THE FCEDERALIST:
A
COLLECTION OF ESSAYS, WRITTEN IN FAVOR
OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION, AS
AGREED UPON BY
THE F(EDERAL CONVENTION,
SEPTEMBER 17, 1787.
REPRINTED FROM THE ORIGINAL TEXT.
UNDER THE EDITORIAL SUPERVISION OF
HENRY B. DAWSON.
NEW YORK:
SCRIBNER, AiMSTRONG, AND CO.
1876.




Entered according to Act of Congress in the year 1864, by
HENRY B. DAWSON,
In the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the Southern District of New York
IWVRSIDB, JAMBRIDa E:
STBRBOTYPED AND PRINTED BX
1. O. HOUGHTON AND COMPANY.




PREFACE.
THE use of The Fwederalist as a text-book, in the
collegiate institutions of the United States, is by no
means a new and untried experiment; and the recent
introduction of the work into the classes of the venerable University at Cambridge, and the proposed intro.
duction of it into those of other institutions in other
States of the Union, will, it is hoped, be productive of
the best results in the future of our country's political
history.
To promote so commendable a purpose this edition
has been prepared; in which, beside the original text,
a carefully prepared Analysis of the work, and of the
claims to authorship of its several Numbers, have been
introduced.'The text employed is that which the distinguished
Authors themselves originally gave to the world, with-ut addition, abridgment, or the least alteration, except
where typographical errors were subsequently corrected
by the Authors themselves, or are apparent and unquestionable; and.-. the People for whom it was written,




iv                     Preface.
and to whom it was especially addressed, received and
acted on it in the form in which its Authors presented
it, the Editor has neither felt at liberty to alter that
form in the least degree himself, nor to recognize any
such alterations by others, except in the cases already
referred to.                    HENRY B. DAWSON.
MoMituxRu, N. Y., September, 1864.




SYNOPTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Essay. Page
I. GENERAL  INTRODUCTION.......................... No. I. 1.I "THE UTILITY  OF THE UNION  TO YOUR [the People of
the State of New York] POLITICAL PROSPERITY,"........II.  6
1. introduction................................................. 6
2. in its political relations with foreign nations................ III   12
A. by securing it against dangers from foreign arms and influence. 12
a. through a removal of the usual causes of just war.......... 13
a. violations of cojnpacts and treaties,.....................  13
A. by securing a more perfect administration of government,..................                               18
a. by the employment of better men than those employed
in State governments,......................... 18
b. by an uniform interpretation of the provisions of those
compacts and treaties,........................... 14
c. by avoiding the local temptation to bad faith to which
a single State may yield,......................... 14
d. by avoiding local prejudices to which a sinqle State may
be subject,...............................   14
b. direct and unlawful violence,.........................15
B. through the greater ability which it will afford to settle amicably those causes of just war,.................... 16
a. in the absence of local pride and prejudices,............ 16
b. in the greater strength of the States when united,....... 16
o. through its removal beyond the influence of unjust causes, IV. 17
a. the superior power of neighboring nations,............. 17
b. the jealousy of foreign powers from successful trade,..... 18
B. by securing it from similar influences in the several States, if
disunited,................................ V. 22
C. by preventing European alliances with rival States or confederacies,...    26
8. in its political relations with the Peoples of other States,.....VI. 27
A  by securing it from inter-State hostilities,............ 27
A. the danger of hostilities arising between " independent, unconnected sovereignties,".............................   27
a. through love of power................................ 28
b. through jealousy of power,........................... 28
c. through competitions of commerce..................... 28
d. through individual passions and influences,............. 28




vi                             Contents.
Essay. Page
A. Pericles and Aspasia referred to..............     No. VI. 28
B. the Peloponnesian war referred to......2.......... 28
C. Cardinal Wolsey referred to...................              29
D. Madame de Maintenon referred to,................ 29
E. Duchess of Marlborough referred to,............ 29
F. Madame de Pompadour referred to.................. 29
G. Shays and the rebellion in Massachusetts referred to,.. 30
B. objections of anti-constitutionists answered,............... 30
a. "the genius of republics is pacific,"...................    30
b. "the spirit of commerce tends to peace,"............... 30
A. Introductory remarks,.......................... 30
B. Sparta referred to,.............................31
C. Athens referred to................................ 31
D. Rome referred to..................81...............1
E. Carthage referred to,............................ 31
F. Venice referred to,.............................. 81
G. Holland referred to,.........8......................
H. Great Britain referred to,.......82.........832
c. an appeal to the People, founded on these examples,... 32
c. the inducements which the disunited States could have to
make war on each other considered,...............VII. 34
a. the same which have produced wars elsewhere........... 84
b. special causes within themselves,........................ 34
A. unadjusted territorial disputes....................... 34
a. introductory remarks,..................... 84
b. crown-lands, within the States...........8......   34
c. western lands,..........................5.......35
d. Wyoming lands...................6...............36
e. New Hampshire grants,.......................... 86
B. commercial rivalry................................837
a. disregard of local revenue laws generally,..........  87
b. jealousy o<New York in New Jersey and Connecticut, 38
C. the existing debt of the confederacy,...............  38
a. in its apportionment amohg the States,............  88
b. in its extinguishment,...................8.........  88
D. local laws violative of private contracts............. 40
E. incompatible alliances between individual States and
foreign powers,.......................... 40
D. the consequences of inter-State hostilities,...........VIII. 41
a. primarily, great destruction of life and property,.......  42
b. ultimately,..................................... 43
A. the establishment of standing armies............ 48
B. the extension of the power of the executive,.......  44
C. the elevation of the military over the civil power,..... 44
C. objections answered................................... 44
A. standing armies were not created in ancient Greece,.... 46




...tents..                              v i
Esmy' Fage,
B. the impotency of the army in Great Britain,. N4. VIII. 46
d. the general subject discussed, and the value of the ETidon
enforced,...........................................  47
4. in affording a barrier to domestic faction and insurrection,....IX. 48
A. liability of republics to experience these troubles,............ 48
B. they afford arguments for the advocates of despotism,........ 49
-h the utility of a confederacy to guard against these troubles, 50
A. resorted to in other ages and countries,................... 50
B. approved by most authors on the subject of politics....... 50
a. Montesquieu's sentiments concerning extended territories,
under republican governments, misrepresented by the
Anti-foederalists,....................5................ 60
b. his views on a confederate republic..................... 61
c. distinction between a confederacy and a consolidation of the
States discussed,..................................... 63
a. what a confederacy is said to be.......................... 63
b. what a confederacy really is,...........5................. 53
~A. the proposed Constitution a confederate republican
form  of government,............................ 54
B. the Lycian Confederacy a confederate republic.........54
D. the propensity of popular governments to faction,.........X. 55'E. the United States liable to the same result,.................... 55
F. what constitutes "a faction,".......................... 56
G. in what way its mischief may be cured,..................... 66
A. by removing its causes.................................. 66
a. in the destruction of the liberty of the People,...........56
b. by causing every citizen to possess the same opinions,
passions, and interests...............................   56
c. the first unwise, the second impracticable................ 56
B. by controlling its effects,............................... 6
a. the nature and purposes of "factions,"...............657
b. when the faction is a minority, "by regular vote,"........59
e. when the faction is a majority..................9......59
A. by dividing the prevailing influences,..................  60
B. by preventing the concentration of those influences,...... 60
H. the advantage of a representative government over a democracy
in curing the mischiefs of faction,.................. 60
I. the advantages of an extended republic over a small one, in like
cases............................................ 62
6. in their commercial relations with foreign nations,..........XI. 64
A. the growing commerce of America has excited the jealousy
of foreign powers,...................................... 65
B. the necessity of uniformity of action in America in order to
secure the benefits arising from its own markets,........... 65
C. the -establishment of a Foederal navy another resource for
commanding the respect of foreign nations,............ 6.. 67




viii                          Contents.
Essay. Pae
D. "a steady adherence to the Union" necessary to secure all the
commercial advantages which America possesses,....No. XI. 67
E. the effects of disunion on the commerce of America,........ 68
A. the rivalship of the different parts would frustrate all their
natural advantages for promoting commerce,.............. 68
B. it would become " a prey to the wanton intermeddling of all
nations who are at war with each other,     "............... 68
a. neutrality is respected only when it can be adequately defended,............................................ 68
c. it would produce "little arts of little politicians to control or
vary the irresistible course of nature" in the growth of
our commerce.,                                           68
D. it would invite foreign nations to interfere with our rights, 68
a. by prescribing the conditions of our political existence,... 68
b. by embarrassing our commerce.........................68
c. by interfering with the commercial rights of the Union,
which had been then acquired,..................... 69
A. in the fisheries....................................69
a. the importance of the fisheries to France and Britain, 69
b. our " decided mastery " therein, a subject of importance to those powers...........................69
c. their importance to all the commercial States,........'69
i. in affording a field for their enterprise,...........  69
ii. in affording a nursery for the mercantile marine,.. 69
d. their importance in promoting the establishment of a
Ftederal navy.................................  70
B. in the navigation of the western lakes,............... 69
C. in the navigation of the Mississippi River............ 69
a. the jealousy of Spain on that szbject,.............. 69
6. in promoting the establishment of a Foederal navy,........... 70
A. such a navy would be mutually advantageous to all the States, 70
7. in their commercial relations with the Peoples of other States,... 70
A. it would promote the interchange of their respective productions,.......................................        70
B. "the veins of commerce would be replenished" and invigorated.................................................70
C. a greater variety would be afforded to the commerce of the
country................................................ 71
D. the aggregate balance of trade would be increased, in favor
of America............................................ 71
E. objection, concerning the necessary course of inter-State commerce, in any event, answered,........................... 71
F. the assumed superiority of Europe referred to, and Americans
appealed to to disprove it................................. 71
8. in respect to revenue,..................................XII. 78
A. commerce the most productive source of national wealth,.... 78




Contents.                               ix
Essay. Page
B. it increases the ability of the inhabitants to pay taxes, No. XII. 74
C. the system of "direct taxation " unsuccessful in the United
States,:                            74
States.................................................- 74
D. "indirect taxation " the main dependence for the necessary
revenues,...............................               75
A. Because " the genius of the People " is opposed to excise
laws,.................................................  75
B. because the scarcity of money will render the collection of
excise duties difficult.................................  75
E. the union of the States will best enable us to improve this
resource,............................................... 75
A. by being conducive to commerce from whence it is drawn,.. 76
B. by simplifying the regulations for its collection,.............   76
F. the separation of the States would destroy this source of
revenue,................................................ 76
A. by promoting illicit trade,.............................  76
B. by promoting jealousy between the States, and ultimate reduction of impost duties, in order to secure trade,........ 76
c. from the absence of sufficiently rigorous border-guards between the States, and the improbability of their establishment................................................. 76
a. the ordinary powers of border-guards intolerable in a free
country............................................ 76
b. border-guards unnecessary with the States united,....... 77
G. the effect of a destruction of this resource,................  78
A. necessity of revenue to the existence of a nation,.......... 78
B. if it cannot be obtained from commerce it must be taken
from the real estate of the inhabitants,.................   79
a. because excises will not be available,.................. 79
b. because the objects proper for excise within the agricultural States will be insufficient to produce the requisite
revenue.............................................  79
c. because it is difficult to trace personal property......... 79
9. in the greater economy in the administration of government, XIII. 80'
A. "if the  States are united under one government, there will
be but one national civil list to support,".................. 80
B. "if they are divided into several confederacies, there will be
as many national civil lists to be provided for,"...........80
A. speculations on the number of confederacies to be formed
from the ddbris of the Union...................S........80
B. each small confederacy will require a civil list as extended
as has been proposed in the new system for the aggregate
of all the States,...................................... 80
a. becauseof the extent of territory which each will occupy. 80
b. because of the necessary plurality of the revenue depart
ments......................................              82




x                               Contents.
Essay. Pag
c. because of the necessary plurality of the military establishments....................................  No. XIII. 83
10. the objection which has been drawn from the extent of territory
which the Union occupies, answered................... XIV. 83
A. the distinction between a republic and a democracy noticed,.. 84
B. the errors of political writers concerning the turbulence in
the ancient republics....................................   84
C. practicability of extending the limits of a republic......... 85
D. the territory of the United States not too extended for their
proper government,.............................. 85
E. the territory of the United States compared with those of
some European nations,...................................86
F. the jurisdiction of the United States limited to objects of general
interest............................................    86
G. the objects of the proposed Constitution are to secure the union
of the thirteen primitive States, and to add to their number,. 87
H. the intercourse between the States will be daily facilitated by
improvements for transit of passengers, etc.,............... 87
I. almost every State being a frontier State, all will be exposed to
foreign aggression, and all, alike, need protection........... 87
J. an appeal to the People of New York to avoid disunion,...... 88
[II. "THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT CONFED-.
ERATION TO PRESERVE THAT UNION,"........... XV. 90
1. introductory remarks,........................................ 90
2. the proposition neither controverted nor doubted............... 91
3. disastrous result of its inefficacy,............................... 91
4. an appeal to the People to " break the charm" of the confederation,................................................... 93
6. the character of the opposition to the Constitution, and its inconsistency,.......................................    93
6. th  character of the defects in the confederacy,....... 94
A. the legislation for States, in their corporate capacity....... 94
A. the bad effect of this evil in raising men and money,..... 94
B. the opposition to the new system, because it deviates from
this principle, considered generally,...........  94
c. the peculiarities of a simple league between independent
nations, considered,................................... 94
D. the effect of a simple league, as the bond of union between
the States, considered generally,..............  9.5
E. such a bond of union inconsistent with the organization of
"a superintending power, under the direction of a common
council,"..............................................   96
r. it is also inconsistent with the authority, over the persons of
the citizens, which is necessary in the establishment of a
government................... 96
a. the purposes of government considered generally,....... 96




Contents.                                xi
Essay. Pags
b. the penalties which governments find it necessary to inflict on offenders against their laws,..........No. XV.  96
A. the coercion of the magistracy, which is applicable only
to men,...................................  96
B. the coercion of arms, which is applicable only to States,  96
a. it would be productive of constant war,...........  96
b. it would be subversive of every purpose of government,.........................................  96
e. the argument that breaches of the laws by the States need
not be expected, considered...........................  96
A. such breaches would arise from the passions of the individual members of the states,...................  97
B. from the impatience of control which arises from the
sovereign powers of the States,....................      97
a. the improbability of the execution of the Foederal measures,
in a simple league of the States, considered and averred,..  98
a. supported by the natural constitution of the local authorities,........................................  98
b. supported by the experience of the United States, under
the old confederation,..............................  99
c. supported by the experience of similar confederacies, elsewhere,.............................. XVI. 100
A. the Lycian and Achsean leagues not thus exposed,.... 100
H. the employment of force in executing the measures of such
a league, "in its application to us," considered,......... 100
a. it would be productive of constant war between the States, 101
b. it would  lead  to counter-alliances between individual
States,............................................. 101
c. it would lead to alliances between foreign nations and
portions of the Union............................... 101
d. it would lead to " the violent death of the confederacy," 102
e. and to the establishment Qf a military despotism......... 103
I. the impracticability of sustaining the Union by military coercion,..............................................     103.r. an efficient government can only be established on the responsibility of individual citizens....................... 103
a. objections answered; that the States, as such, may still
interpose their authority, and obstruct the execution of
the laws,..................................... 104
b. that individuals, also, more or less numerous, may still
oppose the government.............................. 105
c. that the reserved rights of the States would be invaded
by the Foederal government,.................. XVII. 107
A. the absence of any competent inducement,........... 107
B. the People of the several States, through the House of
Representatives, could frustrate such an attempt,.... 108




xii                             Contents.
Essay. Page
C. tile greater danger that the delegated authority of the
Foederal government will be invaded by the State
governments....................... No. XVII. 108
a. from tile superior influence which they will exercise
over the People,..............................   108:. from the diffusive construction of the Fcederal government,................................... 108
ii. from the nature of the objects of local control,... 108
b. the general subject considered,.................. 169
i. enforced by argument........................... 109
ii. illustrated from the history of the feudal system,, 110
iii. illustrated fronm the history of Scotland........... 111
iv. illustrated from the history of the Amphictyonic
league,................................ XVIII. 112
v. illustrated from the history of the Achean league, 115
vi. illustrated from the history of the Germanic
league,...........................XIX. 119
vii. illustrated from the history of Poland........... 125
viii. illustrated from the history of Switzerland,...... 125
ix. illustrated from the history of the United Netherlands,..........................X........X. 126
xg  concluding remarks,....................................  131
B.  "the total want of a SANCTION to its laws,"...........XXI. 132
A. the Fcederal government possesses no pow& to exact obedience........................................... 132
B. the Feederal government possesses no power to punish disobedience...........................................         132
o. the Foederal government has received no express delegation
of authority to use force against the States,.............. 132
C. "the want of a mutual guaranty of the State governments," 133
A. the consequent absence of authority in the Foederal government to assist a State in enforcing its own laws,.......... 134
B. the danger of an "officious interference in the domestic
concerns of its members" by the Foederal government
considered............................................ 131
D. "the principle of regulating the contributions of the States
to the common treasury, by QUOTAS,"...................... 136
A. the standard of constitutional wealth,..................... 135
B. the causes on which it is dependent..................... 136
c. the rule of the confederation, on taxation, is unequal and
oppressive,...........................................  136
D. this cause alone is sufficient to work the destruction of the
Union,.............................................. 136
a. the remedy proposed for this evil,.                             137
a. the advantages of taxes on articles of consumption,..... 137
b. the advantages attending indirect taxation,............ 188




Contents.
Essay. Page
ki. "the want of a power to regulate commerce,"....No. XXII. 139
A. it operates as a bar to the formation of commercial treaties, 139
a. it has given occasion for dissatisfaction between the States, 139
F. the raising of troops by quotas,.......................... 140
A. it produces great expense in raising troops............. 140
B. it is not conducive to a vigorous system  of defence,...... 140
o it is unequal in the burden it imposes on the several States, 141
G. the right of equal suffrage among the States, in the Congress, 141
A. arising from the inequality of weight among the States,.. 142
a. objection that sovereigns are equal, answered........... 142
b. objection that " a majority of the States will be a majority of confederated America," answered,............. 142
c. objection that two thirds of the States, in approval, are
necessary to the most important acts................ 142
A. the mischief which-is incident to the last-named rule, 143
B. the danger from foreign corruption which it imposes, 144
a. republics particularly exposed to this evil,......... 145
b. instances when this evil has prevailed,........... 146
i. the deputies of the United Provinces............. 146
ii. the authorities in Sweden,..................... 146
H. "the want of a judiciary power,"... 146
A. to expound and define the true meaning and operation of
the laws.......................................  146
B. to ascertain the true import of treaties with foreign nations,.......................... 146
c. to secure uniformity in the decision of the judges,........ 147
I. "' the organization of Congress utterly improper for the exercise of those powers which are necessary to a Faederal
hUnion,............................................ 148
J. the existing Fcederal system never had a ratification by the
PEOPLE,.............................................. 149
IV. "THE NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT AT LEAST
EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE PROPOSED,
TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECT " [the preservation of the Union]................................... XXIII. 160
1. concerning "the objects to be provided for by the Fcederal
government,"...............................................     150
A. " the common defence of the members,".................. 160
A. "the authorities essential to the care of the common defence,"................................................ 160
a. "to raise armies,"................................... 150
b. "to build and equip fleets,".............................. 150
c. "to prescribe rules for the government of both" the armies and the fleets,................................ 150
d. "to direct their operations,"................           160
e. "to provide for their support,"....................... 160




uiqv                         Contents.
Emay. Page
a. "these powers ought to exist without limitation," No. XXIII. 160
a.' because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent
and variety of national exigencies,"............   160, 151
b. because it is impossible to foresee "the extent and
variety of means which may be necessary to satisfy "
those exigencies............................ 150, 151
c. this principle fully recognized in the Articles of Confederation,...................151...................... 1
d. no "proper or adequate provision for its exercise"
made in those articles,.............................. 151
e. the expectations concerning it of the framers of those
articles.......................................... 152
f. "this expectation was ill-founded and illusory,"......... 152
g. the effect of that failure.............................. 152
h. the remedy therefor, the measures proposed in the new
Constitution,.1...................................... 152
c. objection, the danger of standing armies, considered,
XXIV. 156
a. the powers referred to are delegated to the LEGISLATIVE department, not to the EXECUTIVE of the Union, 166
b. the Congress itself, in the exercise of the powers referred to, is expressly limited by the terms of the
proposed Constitution,..............................   157
c. the State constitutions, with two exceptions, contain no
interdiction of standing armies, in time of peace,...... 167
d. the Articles of Confederation " had not imposed a single
restraint on the authority of the United States" on
this  subject........................................  158
e. the constant danger of the United States from foreign
and Indian hostilities renders such authority in the
Foederal government necessary...................... 159
f. the growing commerce of the United States demands a
navy for its protection,............................ 161
v. objection, "that the objects enumerated above ought to
be provided for by the State governments," considered,
XXV. 162
a "it would be an inversion of the primary principle of
our political association," by transferring the care of
the common defence to the individual members of the
Union,................................... 162
A. the result' of which would be "oppressive to some
States,".........................................   162
B. it might become dangerous to all the States, through
the inefficiency or inability of some of them,....... 163
C. it would create jealousy by increasing the military
power of some of the States,...................... 168




Contents.                                xv
Essay. Pagi
D. it might afford temptation for invading'the constitutional authority of the Union.............  No. XXV. 163
b. the provisions of the Articles of Confederation on State
military and naval establishments, referred to,........ 164
D. the impropriety of restraining the discretion of Congress,
on keeping up armies, further considered,............. 164
a. the uncertainty of the period or extent of the danger to
be guarded against.................................   164
b. it presumes a possibility of collusion between the Congress and the executive, in schemes of usurpation,.... 165
w. the impropriety of restraining Congress in raisingq armies
in times of peace considered,.......................... 165
o. the objection that "the militia of the country is its natural bulwark," considered,............................. 166
a. it often wants " vigor and stability,"................. 166
b. it is not the most economical,......................... 166
c. standing armies sometimes necessary in times of external
peace.......................................   167
A. instance of Pennsylvania, notwithstanding her Bill of
Rights,......................................... 167
B. instance of Massachusetts, notwithstanding the Articles of Confederation,........................... 167
H. the danger of "fettering  the government with  restrictions " considered,................................... 16.7
~. "the idea of restraining the legislative authority, in the
means of providing for the national defence," further considered,..................................... XXVI. 169
a. its origin..........................................        169
b. it never found much favor in America................. 169
a. "the idea which aims at the exclusion of military establishments in times of peace," further considered......... 170
a. its origin and progress,............................. 170
b. vesting authority on the subject in the Congress, a sufficient safeguard..................................... 171
A. because the subject must be reconsidered every two
years,..................1....................... 173
B. because "schemes to subvert the liberties of a people
require time to mature them  for execution," which
cannot be secured,................................ 174
C. objection, that the executive may seize supplies, answered,.......................................... 175
D. an appeal for the Union based on this objection,...... 175
B. concerning the administration of the laws,........ XXVII. 176
A. the assertion that the laws which the Constitution authorizes cannot be executed without the aid of a military
force, considered,..............................   176




xVi                           C~ontents.
Essay Pag
a. unless the Foederal government shall be worse administered than the State governments, there will be no
danger from  popular ill-will,............. No. XXVII. 176
b. it is probable that the former will be better administered
than the latter,.................................... 177
A. from the greater latitude of choice, in the selection of
officers.......................................... 177
B. from the peculiar care and judgment with which the
Fmderal Senate will be composed,................. 177
C. from the superior intelligence of the Foederal Congress,.................,......................... 177
D. from the absence of faction therein,................. 177
c. there will be less liability to sedition, because there will
be a greater power to suppress it..................... 178
d. the Foederal government " will be strengthened by its
extension to matters of internal concern,"........... 178
a. the proposed form  of government "bids much fairer to
avoid the necessity of using force," than that proposed
by its opponents,...................................... 179
a. because " it enables the Foederal government to employ
the ordinary magistracy of each State, in the execution
of its laws,".................................... 179
b. because it displays to the People the common origin of
both the Foederal and the State governments.......... 179
c. because it conveys to the People the consideration of its
superior power to enforce obedience, and thereby checks
disaffection,....................................... 179
A. "the laws of the -confederacy, as to the enumerated
and leqitimate objects of its jurisdiction, the SUPREME
LAW of the land,"............;............. 180
o. "there may happen cases in which the National government may be necessitated to resort to force,"...XXVIII. 181
a. in which cases force must be employed,................ 181
A. examples referred to, in the individual States,....... 182
B. it would be equally necessary in the plan proposed by
the opponents of the new system,................. 182
b. it will be entirely controlled by the representatives of
the People,................................... 183
A. if the Congress betrays the People there is no remedy
but " the original right of self-defence, which is paramount to all positive forms of government,"........  183
B. in that case it may be remedied better than if a State
government should be similarly treacherous,........ 183
7. tho State governments the greatest security against
Fcederal usurpations of power by the Fcederal authorities,....................... 18




Contents.                              xvii
Essay. Page
D. the great extent of our territory affords additional security,..............................  No. XXVIII. 185
E. the limited resources of the country afford still more
security,..........................................  185
C. concerning "a general power of taxation,".........XXIX. 186
A. such authority is necessary in every constitution......... 187
a. the want of such authority leads either to official plunder,
or................................................. 187
b. to " a fatal atrophy " in the government, and speedy dissolution,...........................................      187
-B in the present confederation, the want of it has produced
disaster,.............................................. 187
o. the only remedy is "that of permitting the National government to raise its own revenues by the ordinary methods of taxation,"..................................... 188
D. objection, that the authority of Congress should be limited
to "external taxation," answered,...................... 188
B. reply, " that deficiencies may be provided for by requisitions
upon the States," considered......................... 189
a. the "vices and deformities" of the system  of requisitions, considered,.................................. 189
b. its effect in time of war...................                190
A. primarily, no " proper dependence " on the plan,.... 191
B. secondly, the diversion of other funds, already appropriated, to the defence of the State................. 191
C. thirdly, the destruction of public credit.............  191
D. fourthly, difficulty in procuring loans,............... 191
E. finally, disaster to the country...................... 191
r. surrejoinder, "that, from  the scantiness of the resources
of the country, the necessity of diverting the established
funds would exist, though the National government should
possess this power," considered........................ 191
a. " the resources of the community, in their full extent,
will be brought into activity for the benefit of the
Union,"......................................             191
b. "whatever deficiency there may be, can readily be supplied by loans..................................... 191
A. confidence inspired, among lenders, by the delegation
of this authority of taxation,.....................   192
B. distrust arising from the absence of that authority, in
the Confederation, removed,...................... 192
o. the necessity of "a general power of taxation" further
considered,...................................... XXX. 192
a. the importance of "first principles," on every genferal
subject,.................................... 192
b. "first principles'" in morals and politics less frequently
b




xviii                          Contents.
Essay. Page
assented to than those of other branches of knowledge...................................... No. XXX. 194
c. the reason for that diversity of opinion in morals and
politics is the passions and prejudices of the reasoner,............................................  194
d. the same influences prevail among the opponents of the
new  system,....................................... 194
A. the reasoning of the anti-Faoderalists reviewed....... 194
B. their fairness, in argument, considered............... 195
C. a review of Publius's arguments on the powers of the
government,...................................... 197
D. a review of the anti-aFederal arguments on the proba-.bility of usurpation by the FRederal government,..... 197
E. a review  of the arguments on the probable aggressions of the State governments on the Faederal authority..........................................  197
a. the sympathy of the People with the State governments,......................................... 197
u. objection, that such a power in the Faederal government
would interfere with the State governments in their
levies of money, considered.................... XXXI. 198
a. the sense of the People, a barrier to the oppressive use
of this power by the Fcederal authorities............. 198
b. the hazard of provoking the resentments of the State
governments, another barrier thereto................ 198
c. a conviction of the utility and necessity of local administrations, for local purposes, a third barrier thereto,..... 198
d. the several States would still retain an independent and
uncontrollable authority to raise their own revenues,... 198
A. an attempt, by the Foederal authorities, to abridge that
authority will be a violent assumption of unconstitutional power,.................................... 199
B. the sovereignty of the FRederal authorities limited in
extent........................................... 199
a. "where the Constitution in express terms grants an exclusive authority to the Union,"................. 199
b. "where it grants an authority to the Union and
prohibits the States from exercising the like authority,"......................................... 199
c. "where it grants an authority to the Union, to which
a similar authority in the States would be absolutely
and totally contradictory and repugnant,"........... 199
C. the only exclusive power of taxation which is delegated
to the Foederal government is that of imposing taxes
on imports.................... 200
D. the authority to impose taxes on all other articles is




Contents.                            xix
Essay. Page
concurrent and coequal in the Feederal and the State
authorities.................             No. XXXI. 200
a. it has not been exclusively granted to the Union,..... 200
b. it has not been prohibited to the several States...... 200
c. it is a necessary deduction from the particular restraint which has been imposed on the States concerning duties on exports and imports,........... 200
i. the contrary would be an unnecessary restraint on
the States...................................  201
ii. it would also be a dangerous restraint on them,.... 201
iii. "the restriction in question is a negative pregnant,"........................................ 201
d. there is no repugnancy between the authority to
levy taxes by the Faederal authorities, and that under which the State governments do the same,... 202
e. concurrent authority to levy taxes the necessary result of a division of the sovereign power,........ 202
z. objection to the delegation of incidental powers of taxation
to the Foederal government considered,................ 208
a. no authority delegated which it would not have necessarily
possessed...........................................  203
b. the authority to levy taxes carries with it all the incidental
authority which may be necessary and proper to carry it
into execution,....................................   204
c. the express delegation of incidental authority an act of
caution,........................................... 205
d. the Federal authorities must judge, in the first instance,
what may be necessary and proper powers for them to
exercise.......................................... 205
e. the constituents of that government must be the ultimate
judge of the necessity and propriety of employing such
powers............................................      205
A. how the constitutional impropriety of a Feederal measure must be determined,........................ 206
B. instances wherein such impropriety would be evident, 206
J. objection, that the laws of the Union concerning taxation
are supreme, considered,.............................. 206
a. any other than supreme laws would- be useless,............ 206
b. all laws must, necessarily, be supreme to those to whom
they apply,............... 206
c. "acts which are not pursuant to the Constitution are
merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be treated as such,"........ 207
d. the new system " expressly confines this supremacy to
laws made pursuant to the Constitution,"............... 207
e. any act of the United States which interferes with a




XX                            Contents.
Essay. Pag
State tax-law (unless upon imports and exports) an unconstitutional usurpation of power........... No. XXXI. 207
x. "concurrent authority concerning taxation the only adissible substitute for\ an entire subordination of the
tates,".................................... XXXIL. 208
a. absurdity of denying the practical impossibility of coiordinate authority,................................ 208
b. illustrations of its practicability, from Roman history,... 209
c. difficulties which will interfere with its execution less
powerful than those which existed in Rome........... 209
d. purposes of a Federal revenue more extended than those
which the State governments must provide for,....... 210
A. " there ought to be a CAPACITY to provide for future
contingencies,"........................      210
B. there must be a capacity to provide for the public defence..........................            210
C. for the payment of public debts,................... 212
e. concluding remarks, urging that a delegation of cowcuntRENT AIUTHORITY was preferable to an entire subordination of the States to the Foederal authorities....... 214
i. objection, "that the jurisdiction of the National government, in the article of revenue, should be restricted to
particular objects," considered,...............  XXXIII. 215
a. it would oppress particular branches of industry......... 215
b. taxes would be unequally distributed................... 215
c. illustration from the proposed limitation of its jurisdiction to duties on imports...........................   215
A. objections against a high tariff,..................... 216
a. it encourages smuggling,.......................... 216
b. it renders other classes tributary to the manufacturing classes, who will hold a monopoly of the markets........................................... 216
c. it will force industry out of its more natural channels
into those which are less beneficial,............. 216
d. it will oppress the merchant in the payment of duties,. 216
B. the limitation proposed would be productive of inequality of taxation among the several States,...... 216
C. the objection, " that the interest of the revenue itself
would be a sufficient guard against an  extreme
tariff," considered,..............................  217
x. objection, that the House of Representatives cannot contain representatives of all classes of tax-paying citizens,
considered.......................................... 218
a. such a special representation of each class impracticable,  219
b. merchants the natural representatives of the mechanic
and manufacturing classes,........................ 219




Contents.                                 xxi
Essay Page
a. the learned professions form no distinct class in society................................. No. XXXIII. 21S
d. the landholders will be well represented  by those in
whom they have most confidence, without regard to
the extent of their property,....................... 220
e. the good effects of a mixed representation, and the
impracticability of special delegations from particular
classes,............................................ 224
f. men possessing the most extensive information will best
represent all classes,............................  221
g. men of strong minds, who belong to no particular class,
will sometimes command the attention which is due to
their merit,.............................          XXXIV. 222
h. men of different trades will seldom  possess greater sympathy for each other than the merchant will for both,.. 222
xr. objection, that a power of internal taxation in the Federal Congress cannot be exercised with advantage for the
want of sufficient knowledge of local circumstances, considered............................................... 224
a. the members from each State can obtain the necessary
information.......................................... 224
b. systems of finance are usually framed by a few persons,.............................................            224
c. local disabilities may be easily ascertained and understood..................................            225
d. the assessment of property to be taxed will devolve on
discreet persons who are acquainted with "local details,"............................................ 225
e. "the National legislature can make use of the system of
each State within that State,".................. 226
f. the proportion of taxes among the States is fixed, and
is "to be determined by the numbers of each State,"
respectively,................................... 226
g. if this power should prove " to be really inconvenient,"
it need not be used, and requisitions may be resorted
to................................................ 226
A. "why not omit that ambiguous power, in the first instance, and rely on requisitions  " answered,....... 227
a. because, if convenient, this mode will be preferable,........................................... 22
b. because the existence of such authority will give
greater efficacy to requisitions...................  227
o. clashing of authority concerning taxation, State and Foederal, cannot occur,................................... 227
P. minor objections to the delegation of authority to levy
taxes considered.................................... 227




xxii                          Contents.
Essay. Page
a. double sets of revenue officers,........... No. XXXIV. 228
b. "duplication of the popular burdens by double taxations,"............................................. 229
c. " the frightful forms of odious and oppressive polltaxes,"..................................... 229
2. in " the power of regulating the militia, and of commanding
its services in times of insurrection and invasion,".XXXV. 231
A. uniformity in its organization and discipline is desirable,.... 231
B. that uniformity is attainable only by confiding the regulation
of the militia to the FEederal authorities,................. 231
C. the weakness of those who oppose the delegation of this authority to the Fcederal authorities,........................ 232
D. objection, that no provision has been made for calling out
the posse comitatus, to assist the Fcederal magistrate, considered,..............................           232
E. objection, that danger may be apprehended from the delegation of such an authority, considered,................. 233
A. the project for a militia establishment which " PUBLIUS "
approved.......................................... 233
B. the necessity for a military establishment would, thereby,
be diminished,................................. 235
c. the pretence of danger from a disciplined militia ridiculed,. 235
D. the authority absolutely retained by the States, to appoint
the officers of the militia, a sufficient safeguard.......... 235
F. objection, based on the authority to order the militia into
distant States, considered............................... 236
V. "THE CONFORMITY OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION TO THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF REPUBLICAN
GOVERNMENT,"...................'V............XXXVI. 238
1. introductory remarks,....................................... 238
A. difficulty of investigating public measures with moderation
and candor,...................................... 239
B. the manner in which the proposed- Constitution has been discussed, considered....................................  239
A. the predetermined friend of the new system may be upright,................................ 240
B. the predetermined opponent " cannot be upright and must be
culpable"................................ 240
C. The Federalist not addressed either to predetermined enemies
or friends of the measure, but to those who desire the happiness of their country,.................................. 240
D. in considering the plan allowances must be made for the difficulties, inherent in the very nature of the undertaking,
which the Convention experienced,.................... 240
A. the novelty of the undertaking,........................ 240
a. the difficulty of " combining the requisite stability and en



Contents.                         xxiii
Essay. Page
ergy in government with a due regard to liberty and the
republican form,"........................ No. XXXVI. 241
c. the difficulty of " marking the proper line of partition between the authority of the General, and that of the State
governments,"...........................-........... 242
D. "the interfering pretensions of the larger and smaller
States,"................................ 246
B. "other combinations [of the States], resulting from a difference of local position and policy,"................ 245
E. it need not excite wonder if the proposed Constitution shall
want harmony between its several parts,................. 246
F. the experience of the past, on similar subjects, when compared with the result in this case, proves,................ 246
A. that the Convention was not afflicted with party animosi~ties, and,.........................................  247
B. that "all the deputations composing the Convention were
finally accommodated,"............................... 247
G. "in every case reported by ancient history in which government has been established with deliberation and consent," it has been framed by a single individual,........
XXXVII. 247
H. the difficulties which they experienced in the establishment
of their governments,.................................. 248
I. the errors which the new system contains are rather the result of the defect of antecedent experience, than of the
want of accuracy and care in preparing it,............... 249
A. proved from general causes............................. 249
B. from the peculiar amendments to the Articles of Confederation which have been proposed for ratification,........ 250
J. the present situation of America considered,.............  260
A. the severity of "her malady,".."..............  261
B. the diversity of the adviceogiven for her relief,........... 261
c. improbability that those who object to the new system
could improve it,.................................    254
D. the proposed Constitution, notwithstanding its defects, an
improvement on the old one,.........................  264
e. the principal grounds of objection to the new one exist, or
are permitted to be exercised, under the old one,........ 265
P. answer, that notwithstanding these practices, under the
old constitution, they are rendered harmless by the entire
dependence of the Congress on the constituent States,
considered.............................. 2565
o. the Congress not open to censure for assuming doubtful
authority........................................... 257
2. "a candid survey of the plan of government reported by the
Convention,".............................XXXVIII. 258




Xxiv                         Contents.
ssay. Pagp
A. no other than a strictly republican form of government reconcilable with the genius of the People of America,........
No. XXXVIII. 258
i. what are the distinctive characters of the republican form,
considered,......................................... 258
a. the example of Holland referred to,..................  258
b. the example of Venice referred to,................... 258
c. the example of Poland referred to,................... 258
d. the example of England referred to,.................  259
e. the general subject discussed.......................... 259
B. the proposed Constitution conforms to the standard here fixed, 260
A. in the tenure of its offices,........................... 260
B. in its absolute prohibition of titles of nobility,.......... 261
c. objection, that it has not preserved the Fe'deral form, but
provides for a National government, considered..,..... 261
a. what is the real character of the proposed government,.. 261
A. it will be founded on the assent and ratification of
the People of the several States, as such............ 262
B. the sources from which its ordinary powers will be
drawn............................................ 263
a. the House of Representatives, from the People of
America,................................... 263
b. the Senate, from the States, as such................ 263
c. the Executive.................................. 263
i. immediately from the States in their political characters....................................... 263
ii. eventually by the House of Representatives, as
representatives of the States, as distinct and coequal bodies politic,.....................  263
C. the operation of its ordinary powers.................. 263
D. the extent of its ordinary powers,.................... 264
E. the authority by which amendments are to be made,. 265
F. the subject generally discussed,.................... 266
b was the Convention authorized to frame and propose a
mixed system..................XXXIX. 266
A. the commissions of its members examined,........... 266
B. the recommendatory acts considered,................. 266
C. the authority of the Convention deduced therefrom,. 267
a. " to establish, in these States, a firm National government,"...............................  267
b. that government to be "adequate to the exigencies of
government, and the preservation of the Union,"....... 267
e. these purposes were "to be effected by alterations and
provisions in the Articles of Confederation,".......    268
d. these alterations were to be reported to the Congress
and to the States, for approval and ratification,...  268




Contents.                           xxs
Essay Page
D. the general subject discussed,..........No. XXXIX. 268
e. how far considerations of duty might have supplied any
defect of regular authority in the Convention,........ 272
A. as its powers were merely advisory and recommendatory, the proposed system is harmless until it
shall be approved,...............................  272
B. the importance, to the United States, of the result of
its deliberations,................................ 278
C. the necessity which existed for a radical change in
the form of government,..................... 274
D. the question whether the Convention exceeded its
powers does not affect the propriety of ratifying
the proposed Constitution,.......... 275
0. the Constitution proposed by the Convention considered,. XL. 276'
A. "the sum or quantity of power which it vests in the [Foederal] government" considered,....................... 276
a. is the aggregate of that power greater than it should be,. 276
A. the arguments of opponents considered generally,.... 277
B. the objects of those powers considered,.............. 277
a. concerning "security against foreign danger,"..... 278
i. the power of declaring war and granting letters of
marque,..................................... 278
ii. that of providing armies and fleets,............. 278
i. it must be indefinite,....................... 278
ii. it must extend to times of peace as wdIl as to
those of war,...............................278
iii. the danger from military establishments considered,...........................  279
iii. that of regulating and calling forth the militia,... 284
iv. that of levying and borrowing money,......... 284
i. the authority to levy internal taxes considered,.. 286
ii. the indefinite character of the authority considered,..285
A. it has been sufficiently restricted,...........  286
B. it was copied from the old system,.......... 287
C. an appeal to the objectors,................. 287
A concerning the "regulation of the intercourse with
foreign nations,"........................ XLL 288
i. the power to send and receive ambassadors and
consuls and to make treaties................   288
ii. to punish piracies and felonies committed on the,high seas, and offences against the laws of nations, 289
il. to regulate foreign commerce,............. 290
i. reflections on the sanction of the slave-trade,....  290
ii. objection to the Constitution, based on that
clause, considered,................ 291




Xxvi                          Contents.
Essay. Page
c. the "maintenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the States,".............. No. XLI. 291
i. to regulate commerce among the States and the
Indian tribes,............................ 292
ii. to coin money, and to regulate its value and that
of foreign coin................................ 294
iii. to provide for the punishment of counterfeiters of
coin and public securities,............. 294
iv. to fix the standard of weights and measures,.... 294
v. to establish an uniform rule of naturalization,.... 294
vi. to establish an uniform law of bankruptcy..... 296
vii. to establish a rule by which public acts, etc.,
shall be proved, and with what effect........... 296
viii. to establish post-roads and post-offices,........  296
d. "miscellaneous powers,".................IJXL=. 297
i. the power to pass laws for securing the exclusive
right to their works to authors and inventors,.. 297
ii. the exclusive right of legislation over the seat of
the Foederal government...................... 297
iii. the punishment of treason against the United
States,...................................... 299
iv. to admit new States into the Union,.......... 299
v. to dispose of and govern the territories and public
property of the United States.................   30C
vi. to guarantee to every State a republican form of
government,......................... 300
vii. to protect the States against invasion.       302
viii. to protect the States against domestic violence,. 302
i. the powers and rights of majorities and minorities of the several States discussed,.......... 302
ii. the probability of a general, overpowering insurrection within all the States considered,... 804
ix. to assume the payment of outstanding debts of
the United States,.........................  806
-i. its  purpose,................................   305
ii. objection, that it does not assert the continued
validity of debts due to the United States, answered,................................... 305
x. to provide for amendments to the Constitution,... 306
xi. the establishment of the new system, when nine
States shall have approved it.................. 306
i. the violation, by this provision, of the Articles of
Confederation considered,.                  307
it. the relations which will exist between the assenting and the dissenting States of the Union
considered.............................. 80




Contents.                          xxvii
Essay. Pap
& "restrictions on the authority of the several States,"
No. XLIII. 3Q8
i. forbidding the establishment of treaties and -aIliances between them.......................... 309
ii. forbidding the issue of letters of marque and reprisal........................................  30S
iii. forbidding the coinage of money by them,....... 309
iv. forbidding the issue of bills of credit by them,... 309
v. forbidding the establishment of any other legal
tender than gold and silver,...............    310
vi. forbidding the passage of bills of attainder,...... 310
vii. forbidding the passage of ex post facto laws,..... 310
viii. forbidding the passage of laws impairing contracts,......................................    310
ix. forbidding the establishment of titles of nobility,. 311
x. forbidding the imposition of duties on exports or
imports..................................... 312
fd "the several powers and provisions by which efficacy is given to all the rest,"................... 312
i. the power to make all necessary and proper laws for
carrying the preceding powers into execution,.. 312
i. the necessity of such authority in the United
States..................................... 312
ii. other methods considered,.................... 312
A. prohibiting the exercise of any power not
expressly delegated to the Union............ 313
B. a positive enumeration of the general powers
so delegated............................ 313
C. a negative enumeration of them, by a specification of the reserved powers.............. 314
3). entire silence on the subject............. 314
iii. the remedy for an abuse of this authority,.... 316
H. the supremacy of the Constitution and constitutional laws of the United States, and of their
treaties with other powers,....................  315
i. the effect of reserving the supremacy of the
State constitutions therefrom, considered,..... 316
iii. the various officers, State and Foederal, to be
bound by oath to support'it,................... 317
i. why State officers are to be thus obligated,...... 317
C. conclusion, that no part of the powers delegated to the
Fcederal government is unnecessary or improper,.... 317
b. will the aggregated powers of-the Union be dangerous
to the reserved authority of the several States,..XLIV. 318
A. if the objects of the Union can be attained only through
the proposed Constitution, it is not a valid objection




xxviii                        Contents.
Essay. Page
that it abridges the authority of the State governments.......................No. XLIV. 818
B. the new Constitution will not prove fatal to the State
governments...................................   319
a. because of the tendency, in confederacies, todes
the General government.of its dele date ers,..  319
b. because the State governments    possess more infii.ww  among the People,........................  21
c. because the State governments are constituent and
essential pats  of.tle EF ederal oernmnt........ 321
d. because the employees of the United States will be
less numerous than those of the States........... 821
a. because the powers reserved by the States are relatively greater and more numerous than those
which are delegated to the Union............... 323
f. because the proposed change consists less in the addition of new powers to the Union, than in the invigoration of its old ones,........................... 324
g. because the State governments will possess more influence among the People, resumed,......... XLV. 325
i. the State and the Foederal governments are' in fact
only different agents for the People, with different powers and for different purposes............ 325
ii. they both depend on the sentiments and sanction of
common constituents for their respective powers, 325
iii. the first and most natural attachment of the People will be to their respective State governments, 326
i. from the greater number of offices in the latter, 326
ii. from the character of the interests which they
provide for.............................   326
/ii. from the greater familiarity of the People with
them,..................................... 326
iv. from the history of the country during the war, 326
iv. if the popular favor should rest on the Faoederal
government, it will be only because that will be
better administered than the others,...........     327
i.'because the prepossessions of the members of the
Federal government will be in favor of their States,8327
i. because the respective States possess the means of
defeating Foederal encroachments,............... 829
j. because other States would sympathize with the suffering State, and combine for its support,......... 330
k. the objection, that the military power will be in the
Faederal government, answered,................... 330
L the impossibility of collecting a force for such a purpose.........................................   881




Contents.                                xxix
Essay. Pap
ii. the superior power of the militia to resist and overcome it...................N......... No. XLV. 331
1. concluding remarks on this particular branch of the
subject,......................................   332
C. concluding remarks, on the danger that the Federal
powers will be formidable to reserved powers of individual States...................................   338
a. "the  particular structure  of  the  Foederal government
and the distribution of its powers among its constituent
parts,"......................................  XLVI. 883
a. "its supposed violation  of the  maxim, that the  legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to
be separate and distinct," considered.................. 333
A. the truth of the maxim  conceded,................... 334
B. the proposed Constitution does not violate it,........ 334
a. the meaning of the maxim  discussed................ 334
i. the views of Montesquieu examined,............. 334
i. the British Constitution, as his standard of government, referred to........................ 334
ii. his own expressed reasons referred to,......  335
ii. the provisions of the State constitutions, relative thereto, examined,...................... 337
i. New  Hampshire,..........................   337
ii. Massachusetts,.............................     338
iii. New York,....................9............. 339
iv. New Jersey,................................  339
v. Pennsylvania................................ 339
vi. Delaware................................... 846
vii. Maryland,................................ 84
viii. Virginia.................................... 84
ix. North Carolina,...........................  341
x. South Carolina............................ 341
xi. Georgia,....................-.............. 341
xii. general remarks on the State constitutions,.... M34
L. the necessity that "these departments shall be so
far connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the others," considered
LVII.J 342
i. " the powers belonging to one department ough t no
to be directly and completely administered by
either of the others," conceded................. 343
li. "neither of them ought to possess an overruling
influence over the others in the administration
of their powers," conceded,.....8............. 348
Il. what practical security can be provided for each,
~against the invasion of the others, considered,... 848




Contents.
Essay. Page
i. the insufficiency of naked constitutional restrictions,..................... No. XLVII. 348
A. the tendency of the legislature to absorb
the others,..............84.......   34b
a. from the nature of our political organization................................  344
b. from  "an  intrepid confidence in its own
strength,"...... 344
C. from necessary extent of its powers,........ 345
d. from its control of the pecuniary resources
of the country, and the indefiniteness of its
authority in many cases................. 34
e. from the examples presented in history,... 345
B. an instance of executive encroachment accounted for,............................... 848
C. concluding remarks,...................... 348
ii. Mr. Jefferson's proposition, that, two thirds of the
members of each of two of the departments
concurring, an appeal to the People may be
taken, considered,................. XLVIII. 349
A. the People the only source of authority,.... 349
B. the propriety of a well-defined mode of appealing to the People considered...........   350
C. it does reach the case of an improper combination of two departments of the government,.................................. 35C
D. by frequent applications it might impair the
respect with which the People would regard
the government,.........................    350
E. the public tranquillity might be disturbed by
a too frequent recurrence to the decision of
the society,.............................   351
F. the decisions thus obtained would not answer
the purpose of maintaining the constitutional
equilibrium of the government,............ 352
a. the legislature will still control the decision, 352
b. members of the legislature will probably
be the members of the conventions to re- ~
vise the form of government,............. 353
C. when such appeals to the People, against
the legislature, will be useful,...........   853
G. concluding remarks on occasional appeals to
the People............................... 354
ii. periodical appeals to the People considered,
XLIX. 364
A. the disadvantage of short intervals discussed, 855




Contents.                           xxxi
Essay. Page
B. the disadvantage of long intervals discussed,
No. XLIX. 355
C. the example of Pennsylvania referred to,.... 355
w. the interior structure of the government should
be so arranged that its several constituent
departments, by their mutual relations, may
keep each other in their proper places,. A. L. 358
A. the members of each should have little to do
in the appointment of members of the others, 359
B. the members of each department should be
as little dependent as possible on those of the
others for their emoluments................ 859
C. the members of each should possess the constitutional means and personal motives to
resist invasions by the members of other
departments,............................. 860
a. this policy not unfrequently resorted to,... 360
b. an equal power of self-defence cannot be
granted to each department............. 361
0. a division of the power of the legislature
necessary, in order to guard against its encroachments,........................ 861
d. an increase of the power of the executive,
that of the veto, for its protection, necessary.................................. 361
v. the advantages afforded by the Foederal system
of America, in securing the rights of the People........................................   82
A. the division of the delegated powers between
two distinct governments, and its subsequent subdivision, in each, among distinct
and separate departments,................. 862
B. the multitude of different and distinct interests among the People,..................  362
L "the House of Representatives,"..................... LI.-_1
A. the qualifications of the electors thereof,............. 366
a. why not subject to regulation by the Congress,.....  365
b. why not subject to regulation by the State legislatures,.........................................    365
c. why not made uniform throughout the several States, 865
d. the advantages derived from the constitutional provision,........................................   365
B. the qualifications of the members,................. 366
C. the term of office of its members,..........8....... 866
a. "whether biennial elections, in this case, will be
safe," considered,..-........................... 866




rxxUii                        Contents.
EWAEy. Pap
i. frequent elections the only effectual security for an
immediate dependence on, and sympathy with,
the People................ No. LI. 36G
ii. the length of terms of service in other governments....8....................... 367
i. British House of Commons, at different periods, 367
ii. Irish Parliament,........................... 368
iii. the American colonies,...................,9
iii. conclusion, that biennial elections will not be dangerous..................................... 370
iv. this conclusion strengthened by other circumstances.............                             370
i. the Foederal Congress w'll possess less power
than the British or Irish Parliaments, or the
colonial Assemblies.........................   370
ii. it will be restrained by its dependence on the
People, while it will be watched, also, by the
several State governments,................. 370
iii. the other departments of the Foederal government will possess fewer means to seduce the
House than are possessed by the governmente
referred to.................................  370
v. objection, that " where annual elections end, tyranny begins," considered,................ LII. 371
i. no adequate reason for the opinion,............ 371
ii. the practice of different States in the choice of
their legislators,........................... 371
iii. the practice of the British Parliament, by simple statute, to change fundamental principles
of government not applicable, in this case, as
a reason.....3.............................  72
a are "biennial elections necessary or useful,"........ 373
i. short terms of office prevent members from acquiring the practical knowledge requisite to the
due performance of their duties,.............. 373
i. greater scope of information necessary in the'oederal than in the State governments,...... 874
ii. the necessity of acquiring a knowledge of foreign affairs.........................    876
ii. short terms will be inconvenient to members who
reside at a distance from the capitol,..3....... 376
Wii. short terms will be more dangerous from the
greater number of inexperienced members,.... 377
iv. short terms will prevent the correction of spurious
elections,..............................        87
v. conclusion, that " biennial elections will be as use



Contents.                          XXXIL
Essay. Page
ful to the public, as they will be safe to the liberty of the People,"................... No. LII. 377
D. "the apportionment of its members to the several
States,"...................................    LIII.  378
a. -numbers in each State the proper standard for regulating the representation of each State,......... 378
i. objection against representation of slaves, considered...............................              378
i. slaves not merely property,..................... 379
ii. slaves are also persons,....................... 379
iii. the Constitution recognizes this mixed character in slaves,.............................. 379
i-. the apportionment is governed by the same rule
as that for the levy of direct taxes,.......... 380
0. they are not considered as property merely, in
the laws of the States which possess them,... 380
A. reply, that they do not form a basis of local
representation, considered,................ 380
vi. the right of representation of property as well
as of persons, considered,.................. 381
vii. the votes in the Congress which are allowed
to the several States should be proportioned
to the comparative wealth of those States,... 382
b. there will be no inducement for falsifying the census, as the measure for representation is also the
measure for taxation............................. 383
E. "the number of which the House is to consist" considered..............................  LIV. 384
a. the importance which is attached to this subject,... 384
b. the difficulty of determining the proper number,.... 885
c. the small States require smaller ratios of representation than the large States.........3..............  386
d. with the limited powers which are delegated to the
Congress the necessity for a numerous representation is diminished,.............................. 386
e. objections considered and answered................ 387
i. "so small a number of members cannot be safely
trusted with so much power,"................. 387
i. a rapid increase of population may be expect-. ed, and a corresponding increase of representation will ensue........................... 387
ii. "whether the smallness of the number, as a temporary regulation, be dangerous to the public liberty," considered.........................    387
iii. from whence can danger ultimately proceed,
considered................................ 88
c




&xxiv                          Contents.
Essay. Page
A. from  foreign gold,...............No. LIV. 388
B. from other branches of the Foederal government,................................. 389
ii. "it will be too small to possess a due knowledge
of the interests of its constituents," considered,
LV. 891
i. " the representative ought to be acquainted with
the interests and circumstances of his constituents," considered........................... 39i
ii. the objects of Federal legislation considered,... 391
A. " a very few representatives will be very sufficient vehicles of information concerning
commerce to the Fwederal councils,"...8.... 392
B. the same observations will apply to matters
concerning taxation.....3...................  93
C. they "will apply also with greater force to
the case of the militia,"......................  98
D. nothing in the above reasons will conflict
with the necessity, before referred to, for
general information in the representative,... 393
iii. the experience of Great Britain referred to,... 394
iii. it will tend to the aggrandizement of the few at
the expense of the many.............. LVI. 396
i. this objection strikes at the root of representative government,.......................... 396
ii. the members of the House will be elected by all
classes and conditions of citizens............ 397
iii. they will be taken from all classes and conditions of citizens.......8.................. 397
iv. securities to insure their fidelity to their constituents.................................. 39rq
A. their personal character,................. 397
B. the honorable position to which they will be
called............................      898
C. the opportunity which will be afforded to secure honor and distinction,............... 398
D. the frequent election compelling them to
remember their dependence on the People,.................................... 398
E. the measures adopted must operate on themselves as well as on \the great mass of the
society................................ 899
v. the provisions for electing members, and their
qualifications for office, similar to those of the
State constitutions for State officers,.........  400
vi. the relative numbers of the constituencies no




Contents.                         xxxv
Essay. Page
justification for approval of the State system
and disapproval of the ]Foederal system,......
No. LVI. 400
A. the doctrine is not reasonable,.............. 400
B. the doctrine is not admissible in its consequences............................... 401
C. the doctrine is not warranted by facts,...... 401
a. the British House of Commons........... 401
b. the State senators of New Hampshire,..... 401
a. the State senators of Massachusetts,.....402
d. the State senators of New York,........... 402
e. members of Assembly in the cities of New
York and Albany,...................... 402
f. State representatives in Pennsylvania,..... 402
g. the upper house of the Assembly of Connecticut,............................. 403
h. the Governor of Connecticut,........... 408
i. the Governor of Massachusetts,........... 403
j. the Governor of New York.............. 403
k. the President of New Hampshire......... 403
iv. "the number of its members will not be augmented from time to time as the progress of population may demand,"...................... LVII. 403
i. the provisions of the State constitutions compared
with those of the proposed Constitution,...... 403
ai. the practice of the State governments considered,...............................  404
iii. the peculiar organization of the Congress will
induce watchfulness on this subject,.......... 404
A. the large States, in the House, can control
the small ones, and compel their acquiescence,.................................  404
a. objection, that the Senate may object and
prevent such an augmentation, answered, 405
1. there is no probability that the House,
representing the majority of the People,
could be successfully resisted,......... 405
2. the consciousness of the House being supported by right, reason, and the Constitution, will check the Senate,......... 405
8. it is not certain that a majority of the
Senate would oppose such an augmentation.............................. 406
4. senators from tile new States will, probably, favor such an augmentation,...... 406
5. "a constitutional and infallible resource"




Xxxvi                         Contents.
Essay. Page
will be a refusal by the House to vote
the supplies,............... No. LVII. 406
6. the Senate will be more ready to yield,
in such a contest, than the House,...... 407
iv. considerations against a numerous House of
Representatives............................ 408
v. objection that a majority of the members of each
House shall form  quorums, and majorities of
quorums enact laws, considered................ 409
P. the authority vested in the Congress to regulate, in
the last resort, the election of the members of the
House of Representatives, considered........ LVIII. 410
a. introductory remarks........................... 410
b. "every government ought to contain in itself the
means of its own preservation,".................... 411
i. the different depositaries of power to control the
elections, considered,........................ 411
ii. the exact character and extent of the delegated
power considered............................ 411
c. "the existence of the Union would be entirely at the
mercy of the State governments," if the regulation
of elections for the Fcederal government is left entirely in their hands............................. 411
i. the right of self-preservation in the State governments is unimpaired,......................... 412
ii. objection, that the retention of authority in the
State  governments to control the  election of
senators is equally dangerous, considered,...... 413
i. it is necessary from the character of the States,
as constituent bodies,...................... 413
ii. it is less hazardous, from the peculiar organization of the Senate.......................... 414
iii. objection, that the interest of each State to be
represented in the House will be sufficient security against an abuse of power by its government, considered............................. 416
d. objection, the Congress may thereby " promote the
election of some favorite class of men in exclusion
of others," considered,..................... LIX. 416
i. the improbability that such a purpose would be
carried out through this channel, discussed,...... 416
ii. the certainty that, if attempted, it would be corrected by "an immediate revolt of the great
body of the People, headed and directed by the
State governments," averred and discussed,.... 417
iti. the dissimilarity of the organization of the Senate




Contents.                          xxxvi
Essay Page
and the House a security against an improper
exercise of this authority,.............  No. LIX. 417
iv. there can be no conceivable motive for such an
attempt on the part of Congress................ 418
v. inquiry concerning the relative weight of influence possessed by different classes of the Peo-.ple,........................................     419
vi. the qualifications, both of the electors and the
elected, being controlled exclusively by the State
governments, no favor can be extended to any
particular class by the Congress................ 421
vii. the certainty of a general revolt against such an
assumption of authority further discussed, and
the necessity of a military power to insure success to the attempt considered,................ 422. objection, that this provision should have been accompanied by a provision that all elections shall be
held within the counties where the electors reside,
considered,.............................. LX. 423
i such a provision would be harmless,............. 423
ii. it would afford no security from the danger apprehended,.................................... 423
iii. the provision compared with provisions concerning elections in the State constitutions,........... 424
i. those in the constitution of New York particularly examined............................  424
ii. defects in the State constitutions no apology for
defects in the proposed Constitution, considered,....................................    425: the probability that such authority in the Congress,
to fix uniform days of election, may be very important to the public welfare,.................. 426
i. the want of any provision in the proposed Constitution, fixing a particular day for the election,
considered,.............................    427
ii. concluding remarks,....                              427
a. the Senate......................................LXI. 428
A. "the qualifications of senators " considered,.........428
B. "the appointment of senators by the State legislatures" considered,.......................  429
C. "the equality of representation in the Senate" oonsidered,                                                 429
a. the mixed character of the Faederal government requires a mixed representation,................... 429
b. the equal representation in the Senate a recognition
of sovereignty in the States,....................  480




xxxviii                       Contents.
Essay. Paer
c. it furnishes a security against improper acts of legislation,...................N.............   o. LXI. 430
D. " the number of senators, and the term for which they
are to be elected," considered...................... 431
a. "the inconveniences which a republic must suffer
from the want of such an institution,"..............  43]1
i. the security which it furnishes against improper
legislation will be wanting,.................... 431
ii. there will be less security against the "infirmity"
of faction................... 432
iii. there will be less wisdom in the legislation of such
a republic.................................... 482
i. the importance of a knowledge of the proper
mode of legislation,.............. 433
ii. the little attention paid thereto in America,.... 438
iv. mutability in its councils from frequent changes
in its members,............................  438
i. the mischievous effects of such mutability,.... 433
A. it forfeits the respect and confidence of other
nations..........................     434
B. by multiplying laws "it poisons the blessings
of liberty,".............................. 434
C. by affecting the market-price of property it
gives the sagacious and the rich an undue
advantage over the industrious and uninformed poor.....................            485
D. it checks extended improvements and enterprise,.................................. 4ou
E. it diminishes the attachment and reverence
of the People,........................... 436
v. "the want of a due sense of National character,"
LXII. 436
vi. " the want of a due responsibility in the government to the People,"........................ 437
vii. the want of a defence to the People against their
own temporary errors and delusions,..........  438
i. objection, that a widely spread People is not subject to such errors and delusions, answered,... 439
b "history informs us of no long-lived republic which
had not a senate,"...............4............... 439
i. the difference between the ancient republics and
the United States.............................. 446
i. Athens referred to............................ 441
ii. Carthage referred to,........................ 441
iii. Sparta referred to,..........................  441
iv. Rome referred to.........................     44'




Contents.                                xxxix
Essay. Pags
v. Crete referred to....................No. LXII.  442
c. objection, that the Senate will "gradually acquire a
dangerous preeminence in the government and
finally transform it into a tyrannical aristocracy,"
considered..................................... 442
i. the impossibility of such a result averred and dis
cussed,................................. 443
ii. the organization of the Senate of Maryland referred to................................... 443
iii. the organization of the two Houses of the British
Parliament,............................ 444
iv. the examples of the ancient repubtles referred to,. 444
i. Sparta and her Ephori,....................... 444
ii. Rome and her Tribunes,............ 444
iii. Carthage and her Senate,..............  445
v. the controlling influence of the. House of Representatives,................................... 445. "the powers vested in the Senate,"..........LXIII. 446
a. the treaty-making power,....................... 446
i. the great importance of that power............. 446
ii. the authority to exercise it vested in those who
will be best qualified to exercise it............. 446
iii. a popular assembly does not possess such qualifications...................................... 447
i. an intimate acquaintance with public affairs necessary,..................................             447
ii. secrecy and despatch are often required....... 449
iv. objections to this part of the proposed Constitution
considered................................ 450
i. that the treaty-making power has not been delegated to men invested with legislative authority,.                                                  460
ii. that treaties so entered into are to be of supreme
authority,.451
iii. that treaties so entered into are not repealable
at pleasure, like Acts of Assembly,........... 451
iv. that they may be made instruments of oppression,......................... 451
v. thatproper guards against corruption are wanting, 452
A. the responsibility of senators considered,.... 452
v. concluding remarks,..........................  453
b. the appointing of public officers,........LXIV. 453
c. its authority as a court for the trial of impeachments......................................                 463
i. the difficulty in forming such a court, in an elective
government.................................  468




Contents.
Essay. Page
ii. the subjects of its jurisdiction render the trust a
delicate one,...................... No. LXIV. 453
iWi. the Senate the most fit depositary of that trust,.. 454
Iv. the propriety of delegating that authority to the
Supreme Court considered,................. 465
t that court will not possess the fortitude, credit,
and authority requisite to the execution of the
duties of the trust,.......................     466
it. the membership of the Supreme Court will be
too limited,...............   456
iii. as the punishment inflicted by the Court of Impeachment will not terminate the proceedings,
it will be improper to bring the offender twice
before the same court..................... 456
v the propriety of a junction of the Supreme Court
with the Senate in this trust, considered and denied.......................................   457
vi. the propriety of delegating this authority to those
who are wholly disconnected with other departments of the government, considered and denied, 458
vii. the proposed Constitution should not be rejected
for that cause, even if this feature is not the
most desirable,..........................    459
viii. objections to this portion of the new Constitution considered,........................ LXV. 460
i. it unites legislative and judicial authority in the
same body,................................ 460
A. the inconsistency of those whorxaise the objection while they admire the constitution
of New York, in which similar provisions
exist.................................... 461
ii. it contributes to an undue accumulation of power in the Senate, and tends toward the establishment of an aristocracy,................. 461
iii. as an appointing power, the Senate will be too
lenient judges of the conduct of those whom
they shall have appointed to office,..........  463
iv. as a treaty-making power, the Senate may be
called to try themselves for corrupt or perfidious action,............................        465
d. the Executive department,................... LXVI. 467
A. the misrepresentations of this subject considered,.. 467
B. the mode of electing the President considered,...
LXVII. 472
a. the only part of the new Constitution which its opponents do not condemn,........................... 472




Contents.                             xh
Essay Page
b. "it is pretty well guarded,"...........No. LXVII. 473
c. "it was desirable that the sense of the People should
operate in the choice,"..................          473
d. it was desirable that the choice should be made by
competent persons..................... 473
e. it was desirable to avoid tumult and disorder,....... 473
f. it was desirable to avoid cabal, intrigue, and corruption............................................ 474
g. it was desirable to maintain the independence of the
President on all but the People themselves........ 476
h. " all these advantages will happily combine " in the
proposed Constitution........................... 475
t. the choice will seldom fall on one who will not be
qualified.......................................  476
C the choice of a Vice-President by the People considered and approved,............................. 476
D. "the real characters of the proposed Executive " considered generally........................LXVIII. 477
a. the executive authority is delegated, generally, to
one person.............................. 477
i. compared with King of Great Britain............. 478
ii. compared with Governor of New York......... 478
b. he is elected for four years, and is reeligible,........  478
i. compared with King of Great Britain,........... 478
ii. compared with Governor of New York,......... 478
c. he is liable to impeachment, trial, removal from office, and subsequent punishment by the civil
law........................................... 478
i. compared with King of Great Britain,.......       478
ii. compared with Governor of New York,.......... 478
iii. compared with the Governors of Maryland and
Delaware,...............................  478
d. he has the power of vetoing any measure passed by
Congress,.................................... 479
i. his authority in this case compared with that of
the King of Great Britain,.................. 479
ii. his authority in this case compared with that of
the Council of Revision in New York,.             479
iii. his authority in this case compared with that of
the Governor of New York..................... 479
iv. his authority in this case compared with that of
the Governor of Massachusetts...............   479
e. he is commander-in-chief of the militia, when in the
Federal service...................... 480
i. his authority in this case compared with that of
the King of Great Britain....................  480




Contents.
Essay. PagW
ii. his authority in this case compared with that of
the Governor of New York........ No. LXVIII. 480
jf he is commander-in-chief of the army and navy of
the United States,............................. 480
i. his authority therein compared with that of the
King of Great Britain,........................ 480
ii. his authority therein compared with that of the
Governor of New York,................... 480
iii. his authority therein compared with that of the
Governors of New Hampshire and Massachusetts,.........................................  481
g. his power to pardon offenders against the laws,..... 481
i. his authority therein compared with that of the
Governor of New York........................ 481
h. his power, in one case, to adjourn the Congress,.... 482
i. his power therein compared with that of the King
of Great Britain,............................. 482
ii. his power therein compared with that of the Governor of New  York,.......................... 482
i. his treaty-making power,......................... 482
i. his power therein compared with that of the King
of Great Britain,............................. 482
j. his power to receive ambassadors and public ministers, 483
k. his power, in connection with the Senate, to appoint
ambassadors and other ministers,................ 483
i. his power therein compared with that of the King
of Great Britain.............................. 484
ii. his power therein compared with that of the Governor of New York........................... 484
1. the general authority of the President reviewed, and
compared with that of the Governor of New
York,........................................   486
m. the general authority of the President reviewed, and
compared with that of the King of Great Britain,.. 485
E. the provisions of the new Constitution, concerning the
Executive, further considered,.........LXIX. 486
a. the idea that a vigorous executive is inconsistent
with the genius of republican government examined and refuted,............................... 486
b. "'the ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive " considered,.......................... 487
i. unity,................................. 488
i. it has been approved by the soundest political
writers,...........................  488
ii. it is indisputably conducive to energy,.........  488
iii. in what manner it may be destroyed,........... 488




Contents.                          xliii
Essay. Pag
A. by vesting the authority in two or more magistrates,....................... No. LXIX. 488
B. by making the authority subject to the cooperation and control of a council,........... 488
a. plurality of magistrates considered,....... 489
b. the controlling authority of a council considered,................................ 491
o. the argument reviewed and concluded,..... 491
1. plurality removes responsibility and destroys the force of popular opinion,.... 492
2. it tends to concealment of wrong-doing,. 492
8. councils are unnecessary where the magistrate is personally responsible,.......  494
4. plurality in the Executive will be more
dangerous to liberty.................. 495
5. plurality will be more expensive,........ 496
iL duration in office of the Executive,......... LXX. 496
i. it affects his personal firmness in the employment of his constitutional powers,...........   496
A. more interest will be felt in that which is
permanent,..................... 497
B. subserviency to popular impulses not desirable in the Executive...................... 497
C. subserviency to the humors of the legislature
equally improper,........................ 498
D. independence of the several departments of
government necessary,.................... 499
E. shortness of the term of office will affect the
independence of the Executive,........... 500
F. a term of four years compared with longer
and shorter terms,.......................   600
it. it affects the stability of his system of administration,............................ LXXI. 502
A. the term  "administration of government"
defined,................................. 502
B. the heads of foreign, finance, military, and
naval departments are only "assistants or
deputies of the chief magistrate," and ought
to be appointed by him and be subject to his
superintendence,........................   502
C. changes in the Executive will produce, primarily, changes in these departments, and,
ultimately, changes in the system of administration............................ 503
iii. the reeligibility of the Executive considered,... 503
A. the opposition thereto considered,......... 608




xliv                           Contents.
Essay. Page
B. the effects of confining the eligibility to a
single term..................... No. LXXI. 504
a. the inducements to good behavior would be
diminished,........................... 604
b. temptations would be offered to selfishness,
peculation, and usurpation,............... 604
C. it would deprive the country of experience in the magistracy,................. 605
d. it would deprive the country of the services of those who can be most useful in
cases of emergency,...................   506
e. it would operate as a constitutional interdiction of stability in the administration,. 606
C. an examination of the supposed advantages
of such a limitation of eligibility........... 507
a. greater independence in the magistracy,... 507
b. greater security to the People,............  507
D. conclusions, on the impropriety of confining
the choice of the People, when incumbents
are qualified, to other and inexperienced candidates.................................... 508
Wii. an adequate provision for its support,....LXXII. 608
i. without such a provision the Executive would
be at the mercy of the legislature,.......... 509
ii. the independence of the Executive cannot be
impaired,............................. 509
iv. competent powers,............................ 510
i. the, power of returning bill, to the legislature
without approval........................... 610
A. the propensity of the legislature to usurp
authority considered.......................  510
B. the propriety of delegating this authority to
the Executive considered.................. 510
a. to defend the Executive from legislative
aggressions,........................ 510
b. to defend the People from improper legislation................................... 611
C. objection, that "one man cannot possess more
wisdom and virtue than a number of men,"
considered,..............................    511
D. objection, that " the power of preventing bad
laws includes that of preventing good ones,"
considered...............................  12
E. the influence of the legislature will prevent
the frequent and incautious use of this
power,......................2........... 612




Contents.                          xlv
Essay. Pige
1. the greater danger is that it will not be used at
all times when it may be employed usefully,.
No. LXXII. 513
G. the power not being absolute, two thirds of the
legislature may successfully resist it,...... 514
a. a similar power delegated to the " Council
of Revision" in New York............  515
b. the Governor of Massachusetts possesses a
power similar to that which is here delegated to the Executive,................. 515
c. the latter preferable to the former,....... 515
Ei. the command of the military and naval forces of
the Union,...................   LXXIII. 516
us. to require opinions of heads of the executive
departments..............................   16
vw. the power of pardoning offenders against the
laws of the Union...................... 517
A. the propriety of delegating it to a single person considered,.......................... 617
B. the propriety of delegating authority to the
President to pardon traitors considered,..... 517
w. in connection with the Senate, to make treaties,
LXXIV. 619
A. one of the best digested features of the proposed Constitution........................ 519
B. objection, that it unites the executive and
legislative departments, considered,.........  520
a. it is a proper combination of the two departments,.......5......................... 620
b. it is not entirely an executive, nor is it entirely a legislative subject, but combines
the nature of both,.....5........... 520
o. it cannot properly be delegated to an elective Executive alone,................... 521
d. it cannot properly be delegated to the Senate alone,.............................   522
e. the House of Representatives cannot properly be admitted to share in that power,.. 523
C. objection, that two thirds of all the Senators
should be required, instead of two thirds of
those present, considered,..................  23
w. in connection with the Senate, to appoint certain
public officers,..................... LXXV. 525
A. this feature of the proposed Constitution is
entitled to particular commendation........   526
B. the People at large cannot exercise this power, 526




xlvi                          Contents.
Essay. Page
C. the President will usually be a. man of ability........................ No. LXXV. 527
D. the delegation of this authority to one man
will beget a livelier sense of duty and greater
regard to reputation than the delegation of it
to many...............................527
E. objection, that it should have been delegated
solely to the President, considered,......... 528
a. all the advantages desired to be gained
thereby will be secured by the proposed
plan................................. 528
b. the fact that his choice may be overruled by
the Senate considered.................. 529
C. the necessary concurrence of the Senate
will afford a check on the favoritism of the
President,............................ 529
F. objection, that the President thereby may secure the complaisance of the Senate to his
views, considered......................... 530
a. the integrity of the whole body of the Senate will check such a result............. 531
b. the proposed Constitution has guarded
against it,............................ 631
G. the consent of the Senate will be necessary
to displace as well as to appoint officers of
the government,................ LXXVI. 532
a;. further stability will thereby be secured to
the government......................... 532
H. objection, that the Senate will be unduly
controlled by the President, considered,.... 533
I. objection, that the President will be unduly
controlled by the Senate, considered,...... 533
J. this feature of the proposed Constitution compared with the plan of appointing State officers in New York,....................... 534
K. the impropriety of delegating this authority
to a council of appointment............... 535
L. the impropriety of admitting the House of
Representatives to share in this authority,.. 536
vii. to communicate information to Congress on the
state of the Union,........................... 536
ii. to recommend to Congress the adoption of such
measures as he shall consider expedient,..... 537
ix. to convene one or both branches of the Congress on extraordinary occasions........... 537
x. to adjourn the Congress when there is a dis



Contents.                           xlvil
Essay. Page
agreement concerning the time of adjournment,..  No. LXXVI. 537
xi. to receive ambassadors and other public ministers,..................................... 537
xii. to execute the laws of the'Union............. 637
xiii. to commission all the officers of the United
States,...                    537
F. concluding remarks,................................ 537
j. the Judiciary department,..................  LXXVIII. 538
A. " the mode of appointing the judges," considered,.... 539
B. "the tenure by which the judges are to hold their
places" considered,.............................. 639
a. it is similar to that by which the judges in the several States hold office,........................... 539
b. objection thereto considered............... 539
i. the Judiciary will be least in a capacity to annoy
the other departments of the government,.        539
ii. it is the weakest of the three departments of government,.....                                   540
c. the necessity for a complete independence of the Judiciary.........................................  41
i. the authority of the courts to pronounce legislative acts void because contrary to the Constitution, considered,..............................  541
ii. the exercise of that authority does not indicate
that the Judiciary is superior to the legislature,.. 541
iii. that the legislature is the constitutional judge of
its own powers, considered and denied,......... 542
iv. the interpretation of the laws is the peculiar province of the courts,............................ 542
i. the effect of that interpretation on the action of
the courts.................................. 542
v. that consideration a reason for the permanent tenure of the Judiciary,............................ 544
vi. independence of the Judiciary also necessary in
order that it may guard the Constitution and
the rights of individuals froyn sudden impulses
of popular passion and prejudice.............. 544
vii. as well as.the private rights of individuals from
the mischievous effects of unjust and partial laws, 545
viii. it is necessary, also, to insure an inflexible and
uniform adherence to the rights of the Constitution and of individuals....................... 546
ix. and from the nature of the qualifications which
are required for the discharge of its duties,...... 540
d. the wisdom of the provision establishing good be



xlviii                        Contents.
Essay. Page
havior as the tenure of office in the Judiciary department considered as conducive to its independence.......................... No. LXXVIII. 547
e. a fixed provision for the support of the Judiciary
also contributes to its independence,..... LXXIX. 548
i. "a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a
power over his will,"...................... 6.. 48
ii. the provisions of the proposed Constitution on this
subject stated,...............................  648
f. the responsibility of the Judiciary considered....... 5650
i. it will be liable to impeachments under the proposed
Constitution............................        550
ii. it is not liable to removal for inability,.......... 550
i. the impossibility of fixing the limits of ability and
disability....................               550
ii. the provisions of the constitution of New York
considered...................       550
g. the extent of the authority delegated to the Judiciary,..................................    LXXX. 551
i. to what cases the judicial authority of the Union
ought to extend, considered,.................... 551
i. to all cases arising from the duly enacted laws of
the Union.....................  552
A. the necessity of a constitutional method of
giving efficacy to constitutional provisions,.. 552
B. examples referred to,...................... 552
ii. to all cases which concern the execution of the
provisions expressly contained in the articles
of Union,................................. 553
ii/. to all cases in which the United States are aparty, 553
iv. to all cases which involve the PEACE of the CONFEDERACY,...............................     6653
A. in their foreign relations,................... 55
B. wherein two States, or a State and the citizens of another State, or the citizens of different States, are parties.................. 654
v to all cases which originate on the high seas,
and are of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction,. 555
vi. to all cases wherein the State tribunals cannot
be supposed to be impartial and unbiased,.... 556
if. to what cases it will extend under the proposed
Constitution...............................  556
i. the constitutional provision stated generally,.... 556
ii. the powers thus delegated' conformable to the
principles which ought to have governed thf
structure of the Judiciary,"................ 6




Contents.                           xlii
Essay. Page
iii. the propriety of delegating "equity jurisdiction" discussed................. No. LXXX. 557
iii. concluding remarks,.......................... 558
C. "the partition of the judiciary authority between different courts, and their relations to each other,"....
LXXXI. 559
a. the constitutional provision stated,................. 559
b. the propriety of establishing " one court of supreme
and final jurisdiction " considered,.............. 560
i. the propriety of delegating that authority to a distinct department, considered,.................. 560
i. that " the errors and usurpations of such a body
will be unaccountable and remediless" considered,...............................   560
A. the proposed Constitution does not " directly
empower the Judiciary to construe the laws
according to the spirit of the Constitution," 561
ii. it secures more completely the separation of the
Judiciary from the legislature................ 561
iii. it recognizes more fully the principle of good
behavior as the tenure of judicial office,.    562
iv. it secures greater legal ability in the determination of causes.............................. 562
v. it removes the Judiciary from the arena of party
strife....................................... 562
vi. the example of several States considered,...... 562
ii. no legislature can rectify the exceptionable decisions of the courts in any other sense than by
prescribing a rule forfuture action.............. 563
iii. the'HI supposed danger of judiciary encroachments
on the legislative authority" considered........ 563
c. "the propriety of the power of constituting inferior
courts " considered.............................. 564
i. "it obviates the necessity of having recourse to
the Supreme Court in every case of FRederal
cognizance,"................................. 664
ii. why the same purpose may not be accomplished
by the instrumentality of the State courts considered...................................... 565
iii. the advantage to be gained by dividing the United
States into judicial districts,..................  566
d. "in what manner the judicial authority is to be distributed between the Supreme and the inferior
courts of the Union,".............................. 666
i. the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court considered,..                  666
d




Contents.
Essay. Page
i. the Feederal courts have no authority to enforce
the payment of their debts by the individual
States......................... No. LXXXI. 567
ii. the original jurisdiction of the inferior courts
considered,.................................     568
iii. the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Ccurt
considered,.............................    568
i. the  meaning  of the  term   "appellate"  discussed.....................................    568
ii. a review of matters of fact by the Supreme
Court not to be implied as a necessary consequence,................... 569
iii. the motives which probably influenced the
Convention in relation to this particular provision.....................................  70
iv. the Congress will have authority to restrain the
Supreme Court from reexamining matters of
fact,.................................... 570
v. concluding remarks,........................ 571. the jurisdiction of the State courts on Foederal ques-'
tions considered,...................... LXXXII.  571
is the individual States " will retain all preixisting authorities which may not be exclusively delegated
to the Fcederal head,".....................      572
i. in what that " exclusive delegation" consists,... 572
i. "the State courts will retain the jurisdiction they
now have, unless it appears to be taken away by
exclusive delegation,"........................ 572
i. "the concurrent jurisdiction of the State tribunals the most natural and defensible construction" of the Constitution.................. 573
ii. this is "only clearly applicable to those descriptions of causes of which the State courts had
previous cognizance"....................... 678
Hi. the decision of causes arising upon a particular
regulation may be committed by the Congress to
the Foederal courts solely, if it desires to do so, 678
i. this will not divest the State courts of any part
of their primitive jurisdiction, further than may
relate to an appeal,........................ 578
ii. nor, except where expressly excluded, of their
right to take cognizance of the causes to which
those particular regulutions may give birth,.....   574
iv. the relation which will subsist between the State
and the FRederal courts in instances of concurrent jurisdiction,............................. 674




Contents.                                1.
Essay. Page
i. an appeal will lie from the State courts to the
Supreme Court of the United States,.........
No. LXXXII. 574
ii. the appellate jurisdiction of the inferior Fcederal courts, in such cases, considered,......... 576
D. objection, that no provision has been introduced into
the proposed Constitution to establish the right of
trial by jury in civil cases, considered,....LXXXIII. 576
a. the disingenuous form of the objection considered,.. 577
i. the silence of the Constitution on this subject...... 577
ii. rules of legal-interpretation applicable to this case,
considered,..............................       5677
iii. " a power to constitute courts is a power to prescribe the mode of trial" therein,.............. 578
iv. concluding remarks,.......................... 578
b. the proper use and true meaning of the maxims on
which the objection rests........................ 579
c. the importance of the right of trial by jury considered, 581
i. its importance in criminal cases conceded......... 581
ii. its relative unimportance in civil cases maintained, 581
i. a safeguard against undue taxation, denied,...... 582
ii. it affords security against official corruption,... 583
iii. it is useful in settling questions of property,.... 584
iii. the extent to which juries are employed in different States....................................  584
d. "no general rule could have been fixed upon by the
Convention which would have corresponded with
the circumstances of all the States,"..........  586. "as much might have been hazarded by taking the
system of any one State as a standard, as by omitting it altogether " and leaving it to the Congress,. 586
f. the difficulty of establishing a general constitutional
rule..........................................   586
i. the impropriety of its use in many cases,......... 587
i. those in which the foreign relations of the United
States are concerned........................ 587
ii. those which belong to the equity jurisdiction,.. 588
ii. "the proposition of Massachusetts" on this subject considered............................... 589
iii. the provision of the constitution of New York on
this subject considered........................ 591
iv. the proposition that it should be established in all
cases whatever,.............................. 592
v. concluding remarks............................. 592
O. other objections to the proposed Constitution considered
and answered,...........................   LXXXIV. 594




lii                         Contents.
Essay. Page
a. it contains no Bill of Rights.............No. LXXXIV. 595
A. the constitution of New York contains none, considered.......................... 595
a. it contains provisions in the body of the instrument,
which, in substance, amount to the same thing,.. 595
b. it adopts, in their full extent, the common and statute laws of Great Britain........................ 595
B. the proposed Constitution contains, in the body of the
instrument, similar equivalent provisions............ 596
C. a Bill of Rights will be unnecessary, because the People
will surrender nothing in the adoption of the proposed
Constitution, and the government will be administered
by their immediate representatives and servants,.... 598
D. a Bill of Rights would be dangerous, as implying the
grant of all powers not expressly withheld,......... 599
E. the liberty of the press considered,..~............... 599
F. the proposed Constitution itself a Bill of Rights,..... 600
b. " the seat of government will be too remote from many
of the States to admit of a proper knowledge, on the
part of the constituent, of the conduct of the representative,"............................................ 601
C. there is no provision respecting debts due to the United
States............................................. 603
d. the additional expense which will be imposed by the, new
system.......................................... 603
A. the increase of offices under the new government considered,........................................ 604
a. in many cases the State officers will be diminished to
the same extent,.........                     605
b. the judiciary will furnish the principal additions,.. 605
B. the diminished sessions of the Congress will counterbalance much of the increased expense,............  605
C. the State legislatures, also, will hold shorter sessions,
at diminished cost,................................ 606
D. concluding remarks,...... 606
VI. "ITS ANALOGY TO YOUR fthe People of the State of New
York] OWN STATE CONSTITUTION,"....... LXXXV. 607
VII. "THE ADDITIONAL SECURITY WHICH ITS ADOPTION WILL AFFORD TO THE PRESERVATION OF
THAT SPECIES OF GOVERNMENT, TO LIBERTY, AND
TO PROPERTY,"........................................ 608
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS,.............................  609
1. the manner in which PUBLIUS had discussed the subject considered,............................................. 609
A. an appeal to the reader to weigh the subject under discussion
carefully, and to,.act conscientiously.................... 609




Contents.                              lii
Essay. Pag(
B. the entire confidence of PUBLIUs in the arguments which
recommend the proposed system,............ No. LXXXV. 610
2. the conceded imperfections of the system no cause for delay in
adopting it,............................................. 610
A. the extent of these concessions has been greatly exaggerated,..........................                              610
A. "that it is radically defective " denied,..................  610
B. "that without material alterations the rights and interests
of the community cannot be safely confided to it " denied, 610
c. although not perfect, it is upon the whole a goad plan,...... 611
B. the precarious state of the country forbids delay for the only
purpose of engaging in the chimerical pursuit of a perfect
plan of government..................................... 611
A. the improbability of assembling a new convention with
the same success as that which attended the last........ 611
B. more easy to obtain amendments subsequent to the adoption
of the Constitution than previous thereto................. 612
c. no plan can be proposed which will be satisfactory to all
the States, in every respect,........................... 612
D. supposed obstacles in the way of making subsequent amendments considered................................. 612
E. the ease with which a Foederal convention may be called
for the amendment of the Constitution, under the provisions of the proposed Constitution,..................... 613
8 concluding remarks,.............................              614




A COMPARATIVE EXHIBIT
OF THE
CLAIMS TO THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE FEDERALIST.
-t         Z8       Ss3       8.2    AS tt       i-      M S   co
o                            I
No.        No.
No. I.    No. I. Ham.    Ham.   Ham.              Ham.  Ham.
II.        II.  J/y      Jay      Jay    JAY       JAy    JAy Jay
Ir.    yIII.  JAY        JAy       JAY    JAY       Jky    Jay      JAy
IV.        IV. JAy       Jay      JAy    JAy       JAy    JAy       JAY
V.         V. JAy       JAy      JAy    JAy       Jay:  Jay        Jay
VI.        VI. Ham.    Ham.   Ham.                 Ham.  Ham.
VII.       VII  Ham.    [lam.   Ham.                Ham.  Ham.
VIII.      V II. Ham.   Ham.   Ham.                  Ham.  I1am.
IX.        IX. Ham.   Ham.   Ham.                   Ham.  11am.
X.         X. Mad.    Mad.    Mad.   Mad.    Mad.  Mad.
XI.        XI. Ham.   Ham.   Ham.                   Ham.  1am.
1 Vide letter published in The Port Folio, Vol. IV. No. 20, ante, page xxviii.
2 Vide ante, pages xxvi. xxvii.
3 " I am assured that Numbers 2. 8. 4. 5. & 64 were written by JoHN JAY
" Numbers 10. 14. 37 to 49 both! Inclusive & 53 by JAMES MADISON Jun" Numbers 18. 19. 20. by Messrs MADISON & HAMILTON jointly.
" All the rest by Mr HAMILTON
",(-Mr HAMILTON told me that Mr MADISON wrote 48 & 49 or from pa. 101 to 112
"of Vol. 2d =))
[In much darker colored ink, and in a different style of the Chancellor's writing:] " NB -
"I showed the above Memr to General HAMILTON in my office in Albany, & he said it:' was correct, seeing the correction above made — "  Chancellor KENT'S MS. notes on the
firstfly-page of his copy of M'LEAN'S edition of The Fcederalist, now owned by his grandton, JAMES KENT, Esq., of Fishkill Landing, N. Y.
4 Copied from the original MS. notes in Mr. MADISON'S copy of TIEBoOT's edition of The
Frederalist, by WILLIAM Q. FORCE, for his father, General PETER FORCE, of Washington,
D.C. 
5 Vide ~Iter of BENJAMIN RUSH, Esq., ante, pages xxxix to xlv.
6 Copied from the original MS. notes in Mr. AMEs's copy of M'LEAN's edition of The
Pasderalist, now owned by his grandson-in-law, FRANCIS HOWLAND, Esq., of Englewood,
N. J.
7 " Memr I have no doubt Mr JAY wrote No 64 on the Treaty Power —He made a
" peech on that Subject in the N Y Convention, & I am told he says he wrote it —I;suspect therefore from internal Ev. the above to be the correct List, & not the one on
"the opposide Page —"  Chancellor KENT'S MS. notes, appended to this list, and in his
copy of The Foederalist, before referred to, inserted immediately opposite to the memorandum approved by General HAMILTON and copied into Note l.
8 From the original MS. notes in Mr. J!;FF ERSN'S copy of M'LEAN's edition of The Fatderalist, now in the Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.
9 From the understanding in Mr. JAY's family, from Chancellor KENT'S MS. notes, and
from the biographical sketch of Mr. JlY's life in D2LAPLAINEx' Repository of the Lives and.Portraits of Distinguished American Characters.




Authorship of The'Fawderalis.                                     Iv
~ _
U  j:Q g                 g P-;:.  _._. _
a         E C         s                 0
No.           No.
No.          No.
XII.         XII.  Ham.    Ham.    Ham.                    Ham.  Ham.
XIII.        XIII.  Ham.    Ham.    Ham.                    Ham.   Ham.
XIV.         XIV.  Mad.        Mad.      Mad.  Mad.    Mad.   Mad.
X V.         XV.  Ham.    Ham.    Ham.                     Ham.   Ham.
XVI.         XVI.  Ham.    Ham.    Ham.                     Ham.  Ham.
XVII.        XVII.  Ham.    Ham.    Ham.                     Mad.   Mad.
XVIII.       XVIII.  H. & M. H. & M. Mad.  H. & M. Mad.   Mad.
XIX.         XIX.  H. & M. H. &,I. Mad.  H  & M. Mad.   Mad.
XX.          XX.  H. & M. H. & M. Mlad.  H. & M. Ham.  Ham.
XXI.         XXI.  Ham.    Ham.  Itam.                      Mad.   Mad.
XXII.        XXII.  Ham.   Iam.    Ham.                      Ham.  Ham.
XXIII.       XXIII.  Ham.   I Ham.    Ham.                    Ham.  Ham.
XXIV.        XXIV.  Ham.    1am.    Ham.                      1am.  Ham.
XXV.         XXV.  Ham.    Ha           m.          Ham.             Ham.
XX\'.        XXVI.   Ham.    Ham.            am.              Ham.   Ham.
XXVIT.       XXVII.  Ham.    Ham.    HIam.                     Ham.   Ham.
XXVIII.   XXVIII.  Ham.    Ham.    Ham.                         Ham.  Ham.
XX I X.       XXX.  Ham.    Ham.    Ham.                      Ham.  Ham.
XXX.        XXXI.  Ham.    Ham.    Ham.                      Ham.  Ham.
XXXI.    XXXII.  Ham.    Ham.    Ham.                         Ham.  Ham.
IXXXIII.  Ham.    Ham.    Ham.                     Ham.  Ham.
XXXII.    XXXIV.  Ham.    Ham.    Ham.                         Ham.  Ham.
XXXIII.       XXXV.  Ham.    Ham.    Ham.                       Ham.  Ham.
XXXIV.    XXXVI.  Ham.    Ham.    Ham.                         Ham.  Ham.
XXXV.        XXIX.  Ham.    Ham.    Ham.                      Ham.  Ham.
XXXVI.   XXXVII.  Mad.    Mad.               Mad.  Mad.    Mad.   Mad.
XXXVII.  XXXVIII.  Mad.    Mad.               Mad.  Mad.    Mad.   Mad.
XXXVIII.   XXXIX.  Mad.    Mad.    Mad.  Mad.    Mad.   Mad.
XXXIX.            XL.  Mad.    Mad.    Mad.  Mad.    Mad.   Mad.
XL.         XLI.  Mad.    Mad.    Mad.  Mad.    Mad.   Mad.
XLI         XLII.  Mad.        Mad.    Mad.  Mad.    Mad.   Mad.
XLII.       XLIII.  Mad.    Mad.    Mad.  Mad.    Mad.   Mad.
XLIII.       XLIV.  Mad.    Mad.    Mad.  Mad.               Mad.   Mad.
XLIV.         XLV.  Mad.        Mad.    Mad.  Mad.           Mad.   Mad.
XLV.        XLVI.  Mad.        Mad.    Mad.  Mad.    Mad.   Mad.
XLVI        XLVII.  Mad.    Mad.    Mad.  Mad.    Mad.   Mad.
XLVII.    XLVIII.  Mad.    Mad.    Mad.  Mad.    Mad.   Mad.
XLVIII.       XLIX.  Ham.    Mad.    Mad.                      Mad.   Mad.
XLIX.            L.  Ham.    Ham.    Mad.                    Mad.   Mad.
L.          LI.  Ham.    Ham.    Mad.                    Mad.   Mad.
LI.         LII.  Ham.    Ham.    Mad.                   Mad.   Mad.
LTI.        LIII.  Ham.    Mad.         Mad.               Mad.   Mad.
LIII.        LIV.  Jdy         Ham.    Mad.  Jly            Mad.   Mad.
LIV.          LV.  Ham.    Ham.    Mad.                    Mad.   Mad.
LV.         LVI.  Ham.    Ham.    Mad.                    Mad.   Mad.
LVI.        LVII.  Ham.    Ham.    Mad.                    Mad.   Mad.
LVII.       LVIII.  Ham.    Ham.    Mad.                    Mad.   Mad.
LTII.         LIXI.  Ham.    Ham.    Ham.                    Ham.  Ham.
LIX.          LX.  Ham.    Ham.    Ham.                    Ham.  Ham.
LX.-        LXI.  Ham.    Ham.    Ham.                    Ham.  Ham.
LXI.        LXII.  Ham.    Ham.    Mad                     Mad.  I Mad.
LXII.       LXIII.  Ham.     Iam.    Mad.                   Mad.  I Mad.
LXIII.       LXIV.  Ham.    J y            JAy               J&y      JAy       J
LXIV          LXV.  Ham.    HIam.    Ham.                    Ham.  Ham.
LXV.        LXVI.  Ham.    Ham.    Ham.                     Ham.  Ham.
LXVI.       LXVII.  Ham.    Ham.    Ham.                     Ham.  Ham.
LXVII.       LXVIII.  Ham.    Ham.    Ham.                    Ham.  Ham.
LXVIII.        LXIX.  Ham.    Ham.    Ham                      Ham.  Ham.
LXIX.         LXX.  Ham.    Ham.    Ham.                     Ham.  Ham.
LX.         LXXI.  Ham.    Ha             Ham.              Ham.  Ham.




Ivi              AAuthorshtp of The Fwderalist.
_ -.....      _.
P                                                  
LXXIV.    LXXV.  Ham.   Ham.    Ham.                    Ham., Eam.
No.        No:X....
LXXI.   LXXVII.  Ham.   Ham.   Ham.                     Ham. Ham.
LXXVXII.   LXXVIII.  Ham.    Ham.    Ham.                 Ham. Ham.
LXXIX       LXXI.  Ham.    Ham.    Ham.                  Ham. Ham.
LXXX.    LXXX.  Ham.   Ham.   Ham.                      Ham. Ham.
LXXXI.   LXXXI.  Ham.   Ha m. Ham.                         am   Ham.
LXXXII.  LXXVII.  Ham.    Ham.    Ham.                   Ham. Ham.
LXXVIII. LXXVIII.  Ham.   Ham.    Ham.                     Ham. Ham.
LXXXIV.  LXXXIV.  Ham.    Ham.    Ham.                    Ham. Ham.
LXXXV.    LXXXV.I Ham. aam.    Ham.                      1am. Ham.
LXXXII I    1.~~~
LXXII.  LXXIII.~~~ Ha n.Hm    a.                  a.H




For the Independent Journal.
THE F4EDERALIST. No. I.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy
of the subsisting Faederal Government, you are
called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the
United States of America. The subject speaks its own
importance; comprehending in its consequences, noth.
ing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety
and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the
fate of an empire, in many respects, the most interesting
in the world. It has been frequently remarked, that it
seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable
or not, of establishing good government from reflection
and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend, for their. political constitutions, on accident and
force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis, at
which we are arrived, may with propriety be regarded
as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a
wrong election of the part we shall act, may, in this
view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune:
of mankind.
This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy
to those of patriotism to heighten the solicitude, which
all considerate and good men must feel for the event
Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a
VOL. I.         1




2                 The Fwderalist.
judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed
and unbiased by considerations not connected with the
public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be
wished, than seriously to be expected.  The plan offered to our deliberations, affects too many particular
interests, innovates upon too many local institutions,
not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of views, passions and prejudices little favorable to the discovery of truth.
Among the most formidable of the obstacles which
the new Constitution will have to encounter, may readily be distinguished the obvious interest of a certain
class of men in every State to resist all changes which
may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument and
consequence of the offices they hold under the Stateestablishments -and the perverted ambition of another
class of men, who will either hope to aggrandize themselves by the confusions of their country, or will flatter
themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the
subdivision of the empire into several partial confederacies, than from its union under one Government.
It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this nature. I am well aware that it would be
disingenuous to resolve indiscriminately the opposition
of any set of men (merely because their situations might
subject them to suspicion) into interested or ambitious
views: Candor will oblige us to admit, that even such
men may be actuated by upright intentions; and it cannot be doubted, that much of the opposition which has
made its appearance, or may hereafter make its appear.
ance, will spring from sources, blameless at least, if not
respectable; the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed
and so powerful are the causes, which serve to give a
false bias to the judgment, that we, upon- many occasions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as




The Fcsderalist.                3
on the right side of questions, of the first magnitude to
society. This circumstance, if duly attended to, would
furnish a lesson of moderation to those, who are ever so
much persuaded of their being in the right, in any controversy. And a further reason for caution, in this respect, might be drawn from the reflection, that we are
not always sure, that those who advocate the truth are
influenced by purer principles than their antagonists.
Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition,
and many other motives, not more laudable than these,
are apt to operate as well upon those who support, as
upon those who oppose, the right side of a question.
Were there not even these inducements to moderation,
nothing could be more ill-judged than that intolerant
spirit, which has, at all times, characterized political
parties. For, in politics as in religion, it is equally
absurd to aim at making proselytes by fire and sword.
Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution.
And yet however just these sentiments will be
allowed to be, we have already sufficient indications,
that it will happen in this as in all former cases of great
national discussion. A torrent of angry and malignant
passions will be let loose. To judge from the conduct
of the opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude, that
they will mutually hope to evince the justness of their
opinidns, and to increase the number of their converts
by the loudness of their declamations, and the bitterness
of their invectives. An enlightened zeal for the energy
and efficiency of government will be stigmatized, as the
offspring of a temper fond of despotic power, and
hostile to the principles of liberty. An over scrupulous
jealousy of danger to the rights of the people, which is
more commonly the fault of the head than of the heart,
will be represented as mere pretence and artifice; the
stale bait for popularity at the expense of public good.
It will be forgotten, on the one hand. that jealousy is




4                The Fcederalist.
the usual concomitant of violent love, and that the
noble enthusiasm of liberty is too apt to be infected
with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust. On the
other hand, it will be equally forgotten, that the vigor
of Government is essential to the security of liberty;
that, in the contemplation of a sound and well-informed
judgment, their interest can never be separated; and
that a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the
specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people, than
under the forbidding appearance of zeal for the firmness
and efficiency of Government. History will teach us,
that the former has been found a much more certain
road to the introduction of despotism, than the latter;
and that of those men who have overturned the liberties
of republics the greatest number have begun their career,
by paying an obsequious court to the people; commencing Demagogues, and ending Tyrants.
In the course of the preceding observations I have
had an eye, my Fellow-Citizens,:.*o putting you upon
your guard against all attempts, from whatever quarter,
to influence your decision in a matter of the utmost
moment to your welfare by any impressions other than
those which may result from the evidence of truth. You
will, no doubt, at the same time, have collected from the
general scope of them that they proceed from a source
not unfriendly to the new  Constitution.  Yes, my
Countrymen, I own to you, that, after having given it
an attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion, it is
your interest to adopt it. I am convinced, that this is
the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your
happiness I affect not reserves, which I do not feel.'I
will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation,
when I have decided. I frankly acknowledge to you
my convictions, and I will freely lay before you the
reasons on which they are founded. The consciousness
of:good intentions disdains ambiguity.  I shall not




The Faederalist.                 9
nowever multiply professions on this head. My motives
must remain in the depository of my own breast: My
arguments will be open to all, and may be judged of by
all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit which will
not disgrace the cause of truth.
I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following interesting particulars. - The utility of the UNION
to your political prosperity- The insufficiency of the
present Confederation to preserve that Union -  The
necessity of a Government at least equally energetic with
the one proposed, to the attainment of this object — The
conformity of the proposed Constitution to the true principles of republican Government-Its analogy to your
own state constitution — and lastly, The additional security, which its adoption will afford to the preservation
of that species of Government, to liberty, and to property.
In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to
give a satisfactory answer to all the objections which
shall have made their appearance, that may seem to
have any claim to your attention.
It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to prove the utility of the UNION, a point, no
doubt, deeply engraved on the hearts of the great body
of the people in every State, and one, which it may be
imagined, has no adversaries. But the fact is, that we
already hear it whispered in the private circles of those
who oppose the new Constitution, that the Thirteen
States are of too great extent for any general system,
and that we must of necessity, resort to separate confederacies of distinct portions of the whole.* This doctrine will, in all probability, be gradually propagated,
till it has votaries enough to countenance an open
avowal of it. For nothing can be more evident, toc
* The same idea, tracing the ar- lications against the new Consti.
guments to their consequences, is tution.- Publius.
held out in several of the late pub



6                 TlTe Fexderalist.
those who are able to take an enlarged view of the
subject, than the alternative of an adoption of the new
Constitution or a dismemberment of the Union.  It
will, therefore, be of use to begin by examining the
advantages of that Union, the certain evils, and the
probable dangers, to which every State will be exposed
from its dissolution. This shall accordingly constitute
the subject of my next address.
PUBLIUS.
For the Independent Journal.
THE FCEDERALIST. No. II.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YoaR:
WVHEN.the people of America reflect that they are
now called upon to decide a question, which, in its
consequences, must prove one of the most important,
that ever engaged their attention, the propriety of their
taking a very comprehensive, as well as a very serious,
view of it, will be evident.
Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of Government, and it is equally undeniable, that
whenever and however it is instituted, the people must
cede to it some of their natural rights, in order to vest it
with requisite powers. It is well worthy of consideration, therefore, whether it would conduce more to the
interest of the people of America, that they should, to
all general purposes, be one nation, under one Fcederal
Government, or that they should divide themselves into
separate confederacies, and give to the head of each, the
same kind of powers which they are advised to place in
one national Government.




The Faderalist.               7
It has until lately been a received and uncontradicted
opinion, that the prosperity of the people of America
depended on their continuing firmly united, and the
wishes, prayers, and efforts of our best and wisest Citizens have been constantly directed to that object. But
Politicians now appear, who insist that this opinion is
erroneous, and that instead of looking for safety and
happiness in union, we ought to seek it in a division of
the States into distinct confederacies or sovereignties.
However extraordinary this new doctrine may appear, it
nevertheless has its advocates; and certain characters
who were much opposed to it formerly, are at present
of the number.  Whatever may be the arguments or
inducements which have wrought this change in the
sentiments and declarations of these Gentlemen, it certainly would not be wise in the people at large to adopt
these new political tenets without being fully convinced
that they are founded in truth and sound Policy.
It, has often given me pleasure to observe, that Independent America was not composed of detached and
distant territories, but that one connected, fertile, widespreading country was the portion of our western sons of
liberty. Providence has in a particular manner blessed
it with a variety of soils and productions, and watered
it with innumerable streams, for the delight and accommodation of its inhabitants. A succession of navigable
waters forms a kind of chain round its borders, as if to
bind it together; while the most noble rivers in the
world, running at convenient distances, present them
with highways for the easy communication of friendly
aids, and the mutual transportation and exchange of
their various commodities.
With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice, that'irovidence has been pleased to give this one connected
country, to one united people; a people descended from
the same ancestors, speaking the same language, pro.




8                The Fwderalist.
fessing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners
and customs, and who, by their joint counsels, arms
and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long and
bloody war, have nobly established their general Liberty
and Independence.
This country and this people seem to have been made
for each other, and it appears as if it was the design
of Providence, that an inheritance so proper and convenient for a band of brethren, united to each other by
the strongest ties, should never be split into a number
of unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties.
Similar sentiments have hitherto prevailed among all
orders and denominations of men among us. To all
general purposes we have uniformly been one people;
each individual citizen everywhere enjoying the same
national rights, privileges, and protection. As a nation
we have made peace and war: as a nation we have
vanquished our common enemies: as a nation we have
formed alliances and made treaties, and entered into
various compacts and conventions with foreign States.
A strong sense of the value and blessings of Union
induced the people, at a very early period, to institute
a Fcederal Government to preserve and perpetuate it.
They formed it almost as soon as they had a political
existence; nay, at a time, when their habitations were
in flames, when many of their Citizens were bleeding,
and when the progress of hostility and desolation left
little room for those calm and mature inquiries and
reflections, which must ever precede the formation of a
wise and well-balanced government for a free people.
It is not to be wondered at, that a Government insti.
tuted in times so inauspicious, should on experiment be
found greatly deficient and inadequate to the purpose it
was intended to answer.
This intelligent people perceived and regretted these




The Federalist.              9
defects. Still continuing no less attached to Union, thar
enamored of Liberty, they observed the danger, which
immediately threatened the former and more'remotely
the latter; and being persuaded that ample security foi
both, could only be found in a national Government
more wisely framed, they, as with one voice, convened
the late Convention at Philadelphia, to take that important subject under consideration.
This Convention, composed of men who possessed
the confidence of the people, and many of whom had
become highly distinguished by their patriotism, virtue,
and wisdom, in times which tried the minds and hearts
of men, undertook the arduous task. In the mild season of peace, with minds unoccupied by other subjects,
they passed many months in cool, uninterrupted, and
daily consultations; and finally, without having been
awed by power, or influenced by any passions except
love for their Country, they presented and recommended
to the people the plan produced by their joint and very
unanimous councils.
Admit, for so is the fact, that this plan is only reconmmenaded, not imposed, yet let it be remembered, that it
is neither recommended to blind appr6batiop, nor to
bMud reprobation; but to that sedate and candid consideration, which the magnitude and importance of the
subject demand, and which it certainly ought to receive.
But this, (as was remarked in the foregoing number of
this Paper,) is more to be wished than expected, that it
may be so considered and examined. Experience on a
former occasion teaches us not to be too sanguine in
such hopes. It is not yet forgotten, that well grounded
apprehensions.of imminent danger induced the people
of America to form the Memorable Congress of 1774.
That Body recommrended certain measures to their ConBtituents, and the event proved their wisdom; yet it is
fresh in our memories how soon the Press began te




10               The Federalist.
teem with Pamphlets and weekly Papers against those
very measures. Not only many of the Officers of Government; who obeyed the dictates of personal interest,
but others, from a mistaken estimate of consequences,
or the undue influence of former attachments, or whose
ambition aimed at objects which did not correspond
with the public good, were indefatigable in their endeavors to persuade the people to reject the advice of
that Patriotic Congress. Many indeed were deceived
and deluded, but the great majority of the people reasoned and decided judiciously; and happy they are in
reflecting that they did so.
They considered that the Congress was composed of
many wise and experienced men. That being convened from different parts of the country, they brought
with them and communicated to each other a variety
of useful information. That in the course of the time
they passed together in inquiring into and discussing
the true interests of their country, they must have acquired very accurate knowledge on that head. That
they were individually interested in the public liberty
and prosperity, and therefore that it was not less their
inclinatiqn than their duty, to recommend only such
measures as after the most mature deliberation they
really thought prudent and advisable.
These and similar considerations then induced the
people to rely greatly on the judgment and integrity of
the Congress; and they took their advice, notwithstanding the various arts and endeavors used to deter and
dissuade them from it. But if the people at large had
reason to confide in the men of that Congress, few of
whom had then been fully tried or generally known, still
greater reason have they now to respect the judgment
and advice of the Convention, for it is well known that
some of -the most distinguished members of that Congress, who have been since tried and justly approved for




The Fwederalist.             11
patriotism and abilities, and who have grown old in
acquiring political information, were also members of
this Convention, and carried into it their accumulated
knowledge and experience.
It is worthy of remark, that not only the first, but
every succeeding Congress, as well as the late Convention, have invariably joined with the people in thinking
that the prosperity of America depended on its Union.
To preserve and perpetuate it, was the great object of
the people in forming that Convention, and it is also the
great object of the plan which the Convention has advised them to adopt. With what propriety, therefore,
or for what good purposes, are attempts at this particular period, made by some men, to depreciate the importance of the Union? Or why is it suggested that
three or four confederacies would be better than one?
I am persuaded in my own mind, that the people have
always thought right on this subject, and that their universal and uniform attachment to the cause of the Union
rests on great and weighty reasons, which I shall endeavor to develop and explain in some ensuing papers.
They who promote the idea of substituting a number
of distinct confederacies in the room of the plan of the
Convention, seem clearly to foresee that the rejection of
it would put the continuance of the Union in the utmost
jeopardy: that certainly would be the case, and I sinccrety wish that it may be as clearly foreseen by every
good Citizen, that whenever the dissolution of the
Union. arrives, America will have reason to exclaim in
the words of the Poet, " FAREWELL! A LONG FAREWELL,
TO ALL MY GREATNESS?.'
PUBLIUS.




12                The Fwderalist.
For the Independent Journal.
THE FCEDERALIST. No. III.
rO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
IT is not a new observation that the people of any
country (if, like the Americans, intelligent and wellinformed,) seldom adopt, and steadily persevere for
many years in, an erroneous opinion respecting their
interests. That consideration naturally tends to create
great respect for.the high opinion which the people of
America have so lorng and uniformly entertained of the
importance of their continuing firmly united under one
Fcederal Government, vested with sufficient powers for
all general and national purposes.
The more attentively I consider and investigate the
reasons which appear to have given birth to this opinion, the more I become convinced that they are cogent
and conclusive.
Among the many objects to which a wise and free
people find it necessary to direct their -attention, that of
providing for their safety seems to be the first. The
safety of the people doubtless has relation to a- great
variety of circumstances and considerations, and consequently affords great latitude to those who wish to
define it precisely and comprehensively.
At present I mean only to consider it as it respects
security for the preservation of peace and tranquillity,
as well against dangers from foreign anrs and injwfence,
as from dangers of the like kind arising from domestic causes. As the former of these comes first in order,
it is proper it should be the first discussed.  Let us
therefore proceed to examine whether the people are not
right in their opinion, that a cordial Union under an




The Fwoderalist.              13
efficient national Government, affords them the best
security that can be devised against hostilities from
abroad.
T'.e- number of wars which have happened or will
hlmi n in the world, will. always be found to be in pro..portion to the number and weight of the causes, whether
F'ea!ik (i.ret juted, which provoke or invite them. If this
rcmarh be just, it beornes useful to inquire, whether
so mains just caueses oi'war are likely to be given by
Vcimted America  is by disunited America; for if it
should turn out that U1lited America will probably give
the fewest, then it will tiLlow, that ii this respect'; the
Union tenids most to preserve the people in a state ofpeace with: other ii2tions.
The just causes of war fbor the most part arise either
from  violations of treaties, or from  direct vioienmc.
America has already formed tret+ies w..th no less than
six foreign nations, and all of them, (x i;pt PvrussLa, are
maritime, and therefore able to annoy..... i 1ijire us:
She has also extensive commerce with Portug'-il Spain,
and Britain, and, with respect to the two. latter, Phi. an
addition, the circumstance of neighborhood to atind,.
It is of high importance to the peace of America, that
she observe the laws of nations towards all these Poweps, and to me it appears evident that this will be more
perfectly and punctually done by one national Government than it could be either by thirteen separate States,
or by three or four distinct confederacies.
Because when once an efficient national Government
is established, the best men in the country will not only
consent to serve, but also will generally be appointed to
manage it; for although town or country, or other con.
tracted influence, may place men in State assemblies, or
senates, or courts of justice, or executive departments;
yet more general and extensive reputation for talents
and other qualifications will be necessary to recommend




14                The F'ader.,list.
men to offices under the national Government, - especially, as it will have the widest field for choice, and
never experience that want of proper persons which is
not uncommon in some of the States. Hence it will
result, that the administration, the political counsels, and
the judicial decisions of the national Government, will
be more wise, systematical, and judicious, than those off
individual States, and consequently more satisfactory
with respect to other nations, as well as moae safe
with respect to us.
Because, under the national Gowernment, treaties and
articles of treaties; as well as~ Yie laws of nations, will
always be expounded "in one sense, and executed in
the same manner,- whereas adjudications on the same
points and questions, in thirteen States, or in three or
foiar 6nfederacies, will not always accord or be consistent; and that, as well front the variety of independent courts and judges appointed by different and
independent Governments, as from the different local
laws and interests which may affect and influence them.
The wisdom.of the Convention, in committing such
questions to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by, and, responsible only -to, one national Government, cannot be too much commended.
Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may
often tempt the governing party in one or two States to
swerve from good faith and justice; but those temptations not reaching the other States, and consequently
having little or no influence on the national Government,
the temptation will be fruitless, and good faith and justice be preserved. The case of the treaty of peace with
Britain adds great weight to this reasoning.
Because even if the governing party in a State should
be disposed to resist such temptations, ye. as such temptations may, and commonly do, result front circumstances peculiar to the State, and may affect a great




The Fwderalist.              15
number of the inhabitants, the governing party may not
always be able, if willing, to prevent the injustice meditated, or to punish the aggressors.  But the national
Government, not being affected by those local circumstances, will neither be induced to commit the wrong
themselves, nor want power or inclination to prevent,
or punish its commission by others.
So far therefore as either designed or accidental vio.
lations of treaties and the laws of nations afford just
causes of war, they are less to be apprehended under
one general Government, than under several lesser ones,
and in that respect, the former most favors the safety
of the people.
As to those just causes of war which proceed from
direct and unlawful violence, it appears equally clear to
me, that one good national Government affords vastly
more security against dangers of that sort than can be
derived from any other quarter.
Because such violences are more frequently caused by
the passions and interests of a part than of the whole;
of one or two States than of the Union. Not a single
Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions of
the present Fcederal -Government, feeble as it is; but
there are several instances of Indian hostilities having
been provoked by the improper conduct of individual
States, who, either unable or unwilling to restrain or
punish offences, have given occasion to the slaughter of
many innocent inhabitants.
The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories,
bordering on some States, and not on others, naturally
confines the causes of quarrel more immediately to the
borderers. The bordering States, if any, will be those
who, under the impulse of sudden irritation, and a quick
sense of apparent interest or injury, will be most likely,
oy direct violence, to excite war with those nations; and
nothing can so effectually obviate that danger, as a na



16                The PFwderalist.
tional Government, whose wisdom  and prudence will
not be diminished by the passions which actuate the
parties immediately interested.
But not only fewer just causes of war will be given
by the national Government, but it will also be more in
their power to accommodate and settle them amicably.
They will be more temperate and cool, and in that respect, as well as in others, will be more in capacity to
act advisedly than the offending State. The pride of
States, as well as of men, naturally disposes them to
justify all their actions, and opposes their acknowledging, correcting, or repairing their errors and offences.
The national Government, in such cases, will not be affected by this pride, but will proceed with moderation
and candor to consider and decide on the means most
proper to extricate them from the difficulties which
threaten them.
Besides it is well known that acknowledgments,
explanations, and compensations are often accepted as
satisfactory from a strong united nation, which would
be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered by a State or
Confederacy of little consideration or power.In the year 1685, the State of Genoa having offended
Louis XIV., endeavored to appease him. -He demanded that they should send their Doge, or chief magistrate, accompanied by four of their Senators, to France,
to ask his pardon and receive his terms. They were
obliged to submit to it for the sake of peace. Would
he on any occasion-either have demanded, or have received, the like humiliation from Spain, or Britain, or
any other powerful nation?
PUBLIUS.




