war.34 But Estenoz and Ivonet were not dealing in abstractions. They had political jobs in mind, and felt that
they knew how to get them. Gomez was none too well
pleased with the formation of this party, and referred to the
"evil" in Hispanic countries of the "third party and even
other groups" in his message of April 5, 1909, though without
alluding specifically to the negro organization.  Estenoz
and his companions continued their work, however, and in
such a manner as to stir up a veritable race question. On
this account they were arrested and put on trial in April
1910, and in the following month the so-called Moruia Law
was passed forbidding the formation of any political party
on lines of race or color. The author of the bill was none
other than Senator Moruia Delgado, himself a colored man
and at one time president of the Senate, though more recently taken into the Cabinet as Secretary of Agriculture.35
For two years following the enactment of the Morua Law,
the Estenoz-Ivonet movement was so intermingled with other
political issues that it is difficult to state with certainty just
what was going on. The two leaders were released from
prison, and allowed to continue the work of organizing their
party. Many writers insist that Gomez was now using
' Varona, Enrique Jose, A los Con-  " Morua died the same month in
servadores, one of Siete circulares: which the bill that bore his name be1910 a 1913, in De la colonia a la came a law.
republica, 250-252, at 251.




310


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


Estenoz to further his own pretensions to a second term;
for example, Vasconcelos (a bitter opponent of Gomez, but
a Liberal of the Zayista group) says that while the press was
crying out against the colored party movement, G6mez not
only protected Estenoz, but also "gave checks and passagemoney in Pullmans to the agents and orators of Estenocism."
Indeed, Vasconcelos goes so far as to say that G6mez fomented the race question to further his reelection plans,
promising villas and castles to Estenoz, and he asserts that
the war-cry of the negroes when eventually they rose in
revolt was "Down with the Morua Law!" to be sure, but
with that, "Long live the reelection!" Then when Gomez's
original plans seemed likely to fail he plotted with Estenoz
and Ivonet (who frequently visited him at the government
palace) to simulate a revolution, so that Gomez could get
the credit of putting it down and use it as a lever to raise
himself once more to the presidential chair.36 A similar
statement was made by a foreign writer,37 but another writer,
presumably a naturalized Cuban citizen with pro-Gomez
leanings, insisted that the Conservatives were responsible
for the release of Estenoz in the first place, though admitting
that the defeat of the colored uprising would "compel"
Gomez's candidacy and "assure his reelection." 38
If the outbreak was intended only as a political maneuver,
it got away from its organizers and became a revolt of seri/ous proportions. It began on May 20, 1912, the tenth anniversary of the republic, but was soon well in hand everywhere except in Oriente, especially in the section running
from the neighborhood of Guantanamo to San Luis. The
" Vasconcelos, 11-14.       to the same effect. Varona, Op. cit.,
"Kennedy, W      M, The rev- 252. Cf. supra, n. 30.
olution in Cuba, in Living age, v.  8 The political situation in Cuba,
CCLXXVI, pp. 463-468, at 467; Feb. in American review of reviews, v.
22, 1913. Even Varona gives a hint XLVI, pp. 45-48, at 48; July, 1912.




POLITICAL HAPPENINGS OF THE GOMEZ ERA          311
whole island was alarmed, however,39 and these fears presently communicated themselves to the government of the
United States. On May 25, 1912, the American minister
delivered a note to the Cuban Secretary of State announcing
certain United States naval dispositions in Cuban waters
and saying that if the Cuban government should be unable,
or should fail, to protect the lives and property of American
citizens that American troops would be landed to take care
of them. The note went on to insist that "this ought not
to be considered as an interventioi." Gomez himself cabled
that same day directly to President Taft in protest, pointing
out (as in all common-sense it was true) that such an action
would in fact be an intervention, and suggesting that it be
taken only following a previous agreement with Cuba, so
as not to render a blow at the prestige of the latter. He
also asserted that no damage had yet been done to foreign
estates, and expressed his conviction that he could continue
to prevent it. Taft replied that he was pleased with the
energetic measures of Gomez, but repeated the purport of
the earlier note when he said that any precautionary acts
of the United States would not in any way represent an "intervention." A later United States note of the 29th would
not agree to make a prior arrangement with the Cuban
government before effecting a landing, and, indeed, a body
of marines was put on shore at Daiquiri, near Santiago, on
the 31st. Just previously G6mez, making a virtue of necessity, had given his "consent," though it can hardly be said
that it was asked. The American forces remained on Cuban
soil for several weeks, affording protection to foreign-owned
mines and sugar estates.40
"For example, Sanjenis tells how that city. Sanjenis, 148-154.
he raised a "Local Guard" of thirty-  0 The correspondence cited here apfive hundred volunteers to protect the pears in Gomez's message to Congress
capital and allay the feeling of panic of May 31, 1912, in Mensajes presithat possessed the white people of denciales, I, 360-363.




312        A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
The really serious stage of the revolt came a few days
after this. According to Vasconcelos it would appear that
one of the lesser leaders of the negro soldiery was not in the
secret of the G6mez-Estenoz plot. This man, Isidoro Santos
Carrera, attacked and burned the La Maya sugar-mill on
June 2. That alarmed General Monteagudo, who was in
charge of operations in Oriente, and he thereupon suspended
constitutional guarantees on the 4th. The original plan,
according to Vasconcelos, was for negro demonstrations in
the vicinity of sugar estates, but no shooting; then G6mez
was to offer an amnesty to those who would lay down their
arms, and quickly "pacify" the country.41 However true
or false this charge may be, G6mez certainly, proceeded with
vigor, following the La Maya affair; indeed, there was nothing else to do, for now he had a real civil war on his hands.
On June 3 G6mez asked Congress for the right to declare
martial law in all the national territory or any part thereof,42
and this was granted by a law of June 5,-though Monteagudo had anticipated the law the day before. On the 6th
Gomez issued a proclamation denouncing the "ferocious
savagery" of the rebels and promising to make short work
of them.43 Unquestionably the country was solidly behind
him. Menocal, the Conservative candidate of 1908, offered
the government a thousand cavalrymen,-an offer which
/was not accepted; 44 leading negroes were on the government
side; 45 and business interests, of course, were of the same
mind. For a few days there was some severe fighting, for
there were about four thousand well-armed negroes in the
field. It was necessary for Monteagudo to defeat them in
battle, but this was done. Afterwards he had to deal with
Vasconcelos, 15-18.        "For example, note the speech of
" In Mensajes presidenciales, I, 363. Cuesta Rendon, a colored representaVasconcelos, 19-22.      tive in Congress, quoted in Gonzalez
" Ibid., 9-10.            Lanuza, 890-891.




POLITICAL HAPPENINGS OF THE GOMEZ ERA


313


separate small bands, until the death of the rebel leaders
broke the back of the revolt. By July 18 the last body
of rebels had been cut to pieces or taken. In all, the revolution cost the lives of some three thousand colored persons.46
In due time an amnesty bill was passed, covering offences
in connection with the uprising,47 and the affair, as such, was
buried. Incidentally, it may be noted, however, that political jobs for negroes have since been granted rather
lavishly, though not those involving any high degree of responsibility, beyond the duty of adding up their pay and
collecting it and of delivering a number of votes to a party
chief.48
Whatever G6mez may have had in mind in connection
with the race conflict, it did not lead to his renomination for
the presidency. The pact with the Miguelistas of the Liberal party was viewed with suspicion and doubt by the
Zayistas almost from the first. As early as the elections
of 1910 there was something approaching an open split,49
and as the time came nearer for the political conventions of
1912 there developed a violent controversy between them.
G6mez was "not a candidate," but newspapers and political
friends were working for his nomination tooth and nail. In
April 1912 General Machado wrote an open letter resigning
from the Cabinet, on the ground that the President's hatred
"for a man" (meaning Zayas, though not naming him) was
precipitating Cuba toward an intervention, just as Estrada
Palma's hatred of G6mez had done (as Machado put it) in
1906. He also referred to "the secret" that everybody knew,
~Trelles, Biblioteca, II, 116.  Among the planks advocated by difISee infra, pp: 531; 533.   ferent Liberals were those calling for
Cf, supra, pp. 22-23.      the prohibition of religious orders, the
4 Incidentally, there were the usual prevention of foreigners from acquirqueer and meaningless, though vote- ing land, and the abolition of the
catching, platforms in the congres- Platt Amendment 
sional electoral campaign of 1910.




314       A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
that G6mez was after reelection, as Estrada Palma had been
before him, and lWe intimated that G6mez should do what
Estrada Palma did not, that is, resign.50 Naturally, G6mez
did not resign, but continued to work under cover for the
nomination. He had as an opponent the cleverest politician
that Cuba has yet produced, however, and when the party
convention was held on May 15 Zayas came out of it with
the Liberal nomination.
The nomination of Zayas was not taken with a good grace
in the Gomez camp. Possibly G6mez still hoped, for a time,
to retain the presidency as a result of the situation that
developed immediately afterward in connection with the
race war. Nevertheless, he dropped his pretensions eventually, whether or not because of alleged objections on the
part of the United States cannot be stated with certainty.
He and his followers did not accept Zayas, however. Governor Asbert of Havana, once a Zayas supporter, but more
recently a close favorite of G6mez, now refused to support
the Liberal candidate at the polls, and threw his influence
to the Conservative nominee. Some Liberal papers attacked
Zayas. La Lucha called him the "candidate of defeat," and
said that he stood for "dissolution, ruin, and rout." This
paper was one of several still clamoring for the election of
G6mez. Gomez himself later published a letter of his to
Ferrara, dated July 15, in which he asserted that Liberal
anion or victory was impossible in the face of the nomination of Zayas, as many Liberals felt that they were serving
both the country and the party by working against him, for
the government would lack "authority, respectability, and
force" in his hands. On this account G6mez held that the
Liberals ought still to reject his candidacy and nominate
a new standard-bearer. Otherwise, like Bryan in the United
" Quoted in Lozano Casado, 50-53.




POLITICAL HAPPENINGS OF THE GOMEZ ERA


315


States, Zayas would carry his party down to defeat.51 Meanwhile the Conservatives had renominated General Menocal.
They had the advantage of party solidarity, which the Liberals lacked,52 and were able to get Asbert lined up on their
side, thus assuring their victory in the normally Liberal great
province of Havana. The smaller province of Pinar del Rio
was safely Conservative. It was therefore necessary to win
one other large province (Santa Clara or Oriente) or the
other two small ones (Matanzas and Camagiiey). The
eventual decision was to make the effort in Oriente.
It is usually asserted that the elections of November 1912
were fair in every respect,53 but there are many who do not
admit that this was so.54     One distinguished Cuban, whose
name would carry weight if it might be mentioned, described
the whole electoral situation to the writer as follows:
"G6mez wanted to be reelected, but would not come out in the open
and say so, pretending that he favored Asbert. But Zayas manipulated
things so that he got the Liberal nomination. Then Gomez aided
Menocal. It developed that it was necessary to win Oriente in order to
defeat Zayas, and there G6mez had Monteagudo and the rural guards
employ all the usual electoral arts of military intimidation and the
like in order to swing the balance for Menocal. Everywhere else the
elections were fair."
Gomez asserted, after the election, that he had done what
he could, within proper limits, to help Zayas (though it is
exceedingly doubtful if Zayas himself knew it!), but the
The election situation is discussed in De la colonia a la republica, 241 -in detail from the G6mez standpoint 243, at 241.
in Lozano Casado, 66-89.           8 For example, Trelles says: "Man2 In one of his circulars to the uel Sanguily directed the elections of
Conservatives, Varona called upon the first of November 1912 with the
the party to take advantage of the greatest impartiality." Trelles, Bib"fractionalism" and "excessive per- lioteca, II, 117. Sanguily was Secresonalism" of their opponents by pre- tary of Government at the time.
senting a solid front themselves.  'Cf. item in Havana Post quoted
Varona, A nuestros correligionarios, infra, p. 567.
one of Siete circulares: 1910 a 1913,




316


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


statement just quoted represents the general opinion with
regard to his action. This is what Perez says:
"Yielding, so they say, to the pressure of General Monteagudo, who
enjoyed an enormous prestige in the army, he had the unfortunate idea
of turning traitor to his party, delivering the presidency of the republic
to Mario Garcia Menocal.""
It is probable, however, that the elections themselves were
substantially correct, although the government may very
well have been ready to use force in case it should have appeared to be necessary. As matters were, Menocal won, and
the Conservatives even carried Congress, though by the narrowest of margins.56 Once the issue was settled, Gomez was
loud in his protestations of impartiality in the elections 57
and of his own non-reelectionist ideas. On this score he said
"I glory in having been the first ruler in Latin America who
has established such a patriotic precedent," 58 and in his
manifiesto, or public statement, of December 1912 to the Liberals he repeated that he had not been a candidate, personally favoring Asbert.59 These remarks need not be considered very seriously, however, from the standpoint of what
he had really wished to do.
On May 20, 1913, Gomez's term came to an end. As that
date approached, various summaries of his achievements in
office were published in the newspapers, mainly laudatory,
in which many things were claimed for him. Yet, to one who
can look at Cuban affairs from the outside, it would seem
that the main significance of his administration lay in the
fact that it marked a restoration of traditionalist tendencies,
with the single exception that Cubans had taken the place
"Perez, 7. Elsewhere, in referring  5For example, in his message of
to the election of Menocal, Perez Nov. 4, 1912, to Congress, in Mensays that Monteagudo "raised him sajes presidenciales, I, 380-393, at 381.
to power in 1912." Perez, 11.    ' Quoted in Lozano Casado, 94.
'Pardo Suarez, 119.            sQuoted in Ibid., 73-75, at 75.




POLITICAL HAPPENINGS OF THE GOMEZ ERA


317


of Spaniards. Estrada Palma had tried to hold back the
current, and it burst over him. G6mez swam with it. A
president like G6mez in a country with more wholesome political traditions would deserve unqualified condemnation,
but in Cuba it is a question whether, on the whole, he does
not more nearly merit praise. He could not have prevented
bad political practices, even if he had desired to do so, for
he had to rely upon a horde of self-seekers whose idea of
"patriotism" was to gather in the fruits of office for themselves. As for G6mez, he never went quite so far in improprieties as it would have been possible for him to go. He
gave some heed to public opinion. And he did not reelect
himself President, as he most certainly could have done if
he had been willing to make use of the violent methods that
were classic in Hispanic America. As one writer has said:
"All his faults he redeemed with a single gesture: he did not aspire
to power through the employment of power, descending the steps of
the palace after having delivered his authority to his opponent of the
previous electoral period." 
And, to be sure, if Cuba could for a time have had rulers
who were no worse than Jose Miguel there might have been
a more rapid evolution toward a better political state.61


e Perez, 9.
e There is nothing remotely approaching a Martinez Ortiz for the
G6mez era or, indeed, for succeeding
administrations. Aside from comparatively brief pamphlets or articles,
there is not a single work that deals
in detail with this period as a whole,
not even as part of a larger work.
Lozano Casado is concerned with the
personality of Jose Miguel, but is
useful, though by no means safe, on
some other phases of the period. The
same thing may be said for Sanjenis,
who was primarily interested in airing his own grievance against the
President. A number of pamphlet

eers contribute incidentally to the
story, here and there. Some of their
works have been cited in this and
the preceding chapter, but several
more are noted in Trelles, Biblioteca,
II, 112-117. So this period, even more
than those before it, is in need of
an exhaustive study making critical
use of government documents, newspapers, and other contemporary evidences. Rowland, Donald Winslow,
The Cuban race war of 1912 (M. A.
thesis, 1926; Ms. in the Library of
the University of California), is a
meritorious study of one phase of this
period.




I
CHAPTER XIV
MENOCAL BEGINS, 1913-1916
THERE was great rejoicing by the best elements in Cuba
when, on May 20, 1913, General Mario Garcia Menocal, the
successful candidate of the Conservative party, took over
the presidency of the republic. At last, they thought, Cuba
was to have the correct and efficient government of which
the workers for independence had dreamed. For the Conservatives seemed to stand for the ideals of Gonzalez Lanuza
and Enrique Jose Varona, men of proven integrity and worth.
Then too there was Menocal himself, rated the highest in
his party. Respected as he was in Cuba, Menocal was even
more admired by the foreign writers who celebrated his advent to power. He "stands... apart from and above the
ordinary run of Cuban politicians," said Sydney Brooks, wellknown English publicist, who then went on to compare him
to Woodrow Wilson, the President of the United States. He
was "the most distinguished and experienced man of affairs
in the island," said Brooks, adding that of all the Cubans
he was "the best man they possessed." Indeed, continued
Brooks, it was unusual to find his type in Cuba, and even
more so for him to have succeeded in politics. He was not a
self-seeker, and not even accused of aspiring to the presidency in order to make money out of it, but was really disinterested and altruistic in his views, thinking of the welfare of the land and not of the manipulation of political jobs
and loot-yielding concessions. Once he made up his mind,
however, he was tenacious of his views, for he was "endowed
318




MENOCAL BEGINS, 1913-1916            319
with a decisive and energetic temperament." Furthermore,
he chose as his ministers men of first-rate quality, with the
result that a healthier atmosphere had become apparent in
Cuban politics.1
This characterization was merely representative of what
foreigners in general and many Cubans thought, and, despite
later "variations from type," was very likely what Menocal
himself intended to be. Even at the outset of his second
term some foreigners were still speaking favorably of him.
For example, George Marvin, an American writer, said of
him that he was "more of an American than... a Cuban,"
intending the remark as praise. He was open, frank, a good
listener, and absolutely honest. He had "extraordinary administrative ability," which he had displayed in war, business, and in the presidency, in which last-named office he
worked "twelve hours a day." This writer pointed out, however, that Menocal had one grave defect: he was typically 
Cuban (and one might add Hispanic American) in being a
strong family man, "which is really at the root of most Cuban 
political troubles." 2
Marvin's remarks on the score of the Menocal defect are
worthy of somewhat more extended comment. Cuban wives,
said Marvin, were the recipients of an oft-repeated, ardent
devotion from their husbands, who might tell them "twenty
times a day" how much they loved them,-and then tell the
same story twenty more times to some woman around the
corner. Nevertheless, the affection for the former was real,
and extended far beyond wife and children, taking in relatives of various degrees as members of "the family." There
'Brooks, Sydney, Cuba and its pres- can review, v. CXCIX, pp. 734-745,
ident, in Living age, v. CCLXXXI, at 745, May, 1914.
pp. 497-499, May 23, 1914; Some im-  'Marvin, George, Keeping Cuba
pressions of Cuba, in North Ameri- libre, in World's work, v. XXXIV,
pp. 553-567, at 564-565; Sept., 1917.




320


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


were some fifteen or twenty persons in one branch of the
Menocal family who all lived in the same house, having little
to do with anybody else, except others of the enlarged family
group. And family loyalty makes its way into politics. An
American military attache once caught a relative of Menocal
in the act of "embezzlements," but Menocal would not punish the man, though he did transfer him to another post.
Thus, said Marvin, "loyalty to friends and kindred is actually
a hampering influence in the public life of Cuba," and it was
that sort of thing which made the Platt Amendment necessary, even in the background of such an otherwise fine man
as Menocal.3
The name of Menocal has already appeared many times
in these pages. He had, indeed, had a distinguished career.
Born at Jagiiey Grande, Matanzas, in 1866, he was taken
two years later to the United States, to which country his
father emigrated when forced to leave Cuba at the time of
the Ten Years' War. Menocal spent much of his boyhood on
a plantation in Mexico, but was educated in the United
States, attending the Maryland College of Agriculture and
eventually obtaining a degree in engineering at Cornell in
1888. He then went to work at his profession, at first for
several years in Nicaragua in connection with the canal
projects of that day, but presently he appeared in Cuba, and
was there at the outbreak of the war in 1895. He enlisted
forthwith as a private, but rose quickly until at length he
attained to the rank of major-general. Few men saw more
active service than he. He fought under Maximo G6mez,
Maceo, and Calixto Garcia, the greatest generals of the war,
but his crowning glory came with the battle of Victoria de


8 Marvin, Op. cit., at 565.




MENOCAL BEGINS, 1913-1916              321
las Tunas while at the head of a division of Calixto Garcia's
army in 1897. On this occasion
"he made such skillful disposition of men and guns that competent
witnesses have said that the conduct of this battle stands out in the
entire record of the Revolution as the one combat in which the Cuban
forces were disposed and directed in accordance with the principles of
military science. Not only did General Menocal direct the operations
in pursuance of a well-considered plan but he is said to have led his
soldiers in the assault with intrepid courage."'
Under the United States military government Menocal was
for a time chief of police of Havana and then inspector of
light-houses, but resigned in 1899 in order to accept an opening with the Cuban American Sugar Company. For that
company he set up the Chaparra sugar plantation, which
became under his management the largest estate of its kind
in the world. His success as a business man was unquestioned. Laboring men as well as great corporations had confidence in him. As one man (who was by no means proMenocal) told the writer, he would "go right out in the fields
with his workmen and share their conditions." Furthermore,
as a sportsman and gentleman, in addition to being a hero
of the war against Spain, he was quite popular generally
among Cubans.5 Some were a little hesitant about him as
a candidate for the presidency, however, because of his long
life in the United States and his close relations with American business enterprises. In the campaign of 1908, for example, the Liberals accused him of being an annexationist.6
Nevertheless, few men could have been found who gave
greater promise of success than Menocal did at the inception
of his presidency in 1913.
'Cubans of to-day, 4.        pp. 497-499, at 497; May 23, 1914.
'Brooks, Sydney, Cuba and its pres-  ' Martinez Ortiz, II, 820.
ident, in Living age, v. CCLXXXI,




322


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


But that was in 1913. For several years following the end
of his second term in 1921 no man was ever more universally
condemned. Indeed, the current began to turn against him
from the time he decided to run for reelection in 1916. One
of the most noteworthy characterizations of the President's
conduct appeared in an open letter directed to him by Juan
Jose de la Maza y Artola early in 1917. Maza was also a
Conservative, but had opposed the reelection of Menocal, and
espoused the cause of the Liberal candidate against him.
He called upon Menocal to acknowledge his defeat in the
elections of 1916:
"Never in America," he said, "has a citizen been exalted to the first
magistracy of his people with more enthusiasm on the part of his own
partisans and more respect among foreigners and even his opponents
than you were in being raised to the presidency of our republic. In
addition to all the honors and glory which you had legitimately acquired
in the brilliant course of your history as an eminent patriot and exemplary
citizen, you had the merit of having been proposed by a party which
had distinguished itself by its vigorous and constant campaigns in favor
of morality and economy in our administration and which as a solid
guarantee of its seriousness and efficiency was offering the clean reputation of the illustrious men of high station who were directing it, by
whose wise and honored counsels all thought that you would always be
inspired... Your first steps... manifested clearly the honesty of
your intentions... But why did you not persevere in that line of
conduct?... Why did you not fortify yourself with the counsels of
the illustrious and honored chiefs of the Conservative party... instead
of... abandoning yourself to the intrigues of those among your friends.. who, avid of advancement, ended by making you believe that you
could not maintain yourself in the government without changing your
course in radical fashion and compounding with what they were wont
to call... the impurities of reality?... There were those who one
day brought it about that you should employ bribery to assure measures
that were fitting for the public good, utilizing only the collectorships, the 
distribution of which you could make, according to the law, at your
pleasure.! And when they saw how satisfied you were with the efficacy


'For a discussion of the collector- the Cuban lottery, see infra, pp. 554 -ships in connection with the evils of 557.




MENOCAL BEGINS, 1913-1916


323


of the system they later got you to dispose profusely of the margin in
the rent of the lottery for the same or other objects, not now so elevated,
and recently from the other funds of the public treasury, even from those
expressly devoted to specific expenditures, for purposes of very doubtful
propriety... It is true, and to the sound part of our people it is
perfectly clear, that these filtrations are not employed to increase your
own patrimony. But, on the other hand, people see with increasing alarm
that at your side there are rapidly being raised up not a few fortunes...
And such is the state of mind that this. alarm has created... that
people do not hesitate to say... that instead of that mad prodigality
with the public funds it is preferable, at the cost of the state, to enrioh
its own chief and a limited number of its functionaries, as this would
be more economical for the nation and less compromising for our
future." '
Of unqualified denunciations of Menocal in connection
with graft, bad administration, election-stealing, and dictatorial methods there is enough to fill volumes. For the
present, however, it will be sufficient to mention the summing-up which one Cuban writer has made of him as recently
as 1924:
"He lacked the perception which the other Presidents have had, to
gain the esteem of his people. In disposing of the funds of a nation
it is necessary to respect liberties, even though it may be by debasing
consciences, as Zayas has done."'
The election of Menocal in 1912 was accepted quietly in
Cuba, and Gomez gave over his power on May 20, 1913.
The new government had made promises of reform and
achievement which it very probably hoped to fulfil. According to Carlos Marti and other Menocal panegyrists it
proceeded to do so in ample measure, bringing prosperity
to the country and accumulating good works, to the accompaniment of correct administration, in a way deserving of
eulogies from the start. These assertions are not altogether


'Quoted in Cabrera, 357-367, at
359-362. Cf. infra, pp: 347-348; 350 -

351; 358-360.
' Prez, 14.




324


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


borne out by the facts. The difficulties in such a program
were none too easy to resolve. Prosperity at length did
come, but not with a rush. The last few months of the
G6mez era were a period of depression on account of the
low price of sugar, Cuba's chief product, and bad conditions
affecting the tobacco crop. This situation continued into
1914, at which time it was aggravated by the outbreak of
the World War. The immediate effect of that was to upset
all the. normal workings of Cuban commerce, although it
seemed clear from the first that it must eventually have a
beneficial effect on the price of sugar. Both the 1913-1914
and 1914-1915 crops were poor, though the product was
already bringing an appreciably higher figure in 1915. Tobacco, however, did not enjoy a single good year during all
Menocal's first term. In addition to bad weather, it suffered
virtual outlawry in European markets, where it was regarded
as a luxury that did not contribute to the winning of the
war. Meanwhile, prices for goods imported into Cuba were
rapidly going up, weighing heavily on the working classes.
Menocal tried to tide over affairs in the dark period from
1913 to 1915 by inaugurating a program of public works,
but there he was balked by Congress, which would not make
the necessary appropriations. And at this time Menocal
was still disposed to give some heed to constitutional limitations on his power. By 1916, however, there seemed not
t6 be a cloud on the economic horizon. The sugar crop of
1915-1916 amounted to more than three million tons, which
was by far the greatest in the history of the country, and
it was sold at very high prices. The next year it was half a
million larger still. The overflow from the good fortune in
the sugar business found its way into other lines. Foreign
capital was attracted, and many Cuban planters preferred
to sell their estates "at prices which have fully satisfied the




MENOCAL BEGINS, 1913-1916            325
sellers and left the buyers content." Indeed, never had
Cuba known such "astonishing prosperity," and even "the
most powerful nations had enjoyed it but few times in equal
measure." 10
The prosperity of the government itself, depending as it
did on custom-house collections, followed the same course
as that of the general business of the country. G6mez had
left only a million and a half in the treasury, together with
so many unpaid debts as to constitute a substantial deficit.
This was without taking into account the numerous bills
carelessly "tossed off" by Congress and the President authorizing projects without assigning the expense to any particular funds, but upon which no work had yet been done.
In this respect the Menocal government was no improvement
on its predecessor. Whatever money came to hand was expended in one way or another, without much attention to
budgets. Indeed, only once in Menocal's first term, for the
year 1914-1915, did Congress so much as trouble itself to
authorize the budget. The commerce of Cuba was approximately 302 millions in 1913-1914, 344 in 1914-1915, 474 in
1915-1916, and 604 in 1916-1917, with balances in favor of
exports of some thirty-eight, eighty-six, 130 and 108 millions
respectively. Most of this was with the United States, in
which respect Cuba already far outranked any other Hispanic
American country. Indeed, Cuba was importing from the
United States more than the A B C countries (Argentina,
Brazil, and Chile) combined and also more than the other
fifteen republics of the Western Hemisphere, or, in other
words, considerably more than a third of all United States
exports to Hispanic America. And yet the other countries
10 The President's messages to Con- ject. See Mensajes presidenciales, I,
gress, especially the long semi-annual especially at pages: 459; 466; 505;
messages at the opening of a session, 525; 529-530; 537; 544; 573; 579;
contain abundant data on this sub- 609; 617; 653; 658; 703; 709.




326


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


of Hispanic America outranked Cuba thirty times over in the
sum total of their population. No country in the world had
so great a per capita trade as Cuba. Nevertheless, the revenues were at first not equal to the necessities of the government,-so much so that Menocal once deemed it necessary
to effect economies, even to the extent of exacting a rebate
of from five to ten per cent on the salaries of public employes
receiving over nine hundred dollars a year.1l Presently,
however, the treasury became more prosperous. Receipts
and expenditures were approximately forty-one, thirty-seven,
forty-six, and fifty-two millions in the four years from 1913
to 1917.12
Current revenues, much or little, did not suffice for all the
needs of the state. One of the most urgent matters was for
the completion of the Havana-Cienfuegos sanitary tunneling
and paving contract on which the work had been started by
Gomez. As already stated, G6mez had tried unsuccessfully
to get Congress to authorize an additional loan of thirteen
millions when the original monies devoted to this project
were exhausted. Menocal took up this question at once, for,
indeed, a considerable sum was due on work already completed and not paid for. In order to keep things going,
G6mez had taken it upon himself to effect a short-term
loan of a million and a half, and Menocal borrowed yet andther million. The latter now called on Congress for authority to borrow fifteen millions, of which ten were to complete work under the old contract, together with some extensions that had been provided for by law, and the other five
divided equally between reimbursement of the two millions
and a half of the short-term loans and other old debts. Menon Message to Congress, Aug. 22,  " These figures are taken from Trel1914, in Mensajes presidenciales, I, les, Biblioteca, II, 127.
529-530.




MENOCAL BEGINS, 1913-1916


327


cal had a majority in favor of the bill, but for months the
Liberals prevented a vote through the familiar no quorum
device. In October 1913 the President called a special session of Congress to act upon this matter, but again there
was no quorum. At length, in the following December, the
bill passed, but for ten millions instead of fifteen. Early
in 1914 the loan was effected with the New York house of
J. P. Morgan and Company, in an issue to mature in 1949,
with a five per cent coupon rate. In addition there was one
short-term domestic loan during Menocal's first presidency
for five millions in 1915, to relieve the needs of the treasury.
This made the total domestic debt some fifteen or sixteen
millions at that time.l3
Despite the general prosperity which eventually developed
toward the close of Menocal's first term, the President found
it difficult to do anything substantial in the way of positive
achievements. Funds were lacking at the outset, and costs
were too heavy later on. Furthermore, not very much could
be accomplished without the consent of Congress, and that
body was none too easy to handle. Time and again, measures
were recommended, without any action being taken. Eventually, it would seem, Menocal "found a way," adapting
himself to the corrupt practices of the G6mez era, while still
later he hit upon the yet more convenient method of acting
on his own initiative in the typical fashion of the Hispanic
American dictator, but these executive shortcomings were
not nearly so much to the fore in his first administration as
in his second.
In spite of all obstacles, if Menocal's eulogists are allowed
to tell the story, especially Carlos Marti, a great deal was
accomplished by the President during his first administra" Loans were a frequent subject for sajes presidenciales, I: 453-454; 459;
discussion in the President's messages 465; 483-485; 546; 581; 709.
to Congress. See, for example, Men.




328


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


tion. In the first place, he "made the country more prosperous than it ever had been before." Never had there been
so many individual fortunes in Cuba. He was solicitous for
the welfare of labor, too, as witness a decree of 1915 for compulsory workmen's insurance, his successful mediation in
various labor disputes, and his patronage of a national labor
congress. He created a Cuban money system. He achieved
great things on behalf of education and public health. He
vastly aided agriculture, especially the sugar industry. One
of his acts in this connection was a decree of 1915 permitting
sugar brokers to quote their commodity in American money
and in cents per pound, instead of, as formerly, in Spanish
weights and money. Another measure was his encouragement of Spanish immigration as a much needed addition to
the supply of labor. He did all he could to advance the pastoral industry, as, for example, by his patronage of the cattle
exposition of 1914. He even promoted a baby show! He
was responsible for the completion of a vast number of
public works, such as the building of schools, hospitals, roads,
bridges, municipal improvements, water-works, post-offices,
wireless stations, and monuments.  Many of Menocal's
"achievements," however, were things that he merely recommended to Congress, without anything ever being done.
Others were things that he was "going to do," such as the
erection of the "Maine" monument "of Hellenic beauty"
(but not done until 1925), the building of the great central
highway (still in the legislative, conversational, and spending stage), the completion of the architectural plan of the
University of Havana (not done yet), and the solution of
Cuba's serious problem over distribution of its water-supply
(not even very far along in the "spending stage" as yet).
The documents emanating from the presidency itself reveal more of the obstacles that Menocal met with than do




MENOCAL BEGINS, 1913-1916


329


the works of his eulogists. This appears, not only in the
messages of the President, but also and more strikingly in
the annual Memorias volumes containing the reports of the
different departments of the administration. The report of
the Secretary of Public Works for the year 1916-1917 may
serve as an illustration. In that year there were fourteen
laws carrying a total appropriation of $948,000 for roads and
nine more in the sum of $1,128,000 for other public works.
The Secretary pointed out that his department had encountered many difficulties. The effects of the economic crisis
of 1913-1914 were still felt; prices of material had increased;
and it was hard to get the needed labor supply. Many
works had had to be stopped and contracts rescinded for
lack of funds. The advance in the cost of both materials'
and labor had been excessive; for instance, coal had formerly
been obtainable at four and a half to five dollars a ton, but
now cost twenty or thirty. The revolution of 1917 paralyzed
work, and caused destruction of much government property,
besides which the insurrectionists in the eastern provinces
appropriated large amounts of the national funds. The
solution of water-supply problems for Havana and Santiago
waited only for a grant of money by Congress, as the preliminary studies had been made. Much road work had been
done, though at heavy expense. Great attention had been
given to repair of roads, as they deteriorated rapidly. Altogether, the department had expended a little more than ten
million dollars during the year.14 Even Marti took occasion
to defend Menocal for not building nine hundred schools
that had been authorized by Congress, pointing out that
this apparently liberal legislation had assigned no funds for
the purpose.


1 Memoria   de la administracion    30 de junio de 1917, pp. 219-405.... entre el 1~ de julio de 1916 y el




330        A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
In point of fact, Menocal did very little on the score of
what has been claimed for him, as will be shown more
specifically in summing up about him at the end of his second
administration. His reform of the money system, however,
is worthy of special mention. United States money had
served as the sole legal basis for the country, but in practice
Spanish and French coins also circulated, and the cumbersome factor of determining exchange rates entered into most
transactions. By the law of 1914, which went into effect
the following year, a Cuban monetary system was established on a parity with that of the United States, with
United States money also passing as legal tender. The value
of this measure to business was incalculable.'5 A number
of Menocal's other "meritorious" acts would seem, on the
whole, to belong rather in the field of political maneuvers
than in that of beneficial administration. He had been
elected in 1912 as a result of the split in the Liberal party,
and probably deemed it necessary to build up Conservative
strength in order to win and retain a more thoroughgoing
control over the government. Many of his political innuendoes, ungenerous though it may appear to some, were directed at the man to whom in great measure he owed his
election, his Liberal predecessor in office.
In one of his first messages he asked Congress to omit
the twenty-five thousand a year for secret expenses that had
been awarded to Gomez, characterizing it as unnecessary
and improper. He also asked for the derogation of a law
of the preceding March 15 which had provided rich jobs for
a number of "provincial inspectors of sanitation." These
appointments were useless and wasteful.16 The suppression
1"Of interest on this subject are at 526, and 609-636, at 618-619.
Menocal's messages to Congress of  "Message to Congress of May 26,
May 9, 1914, and Nov. 1, 1915, in 1913, in Ibid., I, 437.
Mensajes presidenciales, I, 525-526,




MENOCAL BEGINS, 1913-1916


331


of similar posts in the diplomatic service was also recommended by him.17     When it seemed likely that Congress
might not only do away with the secret expense allowance
of the President but also reduce that of the. Department of
Government to twenty-five thousand dollars, Menocal saw
matters in a new light. He pointed out that previous budgets
had allowed that department from fifty to seventy-five thousand a year, and something like $530,000 had been spent in
fact during the four years of G6mez's rule, and therefore he
asked that seventy-five thousand a year should now be assigned.18  And as for botellas, or "soft jobs," it will appear
that he gave rather more than his share of them, before he
stepped down from power.
Some of Menocal's other messages had as high a moral tone
as those which had emanated from Tomas Estrada Palma,
but they carried no "punch" when it came to achievement.
He asked Congress to abolish the lottery,19 but when a year
and a half later, on December 4, 1915, he issued a decree for
an examination of the accounts of the nation, he exempted
those of the lottery.  As Trelles has said, "Comments are
superfluous." 20  In 1915 he vetoed a bill to grant a thirty
year concession for horse-racing and jai-alai,21 but both of
these sports later established themselves in Cuba while Menocal was still in power. He also called for legislation on the
prostitution evil,22 and vetoed an objectionable amnesty
bill,23 but did not achieve what in outward seeming it appeared that he wanted in either case.
7Message to Congress of May 27, y el retroceso (1906 a 1922) de la
1913, in Ibid., I, 437-438, at 438.  repiblica de Cuba, 23.
sMessage to Congress of June 18,  Message to Congress of June 9,
1913, in Ibid., I, 438-439.    1915, in Mensajes presidenciales, I,
1a Message to Congress of March 10, 602-603.
1914, in Ibid., I, 495-496.      2Message to Congress of May 26,
Trelles, El progreso (1902 a 1906) 1916, in Ibid., I, 689-690.
Cf. infra, pp. 531-532.




332


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


In his first long message to Congress, on November 3, 1913,
Menocal availed himself of his opportunity to criticize the
administration of his Liberal predecessor. For example, in
telling of the unsatisfactory state in which he found the
Department of Public Works he expressed himself as follows:
"On several occasions I ordered the suspension of various works in
the different provinces, some because their contracts covered a larger
sum than the credit approved for their execution, and others because
they were being carried on with funds assigned by illegal transfers, the
suppression of which left a deficit in their accounts. In the majority of
cases in the works undertaken by the previous administration there has
been inverted in general expenses and personnel a larger amount than
on the works themselves, for which reason it exceeded the credit approved. This is why the works cannot be continued. The temporary
personnel in all of them was consuming the greater part of the credit
assigned, and the same thing has happened in budgetary credits for
roads and bridges, betterments in rivers and ports, sanitation of the
city of Havana, betterment of the water-supply of the same, and other
allotments for works and services of great importance, which in good
part, for the reason given, have not been attended to."" 
The most resounding instance of Menocal's making political
capital out of the shortcomings of the preceding administration, however, occurred in conection with the Ports Company affair, one of the major grafting measures of the Gomez
administration. This story is told usually in connection
with the presidency of Jose Miguel, but it attained to its
greatest fame through Menocal's cancellation of the contract, and for various reasons, including the ultimate disptosition of the affair, it belongs more properly to the era
of Menocal.25
The thing that made this affair a particularly good medium
"Menocal to Congress, in Mensa- necessary, however, to give a comparjes presidenciales, I, 459-474, at 467. atively brief summary of the case,
2 The writer has in his possession a with citations merely to some of the
bulky file of papers on this subject, documents that have appeared in
many   of them  from  confidential print.
sources. Problems of space make it




MENOCAL BEGINS, 1913-1916         333
for political propaganda was that the Ports Company eventually developed into a foreign-owned corporation, but the
plan was conceived by Cubans who got the graft for themselves. A number of prominent Liberals (who have since
continued to hold a high place in political councils in Cuba)
are said to have been involved in the formulation of the
project. It had its basis in the fact that the ports of Cuba
were in need of dredging and other improvements. The
government was already collecting twenty-five cents a ton
on all imports, for this purpose, but this was being expended
mostly in salaries to engineers, who were supposed to be
drawing up plans. The promoters of the new scheme hoped
to get a concession from the Cuban government. If they
expected to obtain it without undertaking the port improvements they were disillusioned when they consulted G6mez.
He acted characteristically. He was willing to have the thing
go through, but insisted that the work should be done.
Thereupon the promoters approached an American engineer
who had been a successful contractor for several years in
Cuba, a certain Tillinghast L'Hommedieu Huston.26  As
head of the Huston Contracting Company he agreed to undertake the job. A resident of long standing in Cuba, Huston
cannot have been surprised at the obvious likelihood that
there was graft in the deal, but his company was called upon
merely to do the work, without any necessary connection
with the seamy side of the affair. The organizers of the
project were not greatly interested in the port works as
such, but were decidedly in a hurry to get the concession
settled. On this score the following story, told to the writer
by an engineer who was consulted about improvements at
one of the ports, is quite illuminating:


"Colonel "Tilly" Huston is now former part owner of the New York
well known in the United States as a American League Baseball Club.




334


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


"I received a wire from     asking me to tell him next morning
how much it would cost to dredge the port. I replied that it was impossible to say. Aside from making off-hand estimates of prices and
materials, I could not tell what condition the bay was in,-how much dirt
would need to be taken out,-whether there was any rock,-and twenty
other things. He wired back for me to make the estimate anyway and
put it high enough to take care of any possibility. So I sent in the
estimate."
With Congress and the President now willing, there was
one further preliminary step before the deal should go
through. Since G6mez required the improvements themselves to be made, it was necessary to finance them. So the
promoters consulted the general manager of the Trust Company of Cuba, a former partner of Huston and a stockholder
in the Huston Contracting Company, Mr. Norman H.
Davis.27  Davis suggested the formation of a stock company and an issue of bonds on the credit of the company's
contract with Cuba. He agreed for the Trust Company
to handle the bond issue. It is said that a preliminary enquiry was made of the American minister whether the United
States would have any objection to the concession, and it
was not until assurances were received from him     that the
Trust Company consented to act. The Ports Company was
organized, with Carlos Miguel de Cespedes (reputed "master
mind" of the whole affair) as general manager. Huston was
induced to serve as president until some other reputable
American engineer could be secured to take over the directiorf of the work. In 1912 this man was found in the person
of Captain Eugene Klapp. Meanwhile, the financial structure of the company had long since been arranged. There
was to be an authorized capital of ten million dollars in stock
' Mr. Davis later became financial dant of President Wilson. He is now
adviser of the Secretary of the Treas- president of the Woodrow Wilson
ury of the United States and a confi- Foundation.




MENOCAL BEGINS, 1913-1916


335


and ten million more in bonds. The promoters took their
profit in stock, and presently got clear of the affair by selling
out. Bonds in an amount of seven million dollars were issued, of which six million were taken in England.
The Ports Company bill became a law on February 20,
1911.28 The company was to dredge and improve the harbor
of Havana and a number of other named ports, completing
the work in six years. In return, it was to get approximately
seventy-five cents a ton on all goods imported through these
ports into Cuba for the next thirty years.29 Work began
in earnest in March 1911. On the score of what the company did in improving the harbors of Cuba there has never
been any noteworthy criticism. The company gave its best
effort in this direction, and something of value was accomplished. In the summer of 1911 an enquiry on the part of
the representatives of the English bondholders brought out
the fact that the United States government did not approve
of the concession, despite what the American minister may
have told Mr. Davis. The State Department criticized it
as onerous to Cuba and possibly in conflict with the Platt
Amendment. In consequence negotiations were entered into,
as a result of which an agreement was reached for a reduction in the profits of the company. Furthermore, a method
of arbitration was provided to ascertain the damages Cuba
should pay in case she at any time chose to do away with the
concession to the Ports Company. This action was taken
with the consent and virtual participation of the United
States, and embodied in G6mez's decree of May 12, 1913.
Affairs were at this stage when Menocal came into power
a few days later. On June 18, 1913, without consulting the
' This law may be found in Colec- the contract at different times, but
cion legislativa, v. XXXI, pp. 12-16. the above is substantially what it
' There were various alterations in came to.




336       A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
United States, which had been a party to the matter, Menocal issued a decree cancelling the agreement of May 12. On
August 4 he went a step farther, giving out a remarkable and
misleading decree in which he cancelled all rights of the
Ports Company, on the ground that it was never a legal concessionary. The argument was that the company had not
complied with certain technicalities required by the Cuban
corporation law, such, for example, as a provision that all
of the stock should be subscribed for and twenty-five per
cent paid in. In consequence, the contract with the republic
was not valid, according to Menocal, since the Ports Company was never a corporate entity capable in law of making
an agreement. Instructions were given, therefore, to make
no more payments to the company, although the work and
the collections were to be continued by the government.
There were some other interesting features of this document.
While the impression was inescapable that the making of
this contract had been an act of impropriety on the part of
the previous administration, there were no specific charges
against Cubans connected with the deal, but it was put in a
yet worse light as an affair between a foreign organization
and the Cuban state. The history of Huston and Davis
was recited in such a way as to cause them to appear like
two "carpet-baggers" preying upon the republic. Some
startling allegations were made concerning swift changes in
the stock ownership of the company. On January 21, 1911,
Huston was declared to be the owner of five per cent of the
stock, with ninety-five per cent in the hands of a Cuban
named Moragas. But on March 4 Huston had nine hundred
shares, then valued at ninety thousand dollars, in a total of a
thousand. All nine hundred had been given to him for
services. When the capital was increased to ten millions in
common stock the company agreed to pay Huston ten thou



MENOCAL BEGINS, 1913-1916         337
sand dollars a share for his former hundred dollar par value
stock and in addition $825,000 in the company's bonds, but
Huston and his associates were to give the company fifteen
per cent of their stock. Whether these assertions were true
or false and whatever may have been the meaning back of
these strange figures, it certainly seemed as if "Huston and
his associates," presumably Americans, were getting an
astounding amount of graft. It was also represented that
the company was deriving an unexpectedly great profit, having collected $2,990,000 in twenty-seven months, instead of
an originally estimated $580,000.30
There were a number of substantial omissions in Menocal's
account. In point of fact the company took in over three
million dollars on its tonnage allowance, but spent over nine
millions on dredging and other expenses, leaving a difference
of over six millions against the company. And even if there
may have been a technical defect in the original incorporation of the Ports Company, that had been cured by subsequent action of the government and the law courts, and even
in a decree of Menocal ratifying its existence as a company,
to say nothing of the rights in equity that it had acquired.
Menocal's action was therefore a blow at Cuban credit, as
the government had given its virtual guarantee to the bondholders by its contract with the Ports Company.31
Menocal was sustained by Congress and also by the Supreme Court, which upheld the President's decree of August
4, 1913. In all other respects the provisions of the contract
were continued, with the Department of Public Works replacing the Ports Company. In fact, however, the work of
dredging stopped, although the tax was regularly collected.
Owners of the stock and bonds of the Ports Company, mean

O For the decree of Aug. 4, 1913, 574-606.
see Colecci6n legislativa, v. XLI, pp.  81 Roig, passim.




338       A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
while, had enlisted the support of the United States. Whatever of impropriety there may have been in the early stages
of the affair these people, mostly Englishmen, were in the
position of innocent purchasers for value who had bought
their securities on the basis of Cuban credit. The United
States adopted that view, and made strong representations
to Cuba, holding that Cuba's failure to give compensation
for the company's claims amounted to a violation of article
three of the Platt Amendment. Menocal eventually consented to the demands of the United States, and in a message
to Congress of January 21, 1916, recommended action to
indemnify the "so-called" Ports Company, although only as
a matter of "grace and equity," 32 and on July 24, 1917, a
law was passed authorizing the President to settle with the
Ports Company, though without recognizing its legal existence, and also to continue the work of dredging.33 So presently matters with the Ports Company were arranged. As
for the ports themselves, nothing of great consequence has
been done since the Ports Company stopped its work, although the tax has continued to be collected.
The above is only part of the story. Why was there such
an uproar over the affair, and why did Menocal take his
action in the first place? There are any number of answers
to these questions. It is said, for example, that the Cespedes
group had some rivals for the dredging privilege who were
vociferously disappointed when they failed to get their share
of the easy profit. It seems, too, that certain prominent
newspapers were at first paid large sums monthly to support
the deal, but Captain Klapp stopped that when he took
charge of the company's affairs. Thereupon these journals
turned their batteries on the company. More trouble de

" In Mensajes presidenciales, I, 641-  " In the Gaceta, July 26, 1917.
642.




MENOCAL BEGINS, 1913-1916         339
veloped because the Ports Company refused to contribute
to the Conservative campaign fund, when solicited by individuals who had since taken high place in the government.
Menocal himself is said to have been- angered because Puerto
Padre, a port of the Cuban American Sugar Company (in
which Menocal was heavily interested), was not included
in the dredging project. He later added Puerto Padre, by
decree. Some say that a new group of Cuban politicians in
the Menocal era hoped to carry through the plan on its
original basis by first getting rid of the Ports Company,
though the whole affair caused such a scandal that it proved
to be impossible, at least for the time, to arrange the deal.
Probably the most prominent, and certainly the most recognizable, cause for Menocal's action, however, is the political
capital he was able to make out of the affair. For the time
being, too, it worked. If there could have been a fair election between Menocal and G6mez in August 1913 the former
would have won, "hands down."
Menocal's first administration was not lacking in evils of
the usual order in the political life of Cuba, but these were
not nearly so prominent as they were in his second administration, at which point they may more conveniently be taken
up. These earlier years reflected one other current in Cuban
life, however, that must needs be included here. During the
first three years of Menocal's presidency, though a state of
good order was the general rule, there were a few of the
minor outbreaks so characteristic of Cuban life. For example, there was some momentary excitement in November
1913 when a mulatto named Crescencio Garcia started a
revolt in the province of Santa Clara, but the affair was
handled quickly and effectively by the rural guards. There
were violent labor strikes, too, on several occasions. But
the incident which most strikingly represented the turbulence




340       A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
and lack of discipline in Cuban character, as also not a few
political evils, took place when the chief of police of Havana
was murdered in broad daylight by three men who were outstanding figures in the nation's affairs, including Governor
Ernesto Asbert, a leading aspirant for the presidency.
Asbert had been a colonel in the War of Independence, a
prominent leader in the revolution of 1906, and governor
and virtual political boss of the province of Havana since
1908. A very attractive man personally, not unlike Jose
Miguel Gomez in his typically Cuban and likeable traits,
he had also made an excellent record as governor of Havana.
The part he played in the election of Menocal, when he
threw his Liberal following to the Conservative candidate,
has already been recorded. He was generally regarded as
presidential timber, and, indeed, had been favored by many
for the Liberal nomination in 1912.
The victim in the Asbert affair was General Armando de
la Riva, a man not indeed without faults, but of a type that
is all too rare in Cuba. He took an active part in the War
of Independence, serving under Calixto Garcia, and rose to
the rank of brigadier-general, being the youngest general of
the war. A soldier in every sense of the word, he was employed in 1908 in the organization of the permanent army,
and in the following year became chief of police of Havana.
According to many accounts he proved himself to be the
best chief the city had ever had, rendering a conspicuous
service at the time the city was flooded during the cyclone of
1910; on that occasion he personally saved a number of
people by carrying them through the water on his own broad
shoulders until they were out of danger. After less than a
year, however, the politicians were able to effect his removal
as chief of police, because of his war on gambling. Later,
he was reappointed to the same position. Riva was a




MENOCAL BEGINS, 1913-1916


341


splendid figure, powerful, athletic, and commanding, and a
man of character,-one of those, according to United States
Secretary of State Bryan, who are "capable of sacrificing
themselves for the honor and good of the community and
of dying in fulfilment of duty." Furthermore, there was
nothing of the grafter about him; he seemed not to care for
money. Morally, he was perhaps like many others of his
race,34 and he has been accused of having a violent temperament and too uncompromising a nature for a Cuban ambient.
These charges, however, are from a Cuban angle; to others
he does not appear to have been too severe in his standards
for the performance of duty.
It seems that Asbert, though usually reputed an honest
governor, was one of a number of politicians who were conducting gambling clubs and resented Riva's campaign against
them. Both Asbert and Julian Betancourt, a representative
in Congress, had places on the Prado, the principal avenue
of the city. The day before the shooting affray Riva said
to a reporter that he had no quarrel with gambling that was
done discreetly in private clubs, but it was being carried on
notoriously. One man at the Julian Betancourt club was
told that the police would be killed if they tried to interfere with the games there, as the place was frequented by
important politicians. Riva said that he could not allow
that.
"I well know the consideration that is due the politicians," he was
quoted as saying, "and I am sufficiently a discreet man to respect their
circles and even their games when these are conducted properly and
discreetly."
This does not sound like the uncompromising man Riva is
"At the time of the shooting af- dren, both said to be his sons, one
fray he was accompanied by two chil- legitimate, the other not.
t










342


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


said to have been. He had given notice, however, that the
gambling in the two clubs on the Prado must stop.
On July 7, 1913, Riva was passing Asbert's place, when
he saw a negro employe take out a revolver. So he went
up to the man, and demanded the gun, and when the negro
could show no permit except one that had expired had him
arrested for illegally carrying a weapon. As the negro was
being taken to the lock-up, he happened to meet Asbert,
who was in a carriage with Representative Eugenio Arias
of Matanzas and Senator Vidal Morales of Camagiiey.
There was an excited colloquy with the policeman, after
which the three men drove away. Almost immediately afterward they met Riva, who was driving up the Prado, accompanied by his two sons, both of them children. There was
a dispute, in course of which Arias, a violent man, twice
punched Riva, and when the latter hit back Arias drew his
revolver and started firing. Riva jumped from his carriage,
-in part, so it appears, to get the children out of the area
of the firing,-but Arias shot him before he reached the
ground. Riva made his way to the sidewalk, and got behind
a column in front of number 84 Prado, where he was joined
by a captain of police, who returned the fire of Riva's opponents. By this time Asbert and Vidal Morales were also
firing, though it is)said humorously that the latter shot only
"at the man in the moon." Riva, hit twice, was mortally
wounded, and was taken to a hospital, where he died next
day.
The affair occurred at 6:30 P. M., the hour before dinner,
at the most crowded part of the Prado when "all the world"
was out. Two persons besides Riva were wounded, and the
wonder is there were no more. The three men gave themselves up, and Arias confessed his guilt, while the other two
maintained that they were innocent. The incident aroused a




MENOCAL BEGINS, 1913-1916


343


perfect furor of excitement in the country. Asbert had his
defenders, however. El Mundo asserted that Riva had been
persecuting Asbert for political reasons, at the instigation of
the Secretary of Government, asking why Riva pursued
gambling at the Betancourt and Asbert clubs and let it go
unpunished elsewhere. This argument is even yet maintained by the friends of Asbert, who claim that Menocal,
although still in alliance with the Asbertist Liberals, was
making plans to annihilate Asbert politically, as he was no
longer needed by Menocal and was troublesome on account
of his ambition for the presidency. Riva, however, was a
Liberal, and it is at least doubtful that he was lending himself to any such Conservative project. Nobody denies that
he was certainly enforcing the law as against Asbert. El
Triunfo ascribed the affair to "assaults of the police" on the
two clubs, and said this would not have happened under
G6mez,-which was rather a left-handed compliment for
Jose Miguel! La Lucha, in an interesting article defending
Asbert, said that the incident was a reflection of Cuban
social and political conditions. It asked the public not to
condemn Asbert out of hand. "It is enough that we have to
struggle against our sad destiny." The Riva murder did not
pass unnoticed in Washington. There must have been some
preliminary enquiry, for in a note of July 11, 1913, the United
States charge d'affaires expressed the satisfaction of his government that Menocal had evinced a determination to bring
the perpetrators of this crime to justice. Menocal was assured of the "vigorous support" of the United States in his
efforts on behalf of the maintenance of order and fulfilment
of the laws.
Menocal did act, though not until after the receipt of this
note, whether or not there may have been any relation between that and the steps he took. He suspended Asbert




344


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


from his governorship by a decree of July 12, and on the
14th called the Senate in extraordinary session. A little later
he summoned an extra session of Congress as a whole, sending a message on July 24 asking Congress to take up the
question of congressional immunity, which had been raised
in connection with the participation of Arias and Vidal
Morales in the affair.35 Congress was no more willing to discuss this much cherished privilege of its members than it
had been under Gomez, and it was impossible to get a
quorum. The sequel is concerned mainly with the efforts
made to clear Asbert and the others, and is taken up in a
later chapter dealing with amnesties.36 There might have
been no difficulty in the first place, but for the objections of
the United States. Secretary Bryan is once said to have
sent a note to the effect that to allow veterans like Asbert to
commit murder was not consistent with Cuba's obligation
to the United States to maintain a government that was
adequate to protect life and property. On this account two
amnesty bills were held up, and it was not until a bill went
through which virtually excluded Arias but included Asbert
that the United States government waived its objections.
As for Vidal Morales, no great point had ever been made
about him. Cuban opinion, too, has quite generally excused
Asbert. It is admitted that he fired on Riva, but it is claimed
that he did so after Arias had already mortally wounded that
officer and consequently that his shooting should hardly be
considered against him, as the issue was already settled.
However that may be, the excessive disposition to leniency
in Cuba in the aftermath of crime, together with the high
regard in which Asbert was held by many Cubans, is explanation enough of the indulgent attitude toward the for

" In Mensajes presidenciales, I, 449-  ' See infra, pp. 531-533.
450.




MENOCAL BEGINS, 1913-1916                   345
mer governor of Havana. As for Asbert, it virtually killed
his own chances in politics, although he still retained some
influence on behalf of others. The incident may also have
had a bearing on the break that presently developed between
the Asbertist Liberals and the Conservatives. This in turn
was a very nearly decisive factor in the events leading to
the election of 1916 and its sequel, the revolution of February
1917.37
"The early years of the Menocal and has been the principal basis of
administration are lacking in any the story given here. Several other
monographic work of even moder- brief pamphlets on this and other
ately respectable calibre. Marti cov- questions are also mentioned in Trelers the most ground, but is a eulogist les.  But government documents,
pure and simple. The sections in newspapers, and magazine articles
Johnson about Menocal belong in a (both Cuban and American), tosimilar category, and are also lacking gether with the accounts of living
in precision and atmosphere.  Los witnesses, must still be the principal
sucesos del Prado is a detailed and resort of the investigator.
valuable account of the Asbert affairs




CHAPTER XV


THE ELECTIONS OF 1916
THE turning-point in Menocal's career came when he decided to run for a second term in the presidency. Reelection
in the United States is accepted as a matter of course when
a man has made a good record in his first term, but in Hispanic America, possibly because of the insistent demand for
a redistribution of the jobs, it is regarded as a dangerous evil.
"In no republic of the American continent," said Jose Manuel Cortina,
"has the presidential reelection brought anything but revolution, dictatorship, and corruption in all branches of the administration."
Cortina was thinking merely of Hispanic America in his use
of the term "American continent." His remarks certainly
describe what took place in Cuba under Menocal.1 Even
more significant were the words of Menocal himself in a
letter of October 1912 to General Enrique Loinaz del Castillo:
"The effort of the President to bring about his own nomination for
the post while he is still holding it will be taken... as an indication,
in countries of our race, of a certain dangerous spirit of partiality in
whomsoever may conceive this aspiration... The principle of nonreelection is the firmest support of peace."'
Menocal had made a one-term       preelection promise, and,
indeed, Dolz says it was hard to get him to run the first time,
as also for a second term.3 He at first backed General Emilio
Nufiez to succeed him, but later accepted the nomination for
Quoted in Pardo Suarez, 168.  118. Also in Cabrera, 37, n. 1.
'Quoted in Trelles, Biblioteca, II,  'Dolz, 6.
346




THE ELECTIONS OF 1916                    347
himself. This factor in the political situation was not very
prominent in the first two years and a half of Menocal's administration, however. For a little while his government
managed at least moderately well, even in its relations with
Congress, due to the alliance of the Asbertist Liberals and
the Conservatives. But Menocal's stand in the Riva affair,
unavoidable though it was, caused something of a break between the two groups, and in 1914, for political reasons, the
entente between them was formally dissolved. Furthermore,
in the biennial elections of that same year the Conservatives
lost their majority in the House.4 Mention has already been
made of Menocal's difficulties from this time forward in
getting needed legislation from Congress. It is probable
that this factor turned his mind toward reflection, as it did
also to the employment of other evil methods in Cuban
politics for the attainment of his ends. He was urged by
leading politicians to stand for renomination, on the ground
that he was the only man in the party strong enough to unite
all factions and give hopes of success in the ensuing campaign for the presidency.5
During 1915 the name most commonly heard as candidate
for the Conservative nomination was that of General Niuiez,
then Secretary of Agriculture, but toward the close of that
year rumors were already in circulation that Menocal would
run. These were not received with favor by some of the
'The elections of 1914 reflected the towns the voters were forty-six to
normal evils of Cuban functions of forty-nine per cent of the entire popthis sort, except that there seems to ulation, an impossible figure. Menhave been no noteworthy executive ocal asked Congress to authorize a
pressure. Menocal called attention new census as the basis for a correct
to the frauds that had been com- voting list. Mensajes presidenciales,
mitted, in a message to Congress of I, 559-560. Congress, it may be menDec. 14, 1914. The voting lists, made tioned, took no action on this mesup in the time of Magoon, were now sage. See chapter XXIV for a furutterly untrustworthy. A great many ther discussion of general election
persons did not vote in 1914, but it evils.
would appear from the count that   "Dolz, 6.
everybody had done so. In some




348        A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
best men in the party,-by Enrique Jose Varona, among
others. Varona had more and more been drawing away from
active participation in Conservative councils. As early as
1913 he had remonstrated against the use of the spoils system, and had resigned his presidency of the party because
his views did not appear to agree with those of the other'
leaders.6  Other notable opponents of reelection were Jose
Antonio Gonzalez Lanuza, Wifredo Fernandez (then a representative and also editor of El Comercio), General Fernando Freyre de Andrade (then mayor of Havana), Senator
Juan Jose de la Maza y Artola, and General Nunfiez, although
the last-named eventually accepted the idea and battled as
hard as anybody to win the election. The action of Freyre
is especially interesting, as it represented a complete change
of front from the days of 1906. Menocal adherents endeavor
to discount his attitude, however, by saying that Freyre had
hoped to receive the Conservative nomination himself.7 The
most vigorous of Menocal's opponents in his own party, however, was Maza.
Whatever may have inspired Freyre's opposition to Menocal, there was another veteran of 1906 who most certainly
acted consistently with his stand of ten years before. This
was Ricardo Dolz, successor to Varona as president of the
Conservative party and virtual manager of Menocal's campaign. The party "assembly," or convention, was held on
January 16, 1916. The following is the story of that affair,
as told to the writer by a distinguished Cuban who has never
been a politician:
"The opposition to Menocal was so great that he could not have won
the nomination except by unfair methods. It was declared that all
'See on this score A mis correligi- Manifiesto de 1913: a mis correligionarios, the seventh of Siete circu- onarios, in Ibid., 263-266.
lares: 1910 a 1913, in Varona, De la  Merino and Ibarzibal, 20.
colonia a la republica, 254-256, and




THE ELECTIONS OF 1916


349


Conservative Secretaries or ex-Secretaries of government departments
were members of the assembly ex-officio, but this device was not sufficient
to give Menocal a majority. So all Secretaries under the old Moderate
regime were also admitted, although it had been formally stated at the
time when the Conservative party was founded that it was in no sense
a revival of the Moderates, but was a new party. Even so, Menocal
still lacked a majority, but the vote of the delegates was incorrectly
counted, and one of the Menocal adherents stuffed the ballots in his
pocket and left the room. So Menocal won. Nnfiez accepted the
nomination for the vice-presidency, however, on a promise of support
for the presidency in 1920."
This may be exaggerated, but one hears it on every hand in
Cuba. There is a similar statement by Raimundo Cabrera,8
and it is probably a fair approximation of the truth. According to the count, indeed, Menocal's victory was by a
comfortable margin, ninety-two to seventy-one.9
The Liberals were still very much divided at this time;
indeed, one might better speak of the Liberal "parties" than
of the Liberals as a whole, for there were a number of more
or less independent groups, each adhering to some favorite
leader. Zayas had the most numerous following, but not a
majority. Ernesto Asbert ranked next, and was by no means
reconciled to an inactive place in party politics, despite the
Riva incident. General Gerardo Machado and Colonel
Carlos Mendieta directed a so-called Unionist wing of the
Liberal party.10 And there were smaller groups headed by
Jose Miguel G6mez, Alberto Barreras, "Pino" Guerra, and
Eusebio Hernandez.     While most of these men had some
aspirations for the presidency, the names of Zayas and G6mez
were the most often mentioned, with that of Zayas more
prominently to the fore; the evil fame of Jose Miguel was
not yet sufficiently far back in the past for him to have reCabrera, 37.                   "0Curiously enough, Machado and
'Merino and Ibarzabal, 27.     Mendieta were to be rivals for the
Liberal nomination in 1924.




350


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


covered his popularity. So Zayas, the "perpetual candidate,"
or "Bryan of Cuba" (as he was often called), who had been
publicly disparaged by Jose Miguel, Orestes Ferrara, and
other prominent Liberals, was the only logical figure for
the nomination. In due time he won it in the Liberal assembly of March 20, 1916, gaining the support of the
Machado-Mendieta and "Pino" Guerra factions.      Nevertheless, it was almost hopeless for him to go to the polls
unless he could obtain the backing of the former Liberal
chieftain.1"
With the nomination of Zayas the campaign entered a
vigorous stage, based more on arguments about reelectionism
than on the merits of the candidates themselves. Every act
of the Menocal government was criticized as tending toward
the retention of power through the use of power, or, as a
pro-Menocal writing has expressed it, not because of any
violation of the laws, but on account of "the probability that
he might some day intend to commit crimes against the law
of elections." 12 These charges had their logical conclusion
in a bill brought in by Menocal's Conservative opponent,
Senator Maza, to the effect that a President who was a candidate for reflection should step down from his office during
the electoral period. This bill, known as the "Maza law,"
passed both houses of Congress in May.13 Menocal vetoed
it in a message to Congress of July 1916, basing his action
on the Constitution, which permitted of a two-term presidency and called for the exercise of executive power by the
President in a way that was at variance with the provisions
of the Maza law.14  One writer claims that the Maza plan
"For a discussion of events lead-  Ibid., 38. The principal paraing to the nomination of Zayas, see graph of the law is also in Pardo
Merino and Ibarzabal: 18; 31-36.  Suarez, 177.
" Ibid, 37.                  1 In Mensajes presidenciales, I, 695 -697.




THE ELECTIONS OF 1916


351


was favored by the majority of the Conservatives themselves, but it was not possible to get a two-thirds vote in
Congress to overcome the President's veto.15 Meanwhile,
affairs had taken a turn for the better in the Liberal camp.
Gomez and Zayas buried the hatchet in June, and the former
agreed to support Zayas's candidacy and even to direct the
campaign, though under an agreement which Dolz said left
Zayas a "prisoner" of G6mez.16 It appears that the latter
was to be allowed to name certain of the party's candidates
for congressional and municipal posts. Early in October,
although the Hernandez group of Liberals passed over to
the Conservatives, the much more important Asbertist faction made a pact with the Liberals.17  This virtually assured Zayas of victory in the province of Havana. The
Conservatives had, previous to this time, tried to effect a
trade whereby they were to get the votes of that province
for Menocal in exchange for letting a Liberal, Eugenio
Azpiazu, become mayor of the capital. This was denounced
by Varona as "a lack of respect for the public conscience," 18
and eventually it came to naught.
The campaign was one of violence on both sides, duplicating the scenes of 1905. The eventual greater crime of
the Conservatives in "stealing" the election has tended to
obscure the fact that the Liberals were also entitled to little credit for their conduct. From the first, they cried out
"Either Zayas or revolution!" This their newspapers and
orators did not hesitate to say in so many words, but it
might have been implied, too, from their other acts and
statements. Mendieta uttered something like a threat in a
speech at the Liberal assembly in March, when he said
"Pardo Suarez, 179.        '"Interview in Nacion, July 24,
'Dolz, 7.                 1916.
"Merino and Ibarzabal: 43-44; 53.




352


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


that the Liberals would compel the Conservatives to respect their rights, "as they counted on sufficient forces for
that purpose." 19 G6mez later made similar veiled threats,20
and on one occasion, so it is claimed, even went with a
party of friends and shot up the house of a Conservative
leader in the province of Santa Clara.21 However that may
have been, the whole country was soon almost in a state
of war. On August 6 at a Conservative meeting in Marianao,
near Havana, there was an affray with a Liberal policeman
in which six persons were wounded. Similar incidents occurred in numerous towns of the republic: at Manguito on
August 13, when three were killed and two wounded; at
Cienfuegos on August 19, with one dead and three wounded;
at Giiines on September 17, when an Asbertist candidate
for mayor killed his Conservative rival; at Camajuani,
where twenty-eight were wounded in a battle of Liberals
and Conservatives; at Camagiiey on October 7, with one
killed and thirteen wounded; at Giiira de Melena in October,
when a political riot was settled by a charge of government
cavalry, with a number of men wounded; in Havana itself
on October 18, when several persons were wounded in a
collision at the corner of Belascoin and Zanja streets; and,
indeed, at various other places, when men were killed or
wounded or even when they got off without harm, or when
buildings were burned or other deeds of violence were performed. Naturally, each party claimed that the other was
to blame, and probably with truth, in that both parties
were at fault, but the Conservatives point out that the Liberals had only seven men killed in the preelection campaign,
while the Conservatives lost forty-two, arguing from this
that the Liberals were more often the aggressors.22


"Merino and Ibarzabal, 35.
" Ibid., 46.


'lDolz, 13.
'Merino and Ibarzabal, 45-60.




THE ELECTIONS OF 1916


353


The frequency with which these incidents occurred led
the government to appoint military supervisors in a number
of towns, and this gave rise to a fresh controversy. Zayas
later charged that these officials destroyed the liberties of
the municipalities and brought influence to bear in favor
of the Conservatives. But there was a mixed commission
created by Menocal that intervened in matters affecting the
supervisors, the Conservatives claimed, and this body was, if
anything, more Liberal than Conservative; it was composed
of Dolz and Carlos Fonts Sterling for the Conservatives and
Ferrara and Jose Manuel Cortina for the Liberals, with
Sanguily, who had often acted with the Liberals, as the
neutral member. And eight of the supervisors eventually
joined in the revolution against Menocal.23  Certainly, too,
the appointment of military supervisors has been the normal
procedure in Cuba at times of a presidential election, both
before this time and since,-even when Zayas was President. It is probable that they did do something to affect
the elections, Conservatives for the Conservatives, and
Liberals for the Liberals, for political partisanship in Cuba
is too intense for one to expect abstention from the use
of influence and authority by anybody in a position to employ them. In the light of other evidence, however, it is
doubtful whether their conduct had any substantial effect
on the result.
The elections were held on November 1, 1916. There were
a number of riots and shooting affrays, in course of which
three Conservative presidents of electoral boards were killed.
There were also charges by each party that the other had
hindered the voting of opponents and committed innumerable frauds. With respect to the last-named charge, certainly, both sides were right. It is said that there were over
U Dolz, 9-12.




354


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


a million names on the voting lists and that about eight
hundred thousand votes were cast. Yet, three years later
the census was to show that there were only 477,786 eligible
voters in Cuba. And the election was close! That speaks
for itself,-and for both parties.24     Disorder and violence
on this day can hardly have been the rule, however. One
Liberal partisan has said that the elections were "serene" and
"tranquil," "with an appearance of impartiality and legality." 25 And the Liberal newspapers of November 2, at which
time it was popularly believed that the Liberals had won,
praised Menocal for his conduct of the elections.26 This
was also done by the directorate of the Liberal party that
same day in a formal communication to the President.27
In the light of such evidence as this, it seems likely that
the government must have been reasonably fair,-or at
least no worse than the Liberals,-up to and including
election day itself. The real complaint of the Liberals
concerns what happened after that date.
The story is often told in Cuba that Menocal was ready
to concede defeat the night of the 1st, but some of the
women of his family were not willing to accept that outcome. So when a suggestion was made of a way to falsify
the result it was seized upon by "feminine passion," and
Menocal was persuaded to adopt it.28       It may be that the
'Varona, who was as nearly im- Conservative directorate to the Libpartial as any Cuban could be, said eral organization on Nov. 7, 1916, in
that both sides committed "illegali- Merino and Ibarzabal, respectively at
ties" in the election. "Everybody pp. 63-65 and 65-66; also in another
knows that in that respect all were communication of the Conservatives
equaL"  Varona, Dectaraciones, in to the Liberals of Feb. 4, 1917, and
Prensa, Jan. 29, 1917.           of Menocal to Gomez of Feb. 5, 1917,
'Cabrera, 41.                  in Cabrera, respectively at pp. 342 -9 Quotations from Heraldo de Cuba, 344, at 343, and 378-381, at 380, and in
Triunfo, and Nacidn, all Liberal or- Merino and Ibarzabal, pp. 82-83, at
gans, are given in Dolz, 16-18.  83, and 84-85, at 85.
"See on this score an open letter  "See, for example, in Cabrera, 19 -of Menocal to the Liberal directorate 20.
of Nov. 5, 1916, and a letter of the




THE[E ELECTIONS OF 1916


355


story is not true, but it can hardly be doubted that action
was taken which robbed the Liberals of a victory. An intimation of what was coming was given when the government announced on the 3d that later returns seemed likely
to upset what had at first appeared to be a Conservative
defeat. A peculiar thing happened with telegraphic notices
about the election. It had been arranged that telegrams
with preliminary reports should be sent from each voting
precinct to the Central Electoral Board in Havana. These
came in regularly until noon of the 2d, when they stopped.
On the 3d they began to be received again, but from the
Secretary of Government instead of from the telegraph
office as was required by law. The Board protested about
this on the 4th, and from that time forward it received
no more telegrams at all. It seems also that the originals
of those that had been sent were removed from the telegraph
files, so as to leave no trace.29 It is said, too, that the packages containing the electoral documents, which were to be
forwarded to Havana for final scrutiny, were opened and
falsified by government agents in the post-office. The work
was done very slowly, and it was not until late in December
that the supposed "results" were published.30 Some evidence
appearing to connect the President himself with this procedure turned up in a telegram by his secretary, Eusebio
Azpiazu, to Conservative followers in Trinidad. This telegram, under date of November 2, the day after the elections, read as follows: "The general bids me to felicitate
you and to tell you to make every effort and omit no act
that may bring about victory." Azpiazu did not deny the
telegram, but claimed to have sent it on his own initiative.31
The Liberal contention that the returns had been tampered


D Cabrera, 48-49, n. 2.
'0Pardo Suarez, 180.


" Cabrera, 67-68; Merino and Ibarzabal, 65; Trelles, Biblioteca, II, 121.




356


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


with was sustained, first by the Central Electoral Board,
and then on final appeal by the Supreme Court on January
12, 1917. The result was left in doubt, however, as the
elections in a few precincts in Santa Clara and Oriente were
required to be held again, since the packages with the original
vote of these districts had mysteriously "disappeared." 32
Meanwhile, charges and counter-charges had been hurled
back and forth, while the country drifted toward civil war.
The Liberals called attention to numerous removals of their
partisans from government service, especially in the Department of Communications (including the post and telegraph
offices) since the elections. Menocal admitted that there
had been some dismissals, but claimed they had been few
in number and for just cause.33  The Liberals were even
more concerned about the movements of troops that were
ordered by the government. Whatever the leaders may
have had in mind, Liberal partisans were certainly talking
revolution as early as the first week in November, and it
was only natural that dispositions should be made to meet
such a contingency. Especially did the Liberals protest
against the sending of troops to Santa Clara and Oriente,
where the supplementary elections were to be held, insisting
that the government intended to use them to prevent
Liberals from voting. And, indeed, the Liberals did have
a normal expectation of victory if the elections, which had
been set for February 14 in Santa Clara and February 20
in Oriente, should be conducted fairly. They had already
been awarded the electoral vote of the provinces of Havana
and Camagiiey, with Pinar del Rio and Matanzas given to
the Conservatives. The addition of either Santa Clara or
"Cabrera: 18; 51; 55; 63-64; 392- in Cabrera, 378-381, at 380, and
394; Merino and Ibarzabal, 79-80.  Merino and Ibarzabal, 84-85, at 85.
"Letter to G6mez of Feb. 5, 1917,




THE ELECTIONS OF 1916


357


Oriente would decide the issue in favor of the Liberals.
In Santa Clara they had a majority of 1164, except for
the six precincts where the new elections were to be held,
and these could muster a total of only 2,401 names on the
voting lists, a number that was probably far in excess of
the actual voters in that district, which, incidentally, had
ordinarily been a Liberal stronghold. And even if there
had been no fraud in the voting lists it was doubtful whether
as many as two-thirds of the eligible voters would go to the
polls. The situation in the several precincts of Oriente
where another election was required was much the same.34
On this account, as early as December 1916 one of the
Liberal leaders, General Eduardo Guzman, had proposed
that the United States should be invited to supervise any
additional elections that might be necessary, but his suggestion was formally rejected by Liberals and Conservatives
alike.35  Later, some Liberals thought it would have been
well to have adopted that plan,36 but it had no chance of
acceptance at any time; it would have meant defeat for
the Conservatives, which was reason enough for them to
oppose it, and it was a bad political maneuver for the
Liberals to "bring in the foreigner." No doubt some of
their leaders already had in mind the methods of 1906,
in case the government should not yield the issue of its
own accord.
Meanwhile, the Liberals were convinced that the Conservatives intended to go to the supplementary elections
with "blood and fire." They charged them with distributing
arms and munitions in the districts where the partial elections were to be held,-with the pardon of criminals who
For one reference out of many, Cabrera, 104-109, at 105-106.
see letter of Ferrara and Cabrera to  "Merino and Ibarzabal, 78.
President Wilson, Feb. 10, 1917, in  'Cabrera, 81.




