K    ii
n5~
$1~l
~~~~~~~~st




OLYNTIIIAC
AND OTHER PUBLIC ORATIONS
DE M O S THENE S.
TRANSLATED, WITH NOTES, &c.,
BY
CHARLES RANN KENNEDY.
IN TWO VOLUMES,
VOL. I.
NEW YORK:
HARPER & BRIOTHERS, PUBLISHERS,
FRANKLIN SQUARE.
1860.








CONTENTS,
PAGE
PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION...............................                    i
CHRONOLOGICAL ABSTRACT OF EVENTS DURING THE LIFE OF DEMOSTHENES.XX
ORATIONS:The first Olynthiac............................          37
The second Olynthiac................................   45
The third Olynthiac....................................   52
The first Philippic.....................................  60
On the Peace..........................................                 73
The second Philippic...................................   81
On Halonnesus........................................    89
On the Chersonese.....................................                100
The third Philippic.................................... 115
The fourth Philippic.................................. 132
On the Letter.........................................  149
(The Letter of Philip)...................... 156
On the Duties of the State..............................              164
On the Navy Boards...................................  176
On the Liberty of the Rhodians.....................                189
For the Megalopolitans.................................               204
On the Treaty with Alexander.......................... 217
APPENDICES:I. Olynthus.........................................  227
II. Athenian Money and Mines..........................   2563
III. The Thracian Chersonese............................ 262
IV. The Property Tax................................. 306
V. The Trierarchy..................................  311








PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION.
MY principal aim in undertaking this work is to produce a
readable version of Demosthenes, adhering to the original as
closely as is consistent with the primary object. Brevity and
simplicity of style, together with the choice of apt and forcible
words, are the most essential elements of a good translation.
It is sometimes asked, and there seem to be various opinions on the question, whether a translation should be literal?
It depends, I say, upon the object which you propose to accomplish. If you are composing a translation to be used in
the Hamiltonian method of teaching, or as a mere help to the
idle student against his day of examination, then you must be
literal. And to perform  such a task is not very difficult.
But if you seek to accomplish a higher purpose, it is not to
be done in this way: a work of another order becomes necessary.
The primary object of a good translation is, that it may be
read with pleasure, or at least without difficulty, by your
countrymen; and secondary to this is the assisting of the
student in his perusal of the original. It is true, that for both
these purposes a certain degree of closeness is necessary: but
the first of these can not be attained by a literal version, on
account of the varying idioms of languages; whereas the second may be accomplished by a good readable version.
Nor does the matter rest here. I say that the classical student will derive much greater benefit from a readable version
than he could from a literal. I speak of the real and selfimproving student, not the cramming idler, nor yet the mere
school-boy. Let us only see what his wants are.
V,, L —-A




PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION.
Such a person, in studying a Greek author, is not to look
to a translation for a perfect analysis of the construction of
sentences. This he should find out independently, from those
principles of grammar wherewith his mind has been long storing itself, from glossaries, notes and commentaries. A translation which undertook to solve all the student's grammatical
difficulties, would be nothing more than a long note; having
indeed its use, but not performing the service of a good translation.
The student, looking elsewhere for a thorough explanation
of the syntax, may fairly consult the translator as an exponent
of the true meaning of every sentence. And this is one piece
of service which the translator renders him. But he has a
right to look for much more than this; viz. good English,
choice words, and all the other elements of good writing; in
short, the full sense of the original expressed in such a way as
an Englishman would have expressed it himself, allowing for
unavoidable discrepancies.
No man will deny the importance of these things. One of
the objects of studying foreign languages is, to obtain a more
perfect mastery over your own. And a translation, either in
prose or verse, may in this respect be made a useful medium
of instruction, testing the powers and capabilities of your own
tongue in comparison with those of another. Lord Brougham
very truly observes:
" Even to scholars the experiment is not without interest of
trying how far the two languages can be used, so as to render
in the one the thoughts couched originally in the other; and
even to scholars the comparative trial of the structures of the
two, their resemblances, their differences, and their contrasts,
is very interesting."
To attain the advantage here proposed, it is manifest that
the version must be thoroughly English; or there can be no
comparison at all. But I must turn now to another view of
the question.
While it is the translator's duty to produce (if possible)
such a work as, placed side by side with the original, shall be




PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION.             iii
in point of style and composition not unworthy of it, he must
be sure to preserve all needful accuracy in regard to the sense
and meaning. The term itself implies that he must do this.
A translation is different from an imitation.
He must adhere to the original.  He must be accurate.
But, how closely must he adhere? what degree of accuracy
must he observe? are questions that naturally occur, and can
not well be answered except practically, by examples. I will
give just now some examples to illustrate my views; but will
first endeavor, so far as I am able, to express my opinion in
general words.
It is the business of the translator to express the full sense
briefly, simply, forcibly; to add nothing, omit nothing; never
to amplify or exaggerate. He should not servilely imitate
constructions, or follow the order of words, yet not depart even
from them unnecessarily. The production of good English
he will regard as essential; to this every thing must give
way but the sense of the author. Within the limits of these
two conditions, faithful interpretation and good writing, he
may turn and twist his sentences with a considerable degree
of latitude and freedom. But these limits will always preserve him from unreasonable vagaries. While he does not
affect to teach grammatical rules, they must be the guide to
his own version, or he can not translate faithfully, so that he
will always afford a clew to the construction, and will never
mislead.
To accomplish all this, not only must you be thoroughly
familiar with the language which you translate, but you
should have deeply studied your own, and even known several
besides.
It is an essential condition of producing a good translation,
that you should be able to produce a literal one. Only this is
far from being all. There are hundreds of good scholars who
are able to do this, but who are not competent to write well.
And on the other hand, clever men and practiced writers have
failed in translations because they never took due pains to
study the original language, Hence we have had so many




iv          PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION.
bad translations from opposite causes. The literal translators
necessarily fail, for want of a sufficiently high aim, a proper
conception of their duty. The readable have been men who
neglected or despised the niceties of scholastic learning. There
are others also, from whose acquirements more might have
been expected, Who,-carried away by the fervor of their imagination, or not liking the trouble of attending to words,
have considered it sufficient to give the general meaning of
an author, clothing it often in language which is purely their
own.
To the class of loose translators belongs Leland. His version of Demosthenes is the best of the English, and has considerable merit. He appears also to have been a pretty good
scholar, so that his faults are generally attributable rather to
negligence than ignorance. I shall now proceed to show, by
a few examples, what my views of proper translation are.
The following is from the Oration on the Crown; and I
agree with Lord Brougham, that there is an unnecessary departure from the simplicity of the original:ToV,-o rb jtqptarta bOv r'76-e E   TVr6ret 7repta-rdvra     civ6vvov
rrape60Eiv Ebroil~aev SaTrep vq~og.
Leland: By this decree that danger, which hung lowering over
our state, was in an instant dissipated like a cloud.
So also this: Ov6' atv Esl Tai-a q/)aetEv. Leland: No! Let
not the presumptuous assertion once be heard.
In the Oration on the Chersonese, Demosthenes says that
Philip has beaten the Athenians, -. ) rp6-spoS 7rpog 7-'ot Trpaytaat yiyveaOat, that is, by being before us in his operations, first
at his work, first in the field; the last of which translations,
though it might serve, as being a smart idiomatical phrase,
wants comprehensiveness. Leland has: his superior vigilance
in improving all opportunities; which is too vague. But here
let me observe, I don't complain because his version does
not show that the dative case is governed by the preposition,
or on any ground of that kind. It was not his business to
deal with a point of grammar, but to give a good translation.
You might have it thus: by commencing his operations earlier.




PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION.                  v
I object to Leland's version; because the meaning is too vaguely expressed.
In the same oration we have: Avo &v Evioioa  a:'-arr7yas
irvpdvvovf, TrEv dFpv &ravt7Lpi vri'ATT'ciLj   erLTEtLX iaag, bt   v
6''rri Ylcta'0u, vfeiqg 6' ovds -7ast' dTrE0iOvaaaOe, el frl6v dZXXo,30oiESaee, 0dX' eidta-re- daEa'rare d6rov 5rtL aVriiT.
Leland: Eubcea is commanded by his two tyrants; the one, just
opposite to Attica, to keep you perpetually in awe; the other to
Sciathus.  Yet you have not attempted to oppose even this.  No,
you have submitted: you have been insensible to your wrongs.
In thllis passage there are six instances in which the translator has needlessly departed from the original:
First,-the word his does not sufficiently express that Philip
placed the tyrants in Euboa. Observe, I don't complain of
the change of construction. He was perfectly at liberty to
invert it, and say, twco tyrants were placed by him in Eubea, had
such inversion been required to make a neater sentence. The
objection is, that the point of the matter is expressed too
loosely.
Secondly, —e7rtretXtiaa  is not expressed fully enough.
Thirdly,-the word perpetually is not in Demosthenes.
Fourthly,-oppose is not a correct version of drre6rvaaqde.
Fifthly,-the words Eti Kt6Ev adXo EpoieaOe0 are omitted.
Sixthly,-the last clause is an entire mistranslation.
Francis thus translates the passage:Philpp had established two kings in Euboca; one at Eretrici,
which he hath fortified, opposite to the coast of Attica; the other at
Oreum, to awe your island of Sciathos.  Nor have you asserted
your own dignity by opposing these injuries, (since you seem unwilling to attempt any nobler design,) but even indolently sufered them;
apparently remitted to him your own proper rights.
Francis has committed the same error as Leland in the
drreiVaau0e, and has distinctly mistranslated the isTrtTetXi[aq
which Leland has only shirked. Philip did not fortify Eretria, but established in it the sway of Clitarchus, his own
partisan, and thus made him, and through him Eretria itself,
a fortress against Attica; that is, a rallying point, a point




vi           PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION.
d'appui, for the enemies of Athens, from which they might at
any time sally forth, as the Lacedaemonians did from Decelea,
to attack and ravage the country. And so Jacobs has it:
alsfeindlichen Hort.  Pabst: in drohender fester Stellung.
Francis has avoided some errors of Leland; but, besides a
too great verbosity, which is his constant fault, I must notice
another, which is too frequently committed, viz. the insertion
of explanatory words, the proper place for which is a note,
and not the text.  Here we have the words, Eretria, Oreurn,
and our island, added to Demosthenes; and we might just
as well have had the names of the tyrants, or any other historical fact introduced. The translation should be confined to
the text.
A correct literal translation is:
He established two tyrants in Eubaea, one opposite Attica, ficing
him like a hostile fortress, the other against Sciathus; and you
have not even got rid of these nuisances, if yozi would do nothing
else: you have allowed them; you have manifestly given way to
him.
Here the word nuisances is not wantonly added, for it is
contained in the TraiVa, and some such word is necessary to
be introduced.
It may further be observed, that the literal translation of
et dte1s6v da;o io3x;evOe is hardly sufficient to convey to an
English reader the exact meaning of the original, which,
fully expressed, is: these nuisances, at least, you should have got
rid of, though you would do nothing else; yet you have never done
so, &c. But this expansion would weaken the translation
too much. Therefore, I adopt a turn of expression which in
English is equivalent to the Greek form, as those who are
familiar with the Greek form will understand: and I translate thus:
He established two tyrants in Eubaca, one like a hostile fortress
opposite Attica, one threatening Sciathus: and these nuisances you
have never got rid of; not even this would you attempt: you have
submitted; left the road open to him clearly.
In the four preceding examples I can not doubt that Leland




PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION.               vii
understood the text of his author. He has translated him
loosely from carelessness.  And, it may be observed, that,
while he has mistranslated Demosthenes, he has not departed
from the general sense and meaning. But this is not always
so: and persons addicted to very loose translating frequently
wander from the argument as well as from the words. Take
the next example from the Oration on the Chersonese:'H/yent  oVTe XpuaTra Eleaopsetv PovXSeOaoI, oVrE  avi'ro
arpareeVaOat.... oVa'r','ret6d''7ep OViTh) se'Xopev, -rt jlTepa
av-rTCv rrpadErrev WOIoftev.
Which means:
We are unwilling to pay contributions, or to perform military
service,.... and yet, with such disposition, we are not content to
mind our own business.
That is; the Athenians will neither take the proper means
to carry on war, nor will they abstain from public business
and Grecian politics.  But Leland translates the last clause:
Thus we proceed quite regardless of our interests: entirely mistaking the sense, which Auger puts clearly enough; Ainsi disposes, nous ne pouvons nous resoudre a ne nous meler que de ce qui
nous regarde.
Having thus noticed a few errors on the side of excessive
freedom, let me turn to those which are equally injurious, on
the side of excessive accuracy; whose tendency is, to degrade
translation into a school-boy exercise. I must again have recourse to examples.
Take the famous oath:
Ma rovog MapaO(vt rrpoKtCvvviva6avTaa -r7v rrqooy6vov.
By your ancestors who met the peril at Maratlhon.
A person who reviewed Lord Brougham's translation in the
Times, insists that it should be translated thus:
By those of your forefathers, who at Marathon were the first to
encounter the brunt of danger.
And I equally insist, that the critic's translation is detestable, as emasculating all the vigor of the clause. It is true
that he expresses the genitive case more fully, and I would require the school-boy to do so in his lesson; but that is a to



viii        PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION.
tally different affair. Here it is essential to have the fewest
possible words, to preserve the spirit of the appeal, and something may be sacrificed for this purpose. My translation,
however, is not incorrect: it does not exclude the partitive
signification, but only leaves a trifling ambiguity, which deceives no man. But here are eight words for 7rpoictvdvveVaav',a, and the rrpb virtually translated twice, by fjst and
brunt.  Over-accuracy always leads to verbiage.
Jacobs has: —
Bei den A hnherrn schwir' ich, die zu Marathon kdrnpften.
Shortly before the last passage we have: El yap TaVra
TrposiEro'dcovtir, rep' (v o6dEva icv6vvov OV'tv' Ov%'ibrcEltvav
oi 7rpoyoivot, it'f ovat tar6re'rvaev av Aoi5.
Lord Brougham has:For if she had given up without a struggle all that your forefathers encountered every danger to win, who but would have
spurned you,.,Eschines?
His reviewer has:
For if voluntarily and without an obstinate struggle, those honors
had been abandoned, for which our ancestors braved every danger,
where is the man who would not have spit on you with loathing?
Lord Brougham's is far the preferable version.  In the
other, the words voluntarily, obstinate, and with loathing,
though intended to exhibit a wonderful accuracy, are utterly
unwarranted.  And as to KaTErTvaev, which Lord Brougham
is charged with frittering away, the critic needs to be informed, that metaphors can not always be transferred from
one tongue to another. It happens sometimes, that a metaphorical expression, by frequent use, becomes familiar to the
people of the country, but if literally translated into another
language, it sounds harsh or strange to those who are not
accustomed to it. I might call the critic a goose in English,
but if I called him anser in Latin, the point would be lost.
The phrase classi immittit habenas sounds ill, if literally rendered in English, though it has been so.  We know that
KaTa7rdrvacrog had become a common word of abuse at Athens,
and, being such, is well enough represented by such a word as




PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION.                ix
despicable. I do not, however, absolutely say, that the metaphor here may not be preserved; I only object to a criticism
which assumes its positive necessity. But if perfect accuracy
is insisted upon, why add the words with loathing? Jacobs
has the simple angespuckt.
I should prefer, in Lord Brougham's version, the substitution of what for all that; and the omission of you before.iEschines. TlIe introduction of the last word, instead of you, may
be good, to escape too many monosyllables.
In the Oration on the Crown, we have:Ka~ yaip avdpa Wig,a ai crra tv icotvvi 7pbg Tr  c KDiltara rSv
V7rapX6OVTO  dEi d!e 7retpdaOat ira Xotlra rpdrEirLt.
Lord Brougham and his critic both commit the error of attempting to translate idiia and icotivj literally; the one having,
individuals in theirprivate concerns, and the state inpublic affairs;
and the other, a man individually, and a state collectively. The
former of these is better in point of composition, the latter is
closer to the original; but they are both faulty, by making
prominent that which in Greek is a mere flourish, and can
not be represented in our language. It is clear at once that
the words individually and collectively add nothing to the sense
in the above translation. It is a rhetorical antithesis not very
unlike that of /kev and de, which is perpetually recurring,
and has an elegance and a usefulness about it, which we can
seldom express. Sometimes, indeed, it happens, that tev and
de may be represented by such expressions as, on the one hand,
and on the other; but it is rare that they assume so much importance in the sentence.
Leland has avoided this puerility:By the most illustrious of their former actions it is, that private
men or public bodies should model their succeeding conduct.
The only thing which. I object to here is, public bodies, as
being hardly dignified enough.  Translate:For both individuals and communities should ever strive to model
their future conduct by the noblest of their past.
Is there any thing here left unexpressed? That is the test of
a faithful translation.  Are not the words avdpa 6di[a TrparretLt
A 2




X           PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION.
fully enough represented by the words individuals their conduct?
Or what further is wanted   It is no slight advantage, in
my view, that the last translation is shorter than any other.
Yet, brief as it is, it has one word more than the Greek, and
this shows how important it is to struggle for brevity. The
best versions in the world will exceed the Greek in number
of words, if they are faithful; for obvious reasons.'AvArp
is a man; 7rpaT1rro, I do, or, I am doing; 7rpaTrrero, let him
do; TaV-ra, these things; Pti7Turov 7roEtogvTrog, Philip being
at war, or, while Philip is at war. These and the like expansions are inevitable; but they make it the more necessary to
aim at brevity, wherever it can be had, consistently with
good writing. The translator must seize upon every compensation which he can lay hold of, to attain this object; though
it may cost him ten times the trouble of the ordinary method.
OVirdv caIo  y %Xev aet vi, he only mocks you. Don't translate it, he does nothing else but mock you, though this be the
literal translation; because, by so doing, you lose an advantage, which your own language here affords, as a set-off against
many disadvantages. The literal version entails upon you the
extra word does, from which you escape by using the idiomatical turn. This may seem very simple; but I find by experience, that from inattention to such simple matters hardly any
translation in our language is what it ought to be.
"EaTL yap  estv  Tai radX6rTpLa.  (Orat. de Halonneso.)
Translate: For it is possible to hold the property of others;
or, if you please, with Leland: For a man may possess the
property of others.
The sentence expressed at full is: For it is possible to hold
the property of others, as well as your own.
The last five words demonstrate the meaning of gat. Why
do I omit them? Because that full demonstration is purchased at the price of too much verbiage; and the idea is
sufficiently expressed without it, if you read the sentence
properly, laying the emphasis where you ought. The translator, using that reserve which good taste requires, relies
on the intelligence of the judicious reader. And with this




PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION.                xi
reliance, I don't think it necessary to put any words in
italics.
The German translators, Jacobs and Pabst, express the Kai
by auch. But in English neither also nor even, nor any thing
short of a paraphrase can fairly represent it. Auger has, Car
on peut avoir le bien d'autrui. If I am asked why I do not
adopt the turn of Leland or Auger, who are both shorter
than I am, my answer is, that I wish to avoid the ambiguity
of their sentences, which might be construed as importing
that it was lawful to have the property of others, and an emphatic word like possible is better than may or can.
R1O1TE 2 ap X rrpdsere;  errEtdv Ti,yevprat; (First Philippic.)
Literally: When will you do what is necessary I When what
has happened?
Better: When will you perform your duty? In what
event?
Where Demosthenes urges the Athenians a1'3rov'i  4evat, I
often translate it, to serve in person; because the literal expression is inadequate: and to march out yourselves gives but
half the sense, as it refers to naval expeditions as well as land
services.
OVi' Eelti tr7s YTevoiltv, I neither am, nor wish to be.
AtareXO'XYwv. I have ever had is sufficient, without adding and still continue to have': for this makes too many
words.'Es iv r'wXv )XoV rotot yey6vaatv, E 6' d 66dov tv'tftot.
Prom poor have become wealthy, from obscure honorable. But
it is a little better to say: Have risen from poverty to wealth,
from obscurity to honor.
Milton has imitated the Greek construction:
How cam'st thou speakable of mute?
And in poetry I like it, but it does not suit so well in prose.
Ta'q eiOvvag'7reartaitveO0e.  You passed my audit, or you
approved my account.  But not, as more than one translator
has it, you passed and approved my accounts.
I notice this once for all, in order to condemn the practice,




x2ii     I PREFACE-TO THE TRANSLATION.
common with some translators, of putting two words for one.
This they do, either because they doubt which is the better
word, and think, if they have both, they must be right; or
because neither word seems sufficient of itself, and they are
anxious to convey every tittle of the sense. But it is better
to exercise a little reserve, than to indulge this rage for accuracy.
It frequently happens that a turn or paraphrase is not only
allowable, but absolutely necessary; as in the following example from the Oration on the Crown:Ov yaip d j'rov K-r,1atoqtvra tiev 6?dva7ra  6tticstv d' Et,'eL d', E'Trep  WisEZYtV E       av6tvev,  aibv oK "v iypdibaro.
In this passage, which all the English versions that I have
seen mistranslate, it is only necessary to see that the first negative governs both clauses, and nothing is more simple.  But
if we translate the words without a little management, they
make nonsense; -as thus:
For surely he can not prosecute.Eschines on my account, and
would not have indicted me myself, had he thought he should convict me.
That is wrong, because, though the Greek ov may apply
to both clauses, the English can not is prevented from doing
so by the change of tense. Otherwise it might have been literally rendered, as in the following:0ov, - ovi 0   v~~et, obv vr'%0agpcov )~Xoq,
icatvqg 68 tVVTgq l~eispe rre7p7rytevog.
Not.... disliking your person and smitten with passion for
the new bride.
Here I must give the sense by a turn:Surely it can not be, that he is able to prosecute YEschines on
my account, and would not have indicted me myself, had he
thought he would convict me.
But a little further deviation from the original form gives
a more effective translation:
Surely, if he can prosecute Ctesiphon on my account, he would
not have forborne to indict me myself, had he thought he could
convict me.




PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION.                xiii
Auger saw the meaning:
On ne dira pas sans doute qu'un homme, qui peu bien a cause
de moi accuser Cte'siphon, ne mr'eut pas accuse moi-meme, s'il euzt.
cru pouvoir me convaincre.
Jacobs is a little too wide:Denn kann er den Ctesiphon gerichtlich verfolgen um mienetwillen, so konnte er auch micA selbst anklagen, wenn er den
Beweis gegen mich zu frhren hofte.