The IFederalist.             17
For the Independent Journal.
THE FREDERALIST. No. IV.
TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
MY  last Paper assigned several reasons why the
safety of the people would be best secured by
Union, against the danger it may be exposed to by just
Causes of war given to other nations; and those rea-:sons show that such causes would not only be more
rarely given, but would also be more easily accommodated by a national Government, than either by the
State Governments, or the proposed little Confederacies.
But the safety of the People of America against dangers from foreign force, depends not only on their forbearing to give just causes of,war to other nations, but
also on their placing and continuing themselves in such
a situation as not to invite hostility or insult; for it need
not be observed, that there are pretended as well as just
causes of war.
It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human
nature, that nations in general will make war whenever
they have a prospect of getting anything by it; nay,
that absolute monarchs will often make war when their
nations are to get nothing by it, but for purposes and
objects merely personal, such as a thirst for military
glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private
compacts to aggrandize or support their particular families, or partisans.  These, and a variety of motives,
which affect only the mind of the Sovereign, often lead
him to engage in wars not sanctified by justice, or the
voice and interests of his people. But, independent of
these inducements to war, which are more prevalent in
VOL. I.      2




18               The Fawderalist.
absolute monarchies, but which well deserve our attention, there are others which affect nations as often as
Kings; and some of them will on examination be found
to.grow out of our relative situation and circumstances.
With France and with Britain, we are rivals in the
fisheries, and can supply their markets cheaper than
they can themselves, notwithstanding any efforts to prevent it by bounties on their own, or duties on foreign
fish.
With them and with most other European nations,
we are rivals in navigation and the carrying trade; and
we shall deceive ourselves, if we suppose that any of
them will rejoice to see it flourish: for as our carrying
trade cannot increase, without in some degree diminishing theirs, it is more their interest, and will be more
their policy, to restrain, than to promote it.
In the trade to China and India, we interfere with
more than one nation, inasmuch as it enables us to
partake in advantages which they had in a manner
monopolized, and as we thereby supply ourselves with
commodities which we used to purchase from them.
The extension of our own commerce in our own vessels, cannot give pleasure to any nations who possess
territories on or near this Continent, because the cheapness and excellence of our productions, added to the
circumstance of vicinity, and the enterprise and address
of our merchants and navigators, will give us a greater
share in the advantages which those territories afford,
than consists with the wishes or policy of their respec.
tive Sovereigns.
Spain thinks it convenient to shut the Mississippi
against us on the one side, and Britain excludes us
from the Saint Lawrence on the other; nor will either
of them permit the other waters, which are between
them and us, to become the means of mutual intercourse and traffic.




The Faderalist.              19
From these and such like considerations, which might,
if consistent with prudence, be more amplified and de
tailed, it is easy to see that jealousies and uneasinesses
may gradually slide into the minds and cabinets of other
nations; and that we are not to expect they should
regard our advancement in union, in power and consequence by land and by sea, with an eye of indifference
and composure.
The People of America are aware that inducements
to war may arise out of these circumstances, as well as
from others not so obvious at present; and that whenever such inducements may find fit time and opportunity for operation, pretences to color and justify them
will not be wanting. Wisely therefore do they consider
Union and a good national Government as necessary to
put and keep them in such a situation, as, instead of inviting war, will tend to repress and discourage it. That
situation consists in the best possible state of defence,
and necessarily depends on the Government, the arms
and the resources of the country.
As the safety of the whole is the interest of the
whole, and cannot be provided for without Government,
either one or more or many, let us inquire whether onpe
good Government is not, relative to the object in quiestion, more competent than any other given number
whatever.
One Government can collect and avail itself of the
talents and experience of the ablest men, in whatever
part of the Union they may be found. It can move on
uniform principles of policy. It can harmonize, assimilate, and protect the several parts and members, and extend the benefit of its foresight and precautions to each.
In the formation of treaties it will regard the interest of
the whole, and the particular interests of the parts as
Connected with that of the whole. It can apply the
tesources and power of the whole to the defence of any




20'The Ftaderatlst.
particular part, and that more easily and expeditiously
than State Governments, or separate confederacies can
possibly do, for want of concert and unity of system.
It can place the militia under one plan of discipline,
and, by putting their officers in a proper line of subordination to the Chief Magistrate, will, as it were, consolidate them into one corps, and thereby render them more
efficient than if divided into thirteen or into three or
four distinct independent bodies.
What would the militia of Britain be, if the English militia obeyed the Government of England, if the
Scotch militia obeyed the Government of Scotland, and
if the Welch militia obeyed the Government of Wales?
Suppose an invasion: would those three Governments
(if they agreed at all) be able with all their respective
forces, to operate against the enemy so effectually as the
single Government of Great Britain would-?
We have heard much of the fleets of Britain, and the
time may come, if we are wise, when the fleets of
America may engage attention. But if one national
Government had not so regulated the navigation of
Britain as to make it a nursery for seamen -if one national Government had not called forth all the national
means and materials for forming fleets, their. prowess
and their thunder would never have been celebrated.
Let England have its navigation and fleet - Let Scotland have its navigation and fleet - Let Wales have its
navigation and fleet- Let Ireland have its navigation
and fleet - Let those four of the constituent parts of
the British empire be under four independent Governments, and it is easy to perceive how soon they would
each dwindle into comparative insignificance.
Apply these facts to our own case. Leave America
divided into thirteen, or if you please into three or four
independent Governments, what armies could they raise
and pay, what fleets could they ever hope to have?  If




The FPrderahlst.            21
one was attacked, would the others fly to its succor, and
spend their blood and money in its defence? Would.
there be no danger of their being flattered into neutrality by specious promises, or seduced by a too great
fondness for peace to decline hazarding their tranquillity
and present safety for the sake of neighbors, of whom
perhaps they have been jealous, and whose importance
they are content to see diminished?  Although such
conduct would not be wise, it would nevertheless be
natural. The history of the States of Greece, and of
other Countries, abounds with such instances; and it is
not improbable, that what has so often happened would,
under similar circumstances, happen again.
But admit that they might be willing to help the
invaded State or Confederacy. How, and when, and
in what proportion shall aids of men and money be
afforded? Who shall command the allied armies, and
from which of them shall he receive his orders? Who
shall settle the terms of peace, and in case of disputes
what umpire shall decide between them, and compel'
acquiescence? Various difficulties and inconveniences
would be inseparable from such a situation; whereas
one Government, watching over the general and common interests, and combining and directing the powers
and resources of the whole, would be free from all these
embarrassments, and conduce far more to the safety of
the people.
But whatever may be our situation, whether firmly
united under one national Government, or split into a
number of confederacies, certain it is, that foreign nations will know and view it exactly as it is; and they
will act towards us accordingly. If they see that our
national Government is efficient and well administered
- our trade prudently regulated - our militia properly
organized and disciplined — our resources and finances
Tiscreetly managed - our credit reestablished —ow




22               The FWderalist.
people free, contented, and united, they will be much
more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke
our resentment. If, on the other hand, they find us either
destitute of an effectual Government, (each State doing
right or wrong, as to its rulers may seem convenient,)
or split into three or four independent and probably
discordant republics or confederacies, one inclining to
Britain, another to France, and a third to Spain, and
perhaps played off against each other by the three, what
a poor, pitiful figure will America make in their eyes!
How liable would she become not only to their con.
tempt, but to their outrage; and how soon would dearbought experience proclaim that when a people or family
so divide, it never fails to be against themselves.
PUBLIUS.
For the Independent Journal.
THE FCEDERALIST. No. V.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:.
UEEN ANNE, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706,
to the Scotch Parliament, makes some observations
on the importance of the Union then forming between
England and Scotland, which merit; our attention. I
shall present the public with one or two extracts from it.
"s An entire and perfect Union will be the solid founda" tion of lasting peace: It will secure your religion, lib.
"erty, and property, remove the animosities amongst
"4 yourselves, and the jealousies and differences betwixt
"our two kingdoms. It must increase your strength,
" riches, and trade; and by this Union the whole Island,
"being joined in affection and free from all apprehen



The Foderalist. d23
"sions of different interest, will be enabled to resist all
"its enemies." " We most earnestly recommend to you
"calmness and unanimity in this great and weighty
"affair, that the Union may be brought to a happy con"clusion, being the only effectual way to secure our
"present and future happiness; and disappoint the de"signs of our and your enemies, who will doubtless, on
"this occasion, use their utmost endeavors to prevent or
" delay this Union."
It was remarked in the preceding Paper, that weakness and divisions at home would invite dangers from
abroad; and that nothing would tend more to secure us
from them than Union, strength, and good Government
within ourselves. This subject is copious and cannot
easily be exhausted.
The history of Great Britain is the one with which
we are in general the best acquainted, and it gives us
many useful lessons.  We may profit by their experience, without paying the price which it cost them.
Although it seems obvious to common sense, that the
people of such an island should be but one nation, yet
we find that they were for ages divided into three, and
that those three were almost constantly embroiled in
quarrels and wars with one another. Notwithstanding
their true interest, with respect to the continental nations, was. really the same, yet by the arts and policy
and practices of those nations, their mutual jealousies
were perpetually kept inflamed, and for a long series
of years they were far more inconvenient and troublesome, than they were useful and assisting to each
other.
Should the People of America divide themselves into
three or four nations, would not the same thing happen?
Would not similar jealousies arise; and be in like man-.ier cherished?  Instead of their being "joined in af.'fection, and free from all apprehension of different




~24              The JFederaftst.
"interests," envy and jealousy would soon extinguish
confidence and affection, and the partial interests of
eaeh confederacy, instead of the general interests of all
America, would be the only objects of their policy and
pursuits.  Hence, like most other bordering- nations,
they would always be either involved in disputes and
war, or live in the constant apprehension of them.
The most sanguine advocates for three or four confederacies cannot reasonably suppose that they would
long remain exactly on an equal footing in point of
strength, even if it was possible to form them so at first:
but admitting that to be practicable, yet what human
contrivance can secure the continuance of such equality? Independent of those local circumstances which
tend to beget and increase power in one part, and to
impede its progress in another, we must advert to the
effects of that superior policy and good management
which would probably distinguish the Government of
one above the rest, and by which their relative equality
in strength and consideration, would be destroyed. For
it cannot be presumed that the same degree of sound
policy, prudence, and foresight, would uniformly be
observed by each of these confederacies, for a' long
succession of years.
Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen, and happen it would, that any one of these nations
or confederacies should rise on the scale of political importance. much above the degree of her neighbors, that
moment would those neighbors behold- her with envy
and with fear: Both those passions would lead them
to countenance, if not to promote, whatever might' promise to diminish her importance; and would also restrain
them from measures calculated to advance, or even to
secure her prosperity. Much time would not be neces.
sary to enable her to discern these -unfriendly dispositions. She would soon begin, not only to lose confidence




1ne rderalist.               2
in her neighbors, but also to feel a disposition equally
unfavorable to them: Distrust naturally creates distrust,
and by nothing is good-will and kind conduct more
speedily changed than by invidious jealousies and uncandid imputations, whether expressed or implied.
The North is generally the region of strength, and
many local circumstances render it probable, that the
most Northern of the proposed confederacies would,
at a period not very distant, be unquestionably more
formidable than any of the others. No sooner would
this become evident, than the Northern Hive would excite the same ideas and sensations in the more Southern
parts of America which it formerly did in the Southern
parts of Europe: Nor does it appear to be a rash conjecture, that its young swarms might often be tempted to gather honey in the more blooming fields and
milder air of their luxurious and more delicate neighbors.
They who well consider the history of similar divisions and confederacies, will find abundant reason to apprehend, that those in contemplation would in no other
sense be neighbors than as they would be borderers;
that they would neither love nor trust one another, but
on the contrary would be a prey to discord, jealousy, and
mutual injuries; in short, that they would place us ex?
actly in the situations in which some nations doubtless
wish to see us, viz. formidable only to each other.
From these considerations it appears that those Gentlemen are greatly mistaken who suppose that alliances
offensive and defensive might be formed between these
confederacies, and would produce that combination and
union of wills, of arms, and of resources, which would
be necessary to put and keep them in a formidable state
of defence against foreign enemies.
When did the independent States, into which Britain
and Spain were formerly divided, combine in such alli



26              lThe Fcederalist.
ances, or unite their forces against a foreign enemy?
The proposed confederacies will be distinct nations.
Each of them would have its commerce with foreigners
to regulate by distinct treaties; and as their productions
and commodities are different, and proper for different
markets, so would those treatie% be essentially different.
Different commercial concerns must create different interests, and of course different degrees of political attachment to, and connection with, different foreign nations.
Hence it might and probably would happen, that the
foreign nation with whom  the Southern confederacy
might be at war would be the one with whom the
Northern confederacy would be the most desirous of
preserving peace and friendship. An alliance so contrary to their immediate interest would not therefore be
easy to form, nor, if formed, would it be observed and
fulfilled with perfect good faith.
Nay it is far more probable that in America, as in
Europe, neighboring nations, acting under the impulse
of opposite interests and unfriendly passions, would frequently be found taking different sides.  Considering
our distance from Europe, it would be more natural for
these confederacies to apprehend danger from one anrother, than from distant nations, and therefore that each
of them should be more desirous to guard against the
others, by the aid of foreign alliances, than to guard
against foreign dangers by alliances between themselves.
And here let us not forget how much more east it is to
receive foreign fleets into our ports, and foreign armies
into our country, than it is to persuade or compel them
to depart. How many conquests did the Romans and
others make in the characters of allies, and what innovations did they, under the same character, introduce into
the Governments of those whom they pretended to
protect.:Let candid men judge, then, whether the division of




The Fcederalist.             27
America into any given number of independent sovereignties would tend to secure us against the hostilities
and improper interference of foreign nations.
PUBLIUS.
For the Independent Journal.
THE  FCEDERALIST.   No.'VI.
To THE PEOPLE OF CE STATE OF NEW YORK:
THE  three last numbers of this Paper have been
dedicated to an enumeration of the dangers to
which we should be exposed, in a state of disunion,
from the arms and arts of foreign nations. I shall now
proceed to delineate dangers of a different, and, perhaps,
still more alarming kind, those which will in all probability flow from dissensions between the States themselves, and from domestic factions and convulsions.
These have been already in sonie instances slightly anticipated; but they deserve a more particular and more
full investigation.
A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations,
who can seriously doubt that, if these States should
either be wholly disunited, or only united in partial confederacies, the subdivisions into which they might be
thrown would have frequent and violent contests with
each other. To presume a want of motives for such
contests, as an argument against their existence, would
be to forget that men are ambitious, vindictive, and
rapacious. To look for a continuation of harmony
between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties, situated in the same neighborhood, would
be to disregard the uniform course of human events,




U8                 ifte Fwderalist.
and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of
ages.
The causes of hostility among nations are innumera.
ble. There are some which have a general and almost
constant operation upon the collective bodies of society.
Of this description are the love of power, or the desire
of preeminence and dominion - the jealousy of power,
or the desire of equality and safety. There are others
which hate a~ more circumscribed, though an Squally
operative influence, within their spheres: Such are the
rivalships and competitions of commerce between comnrercial nations. And there are others, not less numerous than either of the former, which take their origin
entirely in private passions; in the attachments, enmities, interests, hopes, and fears of leading individuals in
the communities of which they are members. Men of
this clAss, whether the favorites of a king or of a people,
have in too many instances abused the confidence they
possessed; and assuming the pretext of some public
motive, have not scrupled to sacrifice the national tranquillity to personal advantage, or personal gratification.
The celebrated PERICLEs, in compliance with the resentment of a prostitute,* at the expense of much of
the blood and treasure of his countrymen, attacked,
vanquished, and destroyed the city of the Samnians.
The same man, stimulated by private pique against the
Megarensians,4 another nation of Greece, or to avoid a
prosecution with which he was threatened as an accom.
plice in a supposed theft of the statuary PHIDIAS,4 or to
get rid of the accusations prepared to be brought against
him for dissipating the funds of the State in the purchase of popularity,~ or from a combination of all these
* AsPAsIA, vide PLUTARCH'S Life have stolen some public gold with
Pf PERICLES. - Publius.   the connivance of PERICLES for the
t Ibid. - Publius.       embellishment of the statue of Mi
$ Ibid. - Publius.       nerva. - Publius.
~ Ibid. PHIDIAS was supposed to




The Fwderalist.              29
causes, was the primitive author of that famous and
fatal war, distinguished in the Grecian annals by the
name of the Peloponnesian war; which, after various
vicissitudes, intermissions, and renewals, terminated in
the ruin of the Athenian commonwealth.
The ambitious Cardinal, who was Prime Minister to
HENRY VIII., permitting his vanity to aspire to the
Triple Crown,* entertained hopes of succeeding in the
acquisition of that splendid prize by the influence of the
Emperor CHARLES V. To secure the favor and interest of this enterprising and powerful Monarch, he precipitated England into a war with France, contrary to
the plainest dictates of Policy, and at the hazard of the
safety and independence, as well of the Kingdom over
which he presided by his counsels, as of Europe in general. For if there ever was a Sovereign who bid fair to
realize the project of universal monarchy, it was the
Emperor CHARLES V., of whose intrigues WOLSEY was
at once the instrument and the dupe.
The influence which the bigotry of one female,t the
petulance of another,: and the cabals of a third,~ had in
the contemporary policy, ferments, and pacifications, of a
considerable part of Europe, are topics that have been
too often descanted upon not to be generally known.
To multiply examples of the agency of personal considerations in the production'of great national events,
either foreign or domestic, according to their direction,
would be an unnecessary waste of time. Those who
have but a superficial acquaintance with the sources
from which they are to be drawn, will themselves recollect a variety of instances; and those who have a tolerable knowledge of human nature, will not stand in
need of such lights, to form their opinion either of the
* Worn by the Popes. — Publius.  t Duchess of Marlborough. -
t Madame de Maintenon. —Pub- Publitus.
l..u...                   ~ Madame de Pompadour. -Publum.




30                The Faederalist.
reality or extent of that agency. Perhaps however a
reference, tending to illustrate the general principle, may
with propriety be made to a case which has lately happened among ourselves. If SHAYS had not been a desperate debtor, it is much to be doubted whether Massachusetts would have beei plunged into a civil war.
But notwithstanding the concurring testimony of
experience, in this particular, there are still to be found
visionary, or designing men, who stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual peace between the States,
though dismembered and alienated from each other.
The genius of republics (say they) is pacific; the spirit
of commerce has a tendency to soften the manners of
men, and to extinguish those inflammably humors which
have so often kindled into wars. Commercial republics,
like ours, will never be disposed to waste themselves in
ruinous contentions with each other. They will be governed by mutual interest, and will cultivate a spirit of
mutual amity and concord.
Is it not (we may ask these projectors in politics) the
true interest-of all nations to cultivate the same benevolent and philosophic spirit? If this be their true interest, have they in fact pursued it? Has it not, on the
contrary, invariably been found that momentary passions, and immediate interests, have a more active and
imperious control over human conduct than general or
remote considerations of policy, utility, or justice? Have
republics in practice been less addicted to war than
monarchies? Are not the former administered by men
as well as the latter? Are there not aversions, predilections, rivalships, and desires of unjust acquisitions, that
affect nations as well as kings-? Are not popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent
propensities? Is it not well known that their determinations are often governed by a few individuals in




The Federalist.               31
whom they place confidence, and are of course liable to
be tinctured by the passions and views of those individuals? Has commerce hitherto done anything more than
change the objects of war? Is not the love of wealth
as domineering and enterprising a passion as that of
power or glory?  Have there not been as many wars
founded upon commercial motives, since that has become the prevailing system of nations, as were- before
occasioned by the cupidity of territory or dominion?
Has not the spirit of commerce, in many instances, administered new incentives to the appetite, both for the
one and for the other? Let experience, the least fallible
guide of human opinions, be appealed to for an answer
to these inquiries.
Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage, were all Republics; two of them, Athens and Carthage, of the commercial kind. Yet were they as often engaged in wars,
offensive and defensive, as the neighboring Monarchies
of the same times. Sparta was little better than a wellregulated camp; and Rome was never sated of carnage
and conquest.
Carthage, though a commercial Republic, was the
aggressor in the very war that ended in her destruction.
HANNIBAL had carried her arms into the heart of Italy,
and to the gates of Rome, before SCIPIo, in turn, gave
him an overthrow in the territories of Carthage, and
made a conquest of the Commonwealth.
Venice, in latter times, figured more than once in wars
of ambition; till becoming an object of terror to the
other Italian States, Pope JULIus II. found means to accomplish that formidable league,* which gave a deadly
blow to the power and pride of this haughty Republic.
The Provinces of Holland, till they were overwhelmed
in debts and taxes, took a leading and conspicuous part
* The LjsaGUE OF CAMBRAY, gon, and most of the Italian Princes
comprehending the Emperor, the and States. —Publius.
King of France, the King of Ara



32               7The Fwderalist.
in the wars of Europe. They had furious contests with
England for the dominion of the sea; and were anlong
the moat persevering and most implacable of the oppo.
nents of Louis XIV.
In the Government of Britain the representatives of
the people compose one branch of the national legislature. Commerce has been for ages the predominant
pursuit- of that country.  Few  nations, nevertheless,
have been more frequently engaged in war; and the
wars in which that kingdom has been engaged have, in
numerous instances, proceeded from the people.
There have been, if I may so express it, almost as
many popular as royal wars. The cries of the nation
and the importunities of their representatives have,
upon various occasions, dragged their monarchs into
war, or continued them in it, contrary to their inclinations, and, sometimes, contrary to the real interests of
the State. In that memorable struggle for superiority,
between the rival Houses of Austria and Bourbonr, which
so long kept Europe in a flame, it is well known that
the antipathies of the English against the French, seconding the ambition, or rather the avarice of a favorite
leader,* protracted the war beyond the limits marked
out by sound policy, and for a considerable time in opposition to the views of the Court.
The wars of these two last-mentioned nations have
in a great measure grown out of commercial considerations, - the desire of supplanting, and the fear of being
supplanted, either-in particular branches of traffic, or in
the general advantages of trade and navigation.
From this summary of what has taken place in other
countries, whose situations have borne the nearest resemblance to our own, what reason can we have to
confide in those reveries, which would seduce us into
an expectation of peace and cordiality between the
members of the present confederacy, in A state of sep* The Duke of Marlborough. - Pubs.




The Fwderalist.              3I
aration? Have we not already seen enough of the
fallacy and extravagance of those idle theories which
have amused us with promises of an exemption from
the imperfections, weaknesses, and evils incident to
society in every shape?  Is it not time to awake
from the deceitful dream of a golden age, and to adopt
as a practical maxim for the direction of our political
conduct, that we, as well as the other inhabitants of the
globe, are yet remote from the happy empire of perfect
wisdom and perfect virtue?
Let the point of extreme depression to which our
national dignity and credit have sunk; let the inconveniences felt- everywhere from a lax and ill administration of Government; let the revolt of a part.of the State
of North Carolina, the late menacing disturbances in
Pennsylvania, and the actual insurrections and rebellions in Massachusetts, declare!
So far is the general sense of mankind from corresponding with the tenets of those who endeavor to lull
asleep our apprehensions of discord and hostility between the States, in the event of disunion, that it has
from long observation of the progress of society become
a sort of axiom in politics, that vicinity, or nearness of
situation, constitutes nations natural enemies. An intelligent writer expresses himself on this subject to this
effect:  NEIGmHBORING NATIONS (says he) are naturally'4.NEMIES of each other, unless their common weakness
".forces them to league in a CONFEDERATIVE REPUBLIC,
"-and their constitution prevents the differences that
"neighborhood occasions, extinguishing that secret jeal"ousy, which disposes all States to aggrandize them,
" selves at the expense of their neighbors."   This passage, at the same time, points out the EVIL and suggests
the REMEDY.
PUBLIUS.
# Vide Principes des Ntgociations par l'Abbd de Mably. - Pubiw.
VOL. I.     8




34               The Federalist.
For the Independent Journal.
THE F(EDERALIST. No. VII.
TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
IT is sometimes asked, with an air of seeming triumph, what inducements could the States have, if
disunited, to make war upon each other? It would be
a full answer to this question to say —precisely the
same inducements which have, at different times, deluged in blood all the nations in the world. But unfortunately for us, the question admits of a more particular
answer. There are causes of differences within our immediate contemplation, of the tendency of which, even
under the restraints of a Fcederal Constitution, we have
had sufficient experience, to enable us to form a judgment of what might be expected, if those restraints were
removed.
Territorial disputes have at all times been found one
of the most fertile sources of hostility among nations.
Perhaps the greatest proportion of the wars that have
desolated the earth have sprung from this origin. This
cause would exist, among us, in full force. We have a
vast tract of unsettled territory within the boundaries
of the United States. There still are discordant and
undecided claims between several of them; and the
dissolution of the Union would lay a foundation for
similar claims between them all. It is well known,
that they have heretofore had serious and animated
discussions concerning the right to the lands which were
ungranted at the time of the Revolution, and which usually went under the name of crown-lands. The States
within the limits of whose colonial Governments they
were comprised, have claimed them as their property;




The Fcederalist.              35
the others have contended that the rights of the crown
in this article devolved upon the Union; especially as
to all that part of the Western territory which, either by
actual possession, or through the submission of the Indian proprietors, was subjected to the jurisdiction of the
King of Great Britain, till it was relinquished in the
treaty of peace. This, it has been said, was at all
events an acquisition to the Confederacy by compact
with a foreign power. It has been the prudent policy
of Congress to appease this controversy, by prevailing
upon the States to make cessions to the United States
for the benefit of the whole. This has been so far accomplished, as, under a continuation of the Union, to
afford a decided prospect of an amicable termination
of the dispute. A' dismemberment of the Confederacy,
however, would revive this dispute, and would create
others on the same subject. At present, a large part of
the vacant Western territory is, by cession at least, if
not by any anterior right, the common property of the
Union.  If that were at an end, the States which
made the cession, on a principle of Faederal compromise, would be apt, when the motive of the grant had
ceased, to reclaim the lands as a reversion. The other
States would no doubt insist on a proportion, by right
of representation. Their argument would be, that a
grant, once made, could not- be revoked; and that the
justice -of their participating in territory acquired or
secured by the joint efforts of the Confederacy, remained
undiminished. If, contrary to probability, it should be
admitted by all the States, that each had a right to a
share of this common stock, there would still be a difficulty to be surmounted, as to a proper rule of apportionrnent. Different principles would be set up by different
States for this purpose; and as they would affect the
opposite interests of the parties, they might not easily
be susceptible of a pacific adjustment.




36.              The Fcderalist.
In the wide field of Western territory, therefore, we
perceive an ample theatre for hostile pretensions, with.
out any umpire or common judge to interpose between
the contending parties. T) reason from the past to the
future, we shall have good ground to apprehend, that
the sword would sometimes be appealed to as the arbiter of their differences. The circumstances of the dispute between Connecticut and Pennsylvania, respecting
the land at Wyoming, admonish us not to be sanguine
in expecting an easy accommodation of such differences. The Articles of Confederation obliged the parties to submit the matter to the decision of a Foederal
Court. The submission was made, and the Court decided in favor of Pennsylvania. But Connecticut gave
strong indications of dissatisfaction with that determination; nor did she appear to be entirely resigned to it,
till, by negotiation and management, something like an
equivalent was found for the loss she supposed herself
to have sustained. Nothing here' said is intended to
convey the slightest censure on the conduct of that
State. She no doubt sincerely believed herself to have
been injured by the decision; and States, like individuals, acquiesce with great reluctance~ in determinations
to their disadvantage.
Those who had an opportunity of seeing the inside
of the transactions, which attended the progress of the
controversy between this State and the district of Vermont, can vouch the opposition we experienced, as well
from States not interested, as from those which were
interested in the claim; and can attest the danger to
which the peace of the Confederacy might; have been
exposed, had this State attempted to assert its rights by
force. Two motives preponderated in that opposition:
one, a jealousy entertained of our future power; and
the other, the interest of certain individuals of influence
in the neighboring States, who had obtained grants




The Faderalist.              37
of lands under the actual Government of that district
Even the States which brought forward claims, in con
tradiction to ours, seemed more solicitous to dismem
ber this State, than to establish their own pretensions
These were New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut. New Jersey and Rhode Island, upon all occasions, discovered a warm zeal for the independence of
Vermont; and Maryland, till alarmed by the appearance
of a connection between Canada and that place, entered
deeply into the same views. These being small States,
saw with an unfriendly eye the perspective of our growing greatness. In a review of these transactions we
may trace some of the causes, which would be likely to
embroil the States with each other, if it should be their
unpropitious destiny to become disunited.
The competitions of commerce would be another
fruitful source of contention. The States less favorably
circumstanced would be desirous of escaping from the
disadvantages of local situation, and of sharing in the
advantages of their more fortunate neighbors.  Each
State, or separate confederacy, would pursue a system
of commercial polity peculiar to itself. This would occasion distinctions, preferences, and exclusions, which
would beget discontent. The habits of intercourse, on
the basis of equal privileges, to which we have been accustomed from the earliest settlement of the country,
would give a keener edge to those causes of discontent,
than they would naturally have, independent of this circumstance.  We should be ready to denominate injuries
those things which were in reality the justifiable acts of independent sovereignties consulting a distinct interest. The
spirit of enterprise, which characterizes the commercial
part of America, has left no occasion of displaying itself
unimproved. It is not at all probable that this unbridled
spirit would pay much respect to those regulations of
trade, by which particular States might endeavor to




38               The Fwderalist.
secure exclusive benefits to their own citizens. The in.
fractions of these regulations on one side, the efforts to
prevent and repel them on the other, would naturally
lead to outrages, and these to reprisals and wars.
The opportunities which some States would have of
rendering others tributary to them, by commercial regulations, would be impatiently submitted to by the tributary States. The relative situation of New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey, would afford an example of
this kind. New York, from the necessities of revenue,
must lay duties on her importations. A great part of
these duties must be paid by the inhabitants of the two
other States in the capacity of consumers of what we
import. New York would neither be willing, nor able
to forego this advantage. Her citizens would not consent that a duty paid by them should be remitted in
favor of the citizens of her neighbors; nor would it be
practicable, if there were not this impediment in the
way, to distinguish the customers in our own markets.
Would Connecticut and New Jersey long submit to be
taxed by New York for her exclusive benefit?  Should
we be long permitted to remain in the quiet and undisturbed enjoyment of a metropolis, from the possession
of which we derived an advantage so odious to our
neighbors, and, in their opinion, so oppressive? Should
we be able to preserve it against the incumbent weight
of Connecticut on the one side, and the cooperating
pressure of New Jersey on the other? These are questions that temerity alone will answer- in the affirmative.
The public debt of the Union would be a further cause
of collision between the separate States or confederacies.
The apportionment, in the first instance, and the progressive extinguishment, afterwards, would be alike productive of ill-humor and animosity. How would it be
possible to agree upon a rule of apportionment, satisfac.




The Fwederalist.              39
tory to all? There is scarcely any that can be proposed,
which is entirely free from real objections. These, as
usual, would be exaggerated by the adverse interest of
the parties. There are even dissimilar views among the
States, as to the general principle of discharging the
public debt. Some of them, either less impressed with
the importance of national credit, or because their citizens have little, if any,-immediate interest in the question, feel an indifference, if not a repugnance to the payment of the domestic debt, at any rate. These would
be inclined to magnify the difficulties of a distribution.
Others of them, a numerous body of whose citizens are
creditors to the public, beyond the proportion of the
State in the total amount of the national debt, would be
strenuous for some equitable and effectual provision.
The procrastinations of the former would excite the
resentments of the latter.  The settlement of a rule
would in the mean time be postponed, by real differences of opinion and affected delays. The citizens of
the States interested would clamor; foreign powers
would urge for the satisfaction of their just demands;
and the peace of the States would be hazarded to the
double contingency of external invasion and internal
contention.
Suppose the difficulties of agreeing upon a rule sur.
mounted, and the apportionment made. Still there is
great room to suppose, that the rule agreed upon would,
upon experiment, be found to bear harder upon some
States than upon others. Those which were sufferers
by it, would naturally seek for a mitigation of the burden. The others would as naturally be disinclined to
a revision, which was likely to end in an increase of
their own incumbrances. Their refusal'would be too
plausible a pretext to the complaining States to with.
nold their contributions, not to be embraced with avidity; and the non-compliance of these States with their




t0               The Fwvderalist.
engagements would be a ground of bitter dissension and
altercation. If even the rule adopted should in practice
justify the equality of its principle, still delinquencies in
payment, on the part of some of the States, would result
from a diversity of other causes - the real deficiency of
resources; the mismanagement of their finances; accidental disorders in the administration of the Government;
and, in addition to the rest, the reluctance with which
men commonly part with money for purposes that have
outlived the exigencies which produced them, and interfere with the supply of immediate wants. Delinquencies,
from whatever causes, would be productive of complaints,
recriminations, and quarrels. There is perhaps nothing
more likely to disturb the tranquillity of nations, than
their being bound to mutual contributions for any common object which does not yield an equal and coincident
benefit. For it is an observation as true, as it is trite,
that there is nothing men differ so readily about as the
payment of money.
Laws in violation of private contracts, as they amount
to aggressions on the rights of those States whose citizens are injured by them, may be considered as another
probable source of hostility. We are not authorized to
expect, that a more liberal, or more equitable spirit
would preside over the legislations of the individual
States hereafter, if unrestrained by any additional
checks, than we have heretofore seen, in too many instances, disgracing their several codes. We have observed the disposition to retaliation excited in Connecticut, in consequence of the enormities perpetrated by the
legislature of Rhode Island; and we may reasonably
infer, that-in similar cases,-under other circumstances, a
war, not of parchment, but of the sword, would chastise
such atrocious breaches of moral obligation and social
justice.
The probability of incompatible alliances between the




The Fwsderalist.                41
different States, or confederacies, and different foreign
nations, and the effects of this situation upon the peace
of the whole, have been sufficiently unfolded in some
preceding papers. From the view they have exhibited
of this pArt of the subject, this conclusion is to be drawn,
that Ame rica, if not connected at all, or only by the
feeble tie of a simple league, offensive and defensive,
would, by the operation of such opposite and jarring
alliances, be gradually entangled in all the pernicious
labyrinths of European politics and wars; and by the
destructive contentions of the parts into which she was
divided, would be likely to become a prey to the artifices
and machinations of powers equally the enemies of them
all. Divide et impera* must be the motto of every nation that either hates or fears us.t
PUBLIUS.
(From the New York Packet, Tuesday, November 20, 1787.]
THE F(EDERALIST. No. VIII.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE oF NEW YORK.:
A SSUMING it therefore as an established truth, that
the several States, in case of disunion, or such combinations of them as might happen to be formed out of
the wreck of the general Confederacy, would be subject
to those vicissitudes of peace and war, of friendship and
enmity with each other, which have fallen to the lot of
all neighboring nations not united under one Govern* Divide and command. -Pub- proposed to publish them four times
/F/m.                       a week, on Tuesday in the eNew
t In order that the whole subject York Packet and on Thursday in
of these Papers may be as soon as the Daily Advertiser. - Publius.
poasible laid before the Public, it is




42                 The Faderalist.
ment, let us enter into a concise detail of some of the
consequences that would attend such a situation.
War between the States, in the first periods of their
separate existence, would be accompanied with much
greater distresses than it commonly is in those countries
where regular military establishments have long ebtained. The disciplined armies always kept on foot otr
the continent of Europe, though they bear a malignant
aspect to liberty and economy, have, notwithstanding,
been productive of the signal advantage of rendering
sudden conquests impracticable, and of preventing that
rapid desolation, which used to mark the progress of war.
prior to their introduction. The art of fortification has
contributed to the same ends. The nations of Europe
are encircled with chains of fortified places, which mutually obstruct invasion.  Campaigns are wasted in
reducing two or three frontier garrisons, to gain admittance into an enemy's country. Similar impediments
occur at every step, to -exhaust the strength and delay
the progress of an invader.  Formerly, an invading
army would penetrate into the heart of a neighboring
country, almost as soon as intelligence of its approach
could be received; but now, a comparatively small force
of disciplined troops, acting on the defensive, with the
aid of posts, is able to impede, and finally to frustrate,
the enterprises of one much more considerable. The
history of war, in that quarter of the globe, is no longer
a history of nations subdued, and empires overturned,
but of towns taken and retaken, of battles that decide
nothing, of retreats more beneficial than victories, of
much effort and little acquisition.
In this country, the scene would be altogether reversed. The jealousy of military establishments would
postpone them as long as possible. The want of fortifications, leaving the frontiers of one State open to another, would facilitate inroads. The populous States




The Fwderalist.                   43
would, with little difficulty, overrun their less populous
neighbors. Conquests would be as easy to be made, as
difficult to be retained. War, therefore, would be des
ultory and predatory.  PLUNDER and devastation ever
march in the train of irregulars. The calamities of individuals would make the principal figure in the events
which would characterize our military exploits.
This picture is not too highly wrought; though I confess, it would not long remain a just one. Safety from
external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will,
after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent destruction of life and property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual
danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty,
to resort, for repose and security, to institutions which
have a tendency to destroy their civil and political
rights. To be more safe, they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free.
The institutions chiefly alluded to are STANDING
ARMIES, and the correspondent appendages of military
establishments.  Standing armies, it is said, are not
provided against in the new Constitution; and it is
therefore inferred that they may exist under it.' Their
existence, however, from the very terms of the proposition, is, at most, problematical and uncertain.   But
standing armies, it may be replied, must inevitably result from a dissolution of the Confederacy. Frequent
war and constant apprehension, which require a state of
as constant preparation, will infallibly produce them.
The weaker States or confederacies would first have
* This objection will be fully ex- is to be found in any Constitution
amined in its proper place; and it that has been heretofore framed
will be shown that the only nat- in America, most of which contain
ural precaution which could have no guard at all on this subject. —
been taken on this subject, has been Publius.
taken; and a much better one than




44                The Fwderalist.
recourse to them, to put themselves upon an equal
ity with their more potent neighbors.  They would
endeavor to supply the inferiority of population and
resources, by a more regular and effective system of defence, by disciplined troops, and by fortifications. They
would, at the same time, be necessitated to strengthen
the executive arm of Government; in doing which, their
Constitutions would acquire a progressive direction towards monarchy. It is of the nature of wat to increase
the executive at the expense of the legislative authority.
The expedients' which have been mentioned would
soon give the States or confederacies that made use of
them, a superiority over their neighbors. Small States,
or States of less natural strength, under vigorous Governments, and with the assistance of disciplined armies,
have often triumphed over large States, or States of
greater natural strength, which have been destitute of
these advantages. Neither the pride, nor the safety,
of the more important States, or confederacies, would
permit them long to submit to this mortifying and adventitious superiority.  They would quickly resort to
means similar to those by which it had been effected, to
reinstate themselves in their lost preiminence.  Thus
we should, in a little time, see established in every part
of this country the same engines of despotism which
have been the scourge of the old world. This, at least,
would be the natural course of things; and our reasonings will be the more likely to be just, in proportion as
they are accommodated to this standard.
These are not vague inferences drawn from supposed
or speculative defects in a Constitution, the whole power
of which is lodged in the hands of the people, or their
representatives and delegates, but they are solid conclusions, drawn from the natural and necessary-progress of
human affairs.
It may perhaps be asked, by way of objection to this,




The Fwderalist.               45
why did not standing armies spring up out of the conten
tions which so often distracted the ancient republics of
Greece? Different answers, equally satisfactory, may
be given to this question. The industrious habits of the
people of the present day, absorbed in the pursuits of
gain, and devoted to the improvements of agriculture
and commerce, are incompatible with the condition of a
nation of soldiers, which was the true condition of the
people of those republics. The means of revenue, which
have been so greatly multiplied by the increase of gold
and silver and of the arts ou industry, and the science
of finance, which is the offspring of modern times, concurring with the habits of nations, have produced an entire revolution in the system of war, and have rendered
disciplined armies, distinct from the body of the citizens,
the inseparable companion of frequent hostility.
There is a wide difference, also, between military establishments in a country seldom exposed by its situation to internal invasions, and in one which is often
subject to them, and always apprehensive of them. The
rulers of the former can have no good pretext, if they
are even so inclined, to keep on foot armies so numerous
as must of necessity be maintained in the latter. These
armies being, in the first case, rarely, if at all, called into
activity for interior defence, the people are in no danger
of being broken to military subordination. The laws
are not.accustomed to relaxations, in favor of military
exigencies; the civil state remains in full vigor, neither
corrupted, nor confounded with the principles or propensities of the other state. The smallness of the army
renders the natural strength of the community an overmatch-for it; and the citizens, not habituated to look
up to the military power for protection, or to submit to
its oppressions, neither love nor fear the soldiery: they
view them with a spirit of jealous acquiescence in a
necessary evil, and stand ready to resist a power which




46                The Fcederalist.
they suppose may be exerted to the prejudice of theii
rights. The army under such circumstances may usefully aid the magistrate to suppress a small faction, or
an occasional mob, or insurrection; but it will be unable
to enforce encroachments against the united efforts of
the great body of the people.
In a country in the predicament last described, the
contrary of all this happens. The perpetual menacings
of danger oblige the Government to be always prepared
to repel it; its armies must be numerous enough for
instant defence. The continual necessity for, their services enhances the importance of the soldier, and proportionably degrades the condition of the citizen.  The
military state becomes elevated above the civil. The
inhabitants of territories, often the theatre of war, are
unavoidably subjected to frequent infringements on their
rights, which serve to weaken their sense of those rights;
and by degrees, the people are brought to consider the
soldiery not only as their protectors, but as their superiors. The transition from this disposition to that of
considering them as masters, is neither remote nor difficult: but it is very difficult to prevail upon a people
under such impressions, to make a bold or effectual
resistance to usurpations supported by the military
power.
The kingdom of Great Britain falls within the first
description. An insular situation, and a powerful marine, guarding it in a great measure against the possibility of foreign invasion, supersede the necessity of a
numerous army.within the kingdom. A sufficient force
to make head against a sudden descent, till the militia could have time to rally and embody, is all thai
has been deemed requisite. No motive of national policy has demanded, nor would public opinion have tol.
erated, a larger number of troops upon its domestic
establishment. There has been, for a long time past,




The Faederalist.            4~d
little room for the operation of the other causes, which
have been enumerated as the consequences of interna4
war. This peculiar felicity of situation has, in a great
degree, contributed to preserve the liberty which that
country to this day enjoys, in spite of the prevalent
venality and corruption. If, on the contrary, Britain had
been situated on the continent, and had been compelled,
as she would have been, by that situation, to make her
military establishments at home coextensive with those
of the other great powers of Europe, she, like them,
would in all probability be, at this day, a victim to the
absolute power of a single man.'Tis possible, though
not easy, that the people of that island may be enslaved
from other causes; but it cannot be by the prowess
of an army so inconsiderable as that which has been
usually kept up within that kingdom.
If we are wise enough to preserve the Union, we may
for ages enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insulated situation. Europe is at a great distance from us.
Her colonies in our vicinity will be likely to continue
too much disproportioned in strength, to be able to give
us any dangerous annoyance. Extensive military establishments cannot, in this position, be necessary to our
security. But if we should be disunited, and the integral parts should either remain separated, or, which is
most probable, should be thrown together into two or
three confederacies, we should be, in a short course of
time, in the predicament of the continental powers of
Europe —our liberties would be a prey to the means
of defending ourselves against the ambition and jealousy of each other.
This is an idea not superficial or futile, but solid and
weighty. It deserves the most serious and mature consideration of every prudent and honest man, of whatever party. If such men will make a firm and solemn
pause, and meditate dispassionately on the importance




S4                liThe FoEderalist.
of this interesting idea; if they will contemplate it, in
all its attitudes, and trace it to all its consequences, they
will not hesitate to part with trivial objections to a Con
stitution, the rejection of which would in all probability
put a final period to the Union. The airy phantoms
that flit before the distempered imaginations of some ot
its adversaries, would quickly give place to the more
substantial forms of dangers, real, certain, and formidable.
PUBLIUS.
For the Independent Journal.
THE FCEDERALIST. No. IX.
rO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
A FIRM Union will be of the utmost moment to the
peace and liberty of the States, as a barrier against
domestic faction and insurrection. It is impossible to
read the history of the petty Republics of Greece and
Italy, without feeling sensations of horror and disgust,
at the distractions with which they were continually
agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions, by
which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration,
between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. If they
exhibit occasional calms, these only serve as short-lived
contrasts to the furious storms, that are to succeed. If,
now and then, intervals of felicity open themselves to
view, we behold them with a mixture of regret, arising
from the reflection, that the pleasing scenes before us
are soon to be overwhelmed by the tempestuous waves
of sedition and party rage. If momentary rays of glory
break forth from the gloom, while they dazzle us with a




The Foederalist.              49
transient and fleeting brilliancy, they, at the same time,
admonish us to lament, that the vices of Government
should pervert the direction, and tarnish the lustre of
those bright talents and exalted endowments, for which
the favored soils that produced them have been so justly
celebrated.
From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those
Republics, the advocates of despotism have drawn arguments, not only against the forms of Republican Government, but against the very principles of civil liberty.
They have decried all free Government as inconsistent
with the order of society, and have indulged themselves
in malicious exultation over its friends and partisans.
Happily for mankind, stupendous fabrics reared on the
basis of liberty, which have flourished for ages, have, in
a few glorious instances, refuted their gloomy sophisms.
And, I trust, America will be the broad and solid foundation of other edifices, not less magnificent, which will be
equally permanent monuments'of their errors.
But it is not to be denied, that the portraits they have
sketched of Republican Government were too just copies of the originals from which they were taken. If it
had been found impracticable to have devised models
of a more perfect structure, the enlightened friends to
liberty would have been obliged to abandon the cause
of that species of Government as indefensible.  The
science of politics, however, like most other sciences,
has received great improvement. The efficacy of various principles is now well understood, which were either
not known at all, or imperfectly known to the ancients.
The regular distribution of power into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative balances and
checks; the institution of Courts composed of Judges
holding their offices during good behavior; the representation of the people in the Legislature, by Deputies
of their own- election; these are either wholly new dis,
VOL. I.        4




50               TThe Fcaderalist.
coveries, or have made their principal progress towards
perfection in modern times. They are means, and powerful means, by which the excellences of Republican
Government may be retained, and its imperfections lessened, or avoided. To this catalogue of circumstances,
that tend to the amelioration of popular systems of civil
Government, I shall venture, however novel it may ap.
pear to some, to add one more, on a principle which has
oeen made the foundation of an objection to the New
Constitution; I mean the ENLARGEMENT of the ORBIT
within which such systems are to revolve, either in
respect to the dimensions of a single State, or to the
consolidation of several smaller States into one great
Confederacy.  The latter is that which immediately
concerns the object under consideration. It will, however, be of use to examine the principle, in its application to a single State, which shall be attended to in
another place.
The utility of a Confederacy, as well to suppress faction, and to guard the internal tranquillity of States, as
to increase their external force and security, is in reality
not a new idea. It has been practised upon, in different
countries and ages, and has received the sanction of the
most approved writers on the subjects of politics. The
opponents of the Plan proposed, have, with great assiduity, cited and circulated the observations of MONTESQUIEU on the necessity of a contracted territory for a Republican Government. But they seem not to have been
apprised of the sentiments of that great man, expressed
in another part of his work, nor to have adverted to the
consequences of the principle, to which they subscribe
with such ready acquiescence.
When MONTESQUIEU recommends a small extent for
Republics, the standards he had in view were of dimen.
sions far short of the limits of almost every one of these
States. Neither Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,




The Fwderalist.              51
New-York, North Carolina, nor Georgia, can by any
means be compared with the models from which he
reasoned, and to which the terms of his description apply. If we therefore take his ideas on this point, as the
criterion of truth, we shall be driven to the alternative,
either of taking refuge at once in the arms of Monarchy, or of splitting ourselves into an infinity of little, jealous, clashing, tumultuous Commonwealths, the
wretched nurseries of unceasing discord, and the miserable objects of universal pity or contempt. Some of
the writers, wvho have come forward on the other side of
the question, seem to have been aware of the dilemma;
and have even been bold enough to hint at the division
of the larger States, as a desirable thing. Such an infatuated policy, such a desperate expedient, might, by
the multiplication of petty offices, answer the views of
men, who possess not qualifications to extend their influence beyond the narrow circles of personal intrigue;
but it could never promote the greatness or happiness
of the people of America.
Referring the examination of the principle itself to
another place, as has been already mentioned, it will be
sufficient to remark here, that in the sense of the author
who has been most emphatically quoted upon the occasion, it would only dictate a reduction of the sIZE of
the more considerable MEMBERS of the Union; but would
not militate against their being all comprehended in one
Confederate Government. And this is the true question, in the. discussion of- which we are at present interested.
So far are the suggestions of MONTESQUIEU from standing in opposition to a general Union of the States, that
he explicitly treats of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC as the
expedient for extending the sphere of popular Government, and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with
those of republicanism.




52                The Fcederalist.
" It is very probable," (says he,*) "that mankind would
" have been obliged, at length, to live constantly under
"the Government of a SINGLE PERSON, had they not
" contrived a kind of Constitution, that has all the inter" nal advantages of a Republican, together with the ex.
"ternal force of a Monarchical Government. I mean a
" CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC.
" This form of Government is a Convention by which
"several smaller States agree to become members of a
" larger one, which they intend to form. It is a kind of
" assemblage of societies, that constitute a hew one, ca~" pable of increasing by means of new associations, till
"1 they arrive to such a degree of power, as to be able to
" provide for the security of the united body.
" A Republic of this kind, able to withstand an exter"nal force, may support itself without any internal
" corruptions. The form of this society prevents all
" manner of inconveniences.
"If a single member should attempt to usurp the su"preme authority, he could not be supposed to have an
"equal authority and credit in all the Confederate
" States. Were he to have too great influence over one,
" this would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part,
" that which would still remain free might oppose him
" with forces, independent of those which he had usurp"ed, and overpower him before he could be settled in his
"usurpation.
" Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the
"Confederate States, the others are able to quell it.
"Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed
"by those that remain sound. The State may be de"stroyed on one side, and not on the other; the Confed"eracy may be dissolved, and the Confederates preserve
"their Sovereignty.
" As this Government is composed of small Repub.
* Spirit of Laws, Vol. I. Book IX. Chap. I. - Publius.




The FEderalist.              53
"lics, it enjoys the internal happiness of each; and with
"respect to its external situation, it is possessed, by
"-means of the Association, of all the advantages ol
"large Monarchies."
I have thought it proper to quote at length these interesting passages, because they contain a luminous
abridgment of the principal arguments in favor of the
Union, and must effectually remove the false impressions, which a misapplication of other parts of the work
was calculated to make. They have, at the same time,
an intimate connection with the more immediate design
of this Paper; which is, to illustrate the tendency of the
Union to repress domestic faction and insurrection.
A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been
raised between a Confederacy and a consolidation of the
States. The essential characteristic of the first is said
to be, the restriction of its authority to the members in
their collective capacities, without reaching to the individuals of whom they are composed. It is contended,
that the National Council ought to have no concern
with any object of internal administration. An exact
equality of suffrage between the members has also been
insisted upon as a leading feature of a Confederate
Government. These positions are, in the main, arbitrary; they are supported neither by principle nor precedent. It has indeed happened, that Governments of
this kind have generally operated in the manner which
the distinction, taken notice of, supposes to be inherent in
their nature; but there have been in most of them extensive exceptions to the practice, which serve to prove,
as far as example will go, that there is no absolute rule
on the subject. And it will be clearly shown, in the
course of this investigation, that as far as the principle
contended for has prevailed, it has been the cause of incurable disorder and imbecility in the Government.
The definition of a Confederate Republic seems simr




54                 The Federalist.
ply to be, " an assemblage of Societies," or an Association of two or more States into one State. The extent,
modifications, and objects of the Fcederal authority, are
mere matters of discretion. So long as the separate organization of the members be not abolished; so long as
it exists, by a constitutional necessity, for local purposes;
though it should be in perfect subordination to the
general authority of the Union, it would still be, in fact
and in theory, an Association of States, or a Confederacy.
The proposed Constitution, so far from implying an abolition of the State Governments, makes them constit.
uent parts of the National Sovereignty, by allowing
them a direct representation in the Senate, and leaves
in their possession certain exclusive and very important
portions of Sovereign power. This fully corresponds,
in every rational import of the terms, with the idea of a
Federal Government.
In the Lycian Confederacy, which consisted of twenty-three CITIES, or Republics, the largest were entitled to
three votes in the COMMON COUNCIL, those of the middle
class to two, and the smallest to one. The COMMON
COUNCIL had the appointment of all the Judges and
Magistrates of the respective CITIES. This was certainly the most delicate species of interference in their internal administration; for if there be anything that
seems exclusively appropriated to the local jurisdictions,
it is the appointment of their own officers. Yet MONTESQUIEU, speaking of this Association, says, "Were I
"to give a model of an excellent Confederate Republic,
" it would be that of Lycia." Thus we perceive, that
the distinctions insisted upon were not within the contemplation of this enlightened civilian; and we shall be
led to conclude, that they are the novel refinements of
an erroneous theory.
PUBLIUS.




The Federalist.              55
[From the New York Packet, Friday, November 23, 1787.]
THE F(EDERALIST.  No. X.
rO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a
well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more
accurately developed than its tendency to break and
control the violence of faction. The friend of popular
Governments never finds himself so much alarmed for
their character and fate, as when he contemplates their
propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail,
therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without
violating the principles to which he is attached, fprovides
a proper.cure for it. The instability, injustice, and confuision introduced into the public councils, have, in truth,
been the mortal diseases under which popular Governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to
be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the'adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations.
The valuable improvements made by the American
Constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and
modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it
would'be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that
they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side,
as was wished and expected. Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous
citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith,
and of public and personal liberty, that our Governments
are too unstable; that the public good is disregarded in
the conflicts of rival parties; and that measures are too
often decided, not according to the rules of justice, and
the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force




56                The Fwderalist.
of an interested and overbearing majority. However
anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no
foundation, the evidence of known facts will not permit
us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be
found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that
some of the distresses under which we labor have been
erroneously charged on the operation of our_Governments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other
causes will not alope account for many of our heaviest
misfortunes; and/particularly, for that prevailing and
increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm
for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the
continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not
wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice, with
which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations.
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens,
whether amounting to a majority or minority of the
-whole, who are united and actuated by some common
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights
of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests'of the community.
There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.
There are again two methods of removing the causes
of faction: the one'` by destroying the liberty which is
essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every
citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the
same interests.
It could never be more truly said than of the first
remedy, that it was worse than the diseae. Liberty is
to faction, what air is to fire, an aliment without which
it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to
abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the




The FJederalist.               57
annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.
The second expedient is as impracticable, as the first
would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection.'ubsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on
each other; and the former will be objects to which the
latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the fac.
ulties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is niot less an insuperable obstacle to an uniformity
of interests.'The protection of these faculties is the
first object of' Government.  From  the protection of
different and unequal faculties of acquiring property,
the possession of differenlt degrees and kinds of property immediately results;' and from the influence of
these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into diffirent
interests and parties.
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the
nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought
into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning Government,
and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously
contending for preeminence and power; or to persons
of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided man-kind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity,
and-rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each'other, than to cooperate for their common
good.  So'strong is this propensity of mankind to fall
into mutual animosities, -that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful di-.




58               The Fwvderalist.
tinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendlj
passions, and excite their most violent conflicts. But
the most common and durable source of factions has
been the various and unequal distribution of property.
Those who hold, and those who are without property,
have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those
who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under
a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest,
with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the
principal task of modern Legislation, aind involves the
spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary
operations of the Government.
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause;
because his interest would certainly bias his judgment,
and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal,
nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be
both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are
many of the most important acts of legislation, but so
many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the
rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of
large bodies of citizens? and what are the different
classes of Legislators, but advocates and parties to the
causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts?  It is a question to which the
creditors are parties on one side, and the debtors on the
other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them.
Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges;
and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the
most powerful faction, must be expected to prevail.
Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in
what degree, by restrictions on foreign mahufactures?
are questions which would be differently decided by the




The Federalist.               59
landed and the manufacturing classes; and probably by
neither, with a sole regard -to justice and the public
good. The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property is an act which seems to require
the most exact impartiality; yet there is, perhaps, no
legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party, to trample on
the rules of justice. Every shilling, with which they
overburden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to
their own pockets.
It is in vain to say, that enlightened statesmen will
be able to. adjust these clashing interests, and render
them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened
statesmen will not always be at the helm: Nor, in many
cases, can such an adjustment be made at all, without
taking into view indirect and remote considerations,
which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest
which one party may find in disregarding the rights of
another, or the good of the whole.
The inference to which we are brought is, that the
causes of faction cannot be removed; and that relief
is only to be sought in the means of controlling its
effects.
if a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is
supplied by the. republican principle, which enables the
majority to.defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It
may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its
violence under the forms of the Constitution. When
a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular
Government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to
its ruling passion or interest both the public good and
the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good,
and private rights, against the danger of such a faction,
and at the-same time to preserve the spirit and the form
of popular Government, it then the great object to which




60                The Fwrderalist.
our inquiries are directed: Let me add, that it is the
great desideratum, by which alone this form of Government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which
it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind.
By what means is this object attainable? Evidently
by one of two only.' Either the existence of the same
passion or interest in a majority, at the same time, must
be prevented; or the majority, having such coexistent
passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number
and local situation, unable to concert and carry into
effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the
opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that
neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as
an adequate control. They are not found to be such on
the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their
efficacy in proportion to the number combined together;
that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful.
From this view of the subject, it may be concluded,
that a pure Democracy, by which I mean a Society consisting of a sminall number of citizens, who assemble and
administer the Government in person, can admit of no
cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion
or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majdrity of the whole; a communication and concert results
from the form of Government itself; and there is nothing tq check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker
party,~ or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is, that
such Democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security, or the rights of property; and
have in general been as short in their lives, as they have
been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who
have patronized this species of Government, have erroneously supposed, that by reducing mankind to a perfeet equality in their political rights, they would, at the




The Federalist.              61
same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in
their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.
A Republic, by which I mean a Government in which
the scheme of representation takes place, opens. a differ'
ent prospect, and promises the cure for which we are
seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies
from pure Democracy, and we shall comprehend both
the nature of the cure, and the efficacy which it must
derive from the Union.
The two great points of difference, between a Democracy and a Republic, are, firste, the delegation of the
Government, in the latter, to a small numiber of citizens
elected by the rest.:Secondly, the greater number -of
citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the
latter may be extended.
The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand,
to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them
through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose
wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be
least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen,
that the public voice, pronounced.by the_ represeuat4ives
of t he.ople, will,be more consonant to the.4public
good, than if pronounced by the People temselves~,convened for the -purpose. On the other hand, the effect
may bec' ivrted.  Men of factious tempers, of local
prejudices, or of sinister designs, nlay by intrigue, by
corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages,
and then betray the interests of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive Republics
are most favorable to the election of proper guardians
of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of
the latter by two obvious considerations.
In -the first place, it is to be remarked that however
small the Republic may be, the Representatives must be




62                The Fwrderalist.
raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the
cabals of a few; and that however large it may be, they
must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard
against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of Representatives in the two cases not being in
proportion to that of the Constituents, and being proportionally greatest in the small Republic, it follows,
that if the proportion of fit characters be not less in
the large than in the small Republic, the former will
present a greater option, and consequently a greater
probability of a fit choice.
nhi the next place, as each Representative will be
chosen by a greater number of citizens ip the large than
in the small Republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practise with success the vicious
arts, by which elections are too often carried; and the
suffrages of the People, being more free, will be more
likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive
merit, and the most diffusive and established characters.
It must be confessed, that in this, as in most other
cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much
the number of electors, you render the representative too
little acquainted with all their local circumstances and
lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render
him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and National objects. The
Federal Constitution forms a happy combination in
this respect; the great and aggregate interests being
referred to the National, the local and particular to the
State Legislatures.
The other point of difference is, the greater number
of citizens and extent of territory'which may be brought
within the compass of Republican, than of Dem( cratic
Government; and it is this circumstance principally
which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded




The Fwederalist.              63
in the former, than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and
interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties
and interests, the more frequently will a majority be
found of the same party; and the smaller the number
of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller
the compass within which they are placed, the more
easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater
variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common
motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such
a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all
who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in
u.nison with each other. Besides other impediments, it
may be remarked, that where there is a consciousness
of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is
always checked by distrust, in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.
Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage
which a Republic has over a Democracy, in controlling
the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small
Republic, -is enjoyed by the Union over the States
composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of Representatives, whose enlightened views
and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local
prejudices, and to schemes of injustice? It will not
be denied, that the Representation of the Union will
be most likely to possess these requisite endowments.
Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a
greater variety of parties, against the event of any one
party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest?
In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties,
comprised within the Union, increase this security.
Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed
to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes




64               The Fosderalist.
of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the
extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage.
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame
within their particular States, but will be unable to
spread a general conflagration through the other States;
A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction
in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects
dispersed over the entire face of it, must secure the National Councils against any danger from that source;
A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an
equal division of property or Tr. any other improper or
wicked' pi6t'will be less apt to pervade the whole
body of the Union, than a particular member of it; in
the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to
taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.
In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a Republican remedy for the diseases
most incident to. Republican Government. And accord.
ing to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being
Republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the
Spirit, and supporting the character, of Fcderalists.
PUBLIUS.
For the Independent Journcfd,
THE FCEDERALIST. Ne. XI.
TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
THE importance of the Union, in a commercial light,
is one -of those points, about which there is least
room to entertain a difference of opinion, and which has
in fact commanded the most general assent of men, who




Thee Faderalist.              65
have any acquaintance with the subject. This applies
as well to our intercourse with'foreign countries, as with
each other.
There are appearances to authorize a supposition, that
the adventurous spirit, which distinguishes the commercial character of America, has already excited uneasy
sensations in several of the maritime powers of Europe.
They seem to be apprehensive of our too great interference in that carrying trade which is the support
of their navigation and the foundation of their naval
strength. Those of them, which have colonies in America, look forward to what this country is capable of
becoming, with painful solicitude. They foresee the
dangers, that may threaten their American dominions
from the neighborhood of States, which have all the dispositions, and would possess all the means, requisite to
the creation of a powerful marine. Impressions of this
kind will naturally indicate the policy of fostering divisions among us, and of depriving us, as far as possible, of
an ACTIVE COMMERCE in our own bottoms. This would
answer the threefold purpose of preventing our interference in their navigation, of monopolizing the profits
of our trade, and of clipping the wings, by which we
might soar to a dangerous greatness. Did not prudence
forbid the detail, it would not be difficult to trace, by
facts, the workings of this policy to the cabinets of
Ministers.
If we continue united, we may counteract a policy so
unfriendly to our prosperity in a variety of ways. By
prohibitory regulations, extending, at the same time,
throughout the States, we may oblige foreign countries to bid against each other, for the privileges of our
markets. This assertion will not appear chimerical to
those who are able to appreciate the importance of the
markets of three millions of people —increasing in rapid
progression, for the most part exclusively addicted to
VOL,. I.          5




66               The Fderalist.
agriculture, and likely from local circumstances to
remain so —to any manufacturing nation; and the
immense difference there would be to the trade and
navigation of such a nation, between a direct communication in its own ships, and an indirect conveyance of
its products and returns, to and from America, in the
ships of another country. Suppose, for instance, we had
a government in America, capable of excluding Great
Britain (with whom we have at present no treaty of
commerce) from all our ports; what would be the probable operation of this step upon her politics? Would it
not enable us to negotiate, with the fairest prospect of
success, for commercial privileges of the most valuable
and extensive kind, in the dominions of that kingdom?
When these questions have been asked, upon other occasions, they have received a plausible, but not a solid
or satisfactory answer. It has been said, that prohibitions on our part would produce no change in the system of Britain; because she could prosecute her trade
with us, through the medium of the Dutch, who would
be her immediate customers and paymasters for those
articles which were wanted for the supply of our markets. But would not her navigation be materially injured, by the loss of the important advantage of being
her own carrier in that trade? Would not the principal
part of its profits be intercepted by the Dutch, as a compensation for their agency and risk? Would not the
mere circumstance of freight occasion a considerable
deduction? Would not so circuitous an intercourse facilitate the competitions of other nations, by enhancing
the price of British commodities in our markets, and
by transferring to other hands the management of this
interesting branch of the British commerce?
A mature consideration of the objects suggested by
these questions will justify a belief, that the real disadvantages to Britain, from'such a state of things, con



The Fcderalist.              6?
spiring with the prepossessions of a great part of the
nation in favor of the American trade, and with the
importunities of the West India islands, would produce
a relaxation in her present system, and would let us
into the enjoyment of privileges in the markets of those
islands and elsewhere, from which our trade would derive
the most substantial benefits.  Such a point gained
from the British Government, and which could not be
expected without an equivalent in exemptions and
immunities in our markets, would be likely to have a
correspondent effect on the conduct of other nations,
who would not be inclined to see themselves altogether
supplanted in our trade.
A further resource for influencing the conduct of European nations towards us, in this respect, would arise
from the establishment of a Fcederal navy. There can
be no doubt, that the continuance of the Union, under
an efficient Government, would put it in our power, at a
period not very distant, to create a navy, which, if it
could not vie with those of the great maritime powers,
would at least be of respectable weight, if thrown into
the scale of either of two contending parties.  This
would be more peculiarly the case, in relation to
operations in the West Indies. A few ships of the line,
sent opportunely to the reinforcement of either side,
would often be sufficient to decide the fate of a cam.
paign, on the event of which interests of the greatest
magnitude were suspended. Our position is, in this
respect, a very commanding one. And if, to this consideration, we add that of the usefulness of supplies
from this country, in the prosecution of military operations in the West Indies, it will readily be perceived,
that a situation so favorable would enable us to bargain
with great advantage for commercial privileges. A price,vould be set, not only upon our friendship, but upon
our neutrality. By a steady adherence to the Union,




68                The FPederalist.
we may hope, erelong, to become the Arbiter of Europe
in America; and to be able to incline the balance of
European competitions in this part of the world, as our
interest may dictate.
But in the reverse of this eligible situation, we shall
discover, that the rivalships of the parts would make
them checks upon each other and would frustrate all the
tempting advantages which nature has kindly placed
within our reach. In a state so insignificant, our commerce would be a prey to the wanton intermeddlings of
all nations at war with each other; who, having nothing
to fear from us, would, with little scruple or remorse,
supply their wants by depredations on our property, as
often as it fell in their way. The rights of neutrality
will only be respected, when they are defended by an
adequate power. A nation, despicable by its weakness,
forfeits even the privilege of being neutral.
Under a vigorous National Government, the natural
strength and resources of the country, directed to a
common interest, would baffle all the combinations of
European jealousy to restrain our growth. This situation would even take away the motive to such combinations, by inducing an impracticability of success. An
active commerce, an extensive navigation, and a. flourishing marine, would then be the inevitable offspring of
moral and physical necessity. We might defy the little
arts of little politicians to control, or vary, the irresistible
and unchangeable course of nature.
But in a state of disunion, these combinations might
exist and might operate with success. It would be in
the power of the maritime nations, availing themselves
of our universal impotence, to prescribe the conditions
of our political existence; and as they have a common
interest in being our carriers, and still more in preventing our becoming theirs, they would, in all probability,
combine to embarrass our navigation in such a manner




The Faederalist.             69
as would in effect destroy it, and confine us to a PASSIVi
COMMERCE. We should thus be compelled to content
ourselves with the first price of our commodities, and to
see the profits of our trade snatched from us, to enrich
our enemies and persecutors. That unequalled spirit of
enterprise, which signalizes the genius of the American
Merchants and Navigators, and which is in itself an inexhaustible mine of National wealth, would be stifled
and lost; and poverty and disgrace would overspread a
country, which, with wisdom, might make herself the
admiration and envy of the world.
There are rights of great moment to the trade of
America, which are rights of the Union - I allude to
the fisheries, to the navigation of the Western lakes,
and to that of the Mississippi. The dissolution of the
Confederacy would give room for delicate questions, concerning the future existence of these rights; which the
interest of more powerful partners would hardly fail to
solve to our disadvantage. The disposition of Spain,
with regard to the Mississippi, needs no comment.
France and Britain are concerned with us in the fisheries; and view them as of the utmost moment to their
navigation. They, of course, would hardly remain long
indifferent to that decided mastery, of which experience
has shown us to be possessed, in. this valuable-branch of
traffic; and by which we are able to undersell those
nations in their own markets. What more natural than
that they should be disposed to exclude from the lists
such dangerous competitors?
This branch of trade ought not to be considered as a
partial benefit. All the navigating States may, in different degrees, advantageously participate in it, and under
circumstances of a greater extension of mercantile capital would not be unlikely to do it. As a nursery of sea.
men, it now is, or, when time shall have more nearly
assimilated the principles of navigation in the several




70               The Fcederalist.
States, will become an universal resource. To the estab.
lishment of a navy, it must be indispensable.
To this great National object, a NAVY, Union will
contribute in various ways. Every institution will grow
and flourish in proportion to the quantity and extent of
the means concentred towards its formation and support. A navy of the United States, as it would embrace
the resources of all, is an object far less remote than a navy
of any single State, or partial Confederacy, which would
only embrace'the resources of a part.  It happens,
indeed, that different portions of confederated America
possess each some peculiar advantage for this essential
establishment. The more Southern States furnish, in
greater abundance, certain kinds of naval stores —tar,
pitch, and turpentine. Their wood, for the construction
of ships, is also of a more solid and lasting texture.
The difference in the duration of the ships of which the
navy might be composed, if chiefly constructed of
Southern wood, would be of signal importance, either
in the view of naval strength, or of National economy.
Some of the Southern and of the Middle States yield
a greater plenty of iron, and of better quality. Seamen
must chiefly be drawn from the Northern hive. The
necessity of naval protection to external or maritime
commerce, does not require a particular elucidation, no
more than the conduciveness of that species of commerce to the prosperity of a navy. They, by a kind of
reaction, mutually beneficial, promote each other.
An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will advance the trade of each, by an interchange
of their respective productions, not only for the supply
of reciprocal wants at home, but for exportation to
foreign markets. The veins of commerce in every part
will be replenished, and will acquire additional motion
and vigor from a free circulation of the commodities of
every part. Commercial enterprise will have much greater




The Fcederalist.              71
scope, from the diversity in the productions of different
States. When the staple of one fails, from a bad har.
vest or unproductive crop, it can call to its aid the staple
of another. The variety, not less than the value of products for exportation, contributes to the activity of foreign commerce. It can be conducted upon much better
terms, with a large number of materials of a given value,
than with a small number of materials of the same
value; arising from the competitions of trade, and from
the fluctuations of markets. Particular articles may be
in great demand, at certain periods, and unsalable at
others; but if there be a variety of articles, it can
scarcely happen, that they should all be at one time in
the latter predicament; and on this account, the operations of the merchant would be less liable to any considerable obstruction, or stagnation. The speculative trader
will at once perceive the force of these observations;
and will acknowledge, that the aggregate balance of the
commerce of the United States would bid fair to be
much more favorable than that of the thirteen States,
without union, or with partial unions.
It may perhaps be replied to this, that whether the
States are united, or disunited, there would still be an
intimate intercourse between them, which would answer
the same ends: But this intercourse would be fettered,
interrupted, and narrowed, by a multiplicity of causes;
which in the course of these Papers have been amply
detailed. An unity of commercial, as well as political,
interests, can only result from an unity of Government.
There are other points of view, in which this subject
might be placed, of a striking and animating kind. But
they would lead us too far into the regions of futurity,
and would involve topics not proper for a Newspaper
discussion. — I shall briefly observe, that our situation
Invites, and our interests prompt us, to aim at an ascend
ant in the system of American affairs. The world may




~72               The Federalist.
politically, as well as geographically, be divided intc
four parts, each having a distinct set of interests.
Unhappily for the other three, Europe, by her arms and
by her negotiations, by force and by fraud, has, in different degrees, extended her dominion over them all.
Africa, Asia, and America, have successively felt her
domination. The superiority she has long maintained
has tempted her to plume herself as the Mistress of the
World, and to consider the rest of mankind as created
for her benefit. Men, admired as profound philosophers,
have, in direct terms, attributed to her inhabitants a physical superiority; and have gravely asserted, that all animals, and with them the human species, degenerate in
America - that even dogs cease to bark, after having
breathed awhile in our atmosphere.* Facts have too long
supported these arrogant pretensions of the European:
It belongs to us to vindicate the honor of the human
race, and to teach that assuming brother, moderation.
Union will enable us to do it. Disunion will add another'victim to his triumphs. Let Americans disdain to be
the instruments of European greatness! Let the thirteen States, bound together in a strict and indissoluble
Union, concur in erecting one great American system,
superior to the control of all transatlantic force or influence, and able to dictate the terms of the connection
between the old and the new world!
PUBLIUS.
* Recherches philosophiques sur les Americains. - Pubius.




The Foderalist.              73
[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, November 27, 1787.]
THE F(EDERALIST. No. XII.
ro THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
THE effects of Union upon the commercial prosper.
ity of the States have been sufficiently delineated.
Its tendency to promote the interests of revenue will be
the subject of our present inquiry.
The prosperity of commerce is now perceived and
acknowledged, by all enlightened statesmen, to\ be the
most useful, as well as the most productive source
of National wealth; and has accordingly become a
primary object of their political cares. By multiplying the means of gratification, by promoting the
introduction and circulation of the precious metals,
those darling objects of human avarice and enterprise,
it serves to vivify and invigorate the channels of
industry, and to make them flow with greater activity
and copiousness.  The assiduous mnerchant, the laborious husbandman, the active mechanic, and the industrious manufacturer, all orders of men, look forward with eager expectation, and growing alacrity, to
this pleasing reward of their toils. The often agitated
question between agriculture and commerce, has, from
indubitable experience, received a decision, which has
silenced the rivalships that once subsisted between them,
and has proved, to the satisfaction of their friends, that
their interests are intimately blended and interwoven.
It hat been found, in various countries, that in proportion as commerce has flourished, land has risen in value.
And how could it have happened otherwise? Could
that which procures a freer vent for the products of the




74                The Federalist.
earth; which furnishes new incitements to the cultiva.
tors of land; which is the most powerful instrument in
increasing the quantity of money in a State - could
that, in fine, which is the faithful handmaid of labor and
industry, in every shape, fail to augment the value of
that article, which is the prolific parent of far the greatest part of the objects upon which they are exerted?
It is astonishing, that so simple a truth should ever have
had an adversary; and it is one, among a multitude of
proofs, how apt a spirit of ill-informed jealousy, or of
too great abstraction and refinement, is to lead men
astray from the plainest paths of reason and conviction.
The ability of a country to pay taxes must always be
proportioned, in a great degree, to the quantity of money
in circulation, and to the celerity with which it circulates. Commerce, contributing to both these objects,
must of necessity render the payment of taxes easier,
and facilitate the requisite supplies to the treasury.
The hereditary dominions of the Emperor of Germany
contain a great extent of fertile, cultivated, and populous
territory, a large proportion of which is situated in mild
and luxuriant climates.  In some parts of this territory are to be found the best gold and silver mines in
Europe. And yet, from the want of the fostering influence of commerce, that monarch can boast but slender
revenues. He has several times been compelled to owe
obligations to the pecuniary succors of other nations,
for the preservation of his essential interests; and is unable, upon the strength of his own resources, to sustain
a long or continued war.
But it is not in this aspect of the subject alone, that
Union will be seen to conduce to the purposes Qf revenue. There are other points of view, in which itH influence will appear more immediate and decisive. It is
evident from the state of the country, from the habits
of the people, from the experience we have had on the




The Foaderalist.             75
point itself, that it is impracticable to raise any very
considerable sums by direct taxation. Tax laws have
in vain been multiplied; new methods to enforce the
collection have in vain been tried; the public expectation has been uniformly disappointed, and the treasuries
of the States have remained empty. The popular system of administration, inherent in the nature of popular
Government, coinciding with the real scarcity of money,
incident to a languid and mutilated state of trade, has
hitherto defeated every experiment for extensive collections, and has at length taught the different Legislatures
the folly of attempting them.
No person, acquainted with what happens in other
countries, will be surprised at this circumstance. In so
opulent a nation as that of Britain, where direct taxes,
from superior wealth, must be much more tolerable, and,
from the vigor of the Government, much more practicable, than in America, far the greatest part of the National
revenue is derived from taxes of the indirect kind, from
imposts, and from excises. Duties on imported articles
form a large branch of this latter description.
In America, it is evident that we must a long time
depend, for the means of revenue, chiefly on such duties.
In most parts of it, excises must be confined within a
narrow compass.  The genius of the people will ill
brook the inquisitive and peremptory spirit of excise
laws. The pockets of the farmers, on the other hand,
will reluctantly yield but scanty supplies, in the unwelcome shape of impositions on their houses and lands;
and personal property is too precarious and invisible a
fund to be laid hold of in any other way, than by the
imperceptible agency of taxes on consumption.
If these remarks have any foundation, that state of
things which will best enable us to improve and extend so valuable a resource must be best adapted to our
political welfare. And it cannot admit of a serious




76                The Faderalist.
doubt, that this state of things must rest on the basis
of a general Union. As far as this would be conducive
to the interests of commerce, so far it must tend to the
extension of the revenue to be drawn from that source.
As far as it would contribute to rendering regulations
for the collection of the duties more simple and efficacious, so far it must serve to answer the purposes of
making the same rate of duties more productive, and of
putting it into the power of the Government to increase
the rate without prejudice to trade.
The relative situation of these States; the number of
rivers with which they are intersected, and of bays that
wash their shores; the facility of communication in
every direction; the affinity of language and manners;
the familiar habits of intercourse; all these are circumstances that would conspire to render an illicit trade
between them a matter of little difficulty; and would
insure frequent evasions of the commercial regulations
of each other. The separate States, or Confederacies,
would be necessitated by mutual jealousy to avoid the
temptations to that kind of trade, by the lowness of
their duties. The temper of our Governments, for a long
time to come, would not permit those rigorous precautions, by which the European nations guard the avenues
into their respective countries, as well by land as by
water; and which, even there, are found insufficient
obstacles to the adventurous stratagems of avarice.
In France, there is an army of patrols (as they are
called) constantly employed to secure their fiscal regulations against the inroads of the dealers in contraband
trade. Mr. NECKAR computes the number of these patrols at upwards of twenty thousand. This shows the
immense difficulty in preventing-that species of traffic,
where there is an inland communication, and places in
a strong light the disadvantages, with which the collection of duties in this country would be encumbered, if




The Farderalist.             77
by disunion the States should be placed in a situation,
with respect to each other, resembling that of France
with respect to her neighbors. The arbitrary and vexatious powers with which the patrols are necessarily
armed, would be intolerable in a free country.
If, on the contrary, there be but one Government per.
vading all the States, there will be, as to the principal
part of our commerce, but ONE SIDE to guard —the
ATLANTIC COAST. Vessels arriving directly from foreign
countries, laden with valuable cargoes, would rarely
choose to hazard themselves to the complicated and
critical perils which would attend attempts to unlade
prior to their coming into port. They would have to
dread both the dangers of the coast, and of detection,
as well after as before their arrival at the places of their
final destination. An ordinary degree of vigilance would
be competent to the prevention of any material infractiofts upon the rights of the revenue. A few armed vessels, judiciously stationed at the entrances of our ports,
might at a small expense be made useful sentinels of
the laws. And the Government having the same interest to provide against violations everywhere, the cooperation of its measures in each State, would have a
powerful tendency to render them effectual. Here also
we should preserve, by Union, an advantage which nature holds out to us, and which would be relinquished
by separation. The United States lie at a great distance from Europe, and at a considerable distance from
all other places with which they would have extensive
connections of foreign trade. The passage from them
to us, in a few hours, or in a single night, as between
the coasts of France and Britain, and of other neighboring nations, would be impracticable.  This is a
prodigious security against a direct contraband with
foreign countries; but a circuitous contraband to one
State, through the medium of another, would be both




78                The Fwederalist.
easy and safe.  The difference between a direct im.
portation from abroad, and an indirect importation
through the channel of a neighboring State, in small
parcels, according to time and opportunity, with the
additional facilities of inland communication, must be
palpable to every man of discernment..
It is, therefore, evident, that one National Government
would be able, at much less expense, to extend the duties on imports, beyond comparison, further than would
be practicable to the States separately, or to any partial Confederacies. Hitherto, I believe, it may safely be
asserted, that these duties have not upon an average
exceeded in any State three per cent. In France they
are estimated to be about fifteen per cent., and in Britain they exceed this proportion.* There seems to be
nothing to hinder their being increased in this country,
to at least treble their present amount. The singlearticle of ardent spirits, under FRederal regulation, might
be made to furnish a considerable revenue. Upon a
ratio to the importation into this State, the whole quantity imported into the United States may be estimated
at four millions of gallons; which, at a shilling per
gallon, would produce two hundred thousand pounds.
That article would well bear this rate of duty; and if
it should tend to diminish the consumption of it, such
an effect would be equally favorable to the agriculture,
to the economy, to the morals, and to the health of the
society. There is, perhaps, nothing so much a subject
of National extravagance as these spirits.
What will be the consequence, if we are not able to
avail ourselves of the resource in question in its full
extent?  A nation cannot long exist without revenues.
Destitute of this essential support, it must resign its
independence, and sink into the degraded condition of a
province. This is an extremity to which no Government
k If my memory be right they amount to twenty per cent. - Publius.




The Fxederalist.             79
will of choice accede. Revenue, therefore, must be had
at all events. In this country, if the principal part be
not drawn from commerce, it must fall with oppressive
weight upon land. It has been already intimated that
excises, in their true signification, are too little in unison
with the feelings of the people, to admit of great use
being made of that mode of taxation; nor, indeed, in
the States where almost the sole employment is agriculture, are the objects, proper for excise, sufficiently numerous to permit very ample collections in that way.
Personal estate, (as has been before remarked,) from the
difficulty of tracing it, cannot be subjected to large contributions, by any other means than by taxes on consumption. In popular cities, it may be enough the
subject of conjecture, to occasion the oppression of individuals, without much aggregate benefit to the State;
but beyond these circles, it must, in a great measure,
escape the eye and the hand of the tax-gatherer. As
the necessities of the State, nevertheless, must be satisfied in some mode or other, the defect of other resources
must throw the principal weight of the public burdens
on the possessors of land. And as, on the other hand,
the wants of the Government can never obtain an adequate supply, unless all the sources of revenue are open
to its demands, the finances of the community, under
such embarrassments, cannot be put into: a situation
consistent with its respectability or its security. Thus
we shall not even have the consolations of a full treasury, to atone for the oppression of that valuable class
of the citizens, who are employed in the cultivation of
the soil. But public and private distress will keep pace
with each other in gloomy concert; and unite in deploring the infatuation of those counsels which led to
disunion.
PUBLIUS




80                The Fowderalist.
For the Independent Journal.
THE FCEDERALIST. No. XIII.
TO TIIE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
AS connected with the subject of revenue, we may
with propriety consider that of economy.  The
money saved from one object may be usefully applied
to another; and there will be so much the less to be
drawn from the pockets of the people. If the States
are united under one Government, there will be but one
National civil list to support: if they are divided into
several Confederacies, there will be as many different
National civil lists to be provided for; and each of them,
as to the principal departments, coextensive with that
which would be necessary for a Governmenttof the
whole. The entire separation of the States into thirteen unconnected sovereignties is a project too extravagant, and too replete with danger, to have many
advocates. The ideas of men who speculate upon the
dismemberment of the empire, seem generally turned
towards three Confederacies; one consisting of the four
Northern, another of the four Middle, and a third of the
five Southern States. There is little probability that
there would be a greater number.  According to this
distribution, each Confederacy would comprise an extent
of territory larger than that of the kingdom of Great
Britain. No well-informed man will suppose that the
affairs of such a Confederacy can be properly regulated
by a Government less comprehensive in its organs or
institutions than that which has been proposed by the
Convention. When the dimensions of a State attain
to a certain magnitude, it requires the same energy




The Fcederalist.            81
of Government, and the same forms of administration,
which are requisite in one of much greater extent. This
idea admits not of precise demonstration, because there
is no rule by which we can measure the momentum of
civil power, necessary to the government of any given
number of individuals; but when we consider that the
island of Britain, nearly commensurate with each of the
supposed Confederacies, contains about eight millions of
people, and when we reflect upon the degree of authority
required to direct the passions of so large a society to
the public good, we shall see no reason to doubt, that
the like portion of power would be sufficient to perform
the same task in a society far more numerous. Civil
power, properly organized and exerted, is capable of diffusing its force to a very great extent; and can, in a
manner, reproduce itself in every part of a great empire,
by a judicious arrangement of subordinate institutions.
The supposition, that each Confederacy into which
the States would be likely to be divided would require a Government not less comprehensive than the
one proposed, will be strengthened by another supposition, more probable than that which presents us with
three Confederacies, as the alternative to a general Union.
If we attend carefully to geographical and commercial
considerations, in conjunction with the habits and prejudices of the different States, we shall be led to conclude, that in case of disunion, they will most naturally
league themselves under two Governments. The four
Eastern States, from all the causes that form the links of
National sympathy and connection, may with certainty
be expected to unite. New York, situated as she is,
would never be unwise enough to oppose a feeble and
unsupported flank to the weight of that Confederacy.
There atre obvious reasons, that would facilitate her accession to it. New Jersey is too small a State to think
of being a frontier, in opposition to this still more powerVOL. I.       6




82               The Federalist.
ful combination; nor do there appear to be any obstacles
to her admission into it. Even Pennsylvania would
have strong inducements to join the Northern league.
An active foreign commerce, on the basis of her own
navigation, is her true policy, and coincides with the
opinions and dispositions of her citizens. The more
Southern States, from various circumstances, may not
think themselves much interested in the encouragement
of navigation. They may prefer a system, which would
give unlimited scope to all nations, to be the carriers, as
well as the purchasers, of their commodities. Pennsylvania may not choose to confound her interests in a
connection so adverse to her policy. As she must, at
all events, be a frontier, she may deem it most consistent with her safety, to have her exposed side turned
towards the weaker power of the Southern, rather than
towards the stronger power of the Northern Confederacy.
This would give her the fairest chance to avoid being
the FLANDERS of America. Whatever may be the determination of Pennsylvania, if the Northern Confederacy
includes New Jersey, there is no likelihood of mdfe than
one Confederacy to the south of that State.
Nothing can be more evident than that the thirteen
States will be able to support a National Government,
better than one half, or one third, or any number less
than the whole. This reflection must have great weight
in obviating that objection to the proposed plan, which
is founded on the principle of expense; an objection,
however, which, when we come to take a nearer view
of it, will appear in every light to stand on mistaken
ground.
If, in addition to the consideration of a plurality of
civil lists, we take into view the number of persons who
must necessarily be employed to guard the inland communication between the different Confederacies against
illicit trade, and who in time will infallibly spring up




The Fcederalist.              83
out of the necessities of revenue; and if we also take
into view the military establishments which it has been
shown would unavoidably result from the jealousies and
conflicts of the several nations into which the States
would be divided, we shall clearly discover that a separation would be not less injurious to the economy, than
to the tranquillity, commerce, revenue, and liberty of
every part.
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Friday, November 80, 1787.]
THE FCEDERALIST. No. XIV.
TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
W     E have seen the necessity of the Union, as out
bulwark against foreign danger, as the conservator of peace among ourselves, as the guardian of our
commerce and other common interests, as the only substitute for those military establishments which have subverted the liberties of the old world, and as the proper
antidote for the diseases of faction, which have proved
fatal to other popular Governments, and of which alarming symptoms have been betrayed by our own. All
that remains, within this branch of our inquiries, is to
take notice of an objection, that may be drawn from the
great extent of country which the Unior embraces. A
few observations on this subject will be the more proper,
as it is perceived that the adversaries of the New Constitution are availing themselves of a prevailing prejudice, with regard to the practicable sphere of republican
administration, in order to supply, by imaginary diffi



84T              The Fwderalist.
culties, the want of those solid objections, which they
endeavor in vain to find.
The error which limits Republican Government to a
narrow district has been unfolded and refuted in preceding papers. I remark here only, that it seems to owe
its rise and prevalence chiefly to the confounding of a
republic with a democracy; and applying to the former,
reasonings drawn from the nature of the latter. The
true distinction between these forms was also adverted
to on a former occasion. It is, that in a democracy, the
people meet and exercise the Government in person; in a
republic, they assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents. A democracy, consequently,
will be confined to a small spot. A republic may be
extended over a large region.
To this accidental source of the error may be added
the artifice of some celebrated authors, whose writings
have had a great share in forming the modern standard
of political opinions. Being subjects either of an absolute or li.mited monarchy, they have endeavored to
heighten the advantages, or palliate the evils, of those
forms, by placing in comparison with them, the vices
and defects of the republican, and by citing as specimens of the latter, the turbulent democracies of ancient Greece and modern Italy. Under the confusion
of names, it has been an easy task to transfer to a
republic, observations applicable to a democracy only;
and among others, the observation that it can never be
established but among a small number of people, living
within a small compass of territory.
Such a fallacy may have been the less perceived, as
most of the popular Governments of antiquity were of
the democratic species; and even in modern Europe, to
which we owe the great principle of representation, no
example is seen of a Government wholly popular, and
founded, at the same time, wholly on that principle. If




The Fwederalist.              85
Europe has the merit of discovering this great mechan.
ical power in Government, by the simple agency of
which, the will of the largest political body may be
concentred, and its force directed to any object which
the public good requires, America can claim the merit
of making the discovery the basis of unmixed and extensive republics. It is only to be lamented, that any of
her citizens should wish to deprive her of the additional
merit of displaying its full efficacy in the establishment
of the comprehensive system now under her consideration.
As the natural limit of a democracy is that distance
from the central point which will just permit the most
remote citizens to assemble as often as their public
functions demand, and will include no greater number
than can join in those functions; so the natural limit
of a republic is that distance from the centre which
will barely allow the representatives of the people to
meet as often as may be necessary for the administration of public affairs. Can it be said, that the limits of
the United States exceed this distance? It will not be
said by those who recollect that the Atlantic coast is the
longest side of the Union; that during the term of thirteen years, the representatives of the States have been
almost continually assembled; and that the members
from the most distant States are not chargeable with
greater intermissions of attendance, than those from the
States in the neighborhood of Congress.
That we may form a juster estimate with regard to
this interesting subject, let us resort to the actual dimensions of the Union. The limits, as fixed by the treaty of
peace, are, on the east the Atlantic, on the south the
latitude of thirty-one degrees, on the west the Mississippi, and on the north an irregular line running in some
instances beyond the forty-fifth degree, in others falling
as low as the forty-second. The southern shore of Lake




The Fwderalist.
Erie lies below that latitude. Computing the distance
between the thirty-first and forty-fifth degrees, it amounts
to nine hundred and seventy-three common miles; computing it from thirty-one to forty-two degrees, to seven
hundred sixty-four miles and a half. Taking the mean
for the distance, the amount will be eight hundred sixtyeight miles and three fourths. The mean distance fromn
the Atlantic to the Mississippi does not probably ex.
ceed seven hundied and fifty miles. On a comparison
of this extent with that of several countries in Europe,
the practicability of rendering our system commensurate to it appears to be demonstrable.  It is not a great
deal larger than Germany, where a Diet, representing
the whole empire, is continually assembled; or than Poland before the late dismemberment, where another
National Diet was the depositary of the supreme power.
Passing by France and Spain, we find that in Great
Britain, inferior as it may be in size, the representatives
of the'northern extremity of the island have as far to
travel to the National Council, as will be required of
those of the most remote parts of the Union.
Favorable as this view of the subject may be, some
observations remain, which will place it in a light still
more satisfactory.
In the first place it is to be remembered, that the general Government is not to be charged with the whole
power of making and administering laws. Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects, which concern all the members of the republic, but which are not'
to be attained by the separate provisions of any. The
subordinate Governments, which can extend their care to
all those other objects which can be separately provided
for, will retain their due authority and -activity. Were
it proposed by the plan of the Convention to abolish
the Governments of the particular States, its adversaries
would have some ground for their objection; though it




The Faderalist.              87
would not be difficult to show, that if they were abol.
ished, the General Government would be compelled, by
the principle of self-preservation, to reinstate them in
their proper jurisdiction.
A second observation to be made is, that the immediate objects of the Fcederal Constitution is to secure the
union of the Thirteen Primitive States, which we know
to be practicable; and to add to'them such other States
as may arise in their own bosoms, or in their neighborhoods, which we cannot doubt to be equally practicable.
The arrangements that may be necessary for thoseangles and fractions of our territory which lie on our
north-western frontier, must be left to those whom further discoveries and experience will render more equal
to the task.
Let it be remarked, in the third place, that the intercourse throughout the Union will be daily facilitated by
new improvements.  Roads will everywhere be shortened, and kept in better order; accommodations for
travellers will be multiplied and meliorated; an interior
navigation on our eastern side will be opened throughout, or nearly throughout, the whole extent of the Thirteen States. The.communication between the western
and Atlantic districts, and between different parts of
each, will be rendered more and more easy, by those
numerous canals with which the beneficence of nature
has intersected our country, and which art finds it so
little difficult to connect and complete.
A fourth, and still more important consideration, is,
that as almost every State will, on one side or other, be
a frontier, and will thus find, in a regard to its safety, an
inducement to make some sacrifices for the sake of the
general protection; so the States which lie at the greatest distance from the heart of the Union, and which
of course may partake least of the ordinary circulation
of its benefits, will be at the same time immediately




The Foderalist.
contiguous to foreign nations, and will consequently
stand, on particular occasions, in greatest need of its
strength and resources.  It may be inconvenient for
Georgia, or the States forming our western or north.
eastern borders, to send their representatives to the seat
of Government; but they would find it more so to struggle alone against an invading enemy, or even to suppprt
alone the whole expense of those precautions which
may be dictated by the neighborhood of continual danger. If they should derive less benefit, therefore, from.the Union in some respects, than the less distant States,
they will derive greater benefit from it in other respects,
and thus the proper equilibrium will be maintained
throughout.
I submit to you, my Fellow-Citizens, these considerations, in full confidence that the good sense which has
so often marked your decisions will allow them their
due weight and effect; and that you will never suffer
difficulties, however formidable in appearance, or however fashionable the error on which they may be founded
to drive you into the gloomy and perilous scene into
which the advocates for disunion would conduct you.
Hearken not to the unnatural voice, which tells you that
the People of America, knit together as they are by
so many cords of affection, can no longer live together
as members of the same family; can no longer continue
the mutual guardians of their mutual happiness; can no
longer be fellow-citizens of one great, respectable, and
flourishing empire.  Hearken not to the voice which
petulantly tells you, that the form of Government recommended for your adoption is a novelty in the political
world; that it has never yet had a place in the theories
of the wildest projectors; that it rashly attempts what
it is impossible to accomplish. No, my Countrymen;
shut your ears against this unhallowed language. Shut
your hearts against the poison which it conveys; the




The Fwrderalist.             89
kindred blood which flaws in the veins of American citizens, the mingled blood which they have shed in defence
of their sacred rights, consecrate their Union, and excite
horror at the idea of their becoming aliens, rivals, enemies. And if novelties are to be shunned, believe me,
the most alarming of all novelties, the most wild of all
projects, the most rash of all attempts, is that of rending.
us in pieces, in order to preserve our liberties, and promote our happiness. But why is the experiment of an
extended republic to be rejected, merely because it may
comprise what is new? Is it not the glory of the People
of America, that whilst they have paid a decent regard
to the opinions of former times and other nations, they
have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for
custom, or for names, to overrule the suggestions of their
own good sense, the knowledge of their own situation,
and the lessons of their own experience? To this manly
spirit, posterity will be indebted for the possession, and
the world for the example, of the numerous innovations
displayed on the American theatre, in favor of private
rights and public happiness. Had no important step
been taken by the leaders of the Revolution for which a
precedent could not be discovered, no Government established of which an exact model did not present itself,
the People of the United States might, at this moment,
have been numbered among the melancholy victims
of misguided councils, must at best have been laboring
under the weight of some of those forms which have
crushed the liberties of the rest of mankind. Happily
for America, happily we trust for the whole human
race, they pursued a new and more noble course. They
accomplished a revolution which has no parallel in the
annals of human society. They reared the fabrics of
Governments-which have no model on the face of the
globe. They formed the design of a great Confederacy
which it is incumbent on their successors to improve




90               The Fwderalist.
and perpetuate.  If their works betray imperfections,
we wonder at the fewre:s of them. If they erred most
in the structure of the Union, this was the work most
difficult to be executed; this is the work which has been
new modelled by the act of your Convention, and it is
that act on which you are now to deliberate and to
decide.
PUBISlUs.
For the Independent Journal.
THE F(EDERALIST. No. XV.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
IN the course of the preceding papers, I have endeavored, my Fellow-Citizens, to place before you, in a
clear and convincing light, the importance of Union to
your political safety and happiness. I have unfolded to
you a complication of dangers to which you would be
exposed, should you permit that sacred knot which binds
the people of America together to be severed or dissolved
by ambition or by avarice, by jealousy or by misrepresentation. In the sequel of: the inquiry through which
I propose to accompany you, the truths intended to be
inculcated will receive further confirmation from facts
and arguments hitherto unnoticed.  If the road, over
which you will still have to pass, should in some places
appear to you tedious or irksome, you will recollect, that
you are in queslibf information on a subject the most
momentous which can engage the attention of a free
people: that the field through which you have to travel
is in itself spacious, and that the difficulties of the journey have been unnecessarily increased by the mazes




The Fwderalist.              91
with which sophistry has beset the way. It will be my
aim to remove the obstacles to your progress, in as compendious a manner as it can be done, without sacrificing
utility to despatch.
In pursuance of the plan which I have laid down, for
the discussion of the subject, the point next in order to
be examined is the " insufficiency of the present Confederaton to the preservation of the Union." It may perhaps be asked, what need there is of reasoning or proof
to illustrate a position, which is not either controverted
or doubted; to which the understandings and feelings
of all classes of men assent; and which in substance is
admitted by the opponents as well as by the friends of
the New Constitution? It must in truth be acknowledged, that however these may differ in other respects,
they in general appear to harmonize in this sentiment,
at least, that there are material imperfections-in our
National system, and that something is necessary to be
done to rescue us from impending anarchy. The facts
that support this opinion are no longer objects of speculation. They have forced themselves upon the sensibility of the people at large, and have at length extorted
from those, whose mistaken policy has had the principal
share in precipitating the extremity at which we are
arrived, a reluctant confession of the reality of those defects in the scheme of our Fcederal Government, which
have been long pointed out and regretted by the intelligent friends of the Union.
We may indeed, with propriety, be said to have
reached almost the last stage of National humiliation.
There is scarcely anything that can wound the pride, or
degrade the character of an independent'hation, which
we do not experience. Are there engagements, to the
performance of which we are held by every tie respectable among men? These are the subjects of constant
and unblushing violation. Do we owe debts to foreigners,




92                The FQederalist.
and to our own citizens, contracted in a time of imminent peril, for the preservation of our political existence?
These remain without any proper or satisfactory provision for their discharge.  Have we valuable- territories
and important posts in the possession of a foreign power, which, by express stipulations, ought long since to
have been surrendered? These are still retained, to the
prejudice of our interests not less than of our rights.
Are we in a condition to resent or to repel the aggression? We have neither troops, nor treasury, nor Government.* Are we even in a condition to remonstrate
with dignity? The just imputations on our own faith,
in respect to the same treaty, ought first to be removed.
Are we entitled by nature and compact to a free participation in the navigation of the Mississippi? Spain
excludes us from it. Is, public credit an indispensable
resource in time of public danger? We seem to have
abandoned its cause as desperate and irretrievable. Is
commerce of importance to National wealth? - Ours is
at the lowest point of declension. Is respectability in
the eyes of foreign powers a safeguard against foreign
encroachments? The imbecility of our Government
even forbids them to treat with us. Our ambassadors
abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty. Is
a violent and unnatural decrease in the value of land a
symptom of National distress? The price of improved
land in most parts of the country is much lower than
can be accounted for by the quantity of waste land at
market, and can only be fully explained by that want of
private and public confidence, which are so alarmingly
prevalent among all ranks, and Which have a direct tendency to depreciate property of every kind. Is private
credit the friend and patron of industry? That most
useful kind which relates to borrowing and lending is
reduced within the narrowest limits, and this still more
* I mean for the Union. - Publius.




The Fwvderalist.             93
from an opinion of insecurity than from the scarcity
of money. To shorten an enumeration of particulars
which can afford neither pleasure nor instruction, it may
in general be demanded what indication is there of National disorder, poverty, and insignificance, that could
befall a community so peculiarly blessed with natural
advantages as we are, which does not form a part of
the dark catalogue of our public misfortunes?
This is the melancholy situation, to which we have
been brought by those very maxims and councils, which
would now deter us from adopting the proposed Constitution; and which, not content with having conducted
us to the brink of a precipice, seem resolved to plunge
us into the abyss, that awaits us below. Here, my
Countrymen, impelled by every motive that ought to
influence an enlightened people, let us make a firm
stand for our safety, our tranquillity, our dignity, our
reputation. Let us at last break the fatal charm which
has too long seduced us from the paths of felicity and
prosperity.
It is true, as has been before observed, that facts, too
stubborn to be resisted, have produced a species of general assent to the abstract proposition that there exist
material defects in our National system; but the usefulness of the concession, on the part of the old adversaries
of Federal measures, is destroyed by a strenuous opposition to a remedy, upon the only principles that can
give it a chance of success. While they admit that the
Government of the United States is destitute of energy,
they contend against conferring upon it those powers
which are requisite to supply that energy: They seem
still to aim at things repugnant and irreconcilable; at
an augmentation of Federal authority, without a dimi
nution of State authority; at sovereignty in the Union,
and complete independence in the members. They still,
in fine, seem to cherish with blind devotion the political




94               The Foederalist.
monster of an imperium in imperio. This renders a full
display of the principal defects of the Confederation
necessary, in order to show, that the evils we experience
do not proceed from minute or partial imperfections, but
from fundamental errors in the structure of the building,
which cannot be amended, otherwise than by an alteration in the first principles and main'pillars of the fabric.
The great and radical vice in the construction of the
existing Confederation is in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or GOVERNMENTS, in
their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of which they consist. Though this principle
does not run through all the powers delegated to the
Union, yet it pervades and governs those on which the
efficacy of the rest depends. Except as to the rule of
apportionment, the United States have an indefinite
discretion to make requisitions for men and money;
but they have no authority to raise either, by regulations
extending to the individual citizens of America. The
consequence of this is, that, though in theory their resolutions concerning those objects are laws, constitutionally binding on the members of the Union, yet in practice they are mere recommendations, which the States
observe or disregard at their option.
It is a singular instance of -the capriciousness of the
human mind, that after all the admonitions we have had
from experience on this head, there should still be found
men, who object to the New Constitution, for deviating
from a principle which has been found the bane of the
old; and which is, in itself, evidently incompatible with
the idea of GOVERNMENT; a principle, in short, which, if
it is to be executed at all, must substitute the violent
and sanguinary agency of the sword to the mild influence of the Magistracy.
There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea




The Fwderalist.              95
of a league or alliance between independent nations,
for certain defined purposes precisely stated in a treaty;
regulating all the details of time, place. circumstance,
and quantity; leaving nothing to future discretion; and
depending for its execution on the good faith of the parties. Compacts of this kind exist among all civilized
nations, subject to the usual vicissitudes of peace and
war, of observance and non-observance, as the interests
or passions of the contracting powers dictate. In the
early part of the present century, there was an epidemical rage in Europe for this species of compacts; from
which the politicians of the times fondly hoped for
behefits which were never realized. With a view to
establishing the equilibrium of power and the peace of
that part of the world, all the resources of negotiation
were exhausted, and triple and quadruple alliances were
formed; but they were scarcely formed before they -were
broken, giving an instructive but afflicting lesson to
mankind, how little dependence is to be placed on treaties which have no other sanction than the obligations
of good faith; and which oppose general considerations
of peace and justice to the impulse of any immediate
interest or passion.
If the particular States in this country are disposed
to stand in a similar relation to each other, and to drop
the project of a general DISCRETIONARY SUPERINTENDENCE, the scheme would indeed be pernicious, and
would entail upon us all the mischiefs which have been
enumerated under the first head; but it would have
the merit of being, at least, consistent and practicable.
Abandoning all views towards a Confederate Government, this would bring us to a simple alliance offensive
and defensive; and would place us in a situation to be
alternately friends and enemies of each other, as our
mutual jealousies and rivalships, nourished by the intrigues of foreign nations, should prescribe to us.




96               Thke Fwderalist.
But if we are unwilling to be placed in this perilous
ttuation; if we still will adhere to the design of a
National Government, or, which is the same thing, of a
superintending power, under the direction of a common
Council, we must resolve to incorporate into our plan
those ingredients which may be considered as forming
the characteristic difference between a league and a
Government; we must extend the authority of the Union
to the persons of the citizens, - the only proper objects
of Government.
Government implies the power of making laws. It
is essential to the idea of a law, that it be attended with
a sanction; or, in other words, a penalty or punishment
for disobedience. If there be no penalty annexed to
disobedience, the resolutions or commands which pretend to be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more
than advice or recoimmendation. This penalty, whatever it may be, can only be inflicted in two ways: by
the agency of the Courts and Ministers of Justice, or by
military force; by the COERCION of the magistracy, or
by the COERCION of arms. The first kind can evidently
apply only to men: the last kind must, of necessity, be
employed against bodies politic, or communities, or
States. It is evident, that there is no process of a Court
by which the observance of thelaws can, in the last re.
sort, be enforced. Sentences may be denounced against
them for violations of their duty; but these sentences
can only be carried into execution by the sword. In an
association where the general authority is confined to
the collective bodies of the communities that compose
it, every breach of the laws must involve a state of war;
and military execution must become the only instrument
of civil obedience. Such a state of things can certainly
not deserve the name of Government, nor would any
prudent man choose to commit his happiness to it.
There was a time when we were told that breaches,




TkWe &Fderaltst.             97
by the States, of the regulations of the Fcederal author.
ity were not to be expected; that a sense of comfmon
interest would preside over the conduct of the -respective
members, and would beget a full compliance with all
the constitutional requisitions of the Union. This lan.
guage, at the present day, would appear as wild as a
great part of what we now hear from the same quarter
will be thought, when we shall have received further
lessons from that best oracle of wisdom, experience.  It
at all times betrayed an ignorance of the true springs by
which human conduct is actuated, and belied the original inducements to the establishment of civil power.
Why has Government been instituted at all?  Because
the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of
reason and justice, without constraint. Has it been
found that bodies of men act with more rectitude or
greater disinterestedness than individuals? The contrary of this has been inferred by all accurate observers
of the conduct of mankind; and the inference is founded
upon obvious reasons. Regard to reputation has a less
active influence, when the infamy of a bad action is
to be divided among a number, than when it is to fall
singly upon one. A spirit of faction, which is apt to
mingle its poison in the deliberations of all bodies of
men, will often hurry the persons of whom they are composed into improprieties and excesses, for which they
would-:blush in a private capacity.
It addition to all this, there is, in the nature of sovereign power, an impatience of control, that disposes
those who are invested with the exercise of it, to look
with an evil eye upon all external attempts to restrain
or direct its operations. From this spirit it happens,
that in every political association which is formed upon
the prinidple of uniting in a common interest a number
of lesselt seereignties, there will be found a kind of
eccentric tendency in the subordinate or inferior orbs,
VOL. I.         7




98                The Foaderalist.
by the operation of which there will be a perpetual effort
in each to fly off from the common centre. This tendency is not difficult to be accounted for. It has its
origin in the love of power. Power controlled or abridged
is almost always the rival and enemy of that power by
which it is controlled or abridged. This simple proposition will teach us, how little reason there is to expect,
that the persons intrusted with the administration of
the affairs of the particular members of a Confederacy
will at all times be ready, with perfect good-humor, and
an unbiased regard to the public weal, to execute the
resolutions or decrees of the general authority. The
reverse of this results from the constitution of human
nature.
if therefore the measures of the Confederacy cannot
be executed, without the intervention of the particular
administrations, there will be little prospect of their being
executed at all. The rulers of the respective members,
whether they have a constitutional right to do it or not,
will undertake to judge of the propriety of the measures
themselves. They will consider the conformity of the
thing proposed or required to their immediate interests
or aims; the momentary conveniences or inconveniences
that would attend its adoption. All this will be done;
and in a spirit of interested and suspicious scrutiny,
without that knowledge of National circumstances and
reasons of State, which is essential to a right judgment,
and with that strong predilection in favor of local
objects, which can hardly fail to mislead the decision.
The same process must be repeated in every member
of which the body is constituted; and the execution of
the plans, framed by the councils of the whole, will
always fluctuate on the discretion of the ill-informed
and prejudiced opinion of every part. Those who have.
been conversant in the proceedings of popular assemblies; who have seen how difficult it often is, when




The FPderalist.               99
there is no exterior pressure of circumstances, to bring
them to harmonious resolutions on important points,
will readily conceive how impossible it must be to induce a number of such assemblies, deliberating at a
distance from each other, at different times, and under
different impressions, long to co5perate in the same
views and pursuits.
In our case, the concurrence of thirteen distinct sovereign wills is requisite, under the Confederation, to the
complete execution of every important measure that
proceeds from the Union. It has happened as was to
have been foreseen. The measures of the Union have
not been executed; the delinquencies of the States have,
step by step, matured themselves to an extreme, which
has, at length, arrested all the wheels of the National
Government, and brought them to an awful stand. Congress at this time scarcely possess the means of keeping
up the forms of administration, till the States can have
time to agree upon a more substantial substitute for the
present shadow of a Fcederal Government. Things -did
not come to this desperate extremity at once. The
causes which have been specified produced at first only
unequal and disproportionate degrees of compliance
with the requisitions of the Union. The greater deficiencies of some States furnished the pretext of example
and the temptation of interest to the complying, or to
the least delinquent States. Why should we do more
in proportion than those who are embarked with us in
the same political voyage?  Why should we consent
to bear more than our proper share of the common burden? These were suggestions which human selfishness could-not withstand, and which even speculative
men, who looked forward to remote -consequences, could
not, without hesitation, combat. Each State, yielding
to the persuasive voice of immediate interest or convenience, has successively withdrawn its support, till the




100               The Fwederalist.
frail and tottering edifice seems ready to fall upon om
heads, and to crush us beneath its ruins.
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, December 4, 1787.]
THE F(EDERALIST. No. XVI.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
THE tendency of the principle of legislation for
States, or communities, in their political capacities, as it has been exemplified by the experiment we
have made of it, is equally attested by the events which
have befallen all other Governments of the confederate
kind, of which we have any account, in exact proportion to its prevalence in those systems. The confirmations of this fact will be worthy of a distinct and particular examination. I shall content myself with barely
observing here, that of all the Confederacies of antiquity,
which history has handed down to us, the Lycian and
Achaan leagues, as far as there remain vestiges of them,
appear to have been most free from the fetters of that
mistaken principle, and were accordingly those which
have best deserved, and have most liberally received, the
applauding suffrages of political writers.
This exceptionable principle may, as truly as emphatically, be styled the parent of anarchy: It has been seen
that delinquencies in the members of the Union are
its natural and necessary offspring; and -that whenever they happen, the only constitutional remedy is
force, and the immediate effect of the use of it, civil
war.
It remains to inquire how far so odious an engine of




The Fosderalist.           101
Government, in its application to us, would even be
capable of answering its end. If there should not be
a large army, constantly at the disposal of the Nationa
Government, it would either not be able to employ force
at all, or, when this could be done, it would amount to a
war between parts of the Confederacy, concerning the
infractions of a league; in which the strongest combination would be most likely to prevail, whether it consisted of those who supported, or of those who resisted,
the general authority. It would rarely happen that the
delinquency to be redressed would be confined to a
single member; and if there were more than one, who
had neglected their duty, similarity of situation would
induce them to unite for common defence. Indepen.
dent of this motive of sympathy, if a large and influen.
tial State should happen to be the aggressing member,
it would commonly have weight enough with its neigh.
bors, to win over some of them as associates to its
cause. Specious arguments of danger to the common
liberty could easily be contrived; plausible excuses for
the deficiencies of the party could; without difficulty,
be invented, to alarm the apprehensions, inflame the
passions, and conciliate the good-will, even of those
States which were not chargeable with any violation or
omission of duty. This would be the more likely to
take place, as the delinquencies of the larger memberb
might be expected sometimes to proceed from an ambitious premeditation in their rulers, with a view to getting rid of all external control upon their designs of
personal aggrandizement; the better to effect which, it
is presumable they would tamper beforehand with leading individuals in the adjacent States. If associates
could not be found at home, recourse would be had to
the aid of foreign powers, who would seldom be disinclined to encouraging the dissensions of a Confederacy,
from the firm Union of w ich theyhad so -much to fear:




102              The Fcaderalist.
When the sword is once drawn, the passions of men
observe no bounds of moderation. The suggestions of
wounded pride, the instigations of irritated resentment,
would be apt to carry the States, against which the
arms of the Union were exerted, to any extremes necemsary to avenge the affront, or to avoid the disgrace of
submission. The first war of this kind would probably
terminate in a dissolution of the Union.
This may be considered as the.violent death of the
Confederacy. Its more natural death is what we now
seem to be on the point of experiencing, if the Feaderal
system be not speedily renovated in a more substantial
form. It is not probable, considering the genius of this
country, that the complying States would often be inclined to support the authority of the Union, by engaging in a war against the non-complying States. They
would always be more ready to pursue the milder course
of putting themselves upon an equal footing with the
delinquent members, by an imitation of their example.
And the guilt of all would thus become the security of
all. Our past experience has exhibited the operation of
this spirit in its full light. There would in fact be an
insuperable difficulty in ascertaining when force could
with propriety be employed. In the article of pecuniary contribution, which would be the most usual source
of delinquency, it would often be impossible to decide,
whether it had proceeded from disinclination or inability. The pretence of the latter would always be at
hand. And the case must be very flagrant in which its
fallacy could be detected with sufficient certainty to
justify the harsh expedient of~ compulsion. It is easy
to see that this problem alone, as often as it should
occur, would open a wide field for the exercise of factious views, of partiality, and of oppression, in the majority that happened to prevail in the National council.
It seems to require no pains to prove that the States




The Fwaderalist.            103
ought not to prefer a National Constitution, which could
only be kept in motion by the instrumentality of a large
army, continually on foot to execute the ordinary requisitions or decrees of the Government. And yet this is
the plain alternative involved by those who Wish to
deny it the power of extending its operations to individuals. Such a scheme, if practicable at all, would
instantly degenerate into a military despotism; but it
will be found in every light impracticable. The resources of the Union would not be equal to the maintenance of an army considerable enough to confine the
larger States within the limits of their duty; nor would
the means ever be furnished of forming such an army
in the first instance. Whoever considers the populousness and strength of several of these States singly at
the present juncture, and looks forward to what they
will become, even at the distance of half a century,
will at once dismiss as idle and visionary any scheme,
which aims at regulating their movements by laws, to
operate upon them in their collective capacities, and to
be executed by a coercion applicable to them in the
same capacities. A project of this kind is little less
romantic than the monster-taming spirit, which is attributed to the fabulous heroes and demi-gods of antiquity.
Even in those Confederacies which have been composed of members smaller than many of our counties,
the principle of legislation for sovereign States, supported by military coercion, has never been found effectual. It has rarely been attempted to be employed, but
against the weaker members; and in most instances
attempts to coerce the refractory and disobedient have
been the signals of bloody wars, in which one half of
the Confederacy has displayed its banners against the
other half.
The result of these observations to an intelligent




104              The Federalist.
mind must be clearly this, that if it be possible at any
rate to construct a Fcederal Government capable of
regulating the common concerns and preserving the
general tranquillity, it must be founded, as to the objects committed to its care, upon the reverse of the
principle contended for by the opponents of the proposed Constitution. It must carry its agency to the
persons of the citizens. It must stand in need of no
intermediate legislations; but must itself be empowered to employ the arm of the ordinary magistrate to
execute its own resolutions. The majesty of the National authority must be manifested through the medium of the Courts of Justice. - The Government of the
Union, like that of each State, must be able to address
itself immediately to the hopes and fears of individuals;
and to attract to its support those passions which have
the strongest influence upon the human heart. It must,
in short, possess all the means, and have a right to re.
sort to all the methods, of executing the powers with
which it is intrusted, that are possessed and exercised
by the Governments of the particular States.
To this reasoning it may perhaps be objected, that if
any State should be disaffected to the authority of the
Union, it could at any time obstruct the execution of
its laws, and bring the matter to the same issue of force,
with the necessity of which the opposite scheme is reproached.
The plausibility of this objection will vanish the moment we advert to the essential difference between a
mere NON-COMPLIANCE and a DIRECT and ACTIVE RESISTANCE. If the interposition of the State Legislatures be
necessary to give effect to a measure of the Union, they
have only NOT TO ACT, or to ACT EVASIVELY, and the
measure is defeated. This neglect of duty may be disguised under affected but unsubstantial provisions, ao
as not to appear, and of course not to excite any alarm




Tke FRaderalist.           105
in the People for the safety of the Constitution. The
State leaders may even make a merit of their surreptitious invasions of it on the ground of some temporary
convenience, exemption, or advantage.
But if the execution of the laws of the National Government should not require the intervention of the State
Legislatures; if they were to pass into immediate operation upon the citizens themselves, the particular Governments could not interrupt their progress without an
open and violent exertion of an unconstitutional power.
No omissions, nor evasions, would answer the end.
They would be obliged to act, and in such a manner,
as would leave no doubt that they had encroached on
the National rights. An experiment of this nature
would always be hazardous in the face of a Constitution in any degree competent to its own defence, and
of a people enlightened enough to distinguish between
a legal exercise and an illegal usurpation of authority.
The success of it would require not merely a factious
majority in the Legislature, but the concurrence of the
Courts of Justice, and of the body of the People. If the
Judges were not embarked in a conspiracy with the
Legislature, they would pronounce the resolutions of
such a majority to be contrary to the supreme law of
the land, unconstitutional, and void. If the People were
not tainted with the spirit of their State representatives,
they, a Mthe natural guardians of the Constitution, would
throw their weight into the National scale, and give it a
decided preponderancy in the contest. Attempts of this
kind would not often be made with levity or rashness;
because they could seldom be made without danger to
the authors; unless in cases of a tyrannical exercise of
the Fcederal authority.
If opposition to the National Government should arise
from the disorderly conduct of refractory or seditious
individuals, it could be overcome by the same means




106              The Foaderalist.
which are daily employed against the same evil, under
the State Governments. The Magistracy, being equally
the Ministers of the law of the land, from whatever
source it might emanate, would doubtless be as ready
to guard the National as the local regulations from the
inroads of private licentiousness.  As to those partial
commotions and insurrections, which sometimes disquiet
society, from the intrigues of an inconsiderable faction,
or from sudden or occasional ill-humors, that do not infeet the great body of the community, the General Government could command more extensive resources, for
the suppression of disturbances of that kind, than
would be in the power of any single member. And
as to those mortal feuds, which, in certain conjunctures, spread a conflagration through a whole nation; or
through a very large proportion of it, proceeding either
from weighty causes of discontent,. given by the Government, or from the contagion of some violent popular
paroxysm, they do not fall within any ordinary rules
of calculation. When they happen, they commonly
amount to revolutions, and dismemberments of empire.
No form of Government can always either avoid or control them. It is in vain to hope to guard against events
too mighty for human foresight or precaution; and it
would be idle to object to a Government, because it
could not perform impossibilities.
PUBLIUS.




