SOLDIERS' SUFFRAGE. I: S P]] Cli O:I HON. XVM. WARN OF DETROIT, IN THE LEGISLATURE OF MICHIGAN, JAN UARY 8S, 1864, DEZTROIT: 1864. I 'S. iI !i Ie II I I I I I 11 ..6. 4 IN' TIIE LEGISLATURE OF MICIIIGAN, JANUARY 28, 1864, self-preservation on the part of the Union, has my earnest approbation; and that our brave citizen soldiers engaged in it, have my fervent sympathy, and have had, and shall continue to have, all the practical aid and comfort in my power to render them, till their work shall be fi fully done, and the rebels shall be coerced to submission, and civil authority and public tranquility fully restored. And, if, MR. CuAIRMAN, I shall feel called upon to vote against the passage of either of these bills, or of both, I shall do so, not be cause my heart is not alive to the interests and wishes of our noble brothers in the field, but because my heart is also alive with love and respect for that same authority of constitu tional law, to maintain and enfore which, they freely peril all; it will be because I shall feel bound to follow the clear dictates of my un derstanding and conscience; it will be because I feel bound to do, here, on this floor, what they are giving their blood and lives to secure, namely, obedience to the fundamental law of tha land. These Measures a Ground of Real Solicitude. MR. CIAIRMAN: I frankly confess to you, and to the members of this Committee, that I approach the subject now before us, with feelings of unaccustomed solicitude -a solicitude mingled with sad surprise, and strange, ill-boding fears. It is fair to suppose that these measures indicate the nature of the feeling, and the tendencies of mind, into which a large share of the people have fallen. These measures are, doubtless, both the pro duct-the natural out-growth-and exponent of the majority. This is a chief reason why m I contemplate them with such painful anxie The Committee of the whole House, having under consideration the subject of extending the Elective Franchise to Michigan Soldiers, when absent from their places of residence m the Army and Navy of the United States, either by means of what is called " the field systern,II or " the proxy system," Mr. WARNER remarked substantially as follows: MR. CHARMA uN: I do not get up, because I ame abou t to attempt to m ake a speech on this subject, in the technical sense of the term. I have no such purpose. And yet, I feel that I owe it to myself, to the members of this House, and, especially, to those whom I represent on this floor, whether in the Army, or at home, to say, at least, so much as shall be necessary to explain some of the reasons for the vote I expect to cast, when either of the bills now presented for our consideration, shall be put on its final passage. Holy One is Liable to be 1t~isunder stood —A ]Precaution Against It. M-;. CHAIRM,N: In times of great popular excitement, when the current of general sympathy runs high and urgently in one direction, a person, especially one in any public station, is very liable to be so far misapprehended as to be put in a false position, even before those whom he much esteems, and whose opinions are justly entitled to respect, if he cannot, consistently with his convictions of truth and duty, fall in, and go with the current, on all collateral and accidental questions, as well as on all. that are truly cardinal. To guard against such misapprehension, somewhat, and the injustice attending it, permit me, Sir, to say right here, that tilis war of I TT, -ori I -,r noN. 3 3 "lNT 2 have a voice in the civil administration of the government for which they fight, then it would be well to inquire, who is worthy of it?" -See Message, page 10. Now mark: In the present condition of our election laws soldiers, when absent from their places of residence, cannot vote at our State or local elections but it is proposed that this Legislature pass an act enabling them to do so. The essential question arises here in the outset, namely: "Is it competent for the Legislatui e to pass such an act?" This is a Constitutionalquestion. It depends, wholly, on the wording of our State Constitution. But this side issue, thus artfully presented to us, as a sort of preamble, would h ave the question turn, not on the wording and plain sense of th e Constitution, but on the worthiness of the soldiers: just as though an admission that our citizen soldi,Yrs a re worsthy of the right to vote, is the same thihedi as to decide, that the wording of the Constitution of Michigan is exactly suchi as to enable this Legislature to confer on them the right to vote, in, our State and local elections, when they are out of the State, or to give this body the undoubted right to send the ballot box to them, out of the State, or out of the, town or ward where they reside, or to authorize them to vote by proxy. Why, the worthiness of our volunteers is one thing' and I assure you, sir, that I claim it to be a very great thing; but, yet, the wording of our Constitution, by which the powers of this Legislature are determined, is a verydifferent thing. And while these two things from their very nature, cannot be opposed to each other, they of course have no legal or logical connection. Again. It is said: IThe volunteer army ot the United States is composed of the people of the United States. They have left their various occupations, not to become professional soldiers, not to renounce civil life and the pursuits of peace, but to establish upon an enduring basis the right to both, for themselves and their posterity. They are absent from the polls of the elections, in their several towns and wards, beating back the power of a causless and cruel rebellion, in order that these very elections may be held in peace, and that the right to hold them, and to have their results respected and obeyed, shall continue forever. If these volunteer citizen soldiers should not have a voice in the civil administration of the Government," (that is, if they are not permitted to vote, although ever so far away from their semeial places of residence) "then, who is worthy of it? "-Message, page 9-10. Exactly so. This is all just and well, as a tribute to out noble soldiers. But the question very naturally suggests itself to a fair, logical mind, how does even such a well-de served commendation affect the question as to the constitutional right of Michigan soldiers to vote in our elections, when they are either out of the State, or away from the town or ward in which they reside? We may go still further and claim, and get it universally ad mitted, that they are very models of patriot ism. These eloquent representations and awards may deeply move our admiration and sympathy, but it will hardly do for us, as legislators, sworn to follow the Constitution, to adopt them, as sufficient reasons ibr passing either of these bills. The generous, manly, senS ties. I feel as though the majority of this Legislature, and perhaps of the people of the State, are, consciously or unconsciously-in some instances the ormer, and in others the lattercallinog on us through these, and other inconsiderate measures, to launch into lawless chaos. Such seems to be t he strong tendency of the majority. I depl ore it. I shudder as I look in to the future, and forecast the consequences which may spr ing from t hese unbidden experiments, and from t he s tate of public feeling in wh ic h they originate. If these proclivities and tendencies are to run on, unchecked and uncontrolled, and a re to work out their n atural a nd ul timat e c onsequences, what have we that we c an l ook upon as secure? A1ready, as this fami ly of measures are pressed upon us, u nder one pretence and another, and ad their adoption becomes more and mor e certain, I seem to feel the very foundations giving way under mv feet. Adherence to First Principles Essen tia l n These Times. Sir, in a day like this, when our country is in a har d life-and-death struggle, in the abyss of civil war; when the whole fabric of our free ihnstitution s is haking from top to bottom under the shock of a vast, and long protracted rebell ion, aime d at it s utt er overthrow; it seems to me that it is no time f or us, here, to break away from safe moorings, or voluntarily destroy well-settled landmarks by our course of leg islation. We should not suffer ourselves to depart from the well-known and well-tried course of safety, unless actually c om pelled to do so, by an overruling n ecessity. We, here, in the loyal States, should, and, if wise, will, hold fas t to all fundamentals, so that what ought not to be shaken, shall rema in. Side Issues Thrown About this Subject by the noIessage, an d Otherwise. But we will draw nearer to the merits of the question in hand. An d her e I fee l c omp e lled to make this further preliminary remark: It not unfrequently happens, Sir, as we all well know, that when a great matter is brought forward for consider ation and decision very specious, but, at the sa me ti me, really foreign questions work themsel ves up before the attention, get c ontrol of it, and divert it from t he ac tual issues in the case, to themselves. In this w ay it is that these false, i rrelevant, but seductiv e q uestions, o ften seem to many minds, to be th e v ery hinge s on which th e whole case turn s: wherea s, they a r e in reality, not i n the case at all, but are wholl y outside of it, are not related to it, and should have nothing, whatever, to do dwith it. And, now, Sir, I feel fully warranted in saying that the case under discussion is one of the mos t c onspicuou s of this class of cases. These foreign, false, ye t extremely meretricious and seductive issues have so crowded themselves into it, about it, and over it, and under it, that the most cautious and discriminating among us are in great danger of mistaking them for the real issue in question. It may, therefore, be quite profitable for us to search out these delusive, side issues, in this case, and brand and cast them out, so that they will deceive no more. What, then, are they? I answer, that one clearly is this: "If these volunteer citizen soldiers should not I 3 for the sake of the argument, just admit, if you please, that these premises are all valid. What then? What has that to do with the language of the Constitution, by which this Legislature is to be governed? The desire of the soldiers to vote may be ever so strong, their politics ever so sound, and the effect of their votingl ever so gratifying, yet all that does not make the wo rding of the Const itution, regarding the same, other than what it is, and must continue to be, until changed in a constitutional way. sacrificing patriotism of our citizen soldiers is one thing; but the powers of this Legislature, under the unmistakable wording of our organic law, is quite another matter. We will honor, reward and rely on the former, in all such ways and degrees as become us to do; but the latter funishes the rule for our legislative action, and, on no consideration, may we depart from it. Again. It is said: "Surely, he who stands faithfully by his country in the shock of battle, may be safely trusted at the ballot box, though it should be carried to hinm at Vicksburg or Chattanooga."-See Message, p. 10. Grant it. Nay, affirm it, and re-aflirm it, and affirm it again, and let every body admit and assert it at home and abroad, from this day forward. But what then? What has any or all of that to do with the w or ding and sense of our State Constituti on? Does it enlarge any of its provisions, or remove any of i t s l imitations? Does it work a n any amendment s to i t, o r a meaning into its w ords, not before there? Or is any settled rule of interpretation thereby done away with, or o thers, new an d unthought of before, originat ed an d established in their stead? Not at all. The s afety of s end ing th e ballo t box to Chatt anooga, t he P otomac, to Texas, the Gulf of Mexico, or Islands of the Sea, i s one thing; bu t the speci al wording of the Constitution by whi ch the a ction of this Le gislature is limit ed, i s another and ve d fery different thing, indeed. And, as clear-headed men, de sirous of clearing this subject of all extraneous matter, we shall be ca reful t o mark these en tire differences, and shut out what is wholly irrelevant. I am well awar e, that some may undertake to claim, in reply, that wha t has been cited thus fr, as false issues, tending to b ia s the mind and d lead it to commit erroneous acts, are only considerations, offered to show the eminent fitness of an enactment by this Legislature, enabling absent soldiers to vote, provided the Constitution will really admit of it. In answer to such a plea, it should seem qu it e sufficient to say, that the remarks reterred to, falling fr om w hom they did, to whom they did, when and where they did, and appealing as they did and continue to do, to feelings already formed, and to sympathies already strong, are actually received, taken up and used by the many, here, and throughout the State, as a kind of preamble, expressing the conclusive reasons for the action recommended, and now sought by the friends of these respective bills. Such is the effect of them under the circumstances: such is the use made of them. They, therefore, practically raise false, seductive, and dangerous issues. But, MR. CHAIRMAN, I have not quite done with this species of reasoning. For it ii stated as a good reason why one or the other of these bills should pass, that the soldiers desire to vote; that they will vote right; and that a big victory, at the ballot box, would do more towards relaxing the rebellion, and saving the Union, than several great victories by our arms. These points were dwelt upon, and emphasized in this Hall the other evening, and they are taken up, repeated, and urged as decisive arguments in favor of? these measures. Now, in the first place, the comparative effect of these two victories here spoken of, is at least but the prediction of an advocate; but Another Side Issue as to Constitu tional Doubts —The Binding Rule as to Such Doubts —Evils of Departing from it. It is claimed by the friends of this measure, that if there is "doubt," as to its Constitutionality, the soldier of right and justice, is entitled to the benefit of it. (Senate Doc. No. 1, p. 10.) This plea is on the tongue of the many, and we meet it at almost every turn. There is evidently an illusion about the words of this plea to which it owes its plausibility and effect. And it seems to arise in this way: In criminal law, a person is deemed innocent until proved to be guilty; and when the accused is on trial, he is entitled to the full benefits of all real doubts in the matter of proof. And the argument now is, that if this is so, in case of everybody accused of crime, much more should it be so, in case of the soldier, when his right to vote is being settled. If the reputed criminal is entitled to the advantages of all the doubts, it is said, that the soldier is much more entitled to them, in this case. NOW, MR. CHAIRMAN, in the first place, it so happens. that the soldier is not on trial, here; but the Constitution of the sovereign State of Michigan, ordained by the people, is on trial, and it is undergoing a hard trial, too, not so much from the want of a perfect case, as from the biases, the moral inability, and foregone conclusions of those sitting upon it. And in the second place, it is not admitted by the friends of the Constitution, that there are any real doubts about this matter. There are sophistries enough thrown about it, it is true, and side issues, illusions and " petty fogs," but no real doubts, so far as I have been able to see. And, in the third place, if the re are doubts about it, and if the maxim referred to has any application here at all, certainly the Constitution, established by the sovereign people, as it was understood when it was adopted, and as it has been understood and acted on, from that day down, is emphatically entitled to the benefit of all of them. If doubts exist, surely, in this time of civil and political upheavals, the old, time-hallowed, well-attested course of safety should have the advantage of them. And, right here Mr. Chairman, let me advert for a moment to a notion, with which honorable gentlemen seem to be so very well satisfied, namely: "This subject," they say, "1 we find to be embarrassed by very formidable doubts, in a constitutional respect. We find ourselves unable to solve them. Men of ability and large learning in the law, may be able to do it. Consequently, the shortest and best way for us to dispose of the matter is to pass the bill, let the law go into effect, and 4 then let the courts settle the question as to its constitutionality." Now, Sir, overlooking, if you please, the absence on the one hand, and presence on the other, of the spirit and qualities, denoted by this somewhat remarkable plea, it is observable 1. That the very nature of our office, as members of this House, makes us not only legislators, but, at the same time judges of the constituitionality of our proposed acts. We stand here in this two-fold capacity. The exercise of the legislative powers of the State is committed to our discretion, subject always to the Constitution. It is presumed that we know what the Constitution contains, and that we will pass no law, unless we are first well satisfed, after faithful examination, that it is agreeable to its intent and meaning. Our official oath is based on this idea. By it, we declare, ander the most solemn sanctions, that we will faithlully discharge the duties of this two-fold oh'ce of a State representative, according to +he best of our ability, and that, in this twofold capacity, we will support the Constitution of this State-that we will faithfully give our time and best thoughts to this very business. Now, tell me, how all this can be done, unless we rot only legislate, if need shall be, but also adjudge the constitutionality of our legislation, and see to it, that it is beneficial on the one hand, and in keeping with the Constitution on the other? There can be no other way. We, then, as legislators, are to act as Judges, in the first instance, of the constitutional validity of our acts. And in dischaiging this part of our duty, we, of course, are to be guided by the same principles as govern the courts in like cases. This is admitted on all hands, and denied by none. But see now what necessarily comes of it: "It is awell-settled principle, that the courts cannot interfere and declare a statute void, unless the invalidity is placed, in their judgment, beyond reasonable doubt." (Adams vs. Howe, 14 Mass., 345. Clark vs. The People, 26 Wend., 599.) The points I make here are these: 1. The courts cannot rightfully or lawfully act against their reasonable doubts. (5 Mich. 251.) 2. This rule is just as applicable to the Legislature as to the court. The Legislature must be governed by the same rules of interpretation as the court, and can no more go against its substantial constitutional doubts than the court can against theirs. Senate Doc. No. 1 holds out the idea, and many seem to have fallen into the dangerous error, that, if a measure is only so embarrassed with constitutional doubts, that the court will not be fully satisfied of its uncoistitutioneality, and ~n that account will not declare it void, it is then all right, as between us, as legislators, on the one hand, and the Constitution on the other, to pass it. Whereas, the rule is this: We, as legislators, must be first satisfied that a statute would be constitutional before we can enact it; while the court must be first satisfied, that it is actually unconstitutional before they will declare it void; and if we, as legislators, have a substantial doubt as to whether an act would be constitutional, we are to pause; while, on the other hand, if the court have a substantial doubt as to the nnconstitutionality of an act, they are to likewise pause. 3. It being admitted by the plea referred to, and otherwise by 1 the members of this body favorable to this measure, that both of these bills are embarrassed with substantial constitutional doubts, it thence follows, that we are firmly bound, fo r that very reason, were there no other, to pause in our attempts to pass either of them, and, in due course, dismiss one, and vote down the other. And, 2. Consider what, surely, must be the consequences of the opposite course. If we are to allow ourselves to pass laws of whose constitutionality we are not satisfied, or of which we entertain substantial doubts in this regard, on the plea that the courts will properly adjuge and dispose of them, then we may bid " a last adieu " to all system and harmony in legislation. Our statute books will soon become a great body of questionable and opposing acts, by which the people and all the branches of Government will be thrown into " confusion worse confounded.." And the courts can afford no relief, because substantial constitutional doubts stand in their way, and they are justifiable. We, all the while, keep on in these ways of anarchy, because we are not to be restrained by constitutional doubts, although never so grave and substantial! Thus the indifference to constitutional landmarks, already too apparent, will intensity and spread, and so far as it shall proe vail, just to that extent we shall have nothing to go by, no common ground to stand on, no common rule to act under, no common standard to judge by. In very truth we should then have neither rule nor standard at all. Reasonable doubts no longer detering us, we should launch our legislation out on the tumultuous and harborless sea of uncertainty, and this old Ship of State, committed to our management, would roll, and pitch, and strain, and sufber fearful damage, if not a total wreck at our hands. Let us then, Mr. Chairman, meet this case as men, as good legislators, investigate and adjudge it with care and candor, respecting and Following our trell-formed convictions, and pausing, as we are most solemnly bound to do, at our reasonable doubts-being duly forewarned, on the highest of all authority, that "he that doubteth, and yet eateth, is surely to be condemned." Another Side Issue --- Party Po licy Re quires that the Responsibility of'This Tlatter be Shifted from the Leglsla ture to the Cours. This mischievous side issue, calls for a remark. It may be stated thus: The soldiers and the people are clamorous for the passage of this measure; their feelings are excited and resolute about it; they cannot be made to understand why it should not be passed; if it be not passed, the dominant party will be held responsible for the failure, and will be very likely to suffer great damage as a party by reason of it; and that, consequently, policy requires the passage of this measure, so as to shift the responsibility of its defeat (if defeated it must be) from the party in power to the courts, under the belief that if it is killed by the court, that party will suffer much less injury than it will, if it is killed by the Legislature. To this plea I reply: 1. That we, as legislators, as we have al 5 ready seen, are bound to act as judges in this matter, in the first instance, and that we can not shirk this duty without committing a breach of trust. 