Pabst is better.  But all the English translators whom I
have seen are entirely wrong. They seem to have followed
Taylor.  Leland's and Spillan's I subjoin:Leland: He can not pursue Ctesiphon on my account; and
that he hath not directed his impeachment against me, can proceed but from a consciousness that such impeachment could not be
supported.
Spillan: For he can not prosecute Ctesiphon through me, but
if he thought he could convict me, he would not have impeached
him.
One more example, and I have done.  We have at the beginning of the first Olynthiac:"7Oe iroivvv Tl'oO' oi7V-  E`t,  TrpoijKCELt 7rpo0Vifo Ogthetv
aK:ovetv r6V t30ovolttO'vWV avpt0jovXei6etv'   oiv yap t6vov et It
XPUrtln1ov aiicEMEppIVOg qket'trg, i-oVr' av diKov6aavTe )Xdfpotvre,
d0Aa girait ir]  pepa' 7'XT   r7roXap/3dva o'roZa 7-jv 6e6v-'rVo  76. roV 7rapaXpijja Iviotq av EnreXOev etlrrSv.
The literal translation is:
Since therefore this is the case, you should be willing cheerfully
to hear those who desire to advise you.  For then, not only, when
men have come prepared with useful counsel, will you hear and
receive it, but I consider it also part of your good fortune, that
it will occur to some persons to offer many fit suggestions at the
moment.
In the last clause there is a change of construction, or a
slight ellipse.  The argument runs thus:Not only will you get useful counsel which men have prepared
beforehand, but much more; for I consider, &c.
First, to improve the baldness of the literal translation,




xiv          PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION.
dKo'vaavTref dv dic3ot-re may be thrown into an English form
thus: you will have the benefit of hearing.
Secondly, i'qIEL admits of a turn. It refers to the orator
who has come to the assembly, a matter of common Reference
with Demosthenes. And the word is so placed in the sentence
as to have no emphasis of importance.'Eaiqe'tvog i'CeLt'Tt
is little more than kaice7r-Tai'rtg, or E6acefq'vot elatv ol xEyovi-eg. Just as we often translate 6 7raptuv the orator, without
deeming it necessary to say the person who comes forward on
the hustings; so we may deal with q'scet in this place.
Thirdly, a turn may be found for the Eviotq'   v E70reOeMv,
&c., and we may amend the translation thus:So shall you have the benefit of hearing not only such counsel
as your orators have devised beforehand, but more than this; for
I esteem it part of your good fortune, that many useful suggestions
will occur to some speakers at the moment.
Or it may thus be shortened:So shall you have the benefit of all counsel, whether preconsidered or not; for, &c.
The best turn is given by Auger:Outre que vous pouvez profiter des reflexions sages qu'un orateur apporte d la Tribune, vozus etes encore assez heureux pour
qu'il vienne sur le champ a quelques-uns des avis utiles.
And this I adopt. But it may be well to compare this
with other translations.
Francis has:
In this disposition therefore you ought to hear with a favorable attention whoever is willing to propose his advice. Not only
should you hear the salutary scheme which hath been formed
and matured by reflection, but I deem it an instance of your
good fortune, that some of your orators are capable of conceiving upon the instant such expedients as may be useful to the
public.
Here we see that Francis, by mistranslating XdP3ot~-s av,
departs from  the logic of the orator, which is this-You
should be willing to hear all men, for thus you will not miss
any good counsel. Whereas Francis makes the second clause




PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION.                 xv
a repetition of the injunction, as if 2potlrse dv signified you
ought to receive.
And Leland is in this respect little better:It is your part therefore readily and cheerfully to attend to all
who are disposed to offer their opinions. For your regards need
not to be confined to those whose counsels are the effect of premeditation; it is your good fortune to have men among you who can at
once suggest many points of moment.
Jacobs gives the argument correctly:Denn nicht blos, was Einer nach vorldufiger Ueberlegung
hier Nittzliches vortrdgt, werdet Ihr anhoren und zu Herzen
nehmen.
I only object to zu Ilerzen nehmen, as being a little too
strong for Mdfotre. He passes over the'sfet as I do.
An anonymous German version lying before me commits the
error of Francis:-,Denn nicht blos das, was Einer nach vorhergegangener Ueberlegung Niitzliches hier vorbringt, miisst Ihn anhoren und erfassen.
So does Pabst:Ihr miisset nehmlich nicht blos es anhdren und ergreifen
wenn jemand vorbereitet auftritt, um etwas Niitzliches vorzubringen.
I may seem to have been a long time in discussing a question upon a few words. But my object is to show how translation should be conducted, what are the difficulties attending
it, and how they are to be overcome. The literal version is
but the first stage of the process, though it is the stumblingblock with ill-taught scholars. Having analyzed your sentence, and made yourself perfect master of its construction
and meaning, the next thing is to translate it. And this part
Qf the affair is the principal difficulty, requiring a great command of your own language, and the exercise of much thought
and discretion. Nor am I induced to say this only by observing the failures of others, but from the consciousness of my
own deficiencies, and the conviction that I have fallen very
far short of my own aims and endeavors.




xvi         PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION.
I now come to another question, which is of some importance in translating Demosthenes, viz. how the translator is
to deal with all the public and political nomenclature of the
Athenians, the civil and military titles, names of offices and
institutions, terms of law and jurisprudence. On this subject
I am not disposed in the least to depart from the principle
which I adopted many years ago, when I made my first essay
on Demosthenes, and which I stated thus:"As a general rule, I think it better to translate into English than to Anglicize the Greek.  Thus I say jury, parish,
indictment, in preference to dicast, deme, graphe.  It is true that
in each of these cases the word but imperfectly describes the
thing intended; for instance, the proceedings upon our indictment are very different from those of the Athenian prosecution
so described. But, on the other hand, the vernacular term
conveys the idea more pleasingly to the common reader; and
be it remembered, a translation is more for the use of the unlearned than of the learned. I strive therefore to be as little
as possible un-English; and while I always seek for the word
which corresponds most nearly with the original, I am satisfied if it corresponds in some essential points."
I adhere to the above.as the true principle of translation.
Only with respect to the word 4zlaog, I am now more inclined
to adopt the version of township, which Mr. Whiston has used
in the Archseological Dictionary.
The critic of Lord Brougham, whom I have before mentioned, and who may be taken to represent a certain class of
scholars, strongly censures his lordship for attempting to convert the logistae, liturgies, liturgi, &c., into English. And yet
the same person insists that ypaor: shall be an indictment, and
eioayyetia an impeachment; in which he is right, but that is
inconsistent with his general condemnation of Lord Brough.
am's plan.
That indeed it is impossible fully to carry out the opposite
system, is manifest.  For how would you translate Eypdcbar-6?e? He brought a graphe against me! But who could tolerate
this?




PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION.               xvii
You must introduce into your text a heap of monstrosities,
to please the ear of the pedant, and disgust every other.
Graphe, deme, psephism, dicast, agora, bemna, liturgy, phyle, dice,
ecclesia, symmory, chorege, logist, euthyne, stratege, hoplite, metic,
cleruchian, hegemony, bule, cleter, lexiarchic, ecmartyry, anacrisis,
hypomosy, &c.
Nothing is easier than to do this. You have only to abdicate the functions of the translator, and save yourself some
thought and trouble.
But as to the logic of the matter, it is true, that for many
of these ancient terms it is not possible to find a perfectly apposite translation. But it does not follow that you are not to
translate at all.
The pov,)' of five hundred at Athens was very differently
constituted from any English senate or council. But it may
be translated by either of those words, because there is enough
of similarity for that purpose.
Nor needs a court of justice to be called a dicastery, (or, as
Mr. Grote will have it, a dikastery,) because there is a difference in the mode of legal procedure at Athens and in England.
All this is sheer pedantry!
Judicial tribunals and deliberative'bodies are things of universal existence. A court, a judge or juror, a council, a member or president of that council, may just as well be found
at Athens as at Rome, or in London.
Shall I refuse to translate vaiq, a shlp, because Attic triremes and pentecontors are different from English steamboats
and men-of-war?  Or shall I insist on calling a Roman sword
a gladius, because it was different from our own? Do we
make no attempt to translate buris, temo, dentale, stiva, because
Virgil's plow would not suit a modern agriculturist? The
pedant would give his own pupil a sound whipping if he
brought'such an excuse.
T-rpa-r17Tyb is commonly translated general. Yet the functions of the Athenian'-rpa-rqyyT   are far from corresponding
perfectly with those of a modern general. For, besides that
he had various civil duties to perform, both as an administra



xviii       PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION.
tive and judicial functionary, he was an admiral as well as
general, there being no such distinction between the two services as we have in England. But I am content with the
translation of general for all that.
In short, in the translation of many common words we are
compelled by the difference of times and circumstances to be
guilty of some inaccuracy. For example, rXelv is rendered
to sail, in many cases where not sails but only oars impelled
the ship; and it is commonly preferred to the word navigate,
as being of more ordinary use.'Ir7res  is rendered knights,
though our word conveys a somewhat different idea. Charta
and papyrus are called paper, though the material was different from ours. The meals, the articles of dress of the Greeks
and Romans, do not correspond with ours; but we make the
best of it, and translate them.  If I call the Roman lectus, a
couch, I do not present an idea of its form, or of the mode in
which Roman guests were placed at table. You must go to
the dictionary of antiquities, or to some commentary, for an
explanation of that.  So, if I translate  evLrovpyia, a public
office, service, or duty, I do not exhibit the peculiar nature of
the service; yet I give a positive translation of the word,
which is good as far as it goes.
But I grant there is some discretion to be observed. We
must look also to the other side of the question. There are
some terms entirely untranslatable.  Archon can not be converted into English any more than consul. I do not reduce
the Attic money to English, which would cause confusion;
and for the same reason I do not imitate Leland in adopting
the names of the Roman months. Further, I would eschew
all fanciful similarities, all undignified expressions. I would
not call any ancient vehicle a hackney-coach or a cabriolet,
nor any ancient functionary a Lord Mayor. Nor do I approve
of Francis converting'Taiapxot and /bniapyot into colonels and
aids-de-camp. There is some truth in what Olivet says of the
use of such terms, that to put them in the mouth of Demosthenes is like painting Alexander or Caesar in a peruke or an
embroidered coat.




PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION.               xix
I agree also with what Pope says with respect to a translation of Homer:
" The use of modern terms of war and government, such as
platoon, carnpaign, junto, or the like, into which some translators have fallen, can not be allowable; those only excepted,
without which it is impossible to treat the subjects in any
living language."
I have observed a similar rule in the translation of Virgil.
But I must remark, that prose and poetry stand on a somewhat different footing. Archaisms are often allowable and
good in poetry, to give it (as Pope says) a venerable cast;
and, on the other hand, many modern words are fit for prose,
which would not be suitable for poetry-as campaign.
In all these things taste and judgment are required. You
must take care that your translations are as apposite as possible; and when you resort to words which can give but an
imperfect idea of the original, select only such as are dignified,
simple, significant, having rather a general and permanent,
than a local or ephemeral character. I see, for example, no
objection to words such as the following:Prince, general, captain, officer, commissioner, deputy, president,
clerk, secretary, assessor, treasurer, paymaster, collector, board,
rate, property-tax, register, audit, tribe, township, assembly, chairman, bill, decree, motion, resolution, statute, advocate, jury, summons, action, indictment, plea, verdict, damages, fine, information,
arbitrator, award, mortgage, trespass.
But I will detain the reader no longer. I wish I were as
sure that I had carried out my principles well, as I am that
the principles themselves are sound.




CHRONOLOGICAL ABSTRACT
OF
EVENTS DURING THE LIFE OF DEMOSTHENES.
B.C.
385 Demosthenes is born.
This was just nineteen years after the termination of the Peloponnesian war. Greece was reposing under the peace of Antalcidas and the power of Sparta had reached its height.
383 Philip of Macedon is born.
His father, Amyntas II., has disputes with the Olynthians concerning their encroachment on his territories, and applies to
Sparta for aid.
Apollonia and Acanthus, two of the Chalcidian cities, send an embassy to Sparta for the same purpose.
Sparta declares war against Olynthus, and sends a force under
Eudamidas which takes possession of Potidoea.
382 Phebidas, sent from Sparta to reinforce Eudamidas, stops on his
road to Thebes, and seizes the Cadmea, in which he places a
Lacedsemonian garrison. An oligarchical government is established at Thebes, at the head of which are Archias and Leontiades, devoted to Sparta. A multitude of Theban exiles fly to
Athens; among them Pelopidas.
Teleutias, brother of Agesilaus, is sent with a larger force against
Olynthus; is joined by a Theban contingent, by Amyntas, and
Derdas prince of Elymia.
The Spartans require Athens to dismiss the Theban exiles. Athens
refuses.
Teleutias defeats the Olynthians in a battle near the city, and
shuts them in their walls.
381 Teleutias is defeated by the Olynthians, and slain.
380 Agesipolis, one of the-kings, is sent with reinforcements from
Sparta; takes Torone, and dies of a fever. Polybiades succeeds
to the command, and besieges Olynthus.
379 The Olynthians sue for peace, and submit to join the Peloponnesian
confederacy.
Pelopidas and his associates return to Thebes, where, having slain
Archias and Leontiades, they are joined by their countrymen,
and attack the Spartan garrison. A body of Athenian volunteers
come to their assistance, and the garrison capitulates.




CHRONOLOGICAL ABSTRACT OF EVENTS.                   21
B.C.
378 Demosthenes loses his father, and is placed under the care of three
guardians.
The Spartans send their king Cleombrotuwinto Bceotia.
Chabrias, with an Athenian force, occupies the pass at Eleutherna;
Cleombrotus enters by another road, and having dispersed a
Theban force at Platxa, takes possession of Thespihe, where he
leaves Sphodrias, with a part of his army, and then returns to
Peloponnesus.
The Athenians, alarmed at the Spartan invasion, condemn their
generals who had aided in the recovery of the Cadmea.
Sphodrias marches against Athens, to surprise the Piroeus; advances as far as the Thriasian plain, and retreats, after plundering the country.
The Athenians prepare for war with Sparta; strengthen the Piraeus; increase their fleet, and make alliance with Thebes.
Chios, Byzantium, Rhodes, and Mitylene revolt from Sparta, and
renew their confederacy with Athens.
Sphodrias is recalled, and Agesilaus sent with a large Peloponnesian army into Bceotia. He ravages the Theban territory, but
having encountered an Athenian and Theban force, commanded
by Chabrias and Gorgidas, is repulsed, and returns home, leaving Phcebidas in command at Thespiae.
Phoebidas, after gaining partial success against Gorgidas, is defeated and slain.
377 Agesilaus again invades Boeotia; is joined by a force of Olynthian
cavalry, gains some advantage over the Thebans, and, after
strengthening the oligarchical party at Thespise, crosses over to
Megara, where he falls ill.
The Sacred Band, consisting of three hundred men, is established
at Thebes.
Acoris, king of Egypt, at war with Persia, engages the services of
Chabrias, who, on complaint made by Artaxerxes, is recalled by
the Athenians, and Iphicrates sent to assist the satrap Pharnabazus.
376 Cleombrotus is sent into Bceotia, where he is repulsed by the
Athenians and Thebans, and returns home.
A Peloponnesian fleet is sent out under the command of Pollis, to
intercept the corn-ships bound for Athens. Chabrias totally defeats this fleet at Naxos.
Athens regains her ascendency in the Egean sea, and many of the
islands return under her protection.
Timotheus sails with a fleet to Corcyra, which renews her alliance
with Athens.
Jason of Pherae establishes his power or influence over most of the
towns of Thessaly.
875 Timotheus is successful against the Peloponnesians in the Ionian
sea.
Pelopidas fails in an attempt to surprise Orchomenos, is attacked
on his retreat by a superior force of Spartans at Tegyra. The
Spartans are put to the rout, and their generals slain.




22       CHRONOLOGICAL ABSTRACT OF EVENTS
B.c.
374 The Thebans send an army into Phocis, which is in alliance with
Sparta. Cleombrotus crosses the Gulf of Corinth, to the assistance of the Phodans, and forces the Thebans to retreat.
The Athenians attempt to make peace with Sparta, but this is
interrupted by a dispute concerning some Zacynthian exiles restored by Timotheus. A Peloponnesian fleet under Mnasippus
is sent to recover Corcyra. The Athenians determine to relieve
it, and dispatch Timotheus with a fleet from Athens, who is
forced for want of supplies to cruise about the LEgean isles and
the coast of Macedonia and Thrace.
Pharnabazus and Iphicrates invade Egypt, which, after partial
success, they are compelled to evacuate. Iphicrates quarrels
with Pharnabazus, and returns to Athens.
373 Mnasippus lands in Corcyra, and blockades the city, but is routed
in a sally, and slain. His fleet retires to Leucas.
Timotheus is recalled to Athens, and brought to trial, but acquitted. Iphicrates, Callistratus, and Chabrias, succeed to the
command.
The Athenians sail to Corcyra, and capture a Syracusan fleet sent
to the aid of Mnasippus. Cephallenia is brought over to the
Athenian alliance.
The Thebans surprise Platoea, and raze the city to the ground.
The inhabitants, allowed to depart, take refuge in Athens, and
are admitted to the privileges of citizens.
Thespise is taken, and shares the same fate.
372 Iphicrates crosses to Acarnania, and carries on the war against
the Peloponnesians with various success; is preparing to invade
Laconia.
371 The Athenians send embassadors to Sparta, to conclude peace.
The Thebans, invited to join in the embassy, send Epaminondas.
Peace is made between the Peloponnesians and the Athenian confederacy. Epaminondas refuses to concur in the treaty on behalf of Thebes, because she was required to acknowledge the
independence of the Bceotian towns.
Cleombrotus is ordered to march from Phocis into Bceotia; encounters the Thebans under Epaminondas at Leuctra, is totally
defeated and slain.
Jason of Pheroe arrives at Leuctra after the battle. By his mediation an armistice is effected, and the Lacedwemonian army retreats into Peloponnesus.
A congress is held at Athens, and attended by most of the Peloponnesian states, who resolve to maintain the independence declared by the peace of Antalcidas.
The Mantineans rebuild their city, which had been dismantled by
the Lacedoemonians.
A democratical movement takes place in Peloponnesus.
The Arcadians, encouraged by Epaminondas, resolve to build a
new city, to become the seat of a federal government, to be
called Megalopolis. Pammenes is sent with a small Theban force
into Arcadia.




DURING THE LIFE OF DEMOSTHENES.                  23
B.C.
371 Tegea and Orchomenos, under the influence of Sparta and aristocratical institutions, oppose the Arcadian union. The Tegeans
are defeated, and their city taken. Sparta declares war.
370 Amyntas II. dies, leaving three sons, Alexander, Perdiccas, and
Philip. Alexander ascends the throne.
Jason-of Pherae announces his intention of marching to Delphi and
presiding over the Pythian games. He collects a large army,
and excites alarm; but is murdered a short time before the
festival. His brothers Polydorus and Polyphron succeed him.
Agesilaus marches to Mantinea, ravages the country, and returns
to Sparta.
The Thebans prepare to invade Peloponnesus; collect troops from
Phocis, Locris, Thessaly, and various states of Northern Greece.
869 Pelopidas and Epaminondas lead the Theban army to Mantinea;
are joined by the Arcadians, Eleans, and Argives, and invade
Laconia. The Spartans are unable to oppose them in the field,
but, reinforced by a small body of Peloponnesian auxiliaries,
prepare to defend the capital. The Thebans, after ravaging the
country, approach Sparta, are repulsed in a skirmish, and retire.
The Theban army enters Messenia, to accomplish the project of
Epaminondas for the building of a new city, and the separation
of that province from Laconia. The building is rapidly carried
on under Theban protection. The city is called Messene, and
peopled by the Messenian insurgents, with a multitude of exiles
and revolted Helots. Epaminondas, leaving a garrison there,
prepares for his return to Thebes.
The Lacediemonians send an embassy to Athens, to implore her
assistance, which is granted, and Iphicrates is sent with an army
to Peloponnesus.
Polyphron of Pherae, having survived Polydorus, is murdered by
his nephew Alexander, who assumes the office of Tagus, and
oppresses the Thessalian towns. The Aleuadue of Larissa invoke the aid of Alexander, king of Macedon, who marches to
their relief, and puts a garrison in Larissa and Cranon: but he
is hastily recalled to Macedonia, in consequence of intrigues
against him by his mother Eurydice and her paramour
Ptolemy.
Iphicrates stations himself at the Isthmus of Corinth, to oppose
Epaminondas, who passes by a different road, repulsing the
Athenian cavalry.
368 The Thessalians apply to Thebes for aid against Alexander of
Pherse. Pelopidas is sent into Thessaly, while Epaminondas
marches for the second time to invade Peloponnesus.
Dionysius of Syracuse sends a body of Celts and Iberians to the
aid of Sparta.
The Spartans send an army to the Isthmus, and are joined by the
Corinthians and Athenians under Chabrias. Epaminondas forces
their lines, and effects a junction with his allies; after a short
and unimportant campaign he makes an attempt on Corinth, is
repulsed by Chabrias, and returns home.




24       CHRONOLOGICAL ABSTRACT OF EVENTS
B.C.
368 Alexander of Macedon is murdered, and Ptolemy assumes the
regency.
The Arcadians carry on the war with success in the absence of
Epaminondas.
Pelopidas, having marched to Larissa, and restored tranquillity,
is invited into Macedonia, to compose the disputes in the royal
family. He forces Ptolemy to give security for preserving the
kingdom to the heirs of Amyntas; takes hostages from him, and
receives the young Philip into his charge. Philip is taken to
Thebes, where he resides for several years.
The satrap Ariobarzanes makes an ineffectual attempt for the
pacification of Greece.
Alexander of Phersa raises new disturbances. Pelopidas, sent on
an embassy to Thessaly, is seized by him and thrown into prison.
Alexander obtains the assistance of Athens, and defeats a body
of Thebans who are sent against him, among whom Epaminondas, in temporary disgrace for the ill-success of his last campaign, was serving as a private soldier.
The Thebans destroy Orchomenos in Bceotia.
367 Iphicrates sails with an armament to the coast of Macedonia, for
the purpose of recovering Amphipolis; is invited by Ptolemy
and Eurydice to assist them against Pausanias, who aspired to
the throne. He expels Pausanias, but is unable to reduce Amphipolis, which is supported by the Olynthians.