The Fcaderalist.            107
For the Independent Journal.
THE FCEDERALIST. No. XVII.
ro THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
AN objection, of a nature different from that which
has been stated and answered, in my last address,
may perhaps be likewise urged against the principle of
legislation for the individual citizens of America. It
may be said, that it would tend to render the Government of the Union too powerful, and to enable4it to absorb those residuary authorities, which it might be judged proper to leave with the States for local purposes.
Allowing the utmost latitude to the love of power
which any reasonable man can require, I confess I am
at a loss to discover what temptation the persons intrusted with the administration of the General Government could ever feel to divest the States of the authorities of that description. The regulation of the mere
domestic police of a State appears to me to hold out
slender allurements to ambition. Commerce, finance,
negotiation, and war seem to comprehend all the objects
which have charms for minds governed by that passion;
and all the powers necessary to those objects ought, in
the first instance, to be lodged in the National depository.
The administration of private justice between the citizens of the same State, the supervision of agriculture
and of other concerns of a similar nature, all those
things, in short, which are proper to be provided for by
local legislation, can never be desirable cares of a general jurisdiction. It is therefore improbable, that there
should exist a disposition in the Faederal councils to usurp
the powers with which they are connected; because the
attempt to exercise those powers would be as trouble



108              The Faderalist.
some as it would be nugatory; and the possession of
them, for that reason, would contribute nothing to the
dignity, to the importance, or to the splendor of the
National Government.
But let it be admitted, for argument' sake, that mere
wantonness and lust of domination would be sufficient
to beget that disposition; still it may be safely affirmed,
that the sense of the constituent body of the National
representatives, or, in other words, of the People of the
several States, would control the indulgence of so extravagant an appetite. It will always be far more easy for
the State Governments to encroach upon the National authorities3 than for the National Government to encroach
upon the State authorities. The proof of this proposition turns upon the greater degree of influence which
the State Governments, if they administer their affairs
with uprightness and prudence, will generally possess
over the People; a circumstance which at the same time
teaches us, that there is an inherent and intrinsic weak.
ness in all Federal Constitutions; and that too much
pains cannot be taken in their organization, to give
them all the force which is compatible with the principles of liberty.
The superiority of influence in favor of the particular
Governments would result partly from the diffusive construction of the National Government, but chiefly from
the nature of the objects to which the attention of the
State administrations would be directed.
It is a known fact in human nature, that its affections
are commonly weak in proportion to the distance or
diffusiveness of the object. Upon the same principle
that a man is more attached to his family than to his
neighborhood, to his neighborhood than to the community at large, the People of each State would be apt to
feel a stronger bias towards their local Governments
than towards the Government of the Union; unless the




The Federalist.              109
force of that principle should be destroyed by a much
better administration of the latter,
This strong propensity of the human heart would
find powerful auxiliaries in the objects of State regu.
lation.
The variety of more minute interests, which will
necessarily fall' under the superintendence of the local
administrations, and which will form so many rivulets
of influence, running through every part of the society,
cannot be particularized, without involving a detail too
tedious and uninteresting to compensate for the instruction it might afford.
There is one transcendent advantage belonging to the
province of the State Governments, which alone suffices
to place the matter in a clear and satisfactory light, — I
mean the ordinary administration of criminal and civil
justice. This, of all others, is the most powerful, most
universal, and most attractive source of popular obedience and attachment. It is that, which, being the immediate and visible guardian of life and property; having
its benefits and its terrors in constant activity before the
public eye; regulating all those personal interests, and
familiar concerns, to which the sensibility of individuals
is more immediately awake; contributes, more than any
other circumstance, to impressing upon the minds of
the People, affection, esteem, and reverence towards the
Government. This great cement of society, which will'
diffuse itself almost wholly through the chlannels of the
particular Governments, independent of all other causes
of influence, would insure them so decided an empire
over their respective citizens as to render them at all
times a complete counterpoise, and, not unfrequently,
dangerous rivals to the power of the Union.
The operations of the National Government, on the
other hand, falling less immediately under the observa.
tion of the mass of the citizens, the benefits derived




10               The Federalist.
from it will chiefly be perceived and attended to by
speculative men. Relating to more general interests,
they will be less apt to come home to the feelings of the
People; and, in proportion, less likely to inspire a habitual sense of obligation, and an active sentiment of
attachment.
The reasoning on this head has been abundantly exemplified by the experience of all Fcederal Constitutions
with which we are acquainted, and of all others which
have borne the least analogy to them.
Though the ancient feudal systems were not, strictly
speaking, Confederacies, yet they partook of the nature
of that species of association. There was a common
head, chieftain, or sovereign, whose authority extended
over the whole Nation; and a number of subordinate
vassals, or feudatories, who had large portions of land
allotted to them, and numerous trains of inferior vassals
or retainers, who occupied and cultivated that land upon
the tenure of fealty or obedience to the persons of whom
they held it. Each principal vassal was a kind of sovereign within his particular demesnes. The consequences of this situation were a continual opposition to
the authority of the sovereign, and frequent wars between the great barons, or chief feudatories themselves.
The power of the head of the Nation was commonly too
weak, either to preserve the public peace, or to protect
the People against the oppressions of their immediate
lords. This period of European affairs is emphatically
styled by historians, the times of feudal anarchy.
When the sovereign happened to be a man of vigorous and warlike temper and of superior abilities, he
would acquire a personal weight and influence, which
answered for the time the purposes of a more regular
authority. But in general, the power of the barons triumphed over that of the prince; and in many instances
his dominion was entirely thrown off, and the great fiefs




The Faderalist.             111
were erected into independent principalities or States.
In those instances in which the monarch finally prevailed over his vassals, his success was chiefly owing to the
tyranny of those vassals over their dependants. The
barons, or nobles, equally the enemies of the sovereign
and the oppressors of the common people, were dreaded
and detested by both; till mutual danger and mutual
interest effected an union between them fatal to the
power of the aristocracy. Had the nobles, by a conduct
of clemency and justice, preserved the fidelity and devotion of their retainers and followers, the contests between
them and the prince must almost always have ended in
their favor, and in the abridgment or subversion of the
royal authority.
This is not an assertion founded merely in specula.
tion or conjecture. Among other illustrations of its
truth which might be cited, Scotland will furnish a
cogent example. The spirit of clanship which was, at
an early day, introduced into that kingdom, uniting the
nobles and their dependants by ties equivalent to those
of kindred, rendered the aristocracy a constant overmatch for the power of the monarch, till the incorporation with England subdued its fierce and ungovernable
spirit, and reduced it within those rules of subordination, which a more rational and more energetic system
of civil polity had previously established in the latter
kingdom.
The separate Governments in a Confederacy may apt.
be compared with the feudal baronies; with this advantage in their favor, that from the reasons already explained, they will generally possess the confidence and
good.will of the People, and with so important a support, will be able effectually to oppose all encroachments
of the National Government. It will be well, if they are
not able to counteract its legitimate and necessary authority. The points of similitude consist in the rivalship




112              The Fwderalist.
of power, applicable to both, and in the CONCENTRATION of large portions of the strength of the community
into particular DEPOSITS, in one case at the disposal of
individuals, in the other case at the disposal of political
bodies.
A concise review of the events that have attended
Confederate Governments will further illustrate this important doctrine; an inattention to which has been the
great source of our political mistakes, and has given our
jealousy a direction to the wrong side. This review
shall form the subject of some ensuing papers.
PUBLIUS.
For the Independent Journal.
THE F(EDERALIST. No. XVIII.
To TEm PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
A MONG the Confederacies of antiquity, the most
considerable was that of the Grecian Republics,
associated under the Amphictyonic council. From the
best accounts transmitted of this celebrated institution,
it bore a very instructive analogy to the present Confederation of the American States.
The members retained the character of independent
and sovereign States, and had equal votes in the Feederal
council. This council had a general authority to propose and resolve whatever it judged necessary for the
common welfare of Greece; to declare and carry on
war; to decide, in the last resort, all controversies be.
tween the members; to fine the aggressing party; to
employ the whole force of the Confederacy against the
disobedient; to admit new members. The Amphic



The Federalist.             113
tyons were the guardians of religion, and of the immense
riches belonging to the temple of Delphos, where they
had the right of jurisdiction in controversies between
the inhabitants and those who came to consult the
oracle. As a further provision for the efficacy of the
Fmederal powers, they took an oath mutually to defend
and protect the united cities, to punish the violators of
this oath, and to inflict vengeance on sacrilegious despoilers of the Temple.
In theory, and upon paper, this apparatus of powers
seems amply sufficient for all general purposes. In several material instances, they exceed the powers enumerated in the Articles of Confederation. The Amphictyons
had in their hands the superstition of the times, one of
the principal engines by which Government was then
maintained; they had a declared authority to use coercion against refractory cities, and were bound by oath
to exert this authority on the necessary occasions.
Very different, nevertheless, was the experiment from
the theory. The powers, like those of the present Congress, were administered by deputies appointed wholly
by the cities in their political capacities; and exercised
over them in the same capacities. Hence the weakness,
the disorders, and finally the destruction of the Confederacy. The more powerful members, instead of being
kept in awe and subordination, tyrannized successively
over all the rest. Athens, as we learn from DEMOSTHENES, was the arbiter of Greece seventy-three years. The
Lacedtmnonians next governed it twenty-nine years; at
a subsequent period, after the battle of Leuctra, the
Thebans had their turn of domination.
It happened but too often, according to PLUTARCH,
that the deputies of the strongest cities awed and corrupted those of the weaker; and that judgment went in
favor of the most powerful party.
Even in the midst of defensive and dangerous wars
VOL. I.        ~8




114               The Fawderalist.
with Persia and Macedon, the members never acted in
concert, and were, more or fewer of them, eternally the
dupes or the hirelings of the common enemy. The in.
tervals of foreign war were filled up by domestic vicissi
tndes, convulsions, and carnage.
After the conclusion of the war with XERXES, it appears that the Lacedremonians required that a number
of the cities should be turned out of the Confederacy for
the unfaithful part they had acted.  The Athenians,
finding that the Lacedeemonians would lose fewer parti.
sans by such a measure than themselves, and would
become masters of the public deliberations, vigorously
opposed and defeated the attempt. This piece of history proves at once the inefficiency of the union, the
ambition and jealousy of its most powerful members,
and the dependent and degraded condition of the rest.
The smaller members, though entitled by the theory of
their system to revolve in equal pride and majesty
around the common centre, had become, in fact, satellites of the orbs of primary- magnitude.
Had the Greeks, says the Abb6 MILOT, been as wise
as they were courageous, they would have been admonished by experience of the necessity of a closer Union,
and would have availed themselves of the peace which
followed their success against the Persian arms, to establish such a reformation. Instead of this obvious policy,
Athens and Sparta, inflated with the victories and the
glory they had acquired, became first rivals and then
enemies; and did each other infinitely more mischief
than they had suffered from XERXEs. Their mutual jealousies, fears, hatreds; and injuries ended in the celebrated
Peloponnesian war; which itself ended in the ruin and
slavery of the Athenians who had begun it.
As a weak Government, when not at war, is ever agitated by internal dissensions; so these never fail to. bring
on fresh calamities from abroad. The Phocians having




The Fawderalist.            115
ploughed up some consecrated ground belonging to the
temple of Apollo, the Amphictyonic council, according
to the superstition of the age, imposed a fine on the
sacrilegious offenders. The Phocians, being abetted by
Athens and Sparta, refused to submit to the decree.
The Thebans, with others of the cities, undertook to
maintain the authority of the Amphictyons, and to
avenge the violated God. The latter, being the weaker
party, invited the assistance of PHILIP of Macedon, who
had secretly fostered the contest. PHILIP gladly seized
the opportunity of executing the designs he had long
planned against the liberties of Greece. By his intrigues
and bribes he won over to his interests the popular leaders of several cities; by their influence and votes, gained
admission into the Amphictyonic council; and by his
arts and his arms, made himself master of the Confederacy.
Such were the consequences of the fallacious principle on which this interesting establishment was founded.
Had Greece, says a judicious observer on her fate, been
united by a stricter Confederation, and persevered in her
Union, she would never have worn the chains of Macedon; and might have proved a barrier to the vast projects
of Rome.
The Achaean league, as it is called, was another society of Grecian republics, which supplies us with valuable instruction.
The Union here was far more intimate, and its organization much wiser, than in the preceding instance. It
will accordingly appear, that though not exempt from a
similar catastrophe, it by no means equally deserved it.
The cities composing this league retained their municipal jurisdiction, appointed their own officers, and
enjoyed a perfect equality. The Senate, in which they
were represented, had the sole and exclusive right of
oeace and war; of sending and receiving Ambassadors;




116               The Fewderalist.
of entering into treaties and alliances; of appointing a.Chief Magistrate or Proetor, as he was called, who commanded their armies, and who, with the advice and consent of ten of the senators, not only administered the
Government in the recess of the senate, but had a great
share in its deliberations, when assembled. According
to the primitive Constitution, there were two Praetors
associated in the administration; but on trial a single
one was preferred.
It appears that the cities had all the same laws and
customs, the same weights and measures, and the same
money. But how far this effect proceeded from the
authority of the Faederal Council is left in uncertainty.
It is said only that the cities were in a manner compelled to receive the same laws and usages. When
Lacedmemon was brought into the league by PHILOP(EMEN, it was attended with an abolition of the institutions and laws of LYCURGUs, and an adoption of those
of the Achaeans. The Amphictyonic Confederacy, of
which she had been a member, left her in the full exercise'of her Government and her legislation. This circumstance alone proves a very material difference in
the genius of the two systems.
It is much to be regretted that such imperfect monuments remain of this curious political fabric. Could its
interior structure and regular operation be ascertained, it
is probable that more light would be thrown by it on the
science of Fcederal Government, than by any of the like
experiments with which we are acquainted.
One important fact seems to. be witnessed by all the
historians who take notice of Achsean affairs. It is, that
as well after the renovation of the league by ARATUS, as
before its dissolution by the arts of Macedon, there was
infinitely more of moderation and justice in the administration of its Government, and less of violence and
sedition in the people, than were to be found in any of




The Fcederalist.-           117
the cities exercising singly all the prerogatives of sov
ereignty.  The Abb6 MABLY, in his observations on
Greece, says, that the popular Government, which was
so tempestuous elsewhere, caused no disorders in the
members of the Achaan republic, because it was there
tempered by the general authority and laws of the Confederacy.
We are not to conclude too hastily, however, that faction did not, in a certain degree, agitate the particular
cities; much less, that a due subordination and harmony
reigned in the general system. The contrary is sufficiently displayed in the vicissitudes and fate of the
republic.
Whilst the Amphictyonic Confederacy remained, that
of the Achaans, which comprehended the less impor
tant cities only, made little figure on the theatre of
Greece. When the former became a victim to Macedon, the latter was spared by the policy of PHILIP and
ALEXANDER. Under the successors of these princes, however, a different policy prevailed. The arts of divisions
were practised among the Achmeans: Each city was se
duced into a separate interest; the Union was dissolved.
Some of the cities fell under the tyranny of Macedonian
garrisons; others under that of usurpers springing out
of their own confusions. Shame and oppression erelong awakened their love of liberty. A few cities reunited. Their example was followed by others, as opportunities were found of cutting off their tyrants. The
league soon embraced almost the whole Peloponnesus.
Macedon saw its progress; but was hindered, by internal
dissensions, from stopping it. All Greece caught the
enthusiasm, and seemed ready to unite in one Confederacy, when the jealousy and envy in Sparta and Athens,
of the rising glory of the Achaeans, threw a fatal damp
on the enterprise. The dread of the Macedonian power
induced the league to court the alliance of the Kings of




118              The Fwderalist.
Egypt and Syria; who, as successors of ALEXANDF.R,
were rivals of the King of Macedon. This policy was
defeated by CLEOMENS, King of Sparta, who was led
by his ambition to make an unprovoked attack on his
neighbors, the Achaeans; and who, as an enemy to
Macedon, had interest enough with the Egyptian and
Syrian Princes, to effect a breach of their engagements
with the league. The Achaeans were now reduced to
the dilemma of submitting to CLEOMENS, or of supplicating the aid of Macedon, its former oppressor. The
latter expedient was adopted.  The contest of the
Greeks always afforded a pleasing opportunity to that
powerful neighbor, of intermeddling in their affairs. A
Macedonian army quickly appeared: CLEOMENS was
vanquished. The Achaeans soon experienced, as often
happens, that a victorious and powerful ally is but another name for a master. All that their most abject
compliances could obtain from him was a toleration of
the exercise of their laws. PHILIP, who was now on
the throne of Macedon, soon provoked, by his tyrannies,
fresh combinations among the Greeks. The Achoeans,
though weakened by internal dissensions, and by the
revolt of Messene, one of its members, being joined by
the AEtolians and Athenians, erected the standard of
opposition. Finding themselves, though thus supported,
unequal to the undertaking, they once more had recourse
to the dangerous expedient of introducing the succor of
foreign arms. The Romans, to whom the invitation
was made, eagerly embraced it. PHILIP was conquered:
Macedon subdued. A new crisis ensued to the league.
Dissensions broke out among its members. These the
Romans fostered. CALLICRATES, and other popular leaders, became mercenary instruments for inveigling their
countrymen. The more effectually to nourish discord
and disorder, the Romans had, to the astonishment of
those who confided in their sincerity, already proclaimed




The Federalist.              115
universal liberty* throughout Greece. With the same
insidious views, they now seduced the members from
the league, by representing to their pride the violation
it committed on their sovereignty. By these arts, this
union, the last hope of Greece, the last hope of ancient
liberty, was torn into pieces; and such imbecility and
distraction introduced, that the arms of Rome found little difficulty in completing the ruin which their arts had
commenced. The Achwaans were cut to pieces, and
Achaia loaded with chains, under which it is groaning
at this hour.
I have thought it not superfluous to give the outlines
of this important portion of history; both because it
teaches more than one lesson, and because, as a supplement to the outlines of the Achaean Constitution, it
emphatically illustrates the tendency of Federal bodies
rather to anarchy among the members, than to tyranny
in the head.
PUBLIUS.
For the Independent Journal.
THE FCEDERALIST. No. XIX.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
THE examples of ancient Confederacies, cited in my
last paper, have not exhausted the source of experimental instruction on this subject. There are existing
institutions, founded'on a similar principle, which merit
particular consideration. The first which presents itself
is the Germanic Body.
* This war but another name dence of the members on the Feed
more specious for the -indepen- eral head. — Publius.




120             lThe *wderalzst.
In the early ages of Christianity, Germany was oc.
cupied by seven distinct nations, who had no common
chief. The Franks, one of the number, having conquered the Gauls, established the kingdom which has
taken its name from them. In the ninth century, CHARLEMAGNE, its warlike monarch, carried his victorious arms
in every direction; and Germany became a part of his
vast dominions. On the dismemberment, which took
place under his sons, this part was erected into a separate and independent empire. CHARLEMAGNE and his
immediate descendants possessed the reality, as well as
the ensigns and dignity of imperial power. But the
principal vassals, whose fiefs had become hereditary,
and who composed the National Diets, which CHARLEMAGNE had not abolished, gradually threw off the yoke,
and advanced to sovereign jurisdiction and independence. The force of imperial sovereignty was insufficient to restrain such powerful dependants; or to preserve the unity and tranquillity of the empire.  The
most furious private wars, accompanied with every
species of calamity, were carried on between the different Princes and States. The imperial authority, unable to maintain the public order, declined by degrees, till
it was almost extinct in the anarchy, which agitated the
long interval between the death of the last Emperor of
the Suabian, and the accession of the first Emperor of
the Austrian lines. In the eleventh century, the Emperors enjoyed full sovereignty: In the fifteenth, they
had little more than the symbols and decorations of
power.
Out of this feudal system, which has itself many of
the important features of a Confeueracy, has grow-n the
Foaderal system, which constitutes the Germanic empire.
Its powers are vested in a Diet representing the component members of the Confederacy; in the Emperor, who
is the executive magistrate, with a negative on the de



The Fwederalist.            121
crees of the Diet; and in the Imperial Chamber and
Aulic Council, two judiciary tribunals having supreme
jurisdiction in controversies which concern the empire
or which happen among its members.
The Diet possesses the general power of legislating
for the empire; of making war and peace; contracting
alliances; assessing quotas of troops and money; con.
structing fortresses; regulating coin; admitting new
members; and subjecting disobedient members to the
ban of the empire, by which the party is degraded from
his sovereign rights, and his possessions forfeited. The
members of the Confederacy are expressly restricted from
entering into compacts, prejudicial to the empire; from
imposing tolls and duties on their mutual intercourse,
without the consent of the Emperor and Diet; from
altering the value of money; from doing injustice to
one another; or from affording assistance or retreat to
disturbers of the public peace. And the ban is denounced against such as shall violate any of these restrictions. The members of the Diet, as such, are subject in all cases to be judged by the Emperor and Diet,
and in their private capacities by the Aulic Council and
Imperial Chamber.
The prerogatives of the Emperor are numerous. The
most important of them are, his exclusive right to make
propositions to the Diet; to negative its resolutions; to
name ambassadors; to confer dignities and titles; to fill
vacant electorates; to found universities; to grant privileges not injurious to the States of the empire; to receive and apply the public revenues; and generally to
watch over the public safety. In certain cases, the Electors form a Council to him. In quality of Emperor, he
Rossesses no territory within the empire; nor receives
any revenue for his support. But his revenue and dominions, in other qualities, constitute him one of the
most powerful princes in Europe.




122             T1e FPwderalist.
From such a parade of constitutional powers, in the
representatives and head of this Confederacy, the natu.
ral supposition would be, that it must form an exception to the general character which belongs to its kindred systems. Nothing would be further from the
reality. The fundamental principle on which it rests,
that the empire is a community of sovereigns; that the
Diet is a representation of sovereigns; and that the
laws are addressed to sovereigns; renders the empire a
nerveless body, incapable of regulating its own members, insecure against external dangers, and agitated
with unceasing fermentations in its own bowels.
The history of Germany is a history of wars between the Emperor and the Princes and States; of
wars among the Princes and States themselves; of the
licentiousness of the strong, and the oppression of the
weak; of foreign intrusions, and foreign intrigues; of
requisitions of men and money disregarded, or partially
complied with; of attempts to enforce them, altogether
abortive, or attended with slaughter and desolation, involving the innocent with the guilty; of general imbecility, confusion, and misery.
In the sixteenth century, the Emperor, with one part
of the empire on his side, was seen engaged against the
other Princes and States. In one of the conflicts, the
Emperor himself was put to flight, and very near being
made prisoner by the Elector of Saxony. The late King
of Prussia was more than once pitted against his Imperial Sovereign; and commonly proved an overmatch
for him. Controversies and wars among the members
themselves have been so common, that the German
annals are crowded with the bloody pages which describe them.  Previous to the peace of Westphalia,
Germany was desolated by aowar of thirty years, in
which the Emperor, with one half of the empire, was
on one side, and Sweden, with the other half, on the




The Foaderalist.            123
opposite side. Peace was at length negotiated, and
dictated by foreign powers; and the articles of it, to
which foreign powers are parties, made a fundamental
part of the Germanic Constitution.
If the nation happens, on any emergency, to be more
united by the necessity of self-defence, its situation is
still deplorable.  Military preparations must be pre.
ceded by so many tedious discussions, arising from the
jealousies, pride, separate views, and clashing pretensions, of sovereign bodies, that before the Diet can settle
the arrangements, the enemy are in the field; and before the Faederal troops are ready to take it, are retiring
into winter quarters.
The small body of National troops, which has been
judged necessary in time of peace, is defectively kept
up, badly paid, infected with local prejudices, and supported by irregular and disproportionate contributions
to the treasury.
The impossibility of maintaining order, and dispensing justice among these sovereign subjects, produced
the experiment of dividing the Empire into nine or ten
circles or districts; of giving them an interior organization; and of charging them with the military execution
of the laws against delinquent and contumacious members. This experiment has only served to demonstrate,
more fully, the radical vice of the Constitution. Each
circle is the miniature picture of the deformities of this
political monster. They either fail to execute their commissions, or they do it with all the devastation and carnage of civil war. Sometimes whole circles are defaulters; and then they increase the mischief which they were
instituted to remedy.
We may form some judgment of this scheme of military coercion, from a sample given by THUANUS. In
Donawerth, a free and imperial city of the circle of Suabia, the Abbd DE ST. CROIX enjoyed certain immunities




124               The Faderalist.
which had been reserved to him. In the exercise of
these, on some public occasions, outrages were commit.
ted on him, by the people of the city. The consequence
was, that the city was put under the ban of the empire;
and the Duke of Bavaria, though Director of another
circle, obtained an appointment to enforce it. He soon
appeared before the city, with a corps of ten thousand
troops; and finding it a fit occasion, as he had secretly
intended from the beginning, to revive an antiquated
claim, on the pretext that his ancestors had suffered the
place to be dismembered from his territory,* he took possession of it in his own name, disarmed and punished
the inhabitants, and reannexed the city to his domains.
It may be asked, perhaps, what has so long kept this
disjointed machine from falling entirely to pieces? The
answer is obvious. The weakness of most of the members, who are unwilling to expose themselves to the
mercy of foreign powers; the weakness of most of the
principal members, compared with the fornmidable powers all around them; the vast weight and influence
which the Emperor derives from his separate and hereditary dominions; and the interest he feels, in preserving
a system with which his family pride is connected, and
which constitutes him the first Prince in Europe: these
causes support a feeble and precarious Union; whilst
the repellent quality, incident to the nature of sovereignty, and which time continually strengthens, prevents any
reform whatever, founded on a proper consolidation.
Nor is it to be imagined, if this obstacle could be surmounted, that the neighboring powers would suffer a
revolution to take place, which would give to the Empire the force and preeminence to which it is entitled.
Foreign nations have long considered themselves as interested in the changes made by events in this Constitu* PFEFFEL, Nouvel Abrqg. Chronol. for the expense of the expedition. —
de 1' Hist. etc., d'Allemnagne, says the Publius.
pretext was to indemnify himself




The Federalist.            12~
tion; and have, on various occasions, betrayed theiT
policy of perpetuating its anarchy and weakness.
If more direct examples were wanting, Poland, as a
Government over local sovereigns, might not improperly
be taken notice of. Nor could any proof more striking
be given of the calamities flowing from such institutions. Equally unfit for self-government and selfdefence, it has long been at the mercy of its powerful
neighbors; who have lately had the mercy to disburden
it of one third of its people and territories.
The connection among the Swiss Cantons scarcely
amounts to a Confederacy; though it is sometimes cited
as an instance of the stability of such institutions.
They have no common treasury; no common troops
even in war; no common coin; no common judicatory;
nor any other common mark of sovereignty.
They are kept together by the peculiarity of their
topographical position; by their individual weakness
and insignificancy; by the fear of powerful neighbors,
to one of which they were formerly subject; by the'few
sources of contention among a People of such simple
and homogeneous manners; by their joint interest in
their dependent possessions; by the mutual aid they
stand in need of, for suppressing insurrections and rebellions, an aid expressly stipulated, and often required
and afforded; and by the necessity of some regular and
permanent provision for accommodating disputes among
the Cantons. The provision is, that the parties at variance shall each choose four judges out of the neutral
Cantons, who, in case of disagreement, choose an umpire. This tribunal, under an oath of impartiality, pronounces definitive sentence, which all the Cantons are
bound to enforce. The competency of this regulation
may be estimated by a clause in their treaty of 1683,
with VICTOR AMADEUS of Savoy; in which he obliges
himself to interpose as mediator in disputes between




126               The Faoderalist.'
the Cantons, and to employ force, if necessary, against
the contumacious party.
So far as the peculiarity of their case will admit of
comparison with that of the United States, it serves to
confirm the principle intended to be established. Whatever efficacy the Union may have had in ordinary cases,
it appears that the moment a cause of difference sprung
up, capable of trying its strength, it failed. The controversies on the subject of religion, which in three instances have kindled violent and bloody contests, may
be said, in fact, to have severed the league. The Protestant and Catholic Cantons have since had their separate
Diets; where all the most important concerns are adjusted, and which have left the general Diet little other
business than to take care of the common bailages.
That separation had another consequence, which
merits attention. It produced opposite alliances with
foreign powers: of Berne, at the head of the Protestant
association, with the United Provinces; and of Luzerne
at the head of the Catholic association, with France.
PUBLIUS.
CFrom the. New York Packet, Tuesday, December 11, 1787.]
THE F(EDERALIST. No. XX.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
THE United Netherlands are a Confederacy of republics, or rather of aristocracies of a very remarkable
texture, yet confirming all the lessons derived from those
which we have already reviewed.
The Union is composed of seven coequal and sovereign States, and each State or province is a composi.




The Federalist.              127
tion of equal and independent cities. In all important
cases, not only the provinces, but the cities must be
unanimous.
The sovereignty of the Union is represented by the
States-General, consisting usqally of about fifty deputies appointed by the provinces. They hold their seats,
some for life, some for six, three, and one years. From
two provinces they continue in appointment during
pleasure.
The States-General have authority to enter into treaties and alliances; to make war and peace; to raise
armies and equip fleets; to ascertain quotas and demand
contributions.  In all these cases, however, unanimity
and the sanction of their constituents are requisite.
They have authority to appoint and receive ambassadors; to execute treaties and alliances already formed;
to provide for the collection of duties on imports and
exports; to regulate the mint, with a saving to the provincial rights; to govern as sovereigns the dependent
territories. The provinces are restrained, unless with
the general consent, from entering into foreign treaties;
from establishing imposts injurious to others or charging their neighbors with higher duties than their own
subjects. A Council of State, a chamber of accounts,
with five colleges of admiralty, aid and fortify the Faederal administration.
The executive magistrate of the Union is the Stadtholder, who is now a hereditary Prince. His principal
weight and influence in the republic are derived from
this independent title; from his great patrimonial estates; from his family connections with some of the
chief potentates of Europe; and, more than all, perhaps, from his being Stadtholder in the several provinces, as well as for the Union; in which provincial quality, he has the appointment of town magistrates under
certain regulations, executes provincial decrees, presides




L28               The Feaderalist.
when he pleases in the provincial tribunals, and has
throughout the power of pardon.
As Stadtholder of the Union, he has howev~er considerable prerogatives.
In his political capacity, he has authority to settle
disputes between the provinces, when other methods
fail; to assist at the deliberations of the States-General,
and at their particular conferences; to give audiences to
foreign Ambassadors, and to keep agents for his particular affairs at foreign Courts.
In his military capacity, he commands the Faederal
troops; provides for garrisons, and in general regulates
military affairs; disposes of all appointments, from Colonels to Ensigns, and of the Governments and posts of
fortified towns.
In his marine capacity, he is Admiral-General, and
superintends and directs everything relative to naval
forces, and other naval affairs; presides in the admiralties in person or by proxy; appoints Lieutenant-Admirals
and other officers; and establishes Councils of war,
whose sentences are not executed till he approves them.
His revenue, exclusive of his private income, amounts
to three hundred thousand florins. The standing army
which he commands consists of about forty thousand
men.
Such is the nature of the celebrated Belgic Confederacy, as delineated on parchment. What are the characters which practice has stamped upon it? Imbecility
in the Government; discord among the provinces; foreign influence and indignities; a precarious existence in
peace, and peculiar calamities from war.
It was long ago remarked by GROTIUS, that nothing
butthe hatred of his countrymen to the House of Austria kept them from being ruined by the vices of their
Constitution.
The Union of Utrecht, says another respectable writ



Phse Federalist.            129
er, reposes an authority in the States-General, seeming.
ly sufficient to secure harmony; but the jealousy in each
province renders the practice very different from the
theory.
The same instrument, says another, obliges each province to levy certain contributions; but this article never
could, and probably never will, be executed; because the
inland provinces, who have little commerce, cannot pay
an equal quota.
In matters of contribution, it is the practice to waive
the articles of the Constitution. The danger of delay
obliges the consenting provinces to furnish their quotas,
without waiting for the others; and then to obtain reimbursement from the others, by deputations, which are
frequent, or otherwise, as they can. The great wealth
and influence of the province of Holland enable her to
effect both these purposes.
It has more than once happened, that the deficiencies
have been ultimately to be collected at the point of the
bayonet; a thing practicable, though dreadful, in a Confederacy where one of the members exceeds in force all
the rest, and where several of them are too small to
meditate resistance; but utterly impracticable in one
composed of members, several of which are equal to
each other in strength and resources, and equal singly
to a vigorous and persevering defence.
Foreign Ministers, says Sir WILLIAM TEMPLE, who
was himself a foreign minister, elude matters taken ad
referendum, by tampering with the provinces and cities.
In 1726, the treaty of Hanover was delayed by these
means a whole year. Instances of a like nature are
numerous and notorious.
In critical emergencies, the States-General are often
compelled to overleap their constitutional bounds. In
1688, they concluded a treaty of themselves at the risk
of their heads. The treaty of Westphalia, in 1648, by
VOL. I.          9




130               The Fwderalist.
which their independence was formally and finally
recognized, was concluded without the consent of Zea.
land. Even as recently as the last treaty of peace with
Great Britain, the constitutional principle of unanimity
was departed from. A weak Constitution must necessarily terminate in dissolution, for want of proper powers, or the usurpation of powers requisite for the public
safety. Whether the usurpation, when once begus,
will stop at the salutary point, or go forward to the
dangerous extreme, must depend on the contingencies
of the moment. Tyranny has perhaps oftener grown
out of the assumptions of power, called for, on pressing
exigencies, by a defective Constitution, than out of the
full exercise of the largest constitutional authorities.
Notwithstanding the calamities produced by the Stadtholdership, it has been supposed, that without his influence in the individual provinces, the causes of anarchy
manifest in the Confederacy would long ago have dissolved it. " Under such a Government," says the Abb6
MABLY, "the Union could never have subsisted, if the
"provinces had not a spring within themselves, capable
" of quickening their tardiness, and compelling them to
"the same way of thinking. This spring is the Stadt"holder." It is remarked by Sir WILLIAM TEMPLE, " that
"in the intermissions of the Stadtholdership, Holland,
"by her riches and her authority, which drew the others
" into a sort of dependence, supplied the place."
These are not the only circumstances which have controlled the tendency to anarchy and dissolution. The
surrounding powers impose an absolute necessity of
Union to a certain degree, at the same time that they
nourish by their intrigues the constitutional vices, which
keep the republic in some degree always at their mercy.
The true patriots have long bewailed the fatal tendency of these vices, and have made no less than four
regular experiments by extraordinary assemblies, con



The Fcederalist.             131
vened for the special purpose, to apply a remedy. As
many times has their laudable zeal found it impossible
to unite the public councils in reforming the known, the
acknowledged, the fatal evils of the existing Constitution. Let us pause, my Fellow-Citizens, for one moment,
over this melancholy and monitory lesson of history;
and with the tear that drops for the calamities brought
on mankind by their adverse opinions and selfish passions, let our gratitude mingle an ejaculation to Heaven,
for the propitious concord which has distinguished the
consultations for our political happiness.
A design was also conceived of establishing a general
tax to be administered by the Fcederal authority. This
also had its adversaries and failed.
This unhappy people seem to be now suffering, from
popular convulsions, from dissensions among the States,
and from the actual invasion of foreign arms, the crisis
of their destiny. All nations have their eyes fixed on
the awful spectacle. The first wish prompted by humanity is, that this severe trial may issue in such a revolution of their Government, as will establish their Union,
and render it the parent of tranquillity, freedom, and
happiness: The next, that the asylum under which, we
trust, the enjoyment of these blessings will speedily be
secured in this country, may receive and console them
for the catastrophe of their own.
I make no apology for having dwelt so long on the
contemplation of these Fcaederal precedents. Experience
is the oracle of truth; and where its responses are unequivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred. The
important truth, which it unequivocally pronounces in
the present case, is that a sovereignty over sovereigns, a
Government over Governments, a legislation for communities, as contradistinguished from individuals, as it is
a solecism in theory, so in practice it is subversive of
the order and ends of civil polity, by substituting vio



132               The Fwederalist.!ence in place of law, or the destructive coercion of the
sword in place of the mild and salutary coercion of the
magistracy.
PUBLIUS.
For the Independent Journal.
THE FCEDERALIST. No. XXI.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK-:
HAVING in the three last numbers taken a summary
review of the principal circumstances and events,
which have depicted the genius and fate of other confederate Governments, I shall now proceed in the enumeration of the most important of those defects, which
have hitherto disappointed our hopes from the system
established among ourselves. To form a safe and satisfactory judgment of the proper remedy, it is absolutely
necessary that we should be well acquainted with the
extent and malignity of the disease.
The next most palpable defect of the subsisting Con.
federation, is the total want of a SANCTION to its laws,
The United States, as now composed, have no powers to'
exact obedience, or punish disobedience to their resolutions, either by pecuniary mulcts, by a suspension or divestiture of privileges, or by any other constitutional mode.
There is no express delegation of authority to them to use
force against delinquent members; and if such a right
should be ascribed to the Foederal head, as resulting from
the nature of the social compact between the States, it
must be by inference and construction, in the face of that
part of the second Article, by which it is declared, " that
"each State shall retain every power, jurisdiction, and




The  lwderalist.           133
"right, not expressly delegated to the United States in
"Congress assembled."  There is, doubtless, a striking
absurdity in supposing that a right of this kind does not
exist,'but we are reduced to the dilemma either of
embracing that supposition, preposterous as it may
seem, or of contravening or explaining away a provision,
which has been of late a repeated theme of the eulogies
of those who oppose the new Constitution; and the
want of which, in that plan, has been the subject of
much plausible animadversion, and severe criticism. If
we are unwilling to impair the force of this applauded
provision, we shall be obliged to conclude, that the
United States afford the extraordinary spectacle of a
Government, destitute even of the shadow of constitutional power to enforce the execution of its own laws.
It will appear, from the specimens which have been
cited, that the American Confederacy, in this particular,
stands discriminated from every other institution of a
similar kind, and exhibits a new and unexampled phenomenon in the political world.
The want of a mutual guaranty of the State Governments is another capital imperfection in the Fcederal
plan. There is nothing of this kind declared in the
Articles that compose it; and to imply a tacit guaranty
from consideration of utility, would be a still more
flagrant departure from the clause which has been mentioned, than to imply a tacit power of coercion, from
the like considerations. The-want of a guaranty, though
it might in its consequences endanger the Union, dops
not so immediately attack its existence, as the want of
a constitutional sanction to its laws.
Without a guaranty, the assistance to be derived from
the Union in repelling those domestic dangers, which
may sometimes threaten the existence of the State Constitutions, must be renounced. Usurpation may rear
its crest in each State, and trample upon the liberties




134              The Faederalist.
of the people; while the National Government could
legally do nothing more than behold its encroachments
with indignation and regret. A successful faction may
erect a tyranny on the ruins of order and law; while no
succor could constitutionally be afforded by the Union
to the friends and supporters of the Government. The
tempestuous situation from which Massachusetts has
scarcely emerged, evinces that dangers of this kind are
not merely speculative.  Who can determine, what
might have been the issue of her late convulsions, if
the malcontents had been headed by a CAESAR or by a
CROMWELL? Who can predict, what effect a despotism,
established in Massachusetts, would have upon the liberties of New Hampshire or Rhode Island; of Connecticut or New York?
The inordinate pride of State importance has suggested to some minds an objection to the principle of a
guaranty in the Fcederal Government, as involving an
officious interference in the domestic concerns of the
members. A scruple of this -kind would deprive us of
one of the principal advantages to be expected from
Union; and can only flow from a misapprehension of
the nature of the provision itself. It could be no impediment to reforms of the State Constitutions by a
majority of the People, in a legal and peaceable mode.
This right would remain undiminished..The guaranty
could only operate against changes to be effected.by
violence. Towards the prevention of calamities of this
kipd, too many checks cannot be provided. The peace
of society, and the stability of Government, depend absolutely on the efficacy of the precautions adopted on this
head. Where the: whole power of the Government is in
the hands of the People, there is the less pretence for the
use of violent remedies, in- partial or occasional distempers of the State. The natural cure for an ill-administration, in a popular or representative Constitution, is a




The Fawderalist.            13t
change of men. A guaranty by the National authority
would be as much levelled against the usurpations of
rulers, as against the ferments and outrages of faction
and sedition in the community.
The principle of regulating the contributions of the
States to the common treasury by QUOTAS is another
fundamental error in the Confederation. Its repugnancy
to an adequate supply of the National exigencies has
been already pointed out, and has sufficiently appeared
from the trial which has been made of it. I speak of it
now solely with a view to equality among the States.
Those who have been accustomed to contemplate the
circumstances which -produce constitutional wealth,
must be satisfied that there is no common standard or
barometer, by which the degrees of it can be ascertained. Neither the value of lands, nor the numbers
of the People, which have been successively proposed
as the rule of State contributions, has any pretension,to
being a just representative. If we compare the wealth
of the United Netherlands with that of Russia or Germany, or even of France; and if we at the same time
compare the total value of the lands and the aggregate
population of that contracted district with the total
value of the lands and the aggregate population of the
immense regions of either of the three last-mentioned
countries, we shall at once discover, that there is no
comparison between the proportion of either of these
two objects, and that of the relative wealth of those
nations. If the like parallel were to be run between
several of the American States, it would furnish a like
result. Let Virginia be contrasted. with North Carolina, Pennsylvania with Connecticut, or Maryland with
New Jersey, and we shall be convinced that the respective abilities of those States, in relation to revenue
bear little or no analogy to their comparative stock in
lands or to their comparative population. The position




136              The Fcederalist.
may be equally illustrated by a similar process between
the counties of the same State.  No man who is
acquainted with the State of New York will doubt
that the active wealth of King's County bears a much
greater proportion to that of Montgomery, than it would
appear to be, if we should take either the total value of
the lands, or the total numbers of the People, as a criterion!
The wealth of nations depends upon an infinite variety
of causes. Situation, soil, climate, the nature of the
productions, the nature of the Government, the genius
of the citizens, the degree of information they possess,
the state of commerce, of arts, of industry, these circumstances, and many more, too complex, minute, or
adventitious, to admit of a particular specification, occasion differences hardly, conceivable in the relative
opulence and riches of different countries. The consequence clearly is, that there can be no common measure
of National wealth; and, of course, no general or stationary rule, by which the ability of a State to pay
taxes can be determined. The attempt, therefore, to
regulate the contributions of the members of a Confederacy by any such rule, cannot fail to be productive of
glaring inequality and extreme oppression.
This inequality would of itself be sufficient in America to work the eventual destruction of the Union, if
any mode of enforcing a compliance with its requisitions could be devised. The suffering States would not
long consent to remain associated upon a principle
which distributes the public burdens with so unequal
a hand, and which was calculated to impoverish and
oppress the citizens of some States, while those of others would scarcely be conscious of the small proportion
of the weight they were required to sustain. This, however, is an evil inseparable from the principle of quotas
and requisitions.




The Fwderalist.              137
There is no method of steering clear of this inconvenience, but by authorizing the National Government
to raise its own revenues in its own way. Imposts, excises, and, in general, all duties upon articles of consumption, may be compared to a fluid, which will, in
time, find its level with the means of paying them. Thle
amount to be contributed by each citizen will in a degree be at his own option, and can be regulated by an
attention to his resources. The rich may be extravagant, the poor can be frugal; and private oppression
may always be avoided, by a judicious selection of objects proper for such impositions. If inequalities should
arise in some States from duties on particular objects,
these will, in all probability, be counterbalanced by pro.
portional inequalities in other States, from the duties on
other objects. In the course of time and things, an
equilibrium, as far as it is attainable in so complicated
a subject, will be established everywhere.  Qr, if in.
equalities should still exist, they would neither be so
great in their degree, so uniform in their operation, nor
so odious in their appearance, as those which would
necessarily spring from quotas, upon any scale that can
possibly be devised.
It is a signal advantage of taxes on articles of consumption, that they contain in their own nature a security against excess. They prescribe their own limit;
which cannot be exceeded without defeating the end
proposed, - that is, an extension of the revenue. When
applied to this object, the saying is as just as it is witty,
that, " in political arithmetic, two and two do not always
make four." If duties are too high, they lessen the consumption; the collection is eluded; and the product to
the treasury is not so great as when they are confined
within proper and moderate bounds. This forms a
complete barrier against any material oppression of the
citizens, by taxes of this class, and is itself a natural
limitation of the power of imposing them.




138               The Fcederalist.
Impositions of this kind usually fall under the denomination of indirect taxes, and must for a long time
constitute the chief part of the revenue raised in this
country. Those of the direct kind, which principally
relate to lands and buildings, may admit of a rule of
apportionment. Either the value of land, or the number of the people, may serve as a standard. The state
of agriculture and the populousness of a country have
been considered as nearly connected with each other.
And as a rule for the purpose intended, numbers, in the
view of simplicity and certainty, are entitled to a preference. In every country it is a Herculean task to obtain
a valuation of the land: in a country imperfectly settled
and progressive in improvement, the difficulties are increased almost to impracticability. The expense of an
accurate valuation is, in all situations, a formidable objection. In a branch of taxation where no limits to the
discretion of the Government are to be found in the
nature of things, the establishment of a fixed rule, not
incompatible with the end, may be attended with fewer
inconveniences than to leave that discretion altogether
at large.
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Friday, December 14, 1787.]
THE FCEDERALIST. No. XXII.
TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
IN addition to the defects already enumerated in the
existing Fcederal system, there are others of not
less importance, which concur in rendering it altogether
unfit for the administration of the affairs of the Union.




The Federalist.              139
The want of a power to regulate commerce is by all
parties allowed to be of the number. The utility of
such a power has been anticipated under the first head
of our inquiries; and for this reason, as well as from the
universal conviction entertained upon the subject, little
need be added in this place. It is indeed evident, on
the most superficial view, that there is no object, either
as it respects the interests of trade or finance, that more
strongly demands a Fcederal superintendence. The want
of it has already operated as a bar to the formation of
beneficial treaties with foreign powers; and has given
occasions of dissatisfaction between the States. No Nation acquainted with the nature of our political association would be unwise enough to enter into stipulations
with the United States, by which they conceded privileges of ally importance to them, while they were apprised
that the engagements on the part of the Union might
at any moment be violated by its members; and while
they found from experience that they might enjoy every
advantage they desired in our markets, without granting
us any return, but such as their momentary convenience
might suggest. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at,
that Mr. JENKINSON, in ushering into the House of Commons a bill for regulating the temporary intercourse between the two countries, should preface its introduction'by a declaration, that similar provisions in former bills
had been found to answer every purpose to the commerce of Great Britain, and that it would be prudent to
persist in the plan until it should appear whether the
American Government was likely or not to acquire
greater consistency.*
Several States have endeavored, by separate prohibitions, restrictions, and exclusions, to influence the conduct
of that kingdom in this particular;. but the want of con*This, as nearly as I. can recol- on introducing the last bill. - Pub.
lect, was the sense of his speech lius.




140               The Fwederalist.
cert, arising from the want of a general authority, and
from clashing and dissimilar views in the States, has hitherto frustrated every experiment of the kind, and will
continue to do so, as long as the same obstacles to an
uniformity of measures continue to exist.
The interfering and unneighborly regulations of some
States, contrary to the true spirit of the Union, have, in
different instances, given just cause of umbrage and
complaint to others; and it is to be feared that examples
of this nature, if not restrained by a National control,
would be multiplied and extended till they became not
less serious sources of animosity and discord, than injurious impediments to the intercourse between the different parts of the Confederacy. "c The commerce of the
"German empire  is in continual trammels, from the
"multiplicity of the duties which the several Princes
"and States exact upon the merchandises passing
" through their territories; by means of which the fine
" streams and navigable rivers with which Germany is
" so happily watered are rendered almost useless."
Though the genius of the people of this country might
never permit this description to be strictly applicable to
us, yet we may reasonably expect from the gradual conflicts of State regulations, that the citizens of each
would at length come to be considered and treated by
the others in no better light than that of foreigners and
aliens.
The power of raising armies, by the most obvious
construction of the Articles of the Confederation, is
merely a power of making requisitions upon the States
for quotas of men. This practice, in the course of the
late war, was found replete with obstructions to a vigorous, and to an economical system of defence. It gave
birth to a competition between the States, which created
a kind of auction for men. In order to furnish the quo* Encyclopcedia, article Empire. - Publius.




The Federalist.              141
tas required of them, they outbid each other, till boun.
ties grew to an enormous and insupportable size. The
hope of a still further increase afforded an inducement
to those who were disposed to serve, to procrastinate
their enlistment; and disinclined them from engaging for
any considerable periods. Hence, slow and scanty levies
of men, in the most critical emergencies of our affairs;
short enlistments at an unparalleled expense; continual
fluctuations in the troops, ruinous to their discipline, and
subjecting the public safety frequently to the perilous
crisis of a disbanded army. Hence, also, those oppressive expedients for raising men, which were upon several
occasions practised, and which nothing but the enthusiasm of liberty would have induced the people to endure.
This method of raising troops is not more unfriendly
to economy and vigor than it is to an equal distribution
of the burden. The States near the seat of war, influenced by motives of self-preservation, made efforts to
furnish their quotas, which even exceeded their abilities;
while those at a distance from danger were, for the most
part, as remiss as the others were diligent, in their exertions. The immediate pressure of this inequality was
not in this case, as in that of the contributions of money, alleviated by the hope of a final liquidation. The
States which did not pay their proportions of money
might at least be charged with their deficiencies; but no
account could be formed of the deficiencies in the supplies of men. We shall not, however, see much reason
to regret the want of this hope, when we consider how
little prospect there is, that the most delinquent States
will ever be able to make compensation for their pecuniary failures. The system of quotas and requisitions,
whether it be applied to men or money, is, in every
view, a system of imbecility in the Ufnion, and of inequality and injustice among the members.
The right of equal suffrage among the States is




142                 The Fawderalist.
another exceptionable part of the Confederation. Every
idea of proportion and every rule of fair representation
conspire to condemn a principle, which gives to Rhode
Island an equal weight in the scale of power with Massachusetts, or Connecticut, or New York; and to Delaware an equal voice in the National deliberations with
Pennsylvania, or Virginia, or North Carolina. Its operation contradicts that fundamental maxim of republican
Government, which requires that the sense of the majority should prevail. Sophistry may reply, that sovereigns are equal, and that a majority of the votes of the
States will be a majority of confederated America. But
this kind of logical legerdemain will never counteract
the plain suggestions of justice and common sense. It
may happen that this majority of States is a small minority of the People of America; * and two thirds of the
People of America could not long be persuaded, upon
the credit of artificial distinctions and syllogistic subtleties, to submit their interests to the management and
disposal of one third. The larger States would after a
while revolt from the idea of receiving the law from the
smaller. To acquiesce in such a privation of their due
importance in the political scale, would be not merely to
be insensible to the love of power, but even to sacrifice
the desire of equality. It is neither rational to expect
the first, nor just to require the last.'The smaller States,
considering how peculiarly their safety and welfare depend on Union, ought readily to renounce a pretension,
which, if not relinquished, would prove fatal to its duration.
It may be objected to this, that not seven but nine
States, or two thirds of the whole number, must consent
to the most important resolutions; and it may be thence
* New Hampshire, Rhode Island, a majority of the whole number of
New Jersey, Delaware, Georgia, the States, but they do not contain
South Carolina, and Maryland are one third of the people.-Publius.




The Fwederalist.              143
inferred, that nine States would always comprehend a
majority of the inhabitants of the Union. But this
does not obviate the impropriety of an equal vote between States of the most unequal dimensions and populousness: nor is the inference accurate in point of fact;
for we can enumerate nine States, which contain less
than a majority of the people;* and it is constitutionally possible that these nine may give the vote.
Besides, there are matters of considerable moment determinable by a bare majority: and there are others,
concerning which doubts have been entertained, which,
if interpreted in favor of the sufficiency of a vote of
seven States, would extend its operation to interests of
the first magnitude. In addition to this, it is to be observed that there is a probability of an increase in the
number of States, and no provision for a proportional
augmentation of the ratio of votes
But this is not all: what at first sight may seem a
remedy, is, in reality, a poison.  To give a minority a
negative upon the majority, (which is always the case
where more than a majority is requisite to a decision,) is,
in its tendency, to subject the sense of the greater number
to that of the lesser. Congress, from the non-attendance
of a few States, have been frequently in the situation of
a Polish Diet, where a single VOTE has been sufficient to
put a stop to all their movements. A sixtieth part of
the Union, which is about the proportion of Delaware
and Rhode Island, has several times been able to oppose
an entire bar to its operations. This is one of those
refinements which, in practice, has an effect the reverse
of what is expected from it in theory. The necessity
of unanimity in public bodies, or of something approaching towards it, has been founded upon a supposition that it would contribute to security. But its real
* Add New York and Connecti- will still be less than a majority. —:ut to the foregoing seven, and they Publius.




144              The Fcederalist.
operation is to embarrass the administration, to destroy
the energy of Government, and to substitute the pleasure, caprice, or artifices of an insignificant, turbulent, or
corrupt junto, to the regular deliberations and'decisions
of a respectable majority. In those emergencies of a
nation, in which the goodness or badness, the weakness
or strength of its Government, is of the greatest impor.
tance, there is commonly a necessity for action. The
public business must, in some way or other, go forward
If a pertinacious minority can control the opinion of a
majority, respecting the best mode of conducting it, the
majority, in order that something may be done, must
conform to the views of the minority; and thus the
sense of the smaller number will overrule that of the
greater, and give a tone to the National proceedings.
Hence, tedious delays; continual negotiation and intrigue; contemptible compromises of the public good.
And yet, in such a system, it is even happy when
such compromises can take place: for upon some occasions things will not admit of accommodation; and
then the measures of Government must be injuriously
suspended, or fatally defeated. It is often, by the impracticability of obtaining the concurrence of the necessary number of votes, kept in a state of inaction. Its
situation must always savor of weakness, sometimes
border upon anarchy.
It is not difficult to discover, that a principle of this
kind gives greater scope to foreign corruption, as well as
to domestic faction, than that which permits the sense
of the majority to decide; though the contrary of this
has been presumed. The mistake has proceeded from
not attending with due care to the mischiefs that may
be occasioned, by obstructing the progress of Government at certain critical seasons. When the concurrence
of a large number is required by the Constitution to the
doing of any National act, we are apt to rest satisfied




The Faederalist.            145
that all is safe, because nothing improper will be likely
to be done; but we forget how much good may be prevented, and how much ill may be produced, by the
power of hindering the doing what may be necessary
and of keeping affairs in the same unfavorable posture in which they may happen to stand at particular
periods.
Suppose, for instance, we were engaged in a war, ill
conjunction with one foreign nation, against another.
Suppose the necessity of our situation demanded peace,
and the interest or ambition of our ally led him to seek
the prosecution of the war, with views that might justify
us in making separate terms. In such a state of things,
this ally of ours would evidently find it much easier, by
his bribes and intrigues, to tie up the hands of. Government from making peace, where two thirds of all the
votes were requisite to that object, than where a simple
majority would suffice. In the first case he would have
to corrupt a smaller number; in the last, a greater number. Upon the same principle, it would be much easier
for a foreign power with which we were at war, to perplex our councils and embarrass our exertions. And,
in a commercial view, we may be subjected to similar
inconveniences. A nation, with which we might have a
treaty of commerce, could with much greater facility
prevent our forming a. connection with her competitor
in trade; though such a connection should be ever so
beneficial to ourselves.
Evils of this description ought not to be regarded as
imaginary. One of the weak sides of republics, among
their numerous advantages, is, that they afford too easy
an inlet to foreign corruption. An hereditary monarch,
though often disposed to sacrifice his subjects to his ambition, has so great a personal interest in the Government, and in the external glory of the Nation, that it is
not easy for a foreign power to give him an equivalent
VOL. I.        10




146              The Faederalist.
for what he would sacrifice by treachery to the State.
The world has accordingly been witness to few examples of this species of royal prostitution, though there
have been abundant specimens of every other kind.
In republics, persons elevated from the mass of the
community, by the suffrages of their fellow-citizens, to
stations of great preeminence and power, may find compensations for betraying their trust, which, to any but
minds animated and guided by superior virtue, may appear to exceed the proportion of interest they have in
the common stock, and to overbalance the obligations
of duty. Hence it is that history furnishes us with so
many mortifying examples of the prevalency of foreign
corruption in republican Governments. How much
this contributed to the ruin of the ancient commonwealths has been already delineated. It is well known
that the deputies of the United Provinces have,- in various instances, been purchased by the emissaries of the
neighboring kingdoms.  The Earl of Chesterfield, (if
my memory serves me right,) in a letter to his court,
intimates that his success in an important negotiation
must depend on his obtaining a Major's commission
for one of those deputies. And in Sweden the parties
were alternately bought by France and England, in so
barefaced and notorious a manner that it excited universal disgust in the nation, and was a principal cause
that the most limited monarch in Europe, in a single
day, without tumult, violence, or opposition, became one
of the most absolute and uncontrolled.
A circumstance which crowns the defects of the Confederation remains yet to be mentioned, - the want of a
judiciary power. Laws are a dead letter, without courts
to expound and define their true meaning and operation.
The treaties of the United States, to have any force at
all, must be considered as part of the law of the land.
Their true import, as far as respects individuals, must,




The Faederalist.              147
like all other laws, be ascertained by judicial determinations. To produce uniformity in these determinations,
they ought to be submitted, in the last resort, to one
SUPREME TRIBUNAL. And this tribunal ought to be instituted under the same authority which forms the treaties
themselves. These ingredients are both indispensable.
If there is in each State a court of final jurisdiction,
there may be as many different final determinations on
the same point, as there are courts. There are endless
diversities in the opinions of men. We often see not
only different courts, but- the Judges of the same court
differing from  each other.  To avoid the confusion
which would unavoidably result from the contradictory
decisions of a number of independent judicatories,.all
nations have found it necessary to establish one court
paramount to the rest, possessing a general superintendence, and authorized to settle and declare in the last
resort a uniform rule of civil justice.
This is the more necessary where the frame of the
Government is so compounded that the laws of the
whole are in danger of being contravened by the laws
of the parts. In this case, if the particular tribunals are
invested with a right of ultimate jurisdiction, besides
the contradictions to be expected from difference of
opinion, there will be much to fear from the bias of
local views and prejudices, and from the interference
of local regulations. As often as such an interference
was to happen, there would be reason to apprehend that
the provisions of the particular laws might be preferred
to thosb of the general laws; for nothing is more natural
to men in office than to look with peculiar deference
towards that authority to which they owe their official
existence. The treaties of the United States, under the
present Constitution, are liable to the infractions of thirteen different Legislatures, and as many different courts
of final jurisdiction, acting under the authority of those




148               The Fwderalist.
Legislatures. The faith, the reputation, the peace of
the whole Union, are thus continually at the mercy of
the prejudices, the passions, and the interests of every
member of which it is composed. Is it possible that
foreign nations can either respect or'confide in such a
Government? Is it possible that the People of America
will longer consent to trust their honor, their happiness,
their safety, on so precarious a foundation?
In this review of the Confederation, I have confined
myself to the exhibition of its most material defects;
passing over those imperfections in its details by which
even a great part of the power intended to be conferred
upon it has been in a great measure rendered abortive.
It must be by this time evident to all men of reflection,
who can divest themselves of the prepossessions of preconceived opinions, that it is a system so radically
vicious and unsound, as to admit not of amendment
but by an entire change in its leading features and characters.
The organization of Congress is itself utterly improper for the exercise of those powers which are necessary to be deposited in the Union. A single Assembly may be a proper receptacle of those slender, or rather
fettered, authorities, which have been heretofore delegated to the Fcederal head; but it would be inconsistent
with all the principles of good government, to intrust it
with those additional powers, which, even the moderate
and more rational adversaries of the proposed Constitution admit, ought to reside in the United States. If
that plan should not be adopted; and if the necessity
of the Union should be able to withstand the ambitious aims of those men, who may indulge magnificent
schemes of personal aggrandizement from its dissolution; the probability would be, that we should run into
the project of conferring supplementary powers upon
Congress, as they are now constituted; and either the




The Faderalist.              149
machine, from the intrinsic feebleness of its structure,
will moulder into pieces, in spite of our ill-judged efforts
to prop it; or, by successive augmentations of its force
and energy, as necessity might prompt, we shall finally
accumulate, in a single body, all the most important
prerogatives of sovereignty, and thus entail upon our
posterity, one of the most execrable forms of Government that human infatuation ever contrived. Thus we
should create in reality that very tyranny, which the adversaries of the new Constitution either are, or affect to
be, solicitous to avert.
It has not a little contributed to the infirmities of the
existing': Fcederal system, that it never had a ratification
by that PEOPLE. Resting on no better foundation than
the consent of the several Legislatures, it has been exposed to frequent and intricate questions concerning the
validity of its powers; and has, in some instances, given
birth to the enormous doctrine of a right of legislative
repeal. Owing its ratification to the law of a State, it
has been contended, that the same authority might repeal the law by which it was ratified. However gross
a heresy it may be to maintain that a party to a compact has a right to revoke that compact, the doctrine
itself has had respectable advocates. The possibility of
a question of this nature, proves the necessity of laying
the foundations of our National Government deeper than
in the mere sanction of delegated authority. The fab.
ric of American Empire ought to rest on the solid basis
of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE. The streams of National power ought to flow immediately from that pure
original fountain of all legitimate authority.
PUBLIUS.




150               The Fwrderalist.
[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, December 18, 1787.]
THE F4EDERALIST. No. XXIII.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
THE necessity of a Constitution, at least equally energetic with the one proposed, to the preservation
of the Union, is the point, at the examination of which
we are now arrived.
This inquiry will naturally divide itself into three
branches, - the objects to be provided for, by the Feederal Government; the quantity of power necessary to
the accomplishment of those objects; the persons upon
whom that power ought to operate. Its distribution
and organization will more properly claim our attention under the succeeding head.
The principal purposes to be answered by Union are
these, - the common defence of the members; the preservation of the public peace, as well against internal
convulsions as external attacks; the regulation of commerce with other nations, and between the States; the
superintendence of our intercourse, political and commercial, with foreign countries.
The authorities essential to the care of -the common
defence are these, — to raise armies; to build and equip
fleets; to prescribe rules for the government of both;
to direct their operations; to provide for their support.
These powers ought to exist without limitation; because
it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variet4
of National exigencies, or the correspondent extent and
variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy
them. The circumstances that endanger the safety of
nations are infinite; and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to




The Federalist.             151
which the care of it is committed. This power ought
to be coextensive with all the possible combinations of
such circumstances; and ought to be under the direction of the same councils which are appointed to presitle over the common defence.
This is one of those truths which, to a correct and
unprejudiced mind, carries its own evidence along with
it; and may be obscured, but cannot be made plainer
by argument or reasoning. It rests upon axioms as
simple as they are universal; the means ought to be
proportioned to the end; the persons, from whose agency
the attainment of any end is expected, ought to possess
the means by which it is to be attained.
Whether there ought to be a Federal Government
intrusted with the care of the common defence, is a
question in the first instance, open for discussion; but
the moment it is decided in the affirmative, it will follow, that that Government ought to be clothed with all
the powers requisite to the complete execution of its
trust. And unless it can be shown, that the circumstances which may affect the public safety are reducible
within certain determinate limits; unless the contrary
of this position can be fairly and rationally disputed,
it must be admitted, as a necessary consequence, that
there can be no limitation of that authority, which is
to provide for the defence and protection of the community, in any matter essential to its efficacy; that is,
in any matter essential to the formation, direction, or
support of the NATIONAL FORCES.
Defective as the present Confederation has been
proved to be, this principle appears to have been fully
recognized by the framers of it; though they have not
made proper or adequate provision for its exercise.
Congress have an unlimited discretion to make requisitions of men )and money; to govern the army and
navy; to direct their operations. As their requisitions




152              The Foederalist.
are made constitutionally binding upon the States, who
are in fact under the most solemn obligations to furnish
the supplies required of them, the intention evidently
was, that the United States should command whatever
resources were by them judged requisite to the " common defence and general welfare." It was presumed,
that a sense of their true interests, and a regard to the
dictates of good faith, would be found sufficient pledges
for the punctual performance of the duty of the members to the Fcederal Head.
The experiment has, however, demonstrated, that this
expectation was ill-founded and illusory; and the observations, made under the last head, will, I imagine,
have sufficed to convince the impartial and discerning,
that there is an absolute necessity for an entire change
in the first principles of the system; that if we are in
earnest about giving the Union energy and duration,
we must abandon the vain project of legislating upon
the States in their collective capacities; we must extend
the laws of the Fcederal Government to the individual
citizens of America; we must discard the fallacious
scheme of quotas and requisitions, as equally impracticable and unjust. The result from all this is that the
Union ought to be invested with full power to levy
troops; to build and equip fleets; and to raise the revenues which will be required for the formation and support of an army and navy, in the customary and ordinary modes practised in other Governments.
If the circumstances of our country are such as to
demand a compound instead of a simple, a donfederate instead of a sole Government, the essential point
which will remain to be adjusted will be to discriminate the OBJECTS, as far as it can be done, which shall
appertain to the different provinces or departments of
power; allowing to each the most ample authority for
fulfilling the objects committed to its charge. Shall




Tlhe Foderalist.            153
the Union be constituted the guardian of the common
safety? Are fleets and armies, and revenues, necessary
to this purpose? The Government of the Union must
be empowered to pass all laws, and to make all regulations which have relation to them. The same must be
the case in respect to commerce, and to every other matter to which its jurisdiction is permitted to extend. Is
the administration of justice between the citizens of the
same State the proper department of the local Governments? These must possess all the authorities which
are connected with this object, and with every other
that may be allotted to their particular cognizance and
direction. Not to confer in each case a degree of power
commensurate to the end, would be to violate the most
obvious rules of prudence and propriety, and improvidently to trust the great interests of the Nation to hands
which are disabled from managing them with vigor and
success.
Who so likely to make suitable provisions for the
public defence, as that body to which the guardianship
of the public safety is confided; which, as the centre of
information, will best understand the extent and urgency
of the dangers that threaten; as the representative of
the WHOLE. will feel itself most deeply interested in the
preservation of every part; which, from the responsibility
implied in the duty assigned to it, will be most sensibly
impressed with the necessity of proper exertions; and
which, by the extension of its authority throughout the
States, can alone establish uniformity and concert in
the plans and measures, by which the common safety
is to be secured? Is there not a manifest inconsistency
in devolving upon the Faederal Government the care of
the general defence, and leaving in the State Governments the effective powers, by which it is to be provided
for? Is not a want of cooperation the infallible consequence of such a system?  And will not weakness, dis.




154              The Fwderalist.
order, an undue distribution of the burdens and calam
ities of war, an unnecessary and intolerable increase of
expense, be its natural and inevitable concomitants?
Have we not had unequivocal experience of its effects
in the course of the revolution, which we have just accomplished?
Every view we may take of the subject, as candid
inquirers after truth, will serve to convince us, that it is
both unwise and dangerous to deny the Faederal Government an unconfined authority, as to all those objects
which are intrusted to its management. It will indeed
deserve the most vigilant and careful attention of the
People, to see that it be modelled in such a manner as
to admit of its being safely vested with the requisite
powers. If any plan which has been, or may be, offered to our consideration, should not, upon a dispassionate inspection, be found to answer this description,
it ought to be rejected. A Government, the Constitution of which renders it unfit to be trusted with all the
powers which a free People ought to delegate to any Government, would be an unsafe and improper depositary
of the NATIONAL INTERESTS. Wherever THESE can with
propriety be confided, the coincident powers may safely
accompany them. This is the true result of all just reasoning upon the subject. And the adversaries of the
plan promulgated by the Convention ought to have
confined themselves to showing, that the internal structure of the proposed Government was such as to render
it unworthy of the confidence of the People.  They
ought not to have wandered into inflammatory declamations and unmeaning cavils, about the extent of the
powers. The POWERS are not too extensive for the OBJECTS of Fcederal administration, or, in other words, for
the'management of our NATIONAL INTERESTS; nor can
any satisfactory argument be framed to show that they
are chargeable with such an excess. If it be true, as




The Fwderalist.             155
has been insinuated by some of the writers on the other
side, that the difficulty arises from the nature of the
thing, and that the extent of the country will not permit us to form a Government in which such ample powers can safely be reposed, it would prove that we ought
to contract our views, and resort to the expedient of
separate Confederacies, which will move within more
practicable spheres. For the absurdity must continually stare us in the face of confiding to a Government
the direction of the most essential National interests,
without daring to trust it with the authorities which are
indispensable to their proper and efficient management.
Let us not attempt to reconcile contradictions, but firm.
ly embrace a rational alternative.
I trust, however, that the impracticability of one general system cannot be shown. I am greatly mistaken,
if anything of weight has yet been advanced of this
tendency; and I flatter myself, that the observations
which have been made in the course of these papers
have served to place the reverse of that position in as
clear a light as any matter, still in the womb of time
and experience, can be susceptible of. This, at all
events, must be evident, that the very difficulty itself,
drawn from the extent of the country, is the strongest
argument in favor of an energetic Government; for any
other can certainly never preserve the Union of so large
an empire. If we embrace the tenets of those who oppose the adoption of the proposed Constitution, as the
standard of our political creed, we cannot fail to verify
the gloomy doctrines which predict the impracticability
of a National system, pervading the entire limits of the
present Confederacy.
PUBTLIUS.




156               The Fderalist.
For the Independent Journal.
THE F(EDERALIST. No. XXIV.
TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
TO  the powers proposed to be conferred upon theL  Fderal Government, in respect to the creation
and direction of the National forces, I have met with
but one specific.,objection; which, if I understand it
right, is this, - that proper provision has not been made
against the existence of standing armies in time of
peace; an objection which, I shall.now endeavor to
show, rests on weak and unsubstantial foundations.
It has indeed been brought forward in the most vague
and general form, supported only by bold assertions,
without the appearance of argument; without even the
sanction of theoretical opinions; in contradiction to the
practice of other free nations, and to the general sense
of America, as expressed in most of the existing Constitutions. The propriety of this remark will appear,
the moment it is recollected that the objection under
consideration turns upon a supposed necessity of restraining the LEGISLATIVE authority of the Nation, in
the article of military establishments; a principle unheard of, except in one or two of our State Constitutions, and rejected in all the rest.
A stranger to our politics, who was to read our newspapers at the present juncture, without having previously
inspected the plan reported by the Convention, would
be naturally led to one of two conclusions: either that it
contained a positive injunction, that standing armies
should be kept up in time of peace; or that it vested
in the EXECUTIVE the whole power of levying troops,




The Fwderalist.?57
without subjecting his discretion, in any shape, ~o the
control of the Legislature.
If he came afterwards to peruse the plan itself, he
would be surprised to discover, thht neither the one nor
the other was the case; that the whole power of raising
armies was lodged in the Legislature, not in the Executive; that this Legislature was to be a popular body, consisting of the representatives of the People periodically
elected; and that instead of the provision he had supposed in favor of standing armies, there was to be
found, in respect to this object, an important qualification even of the legislative discretion, in that clause
which forbids the appropriation of money for the support of an army for any longer period than two years:
a precaution which, upon a nearer view of it, will appear to be a great and real security against the keeping
up of troops without evident necessity.
Disappointed in his first surmise, the person I have
supposed would be'apt to pursue his conjectures a little
further. He would naturally say to himself, it is impossible that all this vehement and pathetic declamation
can be without some colorable pretext. It must needs
be that this people, so jealous of their liberties, have, in
all the preceding models of the Constitutions which they
have established, inserted the most precise and rigid precautions on this point, the omission of which, in the new
plan, has given birth to all this apprehension and
clamor.
If, under this impression, he proceeded to pass in review the several State Constitutions, how great would
be his disappointment to find that two only of them *
* This statement of the matter is "to liberty, THEY OUGHT NOT to
taken from the printed collections of "be kept up." This is, in truth,
State Constitutions. Pennsylvania rather a CAUTION than a PROHIBIand North Carolina are the two TION. New Hampshire, Massachuwhich contain the interdiction in setts, Delaware, and Maryland have,
these words: " As standing armies in each of their Bills of Rights, a'in time of peace are dangerous clause to this effect: " Standing ar




158                  The Fasderalist.
contained an interdiction of standing armies in time of
peace-; that the other eleven had either observed a profound silence on the subject, or had in express terms admitted the right of the'Legislature to authorize their existence.
Still, however, he would be persuaded that there must
be some plausible foundation for the cry raised on this
head. He would never be able to imagine, while any
source of information remained unexplored, that it was
nothing more than an experiment upon the public credulity, dictated either by a deliberate intention to deceive, or by the overflowings of a zeal too'Itemperate
to be ingenuous. It would probably occur to him, that
he would be likely to find the precautions he was in
search of in the primitive compact between the States.
Here, at length, he would expect to meet with a solution
of the enigma. No doubt, he would observe to himself,
the existing Confederation must contain the most explicit provisions against military establishments in time
of peace; and a departure from this model, in a favorite
point, has occasioned the discontent which appears to
influence these political champions.
If he should now apply himself to a careful and critical survey of the Articles of Confederation, his astonishment would not only be increased, but would acquire
a mixture of indignation, at the unexpected discovery,
that these Articles, instead of containing the prohibition
he looked for, and though they had, with jealous circumspection, restricted the authority of the State Legislatures in this particular, had not imposed a single restraint
" mies are dangerous to liberty, and the Constitutions of the other States,
"ought not to be raised or kept up except the foregoing, and their Con"WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE stitutions are equally silent. I am
"LEGISLATURE; " which is a for- told, however, that one or two
mal admission of the authority of States have Bills of Rights which do
the Legislature. NEw YORK has no not appear in this collection; but
Bill of Rights, and her Constitution that those also recognize the right
says not a word about the matter. of the legislative authoritj in this
No Bills of Rights appear annexed to respect. —PLtblius..




The Fwderalist.            159
on that of the United States. If he happened to be a
man of quick sensibility, or ardent temper, he could now
no longer refrain from regarding these clamors as the
dishonest artifices of a sinister and unprincipled opposition to a plan, which ought at least to receive a fair and
candid examination from all sincere lovers of their country! How else, he would say, could the authors of
them have been tempted to vent such loud censures
upon that plan, about a point in which it seems to have
conformed itself to the general sense of America as declared in its different forms of Government, and in which
it has even superadded a new and powerful guard unknown to any of them? If, on the contrary, he happened to be a man of calm and dispassionate feelings, he
would indulge a sigh for the frailty of human nature,
and would lament, that in a matter so interesting to the
happiness of millions, the true merits of the question
should be perplexed and entangled by expedients so unfriendly to an impartial and right determination. Even
such a man could hardly forbear remarking, that a conduct of this kind has too much the appearance of an
intention to mislead the People by alarming their passions, rather than to convince them by arguments addressed to their understandings.
But however little this objection may be countenanced, even by precedents among ourselves, it may be
satisfactory to take a nearer view of its intrinsic merits.
From a close examination, it will appear, that restraints
upon the discretion of the Legislature, in respect to military establishments in time of peace, would be improper to be imposed; and, if imposed, from the necessities
of society, would be unlikely to be observed.
Though a wide ocean separates the United States
from Europe, yet there are various considerations that
warn us against an excess of confidence or security. On
one side of us, and stretching far into our rear, are grow



160              -The Faderalist.
ing settlements subject to the dominion of Britain. On
the other side, and extending to meet the British settlements, are colonies -and establishments subject to the
dominion of Spain. This situation, and the vicinity of
the West India islands, belonging to these two powers,
create between them, in respect to their American possessions, and in relation to us, a common interest. The
savage tribes on our Western frontier ought to be regarded as our natural enemies, their natural allies; because they have most to fear from us, and most to hope
from them. The improvements in the art of navigation,
have, as to the facility of communication, rendered distant nations, in a great measure, neighbors. Britain and
Spain are among the principal maritime powers of Europe. A future concert of views between these nations
ought not to be regarded as improbable. The increasing remoteness of consanguinity is every day diminishing the force of the family compact between France and
Spain. And politicians have ever with great reason
considered the ties of blood as feeble and precarious
links of political connection. These circumstances,
combined, admonish us not to be too sanguine in considering ourselves as entirely out of the reach of danger.
Previous to the Revolution, and ever since the peace,
there has been a constant necessity for keeping small
garrisons on our Western frontier.  No person can
doubt that these will continue to be indispensable, if it
should only be against the ravages and depredations of
the Indians. These garrisons must either be furnished
by occasional detachments from the militia, or by permanent corps in the pay of the Governrpent. The first
is impracticable; and if practicable, would be pernicious. The militia would not long, if at all, submit to
be dragged from their occupations and families, to perform that most disagreeable duty in times of profound




The  Fwderalist.            161
peace. And if they could be prevailed upon, or compelled to do it, the increased expense of a frequent rotation of service, and the loss of labor, and disconcertion
of the industrious pursuits of individuals, would form
conclusive objections to the scheme. It would be as
burdensome and injurious to the public as ruinous to
private citizens. The latter resource of permanent corps
in the pay of Government amounts to a standing army
in time of peace; a small one, indeed, but not the less
real for being small. Here is a simple view of the subject, that shows us at once the impropriety of a constitutional iiterdiction of such establishments, and the
necessity of leaving the matter to the discretion and
prudence of the- Legislature.,
In proportion to our increase in strength, it is probable, nay, it may be said certain, that Britain and Spain
would augment their military establishments in our
neighborhood. If we should not be willing to be exposed, in a naked and defenceless condition,: to their
insults or encroachments, we should find it expedient to
increase our frontier garrisons, in some ratio to the force
by which our Western settlements might be annoyed.
There are, and will be, particular posts, the possession
of which will include the command of large districts of
territory, and facilitate future invasions of the remainder. It may be added, that some of those posts will be
keys to the trade with the'. Indian nations.  Can any
man think it would be wise to leave such posts in a
situation to be at any instant seized by one or the other
of two neighboring and formidable powers?  To act
this part, would be to desert all the usual maxims of
prudence and policy.
If  we mean to be a commercial people, or even to be
secure on our Atlantic side, we must endeavor, as soon
as possible, to have a navy,' To this purpose, there
must be dock-yards and arsenals; and for the defence of
VOL. I.         11




162               The Fwaderalist.
these, fortifications, and probably garrisons. When a
nation has become so powerful by sea that it can protect its dock-yards by its fleets, this supersedes the necessity of garrisons for that purpose; but where naval
establishments are in their infancy, moderate garrisons
will, in all likelihood, be found an indispensable security
against descents for the destruction of the arsenals and
dock-yards, and sometimes of the fleet itself.
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Friday, December 21, 1787.]
THE FEDERALIST. No. XXV.
To TEE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
IT may perhaps be urged, that the objects enumerated in the preceding number ought to be provided
for by the State Governments, under the direction of the
Union. But this would be, in reality, an inversion of
the primary principle of our political association; as it
would in practice transfer the care of the common defence from the Fcederal head to the individual members: a project oppressive to some States, dangerous to
all, and baneful to the Confederacy.
The territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian
nations in our neighborhood, do not border on particular
States, but encircle the Union from MAINE to GEORGIA.
The danger, though in different' degrees, is therefore
common. And the means of guarding against it ought,
in like manner, to be the objects of common councils
and of a common treasury.  It happens that some
States, from local situation, are more directly exposed
NEW YORK is of this class. Upon the plan of separate




The Feederalist.           163
provisions, New York would have to sustain the whole
weight of the establishments requisite to her immediate
safety, and to the mediate or ultimate protection of her
neighbors. This would neither be equitable as it respected New York, nor safe as it respected the other
States. Various inconveniences would attend such a
system. The States, to whose lot it might fall to support the necessary establishments, would be as little able
as willing, for a considerable time to come, to bear the
burden of competent provisions. The security of all
would thus be subjected to the parsimony, improvidence,
or inability of a part. If the resources of such part becoming more abundant and extensive, its provisions should be
proportionably enlarged, the other States would quickly
take the alarm at seeing the whole military force of the
Union in the hands of two or three of its members:
and those probably amongst the most powerful. They
would each choose to have some counterpoise; and pretences could easily be contrived. In this situation, military establishments, nourished by mutual jealousy, wouid
be apt to swell beyond their natural or proper size; and
being at the separate disposal of the members, they
would be engines for the abridgment or demolition of
the National authority.
Reasons have been already given to induce a supposition that the State Governments will too naturally be
prone to a rivalship with that of the Union, the foundation of which will be the love of power; and that in ally
contest between the Fuederal head and one of its menibers, the People will be most apt to unite with their local
Government. If, in addition to this immense advantage, the ambition of the members should. be stimulated
by the separate and independent possession of military
forces, it would afford too strong a temptation, and too
great facility to them to make enterprises upon, and
finally to subvert, the constitutional authority of the




164               The FPwderalist..
Union.:On' the other hand, the liberty of the People
would be less safe in this state of things than in that
which left the National forces in the hands of the National Government. As far as an army may be considered as a dangerous weapon of power, it had better be
in those hands, of which the People are most likely to be
jealous, than in those of which they are least likely to
be jealous. For it is a truth which the experience of all
ages has attested, that the People are always most in
danger when the means of injuring their rights are in
the possession of those of whom they entertain the least
suspicion.
The framers of the existing Confederation, fully aware
of the danger to the Union fbm- the separate possession
of military forces by the States, have, in express terms,
prohibited them from having either ships or troops, unless with the consent of Congress. The truth is, that
the existence of a Femderal Government. and military
establishments. under State authority, are not less at
variance with each other, than a due supply of the Foederal treasury and the system of quotas and requisitions.:
There are other lights besides those already taken notice
of, in which the impropriety of restraints on the discretion of the National Legislature will be equally manifest.
The design of the objection, which has been mentioned,
is to preclude standing armies in time of peace; though
we have never been informed how far it is designed the
prohibition should extend: whether to raising armies, as
well as to keeping them:up, in a season of tranquillity,
or not. If it be confined to the latter, it will have no
precise signification; and it will be ineffectual for the
purpose intended. When armies are once raised, what
shall' be denominated "keeping them up," contrary to
the sense of the Constitution?  What time shall be
requisite to ascertain the violation? Shall it be a week,
a: month, a year?  Or shall we say, they may be con



The Forderalist.            165
tinued as long as the danger which occasioned their
being raised continues?  This would be to admit that
they might be kept up in time of peace, against threatening or impending danger; which would beat once to
deviate from the literal meaning of the prohibition, and
to introduce an extensive latitude of construction. Who
shall judge of the continuance of the danger? i This
must undoubtedly be submitted to the National Government; and the matter would then be brought to this
issue, that the National Government, to provide against
apprehended danger, might in the first instance raise
troops, and might afterwards keep them on foot, as long
as they supposed the peace or safety of the community
was in any degree of jeopardy. It is easy to perceive,
that a discretion so latitudinary as this would afford
ample room for eluding the force of the provision.
The supposed utility of a provision of this kind can
only be founded on the supposed probability, or at least
possibility, of a combination between the Executive and
the Legislative, in some scheme of usurpation. Should
this at any time -happen, how easy would it be to fabricate pretences of approaching danger! Indian hostilities, instigated by Spain or Britain, would always be at
hand. Provocations to produce the desired appearances
might even be given to some foreign power, and- appeased again by timely concessions. If we can reasonably presume such a combination to have been formed,
and that the enterprise is warranted by a sufficient prospect of success, the army when once raised, from whatever cause, or. on whatever pretext, may be applied to
the execution of the project.
If, to obviate this consequence, it should be resolved
to extend the prohibition to the raising of armies in
time of peace, the- United States would then exhibit
the most extraordinary spectacle which the world'has
yet seen, - that of a nation incapacitated by its Consti



166              The Fafderalist.
tution to prepare for defence, before it was actually in.
vaded. As the ceremony of a formal denunciation of
war has of late fallen into disuse, the presence of an
enemy within our territories must be waited for, as the
legal warrant to the Government to begin its levies of
men for the protection of the State. We must receive
the blow, before we could even prepare to return it. All
that kind of policy by which nations anticipate distant
danger, and meet the gathering storm, must be abstained from, as contrary to the genuine maxims of a
free Government. We must expose our property and
liberty to the mercy of foreign invaders, and invite them
by our weakness to seize the naked and defenceless
prey, because we are afraid that rulers, created by our
choice, dependent on our will, might endanger that
liberty, by an abuse of the means necessary to its
preservation.
Here I expect we shall be told that the Militia of the
country is its natural bulwark, and would be at all times
equal to the National defence. This doctrine, in sub.
stance, had like to have lost us our independence. It
cost millions to the United States that might have been
saved. The facts, which from our own experience forbid a reliance of this kind, are too recent to permit us
to be the dupes of such a suggestion.  The steady
operations of war against a regular and disciplined
army can only be successfully conducted by a force of
the same kind.  Considerations of economy, not less
than of stability and vigor, confirm this position. The
American Militia, in the course of the late war, have, by
their valor on numerous occasions, erected eternal monuments to their fame; but the bravest of them feel and
know that the liberty of their country could not have
been established by their efforts alone, however great
and valuable they were. War, like most other things,




The Faederalist.             167
is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence,
by perseverance, by time, and by practice.
All violent policy, as it is contrary to the natural
and experienced course of human affairs, defeats itself.
Pennsylvania, at this instant, affords an example of
the truth of this remark. The Bill of Rights of that
State declares, that standing armies are dangerous to
liberty, and ought not to be kept up in time of peace.
Pennsylvania, nevertheless, in a time of profound peace,
from the existence of partial disorders in one or two of
her counties, has resolved to raise a body of troops:
and in aMl probability, will keep them up as long as
there is any appearance of danger to the public peace.
The conduct of Massachusetts affords a lesson on the
same subject, though on different ground. That State
(without waiting for the sanction of Congress, as the
Articles of the Confederation require) was compelled
to raise troops to quell a domestic insurrection, and
still keeps a corps in pay to prevent a revival of the
spirit of revolt. The particular Constitution of Massachusetts opposed no obstacle to the measure; but the
instance is still of use to instruct us, that cases are
likely to occur under our Governments, as well as under
those of other nations, which will sometimes render a
military force in time of peace essential to the security
of the society; and that it is therefore improper, in this
respect, to control the Legislative discretion. It also
teaches us, in its application to the United States, how
little the rights of a feeble Government are likely to be
respected, even by its own constituents. And it teaches
us, in addition to the rest, how unequal parchment provisions are to a struggle with public necessity.
It was a fundamental maxim of the Lacedaemonian
commonwealth, that the post of Admiral should not be
zonferred twice on the same person. The Peloponnesian confederates, having suffered a severe defeat at sea




168              The Foederalist.
from the Athenians, demanded LYSANDER, who had
before served with success in that capacity, to command the combined fleets. The Lacedaemonians, to
gratify their allies, and yet preserve the semblance of
an adherence to their ancient institutions, had recourse
to the flimsy subterfuge of investing LYSANDER with the
real power of Admiral, under the nominal title of Vice.
Admiral. This instance is selected from among a multitude that might be cited, to confirm the truth already
advanced and illustrated by domestic examples; which
is, that nations pay little regard to rules and maxims,
calculated in their- very nature to run counter to the
necessities of society. Wise politicians will be cautious about fettering the Government with restrictions,
that cannot be observed; because they know, that every breach of the fundamental laws, though dictated
by necessity, impairs that sacred reverence, which ought
to be maintained in the breast of rulers towards the
Constitution of a country, and forms a precedent for
other breaches, where the same plea of necessity does
not exist at all, or is less urgent and palpable.
PUBLIUS.
For the Independent Journal.
THE FCEDERALIST. No. XXVI.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
IT was a thing hardly to be expected that in a popular revolution the minds of men should stop at
that happy mean which marks the salutary boundary
between POWER and PRIVILEGE, and combines the




The Faderalist.            169
energy of Government with the security of private
rights. A failure in this delicate and important point
is the great source of the inconveniences we experience;
and if we are not cautious to avoid a repetition of the
error, in our future attempts to rectify and ameliorate
our system, we may travel from one chimerical project
to another; we may try change after change; but we
shall never be likely to make any material change for
the better.
The idea of restraining the Legislative authority, in
the means of providing for the National defence, is one
of those refinements, which owe their origin to a zeal
for liberty more ardent than enlightened. We have
seen, however, that it has not had thus far an extensive
prevalency; that even in this country, where it made
its first appearance, Pennsylvania and North Carolina
are the only two States by which it has been in any
degree patronized; and that all the others have refused
to give it the least countenance; wisely judging that
confidence must be placed somewhere; that the necessity of doing it, is implied in the very act of delegating
power; and that it is better to hazard the abuse of that
confidence, than to embarrass the Government and
endanger the public safety, by impolitic restrictions on
the Legislative authority. The opponents of the proposed Constitution combat, in this respect, the general
decision of America; and instead of being taught by
experience the propriety of correcting any extremes into
which we may have heretofore run, they appear disposed to conduct us into others still more dangerous,
and more extravagant. As if the tone of Government
had been found too high, or too rigid, the doctrines they
teach are calculated to induce us to depress or to relax't, by expedients which, upon other occasions, have been
condemned or forborne. It may be affirmed without
the imputation of invective, that if the principles they




176              The Fwederalist.
inculcate, on various points, could so far obtain as to
become the popular creed, they would utterly unfit the
People of this country for any species of Government
whatever. But a danger of this kind is not to be apprehended. The citizens of America have too much discernment to be argued into anarchy. And I am much
mistaken, if experience has not wrought a deep and
solemn conviction in the public mind, that greater
energy of Government is essential to the welfare and
prosperity of the community.
It may not be amiss in this place concisely to remark
the origin and progress of the idea, which aims at the
exclusion of military establishments,in time of peace.
Though in speculative minds it may arise from a contemplation of the nature and tendency of such institutions, fortified by the events that have happened in other
ages. and countries, yet as a National sentiment, it must
be traced to those habits of thinking, which we derive
from the nation from whom the inhabitants of these
States have in general sprung.
In England, for a long time after the Norman Conquest, the authority of the monarch was almost unlimited. Inroads were gradually made upon the prerogative, in favor of liberty, first by the Barons, and
afterwards by the People, till the greatest part of its
most formidable pretensions became extinct. But it
was not till the revolution in 1688, which elevated the
Prince of Orange to the throne of Great Britain, that
English liberty was completely triumphant. As incident to the undefined power of making war, an acknowledged prerogative of the crown, CHARLES II. had,
by his own authority, kept on foot in time of peace a
body of 5,000 regular troops. And this number JAMES
II. increased to 30,000; who were paid out of his civil
list, At the revolution, to abolish the exercise of so
dangerous an authority, it became an article of the Bill




The Faderalist.             171
of Rights then framed, that "the raising or keeping a' standing army within the kingdom in time of peace,
"unless with the consent of Parliament, was against
"law."
In that kingdom, when the pulse of liberty was at its
highest pitch, no security against the danger of standing armies was thought requisite, beyond a prohibition
of their being raised or kept up by the mere authority
of the Executive magistrate. The patriots, who effected
that memorable revolution, were too temperate, and too
well-informed, to think of any restraint on the Legislative discretion. They were aware, that a certain number of troops for guards and garrisons were indispensable; that no precise bounds could be set to the National
exigencies; that a power equal to every possible contingency must exist somewhere in the Government:
and that when they referred the exercise of that power
to the judgment of the Legislature, they had arrived at
the ultimate point of precaution, which was reconcilable
with the safety of the community.
From the same source, the People of America may
be said to have derived a hereditary impression of danger to liberty, from standing armies in time of peace.
The circumstances of a revolution quickened the public
sensibility on every point connected with the security
of popular rights; and in some instances raised the
warmth of our zeal beyond the degree, which consisted
with the due temperature of the body politic. The attempts of two of the States, to restrict the authority of
the Legislature in the article of military establishments,
are of the number of these instances. The principles
which had taught us to be jealous of the power of a
hereditary monarch, were by an injudicious excess extended to the representatives of the People in their popular assemblies. Even in some of the States, where this
error was not adopted, we find unnecessary declarations5




172               The Fcaderalist.
that standing armies ought not to be kept up, in time
of peace, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE LEGISLATURE.
I call them unnecessary, because the reason which had
introduced a similar provision into the English Bill of
Rights is not applicable to any of the State Constitutions. The power of raising armies at all, under those
Constitutions, can by no construction be deemed to reside anywhere else, than in the Legislatures themselves;
and it was superfluous, if not absurd, to declare, that a
matter should not be done without the consent of a
body, which alone had the power of doing it. Accordingly, in some of those Constitutions, and among others, in that of this State of New York, which has been
justly celebrated, both in Europe and America, as one
of the best of the forms of Government established in
this country, there is a total silence upon the subject.
It is remarkable, that even in the two States, which
seem to have meditated an interdiction of military establishments in time of peace, the mode of expression
made use of is rather cautionary than prohibitory. It is
not said, that standing armies shall not be kept up, but
that they ought not to be kept up, in time of peace.
This ambiguity of terms appears to have been the result of a conflict between jealousy and conviction; between the desire of excluding such establishments at all
events, and the persuasion that an absolute exclusion
would be unwise and unsafe.
Can it be doubted that such a provision, whenever
the situation of public affairs was understood to require
a departure from it, would be interpreted by the.Legislature into a mere admonition, and would be made to yield
to the necessities or supposed necessities of the State?
Let the fact already mentioned, with respect to Pennsylvania, decide. What then (it may be asked) is the
use of such a provision, if it cease to operate the moment there is an inclination to disregard it?




The Feaderalist.            173
Let us examine whether there be any comparison, in
point of efficacy, between the provision alluded to, and
that which is contained in the New Constitution, for
restraining the appropriations of money for military purposes to the period of two years. The former, by aiming at too much, is calculated to effect nothing: the latter, by steering clear of an imprudent extreme, and by
being perfectly compatible with a proper provision for
the exigencies of the Nation, will have a salutary and
powerful operation.
The Legislature of the United States will be obliged,
by this provision, once at least in every two years, to
deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military force
on foot; to come to a new resolution on the point; and
to declare their sense of the matter, by a formal vote in
the face of their constituents.  They are not at liberty
to vest in the Executive department permanent funds
for the support of an army, if they were even incautious enough to be willing to repose in it so improper a
confidence. As the spirit of party, in different degrees,
must be expected to infect all political bodies, there will
be, no doubt, persons in the National Legislature willing enough to arraign the measures and criminate the
views of the majority. The provision for the support
of a military force will always be a favorable topic for
declamation. As often as the question comes forward,
the public attention will be roused and attracted to the
subject, by the party in opposition; and if the majority
should be really disposed to exceed the proper limits,
the community will be warned of the danger, and will
have an opportunity of taking measures to guard against
it. Independent of parties in the National Legislature
itself, as often as the period of discussion arrived, the
State Legislatures, who will always be not onJl vigilant, but suspicious and jealous guardians of the rights
of the citizens, against encroachments from the Fcederal




174              The Fewderalist.
Government, will constantly have their attention awake
to the conduct of the National rulers, and will be ready
enough, if anything improper appears, to sound the
alarm to the People, and not only to be the VOICES but,
if necessary, the ARM of their discontent.
Schemes to subvert the liberties of a great community require time to mature them for execution. An army,
so large. as seriously to menace those liberties, could
only be formed by progressive augmentations; which
would suppose, not merely a temporary combination between the Legislature and Executive, but a continued
conspiracy for a series of time. Is it probable that such
a combination would exist at all? Is it probable that
it would be persevered in, and transmitted along through
all the successive variations in a representative body,
which biennial elections would naturally produce in both
houses? Is it presumable, that every man, the instant
he took his seat in the National Senate or House of
Representatives, would commen'ce a traitor to his constituents and to his country? Can it be supposed, that
there would not be found one man, discerning enough
to detect so atrocious a conspiracy, or bold or honest
enough to apprise his constituents of their danger? If
such presumptions can fairly be made, there ought at
once to be an end of all delegated authority. The People should resolve to recall all the powers they have
heretofore parted with out of their own hands, and to
divide themselves into as many States as there are
counties, in order that they may be able to manage their
own concerns in person.
If such suppositions could even be reasonably made,
still the concealment of the design, for any duration,
would be impracticable. It would be announced, by
the Fvry circumstance of augmenting the army to so
great an extent, in time of profound peace. What colorable reason could be assigned, in a country so situ



The Fwaderalist.            175
ated, for such vast augmentations of the military force?
It is impossible that the People could be long deceived;
and the destruction of the project, and of the projectors,
would quickly follow the discovery.
It has been said, that the provision which limits the
appropriation of money for the support of an army to
the period of two years would be unavailing; because
the Executive, when once possessed of a force large
enough to awe the People into submission, would find
resources in that very force, sufficient to enable him to
dispense with supplies from the acts of the Legislature.
But the question again recurs: upon what pretence
could he be put in possession of a force of that magnitude in time of peace? If we suppose it to have been
created in consequence of some domestic insurrection or
foreign war, then it becomes a case not within the principles of the objection; for this is levelled against the
power of keeping up troops in time of peace. Few
persons will be so visionary, as seriously to contend that
military forces ought not to be raised to quell a rebellion, or resist an invasion; and if the defence of the
community, under such circumstances, should make it
necessary to have an army so numerous as to hazard its
liberty, this is one of those calamities for which there is
neither preventative nor cure. It cannot be provided
against by any possible form of Government: it might
even result from a simple league offensive and defensive, if it should ever be necessary for the confederates
or allies to form an army for common defence.
But it is an evil infinitely less likely to attend us in
an united than in a disunited state: nay, it may be safely asserted that it is an evil altogether unlikely to attend
us in the latter situation. It is not easy to conceive a
possibility that dangers so formidable can assail the
whole Union, as to demand a force considerable enough
to place our liberties in the least jeopardy, especially if




176               The Fwderalist.
we take into our view -the aid to be derived from the
militia, which ought' always to be counted upon as a
valuable and powerful auxiliary. But in a state of disunion, (as has been fully shown in another place,) the
contrary of this supposition would become not only
probable, but almost unavoidable.
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, December 25, 1787.]
THE FU(DERALIST. No. XXVII.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
T has been urged, in different shapes, that a Constitution of the kind proposed by the Convention, cannot operate without the aid of a military force to execute
its laws, This, however, like most other things that
have been alleged on that side, rests on mere general
assertion, unsupported by any precise or intelligible des;
ignation of the reasons upon which it is founded. As
far as I have been able to divine the latent meaning of
the objectors, it seems to originate in a presupposition,
that the People will be disinclined to the exercise of
Fcederal authority in any matter of an internal nature.
Waiving any exception that might be taken to the inaccuracy, or inexplicitness, of the distinction between internal and external, let us inquire what ground there is
to presuppose that disinclination in the People. Unless
we presume, at the same time, that the powers of the
general Government will be worse administered than
those of the State Governments, there seems to be no
room for the presumption of ill-will, disaffection, or opposition in the People. I believe it may be laid down




The FaPederalist.            177
as a general rule, that their confidence in, and obedience
to a Government, will commonly be proportioned to the
goodness or badness of its administration. It must be admitted, that there are exceptions to this rule; but these
exceptions depend so entirely on accidental causes, that
they cannot be considered as having any relation to the
intrinsic merits or demerits of a Constitution. These
can only be judged of by general principles and maxims.
Various reasons have been suggested, in the course of
these papers, to induce a probability, that the general
Government will be better administered than the particular Governments; the principal of which reasons are,
thac the extension of the spheres of election will present
a greater option, or latitude of choice, to the People;
that through the medium of the State Legislatureswhich are select bodies of men, and who are to appoint
the members of the National Senate-there is reason to
expect that this branch will generally be composed with
peculiar care and judgment; that these circumstances
promise greater knowledge, and more extensive information, in the National councils; and that they will be less
apt to be tainted by the spirit of faction, and more out
of the reach of th0se occasional ill-humors, or temporary prejudices and propensities, which, in smaller societies,
frequently contaminate the public councils, beget injustice and oppression of a part of the community,~ nd
engender schemes, which, though they gratify a momentary inclination or desire, terminate in general distress, dissatisfaction, and disgust. Several additional
reasons of considerable force, to fortify that probability,
will occur, when we come to survey, with a more critic
eye, the interior structure of the edifice which we are
invited to erect. It will be sufficient here to remark,
that until satisfactory reasons can. be assigned to justify
an opinion, that the Fcederal Government is likely to be
VOL. I.           12




178               The Fcaderalist.
administered in such a manner as to render it odious or
contemptible to the People, there can be no reasonable
foundation for the supposition, that the laws of the
Union will meet with any greater obstruction from them,
or will stand in need of any other methods to enforce
their execution, than the laws of the particular members.
The hope of impunity is a strong incitement to sedition: the dread of punishment, a proportionably strong
discouragement to it. Will not the Government of the
Union, which, if possessed of a due degree of power,
can call to its aid the collective resources of the whole
Confederacy, be more likely to repress the former sentiment and to inspire the latter, than that of a single
State, which can only command the resources within itself? A turbulent faction in a State may easily suppose itself able to contend with the friends to the
Government in that State; but it can hardly be so infatuated as to imagine itself a match for the combined
efforts of the Union. If this reflection be just, there is
less danger of resistance from irregular combinations of
individuals, to the authority of the Confederacy, than to
that of a single member.
I will, in this place, hazard an observation, which will
not be the less just, because to some it may appear new;
which is, that the more the operations of the National
authority are intermingled in the ordinary exercise of
Government; the more the citizens are accustomed to
meet with it in the common occurrences of their political life; the more it is familiarized to their sight and to
their feelings; the further it enters into those objects
which touch the most seqsible chords, and put in motion
the most active springs ofthe human heart; the greater
will be the probability, that it will conciliate the respect
and attachment of the community. Man is very much a
creature of habit. A thing that rarely strikes his senses,
will generally have but little influence upon his mind. A




The Federalist.             179
Government continually at a distance and out of sight
can hardly be expected to interest the sensations of the
People. The inference is, that the authority of the
Union, and the affections of the citizens towards it, will
be strengthened, rather than weakened, by its extension
to what are called matters of internal concern; and will
have less occasion to recur to force, in proportion to the
familiarity and comprehensiveness of its agency. The
more it circulates through those channels and currents,
in which the passions of mankind naturally flow, the
less will it require the aid of the violent and perilous
expedients of compulsion.
One thing, at all events, must be evident, that a Government like the one proposed would bid much fairer
to avoid the necessity of using force, than that species
of league contended for by most of its opponents; the
authority of which should only operate upon the States
in their political or collective capacities. It has been
shown, that in such a Confederacy there can be no
sanction for the laws but force; that frequent delinquencies in the members are.the natural offspring of
the very frame of the Government; and that as often as
these happen, they can only be redressed, if at all, by
war and violence.
The plan reported by the Convention, by extending
the authority of the Foederal head to the individual citizens of the several States, will enable the Government
to employ the ordinary magistracy of each, in the execution of its laws. It is easy t6 perceive that this will
tend to destroy, in the common apprehension, all distinction between the sources from which they might
proceed; and will give the Fmderal Government the
same advantage f6r securing a due obedience to its
authority, which is enjoyed by the Government of each
State, in addition to the influence on public opinion,
which will result from the important consideration of




180                The Fideralist.
its having power to call to its assistance and support
the resources of the whole Union.  It merits particular
attention in this place, that the laws of the Confederacy, as to the enumerated and legitimate objects of its
jurisdiction, will become the SUPREME LAW of the land;
to the observance of which, all officers, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, in each State, will be bound by
the sanctity of an oath. Thus the Legislatures, Courts,
and Magistrates, of the respective members, will be incorporated into the operations of the National Government as far as its just and constitutional authority
extends; and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws.*  Any man, who will pursue, by
his own reflections, the consequences of this situation,
will perceive, that there is good ground to calculate
upon a regular and peaceable execution of the laws of
the Union; if its powers are administered with a common share of prudence. If we will arbitrarily suppose
the contrary, we may deduce any inferences we please
from the supposition; for it is certainly possible, by an
injudicious exercise of the authorities of the best Government that ever was, or ever can be instituted, to provoke and precipitate the People into the wildest excesses.
But thouglh the adversaries of the proposed Constitution
should presume, that the National rulers would be insensible to the motives of public good; or to the obligations of duty, I would still ask them, how the interests
of ambition, or the views of encroachment, can be promoted by such a conduct?
PUBLIUS.
* The sophistry which has been Governments will, in its proper
employed, to show that this will place, be fully detected. —Publius.
tend to the destruction of the State




The Fwaderalist.            181
For the Independent Journal.
THE F(EDERALIST. No. XXVIII.
ro THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
I HAT there may happen cases in which the National
Government may be necessitated to resort to force,
cannot be denied. Our own experience has corroborated
the lessons taught by the examples of other nations; that
emergencies of this sort will sometimes arise in all societies, however constituted; that seditions and insurrections are, unhappily, maladies as inseparable from
the body politic, as tumors and eruptions from the natural body; that the idea of governing at all times by the
simple force of law (which we have been told is the
only admissible principle of republican Government)
has no place but in the reveries of those political doctors, whose sagacity disdains the admonitions of experimental instruction.
Should such emergencies at any time happen under
the National Government,-there could be no remedy but
force.  The means to be employed must be proportioned to the extent of thei mischief. If it should be a
slight commotion in a small part of a State, the militia
of the residue would be adequate to its suppression; and
the natural presumption is, that they would be. ready to
do their duty. An insurrection, whatever may be its
immediate cause, eventually endangers all Government.
Regard to the public peace, if not to the rights of the
Union, would engage the citizens, to whom the contagion had not communicated itself, to oppose the insur.
gents: and if the general Government should be found
in practice conducive to the prosperity and felicity of




182               The Federalist.
the People, it were irrational to believe that they would
be disinclined to its support;
If, on the contrary, the insurrection should pervade a
whole State, or a principal part of it, the employment
of a different kind of force might become unavoidable.
It appears that Massachusetts found it necessary to
raise troops for repressing the disorders within that
State: that Pennsylvania, from the mere apprehension
of commotions among a part of her citizens, has thought
proper to have recourse to the same measure. Suppose
the State of New York had been inclined to reestablish
her lost jurisdiction over the inhabitants of Vermont;
could she have hoped for success in such an enterprise
from the efforts of the militia alone?  Would she not
have been compelled to raise and to maintain a more
regular force for the execution of her design? If it must
then be admitted, that the necessity of recurring to a
force different from the militia, in cases of this extraordinary nature, is applicable to the State Governments
themselves, why should the possibility, that the National
Government might be under a like necessity, in similar
extremities, be made an objection to its existence? Is
it not surprising that men who declare an attachment
to the Union in the abstract, should urge, as an objection to the proposed Constitution, what applies with
tenfold weight to the plan for which they contend; and
what, as far as it has any foundation in truth, is an inevitable consequence of civil society upon an enlarged
scale? Who would not prefer that possibility, to the
unceasing agitations, and frequent revolutions, which
are the continual scourges of petty republics?
Let us pursue this examination in another light.
Suppose, in lieu of one general system, two or three,
or even four Confederacies were to be formed, would
not the same difficulty oppose itself to the operations
of either of these Confederacies?  Would not each of




The Foderalist.              183
them be exposed to the same casualties; and when
these happened, be obliged to have recourse to the same
expedients for upholding its authority, which are objected to a Government for all the States? Would the
militia, in this supposition, be more ready or more able
to support the Fcaderal authority, than in the case of a
general Union?  All candid ahd intelligent men must,
upon due consideration, acknowledge that the principle
of the objection is equally applicable to either of the
two cases; and that whether we have one Government
for all the States, or different Governments for different
parcels of them, or even if there should be an entire
separation of the States, there might sometimes be a
necessity to make use of a force constituted differently
from the militia, to preserve the peace of the community, and to maintain the just authority of the laws
against those violent invasions of them, which amount
to insurrections and rebellions.
Independent of all other reasonings upon the subject,
it is a full answer to those who require a more peremptory provision against military establishments in time
of peace, to say, that the whole power of the proposed
Government is to be in the hands of the representatives
of the People. This is the essential, and after all, only
efficacious security for the rights and privileges of the
People, which is attainable in civil society.*
If the representatives of the People betray their constituents, there is then no resource left but in the exertion of that original right of self-defence, which is paramount to all positive forms of Government; and which,
against the usurpations of the National rulers, may be
exerted with infinitely better prospect of success than
against those of the rulers of an individual State. In
a single State, if the persons intrusted with supreme
power become usurpers, the different parcels, subdivis.
* Its full efficacy will be examined hereafter.-Publius.




184               The Federalist.
ions, or districts of which it consists, having no distinct
Government in each, can take no regular measures for
defence. The citizens must rush tumultuously to arms,
without concert, without system, without resource; except in their courage and despair, The usurpers, clothed
with the forms of legal authority,ecan too often crush the
opposition in embryo. The smaller the extent of territory, the more difficult will it be for the People to form a
regular, or systematic plan of opposition; and the more
easy will it be to defeat their early efforts. Intelligence
can be more speedily obtained of their preparations and
movements; and the military force in the possession of
the usurpers, can be more rapidly directed against the
part where the opposition has begun. In this situation,
there must be a peculiar coincidence of circumstances
to insure success to the popular resistance.
The obstacles to usurpation, and the facilities of resistance increase with the increased extent 6f the State;
provided the citizens understand their rights, and are
disposed to defend them. The natural strength of the.
People in a large community, in proportion to the artificial strength of the Government, is greater than in a
small; and of course more competent to a struggle with
the attempts of the Government to establish a tyranny.
But in a Confederacy, the People, without exaggeration,
may be said to be entirely the masters of their own fate.
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general Government will at all times stand ready to check
the usurpations of the State Governments; and these
will have the same disposition towards the general
Government. The People, by throwing themselves into
either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If
their rights are invaded by either, they-can make use
of the other, as the instrument of' redress. How wise
will it be in them, by cherishing the Union, to preserve
to themselves an advantage which can never be too
highly prized!




