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Le testament authentique de John D. Fink,' la NouvelleOrl6ans, en date du 7 novembre 1855, contient, apros divers legs
particuliers, la disposition universelle suivante:
"It is my wish and desire and I do hereby declare the   tb."to be my  will, that after payment of my just debts and the'
several legacies herein above mentioned, that the proceeds of
the whole of Estate, property, rights and credits be applied to
the erection, maintainance and support of a suitable Asylum in
this City, to be used solely as an Asylum  for  Protestant
Widows and Orphans, to be called "Fink Asylum" and I do
herein request and authorize my friend Diederick Bullerdieck,
' after my decease, to name and appoint three worthy  and res
ponsible persons as trustees to carry out my said intentions res pecting the aforesaid Asylum.
I hereby nominate and appoint my  said friend Diederick
Bullerdieck sole executor of this my last will and testament
with full power to take possession of my estate and be detainer
thereof."
L'ex6cuteur testamentaire, au lieu de nommer trois trust(, a
r6uni six autres personnes pour obtenir un acte d'incorporation
priv6d, avec lui septibme, pour le Fin?k ssylumi: suivant la forme
requise par uneloi de 1855 pour l'organisation des Corporations
Litteraires, SCientifiques, Religieuses ou Charitables.
t"4''
, I i
1   7       I
C>19 I.
II
I I 
(2)
Comme le testament ordonnait a l'ex6cuteur testamentaire de
nommer trois trustees, et que cette disposition est nulle et qu'elle
annulle le legs, certains heritiers du ddfunt ont demandd enjustice
contre l'exdcuteur testamentaire, la restitution du legs de residuo.
Ils ont dchou6 par ddcision de la Cour Supreme de l'Etat de la
Louisiane du 16 mars 1857, qui ddclare infirmer le jugement rendu au profit de l'hdritier, qui declare en meme temps que le le,gs du
residu est fait au profit de la ville de New Orleans (laquelle u'dtait pas en cause), et qui, statuant sur l'intervention au procbs de
la Corporation the Fink.4syliim, la ddmet de cette intervention.
On a mis sous les yeux du Conseil, lo. L'expddition du testa*  t4 20. Une copie en forme de la decision de la Cour Supreme
etqleelques autres pieces qu'il est inutile de relater ici.
On lui demande son sentiment dans l'intdret d'autres hdritier
du meme testateur si, selon son sentiment, les h6ritiers du dit ddfunt auxquels on ne pourrait pas apposer l'arret de la Cour Su
preme du 16 mars 1857, ont le droit de demander la nullit6 du
legs de residuo, soit contre l'exdcuteur testamentaire, soit contre
la ville de New Orleans, a qui la Cour a declare que le legs appartenait, soit enfin et cumulativement  contre les trustees (s'il y
en a eu de nommds) et autres pr6tendants a d6tenir les deniers et
biens quelconquesrestant aprbs paiemeut des legs et des justes
dettes du testateur.
CONSULTATION.
Sur quoi l'avocat a la Cour Imp6riale de Paris, soussign6,
En supposant, en fait et en droit, qu'il y ait quelque hdritier
du defunt auquel la ddcision de la Cour Supreme de la Louisiane,
diC 16 iarrs 185t, ne soit ni applicable, ni opposable, parce qu'il
-0 a 
(3)
n'y aurait t6 ni partie, ni repr6sent6; - point que le soussign6
ne peut exatniner, faute de connaissances spdciales sur la proc6dure
des Etats-Unis,
Est d'avis,
Que tout hdritier du testateur qui n'aurait 6t ni partie, ni reprdsent6 dans ladite decision de la Cour Supreme, a le droit in
contestable de demander, en ce qui le concerne, dans les formes
et suivant les rbgles de comp6tence et de procedure usitdes dans
le pays, la nullit6 du legs de residuo, tant contre l'ex6cuteur testamentaire, que contre la ville de New-Orleans, a qui la Cour a
d6clar6 que le legs appartenait, quoiqu'elle ne fut pas en cause et
ne le r6clamat point, et contre les trustees, s'il en a  t6 nom~6, et
autres pretendants droit a ddtenir les biens de la succession' do
John David Fink, apres lc paiement des justes dettes du d6funt,
et l'acquit de ses legs a titre particulier;
Que le legs universel de residuo par cela seul qu'il est confi6,
a trois trustees, est nul a quelque personne qu'il ait 6t6 fait, meme
quand il aurait 6t6 fait a la ville de New Orleans; [aux termes
de l'article 1507 du code de la Louisiane calqu6 sur l'article 896
du Code Napoleon, mais y ajoutant trois mots de plus;
"Les substitutions et les fideicommis sont prohibds.  Toute
disposition par laquelle le donataire, l'hdritier ou le ldgataire
est charg6 de conserver et de rendre a un tiers est nulle, memo
"a l'dgard du donataire, de l'hdritier institu6 ou du ldgataire."
Que toute l'affaire rdside dans cet article, puisque l'ex6cuteur
testamentaire reqoit l'ordre du testateur de nommer trois trustees
pour exdcuter sos intentions testamentaires quant au legs de residuo.
Que le plus grand danger que courra le demandeur sera quand
a une phase quelconque de la procddure, il arrivera devant la
Cour Supreme do la Louisiane, et rencontrera par consdquent 
( 4 )
(4)
commiepreceddent, l'arr(,t ou ddcision du 16 MAars 1857; mais qu'alors
il est't croire que la loyaute' de la magistrature  lui fera faire
une distinction sur la difference de consulter les preccdents judiciaires dans les pays legifdrds ou codifids et dans les pays de
coutumes, et quc la verit6 16gale triomphlera, par l'organe meme
de la Cour Suprrme, qui, sans s'arreter a ce pr~c6dent prononcera
la nullit6 du legs universel de r6siduo et ordonnera que le residu
de la succession, soitpar l'executeur testamientaire, les tirustees, ouil
tous autres d6tenteurs ou pr6tendants a ce legs universel, restitu6
a l'h6ritier ou aux h6ritiers avec qui le jugrement, arret ou d6cision du 16 Mlars 1857, i}'aura pas 6tc5 dcl,,lr6 comimun.