358         A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
were sent there to spread terror among the inhabitants,with the transfer of employes of the post-office and telegraph stations and the substitution of Conservative agents,with the despatch of troops under the command of men
notoriously in favor of the reelection,-with the location
of voting-booths out in the woods, far from the towns,with putting hindrances upon Liberals who wished to approach them, even including the vice-presidential candidate,
Carlos Mendieta, on one occasion,-and, in general, with
taking violent means to impress upon Liberal voters that
they were not under any circumstances going to be allowed
to win.37  Some remarks of the Conservative party leader,
Ricardo Dolz, served in no small measure to contribute to
this view.  In course of a talk with an editor of La Discusion, a Conservative daily, Dolz denounced the decisions
of the Central Electoral Board and the Supreme Court,
claiming that hundreds of fraudulent votes had been awarded
to the Liberals, while the Cbnservatives had been deprived
even of those that most clearly belonged to them,38 and
he then went on as follows about the way the Conservatives
intended to battle for victory in the partial elections:
"The Conservative party is full of ardor and ready for the struggle... It will fight with such courage as will surely leave a profound mark
on our electoral history. Our presidents of electoral boards will not
be killed," and if the case requires it that will happen to those of the
opposite band.""
Many prominent Conservatives were far from agreeing
with Dolz, notably Varona, Gonzalez Lanuza, Freyre, Maza,
'Cabrera, 68-69; also in letter of in Dolz, 16-18.
Ferrara and Cabrera to President  8This has reference to the murder
Wilson, Feb. 10, 1917, in Ibid., 104- of three Conservative presidents on
109, at 107-108.               election day.
'A detailed account of Conserva-  40Cabrera, 67, n. 1, quoting from
tive assertions on this score is given Discusion of Jan. 23, 1917.




THE ELECTIONS OF 1916                359
and Cosme de la Torriente, all of whom wished to concede
the victory to the Liberals. In an interview published in
Heraldo de Cuba on January 24, 1917, Varona deplored
the Conservative attacks on the Supreme Court decision.41
Five days later he gave out another interview in which
he called upon all Cubans to put aside domestic strife. Both
sides were equally guilty of committing electoral crimes in
the general elections, he said, but (alluding to Dolz's remarks) "never have I known a chief of a government party
to declare that one should go to an election to obtain a
victory at all costs." 42 Torriente was quoted as saying
that it was almost impossible for the Conservatives to win
the partial elections in the face of the advantage that the
Liberals possessed. Indeed, he held that the Liberals had
in fact won on November 1st.43 Freyre said that the Liberal
victory was indisputable. "Dr. Zayas is the President of
Cuba.   The Conservatives ought to take a stand against
the manifest reelectionist intentions of the government." 44
Several days later, unable on account of ill health to attend
a meeting of Conservative leaders, Freyre wrote to Dolz
that "our triumph appears impossible if we try to obtain
it in a peaceful contest between citizens." 45 Maza endeavored
to oppose the Dolz current at that same meeting, but according to Cabrera "Violence imposed silence upon him, and
some of the less impassioned of his coreligionists saved his
life by getting him out of the place." 46 Maza's long letter
to Menocal calling on him to recognize the victory of Zayas
has already been quoted in part.47 In addition he went
'"Quoted in Cabrera, 355-356.  Cuba of Jan. 30, 1917.
"Varona, Declaraciones, in Prensa  "Freyre to Dolz, Feb. 4, 1917, in
of Jan. 29, 1917.             Cabrera, 345-347, at 346.
"Cabrera, 388-391, quoting from  "Cabrera, 75.
Nacion of Jan. 27, 1917.      "4Supra, pp. 322-323.
"Cabrera, 71, quoting Heraldo de




360        A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
frankly into the whole situation, remarking upon Menocal's
pledges against a second term and on the various improprieties associated with his attempt to win a reelection, nevertheless.48
The attitude of these men was well known to the Liberals
long before the publication of their opinions mentioned
above. Indeed, Varona and others had been holding meetings of leaders of both parties, in hopes of settling the issue
without strife. On one of these occasions the Conservatives
offered to withdraw Menocal, if the Liberals would do the
same with Zayas, and hold a new election for somebody
else.49  It was said that Menocal objected especially to
Zayas, whom he considered "unworthy" of the presidency.50
If he was reflecting on the private character of his opponent
there was nobody in Cuba but could furnish confirmatory
evidence,-but this same Menocal was to boost Zayas into
the presidency four years later! At any rate, the Liberals
would not agree to the compromise suggested. Instead, the
directorate of that party formally declared its views on
January 26, to the effect that the Santa Clara elections were
unnecessary, but suggesting, in case the government insisted on holding them, that they be supervised by a committee of six men. The men were specifically named by
them, but, though four were Conservatives, two of the
four were Varona and Torriente.51 Naturally, since this
would have assured a Liberal victory and since the Conservatives had determined to win for themselves, these
proposals were rejected.52  Meanwhile, on February 3,
G6mez had directed a letter to Menocal about the situaMaza to Menocal (date not    Quoted in Cabrera, 338-341. Also
given), in Cabrera, 357-367.  in Merino and Ibarzabal, 82.
'eDolz, 32.                  2The Conservative reply, under
Comment of Ferrara, quoted in date of Feb. 4, 1917, is in Cabrera,
Cabrera, 80.                 342-344. Also in Merino and Ibarzabal, 82-83.




THE ELECTIONS OF 1916


361


tion. This letter, which had in fact been prepared by
Zayas, stated the Liberal case, and called on Menocal out
of "patriotism" and "duty" to make such dispositions in
Santa Clara as would give the Liberals a fair chance.53
Menocal answered, on the 5th, that "If it were not for the
deference I owe you as my predecessor in the presidency
of the republic and as a former companion in arms in the
Army of Liberation I would perhaps abstain from any reply."
He then went on to say that the elections would be conducted lawfully,-but did not agree to the specific requests
of G6mez.54  The latter wrote again, on the 6th, objecting
to Menocal's aspersions, "a bit monarchical in flavor," on
his previous communication, and calling attention to the
fact that Menocal himself had sent a similar letter to Gomez
in connection with the elections of 1912.55 This marked the
end of the negotiations. And, indeed, the revolution had
already been decided upon.56
Quoted in Cabrera, 348-354.  5For some comment on authori4Quoted in Cabrera, 278-381. Also ties, see the note at the end of
in Merino and Ibarzabal, 84-85.  chapter XVI.
5 Quoted in Cabrera, 382-384.




CHAPTER XVI
THE REVOLUTION OF FEBRUARY
SPEAKING of the situation as it was at the beginning of
February 1917, the Menocal historians of this period have
this to say:
"The Liberals were already talking of revolution, without the least
caution. The Liberal directorate was meeting daily to treat of the
elections. But in truth they talked only of something else: they were
making up a list of the friends they had in the army; they were sending
orders to their coreligionists in the provinces to be ready for the great
'jamboree' (chambelona) that they were going to start; different revolutionary projects were discussed; plans for some of them were made;
they studied what would be the most suitable movements; they enquired
into the means for combat of which they could dispose; and discussed
the place, day, and hour it would be convenient for them to begin the
revolution. Some preferred to await the elections in Villas,' but most
of them did not wish to wait even a moment. There were also those
who favored making the revolution in Havana, and others who thought
it more practical to go at once to the country. Of the triumph of the
revolution they were sure, superlatively sure; their victory was going
to be absolutely certain. They counted upon large forces of the army
in Havana, on the troops that were garrisoning Santiago de Cuba and
Camagiiey, and on some scattered detachments throughout the island;
all those troops were commanded by chiefs and officials who inclined to
the Liberal party. Liberals who had been veterans of the War of
Independence were disposed anew to lead a following, but this time,
as in the Revolution of August, against the Cuban government. They
were sure of winning, for even without fighting they knew the way to
cause the government to fall. The country was in the midst of the
sugar harvesting season; sugar, on account of the European War, was
'Villas, otherwise Cuatro (Four) employed quite as much as the
Villas, is the old Spanish name for present-day official name.
Santa Clara province, and is still
362




THE REVOLUTION OF FEBRUARY


363


selling very dear, and at the first burning of a cane-field the planters
would clamor for the immediate intervention of the United States, and
that country, as at the time of the Revolution of August, would decide
in favor of the revolutionists. There was not even a probability of
losing. The hours of the Menocal government were already numbered."'
This represents the situation substantially as it was. At
least as early as February 4, 1917, the revolution was decided
upon, and the plans, already drawn up, must have been
discussed for some time beforehand. Ferrara approached
Raimundo Cabrera on the 4th, asking him to accompany
him on a mission to the United States. He later told
Cabrera that all arrangements for an insurrection had been
made prior to his departure from Cuba on the 5th, and
expressed surprise that Gomez had not acquainted Cabrera
with the facts.3 Down to February 1917 the Liberals had
had rather the better of the moral issue between them and
the Conservatives, especially as concerned post-election happenings. Now, however, they threw all that to the winds
by going out in revolution. It would have been preferable,
as Cabrera said, to have proposed "conspiracy and war,
for after May 20, when all violences would have been
committed and every legal recourse and protest exhausted
uselessly." 4  Hispanic Americans have a peculiar outlook
on such a state of affairs as then existed in Cuba, however,
that Anglo-Americans find hard to understand. When convinced that they are not going to get fair treatment they
withdraw from any attempt at victory by legal methods,
holding that it would be of no avail and would unnecessarily
risk the lives of their partisans. And then they risk a great
many more lives in a civil war, with its attendant damage
2Merino and Ibarzabal, 86. The Cabrera by Ferrara, e.g., in Cabrera:
supreme confidence of the Liberals 118; 125. Also cf. Cabrera, 400.
appears also from Cabrera's account,  'Cf. Cabrera: 118; 124.
notably in opinions expressed to  'Ibid., 125.




364


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


to property and dangers of outside interference, and concede the legal victory to their opponents! This was what
happened in Cuba.
The plan was for G6mez to put himself at the head of
the insurrectionists in Santa Clara, and then entrain for
Havana and in three or four days compel Menocal to abdicate, so that the partial elections could be held without
illegal interference.5 Matters did not turn out that way,
however, for, whatever his political shortcomings, Menocal
showed that he had greater talent for a military campaign
than his opponents. Moreover, the action of the United
States government was to follow a different course from
what it had been in 1906, contributing substantially to the
Liberal defeat. The definitive decision for the revolution
was made at a meeting in G6mez's home, at which Zayas,
Asbert, Ferrara, Machado, Cortina, Agustin Garcia Osuna,
and Damaso Pasalodos were also present. At first it was
set for February 14, the day of the partial elections in
Santa Clara, but at the suggestion of Zayas this arrangement was changed so that Zayas was to give the signal,
after first making a visit to the electoral districts in Santa
Clara. Meanwhile, preparations were to go ahead, with
precise fields of operation assigned to the different generals.
Gomez left Havana in his yacht "Julito" on February 8,
announcing that he was going fishing in the Caribbean. Instead, he made a landing on the 10th in the Bay of Juan
Hernandez, Camagiiey, near Tunas de Zaza, Santa Clara, and
put himself at the head of the revolution. Zayas that same
day gave the expected signal. Not being allowed to approach one of the electoral districts, he held a meeting m
the city of Santa Clara, attended also by Machado, Mendieta,


Statement of Ferrara, referred to in Cabrera, 124-125.




THE REVOLUTION OF FEBRUARY


365


Guzman, and several others, and as a result orders were
given to begin the conflict.6
During all the time that had elapsed since the elections
of November and the outbreak of the revolution in February the United States had by no means been an indifferent spectator. Indeed, the Washington authorities were
more than usually interested in the maintenance of peace in
Cuba, for it was becoming increasingly clear that the United
States must enter the war against Germany, and the Cuban
sugar crop was an indispensable item in the plans of the
American officials; they did not propose to allow it to be
destroyed in a civil war if that could be avoided. There
was a hint of the Washington attitude as early as November
1916. The United States minister at this time was Mr.
William Elliott Gonzales, son of a Cuban who had been
wounded at Cardenas when Lopez assaulted that place in
1850. A brother of this man, too, had fought with Maximo
G6mez in 1898. Gonzales himself was thoroughly American,-so much so, so it is said, that he spoke Spanish with
difficulty. He was in the United States late in November
when he received an enquiry from a friend asking his views
on the situation. Gonzales sent a cablegram in which he
expressed an opinion that peace in Cuba depended on the
wisdom and patriotism of the Cubans themselves. He expected that Menocal would act justly, but was also convinced that any improprieties could be corrected in a permanent and satisfactory fashion only by the employment
of the methods provided by the law. In the excited state
of Cuban opinion this was taken by some Liberals to mean
Cabrera, 190-193, n.1; also 275; present at the meeting) make it
also statement of Gimenez Lanier, appear that the conference in Santa
in Cabrera, 246-252, at 249; and Re- Clara was held on Feb. 10, but
lato... del coronet Roberto Mendez Mendez Peniate, who was also in atPenate, in Cabrera, 399-419, at 400. tendance, says it was the 9th.
Cabrera and Gimenez (who was




366


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


that the United States would back Menocal in his endeavors to win the election by fraud, and so Manuel
Marquez Sterling, editor of La Naci6n, a prominent Liberal
organ, wrote to Gonzales on November 30 asking for a fuller
statement of his ideas. Gonzales, presumably after communicating with his superiors, replied on December 3, making it plain that his basic idea was that all should respect
the law, with a special responsibility attaching to those in
high place.7
If they had not been blinded by the vision of 1906 the
Liberals might have gathered from this that the United
States opposed the idea of a revolution. With the outbreak
of hostilities in February 1917 this attitude became more
and more insistent. On February 11 Gonzales gave out
to the press a long note of Secretary of State Lansing that
he had delivered to the Cuban government the day before,
with reference to the new elections in Santa Clara. Lansing
urged both parties to arrange their differences through the
methods that the law established, calling attention to a
similar controversy in the history of the United States,
the Hayes-Tilden election, which had been settled peacefully, even though the decision favored the candidate that
received a minority of the vote. This note, described by
Cabrera as having a paternalistic tone, and by Merino and
Ibarzabal as somewhat nebulous in character, was at first
not fully understood. The language was clear enough, but
Cubans wanted to know what the United States proposed
to do. The Menocal government itself was doubtful about
it for a time, and replied a bit sharply that "some erroneous
information" must have been given to the President of
the United States if the note intended to imply that any
The letter (in Spanish) is printed 77, and Cabrera, 333-337.
in full in Merino and Ibarzabal, 75 -



THE REVOLUTION OF FEBRUARY


367


departure from legal methods was being contemplated.
Rather, the Cuban authorities intended to proceed vigorously
against all law-breakers. In this connection there was a
peculiar feature of the Cuban note,-something of an oddity
for a diplomatic communication,-in the shape of an envenomed assertion that a plot against President Menocal's
life had just been discovered.8  Several men were arrested
for their complicity in the alleged plot, although many
Liberals have insisted that no such project had ever entered
into their plans.9
The Lansing note was several days too late for the achievement of its intended purpose, for the Liberals had already
gone out in revolution by the time it was published on the
13th. Cabrera thought that the civil war might have been
avoided if the note had come six days sooner,10 but that is
doubtful, as the Liberals expected a repetition of the Revolution of August, eleven years before.    In any event the
United States was not long in clearing up the meaning of
the first note. In a communication of February 14, which
Minister Gonzales gave out to the press that same day,
the Washington authorities expressed apprehension over the
news of the revolution in Cuba, and went on to say that
the United States gave its "confidence and support" only
to constitutional governments. There was also a somewhat vague statement to the effect that the United States
would oppose such governments as came to power through
the medium of revolution or other illegal means." Five
days later, on the 19th, Gonzales gave out a third note, de'For the Lansing note (in Spanish)  9Cf. Cabrera: 121; 124; 190-196,
and the Cuban reply, with comments n. 1, at 192.
thereon, see Cabrera, 116-117, n.1,  1 Ibid., 121.
also 116-122, and Merino and Ibar-  "Ibid., 124, n. 1; Merino and Ibarzabal, 94-96. Both appear, also, in zabal, 98; Havana newspapers of Feb.
Havana newspapers of Feb. 13, 1917. 14, 1917.




368


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


scribed by Cabrera as "autocratic" in tone, "explicit and
harsh," condemning the revolution to inevitable defeat. The
United States announced that it supported the government
and that the insurrection, which was characterized as "lawless and unconstitutional," would "not be countenanced."
The United States would hold the leaders of the revolt
responsible for damage to the persons and property of foreigners and would study what attitude should be adopted
toward those who were participating in the disturbances.12
Yet stronger expressions were employed in several later communications, written, no doubt, with an eye rather more
to the forthcoming war with Germany than to a consideration of United States-Cuban relations in themselves. Answering a request of the Santiago Chamber of Commerce
for an intervention, the Washington authorities cabled on
February 25 that the United States would attribute any
damage to crops to those who were in rebellion, insisting,
also, that the latter must lay down their arms, as the
United States would support only constitutional methods
for reaching a settlement of difficulties.13 Two days later
Gonzales gave out another note to the press. An American
had been killed by insurrectionists at the Carlota mine near
Cienfuegos. Some Menocal troops had pursued the men
implicated in the act, and the United States now asked
the Cuban government to continue its efforts to capture
and punish all of them, and so too with other rebels who
"should dare" to make any attack on the lives or property of
Americans. Indeed, the United States would oppose a
pardon or amnesty for them.14
The strong tone of the "Gonzales notes," as these comu Cabrera, 154-155, n.l; Merino  In Merino and Ibarzabal, 141;
and Ibarzabal, 108-109; and Havana also Havana newspapers of Feb. 27,
newspapers of Feb. 19, 1917.  1917.
" In Discusion, Feb. 25, 1917.




THE REVOLUTION OF FEBRUARY


369


munications are called in Cuba, is explained not merely by
the approach of war between the United States and Germany, but also by the fact that American public opinion
favored Menocal. Much had been written about the corruption of the G6mez administration and the uprightness
of the government of Menocal, besides which the latter had
an especial claim on the good-will of Americans as one
who had been educated in the United States and had intimate relations with the business men of the country. Furthermore, the Liberals were regarded as rather more hostile
to the United States than the Conservatives were, and their
action in going out in revolution at a time when the United e
States was about to declare war on Germany was looked
upon as something like a pro-German maneuver.15 At any
rate, the Gonzales notes virtually settled the issue in Cuba,
leaving the military campaigns as a mere detail, for the
Liberals could not expect to win in the face of the opposition
of the United States. Their hopes had been so great that
the disillusionment was all the more bitter, and one still
hears vigorous denunciations of Gonzales and President Wilson for the part they played in the Revolution of February,
as the insurrection of 1917 is called. For this, Ferrara is
largely responsible. As head of the revolutionary delegation in the United States his experiences were anything but
happy.16 But as proprietor of the influential Heraldo de
Cuba and the Reforma Social he was in a position to express his views and "put them over" among the people
of Cuba. Gonzales has been condemned in particular for
giving out the American notes to the press, an act amounting to "contempt of the Cuban Secretary of State," as
"For evidence concerning Ameri- in American periodicals at that time.
can public opinion, see Cabrera, 135-  "Cf. Cabrera, passim.
136, and passim. Cf. also articles




370


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


Varona called it.17 Although the American attitude made
the Liberal defeat inevitable, the other phases of the revolution may not be lightly dismissed, for the events of February were to be in the background of all that happened
in the remaining years of Menocal's term, with some influence, too, beyond that time, even to the present day.
G6mez may be said to have put himself at the head of
the revolution the day he landed on the southern shores of
Santa Clara on February 10. On the 10th, too, Baldomero
Acosta, Liberal mayor of Marianao,18 and "Pino" Guerra
went out in revolt in the west. It is said that they were
involved in the alleged plot against Menocal, and when
that failed left for the country the night of the 9th.19
The first overt act of the campaign took place, however,
at Camp Columbia, near Havana, on the 11th. It appears
that the plan was to rouse the whole garrison for the Liberal
cause and then join with the police of Havana in a night
attack to overthrow the government. At two o'clock in
the morning of the 11th two shots were fired as a signal, and
immediately the camp was in an uproar, but only a small
portion of the garrison joined in the revolt. So, instead
of marching on Havana the rebels were obliged to flee to
the country.20 That same day Colonel Enrique Quiniones
rose in Camagiiey, taking possession of the capital of the
province. The next day Major Rigoberto Fernandez, with
virtually the entire garrison at his back, declared against
the Menocal government in Santiago, and occupied the city.
And on the 13th the troops in Guantanamo took over that
1 Varona, Enrique Jose, Discurso as that of a ball-player formerly with
leido... la noche del 22 de diciem- Washington in the American League
bre de 1921, in Academia nacional and more recently with Louisville of
de artes y letras, v. VI, pp. 239-246, the American Association. The ballat 241.                       player is a son of the former mayor.
"The name "Baldomero Acosta" is  1Merino and Ibarzabal, 89-91.
quite well known in the United States  O Ibid., 91-93.




THE REVOLUTION OF FEBRUARY           371
place in the name of the revolution. Word came presently
that Guerra was at the head of a band in Pinar del Rio,
that Acosta, Loinaz del Castillo, and Carlos Guas were "out"
in Havana, and that Machado, Mendieta, and others had
risen in Santa Clara. Meanwhile, G6mez was marching
north in Santa Clara, with the idea of seizing the railway
and entraining for Havana. At this moment, when the
prospects of the Liberals seemed to have a roseate hue,
there occurred an event that gave an entirely new turn
to the campaign. Not able yet to compete with the Liberals
in the field, the Menocal government destroyed the railway bridge at Jatibonico, Camagiiey, on the 13th, and
G6mez's plan for a quick descent on Havana was nipped
in the bud. Menocal now had time to prepare his forces,
and he certainly made good use of his opportunity.
It is often asserted that the Liberals hoped to "blackmail" Menocal to an acceptance of their views as the only
means of avoiding the entry of the United States, which
had been fatal to the government party in a similar situation in 1906. Menocal failed to respond in the way expected, however, or to follow the course Estrada Palma
had taken. He announced that there was no need of intervention,-that he would be able to put down the revolution
without help. He also gave out that he had just purchased
ten thousand rifles and five million rounds of ammunition
from the United States government,21 and he issued a call
for volunteers. Menocal did, indeed, have a nucleus of
military strength that Estrada Palma had lacked, although
a considerable body of the army had gone out with the
other side. A number of other steps, since greatly criticized
2Merino and Ibarzabal, 98; the in Civil war in Cuba, in Independsale of munitions by the United ent, v. LXXXIX, p. 344, Feb. 26,
States government to the constituted 1917.
authorities in Cuba is also mentioned




372


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


by the Liberals as savoring of high-handed methods, were
taken by him, all of them in the background of military
affairs, but calculated to strengthen his position. Leading
journals of the Liberal party were at once suppressed, on
the ground that they were contributing to promote disorder.
Heraldo de Cuba was obliged to suspend publication on February 12, La Nacion on the 13th, and El Triunfo and La
Prensa on the 14th. La Prensa later "rectified" its political
opinions, and reappeared in April. This left in the field
only journals that were backing the government or that
had a safely neutral tinge.22   Men were arrested by the
hundreds, too, not only captives in battle, but also those
suspected of conspiracy. Among the latter was the famous
ex-governor of Havana, Ernesto Asbert.23       It had been
intended for him to serve as one of the insurrectionist generals in Havana province.24
Meanwhile the supplementary elections in Santa Clara
were held on February 14. The Liberals made no effort to
participate in them, although it is probably true that any
action on their part would have had no effect on the result, because the government had its own views about counting the vote. In a normally Liberal district the Conservatives polled 2,427 votes to thirty-three for the Liberals.
As there were only 2,401 voters on a presumably padded
list, it must be admitted that the Conservatives were extraordinarily successful.25 The elections in Oriente, scheduled for the 24th, had to be postponed, because of the military situation in that province. Later they were set for
April 9. There seem to have been some irregularities in
2 Merino and Ibarzabal: 96-97; 1917, quoted in Pardo Suarez, 166 -273-282.                       167; also see Cabrera, 296-297, n.
3 Ibid., 117.                2, and La protesta Liberal, in Cabrera,
' Statement of Damaso Pasalodos, 395-398, at 396-397, and in Pardo
in Cabrera, 190-196, n. 1, at 192.  Suarez, 163-168, at 164-165.
s5 Statement of Alfredo Zayas, Mar.,




THE REVOLUTION OF FEBRUARY


373


the methods employed in choosing the date; for example,
the call was issued on March 18 and became official by
publication in the Gazette the day before!       The result of
the elections was quite as extraordinary as in the case of
Santa Clara. To quote from a formal Liberal protest of
May 7, 1917:
"The special elections of Oriente do not differ from those of Santa
Clara as concerns the supposed and unlikely enthusiasm of the voters;
and the same phenomenon is to be observed in them with respect to
the desertion of Liberal voters and their conversion into Conservatives.
There, as in Santa Clara, there were no voters in arms, or in prison,
or absent, or dead. All voted, as is to be deduced from the electoral
documents, even those who gave their suffrages in a district that was
food for flames the day of the election." 
Menocal early took steps to bring all the resources of
the state into his own hands by a law suspending constitutional guarantees. In a message of March 5, 1917, he asked
Congress for such a law, including a provision for him to
dispose of the funds of the treasury as he saw fit in attending
to the expenses occasioned by the insurrection.27       By an
enactment of March 5 in the House and March 6 in the
Senate, Congress granted his request.      That is the simple
story. Back of it, however, there was not a little violence.
It was not possible to have a quorum in the House without
the Liberal members, only a few of whom were present, but
a quorum was nevertheless declared and the measure voted.
All manner of pressure and threats was brought to bear on
the Liberal representatives, and one of them, Alberto
Barreras, who was also governor-elect of Havana, was arrested as he left the House and not released for several
' La protesta Liberal, in Cabrera,  ' In Mensajes presidenciales, I, 731 -395-398, at 397-398, and in Pardo 732; also in Merino and Ibarzabal,
Suarez, 163-168, at 166.         117-119.




374


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


months. In that case, certainly, his right as a congressman
to immunity did not protect him.28
The Liberals expected to win the campaign in the field,
however, and then settle with Menocal at their pleasure.
Meanwhile, Ferrara endeavored to make what seemed to
him a satisfactory arrangement to avoid bloodshed.  On
February 12, despite the disapproval of his associate, Raimundo Cabrera, he sent a fire-eating cablegram to Menocal
calling upon him to resign. Menocal replied next day that
he was surprised at Ferrara's "unheard-of audacity," at the
same time asserting his intention of putting down the revolt "with a firm hand" instead of resigning. Later, on
March 1st, Ferrara cabled Wifredo Fernandez, offering "the
retirement from public life of all the chiefs of the existing
armed movement" if Menocal would agree to "a solution
that may save independence and liberty." Fernandez replied
that there was no likelihood of a loss of independence, as
Menocal was about to suppress the insurrection. He added
that the greatest danger to liberty was the employment
of military rebellion such as was being espoused by Ferrara,
whom many considered a "disturbing element of the republic." The Ferrara notes certainly did not help the Liberal
cause, for they gave the Conservatives the last word and
a chance to ridicule the author,-a fatal thing in Hispanic
American opinion. An organization of Menocal supporters
telegraphed the New York Herald that the greatest benefit
Ferrara could confer on Cuba would be not to return, adding, with an allusion to his Italian birth, that "he who did
not know how to be a patriot in his own land cannot be
so in that of another." And Dolz called attention to Fer

8 Statements of Ignacio   Remirez    205, n. 1, at 200-202, and 274-277, n. 1.
and Alberto Barreras, in Cabrera, 200 -



THE REVOLUTION OF FEBRUARY


375


rara's "lordship" over the revolution, as evidenced by his
offer to dispose of the future of its chiefs.29
Menocal's principal attention, however, was given to the
enemy in the field. It has been said that he personally "directed every military movement of the Federal forces during
the revolution." 30 However that may be, the government
troops were so quickly and so uniformly successful that one
writer has been led to say "there never was any fighting
worthy of the name." 31 This is hardly correct. There
were at least a score of battles, in which losses were not
great, because of the comparatively small numbers engaged,
but it was decidedly "unpleasant" for those who took part
in them. The revolt was quickly crushed in the west; indeed, there was very little fighting in Pinar del Rio, Havana,
and Matanzas. So Menocal was soon able to turn to Santa
Clara. After several minor encounters a government column under Colonel Rosendo Collazo caught G6mez in a
trap at Caicaje on March 7, and captured him and almost
his entire command. This battle was decisive of the war,in so far as it had not already been determined by the attitude of the United States. There remained a great deal
to do in Camagiiey and especially in Oriente, however.
In Camagiiey, the Liberal senator-elect Gustavo Caballero
took charge of the revolution, and by Conservative account
inaugurated a reign of terror. But his rule was brief. Government troops under Colonel Eduardo Pujol swept all before them in that province, and on February 26 recovered
the capital. The fighting went on for a time, and received
an impulse after Caicaje through the appearance of Mendieta
The entire correspondence appears  " Marvin, George, Keeping Cuba
in Merino and Ibarzabal: 101-103; libre, in World's work, v. XXXIV,
115-117. Only the cablegrams be- pp. 553-567, at 565; Sept., 1917. Cf.
tween Ferrara and Menocal are given also Merino and Ibarzabal, 149-150.
in Cabrera, at 139-140, n. 1.   1 Marvin, Op. cit., at 563.




376


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


and others who had escaped from Santa Clara, but it all
came to an end with the defeat and capture of Caballero
on April 21. Some of the leaders, including Mendieta, got
away by taking ship to foreign parts. There is quite a
story in connection with Caballero. According to the government account he was wounded in the battle in which he
was captured, and died on the train en route to the city of
Camagiiey,32 but the Liberals assert, quite probably with
truth, that he "died" because he was executed.33 In consequence, Caballero has taken rank in Liberal pronouncements as the martyr of the Revolution of February, as was
Villuendas in the elections of 1905.34
As might have been expected from the traditions of the
country the war was at its worst and was most long continued in Oriente. When Rigoberto Fernandez took the lead
in the revolt by seizing Santiago on February 12 the entire
military garrison of the province, somewhat less than a thousand men, followed him, except for a few of the officers.
After Caicaje the Liberals were still hopeful that Fernandez
might save the situation for them and bring about honest
elections by carrying on the war until the United States
should intervene. Fernandez disappointed them, however.
As Cabrera put it, "The Odyssey of Caicaje terminated in


Merino and Ibarzabal: 171; 178.
38 Cabrera, 280.
84 The following story, which may or
may not be true, is a sample of what
one hears in Cuba. This was told to
the writer by a man of some distinction who is not a politician.
"Pujol telegraphed to Menocal
about the surrender, and got back a
telegram to take Caballero's corpse
to Camagiiey. Pujol then sent word
that Caballero was alive, but was
again told to take the body to Camagiiey. So Caballero was put into a
separate car from the other prisoners,


and when the train reached Camagiiey he was brought out dead. The
authenticity of the telegrams has
been vouched for in a story given
out by Heraldo, and the Zayas
government claims to have found
some state papers bearing upon the
incident. The only answer the Menocal people have made is to suggest
that the authorities investigate further and find out the truth about
the death of Lavastida under a Liberal regime in 1909-thus replying
merely with a tu quoque."




THE REVOLUTION OF FEBRUARY


377


a combat and a defeat. That of Santiago ended, without
resistance, in flight." 35 There is a legend, based on statements of Fernandez, that the United States naval officers
deceived the Liberal commander with promises of support
for the revolution, thus accounting for the lack of distinction with which the latter handled the campaign in Oriente.
The facts alleged in this connection are utterly at variance
with the whole course of the United States policies at this
time, but as the story is often insisted upon by the Liberals
it may well be repeated here, as told by Fernandez himself.
On the very day that he took possession of Santiago,
Fernandez planned to obstruct the channel leading up to the
bay, so as to defend the city from any Conservative attempt
to retake it, but the American naval authorities (at first
Commodore Knox and then his successor, Commodore
Belknap) objected, engaging to prevent the entry of any
Menocal vessel, according to Fernandez. Nevertheless, the
government boat "Cuba" was later permitted to come in and
disembark troops. Fernandez himself presently abandoned
Santiago at the request of Commodore Belknap, so he said,
doing so in order to avoid the destruction of the city in a
battle between the Menocal forces and his own; he took
this course on Belknap's promise to keep the government
troops out, but the latter were, notwithstanding, allowed
afterward to enter the city. Belknap furthermore agreed
that President Wilson would see to it that the partial elections in Oriente should be conducted honestly. All of these
matters were bolstered up in an ample correspondence which
Fernandez retained in his possession, but when he went
to Haiti, after the revolution broke down, he was seized
by American officials, and these papers were taken from
him. He was also deprived of some $194,000. This was
"Cabrera, 211-216, especially at 213.




378


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


government money, but Fernandez, not recognizing the
Menocal regime, felt it to be his "duty" to distribute this
fund among the officers of the revolution who had been
obliged to take refuge in the United States! 36 The tales of
Fernandez appear to have impressed Cabrera,37 but they
were vigorously denied by the United States. A communication from Washington to the American minster referred
to the "insistence" with which the story was being told
that the United States was considering taking sides with
the insurrectionists. It was incomprehensible how any such
erroneous impression could have gotten out, the note went
on, and to correct it the United States reasserted that it
would consider the rebels as outside the protection of the
law until they should lay down their arms and submit to
the constitutional government. This message was received
on March 24 by the consular office in Guantanamo, which
was instructed to deliver it to the consul at Santiago and
cause it to be published throughout Cuba.38
The Cuban government account of this affair, which in
this instance at least would seem to be reasonably accurate,
is as follows. When Fernandez heard that troops were coming to attack him he appealed to the commander of the
American naval squadron to prevent bloodshed and destruction in Santiago, and the latter agreed to take possession
of the city if Fernandez and his men would leave it. A
formal invitation was issued in a letter of March 8 to Commodore Belknap by Jose Garcia Munioz, whom Fernandez
had appointed temporary civil governor of Oriente. In this
document Garcia Mufioz recited that Fernandez could not
protect the city, as he was obliged to employ all his forces
in operations in the field, and so he requested the landing
" Fernandez, Rigoberto, Exposicion  "TCabrera: 212; 280.
al presidente de los Estados Unidos,  8 Quoted (in Spanish) in Ibid., 280 -quoted in Cabrera, 420-430.  281, n. 1.




THE REVOLUTION OF FEBRUARY


379


of some five hundred men from the American vessels.39
That same day a body of United States marines was landed,
and Fernandez was told to withdraw his troops 'within
twenty-four hours. By midnight the last insurrectionist
soldier had departed from the city; indeed, most of them
had gone the day before. They were informed that they
would not be allowed to return, unless they should deliver
their arms to American outposts before entering the city.
But the Americans did not interfere in any way with civilian
functionaries in the pursuit of their duties.40 Later, some
American forces occupied Guantanamo, Manzanillo, and
Nuevitas, and a body was also sent inland to protect the
mines of El Cobre.4'
The Menocal government turned to military affairs in
Oriente shortly after the Gomez debacle at Caicaje. Colonel
Miguel Varona landed at Nuevitas on the north coast of
Camagiiey with nine hundred men, and proceeded to Santiago, which he entered on March 26. Next day, after some
little fighting, he took both Caimanera and Guantanamo.
Colonels Matias Betancourt and Julio Sanguily joined with
Varona in the work of pacification in Oriente, and by May
the revolution had descended to the stage of "glorified
vagrancy," on the basis of "loot, license, and laziness." Indeed, it was continued that long only because the leaders
were afraid of what might happen to them if they surrendered.42  There was not a little destruction of railway
properties and sugar estates, but there was no longer the
slightest doubt about the issue of the war.43
89 This letter is published in Merino see Marvin, Op. cit., at 553-561. Marand Ibarzabal, 194-196.       vin points out how the fear of a
40Ibid: 192; 194-198.        Liberal attack on Guantanamo caused
4 Cabrera, 257, n. 1.       the American commander of the
4 Marvin, Op. cit., at 564.  naval station at Caimanera to occupy
48For an amusing account of the the first-named city, thus bringing to
later stages of the conflict in Oriente, pass the "third intervention" in Cuba.




380


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


The closing days of the revolt were inextricably involved
in the larger question of the World War. Opinion in Allied
countries was convinced that the insurrection was in reality
a German maneuver, designed to bring about the destruction of the sugar crop and to divert the attention of the
United States. Especially in the United States was this
view taken. In the excited "spy fever" days of 1917 it was
pointed out that the revolution began at just about the
time when the United States broke relations with Germany,
and sensational "evidence" was published to prove the Cuban
Liberal-Germanic plot. There is no doubt but that an
occasional irresponsible Liberal general, piqued at United
States support of the government, made assertions and
threats of a pro-German character, but there is no reason
whatever to connect the revolution as a whole or the Liberal
party with German designs.44      Menocal was shrewd enough
to take advantage of the situation, however, and to further
the belief of the United States government and the American public in the German connection. It is probable, too,
that Cuba's prompt declaration of war against Germany
on April 7, just one day after that of the United States,
had "two thoughts" in it for the state of affairs in Cuba
to "one" of hostility to Germany.45     It is noteworthy, however, that the Liberal members attended the meeting of
Congress which authorized the declaration, and Jose Manuel
" Apart from Liberal denials and vestigations we made we could not
the lack of specific evidence, there is find any definite proof which would
the supporting statement of the pro- authorize so grave a charge." MeMenocal historians of the Revolution rino and Ibarzabal, 249.
of February. Referring to the Lib-  4Ferrara and Cabrera had a very
eral position after the Cuban decla- uncomfortable time in the United
ration of war against Germany, they States in consequence of the alleged
go on as follows: "Against the revo- pro-German character of the Cuban
lutionists there now weighed a new revolt, and the latter frequently comand grave accusation: that of being ments on this factor, quoting also
anti-patriots, that of working against from American newspapers. See, for
the country in aid of the foreign en- example, Cabrera: 164-168, n. 1-3;
emy. We confess that in all the in- 216, n. 2; 229-230, n. 1; and 296.




THE REVOLUTION OF FEBRUARY


381


Cortina made an eloquent speech, in course of which he
praised the United States for the noble and generous help it
had always given to the people of Cuba.46 Now that both
Cuba and the United States had entered the world conflict
the latter was in no mood to let local difficulties in the
island interfere with the larger plans for the war. So, vigorous messages were sent to Cuba pointing out that any
alteration of public order tending to obstruct the output of
the sugar crop would be considered a hostile act by the
United States, and the insurrectionists were advised that if
they did not submit to the Cuban government at once the
United States would consider them and treat them as enemies
of its own.47
Right from the first, many Liberals, discouraged by the
attitude of the United States, had refrained from taking
part in the revolt, and numbers of others surrendered, or
at any rate withdrew from the conflict, after the defeat at
Caicaje. Among those who proceeded early to get into the
good graces of the government was Zayas. Generally considered a timid person, with a careful regard for his own
skin, the Liberal candidate's conduct was certainly very disappointing to the Liberals.48 After authorizing the outbreak
of hostilities he himself disappeared, but turned up later
in the capital, where he was not molested. As one writer
has put it, "Zayas came into Havana and lived quite harmlessly out at the castle of Madame Abreu, who also maintained there the only chimpanzee born in captivity." 49 This
is expressive of a certain disapproval with which his action
was viewed by all parties. It killed Zayas with the Liberals,
and was largely responsible for his flop to the Conservatives
o Merino and Ibarzabal, 247-248. in Cabrera, 281-282, n. 1.
'One Lansing message to this ef-  Cf. Cabrera, 275-276.
feet (in Spanish and undated) is given  " Marvin, Op. cit., at 563.




382        A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
in 1920. In this connection the story is often told that
G6mez was not fighting for Zayas in 1917, but for himself.50
The claim is made that he hoped to play the leading part
in winning the war, then declare himself dictator, and afterward take over the presidency. In the absence of specific
evidence it must be regarded as doubtful that he had any
such idea in mind at the outset of the campaign, but in
the light of Zayas's conduct the thing itself might have happened in case the Liberals had defeated Menocal.
Gomez, indeed, recovered and even enhanced his former
prestige. It can hardly be said that he distinguished himself as a general, but the Cuban mind does not enquire too
closely into matters of military technique. He did risk his
life and his fortune, which was in direct contrast to Zayas's
action. From this time forward the popularity of Jose Miguel
grew until it attained to very nearly Olympian heights.
For a while, however, his supporters were alarmed lest the
Menocal government might execute him. He was interned
in the castle of El Principe in Havana, which was usually
employed as a prison for those guilty of felony. One day
a rumor reached Ferrara and Cabrera in New York that
caused chills to run up and down their spine: that the Conservatives claimed to have discovered a Liberal plot to rescue
G6mez. What his friends feared was an "official assassination, based on flight," an old trick which the Cubans had
learned from the traditions of the colony.'1 No doubt
Ferrara and Cabrera recalled the "flight" of Lavastida in
the time of G6mez's presidency. An attachment of some
six million dollars is said to have been placed upon Jose
Miguel's estates, on the basis of liabilities he had incurred
6~This tale was repeated to the Ibarzabal, 103, and Johnson, IV, 332 -writer by responsible persons. It is 335.
also given currency in Merino and "8Cabrera, 200.




THE REVOLUTION OF FEBRUARY


383


in damages to property as a result of his seditious acts,52
although it is probable that no collection was ever made.
G6mez remained in prison until September 24, 1917, when
he was allowed to depart to his "America" estate.
The Conservative historians of the events of 1917 make a
great parade of the clemency displayed by the Menocal
government in liquidating the revolution. Elsewhere in
Hispanic America, they said, "all military men in rebellion
would have been shot, without exception... and almost
without asking their names... All would have 'tried
to escape, so that it would be necessary to kill them by
shooting them from behind'... The Cuban people had
the satisfaction of knowing that nobody was shot." 53 This
is true. A number were condemned to death, and others
subjected to penalties of varying degree, but Menocal reduced all penalties through use of his pardoning power,
and on March 18, 1918, an ample amnesty bill was passed.
The Liberals were not wholly satisfied with it, since it did
not restore all office-holders to their jobs, but it did open
the jails, and allowed those who had left the country to
return, without fear of punishment.54 It is not necessary
to belittle this meritorious achievement of the Menocal administration, but there is another story behind it. It is
almost certain that the United States insisted on such a
policy; Cabrera speaks vaguely of the success that Ferrara
had in getting the United States to guarantee protection
for the lives of Liberals, and says that Minister Gonzales
assured other members of the diplomatic corps in Havana
that the penalty of death would not be applied to any of
the insurrectionist prisoners.55 This accords with general
52 Cabrera, 267, n. 3.      "Cf. infra, p. 533.
" Merino and Ibarzabal, 283-287.  6Cabrera: 201-205; 205, n. 1.
See also Dolz, 35.




384


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


opinion in Cuba. The following statement made to the
writer on October 20, 1924, is representative of what one
usually hears:
"Recently the Conservatives have had a great deal to say about
the magnanimity of Menocal in 1917, and, indeed, there was general
leniency at that time, but only under compulsion of Secretary Lansing.
Menocal wanted to execute Gomez and some of the others concerned
in the insurrection, but Lansing insisted to Pablo Desvernine that there
was to be 'no blood.' Desvernine was at that time Secretary of State,
but was in Washington on a visit." 
There is no clear evidence, however, that United States
pressure was required, and therefore it is only fair to give
the Menocal government credit on the basis of what it did.
On May 8, 1917, Congress met to proclaim the victorious
candidates, and Menocal and Niufiez were declared the winners by eighty-six electoral votes to thirty-six. The Liberals
had drawn up a formal protest, the day before, against the
validity of the elections, and this document was presented
at the meeting, but was rejected.57 More to the point, however, was that some forty Liberal congressmen, at the suggestion of Zayas, so it is said,58 attended the session, when
without their presence there would have been no quorum.
At least one Liberal, who had risked his life in the field,
was disgusted at this easy acquiescence of the politicians of
his party in the victory of Menocal.59 On May 9 there was
a fresh attempt to assassinate Menocal, or, at least, so government reports of the 10th alleged,60 although Cabrera
called it "a tragic farce... to heap discredit before the
powerful ally against the defeated Liberals." 61      On May
WThis whole subject was discussed  9 Mendez Peniate, Roberto, Relato,
in an anti-Menocal article in Heraldo quoted in Cabrera, 399-419, at 413.
de Cuba, Oct. 29, 1924.           6 Merino and Ibarzabal, 251-255,
7 The Liberal protest is in Cabrera, give a detailed account of this af395-398, and Pardo Suarez, 163-168.  fair.
8 Merino and Ibarzabal, 250.    ' Cabrera, 297-298.




THE REVOLUTION OF FEBRUARY


385


20 Menocal went through the ceremony of inaugural for
a second term, taking the oath to "respect the law and the
institutions of the country." Thus were the elections of
1917 brought to their "logical" conclusion! 62


6 The elections of 1916 and more
particularly their sequel the Revolution of February have a vast body
of materials comparable in quantity
with the parallel period of 1905-1906.
Trelles mentions a number of items,
but there are two that stand out. One
of these is the volume by Cabrera,
which is an engaging literary work as
well as a valuable source-book for
the events of 1916-1917. This is a
narrative of Cabrera's own experiences as a Liberal emissary in the
United States, but in writing it, says
Cabrera, "I present the picture of
what surrounds me: the medium of
my struggles and sufferings, the individuals, the collectivity, the complete scene of my own legend."
Cabrera writes as a Liberal partisan,
not as a historian, but there is a note
of sincerity that is impossible to escape, and the volume (especially the
second edition, which the writer used)
is so well bolstered with documents
in appendices and footnotes that it
takes rank as one of the leading
works in the field of Cuban historiography. On the other hand, one
finds a presentation from the Conser

vative point of view in the Merino
and Ibarzabal history. This makes
a pretence of impartiality, though it
is in fact a rather crudely partisan
Menocal pamphlet. But it is the
only work that covers these exciting
years as a whole, and it introduces
documentary evidence and a point of
view which serve as a check on Liberal accounts. The greater part of
this volume (pages 89 to 287 of the
second edition) is devoted to the period of the war, with a detailed story
of the campaigns. All other books
and pamphlets referring to these years
are of a highly specialized character,
such as personal reminiscences, legal
briefs, arguments, and the like.
Naturally, with a disputed election
and a civil war to deal with, there are
many articles on Cuban affairs at
this time. Among the most important in American periodicals is the
one by Marvin, cited here, while
there were a number of ether formal
articles or editorial utterances worthy
of at least some attention. Johnson,
IV, 328-345, has a chapter on this
subject, but it is not too well informed.




CHAPTER XVII


GOING DOWN: MENOCAL'S SECOND TERM, 1917-1921
THE inauguration of Menocal for a second term  on
May 20, 1917, in a sense marked a new turn in the history
of the republic. Down to this time, although matters had
been getting steadily worse, there had been something commendable in each administration and not a few reputable
men, greatly outnumbered to be sure, in the field of politics.
But from 1917 on, at least to May 20, 1925, it is hard to
find anything good to say about anybody or anything in
the conduct of the Cuban state. If some honest and capable
citizens still held important government posts, they were
without influence and almost without voice to check the
rapidly growing evils in Cuban affairs. Menocal himself
seems to have changed from the man of high purposes
who took over the presidential toga in 1913, or at least to
have become reconciled to a corrupt ambient which he had
at first decried.
At the outset of Menocal's new term Cuba found herself
in the midst of the great World War. It would hardly be
claimed by anybody that Cuba "won the war" or that
she contributed very substantially to the result, but her
achievement was respectable. In his message of April 6
Menocal took the same position as that already announced
by President Wilson against unrestricted submarine warfare, but he also made a special point of the republic's close
ties with the United States, holding that Cuba could not,
"without loss of dignity and decorum, show indifference to
386




GOING DOWN: MENOCAL'S SECOND TERM, 1917-1921 387
the noble attitude assumed by the United States." He
went on to explain that Cuba could not remain neutral,
as that would compel her to treat all belligerents alike,
which should not be done as against the United States,
her "friend and ally." 1 Four German steamers in Havana
and two more at other ports were at once seized by the
Cuban government and turned over to the United States.
On the score of the "conduct of the war" in Cuba, matters
were handled very much as they were in the neighboring
republic to the north, minus a great deal of the excitement.
Under the leadership of the President's wife, Red Cross
work was organized. Cuba contributed generously to the
United States Liberty loans. There were the various meatless and wheatless days. Some Cuban officers went to United
States training camps, while several camps were also established in Cuba. A hospital unit of a hundred doctors
and nurses was despatched to France. The American,
French, and Belgian national holidays (July 4, 14, and 21)
were observed in Cuba. The United States declaration of
war against Austria was followed by a Cuban declaration
of December 16, 1917, specifically because of the United
States action. There were numerous resounding pronouncements of Cuban accord with the United States. And finally,
first among the nations of the world, Cuba in 1923 paid her
war debt to the United States; it amounted to less than
seven million dollars, but payment was in full.2
The one really important achievement of Cuba in the war
was in vastly increasing the output of sugar, which was an
indispensable product for the allies. To be sure, a very
'The Menocal message is in Me- Menocal, Cuba's part in the World
rino and Ibarzabal, 244-247. A por- War, in Current history, v. IX, pt. I,
tion of it in an English translation is pp. 315-318; Nov., 1918. There is
in Johnson, IV, 346-348.      also a highly laudatory chapter in
2For an account of Cuba's partici- Johnson, IV, 346-354.
pation in the war, see an article by




388


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


good price was obtained, though not so high as it might have
been, without government intervention. There was some
talk of sending an army of twenty-five thousand men to
France, but transports were lacking, and the question was
raised whether Cubans would be adapted to the rigorous
winter climate of northern France. There was no overwhelming enthusiasm for the idea, anyway. At least one
man in public life wished to do something, however. This
was Fernando Ortiz, among the most notable scholars that
the republic has produced3 and at that time one of the
few really estimable men in the House. Ortiz wanted to
send at least a small Cuban force to Europe, if only as a
symbol of an active participation in the conflict, and brought
in a bill to that effect. Congress voted the bill, but the
troops were never sent. A universal military service law
was enacted in the summer of 1918, but the war was over
before any practical result came of it.
The truth is, most of the "war measures" in Cuba were
primarily concerned with local affairs. It was not at all
improbable that there might have been another uprising,
and there was always the possibility of damage to the sugar
crop. In 1917 Menocal asked the Washington government
to send some troops to Cuba, and in consequence about
sixteen hundred men were landed in Oriente and a thousand
in Camagiiey. Not until 1922 were these men withdrawn.4
In like manner it is often asserted that the military law
of 1918 was in fact a protective measure against the Liberals,
but a complete farce so far as the World War was concerned. Furthermore, Menocal retained the extraordinary
powers that were granted to him in consequence of the
Revolution of February and the declaration of war against
Germany, and was a virtual dictator to the end of his rule,
'Cf. infra, p. 636.       'Trelles, Biblioteca, II, 125.




GOING DOWN: MENOCAL'S SECONi       RM, 1917-1921 389
legislating by decree and otherwise conducting himself as
an all-powerful, irresponsible head of the state.5 Nothing
was more irksome to the Cubans than this phase of his
government, and the President was bitterly conderned for
it by his opponents, both during his administration and
afterward. Early in 1919, for example, Carlos Mendieta
wrote a celebrated editorial for Heraldo de Cuba entitled
"Good-bye, dictatorship!" (/Adios, dictadura!), basing it on
the rumor that the United States had "turned her eyes
toward Cuba," with the idea of having fair elections in 1920.
Mendieta's article was a most sweeping, if also extravagant,
denunciation of the Menocal government, and got him into
trouble with the authorities. He was haled into court
and fined five hundred dollars for insulting the President.
Immediately a popular subscription was started to reimburse Mendieta, with contributions limited to a penny
apiece.6
Mendieta called the Menocal rule a "class   and vulgar
dictatorship," with nothing of positive achievement in its
favor such as had served in some measure to excuse the
despotism of a Porfirio Diaz of Mexico. He charged Menocal with responsibility for "the almost complete abandonment of public services, without excepting education and
the highways, the greater part of which are impassable,
just as if we might be in the irimitive days of neighborhood roads." This assertion is supported in the writings
of men like Carlos Trelles, who cannot be accused of violent
partisanship. Trelles pointed out that education in Cuba
had steadily declined since the beginning of the century,
Cf. Ibid., II, 122.       comments, on May 19, 1919. The
The Mendieta article first ap- story of the trial was given in an
peared in Heraldo de Cuba on Jan. extra of Feb. 3, 1919, and the regular
29, 1919, and was republished, with issue of the following day.




390


A m     Y OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


reaching its lowest state under Menocal. In the time of
General Wood seventy-five persons per thousand attended
school, but in 1920 this had fallen away to fifty, while the
ratio of pupils in school to the entire population was approximately only a third of what it was in the United States.
On the other hand the number of teachers had nearly
doubled, but this was because the botella (bottle), or graft,
had entered the school system. In marked contrast with
the decline in education was the increase in the numbers
and the expense of the army. From the 1,700 soldiers of
General Wood and three thousand rural guards of Don
Tomas, the army had grown to over ten thousand men
under G6mez, more than fifteen thousand in 1916, and about
eighteen thousand in 1919.7      As for roads, Menocal did
indeed build 456 kilometres of them in eight years, but this
was the poorest record that had been made since the inauguration of the republic. Nevertheless, he had spent on highway constr ition almost as much as his three predecessors
combined and about seven times as much per kilometre as
had been expended by Estrada Palma. All this was without
taking into account the rapid deterioration of roads through
lack of needed repairs.8
Of course, other agencies of the government must share
in the responsibility that attaches to the name of Menocal
for the administration of the country's affairs. Congress,
'Trelles, El progreso (1902 a 1905)  Ibid., 18-19. The following table,
y el retroceso (1906 a 1922) de la based on Trelles, gives some idea of
republica de Cuba, 11-13.       the situation:
Kilo-  Aver-            AverRule           Years metres  age    Cost      age
Estrada Palma...  4     328     82 $ 2,058,000  $ 6,275
Magoon.......  2    608    304  11,154,000  18,345
G6mez.........  4    500    125   6,309,000  12,618
Menocal.......  8    456    57   19,435,000  42,620
To be sure, a great many other fac- was the greatly increased cost of mators were involved, chief among which terials in later years.




GOING DOWN: MENOCAL'S SECOND TERM, 1917-1921 391
for example, either failed to enact really needed legislation
or else voted laws that were bad. In Menocal's seqond
term, however, Congress was less of a factor than it had
been before, because of the President's employment of executive decrees in many cases or his corruption of congressmen
through lavish use of collectorships in the lottery and other
financial lures when he wanted an appearance of legislative
sanction. There were a number of laws ot "economic defence" and the like, growing out of the World War situation,
some of them dating back to Menocal's first term. While
these may have been unobjectionable in the main, it is
frequently asserted that they were administered in an improper fashion. For example, no rice could be imported
or sugar exported without a permit, but it is claimed that
Menocal's associates found no difficulty in obtaining permits, and others could get them if they "paid the price."
Another much criticized bit of legislation was the tourist
law of August 15, 1919, which authorized certain games of
skill where patrons were wont to bet on the result. Under
this law jai-alai made its legal reentry into the capital,
and gambling at the Casino and horse-racing were permitted
in the suburbs of Havana at Marianao. It was such a bill
as those which G6mez and Menocal had both vetoed.
Menocal had different views in 1919, and so too other members of his family, who fought for the measure in Congress
and, so it is said, obtained the jai-alai concession when the
bill became a law. Another Menocal supporter received
his reward in connection with horse-racing. This was Ricardo Dolz, who became president of the company organized
to promote that sport. August 15, 1919, too, is the date
of a law as a result of which the La Osa estate, belonging
to the government, was turned over on surprisingly generous terms to a private company which was constructing




392


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


a bridge over the Almendares River. As the reputation of
sonw of the grantees was none too clean,9 the affair was
looked upon as a scandalous graft deal. Yet another matter of this sort also goes back to that period: a concession
granted to a company, made up exclusively of politicians,
for a public market monopoly in the city of Havana. This
occasioned an advance in the price of agricultural products,
in part becausetthe sellers, who were obliged to dispose of
their goods in the market or not at all, were required to
pay exorbitant prices for their stands there.
Despite the rise of prices in these years and the heavy
expense occasioned by the Revolution of February, the government was increasingly prosperous. Foreign trade grew
until it amounted to well over a billion dollars' worth with
the United States alone in 1920, although it is true that
the value of money had declined so greatly that it can hardly
be taken as a correct index. Revenues advanced from the
thirty-seven to fifty-two millions of Menocal's first term
to some seventy millions in 1918 and $108,000,000 in 1920.
The budget for a while lagged slightly behind, but jumped
to $136,000,000 for the fiscal year 1920-1921, equal to fortyfive dollars per inhabitant. But in point of fact Menocal
spent $182,000,000 that year. Things had changed since
the days of Don Tomas! Then, with approximately fifteen
millions a year, or eight dollars per inhabitant, much more
was accomplished for education and other useful public
services than in the extravagant days of Menocal. Altogether, in eight years of rule, the latter spent some six hundred million dollars, and that without taking into account
the enormous floating debt he left behind or the expenditures of the various municipal and provincial governments.
' One member of the company was the notorious "Pote." Cf. infra, pp.
398-399.




GOING DOWN: MENOCAL'S SECOND TERM, 1917-1921 393
If these were added, the total might reach a billion
dollars.10
Prosperous as it was, the government did not feel able
to finance all its needs without a resort to loans. There
were two issues in 1917. One was for seven millions, and
was employed in making a final settlement of the Ports
Company case. The other was a "war loan" for thirty
millions. Menocal is alleged to have tried to provide for
this by decree, but the United States insisted on a law
of Congress. Half of the money was applied to debts of
the government, but the other fifteen millions were supposed
to be for military purposes. It is said that ten millions
were spent in Cuba and had so little to do with the war that
payment of the remaining five millions was stopped. A
considerable fraction of this "war debt" was employed in
the purchase of a presidential mansion.
It will be recalled that Jose Miguel had left a great
skeleton palace in the Villanueva tract which he acquired
in exchange for the Arsenal lands. During his first term
Menocal tried, without success, to get a grant from Congress that might enable him to finish this building.1" Meanwhile an elaborately expensive palace, far better than any
government edifice in the capital, had been undertaken
by Governor Asbert for the province of Havana. Early in
his second term Menocal purchased this for the nation.
According to one account he thereby relieved the province
of an embarrassing burden of debt, while another story has
it that he virtually compelled the provincial authorities to
sell the building. In any event it came to $3,750,000, or
more than double the cost of the White House in Washing10 Trelles, El progreso (1902 a 1905)  " For example, see Menocal's mesy el retroceso (1906 a 1922) de la sages of Nov. 3, 1913, and Mar. 18,
republica de Cuba, 20-21; also Trelles, 1914, in Mensajes presidenciales, I:
Biblioteca, II, 127.         459-474, at 469; and 496.




394


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


ton, to say nothing of the million that had already been
wasted on the Villanueva structure.12     But this was not all.
It was necessary to furnish this splendid palace in fitting
style. It is said that a hundred thousand dollars was spent
for linen alone, and a commission of sixty thousand was
paid to a cousin of the President for an excellent but somewhat fantastic painting of the battle of Victoria de las
Tunas, the scene of Menocal's greatest glory in the War of
Independence.l3 And, incidentally, the authorized budget
of the presidency had now advanced from the $62,390 a year
that Estrada Palma got in 1905 to $226,000 for Menocal in
1919,14 which of course did not include the expenditures
on the palace or, indeed, various other items that were in
fact under the President's control.
These incidents give a hint of financial improprieties on
the part of Menocal himself, but there are two opinions, even
among those who disapprove of Menocal, as to whether he
actually should be called a grafter. The following are some
statements on this score, all from men whose views are
worthy of attention:
(1) "Menocal did not take anything, but let his relatives and friends
help themselves."
(2) "Menocal was a very wealthy man, and may not have grafted
himself, but he certainly let others do it under him."
(3) "I can excuse Gomez, though he was a grafter, but not Menocal,
even though he personally may not have taken a cent. He was a man
of education and training, and is therefore all the more to be censured
for letting the political affairs of the country sink to the corrupt level
they reached in his administration."
(4) "Menocal profited, perhaps, but less than G6mez or Zayas. For
Trelles, El progreso (1902 a 1905) ants claimed that Menocal even went
y el retroceso (1906 a 1922) de la so far as to remove the linen of the
republica de Cuba: 23; also 23, n. 1. palace to his own home at the end of
"aThis is based on statements of his term.
reputable persons to the writer. Sim-  14Trelles, El progreso (1902 a 1905)
ilar but more extreme charges have y el retroceso (1906 a 1922) de la
been made frequently in the news- relpblica de Cuba, 23.
papers. One of the writer's inform



GOING DOWN: MENOCAL'S SECOND TERM, 1917-1921 395
example, the government deposited its money with the National Bank
of Cuba, and the bank loaned Menocal large sums for his sugar-mills on
favorable terms,-so favorable, indeed, that he never paid them back.
But, then, no politician would have done so."
(5) "It is not true that Menocal did not take graft for himself. The
War of Independence ruined him. To be sure, he got a large salary as
manager of the Chaparra estates, but not wealth, and now he is a
multi-millionaire. And his friends and relatives also feathered their
nests."! I 21i
(6) "Menocal was a white glove grafter on a large scale. He was
worth about a million when he became President, but left office with
thirty or forty millions. And he let his relatives have anything they
wanted. He made a lot by taking over the rice import monopoly for
himself and associates, and something more through the private sale of
sugar export permits."
The following is an interesting comment in an article
that appeared recently in an American periodical:
"Menocal-unapproachable, dignified, lavish-led the third administration, which began witl a necessary breathing space after the ruin
accomplished by Gomez. But, eventually, it improved on these methods
and introduced one or two tricks that even Gomez had not thought of.
There was great activity and small accomplishment by the Department
of Public Works, where plans and estimates were prepared and payments made for imaginary roads and fictitious bridges over non-existent
rivers. More than a score of banks were looted by their directors while
the government stood passively by. With the rise in price of sugar,
incident to the Great War, business began to boom and fortunes to pile
up on every hand. Naturally, the governmental revenues, reflecting the
growing prosperity of the country, doubled and tripled in amount. Soon
the country, individually and as a whole, became money mad. Several
of the Cabinet secretaries and a large number of other public officials,
tempted by the overnight fortunes amassed by business men, started
businesses of their own, utilizing as capital their positions of confidence
and trust in the government. Menocal himself has never been proven
a participant in the graft; not so, however, three members of his Cabinet
and a large following of personal friends to whose venality he was always
obstinately blind. Speculation was Menocal's failing, but due to good
judgment and luck, his life since office has been on a scale that might
tax the resources of a prince. Half a billion in taxes was collected
while he was President, but the only signs of progress in his day that




396


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


remain are the presidential mansion and a bronze and marble statue of
Antonio Maceo." "
That there was a lot of grafting under Menocal would
hardly be denied by anybody. Sebastian Gelabert, who was
for a time Secretary of the Treasury under Zayas, declared in
June 1921 that Cuba had been paying fifteen millions a
year to holders of botellas, or false employes.16 And the state
of the Department of Public Works, as revealed when Zayas
succeeded to the presidency in 1921, showed that fraudulent
contracts had been made on a vast scale. On one other
matter, too, there is virtual unanimity, and that is that
Menocal's friends and relatives were allowed to enrich themselves. Indeed, as a nepotist Menocal far surpassed Jose
Miguel, though hardly rivalling his successor in the presidency,-"because his family was not so large," as one man
put it to the writer. Three of his brothers were in Congress,
and other relatives and friends had good government jobs,
while it is said that all members of the family, even including the women, had collectorships in the lottery. All in all,
the following denunciation by Mendieta may not have been
too severe:
"Menocal has converted Cuba into a factory that is a theatre of
caprices, dilapidations, and madness. He has usurped the power, and
has wronged his compatriots. His work of decomposition is almost
impossible to repair. He has relaxed public customs, with a governmental regime contrary to every precept of economy, and has enthroned
the desire for lucre in official circles.""
For a while a good many elements in Cuba were willing
to excuse the shortcomings of the Menocal administration,
for the country was indeed enjoying such prosperity as it
had never before known. It was the same sort of war and
" Cuba, an American ward again?,  "Trelles, Biblioteca, II, 121.
in Independent, v. CXIII, pp. 35-38;  17Mendieta, Op. cit.
July 19, 1924.




GOING DOWN: MENOCAL'S SECOND TERM, 1917-1921 397
post-war inflation boom as was experienced at that time
in the United States, but in Cuba it was more pronounced;
as a one-product country the island republic ranges farther
in either direction than its great northern neighbor, one moment climbing the empyrean heights, and the next touching the depths of degradation and despair. With exceptionally large crops of sugar and a high price that got even
higher when restrictions were withdrawn at the close of the
war the island was flooded with money. Where sugar had
brought an average of three cents a pound in the past, it rose
to five and a half cents during the war, and to twenty-two
and a half cents in 1920. Everything else went up in proportion. According to a statement of Menocal early in
1920, deposits in banks and savings institutions had increased a thousand per cent in the preceding six years, and
land values had advanced five hundred per cent.18 The most
characteristic note of the day, however, and more in keeping with the pleasure-loving instincts of the Cuban people,
was the wild orgy of extravagance that broke out in the island, such that this period has come to be called "the dance
of the millions." Much of this self-indulgent happiness
overflowed in trips to other parts of the world, to the accompaniment of "good times" of a very exciting variety.
The dance of the millions was a mere false bubble of
prosperity, and when it burst there was nothing left. Overproduction of sugar in different parts of the world caused
the market to break, during the summer of 1920, and the
price crashed down until it was only some three and fiveeighths cents in 1921. All business fell with it. The banks
had made heavy loans to finance the sugar crop on the
basis of the prevailing high prices of the product, but when
18 De Bekker, Leander J, Cuba pp. 230-231; Feb. 21, 1920.
and her president, in Nation, v. CX,




398


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


the market collapsed their security was wiped out. The
borrowers could not repay, and the banks could not meet
their other obligations. In order to tide over the situation
the government on October 10, 1920, declared a moratorium,
or suspension, in the payment of debts until December 1st,
and presently extended the time to January 1st, and then
to February 1st. At the same time, Cuban firms which had
ordered goods in the United States and elsewhere at high
prices now refused to take them. To be sure, prices generally had fallen not only for Cuban sugar but also for
most other materials all over the world, but it is doubtful
if the goods could have been paid for, even at the new
prices. As early as July 1920 the congestion at the Havana
docks was so great that an American commission visited
Cuba to see what could be done to relieve the situation.
Early in January 1921, General Crowder came to Cuba
to assist the republic in solving its electoral dispute (of
which presently), and as part of his duties he also made
suggestions concerning the economic crisis. As a result the
moratorium was continued on a sliding scale, with a provision for a series of gradual payments. The ultimate date
for merchants was fixed at May 15, and for the banks at
June 15.' These steps partially averted financial disaster,
but eventually, owing to "spineless execution" of the bank
liquidating act of January 31, 1921, most of the banks failed,
nevertheless. The most notorious case was that of the National Bank of Cuba itself. The affairs of this institution
had been conducted in an outrageously improper manner,
especially by one of its officers, a Spaniard named Jose L6pez,
or "Pote" as he was generally called in Cuba. The bank
had never been "National" except in name, for "Pote" controlled more than fifty per cent of the shares, bought with
money that had been loaned to him by the bank. "Pote,"




GOING DOWN: MENOCAL'S SECOND TERM, 1917-1921 399
one of the most notorious characters in the republican era,
was originally a bookseller, who accumulated a fortune
through graft in supplying books and other materials for the
schools, and added to it by famous deals in public works
and sanitation contracts with the state. When the affairs
of his "National" bank began to be revealed "Pote" committed suicide. An enquiry developed that he was at that
time in debt to the bank in some nine million dollars.
There were numerous officials both of the National and of
other banks who also had a guilty record, such that they were
criminally indicted, but they were later included in an
amnesty law of the Zayas period.19 While the Cuban banks
and branches of European banks were quite generally failing, two great institutions, the National City Bank of New
York and the Royal Bank of Canada, met every obligation.
They lost heavily, but probably made money in the end,
through the improvement of their relative place in the Cuban
financial world and through later advances in the value of
the security they took over from their debtors.
The least becoming thing in Menocal's eight year rule
was the manner of his passing,-his handling of the elections of 1920, which were even more scandalously stolen
than were those of 1916. He might yet have saved his name
by holding honest elections at this time, but he chose to
go from bad to worse, even turning "traitor to his party,"
as Perez puts it, by thrusting his former opponent Zayas
into the presidency, in order at all costs to beat Gomez.20
After the Revolution of February there was a revival of
the split in Liberal ranks as between Zayas and Gomez,
but this time it was G6mez that had the upper hand. Indeed, Zayas was no longer recognized as a member of the


9 Cf. infra, pp. 534-535.


' Cf. Perez, 13.




400


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


party by most of the Liberals, and so in 1919 he took his
group and formed a new organization which he called the
Popular party. It announced a noisy program of "noninterference of other nations in Cuba's affairs," or virtually
the familiar old anti-Platt Amendment platform, but in
point of fact it was a mere "pirate party," ready to jump in
any direction that might prove to its advantage. The opportunity soon came. Whatever his promises to General
Emilio Nfunez may have been in 1916, Menocal appears to
have had different views as 1920 approached. At first he
hit upon General Rafael Montalvo, a veteran of '95, former
Cabinet official under Estrada Palma, and more recently
prominent in the sugar industry, but presently consideration
of Montalvo was dropped. According to one account Menocal was convinced that Montalvo could not win, but another
story has it that there was a violent personal controversy
between the two men. It was then that an arrangement
was made for Zayas to become the joint candidate of the
Conservative and Popular parties, or virtually of the former,
which represented ninety per cent of the strength in this
alliance. In other words, Zayas made a complete flop, and,
in a sense, so too Menocal. Niuniez jumped in the other
direction, passing over to the Liberal camp.21
Long before the formation of the "National League," as
the Conservative-Popular union was called, there had been
rumblings and murmurs about the forthcoming election. The
Liberals wanted assurances this time that they would not be
robbed, and the idea developed that some sort of help from
the United States was-necessary. Menocal himself, as early
as 1917, advocated the taking of a new census as the basis
for a purification of the voting lists.22 Eventually both the
'General Francisco Carrillo was  2Message to Congress of Apr. 2,
the vice-presidential nominee for the 1917, quoted in Merino and IbarzaConservatives.              bal, 234-243, at 240.




GOING DOWN: MENOCAL'S SECOND TERM, 1917-1921 401
Conservatives and Liberals concurred in the issue of an invitation to General Crowder to come to Cuba and assist in
drawing up a new election law. This was the same officer
who had had such marked success in handling electoral problems in the Magoon era. In addition to his well-known integrity, tirelessness as a worker, and legal and administrative ability, he now had back of him a great prestige
which he had gained for his achievements in American military councils in the World War. So, early in 1919 the invitation was extended, and on February 15 Minister Gonzales announced that Crowder had accepted. About a month
later, on March 18, Crowder came over from Florida in an
airplane. He at once went to work on his task. A census
was duly taken, and studies were made of all elections since
1909, so as to know the different varieties of fraud that had
been practiced, with the idea of providing against them
in the future. In the end, the number and character of the
guarantees in the new law against fraud, all based on previous Cuban experience, were such as to constitute an indictment of the nation. Greater reliance was placed on the
judiciary than had been the case under the old law,-so
much so that it was virtually impossible for a man lawfully
to become President of Cuba without the acquiescence of
the Supreme Court. The law was just as strong or as weak
as the judiciary, and it is said that Crowder told Menocal
that any failure to obtain a prompt result under it would
be fraught with grave consequences for Cuba.23
Despite the seeming cordiality of his original invitation,
Menocal in fact paid little attention to the requirements of
the Crowder law. One provision, against the union of parties,
was done away with by amendment so as to permit of the
Conservative-Popular alliance, and other "safeguards" were
E For something more on the Crowder law, see infra, pp. 574-577.