The Fwderalist.            185
It may safely be received as an axiom in our political
system, that the State Governments will, in all possible
contingencies, afford complete security against invasions
of the public liberty by the National authority. Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretences
so likely to escape the penetration of select bodies of
meq, as of the People at large. The Legislatures will
have better means of information. They can discover
the danger at a distance; and possessing all the organs
of civil power, and the confidence of the People, they
can at once adopt a regular plan of opposition, in which
they can combine all the resources of the community.
They can readily communicate with each other in the
different States; and unite their common forces, for the
protection of their common liberty.
The great extent of,the country is a further security.
We have already experienced its utility against the attacks of a foreign power. And it would have precisely
the same effect against the enterprises of ambitious
rulers in the National councils. If the Fcederal army
should be able to quell the resistance of one State, the
distant States would have it in their power to make
head with fresh forces. The advantages obtained in
one place must be abandoned, to subdue the opposition
in others; and the moment the part which had been
reduced to submission was left to itself, its efforts would
be renewed, and its resistance revive.
We should recollect that the extent of the military
force must, at all events, be regulated by the resources
of the country. For a long time to come, it will not
be possible to maintain a large army; and as the means
of doing this increase, the population and natural strength
of the community will proportionably increase. When
will the time arrive, that the Faederal Government can
raise and maintain an army capable of erecting a despotism over the great body of the People of an immense




186              The Fwderalist.
empire, who are in a situation, through the medium of
their State Governments, to take measures for their own
defence, with all the celerity, regularity, and system of
independent nations? The apprehension may be considered as a disease, for which there can be found no
cure in the resources of argument and reasoning.
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Friday, December 28, 1787.]
THE F(EDERALIST. No. XXIX.
TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORKE:
I T has been already observed, that the Foederal Government ought to possess the power'of providing
for the support of the National forces; in which proposition was intended to be included the expense of raising troops, of building and equipping fleets, and all
other expenses in any wise connected with military
arrangements and operations. But these are not the
only objects to which the jurisdiction of the Union, in
respect to revenue, must necessarily be empowered to
extend. It must embrace a provision for the support of
the National civil list; for the payment of the National
debts contracted, or that may be contracted; and, in
general, for all those matters which will call for disbursements out of the National treasury. The conclusion is, that there must be interwoven, in the frame of
the Government, a general power of taxation, in one
shape or another.
Money is, with propriety, considered as the vital principle of the body politic; as that which sustains its life
and motion, and enables it to perform its most essential




27e F1draat.              187
functions. A complete power, therefore, to procure a
regular and adequate supply of it, as far as the resources
of the community will permit, may be regarded as an
indispensable ingredient in every Constitution. From
a deficiency in this particular, one of two evils must
ensue: either the People must be subjected to continual
plunder, as a substitute for a more eligible mode of supplying the public wants, or the Government must sink
into a fatal atrophy, and, in a short course of time,
perish.
In the Ottoman or Turkish empire, the sovereign,
though in other respects absolute master of the lives
and fortunes of his subjects, has no right to impose a
new tax. The consequence is, that he permits the
Bashaws or Governors of provinces to pillage the People without mercy; and, in turn, squeezes out of them
the sums of which he stands in need, to satisfy his own
exigencies, and those of the State. In America, from a
like cause, the Government of the Union has gradually
dwindled into a state of decay, approaching nearly to
annihilation. Who can doubt, that the happiness of
the People in both countries would be promoted by
competent authorities in the proper hands, to provide
the revenues which the necessities of the public might
require?
The present Confederation, feeble as it is, intended to
repose in the United States an unlimited power of providing for the pecuniary wants of the Union. But proseeding upon an erroneous principle, it has been done
in such a manner as entirely to have frustrated the
intention. Congress, by the Articles which compose
that compact, (as has been already stated,) are authorized to ascertain and call for any sums of money necessary, in' their judgment; to the service of the United
States; and their requisitions, if conformable to the
rule of apportionment are in'every constitutional sense




188              The Faoderalist.
obligatory upon the States. These have no right to
question the propriety of the demand; no discretion
beyond that of devising the ways and means of furnishing the sums demanded. But though this be strictly
and truly the case; though the assumption of such a
right would be an infringement of the Articles of Union;
though it may seldom or never have been avowedly
claimed; yet in practice it has been constantly exercised; and would continue to be so, as long as the
revenues of the Confederacy should remain dependent
on the intermediate agency of its members. What the
consequences of this system have been, is within the
knowledge of every man the least conversant in our
public affairs, and has been amply unfolded in different parts of these inquiries. It is this which has
chiefly contributed to reduce us to a situation, which
affords ample cause both of mortification to ourselves,
and of triumph to our enemies.
What remedy can there be for this situation, but in a
change of the system which has produced it? -In a
change of the fallacious and delusive system of quotas
and requisitions? What substitute can there be imagined for this ignis fatuuts in finance, but that of permitting the National Government to raise its own revenues
by the ordinary methods of taxation, authorized in
every well-ord6red Constitution of civil Government?
Ingenious men may declaim with plausibility on any
subject; but no human ingenuity can point out any
other expedient to rescue us from the inconveniences
and embarrassments naturally resulting from defective
supplies of the public treasury.
The more intelligent adversaries of the new Constitution admit the force of this reasoning; but they qualify their admission, by a distinction between what they
call internal and external taxation. The former they
would reserve to the State Governments; the latiro,




The Federalist.             189
which they explain into commercial imposts, or rather
duties on imported articles, they declare themselves
willing to concede to the Fcederal Head. This distinction, however, would violate that fundamental maxim
of good sense and sound policy, which dictates that
every POWER ought to be in proportion to its OBJECT;
and would still leave the General Government in a
kind of tutelage to the State Governments, inconsistent
with every idea of vigor or efficiency. Who can pretend that commercial imposts are, or would be, alone
equal to the present and future exigencies of the Union?
Taking into the account the existing debt, foreign and
domestic, upon any plan of extinguishment which a
man moderately impressed with the importance of public justice and public credit could approve, in addition
to the establishments which all parties will acknowledge
to be necessary, we could not reasonably flatter ourselves, that this resource alone, upon the most improved
scale, would even suffice for its present necessities. Its
future necessities admit not of calculation or limitation;
and upon the principle, more than once adverted to, the
power of making provision for them as they arise ought
to be equally unconfined. I believe it may be regarded
as a position warranted by the history of mankind, that
in the usual progress of things, the necessities of a nation,
in every stage of its existence, will be found at least
equal to its resources.
To say that deficiences may be provided for by requisitions upon the States, is on the one hand to acknowledge that this system cannot be depended upon; and
on the other hand, to depend upon it for everything
beyond a certain limit.  Those who have carefully
attended to its vices and deformities, as they have been
exhibited by experience, or delineated in the course of
these papers, must feel invincible repugnancy to trusting the National interests in any degree to its opera



190              The Federalist.
tion. Its inevitable tendency, whenever it is brought
into activity, must be to enfeeble the Union, and sow
the seeds of discord and contention between the Fcederal Head and its members, and between the members
themselves. Can it be expected that the deficiencies
would be better supplied in this mode, than the total
wants of the Union have heretofore been supplied, in
the same mode? It ought to be, recollected, that if less
will be required from the States, they will have proportionably less means to answer the demand. If the
opinions of those who contend for the distinction which
has been mentioned were to be received as evidence of
truth, one would be led to conclude, that there was
some known point in the economy of National affairs,
at which it would be safe to stop, and to say: Thus
far, the ends of public happiness will be promoted by
supplying the wants of Government, and all beyond this
is unworthy of our care or anxiety. How is it possible
that a Government, half supplied and always necessitous, can fulfil the purposes of its institution; can provide for the security, advance the prosperity, or support
the reputation of the Commonwealth?  How can it
ever possess either energy or stability, dignity or credit,
confidence at home or respectability abroad?  How
can its administration be anything else than a succession of expedients temporizing, impotent, disgraceful?
How will it be able to avoid a frequent sacrifice of its
engagements to immediate necessity? How can it
undertake or execute any liberal or enlarged plans of
public good?
Let us attend to what would be the effects of this
situation, in the very first war in which we should happen to be engaged. We will presume, for argument
sake, that the revenue arising from the impost duties
answers the purposes of a provision for the public debt,
ud of a peace establishment for the Union. Thus cir




The Fawderalist.            191
cumstanced, a war breaks out. What would be the
probable conduct of the Government in such an emergency? Taught by experience that proper dependence
could not be placed on the success of requisitions,
unable by its own authority to lay hold of fresh resources, and urged by considerations of National danger,
would it not be driven to the expedient of diverting the
funds already appropriated, from their proper objects, to
the defence of the State? It is not easy to see how a
step of this kind could be avoided; and if it should be
taken, it is evident that it would prove the destruction
of public credit at the very moment that it was become
essential to the public safety. To imagine that at such
a crisis credit might be dispensed with, would be the
extreme of infatuation. In the modern system of war,
nations the most wealthy are obliged to have recourse
to large loans.  A country so little opulent as ours
must feel this necessity in a much stronger degree.
But who would lend to a Government, that prefaced its
overtures for borrowing by an act which demonstrated
that no reliance could be placed on the steadiness of its
measures for paying?  The loans it might be able to
procure would be as limited in their extent as burdensome in their conditions. They would be made upon
the same principles that usurers commonly lend to
bankrupt and fraudulent debtors, - with a sparing hand
and at enormous premiums.
It may perhaps be imagined, that, from the scantiness
of the resources of the country, the necessity of diverting the established funds in the case supposed would
exist, though the National Government should possess
an unrestrained power of taxation. But two considerations will serve to quiet all apprehension on this head:
one is, that we are sure the resources of the community,
in their full extent, will be brought into activity for the
benefit of the Union; the other is, that whatever defi



192               The Federalist.
ciencies there may be, can without difficulty be supplied
by loans.
The power of creating new funds upon new objects
of taxation, by its own authority, would enable the
National Government to borrow, as far as its necessities
might require. Foreigners, as well as the citizens of
America, could then reasonably repose confidence in its
engagements: but to depend upon a Government that
must itself depend upon thirteen other Governments for
the means of fulfilling its contracts, when once its situation is clearly understood, would require a degree of
credulity not often to be met with in the pecuniary
transactions of mankind, and little reconcilable with
the usual sharp-sightedness of avarice.
Reflections of this kind may have trifling weight with
men who hope to see realized in America the halcyon
scenes of the poetic or fabulous age; but to those who
believe we are likely to experience a common portion of
the vicissitudes and calamities which have fallen to the
lot of other nations, they must appear entitled to serious
attention. Such men must behold the actual situation
of their country with painful solicitude, and deprecate
the evils which ambition or revenge might, with too
much facility, inflict upon it.
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, January 1, 1788.]
THE FCEDERALIST. No. XXX.
TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
TN disquisitions of every kind, there are certain primary truths, or first principles, upon which all subsequent reasonings must depend. These contain an




The FEderalist.         193
internal evidence, which, antecedent to all reflection oi
combination, commands the assent of the mind. Where
it produces not this effect, it must proceed either from
some defect or disorder in the organs of perception, or
from the influence of some strong interest, or passion, or
prejudice. Of this nature are the maxims in geometry,
that " The whole is greater than its part; that things
equal to the same, are equal to one another; that two
straight lines cannot enclose a space; and' that all right
angles are equal to each other." Of the same nature are
these other maxims in ethics and politics, that there cannot be an effect without a cause; that the means ought
to be proportioned to the end; that every power ought
to be commensurate with its object; that there-ought to
be no limitation of a power destined to effect a purpose
which is itself incapable of limitation. And there are
other truths in the two latter sciences, which, if they
cannot pretend to rank in the class of axioms, are yet
such direct inferences from them, and so obvious in
themselves, and so agreeable to the natural and unsophisticated dictates of common sense, that they challenge the assent of a sound and unbiased mind, with a
degree of force and conviction almost equally irresistible.
The objects of geometrical inquiry are so entirely abstracted from those pursuits which stir up and put in
motion the unruly passions of the human heart, that
mankind, without difficulty, adopt not only the more
simple theorems of the science, but even those abstruse
paradoxes which, however they may appear susceptible
of demonstration, are at variance with the natural conceptions which the mind, without the aid of philosophy,
would be led to entertain upon the subject. The INFINITE DIvISIBILITY of matter, or, in other words, the
INFINITE divisibility of a FINITE thing, extending even
to the minutest atom, is a point agreed among geomeVOL. Is           13




194              The Fwderalist.
tricians, though not less incomprehensible to common
sense than any of those mysteries in religion, against
which the batteries of infidelity have been so industriously levelled.
But in the sciences of morals and politics, men are
found far less tractable. To a certain degree, it is right
and useful that this should be the case. Caution and
investigation are a necessary armor against error and
imposition. -But this untractabteness may be carried
too far, and may degenerate into obstinacy, perverseness, or disingenuity. Though it cannot be pretended,
that the principles of moral and political knowledge
have, in general, the same degree of certainty with those
of the mathematics; yet they have much better claims
in this respect than, to judge from the conduct of men
in particular situations, we should be disposed to allow
them. The obscurity is much oftener in the passions
and prejudices of the reasoner, than in the subject.
Men, upon too many occasions, do not give their own
understandings fair play; but yielding to some untoward bias, they entangle themselves in words, and confound themselves in subtleties.
How else could it happen, (if we admit the objectors
to be sincere in their opposition,) that positions so clear
as those which manifest the necessity of a general power
of taxation in the Government of the Union, should
have to encounter any adversaries among men of discernment? Though these positions have been elsewhere fully stated, they will perhaps not be improperly
recapitulated in this place, as introductory to an exami.
nation of what may have been offered by way of objec.
tion to them. They are in substance as follows: —
A Government ought to contain in itself every power
requisite to the full accomplishment of the objects committed to its care, and to the complete execution of the
trusts for which it is responsible, free from every other




The FcIderalist.            195
control, but a regard to the public good and to the sense
of the People.
As the duties of superintending the National defence;
and of securing the public peace against foreign or domestic violence, involve a provision for casualties and
dangers, to which no possible limits can be assigned, the
power of making that provision ought to know no other
bounds than the exigencies of the nation and the resources of the community.
As revenue is the essential engine by which the means
of answering the National exigencies must be procured,
the power of procuring that article in its full extent must
necessarily be comprehended in that of providing for
those exigencies.
As theory and- practice conspire to prove, that the
power of procuring revenue is unavailing when exercised over the States in their collective capacities, the
Fcederal Government must of necessity be invested
with an unqualified power of taxation in the ordinary
modes.
Did not experience evince the contrary, it would be
natural to conclude that the propriety of a general power
of taxation in the National Government might safely be
permitted to rest on the evidence of these propositions,
unassisted by any additional arguments or illustrations.
But we find, in fact, that the antagonists of the proposed
Constitution, so far from acquiescing in their justness or
truth, seem to make their principal and most zealous
effort against this part of the plan.  It may therefore
be satisfactory to analyze the arguments with which
they combat it.
Those of them which have been most labored with
that view, seem in substance to amount to this: " It is
not true, because the exigencies of the Union may not' be susceptible of limitation, that its power of laying
taxes ought to be unconfined. Revenue is as requisite




196               The Fcederalist.
"to the purposes of the local administrations as to those
of the Union; and the former are at least of equal im"portance with the latter to the happiness of the People.
"It is, therefore, as necessary that the State Govern"ments should be able to command the means of sup"plying their wants, as that the National Government
"should possess the like faculty in respect to the wants
"of the Union. But an indefinite power of taxation in
"the latter might, and probably would in time, deprive
"the former of the means of providing for their own
" necessities; and would subject them entirely to the
" mercy of the National Legislature. As the laws of
"the Union are to become the supreme law of the land;
"as it is to have power to pass all laws that may be
" NECESSARY for carrying into execution the authorities
"with which it is proposed to vest it; the National
"Government might at any time abolish the taxes im"posed for State objects, upon the pretence of an inter" ference with its own. It might allege a necessity of
"doing this, in order to give efficacy to the National
"revenues: And thus all the resources of taxation
"might by degrees become the subjects of Federal mo"nopoly, to the entire exclusion and destruction of the
"State Governments."
This mode of reasoning appears sometimes to turn
upon the supposition of usurpation in the National
Government: at other times, it seems to be designed
only as a deduction from the constitutional operation of
its intended powers. It is only in the latter light that
it can be admitted to have any pretensions to fairness.
The moment we launch into conjectures about the
usurpations of the Fcederal Government, we get into an
unfathomable abyss, and fairly put ourselves out of the
-each of all reasoning. Imagination may range at pleasure, till it gets bewildered amidst the labyrinths of an
enchanted castle, and knows not on which side to turn.




The Fosderalist.            197
to extricate itself from the perplexities into which it has
so rashly adventured. Whatever may be the limits or
modifications of the powers of the Union, it is easy to
imagine an endless train of possible dangers; and by
indulging an excess of jealousy and timidity, we may
bring ourselves to a state of absolute skepticism and
irresolution. I repeat here, what I have observed in substance in another place, that all observations founded
upon the danger of usurpation ought to be referred to
the composition and structure of the Government, not
to the nature or extent of its powers. The State Governments, by their original Constitutions, are invested
with complete sovereignty. In what does our security
consist against usurpations from that quarter? Doubtless in the manner of their formation, and in a due dependence of those who are to administer them upon the
People. If the proposed construction of the Faederal
Government be found, upon an impartial examination
of it, to be such as to afford, to a proper extent, the
same species of security, all apprehensions on the score
of usurpation ought to be discarded.
It should not be forgotten that a disposition in the
State Governments to encroach upon the rights of the
Union is quite as probable as a disposition in the Union
to encroach iupon the rights of the State Governments.
What side would be likely to prevail in such a conflict,
must depend on the means which the contending parties could employ towards insuring success. As in republics strength is always on the side of the People, and
as there are weighty reasons to induce a belief that the
State Governments will commonly possess most influence over them, the natural conclusion is, that such contests will be most apt to end to the disadvantage of the
Union; and that there is greater probability of encroachmnents by the members Upons the Foederal Head, than by
the Fcederal Head rvponi the members. But it is evi,




198              The Fwderalist.
dent that all conjectures of this kind must be extremely
vagueand fallible: and that it is by far the safest course
to lay them altogether aside, and to confine our attention wholly to the nature and extent of the powers, as
they are delineated in the Constitution. Everything
beyond this must be left to the prudence and firmness
of the People; who, as they will hold the scales in their
own hands, it is to be hoped, will always take care to
preserve the constitutional equilibrium between the General and the State Governments.  Upon this ground,
which is evidently the true one, it will not be difficult
~o obviate the objections which have been made to aii
indefinite power of taxation in the United States.
PUBLIUS.
[From the Daily Advertiser, Thursday, January 3, 1788.]
THE F(EDERALIST. No. XXXI.
To THE PEOPL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
ALTHOUGH I am of opinion that there would be
no real danger of the consequences which seem to
be apprehended to the StatQ Governments from a power
in the Union to control them in the levies of money,
because I am persuaded that the sense of the People,
the extreme hazard of provoking the resentments of the
State Governments, and a conviction of the utility and
necessity of local administrations, for local purposes,
would be a complete barrier against the oppressive use
of such a power; yet I am willing here to allow, in its
full extent, the justness of the reasoning which requires
that the individual States should possess an independent




The Faderalist.             199
and uncontrollable authority to raise their own revenues
for the supply of their own wants. And making this
concession, I affirm that (with the sole exception of duties on imports and exports) they would, under the plan
of the Convention, retain that authority in the most absolute and unqualified sense; and that an attempt on
the part of the National Government to abridge them
in the exercise of it, would be a violent assumption of
power, unwarranted by any Article or clause of its Constitution.
An entire consolidation of the States into one complete National sovereignty would imply an entire subordination of the parts; and whatever powers might
remain in them, would be altogether dependent on the
general will. But as the plan of the Co
only at a partial unionr cnsolidation. the State Govlrnm-Mnis would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not, by
that act, exclusively delegated to the United States.
This exclusive delegation, or rather this alienation, of
State sovereignty, would only exist in three cases:
where the Constitution in express terms granted an
exclusive authority to the Union; where it granted in
one instance an authority to the Union, and in another
prohibited the States from exercising the like authority;
and where it granted an authority to the Union, to which
a similar authority in the States would be absolutely and
totally contradictory and repugnant. I use these terms
to distinguish this last.case from another which might
appear to resemble it, but which would, in fact, be essentially different: I mean where the exercise of a concurrent jurisdiction might be productive of occasional
interferences in the policy of any branch of administration, but would- not imply any direct contradiction or
repugnancy in point of constitutional authority. These
three cases of exclusive jurisdiction in the Foederal Gov



200               The Fwederalist.
ernment may be exemplified by the following instances.
The last clause but one in the eighth Section of the first
Article provides expressly, that Congress shall exercise
" exclusive legislation" over the district to be appropriated as the seat of Government. This answers to the
first case. The first clause of the same Section empowers Congress "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts,
"and excises;" and the second clause of the tenth Section of the same Article declares, that "no State shall,' without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or' duties on imports or exports, except for the purpose of' executing its inspection laws."  Hence would result
an exclusive power in the Union to lay duties on
imports and exports, with the particular exception
mentioned; but this power is abridged by another
clause, which declares, that no tax or duty shall be laid
on articles exported from any State; in consequence of
which qualification, it now only extends to the duties on
imports. This answers to the second case. The third
will be found in that clause which declares that Congress shall have power " to establish an UNIFORM RULE
" of naturalization throughout the United States." This
must necessarily be exclusive: because if each State
had power to prescribe a DISTINCT RULE, there could
not be an UNIFORM RULE.
A case which may perhaps be thought to resemble
the latter, but which is in fact widely different, affects
the question immediately under consideration. I mean
the power of imposing taxes on all articles other than
exports and imports. This, I contend, is manifestly a
concurrent and coequal authority in the United States
and in the individual States. There is plainly no ex.
oression in the granting clause which makes that power
exclusive in the Union. There is no independent clause
or sentence which prohibits the States from exercising it.
So far is this from being the case, that a plain and con



7The Federalist.             201
elusive argument to the contrary is to be deduced from
the restraint laid upon the States in relation to duties
bn imports and exports. This restriction implies an admission, that if it were not inserted, the States would
possess the_ power it excludes; and it implies a further
admission, that as to all other taxes the authority of the
States remains undiminished.  In any other view it
would be both unnecessary and dangerous; it would be
unnecessary, because if the grant to the Union of the
power of laying such duties implied the exclusion of the
States, or even their subordination in this particular,
there could be no need of such a restriction; it would
be dangerous, because the introduction of it leads directly to the conclusion which has been mentioned, and
which, if the reasoning of the objectors be just, could
not have been intended; I mean that the States, in all
cases to which the restriction did not apply, would have
a concurrent power of taxation with the Union. The
restriction in question amounts to what lawyers call a
NEGATIVE PREGNANT; that is, a negation of one thing,
and an affirmance of another: a negation of the authority of the States to impose taxes on imports and exports, and an affirmance of their authority to impose
them on all other articles. It would be mere sophistry
to argue that it was meant to exclude them absolutely
from the imposition of taxes of the former kind, and to
leave them at liberty to lay others subject to the control
of the National Legislature.  The restraining or prohibitory clause only says, that they shall not, without the
consent of Congress, lay such duties; and if weq are to
understand this in the sense last mentioned, the Constitution would then be made to introduce a formal provision for the sake of a very absurd conclusion; which is,
that the States, with the consent of the National Legislature, might tax imports and exports; and that they
might tax every other article, wnless controlled by the




202               The Foderalist.
same body. If this was the intention, why not leave it
in the first instance, to what is alleged to be the natural
operation of the original clause, conferring a general
power of taxation upon the Union? It is evident that
this could not have been the intention, and that it will
not bear a construction of the kind.
As to a supposition of repugnancy between the powei
of taxation in the States and in the Union, it cannot be
supported in that sense which would be requisite to work
an exclusion of the States. It is indeed possible that
a tax might be laid on a particular article by a State
which might render it inexpedient that thus a further tax
should be laid on the same article by the Union; but it
would not imply a constitutional inability to impose a
further tax. The quantity of the impositions the expediency or inexpediency of an increase on either side,
would be mutually questions of prudence; but there
*would be involved no direct contradiction of power.
The particular policy of the National and of the State
systems of finance might now and then not exactly coincide, and might require reciprocal forbearances. It is
not, however, a mere possibility of inconvenience in the
exercise of powers, but an immediate constitutional repugnancy, that can by implication alienate and extinguish a preexisting right of sovereignty.
The necessity of a concurrent jurisdiction in certain
cases results from the division of the sovereign power;
and the rule that all authorities, of which the States are
not explicitly divested in favor of the Union, remain
with them in full vigor, is not a theoretical consequence
of that division, but is clearly admitted by the whole
tenor of the instrument which contains the-Articles of
the proposed Constitution. We there find, that, notwithstanding the affirmative grants of general authorities, there has been the most pointed care in those cases
where it was deemed improper that the like authorities




The Federalist.              203
should reside in the States, to insert negative clauses
prohibiting the exercise of them by the States.  The
tenth Section of the first Article consists altogether of
such provisions. This circumstance is a-clear indication of the sense of the Convention, and furnishes a
rule of interpretation out of the body of the Act, which
justifies the position I have advanced, and refutes every
hypothesis to the contrary.
The last clause of the eighth Section of the first
Article of the plan under consideration authorizes the
National Legislature "to make all laws which shall be
"necessary and proper for carrying into execution the
" powers by that Constitution vested in the Government
" of the United States, or in any department or officer
"thereof;" and the second clause of the sixth Article
declares, " that the Constitution and the laws of the
"United States made in pursuance thereof, and the
"treaties made by their authority, shall be the supreme
"law of the land; anything in the constitution or laws
" of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."
These two clauses have been the source of much virulent invective, and petulant declamation, against the
proposed Constitution. They have been held up to the
people in all the exaggerated colors of misrepresentation; as the pernicious engines by which their local
Governments were to be destroyed, and their liberties
exterminated; as the hideous monster whose devouring
jaws would spare neither sex nor age, nor high nor low,
nor sacred nor profane; and yet, strange as it may appear, after all this clamor, to those who may not have
happened to contemplate them in the same light, it may
be affirmed with perfect confidence, that the constitutional operation of the intended Government would be
precisely the same, if these clauses were entirely obliterated, as if they were repeated in every Article. They
are olily declaratory of a truth, which would have re



204               The Faederalist.
suited by necessary and unavoidable implication from
the very act of constituting a Fcederal Government, and
vesting it with certain specified powers. This is so
clear a proposition, that moderation itself can scarcely
listen to the railings which have been so copiously vented
against this part of the Plan, without emotions that disturb its equanimity.
What is a power but the ability or faculty of doing
a thing?  What is the ability to do a thing, but the
power of employing the means necessary to its execution?  What is a LEGISLATIVE power, but a power of
making LAWS?  What are the means to execute a LEGISLATIVE power, but LAWS? What is the power of laying and collecting taxes, but a legislative power, or a
power of making laws, to lay and collect taxes? What
are the proper means of executing such a power, but
necessary and proper laws?
This simple train of inquiry furnishes us at once with
a test by which to judge of the true nature of the clause
complained of. It conducts us to this palpable truth,
that a power to lay and collect taxes must be a power
to pass all laws necessary and proper for the execution
of that power: and what does the unfortunate and
calumniated provision in question do, more than declare the same truth; to wit, that the National Legislature, to whom the power of laying and collecting taxes
had been previously given, might, in the execution of
that power, pass all laws necessary and proper to carry
it into effect? I have applied these observations thus
particularly to the power of taxation; because it is the
immediate subject under consideration, and because it
is the most important of the authorities proposed to be
conferred upon the Union. But the same process will
lead to the same result, in relation to all other powers
declared in the Constitution. And it is expressly to execute these powers, that the sweeping clause, as it has




The Federalist.              205
been affectedly called, authorizes the National Legislature to pass all necessary and proper laws. If there is
anything exceptionable, it must be sought for in the
specific powers, upon which this general declaration is
predicated. The declaration itself, though it may be
chargeable with tautology or redundancy, is at least
perfectly harmless.
But susPICION may ask, Why then was it introduced?
The answer is, that it could only have been done for
greater caution, and to guard against all cavilling refinements in those who might hereafter feel a disposition to
curtail and evade the legitimate authorities of the Union.
The Convention probably foresaw, what it has been a
principal aim of these papers to inculcate, that the danger which most threatens our political welfare is, that
the State Governments will finally sap the foundations
of the Union; and might therefore think it necessary,
in so cardinal a point, to leave nothing to construction.
Whatever may have been the inducement to it, the wisdom of the precaution is evident from the cry which
has been raised against it; as that very cry betrays a
disposition to question the great and essential truth
which it is manifestly the object of that provision to
declare.
But it may be again asked, who is to judge of the
necessity and propriety of the laws to be passed for executing the powers of the Union?  I answer, first, that
this question arises as well and as fully upon the simple
grant of those powers, as upon the declaratory clause:
and I answer in the second place, that the National
Government, like every other, must judge, in the first
instance, of the proper exercise of its powers, and its
constituents in the last. If the Fmaderal Government
should overpass the just bounds of its authority and
make a tyrannical use of its powers, the People, whose
creature it is, must appeal to the standard they have




206               The Federalist.
formed, and take such measures to redress the injury
done to the Constitution as the exigency may suggest
and prudence justify. T roprioetvp..Qiaja a
constitut''nal li ht     V~s Te derm
nature of the  owers upon which it is founded. Suppose,  by some forced constructions o  its authority,
(which indeed cannot easily be imagined,) the Fcederal
Legislature should attempt to vary the law of descent
in any State; would it not be evident, that in making
such an attempt: it had exceeded its jurisdiction, and
infringed upon that of the State?  Suppose, again,
that upon the pretence of an interference with its revenues, it should undertake to abrogate a land-tax imposed by the authority of a State; would it not be
equally evident, that this was an invasion of that con..
current jurisdiction in respect to this species of tax,
which its Constitution plainly supposes to exist in the
State Governments? If there ever should be a doubt
on this head, the credit of it will be entirely due to those
reasoners, who in the imprudent zeal of their animosity
to the Plan. of the Convention, have labored to envelop
it in a cloud, calculated to obscure the plainest and simplest truths.
But it is said, that the laws of the Union are to be
the supreme law of the land. But what inference can
be drawn from this, or what would they amount to, if
they were not to be supreme? It is evident they would
amount to nothing. A LAW, by the very meaning of
the term, includes supremacy. It is a rule, which those
to whom it is prescribed are bound to observe. This
results from every political:association. If individuals
enter into a state of society, the laws of that society:
must be the supreme regulator of their conduct. If a
number of political societies enter into a larger political
society, the laws which the latter may enact, pursuant
to the powers intrusted to it by its Constitution, must




The Fwderalist.             207
necessarily be supreme over those societies, and the individuals of whom they are composed. It would otherwise be a mere treaty, dependent- on the good faith of
the parties, and' not a Government; which is only another word for POLITICAL POWER AND SUPREMACY. But
it will not follow from this doctrine, that acts of the
larger society, which are not pursuant to its constitutional powers, but which are invasions)of the residuary
authorities of the smaller societies, will become the supreme law of the land. These will be merely acts of
usurpation, and will deserve to be treated as such.
Hence we perceive, that the clause which declares the
supremacy of the laws of the Union, like the one we
have just before considered, only declares a truth, which
flows immediately and necessarily from the institution
of a Fcederal Government. It will not, I presume, have
escaped observation, that it expressly confines this supremacy to laws made pursuant to the Constitution;
which I mention merely as an instance of caution in
the Convention; since that limitation would hjve been
to be understood, though it had not been expressed.
Though a law, therefore, laying a tax for the use of
the United States would be supreme in its nature, and
could not legally be opposed or controlled; yet a law for
abrogating or preventing the collection of a tax laid by
the authority of the State, (unless upon imports and
exports,) would not be the supreme law of the land, but
an usurpation of power not granted by the Constitution. As far as an improper -accumulationI of taxes. on
the same object, might tend to render the collection dif.
ficult or precarious, this would he a mutual inconvenience, not arising from  a superiority or defect of
power on either side, but from an injudicious exercise
of power by one or the other, in a manner equally disadvantageous to both. It is to be hoped and presumed,
however, that mutual interest would dictate a concert




208               The Federalist.
in this respect which would avoid any material inconvenience. The inference from the whole is - that the
individual States would, under the proposed Constitution, retain an independent and uncontrollable authority to raise revenue to any extent of which they may
stand in need, by every kind of taxation, except duties
on imports and exports. It will be shown in the next
paper, that this CONCURRENT JURISDICTION in the Article
of taxation was the only admissible substitute for an entire subordination, in respect to this branch of power,
of the State authority to that of the Union.
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Friday, January 4, 1788.]
THE F(EDERALIST. No. XXXII.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF. NEW YORK:
FLATTER myself it has been clearly shown in my
last number, that-the particular States, under the
proposed Constitution, would have COEQUAL authority
with the Union in the article of revenue, except as to
duties on imports. As this leaves open to the States
far the greatest part of the resources of the community,
there can be no color for the assertion, that they would
not possess means as: abmwidat-a icould be desired, for
the supply of their own wants, independent of all external control. That the field is sufficiently wide, will
more fully appear, when we come to advert to the inconsiderable share of the public expenses, for which it
will fall to the lot of the State Governments to pro.
vide.
To argue upon abstract principles, that this cooirdi



The Fwderalist.             209
nate authority cannot exist, is to set up supposition and
theory against fact and reality. However proper such
reasonings might be, to show that a thing ought not to
exist, they are wholly to be rejected, when they are
made use of to prove that it does not exist, contrary to
the evidence of the fact itself. It is well known, that
in the Roman Republic, the legislative authority, in the
last resort, resided for ages in two different political bodies - not as branches of the same Legislature, but as
distinct and independent Legislatures, in each of which
an opposite interest:prevailed; in one, the Patrician; in
the other, the Plebeian. Many arguments might have
been adduced, to prove the unfitness of two such seemingly contradictory authorities, each having power to
annul or repeal the acts of the other. But a man would
have been regarded as frantic, who should have attempted at Rome to disprove their existence. It will be readily understood, that I allude to the COMITIA CENTURIATA
and the COMITIA TRIBUTA. The former, in which the
people voted by centuries, was so arranged as to give a
superiority to the Patrician interest: in the latter, in
which numbers prevailed, the Plebeian interest had an
entire predominancy. And yet these two Legislatures
coexisted for ages, and the Roman Republic attained t
the utmost height of human greatness.
In the case particularly under consideration, there is
no such contradiction as appears in the example cited;
there is no power on either side to annul the acts of the
other. And in practice, there is little reason to apprehend any inconvenience; because, in a short course of
time, the wants of the States will naturally reduce themselves within a very narrow compass; and in the interim,
the United States will, in all probability, find it convenient to abstain:wholly.from those:objects to whieh
the particular States would ble linclined to resort.
To form a more precise judgment of the true merits
VOL. I.        14




210               The Fwederalist.
of this question, it will be well to advert to the propor.
tion between the objects that will require a Faederal pro.
vision in respect to revenue, and those which will require a State provision.  We shall discover that the
former are altogether unlimited: and that the latter are
circumscribed within very moderate bounds. In pursuing this inquiry, we must bear in mind that we are not
to confine our view to the present period, but to look
forward to remote futurity. Constitutions of civil Government are not to be framed upon a calculation of existing exigencies; but upon a combination of these with
the probable exigencies of ages, according to the natural
and tried course of human affairs. Nothing, therefore,
can be more fallacious than to infer the,. extent of any
power, proper to be lodged in the National Government,
from an estimate.of its immediate necessities. There
ought to be a CAPACITY to provide for future contingencies, as they may happen; and as these are illimitable in their nature, it is impossible safely to limit that
capacity. - It is true, perhaps, that a computation might
be made, with sufficient accuracy to answer the purpose,
of the quantity of revenue requisite to discharge the
subsisting engagements of the Union, and to maintain
those establishments which, for some time to come,
would suffice in time of peace. But would it be wise,
or would it not rather be the extreme of folly, to stop at
this point, and to leave the Government, intrusted with.
the care of the: National defence, in a state of absolute
incapacity to provide for theb protection of the community against future invasions of the public peace, by
foreign war or domestic convulsions? If, on the contrary, we ought to exceed this point, where can we stop,
short of an indefinite power of providing for emergencies as they may arise?. Though it is easy to assert, in
general terms, the possibility of forming a rational judgment of a due provision against probable dangers; yet




The Federalist.             211
we may safely challenge those who make the assertion'
to bring forward their data, and may affirm, that- they
would be found as vague and uncertain as any that
could be produced to establish the probable duration of
the world. Observations, confined to the mere prospects
of internal attacks, can deserve no weight; though even
these will admit of no satisfactory calculation: but if
we mean to be a commercial people, it must form a part
of our policy to be able one day to defend that commerce. The support of a navy and of naval wars would
involve contingencies that must baffle all the efforts of
political arithmetic.
Admitting that we ought to try the novel and absurd
experiment in politics, of tying up the hands of Government from offensive war, founded upon reasons of State;
yet certainly we ought not to disable it from guarding
the community against the ambition or enmity of other
nations. A cloud has been for some time hanging over
the European world. If it should break forth into a
storm, who can insure us that in its progress a part of
its fury would not be spent upon us? No reasonable
man would hastily pronounce, that we are entirely out
of its reach. Or if the combustible materials, that now
seem to be collecting, should be dissipated without coming to maturity; or if a flame should be kindled without
extending to us, what security can we have that our
tranquillity will long remain undisturbed from  some
other cause, or from some other quarter? Let us recollect that peace or war will not always be left to our option; that however moderate or unambitious we may
be, we cannot count upon the moderation, or hope to
extinguish the ambition of others.  Who could have'magined at the conclusion of the last war, that France
and Britain, wearied and exhausted as they both were,
would so soon have looked with so hostile an aspect
upon each other?  To judge from the history of man



212              The Faderalist.
kind, we shall be compelled to conclude, that the fiery
and destructive passions of war reign in the human
breast with much more powerful sway than the mild
and beneficent sentiments of peace; and that to model
our political systems upon speculations of lasting tranquillity, is to calculate on the weaker springs of the
human character.
What are the chief sources of expense in every Government? What has occasioned that enormous accumulation of debts with which several of the European
nations are oppressed? The answer plainly is, wars and
rebellions; the support of those institutions, which are
necessary. to guard the body politic, against these two
most mortal diseases of society. The expenses arising
from those institutions which are relative to the mere
domestic police of a State; to the support of its Legislative, Executive, and Judicial departments, with their
different appendages; and to the encouragement of agriculture and manufactures, (which will comprehend almost'all the object8 of State expenditures) are insig.
nificant, in comparison with those which relate to the
National defence.
In the kingdom of Great Britain, where all the ostentatious apparatus of Monarchy is to be provided for, not
above a fifteenth part of the annual income of the nation is appropriated to the class of expenses last mentioned: the other fourteen fifteenths are absorbed in the
payment of the interest, of debts, contracted for carrying
on the wars in which that country has been engaged,
and in the maintenance of fleets.: and armies. If, on the
one hand, it should be observ-ed: that the expenses incurred in the prosecutio, of the ambitious enterprises
and vainglorious pursuits of a Monarchy, are not a
proper standard by which to judge of those which might
be necessary in a Republic; it ought, on the other handi
to be remarked, that there should be as great a dispre




The Frdealist,             213
portion between the profusion and extravagance of a
wealthy kingdom in its domestic administration, and
the frugality and economy which in that particular be-.come the modest simplicity of republican Government.
If we balance a proper deduction from one side, against
that which it is supposed ought to be made from the
other, the proportion may still be considered as holding
good.
But let us advert to the large debt which we have
ourselves contracted in a single war, and let us only calculate on a common share of the events which disturb
the peace of nations, and we shall instantly perceive,
without the aid of any elaborate illustration, that there
must always be an immense disproportion between the
objects of Foederal and State expenditures. It is truef
that several of the States, separately, are encumbered
with considerable debts, which are an excrescence of the
late war. But this cannot happen again, if the proposed system be adopted; and when these debts are
discharged, the only call for revenue of any consequence,
which the State Governments will continue to experience,
will be for the mere support of their respective civil lists;
to which, if we add all contingencies, the total amount
in every State ought to fall considerably short of two
hundred thousand pounds.
In framing a Government for posterity as well as our.
selves, we ought, in those provisions which are designed
to be permanent, to calculate, not on temporary, but on
permanent causes of expense. If this principle be a just
one, our attention would be directed to a provision in
favor of the State Governments for an annual sum of
about two hundred thousand pounds; while the exi.
gencies of the Union could be susceptible of no limits,
even in imagination. In this view of the subject, by
what logic can it be maintained that the local Govern.'nents ought to command, in perpetuity, an EXCLUSIVE




214              The Fwaderalist.
source of revenue for any sum beyond the extent of two
hundred thousand pounds? To extend its power further, in exclusion of the authority of the Union, would
be to take the resources of the community out of those
hands which stood in need of them for the public welfare, in order to put them into other hands which could
have no just or proper occasion for them.
Suppose, then, the Convention had been inclined to
proceed upon the principle of a repartition of the objects
of revenue, between the Union and its members, in propoxrtion to their comparative necessities; what particular
fund could have been selected for the use of the States,
that would not either have been too much or too little'; too little for their present, too much for their future
wants? As to the line of separation between external
and internal taxes, this would leave to the States, at a
rough computation, the command of two thirds of the
resources of the community, to defray from a tenth to a
twentieth part of its expenses; and to the Union, one
third of the resources of the community, to defray from
nine tenths to nineteen twentieths of its expenses. If we
desert this boundary, and content ourselves with leaving
to the States an exclusive power of taxing houses and
lands, there would still be a great disproportion between
the means and the end; the possession of one third of
the resources of the community to supply, at most, one
tenth of its wants. If any fund could have been selected and appropriated, equal to and not greater than
the object, it would have been inadequate to the discharge of the existing debts of the particular States,
and would have left them dependent on the Union for
a provision for this purpose.
The preceding train of observations will justify the
position which has been elsewhere laid down, that " A
t; CONCURRENT JURISDICTION in the article of taxation was
"the only admissible substitute for an entire- subordina



The Fatderalist.            215
"tion, in respect to this branch of power, of State au" thority to that of the Union."  Any separation of the
objects of revenue that could have been fallen upon,
would have amounted to a sacrifice of the great INTERESTS of the Union to the POWER of the individual
States. The Convention thought the concurrent jurisdiction preferable to that subordination; and it is evident that it has at least the merit of reconciling an
indefinite constitutional power of taxation in the Fcederal Government with an adequate and independent
power in the States to provide for their own necessities.
There remain a few other lights, in which this important
subject of taxation will claim a further consideration.
PUBLIUS.
For the Independent Journal.
THE FCEDERALIST. No. XXXIII.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
BEFORE we proceed to examine any other objections to an indefinite power of taxation in the
Union, I shall make one; general remark; which is, that
if the jurisdiction of the National Government, in the
article of revenue, should be restricted to particular objects, it would naturally occasion an undue proportion
of the public burdens to fall upon those objects. Two
evils would spring from this source: the oppression of
particular branches of industry, and an unequal distrioution of the taxes, as well among the several States, as
among the citizens of the same State.
Suppose, as has been contended for, the Faederal power




216      7The Federaltst.
of taxation were to be confined to duties on imports,
it is evident that the Government, for want of being
able to command other resources, would frequently be
tempted to extend these duties to an injurious excess.
There are persons who imagine that they can never be
carried to too great a length; since the- higher they are,
the more it is alleged they will tend to discourage an extravagant consumption, to produce a favorable balance
of trade, and to promote domestic manufactures. But
all extremes are pernicious in various ways. Exorbitant duties on imported articles would beget a general
spirit of smuggling; which is always prejudicial to the
fair trader, and eventually to the revenue itself: they
tend to render other classes of the community tributary,
in an improper degree, to the manufacturing classes, to
whom they give a premature monopoly of the markets:
they sometimes force industry out of its more natural
channels into others in which it flows with less advantage: and in the last place. they oppress the merchant,
who is often obliged to pay them himself without any
retribution from the consumer. When the demand is
equal to the quantity of goods at market, the consumer
generally pays the duty; but when the markets happen
to be overstocked, a great proportion falls upon the merchant, and sometimes not only exhausts his profits, but
breaks in upon his capital. I am apt to think, that a
division of the duty, between the seller and the buyer,
more often happens than is commonly imagined. It is
not always possible to raise the price of a commodity,
in exact proportion to every additional imposition laid
upon it. The merchant, especially in a country of small
commercial capital, is often under a necessity of keeping prices down in order to a more expeditious sale.
The maxim that the consumer is the payer, is so much
oftener true than the reverse of the proposition, that it
is far more equitable that the duties on imports should




The  Foderalist.            217
go into a common stock, than that they should redound
to the exclusive benefit of the importing States. But
it is not so generally true, as to render it equitable,
that those duties should form the only National fund.
When they are paid by the merchant, they operate as
an additional tax upon the importing State, whose citizens pay their proportion of them in the character of
consumers. In this view, they are productive of inequality among the States; which inequality would be
increased with the increased extent of the duties. The
confinement of the National revenues to this species of
imposts would be attended with inequality, from a different cause, between the manufacturing and the nonmanufacturing States.- The States which can go farthest towards the supply of their own wants, by their
own manufactures, will not, according to their numbers
or wealth, consume so great a proportion of imported articles as those States which are not in the same favorable
situation. They would not, therefore, in this mode alone
contribute to the public treasury in a ratio to their abilities. To make them do this, it is necessary that recourse be had to excises; the proper objects of which
are particular kinds of manufactures.  New York is
more deeply interested in these considerations, than
such of her citizens as contend for limiting the power
of the Union to external taxation, may be aware of.
New York is an importing State, and is not likely speedily to be, to any great extent, a manufacturing State.
She would of course suffer in a double light, from restraining the jurisdiction of the Union to commercial
imposts.
So far as these observations tend to inculcate a danger of the import duties being extended to an injurious
extreme, it may be observed, conformably to a remark
made in another part of these papers, that the interest
of the revenue itself would be a sufficient guard against




218               The Fawderalist.
such an extreme. I readily admit that this would be
the case, as long as other resources were open; but if
the avenues to them were closed, HOPE, stimulated by
necessity, would beget experiments, fortified by rigorous
precautions and additional penalties; which, for a time,
would have the intended effect, till there had been leisure to contrive expedients to elude these new precautions. The first success would be apt to inspire false
opinions; which it might require a long course of subsequent experience to correct. Necessity, especially in
politics, often occasions false hopes, false reasonings,
and a system of measures, correspondently erroneous.
But even if this supposed excess should not be a'consequence of the limitation of the Fcaderal power of taxation, the inequalities spoken of would still ensue, though
not in the same degree, from the other causes that have
been noticed. Let us now return to the examination
of objections.
One which, if we may judge from the frequency of
its repetition, seems most to bg relied on, is, that the
House of Representatives is not sufficiently numerous
for the reception of all the different classes of citizens,
in order to combine the interests and feelings of every
part of the community, and to produce a due sympathy
between the representative body and its constituents.
This argument presents itself under a very specious and
seducing form; and is well calculated to lay hold of the
prejudices of those to whom it is addressed. But when
we come to dissect it with attention, it will appear to
be made up of nothing but fair-sounding words. The
object it seems to aim at, is in the first place impracticable, and in the sense in which it is contended for, is
unnecessary. I reserve for another place, the discussion
of the question which relates to the sufficiency of the
representative body in respect to numbers; and shall
eontRnt myself with examining here the particular use




The Federalist.             219
which has been made of a contrary supposition, in ref
erence to the immediate subject of our inquiries.
The idea of an actual representation of all classes of
the people, by persons of each class, is altogether visionary. Unless it were expressly provided in the Constitution, that each different occupation should send one or
more members, the thing would never take place in practice. Mechanics and manufacturers will always be inclined, with few exceptions, to give their votes to merchants, in preference to persons of their own professions
or trades. Those discerning citizens are well aware,
that the mechanic and manufacturing arts furnish the
materials of mercantile enterprise and industry. Many
of them, indeed, are immediately connected with the
operations of commerce. They know that the merchant is their natural patron and friend; and they are
aware, that however great the confidence they may
justly feel in their own good sense, their interests can
be more effectually promoted by the merchant than by
themselves. They are sensible that their habits in life
have not been such as to give them those acquired endowments, without which, in a deliberative assembly,
the greatest natural abilities are for the most part useless; and that the influence and weight, and superior
acquirements of the merchants render them more equal.
to a contest with any spirit which might happen to infuse itself into the public councils, unfriendly to the
manufacturing and trading interests. These considerations, and many others that might be mentioned, prove,
and experience confirms it, that artisans and manufacturers will commonly be disposed to bestow their votes
upon merchants and those whom they recommend. We
must therefore consider merchants as the natural representatives of all these classes of the community.
With regard to the learned professions, little need be
observed; they truly form no distinct interest in society




220               The Fwderalist.
and according to their situation and talents, will be ill
discriminately the objects of the confidence and choice
of each other, and of other parts of the community.
Nothing remains but the landed interest: and this, in
a political view, and particularly in relation to taxes, I
take to be perfectly united, from the wealthiest landlord
down to the poorest tenant. No tax can be laid on land
which will not affect the proprietor of millions of acres
as well as the proprietor of a single acre. Every landholder will therefore have a common interest to keep the
taxes on land as low as possible; and common interest
may always be reckoned upon;as the surest bond of
sympathy. But if we even could suppose a distinction
of interest between the opulent landholder and the middling farmer, what reason is there to conclude, that the
first would stand a better chance of being deputed to
the National Legislature than the last? If we take fact
as our guide, and look into our own Senate and Assembly, we shall find that moderate proprietors of land
prevail in both; nor is this less the case in the Senate,
which consists of a smaller number, than in the Assembly, which is composed of a greater number. Where
the qualifications of the electors are the same, whether
they have to choose a small or a large number, their
votes will fall upon those in whom they have most
confidence; whether these happen to be men of large
fortunes, or of moderate property, or of no property at
all.
It is said to be necessary, that all classes of citizens
should have some of their own number in the representative body, in order that their feelings and interests may
be the better understood and attended to. But we have
seen that this will never happen under any arrangement
that leaves the votes of the People free. Where this is
the case, the representative body, with too few exceptions to have any influence on the spirit of the Govern



T'he Federalist.              221
ment, will be composed of landholders, merchants, ana
men of the learned professions. But where is the danger that the interests and feelings of the different classes
of citizens will not be understood or attended to by
these three descriptions of men? Will not the landholder know and feel whatever will promote or injure
the interest of landed property? And will he not, from
his own interest in that species of property, be sufficiently prone to resist every attempt to prejudice or encumber it? Will not the merchant understand and be
disposed to cultivate, as far as may be proper, the interests of the mechanic and manufacturing arts, to
which his.commerce is so nearly allied? Will.not the
man of the learned profession, who will feel a neutrality to the rivalships between the different branches of
industry, be likely to prove an impartial arbiter between
them, ready to promote either, so far as it shall appear
to him conducive to the general interests of the society?
If we take into the account the momentary-humors
or dispositions which may happen to prevail in particular parts of the society, and to which a wise administration will never be inattentive, is the man whose situation
leads to extensive inquiry and information less likely to
be a competent judge of their nature, extent, and foundation, than one whose observation does not travel beyond the circle of his neighbors and acquaintances? Is
it not natural that a man, who is a candidate for the favor of the People and who is dependent on the suffiages
of his fellow-citizens for the continuance of his public
honors, should take care to inform himself of their dispositions and inclinations, and should be willing to allow them their proper degree of influence upon his conduct?  This dependence, and the necessity of being
bound himself, and his posterity, by the laws to which
he gives his assent, are the true, and they are the strong




222               The Faderalist:
chords of sympathy, between the representative and the
constituent.
There is no part of the administration of Government
that requires extensive information, and a thorough
knowledge of the principles of political economy, so
much as the'business of taxation. The man who understands those principles best, will be least likely to
resort to oppressive expedients, or to sacrifice any particular class of citizens to the procurement of revenue
It might be demonstrated that the most productive sys.
tem of finance will always be the least burdensome.
There can be no doubt that in order to a judicious exercise of the power of taxation, it is necessary that the
person in whose hands it is should be acquainted with
the general genius, habits, and modes of thinking of the
People at large, and with the resources of the country:
And this is all that can be reasonably meant by a
knowledge of the interests and feelings of the People.
In any other sense, the proposition has either no meaning, or an absurd one. And in that sense, let every considerate citizen judge for himself, where the requisite
qualification is most likely to be found.
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, January 8, 1788.]
THE FCEDERALIST. No. XXXIV.
rO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
W     E have seen that the result of the observations, to
which the foregoing number has been principally
devoted, is, that from the natural operation of the different interests and views of the various classes of the




The Fcederalist.          223
community, whether the representation of the People be
more or less numerous, it will consist almost entirely of
proprietors of land, of merchants, and of members of the
learned professions, who will truly represent all those
different interests and views. If it should be objected,
that we have seen other descriptions of men in the local
Legislatures, I answer, that it is admitted there are exceptions to the rule, but not in sufficient number to
influence the general complexion or character of the
Government. There are strong minds in every walk of
life, that will rise superior to the disadvantages of situalion, and will command the tribute due to their merit,
not only from the classes to which they particularly belong, but from the society in general. The door ought
to be equally open to all; and I trust, for the credit of
human nature, that we shall see examples of such vigorous plants flourishing in the soil of Fcederal, as well as
of State legislation; but occasional instances of this
sort will not render the reasoning, founded upon the
general course of things, less conclusive.
The subject might be placed in several other lights,
that would all lead to the same result; and in particular
it might be asked, What greater affinity or relation of interest can be conceived between the carpenter and black.
smith, and the linen manufacturer or stocking-weaver
than between the merchant and either of them? It i
notorious, that there are often as great rivalships be
tween different branches of the mechanic or manufacturing arts, as there are between any of the departments
of labor and industry; so that, unless the representative
body were to be far more numerous than would be consistent with any idea of regularity or wisdom in its deliberations, it is impossible that what seems to be the
spirit of the objection we have been considering, should
ever be realized in practice. But I forbear to dwell any
onger on a matter which has hitherto worn too loose a




224              The Fwaderalist.
garb to admit even of an accurate inspection of its reau
shape or tendency.
There is another objection of a somewhat more precise nature, that claims our attention. It has been asserted that a power of internal taxation in the National
Legislature could never be exercised with advantage, as
well from the want of a sufficient knowledge of local
circumstances, as from an interference between the revenue laws of the Union and of the particular States.
The supposition of a want of proper knowledge, seems
to be entirely destitute of foundation. If any question
is depending in a State Legislature, respecting one of
the Counties, which demands a knowledge of local details, how is it acquired? No doubt from the information of the members of the County. Cannot the like
knowledge be obtained in the National Legislature, from
the representatives of each State? And is it not to be
presumed, that the men who will generally be sent there,
will be possessed of the necessary degree of intelligence
to be able to communicate that information? Is the
knowledge of local circumstances, as applied to taxation, a minute topographical acquaintance with all the
mountains, rivers, streams, highways, and by-paths in
each State; or is it a general acquaintance with its
situation and resources - with the state of its agriculture, commerce, manufactures -with the nature of its
products and consumptions -with the different degrees
and kinds of its wealth, property, and industry?
Nations in general, even under Governments of the
more popular kind, usually commit the administration
of their finances to single men, or to Boards composed
of a few individuals, who digest and prepare, in the first
instance, the plans of taxation, which are afterwards
passed into laws by the authority of the sovereign or
Legislature.
Inquisitive and enlightened statesmen are deemed




Tke Foderalist.              225
everywhere best qualified to make a judicious selection
of the objects proper for revenue; which is a clear indication, as far as the sense of mankind can have weight
in the question, of the species of knowledge of local
circumstances, requisite to the purposes of taxation.
The taxes intended to be comprised under the general denomination of internal taxes, may be subdivided
into those of the direct and those of the indirect kind.
Though the objection be made to both, yet the reasoning upon it seems to be confined to the former branch.
And indeed, as to the latter, by which must be understood duties and excises on articles of consumption, one
is at a loss to conceive, what can be the nature of the
difficulties apprehended.  The knowledge relating to
them must evidently be of a kind that will either be
suggested by the nature of the article itself, or can
easily be procured from any well-informed man, especially of the mercantile class. The circumstances that
may distinguish its situation in one State from its situation in another, must be few, simple, and easy to be
comprehended. The principal thing to be attended to,
would be to avoid those articles which had been previously appropriated to the use of a particular State;
and there could be no difficulty in ascertaining the revenue system of each. This could always be known from
the respective codes of laws, as well as from the information of the members of the several States.
The objection, when applied to real property or to
houses and lands, appears to have, at first sight, more
foundation; but even in this view, it will not bear a
close examination. Land-taxes are commonly laid in
one of two modes, either by actual valuations, permanent or periodical, or by occasional assessments, at the
discretion, or according to the best judgment, of certain
officers whose duty it is to make them. In either case,
the EXECUTION of the business, which alone requires the
VOL. I.         16




226               The Faoderalist.
knowledge. of local details, must be devolved upon
discreet persons in the character of Commissioners or
Assessors, elected by the People, or appointed by the
Government, for the purpose. All that the law can do,
must be to name the persons or to prescribe the manner
of their election or appointment; to fix their numbers
and qualifications; and to draw the general outlines of
their powers and duties. And what is there in all this
that cannot as well be performed by the National Legis.
lature as by a State Legislature? The attention of
either can only reach to general principles: local details,
as already observed, must be referred to those who are
to execute the plan.
But there is a simple point of view, in which this
matter may be placed, that must be altogether satisfactory. The National Legislature can make use of the
system of each State within that State. The method of
laying and collecting this species of taxes in each State,
can, in all its parts, be adopted and employed by the
Frederal Government.
Let it be recollected, that the proportion of these taxes
is not to be left to the discretion of the National Legislature: but is to be determined by the numbers of each
State, as described in the second Section of the first
Article. An actual census, or enumeration of the People
must furnish the rule; a circumstance which effectually
shuts the door to partiality or oppression. The abuse
of this power of taxation seems to have been provided
againsJ with guarded circumspection.  In addition to
the precaution just mentioned, there is a provision that
" all duties, imposts, and excises shall be JUNIFORM
" throughout the United States."
It has been very properly observed, by different speakers and writers on the side of the Constitution, that if
the exercise of the power of internal taxation by the
Union should be discovered on experiment to be really




The Fawderalist.            227
inconvenient, the Feaderal Government may then forbear the use of it, and have recourse to requisitions in
its stead. By way of answer to this, it has been triumphantly asked, why not in the first instance omit that
ambiguous power, and rely upon the latter resource?
Two solid answers may be given; the first is, that the
exercise of that power, if convenient, will be preferable,
because it will be more effectual; and it is impossible to
prove in theory, or otherwise than by the experiment,
that it cannot be advantageously exercised. The contrary, indeed, appears most probable. The second answer is, that the existence of such a power in the Constitution will have a strong influence in giving efficacy
to requisitions. When the States know that the Union
can supply itself without their agency, it will be a powerful motive for exertion on their part.
As to the interference of the revenue laws of the
Union, and of its members, we have already seen that
there can be no clashing or repugnancy of authority.
The laws cannot, therefore, in a legal sense, interfere
with each other; and it is far from impossible to avoid
an interference even in the policy of their different systems. An effectual expedient for this purpose will be,
mutually to abstain from those objects which either
side may have first had recourse to.  As neither can
control the other, each will have an obvious and sensible
interest in this reciprocal forbearance. And where there
is an immediate common interest, we may safely count
upon its operation. When the particular debts of the
States are done away, and their expenses come to be
limited within their natural compass, the possibility almost of interference will vanish.  A small land-tax
will answer the purpose of the States, and will be their
most simple and most fit resource.
Many spectres have been raised out of this power
of internal taxation, to excite the apprehensions of the




228               The Federalist.
People- double sets of revenue officers — a duplication
of their burdens by double taxations, and the frightful
forms of odious and oppressive poll-taxes, have been
played off with all the ingenious dexterity of political
legerdemain.
As to the first point, there are two cases in which
there can be no room for double sets of officers: one,
where the right of imposing the tax is exclusively vested
in the Union, which applies to the duties on imports;
the other, where the object has not fallen under any
State regulation or provision, which may be applicable
to a variety of objects. In other cases, the probability
is, that the United States will either wholly abstain from
the objects preoccupied for local purposes, or will make
use of the State officers and State regulations for collecting the additional imposition. This will best answer
the views of revenue, because it will save expense in the
collection, and will best avoid any occasion of disgust to
the State Governments and to the People. At all events,
here is a practicable expedient for avoiding such an inconvenience; and nothing more can be required than to
show, that evils predicted do not necessarily result from
the plan.
As to any argument derived from a supposed system
of influence, it is a sufficient answer to say, that it ought
not to be presumed; but the supposition is susceptible
of a more precise answer. If such a spirit should infest the councils of the Union, the most certain road to
the accomplishment of its aim would be, to employ the
State officers as much as possible, and to attach them
to the Union by an accumulation of their emoluments.
This would serve to turn the tide of State influence into
the channels of the National Government instead of
making Fcederal influence flow in an opposite and adverse current. But all suppositions of this kind are invidious, and ought to be banished from the considera.




The.. Faeralist.            229
Lion of the great question before the People. They can
answer no other end than to cast'a mist over the truth.
As to the suggestion of double taxation, the answer
is plain. The wants of the Union, are to be supplied in
one way or another; if to be done by the authority of
the Faederal Government, it will not be to be done by
that of the State Government. The quantity of taxes
to be paid by the community must be the same in either
case; with this advantage, if the provision is to be made
by the Union - that the capital resource of commercial
imposts, which is the most convenient branch of revenue, can be prudently improved to a much greater extent under Fcederal than under State regulation, and of
course will render it less necessary to recur to more inconvenient methods; and with this further-advantage,
that as far as there may be any real difficulty'in the exercise of the power of internal taxation, it will impose
a disposition to greater care in the choice and arrangement of the means; and must naturally tend to make
it a fixed point of policy in the National administration
to go as far as may be practicable in making the luxury
of the rich tributary to the public treasury, in order to
diminish the necessity of those impositions which might
create dissatisfaction in the poorer and' most numerous
classes of the society. Happy it is when the interest
which the Government has in the preservation of its
own power, coincides with a proper distribution of the
public burdens, and tends to guard the least wealthy
part of the community from oppression!
As to poll-taxes, I, without scruple, confess my disapprobation of them; and though they have prevailed
from an early period in those States,* which have uni-'ormly been the most tenacious of their rights, I should
lament to see them introduced into practice under th
National Government. But does it follow because there
* The New England States. - Publius.




230              The Fwderalist.
is a power to lay them, that they will actually be laid?
Every State in the Union has power to impose taxes of
this kind; and yet in several of them they are unknown
in practice.  Are the State Governments to be stigmatized as tyrannies, because they possess this power?
If they are not, with what propriety can the like power
justify such a charge against the National Government,
or even be urged as an obstacle to its adoption? As
little friendly as I am to the species of imposition, I still
feel a thorough conviction, that the power of having recourse to it ought to exist in the Fcederal Government.
There are certain emergencies of nations, in which expedients, that in the ordinary state of things ought to
be forborne, become essential to the public weal. And
the Government, from the possibility of such emergencies, ought ever to have the option of making use of
them. The real scarcity of objects in, this country,
which may be considered as productive sources of revenue, is a reason peculiar to itself, for not abridging
the discretion of the National councils in. this respect.
There may exist certain critical and tempestuous conjunctures of the State, in which a poll-tax may become
an inestimable resource. And as I know nothing to
exempt this portion of the globe from; the common
calamities that have befallen other parts -of it, I acknowledge my aversion to every project that is calculated to disarm the Government of -a single weapon,
which in any possible contingency might be usefully
employed for the general defence and security.
PUBLIUS.




The Fwvderalist.            231
[From the Daily Advertiser, Thursday, January 10, 1788.]
THE F(EDERALIST. No. XXXV;
ro THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
THE power of regulating the militia, and of com.
manding its services in times of insurrection and
invasion, are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defence, and of watching over the
internal peace of the Confederacy.
It requires no skill in the science of war to discern,
that uniformity in the organization and discipline of the
militia would be attended with the most beneficial effects, whenever they were called into service for the
public defence. It would enable them to discharge the
duties of the camp and of the field, with mutual intelligence and concert- an advantage of peculiar moment in the operations of an army: arid it would fit
them much sooner to acquire the degree of proficiency
in military functions, which would be essential to their
usefulness. This desirable uniformity can only be accomplished by confiding the regulation of the militia
to the direction of the National authority. It is, therefore, with the most evident propriety, that the plan of the
Convention proposes to empower the Union " to provide
"for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia,
" and for governing such part of them as may be em" ployed in the service of the United States, reserving
" to the States respectively the appointment of the officers,
" and the authority of training the militia according to
" the discipline prescribed by Congress."
Of the different grounds which have been taken in
opposition to the plan of the Convention, there is: none




232               The Federalist.
that was so little to have been expected, or is so unten
able in itself, as the one from which this particular provision has been attacked.  If a well-regulated militia
be.the most natural defence of a free country, it ought
certainly to be under the regulation and at the disposal
of that body, which is constituted the guardian of the
National security. If standing armies are dangerous to
liberty, an efficacious power over the militia, in the body
to whose care the protection of the State is committed,
ought, as far as possible, to take away the inducement
and the pretext to such unfriendly institutions. If the
Foederal Government can command the aid of the militia in those emergencies, which call for the military arm
in support of the civil magistrate, it can the better dispense with the employment of a different kind of force.
If it cannot avail itself of the former, it will be obliged
to recur to the latter. To render an army unnecessary,
will be a more certain method of preventing its existence, than a thousand prohibitions upon paper.
In order to cast an odium upon the power of calling
forth the. militia to execute the laws of the Union, it
has been remarked that there is nowhere any provision
in the proposed Constitution for calling out the POSSE
COMITATUS, to assist the magistrate in the execution of
his duty; whence it has been inferred, that military
force was intended to be his only auxiliary. There is
a striking incoherence in the objections which have appeared, and sometimes even from the same quarter, not
much calculated to inspire a very favorable opinion of
the sincerity or fair dealing of their authors. The same
persons who tell us in one breath, that the powers of
the Fcederal Government will be despotic and unlimited, inform us in the next, that- it has not authority sufficient even to call out the POSSE COMITATUS. The latter, fortunately, is as much short of the truth as the
former exceeds it. It would be as absurd to doubt, that




The Faderalist.              233
a right to pass all laws necessary and proper to execute
its declared powers, would include that of requiring the
assistance of the citizens to the officers who may be in
trusted with the execution of those laws, as it would
be to believe, that a right to enact laws necessary and
proper for the imposition and collection of taxes, would
involve that of varying the rules of descent and of the
alienation of landed property, or of abolishing the trial
by jury in cases relating to it. It being therefore evident, that the supposition of a want of power to require
the aid of the POSSE COMITATUS is entirely destitute of
color, it will follow, that the conclusion which has been
drawn from it, in its application to the authority of the
Foederal Government over the militia, is as uncandid as
it is illogical. What reason could there be to infer, that
force was intended to be the sole instrument of author.
ity, merely because there is a power to make use of it
when necessary? What shall we think of the motives,
which could induce men of sense to reason in this manner? ~ How shall we prevent a conflict between charity
and judgment?
By a curious refinement upon the spirit of republican
jealousy, we are even taught to apprehend danger from
the militia itself, in the hands of the Federal Government. It is observed, that select corps may be formed,
composed of the young and ardent, who may be
rendered subservient to the views of arbitrary power.
What plan for the regulation of the militia may be pursued by the National Government, is impossible to be
foreseen. But so far from viewing the matter in the
same light with those who object to select corps as dangerous, were the Constitution ratified, and were I to
deliver my sentiments to a member of the Fcederal
Legislature from this State on the subject of a militia
establishment, I should hold to him, in substance, the
Following discourse: —




234               The Fwederalist.
"The project of disciplining all the militia of the
"United States is as futile as it would be injurious,
"if it were capable of being carried into execution. A
"tolerable expertness in military movements, is a busi" ess that requires time and practice. It is not a day,
c" or even a week, that will suffice for the attainment of
" it. To oblige the great body of the yeomanry, and
" of the other classes of the citizens, to be under artns
" for the purpose of going through military exercises
" and evolutions, as often as might be necessary to ac"quire the degree of perfection which would entitle
"them  to the character of a well-regulated militia,
"would be a real grievance to the People, and a seri"ous public inconvenience and loss. It would form an
"annual deduction from the productive labor of the
"country, to an amount, which, calculating upon the
"present numbers of the People, would not fall far short
"of the whole expense of the civil establishments of all
" the States. To attempt a thing which would abridge
"the mass of labor and industry to so considerable an
" extent, would be unwise: and the experiment, if made,
" could not succeed, because it would not long be en"dured. Little more can reasonably be aimed at, with
"respect to the People at large, than to have them prop"erly armed and equipped; and in order to see that this'" be not neglected, it will be necessary to assemble them
"once or twice in the course of a year.
"But though the scheme of disciplining the whole
" Nation must be abandoned as mischievous or imprac"ticable; yet it is a matter of the utmost importance,
"that a well-digested plan should, as soon as possible,
"be adopted for the proper establishment of the militia.
"The attention of the Government ought particularly to
" be directed to the formation of a select corps of mod"erate extent, upon such principles as will really fit them
u for service in case of need. By thus circumscribing the




The Fwderalist.              235
" plan, it will be possible to have an excellent body of
" well-tr4ined militia, ready to take the field whenever
"the defence of the State shall require it. This will
" not only lessen the call for military establishments,
"but if circumstances should at any time oblige the
"Government to form an army of any magnitude,
"that army can never be formidable to the liberties of
"the People, while there is a large body of citizens, lit"tle, if at all, inferior to them in discipline and the use
" of arms, who stand ready to defend their own rights,
"and those of their fellow-citizens. This appears to
"me the only substitute that can be devised for a stand"ing army, and the bestpossible security against it. if
"it should exist."
Thus differently from the adversaries of the proposed
Constitution should I reason on the same subject; deducing arguments of safety from the very sources which
they represent as fraught with danger -and perdition.
But how the National Legislature may reason on the
point, is a thing which neither they nor I can foresee.
There is something so far fetched, and so extravagant,
in the idea of danger to liberty from the militia, that
one is at a loss, whether to treat it with gravity or with
raillery; whether to consider it as a mere trial of skill,
like the paradoxes of rhetoricians; as a disingenuous
artifice, to instil prejudices at any price; or as the serious offspring of political fanaticism. Where, in the
name of common sense, are our fears to end, if we may
not trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbors, our fellow-citizens? What shadow of danger can there be
from men who are daily mingling with the rest of their
countrymen; and who participate with them in the same
feelings, sentiments, habits, and interests? What reasonable cause of apprehension can be inferred from a
rower in the Union to prescribe regulations for the
militia, and to command its services when necessary,




236               The Foederalfst.
while the particular States are to have the sole and exclusive appointment of the officers?  If it were possible
seriously to indulge a jealousy of the militia, upon any
conceivable establishment under the Faederal Government, the circumstance of the officers being in the appointment of the States ought at once to extinguish it.
There can be no doubt, that this circumstance will al.
ways secure to them a preponderating influence over
the militia.
In reading many of the publications against the Constitution, a man is apt to imagine that he is perusing
some ill-written tale or romance, which, instead of natural and agreeable images, exhibits to the mind nothing
but frightful and distorted shapes -
d Gorgons, Hydras, and Chimeras dire;"
discoloring and disfiguring whatever it represents, and
transforming everything it touches into a monster.
A sample of this is to be observed in the exaggerated
and improbable suggestions which have taken place respecting the power of calling for the services of the
militia. That of New Hampshire is to be marched to
Georgia, of Georgia to New Hampshire) of New York to
Kentucky, and of Kentucky to Lake Champlain. Nay,
the debts due to the French and Dutch are to be paid in
militia-men instead of Louis d'ors and ducats. At one
moment, there is to be a large army to lay prostrate the
liberties of the People; at another moment, the militia
of Virginia are to be dragged from their homes, five or
six hundred miles, to tame the republican contumacy
of Massachusetts; and that of Massachuisetts is to be
transported an equal distance, to subdue the refractory
haughtiness of the aristocratic Virginians. Do the persons who rave at this rate, imagine that their art or
their eloquence can impose any conceits or absurdities
upon the People of America for infallible truths?




The Fmderalist.            23
If there should be an army to be made use of as the
engine of despotism, what need of the militia? If there
should be no army, whither would the militia, irritated
by being called upon to undertake a distant and hopeless expedition, for the purpose of riveting the chains of
slavery upon a part of their countrymen, direct their
course, but to the seat of the tyrants, who had meditated so foolish as well as so wicked a project, to crush
them in their imagined intrenchments of power, and to
make them an example of the just vengeance of an
abused and incensed People? Is this the way in which
usurpers stride to dominion over a numerous and enlightened Nation? Do they begin by exciting the detestation of the very instruments of their intended usurpa.
tions? Do they usually commence their career by wane
ton and disgustful acts of power, calculated to answer
no end, but to draw upon themselves universal hatred
and execration? Are suppositions of this sort the sober
admonitions of discerning patriots to a discerning People? Or are they the inflammatory ravings of chagrined
incendiaries, or distempered enthusiasts? If we were
even to suppose the National rulers actuated by the most
ungovernable ambition, it is impossible to believe that
they would employ such preposterous means to accomplish their designs.
In times of insurrection, or invasion, it would be
natural and proper, that the militia of a neighboring
State should be marched into another, to resist a common enemy, or to guard the republic against the violence of faction or sedition. This was frequently the
case, in respect to the first object, in the course of the
late war; and this mutual succor is, indeed, a principal
end of our political association, If the power of affording it be placed under the direction of the Union, there
will be no danger of a supine and listless inattention to:he dangers of a neighbor, till its near approach had




238               The Fwderalist.
superadded the incitements of self-preservation, to the
too feeble impulses of duty and sympathy.
I have now gone through the examination of such of
the powers proposed to be vested in the United States,
which may be considered as having an immediate relation to the energy of the Government; and have endeavored to answer the principal objections which have been
made to them. I have passed over in silence those
minor authorities which are either too inconsiderable to
have been thought worthy of the hostilities of the opponents of the Constitution, or of too manifest propriety
to admit of controversy. The mass of Judiciary power,
however, might have claimed an investigation under
this head, had it not been for the consideration that its
organization and its extent may be more advantageously
considered in connection. This has determined me to
refer it to the branch of our inquiries, upon which we
shall next enter.
PUBLIUS.
[From the Daily Advertiser, Friday, January 11, 1788.]
THE F(EDERALIST. No. XXXVI.
T1o THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
IN reviewing the defects of the existing Confederation,
and showing that they cannot be supplied by a Government of less energy than that before the public, several
of the most important principles of the latter fell of
course under consideration. But as the ultimate object
of these papers is, to determine clearly and fully the
merits of this Constitution, and the expediency of adoptIng it, our plan cannot be completed without taking a




The FPederalist.            23S
more critical and thorough survey of the work of the
Convention; without examining it on all its sides;
comparing it in all its parts; and calculating its proba.
ble effects.
That this remaining task may be executed under
impressions conducive to a just and fair result, some
reflections must in this place be indulged, which candor
previously suggests.
It is a misfortune, inseparable from human affairs,
that public measures are rarely investigated with that
spirit of moderation which is essential to a just estimate
of their real tendency to advance or obstruct the public
good; and that this spirit is more apt to be diminished
than promoted, by those occasions which require an
unusual exercise of it. To those who have been led by
experience to attend to this consideration, it could not
appear surprising, that the act of the Convention, which
recommends so many important changes and innovations, which may be viewed in so many lights and relations, and which touches the springs of so many passions and interests, should find or excite dispositions
unfriendly, both on one side and on the other, to a fair
discussion and accurate judgment of its merits.  In
some, it has been too evident from their own publications, that they have scanned the proposed Constitution,
not only with a predisposition to censure, but with a
predetermination to condemn; as the language held by
others betrays an opposite predetermination or bias,
which must render their opinions also of little moment
in the question.  In placing, however, these different
characters on a level, with respect to the weight of their
opinions, I wish not to insinuate that there may not be
a material difference in the purity of their intentions&
It is but just to remark in favor of the latter description,
that as our situation is universally admitted to be peculiarly critical, and to require indispensably, that some



240               The Fewderalist.
thing should be done for our relief, the predetermined
patron of what has been actually done may have. taken
his bias from the weight of these considerations, as well
as from considerations of a sinister nature. The prede.
termined adversary, on the other hand, can have been
governed by no venial motive whatever. The intentions
of the first may be upright, as they may on the contrary
be culpable. The views of the last cannot be upright,
and must be culpable. But the truth is, that these
papers are not addressed to persons falling under either
of these characters. They solicit the attention of those
only, who add to a sincere zeal for the happiness of their
country, a temper favorable to a just estimate of the
means of promoting it.
Persons of this character will proceed to an examination of the Plan submitted by the Convention, not only
without a disposition to find or to magnify faults; but
will see the propriety of reflecting, that a faultless plan
was not to be expected. Nor will they barely make
allowances for the errors which may be chargeable on
the fallibility to which the Convention, as a body of
men, were liable; but will keep in mind, that they themselves also are but men, and ought not to assume an
infallibility in rejudging the fallible opinions of others.
With equal readiness will it be perceived, that besides
these inducements to candor, many allowances ought to
be made, for the difficulties inherent in the very nature
of the undertaking referred to the Convention.
The novelty of the undertaking immediately strikes
us. It has been shown in the course of these papers,
that the existing Confederation is founded on principles
which are fallacious; that we must consequently change
this first foundation, and with it the superstructure resting upon it. It has been shown, that the other Confederacies which could be consulted as precedents have been
vitiated by the-same erroneous prinoiples, and can there.




The Fa3deralist.            241
fore furnish no other light than that of beacons, which
give warning of the course to be shunned, without
pointing out that which ought to be pursued.  The
most that the Convention could do in such a situation,
was to avoid the errors suggested by the past experience
of other countries, as well as of our own; and to provide a convenient mode of rectifying their own errors,
as future experience may unfold them.
Among the difficulties encountered by the Convention, a very important one must have lain, in combining
the requisite stability and energy in Government, with
the inviolable attention due to liberty, and to the repub.
lican form. Without substantially accomplishing this
part of their undertaking, they would have very imperfectly fulfilled the object of their appointment, or the
expectation of the public; yet that it could not be easily
accomplished, will be denied by no one who is unwilling
to betray his ignorance of the subject. Energy in Government is essential to that security against external and
internal danger, and to that prompt and salutary execution of the laws, which enter into the very definition of
good Government. Stability in Government is essential
to National character, and to the advantages annexed to
it, as well as to that repose and confidence in the minds
of the People, which are among the chief blessings of
civil society. An irregular and mutable legislation is
not more an evil in itself, than it is odious to the People; and it may be pronounced with assurance, that the
People of this country, enlightened as they are, with
regard to the nature, and interested, as the great body
of them are, in the effects of good Government, will
never be satisfied, till some remedy be applied to the
vicissitudes and uncertainties, which characterize the
State administrations. On comparing, however, these
valuable ingredients with the vital principles of liberty,
we must perceive at once the difficulty of mingling them
VOL. I.           16




242               The Federalist.
together in their due proportions. The genius of republican liberty seems to demand on one side, not only that
all power should be derived from the People, but that
those intrusted with it should be kept in dependence on
the People, by a short duration of their appointments;
and that even during this short period, the trust should
be placed not in a few, but in a number of hands. Stability, on the contrary, requires, that the hands in which
power is lodged should continue for a length of time
the same. A frequent change of men will result from a
frequent return of elections; and a frequent change of
measures, from a frequent change of men: whilst energy
in Government requires not only a certain duration of
power, but the execution of it by a single hand.
How far the Convention may have succeeded in this
part of their work, will better appear on a more accurate
view of it. From the cursory view here taken, it must
clearly appear to have been an arduous part.
Not less arduous must have been the task of marking
the proper line of partition between the authority of the
General, and that of the State Governments. Every
man will be sensible of this difficulty, in proportion as
he has been accustomed to contemplate and discriminate objects, extensive and complicated in their nature.
The faculties of the mind itself have never yet been
distinguished and defined, with satisfactory precision, by
all the efforts of the most acute and metaphysical philosophers. Sense, perception, judgment, desire, volition,
memory, imagination, are found to be separated, by such
delicate shades and minute gradations, that their boundaries have eluded the most subtle investigations, and
remain a pregnant source of ingenious disquisition and
controversy. The boundaries between the great king.
doms of nature, and, still more, between the various provinces, and lesser portions, into which they are subdivided,
afford another illustration of the same important truth.




The Fwderalist.              243
The most sagacious and laborious naturalists have never
yet succeeded in tracing with certainty the line which
separates the district of vegetable life from the neighboring region of unorganized matter, or which marks
the termination of the formner, and the commencement
of the animal empire. A still greater obscurity lies in
the distinctive characters, by which the objects in each
of these great departments of nature have been arranged
and assorted.
When we pass from the works of nature, in which all
the delineations are perfectly accurate, and appear to be
otherwise only from the imperfection of the eye which
surveys them, to the institutions of man, in which the
obscurity arises as well from the object itself, as from
the organ by which it is contemplated; we must perceive the necessity of moderating still further our expectations and hopes from the efforts of human sagacity.
Experience has instructed us, that no skill in the science
of Government has yet been able to discriminate and
define, with sufficient certainty, its three great provinces, the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary; or even
the privileges and powers of the different Legislative
branches. Questions daily occur in the course of practice, which prove the obscurity which reigns in these
subjects, and which puzzle the greatest adepts in political science.
The experience of ages, with the continued and combined labors of the most enlightened legislators and
jurists, have been equally unsuccessful in delineating the
several objects and limits of different codes of laws, and
different tribunals of justice. The precise extent of the
common law, and the statute law, the maritime law, the
ecclesiastical law, the law of corporations, and other local
laws and custopns, remains still to be clearly and finally
established in Great Britain, where accuracy in such
subjects has been more industriously pursued than in




244              The Fwrderalist.
any other part of the world. The jurisdiction of her
several Courts, general and local, of law, of equity, of
admiralty, &c., is not less a source of frequent and intricate discussions, sufficiently denoting the indeterminate
limits by which they are respectively circumscribed.
All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical
skill, and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained
by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.
Besides the obscurity arising from the complexity of
objects, and the imperfection of the human faculties, the
medium through which the conceptions of men are conveyed to each other adds a fresh embarrassment. The
use of words is to express ideas. Perspicuity therefore
requires, not only that the ideas should be distinctly
formed, but that they should be expressed by words distinctly and exclusively appropriated to them. But no
language is so copious as to supply words and phrases
for every complex idea, or so correct as not to include
many, equivocally denoting different ideas. Hence it
must happen, that however accurately objects may be
discriminated in themselves, and however accurately the
discrimination may be considered, the definition of them
may be rendered inaccurate, by the inaccuracy of the
terms in which it is delivered. And this unavoidable
inaccuracy must be greater or less, according to the
complexity and novelty of the objects defined. When
the Almighty himself condescends to address mankind
in their own language, his meaning, luminous as it must
be, is rendered dim and doubtful by the cloudy medium
through which it is communicated.
Here, then, are three sources of vague and incorrect
definitions: indistinctness oLfthe object, imorqerfection oL
the organ  ofnncr.nn,   inade.tlenss  of t ehicle
of ideas. Any one of these must produce a certain




The Federalist.             245
degree of obscurity. The Convention, in delineating the
boundary between the Fcederal and State jurisdictions,
must have experienced the full effect of them all.
To the difficulties already mentioned, may be added
the interfering pretensions of the larger and smaller
States. We cannot err, in supposing that the former
would contend for a participation in the Government,
fully proportioned to their superior wealth and importance; and that the latter would not be less tenacious
of the equality at present enjoyed by them. We may
well suppose, that neither side would entirely yield to
the other, and consequently that the struggle could be
terminated only by compromise. It is extremely proba,
ble, also, that after the ratio of representation had been
adjusted, this very compromise must have produced a
fresh struggle between the same parties, to give such a
turn to the organization of the Government, and to the
distribution of its powers, as would increase the importance of the branches, in forming which they had respectively obtained the greatest share of influence. There
are features in the Constitution which warrant each of
these suppositions; and as far as either of them is well
founded, it shows that the Convention must have been
compelled to sacrifice theoretical propriety, to the force
of extraneous considerations.
Nor could it have been the large and small States
only, which would marshal themselves in opposition to
each other on various points. Other combinations, resulting from a difference of local position and policy,
must have created additional difficulties.  As every
State may be divided into different districts, and its citizens into different classes, which give birth to contending
interests and local jealousies; so the different parts of
the United States are distinguished from each other, by
a variety of circumstances, which produce a like effect
on a larger scale. And although this variety of inter.




246               The Faederalist.
ests, for reasons sufficiently explained in a former paper,
may have a salutary influence on the administration of
the Government when formed; yet every one must be
sensible of the contrary influence, which must have been
experienced in the task of forming it.
Would it be wonderful, if, under the pressure of all
these difficulties, the Convention should have been forced
into some deviations from that artificial structure and
regular symmetry, which an abstract view of the subject
might lead an ingenious theorist to bestow on a Constitution planned in his closet, or in his imagination? The
real wonder is, that so many difficulties should have
been surmounted; and surmounted, with an unanimity
almost as unprecedented, as it must have been unexpected. It is impossible for any man of candor to reflect
on this circumstance, without partaking of the astonishment. It is impossible for the man of pious reflection,
not to perceive in it a finger of that Almighty hand,
which has been so frequently and signally extended to
our relief in the critical stages of the Revolution.
We had occasion, in a former paper, to take notice of
the repeated trials which have been unsuccessfully mhde
in the United Netheilands, for reforming the baneful and
notorious vices of their Constitution. The history of
almost all the great councils and consultations held
among mankind for reconciling their discordant opinions, assuaging their mutual jealousies, and adjusting
their respective interests, is a history of factions, contentions, and disappointments; and may be classed among
the most dark and degraded pictures, which display the
infirmities and depravities of the human character. If,
in a few scattered instances. a brighter aspect is presented, they serve only as exceptions to admonish us of
the general truth; and by their lustre to darken the
gloom of the adverse prospect, to which they are contrasted. In revolving the causes from which these ex.




The - Fderalist.            247
ceptlons result, and applying them to the particular
instance before us, we are necessarily led to two important conclusions. The first is, that the Convention must
have enjoyed, in a very singular degree, an exemption
from the pestilential influence of party animosities —
the diseases most incident to deliberative bodies, and
most apt to contaminate their proceedings. The second
conclusion is, that all the deputations composing the
Convention were either satisfactorily accommodated by
the final act, or were induced to accede to it by a deep
conviction of the necessity of sacrificing private opinions and partial interests to the public good, and by a
despair of seeing this necessity diminished by delays, or
by new experiments.
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, January 15, 1788.]
THE F(EDERALIST. No. XXXVII.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
IT is not a little remarkable, that in every case reported
by ancient history, in which Government has been
established with deliberation and consent, the task of
framing it has not been committed to an assembly of
men, but has been performed by some individual citizen, of preeminent wisdom and approved integrity.
MINos, we learn, was the primitive founder of the
Government of Crete; as ZALEUCUs was of that of the
Locrians.  THEsEUs first, and after him  DRAco   and
SOLON, instituted the Government of Athens. LYCURGUS
was the lawgiver of Sparta.  The foundation of the
original Government of Rome was laid by ROMULUS;




248               The Fmaderaltst.
and the work completed by two of his elective successorS, NUMA, and TULLIUS HOSTILIUS. On the abolition
of royalty, the Consular administration was substituted
by BRUTUS, who stepped forward with a project for such
a reform, which, he alleged, had been prepared by TULLIUS HOSTILIUS, and to which his address obtained the
assent and ratification of the Senate and People. This
remark is applicable to Confederate Governments also.
AMPHICTYON, we are told, was the author of that which
bore his name. The Achean league received its first
birth from AciHus, and its second from ARATUS.
What degree of agency these reputed lawgivers might
have in their respective establishments, or how far they
might be clothed with the legitimate authority of the
People, cannot, in every instance, be ascertained. In
some, however, the proceeding was strictly regular. DRA- 
co appears to have been intrusted by the People of
Athens with indefinite powers to reform its Government
and laws. And SOLON, according to PLUTARCH, was in
a manner compelled, by the universal suffrage of his
fellow-citizens, to take upon him the sole and absolute
power of new-modelling the Constitution. The proceedings under LYCURGUS were less regular; but as far as
the advocates for a regular reform could prevail, they all
turned their eyes towards the single efforts of that celebrated patriot and sage, instead of seeking to bring
about a revolution, by the intervention of a deliberative
body of citizens.
Whence could it have proceeded, that a People, jealous as the Greeks were of their liberty, should so far
abandon the rules of caution as to place their destiny in
the hands of a single citizen?  Whence could it have
proceeded, that the Athenians, a People who would not
suffer an army to be commanded by fewer than ten Generals, and who required no other proof of danger to their
liberties than the illustrious merit of a fellow-citizen




The Fwderalist.             249
should consider one illustrious citizen as a more eligible
depositary of the fortunes of themselves and their pos.
terity, than a select body of citizens, from whose common deliberations more wisdom, as well as more safety,
might have been expected? These questions cannot be
fully answered, without supposing that the fears of discord and disunion among a number of Counsellors,
exceeded the apprehension of treachery or incapacity in
a single individual. History informs us, likewise, of the
difficulties with which these celebrated reformers had to
contend; as well as of the expedients which they were
obliged to employ, in order to carry their reforms into
effect. SOLON, who seems to have indulged a more
temporizing policy, confessed that he had not given to
his countrymen the Government best suited to their happiness, but most tolerable to their prejudices. And LYCURGUS, more true to his object, was under the necessity
of mixing a portion of violence with the authority of
superstition; and of securing his final success, by a voluntary renunciation, first of his country, and then of his
life. If these lessons teach us, on one hand, to admire
the improvement made by America on the ancient mode
of preparing and establishing regular plans of Government: they serve not less on the other, to admonish us
of the hazards and difficulties incident to such experiments, and of the great imprudence of unnecessarily
multiplying them.
Is it an unreasonable conjecture, that the errors which
may be contained in the plan of the Convention are
such as have resulted rather from the defect of antecedent experience on this complicated and difficult subject,
than from a want of accuracy or care in the investigation of it; and, consequently, such as will not be
ascertained until an actual trial shall have pointed them
out? This conjecture is rendered probable, not only by
many considerations of a general nature, but by the




250              The Fwderalist.
particular case of the Articles of Confederation. It is
observable that' among the numerdus objections and
amendments suggested by the several States, when these
Articles were submitted for their ratification, not one is
found, which alludes to the great and radical error,
which on actual trial has discovered itself. And if we
except the observations which New Jersey was led to
make, rather by her local situation, than by her peculiar
foresight, it may be questioned whether a single suggestion was of sufficient moment to justify a revision of
the system. There is abundant reason, nevertheless, to
suppose that immaterial as these objections were, they
would have been adhered to with a very dangerous
inflexibility, in some States, had not a zeal for their
opinions and supposed interests been stifled by the more
powerful sentiment of self-preservation. One State, we
may remember, persisted for several years in refusing
her concurrence, although the enemy remained the whole
period at our gates, or rather in the very bowels of our
country. Nor was her pliancy in the end effected by a
less motive, than the fear of being chargeable with protracting the public calamities, and endangering the event
of the contest.  Every candid reader will make the
proper reflections on these important facts.
- A patient who finds his disorder daily growing worse,
and that an efficacious remedy can no longer be delayed
without extreme danger, after coolly revolving his situation, and the characters of different physicians, selects
and calls in such of them as he judges most capable of
administering relief, and best entitled to his confidence.
The physicians attend: the case of the patient is carefully examined: a consultation is held: they are unanimously agreed that the symptoms are critical; but that
the case, with proper and timely relief, is so far from
Deing desperate, that it may be made to issue in an improvement of his constitution. They are equally unan.




The Fowderalist.           251
imous in prescribing the remedy, by which this happy
effect is to be produced. The prescription is no sooner made known, however, than a number of persons interpose, and, without denying the reality or danger of
the disorder, assure the patient that the prescription
will be poison to his constitution, and forbid him, under
pain of certain death, to make use of it.  Might not
the patient reasonably demand, before he ventured to
follow this advice, that the authors of it should at
least agree among themselves on some other remedy
to be substituted? And if he found them differing as
much from one another as from his first counselloIs,
would he not act prudently in trying the experiment
unanimously recommended by the latter, rather than
be hearkening to those who could neither deny the
necessity of a speedy remedy, nor agree in proposing
one?
Such a patient, and in such a situation, is America at
this moment. She has been sensible of her malady.
She-has obtained a regular and unanimous advice from
men of her own deliberate choice. And she is warned
by others against following this advice, under pain of
the most fatal consequences. Do the monitors deny the
reality of her danger? No. Do they deny the necessity
of some speedy and powerful remedy? No. Are they
agreed, are any two of them agreed, in their objections
to the remedy proposed, or in the proper one to be substituted?  Let them speak for themselves.  This one
tells us, that the proposed Constitution ought to be rejected, because it is not a confederation of the States,
but a Government over individuals. Another admits,
that it ought to be a Government over individuals, to
a certain extent, but by no means to the extent proposed. A third does not object to the Government over
individuals, or to the extent proposed, but to the want
of a Bill of Rights. A fourth concurs in the absolute




252               The Fcederalist.
necessity of a Bill of Rights, but contends, that it ought
to be declaratory not of the personal rights of individuals, but of the rights reserved to the States in their
political capacity. A fifth is of opinion, that a Bill of
Rights of any sort would be superfluous and misplaced,
and that the plan would be unexceptionable, but for the
fatal power of regulating the times and places of election. An objector in a large State exclaims loudly
against the unreasonable equality of representation in
the Senate.  An objector in a small State is equally
loud against the dangerous inequality in the House of
Representatives. From this quarter, we are alarmed
with the amazing expense, from the number of persons
who are to administer the new Government. From
another quarter, and sometimes from the same quarter,
on another occasion, the cry is, that the Congress will
be but a shadow of a representation, and that the Government would be far less objectionable, if the number
and the expense were doubled. A patriot in a State
that does not import or export, discerns insuperable
objections against the power of direct taxation.  The
patriotic adversary in a State of great exports and imports is not less dissatisfied that the whole burden of
taxes may be thrown on consumption. This politician
discovers in the Constitution a direct and irresistible ten.
dency to monarchy: that is equally sure it will end in
aristocracy. Another is puzzled to say which of these
shapes it will ultimately assume, but sees clearly it must
be one or other of them; whilst a fourth is not wanting,
who with no less confidence affirms that the Constitution is so far from having a bias towards either of these
dangers, that the weight on that side will not be sufficient to keep it upright and firm against its opposite
propensities. With another class of adversaries to the
Constitution, the language is, that the Legislative, Ex.
ecutive, and Judiciary departments are intermixed in




The Federalist.             253
such a manner, as to contradict all the ideas of regular
Government, and all the requisite precautions in favor
of liberty. Whilst this objection circulates in vague and
general expressions, there are not a few who lend their
sanction to it.  Let each one come forward with his
particular explanation, and scarce any two are exactly
agreed on the subject. In the eyes of one, the- junction
of the Senate with the President, in the responsible function of appointing to offices, instead of vesting this ExecUtive power in the Executive alone, is the vicious part of
the organization. To another, the exclusion of the House
of Representatives, whose numbers alone could be a dfie
security against corruption and partiality in the exercise
of such a power, is equally obnoxious. With another,
the admission of the President into any share of a power,
which must ever be a dangerous engine in the hands of
the Executive magistrate, is an unpardonable violation
of the maxims of republican jealousy. No part of the
arrangement, according to some, is more inadmissible
than the trial of impeachments by the Senate, which
is alternately a member both of the Legislative and
Executive departments, when this power so evidently
belonged to the Judiciary department.  "We concur
" fully," reply others, " in the objection to this part of the
" plan, but we can never agree that1 a reference of im"peachments to the Judiciary authority would be an' amendment of the error. Our principal dislike to the
"organization arises from the extensive powers already
"lodged in that department."  Even among the zealous
patrons of a Council of State the most irreconcilable
variance is discovered, concerning the mode in which it
ought to be constituted. The demand of one gentleman is, that the Council should consist of a small number to be appointed by the most numerous branch of
the Legislature. Another would prefer a larger number,
nd considers it as a fundamental condition, that the




254               The Fwederalist.
appointment should be made by the President him.
self.
As it can give no umbrage to the writers against the
plan of the Fcederal Constitution, let us suppose, that
as they are the most zealous, so they are also the most
sagacious, of those who think the late Convention were
unequal to the task assigned them, and that a wiser and
better'plan might and ought to be substituted. Let us
further suppose, that their country should concur, both
in this favorable opinion of their merits, and in their
unfavorable opinion of the Convention; and should
accordingly proceed to form them into a second Convention, with full powers, and for the express purpose
of revising and remoulding the work of the first. Were
the experiment to be seriously made, though it required
some effort to view it seriously even in fiction, I leave it
to be decided by the sample of opinions just exhibited,
whether, with all their enmity to their predecessors, they
would, in any one point, depart so widely from their
example, as in the discord and ferment that would mark
their own deliberations; and whether the Constitution,
now before the public, would not stand as fair a chance
for immortality, as LYCURGUs gave to that of Sparta, by
making its change to depend on his own return from
exile and death, if it were to be immediately adopted,
and were to continue in force, not until a BETTER, but
until ANOTHER should be agreed upon by this new
assembly of Lawgivers.
It is a matter, both of wonder and regret, that those
who raise so many objections against the new Constitution should never call to mind the defects of that which
is to be exchanged for it. It is not necessary that the
former should be perfect: it is sufficient that the latter
is more imperfect. No man would refuse to give brass
for silver or gold, because the latter had some alloy in
it. No man would refuse to quit a shattered and tot.




The Fowderalist.            255
tering habitation for a firm and commodious building,
because the latter had not a porch to it, or because
some of the rooms might be a little larger or smaller, or
the ceiling a little higher or lower than his fancy would
have planned them. But waiving illustrations of this
sort, is it not manifest that most of the capital objections. urged against the new system lie with tenfold
weight against the existing Confederation? Is an indefinite power to raise money dangerous in the hands of
the Faederal Government? The present Congress can
make requisitions to any amount they please; and the
States are constitutionally bound to furnish them; they
can emit bills of credit as long as they will pay for the
paper; they can borrow, both abroad and at home, as
long as a shilling will be lent. Is an indefinite power to
raise troops dangerous? The Confederation gives to
Congress that power also; and they have already begun
to make use of it. Is it improper and unsafe to intermix
the. different powers of Government in the same body
of men? Congress, a single body of men, are the sole
depositary of all the Fcederal powers. Is it particularly
dangerous to give the keys of the treasury, and the command of the army, into the same hands? The Confederation places them both in the hands of Congress. Is
a Bill of Rights essential to liberty? The Confedera.
tion has no Bill of Rights. Is it an objection against
the new Constitution, that it empowers the Senate, with
the concurrence of the Executive, to make treaties which
are to be the laws of the land? The existing Congress,
without any such control, can make treaties which they
themselves have declared, and most of the States have
recognized, to be the supreme law of the land. Is the
importation of Slaves permitted by the new Constitution for twenty years? By the old it is permitted for.
ever.
T shall be told, that however dangerous this mixture




266               The FwRderalist.
of powers may be in theory, it is rendered harmless by
the dependence of Congress on the States for the means
of carrying them into practice: That however large the
mass of powers may be, it is in fact a lifeless mass.
Then, say I, in the first place, that the Confederation is
chargeable with the still greater folly, of declaring certain powers in the Fcederal Government to be absolutely necessary, and at the same time rendering them
absolutely nugatory; and, in the next place, that if the
Union is to continue, and no better government be substituted, effective powers must either be granted to, or
assumed by, the existing Congress; in either of which
events, the contrast just stated will hold good. But this
is not all. Out of this lifeless mass has already grown
an exerescent power, which tends to realize all the dan.
gers that can be apprehended from a defective construction of the supreme Government of the Union.- It is
now no longer a point of speculation and hope, that the
Western territory is a mine of vast wealth to the United
States; and although it is- not of such a nature as to
extricate them from their present distresses, or, for some
time to come, to yield any regular supplies for the public
expenses, yet must it hereafter be able, under proper
management, both to effect a gradual discharge of the
domestic debt, and to furnish, for a certain period, liberal
tributes to the Fcederal treasury. A very large proportion of this fund has been already surrendered by individual States; and it may with reason be expected, that
the remaining States will not persist in withholding
similar proofs of their equity and generosity. We may
calculate, therefore, that a rich and fertile country, of an
area equal to the inhabited extent of the United States,
will soon become a National stock. Congress have assumed the administration of this stock. They have
begun to render it productive.  Congress have undertaken to do more:- they have proceeded to form new




The Fwoderalist.            257
States; to erect temporary Governments; to appoint
officers for them; and to prescribe the conditions on
which such States shall be admitted into the Confederacy. All this has been done: and done without the
least color of Constitutional authority. Yet no blame
has been whispered; no alarm has been sounded. A
GREAT and INDEPENDENT fund of revenue is passing into
the hands of a SINGLE BODY of men, who can RAISE
TROOPS to an INDEFINITE NUMBER, and appropriate money
to their support for an INDEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME. And
yet there are men, who have not only been silent spectators of this prospect, but who are advocates for the
system which exhibits it; and, at the same time, urge
against the new system the objections which we have
heard. Would they not act with more consistency, in
urging the establishment of the latter, as no less necessary to guard the Union against the future powers and
resources of a body constructed like the existing Congress, than to save it from the dangers threatened by the
present impotency of that Assembly?
I mean not, by anything here said, to throw censure
on the measures which have been pursued by Congress.
I am sensible they could not have done otherwise. The
public interest, the necessity of the case, imposed upon
them the task of overleaping their Constitutional limits.
But is not the fact an alarming proof of the danger
resulting from a Government, which does not possess
regular powers commensurate to its objects? A dissolution or usurpation is the dreadful dilemma to which it is
continually exposed.
PUBLIUS.
VOl. I.         I




258               The Fcederalist.
For the Independent Journal.
THE F(EDERALIST. No. XXXVIII.
TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
THE last paper having concluded the observations,
which were meant to introduce a candid survey of
the plan of Government reported by the Convention,
we now proceed to the execution of that part of our
undertaking.
The first question that offers itself is, whether the
general form and aspect of the Government be strictly
republican. It is evident that no other form would be
reconcilable with the genius of the People of America;
with the fundamental principles of the Revolution; or
with that honorable determination which animates every
votary of freedom, to rest all our political experiments
on the capacity of mankind for self-government. If the
plan of the Convention, therefore, be found to depart
from the republican character, its advocates must abandon it as no longer defensible.
What then are the distinctive characters of the republican form? Were an answer to this question to be
sought, not by recurring to principles, but in the application of the term by political writers, to the Constitutions
of different States, no satisfactory one would ever be
found. Holland, in which no particle of the supreme
authority is derived from the People, has passed almost
universally under the denomination of a republic. The
same title has been bestowed on Venice, where absolute
power over the great body of the People is exercised, in
the most absolute manner, by a snmall body of hereditary
nobles. Poland, which is a mixture of aristocracy and
of monarchy in their worst forms, has been dignified




The Fderalist.             259
with the same appellation. The Government of Eng.
land, which has one republican branch only, combined
with an hereditary aristocracy and monarchy, has, with
equal impropriety, been frequently placed on the list of
republics. These examples, which are nearly as dissimilar to each other-as to a genuine republic, show the
extreme inaccuracy with which the term has been used
in political disquisitions.
If we resort, for a criterion, to the different principles
on which different forms of Government are established,
we may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow
that name on, a Government which derives all its powers
directly or indirectly from the great body of the People,
and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good be.
havior. It is essential to such a Government, that it be
derived from the great body of the society, not from an
inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire
to the rank of republicans, and claim for their Government the honorable title of republic. It is sufficient for
such a Government, that the persons administering it be
appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the People;
and that they hold their appointments by either of the
tenures just specified; otherwise every Government in
the United States, as well as every other popular Government that has been or can be well organized or well
executed, would be degraded from the republican character. According to the Constitution of every State in
the- Union, some or other of the officers of Government
are appointed indirectly only by the People. According
to most of them, the chief magistrate himself is so appointed. And according to one, this mode of appoint.
ment is extended to one of the cooirdinate branches of
the Legislature. According to all the Constitutions, also,




260              The Federalist.
the tenure of the highest offices is extended to a definite
period, and in many instances, both within the Legislative and Executive departments, to a period.of years.
According to the provisions of most of the Constitutions,
again, as well as according to the most respectable and
received opinions on the subject, the members of the
Judiciary department are to retain their offices by the
firm tenure of good behavior.
On comparing the Constitution planned by the Convention with the standard here fixed, we perceive at
once that it is, in the most rigid sense, conformable to
it. The House of Representatives, like that of one
branch at least of all the State Legislatures, is elected
immediately by the great body of the People.  The
Senate, like the present Congress, and the Senate of
Maryland, derives its appointment indirectly from the
People. The President is indirectly derived from the
choice of the People, according to the example in most
of the States. Even the Judges, with all other officers
of the Union, will, as in the several States, be the
choice, though a remote choice, of the People themselves. The duration of the appointments is equally
conformable to the Republican standard, and to the
model of the State Constitutions. The House of Representatives is periodically elective, as in all the States;
and for the period of two years, as in the State of South
Carolina. The Senate is elective, for the period of six
years; which is but one year more than the period of
the Senate of Maryland; and but two more than that
of the Senates of New York and Virginia. The Presilent is to continue in office for the period of four years;
as in New York and Delaware the chief magistrate is
elected for three years, and in South Carolina for two
vears. In the other States the election is annual. In
everal of the States, however, no constitutional proviaion is made for the impeachment of the Chief Magis



The Faederalist.           261
awtte. And in Delaware and Virginia, he is not im.
peachable till out of office. The President of the United
States is impeachable at any time during his continuance in office. The tenure by which the Judges are to
hold their places, is, as it unquestionably ought to be,
that of good behavior. The tenure of the ministerial
offices generally, will be a subject of legal regulation,
conformably to the reason of the case, and the example
of the State Constitutions.
Could any further proof be required of the republican
complexion of this system, tth most decisive one might
be found in its absolute prohibition of titles of nobility,
both under the Fcederal and the State Governments;
and in its express guaranty of the republican form to
each -of the latter.
" But it was not sufficient," say the adversaries of the
proposed Constitution, " for the Convention to adhere
"to the republican form. They ought, with equal care,
"to have preserved the Fcederal form, which regards the
"Union as a Confederacy of sovereign States; instead'" of which, they have framed a National Government,
"which regards the Union as a consolidation of the
"States."  And it is asked by what authority this bold
and radical innovation was undertaken?  The handle
which has been made of this objection requires that it
should be examined with some precision.
Without- inquiring into the accuracy of the distinction on which the objection is founded, it will be necessary to a just estimate of its force, First, to ascertain
the real character of the Government in question; Secondly, to inquire how far the Convention were authorized to propose such a Government; and Thirdly, how
far the duty they owed to their country could: supply
any defect of regular authority.
First.-' In order to ascertain the real character of the
Government, it may be considered in relation to the




262              The Foderalist.
foundation on which it is to be established; to the
sources from which its ordinary powers are to be
drawn; to the operation of those powers; to the extent of them; and to the authority by which future
changes in the Government are to be introduced.
On examining the first relation, it appears, on one
hand, that the Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification of the People of America, given
by deputies elected for the special purpose; but on the
other, that this assent and ratification is to be given by
the People, not as individuals composing one entire Nation, but as composing the distinct and independent
States to which they respectively belong. It is to be
the assent and ratification of the several States, derived
from the supreme authority in each State, -the authority of the People themselves. The act, therefore, establishing the Constitution, will not be a National, but a
Faoderal act..That it will be a Fcederal, and not a National act, as
these terms are understood by the objectors, the act of
the People, as forming so many independent States, not
as forming one aggregate Nation, is obvious from this
single consideration, that it is to result neither from the
decision of a majority of the People of the Union, nor
from that of a majority of the States. It must result
from the unanimous assent of the several States that are
parties to it, differing no otherwise from their ordinary
assent than in its being expressed, not by the Legislative authority, but by that of the People themselves.
Were the People regarded in this transaction as forming one Nation, the will of the majority of the whole
People of the United States would bind the minority,
in the same manner as the majority in each State must
bind the minority; and the will of the majority must
be determined either by a comparison of the individual
totes, or by considering the will of the majority of the




The Foaderalist.            263
States as evidence of the will of a majority of the Peo
pie of the United States. Neither of these rules hat
been adopted. Each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body, independent of
all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary
act. In this relation, then, the new Constitution will,
if established, be a FKederal, and not a National Constitution.
The next relation is, to the sources from which the
ordinary powers of Government are to be derived. The
House of Representatives will derive its powers from the
People of America; and the People will be represented
in the same proportion, and on the same principle, as
they are in the Legislature of a particular State. So
far the Government is National, not Fwederal. The
Senate, on the other hand, will derive its powers from
the States, as political and coequal societies; and these
will be represented on the principle of equality in the
Senate, as they now are in the existing Congress. So
far the Government is Faderal, not National. The Executive power will be derived from a very compound
source. The immediate election of the President is to
be made by the States in their political characters.'The
votes allotted to them are in a compound ratio, which
considers them partly as distinct and coequal societies,
partly as unequal members of the same society. The
eventual election, again, is to be made by that branch
of the Legislature which consists of the National representatives; but in this particular act, they are to be
thrown into the form of individual delegations, from so
many distinct and coequal bodies politic. From this
aspect of the Government, it appears to be of a mixed
character, presenting at least as many Fawderal as National features.
The difference between a Fcederal and National Govmrament, as it relates to the operation of the Government,




264               The PFJderalist.
is supposed to consist in this, that in the former, the pow.
ers operate on the political bodies composing the Con.
federacy, in their political capacities; in the latter, on
the individual citizens composing the Nation, in their
individual capacities. On trying the Constitution by
this criterion, it falls under the National, not the Fatderal character; though perhaps not so completely as has
been understood. In several cases, and particularly in
the trial of controversies to which States may be parties, they must be viewed and proceeded against in their
collective and political capacities only. So far the National countenance of the Government on this side seems
to be disfigured by a few Faederal features. But this
blemish is perhaps unavoidable in any plan; and the
operation of the Government on the People, in their individual capacities, in its ordinary and most essential
proceedings, may, on the whole, designate it, in this relation, a National Government.
But if the Government be National with regard to
the operation of its powers, it changes its aspect again
when we contemplate it in relation to the extent of its
powers. The idea of a National Government involves
in it, not only an authority over the individual citizens,
but an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things,
so far as they are objects of lawful Government. Among
a People consolidated into one Nation, this supremacy
is completely vested in the National Legislature. Among
communities united for particular purposes, it is vested
partly in the general, and partly in the municipal Legislatures. In the former case, all local authorities are
subordinate to the supreme; and may be controlled,
directed, or abolished by it at pleasure. In the latter,
the local or municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject,
within their respective spheres, to the general authority,
than the general authority is subject to them, within




The Fwderalist.             265
its own sphere.  In this relation, then, the proposed
Government cannot be deemed a National one; since
its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects
only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and
inviolable sovereignty over all other objects. It is true,
that in controversies relating to the boundary between
the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to
decide, is to be established under the General Govern.
ment. But this does not change the principle of the case.
The decision is to be impartially made, according to the
rules of the Constitution; and all the usual and most
effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartiality. Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent
an appeal to the sword, and a dissolution of the comEat and that it ought to be established under the General, rather than under the local Governments, or, to
speak more properly, that it could be safely established under the first alone, is a position not likely to
be combated.
If we try the Constitution by its last relation, to the
authority by which amendments are to be made, we
find it neither',wholly National, nor wholly FPderal.
Were it wholly National, the supreme and ultimate
authority would reside in the majority of the People of
the Union; and this authority would be competent at
all times, like that of a majority of every National society, to alter or abolish its established Government.
Were it wholly Faederal, on the other hand, the concurrence of each State in the Union would be essential to
every alteration that would be binding on all.  The
mode provided by the Plan of the Convention is not
founded on either of these principles.  In requiring
more than a majority, and particularly, in computing
the proportion by States, not by citizens, it departs from
the National, and advances towards the Faoderal character: in rendering the concurrence of less than the whole




266               The Foederalist.
number of States sufficient, it loses again the Fosderal
and partakes of the National character.
The proposed Constitution, therefore, is, in strictness,
neither a National nor a Foederal Constitution, but a
composition of both. In its foundation it is Fcederal,
not National: in the sources from which the ordinary
powers of the Government are drawn, it is partly Fcederal, and partly National: in the operation of these
powers, it is National, not Foederal: in the extent of
them, again, it is Feaderal, not National: and, finally, in
the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it
is neither wholly Fcederal nor wholly National.
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Friday, January 18, 1788.]
THE FIEDERALIST. No. XXXIX.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
THE  second point to be examined is, whether the
Convention were authorized to frame, and propose
this mixed Constitution.
The powers of the Convention ought, in strictness, to
be determined by an inspection of the commissions
given to the members by their respective constituents.
As all of these, however, had reference, either to the
recommendation from the meeting at Annapolis, in
September, 1786, or to that from Congress, in February, 1787, it will be sufficient to recur to these particular
Acts.
The Act from Annapolis recommends the "appoint"ment of Commissioners to take into consideration the'situation of the United States; to devise such further




The Fwderalist.           26
"provisions, as shall appear to them necessary to rendei
"the Constitution of the Fcederal Government adequate
"to the exigencies of the Union; and to report such an
" Act for that purpose, to the -United States in Congress
" assembled, as when agreed to by them, and afterwards
"confirmed by the Legislature of every State, will effect"ually provide for the same."
The recommendatory Act of Congress is in the words
following: "Whereas, there is provision in the Articles
" of Confederation and Perpetual Union, for making
"alterations therein, by the assent of a Congress of the
" United States, and of the Legislatures of the several
" States: And whereas experience hath evinced, that
"there are defects in the present Confederation; as a
"mean to remedy which, several of the States, and par" ticularly the State of New York, by express instructions
" to their delegates in Congress, have suggested a Con" vention for the'purposes expressed in the following
"resolution; and such Convention appearing to be the
" most probable mean of establishing in these States a
"firm National Government: -
"' Resolved, - That in the opinion of Congress it is
"expedient, that on the 2d Monday of May next a
"Convention of delegates, who shall have been ap"pointed by the several States, be held at Philadelphia,
"for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles
"of Confederation, and reporting to Congress and the
"several Legislatures such alterations and provisions
"therein, as shall, when agreed to in Congress, and con"firmed by the States, render the Fcederal Constitution
"adequate to the exigencies of Government and the pres"ervation of the Union."
From these two Acts, it appears, 1st, that the object
of the Convention was to establish, in these States, a
firm National Government; 2d, that this Government
was to be such as would be adequate to the exigencies




268               The Federalist.
of Government, and the preservation of the Union; 3d
that these purposes were to be effected by alterations
and provisions in the Articles of Confederation, as it is
expressed in the Act of Congress; or by such further
provisions as should appear necessary, as it stands in the
recommendatory Act from Annapolis; 4th, that the
alterations and provisions were to be reported to Congress, and to the States, in order to be agreed to by the
former and confirmed by the latter.
From a comparison and fair construction of these
several modes of expression, is to be deduced the
authority under which the Convention acted. They
were to frame a National Goverrnment, adequate to the
exigencies of Government, and of the Union; and to
reduce the Articles of Confederation into such form as
to accomplish these purposes.
There are two rules of construction, dictated by plain
reason, as well as founded on legal axioms. The one
is, that eivery part of the expression ought, if possible,
to be allowed some meaning, and be made to conspire
to some common end.  The other is, that where the
several parts cannot be made to coincide, the less important should give way to the more important part:
the means should be sacrificed to the end, rather than
the end to the means.
Suppose, then, that the expressions defining the authority of the Convention were irreconcilably at variance with each other; that a National and adequate
Government could not possibly, in the judgment of the
Convention, be effected by alterations and provisions
in the Articles of Confederation; which part of the definition ought to have been embraced, and which rejected? Which was the more important, which the less
Important part?  Which the end; which the means?
Let the most scrupulous expositors of delegated pow.
as; let the most inveterate objectors against those




ITe Faederalist.            269
exercised by the Convention, answer these questions.
Let them declare, whether it was of most importance
to the happiness of the People of America, that the
Articles of Confederation should be disregarded, and an
adequate Government be provided, and the Union preserved; or that an adequate Government should be
omitted, and the Articles of Confederation preserved.
Let them declare, whether the preservation of these
Articles was the end, for securing which a reform of
the Government was to be introduced as the means;
or whether the establishment of a Government, adequate
to the National happiness, was the end at which these
Articles themselves originally aimed, and to which they
ought, as insufficient means, to have been sacrificed.
But is it necessary to suppose, that these expressions
are absolutely irreconcilable to each other; that no alterations or provisions in the Articles of the Confederation,
could possibly mould them into a National and adequate Government; into such a Government as has
been proposed by the Convention?
No stress, it is presumed, will, in this case, be laid on
the title; a change of that could never be deemed an
exercise of ungranted power. Alterations in the body
of the instrument are expressly authorized. New provisionst therein are also expressly authorized. Here then
is a power to change the Title; to insert new Articles;
to alter old ones. Must it of necessity be admitted,
that this power is infringed, so long as a part of the old
Articles remain? Those who maintain the affirmative,
ought at least to mark the boundary between authorized
and usurped innovations; between that degree of change
which lies within the compass of alterations and further
provisions, and that which amounts to a transmutation
of the Government. Will it be said, that the alterations
ought not to have toubied the substance of the Confederation?  The States would never have appointed a




270               The Faederalist.
Convention with so much solemnity, nor described its
objects with so much latitude, if some substantial reform
had not been in contemplation. Will it be said that
the fundamental principles of the Confederation were
not within the purview of the Convention, and ought
not to have been varied? I ask, What are these principles?  Do they require, that in the establishment of the
Constitution the States should be regarded as distinct
and indepdent overeigns?  They are so regardedby
the Constitution proposed. Do they require, that the
members of the Government should derive their appointment from the Legislatures, not from the People of the
States?  One branch. of the new Government is to be
appointed by these Legislatures; and under the Confederation, the delegates to Congress may all be appointed immediately by the People, and in two States* are
actually so appointed. Do they require, that the powers of the Government should act on the States, and
not immediately on individuals? In some instances,
as has been shown, the powers of the new Government will act on the States in their collective characters. In some instances, also, those of the existing Gov-.ernment act immediately on individuals. In cases of
capture; of piracy; of the post-office; of coins, weights,
and measures; of trade with the'Indians; of claims
under grants of land, by different States; and, above all,
in the case of trials by Courts-martial in the army and
navy, by which death may be inflicted without the intervention of a jury, or even of a civil Magistrate; in
all these cases, the powers of the Confederation operate
immediately on the persons and interests of individual
citizens. Do these fundamental principles require, particularly, that no tax should be levied, without the intermediate agency of the States? The Confederation
itself authorizes a direct tax, to a certain extent, on the
* Connecticut and Rhode Island. - Publius.




The Fwderalist.              271
post-office. The power of coinage has been so construed by Congress as to levy a tribute immediately
from  that source also.  But pretermitting these instances, was it not an acknowledged object of the Convention, and the universal expectation of the People,
that the regulation of trade should be submitted to the
General Government, in such a form as would render it
an immediate source of general revenue? Had not
Congress repeatedly recommended this measure, as not
inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the Confederation? Had not every State but one; had not
New York herself, so far complied with the plan of
Congress, as to recognize the principle of the innovation? Do these principles, in fine, require that the
powers of the General Government should be limited,
and that, beyond this limit, the States should be left in
possession of their sovereignty and independence? We
have seen, that in the new Government, as in the old,
the general powers are limited; and that the States, in
all unenumerated cases, are left in the enjoyment of
their sovereign and independent jurisdiction.
The truth is, that the great principles of the Constitution proposed by the Convention may be considered less
as absolutely new, than as the expansion of principles
which are found in the Articles of. Confederation. The
misfortun6 under the latter system has been, that these
principles are so feeble and confined, as to justify
all the charges of inefficiency which have been urged
against it; and to require a degree of enlargement,
which gives to the new system the aspect of an entire
transformation of the. old.
In one particular, it is admitted that the Convention
have'departed from the tenor of their commission. In.
stead of reporting a plan requiring the confirmation oJ
he Legislatures of all the States, they have reported a
plan, which is to be confirmed by the People, and may




272               The Faderalist.
be carried into effect by nine States only. It is worthy
of remark, that this objection, though the most plausible, has been the least urged in the publications which
have swarmed against the Convention. The forbearance can only have proceeded from an irresistible conviction of the absurdity of subjecting the fate of twelve
States to the perverseness or corruption of a thirteenth;
from the example of inflexible opposition given by a
majority of one sixtieth of the People of America, to a
measure approved and called for by the voice of twelve
States, comprising fifty-nine sixtieths of the People; an
example still fresh in the memory and indignation of
every citizen who has felt for the wounded honor and
prosperity of his country. As this objection, therefore,
has been in a manner waived by those who have criticised the powers of the Convention, I dismiss it without
further observation.
The third point to be inquired into is, how far considerations of duty arising out of the case itself could have
supplied any defect of regular authority.
In the preceding inquiries, the powers of the Convention have been analyzed and tried with the same rigor,
and by the same rules, as if they had been real and final
powers, for the establishment of a Constitution for the
United States. We have seen, in what manner they
have borne the trial even on that supposition. It is time
now to recollect, that the powers were merely advisory
and recommendatory; that they were so meant by the
States, and so understood by the Convention; and that
the latter have accordingly planned and proposed a Constitution, which is to be of no more consequence than
the paper on which it is written, unless it be stamped
with the approbation of those to whom it is addressed.
This reflection places the subject in a point of view
altogether different, and will enable us to judge with
propriety of the course taken by the Convention.