Epaminondas marches again into Thessaly, and effects the release
of Pelopidas.
Archidamus, commanding the troops of Lacedvemon, Athens, and
Corinth, with Syracusan auxiliaries, gains a great victory over
the Arcadians and Argives on the borders of Laconia.
Pelopidas is sent on an embassy to Susa, and obtains the Persian
king's sanction for the projects of the Thebans. On his return
a congress is held at Thebes, and attended by the king's deputy,
but the Greek states refuse to accept the dictation of Persia.
366 Demosthenes comes of age, and brings an action against his guardians for mal-administration of his estate, in which he obtains a
verdict.
Iphicrates, with Charidemus of Oreus, sails to attack Amphipolis,
but is opposed by Ptolemy and the Olynthians.
Epaminondas marches into Achaia, but without much success.
Of the Acheean states Sicyon only is secured to the Theban
alliance.
Themison of Eretria surprises Oropus. The Athenians send
Chares to recover it, but the city is put in possession of the
Thebans.
Athens makes a separate peace with the Arcadians.
365 Corinth and the Achseans make peace with Thebes.
Elis and Arcadia go to war, contending for the Triphylian towns.
Ptolemy is slain by Perdiccas III. who ascends the throne of Macedon.
The Amphipolitans negotiate with Iphicrates for the surrender of




DURING THE LIFE OF DEMOSTHENES.                  25
B.C.
365  their town, and give him hostages; but he, being recalled to
Athens, delivers the hostages to Charidemus, who goes off into
the service of Cotys, king of Thrace, and sends back the hostages
to Amphipolis.
864 Sparta assists Elis against the Arcadians, who defeat Archidamus.
The Arcadians invade Elis, and attempt to exclude the Eleans from
the presidency of the Olympic games. The battle of Olympia
is fought, in which the Arcadians and Argives are defeated by
the troops of Elis and Achaia.
Callisthenes commands the Athenian fleet on the Macedonian
coast, and makes war against Perdiccas, but agrees to an armistice. He is superseded by Timotheus, who takes Torone and
Potidsea.
The Thebans are again invited into Thessaly, to give assistance
against Alexander of Pherse. Pelopidas goes with a small troop
to Pharsalus, where he collects an army of Thessalians. Alexander is defeated in the battle of Cynoscephalse, but Pelopidas
is slain. Peace is made between Thebes and Alexander.
363 Dissensions arise between Mantinea and the other Arcadians. It
is proposed to make peace with Elis and Sparta. The Thebans
prepare for another invasion of Peloponnesus. The Matineans
ally themselves to Sparta.
Timotheus takes Pydna and Methone.
The Thebans send a fleet to Byzantium, to detach it from the
Athenian alliance. Laches is sent to oppose it, but without
effect.
Alexander of Phern sends out a squadron to infest and plunder the
small zEgean islands, and lays siege to Peparethus. The Athenians having sent Leosthenes against him, he sails to Attica,
takes several Athenian ships, and plunders the Piraeus.
362 Epaminondas leads his army into Peloponnesus, and, joined by his
Arcadian allies, assaults Sparta, but is repulsed.
The Athenians send a force of six thousand men to the assistance
of the Spartans. They march to Mantinea.
Epaminondas, retreating from Laconia, marches to attack Mantinea. His cavalry are defeated by the Athenians, who sally
from the town.
Agesilaus marches with his army to join the Athenians and Mantineans. Epaminondas advances to attack them, and the battle
of Matinea is fought, one of the most celebrated in Grecian history. On the one side are Boeotians, Thessalians, Eubceans, Locrians, and other northern allies, together with troops of Sicyon,
Argos, Arcadia, and Messenia, to the number of thirty-three
thousand. On the other, Lacedoemonians, Athenians, Mantineans, and troops of Elis and Achaia; considerably less in number. After an obstinate resistance, Epaminondas breaks the
centre of the enemy, but is slain in the moment of victory.
A general peace follows, but the Spartans alone refuse to acknowledge the independence of Messenia.
Timotheus, assisted by the satrap Ariobarzanes, takes Sestus, CriVOL. I.-B




26        CHRONOLOGICAL ABSTRACT OF EVENTS
362  thote, and El~eus, in the Thracian Chersonese; and afterward
lays siege to Samos.
The satraps revolt from the king of Persia. They are promised
assistance by Tachos, king of Egypt, Mausolus, king of Caria,
and most of the maritime parts of the empire.
Miltocythes rebels against Cotys, king of Thrace, and engages the
Athenians to assist him, by promising to cede to them the Chersonese. Cotys amuses the Athenians by negotiation, and overcomes Miltocythes.
861 Samos capitulates after a siege of eleven months.
Orontes betrays the conspirators to Artaxerxes. Datames, satrap
of Cappadocia, is murdered. Tachos, prelparing to make war
against Persia, engages Agesilaus to command his army, and
Chabrias for his admiral.
Agesilaus is sent with a thousand Spartans to Egypt, but quarrels
with Tachos, and transfers his services to Nectanabis, to whom
the Egyptian army revolts. Tachos flies to Persia, and Agesilaus establishes Nectanabis in the dominion of Egypt.
Artaxerxes Mnemon dies, and his son, Artaxerxes Ochus, ascends
the throne of Persia.
360 Timotheus and Charidemus attack Amphipolis, which receives
succor from Macedonia and Olynthus, and the Athenians are defeated.
Cotys marches into the Chersonese, and gets possession of Sestus.
Agpsilaus dies on his return from Egypt.
Pammenes is sent with Theban troops to quell disturbances in
Arcadia; establishes the preponderance of Megalopolis.
Artaxerxes makes an attempt to reconquer Egypt, which fails.
369 Perdiccas is slain in a battle with the Illyrians, leaving an infant
son, Amyntas. Philip ascends the throne of Macedon.
At this time the Illyrians are preparing for a new invasion, the
Pweonians make an irruption from the north, and there are two
pretenders to the crown-Pausanias, assisted by Cotys, and Argaeus, supported by the Athenians.
Philip accommodates matters with Cotys, and marches against
Argaeus, whom he defeats. He returns the Athenian prisoners
without ransom, and makes peace with Athens. He then reduces the Poeonians to submission, and invades Illyria. Bardylis, the Illyrian prince, is defeated in a great battle, and a portion of his dominions is ceded to Macedonia.
358 Cotys, assisted by Charidemus, lays siege to Crithote and Elheus,
but soon after is murdered, leaving three sons, Amadocus, Berisades, and Cersobleptes, among whom the dominions of Cotys
are divided.
Charidemus takes Cersobleptes under his protection, and defeats
the Athenian force.
Miltocythes again raising disturbances, is taken prisoner by Charidemus, who sends him to Cardia, where he is put to death.
Philip lays siege to Amphipolis.
The Olynthians send an embassy to Athens, to negotiate an alli



DURING THE LIFE OF DEMOSTHENES.                 27
B.C.
358  ance, which is prevented by the intrigues of Philip. He conciliates the Olynthians by the cession of Anthemus, and soon afterward obtains possession of Amphipolis. He then marches to
Pydna, which is surrendered to him.
Alexander of Pherne is murdered. Tisiphonus and his brother Lycophron get the command.
3571 Berisades and Amadocus combine against Cersobleptes, and are
assisted by Athenodorus, the Athenian general. Cersobleptes is
forced to enter into a convention, by which the kingdom is
equally divided, and the Chersonese ceded to Athens, with the
exception of Cardia.
The Athenians quarrel with Philip about Amphipolis. He makes
an alliance with the Olynthians.
The Thebans send an army into Eubcea, from which, after much
fighting, they are expelled by the Athenians.
Chares is sent to take possession of the Chersonese, which, after
some opposition from Charidemus, he effects.
The Social War breaks out, in which Byzantium, Chios, Cos, and
Rhodes revolt from the Athenian league. The Athenians attack Chios, and are defeated; Chabrias is slain.
The Phocians send succor to some of the Bceotian towns, attempting to revolt from Thebes. The Thebans procure an Amphictyonic decree against the Phocians for having cultivated a portion of the consecrated plain nearDelphi This was the origin
of the Sacred War.
356 Philip takes Potidoea, with the assistance of the Olynthians, and
gives it up to them.
Alexander is born.
Parmenio, Philip's general, gains a victory over the Illyrians.
Philip takes the mine district of the Pangaeus from the Thasians,
and establishes a new colony at Crenides, which he names Philippi
The Athenians besiege Byzantium, but the siege is raised by the
fleet of the allies. Chares, Timotheus, and Iphicrates command
the Athenian forces, but the two latter are recalled on the complaint of Chares.
The allies ravage Lemnos, Imbrus, and Samos, and levy contributions in the Egean.
Chares, for want of supplies, lends assistance to Artabazus against
the Persian satraps.
Philomelus, the Phocian general, takes possession of Delphi, and
defeats the Locrians of Anmphissa. He negotiates an alliance
with Athens and Lacedoemon, while the Locrians obtain promises of assistance from Thebes and Thessaly.
Corcyra revolts from Athens.
355 The king of Persia threatens Athens with war on account of the
aid furnished by Chares to Artabazus.
The Athenians terminate the Social War by acknowledging the independence of the revolted states.
Timotheus and Iphicrates are brought to trial for misconduct in




28         CHROIN OLOGICAL ABSTRACT OF EVENTS
B.C.
355  the war. Timotheus is found guilty, and goes into exile.
Shortly after, he dies at Chalcis.
The Athenians send an expedition against Olynthus, without success.
Chares takes Sestus.
Philomelus again defeats the Locriana, and being threatened with
a general war, seizes the treasures of Delphi and collects a body
of mercenaries.  The Thessalians and Boeotians, having marched
into Locris, are defeated by Philomelus, who is strongly reinforced from Peloponnesus.
Demosthenes makes the speeches against Leptines and Androtion.
354 The Thebans, largely reinforced, give battle to Philomelus in the
defiles of Parnassus. He is defeated and slain. Onomarchus
succeeds to the command, and the Thebans retire.
Philip sends Macedonian troops to assist Callias of Chalcis against
Plutarch of Eretria. The latter applies to Athens for assistance,
and is opposed by Demosthenes, who makes his first public
speech on this occasion. The Athenians determine to assist
Plutarch, and Phocion is sent with an army to Euboea. He defeats Callias and the Macedonians at Tamynoe, and establishes
popular government at Eretria.
The Athenians debate about making war with Persia. Demosthenes dissuades them in his speech de Symmoriis.
353 Onomarchus takes Thronium, and invades Bceotia. Here he takes
Orchomenus, but is defeated bv the Thebans at Chleronea.
Lycophron, now sovereign of Pherse, enters into alliance with
Onomarchus, and endeavors to oppress the independent Thessalians.
The Spartans declare war against Megalopolis, and apply for assistance to Athens. Demosthenes makes his speech pro Megalopolitanis, in which he urges the Athenians to espouse the
other side. They remain neutral.
Demosthenes delivers the oration against Timocrates.
Philip takes Methone after a long siege, in which he lost an eye.
The Macedonian party prevail at Eretria, and dissolve the connection with Athens.
Mausolus, king of Caria, dies, and is succeeded by his widow Artemisia.
The Phoenicians revolt from Artaxerxes, and enter into alliance
with Nectanabis. Cyprus soon after revolts.
352 Philip, invited by the Thessalians, marches against Lycophron,
defeats Phayllus, brother of Onomarchus, and takes Pagasse.
Onomarchus marches with a large army into Thessaly, and defeats Philip in two battles, who retreats to Macedonia. Onomarchus then invades Bceotia, defeats the Thebans, and takes
Coronea; but is recalled to Thessaly by intelligence that Philip
had returned with large reinforcements. The decisive battle
of Pagasoe is fought, in which Onomarchus is defeated and slain.
Philip expels Lycophron from Pherae, and takes the city of
Magnesia. lIe then prepares to invade Phocis, and marches to




DURING THE LIFE OF DEMOSTHENES.                   29
352   Thermopyloe, but finds the pass guarded by an Athenian force,
and retreats.
Phayllus, joined by a large force of auxiliaries from Sparta,
Achaia, and Athens, invades Boeotia, but is defeated by the
Thebans.
Philip sends out a fleet, plundering the Athenian coast, and ravages Lemnos, Irnbrus, and Scyros.  He himself marches into
Thrace, where, after long being occupied in the interior extending his power over the different tribes, he turns toward the coast
of the Propontis and attacks Heraeum.
Demosthenes speaks the first Philippic.
The oration against Aristocrates is delivered.
Thebes, Argos, Sicyon, and Messene send assistance to Megalopolis. The Spartans, assisted by mercenaries from Phocis, after
various indecisive battles, are compelled to make peace.
Artaxerxes *makes great preparations to recover Phcenicia and
Cyprus.
351 Phayllus overruns the country of the Epicnemidian Locrians, is
defeated by the Bceotians at Able, afterward defeats them at
Aryca, and dies; is succeeded by his nephew Phalecus.
The democratical party at Rhodes solicit the aid of Athens, and
are supported by Demosthenes in his speech de Libertate Rhodiorum.
Artemisia, queen of Caria, dies, and is succeeded by Idrieus, who,
at the command of Artaxerxes, collects a large armament for
the reduction of Cyprus. Phocion the Athenian is joined with
Evagoras in the command of this expedition.
The Thessalians remonstrate with Philip for retaining Pagasse and
Magnesia.
350 Phalaecus invades Bceotia, and takes Chleronea, from which he is
again driven by the Thebans, who invade and ravage Phocis.
Philip takes Apollonia, and threatens the Chalcidian towns. The
Olynthians send to Athens to negotiate alliance.
Pitholaus, brother of Lycophron, recovers Pher.s, and Philip is invited to expel him. On his return from Thessaly he marches
into the Chalcidian peninsula, and lays siege to Stagira.
Cyprus submits to Artaxerxes. Temnes, king of Sidon, assisted
by Mentor at the head of Greek mercenaries, defeats the Persian
satraps.
Demosthenes brings an action against Midias, which is afterward
compromised.
349 The Thebans receive a large subsidy from Persia, to enable them
to carry on the war against Phocis.
The Olynthians send an embassy to Athens to implore assistance.
A warm debate takes place, in which Demosthenes speaks the
first Olynthiac. The Athenians vote alliance, and dispatch
Chares with a small force. The second and third Olynthiacs
are delivered at short intervals after this.
Meanwhile Stagira capitulates; Torone is taken, and most of the
Chalcidian towns hasten to make terms with Philip. The Olyn




30         CHRONOLOGICAL ABSTRACT OF EVENTS
B.C.
349  thians send another embassy, pressing for more effectual assistance. A larger armamen& is sent from Athens, and put under
the command of Charidemus.
The Olynthians, dissatisfied with Charidemus, send a third embassy, and entreat the aid of a native Athenian force. This is
sent, but arrives too late.
Artaxerxes marches in person against the Plhenicians. Temnes
betrays Sidon, and the Phoenicians submit. Mentor is taken into
the service of Persia.
348 Philip takes Mecyberna, the port of Olynthus, and lays siege to
the city, After various ineffectual sallies, Olynthus is betrayed
to Philip, who razes it to the ground.
Phalhecus is deposed from his command by the Phocians. The
Sacred War languishes.
Artaxerxes sends to the Greek states to collect mercenaries for the
invasion of Egypt. Athens and Sparta refuse assistance. The
Thebans send Lacrates with a thousand men; the Argives Nicostratus with three thousand. The Asiatic Greeks furnish a
contingent, and the king marches in person into Egypt. The
conquest of Egypt is ultimately effected, but the exact date is
uncertain.
347 Philip celebrates his triumph over Olynthus by a festival at Dium
in Pieria.
An assembly is held at Athens. to consider the expediency of"
rousing the Greeks against Philip,. ~Eschines is sent for that purpose to Arcadia. The negotiations of Athens are unsuccessful.
Philip causes it to be intimrated at Athens that he is desirous of
peace. A decree passes at Athens to send embassadors to treat
with him.
The Thebans, suffering by the depredations committed on their'territories from the hostile garrisons in Boeotia, invite Philip to
terminate the Sacred War. The Phocians pray for aid of the
Athenians, and offer to put them in possession of Nicaea, Thronium, and Alponus. Meanwhile Phalpecus regains his power in
Phocia, and refuses to admit the Athenian troops.
Parmenio besieges Halus in Thessaly.
Demosthenes, ~Eschines, and eight other embassadors, are sent to
Pella to treat for peace. They return in the beginning of the
following year.
346 Parmenio and Antipater are sent to Athens to negotiate the peace.
A congress of the allies is held, and peace is concluded, on the
terms of each party keeping his own possessions; but the Phocians and Cersobleptes are not named in the treaty.
The ten Athenian embassadors are sent to Macedonia to receive
Philip's oath of ratification. On arriving at Pella, they find that
Philip has marched into Thrace. There he had seized upon the
Sacred Mount, and stripped Cersobleptes of a considerable part
of his dominions. On his return to Pella he takes the embassadors with him to Pherae, and there ratifies the peace. He then
dismisses them, hastens to Thermopylve, takes Niceea, Thronium,




DURING THE LIFE OF DEMOSTHENES.                  31
B.(.
346   and Alponus, and being joined by the Bceotians, marches into
Phocis. Archidamus with the Spartan troops, and Phalhecus
with his mercenaries, retire to Peloponnesus, while the Phocian
towns are either taken by storm or capitulate.
The Athenians, alarmed at this intelligence, begin to prepare for
their own defense, but are reassured by a letter of Philip.
A council of Amphictyons is held at Delphi, and sentence passed
on the Phocians for their sacrilege. Philip becomes a member
of the council, and is chosen to preside at the Pythian games.
The lost Bceotian towns are restored to Thebes by Philip, and Nicma given to the Thessalians.
The Amphictyonic Council send an embassy to Athens, to notify
their.election of Philip, and demand her recognition of it. Demosthenes delivers his Oration on the Peace, in which he dissuades the Athenians from opposing the Amphictyonic league.
345 Philip promises to assist the Messenians and Arcadians against
hostilities threatened by Lacedsempn.
The Athenians send Demosthenes at the head of an embassy to
Messene and Argos, to counteract the influence of Philip.
Diopittes is sent with a body of Athenian settlers to the Thracian
Chersonese, who become involved in disputes with the Cardians.
Philip ravages Illyria, and takes many of the towns in that dis-.trict; after which he marches into Thessaly, where the regnant
family had again made head, and expels them, leaving strong
garrisons in Pherae and Magnesia. Soon afterward he causes
the whole country to be divided into tetrarchies, and governed
by his own partisans.
344 Philip sends Python to Athens, to complain of the Athenian embassy to Peloponnesus. Demosthenes speaks the second Philippic.
Sostratus the pirate, having seized the island Halonnesus, is expelled by Philip. The Athenians demand its return.
Philip sends Python again to Athens, to adjust his disputes. The
Athenians send Hegesippus and other envoys to make proposals
for the amendment of the treaty.
The Cardians resist the attempt of Diopithes to take a portion of
their territories, and apply to Philip for assistance.
343 Philip sends a letter to the Athenians, stating the terms which he
is willing to consent to. Demosthenes and Hegesippus oppose
them as unreasonable. The extant speech de Halonneso is supposed to be that of Hegesippus.
Phocion is sent to protect Megara against a conspiracy to betray
it into the hands of the Macedonians. He secures it by fortifying Nicea, and completing the long walls.
Philip invades Cassopia in Epirus, and annexes it to the dominions
of his brother-in-law Alexander.
Demosthenes, Hegesippus, and Lycurgus are sent into Achaia and
Acarnania, to form a league against Philip, to oppose his designs
upon Ambracia and the western parts of Greece. They are successful, and an Athenian force is sent into Ambracia. Philip
retreats from Epirus.




32        CHRONOLOGICAL ABSTRACT OF EVENTS
B.C.
343 Aristodemus with an Athenian force makes an unsuccessful attempt upon Magnesia.
ZEschines is brought to trial by Demosthenes for misconduct in the
embassy, and acquitted.
Philip sends assistance to the Cardians, and marches into the interior of Thrace to attack Teres. Diopithes, having collected a
large body of mercenaries, endeavors to interrupt the conquests
of Philip.
342 A Macedonian force is sent to Oreus in Euboea, and establishes
Philistides as governor. Clitarchus, a partisan of Philip, is secured in the government of Eretria.
Philip sends a letter to Athens, complaining of the proceedings of
Diopithes as an infraction of the peace. Demosthenes makes
the speech de Chersoneso.
Philip completes the conquest of Thrace, and drives Cersobleptes
from his kingdom. He then marches toward the Propontine
coast.
341 Demosthenes speaks the third Philippic. Early in the year Philip
besieges Selymbria.
Twenty Athenian corn-ships, intended for the relief of Selymbria,
are captured by Philip. The Athenians complain, and the ships
are restored.
Phocion is sent with troops to Euboea, and expels Clitarchus and
Philistides. Demosthenes is crowned by the people for having
advised this expedition.
Selymbria is taken, and Philip proceeds to besiege Perinthus.
The Athenians, under the advice of Demosthenes, apply for assistance to Persia.
840 Philip sends his letter to the Athenians (which is still extant), in
which, after reproaching them for their conduct, he virtually
declares war.
He sends an army into the Chersonese.
The Persians relieve Perinthus, and Philip, leaving troops to blockade it, lays siege to Byzantium.
Demosthenes goes to Byzantium, to offer Athenian succor, which
is accepted, and Chares is sent with a fleet; but the Byzantines
refuse to receive him, and Phocion is sent in his stead. At the
same time assistance is sent from Chios, Cos, and Rhodes, and
also from other parts of Greece.
Philip is compelled to raise the siege of Perinthus and Byzantium,
and his troops are driven out of the Chersonese. He breaks up
his camp, and marches into Scythia.
Artaxerxes is poisoned by the satrap Bagoas, and his son Arses
succeeds him.
839 LEschines goes as one of the Athenian deputies to the Amphictyonic Council. He accuses the Locrians of Amphissa, for having
cultivated the sacred plain. The Delphians having attacked
Cirrha, are put to flight, and a resolution is passed to convoke
an extraordinary meeting at Thermopyl.e. At this meeting,
unattended by Athens or Thebes, war is declared against the




DURING THE LIFE OF DEMOSTHENES.                  33
xc.
339 Locrians, and Cottyphus appointed to command an Amphictyonic
army. He invades Locris, but without effect.