2. The question for us to consider is, not what would promote the interests of this, that, or the other political party, but is this measure agreeable to the Constitution, and does the best good of t he St ate require its passage? We are t o act here fo r the best good of the entire State, and no t exclusively or chiefly for a particular locality, and not at all ifo r the aggrandizement of any political party as s uch. Our official oath knows no party. It recognizes o nly t he State and ational Constitutions, and t he best go od of the entire people of Michiga,n. 3. In the better days of the Republic, it was deemed the dictate of wisdom to place ju dicial offcers abo ve the influ ence s of party politics, or th e fluctuations ot popular feeling. aCosequently the y w ere appointed by the Legislatules for all the courts within their respectiv e States; but in these latter days a change h a s taken place in this respect, and slow thes e judicial office rs are elective of the people. Thus far, however, the sense of sa credness which attaches to the courts, has to a good dearee, shie lded them from the dlebasements, which too often and too strong ly mark t he ele ction of o ther pu blic officers and the administration of their trust. But: Sir, it is painful, that we are not able to say, that all of our c ourts are cle a r and above re proach in this direction. We shou ld not forget that judges and magistrates are human, are subj e ct to the same susceptibilities and weak niaess as oth er men; and that wisdom and safe ty require that they sh oul d n ot be tempted above what they are ab le to bear; nor, on the other haynd, i s it safe to do anything, which sha ll tend to diminish in the common m ind the respect a nd s ense of s acredness felt toward s c ourts of law and justice. But let us pamtse and ask: what do they propose who seek to esca pe r esponsibilit y i n the matter before us, and throw it upon the court? Why, they, in efect, propose, instead oe preserving and strengthening the safeguards about our courts, io turn th e excited and clamorou is feelings of the army and th e populace towards the courts to surg e and beat against them. What would be the natural consequence? Would it not be in substance this: that if the courts should stand firm, and not shape their action by the popular demand, but by a careful adherence to the letter and spirit of the law, they would either be overthrown, or the upright and unflinching judges would be discarded, and others elected in their stead, who would accommodate their official acts to the popular fReling? That, sir, would be an evil day for our State. But this is the very condition of things, which this plea, if ae-ed on, would naturally bring' about, as every candid man must admit, who will trace out its legitimate consequences. HIence, this plea in behalf of this measure is not to be entertained for a moment. It is not only utterly false and irrelevant in principle, but it is especially dangerous in its tendencies. So much, NMr. Chairman, for somle of the many seductive side issues, that have been thrown &round this subject, which I have thought best to clea~r away. , We now come directly to The Mlain Qu-estions at Issue —-=What They Are —-The Controlling Features of these Bllis. 1. The Senate bill No. 3, Sections 1 and 2, provides, that qualified and duly registered voters of this State, shall be permitted to vote by proxy, or by an agent, at every general elec tion, who shall be absent from the township or ward in which they reside, on the day of election, in the military or naval service of this State or the United States. 2. The House bill No. 5 provides, that polls shall be opened for each regiment, or detached portion of each regiment or com pany of Michigan soldiers, when absent from the township or ward in which they reside, ill the military service of this State or of the United States; that suchen polls shall be opened on the same day that is provided for by Title 83, Chap. 6, of the compiled laws; that Com missioners shall be appointed to take the votes of such absentees; that the votes shall be canvassed immediately after the polls shall be closed; that the results shall be certified to by the inspectors unto certain canvassers in the State, and one copy sent by mail to the Secretary of State at Lansing and another handed to one of the Commissioners; and that each elector, voting by virtue of these provisions, shall be considered as voting in the town or ward in which he had a resi dence at the time of his entering the military ser vice. Such are the controlling features of the House bill. In a few words, the Senate bill provides, that absent citizen soldiers may vote by proxy. The House bill, on the other halad, provides for sending the ballot box to these soldiers to receive their votes. These are the two central propositions which I propose to consider. If either of these are upheld, details can be readily adjusted to it; but if each fails, then all falls to the ground. Let me then state these two controlling questions, again, that all may clearly understand just what each one is. 1. Would an act of the Legislature authorizing citizens of the State, who shall be absent from the township or ward in which they reside, in the military service of this State, or of the United States, to vote by proxy, at our public elections, be constitutional? 2. Would an act of the Legislature, requiring polls to be opened on the day of our public elections, among our citizen solders, who shall then ve absent from the township or ward in which they reside, in the military service of this State, or of the United States, be constitutional; and would votes thus given and taken, be valid, and entitled to be counted in the public elections of this State'? MP.. CHAIR~MAN: I am constrained by the convictions of my understanding, and the dictates of my conscience, to answer both of these questions in the negative. And now, please hear me with candor and patience while I explain my reasons. ProvisionRs of the Constitution Agppli cyable to This Subject. It is admitted on all hands, and denied by nobody, that a;ll there is ion the Constitution I i 6 relative to this subject is contained in Sections 1, 2 and 5 of Article 7. All there is in Section 5, which applies to this question is this, namely: "No elector shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence by reason of being employed in the service of the United States or of this State." Sec. 2 provides, that "all votes shall be given by ballot, except for such township officers as may be authorized by law to be otherwise chosen." Sec. 1 reads thus: " In all elections, every white male citizen, every white male inhabitant residing in this State on the 24th day of June, 1835; every white male inhabitant, residing in the State on the first day of January, 1850, who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, pursuant to the laws thereof, six months preceding an election, or who has resided in this State two years and six months, and declared his intention as aforesaid, and evely civilized male inhabitant of Indian descent, a native of the United States, and not a member of any tribe, shall be an elector and entitled to vote; but no citizen or inhabitzLnt shall be an elector or entitied to vote at any election, unless he shall be above the age of twenty-one years, and has resided in the State three forsths, and in the township or ward in which he offers to vote, ten days next prececdiny such election." I denotes the peace, the township or ward within which the citizen may vote. It denotes actual presence, and that the act of voting must be performed wit hin the towns hi p or waid, and not out of it. " In" has here exactly this meaning-in, as distinguished from out. Res iden ce, th en, is restricted to some one township or ward, in the State, and denotes and fixes the location or place within which the citizens may vote. Thus our Constitution makes the place of voting an essential ingredient of the right to vote. It attaches the place of voting to the essential requisites of a voter, "Offers." The etymological sense of this word is here, also, the obvious, practical sense of it. As every scholar well knows, it is of Latin origin, and is compounded of ob, signifying to or before, and ferro, signifying to bear, to bring, to present. Put too-ether, they make the Latin word offerro, which means to bring to, to present to; and the word, offerro, is expressed in English by the word " offer," the primary sense ot which is to'Drcsent for acceptance or rejection; to exhib]it something which may be received or rejected. (See Web. Dic.) This is both the literal and ordinary, practical meaning. "To vote." These words are to be construed in reference to Sec. 2 of Art. 7, which declares that all votes at public elections shall be given by ballot, except for township officers. " To offer to vote," then, at a general election, means to tender a ballot. Who is to do it? The Constitution says, "he," (not some one in his stead, but " he,") the identical elector in person. And riaht here, perhaps as well as anywhere, I may advert to a certain point made in the Message. After quoting the latter member of Sec. 1, the Message says, page 13: " These are fit words to establish the qualifications of voters, but not to control the Legislature as to places where polls of election shall be es tablished and votes offered and received." But what qualifications do these words estab lish? 1. age; 2, residence in the State three months; 3, a residence for the ten days next preceding the election, in the township or ward in which he, the elector, offers to vote. The thought to be pressed here is, that the town ship or ward residence, and the place of voting are one and the same, and in this state of identity, they actually constitute one of the qualifica tions of the voter, " established " by " these fit words " of the Constitution. These words, in prescribing the requisites of the voter, de rive a chief element of their potency from the place of voting; so true is this, that were this element taken away, these words would be emptied of a principal part of their contents. The Message, p. 13, further says that " these words speak directly as to age and residence, and only to these qualifications." Grant it, if you please. But, on the other hand, it can not escape the mind of any one who will be at the pains to analyze the sentence, that the framers of the Constitution were careful to make the place of voting a constztuent part of residence. This is all set forth, in due form, in the predicate of the sentence, so that when the Message claims, that qualifications are only stated here, we may safely grant it, be cause these qualifications incluzde the place of voting. This, then, makes good the saying: Exposition of These Parts of the Con stitution —-Certain Errors in the Tfer sage exposed. Now, keeping distinctly in view the provisions of Sections 2 and 5, what is the true intent and meaning of Section 1, just quoted? What is the real intendment of it, just as it stands, in its connections, whether it be contained in affirmative or negative words, or by what they necessarily imply? For it is the leal intendment that we should seek, because that must govern: just as the Court of Appeals in New York, in Newell vs. The People, 3 Shedd 97, say: Whether we are considering an agreement between parties, a statute or a Constitution, with a view to its interpretation, the thing we are to seek, is the thought which it expresses." Look at the words of this Section. Each one must have some meaning, and no one of them can have but one meaning, where it stands, and it is to be presumed, that that meaning is a sensible one. But what isit? Take the following, for example: ".Has resided," has domiciled, has dwelt, as in a settled and fixed home. But the word "resided" is modified and limited by the words "in the township or ward." Residence is thus restricted to one or the other of these places. And what are these places? They are subdivisions of the territory of Michigan, whose boundaries are marked out, recorded, and de(,lared by public authority. These divisions, districts, or narrow precincts are known in law by the name and style of "townships or wards," as the case may be. They not only limit and restrict the word " resided" in this sentence, but are themselves also limited and restricted by the words "in which he offers to vote." "In whic' " denotes here the identity of " the township or ward," with the place of voting. The word "in" denotes the place at or within which sotiething is said to be or to be done. Here it I 7 votes, and that he, in person, must vote, if at all, in the township or ward where he resides. One proposition involves the other. If for any cause the farmer is not permitted to work, except in his own field, then in his own field must he work, if at all. According to our Constitution, the place of residence and the place of voting are one and the same. Conse quently, an elector having his legal residence in Lansing cannot vote in Corunna, and have his vote certified unto the inspectors of elec tions in Lansing. No: the Constitution re qilires that the elector, in exercising the right of' saiffrage, shall observe the territorial subdi visions of the State, established by public au thority, and recognized in that insrument, as election districts. His residence determines what district, that is, what township or ward he must be in, personally, when he performs the act of voting. What can be more conclusive? Other Principal Reasons for this Ex position. Now, Mr. Chairman, I submit, with all sincerity and confidence, t hat the exposition I have Wiven, fairly states the intent and mean ing of the Constitution in relation to the matter now before us. And some of the pri ncipal reasons tor this opinion beyond those already suggested in the exposition itself; are briefly these: 1. This eaposition adds no ne w wo rd to the text, and takes none from it, while it gpivs to the whole Sectiton, just rqs ir stands, and to ever y word ofM it, an obvious, consistent and practicable meaning. And although some of the friends of this measure claim that the effect of this Section is not such, in some respects, as I have stated it to be, yet I am sure, that what I have just said as to what this exposition does, and does not do, is so manifestly true, that all will admit it at once. All will admit, whether they adopt my exposition or not, that it gives to the Section an obvious, consistent and practicable meaning —just such an one as the people have received, acted on, and carried out, for a long course of years; so that particular illustrations to show that this exposition does exactly what I claim for it, under this head, are wholly needless. No one, furthermore, will think of doubting that it is essential to a. just exposition of this Section, or any other, that it should do, and not do, just what I claim for this. For all will admit that Chief Justice Tindel, in 2 Scott, N. C., p. 521, well says: " It is the duty of all courts to confine themselves to the words of the Legislature, nothing adding thereto and nothing diminishing;'} also, Ernesti, p. 7: " Every word must have some meaning; " also, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, 7 Cush., p. 53, 89: " In putting a construction upon any statute, it shall be so expounded, if practicable, as to give some ef feet to every part of it; " and, likewise, Chief Justice Parker, 15 Mass., p. 205:'"It" (the law) "6 is to be construed sensibly, and with a view to the ooject aimed at by the Legislature." Now the point I make here is this, that the exposition I have given commends itself to us, for the reason, among others, that it adheres to the prin ciples thus expressed by these different authorities, and because, also. an adheren~ce to tham necessitates it;. 2. Another reason in favor of the exposi i' Th e w ise shall be taken in their own crafti ness." The Message sees fit to try to avoid the plain import of this Section by h old ing out (p. 13) that no greater scope c an be given to this part of it than that "the elector must have r esided in some particular township or ward ten days next preceding the election at which he offers to vote." Now, it is har d ly n ecessary to remind fair m ind ed m en, that the Constitution does not read i n this w ay by any meanos, and that it con veys no such idea as the one here expressed. It does not say: " the election at which," &c.. b ut it says: "q in the township or ward in which he offers tovote. Place of e voting, as w e shall pres entl see, is thus made an ele men t of s uffrage in ou r Constitution to better identify the voter, tes t his qualifications, and thus preserve the pu rity of e le ctions. T he n atural esense, th erefore, to be put on t he exp ression, I in th e township or ward in which he offers to vote, i s, in the township or ward in this State, in which he, the elector in person, is to p resent his ballot to th e proper officer to be received or reject ed by h im, as the law, and t he facts in his c ase shall require. The s itherto Universally Receive d Exposit ion Summed Up. Wherefo re, I submit, that the total eff e ct of Sec. 1 is to determine, definitely, 1. Who, of the inhabitants of the State, shall be entitled to vote, at our public elections. On this point alle are agreed. 2. That the elector must vote in person, if a t all. This follows: 1, from the very na ture of the process of offering to vote by ballot; 2, from the principle of common law, requi ring elector stoo vote, personally, at public elections, or forego the privilege; 3, from the fact that the affirmative words of the Sec. confer on t he citiz e n the right to vote, and from the furt her fact, that the C onstitution no where bes tows on him the right of voting by another; and, 4, from the fact, that the exercise of this right requires the exercise of integrity and discretion, and consequently cannot be deligated without special Constitutional authority. 3. Another and last effect of this Section is to determine the place in which each elector must appear in person and vote personally, if at all, namely: in the township or ward in which he has his legal residence. The place of voting is thus definitely determined by what the words of the Sec. point to, assume, presuppose, appropriate and necessarily imply; and for that reason, by what must of necessity enter into their very essence and meaning. As this is the material point in this controversy, let me dwell on it tor a moment, although I may but reaffirm what I have already suggested. The Constitution, then, requires that the citizen shall have a home, a domicil, a settled abode, a legal residence in some township or ward, in this State. at the time of a public election in order to be entitled to vote thereat; and that, having such residencc, he must carry his ballot to the polls, opened in the township or ward where his residence is, and there personally tender his vote, or not vote at all. The controlling idea here is, that the elector must reside in the township or ward, where he i I I 8 tion stated is this, namely: That it is ar- thought that it prescribes the place of voting rived at by giving the words of the Sec- just as imperatively asit does age, residence, tion their natural import in the order in or any other condition of voting. which they are placed. In other words, it But the question naturally arises here, is it results not only from the best of learning and proper in ascertaining the meaning of the reasoning applicable to the subject, but also Constitution, or a statute, to take the words from taking the words of the Section in their of the law in their natural and ordinary imordinary signification and in their actual and port, in the order in which tbey are placed? proper grammatical arrangement-just as or- Is this a sound rule of interpretation? We andinar), sensible, and fair-minded men have al- swer yes, because ways received and understood them. Let me 1. The Constitution is the act of the people. illustrate: The Section says, in plain words, It was ordained by them for the government that "every white male citizen," of certain of all with its jurisdiction. It is in the lanqualifications therein specified, " shall be an guage of the people-such as ordinary sensielector and entitled to vote," but the ri-qht of ble men use and are familiar with in active, substitution is not granted. Now, then, the nat- practical life. It is not full of subtleties, or ural import of these words is, that this is a embodied in dark words, which mean one personal right, a personal privilege or franchise thing to an ordinary man of common sense, -.a right, privilege, or franchise which is per- and a very different thing to a few who have sonial with the elector, and is to be enjoyed been initiated into the mysteries. It is in and exercised by him, personally, if at all. He, plain words, such as ordinary people of comhimself, in person, is to do his own voting, or it mon sense can understand. And what a monsis not to be done, at all. This, Sir, is exactly trous absurdity it would be were it otherwise I the impression naturally produced on the mind -absurd in the last degree, to enact laws of every body of common sense by an atten- by which the people are to regulate their contive reading of this Section. This is the im- duct, which they are to observe, obey and pression which has always been produced by carry out, or expose themselves to the loss of it, and always will be. So, too, where the property, to fines and imprisonment, and yet, Constitution says the Executive power of the on the other hand, embody them in such dark Government of the State shall be vested in a and mysterious words, that the people cannot Governor, the natural import of the language tell what they mean! Why, were this indeed is, that this is a personal trust, which the Gov- so, the laws of the land might about as well be ernor is to discharge himsef, personally, and in Greek or Chaldee, as far as the people are not byproxy. What can be plainer? concerned. But, Sir, this is not so. Far fiom Again. Take these words of this Section: it. And yet it is not to be disguised, that " No citizen shall be an elector or entitled to there is a great error in the popular feeling vote at any election, unless he shall be above with regard to this very matter. The many the age of twenty-one years, and has resided seem to have a feeling, that Constitutions and in the State three months, and in the township statutes are but little else than a body of enigor ward, in which he ofifers to vote, ten days mas, whose hidden meaning can be divined next preceding such election." only by the initiated few. As a natural result Now is not the natural import of these of this, when they take up a law-book, it does words this: 1. That the elector to be entitled not seem to occur to them, that it is to be to vote, must have lived in the State, township read and understood in the same way, substanor ward, the time named; 2, that he must be, tially, as ahistory, or as a treatise on morals at least twenty-one years old; 3, that he must science, the useful arts, or any other producireside in the township or ward in which he tion, in human language, that is, by the exervotes; and, 4, that he must vote in person, in cise of "good faith and common sense," (by the township or ward, in which he resides, if far the most important requisites for a sound he votes at all? Moreover, does not cvery un- interpreter) but they, at once, lay these qualipreiudiced man of common sense naturally re- fications aside, or suspend their action, as bc ceive the impression on reading these words ing now out of place, and with intellects thus of this Section, that they peremptorily pre- neutralized, they begin to stare, vacantly at scribe the place where the elector shall vote, if the mazes before them, and grope for hidden at all, namely, in the township or ward in meanings. Whereas, law is the product of which he resides, just as clearly as they do his common sense, it is in language of common ae and time of residence? Can anything be sense, and is to be read and understood in a nore certain? Whv, you say to George, common sense way, according to its natural Janies and John: "you may go a skating this and ordinary import, except in case of special aftetrnoon, but neither of you shall skate, ex- definitions, which of course are to be regarded. cept on the mill-pond." Now then, what is There may be, also, an apparent exception to the natural import of your words, as to the this rule, in case of technicalities, but there is place wnere these lads are to skate, if they none in principle, because even technicalities skate at all? Can there be any manner of are to be taken in the ordinary sense in which doubt about it? Ii your words are taken in they are used, as such. their ordinary significauion-taken just as sens- Thus it appears that the rule which requires ible men think, speak and write, and just in that the words of the Constitution be taken the sense which you intend to express by in their natural and ordinary signification in them whiat possible room can there be to a the order in which they are placed, if we would fair mind to doubt that the lads are to skate ascertain their true intent and meaning, is on the mill-pond, and not elsewhere, if at all? founded on the solid basis of common sense. Just so in relation to the language of this Seec- But this is not all. That this rule of interpretion. Taken in ics obvious and ordinary sig- tation is as good in law, as in reason, is shown, nihcation, the clear unsophisticated mind, 2. By the opinions of the courts, and of the naturally, nay necessarily, receives from it the most approved elementary law writers. Kent, 9 Vol. I., p. 521, says: "The words of a stat- ute, if in common use, are to be taken in their natural, plain, obvious and ordinary signification and import." Blackstone lays it down, as his first rule of interpretation, that "Words are generally to be understood in their usual and most known signification; not so much regarding the propriety of grammar, as their general and popular use." (Vol. I., p. 59.) The Supreme Court of New York, by Judge, Bronson, 20, Wend. 555, &3, say: "The carrent of authority at the present day is in favor of reading statutes according to the natural and most obvious imporb of the language, without resorting to subtle and forced con- structions for the purpose of either limiting or extending their operations." I might quote other authorities in abundance. But these will suffclee to show how they stand. Now then, the exposition I have stated, bein_ arrived at by giving the words of the Sec- tion their natural and ordinary import, in the order in which they are placed, as we have fully shown, and this method of iinterpreta- tion being supported by such an array of rea- son and authority, we have, in all this, for the purposes of this argument, a very clincher. 