Thie FWderalist.            273
Let us view the ground off which the Convention
stood. It may be collected from their proceedings, that
they were deeply and unanimously impressed with the
crisis, which had led their country almost with one
voice to make so singular and solemn an experiment
for correcting the errors of a system by which this crisis
had been produced; that they were no less deeply and
unanimously convinced, that such a reform as they have
proposed was absolutely necessary to effect the purposes
of their appointment. It could not be unknown to
them, that the hopes and expectations of the great body
of citizens, throughout this great empire, were turned
with the keenest anxiety to the event of their deliberations. They had every reason to believe, that the contrary sentiments agitated the minds and bosoms of
every external and internal foe to the liberty and prosperity of the United States.  They had seen in the
origin and progress of the experiment, the alacrity with
which the proposition, made by a single State, (Virginia,) towards a partial amendment of the Confederation, had been attended to and promoted. They had
seen the liberty assumed by a veryfew deputies, from a
veryfew States, convened at Annapolis, of recommending a great and critical object, wholly foreign to their
commission, not only justified by the public opinion, but
actually carried into effect by twelve out of the thirteen
States. They had seen, in a variety of instances, assumptions by Congress, not only of recommendatory
but of operative powers, warranted in the public estimation, by occasions and objects infinitely less urgent
than those by which their conduct was to be governed.
They must have reflected, that in all great changes of
established- Governments, forms ought to give way to
substance; that a rigid adherence in such cases to the
former, would render nominal and nugatory the transcendent and precious right of the People to " abolish or
VOL. I.        18




274               The Fwderalist.'alter their Government. as to them shall seem most
"likely to affect their safety and happiness,"* since it is
impossible for the People spontaneously and universally
to move in concert towards their object; and it is therefore essential, that such changes be instituted by some
informal and unauthorized propositions, made by some
patriotic and respectable citizen, or number of citizens.
They must have recollected, that it was by this irregular
and assumed privilege, of proposing to the People plans
for their safety and happiness, that the States were first
united against the danger with which they were threatened by their ancient Government; that Committees
and Congresses were formed for concentrating their
efforts, and defending their rights; and that Conventions
were elected in the several States, for establishing the
Constitutions under which they are now governed; nor
could it have been forgotten that no little ill-timed scruples, no zeal for adhering to ordinary forms, were anywhere seen, except in those who wished to indulge,
under these masks, their secret enmity to the substance
contended for. They must have borne in mind, that as
the plan to be framed and proposed was to be submitted to the People themselves, the disapprobation of
this supreme authority would destroy it forever: its
approbation blot out all antecedent errors and irregularities.' It might even have occurred to them, that where
a disposition to cavil prevailed, their neglect to execute
the degree of power vested in them, and still more their
recommendation of any measure whatever, -not warranted by their commission, would not less excite animadversion, than a recommendation at once of a measure fully commensurate to the National exigencies.
Had the Convention, under all these impressions, and
in the midst of all these considerations, instead of exercising a manly confidence in their country, by whose
* Declaration of Independence. - Publius.




The Fwrderalist.            275
confidence they had been so peculiarly distinguished
and of pointing out a system capable in their judgment
of securing its happiness, taken the cold and sullen resolution of disappointing its ardent hopes, of sacrificing
substance to forms, of committing the dearest interests
of their country to the uncertainties of delay and the
hazard of events, let me ask the man who can raise his
mind to one elevated conception, who can awaken in
his bosom one patriotic emotion, what judgment ought
to have been pronounced by the impartial world, by the
friends of mankind, by every virtuous citizen, on the
conduct and character of this assembly? Or if there be
a man whose propensity to condemn is susceptible of
no control, let me then ask, what sentence he has in
reserve for the twelve States who usurped the power of
sending deputies to the Convention, a body utterly unknown to their Constitutions; for Congress, who recommended the appointment of this body, equally unknown
to the Confederation; and for the State of New York,
in particular, who first urged and then complied with
this unauthorized interposition?
But that the objectors may be disarmed of every pretext, it shall be granted for a moment, that the Convention were neither authorized by their commission, nor justified by circumstances in proposing a Constitution for
their country: does it follow that the Constitution ought,
for that reason alone, to be rejected? If, according to
the noble precept, it be lawful to accept good advice
even from an enemy, shall we set the ignoble example
of refusing such advice even when it is offered by our
friends? The prudent inquiry, in all cases, ought surely
to be, not so much from whom the advice comes, as
whether the advice be good.
The sum. of what has been here advanced and proved
is, that the charge against the Convention of exceeding
their powers, except in one instance little urged by the




276               The Foderalist.
objectors, has no foundation to support it; that if they
had exceeded their powers, they were not only warranted,
but required, as the confidential servants of their country, by the circumstances in which they were placed,
to exercise the liberty which they assumed; and that
finally, if they had violated both their powers and their
obligations, in proposing a Constitution, this ought nevertheless to be embraced, if it be calculated -to accomplish the views and happiness of the People of America.
How far this character is due to the Constitution, is the
subject under investigation.
PUBLIUS.
For the Independent Journal.
THE FCEDERALIST. No. XL.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
THE Constitution proposed by the Convention may
be considered under two general points of view.
The FIRST relates to the sum or quantity of power
which it vests in the Government, including the restraints imposed on the States. The SECOND, to the
particular structure of the Government, and the distribution of this power among its several branches.
Under the first view of the subject, two important
questions arise: 1. Whether any part of the powers
transferred to the General Government -be unnecessary
or improper? 2. Whether the entire mass of them be
dangerous to the portion of jurisdiction left in the several States?
Is the aggregate power of the General Government




The Fawderalist.           277
grater than ought to have been vested in it? This is
the first question.
It cannot have escaped those who have attended with
candor to the arguments employed against the extensive
powers of the Government, that the authors of them
have very little considered how far these powers were
necessary means of attaining a necessary end. They
have chosen rather to dwell on the inconveniences which
must be unavoidably blended with all political advantages; and on the possible abuses which must be incident to every power or trust, of which a beneficial use
can be made. This method of handling the subject
cannot impose on the good sense of the People of
Americai It may display the subtlety of the writer; it
may open a boundless field for rhetoric and declamation; it may inflame the passions of the unthinking, and
may confirm the prejudices of the misthinking: but cool
and candid people will at once reflect, that the purest of
human blessings must have a portion of alloy in them;
that'the choice must always be made, if not of the
lesser evil, at least of the GREATER, not the PERFECT
good; and that in every political institution, a power to
advance the public happiness involves a discretion which
may be misapplied and abused.  They will see, therefore, that in all cases where power is to be conferred, the
point first to be decided is, whether such a power be
necessary to the public.good; as the next will be, in
case of an affirmative decision, to guard as effectually
as possible against a perversion of the power to the
public detriment.
That we may form a correct judgment on this subject,
it will be proper to review the several powers conferred
on the Government of the Union; and that this may be
the more conveniently done they may be reduced into
different classes as they relate to the following different
objects: 1. Security against foreign danger; 2. Regula.




278                The Faederalist.
tion of the intercourse with foreign nations; 3. Main.
tenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the
States; 4. Certain miscellaneous objects of general utility; 5. Restraint of the States from certain injurious
acts; 6. Provisions for giving due efficacy to all these
powers.
The powers falling within the first class are those of
declaring war and granting letters of marque; of providing armies and fleets; of regulating and calling forth
the militia; of levying and borrowing money.
Security against foreign danger is one of the primitive objects of civil society.  It is an avowed and
essential object of the American Union. The powers
requisite for attaining it must be effectually confided to
the Fcederal councils.
Is the power of declaring war necessary? No man
will answer this question in the negative. It would
be superfluous, therefore, to enter into a proof of the affirmative. The existing Confederation establishes this
power in the most ample form.
Is the power of raising armies and equipping fleets
necessary? This is involved in the foregoing power.
It is involved in the power. of self-defence.
But was it necessary to give an INDEFINITE POWER
of raising TROOPS, as well as providing fleets; and of
maintaining both in PEACE, as well as in war?
The answer to these questions has been too far anticipated in another pla6e, to admit an extensive discussion of them in this place. The answer indeed seems
to be so obvious and conclusive, as scarcely to justify
such a discussion in any place. With what color of
propriety could the force necessary for defence be limited by those who cannot limit the force of offence?
If a Faederal Constitution could chain the ambition, or
set bounds to the exertions of all other nations, then
indeed might it prudently chain the discretion of its




The FWleralist.              27S
own Government, and set bounds to the exertions for
its own safety.
How could a readiness for war in time of peace be
safely prohibited, unless we could prohibit, in like manner, the preparations and establishments of every hostile
nation? The means of security can only be regulated
by the means and the danger of attack. They will in
fact be ever determined by these rules, and by no oth
ers. It is in vain to oppose Constitutional barriers to
the impulse of self-preservation. It is worse than in
vain; because it plants in the Constitution itself necessary usurpations of power, every precedent of which is a
germ of unnecessary and multiplied repetitions. If one
nation maintains constantly a disciplined army, ready
for the service of ambition or revenge, it obliges the
most pacific nations, who may be within the reach of
its enterprises, to take corresponding precautions. The
fifteenth century was the unhappy epoch of military
establishments in time of peace. They were introduced
by CHARLES VII. of France. All Europe has followed,
or been forced into the example. Had the example not
been followed by other nations, all Europe must long
ago have worn the chains of a universal monarch.
Were every nation, except France, now to disband its
peace establishments, the same event might follow.
The veteran legions of Rome were an overmatch for
the undisciplined valor of all other nations, and rendered
her the mistress of the world.
Not the less true is it, that the liberties of Rome
proved the final victim to her military triumphs; and
that the liberties of Europe, as far as they ever existed,
have, with few exceptions, been the price of her military
establishments. A standing force, therefore, is a dangerous, at the same time that it may be a necessary provision. On the smallest scale, it has its inconveniences. On
an extensive scale, its consequences may be fatal. On




280               The wideralist.
any scale, it is an object pf laudable circumspection and
precaution. A wise nation will combine all these considerations; and, whilst it does not rashly preclude itself
from any resource which may become essential to its
safety, will exert all its prudence in diminishing both
the necessity and the danger of resorting to one, which
may be inauspicious to its liberties.
The clearest marks of this prudence are stamped on
the proposed Constitution. The Union itself, which it
cements and secures, destroys every pretext for a military establishment which could be dangerous. America
united, with a handful of troops, or without a single
soldier, exhibits a more forbidding posture to foreign
ambition, than America, disunited, with a hundred
thousand veterans ready for combat. It was remarked,
on a former occasion, that the want of this pretext had
saved the liberties of one nation in Europe. Being
rendered by her insular situation and her maritime
resources impregnable to the armies of -her neighbors,
the rulers of Great Britain have never been able, by
real or artificial dangers, to cheat the public into an
extensive peace establishment.  The distance of the
United States from the powerful nations of the world,
gives them the same happy security. A dangerous establishment can Aever be necessary or plausible, so long
as they continue a united People. But let it never, for
a moment, be forgotten, that they are indebted for this
advantage to their Union alone. The m~ment of its
dissolution will be the date of a new order of things.
The fears of the weaker, or the ambition of the stronger
States, or Confederacies, will set the same example in
the New, as CHARLES VII. did in the Old World. The
example will be followed here, from the same motives
which produced universal imitation there. Instead ofderiving from our situation the precious advantage
which Great Britain has derived from hers, the face of




The FJlderalist.            281
America will be but a copy of that of the Continent of
Europe.  It will present liberty everywhere crushed
between standing armies and perpetual taxes.  The
fortunes of disunited America will be even more disastrous than those of Europe. The sources of evil in the
latter are confined to her own limits. No superior powers of another quarter of the globe intrigue among her
rival nations, inflame their mutual animosities, and
render them the instruments of foreign ambition, jealousy, and revenge. In America, the miseries springing
from her internal jealousies, contentions, and wars,
would form a part only of her lot. A plentiful addition
of evils would have their source in that relation in
which Europe stands to this quarter of the earth, and
which no other quarter of the earth bears to Europe.
This picture of the consequences of disunion cannot
be too highly colored, or too often exhibited. Every
man who loves peace, every man who loves his country, every man who loves liberty, ought to have it
ever before his eyes, that he may cherish in his heart a
due attachment to the Union of America, and be able
to set a due value on the means of preserving it.
Next to the effectual establishment of' the Union, the
best possible precaution against danger from standing
armies is a limitation of the term for which revenue
may be appropriated to their support. This precaution
the Constitution has prudently added. I will not repeat
here the observations, which I flatter myself have placed
this subject in a just and satisfactory light. But it may
not be improper to take notice of an argument against
this part of the Constitution, which has been drawn
from the policy and practice of Great Britain. It is said,
that the continuance of an army in that kingdom requires an annual vote of the Legislature: whereas the
American Constitution has lengthened this critical period
to two years. This is the form in which the comparison




282              The Faederalist.
is usually stated to the public: but is it a just form a
Is it a fair comparison? Does the British Constitution
restrain the Parliamentary discretion to one year? Does
the American impose on the Congress appropriations
for two years? On the contrary, it cannot be unknown
to the authors of the fallacy themselves, that the British
Constitution fixes no limit whatever to the discretion
of the Legislature, and that the American ties down
the Legislature to two years, as the longest admissible
term.
Had the argument from the British example been
truly stated, it would- have stood thus: The term for
which supplies may be appropriated to the army establishment, though unlimited by the British Constitution,
has nevertheless, in practice, been limited by Parliamentary discretion to a single year. Now, if in Great -Britain, where the House of Commons is elected for seven
years; where so great a proportion of the members are
elected by so small a proportion of the people; where
the electors are so corrupted by the Representatives,
and the Representatives so corrupted by the Crown, the
Representative body can possess a power to make appropriations to the army for an indefinite term, without
desiring, or without daring, to extend the term beyond
a single year, ought not suspicion herself to blush, in
pretending that the Representatives of the United
States, elected FREELY by the WHOLE BODY of the People, every SECOND YEAR, cannot be safely intrusted with
a discretion over such appropriations, expressly limited
to the short period of TWO YEARS?
A bad cause seldom fails to betray itself. Of this
truth, the management of the opposition to the Fcpderal Government is an unvaried exemplification. But
among all the blunders which have been committed,
none is more striking than the attempt to enlist on that
side the prudent jealousy entertained by the People, of,




The Fawderalist.             283
standing armies. The attempt has awakened fully the
public attention to that important subject; and has led
to investigations which must terminate in a thorough
and universal conviction, not only that the Constitution
has provided the most effectual guards against danger
from that quarter, but that nothing short of a Constitution
fully adequate to the National defence, and the preservation of the Union, can save America from as many
standing armies as it may be split into States or Confederacies, and from such a progressive augmentation
of these establishments in each, as will render them as
burdensome to the properties and ominous to the liberties of the People, as any establishment that can become
necessary, under a united and efficient Government,
must be tolerable to the former and safe to the latter.
The palpable necessity of the power to provide and
maintain a navy, has protected that part of the Constitution against a spirit of censure, which has spared few
other parts. It must indeed be numbered among the
greatest blessings of America, that as her Union will
be the only source of her maritime strength, so this will
be a principal source of her security against danger
from  abroad.  In this respect, our situation  bears
another likeness to the insular advantage of Great
Britain. The batteries most capable of repelling for-,
eign enterprises on our safety, are happily such as can
never be turned by a perfidious Government against our
liberties.
The inhabitants of the Atlantic frontier are all of
them deeply interested in this provision for naval protection, and if they have hitherto been suffered to sleep
quietly in their beds; if their property has remained
safe against the predatory spirit of licentious adventurers; if their maritime towns have not yet been cornpelled to ransom themselves from the terrors of a conflagration, by yielding to the exactions of daring and




284              The Federalst.
sudden invaders, these instances of good fortune are not
to be ascribed to the capacity of the existing Government for the protection of those from whom it claims
allegiance, but to causes that are fugitive and fallacious.
If we except perhaps Virginia and Maryland, which are
peculiarly vulnerable on their Eastern frontiers, no part
of the Union ought to feel more anxiety on this subject
than New York. Her sea-coast is extensive. A very
important district of the State is an island. The State
itself is penetrated by a large navigable river for more
than fifty leagues. The great emporium of its commerce,
the great reservoir of its wealth, lies every moment at
the mercy of events, and may almost be regarded as a
hostage for ignominious compliances with the dictates
of a foreign enemy, or even with the rapacious demands
of pirates and barbarians. Should a war be the result of
the precarious situation of European affairs, and all the
unruly passions attending it be let loose on the ocean,
our escape from insults and depredations, not only on
that element, but every part of the other bordering on
it, will be truly miraculous. In the present condition of
America, the States more immediately exposed to these
calaxnities have nothing to hope from the phantom of a
General Government which now exists; and if their
single resources were equal to the task of fortifying
themselves against the danger, the object to be protected would be almost consumed by the means of protecting them.
The power of regulating and calling forth the militia
has been already sufficiently vindicated and explained.
The power of levying and borrowing money, being
the sinew of that which is to be exerted in the National
defence, is properly thrown into the same class with it.
This power, also, has been examined already with much
attention, and has, I trust, been clearly shown to be necessary, both in the extent and form given to it by the




The Fcederalist.
Constitution. I will address one additional reflection,
only, to those who contend that the power ought to
have been restrained to external taxation — by which
they mean, taxes on articles imported from other countries. It cannot be doubted, that this will always be a
valuable source of revenue; that for a considerable time,
it must be a principal source; that at this moment, it is
an essential one. But we may form very mistaken ideas
on this subject, if we do not call to mind in our calculations, that the extent of revenue drawn from foreign
commerce must vary with the variations, both in the extent and the kind of imports; and that these variations
do not correspond with the progress of population,
which must be the general measure of the public wants.
As long as agriculture continues the sole field of labor,
the importation of manufactures must increase as the
consumers multiply. As soon as domestic manufactures
are begun by the hands not called for by agriculture, the
imported manufactures will decrease as the numbers of
people increase. In a more remote stage, the imports
may consist in a considerable part of raw materials,
which will be wrought into articles for exportation, and
will, therefore, require rather the encouragement of bounties, than to be loaded with discouraging duties. A s'ystem of Government, meant for duration, ought to contemplate these revolutions, and be able to accommodate
itself to them.
Some, who have not denied the necessity of the power
of taxation, have grounded a very fierce attack against
the Constitution, on the language in which it is defined.
It has been urged and echoed, that the power "to lay
"and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay
"the debts, and provide for the common defence and
"general welfare of the United States," amounts to an
unlimited commission to exercise every power, which
may be alleged to be necessary for the common defence




286               The Federalist.
or general welfare. No stronger proof could be given
of the distress under which these writers labor for objections, than their stooping to such a misconstruction.
Had no other enumeration or definition of the powers
of the Congress been found in the Constitution, than the
general expressions just cited, the authors of the objection might have had some color for it; though it would
have been difficult to find a reason for so awkward a
form of describing an authority to legislate in all possible cases. A power to destroy the freedom of the press,
the trial by jury, or even to regulate the course of descents, or the forms of conveyances, must be very singularly expressed by the terms " to raise money for the
"general welfare."
But what color can the objection have, when a specification of the objects alluded to by these general terms
immediately follows, and is not even separated by a
longer pause than a semicolon?  If the different parts
of the same instrument ought to be so expounded, as to
give meaning to every part which will bear. it, shall one
part of the same sentence be excluded altogether from a
share in the meaning; and shall the more doubtful and
indefinite terms be retained in their full extent, and the
clear and precise expressions be denied any signification
whatsoever? For what purpose could the enumeration
of particular powers be inserted, if these and all others
were meant to be included in the preceding general
power?  Nothing is more natural or common, than first
to use a general phrase, and then to explain and qualify
-it by, a recital of particulars. But the idea of an enumeration of particulars which neither explain nor qualify
-the general meaning, and can have no other effect than.to confound and mislead, is an absurdity, which, as we
are reduced to the dilemma of charging either on the
authors of the objection or on the authors of the Consti



The Faderalist.              287
tution, we must take the liberty of supposing, had not
its origin with the latter.
The objection here is the more extraordinary, as it
appears that the language used by the Convention is a
copy from the Articles of Confederation. The objects
of the Union among the States, as described in Article
third, are, " their common defence, security of their lib"erties, and mutual and general welfare."  The terms
of Article eighth are still more identical: " All charges
"of war, and all other expenses, that shall be incurred
"for the common defence or general welfare, and al"lowed by the United States in Congress, shall be
"defrayed out of a common treasury," &c. A similar
language again occurs in Article ninth. Construe either
of these Articles by the rules which would justify the
construction put on the new Constitution, and they vest
in the existing Congress a power to legislate in all cases
whatsoever. But what would have been thought of that
assembly, if, attaching themselves to these general
expressions, and disregarding the specifications which
ascertain and limit their import, they had exercised an
unlimited power of providing for the common defence
and general welfare? I appeal to the objectors themselves, whether they would in that case have employed
the same reasoning in justification of Congress, as they
now make use of against the Convention.: How difficult
it is for error to escape its own condemnation!
PUBLIUS.




288               The Fasderalist.
[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, January 22, 1788.]
THE F(EDERALIST. No. XLI.
ro THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
rrHE second class of powers, lodged in the General
Government, consists of those which regulate the
intercourse with foreign nations, to wit: to make Treaties; to send and receive Ambassadors, other public
Ministers, and Consuls; to define and punish piracies
and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences
against the law of nations; to regulate foreign commerce, including a power to prohibit, after the year
1808, the importation of slaves, and to lay an intermediate duty of ten dollars per head, as a discouragement
to such importations.
This class of powers forms an obvious and essential
branch of the Faederal administration.  If we are to
be one Nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in
respect to other Nations.
The powers to make Treaties, and to send and receive
Ambassadors, speak their own propriety. Both of them
are comprised in the Articles of Confederation; with
this difference only, that the former is disembarrassed by
the plan of the Convention of an exception, under which
Treaties might be substantially frustrated by regulations
of the States; and that a power of appointing and receiving "other public Ministers and Consuls," is expressly and very properly added to the former provision
concerning Ambassadors;  The term  Ambassador, ii
taken strictly, as seems to be required by the second of
the Articles of Confederation, comprehends the highest
grade only of public Ministers; and excludes the grades




The FEaderalist.            289
which the United States will be most likelv tt prefer
where foreign embassies may be necessary. And under
no latitude of construction will the term comprehend
Consuls. Yet it has been found expedient, and has
been the practice of Congress, to employ the inferior
grades of public Ministers; and to send and receive
Consuls.
It is true, that where Treaties of commerce stipulate
for the mutual appointment of Consuls, whose functions
are connected with commerce, the admission of foreign
Consuls may fall within the power of making commercial Treaties; and that where no such Treaties exist,
the mission of American Consuls into foreign countries
may perhaps be covered under the authority, given by
the ninth Article of the Confederation, to appoint all
such civil officers as may be necessary for managing the
general affairs of the United States. But the admission
of Consuls into the United States, where no previous
Treaty has stipulated it, seems to have been nowhere'
provided for. A supply of the omission is one of the
lesser instances, in which the Convention have improved
on the model before them. But the most minute provisions become important when they tend to obviate the
necessity or the pretext for gradual and unobserved
usurpations of power.  A list of the cases in which
Congress have been-betrayed, or forced by the defects
of the Confederation, into violations of their chartered
authorities, would not a little surprise those who have
paid no attention to the subject; and would be no inconsiderable argument in favor of the new Constitution,
which seems to have provided no less studiously for the
lesser, than the more obvious and striking defects of the
old.
The power to define and punish piracies and felonies
committed on the high seas, and offences against the law
of nations, belongs with equal propriety to the General
VOL. I.         19




290               The Foderalist.
Governnent, and is a still greater improvement on the
Articles of Confederation. These Articles contain no
provision for the case of offences against the law of nations; and consequently leave it in the power of any
indiscreet member to embroil the Confederacy with foreign nations. The provision of the Fcederal Articles on
the subject of piracies and felonies extends no further
than to the establishment of courts for the trial of these
offences. The definition of piracies might, perhaps, without inconveniency, be left to the law of nations; though
a legislative definition of them is found in most municipal codes. A definition of felonies on the high seas
is evidently requisite. Felony is a term of loose signification, even in the common law of England; and of
various import in the statute law of that kingdom. But
neither the common, nor the statute law of that, or of
any other nation, ought to be a standard for the proceedings of this, unless previously made its own by legislative adoption. The meaning of the term, as. defined
in the codes of the several States, would be as impracticable as the former would be a dishonorable and illegitimate guide. It is not precisely the same in any two
of the States; and varies in each with every revision of
its criminal laws. For the sake of certainty and uniformity, therefore, the power of defining felonies in this
case was in every respect necessary and proper.
The regulation of foreign commerce, having fallen
within several views which have been taken of this
subject, has been too fully discussed to need additional
proofs here of its being properly submitted to the Fcederal administration.
It were doubtless to be wished, that the power of
prohibiting the importation of slaves had not been postponed until the year 1808, or rather, that it had'been
suffered to have immediate operation. But it is not
difficult to account, either for this restriction on the Gen



The Faderalist.            291
eral Government, or for the manner in which the whole
clause is expressed. It ought to be considered as a
great point gained in favor of humanity, that a period of
twenty years may terminate forever, within these States,
a traffic which has so long and so loudly upbraided the
barbarism of modern policy; that within that period, it
will receive a considerable discouragement from the
Foederal Government, and may be totally abolished, by
a concurrence of the few States which continue the unnatural traffic, in the prohibitory example which has
been given by so great a majority of the Union. Happy
would it be for the unfortunate Africans, if an equal
prospect lay before them of being redeemed from the
oppressions of their European brethren!
Attempts have been made to pervert this clause into
an objection against the Constitution, by representing it
on one side as a criminal toleration of an illicit practice,
and on another, as calculated to prevent voluntary and
beneficial emigrations from Europe to America. I mention these misconstructions, not with a view to give
them an -answer, for they deserve none; but as specimens of the manner and spirit, in which some have
thought fit to conduct their opposition to the proposed
Government.
The powers included in the third class are those
which provide for the harmony and proper intercourse
among the States.
Under this head might be included the particular restraints imposed on the authority of the States, and certain powers of the Judicial department; but the former
are reserved for a distinct class, and the latter will be
particularly examined, when we arrive at the structure
and organization of the Government. I shall confine
myself to a cursory review of the remaining powers
comprehended under this third description, to wit: to
"egulate commerce among the several States and the




292              The Fwderalist.
Indian tribes; to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin; to provide for the punishment
of counterfeiting the current coin and securities of the
United States; to fix the standard of weights and measures; to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and
uniform laws of bankruptcy; to prescribe the manner in
which the public Acts, records, and judicial proceedings
of each State shall be proved, and the effect they shall
have in other States; and to establish post-offices and
post-roads.
The defect of power in the existing Confederacy to
regulate the commerce between its several members, is
in the number of those which have been clearly pointed
out by experience. To the proofs and remarks which
former papers have brought into view on this subject, it
may be added, that without this supplemental provision,
the great and essential power of regulating foreign commerce would have been incomplete and ineffectual. A.
very material object of this power was the relief of the
States which import and export through other States,
from the improper contributions levied on them by the
latter. Were these at liberty to regulate the trade between State and State, it must be foreseen, that ways
would be found out to load the articles of import and
export, during the passage through their jurisdiction,
with duties which would fall on the makers of the latter, and the consumers of the former. We may be assured, by past experience, that such a practice would be
introduced by future contrivances; and both by that and
a common knowledge of human affairs, that it would
nourish unceasing animosities, and not improbably terminate in serious interruptions of the public tranquillity.
To those who do not view the question through the
medium of passion, or of interest, the desire of the commercial States to collect, in any form, an indirect revenue from their uncommercial neighbors, must appear




The Federalist.              293
not less impolitic than it is unfair; since it would stim
ulate the injured party, by resentment as well as interest
to resort to less convenient channels for their foreign
trade. But the mild voice of reason, pleading the cause
of an enlarged and permanent interest, is but too often
drowned before public bodies as well as individuals, by
the clamors of an impatient avidity for immediate and
immoderate gain.
The necessity of a superintending authority over the
reciprocal trade of Confederated States, has been illustrated by other examples as well as our own. In Switzerland, where the Union is so very slight, each Canton is
obliged to allow to merchandises a passage through its
jurisdiction into other Cantons, without an augmentation of the tolls. In Germany, it is a law of the Empire,
that the Princes and States shall not lay tolls or customs
on bridges, rivers, or passages, without the consent of
the Emperor and Diet; though it appears from a quotation in an antecedent paper, that the practice in this, as
in many other instances in that Confederacy, has not
followed the law, and has produced there the mischiefs
which have been foreseen here. Among the restraints
imposed by the Union of the Netherlands on its members, one is, that they shall not establish imposts disadvantageous to their neighbors, without the general permission.
The regulation of commerce with the Indian tribes is
very properly unfettered from two limitations in the Articles of Confederation, which render the provision obscure and contradictory. The power is there restrained
to Indians, not members of any of the States, and is not
to violate or infringe the legislative right of any State
vithin its own limits. What description of Indians are
to be deemed members of a State, is not yet settled;
and has been a question of frequent perplexity and contention in the Fcederal Councils. And how the trade




294               The Faederalist.
with Indians, though not members of a State, yet resid.
ing within its legislative jurisdiction, can be regulated
by an external authority, without so far intruding on the
internal rights of legislation, is absolutely incomprehensible. This is not the only case, in which the Articles
of Confederation have inconsiderately endeavored to
accomplish impossibilities; to reconcile a partial sovereignty in the Union, with complete sovereignty in the
States; to subvert a mathematical axiom, by taking
away a part, and letting the whole remain.
All that need be remarked on the power to coin
money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin,
is, that by providing for this last case, the Constitution
has supplied a material omission in the Articles of Confederation. The authority of the existing Congress is
restrained to the regulation of coin struck by their own
authority, or that of the respective States. It must be
seen at once, that the proposed uniformity in the value
of the current coin might be destroyed by subjecting
that of foreign coin to the different regulations of the
different States.
The punishment of counterfeiting the public securities, as well as the current coin, is submitted of course
to that authority which is to secure the value of both.
The regulation of weights and measures is transferred
from the Articles of Confederation, and is founded on
like considerations with the preceding power of regulat*ing coin.
The dissimilarity in the rules of naturalization has
long been remarked as a fault in our system, and as laying a foundation for intricate and delicate questions.
In the fourth Article of the Confederation, it is declared,
"that the free inhabitants of each of these States, pauc"pers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted.
" shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of
"free citizens in the several States; and the People of




The Fwderalist.              29i
"each State shall, in every other, enjoy all the privileges
" of trade and commerce," &c. There is a confusion of
language here, which is remarkable. Why the terms
free inhabitants are used in one part of the Article, free
citizens in another, and People in another; or what was
meant by superadding to "all privileges and immunities
"of free citizens," " all the privileges of trade and
"commerce," cannot easily be determined. It seems to
be a construction scarcely avoidable, however, that those
who come under the denomination of free inhabitants of
a State, although not citizens of such State, are entitled,
in every other State, to all the privileges of free citizens
of the latter; that is, to greater privileges than they may
be entitled to in their own State: so that it may be in
the power of a particular State, or rather every State is
laid under a necessity, not only to confer the rights of
citizenship in other States upon any whom it may admit to such rights within itself, but upon any whom it
may allow to become inhabitants within its jurisdiction.
But were an exposition of the term "inhabitants" to
be admitted which would confine the stipulated privileges to citizens alone, the difficulty is diminished only,
not removed.  The very improper power would still be
retained by each State, of naturalizing aliens in every
other State. In one State, residence for a short term
confers all the rights of citizenship: in another, qualifications of greater importance are required.  An alien,
therefore, legally incapacitated for certain rights in the
latter, may, by previous residence only in the former,
elude his incapacity; and thus the law of one State be
preposterously rendered paramount to the law of another, within the jurisdiction of the other. We owe it
to mere casualty, that very serious embarrassments on
this subject have been hitherto escaped. By the laws of
several States, certain descriptions, of aliens, who had
rendered themselves obnoxious, were laid under inter.




296               The Fwderalist.
diets inconsistent, not only with the rights of citizenship,
but with the privilege of residence. What would have
been the consequence, if such persons, by residence or
otherwise, had acquired the character of citizens under
the laws of another State, and then asserted their rights
as such, both to residence and citizenship, within the
State prescribing them? Whatever the legal consequences might have been, other consequences would
probably have resulted of too serious a nature, not to be
provided against. The new Constitution has accordingly, with great propriety, made provision against them,
and all others proceeding from the defect of the Confederation, on this head, by authorizing the General Government to establish an uniform rule of naturalization
throughout the United States.
The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy
is so intimately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the parties or their property may lie, or be removed into different States, that the expediency of it seems not likely
to be drawn into question.
The power of prescribing, by general laws, the manner in which the public Acts, records, and judicial proceedings of each State, shall be proved, and the effect
they shall have in other States, is an evident and valuable improvement on the clause relating to this subject
in the Articles of Confederation. The meaning of the
latter is extremely indeterminate; and can be of little
importance under any interpretation which it will bear.
The power here established may be rendered a very
convenient instrument of justice, and be particularly
beneficial on the borders of contiguous States, where
the effects liable to justice may be suddenly and secretly
translated in any stage of the process, within a foreign
jurisdiction.
The power of establishing post-roads must, in every




The Fwderaetst.             297
view, be a harmless power; and may perhaps, by judicious management, become productive of great public
conveniency. Nothing which tends to facilitate the in.
tercourse between the States can be deemed unworthy
of the public care.
PUBLIUS.
[For the Independent Journal.]
THE FCEDERALIST. No. XLII.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
THE fourth class comprises the following miscellaneous powers:
1. A power " to promote the progress of science and
" useful arts, by securing, for a limited time, to authors
"and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective
"writings and discoveries."
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned.
The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged
in Great Britain, to be a right at common law. The
right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to
belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals. The
States cannot separatay make effectual provision for
either of the cases, and most of them have anticipated
the decision of this point, by laws passed at the instance
of Congress,
2. " To exercise exlusive legislation, in all cases what"soever,-over such district (not exceeding ten miles
"square) as may, by cession of particular States and
"the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the




298               The Faederalist.
"Government of the United States; and to exercise like
"authority over all places purchased by the consent of
"the Legislatures of the States in which the same shall
"be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock"yards, and other needful buildings." 
The indispensable necessity of complete authority at
the seat of Government, carries its own evidence with
it. It is a power exercised by every Legislature of the
Union, I might say of the world, by virtue of its general supremacy. Without it, not only the public authority might be insulted and its proceedings be interrupted
with impunity; but a dependence of the members of
the General Government on the State comprehending
the seat of the Government, for protection in the exer.
cise of their duty, might bring on the National Councils
an imputation of awe or influence, equally dishonorable
to the Government and dissatisfactory to the other members of the Confederacy. This consideration has the
more weight, as the gradual accumulation of public
improvements at the stationary residence of the Government, would be both too great a public pledge to be
left in the hands of a single State, and would create so
many obstacles to a removal of the Government, as still
further to abridge its necessary independence. The extent of this Faederal district is sufficiently circumscribed
to satisfy every jealousy of an opposite nature. And
as it is to be appropriated to this use with'the consent
of the State ceding it; as the State will no doubt provide in the compact for the rights and the consent of
the citizens inhabiting it; as the inhabitants will find
sufficient inducements of interest to become willing parties to the cession; as they will have had their voice in
the election of the Government, which is to exercise
authority over them; as a municipal Legislature for
local purposes, derived from their own suffrages, will
of course be allowed them; and as the authority of the




The Fwederalist.            29.
Legislature of the State, and of the inhabitants of the
ceded part of it, to concur in the cession, will be derived
from the Whole People of the State, in their adoption
of the Constitution, every imaginable objection seems
to be obviated.
The necessity of a like authority over forts, maga
zines, &c., established by the General Government, is
not less evident. The public money expended on such
places, and the public property deposited in them, require, that they should be exempt from the authority of
the particular State. Nor would it be proper for the
places on which the security of the entire Union may
depend, to be in any idegree dependent on a particular
member of it. All E]bjections and scruples are here also
obviated, by requiring the concurrence of the States concerned, in every such establishment.
3. " To declare the punishment of treason, but no
" attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood,
" or forfeiture, except during the life of the person at" tainted."
As treason may be committed against the United
States, the authority of the United States ought to be
enabled to punish it. But as new-fangled and artificial
treasons have been the great engines by which violent
factions, the natural offspring of free Governments, have
usually wreaked their alternate malignity on each other,
the Convention have, with great judgment, opposed a
barrier to this peculiar danger, by inserting a Constitu.
tional definition of the crime, fixing the proof necessary
for conviction of it, and restraining the Congress, even in
punishing it; from extending the consequences of guilt
beyond the person of its author.
4. " To admit new States into the Union: but no;' new State shall be formed or erected within the juris" diction of any other State; nor any State be formed
"by the junction of two or more States, or parts of




300              Tlhe Federalist.
"States, without the consent of the Legislatures of the
"States concerned, as well as of the Congress."
In the Articles of Confederation, no provision is found
on this important subject. Canada was to be admitted
of right, on her joining in the measures of the United
States; and the other colonies, by which were evidently
meant the other British colonies, at the discretion of
nine States. The eventual establishment of new States
seems to have been overlooked by the compilers of
that instrument. We have seen the inconvenience of
this omission, and the assumption of power into which
Congress have been led by it. With great propriety
therefore has the new system supplied the defect. The
general precaution, that no new States shall be formed,
without the concurrence of the Fcederal authority, and
that of the States concerned, is consonant to the principles which ought to govern such transactions. The particular precaution against the erection of new States, by
the partition of a State without its consent, quiets the
jealousy of the larger States; as that of the smaller is
quieted by a like precaution, against a junction of States
without their consent.
5. "To dispose of and make all needful rules and
"regulations respecting the territory or other property
"belonging to the United States, with a proviso, that
"nothing in the Constitution shall be so construed as
"to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any
"particular State."
This is a power of very great importance, and required
by considerations, similar to those which show the propriety of the former. The proviso annexed is proper in
itself, and was probably rendered absolutely necessary
by jealousies and questions concerning the Western ter.
ritory sufficiently known to the public.
6. "To guarantee to every State in the Union a re"publican form of Government; to protect each of them




The Fwrderalist.            301
"against invasion; and on application of the Legislature,
" or of the Executive, (when the Legislature cannot be:' convened,) against domestic violence."
In a Confederacy founded on republican principles,
and composed of republican members, the superintending Government ought clearly to possess authority to
defend the system against aristocratic or monarchical
innovations. The more intimate the nature of such a
Union may be, the greater interest have the members in
the political institutions of each other; and the greater
right to insist, that the forms of Government under
which the compact was entered into, should be substantially maintained. But a right implies a remedy; and
where else could the remedy be deposited, than where
it is deposited by the Constitution? Governments of
dissimilar principles and forms have been found less
adapted to a Fcederal coalition of any sort, than those
of a kindred nature. "As the Confederate republic of
"Germany," says MONTESQUIEU, " consists of free Cities,
"and petty States, subject to different Princes, experi"ence shows us that it is more imperfect than that of
Holland and Switzerland."  " Greece was undone,"
he adds, " as soon as the King of Macedon obtained a
" seat among the Amphictyons."  In the latter case, no
doubt, the disproportionate force, as well as the monarchical form of the new Confederate, had its share of
influence on the events. It may possibly be asked, what
need there could be of such a precaution, and whether
it may not become apretext for alterations in the State
Governments, without the concurrence of the States
themselves. These questions admit of ready answers.
If the interposition of the General Government should
not be needed, the provision for such an event will be
a harmless superfluity only in the Constitution. But
who can say what experiments may be produced by the
caprice of particular States, by the ambition of enter



302               The Faoderalist.
prising leaders, or by the intrigues and influence of
foreign powers? To the second question it may be
answered, that if the General Government should interpose by virtue of this Constitutional authority, it will
be of course bound to pursue the authority. But the
authority extends- no farther than to a guaranty of a
republican form of Government, which supposes a pre
existing Government of the form which is to be guaranteed. As long, therefore, as the existing republican
forms are continued by the States, they are guaranteed
by the Faederal Constitution.  Whenever the States
may choose to substitute other republican forms, they
have a right to do so, and to claim the Fcederal guaranty for the latter. The only restriction imposed on
them is, that they shall not exchange republican for
anti-republican Constitutions; a restriction which, it is
presumed, will hardly be considered as a grievance.
A protection against invasion is due from every society to the parts composing it. The latitude of the expression here used, seems to secure each State, not only
against foreign hostility, but against ambitious or vindictive enterprises of its more powerful neighbors. The
history, both of ancient and modern Confederacies, proves
that the weaker members of the Union ought not to be
insensible to the policy of this Article.
Protection against domestic violence is added with
equal propriety. It has been remarked, that even among
the Swiss Cantons, which, properly speaking, are not
under one Government, provision is made for this object; and the history of that League informs us that
mutual aid is frequently claimed and afforded; and as
well by the most democratic, as the other Cantons. A
recent and well-known event among ourselves has
warned us to be prepared for emergencies of a like
nature.
At first view, it might seem not to square with the




The Fwderalist.              303
republican theory, to suppose, either that a majority
have not the right, or that a minority will have the
force, to subvert a Government; and consequently, that
the Fcederal interposition can never be required, but
when it would be improper. But theoretic reasoning,
in this as in most other cases, must be qualified by the
lessons of practice. Why may not illicit combinations,
for purposes of violence, be formed as well by a majority
of a State, especially a small State, as by a majority of
a county, or a district of'he same State; and if the
authority of the State ought in the latter case to protect
the local magistracy, ought not the Foederal authority,
in the former, to support the State authority? Besides,
there are certain parts of the State Constitutions, which
are so interwoven with the Fcederal Constitution, that a
violent blow cannot be given to the one, without communicating the wound to the other. Insurrections in a
State will rarely induce a Fcederal interposition, unless
the number concerned in them bear some proportion to
the friends of Government. It will be much better, that
the violence in such cases should be repressed by the
superintending power, than that the majority should be
left to maintain their cause by a bloody and obstinate
contest. The existence of a right to interpose, will generally prevent the necessity of exerting it.
Is it true, that force and right are necessarily on the
same side in republican Governments? May not the
minor party possess such a superiority of pecuniary resources, of military talents and experience, or of secret
succors from foreign powers, as will render it superior
also in an appeal to the sword? May not a more compact and advantageous position turn the scale on the
same side, against a superior number so situated as to
be less capable of a prompt and collected exertion of
its strength? Nothing can, be more chimerical than to
imagine, that in a trial of actual force, victory may be




304              The Faederalist.
calculated by the rules which prevail in a census of the
inhabitants, or which determine the event of an election! May it not happen, in fine, that the minority of
CITIZENs  may become a majority of PERSONS, by the
accession of alien residents, of a casual concourse of
adventurers, or of those whom the Constitution of the
State has not admitted to the rights of suffrage? I
take no notice of an unhappy species of population
abounding in some of the States, who, during the calm
of regular Government, are sunk below the level of men;
but who, in the tempestuous scenes of civil violence,
may emerge into the human character, and give a superiority of strength to any party with which they may
associate themselves.
In cases where it may be doubtful.on which side justice lies, what better umpires could be desired by two
violent factions, flying to arms and tearing a State to
pieces, than the representatives of Confederate States,
not heated by the local flame? To the impartiality of
Judges, they would unite the affection of friends. Happy
would it be, if such a remedy for its infirmities could be
enjoyed by all free Governments; if a project equally
effectual could be established for the universal peace of
mankind!
Should it be asked, what is to be the redress for an
insurrection pervading all the States, and comprising a
superiority of the entire force, though not a Constitutional right; the answer must be, that such a case, as it
would be without the compass of human remedies, so
it is fortunately not within the compass of human probability; and that it is a sufficient recommendation of
the Fcederal Constitution, that it diminishes the risk of
a calamity, for which no possible Constitution can pro.
vide a cure.
Among the advantages of a Confederate republic,
enumerated by MONTESQUIEU, an important one is, "that




The F3wderalist.             305
"should a popular insurrection happen in one of the
"States, the others are able to quell- it. Should abuses
"creep into one part, they are reformed by those that
"remain sound."
7. " To consider all debts contracted, and engage"ments entered into, before the adoption of this Con"stitution, as' being no less valid against the United
"States, under this Constitution, than under the Con" federation."
This can only be considered as a declaratory proposition; and may have been inserted, among other reasons,
for the satisfaction of the foreign creditors of the United
States, who cannot be strangers to the pretended doctrine, that a change in the political form of civil society,
has the magical effect of dissolving its moral obligations.
Among the lesser criticisms which have been exercised on the Constitution, it has been remarked, that
the validity of engagements ought to have been asserted
in favor of the United States, as well as against them;
and in the spirit which usually characterizes little critics,
the omission has been transformed and magnified into a
plot against the National rights. The authors of this
discovery may be told, what few others need to, be informed of, that as engagements are in their nature reciprocal, an assertion of their validity on one side, necessarily involves a validity on the other side; and that as
the Article is merely declaratory, the establishment of
the principle in one case is sufficient for every case.
They may be further told, that every Constitution must
limit its precautions to dangers that are not altogether
imaginary; and that no real danger can exist that the
Government would DARE, with, or even without, this
Constitutional declaration before it, to remit the debts
justly due to the public, on the pretext here con.
demned.
VOL. I.             20




306              The Fwaderalist.
8. " To provide for amendments to be ratified by
"three fourths of the States, under two exceptions
" only."
That useful alterations will be suggested by experience, could not but be foreseen. It was requisite, therefore, that a mode for introducing them should be provided. The mode preferred by the Convention seems
to be stamped with every mark of propriety. It guards
equally against that extreme facility, which would render the Constitution too mutable; and that extreme
difficulty, which might perpetuate its discovered faults.
It moreover equally enables the General and the State
Governments to originate the amendment of errors, as
they may be pointed out by the experience on one side,
or on the other. The exception in favor of the equality
of suffrage in the Senate, was probably meant as a palladium to the residuary sovereignty of the States, implied and secured by that principle of representation in
one branch of the Legislature; and was probably insisted
on by the States particularly attached to that equality.
The other exception must have been admitted on the
same considerations which produced the privilege defended by it.
9. " The ratification of the Conventions of nine States,
" shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Consti" tution between the States, ratifying the same."
This Article speaks for itself. The express authority
of the People alone could give due validity to the Constitution.' To have required the unanimous ratification
of the thirteen States, would have subjected the essential interests of the whole to the caprice or corruption
of a single member. It would have marked a want of
foresight in the Convention, which our own experience
Would have rendered inexcusable.
Two questions of a very delicate nature present themselves on this occasion: —1. On what principle the Con



The Farderalist.            30.
federation, which stands in the solemn form of a compact among the States, can be superseded without the
unanimous consent of the parties to it? 2. What relation is to subsist between the nine or more States ratifying the Constitution, and the remaining few who do
not become parties to it?
The first question is answered at once by recurring to
the absolute necessity of the case; to the great principle
of self-preservation; to the transcendent law of nature
and of nature's God, which declares that the safety and
happiness of society are the objects at which all political
institutions aim, and to which all such institutions must
be sacrificed. PERHAPS, also, an answer may be found
without searching beyond the principles of the compact
itself. It has been heretofore noted among the defects
of the Confederation, that in many of the States it had
received no higher sanction than a mere Legislative
ratification. The principle of reciprocality seems to
require, that its obligation on the other States should
be reduced to the same standard. A compact between
independent sovereigns, founded on ordinary acts of
Legislative authority, can pretend to no higher validity
than a league or treaty between the parties. It is an
established doctrine on the subject of treaties, that all
the Articles are mutually conditions of each other; that
a breach of any one Artiele is a breach of the whole
treaty; and that a breach, committed by either of the
parties, absolves the others, and authorizes them, if they
please, to- pronounce the compact violated and void.
Should it unhappily be necessary to appeal to these del.
icate truths for a justification for dispensing with the
consent of particular States to a dissolution of the Frederal pact, will not the complaining parties find it a
difficult task to answer the MULTIPLIED and IMPORTANT
infractions with which they may be confronted? The
tixne has been, when it was incumbent on us all to veil




308               The Federalist.
the ideas which this paragraph exhibits. The scene is
now changed, and with it the part which the same mo.
tives dictate.
The second question is not less delicate; and the flat.
tering prospect of its being merely hypothetical, forbids
an over-curious discussion of it. It is one of those cases
which must be left to provide for itself. In general, it
may be observed, that although no political relation can
subsist between the assenting and dissenting States, yet
the moral relations will remain uncancelled. The claims
of justice, both on one side and on the other, will be in
force, and must be fulfilled; the rights of humanity must
in all cases be duly and mutually respected; whilst considerations of a common interest, and above all, the
remembrance of the endearing scenes which are past,
and the anticipation of a speedy triumph over the obstacles to reunion, will, it is hoped, not urge in vain
MODERATION on one side, and PRUDENCE on the other.
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Friday, January 25, 1788.]
THE F(EDERALIST. No. XLIII.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
A   FIFTH class of provisions in favor of the Fcederal authority consists of the following restricticns
on the authority of the several States.
1. " No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or
"confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal;,f coin money; emit bills of credit; make anything but:,gold and silver a legal tender in payment of debts;
s pa"s any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law




The Federalist.              309''impairing the obligation of contracts; or grant any
" title of nobility."
The prohibition against treaties, alliances, and confederations, makes a part of the existing Articles of
Union; and, for reasons which need no explanation,
is copied into the new Constitution. The prohibition
of letters of marque is another part of the old system,
but is somewhat extended in the new. According to
the former, letters of marque could be granted by the
States after a declaration of war; according to the latter, these licenses must be obtained, as well during
war, as previous to its declaration, from the Government of the United States. This alteration is fully justified by the advantage of uniformity in all points which
relate to foreign powers; and of immediate responsibility to the Nation in all those, for whose conduct.the
Nation itself is to be responsible.
The right of coining money, which is here taken from
the States, was left in their hands by the Confederation,
as a concurrent right with that of Congress, under an
exception in favor of the exclusive right of Congress to
regulate the alloy and value. In this instance, also, the
new provision is an improvement on the old. Whilst
the alloy and value depended on the general authority,
a right of coinage in the particular- States could have
no other effect than to multiply expensive mints, and
diversify the forms and weights of the circulating pieces.
The latter inconveniency defeats one purpose for which
the power was originally submitted to the Fmderal
head: and as far as the former might prevent an inconvenient remittance of gold and silver to the central mint
for recoinage, the end can be as well attained by local
mints established under the general authority.
The extension of the prohibition to bills of credit
must give pleasure to every citizen, in proportion to his
love of justice and his knowledge of the true springs of




310              The Faideralist.
public prosperity. The loss which America has sus.
tained since the Peace, from the pestilent effects of
paper money on the necessary confidence between man
and'man, on the necessary confidence in the public
councils, on the industry and morals of the People, and
on the character of republican Government, constitutes
an enormous debt against the States chargeable with
this unadvised measure, which must long remain unsatisfied; or rather an accumulation of guilt, which can
be expiated no otherwise than by a voluntary sacrifice
on the altar of justice, of the power which has been the
instrument of it. In addition to these persuasive considerations, it may be observed, that the same reasons
which show the necessity of denying to the States the
power of regulating coin, prove with equal force, that
they ought not to be at liberty to substitute a paper
medium, in the place of coin. Had every State a right
to regulate the value of its coin, there might be as many
different currencies as States, and thus the intercourse
among them would be impeded; retrospective alterations in its value might be made, and thus the citizens
of other States be injured, and animosities be kindled
among the States themselves. The subjects of foreign
powers might suffer from the same cause, and hence the
Union be discredited and embroiled by the indiscretion
of a single member. No one of these mischiefs is less
incident to a power in the States to emit paper money,
than to coin gold or silver. The power to make anything but gold and silver a tender in payment of debts,
is withdrawn from the States, on the same principle
with that of issuing a paper currency.
Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, are contrary to the
first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation. The two former are expressly
prohibited by the declarations prefixed to some of the




The Fwoderalist.            31i
State Constitutions, and all of them are prohibited by
the spirit and scope of these fundamental charters. Ouz
own experience has taught us, nevertheless, that additional fences against these dangers ought not to be
omitted. Very properly, therefore, have the Convention
added this Constitutional bulwark in favor of personal
security and private rights; and I am much deceived,
if they have not, in so doing, as faithfully consulted the
genuine sentiments as the undoubted interests of their
constituents. The sober People of America are weary
of the fluctuating policy which has directed the public
councils. They have seen with regret and with indignation, that sudden changes, and legislative interferences, in cases affecting personal rights, become jobs in
the hands of enterprising and influential speculators,
and snares to the more industrious and less informed
part of the community. They have seen, too, that one
Legislative interference is but the first link of a long
chain of repetitions; every subsequent interference being naturally produced by the effects of the preceding.
They very rightly infer, therefore, that some thorough
reform is wanting, which will banish speculations on
public measures, inspire a general prudence and industry, and give a regular course to the business of society.
The prohibition with respect to titles of nobility is
copied from the Articles of Confederation, and needs
no comment.
2. ", No State shall, without the consent of the Con.
"gress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports,
"except what may be absolutely necessary for executing
"its inspection laws, and the net produce of all duties
"and imposts laid by any State on imports or exports,
"shall be for the use of the treasury of the United
" States; and all such laws shall be subject to the re-'vision and control of the Congress. No State shall,' without the consent of Congress, lay any duty on




312               The Fawderalist.'tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace
"enter into any agreement or compact with another
"State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war unless
" actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will
" not admit of delay."
The restraint on the power of the States over imports
and exports is enforced by all the arguments which
prove the necessity of submitting the regulation of trade
to the Fcederal councils. It is needless, therefore, to
remark further on this head, than that the manner in
which the restraint is qualified seems well calculated at
once to secure to the States a reasonable discretion in
providing for the conveniency of their imports and exports, and to the United States a reasonable check
against the abuse of this discretion.  The remaining
particulars of this clause fall within reasonings which
are either so obvious, or have been so fully developed,
that they may be passed over without remark.
The sixth and last class consists of the several powers
and provisions, by which efficacy is given to all the rest.
1. " Of these the first is, the power to make all laws
" which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
"execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers
" vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
"4 United States."
Few parts of the Constitution have been assailed with
more intemperance than this; yet on a fair investigation
of it, no part can appear more completely invulnerable.
Without the substance of this power, thewhole Constitution would be a dead letter. Those who object to the
Article, therefore, as a part of the Constitution, can only
mean that the form of the provision is improper. But
have they considered, whether a better form could have
been substituted?
There are four other possible methods, which the Convention might have taken on this subject. They might




The Federalist.             313
have copied the second Article of the existing Confeder
ation, which would have prohibited the exercise of an)
power not expressly delegated; they might have attempted a positive enumeration of the powers comprehended under the general terms "necessary and proper;"
they might have attempted a negative enumeration of
them, by specifying the powers excepted from the general definition; they might" have been altogether silent
on the subject, leaving these necessary and proper powers to construction and inference.
Had the Convention taken the first method of adopting the second Article of Confederation, it is evident
that the new Congress would be continually exposed, as
their predecessors have been, to the alternative of construing the term  "expressly" with so much rigor, as
to disarm the Government of all real authority whatever,
or with so much latitude as to destroy altogether tfie
force of the restriction. It would be easy to show, if it
were necessary, that no important power, delegated by
the Articles of Confederation, has been or can be executed by Congress, without recurring more or less to
the doctrine of construction or implication. As the powers delegated under the new system are more extensive,
the Government which is to administer it would find itself still more distressed with the alternative of betraying the public interest by doing nothing, or of violating
the Constitution by exercising powers indispensably
necessary and proper, but, at the same time, not expressly granted.
Had the Convention attempted a positive enumeration of the powers necessary and proper for carrying
their other powers into effect, the attempt would have
involved a complete digest of laws on every subject to
which the Constitution relates; accommodated too, not
only to the existing state of things, but to all the possible changes which futurity may produce; for in every




314               The Faderalist.
new application of a general power, the particular powers, which are the means of attaining the object of the
general power, must always necessarily vary with that
object; and be often properly varied whilst the object
remains the same.
Had they attempted to enumerate the particular powers or means not necessary or proper for carrying the
general powers into execution, the task would have been
no less chimerical; and would have been liable to this
further objection,.that every defect in the enumeration
would have been equivalent to a positive grant of authority. If, to avoid this consequence, they had attempted a partial enumeration of the exceptions, and
described the residue by the general terms, not necessary
or proper, it must have happened that the enumeration
would comprehend a few of the excepted powers only;
that these would be such as would be least likely to be
assumed or tolerated, because the enumeration would of
course select such as would be least necessary or proper;
and that the unnecessary and improper powers included
in the residuum, would be less forcibly excepted, than if
no partial enumeration had been made.
Had the Constitution been silent on this head, there
can be no doubt that all the particular powers requisite
as means of executing the general powers would have
resulted to the Government, by unavoidable implication.
No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that wherever the end is required, the means
are authorized; wherever a general power to do a thing
is given, every particular power necessary for doing it is
included. Had this last method, therefore, been pursued
by the Convention, every objection now urged against
their plan would remain in all its plausibility; and the
real inconveniency would be incurred of not removing a
pretext which may be seized on critical occasions for
drawing into question the essential powers of the
Union.




Tlhe FcPderalist.            315
If it be asked what is to be the consequence, in case
the Congress shall misconstrue this part of. the Consti.
tution, and exercise powers pot warranted by its true
meaning, I answer, the same as if they should misconstrue or enlarge any other power vested in them; as if
the general power had been reduced to particulars, and
any one of these were to be violated; the same in short,
as if the State Legislatures should violate their respective constitutional authorities. In the first instance, the
success of the usurpation will depend on the Executive.
and Judiciary departments, which are to expound and
give effect to the legislative acts; and in the last resort
a remedy must be obtained from the People, who can,
by the election of more faithful representatives, annul
the acts of the usurpers. The truth is, that this ultimate
redress may be more confided in against unconstitutional acts of the Fcederal, than of the State Legislatures, for this plain reason, that as every such act of the
former will be an invasion of the rights of the latter,
these will be-ever ready to mark the innovation, to
sound the alarm to the People, and to exert their local
influence in effecting a change of Fcederal representatives. There being no such intermediate body between
the State Legislatures and the People, interested in
watching the conduct of the former, violations of the
State Constitutions are more likely to remain unnoticed and unredressed.
2. "This Constitution and the laws of the United
" States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and
"all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
"authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
"law of the land, and the Judges in every State shall' be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or
"laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."
The indiscreet zeal of the adversaries to the Constitu.
tion has betrayed them into an attack on this part of it




316               The Fawderalist.
also, without which it would have been evidently and
radically defective. To be fully sensible of this, we
need only suppose for a mornent, that the supremacy of
the State Constitutions had been left complete, by a save
ing clause in their favor.
In the first place, as these Constitutions invest the
State Legislatures with absolute sovereignty, in all cases
not excepted by the existing Articles of Confederation,
all the authorities contained in the proposed Constitution,
so far as they exceed those enumerated in the Confederation, would have been annulled, and the new Congress would have been reduced to the same impotent
condition with their predecessors.
In the next place, as the Constitutions of some of the
States do not even expressly and fully recognize the
existing powers of the Confederacy, an express saving
of the supremacy of the former would, in such States,
have brought into question every power contained in the
proposed Constitution.
In the third place, as the Constitutions of the States
differ much from each other, it might happen that a
treaty or National law, of great and equal importance
to the States, would interfere with some and not with
other Constitutions, and would consequently be valid
in some of the States, at the same time that it would
have no effect in others.
In fine, the world would have seen, for the first time,
a system of Government founded on an inversion of the
fundamental principles of all Government; it would
have seen the authority of the whole society everywhere
subordinate to the authority of the parts; it would have
seen a monster, in which the head was under the direction of the members.
3. " The Senators and Representatives, and the mem"bers of the several State Legislatures, and all Exec"utive and Judicial officers, both of the United States




The Foederalist.            317
" and the several States, shall be bound by oath or affir" mation, to support this Constitution."
It has been asked why it was thought necessary, that
the State magistracy should be bound to support the
Fcederal Constitution, and unnecessary that a like oath
should be imposed on the officers of the United States,
in favor of the State Constitutions?
Several reasons might be assigned for the distinction.
I content myself with one, which is obvious and conclusive.   he members of the Foederal Government will
have nd agency in carrying the State Constitutions into
effect. The members and officers of the State Governments, on the contrary, will have an essential agency
in giving effect to the Fcederal Constitution. The election of the President and Senate will depend, in all
cases, on the Legislatures of the several States. And
the election of the House of Representatives will equally
depend on the same authority in the first instance; and
will, probably, forever be conducted by the officers, and
according to the laws of the States.
4. Among the provisions for giving efficacy to the
Fuederal powers might be added those which belong to
the Executive and Judiciary departments: but as these
are reserved for particular examination in another place,
I pass them over in this.
We have now reviewed, in detail, all the Articles
composing the sum or quantity of power, delegated by
the proposed Constitution to the Fcederal Government;
and are brought to this undeniable conclusion, that no
part of the power is unnecessary or improper for accomplishing the necessary objects of the Union.  The
question, therefore, whether this amount of power shall
be granted or not, resolves itself into another question,
whether or not a Government commensurate to the
exigencies of the Union shall be established; or, in
other words, whether the Union itself shall be preserved
PUBLIUS.




318               The Fwderalist.
For the Independent Journal.
THE FEDERALIST. No. XLIV.
TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
H AVING shown that no one of the powers trans.
ferred to the Federal Government is unnecessary
or improper, the next question to be considered is,
whether the whole mass of them will be dangerous to
the portion of authority left in the several States.
The adversaries to the plan of the Convention, instead
of considering in the first place what degree of power
was absolutely necessary for the purposes of the Fcederal
Government, have exhausted themselves in a secondary
inquiry into the possible consequences of the proposed
degree of power to the Governments of the particular
States. But if the Union, as has been shown, be essential to the security of the People of America against
foreign danger; if it be essential to their security
against contentions and wars among the different States;
if it be essential to guard them against those violent
and oppressive factions which embitter the blessings of
liberty, and against those military establishments which
must gradually poison its very fountain; if, in a word,
the Union be essential to the happiness of the People
of America, is it not preposterous, to urge as an objection to a Government, without which the objects of the
Union cannot be attained, that such a Government may
derogate from the importance of the Governments of
the individual States?  Was then the American Revolution effected, was the American Confederacy formed,
was the precious blood of thousands spilt, and the hardearned substance of millions lavished, not that the Peo.




Thlie Fwderalist.           319
plie of America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety;
but that the Governments of the individual States, that
particular municipal establishments, might enjoy a certain extent of power, and be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of Sovereignty? We have heard of
the impious doctrine in the Old World, that the People
were made for kings, not kings for the People. Is the
same doctrine to be revived in the New, in another shape,
that the solid happiness of the People is to be sacrificed
to the views of political institutions of a different form?
It is too early for politicians to presume on our forgetting
that the public good, the real welfare of the great body
of the People, is the supreme object to be pursued; and
that no form of Government whatever has any other
value, than as it may be fitted for the attainment of
this object. Were the plan of the Convention adverse
to the public happiness, my voice would be, reject the
plan. Were the Union itself inconsistent with the public happiness, it would be, abolish the Union. In like
manner, as far as the sovereignty of the States cannot
be reconciled to the happiness of the People, the voice
of every good citizen must be, let the former be sacrificed to the latter. How far the sacrifice is necessary,
has been shown. How far the unsacrificed residue will
be endangered, is the question before us.
Several important considerations have been touched
in the course of these papers, which discountenance the
supposition, that the operation of the Fcederal Government will by degrees prove fatal to the State Governments. The more I revolve the subject, the more fully
I am persuaded, that the balance is much more likely
to be disturbed by the preponderancy of the last than
of the first scale.
We have seen, in all the examples of ancient and
modern Confederacies, the strongest tendency continually
betraying itself in the members, to despoil the General




320               The Faederalist.
Government of its authorities, with a very ineffectual
capacity in the latter to defend itself against the
encroachments. Although, in most of these examples,
the system has been so dissimilar from that under consideration as greatly to weaken any inference concerning
the latter from the fate of the former, yet, as the States
will retain, under the proposed Constitution, a very
extensive portion of active sovereignty, the inference
ought not to be wholly disregarded. In the Achaean
league it is probable that the Fcederal head had a degree
and species of power, which gave it a considerable likeness to the Government framed by the Convention. The
Lycian Confederacy, as far as its principles and form are
transmitted, must have borne a still greater analogy to it.
Yet history does not inform us, that either of them ever
degenerated, or tended to degenerate, into one consolidated Government. On the contrary, we know that
the ruin of one of them proceeded from the incapacity
of the Fcederal authority to prevent the dissensions, and
finally the disunion, of the subordinate authorities.
These cases are the more worthy of our attention, as the
external causes by which the component parts were
pressed together were much more numerous and powerful
than in our case; and consequently less powerful liga.
ments within would be sufficient to bind the members
to the head, and to each other.
-In the feudal system, we have seen a similar propen.
sity exemplified. Notwithstanding the want of proper
sympathy in every instance between the local sovereigns
and the People, and the sympathy in some instances
between the general sovereign and the latter, it usually
happened that the local sovereigns prevailed in the rivalship for encroachments.  Had no external dangers
enforced internal harmony and subordination, and particularly, had the local sovereigns possessed the affections
of. the People, the great kingdoms in Europe would at




The Fwderalist.            321
this time consist of as many independent princes, as
there were formerly feudatory barons.
The State Governments will have the advantage of
the Fcederal Government, whether we compare them in
respect to the immediate dependence of the one on the
other; to the weight of personal influence which each
side will possess; to the powers respectively vested in
them; to the predilection and probable support of the
People; to the disposition and faculty of resisting and
frustrating the measures of each other.
The State Governments may be regarded as constituent and essential parts of the Fcederal Government;
whilst the latter is nowise essential to the operation
or organization of the former. Without the intervention
of the State Legislatures, the President of the United
States cannot be elected at all. They must in all cases
have a great share in his appointment, and will perhaps,
in most cases, of themselves determine it. The Senate
will be elected absolutely and exclusively by the State
Legislatures.  Even the House of Representatives,
though drawn immediately from the People, will be chosen very much under the influence of that class of men,
whose influence over the People obtains for themselves
an election into the State Legislatures.  Thus, each
of the principal branches of the Fcederal Government will
owe its existence more or less to the favor of the State
Governments, and must consequently feel a deperidence,
which is much more likely to beget a disposition too
obsequious, than too overbearing towards them. On
the other side, the component parts of the State Governments will in no instance be indebted for their appointment to the direct agency of the Feederal Government,
and very little, if at all, to the local influence of its
members.
The number of individuals employed under the Con.
stiftion of the United States: will be much smaller
VOL. I.         21




322               The Fwederalist.
than the number employed under the particular States
There will consequently be less of personal influence
on the side of the former than of the latter.  The
members of the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary
departments of thirteen and more States, the justices of
peace, officers of militia, ministerial officers of justice,
with all the county, corporation, and town officers,
for three millions and more of people, intermixed, and
having particular acquaintance with every class and
circle of people, must exceed, beyond all proportion,
both in number and influence, those of every description
who will be employed in the administration of the Fcederal system. Compare the members of the three great
departments of the thirteen States, excluding from
the Judiciary department the justices of peace, with
the members of the corresponding departments of the
single Government of the Union; compare the militia
officers of three millions of people, with the military
and marine officers of any establishment, which is within
the compass of probability, or, I may add, of possibility,
and in this view alone, we may pronounce the advantage
of the States to be decisive. If the Fcederal Govern.
ment is to have collectors of revenue, the State Governments will have theirs also. And as those of the former
will be principally on the sea-coast, and not very
numerous, whilst those of the latter will be spread over
the face of the country, and will be very numerous,
the advantage in this view also lies on the same side.
It is true, that the Confederacy is to possess, and may
exercise, the power of collecting internal as well as
external taxes throughout the States: but it is probable
that this power will not be resorted to, except for supplemental purposes of revenue; that an option will then
be given to the States to supply their quotas by previous
collections of their own; and that the eventual collection, under the immediate authority of the Union




The FPderalist.             32b
will generally be made by the officers, and according
to the rules, appointed by the several States. Indeed
it is extremely probable, that in other instances, partic.
ularly in the organization of the Judicial power, the officers of the States will be clothed with the correspondent
authority of the Union. Should it happen, however,
that separate collectors of internal revenue should be
appointed under the Fcederal Government, the influence
of the whole number would not be a comparison with
that of the multitude of State officers in the opposite
scale. Within every district, to which a Fcederal collector would be allotted, there would not be less than
thirty or forty, or even more, officers, of different'descriptions, and many of them persons of character and weight,
whose influence would lie on the side of the State.
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution
to the Faederal Government are few and defined.
Those which are to remain in the State Governments
are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace,
negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the
power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected.
The powers reserved to the several States will extend to
all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs
concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the People,
and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of
the State.
The operations of the Faederal Government will be
most extensive and important in times of war and danger; those of the State Governments, in times of peace
and security. As the former periods will probably bear
a small proportion to the latter, the State Governments
will here enjoy another advantage over the Fcederal
Government. The more adequate, indeed, the Fcederal
powers may be rendered to the National defence, the
ess frequent will be those scenes of danger which might




324              The Faderalist.
favor their ascendency over the Governments of the par.
ticular States.
If the new Constitution be examined with accuracy
and candor, it will be found that the change which it'proposes consists much less in the addition of NEW
POWERS to the Union, than in the invigoration of its
ORIGINAL POWERS. The regulation of commerce, it is
true, is a new power; but that seems to be an addition
which few oppose, and from which no apprehensions
are entertained. The powers relating to war and peace,
armies and fleets, treaties and finance, with the other
more considerable powers, are all vested in the existing
Congress by the Articles of Confederation. The proposed change does not enlarge these powers; it only
substitutes a more effectual mode of administering them.
The change relating to taxation may be regarded as the
most important: and yet the present Congress have as
complete authority to REQUIRE of the States indefinite
supplies of money for the common defence and general
welfare, as the future Congress will have to require them
of individual citizens; and the latter will be no more
bound than the States themselves have been, to pay the
quotas respectively taxed on them.  Had the States
complied punctually with the Articles of Confederation,
or could their compliance have been enforced by as
peaceable means as may be used with success towards
single persons, our past experience is very far from
countenancing an opinion, that the State Governments
would have lost their constitutional powers, and have
gradually undergone an entire consolidation. To maintain that such an event would have ensued, would be
to say at once, that the existence of the State Governments is incompatible with any system whatever, that
accomplishes the essential purposes of the Union.
PUBLIUS




The Fa.deralist.            32C
[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, January 29, 1788.]
THE F(EDERALIST. No. XLV.
ro THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
RESUMING the subject of the last paper, I proceed
to inquire, whether the Fcederal Government or the
State Governments will have the advantage with regard
to the predilection and support of the People. Notwithstanding the different modes in which they are appointed, we must consider both of them as substantially
dependent on the great body of the citizens of the
United States.  I assume this position here as it respects the first, reserving the proofs for another place.
The Fcederal and State Governments are in fact but
different agents and trustees of the People, constituted
with different powers, and designated for different purposes.  The adversaries of the Constitution seem to
have lost sight of the People altogether, in their reasonings on this subject; and to have viewed these different
establishments, not only as mutual rivals and enemies,
but as uncontrolled by any common superior, in their
efforts to usurp the authorities of each other.  These
gentlemen must here be reminded of their error. They.
must be told, that the ultimate authority, wherever the
derivative may be found, resides in the People alone;
and that it will not depend merely on the compara.
tive ambition or address of the different Governments,
whether either, or which of them, will be able to enlarge its sphere of jurisdiction at the expense of the
other. Truth, no less than decency, requires, that the
event in every case should be supposed to depend on
the sentiments and sanction of their common constitu.
ents.




326               The Faederalist.
Many considerations, besides those suggested on e
former occasion, seem to place it beyond doubt, that the
first and most natural attachment of the People will be
to the Governments of their respective States. Into the
administration of these, a greater number of individuals
will expect to rise. From the gift of these, a greater
number of offices and emoluments will flow. By the
superintending care of these, all the more domestic and
personal interests of the People will be regulated and
provided for. With the affairs of these, the People will
be more familiarly and minutely conversant. And with
the members of these will a greater proportion of the
People have the ties of personal acquaintance and
friendship, and of family and party attachments; on
the side of these, therefore, the popular bias may well
be expected most strongly to incline.
Experience speaks the same language in this case.
The Faederal administration, though hitherto very defective, in comparison with what may be hoped under
a better system, had, during the war, and particularly
whilst the independent fund of paper emissions was in
credit, an activity and importance as great as it can
well have, in any future circumstances whatever. It
was engaged, too, in a course of measures which had for
their object the protection of everything that was dear,
and the acquisition of everything that could be desirable to the People at large. It was, nevertheless, invariably found, after the transient enthusiasm for the early
Congresses was over, that the attention and attachment
of the People were turned anew to their own particular
Governments; that the Fcederal Council was at no time
the idol of popular favor; and that opposition to proposed enlargements of its powers ancr importance was
the side usually taken by the men, who wished to build
their political consequence on the prepossessions of
their fellow-citizens.




The Federalist.            327
If, therefore, as has been elsewhere remarked, the Peo
ple should in future become more partial to the Fcederal
than to the State Governments, the change can only result from such manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administration, as will overcome all their antecedent
propensities. And in that case, the People ought not
surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where they may discover it to be most due; but
even in that case, the State Governments could have
little to apprehend, beause it is only within a certain
sphere, that the Fcederal power can, in the nature of
things, be advantageously administered.
The remaining points, on which I propose to compare
the Foederal and State Governments, are the disposition
and the faculty they may respectively possess, to resist
and frustrate the measures of each other.
It has been already proved, that the members of the
Faederal will be more dependent on the members of the
State Governments, than the latter will be on the former. It has appeared also, that the prepossessions of
the People, on whom both will depend, will be more on
the side of the State Governments, than of the Federal
Government. So far as the disposition of each towards
the other may be influenced by these causes, the State
Governments must clearly have the advantage. But
in a distinct and very important point of view, the
advantage will lie on the same side. The prepossessions, which the members themselves will carry into the
Faederal Government, will generally be favorable to the
States; whilst it will rarely happen, that the members
of the State Governments will carry into the public
councils a bias in favor of the General Government. A
local spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the members of Congress, than a National spirit will prevail in
the Legislatures of the particular States. Every one
snows, that a great proportion of the errors committed




328               The Federalist.
by the State Legislatures proceeds from the disposition
of the members to sacrifice the comprehensive and permanent interest of the State, to the particular and separate views of the counties or districts in which they
reside. And if they do not sufficiently enlarge their
policy to embrace the collective welfare of their particular State, how can it be imagined, that they will make
the aggregate prosperity of the Union, and the dignity
and respectability of its Government, the objects of their
affections and consultations? For the same reason that
the members of the State Legislatures will be unlikely
to attach themselves sufficiently to National objects, the
members of the Foederal Legislature will be likely to
attach themselves too much to local objects. The States
will be to the latter, what counties and towns are to the
former. Measures will too often be decided according to
their probable effect, not on the National prosperity and
happiness, but on the prejudices, interests, and pursuits
of the Governments and People of the individual States.
What is the spirit that has in general characterized the
proceedings of Congress? A perusal of their journals,
as well as the candid acknowledgments of such as have
had a seat in that assembly, will inform us, that the
members have but too frequently displayed the character, rather of partisans of their respective States5 than
of impartial guardians of a common interest; that where
on one occasion improper sacrifices have been made of
local considerations to the aggrandizement of the Fcederal Government, the great interests of the Nation have
suffered on an hundred, from an undue attention to the
local prejudices, interests, and views of the particular
States.  I mean not by these reflections to insinuate,
that the new Faederal Government will not embrace a
more-enlarged plan of policy than the existing Government may have pursued; much less, that its views will
be as confined as those of the State Legislatures; but




The Federalist.             329
only that it will partake sufficiently of the spirit of both,
to be disinclined to invade the rights of the individual
States, or the prerogatives of their Governments. The
motives on the part of the. State Governments, to augment their prerogatives by defalcations from the Fcederal
Government, will be overruled by no reciprocal predispositions in the members.
Were it admitted, however, that the Fcederal Government may feel an equal disposition with the State Governments to extend its power beyond the due limits, the
latter would still have the advantage in the means of
defeating such encroachments. If an act of a particular
State, though unfriendly to the National Government,
be generally popular in that State, and should not too
grossly violate the oaths of the State officers, it is executed immediately and of course by means on the spot,
and depending on the State alone. The opposition of
the Federal Government, or the interposition of Fcaderal officers, would but inflame the zeal of all parties on
the side of the State, and the evil could not be prevented
or repaired, if at all, without the employment of means
which must always be resorted to with reluctance and
difficulty. On the other hand, should an unwarrantable
measure of the Foederal Government be unpopular in
particular States, which would seldom fail to be the
case, or even a warrantable measure be so, which may
sometimes be the case, the means of opposition to it are
powerful and at hand. The disquietude of the People;
their repugnance, and perhaps refusal, to cooperate with
the officers of the Union; the frowns of the Executive
magistracy of the State; the embarrassments created by
Legislative devices, which would often be added on such
occasions, would oppose, in any State, difficulties not to
be despised; would form, in a large State, very serious;mpediments; and where the sentiments of several ad.
Joining States happened to be in unison, would present




330              The Faederalist.
obstructions which the Fcderal Government would
hardly be willing to encounter.
But ambitious encroachments of the Fcederal Government, on the authority of the State Governments, would
not excite the opposition of a single State, or of a few
States only. They would be signals of general alarm.
Every Government would espouse the common cause
A correspondence would be opened. Plans of resistance
would be concerted. One spirit would animate and
conduct the whole. The same combination, in short,
would result from an apprehension of the Fcederal, as
was produced by the dread of a foreign yoke; and unless the projected innovations should be voluntarily renounced, the same appeal to a trial of force would be
made in the one case, as was made in the other. But
what degree of madness could ever drive the Fmderal
Government to such an extremity? In the contest with
Great Britain, one part of the empire was employed
against the other. The more numerous part invaded
the rights of the less numerous part. The attempt was
unjust and unwise; but it was not in speculation absolutely chimerical. But what would be the contest, in
the case we are supposing? Who would be the parties?
A few representatives of the People would be opposed
to the People themselves; or rather one set of representatives would be contending against thirteen sets of representatives, with the whole body of their common
constituents on the side of the latter.
The only refuge left for those who prophesy the downfall of the State Governments is the visionary suppo.
sition that the Fcederal Government may. previously
accumulate a military force for the projects of ambition.
The reasonings contained in these papers must have
been employed to little purpose indeed, if it could be
necessary now to disprove the reality of this danger.
That the People and the States should, for a sufficient




The Facderalist.            331
period of time, elect an uninterrupted succession of mer
ready to betray both; that the traitors: should, through
out this period, uniformly and systematically pursue
some fixed plan for the extension of the military establishrrent; that the Governments and the People of the
States should silently and patiently behold the gathering
storm, and continue to supply the materials, until it
should be prepared to burst on their own heads, must
appear to every one more like the incoherent dreams of
adelirious jealousy, or the misjudged exaggerations of a
counterfeit zeal, than like the sober apprehensions of
genuine patriotism. Extravagant as the supposition is,
let it however be made. Let a regular army, fully equal
to the resources of the country, be formed; and let it be
entirely at the devotion of the Faederal Government:;
still it would not be going too far to say, that the State
Governments, with the People on their side, would be
able to repel the danger. The highest number to which,
according to the best computation, a standing army can
be carried in any country, does not exceed one hundredth part of the whole number of souls; or one twenty-fifth part of the number able to bear arms. This
proportion would not yield, in the United States, an
army of more than twenty-five or thirty thousand men.
To these would be opposed a militia amounting to near
half a million of citizens with arms in their hands, offi.
cered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting
for their common liberties, and united and conducted
by Governments possessing their affections and confidence. It may well be doubted, whether a militia thus
circumstanced could ever be conquered by such a proportion of regular troops.  Those wJo are best acquainted with the late successful resistance of this country against the British arms, will be most inclined to
deny the possibility of it.  Besides the advantage: of
being armed, which the Americans possess over; the




332              The Federalist.
People of almost every other nation, the existence of
subordinate Governments, to which the People are at.
tached, and by which the militia officers are appointed,
forms a barrier, against the enterprises of ambition,
more insurmountable than any which a simple Government of any form can admit of. Notwithstanding the
military establishments in the several kingdoms of Europe, which are carried as far as the public resources will
bear, the Governments are afraid to trust the People
with arms. And it is not certain, that with this aid
alone, they would not be able to shake off their yokes.,But were the People to possess the additional advantages of local Governments chosen by themselves, who
could collect the National will, and direct the National
force, and of officers appointed out of the militia, by
these Governments, and attached both to them and to
the militia, it may be affirmed with the greatest assurance, that the throne of every tyranny in Europe would
be speedily overturned in spite of the legions which
surround it.  Let -us not insult the free and gallant
citizens of America with the suspicion, that they would
be less able to defend' the rights of which they would
be in actual possession, than the debased subjects of
arbitrary power would be to rescue theirs from the
hands of their oppressors. Let us rather no longer insult them with the supposition, that they can ever reduce
themselves to the necessity of making the experiment,
Dy a blind and tame submission to the long train of insidious measures which must precede and produce it.
The argument under the present head may be put
into a very concise form, which appears altogether conclusive. Either the mode in which the Fmderal Gov-ernment is to be constructed will render it sufficiently
tdependent on the People, or it will not. On the first
supposition, it will be restrained by that dependence
Iftom forming schemes obnoxious to their constituents.




The Federalist.             333
On the other supposition, it will not possess the confi
dence of the People, and its schemes of usurpation wil.
be easily defeated by the State Governments, who will
be supported by the People.
On summing up the considerations stated in this and
the last paper, they seem to amount to the most convincing evidence, that the powers proposed to be lodged
in the Faederal Government are as little formidable to
those reserved to the individual States, as they are indispensably necessary to accomplish the purposes of the
Union; and that all those alarms which have been
sounded, of a meditated and consequential annihilation
of the State Governments, must, on the most favorable
interpretation, be ascribed to the chimerical fears of the
authors of them.
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Friday, February 1, 1788.]
THE FCEDERALIST. No. XLVI.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
HAVING reviewed the general form of the proposed
Government and the general mass of power al.
lotted to it, I proceed to examine the particular structure of this Government, and the distribution of this
mass of power among its constituent parts.
One of the principal objections inculcated by the
more respectable adversaries to the Constitution is its
supposed violation of the political maxim, that the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary departments ought to
be separate and distinct. In the structure of the Feederal Government, no regard, it is said, seems to have
been paid to this essential precaution in favor of liberty




334       T h       e Fwaderalist.
The several departments of power are distributed and
blended in such a manner, as at once to destroy all
symmetry and beauty of form, and to expose some of
the essential parts of the edifice to the danger of being
crushed by the disproportionate weight of other parts.
No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value,
or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened
patrons of liberty, than that on which the objection is
founded. The accumulation of all powers, Legislative,
Executive, and Judiciary, in the same hands, whether
of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny. Were the Federal Constitution,
therefore, really chargeable with this accumulation of
power, or with a mixture of powers, having a dangerous
tendency to such an accumulation, no further arguments
would be necessary to inspire a universal reprobation of
the system. I persuade myself, however, that it will be
made apparent to every one, that the charge cannot be
supported, and that the maxim on which it relies has
been totally misconceived and misapplied. In order to
form correct ideas on this important subject, it will be
proper to investigate the sense in which the preservation
of liberty requires, that the three great departments of
power should be separate and distinct.
The oracle who is always consulted and cited on
this subject is the celebrated MONTESQUIEU. If he be
not the author of this invaluable precept in the science
of politics, he has the merit at least of displaying and
recommending it most effectually to the attention of
mankind. Let us endeavor, in the first place, to ascertain his meaning on this point.
The British Constitution was to MONTESQUIEU what
HOMER has been to the didactic writers on epic'poetry.
As the latter have considered the work of the immortal
Bard as the perfect model from which the principles




The Fwderalist.            W33
and rules of the epic art were to be drawn, and by which
all similar works were to be judged: so this great political critic appears to have viewed the Constitution of
England as the standard, or to use his own expression,
as the mirror of political liberty; and to have delivered
in the form of elementary truths the several characteristic principles of that particular system. That we may
be sure, then, not to mistake his meaning in this case,
let us recur to the source from which the maxim was
drawn.
On the slightest view of the British Constitution we
must perceive that the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary departments are by no means totally separate
and distinct from each other. The Executive magistrate forms an integral part of the Legislative authority.
He alone has the prerogative of making treaties with
foreign sovereigns, which, when made, have, under certain
limitations, the force of Legislative acts. All the members of the Judiciary department are appointed by him;
can be removed by him on the address of the two
Houses of Parliament; and form, when he pleases to
consult them, one of his constitutional Councils. One
branch of the Legislative department forms also a
great constitutional Council to the Executive chief; as, on
another hand, it is the sole depositary of judicial power
in cases of impeachment, and is invested with the
supreme appellate jurisdiction in all other cases. The
judges, again, are so far connected with the Legislative
department as often to attend and participate in its
deliberations, though not admitted to a Legislative vote.
From these facts, by which MONTESQUIEU was guided,
it may clearly be inferred, that in saying, " There can
"be no liberty, where the Legislative and Executive
"powers are united in the same person, or body of
"magistrates," or, " if the power of judging be not sep-'arated from the Legislative and Executive powers?"




336              The Ftrderalist.
he did not mean that these departments ought to have
no partial agency in, or no control over the acts of each
other. His meaning, as his own words import, and
still more conclusively as illustrated by the example in
his eye, can amount to no more than this, that where the
whole power of one department is exercised by the same
hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free Constitution are subverted. This would have been the case
in the Constitution examined by him, if the King, who
is the sole Executive magistrate, had possessed also the
complete Legislative power, or the supreme administration of Justice; or if the entire Legislative body had possessed the supreme Judiciary, or the supreme Executive
authority. This, however, is not among the vices of that
Constitution. The magistrate in whom the whole Executive power resides cannot of himself make a law,
though he can put a negative on every law; nor administer justice in person, though he has the appointment
of those who do administer it. The judges can exercise
no Executive prerogative, though they are shoots from the
Executive stock; nor any Legislative function, though
they may be advised with by the Legislative Councils.
The entire Legislature can perform no Judiciary act;
though by the joint act of two of its branches the
judges may be removed from their offices; and though
one of its branches is possessed of the Judicial power
in the last resort. The entire Legislature again can
exercise no Executive prerogative, though one of its
branches constitutes the supreme Executive magistracy,
and another, on the impeachment of a third, can try and
condemn all the subordinate officers in the Executive
department.
The reasons on which MONTESQUIEU grounds his
maxim are a further. demonstration of his meaning.
" When the Legislative and Executive powers are united




The Favderalist.            337
" in the same person or body," says he, " there can be
"no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the
"same monarch or Senate should enact tyrannical laws
"to execute them  in a tyrannical manner."  Again,
"Were the power of judging joined with the Legisla" tive, the life and liberty of the subject would be
" exposed to arbitrary control, for the Judge would then
"be the Legislator. Were it joined to the Executive
"power, the Judge might behave with all the violence
"of an oppressor."  Some of these reasons are more
fully explained in other passages; but briefly stated
as they are here, they sufficiently establish the meaning
which we have put on this celebrated maxim of this
celebrated author.
If we look into the Constitutions of the several States,
we find, that, notwithstanding the emphatical, and
in some instances, the unqualified terms in which this
axiom has been laid down, there is not a single instance
in which the several departments of power have been
kept absolutely separate and distinct. New Hampshire,
whose Constitution was the last formed, seems to have
been fully aware of the impossibility and inexpediency
of avoiding any mixture whatever of these departments;
and has qualified the doctrine by declaring, "that the
"Legislative, Executive and Judiciary powers ought
"to be kept as separate from, and independent of each
"other, as the nature of a free Government will admit;
"or as is consistent with that chain of connection, that
" binds the whole fabric of the Constitution in one indis"soluble bond of unity and amity."  Her Constitution
accordingly mixes these departments in several respects.
The Senate, which is a branch of the Legislative depart.
tneit, is also a J  icial tribunal for the trial of impeachments. The prbsident, who is the head of the Executive
department, is the presiding member also of the Senate;
and, besides an equal vote in all cases, has a casting
VOL. I.             22




338               The Fwoderalist.
vote in case of a tie. The Executive head is himself
eventually elective every year by the Legislative depart.
ment; and his Council is every year chosen by and from
the members of the same department. Several of the
officers of State are also appointed by the Legislature.
And the members of the Judiciary department are
appointed by the Executive department.
The Constitution of Massachusetts has observed
a sufficient though less pointed caution, in expressing
this fundamental Article of liberty. It declares, "that
"the Legislative department shall never exercise the
" Executive and Judicial powers, or either of them:
" the Executive shall never exercise the Legislative and
"Judicial powers, or either of them: the Judicial shall
"never exercise the Legislative and Executive powers
"or either of them. " This declaration corresponds precisely with the doctrine of MONTESQUIEU, as it has been
explained, and is not in a single point violated by the
plan of the Convention. It goes no farther than to
prohibit any one of the entire departments from exercising the powers of another department. In the very
Constitution to which it is prefixed, a partial mixture
of powers has been admitted. The Executive magistrate has a qualified negative on the Legislative body,
and the Senate, which is a part of the Legislature,
is a court of impeachment for members both of the
Executive and Judiciary departments. The members
of the Judiciary department, again, are appointable by
the Executive department, and removable by the same
authority on the address of the two Legislative branches.
Lastly, a number of the officers of Government are
annually appointed by the Legislative department. As
the appointment to offices, particularly Executive offices,
is in its nature an Executive function, the compilers
of the Constitution have, in this last point at least,
violated the rule established by themselves.




The Fwderalist.            339
I pass over the Constitutions of Rhode Island and
Connecticut, because they were formed prior to thi
Revolution, and even before the principle under examination had become an object of political attention.
The Constitution of New York contains no declaration on this subject; but appears very clearly to have
been framed with an eye to the danger of improperly
blending the different departments. It gives, nevertheless,
to the Executive magistrate, a partial control over the
Legislative department; and, what is more, gives a like
control to the Judiciary department; and_even blends
the Executive and Judiciary departments in the exercise
of this control. In its Council of Appointment, members of the Legislative are associated with the Executive
authority, in the appointment of officers, both Executive
and Judiciary. And its Court for the trial of Impeachments and Correction of Errors, is to consist of one
branch of the Legislature and the principal members
of the Judiciary department.
The Constitution of New Jersey has blended the
different powers of Government more than any of the preceding. The Governor, who is the Executive magistrate,
is appointed by the Legislature; is Chancellor and
Ordinary, or Surrogate of the State; is a member of
the Supreme Court of Appeals, and President, with
a casting vote, of one of the Legislative branches.
The same Legislative branch acts again as Executive
Council of the Governor, and with him constitutes the
Court of Appeals.  The members of the Judiciary
department are appointed by the Legislative department
and removable by one branch of it, on the impeachment
of the other.
According to the Constitution of Pennsylvania, the
President, who is the head of the Executive department,
is annually elected by a vote in which the Legislative
lepartment predominates. In conjunction with an




340               The Federalist.
Executive Council, he appoints the members of the
Judiciary department, and forms a court of inlpeachment for trial of all officers, Judiciary as well as Executive. The judges of the Supreme Court, and justices
of the peace seem also to be removable by the Legislature; and the Executive power of pardoning in certain
cases to be referred to the same department. The members of the Executive Council are made EX OFFICIO
justices of peace throughout the State.
In Delaware, the chief Executive magistrate is
annually elected by the Legislative department. The
Speakers of the two Legislative branches are Vice-presidents in the Executive department. The Executive
chief, with six others, appointed, three by each of the
Legislative branches, constitute the Supreme Court of
Appeals; he is joined with the Legislative department
in the appointment of the other judges.  Throughout
the States, it appears that the members of the Legislature may at the same time be justices of the peace; in this
State, the members of one branch of it are Ex OFFICIO
justices of the peace; as are also the members of the
Executive Council. The principal officers of the Executive department are appointed by the Legislative; and
one branch of the latter forms a Court of Impeach.
ments. All officers may be removed on address of the
Legislature.
Maryland has adopted the maxim in the most unqual.
ified terms; declaring that the Legislative, Executive,
and Judicial powers of Government ought to be forever
separate and distinct from each other. Her Constitution, notwithstanding, makes the Executive magistrate
appointable by the Legislative department; and the
members of the Judiciary by the Executive department.
The language of Virginia is still more pointed on this
subject. Her Constitution declares, "that the Legisla.




The Faderalist.              341
"tive, Executive, and Judiciary departments shall be
"separate and distinct; so that neither exercise the pow"ers properly belonging to the other; nor shall any per
"son exercise the powers of more than one of them
"at the same time; except that the justices of county
"courts shall be eligible to either House of Assembly."
Yet we find not only this express exception, with respect to the members of the inferior courts, but that the
chief magistrate, with his Executive Council, are appointable by the Legislature; that two members of the
latter are triennially displaced at the pleasure of the
Legislature; and that all the principal offices, both Executive and Judiciary, are filled by the same department..
The Executive prerogative of pardon, also, is in one case
vested in the Legislative department.
The Constitution of North Carolina, which declares,
" that the Legislative, Executive, and supreme Judicial
"powers of Government ought to be forever separate
" and distinct from each other," refers, at the same time,
to the Legislative department, the appointment not only
of the Executive chief, but all the principal officers with.
in both that and the Judiciary department.
In South Carolina, the Constitution makes the Ex.
ecutive magistracy eligible by the Legislative department. It gives to the latter, also, the appointment of
the members of the Judiciary department, including even
justices of the peace and sheriffs: and the appointment
of officers in the Executive department, down to captains in the army and navy of the State.
Ih the Constitution of Georgia, where it is declared,
"that the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary departu ments shall be separate and distinct, so that neither
"exercise the powers properly belonging to the other,"
we find that the Executive department is to be filled by
appointments of the!Legislature; and the Executive pre.
rogative of pardon to be finally exercised by the same




342               The Fewderalist.
authority. Even justices of the peace are to be appointed by the Legislature.
In citing these cases in which the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary departments have not been kept to.
tally separate and distinct, I wish not to be regarded as
an advocate for the particular organizations of the several State Governments. I am fully aware, that among
the many excellent principles which they exemplify, they
carry strong marks of the haste, and still stronger of the
inexperience, under which they were framed. It is but
too obvious, that in some instances the fundamental
principle under consideration has been violated by too
great a mixture, and even an actual consolidation of the
different powers; and that in no instance has a competent provision been made for maintaining in practice the
separation delineated on paper. What I have wished
to evince is, that the charge brought against the proposed Constitution, of violating a sacred maxim of free
Government, is warranted neither by the real meaning
annexed to that maxim by its author, nor by the sense
in which it has hitherto been understood in America.
This interesting subject will be resumed in the ensuing
paper.
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Friday, February 1, 1788.]
THE FIEDERALIST. No. XLVII,
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
TT was shown in the last paper, that the political apophthegm there examined does not require that the
Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary departments should




The Faderalist.              343
be wholly unconnected with each other. I shall under.
take in the next place to show, that unless these departs
ments be so far connected and blended, as to give to
each a constitutional control over the others, the degree
of separation which the maxim requires, as essential to
a free Government, can never in practice be duly maintained.
It is agreed on all sides, that the powers properly
belonging to one of the departments ought not to be
directly and completely administered by either of the
other departments. It is equally evident, that neither
of them ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others in the administration of
their respective powers.  It will not be denied, that
power is of an encroaching nature, and that it ought to
be effectually restrained from passing the limits assigned
to it.  After discriminating, therefore, in theory, the
several classes of power as they may in their nature be
Legislative, Executive, or Judiciary, the next and most
difficult task is to provide some practical security for
each, against the invasion of the others. What this
security ought to be, is the great problem to be solved.
Will it be sufficient to mark, with pre'cision, the
boundaries of these departments, in the constitution
of the Government, and to trust to these parchment
barriers against the encroaching spirit of power? This
is the security which appears to have been principally
relied on by the compilers of most of the American
Constitutions.  But experience assures us, that the
efficacy of the provision has been greatly overrated;
and that some more adequate defence is indispensably
necessary for the more feeble, against the more powerful, members of the Government.  The Legislative
department is everywhere extending the sphere of its
activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous
vortex.




344               The Fwderalist.
The founders of our republics have so much merit
for the wisdom which they have displayed, that no task
can be less pleasing than that of pointing out the errors
into which they have fallen. A respect for truth, how.
ever, obliges us to remark, that they seem never for a
moment to have turned their eyes from the danger to
liberty from the overgrown and all-grasping prerogative
of an hereditary magistrate, supported and fortified by
an hereditary branch of the Legislative authority. They
seem never to have recollected the danger from Legislative usurpations, which, by assembling all power in the
same hands, must lead to the same tyranny as is threatened by Executive usurpations.
In a Government where numerous and extensive prerogatives are placed in the hands of an hereditary monarch, the Executive department is very justly regarded
as the source of danger, and watched with all the jealousy which a zeal for liberty ought to inspire. In a
democracy, where a multitude of people exercise in per.
son the Legislative functions, and are continually exposed, by their incapacity for regular deliberation and
concerted measures, to the ambitious intrigues of their
Executive* magistrates, tyranny may well be apprebhended, on some favqrable emergency, to start up in
the same quarter.  But in a representative republic,
where the Executive magistracy is carefully limited,
both in the extent and the duration of its power; and
where the Legislative power is exercised by an assembly, which is inspired, by a supposed influence over the
People, with an intrepid confidence in its own strength;
which is sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions
which actuate a multitude, yet not so numerous as to
be incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions, by
means which reason prescribes; it is against the enterprising ambition of this department, that the People
ought to indulge all their jealousy, and exhaust all their
precautions.




The Federatlist              348:
The Legislative department derives a superiority in
our Governments from other circumstances.  Its constitutional powers being at once more extensive, and
less susceptible of precise limits, it can, with the greater
facility, mask, under complicated and indirect measures,
the encroachments which it makes on the coordinate
departments. It is not unfrequently a question of real
nicety in Legislative bodies, whether the operation of a
particular measure will, or will not extend beyond the
Legislative sphere. On the other side, the Executive
power being restrained within a narrower compass, and
being more simple in its nature, and the Judiciary being described by landmarks, still less uncertain, projects
of usurpation by either of these departments would immediately betray and defeat themselves. Nor is this
all: as the Legislative department alone has access to
the pockets of the People, and has in some Constitutions full discretion, and in all, a prevailing influence
over the pecuniary rewards of those who fill the other
departments, a dependence is thus created in the latter,
which gives still greater facility to encroachments of the
former.
I have appealed to our own experience for the truth
of what I advance on this subject. Were it necessary
to verify this experience by particular proofs, they might
be multiplied without end. I might find a witness in
every citizen who has shared in, or been attentive to,
the course of public administrations.  I might collect
vouchers in abundance from the records and archives of
every State in the Union. But as a more concise, and
at the same time equally satisfactory evidence, I will
refer to the example of two States, attested by two unexceptionable authorities.
The first example is that of Virginia, a State which, as
we have seen, has expressly declared in its Constitution,
that the three great departments ought not to be inter



346               The Foxderalist.
mixed. The authority in support of it is Mr. JEFFERSON)
who, besides his other advantages for remarking the operation of the Government, was himself the chief magistrate of it. In order to convey fully the ideas with which
his experience had impressed him on this subject, it will
be necessary to quote a passage of some length from his
very interesting " Notes on the State of Virginia," p. 195.
" All the powers of Government, Legislative, Executive,
"and Judiciary, result:to the Legislative body. The
"concentrating these in the same hands, is precisely the
"definition, of despotic Government. It will be no al"leviation, that these powers will be exercised by a plu" rality of hands, and not by a single one. One hundred
"and seventy-three despots would surely be as oppressive
"as one. Let those who doubt it, turn their eyes on
"the republic of Venice. As little will it avail us, that
"they are chosen by ourselves. An elective despotism
"was not the Government we fought for; but one which
I" should not only be founded on free principles, but in
" which the powers of Government should be so divided
"and balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as
"that no one could transcend their legal limits, without
"being effectually checked and restrained by the others.
"For this reason, that Convention which passed the or"dinance of Government, laid its foundation on this
"basis, that the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary
"departments should be separate and distinct, so that
" no person should exercise the powers of more than one
"of them at the same time. But no barrier was provided
" between these several powers. The Judiciary and Exec"utive members were left dependent on. the Legislative
"for their subsistence in office, and some of them for
"their continuance in it.. If, therefore, the Legislature
"assumes Executive and Judiciary powers, no opposi"tion is likely to be made; nor, if made, can be effect-'4ual; because in that case they may put their proceed



The Federalist.             347
"ing into the form of an Act of Assembly, which wilh
".render them obligatory on the other brariches. They
"have accordingly, in many instances, decided-rights
"which should have been left to Judiciary controversy,
"and the direction of the Executive, during the whole
"time of their session, is becoming habitual andfamiliar."
The other State which I shall take for an example is
Pennsylvania; and the other authority, the Council
of Censors which assembled in the years 1783 and 1784.
A part of the duty of this body, as marked out by the
Constitution, was " to inquire, whether the Constitution
"- had been preserved inviolate in every part; and whether
" the Legislative and Executive branches of Government
i" had performed their duty as guardians of the People,
"or assumed to themselves, or exercised other or greater;" powers than they are entitled to by the Constitution."
In the execution of this trust, the Council Were necessarily led to a comparison of both the Legislative and
Executive proceedings, with the constitutional powers
of these departments; and from the facts enumerated,
and to the truth of most of which both sides in the
Council subscribed, it appears, that the Constitution
had been flagrantly violated by the Legislature in a variety of important instances.
A great number of laws had been passed, violating,
without any apparent necessity, the rule requiring that
all bills of a public nature shall be previously printed
for the consideration of the People; although this is
one of the precautions chiefly relied on by the Constitution against improper acts of the Legislature.
The constitutional trial by jury had been violated;
and powers assumed, which had not been delegated
by the Constitution.
Executive powers had been usurped.
The salaries of the Judges, which the Constitution
expressly requires to be fixed, had been occasionally




348,             The Fwderalist.
varied; and cases belonging to the Judiciary depart.
ment frequently drawn within Legislative cognizance
and determination.
Those who wish to see the several particulars falling
under each of these heads, may consult the Journals
of the Council, which are in print. Some of them,
it will be found, may be imputable to peculiar circumstances connected with the war; but the greater part
of them may be considered as the spontaneous shoots
of an ill-constituted Government.
It appears, also, that the Executive department had
not been innocent of frequent breaches of the Constitution. There are three observations, however, which
ought to be made on this head: First, A great proportion of the instances were either immediately produced
by the necessities of the war., or recommended by Congress, or tie Commander-in-chief; Secondly,'In most
of the other instances, they conformed either to the
declared or the known sentiments of the Legislative department; Thirdly, The Executive department of Pennsylvania is distinguished from that of the other States,
by the number of members composing it. In this respect, it has as much affinity to a Legislative assembly,
as to an Executive Council. And being at once exempt
from the restraint of an individual responsibility for the
acts of the body, and deriving confidence from mutual
example and joint influence, unauthorized measures
would of course be more freely hazarded, than where
the Executive department is administered by a single
hand, or by a few hands.
The conclusion which I am warranted in drawing
from these observations is, that a mere demarcation
on parchment of the constitutional limits of the several
departments is not a sufficient guard against those encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration
of all the powers of Government in the same hands.
PUBLIUS.




The Fvederalist.           349
[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, February 5, 1788.]
THE F(EDERALIST. No. XLVIII.
ro THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW' YORK:
THE author of the " Notes on the State of Virginia,"
quoted in the last paper, has subjoined to that valuable work the draught of a Constitution, which had been
prepared in order to be laid before a Convention expected ito be called in 1783, by the Legislature, for the establishment of a Constitution for that Commonwealth.
The plan, like everything from the same pen, marks a
turn of thinking, original, comprehensive, ail accurate;
and is the more worthy of attention as it equally displays a fervent attachment to republican Government,
and an enlightened view of the dangerous propensities
against which it ought to be guarded. One of the
precautions which he proposes, and on which he appears
ultimately to rely as a pjadito the weaker departments of power, against the invasions of the stronger
is perhaps altogether his own, and as it immediately
relates to the subject of our present inquiry, ought not
to be overlooked.
His proposition is, "that whenever any two of the
" three branches of Government shall concur in opin"ion, each by the voices of two thirds of their whole
"number, that a Convention is necessary for altering
"-the Constitution, or correcting breaches of it, a Con-' vention shall be called for the purpose."
As the People are the only legitimate fountain -of
power, and it is from them that the constitutional charter,
under which the several branches of Government hold
their power, is derived, it seems strictly consonant to the




350               The Foderalist.
republican theory, to recur to the same original author.
ity, not only whenever it may be necessary to enlarge,
diminish, or new-model the powers of the Government;
but also whenever any one of the departments may,commit encroachments on the chartered authorities of the
others. The several departments being perfectly coordinate by the terms of their common commission, neither
of them, it is evident, can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between their respective powers; and how are the encroachments of the
stronger to be prevented, or the wrongs of the weaker
to be redressed, without an appeal to the People themselves, who, as the grantors of the commission, can
alone declare its true meaning, and enforce its observance?
There is certainly great force in this reasoning, and
it must be allowed to prove, that a constitutional road
to the decision of the People ought to be marked out
and kept open, for certain great and extraordinary occasions. But there appear to be insuperable objections
against the proposed recurrence to the People, as a provision in all cases for keeping the several departments
of power within their constitutional limits.
In the first place, the provision does not reach the
case of a combination of two of the departments against
a third. If the Legislative authority, which possesses
so many means of operating on the motives of the other
departments, should be able to gain to its interest either
of the others, or even one third of its members, the
remaining department could derive no advantage from
its remedial provision. I do not dwell, however, on
this objection, because it may be: thought to lie rather
against the modification of the principle, than against
the principle iitself.
In the next- place, it may be considered as an objection inherent in the principle, that as every appeal to




The Federalist.            351
the People would carry an implication of some defect
in the Government, frequent appeals would, in a great
measure, deprive the Government of that veneration
which time bestows on everything, and without which
perhaps the wisest and freest Governments would not
possess the requisite stability. If it be true that all
Governments rest on opinion, it is no less true, that
the strength of opinion in each individual, and its practical influence on his conduct, depend much on the
number which he supposes- to have entertained the
same opinion. The reason of man, like man himself,
is timid and cautious when left alone; and acquires
firmness and confidence, in proportion to the number
with which it is associated. When the examples which
fortify opinion are ancient, as well as numerous, they
are known to have a double effect. In a Nation of philosophers, this consideration ought to be disregarded.
A reverence for the laws would be sufficiently inculcated
by the voice of an enlightened reason. But a Nation
of philosophers is as little to be expected, as the philosophical race of kings wished for by PLATO. And
in every other Nation, the most rational Government
will not find it a superfluous advantage to have the
prejudices of the community on its side.
The danger of disturbing the public tranquillity by
interesting too strongly the public passions, is a still more
serious objection against a frequent reference of constitutional questions to the decision of the whole society.
Notwithstanding the success which has attended the
revisions of our established forms of Government,
and which does so much honor to the virtue and intelligence of the People of America, it must be confessed,
that the experiments are of too- ticklish a nature to be
unnecessarily multiplied. We are to recollect, that all
the existing Constitutions were formed in the midst' of
a danger which repressed the passions most unfriendly




352              The Fwaderalist.
to order and concord; of an enthusiastic confidence
of the People in their patriotic leaders, which stifled
the ordinary diversity of opinions on great National
questions; of a universal ardor for new and opposite
forms, produced by a universal resentment and indignation against the ancient Government; and whilst no
spirit of party, connected with the changes to be made,
or the abuses to be reformed, could mingle its leaven
in the operation. The future situations in which we
must expect to be usually placed, do not present any
equivalent security against the danger which is apprehended.
But the greatest objection of all is, that the decisions
which would probably result from such appeals would
not answer the purpose of maintaining the constitutional equilibrium of the Government. We have seen
that the tendency of republican Governments is to
an aggrandizement. of the Legislative, at the expense
of the other departments. The appeals to the People,
therefore, would usually be made by the Executive and
Judiciary departments. But whether made by one side
-or the other, would each side enjoy equal advantages
on the trial? Let us view their different situations.
The members of the Executive and Judiciary departments are few in number, and can be personally known
to a small part only of the People. The latter, by the
mode of their appointment, as well as by the nature
and permanency of it, are too far removed from the
People to share much in their prepossessions.  The
former are generally the objects of jealousy; and their
administration is always liable to be discolored and
rendered unpopular. The members of the Legislative
department, on the other hand, are numerous. They
are distributed and dwell among the People at large.
Their connections of blood, of friendship, and of acquaintance, embrace a great proportion of the most




Thei Fwderalist.            353
influential part of the society. The nature of their
public trust implies a personal influence among the
People, and that they are more immediately the confidential guardians of the rights and liberties of the
People. With these advantages, it can hardly be supposed that the adverse party would have an equal
chance for a favorable issue.
But the Legislative party would not only be able to
plead their cause most successfully with the People.
They would probably be constituted themselves the
judges. The same influence which had gained them
an election into the Legislature, would gain them a seat
in the Convention. If this should not be the case with
all, it would probably be the case with many, and pretty
certainly with those leading characters, on whom every
thing depends in such bodies. The Convention, in short,
would be composed chiefly of men who had been, who
actually were, or who expected to be, members of the
department whose conduct was arraigned. They would
consequently be parties to the very question to be decided by them.
It might, however, sometimes happen, that appeals
would be made under circumstances less adverse to the
Executive and Judiciary departments. The usurpations
of the Legislature might be so flagrant and so sudden,
as to admit of no specious coloring. A strong party
among themselves might take side with the other
branches. The Executive power might be in the hands
of a peculiar favorite of the People. In such a posture
of things, the public decision might be less swayed by
prepossessions in favor of the Legislative party. But
still it could never be expected to turn on the true merits
of the question. It would inevitably be connected with
the spirit of preexisting parties, or of parties springing
out of the question itselfi It would be connected with
persons of distinguished character, and extensive influVOL. I.        23




354               The Federalist.
ence in the community. It would be pronounced by
the very men who had been agents in, or opponents of
the measures, to which the decision would relate. The
passions, therefore, not the reason, of the public, would
sit in judgment.  But it is the reason of the public
alone, that ought to control and regulate the Government. The passions ought to be controlled and regulated by the Government.
We found in the last paper, that mere declarations in
the written Constitution are not sufficient to restrain
the several departments within their legal limits. It
appears in this, that occasional appeals to the People
would be neither a proper, nor an effectual provision for
that purpose.  How far the provisions of a different
nature contained in the plan above quoted might be
adequate, I do not examine.  Some of them are unquestionably founded on sound political principles, and
all of them are framed with singular ingenuity and
precision.
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, February 5, 1788.]
THE FCEDERALIST. No. XLIX.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
IT may be contended, perhaps, that instead of occasional appeals to the People, which are liable to the
objections urged against them, periodical appeals are the
proper and adequate means of preventing and correcting
infractions of the Constitution.
It will be attended to, that in the examination of
these expedients, I confine myself to their aptitude for




The Fwderalist.              355
enforcing the Constitution, by keeping the several departments of power within their due bounds, without
particularly considering them as provisions for altering
the Constitution itself. In the first view, appeals to the
People at fixed periods appear to be nearly as ineligi.
ble, as appeals on particular occasions as they emerge.
If the periods be separated by short intervals, the measures to be reviewed and rectified will have been of
recent date, and will be connected with all the circumstances which tend to vitiate and pervert the result of
occasional revisions. If the periods be distant from each
other, the same remark will be applicable to all recent
measures; and in proportion as the remoteness of the
others may favor a dispassionate review of them, this
advantage is inseparable from inconveniences which
seem to counterbalance it. In the first place, a distant
prospect of public censure would be a very feeble restraint on power from those excesses, to which it might
be urged by the force of present motives. Is it to be
imagined, that a Legislative assembly, consisting of a
hundred or two hundred members, eagerly bent on some
favorite object, and breaking through the restraints of
the Constitution in pursuit of it, would be arrested in
their career, by considerations drawn from a censorial
revision of their conduct at the future distance of ten,
fifteen, or twenty years? In the next place, the abuses
would often have completed their mischievous effects
before the remedial provision would be applied. And
in the last place, where this might not be the case, they
would be of long standing, would have taken deep root,
and would not easily be extirpated.
The scheme of revising the Constitution, in order to
correct recent breaches of it, as well as for other purposes, has been actually tried in one of the States. One
of the objects of the Council of Censors which me{ in
Pennsylvania, in 1783 and 1784, was) as we have seen,




356               bte Foederalist.
to inquire, "whether the Constitution had been violated;
" and whether the Legislative and Executive departments
"had encroached on each other." This important and
novel experiment in politics merits, in several points of
view, very particular attention. In some of them it may
perhaps, as a single experiment, made under circumstances somewhat peculiar, be thought to be not absolutely conclusive.  But as applied to the case under
consideration, it involves some facts, which I venture to
remark, as a complete and satisfactory illustration of
the reasoning which I have employed.
First. It appears, from the names of the gentlemen
who composed the Council, that some, at least, of its
most active and leading members had also been active
and leading characters in the parties which preeixisted in
the State.
Secondly. It appears, that the same active and leading members of the Council had been active and influential members of the Legislative and Executive
branches, within the period to be reviewed; and even
patrons or opponents of the very measures to be thus
brought to the test of the Constitution.  Two of the
members had been Vice-presidents of the State, and
several others members of the Executive Council, within the seven preceding years. One of them had been
Speaker, and a number of others distinguished members of the Legislative assembly, within the same
period.
Thirdly. Every page of their proceedings witnesses
the effect of all these circumstances on the temper of
their deliberations. Throughout the continuance of the_
Council, it was split into two fixed and violent parties.
The fact is acknowledged and lamented by themselves.
Had this not been the case, the face of their proceedings
exhibits a proof equally satisfactory. In all questions,
however unimportant in themselves, or unconnected




The Fcederalist.            357
with each other, the same names stand invariably con.
trasted on the opposite columns. Every unbiased observer may infer, without danger of mistake, and at the
same time, without meaning to reflect on either party, or
any individuals of either party, that, unfortunately, pas.
sion, not reason, must have presided over their decisions.
When men exercise their reason coolly and freely, on a
variety of distinct questions, they inevitably fall into
different opinions on some of them. When they are
governed by a common passion, their opinions, if they
are so to be called, will be the same.
Fourthly. It is at least problematical, whether the
decisions of this body do not, in several instances, misconstrue the limits prescribed for the Legislative and
Executive departments, instead of reducing and limiting
them within their constitutional places.
Fifthly. I have never understood that the decisions of
the Council on constitutional questions, whether rightly
or erroneously formed, have had any effect in varying
the practice founded on Legislative constructions. It
even appears, if I mistake not, that in one instance the
contemporary Legislature denied the constructions of
the Council, and actually prevailed in the contest.
This censorial body, therefore, proves at the same
time, by its researches, the existence of the disease, and
by its example, the inefficacy of the remedy.
This conclusion cannot be invalidated by alleging
that the State in which the experiment was made was
at that crisis, and had been for a long time before, violently heated and distracted by the rage of party. Is it
to be presumed, that at any future septennial epoch the
same State will be free from parties? Is it to be presumed that any other State, at the same or any other
given period, will be exempt from them? Such an
event ought to be neither presumed nor desired; because an extinction of parties necessarily implies either




358               The Fowderalist.
a universal alarm for the public safety, or an absolute
extinction of liberty.
Were the precaution taken of excluding from the
assemblies elected by the People, to revise the preceding administration of the Government, all persons who
should have been concerned in the Government within
the given period, the difficulties would not be obviated.
The important task would probably devolve on men,
who, with inferior capacities, would in other respects be
little better qualified.  Although they might not have
been personally concerned in the administration, and
therefore not immediately agents in the measures to be
examined, they would probably have been involved in
the parties connected with these measures, and have
been elected under their auspices.
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Friday, February 8, 1788.]
THE F(EDERALIST. No. L.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
TO what expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for
maintaining in practice the necessary partition of
power among the several departments, as laid down in
the Constitution? The only answer that can be given
is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be
inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the Government as that its
several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations,
be the means of keeping each other in their proper
places. Without presuming to undertake a full devel-',pment of this important idea, I will hazard a few gen.




The Frderalist..359
eral observations, which may perhaps place it in a
clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the Government
planned by the Convention.
In order to lay a due foundation for that separate
and distinct exercise of the different powers of Government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all
hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it
is evident that each department should have a will
of its own; and consequently should be so constituted,
that the members of each should have as little agency
as possible in the appointment of the members of the
others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it
would require that all the appointments for the supreme Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the People, through channels having no communication whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan
of constructing the several departments wouldfbe less
difficult in practice, than it may in contemplation appear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional
expense would attend the execution of it. Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must'be admitted.
In the constitution of the Judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on
the principle: first, because peculiar qualifications being
essential in the members, the primary consideration
ought to be to select that mode of choice which best
secures these qualifications; secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held
in that department, must soon destroy all sense of de.
pendence on the authority conferring them.
It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on
those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their
offices. Were the Executive magistrate, or the Judges,




860               The Foaderalist.
not independent of the Legislature in this particular
their independence in every other would be merely
nominal.
But the great security against a gradual concentration
of the several powers in the same department, consists
in giving to those who administer each department the
necessary constitutional means, and personal motives,
to resist encroachments of the others. The provision
for defence must in this, as in all other cases, be
made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition
must be made to counteract ambition. The interest
of the man must be connected with the constitutional
rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human
nature, that such devices should be necessary to control
the abuses of Government. But what is Government
itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?
If men were angels, no Government would be necessary.
If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on Government would be necessary. In
framing a Government which is to be administered by
men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you
must first enable the Government to control the
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control
itself. A dependence on the People is, no doubt, the
primary control on the Government; but experience
has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced
through the whole system of human affairs, private
as well as public. We see it particularly displayed
in all the subordinate distributions of power; where
the constant aim is, to divide and arrange the several
offices in such a manner as that each may be a check
on the other; that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These




The Feaderalist.            361
inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the
distribution of the supreme powers of the State.
But it is not possible to give to each department an
equal power of self-defence. In republican Government,
the Legislative authority necessarily predominates. The
remedy for this inconveniency is, to divide the Legislature into different branches; and to render them, by
different modes of election, and different principles
of action, as little connected with each other, as the
nature of their common functions, and their common
dependence on the society, will admit. It may even
be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments
by still further precautions. As the weight of the
Legislative authority requires that it should be thus
divided, the weakness of the Executive may require,
on the other hand, that it should be fortified. An absolute negative on the Legislature appears, at first view,
to be the natural defence with which the Executive
magistrate should be armed. But perhaps it would
be neither altogether safe, nor alone sufficient. On ordinary occasions, it might not be exerted with the
requisite firmness; and on extraordinary occasions, it
might be perfidiously abused. May not this defect
of an absolute negative be supplied by some qualified
connection between this weaker department and the
weaker branch of the stronger department, by which
the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights
of the former, without being too much detached from
the rights of its own department?
If the principles on which these observations are
founded be just, as I persuade myself they are, and they
be applied as a criterion to the several State Constitutions, and to the Fmderal Constitution, it. will be found,
that if the latter does not perfectly correspond with
them, the former are infinitely less able to bear such
a test.