Philip, on his return from Scythia, is attacked by the Triballi, and
is wounded in a hard-fought battle.
Phocion carries on successful operations against Philip in the
north, but is severely wounded in an incursion into Macedonia.
Another Amphictyonic assembly is convened, at which Philip is
elected general to carry into effect the decree against the Locrians.
338 Philip marches through Thessaly, and takes possession of Elatea,
which he begins to fortify.
The Athenians in alarm hold an assembly of the people, at which
Demosthenes proposes to send an embassy to Thebes. This is
resolved upon, and Demosthenes himself heads the embassy.
Meanwhile the Athenians muster all their troops, and collect a
body of ten thousand mercenaries.
An assembly is convoked at Thebes, and attended by Python on
Philip's behalf; but Demosthenes prevails on the Thebans to
become allies of Athens.
Philip marches against Amphissa, and defeats Chares, who had
been sent to succor the Locrians. After two indecisive battles,
the hostile armies meet at Chaeronea. Philip is at the head of
thirty-two thousand men, chiefly Macedonians and Thessalians.
On the other side are the forces of Athens and Thebes, with a
few auxiliaries from Peloponnesus, somewhat inferior in number. Philip gains a decisive victory.
The Athenians take energetic measures for the defense of their
city. Demosthenes pronounces the funeral orations in honor
of the slain. Lysicles the general is condemned to death.
Ctesiphon proposes a decree, that Demosthenes be crowned at the
Dionysian festival for his services in repairing the fortifications,
and his general merits as a citizen. For this a prosecution is
instituted against him by AlEschines.
Philip grants peace to the Athenians, and puts a Macedonian garrison into Thebes. The Bceotian towns are emancipated, and
Oropus given to Athens.
Philip holds a congress of the Greeks at Corinth, and declares
war against Persia. He makes a triumphant march through
Peloponnesus, and obtains universal submission.
337 Attalus and Parmenio are sent with a force into Asia Minor, to
liberate the Greek cities.
Philip is engaged in a war with the Illyrians, after which he celebrates his marriage with Cleopatra, and is involved in domestic
broils.
Arses is murdered, and Darius Codomanus raised to the throne of
Persia.
836 A great festival is held at Egwe in Macedonia, to solemnize the
marriage of Philip's daughter with the king of Epirus; and attended from all parts of Greece. During the solemnity, Philip
is murdered by Pausanins, one of his guards.
B2




34        CHRONOLOGICAL ABSTRACT OF EVENTS
B.C.
336 Demosthenes receives speedy information of Philip's death, and
takes instant measures to free the Greeks from Macedonia.
Embassadors are sent to the Greek states, and a correspondence commenced with Attalus in Asia, and also with the Persian Court. A general rising is meditated in Greece, and also
among the northern tribes.
Alexander hastens to Thermopylhe, joined by the Thessalians, and
holds an Amphictyonic council, at which he is elected general
of the Greeks. Thence he marches into Boeotia, and procures
the submission of Thebes. The Athenians send embassadors to
conciliate him, and among them Demosthenes, who, after going
as far as Cithberon, returns. Alexander then proceeds to Corinth, where at a general congress he is chosen to conduct the
war against Persia.
335 Alexander marches into Thrace, defeats the Triballi, crosses the
Danube, and, after receiving the submission of some barbarous
tribes, returns through Ppeonia to attack the Illyrian prince
Cleitus. While he is yet in Illyria, he hears of the revolt of
Thebes.
The Thebans, having blockaded the Macedonian garrison in the
Cadmea, send to divers Greek states for assistance. Demosthenes persuades the Athenians to vote alliance, and himself
furnishes the Thebans with a supply of arms. Elis and other
cities of Peloponnesus send troops to the aid of Thebes, but
they march no farther than the Isthmus, hearing of the advance of Alexander.
Alexander besieges Thebes, which after a desperate resistance is
taken by storm, and razed to the ground.
The Athenians send a deputation to appease Alexander, who requires them to deliver up the principal leaders of the war-party, among them, Demosthenes, Hyperides, and Lycurgus. But
he is persuaded by Demades to waive this demand.
334 Alexander crosses the Hellespont into Asia Minor.
Battle of Granicus.
Memnon intrigues with the Greek states, especially Lacedremon,
to excite a rising against Macedonia. His death, which happens soon after, is fatal to-the Persian cause.
333 Battle of Issus.
332 Siege of Tyre.
The Lacedaemonians send an embassy to Darius.
Agis, king of Sparta, sails to Crete, and reduces the island under
the Persian dominion.
331 Alexandria in Egypt is founded.
Battle of Arbela.
Alexander enters the Persian capital.
Agis forms a confederacy in Peloponnesus.
330 Antipater marches to suppress an insurrection in Thrace. The
Lacedeemonians, commanded by Agis, rise in arms, and, joined
by the Eleans and Achaians, besiege Megalopolis. Antipater




DURING THE LIFE OF DEMOSTHENES.                 35
B.a.
330   hastens to its relief, and an obstinate battle is fought, in which
Agis is defeated and slain.
AEschines brings on the trial of Ctesiphon, and the two Orations
for the Crown are delivered. Ctesiphon is acquitted, and
IEschines retires in exile to Rhodes, where he opened a school
of rhetoric, and died many years after.
Darius is murdered.
328 Alexander sets out on his march for India.
327 Porus is overcome.
326 The army embarks on the Indus.
325 Alexander returns to Persia.
324 An order sent by Alexander is read at the Olympic games, commanding the reception of exiles by the Greek states. Demosthenes goes to Olympia to remonstrate with the Macedonian
envoy. The Athenians send an embassy to Alexander, to complain of this measure.
Messages are sent to the Greek cities, requiring them to pay
divine honors to Alexander.
Harpalus, flying from Babylon with a large treasure, arrives in
Athens. Antipater demands that he shall be given up by the
Athenians, who throw him into prison, and pass a decree, on the
motion of Demosthenes, to lodge his treasure in the Acropolis.
A large portion of it is missing, and, on inquiry being instituted by the Areopagus, Demosthenes (among others) is charged
with having received a bribe from Harpalus. He is found
guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of fifty talents.
Unable to pay this, he fies to Megara, and remains in exile.
323 Alexander dies at Babylon.
The Athenians resolve on war, and send embassadors to stir up
the Greeks. A general rising takes place, and Leosthenes the
Athenian is chosen commander. Sparta remains neutral, and
the Bceotians adhere to Macedonia.
Leosthenes defeats the Bceotians at PlatLea, and marches to meet
Antipater in Thessaly. Antipater is totally defeated, and takes
refuge in Lamia, where he is blockaded.
Macedonian envoys are sent to Peloponnesus, to counteract the
efforts of the Athenians. Demosthenes opposes them successfully in Argos, Corinth, and Arcadia.
Demosthenes is recalled from exile by the Athenians, and a ship
sent to bring him home.
Leosthenes is killed in a sally from Lamia. Antiphilus succeeds
him as general.
The siege of Lamia is raised by the advance of Leonatus, who is
himself defeated and slain; but Antipater effects a junction with
his army, and receives large reinforcements from Macedonia.
322 The Athenian fleet is defeated by the Macedonian.
A Macedonian force lands at Marathon and ravages Attica, but is
defeated by Phocion.
Antipater attacks the Greeks with a greatly superior army at Cran



36       CHRONOLOGICAL ABSTRACT OF EVENTS.
B.a.
322   non in Thessaly, and gains a doubtful victory, which becomes
decisive by the general desertion of the allies.
Antipater advances against Athens, which submits, and receives a
Macedonian garrison.
The Athenians are compelled to remodel their constitution, and
adopt a property qualification, which disfranchises a large number of citizens.
Demosthenes and Hyperides, with other orators of the war-party,
are demanded by Antipater. Demosthenes flies first to AEgina,
and afterward to Calaurea, where he takes refuge in the temple
of Neptune. Pursued by Archias, the Macedonian emissary, he
puts an end to his life by poison.




THE
ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENESo
THE FIRST OLYNTHIAC.
THE ARGUMENT.
Olynthus was a city in Macedonia, at the head of the Toronaic gulf, and
north of the peninsula of Pallene. It was colonized by a people from
Chalcis in Eubcea, and commanded a large district called Chalcidice,
in which there were thirty-two cities. Over all this tract the sway of
Olynthus was considerable, and she had waged wars anciently with
Athens and Sparta, and been formidable to Philip's predecessors on
the throne of Macedon. Soon after Philip's accession, the Olynthians
had disputes with him, which were at first accommodated, and he
gratified them by the cession of Anthemus. They then joined him
in a war against Athens, and he gave up to them Potidsea, which
had yielded to their united arms. After the lapse of some years,
during which Philip had greatly increased his power, and acquired
considerable influence in Thessaly and Thrace, the Olynthians became alarmed, and began to think him too dangerous a neighbor.
The immediate cause of rupture was an attack which he made on one
of the Chalcidian towns. An embassy was instantly sent to Athens,
to negotiate an alliance. Philip, considering this as an infraction of
their treaty with him, declared war against them, and invaded their
territory. A second embassy was sent to Athens, pressing for assistance. The question was debated in the popular assembly. Demades,
an orator of considerable ability, but profligate character, opposed
the alliance. Many speakers were heard; and at length Demosthenes
rose to support the prayer of the embassy, delivering one of those
clear and forcible speeches, which seldom failed to make a strong
impression on his audience. The alliance was accepted, and succors
voted.
The orator here delicately touches on the law of Eubulus, which had
made it capital to propose that the Theoric fund should be applied to
military service. This fund was in fact the surplus revenue of the
civil administration, which by the ancient law was appropriated to
the defense of the commonwealth; but it had by various means been
diverted from that purpose, and expended in largesses to the people,




38          THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
to enable them to attend the theatre, and other public shows and
amusements. The law of Eubulus perpetuated this abuse. (See my
article Theorica in the Archaeological Dictionary.) Desmosthenes,
seeing the necessity of a war supply, hints that this absurd law ought
to be abolished, but does not openly propose it.
There has been much difference of opinion among the learned as to the
order of the three Olynthiac orations; nor is it certain, whether they
were spoken on the occasion of one embassy, or several embassies.
The curious may consult Bishop Thirlwall's Appendix to the fifth
volume of his Grecian History, and Jacobs' Introduction to his translation. I have followed the common order, as adopted by Bekker,
whose edition of Demosthenes is the text of this translation; and
indeed my opinion is, on the whole, in favor of preserving the common order, though the plan of this work prevents my entering into
controversy on the question. To enable the reader more fully to
understand the following orations, I have in an Appendix to this
volume given a brief account of Olynthus, showing its position with
reference to Macedonia, and the importance of its acquisition to
Philip. The historical abstract prefixed to this volume is intended
chiefly to assist the reader in reference to dates. Such occurrences
only are noticed as may be useful to illustrate Demosthenes.
I BELIEVE, men of Athens, you would give much to know,
what is the true policy to be adopted in the present matter of
inquiry. This being the case, you should be willing to hear
with attention those who offer you their counsel.  Besides
that you will have the benefit of all preconsidered advice, I
esteem it part of your good fortune, that many fit suggestions
will occur to some speakers at the moment, so that from
them all you may easily choose what is profitable.
The present juncture, Athenians, all but proclaims aloud,
that you must yourselves take these affairs in hand, if you
care for their success. I know not how we seem disposed in
the matter.]  My own opinion is, vote succor immediately,
and make the speediest preparations for sending it off from
Athens, that you may not incur the same mishap as before;
send also embassadors, to announce this, and watch the proceedings. For the danger is, that this man, being unscrupulous and clever at turning events to account, making concessions when it suits him, threatening at other times, (his
threats may well be believed,) slandering us and urging our
absence against us, may convert and wrest to his use some
1 This is a cautious way of hinting at the general reluctance to adopt
a vigorous policy. And the reader will observe the use of the first person, whereby the orator includes himself in the same insinuation.




THE FIRST OLYNTHIAC.                    39
of our main resources. Though, strange to say, Athenians, the
very cause of Philip's strength is a circumstance favorable to
you.' His having it in his sole power to publish or conceal
his designs, his being at the same time general, sovereign, paymaster, and every where accompanying his army, is a great
advantage for quick and timely operations in war; but, for a
peace with the Olynthians, which he would gladly make, it
has a contrary effect. For it is plain to the Olynthians, that
now they are fighting, not for glory or a slice of territory, but
to save their country from destruction and servitude. They
know-,how he treated those Amphipolitans who surrendered
to him their city, and those Pydneans who gave him admittance.2  And generally, I believe, a despotic power is mistrusted by free states, especially if their dominions are adjoining. All this being known to you, Athenians, all else
of importance considered, I say, you must take heart and
spirit, and apply yourselves more than ever to the war, contributing promptly, serving personally, leaving nothing undone.  No plea or pretense is left you for declining your
duty.  What you were all so clamorous about, that the
Olynthians should be pressed into a war with Philip, has of
itself come to pass,3 and in a way most advantageous to you.
For, had they undertaken the war at your instance, they
1 After alarming the people by showing the strength of their adversary, he turns off skillfully to a topic of encouragement.
2 Amphipolis was a city at the head of the Strymonic gulf, in that
part of Mc'edonia which approaches western Thrace. It had been built
formerly by an Athenian colony, and was taken by the Spartan general Brasidas in the Peloponnesian war. Ever since Athens regained her
character of an imperial state, she had desired to recover Amphipolis,
which was important for its maritime position, its exportation of iron,
and especially from the vicinity of the forests near the Strymon, which
afforded an inexhaustible supply of ship-timber. But she had never
been able to accomplish that object. Philip, who at that time possessed
no maritime town of importance, was for obvious reasons anxious to
win Amphipolis for himself; and he got possession of it partly by force
of arms, partly by the treachery of certain Amphipolitans who were
attached to his interest. It seems the Athenians had been amused by
a promise of Philip to give up the town to them. The non-performance
of this compact led to their first long war with him. Immediately after
the capture of Amphipolis, Philip marched against Pydna, and was admitted into the town.
3 Compare Virgil, -En. ix. 6.
Turne, quod optanti Divum promittere nemo
Auderet, volvenda dies en attulit ultro.




40          THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
might have been slippery allies, with minds but half resolved
perhaps: but since they hate him on a quarrel of their own,
their enmity is like to endure on account of their fears and
their wrongs. You must not then, Athenians, forego this
lucky opportunity, nor commit the error which you have
often done heretofore. For example, when we returned from
succoring the Eubceans, and Hierax and Stratocles of Amphipolis came to this platform,l urging us to sail and receive
possession of their city, if we -had shown the same zeal for
ourselves as for the safety of Eubea, you would have held
Amphipolis then and been rid of all the troubles that ensued.  Again, when news came that Pydna,2 Potidoea, Methone, Pagasse, and the other places (not to waste time in
enumerating them) were besieged, had we to any one of these
in the first instance carried prompt and reasonable succor,
we should have found Philip far more tractable and humble
now. But, by always neglecting the present, and imagining the future would shift for itself, we, 0 men of Athens,
have exalted Philip, and made him greater than any king
of Macedon ever was.  Here then is come a crisis, this
of Olynthus, self-offered to the state, inferior to none of the
former. And methinks, men of Athens, any man fairly estimating what the gods have done for us, notwithstanding
many untoward circumstances, might with reason be grateful
to them. Our numerous losses in war may justly be charged
to our own negligence; but that they happened not long ago,
and that an alliance, to counterbalance them, is open to our
acceptance, I must regard as manifestations of divine favor.
It is much the same as in money matters. If a man keep
what he gets, he is thankful to fortune; if he lose it by im1 The hustings from which the speakers addressed the people. It
was cut to the height of ten feet out of the rock which formed the
boundary wall of the assembly; and was ascended by a flight of steps.
2 Potidnea was in the peninsula of Pallene, near Olynthus, and was
therefore given by Philip to the Olynthians, as mentioned in the argument. Methone and Pydna are on the Macedonian coast approaching
Thessaly. Pagasse is a Thessalian town in the Magnesian district. It
was the sea-port of Pherve, capital of the tyrant Lycophron, against
whom Philip was invited to assist the Thessalians. Philip overcame
Lycophron, and restored republican government at Pheroe; but Pagase he garrisoned himself, and also Magnesia, a coast-town in the same
district.




THE FIRST OLYNTHIAC.                41
prudence, he loses withal his memory of the obligation. So
in political affairs, they who misuse their opportunities forget
even the good which the gods send them; for every prior
event is judged commonly by the last result. Wherefore,
Athenians, we must be exceedingly careful of our future
measures, that by amendment therein we may efface the
shame of the past.  Should we abandon these men' too, and
Philip reduce Olynthus, let any one tell me, what is to prevent him marching where he pleases?  Does any one of you,
Athenians, compute oi consider the means, by which Philip,
originally weak, has become great? Having first taken Amphipolis, then Pydna, Potidaea next, Methone afterward, he
invaded Thessaly. Having ordered matters at Pherse, Pagasae,
Magnesia, every where exactly as he pleased, he departed for
Thrace; where, after displacing some kings and establishing
others, he fell sick; again recovering, he lapsed not into indolence, but instantly attacked the Olynthians. I omit his expeditions to Illyria and Paeonia, that against Arymbas,2 and
some others.
Why, it may be said, do you mention all this now? That
you, Athenians, may feel and understand both the folly of continually abandoning one thing after ar other, and the activity
which forms part of Philip's habit and existence, which makes
it impossible for him to rest content with his achievements.
If it be his principle, ever to do more than he has done, and
yours, to apply yourselves vigorously to nothing, see what
the end promises to be. Heavens! which of you is so simple
as not to know, that the war yonder will soon be here, if we
are careless? And should this happen, I fear, 0 Athenians,
that as men who thoughtlessly borrow on large interest, after
a brief accommodation, lose their estate, so will it be with us;
found to have paid dear for our idleness and self-indulgence,
we shall be reduced to many hard and unpleasant shifts, and
struggle for the salvation of our country.
To censure, I may be told, is easy for any man; to show
what measures the case requires, is the part of a counselor.
I am not ignorant, Athenians, that frequently, when any disappointment happens, you are angry, not with the parties in
1 Here he points to the Olynthian embassadors.
2 Arymbas was a king of the Molossians in Epirus, and uncle of
Olympias, Philip's wife.




42          THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
fault, but with the last speakers on the subject; yet never,
with a view to self-protection, would I suppress what I deem
for your interest. I say then, you must give a two-fold assistance here; first, save the Olynthians their towns,' and send
out troops for that purpose; secondly, annoy the enemy's
country with ships and other troops; omit either of these
courses, and I doubt the expedition will be fruitless. For
should he, suffering your incursion, reduce Olynthus, he will
easily march to the defense of his kingdom; or, should you
only throw succor into Olynthus, and he, seeing things out
of danger at home, keep up a close and vigilant blockade, he
must in time prevail overthe besieged. Your assistance therefore must be effective, and two-fold.
Such are the operations I advise. As to a supply of money: you have money, Athenians; you have a larger military
fund than any people; and you receive it just as you please.
If ye will assign this to your troops, ye need no further supply; otherwise ye need a further, or rather ye have none at
all.  How then? some man may exclaim: do you move that
this be a military fund? Verily, not I.2 My opinion indeed
is, that there should be soldiers raised, and a military fund,
and one and the same regulation for receiving and performing what is due; only you just without trouble take your allowance for the festivals. It remains then, I imagine, that
all must contribute, if much be wanted, much, if little, little.
Money must be had; without it nothing proper can be done.
Other persons propose other ways and means. Choose which
ye think expedient; and put hands to the work, while it is yet
time.
It may be well to consider and calculate how Philip's
1 The Chalcidian towns. See the Argument. Philip commenced his
aggressions upon the Olynthians by reducing several of these.
2 There is some studied obscurity in this passage, owing to the necessity under which the speaker lay of avoiding the penalty of the law;
and a little quiet satire on his countrymen, who seemed desirous of
eating their pudding and having it too. The logic df the argument
-runs thus-My opinion is, that we ought to have a military fund, and
that no man should receive public money, without performing public
service. However, as you prefer taking the public money to pay for
your places at the festivals, I will not break the law by moving to apply that money to another purpose. Only you gain nothing by it;
for, as the troops must be paid, there must be an extraordinary contribution, or property tax, to meet the exigency of the case.




THE FIRST OLYNTHIAC.                    43
affairs now stand. They are not, as they appear, or as an
inattentive observer might pronounce, in very good trim,
or in the most favorable position. He would never have
commenced this war, had he imagined he must fight.  He
expected to carry every thing on the first advance, and has
been mistaken. This disappointment is one thing that troubles and dispirits him; another is, the state of Thessaly.)
That people were always, you know, treacherous to all men;
and just as they ever have been, they are to Philip.  They
have resolved to demand the restitution of Pagasoe, and have
prevented his fortifying Magnesia; and I was told, they
would no longer allow him to take the revenue of their harbors and markets, which they say should be applied to the
public business of Thessaly, not received by Philip.  Now,
if he be deprived of this fund, his means will be much straitened for paying his mercenaries. And surely we must suppose, that Patonians and Illyrians, and all such people, would
rather be free and independent than under subjection; for
they are unused to obedience, and the man is a tyrant. So
report says, and I can well believe it; for undeserved success
leads weak-minded men into folly; and thus it appears often, that to maintain prosperity is harder than to acquire it.
Therefore must you, Athenians, looking on his difficulty as
your opportunity, assist cheerfully in the war, sending embassies where required, taking arms yourselves, exciting all other
I Philip's influence in Thessaly was of material assistance to him in
his ambitious projects. It was acquired in this way. The power established by Jason of Pherme, who raised himself to a sort of royal authority under the title of Tagus, had devolved upon Lycophron. His
sway extended more or less over the whole of Thessaly; but was, if
not generally unpopular, at least unacceptable to the great families in
the northern towns, among whom the Aleuadwe of Larissa held a prominent place. They invoked Philip's aid, while Lycophron was assisted
by the Phocian Onomarchus. After various success, Onomarchus was
defeated and slain, and Lycophron expelled from Pheree. This established Philip's influence, and led to his being afterward called in to
terminate the Sacred war. How far the assertions of Demosthenes,
respecting the discontent of the Thessalians, are true, can not exactly
be told. They are confirmed, however, in some degree by the fact,
that at the close of the Sacred war Philip restored to them Magnesia.
A new attempt by the regnant family caused Philip again to be invited, And Thessaly became virtually a province of Macedonia. Among
other advantages therefrom was the aid of a numerous cavalry, for
which Thessaly was famous.