3. rhat the m ikers of the Constitution es eciatll intended by the wards of said section -, relative to the place of voting, to defiaitely establish the place in which each elector shall appear in person and personally cast his vote, if he vote at all, namely, in the township or ward in which he resides, is demonlsrrated, not only by the natural and ordinary import of the words themselves, but also by the prticular considerations which led to their begis engrafted, as an ameindment, into th' Constituation of 1835 and also to their being carried into the Constitutio,n nowinjforce. These considerations show the evil felt and the speciflc renmedy which the authors of the Constitution most deliberately intended to create and apply by requiring each elector to vote, if at all, in the place and manner thus fixed ond limited. The facts in this matter are, in substance, these: In the Constitution of 1835, it was provided that no citizen or individual should be entitled to vote except in the district, county or township in which he resided at the time of election. A difference in opinion as to the effect of this provision arose among the inspectors of elections in different parts of the State. Many boards held that, under this provision, anelector was entitled to vote for State officers and Congressmen anywhere in his election district; for county officers anywhere in his county, but for town officers he must vote in his township, or, if polls should not be opened in his township, he might vote anywhere in his county. From these different rulings, in different localities, much confusion and dissatisfaction resulted. But the worst thing of all about it was, that it opened the door to much illegal voting, and in this way: Unscrupulous electors were accustomed to go from one town to another in their election district, on the day of election, and vote in each one. By this meins great frauds were committed and the elections were not a little corrupted. The evil became serious. Good citizens throughout the State felt that it should and must be stopped. But how-"that was the rub." At length they hit on this expedient. namely: to narrow down the territory or district within which an elec- X tor might vote to the smalle st practicable limits; to make it a n essential qualification of suffrage that the elector should reside and vote in one a nd the same distrect; to thus bring the polls, as near as conveniently may be, to the settled abode of each citizen so that his rights as a voter would be personally known to the inspectors and to his neighbors about the polls and consequently might be readily and satis factorily tested They judged that the safe guards to be thus afforded would be a good remedy for these much felt evils. Conse quently the Leg,,islature of 1838 proposed " that so much of the Constitution as prescribes the place in which an elector may vote and which is in these words, to-wit: " district, county or township," be abolished, and that the words "township or ward" be substituted in their place," thus making the sentence, if amended as proposed, read thus: " No citizen or inbab itant shall be entitled to vote except in the township or ward in which he shall reside at the time of election." This proposed amend ment was agreed to by the Legislature of 1839, and was submitted to and ratified by the peo ple in the same year. This provision remained in this form till 1850, when the Constitution was revised and the qualifications of electors and the requirement as to the place of voting were cast in the form in which we find them in Section 1, already quoted. By this change the qualifcations of electors were stated more guardidly, but the thought and requirement as to the place of voting remained the same. That is, in either case it was to be performed by the elector, if at all, in the township or ward in which he resided. That the people understood the words of the Constitution of 1835, above referred to as pre scribing the place of voting, and that they intended to prescribe the place of voting by the amendment of 1839, is shown not only by the general history of the amendment, which discloses that such was the object of it, but also by specific words made use of in the very proposition to amend. The proposition says: " So much of the Constitution as3prescribes the place in which electors may vote." What can be more decisive? That the people also intended to prescribe the place of voting by the words of said Section 1 of the Constitution of 1850, is clearly proved by this, as well as by many other irrefutable arguments, namely: 1. The thought and requirement of the amendment of 1839, were carried into the Constitution of 1850 and that too by the very people, for the most part, who effected the amendment of 1839; and 2, The people, and all the authorities, have pursued the same course, exacz,. under the Constitution of 1850 as to the:'ce and manner of voting as they did unuer the amendment of 1839. In this respect there was, and has been, no manner of change. Now, as then, and then, as now, each elector was required to appear in person at the polls in the township or ward in which he resided, and personally cast his vote or not vote at all. Such, Sir, was the specific remedy incorpora. ted into the Constitution against illegal voting And the precise thought which I wish right here to press on the minds of the members of the committee is this, that in this very remedy we clearly see the spirit and object of these particular words of the Constitution prescribing the place of votinlg-w hat led to their i i 10 insertion-what they were designed to effect and what is their true intent and meanhi tg. And in this mode of reasoning I am sustaine d by high authority. Blackstone (vol. I p. 61) says: " The most universal and effectual way of discovering the true meaning of a law, when the words are dubious, is by considering the reason and spirit of it, or the cause which moved the legislator to enact it." To the same effect, Vattel says, in his essay on the rules of construction, that "the ieason of a law or of a treaty-that is to say, of the motive which led to the makine of it and the object in contemplation at the time-is the most certain clue to lead us to the discovery of its true meaning." Kent, vol. 1 p. 521 says: "When the words are not explicit, the intention is to be collected from the context, from the occasion and necessity of the law, from the mischief felt and the object and remedy in view." Puffendorf says: "Butthatwhich helps us most in the discovery of the true meaning of the law is, the reason of it, or the cause which moved the Ifegislature to enact it." The United States iiSupreme Court, by Marshall, Chief Justice, lay down the sam e doctrine in 9 Wheat. p 189. And finally the Supreme Court of this State, in Streeter vs. Paton, 7 of Mich. p. 141, lay down the same principle in these explicit terms: "Our present Constitution was not the formation of a new government, but the continuation of a government formed under a previous Constitution, whose supposed or real defects it was intended to correct; and,in construing it, we are bound to look to the distribution of' judicial power under the old Constitution, and to discover if we can the evil, if any, arising from that distribution and intended to be corrected by the new Constitution." Thus the principle of construction contended for here is clearly and authoritatively settled. Wherefore, when the words of the Constitution, relative to the place of voting, are viewed in the light of a remedy, just as the facts show that they should be: when the causes which led to their introduction into the Constitution are inquired into; when the object aimed at by their use is more fully explained by reference to the well-known facts of history, then the conviction becomes irr esistable, that their true intent and meaning is, that each elector shall vote, personally, if at all, in the township or ward in which he resides and not by proxy, or in any other place. Hlere, then, is another clincher in favor of the exposition I have offered. 4. Another consideration of special importance, in favor of the exposition I have given, is, That it is sustained by the uniform practice, custom, or usage of the citizeniss and authorities of the State for nearly a quarter of a century-that is, f? om the origin of the State government. The well settled doctrine is laid down in Kent, vol. I., p. 524, that "where the penningi i of a statute is dubious, long usage is a just medium to expound it by." The rule is this, that "long usage" may b resorted to, in or - der to explaii a law or written instrument but t not to defeat it. What then has been the usage or practicet touching this question? When did it begin? t Was the begminning at or about the time the I Constitution was adopted? With whom did a it originate? IDid the men, with whom it | originated, live at, or about the time that instrume-nt was made and went into operation? I-lad they fit opportunities for kno i" the circumstances, under which it was f7amd, submitted, and ratified? And what was the true intent,.ind m-aa-nidg of the members of'the Convention, who drfted it, and of the people, who adopted it? And has the practice I)een uniform, and as extensive as the jurisdiction of the CoDstitution? Sir, I. e these as rp-co'Il,Zl mateiial inquiries in'his and they are answerable, affirmatively, and in a few words. As we have already seen, the citizens of this State of all classes, understood that the words of the amendment of 1839, just spoken of" imperatively required each elector to vote perso?zally, or not at all, in the township or ward in which he resided, and that they were introduced into the Constitution for that very reason. And from the time that amendment took effect all -voting at State and local elections, procee,ded on that idea. The present Con'stitution was framed and adopted in 1850, by the Came citizens, substantially, as effected the amendment of'1839. The same idea expressed in the amendment relative to the place of voting, was carried into the new Constitution, but in the words already quoted, namely: 11 No citizen or inhabitant shall be an elector or entitled to vote, at any election, unless he has resided in the State three months and in the to vvnship or ward in which he offers his vote ten days next preceding such election." Now mark this: The members of the Conve-ation who drafted this provision and the people who adopted it, Understood at the time, and especially intended, that its natural and necessary effect should be to prescribe and fix the place of voting, and require every elector, the same as the amendment f 1839, to appear in person at the polls, in the township or ward in which he resides, in order to vo and there vote personally, or not at all. tul t how do we know all this? Because, 1. Such is the natural and ordinary import of these words, as we have clearly seen. 2. The greater part of them are still livin,,, and they assure us that such was their earnest intentio-n. Some ol'them, standing high on account of character, intelligence and legal ability, who were also members of the constitutional convention, have assured me that such, certainly. was their understanding and intention. 3. Tfie' very- members of that convention, and the people who adopted the Constitution, of course knew, exactly, what they meant, and they,aid what they meant and meant what they said; these all, with one accord, and without question, acted on this idea from the start, and from that time down, the same idea has prevailed, and all voting at State and local elections has been done from year to year in exact confori-nity with it fbr nearly fifteen years, under this Constitution, and nearly twenty-five since the amendment of the old one. Now sir, what do we see in all this, which touches our present purpose?. See, Sir? Why, we see the men who framed the amend 11 party, of every description of business, and of every kind and degree of intelligence, all coming up, in every part of the State, at a fixed time, from year to year, in unbroken succession, for nearly a qu-arter of a century, and unanimously illustrate, declare and confirm by what they do, that the true intent and meaning of the words of said Section 1, relative to the place of voting, is that each elector, in order to vote at all, shall appear in person at the polls, in the township or ward in which he resides, and there personally tender his voteto the proper officer. Sir, in view of a practical exposition such as this, where the precedent is commensurate with the adoption of the Constitution, and ac quiesced in, and acted upon since that time by an unbroken chain of practice, we may say as the Supieme Court of the United States said, in I Cranch 299: "'It has, indeed, fixed the construction. It is a contemporary interpretation of the most forcible nature. This practical exposition is too strong and obstinate to be shaken or controlled." Again, by the same Court, 5 Cranch 22, M'Keen v. D elancy's Lessee, a case arising under the act of Pennsylvania, of 1715, which required deeds to be acknowledged before a Justice of the Peace in the county where the land lay. It had been the contemporaneous and uniform practice from 1715 to the date o - the deed (1 775) to acknowledge deeds before a Justice ofthe Supreme Court, although the act of 1715 did not authorize such a practice. The Court held, "as that practice had prevailed for so long a period, it must be considered a correct exposition of the statute, or good evidence of such construction by the judicial tribunals of Pennsylvania." In Packard v. Richardson, 17 Mass. 121,143. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts say: " A contemporaneous is generally the best construction of a statute. It gives the sense of a community of the terms made use bi by a Legislature. If thete is ambiguity in the language, the understanding and application of it, when the statute first comes into operation, sanctioned by long acquiescence on the part of the legislative and judicial tribunals, is the strongest evidence that it has been rightly explained in practice. A construction under such circumstances becomes established law." And now, Sir, if it be possible, that any doubt can remain in the mind of any member of the committee, it will be effectually removed by the words of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court of New Hampshire, uttered in reference to a measure like the one now before us. Their words are these: "The langue of the Constitutioiz is to be understood in e the sense in which it was used at the time of its adoption." Am. Law Reg. for Oct., 1863. In what sense the ]anguage of Section 1, in question, was used at the time the Constitution of this State was adopted, is a matter of proof; and that proof we have from thousands of living witnesses, and in an unbroken chain of historical facts, as I have before shown, and shall still further show. Now, Sir, on the principles established by these decisions it follows, unavoidably, that the living testimony, and the long practice of which I have spoken, relative to the prescribed place of voting, also, as to the personal presence of the elector at the polls, his voting there, personally, and, especially, as this practice originated in the sense given to the words of the Constitution before and at the time the in strument was adopted, and has been universally acquiesced id and partaken of by the people and by the officers of the Government, in all of its departments-I repeat, that according to these decisions, this practice is now to be accepte bby us, and by a ll concerned, as t he correct exposition of said Section 1, and i s to be treated as ta ntamount to such a con struction by the Supreme Court of this State. So, Sir, we have here, in this lono and universal usage, thus enforced by thousands of living witnesses, another clincher in favor of the exposition I have given, so strong that no one can break it, or escape from it. 5. Another consideration in favor of this exposition is derived from Legislative acts passed at the time, or very soon after the adoption of the Constitution. In the case, The People vs. Green, 2 Wendell 274, it was held, that in the construction of a statute, great deference is certainly due to a legislative exposition of a constitutional provision, especially when it was made almost contemporaneously with constitutional provision, and may be supposed to result from the same views of policy and mode of reasoning, which prevailed among the framers of the instrument expounded, Now for the application of the rule. Our present Constitution was submitted to the people and approved in November, 1850. The Legisla-ture met shortly thereafter. At its first session, after the adoption of the Constitution, our general election law was passed. It was approved in June, 1851. iSo the act was passed almost contemporaneously with the adoption of the Constitution. Now it is but reasonable to suppose, that if the authors of that instrument, or the people who adopted it entertained any such notion, as to the effect of Section 1, Art. 7, in relation to elections, as are now advanced by the friends of either of the bills before us, the members of that first Legislature would have possessed it, also, and that it would have been embodied by them in the general election law; or, at all events, that they would have given expression to it, in some form or other. Is it conceivable that it could have been otherwise? No, sir. Well did they, in way, directly or indirectly indicate any such notion? Not by any means. But on the contrary, they did most distinctly indicate the same views, as to the effect of Sec. 1, that are expressed in the exposition I have stated. For, our general election law which they passed, provides that a general election shall be held in the several townships and wards of the State, on Tuesday succeeding the first Monday of November, 1852, and on the same day every second year thereafter. It also provides, that the polls shall be opened at 8 o'clock in the forenoon of that day, and close at 5 o'clock P. M., and that the canvass of the votes shall take place immediately thereafter, and the result declared These provisions remain to this day unaltered. And you will please observe, that the same idea is expressed hsere as to the prescribed place of voting, that is contained in the Constitution. You will note this too, that the business of voting, counting the votes, and declaring the result, is all to 12 S8. Two or thlee acts of the Legislature of the kind named, of recent date, allowing citi zens to keep on doing lawful things, just as they had been doing them, cannot be said to form a legislative precedent for a new order of things, affecting constitutional powers, and I the purity of elections. A legislative prece dent to come within the rule isnot made quite so quick or quite so easily. In order to con stitute acts of the Legislature such a practical exposition of the Constitution, as is entitled to much weight, they must have been passed at or about the time the Constitution was adopted, and acquiesced in, and acted under, by the people and all the departmeqnts of the government since that time. Why, Sir, just look at it. If threc or tour acts of the Legislature of recent date, and without regard to the ac quiescence of the people and of the other de partments of govelsument, and their action on them, are to be held as evidence of what the s Constitution is, then the Legislature has only to pass a few successive erroneous acts in or der to remove all constitutional restrictions on itself whatever, and, in fact, do away with the Constitution entirely. 4. As we have already intimated, these acts are of recent date. The constitutionality of no one of them has yet been passed upon by the Court. This lact, in connection with preceding considerations, shows, that they do not approach anywhere near to a precedent of suc h attribute s, as the rule contemplates, a l nd are, therefore, entitledto no mannder ofweight, in the settlement of the question in hand. And in this state of utter weakiness for such a use, we leave them. 6. Another consideration of great moment in lavor of the hitherto universally received exposition of this provision of the Constitu tion is, that it agrees with the sense put on it by the mem,bers of the legal profession, who lived in the State at the time the Constitution was adopted and, also, by those who came here, or entered the profession soon thereajter-which sense the projession have con tie,tued to put upon it, and which they put upon it now, irrebpective of party, with perhaps a few seeming exceptions of very recect origin. Lord Coke says: "(Great regard ought, in construing a statute, to be paid to the con struction, which the sages of the law, who lived about the time, or soon thereafter, put upon it, because they were'test able to judge of the intention of the makers at the time, when the law was made.' Such being the rule, what now are the facts? The Constitution of this State was adopted but a little over thirteen years ago. The greater part of the lawyers who lived in the State, then, live here now. And what is more, nearly every leading member of the profession in the State, to-day, was in the profession here at that time. I know several lawyers of distinction, who were members of the convention which framed the Constitu tion. I have conversed with them, on this very matter. They say, emphatically, that the meaning, which they and their contem porary brethren put on this part of that in strument, was exactly the same as the one stated in the exposition 1 have offered, I have talked with other lawyers of standing, both Democrats and Republicans, not of that con vention, but who were here when the Con b e d ispatched in a day, if practicable, and in tw o at most. Th ere is to be no waiting for v otes to com e in fr om abroad, no provisions for prox y vo ting, none for sending the ballotbox awa y to receive t he votes of students, sailors, soldiers, foreign rMinisters, or other absentees. No, sir, there i s nothin of the k ind, although Sec. 5, Art r, of the Constitution, h ad j us t been adopted, providing that these classes of citizens shall neither gain or lose a residence by being away. No, sir, there is nothing in t he proceedings of that Legislature, or any subsequent ored, till the pres e nt, which has the slightest loolk towards the possibil ity of such a thing. Every thing shows that the thought was not then conceived by the wildest dr eamer. But on the other hand th e exactly opposite idea, viz: t hat each elector, in ord er to enjoy th e elective franchis e mu st app ea r in person, in the township or ward in w hich h e r esides, and there vote personally-this idea pervades the elec tion laws, an d is inco rpora ted i nt o th eir life and substanc e. The result then, to which we are th us conducted, is this, 1st, th at we have in this particular view of the case, a p ractical, contemporanceus,an d continuousexs ousition by the L egislature wh ich ag ree s exactly, with the one that the opponentsof these bills approve of; and 2d, that the Supreme Court of the united States, in McCulluck vs the State of Mary, land, 4 Wh eat. 316 by Mar shall, Chief Ju stice, uttered good sens e as w ell as good law, when it said: of An exposition of the Constitution deliberately establish ed by legislative acts, oug ht not to be lightly disregarded." I am not unmindful of the if a ct, sir, that the advocates of this soldiers' voting project, claim that we have in this State legislative recedeants for i t. It is stated in Senate Doc. o. 1, and in t he report of the Honorable m em ber fr om Lapeer, Mr. neminway, that th e Leg islat ure oo this State has, in many cases, under the present Constitution, authorized citizens to hold elections outside of the limits of the township in which they reside. In th e report ofMr. Heminway, it is said, that this was done in 1861, in case of Ann Arbor, Pontiac and Coldwater; of Lansing and Saginaw in 1859; and of P ort Huron in 1857-the citizens of each of these towns, being empowered to v ote, in a city of the same name, locat ed within its original limits. It s eem s q uite suffi cient, in reply to this argument, to say: 1. That it is admitted, that each of these cities is located in the original boundaries of the township of the same name, and that the citizens of the township hold their elections just where they did before the city was established. Now then, how does the case stand? Exactly thus: for certain local purposes, a lhe is run round a few acres, more or less; but elections are to be held just where they were before the line was run, or the city incorporated. So far as elections are concerned, the city is put into the township, and not the township into the city. 2. In some of the cases spoken of, and I do not know but in all, the cities were incorported, subject to the right ofrthe people of the township to hold elections thereinl, the same as befbre. So, for the purposes of elections, the township stands in all respects, just as it would had no city been located within its limits. 