,Qlclqiies reflexions d6inonticront le fondemeit des proposi t],;'-'qule le soussigu6 vicuet d'"6iettre.
I.
La inaxime res jttdicata pro veritcte liabetur a ses limites  chez
tous les peuples.
Lajustice n'a le pouvoir de decider les questions  qu'entre les
parties qui proce6dent devrant elle. La chose jug6e ne nuit ni ne
profite aux tiers qui ne sont pas parties au procbs. Res judicata
nec prodest nec nocet tertio.
Donc, la ddcision de la Cour Supreme qui a, en l'absence de la
ville de New Orleans, ddclar6 la dite ville, ldgataire universelle du rdsidu des biens du testateur, nonobstant la nullittl du
legs, n'a pas meme rendu un jugement  au profit de  cette ville.
Elle n'avait pas intent.  d'action; elle n'6tait pas partie au procbs: donc, rien n'estjugd a son (gard.-  Ce  que le juge a dit
n'est qu'une simple opinion, mais ne confure aucun droit a la Cit6
de New Orleans. - Si elle a des droits, qu'elle agisse contre les
antres parties: jusque la, elle ne peut invoquer un  jugement  qui
mui est 6tranger.
De meme, un oi plusieurs he'ritiers q'i n'etaient pas parties au 
(;)
procbs ou qui n'y dtaient pas ri'pr'scntds nie peuvent:trc l1ess
par un jugement a eux etranger.
Ils sont ljersonnes dirffecntes de celles avec qui le jugemient a
6td rendu.  Cela cst 611mentairc dans tous les pays  ou rg(rne le
droit.
II.
Ce qui est encore clmentaire et commun  i toutes les nations,
c'est que la nullit6 du  testament tourne toujours au profit de
l'hiritier.
L'hdritier legal, 1'hdritier ab intestat est cclui auquel reviennent
les biens si le testament est nul  et non valide.  La raison en est
que toutes les nations ctablisscniit par leurs lois l'ordre des successions dans les familles, que la facult( de tester n'est qu'une puissance privce accordce an sujct de la loi, sous la condition de ne
pas violer les lois de la cit; quc lorsque le testatcur viole les
dispositions prohibitives du droit public, il n'y a plus de testament
en cette partic; et s'il n'y a plus de testament  in parte qua, la
disposition de l'homme n'existc plus, et l'ordre l6gitime des hdritiers indiquc seTul qu'ils sont les vrais he6ritiers.
III.
Dans l'cspccc, le legataire  universel n'est pas autre que les
trois trustees que l'exdcuteur testamentaire doit nommer et constituer pour exdcuter les intentions du testateur et qui seront charg6s d'appliquer le rdsidu de ses biens a la construction, au maintien et au soutien d'un asile pour les veuves et orphelins Protestants dans la ville de la Nouvelle-Orldans; les personnes, objet
de la libdralit6 et qui profiteront du  fideicommis ne sont pas
les veuves et orphelins Protestants, existants au jour du de'cis du
testateur, ce qui cut dtd un legs a distribuer entre eux et fort licite quoique de difficile ex6cution; c'6tait tout au contraire une
fondation pour l'avenir, qui ne leur conferait quo l'usage de l'asile 
{) ~   ~     t
a  1lever, maintenir et entretenir; ce n'6tait pas ligue a la ville
ce devait etre construit dans la ville; et le nom meme de Fink
.dsylurn indiquait meme que ce n'"tait qu'un dtablissement priv6,
confi6 aux trustees ou fideicommissaires qui, n'en auraient la propriete que in trust, sous l'obligation morale de donner aux fonds et
aux deniers la destination perp6tuelle indiqude par le testateur
Or, cc n'est pas le but moral du testateur que le soussign6
attaque: ce qu'il blaime, ce qu'il dit contraire a la loi, c'est la
disposition en elle-mime comme violant le droit public de l'6tat
de la Louisiane.
L'article 1507 du code Louisianais prolibe dans les donations
et les testaments les fideicommis; il ne se contente pas  de le
prohiber; il les ddclare nuls: ce n'est p)as assez de les avoir d6claris nuls, il d6clare nul meme la disposition qu'ils affectent; ils
sont a la fois nuls et annullateurs, nuls et irritants.
Rien n'en doit subsister ni la disposition principale ni les effets
pour les tiers.
Done, le legs du r6sidu grdv6 du fideicommis pour faire un
6tablissement priv6 ddcor6 du nom du testateur pour soutenir une
classe de personnes qui ne constitue pas une corporation publique,
est un legs nul et sans effet, done le testateur a fait ce que la loi lui
ddfendait de faire; done, les biens compris dans ce legs universel, sont restds dans la succession; done, ils appartiennent b
ses hdritiers lgitimes dis l'instant de l'ouverture de la succession
(Code de la Louisiane, Art. 934.)
IV.
Quand meme on donnerait une autre interpretation au testament et qu'on regarderait la ville de New-Orldans comme le but
de la liberalit6 de John D. Fink (ce que nous ne croyons pas
etre) il n'en serait pas moins vrai, en point de fait, que le testateur
n'a pas donn6 directement a la ville, et qu'il aurait charg6 expres. 