362               The Fwaderalist.
There are moreover two considerations particularly
applicable to the Fcederal system of America, which
place that system in a very interesting point of view.
First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered
by the People is submitted to the administration of
a single Government; and the usurpations are guarded
against, by a division of the Government into distinct
and separate departments. In the compound republic
of America, the power surrendered by the People is first
divided between two distinct Governments, and then
the portion allotted to each, subdivided among distinct
and separate departments. Hence a double security
arises to the rights of the People. The different Governments will control each other, at the same time that
each will be controlled by itself.
Second. It is of great importance in a republic, not
only to guard the society against the oppression of its
rulers, but to guard one part of the society against
the injustice of the other part.  Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the
minority will be insecure. There are but two mbthods
of providing against this evil: the one by creating
a will in the community independent of the majority,
that is, of the society itself; the other by comprehending
in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens
as will render an unjust combination of a majority of
the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The
first method prevails in all Governments possessing
an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best,
is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust
views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor
party, and may possibly be turned against both parties.
The second method will be exemplified in the Faederal
republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in




The Faderalist.              363
it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the
society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests,
and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals,
or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested
combinations of the majority. In a free Government,
the security for civil rights must be the same as that for
religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity
of sects. The degree of security in both cases, will
depend on the number of interests and sects; and this
may be presumed to depend on the extent of country.and number of People comprehended under the same
Government.  This view of the subject must particularly recommend a proper Fcederal system to all the
sincere and considerate friends of republican Government; since it shows, that in exact proportion as the
territory of the Union may be formed into more circumscribed Confederacies, or States, oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated; the best security,
under the republican forms, for the rights of every class
of citizens, will be diminished; and consequently, the
stability and independence of some member of the Government, the only other security, must be proportionally
increased. Justice is the end of Government. It is
the end of civil society. It ever has been, and ever will
be pursued, until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost
in the pursuit. In a society, under the forms of which
the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the
weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign, as in a
state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as in the
latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted,
by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a
Government which may protect the weak, as well
as themselves: so, in the former state, will the more
powerful factions or parties be gradually induced, by




364               The FoWderalist.
a like motive, to wish for a Government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful. It can be little doubted, that if the State of Rhode
Island was separated from the Confederacy, and left
to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form
of Government within such narrow limits would be
displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious
majorities, that some power altogether independent
of the People would soon be called for by the voice of
the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity
of it. In the extended republic of the United States,
and among the great variety of interests, parties, and
sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of
the whole society could seldom take place on any other
principles than those of justice and the general good;
whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the
will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also,
to provide for the security of the former, by introducing
into the Government a will not dependent on the latter:
or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself. It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within
a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of
self-government. And happily for the republican cause,
the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great
extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the
Faederal principle.
PUBLIUS.




The Fwderalist.             365
[From the New York Packet, Friday, February 8, 1788.]
THE FCEDERALIST. No. LI.
rO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
FROM the more general inquiries pursued in the four
last papers, I pass on to a more particular examination of the several parts of the Government. I shall
begin with the House of Representatives.
The first view to be taken of this part of the Government relates to the qualifications of the electors and
the elected.
Those of the former are to be the same with those of
the electors of the most numerous branch of the State
Legislatures. The definition of the right of suffrage is
very justly regarded as a fundamental article of republican Government. It was incumbent on the Convention, therefore, to define and establish this right in the
Constitution. To have left it open for the occasional
regulation of the Congress, would have been improper
for the reason just mentioned. To have submitted it to
the Legislative discretion of the States, would have
been improper for the same reason; and for the additional reason that it would have rendered too dependent
on the State Governments, that branch of the Fcederal
Government which ought to be dependent on the People
alone. To have reduced the different qualifications in
the different States to one uniform rule, would probably have been as dissatisfactory to some of the States,
as it would have been difficult to the Convention. The
provision made by the Convention appears, therefore, to
be the best that lay within their option.  It must be
satisfactory to every State; because it is conformable




366               The Fcederalist.
to the standard already established, or which may be
established by the State itself. It will be safe to the
United States; because, being fixed by the State Constitutions, it is not alterable by the State Governments,
and it cannot be feared that the People of the States
will alter this part of their Constitutions in such a
manner as to abridge the rights secured to them by the
Fcederal Constitution.
The qualifications of the elected, being less carefully
and properly defined by the State Constitutions, and
being at the same time more susceptible of uniformity,
have been very properly considered and regulated by the
Convention.  A representative of the United States
must be of the age of twenty-five years; must have
been seven years a citizen of the United States; must,
at the time of his election, be an inhabitant of the State
he is to represent; and, during the time of his service,
must be in no office under the United States. Under
these reasonable limitations, the door of this part of the
Fcederal Government is open to merit of every description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old,
and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession of religious faith.
The term for which the Representatives are to be
elected, falls under a second view which may be taken
of this branch. In order to decide on the propriety of
this Article, two questions must be considered: First,
whether biennial elections will, in this case, be safe;
Secondly, whether they be necessary or useful.
First. As it is essential to liberty, that the Governinent in general should have a common interest with
the People; so it is particularly essential, that the
branch of it under consideration should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with
the People. Frequent elections are unquestionably the
only policy by which this dependence and sympathy




The Fwderalist.             367
can be effectually secured. But what particular degree
of frequency may be absolutely necessary for the purpose, does not appear to be susceptible of any precise
calculation, and must depend on a variety of circum
stances with which it may be connected. Let us consult experience, the guide that ought always to be
followed, whenever it can be found.
The scheme of representation, as a substitute for a
meeting of the citizens in person, being at most but
very imperfectly known to ancient polity, it is in more
modern times only, that we are to expect instructive examples. And even here, in order to avoid a research
too vague and diffusive, it will be proper to confine ourselves to the few examples which are best known, and
which bear the grieatest analogy to our particular case.
The first to which this character ought to be applied, is
the House of Commons in Great Britain. The history
of this branch of the English Constitution, anterior to
the date of Magna Charta, is too obscure to yield instruction. The very existence of it has been made a
question among political antiquaries. The. earliest records of subsequent date prove, that Parliaments were
to sit only every year; not that they were to be elected
every year. And even these annual sessions were left
so much at the discretion of the monarch, that under
various pretexts, very long and dangerous intermissions
were often contrived by royal ambition. To remedy
this grievance, it was provided by a statute in the reign
of CHARLES II., that the intermissions should not be
protracted beyond a period of three years. On the accession of WILLIAM III., when a revolution took place
in the Government, the subject was still more seriously
resumed, and it was declared to be among the fundamental rights of the People, that Parliaments ought to
be heldfrequently. By another statute, which passed a
few years later in the same reign, the term, "frequently,"




368               The Fwderalist.
which had alluded to the triennial period settled in the
time of CHARLES II., is reduced to a precise meaning, it
being expressly enacted, that a new Parliament shall be
called within three years after the determination of the
former. The last change, from three to seven years, is
well known to have been introduced pretty early in the
present century, under an alarm for the Hanoverian succession. From these facts it appears, that the greatest
frequency of elections which has been deemed necessary
in that kingdom, for binding the Representatives to their
constituents, does not exceed a triennial return of them.
And if we may argue from the degree of liberty retained
even under septennial elections, and all the other vicious
ingredients in the Parliamentary Constitution, we cannot doubt that a reduction of the period from seven to
three years, with the. other necessary reforms, would so
far extend the influence of the People over their Representatives as to satisfy us, that biennial elections, under
the Fcederal system, cannot possibly be dangerous to
the requisite dependence of the House of Representatives on their constituents.
Elections in Ireland, till of late,, were regulated entirely by the discretion of the crown, and were seldom
repeated, except on the accession of a new Prince, or
some other contingent event.  The Parliament which
commenced with GEORGE II. was continued throughout
his whole reign, a period of about thirty-five years. The
only dependence of the Representatives on the People
consisted in the right of the latter to supply occasional
vacancies, by the election of new members, and in the
chance of some event which might produce a general
new election. The ability also of the Irish Parliament
to maintain the rights of their constituents, so far as the
disposition might exist, was extremely shackled by the
control of the crown over the subjects of their delibera.
tion.  Of late, these shackles, if I mistake not, have




The Fcederalist.            369
been broken; and octennial Parliaments have besides
been established. What effect may be produced by this
partial reform, must be left to further experience. The
example of Ireland, from this view of it, can throw but
little light on the subject. As far as we can draw any
conclusion from it, it must be that if the People of that
country have been able under all these disadvantages to
retain any liberty whatever, the advantage of biennial
elections would secure to them every degree of liberty,
which might depend on a due connection between their
Representatives and themselves.
Let us bring our inquiries nearer home. The example of these States, when British colonies, claims particular attention, at the same time that it is so well
known as to require little to be said on it. The principle of representation, in one branch of the Legislature
at least, was established in all of them. But the periods
of election were different.  They varied from one to
seven years. Have we any reason to infer from the
spirit and conduct of the Representatives of the People,
prior to the Revolution, that biennial elections would
have been dangerous to the public liberties? The spirit
which everywhere displayed itself, at the commencement of the struggle, and which vanquished the obstacles to Independence, is the best of proofs, that a
sufficient portion of liberty had been everywhere enjoyed, to inspire both a sense of its worth and a zeal
for its proper enlargement. This remark holds good, as
well with regard to the then colonies whose elections
were least frequent, as to those whose elections were
most frequent. Virginia was the colony which stood
first in resisting the Parliamentary usurpations of Great
Britain; it was the first also in espousing, by public
Act, the resolution of Independence. In Virginia, nevertheless, if I have not been misinformed, elections under
the former Government were septennial. This particuvOL.           24




370              The Fwderalist.
lar example is brought into view, not as a proof of any
peculiar merit, for the priority in those instances was
probably accidental; and still less of any advantage in
septennial elections, for when compared with a greater
frequency they are inadmissible; but merely as a proof,
and I conceive it to be a very substantial proof, that the
liberties of the People can be in no danger from biennial
elections.
The conclusion resulting from these examples will be
not a little strengthened, by recollecting three circumstances. The first is, that the Famderal Legislature will
possess a part only of that supreme Legislative authority which is vested completely in the British Parliament;
and which, with a few exceptions, was exercised by thecolonial Assemblies, and the Irish Legislature. It is a
received and well-founded maxim, that where no other
circumstances affect the case, the greater the power is,
the shorter ought to be its duration; and conversely, the
smaller the power, the more safely may its duration be
protracted. In the second place, it has, on another occasion, been shown, that the Fcederal Legislature will not
only be restrained by its dependence on the People as
other Legislative bodies are, but that it will be moreover watched and controlled by the several collateral
Legislatures, which other Legislative bodies are not,
And in the third place, no comparison can be made between the means that will be possessed by the more
permanent branches of the Foederal Government, for
seducing, if they should be disposed to seduce, the
House of Representatives from their duty to the People,
and the means of influence over the popular branch,
possessed by the other branches of the Government
above cited. With less power, therefore, to abuse, the
Fcederal Representatives can be less tempted on one
side, and will be doubly watched on the other.
PUBLIUS.




The Federalist.             371
[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, February 12, 1788.]
THE F(EDERALIST. No. LII.
ro THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
J SHALL here, perhaps, be reminded of a current ob.
servation, "that where annual elections end, tyran"ny begins."  If it be true, as has often been remarked,
that sayings which become proverbial are generally
founded in reason, it is not less true, that when once
established, they are often applied to cases to which the
reason of them does not extend. I need not look for a
proof beyond the case before us. What is the reason
on which this proverbial observation is founded? No
man will subjeet himself to the ridicule of pretending
that any natural connection subsists between the sun or
the seasons, and the period within which human virtue
can bear the temptations of power. Happily for mankind, liberty is not, in this respect, confined to any single
point of time; but lies within extremes, which afford
sufficient latitude for all the variations which may be
required by the various situations and circumstances of
oivil society. The election of magistrates might be, if
it were found expedient, as in some instances it actually
has been, daily, weekly, or monthly, as well as annual;
and if circumstances may require a deviation from the
rule on one side, why not also on the other side? Turning our attention to the periods established among our.
selves, for the election of the most numerous branches
of the State Legislatures, we find them by no means
coinciding any more in this instance, than in the elections of other civil magistrates.  In Connecticut and
Rhode Island, the periods are half-yearly. In the other




372               The Fa3deralist.
States, South Carolina excepted, they are annual. In
South Carolina they are biennial; as is proposed in the
Faederal Government. Here is a difference, as four to
one, between the longest and shortest periods; and yet
it would be not easy to show, that Connecticut or
Rhode Island is better governed, or enjoys a greater
share of rational liberty, than South Carolina; or that
either the one or the other of these States are distinguished in these respects, and by these causes, from the
States whose elections are different from both.
In searching for the grounds of this doctrine, I can
discover but one, and that is wholly inapplicable to our
case. The important distinction so well understood in
America, between a Constitution established by the
People, and unalterable by the Government, and a law
established by the Government and alterable by the
Government, seems to have been little understood, and
less observed in any other country. Wherever the supreme power of legislation has resided, has been supposed to reside also a full power to change the form of
the Government. Even in Great Britain, where the
principles of political and civil liberty have been most
discussed, and where we hear most of the rights of the
Constitution, it is maintained, that the authority of the
Parliament is transcendent, and uncontrollable, as well
with regard to the Constitution, as the ordinary objects
of Legislative provision.  They have accordingly, in
several instances, actually changed by Legislative Acts,
some of the most fundamental Articles of the Government. They have in particular, on several occasions,
changed the period of election; and, on the last occasion, not only introduced septennial in place of triennial
elections, but by the same Act, continued themselves in
place four years beyond the term for which they were
elected by the People. An attention to these dangerous
practices has produced a very natural alarm in the vota



The Fcederalist.           373
ties of free Government, of which frequency of elections
is the corner-stone; and has led them to seek for some
security to liberty, against the danger to which it is
exposed. Where no Constitution, paramount to the
Government, either existed or could be obtained, no
constitutional security, similar to that established in the
United States, was to be attempted. Some other security, therefore, was to be sought for; and what better
security would the case admit, than that of selecting
and appealing to some simple and familiar portion of
time, as a standard for measuring the danger of innovations, for fixing the National sentiment, and for uniting
the patriotic exertions? The most simple and familiar
portion of time, applicable to the subject, was that of a
year; and hence the doctrine has been inculcated by a
laudable zeal, to erect some barrier against the gradual
innovations of an unlimited Government, that the advance towards tyranny was to be calculated by the
distance of departure from the fixed point of annual
elections. But what necessity can there be of applying
this expedient to a Government, limited as the Fcederal
Government will be, by the authority of a paramount
Constitution? Or who will pretend that the liberties of
the People of America will not be more secure under
biennial elections, unalterably fixed by such a Constitution, than those of any other Nation would be, where
elections were annual, or even more frequent, but subject to alterations by the ordinary power of the Government?
The second question stated is, whether biennial elections be necessary or useful? The propriety of answering this question in the affirmative, will appear from
several very obvious considerations.
No man can be a competent Legislator, who does not
add, to an upright intention and a sound judgment, a
certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on which




374               The Faoderalist.
he is to legislate.. A part of this knowledge may be acquired by means of information which lie within the
compass of men in private, as well as public stations.
Another part can only be attained, or at least thoroughly
attained, by actual experience in the station which requires the use of it. The period of service, ought, therefore, in all such cases, to bear some proportion to the
extent of practical knowledge, requisite to the due performance of the service. The peri6d of Legislative service established in most of the States for the more
numerous branch is, as we have seen, one year. The
question then may be put into this simple form: does
the period of two years bear no greater proportion to
the knowledge requisite for Fcederal Legislation than
one year does to the knowledge requisite for State
Legislation? The very statement of the question, in
this form, suggests the answer that ought to be given
to it.
In a single State, the requisite knowledge relates to
the existing laws, which are uniform throughout the
State, and with which all the citizens are more or less
conversant; and to the general affairs of the State,
which lie within a small compass, are not very diversified, and occupy much of the attention and conversation of every class of people. The great theatre of
the United States presents a very different scene. The
laws are so far from being uniform, that they vary in
every State; whilst the public affairs of the Union are
spread throughout a very extensive region, and are extremely diversified by the local affairs connected with
them, and can with difficulty be correctly learnt in any
other place, than in the central councils, to which a
knowledge of them will be brought by the Representatives of every part of the empire. Yet some knowledge
of the affairs, and even of the laws of all the States,
ought to be possessed by the members from each of the




The, Federalist.            375
States. How can foreign trade be properly regulated
by uniform laws, without some acquaintance with the
commerce, the ports, the usages, and the regulations of
the different States? How can the trade between the
different States be duly regulated, without some knowledge of their relative situations in these and other respects? How can taxes be judiciously imposed, and
effectually collected, if they be not accommodated to
the different laws and local circumstances relating to
these objects in the different States? How can uniform
regulations for the militia be duly provided, without a
similar knowledge of many internal circumstances by
which the States are distinguished from each other?
These are the principal objects of Fcederal Legislation,
and suggest, most forcibly, the extensive information
which the Representatives ought to acquire. The other
interior objects will require a proportional degree of information with regard to them.
It is true, that all these difficulties will, by degrees, be
very much diminished. The most laborious task will
be the proper inauguration of the Government, and the
primeval formation of a Fcederal code. Improvements
on the first draughts will every year become both easier
and fewer. Past transactions of the Government will
be a ready and accurate source of information to new
members. The affairs of the Union will become more
and more objects of curiosity and conversation among
the citizens at large.  And the increased intercourse
among those of different States will contribute not a
little to diffuse a mutual knowledge of their affairs, as
this again will contribute to a general assimilation of
their manners and laws. But with all these abatements,
the business of Fcederal Legislation must continue so
far to exceed, both in novelty and difficulty, the Legis-'ative business of a single State, as to justify the longer
period of service assigned to those who are to transact it.




376               The Facderattst.
A branch of knowledge, which belongs to the acquirements of a Fcederal Representative, and which has not
been mentioned, is that of foreign affairs. In regulating
our own commerce, he ought to be not only acquainted
with the treaties between the United States and other
nations, but also with the commercial policy'and laws
of other nations. He ought not to be altogether ignorant of the law of nations; for that, as far as it is
a proper object of municipal Legislation, is submitted
to the Fcederal Government. And although the House
of Representatives is not immediately to participate in
foreign negotiations and arrangements, yet from the
necessary connection between the several branches of
public affairs, those particular branches will frequently
deserve attention in the ordinary course of Legislation,
and will sometimes demand particular Legislative sanc.
tion and cooperation.  Some portion of this knowledge may, no doubt, be acquired in a man's closet; but
some of it also can only be derived from the public
sources of information; and all of it will be acquired
to best effect, by a practical attention to the subject,
during the period of actual service in the Legislature.
There are other considerations, of less importance,
perhaps, but which are not unworthy of notice. The
distance which many of the Representatives will be
obliged to travel, and the arrangements rendered necessary by that circumstance, might be much more serious
objections with fit men to this service, if limited to a
single year, than if extended to two years. No argument can be drawn on this subject, from the case of the
delegates to the existing Congress. They are elected
annually, it is true; but their reelection is considered by
the Legislative assemblies almost as a matter of course.
The election of the Representatives by the People would
not be governed by the same principle.
A few of the members, as happens in all such assem



The Fwderalist.              377
blies, will possess superior talents; will, by frequent
reelections, become members of long standing; will be
thoroughly masters of the public business, and perhaps
not unw'illing to avail themselves of those advantages.
The greater the proportion of new members, and the less
the information of the bulk of the members, the more
apt will they be to fall into the snares that may be laid
for them. This remark is no less applicable to the relation which will subsist between the House of Representatives and the Senate.
It is an inconvenience mingled with the advantages
of our frequent elections, even in single States, where
they are large, and hold but one Legislative session in a
year, that spurious elections cannot be investigated and
annulled in time for the decision to have its due effect.
If a return can be obtained, no matter by what unlawful means, the irregular member, who takes his seat of
course, is sure of holding it a sufficient time to answer
his purposes. Hence, a very pernicious encouragement
is given to the use of unlawful means, for obtaining
irregular returns. Were elections for the Fcederal Leg.
islature to be annual, this practice might become a very
serious abuse, particularly in the more distant States.
Each House is, as it necessarily must be, the judge of
the elections, qualifications, and returns of its members;
and whatever improvements may be suggested by ex.
perience, for simplifying and accelerating the process in
disputed cases, so great a portion of a year would unavoidably elapse, before an illegitimate member could be
dispossessed of his seat, that the prospect of such an
event would be little check to unfair and illicit means
of obtaining a seat.
All these considerations taken together warrant us
in affirming, that biennial elections will be as useful
to the affairs of the public, as we have seen that they
will be safe to the liberty of the People.
PUBLIUS.




378               The Fwderalist.
[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, February 12, 1788.]
THE F(EDERALIST. No. LIII.
ro THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
THE next view which I shall take of the House of
Representatives, relates to the apportionment of its
members to the several States, which is to be determined
by the same rule with that of direct taxes.
It is not contended, that the number of People in
each State ought not to be the standard for regulating
the proportion of those who are to represent the People
of each State. The establishment of the same rule for
the apportionment of taxes will probably be as little
contested; though the rule itself, in this case, is by no
means founded on the same principle. In the former
case, the rule is understood to refer to the personal rights
bf the People, with which it has a natural and universal
connection. In the latter, it has reference to the proportion of wealth, of which it is in no case a precise measure, and in ordinary cases a very unfit one. But notwithstanding the imperfection of the rule as applied
to the relative wealth and contributions of the States,
it is evidently the least exceptionable among the practicable rules; and had too recently obtained the general sanction of America, not to have found a ready
preference with the Convention.
All this is admitted, it will perhaps be said: but does
it follow, from an admission of numbers for the measure
of representation, or of slaves combined with free citizens as a ratio of taxation, that slaves ought to be
included in the numerical rule of representation? Slaves
are considered as property, not as persons. They ought,
therefore, to be comprehended in estimates of taxation,




The Federalist.              379
which are founded on property, and to be excluded froir
representation, which is regulated by a census of persons. This is the objection, as I understand it, stated
in its full force. I shall be equally candid in stating
the reasoning which may be offered on the opposite side.
" We subscribe to the doctrine," might one of our
Southern brethren observe, " that representation relates
" more immediately to persons, and taxation more irn"mediately to property, and we join in the application of
" this distinction to the case of our slaves. But we must
"deny the fact, that slaves are considered merely as
" property, and in no respect whatever as persons. The
"true state of the case is, that they partake of both
"these qualities: being considered by our laws, in some
"respects, as persons, and in other respects as property.
"In being compelled to labor, not for himself, but for
"a master; in being vendible by one master to another
"master; and in being subject at 11 times to be re"strained in his liberty and chastised in his body, by the
"capricious will of another, —the slave may appear to
"be degraded from the human rank, and classed with
"those irrational animals which fall under the legal
"denomination of property. In being protected, on the
" other hand, in his life and in his limbs, against the vio"lence of all others, even the master of his labor and
"his liberty; and in being punishable himself for all
"violence committed against others, — the slave is no
"less evidently regarded by the law as a member of the
"society, not as a part of the irrational creation; as a
"' moral person, not as a mere article of property. The
" Federal Constitution, therefore, decides with great
" propriety on the case of our slaves, when it views them
"in the mixed character of persons and of property. This
"is in fact their true character. It is the character
" bestowed on them by the laws under which they live;:' and it will not be denied, that these are the proper




380               The Faderdclist.
" criterion; because it is only under the pretext'that the
"laws have transformed the negroes into subjects of
Uproperty, that a place is disputed them in the compu"tation of numbers; and it is admitted; that if the laws
"were to restore the rights which have been taken away,
"the negroes could no longer be refused an equal share
"of Representation with the other inhabitants.
" This question may be placed in another light. It
"is agreed on all sides, that numbers are the best scale
"of wealth and taxation, as they are the only proper
"scale of Representation.  Would the Convention have
"been  impartial or consistent, if they had rejected
"the slaves from the list of inhabitants, when the shares
"of Representation were to be calculated, and inserted
" them on the lists when the tariff of contributions was
"to  be adjusted?  Could it be reasonably expected,
"that the Southern States would concur in a system,
"which considered their slaves in some degree as men,
"when burdens were to be imposed, but refused to con.
" sider them in the same light, when advantages were
"to be conferred? Might not some surprise also be
" expressed, that those who reproach the Southern States
" with the barbarous policy of considering as property
"a part of their human brethren, should themselves
9" contend, that the Government to which all the States
" are to be parties, ought to consider this unfortunate
" race more completely in the unnatural light of property,
" than the very laws of which they complain?
" It may be replied, perhaps, that slaves are not includ"ed in the estimate of Representatives in any of the
"States possessing them. They neither vote themselves,
I" nor increase the votes of their masters. Upon what
"principle, then, ought they to be taken into the Feed"eral estimate of representation? In rejecting them
"altogether, the Constitution would, in this respect,
"have followed the very laws which have been appealed
"to, as the proper guide.




The Fwderalist.              881
"This objection is repelled by a single observation.
"It is a fundamental principle of the proposed Consti.
" tution, that as the aggregate number of Representatives' allotted to the several States is to be determined by
"a Faederal rule, founded on the aggregate number of
"inhabitants, so the right of choosing this, allotted
"number in each State, is to be exercised by such part
"of the inhabitants, as the State itself may designate.
"The qualifications on which the right of suffrage
" depend, are not perhaps the same in any two States.
"In some of the States, the difference is very material.
"In every State, a certain proportion of inhabitants are
" deprived of this right by the Constitution of the State,
"who will be included in the census by which the Fed"eral Constitution apportions the Representatives. In
"this point of view, the Southern States might retort
"the complaint, by insisting that the principle laid down
"by the Convention required that no regard should be
"had to the policy of particular States towards their
"own inhabitants; and consequently, that the slaves,
"as inhabitants, should have been admitted into the' census according to their full number, in like manner
"with other inhabitants, who, by the policy of other
" States, are not admitted to all the rights of citizens.
"A rigorous adherence, however, to this principle, is
"waived by those who would be gainers by it. All
"that they ask is, that equal moderation be shown on
the other side. Let the case of the slaves be consid.
"ered, as it is in truth, a peculiar one.  Let the com-'promising expedient of the Constitution be mutually'adopted, which regards them as inhabitants, but as
"debased by servitude below the equal level of free
"inhabitants; which regards the slave as divested of
"two fifths of the mawn.
" After all, may not another ground be taken on which
"this Article of the Constitution will admit of a still




382               The Federalist.
"more ready defence? We have hitherto proceeded
"on the idea, that representation related to persons
"only, and not at all to property. But is it a just idea?
"Government is instituted no less for protection of
"the property, than of the persons, of individuals.
"The one as well as the other, therefore, may be con"sidered as represented by those who are charged with
"the Government. Upon this principle it is, that in
"several of the States, and particularly in the State
" of New York, one branch of the Government is in" tended more especially to be the guardian of property,'and is accordingly elected by that part of the society
"which is most interested in this object of Government.
"In the Fcederal Constitution, this policy does not pre"vail. The rights of property are committed into the
" same hands, with the personal rights. Some attention
"ought, therefore, to be paid to property, in the choice
"of those hands.
" For another reason, the votes allowed in the Faed"eral Legislature to the People of each State, ought
"to bear some proportion to the comparative wealth
"of the States. States have not, like individuals, an
"influence over each other, arising from superior advan" tages of fortune. If the law allows an opulent citizen
" but a single vote in the choice of his Representative,
ithe respect and consequence which he derives from'his fortunate situation very frequently guide the votes
"of others to the objects of his choice; and through this
"imperceptible channel, the rights of property are con"veyed into the public representation. A State pos"sesses no such influence over other States. It is not
"probable, that the richest State in the Confederacy
"will ever influence the choice of a single Representa.
" tive, in any other State. Nor will the Representatives
"of the larger and richer States possess any other' advantage in the Federal Legislature, over the Repre.




The Fwaderalist.             382' sentatives of other States, than what may result from
"their superior number alone. As far, therefore, as their
"superior wealth and weight may justly entitle them
"to any advantage, it ought to be secured to them by
"a superior share of representation. The new Constitution is, in this respect, materially different from the
"existing Confederation, as well as from that of the
"United Netherlands, and other similar Confederacies.
"In each of the latter, the efficacy of the Faederal res"olutions depends on the subsequent and voluntary
"resolutions of the States composing the Union. Hence
"the States, though possessing an equal vote in the
"public councils, have an unequal influence, correspond"ing with the unequal importance of these subsequent
" and voluntary resolutions. Under the proposed Consti" tution, the Fcederal Acts will take effect without the
" necessary intervention of the individual States. They
"will depend merely on the majority of votes in the
" Federal Legislature; and consequently each vote,
"whether proceeding from  a larger or smaller State,
"or a State more or less wealthy or powerful, will have
"an equal weight and efficacy; in the same manner
"as the votes individually given in a State Legislature,
"by the Representatives of unequal counties or other dis-;' tricts, have each a precise equality of value and effect;
"or if there be any difference in the case, it proceeds
"from the difference in the personal character of the
"individual Representative, rather than from any regard
"to the extent of the district from which he comes."
Such is the reasoning which an advocate for the
Southern interests might etnploy on this subject; and
although it may appear to be a little strained in some
points, yet on the whole, I must confess, that it fully
reconciles me to the scale of representation which the
Convention have established.
In one respect, the establishment of a common meas



384               The Federalist.
ure for representation and taxation will have a very
salutary effect. As the accuracy of the census to be
obtained by the Congress will necessarily depend, in
a considerable degree, on the disposition, if not on the
cooJperation of the States, it is of great importance that
the States should feel as little bias as possible, to swell
or to reduce the amount of their numbers. Were their
share of representation alone to be governed by this rule,
they would have an interest in exaggerating their inhabitants. Were the rule to decide their share of taxation
alone, a contrary temptation would prevail. By extending the rule to both objects, the States will have opposite
interests, which will control and balance each other, and
produce the requisite impartiality.
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Friday, February 15, 1788.]
THE FEDERALIST. No. LIV.
To TEE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW' ORK:
THE number of which the House of Representatives
is to consist, forms another, and a very interesting
point of view, under which this branch of the Fcederal
Legislature may be contemplated. Scarce any Article
indeed in the whole Constitution seems to be rendered
more worthy of attention, by the weight of character,
and the apparent force of argument, with which it has
been assailed.  The charges exhibited against it are,
first, that so small a number of Representatives will be
an unsafe depositary of the public interests; secondly,
that they will not possess a proper knowledge of the
local circumstances of their numerous constituents;
thirdly, that they will be taken from that class of citi



The Fawderalist.         38t
gens which will sympathize least with the feelings of
the mass of the People, and be most likely to aim at a
permanent elevation of the few, on the depression of the
many; fourthly, that defective as the number will be in
the first instance, it will be more and more disproportionate, by the increase of the People, and the obstacles
which will prevent a correspondent increase of the Representatives.
In general it may be remarked on this subject, that
no political problem is less susceptible of a precise solution, than that which relates to the number most convenient for a representative Legislature; nor is there any
point on which the policy of the several States is more
at variance, whether we compare their Legislative Assemblies directly with each other, or consider the proportions which they respectively bear to the number of
their constituents. Passing over the difference between
the smallest and largest States, as Delaware, whose
most numerous branch-consists of twenty-one Repre.
sentatives, and Massachusetts, where it amounts to
between three and four hundred, a very considerable
difference is observable among States nearly equal in
population. The number of Representatives in Pennsylvania is not more than one fifth of that in the State
last mentioned. New York, whose population is to
that of South Carolina as six to five, has little more
than one third of the number of Representatives. As
great a disparity prevails between the States of Georgia
and Delaware or Rhode Island. In Pennsylvania, the
Representatives do not bear a greater proportion to their
constituents, than of one for every four or five thousand.
In Rhode Island, they bear a proportion of at least one
for every thousand. And according to the Constitution
of Georgia, the proportion may be carried to one to
every ten electors; and must unavoidably far exceed the
proportion in any of the other States.
VOL. I.            25




386               The Ftederalist.
Another general remark to be made is, that the ratio
between the Representatives and the People ought not
to be the same, where the latter are very numerous, as
where they are very few. Were the Representatives
in Virginia to be regulated by the standard in Rhode
Island they would, at this time, amount to between four
and five hundred; and twenty or thirty years hence, to
a thousand. On the other hand, the ratio of Pennsylvania, if applied to the State of Delaware, would reduce
the representative Assembly of the latter to seven or
eight members. Nothing can be more fallacious, than
to found our political calculations on arithmetical principles. Sixty or seventy men may be more properly
trusted with a given degree of power, than six or seven.
But it does not follow, that six or seven hundred would
be proportionably a better depositary. And if we carry
on the supposition to six or seven thousand, the whole
reasoning ought to be reversed. The truth is, that in all
cases, a certain number at least seems to be necessary
to secure the benefits of free consultation and discussion; and to guard against too easy a combination for
improper purposes; as on the other hand, the number
ought at most to be kept within a certain limit, in order
to avoid the confusion and intemperance of a multitude.
In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever characters composed, passion never fails to wrest the sceptre
from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian Assembly would still have been a
mob.
It is necessary also to recollect here the observations
which were applied to the case of biennial elections.
For the same reason that the limited powers of the
Congress, and the control of the State Legislatures, jus.
tify less frequent elections than the public safety might
otherwise require, the members of the Congress need
be less numerous than if they possessed the whole power




The Federalist.            385
of legislation, and were under no other than the ordinary
restraints of other legislative bodies.
With these general ideas in our minds, let us weigh
the objections which have been stated against the number of members proposed for the House of Representatives. It is said, in the first place, that so small a number cannot be safely trusted with so much power.
The number of which this branch of the Legislature
is to consist, at the outset of the Government, will be
sixty-five. Within three years a census is to be taken,
when the number may be augmented to one for every
thirty thousand inhabitants; and within every successive
period of ten years, the census is to be renewed, and augmentations may continue to be made under the above
limitation. It will not be thought an extravagant conjecture, that the first census will, at the rate of one for
every thirty thousand, raise the number of Representatives to at least one hundred. Estimating the negroes
in the proportion of three fifths, it can scarcely be doubted, that the population of the United States will, by
that time, if it does not already, amount to three millions. At the expiration of twenty-five years, according
to the computed rate of increase, the number of Representatives will amount to two hundred; and of fifty
years, to four hundred. This is a number, which I presume will put an end to all fears arising from the smallness of the body. I take for granted here, what I shall,
in answering the fourth objection, hereafter show, that
the number of Representatives will be augmented, from
time to time, in the manner provided by the Constitution.  On a contrary supposition, I should admit the
objection to have very great weight indeed.
The true question to be decided then is, whether the
smallness of the number, as a temporary regulation, be
dangerous to the public liberty? Whether sixty-five
members for a few years, and a hundred, or two hundred,




388               The JFrderalist.
for a few more, be a safe depositary for a limited and
well-guarded power of legislating for the United States?
I must own that I could not give a negative answer to
this question, without first obliterating every impression
which I have received, with regard to the present genius
of the People of America, the spirit which actuates the
State Legislatures, and the principles which are incorporated with the political character of every class of
citizens. I am unable to conceive, that the People of
America, in their present temper, or under any circumstances which can speedily happen, will choose, and
every second year repeat the choice, of sixty-five or an
hundred men, who would be disposed to form and pursue a scheme of tyranny or treachery. I am unable to
conceive that the State Legislatures, which must feel
so many motives to watch, and which possess so many
means of counteracting the Federal Legislature, would
fail either to detect or to defeat a conspiracy of the latter against the liberties of their common constituents. I
am equally unable to conceive, that there are at this time,
or can be in any short time, in the United States, any
sixty-five or an hundred men capable of recommending
themselves to the choice of the People at large, who
would either desire or dare, within the short space of
two years, to betray the solemn trust committed to
them. What change of circumstances, time, and a fuller population of our country, may produce, requires a
prophetic spirit to declare, which makes no part of my
pretensions. But judging from the circumstances now
before us, and from the probable state of them within a
moderate period of time, I must pronounce, that the
liberties of America cannot be unsafe in the number of
nands proposed by the Fcederal Constitution.
From what quarter can the danger proceed? Are we
afraid of foreign gold? If foreign gold could so easily
corrupt our Fcederal rulers, and enable them to ensnare




The Fwderatist.              389
and betray their constituents, how has it happened that
we are at this time a free and independent Nation?
The Congress which conducted us through the Revolu.
tiop were a less numerous body than their successors
will be: they were not chosen by, nor responsible to
their fellow-citizens at large: though appointed from
year to year, and recallable at pleasure, they were gen.
erally continued for three years, and, prior to the ratification of the Frederal Articles, for a still longer term:
they held their consultations always under the veil of
secrecy: they had the sole transaction of our affairs
with foreign nations: through the whole course of the
war, they had the fate of their country more in their
hands, than it is to be hoped will ever be the case with
our future Representatives; and from the greatness of
the prize at stake, and the eagerness of the party which
lost it, it may well be supposed, that the use of other
means than force would not-have been scrupled: yet we
know by happy experience, that the public trust was not
betrayed; nor has the purity of our public councils in
this particular ever suffered, even from the whispers of
calumny.
Is the danger apprehended from the other branches of
the Fcederal Government? But where are the means
to be found by the President, or the Senate, or both?
Their emoluments of office, it is to be presumed, will
not, and without a previous corruption of the House of
Representatives cannot, more than suffice for very differ.
ent purposes; their private fortunes, as they must all be
American citizens, cannot possibly be sources of danger.
The only means then which they can possess, will be in
the dispensation of appointments. Is it here that suspicion rests her charge?  Sometimes we are told, that
this fund of corruption is to be exhausted by the President, in subduing the virtue of the Senate. Now, the
fidelity of the other House is to be the victim.  The




390              The Fiederalist.
improbability of such a mercenary and perfidious combination of the several members of Government, standing on as different foundations as republican principles
will well admit, and at the same time accountable to
the society over which they are placed, ought alone to
quiet this apprehension. But fortunately, the Constitution has provided a still further safeguard. The members of the Congress are rendered ineligible to any civil
offices, that may be created, or of which the emoluments
may be increased, during the term of their election. No
offices therefore can be dealt out to the existing members, but such as may become vacant by ordinary casualties; and to suppose that these would be sufficient to
purchase the guardians of the People, selected by the
People themselves, is to renounce every rule by which
events ought to be calculated, and to substitute an indiscriminate and unbounded jealousy, with which all
reasoning must be vain. The sincere friends of liberty,
who give themselves up to the extravagancies of this
passion, are not aware of the injury they do their own
cause. As there is a degree of depravity in mankind,
which requires a certain degree of circumspection and
distrust; so there are other qualities in human nature,
which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence.
Republican Government presupposes the existence of
these qualities in a higher degree than any other form.
Were the pictures which have been drawn by the political jealousy of some among us, faithful likenesses of the
human character, the inference would be, that there is
not sufficient virtue among men for self-government;
and that nothing less than the chains of despotism can
restrain them from destroying and devouring one an.
3ther.
PUBLIUS.




The Ewaderalist.             391
[From the New York Packet, Tuesday,,February 19, 1788.]
THE FCEDERALIST. No. LV.
ro THIIE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
THE second charge against the House of Representatives is, that it will be too small to possess a due
knowledge of the interests of its constituents.
As this objection evidently proceeds from a comparison of the proposed number of Representatives, with
the great extent of the United States, the number of
their inhabitants, and the diversity of their interests,
without taking into view, at the same time, the circumstances which will distinguish the Congress from other
Legislative bodies, the best answer that can be given
to it will be a brief explanation of these peculiarities.
It is a sound and important principle, that the Representative ought to be acquainted with the interests and
circumstances of his constituents. But this principle
can extend no further, than to those circumstances and
interests to which the authority and care of the Representative relate. An ignorance of a variety of minute
and particular objects, which do not lie within the compass of legislation, is consistent with every attribute
necessary to a due performance of the legislative trust.
In determining the extent of information required in
the exercise of a particular authority, recourse then must
be had to the objects within the purview of that authority.
What are. to be the objects of Foederal Legislation?
Those which are of most importance, and which seem
most to require local knowledge, are commerce, taxa
tion, and the militia.




392       T       he Foaderalist.
A proper regulation of commerce requires much in.
formation, as has been elsewhere remarked; but as far
as this information relates to the laws and local situation
of each individual State, a very few Representatives
would be very sufficient vehicles of it to the Fcederal
councils.
Taxation will consist, in a great measure, of duties
which will be involved in the regulation of commerce.
So far the preceding remark is applicable to this object.
As far as it may consist of internal collections, a more
diffusive knowledge of the circumstances of the State
may be necessary. But will not this also be possessed
in sufficient degree by a very few intelligent men, diffusively elected within the State? Divide the largest
State into tenor twelve districts, and it will be found
that there will be no peculiar local interest in either,
which will not be within the knowledge of the Representative of the district. Besides this source of information,
the laws of the State, framed by Representatives from
every part of it, will be almost of themselves a sufficient
guide. In every State there have been made, and must
continue to be made, regulations on this subject, which
will, in many cases, leave little more to be done by the
Federal Legislature, than to review the different laws,
and reduce them in one general Act. A skilful individual in his closet, with all the local codes before him,
might compile a law on some subjects of taxation for
the whole Union, without any aid from oral information;
and it may be expected, that whenever internal taxes
may he necessary, and particularly in cases requiring
uniformity -throughout the States, the more simple
objects will be preferred. To be fully sensible of the
facility which will be given to this branchof Fcederal
Legislation, by the assistance of the State codes, we
need only suppose for a moment, that this or any other
State were divided into a number of parts, each having




The Fawderalist.             393
and exercising -within itself a power of local legislation.
Is it not evident that a degree of local information and
preparatory labor would be found in the several volumes
of their proceedings, which would very much shorten
the labors of the General Legislature, and render a much
smaller number of members sufficient for it?
The Fcederal councils will derive great advantage
from another circumstance. The Representatives of each
State will not only bring with them a considerable
knowledge of its laws, and a local knowledge of their
respective districts, but will probably in all cases have
been members, and may even at the very time be members, of the State Legislature, where all the local information and interests of the State are assembled, and
from whence they may easily be conveyed by a very few
hands into the Legislature of the United States.
The observations made on the subject of taxation
apply with greater force to the case of the militia. For
however different the rules of discipline may be in different States, they are the same throughout each particular State; and depend on circumstances which can
differ but little in different parts of the same State.
The attentive reader will discern that the reasoning
here used, to prove the sufficiency of a moderate.number of Representatives, does not in any respect contradict what was urged on another occasion with regard
to the extensive information which the Representatives
ought to possess, and the time that might be necessary
for acquiring it. This information, so far as it may
relate to local objects, is rendered necessary and difficult,
not by a difference of laws and local circumstances
within a single State, but of those among different
States. Taking each State by itself, its laws are the
same, and its interests but little diversified. A few men,
therefore, will possess all the knowledge requisite for a
proper representation of them. Were the interests and




394               The l'eFderalist.
affairs of each individual State perfectly simple and
uniform, a knowledge of them in one. part would involve
a knowledge of them in every other, and the whole
State might be competently represented by a single
member taken from any part of it. On a comparison
of the different States together, we find a great dissimilarity in their laws, and in many other circumstances
connected with the objects of Fcederal Legislation, with
Wall of which the Fcederal Representatives ought to have
some acquaintance.  Whilst a few Representatives,
therefore, from each State, may bring with them a due
knowledge of their own State, every Representative
will have much information to acquire concerning all
the other. States. The changes of time, as was formerly
remarked, on the comparative situation of the different
States, will have an assimilating effect. The effect
of time on the internal affairs of the States, taken singly,
will be just the contrary. At present, some of the
States are little more'than a society of husbandmen.
Few of them have made much progress in those
branches of industry, which give a variety and complexity to the affairs of a Nation. These, however, will
in all of them be the fruits of a more advanced popu.
lation; and will require, on the part of each State,
a fuller representation. The foresight of-the Convention has accordingly taken care that the progress of
population may be accompanied with a proper increase
of the representative branch of the Government.
The experience of Great Britain, which presents to
mankind so many political lessons, both of the monitory
and exemplary kind, and which has been frequently
consulted in the course of these inquiries, corroborates
the result of the reflections which we have just made.
The number of inhabitants in the two kingdoms of
England and Scotland cannot be stated at less than
eight millions. The Representatives of these eight. mild




The Fasderalist.             395
lions in the House of Commons, amount to five hundred
and fifty-eight. Of this number, one ninth are elected
by three hundred and sixty-four persons, and one half,
by five thousand seven hundred and twenty-three persons.* It cannot be supposed that the half thus elected,
and who do not even reside among the People at large,
can add anything either to the security of the People
against the Government, or to the knowledge of their
circumstances and interests in the Legislative councils.
On the contrary, it is notorious, that they are more
frequently the representatives and instruments of the
Executive magistrate, than the guardians and advocates
of the popular rights. They might therefore, with great
propriety, be considered as something more than a mere
deduction from the real Representatives of the Nation.
We will, however, consider them  in this light alone,
and will not extend the deduction to a considerable
number of others, who do not reside among their constituents, are very faintly connected with them, and
have very little particular knowledge of their affairs.
With all these concessions, two hundred and seventynine persons only, will be the depository of the safety,
interest, and happiness of eight millions; that is to say,
there will be one Representative only, to maintain the
rights, and explain the situation, of twenty-eight thousand
six hzindred, and seventy constituents, in an Assembly
exposed to the whole force of Executive influence, and
extending its authority to every object of Legislation
within a Nation whose affairs are in-the highest degree
diversified and complicated. Yet it is very certain, not
only that a valuable portion of freedom has been preserved under all these circumstances, but that the defects
in the British code are chargeable, in a very small proportion, on the ignorance of the Legislature concerning
the circumstances of the People. Allowing to this case
* BURGH'S Political Disquisitions. - Publius.




39f6              The Faederaltst.
the weight which is due to it, and comparing it with
that of the House of Representatives as above explained,
it seems to give the fullest assurance, that a Rep.
resentative for every thirty thousand inhabitants, will
render the latter both a safe and competent guardian of
the interests which will be confided to it.
PUBLIUS.
CFromn the New York Packet, Tuesday, February 19, 1788.]
THE F(EDERALIST. No. LVI.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
THE third charge against the House of Representas
tives is, that it will be taken from that class of citizens which will have least sympathy with the mass of
the People, and be most likely to aim at an ambitious
sacrifice of the many, to the aggrandizement of the few.
Of all the objections which have been framed against
the Fcederal Constitution, this is perhaps the, most extraordinary.  Whilst the objection itself is levelled
against a pretended oligarchy, the principle of it strikes
at the very root of republican Government.
The aim of every political Constitution is, or ought
to be, first, to obtain for rulers men who possess most
wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and, in the next place, to take
the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous, whilst they continue to hold their public trust. The
elective mode of obtaining rulers, is the characteristic
policy of republican Government. The means relied
on in this form of Government for preventing their de



The Federalist.              397
generacy, are numerous and various. The most effectual one, is such a limitation of the term of appointments, as will maintain a proper responsibility to the
People.
Let me now ask, what circumstance there is in the
Constitution of the House of Representatives, that violates the principles of republican Government, or favors
the elevation of the few, on the ruins of the many?
Let me ask, whether every circumstance is not, on the
contrary, strictly conformable to these principles; and
scrupulously impartial to the rights and pretensions of
every class and description of citizens?
Who are to be the electors of the Fcederal Represent.
atives? Not the rich, more than the poor; not the
learned, more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs
of distinguished names, more than the humble sons
of obscurity and unpropitious fortune. The electors
are to be the great body of the People of the United
States. They are to be the same who exercise the right in
every State of electing the correspondent branch of the
Legislature of the State.
Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every
citizen whose merit may recommend him to the esteem
and confidence of his country. No qualification of
wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession,
is permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint the
inclination of the People.
If we consider the situation of the men on whom
the free suffrages of their fellow-citizens may confer the
representative trust, we shall find it involving every
security which can be devised or desired for their fidelity
to their constituents.
In the first place, as they will have been distinguished
by the preference of their fellow-citizens, we are to presume, that in general they will be somewhat distin.
guished, also, by those qualities which entitle them to




398               The Faederalist.
it, and which promise a sincere and scrupulous regard
to the nature of their engagements.
In the second place, they will enter into the public service under circumstances which cannot fail to produce a
temporary affection at least to their constituents. There
is in every breast a sensibility to marks of honor, of favor,
of esteem, and of confidence, which, apart from all considerations of interest, is some pledge for grateful and
benevolent returns. Ingratitude is a common topic of
declamation against human nature; and it must be
confessed, that instances of it are but too frequent and
flagrant, both in public and in private life. But the
universal and extreme indignation which it inspires,is
itself a proof of the energy and prevalence of the contrary sentiment.
In the third place, those ties which bind the Representative to his constituents, are strengthened by motives of
a more selfish nature. His pride and vanity attach him
to a form of Government which favors his pretensions,
and gives him a share in its honors and distinctions.
Whatever hopes or projects might be entertained by a
few aspiring characters, it must generally happen, that
a great proportion of the men deriving their advancement from their influence with the People, would have
more to hope from a preservation of the favor, than from
innovations in the Government subversive of the authority of the People.
All these securities, however, would be found very
insufficient without the restraint of frequent elections.
Hence, in the fourth place, the House of Representatives
is so constituted, as to support in the members an habitual recollection of their dependence on the People. Before the sentiments impressed on their minds by the
mode of their. elevation can be effaced by the' exercise
of power, they will be compelled to anticipate the
moment when their power is to cease, when their exer



The Fwrderalist.            399
cise of it is to be reviewed, and when they must descena
to the level from which they were raised; there forever
to remain, unless a faithful discharge of their trust shall
have established their title to a renewal of it.
I will add, as a fifth circumstance in the situation of
the House of Representatives, restraining them from
oppressive measures, that they can make no law which
will not have its full operation on themselves and their
friends, as well as on the great mass of the society
This has always been deemed one of the strongest
bonds by which human policy can connect the rulers and
the People together. It creates between them that communion of interests and sympathy of sentiments, of which
few Governments have furnished examples; but without
which every Government degenerates into tyranny. If
it be asked, what is to restrain the House of Representatives from making legal discriminations in favor of
themselves and a particular class of the society, I
answer, the genius of the whole system; the nature
of just and constitutional laws; and above all, the vigilant and manly spirit which actuates the People of
America: a spirit which nourishes freedom, nd in return is nourished by it.
If this spirit shall ever be so far debased as to tolerate
a law not obligatory on the Legislature, as well as on
the People, the People will be prepared to tolerate anything but liberty.
Such will be the relation between the House of Representatives and their constituents.  Duty, gratitude,
interest, ambition itself, are the chords by which they
will be bound to fidelity and sympathy with the great
mass of the People. It is possible that these may all
be insufficient to control the caprice and wickedness of
man. But are they not all that Government will admit,
and that human prudence can devise? Are they not
the genuine and the characteristic means, by which Re.




400               The Fwderalist.
publican Government provides for the liberty and happiness of the People? Are they not the identical means
on which every State Government in the Union relies
for the attainment of these important ends? What then
are we to understand by the objection which this paper
has combated?  What are we to say to the men who
profess the most flaming zeal for Republican Government, yet boldly impeach the fundamental principle of
it; who pretend to be champions for the right and the
capacity of the People to choose their own rulers, yet
maintain that they will prefer those only who will
immediately and infallibly betray the trust committed
to them?
Were the objection to be -read by one who had not
seen the mode prescribed by the Constitution for the
choice of Representatives, he could suppose nothing less,
than that some unreasonable qualification of property
was annexed to the right of suffrage; or that the right of
eligibility was limited to persons of particular families
or fortunes; or at least that the mode prescribed by the
State Constitutions was, in some respect or other, very
grossly departed from. We have seen, how far such a
supposition would err, as to the two first points. Nor
would it, in fact, be less erroneous as to the last. The
only difference discoverable between the two cases is,
that each Representative of the United States will be
elected by five or six thousand citizens; whilst in the
individual States, the election of a Representative is
left to about as many hundreds. Will it be pretended,
that this difference is sufficient to justify an attachment
to the State Governments, and an abhorrence to the
Fcederal Government? If this be the point on which
the objection turns, it deserves to be examined.
Is it supported by reason? This cannot be said,
without maintaining that five or six thousand citizens
are less capable of choosing a fit Representative, or




The Fwde-ratist.              401
more liable to be corrupted by an unfit one, than five
or slx hundred. Reason, on the contrary, assures us, that
as in so great a number a fit Representative would be
most likely to be found, so the choice would be less
likely to be diverted from him, by the intrigues of the
ambitious or the bribes of the rich.
Is the consequence from this doctrine admissible?  If
we say that five or six hundred citizens are as many as
can- jointly exercise their right of suffrage, must we not
deprive the People of the immediate choice of their publie servants, in every instance, where the administration
of the Government does not require as many of them
as will amount to one for that number of citizens?'Is the doctrine warranted by facts?  It was showii
in the last paper, that the real -repreenhtation' in thie
British House of Commons very little exceeds the pro6portion of one for every thirty thousand inhabitants.
Besides a variety of powerful causes, not existing' here,
and which -favor in that country the pretensions of rank
aiid wealth, no. persdn is eligible as a Representative of
a county, unless he possess real estate of'the clear valUe:of
six hundred pounds sterling pet year; nor of a city' or
borougli, unless he possess a like estate of half that anfilual value.::'To' this qualification,  on the' part of tie6
cufi'ty Representatives, is added' another on'the part of
th 6'county eledtors, which restrains the rigit of suffrage
to persons' hkiving a freehold estate of the annual value
of mOdre than twenty pounds sterling, according to the
present rate of money.  Notwithstanding these unfavorable circuimstances, and notwithstanding some very
unequal laws in the British'code, it cannot be said, that
thke Representatives of the'Nation have elevated the few
oh thtruifis of the many.
Bdut we nered not resort to foreign experience on this
sdbject.  Our' own is explicit, and decisive. The'di'
tiiets- in'New  Hampshire, in which the Senators ate
VOL. I.             26




402               The Faderalist.
chosen immediately by the People, are nearly as large
as will be necessary for her Representatives in the Congress. Those of Massachusetts are larger than will be
necessary for that purpose; and those of New York still
more so. In the last State, the Members of Assembly,
for the cities and counties of New York and Albany, are
elected by very nearly as many voters as will be entitled
to a Representative in the Congress, calculating on the
number of sixty-five Representatives only. It makes
no difference, that in these Senatorial districts and
counties, a number of Representatives are voted for
by each elector, at the same time. If the same electors,
at the same time, are capable of choosing four or five
Representatives, they cannot be incapable of choosing
one. Pennsylvania is an additional example. Some
of her counties, which elect her State Representatives,
are almost as large as her districts will be by which
her Fcederal Representatives will be elected.  The
city of Philadelphia is supposed to contain between
fifty and sixty thousand souls. It will, therefore, form
nearly two districts for the choice of Feederal Representatives. It forms, however, but one- county, in which
every elector votes for each of its Representatives in the
State Legislature. And what may appear to be still
more directly to our purpose, the whole city actually
elects a single member for the Executive Council. This
is the case in all the other counties of tile State.
Are not these facts the most satisfactory proofs of the
fallacy which has been employed against the branch of
the Faederal Government under consideration? Has it
appeared on trial, that the Senators of New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, and New York, or the Executive Council
of Pennsylvania, or the members of the Assembly in
the two last States, have betrayed any peculiar disposition to sacrifice the many to the few; or are in any reipect less worthy of their places, than the Representa



The. Federalist.            403
tives and magistrates appointed in other States, by very
small divisions of the People?
But there are cases of a stronger complexion than any
which I have yet quoted. One branch of the Legislature
of Connecticut is so constituted, that each member of it
is elected by the whole State. So is the Governor of that
State, of Massachusetts, and of this State, and the President of New Hampshire. I leave every man to decide
whether the result of any one of these experiments can
be said to countenance a suspicion, that a diffusive mode
of choosing Representatives of the People tends to elevate traitors and to undermine the public liberty.
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Friday, February 22, 1788.]
THE FCEDERALIST. No. LVII.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORE:
THE remaining charge against the House of Representatives, which I am to examine, is grounded on
a supposition that the number of members will not be
augmented from time to time, as the progress of popu.
lation may demand.
It has been admitted, that this objection, if well sup.
ported, would have great weight. The following observations will show, that like most other objections against
the Constitution, it can only proceed from a partial view
of the subject; or from a jealousy which discolors and
disfigures every object which is beheld.
1. Those who urge the objection seem not to have recollected, that the Fcederal Constitution will not suffer
by a comparison with the State Constitutions, in the




404                The FAederalist.
security provided for a gradual augmentation of the
number-of Representatives.  The number which is to
prevail in the first instance, is declared to be temporary.
Its duration is limited to the short term of three years.
Within every successive term of ten years, a census of
inhabitants is to be repeated. The unequivocal objects
of these regulations are, first, to readjust, from time to
time, the apportionment of Representatives to the number of inhabitants; under the single exception, that each
State shall -have one Representative at least: Secondly,
to augment the number of Representatives at the same
periods; under the Psole limitation, that the whole number shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand inhabitants.  If we review the Constitutions of the several
States, we shall find that some of them contain no determinate regulations on this subject; that others correspond pretty much on this point with the F1ederal
Constitutions; and that the most; effectal security in
any of them  is resolvable into a mere directory provision.
2. As far as experience has taken place on this subject, a gradual increase of Representatives under the
State Constitutions has at least kept pace with that of
the constituents; and it appears that the former have
been as ready to concur in such measures as the latter
have been to call6for them.
3. There is a peculiarity in the Foederal Constitution,
which insures a watchful attention in a majority bath of
the People aind` of their Representatives, to a constitutional augmteifttioti'of the latter.  The peculiarity lies
in this, that 6ni brahich of the Legislature is a representition of citizens, the. dthei. f the States': in.the former,
consequently, the larger States will have most weight;
in the latter, the advantage will be in favor of the smallbir States.;fr6m tthis circumstance it may with certainty
b61 inferred that the' larger States will be strenuous a:d




7The Fad-eralist.           405
vocates for increasing the number and weight of that
part of the Legislature in which their influence predominates. And it so happens, that four only of the largest
will have a majority of the whole votes in the Hiouse of
Representatives.' Should the Representatives or People,
therefore, of the smaller States, oppose at any time a
reasonable addition of members, a coalition of a very few
States will be sufficient to overrule the opposition; a
coalition, which, notwithstanding the rivalship and local
prejudices which might prevent it on ordinary occasions,
would not fail to take place, when not merely prompted
by common interest, but justified- by equity and the
principles of the Constitution.
It may be alleged, perhaps, that the Senate would be
prompted by like motives to an adverse coalition; and
as their concurrence would be indispensable, the just
and constitutional views of the other branch might be
defeated.  This is the difficulty which has probably
created the most serious apprehensions in the jealous
friends of a numerous representation. Fortunately it is
among the difficulties which, existing only in appearance, vanish on a close and accurate inspection. The
following reflections will, if I mistake not, be admitted
to be conclusive and satisfactory on this point.
Notwithstanding the equal authority which will subsist between the two Houses on all Legislative subjects,
except the originating of money bills, it -cannot be
doubted, that the House, composed of the greater
number of members, when supported by the more powerful States, and -speaking the known and determined
sense of a majority of the People, will have no small ad.
vantage in a question depending on the comparative
firmness of the two Houses.
This advantage must be increased by the consciousness, felt by the same side, of being supported in its
demands by right, by reason, and by the Constitution




406               The Fwderalist.
and the consciousness, on the opposite side, of contend
ing against the force of all these solemn considerations.
It is farther to be Considered, that in the gradation between the smallest and largest States, there are several,
which, though most likely in general to arrange them.
selves among the former, are too little removed in extent and population from the latter, to second an opposition to their just and legitimate pretensions. Hence,
it is by no means certain, that a majority of votes, even
in the Senate, would be unfriendly to proper augmentations in the number of Representatives.
It will not be looking too far to add, that the Senators
from all the new States may be gained over to the just
views of the House of Representatives, by an expedient
too obvious to be overlooked. As these States will, for
a great length of time, advance in population with peculiar rapidity, they will be interested in frequent reapportionments of the Representatives to the number of
inhabitants. The large States, therefore, who will prevail in the House of Representatives, will have nothing
to do, but to make reapportionments and augmentations
mutually conditions of each other; and the Senators
from all the most growing States will be bound to contend for the latter, by the interest which their States will
feel in the former.
These considerations seem to afford ample security
on this subject; and ought alone to satisfy all the doubts
and fears which have been indulged with regard to it.
Admitting, however, that they should all be insuffici.
ent to subdue the unjust policy of the sm'aller States,
or their predominant influence in the councils of the
Senate, a constitutional and infallible resource still remains with the larger States, by which they will be
able at all times to accomplish their just purposes. The
House of Representatives can not only refuse, but they
alone can propose the supplies requisite for the support




The Federalist.            407
of Government. They, in a word, hold the purse; that
powerful instrument by which we behold, in the history
of the British Constitution, an infant and humble representation of the People gradually enlarging the sphere
of its activity and importance, and finally reducing, as
far as it seems to have wished, all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the Government. This
power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the
most complete and effectual weapon, with which any
Constitution can arm the immediate Representatives of
the People, for obtaining a redress of every grievance,
and for carrying into effect every just and salutary
measure.
But will not the House of Representatives be as much
interested as the Senate, in maintaining the Government
in its proper functions; and will they not therefore be
unwilling to stake its existence or its reputation on the
pliancy of the Senate? Or if such a trial of firmness
between the two branches were hazarded, would not the
one be as likely first to yield as the other? These questions will create no difficulty with those who reflect that
in all cases, the smaller the number, and the more permanent and conspicuous the station, of men in power,
the stronger must be the interest which they will individually feel in whatever concerns the Government.
Those who represent the dignity of their country in the
eyes of other nations, will be particularly sensible to
every prospect of public danger, or of a dishonorable
stagnation in public affairs. To those causes, we are to
ascribe the continual triumph of the British House of
Commons over the other branches of the Government,
whenever the engine of a money bill has been employed.
An absolute inflexibility on the side of the latter, although it could not have failed to involve every department of the State in the general confusion, has neither
been apprehended; nor experienced. The utmost degree




408               The Fwaderalist.
of firmness that can be displayed by the Federal Sen.
ate or President, will not be more than equal to a resistance, in which they will be supported by constitutional
and patriotic principles.
In'this review of the Constitution of the House of
Representatives, I have passed over the circumstance of
economy, which, in the present state of affairs, might
have had some effect in lessening the temporary number
of Representatives; and a disregard of which would
probably have been as rich a theme of declamation
against the Constitution, as has been furnished by the
smallness of the number proposed.  I omit also:any
remarks on the difficulty which might be found, under
present circumstances, in engaging in the Faederal service a large number of such characters as the People
will probably elect. One observation, however, I must
be permitted to add on this subject, as claiming, in my
judgment, a very serious attention. It is, that in all
Legislative Assemblies, the greater the number composing them may be, the fewer will be the men who will
in fact direct their proceedings. In the first place, the
more numerous any Assembly may be, of whatever characters composed, the greater is known to be the ascendency of passion over reason.  In the next place, the
larger the number, the greater will be the proportion of
members of limited information and of weak capacities.
Now, it is precisely on characters of this description,
that the eloquence and address of the few are known to
act with all their force. In the ancient republics, where
the whole body:of the People assembled in person, a
single orator, or an' artful statesman, was generally seen
to rule with as complete a sway, as if a sceptre had been
placed in his single hand. On the same principle, the
more multitudinous a representative Assembly may be
rendered, the more it will partake of the infirmities incident to collective meetings of the People. Ignorance




The Feoderalist.           409
will be the dupe of cunning; and passion the slave of
sophistry and declamation. The People can never err
more than in supposing, that by multiplying their Representatives beyond a certain limit, they strengthen the
barrier against the Government of a few. Experience
will forever admonish them, that on the contrary, after
securing a sufficient number for the purposes of safety, of
local information, and of diffusive sympathy with the whole
society, they will counteract their own views, by every addition to their Representatives. The countenance of the
Government may become more democratic; but the soul
that animates it will be more oligarchic. The machine
will be enlarged; but the fewer, and often the more secret,
will be the springs by which its motions are directed.
As connected with the objection against the number of Representatives, may properly be here noticed,
that which has been suggested against the number made
competent for Legislative business. It has been said,
that more than a majority ought to have been required
for a quorum; and in particular cases, if not in all, more
than a majority of a quorum for a decision. That
some advantages might have resulted from such a precaution, cannot be denied.  It might have been an
additional shield to some particular interests, and another obstacle generally to hasty and partial measures.
But these considerations are outweighed by the inconveniences in the opposite scale. In all cases where justice or the general good might require new laws to be
passed, or active measures to be pursued, the fundamental principle of free Government would be reversed.
It would be no longer the majority that would rule:
the power would be transferred to the minority. Were
the defensive privilege limited to particular cases, an
interested minority might take advantage of it to screen
themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general weal,
or, in particular emergencies, to extort unreasonable




410               The Fwaderalist.
indulgences. Lastly, it would facilitate and foster the
baneful practice of secessions; a practice which has
shown itself even in States where a majority only is
required; a practice subversive of all the principles of
order and regular Government; a practice which leads
more directly to public convulsions, and the ruin of popular Governments, than any other which has yet been
displayed among us.
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Friday, February 22, 1788.]
THE FCEDERALIST. No. LVIII.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
THE natural order of the subject leads us to consider,
in this place, that provision of the Constitution
which authorizes the National Legislature to regulate,
in the last resort, the election of its own members.
It is in these words: " The times, places, and manner
" of holding elections for Senators and Representatives,
" shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature'" thereof; but the Congress may, at any time, by law,
4" make or alter such regulations, except as to the places
" of choosing Senators." * This provision has not only
been declaimed against by those who condemn the Constitution in the gross; but it has been censured by those
who have objected with less latitude, and greater moderation; and, in one instance, it has been thought exceptionable by a gentleman who has declared himself the
advocate of every other part of the system.
I am greatly mistaken, notwithstanding, if there be
*1st Clause, 4th Section of the 1st Article. -Publius.




The Fwderalist.             411
any Article in the whole plan more completely defensible
than this. Its propriety rests upon the evidence of this
plain proposition, that every Government ought to contain
in itself the means of its own preservation. Every just
reasoner will, at first sight, approve an adherence to this
rule, in the work of the Convention; and will disapprove
every deviation from it, which may not appear to have
been dictated by the necessity of incorporating into the
work some particular ingredient, with which a rigid conformity to the rule was incompatible. Even in this case,
though he may acquiesce in the necessity, yet he will
not cease to regard and to regret a departure from so
fundamental a principle, as a portion of imperfection in
the system which may prove the seed of future weakness, and perhaps anarchy.
It will not be alleged, that an election law could have
been framed and inserted in the Constitution, which
would have been always applicable to every probable
change in the situation of the country; and it will, therefore, not be denied, that a discretionary power over elections ought to exist somewhere. It will, I presume, be as
readily conceded, that there were only three ways in
which this power could have been reasonably modified
and disposed; that it must either have been lodged
wholly in the National Legislature, or wholly in the
State Legislatures, or primarily in the latter, and ultimately in the former. The last mode has, with reason,
been preferred by the Convention. They haye submitted
the regulation of elections for the Fcederal Government,
in the first instance, to the local administrations; which,
in ordinary cases, and when no improper views prevail,
may be both more convenient and more satisfactory;
but they have reserved to the National authority a right
to interpose, whenever extraordinary circumstances might
render that interposition necessary to its safety.
Nothing can be more evident, than that an exclusive




4.12              The.Foderalist.
power of regulating elections for the National CGovern
ment, in the hands of the State Legislatures, would
leave the existence of the Union entirely at their mercy.
They could at any moment annihilate it, by neglecting
to provide for the choice of persons to administer its
affairs. It is to little purpose to say, that a neglect
or omission of this kind would not be likely to take
place. The constitutional possibility of the thing, with
out an equivalent for the risk, is an unanswerable objec
tion. Nor has any satisfactory reason been yet assigned
for incurring that risk. The extravagant surmises of
a distempered jealousy, can never be dignified with that
character. If we are in a humor to presume abuses of
power, it is as fair to presume them on the part of the
State Governments, as on the part of the General Government. And as it is more consonant to the rules of
a just theory, to intrust the Union with the care of its
own existence, than to transfer that care to any other
hands, if abuses of power are to be hazarded on the one
side or on the other, it is more rational to hazard them
where the power would naturally be placed, than where
it would unnaturally be placed.
Suppose an Article had been introduced into the
Constitution, empowering the United States to regulate
the elections for the particular States, would any man
have hesitated to condemn it, both as an unwarrantable
transposition of power, and as a premeditated engine
for the destruction of the State Governments? The
violation of principle, in this case, would have required
no comment; and, to an unbiased observer, it will not
be less apparent in the project of subjecting the existi-nce of tHie National Government, in a similar respect,
to the pleasure of the State Governments. An impartial view of the matter cannot fail to result in a conviction, that each, as far as possible, oughi; to depend on
itself for its own preservation.




The FWderalist.             43~
As an objection to this position, it may be remarked
that the, constitution of the National Senate would in.
volve, in its full extent, the danger which it is suggested
might flow from an exclusive power in the State Legis.
latures to regulate the Fmederal elections. It may be
alleged, that by declining the appointment of Senators,
they might at any time give a fatal blow to the Union;
and from this it may be inferred, that as its existence
would be thus rendered dependent upon them in so essential a point, there can be no objection to intrusting
them with it, in the particular case under consideration.
The interest of each State, it may be added, to maintain
its representation in the National Councils, would be
a complete security against an abuse of the trust.
This argument, though specious, will not, upon examination, be found solid. It is certainly true, that the
State Legislatures, by forbearing the appointment of
Senators, may destroy the National Government. But
it will not follow, that because they have the power to
do this in one instance, they ought to have it in every
other. There are cases in which the pernicious tendency
of such a power may be far more decisive, without any
motive equally cogent with that which must have regulated the conduct of the Convention in respect to the
formation of the Senate, to recommend their admission
into the system. So far as that construction may expose the Union to the possibility of injury from the
State Legislatures, it is An evil; but it is an evil which
could not have been avoided without excluding the
States, in their political capacities, wholly from a place
in the organization of the National Government. If
this had been done, it would doubtless have been interpreted into an entire dereliction of the Fcederal princi
ple; and would - certainly have deprived the State Gov
ernments of that absolute safeguard, which they will
enjoy under this provision. But however wise. it may




414               The Foederalist.
have been, to have submitted in this instance to an in.
convenience, for the attainment of a necessary advantage
or a greater good, no inference can be drawn from thence
to favor an accumulation of the evil, where no necessity
urges, nor any greater good invites.
It may be easily discerned, also that the National
Government would run a much greater risk, from a powrer in the State Legislatures over the elections of its
House of Representatives, than from their power of appointing the members of its Senate. The Senators are
to be chosen for the period of six years; there is to be a
rotation, by which the seats of a third part of them are
to be vacated and replenished every two years; and no
State is to be entitled to more than two Senators; a
quorum of the body is to consist of sixteen memberse
The joint result of these circumstances would be, that
a temporary combination of a few States, to intermit
the appointment of Senators, could neither annul the
existence, nor impair ihe activity of the body; and it
is not from a general and permanent combination of the
States, that we can have anything to fear. The first might
proceed from sinister designs in the leading members
of a few of the State Legislatures: the last would suppose a fixed and rooted disaffection in the great body
of the People; which will, either never exist at all, or
will, in all probability, proceed from an experience of the
inaptitude of the General Government to the advancement of their happiness; in which event, no good citizen could desire its continuance.
But with regard to the Foederal House of Representatives, there is intended to be a general election of members once in two years. If the State Legislatures were to
be invested with an exclusive power of regulating these
elections, every period of making them would be a delicate crisis in the National situation; which might issue
in a dissolution of the Union, if the leaders of a few of




The Federalist.             41t
the most important States should have entered into a
previous conspiracy to prevent an election.
I shall not deny, that there is a degree of weight in
the observation, that the interest of each State, to be
represented in the Faederal Councils, will be a security
against the abuse of a power over its elections in the
hands of the State Legislatures. But the security will
not be considered as complete, by those who attend to
the force of an obvious distinction between the interest
of the People in the public felicity, and the interest of
their local rulers in the power and consequence of their
offices. The People of America may be warmly attached to the Government of the Union, at times when
the particular rulers of particular States, stimulated by
the natural rivalship of power, and by the hopes of personal aggrandizement, and supported by a stong faction
in each of those States, may be in a very opposite temper. This diversity of sentiment between a majority of
the People, and the individuals who have the greatest
credit in their councils, is exemplified in some of the
States at the present moment, on the present question.
The scheme of separate Confederacies, which will always multiply the chances of ambition, will be a never
failing bait to all such influential characters in the State
administrations, as are capable of preferring their own
emolument and advancement to the public weal. With
so effectual a weapon in their hands as the exclusive
power of regulating elections for the National Government, a combination of a few such men, in a few of the
most considerable States, where the temptation will always be the strongest, might accomplish the destruction
of the Union, by seizing the opportunity of some casual
dissatisfaction among the People, (and which perhaps
they may themselves have excited,) to discontinue the
choice of members for the Fcederal House of Representatives. It ought never to be forgotten, that a firm




416               The Faederalist.
Union of this country, under an efficient Government,
will probably be an increasing object of jealousy to
more than one nation of Europe; and that enterprises
to subvert it will sometimes originate in the intrigues of
foreign powers, and, will seldom fail to be patronized
and abetted by some of them. Its preservation therefore ought in no case, that can be avoided, to be committed to the guardianship of any but those, whose
situation will uniformly beget an immediate interest in
the faithful and vigilant performance of the trust.
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, February 26, 1788.]
THE F(EDERALIST. No. LIX.
TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
W     E have seen, that an uncontrollable power over
the elections for the Faederal Government could
not, without hazard, be committed to the State Legislatures. Let us ilow see, what would be the danger on
the other side: that is, from confiding the ultimate right
of regulating its own elections to the Union itself. It
is not pretended, that this right would e ra  oe used for
the exclusion of any State from its scare in the representation. The interest of all would, in this respect at
least, be the security of all. But it is alleged, that it
might be employed in such a manner as to promote the
election of some favorite class of men in exclusion of
others, by confining the places of election to particular
districts, and rendering it impracticable to the citizens
at large to partake in the choice. Of all chimerical suppositions, this seems to be the most chimerical. On the




The Foederalist.             417
one hand, no rational calculation of probabilities would
lead us to imagine that the disposition, which a conduct
so violent and extraordinary would imply, could ever
find its way into the National Councils; and on the
other, it may be concluded with certainty, that if so
improper a spirit should ever gain admittance into them,
it would display itself in a form altogether different and
far more decisive.
The improbability of the attempt may be satisfactorily inferred from this single reflection, that it could never
hke made without causing an immediate revolt of the
great body of the People, headed and directed by the
State Governments. It is not difficult to conceive that
this characteristic right of freedom may, in certain turbulent and factious seasons, be violated, in respect to a
particular class of citizens, by a victorious and overbearing majority; but that so fundamental a privilege, in a
country so situated and enlightened, should be invaded
to the prejudice of the great mass of the People, by the
deliberate policy of the Government, without occasioning a popular revolution, is altogether inconceivable and
incredible.
In addition to this general reflection, there are considerations of a more precise nature, which forbid all apprehension on the subject. The dissimilarity in the ingredients.which will compose the National Government,
and:still. more in the manner in which they will be
brought into action in its various branches, must form
a powerful obstacle to a concert of views, in any partial
schemeof elections. There is sufficient diversity in the
state of property, in the genius, manners, and habits of
the People of the different parts of the Union, to occasiomaa material diversity of disposition in their Representatives towards the different ranks and conditions in
society.,Arid though an intimate intercourse under the
sanme Government will promote a gradual- assimilation,
VOL. I.             27




418               The Foederalist.
in some of these respects, yet there are causes, as well
physical as moral, which may, in a greater or less degree, permanently nourish different propensities and inclinations in this respect. Butt the circumstance which
will be likely to have the greatest influence in the matter, will be the dissimilar modes of constituting the several component parts. of the Government. The House
of Representatives being to be elected immediately by
the People, the Senate by the State Legislatures, the
President by Electors chosen for that purpose by the
People, there would be little probability of a common
interest to cement these different branches in a predilection for any particular class of electors.
As tO the Senate, it is impossible that any regulation
of "time and manner," which is all that is proposed to
be submitted to the National Government in respect to
that body, can affect the spirit which will direct the
choice of its members. The collective sense of the State
Legislatures can never be influenced by extraneous circumstances of that sort; a consideration which alone
ought to satigfy us, that the discrimination apprehended
would never be attempted. For what inducement could
the Senate have, to concur in a preference in which itself would not be included-? Or to what purpose would
it be established, in reference to one branch of the Legislature, if it could not be extended to the other? The
composition of the one would in this case counteract
that of the other. And we can never suppose that it
would embrace the appointments to the Senate, unless
we can at the same time suppose the voluntary cooiperation of the State Legislatures. If we make the latter
supposition, it then becomes immaterial where the power in question is placed, whether in their hands, or in
those of the Union.
But what is to be the object of this capricious partiality in the National Councils? Is it to be exercised in a




The Foederalist.             419
discrimination between the different departments of in.
dustry, or between the different kinds of property, or
between the different degrees of property? Will it lean
in favor of the landed interest, or the moneyed interest,
or the mercantile interest, or the manufacturing interest? Or, to speak in the fashionable language of the
adversaries to the Constitution, will it court the elevation of " the wealthy and the well-born," to the exclusion and debasement of all the rest of the society?
If this partiality is to be exerted in favor of those who
are concerned in any particular description of industry
or property, I presume it will readily be admitted, that
the competition for it will lie between landed men and
merchants. And I scruple not to affirm, that it is infinitely less likely that either of them should gain an
ascendant in the National Councils, than that the one
or the other of them should predominate in all the local
Councils. The inference will be, that a conduct tending to give an undue preference to either is much less to
be dreaded from the former, than from the latter.
The several States are in various degrees addicted to
agriculture and commerce. In most, if not all of them,
agriculture is predominant. In a few of them, however,
commerce nearly divides its empire; and in most of them
has a considerable share of influence. In proportion as
either prevails, it will be conveyed into the National representation; and for the very reason, that this will be
an emanation from a greater variety of interests, and in
much more various proportions, than are to be found in
any single State, it will be much less apt to espouse
either of them with a decided partiality, than the representation of any single State.
In a country consisting chiefly of the cultivators of
land, where the rules of an equal representation obtain,
the landed interest must, upon the whole, preponderate'n the Government. As long as this interest prevails in




420               The Foederalist.
most of the State Legislatures, so long it must main.
tain a correspondent superiority in the National Senate,
which will gen4ally be a faithful copy of the majorities
of those Assemblies. It cannot therefore be presumed,
that a sacrifice of the landed to the.mercantile class will
ever be a favorite object of this branch of the Fmederal
Legislature. In applying thus particularly to the Senate
a general observation suggested by the situation of the
country, I am governed by the consideration, that the
credulous votaries of State power cannot, upon their
own principles, suspect, that the State Legislatures
would be warped from their duty by any external influence. But in reality the same situation must have
the same effect, in the primitive composition at least of
the Faederal House of Representatives, an improper
bias towards the mercantile class, is as little to be expected from this quarter as from the-other.
In order, perhaps, to give countenance to the objection
at any rate, it may be asked, is there not danger of an
opposite bias in the National Government, which may
dispose it to endeavor to secure a monopoly of the Fmderal administration to the landed class? As there is
little likelihood, that the supposition of such a bias will
have any terrors for those who would be immediately
injured by it, a labored answer to this question will be
dispensed with. It will be sufficient to remark, first,
that for the reasons elsewhere assigned, it is less likely
that any decided partiality should, prevail in the Councils of the Union, than in those of any of its members.
Secondly, that there would be no temptation to violate
the. Constitution in favor of the landed class, because
that class would, in the natural course of things, enjoy
as great a preponderancy as itself could desire. And,
thirdly, that men accustomed to investigate the sources
Af public prosperity, upon a large scale, must be too
well convinced of the utility of commerce to be inclined




The Fvwderalist.              421
to inflict upon it so deep a-wound, as would result from
the entire exclusion of those who would best understand
its interest, ftom a share in the management of them.
The importance of commerce, in the view of revenue
alone, must effectually guard it against the enmrity'of a
body which would be continually importuned in its
favor, by the urgent calls of public necessity.
I the rather consult brevity, in discussing the prob.
ability of a preference founded upon a discrimination
between the different kinds of industry and property, because, -asfar as I understand the meaning of the objectors, they contemplate a discrimination of another kind.
They appear to have in. view, as the objects -of the preference with which they endeavor to alarm us, those whom
they designate by the description of "the wealthy and
"'the well-born."  These, it seems, are to be exalted to an
odious preeminence over the rest of their fellow-citizens;
At one time, however, their elevation is to be a neces.
sary consequence of the smallness of the representative
body; at another time, it is to be effected.by depriving
the People at.large of the opportunity of exercising their
right of suffrage in the choice of that body.
But upon what principle is the discrimination of the
places of election to be made, in order to answer the
purpose of the meditated preference?- -,Are " the wealthy
" and the well-born," as they are called, confined to particular spots in the several States? - Have they, by some
miraculous instinct or foresight, set apart in each of
them, a common place of residence? Are they only
to'be met with in the towns or cities?  Or-are they,
on the contrary, scattered over the face of the country
as. avarice or chance may have happened to cast their
own. lot, or that of their predecessors? If the latter is
the case, (as every intelligent man knows it to be,*) is it,rot evident that the policy of confining the places ot
* Particularly in the Southern States and in this State. — Pibliu.




422               The Federalist.
elections to particular districts, would be as subversive
of its own aim, as it would be exceptionable on every
other account:? The truth is, that there is no method of
securing to the rich the preference apprehended, but by
prescribing qualifications of property either for those
who may elect, or be: elected. But this forms no part
of the power to be conferred upon the National Government. Its authority would be expressly restricted to the
regulation of the times, the places, and the manner of
elections. The qualifications of the persons who may
choose, or be chosen, as has been remarked upon other
occasions, are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and
are unalterable by the Legislature.
Let it however be admitted, for argument sake, that
the expedient suggested might be successful; and let it
at the same time be equally taken for granted, that all
the scruples which a sense of duty, or an apprehension
of the danger of the experiment, might inspire, were
overcome in the breasts of the National rulers; still I
imagine, it will hardly be pretended, that they could
ever hope to carry such an enterprise into'execution,
without the aid of a military force sufficient to subdue
the resistance of the great body of the People.  The
improbability of the existence of a force equal to that
object, has been discussed and demonstrated in different
parts of these papers; but that the futility of the objection under consideration may appear in the strongest
light, it shall be conceded for a moment, that such a
force might exist; and the National Government shall
be supposed to be in the actual possession of it. What
will be the conclusion:? With a disposition to invade
the essential rights of the community, and with the
means of gratifying that disposition, is it presumable
that the persons who were actuated by it would amuse
themselves in the ridiculous task of fabricating election
laws for securing a preference to a favorite class of




The Famderalist.            42i
men? Would they not be likely to prefer a conduct
better adapted to their own immediate aggrandizement?
Would they not rather boldly resolve to perpetuate
themselves in office by One decisive act of usurpation
than to trust to precarious expedients which, in spite of
all the precautions that might accompany them, might
terminate in the dismission, disgrace, and ruin of their
authors? Would they not fear, that citizens, not less
tenacious than conscious of their rights, would flock
from the remotest extremes of their respective States to
the places of election, to overthrow their tyrants, and to
substitute men who would be disposed to avenge the
violated majesty of the People?
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, February 26, 1788.]
THE FCEDERALIST. No. LX.
To TRE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
T-HE more candid opposers of the provision respect.
ing elections, contained in the plan of the Convention, when pressed in argument, will sometimes
concede the propridty of that provision; with this qualification, however, that it ought to have been accompanied with a declaration, that all elections should be
had in the counties where the electors resided. This,
say they, was a necessary precaution against an abuse
of the power. A declaration of this nature would certainly have been harmless; so far as it would have had,he effect of quieting apprehensions, it might not have
been undesirable. But it would, in fact, have afforded
little or no additional security against the danger appre



424               The -FArderalist.
hended; and the want of it will never be considered, by
an impartial and judicious examiner, as a serious, still
less as an insuperable objection to the plan. The differ.
ent views taken of the subject in the two preceding
papers must be sufficient to satisfy all dispassionate and
discerning:men, that if the public liberty should ever be
the victim of the ambition of the National rulers, the
power under examination, at least, will be guiltless of
the sacrifice.
If those who are inclined to consult' their jealousy
only, would exercise it in a careful inspection of the
several State Constitutions, they would find little less
room for disquietude and alarm, from the latitude"which
most of them allow in respect to elections, than from
the latitude which is proposed to be allowed to the
National Government in the same respect. A review
of their situation, in this particular,. would tend greatly
to remove any ill impressions which may remain in regard to; this matter.,But as- thart review wbulid  lead
into long and tedious details, I shall content myself
with the single example of the State in which I write.
The Constitution of New York makes no other provision for locality of elections, than that the members of'
the Assembly-shall be elected:in tier counties;' those of
the Senate, in the great districts into which the State is
or may be divided: these at present are four in number,
and comprehend each from two to six counties. It may
readily be perceived, that it would notf:be more difficult
to the Legislature of New' York to defeat the suffrages
of the citizens of New Yorki by confining elections tO
particular places, than for the Legislature of the United
States to defeat the suffrages of the citizens of the Union,
by the like expedient.  Suppose, far instance, the city
of Albany was to' be appointed the sole place of election for the county and district of -which it: is a part,
would not -the inhabitants of that city speedily become




The Fwderalist.             425
the only electors of the members both of the Senate
and Assembly for that county and district? Can we
imagine, that the electors who reside in the remote subdivisions of the county of Albany, Saratoga, Cambridge,
&c., or in any part of the county of Montgomery, would
take the trouble to come to the city of Albany, to give
their votes for members of the Assembly or Senate
sooner than they would repair to the city of New York
to participate in the choice of the members of the FcBderal House of Representatives? The alarming indifference discoverable in the exercise of so invaluable a privilege under the existing laws, which afford every facility
to it, furnishes a ready answer to this question. And,
abstracted from any experience on the subject, we can
be at no loss to determine, that when the place of elec-t
tion is at an inconvenient distance from the elector, the
effect upon his conduct will be the same, whether that
distance be twenty miles, or twenty thousand miles.
Hence it must appear, that objections to the particular
modification of the Faderal power of regulating elections, will, in substance, apply with equal force to the
modification of the like power in the Constitution of
this State; and for this reason it will be impossible to
acquit the one, and to condemn the other. A similar
comparison would lead to the same conclusion, in re.
spect to the Constitutions of most of the other States.
If it should be said, that defects in the State Constitutions furnish no apology for those which are to be
found in the plan proposed, I answer, that as the former have never been thought chargeable with inatten.
tion to the security of liberty, where the imputations
thrown on the latter can be shown to be applicable to
them also, the presumption is, that they are rather the
cavilling refinements of a predetermined opposition,
than the well-founded inferences of a candid research
after truth. To those who are disposed to consider, as




426               The Fwderalist.
innocent omissions in the State Constitutions, what they
regard as unpardonable blemishes in the plan of the
Convention, nothing can be said; or at most, they can
only be asked to assign some substantial reason why
the Representatives of the People, in a single State,
should be more impregnable to the lust of power, or
other sinister motives, than the Representatives of the
People of the United States? If they cannot do this,
they ought at least to prove to us that it is easier to
subvert the liberties of three millions of People, with the
advantage of local Governments to head their opposition, than of two hundred thousand People who are
destitute of that advantage. And in relation to the point
immediately under consideration, they ought to convince
us that it is less probable that a predominant faction in
a single State, should, in order to maintain its superiority, incline to a preference of a particular class of electors, than that a similar spirit should take possession of
the Representatives of thirteen States, spread over a
vast region, and in several respects distinguishable from
each other by a diversity of local circumstances, prejudices, and interests.
Hitherto my observations have only aimed at a vindi.
cation of the provision in question, on the ground of
theoretic propriety, on that of the danger of placing the
power elsewhere, and on that of the safety of placing it
in the manner proposed. But there remains to be mentioned a positive advantage, which will result from this
disposition, and which could not as well have been obtained from any other: I allude to the circumstance
of uniformity, in the time of elections for the Fcederal
House of Representatives.  It is more than possible,
that this uniformity may be found by experience to be
of great importance to the public welfare; both as a
security against the perpetuation of the same spirit in
the body, and as a cure for the diseases of faction.: If




T7ie Foederalist.          42T
each State may choose its own time of election, it is
possible there may be, at least, as many different periods
as there are months in the year.  The times of election
in the several States, as they are now established for
local purposes, vary between extremes as wide as March
and November. The consequence of this diversity would
be, that there could never happen a total dissolution or
renovation of the body at one time.  If an improper
spirit of any kind should happen to prevail in it, that
spirit would be apt to infuse itself into the new members, as they come forward in succession.  The mass
would be likely to remain nearly the same; assimilating
constantly to itself its gradual accretions. There is a
contagion in example, which few men have sufficient
force of mind to resist. I am inclined to think, that
treble the duration in office, with the condition of a total
dissolution of the body at the same time, might be less
formidable to liberty than one third of that duration
subject to gradual and successive alterations.
Uniformity in the time of elections seems not less
requisite for executing the idea of a regular rotation in
the Senate, and for conveniently assembling the Legislature at a stated period in each year.
It may be asked, Why then could not a time have
been -fixed in the Constitution? As the most zealous
adversaries of the plan of the Convention in this State,
are, in general, not less zealous admirers of the Constitution of the State, the question may be retorted, and
it may be asked, Why was not a time for the like purpose fixed in the Constitution of this State? No better
answer can be given than that it was a matter which
might safely be intrusted to Legislative discretion; and
that if a time had been appointed, it might, upon
experiment, have been found less convenient than some
other time.  The same answer may be given to the
question put on the other side. -And it may be added




428              The Federalist.
that the supposed danger of a gradual change being
merely speculative, it would have been hardly advisable
upon that speculation to establish, as a fundamental
point, what would deprive several States of the convenience of having the elections for their own Govern.
ments, and for the National Government, at the same
epochs.
PUBLIUS.
For the Independent Journal.
THE FCEDERALIST. No. LXI.
To THE PxOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORKm
H AVING examined the constitution of the House
of Representatives, and answered such of the objections against it as seemed to merit notice, I enter
next on the examination of the Senate.
The heads into which this member of the Government may be considered, are, I. The qualifications of Senators; II. The appointment of them by
the State Legislatures; III. The equality of representation in the Senate; IV. The number of Senators,
and the term for which they are to be elected; V. The
powers vested in the Senate.
I. The qualifications proposed for Senators, as distinguished from those of Representatives, consist in a
more advanced age, and a longer period of citizenship.
A Senator must be thirty years of age at least; as
a Representative must be twenty-five. And the former
must have been a citizen nine years; as seven years are
required for the latter. The propriety of these distinctions is explained by the nature of the Senatorial trust




The Federalist.            429
which, requiring greater extent of information and
stability of character, requires, at the same time,that
the Senator should have reached a period of life most
likely to supply these advantages; and which, participating immediately in transactions with foreign nations,
ought to be exercised by none who are not thoroughly
weaned from the prepossessions and habits incident
to foreign birth and education. The term of nine years
appears to be a prudent mediocrity between a total
exclusion of adopted citizens, whose merits and talents
may claim a share in the public confidence, and an
indiscriminate and hasty admission of them, which
might create a channel for foreign influence on the National Councils.
II. It is equally unnecessary to dilate on the appointment of Senators by the State Legislatures. Among
the various modes which might have been devised for
constituting this branch of the Government, that which
has been proposed by the Convention is probably the
most congenial with the public opinion. It is recommended by the double advantage of favoring a select
appointment, and of giving to the State Governments
such an agency in the formation of the Fcederal Government, as must secure the authority of the former, and
may form a convenient link between the two systems.
III. The equality of representation in the Senate is
another point, which, being evidently the result of compromise between the opposite pretensions of the large
and the small States, does not call for much discussion.
If indeed it be right, that among a People thoroughly
incorporated into one Nation, every district ought to
have a proportional share in the Government; and that
among independent and sovereign States, bound to.
gether by a simple league, the parties, however unequal
in size, ought to have an equal share in the common
-ouncils; it does not appear to be without some reason.




430               The Fcederalist.
that in a compound republic, partaking both of the Na.
tional and Fcederal character, the Government ought to
be founded on a mixture of the principles of proportional and equal representation. But it is superfluous
to try, by the standard of theory, a part of the Constitution which is allowed on all hands to be the result, not
of theory, but C" of a spirit of amity, and that mutual
" deference and concession which the peculiarity of our
"poliitical situation rendered indispensable." A common
Government, with powers equal to its objects, is called
for by the voice, and still more loudly by the political
situation, of America. A Government, founded on principles more consonant to the wishes of the larger States,
is not likely to be obtained from the smaller States.
The only option, then, for the former, lies between the
proposed Government, and a Government still more objectionable. Under this alternative, the advice of prudence must be, to embrace the lesser evil; and, instead
of indulging a fruitless anticipation of the possible mischiefs which may ensue, to contemplate rather the
advantageous consequences which may qualify the
sacrifice.
In this spirit it may be remarked, that the equal vote
allowed to each State is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the
individual States, and an instrument for preserving that
residuary sovereignty. So far the equality ought to be
no less acceptable to the large than to the small States;
s-nce they are not less solicitous to guard, by every possible expedient, against an improper consolidation of
the States into one simple republic.
Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in
the constitution of the Senate is, the additional impediment it must prove against improper acts of legislation. No law or resolution can now be passed without
the concurrence, first, of a majority of the People, and,




The Faederalist.            431
then, of a majority of the States. It must be acknowledged that this complicated check on legislation may, in
some instances, be injurious as well as beneficial; and
that the peculiar defence which it involves in favor of
the smaller States, would be more rational, if any interests common to them, and distinct from those of the
other States, would otherwise be exposed to peculiar
danger. But as the larger States will always be able,
by their power over the supplies, to defeat unreasonable
exertions of this prerogative of the lesser States, and as
the facility and excess of law-making seem to be the
diseases to which our Governments are most liable, it is
not impossible that this part of the Constitution may be
more convenient in practice, than it appears to many in
contemplation.
IV. The number of Senators, and the duration of
their appointment, corne next to be considered. In order
to form an accurate judgment on both these points, it
will be proper to inquire into the purposes which are to
be answered by a Senate; and in order to ascertain
these, it will be necessary to review the inconveniences
which a republic must suffer from the want of such an
institution.
First. It is a misfortune incident to republican Government, though in a less degree than to other Governments, that those who administer it may forget their
obligations to their constituents, and prove unfaithful to
their importaht trust. In this point of view, a Senate,
as a second branch of the Legislative Assembly, distinct
from, and dividing the power with, a first, must be in all
cases a'salutary check on the Government. It doubles
the security to the People, by requiring the concurrence
of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of one would
otherwise be sufficient. This is a precaution founded
on such clear principles, and now so well understood in




432               The Favderalist.
the United States, that it would be more than super.
fluous to enlarge on it. I will barely remark, that as the
improbability of sinister combinations will be in proportion to the dissimilarity in the genius of the two bodies,
it must be politic to distinguish them from each other
by every circumstance which will consist with a due
harmony in all proper measures, and with the genuine
principles of republican Government.
Secondly. The necessity of a Senate is not less indicated by the propensity of all single and numerous assemblies, to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent
passions, and to be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions. Examples on this
subject might be cited without number; and from proceedings within the United States, as well as from the
history of other nations. But a position that will not
be contradicted, need not be proved. All that need be
remarked, is, that a body which is to correct this infirmity, ought itself to be free from it, and consequently
ought to be less numerous. It ought, moreover, to possess great firmness, and consequently ought to hold its
authority by a tenure of considerable duration.
Thirdly. Another defect to be supplied by a Senate
lies in a want of due acquaintance with the objects and
principles of legislation. It is not possible that an as.
sembly of men called for the most part from pursuits of
a private nature, continued in appointment for a short
time, and led by no permanent motive to devote the intervals of public occupation to a study of the laws, the
affairs, and the comprehensive interests of their country,
should, if left wholly to themselves, escape a variety of
important errors in the exercise of their legislative trust.
It may be affirmed, on the best grounds, that no small
share of the present embarrassments of America is to be
charged on the blunders of our Governments; and that
these have proceeded from the heads rather than the




The Feaderalist.           433
hearts of most of the authors of them. What indeed
are all the repealing, explaining, and amending laws,
which fill and disgrace our voluminous codes, but so
many monuments of deficient wisdom; so many impeachments exhibited by each succeeding, against each
preceding session; so many admonitions to the People,
of the value of those aids which may be expected from
a well-constituted Senate?
A good Government implies two things: first, fidelity
to the object of Government, which is the happiness of
the People; secondly, a knowledge of the means by
which that object can be best attained. Some Governments are deficient in both these qualities; most Governments are deficient in the first.  I scruple not to assert,
that in American Governments too little attention has
been paid to the last. The Foederal Constitution avoids
this error; and what merits particular notice, it provides
for the last in a mode which increases the security for
the first.
Fourthly. The mutability in the public councils arising from a rapid succession of new members, however
qualified they may be, points out, in the strongest manner, the necessity of some stable institution in the Government. Every new election in the States is found to
change one half of the Representatives.  From this
change of men must proceed a change of opinions; and
from a change of opinions, a change of measures. But
a continual change even of good measures is inconsistent with every rule of prudence, and every prospect of
success. The remark is verified in private life, and becomes more just, as well as more important, in National
transactions.
To trace the mischievous effects of a mutable Government, would fill a volume. I will hint a few only, each
of which will be perceived to be a source of innumerable others.
VOL. I.        28




434               Thle Foederalist.
In the first place, it forfeits the respect and confidence
of other nations, and all the advantages connected with
National character. An individual who is observed to
be inconstant to his plans, or perhaps to carry on his
affairs without any plan at all, is marked at once, by all
prudent people, as a speedy victim to his own unsteadiness and folly. His more friendly neighbors may pity
him, but all will decline to connect their fortunes with
his; and not a few will seize the opportunity of making
their fortunes out of his. One nation is to another,
what one individual is to another; with this melancholy
distinction perhaps, that the former, with fewer of the
benevolent emotions than the latter, are under fewer
-restraints also from taking undue advantage from the
indiscretions of each other. Every nation, consequently,
whose affairs betray a want of wisdom and stability,
may calculate on every loss which can be sustained
from the more systematic policy of its wiser neighbors.
But the best instruction on this subject is unhappily
conveyed to America by the example of her own situa.
tion. She finds that she is held in no respect by her
friends; that she is the derision of her enemies; and that
she is a prey to every nation which has an interest in
speculating on her fluctuating councils and embarrassed
affairs.
The internal effects of a mutable policy are still more
calamitous. It poisons the blessing of liberty itself. It
will be of little avail to the People, that the laws are
made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so
voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent
that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or
revised before they are promulged, or undergo such
incessant changes that no man, who knows what the
law is to-day, can guess what it will be to-morrow.
Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that
be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed?




The Fcederalist.            435
Another effect of public instability is the unreasonable advantage it gives to the sagacious, the enterprising, and the moneyed few, over the industrious and
uninformed mass of the People. Every new regulation
concerning commerce or revenue, or in any manner affecting the value of the different species of property,
presents a new harvest to those who watch the change
and can trace its consequences; a harvest, reared not by
themselves, but by the toils and cares of the great body
of their fellow-citizens. This is a state of things, in
which it may be said, with some truth, that laws are
made for the few, not for the many.
In another point of view, great injury results from an
unstable Government. The want of confidence in the
public councils damps every useful undertaking, the
success and profit of which may depend on a continuance of existing arrangements. What prudent merchant will hazard his fortunes in any new branch of
commerce, when he knows not but that his plans may
be rendered unlawful before they can be executed?
What farmer or manufacturer will lay himself out for
the encouragement given to any particular cultivation
or establishment, when he can have no assurance that
his preparatory labors and advances will not render him
a victim to an inconstant Government? In a word, no
great improvement or laudable enterprise can go forward, which requires the auspices of a steady system of
National policy.
But the most deplorable effect of all is that diminution of attachment and reverence, which steals into the
hearts of the People, towards a political system which
betrays so many marks of infirmity, and disappoints so
many of their flattering hopes. No Government, any
more than an individual, will long be respected, without
being truly respectable; nor be truly respectable, with.
out possessing a certain portion of order and stability.
PUBLIUS.




436              The Foederalist
For the Independent Journal.
THE FCEDERALIST. No. LXII.
TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
A FIFTH desideratum, illustrating the utility of a
Senate, is the want of a due sense of National
character. Without a select and stable member of the
Government, the esteem of foreign powers will not only
be forfeited by an unenlightened and variable policy,
proceeding from the causes already mentioned, but the
National Councils will not possess that sensibility to the
opinion of the world, which is perhaps not less necessary in order to merit, than it is to obtain its respect and
confidence.
An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every Government, for two reasons: the one
is, that independently of the merits of any particular plan
or measure, it is desirable, on various accounts, that it
should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise
and honorable policy; the second is, that in doubtful
cases, particularly where the National Councils may be
warped by some strong passion, or momentary interest,
the presumed or known opinion of the impartial world
may be the best guide that can be followed. What has
not America lost by her want of character with foreign
nations; and how many errors and follies would she not
have avoided, if the justice and propriety of her measures had, in every instance, been previously tried by the
light in which they would probably appear to the unbiased part of mankind.
Yet however requisite a sense of National character
may be, it is evident that it can never be sufficiently




The Foederalist.           437
possessed by a numerous and changeable body. It car
only be found in a number so small that a sensible degree of the praise and blame of public measures may
be the portion of each individual; or in an assembly so
durably invested with public trust, that the pride and
consequence of its members may be sensibly incorporated with the reputation and prosperity of the community.  The half-yearly Representatives of Rhode
Island would probably have been little affected in their
deliberations on the iniquitous measures of that State,
by arguments drawn from the light in which such measures would be viewed by foreign nations, or even by
the sister States; whilst it can scarcely be doubted, that
if the concurrence of a select and stable body had been
necessary, a regard to National character alone would
have prevented the calamities under which that misguided People is now laboring.
I add, as a sixth defect, the want, in some important
cases, of a due responsibility in the Government to the
People, arising from that frequency of elections, which
in other cases produces this responsibility. This remark
will, perhaps, appear not only new, but paradoxical. It
must nevertheless be acknowledged, when explained, to
be as undeniable as it is important.
Responsibility, in order to be reasonable, must be limited to objects within the power of the responsible party;
and in order to be effectual, must relate to operations of
that power, of which a ready and proper judgment can
be formed by the constituents. The objects of Government may be divided into two general classes: the one
depending on measures which have singly an immediate
and sensible operation; the other depending on a suctession of well-chosen and well-connected measures,
which. have a gradual and perhaps unobserved operation.
The importance of the latter description to the collective and permanent welfare of every country, needs no




438               The Foederalist.
explanation. And yet it is evident, that an assembly
elected for so short a term as to be unable to provide
more than one or two links in a chain of measures, on
which the general welfare may essentially depend, ought
not to be answerable for the final result, any more than
a steward or tenant, engaged for one year, could be
justly made to answer for places or improvements which
could not be accomplished in less than half a dozen
years. Nor is it possible for the People to estimate the
share of influence which their annual assemblies may
respectively have on events resulting from the mixed
transactions of several years. It is sufficiently difficult,
to preserve a personal responsibility in the members of
a numerous body, for such acts of the body as have an
immediate, detached, and palpable operation on its constituents.
The proper remedy for this defect must be an additional body in the Legislative department, which having
sufficient permanency to provide for such objects as require a continued attention, and a train of measures
may be justly and effectually answerable for the attainment of those objects.
Thus far I have considered the circumstances which
point out the necessity of a well-constructed Senate,
only as they relate to the Representatives of the People.
To a People as little blinded by prejudice, or corrupted
by flattery, as those whom I address, I shall not scruple
to add, that such an institution may be sometimes necessary, as a defence to the People against their own
temporary errors and delusions.  As the cool and deliberate sense of the community ought, in all Governments,
and actually will, in all free Governments, ultimately
prevail over the views of its rulers: so there are particular moments in public affairs, when the People, stimulated by some irregular'passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of




The Faderalist.             439
interested men, may call for measures which they them
selves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and
condemn. In these critical moments, how salutary will
be the interference of some temperate and respectable
body of citizens, in order to check the misguided career,
and to suspend the blow meditated by the People against
themselves, until -reason, justice, and truth can regain
their authority over the public mind? What bitter anguish would not the People of Athens have often escaped, if their Government had contained so provident
a safeguard against the tyranny of their own passions?
Popular liberty might then have escaped the indelible
reproach of decreeing to the same citizens the hemlock
on one day, and statues on the next.
It may be suggested, that a People spread over an
extensive region cannot, like the crowded inhabitants of
a small district, be subject to the infection of violent
passions, or to the danger of combining in pursuit of
unjust measures. I am far from denying that this is a
distinction of peculiar importance. I have, on the con.
trary, endeavored in a former paper to show, that it is
one of the principal recommendations of a confederated
republic. At the same time, this advantage ought not
to be considered as superseding the use of auxiliary pre
cautions. It may even be remarked, that the same ex
tended situation, which will exempt the People of
America from some of the dangers. incident to lesser
republics, will expose them to the inconveniency of
remaining for a longer time under the influence of
those misrepresentations which the combined industry
of interested men may succeed in distributing among
them.
It adds no small weight to all these considerations, to
ecollect that history informs us of no long-lived republic, which had not a Senate. Sparta, Rome, and
Carthage are, in fact, the only States to whom  that




440               The Fcederalfst.
character can be applied. In each of the two first, there
was a Senate for life. The constitution of the Senate
in the last is less known.  Circumstantial evidence
makes it probable, that it was not different in this particular from the two others. It is at least certain, that
it had some quality or other which rendered it an anchor
against popular fluctuations; and that a smaller Council,
drawn out of the Senate, was appointed not only for life,
but filled up vacancies itself. These examples, though
as unfit for the imitation, as they are repugnant to the
genius, of America, are, notwithstanding, when compared
with the fugitive and turbulent existence of other ancient republics, very instructive proofs of the necessity
of some institution that will blend stability with liberty.
I am not unaware of the circumstances which distinguish
the American from other popular Governments, as well
ancient as modern; and which render extreme circumspection necessary, in reasoning from the one case to the
other. But after allowing due weight to this consideration, it may still be maintained, that there are many
points of similitude which render these examples not
unworthy of our attention. Many of the defects, as we
have seen, which can only be supplied by a Senatorial in.
stitution, are common to a numerous assembly frequently
elected by the People, and to the People themselves.
There are others peculiar to the former, which require
the control of such an institution. The People can
never wilfully betray their own interests; but they may
possibly be betrayed by the Representatives of the People; and the danger will be evidently greater, where the
whole Legislative trust is lodged in the hands of one
body of men, than where the concurrence of separate
and dissimilar bodies is required in every public Act.
The difference most relied on, between the American
and other republics, consists in the principle of represen.
tation; which is the pivot on which the former move,




The Foederalist.           441
and which is supposed to have been unknown to the latter, or at least to the ancient part of them. The use
which has been made of this difference, in reasonings
contained in former papers, will have shown, that I am
disposed neither to deny its existence, nor to undervalue
its importance. I feel the less restraint, therefore, in observing, that the position concerning the ignorance of
the ancient Governments on the subject of representa.
tion, is by no means precisely true in the latitude corn
monly given to it. Without entering into a disquisition
which here would be misplaced, I will refer to a few
known facts, in support of what I advance.
In the most pure democracies of Greece, many of the
Executive functions were performed, not by the People
themselves, but by officers elected by the People, and
representing the People in their Executive capacity.
Prior to the reform of SOLON, Athens was governed by
nine Archons, annually elected by the People at large.
The degree of power delegated to them, seems to be left
in great obscurity. Subsequent to that period, we find
an Assembly, first of four, and afterwards of six hundred members, annually elected by the People; and partially representing them in their Legislative capacity,
since they were not only associated with the People in
the function of making lawb, but had the exclusive
right of originating Legislative propositions to the People. The Senate of Carthage, also, whatever might be
its power, or the duration of its appointment, appears to
to have been elective by the suffrages of the People.
Similar instances might be traced in most, if not all
the popular Governments of antiquity.
Lastly, in Sparta, we* meet with the Ephori, and in
Rome with the Tribunes; two bodies, small indeed in
number, but annually elected by the whole body of the
People, and considered as the Representatives of the
People, almost in their plenipotentiary capacity. The




442               The Feaderalist.
Cosmi of Crete were also annually elected by the People,
and have been considered by some authors as an institution analogous to those of Sparta; and Rome, with
this difference only, that in the election of that representative body the right of suffrage was communicated to
a part only of the People.
From these facts, to which many others might be added,
it is clear that the principle of representation was neither
unknown to the ancients, nor wholly overlooked in their
political Constitutions. The true distinction between
these and the American Governments, lies in the total
exclusion of the People, in their collective capacity, from
any share in the latter, and not in the total exclusion of
the Representatives of the People from the administration
of the former. The distinction, however, thus qualified,
must be admitted to leave a most advantageous superiority in favor of the United States. But to insure to this advantage its full effect, we must be careful not to separate
it from the other advantage, of an extensive territory.
For it cannot be believed, that any form of representative
Government could have succeeded within the narrow
limits occupied by the democracies of Greece.
In answer to all these arguments, suggested by reason,
illustrated by examples, and enforced by our own experience, the jealous adversary of the Constitution will probably content himself with repeating, that a Senate appointed not immediately by the People, and for the term
of six years, must gradually acquire a dangerous preiminence in the Government, and finally transform it into a
tyrannical aristocracy.
To this general answer, the general reply ought to be
sufficient, that liberty may be endangered by the abuses
of liberty, as well as by the abuses of power; that there
are numerous instances of the former as well as of the
latter; and that the former, rather than the latter, is apparently most to be apprehended by the United States.
But a more particular reply may be given.




The Fwederalist.            443
Before such a revolution can be effected, the Senate
it is to be observed, must in the first place corrupt itself;
must next corrupt the State Legislatures  must then corrupt the House of Representatives; and must finally
corrupt the People at large. It is evident that the Senate must be first corrupted, before it can attempt an establishment of tyranny. Without corrupting the State
Legislatures, it cannot prosecute the attempt, because the
periodical change of members would otherwise regenerate the whole body. Without exerting the means of
corruption with equal success on the House of Representatives, the opposition of that coequal, branch of the
Government would inevitably defeat the attempt; and
without corrupting the People themselves, a succession of new Representatives would speedily restore all
things to their pristine order. Is there any man who can
seriously persuade himself, that the proposed Senate can,
by any possible means within the compass of human
address, arrive at the object of a lawless ambition,
through all these obstructions?
If reason condemns the suspicion, the same sentence
is pronounced by experience.  The Constitution of
Maryland furnishes the most apposite example. The
Senate of that State is elected, as the Fuederal Senate
will be, indirectly by the People, and for a term less by
one year only than' the Fcederal Senate. It is distinguished, also, by the remarkable prerogative of filling up
its own vacancies within the term of its appointment;
and at the same time, is not under the control of any
such rotation as is provided for the Foederal Senate.
There are some other lesser distinctions, which would
expose the former to colorable objections, that do not
lie against the latter. If the Foederal Senate, therefore,
really contained the danger which has been so loudly
proclaimedc some symptoms at least of a like danger
ought by this time to have been - betrayed by the Senate




444              The Fwderaltst.
of Maryland; but no such symptoms have appeared.
On the contrary, the jealousies at first entertained by
men of the same description with those who view with
terror the correspondent part of the Federal Constitu.
tion, have been gradually extinguished by the progress
of the experiment; and the Maryland Constitution is
daily deriving, from the salutary operation of this part
of it, a reputation in which it will probably not be rivalled by that of any State in the Union.
But if anything could silence the jealousies on this
subject, it ought to be the British example. The Senate
there, instead of being elected for a term of six years,
and of being unconfined to particular families or fortunes, is an hereditary Assembly of opulent nobles.
The House of Representatives, instead of being elected
for two years, and by the whole body of the People, is
elected for seven years, and, in very great proportion,
by a very small proportion of the People. Here, unquestionably, ought to be seen in full display the aristo.
cratic usurpations and tyranny which are at some future
period to be exemplified in the United States. Unfortunately, however, for the Anti-Foederal argument, the
British history informs us that this hereditary Assembly
has not even been able to defend itself against the continual encroachments of the House of Representatives;
and that it no sooner lost the support of the monarch,
than it was actually crushed by the weight of the popular
branch.
As far as antiquity can instruct us on this subject, its
examples support the reasoning which we have employed.
In Sparta, the Ephori, the annual Representatives of the
People, were found an overmatch for the Senate for life;
continually gained on its authority; and finally drew
all power into their own hands. The Tribunes of Rome,
who -were the Representatives of the People, prevailed,
it is well known, in almost every contest with the Senate




The Foederalist.           445
for life, and in the end gained the most complete tri.
umph over it. The fact is the more remarkable, as
unanimity was required in every act of the Tribunes,
even after their number was augmented to ten. It proves
the irresistible force possessed by that branch of a free
Government, which has the People on its side. To
these examples might be added that of Carthage, whose
Senate, according to the testimony of POLYBIUS, instead
of'drawing all power into its vortex, had, at the commencement of the second Punic War, lost almost the
whole of its original portion.
Besides the conclusive evidence resulting from this
assemblage of facts, that the Faederal Senate will never
be able to transform itself, by gradual usurpations, into
an independant and aristocratic body, we are warranted
in believing, that if such a revolution should ever happen
from causes which the foresight of man cannot guard
against, the House of Representatives, with the People
on their side, will at all times be able to bring back the
Constitution to its primitive form and principles. Against
the force of the immediate Representatives of the People,
nothing will be able to maintain even the Constitutional
authority of the Senate, but such a display of enlightened policy, and attachment to the public good, as will
divide with that branch of the Legislature the affections
and support of the entire body of the People themselves,
PUBLIUS.