13 stitution was adopted. These all say that such is the meaning which they and their brethren put upon it. I have talked with good lawyers, who have come to the State, or entered the profession, since the adoption of the Constitution, who have given attention to this subject; they say that their view of it is the same. If I am not mistaken, and I believe I am not, I have conversed with every lawyer of this house, but one, on this point, and I feel confident that all of them actually take the same view that 1 maintain, except one, who says he is not sure, that he has doubts about it. All of the Judiciary Committee take this view, save one, "the doubter." The chairman of the committee of elections, the Hon. T. G. Smith, submitted a report to us last winter against the constitutionality of thisverv p roject, by w h ich he did himself c red it as a m an and as lawyer. And I will venture the remark here, that if any lawy er of ieaey ied a this house, save my friend'the doubter," v otes for either of these b ills, it will be beca use his sympathetic impulses carry him beyond the limits of h is judgment, or ifom par tisan c onsiderations. All of them, save the doubter, evi nce a conviction, that th is project is uncons titutional. And is it cIeditable, n ay is it possible, nay is it not a libel on human naa t ure to suppose that any of e i them, with the tanctities of his offici al oath on his conscience, w ill hesitate to act on his convictions?-that any one of t hem will e ar, (i ke the il a le th believing pa rents, whose blind son had be en made to s ee) t o take sides on a question of this importance, and vindicate his belief, lest he mayp in the happenings of the future, se em to be lacking in par ty fid elity, and on that account, erhaps, be turned out of the party synagogue Sir, let me say to such an one, if such an one th ere be: 1, Tha t the man, wh o is untrue to his convictions, mus t lose his own self-respec t, and he that so acts a s to lose his own self-respect, is very likely to lose, by the same act, t he respect o f others; and, 2, that the dang er to him in this matt er lies on the side of following party end s, or yielding to party learns. ber Sir, let him be assured, betimes, that however much certain political aspirants may strive to make this a party question, t hey c annot succeed in th e attem pt. T hey may get up a little stir here, perhaps, in that direct ion, and th e vote on it, wh en taken, may be divided by party lines with a few exceptions; but these lines will not run far or long, outside of this House. The sober second thought will destroy them. Men of intelligence and weight of all parties, all over the State, will disapprove of this project, as cont ra ry to the Constitution. A nd inste ad of being brought in to the support of it as individuals, or as a party, they will scout it in both capacities. So the man is in much greater danger of being marked and eschewed, who goes for it, or tries to induce others to go for it, or to make it a party measure, than the man who stands up square and true to his convictions, and manfully opposes it. Let him that is in danger take warning. But, Mr. Chairman, I have not quite done with the members of' the legal profession, who lived here contemnporaucously with the adoption of the Constitution, and from that time to this. I have said, that they embrace the most conspicuous andi influential lawyers of BLAlR vs. BLA IRl. It seems that a while previous to the meeting of this Legislature last winter, Mr. Blair had occasicn to express his views deliberately, as to the constitutionality and expediency of this same project with regard to soldiers voting, when away from their place of residence; and in doing so, he made use of these words, namely: " The Legislature cannot authorize a citizen to vote in any place, except in the township or ward where he resides." ie continued: "The language of Art. 7, Sec. 1, is as follows:' But no citizen or inhabitant shall be an elector or entitled tovote at any election, unless he shall be above the age of twenty-one years, and has resided in this State three months, and in the township or ward in which he offers to vote, ten days next preceding such election,"' After making this quotation, h e a dded: " X think thi s is decisive." Suchwas the deliberate opinion of Mr. Blair, deliberately stated, as to the constitutionality of this measure but a short time before the meeting of this Legislature last winter. What he then stated as to the expediency of it, we shall take due notice of in its proper place. But, Sir, it should seem from appearances that Mr. Blair has changed his mind. He then said that " the Legislature cannot authorize a citizen to vote in any place except in the township or ward where he resides;" and he adduced the words of the Constitution, Article, Sectio-n, and clause, to support what he said. But he now advances a directly contrary opinion, and brings forward certain novel theories of construction to back it —not the plain words of the Constitution, taken in their natural and ordinary import, but rather certain hitherto unknown theories of construction. Now, Sir, both of these antagonistical opinions cannot be correct. If a judge gives two directly opposite opinions on exactly the same set of facts, and under the same law, both cannot be good. In one or the other, he must be either mistaken or dishonest. If a witness testifies to one set of facts, at one hearing of a case, and then to a directly opposite set of Acts, at another hearing of the very same case, both of his statements, of course, cannot be true; and not only so. you will of necessity be led to query whether he, at bottom, has any truth in him at all-whether he really has either moral or mental integrity in his head or heart. But, Mr. Chairman, let me here make this inquiry: Are we to infer from these surprising disclosures that Mr. Blair is so sadly lacking in the State. And so they do. And, Sir, without raising any invidious comparisons, I could :not but seem to myself, as lacking in fidelity to the occasion, should I omit to speak of one of the most eminent among them by name. He has been for several years prominently before the people, who have reposed in him great public trusts, and duly appreciated his services in the discharge of them. Ilir, name is a favorite one with- the majority of this Ho-use, and, 1-n truth, is at present one of the talismanic names of the dominant party in the State. I have, Sir, the bodor to refer here to the name of AUSTIN BLAIR, OF JACIKSON, Michigan. And now "who bath ears to hear let him hear" 14 mental integrity as this would indicate. leaving moral integrity out of the question; that he is not true to his convictions; that his mind is not true to itself; that it is so made up, as not to be able to clearly see and duly appreciate the force of fundamental principles, or adhere to them against temptations from without, or the strivings of personal ambition from within? Or are we to infer that Mr. Blair has two opinions as to the constitutionality of this measure, one being his opinion as a lawyer, and the other his opinion as a politician, scheming for future promotion, and that he now advances one and now the other, as shall best serve his purpose? We daily recognize the fact that a man may and should change his mind, when there is a good reason for it. We recognize the fact, too, that he may differ from himself at difierent times. We also, on the other hand, recognize the fact that principles do not change; and that this provision of the Constitution is now just what it was when Mr. Blair pronounced it to be decisive against a measure like the one under consideration. We also recognize the further fact, that men sometimes have strong motives for changing their opinions, when they have no good reason for it; and in such cases they may assign for reasons what have the form thereof, but not the power. How good Mr. Blair's reasons are for his new opinion, we have seen a little already, and shall see more fully a little further on. In the meantime, Mr. Chairman, I must confess that I am reminded here of the habits of a certain money and stock broker, a native of France, and a person of note in his way, who resided in Boston. You go into his office and say to him: "Mr., how is Western?" IHe h would reply: "Do you wish to buy, or do you wish to sell?" You answer:' Buy." He continues: "Well, the Board closed to-day at $90, with an evident tendency upward. I will sell at $90.50." But if you say to him: "1 wish to sell," then, he would answer: "Well, the Board closed to-day at $90, with an evident tendency downward. I will give you $89.50." But let me again inquire of any who may know, if it be indeed true that Mr. Blair, whom the most of us have hitherto believed to be a man of fair intentions, has at length become so far perfected in the arts of the modern politician as to be capable of saying to any whom it may concern: "If you must and will know the true intent and ineaning of the Constitution, relative to this measure, I tell you, as a lawyer, that the Legislature cannot authorize a citizen to vote in any place, except in the township or ward where he resides;" but if you are disposed to accommodate, orsell yourself to our side, that is, to my party, within the party, I then tell you, as a politician, believing that "the end justifies the means," and as one bound to win, Constitution or no Contstitution, that the legal validity of this measure "need not be doubted?" Is this the ultimate object of his recommendation of this measure? If yea, then he and his adherents might well pray, in the language of Burns: "O0 wad some Pow'r the giftie tie us To see oursels as others see us!' It wan frae monte a blunder free us, An' tbolish notion." Sir, we s hould be led to smile at this erxtremely unsightly s pect acle were th ere not a kind of moral melancholy intermingled which turns ridicule into mourning. Bu t s till the position remains in full integrity and force, that the exposition I have offered a,-rees with, and is supported by, the views of the members of the the lega l professio n, who lived in the State at the time the Constitution was a dopted, an d a lso of those who came here or ent ered t he pr ofes sion s oo n thereafter, which views have universally prevailed until a clique hit upon this measure to preserve party supremacy and especially personal supremacy in the party. 7. Another consideration in favor of the exposition I have offered is, that it is agreeable to, and is supported by, principles of the common law in force when thle Constitution was adopted, and still remainin force. I have, in a manner, anticipated this consideration; but it is of too much weight not to be specially stated. Kent vol. 1 p. 524 says: 11 Statutes are likewise to be construed in reference to the principles ofthe commonlaw." He adds: "This has been the language of the courts in every age." And to guard against mistake or quibbling here it may be well to remark what every common sense man knows to be true, that it is well settled, and questioned by no one, that " in expounding a constitutional provision the same rules of construction and interpretation should obtain as are adopted and applied in the construction of a statute. (Smith's Com. oni Stat. and Con. construction p. 418.) And it may be well to note further that our Constitution Art. SO Sec. 1, recognized the common law and declares it to be in force. What then, was the common law applicable to this subject at the time the Constitution was adopted? Kent Vol. II p. 369 says: " In the case of elections in public and municipal corporations, and in all other elections of a public nature, every vote must be personally given." He cites the cases: TheDeanand Chapter of Ferns, Davies's Rep't. 129, and Attorney General vs. Scott, 1 Vesey, 413, to substantiate this important doctrine. The words of the Constitution in question, being then construed according to the common law, it follows that the voting there spoken of means voting in person, and that under that instrument the elector must vote at public elections personally or not at all. This supports my exposition, while it gives this proxy bill its deatth blow. Again. The provisions of the old Constitution with regard to public elections, as well as the general election law in force before and at the time the present Constitution was adopted, harmonized exactly with the principles of the common law effecting the same; and in pursuance of these principles and provisions a practice then prevailed, as we have seen in another aspect of this case, which possessed, lst, all the attributes of a common law principle; 2, all the authority of constitutional and statutory enactments; and 3, all the force of a construction by the Supreme Coutrt of this State. This practice, resting on such solid grounld, and proceeding under such ultimate legal sancetions, definitely prescribed the place and manner of voting by requiring each elector to be personall preserve at She polls in th, towon 15 ship or ward in which he resides, and there personally tender his vote, or not vote at all. The iacts stated here are admitted by all. Now observe, 1. That it was to this practice, then in use and thu s e s tablished, that the framers of our present Constitution referre d by t he words of Sec. 1, t o wit: " N o citizen shall be entitledto to vote at any e lecti on un les s he has resided in the townshi p or ward in which he oresrs to vote, ten days nesxt preced ing such electi on." 2. They took it f or gr anted that this practice mus t r ema in becaus e it was but carrying out an imoptant principle of the common l aw, and of te p rovisions of the po sitive laws of the State, which, they declare, should remain in force-(Art. 20 Sec. 1;) and because many of them now tell us, and none deny it, that they took it for grante d that this practice would continue. Now, co nstruing the words of Sec. 1 in question in refe re nce t o this practice, it follows that inasmuch as no different provision is made in the Cons tit ution, the ri(ht of suff rage, established by it, is to be exercised by the elector persondally at the polls ip th e township or ward in which he r esides, and no where else. And this, Sir, puts a complete extinguishernon this field system n1ow sought to be established; so both systems are clearly forbidden by the Constitution whe n i t is co nstrued i n reference t o t he pri nciple s of the common law, a s theo iule requires. N ow, Sir, no man of common discernment can fail to rem ark two thin gs here, because they stand out so very prominently: 1. That by t he w ords they made use of in Sec. 1, t he f ram er s of the C on stitution so re - ferr ed to th is practice a s t o recognize its permanent validity and by necessary implication adopted it and actually made it a part and parcel of that instrument. And, 2. Having do ne this, they felt that they had d one, in this regard, all tha t wa s necessary to b e done; that t he p ractic e b e ing thus brought into the in stru ment, it was there, oind must continue to beh n there, a nd that n o expre ssly affirmative or expressly ned lativ e provisions could do any more. Anct a r, there they left it, without unnecessary words, but in a simple form and there it now stands as an intergral part of the Constitution of the State. And sir e, let me remark another th ing here, n amely: that the rule requiring statutes and constitutional pr ovisions to be construed in reference to the principles of common law, or established custom or usage, is general in its application. It extend s to contracts so as to expound the meaning of their words, or the intention of the parties. The application of the rule applied to business affairs is too familiar to require illustration. Parsons, in his work on Laws ot Business, p. 35 says: "1 Any custom will be regarded by the Court which comes within the reason of the rule that makes the custom a part of the contract. It comes within the reason only when it is so far established and so well known to the parties, that it must be supposed that their contract was made with reference to it." Now, in the case before us, we are not left to supposition. Here is certainty. The framers of the C:onstitutionl referred to the usage as8 to voting in such way as to adopt it. This ma. kes the argument perfect. Opinions of the Courts. 8. Another consideration in favor of the received exposition of the words of the Constitution in question, is, that it is sustained by the courts of all the other States, whose Constitutions are similar to ours, where the subject has come before them, unless the court of the State of Iowa is an exception. For example: The Constitution of New Hampshire provides for holding meetings of electors, in the several towns of the State for the choice of public officers. It also provides that each elector shall have the right to vote in the presence of the selectmen of the town, min open meeting in the town or parish wherein he dwells. Now in what material respect does this provision differ from the provision in question of our Constitution? Our Constitution requires that a citizen shall have his legal residence in the township or ward within the State, where he votes, and that he shall vote, if at all, in such township or ward. Again, I ask, wherein this differs in any material point from the provision of the Constitution of New Hampshire? If, now, we take into account here, as we certainly mus t, what the words o f our Constitution necessar ily imply, namely: the reco gni ad ad o tion and adoption of the esta bli shed exposi tion and practice, which require the elector to appear in person at the polls in the township or wsrd where he resides, and there, with his own hand, tender his vote to the proper officer in presence of the inspectors; I repeat, that if this established practice and contemporaneous exposition are taken into account, the two cases become not only identical in substance, but almost wholly so in details. Now let us see how the Judges of the Su preme Court of New Hampshire regard a measure like the one now before us, in its re lations to their Constitution, which we see is essentially the same as ours as far as this meas ure is concerned. The Judffes of that court, in an opinion given under date of June 23d, 1863, say: " By the common law, in elections of public and municipal corporations, and in all other public elections, every vote must be personally given. (Citint, 2 Kent Corn. 294 [369-10th Ed.] The Dean., &c., of Ferns. Davies 129, Any. and A. Corp., 3d Ed., 95-97, Taylor vs. Griswold, 2 Green, (N. Y.) 22,,6,234, 235; Phillips vs. Wickham 1, Page 578; State vs. Tudor, 5 Day, 333; See Attorney-General vs. Scott, 1 Vesey, 413.) They continue: " The history of the origin of the powers of towns in New England, and of the na ture and usages of their meetings (almost identical, in detail even, with ours in Mich igan), shows that in this respect the prac tlce here, before and at the date of the adop tion of the Constitution, was in accordance with the general rule of the common law. As the language of' the Constitution is to be understood in the sense in which it was used at the time of its adoption (opinion of the Justices, 41 N. H., 551,) and as at that time, both by the common law and by the settled usage here, the right ot voting for public offi cers was a right that must be exercised per sonally by the voter at the meeting held for tile purpose, it follows that if no different pro vision is made in the Constitution, the rigrht of suffrage established by it is to be exercised by the voter in person, at the meetings duly held I I. I, 16 for that purpose." They further say: "We have thus far consa3idred the provisions of this bill as if they were in fact what they purport to be, provisions to allow the elector to vote by another in the meting of the town, & b., in whicl he is entitled to vote. But the bill, in effect, permits the elector to vote at places other than those fixed by the Constitution; * * * * and this, we think, is in conflict with its provisions (Am. Law R. for Oct., 740.) This opinion fits our case now in hand exactly. It seems to deal a decisive blow at every material point in and about this measure now sought to be passed. Again. The C,-nstitution of Pennsylvania, Article 3, Section 1, provides that "In elections by the citizens, every white freemin of s the ace of twenty-one years, having resided in this State one year, an- in the election district wher. he o'ers to vote, ten days immediately preceding such election, and within two years aid a State or county tax, which shall have een assessed at lea3t ten days before the elec- I tion, shall enjoy the rights of an elector.", You will observe here that exactly the same form ot words is used in the P?ennsylvania Constitltion, with retard to the place of voting, that is used in ours. T'ae former says: "In the election district,where he offers to vote;"! ours says: " in the township or ward in which i he offers to vote." The Constitution of Penn- sylvania does not describe election districts; it makes no boundaries, it does not say what they are, or wiat they shall be; in short, it does not create them; n either does ours. Both are exactly alike in these respects. That Constitution recognizes them, as existing and to exist; our does the same, in relation to townships and wards. That takes them up and makes them an integral part of itself; E ours does the same in relation to townships and wards, making them "election districts." The sim,.ilarity of the two instruments, as to the provisions compared here, is complete. So far all is plain. t A law was passed by the Legislature of Penansylvamia, providing for soldiers, engaged in the service of the Uiited States, to vote in their public elections when absent from their election districts, whether within or outside of the boundaries of the State. In the case, Chase vs. Miller, the question as to the consti- tutionailty of this law came before the Sapreme Court of that State in the winter of 1862, to be adjudged and settled. The opinion of the Court was delivered May 23d, 1862, in which they say: "The Constitution does not define an election district. Election districts acquired their first constitutional recognition in 1838. They had, however, long been familiar to our ordinary legislation. Always, from 1799 down to the present hour, election districts, within the meaning of our statute, have denoted subdivisions of Pennsylvania territory, marked out by know boundaries pre-arranged and declared by public authority.'" I (The same as the townships and wards in Michigan when our Constitution was adopted.) The court continues: "Now, whilst the Constitution did not stop to define election districts, it took up and incorporated them, as the Legislature had theretofore or should thereafter define and regulate them. And, therefore election districts mean in the Coustitution just what they mean in the