( 7 )
s6ment son ex6cuteur de nommier et d'6tablir trois personnes pour
trustees afin queces trustees mnetteint   l'exScution ses intentions
d'appliquer ce qui restrerait apres paiemient des justes dettes et des
legs, sur l'universalit6 de ses biens, propri6tcs, droits, effets et cr6ances, a' l'6rection maintien et soutien d'un Asyle convenable dans la
ville pour en faire profiter seulemnent les veuves et orphelins Protestants:-ainsi et en point de fait, c'est toujours a des trustees, c'esta-dire a des fideicommissaires que le testament a  ordonn6 de
remettre le residu de la succession pour l'ex6cution de la volont6
du d6funt.  I1 importe pen qu'apr~s eux, l'Asyle Fink appartienne
a la ville (corporation publique et reconnue) ou ne lui appartienno
pas, puisque l'Asyle Fink ne pourrait parvenir a la ville que par
une cons6quence de fideicommis proliib6.
Quand l'article 1507 a dit les fideicommis sont proh ibe's, et
qu'il a annull6 le fideicommis et'la substitution il n'a pas fait
comme la loi franwaise. Celle-ci, dans l'article 911 du Code Napol6on, a proliib6 seulement les fideicommis faits au profit des
incapables, par ces mots: " toute disposition au profit d'un incapable sera nulle, meme si on l'a fait sous le nom de personnes interpos6es."
Le code de la Louisiane est plus s6vore: "les fideicommis sont
prohibis."
ILS SONT PROHIBES soit que les personnes qui en profiteront
plus tard soient capables ou incapables, priv6es ou publiques, corporations aux simples particuliers.
Dans le systbme Louisianais, dbs qu'il y a fideicommis, le legs
est d'une nullit6 radicale.
Donc, pen importe quelle interpretation on  donnera au  legs,
quelle fin on lui indlquera, quelle personne en doit profiter. Sera-ce
la ville, corporation publique ou reconnue? Sera-ce les veuves
et orphelins protestants; classe qui ne forme pas une corporation 
(8)
mniie priv e?  Sera-ce une corporation priv-e  etablie suivant le3
lois du 1)ays, ct qui se trouvera en position de coinmercer du bien
du ddfunt, en imposant des conditions pour  entrer dans l'Asyle;
Tout cela nous iinporte peu, et il n'y a pas besoin d'examiner.
Des que le testateur a voulu que le r-sidu de sa succession entrait aux mains dc fideicommissaires chargds de remplir et d'ex6 -
cuter sa volontd sur ce point, le legs de residuo est nulle et d'une
nullit6 absolue.-Ce qui constitue ce  residu est dans  la succession ab intestat.
V.
Le soussignIl ne dira qu'un mot sur le mot trustees dont se sert
le testament. Les trustees sont les fideicommissaires anglais. Dans
une consultation delibdrde pour la Nouvelle-Orldans, dans l'affaire
McDonough, avec ses illustres confreres AIMI. Delangle,  Giraud,
Duranton pere et Marcadd le 18 Ddcembre 1851, il avait dej "
6crit "le mot fideicommis (fideicommissa ) nous parait avoir
"dt ajoutd i l'art 896 du Code Louisianien, k cause de l'origine
anglaise des autres Etats-Unis, et pour proscrire en meme
temps taut les substitutions de l'ancien droit franqais que les
trsts du droit anglais."  I a depuis appris que Mr.  Brown,
lrun des rddacteurs du Code de la Louisiane. avait dit la memo
chose d'une manibre formelle.  Donc, il peut dire avec raison et
en toute connaissance de cause que les trustees n'dtant que des
fideicommissaires, le legs fait de residuo par le testateur aux
trois trustees a nommer par son ex6cuteur pour mettre en ceuvre
ses intentions sur i'Asyle a dtablir, le maintenir et le soutenir est
un legs radicalement nul d'apres les lois de l'Etat.
VI.
On dlve ici une difficultd secondaire; et l'on dit contre l'hdrdit6, qu'effectivement il y a dans le testament une ddldgation par
le testateur i ure tierce personne (l'ex6cuteur) de choisir des 
(9)
trustees ou admiiistrateurs d'une portion de sa fortune; que dans
la vdrit6 c'est l une pure nullitd; mais que d'apres l'article 1506
du Code Louisianais; les conditions ou clauses nulles dans les
testaments sont et doivent etre considdrds comme non ecrites.
Et de la l'on a tir6 la consequence, qu'effectivement si le legs
6tait principalement fait pour l'utilit6 des veuves et orphelins
protestants de N.-Orldans, le legs de residuo serait effectivement
nul, puisque les veuves et les orphelins protestants dans une cit6
ne forment pas une corporation ou personne civile, et sont incapables de recevoir cornme personnes incertaines; mais qu'en decidant en fait que le vrai ldgataire de residuo 6tait la cit6 de la
N.-Orldans, (corporation publique capable de recevoir), on pouvait effacer l'institution de trustees comme contraire a la loi et
par consdquent la considerer comme non dcrite.
Or, selon le soussi,gn6, cela est contraire au testament, si on en
considere le sens; et cela est contraire a la loi Louisanienne, si
l'on veut en consulter le texte et l'esprit.
VII.
Quant au sens, il est impossible de dire que cette disposition
"JIa volonte' est que l'entier reste de mes biens...... soit applique'
" et employe a l'erection, maintenance et entretien d'un.Asyle dans la
ville JV'.-Orleans, pour l'usage seulement des veuves protestants et des
"orphelinsprotestants........ "soit une disposition en faveur de
la ville.  La ville n'est point ldgataire; la phrase n'indique  par
les mots in this City que le lieu ou le testateur veut que l'Asylo
soit 6rig,.