44          THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
people; for if Philip got such an opportunity against us, and
there was a war on our frontier, how eagerly think ye he
would attack you! Then are you not ashamed, that the very
damage which you would suffer, if he had the power, you dare
not seize the moment to inflict on him?
And let not this escape you, Athenians, that you have now
the choice, whether you shall fight there, or he in your country. If Olynthus hold out, you will fight there and distress
his dominions, enjoying your own home in peace. If Philip
take that city, who shall then prevent his marching here?
Thebans? 1 wish it be not too harsh to say, they will be
ready to join in the invasion. Phocians? who can not defend
their own country without your assistance. Or some other
ally? But, good sir, he will not desire! Strange indeed, if,
what he is thought fool-hardy for prating now, this he would
not accomplish if he might. As to the vast difference between a war here or there, I fancy there needs no argument.
If you were obliged to be out yourselves for thirty days only,
and take the necessaries for camp-service from the land, (I
mean, without an enemy therein,) your agricultural population would sustain, I believe, greater damage than what the
whole expense of the late war' amounted to. But if a war
should come, what damage must be expected? There is the
insult too, and the disgrace of the thing, worse than any damage to right-thinking men.
On all these accounts, then, we must unite to lend our
succor, and drive off the war yonder; the rich, that, spending a little for the abundance which they happily possess,
they may enjoy the residue in security; the young,2 that,
gaining military experience in Philip's territory, they may
become redoubtable champions to preserve their own; the
The Amphipolitan war, said to have cost fifteen hundred talents.
2 Strictly, those of the military age, which was from eighteen years
to sixty. Youths between eighteen and twenty were liable only to
serve in Attica, and were chiefly employed to garrison the walls. Afterward they were compellable to perform any military service, under
the penalty of losing their privileges as citizens. The expression in
the text, it will be seen, is not rendered with full accuracy; as those
of the military age can only be called young by comparison. But a
short and apt antithesis was needed. Sometimes I have "tIre serviceable," or "the able-bodied." Jacobs: die waffenflihigen Jiinglinge, and
elsewhere, die Riistige.




THE SECOND OLYNTHIAC.                    45
orators, that they may pass a good account' of their statesmanship; for on the result of measures will depend your
judgment of their conduct.  May it for every cause be prosperous.
THE SECOND OLYNTHIAC.
THE ARGUMENT.
The Athenians had voted an alliance with the Olynthians, and resolved
to send succors. But the sending of them was delayed, partly by
the contrivance of the opposite faction, partly from the reluctance of
the people themselves to engage in a war with Philip. Demosthenes
stimulates them to exertion, and encourages them, by showing that
Philip's power is not so gloat as it appears.
ON many occasions, men of Athens, one may see the kindness of the gods to this country manifested, but most signally, I think, on the present. That here are men prepared
for a war with Philip, possessed of a neighboring territory
and some power, and (what is most important) so fixed in
their hostility, as to regard any accommodation with him as
insecure, and even ruinous to their country; this really appears like an extraordinary act of divine beneficence.  It
must then be our care, Athenians, that we are not more unkind to ourselves than circumstances have been; as it would
be a foul, a most foul reproach, to have abandoned not only
cities and places that once belonged to us, but also the allies
aid advantages provided by fortune.
To dilate, Athenians, on Philip's power, and by such discourse to incite you to your duty, I think improper: and
why? Because all that may be said on that score involves
matter of glory for him, and misconduct on our part. The
more he has transcended his repute,2 the more is he universally admired; you, as you have used your advantages
1 Every man, who is required to justify the acts for which he is responsible, may be said to be "called to account." But Demosthenes
speaks with peculiar reference to those accounts, which men in official
situations at Athens were required to render at the close of their
administration.
2 Jacobs otherwise: iiber sein Verdienzst gelungen.




46          THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
unworthily, have incurred the greater disgrace. This topic,
then, I shall pass over. Indeed, Athenians, a correct observer
will find the source of his greatness here,1 and not in himself.
But of measures, for which Philip's partisans deserve his
gratitude and your vengeance, I see no occasion to speak now.
Other things are open to me, which it concerns you all to
know, and which must, on a due examination, Athenians,
reflect great disgrace on Philip. To these will I address
myself.
To call him perjured and treacherous, without showing
what he has done, might justly be termed idle abuse.  But
to go through all his actions and convict him in detail, will
take, as it happens, but a short time, and is expedient, I
think, for two reasons: first, that his baseness may appear
in its true light; secondly, that they, whose terror imagines
Philip to be invincible, may see henhas run through all the
artifices by which he rose to greatness, and his career is just
co-e to an end.  I myself; men of Athens, should most
azsuredly have regarded Philip as an object of fear and admiration, had I seen him exalted by honorable conduct;
but observing and considering I find, that in the beginning,
when certain persons drove away the Olynthians who desired
a conference with us, he gained over our simplicity by engaging to surrender Amphipolis, and to execute the secret
article2 once so famous; afterward he got the friendship of
the Olynthians, by taking Potidaea from you, wronging you
his former allies, and delivering it to them; and lastly now
the Thessalians, by promising to surrender Magnesia, and
undertake the Phocian war on their behalf. In short, none
who have dealt with him has he not deceived. He has risen
by conciliating and cajoling the weakness of every people in
turn who knew him not. As, therefore, by such means he
1 In this assembly, by the contrivance of venal orators, or through
the supineness of the people. In the first Philippic there is a more
pointed allusion to the practices of Philip's adherents, who are charged
with sending him secret intelligence of what passed at home. Such men
as Aristodemus, Neoptolemus, perhaps Demades and others are referred
to. Aschines had not yet begun to be a friend of Philip.
2 A secret intrigue was carried on between Philip and the Athenians,
by which he engaged to put Amphipolis in their hands, but on the understanding that they would deliver up Pydna to him. Demosthenes
only mentions the former part of the arrangement, the latter not being
honorable to his countrymen.




THE SECOND OLYNTHIAC.                    47
rose, when every people imagined he would advance their
interest, so ought he by the same means to be pulled down
again, when the selfish aim of his whole policy is exposed.
To this crisis, O Athenians, are Philip's affairs come; or let
any man stand forward and prove to me, or rather to you,
that my assertions are false, or that men whom Philip has
once overreached will trust him hereafter, or that the Thessalians who have been degraded into servitude would not
gladly become free.
But if any among you, though agreeing in these statements, thinks that Philip will maintain his power by having
occupied forts and havens and the like, this is a mistake.
True, when a confederacy subsists by good-will, and all parties to the war have a common interest, men are willing to
co-operate and bear hardships and persevere. But when one
has grown strong, like Philip, by rapacity and artifice, on the
first pretext, the slightest reverse, all is overturned and broken
up.1  Impossible is it,-impossible, Athenians,-to acquire
a solid power by injustice and perjury and falsehood. Such
things last for once, or for a short period; maybe, they blossom fairly with hope;2 but in time they are discovered and
drop away.3  As a house, a ship, or the like, ought to have the
lower parts firmest, so in human conduct, I ween, the principle and foundation should be just and true. But this is not
so in Philip's conduct.
I say, then, we should at once aid the Olynthians, (the
best and quickest -way that 6an be suggested will please me
1 The original civexatir7e is " shakes off," or " throws off," as a horse
does his rider, when he rears and tosses up his neck. It will be observed that Demosthenes is very high-flown in his language here, passing from one metaphor to another. Leland translates these words,
"overthrows him, and all his greatness is dashed at once to the ground."
Francis: "hath already shaken off the yoke and dissolved their alliance." Wilson: "turneth all things upside down and layeth it flat in
the end." Auger, better: szffisentpour l'6branler et la dissoudre. Jacobs:
reicht Alles umzustiirzen und aqcfzulosen. Pabst, very nearly the same.
2 So in Henry VIII. Act iii. Sc. 2.
Such is the state of man: to-day he puts forth
The tender leaves of hope, to-morrow blossoms,
And wears his blushing honors thick upon him.
3 Like the leaves of a flower pursuing the last metaphor. So says
Moore, in The Last Rose of Summer: "the gems drop away." Jacobs:
fdllt sie von selbst zusammen. Pabst: stiirzt in sich selbst zusammen.




48         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
most,) and send an embassy to the Thessalians, to inform
some of our measures, and to stir up the rest; for they have
now resolved to demand Pagasse, and remonstrate about
Magnesia.  But look to this, Athenians, that our envoys
shall not only make speeches, but have some real proof that
we have gone forth as becomes our country, and are engaged
in, action. All speech without action appears vain and idle,
but especially that of our commonwealth; as the more we
are thought to excel therein, the more is our speaking distrusted by all. You must show yourselves greatly reformed, greatly changed, contributing, serving personally, acting
promptly, before any one will pay attention to you. And if
ye will perform these duties properly and becomingly, Athenians, not only will it appear that Philip's alliances are weak
and precarious, but the poor state of his native empire and
power will be revealed.
To speak roundly, the Macedonian power and empire is
very well as a help, as it was for you in Timotheus' time
against the Olynthians; likewise for them against Potidaea
the conjunction was important; and lately it aided the Thessalians in their broils and troubles against the regnant house:
and the accession of any power, however small, is undoubtedly useful.  But the Macedonian is feeble of itself, and
full of defects.  The very operations which seem to constitute Philip's greatness, his wars and his expeditions, have
made it more insecure than it was originally. Think not,
Athenians, that Philip and his subjects have the same likings. He desires glory, makes that his passion, is ready for
any consequence of adventure and peril, preferring to a
life of safety the honor of achieving what no Macedonian
king ever did before. They have no share in the glorious
result; ever harassed by these excursions up and down, they
suffer and toil incessantly, allowed no leisure for their employments or private concerns, unable even to dispose of
their hard earnings, the markets of the country being closed
on account of the war. By this then may easily be seen,
how the Macedonians in general are disposed to Philip. His
mercenaries and guards, indeed, have the reputation of admirable and well-trained soldiers, but, as I heard from one
who had been in the country, a man incapable of falsehood,
they are no better than others. For if there be any among




THE SECOND OLYNTHIAC.                     49
them experienced in battles and campaigns, Philip is jealous
of such men and drives them away, he says, wishing to keep
the glory of all actions to himself; his jealousy (among other
failings) being excessive. Or if any man be generally good
and virtuous, unable to bear Philip's daily intemperances,
drunkenness, and indecencies,1 he is pushed aside and accounted as nobody. The rest about him are brigands and parasites,
and men of that character, who will get drunk and perform
dances which I scruple to name before you.  My information
is undoubtedly true; for persons whom all scouted here as
worse rascals than mountebanks, Callias the town-slave and
the like of him, antic-jesters,2 and composers of ribald songs
to lampoon their companions, such persons Philip caresses
and keeps about him. Small matters these may be thought,
Athenians, but to the wise they are strong indications of his
character and wrong-headedness. Success perhaps throws a
shade over them now; prosperity is a famous hider of such
blemishes; but, on any miscarriage, they will be fully exposed.
And this (trust me, Athenians) will appear in no long time,
if the gods so will and you determine. For as in the human
body, a man in health feels not partial ailments, but, when
illness occurs, all are in motion, whether it be a rupture or a
sprain or any thing else unsound; so with states and monarchs, while they wage eternal war, their weaknesses are
t The original signifies a certain lascivious dance, which formed a
part of riotous festivities. We gather from history that the orator's
description here is not wholly untrue, though exaggerated. Thirlwall
thus writes of Philip: "There seem to have been two features in his
character which, in another station, or under different circumstances,
might have gone near to lower him to an ordinary person, but which
were so controlled by his fortune as to contribute not a little to his success. He appears to have been by his temperament prone to almost
every kind of sensual pleasure; but as his life was too busy to allow
him often to indulge his bias, his occasional excesses wore the air of an
amiable condescension. So his natural humor would perhaps have led
him too often to forget his dignity in his intercourse with his inferiors;
but to Philip, the great king, the conqueror, the restless politician, these
intervals of relaxation occurred so rarely, that they might strengthen
his influence with the vulgar, and could never expose him to contempt."
It has been observed, that Philip's partiality for drinking and dancing,
his drollery, and a dash of scurrility in his character', endeared him
especially to the Thessalians. See Jacobs' note on this passage.
2 Miuovf ye2.oiwv, players of drolle, mimes, or farces. Our ancient
word droll signifies, like puuof, both the actor and the ttiig acted.
VOLE I.-C




60         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
undiscerned by most men, but the tug of a frontier war betrays all.
If any of you think Philip a formidable opponent, because
they see he is fortunate, such reasoning is prudent, Athenians.
Fortune has indeed a great preponderance-nay, is every thing,
in human affairs. Not but that, if I had the choice, I should
prefer our fortune to Philip's, would you but moderately perform your duty. For I see you have many more claims to
the divine favor than he has. But we sit doing nothing;
and a man idle himself can not require even his friends to
act for him, much less the gods. No wonder then that he,
marching and toiling in person, present on all occasions,
neglecting no time or season, prevails over us delaying and
voting and inquiring. I marvel not at that; the contrary
would have been marvelous, if we doing none of the duties
of war had beaten one doing all. But this surprises me, that
formerly, Athenians, you resisted the Lacedaemonians for the
rights of Greece, and rejecting many opportunities of selfish
gain, to secure the rights of others, expended your property
in contributions, and bore the brunt of the battle; yet now
you are loth to serve, slow to contribute, in defense of your
own possessions, and, though you have often saved the other
nations of Greece collectively and individually, under your
own losses you sit still. This surprises me, and one thing
more, Athenians; that not one of you can reckon, how long
your war with Philip has lasted, and what you have been
doing while the time has passed. You surely know, that
while you have been delaying, expecting others to act, accusing, trying one another, expecting again, doing much the
same as ye do now, all the time has passed away. Then are
ye so senseless, Athenians, as to imagine, that the same measures, which have brought the country from a prosperous to
a poor condition, will bring it from a poor to a prosperous?
Unreasonable were this and unnatural; for all things are
easier kept than gotten. The war now has left us nothing
to keep; we have all to get, and the work must be done by
ourselves. I say then, you must contribute money, serve in
person with alacrity, accuse no one, till you have gained
your objects; then, judging from facts, honor the deserving,
punish offenders; let there be no pretenses or defaults on
your own part; for you can not harshly scrutinize the con



THE SECOND OLYNTHIAC.                      51
duct of others, unless you have done what is right yourselves.
Why, think you, do all the generals' whom you commission
avoid this war, and seek wars of their own? (for of the
generals too must a little truth be told.) Because here the
prizes of the war are yours; for example, if Amphipolis be
taken, you will immediately recover it; the commanders
have all the risk and no reward. But in the other case the
risks are less, and the gains belong to the commanders and
soldiers; Lampsacus,2 Sigeum, the vessels which they plunder.
So they proceed to secure their several interests: you, when
you look at the bad state of your affairs, bring the generals
to trial; but when they get a hearing and plead these necessities, you dismiss them. The result is that, while you are
quarreling and divided, some holding one opinion, some
another, the commonwealth goes wrong. Formerly, Athenians, you had boards3 for taxes; now you have boards for
1 A system of employing mercenary troops sprang up at the close
of the Peloponnesian war, when there were numerous Grecian bands
accustomed to warfare and seeking employment. Such troops were
eagerly sought for by the Persian satraps and their king, by such men
as Jason of Pherse, Dionysius of Syracuse, or Philomelus of Phocis.
Athens, which had partially employed mercenaries before, began to
make use of them on a large scale, while her citizens preferred staying
at home, to attend to commerce, politics, and idle amusements. The
ill effects however were soon apparent. Athenian generals, ill supplied
with money, and having little control over their followers, were tempted or obliged to engage in enterprises unconnected with, and often adverse to, the interests of their country. Sometimes the general, as well
as the troops, was an alien, and could be very little depended on. Such
a person was Cbaridemus, a native of Oreus in Euboea, who commenced
his career as captain of a pirate vessel. He was often in the service
of Athens, but did her more harm than good. See my article Mercenariz, Arch. Dict.          ~
2 Chares, the Athenian general, was said to have received these
Asiatic cities from Artabazus, the Persian satrap, in return for the
service he had performed. Probably it was some authority or privileges in those cities, not the actual dominion, that was conferred upon
him. Sigeum, which is near the mouth of the Hellespont, and was a
convenient situation for his adventures, was the ordinary residence of
Ch ares.
3 This refers to the institution of the cvufzopiat, or boards for management of the property-tax at Athens, as to which see Appendix IV.
The argument of Demosthenes is as follows-The three hundred wealthier citizens, who were associated by law for purposes of taxation, had
become a clique for political purposes, with an orator at their head, (he
intentionally uses the term 7i'yeuWv, chairman of the board,) to conduct




62           THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
politics.  There is an orator presiding on either side, a general under him, and three hundred men to shout; the rest of
you are attached to the one party or the other. This you
must leave off; be yourselves again; establish a general liberty
of speech, deliberation, and action.  If some are appointed to
command as with royal authority, some to be ship-captains,
tax-payers, soldiers by compulsion, others only to vote against
them, and help in nothing besides, no duty will be seasonably performed; the aggrieved parties will still fail you, and
you will have to punish them instead of your enemies. I say,
in short; you must all fairly contribute, according to each
man's ability; take your turns of service till you have all
been afield; give every speaker a hearing, and adopt the
best counsel, not what this or that person advises. If ye act
thus, not only will ye praise the speaker at the moment, but
yourselves afterward, when the condition of the country is
improved.
THE THIRD OLYNTHIAC.
THE ARGUMENT.
The Athenians had dispatched succors to Olynthus, and received, as
Llbanius says, some favorable intelligence; more probably, however, some vague rumors, which led them to imagine the danger was
for the time averted. They began, very prematurely, as the result
showed, to be confident of success, and talked of punishing Philip for
his presumption. In this they were encouraged by certain foolish
orators, who sought to flatter the national prejudices. Demosthenes
in this oration strives to check the arrogance of the people; reminds'
them of the necessity of defensive rather than offensive measures, and
especially of the importance of preserving their allies. He again adverts (and this time more boldly) to the law of Eubulus, which he
intimates ought to be repealed; and he exhorts the Athenians generally to make strenuous exertions against Philip.
NOT the same ideas, men of Athens, are presented to me,
when I look at our condition, and when at the speeches which
the business of the assembly, while they stood to shout and applaud his
speeches. The general, who held a judicial court to decide disputes
about the property-tax, and who in matters of state ought to be independent, was subservient to the orator, who defended him in the
popular assembly.




THE THIRD OLYNTHIAC.                    53
are delivered. The speeches, I find, are about punishing Philip; but our condition is come to this, that we must mind we
are not first damaged ourselves. Therefbre, it seems to me,
these orators commit the simple error of not laying before you
the true subject of debate. That once we might safely have
held our bwn and punished Philip too, I know well enough;
both have been possible in my own time, not very long ago.
But now, I am persuaded, it is sufficient in the first instance
to effect the preservation of our allies. When this has been secured, one may look out for revenge on Philip; but before we
lay the foundation right, I deem it idle to talk about the end.
The present crisis, 0 Athenians, requires, if any ever did,
much thought and counsel. Not that I am puzzled, what
advice to give in the matter; I am only doubtful, in what
way, Athenians, to address you thereupon. For I have been
taught both by hearsay and experience, that most of your
advantages have escaped you, from unwillingness to do your
duty, not from ignorance. I request you, if I speak my mind,
to be patient, and consider only, whether I speak the truth,
and with a view to future amendment. You see to what
wretched plight we are reduced by some men haranguing for
popularity.
I think it necessary, however, first to recall to your memory a few past events. You remember, Athenians, when news
came three or four years ago, that Philip was in Thrace besieging Heroeum.1 It was then the fifth month,2 and after
much discussion and tumult in the assembly you resolved
to launch forty galleys, that every citizen under forty-five3
should embark, and a tax be raised of sixty talents. That
year passed; the first, second, third month arrived; in that
I A fortress on the Propontis, (now Sea of Marmora,) near Perinthus.
This was a post of importance to the Athenians, who received large
supplies of corn from that district.
2 Corresponding nearly to our November. The Attic year-began in
July, and contained twelve lunar months, of alternately 29 and 30
days. The Greeks attempted to make the lunar and solar courses coincide by cycles of years, but fell into great confusion. See Calendarium in Arch. Diet.
3 This large proportion of the serviceable citizens, Tlv tv lKiqta,
shows the alarm at Athens. Philip's illness seems to have put a stop
to his progress in Thrace at this period. Immediately on his recovery
he began his aggression against Olynthus. See the Chronological Abstract prefixed to this volume.




54         TIlE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
month, reluctantly, after the mysteries,' you dispatched Charidemus with ten empty ships and five talents in money; for
as Philip was reported to be sick or dead, (both rumors calme,)
you thought there was no longer any occasion for succors,
and discontinued the armament.  But that was the very
occasion; if we had then sent our succors quickly, as we
resolved, Philip would not have been saved to trouble us
now.
Those events can not be altered. But here is the crisis of
another war, the cause why I mentioned the past, that you
may not repeat your error. How shall we deal with it, men
of Athens?  If you lend not the utmost possible aid, see how
you will have manceuvred every thing for Philip's benefit.
There were the Olynthians, possessed of some power; and
matters stood thus: Philip distrusted them, and they Philip.
We negotiated for peace with them; this hampered (as it
were) and annoyed Philip, that a great city, reconciled to us,
should be watching opportunities against him. VWe thought
it necessary by all means to make that people his enemies;
and lo, what erewhile you clamored for, has somehow or other been accomplished. Then what remains, Athenians, but
to assist them vigorously and promptly?  I know not.  For
besides the disgrace that would fall upon us, if we sacrificed
any of our interests, I am alarmed for the consequences, seeing how the Thebans are affected toward us, the Phocian
treasury exhausted, nothing to prevent Philip, when he has
subdued what lies before him, from  turning to matters here.
Whoever postpones until then the performance of his duty,
wishes to see the peril at hand, when he may hear of it elsewhere, and to seek auxiliaries for himself, when he may be
auxiliary to others; for that this will be the issue, if we
throw away our present advantage, we all know pretty well.
But, it may be said, we have resolved that succors are
necessary, and we will send them; tell us only how. Marvel not then, Athenians, if I say something to astonish the
multitude. Appoint law-revisers:2 at their session enact no
1 The Eleusinian Mysteries, in honor of Ceres and Proserpine, called
The Mysteries from their peculiar sanctity.