statutes." m This describes our case here in Michigan precisely. Oar townsh ips and wards, for thi e purposes of votibr are oar election districts. New townships and wards may be established by the L,gislature, old ones divided, or their boundaries modified; but no matter what chances take plac3 in this respect, they still mean, in the Con3titution, subdivisions of Michigan territory, the same as in the statute. And as the court of Pennsylvania says: " We must understand the Constitution, then, as prescribing to the qualified voter that his ballot mast be cast in saich election district;" that is, in sucvh township or ward. That court farther says, in this same case: "To offer to vote by ballot, is to present one's self, with proper qualifications, at the time and place appointed, and to make manual delivery of the ballot to the officers appointed by law to receive it. T'e ballot cannot be sent by mal1 or express, n gr can it be cast outside of all Pennsylvania election districts, and certified into the county where the voter has his domicil. We cannot be persuaded, that the Constitution ever contemplated any such mode of voting, and we have abundant reason for thinking, that to permit it would break down all the safe-gluards of honest suffrage. The Coa3titutioa meant, rather, that the v)ter in proprie personae should offer his vote in an appropriate election district, (township or ward in Michigan) in order that his neighbors might be at hind to establish his right to vote if it were challenged, or to challenge it if it were doubtful.!' i'The amendmne-int [requiring residence in the election district wiiere the freeman offers to votej so understood introduced not only a new test of the rig-'lt of suffragre, to wit, a district residence, (towaship or ward in Michigan) but a rule of votin- also. Placz became an element of saffrage for a two-fold purpose. Without the district residence no man shall vote, but havin,, had the district residence, the right it counrs is to vote in that district." [In that township or ward in Michigan.] "Such," the court says, " is the voice of the Constitution " And su,ch, then, is the voice of the Constitution of Michigan, for the two cases are exactly the same. Again. The provisions of the Constitution of Connecticut in relation to this subject are very similar to those in the Constitution of New Hampshire. And the General Assembly of Connecticut, passed an Ac,, in 1862), " providin a mode of takling the votes in the election of State and other o-c,Tirs of persons absent from the State as volunteers in the military service of the United States." But the Judges of the Supreme Court of that State pronounced the act repugnant to the Constitution and void, because, as a principal reason, it authorized votes to be taken at places other than those prescribed in that instrument. (Am. L. Reai. for June, 186'3, p. 460.) And, Sir, these decisions indicate the course, in which the decisions of the courts of all the States ran with regard to this subject where it has come before them under constitutionalprovisions similar to our own, unless the court of Iowa forms an exception, to which we will now give a moment's attention. Article 3, Section 1 of the Constitution of that State reads as follows: "Every white male citizen of the United States, of the age I 17 tutional? We will let the court answer this question for itself, the same as we did the other. Having cited several cases, in which the books abound, showing "that if it be doubtful or questionable whether the Legislature has exceeded its limits, the judiciary cannot interfere, though it may not be satisfied that the act is constitutional," the court then say: "In view of this well-settled rule, recognized in the foregoing cases, we feel entirely satisfied as to our duty in the present case. There is certainly a substantial doubt-and although we might not be satisfied of its constitutionality,-yet if not satisfied of its uineonstitutionality it is our duty to uphold the laW." Without stopping to discuss the propriety of the application of this rule in this particular instance, there is no doubt as to the validity of the rule itself and that it applies to legislators as between them and the Constitution, requiring them to pause at substantial doubts the same as the court, as we have already seen. It is also observab'le in this connection, that the court of Iowa in giving its opinion in this case, speak approvingly of the Connecticut and New Hampshire decisions, which I have adduced to support my position against this measure, and that while,they admit by Implication that the Pennsylvania decision is good law, under the Constitution of that State, they claim that the provisions of the two Constitutions affecting, this question are not the same. You see too what the difference is between our Constitution and that of iowa, as adjudged by the court of the latter; that in the opinion of that court the meaning of tile e-:Dression a in wzich he offers to vote," is exactly vhat I have stated it to be; that the court of Iowa was in doubt as to the constitutionaity of the ir s oldiers' voting a ct, a fter all th e advantagies it gained from the word, "claim," but that it finally upheld it, because, notwithstanding its " substantial doubt," it was not satisfied of its unconstitutionalityy." Now. Sir, this decision stands by itself and alone. But it is not to be despised on that account. Let all the respect be given to it to which it is justly entitled, where it belongs and applies; yet it should not be expected to weigh very much with this body in support of the measure now before us, and especially as it weighs quite as much, at least, against as for it, and when, too, the united voices of all these other courts are against it, as well as the great body of truth and argument which we perceive to be arrayed agalust it, and know the same to be unanswerable. We should be loth to believe, on ordinary proof, that a mnan claiming to have clear views and patriotic motives would aff'ect to entrench himself behind this decision, on this occasion, against such formidable odds. And yet, Sir strange to say, we hear Honorable gentlemen, even of the legal profession, connected with this Leg-slature, say that they can go for this measure under shelter of the iowa decision, although, in the very- same sentence, they tell us that they by no measly accept it as good law even under the Constitution of that State. Their conduct in this respect, is well suited to remuind us of the habits of the ostrich. It is said of that animal that if it is h otly pursued, it will thrust its headlinto the salad, and, although its whole body is exposed? it fancies itscif secur e, of twenty-one years, who shall have been a resident of the State six months next preceding t he e lection, a md of th e cou nt y in wh icnh he claims his vote, sixty days, shall be entitled to vote at all elections, which are now, o r may be authorized by law." By an act, approved September lnth 186t, the Legislature of Iowa provided that the qualified electors of the State in the military s ervice of the United States, be permitted to vote at certain election a ls at polls opened and condu cted beyond the limits of the county and the State of which t he y claim to be residents. The Supreme Cour t of Iowa, in Morrison v s. Spininser, already referred to, say on grounds wh i ch we shall soon point out: "We feel co nstrained to say, that this law can be, and should be, upheld." The first question which naturally arises he re is: Are the Constitutions of Iowa and M ichigan alik e as to th e subject-matte r before us? We w ill let the Supreme Court of Iowa answ er this qu estion. In the case just referred to, that court having, in a preceding sentence, spoken of the express provisions of the Constitutions of Kentucky and Illinois regarding this q uestion says: " The Constitution of Michigan, on the other ha nd contains no such expres s provisions or or restrictions, a nd is not so entirely lunlike our owln"-saggesting most emphatically, that in their opinion there is a substantial difference in the two instrements as to this question. Sen ate Doc. N o. 1 ain quoting from this same sentence, is careful to omit that par t of i t s uggesting this difference. That court is at the pains to point out in part, what this difference is as it sta nds in their minds. It c onusists in the difference of meaning between the words, "elaims ai and "offers." The Iowa C iostitution says: " in whic h he claims his vote," wh,iile ours says: " in which he olfers to vote. In illustration of this dioftrenet that court says: "IIEtymologically it (claims) by Do m ean s implie s th at plac e or p resence are essentia l t o its paotency or completeness. On the other hand, to "1 offer " to do a thing is, to bring to, or before-to present for acceptance or rejection-to exhibit something that may be taken or received, or not. And hence the argument drawn fiom the case in Pennsylvania, is not by any means conclusive (against the constitutionality of the Iowa act, on account of this difference in the Constitutions of the two States). For (continues the court) while, in the language of Woodward, J, it may be true, that to offEr to vote by ballot, is to present one's self, with proper quialifications, at the time and piaee appointed and make manual delivery of the ballot to the officers appointed by law to receive it-it by no means necessarily follows that the same would be the meaning of the word a claims I' as used in our Constitution. The one does not imply so conclusively as the other, the idea of a personal presence in order to assert the right." Such, Sir, is the difference as adjudged bythe Supreme Court of Iowa between the Constitutions of Pennsylvania and Michigan on the one hand and of Iowa on the other, with regard to this question. The nlext question is: Why did the court ofi Iowa sufferr the act of its Legislature permittinlg absent soldiers to vote, to pass a~s conarti I iI I I I i I i 18 ly so, or so in effect. Such seems to be the doctrine involved in this Section. Now, Mr. Chairmin, I confess that the absurdity of this doctrine is so glaring, that one can hardly be justified in taking up time in pointing it out; and I certainly should not feel warranted in doing so on this occasion, did I not happen to know that many being deceived, accept this doctrine as tenable. Many suppose that it is competent for the Legislature to declare that any provision of the Constitution shall be deemed to mean whatever it shall see fit, and that such declaration must govern. Many too argue in this way: That the ballotbox of any township or ward is the symbol of of such township or ward for all the purposes of public elections; that to whatever point in the United States the ballot-box shall be trans ported by the authority of the Legislature, and opened for the reception of votes, there the township or ward to which it belongs is synbolically present; and that in this way any township or ward in the State may be carried in effect to any citizen-soldier of this State, whether within or without its geographical lines, so as to enable him to vote to all intents and purposes, in the township or ward where he resides, agreeably to the spirit of the Constitution. Now, Sir, I will let the Judges of the Supreme Court of Connecticut reply to the doctrine and reasoning here referred to. They remark, in the case already cited, as follows: " Doubtles s the General Assembly may say in any language they choose, that a statute (mark that*.a statute") shall be considered, held and taken to embrace some subject-matter or thing, or construe d to be in accord ance with, or a compliance with some other sta tute, c., and if the plae o f voting could have been f ixe d by statute, the provision in question would be valid. But applied to the Constitutio n that provision of the law is an anonzaly, and in effect, an effort by an inferior to change, extend and indirectly control a clear, full and exhaustive mandate of its superior, in a material particular, even in respect to its own organization, and inconsistent with the fundamental principles of constitutional law. "If the General Assembly (the Legislature) can thus add to. alter and control one constitutional provision respecting elections, there are no others beyond their reach. They may direct votes to be taken at any time, and say that they shall be considered, held and taken to have been cast on the first Monday of April. They may authorize minors to vote and say that their votes shall be considered, taken and held to be the votes of electors of full age; or colored men, and say that their votes shall be considered, taken and held to be the votes of white men and electors; and so may authorize the taking and counting of the votes of women and aliens. Nor would there remain any other matter of constitutional provision or purpose, which might not be reached at any time by a temporary and fluctuating legislative majority, and by the same legislative alchemy of changing things constructively, into what they are not in fiact, be practically controlled or annulled. Indeed, the same process which could turn votes taken in a camp to votes taken in an electors' meeting (in a township or ward) might turn those takien in because, having thus closed its eyes and ears to the danger, it doe.s not hear or see it. It is, therefore, called the sil liest of birds. Milr. Chairman, the dec ision of the court of Connecticut referred t o, is spoken of in th e M essage, and also in reports, and e spe c i ally in Senate Doc. No. 1, a s sustaining th e principle of this House bill, or of the field system, where the Constitution is worded like ours. I s t his so in fact? Let the court speak for itself We hav e s een, Sir, that the form of word s in the Constitution of Pennsylvania relativ e t o this subject, is just like ours. The court of C onnec ticu t use these w ords with reference tothat,namely:'InPennsylvaniat he place only was prescribed bythe Constitution; but that wa s sufficient to render an act of the Legisglatbure authorizinqg th e reception of soldiers' votes ou t of the State invalid." The case of Pennsylvania is our case exact ly an d the court of Connectic ut in pronouncing thus against the constitutional ity o f the Pennsylvania act pronounc es with equal force against the constitution ality of this mea sure. Consequently, if you pass th is measure, yo n will do so in defia nce of a judicial opin ion as controlling in authority as a judicial decisi o n can be not pronounced by t he Sup rem e Cour t of our own State, or of t he Un ited States. To prevent misapprehension, it -may be well to observe here that the Constitutions of some of the S tates d o n ot fix the plac e of voting; t hey p rescribe the qualifications of the voter without making the place of voting within the State, an essential element of suffrage; but they commit the power to the Legislature to regulate th e place w here vo tes m ay be offered and received. The Constitutio ns of Ohio and Wisconsi n com e under this category; and it is thoughlt b y som e g ood lawyers that the reception of votes outside of the limits of these S tat e s may be constitutionally authorized by their respective Legislatures, but not so where the Constitution of a State directly or by impli catio n f lie s the place of voting. Before closing this part of the argument, I desire to call the attention of the Committee to the language of Section 3 of the House Bill now before us. This Section reads as follows: "Each elector voting by virtue of the provisions of this act, shall be considered as voting in the town or ward in which he had a residence at the time of his entering the military servicethat is, he shall have the right, so far as authorized by this act, to vote for the same officers and no others that he might lawfully have voted for in the township or ward in which he resided at the time of entering the military service." The doctrine involved in this Section seems to be this, namely: Acts otherwise repugnant to the Constitution, become constitutional and valid, simply by an act of the Le,gislature declaring that they shall be considered constitutional. This doctrine being admitted, it follows that if it be indeed true, as the matter now stands, that it would be unconstitutional to vote by proxy at public elections, or to send the ballot box out of the State to receive the votes of our citizen soldiers, an act of the Legdislature declarmoff that the same shall be "consfdered" conlstitlutioual, or as voting in te town or ward in whichj the persons thus vothing had a residence at the time of entering the military Service, would make it all actual 19 both persons and forms, are excluded. This right, then, dees not extend to all-far from it. In this State, for illustration, the people, in framing the Constitution, withheld it from aliens, negroes, Indians of any tribe; from women and minors-in short, from everybody except such as answer to a certain specific description. Such as come under this description are called citizens, and to them the Constitution delegates the power to vote at St'ite and local elections, in person, but not by proxy. It no where confers on the elector the right of Substitution. It thence follows, that with us the right to vote is strictly personal, and cannot be delegated or performed by proxy. [Lyon vs. Jerome, 26 Wend., p. 485.] Furthermore. The right to vote being delegated by the Constitution to a carefully speciied class, without the right of substitution, it is in the nature of a personal privilege, a personal franchise, or an office in the enjoy. ment and discharge of which the whole commonwealth is much interested, and great purity, care and discretion are reguired. For this reason, it is personal and cannot be delegated to, or exercised by, an agent. In the case, Powell vs. Tuttle, 3 Comstock, p. 396, the Court says: "An authority to do acts merely mechanical may be delegated, but not so where the act involves the exercise of judgment and discretion." Thus, Mr. Chairman, the question seems to be settled beyond the possibility of being disturbed, that the office of an elector in this State is strictly personal, and that its duties cannot be performed, or meddled with by an agent, or by proxy, any more than those of an assessor, a judze, or legislator. But Honorable gentlemen profess to find support for this proxy bill in an argument of this sort. They say: "Here is an elector without hands. He comes to the polls and some one, at his request and in his presence, deposits his vote for him." Now they ask: "Is not this vote lawfully cast?" Grant it. What then? - Why, they ask: "Is not this voting by another, by an agent, by proxy, and does not this in reality admit the principle of this proxy bill?" By no manner of means. For, as the Justices of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire well say, in the opin ion be fore cited: "If it were allowable, that the votes of infirm or disabled electors be deposited for them in their presence, it would by no means follow that this could be done for them in their absence; for," they continue, "an act done by me, in the presence, and under the con trol of another, for that other, is regarded, not as the exercise of a delegated authority, but as the personal act of the party in whose behalf it was performed; "but," they add,'it is otherwise, where the act is done by a person's direction in his absence and beyond his control." They cite Kidder vs. Prescott, 4 Foster 263; and Hanson vs. Rowe, 6 Foster 327. Thus it appears, Sir, that this fancied argument is far more halt, and blind, and maimed, and pit iable than the poor cripples from whose case it is derived. But, Mr. Chairman, the practice of voting by prosy, in joint stock companies or monied corporations, is adduced in support of this proxy bill. Some seem to be much influenced by it. But it seems to me that if gentlemen will think a moment, they will clearly discover fact in the electors' meeting (or in a township or ward) into th e votes of women, o r aliens, or minors, or colored men, and exclude them for that reason f rom t he canvass, and so on, t il l the Constitution and constitutional law became a mockery." Dogmnas Put F orth i n Support of thi s t ileasure by its Advoeates. Having given an exposition of the words of the Constitution relat ive to this que stion, which I am mor ally certain cont ai n ans the truth, the whole tr uth, and nothing but the truth, and having substantiated it by facts, arguments, authoritv and law not to be impeached, I have thus made out my case, and might with propriety here rest; and it may be that a du e regard to your patience irequires me to do so. But, Sir, certain theories have been ramed with gro e at care and hav e be en pressed on our attention with extreme assiduity, in order, i f possible, to evade this hitherto universally received exposition, and thu s facilitate the passage of this measure. They seem to be of a mixed nature. That is, they seem to be somew ha t of the naturef f outsi de questions, and somewhat in a line with these measures. But they are made up of errors for the mos t part; yet the y have just enough of truth about them, or the semblance of truth, to give t he e rror cur rency and effect with many m inds. I therefore now propose to take th e m up and c onsider them sep ar ately. I. In suppo rt of this pr ox y bill it is said: 1. That it is a well-settled principle of law t at hat wha t ever any pers on has original authority to do himself he may do by another. 2. That the Bill providing for the soldiers' vo ting by proxy is based on this well-established principle of law. 