Le reste de la disposition prouve encore davantage que la ville
n'est pas gratifiee, qu'elle n'est meme pas le but de la libdralit6 du
testateur; car le testateur vent qute l'exdcuteur nomme trois
trustees pour etre charges de l'6rectioin, maintenance et entretien
du dit asile, et que l'asile porte le nom du testateur.-Donc, l'ta-. 
(10)
blissenient qu il projette n'appartienidra pas k a 1   ilIe, et ne senL
qu'un 6tablissenmenlt priv6, ayant une existence et une administration absolument ind6pendante de l'admiiistration de la ville.
L'(tablissement des trustees, et l'ordre d'en normmer, est une
preuve certaine que le testateur, loin de songer a domer a la ville,
youlait que l'administration publique et municipale ne s'iinmiseat
en rien dans un legs, qu'il faisait pour l'utilite d'une classe de
personnes d'une religion ddtermine et nialtraitdes par la fortune.
VIII.
31ais, dans tous les cas, meIne quaind le legs aurait 6t6 fait par
le testatcur dans le but final dcetre utile a la ville de N.-Orl6ans
quand dans sa pens6e, les trustees ou fideicommissaires auraient
du 6riger, nainitenir et soutenir l'asile Fink, le conserver ainsi
apres l'avoir formS, et le rendre a la ville de New-Orleanls, en examinant la question d'apres la legislation Louisiane, il faut ne6ces
sairemnent prononeer la nullite du leg,s, et l'on ne peut considdrer
l'ordre de nommer des trustees comme une disposition non derite.
Dans tous ]es  legs par fideicommmis comme  dans toutes substitutions, on distingue deux especes de personncs sur lesquels
l'intention du testateur est dirige: le grevj,  celui auquel le testateur donne directement et qui est charg6 de rendre, et l'appel6
ou les appeles, ceux envers lesquels le greve6 doit ex6cuter la vo
lont6 du testateur.
Or, d'apres les lois de la Louisiane, tout est nul pour les fideicommis comme pour les substitutions, et rien ne doit demeurer du
legs, ni la disposition faite au profit du grev6, ni la disposition
faite pour les appels; encore une fois tout est nul.
La question n'est pas nouvelle. Elle s'est presentde en droit
franqais pour les substitutions fiddicornnmmissaires sur l'art.
896 du Code Napoldon semblable pour son texte a  T'art.  1507
du Code de la Louisiane, lequel ajoute aux substitutions les fidkie'
I 
( It )
La Jurisprudence de la Cour de Cassation est clez nous certaine sur cc point. En vain, viendrait-on dire: les conditions
contraires a la loi sont repittees non ecrites (Art. 900 du Code
Napoleon).  Donc, le grev5 peut garder son  legs; il n'y a de
nul que la substitution.
-On r6pond: il y a en droit fran~ais deux lois bien distinctes
1'art. 900 et r'art. 896.-(Iotons qu'il faut en dire autant en droit
Louisianien, il y a aussi deux lois bien distinctes, l'article 1506
semblable a notre article 900 et l'art 1507 semblable a notre
article 896 et qui ajoute les fideicommis.)
L'article 900 est une regle g6ner-ale (1506) l'art. 896 (1507)
est une exception.  En grniral, si une disposition n'a  d'autre
vice que d'etre faite sous une condition impossible ou contraire
ak la loi, elle est valable, parceque la condition ill~gale est cense6c
non erite; au contraire quand la loi annulle la charge ou  condition de conserver et de rendre, il n'y a plus a s'occuper de l'art
900 (ou 1506:) il n'est pas fait pour cc cas special. La disposition principale est nulle; la disposition secondaire l'est aussi. Le
premier arret de la Cour de Cassation sur cette matiere est du 18
janvier 1808; il so trouve au repertoire de M. Mferlin, au  mot
substitution fideicommissaire, Sect. 1 ~ IV, No 2, et contient
son rdquisitoire; et c'est du jurisprudence certnine.
Ajoutons qu'il en doit etre a plus forte raison de  meme des fideicommis perpetuels.-Ji perpetual trust constitu6 pour former
un 6tablisscment priv6 est un fideicommis perp6tuel; I- loi Louisianaise les proscrit.  ELLE LES  ROEIBE: Cc n'est plus la condition qui est prohib6e: c'est le legs en lui-meme.  Le iesidu do
la succession 6tant donn6 nullement et contre la prohlibition de
la loi, demeure dans la succession ab intestat. 
( 12 )
ix.
Le soussignal a dit que le plus grand danger que courrait le
demandeur, s'elevcrait quand dans une phase quelconque du pro
ces, il reviendrait devant la  Cour Supreme de la Louisiane et
rencontrerait comnire prdcedent l'arret du 16 mars 1857.
Car il est certain pour lui qu'en Angleterre et chez les nations
qui ont emprunte de l'Angleterre lcur mode de procader, les prdcedents et les arrets d ja' rendus out une influence sur les ddcisions a venir bien autremeut puissante qu'cn France.
Pour ce cas il soumet a la loyant6 des nmagistrats de la Louisiane les observations suivanites
A la Louisiane, comme chez nous, les arrets ne statuent que sur
des cas particuliers.  Tout cc qui est dit par le juge avant la partie dispositive du jugcement est l'cxpression d'opinion, d'examen,
de doctrine, mais n'est pas encore cc qu'on peut appeler res jud,'cata. La chose jugde n'est vd6ritablement que dans le dictum; et
encore cette chose jugee n'existe-t-elle qu'entre les parties qui ont
4t6 parties a la ddcision judiciaire.
Les magistrats qui composeront la Cour, rdfldchiront dans
leur haute sagesse que les prdcddents doivent avoir beaucoup
moins d'influence sur les jugements a rendre dans l'Etat de la
Louisiane que dans les autres Etats de l'Amdrique du Nord, par
cela seul que la Louisiane est un pays 16gifdr( par son Code  Civile.