402


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


flagrantly disregarded.   Speaking generally of Cuban elections and of the election of 1920 in particular, Doctor Herbert J. Spinden, an official observer, has this to say:
"The ancient psychology of Spanish politics flares up luridly in Cuba. In their long wars for independence Cubans exhibited a willingness
to die for their country... But since securing independence they have
not shown an ability to live for their country... Many of the things
complained of in Cuban politics could be matched... in the United
States. But... We have never suffered from a President who went
into office a poor man and came out a multi-millionaire. We have never
suffered from the coercive action of an army or from other grave evils
which exist in the politics of Cuba... we have never had at the head
of our nation a man like Menocal, who over his own signature pardoned
335 criminals during the electoral period, of which 44 were murderers... The story of the last election is sordid and cynical to a degree.
All mayors of liberal towns were shorn of their executive rights and
military supervisors responsible to the Secretary of the Interior and
having at their beck and call the intimidating forces of the army were
put in charge throughout Cuba. These men were armed and they shot
to kill in ill-starred Sagua. In addition, then, to all petty trickery in
counting ballots and juggling figures, there were forces abroad in the
last election which were sinister in the extreme. There can be little
doubt but that this was stolen." 24
As early as August 1920, the Liberals, who had nominated
G6mez for the presidency (with Miguel Arango for VicePresident-), threatened to withdraw from the elections, which
was virtually as much as to say that they would provoke
United States intervention or start an insurrection unless
they were given a fair chance for victory. The Washington
government did not want another Revolution of August or
February, and took steps at once to adjust the situation.
In a note of August 30 it was made clear that the Liberals
had better go to the polls; the United States would not favor
34Spinden, Herbert Joseph, Amer- Museum of Cambridge, Massachuica and her duty in Cuba, in Boston setts, is one of the leading anthroTranscript, Aug. 7, 1923. The author, pologists in the United States.
who is an official of the Peabody




GOING DOWN: MENOCAL'S SECOND TERM, 1917-1921 403
either party, but would have official observers on hand, with
the idea of avoiding intimidation or fraud.25 This was very
like intervention, but it is said that Menocal was prevailed
upon to request the observers, although the suggestion came
from  Washington.26   So the observers "came," and "saw,"
but could not prevent the evil methods of other years to
win the election. What were these methods? For one thing
the Department of the Interior was combined with that of
War under one Secretary, Charles 27 Hernandez. This meant
that the man who was responsible for the conduct of the elections might also make use of the regular soldiery and the
rural guards in such ways as he saw fit. As Secretary of the
Interior, Hernandez suspended or supplanted mayors and
police chiefs in Liberal towns, and as Secretary of War appointed military supervisors in their places, picking the officers he wanted. It was all done on a pretence of maintaining
order, but was in fact a political maneuver. Out of 112
municipalities, there were seventy-three, mainly in Liberal
territory, that were put under military supervisors. Most
of the higher officers of the army dared to refuse to do political work, to their credit be it said, but enough lesser
officials were found to supply the need, often mere sergeants
or corporals, and some of them instituted a veritable reign
of terror. Between March 1st and October 6, 1920, too, as
already stated, Mepocal pardoned 335 criminals, including
forty-four murderers, in order to use them as gunmen and
bullies and to get the value of their "family influence." 28
Spinden tells of one case in Santo Domingo that illustrates
2'Spinden, Herbert Joseph, Shall general Crowder en Cuba, in Reforma
the United States intervene in Cuba?, social, v. XX, pp. 99-112, at 99;
in World's work, v. XLI, pp. 465-483, June, 1921.
Mar., 1921, is the best available ac-  " Not Carlos, as usually in Spanish,
count of the elections of 1920, and is but Charles.
the principal basis of the story given  2 Cf. supra, pp. 319-320, and infra,
here.                          pp. 565-566.
opez, Jacinto, El fracaso del




404


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


how these methods worked out. Santo Domingo was then,
as it usually is, one of the "crucial" electoral points in the
"crucial" province of Santa Clara. On September 13, 1920,
it seems that Congressman Adolfo Niunez wrote Menocal
a letter about conditions there. He asked for the transfer
to that town of three specifically named military officers, "to
counteract Troadio Perez, who has ranged himself with Jose
Miguel"; he reported that the Conservative mayor was doing
nothing to further the campaign, and asked that he be
"called to order"; and he insisted on the pardon of a certain
criminal, Jose de Jesus Fundora, because "his family, friends,
and fellow party members... are many and of great importance in that district." No evidence is at hand as to
what may have happened to the mayor, but Fundora was
pardoned on September 29. He had already served two
years and a half of a sentence of nearly fifteen years for
murder, but the court that sentenced him refused to recommend a pardon, which was the usual procedure in such cases.
So Menocal went over their heads and pardoned him anyway. Various steps are alleged to have been taken, too, to
"counteract" Sergeant Perez,-among them, several attempts
to murder him, but Perez escaped.
While' the Conservatives were ready to use violence, if
necessary, in order to win the election, they also employed
other measures to poll as large an actual vote as they could.
In particular, they endeavored to split the negro vote, which
was normally Liberal, and for this purpose gave an impulse
to passions that were, to say the least, improper. In Cuba,
as elsewhere in the Americas, the negroes retained some
traces of their ancient African superstitions, and were wont
to give vent to them in the ceremonial of their secret societies, or ianiigos, as they were called. Formerly they had
observed many weird rites, such, for example, as that of




GOING DOWN: MENOCAL'S SECOND TERM, 1917-1921 405
initiation when they drank the blood of a freshly killed
rooster, perhaps mixing the potion with alcohol. In particular they indulged in certain dances called congas that
were described as shameful. Attempts had been made under
Spanish and United States rule to suppress these organizations, but they lived on in secret, to some extent. The societies themselves were bitterly hostile to one another, and
it had so happened that the head of one of them had murdered the head of another. Menocal now stepped in, and
pardoned the murderer, thus reviving the old feud between
the two organizations and their followers. There were a
number of shooting affrays, but presumably Menocal gained
Zayas some votes. Also, parades of negroes favoring the
National League candidates were allowed, to the accompaniment of congas in the public streets.
Election day came on November 1st, one day ahead of that
in the United States. The voters turned out in great numbers, where they could, especially in Santa Clara, which was
literally the "battle-ground" of the election, for fourteen
men were killed there that day. There were many who did
not vote, however, especially in the rural districts, where
there were evidences of intimidation. In the outskirts of
Santo Domingo, for example, the Conservatives voted 96.5
per cent of their enrollment, as against 10.7 per cent for the
Liberals. And yet the majority for Zayas in the rural districts of Santa Clara was only 1195, despite the fact that
bands of armed men were riding about and other means were
being employed to keep down the Liberal vote. At Guaracabulla, where Gomez had an enrollment of eighty-six votes
more than Zayas, the voting-place was not allowed to open.
At Hernando 151 Liberals were enrolled, but only seventeen
voted, and at Nazareno just eight voted out of 108. Even
the larger towns had to encounter something in the way of




406


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


armed intimidation. At Sagua la Grande the sergeant in
charge ordered his men to fire into a body of Liberals, and
several were killed. At Cienfuegos a number of criminals
were appointed policemen! Strong-arm methods were not,
however, the usual means employed to get a favorable vote.
There were other simpler and more vulgar devices. At
Guaso the polls were closed before the regular hour; indeed,
this was done in various places as soon as the Conservatives
had voted. At Salamanca the voting was delayed, with some
thirty an hour being admitted to the polling-place, and in
consequence about eighty Liberals did not get a chance to
vote. At Col6n, Matanzas, the military supervisor, a sergeant, burned the returns when they indicated a Liberal
majority. And yet the Conservatives carried Santa Clara
by only 2325 votes in a total of 86,411, and all of Cuba by
10,585 in 312,765. Naturally, the Liberals were no mere
innocent lambs themselves in the course of this election.
These affairs in Cuba are all a matter of opportunity, and
the greater blame attaches to the Conservatives merely because they were in a position to be more frequently unlawful
and because they could not have won in a fair election. As
matters were, Zayas "lost" only the province of Havana,
and was declared elected.
In the midst of an excitement and bitterness that
paralleled the days of 1916, appeals were now taken in
in accord with the provisions of the electoral law, but the
end of the year came without a decision being reached, due
in part to the introduction of technicalities into the preliminary hearings, to promote delay. It began to look as if the
issue might be postponed to the very day of the next inaugural, and the country seemed drifting again toward civil
war. In this emergency the United States decided to act.
On January 6, 1921, without formal prior notice to the




GOING DOWN: MENOCAL'S SECOND TERM, 1917-1921 407
Cuban authorities, General Crowder turned up in Havana,
as the special representative of President Wilson. His arrival was viewed with mixed feelings. On the whole, the
Liberals welcomed him, for they were convinced that Menocal would yield the election only through force, and as the
United States would not permit of a revolution its intervention was necessary. Indeed, as early as November 7, 1920,
the Liberals had suggested a United States provisional government for the holding of new elections. The Conservatives
were not at all pleased over the coming of Crowder. It
is said that Menocal resented it, and announced while Crowder was en route to Cuba that he would not receive him. He
did not go to any such length, however, when Crowder arrived. Some others, less partisan than Menocal, were also
disturbed, and among them the veteran political theorist
Enrique Jose Varona, ever suspicious of the United States
and hopeful that Cuba, left to herself, might evolve out of
the ills that afflicted her life. He referred ominously to this
appointment "for functions as extensive as they are
obscure." 29
Crowder went to work in his usual efficient manner. On
January 10 he addressed a long communication to Menocal,
objecting to the delays in the decision of disputed cases, and
pointing out how matters might be expedited. He called
attention to the fact that many municipal governments were
already ad interim administrations, that the provincial governments would become so in February, and, of course, the
national government on May 20, unless an adjustment might
in the meantime be reached. The situation was therefore
"one of great gravity," which when considered with the existing financial crisis "constitutes a menace to the National life,
29Varona, Enrique Jose, Discurso de artes y letras, v. VI, pp. 239-246,
leido... la noche del 22 de dici- at 241.
embre de 1921, in Academia nacional




408


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


calling for extraordinary remedial measures." It is not surprising that Crowder's suggestions were adopted, and presently the dockets were cleared sufficiently for the Supreme
Court to render the final decisions. This body acted creditably, just as it had in 1916, and on the whole favored the
contentions of the Liberals. The elections in some two hundred and fifty voting districts, about twenty per cent of the
total, were annulled, and new partial elections were called
for, to be held simultaneously in March,-a proposal of
Crowder. Crowder now did everything he could to make
these a success. He personally visited and inspected all the
storm centres. He got Menocal, G6mez, and Zayas together
on February 26, and a "pact of honor" was arranged. Menocal agreed not to use military supervisors, but to have inspectors present representing the Central Electoral Board,
and the date was set for March 15. Everything now seemed
to have been made ready either for an honest election or else
a just cause for complaint on which the United States might
act, when suddenly all was upset again, and Crowder's efforts
went for naught.
Attention has already been called to that odd quirk of
character which makes Hispanic Americans withdraw from
an electoral contest when they think they cannot win,
whether from lack of votes or because of the employment
of violent methods by the other side. G6mez and the Liberals got it into their heads that they were not going to receive fair play. It was true, indeed, that the Conservatives
were quite as determined that G6mez should not become
President as the Liberals were that Zayas should not. Neither
side was going to concede the victory, short of compulsion
by the United States. The Liberals failed to realize that
their only chance of success was to go through with the elections and rely on the United States to see that justice was




GOING DOWN: MENOCAL'S SECOND TERM, 1917-1921 409
done. As the date for the partial elections approached, however, the usual suspicions of governmental improprieties developed, and bitterness cropped out to such an extent that
in Colon, Matanzas, there was a veritable battle of Liberals
and Conservatives on March 9. Hundreds of shots were
fired, and some casualties sustained. So the Liberals refused
to go to the polls on March 15, and, of course, Zayas won!
The action of G6mez and his partisans, which appears
stupid to the Anglo-American mind, can be excused only on
the ground that it was typically Hispanic American. If they
could have been a little more patient and gone to the elections it is probable that they would have had the support
of the United States in a review of the affair that would
have placed the Liberal candidate in the presidential chair
on May 20. The writer has it on good authority that
Crowder himself stated privately that in his opinion G6mez
would have been proclaimed President instead of Zayas if
he had cooperated in the attempt to solve the electoral dispute instead of withdrawing. But the Liberals felt, mistakenly, that they had taken the right course to win. G6mez
went to Washington to lay his case before the State Department and to appeal for a United States provisional government to supervise new elections. He entered a formal petition to this effect on April 5, which, to say the least, showed
confidence in the United States.30 Meanwhile, in Cuba, the
Liberals refused to make a quorum in Congress, expecting
in this way to prevent a formal proclamation of victory for
Zayas. The United States had no basis for an intervention,
however. It had not been invited to take that action by
'3There were, of course, a number flage reflecting this view. Carbonell
of Cubans who did not share this first ran this material as a series in
confidence. Carbonell, Miguel Angel, a Havana daily paper, Nacion, from
El peligro del dguila (Habana, 1922), Apr. 8 to Apr. 26, 1921, at the time
is a volume of somewhat airy persi- Jose Miguel was in Washington.




410       A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
the constituted authorities as in 1906, and it could not do
anything on a mere possibility, or even a probability, that
the Conservatives would have stolen the elections of March
15 if the Liberals had gone to the polls. In other words,
there was no case under the Permanent Treaty. So Gomez's
petition was denied, and on April 17 the United States formally recognized the election of Zayas, at the same time intimating that there might indeed be an intervention if a
legal government were not in office on May 20. Gomez accepted the decision, and announced that he had given up
the contest, but the excitement in Cuba continued for a
time. The Liberal candidate for governor of the province
of Havana was murdered, and Zayas's private secretary also
fell by an assassin's hand. Threats were freely made that
Zayas would be "dead" before he became President. Gradually, however, the atmosphere cleared, for the Liberals
could not but recognize the futility of further opposition in
the face of the attitude of the United States. So at length
the Liberals went to Congress, and Zayas was duly inaugurated on May 20.
And what of Gomez? The outcome of the election was
an overwhelming blow to him. He went to New York, where
he was taken sick, and died there on June 13. Although it
may be considered small satisfaction by some, there was nothing that could more surely enthrone him in the hearts of the
Cuban people than his death at this time. He became the
newest and greatest of the Liberal martyrs. He was the
"patriot" who had yielded his own "just claims" in the face
of the Washington decision, so as to save his country from
civil war. And he died of a "broken heart." An always likeable figure during his life, he became popular almost to the
point of deification in death. Not even the name of a Marti,
Maximo Gomez, or Maceo can to this day rouse the Cuban




GOING DOWN: MENOCAL'S SECOND TERM, 1917-1921 411
masses to such enthusiasm as can that of Jose Miguel. His
remains were taken to Havana, and on June 19 a great
funeral was held. There was a procession two miles long,
and the streets were strewn with flowers. In course of the
march there was a riot, in which scores were hurt and one
man killed, but it was based on devotion to Gomez more
than opposition to the authorities. Eager to render one
more last service to their chief, his admirers broke through
the police, in an effort to carry the coffin. So passed Jose
Miguel, a man who had his faults, but who should not be
judged too harshly in a final review of his character.
And what then of Menocal? To many he will appear a
more pathetic figure than Gomez. A man of wonderful gifts
and good intentions, he had failed by the very victories he
had won, for in gaining them he had outdone his predecessors
in political iniquities of a sort that he himself had denounced.
To be sure, he was to some extent a victim of bad luck, in
that he went out of office at the time of a grave economic
depression following on the heels of unparalleled prosperity.
Governments and rulers are always blamed for such moments as this, however little they may have been responsible
for them. In the case of Menocal, however, his political
shortcomings were to live in Cuban memory when complaints
about the depression had been forgotten. As Perez has said,
he did not "respect liberties," and failed, therefore, to "gain
the esteem of his people." Fortunately for Menocal's ultimate place in Cuban history he was again to play a prominent part in the politics of the country, and this time was
to conduct himself more in keeping with the reputation he
had before he first became President.31
1 There is not even a third-rate items, and other somewhat superficial
book available on Menocal's second evidences until such time as a student
term. One must therefore depend comes along who is able to make the
upon periodical articles, newspaper several years of intensive study of




412


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


government documents and other evidences that such a period requires
before its history can be written satisfactorily.  Fortunately,  however,
there is an exceptionally valuable
brief study by Trelles (the El progreso pamphlet) that touches prominently on this period and an unusually worth-while article, by Spinden,
on the elections of 1920. Furthermore, of course, numerous witnesses


are still alive, and the period is sufficiently far back in the past so that
at least some of the venom and partisanship  have  disappeared.   The
writer believes that later investigations will indeed add much material
and  correct some statements contained here, but will make very little
substantial change in the narrative of
these years.




CHAPTER XVIII


ZAYAS AND CROWDER, 1921-1923
FEW men ever had a better chance than Zayas to make a
distinguished record, and none more dismally failed. The
depths of degradation to which Cuba sank under Menocal
had developed an aroused public opinion in the island among
the better elements of the educated classes, and the emergencies of the financial situation had brought about the direct assistance of the United States, as represented by the
mission of General Crowder. This gave Zayas what might
have been a favorable opening for a praiseworthy administration. United States Secretary of State Hughes is said to
have told him that he had an opportunity to make his name
the greatest of any President in Hispanic American history,
if he would carry through the reforms that came to be known
as the "moralization program." Zayas agreed to do it, but
lacked the character and, indeed, the sincere desire necessary
to obtain results, and, one by one, promises and reforms alike
fell by the wayside. In the end a "new low" in shameless
political depravity was attained, farther down than the worst
stages of the Menocal regime. For two years, however, the
evils were held in check and something in the way of reform
momentarily accomplished, through the presence of Crowder,
who had the backing of the United States. These two men,
Zayas and Crowder, who might almost be symbolized as
"Evil" and "Good," dominated the years 1921-1923. For a
while, "Good" was almost more influential than "Evil," but
at length the latter won. All that remained of Crowder's
413




414


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


work was the record of what he had attempted to do for
Cuba, together with his revelations of conditions that
needed to be corrected, but doubtless that was of value as a
stimulus to public opinion and as a basis for action in the
future.
The people of Cuba had no illusions about Zayas when he
became President. They had long regarded him as a brilliantly clever man, of considerable intellectual attainments,
but with the common failings of the politician and exceptionally low moral standards. Of an old Cuban family, Zayas
himself had fallen upon evil days financially, and despite
his reputed shrewdness both as a politician and lawyer he
had never succeeded in repairing the family fortunes. This
was not because he was not willing to engage in any scandalous affair that would yield him a sure return. Indeed,
he was ready to pick up "easy money" in such small quantities that people were calling him a "peseta-stealer" as early
as the electoral campaign of 1908.1 Possibly one reason for
his ill-success was that he was a notoriously timid man, who
shunned danger in a land where physical courage is one of
the most highly admired traits. As one volume has set forth
on this score,
"This peculiar man, who is very tenacious in his desires, is at the same
time a timid character... Doctor Zayas did not take a direct part
in any of the revolutions,-to be sure, on account of his conviction as an
evolutionist, but undoubtedly, also, because of the timidity of his
character." 2
All accounts agree that Zayas possessed an almost oriental
patience and immobility of countenance such that he was
1This was in part due to the fact the War of Independence. Cf. Marthat Zayas carried a Spanish peseta tinez Ortiz, II, 820. The peseta had
as a souvenir of the days he had a normal value of about twenty
spent in prison at Ceuta at the time cents.
he was deported from Cuba during  2Merino and Ibarzabal, 18,




ZAYAS AND CROWDER, 1921-1923             415
often called "El Chino" (The Chinaman).3 A story is told
of him that is usually regarded as having a representative
value beyond the incident. At the time when he and a
number of other Cubans were being deported to a Spanish
prison in Africa, during the War of Independence, Zayas
developed a severe toothache. Noticing that Zayas's face
bore no evidences of pain, Gonzalez Lanuza asked how he
endured his trouble so easily. Thereupon, Zayas replied:
"It does not hurt. Nothing ever hurts me much." By extension this remark has been taken to mean that Zayas had
a kind of permanent anaesthetic, both physically and in the
realm of morals. So far as his morals were concerned, neither
friend nor foe defends Zayas from grave charges. It is a
question just how far one should proceed with evidence on
this score, especially since other persons than Zayas who
are still alive and who may be "more sinned against than
sinning" would also be involved. Perhaps it is well to let
the matter rest with the following brief generalization out
of a rather long statement by a distinguished Cuban:
"Zayas himself comes of a good family, but he is to a certain extent
a degenerate, with especially morbid sensual proclivities."
Few will deny that Zayas was what might be termed a "slippery" individual. His word was of no value, but whatever
stand he might take it was always hard, if not impossible,
to pin him down to an admission of error. The following
statement is illustrative of this phase of the peculiar psychology of Zayas:
"At the time of the Constitutional Assembly he declared himself an
atheist, but while he was President he stood sponsor at the baptism
into the Catholic faith of one of his grandchildren. As one has to
swear that he believes in the Catholic religion in order to be a sponsor,
3It is sometimes said that this is him, but there seems to be no basis
because Zayas had Chinese blood in in fact for the assertion.




416


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


we might have here a case of conversion, were it not that it was merely
part of a constant farce, the same before the Constitutional Assembly
as before the Catholic priest."
Zayas had already dipped his hands in the public treasury
before his elevation to the presidency, though not as deeply
as some others. The best known instance of this sort is in
connection with his famous "history of Cuba." On April
12, 1913, a little over a month before the inauguration of
Menocal, Gomez published a decree appointing Zayas to
write a history of Cuba at a salary of six thousand dollars
a year and authorizing him to go to Spain whenever he
thought best, to get copies of documents from the Spanish
archives. This created a storm of disapproval within the
Academy of History, of which Zayas was a member, because
it put that body in a ridiculous position, as it had been
founded by the government for just such purposes as now
seemed to be involved in the decree on behalf of Zayas. At
a meeting on April 24, at which Zayas was not present, although he knew that this matter was to be taken up, it was
decided to cite Zayas to appear and explain his connection
with the affair. In course of the debate Manuel Sanguily
remarked that if the idea were merely to give Zayas a generously paying government job, some other means of doing
it should be found. Zayas attended the following meeting,
on May 1st, and defended the decree, but every other member present held that its execution would not be consistent
with the objects of the society. A committee, headed by
Sanguily, was appointed to wait upon the President to see
whether the decree might be modified or annulled, and this
body reported back to the Academy in the meeting of May
14. Sanguily explained that G6mez told them the decree
had been issued at Zayas's own request, in order to provide
him with a means of living after his retirement from the




ZAYAS AND CROWDER, 1921-1923


417


vice-presidency on May 20. Gomez even showed them         the
original of the decree, which was written in Zayas's own
hand. He agreed, however, to modify it so as to allow Zayas,
in conjunction with the Academy, to gather materials for an
eventually to be written history,-still at six thousand a year
for Zayas. Since the Academy had gained its point, this
solution of the difficulty was accepted, and in the meeting
of May 14 Zayas expressed his satisfaction, saying further
that he proposed to work very hard in order to collect for the
Academy "a veritable treasure of historical documents."
The above is from the formal account in the minutes of the
meetings of the Academy.4 It may be supplemented by the
following statement, which comes direct from a person who
had an intimate knowledge of the whole affair:
"When the matter first came before the Academy, Zayas pretended
that the publication of the decree in the Gazette was the first he knew
of the affair, but later was obliged to admit that the story told by
G6mez to the Sanguily committee was true, although he made a 'savingface' excuse to account for his earlier statement to the contrary. Menocal
allowed Zayas to hold his job until just before the elections of 1916,
when Zayas was again the candidate as against Menocal. Then Menocal
sent an enquiry to the Academy, asking what Zayas had turned in so
far in the way of materials. The Academy could give but one answer,
and that answer was 'Nothing!'"
It is often asserted in print that Zayas held this post eight
years, and collected something like fifty thousand dollars.
In view of the above statement,-unless, indeed, the "soft
job" was restored after the Revolution of February (which
would be quite possible, as botellas are often given to uncomfortable opponents),-it would seem that Zayas "earned"
only some twenty thousand dollars out of his "history," but
what other "historian" was ever paid at an equally generous
'Academia de la historia, Anales, v. VI, pp. 48-58; Jan.-Feb., 1924.




418


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


rate?!! 5 To be sure, Zayas did begin a history in 1916,very likely as an election maneuver. It concerned events of
the years 1867-1868, but was wholly lacking in five-hundreddollars-a-month historical technique.6    Of a piece with this
"history" affair is another pre-presidential incident in Zayas's
career. It seems that he borrowed five thousand dollars at
the National Bank, but when that institution got into difficulties and an attempt was made to collect the debt Zayas
denied his own signature. No doubt, he had never intended
to pay it anyway, for it was merely a "political loan," of a
type that had become fashionable in governmental circles
before Zayas gathered in his bit.
A number of other estimates bearing on the career and
character of this strange individual should be given, but they
involve a discussion of his administration, and may therefore be taken up more suitably in the next chapter. One
such opinion may be given here, by way of a preliminary
estimate of his rule:
"Cuba is a country of vice versas. The case of Doctor Zayas is proof
of that assertion, for when he won he did not collect, and when he lost
he did... It would have been an act of ingratitude on the part of
the Cubans not to have consented to his elevation to the supreme
bureaucratic throne, for in an interval of four years,-long for politicians
who are waiting, but short in the infinite course of ungrateful time,he could realize the maximum work of prostituting public customs in a
proportion superior to anything that had gone before, and, as a consequence of that, private customs, too; and he was able to elevate his
endless and insatiable relatives to the category of Sotomayor of the
fable... He was a traitor to his party and political creed, throwing
down his twenty years of Liberalism as if they were a castle of cards.
Thus he went to the executive power, with the hatred of his friends of
other years and the scorn of his one-time coreligionists... Of his
Merino and Ibarzabal, 37, say that written in 1917.
Zayas collected "more than twenty  'The Zayas "history," entitled Un
thousand dollars" for his history. It capitulo de la historia general de
is to be noted, however, that the Cuba, is in Cuba contempordnea, v.
Merino and Ibarzabal volume was XI, pp. 14-47; May, 1916.




ZAYAS AND CROWDER, 1921-1923


419


government, not the least eulogy can be made, unless it may be for his
impassiveness in supporting everything, his leniency in combating enemies, and the serenity with which he has confronted difficult situations
that have presented themselves, always resolving them to his own
satisfaction."'
Back in the 1912 campaign Heraldo de Cuba, a Liberal organ,
had said that "the election of Doctor Zayas would be a disgrace to the country." 8 This was prophetic of what was
actually to come to pass.
General Crowder is too well known as a man of high character and extraordinary executive ability to require extended
comment for the present generation of readers. His meritorious work at the time of the Magoon rule has already
been described. Two other yet greater services had fallen
to his lot to perform. It was Crowder who was responsible
for the difficult and involved task of organizing civil government in the Philippines. And, as everybody knows, he raised
the American army for the World War under the terms of
the Selective Service Law. In the performance of this duty
he had under him 193,117 subordinates, with whose aid he
registered nearly twenty-four million men, classified industrially as well as in a military way some seventeen million,
physically examined about eight million, selected and entrained nearly four million, and had two million more ready
on Armistice Day to respond to demands for man-power in
case they should be needed. The problem that confronted
him in Cuba was in many respects the hardest of all, because
it did not carry with it any authority to act. As already set
forth, however, Zayas was compelled by the exigencies of
the situation to take a goodly portion of American advice
during the first two years of his administration,-or at least


' Perez, 15-16.
8 Quoted in Merino and Ibarza'bal, 19., I fait




420


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


to appear so to do,-and so Crowder's investigations and
suggestions had at times an almost decisive influence on the
course of governmental action. Some comments upon him
from this purely Cuban angle of his career may therefore be
worth while, though his place in public esteem was already
assured before this latest association of his with the island's
affairs.
It would be easy to accumulate a volume of laudatory
comment on Crowder's work in Cuba, including printed
statements as well as oral. They would boil down to something like the following: beyond anything else Crowder is
honest; he is also a man of vast legal knowledge and a tremendous, dynamic activity, with executive ability that is uncommon; he is sincerely desirous of the welfare of Cuba,
feeling assured that what is best for Cuba is likewise best
for the United States; he has a more detailed knowledge of
Cuban affairs than any man in the island, whether native
or foreigner; and except for General Wood there is no American among those who have served in Cuba who rivals him
in the greatness and unselfishness of his achievements. There
is no particular advantage in adding up columns of praise
of this tenor. Rather, in the case of a man with such an
impregnably good record it is preferable to seek serious statements that reflect some criticism, the better to explain the
position Crowder has occupied in Cuba and to hint at the
difficulties he has had to encounter. It will be noticed, however, that in all the statements that follow there is rather
more on the constructive than on the destructive side with
respect to his character and work.
(1) "Crowder is so honest he leans backward, and some day he may
injure his spine. He does not speak Spanish, and perhaps on that
account is not fully acquainted with Spanish American character. As a
result he is a little too impatient for immediate results, and too insistent
in his pressure on Cuban officials."




ZAYAS AND CROWDER, 1921-1923


421


(2) "It may be said to General Crowder's credit that he is possibly
the most unpopular man in Cuba. A lot of Americans don't like him
because he will not use his office as a collection agency for their contracts, and the politicians are against him because he represents a
possible check on their pocket-filling propensities."
(3) "General Crowder is the only man in Cuba who has a detailed
statistical knowledge of affairs in the island, and he uses the data
he compiles as the basis for suggestions about desirable legislation. He
is perhaps a little too confident that the laws he proposes would solve
the ills of Cuban life."
(4) "General Crowder is unmarried, and therefore has no distractions
of a family nature, but is wedded to his work. He is burningly desirous
of bringing about an improvement in Cuban affairs, and is impatient
over the slowness with which things move. One would not know that
he had been Provost-General of the American army during the war,
for he never mentions it, but he will talk for hours about Cuba. A tremendous worker himself, he drives his office staff wild; there is none
of the usual 'social secretary' dilly-dallying in the American embassy
of Havana, such as one finds il the embassies elsewhere, for Crowder
is hungry for data on a variety of subjects,-so much so, that the office
can't keep up with him. He has a certain pride in his record, but feels
that he is failing in Cuba, because matters are going just the opposite
to what he desires. The one criticism that might be made of him is
that he has not fully caught the spirit of these people, not quite grasping
to the full the undisciplined, individualistic traits they have, and
expecting them to act too much as Anglo-Saxons would. So he has not
learned that all the laws in the world mean nothing to a Hispanicblooded person, if it does not fit his convenience. In consequence, the
General is often over-hopeful of some good result,-only to be cast
down when high-class men act just about as disgracefully as their more
lowly fellows."
These remarks may be allowed to stand without comment,
except in one particular. Crowder's reliance on legislation
is probably overemphasized. Two things must be remembered in this connection. One is, that Cuba is a country that
lacks organic laws of a political code, except in so far as
Crowder himself was able to put his own suggestions on the
statute-books during the intervention of 1906-1909.         There
9 Cf. infra, pp. 544-545.




422


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


is a real value in getting correct principles into a code, whatever the immediate action may be that is taken upon them.
In the second place, Crowder has never had administrative
power in Cuba, and cannot be held responsible for the failure
to execute the laws. Even in the years of his greatest influence, 1921-1923, his "power" (which, after all, amounted to
nothing more than the Washington authorities were willing
to do in backing up his suggestions) was not nearly as great
as some people have supposed. Witness, for example, the
utter failure of the bank liquidating acts of January 1921,
through Crowder's inability to get ordinarily honest, courageous action on an admittedly good law. Other similar instances will appear in the sequel.
Even before Zayas became President it was apparent that
United States help would be necessary to save the country
from bankruptcy and the possibility of intervention. Menocal was about to leave office, with nothing in the treasury
and an unknown though certainly enormous floating debt,
but a seriously impaired government income, to say nothing
of the heavy requirements on Cuban bonds. It was clear
that the administration would find it difficult to obtain money
enough for running expenses, without any of the usual opportunities for graft on a large scale. So Zayas was ready to be
friendly and attentive to Crowder, who was at that time
the personal representative of President Harding, as formerly he had been of President Wilson, but not yet
ambassador to Cuba.   Trying to carry water on each
shoulder, however, Zayas endeavored to conceal his momentary subserviency to Crowder, but when confronted with
both angles of his pretence, he came to the fore in his
usual clever manner and reconciled them. He wrote a
letter to Heraldo de Cuba, under date of May 12, 1921, as
follows:




ZAYAS AND CROWDER, 1921-1923


423


"In the letter published this morning I asserted that I had no
knowledge of a cablegram which it was said had been sent to the Cuban
minister at Washington requesting him to ask of that government that
General Crowder, in his character as special envoy and personal representative, should remain with us. That statement is strictly correct.
I had no knowledge of such a cablegram, but it was natural that I
should not have, because General Crowder is accredited to the government of my very respected friend President Mario G. Menocal. Had
I been consulted regarding the sending of such a cablegram I should
have given it my unqualified approval, because I esteem at its full value
the aid which he has already given to Cuba, and in case his government
should permit him to remain among us, I shall not hesitate, upon
assuming the government of Cuba, to utilize the valuable and disinterested services he is capable of rendering in resolving many difficult
problems which confront us. This attitude I announced at the time
of the arrival of General Crowder in Cuba, indicating in a newspaper
his great knowledge of our affairs, his clear intelligence, and his good
intentions." 10
In view of the way Zayas later kicked over the traces, this
letter has a peculiar interest beyond that of the moment
when it was written.
Zayas had already drawn up his first message to Congress
by the time he entered office, and it was read in the joint
session of May 21, 1921. Some of its main features were
undoubtedly the suggestions of Crowder, easily recognizable
as such, and were in the nature of a preliminary announcement of the reforms that would be necessary if Cuba were
to set her house in order. Zayas began by promising to keep
to his own functions, "without invading or usurping your
powers in the least." Next came recommendations for
changes in the electoral code,-all in line with Crowder's
ideas.l" A number of constitutional reforms were proposed:
for executive Secretaries to appear before Congress; limiting
congressional immunity; changing the two-thirds quorum
rule to a majority or less; for direct vote of the people for
10 Quoted in Heraldo de Cuba, May  Cf. infra, pp. 574-579.
13, 1921.




424


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


President and Vice-President, "prohibiting that of the first
in two successive terms"; and for a thorough revision of the
paragraphs concerning municipal and provincial government.
Almost certainly this portion of the message was first suggested by Crowder. The budget for 1921-1922 had already
been made out for over $104,000,000. Zayas asked for a
cut in this to a sum between fifty and sixty millions. This
clearly was a Crowder measure. Zayas referred to the difficulties of the banks and the sugar industry, and proposed the
founding of a new national bank. In dealing with public
works he laid stress on his plan to build the much talked of
central highway from end to end of the island. As a program
and a promise this message was admirable, but as a sincere
exemplification of Zayas's desires it was an arrant farce, not
worth the paper it was written upon. After Zayas got matters into his own hands in 1923, he legislated by decree frequently, in typical Menocal fashion. Electoral reforms were
never undertaken, except to make matters worse than they
were before.12 There were long congressional discussions
about the proposed constitutional changes, but nothing was
ever doie.13 National bank projects were indeed taken up,
but, as will appear, with corrupt motives in mind. Even
the budget was not acted upon for the fiscal year 1921-1922,
but was reduced the following year as a result of the insistence of the United States.
The finances of the country were in a very bad way when
Zayas assumed the presidency. In the fiscal year 1920-1921
the receipts of the government amounted to nearly $108,000,000, the greatest in the history of the republic. The
budget for that year (actually the budget of 1918-1919, which
" Cf. infra, pp. 577-578.  they appear in more ample form in
"For some of these discussions, see the Diarios de sesiones volumes of
Pardo Suarez,. 260-296. Naturally, the two houses of Congress.




ZAYAS AND CROWDER, 1921-1923


425


was the most recent one that Congress had approved) called
for an expenditure of some sixty-four millions, but the government in fact spent about $182,000,000. It was already
clear, in May 1921, that there would be a considerable falling-off in revenue for 1921-1922, and, indeed, only some
fifty-seven millions were eventually collected.  In the face
of that was the budget for $104,000,000 and an overwhelming burden of current and funded debt. Congress, to be sure
(for the ninth time since 1905), did not act on the budget,
which legally put into effect the sixty-four million budget
of 1918-1919. Cuba had already, earlier in 1921, defaulted
for the first time in her history on her bonded debt, both
domestic and foreign; indeed, it was in expectation of this
event that President Wilson was induced in large measure
to send Crowder to Cuba as his special agent, as the relations
of the countries under the Permanent Treaty were seriously
involved in the financial debacle. Through the good offices
of the United States an emergency loan of five million dollars was effected with J. P. Morgan and Company, which
enabled the republic to resume payments on the funded debt.
This left the handling of the floating debt as the most pressing immediate problem, and at once raised the point that was
the basis of Crowder's influence during the next two years:
the necessity for a loan if these debts were to be paid and
the credit of the republic maintained.
The worst situation of all with respect to the floating debt
was that of the left-over contracts of the Menocal regime in
the Department of Public Works. Enormous sums were
owing under contracts with this branch of the government,
and it was known that many of the agreements were tainted
with fraud. Crowder told Zayas that this condition would
have to be cleared up before Cuba could get a loan. Zayas
at first resisted an investigation, but when he became con



426


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


vinced that he must permit one or get no loan he yielded
to Crowder's demands. On August 13, 1921, he issued a decree covering contracts on which work had not been completed. All illegal contracts were to be annulled, and on
legal contracts there was to be a readjustment in unit prices
or else a cancellation of the contract. This necessitated an
investigation, and it was undertaken under the direction of
Major Albert Lyman, the United States military attache.
He found that there was more than forty-nine million dollars' worth of work that had been contracted for, of which
some thirty-seven millions' worth was as yet unexecuted.
The prices charged were far in excess of those prevailing for
private work at the time the contracts were made, and the
amounts of money involved were much greater than those
which had been authorized by Congress. Some contracts
had never had congressional sanction at all. There was a
total of 354 contracts, assuming obligations far beyond
Cuba's ability to pay. Crowder now brought pressure upon
Zayas to correct the evils that had been laid bare, but the
work of the latter was half-hearted and imperfect. In some
cases he annulled contracts, but gave the contractors a bonus,
and in various ways there continued to be a "goat" in the
department's affairs.14 Of course, too, there were many other
debts, besides those originating in the Department of Public
Works.
Crowder spent most of his time during 1921 in acquiring
information about every phase of Cuban affairs, and it was
not until 1922, with a vast array of facts and figures at his
command, that he proceeded more actively than before to
"4Conn, Edward L, The various Hispanic American countries
crisis in Cuba: III, The goat in the the word "chivo," or goat, is used as a
treasury, in (Philadelphia Public synonym for graft,-possibly on the
ledger, reprinted in) Berkeley (Cali- analogy of a goat's giving milk.
fornia) Gazette, Nov. 21, 1923. In




ZAYAS AND CROWDER, 1921-1923


427


make suggestions for the renovation of public life. His ideas
were embodied in a series of communications that he sent
directly to Zayas which have come to be known as the
"fifteen memoranda," for they were numbered consecutively
from one to fifteen. Only one of the memoranda, number
thirteen, has ever been published in full, but enough information about all of them has reached the hands of other
persons so that a great deal may be said about them, although
the originals are not as yet available. The series appears
to have begun in February or March 1922. The first on
which the writer has a note is number three, of March 10,
1922.  This made suggestions for needed constitutional
amendments,-the same as those already proposed in Zayas's
opening message to Congress. Number five, of April 3, 1922,
asked what had been done about the revision of contracts in
the Department of Public Works and what to find out the
actual indebtedness of the government. Presumably, not
much had been accomplished. Number six, of April 12, 1922,
urged Zayas to get Congress to pass a budget, instead of
neglecting it as it had done since 1918, and suggested the
terms that the budget ought to contain. Number seven,
also on April 12, stated that the maximum of the budget
should be fifty-five million dollars, and pointed out where
savings could be effected. Number eight, of May 5, 1922,
charged that graft and corruption were still rampant in the
various administrative departments, thus undermining Cuban
credit and making it necessary for the government to act.
Number nine, of May 10, 1922, appears to have been an important communication with respect to the national audit
that had been undertaken by Secretary Gelabert of the
Treasury Department. It seems that a rather careless estimate had figured the total floating debt, as of May 20, 1921,
to be some forty-six millions. No attempt had been made to




428       A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
ascertain any additional floating indebtedness up to June
30, 1921, or for the fiscal year 1921-1922, although it was
known that expenditures for the latter period would probably exceed receipts by fifteen million dollars. These additional sums since May 20, 1921, ought therefore to have been
added to the previous total, since they had not been paid.
Crowder pointed out that this indebtedness could be met only
by a drastic reduction in the cost of government such that
the revenues would produce a surplus over expenditures (an
unlikely event), or else by a loan. A really accurate audit
would be necessary, however, before a loan could be discussed, but at any rate something must be done, as creditors
with just claims, not merely those with fraudulent contracts
in the Public Works Department, were pressing for the payments due them. Numbers ten and eleven, of May 15 and
June 26, 1922, discussed needed reforms of the lottery, a
matter which the bankers with whom negotiations for a
loan were being undertaken considered of especial importance
as a preliminary to an agreement.15
This is a good point to pause to mention some of the precise evils on which Crowder's charges of corruption in public
office were based. The newspapers of that period are teeming with assertions on this score, but one need not rely upon
them, for the pronouncements of some of the most responsible bodies in Cuban life, such, for example, as the Rotary
Club of Havana and various economic associations, are replete with condemnations of the immorality in public administration. One case was that of a contract to provide
food supplies for the army at such an exorbitant rate that
it accounted for one-fourth of the entire military expense.
The contract was awarded without any resort to public


"SThe subject of lottery reform  at   chapter XXIII.
this time is considered more fully in




ZAYAS AND CROWDER, 1921-1923


429


bidding as the law required. The matter came to public
attention in April 1922 when Zayas was about to re-award
the contract to the same firm. It is said that Crowder
protested, though with what success the writer is not informed. Undoubtedly there was a tidbit of graft in the
deal for Cuba's "first citizen," as also for various others.
Graft continued at a normal pace in the administration of
the custom-house, one of the outstanding rivals of the lottery
and the Department of Public Works in the sum total of its
pilferings. Conservative estimates calculated a loss of fifteen
per cent through graft in the collection of revenues and another twenty-five per cent in disbursements, while other
estimates were even higher. One notorious instance of this
sort was brought to light in the Bureau of Communications,
of the Department of Government, in April 1922. The officers of the telegraph operators' union were claiming that
the budget discriminated against the men whose affairs they
handled, and so sent a petition to Zayas in which they made
direct charges about the number of "imaginary" jobs in the
bureau, holding that if these were suppressed there would
be enough for the just needs of the telegraphers. An investigation revealed the existence of some sixty or seventy
sinecures, given to the holders by order of the Secretary of
Government, Francisco Martinez. It was charged that the
salaries were paid indirectly to Martinez himself and that
he was also turning an "honest penny" by tolerating gambling in Marianao and prostitution in Havana. Both he
and his brother-in-law, who had become his private secretary, were poor when he went into office, and now they were
rich. Even the notoriety over the illegalities in the Department of Public Works was not sufficient to banish graft
there. New contracts were still made on much the same
basis as before, without advertising or public bidding or an




430


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


award to the lowest responsible bidder; indeed, most of the
awards went to political friends totally unqualified to do
the work called for and at ridiculously high prices. No
doubt the sum total of the amounts stolen from the government was not so great as it had been under Menocal or as
it was to be later under Zayas, but graft as an institution
was more widespread than ever, with virtual immunity from
punishment for the grafters, and the President was not
making a sincere effort to stop it. Obviously this was not
a healthy background for a loan.
One of the first problems Crowder had to face upon his
arrival in Cuba in January 1921 was the banking situation.
Something has already been said about this in connection
with the moratorium, but there were other matters to consider. There was the question of the punishment to be
meted out for crimes of the bank officials and that of the
rehabilitation of the National Bank. By and with the advice of Crowder some banking legislation was enacted as
early as January 31, 1921, and a Bank Liquidation Committee was constituted. As already mentioned, however, the
execution of this law was worse than futile. The bankers
were protected from criminal liability, in part because Zayas
and a number of other leading politicians were likely to be
compromised, because of the large "loans" that had been
made to them without an observance of the requirements of
the law. And presently, when the National Bank failed, it
carried down with it some twenty millions of government
funds that had been on deposit there. Meanwhile, Congress
took no action on Zayas's request for a new law, as set forth
in his message of May 21, 1921, and repeated on November 7,
1921. Seeking an expert opinion, Crowder had caused an
invitation to be extended to William P. Harding, a member
of the Federal Reserve Board of the United States, to come




ZAYAS AND CROWDER, 1921-1923


431


to Cuba and make an investigation of the financial situation.
Harding was in Cuba for about two months during 1921, and
at length reported that it would take a large staff of experts
several years to make an accounting, such was the disorder
in which he found affairs. He suggested that a fresh start
be made, with a good accounting system. Asked to propose
a national banking law, he eventually drew up a plan, and
gave it to Crowder while the latter was in Washington in
January 1922.
One of the features of the Harding plan was a proposed
National Reserve Bank, which should be the only Cuban
bank of issue and should be so constituted as to keep Cuban
money on a parity with the dollar. Harding suggested that
it should have a capital of twenty million dollars, of which
five millions should be subscribed, half by United States
citizens and half by the Cuban treasury. The President of
Cuba was to name four directors, and the American stockholders four more, while a ninth was to be chosen by the
other eight members of the board. In case of disagreement
the Federal Reserve Board of the United States was to
indicate a preference as between the two receiving the highest
vote. There was to be a gold reserve to redeem the proposed
issue of Cuban money (to replace American paper, current
in the island), half of it on deposit in Havana and half in
New York. This, of course, meant a virtual United States
control, but Harding felt that Americans would not invest
in the bank on any other basis, believing also that the stabilizing influence of American participation was necessary to
the success of the bank. With the Harding report before it,
a Cuban committee drew up a substitute plan. This was
framed cleverly to resemble the much praised Federal Reserve Act of the United States,-but for conditions that were
utterly different. The greater part of the capital was to be




432       A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
subscribed in Cuba, and a majority of the board of directors
was to be appointed by the Cuban President. There was
to be a gold reserve, but redemption of paper was to take
place in Cuba alone. A somewhat extraordinary National
Banking Commission was provided for, with the Secretary
of the Treasury as chairman, and five others, appointed by
the President at a salary of ten thousand a year. There
were to be three technical advisers, too, with salaries of nine
thousand each. The "work" assigned to this committee was
of such a character that, as Harding said, it could be done
just as well and far more inexpensively in the Treasury Department, as most of it was mere routine. Some such central
committee was necessary in the United States to produce
uniformity, he said, as there were twelve federal reserve
banks, but in Cuba there was to be but a single bank. Secretary Mellon of the United States Treasury Department is
said to have stated that he agreed with Harding. As for the
latter, he would have nothing further to do with the matter,
not being interested in any system that would not certainly
keep Cuban money at par with the dollar. No doubt, too,
he could see,-as who could not?,-that the Cuban plan
would have projected the bank into politics, making it a
perquisite of the President. Crowder made the reserve bank
project the subject of his memorandum number twelve, of
July 10, 1922, suggesting that the republic get back to the
Harding plan, but nothing was accomplished along this line.
He was successful in warding off the substitute measure,
however, although later in Zayas's term new and yet more
extreme Cuban "plans" were to be devised.
It will be obvious from the foregoing that something more
than mere suggestions of reform was going to be necessary
if any positive results were to be attained. The men in power
were not fit instruments of a moralization program, and




ZAYAS AND CROWDER, 1921-1923             433
Crowder was eager to replace them with officials who would
be incorruptible.   So, taking advantage of the popular
clamor against certain members of the existing Cabinet, and
with the back-log of the necessity for the loan, he brought
pressure to bear to cause the dismissal of the Zayas Secretaries and the appointment of upright men in their place.'1
The old Cabinet resigned on June 15, 1922, and a new one,
made up of men whose names were probably approved by
Crowder, was inducted into office four days later. This was
the origin of the so-called "Honest Cabinet." Zayas consented, for the country had not yet negotiated the loan of
which it stood in need, and the bankers were vitally interested in obtaining an honest administration of Cuba's affairs.
The Honest Cabinet went to work with a will, and rendered a really meritorious service. The budget was reduced
some fifty per cent. Many unnecessary employes were separated from the rolls, and bonuses to others were abolished.
They did especially well in untangling the contract situation
in the Public Works Department. Responding unwillingly
to pressure Zayas had annulled ninety-eight out of the 354
contracts in that department, though often to the accompaniment of improprieties, as already stated. By the time
that the Honest Cabinet came into office the amount of
Public Works contracts had jumped to nearly eighty millions,
of which sixty were involved in the remaining 256 contracts
still hanging fire from the Menocal period, while there was
nearly thirty millions of work still unexecuted. In some nine
months the Honest Cabinet was able to dispose of all but
ninety-five contracts, of which fourteen more would certainly
6 Machado, 19-20, n. 1, says that renovation of the Cabinet, due to the
Crowder "exerted no pressure whatso- fact that public opinion was accusing
ever" in this affair, but Trelles, Bib- certain Secretaries of having realized
lioteca, II, 128, enters the following acts that were improper for honest
under date of June 12, 1922: "Gen- functionaries." The Trelles statement
eral Crowder exacts the immediate is probably the correct version.




434       A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
have been cancelled if the Honest Cabinet had remained in
power, as they were illegal. It was discovered that numerous
frauds were being committed in the new contracts of the
Zayas period, as well as in those from the time of Menocal.
A paving contract for Cienfuegos went to a company in
which a son of Zayas and a son of one of his intimate friends
(who had been appointed to an important post in the Public
Works Department) were among the heavy stockholders. A
brother of the president of the Senate held a contract for
repairing a road in the province of Camagiiey. A dredging
contract for the port of Havana was given to an American
company of a somewhat unsavory history; this company
was a client of the law firm of which Zayas was a member,
and it is said that it paid eight per cent of all its contract
amounts to Zayas's law partner. The president of the Senate
and an ex-Secretary of Public Works acquired the paving contract for the city of Camagiiey, although another was put
forward as the holder who was in fact a mere dummy for
the two men.'7
/ The appointment of the Honest Cabinet was a most important step as a preliminary to the loan, and marked the
influence of Crowder at its height. The need for a loan had
already been discussed pro and con for many months. Most
of the politicians had very little financial knowledge, and
since the sum to be obtained was to be applied chiefly in
payment of the country's floating debt and not on "succulent
affairs" that would be profitable to themselves they opposed
the loan altogether or else wanted to cut down the amount.
To them the value of the nation's credit meant nothing.
They thought the golden flow would continue just the same,
credit or no credit. Not a few respectable elements of the
" Conn, Edward L, The ger, reprinted in) Berkeley (Califorcrisis in Cuba: III, The goat in the nia) Gazette, Nov. 21, 1923.
treasury, in (Philadelphia Public led



ZAYAS AND CROWDER, 1921-1923


435


non-political class felt the same way, for a high regard for
national credit cannot be said to be a notable trait in Hispanic American character.18 It was Crowder himself who
suggested that fifty million dollars would be needed. The
politicians objected that the floating debt could not possibly
be more than half as much, but some others claim that Crowder and the Morgan experts underestimated the amount,
asserting that it was at least seventy millions. At length,
in 1925, the Debt Commission fixed the amount due as $43,540,983.40, or considerably more than the thirty-five millions which were eventually applied on the floating debt
out of the proceeds of the loan.19 Whatever some of the
other politicians may have thought, Zayas fully appreciated
the importance of the loan. Nobody has ever called him a
fool; at any rate, he realized that the reestablishment of
Cuban credit meant the difference between "dividends" and
a "deficit" for the remaining years of his administration.20
So, now that the Honest Cabinet had been appointed, he
asked Crowder what more would be required before the


United States would approve
This drew forth a reply from
famous memorandum number
8 Cf. Machado, 82-83, especially n.
23-24. Machado was not enthusiastic
about paying debts "whose legitimacy
is doubtful," feeling sure, too, that
the total of the floating debt could
not be more than thirty million.
1 The Debt Commission, created by
a law of September 13, 1922, held its
first meeting on the following October 13, and its last on February 19,
1925, at which time it finished its
work. In all, it received 28,201 claims
totaling $45,777,629.20, and ordered
payment of $32,047,192.27, in addition
to $8,596,174.55 for salaries and pensions of government employes and
$2,897,616.58 for veterans' pensions.


the fifty million dollar loan.
Crowder in the shape of the
thirteen of July 21, 1922.
0 The writer recognizes how difficult it is for even the educated person
with a non-financial mind to grasp
the value of a loan that does not contribute directly to a yield in revenue.
A recent statement by an American
railway president referred to a huge
loan his company had effected for
the purchase and improvement of
railway equipment. Going on, he
said that the amount borrowed was
now yielding the company twenty per
cent. Cuba was in just such a position as that, except that the indirect
value of a restoration of credit was
perhaps worth far more than twenty
per cent.




436


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


Memorandum number thirteen was perhaps not nearly
so interesting a document in itself as some of the other communications of Crowder to Zayas, but it attained to a peculiar notoriety because it was the only one that was ever
published and was the first of which the public had heard.
Heraldo de Cuba procured a copy in some fashion as yet unknown, and brought it out in translation on August 5, 1922.
Unlike the exhaustive discussions that it is said were a
marked feature of its twelve predecessors, number thirteen
appeared to be an informal letter, just as if it might have
been dictated off-hand; indeed, in his opening paragraph
Crowder remarked that everything he was saying was subject to revision. First he called attention to the financial
situation. Resumption of payments on the bonded debt had
taken place, not out of ordinary revenues, but from proceeds of the Morgan emergency loan of five millions, while
the domestic loan of 1917 was still some three millions in
arrears. The floating debt was embarrassingly large; Manuel
Despaigne, the new Secretary of the Treasury, had said that
it was about equal to the total expected annual receipts.
So Cuba was in unusual danger, and extraordinary measures
were needed to save her credit. On account of her rights
under the Permanent Treaty the United States needed to
have an assurance that the Cuban government would take
adequate steps to secure prompt payment of interest and
sinking fund charges on its bonds. Congress should therefore pass laws providing for the loan, assigning permanent
revenues for service upon it, and making certain reforms.
The economies of the new budget must be realized, and the
graft alluded to in memorandum number eight done away
with, in part through the removal of certain officials from
office, under a suspension of the civil service law. Charges
were persistently being made about extensive frauds in the




ZAYAS AND CROWDER, 1921-1923


437


custom-house and internal revenue bureau, and these must
be proved false or the evils corrected, as a condition precedent to a loan. Corrupt conditions in the judiciary were
specifically alluded to by Crowder,21 and he also mentioned
the improper conditions that still surrounded the award of
government contracts, such as the failure to call for competitive bids or to insist on reasonable unit prices. While
not demanding any radical immediate reform in these
branches, Crowder felt that some steps ought at least to be
undertaken.22
The publication of memorandum number thirteen roused
a double-barreled storm of disapproval in Cuba. By many,
the action of the United States, through Crowder, was looked
upon as an unwarranted interference in Cuban affairs, at
the same time that the evils in the political life of the republic which had caused it were unsparingly denounced. In
an editorial entitled 'Worse than the Platt Amendment,"
Heraldo de Cuba viewed the loan project with concern, fearing that it might put Cuba "in the position of Haiti," but
went on to say that the country deserved no better fate for
having endured the corrupt rule of Menocal and Zayas, together with the improprieties of other administrative officials,
of Congress, and of the judiciary, as well as for maintaining
the lottery. Cuba might not have so much to fear from
Crowder, but his successor could be another Magoon.23  In
a news item of the same day Heraldo de Cuba said that
Crowder had insisted that the laws of the moralization program must be approved by August 15. Secretary Despaigne
urged that this course should be taken, as the republic needed
the loan, and Secretary of State Carlos Manuel de Cespedes
' See infra, pp. 539-546.  was later republished in other news"Memorandum  number thirteen papers,-for example, in Tarde of
was first published in Spanish in Nov. 13, 1924.
Heraldo de Cuba of Aug. 5, 1922. It  X Heraldo de Cuba, Aug. 5, 1922.




438


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


was quoted as calling on the patriotism of the people to help
in reestablishing Cuban credit and thereby the security of
the country, for the reforms demanded were only such as
every good government should wish to have.24
Whether or not there ever was any such thing as a Crowder
ultimatum, the desired legislation was enacted by August 30.
A little while later, on October 10, 1922, Crowder left Cuba
on a visit to Washington. In this connection Diario de la
Marina came out with an editorial on what he had accomplished in the twenty-two months since he came to the island
in January 1921. According to this influential newspaper
the following achievements were to be credited to Crowder:
He was responsible for relieving the congestion iat the docks
of Havana in 1921, causing eighty million dollars' worth of
merchandise to be placed in warehouses.
He had saved the country from civil war over the ZayasGomez issue.
It was on his initiative that the budget had been reduced
from $130,000,000 to fifty-five millions.
Due to him, there had been a partial administrative reorganization, with the elimination of about fifteen thousand
unnecessary employes.
He had brought about a change in Zayas's first Cabinet,
resulting in the resignation of seven of its nine members.
The lottery had been reformed, and in consequence the
illegal collection of ten million dollars had been brought to
an end and a "sentence of death" imposed upon "the subsidized press."
He had promulgated a legislative, financial, and moralization program which included: a law for a fifty million loan,
to take care of the floating debt; a law for a new accounting
system of the republic, although Zayas intended to veto it;
Heraldo de Cuba, Aug. 5, 1922.




ZAYAS AND CROWDER, 1921-1923             439
a law for cancelling illegal contracts and classifying the others
that went to make up the floating debt; a law eliminating
venal judges; and a law suspending certain portions of the
Civil Service Code, so that the new Secretaries might reorganize their departments with an honest personnel.
In attaining these ends Crowder had had to contend with
the lukewarm help of the Zayas government and the "almost
seditious" attacks of opponents of reform.    He had succeeded, however. His object in all his work had been the
same as that embodied in the language of President McKinley in his instructions to the Philippine Commission in
1900:
"In all the forms of government and administrative provision...
bear in mind that the government... is designed not for our satisfaction,... but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people... and the measures adopted should be made to conform to their
customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent
consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of
just and effective government."2
So it was, that Crowder wanted his reforms in Cuba to be
in the hands of Cubans themselves. Referring to the purification of the lottery (which, to be sure, was to be of very
short duration), Diario de la Marina mentioned its sequel
of indictments, which had even reached out to include Zayas's
own son, and quoted another Havana paper to the effect that
if everybody who had participated in graft in Cuba were
treated as he deserved "the whole island of Cuba would
have to be converted into an immense prison to hold them
all." In conclusion, Diario de la Marina defended Crowder
against the charge that he was an "intervention despot,"
asserting that impartial observers held that public sentiment
was really in his favor, because he was friendly to Cuba and
5 This document, though signed by  Root.
McKinley, was the work of Elihu




440


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


wanted to take steps to avoid civil wars and the necessity
for interventions.26
Matters now moved rapidly toward an agreement for a
loan. To be sure, there was a notoriously corrupt mid-term
election in 1922,27 but there was no political disturbance as
a sequel. The Morgan house is said to have asked that
further and drastic changes be made to mitigate the evils
of the lottery and that assurances be given that the Honest
Cabinet would be kept in office as some guarantee that
other reforms already in effect would be maintained. Zayas
promised to accede to both requests, and on that basis the
final steps were taken, and the loan agreement signed early
in 1923. The loan was issued at 96.77, with a five and a half
per cent coupon rate and 1953 as the date of maturity, yielding over forty-eight millions to the Cuban treasury. About
seven million was devoted to payment of the war debt to
the United States, and six million more was turned over to
the Department of Public Works for use in connection with
sanitation only. The rest was to be applied on the floating
debt, and not be available for anything else, which was a
great disappointment to the politicians, who in consequence
have since expressed their feeling about the loan that was
"forced" on Cuba. It was already clear that there would
not be enough to pay all claims. So it was decided to make
a beginning by paying seventy per cent of the debts due in
the Department of Public Works, after scaling down or
annulling many of the contracts, and thirty per cent of all
other debts. Whether or not these payments were actually
made, it is certain that most of the other obligations were
compelled to wait and had not been met by the end of
Zayas's term. And meanwhile the government boasted of
' Resultados de la intervencion de la marina, Oct. 10, 1922.
unipersonal:... ta actuaci6n del 27 See infra, pp. 575-577.
general Crowder en Cuba, in Diario 




ZAYAS AND CROWDER, 1921-1923


441


the vast sums it was accumulating in the treasury,-really,
to a great extent, the unexpended surplus of the loan.28
Zayas now had the loan, and, furthermore, the economic
prospects of the country had taken a decided turn for the
better. The 1922-1923 sugar crop was large, and brought a
a very good price. This was, of course, reflected in government receipts, which eventually proved to be nearly seventythree millions for 1922-1923, with a likelihood of yet better
returns for the following year. There was no longer any
reasonable doubt but that Cuba could meet her financial
obligations with an ample margin to spare. So Zayas felt
that the time had come for him to break with Crowder, especially since it was now virtually certain that there would be
ample funds in the treasury to enrich the "patriots" who
could get their hands on them if the Crowder reforms were
out of the way. Other politicians as well as Zayas had long
been restive under the restraints that had been put upon
them, and the newspapers which were subordinate to their
interests had subjected the American representative to a
constant fire of attack. On one ocasion there was a resolution of Congress asking for more information about the
nature of his mission.29 On another, following the appointment of the Honest Cabinet, Congress called upon the United
States government to adjust itself to the spirit of the Platt
Amendment as embodied in the letter of Secretary Root to
General Wood of April 3, 1901, in which it was stated that
the rights of the United States were not to be interpreted as
amounting to a privilege of interfering in the affairs of
Cuba.30 On the same order was a strangely worded preface, On this score, note the following 715-716, at 715; July, 1921.
editorial: A just petition of the mer-  0 Machado, 20-22, n. 2, quotes this
chants, in Diario de la marina, trans- resolution. The date of the letter to
lated in Havana Post, Nov. 24, 1925. General Wood is given mistakenly as
Reforms under Cuba's new presi- Apr. 2.
dent, in Current history, v. XIV, pp.




442


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


to an amnesty bill which passed the Senate on October 9,
1922. This claimed that graft should not be prosecuted as a
crime, alleging that it had been "introduced" under the
American administration of Governor Magoon and had developed naturally out of that. The resolution went on to
recite the various forms of corruption in Cuban political life
and to argue that graft had become customary and therefore permissive. So the bill proposed a blanket immunity
for all grafters. The United States objected to the resolution, and that part of the bill was killed in the House.31 Not
a few respectable men of the non-political class, too, were
opposed to the Crowder mission, even though they approved
of his measures, for they were afraid it might possibly result
in a loss of independence. To them "the worst Cuban government is better than the best foreign government," although they would have modified that statement with an
expression of confidence that in course of time Cuba would
evolve to satisfactory political conditions by her own efforts
alone. Zayas was clever enough to take advantage of this
feeling and also to profit by certain features of President
Harding's policy, to shake off the ties that had bound him to
Crowder and declare for himself.
Zayas had at least three reasons why he wanted to steer
his own course, but all of them may be summed up in the
one word "graft." In the first place, he wanted to get rid
of the Honest Cabinet. He had had a number of collisions
with his Secretaries, especially Manuel Despaigne of the
Treasury and Demetrio Castillo of Public Works. He objected to some of their dismissals of employes, and they also
blocked him by refusing to countersign a number of his appointments. As early as January 1923 there were rumors
8 Conn, Edward L, Cuba lic ledger, reprinted in) Berkeley
not free but enslaved: VII, Surgery (California) Gazette, Nov. 26, 1923.
for sore spots, in (Philadelphia Pub



ZAYAS AND CROWDER, 1921-1923


443


that Zayas was going to dismiss the Honest Cabinet, whereupon the United States sent a message of enquiry, for the
loan had been approved on the basis of its retention. Zayas
did not yet have the proceeds of the loan; so it behooved
him to tread softly. Therefore he replied, so it is said, with
a promise to keep his Secretaries "indefinitely," and so got
his money. About this time, "reason number two" was developing in his mind. A magnificent deal had been rigged
up for the purchase by the state of the Santa Clara Convent
of Havana, at a great profit to Zayas and associated politicians. In the back of the President's head, too, was his
"third reason,"-the '~reform" of the lottery, which he proposed to undertake in a very different manner from what the
bankers and the United States government had expected,a way that promised millions to Cuba's "hard-working"
executive. The Santa Clara project came up first, but
Despaigne refused to authorize it, and was backed up in his
course by the other honest members of the Cabinet. Thereupon Zayas subjected them to all manner of indignities in
hopes of getting them to resign, but they would not do so.
Early in Ap*il, affairs had come to such a pass that it was
common talk that Zayas intended to dismiss his Cabinet,
despite the promises he had made.32  Presently he hit upon
a campaign cry that gave him his opening, raising the issue
of "nationalism." He pictured his Cabinet as representative
of the United States rather than of Cuba. So on April 3,
1923, he dismissed four of his Secretaries (Aristides Agramonte, Demetrio Castillo, Manuel Despaigne, and Ricardo
Lancis) for "high reasons of state," as he put it, and brought
back the old corrupt crowd in their place. Naturally this
met with disapproval on the part of the United States
82It is said that the dismissal of which the President's wife offered at
these men was foreshadowed, several a dinner, in which she drank to the
days before it occurred, by a toast fall of the Cabinet.




444


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


government, which reminded Zayas of his promise to keep
his ministers "indefinitely." Zayas is said to have replied,and certainly such an answer would have been characteristic
of the man,-that he had indeed made such a promise,
but that the word "indefinitely" might imply a short time
as well as a long one, holding therefore that he had kept
his word. And no doubt he had, for his word was a variable
and slippery thing.33
For a few months, now, Cuba was rampant with "nationalism." It may be taken as a general rule, with few exceptions, that all politicians and their henchmen are antiUnited States, not at all because of any fear of American
"imperialism," but because Washington tends to be a check
on their accumulating illegal profits. Indeed, nothing could
be more absurd than the "nationalism" issue in Cuba, for
if there is one country in Hispanic America where the
ghost of American aggression has been bottled up that country is Cuba.34 Heraldo de Cuba, which has always been
nationalistic in a very real sense, could not follow the "na
tionalism" of Zayas. In its issue of April 3, 1923, the day
of the dismissal of the Honest Cabinet, it refuted the state

" Conn, Edward L, The
crisis in Cuba: II, A presidential
Aladdin, in (Philadelphia Public
ledger, reprinted in) Berkeley (California) Gazette, Nov. 20, 1923.
84 It would, no doubt, be possible to
cite thousands of expressions to this
effect in Cuban writings, even in the
great majority of the newspapers
which at various times, for corrupt
reasons, lend their columns to attacks on the United States. The following is a sample statement of Orestes Ferrara, a man who was 'always
a fire-eating but sincere nationalist,
though recognizing in 1923, as he had
in 1909, that there was no real danger
of an annexation to the United States
unless the Cubans provoked it themselves: "The truth is, that the only


danger to our independence is in annexation, and not in that as the product of a violent act by our neighbors
from the north, for they would never
do any such thing, but as a consequence of a work that is daily being
realized in Cuban territory itself."
Speech of Ferrara, quoted in Camara
de representantes, Diario de sesiones,
Feb. 16, 1910, v. XII, no. 42, p. 3.
A similar statement is the following:
"Those who insult the American people by constantly declaring that they
want to take over Cuba must be
fiends or idiots." The faith of an
American president, in Comercio
(Cienfuegos), translated in Havana
Post, May 14, 1924. Cf., also, infra,
pp. 646-648.




ZAYAS AND CROWDER, 1921-1923


445


ment of Wifredo Fernandez that the Secretaries were in
rebellion against the President, asserting that they were
being separated from their posts because they would not
countenance repellant and immoral deals. Heraldo de Cuba
went on to say that Zayas was resolved, if the United States
should put any difficulties in his way, to lay his case before
the Pan-American Congress, which was about to meet in
Santiago, Chile. It was pointed out, too, that not all the
Secretaries of the Honest Cabinet were to go.35  In that
same issue of Heraldo de Cuba, Ferrara replied to Wifredo
Fernandez, who had accused him of saying that the five
Secretaries (really four), about to be dismissed, were the
only ones who knew how to serve Cuba, and of defending
them in their influence in Cuban affairs. Denying that he
had made the statement attributed to him, Ferrara went on
to the effect that the cry of rebellion was not on the part
of the Secretaries, but rather of their opponents, whom
they had prevented from committing nefarious crimes
against the state for nearly a year. The dismissed Secretaries were worthy of admiration, for they represented respect for law and honesty as against shameless frauds. It
was not a question of there being just five honest Cubans
or of their interference with the President's constitutional
rights, but rather one of national decorum and sovereignty.
To save Cuba, it was necessary to have an honest administration. The Secretaries ought not to defend a President who
was doing bad things, and they were under no obligation
to resign; rather, it was better for them to stay in office,
no matter how unpleasant, in order to save Cuba.36  This
probably represented the opinion of the majority of the
86El doctor A. Zayas... ha diri-  Ferrara, Orestes, Lo que dije y
gido a todos los secretarios una carta pienso, in Heraldo de Cuba, Apr. 3,
circular en la que les pide la renun- 1923.
cia, in Heraldo de Cuba, Apr. 3, 1923.




446


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


decent element among the educated classes in Cuba. Certainly there was a lot more smoke than fire to the nationalism
of Zayas.
There were no thunderbolts from the direction of Washington. Crowder, who had given up his former category
as special agent of President Harding to become, in January 1923, the first American ambassador to Cuba,-such
was the importance of this post,-was thoroughly muzzled,
except as Secretary Hughes might permit him to speak.
That appeared to mean that he could not say anything
at all. Thus encouraged, the Cuban politicians proceeded
gaily to the enactment of the Santa Clara purchase and the
"reform" of the lottery. As for the lottery, its evil features
were either sanctioned or else made worse than ever, and
the bill was passed by a great majority.37 Zayas vetoed it,
thus again "complying" with his promise, but he did so in
a "come on, boys!" message that praised Congress for its
noble sentiments and implied approval. Congress then passed
the measure over his veto, by ninety-six to three in the
House on July 23 and unanimously in the Senate next day,
and Zayas affixed his signature on August 4. Not satisfied
with having the fleshpots in their own hands again, and a
little restive under the criticism of those who had not
been swept off their feet by the cry of nationalism, Congress
prefixed a resolution to explain why it had voted the bill
the first time and then ratified it again. Principal among
the reasons assigned was the necessity, so it would appear,
of putting the United States government in its proper place.
In the language of the resolution,
"Because there has been scattered through the country the version
that there have been official intimations on the part of the government
of the United States, if Congress should not ratify the law it would
" For a discussion of the lottery bill itself, see infra, pp. 558-561.




ZAYAS AND CROWDER, 1921-1923


447


abandon the full exercise of its constitutional powers to resolve in
domestic affairs."
Going on then to speak of the restoration of credit and the
generally happy financial situation of the republic, the resolution maintained that there was not the slightest cause for
any interference with the prerogatives of Congress, and
censured those who had attacked its members for enacting
the law. In conclusion, it said with respect to the attitude
of their opponents that it was
"A political maneuver that ought not to have been initiated and that
will have a dangerous amplitude for our nationality itself unless all
factors of Cuban society unite to bear to the government and Congress
of the United States the firm impression that the people of Cuba would
feel profoundly wounded in their sentiments if there should be any
intent to exercise that interference, which is improper, because our
republic is fulfilling its international obligations with all exactitude;
which is unlawful, as the treaties that define their relations with other
states do not authorize it; and which is disquieting, because it would
end definitively in breaking morally the solid ties of historic association
that unite us to the great American nation."'
This resolution, which outraged all precedents of diplomatic intercourse between countries that intended to remain
at peace, was none too well received in the United States.
The Outlook commented upon it editorially in an article entitled "Independence or impudence?", implying the latter.39
During the summer of 1923 Crowder had written two more
memoranda (the fourteenth and fifteenth) protesting against
the terms of the lottery law, but scant attention was paid
to him. And why not?,-for there was not even a whisper
from Washington. One Cuban newspaper has suggested
that American meekness in 1923 is to be interpreted, not
that Zayas defeated the United States, but, rather, that
Gaceta, Aug. 4, 1923.        655; Aug. 29, 1923.
89 In Outlook, v. CXXXIV, pp. 654 -



448


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


the Republican party wanted to avoid giving any chance
for people to call it imperialistic in the uncertain pre-presidential campaign situation of that time.40       A more likely
reason for the American attitude, however, is the one that
Zayas had had in mind in dismissing the Honest Cabinet,the fear of Washington that a strong stand might hurt the
United States before the Pan-American Congress and in its
general Hispanic American policy. On this score the following is a statement concerning Secretary of State Hughes
and his policy that was made by a man of long experience
in Hispanic America, to whose opinions the writer is inclined to subscribe:
"Hughes is so afraid that somebody may say that the United States
acted improperly or in an imperialistic manner that he leans backwards,
and in so doing does a lot of harm, here in Cuba at any rate. He does
not realize that Hispanic American peoples respect strong actions, however much they may shout against them at the time, and that in any
event their momentary outbursts pass away very quickly. In fact, no
amount of gentle methods will do away with Hispanic American criticism, and it won't stop 'nationalistic' politicians, whose patriotism has
a very definite relation to their own personal fortunes. In Cuba, Hughes
did not back up Crowder when Zayas kicked over the traces in 1923.
So Zayas has not only been enabled to pose as the savior of Cuban
liberties, but has also been virtually defended in the most stupendous
campaign of graft I have ever witnessed, because Hughes will not let
the Cubans have a revolution or will not take the responsibility of
stopping these evils himself. As I see it, he ought to do one or the other,
even at the cost of a revolution, which would indeed be a terrible
calamity. Better still, no doubt, would be for him to have the moral
courage to undertake and see through a program of reform such as all
decent Cubans want, irrespective of what anybody might say, Cubans,
Hispanic Americans, or Democrats in the United States, since there is
no real danger in such a policy and since it is based on right principles." "
0 Did Zayas save the country from abortive revolution against Zayas,
the stamp of Uncle Sam's hoof?, in which was doomed to failure when the
Avisador comercial, translated  in United States followed its recently deHavana Post, Dec. 6, 1924.       veloped policy of backing the gov4 This statement was made to the ernment in power.
writer in May 1924, just after the




ZAYAS AND CROWDER, 1921-1923               449
Zayas did indeed make all the political capital he could
out of having "saved" the country, and kept singing the
same tune to the end of his administration. To be sure,
to the understanding ear it was in a weird key.          Some
go so far as to assert that the cry of Cuban "nationalism"
was first suggested in New     York,-by American financial
interests which hoped to enhance their own profits through
lining Zayas's pockets with American dollars in return for
improper concessions, if Crowder were out of the way. It is
doubtful whether there was any such precise arrangement,
but it would have been conceivable with a man like Zayas.
A generalization by Spinden so aptly covers his case that
the subject may be dismissed by quoting it:
"Patriotism is the last resort of scoundrels. We may rest assured
that the vociferous spoilers in Cuba will not neglect the proper phrases
to hide their evil designs. The ordinary man in the streets... will
grin and bear it, and national pride will be invoked to make him turn
against the United States as somehow deeply to blame. That is part
of the price we must pay to achieve real leadership in moral things.""
One more statement may be quoted, this time with respect
to the other of the two most prominent actors in this period,
General Crowder.
"You can't help feeling proud of the general for what he tried to do
in Cuba, but he may have made a mistake in insisting on the loan.
There would have been chaos without it, but that might have hastened
some effective reform that would help to eradicate the graft that is
eating at the heart of the republic now."
Was it a mistake?    Who can say?     If it was, who can deny
that it was an honest and generous one? And was there
any good reason why his achievements should have been
surrendered so easily? 43
a Spinden, Herbert Joseph, America  "For some comment on authorities
and her duty in Cuba, in Boston for the Zayas period, see note at the
Transcript, Aug. 7, 1923.       end of chapter XX.




CHAPTER XIX


CORRUPTION AND REMONSTRANCE
1923-1924
WITH United States help, offered through the medium
of General Crowder's services, Cuba had had a chance to
become the model republic of Hispanic America, if the pace
could have been maintained. Zayas gave the moralization
program such a setback, however, that except as an example
all of the work was lost. Indeed, the last two years of the
Zayas rule were so utterly depraved that a beginning would
have to be made from a point farther back than at the time
he took office in 1921. To be sure, in some respects the
situation was better in 1925. The country was not nearly
in such a bad way financially, though the prospects of
sugar were none too flattering. And there was a peaceful
succession to the presidency. In neither case, however, was
Zayas entitled to any particular credit. As has already
been pointed out, Cuban prosperity is dependent on factors
quite outside of government, which may hinder progress
but cannot produce it. And Zayas gave up the presidency
only when it was clear to him that he could not reelect himself, not even with the employment of the methods of 1916
and 1920. The one merit accruing to him is that he recognized this fact, and yielded to the inevitable. It may be
interesting at this point to give some opinions of Zayas,
set forth in the light of his conduct down to the summer
of 1924. The following are a few sample statements, includ450




CORRUPTION AND REMONSTRANCE, 1923-1924


451


ing one that is ultra-favorable, but not altogether out of line
with the others:
(1) "People do not understand Zayas, who is really a great man.
To be sure, he has not been perfect. You can't defend the Santa Clara
purchase or his nepotism. And everything they say about..!...
is true. All else about Zayas is good. He is an idealist, and admires
Lincoln above any man in history, possessing an unusually rich library
on his life. Everybody knows he is no fool, and, above all, he has remarkable patience. He has a perfect passion for freedom of speech, and in
the face of insult he calmly bides his time. He has often been urged
to suspend certain newspapers that attack him or to exile a vociferous
opponent, but he refuses to do so, insisting that the way to get rid
of license in expression is to let it run its course. He believes in Cuba
for the Cubans, and in time to come will be regarded as the greatest man
the country has produced."
(2) "If it is true that Zayas has made a study of the life of Lincoln
it was only to learn how to do the opposite!"
(3) "Zayas has been Cuba's worst ruler since the separation from
Spain. He has been the worst nepotist and the worst grafter. He has
made many improvements on paper,-almost none at all in fact. He
will get a bill put through for a road, have some engineer relative draw
up a plan, pay him half a million, and nothing more will be done,except for the division of the spoil. The more than thirty millions
he has accumulated in the treasury are all a false appearance. He has
them, through not paying the floating debt, but he himself is far more
likely to get a lot of this money than ever the creditors are to receive
a cent."
(4) "Zayas is not ashamed to rake in pesetas if he can't get pesost
Worse than his own graft, however, is the way he lets his relatives ride.
Worse yet is that his wife's relatives are feeding at the public crib, too."
(5) "Zayas's 'nationalism' is only a farce. Of course, it is a useful
cry in practical politics, but at the very time that he was shouting loudest
about 'Cuba for the Cubans' he was making deals with great corporations
so as to give excessive privileges in Cuba to foreigners. Some people
praise him for stepping down from the presidency, instead of reelecting
himself by force, but he knew perfectly well that there would be a real
revolution if he intended to inflict himself on Cuba again and that the
army would be on the other side. So he made the best arrangement he
could, to keep himself and his relatives out of jail."
The peseta has a normal value of  dollar.
twenty cents, and the peso of a




452


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


It would be easy to accumulate thousands of Zayas items
from newspapers and other Cuban sources, but they would
not differ appreciably from the above. A few such statements are referred to later, in connection with the events
of these years.     It happens, too, that several carefully
thought-out articles have appeared in United States
periodicals dealing with Zayas. In September 1925 there
was a series of articles by Albert Whiting Fox in the Washington Post about the evil conditions that were causing what
seemed almost like a national uprising against Zayas at
that time. In November 1923 Edward L. Conn had a
similar series of articles in the Philadelphia Public Ledger,
with an even more detailed survey of Zayas's conduct and
other iniquities in Cuban political life. More recently other
estimates of the Zayas government have appeared. The
following recites one characteristic instance of the President's procedure:
"On taking over the presidency, Dr. Zayas found that in the budget
he was allowed about three hundred thousand dollars annually for the
Executive Department of the government. Repeatedly he appealed to
Congress to increase this amount by $180,000, threatening, if his wishes
were not respected, to close the palace and return to his home at
Morro No. 3. Congress... turned a deaf ear to his distress. He
then appealed for aid to his Cabinet,... and one of them, Capt.
Castillo Pokorny, an honor graduate of West Point,... suggested that,
if Dr. Zayas found himself unable to live within his allotment, it would
be a fitting recognition of the straits in which the country found itself
if the President were to close the palace and discharge the hordes of
servants who were proving so costly. Current bills for supplies at
the palace were unpaid, and eventually came before the debt commission,
together with thousands of unpaid accounts left over from Menocal's
administration. Among these bills were some for hundreds of dollars'
worth of perfume, one for eight hundred dollars' worth of eggs,-one
month's consumption of the presidential family,-others of ten and
twenty thousand dollars for pheasants and roses. Balked by both
Congress and the Cabinet, Dr. Zayas pondered deeply and shortly
evolved a wonderful new scheme. With the help of Erasmos Regue




CORRUPTION AND REMONSTRANCE, 1923-1924


453


Feros, Secretary of Justice, he issued a decree ordering the payment to
himself of the funds he so much coveted."
Various other instances of presidential misconduct are mentioned in the same article.2    The following is another interesting characterization of Zayas and his government:
"Proceeding cautiously at first, he obtained a loan of $50,000,000 in
this country.  This done, he threw  off the 'vicious intermeddling of
Washington,' placed fourteen members of his family in strategic positions
in the administration, and, his forces thus distributed, laid siege to the
public treasury. The loan offered the first chance... Not only the
available portion of the loan but also the annual revenue, amounting
to $81,000,000, was exhausted before public employees could be paid,
before overdue coupons on the public debt could be taken up, before
some $400,000 due the United States on postal money order account
could be turned over. Public works appropriations were also closely
scrutinized. Great interest was shown in the cleaning of streets and
the repair of highways and bridges, and large appropriations were
obtained for these purposes. The money was promptly withdrawn
from the Treasury, but the cleaning and the repairs are still to be done.
A foreign engineer, interested in comparative costs on bridge-repairing,
took a list of seven bridges that the records showed had been recently
repaired at a cost of $367,000. He found not only that the repairs had
not been made, but that not one of the bridges had ever existed! The
Cuban politicians did not overlook the more usual forms of graft.
Gambling places and houses of prostitution paid heavily for exemption
from police molestation. Contracts for food and supplies in the jails
and other public institutions were fully exploited. A peculiarity of the
Cuban fiscal system was also made to yield its due. Each municipality
must submit its annual budget to the Department of the Interior for
its approval. These budgets being largely false, it was worth money
to approve them. And the money was forthcoming. Large sums were
paid to the officials of the department for approval and included in the
amounts for which the local public was mulcted."'
Cuba, an American ward again?,   'Norton, Henry Kittredge, Self-dein Independent, v. CXIII, pp. 35-38, termination in the West Indies, in
at 36; July 19, 1924. Among other World's work, v. LI, pp. 77-84, at 81 -things, this article asserts that Zayas 82; Nov., 1925. This is the first of
held his history-writing job for eight a series of three articles under this
years, receiving "almost fifty thou- title.
sand dollars." Cf. supra, pp. 416-418.