2 A provision was made by Solon for a periodical revision of the
Athenian laws by means of a legislative committee, called Nouo0eSrat.
(See my article Nomothetes, Arch. Diet.) They were chosen by lot from




THE THIRD OLYNTHIAC.                 55
statutes, for you have enough, but repeal those which are at
present injurious; I mean, just plainly, the laws concerning
our theatrical fund, and some concerning the troops, whereof
the former divide the military fund among stayers-at-home
for theatrical amusement, the latter indemnify deserters, and
so dishearten men well inclined to the service. When you
have repealed these, and made the road to good counsel safe,
then find a man to propose what you all know to be desirable.
But before doing so, look not for one who will advise good
measures and be destroyed by you fbr his pains. Such a person you will not find, especially as the only result would be,
for the adviser and mover to suffer wrongfully, and, without
forwarding matters, to render good counsel still more dangerous in future. Besides, Athenians, you should require the
same men to repeal these laws, who have introduced them.
It is unjust, that their authors should enjoy a popularity
which has injured the commonwealth, while the adviser of
salutary measures suffers by a displeasure that may lead to
general improvement. Till this is set right, Athenians, look
not that any one should be so powerful with you as to transgress these laws with impunity, or so senseless as to plunge
into ruin right before him.
Another thing, too, you should observe, Athenians, that a
decree is worth nothing, without a readiness on your part to
do what you determine. Could decrees of themselves compel
you to perform your duty, or execute what they prescribe,
neither would you with many decrees have accomplished little
or nothing, nor would Philip have insulted you so long. Had
it depended on decrees, he would have been chastised long
ago. But the course of things is otherwise. Action, posterior in order of time to speaking and voting, is in efficacy
prior and superior. This requisite you want; the others you
possess. There are among you, Athenians, men competent
to advise what is needful, and you are exceedingly quick at
understanding it; ay, and you will be able now to perform it,
the judicial body, on a reference to them by a vote of the populal
assembly. Demosthenes says, "enact no statutes," instead of saying,
" let the committee enact no statutes." This is because the committee
would be taken from the people themselves, and the part are treated
as the whole. So in speeches to juries we shall frequently observe
that in mentioning the decision of some other jury he says, "' you did
this or that," as if they were the same persons.




56          THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
if you act rightly.  For what time or season would you have
better than the present? When will you do your duty, if
not now? Has not the man got possession of all our strongholds?  And if he become master of this country, shall we
not incur foul disgrace? Are not they, to whom we promised
sure protection in case of war, at this moment in hostilities?
Is he not an enemy, holding our possessions-a barbarian —
anything you like to call him?  But, O heavens! after permitting, almost helping him to accomplish these things, shall
we inquire who were to blame for them?  I know we shall
not take the blame to ourselves. For so in battles, no runaway accuses himself, but his general, his neighbor, any one
rather; though, sure enough, the defeat is owing to all the
runaways; for each one who accuses the rest might have
stood his ground, and had each done so they would have conquered. Now then, does any man not give the best advice?
Let another rise and give it, but not censure the last speaker.
Does a second give better advice? Follow it, and success
attend you! Perhaps it is not pleasant: but that is not the
speaker's fault, unless he omits some needful prayer.2 To
pray is simple enough, Athenians, collecting all that one desires in a short petition: but to decide, when measures are the
subject of consideration, is not quite so easy; for we must
choose the profitable rather than the pleasant, where both are
not compatible.
But if any one can let alone our theatrical fund, and suggest other supplies for the military, is he not cleverer? it
may be asked. I grant it, if this were possible: but I wonder
if any man ever was or will be able, after wasting his means
in useless expenses, to find means for useful. The wishes of
1 Barbarians (among the Greeks) designates persons who were not
of Hellenic origin. Alexander, an ancestor of Philip, had obtained admission to the Olympic games by proving himself to be of Argive descent. But the Macedonian people were scarcely considered as Greeks
till a much later period; andl Demosthenes speaks rather with reference to the nation than to Philip personally.
2 Demosthenes sneers at the custom of introducing into the debate
sententious professions of good-will, and prayers for prosperity; a poor
substitute (he would say) for good counsel. Compare Virg. Georg.
III. 454.
Alitur vitium vivitque tegendo,
Dum medicas adhibere manus ad vulnera pastor
Abnegat, et meliora Deos sedet omina poscens.




THE THIRD OLYNTHIAC.                 57
men are indeed a great help to such arguments, and therefore the easiest thing in the world is self-deceit; for every
man believes what he wishes, though the reality is often
different. See then, Athenians, what the realities allow, and
you will be able to serve and have pay. It becomes not a
wise or magnanimous people, to neglect military operations
for want of money, and bear disgraces like these; or, while
you snatch up arms to march against Corinthians and Megarians, to let Philip enslave Greek cities for lack of provisions for your troops.
I have not spoken for the idle purpose of giving offense: I
am not so foolish or perverse, as to provoke your displeasure
without intending your good: but I think an upright citizen
should prefer the advancement of the commonweal to the
gratification of his audience. And I hear, as perhaps you do,
that the speakers in our ancestors' time, whom all that address you praise, but not exactly imitate, were politicians
after this form and fashion;-Aristides, Nicias, my namesake,'
Pericles.  But since these orators have appeared, who ask,
What is your pleasure? what shall I move? how can I oblige
you? the public welfare is complimented away for a moment's
popularity, and these are the results; the orators thrive, you
are disgraced. Mark, 0 Athenians, what a summary contrast may be drawn between the doings in our olden time and
in yours. It is a tale brief and familiar to all; for the examples by which you may still be happy are found not abroad,
men of Athens, but at home.  Our forefathers, whom the
speakers humored not nor caressed, as these men caress you,
for five-and-forty years took the leadership of the Greeks by
general consent, and brought above ten thousand talents into
the citadel; and the king of this country was submissive to
them, as a barbarian should be to Greeks; and many glorious
trophies they erected for victories won by their own fighting
on land and sea, and they are the sole people in the world who
have bequeathed a renown superior to envy. Such were their
merits in the affairs of Greece: see what they were at home,
both as citizens and as men. Their public works are edifices
and ornaments of such beauty and grandeur in temples and
1 Dernosthenes, the general so distinguished in the Peloponnesian
war, who defeated the Spartans at Pylus, and afterward lost his life in
Sicily.
C2




THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
consecrated furniture, that posterity have no power to surpass them. In private they were so modest and attached to
the principle of our constitution, that whoever knows the
style of house which Aristides had, or Miltiades, and the
illustrious of that day, perceives it to be no grander than
those of the neighbors. Their politics were not for moneymaking; each felt it his duty to exalt the commonwealth.'
By a conduct honorable toward the Greeks, pious to the gods,
brotherlike among themselves, they justly attained a high
prosperity.
So fared matters with them under the statesmen I have
mentioned. How fare they with you under the worthies of
our time? Is there any likeness or resemblance? I pass over
other topics, on which I could expatiate; but observe: in
this utter absence of competitors, (Lacedaemonians depressed,
Thebans employed, none of the rest capable of disputing the
supremacy with us,) when we might hold our own securely
and arbitrate the claims of others, we have been deprived of
our rightful territory, and spent above fifteen hundred talents
to no purpose; the allies, whom we gained in war, these persons have lost in peace, and we have trained up against
ourselves an enemy thus formidable. Or let any one come
forward and tell me, by whose contrivance but ours Philip
has grown strong. Well, sin this looks bad, but things at
home are better. What proof can be adduced? The parapets
that are whitewashed?  The roads that are repaired? fountains, and fooleries?2 Look at the men of whose statesmanship these are the fruits. They have risen from beggary to
opulence, or from obscurity to honor; some have made their
private houses more splendid than the public buildings; and
in proportion as the state has declined, their fortunes have
been exalted.
What has produced these results?  How is it that all
went prosperously then, and now goes wrong?  Because anciently the people, having the courage to be soldiers, controlled
the statesmen, and disposed of all emoluments; any of the
As Horace says:Privatus illis census erat brevis,
Commune magnum.
2 Jacobs: und solches Geschivatz. The proceedings of Eubulus are
here more particularly referred to.




THE THIRD OLYNTHIAC.                    59
rest was happy to receive from the people his share of honor,
office, or advantage. Now, contrariwise, the statesmen dispose of emoluments; through them every thing is done; you
the people, enervated, stripped of treasure and allies, are become as underlings and hangers-on, happy if these persons
dole you out show-money or send you paltry beeves;1 and,
the unmanliest part of all, you are grateful for receiving your
own. They, cooping you in the city, lead you to your pleasures, and make you tame and submissive to their hands. It
is impossible, I say, to have a high and noble spirit, while you
are engaged in petty and mean employments: whatever be the
pursuits of men, their characters must be similar. By Ceres,
I should not wonder, if I, for mentioning these things, suffered more from  your resentment than the men who have
brought them to pass. For even liberty of speech you allow
not on all subjects; I marvel indeed you have allowed it
here.
Would you but even now, renouncing these practices, perform military service and act worthily of yourselves; would
you employ these domestic superfluities as a means to gain
advantage abroad; perhaps, Athenians, perhaps you might
gain some solid and important advantage, and be rid of these
perquisites, which are like the diet ordered by physicians for
the sick.  As that neither imparts strength, nor suffers the
patient to die, so your allowances are not enough to be of
substantial benefit, nor yet permit you to reject them and
turn to something else. Thus do they increase the general
apathy. What? I shall be asked: mean you stipendiary
service? Yes, and forthwith the same arrangement for all,
Athenians, that each, taking his dividend from the public,
may be what the state requires. Is peace to be had? You
I Entertainments were frequently given to the people after sacrifices,
at which a-very small pait of the victim was devoted to the gods,
such as the legs and intestines, the rest being kept for more profane
purposes. The Athenians were remarkably extravagant in sacrifices.
Demades, ridiculing the donations of public meat, compared the republic to an old woman, sitting at home in slippers and supping her broth.
Demosthenes, using the diminutive 3iot&la, charges the magistrates with
supplying lean and poor oxen, whereas the victims ought to be healthy
and large, riPeta. See Virgil,,En. xi. 739.
Hie amor, hoc studium; dum sacra secundus aruspex
Nuntiet, ac lucos vocet hostia pinguis in altos.




60         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
are better at home, under no compulsion to act dishonorably
from indigence.  Is there such an emergency as the present?
Better to be a soldier, as you ought, in your country's cause,
maintained by those very allowances.  Is any one of you
beyond the military age?  What he now  irregularly takes
without doing service, let him take by just regulation, superintending and transacting needful business.  Thus, without
derogating from or adding to our political system, only removing some irregularity, I bring it into order, establishing a
uniform rule for receiving money, for serving in war, for
sitting on juries, for doing what each according to his age can
do, and what occasion requires. I never advise we should give
to idlers the wages of the diligent, or sit at leisure, passive and
helpless, to hear that such a one's mercenaries are victorious;
as we now do.  Not that I blame any one who does you a
service: I only call upon you, Athenians, to perform on your
own account those duties for which you honor strangers, and
not to surrender that post of dignity which, won through
many glorious dangers, your ancestors have bequeathed.
I have said nearly all that I think necessary. I trust you
will adopt that course which is best for the country and yourselves.
THE FIRST PHILIPPIC.
THE ARGUMENT.
Philip, after the defeat of Onomarchus, had marched toward the pass
of Thermopylae, which, however, he found occupied by the Athenians,
who had sent a force for the purpose of preventing his advance.
Being baffled there, he directed his march into Thrace, and alarmed
the Athenians for the safety of their dominions in the Chersonese.
At the same time he sent a fleet to attack the islands of Lemnos and
Imbrus, infested the commerce of Athens with his cruisers, and even
insulted her coast. In Thrace he became involved in the disputes
between the rival kings Amadocus and Cersobleptes, espousing the
cause of the former; and for some time he was engaged in the interior of that country, either at war with Cersobleptes, or extending his
own influence over other parts of Thrace, where he established or
expelled the rulers, as it suited him. It was just at that time that
Demosthenes spoke the following oration, the first in which he called




THE FIRST PHILIPPIC.                    61
the attention of his countrymen to the dangerous increase of Philip's
power. lie had become convinced by the course of events, and by
observing the restless activity of Philip, that Athens had more to
fear fr om him than from Thebes, or from any new combination of the
Grecian republics. The orator himself, perhaps, hardly appreciated
the extent of Philip's resources, strengthened as he was now by the
friendship of Thessalv, possessed of a navy and maritime towns, and
relieved from the presence of any powerful neighbors. What were
the precise views of Demosthenes as to the extent of the impending
danger, we can not say. It was not for him to frighten the Athenians too much, but to awaken them from their lethargy. This he does
in a speech, which, without idle declamation or useless ornament, is
essentially practical. He alarms, but encourages, his countrymen;
points out both their weakness and their strength; rouses them to a
sense of danger, and shows the way to meet it; recommends not any
extraordinary efforts, for which at the moment there was no urgent
necessity, and to make which would have exceeded their power, but
unfolds a scheme, simple and feasible, suiting the occasion, and calculated (if Athenians had not been too degenerate) to lay the foundation of better things.
HAD the question for debate been any thing new, Athenians, I should have waited till most of the usual speakers'
had been heard; if any of their counsels had been to my liking, I had remained silent, else proceeded to impart my own.
But as the subjects of discussion is one upon which they have
spoken oft before, I imagine, though I rise the first, I am entitled to indulgence. For if these men had advised properly in time past, there would be no necessity for deliberating
now.
First I say, you must not despond, Athenians, under your
present circumstances, wretched as they are; for that which
is worst in them  as regards the past, is best for the future.
What do I mean? That your affairs are amiss, men of Athens, because you do nothing which is needful; if, notwithstanding you performed your duties, it were the same, there
would be no hope of amendment.
Consider next, what you know by report, and men of experience remember; how vast a power the Lacedaemonians had
not long ago, yet how nobly and becomingly you consulted
1 By an ancient ordinance of Solon, those who were above fifty years
of age were first called on to deliver their opinion. The law had ceased
to be in force; but, as a decent custom, the older men usually commenced the debate. There would be frequent occasions for departing
from such a custom, and Demosthenes, who was now thirty-three, assigns his reason for speaking first.




62         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
the dignity of Athens, and undertook the war' against them
for the rights of Greece. Why do I mention this? To show
and convince you, Athenians, that nothing, if you take precaution, is to be feared, nothing, if you are negligent, goes as
you desire.  Take for examples the strength of the Lacedsemonians then, which you overcame by attention to your
duties, and the insolence of this man now, by which through
neglect of our interests we are confounded.  But if any
among you, Athenians, deem Philip hard to be conquered,
looking at the magnitude of his existing power, and the loss
by us of all our strongholds, they reason rightly, but should
reflect, that once we held Pydna and Potidaea and Mlethone
and all the region round about as our own, and marry of the
nations now leagued with him were independent and free,
and preferred our friendship to his. Had Philip then taken
it into his head, that it was difficult to contend with Athens,
when she had so many fortresses to infest his country, and
he was destitute of allies, nothing that he has accomplished
would he have undertaken, and never would he have acquired so large a dominion. But he saw well, Athenians,
that all these places are the open prizes of war, that the
possessions of the absent naturally belong to the present,
those of the remiss to them that will venture and toil.
Acting on such principle, he has won every thing and keeps
it, either by way of conquest, or by friendly attachment and
alliance; for all men will side with and respect those, whom
they see prepared and willing to make proper exertion. If
you, Athenians, will adopt this principle now, though you
did not before, and every man, where he can and ought to
give his service to the state, be ready to give it without
excuse, the wealthy to contribute, the able-bodied to enlist;
in a word, plainly, if you will become your own masters, and
cease each expecting to do nothing himself, while his neighbor does every thing for him, you shall then with heaven's
permission recover your own, and get back what has been
frittered away, and chastise Philip.  Do not imagine, that
lie refers to the war in which Athens assisted the Thebans against
Lacedremon, and in which Chabrias won the naval battle of Naxos.
That war commenced twenty-six years before the speaking of the first
Philippic, and would be well remembered by many of the hearers.
See the Historical Abstract in this volume.




THE FIRST PHILIPPIC.                63
his empire is everlastingly secured to him as a god. There
are who hate and fear and envy him, Athenians, even among
those that seem most friendly; and all feelings that are in
other men belong, we may assume, to his confederates. But
now they are all cowed, having no refuge through your tardiness and indolence, which I say you must abandon forthwith. For you see, Athenians, the case, to what pitch of
arrogance the man has advanced, who leaves you not even
the choice of action or inaction, but threatens and uses (they
say )outrageous language, and, unable to rest in possession of
his conquests, continually widens their circle, and, while we
dally and delay; throws his net all around us. When then,
Athenians, when will ye act as becomes you? In what event?
In that of necessity, I suppose. And how should we regard
the events happening now? Methinks, to freemen the strongest necessity is the disgrace of their condition. Or tell me, do
ye like walking about and asking one another: —is there any
news? Why, could there be greater news than a man of
Macedonia subduing Athenians, and directing the affairs of
Greece?  Is Philip dead?  No, but he is sick. And what
matters it to you? Should any thing befall this man, you will
soon create another Philip, if you attend to business thus.
For even he has been exalted not so much by his own strength,
as by our negligence. And again; should any thing happen
to him; should fortune, which still takes better care of us
than we of ourselves, be good enough to accomplish this; observe that, being on the spot, you would step in while things
were in confusion, and manage them as you pleased; but as
you now are, though occasion offered Amphipolis, you would
not be in a position to accept it, with neither forces nor counsels at hand.1
However, as to the importance of a general zeal in the discharge of duty, believing you are convinced and satisfied, I
say no more.
As to the kind of force which I think may extricate you
from your difficulties, the amount, the supplies of money, the
best and speediest method (in my judgment) of providing all
the necessaries, I shall endeavor to inform you forthwith,
1 Important advice this, to men in ll relations of life. Good luck is
for those who are in a position to avail themselves of it.
Illi poma cadnnt qui poma sub arbore quserit.




64          THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
making only one request, men of Athens. When you'have
heard all, determine; prejudge not before. And let none
think I delay our operations, because I recommend an entirely new force. Not those that cry, quickly! to-day! speak
most to the purpose; (for what has already happened we shall
not be able to prevent by our present armament;) but he that
shows what and how great and whence procured must be the
force capable of enduring, till either we have advisedly terminated the war, or overcome our enemies: for so shall we
escape annoyance in future. This I think I am able to show,
without offense to any other man who has a plan to offer.
My promise indeed is large; it shall be tested by the performance; and you shall be my judges.
First, then, Athenians, I say we must provide fifty warships,' and hold ourselves prepared, in case of emergency, to
embark and sail. I require also an equipment of transports
for half the cavalry2 and sufficient boats.  This we must have
ready against his sudden marches from his own country to
Therrnopylee, the Chersonese, Olynthus, and any where he
likes. For he should entertain the belief, that possibly you
may rouse from this over-carelessness, and start off, as you
did to Eubcea,3 and formerly (they say) to Haliartus,4 and very
lately to Thermopyle.  And although you should not pursue
just the course I would advise, it is no slight matter, that
The Athenian ship of war at this time was the Trireme, or galley
with three ranks of oars. It had at the prow a beak (11/3o20ov), with a
sharp iron head, which, in a charge, (generally made at the broadside,)
was able to shatter the planks of the enemy's vessel. An ordinary trireme carried two hundred men, including the crew and marines. These
last (tir3cdrat) were usually ten for each ship, but the number was
often increased. The transports and vessels of burden, whether merchant vessels or boats for the carriage of military stores, were roundbottomed, more bulky in construction, and moved rather with sails than
oars. Hence the fighting ship is called 7raxea, swift. It carried a sail,
to be used upon occasion, though it was mainly worked with oars.
2 The total number was one thousand, each tribe furnishing one
hundred.
3 The expedition about five years before, when the Thebans had sent
an army to Eubcea, and Timotheus roused his countrymen to expel them
from the island. Of this, Demosthenes gives an animated account at
the close of the oration on the Chersonese.
4 B.C. 395, when the war between Thebes and Sparta had begun, and
Lysander besieged Haliartus. He was slain in a sally by the Thebans
and Athenians.




THE FIRST PHILIPPIC.                   65
Philip, knowing you to be in readiness-know it he will for
certain; there are too many- among our own people who report every thing to hiam-may either keep quiet from apprehension, or, not heeding your arrangements, be taken off his
guard, there being nothing to prevent your sailing, if he give
you a chance, to attack his territories.  Such an armament,
I say, ought instantly to be agreed upon and provided. But
besides, men of Athens, you should keep in hand some force,
that will incessantly make war and annoy him: none of your
ten or twenty thousand mercenaries, not your forces on paper,l
but one that shall belong to the state, and, whether you appoint one or more generals, or this or that man or any other,
shall obey and follow him. Subsistence too I require for it.
What the force shall be, how large, from what source maintained, how rendered efficient, I will show you, stating every
particular. Mercenaries I recommend —and beware of doing
what has often been injurious-thinking all measures below
the occasion, adopting the strongest in your decrees, you fail
to accomplish the least-rather, I say, perform and procure a
little, add to it afterward, if it prove insufficient.  I advise
then two thousand soldiers in all, five hundred to be Athenians, of whatever age you think right, serving a limited time,
not long, but such time as you think right, so as to relieve
one another; the rest should be mercenaries. And with them
two hundred horse, fifty at least Athenians, like the foot, on
the same terms of service; and transports for them. Well;
what besides? Ten swift galleys: for, as Philip has a navy,
we must have swift galleys also, to convoy our power. How
shall subsistence for these troops be provided? I will state
and explain; but first let me tell you why I consider a
force of this amount sufficient, and why I wish the men to be
citizens.
Of that amount, Athenians, because it is impossible for us
now to raise an army capable of meeting hkn in the field:
we must plunder2 and adopt such kind of warfare at first:
1 Literally "written in letters," that is, promised to the generals
or allies, but never sent. Jacobs: cine liacht die auf dem Blatte stel/t.
Compare Shakspeare, Henry IV, Second Part, Act i.