En effet, il semble que les Cours de justice doivent faire une
grande difference quant a la puissance des prdcddents entre les
pays ou les lois Civiles ont dt6 codifides et ceux ou elles ne l'ont
pas t6.
Dans  les  pays que nous appellerions en franvais pays de
Coutie:~, et en anglais of Comnon law, nous reconnaissons qu'il 
( 13 )
e,st d'une haute utilit6 d'invoquer les arrLts prdcde'ents (seris rerum perpetu6 judicatlarurnm), parce que la sdrie d'arrets conforme
est une preuve autlhentique et respectaTble do at coutume qui s'est
introduite sur un point donn6.
Mlais dans les pays 16g,if6r6s, quant aux lois civiles (ceux qui se
sont donn6s des Codes, comme la France, comine la Louisiane),
les arrets comniandent encore le respect, mais ils n'y peuvent
exercer d'autorit( qu'autant qu'on reconnait leur parfaite conformit6 a la loi 6crite.
Dans ces pays, les citoyens, par leur adhdsion h un Code civil,
ont positivement de6clard qu'ils n'entendaient pas mettre leurs
biens, leurs personnes et leurs droits a la merci du flot changeant
et mobile de l'opinion; que, pour eux, la loi etait l'ancre de salut;
que, si quelqucs arrets s'en dcartaient, ils ne seraient chose jugde
qu'entre les parties; et que les arrets suivants, quoique dans des
espbces semblables, devaielit se conformer a la loi; car le pouvoir
judiciaire, maitre des citoyens qui recourent a lui, ne pent, par
une suite d'arrcts, changer la loi dont il n'est que le ministre.
Et de cette vdrit6, il suit qu'unte partie qui demande la meme
chose que la partie qui a succomb6 en 1857, a le droit de ddmontrer, soit devant le juge du premier degr6, soit devant la Cour
Supreme, que malgrd le morite personnel du magistrat, et malgr6 son autorit6 sur les parties qui etaient en cause, l'arret de
1857 ne pent pas etre pris comme un pre6cddent liant les magistrats dans une affaire intentde par un nouveau demandeur non re
prdsent6 a l'arret de 1857.
On sera libre d'examiner si tous les dldments de la cause out
dt6 bicn connus, bien combin6s; si les raisonnements 6taient
,;ustes, complets et concluants; et meme en presenter d'autres;
I 
(14 )
hr l'affaire n'est plus la nmite; ce n'est pas la meme affaire, quoique semblable.
D6libdr6 a Paris, le 19 d6cembre 1859.
COIN  DELISLE,
Avocat a la  Cortr Imperiale; ancien membre
du Conseil de l'Ordre.
L'avocat, soussigncl, adhere completement a la Consultation de
son honorable confrere, MI. Coin Delislec.
Paris, le 20 ddcembre 1859.
PAILLARD DE VILLENEUVE,
Avocat (i la Cour Imperiale de Paris, Membre du
Conseil de l' Ordre.
_,,  *, 44         _. 
I 
OPINION
of Messieurs Coin Delisle and Paillard de Villeneuve
on the validity of the disposition contained in the
will of the late John D Fink providing for the con    struction and support of an Asylum in the city of
New Orleans for the benefit of Protestant Widows
and Orphans.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The will of John D. Finik made in the authentic form and dated
at New Orleans on the seventh of novenlmber 1855, contains after
several particular legacies, the following universal disposition:
It is my wish and desire and I do hereby declare the same to
be my will, that after payment of my just debts, and the several
legacies herein-above mentioned, that the proceeds of the whole
of my estate, property, rights and credits be applied to the erection, maintenance and support of a suitable asylum in this city to
be used solely as an asylum for Protestant Widows and Orphans
to be called "Fink's Asylum; "and I do herein request and auth.
orise my friend I)iedrick Bullerdieck, after my decease, to name
and appoint three worthy and responsible persons as Trustees
to carry out my said intentions respecting the aforesaid asylum.
"I hereby nominate and appoint my said friend Diedrick Bullerdieck sole executor of this my last will and testament, withi
full power to take possession of my estate and be detainer thereof.." 
(2 )
The testamentary executor instead of appointing three trustees,
united with six other persons to obtain an act of incorporation of
the Fink A.,ylurn in accordance with a statute of 1855 providing
for the organization of litterary, scientific, religious or charitable
corporations. As the will directed the testamentary executor to
appoint three trustees and as this disposition is null and annuls the
legacy, certain heirs of the deceased claimed judicially from the
executor, the restitution of the residuum of the succession embraced in the legacy.
In this they failed by the decision of the Supreme Court of
Louisiana rendered on the 16th of Miarch 1857, which reversed
the judgment that had been rendered in favor of the heirs, declared at the same time that the legacy of the residue  enured to
the benefit of the City of New Orleans (that corporation being no
party to the cause), and dismissed the intervention of the Fink
.sylum Corporation.
The will, a certified copy of the decision of the Supreme Court
and some other papers not material to be mentioned here, have
been submitted to the undersigned.
His opinion is asked on behalf of other heirs of the same testator, whether supposing the judgment of the Supreme Court
of the 16th of Mtarch, 1857, could not be opposed to them,
they have the right to demand the nullity of the legacy de residuo
against the testamentary executor, the city of New Orleans to
whom the Court has decided the legacy to belong, and cumulatively against trustees (if any have been named) or others asserting any claim to detain the property or any portion of it remaining after the payment of the legacies and the just debts of
the testator.
I 
CONSULTATION.