'the firs t of the se propositions is correct beyond all question, but the second is clearly erroneous. And the error lies in this, that this principl e of law w ith regard to agtncty applies only to what men have an original right or authority to do in their private affairs, and to certain mechanical or ministerial acts, such as are performed by a Deputy Sheriff and a poster of notices. It does not apply to their political acts and relations. Walker, in his treatise on American Law, p. 246, says: "One person cannot depute another to vote for him "I-meaning in civil and political elections. And Kent says, Vol. 2, p. 369, as we have before seen, that "in the case of elections in public and municipal corporations, and in all other elections of a public nature, every vote must be personally given. " This is a principle of common law every where recognized. Besides. Here is another consideration which should seem to be decisive, namely: The right to vote is a delegated right. It is not an original, natural or necessary right, such, for instance, as is the right to live. In our American system this right is created by the several State Constitutions. They determine by careful definitions the classes of persons on whom this right shall be conferred, and by implication that it shall not be conferred on any others. In respect to the right of voting the Constitution is of the nature of an enabling act. It gives the inhabitant a~ll the right to vote he possesses. It enables those corning within its descriptions to exercise this right in the form which it points out. Others, 20 that there is no real analogy between the two things. Why look: The principle on which voting is based, in joint stock companies, stands alone. It is peculiar. There the right to vote attaches to the shares, in the capital stock. It goes with them as they are transferred from one to another. Very generally each share, by the act of incorporation, is entitled to one vote. Hence the greater the number of shares one holds, the greater the number of votes he is entitled to cast; and vice versa. And here mark this, that even in any of these companies, a shareholder cannot vote by proxy, unless it is specially provided for in the act of incorporation. A clause is almost always inserted in a charter, or general act, that members may vote " in person or by proxy." But if, for any cause, the words "by proxy," are left out, as they are in State Constitutions and election laws, each shareholder must be present and vote in person, or not at all. In Taylor vs. Griswold, 2 Green's N. J. Rep. 223, the Supreme Court, after full and learned discussion, held it to be a principle of the common law, that where an election depends upon the exercise of judgement the right can not be deputed; and that it requires legislative sanction before any corporate body can make a valid by-law authorizing members to vote by proxy. The conclusion, therefore, Mr. Chairman, is lain, and not to be eluded, that this proxy bill has no support from law, the decisions of the courts, analogy or usage, but that all these are directly against it. It must, therefore, fall dead to the ground. II. Another of these mixed theories is this: All political power," say they, "is vested in the people "-grant it-', the people make and unmake Constitutions " —grant that, also -"that we, the members of the Legislature, are the representatives of the peo - ple, duly commissioned to exercise their powers of government "-true, within conllstitutional limits-'" and that we, by virtue of our relations to the people as their civil and political representatives, may properly do whatever it is competent for the people to do or authorize to be done as regards the exercise of governmental powers." I Not so, by any means. A more startling nonsequiter could hardly be stated. Why, Mr. Chairman, have the authors of this theory forgotten what country they are in, and the genius of the government under which they live, and about which they thus speculate? In monarchical and despotic governments, a similar doctrine has been held. Sir'4lliam Blackstone remarks: " We may v nture to aftirm that the power of Parliament is absolute and without control." And Coke himself says: " That the power and jurisdiction of Parliament is so transcendent and absolute that it cannot be considered either for causes orpersons within anybounds." But, Sir; this country is not England, nor is this government the Eng,lish government. This is the United States, and we live under a system of government peculiar to America. And I submit that this system in respect to the point here raised, is in substance this: The people, in their calm and clear moments and in their original and aggregate capacity, ordain articles to regulate the exercise of their sovereignty, or, powers of government. They divide their " powers of government int o three depar t ments: th e legislative, executive and judicial." This is so with the general, as well as with each of the State government s. In this State the people, by their organic arti cles, have divested themselves of the powers of legislation, and lodged them in a "Senate and Houase of Representatives," to be exer cised, however, subject to the true intent and meaning ofthese articles. For the people took good care to set metes and bounds in these arti cles beyond which their officers and representa tives, in any department of government, shall not pass. In general terms, these articles pre scribe the organization, powers, and duties of the Legislature, as well as the other depart, ments of government. And these articles are the Constitution. It must remain just as it is in each "jot and tittle," until changed by the people in the manner therein specified. And by this instrument, just as it stands, must this Legislature be strictly governed, and to it its action must be conformed, otherwise it will be of no effect. So the Courts hold. For example: The Supreme Court of New York, when composed of those master jurists, Nel son, Bronson, and Cowen, unanimously held on this point, as follows: sUnder our form of government, the Legislature is not supreme. It is only one of the organs of that absolute sovereignty which resides in the whole body of the people. Like other departments of the government, it can only exercise such powers as have been delegated to it; and when it steps beyond that boundary, its acts, like those of the most humble m,.agistrate in the State, who transcends his jurisdiction, are ut terly void." (Tyler rs. Porter, 4 Hill I40.) Thus endeth this theory of Legislative om nipotence. III. But, Sir, here is another of these mixed theories. It lays down a new rule of construc tion-a rule which has been invented, it should seem, for the special purpose of se curing, if possible, the passage of this measure in some form or other. This theory is somewhat complex, but may be clearly sta ted as follows: 1. The Constitution of the United States is a grant ofpowers, while the State Constitutions grant no powers, but only impose limitations of power. 2. It thence follows that in.,e,rtaining the powers of the Legislature t:l:iiier the State Constitution, we are to look not at what is authorized to be done, but what is prohibited. 3. All such prohibitions must be II exnress" -~'direct," in distinction from implied or from af,rmative provisiona; otherwise they are not binding on the Legislature. 4. There is in the Constitution of Michigan no "express prohibition " against the proposed law to authorize absent soldiers to vote; therefore, such a law would be free from constitu tional objection. Such, Sir, is one of the theories of the champions of this measure, as to a rule of constitutional construction. Is it correct? It certainly has the merit of novelty. But the question is not whether it is new or old, whether it is an acknowledged principle, or a dogma invented for the occasion, but is it correct or erroneous? This is the question. Now, Sir, as to points 1 and 2 of this ~theory. They have, it must be confessed, the II 21 not say to the Legislature, in the " express" language of prohibition, you shall not pass it, and on the ground of the "absence" of such an " express prohibition," the argument for the law is based by the authors of this theory. Members of this House stoutly maintain the same position. On the other hand, the friends of the Constitu tion hold that there is nothing better settled in the whole range of legislation, or jurisprudence than this, namely: That the Constitution limits and restrains the action of the Legislature: 1. By express prohibition. This is admitted, and may be passed. 2. By affirmat ive provisions. That is to s ay, if the Constitution sa ys, affirmativelty, that a thing shall be done, or a right exercised in a particular way, every other way is thereby excluded and prohibited as fully and as firmly as it could have been done by " express prohibitions." What is the difference in the effect of your words, whether you say, affrmatively, to your boy, John: "You shall stay in your room to-day," or, negatively: "You shall not leave your room, to-day! " Do not the affrmative words, " you shall stay in," limit John's action just as much and as effectually as the negative words, " you shall not leave? " And is not this an inherent principle of language? Are not these forms of expression used, interchangeably, by all classes, and in every species of composition? Why, look at the common sense of the thing. You tell John, glrmatively, " to stay in his room to-day." Do you not say to him by this afrmative requirement that he shall not do otherwise? Do not these affirmative words contain a negative as strong as can be stated that John shall not leave ' his room to-day?" And is he at liberty to leave, when you have expressly told him to stay in, simply because you did not expressly prohibit him from going out? Or must you, in order to make it obligatory on John to stay in, " expressly prohibit " him from going out? Or must you go even farther, and think of each thing that it is possible for him to do, inconsistent with his staying in, and re-utter your "express prohibition " against every separate particular? Why, Sir, every one well knows who can speak or understand the English language, that your affirmative requirement, that John shall stay in, obliges him to do that very thing, and forbids him from doing every thing else, whatever, in any way inconsistent with it. And now, Sir, does not this same principle hold good, in determining what limits the words of the Constitution impose on the power of the Legislature? This theory of construic tion now under review flatly denies it. Consequently, we may appeal to the de cisions of the courts to settle the matter. What, then, say the courts about it? In the case of The District Township of the city o Dubuq~ie vs. The City of Dubuque, 7 Clarkf (Iowa,) the court says: " If by a law or Con stitution, a thing is to be done in a particu lar manner or form, this includes a negative that it shall not be done otherwise." Also, in the 5 of Texas, 418t the court says: "Affirm ative words in a statute, may be construed as a negative of what is not affirmed." Again. In 3 Brevard, p. 396 the court hold: " Where an act requires a thing to be done in a particu show of depth and philosophy about them, not a little imposing. And it is not pretended that they do not involve important distinctions and doctrines. But, nevertheless, I respectfully submit: 1. That they are erroneous, so far ms they are at variance, if they are at variance at all, with the well-settled doctrine, namely: That both the Federal and State Constitutions are acts of the people speaking in their original capacity —the former being the act of the people of all the States, the latter of the people of each seperate State, by and for themselves; that by these Constitutions, the people have divided the powers of sovereignty between the government of the Union and those of the States; that they are each sovereign and independent with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither of them sovereign and independent with respect to the objects committed to the other-the authority of the Federal Constitution, and the laws of Congress and the public treaties made in pursuance of it being supreme, in case of conflict; and that (what is more especially applicable to this discussion) each of these Constitutions, in its distinctive sphere, prescribes, both by affirmaives and negative provisions how the public authority shall be executed, and what shall be thea organization, powers, and duties, of their respective Legislatures, as well as the other departments of government, State, no less than national. (4 Wheaton 316; Kent's com. vol. 1, p. 504; Webster in reply to Calhoun, Feb. 16th, 33.) I repeat, that so far as points 1 and 2 of this theory conflict, if they conflict at all, with the views just stated, then just to that extent, these points must be held to be erroneous. But I submit: 2. That although it is suggested in Senate Dec. No. 1, p. 2, and in the minority report of the Committee on the Judiciary of this'House of the 25th inst., that the question hinges on the doctrines set forth in points 1 and 2 of this theory yet, as a matter of fact and of legic, it is clearly otherwise, and that the real importance of the theory for the purposes of this case is contained in points 3 and 4, including the inference. We may, therefore, dismiss the former and turn our attention to the latter. Well, then, as to point 3. It is indeed true, that in order to prohibit the State Legislature by the Constitution from doing an act, the prohibiting clause must be "express"-" direct," in distinction from being implied or from being an affirmative provision? Is this a sound rule of construction? May n ot an affirmsative provision work prohibitions? May not a prohibition be implied if the implication be a necessary one? Or must it be in" direct," or "express" terms, as thou shalt not? The authors of this theory of construction aver that it must be. They produce no authority to support it except their own dicta. But let us hear what they say. On pages 9 and 10 of Senate Dec. No. 1 of this Session, are these words: "It seems clearly established that our Constitution contains no "express" pi ohibition to prevent the Legislature from passing such a law (a law authorizing absent soldiers to vote). Can the members hesitate to pass it in the absence of suoh prohibition?" Here the ar gument in favor of such a law is, that there is no "express prohibition" in the Constitution against it. That instrument, it is alleged, does t 22 lar way, that way alone must be pursued." The same principle is laid down with great clearness, in Head and Amory vs. The Provi dence Insurance Co., 3 Cranch, p. 127. Other cases might be cited, but these are quite suffi cient to show us that the courts hold, that affirmative words, as thou shalt do thus and so, firmly bind those on whom they operate to the modes specified, and prohibit all other modes, or courses, or forms inconsistent with them, quite as effectually as any negative forms of expression, conceivable. And right here, Mr. Chairman, another con sideration is worthy of notice: Smith, in his Commentaries on Statutory and Constitutional Construction, p. 663, says: " Every construc tion, which leads to an absurdity, ought to be rejected." And Vattel, among his rules of construction, has this: "We should not give to any piece a meaning from which any absurd consequences would follow, but must interpret it in such a manner as to avoid absurdity." Now, just see to what absurdities the rule of construction, contended for by this novel theory, would lead to, if adopted It holds, that in order to prohibit the Legislature from doing an act, there must be an Express pro hibition," in the Constitution to that effect that it must say, " you shall not." Just apply this rule practically, and see how it works: The Constitution says, affirmatively, that "' the Gov erno r shall hold his office for two years." It does no t say, that he shall not hold it any longer. Now tell me, does, or does not, this affirmative provision of the Constitution prohibit the Legislature from passing an act, that he shall hold his office for four, five or any reate r nu mber of years than two? Ac cordin, to thi s new theory of c o nstruction, it is competent for t he Leg islatu re to do so, be cause there is no " express prohibition' against it in the Constitution. Again: The Constitution says a3ffrmatively:' The judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court., in Circuit Courts, in Probate Courts, and in Justices of the Peace." Now, is the Legislature at liberty to take away this power from these tribunals and re-invest it, for example, in the Board of State Auditors because there is no "express'" constitutional prohibition against it? If not, what becomes of this rule of construction laid down in said Doc. No. 1? Again: the Constitution provides aJfrmatively, that every white male citizen and inhabitant and every civilized male inhabitant of Indian descent, answering to certain specific descriptions, shall be entitled to vote. It does not say that other inhabitants shall not vote. Now if this Legislature should pass an act allowing aliens, women, minors negroes and Indians of regular tribes to vote in our State and local elections, would the law be constitutional because there is no " express prohibition " in the Constitution against it? If not, what then becomes of this rule of construction, that the Legislature may lawfully do anything in the line of legislation not "expressly prohibited" by the Constitution; and what too becomes of the appeal in behalf of this House Bill, founded on the " absence of such prohibition? " Sir, whato0.ajht to become of them? We have seen that this kind of construction has no foundation in the nature of human language- that it has no support trom the decisions of the courts, but that it is roundly d enied by the courts as w e ll as by th e n ature and use of language, and that, finally, it is contradictory to common sense and leads to extreme absurdities wherever t it is applied. What, then, ought to become of it-this very sum and subst an ce of the aforenamed Docu ment No. 1? You say, Sir, let i t fall, although great may be the fall of it, " b ecause it is founded on the sand." And t u s p th us e ndeth that Document and its "/ one idea."' We might add, that the powers of th e Legislature are l im ited, 3. By what the words of the Constitution, ne ces sarily imipty. But as I shall have occasion to speak of this important source of limitatio n a little further on, it wo uld not be a good use of ti me to dwell on i t he re. IV. We next come to still anot he r of these mixed theories. This, like the one last considered, relates to a rule of constru ction. It teaches that the Legislature may be restrained by express require ments or by express prohibition s in t he Constitution, but not by implica tion-not restrained by any thing which the words of the Const itu tion pre-suppose or imply. Such is e the t heory. Sir, let no o ne f ancy from the extraordinary character of this theory, that I am setting up w"a ma n of straw" her e. This t heory is in print. In e es sg, s a the Message, p., are these wo rds: " That th e Legis lature has the power to fixs the time, place and manner of holding elections and to est ablish the qualifica tions of voters, unless prohibit ed by the Constitution from doing so, need no t be doubted." Here is the worfd I prohibited," but n eit her directly" or " expressly," is prefixed to it. All is not yet fully ready for that. Again: ib. p. 12, are these words, " Tha t i nstrument (the Constitution) has nowh ere required that the election shall be held in a ny parti cular place." That is, according to this particular theory, it is not required to be in the t ownships and wards, an d why? Because it is not done in " direct or express" terms, but only by implication. H,)w ever, we have not, as yet, come to the word " direct," in this State paper. But we are be ing cautiously led to it. It is near at hand. For on page 13 we read, that',they (words of Sec. 1 Art. 7 of the Constitution in relation to qualifications of voters and the place of voting) speak directly as to age and residence, and only r" directly"] to those qualifications. All else is incidental and explanatory." Here we have it. And the obvious suggestion here is, that there is and can be no such thing in the Constitution as an implied direction to the Legislature of the nature either of a restraint or a rule of duty. But let us look still further. On page 13 we read: " If it was intended to forbid the Legislature from authorizing the reception of a sate in any other place than in the town or ward where the elector resided, it is not conceivable, that it should be left by the Convention to a merely casual expression, which does not directly either command or forbid any thing." HeIe the theory comes plainly to the surface, that a provision of the Constitution must be either " directly" affirmative or "' directly" negative, in order to act on the Legislature as a command or prohibition. Imnplcations, however clear and nzecessacry, are, afccordiqzg to this theory, o~f no avail. Nothinlg but direct, y, affirmative, or negative terms, a's you shall, or shall not,' are to be regarded. 23 "the necessary implications" of the Constitution on an equal footing with its "expr e s s words " as sources of restraint o n the action of the Legislature. The court declare s tha t they possess equal force and are entitled to equal respect. And thus i t appears that this is the well established law of the land, any new-born theory in the Mes s age or elsewhere "to the contrary notwith standing." And even in the Iowa case, so much relied on by the friends of this meas ure, (O'Neal vs. Watson) tie Court dist inctly recognize s th e same doctrine. It says: " The Legislature clearly has the power to legislate on all rightful subjects of' legislation, unless expressly prohibited from so doing, or where the prohibition is implied from some e xpress provision." This hits the case in hand exact ly. Our Con - stitution says: "No citizen or inhabitant shall be an elector or entitled to vote at any election, unless he shall be above the age ol twenty-one years, and has resided in the State three months, and in the township or ward in which he offers to vote, ten days next preceding such election." This is an "express" negative " provision;" and the prohibition implied in it, is, that no elector shall be permitted to vote who does not personally appear at the polls in the town or ward in which he resides, and there personally offer to vote, as will presently more fully appear. So the Iowa case confirms the position, that the Legislature is limited and restrained in its action by what the words of the Constitution necessarily imply. In McCullock vs. the State of Maryland (4 Wheat 316), Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the entire Court, pronounced an act of the Legislature of Maryland void, not on the ground that it was prohibited by any express words of the Federal Constitution, (and indeed the Court said, that there were none of that character against the act,) but because it was in conflict with what the wording of that instrument necessarily implies. And in remarking on the case, that great prince of American jurisprudence dwells with characteristic vigor and point on what he very suggestively terms Ad that vast mass of incidental powers which must be involved in the Constitution, if that instrument be not a splendid bauble." Again: In Streeter vs. Paton, 7 Mich. 341, the question arose whether the merely a, rmative provision of Art. 6 Sec. 1 of the Constitution, vested exclusive judicial jurisdiction in the courts therein named, or whether it is competent for the Legislature to give concurrent jurisdiction with any of these tribunals to a Circuit Court Commissioner, or to any one else, because not prohibited from doing so by any expressly negative words. To this our Supreme Court said: "There are no negative or other terms used, clearly and beyond all doubt, confining the power to the Courts mentioned. It is by implication only, it is so confined; and not by any express language that the power to vest any part of it elsewhere is taken from the Legislature, if the Legislature is in fact destitute of this power. This implication, standing by itself, would be conclusive — how apposite to this theory before us and how decisive against it! Thus, we see, Mr. Chairman, that the lawr on this subject is clear and strong in support of our proposition, that the action of the Legislature is limited and restrained by what But once more. On page 13 of this same Message, is this language: " These words (of Sec. 1 Art. 7, before referred to,) no doubt pre-suppose, that the offer to vote will be made in the township or ward in which the elector resides. But they neither require it to he so, nor forbid it to be otherwise." That is to say, according to this theory, it is plain beyond the possibility of doubt. on the very face of Sec. 1 Art. 7 of the Constitution, that the makers of that instrument took it for granted, and that this Section assumes it, and is based upon it as an existing and permanent fact, that the elector would appear inperson in the township or ward where he resides, and there personally offer to vote; and yet it alleges on the other hand that all this is of no manner of importance as a restraint on the action of the Legislature, and why? Because, forsooth, it does not happen to be stated in the exact formr of an express requirement or prohibition I Such is the theory of construction set forth in the Message! No authority is adduced to support it. No reason is given for it, founded in law, language, usage, fact, or common sense. And none can be given for it, springing from any of these sources. It rests upon the solitary ipse dixit of the author; and the degree of importance to be attached to it from this circumstance, each one will judge for himseli f Before going further with this theory, it may not be amiss to call attention to what evidently suggested it, which is this: The place of voting, and the personal presence of the voter there, and his voting personally, are I fixed, not by expressly affirmative or expressly negative provisions of the Constitution, but by what the words of that instrument in said Sec. 1 necessarily imply, which is, in fact, but a continuance of the practice relative to voting, then long in use. and agreeable to common law and the old Constitution as amended in 1839. The framers of that instrument very well knew that this practice was fully provided for, and would be perpetuated by such an implication as the one contained in the words they use. Consequently, they there left the matter to go on as aforetime. The author of this theory of construction, which we are here speaking of, evidently clearly saw just how this matter actually stands in the Constitution, and that this neces sary implication as a source of restraint on the Legislature, must be, somehow, disposed of, or this measure could not be passed. Hence this theory. Now Sir, the friends of constitutional law do not admit, in any manner, the validity of this pretended principle of construction, and claim, on the contrary, that the Legislature is not only limited and restrained by the expressly affirmative and negative provisions of the