We fortify in paper and in figures,
Using the names of men instead of men.' Make predatory incursions, as Livy says, " populabundi magis quam
justo more belli." Jacobs: den Krieg als Freibeuter fiiren. Another




66          THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
our force, therefore, must not be over-large, (for there is not
pay or subsistence,) nor altogether mean. Citizens I wish to
attend and go on board, because I hear that formerly the
state maintained mercenary troops at Corinth,' commanded
by Polystratus and Iphicrates and Chabrias and some others, and that you served with them yourselves; and I am
told, that these mercenaries fighting by your side and you
by theirs defeated the Lacedaemonians. But ever since your
hirelings have served by themselves, they have been vanquishing your friends and allies, while your enemies have become
unduly great. Just glancing at the war of our state, they
go off to Artabazus2 or any where rather, and the general
follows, naturally; for it is impossible to command without
giving  pay.  What therefore ask I?  To remove the excuses both of general and soldiers, by supplying pay, and
attaching native soldiers, as inspectors of the general's conduct.  The way we manage things now is a mockery.  For
if you were asked: Are you at peace, Athenians? No, indeed,
you would say; we are at war with Philip. Did you not
choose from yourselves ten captains and generals, and also
captains and two generals3 of horse?  How are they emGerman: Streifzaige zu machen (guerilla warfare). Leland: " harass
him with depredations." Wilson, an old English translator: "rob and
spoil upon him."
He alludes to the time when Corinth, Athens, Thebes, and Argos,
were allied against Sparta, and held a congress at Corinth, B.C. 394.
The allies were at first defeated, but Iphicrates gained some successes,
and acquired considerable reputation by cutting off a small division
(mora) of Spartan infantry.
2 Diodorus relates that Chares, in the Social war, having no money
to pay his troops, was forced to lend them to Artabazus, then in rebellion against the king of Persia. Chares gained a victory for the satrap,
and received a supply of money. But this led to a complaint and
menace of war by the king, which brought serious consequences. See
the Historical Abstract.
3 There were chosen at Athens every year
Ten generals (one for each tribe), aiQa7rTyoi.
Ten captains (one for each tribe), 7aiaeXolt.
Two generals of cavalry,'7rwra)xol.
Ten cavalry officers (one for each tribe), O,2,aqxeot.
In a regular army of citizens, when each tribe formed its own division, both of horse and foot, all these generals and officers would be
present. Thus, there were ten generals at Marathon. A change took
place in later times, when the armies were more miscellaneous. Three




THE FIRST PHILIPPIC.                  67
ployed? Except one man, whom you commission on service
abroad, the rest conduct your processions with the sacrificers.
Like puppet-makers, you elect your infantry and cavalry officers for the market-place, not for war. Consider, Athenians;
should there not be native captains, a native general of horse,
your own commanders, that the force might really be the
state's? Or should your general of horse sail to Lemnos,' while
Mlenelaus commands the cavalry fighting fobr your possessions?
I speak hot as objecting to the man, but he ought to be elected by you, whoever the person be.
Perhaps you admit the justice of these statements, but wish
principally to hear about the supplies, what they must be
and whence procured. I will satisfy you. Supplies, then, for
maintenance, mere rations for these troops, come to ninety
talents and a little more: for ten swift galleys forty talents,
twenty minas a month to every ship; for two thousand soldiers forty more, that each soldier may receive for rations ten
drachms a mouth; and for two hundred horsemen, each receiving thirty drachms a month, twelve talents.2 Should any
one think rations for the men a small provision, he judges erroneously. Furnish that, and I am sure the army itself will,
without injuring any Greek or ally, procure every thing else
from the war, so as to make out their full pay. I am ready
to join the fleet as a volunteer, and submit to any thing, if this
be not so.  Now for the ways and means of the supply, which
I demand from you.
[Statemejnt3 of ways and means.]
This, Athenians, is what we have been able to devise.
When you vote upon the resolutions, pass what you4 approve,
Athenian generals were frequently employed, and at a still later period
only one. Demosthenes here touches on a very important matter, which
we can well understand, viz. the necessity of officering the foreign mercenaries from home.
1 To assist at a religious ceremony held annually at Lemnos, where
many Athenians resided.
2 As to Athenian money, see Appendix IT.
3 Here the clerk or secretary reads the scheme drawn up by Demosthenes, in the preparing of which he was probably assisted by the financial officers of the state. What follows was, according to Dionysius,
spoken at a different time. The curious may consult Leland, and Jacobs' introduction to his translation.
4 I e. some measure, if not mine, whereby the war may be waged




68         THE ORATIONS-OF DEMOSTHENES.
that you may oppose Philip, not only by decrees and letters,
but by action also.
I think it will assist your deliberations about the war and
the whole arrangements, to regard the position, Athenians, of
the hostile country, and consider, that Philip by the winds and
seasons of the year gets the start in most of his operations,
watching for the trade-winds' or the winter to commence
them, when we are unable (he thinks) to reach the spot. On
this account, we must carry on the war not with hasty levies,
(or we shall be too late for every thing,) but with a permanent
force and power. You may use as winter quarters for your
troops Lemnos, and Thasus, and Sciathus, and the islands2 in
that neighborhood, which hav'e harbors and corn and all necessaries for an army.  In the season of the year, when it is
easy to put ashore and there is no danger from the winds, they
will easily take their station off tile coast itself and at the entrances of the sea-ports.
How and when to employ the troops, the commander appointed'by you will determine as occasion requires. What
you must find, is stated in my bill. If, men of Athens, you
will furnish the supplies which I mention, and then, after
completing your preparations of soldiers, ships, cavalry, will
oblige the entire force by law to remain in the service, and,
while you become your own paymasters and commissaries,
demand from your general an account of his conduct, you
will cease to be always discussing the same questions without
forwarding them in the least, and besides, Athenians, not
only will you cut off his greatest revenue —What is this?
He maintains war against you through the resources of your
allies, by his piracies on their navigation-But what next?
You will be out of the reach of injury yourselves: he will
not do as in time past, when falling upon Lemnos and
Imbrus he carried off your citizens captive, seizing the vessels at Gervestus he levied an incalculable sum, and lastly,
made a descent at Marathon and carried off the sacred
effectually. The reading of -rottjaare, adopted by Jacobs after Schaefer,
is inot in congruity writh the sentence.
I The Etesian winds blowing from the northwest in July, which
would impede a voyage firom Athens to Macedonia and Thrace.
2 As Scopelus, Halonnesus, Peparethus, which were then subject to
Athens.




THE FIRST PHILIPPIC.                    69
galley' from our coast, and you could neither prevent these
things nor send succors by the appointed time.  But how
is it, think you, Athenians, that the Panathenaic and Dionysian festivals2 take place always at the appointed time,
whether expert or unqualified persons be chosen to conduct
either of them, whereon you expend larger sums than upon
any armament, and which are more numerously attended
and magnificent than almost any thing in the world; while
all your armaments are after the time, as that to Methone,
to Pagasre, to Potidaea?  Because in the former case every
thing is ordered by law, and each of you knows long beforehand, who is the choir-master3 of his tribe, who the gymnastic4 master, when, from whom, and what he is to receive,
and what to do. Nothing there is left unascertained or undefined: whereas in the business of war and its preparations
all is irregular, unsettled, indefinite.  Therefore, no sooner
have we heard any thing, than we appoint ship-captains, dispute with them on the exchanges,5 and consider about ways
I A ship called Paralus, generally used on religious missions or to
carry public dispatches.
2 The Panathenaic festivals were in honor of Pallas or Athene, the
protectress of Athens, and commemorated also the union of the old
Attic towns under one government. There were two, the greater held
every fourth year, the lesser annually. They were celebrated with
sacrifices, races, gymnastic and musical contests, and various other
amusements and solemnities, among which was the carrying the pictured robe of Pallas to her temple. The Dionysia, or festival of Bacchus, will be spoken of more fully hereafter.
3 The choregus, or choir-master, of each tribe, had to defray the
expense of the choruses, whether dramatic, lyric, or musical, which
formed part of the entertainment on solemn occasions. This was one
of the 2elwovpyiat, or burdensome offices, to which men of property
were liable at Athens; of which we shall see more in other parts of
our author.
4 The gymnasiarch, like the choregus, had a burden imposed on him
by his tribe, to make certain provisions for the gymnasium, public place
or school of exercise. Some of the contests at the festivals being of a
gymnastic nature, such as the Torch-race, it was his duty to make arrangements for them, and more particularly to select the ablest youths
of the school for performers.
5 For every ship of war a captain, or trierarch, was appointed, whose
duty it was, not merely to command, but take charge of the vessel,
keep it in repair, and bear the expense (partly or wholly) of equipping it. In the Peloponnesian war we find the charge laid upon two
joint captains, and afterward it was borne by an association formed
like the Symmorize of the Property Tax. Demosthenes, when he came




70          THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
and means; then it is resolved that resident aliens and householders' shall embark, then to put yourselves on board instead:
but during these days the objects of our expedition are lost;
for the time of action we waste in preparation, and favorable moments wait not our evasions and delayvs. The forces
that we imagine we possess in the mean time, are found, when
the crisis comes, utterly insufficient. And Philip has arrived
at such a pitch of arrogance, as to send the following letter to
the Euboeans:
[The letter is read.]
Of that which has been read, Athenians, most is true, unhappily true; perhaps not agreeable to hear. And if what
one passes over in speaking, to avoid offense, one could pass
over in reality, it is right to humor the audience: but if
graciousness of speech, where it is out of place, does harm in
action, shameful is it, Athenians, to delude ourselves, and by
putting off every thing unpleasant to miss the time for all
operations, and be unable even to understand, that skillful
makers of war should not follow circumstances, but be in
advance of them; that just as a general may be expected to
lead his armies, so are men of prudent counsel to guide
circumstances, in order that their resolutions may be accomplished, not their motions determined by the event. Yet
you, Athenians, with larger means than any people.-ships,
infantry, cavalry, and revenue-have never up to this day
made proper use of any of them; and your war with'Philip
differs in no respect from  the boxing of barbarians.  For
among them  the party struck feels always for the blow;2
strike him somewhere else, there go his hands again; ward or
look in the face he can not nor will. So you, if you hear of
to the head of affairs, introduced some useful reforms in the system of
the Trierarchy.
The exchange, avvridoola, was a stringent but clumsy contrivance, to
enforce the performance or these public duties by persons capable of
bearing them. A party charged might call upon any other person to
take the office, or exchange estates with him. If he refused, complaint
was made to the magistrate who had cognizance of the business, and
the dispute was judicially heard and decided.
1 Freedmen, who had quitted their masters' house, and lived independently.
2 Compare Virgil, uEn. ix. 577.
Ille manum projecto tegmine demens
Ad vulnus tulit.




THE FIRST PHILIPPIC.                71
Philip in the Chersonese, vote to send relief there, if at
Thermopylke, the same; if any where else, you run after his
heels up and down, and are commanded by him; no plan
have you devised for the war, no circumstance do you see
beforehand, only' when you learn that something is done,
or about to be done. Formerly perhaps this was allowable:
now it is come to a crisis, to be tolerable no longer. And it
seems, men of Athens, as if some god, ashamed for us at our
proceedings, has put this activity into Philip. For had he
been willing to remain quiet in possession of his conquests
and prizes, and attempted nothing further, some of you,
I think, would be satisfied with a state of things, which
brands our nation with the shame of cowardice and the
foulest disgrace. But by continually encroaching and grasping after more, he may possibly rouse you, if you have not
altogether despaired. I marvel, indeed, that none of you,
Athenians, notices with concern and anger, that the beginning
of this war was to chastise Philip, the end is to protect ourselves against his attacks. One thing is clear: he will not
stop, unless some one oppose him. And shall we wait for
this? And if you dispatch empty galleys and hopes from
this or that person, think ye all is well? Shall we not embark? Shall we not sail with at least a part of our national forces, now though not before? Shall we not make
a descent upon his coast?  Where, then, shall we landf
some one asks. The war itself, men of Athens, will discover
the rotten parts of his empire, if we make a trial; but if
we sit at home, hearing the orators accuse and malign one
another, no good can ever be achieved. Methinks, where a
portion of our citizens, though not all, are commissioned with
the rest, Heaven blesses, and Fortune aids the struggle: but
where you send out a general and an empty decree and hopes
from the hustings, nothing that you desire is done; your
enemies scoff, and your allies die for fear of such an armament. For it is impossible-ay, impossible, for one man to
execute all your wishes: to promise,2 and assert, and accuse
this or that person, is possible; but so your affairs are ruined.
This loose mode of expression, which is found in the original, I
designedly retain.
2 Chares is particularly alluded to. The " promises of Chares" passed into a proverb.




72          THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
The general commands wretched unpaid hirelings; here
are persons easily found, who tell you lies of his conduct;
you vote at random from what you hear: what then can be
expected?
How  is this to cease, Athenians?  When you make the
same persons soldiers, and witnesses of the general's conduct,
and judges when they return home at his audit;' so that you
may not only hear of your own affairs, but be present to see
them. So disgraceful is our condition now, that every general is twice or thrice tried2 before you for his life, though
none dares even once to hazard his life against the enemy:
they prefer the death of kidnappers and thieves to that which
becomes them; for it is a malefactor's part to die by sentence
of the law, a general's to die in battle. Among ourselves,
some go about and say that Philip is concerting with the
Lacedeamonians the destruction of Thebes and the dissolution
of republics; some, that he has sent envoys to the king;3
others, that he is fortifying cities in Illyria: so we wander
about, each inventing stories. For my part, Athenians, by
the gods I believe, that Philip is intoxicated with the magnitude of his exploits, and has many such dreams in his imagination, seeing the absence of opponents, and elated by success;
but most certainly he has no such plan of action, as to let the
silliest people among us know what his intentions are; for
the silliest are these newsmongers. Let us dismiss such talk,
and remember only that Philip is an enemy, who robs us of
our own and has long insulted us; that wherever we have
expected aid from any quarter, it has been found hostile, and
that the future depends on ourselves, and unless we are
willing to fight him there, we shall perhaps be compelled to
fight here. This let us remember, and then we shall have
1 The audit or scrutiny of his conduct which every officer of the republic had to undergo, before a jury, if necessary, at the end of his administration. In the case of a general, the scrutiny would be like a
court-martial.  The Athenian people, (says Demosthenes,) as represented by the citizen soldiers, would themselves be witnesses of the
general's conduct. These same soldiers, when they came home, or at
least a portion of them, might serve on the jury; and so the people
would be both witnesses and judges.
2 Chares was tried several times. Capital charges were preferred
also against A'utocles, Cephisodotus, Leosthenes, Callisthenes.
3 The king of Persia, generally called the kinrg by the Greeks.




ON THE PEACE.                        73
determined wisely, and have done with idle conjectures. You
need not pry into the future, but assure yourselves it will be
disastrous, unless you attend to your duty, and are willing to
act as becomes you.
As for me, never before have I courted favor, by speaking
what I am  not convinced is for your good, and now I have
spoken my whole mind frankly and unreservedly. I could
have wished, knowing the advantage of good counsel to you,
I were equally certain of its advantage to the counselor: so
should I have spoken with more satisfaction.  Now, with an
uncertainty of the consequence to myself, but with a conviction that you will benefit by adopting it, I proffer my advice.
I trust only, that what is most for the common benefit will
prevail.
THE ORATION ON THE PEACE.
THE ARGUMENT.
To understand as well the subject of this oration, as the motives of
Demosthenes, who here recommends a course of action different from
the vigorous measures counseled by him on other occasions, it is necessary to take a short review of the preceding events, and observe
the position in which Athens stood at the time when the speech was
delivered.
Philip, after taking Olynthus, turned his thoughts to new objects, of
which the more immediate were, first, to get possession of the Greek
towns on the Hellespont and the Chersonese; secondly, to get a footing in southern Greece. The first of these seemed comparatively easy
since the reduction of Olynthus; the second was more difficult, and
could only be accomplished by the aid or sufferance of certain Greek
states. But the continuance of the Sacred war afforded Philip an
opportunity of which he skillfully availed himself. Phalecus, son of
Onomarchus, had maintained his ground against the enemy, and both
Thebans and Thessalians began to be desirous of Macedonian aid.
But Athens was in alliance with Phocis, and Philip had seen some
few years before, when the Athenians occupied the pass of Thermopylae, that they were still capable of vigorous efforts, if under able
direction or any strong excitement. It became therefore his policy to
conciliate Athens for the present. He caused it to be announced by
means of his agents and partisans, that he was desirous of peace, and
reports of various acts of kindness done by him to Athenian citizens
in Macedonia were studiously disseminated. This seems to have been
the period at which Philip gained over to his interest, or even retained
in his service, divers active members of the Athenian assembly.
VOL. I —



74           THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
Among them was Philocrates, who first made a formal motion, that
Philip should have leave to open a negotiation. Soon after he carried
a decree to send embassadors to Philip, and ten were dispatched,
among them, Philocrates himself, ~Eschines, and Demosthenes. They
returned with a letter from Philip, and were soon followed by three
Macedonian envoys of high distinction, Antipater, Parmenio, and
Eurylochus. The Athenians met in assembly; peace was determined
on, and the embassadors were again ordered to sail to Macedonia to
receive the oath of Philip. In the mean time Philip had marched into
Thrace, where he defeated Cersobleptes, the king of that country,
and took possession of a part of his dominions. From this expedition
he had not returned when the Athenian embassadors arrived at Pella,
the Macedonian capital. Here they waited a month, and, on Philip's
return, were induced by that monarch, who had secretly prepared for
his invasion of Phocis, to accompany him as far as Pherse in Thessaly.
From Pherse they departed for Athens, and Philip marched straight
to Thermopylke.  The Athenians, deceived by his promises, were
lulled into security; Phalkecus, seeing no hope of assistance, withdrew
from Phocis, while Philip, strengthened by the forces of Thessaly and
Thebes, overran the country, and took possession of Delphi. An
Amphictyonic council was convened to sit in judgment on the sacrilegious Phocians. Sentence was passed on them, which (besides
other penalties) deprived them of their seat in the council of Amphictyons, and transferred their privileges to the king of Macedonia.
The first intelligence of these transactions was received at Athens with
consternation. Measures were taken to put the city in a state of defense, as if an invasion were threatened. Philip sent a calm letter
of remonstrance, which allayed the fears of the people, but did not
abate their anger and ill-humor A feeling of disappointment was
mingled with shame for their own credulity, and alarm at the increase of Macedonian influence. They saw too, with deep vexation,
that Philip, instead of conferring any benefit upon Athens, as they
had fondly hoped he would, had exerted himself to promote the advantage of Thebes, which, by his assistance, recovered her subject
Bceotian towns, and even obtained some of the Phocian territory for
herself. Nothing more strongly marked the state of public feeling
at Athens, than her refusal at this time to attend the Pythian games,
at which Philip had been chosen to preside by the Amphictyonic decree. The Athenians by absenting themselves made a sort of protest against his election.
It was in this state of things that Macedonian embassadors, accompanied
by Thessalian and B(eotian, arrived at Athens, to demand from her a
formal sanction of the decree by which Philip had become a member
of the Amphictyonic council. An assembly was held to consider the
question. The people were exceedingly clamorous, and applauded
those orators who opposed the claim of Philip. ~Eschines, who supported it, could scarcely obtain a hearing. Demosthenes at length
addressed the assembly, and, without advising any dishonorable
submission, or even direct concession to what the envoys required,
strongly dissuaded his countrymen from taking any course which
might draw Athens into a war. It was not that Philip was less to




ON THE PEACE.                       75
be dreaded now than he was before; on the contrary, his power
had greatly increased; but this was not the time to provoke his
hostility, backed as he was by Thessaly and Thebes; and even if
Athens could stand alone against such a combination, a mere Amphictyonic title was not a proper subject of quarrel.
It appears that the Athenians came to no formal vote on this matter,
but their anger was so far calmed by the arguments of Demosthenes,
that the envoys departed with full confidence that the peace would
not be broken.
I SEE, men of Athens, our affairs are in great perplexity and
confusion, not only because many interests have been sacrificed, and it is useless to make fine speeches about them, but
because, for preserving what remains, you can not agree upon
any single expedient, some holding one opinion, and some another.  And besides, perplexing and difficult as deliberation of
itself is, you, Athenians, have rendered it far more so. For
other men usually hold counsel before action, you hold it after:
the result of which during all the time of my remembrance
has been, that the censurer of your errors gets repute and
credit as a good speaker, while your interests and objects of
deliberation are lost. Yet, even under these circumstances, I
believe, and I have risen with the persuasion, that if you will
desist from wrangling and tumult, and listen as becomes men
on a political consultation of such importance, I shall be able
to suggest and advise measures by which our affairs may be
improved and our losses retrieved.
Well as I know, Athenians, that to talk before you of one's
self and one's own counsels is a successful artifice with
unscrupulous men, I think it so vulgar and offensive, that
I shrink from  it even in a case of necessity.  However, I
think you will better appreciate what I shall say now, by
calling to mind a little that I said on former occasions. For
example, Athenians, when they were advising you in the
troubles of Eubcea to assist Plutarch,' and undertake a disI Callias, sovereign of Chalcis, had invited Philip into Euboea, to
assist him against Plutarch, sovereign of Eretria; Plutarch applied to
Athens for assistance, and Phocion was sent with an army into Euboea,
where, by the carelessness or treachery of Plutarch, he was exposed in
a defile at Tamynse, and attacked by Callias with a superior force of
Chalcidians and Macedonians. He gained the victory, but to punish
Plutarch expelled him from Eretria. This happened B.c. 354. After
Phocion quitted the island, a Macedonian party began to prevail at
Eretria, and Philip got possession of the city, defeating and taking
prisoner Molossus, the Athenian commander.




76         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHIENES.
creditable and expensive war, I, and I alone, stood forward to
oppose it, and was nearly torn to pieces by the men who for
petty lucre have seduced you into many grievous errors. A
short time later, when you incurred disgrace, and suffered
what no mortals ever did from parties whom they assisted,
you all acknowledged the worthlessness of their counsels
who misled you, and the soundness of mine. Again, Athenians, when I saw that Neoptolemusl the actor, privileged
under color of his profession, was doing serious mischief to
the state, managing and directing things at Athens on Philip's behalf, I came and informed you, not from any private
enmity or malice, as subsequent occurrences have shown.
And herein I shall not blame the advocates of Neoptolemus,
(for there were none,) but you yourselves; for had you been
seeing a tragedy in the temple of Bacchus, instead of it being
a debate on the public weal and safety, you could not have
heard him with more partiality, or me with more intolerance.