Whereupon the undersigned Counsel of the Imperial Court of
Paris, supposing that in fact and in law there is any heir of the
deoedent to whom the judgment of the Supreme Court of the
State of Louisiana of the 16th of March, 1857, is innapplicable
and cannot be opposed as being neither a party to nor represented in the cause; a point which the undersigned declines to
examine from a want of the requisite knowledge of the rules of
practice of the Courts of the United States,
Is of opinion, That every heir of the testator, not a party to
or represented in the decision of the Supreme Court has the
incontestable right, in so far as concerns him, to demand in the
form and according to thile rules of jurisdiction and procedure in
force in the country, the nullity of the legacy de residue as well
against the Testamentary Executor as against the city of New
Orleans to whom the Court declared the legacy to belong, although it was no party to the record, and did not claim it, and
against the trustees if they have been appointed or others claiming right to detain the property of the succession of John David
Fink, after the payment of the just debts of the deceased, and the
discharge of the particular legacies;
That the universal legacy de residue for the reason alone that
it is confided to three trustees, is null, no matter to whom the
same may have been made, even though it should have been made
to the city of New Orleans; and this according to the terms of
article 1507 of the Code of Louisiana framed upon the 896th
article of the Code Napoleon with the addition of three words
more  "Les substitutions et les fldeicomvris sont prohibis. Toute
disposition par laquelle le donataire, l'h6ritier ou le1 6gataire
est charg6 de conserver et de rendre h uu tiers est nulle, meme ab
l'~gard du donataire, de l'h6ritier institu6 ou du lgataire.... " 
(4)
That the whole case is embraced in this article because tihe
Testamentary Executor is ordered by the Testator to appoint three
trustees to execute his testamentary intentions with respect to
the legacy de residuo.
That the principal danger the plaintiff has to incur will be
when at a particular stage of the proceedings, he shall come
before the Supreme Court of Louisiana, and will consequently
have to meet as a precedent, the decree or decision of the 16th of
March, 1857.  He can, however, confidently expect that the
loyalty of that tribunal will induce it to appreciate the difference
between the effect to be given to judicial precedents in a country
governed by a positive or codified system of laws, and that to
which they are entitled in a country of customary law, and that
legal truth will triumph through the organ of the Supreme Court
itself which without regarding this precedent, will pronounce the
nullity of the universal legacy dce residuo, and decree the restitution of the residue of the succession by the testamentary executor,
the trustees or any other detainers of this universal legacy, to
the heir or heirs not bound by the judgment or decision of the
16th of MIarchl, 1857.
A few observations will show upon what foundation these propositions are supporteld.
I.
The maxim res judicata pro veritate habetur has its limits in
all countries-courts of justice have power to decide controversies only between the parties who appear before them. The
authority of the thing adjudged cannot be invoked either for or
against third persons not parties to the action-Res judicata nec
prodest, nec itocet tertio.
The decision, then, of the Supreme Court, which in the absence
of the city of New Orleans, declared that corporation the uni 
versal legatee of the residiuum of the property of the deceased,
notwithstandling the nullity of that legacy, has not even the force
of a judgment in favor of the city.  The city had brought no
suit, and was no party to the proceedings, consequently nothing
was adjudged sofar as concerned that corporation-what the
court said was  nothing more than a simple opinion, conferring
no right upon the city of New Orleans. If the city has any
rights, let it assert them against the other parties, for until then
it cannot avail itself of a judgment to which it is a stranger.
In the sanie manner one or more of the heirs who were not
parties to or represenited in the suit, cannot be injuriously affected
by a judgment which is foreign to them-They are dfiferent persons from those between whom thle judgment has been pronounced.
This is elementary.
II.
What is also elementary and admitted in every country is that
it is always the heir who profits by the nullity of a testament.
It is to the legal heir, the heir cb iiitestato, that the propertyrever8is
if the will be null and invalid. The reason of this is that all
nations establish by their laws the order of succession in families,
and that the testamentary power is only a private right accorded
to the citizen, on condition that hlie does not violate the public
law (les lois de la cit6); that when the testator violates the prohibitory dispositions of public law, there is in that part of his
will no testament, and if there be no testament in parte qua, the
disposition no longer exists, and the legal order of succession
alone indicates who are the real heirs.
III.
Ii the present case the universal legatee is none other than the
three trustees whomn the testamentary executor is to nominate
and appoint ia order to execute the intentions of the testator, 
(6)
and who are to be charged with the application of the residuum
of his property, towards the construction, maintenance and support of an asylum for Protestant widows and orphans in the city
of New Orleans, the persons who are the objects of this liberality
and are to profit by the fdeicommis are not the Protestant
widows and orphans living at the death of the testator, this would
have been a legacy to be distributed among these persons and
quite lawful, although difficult of execution. On the contrary it
was a foundation for thie future, which gave them only the use of
the Asylum to be built, endowed and supported; which was not
bequeathed to the city; for it was to be built in the city. and its
very name, Finik Asylum, showed it was merely a private establishment confided to trustees or fideicommissaries who were
to hold the property only in tru?st under the moral obligation to
apply the funds to the perpetual destination indicated by the
testator.
Hence the undersigned does not attack the moral object the
testator had in view, but what he censures and what he insists is
illegal is the disposition in itself as violative of the public law of
Louisiana.
Article 1507 of the Louisiana Code, prohibits fideicommissa
in donations and testaments. It does not alone prohibit them, it
declares them null-and not content with declaring them null,
it declares also null the disposition they affect-they are at the
same time null and nullifying (nuls et annultateurs, nuls et irritants.)
Nothing of them can be kept alive, neither the principal disposition nor its effects upon third persons.
Thus the legacy of ~the residue burthened with the trust to
create a private establishment endowed with the testator's name,
for the purpose of supporting a class of persons who do not constitute a public corporation is a legacy which is cull and of no 
( 7 )
effect; hence the testatorhas done what thlelaw prohibited him from
doing; and hence the property which is embraced in this universal legacy has continued to remain in the succession and has
consequently belonged to the legal heirs from the moment the
succession was opened. (Code of Louisiana, Art. 934.)