454


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


The orgy of graft alluded to in these statements was
made possible by an era of prosperity that filled the treasury. For 1923-1924 government receipts were about ninetyone millions and a half, and about ninety-three and a half
for 1924-1925,-this, of course, in addition to the sums that
were misappropriated before ever they got into the record.
Since the government was not paying off the floating debt,
this left an ample amount for political rewards.4      Indeed,
for a time it seemed as if there was almost more than
Zayas and his cohorts could spend. Over a twelve-month,
from the spring of 1923 to the spring of 1924, the so-called
"surplus" in the treasury advanced from some three millions
to about thirty-four. Meanwhile, the creditors, to whom
much more than this sum was due, were obliged to wait.
Late in 1924 Zayas issued a decree to the effect that twenty
per cent of the back salary due government employes would
now be paid to them; he tried to make capital out of it,
as if it were a Christmas gift. There were hints, however,
that even this belated and moderate regard for one group
of the nation's creditors was being displayed because a
few presidential favorites were to obtain special advantages
from the measure.5 This was a mere bagatelle in the sum
total of the floating debt, and caused no particular strain on
the government's resources. For other reasons, however,presently to be discussed,-the surplus did turn downward in
1924, and people were alarmed lest the new President would
'The money order account between drawn in Cuba and payable in the
the United States and Cuba is one United States, the latter was paying
sample of the way in which the latter out money without reimbursement,
allowed debts to run, while revenues although the Cuban post-office had
were accumulating. As part of the received the full amount. This was a
postal agreement between the two mild theft inflicted on the American
countries, Cuba was required to keep people:
four hundred thousand dollars on de-  'See, for example, A  ridiculous
posit in Washington, but, instead of twenty per cent, in Discusi6n, transdoing so, actually permitted a deficit lated in Havana Post, Nov. 25, 1924.
to develop. So, on money orders




CORRUPTION AND REMONSTRANCE, 1923-1924


455


be left with nothing but debts, and no cash at all for current needs. Pressure was brought to bear on Zayas, and in
December 1924 he announced that he would leave twentyfive million in the treasury for the next government. This
was as much as to say: "I won't take it all, but will leave
a little for you." In point of fact, however, the "surplus"
on May 20, 1925, was variously estimated from a mere two
hundred thousand dollars, at the highest, all the way down
to a deficit of two millions, while in any event the floating
debt was still floating!
Inevitably, an account of the last two years of Zayas's~
administration must deal mainly with political corruption.
It should be remembered, too, that Zayas was not alone in
the picture. By this time the overwhelming presumption
with regard to any politician, national or local, was that
he was a grafter and perhaps a criminal.6 The man who
was most nearly responsible for this condition, however,
was the President himself, and so attention may be directed
primarily to those deals in which he was concerned. The
first of the ultra-notorious graft projects was the purchase
of the Santa Clara Convent, to serve as a government office
building. In 1920, when Havana real estate prices were
skyrocketing, this was sold by the church authorities to
a private syndicate for a mere fraction of the figure Zayas
agreed upon in the low-priced real estate era of 1923, and
the 1920 purchase was also on very easy terms.7 This seems
to have been part of a deal that was arranged before Zayas
became President. At any rate, on February 6, 1922, the
company offered the building to the government at an ex'Cf. infra, p. 573.         ledger, republished in) Berkeley
Norton, Henry Kittredge, Op. cit., (California) Gazette, Nov. 20, 1923,
82, gives the price as six hundred says it was a million. There is also
thousand, while Conn, Edward L, some mention of this deal in the
The crisis in Cuba: II, A presidential Gaceta, Mar. 13, 1923, but without
Aladdin, in (Philadelphia Public any reference to the price.




456


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


aggerated price. The administration did not act at that
time, so Zayas said, because of other "transcendental problems,"-which might have been rendered "because of Crowder." On August 9, 1922, a new offer was made at a lower
price: $2,350,000! The "transcendental problems" were
still operating, but on March 10, 1923, Zayas issued a decree
for the purchase that was countersigned by Erasmo Regiieiferos, Secretary of Justice.8
Immediately there was a storm of protest. The opposition
of the Honest Cabinet has been alluded to already. Congress, too, addressed a number of unpleasant enquiries to
the President. Presumably the congressmen had not been
declared "in" on the deal; in this connection it is interesting to note that a petition of the House to the President
for information concerning the purchase was fathered by
Representative Sagar6, who played an unsavory part, later,
in the Cardenas Bay affair. Zayas had stated that the
Cabinet approved the purchase, although everybody knew
that the refusal of four Secretaries to countenance it was
what cost them their places in the following April. He
was asked to explain his statement, and also to account for
his failure to get legislative sanction for the deal or the signature of his Secretary of the Treasury to the decree. On
April 2, 1923, the same day he dismissed the four honest
Secretaries, Zayas sent his answer to the House.
It was a long and mystifying document, full of legal
terminology. The House had requested a copy of the agreement of the Cabinet for the purchase. This, Zayas did
not give, for the simple reason that there had never been
any such agreement. It seems that Zayas and Regiieiferos
were handling this affair, but on February 3, 1923, the other


'For the decree, which gives a pres- the sale, see the Gaceta, Mar. 13,
idential view of the antecedents of 1923.




CORRUPTION AND REMONSTRANCE, 1923-1924


457


Secretaries addressed them an enquiry about the legal title
to the convent and the contract price. This amounted to
an agreement of the Secretaries, Zayas claimed, "for without a desire for its acquisition there would be no order for
the said study." Later, however, they "ratified" it, he said,
for there was a Cabinet meeting at which they entered no
objections. He had had Regiieiferos countersign the decree
instead of the Secretary of the Treasury (who at that time
was the incorruptible Manuel Despaigne), because the
former had done all the preliminary work and it was a
matter that concerned various departments, not merely the
Treasury alone. He admitted that the Secretary of the
Treasury would eventually have to approve it,-and well
might he admit it, for he intended very soon to have a
Secretary who would be more amenable to his wishes than
Despaigne. He denied that he needed a law in order to
make the agreement, claiming that he had authority so
to do under article sixty-eight of the Constitution, which
gave the President a right to issue decrees for the execution
of the laws,-a very "elastic" interpretation of that paragraph, it would appear. In this connection he cited various
precedents of similar actions by other Presidents. In that,
certainly, he was right! In commenting upon it, Heraldo
de Cuba pointed out that most of the precedents were from
the Menocal era, but even then at no such "monstrous
price" as Zayas wanted to pay for Santa Clara. Zayas did
admit that he would have to get congressional sanction before he could expend the money called for by the decree.
Congressmen must have taken particular notice of this admission, for it meant that their "interests" would eventually
have to be considered. In defence of the price, Zayas named
other pieces of Havana real estate that had been sold at
an even higher figure, and claimed anyway that the amount




458


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


was of scant importance, as it was to be paid on easy terms
over a period of years.9 It was more than a year, however,
before Congress sanctioned the deal, but in June 1924 a
bill was enacted, which Zayas signed and the Secretary of
the Treasury countersigned, but the latter was now, not.Manuel Despaigne, but Carlos Portela.10 Just how much
Zayas made out of this deal, and how much more was
distributed to other officials and congressmen, is uncertain,
but the total of the graft involved was probably considerably
more than a million.
Another major grafting deal, though later in making its
appearance in public, was enacted into law with much
more facility and at an earlier date than the Santa Clara
purchase, for Zayas now knew better how to proceed. This
was the famous Tarafa Law, a piece of legislation so replete with complications that it is difficult to describe in
the brief space that can be allotted to it."1 As originally
presented, the bill seemed to be a national service law of
a distinctly "patriotic" flavor, but it eventually developed
that the whole affair was largely a battle of American interests, especially of those connected with the Cuba Railway on the one hand and some of the sugar companies on
the other. Each side, indeed, had an arguable case, though
not without defects, but the main interest here is the
connection of the government, whose course seems to have
been dictated by the amount of personal profit that the
politicians were able to derive from the controversy.
In an island with such a plethora of good harbors as
Cuba possesses, it was a simple matter for many of the
'The Zayas answer and an article 1924.
commenting upon it (El ejecutivo y  The writer possesses data enough
el "affaire" del convento de Santa for a monograph on this law, though
Clara) are in Heraldo de Cuba, Apr. it would have many lacunae, espe3, 1923.                      cially as concerns placing the respon'o The law is in the Gaceta, June 13, sibility for the graft involved.




CORRUPTION AND REMONSTRANCE, 1923-1924


459


sugar companies to develop ports of their own, with private
railway lines connecting them with their near-by estates.
Approximately thirty-one per cent of the 1922-1923 crop
was shipped without being hauled over public service railways, and of that amount eighty-five per cent was the
product of American companies. Altogether, there were
forty-seven private ports in operation, all of them in the
eastern provinces. The government had acquiesced in the
employment of these ports, but it was a question whether
anything that could be called more than a revocable license
had ever been given, but in many cases they had been used
for twenty years, and in some for thirty. Naturally, the
eastern railways were deprived of an opportunity to earn
freight from companies with private ports, and the situation
was aggravated for them by events growing out of the depression of 1921. The banks, it will be remembered, had
loaned vast sums on sugar estates, and were eventually
obliged to foreclose and take over the properties which had
served as security. Among others, the National City Bank
of New York found itself with a number of plantations on
its hands in Camagiiey. These were incorporated as a
subsidiary of the bank, as the General Sugar Company,
and the proposal was made to make use of the private port
of Santa Maria. At the same time, the American Sugar
Company planned to adopt the private port method of
shipping from its estates in Camagiiey. This was a serious matter to at least one railway, the Cuba Northern, in
northern Camagiiey, commonly called the "Tarafa Line,"
because it was very largely the creation of Colonel Jose
Miguel Tarafa, its chief stockholder and president. He is
credited with devising the bill which came to be known
by his name, though he himself was not in politics and
therefore not its official sponsor.




460        A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
As originally drafted, the bill applied to all sugar estates
using private ports, which especially affected Camagiiey
and Oriente. The private ports were to be closed, and the
sugar companies required to use the public service railways
in sending their products to an authorized port. This was
what it amounted to in fact, but very few persons, not
even most members of Congress, knew the precise terms
of the bill, for Tarafa and his co-workers kept them shrouded
in mystery. No secret was made, however, about there being some sort of bill that they earnestly wanted to have
passed, and no expense was spared, while, furthermore, the
Cuban "flag" was waved vigorously about this "thoroughly
Cuban measure." Tarafa gave the members of Congress
an excursion over his line, but this was not all that he, or
somebody, gave them. It is conservatively estimated that
he spent at least half a million to assure the approval of
Zayas and Congress. Indeed, at the height of Zayas's controversy with the Veterans and Patriots Association in the
fall of 1923 the latter gave out a public statement in which
it was asserted that a minimum of six thousand dollars was
paid to representatives, twenty thousand to senators, and
five hundred thousand to the President. At length, on
August 10, 1923, the bill was passed by the House in a
typically Cuban fashion. At two o'clock in the morning,
without prior notice, it was introduced, and it passed three
hours later by eighty-eight to nine. As one newspaper
remarked of this action:
"When the measure was read, its terms became known to the representatives for the first time. And no copies of it were distributed
beforehand or even after it had been approved.""
It might be mentioned, too, that the bill was a long and
complicated document that would have been difficult for an
" Aprobacion por sorpresa de la ley Tarafa, in Mercurio, Aug. 11, 1923.




CORRUPTION AND REMONSTRANCE, 1923-1924


461


expert lawyer to understand after hours of study. It purported to be a measure for consolidating the railways of the
country, or some of them, under a Cuban charter, but at
this stage of the controversy people's minds were directed
to the fact that it seemed to levy a kind of tribute on the
sugar companies and associated industries.
Immediately there was an outcry against the law, and
not least of all in Cuba, especially by the powerful associtation of landowners and planters (hacendados and
colonos), which included in its membership some of the
wealthiest men in the island among those whose income
was not derived from politics. In this connection it is to
be observed that the great sugar companies procure a large
proportion of their commodity from neighboring landowners and from planters to whom the company rents lands
of its own.13 So it was not merely the companies that would
suffer, but also a great many Cubans. These men, individually, and through the press and their organizations, came out
against the bill, calling it confiscatory and censuring the
secrecy and graft that had been employed to procure its
enactment. Indeed, Cuban business interests generally were
opposed to the measure. Naturally, too, the sugar companies protested, and carried their case to Wasihington.
Newspapers and magazines in the United States gave columns of space to the affair, and with few exceptions, whether
Republican or Democratic, denounced it as confiscatory.
Secretary Hughes is said to have requested a delay before
the bill should be carried any farther.14 Meanwhile, the
sugar companies pleaded their cause before the State Department, employing no less a figure than Elihu Root to
present their claims. It was at this stage that other Ameri

1 Cf. infra, p. 614.
"New York Journal of commerce, Aug. 14, 1923.




462


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


can interests began to appear on the opposite side, especially those which were interested in the affairs of the
Cuba Railway, and they too had their representatives in
Washington. It is generally regarded that the companies
had what amounted to at least a prescriptive right to use
the private ports and that the original draft of the Tarafa
bill involved a virtual, if indirect, confiscation of their properties, which would have been in contravention of article
three of the Permanent Treaty, but the ever-cautious Mr.
Hughes was not convinced that they had proved their case
sufficiently for him to take any decisive action. According
to some accounts he regarded the railway consolidation as
a purely Cuban measure, but objected to the confiscatory
features with reference to the sugar interests, while others
claim he maintained that the sugar companies had not
proved their case at all. At any rate, the sugar men seem
to have decided that it would be best for them  to deal
directly with the railway interests. Meanwhile, too, General
Sugar had dropped out of the fight,-whether because its
port of Santa Maria had been validated by the government
or for other reasons cannot be asserted with certainty. Several conferences were now held in New York between officials
of the different interests, with Tarafa present, and as a
result a new bill was drawn up, to the effect that the private
ports in use prior to 1923 were not to be disturbed, but
that there were to be no new ones; in other words, the
public service railways were to get the benefit of any further
development of the sugar industry. This compromise satisfied most Cuban sugar men, and some, but not all, of the
foreigners. It did not satisfy a great many other people
in Cuba, however. Attention now began to be directed to
the railway features of the bill, which permitted of the
consolidation into one system of any three interconnecting




CORRUPTION AND REMONSTRANCE, 1923-1924


463


roads, of which two must be Cuban. It was generally understood that this law was to serve as the basis for the
merger of the Cuba Railway (an American corporation)
with two Cuban lines, the Camagiiey and Nuevitas (all of
whose stock was owned by the Cuba Railway) and the
Cuba Northern. This amounted to an expansion of the
Cuba Railway, which would inevitably have by far the
greater amount of stock in the new consolidated railway.
On September 21, 1923, the Senate passed the bill, amended
in accord with the changes made in New York, by fifteen
to four, and on the 25th the House passed the amended
bill by ninety-two to seven. The sugar interests which
had intended to create private ports, but were now barred
from doing so, still hoped to defeat it, and prevailed
upon Hughes to get Zayas to hear their arguments before
signing it. The latter overruled their objections, however,
and signed the bill on October 9, 1923. This marked the
departure from his official family of another member of the
one-time Honest Cabinet. Enrique Hernandez Cartaya, a
hold-over from that body, who had been serving as Secretary of the Treasury, refused to countenance the deal, and
so sent in his resignation.
Apart from the matter of graft, it seems probable that
some of the features of the Tarafa Law were of doubtful
advisability. For example, it permits of rebates in freight
bills. And it is uneconomic in that it is cheaper to ship
from near-by private ports. On the other hand, many
argue the advantages of a single great railway system, on
the analogy of the mergers at present being advocated in
the United States. It is believed that the consolidated line
may eventually acquire the United Railways and other companies in Cuba. To many Cubans, however, it seems that
the formation of the much boasted national company has




464       A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
in fact resulted in turning over a Cuban line to a foreign
corporation, which may in time monopolize the railway
facilities of the island. And for this they blame the "nationalistic" Zayas! As for the graft in the deal, it is generally
believed that Colonel Tarafa could tell whence it came and
how it was distributed. In November 1924 La Discusi6n
had a series of articles denouncing him for "ditching" the
minority stockholders of the Cuba Northern in bringing
about the consolidation. The inference was that Tarafa
himself got a large retainer, part of which he used to win
the "sympathy" of Zayas and Congress. Whatever the truth
may be as to the source of the graft and the moral obliquity
involved in offering it, it is generally admitted that the
law was bought.15
However much Zayas may have profited by the Santa
Clara and Tarafa deals, he had not confined himself to them,
but had various "sources of income." Not a man of considerable means before he became President, he was able
after two years, at a salary of twenty-five thousand a year,
to acquire a three hundred thousand dollar estate of some
six hundred acres, just outside of Havana. To be sure,
this fine property, which he named after his wife "Villa
Maria," may not have involved him in as much expense
as it might some other man, for it is said that he used soldiers and convicts in work on the place and took quantities
of stone from the government quarries,-all, of course, without paying any money. As for the national palace in Havana,
that became a residence for whole bevies of the Zayas
family. One month the presidential expense account showed
an item of ten thousand dollars for "chickens," to say nothing of a comparatively small amount for rouge and hair16The law is in the Gaceta, Oct. 9, ed. by Juan de Dios Tejada, Habana
1923. For an English version, see [1923].
Cuban railway consolidation law, tr.




CORRUPTION AND REMONSTRANCE, 1923-1924


465


pins.16 There was something more than mere board and
room, however luxurious, for the relatives of the President
and his wife. At least fourteen were provided with good
positions in the government service. The President's son,
Alfredo Zayas, Jr., became director-general of the lottery.17
A brother, Francisco Zayas, was once at the head of the
Department of Public Instruction, and later minister to
France. A stepson, "Willie" G6mez Conlon, was majordomo of the palace; for a while he had a perfumery stand
there, and it behooved the politicians to patronize his business, but presently it was ridiculed out of existence. Andres
Pereira, a son-in-law, was comptroller-general of the republic. Another son-in-law, Celso Cuellar del Rio, held a
notarial post worth fifty thousand a year; he is now a
senator. Carlos Portela, a cousin, was Under-Secretary of
the Treasury,-later becoming Secretary. A nephew, Jose
Maria Zayas, held an important post in the customs service.
And similarly with the others among the fourteen favorites
of fortune, one of whom is described as "probably a
nephew." 18
It must not be imagined that the Cuban people resigned
themselves to these evils without registering an objection.
To be sure, the decent elements of Cuba always labor under
grave and almost insuperable handicaps in governmental
matters, but this was one of the times when there was an
aroused public opinion. Crowder's fifteen memoranda had
taught them to speak their mind. It began to be expressed
vigorously while Zayas was maneuvering with a view to ridding himself of the Honest Cabinet. Just a day ahead of
Zayas's letter dismissing four of his Secretaries, Gonzalo
"6 Cf. supra, p. 166.      Aladdin, in (Philadelphia Public
7 Cf. infra, pp. 535-537.  ledger, reprinted in) Berkeley (Calit Conn, Edward L, The fornia) Gazette, Nov. 20, 1923.
crisis in Cuba: II, A presidential




466


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


Freyre de Andrade, a prominent and respected Conservative
among the better class of the old school, wrote an open letter, announcing his withdrawal from the Conservative party.
He arraigned it for the evils that had developed under
Menocal and Zayas, and asserted that there was no hope
of betterment, because leadership among the Conservatives must fall inevitably to one or other of these same two
men, to whom the other members of the party organization
were wholly subservient.'9 This letter was merely a symptom of the times. The very next day, on April 2, 1923, an
organization, called the Cuban Committee of National and
Civic Renovation, got out a manifiesto, or public statement,
denouncing the corruption in governmental circles. The real
author of the document was the president of the organization, Fernando Ortiz, a former member of the House and one
of the most brilliant scholars in the era of the republic.
Among the hundreds of other signers were, as Heraldo de
Cuba put it,
"Cubans of the greatest distinction, many of them eminent figures in
science and the realm of intellectuality, and, almost all, men who live
outside of political parties, without connections or bonds that tie them
to their assemblies."
One of the signers was Mario Macbeath, president of the
Rotary Club of Havana, one of the most respected organizations in Cuba, and presidents or officials of scores of other
non-political associations also affixed their names. In fine,
the manifiesto was in no sense of the word a political document, but represented men who were desirous of the regeneration of Cuba, without thought of any direct advantage
to themselves. The document itself went into detail about
numerous evils, including the following: tax frauds that were
"Freyre de Andrade, Gonzalo, Conservador, Apr. 1, 1923, in Heraldo
Carta... separdndose del partido de Cuba, Apr. 2, 1923.




CORRUPTION AND REMONSTRANCE, 1923-1924


467


forced on people by government officials for the benefit of
the latter; the graft in customs collections; the state of
abandonment, as well as the corruption, in the affairs of
the Public Works Department; lack of attention to sanitation and public charity; the exploitation of lewd women by
the higher politicians; the decline in education, and its accompaniment of a rapid increase in illiteracy; the corruption of the judiciary; the use of the army in politics; the
glaring remissness of Congress in failing to enact needed
laws, and its startling activity in fostering every conceivable
form of governmental impropriety; the unconstitutional acts
of the President in legislating by decree; and electoral
manipulations that tended to keep the power in the hands
of those least worthy of possessing it, as, for example, in
the election of 1922, when more than a fifth of the candidates had at one time or another been adjudged guilty of
crime. In closing, the manifiesto called upon the people
to save Cuba. The present administration was not the only
one that had been to blame, for, indeed, these evils had
their roots in Spanish colonial customs, but they had developed into a "political parasitism" that was
"inefficient from lack'of culture, rotten in character, ready to compromise with every sort of delinquency, hand in glove with all kinds of
fraud, an unbridled pilferer from the public treasury, and incapable...
of submitting human selfishness to the limits which... civilization
and the interdependence of modern world relations impose."
The document ended with an exhortation to the politicians
to make the necessary sacrifices to bring about the complete
renovation of Cuban life, for otherwise "Tomorrow we shall
ask it of the people!" 20
From this time forward there was a growing impatience
0 Junta cubana de renovaci6n naci- de 1923, in Heraldo de Cuba, Apr. 4,
onal-civica, Manifiesto del 2 de abril 1923.




468


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


with the Zayas government that was enhanced by the practical certainty that Zayas would reelect himself if given a
chance. Among numerous organizations that began to make
themselves heard was the Veterans Association, which had
kept out of politics since its brush with G6mez and had
taken its place as perhaps the most highly revered group
in the country, standing in a sense for a thoroughgoing
Cuban patriotism. This body felt aggrieved, because in the
midst of an orgy of political extravagance the pensions of
the veterans of '95 were not being paid. As many of the
men were now quite old and dependent for a living on their
pensions, the Association took up their cause, and issued
a call for veterans all over Cuba to send delegates to Havana
to join in a resounding protest. Prominent among the leaders of the Veterans at this time was General Carlos Garcia
Velez, a son of the famous Calixto Garcia. Garcia Velez
was a man whose own past history had its political shadows.
He had long been a leading figure in the Cuban diplomatic
service, and was at that very moment minister to England,
but he had shown a disposition to spend more money than
his own resources permitted. It is said that the government
had once paid his private debts while he was minister to
Mexico and that he had recently demanded forty thousand
dollars to settle his accounts, holding out a threat of trouble
unless this sum should be given to him.21 Apparently the
request, if made, must have been denied, for now Garcia
Velez came out furiously for reform, and in one of the meetings of the Association pushed through a resolution condemning the Tarafa Law. Later, the directorate of the
Association repudiated this action, on grounds that the organization did not wish to appear in a political matter that
had no direct bearing on its own functions. So Garcia Velez
'$ "A Sage," in Havana Post, May 8, 1924.




CORRUPTION AND REMONSTRANCE, 1923-1924


469


decided to found a new society which might serve as a
medium for an expression of the public will against the
government. Thus it was that the Veterans and Patriots
Association was established, and from this time forward for
over half a year it held the centre of the stage in the demonstrations against the existing order.
The first meeting of the new Association was held on
August 12, 1923, in the Maxim Theatre, Havana. The
building was not large enough to hold all who wished
to attend, but places were reserved for a number of high
officers who had fought in the Army of Liberation. At the
outset some of the speakers hoped to confine the activities
of the body to the pension question, but, while that was
being discussed, in came Garcia Velez and strode to the
platform to the accompaniment of an ovation. He at once
asked for permission to speak, and delivered an ultra-patriotic address in which he declared that the republic was in
danger and could be saved only by attacking such evils as
the lottery and Tarafa laws represented. Others followed
with equally or even more fiery addresses, some of them so
violent that Heraldo de Cuba felt it could not print them.22
Garcia Velez kept jumping to his feet to send the meeting
into a paroxysm of enthusiasm. In the end an agreement
was taken for a permanent assembly until the present grave
problems were resolved, and a committee was appointed to
ask Congress to repeal the lottery and Tarafa laws and to
regularize the pay of veterans' pensions.  Then, after a
final speech of Garcia Velez, in which he bade the veterans
to be ready for any contingency, the meeting adjourned.23
On August 31, 1923, another great meeting was held, this
" One such suggestion that Heraldo window 
de Cuba did mention was for the vet-  ' The meeting is described in deerans to go to the legislative halls tail in Heraldo de Cuba, Aug. 13,
and throw the furniture out of the 1923.




470


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


time at the Marti Theatre, Havana, at which it was decided
to make twelve specific recommendations to Congress. These
amounted to an adoption of the Crowder moralization program, although not set forth as such. In addition to the
three points agreed upon in the August 12 meeting, Congress
was asked: to pass laws to guarantee the independence of
the courts; to derogate those portions of the electoral code
that gave practical control of party assemblies to congressmen and politicians; to vote a law of accounting to fix responsibility for disbursements; to limit congressional immunity so that. it could not protect men guilty of common
crimes; to abolish presidential reflection, by constitutional
amendment; to provide against amnesties for common
crimes.  One other recommendation concerned a law    of
merely passing interest, having to do with customs tariff
favors for the Cuba Northern Railway, and two others seem
merely to have been reaching out for popular approval:
one about giving preferential rights to Cuban laborers; and
one advocating woman's suffrage.24
For several months, now, there was something of the stir
of impending revolution, which the Veterans and Patriots
had openly threatened. Talk of an uprising could be heard
on every street corner. Interest spread to the United States,
where the press gave generous space to the news from Cuba.
The already-mentioned articles of Fox and Conn attracted
great attention both in the United States and Cuba. Fox's
account ran serially in five numbers of the Washington Post
during September. To him it seemed that either revolution
or intervention was inevitable. In a sense Crowder was
the axis of the controversy, he said,-in that the issue was
between his policies and those of Zayas. The nationalistic
Asamblea magna de Veteranos y aldo de Cuba, Sept. 1, 1923.
Patriotas: proclama al pais, in Her



CORRUPTION AND REMONSTRANCE, 1923-1924  471
movement was really a form of hostility to the United States,
serving as a shield behind which the politicians were engaging in graft. Zayas himself was very clever in his use
of the patriotic appeal, hoping to go to the very limit of
United States patience before stopping short. In illustration of this, Fox told how Zayas had enquired of Hughes
whether he did not have a right to make changes in his
Cabinet. Obviously the American Secretary could not very
well say "No," and so Zayas claimed that this admission
justified him in dismissing the Honest Cabinet. Fox felt
that all the best elements in Cuba, including business men,
were on the side of the Veterans and Patriots, and he had
what proved to be an unduly exalted idea of the leadership
of Garcia Velez, pointing out that he still held his post of
minister to London, though in open opposition to Zayas, for
the latter was too discreet to risk precipitating a conflict
through relieving him. Both sides were opposed to intervention, Fox noted, but the Veterans and Patriots would
like the approval of the United States, and Zayas had gone
to some pains, during August, to get the Washington authorities to say that they would not support a revolutionary
movement, but Hughes had not given him an answer, one
way or the other. Zayas and his followers could not be
in accord with the United States, because that would mean
an end to their graft, but all recognized that the American
government held the key to the situation in case it desired
to use it. Fox held that a continuance of corruption would
mean an eventual intervention, insisting that it was the duty
of the United States under article three of the Platt Amendment to correct the situation, as a regime like that of Zayas
did not give adequate protection to life, liberty, and property.
In commenting on these articles, Heraldo de Cuba expressed
an opinion that they probably represented the views of




472


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


Crowder, Hughes, and Coolidge (who had just become President of the United States, following Harding's death), as
well as Fox. Though denying the applicability of the Platt
Amendment, Heraldo de Cuba said Fox had shown that
Cuba was in danger from the United States, and therefore
urged the two Cuban factions to effect a compromise.25
There was no disposition in Cuba to follow Heraldo de
Cuba's advice, however. The controversy continued. Crowder was indeed injected into it, though maintaining a discreet silence himself. Leaders of the Veterans and Patriots
openly praised him. One of them, Carlos Mendieta, Liberal
candidate for Vice-President in 1916 and now regarded as
a strong probability for the Liberal nomination for the
presidency in 1924, came out in a public statement to the
effect that Crowder was a better friend of Cuba than Zayas.
He denounced the dismissal of the Honest Cabinet as an
act of "theatrical patriotism," holding that Zayas's nationalism was synonymous with corruption. According to Mendieta, Zayas claimed that any interference with corruption
would provoke intervention, but Mendieta felt, on the contrary, that corruption itself would surely bring it on.26 Zayas,
meanwhile, was a little worried, as witness his enquiry of
the United States government, mentioned by Fox. On September 20, 1923, orders were given for the arrest of the
Veterans and Patriots' leaders, and twenty of them were
taken, but Garcia Velez, Manuel Despaigne, and Oscar Soto,
respectively president, treasurer, and secretary of the organization, escaped.  On the 22d Zayas announced that
they would not be molested if they would return to Havana,
2 The Fox articles (used by the Post from the 10th to the 14th.
writer only in Spanish translation)  Conn, Edward L, The
and the comment of Heraldo de Cuba crisis in Cuba: I, Reform or revoluappear in issues of the latter of Sept. tion, in (Philadelphia Public ledger,
11, 12, 13, 14, and 19, 1923. They republished in) Berkeley (California)
were published in the Washington Gazette, Nov. 19, 1923.




CORRUPTION AND REMONSTRANCE, 1923-1924


473


but Garcia Velez refused to accept the proffered immunity.
The other twenty men were released.27 Despaigne and Soto
soon put in an appearance again.
It is probable that the original order for the arrest of
these men was not altogether a Zayas measure, for the
President usually preferred to temporize, in hopes that delay might eventually turn matters to his advantage. More
in line with his customary procedure was a long letter he
wrote to General Alfredo Rego on October 10, 1923, which
was given to the press several days later. It was a typical
Zayas document. He welcomed the Veterans and Patriots'
program, for its aims were the same as his own! He defended the lottery and Tarafa laws, but was ready to sign
bills for most of the other features requested by the Veterans
and Patriots, "if Congress would enact a law." He opposed
an accounting law, for the law as it was, was adequate "for
the purposes of an honest administration." He had twice
asked Congress to enact a law against the reflection of a
President, though unwilling to admit that reelection necessarily involved disorder, "for that depends on the personal
characteristics of the chief of the state." He claimed to
have undertaken all manner of reforms, many of them with
marked success, and of course denied any improprieties by
his government. Throughout, he endeavored to give a false
impression, as, for example, mentioning reforms that were
really due to the pressure from Crowder and failing to state
how they had since been abandoned. Naturally, he did
not expect to deceive the leaders of the Veterans and Patriots, but he hoped, no doubt, to go over their heads to
make an impression on the people. In line with this were
several gentle thrusts at the Veterans and Patriots.  It
2" Ibid.




474


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


was not to be wondered at, he said, that foreigners should
seek the protection of their governments, but he was surprised that any Cubans should have gone abroad to make
complaints against their own country's authorities, thus intimating that his opponents were in favor of an intervention
that Zayas's own great "patriotism" was desirous of avoiding.28
Just a few days later, on October 14, 1923, the supreme
council of the Veterans and Patriots, with delegates from
every part of Cuba, held a great meeting in Havana at
the Fausto Theatre. About a thousand persons were present. The final details in organization were settled, in which
connection it is to be noted that such respected figures
as Sanguily, Mendieta, Maza y Artola, and Hernandez
Cartaya were included among the honorary presidents and
Enrique Jose Varona was first of the six active vice-presidents. A new manifiesto, or statement to the public, was
read and approved that for straight speaking surpassed anything of the sort that had ever been known in Cuba, according to Heraldo de Cuba, even including "concrete accusations against the President." The announced occasion for
the document was the resistance of Congress and the President to meeting the demands set forth by the Veterans and
Patriots in their earlier petitions to the government. The
illicit profits of congressmen and the President on such
acts as the lottery and Tarafa laws were alluded to, specifically and without reserve, as typical of the evils which were
leading the country along the road to bankruptcy and intervention. The program of August 29 was again recited
(though with the omission of the woman's suffrage clause),
and the underlying reason was given why it had been decided upon: in effect, so that the President and most senators
"The Zayas letter is in Mundo, Oct. 13, 1923.




CORRUPTION AND REMONSTRANCE, 1923-1924


475


and representatives, who "arrived poor to the posts they hold
and have rapidly enriched themselves in them," might be
restrained from further acts of lawlessness. The subsidized
press was excoriated in no uncertain fashion for its "calumnies" against the Association and its leaders; just three
Havana papers were exempted from this sweeping condemnation. Some further agreements were taken, suggesting
the need of additional reforms not mentioned in the program
of August 29, and authority was given to the supreme council
to "decide what it may think necessary for the good of
the country," implying even revolution if deemed best.
Throughout the meeting there was a great deal of violent
oratory, much of which found its way into the formal agreements that were drawn up. When one member suggested
that the language of the manifiesto should be toned down,
there was an angry remonstrance, in course of which Soto
declared that there was no necessity for any change, as this
was a "revolutionary assembly"; indeed, according to him,
they had been in revolution for forty-eight days, during
which they had done everything except actually engage in
battle.29
It is hardly necessary to give a detailed story of the next
half year in the controversy between the government and
the Veterans and Patriots. The issue was already joined
by October 1923, and it was merely a question of time when
it should be settled one way or the other, as neither side
9 The manifiesto and agreements, stood. This act of "injustice" was
together with comment thereon, are not to be wondered at, said Heraldo
to be found in El manifiesto redac- de Cuba, as some of the leaders of
tado por Veteranos y Patriotas, in the Association were until recently
Heraldo de Cuba, Oct. 15, 1923. holders of botellas (easy jobs) and
Heraldo de Cuba, which had sup- collectorships in the lottery and orported the Tarafa Law, was deeply ganizers of chivos (graft deals). In
offended because it was not included point of fact, said Heraldo de Cuba,
in the list of papers that were de- it had been sustaining this moralizascribed as having backed the ideas tion campaign for ten years.
for which the Veterans and Patriots




476


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


would yield. There were charges and counter-charges in
Cuba; in the United States the Conn articles followed those
of Fox, and there was considerable uneasiness in business
and governmental circles. No outbreak took place during
the fall and winter, however. The elements back of the
Veterans and Patriots most certainly wanted no revolution
in the cane-cutting season, and when that should be finished
in the spring it would be nearly time for a presidential election, at which matters might conceivably be settled by the
ballot; or if the elections should be conducted unfairly there
would then be an undeniable basis for a protest, perhaps
even in arms. On the other hand the cane-cutting season
would loom up again as an anti-revolution argument. The
United States, if willing to take a hand, could have resolved the issue, but Washington, though thoroughly disapproving the Zayas regime and although it might be said
to have been defeated in a diplomatic encounter with Zayas,
seemed altogether unwilling to undertake a campaign on
behalf of the principles it had urged so insistently down
to the spring of 1923. So it behooved the Veterans and
Patriots to settle this matter alone, and at length the more
ardent spirits of the Association could contain themselves
no longer.
On April 30, 1924, a revolt broke out near Cienfuegos
under the leadership of Colonel Federico Laredo Bru. Garcia
Velez, then in New York, was believed to have given the
order for the uprising and to have departed for Cuba to
take command himself. Reports of revolutionary activity
came in from thirty or forty towns of Santa Clara, although
the government insisted that the outbreak was of no consequence, being limited to twenty-three soldiers who had deserted from the army. Later it appeared that somewhat
more than that number, admittedly as many as five hun



CORRUPTION AND REMONSTRANCE, 1923-1924


477


dred, arose in arms, but the official reports were substantially correct, just the same. The revolution proved a
ridiculous failure, and was virtually at an end inside of a
week, with hardly a battle, if indeed any fighting at all.
Then followed a series of explanations and recriminations
which tended to throw light on the whole movement. Garcia
Velez, who for a moment had been a national idol, was now
unqualifiedly denounced. His own bad political past was
recited against him, and his leadership of the Veterans and
Patriots was described as cowardly, treasonable, or incompetent. Some accused him of spending the Association's funds
on his own pleasures in New York cabarets, and one of his
associates in that city complained that he had led the other
members of the committee to believe that he had left for
Cuba, when in fact he had remained in New York.30 Insinuations against other leaders of the Veterans and Patriots
were also freely indulged in, and it was claimed that "The
organization was never intended to accomplish any of the
reforms that it enunciated," but was designed to attract a
following "so that its leaders could control a large part of
the federal patronage and mayhaps prove a deciding factor
in the presidential election." 31    Some advanced the idet
that Zayas himself had staged the revolution, so that he
could gain prestige by putting it down.32 After all, however,
the determining factor in the conflict was the attitude of
For a particularly scathing denun- Heraldo, translated in Havana Post,
ciation of Garcia Velez, insisting that May 19, 1924.
he was either a coward or a traitor,  "'A Sage," in Havana Post, May
see gCobarde o traidor?, in Sol, May 27, 1924. In an earlier editorial, May
15, 1924. Another paper, which, like 8, 1924, the same writer said of the
Sol, had strongly supported the Vet- Veterans and Patriots' leaders that
erans and Patriots' cause, declared "only Colonel Manuel Despaigne can
that Garcia Velez was merely "in- be absolved from 'crookedness."'
capable of leading an armed move-  "This is suggested, though not posment, and much less one based on itively asserted, by Ram6n Vasconthe regeneration of the country." celos, in Heraldo de Cuba, May 8,
Neither a coward nor a traitor, in 1924.




478


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


the United States. The Washington authorities as thoroughly approved of the Veterans and Patriots' program as
they disapproved of Zayas, and probably believed in the
sincerity of the reform movement, but from the first news
of the outbreak they came out on the side of the constituted
power. An embargo was placed on the sale of munitions
to the insurrectionists, while Zayas was allowed to purchase
needed equipment from the United States government itself. More than anything else, this probably accounts for
the failure of the movement to gather headway. In keeping with its policy in dealing with other Caribbean countries
as well as Cuba, Washington seemed to be putting a veto
on revolution, whatever the cause. So it was useless to
proceed, and the expected uprisings in the eastern provinces
did not materialize.
It is probable that many of the criticisms of the Veterans
and Patriots' movement, after the dismal failure of the
Laredo Bru uprising, were overdrawn. The leadership was
faulty, but not so insincere as was frequently alleged. Not
only Despaigne, but also Carlos Alzugaray and a number of
others were at least honest, whatever may be said for their
judgment. Back of them were the best elements in Cuba,
who were undoubtedly inspired by a desire for thoroughgoing reform, and not by any idea of personal profit. As
for Garcia Velez, the writer is impressed by the opinion of
those who say that his real motive in the campaign of the
Veterans and Patriots was not, indeed, reform and not revenge or blackmail against Zayas, but ambition for the
presidency. He prated about revolution, but did not want
it, hoping, however, to get the backing of the Association
at some favorable turn in the political situation that might
carry him to the first magistracy of the republic,-and perhaps a chance then to reap his profits. It was a mistake




CORRUPTION AND REMONSTRANCE, 1923-1924


479


for the Veterans and Patriots to have entered the political
arena at all, and certainly for them to have engaged in
an armed revolt. As a protesting body they could have
kept alive the moralization movement, but their defeat in
such a fiasco as the so-called revolution of 1924 gave Cuba
to the politicians, who felt henceforth that there was no
further need for them to restrain themselves in the pursuit of private fortune at the expense of the state.
Almost surely Zayas had not staged the Laredo Brui revolt, for he was frightened; it was impossible to say how
far it might go, in a country that disapproved of Zayas,
even though it may not have wanted revolution. For a
while Zayas put aside his much vaunted "patience," and
acted as Menocal might have done. He provided for a
strict watch over communications by telegraph or telephone,
forbade radio broadcasting, suspended El Sol and El Heraldo
(not Heraldo de Cuba), exiled some of his opponents, and
arrested Alzugaray, Soto, and other leaders of the Veterans
and Patriots. Incidentally, too, he decreed himself a million dollars for war purposes, and bought military supplies
in the United States.33    With the crisis past, however, he
soon restored matters to the status quo, making no effort
(be it said to his credit) to wreak vengeance upon his
opponents.34   And, indeed, there was no longer any reason
" The Cuban Senate, somewhat un- who had given out a public statement
expectedly, approved the million dol- alleging that Zayas was a poor man
lar decree. In commenting upon this, when he became President and had
one writer said: "It makes very lit- used his office to make himself rich.
tie difference whether the lower house These men were accused of insulting
concurs or not since the million dol- the President, and a penalty of six
lars have already been spent." "A months' imprisonment was asked for
Sage," in Havana Post, May 15, 1924. them. In their manifiesto they had
4 While the issue of the revolution referred to Zayas's having overdrawn
was still uncertain, Zayas initiated a his account at the National Bank and
famous case against a number of his denial of his own signature on
highly respected citizens, members of that occasion, prior to his inaugurathe Good Government Association, tion as President, and to his lavish




480


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


to be afraid of them, for the Veterans and Patriots were
"very dead."35


expenditures more recently on his
newly acquired Villa Maria estate.
The judge in the case, Enrique Almagro, sought to get documents that
might throw light on the affair, but
the court emissaries were refused access to the papers in the keeping of
the Bank Liquidation Committee, as
also to the files of Villa Maria. The
case came up for trial on May 8.
The defendants asserted that there
was no insult to the President, as
they had merely told the truth.
Presently Almagro rendered a somewhat unique decision, holding that
there was no necessary reason for
believing  that  the   defendants'
charges were correct and that therefore there was no insult. It was conceivable, he said, that Zayas might
have been an avaricious man who was
really wealthy but wished to make
himself appear poor. Then lately he
might have changed his mind, and


that could account for the difference
between the National Bank incident
and the expenditures on Villa Maria.
And as for Zayas's having overdrawn
his account, why Almagro had once
overdrawn his,-for eight dollarsl So
with this "defence" of Zayas, Almagro dismissed the case. (Heraldo
de Cuba, May 9, 1924). Commenting upon the Almagro decision one
paper said: "We do not know of
whom he reminded us more, whether
of Machiavelli or Anatole France.
But we can indeed affirm that the
irony of Eca de Queiroz had this
morning... a terrible competitor."
(Pais, May 8, 1924). Jose Maria Ega
(or Eza) de Queiroz (1843-1900) was
a Portuguese novelist, celebrated for
an ironical humor which he employed
in satirizing his own times.
a For some comment on authorities, see note at the end of chapter
XX.




CHAPTER XX


EXIT ZAYAS, 1924-1925
ONE immediate result of the defeat of the Veterans and
Patriots was the resumption of corruption, with scarcely
any further need for attention to public opinion. The Santa
Clara purchase at length became a law, early in June 1924,
and the most notorious amnesty bill in the history of the
republic was enacted in that same month.' To be sure,
there were other ways of making money outside of the
great "deals," as by picking it up in small amounts in
transactions that were engaged in frequently over a long
period of time. There was an enormous graft, for example,
in the importation of laborers for work on sugar plantations.
This mainly concerned negroes from Haiti and Jamaica, but
applied also to the Chinese. As for the last-named, Cuba
had a Chinese exclusion law that was operating very rigidly,
according to the official reports of Zayas. In his message to
Congress of April 7, 1924, Zayas said that three persons of
Chinese race were admitted to Cuba in 1922 and seven in
1923, and a year later (April 6, 1925) he said that none at
all came in during 1924. Yet it was common knowledge that
they were entering every year by the thousands. One paper
claimed that there were 150,000 in Cuba, most of whom
had arrived since the census of 1919; a shipload of five
hundred had been landed just a few days before.2 Another
writer asserted that a Cuban consular representative in
1 For a discussion of the amnesty  'La invasion amarilla, in Mundo,
bill, see infra, pp. 534-538.  May 10, 1924.
481




482


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


Canton, China, was said to have cleared two hundred thousand dollars in three years for his vises of passports.3   In
the light of Zayas's exceedingly meagre estimates it is not
hard to believe the charges to the effect that he was profiting from this traffic.4  On the other hand, the government
now ceased to do much of anything of a really useful constructive character. From this time forward, to the end of
Zayas's rule, hardly a day passed but that some newspaper
complained of congressional inaction. For weeks there would
be no meetings of either house, unless to pass upon some
notorious bit of legislation. Even the most imperatively
needed laws, such as the sanction of the budget and of further payments on the floating debt (to say nothing of reforms), were left without study or even to fail because
of congressional inertia. The same phenomenon was to be
observed in administrative circles. Practically nothing was
done to get rid of the illegal contracts in the Public Works
Department after the dismissal of the Honest Cabinet, and
various of the national services were sadly neglected.5 This
is not to say that no money was being expended.        By no
means! Furthermore, Zayas was now planning to employ a
large portion of his thirty-three million surplus on a "program" of public works, ostensibly for such things as the
long discussed central highway and other roads as well as
on aqueducts, schools, and hospitals.6 There was little or
no enthusiasm for the Zayas projects, however, as it was
pretty generally understood that the politicians would get
'"A Sage," in Havana Post, May articles calling attention to the fail14, 1924.                      ure of the government to perform its
'La inmigracion china, in Diario ordinary administrative duties, even
de la marina, May 15, 1924, gives a in the care of such well known thorgood brief summary of Chinese immi- oughfares as Obispo and O'Reilly
gration from 1847 to 1924.     streets.
' The streets of Havana, in Heraldo  'From an interview with the Presde Cuba, translated in Havana Post, ident's son-in-law, Celso Cuellar del
May 10, 1924, is one among scores of Rio, in Discusion, May 10, 1924.




EXIT ZAYAS, 1924-1925


483


the money, and it was suspected that the real object was
to assist Zayas to win a reflection through gifts to various
persons and at least a promise of gold to many others.7
Zayas was indeed looking ahead to the elections in November. He had gone into office on a one-term platform,
and had frequently expressed himself as opposed to reelection, but nobody, least of all Zayas, believed that he would
not run if he had a reasonable chance of success. When
asked by a reporter, in the fall of 1923, whether he would
be a candidate, Zayas is said to have replied: "I am not a
candidate, but if I should be... I would not employ
any censurable means." 8 Eventually, in May 1924, with
the campaign of the Veterans and Patriots now dead, Zayas
came out in the open, and announced that he would run
again, presumably as in 1920, as the candidate of a Conservative-Popular coalition. He was still "opposed to reelection,"
but Congress had "five times" neglected his requests to take
action on the matter; so apparently there was no help for
it but that he must run! Presently he received the Popular nomination, which amounted to passing over to his
right hand what he already held in his left.
The campaign within the Liberal party was the one that
commanded perhaps the major share of attention during
the summer of 1924. It developed into a battle between
General Machado and Colonel Mendieta, the one-time allies
of 1916. The latter was'commonly regarded at the choice
of the rank and file of the party, and he was favored, too,
by the regeneration element, for he had taken part in the
demonstrations against Zayas and was believed to be a man
' Among editorials to this effect are defends his acts, in (Philadelphia
one in Pais of May 13, 1924, and an- Public ledger, republished in) Berkeother in Sol of May 16.    ley (California) Gazette, Nov. 27,
'Conn, Edward L, Cuba 1923.
not free but enslaved: VIII, Zayas




484


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


of unimpeachable honesty. Machado, who had been out
of politics since 1917, was not nearly so well known, although he had been prominent both as a soldier and in the
higher ranks of the Liberal councils prior to his withdrawal
of seven years before. Furthermore, whether justly or not,
he was regarded by many as seeking office in order to increase his already considerable fortune. Machado, however, proved himself far better able than his opponent to
meet the exigencies of a Cuban political situation. Mendieta
remained at home, insisting that he would win if the delegates to the assembly voted as the people wanted them to
do. He even had the moral courage to give out an interview in which he asserted that Cuba's future lay in her
going hand in hand with the United States.9 That was no
secret to the intelligent people of the republic, but it was
a brave thing to say, for a few diatribes on the Platt Amendment would have been more productive of votes. Mendieta
also came out emphatically for honest government. On the
other hand, Machado adapted himself to conditions as they
were, went to the Liberal assembly or wherever else it was
desirable to go in order to further his cause, perhaps made
a number of promises, and certainly won many friends
through the medium of his admittedly agreeable personality.
So, when the votes were counted, Machado had won. There
was some talk of a contest or of a separate ticket, but
Mendieta declined to go back of the action of the assembly,
although he did refuse to take any part in the coming campaign, releasing his followers to vote as they pleased.
The nomination of Machado was not unexpected, but an
unlooked for event took place at the Conservative assembly.
Zayas failed of nomination! Menocal proved to have a
majority, with Mendez Capote as his running-mate. Of
'From an interview in Heraldo de Cuba, May 19, 1924.




EXIT ZAYAS, 1924-1925


485


course, the Zayas adherents claimed that the nomination
was stolen, but the fact was that Zayas now had the formal
backing of the insignificant Popular party alone. There
followed a number of conferences between Machado and
Zayas about a Liberal-Popular alliance, and there was a
quite general belief that a new ticket of the two men would
emerge, with Zayas at the head of it. So Cuban opinion
was considerably surprised when on August 23 Zayas withdrew his own candidacy in favor of Machado, with Carlos
De la Rosa of the Popular party as the vice-presidential
nominee. At the same time, the public was informed that
Zayas was to have the right to name three Cabinet Secretaries in case Machado should prove successful at the polls.
The only real surprise over this line-up is that anybody
should have expected a different result. As between Zayas
and Machado, the advantage was with the latter. He
could offer votes as against Zayas's rather dubious government control. Only the strongest of strong-hand measures
could win for the Populars, and such a victory would be an
all too obvious absurdity. Furthermore, Zayas was not in
the same position that Menocal had been to employ force,
for the officers of the army were for the most part strong
supporters of the Conservative party or at any rate hostile
to Zayas. Indeed, so great was the opposition to the scantily
esteemed occupant of the presidential chair that it is highly
probable that his election on any basis would have provoked a revolution beside which not only that of 1924 but
even those of 1917 and 1906 might have paled into insignificance. This was freely predicted in newspaper editorials, and was also stated privately to the writer by more
than one responsible and disinterested person. And Zayas,
who had never been either a fool or a fighter, could see
the handwriting on the wall. It is probable that he thought




486


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


more of saving his neck, in bis conversations with Machado,
than of retaining his power, and possibly his right to name
three Secretaries was merely a blind, back of which the
real agreement was that the President and his relatives and
friends were not to be prosecuted for any crimes they
might have committed while Zayas was in power.
In view of the reputed unpopularity of Machado's victory
over Mendieta, it may be wondered why the latter could
hope to command an especially large vote. Any Liberal,
however, whether Machado or somebody else, had at least
two reasons for an expectation of victory. One was, that
Cuba is normally Liberal,-not that there is the slightest
difference in principle between the two great parties in
Cuba; indeed, except for the non-reelection promise, very
few persons in Cuba could have recited any of the forty
tenets in the Machado "platform," which (as is customary
in Cuba) was prepared and published by him after his nomination.  Only once in five elections had the Liberals
triumphed since the party was formed in 1905, but they
had in fact represented a majority every time, although a
split in their ranks in 1912 gave the Conservatives the only
victory to which they were entitled. The word "Liberal"
had an appeal that gave the party its start, and the habit
of voting that ticket had passed on from father to son.
The unfair treatment the Liberals had received in 1916 and
1920 had also added to their numbers, and strengthened
them in loyalty to the organization.
The second reason why Machado could count on a large
vote was because of the reputation of his opponent. Menocal
was the strongest man in the inner councils of the Conservative party, and possibly the only one who could have
beaten Zayas for the nomination, but he was hated more
than any man in Cuba. Even Zayas might have had a




EXIT ZAYAS, 1924-1925


487


chance for the popular vote ahead of Menocal, although if
restricted to a choice between these two it is quite possible
that a double assassination would have been called in to
settle the issue. The character of Menocal's eight year rule,
coupled with the fact that he was a man of the classes, a
gentleman, and an aristocrat, was enough to make him an
utterly unpopular candidate.  People were sure to cast
I their ballots for Machado, in order to vote against Menocal.
And yet there were unusual circumstances that might have
given the Conservatives cause for hope. In 1922, when no
government pressure was exercised, they had carried Pinar
del Rio, and lost Santa Clara and Oriente by slender majorities. These three provinces would give them the victory
if they could take them in 1924. Several things now gave
i them a seeming advantage in Oriente, chief among which
was the accession of the one-time Liberal spellbinder, the
immensely popular and influential colored politician, Juan
Gualberto Gomez. In addition, the moralization program
had been adopted at the time of the assembly,-a n1ovelty
in Cuba,-as a party platform, and this, together with
Mendieta's withdrawal from the conflict, which was interpreted as a virtual condemnation of Machado, appeared
likely to attract many Liberals. It was stated privately, too,
-and believed by many reputable men,-that this was a
new Menocal who was going to the polls, a man who was
eager to redeem both Cuba and his own good name. Naturally, there were many who were far from convinced of
the sudden reformation of the Conservative chief, however.
Feeling that they could count on Pinar del Rio and
Oriente, the Conservatives concentrated on Santa Clara,
which again became the battleground of the campaign.
For a brief moment it looked as if there might be an "oldtime" election, punctuated with strife. On October 5 there




488


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


was a collision between Menocal's own entourage and the
police of Camagiiey, in which several men were killed and
more than two score wounded. It seems that 1917 had not
been forgotten, for the Liberal papers were full of "Remember Caballero!" stories and warnings for Menocal not
to visit Camagiiey. Predictions were freely made that if
he included that city in his tour he would never leave it
alive. Each side promptly blamed the other for the affair,
but there was no denying the fight. Almost on the eve
of the election, on October 29, there was another affray,
at Jicotea, in Santa Clara, when several persons were
wounded in a fracas that took place while Menocal's train
was leaving the station.  The Conservatives were daily
making charges, too, of undue favoritism on the part of the
government in aid of Machado's candidacy. Strong hints
were given by them that they might go out in revolution if
they were "robbed" of victory, which they insisted they
could not lose unless it were stolen from them. They tried
to create an impression that the United States would intervene if Menocal were "deprived of the election," but this
was a maneuver that not only had no basis in fact but
was also without effect, for nobody believed it.  While
there was some truth in Conservative charges that the government was assisting Machado, the handling of the elections, on the whole, was at least "reasonably fair." Only
crass stupidity could have induced the authorities to employ
such measures as Menocal had once used, because for days
before the election it was evident to everybody not blinded
by partisanship that on an honest vote Machado was sure
to win. All that the government had to do was to safeguard the interests of the Liberals as against any possible
aggressions of the other side, but without any necessity
for manufacturing votes. It is probably true that arms




EXIT ZAYAS, 1924-1925


489


were distributed at various points, to be used if the Conservatives should endeavor to upset the election, and the
military supervisors appointed to various electoral districts
were almost certainly not favorable to Menocal. Undoubtedly, too, there was a great deal of vote-buying, but by both
sides, for that is so inherently a part of every Cuban election that is not considered overly corrupt.10 Still other steps
were taken by the government.          Many employes in the
national service were relieved of their positions because
they were known to favor Menocal. With a view to counteracting Menocal's influence with the officers of the army,
Zayas issued a decree promoting sergeants to the rank of
lieutenants in case they had served a stipulated long period
of years. Other charges might be mentioned, too, but whatever it may have intended to do in case there should develop any danger of defeat, the actual conduct of the government was such that it did not materially affect the result. To Zayas, therefore, goes some credit, not as for an
honest election, but for not being so stupid as to take steps
which were unnecessary, to produce a Machado victory.1T
The one disturbing factor was whether the Conservatives
might start a revolution following their defeat.        Preelection maneuvers had plainly carried such a threat, but the
thing did not seem   to "go over."    It was "not in the air."
10 One Conservative paper out in both Liberals and Conservatives told
the provinces later bewailed the par- him about the intimidations in the
ty's handling of the election in its rural districts by armed men of "the
district because it was so niggardly other side." There was, indeed, an
in the buying of votes. The Liberals, air of tenseness, as of something that
on the other hand, had given a dol- might take place, and the great crowd
lar and a piece of a lottery ticket (at in the plaza that night experienced
a cost of perhaps twenty-five cents, several scares. Once a shot was fired.
with a possible yield of a thousand This seemed ominous,-but it was
dollars) to all who had cared to succeeded almost immediately by a
apply.                          great cheer and an impromptu parade,
The writer was in Sancti Spiritus, in the midst of which could be seen
a supposedly "crucial point," on the a figure on horseback. It proved to
day of the election. There was cer- be none other than "the candidate"
tainly no interference there, though himself, General Machado.




490


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


The only real excitement was of a wholesome type, in an
outburst of joy in victory that swept the country. Night
and day, with or without bibulous incentive, the Liberals
shouted their cries and sang their songs, to the accompaniment of cruel gibes at the defeated party and especially its
candidate.12   It was quite some time before the returns
were complete, but it was fairly evident from the first
that Machado had an immense majority.             On the final
count he carried every province except Pinar del Rio.
It was now Menocal's turn, in customary Hispanic American fashion, to dispute the election and then keep the
country in a turmoil for several months until a revolution
or the intervention of the United States should come along
to settle matters. For a while he seemed likely to run
to form. On November 2, the day after the election, he
and Mendez Capote issued a statement claiming that the
election had been illegal and "declining responsibility for
the future." The more hot-headed of the Conservatives
would, indeed, have welcomed a revolution, but Menocal
stopped short of that, although at first he appears to have
contemplated taking all the legal steps available for lodging
a protest.   Several days later, however, he did something
that has happened rarely, if at all, anywhere else in Hispanic
America: he acknowledged defeat! It is said on good authority that he decided to do so after a long conference
"The principal Liberal cry was "A  "Menocal se revent6
pie" (Ah pee-ay), meaning "Afoot,"  Que esta vez fue diferente:
in contradistinction to the term "A  Gonzales no era ministro,
caballo," or "On horseback," by which  Ni era Wilson presidente."
the Liberals characterized the Conser- Freely translated, this might be renvatives. The latter developed from  dered:  "Menocal went 'bust,' for
the fact that Menocal rode a magnifi- this time it was different: Gonzales
cent white charger while conducting wasn't minister, nor Wilson Presihis campaign, and it seemed also to dent."  The reference to Gonzales
carry the figurative idea of Conserva- and Wilson is illustrative of the intive aristocracy as opposed to Liberal eradicable Liberal belief that these
democracy. One of the songs heard two men were responsible for the vicby the writer ran as follows:    tory of Menocal in 1916-1917.




EXIT ZAYAS, 1924-1925


491


with Crowder, who persuaded him to take this course. The
big thing, however, is that Menocal did it. He even wrote
a letter of felicitation to his victorious opponent,-a letter,
indeed, which might have been somewhat more cordially
phrased,-a courtesy which is part of the normal aftermath
of an election in the United States, but is almost unheard
of in Hispanic America. This act of Menocal should go
far to redeem his reputation, for he furnished his country
an example of greatness in defeat. In any event his campaign had not been an utter failure. He alone prevented
the nomination and a possible victory for Zayas. And the
adoption of a platform announcing a real issue,-whether
or not Menocal was responsible for it, and even if it were
not sincere,-marked a step forward in the evolution of
Cuban politics.l8
The election was now over, with six months to go before
the end of the Zayas orgy. It had so far been an "orgy,"
indeed, but yet the Cuban chief of state might well have
claimed that he had never been entirely free to act. First
there was Crowder, then the Veterans and Patriots, and
more recently the possibility of a Conservative revolution.
All these annoyances were now out of his way, however,
and in addition he had virtual assurance of immunity from
prosecution at the end of his term. So for the first time
he had an opportunity to give broad expression to his natural
instincts. A brief term to characterize this period might
almost be written: "Zayas becomes himself!" Not quite,
however,-for Machado and the law were in the offing if
the administration got too far out of hand. And Machado
was obliged to speak out loud on at least one occasion, al" The material here on the election Machado in Cuba, in Oakland (Calof 1924 is taken from an article by the ifornia) Tribune, Mar. 29 and Apr. 5,
writer entitled The election of 1925.




492


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


though he appears in the main to have let matters take
their course until Zayas should step down from power. So
the latter was able almost to "become himself," even though
he lacked a little of being so. It is hardly necessary, under
the circumstances, to say what was to be the nature of the
Zayas rule henceforth. And yet, some of the graft deals
of this era were so utterly bald and shameless as to cause
"admiration," making other notorious affairs appear almost
honest by comparison. One of the earliest transactions of
this sort was the expropriation by the government, at a
phenomenal price, of some lands that were designed (at least
in theory) to be utilized as a westerly continuation of the
Malecon drive along the ocean front of Havana. While
it is always difficult to obtain precise information about
events of this type, the following is substantially what happened.
According to old Spanish laws which had never been derogated, the government owned the coast-line of Cuba for a
distance of twenty meters from the shore. Nevertheless,
whether as a result of special favors or otherwise, many
Spaniards in colonial days had been allowed to squat upon
these lands and use them as if they were their own. That
was what happened in the case of the lot involved in the
famous deal of 1924, which was a strip of coast from G to 0
streets in the Vedado district, or eight blocks of very nearly
solid rock that was often completely under water. The
heirs of the two Spaniards who had occupied this territory
had it taken away from them when Spain went to war with
the United States, as the government wished to set up fortifications there. They entered a claim on this account during the Magoon era, and were awarded a large sum of money
(which would seem to raise some question as to the applicability of the old Spanish laws), but were never paid.




EXIT ZAYAS, 1924-1925


493


Early in the ensuing G6mez administration the scheme that
was to culminate in the deal of 1924 had its inception. Zayas
has not definitely been connected with it at that stage,
although there are many who believe that he had a hand,
since it is quite generally alleged that his "precious" cousin,
Carlos Portela, was one of the moving spirits. At any
rate, a rather shadowy group of Cubans made a bargain for
some outlying lands of an estate other than that of the
two Spaniards already mentioned, paying an amount variously estimated at from eleven thousand to forty-five thousand dollars for them. In the deed it was stated that the
seller was not certain that the lands in question belonged
to his estate, but the buyer was to take all the risk. The
lands, indeed, were of indefinite location, and had to be
indicated precisely before they could be recorded under the
names of the purchasers. So presently the already described
lot in Vedado was selected as the region intended to be
covered in the terms of the deed. Not much more seems
to have been accomplished while G6mez was in power. Late
in 1913 the men who were managing this affair organized
as an American corporation under the name North Havana
Land Company, to which ostensibly the promoters ceded
their rights,-a familiar device of throwing up a smoke
screen, so as to conceal the identity of those who were in
fact to reap the financial benefits to be obtained. Then
there was a long delay, until after the dismissal of the Honest Cabinet in 1923. Early in May of that year an underofficial of the Public Works Department began an action
to expropriate the lands of the company for the Malec6n
continuation, and appraisers were named who fixed a valuation of approximately $2,300,000!  When the case was
brought to trial one of the prosecuting attorneys in the
Department of Justice was on the point of entering an appeal




494


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


from the decision of the judge condemning the property for
the amount brought in by the appraisers, whereupon Secretary Aurelio Sandoval of the Department of Public Works
wrote to Secretary Regiieiferos of the Department of Justice,
on May 30, 1924, asking that no such action be taken. So
when the maneuvering was over, including an estimated expenditure of a good many thousands of dollars among officials
of the courts, the decision of the tribunal was allowed to
stand. The Secretary of the Treasury, who, oddly enough,
happened to be Carlos Portela, now recommended that the
monies be paid, and so Zayas stepped in with a decree ordering the payment to the company's agent of $2,247,075.65.
This took place late in October, and without any "undue
delay" and without waiting for the sanction of Congress
the moneys were withdrawn from the treasury. One may
be pardoned for considering this a very flattering deal for
the company, since the sum it received was some five thousand to twenty thousand per cent more than originally was
expended for these lands. Of course, however, a great deal
had to be given away. Even El Mundo, ordinarily a fawning
administration journal, estimated that more than half of
the amount obtained was paid out in "commissions." 14
Normally Congress might have been expected to raise some
such protest as it had made over the Santa Clara purchase,
for its consent had not been procured, but its interests were
being taken care of in another direction in a deal that was
perhaps the most startlingly "raw" among the many of the
Zayas era. This was the Cardenas Bay affair. On November 23, 1924, Heraldo de Cuba came out with an editorial
4 The Malecon land affair, in it, and numerous citations might be
Mundo, translated in Havana Post, given. There is an assertion in HerOct. 28, 1924. The fullest and most aldo de Cuba, Dec. 1, 1924, that
outspoken accounts of this incident Zayas himself "received a million dolare to be found in Heraldo de Cuba. lars."
The press pretty generally condemned




EXIT ZAYAS, 1924-1925


495


asserting that a number of immoral laws had already been
passed that month, although the Senate had met but once,
and the House not at all, but the latter was believed to have
passed the bills in a secret meeting at the close of the previous session in June. One of these was an appropriation of
$2,700,000 for dredging and other improvements in the harbor of Cardenas, Matanzas.15 On ensuing days, presumably
as a result of investigations made by the editor of the paper,
Gustavo Gonzalez Beauville, who was himself a member of
the House, the details of the plan and its passage through
the House were made known for the first time. It seems
that an illegal meeting of the House had been held on June
10, 1924, when none of the officers and fewer than twentyfive of the 116 representatives were present, or very many
less than the two-thirds required for a quorum. Three men,
named as Oscar del Pino, Bartolome Sagar6, and Matias
Rubio, organized the meeting, however, and in five minutes,
according to Heraldo de Cuba, they passed twenty-nine bills,
dispensing with readings and the other formalities called for
by the rules of the House. The Cardenas Bay bill must have
been very nearly the worst of the lot, for it was put through
in a way calculated to deceive even the members of the June
10 meeting. As it reached the Senate it was the third article
in a bill of which the first appropriated seventy thousand
dollars for a road between Bahia Honda and Consolaci6n del
Norte, in another part of the country, west of Havana.
Yet the records of the House showed the Bahia Honda road
project as a three article bill in itself, with no mention of
the Cardenas Bay appropriation at all. Heraldo de Cuba
concluded that the bill which reached the Senate had never
in fact been voted on, but had been substituted for the one


U Un grupo de leyes inmorales, in Heraldo de Cuba, Nov. 23, 1924.




496


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


passed in the rump meeting of the House. The Senate approved it almost in secret in the sole meeting it held during
November.
Naturally, the bill itself had some very remarkable features. The concession was to be awarded under such peculiar
circumstances that it was obvious that only an already determined group, or "company," could fulfil the requirements; for example, the contract was to be signed within
five days after the bill became a law, which would not have
been time enough for an honest concern even to make soundings in the bay of Cardenas. Seven hundred thousand dollars was to be paid to the company in advance! To be sure,
it had to give a million dollar bond for fulfilment of its contract,-but with a firm that was bonded to the government
for only twenty-five thousand dollars. The other two million
of the appropriation was to be paid in three equal amounts
over a period of three years. In addition, the company was
to receive a fifty year concession authorizing it to collect
charges on goods using the Cardenas docks, at prices that
were at least double those generally prevailing at the time
in other cities; it was to be allowed to condemn lands, without limitations as to amount or quality, for its docks and
warehouses; it was to have the exclusive warehouse privilege at that port; and it was to be allowed the use of all
government dredging materials and bring in anything else
it needed free of duty. These provisions were bad enough
in themselves, and the fifty year term of the special privileges might have been worse, except that there was the
familiar provision allowing the government to cancel the
contract,-on payment of an indemnity of a million in cash
to the company. No doubt, it was intended that this clause
of the contract should at no very distant date become
operative.




EXIT ZAYAS, 1924-1925


497


The revelations of Heraldo de Cuba were taken up by
other journals, and the famous Cardenas Bay bill became
the topic of the hour. All eyes were now turned upon Zayas,
who had not yet attached his signature, although as Heraldo
de Cuba put it he had been offered "three hundred thousand
reasons" for signing it.'6 Some strong representations were
made to get Zayas to veto the bill, but he is said to have
replied that he had no reason to doubt the genuineness of
the document itself, since the president of the House (then
absent in the Isle of Pines) had not asked to have it returned, and he thought the bill itself was good. So he proposed to allow it to become a law, though without his signature, through permitting the ten day period in which he
might have vetoed it to pass,-a course he had followed a
number of times before, as for example with the lottery law
and the Santa Clara purchase act. On December 1, 1924,
therefore, the final legislative step was taken, with the publication of the act in the Gaceta. And it is possible that
Zayas got his "three hundred thousand reasons" with something to spare, for in an editorial of that same day Heraldo
de Cuba set his profit at $350,000.17
The Malec6n and Cardenas Bay affairs were not by any
means the only graft deals of this period and not even the
largest in amounts involved among those that were planned.
And Heraldo de Cuba was not alone in condemning them.
Even the papers that were ordinarily Zayas apologists permitted themselves to refer generally to graft or to denounce
some Secretary, while endeavoring to defend Zayas. Over
a period of less than three weeks, from November 15 to
6 In a later editorial entitled El the term "de peso," or "weighty,"
pais de las viceversas, in Heraldo de may also mean "dollar."
Cuba, Dec. 1, 1924, it was said that  "Gonzalez Beauville, Gustavo, EsZayas had been offered "three hun- tatua de cieno, in Heraldo de Cuba,
dred thousand weighty reasons," but Dec. 1, 1924.




498


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


December 4, the writer noted criticisms on this score in El
Comercio, Diario de la Marina, La Discusi6n, El Heraldo,
Heraldo de Cuba, El Mundo, La Noche, El Pais, Havana
Post, El Sol, La Tarde, and El Triunfo. Undoubtedly, too,
there were similar accusations in other papers. The following were among the things complained of, aside from those
already described: graft in the custom-house, by arrangement between shippers and government officials; a municipal loan graft; graft in Haitian and Jamaican immigration,
growing out of the importation of these laborers on authorization by presidential decree; a proposed European "tour
of investigation" for a committee of congressmen,-a bill
that Zayas vetoed when it got too prominently in the news;
the Palatino fire-company graft; the Giiines aqueduct contract; the attempt to dispossess the Caujeri Indians of their
lands; the $2,500,000 purchase of the Matadero lands; the
preparations for a fraudulent grab of the Christmas lottery
prizes, as in 1923; 18 graft in the Public Works Department
in the alleged building or repair of roads and in other functions of this branch of the service, notably the central highway project; the proposed rehabilitation of the National
Bank; the graft from the protection of gambling-houses;
and numerous pardons and other small transactions. Many
of these deals never got beyond the project stage, indeed,
but it was in the air that no reasonable opportunity to turn
an illegal profit was being missed. Quite as objectionable
as the deals themselves was the way in which Zayas was
carrying through his measures, acting like Menocal, as
Heraldo de Cuba put it, in considering the treasury his
own,19 and conducting himself as a financial dictator in expending moneys by decree, on the ground that there was
s Cf. infra, pp. 561-562.
1Pobre pais, in Heraldo de Cuba, Nov. 18, 1924.




EXIT ZAYAS, 1924-1925


499


no law to prevent him, since Congress was failing to pass
budgets or other needed legislation.20
There was a great deal of frank speaking in connection
with these charges. Heraldo de Cuba had many a dart for
Celso Cuellar del Rio, the President's son-in-law, characterizing him as the most voracious of the gang. On one
occasion it gave the street number and a detailed description
of a gambling place which it claimed was being protected
by Cuellar for seven hundred dollars a day.21      And Zayas
was not spared.    Gonzalez Beauville alluded to a time, a
short while before, when Zayas went to Zulueta Street at
midnight to get his percentage in a gambling-house graft.22
Indeed, the President represented "a new and a tragic dance
of the millions," 23 for "In the inconceivable sacking of the
treasury of the Cuban people Zayas is leaving Menocal very
far behind"; 24 he had
"the sad honor of having been the first President to quote a market
price on his signature, at times very low,-pardons, small transactions,
etc.,-at other times a little dear, as in the case of the Malecon affair." 2
In a similar vein Heraldo de Cuba later remarked that Zayas
was not an aspirant for glory, popularity, or the affection
of the people, but aspired only to gold, in pursuit of which
he had disposed of everything he could sell,-decrees, laws,
resolutions, and pardons.26
The greatest deals of the closing months of the Zayas rule
were two that failed for the time being, the National Bank
scheme, involving some thirty-one millions, and the central
2El congreso responsable de la  "Pobre pats, in Heraldo de Cuba,
bancarrota de la hacienda, in Dis- Nov. 18, 1924.
cusion, Nov. 20, 1924.            4Zayas se lleva la repiblica, in
2'News item in Heraldo de Cuba, Heraldo de Cuba, Dec. 1, 1924.
Nov. 15, 1924.                    6Editorial inset, in Heraldo de
2 Gonzalez Beauville, Gustavo, Es- Cuba, Dec. 1, 1924.
tatua de cieno, in Heraldo de Cuba,  'Zayas, id6latra del oro, in HerDec. 1, 1924.                   aldo de Cuba, Dec. 3, 1924.