446               The Fewderalist.
[From the New York Packet, Friday, March 7, 1788]
THE FIEDERALIST. No. LXIII.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
I T is a just and not a new observation, that enemies
to particular persons, and opponents to particular
measures, seldom confine their censures to such things
only in either as are worthy of blame. Unless on this
principle, it is difficult to explain the motives of their:
conduct, who condemn the proposed Constitution in the
aggregate, and treat with severity some of the most
unexceptionable Articles in it.
The second Section gives power to the President, "by
" and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make
" treaties, PROVIDED TWO THIRDS OF THE SENATORS PRES" ENT CONCUR.,"
The power of making treaties is an important one,
especially as it relates to war, peace, and commerce; and
it should not be delegated but in such a mode, and with
such precautions, as will afford the highest security, that
it will be exercised by men the best qualified for the
purpose, and in the manner most conducive to the public good.` The Convention appears to have been attentive to both these points; they have directed the President to be chosen by select bodies of Electors, to be
deputed by the People for that express purpose; and
they have committed the appointment of Senators to
the State Legislatures. This mode has, in such cases,
vastly the advantage of elections by the People in their
collective capacity, where the activity of party zeal, taking advantage of the supineness, the ignorance, and the
hopes and fears of the unwary and interested, often




The Fwderalist.              447
places men in office by the votes of a small proportion
of the Electors.
As the select Assemblies for choosing the President
as well as the State Legislatures who appoint the Senators, will in general be composed of the most enlightened and respectable citizens, there is reason to presume,
that their attention and their votes will be directed to
those men'only who have become the most distinguished by their abilities and virtue, and in whom the
People perceive just grounds for confidence. The Constitution manifests very particular attention to this object. By excluding men under thirty-five from the first
office, and those under thirty from the second, it confines
the Electors to men of whom the People have had time
to form a judgment, and with respect to whom they will
not be liable to be deceived by those brilliant appearances of genius and patriotism, which, like transient
meteors, sometimes mislead as well as dazzle. If the
observation be well founded, that wise Kings will always
be served by able ministers, it is fair to argue, that as an
Assembly of select Electors possess, in a greater degree
than Kings, the means of extensive and accurate information relative to men and characters, so will their appointments bear at least equal marks of discretion and
discernment. The inference which naturally results from
these considerations is this, that the President and Senators so chosen will always be of the number of those
who best understand our National interests, whether
considered in relation to the several States or to foreign
Nations, who are best able to promote those interests,
and whose reputation for integrity inspires and merits
confidence. With such men the power of making trea.
tieS may be safely lodged.
*Although the absolute necessity of system, in the con.
duet of any business, is universally known: and acknowl.
edged, yet the high importance of it in National affairs,




448              The Federalist.
has not yet become sufficiently impressed on the public
mind. They who wish to commit the power under consideration to a popular assembly, composed of members
constantly coming and going in quick succession, seem
not to recollect, that such a body must necessarily be
inadequate to the attainment of those great objects,
which require to be steadily contemplated in all their
relations and circumstances, and which can only be
approached and achieved by measures, which not only
talents, but also exact information, and often much time,
are necessary to concert and to execute. It was wise,
therefore, in the Convention to provide, not only that
the power of making treaties should be committed to
able and honest men, but also that they should continue
in place a sufficient time to become perfectly acquainted
with our National concerns, and to form and introduce
a system for the management of them. The duration
prescribed is such as will give them an opportunity of
greatly extending their political information, and of rendering their accumulating experience more and more
beneficial to their country. Nor has the Convention discovered less prudence, in providing for the frequent elections of Senators in such a way as to obviate the inconvenience of periodically transferring those great affairs
entirely to new men; for by leaving a considerable residue of the old ones in place, uniformity and order, as
well as a constant succession of official information, will
be preserved.
There are few who will not admit, that the affairs of
trade and navigation should be regulated by a system
cautiously formed and steadily pursued; and that both
our treaties and our laws should correspond with and be
made to promote it. It is of much consequence that
this correspondence and conformity be carefully maintained; and they who assent to the truth of this position
will see and confess, that it is well provided for by mak



The Fcederalist.             449
ing concurrence of the Senate necessary, both to treaties
and to laws.
It seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties, of
whatever nature, but that perfect secrecy and immediate
despatch are sometimes requisite. There are cases where
the most useful intelligence may be obtained, if the persons possessing it can be relieved frorp apprehensions of
discovery. Those apprehensions will operate on those
persons, whether they are actuated by mercenary or
friendly motives; and there doubtless are many of both
descriptions, who would rely on the secrecy of the President, but who would not confide in that of the Senate,
and still less in that of a large popular Assembly. The
Convention have done well, therefore, in so disposing of
the power of making treaties, that although the President must, in forming them, act by the advice and consent of the Senate, yet -he will be able to manage the
business of intelligence in such a manner as prudence
may suggest.
They who have turned their attention to the affairs of
men, must have perceived that there are tides in them;
tides very irregular in their duration, strength, and direction, and seldom found to run twice exactly in the same
manner or measure. To discern and to profit by these
tides in National affairs, is the business of those who
preside over them; and they who have had much experience on this head inform us, that there frequently are
occasions when days, nay, even when hours are precious.
The loss of a battle, the death of a Prince, the removal
of a minister, or other circumstances intervening to
change the present posture and aspect of affairs, may
turn the most favorable tide into a course opposite to
our wishes. As in the field, so in the cabinet, there are
moments to be seized as they pass, and they who preside in either, should be left in capacity to improve
them. So often and so essentially have we heretofore
VOL. i.           29




450              The Fwderalist.
suffered from the want of secrecy and despatch, that the
Constitution would have been inexcusably defective, if
no attention had been paid to those objects. Those
matters which in negotiations usually require the most
secrecy and the most despatch, are those preparatory and
auxiliary measures which are no otherwise important in
a National view, than as they tend to facilitate the at.
tainment of the objects of the negociation. For these,,
the President will find no difficulty to provide; and
should any circumstance occur, which requires the advice and consent of the Senate, he may at any time
convene them. Thus we see, that the Constitution provides that our negotiations for treaties shall have every
advantage which can be derived from talents, information, integrity, and deliberate investigations, on the one
hand, and from secrecy and despatch, on the other.
But to this plan, as to most others that have ever
appeared, objections are contrived and urged.
Some are displeased with it, not on account of any
errors or defects in it, but because, as the treaties, when
made, are to have the force of laws, they should be made
only by men invested with Legislative authority. These
gentlemen seem not to consider that the judgments of
our courts, and the commissions constitutionally given
by our Governor, are as valid and as binding on all persons whom they concern, as the laws passed by our
Legislature. All Constitutional acts of power, whether
in the Executive or in the Judicial department, have as
much legal validity and obligation as if they proceeded
from the Legislature; and therefore, whatever name be
given to the power of making treaties, or however obligatory they may be when made, certain it is, that the
People may, with much propriety, commit the power to
a distinct body from the Legislature, the Executive, or
the Judicial.  It surely does not follow, that because
they have given the power of making laws to the Legis



The Fwoderalist.            451
lature, that therefore they should likewise give them
power to do every other act of sovereignty by which the
citizens are to be bound and affected.
Others, though content that treaties should be made
in the mode proposed, are averse to their being the
supreme laws of the land. They insist, and profess to
believe, that treaties, like Acts of Assembly, should be
repealable at pleasure. This idea seems to be new and
peculiar to this country; but new errors, as well as new
truths, often appear. These gentlemen would do well to
reflect, that a treaty is only another name for a bargain;
and that it would be impossible to find a Nation who
would make any bargain with us, which should be binding on them absolutely, but on us only so long and so
far as we may think proper to be bound by it. They
who make laws may, without doubt, amend or repeal
them; and it will not be disputed that they who make
treaties may alter or cancel them: but still let us not
forget that treaties are made, not by only one of the contracting parties, but by both; and consequently, that as
the consent of both was essential to their formation at
first, so must it ever afterwards be to alter or cancel
them. The proposed Constitution, therefore, has not in
the least extended the obligation of treaties. They are
just as binding, and just as far beyond the lawful reach
of Legislative Acts now, as they will be at any future
period, or under any form of Government.
However useful jealousy may be in republics, yet
when like bile in the natural, it abounds too much in
the body politic, the eyes of both become very liable to
be deceived by the delusive appearances which that malady casts on surrounding objects.  From this cause,
probably, proceed the fears and apprehensions of some,
that the President and Senate may make treaties without an -equal eye to the interests of all the States. Others suspect, that two thirds will oppress the remaining




.152              The FEderalist.
third, and ask, whether those gentlemen are made suffi.
ciently responsible for their conduct; whether, if they
act corruptly, they can be punished; and if they make
disadvantageous treaties, how are we to get rid of those
treaties?
As all the States are equally represented in the Senate, and by men the most able and the most willing to
promote the'interests of their constituents, they will all
have an equal degree of influence in that body, especially
while they continue to be careful in appointing proper
persons, and to insist on their punctual attendance. In
proportion as the United States assume a National form,
and a National character, so will the good of the whole
be more and more an object of attention; and the Government must be a weak one indeed, if it should forget,
that the good of the whole can only be promoted by advancing the good of each of the parts or members which
compose the whole. It will not be in the power of the
President and Senate to make any treaties, by which
they, and their families and estates, will not be equally
bound and affected with the rest of the community; and
having no private interests distinct from that of the
Nation, they will be under no temptations to neglect the
latter.
As to corruption, the case is not supposable. He must
either have been very unfortunate in his intercourse with
the world, or possess a heart very susceptible of such im.
pressions, who can think it probable, that the President
and two thirds of the Senate will ever be capable of such
unworthy conduct. The idea is too gross, and too invidious, to be entertained. But in such a case, if it should
ever happen, the treaty so obtained from us would, like
all other fraudulent contracts, be null and void by the
law of Nations.
With respect to their responsibility, it is difficult to
conceive how it could be increased. Every consideram




The Federalist.             453
tion that can influence the human mind, such as honor,
oaths, reputations, conscience, the love of country, and
family affections and attachments, afford security for their
fidelity. In short, as the Constitution has taken the utmost care that they shall be men of talents and integrity, we have reason to be persuaded, that the treaties
they make will be as advantageous, as, all circumstances
considered, could be made; and so far as the fear of punishment and disgrace can operate, that motive to good
behavior is amply afforded by the Article on the subject
of impeachments.
PUBLIUIS.
[From the New York Packet, Friday, March 7, 1788.]
THE F(EDERALIST. No. LXIV.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
THE remaining powers which the plan of the Convention allots to the Senate, in a distinct capacity,
are comprised in their participation with the Executive
in the appointment to offices, and in their Judicial character as a Court for the trial of impeachments:. As in
the business of appointments,-the Executive will be the
principal agent, the provisions relating to it will most
properly be discussed in the examination of that department. We will therefore conclude this head, with a view
of the Judicial character of the Senate.
Aiwell-constituted Court for the trial of impeach.
ments is an object not more to be desired, than difficult
*o be obtained in a Government wholly elective. The
subjects of its jurisdiction are those offences which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other




454               The Faderalhst.
words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust
They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety
be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to -injuries done immediately to the society itself. The prosecution of them, for this reason, will seldom fail to agitate
the passions of the whole community, and to divide it
into parties more or less friendly, or inimical, to the accused. In many cases, it will connect itself with the
preSxisting factions, and will enlist all their animosities,
partialities, influence, and interest on one side, or on the
other; and in such cases, there.will always be the greatest danger, that the decision will be regulated more by
the' comparative strength of parties, than by the real
demonstrations of innocence or guilt.
The delicacy and magnitude of a trust, which so deeply
concerns the political reputation and existence of every
man engaged in the administration of public affairs, speak
for themselves. The difficulty of placing it rightly, in a
Government resting entirely on the basis of periodical
elections, will as readily be perceived, when it is considered that the most conspicuous characters in it will, from
that circumstance, be too often the leaders, or the tools
of the most cunning or the most numerous faction, and
on this account, can hardly be expected to possess the
requisite neutrality towards those whose conduct may
be the subject of scrutiny.
The Convention, it appears, thought the Senate the
most fit depositary of this important trust. Those who
can best discern the intrinsic difficulty of the thing, will
be least hasty in condemning that opinion; and will be
most inclined to allow due weight to the arguments
which may be supposed to have produced it.
What, it may be asked, is the true spirit of the institution itself? Is it not designed as a method of NATIONAL INQUEST into the conduct of public men?  If
this be the design of it, who can so properly be the in



The Fwoderalist.            45o
quisitors for the Nation as the Representatives of the
Nation themselves? It is not disputed that the power
of originating the inquiry, or in other words, of preferring the impeachment, ought to be lodged in the hands
of one branch of the Legislative body: will not the reasons which indicate the propriety of this arrangement,
strongly plead for an admission of the other branch of
that body to a share of the inquiry? The model, from
which the idea of this institution has been borrowed,
pointed out that course to the Convention. In Great
Britain, it is the province of the House of Commons to
prefer the impeachment; and of the House of Lords to
decide upon it. Several of the State Constitutions have
followed the example. As well the latter, as the former,
seem to have regarded the practice of impeachments, as
a bridle in the hands of the Legislative body upon the
Executive servants of the Government. Is not this the
true light in which it ought to be regarded?
Where else than in the Senate could have been found
a tribunal sufficiently dignified, or sufficiently independent? What other body would be likely to feel confidence enough in its own situation, to preserve, unawed
and uninfluenced, the necessary impartiality between an
individual accused, and the Representatives of the People, his accusers?
Could the Supreme Court have been relied upon as
answering this description? It is much to be doubted,
whether the members of that tribunal would at all times
be endowed with so eminent a portion of fortitude, as
would be called for in the execution of so difficult a task;
and it is still more to be doubted, whether they would
possess the degree of credit and authority, which might,
on certain occasions, be indispensable towards reconciling the People to a decision that should happen to clash
with an -accusation brought by their immediate Repre.
sentatives. A deficiency in the first, would be fatal to




456               The Faderalist
the accused; in the last, dangerous to the public tran.
quillity. The hazard in both these respects, could only
be avoided, if at all, by rendering that tribunal more numerous than would consist with a reasonable attention
to economy. The necessity of a numerous Court for the
trial of impeachments, is equally dictated by the nature
of the proceeding. This can never be tied down by such
strict rules, either in the delineation of the offence by the
prosecutors, or in the construction of it by the Judges, as
in common cases serve to limit the discretion of Courts
in favor of personal security. There will be no jury to
stand between the Judges, who are to pronounce the sentence of the law, and the party who is to receive or suffer
it. The awful discretion which a Court of Impeachments
must necessarily have, to doom to honor or to infamy the
most confidential and the most distinguished characters
of the community, forbids the commitment of the trust
to a small number of persons.
These considerations seem alone sufficient to authorize a conclusion, that the Supreme Court would have
been an improper substitute for the Senate, as a Court
of Impeachments. There remains a further consideration, which will not a little strengthen this conclusion.
It is this:- The punishment which may be the consequence of conviction upon impeachment, is not to terminate the chastisement of the offender. After having
been sentenced to a perpetual ostracism from the esteem
and confidence, and honors and emoluments of his country, he will still be liable to prosecution and punishment
in the ordinary course of law. Would it be proper that
the persons who had disposed of his fame, and his most
valuable rights as a citizen, in one trial, should, in another trial, for the same offence, be also the disposers of
his life and his fortune? Would there not be the greatest reason to apprehend, that error, in the first sentence,
would be the parent of error in the second sentence?




The Fwderalist.            457
That the strong bias of one decision would be apt to
overrule the influence of any new lights which might
be brought to vary the complexion of another decision?
Those who know anything of human nature, will not
hesitate to answer these questions in the affirmative;
and will be at no loss to perceive, that by making the
same persons Judges in both cases, those who might
happen to be the objects of prosecution would, in a
great measure, be deprived of the double security intended them by a double trial. The loss of life and
estate would often be virtually included in a sentence.
which, in its terms, imported nothing more than dismission from a present, and disqualification for a future
office. It may be said, that the intervention of a Jury,
in the second instance, would obviate the danger. But
Juries are frequently influenced by the opinions of
Judges. They are sometimes induced to find special
verdicts, which refer the main question to the decision
of the Court. Who would be willing to stake his life
and his estate upon the verdict of a Jury acting under
the auspices of Judges who had predetermined his guilt?
Would it have been an improvement of the plan, to
have united the Supreme Court with the Senate, in the
formation of the Court of Impeachments? This union
would certainly have been attended with several advantages; but would they not have been overbalanced by
the signal disadvantage, already stated, arising from the
agency of the same Judges in the double prosecution to
which the offender would be liable? To a certain extent, the benefits of that union will be obtained from
making the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court the
President of the Court of Impeachments, as is proposed
to be done in the plan of the Convention; while the
inconveniences of an entire incorporation of the former
into the- latter will be substantially avoided. This was
perhaps the prudent mean I forbear to remark upon




458              The Faideralist.
the additional pretext for clamor against the Judiciary
which so considerable an augmentation of its authority
would have afforded.
Would it have been desirable to have composed the
Court for the trial of impeachments, of persons wholly
distinct from the other departments of the Government?
There are weighty arguments, as well against, as in favor of such a plan. To some minds it will not appear a
trivial objection, that it could tend to increase the complexity of the political machine, and to add a new spring
to the Gove'rlment, the utility of which would at best be
questionable.  But an objection which will not be
thought by any unworthy of attention, is this: a Court
formed upon such a plan, would either be attended with
a heavy expense, or might in practice be subject to a variety of casualties and inconveniences. It must either
consist of permanent officers, stationary at the seat of
Government, and of course entitled to fixed and regular
stipends, or of certain officers of the State Governments,
to be called upon whenever an impeachment was actually depending. It will not be easy to imagine any third
mode materially different, which could rationally be proposed. As the Court, for reasons already given, ought
to be numerous, the first scheme will be reprobated by
every man, who can compare the extent of the public
wants with the means of supplying them; the second
will be espoused with caution by those who will seriously consider the difficulty of collecting men dispersed
over the whole Union; the injury to the innocent, from
the procrastinated determination of the charges which
might be brought against them; the advantage to the
guilty, from the opportunities which delay would afford
to intrigue and corruption; and in some cases the detriment to the State, from the prolonged inaction of men
whose firm and faithful execution of their duty might
have exposed them to the persecution of an intemperate




The Fwderalist.             459
or designing majority in the House of Representatives
Though this latter supposition may seem harsh, and
might not be likely often to be verified, yet it ought not
to be forgotten that the demon of faction will, at certain seasons, extend his sceptre over all numerous bodies of men.
But though one or the other of the substitutes which
have been examined, or some other that might be devised, should be thought preferable to the plan, in this
respect, reported by the Convention, it will not follow
that the Constitution ought for this reason to be rejected.
If mankind were to resolve to agree in no institution of
Government, until every part of it had been adjusted to
the most exact standard of perfection, society would soon
become a general scene of anarchy, and the world a desert. Where is the standard of perfection to be found?
Who will undertake to unite the discordant opinions of
a whole community, in the same judgment of it; and to
prevail upon one conceited projector to renounce his infallible criterion for the fallible criterion of his more conceited neighbor? To answer the purpose of the adversaries of the Constitution, they ought to prove, not
merely that particular provisions in it are not the best
which might have been'imagined, but that the plan
upon the whole is bad and pernicious.
PUBLIUS.




460              The Foederalist.
[Fronm the New York Packet, Tuesday, March 11, 1788.]
THE FCEDERALIST. No. LXV.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
A   REVIEW  of the principal objections that have
appeared against the proposed Court for the trial
of impeachments, will not improbably eradicate the remains of any unfavorable impressions which may still
exist in regard to this matter.
The first of these objections is, that the provision in
question confounds Legislative and Judiciary authorities in the same body, in violation of that important and
well-established maxim which requires a separation between the different departments of power. The true
meaning of this maxim has been discussed and ascertained in another place, and has been shown to be entirely compatible with a partial intermixture of those departments for special_ purposes, preserving them, in the
main, distinct and unconnected. This partial intermixture is even, in some cases, not only proper, but necessary to the mutual defence of the several members
of the Government against each other. An absolute or
qualified negative in the Executive upon the acts of the
Legislative body, is admitted by the ablest adepts in
political science, to be an indispensable barrier against
the encroachments of the latter upon the former. And
it may, perhaps, with no less reason be contended, that
the powers relating to impeachments are, as before intimated, an essential check in the hands of that body
upon the encroachments of the Executive. The division
of them between the two branches of the Legislature,
assigning to one the right of accusing, to the other the




The Faederalist.               461
right of judging, avoids the inconvenience of making
the same persons both accusers and Judges; and guards
against the danger of persecution, from the prevalency
of a factious spirit in either of those branches. As the
concurrence of two thirds of the Senate will be requisite to a condemnation, the security to innocence, from
this additional circumstance, will be as complete as
itself can desire.
It is curious to observe, with what vehemence this
part of the plan is assailed, on the principle here taken
notice of, by men who profess to admire, without exception, the Constitution of this State; while that Constitution makes the Senate, together with the Chancellor
and Judges of the Supreme Court, not only a Court of.Impeachments, but the highest Judicatory in the State,
in all causes, civil and criminal. The proportion, in
point of numbers, of the Chancellor and Judges to the
Senators, is so inconsiderable, that the Judiciary authority of New York, in the last resort, may, with truth,
be said to reside in its Senate. If the plan of the Convention be, in this respect, chargeable with a departure
from the celebrated maxim which has been so often
mentioned, and seems to be so little understood, how
much more culpable must be the Constitution of New
York? *
A second objection to the Senate, as a Court of Impeachments, is, that it contributes to an undue accumulation of power in that body, tending to give to the
Government a countenance too aristocratic. The Senate, it is observed, is to have concurrent authority with
the Executive in the formation of treaties and in the
appointment to offices: if, say the objectors, to these
prerogatives is added that of deciding in all cases of
* In that of New Jersey, also, sylvania, and South Carolina, one
the final judiciary authority is in a branch of the Legislature is the
branch of the Legislature. In New  Court for the trial of impeachIampshire, Massachusetts, Penn- ments. — Publius.




462               The Faderalist.
impeachment, it will give a decided predominancy to
senatorial influence. To an objection so little precise in
itself, it is not easy to find a very precise answer.
Where is the measure or criterion to which we can appeal, for determining what will give the Senate too
much, too little, or barely the proper degree of influence? Will it not be more safe, as well as more simple, to dismiss such vague and uncertain calculations, to
examine each power by itself, and to decide, on general
principles, where it may be deposited with most advantage and least inconvenience?
If we take this course, it will lead to a more intelligible, if not to a more certain result. The disposition
of the power of making treaties, which has obtained in
the plan of the Convention, will, then, if I mistake not,
appear to be fully justified by the considerations stated
in a former number, and by others which will occur under the next head of our inquiries. The expediency of
the junction of the Senate with the Executive, in the
power of appointing to offices, will, I trust, be placed in
a light not less satisfactory, in the disquisitions under
the same head. And I flatter myself the observations
in my last paper must have gone no inconsiderable way
towards proving, that it was not easy, if practicable, to
find a more fit receptacle for the power of determining
impeachments, than that which has been chosen. If
this be truly the case, the hypothetical dread of the too
great weight of the Senate- ought to be discarded from
our reasonings.
But this hypothesis, such as it is, has already been
refuted in the remarks applied to the duration in office
prescribed for the Senators. It was by them shown, as
well on the credit of historical examples, as from the
reason of the thing, that the most popular branch of every
Government, partaking of the republican genius, by
being generally the favorite of the People, will be as




The Federalist.             463
generally a full match, if not an overmatch, for every
other member of the Government.
But independent of this most active and operatiw
principle, to secure the equilibrium' of the National
House of Representatives, the plan of the Convention
has provided in its favor several important counterpoises
to the additional authorities to be conferred upon the
Senate. The exclusive privilege of originating money
bills will belong to the House of Representatives. The
same House will possess the sole right of instituting impeachments: is not this a complete counterbalance to
that of determining them? The same House will be the
umpire in all elections of the President, which do not
unite the suffrages of a majority of the whole number
of Electors; a case which it cannot be doubted will
sometimes, if not frequently, happen.  The constant
possibility of the thing must be a fruitful source of influence to that body. The more it is contemplated, the
more important will appear this ultimate, though contingent power, of deciding the competitions of the most
illustrious citizens of the Union, for the first office in it.
It would not perhaps be rash to predict, that as a mean
of influence it will be found to outweigh all the peculiar
attributes of the Senate.
A third objection to the Senate as a Court of Impeachments, is drawn from the agency they are to have in
the appointments to oftice.  It is imagined that they
would be too indulgent Judges of the conduct of men,
in whose official creation they had participated. The
principle of this objection would condemn a practice,
which is to be seen in all the State Governments, if not
in all the Governments with which we are acquainted:
I mean that of rendering those who hold offices during
pleasure, dependent on the pleasure of those who appoint them. With equal plausibility might it be alleged
in this case, that the favoritism of the latter would al




464               The Fcederalist.
ways be an asylum for the misbehavior of the former.
But that practice, in contradiction to this principle, proceeds upon the presumption, that the responsibility of
those who appoint, for the fitness and competency of the
persons on whom they bestow their choice, and the interest they will have in the respectable and prosperous
administration of affairs, will inspire a sufficient disposition to dismiss from a share in it all such, who, by their
conduct, shall have proved themselves unworthy of the
confidence reposed in them. Though facts may not al
ways correspond with this presumption, yet if it be, in
the main, just, it must destroy the supposition that the
Senate, who will merely sanction the choice of the Executive, should feel a bias, towards the objects of that
choice, strong enough to blind them to the evidences of
guilt so extraordinary, as to have induced the Representatives of the Nation to become its accusers.
If any further arguments were necessary to evince the
improbability of such a bias, it might be found in the
nature of the agency of the Senate in the business of
appointments.
It will be the office of the President to nominate, and,
with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint.
There will, of course, be no exertion of choice on the
part of the Senate. They may defeat one choice of the
Executive, and oblige him to make another; but they
cannot themselves choose - they can only ratify or reject the choice of the President. They might even entertain a preference to some other person, at the very moment they were assenting to the one proposed; because
there might be no positive ground of opposition to him;
and they could not be sure, if they withheld their assent, that the subsequent nomination would fall upon
their own favorite, or upon any other person in their estimation more meritorious than the one rejected. Thus
it could hardly happen, that the majority of the Senate




The Foaderalist.           465
would feel any other complacency towards the object of
an appointment than such as the appearances of merit
might inspire, and the proofs of the want of it destroy.
A fourth objection to the Senate, in the capacity of a
Court of Impeachments, is derived from their union with
the Executive in the power of making treaties. This, it
has been said, would constitute the Senators their own
Judges, in every case of a corrupt or perfidious execution
of that trust. After having combined with the Executive in betraying the interests of the Nation in a ruinous
treaty, what prospect, it is asked, would there be of their
being made to suffer the punishment they would deserve
when they were themselves to decide upon the accusation brought against them for the treachery of which they
had been guilty?
This objection has been circulated with more earnestness, and with greater show of reason than any other
which has appeared against this part of the plan; and
yet I am deceived, if it does not rest upon an erroneous
foundation.
The security essentially intended by the Constitution
against corruption and treachery in the formation of
treaties, is to be sought for in the numbers and characters of those who are to make them. The JOINT AGENCY
of the Chief Magistrate of the Union, and of two thirds
of the members of a body selected by the collective wisdom of the Legislatures of the several States, is designed
to be the pledge for the fidelity of the National Councils in this particular. The Convention might with propriety have meditated the punishment of the Executive,
for a deviation from the instructions of the Senate, or a
want of integrity in the conduct of the negotiations committed to him; they might also have had in view the
punishment of a few leading individuals in the Senate,
who should have prostituted their influence in that body
as the mercenary instruments of foreign corruption: but
VOL. I.        30




466               The Fwderalist.
they could not, with more or with equal propriety, have
contemplated,,the impeachment and punishment of two
thirds of the Senate, consenting to an improper treaty,
than of a majority of that or of the other branch of the
National Legislature, consenting to a pernicious or unconstitutional law: a principle which, I believe, has
never been admitted into any Government. How, in
fact, could a majority of the House of Representatives
impeach themselves?  Not better, it is evident, than
two thirds of the Senate might try themselves.  And
yet what reason is there, that a majority of the House
of Representatives, sacrificing the interests of the society by an unjust and tyrannical act of legislation, should
escape with impunity, more than two thirds of the Senate, sacrificing the same interests in an injurious treaty
with a foreign power? The truth is, that in all such
cases it is essential to the freedom, and to the necessary
independence of the deliberations of the body, that the
members of it should be exempt from punishment for
acts done in a collective capacity; and the security to
the society must depend on the care which is taken to
confide the trust to proper hands, to make it their interest to execute it with fidelity, and to make it as difficult
as possible for them to combine in any interest opposite
to that of the public good.
So far as might concern the misbehavior of the Executive in perverting the instructions, or contravening the
views of the Senate, we need not be apprehensive of the
want of a disposition in that body to punish the abuse
of their confidence, or to vindicate their own authority.
We may thus far count upon their pride, if not upon
their virtue. And so far even as might concern the corruption of leading members, by whose arts and influence
the majority may have been inveigled into measures
odious to the community, if the proofs of that corruption
should be satisfactory, the usual propensity of human




The Fwderalist.             467
nature will warrant us in concluding that there would
be commonly no defect of inclination in the body to
divert the public resentment from themselves by a ready
sacrifice of the authors of their mismanagement and dis.
grace.
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, March 11, 1788.]
THE FCEDERALIST. No. LXVI.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
THE Constitution of the Executive department of the
proposed Government, claims next our attention.
There is hardly any part of the system which could
have been attended with greater difficulty in the arrangement of it than this; and there is, perhaps, none
which has been inveighed against with less candor or
criticised with less judgment.
Here the writers against the Constitution seem to have
taken pains to signalize their talent of misrepresentation.
Calculating upon the aversion of the People to monarchy,
they have endeavored to enlist all their jealousies and
apprehensions in opposition to the intended President
of the United States; not merely as the embryo, but as
the full-grown progeny of that detested parent. To establish the pretended affinity, they have not scrupled to
draw resources even from the regions of fiction. The
authorities of a magistrate, in few instances greater, in
some instances less, than those of a Governor of New
York, have been magnified into more than royal prerogatives. He has been decorated with attributes superior
in dignity and splendor to those of a King of Great Brit.




468              The F14deralist.
ain. He has been shown to us with the diadem spar.
kling on his brow and the imperial purple flowing in his
train. He has been seated on a throne surrounded with
minions and mistresses, giving audience to the Envoys
of foreign potentates, in all the supercilious pomp of
majesty. The images of Asiatic despotism and voluptuousness have scarcely been wanting to crown the exaggerated scene. WVe have been taught to tremble at
the terrific visages of murdering janizaries; and to blush
at the unveiled mysteries of a future seraglio.
Attempts so extravagant as these to disfigure, or it
might rather be said, to metamorphose the object, render
it necessary to take an accurate view of its real nature
and form: in order as well to ascertain its true aspect
and genuine appearance, as to unmask the disingenuity,
and expose the fallacy of the counterfeit resemblances
which have been so insidiously, as well as industriously,
propagated.
In the execution of this task, there is no man who
would not find it an arduous effort either to behold with
moderation, or to treat with seriousness the devices, not
less weak than wicked, which have been contrived to
pervert the public opinion in relation to the subject.
They so far exceed the usual, though unjustifiable licenses of party artifice, that even in a disposition the
most candid and tolerant, they must force the sentiments
which favor an indulgent construction of the conduct of
political adversaries to give place to a voluntary and unreserved indignation. It is impossible not to bestow the
imputation of deliberate imposture and deception upon
the gross pretence of a similitude between a King of
Great Britain and a magistrate of the character marked
out for that of the President of the United States. It is
still more impossible to withhold that imputation from
the rash and barefaced expedients which have been
employed to give success to the attempted imposition.




The 1F vderalist.           469
In one instance, which I cite as a sample of the
general spirit, the temerity has proceeded so far as tc
ascribe to the President of the United States a powel
which by the instrument reported is expressly allotted to
the Executives of the individual States. I mean the
power of filling casual vacancies in the Senate.
This bold experiment upon the discernment of his
countrymen, has been hazarded by a writer who (whatever may be his real merit) has had no inconsiderable
share in the applauses of his party;  and who, upon this
false and unfounded suggestion, has built a series of
observations equally false and unfounded. Let him now
be confronted with the evidence of the fact; and let him,
if he be able, justify or extenuate the shameful outrage
he has offered to the dictates of truth, and to the rules
of fair dealing.
The second Clause of the second Section of the second Article empowers the President of the United
States " to nominate, and by and with the advice and
" consent of the Senate, to appoint Ambassadors, other
" public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme
"Court, and all other officers of the United States,
" whose appointments are not in the Constitution other-'"wise provided for, and which shall be established by
"law." Immediately after this Clause follows another
in these words: " The President shall have power to fill
" up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of
" the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire
" at the end of their next session."  It is from this last
provision that th6 pretended power of the President to
fill vacancies in the Senate has been deduced. A slight
attention to the connection of the Clauses, and to the
obvious meaning of the terms, will satisfy us that the
deduction is not even colorable.
The first of these two Clauses, it is clear only provides
4 See Cato, No. V. - Publius.




470                The Faederalist.
a mode for appointing such officers, "whose appoint"ments are not otherwise provided for in the Constitu"tion, and which shall be established by law; " of course
it cannot extend to the appointment of Senators, whose
appointments are otherwise provided for in the Constitution,* and who are established by the Constitution, and
will not require a future establishment by law. This
position will hardly be contested.
The last of these two clauses, it is equally clear, cannot be understood to comprehend the power of filling
vacancies in the Senate, for the following reasons: —
First. The relation in which that Clause stands to the
other, which declares the general mode of appointing
officers of the United States, denotes it to be nothing
more than a supplement to the other; for the purpose
of establishing an auxiliary method of appointment, in
cases to which the general method was inadequate,
The ordinary power of appointment is confined to the
President and Senate jointly, and can therefore only be
exercised during the session of the Senate; but as it
would have been improper to oblige this body to be continually in session for the appointment of officers, and
as vacancies might happen in their recess, which it
might be necessary for the public service to fill without
delay, the succeeding clause is evidently intended to
authorize the President, singly, to make temporary appointments " during the recess of the Senate, by grant"ing commissions which should expire at the end of
"their next session."  Secondly. If this Clause is to be
considered as supplementary to the one which precedes,
the vacancies of which it speaks must be construed to
relate to the "officers " described in the preceding one;
and this, we have seen, excludes from its description
the members of the Senate. Thirdly. The time within
which the power is to operate, "during the recess of the
* Article 1, Section 3, Clause 1.- Publius.




The Federalist.             471
"Senate," and the duration of the appointments, " to the
"end of the next session' of that body, conspire to elucidate the sense of the provision, which, if it had been
intended to comprehend Senators, would naturally have
referred the temporary power of filling vacancies to the
recess of the State Legislatures, who are to make the
permanent appointments, and not to the recess of the
National Senate, who are to have no concern in those
appointments; and would have extended the duration
in office of the temporary Senators to the next session
of the Legislature of the State, in whose representation
the vacancies had happened, instead of making it to expire at the end of the ensuing session of the National
Senate. The circumstances of the body authorized to
make the permanent appointments would, of course,
have governed the modification of a power which related to the temporary appointments; and as the
National Senate is the body, whose situation is alone
contemplated in the Clause upon which the suggestion
under examination has been founded, the vacancies to
which it alludes can only be deemed to respect those
officers in whose appointment that body has a concurrent agency with the President. But lastly, the first and
second Clauses of the third Section of the first Article,
not only obviate all possibility of doubt, but destroy the
pretext of misconception. *The former provides, that
"the Senate of the United States shall be composed of
" two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legisla" ture thereof for six years;" and the latter directs, that,
"if vacancies in that body should happen by resignation
"or otherwise, during the recess of the Legislature of
" ANY STATE, the Executive THEREOF may make tempo."rary appointments until the next meeting of the Legis.
"lature, which shall then fill such vacancies."  Here is
an express power given, in clear and unambiguous
terms, to the State Executives, to fill the casual vacan



472               The Faederalist.
cies in the Senate, by temporary appointments; which
not only invalidates the supposition, that the Clause
before considered could have been intended to confer
that power upon the President of the United States,
but proves that this supposition, destitute as it is even
of the merit of plausibility, must have originated in an
intention to deceive the People, too palpable to be
obscured by sophistry, too atrocious to be palliated by
hypocrisy.
I have taken the pains to select this instance of misrepresentation, and to place it in a clear and strong light,
as an unequivocal proof of the unwarrantable arts which
are practised, to prevent a fair and impartial judgment
of the real merits of the Constitution submitted to the
consideration of the People. Nor have I scrupled, in
so flagrant a case, to allow myself in a severity of animadversion, little congenial with the general spirit of
these papers. I hesitate not to submit it to the decision
of any candid and honest adversary of the proposed
Government, whether language can furnish epithets of
too much asperity, for so shameless and so prostitute
an attempt to impose on the citizens of America.
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Friday, March 14, 1788.]
THE FEPDERALIST. No. LXVII..To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
THE mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of
the United States, is almost the only part of the sys.
tem, of any consequence, which has escaped without se.
vere censure, or which has received the slightest mark of




The Fwederalist.             473
approbation from its opponents. The most plausible of
these, who has appeared in print, has even deigned to
admit, that the election of the President is pretty well
guarded.* I venture somewhat further, and hesitate not
to affirm, that if the manner of it be not perfect, it is
at least excellent. It unites in an eminent degree all the
advantages, the union of which was to be wished for.
It was desirable, that the sense of the People should
operate in the choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to be confided. This end will be answered by committing the right of making it, not to any
preestablished body, but to men chosen by the People
for the special purpose, and at the particular conjuncture.
It was equally desirable, that the immediate election
should be made by men most capable of analyzing the
qualities adapted to the station, and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which were
proper to govern their choice. A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general
mass, will be most likely to possess the information and
discernment requisite to such complicated investigations.
It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little opportunity as possible to tumult and disorder. This evil
was not least to be dreaded in the election of a magistrate, who was to have so important an agency in the
administration of the Government, as the President of
the United States. But the precautions which have been
so happily concerted in the system under consideration,
promise an effectual security against this mischief. The
choice of several, to form an intermediate body of Electors, will be much less apt to convulse the community,
with any extraordinary or violent movements, than the
choice of one who was hiriself to be the final object of
*Vide Federal Farmer. - Publius.




474              The Foederalist.
the public wishes. And as the Electors, chosen in each
State, are to assemble and vote in the State in which
they are chosen, this detached and divided situation will
expose them much less to heats and ferments, which might
be communicated from them to the People, than if they
were all to be convened at one time, in one place.
Nothing was more to be desired than that every practicable obstacle should be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and
corruption. These most deadly adversaries of republican
Government might naturally have been expected to
make their approaches from more than one quarter, but
chiefly from the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper ascendant in our Councils. How could they better gratify this, than by raising a creature of their own
to the Chief Magistracy.of the Union?  But the Convention have guarded against all danger of this sort,
with the most provident and judicious attention. They
have not made the appointment of the President to depend on any preixisting bodies of men, who might be
tampered with beforehand to prostitute their votes; but
they have referred it in the first instance to an immediate
act of the People of America, to be exerted in the choice
of persons for the temporary and sole purpose of making
the appointment. And they have excluded from eligibility to this trust, all those who from situation might be
suspected of too great devotion to the President in office
No Senator, Representative, or other person holding a
place of trust or profit under the United States, can be
of the numbers of the Electors. Thus without corrupting the body of the People, the immediate agents in the
election will at least enter upon the task free from any
sinister bias. Their transient existence, and their detached situation, already taken notice of, afford a satisfactory prospect of their continuing so, to the conclusion
of it. The business of corruption, when it is to embrace
so considerable a number of men, requires time as weU




The Fcederalist.           475
as means. Nor would it be found easy suddenly to em.
bark them, dispersed as they would be over thirteen
States, in any combinations founded upon motives,
which, though they could not properly be denominated
corrupt, might yet be of a nature to mislead them from
their duty.
Another, and no less important desideratum was, that
the Executive should be independent for his continuance
in office on all but the People themselves. He might
otherwise be tempted to sacrifice his duty to his complaisance-for those whose favor was necessary to the duration of his official consequence. This advantage will
also be secured, by making his reelection to depend on
a special body of representatives, deputed by the society for the single purpose of making the important
choice.
All these advantages will happily combine in the plan
devised by the Convention; which is, that the People
of each State shall choose a number of persons as
Electors, equal to the number of Senators and Representatives of such State in the National Government,
who shall assemble within the State, and vote for some
fit person as President. Their votes, thus given, are to
be transmitted to the seat of the National Government
and the person who may happen to have a majority of the
whole number of votes, will be the President. But as
a majority of the votes might not always happen to centre in one man, and as it might be unsafe to permit less
than a majority to be Conclusive, it is provided, that, in
such a contingency, the House of Representatives shall
select out of the candidates, who shall have the five highest number of votes, the man who in their opinion may
be best qualified for the office.
The process of election affords a moral certainty, that
the office of President will never fall to the lot of any
man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the




476                The Federaltst.
requisite qualifications. Talents for low intrigue, and
the little arts of popularity, may alone suffice to elevate
a man to the first honors in a single State; but it will
require other talents, and a different kind of merit, to establish him in the esteem and confidence of the whole
Union, or of so considerable a portion of it, as would
be necessary to make him a successful candidate for the
distinguished office of President of the United States.
It will not be too strong to say, that there will be a constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters
preeminent for ability and virtue. And this will be
thought no inconsiderable recommendation of the Constitution, by those who are able to estimate the share which
the Executive in every Government must necessarily have
in its good or ill administration. Though we cannot
acquiesce in the political heresy of the poet who says,
" For forms of Government let fools contest"That which is best administered is best -"
yet we may safely pronounce, that the true test of a
good Government is its aptitude and tendency to produce
a good administration.
The Vice-President is to be chosen in the same manner with the President; with this difference, that the
Senate is to do, in respect to the former, what is to be
done by the House of Representatives, in respect to the
latter.
The appointment of an extraordinary person, as VicePresident, has been objected to as superfluous, if not
mischievous. It has been allegetl, that it would have
been preferable to have authorized the Senate to elect
out of their own body an officer answering that description. But two considerations seem to justify the ideas
of the Convention in this respect. One is, that to secure at all times the possibility of a definite resolution
of the body, it is necessary that the President should
have only a casting vote. And to take the Senator of




The Foederalist.            471
any State from his seat as Senator, to place him in that
of President of the Senate, would be to exchange, in regard to the State fromn which he came, a constant for a
contingent vote. The other consideration is, that as the
Vice-President may occasionally become a substitute for
the President, in the supreme Executive magistracy, all
the reasons which recommend the mode of election prescribed for the one, apply with great, if not with equal
force, to the manner of appointing the other. It is remarkable, that in this, as in most other instances, the
objection which is made would lie against the Constitution of this State. We have a Lieutenant-Governor,
chosen by the People at large, who presides in the Senate, and is the constitutional substitute for the Govern!
or, in casualties similar to those which would authorize
the Vice-President to exercise the authorities, and discharge the duties of the President.
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Friday, March 14, 1788.]
THE F(EDERALIST. No. LXVIII.'o THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
IPROCEED now to trace the real characters of the
proposed Executive, as they are marked out in the
plan of the Convention. This will serve to place in a
strong light the unfairness of the representations which
have been made in regard to it.
The first thing which strikes our attention is, that the
Executive authority, with few exceptions, is to be vested
in a single magistrate. This will scarcely, however, be
considered as a point upon which any comparison car




478               The Faederalist.
be grounded; for if, in this particular, there be a resemblance to the King of Great Britain, there is not less a
resemblance to the Grand Seignior, to the Khan of Tartary, to the man of the seven mountains, or to the Governor of New York.
That magistrate is to be elected for four years; and
is to be reiligible as often as the People of the United
States shall think him worthy of their confidence. In
these circumstances, there is a total dissimilitude between him and a King of Great Britain, who is an hereditary monarch, possessing the crown as a patrimony
descendible to his heirs forever; but there is a close analogy between him and a Governor of New York, who
is elected for three years, and is reiligible without limitation or intermission. If we consider, how much less
time would be requisite for establishing a dangerous
influence in a single State, than for establishing a like
influence. throughout the United States, we must conclude that a duration of four years for the Chief Magistrate of the Union is a degree of permanency far less to
be dreaded in that office, than a duration of three years
for a correspondent office in a single State.
The President of the United States would be liable to
be impeached, tried, and, upon conviction of treason,
bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors, removed
from office; and would afterwards be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law. The
person of the King of Great Britain is sacred and inviolable; there is no constitutional tribunal to which he is
amenable; no punishment to which he can be subjected
without involving the crisis of a National revolution.
In this delicate and important circumstance of personal
responsibility, the President of Confederated America
would stand upon no better ground than a Governor of
New York, and upon worse ground than the Governors
of Maryland and Delaware.




The Fcederalist.            479
The President of the United States is to have power to
return a Bill, which shall have passed the two branches
of the Legislature, for reconsideration; and the Bill so
returned is to become a law, if, upon that reconsideration, it be approved by two thirds of both Houses. The
King of Great Britain, on his part, has an absolute negative upon the Acts of the two Houses of Parliament.
The disuse of that power for a considerable time past,
does not affect the reality of its existence; and is to be
ascribed wholly to the Crown's having found the means
of substituting influence to authority, or the art of gaining a majority in one or the other of the two Houses, to
the necessity of exerting a prerogative which could seldom be exerted without hazarding some degree of National agitation. The qualified negative of the President differs widely from this absolute negative of the
British sovereign; and tallies exactly with the revision.
ary authority of the Council of Revision of this State,
of which the Governor is a constituent part. In this
respect, the power of the President would exceed that of
the Governor of New York, because the former would
possess, singly, what the latter shares with the Chancellor and Judges; but it would be precisely the same with
that of the Governor of Massachusetts, whose Constitution, as to this Article, seems to have been the original
from which the Convention have copied.
The President is to be the " Commander-in-Chief of
"the army and navy of the United States, and of the
" militia of the several States, when called into the act" ual service of the United States. He is to have power
"to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against
"the United States, except in cases of impeachment; to
"recommend to the consideration of Congress such
"measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient;
"to convene, on' extraordinary occasions, both Houses
" of the Legislature, or either of them, and, in case of




480                   The Faderalzst.
"disagreement between them  with respect to the timeof
" adjournment, to adjourn them  to such time as he shall
"think proper; to take care that the laws be faithfully
" executed; and to commission all officers of the United
" States." In most of these particulars, the power of
the President will resemble equally that of the King of
Great Britain, and of the Governor of New  York.  The
most material points of difference are these:-  First.
The President will have only the occasional com~mand
of such part of the militia of the Nation, as by Legislative provision may be called into the actual service of
the Union. The King of Great Britain, and the Governor of New York, have at all times the entire command of all the militia within their several jurisdictions.
In this Article, therefore, the power of the President
would be inferior to that of either the Monarch, or the
Governor.  Second.   The  President is to  be  Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy of the United
States. In this respect, his authority would be nominally the same with that of the King of Great Britain,
but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount
to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General
and Admiral of the Confederacy: while that of the British King extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies; all which by
the Constitution under consideration, would appertain
to the Legislature.* The Governor of New York, on
* A writer in a Pennsylvania pa- II., Chap. 6, it was declared to be in
per, under the signature ofTAMONY, the King alone, for that the sole
has asserted that the King of Great supreme government and command
Britain owes his prerogative as Com- of the militia within his Majesty's
mander-in-Chief to an annual mu- realms and dominions, and of all
tiny bill. The truth is, on the con- forces by sea and land, and of all
trary, that his prerogative, in this forts and places of strength, EVER
respect, is immemorial, and was only WAS AND IS the undoubted right of
disputed, "contrary to all reason his Majesty and his royal predeces"and precedent," as BLACKSTONE, sors, Kings and Queens of England
vol. 1, page 262, expresses it, by the and that both or either House of
Long Parliament of CHARLES I.; but Parliament cannot nor ought to pre
by the statute the 13th of CHARLES tend to the same. - Publius.




The Fwderalist.               481
the other hand, is by the Constitution of the State vested
only with the command of its militia and navy. But
the Constitutions of several of the States expressly declare their Governors to be Commanders-in-Chief, as
well of the army as navy; and it may well be a question, whether those of New Hampshire and Massachusetts, in particular, do not, in this instance, confer larger
powers upon their respective Governors, than could be
claimed by a President of the United States. Thirdl.
The power of the President, in respect to pardons, would
extend to all cases, except those of impeachment. The
Governor of New York may pardon in all cases, even in
those of impeachment, except for treason and murder.
Is not the power of the Governor, in this Article, on a
calculation of political consequences, greater than that
of the President? All conspiracies and plots against the
Government, which have not been matured into actual
treason, may be screened from punishment of every kind,
by the interposition of the prerogative of pardoning. If
a Governor of New York, therefore, should be at the head
of any such conspiracy, until the design had been ripened
into actual hostility, he could insure his accomplices and
adherents an entire impunity. A President of the Union,
on the other band, though he may even pardon treason,
when prosecuted in the ordinary course of law, could
shelter no offender, in any degree, from the effects of
impeachment and conviction. Would not the prospect
of a total indemnity for all the preliminary steps, be a
greater temptation to undertake, and persevere in an enterprise against the public liberty, than the mere pros.
pect of an exemption from death and confiscation, if the
final execution of the design, upon an actual appeal to
arms, should miscarry? Would this last expectation
have any influence at all, when the probability was computed, that the person who was to afford that exemption
might himself be involved in the consequences of the
VOL. I.            31




482               The Faederalist.
measure; and might be incapacitated by his agency in
it from affording the desired impunity?  The better to
judge of this matter, it will be necessary to recollect,
that, by the proposed Constitution, the offence of treason
is limited " to levying war upon the United States, and
"adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and com"fort; " and that by the laws of New York it is confined
within similar bounds.  Fourthtl. The President can
only adjourn the National Legislature, in the single case
of disagreement about the time of adjournment. The
British monarch may prorogue or even dissolve the Parliament. The Governor of New York may also prorogue the Legislature of this State for a limited time;
a power which, in certain situations, may be employed
to very important purposes.
The President is to have power, with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two
thirds of the Senators present concur. The King of
Great Britain is the sole and absolute representative
of the Nation, in all foreign transactions. He can of his
own accord make treaties of peace, commerce, alliance,
and of every other description. It has been insinuated,
that his authority in this respect is not conclusive, and
that his conventions with foreign powers are subject to
the revision, and stand in need of the ratification of Parliament. But I believe this doctrine was never heard of
until it was broached upon the present occasion. Every
jurist * of that kingdom, and every other man acquainted
with its Constitution, knows, as an established fact, that
the prerogative of making treaties exists in the Crown in
its utmost plenitude; and that the compacts entered into
by the royal authority have the most complete legal validity and perfection, independent of any other sanction.
The Parliament, it is true, is sometimes seen employing
itself in altering the existing laws to conform them to the
* Vide BLACKSTONEJ'S Commentaries, vol. 1, p. 257. - Publius




The Fcederalist.            483
stipulations in a new treaty; and this may have possi.
bly given birth to the imagination, that its cooperation
was necessary to the obligatory efficacy of the treaty
But this Parliamentary interposition proceeds from a
different cause: from the necessity of adjusting a most
artificial and intricate system of revenue and commercial laws, to the changes made in them by the operation
of the treaty; and of adapting new provisions and precautions to the new state of things, to keep the machine
from running into disorder. In this respect, therefore,
there is no comparison between the intended power of
the President and the actual power of the British sovereign. The one can perform alone what the other can
only do with the concurrence of a branch of the Legislature. It must be admitted, that, in this instance, the
power of the Fcederal Executive would exceed that of
any State Executive. But this arises naturally from the
exclusive possession by the Union of that part of the
sovereign power which relates to treaties. If the Con.
federacy were to be dissolved, it would become a question, whether the Executives of the several States were
not solely invested with that delicate and important prerogative.
The President is also to be authorized to receive Ambassadors, and other public Ministers. This, though it
has been a rich theme of declamation, is more a matter
of dignity than of authority. It is a circumstance which
will be without consequence in the administration of the
Government; and it was far more convenient that it
should be arranged in this manner, than that there should
be a necessity of convening the Legislature, or one of
its branches, upon every arrival of a foreign Minister,
though it were merely to take the place of a departed
predecessor.
The President is to nominate, and, with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to appoint Ambassadors and other




484                  The Faederalist.
public Ministers, Judges of the Supreme Court, and in
general all officers of the United States established by
law, and whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by the Constitution. The King of Great Britain is
emphatically and truly styled the fountain of honor. He
not only appoints to all offices, but can create offices.
He can confer titles of nobility at pleasure; and has the
disposal of an immense number of Church preferments.
There is evidently a great inferiority in the power of the
President, in this particular, to that of the British King;
nor is it equal to that of the Governor of New York, if
we are to interpret the meaning of the Constitution of
the State by the practice which has obtained under it.
The power of appointment is with us lodged in a Council, composed of the Governor and four members of the
Senate, chosen by the Assembly.  The Governor claims,
and has frequently exercised the right of nomin'ation,
and is entitled to a casting vote in the appointment. If
he really has the right of nominating, his authority is in
this respect equal to that of the President, and exceeds
it in the article of the casting vote. In the National
Government, if the Senate should be divided, no appointment could be made: in the Government of New
York, if the Council should be divided, tie Governor
can turn the scale, and confirm his own nomination.*
If we compare the publicity which must necessarily
attend the mode of appointment by the President and
an entire branch of the National Legislature, with the
privacy in the mode of appointment by the Governor of
New York, closeted in a secret apartment with at most
four, and frequently with only two persons; and if we
* Candor,.however, demands an tionally questioned. And independacknowledgment, that I do not ent of this claim, when we take into
think the claim of the Governor to view the other considerations, and
a right of nomination well founded. pursue them through all their conYet it is always justifiable to reason sequences, we shall be inclined to
from the practice of a Government, draw much the same conclusion. -
till its propriety has been constitu- Publius.




The Faederalist.            485
at the same time consider, how much more easy it must
be to influence the small number of which a Council of
Appointment. consists, than the considerable number of
which the National Senate would consist, we cannot
hesitate to pronounce, that the power of the Chief Magistrate of this State, in the disposition of offices, must,
in practice, be greatly superior to that of the Chief Magistrate of the Union.
Hence it appears, that except as to the concurrent
authority of the President in the Article of treaties, it
would be difficult to determine whether that magistrate
would, in the aggregate, possess more or less power than
the Governor of New York. And it appears yet more
unequivocally, that there is no pretence for the parallel
which has been attempted between him and the King
of Great Britain. But to render the contrast, in this
respect, still more striking, it may be of use to throw
the principal circumstances of dissimilitude into a closer
group.
The President of the United States would be an offi
cer elected by the People for four years: the King of
Great Britain is a perpetual and hereditary Prince. The
one would be amenable to personal punishment and
disgrace: the person of the other is sacred and inviolable. The one would have a qualified negative upon the
Acts of the Legislative body: the other has an absolute
negative. The one would have a right to command the
military and naval forces of the Nation: the other, in
addition to this right, possesses that of declaring war,
and of raising and regulating, fleets and armies by his
own authority. The one would have a concurrent power
with a branch of the Legislature in the formation of
treaties- the other is the sole possessor of the power of
making treaties. The one would have a like concurrent
authority in appointing to offices: the other is the sole
author of all appointments.  The one can confer no




486               The Fcederalist.
privileges whatever: the other can make denizens of
aliens, noblemen of commoners; can erect corporations
with all the rights incident to corporate bodies. The
one can prescribe no rules concerning the commerce or
currency of the Nation: the other is in several respects
the arbiter of commerce, and in this capacity can establish markets and fairs, can regulate weights and measures, can lay embargoes for a limited time, can coin
money, can authorize or prohibit the circulation of foreign coin. The one has no particle of spiritual jurisdiction: the other is the supreme head and Governor of
the National Church! What answer shall we give to
those who would persuade us, that things so unlike resemble each other? — The same that ought to be given
to those who tell us, that a Government, the whole
power of which would be in the hands of the elective
and periodical servants of the People, is an aristocracy,
a monarchy, and a despotism.
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, March 18, 1788.]
THE FCEDERALIST. No. LXIX.
TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
INHERE is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous Executive is inconsistent with
the genius of republican Government. The enlightened
well-wishers to this species of Government must at least
hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation;
since they can never admit its truth, without, at the
same time, admitting the condemnation of their own
principles. Energy in the Executive is a leading char



The Faederalist.            487
acter in the definition of good Government. It is essen
tial to the protection of the community against foreign
attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property
against those irregular and high-handed combinations
which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises
and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy.
Every man, the least conversant in Roman story, knows
how often that Republic was obliged to take refuge in
the absolute power of a single man, under the formid
able title of Dictator, as well against the intrigues of
ambitious individuals, who aspired to the tyranny, and
the seditions of whole classes of the community, whose
conduct threatened the existence of all Government, as
against the invasions of external enemies, who menaced
the conquest and destruction of Rome.
There can be no need, however, to multiply arguments or examples on this head. A feeble Executive
implies a feeble execution of the Government. A feeble
execution is but another phrase for a bad execution;
and a Government ill executed, whatever it may be in
theory, must be, in practice, a bad Government.
Taking it for granted, therefore,. that all men of sense
will agree in the necessity of an energetic Executive, it
will only remain to inquire, what are the ingredients,
which constitute this energy? How far can they be
combined with those other ingredients which constitute
safety in the republican sense? And how far does this
combination characterize the plan which has been reported by the Convention?
The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are, first, unity; secondly, duration; thirdly, an
adequate provision for its support; fourthly, competeni
powers.
The ingredients which constitute safety in the repub.




488                The FWderalist.
lican sense are, first, a due dependence on the People
secondly, a due responsibility.
Those politicians and statesmen who have been the
most celebrated for the soundness of their principles,
and for the justness of their views, have declared in favor
of a single Executive, and a numerous Legislature.
They have, with great propriety, considered energy as
the most necessary qualification of the former, and have
regarded this as most applicable to power in a single
hand; while they have, with equal propriety, considered
the latter as best adapted to deliberation and wisdom,
and best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the
People, and to secure their privileges and interests.
That unity is conducive to energy, will not be disputed.  Decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch, will
generally characterize the proceedings of one man, in a
much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any
greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished.
This unity may be destroyed in two ways: either by
vesting the power in two or more magistrates, of equal
dignity and authority; or by vesting it ostensibly in one
man, subject, in whole or in part, to the control and
cooperation of others, in the capacity of Counsellors to
him. Of the first, the two Consuls of Rome may serve
as an example; of the last, we shall find examples in
the Constitutions of several of the States. New York
and New Jersey, if I recollect right, are the only States
which have intrusted the Executive authority wholly to
single men.*  Both these methods of destroying the
unity of the Executive have their partisans; but the
votaries of an Executive Council are the most numerous. They are both liable, if not to equal, to similar
* New York has no Council ex- consult. But I think, from the
cept for the single purpose of ap- terms of the Constitution, their respointing to offices; New Jersey has olutions do not bind him. - Publius
a Council whom the Governor may




The Fawderalist.            489
objections, and may in most lights be examined in con
junction.
The experience of other Nations will afford little in.
struction on this head. As far, however, as it teaches
anything, it teaches us not to be enamored of plurality
in the Executive. We have seen that the Achaeans, on
an experiment of' two Prators, were induced to abolish
one.  The Roman history records many instances of
mischiefs to the Republic from the dissensions between
the Consuls, and'between the Military Tribunes, who
were at times substituted to the Consuls. But it gives
us no specimens of any peculiar advantages derived to
the State from the circumstance of the plurality of those
magistrates. That the dissensions between them were
not more frequent or more fatal, is matter of astonishment, until we advert to the singular position in which
the Republic was almost continually placed, and to the
prudent policy pointed out by the circumstances of the
State, and pursued by the Consuls, of making a division
of the Government between them. The Patricians engaged in a perpetual struggle with the Plebeians for the
preservation of their ancient authorities and dignities;
the Consuls, who were generally chosen out of the former body, were commonly united by the personal interest they had in the defence of the privileges of their
order. In addition to this motive of union, after the
arms of the Republic had considerably expanded the
bounds of its empire, it became an established custom
with the Consuls to divide the administration between
themselves by lot; one of them remaining at Rome to
govern the city and its environs; the other taking the
command in the more distant provinces. This expedient must, no doubt, have had great influence in pre.
venting those collisions and rivalships which might otherwise have embroiled the peace of the Republic.
But quitting the dim light of historical research,




490               The Faederalist.
attaching ourselves purely to the dictates of reason and
good sense, we shall discover much greater cause to
reject than to approve the idea of pluralitxy in the Executive, under any modification whatever.
Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any
common enterprise or pursuit, there.is always danger of
difference of opinion. If it be a public trust or office, in
which they are clothed with equal dignity and authority,
there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even
animosity. From either, and especially from all these
causes, the'most bitter dissensions are apt to spring.
Whenever these happen, they lessen the respectability,
weaken the authority, and distract the plans and operations of those whom they divide. If they should unfortunately assail the Supreme Executive Magistracy of a
country, consisting of a plurality of persons, they might
impede or frustrate the most important measures of the
Government, in the most critical emergencies of the
State.  And what is still worse, they might split the
community into the most violent and irreconcilable factions, adhering differently to the different individuals who
composed the Magistracy.
Men often oppose a thing, merely because they have
had no agency in planning it, or because it may have
been planned by those whom they dislike. But if they
have been consulted, and have happened to disapprove,
opposition then becomes, in their estimation, an indispensable duty of self-love. They seem to think themselves bound in honor, and by all the motives of personal infallibility, to defeat the success of what has been
resolved upon contrary to their sentiments. Men of upright, benevolent tempers have too many opportunities
of remarking, with horror, to what desperate lengths this
disposition is sometimes carried, and how often the great
interests of society are sacrificed to the vanity, to the
conceit, and to the obstinacy of individuals, who have




The Foederalist.            491
credit enough to make their passions and their caprices
interesting to mankind. Perhaps the question now be
fore the public may, in its consequences, afford melan
choly proofs of the effects of this despicable frailty, or
rather detestable vice in the human character.
Upon the principles of a free Government, inconveniences from the source just mentioned must necessarily
be submitted to in the formation of the Legislature; but
it is unnecessary, and therefore unwise, to introduce
them into the constitution of the Executive. It is here
too, that they may be most pernicious. In the Legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a
benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of
parties in that department of the Government, though
they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often
promote deliberation and circumspection; and serve to
check excesses in the majority. When a resolution too
is once taken, the opposition must be at an end. That
resolution is a law, and resistance to it punishable. But
no favorable circumstances palliate, or atone for the disadvantages of dissension in the Executive department.
Here, they are pure and unmixed. There is no point at
which they cease to operate. They serve to embarrass
and weaken the execution of the plan or measure to
which they relate, from the first step to the final conclusion of it. They constantly counteract those qualities
in'the Executive, which are the most necessary ingredients in its composition, —vigor and expedition; and
this without any counterbalancing good. In the conduct of war, in which the energy of the Executive is
the bulwark of the National security, everything would
be to be. apprehended from its plurality.
It' must be confessed, that these observations apply
with principal weight to the first case supposed, that
is, to a plurality of Magistrates of equal dignity and
authority; a scheme, the advocates for which are not




492              The Faederalist.
likely to form a numerous sect; but they apply, though
not with equal, yet with considerable weight to the proj.
cet of a Council, whose concurrence is made constitutionally necessary to the operations of the ostensible
Executive. An artful cabal in that Council would be
able to distract and to enervate the whole system of administration. If no such cabal should exist, the mere
diversity of views and opinions would alone be sufficient to tincture the exercise of the Executive authority
with a spirit of habitual feebleness and dilatoriness.
But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality
in the Executive, and which lies as much against the
last as the first plan, is, that it tends to conceal faults,
and destroy responsibility.  Responsibility is of two
kinds, to censure and to punishment. The first is the
most important of the two, especially in an elective
office. Man, in public trust, will much oftener act in
such a manner as to render him unworthy of being any
longer t4usted, than in such a manner as to make him
obnoxious to legal punishment. But the multiplication
of the Executive adds to the difficulty of detection in
either case. It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine, on whom the blame or
the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted from
one to another with so niuch dexterity, and under such
plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in
suspense about the real author.  The circumstances
which may have led to any National miscarriage or misfortune, are sometimes so complicated, that, where there
are a number of actors who may have had different
degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see
upon the whole that there has been mismanagement,
yet it may be impracticable to pronounce, to whose account the evil which may have been incurred is truly
chargeable.




The Fwderalist.            493
"I was overruled by my Council. The Council were
" so divided in their opinions, that it was impossible
"to obtain any better resolution on the point."  These
and similar pretexts are constantly at hand, whether true
or false.  And who is there, that will either take the
trouble or incur the odium, of a strict scrutiny into the
secret springs of the transaction? Should there be found
a citizen zealous enough to undertake the unpromising
task, if there happen to be collusion between the parties
concerned, how easy is it to clothe the circumstances
with so much ambiguity, as to render it uncertain what
was the precise conduct of any of those parties?
In the single instance in which the Governor of this
State is coupled with a Council, that is, in the appointment to offices, we hawe seen the mischiefs of it in the
view now under consideration.  Scandalous appointments to important offices have been made.  Some
cases, indeed, have been so flagrant that ALL PARTIES have
agreed in the impropriety of the thing. When inquiry
has been made, the blame has been laid by the Governor
on the members of the Council; who, on their part, have
charged it upon his nomination: while the People remain altogether at a loss to determine, by whose influence their interests have been committed to hands so
unqualified, and so manifestly improper. In tenderness
to individuals, I forbear to descend to particulars.
It is evident from these considerations, that the plurality of the Executive tends to deprive the People of
the two greatest securities they can have for the faithful
exercise of any delegated power: -First the restraints
of public opinion, which lose their efficacy as well on
account of the division of the censure attendant on bad
measures among a number, as on account of the uncertainty on whom it ought to fall; and, secol, the opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the
misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either to




494               The Feederalist.
their removal from office, or to their actual punishment
in cases which admit of it.
In England, the King is a perpetual Magistrate; and
it is a maxim which has obtained for the sake of the
public peace, that he is unaccountable for his administration, and his person sacred. Nothing, therefore, can
be wiser in that Kingdom, than'to annex to the King a
constitutional Council, who may be responsible to the
Nation for the advice they give. Without this, there
would be no responsibility whatever in the Executive
department, an idea inadmissible in a free Government.
But even there, the King is not bound by the resolutions
of his Council, though they are answerable for the advice they give. He is the absolute master of his own
conduct in the exercise of his office; and may observe
or disregard the counsel given to him, at his sole discretion.
But in a Republic, where every Magistrate ought to
be personally responsible for his behavior in office, the
reason, which in the British Constitution dictates the
propriety of a Council, not only ceases to apply, but
turns against the institution. In the monarchy of Great
Britain, it furnishes a substitute for the prohibited responsibility of the Chief Magistrate; which serves in
some degree as a hostage to the National justice for his
good behavior. In the American republic, it would serve
to destroy, or would greatly diminish the intended and
necessary responsibility of the Chief Magistrate himself.
The idea of a Council to the Executive, which has so
generally obtained in the State Constitutions, has been
derived from that maxim of republican jealousy which
considers power as safer in the hands of a number of
men than of a single man. If the maxim should be
admitted to be applicable to the case, I should contend,
that the advantage on that side would not counterbal



The Fcederalist.            495
ance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite side.
But I do not think the rule at all applicable to the Ex
ecutive power. I clearly concur in opinion, in this particular, with a writer whom the celebrated JUNIUS pronounces to be "deep, solid, and ingenious," that "the
"Executive power is more easily confined when it is' ONE; " * that it is far more safe there should be a single
object for the jealousy and watchfulness of the People;
and, in a word, that all multiplication of the Executive
is rather dangerous than friendly to liberty.
A little consideration will satisfy us, that the species
of security sought for in the multiplication of the
Executive, is unattainable. Numbers must be so great
as to render combination, difficult, or they are rather a
source of danger than of security. The united credit
and influence of several individuals must be more
formidable to liberty, than the credit and influence of
either of them separately. When power, therefore, is
placed in the hands of so small a number of men, as to
admit of their interests and views being easily combined
in a common enterprise, by an artful leader, it becomes
more liable to abuse, and more dangerous when abused,
than if it be lodged in the hands of one man; who,
from the very circumstance of his being alone, will be
more narrowly watched and more readily suspected,
and who cannot unite so great a mass of influence as
when he is associated with others. The Decemvirs of
l/o)
Rome, whose name denotes their rnumber,t were more
to be dreaded in their usurpation than any ONE of them
would have been. No person would think of proposing
an Executive much more numerous than that body;
from six to a dozen have been suggested for the numbei
of the Council. The extreme of these numbers, is not
too great for an easy combination; and from such a
combination, America would have more to fear, than
* DE LOLME.- Publius.       t Ten. -Publius.




496              The Fwderalist.
from the ambition of any single individual. A Council
to a Magistrate, who is himself responsible for what he
does, are generally nothing better than a clog upon his
good intentions; are often the instruments and accomplices of his bad; and are almost always a cloak to his
faults.
I forbear to dwell upon the subject of expense;
though it be evident that if the Council should be
numerous enough to answer the principal end aimed at
by the institution, the salaries of the members, who
must be drawn from their homes to reside at the seat of
Government, would form an item in the catalogue of
public expenditures, too serious to be incurred for an
object of equivocal utility. I will only add, that, prior
to the appearance of the Constitution, I rarely met
with an intelligent man from any of the States, who
did not admit, as the result of experience, that the
UNITY of the Executive of this-State was one of the
best of the distinguishing features of our Constitution.
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, March 18, 1788.]
THE F(EDERALIST. No. LXX.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
DURATION  in office has been mentioned as the
second requisite to the energy of the Executive
authority. This has relation to two objects: to the
personal firmness of the Executive Magistrate, in the
employment of his Constitutional powers; and to the
stability of the system of administration, which may
have been adopted under his auspices. With regard to




The Foederalist.             497
the first, it must be evident, that the longer the duration
in office, the greater will be the probability of obtaining
so important an advantage. It is a general principle of
human nature that a man will be interested in whatever he possesses, in proportion to the firmness or
precariousness of the tenure by which he holds it; will
be less attached to what he holds by a momentary or
uncertain title, than to what he enjoys by a durable or
certain title; and, of course, will be willing to risk
more for the sake of the one, than for the sake of the
other. This remark is not less applicable to a political
privilege, or honor, or trust, than to any article of
-ordinary property. The inference from it is, that a
man acting in the capacity of Chief Magistrate, under
a consciousness that in a very short time he must lay
down his -office, will be apt to feel himself too little
interested in it, to hazard any material censure or perplexity, from the independent exertion of his powers, or
from encountering the ill-humors, however transient,
which may happen to prevail, either in a considerable
part of the society itself, or even in a predominant
faction in the Legislative body. If the case should
only be, that he might lay it down, unless continued by
a new choice; and if he should be desirotus of being
continued, his wishes, conspiring with his fears, would
tend still more powerfully to corrupt his integrity, or
debase his fortitude. In either case, feebleness and
irresolution must be the characteristics of the station.
There are some, who would be inclined to regard the
servile pliancy of the Executive to a prevailing current,
either in the community, or in the Legislature, as its
best recommendation. But such men entertain very
crude notions, as well of the purposes for which Gov.
ernment was instituted, as of the true means by which
the public happiness may be promoted. The republican principle demands, that the deliberate sense of the
VOL. I.        32




498              The Focderalist.
community should govern the conduct of those to
whom they intrust the management of their affairs;
but it does not require an ufnqualified complaisance to
every sudden breeze of passion, or to every transient
impulse which the People may receive from the arts
of men, who flatter their prejudices to betray their
interests. It is a just observation, that the People
commonly intend the PUBLIC GOOD. This often applies
to their very errors.  But their good sense would
despise the adulator who should pretend, that they
always reason right about the means of promoting it.
They know from experience, that they sometimes err;
and the wonder is, that they so seldom err as they do,
beset as they continually are, by the wiles of parasites
and sycophants; by the snares of the atmbitious, the
avaricious, the desperate; by the artifices of men who
possess their confidence more than they deserve it; and
of those who seek to possess, rather than to deserve it.
When occasions present themselves, in which the
interests of the People are at variance with their
inclinations, it is the' duty of the persons whom they
have appointed to be the guardians of those interests,
to withstand the temporary delusion, in order to give
them time and opportunity for more cool and sedate
reflection. Instances might be cited, in which a conduct of this kind has saved the People from very fatal
consequences of their own mistakes, and has procured
lasting monuments of their gratitude to the men who
had courage and magnanimity enough to serve them at
the peril of their displeasure.
But however inclined we might be, to insist upon an
unbounded complaisance in the Executive to the inclinations of the People, we can with no propriety
contend for a like complaisance to the humors of the
Legislature.  The latter may sometimes stand in
opposition to the former; and at other times the People




The Foederalist.           499
may be entirely neutral. In either supposition, it is
certainly desirable, that the Executive should be in a
situation to dare to act his own opinion with vigor and
decision.
The same rule which teaches the propriety of a
partition between the various branches of power,
teaches us likewise that this partition ought to be so
contrived as to render the one independent of the other.
To what purpose separate the Executive or the Judiciary from the Legislative, if both the Executive and
the Judiciary are so constituted as to be at the absolute
devotion of the Legislative? Such a separation must
be merely nominal, and incapable of producing the ends
for which it was established. It is one thing to be subordinate to the laws, and another to be dependent on the
Legislative body. The first comports with, the last violates, the fundamental principles of good Government;
and whatever may be the *forms of the Constitution,
unites all power in the same hands. The tendency of
the Legislative authority to absorb every other, has
been fully displayed and illustrated by examples in
some preceding numbers. In Governments purely republican, this tendency is almost irresistible. The
Representatives of the People, in a popular Assembly,
seem sometimes to fancy, that they are the People
themselves, and betray strong symptoms of impatience
and disgust at the least sign of opposition from any
other quarter; as if the exercise of its rights, by either
the Executive or Judiciary, were a breach of their
privilege, and an outrage to their dignity. They often
appear disposed to exert an imperious control over the
other departments; and as they commonly have the
People on their side, they always act with such momentum, as to make it very difficult for the other
members of the Government to maintain the balance
of the Constitution.




500              The Foederalist.
It may perhaps be asked, how the shortness of the
duration in office can affect the independence of the
Executive on the Legislature, unless the one were
possessed of the power of appointing or displacing the
other. One answer to this inquiry may;be drawn from
the principle already remarked, that is, from the slender
interest a man is apt to take in a short-lived advantage,
and the little inducement it affords him to expose
himself, on account of it, to any considerable inconvenience or hazard. Another answer, perhaps more
obvious, though not more conclusive, will result from
the consideration of the influence of the Legislative
body over the People; which might be employed to
prevent the reilection of a man who, by an upright
resistance to any sinister project of that body-, should
have made himself obnoxious to its resentment.
It may be asked also, whether a duration of four
years would answer the end proposed; and if it would
not, whether a less period, which would at least be
recommended by greater security against ambitious
designs, would not, for that reason, be preferable to a.
longer period, which was, at the same time, too short
for the purpose of inspiring the desired firmness and
independence of the Magistrate.
It cannot be affirmed, that a duration of four years,
or any other limited duration, would completely answer
the end proposed; but it would contribute towards it
in a degree which would have a material influence
upon the spirit and character of the Government.
Between the commencement and termination of such
a period, there would always be a considerable interval,
in which the prospect of annihilation would be suffieiently remote, not to have an improper effect upon the
condiuct of a man indued with a tolerable portion of
f:Ottitude;, and in which he might reasonably promise
himself, that there would be time enough before it




The Federalist.               501
arrived, to make the community sensible of the propriety of the measures he might incline to pursue.
Though it be probable, that, as he approached the
moment when the public were, by a new election, to
signify their sense of his conduct, his confidence, and
with it his firmness, would decline; yet both the one
and the other would derive support from the opportunities which his previous continuance in the station
had afforded him, of establishing himself in the esteem
and good-will of his constituents. He might, then,
hazard with safety, in proportion to the proofs he had
given of his wisdom and integrity, and to the title he
had acquired to the respect and attachment of his
fellow-citizens. As on the one hand, a duration of four
years will contribute to the firmness of the Executive
in a sufficient degree to render it a very valuable ingredient in the composition, so on the other, it is not
enough to justify any alarm for the public liberty. If a
British House  of Commons, from  the most feeble
beginnings, from  the mere power of assenting or disagreeing to the imposition of a new tax, have, by rapid
strides, reduced the prerogatives of the Crown and the
privileges of the nobility within the limits they conceived
to be compatible with the principles of a free Government, while they raised themselves to the rank and
consequence of a coequal branch of the Legislature;
if they have been able, in one instance, to abolish both
the royalty and the aristocracy, and to overturn all the
ancient establishments, as well in the Church as State;
if they have been able, on a recent occasion, to make
the Monarch tremble at the prospect of an innovation'
attempted by them; what would be to be feared from
an elective Magistrate of four years' duration, with the
confined  authorities of a President of the  United
* This was the case with respect and rejected in the House of Lords,
to Mr. Fox's India bill, which was to the entire satisfaction, as it is
earried'in the House of Commons, said, of the People. - Publius.




502               The Fcederalist.
States?  What, but that he might be unequal to the
task which the Constitution assigns him? I shall only
add, that if his duration be such as to leave a doubt
of his firmness, that doubt is inconsistent with a jealousy of his encroachments.
EUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Friday, March 21, 1788.]
THE F(EDERALIST. No. LXXI.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
HE ADMINISTRATION of Government, in its largest
sense, com prehends all the operations of the bodX
politic, whether Legislative E xecutiye or Judiciary.  but
in its most usual, and perhaps in its most precise
signification, it is limited to Executive details, and falls
peculiarly within the province of the Executive department. The actual conduct of foreign negotiations, the
preparatory plans of finance, the application and disbursement of the public moneys in conformity to the general
appropriations of the Legislature, the arrangement of
the army and navy, the direction of the operations of
war: these, and other matters of a like nature, constitute
what seems to be most properly understood by the administration of Government. The persons, therefore,
to whose immediate management these different matters
are committed, ought to be considered as the assistants
or deputies of the Chief Magistrate; and on this account,
they ought to derive their offices from his appointment,
at least from his nomination, and ought to be subject to
his superintendence. This view of the subject will at
once suggest to us the intimate connection between the




The Federalist.             503
duration of the Executive Magistrate in office, and the
stability of the system of administration. To reverse and
undo what has been done by a predecessor, is very often
considered by a successor as the best proof he can give
of his own capacity and desert; and in addition to this
propensity, where the alteration has been the result of
public choice, the person substituted is warranted in
supposing, that the dismission of his predecessor has
proceeded from a dislike to his measures; and that the
less he resembles him, the more he will recommend himself to the favor of his constituents. These considerations, and the influence of personal confidences and attachments, would be likely to induce every new President to promote a change of men to fill the subordinate
stations; and these causes together could not fail to
occasion a disgraceful and ruinous mutability in the
administration of the Government.
With a positive duration of considerable extent, I connect the circumstance of re6ligibility. The first is necessary to give to the officer himself the inclination and the
resolution to act his part well, and to the community time
and leisure to observe the tendency of his measures, and
thence to form an experimental estimate of their merits.
The last is necessary to enable the People, when they
see reason to approve of his conduct, to continue him
in the station, in order to prolong the utility of his talents and virtues, and to secure to the Government the
advantage of permanency in a wise system of administration.
Nothing appears more plausible at first sight, nor more
ill-founded upon close inspection, than a scheme which
in relation to the present point has had some respectable
advocates, — I mean that of continuing the Chief Magistrate in office for a certain time, and then excluding
him from it, either for a limited period or forever after.
This exclusion, whether temporary or perpetual, would




604               The Faederalist.
have nearly the same effects; and these effects would be
for the most part rather pernicious than salutary.
One ill effect of the exclusion would be a diminution.of the inducements to good behavior. There are few
men who would not feel much less zeal in the discharge
of a duty, when they were conscious that the advantages of the station with which it was connected must
be relinquished at a determinate period, than when they
were permitted to entertain a hope of obtaining, by meriting, a continuance of them. This position will not be
disputed, so long as it is admitted, that the desire of reward is one of the strongest incentives of human conduct; or that the best security for the fidelity of mankind, is to make their interest coincide with their duty.
Even the love of fame, the ruling passion of the noblest
minds, which would prompt a man to plan and undertake extensive and arduous enterprises for the public
benefit, requiring considerable time to mature and perfect them, if he could flatter himself with the prospect
of being allowed to finish what he had begun, would,
on the contrary, deter him from the undertaking, when
he foresaw that he must quit the scene before he could
accomplish the work, and must commit that, together
with his own reputation, to hands which might be unequal or unfriendly to the task. The most to be expected
from the generality of men, in such a situation, is the
negative merit of not doing harm, instead of the positive
merit of doing good.
Another ill effect of the exclusion would be the temptation to sordid views, to peculation, and, in some instances, to usurpation. An avaricious man, who might
happen to fill the office, looking forward to a time when he
must at all events yield up-the emoluments he enjoyed,
would feel a propensity, not easy to be resisted by such
a man, to make the best use of the opportunity he en
joyed, while it lasted; and might not scruple to have




The Federalist.             505
recourse to the most corrupt expedients to make the
harvest as abundant as it was transitory; though the
same man, probably, with a different prospect before
him, might content himself with the regular perquisites
of his situation, and might even be unwilling to risk the
consequences of an abuse of his opportunities. His avarice might be a guard upon his avarice. Add to this, that
the same man might be vain or ambitious, as well as
avaricious. And if he could expect to prolong his honors by his good conduct, he might hesitate to sacrifice
his appetite for them to his appetite for gain. But with
the prospect before him of approaching and inevitable
annihilation, his avarice would be likely to get the victory over his caution, his vanity, or his ambition.
An ambitious man two, when he found himself seated
on the summit of his country's honors, when he looked
forward to the time at which he must descend from the
exalted eminence forever, and reflected that no exertion
of merit on his part could save him from the unwelcome
reverse. such a man, in such a situation, would be much
more violently tempted to embrace a favorable conjuncture for attempting the prolongation of his power, at every
personal hazard, thaflt if he had the probability of answering the same end by doing his duty.
Would it promote the peace of the community, or the
stability of the Government, to have half a dozen men
who had had credit enough to be raised to the seat of
the Supreme Magistracy, wandering among the People
like discontented ghosts, and sighing for a place which
they were destined never more to possess?
A third ill effect of the exclusion would be, the depriving the community of the advantage of the experience
gained by the Chief Magistrate in the exercise of his
office. That experience is:the parent of wisdom, is an
adage, the truth of which is recognized by the wisest as
well as the simplest of mankind. What more desirable




506                The Fwderalist.
or more essential than this quality in the Governors of
Nations? Where more desirable or more essential than
in the first Magistrate of a Nation.? Can it be wise
to put this desirable and essential quality under the ban
of the Constitution; and to declare that the moment it
is acquired, its possessor shall be cbmpelled to abandon
the station in which it was acquired, and to which it is
adapted? This, nevertheless, is the precise import of
all those regulations which exclude men from serving
their country, by the choice of their fellow-citizens, after
they have by a course of service fitted themselves for
doing it with a greater degree of utility.
A fourth ill effect of the exclusion would be, the banishing men from stations in which, in certain emergencies of the State, their presence might be of the greatest moment to the public interest or safety. There is
no Nation which has not, at one period or another, experienced an absolute necessity of the services of particular men, in particular situations, perhaps it would
not be too strong to say, to the preservation of its political existence. How unwise, therefore, must be every
such self-denying ordinance, as serves to prohibit a Nation from making use of its own citizens, in the manner
best suited to its exigencies and circumstances! Without supposing the personal essentiality of the man, it is
evident that a change of the Chief Magistrate, at the
breaking out of a war, or at any similar crisis, for another,
even of equal.merit, would at all times be detrimental
to the community, inasmuch as it would substitute inexperience to experience, and would tend to unhinge and
set afloat the already settled train of the administration.
A fifth ill effect of the exclusion would be, that it
would operate as a constitutional interdiction of stability
in the administration.  By necessitating a change of
men, in the first office of the Nation, it would necessitate a mutability of measures. It is not generally to be




Thle Foederalist.          507
expected, that men will vary, and measures remain uniform. The contrary is the usual course of things. And
we need not be apprehensive that there will be too much
stability, while there is even the option of changing;
nor need we desire to prohibit the People from continuing their confidence where they think it may be safely
placed, and where, by constancy on their part, they may
obviate the fatal inconveniencies of fluctuating councils
and a variable policy.
These are some of the disadvantages which would flow
from the principle of exclusion. They apply most forcibly to the scheme of a perpetual exclusion; but when
we consider,-that even a partial exclusion would always
render the readmission of the person a remote and precarious object, the observations which have been made
will apply nearly as fully to one case as to the other.
What are the advantages promised to counterbalance
these disadvantages? They are represented to be: 1st.
Greater independence in the Maistrate; 2d, Greater
securitv tho the._le. Unless the exclusion be perpetual, there will be no pretence to infer the first advantage. But even in that case, may he have no object beyond his present station, to which he may sacrifice his independence? May he have no connections, no friends,
for whom he may sacrifice it? May he not be less willing, by a firm conduct, to make personal enemies, when
he acts under the impression, that a time is fast approaching, on the arrival of which he not only MAY; but
MUST be exposed to their resentments, upon an equal,
perhaps upon an inferior footing? It is not an easy
point to determine whether his independence would be
most promoted or impaired by such an arrangement.
As to the second supposed advantage, there is still
greater reason to entertain doubts concerning it. If the
exclusion were to be perpetual, a man of irregular ambition, of whom alone there could be reason in any case to




508               The Federalfst.
entertain apprehension, would, with infinite reluctance,
yield to the necessity of taking his leave forever of a
post, in which his passion for power and preeminence
had acquired the force of habit. And if he had been
fortunate or adroit enough to conciliate the good-will of
the People, he might induce them to consider as a very
odious and unjustifiable restraint upon themselves, a
provision which was calculated to debar them of the
right of giving a fresh proof of their attachment to a
favorite.  There may be conceived circumstances in
which this disgust of the People, seconding the thwarted
ambition of such a favorite, might occasion greater danger to liberty, than could ever reasonably be dreaded
from the possibility of a perpetuation in office, by the
voluntary suffrages of the community, exercising a constitutional privilege.
There is an excess of refinement in the idea of disabling the People to continue in office men who had entitled themselves, in their opinion, to approbation and
confidence; the advantages of which are at best speculative and equivocal, and are overbalanced by disadvantages far more certain and decisive.
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Friday, March 21, 1788.]
THE F(EDERALIST. No. LXXII..TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
TIPHE third ingredient towards constituting the vigor'of the Executive authority, is an adequate provision
for its support. It is evident, that without proper attention to this Article, the separation of the Executive from




The Fwderalist.             509
the Legislative department would be merely nominal
and nugatory.  The Legislature, with a discretionary
power over the salary and emoluments of the Chief
Magistrate, could render-him as obsequious to their *ivill,
as they might think proper to make him. They might,
in most cases, either reduce him by famine, or tempt
him by largesses, to surrender at discretion his judgment
to their inclinations. These expressions, taken in all
the latitude of the terms, would no doubt convey more
than is intended. There are men who could neither be
distressed, nor won, into a sacrifice of their duty; but
this stern virtue is the growth of few soils; and in the
main it will be found, that a power over a man's support is a power over his will. If it were necessary to
confirm so plain a truth by facts, examples would not be
wanting, even in this country, of the intimidation or seduction of the Executive by the terrors, or allurements,
of the pecuniary arrangements of the Legislative body.
It is not easy, therefore, to commend too highly the
judicious attention which has been paid to this subject
in the proposed Constitution. It is there provided, that
" The President of the United States shall, at stated
"times, receive for his service a compensation which'shall neither be increased, nor diminished, during the
"period for which he shall have been elected; and he
"shall not receive within that period any other emolument
"from the United States, or any of them." It is impossible to imagine any provision which would have been
more eligible than this. The Legislature, on the appointment of a President, is once for all to declare what
shall be the compensation for his services during the
time for which he shall have been elected. This done,
they will have no power to alter it, either by increase or
diminution, till a new period of service by a new election commences.  They can neither weaken his fortitude
by operating upon his necessities, nor corrupt his in



510               T~he Feaderalist.
tegrity by appealing to his avarice. Neither the Union,
nor any of its members, will be at liberty to give, nor
will he be at liberty to receive, any other emolument
than that which may have been determined by the first
act. He can of course have no pecuniary inducement
to renounce or desert the independence intended for him
by the Constitution.
The last of the requisites to energy, which have been
enumerated, are competent powers. Let us proceed to
consider those which are proposed to be vested in the
President of the United States.
The first thing that offers itself to our observation, is
the qualified negative of the President upon the Acts or
Resolutions of the two Houses of the Legislature; or,
in other words, his power of returning all Bills with objections; to have the effect of preventing their becoming laws, unless they should afterwards be ratified by
two thirds of each of the component members of the
Legislative body.
The propensity of the Legislative department to intrude upon the rights, and to absorb the powers, of the
other departments, has been already suggested and repeated; the insufficiency of a mere parchment delineation of the boundaries of each, has also been remarked
upon; and the necessity of furnishing each with constitutional arms for its own defence, has been inferred and
proved. From these clear and indubitable principles,
results the propriety of a negative, either absolute or
qualified, in the Executive, upon the Acts of the Legislative branches.  Without the one or the other, the
former would be absolutely unable to defend himself
against the depredations of the latter. He might gradually be stripped of'his authorities by successive Resolutions, or annihilated by a single vote. And in the one
mode or the other, the Legislative and Executive powers might speedily come to be blended in the same




The Foederalist.           511
hands. If even no propensity had ever discovered itself
in the Legislative body, to invade the rights of the Executive, the rules of just reasoning and theoretic propriety would of themselves teach us, that the one ought
not to be left at the mercy of the other, but ought to
possess a constitutional and effectual power of selfdefence.
-But the power in question has a further use. It not
only serves as a shield to the Executive, but it furnishes
an additional security against the enaction of improper
laws. It establishes a salutary check upon the Legislative body, calculated to guard the community against
the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse
unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body.
The propriety of a negative has, upon some ocqasions, been combated by an observation, that it was not
to be presumed a single man would possess more virtue
and wisdom than a number of men; and that unless this
presumption should be entertained, it would be improper to give the Executive Magistrate any species of
control over the Legislative body.
But this observation, when examined, will appear
rather specious than solid..The propriety of the thing
does not turn upon the supposition of superior wisdom
or virtue in the Executive; but upon the supposition,
that the Legislative will not be infallible; that the love
of power may sometimes betray it into a disposition to
encroach upon the rights of the other members of the
Government; that a spirit of faction may sometimes
pervert its deliberations; that impressions of the moment may sometimes hurry it into measures which itself, on maturer reflection, would condemn. The primary inducement to conferring the power in question
upon the Executive is, to enable him to defend himself
the secondary one is to increase the chances in favor of




512              The Federalist.
the community against the passing of bad laws, through
haste, inadvertence, or design. The oftener a measure
is brought under examination, the greater the diversity
in the situations of those who are to examine it, the less
must be the danger of those errors which flow from
want of due deliberation, or of those missteps which
proceed from the contagion of some common passion or
interest. It is far less probable, that culpable views of
any kind should infect all the parts of the Government
at the same moment and in relation to the same object, than that they should by turns govern and mislead
every one of them.
It may perhaps be said that the power of preventing
bad laws includes that of preventing good ones; and
may be used to the one purpose as well as to the other.
But this objection will have little weight with those
who can properly estimate the mischiefs of that inconstancy and mutability in the laws, which form the greatest blemish in the character and genius of our Governments. They will consider every institution'calculated
to restrain the excess of law-making, and to keep things
in the same state in which they may happen to be at
any given period, as much more likely to do good than
harm; because it is favorable to greater stability in the
system of Legislation. The injury which may possibly
be done by defeating a few good laws, will be amply
compensated by the advantage of preventing a number
of baid ones.
Nor is this all. The superior weight and influence
of the Legislative body in a free Government, and the
hazard to the Executive in a trial of strength with that
body, afford a satisfactory security that the negative
would generally be employed with great caution; and
there would oftener be room for a charge of timidity
than of rashness in the exercise of it.  A King of
Great Britain, with all his train of sovereign attributes,




The Fwderalist.            513
and with all the influence he draws from a thousand
sources, would, at this day, hesitate to put a negative
upon the Joint Resolutions of the two Houses of Parliament. He would not fail to exert the utmost resources
of that influence to strangle a measure disagreeable to
him, in its progress to the throne, to avoid being reduced to the dilemma of permitting it to take effect, or
of risking the displeasure of the Nation, by an opposition to the sense of the Legislative body. Nor is it
probable, that he would ultimately venture to exert his
prerogatives, but in a case of manifest propriety, or extreme necessity. \All well-informed men in that Kingdom will accede to the justness of this remark. A very
considerable period has elapsed since the negative of the
Crown has been exercised.
If a Magistrate so powerful and so well fortified as
a British monarch, would have scruples about the exercise of the power under consideration, how much
greater caution may be reasonably expected in a President of the United States, clothed for the short period
of four years, with the Executive authority of a Government wholly and purely republican?
It is evident, that there would be greater danger of his
not using his power when necessary, than of his using
it too often, or too much. An argument, indeed, against
its expediency, has been drawn from this very source.
It has been represented, on this account, as a power
odious in appearance, useless in practice. But it will
not follow, that because it might be rarely exercised, it
would never be exercised. In the case for which it is
chiefly designed, that of an immediate attack upon the
constitutional rights of the Executive, or in a case in
which the public good was evidently and palpably sacrificed, a man of tolerable firmness would avail himself
of his constitutional means of defence, and would listen
to the admonitions of duty and responsibility. In the
VOL. I.            33




514               The Fwaderalist.
former supposition, his fortitude would be stimulated
by his immediate interest in the power of his office; in
the latter, by the probability of the sanction of his constituents; who, though they would naturally incline to
the Legislative body in a doubtful case, would hardly
suffer their partiality to delude them in a very plain
case. I speak now with an eye to a Magistrate possessing only a common share of. firmness. There are men
who, under any circumstances, will have the courage to
do their duty at every hazard.
But the Convention have pursued a mean in this
business, which will both facilitate the exercise of the
power vested in this respect in the Executive magistrate, and make its efficacy to depend on the sense of a
considerable part of the Legislative body. Instead of
an absolute negative, it is proposed to give the Executive the qualified negative already described. This is
a power which would be much more readily exercised
than the other. A man who might be afraid to defeat
a law by his single VETO, might not scruple to return
it for reconsideration; subject to being finally rejected
only in the event of more than one third of each House
concurring in the sufficiency of his objections.  He
would be encouraged by the reflection, that if his opposition should prevail, it would embark in it a very
respectable proportion of the Legislative body, whose influence would be united with his in supporting the propriety of his conduct in the public opinion. A direct
and categorical negative has something in the appearance
of it more harsh, and more apt to irritate, than the mere
suggestion of argumentative objections to be approved
or disapproved by those to whom they are addressed.
In proportion as it would be less apt to offend, it would
be more apt to be exercised; and for this very reason,
it may in practice be found more effectual. It is to be
hoped that it will not often happen that improper views




The Fewderalist.             515
will govern so large a proportion as two thirds of both
branches of the Legislature at the same time; and this
too in spite of the counterpoising weight of the Ex.
ecutive. It is at any rate far less probable that this
should be the case, than that such views should taint
the resolutions and conduct of a bare majority. A
power of this nature in the Executive, will often have
a silent and unperceived, though forcible operation.
When men, engaged in unjustifiable pursuits, are
aware that obstructions may come from a quarter
which they cannot control, they will often be restrained by the bare apprehension of opposition, from
doing what they would with eagerness rush'into, if no
such external impediments were to be feared.
This qualified negative, as has been elsewhere remarked, is in this State vested in a Council, consisting
of the Governor, with the Chancellor and Judges of the
Supreme Court, or any two of them. It has been
freely employed upon a variety of occasions, and frequently with success.  And its utility has become so
apparent, that persons who, in compiling the Constitution, were violent opposers of itrhave; from experience
become its declared admirers.* (? ~::*'5'.
I have in another place remarked that the Convention,
in the formation of this part of their plan, had departed
from the model of the Constitution of this State, in
favor of that of Massachusetts. Two strong reasons
may be imagined for this preference. One is that the
Judges, who are to be the interpreters of the law, might
receive an improper bias3 from having given a previous
opinion in their revisionary capacities; the other is that
by being often associated with the Executive, they might
be induced to embark too far in the political views of
that Magistrate, and thus a dangerous combination
* Mr. ABRAHAM YATES, a warm vention, is of this number. -Pub
)pponent of the plan of the Con- lius.




516               The FPderalist.
might by degrees be cemented between the Executive
and Judiciary departments. It is impossible to keep the
Judges too distinct from every other avocation than that
of expounding the laws. It isp DlerLy'd0a-nperoq_ to
place them in a situation to be either corru ted or influ
enced-by t3he  xecutive.
PUBLIUS.
[Fronm the New York Packet, Tuesday,,March 25, 1788.]
THE - F(EDERALIST. No. LXXIII.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
THE President of the United States is to be " Corn
1" mander-in-Chief of the army and navy of the
" United States, and of the militia of the several
" States when called into the actual service of the
" United States." The propriety of this provision is so
evident in itself, and it is, at the same time, so consonant
to the precedents of the State Constitutions in general,
that little need be said to explain or enforce it. Even
those of them which have, in other respects, coupled the
Chief Magistrate with a Council, have for the most part
concentrated the military authority in him alone. Of
all the cares or concerns of Government, the direction
of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which
distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand.
The direction of war, implies the direction of the common strength; and the power of directing and employing the common strength, forms a usual and essential
part in the definition of the Executive authority.
"' The President may require the opinion, in writing,
"of the principal officer in each of the Executive de.




The Federalist.              517
" partments, upon any subject relating to the duties of
"their respective offices." This I consider as a mere
redundancy in the plan; as the right for which it pro.
vides would result of itself from the office.
He is also to be authorized " to grant reprieves and
" pardons for offences against the United States, except
"in cases of impeachment."  Humanity and good policy
conspire to dictate, that the benign prerogative of pardoning should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed. The criminal code of every country partakes
so much of necessary severity, that without an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice,would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel.
As the sense of responsibility is always strongest, in
proportion as' it is undivided, it may be inferred, that a;.single man would be most ready to attend to the force
of those motives which might plead for a mitigation of
the rigor of the law, and least apt to yield to considerations, which were calculated to shelter a fit object of its
vengeance. The reflection that the fate of a fellowcreature depended on his sole fiat, would naturally inspire scrupulousness and caution; the dread of being
accused of weakness or connivance would beget equal
circumspection, though of a different kind. On the
other hand, as men generally derive confidence from
their numbers, they might often encourage each other
in an -act of obduracy, and might be less sensible to the
apprehension of suspicion or censure for an injudicious
or affected clemency.  On these accounts, one man
-appears to be a more eligible dispenser of the mercy
of,Government, than -a body of men.
The.expediency of vesting the power of pardoning in
the President has, if I mistake not, been only contested
in- relation to the crime of treason. This, it has been
urgedd, ought to have depended upon the assent of one,
or both of the branches of the Legislative body. I shad




518               The Fwderalist.
not deny that there are strong reasons to be assigned
for requiring in this particular the concurrence of that
body, or of a part of it. As treason is a crime levelled
at the immediate being of the society, when the laws
have once ascertained the guilt of the offender, there
seems a fitness in referring the expediency of an act of
mercy towards him to the judgment of the Legislature.
And this ought the rather to be the case, as the supposition of the connivance of the Chief Magistrate ought
not to be entirely excluded. But there are also strong
objections to such a plan. It is not to be doubted, that
a single man of prudence and good sense is better fitted,
in delicate conjunctures, to balance the motives which
may plead for and against the remission of the punishment, than any numerous body whatever. It deserves
particular attention, that treason will often be connected
with seditions. which embrace a large proportion of the
community; as lately happened in Massachusetts. In
every such case, we might expect to see the representation of the People tainted with the same spirit which
had given birth to the offence. And when parties were
pretty equally matched, the secret sympathy of the
friends and favorers of the condemned person, availing
itself of the good-nature and weakness of others, might
frequently bestow impunity where the terror of an example was necessary.  On the other hand, when the
sedition had proceeded from causes which had inflamed
the resentments of the major party, they might often be
found obstinate and inexorable, when policy demanded
a conduct of forbearance and clemency. But the principal argument for reposing the power of pardoning in
this case in the Chief Magistrate is this: in seasons
of insurrection or rebellion, there are often critical moments, when a well-timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquillity of the Commonwealth; and which, if suffered to pass unimproved,




The Fswderalist.            519
it may never be possible afterwards to recall. The dila
tory process of convening the Legislature, or one of its
branches, for the purpose of obtaining its sanction to
the measure, would frequently be the occasion of letting
slip the golden opportunity. The loss of a week, a day
an hour, may sometimes be fatal. If it should be ob
served, that a discretionary power, with a view to such
contingencies, might be occasionally conferred upon the
President, it may be answered in the first place, that it
is questionable, whether, in a limited Constitution, that
power could be delegated by law; and in the second
place, that it would generally be impolitic beforehand
to take any step which might hold out the prospect of
impunity. A proceeding of this kind, out of the usual
course, would be likely to be construed into an argument of timidity or of weakness, and would have a
tendency to embolden guilt.
PUBLIUS.
For the Independent Journal.
THE FCEDERALIST. No. LXXIV.
TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
THE President is to have power, "by and with tne
"advice and consent of the Senate, to make trea"ties, provided two thirds of the Senators present con" cur. "
Though this provision has been assailed on different
grounds, with no small degree of vehemence, I scruple'not to -declare my firm persuasion, that it is one of the
best digested and most'unexceptionable parts of the
plan. One ground of objection is the trite topic of the




20       0     The  Foederalist.
intermixture of powers; some contending that the
President ought alone to possess the power of making
treaties; others, that it ought to have been exclusively
deposited in the Senate. Another source of objection
is derived from the small number of persons by whom
a treaty may be made. Of those who espouse this objection, a part are of opinion that the House of Representatives ought to have been associated in the business,
while another part seem to think that nothing more was
necessary than to have substituted two thirds of all the
members of the Senate, to two thirds of the members
present. As I flatter myself the observations made in
a preceding number, upon this part of the plan, must
have sufficed to place it, to a discerning eye, in a very
favorable light, I shall here content myself with offering
only some supplementary remarks, principally with a
view to the objections which have been just stated.
~With regard to the intermixture of powers, I shall rely
upon the explanations already given in other places, of
the true sense of the rule upon which that objection is
founded; and shall take it for granted, as an inference
from them, that the union of the -Executive with the
Senate, in the Article of treaties, is no infringement of
that rule. I venture to add, that theparticular nature
of the power of making treaties, indicates a peculiar
propriety in that union. Though several writers on the
subject of Government place that power in the class of
Executive authorities, yet this is evidently an arbitrary
disposition; for if we attend carefully, to its operation, it
will be found to partake more of the Legislative than of
the Executive character, though it does not seem strictly
to fall within the definition of either of them. The essence
of the Legislative authority is to enact laws, or, in other
words, to prescribe rules for the regulation of the society;
while the execution of the laws, and the employment of
the common strength, either for this purpose, or for the




The Fawderalist.            521
common defence, seem to comprise all the functions of
the Executive magistrate. The power of making treat
ties is, plainly, neither the one nor the other. It relates
neither to the execution of the subsisting laws, nor to
the enaction of new ones; and still less to an exertion
of the common strength. Its objects are CONTRACTS
with foreign Nations, which have the force of law, but
derive it from the obligations of good faith. They are
not rules prescribed by the sovereign to the subject, but
agreements between sovereign and sovereign. The power
in question seems therefore to form a distinct department, and to belong, properly, neither to the Legislative
nor to the Executive. The qualities elsewhere detailed,
as indispensable in the management of foreign negotiations, point out the Executive as the most fit agent in
those transactions; while the vast importance of the
trust, and the operation of treaties as laws, plead strongly
for the participation of the whole or a portion of the
Legislative body in the office of making them.
However proper or safe it may be in Governments,
where the Executive Magistrate is an hereditary monarch, to commit to him the entire power of making
treaties, it would be utterly unsafe and improper to intrust that power to an elective Magistrate of four years'
duration. It has been remarked, upon another occasion,
and the remark is unquestionably just, that an hereditary
monarch, though often the oppressor of his People, has
personally too much at stake in the Government, to be in
any material danger of being corrupted by foreign powers. But a man raised from the station of a private citizen to the rank of Chief Magistrate, possessed of but
a moderate or slender fortune, and looking forward to
a period not very remote, when he may probably be
obliged to return to the station from which he was taken,
might sometimes be under temptations to sacrifice his
duty to his interest, which it would require superlative




522              The Federalist.
virtue to withstand. An avaricious man might be.empt.
ed to betray the interests of the State to the acquisition
of wealth. An ambitious man might make his own
aggrandizement, by the aid of a foreign power, the price
of his treachery to his constituents. The history of
human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion
of human virtue, which would make it wise in a Nation
to commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind,
as those which concern its intercourse with the rest of
the world, to the sole disposal of a Magistrate created
and circumstanced as would be a President of the
United States.
To have intrusted the power of making treaties to the
Senate alone, would have been to relinquish the benefits
of the constitutional agency of the President in the conduct of foreign negotiations. It is true, that the Senate
would, in that case, have the option of employing him
in this capacity; but they would also have the option
of letting it alone; and pique or cabal might induce the
latter rather than the former. Besides this, the miinisterial servant of the Senate could not be expected to enjoy
the confidence and respect of foreign powers in the same
degree with the constitutional representatives of the
Nation; and of course, would not be able to act with
an equal degree of weight or efficacy. While the Union
would, from this cause, lose a considerable advantage in
the management of its external concerns, the People
would lose the additional security which would result
from  the cooperation of the Executive.  Though it
would be imprudent to confide in him solely so important a trust, yet it cannot be doubted, that his participation would materially add to the safety of the society.
It must indeed be clear, to a demonstration, that the
joint possession of the power in question, by the President and Senate, would afford a greater prospect of se.
nurity, than the separate possession of it by either of




The Fcederalist.            523
them. And whoever has maturely weighed the circumstances which must concur in the appointment of a Presq
ident, will be satisfied that the office will always bid fair
to be filled by men of such characters, as to render theit
concurrence in the formation of treaties peculiarly desirtable, as well on the score of wisdom, as on that of integrity.
The remarks made in a former number, which has
been alluded to in another part of this paper, will apply
with conclusive force against the admission of the House
of Representatives to a share in the formation of treaties. The fluctuating, and, taking its future increase
into the account, the multitudinous composition of that
body, forbid us to expect in it those qualities which are
essential to the proper execution of such a trust. Accurate and comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics;
a steady and systematic adherence to the same views;
a nice and uniform sensibility to National character;
decision, secrecy, and despatch, are incompatible with the
genius of a body so variable and so numerous. The
very complication of the business, by introducing a necessity of the concurrence of so many different bodies,
would of itself afford a solid objection. The greater
frequency of the calls upon the House of Representatives, and the greater length of time which it would often
be necessary to keep them together when convened, to
obtain their sanction in the progressive stages of a treaty,
would be source of so great inconvenience and expense,
as alone ought to condemn the project.
The only objection which remains to be canvassed, is
that which would substitute the proportion of two thirds
of all the members composing the senatorial body, to
that of two thirds of the members present. It has been
shown, under the second head of our inquiries, that all
provisions which require more than the majority of any
body, to its Resolutions, have a direct tendency to em




524              The Fwderalist.
barrass the operations of the Government, and an india
rect one to subject the sense of the majority to that of
the minority.  This consideration seems sufficient to
determine our opinion, that the Convention have gone
as far in the endeavor to secure the advantage of numbers in the formation of treaties, as could have been
reconciled either with the activity of the public councils
or with a reasonable regard to the major sense of the
community.  If two thirds of the whole number of
members had been required, it would, in many cases,
from the non-attendance of a part, amount in practice
to a necessity of unanimity. And the history of every
political establishment in which this principle has prevailed, is a history of impotence, perplexity, and disorder.
Proofs of this position might be adduced from the examples of the Roman Tribuneship, the Polish Diet, and
the States General of the Netherlands; did not an example at home render foreign precedents unnecessary.
To require a fixed proportion of the whole body,
would not, in all probability, contribute to the advantages of a numerous agency, better than merely to require a proportion of the attending members.  The
former, by making a determinate number at all times
requisite to a resolution, diminishes the motives to punctual attendance. The latter, by making the capacity of
the body to depend on a proportion which may be varied
by the absence or presence of a single member, has the
contrary effect. And as, by promoting punctuality, it
tends to keep the body complete, there is great likelihood that its resolutions would generally be dictated by
as great a number in this case, as in the other; while
there would be much fewer occasions of delay.  It
ought not to be forgotten that under the existing Con.
federation, two members may, and usually do represent
a State; whence it happens that Congress, who now
are solely invested with all the powers of the Unioan




The FEederalist.            529
rarely consists of a greater number of persons than would
compose the intended Senate. If we add to this, that
as the members vote by States, and that where there is
only a single member present from a State, his vote is
lost, it will justify a supposition that the active voices
in the Senate, where the members are to vote individually, would rarely fall short in number of the active
voices in the existing Congress. When, in addition to
these considerations, we take into view the co;operation
of the President, we shall not hesitate to infer that the
People of America would have greater security against
an improper use of the power of making treaties, under
the new Constitution, than they now enjoy under the
Confederation. And when we proceed still one step
further, and look forward to the probable augmentation
of the Senate, by the erection of new States, we shall
not only perceive ample ground of confidence in the
sufficiency of the members, to whose agency that power
will be intrusted; but we shall probably be led to conclude, that a body more numerous than the Senate
would be likely to become, would be very little fit for
the proper discharge of the trust.
PUBLIUS.
[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, April 1, 1788.J
THE F(EDERALIST. No. LXXV.
To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
THE President is "to nominate, and, by and with
"the advice and consent of the Senate, to ap"point Ambassadors, other public Ministers and ConU suls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other offi



526               The Foederalist.'
"cers of the United States, whose appointments are not
"otherwise provided for in the Constitution. But the
"Congress may by law vest the appointment of such
"inferior officers as they think proper, in the President
"alone, or in the Courts of law, or in the Heads of de"partments. The President shall have power to fill up
"all vacancies which may happen during the recess of
"the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire
"at the end of their next session."
It has been observed in a former paper, that " the true
"test of a good Government is its aptitude and tendency
" to produce a good administration."  If the justness of
this observation be admitted, the mode of appointing the
officers of the United States contained in the foregoing
clauses, must, when examined, be allowed to be entitled
to particular commendation. It is not easy to conceive
a plan better calculated than this to promote a judicious choice of men for filling the offices of the Union
and it will not need proof, that on this point must es
sentially depend the character of its administration.
It will be agreed on all hands, that the power of appointment, in ordinary cases, ought to be modified in
one of three ways. It ought either to be vested in a
single man; or in a select Assembly of a moderate
number; or in a single man, with the concurrence of
such an Assembly. The exercise of it by the People at
large will be readily admitted to be impracticable; as
waiving every other consideration, it would leave them
little time to do anything else. When, therefore, mention is made in the subsequent reasonings, of an Assembly or body of men, what is said must be understood
to relate to a select body or Assembly, of the description already given. The People collectively, from their
number and from their dispersed situation, cannot be
regulated in their movements by that systematic spirit
of cabal and intrigue, which will be urged as the chief




The Feaderalist.              527
objections to reposing the power in question in a body
of men.
Those who have themselves reflected upon the subject
or who have attended to the observations made in other
parts of these papers, in relation to the appointment of
the President, will, I presume, agree to the position, that
there would always be great probability of having the
place supplied by a man of abilities, at least respectable.
Premising this, I proceed to lay it down as a rule, that
one man of discernment is better fitted to analyze and
estimate the peculiar qualities adapted to particular offices, than a body of men of equal, or perhaps even of
superior discernment.
The sole and undivided responsibility of one man
will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty, and a more
exact regard to reputation. He will, on this account,
feel himself under stronger obligations, and more interested to investigate with care the qualities requisite to
the stations to be filled, and to prefer with impartiality
the persons who may have the fairest pretensions to
them. He will have fewer personal attachments to gratify, than a body of men who may each be supposed to
have an equal number; and will be so much the less
liable to be misled by the sentiments of friendship and of
affection. A single well-directed man, by a single understanding, cannot be distracted and warped by that diversity of views, feelings, and interests, which frequently
distract and warp the resolutions of a collective body.
There is nothing so apt to agitate the passions of mankind as personal considerations, whether they relate to
ourselves or to others, who are to be the objects of our
choice or preference. Hence, in every exercise of the
power of appointing to offices by an Assembly of men,
we must expect to see a full display of all the private
and party likings and dislikes, partialities and antipathies,
attachments and animosities, which are felt by those who




528               The Fcederalist.
compose the Assembly. The choice which may at any
time happen to be made under such circumstances, will
of course be the result either of a victory gained by one
party over the other, or of a compromise between the
parties. In either case, the intrinsic merit of the candidate will be too often out of sight. In the first, the
qualifications best adapted to uniting the suffrages of
the party, will be more considered than those which fit
the person for the station. In the last, the coalition will
commonly turn upon some interested equivalent: c" Give
" us the man we wish for this office, and you shall have
"the one you wish for that."  This will be the usual
condition of the bargain. And it will rarely happen
that the advancement.of the public service will be the
primary object either of party victories, or of party negotiations.
The truth of the principles here advanced seems to
have been felt by the most intelligent of those who have
found fault with the provision made, in this respect, by
the Convention. They contend that the President ought
solely to have been authorized to make the appointments
under the Fcpderal Government. But it is easy to show,
that every advantage to be expected from such an arrangement would, in substanee, be derived from the
power of nomination, which is proposed to be conferred
upon him; while several disadvantages which might
attend the absolute power of appointment in the hands
of that officer would be avoided. In the act of nomination, his judgment alone would be exercised; and as it
would be his sole duty to point out the man, who with
the approbation of the Senate should fill an office, his
responsibility would be as complete as if he were to
make the final appointment. There can, in this view,
be no difference between nominating and appointing.
The same motives which would influence a proper discharge of his duty in one case, would exist in the other.




The Faderalist.            529
And as no man could be appointed but on his previou2
nomination, every man who might be appointed would
be, in fact, his choice.
But might not his nomination be overruled?  I grant
it might, yet this could only be to make place for
another nomination by himself. The person ultimately
appointed must be the object of his preference, though
perhaps not in the first degree. It is also not very probable that his nomination would often be overruled. The
Senate could not be tempted, by the preference they
might feel to another, to reject the one proposed; because they could not assure themselves, that the person
they might wish would be brought forward by a second
or by any subsequent nomination.' They could not even
be certain, that a future nomination would present a
candidate in any degree more acceptable to them; and
as their dissent might cast a kind of stigma upon the individual rejected, and might have the appearance of a
reflection upon the judgment of the Chief Magistrate,
it is not likely that their sanction would often be refused, where there were not special and strong reasons for
the refusal.
To what purpose then require the cooiperation of the
Senate? I answer, that the necessity of their concurrence would have a powerful, though, in general, a silent
operation. It would be an excellent check upon a spirit
of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly
to preventing the appointment of unfit characters from
State prejudice, from family connection, from personal
attachment, or from a view to popularity. In addition
to this, it would be an efficacious source of stability in
the administration.
It will readily be comprehendedc, that a man who had
himself the sole disposition of offices, would be governed
much more by his private inclinations and interests, than
when he was bound to submit the propriety of his choice
VOL. I.       34




530               The Faederalist.
to the discussion and determination of a different and
independent body, and that body an entire branch of
the Legislature. The' possibility of rejection would be
a strong motive to care in proposing. The danger to
his own reputation, and, in the case of an elective Magistrate, to his political existence, from betraying a spirit
of favoritism, or an unbecoming pursuit of popularity,
to the observation of a body whose opinion would have
great weight in forming that of the public, could not
fail to operate as a barrier to the one and to the other.
He would be both ashamed and afraid to bring forward,
for the most distinguished or lucrative stations, candidates who had no other merit than that of coming from
the same State to which he particularly belonged, or of
being in some way or other personally allied to him, or
of possessing the necessary insignificance and pliancy to
render them the obsequious instruments of his pleasure.
To this reasoning it has been objected, that the President, by the influence of the power of nomination, may
secure the complaisance of the Senate to his views.
The supposition of universal venality in human nature,
is little less an error in political reasoning, than the supposition of universal rectitude. The institution of delegated power implies, that there is a portion of virtue and
honor among mankind, which may be a reasonable foundation of confidence; and experience justifies the theory.
It has been found to exist in the most corrupt periods of
the most corrupt Governments. The venality of the
British House of Cdmmons has been long a topic of
accusation against that body, in the country to which
they belong, as well as in this; and it cannot be doubted
that the charge is, to a considerable extent, well founded.
But it is as little to be doubted, that there is always a
large proportion of the body, which consists of independent and public-spirited men, who have an influential
weight in the councils of the Nation. Hence it is, (the




Tlhe Fcederalist.            631
present reign not excepted,) that the sense of that body
is often seen to control the inclinations of the monarch,
both with regard to men and to measures. Though it
might therefore be allowable to suppose, that the Executive might occasionally influence some individuals in
the Senate, yet the supposition, that he could in general purchase the integrity of the whole body, would be
forced and improbable. A man disposed to view human nature as i is, without either flattering its virtues,
or exaggerating its vices, will see sufficient ground of
confidence in the probity of the Senate, to rest satisfied,
not only that it will be impracticable to the Executive
to corrupt or seduce a majority of its members, but that
the necessity of its cooperation, in the business of appointments, will be a considerable and salutary restraint
upon the conduct of that Magistrate. Nor is the integrity of the Senate the only reliance. The Constitution
has provided some important guards' against the danger
of Executive influence upon the Legislative body: it
declares, that " No Senator or Representative shall, dur"ing the time for which he was elected, be appointed to
"any civil office under the United States, which shall
"have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall
"' have been increased during such time; and no person,
i" holding any office under the United States, shall be a
"member of either House during his continuance in
office."
PUBLIUS.




532               The Fasderalist.
[From the New York Packet, Friday, April 4, 1788.]
THE F(EDERALIST. No. LXXVI.
TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
IT has been mentioned as one of the advantages to be
expected from the cooperation of the Senate,:in the
business of appointments, that it would contribute to
the stability of the administration. The consent of that
body would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint.  A change of the Chief Magistrate, therefore,
would not occasion so violent or so general a revolution
in the officers of the Government as might be expected,
if he were the sole disposer of offices. Where a man in
any station had given satisfactory evidence of his fitness
for it, a new President would be restrained from attempting a change in favor of a person more agreeable
to him, by the apprehension that a discountenance of
the Senate might frustrate the attempt, and bring some
degree of discredit upon himself. Those who can best
estimate the value of a steady administration will be
most disposed to prize a provision, which connects the
official existence of public men with the approbation or
disapprobation of that body, which, from the greater
permanency of its own composition, will in all probability be less subject to inconstancy than any other member of the Government.
To this union of the Senate with the President, in the
Article of appointments, it has in some cases been suggested, that it would serve to give the President an undue influence over the Senate; and in others that it
would have an opposite tendency; a strong proof that
neither suggestion is true.