IV.
But even if a different interpretation were to be given to the
will, and the city of New Orleans should (contrary to our opinion) be considered as the object of the liberality of John I).
Fink, it would not be the less true that the testator has not given
directly to the city and that he has expressly charged his executor to appoint and constitute three persons as trustees in order
that those trustees should put in execution his intention of applying the remainder of his succession after payment of just debts
and legacy to the construction, maintenance and support of a
suitable asylum in the city for the sole benefit of Protestant
widows and orphans.
Thus in point of fact it is always to trustees that the testament
directs the residue of the succession to be remitted, for the execution of the will of the deceased.  It is of little importance that
after them the Fink Asylum will or will not belong to the city
(an acknowledged public corporation) since the Fink Asylum
cannot come to the city except through the intervention of a
prohibited fideicommissum.
When article 1507 declares that fideicommi8ssa are prohibited,
and that it annuls fideicommissa and substitutions, it proceeds
differently from the French Law, which in the following words
of article 911 of the Code Napoleon prohibits only those fidei commissa which are created for the benefit of persons incapable
of taking directly: "toute disposition en faveur d'un incapable
sera nulle mcme si on l'a fait sous le nom des personnes interpo sies.". I...........................  
(8)
The Code of Louisiana is imore rigorous; "fideicomtmis.sa are
prohibitedl."
THEY ARE PROHIBITED whethler the persons who are ultimately
to profit by them are capable or incapable, private or public,
corporations or individuals.
In the Louisiana systemn the moment  there is a fideicommis sum the legacy is radically null.
Hence it is of little consequence what interpretation be given
to the leg,acy, what object be assigned to it or what person is to
profit by it. Is it the city a public or recognised corporation?
or is it the Protestant widows and orphans, a class of persons
who do not even constitute a private corporation? or is it a
private corporation established in conformity with law and which
by imposing the requisite condition for entering the Asylum may
have placed itself in a position to claim the property of the deceased? These are questions which concern us but little, and
there is no need to examine them.
As soon as the testator willed that the residue of his succession
should go in the hands of fideicommissaires charged  to fulfil and
execute his behests in this particular, the legacy de residuo became
null, radically null. What composes the residue remains in the
succession ab intestato.
V.
The undersigned has but one observation to make upon  the
word trustees used by the testator. Trustees are the English fideicommissaries. In a consultation held for the city of New Orleans
in the MIcDonogh case with his illustrious confrbres Atessrs. DelaIngle, Giraud, Duranton pare and AIarcad6 on the 18th of December 1851, he had already  written" this word  fideicommis
(fideicommissa) seems to us to have been added to article 896 of
the Louisiana Code on account of the English origin of the other
S +ates of the Unioi  and to prohibit as well the substitution of the 
(9)
old French law as the trusts of the English system." Hie has learned since that Mr. Brown one of the framers of the Code of Louisiana had formally made the same remark. We may, then, say with
reason and understandingly that trustees being but fideicommissaries, the legacy de residuo made by the testator to the three
trustees to be nominated by his executor to put in action his intentions with respect to the erection, maintenance and support of
the asylum is a legacy radically null under the law of the State.
VI.
Here a difficulty of secondary importance is presented and it
is urged against the heirs that although, in truth, there is in the
will a delegation by the testator to a third person (the executor)
to choose trustees or administrators of a portion of his fortune,
and that this beyond question is a pure nullity: still according
to article 1506 of the Louisiana Code those conditions or clauses in a will which are null, are and are to be reputed as not written. And from this the conclusion is drawn that, while the legacy de rcsidtuo would if made directly for the benefit of the Protestants widows and orphans of New Orleans, be entirely void because theProtestant widows and orphans in a city do not coustitute a
corporation a civil person and are incapable of taking as uncertain
persons; nevertheless by deciding as a fact that the true legatee
de residtio was the city of New Orleans a public corporation capa.
ble of receiving, the institution of trustees might be effaced as being contrary to law and consequently be considered as not written.
But in the view of the undersigned, this is contrary to the testarnent, if we have  regard to its meaning,  and contrary to the
Law of Louisiana if we consult its text and its spirit.
VII.
As to  the meaning  of the will,  it is impossible to say that
this disposition " It is my will and desire and I do hereby de 
( 10 )
dare the same to be my uwill...... that the proceeds of my whole
estate, property, rights, effeccts and credits be applied to the erection
and maintenance and support of a suitable asylum in this city, to be
utsed soly as an asyltum for Protestant widows  aud orphans",
can be a disposition in favor of the city. The city is
not a legatee; the words in this city merely indicate the place
where the testator wishes the asylum should be constructed.
The remainder of the disposition establishes still more clearly
that the city is not the beneficiary, nor even the object of the liberality of the testator. For he wills that the executor shall
appoint three trustees to be charged with the duty of erecting,
maintaining and supporting the asylum, which is to bear his name.
The asylum then which he projected was not to belong to the
city, it was only to be a private establishment having an existence and an administration absolutely independent of the administration of the city. The appointment of trustees, the order to
the executor to select them is a conclusive proof the testator never
dreamed of an intention to give to the city but desired that the
public municipal administration should have no part in a legacy
which he destined for the benefit of a class of persons of a particular religion to whom fortune had not been propitious.
VIII.
But in any case- even should the legacy have been made by
the testator with the ultimate view of being useful to the city;'even
if in his thought, the trustees or fideicommissaries were to construct, maintain and endow the asylum, and after forming it to
deliver it over to the city of New IOrleans-examining the question under the Legislation of Louisiana, we are forced to pronounce
the nullity of the legacy and to affirm that the order to appoint
trustees cannot be considered as a disposition not written.