500


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


highway project, at a cost of more than $390,000,000. The
rehabilitation of the National Bank had been suggested in
August 1924 by the Bank Liquidation Committee, an administrative body that had been functioning ever since the
crash of 1921. The government was to lend the new institution ten million dollars and deposit all government funds
with it, national, provincial, and municipal, paying two
per cent to the bank to reimburse it for handling them. A
particularly bad feature was the injection of the bank into
politics through the inclusion of the Secretary of the Treasury, ex-officio, on the board of directors, and another was
the provision that the new law could not be changed for
thirty years without the bank's consent. The central highway deal was, of course, a more pretentious affair. While
nobody denied that Cuba needed roads, the cost of this bill
seemed likely to be out of all proportion to its worth and to
involve considerable rewards for certain Conservatives who
had been associated with Zayas and must now step down
from their positions of influence. Some claimed that the
graft in the deal ran as high as $340,000,000, and, naturally,
there was to be the usual heavy initial payment feature.
Finally, in February 1925, Machado himself came out against
the bill, calling attention to the fact that the financial prospects of the republic were none too favorable for supporting
such a law, owing to the drop in the price of sugar. This
had its effect. It was the master's voice! At any rate no
action was taken prior to the end of Zayas's term.
The corrupt deals that have been mentioned here were
only a few out of the many. For example, the early part
of 1925 saw the central highway project rivalled by a bill
that was to put immigration in the hands of Jose Manuel
Govin for thirty years. This, too, failed of passage. Zayas
meanwhile issued more decrees than ever, and was even




EXIT ZAYAS, 1924-1925


501


sustained in his procedure by a decision, late in January,
of the Supreme Court. To be sure, Congress still neglected
its duties, rarely meeting. For a time it was interested in
"constitutional reform,"-but it soon developed that the
most desired reform was one increasing the number of representatives and lengthening the terms of members to six years
for representatives and twelve for senators! The movement, however, did not get very far. Another matter of
interest in these days was the already discussed ratification
by the United States of the Isle of Pines treaty.27
In one particular, at least, it would seem that Heraldo
de Cuba was wrong, when it remarked that Zayas did not
aspire to glory, for the President devoted himself, heart and
soul, to a measure designed to perpetuate his name. That
was the erection of a monument to himself before he went
out of office. Popular subscriptions were called for, and
the politicians and a few others put down their names. Late
in November, Zayas issued a decree appropriating thirtysix thousand dollars for a new park in front of the presidential palace where it was proposed to erect the statue.
Naturally, the whole project met with disapproval, and
even more with ridicule. It had been suggested that the
monument carry the legend "Restorer of the liberties of his
country," alluding to his "nationalism" of 1923. Various
proposals were now made for other legends, on the analogy
of names of battles placed on great generals' tombs, but in
the case of Zayas to read: "Santa Clara Convent deal";
"Malec6n affair"; and "Cardenas Bay contract." One writer,
after remarking that Zayas's desire for the monument was
indicative of senility, went on to say that the statue "cannot
be equestrian, because the only animal Zayas could be por27 See supra, pp. 157-159.




502         A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
trayed as riding would be a goat." 28      When it is remembered that the word "chivo," or "goat," is synonymous with
"graft," the inference is inescapable. According to another
critic:
"The statue ought to be made, not of marble, but of slime... In that
way his memory will be perpetuated, not in imperishable bronze as
befits his frauds, but in the... mud that is so congenial to the chief
of the state." 
Early in the new year the students of the University and
other schools of Havana staged a demonstration against the
erection of the monument, threatening to destroy it if it ever
were put up. Zayas had his monument, nevertheless. As
one writer has put it:
"Another project was completed with eclat, a project which shows
better than anything else the utter shamelessness of the Cuban politician
and the embryonic state of Cuban democracy. In the center of the
public square facing the presidential palace, Zayas erected his statue
in enduring stone. And on its base is a tablet which informs the reader
that this monument was erected by a 'grateful people' to the 'restorer
of the liberties of his country!' ""
In a sense the monument just got "under the gun," for the
statue was not received in Havana until May 16, four days
before the end of Zayas's term, but it was mounted on its
pedestal that same day.
The greatest title to fame that Zayas himself has claimed
lies in his assertion of "nationalism." In his final long message to Congress at the opening of the session in April 1925,
he put special emphasis upon it, saying that this had
amounted to a "cult" with him. As he set it forth, in referring to Cuban relations with the United States:
S Editorial in Heraldo, translated  " Norton, Henry Kittredge, Selfin Havana Post, Nov. 22, 1924.   determination in the West Indies, in
"Gonzalez   Beauville,  Gustavo, World's work, v. LI, pp. 77-84 at 83;
Estatua de cieno, in Heraldo de Nov., 1925.
Cuba, Dec. 1, 1924.




EXIT ZAYAS, 1924-1925


503


"Perhaps my greatest reward on leaving the duties which I discharge
is in having the full consciousness of having brought about a rectification
of an erroneous concept about our capacity for the life of an independent
nation and of our qualities as citizens, and, in consequence, of having
caused a change from a status of an annoying and belittling tutelage to
that of a correct, adequate, and reciprocal conduct where our dignity
does not suffer."
In this same message Zayas alluded to a book that he proposed to publish, to be entitled Four years of government,
and intimated that in this volume
"I shall have to put in clear relief my conduct with respect to the
interference of the American government in Cuba."l
It would perhaps be too cruel a judgment to say that the
man who was willing to risk intervention in 1906, who besought it in 1917, and who publicly expressed approval of
the Crowder mission in 1921 should set up as his principal
achievement what was, after all, little more than the tolerance of Secretary Hughes for a Zayas political maneuver
designed to bring about, not "freedom," but "freedom for
grafters," in Cuba. Zayas, indeed, made some other claims
for himself at different times, most of which, however,such as those about prosperity, the "surplus," and reform,
-must be discounted or rejected altogether. Liberal organs
that opposed Zayas personally have praised him for his conduct of elections, but there they were thinking more of the
victory of their party than of any specially meritorious conduct, although, as already pointed out, he was entitled at
least to some negative praise. He certainly has a right to
consideration on another score. It is said, probably with
truth, that apart from matters involving corruption Zayas
could be counted upon to take a sound, conservative, and
generally correct stand. Business interests were not par' Zayas to Congress, Apr. 6, 1925, 8901, especially at 8849, 8851, and
in Gaceta, Apr. 20, 1925, pp. 8849- 8852.




504


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN RtPUBLIC


ticularly hostile to him. Indeed, along economic lines he
may have rendered something of real service, though at a
tremendous cost. There will be two opinions about his
methods of handling strikes, with which Cuba continued
to be infested during his administration. Zayas pretty generally turned up on the side of the employer, even including
-decidedly so!-the foreign capitalist, not hesitating at
times to exile union leaders or in other ways to use force.
In defence of this procedure it must be admitted that it
is hard to be patient with the extreme radicalism that manifests itself in the councils of Cuban labor. In conclusion,
however, making all due allowance for anything that may
redound to the credit of Zayas, it is difficult to escape the
conviction that he had been by far the worst President of
Cuba and one of the most corrupt rulers any nation in history has ever had.32


2 There is not even a fifth-rate
book covering the Zayas period, and
Zayas's own volume, if it ever is to
appear, has not been available to the
writer. So, aside from a few pamphlets, one is forced to rely on published documents, periodical literature, and the evidences of living
witnesses. There are some rather
better than usual articles in English,
notably those of Conn, Fox, Norton,
and Spinden, but they need the backlog of the support and "atmosphere"
of Cuban materials. For the details
of the story one will go inevitably to
the newspapers. Heraldo de Cuba,
a frank and independent, if also out

spoken, journal has been most employed here, but it is always possible to reach virtually the same
result through the medium of other
Cuban papers. The Havana Post,
with its translations of important
editorials from the Cuban press and
its capable "A Sage" column, is especially helpful. Much of this material could not have been used with
even moderate safety, however, if the
writer had not been able to supplement it by his experience of Cuban
life, including conversations with wellinformed persons, during his two
visits of 1924 in the island of Cuba.




CHAPTER XXI


THE CONSTITUTION AND CONGRESS
THE Constitution of Cuba has many excellences. Some
features have, indeed, proved to be bad in the way they
have worked out, but the evil is not apparent at first reading, and is due rather to the way they have been interpreted
than to anything inherently wrong in them. A Constitution
such as Cuba has might have been equally satisfactory to
the people of the United States as the one they possess,
while the Cubans would have had no better fortune with
the fundamental document of the northern republic than
they have had with their own. The difference in the degree
of success the two Constitutions have had is due wholly to
the difference in the two peoples. The Cubans, handicapped by evil political traditions which put the personal
advantage of office-holders far above any consideration of
public service, have debauched their own Constitution, so
that it appears to be seriously defective in many particulars. No document could have been devised, however, that
would have been able to avoid the evils in Cuban political
life, for it could not possibly rise superior to the level of the
people.
In general, the Constitution resembles that of the United
States, with a number of improvements in the light of American experience and in accord with Cuban conditions. It
is a much longer and far more detailed document, with a
total of 115 "articles," distributed through fourteen "titles."
505
*                    i.  <~~~~~~~~~~~~




506


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


In addition, there is a preamble, some transitory provisions
in unnumbered paragraphs (no longer important), the
Platt Amendment "appendix," and the Permanent Treaty
with the United States in the same terms as the appendix.
The two last-named features belong rather to the field
of relations with the United States than to the subject
under discussion here, and so may be omitted from consideration. The following is a brief summary of the fourteen
titles:
Title I proclaims an independent republic for Cuba and
adjacent islands, and divides the territory into the six already existing provinces.
Title II defines who are Cubans, including the native-born
and naturalized foreigners.
Title III provides that foreigners are entitled to the same
protection and civil rights and subject to the same civil
obligations as Cubans.
Title IV is the Cuban "Bill of Rights." It is more complete than that of the United States. One article announces
freedom of worship and the separation of church and state.
Another makes primary education compulsory and free.
Universal man-suffrage is provided for, and a paragraph is
included "to assure the intervention of minorities in the
preparation of the census of voters and other electoral matters and in their representation in the House of Representatives, the Provincial Councils, and Municipal Boards." In
all, there are thirty-two articles in this title.
Title V vests sovereignty in the Cuban people.
Title VI, in twenty-one articles, deals with the legislative
power. In the main this follows the Constitution of the
United States. Congress is made up of two chambers, the
Senate, and the House of Representatives. There are four
senators from each of the six provinces, elected for eight




THE CONSTITUTION AND CONGRESS


507


years, with the body renewable by half, every four years.
Thirty-five years is the minimum age for senators. They
are elected indirectly, with the selection to some extent influenced by wealth; the choice is made by the members of
the Provincial Councils and twice their number of additional
electors, who are chosen by the voters of the provinces, except that half of them are to be among the largest tax-payers.
The Senate has the exclusive right to try impeachments,
confirm nominations, and approve treaties, like the Senate
of the United States. The minimum age for a representative
is twenty-five years, with one representative for every
twenty-five thousand inhabitants, chosen by direct election
every four years. The House is renewable by half, every
two years. This branch alone has the power to impeach
government officers. Each chamber is judge of elections
to its own body, and neither may expel a member, except
by two-thirds vote. Congress as a whole has much the same
sort of powers as the Congress of the United States, such
as the right to participate in all legislation, which includes
the passing of an annual budget. A presidential veto may
be overcome by a two-thirds vote. Notable in the light of
later events is this provision: "Senators and representatives
shall be arrested or indicted only upon permission of the
body to which they belong... except in case they are
caught in the act in the commission of some crime." Another important paragraph requires that they shall not
"commence their sessions without two-thirds of the total
number of their members being present, or continue them
without an absolute majority of them."
Title VII concerns the executive branch. To be President
one must be at least forty years old, and Cuban-born. The
method of election is by presidential electors, as in the
United States, and the term of office is four years. The




508


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


powers of the President are virtually the same as those of
a President of the United States.
Title VIII provides for a Vice-President.
Title IX makes provision for Cabinet officers,-something
that was not done directly in the Constitution of the United
States. One noteworthy paragraph calls for the appropriate
secretaries to countersign all presidential documents. In
effect, this has meant no more than that a President must
control his Cabinet.
Title X concerns the judiciary. The Supreme Court alone
is specifically provided for.
Title XI has to do with provincial government. Here a
departure is made from the system of the United States, in
that the provinces are distinctly subordinate to the national
government. Instead of leaving it to the provinces to set
up their own government, the Constitution settles it that
there shall be a governor and a single-chamber legislative
body, the Provincial Council. Either the national or the
provincial government may take the initiative in impeachments, but in any event the Senate is the court of trial.
Title XII, concerning municipalities, is a section that has
no counterpart in the United States Constitution, and like
the preceding title emphasizes the centralized character of
the Cuban state. Government by a mayor (alcalde) and
Board of Aldermen (ayuntamiento) is provided for, and in
other respects the superior position of the national authorities is asserted.
Title XIII declares that all lands in Cuban territory not
belonging to a province, a municipality, or private individuals is part of the national estate.
Title XIV sets forth the method of amending the Constitution, making it so difficult that no amendments have
so far been adopted. Two-thirds of the members of each




THE CONSTITUTION AND CONGRESS


509


house must concur in proposing an amendment, after which
a constitutional convention is to be called which may accept
or reject it, but not do anything else.
But "What is the Constitution among friends?" A pessimist might be pardoned for holding that the Cuban Constitution has been used primarily to promote evil rather
than check it. Government everywhere, in the United States
as well as in Cuba, is to a great extent incompetent and
bad. There are degrees of difference, however. As one
Cuban writer recently remarked, after a visit to the United
States, there were grafters in the northern republic, but
there were also good roads and excellent schools; the politicians had to accomplish some good for the community they
served, not merely provide sinecures for themselves and
their friends.1 There is, indeed, some service rendered by
the government in the United States. If, for example, a
road is built, it will be a good road. In Cuba, however, it
will be paid for at a generous rate, but not built, or at best
only half built, so that in a few years it will be worth nothing.
The typical Cuban politician is a grafter, if not a criminal;
in the elections of 1922, as already stated, more than onefifth of the candidates had penal antecedents.2      Not only
do they accept graft; they solicit it. As one man expressed
it (and the present writer has ample evidence to the same
effect):
"Taxpayers are not permitted to be honest if they want to. Inspectors
invariably suggest a false return and a division with them of the saving
thus effected. To refuse is to invite endless interference, petty annoyance, and an excessive levy. The courts afford no adequate protection.
The Supreme Court has recently held that the courts cannot take jurisdiction of a criminal charge against an official unless he has first been
1Impressions, in Diario de la ma-  2Trelles, El progreso (1902 a 1905)
rina, translated in Havana Post, May y el retroceso (1906 a 1922) de la
16, 1924.                      repu'blica de Cuba, 25.




510


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


found guilty in an 'administrative trial' on charges preferred by the
chief of his department!"8
This is not to say that all government employes are bad.
The great majority of them, the rank and file, are not.
Most of them may owe their positions to some sort of influence, but they derive merely a living from them, and not a
very luxurious one, either. The only work that is ever done
in government circles is done by them, and few people are
more frank than they in expressing themselves about the
bad character of Cuban politics. One should distinguish
between these men and the politicians, including among the
latter those employes who are in positions that enable them
to get the money. As for the latter,
"No power has yet been able to curb the appetite of the Cuban politicians for pelf. Because of the 'accursed intermeddling of the Colossus
of the North,' they have been forced to develop a new technique of public
pilfering, but the despotic tradition of Spanish maladministration persists
in all its pristine vigor." 
Few factors of Cuban history illustrate the evils of politics
more clearly than the workings of Congress.
As already noted, the Constitution calls for the intervention of minorities in various legislative bodies of the republic.
To carry this into effect it was at first provided in the case
of representatives that individuals could vote for candidates
for two-thirds of the offices to be filled. It developed, however, that a very small minority might elect one-third of
the representatives under this law,-a minority that might
conceivably be a mere fraction of a third of the total vote.
On the other hand, skilful politicians virtually nullified the
act through a device called "el copo," by putting two tickets


'Norton, Henry    Kittredge, Self- World's work, v. LI, pp. 77-84, at 83;
determination in the West Indies, in Nov., 1925.                'Ibid., 81.




THE CONSTITUTION AND CONGRESS


511


in the field which were really the same.5 So the law was
changed at the time of the United States intervention of
1906 to 1909 in favor of proportional representation. According to the new arrangement, individuals vote for the full
number of representatives to which the province is entitled,
and then each party gets its proportion according to the
total of its vote. A theoretically bad feature of this law
is that it might make it hard for a President to get a working
majority, but in point of fact no Cuban President has encountered any difficulty on this score, because it has always
been possible through corrupt methods, mainly in connection with the lottery, to get as large a vote as may be needed.
The politicians have succeeded in defeating the new law,
however, at least in a measure, through the medium of a
practice called the "refuerzo" (reinforcement), the practical
effect of which is to assure the victory of the more corrupt
candidates in a party list.6
The United States Constitution provides that a majority
of either house of Congress constitutes a quorum, whereas
two-thirds of the membership is required in Cuba. It is
doubtful whether it would be correct to say that the quorum
evil that has developed in Cuba is wholly, or even mainly,
due to the difference in the number who must be present,
for the writer has confidence in the ability of Cuban politicians to get around any constitutional provision ever made,
but in practice a third of the members, plus one (thirty-nine
Representatives in the present House of 115 or nine Senators of the twenty-four in the Senate), can block all legislation, merely by absenting themselves. Members of the
legislative bodies have availed themselves of this power to
such an extent that for weeks at a time there may not be
6For an explanation of "el copo,"  6This is taken up in detail infra,
cf. supra, p. 170, n. 26.    pp. 569-572.




512       A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
a single meeting of either house while Congress is "in session." Nothing was done by the early Cuban government
to compel attendance by absent members, but some action
was taken during the United States intervention. On January 2, 1909, Governor Magoon issued a decree to the following effect:
Henceforth, no member of Congress was to absent himself
without the consent of the house to which he belonged.
No house was to grant leaves of absence to more than a
sixth of its membership.
Any five senators or fifteen representatives could form a
quorum for the sake of issuing process to compel absent
members to attend, with a right to order them arrested and
brought to the meeting of their house.
Members absent without leave were to receive no pay.
In that same month the intervention came to an end, and
the law was a dead letter in the ensuing administration of
President Gomez. Toward the end of the Gomez administration the Magoon decree was repealed. Since that time
there has been no compulsory attendance of members, and
many make a practice of going only when it is to their financial interest to do so. The President is usually able to get
a quorum, however, no matter what the political complexion
of Congress may be, for he may make it "worth their while"
to attend.
The paragraph about immunity from arrest is not strikingly different from the provision in the Constitution of the
United States that congressmen shall be "privileged from
Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the
same." Congress passed a bill on the score of immunity in
1903, covering all the offences in the penal code, and providing that a congressman could be tried for a crime only




THE CONSTITUTION AND CONGRESS


513


after solicitation by the Supreme Court of the house to
which the man belonged, together with the consent of that
body; without such consent there could be no trial. President Estrada. Palma, the only executive of high principles
the Cuban Republic has ever had, vetoed this in a message
of December 31, 1903, that deserves special mention. In
part he wrote as follows:
"The project in this case removes them [the senators and representatives] from the jurisdiction of the regular courts, and creates for them
an exclusive privilege which is not contained either in the letter or in
the spirit of the Constitution. This, on the contrary, does so... only
for the opinions and votes issued in the exercise of their duties. And if it
demands that they may not be indicted for common crimes... without
the prior authorization of the respective legislative body, it does not do
so with the intention of establishing a personal privilege, but in order
to protect the senator or representative against any plot which may be
hatched as the result of their actions in the discharge of their functions...These, consequently, are fully included within the terms of article 11,
which declares that all Cubans are equal under the laws, adding that
the Republic does not recognize prerogatives or personal privileges."
The President also condemned a transient feature releasing
certain congressmen already tried or sentenced by judicial
bodies, saying that it struck at the judiciary, making it subordinate to the legislative branch.      If any of the three
branches of government, legislative, judicial, or executive,
"is worthy of a higher respect," he said, "it would be the
judicial power alone."
Upon receipt of this message the House passed a resolution regretting the "unseemly and improper language used."
The bill became a law over the President's veto. It is not
too much to say that, as a result, Congress has become a
haven of criminals and grafters. Newspapers have taken
advantage of congressional immunity by employing congressmen on their editorial staffs as a buffer against suits for
libel. Indeed, many defamatory articles are published for




514


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


the sole purpose of exacting tribute or graft. A careful examination of Supreme Court requests for the right to try
representatives on charges of crime shows that three such
requests were granted down to 1923, and 709 were denied.
Fifty-four more were pending, many of which have since
been denied, and none (so far as the writer knows) granted.
And not only this, but it is also worthy of note that the
immunity evil grows progressively worse.7      In the case of
the Senate, complete data are not at hand, but in about a
hundred requests, a single one has been granted. It may
be added that precise information on this and other scores
involving corruption is difficult to obtain, because they are
dealt with in secret sessions. Furthermore, it is regarded
as a grave breach of loyalty to the group for one congressman
to reveal anything concerning the misdeeds or crimes of
another, whatever the political affiliation of the offender.
Some newspapers might even go so far as to denounce such
revelations as "treason." One must remember, too, that
congressmen are often permitted to commit crimes without
being arrested, because of the known futility of any effort
to punish them and the danger involved for the person who
would make such an attempt.8 If in rare instances a congressman is delivered over to the courts for trial, or some
other member of the political class, not a congressman, is
charged with a crime, it does not mean that he will suffer
the normal penalty, even if he is declared guilty. A prac'Ortiz, 16. Ortiz says there were car over the speed limits or his
forty-two such cases in the Estrada neighbor's live-stock, or shoot the
Palma era, thirty-five in that of lights out of lampposts, without getG6mez, 279 under Menocal, and 356 ting arrested. In each instance the
( ) during the first two years of remonstrating  policeman gets arZayas.-                         rested."  Marvin, George, Keeping
This is expressed by one writer Cuba libre, in World's work, v.
as follows: "By Cuban law, a Con- XXXIV, pp. 553-567, at 566; Sept.,
gressman is immune from process- 1917.
serving... He can drive his motor




THE CONSTITUTION AND CONGRESS


515


tice has sprung up of introducing amnesty laws covering
ordinary crimes, and one must indeed be lacking in influence
or wealth if he cannot get himself included in an amnesty.
This applies to private citizens and politicians both. Of
course, somebody has to be "paid," if there is not otherwise
some strong practical reason for a grant of this favor. Amnesties are in addition to the wholesale issue of pardons,
but the former are preferred by the average criminal, since
they wipe the slate clean, leaving it as if no crime had been
committed at all.9
A study of congressional legislation in the era of the republic shows very little constructive work and a great deal
that is evil. The overthrow of Spain necessitated a new
political system dissociated from the monarchical and colonial organization of earlier times. Much was done by the
United States military government to provide Cuba with
organic laws. Indeed, something of the sort was an absolute prerequisite to the establishment of the new government at all. There were fifteen such laws enacted by orders
of the military governors.10 The Cuban Constitution called
'For data concerning amnesties, "1The following is a list of the legal
pardons, and the bad state of the law contributions of the military governcourts see chapter XXII.      ment:


1. Postal code
2. School law
3. Customs tariff
4. Creation of correctional courts
5. Due process of law,-against unlawful seizure and disturbance of
property
6. Writ of habeas corpus
7. Organization of rural guards
8. Organization and regulation of police
force
9. Customs ordinances
10. Vaccination law
11. Railroad law
12. Railway tariffs
13. Quarantine laws and regulations
14. Revenue cutter service
15. Immigration law and regulations


Order
(I,,


115 July 21, 1899.
226 Dec. 6, 1899.
198 May 12, 1900.
213  May 25, 1900.
362  Sept. 17, 1900.
427 Oct. 15, 1900.
114 Apr. 5, 1901.


~C
(t
it


"     156
"    173
"     165
C"    34
"     117
"     122
"     154
"     155


June 11, 1901.
June 22, 1901.
June 24, 1901. 
Feb. 7, 1902.
Apr. 28, 1902.
Apr. 29, 1902.
May 14, 1902.
May 15, 1902.




516


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


for at least twenty-eight more. During the Estrada Palma
administration only four were passed, together with a modification of General Wood's rural guards law. The four new
laws were by no means the most urgently needed. They
covered the following subjects:
1. Diplomatic and Consular Service. This has since been
repealed.
2. Provincial government. This did little more than repeat the Constitution, and its futility was amply proved in
the electoral disturbances of the Estrada Palma era.
3. Parliamentary procedure in relations between the
House and Senate.
4. Procedure in cases of unconstitutionality. All of these
were enacted in 1903, except the third, which dates from
July 22, 1902. The main interest of Congress in these
years was the securing of the Speyer loan of thirty-five million dollars (February 27, 1903) and the internal loan of
$11,500,000, both applicable to the bonus for the soldiers of
the Cuban War of Independence.
Possibly the greatest constructive work of the Magoon
administration in the 1906-1909 intervention was the enactment of a political code. Some of the laws passed at that
time have since been revised fundamentally, but the following twelve are still substantially in effect, though several
of them have been amended:
1. Organic law of the executive power.
2. Organic law of the judiciary.
3. Organic law of the provinces.
4. Organic law of the municipalities.
5. Municipal accounting law.
6. Municipal tax law.
7. Civil service law.
8. Electoral law.
9. Military penal law.




THE CONSTITUTION AND CONGRESS


517


10. Law of military procedure.
11. Law of expropriations or condemnations of property.
12. Law for demarcation of estates in common.
At least eleven more organic laws were still needed at the
time of the restoration of Cuban government in 1909. The
following is a list of them:
1. Revision of the civil code and law of civil procedure.
2. Revision of the penal code and law of criminal procedure.
3. Revision of the code of commerce.
4. Revision of the law of public instruction.
5. Revision of the law governing the railway commission.
6. Revision of the law of eminent domain.
7. Revision of the law of public works.
8. Revision of the law of administrative contracts.
9. Forestry law.
10. Law of mines and mining.
11. Patent law.
Yet, virtually nothing has been done since 1909, although
the legal provisions covering these subjects date back for
the most part to the Spanish regime, and far back in that.
For example, under the existing civil and commercial codes
it is difficult to collect debts or to obtain proper security.
The penal code still contains slavery precepts. These matters have been adjusted in Porto Rico and the Philippine
Islands, which were acquired from Spain by the United
States in 1898, but not in Cuba, although an equal length
of time has elapsed. Governor Magoon (January 6, 1908)
appointed some Cuban lawyers to draft a new penal code
and law of criminal procedure, but nothing came of it. A
law for a new committee was enacted on March 11, 1923,
but nothing was done.
During the administration of G6mez, Congress passed
only two important organic acts, the Territorial Bank of
Cuba law of June 20, 1910, and the suspension of payments




518


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


law of June 29, 1911.11 On the other hand, this period
marked the inauguration of notorious graft bills on a large
scale, such as the lottery law of July 8, 1909, the Ports (or
Dredging) Company concession of February 23, 1911, and
the law for the exchange of the Arsenal property for Villanueva of July 23, 1911. The story of legislation in the
Gomez period has been repeated in the administrations of
Menocal and Zayas, except that matters have become progressively worse. Legislation has been personal, not constructive. There is not even a law of public order, to regulate the suspension of constitutional guarantees, as called
for by Article 41 of the Constitution. The only law applicable therefore is that of the Spanish colony! Indeed,
Congress rarely performs its constitutional duty of approving the budget. Nine times in the history of the republic
Congress has not acted at all. Even when it does act, it
takes the budget the President submits. On the other
hand, down to the summer of 1923 there had been sixteen
amnesty bills (with another, the worst of the lot, in 1924),
349 pension acts, and fifty special private donations, usually
to individuals. Between 1915 and 1920 there were six general retirement laws affecting employes on the civil list. The
pensions they were to receive were made inheritable! A
three per cent deduction is indeed made from the salaries of
these employes,-but the amount secured by that means is
far from covering the cost of the plan. On June 30, 1913,
a general retirement law for land and sea forces was enacted,
and on April 11, 1918 (modified June 11, 1922), a pension
law for members of the Army of Liberation and the Civil
Auxiliary Corps, or civilians who aided in the winning of
"1There were indeed some further permanent army, a modification of a
minor laws at this time, including hunting and game law of the Magoon
an amendment to General Wood's era, and a nautical school law.
school law, the organization of a




THE CONSTITUTION AND CONGRESS


519


independence, was put on the statute-books. This last
would seem to be a particularly objectionable raid on the
treasury, as the beneficiaries had already had the proceeds
of the above-mentioned loans of the Estrada Palma era,
besides a three million dollar gift from the United States.
The cost of this bill is over three millions a year, and constantly becoming greater.
This functional inefficiency of Congress is aggravated by
the notoriously well known fact that a considerable proportion of legislation is based upon motives of fraud or graft.
Often there is secrecy about pending legislation when there
can be no possible reason for it except fraud. Indeed, it is
hard to get copies of a bill before it is published in the
Gazette (Gaceta) as a law. When the iniquitous lottery law
of the Zayas government was being considered, a certain
congressman who was opposed to it was able only with difficulty to get a copy. At the time of the Santa Clara Convent deal one newspaper published the following frank
statement:
"We are not going to defend this much discussed question, simply
because we have not been given money to defend it. Everybody knows
here that when lances are broken in favor of or against a transaction of
that class it is because money has been given, or else that the newspapers
and newspapermen have not been considered in the division."
Indeed, it is generally admitted that the attention of Congress is almost exclusively devoted to the consideration of
measures that will redound to the private benefit of the congressmen themselves, whatever the merits of the bill. The
great work of revising the codes and enacting important
constructive laws is hardly taken up at all; when there is
"nothing in it" for congressmen, there are likely to be no
sessions. On the other hand, the lottery law of 1923 received
"Lucha, May 18, 1923.




520


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


a very nearly unanimous vote in both houses, without any
division along party lines. Even if there were not plenty
of evidence of bribery on other scores, the character of this
vote would be indicative of corruption.
A few only out of the many evils of congressional life have
been taken up here,13 but the most disheartening feature is
that the legislative body, together with all other branches
of government activities, has gone from bad to worse. The
failures of Congress to pass the budget, for example, have
all occurred in the past twelve years. In the early days
of the republic there were a number of men of high character taking part in political life. Each new administration
saw fewer of them, until at present there are hardly any
left. This is no irresponsible assertion. It is vouched for by
the most highly respected men in the republic. Carlos
Trelles delivered a noteworthy address on April 14, 1923,
showing how the affairs of the nation had become worse with
each succeeding administration.'4  In a brilliant essay as
long ago as 1914 Mario Guiral Moreno pointed out that
the politicians had abandoned issues that might have made
for a wholesome atmosphere and adopted all the evils of
personalism, with its "ignoble intrigues and bastard
ambitions," easy shifts from one party to another and
inter-party transactions,-in fine, a system  of "I-ism"
(yoismo). Budgets were being voted in those days, but
Guiral Moreno showed how they meant nothing at all, for
expenditures were always far greater than budgets, owing
to the passing of special laws, often for purely electoral purposes, chargeable generally "against funds not devoted to
other objects." He also asserted that the politicians were
SMany specific instances of cor-  "Trelles, Op. cit.
ruption are treated elsewhere.




THE CONSTITUTION AND CONGRESS


521


responsible for stirring up the race war of 1912 and other
evils.
"To prove the sincerity of their preachings some of those 'politicians'
have taken off their shoes and stockings on the very platform to convince
their hearers that they do not disdain to imitate those who from necessity
or habit go barefooted; they have put up with the practices of the negro
secret societies (iiaiguismo),' permitting the production in the streets
of this capital of spectacles appropriate to African regions, to the lessening of our good name and culture."'
The social evil alluded to by Guiral Moreno can hardly be
considered serious now, but corrupt political practices have
become more general, if not worse. Enrique Jose Varona has
frequently lamented the growing degradation of political
life. In 1921, for example, he pointed out that many of the
dangers besetting the country were due to personalism in
politics, instead of principle. In the War of Independence,
he said, men fought for liberty, and not for Maximo Gomez
or Antonio Maceo. Now, things were different, become a
chaos of personalities amounting to republican feudalism.
Politicians spoke the word "country," but had it only on
their lips.17  To quote another distinguished student of
Cuban affairs, "Instead of carrying to public power a proportional representation of wealth, we are carrying wealth
to the hands of the representatives of the public power." 18
Yet more to the point was an open letter of Gonzalo


Freyre de Andrade, April 1,
'5The practices of the nanigos, or
negro secret societies, are said to be
notoriously lewd and superstitious.
1"Guiral Moreno, Nuestros problemas politicos, economicos y sociales,
in Cuba contempordnea, v. V, pp.
401-424, at 422; Aug., 1914. The
author gives a table (at 416-417)
covering the years 1899 to 1915,
showing the estimate of receipts and
budget amounts for each year, together with the actual (and in every
case greater) receipts and expendi

1923, withdrawing from the
tures of those years. The figures are
complete only for the years 1902 -1913.
1 Varona, Enrique Jose, Discurso
leido... la noche del 22 de diciembre de 1921, in Academia nacional
de artes y letras, v. VI, pp. 239-246,
at 242; 1921.
8 Carri6n, Miguel de, El desenvolvimiento social de Cuba en los
ultimos veinte aios, in Cuba contempordnea, v. XXVII, pp. 6-27, at
20; Sept., 1921.




522


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


Conservative party. Freyre is quite generally recognized by
respectable elements in Cuban society as an honorable man.
He had just served eight years as a representative in Congress, during which time, according to Heraldo de Cuba,
his work had always been "high-minded, noble, well-intentioned, and of a sincere and pure patriotism." In this letter,
directed to the president of the party in his district, he remarked that his term was ending that day, and requested
that his name be erased from the Conservative rolls. He
had been obliged constantly to break with his party in Congress, because the new men had shown themselves too eager
to undertake abominable crusades against liberty and the
public treasury. He then made a detailed series of charges
concerning the misconduct of the Conservatives during the
ten years they had been in power, and asked where were
the doctrines, example, and virtues of the founders of the
party, of men like Gonzalez Lanuza and Varona, answering
his own question by the assertion that nothing but the name
Conservative remained. He himself had no plans for entering a new party, but would follow any that would put up
for the presidency "a virtuous and energetic Cuban, capable
of restoring to Cuba its lost credit and of reconquering its
eclipsed independence." 19
Next day, on April 2, 1923, a manifiesto, or public statement, was given out by an organization called the Junta
Cubana de Renovaci6n Nacional-Civica (Cuban Committee
for National and Civic Renovation). This is important, not
merely for what it says, but especially because of the high
character of the hundreds of men who signed it. According
to Heraldo de Cuba, they were "Cubans of the greatest
distinction, many of them eminent figures in science and
19Freyre de Andrade, Gonzalo, Conservador, in Heraldo de Cuba,
Carta... separdndose del partido Apr. 2, 1923.




THE CONSTITUTION AND CONGRESS


523


the realm of intellectuality, and almost all men who live
outside of political parties, without connections or bonds
that tie them to their assemblies." The document was prepared by Fernando Ortiz, a distinguished lawyer, sociologist,
and historian, the president of the Junta.20  Ortiz, long a
member of Congress, had voluntarily withdrawn from that
body, because he could not countenance its corrupt practices. Among the signers was Mario Macbeath, president
of the Rotary Club of Havana, possibly the most respected
organization in Cuba. Presidents or officials of scores of
other non-political organizations also affixed their names.
In fine, the manifiesto was in no sense of the word a political
document, for the signers represented loose affiliations with
different parties, or, more properly, were men who were desirous of the regeneration of Cuba, without any thought of
personal advantage to themselves.
The document itself was a denunciation of all branches
of the Cuban government, making many specific charges.
While no one branch of government was singled out for attack, the executive was perhaps considered the most culpable,
but the corruption and inefficiency of Congress inevitably
found a place in the manifiesto. After reciting numerous
evils in Cuban political life, the manifiesto charged Congress with being asleep, calling attention to its delinquency
in failing to provide the complementary laws called for by
the Constitution and its negligence with respect to the
budget, while it displayed "an unbridled legislative activity
in the grant of fabulous credits." Many important reforms
were named that the President had recently requested of
Congress, but that body had either done nothing, or else
passed a bill that made the situation worse than before,0 For something further about Ortiz, cf. supra, p. 388, and infra, p. 636.




524


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


and the President had not made use of the veto! 21 On the
other hand, during the history of the republic Congress had
passed over four hundred laws for pensions or gifts, and
over two hundred and fifty public works laws, enough for
roads, schools, and fine buildings all over Cuba if the funds
had been honestly applied. Furthermore, it had enacted
sixteen amnesty bills, which might have brought about a few
just releases, but the majority of those who received the
favor of these laws were the worst sort of criminals, who
for political reasons (to assist congressmen in retaining their
posts) were allowed to escape the penalties they had incurred.22  The manifiesto then went on to refer to the protection afforded by Congress to members of its own body
committing crimes, through the interpretation given to congressional immunity. As a result, there was no law which
congressmen and their friends need obey. For them the
Constitution was a mere formality, to be scorned if it molested them.23
It is hardly necessary to go on reciting evidence concerning the failure of Congress to fulfil its constitutional duties.
Any number of other documents might be adduced. Charges
such as those referred to above have been made by the most
responsible associations in Cuba, such, for example, as the
Congress of Economic Corporations, the Association          for
Good Government, the National Assembly of Veterans, and
the Rotary Club of Havana.       In a six months period from
"The seeming inconsistency  of altogether from his promises of rePresident Zayas is explained by the form. In this he was to prove sucfact that his requests for legislation cessful.
were made in response to pressure   The figures of the manifiesto, it
from the United States, without any will be noted, differ slightly from
sincere desire on his part for political those of the writer, though substanreform; indeed, as is pointed out else- tially the same.
where, his requests were mainly for  Junta cubana de renovaci6n nathe sake of appearances, with the cional-civica, Manifiesto del 2 de
idea of temporizing until a changed abril de 1923, in Heraldo de Cuba,
situation might allow him to escape Apr. 4, 1923.




THE CONSTITUTION AND CONGRESS


525


November 1921 to April 1922 there were eighty-four complaints in the press of Havana concerning political graft
and corruption, many of them involving congressmen. And
that was a comparatively "pure" era, owing to the influence
of Crowder and the financial stringency of those times. The
last two years of the Zayas administration would easily have
yielded eighty-four charges a month.
What is the meaning of all this? In a word, that the evils
of the colonial era live on. For a little while the ideals
engendered by the struggle for independence held the politicians in check, but the Latin memory is short, and soon
afterward the old materialism and personalism of Spanish
days reasserted themselves. By the close of the Zayas administration they had probably outdistanced their colonial
prototype. A number of important reforms might be suggested for the correction of existing evils, but it would probably be a waste of ink to set them down. Even if adopted,
they would not change things one iota, for the trouble is
not in the laws or the Constitution but in the men who are
at the helm in political affairs. Instead of disinterested
statesmen, the republic has developed a governmental class
which is an incubus upon the life of the island. It is to be
hoped that this reign of political parasitism marks only a
transitional stage,-the storm before the calm,-but it cannot be allowed to grow much worse, or the Cuban Republic
will be past saving.24
24A copy of the Cuban Constitution phlets, and passages in books which
in both Spanish and English appears are primarily devoted to other subin International bureau of the Ameri, jects. The articles of Carri6n, Guiral
can republics, American constitutions, Moreno, Ortiz, Trelles, and Varona,
II, 109-154. There is also an English cited here, are among the more notetranslation in Johnson, IV, 204-240. worthy items, as also are the maniAs for the character of Congress it fiestos of various Cuban societies that
would easily be possible to accumu- have concerned themselves with polilate a great volume of items, what tical practices in the era of the rewith government documents, articles public.
in periodicals and newspapers, pam



CHAPTER XXII


THE FUTILITY OF THE LAW IN CUBA
CUBA has a Congress that has never passed the constructive legislation called for by the Constitution of 1902, while
at the same time displaying a ready alacrity in enacting bills
which are beneficial to politicians alone. The executive
has cooperated with Congress in promoting major grafting
bills and in maintaining the government lottery, and it has
struck out on its own account to engage in transactions for
the enrichment of the President and other members of the
administration. And the judiciary has joined with the legislative and executive branches to make the law a mockery
in Cuba, all for the sake of the political class, at the expense
of the republic. Amnesties, pardons, and the corruption of
the courts are among the means employed in bringing about
this condition of affairs.
As amnesties have to be passed into law through the normal processes of legislative enactment, involving publication
of the record, it is possible to obtain a wealth of incontrovertible material on this subject. Nevertheless, it is usually
necessary to go behind the language of the laws or even of
debates, because it is so often the custom to use broad general terms to fit what is really an individual case. From 1899 
to 1924 twenty-nine amnesties were enacted in Cuba. The
record is not so bad as it might appear, for prior to 1909
there were eighteen amnesties which were a natural aftermath of the disturbed times following the establishment of
independence. There were nine orders for an amnesty dur526




THE FUTILITY OF THE LAW IN CUBA


527


ing the military intervention by the United States, and three
more (one by Taft and two by Magoon) at the outset of
the intervention following the revolution of 1906. Only one
of these has ever been criticized to any great extent. On
October 10, 1906, Mr. Taft proclaimed an amnesty for those
who had taken part in the insurrection, on account of their
political acts, but not for ordinary non-political crimes.
The trouble was, that he exempted those who had seized
property for military purposes. This is the famous "horsethief paragraph" of the Taft proclamation, as a result of
which the insurrectionist soldiers were virtually authorized
to keep the horses they had picked up in course of the campaign. Mr. Taft also recommended to the solicitude of the
provincial governors those who had committed ordinary
crimes before the dissolution of the insurrectionist forces.
Governor Magoon's order of April 23, 1907, extended the
terms of the Taft proclamation to the government troops
for the period of the revolution of 1906.
Very little objection has been made, either, to the six
amnesties during the rule of Estrada Palma. The first of
these was introduced on May 21, 1902, the day after the
surrender of the island to Cuban authorities by the United
States military government. The bill called for an amnesty
for crimes committed by American citizens during the period
of the intervention. An amendment provided for the liberation of soldiers of the Cuban army on account of any penalty
they might then be undergoing. Some objection was made
to this, because a number of them were men who had committed fresh crimes after having been pardoned by General
Wood, who had not granted any such favor to American
criminals. No doubt, too, it was the wish of the promoters
of this bill not to associate a Cuban matter with what was
intended to be a symbol of gratitude to the United States.




528       A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
As the bill went through, June 9, 1902, it did not include
the amendment. The other five amnesties of the Estrada
Palma period were as follows:
October 3, 1902, for all municipal employes on account of
crimes committed in their official capacity prior to May 20,
1902 (the birth-date of the republic), and for all who had
committed crimes in connection with the previous election.
November 10, 1902, for all public crimes of the press, but
to include crimes against individuals only if the person damaged should consent. An amendment proposed to include
non-political crimes of the press, but this was dropped.
June 10, 1903, for crimes growing out of the strike of
Havana laborers in November 1902. On the night of November 23-24, as already mentioned,' the laborers had attacked the police. A sanguinary battle followed, in which
twenty laborers were killed and over a hundred wounded.
In the discussion of the bill the question was again raised
whether any but political crimes could be fit subjects of an
amnesty and therefore whether there should be an amnesty
for a strike. While this issue was not definitely settled, the
enactment of the bill as a law must be considered a step
toward the ultimate pernicious principle that there is no
limit to the scope of an amnesty in Cuba.
January 30, 1906, for crimes of all public functionaries except municipal officials (included in the law of October 3,
1902) to May 20, 1902, and for all officials, municipal or
otherwise, to December 31, 1905. This bill grew out of the
disturbances in connection with the elections of 1905.
May 19, 1906, for crimes of rebellion, conspiracy, disobedience, and attacks on constituted authorities, between
September 23 and December 1, 1905. This was a supplement to the preceding, covering group acts, while the other
1 Cf. supra, pp. 178-179.




THE FUTILITY OF THE LAW IN CUBA


529


concerned misdeeds of individuals. Leaders of the Moderate
party held that the amnesty principle should be confined
to group acts, but they were overruled.
The black period in the history of Cuban amnesties begins
with the administration of President Gomez. Four laws
were enacted at that time, as follows:
March 6, 1909, a sweeping, jail-delivery law for crimes to
January 28, 1909, when the United States intervention came
to an end. The bill was requested by President G6mez himself in a message of February 1st, in which he expressed a
desire that it should be "the most extensive of all the amnesties granted up to now." G6mez went on to say that this
would be the only such act he would suggest, and "indeed,
I propose to close forever the series of pardons." The law
was introduced by Orestes Ferrara, one of the most brilliant
and respected of Cuban politicians in the post-intervention
period of the republic's history. The Liberal Party got behind the bill, holding that it should be the biggest ever, as
an act of patriotism, to register the joy of Cubans in getting
back the republic. The Conservatives endeavored to narrow
the bill. As Gonzalez Lanuza remarked, in order to celebrate
the birth of a child one need not loose his "tigers." The
Liberals had the whip-hand, however, and there was a succession of "patriotism" and "happiness of homes" speeches,
to the accompaniment of amendments amplifying the terms
of the bill. The old objection that an amnesty should be
considered as covering only political crimes was "snowed
under" in the bill as it became a law, except as this might
be considered a special act of grace. About the only thing
that can be said in favor of this bill is that amnestied criminals were not released from civil responsibility for their
crimes. Not to go into detail, it may be said that nearly all
crimes, public or private, that could be remembered at the




530


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


time were included, except those involving the death penalty
and crimes of moral turpitude, such as rape or "youthful
corruption." Even second-offence criminals were not excluded, and the President was empowered to reduce the
penalty of those under sentence of death to the next lower
penalty and the sentences of the few others not included
in the terms of the bill by one-fourth. Thus was this somewhat strange means of exemplifying Cuban "patriotism"
consummated.
February 22, 1910, for crimes of the press to February
15, 1910. Press crimes had been included in the law of 1909,
but this was a more ample bill, besides extending the period
of time.
June 7, 1910, a law amplifying the law of 1909, for crimes
committed before January 28, 1909. The growing group
consciousness of the political class was manifested by a
provision amnestying public officials for "any crime." Such
crimes as attack on constituted authority, firing a gun or
pistol (disparo de arma de fuego), public disorder, and infraction of the railway law were also added. The reason
for this law was that the Supreme Court had interpreted
the earlier law in a way to restrict it as much as possible.
The "patriots" in Congress would have none of that.
June 29, 1911, for crimes in connection with the election
of November 1, 1910. This bill was opposed by the Conservatives and some Liberals, among whom was Ferrara
(who had voted for earlier bills), on the ground that there
had been too many amnesty laws already.
The Conservatives had made a commendable record in
opposing amnesty laws during the G6mez administration,
but were to add some chapters to amnesty history themselves, once they got into power under Menocal and Zayas.
It is to be noted, too, that many of the laws of this period




THE FUTILITY OF THE LAW IN CUBA


531


were couched in terms none too easy to understand, with
frequent references to paragraphs of a code, rather than a
specific mention of a crime. At the outset of this period,
however, there were several amnesty bills that failed. The
most celebrated of these was a bill of 1913, which is nevertheless worthy of mention because most of its paragraphs
were eventually enacted into law. Among a number of
categories provided for were laborers in strikes, the rebels
in the race war of 1912, and (most in the limelight of all)
the murderers of General Riva, chief of police of Havana.
As already set forth, three prominent politicians had been
responsible for the death of Riva, under circumstances that
left them small title to considerations of clemency.2 It was
generally agreed that Congressman Arias had begun the
shooting, but it was on account of a quarrel of his political
chief, General Asbert, who also took part in the affray. The
bill referred obscurely to the Asbert and Arias affair, aiming
to include the former in a paragraph about "crimes of governors of provinces" and the latter in one about "shooting off
a firearm at a definitely determined person." Ferrara was
one of those who opposed the bill, and was the only one who
alluded to Asbert in the debate, and then without mentioning him by name. "I do not believe that such ample
measures should be dictated for one man alone," he said,
"however respectable he may be." As for the labor paragraph, concerning which a number of members availed
themselves of the opportunity to make "noble" speeches,
he called it a bit of "populacheria," or playing to the gallery, to get votes. The bill was passed, but need not be
considered, because it was vetoed by Menocal, primarily, it
is believed, because of the objections of Secretary of State
Bryan on behalf of the United States. The ostensible reason
2This incident is described in detail supra at pp. 339-345.




532


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


given by the President for vetoing the bill was that amnesties should concern political crimes only.
The Asbert bill was presently enacted into law on February 2, 1915. The phraseology was most obscure, but it
was understood that this was meant for Asbert alone, without any other of the usual features of amnesty bills. Even
Arias was excluded, for those who had declared themselves
authors of the crimes mentioned in the bill were not to receive the benefit of the law, and Arias had confessed, while
Asbert had not. Ferrara voted for the bill, though declaring
himself opposed to the general idea of amnesties.
"We have seen liberty given to the worst types of delinquents," he said,
"without any other merit or reason than the support of some politicianfriend or the blind clemency of our first citizen."
Ferrara went on to say it would therefore be unjust to oppose this amnesty, "which refers in a specific manner to
General Asbert," who committed a crime, but at the bottom
of his heart is "an honorable man." The fact that Asbert
had already been in prison more than a year also had some
weight with him. Menocal vetoed this bill, too. Amnesties
in other lands, he said, had been given only for political,
electoral, or press crimes, and almost never for common
crimes, which were subject for pardon, and not amnesty.
Amnesties for a single person were even less fitting, even
though that person might not be named in the bill, as at
present. Furthermore, Asbert had been condemned by the
Supreme Court, and it was not wise to overthrow the decisions of that august tribunal. This excellent statement was
nothing more than a gesture, however. Menocal had previously informed his henchmen that they were free to vote
against his veto. By a vote of four to sixty-four the veto
was not sustained by the House, and similar action followed
in the Senate. This time, too, the United States govern



THE FUTILITY OF THE LAW IN CUBA


533


ment raised no objection, taking the view that Arias was
the more culpable. Quite aside from the question whether
the United States government should have concerned itself
in the first place, it is difficult in the light of the facts in the
Riva murder to consider this change of front as anything
but a moral quibble.
The paragraphs of the 1913 bill referring to crimes of the
insurrectionists in the race war of 1912 were presently embodied in a separate amnesty by a law of March 10, 1915.
In vetoing the earlier bill President Menocal had stated that
this matter was a fit subject for an amnesty if it should
appear in a bill by itself. In like manner a bill for election
crimes and misdemeanors to April 30, 1915, for the preceding election, met with no objection, and became a law
on July 7, 1915. While the revolution of 1917 was in progress a law of February 27 promised an amnesty to insurrectionists who should surrender within ten days. Little if any
fault could be found with these three laws. A bill of 1918,
covering the 1916-1917 elections and the revolution of 1917,
developed into a political battle between the Conservatives
(then in power) and the Liberals, who had felt that they
had been robbed of victory in the elections and had therefore taken up arms against the government. The Liberals
insisted that government officials and military officers involved in the insurrection should be restored to their jobs
and freed from civil responsibility for their acts. But as
the bill became law, on March 18, 1918, it excluded army
officers, though suggesting that the President might pardon
them, without however restoring them to their military
posts. It was also provided that politicians would not get
back their positions through the amnesty, though they were
permitted to have recourse to legal proceedings in the matter. This was supplemented by a law of August 22, 1919,




534


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


for election crimes since November 1, 1916. A paragraph
amnestying crimes in connection with the formation or renewal of political parties, to May 1, 1919, had a bearing on
the political deal that was presently to result in Menocal's
backing Zayas, his earlier opponent on the Liberal ticket,
as the Conservative candidate for the presidency.
Up to the summer of 1924 but one amnesty bill had been
passed during the administration of President Zayas,-the
law of June 5, 1924,-but this was a measure that for utter
indefensibility surpassed all its predecessors combined. The
G6mez law of 1909 was possibly more sweeping, but had the
shadow of an excuse, and was not so clearly on behalf of
"distinguished" criminals as the Zayas bill. These, of course,
were provided for in general paragraphs intended to cover
their specific case. No better comment on this bill can be
made than that given in the editorial columns of the Havana
Post by "A. Sage." His remarks follow:
"Contrary to the opinion generally held, the amnesty law will not open
the prison doors to all delinquents. The ordinary garden variety of
crooks will get very little from it, as it was specially drafted to give
relief to 'members of the best families,' and only the influential authors
of misdemeanors and crimes will be washed clean of criminal 'antecedents.' Those Cubans of less distinguished families will remain in
durance vile.
"Heading the list of those favored by the amnesty is Representative
Joseph R. Cano, who shot and killed one of his fellow Representatives,
Rafael Martinez Alonso, about two years ago, in the Hotel Luz. Cano
fled from Cuba after the House had granted the judiciary permission
to bring proceedings against him for his crime. He long has been
anxious to return to Cuba and resume his seat in the lower house and
to carry on his candidacy for Governor of Havana province, to which
he aspired at the time Alonso was murdered.
"Ex-Mayor Marcelino Diaz de Villegas, with the president of the city
council, the councilmen, and other high officials of the last Havana city
administration also are among those included in the whitewashing applied
by the amnesty law. The accusations brought against them for mal



THE FUTILITY OF THE LAW IN CUBA


535


version of public funds and a long list of other crimes now will be
dropped.
"Ex-Governor Vigo of Matanzas province, and ex-Governor Lora of
Oriente province, along with Provincial Treasurer Socias of the latter
province, who were facing trials for dissipation of public funds, have
nothing further to fear and no longer can it be officially written that
they have 'criminal antecedents.'
"The ex-mayor, with several aldermen and municipal employes of
Perico, who attempted to blackmail Manager Caldwell of Central
Tinguaro, will enjoy the full benefits of the amnesty law.
"The assassins of Florencio Guerra, mayor of Cienfuegos, also are
saved from punishment by the amnesty law.
"Lorenzo Vizquiera, who shot Policeman Juan Viola, and Angel Lopez
Urquizo, who killed a policeman in Vibora, also are set free by virtue
of the law, as well as Ramon Navarro, who killed his landlord,
Dr. Gonzalez Nokey, in the courtroom.
"Juan Cobos, who murdered his wife on the Prado, in front of the
offices of Representative Herrera Sotolongo, the champion in the lower
house of the law, will regain his liberty.
"Last, but not least, the son of President Zayas, Alfredo Zayas Jr.,
now director of the lottery, who was implicated with Norberto Alfonso,
the director of the lottery at the time, in malversion of funds and in
other frauds, has his slate wiped clean. Alfonso, who was an humble
druggist in Jesus del Monte at the time he was named lottery director,
soon developed a genius for trading in valuable real estate and made the
fullest use of rights he assumed by virtue of his office over automobiles
and other Government properties, naturally, together with other lottery
officials, profits greatly by the signing of the amnesty law by the
President.
"The amnesty could not have been more pious and far-reaching for
influential delinquents. It even absolves the unknown authors of the
robbery of the $100,000 in Liberty bonds which had been deposited in
the national treasury by an American insurance company as a bond
for its operations in Cuba; and also all the customs administrators, fiscalzone employes, and municipal, provincial, and Government treasurers
who have misapplied or stolen public funds.
"It will be consoling to the depositors and creditors of the defunct
banks to know that the liquidating commissions and their employes have
not been overlooked in this masterpiece of legislation, and that they are
fully exonerated for anything they may have done since the bank crash
of 1920 in the handling of the properties and funds of these institutions."'
'Havana Post, June 6, 1924.




536


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


The Martinez Alonso murder had developed from the
ambition of Representative Jose Ramon Cano to become
governor of the province of Havana. It seems that Cano,
a wealthy mulatto, had paid Martinez Alonso a sum of
money to assist him in his campaign against Alberto Barreras, a man of good reputation. It is said that Martinez
Alonso took the money, but helped Barreras, who won the
election. Later, when Cano sat across the table from Martinez Alonso at the Hotel Luz, he drew a revolver and shot his
vis-a-vis under the table. According to common report, a
Cabinet officer concealed Cano in his house, whence he made
his way to the United States, returning just before the
amnesty bill was passed. Following the enactment of the
bill he ran for reelection to the House, and was successful!
He was accused of buying votes and bribing electoral officials,
wherefore his certificate of reelection was denied by the
Supreme Court in February 1925. On May 14, 1925, some
"unknown persons" murdered Cano as he was leaving the
jai-alai court of Havana.
There were thirty or forty officials of the city of Havana
freed by the amnesty who had been under indictment since
1921. In the meantime they had adopted an ingenious device to postpone paying the penalty of their crimes. The
Cuban law allows three continuances of a trial, without
assignment of reasons, for such duration as the judges may
decide. The men were indicted together. They then began
to ask continuances in turn, and the judge in the case sustained them! As a result they had not yet been brought
to trial. The case of the President's son was in some respects even worse. He was Assistant Director General of
the Lottery at the time he was indicted, but in the meantime his august father had promoted him to be Director




THE FUTILITY OF THE LAW IN CUBA        537
General! No doubt he had displayed the type of ability
that was most desired.
The following were some of the categories of crimes
affected by the law of 1924: crimes punishable by sentences
of not more than six years or by fine; crimes against persons
in certain stipulated cases; crimes committed by those who
got three votes on a conviction by the Supreme Court;
crimes having to do with the press, perjury, and duelling;
administrative and judicial infractions of the law; crimes
of public functionaries in connection with their duties and
of others who were condemned with them; crimes of those
who were members of an elective body; crimes in connection
with strikes; and political crimes prior to January 1, 1915.
In all other instances the law covered crimes to April 1, 1924.
Those who were guilty of robbery, forgery, counterfeiting,
and banking crimes were specially excepted from the amnesty, and it was also stipulated that receipt of the privileges of this law did not include a restoration to the office
held at the time of the crime.
On ensuing days the newspapers had stories concerning
those who had availed themselves of the amnesty. On June
6, for example, one paper named forty-two persons, describing their crimes. One was the private secretary of the chief
engineer of Havana; there were a number who had been
guilty of infringement of the postal code, attempted theft,
wounding, shooting, and acts against constituted authority;
one was the man who had killed his wife; another had
wounded his concubine; some laborers had thrown dynamite
in the Havana-Madrid Inn; and Representative Cano was
an early arrival.4 Next day there were various others. One
was the former treasurer of the province of Oriente who had
been guilty of embezzlement, in company with Ex-Gover'Mundo, June 7, 1924.




538


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


nor Lora and others; a number had committed rape; and
one had    been   charged   with  "homicide    through   imprudence." 5 The despicable character of some of these crimes
may lead one to wonder at the oft-recurring desire of Congress for an amnesty. According to Enrique Jose Varona it
is "sometimes in order to serve the interests of brokers in this
traffic; at others, to repay what are improperly called political 'services'; and at still others from a badly directed
sense of commiseration." 6 The "political services" of these
criminals are usually rendered in connection with elections,
more particularly in elections about to take place than as
a reward for past favors. Some mention of this is made elsewhere.7    Family influence has been suggested as another
factor behind these bills.8
The grafting phase of the jail-delivery evil, alluded to by
Varona, comes up more frequently in the case of executive
pardons.    "There is not a meeting of the secretaries of
state," says Varona, "but that on the following day there
is published the interminable list of pardons."          If that
were true in 1915, when Varona made his pronouncement, it
is even more notably the case in recent years. It has been
openly and publicly asserted, for example, that there was a
regular traffic in pardons at more or less definitely established rates during the Zayas administration.10 Certainly,
an abnormally great number of pardons was granted.          The
'Mundo, June 8, 1924.          abril de 1923, in Heraldo de Cuba,
'Varona, Enrique Jose, Recepcion Apr. 4, 1923. The importance of
en la Academia nacional de artes y "family influence" in Cuban politics
letras:  discurso leido el dia 11 de is mentioned supra, pp. 319-320, and
enero de 1916, in Varona, Por Cuba: infra, pp. 565-566.
discursos, 315-342, at 328.        'Varona, Op. cit., at 328.
7E. g., supra, pp. 403-404, and infra,  "o While it would be difficult to cite
p. 573.                          a concrete case, the newspapers have
Junta cubana de renovaci6n na- repeatedly made assertions to this
cional-civica, Manifiesto del ~ de effect.




THE FUTILITY OF THE LAW IN CUBA


539


following table gives some idea of the growth of this
evil: 11
Months in   Pardons   Murderers   Average
President.      office.   per month.  pardoned.  per month.
Estrada Palma       54          6          6.11
Gomez               52         29         15.56
Menocal             96         30         50.52
Zayas               25         33         55        2.20
From this it will appear that in his first twenty-five months
of rule (beyond which point the writer does not have the
figures) Zayas was issuing five and a half times as many
pardons as Estrada Palma had given, including twenty times
as many for murderers. Indeed, in the race between murderers to kill and the President to show them clemency the
latter was winning out, as more murderers were pardoned by
him in those months than were convicted. The affinity between pardons and elections is borne out by the records.
Thus, Menocal issued 231 pardons in October 1916, and in
September 1920 gave seventy-five, of which nineteen were
for murderers. In October 1922 Zayas pardoned sixty-three
persons, or about double his usual monthly quota.12
The amnesty and pardon evils are accentuated by the bad
state of the judiciary. There are less than twenty-seven
convictions in every hundred trials for murder, and only
fourteen convictions in every hundred crimes of all sorts. In
consequence there is a growing public consciousness of impunity and therefore a startling advance in the commission
of crimes. The population of Cuba increases about three
and five-tenths per cent each year, but cases of manslaughter
are increasing at the rate of twenty per cent and killings
of all kinds fifteen per cent. From July 1, 1922, to June
"For the record (none too good)  "The data on pardons given here
of the intervening Magoon era, see are from Ortiz, 15-16.
supra, pp. 254-255.




540


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


30, 1923, there were 833 murders, or an average of 269 to
the million. The United States is notoriously bad in the
number of murders, but the record of the northern republic
is only eighty-five to the million, or less than a third of the
average for Cuba. In a presidential election year the Cuban
average is likely to jump; for example, it was 339 to the
million in 1920-1921. Other crimes are also advancing more
rapidly than the rate of population, notably robbery, which
is increasing ten per cent a year. In other words, not only
is crime increasing, but also, as Ortiz expresses it,
"Our delinquency is losing its culture, is retrograding, becoming more
violent and primitive instead of more astute and progressive as in other
countries of the world of normal cultivation."
In like manner other social evils have been advancing in
intensity and in amount. This is true of gambling in its
many and varied forms, also prostitution, corruption of
minors, rape, abduction, and suicide.13
Not only are the courts ineffective in handling criminal
cases, but they are also corrupt or inefficient in the performance of all their duties. Although the Supreme Court at
times comes in for denunciations,14 it is usually given a
good reputation for rectitude and ability, but is the only
court in the island that is relatively free from scandal. In
any event the Supreme Court is helpless, as most of the
iniquities can be perpetrated by a resort to courts lower
down. Judges are political appointees, and resemble in bad
character the men from whom they receive their posts. Many
of them do little more than draw their pay, absenting themselves from their duties or going on "vacation," while secretaries are left to do the work. The President has the power
18The data given here on crime  "For example, in Junta cubana de
and public morals are from Ortiz, 17- renovaci6n nacional-civica, Op. cit.
23.




THE FUTILITY OF THE LAW IN CUBA


541


to remove judges, but, for reasons best known to himself,
rarely avails himself of the opportunity. It is said that
reputable lawyers will take a case to court only as a last
resort, and then they prefer to lose in the lower court, in
order to escape graft, hoping they may win on an appeal
to the Supreme Court.15 The following are brief statements
about the courts, chosen at random from a number in the
writer's possession:
(1) "The courts are notoriously corrupt. Money will decide almost
any case. Foreigners usually prefer either to write off unfulfilled contracts or else make an adjustment out of court. Their main remedies
are a greater preliminary watchfulness and increased prices to cover the
extra hazard of the business."
(2) "I was born in Spain, but became an American citizen. A few
years ago I returned to my former allegiance to Spain. Why? Because
I was living in Cuba, where my American citizenship never did me any
good. The Cuban government owed me thirty-five thousand dollars,
and I wanted the State Department to give a hint to the Cuban
government to pay. But the policy of the United States is not to make
a fuss, if possible to avoid it. I was told to go to the Cuban courts for
my remedy. And this in Cuba! So I am once again a Spaniard."
Usually men in business will deny that they have ever paid
graft, but admit that the practice is general on the part of
nearly everybody else. Now and then a man will tell you
frankly that he has given his bit to political job-holders,
though insisting, and very likely with truth, that he was
obliged to do so. One such instance is involved in the following statement:
"Graft is constantly being thrust at you. I don't like it, but I have
paid it, and taken my profit, rather than suffer the annoyance that
would surely follow if I refused. On one occasion I had a case in the
courts. An underling of the judge came to see me, and said he could
"1Conn, Edward L, The (California) Gazette, Nov. 23, 1923.
crisis in Cuba: V, Courts of infre- Scores of Cuban references could be
quent justice, in (Philadelphia Pub- added to substantiate Conn's relic ledger, reprinted in) Berkeley marks.




542


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


get a decision for me if I would give him fifty dollars; otherwise, it
looked as if I would lose. I told him I would make him a present of
fifty dollars, if I won. He was satisfied,-and I won! There was another
case involving several hundred dollars' worth of valuables. I won, but
the judge has kept the valuables. He is probably waiting for fifty dollars,
and I'll have to pay it. If you decline to enter a graft deal with them,
they do not attribute it to honesty. They think you are afraid you may
get caught, and are at great pains to explain how safe it is."
A number of specific instances of judicial corruption are
referred to elsewhere by the writer in connection with notable
cases of administrative graft. The major thefts are perhaps
not such a hindrance to ordinary business dealing, however,
as the constant, comparatively petty graft indulged in by
the judges whenever occasion therefor presents itself or
can be made. The following is a typical case, within the
writer's knowledge; the names used are all fictitious. Several prominent Americans and Englishmen, including
Colonel Roe, his son Richard, and the brothers Colonel and
Major Coe, purchased T. Island, and organized the T. Development Company. Colonel Roe was a retired officer in
the American army; the Coes were officers of the British
army. Richard Roe was made manager of the company,
holding a general power of attorney. On several occasions,
this company employed the services of a lawyer named
Ladr6n to draw up certain papers and do other bits of
legal routine work. When they wished to pay him he
wanted seven thousand dollars!! The company offered to
settle for six hundred dollars, which was in itself a considerable amount for the services performed, but the lawyer
refused, and brought suit for the seven thousand. The
case dragged along for some time, with at length a decision in favor of the lawyer and an appeal. While the
case was still before the court of first instance, two things
happened: Richard Roe left for the United States, giving




THE FUTILITY OF THE LAW IN CUBA


543


a power-of-attorney to the company's new lawyer, Bueno;
and the judges learned that the company had about four
thousand dollars in the bank at Moreno! The judge of
the court of first instance went on a vacation, leaving the
municipal judge in charge of the court, while a young lawyer was designated to take the latter's place in the municipal
court. Acting now in the higher court, the former municipal
judge affirmed a decision he himself had given in the lower
court, and ordered the money seized. Then he, too, went
on vacation, leaving the young lawyer in charge of both
courts, with instructions to seize the money. Bueno objected, but his objection was set aside by the second judge
before he left, on the ground that Richard Roe had not
left any evidence that he could give a power-of-attorney
for the company, although this same judge had, in the first
place, accepted the suit against Richard Roe in the company's name and all the papers had been served on him.
The young temporary judge drew the money out of the
bank after banking hours on a Saturday afternoon. He
happened to be a good friend of Mercante, the leading
business man of Moreno, who supplied the company with
provisions. When he mentioned the affair to Mercante
that afternoon, Mercante made him promise to have nothing further to do with it and to hold the money. That
night Major Coe arrived in Moreno, and Mercante told
him about it. Major Coe was a man of no little private
influence, and he went into action at once. He was therefore able to get a decision the following Monday for the
return of the money to the bank. At last accounts, it
was there yet, but still in litigation. The two judges were
theoretically "removed" by a promotion to better posts in
another part of the country!
Numerous responsible associations or individuals could be




544


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


quoted in support of the charges against the judiciary. It
will perhaps be sufficient, however, to quote the American
ambassador, General Enoch H. Crowder, on this score,
making use of memorandum thirteen, the only one of the
"fifteen memoranda" that has so far appeared in print.
As already stated, it concerned the conditions precedent to
an approval of the fifty million dollar loan, presently secured in 1923. The memorandum was dated July 21, 1922.
One paragraph of this document discussed the judiciary.
General Crowder asserted that charges still persisted as to
the malfeasance in office of subordinate members of the
judicial branch, including the secretaries of courts. He also
noted the failure of the courts to be prompt in trying the
crimes of bankers connected with the institutions undergoing liquidation and those of politicians involved in graft
deals. There was no reason for the delay in the proceedings against the officials of Havana for frauds and other
misdeeds, he said. He complained, too, because the bank
defaulters had not been extradited. While not making judicial reform an absolute prerequisite to the loan, the ambassador felt that an investigation and proper proceedings
should be instituted to improve the situation.16
And so on, ad infinitum. The charge quoted to the Spaniard about United States policy is true. There is a statement
by Secretary of State Seward on this score in 1866 which
would seem to have been adopted as the normal practice
of the United States in Hispanic American affairs. The
case arose in a controversy involving an American in
Colombia, but is certainly applicable to the procedure of
the United States in Cuba:
M Crowder, Enoch Herbert, El 5, 1922; republished in Tarde, Nov.
memorandum no. 13, translated to 13, 1924.
Spanish in Heraldo de Cuba, Aug.




THE FUTILITY OF THE LAW IN CUBA


545


"We are unfortunately too familiar with complaints of the delay and
inefficiency of the courts in the South American republics. We must,
however, continue to repose confidence in their independence and integrity, or we must take the broad ground that those States are like those
of Oriental semi-civilized countries-outside the pale within which the
law of nations, as generally accepted by Christendom, is understood to
govern. The people who go to these regions and encounter great risks
in the hope of great rewards, must be regarded as taking all the circumstances into consideration, and cannot with reason ask their government
to complain that they stand on a common footing with native subjects
in respect to the alleged wants of an able, prompt, and conscientious
judiciary. We cannot undertake to supervise the arrangements of the
whole world for litigation, because American citizens voluntarily expose
themselves to be concerned in their deficiencies.""
This stand is a handicap in the submission of claims in Cuba
for denial of justice, although it is probably true that Americans and other foreigners receive as much consideration from
the iniquitous workings of the courts as do the Cubans themselves. The Permanent Treaty between the United States
and Cuba does, indeed, give the former a right to insist on
better treatment, on grounds that the Cuban government,
through the delinquency of its law courts, is not furnishing
the adequate protection to property that Cuba has agreed
to give. Nevertheless, the United States is not at all likely
to act in any other way toward Cuba than it would toward
Colombia, except in case of an intervention on other scores,
when it is probable that a reorganization of legal procedure
and practice might be attempted, along with other reforms.
It is not with any idea of holding a brief for the foreigner
that this is being written. Most foreigners adapt themselves to the situation as they find it. It is Cuba that has
"Seward, William  Henry, to Al- in A digest of international law, ed.
lan A         Burton (minister to by John Bassett Moore (8 vols.
Colombia), no. 137, Apr. 27, 1866, Washington. 1906), v. VI, p. 660.
Dip. Cor. 1866, III, 522-523, quoted




546


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


to pay; for the cost of supporting her parasite class is
eventually passed on to the people as a whole.l8


'This chapter is based on a study
of Cuban government documents and
the published statements of various
organizations and individuals, supplemented by material in the newspapers and the oral comments of a
number of men interviewed by the
writer. Of special note in connection with amnesties is the following
Relacion de antecedentes con motivo
de indultos y leyes de amnistia promulgadas a partir del ano 1899, coll.
by Lorenzo Perez. The collection by


Sefior Perez, who is Assistant Director of the Library of the House of
Representatives, was based principally on the Diarios de sesiones
volumes of the proceedings of the
House. The collection was never
published, but exists in bound form
in the Library of the House. An
outstandingly important item on all
matters considered here is the Ortiz
pamphlet entitled La decadencia
cubana.




CHAPTER XXIII


THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT LOTTERY
THE history of the government lottery in Cuba constitutes
one of the darkest chapters in the story of the republic,
and, like most other things in the political life of the
country, represents a steadily growing evil that would seem
to have reached its climax in the administration of President Zayas. Cuba had long been accustomed to the Spanish lottery, but the United States military government of
1898-1902 made short shrift of that. There were stirrings
for a lottery law during the Estrada Palma administration,
but the President was able to head them off.' Just as in
the case of so many other iniquities in Cuban politics, the
starting-point,-or perhaps better, the revival of the colonial
norm,-was the administration of President G6mez. The
bill was introduced in the House on February 17, 1909, by
Rafael Martinez Ortiz, who was opposed to the idea of a
lottery, and said so in the preamble, but recognized that
there was a popular demand for it, and felt that his bill
was less harmful than any other that might be proposed.
The revenues were to be devoted to the building of bridges
and roads. It soon developed, however, that the mild bill
of Martinez Ortiz was not at all to the liking of the majority. They wanted the lottery, but one with a "punch," like
the old Spanish lottery. So a new bill was substituted,
and Martinez Ortiz went over to the opposition. The Conservatives were taking a party stand against the bill, but
1Cf. supra, pp. 168-169.
547




548


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


when it came to a vote many of their members joined with
the Liberals in passing it. The vote in the House was fiftythree to twenty, and in the Senate seventeen to two. Senators Crist6bal Laguardia and Salvador Cisneros Betancourt
opposed it in the Senate.
"Laughable and ridiculous is the reasoning which our
leading men uphold in justifying the repugnant game of the
lottery," said Cisneros Betancourt. "It is said: 'The people
wish it, and we their representatives ought to temporize
with it and please them in whatever they propose.'" He
then went on to draw a parallel in connection with the game
of jai-alai,2 which the people wanted, but the concession
was to expire in another year. (But jai-alai came back
with the "tourist" law of the Menocal era). It was true
that Cubans liked all kinds of gambling, said Cisneros, and
there were those who were planning to have a Cuban Monte
Carlo. Should that be reason enough for giving it to them?
(However that may be, the Casino was also established in
the epoch of Menocal). There were even those who believed in protection for prostitution, said Cisneros. (And
certainly in 1925 it was notorious that government officials
were sharing in this traffic. The exploitation of "margaritas"
by high politicans was one of the express charges of the distinguished gentlemen who signed the manifiesto of the Cuban
Committee of National and Civic Renovation).3 According
to Cisneros the lottery was introduced in part to give more
political jobs. (In this, certainly, he was prophetic.) He held
that the people were wrong in wanting the lottery and that
their representatives ought therefore not to give it to them.
Senator Gonzalo Perez was one of the principal speakers on behalf of the bill. His arguments sound like those


3 Described infra, p. 606, n. 25.
'Heraldo de Cuba, Apr. 4, 1923. Cf. supra, pp. 522-524.




THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT LOTTERY


549


of a man who knows the thing he is speaking for has scant
public reason for existence, but who wants to make a showing on behalf of a program that has already been decided
upon. The lottery was immoral, he said, but there were
worse things (not naming them) which were sanctioned by
the government. In a sense, too, the lottery was not so very
bad, for it gave hope of wealth to the poor man, sustaining and animating him. Anyway, the people wanted it,
and would spend their money on foreign lotteries if they
did not have one of their own. It was better to keep the
money in Cuba; indeed, it was necessary, so that the country might have roads, public buildings, hospitals, schools,
and houses for workmen, and as a result of these improvements the morals of the people would be so built up that
the lottery would no longer be necessary, for Cuba would
be happy, thanks to the lottery.4  Called on for a speech
in the House, Gonzalez Lanuza spoke rather pessimistically,
feeling certain that the bill would pass, although lotteries
in all times had been condemned by writers on government economy. He came out convincingly, however, against
two of the arguments of the proponents of the bill, showing that the installation of the lottery would not prevent
the purchase of the tickets of foreign lotteries or gambling
in other forms, and insisting that the mere wish of the
people for the lottery was not sufficient reason for giving
it to them; on this latter point he asked whether the Chinese
should be allowed to have their opium simply because they
wanted it.5
The government lottery has been in existence since 1909,
but the material and "moral" results predicted by Senator
'The speech of Cisneros and press in a pamphlet published by Cisneros
clippings referring to those of La- Betancourt.
guardia and Perez, together with  'Speech of May 12, 1909, in Goncomments of the newspapers, appear zalez Lanuza, 837-841.




550


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


Perez have as yet failed to put in an appearance. Indeed,
the current has been the other way, with the lottery no
small contributor. The bill of 1909 was signed by Gomez
on July 7. It was a long document of nine "titles" and
forty-nine articles, supplemented by a reglamento, or set
of regulations, in nineteen "chapters" of seventy-one articles. The following is a brief summary of the more notable
articles:
1. The institution was to be styled The National Lottery
of Cuba.
2. It was to have a General Directorate, annexed to the
Department of the Treasury. The Director General was
to be nominated by the President, with the approval of
the Senate.
3. No other lottery tickets were to be allowed in Cuba.
7. Unsold tickets were to be taken for the account of the
Department of the Treasury. A list of these was to be
published before the drawing.
10. Seventy per cent of the total of the tickets was to be
given in prizes.
20. Two globes, with little balls in them, were to be used
in drawings for the prizes. The first was to contain all the
numbers of the lottery, one for each ball, and the second
all the prizes. One was to be taken from each at the same
time, and the process continued until all the prizes were
drawn.
21. The drawings were to be made by children nine to
fourteen years of age from two designated orphan institutions.
31. There were to be not more than three drawings a
month or more than two extraordinary drawings (i.e. for
unusually large prizes) a year.
33. Foreign lotteries were prohibited.




THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT LOTTERY


551


34. The revenues derived from the lottery were to go
into the treasury.
35. As many "collectors" were to be appointed to facilitate sale of the tickets as might be necessary.
36. The Secretary of the Treasury was to appoint them.
38. The collectors were to be allowed three per cent of
the face value of the tickets they should acquire and sell.
39. They could authorize others to sell the tickets directly to the public, but the crying of tickets was "absolutely prohibited."
40. They were to turn in their unsold tickets or telegraph their numbers before noon of the day before the drawing.
42. People might have a right to subscribe regularly for
one or more precise numbers.
43. The cost of handling was not to be over five per
cent of the value of the tickets.
49. All of the personnel of the lottery must be Cubans.
The law authorized the President to draw up a supplementary regulation concerning the operation of the lottery
bureau. The republic has been in existence nearly a quarter
of a century without the enactment of the supplementary
laws called for by the Cuban Constitution, but the decree
for the regulation was issued the same day the bill was
signed, on July 7, 1909. It went into detail about drawings and the functions of the various officials. The Director was required to give bond for ten thousand dollars,
and the Assistant Director for five thousand. In the light
of the opportunities for graft on a colossal scale that these
positions were eventually to afford, these amounts were a
mere bagatelle. A provision was made for keeping books,
but nothing was said about publicity of accounts. Among
regulations that were not in fact observed when the bill




552


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


became a law were the following: no collector was to charge
more than the legal price for a ticket "on any pretext whatsoever"; no minors were to be employed in selling tickets;
no re-seller was to raise the price or to cry his wares; the
office of the collector was not to be used for any other business.
Assuming compliance with the law, it will be observed
that the public paid $588,0006 to produce a net revenue to
the government of $123,200.7 At five per cent, the operating cost was twenty-eight thousand dollars. To men like
Martinez Ortiz, Cisneros Betancourt, and Laguardia this
seemed like a bad law, but by comparison with later laws
it was lily-white. By 1912 the politicians knew more clearly
what they wanted, and an amendment became a law on
July 9, 1912, which made changes, among others, in the
following articles of the earlier law:
2. The Director General was not to be removable, except
by formal process. (The intent of this was to strengthen
this officer as against his former superior, the Secretary
of the Treasury.)
30. The determination of the plan of drawings was to
be in the hands of the Director General, instead of the Secretary of the Treasury as in the law of 1909.
31. The number of annual extraordinary drawings was
reduced to the one at Christmas.
35. The number of "collectors" was fixed at one to each
three thousand inhabitants.
36. Collectors were to be appointed by the Secretary of
the Treasury on nomination of the Director General. All
The face value, $560,000, plus the lectors, less seventy per cent for
legal five per cent profit to the re- prizes, and less the five per cent
sellers.                      operating cost, or twenty-two per
'That is, one hundred per cent, cent.
less three per cent profit to the col



THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT LOTTERY


553


were to be Cubans, and a complete list of their names was
to be published in the official Gazette. They were not to be
removed from their collectorships, except for justifiable
cause in a formal process to be instituted by the Director
General. Something was said aboutnew appointees and
those already on the list "who may be ratified" in their
posts. (The old law had said nothing about dismissal.
Apparently the new law was intended to allow of as clean a
sweep of the old collectors as might be desired).
37. "Collectors will not be obliged to give bond for the
performance of their duties." (The old law had required
bond). The allotment of tickets was to be equal to each
collector, who was to pay for them at the time he got
them.
38. If a collector failed to call for his tickets his collectorship might be cancelled.
39. Anybody might be employed to resell tickets, but
crying them or charging more than five per cent beyond
the face value was made punishable by a fine of three
dollars the first time and ten thereafter. (The fine was
twenty-five dollars in the first law, and there were various
limitations upon reselling).
42. No private subscription to numbers was henceforth
to be allowed, as all the tickets were to be allotted to the
collectors.
43. The operating allowance of the lottery bureau was
raised from five per cent to twelve. The Director General
was to appoint all lesser officials of the bureau, and was
to nominate men for the higher posts, for appointment by
the Secretary of the Treasury.
49. Funds accruing from prize-winning tickets that had
not been collected and from fines against collectors were
to be paid into the lottery bureau.




554       A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
The virtual effect of this law was to make the lottery
bureau an autonomous department, instead of a mere branch
of the Department of the Treasury, as before. The new
percentage assigned to the bureau for operating costs was
so extravagant that it was amended by presidential decree
of the same date as the bill to nine per cent, and still further
to eight per cent by a law of October 29, 1914. On this
basis the financial result for a single drawing remained the
same as before, except that the operating cost was increased
from twenty-eight thousand dollars to $44,800, and the net
revenue decreased from $123,200 to $106,400, or nineteen
per cent of the face value of the tickets. This was the only
apparent change, but an entering wedge for corruption was
established, especially through the provisions that removed
the bureau from the control of the Secretary of the Treasury. In point of fact it has existed since 1912 as a virtually
independent branch of government, subject only to the President. In consequence a number of evil practices came into
existence, as follows:
There was no audit of the bureau's accounts by the
Auditor General and no inspection of its work by the Secretary of the Treasury. If books were kept, they were
merely for the private information of the bureau officials
and the President. The full eight per cent expense was always drawn, and as this was far beyond the actual expenses
of the bureau the greater part was employed in political
patronage.
A figure quite outside the intent of the law appeared
in the wholesale dealers (acaparadores), who bought up the
tickets at an advance in price from the collectors and sold
them at a still higher price to the resellers. As one result
the collectorship (colecturia) became a valuable privilege
involving no risk and no labor, and was eagerly sought by




THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT LOTTERY            555
those having personal or political influence. Furthermore,
the extra profit to the collector and the profit to the wholesale dealer were added to the cost of the tickets in violation
of the law, so that the price now ranged from perhaps a
minimum of twenty-four dollars to a maximum that might
be as high as forty, instead of the legal twenty-one; out in
the rural districts the price is said to have reached fifty
dollars, at times. Perhaps thirty dollars would be a fair
average for the cost of a ticket during the operation of
this law.
It became the practice to cede the three per cent, formerly
allowed as the profit of the collectors, to the officials of the
bureau as a reward for their cooperation in enabling the
collectors and-wholesalers to get their illegal profit.
No attempt was made to comply with the law with regard to collectorships. Instead of a legal five or six hundred, there were as many as two thousand in 1922. Appointments, which were supposed to be permanent during
good behavior, were in fact revocable at the will of the
Director General. The names appearing in the register of
collectors were fictitious, back of which the real holders hid
their identity.
On this basis the actual financial result in violation of
the law showed a startlingly increased cost to the public,
although the net to the treasury was not disturbed. This
is most vividly represented if one takes, not merely the
figures for a single drawing, but the sum total for the
drawings of an entire year. With the inclusion of the
proceeds of the Christmas lottery the government's nineteen per cent net amounted to about four million dollars.
Meanwhile the people paid $31,579,000 (one hundred and
fifty per cent) for at least a theoretical opportunity to win
$14,737,100 (seventy per cent) in prizes. The collectors,




556


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


wholesalers, and resellers between them took in an illegal
$9,473,400, to say nothing of the above-mentioned three per
cent graft of $631,600 or the excess over actual costs from
the $1,684,300 (eight per cent) allowed for the administrative needs of the bureau. From this it appears that the
Cuban people were paying some ten dollars a head for
lottery tickets each year, of which more than three dollars,
or a total of some nine millions and a half, was mulcted
from them in defiance of law, for corrupt purposes. As
Cuban revenues in the Zayas period varied from some fiftyfive millions to seventy-five millions, it will be seen that
the graft bill of the lottery alone has ranged from thirteen
to eighteen per cent of the total government receipts from
all sources, while the cost to the public has been from forty
to sixty per cent of that amount, to produce a net yield
of only five to seven per cent. The biggest part of the
illegal profit went to the collectors, who averaged about
$273 a month for each of the approximately two thousand
collectorships, or $3,276 a year.  In point of fact, however, there were not two thousand collectors! Many individuals held more than one collectorship. A careful investigation revealed the following corrupt situation during the
Zayas period:
Some eight or nine hundred collectorships were reserved
by the Director General himself for direct sale to wholesalers. This yielded from two hundred thousand dollars to
$250,000 a month, or $2,400,000 to three millions a year,
for the personal or political uses of the President and the
Director General. According to one writer 8 President Zayas
took over a million a year from this sum, and the Director
8Conn, Edward L, Cuba Public ledger, reprinted in) Berkeley
not free but enslaved: VI, Huge (California) Gazette, Nov. 24, 1923.
graft in the lottery, in (Philadelphia




THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT LOTTERY


557


General (who by an extraordinary coincidence happened to
be the President's own son!) a sum almost as large. The
remainder was used as a "slush fund," especially for distribution among the newspapers.
Some two hundred collectorships were distributed among
senators, and two hundred and fifty to three hundred more
to members of the House. The average number of collectorships held by senators was about eight, but one senator was
known to have sixteen and another fourteen. Not more
than two senators had no collectorships at all. The average
for representatives was between two and three, but several
were known to have six, while there were not more than
ten at the outside without any.
The remaining six or eight hundred were distributed to
various members of the political class. Curiously enough,
Cabinet officers held a comparatively small number, but
this is not to be wondered at, for they had remarkable
opportunities for graft in other ways. Officers of the police,
army officers, political leaders other than congressmen (and
of all parties!), newspaper men, judges, and men or women
who were prominent for other reasons were among the holders. A very few were given to crippled or aged veterans
or to the widows of distinguished Cuban patriots.
These facts about the lottery, which were notorious,
were particularly in the public eye in 1921 and 1922, when
the republic was in need of a loan. As already mentioned,
the depression of 1920-1921 had caused Cuba to default on
the interest and sinking fund requirements of the bonded
debt, while there was a floating debt that was believed to be
about fifty million dollars. One of the stumbling-blocks in
the way of negotiating a fresh loan was the well-known corruption of the lottery bureau. Various suggestions by prominent individuals and civic institutions were made, most of




558       A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
which amounted to little more than a call for an enforcement
of the law, and at length President Zayas agreed to do something. On June 26, 1922, he issued an executive decree
for the reform of the lottery. This was a clever document,
like the man who wrote it, but it was not sincere. The
decree pretended to reestablish the lottery on a lawful basis,
but it did not clearly do away with the wholesale dealers,
or deprive the collectors of their sinecure, or require the
bureau to be held accountable before the courts for violations of law, and no steps were taken to remove the corrupt
officials of the lottery. As was natural, the former illegal
practices continued. The President is said to have promised, however, to amend these details, or even to bring
about the abolition of the lottery altogether. The bankers had been particularly concerned over this matter, but
eventually seem to have been satisfied that something would
be done, and loaned Cuba fifty million dollars. Meanwhile,
too, there had been a favorable turn in the sugar market,
and government receipts began to pick up.
Zayas now had the loan, and there was every indication
that the depression was past. He was therefore ready and
eager to repudiate his promises, though skilful, as always,
in "saving face" and appearing to act as he had agreed.
It was at this time that he raised the "nationalism" cry
against the interference of the United States in Cuban
affairs. The retention of the lottery was but a single factor
in this campaign, but was an important one. So the expected bill for the suppression of the lottery turned out
to be quite something else!  It is the general belief in
Cuba, by friend and foe of Zayas alike, that the new lottery
law, which was eventually put on the statute-books under
date of August 4, 1923, was prepared in the presidential
palace. It was then put through the Senate and House




THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT LOTTERY


559


by one of those surprise votes for which the Cuban Congress
is quite too famous. The first time the general public knew
that such a bill was pending was when the papers of April
28, 1923, carried news items that the bill had been reported
out and passed unanimously by the Senate on the day before. The House did not act until July 10, when it held
an all-night session and passed the bill in the early morning of the 11th by ninety-five to five. The substantial
unanimity of these votes is noteworthy. The press charged
that it was because the congressmen had been promised a
number of additional collectorships.
The lottery law of 1909 is sometimes referred to as the
"bad" law, while the law of 1912 is styled "worse," leaving to the law of 1923 the popular credit of being the
"worst." In effect, it legalized the former unlawful practices. The bill itself masqueraded as a pension law on behalf of veterans and as a bonus to government employes; the
bonus had been promised by a law of 1920, to take care of
the increased cost of living, but had never been paid. The
lottery on its new basis was merely "an incident" in this
bill, to provide the funds for these admittedly worthy purposes. There was also a long "nationalistic" preamble, insulting the United States, but this has been discussed already; no doubt, it was intended to account for the virtually
unanimous vote the bill was designed to have. President
Zayas vetoed it, knowing full well that he would not be
"sustained." There was no fire in the President's veto. On
the contrary, he praised Congress for the "noble" sentiments
it had expressed,-in the preamble. With this preliminary
"clap-trap" out of the way, attention may now be given
to the really fundamental thing,-the terms of the new law.
The following noteworthy changes were made in articles
of the previous law:




560


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


2. The bureau was made autonomous. (This was a fresh
step away from the Secretary of the Treasury, leaving the
lottery management entirely a matter between the President
and the Director General).
31. The maximum number of tickets was set at thirtyfive thousand, except for the Christmas lottery, the number
for which was to be decided by the Director General, in
agreement with the President.
35. There were to be two thousand collectorships, established wherever the Director General might deem best,
and the law was so ambiguously worded that it was now
made to appear that more than one collectorship could be
held by a single person. (This not only greatly increased
the legal number of collectorships and endorsed the plural
holding evil, but also removed former restrictions on territorial distribution in accord with population).
36. Collectors were to be appointed by the Director General, with the approval of the President. They were to
hold their posts for life, being irremovable, except on voluntary retirement, failure to make the payments for their
tickets as required by law, imprisonment for crime, loss of
citizenship, or mental incapacity. (This again strengthened the Director General, in conjunction with the President. And the former requirement for publication of the
names of collectors was omitted! A seemingly inconsistent
feature declared that these "life" collectorships were as- 
signable. One might wonder whose "life" was involved).
39. The prohibition against increasing the price of a ticket
more than five per cent beyond its face value was omitted!
All existing collectorships were cancelled! The new collectors were to be appointed within thirty days after the
bill should become a law. In overcoming the President's
veto, the House prefixed a resolution explaining why it had




THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT LOTTERY


561


voted for the law. The principal play was made on "nationalism," in an attack on the United States, but one of the
other reasons assigned was to do away with the "immorality"
of the unstable tenure of the collectors, who were menaced
with a possible loss of their collectorships under the old
law. Nevertheless, as will be observed, the solicitude of the
House for the collectors was most tenderly expressed in the
bill itself by depriving all of them of their posts,-very
likely so that congressmen might get more collectorships
for themselves. Now that his "veto" had been overcome,
President Zayas sanctioned the law. When it was published
in the Gazette, a composite of the entire law as it then stood
was inserted. No doubt, this may have served to keep some
people from looking up the former derogated provisions,
thus concealing the all too obvious iniquity of the law of
1923.
The financial result of the new law would normally be
similar to that of the illegal operation of the old law, except that thirty-five thousand tickets are now issued for
each drawing, but, for reasons that are not altogether clear,
the profit on the tickets has not been so great as before.
A decline in Cuban prosperity has, doubtless, had much to
do with it. It may be due in part to a loss of confidence
in the honesty of the lottery from the standpoint of drawings for prizes. On this score a somewhat celebrated incident
is alleged to have taken place in connection with the Christmas lottery of 1923. The President's wife won the second
prize, which amounted to two hundred thousand dollars.
Quite a story is told about this affair,-one that has been
repeated in perhaps every newspaper of the island. It is
said that a certain man had long been in the habit of buying the full ticket 9 for number 4,444. The 1909 law gave
9Each ticket is divided into a hun- proportionately in any prize that
dred pieces, and each piece shares may be won.




562


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


individuals a right to do this, and, although that provision
was not retained in later laws, it was customary to permit
it. Putting in his bid, as usual, for number 4,444, the man
was told he could not have it, because the wife of the
President had asked for it. When the story came out, after
the number had won its huge prize, the fame of "los cuatro
cuatros" (the four fours) reached to the farthest village, and
not a few protests were voiced. At one place, for example,
a parade was staged in which a goat with four fours painted
on him was the central figure. As the word "chivo," which
means "goat," is the Cuban equivalent of "graft," the implication was clear.10
This is by no means the only story of its kind concerning dishonest manipulation of the lottery since it has been
under the control of the President and his son, following
the law of 1923. It is said that the first prize of three hundred thousand dollars, in the Christmas lottery of 1923,
was also won in the palace, though no one person held the
full ticket. Some newspapers charged that a new deal was
being arranged, prior to the Christmas lottery of 1924. The
names of the winners of large prizes are not given out, and
it is believed that much fraud develops from this fact. It
is said, for example, that the Director General collects all
the prizes on unsold numbers that are returned to the bureau
before the drawing. As the books of the lottery have never
been audited, this certainly would be possible. There may
be no truth in these rumors, but the record of the President
and his son (the latter of whom was indicted for malfeasance
in office when he was Assistant Director General of the lottery in 1921) leads one to believe that if these things can
10Many insist that such a fraud as explained to the writer just how it
the one alleged in the case of the might be worked for one number.
four fours is impossible, with the It cannot be asserted, however, that
publicity of drawings, but it has been that method was employed.




THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT LOTTERY


563


be done they have done them. Certainly, one would have
to be an optimist to believe that he had his full lawful
percentage of chance for a prize when he bought a ticket.
And yet, though the excess of cost above the face value
has declined, the lottery is far from a moribund institution.
People buy tickets, perhaps, in hopes that the lottery officials will let a few prizes slip through their hands. Possibly
even they are too optimistic.'1


11The lottery laws are to be found
in various sections of the published
documents of the republic,-for example, in the following: the Gaceta,
or official Gazette; Republica de
Cuba, Leyes y decretos de la republica; and Diarios de sesiones, or
journals of Congress, with each house
having its own set. The last-named
item is particularly interesting for
the earlier period, as it gives a detailed account of the debates. Lately,
the "surprise vote" method of leg

islation has cut down the record of
speeches. Important laws are often
published separately in pamphlet
form, and a number of publications of
lottery laws have appeared. It would
not be difficult to accumulate a volume of items dealing with discussions of the lottery. The very great
majority contain denunciations on the
score of its corruption, while a much
smaller number object to the institution itself.




CHAPTER XXIV


CUBAN ELECTION EVILS
THE legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the
Cuban government are notoriously corrupt or inefficient,
usually both, and this is a condition of affairs that is generally recognized and deplored, except by the political class,
which profits from it. If this is so, why then do not the
people make a clean sweep of their rulers through use of
the ballot? This is a question that might be asked seriously outside of Cuba, but hardly in that republic itself.
The people do not overturn the politicians, because the latter will give them no chance to do so. All the people may
do, at the best, is to choose among candidates that are
perhaps equally bad, and sometimes not even this much
of a privilege is accorded them.
Social and economic conditions in Cuba make political
life very different from what it is in the United States.' As
in most Hispanic lands, so too in Cuba, the native-born
"better class" elements have had but indifferent success
in competing with foreigners in business, although, indeed,
there are some noteworthy exceptions. So the great majority
of the educated Cubans feel that they have no alternative
but to go into one of the professions (law, medicine, teaching, arms, literature, journalism, engineering, architecture)
or into politics. Often, indeed, they combine the two, the
better to make both ends meet. To some extent this springs
1A moderately extensive survey of given infra in chapters XXV and
social and economic conditions is XXVI.
564




CUBAN ELECTION EVILS


565


from necessity, as the pickings in the professions are not
great enough to enable all who are in them to live on a
moderately good scale. It is a "necessity," for there is a wide
separation of classes in Cuba, with very little of the middle-class element that is the backbone of a country like the
United States. The well-born Cuban would on no account
engage in manual labor. He has reached a stage where he
will consider a good business position but even that has not
yet attained to a very high place in the social scale. Certainly, the humdrum life in the lower ranks of business,
with its slow progress toward a remotely possible affluence,
has nothing in it for the Cuban to compare with politics, not
even with the light-paying, but highly respected small government job. The game of politics, with all its risks,-even
risk of death in troubled times,-appeals to the Hispanic
love of adventure. And for the more fortunate it points
the royal road to wealth, a wealth that may run far into
the millions, on a financial capital of less than a "shoestring."
To be sure, riches can be obtained only through utilizing
one's opportunities for corruption, but so firmly rooted is
the Spanish colonial practice of "government for the sake
of the office-holders" that almost no social stigma is involved
in graft, and there is hardly any need for concealment. It
is the traditionally expected thing, and merely evidences the
fact that the man who engages in it is "not a fool."
The successful politician has more than himself and his
own immediate family to look out for, however. He must
do what he can to see that all his relatives and his wife's
relatives get jobs that will at least yield them a living wage,
or better than that, if possible. This comes about through
the curse of family influence, an evil of Hispanic life that is
comparatively unknown in the United States. In Cuba it
has frequently happened that a President has appointed,




566


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


not one, but several of his relatives to some of the highest
posts of government. Zayas was especially notorious for
this. Other politicians do what they can in proportion to
their opportunities. And father, brother, son, uncle, nephew,
cousin to the nth degree, and various "in-laws" are all members of "the family" in Cuba. Besides, one may also help
a friend by feeding him at the public crib. The thing is
criticized, but it is doubtful if those who object the loudest
would do anything else themselves. Thousands upon thousands of government employes make nothing more than a
bare living out of their positions, but there are other thousands from all ranks of society who want similar posts. In
consequence there is a constant tendency to multiply jobs,
while the competition for the more profitable places is
lessened momentarily only as these, too, are increased in
number. In fine, there has developed a "political class,"
which, as one writer has put it, takes the place of the middle
class (non-existent in Cuba) that a republic needs to have.
It is, indeed, a parasite class, which has made "politics our
only industry and administrative fraud the only open road
to fortune for our compatriots." This writer went on to
describe it as an industry stronger than sugar, more lucrative than railways, and surer than banking, shipping, and
commerce. It brought many ills in its train, such as upsets of public order, lowering of social and moral standards,
and a retarding of individual betterment, but was inevitable
under the peculiar social conditions of Cuba.2
A detailed story of the different Cuban elections has already been given. So far as presidential elections go, the
following comment hits the mark:
'Carrin, Miguel de, El desenvol- pordnea, v. XXVII, pp. 6-27, 19-20;
vimiento social de Cuba en los ulti- Sept., 1921.
mos veinte anos, in Cuba contem



CUBAN ELECTION EVILS                  567
"In the history of Cuba no Candidate for the presidency has ever lost
an election who was backed by the government. [Estrada] Palma
reelected himself to be ousted by a revolution; Gomez, leader of the
revolution, who was favored by the intervention government, became
president; Menocal was supported by Gomez with the rural guard and
defeated Zayas, and four years later he reelected himself, and in the
following election threw the support of the government to Zayas who
was declared president by a decision of the supreme court."'
In like manner Zayas supported Machado, who was elected
in 1924. The evil is one that has grown progressively worse.
A first period of increasingly bad conditions reached its culmination in 1905, resulting in the revolution of 1906, followed by the United States intervention of 1906-1909. During the intervention a law of elections was promulgated
which was primarily the work of the then Colonel Crowder,
as head of the Advisory Law Commission. This was an outgrowth of a careful taking of the census, and contained a
number of excellent features, including the following: public
registration of voters; the holding of elections on a single
day; district electoral boards containing representatives of
all parties; official tickets; proportional representation in
the House and in provincial and municipal councils; the
secret ballot; a first scrutiny of the vote by the officials of
the district electoral board; municipal, provincial, and
national electoral boards for the hearing of cases on infractions of the law; and an appeal from them to the law
courts. No objection could be found with the elections of
1908, and those of 1910, 1912, and 1914 were in the main
not badly conducted. In 1916 fraud on a great scale made
its appearance, however, and it became worse in ensuing
years. As the present writer set forth on another occasion:
"The buying of votes and voting of dead men are within an American's
ken, but in Cuba the latter, at least, is indulged in to a degree that
"A Sage," in Havana Post, July 15, 1924




568


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


would hardly pass muster in twentieth-century United States. The
number of votes at a presidential election has been known to be about
double the total number of voters in Cuba, and this in spite of every
conceivable device to keep adherents of the opposite party from voting
at all. Soldiers have patrolled the polls or ridden through the country
to intimidate the opposition. Clocks are moved forward or backward
as the exigencies of the voting hours demand. There are innumerable
tricks to delay the voting so that the opposition voters never get to the
booths. Criminals have been pardoned to serve as hoodlums and to
get the votes their 'family influence' represents. And if the vote of a
particular precinct is still adverse, one may burn the polling place and
destroy the record. A President, in control of the army and the
political machinery, must have a veritable national uprising against him
to lose an election, if he takes advantage of his powers. The precedents
are generally to the effect that he would be an unusual President who
would not do so."'
The writer might have added that a national uprising would
probably be ineffective, because of the recent policy of the
United States in lending support to a government in power
in the event of a revolution.     A much clearer idea of the
meaning of some of the practices referred to will be obtained
if a few of them, at least, are discussed somewhat more in
detail.
"Forros" is a term    used for false voters, recruited from
many sources. There have been many falsifications of the
census and the voting lists, to get names upon them that
could be voted. An examination of these lists reveals such
names as Crist6bal Col6n (Spanish for Christopher Columbus), Diego Velazquez (the Spanish conqueror of Cuba),
Valeriano Weyler (the famous "Butcher" of War of Independence notoriety), and the names of all the other numerous captain-generals of Cuba. It would seem that no very
great amount of imagination was used in these cases by the
falsifiers of the lists. There were so many forros, however,
'Chapman, Charles Edward, The review of reviews, v. LXX, pp. 413 -Cuban election problem, in American 419; Oct., 1924.




CUBAN ELECTION EVILS


569


that it was indeed difficult to get names enough to serve,
for prior to 1919 there were more forros than actual voters!
This has been an abuse practiced by both parties. In a
hard-fought presidential election, the number of forros
would be kept down, through challenges from both sides,
except in cases where the government was exerting special
pressure.  In that case the government forros would be
counted, and the others not. The evil has been more noticeable, however, in the partial elections in between elections
for the presidency. At such times political interest has not
been nearly so intense, and in consequence the number of
forros might well decide an election. The forros grew out
of corrections of the voting lists as established by the census
and electoral law of 1908. Down to that time there had been
special registrations for each election, as in the United
States. In 1908 it was provided that the register of voters
should be permanent, plus those who should subsequently
gain the right to vote, and minus those who from death or
other cause should lose it. The addition or removal of names
was intended to be merely a clerical task in the keeping of
the municipal electoral boards. The latter seem to have
been much better at addition than subtraction, for by 1919,
in a man-suffrage country, the voters represented the impossible number of 44.2 per cent of the population. A striking case was that of Candelaria in Pinar del Rio. This town,
with a total of 9,234 inhabitants, was able to muster 25,820
voters!
Another evil is the "refuerzo." This has applied especially
in the case of elections to Congress and the provincial and
municipal councils, growing out of the fact that one voted
for the full number of representatives or councillors to the
province or municipality, instead of for just one from a
limited district, as in the United States. Thus, if a province




570


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


were entitled to twenty-five representatives in Congress, one
might vote twenty-five names. In such an event a man
might vote for some of his party's candidates, and not for
others, thus giving a "refuerzo," or reinforcement, to those
whom he favored. So far, the proceeding was quite within
the law; indeed, it was just what had been contemplated,
on the theory that it would bring about the election of the
best candidates. In practice, however, there developed the
peculiar anomaly of a candidate in opposition to other candidates of his own party, as well as against those of the
other party. The situation was still further complicated
by the fact that Cuba had adopted the system of proportional representation, by an enactment of the Magoon era,
as the means for securing the influence of minorities that is
called for by the Constitution. To get around the possible
confusion that might result from a "straight ticket" vote
it was further enacted that in case of a tie those names
coming nearest the top of the ballot should receive first
consideration. So, quite apart from the maneuvers in the
nominating assemblies to get a place at the top of the
ticket, there has been a considerable competition among
members of the same party to get a refuerzo at the time of
the vote. It will be seen, therefore, that the straight party
vote, for which a politician in the United States might
normally strive, was one of the last things to be desired by
a candidate of either party whose name was toward the
lower end of the list. The voters were therefore bribed or
otherwise influenced to vote only for one name in the party
list, and not vote at all for other names, or even to vote
all the candidates but one of another party! And since
those candidates whose names were far down on the ballot
needed to get a greater vote than those at the top, the




CUJBAN ELECTION EVILS


571


latter engaged in the refuerzo as well as the former, in order
to safeguard their own candidacies.
The refuerzo has not stopped there. Politicians of the
two parties might get together and arrange fraudulent trades,
-say of votes for a senator of one party as against votes for
the presidential candidate of another. Cases have even occurred where one entire set of party officials would be
bought up, in which case they would throw their influence
to a refuerzo all along the line in favor of the candidates
of the other party. Frequently, members of opposite parties
have gotten together and appointed an "administrator" to
handle the purchase of the vote for all members of the
group. There would still be a chance to win the election,
after an adverse vote had been turned in, through a falsification at the time of the count or during transmission of
the vote to the capital. Many of the practices employed
are also included in current definitions of the refuerzo. For
example, it has often been arranged by officials of both
parties to mutilate enough straight tickets or vote a sufficient number of partially blank ballots to secure a result
other than that in the vote as cast. This has been done
in collusion with the municipal electoral board, at the time
it counted the vote. It was not so difficult to arrange as
might seem likely. Municipal boards were made up of an
equal number from the two parties, together with a municipal judge, who determined the result in case of a difference between the party representatives. So, if officials of
the opposite parties agreed, their representatives in the
boards could control the situation. If it were deemed desirable to secure the cooperation of the judge, that was a
simple affair, for municipal judges were, and still are, political appointees who do not even have to be lawyers. They
are therefore menaced with being relieved of their post or




572


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


transferred, while their appointment in the first place, together with promotions or other favors, is purely a matter of
political favor. This was a factor that assisted not only in
the illegal refuerzo, but also in presidential control of elections! There was plenty of opportunity in which to complete the fraud, even if it had not been accomplished by
the time of the first scrutiny of the vote. The votes were
left in the hands of the judge of the electoral board, with
no guaranties whatsoever. So he might open the package
and change the vote, or it could be done afterward by postal
officials before its delivery at the capital. Meanwhile, it
went through a further scrutiny on the part of higher electoral boards. Falsification in these later stages has been
indulged in only in case the opposite parties could not
agree, being especially employed by the government party
in a presidential election. According to common report, there
was a great deal of this in the election of 1916.
These dishonest practices have been the more easily engaged in because of other evils in Cuban political life that
make escape from the legal consequences easy and reward
for success alluring. As already stated, there was an appeal
under the law of 1908 from the findings of the lower electoral boards to those higher in the scale, and from them
to the courts, but the appeal to the higher boards may be
said to have involved a distinction without a difference, and
the courts were notoriously corrupt. At best the courts
were given to the adoption of legal devices to avoid rendering a decision. As most of the appeals against frauds in the
electoral boards have come at times of a presidential election, and as the government party has been more likely
to have perpetrated them, the judges did not wish to take
the responsibility for upsetting the vote and thus risk losing their posts. Even a conviction for electoral frauds has




CUBAN ELECTION EVILS


573


held few terrors, for pardons and amnesties have followed
crime in rapid succession in Cuba, and election crimes have
always been forgiven. On the other hand, there has been
that "compensation for fraud to the political servant" known
in Cuba as the "botella" (bottle), which has been defined as
"pretended employment, without any work to do,"-the
"soft" government job.5 All this has been without taking
into account the factor of intimidation of the voter, already
alluded to. That has been accomplished not merely by use
of the army, the rural guards, and the police, but also by
employment of thugs called "matones," or "killers."
Yet another evil has also existed to assist the politicians
in their control of the vote. Political parties have been
recognized by the law, but have had an extra-legal position,
without any provision for regulation of their internal management, in imitation of the system in the United States.
This has worked out very badly in Cuba, and is a matter
the importance of which cannot be overemphasized. The
Cuban electorate has had a choice of voting only as between the men whose names appear on the official ballots.
Some attempts have been made to bring the methods of
nomination under the law, so as to get lists of candidates
more nearly responsive to the wishes of the people, but
the politicians of all parties have joined in resistance to this
innovation, as it threatened their "ownership" of the government. In consequence, the voters have had little to pick
from; usually it has been a case of one "crook" or another,
as witness the case of the elections of 1922, when more than
a fifth of the candidates on the official ballots had criminal
antecedents. Indeed, within any given party the worst
man is likely to win the nomination and gain the position
5Ortiz, Fernando, La reforma elec- forma social, v. XX, pp. 214-225, at
toral de Crowder en Cuba, in Re- 222; July, 1921.




574


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


at the top of the ballot, for all sorts of frauds have been
perpetrated, without any criminal liability attaching. When,
for example, President Menocal found that the majority in
his party assembly (as the conventions are called) would
be against him, he caused his Cabinet Secretaries to be included as members of the assembly ex-officio, and thus dominated the vote. There was no law to stop him, and he had
the supreme argument of force on his side. The dominant
position of the President in the party assembly is one of
the principal causes for the formation of fractional groups.
Unable to get what they want within their own party, some
men get out, form an organization of their own, and make
headway as a "pirate" party, to which favors must be
granted to keep them from swinging the balance in the
opposite direction. The most famous instance in recent
years was the formation of the Popular party by Alfredo
Zayas in 1919, a maneuver which carried him to the presidency.
The law of 1908 was not responsible for these evils, but
was associated with them in the popular mind, and when
the bitterly criticized election of 1916 was followed by
fraudulent elections in 1918 there was an insistent demand
in many quarters for a new law, although the reputed author
of the old law, the former Colonel Crowder, was held in
great respect,-all the more so, perhaps, in the light of the
reputation he had won in organizing the American army
in the World War. So in 1919 President Menocal issued
an invitation to this famous officer, now become a general,
to come to Cuba and give his advice for drawing up a new
law of elections. Both the Conservatives and Liberals announced their willingness to cooperate in the plan, although
the latter (then out of power) set forth through a committee of their members in the House that the trouble was




CUBAN ELECTION EVILS              575
not in the laws, but in the failure to observe them. According to these men, no reform could avoid an improper
conduct of the elections, unless accompanied by a preventive
action on the part of the United States, for "the evil was
in the men in the government, not in the precepts of the
law." This assertion was so eminently in accord with the
facts that it is hardly worth while to devote much space to
the Crowder election law of 1919. There was, indeed, a most
valuable preliminary work accomplished in the form of a
new census, taken that same year.  The ratio of voters
turned out to be 17.2 per cent of the population, instead
of the 44.2 per cent previously on the registration lists. The
law itself was a bulky document, making a fat volume.
Past elections were studied, and an attempt was made to
meet all improprieties that had developed. The law is primarily interesting, however, in the light of the way it was
not carried out. For example, it was provided that where
the voting ratio in any voting district (barrio, or ward) was
one per cent higher than at the preceding election it was
presumptively fraudulent, and if over three per cent, conclusively so. On this basis the following result was obtained
in the elections of 1922:


Number with less    Number with     Number with
Total voting      thanonepr        over one per       over three
'Tistricts.      c than one per  cent increase but
cent increase.                      per cent.
less than three.
1193              387              512              294
100%              32.4%            42.9%            24.7%


Thus only 32.4 per cent of the vote was presumptively legal
under the terms of the law, and 67.6 per cent was fraudulent.
This would seem to imply that the forros still live.
General Crowder attempted to overcome the "pirate




576       A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
party" evil by a provision forbidding different parties from
carrying the same names as candidates for office. As already mentioned, these groups, called "parties," were merely
for the purpose of traffic in votes. They were not confined
to national politics, but existed also within provinces and
even within municipalities, so the leader could get one or
two places in a trade whereby his group would support
the larger party in its other candidacies. This paragraph
of the Crowder law did not suit President Menocal, and
he had it amended, after which he formed the ConservativePopular alliance for the elections of 1920. In that year
these two parties had identical lists of candidates. The same
thing happened in 1924, but this time the Popular party
joined with the Liberals.
The "repeating" evil had been so prominent prior to
1919,-that is to say, plural voting by individuals, who, of
course, had but a single legal vote,-that the new law
called for each man to have a certificate (cedula) of a right
to vote. The idea was that this could be checked off and
repeating avoided, since no one without a certificate was
to be allowed to vote. The only effect of this paragraph was
to add a new commodity to the Cuban market. The certificates were sold freely to the highest bidder. In 1922
the market price in Havana was fifty dollars, while from
ten to fifteen dollars was the normal range in the country
districts. And, despite efforts of the new law to overcome
it, the refuerzo in its worst forms continued unchecked. In
the elections of 1922 refuerzos were quite generally sold by
political chiefs to candidates for municipal and provincial
office, as well as for those who were running for election
to the national House. In Madruga, province of Havana,
seven Liberal, five Conservative, and two Popular candidates
for representative, together with several aspirants for pro



CUBAN ELECTION EVILS


577


vincial and municipal posts, formed a coalition to buy up
the electoral board. Each candidate for representative contributed fifteen hundred dollars, and nine others gave five
hundred apiece, while the rest got on the ticket free, for
personal reasons. In all, the sum of $22,500 was paid, of
which each of nine "college," or voting district, boards got
five hundred dollars, while the municipal electoral board
got eighteen thousand. The work was done by substituting
false ballots for the real ones. The case was by no means
unique; such things probably happen in every election in
each voting district, being notorious in the elections of 1922.6
Indeed, what with forros, the refuerzo, and the sale of voting
certificates, those elections were possibly the most fraudulent
ever held in Cuba.
Another feature of the law, supplemented by a law of
June 11, 1921, had led to the hope that the evil political
machine could be overthrown through a free reorganization
of each party, prior to an election. The politicians found an
easy way to get around that, by a law of January 2, 1922,
against the reorganization of political parties.  President
Zayas allowed the bill to become a law without his signature,-a procedure often followed by him in the case of
bad legislation that should have been vetoed. According
to this law, the men comprising the existing executive committee of each party (so framed as to include the Liberal,
Conservative, and Popular parties only) were to nominate
all municipal, provincial, and national candidates for the
elections of 1922. Great care was taken to see that these
committees should be composed of the "right men." For
example, provincial executive committees were to designate
municipal executive committees in localities that did not
The writer has personal knowl- the polls, but when the announceedge of what happened at one of the ment was given out it seems that
sugar-mills. Just two men went to three hundred had "voted."




578       A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
have them, and all vacancies on existing committees were
to be supplied by members of the committees themselves.
The lists of candidates selected by these committees were
to be printed on the official ballot. Thus the discredited
politicians were enabled to retain control of party management, to assure the constant reflection of themselves.
And yet the elections of 1922 are often styled "good," because there was no presidential interference with armed
forces. That was because the outcome of the election was a
matter of indifference to the President. The Liberals were
successful, but the pseudo-Popular-Conservative occupant
of the executive chair later found no difficulty in getting an
almost unanimous vote in Congress whenever he wanted
it. That, however, does not directly concern elections, although it may help in a measure to explain them.
The fraudulent character of the elections of 1920 and
1922 caused General Crowder (who had become United
States ambassador to Cuba in 1923) and a number of leading Cubans to think about a new law, to meet some of the
evils that had persisted, or developed, despite the law of
1919. To overcome the forros evil, it was proposed to require frequent meetings of municipal electoral boards to get
the voting lists ready before January 1, 1924, because by the
law of 1919 nobody could vote at an election unless he were
a registered voter. In addition to being excluded from the
elections of 1924, those who should register and did not
do so were to be fined. The article that Menocal had derogated, to the effect that no man could appear as a candidate on two party lists, was to be restored. The voting
certificate was to be done away with, and in its place a
requirement was to be inserted that officials of a voting district electoral board were to reside in the district, so that
they might know the voters personally. Other safeguards




CUBAN ELECTION EVILS


579


against "repeating" were also proposed. To guard against
the refuerzo it was suggested that individuals be required
to vote a straight ticket; the adoption of the "single member district" plan in use in the United States was considered,
but dropped, as it would have required an amendment to
the Constitution, a virtual impossibility under the circumstances. The law was introduced in the House on February
22, 1923, by Fernando Ortiz and Santiago Rey. The latter,
who was president of the Conservative party, was to have
charge of the bill. Just at that time President Zayas raised
his "nationalism" issue against the United States, and Rey
went over to his side. Zayas did promise to call a congressional committee "later" to discuss the matter of a new
election law, but a precise date was never set, and nothing
was done.
The elections of 1924 have been heralded abroad as "fair,"
but they were that only in so far as they represented the
preference of the people for Machado over Menocal. The
same evils manifested themselves as before, and if, indeed,
there was comparatively little violence, it was probably because the victory of Machado was so overwhelmingly sure
that it was unnecessary. In conclusion it may be said that
there is probably no law that would serve any better than
the election law of 1919. That, indeed, has not checked
fraud. Furthermore, it has some features that are distinctly bad. As one keen-minded Cuban gentleman of Santiago told the writer,
"The Crowder law is based on party conventions, beginning with the
election of ward delegates, then municipal, then provincial, and finally
national. No decent man has a chance to get far in politics by this
course. It is too democratic for Cuba. The Spanish system, based on
property-holding, payment of a poll-tax, or the literacy test, was much
better."




580


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


There is probably no way to bring about honesty in Cuban
elections, except by evolution toward better standards, or
unless there is an upheaval that will overwhelm the present
political class. Until one or other happens, election laws
are likely to be just so much waste paper. There is nothing in sight at present, however, to make one expectant of
either eventuality for many years.7


7This chapter is based in part on
the various election laws, which may
be found in the official Gazette, or
Gaceta, at the appropriate date.
Nearly every volume or article dealing with political happenings in Cuba
has something to say about election


evils. The volumes of Barbarrosa,
Cabrera, Collazo, Dolz, Martinez
Ortiz, Merino and Ibarzabal, and
Pardo Suarez are particularly noteworthy, and among scores of articles
those of Marvin, Ortiz, Scott, and
Spinden are perhaps outstanding.




CHAPTER XXV


SOCIAL FACTORS IN CUBAN LIFE 1
Cuba has a population of more than three millions; at
the close of 1922 it was estimated that there were 3,123,040
persons in the island, of whom 2,193,936, or almost exactly
seventy per cent, were white, while most of the rest were
black. The presence of two such dissimilar races in the island is only one factor, however, in the numerous problems
of Cuban society. Foreigners make up a goodly proportion
of the whites, and they do not become Cuban. The colored
people are patriotic, but retain many of their ancestral
traits. There are no organized classes. The white laborer
is to be distinguished from the colored, and the Spanish
capitalist from the Cuban. In fine, there is no real national
unity, or, as one writer has put it, the Cuban state is "an
almost hypothetical entity," because there is no "Cuban
society."2
A discriminating census, taken by a group of men from
Mississippi, would probably cut down the white man's pro

1As originally planned it was intended to include separate chapters
on the Cuban social inheritance, race
problems, women, and education.
When eventually it was decided to
deal primarily with political conditions since 1902, it seemed desirable
to include at least some hint of these
other matters, in addition to what
appears, incidentally, elsewhere in
the narrative. This chapter is not to
5E


be considered as in any sense a summary, however, but rather as a suggestion that might work out in
formulation into quite different proportions.
'Carrion, Miguel de, El desenvolvimiento social de Cuba en los uiltimos veinte aios, in Cuba contempordnea, v. XXVII, pp. 6-27, at 24;
Sept., 1921.




582


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


portion very materially from the now generally estimated
seventy per cent. The difference is that in the United
States a man is "colored" unless he is all white, while in
Cuba one may "pass for white," notwithstanding a few kinky
hairs and a shadowy complexion. Certainly, many of the
"white" Cubans of the rural districts, or "guajiros," as they
are called, have some negro blood in them. Even on this
basis the whites were once so greatly in the minority that
they were in terror lest Cuba become "another Haiti." That
danger seems now to be too remote for serious consideration,
as the whites, already in the majority, are gaining a greater
and greater preponderance every year. This is due to immigration, which is for the most part white. Thousands of
negro laborers come in each year from Haiti and Jamaica
during cane-cutting season, but most of them are shipped out
again as soon as the crop is gathered. Those who remain
do not multiply to any extent, as they are rarely accompanied by wives. In 1919 the census showed 44,609 persons in Cuba born in other islands of the West Indies, of
whom 8,318 were women.
As already pointed out, the Cuban negro differs from his
racial brother in the United States,3 and many observers
claim that the Cuban is the better of the two. He has the
courteous Spanish manner and personal dignity; his features have little of the thickness so characteristic of the
American negro; he dresses neatly and in reasonably good
taste; and he is not domineering or loud-mouthed.  He
makes a good laborer in the fields, and can be used with
success in some of the lighter forms of manufacturing. His
faults are those of the race wherever it is found. He lacks
morality, as measured by Anglo-Saxon standards, but he
confines his amours to people of his own color, and has not
a Cf. supra, p. 22.




SOCIAL FACTORS IN CUBAN LIFE


583


been guilty of attacks on white women. He is inclined to
idleness, and somewhat addicted to petty dishonesty. He
retains a little more superstition, perhaps, than does the
negro of the United States, and is reputed to find some medium for its expression in his nanigos, or secret societies.
While it could hardly be said that he is on a plane of social
and political equality with the whites, there is a real toleration that allows him to aspire to distinction in any field.
Two negroes have been among the leading figures in the
political life of the republic, Martin Morua Delgado (once
president of the Senate and later Secretary of Agriculture)
and Juan Gualberto Gomez (senator and spellbinder from
Oriente), while there have been many others who have attained to high place not only in politics but also in journalism and literature.
There is a considerable number of Chinese who help to
make up the thirty per cent of Cuba's colored population.
They began to be imported into the country to serve as
laborers during the latter half of the nineteenth century,
but as their coming has always represented almost wholly an
immigration of men, there were few of them left at the
outset of the republican era. According to the census of
1919 there were 16,146 persons of the yellow race in the
island, of whom 15,518 were men. Only 10,300, however,
were definitely entered as Chinese, though doubtless there
were many more in the group styled "unknown." Mention
has already been made of their entry by the thousands in
recent years,4 despite the existence of anti-Mongolian immigration laws. They serve mainly as laborers in the fields,
although a few are merchants or truck gardeners. As in
other parts of the world, they keep to themselves, and
since there are not many women among them they appear
4Cf. supra, pp. 481-482.




584         A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
to be a mere passing factor in the social history of the island.5
By all odds the most important element numerically
among the foreigners are the Spaniards. Thousands come
into Cuba every year, most of them from Galicia and Asturias or other parts of northern Spain; in 1923, for example, the official records showed 46,439 immigrants from
Spain. Most of them intend to return to their native country as soon as they have accumulated wealth enough to live
comfortably thenceforward in the towns where they were
born; so there is a heavy outgoing flow of the Spanish population. For the same reason the great majority of Spanish
immigrants are men. The census of 1919 shows that out
of a total of 272,030 foreigners, 245,644 were Spaniards, or
about eight and a half per cent of the entire population of
the island, but only 58,472 were women, as against 187,172
men.
However Spaniards may have lacked perfection in political
matters, they have usually enjoyed a high rating in the
business world. Certainly this is true of them in Cuba.
They occupy a prominent place in the sugar and tobacco
industries, but in the main they are not so much a landholding as they are a commercial, money-lending class. They
are the principal retail merchants in the island, in big business and in little. While many of them remain in Havana,there were 76,390 in the capital and 97,539 in Havana province as a whole in 1919,-they dominate the mercantile life
of the rural districts almost as outstandingly as that of the
"It must be borne in mind that most uncivil elements of population,"
the racial situation indicated by the or, in other words, "uncivilized
census of 1919 may have been Ethiopians and unabsorbable Asiatics,
changed considerably by the activ- with their smallpox, malaria, feity of the Zayas government in en- tiches, opium, and misery." Qrtiz.,
couraging "the public and clandes- 29.
tine immigration of the worst and




SOCIAL FACTORS IN CUBAN LIFE


585


cities. The Spanish-owned bodega, or general store, is not
merely the retail emporium, but also the place of resort for
a loan (perhaps at usurious interest) or as an exchange where
one may dispose of his crop. The Spaniard is in every sense
of the word a good worker and a good business man. He
has vigor, energy, endurance, and determination; he will
work long hours effectively and without complaint; and his
word, once pledged, is "as good as his bond." Any hostility the Cubans may have felt toward the Spaniards has
long since passed. Now, there is at times an agitation for
a more permanent form of Spanish immigration,-for Spaniards who will come with their families and take out naturalization papers,-but the canny Iberian still prefers to look
upon Cuba as the royal road to an eventual life of ease in
Spain,-a wealth to be obtained, not now in politics, but
in a game he plays much better, in business.
There is a paternalistic flavor to the life of most Spaniards in Cuba that is more akin to the practices of a medieval
guild than it is to society as it exists in the United States.
Thousands of Spaniards come as apprentices, or "dependents," as they are called, to an already established business, recommended to some friend or relative by their fathers
in Spain. They receive a salary, but a large portion is put
to their credit toward an eventual partnership in the business. When the senior partner betakes himself to Spain,
the others below him "move up a notch." The "dependent"
in the business has very little personal freedom in the initial
stages of his career. The senior partner is at one and the
same time his business superior and in the place of a father,
-an autocratic, though usually kindly, father if he wills.
The young man will hardly leave the shop, day or night,
except for his "night off," once a month, or when he may
have been given permission to go to night-school or to his




586       A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
club. "To his club,"-for nearly all the Spaniards in Cuba
belong to some club named for the region whence they came.
In January 1926, for example, the Galician Club of Havana
had a membership of 67,712 members, the Asturian Club 60,351, and two others respectively 44,243 and 16,859. Obviously, many of the members do not reside in Havana. These
great institutions are for the common benefit of members, a
kind of insurance against sickness or other misfortune, as
well as for pleasurable associations. The dues are comparatively light, but the "turnover" in collections is so
great that the organizations themselves are very wealthy,
with club-houses that are the wonder of every visitor to
Havana. If one seeks for faults in the Spanish population
he finds it in the normal characteristics of the race,-more
particularly in a weakness for women. The well-to-do among
them also like a game of chance. These are matters of no
very great concern, however. The real Spanish problem,
as the Cubans see it, is how to get more Spaniards who will
come and take root as citizens of the republic.
Although there are some considerable colonies from various European and Hispanic American countries, the United
States ranks next to Spain among white countries in the
number of its citizens who live in Cuba, while the business interests of Americans surpass those of any other foreign people. Unlike the Spaniards, most American residents of Cuba have their families with them, it would seem,
for in a total of 9,555 Americans in 1919, there were 5,278
men and 4,277 women. Nevertheless, the great majority
expect to return to the United States, although there is no
inconsiderable proportion of them who are satisfied to stay
in Cuba for the rest of their days. Other considerable
white colonies in 1919 were those from Mexico (3,469),
France (2,340), and Great Britain (1,089), with about eleven




SOCIAL FACTORS IN CUBAN LIFE


587


thousand more scattering, and possibly a number of others
from the islands of the West Indies whose immigrants in
Cuba are mainly negro.
The Cubans themselves may be divided into three social
groups, depending very largely on their position in the
economic life of the country. At one extreme are the laborers, many of them negro or negroid. At the other are
the land-holding class, made up of people of white blood.
In between are the men in the professions and the politicians,
mostly white in the upper ranks, but containing a considerable proportion of negroid elements, notably among the
holders of government soft jobs, or botellas. The laborers of the cities do not differ sufficiently from laborers in
the United States to call for comment here, although mention may be made of their radicalism on the one hand and
of a lower standard of living they have on the other. The
guajiro, however, has no parallel in the United States. He is
a rural wanderer. Now and then he will work for somebody else, and at other times will "squat" in any locality
he likes, build himself a hovel, raise a crop, and remain
there until ordered to move on. He is able to do this because there are many vast estates in Cuban hands that
are not worked by their owners, since taxes are collected
only on developed lands. The recent phenomenal growth
of the sugar industry has very greatly reduced the opportunities available to the guajiro squatter, however.
Contrary to a pretty generally diffused opinion, Cuba is
not "owned" by foreigners, but belongs in greatest part to
the Cubans themselves, especially those of the great landowning class. To be sure, they are in a sense subordinated
to the foreign-owned sugar companies (except as they themselves have large holdings in these corporations) and to other
business interests in the hands of Americans, Englishmen,




588


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


and Spaniards. Their position is impregnable, however, so
long as they hold the land. Unquestionably these people
are the "best" in Cuban society, educated as well as wealthy,
genteel, honorable, and delightful. They live apart from
politics, unless forced to take a hand indirectly in defence
of their properties. Naturally, they are conservative in tendency and not sympathetic to the government that has developed in Cuba under the republic. That is not to say they
are not patriotic, although it would be difficult to determine just what stand they might take with regard to the
ultimate political destiny of Cuba.
The professional and political class is made up of widely
varying elements, but they are alike in origin in that they
are the heirs of the workers for independence. Many of
those in the professions, including most doctors, some teachers, and a few lawyers, lean rather to the ideals of the landholding class, but the others depend frankly on political connections as their principal support in the battle for existence. The Spaniards may be the merchants, American and
Cuban proprietors between them control the great agricultural resources of the island, but the leaders in the Army
of Liberation have taken their reward in the "ownership"
of the government. If financially successful they may make
a place for themselves or their descendants in the ranks of
the landed aristocracy. Meanwhile, they cling to "the government," both as a living and as a hope. They are the
nearest thing to a native-born middle class that Cuba possesses, but their destiny is to go up to the Cuban "four hundred," or down to the hopeless mass, or else to remain as
they are, a parasite, a detriment, and a danger.
There are of course numerous cross-cuts in Cuban society
along other lines than those treated here.  One of these
involves a distinction between people who liv6 in Havana




SOCIAL FACTORS IN CUBAN LIFE


589


and those who dwell elsewhere in the republic. The wealth
and power of the country tends to concentrate in the capital.
Especially is this true of the native-born element among the
land-holding and political classes. A study of Parker, Cubans
of to-day, shows not only that the great majority of those
named in that volume reside in the city of Havana, but also
that most of them were born in the province. While Parker
concerned himself primarily with officials, writers, physicians,
and teachers, the same result undoubtedly would be obtained for wealthy Cubans not coming within the above categories. Indeed, a composite Cuban leader, on the basis
of the comparative numbers of those included in Cubans
of to-day, would not only be a native of Havana province
and a resident of the capital, but he would also be a graduate
of the University of Havana (the majority), although he
would have spent some time abroad (over half of those
listed,-mostly in the United States, with about a third receiving part of their education in a foreign country). He
might be a veteran of the War of Independence (about a
third), and would most likely be an official, with perhaps
some other profession, too, notably journalism. A comparison with Who's who in. America shows a much wider distribution of leadership in the United States, both in territory and
in profession. To be sure, there may be a difference in the
character of the two volumes mentioned, but the generalization as to the overwhelming predominance of the capital in
the social life of Cuba holds true.
From the foregoing it will be seen that Cuban society is
indeed a conglomerate of many diverse elements. The only
thing that brings unity into the whole is the underlying
factor of an American-tinctured Hispanic character.  On
this basis the Cubans of all classes will be found to have
much in common, though in varying proportions. They




590


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


have not yet emancipated themselves from the evils of their
Hispanic heritage. They frankly put family, friends, and
self ahead of the welfare of the country. They indulge themselves in whatever appeals to their material ego. Thus,
illicit unions with women play a large part in the life of
men, and are no bar sinister to social prestige or even the
highest political office. This is a factor which is productive not only of offences involving moral turpitude but
also of crimes of violence and physical and mental disease.
One manifestation is in a certain fondness for the perusal
of pornographic literature, the sale of which is virtually unrestricted.6 Indeed, most of the ills which afflict the people
of Cuba might be traced to that Hispan.,ielf-indulgence
which is one of the foundation stones of Cuban character
and which has in some respects become worse than it was
at the source on account of a greater New World lack of
discipline than existed in the mother country Spain.7 The
native-born Cuban is likely to be improvident and addicted


Among allusions to the pornographic literature evil may be noted
the comments in Barbarrosa: 49;
121; and Wright, 97.
7For a rather pessimistic discussion of Cuba's evil Hispanic heritage,
see Carri6n, Op. cit., at pp. 12-13.
Enrique Jose Varona, in a comparatively mild and subdued fashion, has
frequently lectured the Cubans about
their faults. In his Nuestra indisciplina (Cuba contempordnea, v. IV
[Jan., 1914], pp. 12-16) he called particular attention to the Cuban lack
of discipline, which had become more
pronounced since the winning of independence. In an address of 1915
(Recepcion en la Academia nacional
de artes y letras: discurso leido el
dia 11 de enero de 1915, in Varona,
Por Cuba: discursos [Habana. 1918],
pp. 315-342) he gave a general detunciation of the vices in Cuban life,
reaching the conclusion that "Re

publican Cuba seems to be a twin
sister of Cuba of colonial times," to
the accompaniment of "incompetence,
favoritism, nepotism, and corruption,"
with "justice... in hands that ignorance makes stupid, when interest
does not twist them," and politics of
the same dishonest mould as in the
pre-independence era. "Only in this
have we progressed: our parasites
are not foreign, but indigenous." In
a similar vein is an address by him
in 1921 (Discurso leido... la noche
del 22 de diciembre de 1921, in
Academia nacional de artes y letras,
v. VI [Habana. 1921], pp. 239-246.
The most scathing denunciation of
the ills of Cuban life, however, is to
be found in Ortiz, La decadencia
cubana, a remarkable pamphlet of
1924, in which the assertions of its
author are backed pp by an array
of statistical data that is startling in
its reach.




SOCIAL FACTORS IN CUBAN LIFE                    591
to gambling. There is very little ambition for fame, very
little altruism  that reaches beyond one's immediate circle,
and therefore very little real work or achievement. It is
probable that no man in Cuba has such a detailed knowledge of his own country as has the American ambassador,
General Crowder. There are not even any government
statistics worthy of the name. If there is personal pride,
it is too often merely in a display of wealth. Thus one
will find good automobiles-the modern "baronial escutcheon" in Hispanic America-in a country that lacks highways and even in cities that do not possess a single hundredyard stretch of ordinarily decent road.8 Even the usually
praiseworthy factor of family love has its dark side, for it
leads not only to nepotism in politics,9 but also to extravagance and to over-indulgence of the whims of children. If
a man's son cheats at school, commits rape, robs, or does
a murder he may be sure that he will be defended by his
father to the best of his ability against the "injustice" of
punishment. The sole unpardonable fault is infidelity of
one's own wife. These are generalizations, to be sure, and
subject to qualification. One such would be that the women,
as in all lands, are very much better than the men,-certainly so, from the standpoint of conduct.10
8 Due to bad road conditions, the women by Cuban writers. There is
reckless Hispanic mode of driving, much of value, however, in Cuban
and lack of care, automobiles in Cuba novels, such, for example, as those of
do not last long. In Manzanillo, for Raimundo Cabrera. A somewhat unexample (as a sales agent told the sympathetic, but searching and usewriter), there were some four hun- ful account, is to be found in the
dred good machines in 1924, but not chapter entitled Home life in Wright,
a single repair shop  There is a 98-133. As the author says of Cuban
market, however, as anybody who parents: "Their love for their offhappens to have made some money spring is not the less sincere because
is likely to buy an expensive auto- it is tempered by neither wisdom nor
mobile, whether he can use it or foresight." Ibid., 102. There is a
not.                             brief and unfavorable characteriza9Cf. supra, p. 465.            tion of Cuban women in Franck, 45 -"It is, of course, difficult to find 48, which, however, has something of
a non-partisan discussion of Cuban interest in it.




592


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


In the light of these evils in Cuban character the already described iniquities of Cuban politics become reasonably explicable. Among a people accustomed to self-indulgence, with personal profit at state expense a tradition
of the land, most individuals work frankly and whole-heartedly for themselves. To struggle for reputation, glory, or
achievement for such an abstraction as the nation, at the
risk of sacrificing one's own comfort, would be to play the
part of a fool. And advancement comes, not through merit,
but through influence. It is far more worth while to be
able to say "I have the backing of Senator So-and-So" than
to have the greatest ability, broadest information, or best
product when one is seeking a favor. It is often said that
the "better people" in the United States do not go in for
politics, but that is far more accurately the case in Cuba.
If only the politicians were a little more moderate in their
graft deals, so that there might be no appreciable danger of
their ruining the country, decent persons would hardly give
the government a thought, except perhaps to refer contemptuously to "those canaille!", as if to people of a different
world. In other words, the atmosphere is favorable to political shortcomings in Cuba. Many of the evils incidental
to the activities of government have already been recounted.
Some of them which have a direct bearing on social conditions are worth mentioning here.
Education in the republican era has been going backwards
instead of forward. Cuba is now fifty-three per cent illiterate, and sixty-eight per cent of the Cuban children do not
enter school. In 1900 fifty per cent more children attended
school (seventy-five each thousand) than do so now (fifty
a thousand in 1920). Only one child in each hundred gets
as far as the fifth grade. Seventy-one pupils but of 234,000
attending school in 1919 finished their studies, or less than




SOCIAL FACTORS IN CUBAN LIFE


593


a third of one per cent, and only one out of every 215 goes
through the primary schools. Just one schoolhouse has been
built in a Cuban city since independence, and only eighty
in the country."l It is hardly necessary to add that these
conditions are not due to any lack of expenditures! It is
also unnecessary to say that the above figures do not agree
with the so-called "statistics" of the Cuban government; in
Zayas's message to Congress of April 7, 1924, for example,
it was made to appear that Cuba was only 27.1 per cent
illiterate, a record that was better than that of any other
country in Hispanic America.
Conditions are particularly bad in the primary schools.
In 1922 Ramiro Guerra, vice-president of the University
Pedagogical Association, published a pamphlet in which he
made eighteen recommendations for an improvement of the
system, which, however, might better be described as
eighteen revelations of existing evils along the lines mentioned above. He found the root of the trouble in politics,
even though the Secretary of Public Instruction might happen to be a man of understanding and good character, for
he would have to struggle "against vested interests, established habits, and professional politicians accustomed to avail
themselves of the secretariat to satisfy the needs of their
local politics." In Guerra's opinion, "All the electoral, political, banking, and financial reforms will be ephemeral and
inefficacious if based on a population the majority of which
is made up of illiterates." 12 In 1924 Alfredo Maria Aguayo,
president of the above-named association and a professor
of pedagogy in the University, made a similar arraignment
of conditions, going a little farther, in that he asserted that
"Ortiz, 10-13.             gogica (Habana. 1922. 15pp.), espe'Guerra y Sanchez, Ramiro, Un cially at pp. 13-15.
programa nacional de accion peda



594          A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
not one Secretary of Public Instruction since 1902 had been
anything more than a dilettante in educational affairs. He
denounced the government in this connection for its lack of
idealism, its incompetence, and its lack of loyalty to the
cause of the school, claiming that the system      had already
taken on the characteristics of colonial times, and holding
that it must be removed from      direct governmental control
if anything worth while was to be accomplished.13         Other
equally searching criticisms of the workings of Cuban primary education might also be quoted to the same effect.14
Higher education, in the six high schools of Cuba (one for
each province) and the University of Havana, also suffers
from various ills, though not nearly so many as in the institutions lower down. The University is in the main a typical
Hispanic American professional school, with the usual four
colleges of law, medicine, engineering, and arts and sciences,
the last-named primarily devoted to the training of teachers.
By way of illustration it is worthy of note that there is just
one professor of history and no course in the history of Cuba;
Cuban history is taught in infantile fashion in the primary
schools, and there only. Students are in the University to
work, however, and have few "activities" outside the classroom. As in other Hispanic countries, much of their spare
time is devoted to a somewhat extraordinary interest in
politics.15
18Aguayo, Alfredo Maria, Factores Cuba contempordnea, v. XXXIII, pp.
cualitativos de nuestra decadencia es- 325-382; Dec., 1923.
colar, in Revista bimestre cubana, v.  "5 The following is a rather vivid deXIX, pp. 81-95; Mar.-Apr., 1924.  scription of the University as it was
4 Two in particular are worthy of in 1910 and as, to a great extent, it
note on account of the high char- still is today:
acter and scholarship of the men   "It seems strange, yet is a fact,
who wrote them: the already cited that the University has always been
pamphlet of Ortiz and another by co-educational... for it was so far
Carlos Trelles, entitled La instruc- from the thought 6f its founders that
cion primaria de Cuba comparada women would attehd that they forgot
con la de algunos otros paises, in to bar them, and now perhaps one




SOCIAL FACTORS IN CUBAN LIFE


595


The propensity of the students to mingle in political affairs
seems at first thought commendable, but the Cuban youth,
although he has the merit of good intentions, flies off the
handle too readily in radical demonstrations that are far
more indicative of lack of discipline than they are of righteousness and good judgment. On questions touching the
University itself he may have something more of wisdom.
Late in 1923, for example, conditions at the University were
suffering from dry rot as of a government bureau. Many of
the professors were little better than holders of a botella,
doing nothing at all for their pay. The situation was corrected in a manner that certainly knows no parallel in the
history of universities in the United States. The students,
disgusted with the "cutting" of their professors, rose in
armed rebellion, drove the faculty off the campus, and for
two days held possession of the University. The government
hesitated to do anything, fearful lest it might incur the unpopularity that the Spanish government suffered in the
famous case of the student martyrs. So, presently, what


sixth or even a fifth of the students
are girls; most of these are enrolled
in the school of pedagogics... Of
what Americans know as 'college life'
there is none at all in this University.
When I investigated I found that the
student body was not organized; there
were no elections... I found no
rushes, rows, and rivalries between
the 'years.' In fact, the courses are
so arranged that no recognition of
classes is practicable.  There were
no flourishing athletic organizations... There is no gymnasium...
There is no campus daily paper, no
comic weekly, no literary monthly... In short, the student here never
goes to college; he merely attends
school. He goes to classes and he
comes home again,-not to a dormitory or a club or a friendly 'frat
house, but to a bordin.. What,
besides 'beating' his boarding house,


is the young man doing with his
leisure time? The question had better pass uninvestigated. They are a
solemn set, these Cuban students,
pale, emaciated, and sunken eyed.
I'd like to think it is consumption
of too much midnight oil ails all of
them. Some, certainly, are seriousminded and well-informed, and they
take a surprising, and, to an American, inexplicable, interest in matters
one might imagine would concern
them not at all. They frequently
lead in demonstrations for or against
the government... There is perhaps no body in this community any
single man or institution desires less
to antagonize, nor any body that,
once antagonized, or, vice versa,
pleased, can make its opinions quite
so obvious to all concerned, as can
the students of Havana University."
Wright, 35-37.




596


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


amounted to a surrender to the students was arranged, with
the dismissal of more than a hundred professors. Also, a
new method was adopted for choosing a president of the
University. He was to be elected every two years by
the alumni, faculty, and students, each of which groups
was to have an equal vote! The University is located
on an eminence in the Vedado district, commanding a fine
view of the city, bay, and ocean. Formerly it was the site
of a Spanish powder factory, and it still has several onetime military patios, or open courts, now attractively planted
to flowers and trees. Some of the buildings are excellent,
though more are needed. American influences are beginning
to make themselves felt, even to the point of the possession
of a stadium (in course of erection in 1924) where various
games are played, including baseball and, oddly enough,
American football. This apparently marks a conscious effort
toward the development of a University spirit among the
students, as distinguished from the purely professional spirit
of the typical Hispanic American institution of higher
learning. In 1926 there were 4499 students at the University, of whom 2928 were in daily attendance and 1571
doing part-time work. The government does not interfere
in the management of the University, if indeed it also
neglects it.
Another matter, which, like education, is at least akin to
the realm of letters, may perhaps be discussed more appropriately under the heading of social factors: the newspapers. In Hispanic America the newspaper ordinarily performs the same function as the newspapers and moderately
serious popular magazines perform jointly in the United
States, for no vast body of magazine readers per se has as
yet been built up. While less true in Cuba than in most
of the southern republics, it is nevertheless a fact that news



SOCIAL FACTORS IN CUBAN LIFE


597


papers are still the principal resort of the people, not merely
for news, but also for more or less serious articles. Editorials, too, have an importance in the public mind that they
appear to have lost in the United States. The press of Cuba
is almost solely the press of Havana. Each considerable
town will have its daily, or two or three of them, or perhaps
only a weekly, but they contain local items, in the main, and
have little of general interest except the national and foreign
news, which is given in far more ample detail by the papers
of Havana. Indeed, the latter are the chief reliance of the
people in all parts of the island; even the great and relatively
distant city of Santiago depends more on the journals from
the capital than it does on the local sheets. One thing of
note does appear in the provincial papers. They bring out
that Havana, with its politicians, is a parasite on the rest
of the country, and bitterly resent the favoritism for the
capital in national services and the neglect of the other districts of the island. In some respects the papers of Havana
are a part of the United States news' system,-certainly
more so than elsewhere in Hispanic America. Events in the
northern republic vie with those in Cuba in allotment of
space, and sports in particular, notably major league ballgames, are followed with quite as keen an interest and understanding as they are in the United States. European news
is treated in about the same fashion as in the American
papers, except that some of the Havana dailies pay special
attention to Spain, thus recognizing the natural demand of
the great Spanish population of Cuba. Nevertheless, the
Havana papers display the Hispanic American characteristics
already mentioned, as well as some others, such as a freedom
of speech that is a never-ending marvel to the Anglo-American reader and a financial reason for existence that is all too
obviously based on political graft.




598


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


The number of newspapers in Havana is a constantly
varying quantity, but it is always astonishingly large. In
1917, for example, there were thirty-seven dailies in Havana
of presumably general circulation, or more than twice as
many as there were in New York City.16 Taking into account the difference in population, that would have meant
a ratio of forty or fifty to one in favor of Havana, in a country where more than half the people were illiterate and
most of the rest too poor to part lightly with the five-cent
piece which is the normal price of a paper. It cannot be
the advertising that pays the expense of printing, for circulation is limited. There remains one further source of revenue, which is asserted on every hand and frankly admitted
by journalists themselves: the illegal government subsidy
for political purposes. "Freedom of speech," too, takes no
account of libel, and at times is employed, beyond a doubt, as
the basis of blackmail. Naturally, one expects to find politics somehow responsible, and, if so, is sure not to be disappointed. There is a normally greater latitude in speech
in Hispanic countries than in English-speaking lands, but
in its extreme forms in Cuba this practice springs from the
congressional immunity evil. Most of the newspapers of
Havana are controlled by congressmen, or else have congressmen as editorial writers on their staffs. These men
can say anything, and as the laws are interpreted in Cuba
incur no responsibility. By extension, the newspapers for
which they write,-or at least to which they lend their names,
-seem also to be immune from punishment, unless the national executive may happen to suspend them during some
' Marvin, George, Keeping Cuba reference to New York newspapers
libre, in World's work, v. XXXIV, must have been merely to those in
pp. 553-567, at 566; Sept., 1917. The English, of genial circulation.




SOCIAL FACTORS IN CUBAN LIFE


599


emergency at a time when they have taken sides against
the administration.17
This is not to say that there are no good newspapers in
Havana. Several are excellent from every standpoint. A
few others have merits, if also their conduct is not wholly
to be commended. The dean of the Havana press is Diario
de la Marina, founded in 1830. This is the organ of the
Spanish colony, and therefore attached to no political party,
but in general it is conservative in tendency. Whatever
Diario de la Marina has to say is worthy of consideration,
as it is perhaps the most nearly independent journal in the
capital and is a reputable publication. Naturally, Spanish
news gets a lot of space in this paper. El Mercurio is one of
several commercil papers, and is excellent of its kind. It
is devoted to the interests of the Cuban sugar men, and
avoids politics, except as that affects business. For news
concerning sugar, tobacco, custom-house regulations, and
the various markets this is probably the best paper in Cuba.
Perhaps the most influential daily is Heraldo de Cuba, about
which one may hear many stories pro and con. Founded
by Orestes Ferrara and edited later by Carlos Mendieta,
both men of extraordinary prestige in Cuba, this paper is
now in the hands of Gustavo Gonzalez Beauville, a member
of the House of Representatives. If there were but one
paper in Havana capable of existing without a political
subsidy, this surely would be that one, as it has the largest
circulation in the island. And if it does get a subsidy it can
hardly be from the national executive, as no paper has more
violently and unrestrainedly attacked the Cuban Presidents
"These evils are discussed freely many,-is Impressions, in Diario de
by the newspapers themselves,-with la marina, translated in Havana Post,
regard to other newspapers, which are July 12, 1924. This objects to the
sometimes referred to generally, but practice of employing congressmen as
not infrequently mentioned specifi- newspaper men.
cally. One such editorial,-out of




600        A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
than has Heraldo de Cuba. Some refer to it as a "yellow
journal," but the writer is inclined to believe that it is one
of the most valuable sources of information about Cuba
among Cuban periodicals. To be sure, it is destructive in
its comment, but it provides something more than rhetoric,
as it has the financial resources to enable it to get at the
facts.
One group of papers, commonly regarded as belonging
to the Govin family, contains three prominent dailies, El
Mundo (a morning paper, edited for many years by Rafael
Maria Govin), La Prensa (which comes out in the afternoon), and the Havana Post (the leading English-language
paper). El Mundo perhaps ranks second in the island in
circulation, and it has enormous resources behind it, but
there its resemblance to Heraldo de Cuba stops. If El
Mundo does not get a government subsidy, then all the
writer's informants in Cuba are mistaken. It is difficult to
escape the impression that the Govin family is in business
for the money and makes "policies" subservient to the
pocket-book. El Mundo adopts the attitude of an intensely
"nationalistic" sheet, and so is always looking for a chance
to attack "Yankee imperialism," not only in Cuba but also
in other parts of the Americas,-or the Philippines, for that
matter. The writer is not familiar with a certain New York
paper, said to be another property of the Govin family,
but doubts whether it is as anti-American as El Mundo.s1
El Mundo poses as an independent journal in politics and
in other respects, but its "courtesy" to Cuban Presidents,any of them,-is in marked contrast to the straight speaking
18 The writer has it on good author- decoration, by discussing methods
ity that one member of the family with Alfonso XIII of making Spanis reputed to have sought to ingra- ish propaganda in Hispanic America
tiate himself in the favor of the king to defeat Unitd States influence
of Spain, with a view to obtaining a there.




SOCIAL FACTORS IN CUBAN LIFE           601
of Heraldo de Cuba. In its editorial tone El Mundo has
an air of being the watch-dog and saviour of Cuba, but its
protests against administrative evils are usually mild to the
point of politeness.
La Prensa is too much like El Mundo to merit consideration, but the Havana Post demands attention. The writer
doubts the supposed connection between this paper and the
Govin family, not so much because it has a radically different
policy, as because it openly charges El Mundo with being a
subsidized sheet and is able to attack such pet projects of the
proprietors of El Mundo as the Govin immigration bill of
1925.19 The Havana Post is an excellent newspaper, the
best English-language paper with which the writer is acquainted in Hispanic America. It is a patriotic American
journal, devoted to the interests of the American colony, but
takes a great interest in the "passing show" of Cuban life,
political and otherwise. Three of its features are especially
noteworthy. One is its weekly summary of Cuban news,a convenient medium of information. Another its two columns of. translations, daily, of leading editorials in other
Cuban papers. And third the comments of "A Sage," presumably Mr. John Thomas Wilford, the very capable editor
of the paper, who has been connected with the Post since
1909, though not as editor until 1919. In his somewhat more
restrained American style, "A Sage" lacks only a little of
being as frank as Heraldo de Cuba in condemning existing
evils. His manner, however, is rather that of a man who is
laughing a bit cynically at a people whom he cannot take
seriously, certainly in so far as their politics are concerned.
Nevertheless, what he says is worth while, because the "Sage"
brings real intellectual power to his task, fortified by detailed information, the perspective of a foreigner, and an
19 Cf. supra, p. 500.