The Federalist.            533
To state the first in its proper form, is to refute it. It
amounts to this, —the President would have an improper influence over the Senate; because the Senate
would have the power of restraining him. This is an
absurdity in terms.  It cannot admit of a doubt that
the entire power of appointment would enable him
much more effectually to establish a dangerous empire
over that body, than a mere power of nomination subject to their control.
Let us take a view of the converse of the proposition:
"the Senate would influence the Executive."  As I
have had occasion to remark in several other instances,
the indistinctness of the objection forbids a precise answer. In what manner is this influence to be exerted?
In relation to what objects? The power of influencing
a person, in the sense in which it is here used, must imply a power of conferring a benefit upon him. How
could the Senate confer a benefit upon the President by
the manner of employing their right of negative upon
his nominations? If it be said they might sometimes
gratify him by an acquiescence in a favorite choice,
when public motives might dictate a different conduct, I
answer, that the instances in which the President could
be personally interested in the result, would be too few
to admit of his being materially affected by the compliances of the Senate.  The POWER which can originate the disposition of honors and emoluments, is more
likely to attract than to be attracted by the POWER which
can merely obstruct their course. If by influencing the
President be meant restraining him, this is precisely
what must have been intended. And it has been shown
that the restraint would be salutary, at the same time
that it would not be such as to destroy a single advantage to be looked for from the uncontrolled agency of
that Magistrate. The right of nomination would produce all the good of that of appointment, and would in
a great measure avoid its evils.




534              The Foederalist.
Upon a comparison of the plan for the appointment
of the officers of the proposed Government, with that
which is established by the Constitution of this State, a
decided preference must be given to the former. In that
plan, the power of nomination is unequivocally vested
in the Executive. And as there would be a necessity
for submitting each nomination to the judgment of an
entire branch of the Legislature, the circumstances attending an appointment, from the mode of conducting
it, would naturally become matters of notoriety; and
the public would be at no loss to determine, what part
had been performed by the different actors. The blame
of a bad nomination would fall upon the President
singly and absolutely. The censure of rejecting a good
one would lie entirely at the door of the Senate; aggravated by the consideration of their having counteracted the good intentions of the Executive. If an ill
appointment should be made, the Executive for nominating, and the Senate for approving, would participate,
though in different degrees, in the opprobrium and disgrace.
The reverse of all this characterizes the manner of
appointment in this State. The Council of Appointment consists of from three to five persons, of whom the
Governor is always one. This small body, shut up in
a private apartment, impenetrable to the public eye,
proceed to the execution of the trust committed to
them. It is known that the Governor claims the right
of nomination, upon the strength of some ambiguous
expressions in the Constitution; but it is not known
to what extent, or in what manner he exercises it; nor
upon what occasions he is contradicted or opposed. The
censure of a bad appointment on account of the uncertainty of its author, and for want of a determinate object, has neither poignancy nor duration. And while
an unbounded field for cabal and intrigue lies open, all




The Fwederalist.            535
idea of responsibility is lost. The most that the public
can know, is that the Governor claims the right of nomination; that two out of the inconsiderable number of
four men can too often be managed without much difficulty; that if some of the members of a particular
Council should happen to be of an uncomplying character, it is frequently not impossible to get rid of their
opposition, by regulating the times of meeting in such a
manner as to render their attendance inconvenient; and
that from whatever cause it may proceed, a great number of very improper appointments are from time to
time made. Whether a Governor of this State avails
himself of the ascendant he must necessarily have, in
this delicate and important part of the administration,
to prefer to offices men who are best qualified for them,
or whether he prostitutes that advantage to the advancement of persons whose chief merit is their implicit devotion to his will, and to the support of a despicable
and dangerous system of personal influence, are questions which, unfortunately for the community, can only
be the subjects of speculation and conjecture.
Every mere Council of Appointment, however constituted, will be a conclave, in which cabal and intrigue
will have their full scope. Their number, without an
unwarrantable increase of expense, cannot be large
enough to preclude a facility of combination. And as
each member will have his friends and connections to
provide for, the desire of mutual gratification will beget
a scandalous bartering of votes and bargaining for
places.  The private attachments of one man might
easily be satisfied; but to satisfy the private attachments
of a dozen, or of twenty men, would occasion a monopoly of all the principal employments of the Government, in a few families, and would lead more directly
to an aristocracy or an oligarchy, than any measure that
Iould be contrived. If, to avoid an accumulation of




536              The Fwederalist.
offices, there was to be a frequent change in the persons
who were to compose the Council, this would involve
the mischiefs of a mutable administration in their full
extent. Such a Council would also be more liable to
Executive influence than the Senate, because they
would be fewer in number, and would act less immediately under the public inspection. Such a Council,
in fine, as a substitute for the plan of the Convention,
would be productive of an illcrease of expense, a multiplication of the evils which spring from favoritism and
intrigue in the distribution of public honors, a decrease
of stability in the administration of the Government,
and a diminution of the security against an undue influence of the Executive. And yet such a Council has
been warmly contended for as an essential amendment
in the proposed Constitution.
I could not with propriety conclude my observations
on the subject of appointments, without taking notice of
a scheme, for which there have appeared some, though
but few advocates; I mean that of uniting the House
of Representatives in the power of making them.  I
shall, however, do little more than mention it, as I cannot imagine that it is likely to gain the countenance
of any considerable part of the community. A body
so fluctuating, and at the same time so numerous, can
never be deemed proper for the exercise of that power.
Its unfitness will appear manifest to all, when it is recollected that in half a century it may consist of three
or four hundred persons.  All the advantages of the
stability, both of the Executive and of the Senate,
would be defeated by this union; and infinite delays
and embarrassments would be occasioned.  The example of most of the States in their local Constitutions,
encourhges us to reprobate the idea.
The, only remaining powers of the Executive are
comprehended in giving information to Congress of the




The Faoderalist.           537
state of the Union; in recommending to their consider
ation such measures as he shall judge expedient; in
convening them, or either branch, upon extraordinary
occasions; in adjourning them when they cannot themselves agree upon the time of adjournment; in receiving Ambassadors and other public Ministers; in faithfully executing the laws; and in commissioning all the
officers of the United States.
Except some cavils about the power of convening
either House of the Legislature, and that of receiving
Ambassadors, no objection has been made to this class
of authorities; nor could they possibly admit of any.
It required, indeed, an insatiable avidity for censure, to
invent exceptions to the parts which have been excepted
to. In regard to the power of convening either House
of the Legislature, I shall barely remark, that in respect
to the Senate at least, we can readily discover a good
reason for it. As this body has a concurrent power with
the Executive in the Article of treaties, it might often
be necessary to call it together with a view to this object, when it would be unnecessary and improper to
convene the House of Representatives. As to the reception of Ambassadors, what I have said in a former
paper will furnish a sufficient answer.
We have now completed a survey of the structure
and powers of the Executive department, which, I have
endeavored to show, combines, as far as republican prin.
ciples will admit, all the requisites to energy.  The
remaining inquiry is, —Does it also combine the requisites to safety, in the republican sense, — a due dependence on the People - a due responsibility? The
answer to this question has been anticipated in the investigation of its other characteristics, and is satisfactorily deducible from these circumstances; from the election
of the President once in four years by persons immediately chosen by the People for that purpose; and from




538              The Fcederalist.
his being, at all times, liable to impeachment, trial, dis.
mission from office, incapacity to serve in any other, and
to forfeiture of life and estate by subsequent prosecution
in the common course of law. But these precautions,
great as they are, are not the only ones which the plan
of the Convention has provided in favor of the public
security.. In the only instances in which the abuse of
the Executive authority was materially to be feared, the
Chief Magistrate of the United States would, by that
plan, be subjected to the control of a branch of the Legislative body. What more could be desired by an enlightened and reasonable people?
PUBLIUS.
[From M'LEAN's Edition, New York, M.DCC.LXXXVm.]
[THE F(EDERALIST.] No. LXXVIII.
[To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:]
~W E proceed now to an examination of the Judiciary
department of the proposed Government.
In unfolding the defects of the existing Confederation
the utility and necessity of a Fcederal Judicature have
been clearly pointed out. It is the less necessary to recapitulate the considerations there urged, as the propriety of the institution in the abstract is not disputed; the
only questions which have been raised being relative to
the manner of constituting it, and to its extent. To
these points, therefore, our observations shall be confined.
The manner of constituting it seems to embrace these
several objects: -1st, The mode of appointing the
Judges; —2d, The tenure by which they are to hold
their places; — 3d. The partition of the Judiciary au



The Fwederalist.             539
thority between different courts, and their relations tc
each other.
First. As to the mode of appointing the Judges; this
is the same with that of appointing the officers of the
Union in general, and has been so fully discussed in the
two last numbers, that nothing can be said here which
would not be useless repetition.
Second. As to the tenure by which the Judges are
to hold their places: this chiefly concerns their duration
in office; the provisions for their support; the precautions
for their responsibility.
According to the plan of the Convention, all Judges
who may be appointed by the United States are to hold
their offices during good behavior; which is conformable
to the most approved of the State Constitutions, and
among the rest, to that of this State. Its propriety having been drawn into question by the adversaries of that
plan, is no light symptom of the rage for objection, which
disorders their imaginations and judgments.  The
standard of good behavior for the continuance in office
of the Judicial magistracy, is certainly one of the most
valuable of the modern improvements in the practice of
Government. In a monarchy, it is an excellent barrier
to the despotism of the Prince; in a republic it is a no
less excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body. And it is the best
expedient which can be devised in any Government, to
secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration
of the laws.
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive, that, in a Government
in which they are separated from each other, the Judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the
least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or
injure them. The Executive not only dispenses the




540                The Fwderalzst.
honors, but holds the sword of the community.  The
Legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes
the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen
are to be regulated. The Judiciary, on the contrary, has
no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society;
and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly
be said to have neither FORCE nor WIL Lbut merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the
Executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.
This simple view of the matter suggests several important consequences. It proves incontestably, that the
Judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three
departments of power;' that it can never attack with
success either of the other two; and that all possible
care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against their
attacks. It equally proves, that though individual oppression may now and then proceed from the courts of
justice, the general liberty of the People can never be
endangered from that quarter: I mean so long as the
Judiciary remains truly distinct from both the Legislature and Executive.  For I agree, that "there is no
"liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from
" the Legislative and Executive powers."t And it proves,
in the last place, that as liberty can have nothing to fear
from the Judiciary alone, but wold. ingto
fear fromits wuniog with either of the other departments;
that as all the effects of sucli an union mustiensue-ff6m
a dependence of the former on the latter, notwithstanding a nominal and apparent separation; that as, from
the natural feebleness of the Judiciary, it is in continual
jeopardy of being overpowered, awed, or influenced by its
coordinate branches; and that as nothing can contribute
* The celebrated MONTESQUIEU, "JUDICIARY is next to nothing."
speaking of them, says, "Of the Spirit of Laws, Vol. I. page 186. -
"three powers above mentioned, the Publius.
i Idem, page 181.- Ptublius.




The Fcederalist.             541
so much to its firmness and independence as perma
nency in office, this quality may therefore be justly regarded as an indispensable ingredient in its constitu.
tion; and in a great measure, as the citadel of the public
justice and the public security.
The complete independence of the Courts of justice
is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution. By a
limited Constitution, I understand one which contains
certain specified exceptions to the Legislative authority;
such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and the like. Limitations
of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way
than through the medium of the Courts of justice;
whose duty it must be to declare all Acts contrary to
the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without
this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges
would amount to nothing.
Some perplexity respecting the rights of the Courts to
pronounce Legislative acts void, because contrary to the
Constitution, has arisen from an imagination that the
doctrine would imply a superiority of the Judiciary to
the Legislative power. It is urged that the authority
which can declare the acts bf another void, must necessarily be superior to the one whose acts may be declared
void. As this doctrine is of great importance in all the
American Constitutions, a brief discussion of the ground
on which it rests cannot be unacceptable.
There is no position which depends on clearer principleq, than that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is
exercised, is void. No Legislative act, therefore, contrary
to the Constitution, can be valid. To deny this, would
be to affirm, that the deputy is greater than his principal;
that the servant is above his master; that the Representatives of the People are superior to the People themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers, may do not




542               The FPederalist.
only what their powers do not authorize, but what they
forbid.
If it be said that the Legislative body are themselves
the constitutional judges of their own powers, and that
the construction they put upon them is conclusive upon
the other departments, it may be answered, that this
cannot be the natural presumption, where it is not to be
collected from any particular provisions in the Constitution. It is not otherwise to be supposed, that the Constitution could intend to enable the Representatives of
the People to substitute their will to that of their constituents. It is far more rational to suppose, that the
Courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the People and the Legislature, in order, among
other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned
to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the
proper and peculiar province of the Courts. A Constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the Judges,
as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to
ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any
particular Act proceeding from the Legislative body. If
there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which'has the superior obligation
and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or in other
words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the
statute; the intention of the People to the intention of
their agents.
Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a
superiority of the Judicial to the Legislative power. It
only supposes that the power of the People is superior
to both; and that where the will of the Legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the
People, declared in the Constitution, the Judges ought
to be governed by the latter rather than the former.
They ought to regulate their decisions by the funda.
mental laws, rather than by those whioh-are not fundamental.




The Fwederalist.             543
This exercise of judicial discretion, in determining
between two contradictory laws, is exemplified in a familiar instance. It not uncommonly happens, that there
are two statutes existing at one time, clashing in whole
or in part with each other, and neither of them containing any repealing clause or expression. In such a case,
it is the province of the Courts to liquidate and fix their
meaning and operation; so far as they can, by any fair
construction, be reconciled to each other, reason and law
conspire to dictate that this should be done; where this
is impracticable, it becomes a matter of necessity to
give effect to one, in exclusion of the other. The rule
which has obtained in the Courts for determining their
relative validity is, that the last in order of time shall be
preferred to the first. But this is a mere rule of construction, not derived from any positive law, but from
the nature and reason of the thing. It is a rule not
enjoined upon the Courts by Legislative provision, but
adopted by themselves, as consonant to truth and propriety, for the direction of their conduct as interpreters
of the law; They thought it reasonable, that between
the interfering acts of an equal authority, that which
was the last indication of its will should have the preference.
But in regard to the interfering acts of a superior and
subordinate authority, of an original and derivative
power, the nature and reason of the thing indicate the
converse of that rule as proper to be followed. They
teach us, that the prior act of a superior ought to be
preferred to the subsequent act of an inferior and subordinate autfiority; and that accordingly, whenever a particular statute contravenes the Constitution, it will be
the duty of the Judicial tribunals to adhere to the latter
and disregard the former.
It can be of no weight to say that the Courts, on the
pretence of a repugnancy, may substitute their own




544                The Feaderalist.
pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the Legislature. This might as well happen in the case of two
contradictory statutes; or it might as well happen in
every adjudication upon any single statute. The Courts
must declare the sense of the law; and if they should
be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the
consequence would equally be the substitution of their
pleasure to that of the Legislative body. The observation, if it proved anything, would prove that there
ought to be no Judges distinct from that body.
If then the Courts of justice are to be considered as
the bulwarks of a limited Constitution, against Legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford a
strong argument for the permanent tenure of Judicial
offices, since nothing will contribute so much as this to
that independent spirit in the Judges, which must be essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty.
This independence of the Judges is equally requisite
to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals,
from the effects of those ill humors, which the arts of
designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures,
sometimes disseminate among the People themselves,
and which, though they speedily give place to better
information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the mean time, to occasion dangerous innovations in the Government, and serious oppressions of the
minor party in the community. Though I trust the
friends of the proposed Constitution will never concur
with its enemies,* in questioning that fundamental principle of republican Government, which admits the right
of the People to alter or abolish the established  Constitution, whenever they find it inconsistent with their happiness, yet it is not to be inferred from this principle, that
the Representatives of the People, whenever a rmomen* Vide Protest of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania, MARTIN'S
Speech, &c. - Publius.




The Federalist.             545
tary inclination happens to lay hold of a majority of
their constituents, incompatible with the provisions in
the existing Constitution, would, on that account, be
justifiable in a violation of those provisions; or that the
Courts would be under a greater obligation to connive
at infractions in this shape, than when they had proceeded wholly from the cabals of the Representative
body. Until the People have, by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or changed the established form,
it is binding upon themselves collectively, as well as individually; and no presumption, or even knowledge of
their sentiments, can warrant their Representatives in a
departure from it, prior to such an act. But it is easy
to see, that it would require an uncommon portion of
fortitude in the Judges to do their duty as faithful
guardians of the Constitution, where Legislative invasions of it had been instigated by the major voice of
the community.
Bu;t it is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution only, that the independence of the Judges may
be an essential safeguard against the effects of occasional
ill humors in the society. -These sometimes extend no
farther than to the injury of the private rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and partial laws.
Here also thi4rmness of the Judicial magistracy is of
vast importance in mitigating the severity, and confining the operation of such laws. It not only serves to
moderate the immediate mischiefs of those which may
have been passed, but it operates as a check upon the
Legislative body in passing them; who, perceiving that
obstacles.to the success of iniquitous intention are to be
expected from the scruples of the Courts, are in a manner compelled, by the very motives of the injustice they
meditate, to qualify their attempts. This is a circumstance calculated to have more influence upon the character of our Governments, than but few may be aware
VOL. I.            35




546               The Fcederalist.
of. The benefits of the integrity and moderation of the
Judiciary have already been felt in more States than
one; and though they may have displeased those whose
sinister expectations they may have disappointed, they
must have commanded the esteem and applause of all
the virtuous and disinterested. Considerate men, of
every description, ought to prize whatever will tend to
beget or fortify that temper in the Courts; as no man
can be sure that he may not be to-morrow the victim of
a spirit of injustice, by which he may be a gainer to-day.
And every man must now feel, that the -inevitable tendency of such a spirit is to sap the foundations of public
and private confidence, and to introduce in its stead
universal distrust and distress.
That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights
of the Constitution, and of individualsi which we perceive to be indispensable in the Courts of justice, can
certainly not be expected from Judges who hold their
offices by a temporary commission. Periodical appointments, however regulated, or by whomsoever made,
would, in some way or other, be fatal to their necessary
independence. If the power of making them was committed either to the Executive or Legislature, there
would be danger of an improper complaisance to the
branch which possessed it; if to both, there would be
an unwillingness to hazard the displeasure of either;
if to the People, or to persons chosen by them for the
special purpose, there would be too great a disposition
to consult popularity, to justify a reliance that nothing
would be consulted but the Constitution and the laws.
There is yet a further and a weighty reason for the
permanency of the Judicial offices; which is deducible
from the nature of the qualifications they require. It
has been frequently remarked, with great propriety, that
a voluminous code of laws is one of the inconveniences
necessarily connected with the advantages of a free Gov




The FPaderalist.           547
ernment. To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the Courts,
it is indispensable that they should be bound down by
strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and
point out their duty in every particular case that comes
before them; and it will readily be conceived from the
variety of controversies which grow out of the folly andA
wickedness of mankind, that the records of those precedents must unavoidably swell to a very considerable
bulk, and must demand long and laborious study -to
acquire a competent knowledge of them. Hence it is,
that there can be but few men in the society, who will
have sufficient skill in the laws to qualify them for the
stations of Judges. And making the proper deductions
for the ordinary depravity of human nature, the number
must be still smaller of those who unite the requisite
integrity with the requisite knowledge. These considerations apprize us, that the Government can have no
great option between fit characters; and that a temporary duration in office, which would naturally discourage such characters from quitting a lucrative line of
practice to accept a seat on the Bench, would have
a tendency to throw the administration of justice into
hands less able, and less well qualified, to conduct
it with utility and dignity. In the present circumstances of this country, and in those in which it is
likely to be for a long time to come, the disadvantages
on this score would be greater than they may at first
sight appear; but it must be confessed, that they are
far inferior to those which present themselves under
the other aspects of the subject.
Upon the whole, there can be no room to doubt that
the Convention acted wisely, in copying from the models
of those Constitutions which have established good behavior as the tenure of their Judicial offices, in point of
duration; and that so far from being blamable on this
account, their plan would have been inexcusably defece




548               The Fcederalist.
tive, if it had wanted this important feature of good
Government. The experience of Great Britain affords
an illustrious comment on the excellence of the institution.
PUBLIUS.
[From M'LEAN'S Edition, New York, M.DCC.LXXXVIII.]
[THE FCEDERALIST.] No. LXXIX.
[To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:]
NEXT  to permanency in office, nothing can conl   tribute more to the independence of the Judges,
than a fixed provision for their support. The remark
made in relation to the President is equally applicable
here. In the general course of human nature, a power
over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will.
And we can never hope to see realized in practice, the
complete separation of the Judicial from the Legislative
power, in any system which leaves the former dependent
for pecuniary resources on the occasional grants of the
latter. The enlightened friends to good Government, in
every State, have seen cause to lament the want of precise and explicit precautions in the State Constitutions
on this head. Some. of these indeed have declared, that
permanent * salaries should be established for the Judges;
but the experiment has- in some instances shown, that
such expressions are not sufficiently definite to preclude
Legislative evasions. Something still more positive and.unequivocal has been evinced to be requisite. The plan
of the Convention accordingly has provided, that the
*. Vide Constitution of Massachusetts, Chapter 2, Section 1, Article 18
- Publius.




The Feuderalist.             549
Judges of the United States "shall at stated times re"ceive for their services a compensation, which shall,
"not be diminished during their continuance in office."
This, all circumstances considered, is the most eligible
provision that could have been devised. It will readily be understood, that the fluctuations in the value of
money, and in the state of society, rendered a fixed rate
of compensation in the Constitution inadmissible. What
might be extravagant to-day, might in half a century
become penurious and inadequate. It was therefore
necessary to leave it to the discretion of the Legislature
to vary its provisions in conformity to the variations in
circumstances; yet under such restrictions as to put it
out of the power of that body to change the condition
of the individual for the worse. A man may then be
sure of the ground upon which he stands, and can never
be deterred from his duty by the apprehension of being
placed in a less eligible situation. The Clause which
has been quoted combines both advantages. The salaries of Judicial offices may from time to time be altered, as occasion shall require, yet so as never to lessen
the allowance with which any particular Judge comes
into office, in respect to him. It will be observed, that
a difference has been made by the Convention between
the compensation of the President and of the Judges.
That of the former can neither be increased nor diminished. Thai of the latter can only not be diminished.
This probably arose from the difference in the duration of
the respective offices. As the President is to be elected
for no more than four years, it can rarely happen that an
adequate salary, fixed at the commencement of that
period, will not continue to be such to its end. But
with regard.to the Judges, who, if they behave properly,
svill be secured in their places for life, it may well happen, especially in the early stages of the Government,
that a stipend, which would be very sufficient at their




550               The Faederalist.
first appointment, would become too small in the prog.
ress of their service.
This provision for the support of the Judges bears
every mark of prudence and efficacy; and it may be
safely affirmed, that together with the permanent tenure
of their offices, it affords a better prospect of their independence than is discoverable in the Constitutions ot
any of the States, in regard to their own Judges.
The precautions for their responsibility are comprised
in the Article respecting impeachments. They are liable
to be impeached for malconduct, by the House of Representatives, and tried by the Senate; and, if convicted,
may be dismissed from office, and disqualified for holding any other. This is the only provision on the point,
which is consistent with the necessary independence of
the Judicial character; and is the only one which we
find in our own Constitution in respect to our own
Judges.
The want of a provision for removing the Judges on
account of inability, has been a subject of complaint.
But all considerate men will be sensible, that such a provision would either not be practised upon, or would be
more liable to abuse, than calculated to answer any good
purpose. The mensuration of the faculties of the mind
has, I believe, no place in the catalogue of known arts.
An attempt to fix the boundary between the regions of
ability and inability, would much oftener give scope to
personal and party attachments and enmities, than advance the interests of justice, or the public good. The
result, except in the case of insanity, must for the most
part be arbitrary; and insanity, without any formal or
express provision, may be safely pronounced to be a virtual disqualification.
The Constitution of New York, to avoid investiga
tions that must forever be vague and dangerous, has
taken a particular age as the criterion of inability. No




The Federalist.            551
man can be a Judge beyond sixty. I believe there are
few at present, who do not disapprove of this provision
There is no station, in relation to which it is less proper
than to that of a Judge. The deliberating and compare
ing faculties generally preserve their strength much be.
yond that period, in men who survive it; and when, in
addition to this circumstance, we consider, how few
there are who outlive the season of intellectual vigor,
and how improbable it is that any considerable proportion of the Bench, whether more or less numerous,
should be in such a situation at the same time, we shall
be ready to conclude, that limitations of this sort have
little to recommend them. In a republic, where fortunes
are not affluent, and pensions not expedient, the dismission of men from stations in which they have served
their country long and usefully, on which they depend
for subsistence, and from which it will be too late to
resort to any other occupation for a livelihood, ought to
have some better apology to humanity, than is to be
found in the imaginary danger of a superannuated
Bench.
PUBL1US.
[From M'LEAN'S Edition, New York, M.DCC.LXXXVIII.]
[THE FCEDERALIST.] No. LXXX.
[To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:]
Tro judge with accuracy of the proper extent of the
Fcederal Judicature, it will be necessary to consider, in the first place, what are its proper objects.
It seems scarcely to admit of controversy, that the
[udiciary authority of the Union ought to extend to




552               The Foderalist.
these several descriptions of cases: 1st, To all those
which arise out of the laws of the United States, passed
in pursuance of their just and constitutional powers of
Legislation; 2d, To all those which concern the exe.
cution of the provisionis expressly contained in the Articles of Union; 3d, To all those in which the United
States are a party; 4th, To all those which involve the
PEACE of the CONFEDERACY, whether they relate to the
intercourse between the United States and foreign nations- or to that between the States themselves; 5th,
To all those which originate on the high seas, and are
of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction; and, lastly, to all
those in which the State tribunals cannot be supposed
to be impartial and unbiased.
The first point depends upon this obvious consideration, that there ought always to be a constitutional
method of giving efficacy to constitutional provisions.
What, for instance, would avail restrictions on the authority of the State Legislatures, without some constitutional mode of enforcing the observance of them?
The States, by the plan of the Convention, are prohibited from doing a variety of things; some of which are
incompatible with the interests of the Union, and others
with the principles of good Government. The imposition of duties on imported articles, and the emission of
paper money, are specimens of each kind. No man of
sense will believe, that such prohibitions would be scru.
pulously regarded, without some effectual power in the
Government to restrain or correct the infractions of
them. This power must either be a direct negative on
the State laws, or an authority in the Fcederal Courts
to overrule such as might be in manifest contravention
of the Articles of Union. There is no third course that
I can imagine. The latter appears to have been thought
by the Convention preferable to the former, and, I presume, will be most agreeable to the States.




The Fwderalist.             553
As to the second point, it is impossible, by any argu.
ment or comment, to make it clearer than it is in itself
If there are such things as political axioms, the propriety
of the Judicial power of a Government being coextensive with its Legislative, may be ranked among the
number. The mere necessity of uniformity in the inter.
pretation of the National laws, decides the question.
Thirteen independent Courts of final jurisdiction over
the same causes, arising upon the same laws, is a hydra
in Government, from which nothing but contradiction
and confusion can proceed.
Still less need be said in regard to the third point.
Controversies between the Nation and its members or
citizens, can only be properly referred to the National
tribunals. Any other plan would be contrary to reason,
to precedent, and to decorum.
The fourth point rests on this plain proposition, that
the peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposa of a PART. The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members. And the responsibility for an injury ought ever to
be accompanied with the faculty of preventing it. As
the denial or perversion of justice by the sentences of
Courts, as well as in any other manner, is with reason
classed among the just causes of war, it will follow, that
the Fcederal Judiciary ought to have cognizance of all
causes in which the citizens of other countries are concerned. This is not less essential to the preservation of
the public faith, than to the security of the public'tranquillity. A distinction may perhaps be imagined between cases arising upon treaties and the laws of nations
and those which may stand merely on the footing of
dhe municipal law. The former kind may be supposed
proper for the Fcederal jurisdiction, the latter for that of
the States. But it is at least problematical, whether an
unjust sentence against a foreigner, where the subject of




554               The Federalist.
controversy was wholly relative to the lex loci, woulc
not, if unredressed, be an aggression upon his Sovereign,
as well as one which violated the stipulations of a treaty,
or the general Law of Nations. And a still greater objection to the distinction would result from the immense
difficulty,'if not impossibility, of a practical discrimination between the cases of one complexion and those of
the other. So great a proportion of the cases in which
foreigners are parties, involve National questions, that it
is by far most safe and most expedient to refer all those
in which they are concerned to the National tribunals.
The power of determining causes between two States,
between one State and the citizens of another, and between the citizens of different States, is perhaps not less
essential to the peace of the Union than that which has
been just examined. History gives us a horrid picture
of the dissensions and private wars which distracted and
desolated Germany prior to the institution of the IMPERIAL CHAMBER by MAXIMILIAN, towards the close 0c the
fifteenth century; and informs us, at the same time, of
the vast influence of that institution in appeasing the
disorders and establishing the tranquillity of the Empire.
This was a Court invested with authority to decide
finally all differences among the members of the Germanic body.
A method of terminating territorial disputes between
the States, under the authority of the Federal head, was
not unattended to, even in the imperfect system by which
they'have been hitherto held together. But there are
many other sources, besides interfering -claims of boundary, from which bickerings and animosities may spring
up among the members of the Union. To some of these
we have been witnesses in the course of our past experience. It will readily be conjectured that I allude to
the fraudulent laws which have been passed in too many
of the' States. And though the proposed Constitution




The Foederalist.            555
establishes particular guards against the repetition of
those instances which have heretofore made their appear.
ance, yet it is warrantable to apprehend, that the spirit
which produced them will assume new shapes that could
not be foreseen nor specifically provided against. Whatever practices may have a tendency to disturb the harmony between the States, are proper objects of Fcederal
superintendence and control.
It may be esteemed the basis of the Union, that "the
" citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privi" leges and immunities of citizens of the several States."
And if it be a just principle that every Government ought
to possess the means of executing its own provisions, by its
own authority, it will follow, that in order to the inviolable maintenance of that equality of privileges and immunities to which the citizens of the Union will be entitled, the National Judiciary ought to preside in all cases
in which one State or its citizens are opposed to another
State or its citizens. To secure the full effect of so fundamental a provision against all evasion and subterfuge,
it is necessary that its construction should be committed
to that tribunal, which having no local attachments will
be likely to be impartial between the different States and
their citizens, and which, owing its official existence to
the Union, will never be likely to feel any bias inauspi.
cious to the principles on which it is founded.
The fifth point will demand little animadversion.
The most bigoted idolizers of State authority have not
thus far shown a disposition to deny the National Judiciary the cognizance of maritime causes. These so generally depend on the Laws of Nations, and so commonly
affect the rights of foreigners, that they fall within the
considerations which are relative to the public peace.
The most important part of them are, by the present
Confederation, submitted to Federal jurisdiction.
The reasonableness of the agency of the National




556               The Fwderalist.
Courts in cases in which the State tribunals cannot be
supposed to be impartial, speaks for itself. No man
ought certainly to be a Judge in his own cause, or in
any cause, in respect to which he has the least interest
or bias. This principle has no inconsiderable weight in
designating the Fcederal courts as the proper tribunals
for the determination of controversies between different
States and their citizens. And it ought to have the
same operation in regard to some cases between citizens of the same State. Claims to land under grants
of different States, founded upon adverse pretensions of
boundary, are of this description. The Courts of neither
of the granting States could be expected to be unbiased.
The laws may have even prejudged the question, and
tied the Courts down to decisions in favor of the grants
of the State to which they belonged. And even where
this had not been done, it would be natural that the
Judges, as men, should feel a strong predilection to the
claims of their own Government.
Having thus laid down and discussed the principles
which ought to regulate the constitution of the Foederal
Judiciary, we will proceed to test, by these principles,
the particular powers of which, according to the plan of
the Convention, it is to be composed. It is to comprehend' all cases in law and equity arising under the Con"stitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties
" made, or which shall be made, under their authority,
" to all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Minis"ters, and Consuls; to all cases of admiralty and mari"time jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United
"States shall be a party; to controversies between two
"or more States; between a State and citizens of an"other State; between citizens of different States; be"tween citizens of the same State, claiming lands under
"grants of different States; and between a State or the
"citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens, and sub.




The Fwderalist.             557
" jects." This constitutes the entire mass of the Judi.
cial authority of the Union. Let us now review it in
detail. It is then to extend,
First. To all cases in law and equity, arising under
the Constitution and the laws of the United States. This
corresponds with the two first classes of causes, which
have been enumerated, as proper for the jurisdiction of
the United States. It has been asked, what is meant
by "cases arising under the Constitution," in contradistinction from those " arising under the laws of the
" United States? " The difference has been already explained. All the restrictions upon the authority of the
State Legislatures furnish examples of it. They are no,
for instance, to emit paper money; but the interdiction
results from the Constitution, and will have no connection with anyJlaw of the United States. Should paper
money, notwithstanding, be emitted, the controversies
concerning it would be cases arising upon the Constitution and not the laws of the United States, in the ordinary signification of the terms. This may serve as a
sample of the whole.
It has also been asked, What need of the word "equity?" -What equitable causes can grow out of the Constitution and laws of the United States? There is hardly
a subject of litigation between individuals, which may
not involve those ingredients of fraud, accident, trust, "or
hardship, which would render the matter an object of
equitable, rather than of legal jurisdiction, as the distinction is known and established in several of the
States. It is the peculiar province, for instance, of a
Court of Equity to relieve against what are called hard
bargains: these are contracts in which, though there may
have been no direct fraud or deceit, sufficient to invalidate them in a Court of Law, yet there may have been
some undue and unconscionable advantage taken of the
necessities or misfortunes of one of the parties, which




D58               The Fcederalist.
a Court of Equity would not tolerate. In such cases,
where foreigners were concerned on either side, it would
be impossible for the Fcederal judicatories to do justice
without an equitable as well as a legal jurisdiction.
Agreements to convey lands claimed under the grants
of different States, may afford another example of the
necessity of an equitable jurisdiction in the Federal
Courts. This reasoning may not be so palpable in those
States where the formal and technical distinction between LAW and EQUITY is not maintained, as in this
State, where it is exemplified by every day's practice.
The Judiciary authority of the Union is to extend,
Second. To treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the authority of the United States, and to all
cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers, and
Consuls. These belong to the fourth clas of the enumerated cases, as they have an evilleen connection with
the preservation of the National peace.
Third.  To cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. These form, altogether, theifth of the enumerated classes of causes, proper for the cognizance of
the National Courts.
Fourth. To controversies to which the United States
shall be a party. These constitute the third of those
classes.
fifth. To controversies between two or more States;
between a State and citizens of another State; between
citizens of different States. These belong to the fQouAti
of those classes, and partake, in some measure, of the
nature of the last.
Sixth. To cases between the citizens of the same
State, claiming lands under grants of different States.
These fall within the la.t clss, and are the only instances in which the proposed Constitution directly contemplates the cognizance of disputes between the citizens of,he same State.




The Fwderalist.             559'Seventh. To cases between a State and the citizens
thereof, and foreign States, citizens, or subjects. These
have been already explained to belong to the fourth
of the enumerated classes, and have been shown to be,
in a peculiar manner, the proper subjects of the National
judicature.
From this review of the particular powers of the
Fcederal Judiciary, as marked out in the Constitution,
it+ appears, that they are all conformable to the principles
which ought to have governed the structure of that department, and which were necessary to the perfection
of the system. If some partial inconveniences should
appear to be connected with the incorporation of any of
them into the plan, it ought to be recollected, that the
National Legislature will have ample authority to make
such exceptions, and to prescribe such regulations, as will
be calculated to obviate or remove these inconveniences.
The possibility of particular mischiefs can never be
viewed, by a well-informed mind, as a solid objection to
a general principle, which is calculated to avoid general
mischiefs, and to obtain general advantages.
PUBLIUS.
[From M'LEAN's Edition, New York, M.DCC.LXXXVIII.]
[THE F(EDERALIST.] No. LXXXI.
[To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:]
LET us now return to the partition of the Judiciary
authority between different Courts, and their rela.
tions to each other.
"The Judicial power of the United States is" (by




560               The Faderalist.
the plan of the Convention) "to be vested in one Su.
"preme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Con"gress may, from time to time, ordain and establish." *
~tLihat there ought to be one Court of supreme and
final jurisdiction, is a proposition which is not likely
to be contested. The reasons for it have been assigned
in another place, and are too obvious to need repetition.
The only question that seems to have been raised concerning it, is, whether it ought to be a distinct body, or
a branch of the Legislature. The same contradiction
is observable in regard to this matter, which has been
remarked in several other cases. The very men who
object to the Senate as a Court of Impeachments, on
the ground of an improper intermixture of powers, advocate, by implication at least, the propriety of vesting
the ultimate decision of all causes, in the whole or in a
part of the Legislative body.
The arguments, or rather suggestions, upon which this
charge is founded, are to this effect: - "' The authority
"of the proposed Supreme Court of the United States,
" which is to be a separate and independent body, will be
"superior to that of the Legislature. The power of
"' construing the laws according to the spirit of the Con"stitution, will enable that Court to mould them into
"whatever shape it may think proper; especially as its
"decisions will not be in any manner subject to the revi"sion or correction of the Legislative body. This is as
"unprecedented as it is dangerous. In Britain, the Ju" dicial power, in the last resort, resides in the House of
" Lords, which is a branch of the Legislature; and this
"part of the British Government has been imitated in
"the State Constitutions in general. The Parliament of
"Great Britain, and the Legislatures of the several
"States, can at any time rectify, by law, the exception"able decisions of their respective Courts. But the errors
*Article 3, Sec. 1. -Publius.




The Fcederalist.            561
" and usurpations of the Supreme Court of the United
"States will be uncontrollable and remediless."  This,
upon examination, will be found to be altogether made
up of false reasoning upon misconceived fact.
In the first place, there is not a syllable in the plan
under consideration which directly empowers the National
Courts to construe the laws according to the spirit of the
Constitution, or which gives them any greater latitude in
this respect than may be claimed by the Courts of every
State. I'admit, however, that the Constitution ought
to be the standard of construction for the laws, and that
wherever there is an evident opposition, the laws ought to
give place to the Constitution. But this doctrine is not
deducible from any circumstance peculiar to the plan of
the Convention; but from the general theory of a limited
Constitution; and as far as it is true, is equally applicable to most, if not to all the State Governments. There
can be no objection, therefore, on this account, to the
Foederal judicature, which will not lie against the local
Judicatures in general, and which will not serve to condemn every Constitution that attempts to set bounds
to Legislative discretion.
But perhaps the force of the objection may be thought
to consist in the particular organization of the Supreme
Court: in its being composed of a distinct body of
magistrates instead of being one of the branches of the
Legislature, as in the Government of Great Britain and
that of this State. To insist upon this point, the authors of the objection must renounce the meaning they
have labored to annex to the celebrated maxim, requiring
a separation of the departments of power. It shall, nevertheless, be conceded to them, agreeably to"'the interpretation given to that maxim in the- course of these papers,
that it is not violated by vesting the ultimate power of
judging in a part of the Legislative body. But though
this be not an absolute violation of that excellent rule, yet
VOL. I.            36




562               The Federalist.
it verges so nearly upon it, as on this account alone to be_
less eligible than the mode preferred by the Convention.
From a body which had even a partial agency in passing
bad laws, we could rarely expect a disposition to temper
and moderate them in the application. The same spirit
which had operated in making them would be too apt
in interpreting them; still less could it be expected, that
men who had infringed the Constitution, in the character
of Legislators, would be disposed to repair the breach in
the character of Judges. Nor is this all;- every reason
which recommends the tenure of good behavior for Judicial offices, militates against placing the Judiciary
power, in the last resort, in a body composed of men
chosen for a limited period. There is an absurdity in
referring the determinations of causes, in the first instance, to Judges of permanent standing; in the last,
to those of a temporary and mutable constitution. And
there is a still greater absurdity in subjecting the decisions of men selected for their knowledge of the laws,
acquired by long and laborious study, to the revision
and control of men, who, for want of the same advantage, cannot but be deficient in that knowledge. The
members of the Legislature will rarely be chosen with
a view to those qualifications which fit men for the stations of Judges; and as, on this account, there will be
great reason to apprehend all the ill consequences of
defective information, so, on account of the natural propensity of such bodies to party divisions, there will be
no less reason to fear, that the pestilential breath of faction may poison the fountains of justice. The habit of
being continually marshalled on opposite sides, will be
too apt to stifle the voice both of law and of equity.
These considerations teach us to applaud the wisdom
of those States, who have committed the Judicial power,
in the last resort, not to a part of the Legislature, but to
distinct and independent bodies of men. Contrary to




The Fwaderalist.           563
the supposition of those who have represented the plan
of the Convention, in this respect, as novel and unprecedented, it is but a copy of the Constitutions of New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Georgia; and the preference which has been given to
those models is highly to be commended.
It is not true, in the second place, that the Parliament
of Great Britain, or the Legislatures of the particular
States, can rectify the exceptionable decisions of their
respective Courts, in any other sense than might be done
by a future Legislature of the United States. The
theory, neither of the British, nor the State Constitutions,
authorizes the revisal of a Judicial sentence by a Legislative act. Nor is there-anything in the proposed Constitution, more than in either of them, by which it is forbidden. In the former, as well as in the latter, the impropriety of the thing on the general principles of law and
reason, is the sole obstacle. A Legislature, without exceeding its province, cannot reverse a determination
once made in a particular case; though it may prescribe
a new rule for future cases. This is the principle, and
it applies in all its consequences, exactly in the same
manner and extent, to the State Governments, as to the
National Government now under consideration. Not
the least difference can be pointed out in any view of
the subject.
It may in the last place be observed, that the supposed
danger of Judiciary encroachments on the Legislative authority, which has been upon many occasions reiterated,
is in reality a phantom.  Particular misconstructions
and contraventions of the will of the Legislature, may
now and then happen; but they can never be so extensive as to amount to an inconvenience, or in any sensible degree to affect the order of the political system.
This may be inferred with certainty, from the general




564                 The Fcederalist.
nature of the Judicial power; from the objects to which
it relates; from the manner in which it is exercised;
from its comparative weakness; and from its total incapacity to support its usurpations by force. And the
inference is greatly fortified by the consideration of the
important constitutional check which the power of instituting impeachments in one part of the Legislative
body, and of determining upon them in the other, would
give to that body upon the members of the Judicial
department.  This is alone a complete security.  There
never can be danger that the Judges, by a series of deliberate usurpations on the authority of the Legislature,
would hazard the united resentment of the body intrusted with it, while this body was possessed of the
means of punishing their presumption, by degrading
them from their stations. While this ought to remove
all apprehensions on the subject, it affords, at the same
time, a cogent argument for constituting the Senate a
Court for the Trial of Impeachments.
Having now examined, and, I trust, removed the objections to the distinct and independent organization of
the Supreme Court, I proceed to consider the propriety
of the power of constituting inferior Courts,* and the
relations which will subsist between  these and the
former.
The power of constituting inferior Courts, is evidently
calculated to obviate the necessity of having recourse to
the Supreme Court in every case of Foederal cognizance.
It is intended to enable the National Government to institute or authorize, in each State or district of the
* This power has been absurdly evident design of the provision is,
represented as intended to abolish to enable the institution of local
all the County Courts in the several Courts, subordinate to the Supreme,
States, which are commonly called either in States or larger districts.
Inferior Courts. But the expres- It is ridiculous to imagine that
sions of the Constitution are, to con- County Courts were in conteimplastitute "tribunals INFERIOR TO tion. -Publius.
" THE SUPREME COURT; " and the




The Fawderalist.            56%
United States, a tribunal competent to the determination
of matters of National jurisdiction within its limits.
But why, it is asked, might not the same purpose
have been accomplished by the instrumentality of the
State  Courts?  This admits of different answers.
Though the fitness and competency of those Courts
should be allowed in the utmost latitude, yet the substance of the power in question may still be regarded as
a necessary part of the plan, if it were only to empower the National Legislature to commit to them the
cognizance of causes arising out of the National Constitution.  To confer the. power of determining such
causes upon the existing Courts of the several States,
would perhaps be as much "to constitute tribunals,"
as to create new Courts with the like power. But ought
not a more direct and explicit provision to have been
made in favor of the State Courts? There are, in my
opinion, substantial reasons against such a provision:
the most discerning cannot foresee, how far the prevalency of a 4ocal spirit may be found to disqualify the
local tribunals for the jurisdiction of National causes;
whilst every man may discover, that Courts constituted
like those of some of the States would be improper
channels of the Judicial authority of the Union. State
Judges, holding:their offices during pleasure, or from
year to year, will be too little independent to be relied
upon for an inflexible execution of the National laws.
And if there was a necessity for confiding the original
cognizance of causes arising under those laws to them,
there would be a correspondent necessity for leaving the
door of appeal as wide as possible. In proportion to
the grounds of confidence in, or distrust of the subordinate tribunals, ought to be the facility or difficulty of
appeals. And well satisfied as I am of the propriety of
the appellate jurisdiction, in the several classes of causes
to which it is extended by the plan of the Convention,




566               The Federalist.
I should consider everything calculated to give, in practice, an unrestrained coubrse to appeals, as a source of
public and private inconvenience.
I am not sure, but that it will be found highly expedient and useful, to divide the United States into four,
or five, or half a dozen districts; and to institute a
Faederal Court in each district, in lieu of one in every
State. The Judges of these Courts, with the aid of the
State Judges, may hold circuits for the trial of causes
in the several parts of the respective districts. Justice
through them may be administered with ease and despatch; and appeals may be safely circumscribed within
a narrow compass. This plan appears to me at present the most eligible of any that could be adopted;
and in order to it, it is nedessary that the power of
constituting inferior Courts should exist in the full extent in which it is to be found in the proposed Constitution.
These reasons seem sufficient to satisfy a candid
mind, that the want of such a power would have been
a great defect in the plan. Let us now examine, in
what manner the Judicial authority is to be distributed
between the Supreme and the inferior Courts of the
Union.
The Supreme Court is to be invested with original jurisdiction, only " in cases affecting Ambassadors, other
"public Ministers, and Consuls, and those in which A
" STATE shall be a party." Public Ministers of every class
are the immediate representatives of their Sovereigns.
All questions in which they are concerned are so directly
connected with the public peace, that, as well for the
preservation of this, as out of respect to the sovereignties
they represent, it is both expedient and proper, that such
questions should be submitted in the first instance to the
highest judicatory of the Nation. Though Consuls have
not in strictness a diplomatic character, yet as they are




The Fwderalist.             567
the public agents of the Nations to which they belong
the same observation is in a great measure applicable tc
them. In cases in which a State might happen to be a
party, it would ill suit its dignity to be turned over to an
inferior tribunal.
Though it may rather be a digression from the immediate subject of this paper, I shall take occasion to
mention here a supposition which has excited some
alarm upon very mistaken grounds. It has been suggested that an assignment of the public securities of one
State to the citizens of another would enable them to
prosecute that State in the Fcederal Courts for the
amount of those securities: a suggestion, which the
following considerations prove to be without foundation.
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be
amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.
This is the general sense, and'the general practice of
mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes
of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the Government of
every State in the Union. Unless therefore, there is a
surrender of this immunity in the plan of the Convention, it will remain with the States, and the danger intimated must be merely ideal. The circumstances which
are necessary to -produce an alienation of State sovereignty, were discussed in considering the Article of taxation, and need not be rep6eated here. A recurrence to
the principles there established will satisfy us, that there
is no color to pretend that the State Governments would
by the adoption of that plan, be divested of the privilege
of paying their own debts in their own way, free from
every constraint, but that which flows from the obligations of good faith. The contracts between a nation
and individuals are only binding on the conscience of
the sovereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive
force. They confer no right of action, independent of
the sovereign will. To what purpose would it be to




568              The Fcederalist.
authorize suits against States for the debts they owel
How could recoveries be enforced?  It is evident, it
could not be done, without waging war against the contracting State; and to ascribe to the Faederal Courts, by
mere implication, and in destruction of a preexisting
right of the State Governments, a power which would
involve such a consequence, would be altogether forced
and unwarrantable.
Let us resume the train of our observations. We
have seen, that the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court would be confined to two classes of causes, and
those of a nature rarely to occur. In all other cases of
Federal cognizance, the original jurisdiction would appertain to the inferior tribunals; and the Supreme Court
would have nothing more than an appellate jurisdiction,
"with such exceptions, and under such regulations, as
" the Congress shall make."
The propriety of this appellate jurisdiction has been
scarcely called in question in regard to'matters of law;
but the clamors have been loud against it as applied
to matters of fact. Some well-intentioned men in this
State, deriving their notions from the language and forms
which obtain in our Courts, have been induced to consider it as an implied supersedure of the trial by jury, in
favor of the civil-law mode of trial, which prevails in
our Courts of Admiralty, Probates, and Chancery. A
technical sense has been affixed to the term "appellate,"
which, in our law parlance, is commonly used in reference to appeals in the course of the civil law. But if I
am not misinformed, the same meaning would not be
given to it in any part of New England. There an appeal from one jury to another, is familiar both in language and practice, and is even a matter of course, until
there have been two verdicts on one side. The word
"appellate," therefore, will not be understood in the
same sense in New England as in New York, which




The Fcederalist.             569
shows the impropriety of a technical interpretation do.
rived from the jurisprudence of any particular State.
The expression, taken in the abstract, denotes nothing
more than the power of one tribunal to review the proceedings of another, either as to the law or fact, or both.
The mode of doing it may depend on ancient custom or
legislative provision, (in a new Government it must depend on the latter,) and may be with or without the aid
of a jury, as may be judged advisable. If, therefore, the
reexamination of a fact once determined by a jury,
should in any case be admitted under the proposed Constitution, it may be so regulated as to be done by a second jury, either by remanding the cause to the Court
below for a sedcond trial of the fact, or by directing an
issue immediately out of the Supreme Court.
But it does not follow that the reexamination of a
fact once ascertained by a jury, will be permitted in the
Supreme Court. Why may not it be said, with the
strictest propriety, when a writ of error is brought from
an inferior to a superior Court of law in this State, that
the latter has jurisdiction of the fact, as well as the
law?  It is true it cannot institute a new inquiry concerning the fact, but it takes cognizance of it as it appears upon the record,,and pronounces the law.arising
upon it.*  This is jurisdiction of both fact and law;
nor is it even possible to separate them. Though the
common-law Courts of this State ascertain disputed
facts by a jury, yet they unquestionably have jurisdiction of both fact and law; and accordingly when
the former is agreed in the pleadings, they have no recourse to a jury, but proceed at once to judgment. I
contend, therefore, on this ground, that the expressions,
"appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact," do not
necessarily imply a reexamination in the Supreme Court
of facts decided by juries in the inferior Courts.
* This word is composed of Jus ing or pronouncing of the lawi.and DIOTIO, juris dictio, or a speak- Publius.




570                The Fwaderalist.
The following train of ideas may well be imagined to
have influenced the Convention, in relation to this particular provision. The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (it may have been argued) will extend to
causes determinable in different modes, some in the
course of the COMMON LAW, others in the course of the
CIVIL LAW. In the former, the revision of the law only
will be, generally speaking, the proper province of the
Supreme Court; in the latter, the reexamination of the
fact is agreeable to usage, and in some cases, of which
prize causes are an example, might be essential to the
preservation of the public peace. It is therefore necessary, that the appellate jurisdiction should, in certain
cases, extend in the broadest sense to Inatters of fact.
It will not answer to make an express exception of cases
which shall have been originally tried by a jury, because
in the Courts of some of the States all causes are tried
in this mode;* and such an exception would preclude
the revision of matters of fact, as well where it might
be proper, as where it might be improper. To avoid all
inconveniences, it will be safest to declare generally,
that the Supreme Court shall possess appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, and that this jurisdiction
shall be subject to such exceptions and regulations
as the National Legislature may prescribe.  This will
enable the Government to modify it in such a manner as
will best answer the ends of public justice and security.
This view of the matter, at any rate, puts it out of all
doubt that the supposed abolition of the trial by jury,
by the operation of this provision, is fallacious and untrue. The Legislature of the United States would certainly have full power to provide, that in appeals to the
Supreme Court there should be no reixamination of facts,
* I hold that the States will have in many cases of Fcederal cogniconcurrent jurisdiction with the zance, as will be explained in my
subordinate Federal judicatories, next paper. - Publius.




The Fewderalist.            571
where they had been tried in the original causes by
juries. This would certainly be an authorized excep.
tion; but if, for the reason already intimated, it should
be thought too extensive, it might bet qualified with a
limitation to such causes only as are determinable at
common law in that mode of trial.
The amount of the observations hitherto made on the
authority of the Judicial department is this: that it has
been carefullv restricted to those causes which are mani.
festly proper for the cognizance of the National Judicature; that in the partition of this authority, a very small
portion of original jurisdiction has been reserved to the
Supreme Court, and the rest consigned to the subordinate
tribunals; that the Supreme Court will possess an appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, in all the cases
referred to them, but subject to any exceptions and regulations which may be thought advisable; that this appellate jurisdiction does, in no case, abolish the trial by
jury; and that an ordinary degree of prudence and integrity in the National;Councils, will insure us solid advantages from the establishment of the proposed Judici.
ary, without exposing us to any of the inconveniences
which have been predicted from that source.
PUBLIUS.
[From M'LEAN's Edition, New York, M.DCC.LXXXVIII.]
[THE FCEDERALIST.] No. LXXXII.
[To TEM PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:]
fHE erection of a new Government, whatever care oz
-,-'wisdom  may distinguish the work, cannot fail to
originate questions of intricacy and nicety;- and these




572               The Feederalist.
may, in a particular manner, be expected to flow from
the establishment of a Constitution founded upon the
total or partial incorporation of a number of distinct
sovereignties.'Tis time only that can mature and perfect so compound a system, can liquidate the meaning
of all the parts, and can adjust them to each other in
a harmonious and consistent WHOLE.
Such questions, accordingly, have arisen upon the
plan proposed by the Convention, and particularly concerning:the Judiciary department. The principal of
these respect the situation of the State Courts, in regard
to those causes which are to be submitted to Fcederal
jurisdiction. Is this to be exclusive, or are those Courts
to possess a concurrent jurisdiction? If the latter, in
what relation will they stand to the National tribunals?
These are inquiries which we meet with in the mouths
of men of sense, and which are certainly entitled to attention.
The principles established in a former paper teach
us that the States will retain all preexisting authorities
which may not be exclusively delegated to thq Fcederal
head; and that this exclusive delegation can only exist
in one of three cases: where an exclusive authority is,
in express terms, granted to the Union; or where a particular authority is granted to the Union, and the exercise of a like authority is prohibited to the States; or
where an authority is granted to the Union, with which
a similar authority in the States would be utterly incompatible. Though these principles may not apply
with the same force to the Judiciary, as to the Legislative power, yet I am inclined to think, that they are, in
the main, just with respect to the former, as well as the
latter. And under this impression, I shall lay it down
as a rule, that the State Courts will retain the jurisdiction they now have, unless it appears to be taken away
in one of the enumerated modes.
* No. XxxI.- Publius.




The Federalist.             573;
The only thing in the proposed Constitution, which
wears the appearance of confining the causes of Faederal
cognizance to the Fcederal Courts, is contained is this
passage: — " The'JUDICIAL POWER Of the United States
"shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such in"ferior Courts as the Congress shall from time to time
"ordain and establish." This might either be construed
to signify, that the Supreme and subordinate Courts of
the Union should alone have the power of deciding
those causes, to which their authority is to extend; or
simply to denote, that the organs of the National Judiciary should be one Supreme Court, and as many subordinate Courts as Congress should think proper to appoint; or in other words, that the United States should
exercise the Judicial power with which they are to be
invested, through one supreme tribunal, and a certain
number of inferior ones, to be instituted by them. The
first excludes, the last admits, the concurrent jurisdiction of the State tribunals;' and as the first would
amount to an alienation of State power by implication,
the last appears to me the most natural and the most
defensible construction.
But this doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction is only
clearly applicable to those descriptions of causes, of
which the State Courts have previous cognizance. It
is. not equally evident in relation to cases which may
grow.out of, and be peculiar to, the Constitution to be
established; for not to allow the State Courts a right of
jurisdiction in such cases, can hardly be considered as
the abridgment of a preexisting authority. I mean not
therefore to contend that the United States, in the
course of legislation upon the objects intrusted to
their direction, may not commit the decision of causes
arising upon a particular regulation to the Fcederal
Courts, solely, if such a measure should be deemed expedient; but I hold that the State Courts will be di



574                The Faederalist.
vested of no part of their primitive jurisdiction, further
than may relate to an appeal; and I am even of opinion
that in every case in which they were not expressly
excluded by the future acts of the National Legislature,
they will of course take cognizance of the causes to
which those acts may give birth. This I infer from the
nature of Judiciary power, and from the general genius
of the system. The Judiciary power of every Government looks beyond its own local or municipal laws, and
in civil cases lays hold of all subjects of litigation be.
tween parties within its jurisdiction, though the causes
of dispute are relative to the laws of the most distant
part of the globe. Those of Japan, not less than of
New York, may furnish the objects of legal discussion
to our Courts.  When in addition to this we consider
the State Governments and the National Governments,
as they truly are, in the light of kindred systems, and as
parts of ONE WHOLES the inference seems to be conclusive, that the State Courts would have a concurrent jurisdiction, in all cases arising under the laws of the Union,
where it was not expressly prohibited.
Here another question occurs: What relation would
subsist between the National and State Courts in these
instances of concurrent jurisdiction? I answer, that an
appeal would certainly lie from the latter, to the Supreme Court of the United States. The Constitution
in direct terms gives an appellate jurisdiction to the
Supreme Court in all the enumerated cases of Faederal
cognizance, in which it is not to have an original one,
without a single expression to confine its operation to
the inferior Fcederal Courts. The objects of appeal, not
the tribunals from which it is to be made, are alone
contemplated. From this circumstance, and from the
reason of the thing, it ought to be construed to extend
to the State tribunals. Either this must be the case, or
the local Courts. must be excluded from a concurrent




The  Faederalist.            571
jurisdiction in matters of National concern, else the
Judiciary authority of the Union may be eluded at the
pleasure of every plaintiff or prosecutor. Neither of
these consequences ought, without evident necessity, to
be involved; the latter would be entirely inadmissible,
as it would defeat some of the most important and
avowed purposes of the proposed Government, and
would essentially embarrass its measures. Nor do I
perceive any foundation for such a supposition. Agreeably to the remark already made, the National and State
systems are to be regarded as ONE WHOLE. The Courts of
the latter will of course be natural auxiliaries to the execution of the laws of'the Union, and an appeal from them
will as naturally lie to that tribunal, which is destined
to unite and assimilate the principles of National justice
and the rules of National decisions. The evident aim of
the plan of the Convention is, that all the causes of the
specified classes shall, for weighty public reasons, receive their original or final determination in the Courts
of the Union. To confine, therefore, the general expressions giving appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme
Court, to appeals from the subordinate Fcederal Courts,
instead of allowing their extension to the State Courts,
would be to abridge the latitude of the terms, in subversion of the intent, contrary to every sound rule of in.
terpretation.
But could an appeal be made to lie from the State
Courts to the subordinate Fcederal judicatories? This is
another of the questions which have been raised, and of
greater difficulty than the former. The following considerations countenance the affirmative. The plan of
the Convention, in tlw first place, authorizes the National Legislature "to constitute tribunals inferior to the
" Supreme Court." * It declares, in the next place, that' the JUDICIAL POWER of the United States shall be vestea
* Sec. 8th, Art. 1st. - Publius.




576              The Fcederalist.
~' in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as'' Congress shall ordain and establish;" and it then proceeds to enumerate the cases, to which this Judicial
power shall extend. It afterwards divides the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court into original and appellate, but
gives no definition of that of the subordinate Courts.
The only outlines described for them are, that they shall
be " inferior to the Supreme Court," and that they shall
not exceed the specified limits of the Fcederal Judiciary.
Whether their authority shall be original or appellate, or
both, is not declared. All this seems to be left to the
discretion of the Legislature. And this being the case,
I perceive at present no impediment to the establishment
of an appeal from the State Courts to the subordinate
National tribunals; and many advantages attending the
power of doing it may be imagined. It would diminish
the motives to the multiplication of Fcederal Courts, and
would admit of arrangements calculated to contract the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The State
tribunals may then be left with a more entire charge
of Fcaderal causes; and appeals, in most cases in which
they may be deemed proper, instead of being carried to
the Supreme Court, may be made to lie from the State
Courts to District Courts of the Union.
PUBLIUS.
[From M'LEAN'S Edition, New York, M.DCC.LXXXVIII.]
[THE FCEDERALIST.] No. LXXXIII.
[To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:1
THE objection to the plan of the Convention, which
has met with most success in this State, and perhaps in several of the other States, is that relative to the




The Fadderalist.              577
want of a constitutional provision for the trial by jury in
civil cases. The disingenuous form in which this objection is usually stated, has been repeatedly adverted to
and exposed; but continues to be pursued in all the conversations and writings of the opponents of the plan.
The mere silence of the Constitution in regard to civil
causes, is represented as an abolition of the trial by jury;
and the declamations to which it has afforded a pretext
are artfully calculated to induce a persuasion, that this
pretended abolition is complete and universal; extending
not only to every species of civil, but even to criminal
causes. To argue with respect to the latter, would, however, be as vain and fruitless, as to attempt the serious
proof of the existence of matter, or to demonstrate any
of those propositions, which, by their own internal evidence, force conviction, when expressed in language
adapted to convey their meaning.
With regard to civil causes, subtleties almost too contemptible for refutation have been employed to countenance the surmise, that a thing, which is only not provided for, is entirely abolished. Every man of discernment must at once perceive the wide difference between
silence and abolition. But as the inventors of this fallacy
have attempted to support it by certain legal maxims of
interpretation, which they have perverted from their true
meaning, it may not be wholly useless to explore the
ground they have taken.
The maxims on which they rely are of this nature:
"A specification of particulars is an exclusion of gen"erals;" or, " The expression of one thing is the exclu"sion of another."  Hence, say they, as the Constitution has established the trial by jury in criminal cases,
and is silent in respect to civil, this silence is an implied
prohibition of trial by jury, in regard to the latter.
The rules of legal interpretation are rules of common
sense, adopted by the Courts in the construction of the
VOL. I.             37




578                The Foaderalhst.
laws. The true test, therefore, of a just application of
them, is its conformity to the source from which they
are derived. This being the case, let me ask, if it is
consistent with common sense to suppose, that a provision obliging the Legislative power to commit the trial
of criminal causes to juries, is a privation of its right to
authorize or permit that mode of trial in other cases?
Is it natural to suppose, that a command to do one thing
is a prohibition to the doing of another, which there was
a previous power to do, and which is not incompatible
with the thing commanded to be done? If such a supposition would be unnatural and unreasonable, it cannot be rational to maintain, that an injunction of the
trial by jury in certain cases, is an interdiction of it in
others.
A power to constitute Courts is a power to prescribe
the mode of trial; and consequently, if nothing was
said in the Constitution, on the subject of Juries, the
Legislature would be at liberty, either to adopt that institution, or to let it alone. This discretion, in regard to
criminal causes, is abridged by the express injunction of
trial by jury in all such cases; but it is of course left at
large in relation to civil causes, there being a total silence
on this head. The specification of an obligation to try
all criminal causes in a particular mode, excludes indeed
the obligation or necessity of employing the same mode
in civil causes, but does not abridge the power of the
Legislature to exercise that mode, if it should be thought
proper. The pretence, therefore, that the National Legislature would not be at full liberty to submit all the
civil causes of Fcederal cognizance to the determination
of juries, is a pretence destitute of all just foundation.
From these observations this conclusion results, that
the trial by jury in civil cases would not be abolished;
and that the use attempted to be made of the maxims
which have been quoted, is contrary to reason and comn



The Foederalist.            575
mon sense, and therefore not admissible. Even if these
maxims had a precise technical sense, corresponding
with the ideas of those who employ them upon the
present occasion, which, however, is not the case, they
would still be inapplicable to a Constitution of Government. In relation to such a subject, the natural and obvious sense of its provisions, apart from any technical
rules, is the Jrue criterion of construction.
Having now seen that the maxims relied upon will
not bear the use made of them, let us endeavor to ascertain their proper use and true meaning. This will be.best done by examples. The plan of the Convention declares, that the power of Congress, or, in other words, of
the National Legislature, shall extend to certain enumerated cases.. This specification of particulars evidently
excludes all pretension to a general Legislative authority; because an affirmative grant of special powers
would be absurd, as well as useless, if a general authority was intended.
In like manner, the Judiciaf authority of the Feoderal
Judicatures is declared by the Constitution to comprehend certain cases particularly specified. The expression of those cases marks the precise limits, beyond
which the Foederal Courts cannot extend their jurisdiction; because the objects of their cognizance being
enumerated, the specification would be nugatory, if it
did not exclude all ideas of more extensive authority.
These examples are sufficient to elucidate the maxims
which have been mentioned, and to designate the manner in which they should be used. But that there may
be no possibility of misapprehension upon this subject,
I shall add one case more, to demonstrate the proper
use of these maxims, and the abuse which has been
made of them.
Let us suppose that by the laws of this State a married woman was incapable of conveying her estate, and




580               The Fcederalist.
that the Legislature, considering this as an evil, should en.
act that she might'dispose of her property by deed executed in the presence of a magistrate. In such a case
there can be no doubt but the specification would
amount to an exclusion of any other mode of conveyance; because the woman having no previous power to
alienate* her property, the specification determines the
particular mode which she is, for that purpgse, to avail
herself of. But let us further suppose that in a subsequent part of the same Act it should be declared that
no woman should dispose of any estate of a determinate
value without the consent of three of her nearest relations, signified by their signing the deed; could it be inferred from this regulation that a married woman might
not procure the approbation of her relations to a deed
for conveying property of inferior value? The position is too absurd to merit a refutation, and yet this is
precisely the position which those must establish who
contend that the trial by juries, in civil cases, is abolished, because it is expressly provided for in cases of
a criminal nature.
From these observations, it must appear unquestionably true, that trial by jury is in no case abolished by
the proposed Constitution; and it is equally true, that
in those controversies between individuals in which the
great body of the People are likely to be interested, that
institution will remain precisely in the same situation in
which it is placed by the State Constitutions, and will
be in no degree altered or influenced by the adoption of
the plan under consideration. The foundation of this
assertion is, that the National Judiciary will have no
cognizance of them, and of course they will remain determinable as heretofore by the State Courts only, and
in the manner which the State Constitutions and laws
prescribe. All land causes, except where claims under
the grants of different States come into question, and all




The Fcederalist.             581
other controversies between the citizens of the same
State, unless where they depend upon positive violations
of the Articles of Union, by Acts of the State Legislatures, will belong exclusively to the jurisdiction of the
State tribunals. Add to this, that admiralty causes,
and almost all those which are of equity jurisdiction, are
determinable under our own Government without the
intervention of a jury; and the inference from the whole
will be, that this institution, as it exists with us at present, cannot possibly be affected, to any great extent, by
the proposed alteration in our system of Government.
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the Con.
vention, if they agree in nothing else, concur at least in
the value they set upon the trial by jury; or if there is
any difference between them it consists in this: the
former regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the
latter represent it as the very palladium of free Government. For my own part, the more the operation of the
institution has fallen under my observation, the more
reason I have discovered for holding it in high estimation; and it would be altogether superfluous to examine
to what extent it deserves to be esteemed useful or
essential in a representative republic, or how much
more merit it may be entitled. to, as a defence against
the oppressions of an hereditary monarch, than as a
barrier to the tyranny of popular Magistrates in a popular Government. Discussions of this kind would be more
curious than beneficial, as all are satisfied of the utility
of the institution, and of its friendly aspect to liberty.
But I must acknowledge that I cannot readily discern
the inseparable connection between the existence of liberty, and the trial by jury in civil cases. Arbitrary impeachments, arbitrary methods of prosecuting pretended
offences, and arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary convictions, have ever appeared to me to be the great engines of Judicial despotism; and these have all relation




582               The Federalist.
to criminal proceedings. The trial by jury in criminal
cases, aided by the habeas corpus Act, seems therefore
to be alone concerned in theI question. And both of
these are provided for, in the most ample manner, in
the plan of the Convention.
It has been observed, that trial by jury is a safeguard
against an oppressive exercise of the power of taxation.
This observation deserves tb be canvassed.
It is evident that it can have no influence upon the
Legislature, in regard to the amount of the taxes to be
laid, to the objects upon which they are to be imposed,
or to the rule by which they are to be apportioned. If
it can have any influence, therefore, it must be upon the
mode of collection, and the conduct of the officers intrusted with the execution of the revenue laws.
As to the mode of collection in this State, under our
own Constitution, the trial by jury is in most cases out
of use. The taxes are usually levied by the more summary proceeding of distress and sale, as in cases of rent.
And it is acknowledged on all hands, that this is essential to the efficacy of the revenue laws. The dilatory
course of a trial at law to recover the taxes imposed
on individuals, would neither suit the exigencies of the
public, nor promote the convenience of the citizens. It
would often occasion an accumulation of costs, more
burdensome than the original sum of the tax to be levied.
And as to the conduct of the officers of the revenue,
the provision in favor of trial by jury in criminal cases,
will afford the security aimed at. Wilful abuses of a
public authority, to the oppression of the subject, and
every species of official extortion, are offences against
the Government; for which the persons who commit
them may be indicted and punished according to the
circumstances of the case.
The excellence of the trial by july in civil cases appears to depend on circumstances foreign to the preser



The Fwaderalist.             583
vation of liberty. The strongest argument in its favor
is, that it is a security against corruption. As there is
always more time, and better opportunity, to tamper
with a standing body of magistrates, than with a jury
summoned for the occasion, there is room to suppose,
that a corrupt influence would more easily find its way
to the former than to the latter. The force of this consideration is, however, diminished  by others.  The
Sheriff, who is the summoner of ordinary juries, and the
Clerks of Courts, who have the nomination of special
juries, are themselves standing officers, and acting individually, may be supposed more accessible to the touch
of corruption than the Judges, who are a collective body.
It is not difficult to see, that it would be in the power of
those officers to select jurors who would serve the purpose of the party as well as a corrupted Bench. In the
next place, it may fairly be supposed, that there would
be less difficulty in gaining some of the jurors promiscuously taken from the public mass, than in gaining men
who had been chosen by the Government for their probity and good character. But making every deduction
for these considerations, the trial by jury must still be a
valuable check upon corruption. It greatly multiplies
the impediments to its success. As matters now stand,
it would be necessary to corrupt both Court and jury;
for where the jury have gone evidently wrong, the, Court
will generally grant a new trial, and it would be in most
cases of little use to practice upon the jury, unless the
Court could be likewise gained. Here then is a double
security; and it will readily be perceived, that this complicated agency tends to preserve the purity of both institutions. By increasing the obstacles to success, it
discourages attempts to seduce the integrity of either.
The temptations to prostitution, which the Judges might
iave to surmount, must certainly be much fewer, while
the cooiperation of a jury is necessary, than they migh.




584                The Federalist.
be, if they had themselves the exclusive determination
of all causes.
Notwithstanding, therefore, the doubts I have expressed, as to the essentiality of trial by jury in civil
cases, to liberty, I admit that it is in most cases, under
proper regulations, an excellent method of determining
questions of property; and that on this account alone,
it would be entitled to a constitutional provision in its
favor if it were possible to fix the limits within which
it ought to be comprehended. There is, however, in all
cases, great difficulty in this; and men not blinded by
enthusiasm, must be sensible, that in a Fcederal Government, which is a composition of societies whose
ideas and institutions in relation to the matter materially vary from each other, that difficulty must be
not a little augmented. For my own part, at every
new view I take of the subject, I become more
convinced of the reality of the obstacles, which, we are
authoritatively informed, prevented the insertion of a
provision on this head in the plan of the Convention.
The great difference between the limits of the jury
trial in different States, is not generally understood.
And as it must have considerable influence on the sentence we ought to pass upon the omission complained
of in regard to this point, an explanation of it is necessary. In this State, our Judicial establishments resemble, more nearly than in any other, those of Great
Britain.  We have Courts of common law, Courts of
Probates, (analogous in certain matters to the spiritual
Courts in England,) a Court of Admiralty, and a Court
of Chancery. In the Courts of common law only, the
trial by jury prevails, and this with some exceptions. In
all the others, a single Judge presides, and proceeds in
general either according to the course of the canon or
civil law, without the aid of a jury.* In New Jersey,
+ It has been erroneously insinu- Chancery, that this Court generally
ited, with regard to the Court of tries disputed facts by a jury. The




The Foederalist.              585
there is a Court of Chancery which proceeds like ours;
but neither Courts of Admiralty, nor of Probates, in the
sense in which these last are established with us. In
that State the Courts of common law have the cognizance of those causes, which with us are determinable in
the Courts of Admiralty and of Probates, and of course
the jury trial is more extensive in New Jersey, than in
New York. In Pennsylvania, this is perhaps still more
the case, for there is no Court of Chancery in that State,
and its common-law Courts have equity jurisdiction. It
has a Court of Admiralty, but none of Probates, at least
on the plan of ours. Delaware has in these respects imitated Pennsylvania. Maryland approaches more nearly
to New York, as does also Virginia, except that the
latter has a plurality of Chancellors. North Carolina
bears most affinity to Pennsylvania; South Carolina to
Virginia. I believe, however, that in some of those
States which have distinct Courts of Admiralty, the
causes depending in them  are triable by juries.  In
Georgia there are none but common-law Courts, and an
appeal of course lies from the verdict of one jury to another, which is called a special jury, and for which a
particular mode of appointment is marked out. In Connecticut, they have no distinct Courts either of Chancery
or of Admiralty, and their Courts of Probates have no
jurisdiction of causes. Their common-law Courts have
admiralty, and, to a certain extent, equity jurisdiction
In cases of importance, their General Assembly is the
only Court of Chancery. In Connecticut, therefore, the
trial by jury extends in practice further than in any other
State yet mentioned. Rhode Island is, I believe, in this
particular, pretty much in the situation of Connecticut
Massachusetts and New Hampshire, in regard to the
blending of law, equity, and admiralty jurisdictions, are
truth is, that references to a jury in validity of a devise of land comet
that Court rarely happen, and are in into question. - Publius.
de ease necessary but where the




586               The Federalist.
in a similar predicament. In the four Eastern States, the
trial by jury not only stands upon a broader foundation
than in the other States, but it is attended with a peculiarity unknown, in its full extent, to any of them.
There is an appeal of course from one jury to another,
till there have been two verdicts out of three on one side.
From this sketch it appears, that there is a material
diversity, as well in the modification as in the extent of
the institution of trial by jury in civil cases, in the several States; and from this fact, these obvious reflections
flow: first, that no general rule could have been fixed
upon by the Convention, which would have corresponded
with the circumstances of all the States; and secondly,
that more, or at least as much might have been hazarded,
by taking the system of any one State for a standard, as
by omitting a provision altogether, and leaving the matter as has been done to Legislative regulation.
The propositions which have been made for supplying
the omission, have rather served to illustrate, than to
obviate the difficulty of the thing. The minority of
Pennsylvania have proposed this mode of expression for
the purpose -; Trial by jury shall be as heretofore " -
and this I maintain would be senseless and nugatory.
The United States, in their united or collective capacity,
are the OBJECT to which all general provisions in the Constitution must necessarily be construed to refer. Now,
it is evident, that though trial by jury, with various limitations, is known in each State individually, yet in the
United States, as such, it is, at this time altogether unknown; because the present Fcederal Government has
no Judiciary power whatever; and consequently, there is
no proper antecedent or previous establishment, to which
the term heretofore could relate. It would therefore be
destitute of a precise meaning, and inoperative from its
uncertainty.
As on the one hand, the form of the provision would




The Federalist.              587
not fulfil the intent of its proposers; so on the other, if
I apprehend that intent rightly, it would be in itself inexpedient. I presume it to be, that causes in the Fcederal
Courts should be tried by jury, if, in the State where the
Courts sat, that mode of trial would obtain in a similar
case in the State Courts, -that is to say, admiralty
causes should be tried in Connecticut by a jury, in New
York without one. The capricious operation of so dissimilar a method of trial in the same cases, under the
same Government, is of itself sufficient to indispose
every well-regulated judgment towards it.  Whether
the cause should be tried with or without a jury, would
depend, in a great number of cases, on the accidental
situation of the Court and parties.
But this is not, in my estimation, the greatest objec.
tion. I feel a deep and deliberate conviction, that there
are many cases in which the trial by jury is an ineligible
one. I think it so particularly, in cases which concern
the public peace with foreign nations; that is, in most
cases where the question turns wholly on the Laws of
Nations. Of this nature, among others, are all prize
causes. Juries cannot be supposed competent to investigations, that riequire a thorough knowledge of the laws
and usages of nations; and they will sometimes be under
the influence of impressions which will not suffer them
to pay sufficient regard to those considerations of public
policy, which ought to guide their inquiries. There
would of course be always danger, that the rights of
other nations might be infringed by their decisions, so as
to afford occasions of reprisal and war. Though the
proper province of juries be to determine matters of fact,
yet in most cases, legal consequences are complicated
with fact in such a manner, as to render a separation
impracticable.
It will add great weight to this remark, in relation to
prize causes, to mention that the method of determining




588                 The Foederatzst.
them  has been thought worthy of particular regulation
in various treaties between different powers of Europe,
and that, pursuant to such treaties, they are determinable
in Great Britain in the last resort before the King himself
in his Privy Council, where the fact as well as the law
undergoes a reexamination. This alone demonstrates
the impolicy of inserting a fundamental provision in the
Constitution which would make the State systems a
standard for the National Government in the Article under consideration, and the danger of encumbering the
Government with any constitutional provisions, the propriety of which is not indisputable.
My convictions are equally strong, that great advantages result from the separation of the equity from the
law jurisdiction; and that the causes which belong to
the former, would be improperly committed to juries.
The great and primary use of a Court of equity is to
give relief in extraordinary cases, which are exceptions *
to general rules. To unite the jurisdiction of such cases
with the ordinary jurisdiction, must have a tendency to
unsettle the general rules, and to subject every case that
arises to a special determination; while a separation of
the one from the other has the contrary effect of rendering one a sentinel over the other, and of keeping each
within the expedient limits. Besides this, the circumstances that constitute cases proper for Courts of equity
are in many instances so nice and intricate, that they
are incompatible with the genius of trials by jury. They
require often such long, deliberate and critical investigation, as would be impracticable to men called from
their occupations, and obliged to decide before they were
permitted to return to them. The simplicity and expedition which form the distinguishing characters of this
* It is true that the principles by are in the main applicable to SPE.
which that relief is governed are CIAL circumstances, which form ex.
aow reduced to a regular system; ceptions to general rules.- Publius
but it is not the less true that they




The Federalist.              589
mode of trial require, that the matter to be decided
should be- reduced to some single and obvious point;
while the litigations usual in Chancery, frequently comprehend a long train of minute and independent particulars.
It is true, that the separation of the equity from the
legal jurisdiction is peculiar to the English system of
jurisprudence: which is the model that has been followed in several of the States. But it is equally true,
that the trial by jury has been unknown in every case
in which they have been united. And the separation
is essential to the preservation of that institution in its
pristine purity. The nature of a Court of equity will
readily permit the extension of its jurisdiction to matters of law; but it is not a little to be suspected, that
the attempt to extend the jurisdiction of the Courts of
law to matters of equity will not only he unproductive
of the advantages which may be derived from Courts
of Chancery, on the plan upon which they are established in this State, but will tend gradually to change
the nature of the Courts of law, and to undermine the
trial by jury, by introducing questions too complicated
for a decision in that mode.
These appear to be conclusive reasons against incorporating the systems of all the States, in the formation
of the National Judiciary, according to what may be
conjectured to have been the intent of the Pennsylvania
minority. Let us now examine, how far the proposition
of Massachusetts is calculated to remedy the supposed
defect.
It is in this form: " In civil actions between citizens
"of different States, every issue of fact, arising in actions
"at'common law, may be tried by a jury if the parties,
"or either of them, request it."
This, at best, is a proposition confined to one description of causes; and the inference is fair, either that the




590               The Fewderalist.
Massachusetts Convention considered that as the only
class of Fcederal causes, in which the trial by jury would
be proper; or that if desirous of a more extensive provision, they found it impracticable to devise one which
would properly answer the end. If the first, the omission of a regulation respecting so partial an object can
never be considered as a material imperfection in the
system. If the last, it affords a strong corroboration of
the extreme difficulty of the thing.
But this is not all: if we advert to the observations
already made respecting the Courts that subsist in the
several States of the Union, and the different powers exercised by them, it will appear, that there are no expressions more.vague and indeterminate than those which
have been employed to characterize that species of causes
which it is intended shall be entitled to a trial by jury.
In this State, the boundaries between actions at common law and actions of equitable jurisdiction, are ascertained in conformity to the rules which prevail in England upon that subject. In many of the other States,
the boundaries are less precise. In some of them, every
cause is to be tried in a Court of common law, and upon
that foundation every action may be considered as an
action at common law, to be determined by a jury, if
the parties, or either of them, choose it. Hence the
same irregularity and confusion would be introduced by
a compliance with this proposition, that I have already
noticed as resulting from the regulation proposed by the
Pennsylvania minority. In one State a cause would
receive its determination from a jury, if the parties, or
either of them, requested it; but in another State, a
cause exactly similar to the other, must be decided without the intervention of a jury, because the State judicatories varied as to common-law jurisdiction.
It is obvious, therefore, that the Massachusetts proposition, upon this subject, cannot operate as a general




The Faederalist.            591
regulation, until some uniform plan, with respect to the
limits of common-law and equitable jurisdictions, shall
be adopted by the different States. To devise a plan of
that kind, is a task arduous in itself, and which it would
require much time and reflection to mature. It would be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to suggest any general regulation that would be acceptable to all the States
in the Union, or that would perfectly quadrate with the
several State institutions.
It may be asked, Why could not a reference have been
made to the Constitution of this State, taking that,
which is allowed by me to be a good one, as a standard
for the United States? I answer, that it is not very
probable the other States should entertain the same
opinion of our institutions which we do ourselves. It is
natural to suppose that they are hitherto more attached
to their own, and that each would struggle for the preference. If the plan of taking one State as a model for
the whole had been thought of in the Convention, it is
to be presumed that the adoption of it in that body,
would have been rendered difficult by the predilection
of each representation in favor of its own Government;
and it must be uncertain, which of the States would
have been taken as the model. It has been shown that
many of them would be improper ones. And I leave
it to conjecture, whether, under all circumstances, it is
most likely that New York, or some other State, would
have been preferred. But admit that a judicious selection could have been effected in the Convention, still
there would have been great danger of jealousy and disgust in the other States, at the partiality which had been
shown to the institutions of one. The enemies of the
plan would have been furnished with a fine pretext for
raising a host of local prejudices against it, which perhaps might have hazarded, in no inconsiderable degree,
its final establishment.




592                The Fcderalist.
To avoid the embarrassments of a definition of the
cases which the trial by jury ought to embrace, it is
sometimes suggested by men of enthusiastic tempers,
that a provision might have been inserted for establishing it in all cases whatsoever. For this, I believe no
precedent is to be found in any member of the Union;
and the considerations which have been stated in discussing the proposition of the minority of Pennsylvania,
must satisfy every sober mind, that the establishment
of the trial by jury in all cases, would have been an unpardonable error in the plan.
In short, the more it is considered, the more arduous
will appear the task of fashioning a provision in such a
form as not to express too little to answer the purpose,
or too much to be advisable; or which might not have
opened other sources of opposition to the great and
essential object of introducing a firm National Government.
I cannot but persuade myself on the other hand, that
the different lights in which the subject has been placed
in the course of these observations, will go far towards
removing in candid minds the apprehensions they may
have entertained on the point. They have tended to
show, that the security of liberty is materially concerned
only in the trial by jury in criminal cases, which is provided for in the most ample manner in the plan of the
Convention; that even in far the greatest proportion of
civil cases, and those in which the great body of the community is interested, that mode of trial will remain in its
full force, as established in the State Constitutions, untouched and unaffected by the plan of the Convention;
that it is in no case abolished' by that plan; and that
there are great, if not insurmountable difficulties, in the
Vide No. LXXXI., in which the ters of fact being vested in the Susupposition of its being abolished preme Court, is examined and re.
by the appellate jurisdiction in mat- futed.- Publius.




The Fwderalist.             593
way of making any precise and proper provision for it,
in a Constitution for the United States.
The best judges of the matter will be the least anxious
for a constitutional establishment of the trial by jury in
civil cases, and will be the most ready to admit, that the
changes which are continually happening in the affairs
of society, may render a different mode of determining
questions of property preferable in many cases in which
that mode of trial now prevails. For my part I acknowledge myself to be convinced, that even in this
State it might be advantageously extended to some cases
to which it does not at present apply, and might as advantageously be abridged in others. It is conceded by
all reasonable men, that it ought not to obtain in all
cases. The examples of innovations which contract its
ancient limits as well in these States as in Great Britain,
afford a strong presumption that its former extent has
been found inconvenient; and give room to suppose
that future experience may discover the propriety and
utility of other exceptions. I suspect it to be impossible in the nature of the thing, to fix the salutary point
at which the operation of the institution ought to stop;
and this is with me a strong argument for leaving the
matter to the discretion of the Legislature.
This is now clearly understood to be the case in
Great Britain, and it is equally so in the State of Con.
necticut; and yet it may be safely affirmed, that more
numerous encroachments have been made upon the trial
by jury in this State since the Revolution, though provided for by a positive Article of our Constitution, than
has happened in the same time either in Connecticut or
Great Britain. It may be added, that these encroachments have generally originated with the men who endeavor to persuade the People they are the warmest defenders of popular liberty, but who have rarely suffered
constitutional obstacles to arrest them in a favorite career.
VOL. I.         38




594               The Fawderalist.
The truth is, that the general GENIUS of a Government is
all that can be substantially relied upon for permanent
effects. Particular provisions, though not altogether
useless, have far less virtue and efficacy than are commonly ascribed to them; and the want of them will
never be, with men of sound discernment, a decisive
objection to any plan. which exhibits the leading characters of a good Government.
It certainly sounds not a little harsh and extraordinary
to affirm that there is no security for liberty in a Constitution which expressly establishes the trial by jury in
criminal cases, because it does not do it in civil also;
while it is a notorious fact that Connecticut, which has
been always regarded as the most popular State in the
Union, can boast of no constitutional provision for;either.
PUBLIUS.
[From M'LEAN'S Edition, New York, M.DCC.LXXXVIII.]
[THE FCEDERALIST.]  NO. LXXXIV.
ITo THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:]
IN the course of the foregoing review of the Constition, I have taken notice of, and endeavored to answer most of the objections which have appeared against
it. There, however, remain a few which either did not
fall naturally under any particular head, or were forgotten in their proper places. These shall now be discussed;
but as the subject has been drawn into great length, I
shall so far consult brevity, as to comprise all my observation's on these miscellaneous points in a single paper.
The most considerable of the remaining objections is,




The F      drderaist.      596
that the plan of the Convention contains no Bill of Rights.
Among other answers given to this, it has been upon
different occasions remarked, that the Constitutions of
several of the States are in a similar predicament. I
add, that New York is of the number. And yet the
opposers of the new system, in this State, who profess
an unlimited admiration for its Constitution, are among
the most intemperate partisans of a Bill of Rights. To
justify their zeal in this matter, they allege two things:
one is, that though the Constitution of New York has
no Bill of Rights prefixed to it, yet it contains, in the
body of it, various provisions in favor of particular
privileges and rights, which, in substance, amount to
the same thing; the other is, that the Constitution
adopts, in their full extent, the common and statute
law of Great Britain, by which many other rights, not
expressed in it, are equally secured.
To the first I answer, that the Constitution proposed
by the Convention contains, as well as the Constitution
of this State, a number of such provisions.
Independent of those which relate to the structure of
the Government, we find the following: - Article 1, Section 3, Clause 7, "Judgment in cases of impeachment
"shall not extend further than to removal from office,
"and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of
"honor, trust, or profit under the United States; but the'party convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable and subject
"to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment accord" ing to law." Section 9, of the same Article, Clause 2,
" The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
" suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or inva.
"sion the public safety may require it."  Clause 3,
"No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be
"passed."  Clause 7, "No title of nobility shall be
"granted by the United States; and no person hold.' ing any office of profit or trust under them, shall,




596               The Feaderalist.
"without the consent of the Congress, accept of an)
"present, emolument, office, or title of any kind what.
"ever, from any king, prince, or foreign State."  Article
3, Section 2, Clause 3, " The trial of all crimes, except
" in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such
" trial shall be held in the State where the said crimes
" shall have been committed; but when not committed
"within any State, the trial shall be at such place or
"places as the Congress may by law have directed."
Section 3, of the same Article, "Treason against the
"United States shall consist only in levying war against
"them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid
"and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason,
"unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same
"overt act, or on confession in open Court." And
Clause 3, of the same Section, "The Congress shall
"have power to declare the punishment of treason; but
" no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood,
" or forfeiture, except during the life of the person at" tainted."
It may well be a question, whether these are not,
upon the whole, of equal importance with any which
are to be found in the Constitution of this State. The
establishment of the writ of habeas corpus, the prohibition of ex post facto laws, and of TITLES OF NOBILITY, to
which we have no corresponding provisions in our Constitution, are perhaps greater securities to liberty and republicanism than any it contains. The creation of crimes
after the commission of the fact, or, in other words, the
subjecting of men to punishment for things- which,
when they were done, were breaches of no law, and
the practice of arbitrary imprisonments, have been, in all
ages, the favorite and most formidable instruments of
tyranny. The observations of the judicious BLACKSTONE,'
in reference to the latter, are well worthy of recital:
* Vide BLACKSTONE'S Commentaries, vol. 1, page 186. - Publius.




The Fewderalist.             597
" To bereave a man of life," (says he,) " or by violence t.
" confiscate his estate without accusation or trial, would
" be so gross and notorious an act of despotism, as must
" at once convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the
" whole nation; but confinement of the person, by se"cretly hurrying him to jail, where his sufferings are
" unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a less striking,
"and therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary
" Government." And as a remedy for this fatal evil
he is everywhere peculiarly emphatical in his encomiums on the habeas corpus Act, which in one place he
calls " the BULWARK of the British Constitution." *
Nothing need be said to illustrate the importance of
the prohibition of titles of nobility. This may truly be
denominated the corner-stone of Republican Government; for so long as they are excluded, there can never
be serious danger that the Government will be any
other than that of the People.
To the second, that is, to the pretended establishment
of the common and statute law by the Constitution, I
answer, that they are expressly made subject " to such
"alterations and provisions as the Legislature shall from
"' time to time make concerning the same." They are
therefore at any moment liable to repeal by the ordinary
Legislative power, and of course have no constitutional sanction. The only use of the declaration was
to rec6gnize the ancient law, and to remove doubts
which might have been occasioned by the Revolution.
This consequently can be considered as no part of a
declaration of rights; which under our Constitutions
must be intended as limitations of the power of the
Government itself.
It has been several times truly remarked, that Bills of
Rights are, in their origin, stipulations between kings and
heir subjects, abridgments of prerogative in favor of
* -Vide BLACKSTONE'S Commentaries, vol. 4, page 488.- Publius.




598                The Faederalist.
privilege, reservations of rights not surrendered to the
prince.  Such was MAGNA CHARTA, obtained by the
Barons, sword in hand, from King JOHN. Such were
the subsequent confirmations of that charter by succeeding princes. Such was the Petition of Right assented to by CHARLES I., in the beginning of his reign.
Such, also, was the Declaration of Right presented by the
Lords and Commons to the Prince of Orange in 1688,
and afterwards thrown into the form of an Act of Parliament called the Bill of Rights. It is evident, therefore,
that, according to their primitive signification, they have
no application to Constitutions professedly founded upon
the power of the People, and executed by their immediate representatives and servants. Here, in strictness, the People surrender nothing; and as they retain
everything, they have no need of particular reservations.' WE, THE PEOPLE of the United States, to secure the
" blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do
"ordain and establish this Constitution for the United
" States of America." Here is a better recognition of
popular rights, than volumes of those aphorisms which
make the principal figure in several of our State Bills
of Rights, and which would sound much better in a
treatise of ethics, than in a Constitution of Government.
But a minute detail of particular rights is certainly
far less applicable to a Constitution like that under consideration, which is merely intended to regulate the general political interests of the Nation, than to a Constitution which has the regulation of every species of personal and private concerns.  If, therefore, the loud
clamors against the plan of the Convention, on this
score, are well founded, no epithets of reprobation will
be too strong for the Constitution of this State. But
the truth is, that both of them  contain all which, in
relation to their objects, is reasonably to be desired.




The Fcederalist.            599
I go further, and affirm, that Bills of Rights, in the
sense and to the extent in which they are contended for,
are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution
but would even be dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to powers not granted; and on this very
account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more
than were granted. For why declare that things shall
not be done which there is no power to do? Why, for
instance, should it be said, that the liberty of the press
shall not be restrained, when no power is given by
which restrictions may be imposed? I will not contend
that such a provision would confer a regulating power;
but it is evident that it would furnish, to men disposed
to usurp, a plausible pretence for claiming that power.
They might urge with a semblance of reason, that the
Constitution ought not to be charged with the absurdity
of providing against the abuse of an authority, which
was not given, and that the provision against restraining the liberty of the press afforded a clear implication,
that a power to prescribe proper regulations concerning it
was intended to be vested in the National Government.
This may serve as a specimen of the numerous handles
which would be given to the doctrine of constructive
powers, by the indulgence of an, injudicious zeal for
Bills of Rights.
On the subject of the liberty of the press, as much
has been said, I cannot forbear adding a remark or two:
in the first place, I observe, that there is not a syllable
concerning it in the Constitution of this State; in the
next, I contend, that whatever has been said about it in
that of any other State, amounts to nothing. What
signifies a declaration, that " the liberty of the press shall
"be inviolably preserved?"  What is the liberty of the
Dress? Who can give it any definition which would
not leave the utmost latitude for evasion? I hold it to
be impracticable; and from this I infer, that its security,




600                     The Faederalist.
whatever fine declarations may be inserted in any Con.
stitution respecting it, must altogether depend on public
opinion, and on the general spirit of the People and of
the Government.*   And here, after all, as is intimated
upon another occasion, must we seek for the only solid
basis of all our rights.
There remains but one other view of this matter to
conclude the point.  The truth is, after all the declamation we have heard, that the Constitution is itself, in
every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL
OF RIGHTS. The several Bills of Rights in Great Britain
form its Constitution, and conversely the Constitution
of each State is its Bill of Rights. And the proposed
Constitution, if adopted, will be the Bill of Rights of
the Union. Is it one object of a Bill of Rights to declare and specify the political privileges of the citizens in
the  structure  and  administration  of the Government?
This is done in the most ample and precise manner in
the plan of the Convention; comprehending various
precautions for the public security, which are not to be
found in any of the State Constitutions. Is another object of a Bill of Rights to define certain immunities and
* To show that there is a power if duties of any kind may be laid
in the Constitution, by which the  without a violation of that liberty,
liberty of the press may be affected, it is evident that the extent must
recourse has been had to the power depend on Legislative discretion,
of taxation. It is said, that duties regulated  by public opinion; so
may be laid upon publications so  that, after all, general declarations
high as to amount to a prohibition. respecting the liberty of the press,
I know not by what logic it could  will give it no greater security than
be maintained, that the declarations  it will have without them. The
in the State Constitutions, in favor same invasions of it may be efof the freedom of the press, would  fected under the State Constitube a constitutional impediment to  tions which contain those declarathe imposition of duties upon pub- tions through the means of taxalications by the State Legislatures. tion, as under the proposed ConIt cannot certainly be pretended  stitution, which has nothing of the
that any degree of duties, however kind. It would be quite as signifilow, rould be an abridgment of the  cant to declare, that Government
liberty of the press. We know that ought to be free, that taxes ought
newspapers are  taxed in Great not to be excessive, &c., as that the
Britain, and yet it is notorious that liberty of the press ought not to be
the press nowhere enjoys greater restrained. - Publius.'iberty than in that country. And




The Fcederalist.            601
modes of proceeding, which are relative to personal ana
private concerns? This we have seen has also been attended to, in a variety of cases, in the same plan. Adverting therefore to the substantial meaning of a Bill of
Rights, it is absurd to allege that it is not to be found in
the work of the Convention. It may be said that it does
not go far enough, though it will not be easy to'make
this appear; but it can with no propriety be contended.
that there is no such thing. It certainly must be immaterial what mode is observed as to the order of declaring
the rights of the citizens, if they are to be found in any
part of the instrument.which establishes the Government.
And hence it must be apparent, that much of what has
been said on this subject rests merely on verbal and
nominal distinctions, entirely foreign from the substance
of the thing.
Another objection, which has been made, and which,
from the frequency of its repetition, it is to be presumed
is relied on, is of this nature: It is improper" (say the
objectors) "to confer sucl&large powers, as are proposed,
upon the National Government; because the seat of that
Government must of necessity be too remote from many
of the States to admit of a proper knowledge on the part
of the constituent, of the conduct of the representative
body." This argument, if it proves anything, proves that
there ought to be no General Government whatever. For
the powers which, it seems to be agreed on all hands,
ought to be vested in the Union, cannot be safely intrusted
to a body which is not under every requisite control. But
there are satisfactory reasons to show, that the objection
is, in reality, not well founded. There is in most of the
arguments which relate to distance a palpable illusion of
the imagination. What are the sources of information,
by which tie people in Montgomery county must regulate
their judgment of the conduct of their Representatives in
the State Legislature? Of personal observation they




602               The Faderalist.
can have no benefit. This is confined to the citizens on
the spot. They must therefore depend on the informa.
tion of intelligent men, in whom they confide; and how
must these nlen obtain their information? Evidently
from the complexion of public measures, from the public prints, from correspondences with their Representatives, and with other persons who reside at the place of
their deliberation. This does not apply to Montgomery
county only, but to all the counties at any considerable
distance from the seat of Government.
It is equally evident, that the same sources of information would be open to the People, in relation to the conduct of their Representatives in the General Government;
and the impediments to a prompt communication which
distance may be supposed to create, will be overbalanced
by the effects of the vigilance of the State Governments.
The Executive and Legislative bodies of each State will
be so many sentinels over the persons employed in every
department of the National administration; and as it
will be in their power to adoptiand pursue a regular and
effectual system of intelligence, they can never be at a
loss to know the behavior of those who represent their
constituents in the National Councils, and can readily
communicate the same knowledge to the People. Their
disposition to apprise the community of whatever may
prejudice its interests from another quarter, may be relied
upon, if it were only from the rivalship of power. And
we may conclude with the fullest assurance, that the
People, through that channel, will be better informed of
the conduct of their National Representatives, than they
can be, by any means they now possess, of that of their
State Representatives.
It ought also to be remembered, that the citizens who
inhabit the country at and near the seat of Government
will, in all questions that affect the general liberty and
prosperity, have the same interest with those who are at




The Fwderalist.               602
a distance; and that they will stand ready to sound the
alarm when necessary, and to point out the actors in any
pernicious project. The public papers will be expeditious messengers of intelligence to the most remote
inhabitants of the Union.
Among the many curious objections which have ap.
peared against the proposed Constitution, the most extraordinary and the least colorable is derived from the
want of some provision respecting the debts due to the
United States. This has been represented as a tacit relinquishment of those debts, and as a wicked contrivance
to screen public defaulters.  The  newspapers have
teemed with the most inflammatory railings on this
head; yet there is nothing clearer than that the suggestion is entirely void of foundation, the offspring of extreme ignorance or extreme dishonesty. In addition to
the remarks I have made upon the subject in another
place, I shall only observe, that as it is.a plain dictate
of common sense, so it is. also an established doctrine
of political law, that, "States neither lose any of their
" rights, nor are discharged from any of their obligations,
"' by a change in the form of their civil Government." *
The, last objection of any consequence, which I at
present recollect, turns upon the article of expense. If it
were even true, that the adoption of the proposed Government would occasion a considerable increase of expense, it would be an objection that ought to have no
weight against the plan. The great bulk of the citizens
of America are with reason convinced, that Union is the
basis of their political happiness. Men of sense of all
parties now, with few exceptions, agree that it cannot
be preserved under the present system, nor without radical alterations; that new and extensive powers ought to
* Vide RUTHERFORD'S Institutes, 11, chap. ix. sect. viii. and ix.vol. 2. book 11, chap. x. sect. xiv. Publius.
mnd xv. Vide also GROTIuS, book




604               The Foederalist.
be granted to the National head, and that these require
a different organization of the Fcederal Government; a
single body being an unsafe depository of such ample
authorities. In conceding all this, the question of expense must be given up; for it is impossible, with any degree of safety, to narrow the foundation upon which the
system is to stand. The two branches of the Legislature are, in the first instance, to consist of only sixty-five
persons, which is the same number of which congress,
under the existing Confederation, may be composed. It is
true, that this number is intended to be increased; but
this is to keep pace with the progress of the population
and resources of the country. It is evident that a less
number would, even in the first instance, have been unsafe; and that a continuance of -the present number
would, in a more advanced stage of population, be a
very inadequate representation of the People.
Whence is the dreaded augmentation of expense to
spring?  One source indicated, is the multiplication of
offices under the new Government. Let us examine
this a little.
It is evident that the principal departments of the administration under the present Government, are the same
which will be required under the new. There are now
a Secretary of War, a Secretary for Foreign Affairs, a
Secretary for Domestic Affairs, a Board of Treasury consisting of three persons, a Treasurer, assistants, clerks,
&c. These offices are indispensable under any system,
and will suffice under the new as well as the old. As to
Ambassadors and other ministers and agents in foreign
countries, the proposed Constitution can make no other
difference, than to render their characters, where they
reside, more respectable, and their services more useful.
As to persons to be employed in the collection of the
revenues, it is unquestionably true that these will form a
very considerable addition to the number of Fcderal offi



The Fefderalist.            60A
cers; but it will not follow, that this will occasion arn
increase of public expense. It will be in most cases
nothing more than an exchange of State for Nationai
officers. In the'collection of all duties, for instance, the
persons employed will be wholly of the latter description.
The States individually will stand in no need of any for
this purpose. What difference can it make in point of
expense, to pay officers of the customs appointed by
the State or by the United States? There is no good
reason to suppose, that either the number or the salaries
of the latter, will be greater than those of the former.
Where then are we to seek for those additional articles
of expense, which are to swell the account to the enormous size that has been represented to us? The chief
item which occurs to me, respects the support of'the
Judges of the United States. I do not add the President,
because there is now a President of Congress, whose expenses may not be far, if anything, short of those which
will be incurred on account of the President of the
United States. The support of the Judges will clearly
be an extra expense, but to what extent will depend on
the particular plan which may be adopted in regard to
this matter.  But upon no reasonable plan can it
amount to a sum which will be an object of material
consequence.
Let us now see what there is to counterbalance any
extra expense that may attend the establishment of the
proposed Government. The first thing which presents
itself is, that a great part of the business which now keeps
Congress sitting through the year, will be transacted by
the President. Even the management of foreign negotiations will naturally devolve upon him, according to
general principles concerted with the Senate, and subject
to their final concurrence. Hence it is evident, that a
portion of the year will suffice for the session of both
the Senate and the House of Representatives: we may




606              The Faoderalist.
suppose about a fourth for the latter, and a third, or per.
haps half, for the former. The extra business of treaties
and appointments may give this extra occupation to the
Senate. From this circumstance we may infer, that until the House of Representatives shall be increased greatly
beyond its present number, there will be a considerable
saving of expense from the difference between the constant session of the present, and the temporary session
of the future Congress.
But there is another circumstance, of great importance in the view of economy. The business of the
United States has hitherto occupied the State Legislatures, as well as Congress. The latter has made requisitions which the former have had to provide for. Hence it
has happened, that the sessions of the State Legislatures
have been protracted greatly beyond what was necessary
for the execution of the mere local business of the States.
More than half their time has been frequently employed
in matters which related to the United States. Now the
members who compose the legislatures of the several
States amount to two thousand and upwards; which
number has hitherto performed what under the new system will be done in the first instance by sixty-five persons, and probably at no future period by above a fourth
or a fifth of that number. The Congress under the proposed Government will do all the business of the United
States themselves, without the intervention of the State
Legislatures, who thenceforth will have only to attend to
the affairs of their particular States, and will not have to
sit in any proportion as long as they have heretofore
done. This difference, in the time of the sessions of the
State Legislatures, will be clear gain, and will alone
form an article of saving, which may be regarded as an
equivalent for any additional objects of expense that
may be occasioned by the adoption of the new system.
The result from these observations is, that the sources




The Federalist.             607
of additional expense from the establishment of the
proposed Constitution, are much fewer than may have
been imagined; that they are counterbalanced by considerable objects of saving; and that while it is questionable on which side the scale will preponderate, it is
certain that a Government less expensive would be
incompetent to the purposes of the Union.
PUBLIUS.
[From M'LEAN'S Edition, New York, M.DCC.LXXXVIII.]
[THE F(EDERALIST.] No. LXXXV.
-To THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:]
ACCORDING to the formal division of the subject
of these papers, announced in my first number, there
would appear still to remain for discussion, two points," the analogy of the proposed Government to your own
"State Constitution," and " the additional security which
"its adoption will afford to republican Government, to
" liberty, and to property."  But these heads have been
so fully anticipated and exhausted in the progress of
the work, that it would now scarcely be possible to do
anything more than repeat, in a more dilated form,
what has been heretofore said; which the advanced
stage of the question, and the time already spent upon
it, conspire to forbid.
It is remarkable, that the resemblance of the plan of
the Convention to the Act which organizes the Government of this State holds, not less with regard to many
of the supposed defects, than to the real excellences of
the former. Among the pretended defects, are the reeligibility of the Executive; the want of a Council; the




608             The Foaderalist.
omission of a formal Bill of Rights; the omission of a
provision respecting the liberty of the press: these and
several others, which have been noted in the course of
our inquiries, are as much chargeable on the existing
Constitution of this State, as on the one proposed for the
Union; and a man must have slender pretensions to
consistency, who can rail at the latter for imperfections,
which he finds no difficulty in excusing in the former.
Nor indeed can there be a better proof of the insincerity
and affectation of some of the zealous adversaries of
the plan of the Convention among us, who profess to be
the devoted admirers of the Government under which
they live, than the fury with which they have attacked
that plan, for matters in regard to which our own Constitution is equally, or perhaps more vulnerable.
The additional securities to republican Government, to
liberty, and to property, to be derived from the adoption
of the plan under consideration, consist chiefly in the
restraints which the preservation of the Union will impose on local factions and insurrections, and on the
ambition of powerful individuals in single States, who
might acquire credit and influence enough, from leaders
and favorites, to become the despots of the People; in
the diminution of the opportunities to foreign intrigue,
which the dissolution of the Confederacy would invite
and facilitate; in the prevention of extensive military
establishments, which.could not fail to grow out of wars
between the States in a disunited situation; in the express guaranty of a republican form of Government to
each; in the absolute and universal exclusion of titles
of nobility; and in the precautions against the repetition
of those practices on the part of the State Governments,
which have undermined the foundations of property and
credit, have planted mutual distrust in the breasts of all
classes of citizens, and have occasioned an almost universal prostration of morals.




The Fxederalist.           609
Thus have I, Fellow-Citizens, executed the task I had
assigned to myself; with what success, your conduct
must determine. I trust at least you will admit that I
have not failed in the assurance I gave you respecting
the spirit with which my endeavors should be conducted.
I have addressed myself purely to your judgments, and
have studiously avoided those asperities which are too
apt to disgrace political disputants of all parties, and
which have been not a little provoked by the language
and conduct of the opponents of the Constitution. The
charge of a conspiracy against the liberties of the People, which has been indiscriminately brought against the
advocates of the plan, has something in it too wanton
and too malignant, not to excite the indignation of every
man who feels in his own bosom a refutation of the
calumny. The perpetual changes which have been rung
upon the wealthy, the well-born, and the great, have been
such as to inspire the disgust of all sensible men. And
the unwarrantable concealments and misrepresentations
which have been in various ways practised to keep the
truth from the public eye, have been of a nature to demand the reprobation of all honest men. It is not impossible that these circumstances may have occasionally
betrayed me into intemperances of expression which I did
not intend: it is certain, that I have frequently felt a
struggle between sensibility and moderation; and if the
former has in some instances prevailed, it must be my
excuse, that it has been neither often, nor much.
Let us now pause, and ask ourselves, whether, in the
course of these papers, the proposed Constitution has
not been satisfactorily vindicated from the aspersions
thrown upon it; and whether it has not been shown to
be worthy of the public approbation, and necessary to
the public safety and prosperity. Every man is bound
to answer these questions to himself, according to the
best of his conscience and understanding, and to act
VOL. I.            39




510               The FFwderalist.
agreeably to the genuine and sober dictates of his judgment. This is a duty from which nothing can give him
a dispensation.'Tis one that he is called upon, nay,
constrained by all the obligations that form the bands
of society, to discharge sincerely and honestly. No
partial motive, no particular interest, no pride of opinion, no temporary passion or prejudice, will justify to
himself, to his country, or to his posterity, an improper
election of the part he is to act. Let him beware of an
obstinate adherence to party; let him reflect, that the
object upon which he is to decide is not a particular interest of the community, but the very existence of the
Nation; and let him remember, that a majority of
America has already given its sanction to the plan
which he is to approve or reject.
I shall not dissemble, that I feel an entire confidence
in the arguments which recommend the proposed system to your adoption; and that I am unable to discern
any real force in those by which it has been opposed. I
am persuaded, that it is the best which our political
situation, habits, and opinions will admit, and superior
to any the Revolution has produced.
Concessions on the part of the friends of the plan,
that it has not a claim to absolute perfection, have
afforded matter of no small triumph to its enemies.
"Why," say they, " should we adopt an imperfect thing?
" Why not amend it and make it perfect before it is
"irrevocably established?"  This may be plausible
enough, but it is only plausible. In the first place I remark, that the extent of these concessions has been
greatly exaggerated. They have been stated as amounting to an admission, that the plan is radically defective;
and that without material alterations, the rights and the
interests of the community cannot be safely confided to
It. This, as far as I have understood the meaning of
those who make the concessions, is an entire perversion




The Fmaderalist.            61'
of their sense. No advocate of the measure can be
found, who will not declare as his sentiment, that the
system, though it may not be perfect in every part, is,
upon the whole, a good one; is the best that the present
views and circumstances of the country will permit;
and is such an one as promises every species of security
which a reasonable People can desire.
I answer in the next place, that I should esteem it the
extreme of imprudence to prolong the precarious state
of our National affairs, and to expose the Union to the
jeopardy.of successive experiments, in the chimerical
pursuit of a perfect plan. I never expect to see a perfect
work from imperfect man. The result of the deliberations of all collective bodies, must necessarily be a compound as well of the errors and prejudices, as of the
good sense and wisdom  of the individuals of whom
they are composed. The compacts which are to embrace thirteen distinct States, in a common bond of
amity and union, must as necessarily be a compromise
of as many dissimilar interests and inclinations. How
can perfection spring from such materials?
The reasons assigned in an excellent little pamphlet
lately published in this city,* are unanswerable to show
the utter improbability of assembling a new Convention,
under circumstances in any degree so favorable to a
happy issue, as those in which the late Convention met,
deliberated, and concluded. I will not repeat the arguments there used, as I presume the production itself has
had an extensive circulation. It is certainly well worthy
the perusal of every friend to his country. There is,
however, one point of light in which the subject of
amendments still remains to be considered; and in which
it has not yet been exhibited to public view. I cannot
resolve to conclude without first taking a survey of it in
this aspect.
* Entitled " An Address to the Peopie of the State of New York." - Pub'ius.




612                The Fcederalist.
It appears to me susceptible of absolute demonstra
tion, that it will be far more easy to obtain subsequent
than previous amendments to the Constitution. The
moment an alteration is made in the present plan, it becomes, to the purpose of adoption, a new one, and must
undergo a new decision of each State. To its complete establishment throughout the Union, it will therefore require the concurrence of thirteen States. If, on
the contrary, the Constitution proposed should once be
ratified by all the States as it stands, alterations in it
may at any time be effected by nine States. Here then
the chances are as thirteen to nine* in favor of subsequent amendments, rather than of the original adoption
of an entire system.
This is not all. Every Constitution for the United
States must inevitably consist of a great variety of particulars, in which thirteen independent States are to be
accommodated in their interests or opinions of interest.
We may of course expect to see, in any body of men
charged with its original formation, very different combinations of the parts upon different points. Many of
those who form a majority on one question, may become
the minority on a second, and an association dissimilar
to either may constitute the majority on a third. Hence
the necessity of moulding and arranging all the particulars which are to compose the whole, in such a manner as to satisfy all the parties to the compact; and
hence, also, an immense multiplication of difficulties
and casualties in obtaining the collective assent to a
final Act. The degree of that multiplication must evidently be in a ratio to the number of particulars and
the number of parties.
But every Amendment to the Constitution, if once
established, would be a single proposition, and might be
* It may rather be said TEN, for the measure, three fourths must
though two thirds may set on foot ratify. - Publius.




The Fwderalist.             613
brought forward singly. There would then be no necessity for management or compromise, in relation to any
other point; no giving, nor taking. The will of the
requisite number would at once bring the matter. to a
decisive issue. And consequently, whenever nine, or
rather ten States, were united in the desire of a particular amendment, that amendment must infallibly take
place. There can, therefore, be no comparison between
the facility of effecting an amendment, and that of
establishing in the first instance a complete Constitution.
In opposition to the probability of subsequent amendments, it has been urged, that the persons delegated to
the administration of the National Government, will
always be disinclined to yield up any portion of the
authority of which they were once possessed. For my
own part, I acknowledge a thorough conviction, that
any amendments which may, upon mature consideration,
be thought useful, will be applicable to the organization
of the Government, not to the mass of its powers; and
on this account alone, I think there is no weight in the
observation just stated.  I also think there is little
weight in it on another account. The intrinsic difficulty
of governing THIRTEEN STATES at any rate, independent
of calculations upon an ordinary degree of public spirit
and integrity, will, in my opinion, constantly impose on
the National rulers the necessity of a spirit of accommodation to the reasonable expectations of their constituents. But there is yet a further consideration, which
proves beyond the possibility of doubt, that the observation is futile. It is this, that the National rulersj
whenever nine States concur, will have no option upon
the subject. By the fifth Article of the plan, the Con.
gress will-be obliged, "on the application of the Legis.'' latures of two thirds of the States," (which at present
amount to nine,) "to call a Convention for proposing




614               The Fvderalist.
"Amendments, which shall be valid to all intents and
"purposes, as part of the Constitution, when ratified by
"the Legislatures of three fourths of the States, or by
" Conventions in three fourths thereof." The words of
this Article are peremptory.  The Congress "shall call
"a Convention." Nothing in this particular is left to
the discretion of that body. And of consequences all
the declamation about the disinclination to a change,
vanishes in air. Nor however difficult it may be supposed to unite two thirds, or three fourths of the State
Legislatures, in amendments which may affect local
interests, can there be any room to apprehend any such
difficulty in a union on points which are merely relative
to the general liberty or security of the People.  We
may safely rely on the disposition of the State Legisla.
tures to erect barriers against the encroachments of the
National authority.
If the foregoing argument is a fallacy, certain it is,
that I am myself deceived by it; for it is, in my conception, one of those rare instances in which a political truth can be brought to the test of a mathematical
demonstration. Those who see the matter in the same
light with me, however zealous they may be for amendments, must agree in the propriety of a previous adoption, as the most direct road to their owl object.
The zeal for attempts to amend, prior to the establishment of the Constitution, must abate in every man,
who is ready to accede to the truth of the following
observations of a writer, equally solid and ingenious:
"To balance a large State or society," (says he,) " wheth"er monarchical or republican, ton general laws, is a
"work of so great difficulty, that no human genius,
"however comprehensive, is able by the mere dint of
"reason and reflection, to effect it. The judgments of
"many must unite in the work; EXPERIENCE must'guide their labor; TIME must bring it to perfection;




The Ewderalist.              615
"and the FEELING of inconveniences must correct the'" mistakes which they inevitably fall into, in their first
" trials and experiments." * These judicious reflections
contain a lesson of moderation to all the sincere lovers
of the Union; and ought to put them upon their guard
against hazarding anarchy, civil war, a perpetual alienation of the States from each other, and perhaps the
military despotism of a victorious demagogue, in the
pursuit of what they are not likely to obtain, but from
TIME and EXPERIENCE. It may be in me a defect of political fortitude, but I acknowledge that I cannot entertain an equal tranquillity with those who affect to treat
the dangers of a longer continuance in our present situation as imaginary. A NATION, without a NATIONAL
GOVERNMrNT, is, in my view, an awful spectacle. The
establishment of a Constitution, in time of profound
peace, by the voluntary consent of a whole People, is a
PRODIGY, to the completion of which I look forward
with trembling anxiety. I can reconcile it to no rules
of prudence to let go the hold we now have, in so arduous an enterprise, upon seven out of the thirteen States;
and after having passed over so considerable a part of the
ground, to recommence the course. I dread the more
the consequences of new attempts, because I KNOW that
POWERFUL INDIVIDUALS, in this and in other States, are
enemies to a general National Government in every
possible shape.
PUBLIUS.
* HUME's Essays, vol. 1, page 128.- The Rise of Arts and Sciences.Publius.