In all fideicommissary legacies as in all substitutions two classes 
(11 )
of )persons are to be distiuguislied on wlion the intentions of the
tcstator rest; the greve to whomi tihe testator gives directly and
wlio is charged to deliver, atd the appe[e or appele's, those for
whom thie grev  is to execute the will of the testator.
Now accordiing to the Law of Louisiana every thing is null
for thefidecommissumn as for tlie substitution and niiothling ought to
remiain of the legacy, neither thee disposition made in favor of the
grev6 nor tihe disposition made for the appeles: once more tew
whole is iultl.
The question is not a new one.  It has arisen in the French
system with respect to fideicommissary substitutions under article
896 of the Code  Napoleon similar in its text to article 1507 of
the Louisiana Code to which latterftdeicommissa have been added.
The jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation is with us fixed
upon this point. In vain would it be said, conditions contrary to
the law are reputed not written, (Art 900 Code Napol6on) and
hence the gireve can keep his legacy, it is only the substitution
which is null. The answer is: there are in the French law, two
provisions very distinct from each other, article 900 and article
89(6. (remark that the same is to be said of the law of Louisiana,
where there all also two equally distinct provisions, article 1506
similar to our article 900 and article 1507isimilar to our article
896 and which adds to it, ftdeicoinmissa.)
Art 900 (1506) is the general rule, article 896 (1507) is an
exception. Generally if a disposition has no other defect than that
it is made under an impossible condition or one contrary to law,
it is valid because the illegal condition is reputed not written:
on the other hand where the law annuls the charge or condition
to preserve and to render, there is no room for the application of
article 900 (or 1506): It is not designed for this particularcase.'Tlio principal disposition is nits, the secondary one is ala null. 
( I- )
The first ariet of the court of Cassation  Upon this subject is of
the 18th of january 1808: it is to be found in the Repertoire of
Mr. Merlin under  the head  s?tbstit?itionfi(leicommissaire Sec. 1
~ IV No 2 and contains his official opinion. This jurisprudence is
uniform.
Let us add that afortiori this should be so with respect to per-.
petualfideicof77imissa.. pcr)et?ealtrqust constituted to form a private
establishlinent is a perpetual fidcleicommissum.  The law  of Lonisiana proscribes tlhem-IT PROHIBITS TIEM-It is no-longer the
condition which is prohibited, it is the legacy in itself. The residuary legacy being invalid and made  contrary to the prohlibition of the law remains in the slluccession at) intestafe.
IX.
The undersigned 1las said that the principal danger to whichlthe plaintiff is exposed would arise when at soneic stage of the
cause he would come before the Supreme  Court of Louisiana
where the judgment of the 16 of March, 1857, will be opposed to
him as a precedent.
For the undersigned is aware that in England and in those
countries who have derived their mnode of procedure from England,
precedents and adjudged cases have an influence upon future decisions far more potent than in France.
For this reason he submits to the consideration of the court
the following observations
In Louisiana, as with us, judgments make the law only of particular cases. All that is said by the judge before the decretal part
of the judgment (la partie dippositive) is the expression of opinion,
minere matter of doctrine, which does not constitute res judicata.
The thing adjudged is contained only in the decree (dictum) and
even this thing adjudged exists only between the persons  who
have been parties to the judgnment. 
( l, )
IThe Court will doubtless bear in mind teat precedents ought
to have much less influence upon subsequent decisions in Louisiana, than in the other States of the Union inasmuch as through
its Civil Code, Louisiana is a country of codified or written law.
It would appear that Courts of Justice ought in fact to make a
great difference as to the force of precedents between those countries whose laws have been and those whose laws have not been
codified.
. In the countries which in French we would designate as custonmry (pays de costumes) and in English as countries of common law,
wfe recognize the great utility of invoking former decisions (series
rerum perpetuo judicatarum); because a uniform series of decisions
is an authentic and reliable proof of the custom which has been
introduced in a given matter.
But in countries of written law, which as France and Louisiana,
have enacted codes, precedents whilethey command respect, have
no authority except in so far as they conform to the written law.
In those countries, the citizens by their adoption of a Civil
Code, have positively declared their wish not to put their persons,
their rights and their property at the mercy of the changing'current of opinion. For them the law is their anchor of safety, a
departure from which even in a series of decisions would be consecrated into the force of the thing adjudged, only between the
parties thereto, and subsequent decisions, though in similar cases,
should take the law and not the precedents for their guide; the
judiciary, though it controls the rights of the citizens who have
recourse to it, cannot by a series of decisions change the law,
which it has only the power to administer.
And from this truth we draw the consequence that a party who
demands the same thing as the one who failed in 1857, has the right
,to demaonstrte whether before the Court of the first instance
4..v -d
'r. 
( 14 )
or before the Supreme Court, that notwithstanding the personal
merit of the Judge and notwithstanding his authority over the
persons who were parties to the decree of 1857, that decree
should not be taken as a precedent binding upon the magistracy
in a case instituted by a new plaintiff not represented in the
judgment of 1857.
Such a person will be free to examine whether all the elements
of the cause have been well ascertained and properly combined;
whether the reasons were correct, complete and conclusive and
even to present additional ones, for the case is no longer the
same, however similar.
Considered at Paris, December 19th, 1859.
[Signed]              COIN DELISLE,
Avocat (I la Cour Impdriale; ancien nembre
du Conseil de l'Ordre.
The undersigned adopts in its entirety the above opinion of
his honorable confrere.
PAILLARD DE VILLENEUYE,
Avocat t a Gour Imp ria~e de Paris; ileembre du
Covzseil de l'Or&de.
PARIS, Deceimber 20, 1859.
I