602        A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
intimate acquaintance with Cuban character. There is another American publication, not a newspaper, which is
deserving of mention: the Times of Cuba, a monthly review.
Under the able editorship of Mr. Edward O'Brien this
periodical has acquired a vast circulation. It is one of the
best condensed sources of information about Cuba, especially
along economic lines, that there is in the island.
Certain papers of Havana are ordinarily classed as Liberal,
while others are Conservative, with El Triunfo and La Discusi6n as the two leaders, respectively.20 Heraldo de Cuba
is often called Liberal, but, while it is anti-Conservative, it
is quite as likely to attack members and policies of the Liberal party. The life of the party journal is in direct ratio
to the success of the party in politics, now on the highroad
of affluence, now falling to the level of infrequent publication
or even suspension. El Sol and El Heraldo 21 are papers
without definite political tendency, though more Liberal
than Conservative. They are like Heraldo de Cuba in their
propensity to criticize, but do not have the financial resources to be equally independent and above suspicion. La
Lucha is one of a group of three, including also La Noche
and El Imparcial, which are the property of a man named
Jose Hernandez Guzman. These papers are a complaisant
lot, backing opposite policies with great facility. It is said
that the owner supported the three leading candidates for
the presidency in the early stages of the campaign of 1924,
lending Imparcial to Menocal, Noche to Machado, and
Lucha to Zayas. La Lucha was once the property of a
Spaniard named San Miguel who had fought the independence movement, but remained in Cuba to publish a news"Nacidn was once a prominent Menocal campaign.
Liberal paper, and Dia and Nuevo  JHeraldo has lately ceased pubpais were Conservative dailies. Dia lication.
was revived in 1924 at the time of the




SOCIAL FACTORS IN CUBAN LIFE


603


paper under the republic. When asked why he had done
so, he is said to have replied, with a sweeping gesture: "I
remain-to attend the funeral of this."  He therefore used
his paper primarily to enhance his own fortune by fair means
or foul, but also to stir up discord, urging all sides on "to
every possible calamity."22  Another prominent daily in
Havana is El Pais, which, like Diario de la Marina, caters
a great deal to the Spanish colony. La Politica Comica is a
humorous weekly, which, nevertheless, has a certain importance in the political field. There are yet other papers, and
there is much more that could be said about those named
here, some of it in their favor, and some (with perhaps added
details about subsidies) that is not so good. Taken together
they are an incomparable source of information about Cuban
affairs, for theyTtend to check one another, and from the
standpoint of their value as newspapers they are at least
vigorously and attractively written, and reasonably well
supplied with information on the events of the day.23
Something has already been said about the startling increase in crime in Cuba, due to amnesties, pardons, congressional immunity, and the inept and dishonest administration of justice. In like manner gambling, forbidden by law
but protected by government officials, who are partners or
proprietors in these enterprises, flourishes to such a degree
that Cuba is often called the "Monte Carlo of America."
The lottery, the cock-fight, jai-alai, horse-racing, and the
Casino are merely better known instruments of a habit that
reaches beyond them into every nook and cranny of the
nation. Prostitution, too, is a running-mate of gambling.
22Wright, 146.             ed by N. W. Ayer and Sons, which
For a brief statement about includes Havana papers, as well as
Cuban newspapers as of any given those of the United States and Cantime, one may consult the American ada.
newspaper annual and directory, edit



604


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


Over a period of ten years cases of abduction doubled and
corruption of minors quadrupled. Suicides increased seven
times over, between 1899 and 1923; in comparison with the
United States the people of Cuba have a violent desire to
kill themselves that is eight times greater than that of their
neighbors.24 In some countries religion might serve as a
disciplinary factor to hold the people in check, but in Cuba
the church seems to have lost its grip; a writer who wishes
to win applause can do so easily by lashing at the church,
which surely is very different from conditions as they are in
the United States.
Social evils are always more easy to discern than excellences, but it must not be imagined for a moment that
the Cubans lack their normal share of good traits offsetting
the bad. They are generous to a fault, and except as they
may have reached the point of luxury are industrious, eager
to learn, and quick in doing so. Above all, however, they
possess, along with others of the Hispanic race, that delightful quality of friendliness and likeableness that is embodied
in the Spanish word "simpatia" (literally, but not accurately,
"sympathy"), a word that has no exact rendering in English,
since the thing itself does not too clearly exist among AngloAmerican peoples. For example, despite a greater class
separation than in the United States, there is a democracy
of manner that the northern republic never knows. A man
at the top of the social scale will converse familiarly, and
not condescendingly, With one of the opposite category. On
the other hand, a waiter may pick up your newspaper and
stand by your table and read it, if you are not using it.
Withal, there is no passing of the boundaries of real courtesy
and respect. The very characteristics which are productive
of so much evil have also their attractive side. If a man
'Ortiz, 21-23.                     i




SOCIAL FACTORS IN CUBAN LIFE


605


will unblushingly violate the proprieties on his own account,
he at least is willing to let others conduct their lives in the
way they see fit, provided they occasion no trouble to himself. In consequence there is an atmosphere of personal
freedom that is almost unknown in the United States, where
all one's activities are subordinated to "what people may
say." Americans ordinarily cannot grasp the full flavor of
this freedom unless they have lived for long periods of time
in Hispanic countries, and when they do comprehend it, it
is the thing that most often decides them to abandon their
native land and remain where one is free to be himself. In
other words, the Cubans are individualists, and, whatever
there may be against such an ideal on many scores, it also
carries with it azest of life that conformity to "the group"
can never yield. The very politicians, whose shortcomings
the writer has so freely described, are far more likeable as
human beings than the most puritanically God-fearing,
"good" Americans have ever been. Furthermore, there is
nothing that is hopelessly bad in Cuban character. The
evils can be met and overcome, without destroying the praiseworthy features. There has already been something of "improvement" in a quarter century of republican life. Cubans
live better than they did,-more hygienically, more comfortably, with better clothing, and more of the concomitants
of a high social order, in the way of municipal services, theatres, good shops, and what not. There is less of social
stigma attached to work, higher educational ideals (despite
governmental practices), even a somewhat lessening tolerance of children's faults, and very much greater freedom for
women. In other words, underneath an all too easily visible
surface of badness there is a deep current flowing that moves
on to better things.
Thus far in this recital the writer has discussed the social




606


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


order in terms of "evil" and "good," as those words are ordinarily understood in English. If, however, he were writing
more as a philosopher than as a historian he might banish
these terms, especially the former, altogether. It is open
to question whether life may not be better in Cuba than
it is in the United States. For example, the moralist may
find it necessary to condemn jai-alai25 as it is played in
Havana, or even baseball, because of the attendant gambling,26 but individuals enjoy them, quite apart from any


' Jai-alai, called "pelota" (ball) in
Spain and "fronton" (from the word
for the "court" in which it is played)
in Mexico, and usually translated as
"Basque ball" in English, is a beautiful and attractive game belonging
to the same "family" as tennis and
hand-ball. It may even have been
the ancestor of the two last-named
sports. At any rate, it is of an ancient vintage in the history of the
Basque provinces of northern Spain
The court is a rectangle 210 feet long
and sixteen wide, paved with cement,
and bounded by a front, rear, and
one long side wall of smooth-surfaced
granite. On the other long side, beyond a narrow space of open ground,
are the seats for the public. The
ball is like an enlarged golf ball,
solid and very fast. It is handled
by the players through the medium
of a curve-shaped cesta, or basket,
which is two or three feet long and
just wide enough to admit of receiving the ball.   There are various
games, but the one most often played
is  between   two-men   teams   of
"whites" and "blues."  The ball is
served against the front wall, and
then is to be played on the fly or
first bound by a member of the
other side. It may bound against
the side or rear walls without its
counting against the player, as only
the bound on the floor is considered. The play goes back and forth,
first one side handling the ball and
then the other, until a player misses
or hits out of bounds. That scores


a point for the other side. The game
may last any stipulated number of
points, but it is usually twenty-five
or thirty in Havana. It calls for a
dexterity, skill, gracefulness, and
speed that have to be seen to be appreciated. Gambling on the result,
however, is an all too apparent accompaniment,-indeed, an "audible"
one, for blocks away. A Cuban
crowd,-or a Spanish one, for that
matter, as many of those in attendance are Spaniards and so too most
of the players,-is not satisfied with
a single beforehand bet on the result,
but wagers are made mostly during
the process of the play, and at surprising odds. A team leading thirteen to nine may be held as high
as five to one,-and a few minutes
later a rally may cause the odds to
veer  in  the  opposite  direction.
Withal, there is a din that never
stops until the game is finished. The
popular term "Palace of Shouts"
(Gritos) for the court in Havana is
well deserved, but the actual amount
of noise is almost greater to the
cubic inch than it would be to the
cubic foot in any athletic contest in
the United States. It must be remembered, too, that the betting is
heavy, reaching into hundreds or even
thousands of dollars, though the individual with the "roll" may look as
if he didn't know where his next
cent was coming from.
'Franck, 25-29, has an interesting
description df baseball as it is played
in Cuba. In this case, howeyer, the




SOCIAL FACTORS IN CUBAN LIFE


607


false notions they may have as to their prospects of gaining
sudden wealth. It makes for not a little human happiness.
Undoubtedly, also, it is productive of a great deal of misery,
-for a kind of corruptly diverted perspective that may serve
in a measure to check social "progress." Is there not some
mean between the extremes of prohibition on the one hand
and unbridled license on the other? This, of course, is not
a question for the historian to answer, but he would leave a
false idea of the facts in the minds of his readers if he did
not at least present a suggestion of the spirit in things as
they are, as well as the mere external appearance in a language that might well be misinterpreted in another direc

story of the gambling is somewhat
overdrawn; at any rate, in several
games that the present writer saw,
the great majority of the grand-stand
crowd seemed to take no part in the
betting. Nevertheless, there was a
great deal of gambling, if, indeed,
less than in jai-alai, and the enthusiasm of the crowd surpassed even
that of a World's Series ball-game in
the United States. The Cubans play
real baseball, and several of their
athletes have distinguished themselves in the great leagues of the
United States. Adolfo Luque, playing with Cincinnati, was the champion pitcher of America in 1923 and
1925, and Miguel Gonzales has for
years rated as one of the best catchers in baseball. The Cuban papers
give a lot of space to the game, and
the accounts have a Hispanic freedom and spiritedness that make them
far more vivid than the average
"story" in the American newspaper.
The Cincinnati team of the National
League,-"our beloved Cincy," as
they call it,-is the favorite "big
league" club of the Cuban people,
for Cuban players have more often
been given a chance by that team
than by any other.
'7 While there is little that could


be characterized as a serious social
study concerning Cuba, there is, of
course, a vast body of materials
that might be utilized. There are
a great many books of description
and travel by Americans dealing with
Cuba and scores of articles, most
of them rather superficial. One volume, however, is especially worthy of
comment, Cuba, by Irene Aloha
Wright. This is a remarkable book
for an American to have written, not
only because of its information and
its insight, but also because of its almost Hispanic independence and
freedom of expression. Miss Wright
based her impressions on a number
of years' residence in Cuba, during
which time she took an active part
in the every-day life of the country
serving for a while as a reporter on
Diario de la marina.   She outspokenly decried many of the conditions
in the social atmosphere of the country,-although it may be observed,
incidentally, that Miss Wright has
continued to reside either in Cuba
or Spain ever since, in preference to
her own America. Though written
as far back as 1910 Miss Wright's
book is still worth reading, because
of its grasp on some of the underlying factors in Cuban life. Cuban




608


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


writers, while they lack the perspective of the foreigner in discussing social conditions, have a far more
detailed and accurate knowledge of
particular institutions. The articles
and pamphlets of Aguayo, Carrion,
Guerra, Ortiz, Trelles, and Varona on
education and other matters, cited
in this chapter, are valuable samples
of this type of literature. The volume on the census of 1919 (Censo de
la republica de Cuba: ano de 1919)


is a treasure-house of information, as
also are its predecessors of 1899 and
1907. All three were prepared under
American auspices, with great care.
Parker, Cubans of to-day, is a useful
volume. Any number of other references might be given. Indeed, there
are few fields of Cuban history more
prolifically rich in materials and less
carefully worked out in well formulated studies. And hardly any subject is nearly so interesting.


k




CHAPTER XXVI


MATERIAL AND INTELLECTUAL CONDITIONS1
THE phenomenal wealth of Cuba is due in part to its natural resources and in part to the virtual underwriting of the
republic by the United States through the Permanent Treaty,
or Platt Amendment. Sugar is easily Cuba's chief product.
The climate and soil of the island are so well adapted to the
growth of the sugar-cane that Cuba has come to be recognized as the 'tgar-bowl of the world."   The sugar crop,
which in 1911 amounted to 1,379,609 tons, was about 5,100,000 in 1925, or nearly a fourth of the world's total production. Between 1909 and 1925 the annual crop was generally
larger than in the preceding year, but there were wide fluctuations in price. Sugar rose from a normal level of around
three cents a pound, to as much as five and a half cents
during the World War, and then to an inflated level of
twenty-two and a half cents in 1920. In that same year the
market broke, and the price fell to three and five-eighths
cents, rising again in 1923 to an average level of four and
nine-tenths cents. Heavy production in different parts of
the world caused a fall in price to less than three cents in
1925. The greater part of Cuban sugar estates is under
the control of American companies. In 1924 over sixty per
cent of the industry was in American hands. Altogether,
the American investment in Cuba sugar is worth approxiThe writer at first proposed to intellectual productivity, but decided
have separate chapters on the sugar at length to reduce this material to
industry, the railways, financial his- the comparatively short space given
tory, general economic problems, and here. Cf. p. 581, n. 1.
609




610


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


mately a billion dollars, or more than all the sugar properties
combined in lands under the American flag. Normally the
United States takes from ninety to ninety-five per cent of
the entire Cuban crop.
Cuban tobacco products are among the most highly regarded in the world, but the industry though second in importance in the island, does not compare with that of sugar.
All other Cuban industries are insignificant by comparison
with sugar or tobacco. In recent years the market for molasses, a by-product of sugar, has assumed considerable proportions. The island is adapted to fruit culture, notably
citrus fruits, bananas, pineapples, and cocoanuts, but the full
possibilities of this industry have not yet been realized. The
grazing industry has attained to some prominence. There
are iron, manganese, copper, and asphalt mines in the island,
especially in Oriente. The henequen industry of Matanzas
and sponge industry of Bataban6 are locally important. In
Cuban industries as a whole the United States has a total
investment of nearly a billion and a half. This compares
with eighty millions in 1901, which at that time was considered large. While most of the American money is in sugar,
there are also vast sums in tobacco, mining, fruit, railways,
street car companies, docks, warehouses, electric light and
power companies, telephone companies, banks, hotels, steamship lines, and Cuban bonds sold in the northern republic.
In 1923 American holdings in Cuba were estimated as
twenty-seven per cent of the entire sum invested in the
twenty republics to the south of the United States! Mexico,
in which the American investment reached an amount second
only to that of Cuba, had but seventeen per cent.
Cuba is an intensely commercial country, exporting all
but a little of what it produces and importing nearly everything it consumes, even including food products, which con



MATERIAL AND INTELLECTUAL CONDITIONS


611


stitute some thirty-five to forty per cent of the total. Sugar
makes up eighty-five per cent or more of the exports in value,
with tobacco eight or ten per cent, and other products scattering. The increase in the value of Cuban trade has been
little less than phenomenal. At the beginning of the century (1900 to 1904) Cuba had an average annual volume of
trade of about $136,000,000. This had reached a total of
slightly more than three hundred million in 1914 and approximately $725,000,000 in 1924, the highest figure up to
that time in Cuban history, except for the inflation period
of 1919-1920. In 1920 the volume of trade with the United
States alone was $1,125,000,000, but value in dollars was
hardly a correct index then. Cuban products enjoy a preferential tariff of twenty per cent in the United States, while
those from the United States get a concession of from twenty
to forty per cent in Cuba. This is one of the reasons for
the dominant position of the United States in Cuban trade.
At the opening of the century (1900 to 1904) the normal
value of the United States trade was only some $101,000,000.
Disregarding the abnormal figures for 1920, American commerce with Cuba had reached $553,510,261 in 1924, or about
seventy-six per cent of the total. The importance of this
trade to the United States is illustrated by figures for 1923
showing that Cuba with $367,345,910 stood second in the
world in exports to the United States, and with $181,717,272
was sixth in imports from that country! This far surpassed
the value of American trade with any other part of Hispanic
America. On account of the decline in the price of sugar
the value of Cuban trade with the United States was over
fifty millions smaller in 1925 than it was in 1924.
There are two principal railway systems in Cuba, which
also control several lesser lines. The United Railways of
Havana is an English company which is the dominant factor




612


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


in the west, while the Cuba Railroad, an American company,
is equally powerful in the east. The latter has greatly extended its sphere of influence through acquiring virtual
ownership of the Cuba Northern in 1924. While the island
is, on the whole, well served by railways, with some 3250
miles in operation, the same cannot be said for the roads.
Vast sums have been expended in road-building, but with
little or no benefit to the republic, because of graft or lack of
care. Naturally enough, government figures on this score
are unreliable. Direct steamship connection exists with
numerous European and American ports, with frequent sailings, and there is train service to the United States, availing
itself of a ferry from Havana to Key West.
Cuba had no currency of its own until 1915, using a variety
of Spanish, American, and other foreign coins. Since 1915
there has been a Cuban coinage system paralleling that of
the United States, but American money is also legal tender
and is in fact in general use. The revenues of the government, which were some forty-one millions in 1910, rose to
about double that figure in 1919, and still further to nearly
$110,000,000 in 1921, but fell away to about fifty-seven million the next year as a result of the depression of 1920-1921.
But in 1924 they were more than ninety-one million, and
nearly ninety-three million in 1925. Expenditures ordinarily keep pace with revenues. In 1925 Cuba had a foreign
debt of about eighty-seven million and a domestic debt just
under twelve million. In addition there is a floating debt
of perhaps fourteen million.2
So much for the story in brief. Something further should
be said, however, to bring the situation more clearly into
view. Unquestionably the sugar industry is in the back2The data given here were obtained eign and Domestic Commerce at
from a study of the many admirable Washington.
publications of the Bureau of For



MATERIAL AND INTELLECTUAL CONDITIONS


613


ground of every important phase of Cuban life. As virtually
a one-product country Cuba is an economic football. When
prosperity gives it a kick it soars high, but when depression
boots it, it drives at the enemy's line and is batted back.
The last years of Menocal's rule were eloquent of that.
Sugar is produced in every province in Cuba, but especially
in Camagiiey and Oriente, with Santa Clara and Matanzas
also making a good showing. In Spanish days the two firstnamed provinces were not greatly utilized for sugar estates,
but the growing demand for Cuba's chief product and the
development of railway facilities have, contributed to make
this region preeminent. Forests have been burned to give
room for cane, and the ashes and stumps left in the fields
to serve as fertilizer. Occasionally the more valuable species
of timber are first cut down and hauled away, but perhaps
more often they are not. Thus, woods that are highly prized
in the north,-mahogany, for example,-are sacrificed to
make room for sugar. The method of planting is very
simple. Men with sharp-pointed sticks make holes in the
ground about four feet apart, and others follow them bearing
short lengths of cane, each containing one or two joints.
These are thrust, one at a time, in the holes that have just
been made, and then made firm by pressing the earth around
them through stamping with the bare feet. The cane sprouts
quickly from the eyes of the sections, and in eighteen months
is ready for cutting. The original stalk lasts without replanting, however, for from five to twenty-five years; indeed,
it is said that some of the cane-fields of Oriente have still
produced good crops after sixty years. The cane responds
readily to fertilizing processes, but without some assistance
of that sort the soil becomes exhausted much earlier than
otherwise. Fire is one of the grave threats of the cane-field,
as there are few growing things that are easier to ignite and




614


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


more difficult to stop. Public opinion has been educated to
an appreciation of the importance of the sugar crop to all
in the community; so nearly everybody turns out to help
check a blaze that has started, and woe betide any man suspected of having set fire to a field deliberately! There would
be no waiting for the decision of a law court.
Perhaps not more than a tenth of the sugar produced in
Cuba comes from "administration cane," or that which is
grown under the direct management of the great companies
in control of the sugar-mills, or "centrales," as they are called.
Instead, the "colono" (colonist) system is in almost general
use, although in a variety of forms. In many cases a man
will be a proprietor of his own lands, but will sell his cane
to a near-by mill. The more generally accepted meaning for
this system, however, concerns the men who get lands from
the central company on a peculiar rental basis whereby they
receive in sugar, or its market price, a certain percentage on
every hundred pounds of cane delivered. It may range from
four to eight per cent, though perhaps more often somewhere between those limits. Thus, if it were six per cent,
the colono would get six pounds of sugar, or more likely the
price of six pounds, for every hundred pounds of cane, leaving the company whatever amount of sugar above six pounds
it could get out of that amount of cane. As sugar averages
only a little more than eleven pounds to each hundred of
cane, the administration ordinarily has less than half the
total amount, out of which to pay its expenses and provide
dividends. Such scientific methods have been employed by
the great sugar companies, however, that profits begin at a
moderately low cost per pound. At the present time it is
said that sugar is profitable at a price of three cents, although
there are undoubtedly some concerns that can make money
under the three cent level.




MATERIAL AND INTELLECTUAL CONDITIONS


615


As one travels in Cuba he passes miles and miles of growing cane, and presently sees a tall chimney, perhaps two
hundred feet high, which marks the location of a mill. The
cutting season, though varying with different estates, runs
ordinarily from December to June, in the dry season. No
labor-saving devices have yet been able to supersede the
traditional workman in the fields, who takes his machete,
or harvesting knife, and goes from stalk to stalk, cutting it
near the ground. Several more strokes, and he has stripped
it of its leaves, shaved off the top, and divided what is left
into two pieces about three feet long. These are gathered
by men driving two-wheeled ox-carts, and taken directly
to the mill, or, more often, to the nearest station of the narrow-gauge railway that winds here and there through the
estate. The mill itself has an enormously expensive but
highly efficient equipment for extracting the juice from the
cane and then reducing it to raw sugar, although the refining
process is usually completed after shipment to the United
States. Good wages are paid,-enough for the Cuban guajiro
to work from four to six months, and then "loaf and buy
lottery tickets the rest of the year"; 3 at least, so some of
the writers say, although there are other factors in Cuban
life (to be mentioned presently) which keep the laborer in
a state that is far from one of affluence. There are not
enough laborers in Cuba to meet the demand, and so thousands of others are brought in,-Spaniards, Haitians, Jamaicans, and Chinese,-most of whom return to their native
country (except the Chinese) at the end of the cutting season. Then ensues the "dead" season, from June to December, when the cane may be left to itself, with very little
supervision, and without any need, therefore, for a considerable labor supply. Thus Cuba, which is a bee-hive in winter,
'Franck, 82.


*




616        A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
becomes "dead" in the summer,-though very much alive
in the ways of pleasurable recreation.
During the latter part of the dead season in sugar, the
tobacco industry is at its most active stage, from October
to January, although various other processes are necessary,
before the finished product reaches the market, that consume
most of the year. Tobacco may be grown in every province
of Cuba, but Pinar del Rio is by all odds the greatest producer. There, in the famous Vuelta Abajo district, of which
the city of Pinar del Rio is approximately the centre, is
grown the best tobacco leaf in the world. Vuelta Abajo is
only some thirty miles long from west to east and ten miles
wide, and not all of its fields yield the finest grade of tobacco, but, in those that do, it is not unusual for the net to
run as high as two thousand dollars an acre. Most of the
lands of Pinar del Rio, however, in Vuelta Abajo or out of
it, are far less profitable than that. The industry itself is
highly complicated, involving seeding, transplanting, an expensive process of cultivation, cutting and curing of the leaf,
and its shipment to Havana. The project is usually handled
on shares between a landholder, who also provides capital,
and a veguero, or planter, who carries on all the work. The
modern tobacco field looks, in the distance, like a series of
great snow-banks,-an effect produced by wide-spreading
canopies of cheese-cloth, to protect the plants from a persistent and dangerous insect pest. There is an enormous
consumption of tobacco in Cuba,-perhaps forty per cent of
the total crop. About two-thirds of the portion that is exported goes out in the form of leaf, and most of the remaining third in cigars.
The other industries of Cuba may be passed over here,
except for some further comment on the railroads. Cuba's
first railway was built at Giiines, province of Havana, in




MATERIAL AND INTELLECTUAL CONDITIONS


617


1837,-before even a mile had been built anywhere else under
the Spanish Flag. This formed the nucleus for the later development of the powerful United Railways of Havana, an
English company which today occupies a dominant position
among the public service railways in the three western provinces of Cuba. There was not a great deal of railway building under Spain, however; at the close of Spanish rule there
were perhaps a thousand miles of track in the island, or less
than a third of what Cuba possesses now; in 1900 it had increased to 1135 miles, nine-tenths of which radiated from
Havana, with but a little over a hundred miles in the three
eastern provinces, constituting about three-fourths of the
territory of the island. In that same year an enterprise got
under way that was to open up eastern Cuba and immeasurably increase the wealth and resources of the country. This
was the building of the Cuba Railway, the story of which
reads more like a romance than a drab recital of a business
transaction.
Early in 1900 Sir William Van Home, famous as the
builder of the Canadian Pacific Railway, was in Cuba, on
his way to British Guiana. He never went any farther. Seeing great possibilities for a railway in eastern Cuba, he resolved to put his ideas to the test. Under the handicap
of the Foraker Law,4 he not only could expect no government
subsidy, but also could not even obtain a government charter. There was nothing in the law that prevented one from
building a railway as a private undertaking, however, and
he was able to gain assurances of approval from the United
States military government. Van Horne then went to New
York, interested a number of American and Canadian capitalists, and in April 1900 incorporated with his associates


4Cf. supra, pp: 105; 123.




618       A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
under a New Jersey charter as the Cuba -Company, which
was to develop the resources of Cuba "in all practicable
ways." This was rather an aristocrat among stock companies, for there were only 160 shares, each with a par value
of fifty thousand dollars. In recent years the shares have
been split up. In 1902 the Cuba Railroad Company was
incorporated as a subsidiary of this organization. Meanwhile, Van Home had proceeded with tremendous energy
in the building of his line, which was to run eastward from
the city of Santa Clara to Santiago in the south of Oriente
and to Antilla, on Nipe Bay, on the northern shore of the
same province. Owners had to be induced to part with
strips of their land, either as a free gift or on their own
terms. Eventually some assistance was obtained from the
Wood government, though mainly in quieting the title of
the company to the lands it had acquired and in the grant
of a revocable license for it to cross streams, roads, or other
public property. As early as December 1, 1902, the road
was completed and ready for traffic! Thus, Santiago was
brought within one day's ride of Havana, where formerly
it had taken ten days, and a new Cuba, since become the
richest part of the island, was opened to productive development.
There are several other comparatively unimportant public
service railways in addition to the United and Cuba lines,
but of perhaps more interest are the numerous private railways of the great sugar companies. These not only assist
in getting the cane to the mill, but also carry the raw sugar
to a near-by port or else to a station of some public service
railway. In the latter event the private lines may have a
standard gauge track, although narrow gauge lines are
usually employed. The private lines are wholly subordinated
to the industry they represent, doing very little business on




MATERIAL AND INTELLECTUAL CONDITIONS               619
other scores, and ordinarily they shut down altogether during the dead season of the sugar estates.
The phenomenal wealth of Cuba is based very largely on
the existence of the Permanent Treaty with the United
States, as none acknowledge more readily than the more
serious-minded of the Cuban writers.5 A great many, however, wonder whether the vast influx of foreign capital into
the island has been of any benefit to the Cubans themselves. Varona has called attention to this factor in numerous essays, pointing out that Cuba's best lands are foreignowned, growing sugar (and to a less extent tobacco) for
export, at the same time that the Cubans import from abroad
almost everything they consume, even including food and
other articles that might be produced at home. He felt that
care should be taken to assist the Cubans in retaining possession of their own soil.6 Much the same position has been
taken by other Cuban writers. Ortiz has asserted that twothirds of the sugar industry is under American control (not
to mention other industries that are more or less completely
American), although admitting that ninety-five per cent
of the plantations, on the "colono" basis, are in HispanoCuban hands and that American ownership of Cuban soil
does not amount to more than 16.72 per cent.         He feared
some political consequences, remarking that the Americans,
however altruistic, would be more likely to think of their
estates than of Cuba; they certainly would never destroy
5For example, Perez, Luis Marino, effect. His attitude, as usual in his
Cuba and the United States, in In- works, was less that of anti-foreign
ter-America (Eng. ed.), v. V, pp. 358- propaganda than of lecturing the
361, at 360; Aug., 1922.        Cuban people to get them to mend
Varona, Enrique Jose, Discurso their ways. "Our tendency is to live
sobre el capital extranjero... el 8 from the budget, and not from the
de junio de 1911, in De la colonia a land," he once said. Mirando ade- /
la republica, 257-261, is one item out lante (May 14, 1915), in De la coof many in Varona's writings to this lonia a la republica, 267-268, at 268.




620


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


them voluntarily, as many Cubans of the independence era
had done.7
There can be little quarrel with these statements, especially in the form that men like Varona and Ortiz put them,
as a Cuban matter rather than as an aggressive foreign evil.
Popular opinion, however, is inclined to exaggerate the
amount of the resources already in foreign hands. As one
writer has put it, the Cubans won their independence from
Spain only to turn the country over to alien business interests, except that the Cubans retained the taxes, the national
hymn, and the flag,-and also politics.8 The American investment in Cuba is certainly great, but the Cubans still
"own" their own country; indeed, many of the "American"
corporations operating in the islands are owned in part by
Cubans holding securities of these companies. Aside from
that, one of the more reputable Havana papers recently
pointed out that Americans owned only some fifteen per
cent of Cuban wealth, or about $1,250,000,000 in a total of
eight billions. A great deal more, however, was in other
foreign hands.9 It cannot be denied that foreign capital,
particularly American, does dominate the economic life of
Cuba and consequently has a very great influence on social
and political conditions. Whether this is a situation that is
good or bad is something that may be argued pro and con.
One thing ought to be said, nevertheless, and that is that
the United States government, except in times of an emergency, does not render any considerable aid to the American
companies in Cuba. The State Department has consistently
taken the stand that it is not a claims agency, and American
' Ortiz, 24-27.           sible for Cuba's welfare, in Diario de
8Roa, Jorge, Del ambiente actual, la marina, translated in Havana Post,
in Diario de la marina, May 13, 1924. Feb. 11, 1925.
9Foreign capital is greatly responr




MATERIAL AND INTELLECTUAL CONDITIONS


621


business concerns have usually adapted themselves to conditions as they found them.10
Popular opinion concerning the aggrandizement of foreign
corporations occasionally finds expression in Congress. Soon
after the installation of the Gomez government, for example, Emilio Arteaga introduced a bill in the House, on
February 19, 1909, prohibiting the purchase of real estate
in Cuba by foreigners; in the preliminary discussions it had
even been suggested that foreigners already owning lands
should be required to become Cuban citizens, but that feature was not included in the bill as presented. For a time
it seemed to have a chance of passing, as it was backed by
El Triunfo, the principal Liberal organ of that period, generally regarded as the mouthpiece of President Gomez. Almost at once it became apparent, however, that the existence
of foreign capital was the lesser of two evils. Business interests were frightened, various enterprises were halted, and
Cuban values showed a tendency to drop "through the bottom." So the bill was reported unfavorably, and beaten
decisively, forty-nine to eleven, in a vote taken March 8,
1909.1l Among those who opposed the measure was the
eminent and respected Gonzalez Lanuza, who said that the
trouble was, not that the Cubans were selling their lands
to the foreigners, but that they were placed in such a position that they could not do anything else. Furthermore, if
immigrants were to be attracted who would take root in
Cuba it was necessary to give them a chance to acquire land.12
10 Incidentally, it may be remarked sides. Witness, for example, the batthat American capital in no sense tle over the Tarafa Law. Cf. supra,
acts as a unit. One of the principal pp. 458-464.
concerns of most American companies  ' Havana Post for Feb. 19, 20, 26,
is competition, not with Cubans or and Mar. 4, 5, 9.
with European corporations, but with  "Speech in the session of Mar. 8,
other Americans. In any controversy 1909, in Prohibicion a los extranjeros
involving American capital there are de adquirir tierras, in  Gonzalez
usually American companies on both Lanuza, 797-803.




622


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


That Cuba as a whole profits from the presence of foreign
capital is impossible to deny; without it Cuba would sink
from being relatively the richest country in Hispanic America to a level certainly very much farther down. The
question that interests the Cuban people, however, is
whether they themselves gain from it. To the writer it
seems that beyond a doubt they do. Small as Cuba is, it
supports a considerable Cuban population, rather greater
per square mile than in most parts of Hispanic America.
And it must be that a very notable individual opportunity
is offered, for there is an extraordinary number of wealthy
Cubans in the island,-certainly rather more per capita than
almost anywhere else in Hispanic America. Furthermore,
not only indirectly, but also in many direct ways the foreign
companies do much to benefit both Cuba and the Cubans.
They employ vast numbers of Cubans,-virtually all that
are willing to work; they help local cane-farmers with loans
and in other ways to keep up their cultivation; some of the
best schools in Cuba are provided by them, free of charge;
a number of trades are taught to Cubans through their
agency, such as those of mechanics, locomotive engineers,
and carpenters; large amounts are expended by them in sanitation; hospitals are furnished which are available for people
generally in their district as well as for their own employes;
near-by towns often receive aid from them in municipal
improvements, such as the installation of sewage systems
and the building of slaughter-houses; many of the roads in
their district are kept in repair by them; and housing conditions on the foreign-owned estates are usually better than
in those under Cuban control. These are but a few incidental ways in which Cubans are benefited by foreign capital.
The greatest single item, however, is in the amount of revenue it pays to the Cuban state. If most of it is wasted,




MATERIAL AND INTELLECTUAL CONDITIONS               623
it is hardly the fault of the foreign companies. All this is
not to say that Cuba is better off with her wealth in foreign
hands than she would be if the same wealth were Cubanowned. It seems to the writer that Cuba is merely going
through an inevitable preliminary process. All countries in
their economic youth, the United States included, turn to
foreign capital for the initial stages of their development.
Eventually they may win over the foreign enterprises to
themselves if they deserve to have them. Cubans may feel
a dislike for foreign capital now, just as the American hated
the "bloated British bondholder" a century ago, but they
may just as surely regain their country as the people of the
United States have won back theirs, if they will do what
Varona and Ortiz recommend: do the best they can with
the capital they already possess, and meanwhile correct
the defects, notably corrupt government, that keep them
from improving their condition beyond what it is today.13
To be sure, there are a number of evils that grow out of
the presence of foreign capital in Cuba. Indirectly, of course,
the greatest springs from the vast revenues collected by
the state, without which the now colossal graft in Cuba
would sink perhaps to a Honduranian scale. It is often
asked whether the companies themselves do not also engage
directly in graft, with the idea of influencing politics for
purposes of their own. The question in fact resolves itself
3 A phase of the unpopularity of later. The Royal Bank of Canada
foreign capital is to be found in at- does the same thing, but does not
tacks on the National City Bank of have such a large loan business as
New York, one of the most impor- the City Bank." Both the National
tant banking houses doing business City and the Royal Bank met all
in Cuba. As a prominent Spaniard their obligations in the crash of 1920,
said to the writer: "The unpopular- but have probably made things up
ity of the National City Bank to some extent since, as they no
amounts to nothing. It is because longer face the competition of Cuban
debtors hate their creditors when they and continental European institufind it difficult to pay, and the Na- tions which closed their doors at that
tional City insists upon payment on time. People know their money is
the due date, and not several days safe with the above-named banks.




624       A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
into two distinct parts. The companies do indulge in graft,
almost all of them. Usually, however, it is not because they
are meddling in politics, but because the politicians are
meddling with them. Rather than suffer annoyance most
of the foreign corporations will do such things as provide
Cuban officials with houses free of charge, or employ politicians and their friends as "lawyers," without any work to
do. Ordinarily, the greater corporations do not have to
go beyond this stage, as they are indirectly too valuable to
the politicians in Havana through the revenues they provide.
It is probable that some of the foreign companies do seek
special favors by means of improprieties on a great scale,
but that would not seem to apply to the sugar interests,
which want primarily to be let alone.
There are, indeed, a number of bad corporate practices
which are indulged in by Cuban companies as well as foreign and are a fraud on stockholders, usually foreigners,
rather than on the Cubans themselves. Quite often, so it
is said, a stock company will be formed to engage in the
sugar business. The promoters will keep control, and will
give themselves good high-paying jobs as officers of the company. Presently a few large dividends will be paid, enabling
the promoters to unload their stock at a high price,-and
then dividends will be passed, and the stock come smashing
down. Reacquiring control, the officers,-that is to say,
the promoters,-will suggest a bond issue, and when this is
put through will keep fifty-one per cent of the bonds, and
again unload the stock. Next the company is forced into
receivership, and given to the bondholders, the original promoters. If in fact they have a good sugar property they
may at this point carry on the business in a more reputable
manner; otherwise they may look for a new crop of "easy
marks," and go through the same operation as before. Even




MATERIAL AND INTELLECTUAL CONDITIONS         625
when corporate iniquities are not indulged in on the scale
just described, there are many improprieties of a lesser order.
Aside from the high-paying office graft,-for such it often
is,-men in control of a company may organize several other
companies for themselves, using their position with the
larger concern in order to make unfair profits for the ones in
which they have full ownership. One such case came to the
writer's notice, where a coal company, organized by officers
of a great corporation, was given the sole right to sell coal
to the latter,-and did so at more than the market price.
Practices of this sort are, of course, a form of robbing the
small stockholder such as is engaged in everywhere, but in
Cuba the law is less likely to impose a check on these operations than in countries where government is on a somewhat
more respectable basis.
Quite apart from foreign capital in itself, there are a number of other problems in the economic life of Cuba. One is a
bad system of taxation. Taxes on real estate are very light,
and on unimproved lands nothing at all. One writer says
that during the Magoon era the only time all the Cuban
members of the Advisory Law Commission agreed was in
opposing a tax on unimproved land. They asserted that it
would cause a revolution, although they were really afraid
lest those who were thus taxed might demand a greater
representation in government, which the politicians wanted
to keep to themselves.l4 Other sources of revenue had therefore to be tapped. Something has been obtained from industrial taxes:
"Every shop, factory, office, here, pays for the privilege of bidding
for trade; wagons and carriages, automobiles and carts; peddlers,
funerals, and public amusements,-every form of activity and energy, in
short, is taxed.""


' Wright, 196.


16 Ibid., 197.




626


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


The total of these contributions, however, is not very heavy,
and the addition of the lottery revenue leaves the government still far short of its needs. As already pointed out, it is
the custom-house that accounts for the great bulk of the
national income. And the tax is high. In 1909 Cuba was
paying $12.10 per capita in customs duties alone, as compared with the following sums at that time in countries
with a high protective tariff: United States $3.55; France
$2.22; Italy $1.72; Germany $1.22; and Austria $.51.16
Later, Cuba collected still more. In Menocal's best year
for customs receipts, he took in over thirty dollars per inhabitant, though averaging about seventeen for the entire
period of his rule, while Zayas averaged about twenty-three
dollars. The evil, however, is not so much in the amount
as in the character of the goods that pay the duties, for the
system is frankly one of "extortion for revenue only,"taxes, not so much on luxuries or on products for which
Cuba has an "infant industry," but on necessities, with the
burden falling heaviest on those least able to pay, on the
mass of the Cuban people.17
This brings up a question, often discussed in Cuba, that
would be worthy of consideration if there were the slightest
chance that it would be treated seriously by the politicians.
That is, the desirability of legislation to promote economic
diversity, especially along the lines of protection for Cuban
industries that might produce some of the necessities at
present purchased abroad. There is frequently a great deal
of talk along these lines, but nothing of importance is ever
accomplished, as the Cuban government is "in business" for
1 Wright, 198.              e. g. in A los Conservadores, no. 4 in
17Ibid: 194; 198. Many Cuban Siete circulares: 1910 a 1913, in De
writers have called attention to this la colonia a la repuiblica, 247-250, at
same evil. Varona did so frequently, 247-248.




MATERIAL AND INTELLECTUAL CONDITIONS            627
"revenue only," and not for Cuba.18 To be sure, some industries have sprung up in Cuba as a result of the high tariff,those producing beer, soap, and cement, for example,-but
they occupy a very insignificant position in the sum total of
Cuban wealth.
Certainly one problem in Cuba about which volumes
could be written is that concerning labor. The greater part
of the labor supply is floating and without steady employment, due to the peculiarities of the sugar industry. From
December to June, labor is at a premium, and from June
until near December is a drug on the market. In most other
industries there is work the year around, but they do not
compare in importance with sugar. And if technical skill
is required it is more often a foreigner who is engaged than
a Cuban, as the latter rarely has the type of ability demanded, though a good workman at tasks he understands.
One of the most annoying conditions, however,-wherever
the fault may lie,-is the prevalence of strikes. The situation is not the same as in the United States. Labor is not
in the least degree conservative, but is ignorant and opportunist, at the beck and call of leaders, frequently Spanish
radicals, who do not command respect; many of them use
their power to blackmail proprietors into paying them graft
in order to avoid a strike. Most of the newspapers condemn
the propensity of the laborers to strike, and they speak out
on this score with a freedom that no journal in the United
States would display. The government, as a rule, does noth" Las entidades econ6micas y la Cuban infant industries. An imporreforma arancelaria, in Diario de la tant problem, in Prensa, translated in
marina, May 14, 1924, is one such Havana Post, May 14, 1924, advoarticle, out of many. This stated cated protection for the poultry inthat the Association of Havana Mer- dustry, asserting that Cuba was paychants had joined with the National ing fifteen millions for poultry and
Association of Industry in approving eggs, with eggs at from four to ten
the proposed tariff reform to protect cents apiece.




628


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


ing, although congressmen will make radical labor speeches
and will at times promote amnesty bills in favor of strikers
who have broken the laws. If the government does move,
it will almost always take the side of the employers. This
is easy to comprehend. Profits for employers mean also a
large volume of foreign trade, which means revenue for
the government, which means the politicians. The laborers,
even if they are right, must not be allowed to cut down
the funds in the treasury. If popular opinion as represented
by the newspapers is correct, however, the laborers of Cuba
are more often wrong than right. They strike if they think
they can win, irrespective of the merits of their case. And
if one group wins, another strikes; and then the first group,
which may have made a binding agreement to accept certain
terms, will blithely forget its contract, and go out again.19
In the fall of 1924 something new in strikes made its appearance in Cuba, this being a series of outbreaks at the
sugar mills. Owing to the migratory character of labor, and
especially the wholesale departure of workmen during the
dead season, there had never been any unions at the mills.
A number of labor leaders, in great part Spaniards, now proposed to organize the workers, and instituted various de

1 The following are some sample
comments to this effect in connection with a strike that broke out on
the United Railways in May 1924.
"When the railroaders win a strike,
then another union decrees a strike,
believing that it also can triumph in
its demands, regardless of whether
they are justified or not." Again a
strike, in Sol, translated in Havana
Post, May 27, 1924. Speaking of the
demands of the railway employes,
"A Sage" had this to say: "The
railway could stand the additional
burden if by so doing an end to the
striking proclivities of its employes
could be reached... It is certain,


however, as the past experience has
shown, that every time a concession
is made to the workers by the railway, or by any other company, it
encourages the workers to make further demands." Havana Post, May
27, 1924. While the strike was going
on, a laborer named Emilio Marichal attempted to murder General
Archibald Jack, the manager of the
railway, wounding him severely. The
laborer was given a light sentence,
and an amnesty bill was soon introduced on his behalf, though in this
instance without success. Marichal's
sentence expires during 1926.




MATERIAL AND INTELLECTUAL CONDITIONS


629


mands, just on the eve of the cane-cutting season. They
insisted on such things as recognition of the union, the closed
shop, an eight-hour day, higher wages, equal pay at all seasons of the year, and a right for the walking delegates of the
union to have a place in the mills and to participate in their
administration. This caused general consternation in Cuba,
owing to the menace to the very life of the island through a
possible failure of the sugar crop. Almost without exception
the newspapers condemned the movement, and called on the
government to act. Some were fearful of strong hand
methods, however, as witness the following:
"The mill strike cannot be ended through force. If violence is employed there will be no sugar crop this year. Have the mill owners and
the sugar planters forgotten that one man with a box of matches can
destroy all the cane plantations of a mill without being seen or caught?
Do they ignore that there is nothing so easy to 'sabotage' as a sugarcane field?" 0
Presently there was talk of the railway laborers going out
in sympathy with the sugar workers and even of a general
strike. This drew forth the following comment in one newspaper:
"Our laborers do not suffer the sting of cold or the pangs of hunger.. Many of the locomotive-drivers and engineers in Cuba, without
exaggeration, earn more money than... men who work with their
heads. No real reasons exist in Cuba for the workingmen to become
desperate. On the contrary there is always an ample field for work
in town and country. To talk, therefore, of 'shaking off the chains of
oppression' is not only absurd but insincere."21
The national authorities at length decided to act. On November 12, 1924, Zayas demanded that the mill-owners and
their employes come to an agreement, or otherwise the gov'o With violence there will be no  ' The mill strike, in Lucha, transcrop, in  Heraldo, translated  in lated in Havana Post, Nov. 28, 1924.
Havana Post, Nov. 15, 1924.




630


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


ernment would take a hand. When he denied the right of
strikers to dictate conditions for the acceptance of workmen
at the mills and expressed an intention of deporting the
"pernicious foreigners" who, he asserted, were largely responsible for the strikes, he intimated plainly enough which
side of the controversy he was likely to adopt. A few days
later he began deporting Spanish labor leaders, and meanwhile gave such aid to the mill-men as he could in protecting their cane. A number of fields were burned, however; on November 25, for example, it is said that twentyfive thousand arrobas of sugar (625,000 pounds) were destroyed. In December the strikes were on their last legs.
Late rains played into the hands of the owners, making early
grinding unnecessary, and the long duration of the dispute
had pretty well depleted the financial resources of the
strikers. So much for the sugar strike of 1924. But what
of the future?
These comments will give a false view of the situation,
however, if they are interpreted as implying that the laborers have no cause for complaint. They do have cause,
but the complaint is misdirected. The fact that the newspapers and non-union people are generally against them is
accounted for not merely by the mistakes of the workmen
and their radicalism but also because the public opinion
that the former reflect is that of capital and politics. It is
probable that capital is far less at fault than politics. That
brings up the familiar bugaboo of Cuban life,-the extreme
cost of a parasite government. Here is the way one writer
states the case:
"Cuba's population numbers approximately three million. These pay
to the government through the custom-house alone $30,000,000 to
$45,000,000 per annum, or $10 to $15 per capita, three or four times
the figure for the highly protective United States. Nor are the Cuban




MATERIAL AND INTELLECTUAL CONDITIONS                631
duties paid by the rich on luxuries alone. The bulk of Cuba's imports
consists of food and clothing for her common people. The import
duties are paid from the sweat of the laborer's brow. In addition to
this the Cuban pays in internal taxes another $10 per capita. He contributes, albeit voluntarily, nearly $12,000,000 more to a corrupt lottery
from which the government receives only $4,000,000 or $5,000,000. To the
official cost of, say, $25 per capita which the Cuban pays for government
must be added, besides the lottery burden, first, all those little extortions
and petty tributes which he must pay every time he comes in contact
with an official but which never show in the accounts; and second, the
uncalculated and incalculable losses which he suffers from the kind of
government he gets. Is it to be wondered at that occasionally he looks
wistfully at the Porto Rican, his former fellow-sufferer under the yoke
of Spain, who now enjoys all the blessings of good government, protection of life and property, schools, roads, libraries, and many other things
of which the Cuban does not even dream, all at a cost of $11 per capita,
and wonders if 'Cuba Libre' is not a snare and a delusion? And when
he sees that Porto Rican safe within the tariff wall of the United States,
making money out of his sugar while Cuba counts her deficits on hers,
and thinks of the additional $105,000,000 which Cuba loses each year
because she is outside that wall-$35 for every man, woman, and child
in the island-more than enough to pay for the decent government he
would have if he were within it-who shall blame him if he indulges in
some mental calculations as to the price of liberty which it would be
treason for him to utter?" 
At least one writer goes beyond the Cuban politicians to
place responsibility upon the United States for "betraying"
the Cuban people by making them independent politically
and thus utterly dependent economically on the whim of the
great neighbor to the north. Asking what Cuba really wants,
this writer answers the question as follows:
"Assuredly it is not that parasites be permitted to speak in her name
any longer; to parade in the trappings of a fictitious independence; to
bleed her for their support, in the name of a liberty she does not
possess; but, instead, nothing more or less than opportunity to produce
her crops in quietude, to sell them for what they are worth, and to buy
from the proceeds what she must have at a fair price for it. Closer
'Norton, Henry Kittredge, Self- World's work, v. LI, pp. 77-84, at 84;
determination in the West Indies, in Nov., 1925.




632


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


economic relation to the United States! To obtain that she'd actually
be willing to continue to tolerate this republic of hers, if Washington
which erected will not permit her to abolish it; could she but have altered
tariffs to enable her to sell what she might then grow... she'd be well
able to support her politicians, if their keep is the penalty laid upon her
for Washington's erroneous snap judgment of her needs."'
There is more than a little truth in this. Cuba is utterly
at the mercy of the United States economically.        She is a
one-crop country, dependent upon the American market,
and subordinated in that to the interests of sugar men whose
estates are under the American flag. All goes well when
the price of sugar is high, but the pinch comes when it is
low. At the time of the phenomenal drop in 1920-1921, for
example, the United States clapped on an emergency tariff
of two cents a pound (subsequently withdrawn), to protect
the companies in continental United States, Porto Rico,
Hawaii, and the Philippines. Cuba still had her twenty per
cent advantage over other countries, but it availed her little.
It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that Cuban writers
and Cuban politicians are constantly agitating for a revision
of the reciprocity treaty, so as to put Cuban sugar on a still
more favorable basis in the American market.24 It must be
admitted that the plea has merit, for Cuba and the United
States economically are one, Cuba pays well for American
goods, and the United States has certain special political
advantages under the Permanent Treaty, but the island republic has so far not been too successful in its quest of a
more favorable treaty.    The sugar interests of the United
Wright, 206. The quotation is also was the basic idea in an address
from an admirable chapter entitled delivered by Cosme de la Torriente,
Wanted: a market!, 194-206.      Cuban ambassador to the United
' For an excellent argument to this States, at a banquet in the Biltmore
effect, see Perez, Luis Marino, Op. Hotel, New York City, Apr. 23, 1924,
cit. A ray of hope, in Mercurio, on the occasion of the inauguration of
translated in Havana Post, May 15, the Cuban Chamber of Commerce at
1924, is a sample editorial, out of New York.
hundreds, to the same effect. This




MATERIAL AND INTELLECTUAL CONDITIONS


633


States are opposed to any change, but it is doubtful if that
is solely accountable for Cuba's failure to gain a lower tariff,
and it may not be even the principal obstacle in Cuba's
way. The fact is, that the tariff on sugar is, next to the
Permanent Treaty, the most important medium of pressure
the United States can use in dealings with Cuba, and while
graft continues to be the norm of political procedure in
that country it is not likely that the United States will
grant any privileges which, after all, would probably be
utilized primarily to the advantage of the corrupt, parasitic,
and anti-American political class.
Cuban literature since the winning of independence has
lost what was once almost its sole raison d'etre, that of being
a weapon in the struggle for liberty against Spain. Both
in poetry and in prose the nineteenth century furnished
many names worthy of the best in Hispanic American letters, among which those of Heredia, Varela, Saco, Luz y
Caballero, and Marti perhaps stand out from the rest. These
men were Cuban patriots above all else, using their writings
primarily for purposes of attack against the "oppressor,"
Spain. With liberty attained, however, there has been very
little in the life of the republic to inspire a new band of
intellectuals. Protests against the political corruption of
one's own countrymen are no such ringing theme as a battle
for freedom against the outlander.
There are few names that must needs be mentioned in a
review of intellectual life in the period of the republic. By
general consent Enrique Jose Varona is given first rank
among the literary figures of the period. It is a question,
however, whether his best work may not have belonged to
the pre-independence era. He was in the front rank of the
workers for separation from Spain, and, indeed, since his




634


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


literary debut in 1879 he has been associated with almost
every important intellectual movement in Cuba. A philosopher of the school of Herbert Spencer, he taught the
gospel of freedom, finding a medium especially in the Revista cubana (Cuban review) and later in La patria (The
fatherland), of both of which magazines he was the editor.
After the winning of independence he served as Secretary
of Public Instruction under General Wood, and was later
president of the Conservative party for a while and VicePresident of the republic from 1913 to 1917, but in the
main he has not been active in politics. He has continued
to write on social, political, and economic subjects, but while
greatly respected he has not been followed in his counsels.
His essays might have been penned by a Puritan of colonial
New England, in so far as their unimpeachable moral judgments are concerned, and, indeed, they read very much like
a Protestant tract lecturing the people for their sins, though
simply and logically presented. Like nearly all of the patriots
of pre-independence days, Varona is slightly anti-American
and still seems to feel the suspicions of 1898. Nevertheless,
there is a world of sound advice in his preachings, and the
day might well come when the Cubans should make some
attempt to profit by them.
A number of others might also be named who, like Varona,
belong to two ages in Cuban literature, with possibly their
best work in the earlier of the two. Manuel Sanguily, another of the literary battlers for independence, is one. He
was famous primarily as an orator. Under the republic he
participated actively in politics until 1913, and did comparatively little writing. A rather more notable literary
figure in republican times is Raimundo Cabrera, a leading
Cuban novelist and descriptive writer, some of whose best
works were published during the era of the republic. His




MATERIAL AND INTELLECTUAL CONDITIONS


635


Mis malos tiempos, one of the principal authorities for the
exciting events around the Revolution of February, is also
a delightful literary product, and his novels are a faithful
portrait of Cuban life since 1900.
One of the more important literary developments of the
republican period has been the founding of a number of
excellent magazines, which is all the more noteworthy in that
journals of this class do not often flourish in Hispanic American countries. The following is one writer's rather enthusiastic judgment of them:
"At present the periodicals published in the island equal if they do not
surpass in literary qualities those of any other nation. Take, for example,
the beautifully illustrated Figaro, long conducted by the poet Manuel S.
Pichardo; Cuba y America, whose purpose is 'the regeneration of Cuban
culture,' and whose editor, Salvador Salazar, is an enthusiastic student
of literature; or the scholarly monthly Cuba Contempordnea, directed
by Carlos de Velasco, which is doing an unsurpassed service for the study
of Cuban literature. The famous organ of the ancient society, Los
Amigos del Pais, entitled La Revista bimestre cubana, has also been
revived." 2"
Reforma Social, one of the best monthly reviews in Hispanic America, ought also to be included in this list.
There are several writers of note who belong wholly to the
republic. One of these is Rafael Martinez Ortiz, whose twovolume history, entitled Cuba: los primeros anos de independencia (Cuba: the first years of independence) is in
every sense a meritorious study. The author was a prominent Liberal in the political life of the republic, but was able
to subordinate partisanship in writing history and to employ
the technique of the historian. His history is also in a most
"Coester, Alfred, The literary his- republic. The reference to Salazar is
tory of Spanish America (New York. inaccurate, for Raimundo Cabrera,
1919), pp. 428-429. Coester has an who founded Cuba y America in
entire chapter on Cuba (pp. 373-430), 1897, was its editor until it suspended
but only a mere fragment touches the publication in 1920.




636


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


attractive style.  Another outstanding figure is Carlos
Trelles, the Cuban Medina, whose bibliographical output has
been phenomenal in amount and value on every phase of
Cuban history. Except for the great Chilean just alluded
to, there is perhaps no bibliographer in the world who outranks Trelles,-certainly none in the two Americas. Trelles
occasionally turns aside for a searching analysis and denunciation of existing social and political conditions. Possibly the man of the most varied intellectual attainments in
contemporary Cuban letters is Fernando Ortiz, lawyer,
criminologist, historian, one-time professor in the University,
for a while a representative in Congress, now president of
the Academy of History, president of the Sociedad Econ6mica de los Amigos del Pais (Economic Society of the
Friends of the Country), editor of Revista bimestre cubana
(Bi-monthly Cuban review), and also editor of Archivos
del folklore cubano (Archives of Cuban folklore).      He
is the author of several historical studies on social aspects
of colonial times, especially concerning the negroes, and
is a prolific writer on contemporary social and political
problems, dealing one moment with education, another with
judicial questions, and at all times standing for a thoroughgoing correction of present-day evils. With that manysidedness that has characterized a number of the great Hispanic scholars of the past, he also has the highmindedness
of the true Cuban patriot. Several other men would be
deserving of notice in a more extensive survey of Cuban intellectual productivity, such as the already mentioned editors
of Cuba's leading periodicals or Alfredo Aguayo for his writtings on education.26 In addition, one might well name the
Cubans of to-day, the Cuban Ninety-five were authors or journal"Who's Who," includes a number of ists; ninety-seven, educators; and
men who have attained to distinction eleven, artists or musicians. These
in literature, education, and art. figures would be reduced to perhaps




MATERIAL AND INTELLECTUAL CONDITIONS      637
following: in literary criticism Jose Maria Chac6n, Jorge
Maniach, Enrique Hernandez Miyares, Manuel Marquez
Sterling; the poets Agustin Acosta, Bonifacio Byrne, Gustavo Sanchez Galarraga, Juan Marinello, Ruben Martinez
Villena; among novelists Miguel de Carri6n, Carlos Loveira;
the historians Emilio Bacardi, Domingo Figarola, Fernando
Figueredo, Francisco Gonzalez del Valle, and Antonio Valverde; in law Mariano Aramburo, Antonio Sanchez de
Bustamante; in science Israel Castellanos, Carlos De la Torre,
Jorge Le-Roy, Emilio Roig; and in art the painter Leopoldo
Romaiach.27
Something has already been said about education and the
newspapers,28 both of which subjects might ordinarily be
considered under the heading of intellectual life. In Cuba,
however, it would seem that they belong rather more in
the realm of social problems.29


thirty-five, twenty-seven, and seven,
respectively, if the men were considered merely from the standpoint of
the profession in which they were
most prominent.
" An outstandingly important discussion of recent tendencies in the
history of Cuban culture is Mafiach,
Jorge, La crisis de la alta cultura en
Cuba, Habana, 1925, an address which
was published in a pamphlet of fortyfour pages.
8 Supra, pp. 592-603.
' One cannot complain of lack of
material on the score of economic
conditions, for there is an abundance
of it in Cuban and United States gov

ernment documents, articles in periodicals, news items and editorials,
and in a number of books. Probably
the best continuing material along
statistical lines is that provided in
the frequent Bulletins of the Bureau
of Foreign and Domestic Commerce,
in the Department of Commerce at
Washington. Concerning intellectual
productivity there is as yet little but
the works of the men themselves,
with nothing of great account in the
way of formulated studies concerning
them. Comments in the Cuban reviews are undoubtedly the nearest
thing to critical appreciations that
have yet appeared.




CHAPTER XXVII


THE FUTURE OF CUBA: A QUESTION
WHAT does the future hold forth for Cuba? What for the
relations of the United States and Cuba? What ought to
be done in Cuba, and what, if any, are the obligations of the
United States? An answer to these questions is not easy,all the less so, since it is difficult to say what is the precise
character of Cuban-American relations now. The basis for
the relationships between Cuba and the United States is,
of course, the Permanent Treaty, growing out of the Platt
Amendment.' According to one's attitude toward Cuban
affairs the famous "appendix" means much or little. At the
one extreme are those who hold it means a right for the
United States to intervene in Cuba at any time, since it is
always possible to find instances where there has not been
an adequate "protection of life, property, and individual
liberty." Indeed, one would not need to hunt very hard for
such cases in the notoriously bad Cuban governments of
recent years. At the other extreme are those who deny that
the Platt Amendment imposes any limitation on Cuban sovereignty or who reject it altogether. Among the more interesting writings of Cubans are volumes by Ambrosio Valentin Lopez Hidalgo, a veteran of the War of Independence,
and Luis Machado, a prominent young lawyer of Havana.
L6pez Hidalgo held that the Platt Amendment and the
subsequent treaty did limit Cuban sovereignty, and, in so
much, represented a non-fulfilment of the promise of indeSee supra, chapter VI, passim, especially at pp. 135-137.
638




THE FUTURE OF CUBA: A QUESTION


639


pendence in the Joint Resolution of April 20, 1898. In this
connection he drew an interesting parallel between the language of the Joint Resolution and that of the American
Declaration of Independence.2 After indulging himself in a
few denunciations of American bad faith Lopez Hidalgo
went on to say that most of the articles of the Platt Amendment contained political principles that any good Cuban
government might well have adopted. The worst feature of
the document, he said, was because it was imposed upon
Cuba. Even article three, about intervention, would not be
objectionable if it were confined to an action "for preserving
the independence of Cuba." Article eight about the Permanent Treaty, Lopez Hidalgo insisted was bad in every way,
on the ground that the political and civil conditions of nations are not permanent, wherefore no permanent treaty
should ever be made. Cubans ought to form a political party
to bring about the abrogation of the treaty, he thought, but
the preliminary work should be the political regeneration
of Cuba, so as to prove to the United States that the Permanent Treaty is unnecessary. He then proceeded to denounce some of the various evils with which Cuba is
afflicted.
The volume of Machado, though exhibiting all the fiery
impatience of a young man,-so much so, that the writer
of the foreword, Rafael Montoro, former Cuban Secretary
of State, said he could not agree with the author in all his
conclusions,-is, nevertheless, more directly to the point
than the work of L6pez Hidalgo. Like L6pez Hidalgo,
Machado held that the Platt Amendment contradicted the
2A well-known American states- Joint Resolution rather than of any
man, in remarking on this to the intended parallelism in the case of
writer, said it was indicative of the United States in 1776 and that
the paucity of words and ideas of the of Cuba in 1898.
congressmen who subscribed to the




640


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


Joint Resolution, and he remarked further that the Permanent Treaty which grew out of it was a unilateral contract, with Cuba having all of the obligations and none of
the rights. Nevertheless, it was a treaty, but, as such,
was quite as open to Cuban interpretation as to that of the
United States. In practice, only the American interpretation had been employed, and that had developed into a
form of meddling in Cuban affairs that was not warranted
by any of the terms of the document. Machado then set
forth his own views.
According to Machado some of the paragraphs of the
Platt Amendment and the treaty were temporary, since
become obsolete, while others concerning Cuban territory
were in part fulfilled and in part awaiting the action of
the United States, and still others were those that were
actively in effect. In the first group he included articles
four (for validation of the acts of the United States military
government), five (about sanitation), and eight (calling
for the permanent treaty). The inclusion of the sanitation
article in this group is not in accord with the usual view
on that subject. Machado worked it out on the basis of
his understanding of the words "the plans already devised,"
holding that it referred only to the specific projects of the
period of General Wood. Articles six (about the Isle of
Pines) and seven (concerning coaling stations) were referred to as "the most grievous" for Cubans of any in the
treaty. Article six has since become obsolete with the
ratification in 1925 of the treaty which recognizes Cuban
sovereignty over the Isle of Pines, and the vicissitudes of
the coaling station clause have already been discussed.3
About the only objection Machado had to article one
(against making treaties that might impair the independence
'Supra, pp. 156-159.




THE FUTURE OF CUBA: A QUESTION


641


of Cuba) was the popular myth that had grown up, not
only abroad but even in Cuba, that Cuba could make no
treaties without the consent of the United States. Obviously,
Machado was right on this score. The right of Cuba to
make treaties has never been questioned, and probably will
not be, as it is unlikely that Cuba would offer voluntarily
to "impair the independence" of the country. As to article
two (about public debts), however, there are few who would
follow Machado, who seems to have suggested, though in
vague terms, that Cuba need not consult the United States
before negotiating a foreign loan.
Like most other commentators on the Permanent Treaty,
Machado found article three (about intervention) the
"nerve" and "axis" of the whole document. Intervention,
he pointed out, was a normal right in international law,
though to be exercised only in extraordinary emergencies.
The American experiment of putting it in a treaty with
Cuba had been adopted in later treaties of other nations,
as witness in the case of the defeated Central Powers in
the World War. That did not mean, however, that they
were no longer independent, sovereign countries, and there
was no such implication in the case of Cuba. He held that
the "preservation of Cuban independence" meant no more
than such a guarantee as that of the neutrality of Belgium
in the agreements of European powers, and the right of
intervention was to accrue only in case of a direct foreign
attack; in other words, it was nothing more than a defensive
alliance between the United States and Cuba. As for the
"maintenance of a government adequate for the protection
of life, property, and individual liberty," he quoted a remark which he alleged Elihu Root had made to Mendez
Capote in 1901, to the effect that an intervention on that
score would take place "only in case Cuba should reach such




642         A HISTORY OF TIE CUBAN REPUBLIC
a state of anarchy as to signify the absence of any government at all." Machado denied the right of the United
States to intervene to prevent bad government or even revolution, and also took the position that an intervention ought
normally to be preceded by an express invitation of the
Cuban authorities.
A competent English student, Sydney Brooks, wrote a
series of articles from 1910 to 1914 in which he presented
some interesting points of view concerning the Permanent
Treaty.4 He saw in it a "dormant suzerainty" of the United
States. According to him it meant that Cuba could not
go to war without United States consent or indulge in "financial caprices" that had earned a "noxious immortality" for
Nicaragua and Venezuela. Indeed, he felt that it was a
great advantage to Cuba. "It would seem as though the
experiment of self-government were being tried under more
promising conditions in Cuba than obtain anywhere else
in or around the southern hemisphere." Capital was almost
as safe in Cuba, he thought, as in a state of the United
States.  Some evils had, indeed, developed to bring the
"Platt Amendment," as he preferred to call it, into the
limelight, for government was "expensive," with politicians
"feathering their own nests," wherefore some elements advocated a more direct and stronger United States control, and
even the anti-American politicians did not really want any
lessening of the bond. They did show a tendency to go
just to the edge of intervention, however, as they had in
1906, in order to achieve their own ends. Thus the Platt
'Brooks, Sydney, Cuba, in Fort- Cuba and the Cuban question, in
nightly review, v. XCIV, pp. 796-808, North American, v. CXCVI, pp. 52 -Nov., 1910; repub. in Living age, v. 62, July, 1912; Some impressions of
CCLXVII, pp. 653-661, Dec. 10, 1910; Cuba in North American, v. CXCIX,
An English view of Cuba, in Forum, pp. 734-735, May, 1914.
v. XLVI, pp. 461-470, Oct., 1911; The  For references to a number of other
truth about Cuba, in Independent, v. articles on Cuba by the same author
LXXI, pp. 1193-1197, Nov. 30, 1911; one may look in the Readers' guide.




THE FUTURE OF CUBA: A QUESTION


643


Amendment to some extent put a premium on revolutionary
violence, in order to blackmail a party in power through
the threat of a United States intervention.  On this account a kind of corollary to the Amendment had developed
in the shape of "meddling" by the United States to ward
off threatened dangers, wherefore the United States ambassador acted as a virtual supervisor or censor of Cuban
affairs.
The best American opinion is not unlike that of the Cuban
Machado in its main implications. Machado, indeed, quoted
writings of Elihu Root, Senator Platt, and James Brown
Scott (president of the American Institute of International
Law) to the effect that the Platt Amendment, or (to cite
what should be considered the superior document) the Permanent Treaty, in no way limited the sovereignty of Cuba
and setting forth the same interpretation of the article on
intervention. On this score a distinguished American statesman recently took the same position in a conversation with
the writer. A propos of bad political conditions in the
southern republic he remarked that "Cuba has an indefeasible right to stew in her own juice."  L6pez Hidalgo and
Machado were alike in representing that the Platt Amendment and the treaty were inconsistent with the Joint Resolution, despite Machado's somewhat illogical conclusion that
it did not limit Cuban independence at all. The American
point of view has been well expressed by John Bassett Moore,
an expert in international law and prominent in American
national counsels during McKinley's administrations. His
statement follows:
"The question whether the Platt Amendment was justified is one upon
which, so far as I recall, I have never before been asked to express an
opinion. As Assistant Secretary of State during the war with Spain,
and as legal adviser to the Peace Commission at Paris, I do not think




644


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


I ever heard the question mooted as to whether the United States would
be precluded, by the Teller resolution, from taking any measures whatsoever to safeguard the maintenance of peace and order in Cuba after
our intervention should have secured for the island its independence of
Spain. There was, indeed, nothing to raise this precise question at that
juncture. Prior to the negotiations at Paris there existed, as I distinctly
recall, a widespread skepticism in the United States as to the feasibility
of eventually giving effect to the Teller resolution. Possibly the Spanish
Commissioners were not wholly unadvised of this feeling when, early in
the negotiations, they proposed to cede Cuba to the United States; and
I think they were surprised as well as chagrined when President
McKinley declined to entertain the proposal. President McKinley, as
you no doubt are aware, in effect compelled the omission from the
resolution of intervention, in April 1898, of a clause recognizing the
insurgent organization called the Republic of Cuba; and the fact is
well known that his reason for so doing was his belief that the United
States, in intervening to expel by force the government of Spain, should,
in the interest of all concerned, preserve its freedom to deal as might
seem best, during the war and at its close, with conditions as they might
then be found to exist. This was not conceived to be incompatible
with the Teller resolution. Among the grounds on which the intervention
of the United States was justified, abroad as well as at home, that which
was most generally accepted was the need of putting an end to the
disorders that had more or less prevailed in the island during the
preceding thirty years. It is a very common thing, as the events of
even the past few years have shown, for the period succeeding the
establishment, by war, of the independence of a new state, to be characterized by tumults, by disregard of life and property, and by revolutionary activities, growing out of inexperience in government and the
personal rivalries of political or military chieftains.  It is equally
notorious that such conditions have repeatedly given rise to foreign
intervention, armed as well as unarmed, without other justification than
that which international practice affords. It was considerations such as
these that inspired the Platt Amendment; and they were reinforced
by the further consideration that the United States would, in conformity
with declarations repeatedly made in the course of the preceding hundred
years, stand ready to protect the island's independence against attack.
In mentioning these declarations, I do not intend to imply that they
were wholly altruistic. They were made in the interest of the United
States as well as in that of Cuba. This mutuality of interest was fully
understood by all those by whom the armed intervention of the United
States in behalf of Cuba was urged; they relied upon it for the fruition




THE FUTURE OF CUBA: A QUESTION


645


of their efforts. Mutuality of interest is the principle on which the
Platt Amendment is founded.
In making these explanations, I do not intend to enter into the
discussion of any of the particular questions of interpretation that have
arisen concerning the amendment. I have always believed that the
amendment is capable of being interpreted in a sense compatible with
the maintenance of Cuban independence and self-government, in substance as well as in form; and I have always acted upon the belief that
it should be so interpreted. This was, in my opinion, the intention of
the United States." 
In fine, stripping the discussions of the treaty of all complaints about the manner in which it was put through, there
is very little difference between American and Cuban interpretations. Machado's insistence that the United States has
no right under article five to be concerned over Cuban
sanitation, however, has a very weak basis to rest upon.
The United States authorities were interested in this as
a permanent question, to protect the ports of the southern
states. On this score General Wood wrote to Secretary Root,
on February 19, 1901, as follows:
"There is another phase of this Cuban situation which seems to be
of vital importance; that is the sanitary conditions which will probably
e;ist in Havana and other large cities under a Cuban government.
As I understand it the purpose of the war was not only to assist the
Cubans, but, in a general sense, to abate a nuisance. It is probable
that if we leave the island of Cuba without a definite agreement with
the government to come in reference to the maintenance of good sanitary
conditions, that we shall soon find Havana and all other large cities
in practically the same condition of sanitation as during the Spanish War
and a menace to our Southern seaports and the consequent interference
with commerce will continue... It is highly probable that after the
withdrawal of the Americans this work will be carried out in anything
but a complete and perfect manner. This question of control of sanitation of Cuban ports is, in my opinion, of vital importance to the
United States." 


' Moore to the writer, Mar. 15, 1925.  'Quoted in Root, 187.




646


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


It was this letter that decided the Washington authorities to
write article five into the Platt Amendment.
So, from a strictly legal standpoint, Cuba is independent,
despite the Permanent Treaty. Her complete freedom of
action is limited, but so is that of any country that makes
any treaties at all, or at times even without treaties, when a
nation's acts run contrary to the principles of international
law. The kinds of things that are required of Cuba have also
appeared in the treaties of other countries. The objection
on the basis of United States "meddling" has no valid
basis, for it is the habit of all ambassadors to take up matters that affect their own country's interests.   Is it not
true, however, that the interests of the United States in
Cuba are so great as in fact to establish a peculiar relationship between them, different from that which ordinarily
exists between two sovereign and independent nations? The
writer believes that this is so. As Machado put it,
"Cuba is now not merely the key of the Gulf of Mexico; Cuba today
is the key of the United States."
And again,
"For the United States the independence of Cuba is a vital subject.
Given our privileged geographical situation, equidistant between the two
Americas, closing the passage which puts the waters of two worlds and
two civilizations into communication, one hour away from American
territory, we have the most important strategic position of the whole
continent, and the security of the south of the United States is iir
our hands."
Under these circumstances, are there not some limitations
on allowing Cuba to "stew in her own juice?" Is there
not some point where the United States might step in,
short of actual anarchy or foreign invasion? If so, does
not that constitute a virtual protectorate, at least from the
standpoint of a moral obligation to help the Cubans help




THE FUTURE OF CUBA: A QUESTION


647


themselves? There are a great many Cubans who feel
that this is the case; Machado seemed to believe that they
were far more numerous than those who adopted his own
view of the Permanent Treaty. Indeed, a general acceptance of the idea of American trusteeship in Cuba has undoubtedly contributed to the economic well-being of that
country, and is the sole reason why the bonds of Cuba
should sell in the market at a better price than those of
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, France, and most other countries.
Even so, unless the United States is willing to render Cuba
yet more assistance, the island republic is not likely for
many years to be anything but the plaything and football
of the political class, which represents little more than itself,
and not the best interests of the country. So far as the
United States is concerned, the matter is not greatly material. With the Permanent Treaty in effect, this country
is amply protected from the standpoint of Cuba. The people
in Cuba are not satisfied with the way things are going in
the island, however, and they look to the future for a
change. Opinions range all the way from maintenance of
the status quo, to annexation to the United States on the
one hand, or to an independence divorced from the Permanent Treaty, on the other. It may be well to consider these
varying points of view.
Annexation to the United States would be utterly unthinkable except through the admission of Cuba to the
Union as a state. That, however, is a contingency that is
too remote to merit extended discussion. It could not
come until Cuba had attained to a satisfactory domestic
situation, as American political practice does not permit of
federal intervention in the affairs of the states. Furthermore, many elements in the United States would be opposed to the inclusion of Cuba in the Union. Aside from




648


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


those who might object on racial or religious grounds, there
are powerful business interests, some of them doing business in Cuba and others in the United States, which are
immensely better off with things as they are than they
would be with Cuba brought within the purview of American law, tariff and otherwise. Some would object, too, on
general political grounds, through opposition to "imperialism" or a fear that annexation might have a bad effect
on American relations with the other Hispanic American
republics. So, while the admission of Cuba as a state may
be considered in the realm of possibility, it is perhaps also
true that the initiative must come, if at all, from Cuba.
Before Cuba would be accepted, however, her own domestic
affairs would have to be in such a satisfactory condition
that, no doubt, she would then prefer to go her own way
as a republic.
Seemingly at the opposite pole from annexation as a
state, but really not far away, would be a divorce from the
Permanent Treaty. Not until Cuba had attained to such
a condition as might entitle her to ask admission to the
Union would the United States be likely to give up the
treaty, and even then the clause guaranteeing Cuban independence would probably be the basis of some new agreement. The surest way for Cuba to rid herself of the Permanent Treaty, if she so desires, would be to do away with
the evils of her political life, including the self-styled
"nationalistic" politicians, who shout the loudest against the
treaty, though knowing full well that their own pernicious
activities are a certain bar to its abrogation.
A great many believe that there should be a more active
American supervision of Cuban affairs, especially in the
way of financial control, with perhaps also some responsibility for the general course of politics. Foreign business




THE FUTURE OF CUBA: A QUESTION


649


men quite often favor such a change as this, though, curiously enough, that is far more the case with Europeans
than with Americans. Not a few Cubans, too, would like
to see something of the sort as a temporary measure. It
is difficult to see how it could be brought about, however,
except as the result of a fresh intervention. Certainly, no
Cuban government made up of the present political class
would consent to this, and any better element should find
it difficult or impossible to get into power, without the
backing of the United States; and if it did get into power
the need for an increased American control might be unnecessary.
There are some who claim that the next move should be
in the direction of a diminished American authority, with
the Permanent Treaty retained, but tucked away in a
"pigeon-hole," to be used only in an emergency, and with
the American ambassador no longer "meddling," but limiting himself to the same sorts of activities as other foreign
representatives engage in. This idea results from a misunderstanding of the meaning and implications of the Permanent Treaty. If the treaty is retained it cannot be "used"
any less than it is already. The United States ambassador
"meddles" more than other ministers because American interests are vastly more important than those of other countries. The next step in the direction of greater freedom of
action for Cuba cannot be less than an abrogation of the
treaty itself, in whole or in part. As things are, Cuba does
as she pleases, and is held in check, if at all, only by the
fear of an American intervention,-an intervention which
the suggestions (or "meddlings") of the American ambassador are calculated to avoid.
With admission to the American Union as a state or divorce from the Permanent Treaty left out of the reckoning




650


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


as too remote for present consideration, three possibilities
for the immediate future are left for Cuba: a continuance
of existing evils, provided they do not get too far out of
hand; intervention; or moral backing of the regeneration
element by the United States.        That the United States
is extremely unwilling to intervene in Cuban affairs, the
history of the republic has furnished ample proof. Nevertheless, the attitude of the United States is not only permissive of political evils in Cuba, it is charged, but also
is virtually responsible for them. Especially is this so in
view of the recent American policy of supporting existing
governments in Cuba and other Caribbean countries, irrespective of their character. This does, indeed, discourage
revolution, which cannot hope to succeed in the face of
American aid to the government party, but it also enthrones
the political class beyond the possibility of dislodgement.
The following comment of a keen-minded, reputable Cuban
is interesting:
"The worst thing about the present situation is its utter hopelessness. The politicians are a bad lot,-necessarily so, for democracy
in Cuba is a farce. The United States is to blame, for she will not
allow revolutions against the government and also will take no responsibility for its conduct. If the United States will not let the Cubans save
themselves, she ought at least to take responsibility by selecting a
President. The Washington authorities are too indifferent or too timid
to do this, however, although it might temporarily solve our ills. There
is plenty of reason for an intervention, if the United States cared to go
that far, as sanitation is not being kept up and financial matters are
handled in such a way as to run contrary to the provisions of the Platt
Amendment. If the United States will not take some such step, then
she ought to let Cuba entirely alone. That would be better than an
uncertainty, although it would mean that the republic would become
another Haiti or Honduras. Eventually, Cuba will probably join the
United States as a state. That is her real destiny. But what will happen
in the meantime?"
From the standpoint of her own interests, it may be no




THE FUTURE OF CUBA: A QUESTION        651
concern of the United States that Cuba is in the grip of a
corrupt political class, but it is conceivable that a continuance of present evils might arouse the Cubans to such a
pitch of opposition to the politicians that they would confront both the home government and the United States in
an effort to gain real freedom for themselves. A situation
might well develop in such an event that would bring a
call for United States intervention. In this connection the
ease with which millions of dollars' worth of property can
be destroyed in the cane-fields of Cuba is worth bearing in
mind. In such a contingency there would probably be no
prolonged delay to speculate over the meaning of article
three of the treaty. The United States would act! Intervention by the United States would be wholly undesirable
from the standpoint of the advantage of the northern republic. It cannot be asserted too strongly that American
interests do not call for direct control of Cuba; indeed, they
are best served when the Cubans can take care of themselves. Nevertheless, no matter what the circumstances
leading to an intervention might be, it would be viewed
with suspicion in all parts of the world, especially in Hispanic America. And it is true that it is far easier to go
into a country than it is to get out of it, afterward. Assuming an intervention, however, what ought to be accomplished? It is possible to name many things,-among others,
the following:
I. The lottery should be reformed, but not done away
with, since the people would then patronize the Mexican
and Spanish lotteries. Provisions should be made for an
open audit and for doing away with the enormous profits
of middlemen. Politicians should not be allowed to hold
collectorships; these should be reserved as a kind of pension for deserving public servants who had retired.