Constitution, but that it is also limited and restrained, 3. By what the words of the Constitution neces sarily imply. L The courts so hold. In the case, Sears vs. Cottrell, 5 Michigan, p. 260, the Supreme Court of this State says: " An act of a State Legislature, not prohibited by the express words of the Constitution, or by necssessary implication, cannot be declared void, as a violation of that instrument." Mr. Chairman, please note carefifily, the terms of this pertinent dlecision. It places l I I 24 the words of the Constitution necessarily imply, as well as by expressly affirmative and negative provisions; and that, consequently, the con trary doctrine, set forth and advocated in the Message, has no manner of legal foundation. But, 2. Usage and common sense both teach the same thing. They teach, as clearly and as positively, as do the courts, that the power and action of the Legislature, are limited and restrained by what the words of the Constitution necessarily imply. Our Constitution, our laws, our jurisprudence, our literature, our every day transactions abound in illustrations of the truth of this position. For example: The Constitution of this State sa) s, "The property of no person shall be taken for public use without just compensation therefor." In Sec. 2 of the same Art. is prescribed the manner in which such compensation shall be determined, when private property is so taken. But the Consti tution no where says, in express terms, that private property may be taken for the use and benefit of the pu blic. But yet these words " pre-suppo se" the exi stence of the r ight; they clearly imply it; they distinctly recognize it, and go on the ground of it; con sequently, the right is contained in them by necessary implica tion. Again. The Federal Constitution confers on Congress the power " to establish post offices and pos t r oads." But whence the authority an d duty of Congress, u nd e r and by virtue of th at in strume nt, to crrry the mail, and to pun ish those who rob it, or s teal letters foom a post office? Why, Sir, all the authority or duty ther e is f or all that, is implied in the au thority to "establish post offices and post road s. " And ou r whole immense post offnce system, and all the laws and regulation s con cerning it, are b ased on that implication. Our State and gN a tional Constitutions and laws are full of similar illustrations. But let us take for a moment, more familiar cases-such as we meet with in every day life. For instance: If y ou, with my consent, go to work f or me without any expre ss agreement asr to compen sation, it is pre-supposed " that I will pay you what your services are fairly worth, and I am obliged to do so, by necessary implicatioon. If you h ave sold goods to me, of any description, and I have consented to receive them, withou t a n y agr eement as to p rice, it is t'pre-supposed," that I will pay you what they are reasonably worth, and I am firmly b o u n d to do so, by w hat that pre- supp osit ion necessarily iamplies. If I ask you for a hundred dollars and you let me have it, and I go away with it, a word not being said by either of us as to refhnding it, is is pre-sitpposed that I will account to you for it, and, by necessary implication, resulting from such pre-supposition, I am obliged to do so. And thus it is that this principle of pre-supposition and necessary implication operates in matter-of fact life. Take one case more. The Federal and State Constitutions both say with entire clearness, " that the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus shall net be suspended except in case of rebellion or invasion the public safety require it." But you will please note, that neither of these instruments say in express words, that the privileges of this writ may be snapended at all, and yet the words of each Constitution pre-suppose that i t may be suspended in the contingency contemplated; the y go on that basis; and, cons equently, this pre-suppositi o n enters into the very essence of the provision. Now, Sir, since th i s is so, a nd i t is impossi - ble to be otherwise, it the nce plainly follows that if the words of the Constitution, Art. 7, Sec. 1, "pre-suppose that the offer to vote will be made in the township or ward in which the elector resides," as the Message expr es s ly a f firms t the fact t o be, then, that must be the fundamen tal law by necessary implication, and for the reas on already illustrated, namelyi That where the words of the Constitution " pre-suppose" a right, privilege or duty to ex ist, and recognize it as permanent, and proceed on the groun d of it, the samd t he reby becomes a vital part of the instrument i tself b y neces sary implication; and the case becomes stil l stronger, if such a thing be possible, where what is thus pre-supposed or implied, is agree able to the principles of common law, as is the fact, in this particular instance, as we have before fully shown. And in the pregnant words of Chief Justice Marshall, this proposition is " sustained on a principle, which so entirely pervades the Con stitution, is so intermixed with the materials which compose it, so interwoven with its web, so blended with its texture, as to be incapable of being separated from it, without rending it into shreds." Thus, Sir, the theory of the Message, that the power and action of the Legislature are not limited and restrained by what the words of the Constitution pre-suppose and imply, 1' Melts into air, into thin air; And, like the baseless fabric of a vision Leaves not a rack behind.', V. Another of these evasive theories is this: "These words of the Conzstitultion, to wtit:' In the township or ward in which he offers to vote,' prop erly mean the township or ward, in which the elec tor' s vote is to take effect. " This construction, it I rightly understand its history, originated with a gentleman of acknowledged ability, and who stands high and strong in the domain of party politics, not only of this State but of the nation. It seems to be quite satisfactory to very many. I may, therefore, be allowed tp dwell on it for a few moments. And I co:6fess to a feeling of embarrassment in attempting it, because I am -not sure that I know exactly what it means. The distinguished author of it did not happen to tell us, nor as far as I know, has any of those accepting it. We must then, get at it as best we can. '"To take effect" means to be efficacious. A vote, therefore, to take effect in a township or ward, must mean, if indeed it has any meaning at all, one of two things: either to operate in the choice of township or ward officers only, or to be counted in the township or ward. To confine the votes of electors to the choice of township or ward offleers, would, of necessity, put an end to all County or State elections. Taken in this sense, this construction would defeat the object, not only of Sec. 1, refbrred to, but of the whole Constitution, and thus paralize, and even destroy the government itself. Consequently, in this sense, it is to be rejected. It' by this construcetion is meant, that the votes of electors are to be I 25 terms, when its meaning is evident and leads to no absurd consclusion there can be no rea son for refusing to admit the meaning, which such deed (instrument) naturally presents. To go elsewhere in search of conjecture, in order to restrict or extend it, is but an attempt to elude it." Exactly so. And how completely these apposite words of this greaat authority bring to naught this evasive theory of our distinguish ed partisan politician. 4. By looking back to what we have estab lished in the course of this argument, we see, that this theory, or the proposed reading of the Constitution, is contrary to the universal, uni form, and unquestioned usage from the time the Constitution was adopted —contrary to cotemporaneous legislation, to the opinion of the legal profession, universally, at and from the time the Constitution was proposed, and to the opinions of all the courts of such of the States as have spoken on this subject, whose organic law, on this point, is siemilar to ours. F or these reasons we may regard the pro posed reading, or the substitutini of the words "in which his vote is to take effect," for the l words, " in which he offers to vote," as a gross violation of the text-as a shere conjecture, lying outside of the expression of the text, having the effect, if not the deliberate design to evade the plain meaning of the Constitution, and thus secure for an ulterior end, a law not agreeable to its letter or intent. VI Awothier qf thtese evasive theories is, Tha', a law like the oize Ooze proposed is necessary to give effect to Sec. 5, Art. 7, of the (,2Oistitu tioi, which declares, that "no elector shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence by reason of his being employed in the service o eo the United States or of this State; nor while engaged in the navigation of the waters of this State or of the United States, or of the high seas; nor while a student of any seminary of learning; nor while kept at any almns-house, or other asylum at public expense; nor while confined in any public prison." Now, it is maintained, that for the want of a statute, corresponding with this provision of the Constitution, this right of absentees to vote is not available that it is wholly inert; and that "it is not to be supposed, that it was the purpose of the Constitution to preserve a naked right to vote, but with restrictions pre venting its exercise." This view of the case taken all alone, seems plausible. It is an artful way to beg the ques tion. But the first inquiry here is, what is the true intent and meaning of this provision? When we know that, it must govern:us. In ascertaining what the intention of an instru ment is, all elementary writers on law, and all , the courts, as well as our own common sense, I tell us, that "' the intention of the law-giver is to be deduced from a view of the vwhlole and every part of a statute, taken and comnared together." Kent vol. 1, p. 520, 12 Wheat. 32. Now, we have already shown bv acets, argu ments, authority, and law, not to be shaken, that the true intent and IN ain.u of Sec. 1, Art. 7, is that each elector in order to vote, must appear in person at the polls in the township or ward in which he resides and there person ally tender his rote. I Now, the same facts, arg.aments autlior;ties, and settled decisiorns of the ourts, or nearly the same, by which the sese of ~I~.! is counted in the t own ship or ward, where they resi de, the n there are many fatal objection s to it: 1. It does not take the words of the Cors onstitution in their natural or ordina ry impor t, which, as w ee hav e s een, i s essential. What honest, straight-forward ma n of common s ens e, would ever imagine, that the phrase, "in which he offers to vote," means "in which his vote is to take effect," that is, to be counted! Why, just look at the two sets of words. Compare them. How entirely dissimilar in mean For example: "He" does not mean "his," nor can the words "offers to vote," be so twisted as to mean " to take effect," or to count votes, or to be counted. The words of the Constitution referred to, only seek to provide for getting votes into the ballott box; they leave it to the Legislature to determine how and by whom they shall be counted, after being cast into it. Why, Sir, this is all pretence, the absurdity of which is really too glaring to be talked about. But the announcement and advocacy of this theory can be accounted for, perhaps on the hypothesis, that the friends of this measure deem it important to become all things to all men, if by any means, they may deceive some, and thus carry it. But, 2. This theory of construction takes plain, words out of the Constitution and puts dubious ones into it. It is wholly unallowable to do either. Indeed, any theory of construction, which adds to or takes from the text of that instrument, is not to be tolerated for a moment. We may expound when necessary, but not alter or amend. In King vs. Burrell, 12 A. & E. 468, Judge Patterson says: I see the necessity of not importing into statutes words which are not to be found there. Such a mode of interpretation, (he adds) only occasions endless difficulty." And in a case before cited, Chief Justice Tindal says: "It is the duty of all courts to confine themselves to the words of the statute, nothing addinr thereto, and nothing diminishing." Otherwise, the courts would take on themselves the business of making laws, as well as interpreting and applying them. In like manner, legislators are to take the words of the Constitution just as they naturally or fairly read. If we take out words from it or put them in, we take on ourselves the responsibility of altering and amending the Constitution instead of obeying and carrying it out. If the Constitution is imperfect, it is the business of the people, in their original capacity to amend it, in the mode prescribed, and not ours; and until the people shrall do that, its words, just as they stand, must govern us. 3. This proposed reading for this part of the Constitution, is mere conjecture, or construction, which means drawing conclusions respecting a point or idea, which lies outside of, or beyond the text. The rule is, that where the sense of the words of the text is plain and reasonable, as in this instance, a resort to construction is not admissible. In his work on Statutory and Constitutional Law, p. 227, Segwick says: "When we see what is the sense, that agrees with the intention of the instrument, it is not allowvable to wrest the words to a contrary meaning." Vattel says: " It is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation." Hie continues:'"When a deed (an instrument) is worded in clear and pricisc 26 gencies in mind, and in view of them fixed the place of voting, and required the elector to ap pear inii person and vote personally, as already pointed out. 2. The received exposition does not have the effect to disfranchise soldiers any more than it does students sailors, or foreign ministers. It disfranchises no one. In fact it nas just the contrarv effect. It faithfully continues the elective franchise for these vari ous classes of absentees, in full force, to be enjoyed by them at once on their return. Is this a mere empty right-a right of no value a barefaced mockery? While away, these per s on s are not at home to vote, it is true; nor are they at home to enjoy its comforts, to take care of their families and business. These are great evils, they are Treat hardships, but they are incident to certain vocations, and, especia ily, to a state of war. They illustrate the enormous crime of this rebellion, the ill desert of such as aid and abet it, and the sympathy and gratitude due to those who endure these hardships, in order to quell it, and save the Union. But, eMr. Chairman, our official duty as legislators, is plain. The people have placed a Constitution over us, and made us subject to it. We must take its words, just as they stand, and naturally mean. By this must we be strictly governed, and not by any notions of our own as to what is polic y, what i s con venient, or inconvenient, what Lis a privilee or hardship. And so the courts decide. The Inhabitants of St. George, Dwarris p. 597, Mr. Justice Taunton says: " Policy is a very questionable and unsatisfactory ground; because men's minds differ much on the nature and extent of public policy." He continues; "The, ground ot public policy is a very unsafe one. It is best to adhere to the words used in the act of Parliament." Also Judge Story in Conflict of Laws, savs: "'Arguments fiom policy or inconvenience ought to have little weight. The only sound principle is to declare ita lex scripta est, (thus the law is written,) to follow and to obey; nor could there be well found a more unsafe guide or practice than mere policy and convenience." In the Queen vs. Justices of Lanicastershire 11 A. & E. 157, Mr. Justice Patterson says: "I cannot tell what consequences may result from the construction whice we must put upon the Statute; but if mischievous, they must be remedied by the Leg,,islatu-e." In Rhodes vs. Smithurst, 4 Mess, andW.63, Lord Abentersays; A court of law ought not to be influenced, or governed by-any notions of hardship; cases may require legislative interference, but judges cannot modify the rules of law." Now exactly the same principle applies as between the Legislature and the Constitution. The Leg,islature cannot be justified in disregarding or evading the plain meaning of any provision of that instrument, because it conflicts with the opinions of policy, expediency, convenience, hardship, or justice entertained by its diferent members. Tile remedy for an imper'ect, unwise, or-oppressive provision of the Constitution, If such exists, is by an appeal to the justice and patriotism of the people. In their original and aggregate capacity, they can correct the evil by amendment, or a new instrumen~t; but the Legislatulre cannot a~ssrune their r'ights'andi mos'e than the court. The Legislature,e itself;,is the creature of established, determine the meaning of See. 5 to be exactly this: No elector, if absent frlom the townslhip, or ward in which he resides, on an y of the g.rounds the rein named, shall either lose or gain a residence on that account, bu t as to the m att er of v ot ing, as wsell a s to ot her purpos es of r esidence' lie shall stand, precisely, w her e h e would have stood, had he n ot been ab sent at all. His residence is contin ued, h is rig,,ht t o vo te where he resides i s pre served, s o that when he comes back to the place of his residence, he can exercise this right at once. without being oblid ed to earn a residence a second time. Such, I submit, is the t rue meaning e t d of the words of Sec. G5, taken in their natul ral, o rdinary, and necessary import, ia the order in whic h they are placed. It makes t he two Sections entirely harmonious, and both taken together, sustain the exposit ion I have stated. T h is particular theory, then being met and disposed of by th e sam e considerations, in the main, as th e last, I refer to them without further commen t upon it. VII. Ano ther th e ory designed to elude the r eceived ex position, and secure the passage of the is this measure is thhse "e Thepreseyt countinamezcy its one not contedidplyatec i b y the Copventioc which jk anted th e Cozstitutioh, or by the people who adopted it; " I that phublic p olsicy reqPuires,ta that tene Ctonstitutio t b e construed liberally, so as to avoid ips fari as possible, th e hardships and iimcontvez;iencies connrected with these dark and bloody tnes; and that t he r eceived exposi tion practically disfranchises a large share of our most p atriotic and worthy fellow citaiens-a tiardtshtipl which the passag e o f this measure woty-d remoo)e. Now, Mr. Chairman, I call you to witness, and I call th e membe r s of thi s Commit te e to wi tn e ss, that J am not arguing, a,aifst the propriety of soldiersf voting in itself considerednot at a11; but th at out Constitution. as it now reads, prohibits the p assage of either of the se Bills. This is just wh ere I stand. Keep ing this in view, let us examine the positi on taken b y the friends of this project, as here stated. Let us do it candidly, beine onl y d esirous to k now and obey the truth. In the first place, we all know, or should know, that it is not true, that the C on stit ut ion d oes not contemplate a contingency in public a ffairs, in kinad, like the present. It is n ot pretended, tha t the framers of that instrument, or the people adopting it, foresaw that any particular rebellion or invas ion w ould take place,; but it is plain enough, on the f ace of that instrument, t h at they folesaw, that rebellion or invasion of soire kind, in some form and to some degree, less or more, might occur, and foreseeing it, they providert for it. For example: They provided, that "the privileges of the writ of habsa,s corprus shall not be suspended, except in ease of i'ebellionz and invasionis the public safety requires it." These words clearly show, that they foresaw, that times such as these, rmig'ht occur. They also provided for enrolling and equipping the militia, determined who saill be Com-manderin-Cieiif of the military and naval forces of the State, and authorized him to call then out " to suppress i~'zsurrection and rep~e invarsion."I These, then, are some of the main poinlts to which these proofs conduct us: 1. Thlat the Converttien, Iramning' the Constitution, andl thleI people adopting ~t, had these terrible contra- I i Ii II i i i I i i I 27 ly from the paramount authority, to-wit, the Federal Constitution. It. It necessarily follows from these premises that should either of these bills be passed by this Legislature, the law will be valid, how ever much it may conflict with the Constitu tion of the State, because it will be in pursuance of the express pro\sos of the Federal Constitution, whose autlhoity is supreme. Such, Sir, I prophesy, is tlb sLbstanee of the argument which the champions o this inmeas ure will try to set up in its behalf, on these provisions of the Constitution of thie United States. In reply, it should seem quite suffi cient to say: That Sec. II. 1, Art. 1. of the Federal Con stitution, reads in this way: "The House of Representatives (in Congress) shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States; and the electors in each State shall have the qualificeations requisitefor electors of the most numerous branch oj' the State Legislature." By this provision of the United States Constitution, it is left to each State to determine the qualifications of electors of Federal Representatives, subject, however, to this one limitation, namely: That the qualifications must be the same, as for electors of State Representatives," in order that the States maynotbe tempted to pervert this power." As before suggested, these qualifications of electors, or requisites, or conditions of suffrage, differ in different States; in some there is a property qualification, in others, not; in some color is made a qualification, in others, not; in some "place I is an essential requisite, in others, not. But whatever these qualifications, requisites or conditions, are, in any State, they must be the same for electors of Cong ressmen as for electors of State Repre sentatives. You will please note here, that the qualifications or requisites of electors of State Representatives are made the standard made so by the Federal Constitution. The Constitution of this State, as we have already fully seen, makes "place " an element, or condition of voting. That is, it makes it an essential requisite of electors of all public offcers, elective of the people, ("the most numerous branch of the State Legislature" included,) that they vote "in the township or ward" where they reside. Now, right here, be it observed: 1. That by the provision of the Federal Con stitution, last quoted, that instrument, in ef feet, takes up, adopts, appropriates, and im poses this same requisite for electors of I Federal Representatives from Michigan as com pletely as it would have done had it been incorporated into its very text. 2. That this Legisatu re cannot, by any possibility, avoid this cardinal requisite for electors of Representatives in Congress by any act of legislation, because it is firmly tied to it both by the Constitution of the State and of the United States. 3. That Co;gsres.