652       A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC
II. Provision should be made for an audit of all municipal
and provincial accounts. This has never been done, and in
consequence there has been no check on bad practices.
III. A hierarchy of courts should be set up to try offences
against public revenues. That would be a step toward the
elimination of graft.
IV. Immunity of congressmen from punishment for crime
should be done away with.
V. The two-thirds quorum rule of Congress should be
abrogated, and process established to compel the attendance
of absentees. A Magoon law of "no work, no pay," might
be reenacted.
VI. The much needed codes and other forms of constructive legislation already referred to7 should be prepared and
put into operation.
VII. There should be a complete reorganization of education. Many Cubans regard this as the most fundamentally needed reform of all.
Even if these things were done, what permanent benefit
would come? Unless the intervention lasted long enough
to establish these reforms, as has been the case with the
codes provided for Porto Rico and the Philippines, there
would be an early, if not an immediate, return to normal
Cuban methods, following the departure of the American
governor. One cannot change traditions and customs by a
few laws. The lifetime of a full generation would be required if the reforms were to become part and parcel of
Cuban practices. But of all things, from the standpoint
of United States interests, a long intervention is one of the
least to be desired. All of the features of the above-mentioned platform would have a much better chance of permanence if they might come as a result of Cuban action
' E.g., see supra, p. 517.




THE FUTURE OF CUBA: A QUESTION


653


under Cuban leadership. There are many worthy men who
sincerely desire to do all these things for Cuba, but they
are helpless, as matters are. They might, indeed, face the
Cuban politicians who "own" the government, supported
to a considerable extent (as it would be) by the United
States, and they might win in the conflict, but Cuba would
be ruined. So, naturally, they draw back. If, however,
they might have the moral backing of the United States,
at least to the extent of the northern republic's not giving
direct aid to the politician-owned government of Cuba, then
victory might be easy and not too expensive. The present
situation does, indeed, offer a curious anomaly of the antiAmerican political class being kept in power to prey upon
their country by the government of the United States. And
yet the writer does not go so far as to complain of United
States policy. There is much to be said in its favor. Certainly it makes things easier for the United States,-always provided she can depend on the Cuban regenerationists
not to risk the economic ruin of their country in a desperate
civil war and can keep Cuban governments up to a respectable performance of their international obligations.  The
United States can well say that it is not in the business
of neighborhood reform, and it is an unanswerable argument.
Nevertheless, many Cubans feel that the great republic of
the north has some special obligations toward the island
which differentiate the case of Cuba from that of other
countries.
There is, indeed, one final possibility,-a bit improbable,
perhaps, but undeniably the best solution of Cuban affairs,and that is that in some way, through the normal processes
of Cuban political machinery, a clean government may come
to the fore, without intervention, revolution, or kindred ills.
The only possible manner in which a start in this direction




654


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


can be made is by the election of a President who is at once
honest and able. Such a man would probably fail, as Estrada
Palma did,-or his work would be without effect, unless
he might be succeeded by several more Presidents of the
same stamp,-but he would at least have a remote chance
for success, and this by the very best method in which it
could be attained. It may be observed that this seems to
treat the solution of Cuban ills as to a great extent an executive roblem. The writer believes that for the immediate
future this is true. The time has not yet come for any
honest, reasonably well informed man to talk of reform
through an early development of Cuban democracy. Eventually that must take place, if the republic is to mean anything, but the start will have to be made in the traditional
manner from above. The reforms, indeed, must reach into
all other branches,-Congress, the judiciary, provincial and
municipal government, and the conduct of elections,-but
the President must lead the way.
This volume takes the story of Cuba to May 20, 1925.
On that day the new President, General Gerardo Machado,
went into office. No man could have made any stronger
promises than Machado on the score of inaugurating an
honest administration. His record in the past had been
such that there seemed to be at least a possibility that he
was sincere. Though formerly a member of the political
class, he belonged to it in a period when it still had some
claims to respectability. Leaving it voluntarily, he displayed an ability to make a living and even considerable
wealth outside of politics. Not being under any such "necessity" for graft as his immediate predecessor, he may
choose to avoid it, and indeed, has stated that he is going
to leave the presidency with less money than he had when
he went into it, besides initiating reforms to bring about




THE FUTURE OF CUBA: A QUESTION


655


honest government.8 Too much reliance should not be
placed on expressions of good intention, even granting they
are sincere, but an honest and capable executive is Cuba's
greatest hope. The best elements in Cuban society would
get behind such a man as Machado has promised to be,
and when that occurs, whether the man be Machado or some
later President, Cuba will have a chance to escape the virtual
hrndnrflom tin wxrhog h  0 nrir wholr her athnT r"nT*rril~ bp1;+;/c~^


8JnJITVlCA~uc  111 VT 11j^J. k11.j 1J.LJ V A1
and to become "Cuba Libre"
of the United States, as well
should come to pass.
8 This is not the place to deal with
the administration of President Machado, who has been in office less
than a year, as this is being written.
Some rumors about him have come
to the writer's notice that are, in the
main, favorable. He seems disposed
to maintain good relations with the
United States. Prior to his inauguration he made a trip north, visiting
President Coolidge in Washington,
and since becoming President he has
taken some steps along the lines of
the moralization program. In particular, he has done some noteworthy
things in connection with the problems of the judiciary. Three committees have been appointed to undertake the following code revisions:
revision of the civil codes and codes
of procedure; revision of the commercial code; and revision of the
criminal code. Furthermore, he has
started to purify the courts, filing
cases against a number of judges on
grounds of crime or inefficiency. If
Machado carries through these reforms successfully he will have done
enough, without more, to make his
name famous in the annals of Cuba.
Withal, while vigorously attacking
evils in his own administration, so
it is said, he has avoided any revelation of the scandals of his predecessors, which may in part account for


1-L-VA IJJ l1Iu ltaiUJJL jJU UltlUUlliz
indeed. It is in the interest
as in that of Cuba, that this
the fact that Congress has supported
him. On the other hand, if rumor is
correct, he has conducted himself like
a typical Hispanic American dictator
in certain other matters. He has deported labor agitators by the hundreds. There have been several incidents of the "Lavastida affair" type.
Some claim that he has completed
the work, begun by Menocal and
Zayas, of destroying the democratic
character of internal party management, as called for by the electoral
law of 1919,-this, in preparation for
victory in the elections of 1928. The
writer presents these comments about
Machado without insisting that they
are true or false. One thing, however, he does believe: Machado has
a chance to make his name the greatest in the history of the republic.
He   as ability enough to meet the
demands of the situation. But will
he avoid the corrupt practices of
most of his predecessors? Will he
say "Nol" to family and friends?
Will he carry through the reforms
that he has begun? And will he hold
an honest election in 1928? If he
will do these things, then not Zayas,
Menocal, G6mez, or even honest old
Don Tomas will have made so good
a record. This writer wishes that he
may accomplish these things,-or, at
least, make an effort to do so.








* ESSAY ON AUTHORITIES
The amount of material on the republic of Cuba already reduced to writing is, of course, more than one man could read
in ten thousand years. Furthermore, there is an extraordinary
lack of well formulated studies that might otherwise save the
investigator's time and lead more surely to a well rounded volume of history. Even the preliminary stage of the collection and
editing of materials has hardly been reached as yet, except for
the bibliographical work of Carlos Trelles. The field is wide
open, therefore, for the writer of monographs, who must make
his own estimate of the documents, but it is difficult for the
general historian. The items listed below are intended to portray this state of affairs. Nearly all of them (and many more,*
besides) have also been cited in the text. No attempt has been
made to attain to adequate proportions in the individual descriptions, since with respect to the more important works the greater
part of the comment already appears in the bibliographical footnotes at the end of the various chapters. The following chart
shows how the material has been classified for presentation:
I. PRINTED MATERIAL
BIBLIOGRAPHIES
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
A. Cuban
B. United States
PERIODICALS
A. Cuban magazines
B. United States and other foreign magazines
C. Newspapers
D. Some noteworthy articles
BOOKs
II. OTHER EVIDENCE
MANUSCRIPTS
STATEMENTS OF LIVING WITNESSES
657!




658


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


I. PRINTED MATERIAL
BIBLIOGRAPHIES
1. Trelles, Carlos Manuel.  Biblioteca historica cubana
2v. Matanzas, Cuba. I: 1922; II: 1924. A third
volume, not available to the writer, has recently been
published.
There are many volumes of bibliography with at least some
bearing on the Cuban republic, and, of course, many
other books that contain lists of materials on Cuba.
It is not necessary, however, to mention more than
the single item given here, as an intelligent use of the
Trelles Biblioteca will take one as far as he may
wish to go. This is but one of many bibliographical
works on Cuba by the same author,' but is the most
generally useful of all. Volume one treats more particularly of the colonial epoch, with volume two devoted to the republic. Pages 1 to 129 in this volume
deal chronologically with Cuban history since 1898,
and 129 to 487 are concerned with special phases of
Cuban affairs, such as the Senate, the House, diplomatic history, and the history of provinces, cities,
and towns, to name only a few of the topics included.
While most of the items are of Cuban origin, the
author has made every effort to cite American and
other publications as well.  Important government
documents, periodical articles, and pamphlets are entered as well as books. One novelty in a bibliography
is Trelles's own running historical comments interspersed between the items,-a valuable source of information in itself. While it would be possible to
pick out some technical inaccuracies in the methods
of entry, the substantial character of the work and the
facility with which it may be used are such that Trelles
deserves to rank second only to Medina, the great
Chilean, among the bibliographers of the western world.
Certainly his volumes are a treasure-house for the
student of Cuban affairs.
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
While one may find scattered documents here and there of
the sort often called "primary," other than those emanating
'Cf. Jones, Cecil Knight, Hispanic works of bibliography by Trelles, all
American bibliographies, Baltimore, published prior to the Biblioteca.
1922. This lists no fewer than ten




ESSAY ON AUTHORITIES


659


from  government sources,-such as printed letters, diaries,
handbills, and public statements,-the number of those at present known and accessible is not very great, and their importance
for the general subject of Cuban history since 1902 is not outstanding. Unquestionably much useful material will be found
in government publications of such countries as Spain, England,
and Cuba's neighbors in the Caribbean, but the documents of
the republic of Cuba will, of course, be the most noteworthy,
and those of the United States will undoubtedly rank next.
A. Cuban
In addition to the publications named below, the Cuban
government gets out many others emanating from the different secretariats and various commissions, to say nothing of
the haphazard printings of local bodies. Those given here
are perhaps the more important among the government publications. Except where place and date of publication
are given, all are published at Havana in continuing sets.
2. Academia de artes y letras. Anales.
Published irregularly, since 1916.
3. Academia de la historia. Anales.
Issued as a quarterly, but in fact published irregularly, since 1922.
4. Camara de representantes. Diario de sesiones.
This has been published since the establishment of
the republic. It is concerned with the debates in the
House.
5. Camara de representantes.  Memoria de los trabajos
realizados.
This covers the transactions of the House, including matter about the organization of the House, proposals for legislation, laws promulgated, and messages
from the President. Each volume covers a legislative
period of two years, and the set is complete to date.
6. Camara de representantes.    Mensajes presidenciales
remitidos al Congreso.
While the messages of the Presidents contained here
may also be found in other publications, and while
this set includes only selected messages, it is nevertheless an exceedingly convenient medium for the use
of the more important presidential communications.
Only one volume, taking to March 5, 1917, has so
far been published.




660


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


7. Coleccion legislativa: leyes, decretos y resoluciones.
This contains the laws, decrees, and treaties of the
republic. The fifty-three volumes already published
are complete to 1916.
8. Cuban census office. Report on the census of Cuba,
1899. Washington. 1900. Also published in Spanish at Washington in 1899.
Although issued under the auspices of the United
States War Department, this may properly be considered a Cuban government publication. It is the
first of three very important volumes embodying the
results of the censuses of 1899, 1907, and 1919. Taken
together they represent one of the most useful sources
of information that can be found. All three were
carefully and capably prepared. See items 9 and 13
below.
9. Direcci6n general del censo. Census of the republic of
Cuba, 1919. Havana. 1920. An edition in Spanish
was published at Havana in 1921.
See comment at item 8 supra; also supra, p. 608, n. 27.
10. Gaceta oficial de la republica.
Issued daily except Sundays and holidays, and complete from 1902 to date. It contains all laws, decrees, and regulations of the republic, besides decisions
of the Supreme Court and other important matter.
11. Jurisprudencia del tribunal supremo.
This has to do with cases before the Supreme Court.
Thirty-eight volumes have thus far been issued, covering the period to 1907.
12. Memoria de la administracion del presidente de la republica.
Following the practice adopted by Governor Magoon, the Cuban government in 1909 inaugurated this
set of annual reports of the President. Each volume
covers the political year, from July 1st to the following June 30. The set embraces a digest of all
administration activities, and is complete to date.
13. Oficina del censo. Cuba: population, history and resources... census of Cuba, taken in the year 1907.




ESSAY ON AUTHORITIES


661


Washington. 1909. First issued in Spanish, at Washington in 1908.
See comment at item 8, supra.
14. Report of provisional administration.  2v.  Havana.
1908-1909. Also published in Spanish at Havana in
the same years.
The two volumes cover respectively from October
13, 1906, to December 1, 1907, and from the lastnamed date to December 1, 1908. These record the
activities of the United States provisional government
under Governor Magoon.
15. Senado. Diario de sesiones.
This is the Senate publication paralleling that mentioned supra in item 4 for the House.
16. Senado. Memoria de los trabajos realizados.
In like manner this parallels the similar publication
for the House noted supra in item 5.
B. United States
There is a vast wealth of material about Cuba in United
States government publications. A moderately careful survey covering the period from May 20, 1902, to 1923 revealed some 825 sets of papers totaling 11,544 closely
printed pages, and it is noteworthy that the amount of
material published about Cuba is increasing in volume.
That is particularly true of matter having to do with trade
and investment conditions, although political documents,
notably those involving claims, especially Spanish claims,
also bulk large. The Taft and Bacon Report, drawn upon
very heavily for the data in chapters VIII and IX, is one
important single item. There is scant point in reciting
here the various sets of United States government publications,2 but some mention ought to be made of the very
important work being done in recent years by the Bureau
of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, of the Department
of Commerce. This gets out daily consular and trade reports, occasional reports of special agents and commercial
attaches, and frequently appearing trade information bul2They are set forth in ample de- and Frederick Jackson Turner (first
tail in the well-known Guide to the published in 1896, and in various edistudy of American history by Ed- tions since then).
ward Channing, Albert Bushnell Hart,




662


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


letins. While Cuba is only one country out of many dealt
with by the Bureau, there is no better source of information
concerning economic affairs in the island republic than
in these publications. The bulletins issued by the PanAmerican Union are also noteworthy, as much of their
information is derived from  consular reports.  On the
other hand, some of the material in this set is in the nature
of pleasant propaganda. Of special note among its publications is the set entitled American constitutions, in
which (in v. II, pp. 109-154) one may find the Cuban
Constitution in both Spanish and English.
PERIODICALS
A. Cuban magazines
Items 2 and 3 supra might well have been considered
here. Among the other reviews and quarterlies those named
below are undoubtedly the most serious and worthwhile
for the purposes of the student of Cuban history. All
of them are of exceptionally high calibre. Cf. supra, p. 635.
17. Cuba contempordnea. Issued monthly at Havana since
1913.
Under the able editorship of Carlos de Velasco (cf.
infra, p. 673) and, more recently, Mario Guiral
Moreno, this has won a name for itself as one of the
leading magazines in all Hispanic America. While
covering a wide range in subject-matter, it has a number of articles that are very important as materials for
Cuban history.
18. Cuba y America. A weekly magazine, published since
1897, at first for two years in New York, and afterward in Havana, to 1917, when it ceased publication.
Broad in subject-matter, like the preceding. Long
edited by Raimundo Cabrera. Cf. supra, pp. 634-635,
and infra, p. 667.
19. Reforma social. A monthly review, published in New
York from 1914 to 1921, and since then in Havana.
A publication of the influential Orestes Ferrara, devoted to "social, economic, political, parliamentary,
statistical, and sanitation questions."
20. Revista bimestre cubana. Founded originally in 1831
as the organ of the Sociedad Econ6mica de los Amigos




ESSAY ON AUTHORITIES


663


del Pais (Economic Society of the Friends of the Country), established in 1793, it lived three years, being
edited by the famous Jose Antonio Saco. Revived in
1911, and published bi-monthly ever since, under the
editorship of the distinguished Cuban scholar, Fernando
Ortiz.
This important review is one of the leading sources
of information about Cuban affairs, especially those
having a broad social and economic scope.
B. United States and other foreign magazines
Naturally, the material about Cuba appears only incidentally in the magazines of other countries, but there is
an especially great number of articles in periodicals published in the United States. A survey of the well-known
indices of American periodical literature, Poole's index,
and the Readers' guide for the years from May 20, 1902,
to 1925 revealed approximately two thousand articles about
Cuba, to which must be added those in periodicals not
listed in the above-named volumes and others in newspapers.  By far the most important magazine for the
historical scholar is the Hispanic American historical review, now published by Duke University. Under the able
editorship of Doctor James Alexander Robertson, this
periodical is the one indispensable tool of the Hispanic
American field, and is as useful for Cuba as for the other
republics south of the United States. Occasional articles
also appear in other serious periodicals. The material in
popular magazines is rarely of a high quality, consisting
mainly of digests from the New York newspapers or else
of uninformed or partisan surveys. Now and then one gets
useful data from them, however, and they are always
helpful as an indication of the trend of American opinion.
The best current sources of information among them are
the American review of reviews and Current history, which
give brief summaries of Cuban events, while some of the
other magazines, notably World's work, occasionally publish longer articles of much interest and value. In the
periodicals of other countries the articles about Cuba are
fewer in number and usually of less importance.
C. Newspapers
The newspapers unquestionably are one of the most important forms of contemporary material for events in Cuba
and opinions about them. The Cuban papers have already




664


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


been discussed in detail supra, pp. 596-603. Except for an
occasional formal article, the newspapers of the United
States and other foreign countries are, of course, much
less important, although they do reflect the outsider's attitude with respect to Cuban affairs.
D. Some noteworthy articles
The articles named below are only a few of those cited
in this volume. Another list equally long and possibly
equally important (including a number of articles that
the writer saw but did not have occasion to use) might
easily be drawn up. Of those referred to here, however,
the following would appear to be outstandingly worth
while:
21. Aguayo, Alfredo Miguel. Factores cualitativos de nuestra decadencia escolar, in Revista bimestre cubana, v.
XIX, pp. 81-95; Mar.-Apr., 1924.
22. Brooks, Sydney. Cuba, in Fortnightly review, v. XCIV,
pp. 796-806; Nov., 1910.
For a number of other articles on Cuba by the same
author, see supra, p. 319, n. 1, and p. 642, n. 4.
23. Carri6n, Miguel de. El desenvolvimiento social de Cuba
en los ultimos veinte anos, in Cuba contemporanea,
v. XXVII, pp. 6-27; Sept., 1921.
24. Conn, Edward L. The crisis in Cuba, in (Philadelphia Public ledger, republished in) Berkeley (California) Gazette, Nov. 19-24, 26-29, 1923.
A series of ten articles, with the title for the last
five changing to Cuba not free but enslaved.
25. Crowder, Enoch Herbert. El memorandum no. 13, tr.
Sp. in Heraldo de Cuba, Aug. 5, 1922.
26. Cuba, an American ward again?, in Independent, v.
CXIII, pp. 35-38; July 19, 1924.
27. Fox, Albert Whiting. [Articles on the state of affairs
in Cuba at the time of the Veterans and Patriots'
movement], in (Washington Post, Sept. 10-14, 1923,
tr. Sp. in) Heraldo de Cuba, Sept. 11-14, 19, 1923.
28. Guiral Moreno, Mario. Nuestros problemas politicos,
economicos y sociales, in Cuba contempordnea, v. V,
pp. 401-424; Aug., 1914.




ESSAY ON AUTHORITIES


665


29. La inmigracion china, in Diario de la marina, May 15,
1924.
30. Johnston, Sir Harry. An Englishman's impressions of
American rule in Cuba, in McClure, v. XXXIII, pp.
496-504; Sept., 1909.
31. Junta cubana de renovaci6n nacional-civica. Manifiesto
del 2 de abril de 1923, in Heraldo de Cuba, Apr. 4,
1923.
32. Kennedy, W         M. The revolution in Cuba, in Living age, v. CCLXXVI, pp. 463-468; Feb. 22, 1923.
33. Marvin, George. Keeping Cuba libre, in World's work,
v. XXXIV, pp. 553-567; Sept., 1917.
34. Menocal, Mario Garcia. Cuba's part in the World War,
in Current history, v. IX, pt. 1, pp. 315-318; Nov.,
1918.
35. Norton, Henry Kittredge.   Self-determination in the
West Indies, in World's work, v. LI, pp. 77-84; Nov.,
1925.
36. Ortiz, Fernando. La reforma electoral de Crowder en
Cuba, in Reforma social, v. XX, pp. 214-225; July,
1921.
37. Perez, Luis Marino. Cuba and the United States, in
Inter-America (Eng. ed.), v. V, pp. 358-361; Aug.,
1922.
38. Resultados de la intervencion unipersonal:... la actuacion del general Crowder en Cuba, in Diario de
la marina, Oct. 10, 1922.
39. Scott, James Brown. The Attitude of the United States
toward political disturbances in Cuba, in American
journal of international law, v. XI, pp. 419-423; Apr.,
1917.
40. Spinden, Herbert Joseph. America and her duty in
Cuba, in Boston Transcript, Aug. 7, 1923.
41. Spinden, Herbert Joseph. Shall the United States intervene in Cuba?, in World's work, v. XLI, pp. 465 -483; Mar., 1921.
42. Varona, Enrique Jose. Discurso leido... en la sesion
extraordinaria celebrada la noche del 22 de diciembre
de 1921, in Academia nacional de artes y letras, v. VI
(Habana. 1921), pp. 239-246.




666


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


43. Varona, Enrique Jose. Nuestra indisciplina, in Cuba
contempordnea, v. IV, pp. 12-16; Jan., 1914.
44. Varona, Enrique Jose. El talon de Aquiles, in Figaro,
v. XXII, p. 490; Sept. 30, 1906.
45. Watterson, Henry. Again 'Cuba libre', in Havana Post,
Jan. 29, 1909.
46. Whittlesey, D        S. Geographic factors in the relations of the United States and Cuba, in Geographic
review, v. XII, p. 241-256; Apr., 1922.
47. Wigdil, Walter. Addition without division = revolution,
in Independent, v. LXXII, pp. 1352-1356; June 20,
1912.
BOOKS
Obviously, as used here, the word "Books" is meant to include printed volumes not embraced in the other categories
already discussed. The list given below does not contain
all of the books on Cuba in the era of the republic, as a glance
at the invaluable Trelles will readily show. Probably the most
important works are named, however, together with some of
less consequence to which the writer had occasion to refer.
A number of other useful volumes might be mentioned, especially of a general descriptive or economic character, but they
are not essential in a broad list. Much valuable material may
often be found, too, in volumes only partly devoted to Cuba,
but few, if any, are indispensable in a study of the republic.
If the books were classified they might fall into the following
groups: important histories of broad periods (with the
Martinez Ortiz work the sole item!); historical monographs
(with Cabrera and Velasco alone deserving inclusion); discussions of particular phases or events of Cuban history; collections of articles and addresses; partisan works on special fields;
eulogies; works of description and travel; and important pamphlets. Taken together, they do not constitute a very satisfactory set of materials. The historian must go beyond them to
other sources of information. Many of these items have already
been described in footnotes in the body of this volume, and in
that case a reference is made to the appropriate page. The list
follows:
48. Barbarrosa, Enrique. El proceso de la republica. Habana.
1911.
This is a collection of editorials written by the author
during the Estrada Palma and Magoon eras and the
first part of the G6mez administration. Somewhat




ESSAY ON AUTHORITIES


667


given to extravagance and excessive fault-finding, the
volume is nevertheless a useful aid for the period it
covers. Cf. p. 225, n. 42.
49. Cabrera, Raimundo. Mis malos tiempos. 2 ed. Habana.
1920. The first edition was also published at Habana
in 1920.
Although intended primarily as a relation of the
author's personal experiences at the time of the Revolution of February, this volume is in fact so well
documented and so admirably well done that it is virtually a historical monograph of great merit.  For
something further about the author, a principal figure
in the literary history of Cuba, see supra, pp. 634-635.
This volume is commented upon in some detail at p.
385, n. 62.
50. Cisneros Betancourt, Salvador.  Voto particular.
contra el proyecto de loteria nacional. Habana. 1909.
A thirty-two page pamphlet recording the author's
opposition to the lottery bill of 1909, together with
some comments of the press.
51. Collazo, Enrique. Cuba intervenida. Habana. 1910.
A violent and partisan pro-Liberal volume blaming
the Moderates for the intervention of the United
States in Cuba in 1906. Cf. p. 225, n. 42.
52. Cubans of to-day, ed. by William Belmont Parker.
New York and London. 1919.
One of several "Who's who" volumes on Hispanic
American countries published under the auspices of
the Hispanic Society of America. This has the defects of all such works, which was expressed by a
reviewer of the volume for Chile, with a play on the
two Spanish words for the verb "to be": "No estan
todos los que son, ni son todos los que estan"  (All the
really important persons are not included, nor are all
those who are included really important). It is nevertheless a very useful compendium as of the date compiled. For some further comment see supra, p. 589.
53. Dollero, Adolfo. Cultura cubana. Habana. 1916.
A volume of 480 pages, by an Italian. It contains
much of historical and contemporary interest, not
only on social and economic aspects of Cuban life, but




668


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


also on literary and scientific matters. Furthermore,
there is something about Cubans who have distinguished themselves abroad and concerning foreigners
who have made a name for themselves in Cuba. This
is supplemented by two later volumes of the same
author: Cultura cubana: Matanzas (Habana. 1919.
438 pages); and Cultura cubana: Pinar del Rio (Habana. 1921. 436 pages).
54. Dolz, Ricardo. El proceso electoral de 1916. Habana.
1917.
A forty page pamphlet presenting the Conservative
argument in justification of the party's conduct in
the elections of 1916.
55. Forbes-Lindsay, Charles Harcourt Ainslie.  Cuba and
her people of to-day. Boston. 1911.
This is typical of the better class descriptive works
of Hispanic American countries. After a brief historical account, it enters upon a general discussion
of the geographical, social, political, and economic
characteristics of Cuba, with particular emphasis on
economic factors. Although in a sense now out of
date, it still has some value as material for history.
Among other volumes of this character that have appeared in recent years are those of Charles Berchon
(1910), John Brooks Henderson (1916), Alpheus Hyatt
Verrill (1920), and those of Franck and Wright entered
below at items 56 and 84.
56.  Franck, Harry Alverson. Roaming through the West
Indies. New York. 1920.
This is representative of a large group of descriptive works which include Cuba as part of a wider
field. Only some eighty pages are devoted to Cuba.
Franck "hits off" Cuban life in an interesting, clever
manner, but does not go into it very deeply.
57. Gonzalez Lanuza, Jose. Discursos y trabajos. Habana.
1921.
While this might be entered in the group of government documents, since it was issued at state expense
as a publication of the House, it would seem to be
more appropriate to discuss it here as a volume of
Gonzales Lanuza himself. It consists of selections
from the Diarios de sesiones volumes of the House of




ESSAY ON AUTHORITIES


669


those portions that include speeches of Gonzalez
Lanuza during the period of his membership, from
1909 to 1915. His speeches on fifty-one different bills
(representing considerably more than that number of
times when Gonzalez Lanuza spoke) are included,
making a volume of 975 pages covering every variety
of subject-matter before the House in those years.
The work is particularly noteworthy because of the
intellectual attainments and high character of Gonzalez
Lanuza.
58. Guerra y Sanchez, Ramiro. Un cuarto de siglo de evoluci6n cubana.  Habana. 1924.
A "quarter of a century of progress" eulogy, reciting the achievements of the republic from 1899 to
1924. Devoted mainly to a study of economic advance, it nevertheless points out errors in political
life and the lack of attention to education.
59. Guerra y Sanchez, Ramiro. Historia de Cuba. Habana.
1922.
A text-book of Cuban history for use in the Cuban
schools. It is interesting as indicative of what Cubans
learn with respect to their own history.  Only a
small portion of the volume touches the republic. Cf.
supra, p. 231, and p. 231, n. 10. There are several
other volumes of this same character; for example,
one by Isidro Perez Martinez (2 ed. 1925), and another by Carlos Valdes Codina (1905).
60. Johnson, Willis Fletcher. The history of Cuba. 5 v.
New York. 1920.
This is pleasingly written, but it might better have
ended at 1902, as the part devoted to the republic
(a little over a hundred pages of volume four) is
filled with inaccuracies, and reads like an off-hand
dictation by a Menocal adherent. Volume five is a
descriptive account of Cuban resources.  So far as
the republic is concerned, this is the most valuable part
of Johnson's work.
61. L6pez Hidalgo, Ambrosio Valentin. Cuba y la enmienda
Platt. Habana. 1921.
A useful discussion of the Platt Amendment and
Permanent Treaty. Taken up supra, pp. 638-639.




670


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


62. Lozano Casado, Miguel. La personalidad del general
Jose Miguel Gomez.    Habana.  1913.
A eulogy of G6mez, especially interesting for its
presentation of the personal traits of the likeable Jose
Miguel. Cf. p. 317, n. 61.
63. Machado y Ortega, Luis. La enmienda Platt. Habana.
1922.
Another useful discussion of the Platt Amendment
and Permanent Treaty. Taken up in detail supra,
pp. 639-642.
64. Marti, Carlos. Forjando patria. Habana. 1917.
A eulogy of Menocal, covering his first administration. Superficial. Cf. p. 345, n. 37.
65. Martinez Ortiz, Rafael.  Cuba: los primeros anos de
independencia, 2 v. 2 ed. Paris. 1921. The first edition, consisting only of volume one, was published
in 1911 at Habana.
This excellent work, covering the years 1899 to 1909
(though in less detail after 1906), easily takes first
rank in the field of historical writings with reference
to the era of the republic. Indeed, it stands alone,
for there is nothing else that merits being called a
first-rate volume of history. That, however, does not
in any way reflect upon Martinez Ortiz, whose work
would be well to the front if it had fifty competitors
instead of none. For further comments, see: p. 124,
n. 19; p. 175, n. 27; p. 225, n. 42; and p. 269, n. 26.
66. Merino, Bernardo, and Federico de Ibarzabal. La revolucion de febrero, 2 ed. Habana. 1918. The first
edition was published in Habana in 1917.
A pro-Menocal account of the Revolution of February. A work of considerable utility, despite its partisanship. Cf. supra, p. 385, n. 62.
67. Military notes on Cuba. 1909. Washington. 1909.
Published under the auspices of the United States
War Department, this belongs in the category of official descriptive works, but emphasizes military geography.
68. Ortiz, Fernando. La decadencia cubana. Habana. 1924.
Only thirty-two pages long, this pamphlet, because
of its amazing collection of data and the distinction
of the author, is one of the indispensable items that




ESSAY ON AUTHORITIES


671


must be used by the student of Cuban history. It
takes the same point of view as the Trelles pamphlet,
given below at item 79, that under the corrupt and
inefficient management of the politicians the affairs
of the republic have been going from bad to worse.
Dealing with education, justice, public morals, collective wealth, and public finances, Ortiz marshals a
startling array of facts that make his conclusions inevitable. Cf. also: p. 525, n. 24; p. 546, n. 18; and p.
608, n. 27.
69. Pardo Suarez, Vicente. La eleccion presidencial en Cuba.
Habana. 1923.
This is a useful volume, presenting an argument
against presidential reelection. From that standpoint
the various elections in the era of the republic are discussed, and a number of valuable documents are embodied in the text in substantiation of the position
taken by the author.
70. Perez, Juan de Dios. Figuras nacionrles. Ranchuelo,
Cuba. 1924.
This brief pamphlet (twenty-eight pages long)
characterizing the different Cuban Presidents is useful because of the frankness and impartiality of the
author, who appears also to have been more than
usually well informed.
71. Quesada, Gonzalo de. Cuba. Washington. 1905.
Published by the International Bureau of American
Republics (otherwise Pan-American Union), this has
the usual merits and defects of an exhaustive but official presentation of information. Obviously, because
of the early date of its appearance, it is a mere starting-point, so far as the history of the republic is
concerned.
72. Rodriguez, Francisco de Paula.    Sociologia cubana.
Habana. 1919.
An eighty-three page pamphlet of addresses by the
author before Masonic lodges. It contains some worthwhile appreciations of contemporary Cuban psychology and social life.
73. Roig, Enrique. La ley del dragado. Habana. 1915.
A legal brief, presented to the Judiciary Committee
of the House of Representatives, objecting to the pro



672


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


posed cancellation of the contract of the government
with the Ports Company.
74. Root, Elihu. The military and colonial policy of the
United States, ed. by Robert Bacon and James Brown
Scott. Cambridge, Massachusetts. 1916.
Although but forty pages of this volume are devoted
to Cuba, that portion is of great importance as concerns the Platt Amendment and United States relations with Cuba, because of the tremendous influence
of Elihu Root in these matters. The Cuban section
is made up almost wholly of extracts from Root's reports while he was United States Secretary of War.
75. Rousset, Ricardo. Historial de Cuba. 3 v. Habana.
1918.
This has to do with local history and description,
taking up the six provinces of Cuba in turn, from
west to east.
76. Sanguily, Manuel.  Discursos y conferencias.  2 v.
Habana. 1918-1919.
A collection of addresses by a man often pronounced
to be the leading orator of his time. Only the second
half of volume two, from 1902 to 1916, relates to the
republic. This includes twelve addresses, which are
of some general interest in connection with questions
of the day.
77. Sanjenis, Avelino. Tiburon. Habana. 1915.
An attack on Gomez by a man who served as one
of his private secretaries during his administration.
With all due allowance for the grievance of the author
against his former chief, it may nevertheless be characterized as a work of some value for the period it
covers. Cf. p. 317, n. 61.
78. Los sucesos del Prado. Habana. 1914.
A compilation by various writers dealing with the
murder of General Armando de la Riva. Cf. p. 345,
n. 37.
79. Trelles, Carlos Manuel. El progreso (1902 a 1905) y el
retroceso (1906 a 1922) de la republica de Cuba.
Habana. 1923.
Though a mere thirty page pamphlet, this publication of its distinguished author has an importance out




ESSAY ON AUTHORITIES


673


of all proportion to its length. Trelles has accumulated a wealth of data to show that the republic, after
making noteworthy progress to 1905, retrograded
steadily thereafter. Education, the army, immigration, sanitation, roads, national expenditures, the lottery, and criminality are some of the headings under
which he discusses this topic. The Trelles pamphlet
is a good companion-piece to the one by Ortiz, mentioned supra at item 68. Also cf: p. 412, n. 31; p. 525,
n. 24; and p. 546, n. 27.
80. Varona, Enrique Jose. De la colonia a la republica.
Habana. 1919.
This is a collection of articles and addresses by a
man generally regarded as one of the greatest intellectual figures that Cuba has produced. Cf. supra,
p. 633. Less than a fifth of the volume relates to the
era of the republic, but that much is a valuable commentary on the social, economic, and political phases
of Cuban history, especially from 1906 to 1915.
81. Varona, Enrique Jose. Por Cuba: discursos. Habana.
1918.
Also a collection of Varona addresses. Particularly
notable for its frank discussion of Cuban political ills
is the one entitled Recepcion en la academia nacional
de artes y letras: discurso leido el dia 11 de enero de
1915, at pp. 315-342.
82. Vasconcelos, Ram6n. El general Gomez y la sedicion de
mayo. 2 ed. Habana. 1916. The first edition was
also published in Habana in 1916.
This is a brief pamphlet (twenty-nine pages long),
by a negro of recognized ability as a journalist, dealing with the race war of 1912 and charging G6mez
with responsibility therefor.
83. Velasco, Carlos de. Estrada Palma: contribucion historica. Habana. 1911.
This volume, prepared by one of the leading scholars
of the republican era, is made up of articles and addresses by Velasco and others which for the most part
had previously been published elsewhere. Much of
the value of the book is due, however, to the ample
data provided by Velasco in footnotes. Taken as a
whole the work ranks with that of Cabrera as one of




674


A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC


the leading examples of Cuban historical literature
dealing with the republic. See also p. 225, n. 42.
84. Wright, Irene Aloha. Cuba. New York. 1910.
This volume, which is more fully described supra
at p. 607, n. 27, is a really remarkable work, not only
the best of its class among those on Cuba, but also
outstanding in the entire field of Hispanic American
description and travel. The author knew the subject
with which she dealt, and had no hesitancy in speaking her mind. The book makes a fascinating social
study, and is valuable also for economic data as well
as for its general descriptive account. It is the kind
of volume that never gets wholly "out of date."
II. OTHER EVIDENCE
MANUSCRIPTS
The enormous body of manuscript material touching upon
the republic is not yet available, except as one may stumble
in haphazard fashion on particular documents here and there.
Government files of Cuban and United States bureaus are not
open to the investigator, and presumably that would also be
true of other countries whose unpublished official papers might
happen to have valuable material. As for private correspondence, hardly anybody, if indeed anyone at all, has given a
thought to accumulating a collection. Nevertheless, the writer
has been able to use important manuscripts, some of which
have been cited in the account. A number of others could not
be quoted to their source, however.
STATEMENTS OF LIVING WITNESSES
In a subject like the present, where innumerable witnesses
have lived in Cuba during the time of the events described,some of them for the entire period of the republic,-one must
inevitably turn to living witnesses for information, or more
particularly for opinions. There is, indeed, scant difference
between an oral statement judicially made and carefully taken
and a printed document, which, after all, is merely the statement written down. To be sure, most statements, even if "carefully taken," are not so "judicially made" as they would be
if the author were to publish his responsibility to the world.
This defect is to some extent cured, however, where the investigator gathers a number of statements on different sides
of the same question, as they tend to check one another. The




ESSAY ON AUTHORITIES                 675
writer procured hundreds of such statements, but has used
them sparingly and only when they represented a widespread
opinion of a considerable group or some particularly striking
view. While many of those who gave them would have consented to the use of their names, many others would not, and
so the writer has followed a consistent policy of not mentioning any of them. At all events the statements do little more
than lend color to an account which rests fundamentally on
more substantial evidence.








INDEX


Acevedo, Guillermo, 306.
Acosta, Agustin, 637.
Acosta, Baldomero, 370, 371.
Adams, John Quincy, 51-54, 138.
Advisory Law Commission, 237, 248 -251, 253, 256, 267, 268, 567, 625.
Agramonte, Aristides, 443.
Aguayo, Alfredo Maria, 593, 636.
Agiiero, Joaquin de, 37.
Aguilera, Francisco, 41.
Albemarle, Lord, 47.
Alfonso, Norberto, 535.
Alfonso XIII of Spain, 600.
Almagro, Enrique, 480.
Almeida, ball-player, 13.
Almendares River, 392.
Alquizar, 189.
Alzugaray, Carlos, 478, 479.
Amadeo of Savoy, 39.
American Sugar Company, 459.
Americans. See United States and
Americans.
Antilla, 15, 618.
Aramburo, Mariano, 637.
Arango, Miguel, 402.
Argentina, 325, 647.
Arias, Eugenio, 342, 344, 531-533.
Arsenal lands, 290, 291, 393, 518.
Arteaga, Emilio, 621.
Asbert, Ernesto, 192, 195, 253, 273,
314-316, 340-345, 347, 349, 351, 352,
364, 372, 393, 531, 532.
Assembly, the, 102, 103, 128, 130,
181, 271, 415, 416.
Autonomists, 70, 77-79, 84, 130, 131,
145.
Azpiazu, Eugenio, 351.
Azpiazu, Eusebio, 355.
Bacardi, Emilio, 637.
Bacon, Robert, 181, 192, 193, 196,
200, 202-212, 218, 227, 236, 247,
248, 259.
Bahia Honda, 38, 156, 157, 495.
Baire, 76.
Baracoa, 25.




Barbarrosa, Enrique, 176, 277, 291,
304.
Barreras, Alberto, 349, 373, 536.
Barry, Thomas Henry, 256.
Batabano, 189, 240, 610.
Bayamo, 146, 152, 221.
Belize, 57.
Belknap, Reginald Rowan, 377,
378.
Bell, James Franklin, 227, 256.
Bellamar, 15.
Belt, Jorge Alfredo, 221, 222.
Betancourt, Julian, 341, 343.
Betancourt, Matias, 379.
Black, William Murray, 244.
"Black Warrior," 59, 60.
Blanco, Ram6n, 83, 88, 89, 97.
Bliss, Tasker Howard, 118.
Boniato,. 21.
Brazil, 325, 647.
Brooke, John Rutter, 97, 100, 101,
103-107, 110, 111, 120, 123, 128.
Brooks, Sydney, 268, 318, 642.
Bryan, William Jennings, 341, 531.
Bryce, James, 147.
Buchanan, James, 57, 58, 60, 61,
138.
Burriel, General, 65, 66.
Byrne, Bonifacio, 637.
Caballero, Gustavo, 375, 376, 488.
Cabanas, 6, 11.
Cabrera, Raimundo, 349, 359, 363,
366-368, 374, 376, 378, 382-384, 634.
Caibarien, 281.
Caicaje, 375, 376, 379, 381.
Caimanera, 157, 379.
Calhoun, John Caldwell, 53.
California, 55, 62.
Camagiiey, city of, 5, 15-18, 24, 37,
42, 342, 352, 362, 370, 375, 376, 434,
488.
Camagiiey, province of, 41, 80, 82,
83, 132, 166, 170, 196, 315, 356,
364, 371, 375, 379, 388, 434, 459,
460, 490, 506, 508, 594, 613.


677




678


INDEX


Camagiiey and Nuevitas Railway,
463.
Camajuani, 352.
Candelaria, 569.
Cano, Jose Ram6n, 534, 536, 537.
Cardenas, 36, 365, 456, 494-497, 501.
Caribbean area, 1, 2, 45, 51, 141,
219, 364, 478, 582, 587.
Carlota mine, 368.
Carri6n, Miguel de, 637.
Carroll, James, 115, 116.
Castellanos, Israel, 637.
Castillo, Lieutenant, 305.
Castillo Duany, Demetrio, 195, 253.
Castillo  Pokorny, Demetrio, 442,
443, 452.
Catholic Church, the Roman, 119,
120, 415, 416.
Caujeri Indians, 498.
Cayo Cristo, 278, 295.
Central America, 55, 57.
Central Valley, 75.
Cespedes, Carlos Manuel de, 40, 41.
Cespedes, Carlos Manuel de (another), 437.
Cespedes, Carlos Miguel de, 334,
338.
Chac6n, Jose Maria, 637.
Chaparra, 198, 321, 395.
Charles III of Spain, 27, 31.
Chile, 325, 647.
China and the Chinese, 104, 252,
481, 482, 549, 583, 615.
Ciego de Avila, 17, 18.
Cienfuegos, 5, 23, 143, 156, 186, 200,
276, 326, 352, 368, 406, 434, 476.
Cisneros Betancourt, Salvador, 41,
82, 133, 548, 552.
Claiborne, Governor, 48.
Clay, Henry, 138.
Cleveland, Grover, 71, 72, 85, 86,
149.
Collazo, Rosendo, 375.
Colombia, 32, 53, 54, 544, 545.
Col6n, 406, 409.
Colon, Crist6bal. See Columbus,
Christopher.
Columbia, Camp, 227, 290, 370.
Columbus, Christopher, 25, 568.
Comercio, El, 303, 348, 498.
Congress, 160-162, 168-171, 182, 183,
185, 191, 193, 200, 201, 209-212,
236-239, 244, 247, 248, 250, 262,
264, 265, 274, 275, 277, 282-287,
290, 292, 303, 307, 309, 312, 316,
324-332, 334, 337, 338, 341, 344,


347, 350, 351, 373, 380, 384, 388,
390, 391, 393, 396, 409, 410, 423,
425-427, 430, 434, 436, 437, 441,
442, 446, 447, 452, 456, 458, 460,
463, 464, 466, 467, 469, 470, 473,
474, 481-483, 494-497, 499, 501, 502,
505-526, 530, 536, 538, 547-550, 557 -561, 567, 569, 570, 576, 578, 593,
599, 621, 652, 655.
Conn, Edward L., 452, 470, 476.
Conservative  Republicans.    See
Conservatives; Republicans.
Conservatives, 259-262, 277, 284, 285,
304, 305, 308, 310, 312, 314-316,
318, 322, 330, 339, 340, 343, 345,
347-353, 355-360, 369, 372-375, 377,
381-384, 400, 401, 404-410, 466, 483 -491, 500, 522, 529, 530, 533, 534,
547, 548, 574, 576-579, 602, 634.
Consolaci6n del Norte, 495.
Constitution, the, 132-135, 137, 138,
140, 141, 154, 168, 170, 171, 183,
192, 203, 212, 229, 247-251, 258,
265, 283, 302, 350, 457, 505-526,
551, 570, 579.
Constitutional Unionists, 84.
Convention, the, 133, 134, 137, 139 -143.
Coolidge, Calvin, 158, 219, 472,
655.
Corona, Mariano, 168.
Cortes, Francisco, 300, 301.
Cortes, Hernan, 25.
Cortina, Jose Manuel, 346, 353, 364,
380, 381.
Cristina of Spain, 50.
Crittenden, William S., 38.
Crowder, Enoch Herbert, 234, 248,
250, 251, 262, 267, 268, 398, 401,
407-409, 413-450, 465, 470-473, 491,
503, 525, 544, 567, 574-576, 578,
579, 591.
Cuba, newspaper, 303.
Cuba Company. See Cuba Railway.
Cuba Contemporanea, 635.
Cuba Northern Railway, 459, 463,
464, 470, 612.
Cuba Railway, 15, 16, 123, 124, 281,
458, 462, 463, 612, 617, 618.
Cuba y America, 635.
Cuban American Sugar Company,
321, 339.
Cubano, El, 35.
Cubitas Mountains, 83.
Cuellar del Rio, Celso, 465, 499.




INDEX


679


Dahlgren, Lieutenant, 55.
Daiquiri, 311.
Dallas, George Mifflin, 56.
Danish West Indies, 62, 67.
Davis, Jefferson, 36.
Davis, Norman H., 334-336.
Day, William Rufus, 94
De la Rosa, Carlos, 485.
De la Torre, Carlos, 637.
De Soto, Hernando, 25.
Derby, Lord, 68.
Despaigne, Manuel, 436, 437, 442,
443, 456-458, 472, 473, 478.
Desvernine, Pablo, 384.
Dewey, George, 92.
Diario de la Marina, El, 190, 438,
439, 498, 599, 603.
Diaz de Villegas, Marcelino, 534.
Discusi6n, La, 105, 188, 304, 305, 358,
464, 498, 602.
Dolz, Ricardo, 145, 169, 171, 172,
293, 294, 346, 348, 351, 353, 358,
359, 374, 391.
Dominican Republic, 67, 134. See
Haiti.
Ducasse, Juan, 257.
Dupuy de Lome, Senor, 87.
Dutch, the, 26.
El Caney, 21, 305.
El Cobre, 379.
England and Englishmen, 26, 27, 29 -31, 46-50, 52-54, 57, 58, 63, i68,
72, 91, 123, 147, 149, 210, 21i90,
291, 335, 338, 468, 471, 58  87,
611, 617, 623.
Estenoz, Evaristo, 260, 308-310, 312.
Estevez Romero, Luis, 94, 95.
Estrada Palma, Tomas, 41, 75-77,
82, 83, 85, 144-146, 152-226, 230,
231, 237, 239, 241, 242, 244, 246,
249, 255, 257, 262, 268, 271, 275,
276, 278-280, 283, 313, 314, 317,
331, 371, 390, 392, 400, 513, 516,
519, 527, 528, 539, 547, 567, 654,
655.
Everett, Edward, 138.
Ferdinand VII of Spain, 32.
Fernandez, Rigoberto, 370, 376-379.
Fernandez, Wifredo, 348, 374, 445.
Ferrara, Orestes, 195, 224, 265, 271,
293, 303, 314, 350, 353, 363, 364,
369, 374, 375, 382, 383, 445, 529 -532, 599.


I


Fifteen memoranda, the, 427, 435 -437, 447, 465, 544.
Figaro, El, 203, 635.
Figarola, Domingo, 637.
Fighting Cabinet, the, 181, 183, 185,
212.
Figueredo, Fernando, 637.
Filibustero, El, 35.
Fillmore, Millard, 57, 58.
Finlay, Charles John, 115.
Fish, Hamilton, 64, 68.
Flick, Robert J., 234.
Florida, 1, 2, 25, 45, 47-50, 55, 57.
75, 401.
Fonts Sterling, Carlos, 353.
Foraker Law, the, 105, 123, 124, 617.
Fox, Albert Whiting, 452, 470-472,
476.
France and Frenchmen, 26, 30, 47,
48, 50, 52-54, 58, 63, 93, 129, 146,
330, 387, 388, 586, 647.
Freyre de Andrade, Fernando, 102,
128, 182-184, 188, 206, 212, 348,
358, 359.
Freyre de Andrade, Gonzalo, 465,
466, 521, 522.
Froude, James Anthony, 72.
Frye, Alexis E., 111, 112.
Fundora, Jose de Jesus, 404.
Funston, Frederick, 228.
Gaceta, La, 373, 417, 497, 519, 553,
561.
Gallatin, Albert, 47, 48.
Garcia, Calixto, 42, 82, 127, 128,
320, 321, 340, 468.
Garcia, Crescencio, 339.
Garcia, Pelayo, 160.
Garcia Menocal, Mario. See Menocal, Mario Garcia.
Garcia Muiioz, Jos6, 378.
Garcia Osuna, Agustin, 364.
Garcia Velez, Carlos, 195, 253, 468,
469, 471-473, 476-478.
Gazette, The. See Gaceta, La.
Gelabert, Sebastian, 396, 427.
General Sugar Company, 459.
Germany, 210, 217, 365, 368, 369,
380, 387, 388.
G6mez, Jose Miguel, 130, 133, 145,
167, 169, 172, 173, 175, 183, 186,
190-193, 195, 212, 213, 218, 224,
231, 240, 241, 243-246, 253, 258,
259, 260, 262, 263, 266, 270-317,
323-327, 331-335, 339, 340, 343, 344,
349-352, 360, 361, 363, 364, 369 -



680


INDEX


371, 375, 379, 382-384, 390, 391,
393-396, 399, 402, 404, 405, 408 -411, 416, 417, 438, 468, 493, 512,
517, 518, 529, 530, 534, 539, 550,
567, 621, 655.
G6mez, Juan Gualberto, 102, 133,
170, 195, 248, 253, 272, 487, 583.
G6mez, Maximo, 42, 76, 79-83, 89,
91, 101-103, 127-130, 134, 143-145,
154, 169, 172, 173, 259, 320, 365,
410, 521.
G6mez Conlon, "Willie," 465.
Gonzales, Miguel, 607.
Gonzales, William Elliott, 365-369,
378, 383, 401, 490.
Gonzalez Beauville, Gustavo, 495,
499, 599.
Gonzalez del Valle, Francisco, 637.
Gonzalez Lanuza, Jose Antonio, 277,
284, 285, 318, 348, 358, 415, 522,
529, 549, 621.
Gordo, El, 302.
Gorgas, William Crawford, 117.
Govin, Jose Manuel, 500, 600, 601.
Govin, Rafael Maria, 600, 601.
Grant, Ulysses Simpson, 40, 63, 64,
138.
Guam, 95.
Guanabacoa, 177, 179, 189, 229.
Guanamaquilla, 37.
Guantanamo, 156, 157, 310, 370, 378,
379.
Guaracabulla, 405.
Guas, Carlos, 371.
Guaso, 406.
Guerra, Faustino ("Pino"), 191, 192,
194, 195, 253, 256, 257, 299, 300,
302, 349, 350, 370, 371.
Guerra, Urbano, 257.
Guerra y Sanchez, Ramiro, 593.
Giiines, 352, 498, 616.
Giiira de Melena, 352.
Guiral Moreno, Mario, 520, 521.
Guzman, Eduardo, 195, 202, 253, 357,
365.
Haiti, 2, 31, 35, 51, 437, 481, 498,
582, 615.
Hamilton, Mr., 46.
Hanna, Mathew E., 112.
Harding, Warren Gamaliel, 422, 442,
446, 472.
Harding, William   Proctor Gould,
430-432.
Harvard University, 113.


Havana, city of, 3-17, 20, 22, 23, 25,
30, 38-40, 47, 49, 51, 55, 59, 71,
84, 87, 98, 107, 110, 111, 114, 115,
128, 133, 137, 145, 146, 165, 166,
173, 178, 179, 185, 189, 192, 195,
197, 199-203, 205, 211, 220, 227,
234, 236, 239, 240, 248, 254, 260,
264, 266, 276, 282, 284, 289-292,
314, 321, 326, 329, 332, 335, 340,
341, 348, 351, 352, 355, 362, 364,
370-373, 381-383, 387, 391, 392, 398,
407, 411, 421, 429, 431, 434, 438,
443, 455, 457, 464, 468-470, 472,
474, 475, 492, 495, 498, 499, 502,
525, 528, 531, 534, 536, 537, 544,
576, 584, 586, 588, 589, 596-600,
602, 603, 606, 612, 616-618, 620,
624, 645.
Havana, province of, 80, 81, 131,
132, 157, 170, 172, 173, 184, 189,
192, 195-197, 250, 306, 315, 340,
351, 356, 371, 372, 375, 393, 406,
410, 490, 506, 508, 534, 536, 576,
589, 594, 613, 616, 617.
Havana, University of, 113; 328, 502,
589, 593-596.
Heraldo, El, 479, 498, 602.
Heraldo de Cuba, El, 359, 369, 372,
389, 419, 422, 436, 437, 444, 445,
457, 461, 469, 471, 472, 474, 494,
495, 497-499, 51t, 522, 599, 600 -602.
Heri*a, Jose Maria, 633.
H    ndez, Charles, 403.
He     dez, Eusebio, 349, 351.
HeL    dez, Gualberto, 272, 287.
Heirndez Cartaya, Enrique, 463,
474.
Hernandez Guzman, Jose, 602.
Hernandez Miyares, Enrique, 637.
Hernando, 405.
Hershey Line, 13-15.
Hershey mill, 14.
Hobson, Richmond Pearson, 21.
Honest Cabinet, the, 433-435, 440 -445, 448, 452, 456, 463, 465, 471,
472, 482.
House   of Representatives.   See
Congress.
Hughes, Charles Evans, 159, 413, 446,
448, 461-463, 471, 472, 503.
Huston, Tillinghast L'Hommedieu,
333, 334, 336, 337.
Ibarzabal, Federico de, 366.
Illance, police chief, 186.




INDEX


681


Imparcial, El, 602.
Independent Party of Color, 260,
308.
Isabella II of Spain, 34, 39.
Ivonet, Pedro, 308-310.
Jack, Archibald, 628.
Jackson, Andrew, 138.
Jagiiey Grande, 320.
Jamaica, 242, 481, 498, 582, 615.
Jatibonico, 371.
Jefferson, Thomas, 47, 48, 51, 126,
138.
Jesuis del Monte, 30, 287, 535.
Jicotea, 290, 488.
Jimenez Castellanos, Adolfo, 97.
Johnston, Harry, 147.
Joint Resolution, the, 91, 92, 127,
129, 135, 137, 149, 639, 640, 643.
Juan Hernandez, Bay of, 364.
Juicaro, 289.
"Julito," 364.
Junta, the Cuban, 75, 82, 83.
Key West, 1, 36, 75, 612.
Klapp, Eugene, 334, 338.
Knox, Dudley Wright, 377.
Knox, Philander Chase, 307.
La Maya mill, 312.
La Osa, 391.    S
La Salud, 189.
Ladrones Islands, 93.
Laguardia, Cristobal, 548, 552
Lancis, Ricardo, 443.
LanD, Manuel, 234.
Lansing, Robert, 366, 367, 38
Lara Miret, "General," 257.
Laredo Bru, Federico, 476, 478, 479.
Lavastida, Manuel, 300-302, 382,
655.
Lazear, Jesse W., 116.
Lazo, Manuel, 195.
Lee, Robert Edward, 36.
Le-Roy, Jorge, 637.
Liberals, 169, 173, 181-195, 199, 204,
206, 208-214, 218, 223, 227-229, 236,
253, 258, 259, 261, 262, 271, 276,
283-285, 297, 304, 308, 310, 313,
314-316, 321, 322, 327, 330, 332,
333, 340, 343, 345, 347, 349-367,
369-377, 380-384, 388, 399-410, 418,
419, 472, 483, 490, 503, 529, 530,
533, 534, 548, 574, 576-578, 602,
621, 635.
Lincoln, Abraham, 62, 451.


Llorente, Pedro, 133.
Loinaz del Castillo, Enrique, 195,
346, 371.
L6pez, Jose ("Pote"), 392, 398, 399.
L6pez, Narciso, 35-38, 40, 41, 57, 58,
365.
L6pez Hidalgo, Ambrosio Valentin,
638, 639, 643.
Lora, Governor, 535, 537, 538.
Lorenzo, General, 33, 34.
Lorraine, Lambton, 65.
Louis Philippe of France, 50.
Loveira, Carlos, 637.
Lozano Casado, Miguel, 273, 293,
295.
Lucha, La, 314, 343, 602.
Luque, Adolfo, 607.
Luz y Caballero, Jose de la, 633.
Lyman, Albert, 426.
Macbeath, Mario, 466, 523.
McDonald, J. W., 232.
Maceo, Antonio, 42, 76, 79, 80, 82,
128, 259, 320, 396, 410, 521.
Machado, Gerardo, 271, 294, 297,
313, 349, 350, 364, 365, 371, 483 -492, 500, 567, 579, 602, 654, 655.
Machado, Luis, 638-648.
McKinley, William, 82, 86-91, 95,
105, 106, 126, 139, 154, 155, 439,
643, 644.
Madison, James, 48, 49.
Madruga, 576.
Magoon, Charles Edward, 223, 229 -248, 253-259, 262, 264-268, 274 -276, 280, 283, 284, 390, 401, 419,
437, 442, 492, 512, 516-518, 527,
570, 625, 652.
"Maine," 6, 84, 85, 87-89, 328.
Malecon, the, 5, 8, 166, 240, 492,
493, 497, 499, 501.
Mafach, Jorge, 637.
Manduley del Rio, Rafael, 223.
Manguito, 352.
Manila, 92, 93.
Manzanillo, 179, 281, 379, 591.
Marcy, William Learned, 60, 61.
Marianao, 11, 12, 205, 206, 285, 352,
370, 391, 429.
Marichal, Emilio, 628.
Marinello, Juan, 637.
Marquez Sterling, Manuel, 366, 637.
Marsans, Armando, 13.
Marti, Carlos, 323, 327, 329.
M<i   Jos6, 42, 74-77, 82, 259, 264,
410, 633.




682


INDEX


Marti, town of, 281.
Martinez, Francisco, 429.
Martinez Alonso, Rafael, 534, 536.
Martinez Campos, Arsenio, 42, 79 -81.
Martinez Ortiz, Rafael, 98, 100, 105,
114, 119, 144, 147, 153, 156, 160,
171, 173, 182, 184, 192-194, 196,
204, 209, 211, 214, 217, 228, 229,
231, 254, 262, 263, 267, 268, 272,
284, 547, 552, 635.
Martinez, town of, 189.
Martinez Villena, Ruben, 637.
Marvin, George, 319, 320.
Mas6, Bartolome, 82, 144-146.
Mason, John Young, 58, 60.
Matanzas, city of, 5, 13-16, 18, 24,
36, 220, 221, 342.
Matanzas, province of, 80, 131, 132,
170, 196, 243, 315, 320, 356, 375,
406, 409, 490, 495, 506, 508, 535,
594, 610, 613, 616, 617.
Maza y Artola, Juan Jose de la,
322, 348, 350, 358, 359, 474.
Maz6 Parra, "General," 257.
Mellon, Andrew William, 432.
Mendez Capote, Domingo, 133, 145,
172, 183, 204-206, 208, 210, 484,
490, 641.
Mendieta, Carlos, 271, 349-351, 358,
364, 371, 375, 376, 389, 396, 472,
474, 483, 484, 486, 487, 599.
Mendoza, Arturo, 257.
Menocal, Mario Garcia, 198, 199,
206, 207, 209, 262, 274, 292, 293,
312, 315, 316, 318-413, 416, 417,
422-425, 430, 433, 434, 437, 452,
457, 466, 479, 484-491, 498, 499,
518, 530-534, 539, 548, 567, 574,
576, 578, 579, 602, 613, 626, 655.
Mercurio, El, 599.
Merino, Bernardo, 366.
"Merrimac," 21.
Mexico, 25, 32, 53, 54, 56, 57, 468,
586, 606, 610.
Mexico, Gulf of, 45, 47, 51, 55, 646.
Miniet, Vicente, 305, 306.
Mississippi valley, 47-49, 54, 55, 57,
62, 71.
Moderates, 172-174, 180-189, 191-193,
204, 206-214, 218, 227, 229, 236,
258, 349, 529.
Monroe, James, 48, 138.
Monroe Doctrine, 50-52, 68, 217.
Montalvo, Rafael, 181, 400.
Montoro, Rafael, 262, 639.




Monteagudo, Jose, 195, 253, 256, 271,
284, 299, 300, 312, 315, 316.
Moore, John Bassett, 643.
Moragas, Senor, 336.
Morgan, Edwin V., 196, 199 205.
Morgan and Company, J. P., 327,
425, 435, 436, 440.
Mor6n, 289.
Morro (Havana), the, 5, 8, 11, 48,
146, 276.
Morro (Santiago), the, 20-22.
Morua Delgado, Martin, 145, 168,
169, 189, 261, 265, 309, 583.
Moruia Law, 309, 310.
Mundo, El, 190, 287, 343, 494, 498,
600, 601.
Naci6n, La, 366, 372.
National Bank of Cuba, 395, 398,
399, 418, 430, 479, 480, 498-500.
National City Bank of New York,
399, 623.
National Liberals. See: Liberals;
Nationalists.
Nationalists, 130-132, 134, 143-145,
169-171, 173, 213.
Nationals. See Nationalists.
Nazareno, 405.
New Orleans, 47, 55, 57.
Nicaragua, 320, 642.
Nipe, 156, 618.
Noche, La, 498, &02.
Nu itas, 25, 281, 379.
Njo Pals, El, 131.
Nlz, Adolfo, 404.
iz, Emilio, 133, 145, 172, 173,, 307, 346-349, 384, 400.
O'Brien, Edward, 602.
Olmstead, Victor Hugo, 252.
Olney, Richard, 149.
Oriente, province of, 2, 15, 18, 20,
22, 23, 40, 41, 76, 79, 82, 96, 97,
103, 105, 115, 127, 132, 146, 166,
170, 179, 195, 196, 221, 223, 257,
281, 305, 310, 312, 315, 356, 357,
372, 373, 375-379, 388, 460, 487,
490, 506, 508, 535, 537, 583, 594,
610, 613, 616, 618.
Ortiz, Fernando, 255, 388, 466, 523,
540, 579, 619, 620, 623, 636.
Ostend Manifesto, 60, 61.
Pais, El, 498, 603.
Palmarito, 179.
Panama, 1, 55, 62, 233.
Panama Canal, 117, 167, 219.




INDEX


683
rj


Paris, treaty of, 94, 95, 129, 135-138,
140, 142, 157.
Parker, William Belmont, 589.
Pasalodos, Damaso, 364.
Patria, La, 634.
Pereira, Andres, 465.
Perez, Gonzalo, 548-550.
Perez, Juan de Dios, 316, 399, 411.
Perez, Troadio, 404.
Permanent Treaty, 137-146, 265, 410,
425, 436, 462, 506, 545, 609, 619,
632, 633, 638-643, 646-649.  See
Platt Amendment.
Pershing, John Joseph, 234, 235.
Philippines, 50, 92, 93, 95, 232, 233,
250, 600, 632, 652.
Pichardo, Manuel Serafin, 635.
Pierce, Franklin, 58-60.
Pinar del Rio, city of, 616.
Pinar del Rio, province of, 2, 38, 80,
132, 170, 183-185, 189, 192, 194 -196, 250, 315, 356, 371, 375, 487,
490, 506, 508, 569, 594, 613, 616,
617.
Pines, Isle of, 136, 141, 146, 157-159,
497, 501, 640.
Pino, Oscar del, 495.
Placetas, 300.
Platt, Orville Hitchcock, 140, 155,
643.
Platt Amendment, 135-137, 140-145,
157, 169, 180, 187, 190, 192, 193,
199, 213, 215, 320, 335, 338, 400,
441, 471, 472, 484, 506, 609, 638 -647, 650. See Permanent Trely.
Politica Comica, La, 303, 603.  I
Polk, James Knox, 56-58.
Popular Party, 400, 401, 405, 483,
485, 574, 576-578.
Portela, Carlos, 458, 465, 493, 494.
Porto Rico, 50, 93, 95, 157, 250, 517,
631, 632, 652.
Ports Company, 274, 293, 332-339,
393, 518.
Post, The Havana, 301, 498, 534,
601.
Pownall, Governor, 47.
Prado (Havana), the, 6-8, 11, 33,
39, 286-288, 290, 341, 342.
Prensa, La, 302, 372, 600, 601.
Prim, General, 66.
Protocol, the, 93, 94.
Puerto Padre, 339.
Puerto Principe. See: Camagiiey,
city of; Camagiiey, province of.
Pujol, Eduardo, 375.


Quesada, Gonzalo de, 133, 145, 202.
Quiiiones, Enrique, 370.
Quitman, Governor, 36.
Rancho Veloz, 257.
Rathbone, Estes G., 118.
Rattenbury, J. Freeman, 49.
Recio, Tomas, 253.
Reed, Walter, 115.
Reforma Social, La, 369, 635.
Reformists, 84.
Rego, Alfredo, 473.
Regiieiferos, Erasmo, 452, 453, 456,
457, 494.
Republicans, 130-132, 134, 144, 145,
169-173.
Revista Bimestre Cubana, La, 635.
Revista Cubana, La, 634.
Rey, Santiago, 579.
Rius Rivera, General, 129, 217.
Riva, Armando de la, 340-344, 347,
349, 531, 533.
Robinson, Albert Gardner, 125, 132,
148, 149.
Rodriguez, Alejandro, 211.
Roig, Emilio, 637.
Roloff, Carlos, 211.
Romainach, Leopoldo, 637.
Roosevelt, Theodore, 21, 92, 97, 149,
154-156, 159, 190, 199-202, 206-209,
211, 213, 216, 217, 219, 236, 260,
264.
Root, Elihu, 104, 135, 137-142, 148,
155, 159, 201, 217, 232, 235, 260,
266, 441, 461, 641, 643, 645.
Roque River, 166.
Royal Bank of Canada, 399, 623.
Rubio, Matias, 495.
Saco, Jose Antonio, 35, 39-41, 43,
82, 633.
Sagaro, Bartolome, 456, 495.
Sagua la Grande, 402, 406.
Saint Thomas, island of, 67.
Salamanca, 406.
Salazar, Salvador, 635.
San Antonio de las Vueltas, 185.
San Juan, 189.
San Juan Hill, 21.
San Juan River, 14.
San Luis, 281, 310.
San Miguel, Senor, 602, 603.
Sanchez de Bustamante, Antonio,
637.
Sanchez Galarraga, Gustavo, 637.
Sancti Spiritus, 17, 24, 270, 489.




684


INDEX


Sandoval, Aurelio, 494.
Sanguily, Julio, 379.
Sanguily, Manuel, 102, 133, 145, 154,
156, 169, 209, 210, 224, 353, 416,
417, 474, 634.
Sanjenis, Avelino, 288, 289.
Santa Clara, city of, 18, 23, 123, 364,
370, 618.
Santa Clara, province of, 23, 41, 80,
130-132, 170, 172, 173, 184-186, 195 -197, 213, 257, 271-273, 315, 339,
352, 356, 357, 360, 361, 364, 366,
371-373, 375, 376, 404-406, 476, 487,
488, 490, 506, 508, 594, 613, 616.
Santa Clara Convent, 443, 446, 451,
455, 457, 458, 464, 481, 494, 497,
501, 519.
Santa Lucia, Marquis of. See Cisneros Betancourt, Salvador.
Santa Maria, 459, 462.
Santiago, 2, 5, 15, 17-25, 65, 92, 93,
96, 115, 123, 127, 167, 223, 281,
311, 329, 362, 368, 370, 376-379,
579, 597, 618.
Santo Domingo, 403-405.
Santo Domingo, island of. See
Haiti.
Santos Carrera, Isidoro, 312.
Saunders, Minister, 57.
Schoenrich, Otto, 248.
Scott, James Brown, 643.
Senate, the. See Congress.
Sevilla, 179.
Seward, William Henry, 544.
Sherman, John, 71, 72.
Siboney, 21.
Sickles, Daniel, 65, 66.
Siglo, El, 282.
Sol, El, 479, 498, 602.
Soles de Bolivar, 32.
Soto, Oscar, 472, 473, 475, 479.
Soule, Pierre, 58-61.
Spain and Spaniards, 4, 25-44, 46 -100, 107, 111, 117, 119, 121-123,
126, 127, 129, 131-133, 135, 137,
138, 145, 147-149, 157, 158, 164,
165, 168, 220, 221, 226, 239, 241,
247-250, 252, 255, 264, 266, 281,
283, 284, 317, 328, 330, 398, 402,
405, 467, 492, 510, 515, 517, 518,
525, 541, 544, 547, 565, 579, 581,
584-586, 588, 590, 595-597, 599, 600,
602, 603, 606, 612, 613, 615, 617,
620, 627, 628, 630, 631, 633, 643,
644.
Spaniards. See Spain and Spaniards.




Speyer and Company, 163, 165, 167,
277, 279, 516.
Spinden, Herbert Joseph, 402, 403,
449.
Steinhart, Frank Maximilian, 199 -202, 205, 253, 267.
Supreme Court, the, 107, 120, 250,
302, 337, 356, 358, 359, 401, 408,
501, 508, 509, 513, 514, 530, 532,
536, 537, 540, 541.
Tacon, Miguel, 32-34.
Taft, William Howard, 181, 188, 192,
193, 196, 202-220, 226-230, 232,
233, 235-237, 247, 248, 253, 254, 256,
258-260, 264, 311, 527.
Taguayab6n, 300, 301.
Tampa, 75.
Tarafa, Jose Miguel, 459, 462, 464.
Tarafa Law, 458-464, 468, 473, 474,
621.
Tarafa Line. See Cuba Northern
Railway.
Tarde, La, 498.
Tarquino, Mount, 2.
Taylor, Zachary, 57.
Teller Resolution. See Joint Resolution.
Ten Years' War, 40-44, 63-70, 74,
220.
Terry, Emilio, 170.
Times of Cuba, The, 602.
Torriente, Cosme de la, 359, 360.
Trelles, Carlos Manuel, 161, 231,
255, 287, 301, 331, 389, 520, 636.
T*idad, 355.
Triunfo, El, 303, 343, 372, 498, 602,
621.
Tunas de Zaza, 364.
Union Democrats, 130, 131.
United Railways, 13, 15, 290, 463,
611, 617, 628.
United States and Americans, 1-3, 5 -7, 9-16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 27, 32, 34-37,
39, 40, 44-73, 75, 76, 81-152, 155 -161, 164, 180, 187, 189-193, 196,
199-207, 211, 214-220, 223, 226-270,
277, 284, 292, 294, 298, 307, 308,
311, 314, 315, 321, 325, 330, 335 -338, 343, 344, 346, 357, 363-371, 375 -384, 386-390, 392, 393, 395, 397,
398, 400, 402, 403, 405-410, 413,
419-426, 430, 434-437, 440-446, 448,
450, 452-454, 458-463, 470-472, 476,
478, 479, 484, 488, 490-492, 501-503,




INDEX


685


505-512, 515, 517, 519, 524, 527, 529,
531-533, 536, 540, 541, 544-546, 558,
559, 561, 564, 565, 567-570, 573,
575, 578, 579, 582, 583, 585-587,
589, 592, 595-597, 600, 601, 604-607,
609-612, 615, 617, 619-621, 623, 627,
630-633, 638, 640-653, 655.
Valverde, Antonio, 637.
Van Horne, William, 617, 618.
Varela y Morales, Felix, 633.
Varona, Enrique Jose, 203, 216, 231,
287, 308, 309, 318, 348, 351, 358 -360, 370, 407, 474, 521, 522, 538,
619, 620, 623, 633, 634.
Varona, Miguel, 379.
Vasconcelos, Ram6n, 286, 310, 312.
Velasco, Carlos de, 635.
Velazquez, Diego, 25, 568.
Venezuela, 35, 126, 642.
Vento, 290.
Verdad, La, 34.
Verdad y Justicia, La, 303.
Veterans and Patriots Association,
460, 469-483, 491.
Veterans Association, 198, 199, 202,
203, 294, 306-308, 468. See Veterans and Patriots Association.
Vicana, 179.
Victoria de las Tunas, 320, 321, 394.
Vidal Morales, Senator, 342, 344,
531.
Vigo, Governor, 535.
Villanueva lands, 274, 290-292, 393,
394, 518.
Villuendas, Enrique, 186, 229, 376.
Virgin Islands. See Danish West
Indies.
"Virginius," 65, 66.
Vuelta Abajo, 616.


Watterson, Henry, 263, 266.
Webster, Daniel, 138.
West Indies. See Caribbean area.
Weyler, Valeriano, 81-83, 86, 98, 568.
Wilford, John Thomas, 601.
Wilson, Woodrow, 219, 318, 334, 369,
377, 386, 407, 422, 425, 490.
Winship, Blanton C., 248.
Wint, Theodore Jonathan, 256.
Wood, Leonard, 20, 21, 92, 96, 97,
101, 103-125, 127, 129-131, 133, 134,
137-151, 155, 157, 161, 182, 183,
229, 235, 255, 257, 266, 268, 283,
284, 390, 420, 441, 516. 518, 527,
618, 634, 640, 645.
World War, the, 217, 248, 362, 380,
381, 386-388, 391, 395, 397, 401,
419, 574, 609, 641.
Yara, 40, 41, 221.
Yucatan, 45, 56, 57.
Yumuri River, 14.
Yumuri Valley, 15.
Zanjon, treaty of, 42, 69, 221.
Zayas, Alfredo, 133, 145, 156, 164,
172, 173, 182, 183, 191, 195, 203 -210, 248, 253, 258-262, 273, 274,
297-300, 304, 305, 310, 313-315, 323,
349-351, 353, 359-361, 364, 381, 382,
384, 394, 396, 399, 400, 405, 406,
408-410, 413-504, 518, 519, 524, 525,
530, 534-536, 538, 539, 547, 556,
558, 559, 561, 562, 566, 567, 574,
577, 579, 584, 593, 602, 626, 629,
655.
Zayas (Jr.), Alfredo, 465, 535-537,
557, 562.
Zayas, Francisco, 465.
Zayas, Jose Maria, 465.




I




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