- cannot avoid this essential requisite for electors of Congressmen, here in Michigan, (to-wit, that the elector shall vote " in the township or ward" where he resides) by taking the matter into its own hands, bec ause that body is, also, firmly bound to it by an express provision of the Federal Constitution —Azt. 1, Sec. 1I.1.S the Constitution, the same as the court, and must follow its provisions with equal strictness, and by the same rules of interpretation. This theory, therefore, with regard to the unanticipated state of the country, public policy, inconvenience, and the like, being erroneous thro -,ghout, either in fact or in law, is entitled to no manner of weight against the plain sense of the Constitution. VIII. One thing more. Were this measure passed, would the law be valid for the electiont of Goitqressmnen and P?residential Electors, although incomp,atible with the Coitstitution? of M-Vichigan?" This question, so far as I know, has not been raised by anybody here or elsewhere. I don't know a s any one, on either side, will think it wor thy of c onsi deration. But, being aware of the ingenuity and bold ness of the champions of this meas ure on this floor, I expect that they will claim, in due time, that, should it become a law, it will be valid as to the election of members of Congress and Presidential Electors, however repug nant it may b e to our Stat e Constitution. Now, as I do not wish to take the floor again on this subject, permit me to anticipate this point to be hereafter raised by the o ther side, in all probability, and also the argument by which the y will attem pt to sustain it. With a v iew to this, it i s t o be noted here that Se. IV. 1, Art. 1. of the Con stitution of the United States, rea ds as follows: "The times, places, axnd mnanrer of holding elections for Senators and R epresentative s (in Congress) shall be p r escribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Co ngress may, a t any time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators." And Sec. I. 1, Art. II, of the same instrument, reads thus: "Each State shall appoint, in such a manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors (of President and Vice-President) equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in Congress." We may well expect, Sir,, that the friends of this measure will make the mos~ they possibly can out of these provisions, in order to promote its passage. And what positions will they take, and what course of argument will they be likely to institute in view of them? I opine, that all their efforts in this respect, will amount, in substance, to this, namely: 1. IIThe Constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the land, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." 2. By these provisions of the Federal Constitution, the times, places and manner of holding elections for the officers in question, are to be prescribed, not by the people of the several States acting in their original character, not by the Constitutions of the different States; but, on the contrary, the power to so prescribe and determine, is taken away from the people of the several States, in their primary capacity-taken away from State Constitutions-anddommitted to thie Legislatures of the respective States, subject only to the revision of Congressi so that S~tate Constitutions have no jurisdiction or control in the case whatever, while the Legislature of eachl State has fuill jurisdiction, independent of the Constitution thereof, having derived it direct, II 28 and in others by general ticket. In this State they are elective of the people by general ticket. The bills before us contemplate this same mode of electing them. Now, Sir, I submit with deference, that granting that the Legislature may repeal that part of' the election law which relates to the mode of choosing these Electors, and direct that they shall be a,ppointed in some other mode; yet, whien and so lon7g, as it makes them elective of the people at our general election, and by the qual ified electors of the State, the Constitution of the State comes in to prescribe and determine their qualifications or requ'sites, or the conditions under which they shall vote, if at all; and because that Constitution requires each and all electors of of public officers to vote at our general elections, in the township or ward where they reside, it thence follows, that the proposed law, allowinii them to vote elsewhere, and even outside of the State lines at such elections, would be invalid as to the choice of Presidential Electors the same as for other public officers. Consequently, the doctrine, that the proposed law, would be valid for the election of Federal Representatives and Presidential Electors, even if unconstitutional and void as to the election of other public officers, cannot be lawfully upheld here in Michigan, whatever may be the case in some of the other States. Now, Sir, to recapitulate somewhat, at this point in this discussion: It has been my aim thus far, 1. To clear the subject in hand, of seductive side issues, and to put it in its just light. 2. To state the true intent and meaning of the Constitution with regard to it. 3. To illustrate and sustain that intent and meaning, as thus stated, by facts, arguments, authority, and law as settled by the courts. 4. To meet and overthrow by the same means, the many false theories, gotten up and brought forward by the special champions of this measure to elude the plain sense of the Constitution, turn the minds of members away from the real merits of the case, and, thus, to secure the enactment of the proposed law. And this finishes what I have to say, at this time, on the constitutionality of this measure. I regret, that the effort is so far short of the work of a master; but, Sir, I have uttered as best I could, under the circumstances, what occurred to me. The subject unfolded, as I proceded, and as a result, I have detained you far beyond my expectation; but without offering any apology fbr holding the floor so long, except such as the importance of the subject, the circumstances of the occasion, the relations of one portion of this body to the other, and my freedom. from 1arty obligations and party trammels naturally suggest, I now propose to add a few words with regard to The Expediency of this Project. Many think it unwise to pass a law of the kind proposed because, 1. It is so nearly impracticable to carry it out. The Committee of Elections took this view last winter, in their able Report before spoken of, to which I refer, as presenting a lucid statement, of this particular point. And Mr. BLAIre himself, on the occasion referred to, in Thus, Sir, this anticipated argument in favor of the validity of this measure for the election of Congressmen wholly fails, when examined and put to the tett. I might offer other considerations showing that this anticipated argument is utterly indefensible, as far as the election of Federal Repriesentatives is concerned; but it is not necessary, as it is already overthrown and disposed of; nevertheless, without attempting to discuss the question, whether or not, an act of the Legislature would be valid, which should be authorized by the Constitution of the United States, but unauthorized by the Constitution, of the State, we shall do well not to forget, 1. Th at in case the Constitution of the State anid of the United States, contain provisions with regard to the same subject affecting the powers of the Legislature of the State, they are to be construed with reference to each other; that the words of each are to be taken in their natural and ordinary import; and holding to this rule that interpretation of the afore-mentioned provisions of these respective instruments is to prevail, which shall be consistent and harmonious, one with the other. 2. The universally received exposition, on which I have dwelt, of Sec. 1, Art. 7, of the Constitution of this State with regard to elections, and of Sec. II. 1, and of Sec. IV. 1. of Art. I. of the Constitution of' the UnitedStates relative to the election of Federal RepresentativesI repeat that this exposition, as denoted by our general election law, gives full eflbet to every word of these several provisions, and makes them and the Statute all consistent and harmonious with each other, as to the qualifications of electors, the time, place, and manner of holding elections, as well as to every other particular to which they relate. 3. The argument in favor of the validity of the law now sought, as to the election of Congressmen, (which I have anticipated,) would array the Constitution of the United States against both itself and the Constitution of this State; it would also array the action of the Legislature against both the State and Federal Constitutions, and make the subordinate superior to the principal-the creature superior to the creator. Such an innovation, resulting in such antagonisms and absurdities, is wholly unallowable, as against an exposition and practice, co-eva] and co-exteusive, with the adoption and jurisdiction of the Constitution of the State, which gives every word involved a full, natural and reasonable meaning, and makes them all blend in one consistent anDd harmonious whole. This latter is a practical exposition, which possess attributes "too firm to be shaken or controlled.'" One word as to the election of Presidential Electors. As we have seen, the Constitution of the United States provides that they shall be appointed by each State in such manner as the Lefislature thereof may direct. This provision has been taken in its most comprehensive meaning. A large discretion has been exercised under it by the Legislatures of the different States. They have deterrnined who shall appoint, as well as the mode of appointing. For this reason, there is some diversity among the seveial States as to the mode of choosing these Electors. In some of the States they are chosenby the Legislature, in others by districts, '.29 subject, on election days as well as on others, to the control of their commanding officers. But MR. BLAIR, for some cause, now holds very different language. He now says: " If these volunteer citizen soldiers should not have a voice in the civil administration of the government, then it would be well to inquire, who is worthy of it." Hle now tells us, in effect, that the ballot box may be safely sent among these soldiers, although subject to the control of their Commanders, and right into the very camps, whose influences he seems to have been so suspicious of, but a short time ago! Then he declared, that he had no great confidence in votes taken of the soldiers, under such circumstances; but, now, forsooth, his confidence seems to repose on them especially. Whence this conversion? Whence this casting discredit on the votes of soldiers, yesterday, and panegyrics on them to-day? Can there be any good reason for it? There may be a strong motive for it; but is there any good reasonz? Are not the soldiers as far away from home now as then? Are they not as fully subjected to all the influences of camps, and are not these influences quite as bad, now, as then? Or has a continuance in army life, made the soldiers more intelligent, and virtuous, and less and less under the control of their Commanders, so that they can vote more under standingly, and with a greater degree of independence now than they could have done at the last general election? And is this why MR. BLAIR has turned, "' riqht about face," on this question? Or is there less opportunity, now, than then, for an ambitious office-seeker, at home, to conspire with Commanders in the camps, so as to control elections to his liking-so as to secure, for example, the choice of such, and so many Representatives and Senators for the next Legislature, as shall accompl ish his wishes, and thus effect his a dva ncement? Is it indeed true, that such an improvement has really taken place? And is that the actual, produciing cause of MR. BLAIR'S radical change of mind? The point of my inquiry is. not whether MR. BLAIR had a motive for this change, for that is admitted; but whethe r he has a justif,ying reason for it. He submitted, in his Message, certain theories in support of his new views; but having handled and examined them, we find that they are just about as in n ocent of t ruth as a pretty bauble is of solid matter. Now, we inquire, again, does any justifyi7?g reason anywhere e x ist for this cha nge o'f base," on the part of Mr. BLAIR? Th e truth is, Sir. man follows the promptings of his dominant motive; and the character of the motive de pends on the real character ot the man. If he is a man of truth and "right reason"-if these compose the substance of his moral and intellectual being-then his dominant motive will spring from truth and reason, and he will follow their light whithersoever it shall lead him. But, onthe other hand, if he is greedy of gain, or of political prefermeut,-if either of these passions is dominant in him, his ruling motive will spring from it, and he will follow its promptings, change fronts, and shift about for good reasons, or without them, or against them as the case may be, so long as he remains a man of this type. I remember a case in point. I was once present at a meeting of a set of Rail road directors. They had a confidential adviser speaking of this point, used these words: "It is well nigh impossible to have the soldiers vote because of the great number of districts in which votes are to be polled, and returns made, and because the soldiers will be subject to the control of their commanding officers, and may be in line orf battle, or on a march upon election day." This is one of the grounds which Mr. BLAIR then assigned for his conviction, that such a law as is now sought, would be inexpedient. He states the point fairly. Is it less important, and forcible now, than then? It you say yes, please adduce the proof. 2. Xffany regard it inexpedient to pass this measmu e, on accoiunt of the opportuiity the experimenrt would afford for ille,gal voting, it beting alike impossible to enforce any effci,qt system of challenging, or to punish offenders. Suppose somebody in New Orleans knows the name and place of residence of some Michigan soldier, who, for some reason, is unable to be on hand to vote. The ballot box from Michigan comes there for votes. This man at New Orleans, steps forwaid, and, assuming the name of the absent soldier from Michigan, offers to vote. There is no one there to challenge him. He votes. This is but one case in many thousands, perhaps. In this way the ballot box would quite likely be stuffed with illegal votes. Now, how can any law, which we may pass here, prevent such a result if the ballot box is sent there as proposed; and how can punishment be inflicted on the offender under any law of Michigan, so long as the laws of Michigan have no effect outside of the State lines? In short, what law is there against stuffing a Michigan ballot box in New Orleans, or anywhere else outside of the lines of the State? Under what law could the offender be complained of? What court would havejurisdiction of such a case? Indeed, could any case be gotten up on account of such an act? Would't be an offence against law? Would it not be a kind of mischief which would work great evils, but yet could not be got at? Thisais what is claimed as quite sure to follow from the passage of this measure. 3. Many argue against the expediency of this measure, because: 1. NYo discussions can be had in the camps on political topics, or the merits of candidates. 2. The soldiers are not in circumstances to vote independently, but rather as their Commanders shall desire. 3. This measure would thus putt a very dangerous power into the hands of these Commanders, which they could easily use, especially by confederating with a few ambitious men at home, to get a kind of voting monopoly, hold the balance of power, control elections, and thus, the State and national governments. In such event, the sword, the purse, and the law would fall into the same hands, and misrule, or a terrible despotism, would probably be the result. Such is the way which many reason, irrespective of party. Theirviews are strengthened by reference to examples, occurring in the past, and in France and Mexico in our own day. It should seem that Mr. BLAIR ha s shared in these general views. For in speaking of this measure, not long ago, he said: "I confkss to having nzo great confidence i~ the votes of soldiers far awsay j'rora home, and subject to call the isxfluencees of camps and where no discussion can be had." Mu. BLxmR had already spoken o f the soldiers being 30 the very contents of whose being was a desire for gain. He was also present. They submit ted a certain financial project to him for his opinion. The case was a plain one, and be at once decided against the scheme, and gave his reasons, which were good: just as MR. BLAIR did, a short time ago, against this project. But this money-loving adviser, of a sudden, saw how he could make ten thousand dollars, in half an hour, out of the railroad, if the plan of the directors were adopted. Controlled by his ruling motive, he changed his mind os tensibly, and in ten minutes after he gave his first opinion, he gave another diametrically opposite. The plan was adopted, because the directors had a bias that way, and in less than two hours their adviser had made $10,000 out of the concern and got his money, which went so far to ruin it, and that is all the good his new opinion did them. Now this old sharper had a motive for changing his opinion, and it controlled him, but he had no justifying reaso,n for it; and he knew that in that process he received a lie into the inmost sanctuary of his natuire, and gave utterance to it in his second opinion. Does this illustrate any part of Mr. BLAIR'S course in this matter? Mr. BLAIR, as well as the sharper, changes "his base." Mr. BLAIR gives no more justifying reasons for it, than the sharper. We see the motive ($10,000), which determined the sharper to contradict himself on all material points. What is Mr. BLAIP's motive? Is it to provide for himself votes against the time of need? Hlas he daring enough to try to navigate the uneven political sea, in two contrary opinions on such a question as this, when the motive in which the last originated, stands out so plainly and the means for carrying it out are so very revolutionary? Why, one would naturally suppose, that he would have been admonished, betimes, by the fate of the adventurer, who undertook to get across a rough river in two tubs, having one foot in each. The poor fellowsee-sawed, and pitched in opposite directions, first one side being up, and then the other, as the waves happened to rise or fall, till at length he reached a point, where the waters divided, and his tubs, taking opposite courses, split him right up, and thus finished him. And is it not more than possible, Sir, that when these two entirely contradictory positions of Mr.BLAIR, on a constitutional question, involving the integrity of the Constitution it- self, the purity of elections, and the stability of the government, become generally known and compared; when the nature, tendency, and object of the last position shall be well understood, as the same will soon De; then, in that day, shall not the voice of an indignant people be heard coming up from all parts of the State, louder than the voice of many waters, saying: "The double-minded man," the man of no settled principles, the man, who now advances one opinion, and now another directly contrary, the man, who now goes for one course of action, and now for an entirely opposite course-such a man is "unstatle in all his ways?" He hath no sure foundations. He is not to be built on more than a quicksand. u Avoid him. These extremely exigent times call for men for high places, of clear heads and pure hearts, of vigorous wills and solid bomRo m who are founded on the rock of unchanging. truth and right reason, and who can " stand fast in one mind," having fit qualifications for conducting the country, successfully, through this season of s pecial exigency and t r ial. Atd this leads me to consider, 4. The dangerous precedent, which the passage of the proposed law and the practice utnder it, would aford as to the mana qemzezt of elections. Mr. Chairman, I was born and brought up in a State, the most thoroughly and nobly Whlie of any State in the Unioii-the State of Ver mont. I was taught, from the first, to regard the British, the Democrats, and the Devil, as being pretty much on a par. And I confess, that I remain very much of the same mind still, although I am free to admit, that I have learned, that there are many honorable excep tions to tuis general proposition among the Democrats, and that the Whigs were not, and that the Republicans are not all as pure and wise, as I once supposed them to be. But I never had any affinity for the distiictive spirit or dogmas of the democratic party. And I never cast a democratic political party vote in my life, and it is not lilvely I ever shall. I al ways had a kind of feeling, more or less dis tinct and influential, that pretty much all that is peculiar to that party, whether in spirit or theory, is the result of the fall of man; and yet, in spite of this, I rejoice to be able to re cognize many excellent men among the Demo crats; nay, some of God's noblest offspring. Now, Sir, it was a standing charge, on the part of the Whig party ao'ainst the Democrats, that the latter would do anything —change their tenets, shift grounds, deny, to-day, what they swore to, yesterday, trample the Consti tution, and, especially, stuff the ballot box, and corrupt the elections, in short, that they would do any thing, no matter what, in order either to preserve or gain party ascendancy; and furthermore, (and as a natural consequence) that the irreverence for age and experience, for learning, wisdom and religion, the disposi tion to break through all law and all principle, and all constitutional restrictions, so prevalent in the land, is attributable to the spirit and conduct of the democratic party, and its members. Nor did the matter stop here. The Whig,s, at length, being joined by a few of the more considerate and conscientious of the Dem-ocrats, organized the Republican party. Of course, the Whigs carried over into the new party, all their old accusations and prejudices against the Democrats, and have increased the stock by such additions, as they have been able from time to time to accumulate. And the opportunities have not been either few nor small; so that, now, accusations and charges against the Democrats, and. especially, for irregular and corrupt proceedings at elections, really constitute an important department of the literature of the Republican party; and I have no thought of attempting to deny, that it is all substantially true. And, now, let it be granted, that it is indeed so; that the Democrats are just as bad as the Republicans charge them to be. Let us suppose too, that this measure is passed by Republican votes against Democratic, and that the law has gone into effect, and the ballot box has been sent out of the Stat@, and all over the United States, Jorvotes. Now, see what. a precedent is thus afforded bv Republicans to these lawless Democrats. A~nd suppose, too, one thing more, 31 namely, that in the ups and downs of party, these reckless Democrats, full of all subtilty and mischief; again come into power. Now, with such a precedent as this before them, originated and established too, by the circurmspect, law-loving and law-abiding Republicans, what would these Democrats not do with the ballot box, and in the conduct of elections, in order to choose their candidates and carry their points! They will not restrict the ballot box, when sent out of the township or ward to the soldier, and the camp. They will not be guilty of such narrow and odious partiality as that. Not they. For they will, at once, so amend the law, as to authorize the ballot box to be sent to all citizens out of the town or ward in which they reside, wherever they are, in this or in foreign lands, and polls to be opened in other States, in the chief places of concourse, in the streets, in the opening of the gates, in the cities, at all points, at home and abroad, where a democratic ballot box can be filled up for the benefit of that party in Miehizan. And from that time on, they would overrun us, rive us from head to foot, cut us up root and bianich, and trample us down. And should you remonstrate against it, and ask why do ye so, they will point you to this law, this very precedent, which you establish, and say: "Here is our justification;" and you will be speechless, smitten "with shame and confusion of face." Will you, then, by the passage of this measure, deliberately establish such a precedent as that for these audacious Philstines, who may soon become your political masters? Will you thus deliberately arm your deadly foes, who persistently seek your fair places, your dominion, your political life? You, Sir, may have rashness enough to venture it. The majority of this body may be rash enough to venture it. But, thank Heaven, I, for one, am not; and believing " discretion to be the better part of valor," I shall not consent to it. And this leads me to speak of another consideration, which appeals especially to RepublicaIns, namely: 5. Thzs measure will, if passed and carried out, be a source of anioyance and grief to a large portion of the people of the State, and will serve to give increased aggravation to other extreme Re- pubichan mneasures, and thus, tend strongly to weaken the Republican party, and displace it Jromn 2:ow