But I suppose you all now understand, that he made his
journey to the enemy, in order (as he said) to get the debts
there owing to him, and defray Ithereout his public charges at
home; and, after urging this argument, that it was hard to
reproach men who brought over their effects from abroad, as
soon as he obtained security through the peace, he converted
into money all the real estate which he possessed here, and
has gone off with it to Philip. Thus two of my warnings,
justly and rightfully pronounced, in accordance with' the
truth, testify in my favor as a counselor. A third, men of
Athens, I will mention, this one only, and straight proceed to
the subject of' my address.  When we embassadors, after
receiving the oaths on the peace, had returned, and certain
men were promising that Thespiae and Plataa2 would be
repeopled; that Philip, if he got the mastery, would save the
Phocians, and disperse the population of Thebes;3 that Oropus4
1 Neoptolemus on some professional engagement at Pella had probably been bribed by Philip. He was active in promoting the peace,
and afterward abandoned his country for Macedonia.
2 Thespiae and Platcea were taken and razed to the ground by the
Thebans under Epaminondas, B.c. 373.
3 That is, dismantle the city, and disperse the inhabitants into villages in order to destroy their power. An example of such a tLoiK[tt'
was the dismemberment of Mantinea by the Spartans in the year B.c.
385.' Oropus was a border town, for the possession of which Thebes and




ON TIlE PEACE.                     77
would be yours, and Eubea given as compensation for Am,
phipolis, with more of the like hopes and delusions, which
led you on, against policy, equity and honor, to abandon the
Phocians; you will find, I neither aided in any of these deceits, nor held my tongue.  I warned you, as you surely remember, that I knew not of these things nor expected them,
and deemed it all idle gossip.
These instances, wherein I have shown greater foresight
than others, I mention not by way of boast, nor ascribe,
Athenians, to any sagacity of my own, nor will I pretend to
discover or discern the future from any but two causes, which
I will state: first, men of Athens, through good fortune,
which I observe beats all the craft and cleverness of man;
secondly, because I judge and estimate things disinterestedly,
and no one can show that any lucre is attached to my politics
or my speeches. Therefore, whatever be your true policy, as
indicated by the circumstances, I have a correct view of it;
but when you put money on one side as in a balance, it
carries away and pulls down the judgment with it, and he
that does so can no longer reason upon any thing justly or
soundly.
The first thing which I maintain to be necessary is this.
Whether you seek to obtain allies, or contribution,l or aught
else for the state, do it without disturbing the present peace;
not that it is very glorious or worthy of you, but, whatever
be its character, it had better suited our interests never to
have made peace, than to break it ourselves: for we have
thrown away many advantages, which would have rendered
the war then safer and easier for us than it can be now.
Secondly, Athenians, we must take care that these people
assembled and calling themselves Amphictyons2 are not by
Athens had long contended. Themison of Eretria had taken it from
Athens, and put it in the hands of the Thebans.
1 I. e. money contributed by allies. When the Athenians re-established their confederacy, which had been dissolved by the Peloponnesian war, the payments received from the allies received the name of
contributions, avvraeS, as less obnoxious than tribute, S6por.
2 The Amphictyonic league, at the head of which Philip was now
placed, was a federal union of Hellenic (or Greek) tribes, having for its
object the maintenance of a common religion and nationality. The
various deputies met twice a year, in the spring at Delphi, in the autumn
at Anthela near Thermopyloe. They met, not only to celebrate games
and festivals, but to transact the business of the league, to determine




78          TIlE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
us necessitated, or furnished with a plea, to make a common
war against us. I grant, if we renewed the war with Philip
on account of Amphipolis, or any such private quarrel, in
which Thessalians, Argives and Thebans are not concerned,
none of them would join in it, and least of all —hear me
before you cry out —the Thebans: not that they are kindly
disposed to us, or would not gratify Philip, but they see
clearly, stupid as one may think them,] that, if they had,
a war with you, the hardships would all be theirs, while
another sat waiting for the  advantages.  Therefore they
would not throw themselves into it, unless the ground and
origin of the war were common. So if we again went to war
with the Thebans for Oropus or any private cause, I should
fear no disaster, because our respective auxiliaries would assist
us or them, if either country were invaded, but would join
with neither in aggression. Such is the spirit of alliances
that are worth regard, and so the thing naturally is. People
are not friendly either to us or the Thebans, to the extent of
equally desiring our safety and our predominance. Safe they
would all have us for their own sakes; dominant, so as to
become their masters, they would not have either of us.
What then, say I, is the danger? what to be guarded against?
Lest in the coming war there be found a common plea, a
common grievance for all. If Argives, and Messenians, and
Megalopolitans, and some of the other Peloponnesians, who
are in league with them, are hostile to us on account of our
negotiating with the Lacedacmonians and seeming to take up
some of their enterprises; if the Thebans are (as they say)
our enemies, and will be more so, because we harbor their
questions of international law and religion. The oracular sanctity of
Delphi gave a dignity to these meetings, but the rivalry and jealousies
of the more powerful Greek states did not permit them (in general) to
be controlled by Amphictyonic decrees. The three Sacred wars are
instances in which their decrees were enforced by combination; but in
the two last, for which Philip's aid was invited, there was but little
enthusiasm in the cause from any motive of religion or patriotism. The
meeting at which Philip had been chosen president was so tumultuous
and irregular, that the Athenians would not allow it to be a legal convocation of the Amphictyonic body. Philip greatly resented this, because his election was considered to establish the title of his countrymen to rank among the Greek nations.
Bceotian stupidity was proverbial. So Horace, Epist. II. i. 224.
Bceotfim in crasso jurares'aere natum.




ON TIIE PEACE.                      79
exiles and in every way manifest our aversion to them; Thessalians again, because we harbor the Phocian exiles, and Philip,
because we oppose his admission to the Amphictyonic body;
I fear that, each incensed on a private quarrel, they will
combine to bring war upon you, setting up the decrees of the
Amphictyons, and be drawn on (beyond what their single
interests require) to battle it with us, as they did with the
Phocians. For you are surely aware, that now the Thebans
and Philip and the Thessalians have co-operated, without having each exactly the same views. For example, the Thebans
could not hinder Philip from advancing and occupying the
passes, nor yet from coming last and having the credit of their
labors. True, in respect of territorial acquisition, something
has been done for them; but in regard to honor and reputation, they have fared wretchedly; since, had Philip not stepped
in, they swould (it seems) have got nothing.  This was not
agreeable to them, but having the wish without the power
to obtain Orchomenos and Coronea, they submitted to it all.
Of Philip, you know, some persons venture to say, that he
would not have given Orchomenos and Coronea to the Thebans, but was compelled to do so. I wish them joy of their
opinion,' but thus far I believe, that he cared not so much
about that business, as he desired to occupy the passes, and
have the glory of the war, as being determined by his agency,
and the direction of the Pythian games. Such were the objects of his ambition. The Thessalians wished not either
Philip or Thebes to be aggrandized, since in both they saw
danger to themselves; but sought to obtain these two advantDemosthenes did not entirely scout the suggestion made with regard
to Philip's views; but perhaps he thought that Philip could not venture
to offend his Theban allies then; and one of the means of humbling
Athens was, to increase the power of her neighbor. If it be asked why
Philip might not have seized upon Elatea at this time, as well as eight
years later, I should say, not on account of the peace with Athens, but
because he desired to rest upon his Amphictyonic honors, and have the
full benefit of the moral ascendency which he had acquired. It was
not clear that his grand object, which was rather to lead than to conquer Greece, might not be obtained without a war against any of her
principal states. Afterward, when the Athenians, under the active administration of Demosthenes, baffled his efforts in the north, and showed
a determination to counteract all his projects, it became necessary for
him to strike a decisive blow, even at the risk of irritating Thebes.
He ran this risk, and succeeded, but not without danger.




80          THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
ages, the synod at Thermopylae, and the privileges at Delphi;1
for which objects they aided the confederacy.  Thus you will
find that each party has been led into many acts unwillingly:
and against this danger, being such as I describe, you must
take precautions.
Must we then do as we are bidden, for fear of the consequences? and do you recommend this?  Far from it.  I advise you so to act, as not to compromise your dignity, to avoid
war, to prove yourselves right-thinking, just-speaking men.
With those who think we should boldly suffer any thing, and
do not foresee the war, I would reason thus.  We permit the
Thebans to have Oropus; and if one asked us why, and required a true answer, we should say, To avoid war. And to
Philip now we have ceded Amphipolis by treaty, and allow
the Cardians2 to be excepted from  the other people of the
Chersonese; and the Carian3 to seize the islands Chios, Cos,
and Rhodes, and the Byzantines to detain4 our vessels; evidently because we think the tranquillity of peace more beneficial than strife and contest about such questions. It were
folly then and utter absurdity, after dealing thus with each
party singly on matters of vital moment to ourselves, to battle
now with them all for a shadow at Delphi.
I The Thessalians were peculiarly aggrieved by their exclusion
(during the Sacred wvar) from the national synod, and from the oracle
and festivities of Delphi. Their country had been the cradle of the
Hellenic race, their deputies were the most numerous in the council,
and their vicinity to the places of meeting gave them a greater interest
in the proceedings. Hence they most eagerly pressed for punishment
of the Phocians. The tribes of Mount (Eta proposed, that the male
population of Phocis should be precipitated from the Delphian rock;
which cruelty was not permitted by Philip. To gratify the Thessalians, Philip put them in possession of Niceea, one of the towns near
the pass of Thermopyloe, but even there he kept a Macedonian garrison. The Thebans had expected to have that town themselves, and
were disappointed.
2 Cardia was a city at the northwestern extremity of the Chersonese,
and from its position on the isthmus was considered the key of the
peninsula. Among the towns ceded to Athens by Cersobleptes, Cardia
had not been included; but the Athenians afterward laid claim to it,
and Philip supported the Cardians in resisting that claim.
3 Idrieus, king of Caria, who was now in possession of these islands,
which had revolted from Athens in the Social war.
4 Compel them to go into their port to pay harbor duties.




THE SECOND PHILIPPIC.                    81
THE SECOND PHILIPPIC.
THE ARGUMENT.
Soon after the close of the Phocian war, the attention of Philip was
called to Peloponnesus, where the dissensions between Sparta and
her old enemies afforded him an occasion of interference. The
Spartans had never abandoned their right to the province of Messenia, which had been wrested from them by Epaminondas; and
since Thebes was no longer to be feared, they seem to have conceived hopes of regaining their lost power. The Argives and the
Arcadians of Megalopolis were in league with Messenia, but Sparta
had her allies in the Peloponnesus, and even Athens was suspected
of favoring her cause. It does not appear that any open hostilities
had taken place; but about this time the fears of the Messenians induced them to solicit the alliance of Philip. He willingly promised
them his protection, and sent a body of troops into the Peninsula.
The progress which Macedonian influence was making there having
alarmed the Athenians, they sent Demosthenes with an embassy to
counteract it. He went to Messene and to Argos, addressed the
people, and pointed out the dangers to which all Greece was exposed tby Philip's ambition. It seems that he failed in rousing their
suspicions, or they were too much occupied by an immediate peril
to heed one that appeared remote. Philip however resented this
proceeding on the part of the Athenians, and sent an embassy to
expostulate with them, especially on the charge of bad faith'and
treachery which had been preferred against him by Demosthenes.
Embassadors from Argos and Messene accompanied those of Macedon, and complained of the connection that appeared to subsist between Athens and Lacedaemon, hostile (they thought) to the liberties
of Peloponnesus. In answer to these complaints, Demosthenes addressed his second Philippic to the Popular Assembly; repeating the
substance of what he had said to the Peloponnesians, vindicating his
own conduct, and denouncing the Macedonian party at Athens. The
embassy led to no immediate result; but the influence of Demosthenes at home was increased.
IN all the speeches, men of Athens, about Philip's measures
and infringements of the peace, I observe that statements
made on our behalf are thought just and generous,' and all
1 Generous, as regards the Greek states, whose independence the
Athenians stand up for. This praise Demosthenes frequently claims
for his countrymen, and, compared with the rest of the Greeks, they
deserved it. Leland understood the word  t2Lav6p6Jmrov& in the same
D 2




82         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
who accuse Philip are heard with approbation; yet nothing
(I may say) that is proper, or for the sake of which the
speeches are worth hearing, is done. To this point are the
affairs of Athens brought, that the more fully and clearly
one convicts Philip of violating the peace with you, and
plotting against the whole of Greece, the more difficult it
becomes to advise you how to act.  The cause lies in all
of us, Athenians, that, when we ought to oppose an ambitious power by deeds and actions, not by words, we men of
the hustings1 shrink from our duty of moving and advising, for fear of your displeasure, and only declaim on the
heinousness and atrocity of Philip's conduct; you of the
assembly, though better instructed than Philip to argue
justly, or comprehend the argument of another, to check
him in the execution of his designs are totally unprepared.
The result is inevitable, I imagine, and perhaps just.  You
each succeed better in what you are busy and earnest about;
Philip in actions, you in words. If you are still satisfied
with using the better arguments, it is an easy matter, and
there is no trouble: but if we are to take measures for the
correction of these evils, to prevent their insensible progress,
and the rising up of a mighty power, against which we could
have no defense, then our course of deliberation is not the
same as formerly; the orators, and you that hear them, must
prefer good and salutary counsels to those which are easy and
agreeable.
First, men of Athens, if any one regards without uneasiness the might and dominion of Philip, and imagines that it
threatens no danger to the state, or that all his preparations
are not against you, I marvel, and would entreat you every
one to hear briefly from me the reasons, why I am led to
form a contrary expectation, and wherefore I deem Philip an
enemy; that, if I appear to have the clearer foresight, you
sense, though he translates it humane. We use the term philanthropic
in a sense not unlike that of the orator; but, as Leland truly observes,
" the distinction of Greek and barbarian precluded the rest of mankind
from a just share in Grecian philanthropy'" and he might have added,
that their notions of slavery were not in accordance with an enlarged
humanity. Therefore, I prefer a word of a less arrogant meaning.
Jacobs: billig. Francis: "filled with sentiments of exceeding moderation."
Auger has: " nous qui montons a la tribune."




THE SECOND PHILIPPIC.                   83
may hearken to me; if they, who have such confidence and
trust in Philip, you may give your adherence to them.
Thus then I reason, Athenians.  What did Philip first
make himself master of after the peace?  Thermopylae  and
the Phocian state.  Well, and how used he his power?  lie
chose to act for the benefit of Thebes, not of Athens.  Why
so? Because, I conceive, measuring his calculations by
ambition, by his desire of universal empire, without regard
to peace, quiet, or justice, he saw plainly, that to a people of
our character and principles nothing could he offer or give,
that would induce you for self-interest to sacrifice any of the
Greeks to him. He sees that you, having aespect for justice,
dreading the infamy of the thing, and exercising proper forethought, would oppose him in any such attempt as much as
if you were at war: but the Thebans he expected (and
events prove him right) would, in return for the services
done them, allow him in every thing else to have his way,
and, so far from thwarting or impeding him, would fight on
his side if he required it. From the same persuasion he befriended lately the MIessenians and Argives, which is the highest panegyric upon you, Athenians; for you are adjudged
by these proceedings to be the only people incapable of betraying for lucre the national rights of Greece, or bartering
your attachment to her for any obligation or benefit. And
this opinion of you, that (so different) of the Argives and
Thebans, he has naturally formed, not only from a view of
present times, but by reflection on the past. For assuredly
he finds and hears that your ancestors, who might have governed the rest of Greece on terms of submitting to Persia,
not only spurned the proposal, when Alexander,1 this man's
ancestor, came as herald to negotiate, but preferred to abandon their country and endure any suffering, and thereafter
1 Alexander of Alacedon, son of Amyntas, was sent by Mardonius,
the Persian commander, to offer the most favorable terms to the Athenians, if they would desert the cause of the Greeks. The Spartans at
the same time sent an embassy, to remind them of their duty. The
spirited reply which the Athenians made to both embassies is related
by Herodotus. The Thebans submitted to Xerxes, and fought against
the Greeks at the battle of P'latea. The Argives were neutral, chiefly
fi'om jealousy of Sparta. They demanded half the command of the
allied army, as a condition of their assistance, but this could not be
complied with.




84         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
achieved such exploits as all the world loves to mention,
though none could ever speak them worthily, and therefore
I must be silent; for their' deeds are too mighty to be utteredl in words.  But the forefathers of the Argives and'Tlhebans, they either joined the barbarian's army, or did not oppose it; and therefore he knows that both will selfishly embrace their advantage, without considering the common interest of the Greeks. He thought then, if he chose your friendship, it must be on just principles; if he attached himself to
them, he should find auxiliaries of his ambition. This is the
reason of his preferring them to you both then and now. For
certainly he does'not see them with a larger navy than you,
nor has he acquired an inland empire and renounced that of
the sea and the ports, nor does he forget the professions and
promises on which he obtained the peace.
Well, it may be said, he knew all this, yet he so acted, not
from ambition or the motives which I charge, but because the
demands of the Thebans were more equitable than yours. Of
all pleas, this now is the least open to him. He that bids the
Lacedaemonians resign M]essene, how can he pretend, when he
delivered Orchomenos and Coronea to the Thebans, to have
acted on a conviction of justice?
But, forsooth, he was compelled, —this plea remains-he
made concessions against his will, being surrounded by Thessalian horse and Theban infantry.  Excellent!  So of his
intentions they talk; he will mistrust the Thebans; and
some carry news about, that he will fortify Elatea.  All
this he intends and will intend, I dare say; but to attack
the Laceda-emonians on behalf of Messene and Argos he does
not intend; he actually sends mercenaries and money into
the country, and is expected himself with a great force. The
Lacedemonians, who are enemies of Thebes, he overthrows;
the Phocians, whom he himself before destroyed, will he now
preserve?
And who can believe this? I can not think that Philip,
The simple e'rEirv in the original is more forcible than if it had been
trratveiv, or the like. Compare Shakspeare, Coriolanus, Act ii. sc. 2.
I shall lack voice: the deeds of Coriolanus
Should not be uttered feeblyFor this last,
Before and in Corioli, let me say,
I can not speak him home,




TIIE SECOND PHILIPPIC.              85
either if he was forced into his former measures, or if he
were now giving up the Thebans, would pertinaciously oppose
their enemies; his present conduct rather shows that he
adopted those measures by choice. All things prove to a
correct observer, that his whole plan of action is against our
state. And this has now become to him a sort of necessity.
Consider.  He desires empire: he conceives you to be his
only opponents. He has been for some time wronging you,
as his own conscience best informs him, since, by retaining
what belongs to you, he secures the rest of. his dominion:
had he given up Amphipolis and Potidaea, he deemed himself
unsafe at home. He knows therefore, both that he is plotting against you, and that you are aware of it; and, supposing you to have intelligence, he thinks you must hate him;
he is alarmed, expecting some disaster, if you get the chance,
unless he hastes to prevent you. Therefore he is awake, and
on the watch against us; he courts certain people, Thebans,
and people in Peloponnesus of the like views, who from cupidity, he thinks, will be satisfied with the present, and from
dullness of understanding will foresee none of the consequences. And yet men of even moderate sense might notice
striking facts, which I had occasion to quote to the Messenians
and Argives, and perhaps it is better they should be repeated
to you.
Ye men of Messene, said I, how do ye think the Olynthians
would have brooked to hear any thing against Philip at those
times, when he surrendered to them Anthemus, which all
former kings of Macedonia claimed, when he cast out the
Athenian colonists and gave them Potidsea, taking on himself
your enmity, and giving them the land to enjoy?  Think ye
they expected such treatment as they got, or would have believed it if they had been told? Nevertheless, said I, they,
after enjoying for a short time the land of others, are for a
long time deprived by him of their own, shamefully expelled,
not only vanquished, but betrayed by one another and sold.
In truth, these too close connections with despots are not safe
for republics. The Thessalians, again, think ye, said I, when
he ejected their tyrants, and gave back Nicaea and Magnesia,
they expected to have the decemviratel which is now estab1 Thessaly was anciently divided into four districts, each called a
tetras, and this, as we learn from the third Philippic, was restored soon




86          THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
lished? or that he who restored the meeting at Pylael would
take away their revenues? Surely not. And yet these things
have occurred, as all mankind may know. You behold Philip,
I said, a dispenser of gifts and promises: pray, if you are wise,
that you may never know him for a cheat and a deceiver. By
Jupiter, I said, there are manifold contrivances for the guarding and defending of cities, as ramparts, walls, trenches, and
the like: these are all made with hands, and require expense;
but there is one common safeguard in the nature of prudent
men, which is a good security for all, but especially for democracies against despots.  What do I mean?   Mistrust.
Keep this, hold to this; preserve this only, and you can never
be iinjured. What do ye desire? Freedom. Then see ye not
that Philip's very titles are at variance therewith?   Every
king and despot is a foe to freedom, an antagonist to laws.
Will ye not beware, I said, lest, seeking deliverance from war,
you find a master?
They heard me with a tumult of approbation; and many
other speeches they heard from the embassadors, both in my
presence and afterward; yet none the more, as it appears,
will they keep aloof from Philip's friendship and promises.
And no wonder, that Messenians and certain Peloponnesians
should act contrary to what their reason approves; but you,
after the termination of the Sacred war. The object of Philip in
effecting this arrangement was, no doubt, to weaken the influence of
the great Thessalian families by a division of power; otherwise the
Phervean tyranny might have been exchanged for an oligarchy powerful enough to be independent of Macedonia.  The decemvirate here
spoken of (if the text be correct) was a further contrivance to forward
Philip's views; whether we adopt Leland's opinion, that each tetrarchy was governed by a council of ten, or Schaefer's, that each city
was placed under tell governors. Jacobs understands the word decemvirate not to refer to any positive form of government, but generally
to designate a tyranny, such as that which the Lacedsemrnians used
to introduce into conquered cities. So, for example, the Romans might
have spoken of a decemvirate after the time of Appius. However this
be, Philip seems to have contrived that the ruling body, whether in
the tetrarchy or the decadarchy, should be his own creatures. Two
of them, Eudicus and Simus, are particularly mentioned by Demosthenes as traitors.
Pylce, which signifies gates, was a name applied by the Greeks to
divers passes, or defiles, but especially to the pass of Therrnopylce, which
opened through the ridges of Mount CEta into the country of the Epicnemidian Locrians, and was so called from the hot sulphureous springs
that gushed front the foot of the mountain.




THE SECOND PHILIPPIC.                   87
who understand yourselves, and by us orators are told, how
you are plotted atainst, how you are inclosed! you, I fear, to
escape present exertion, will come to ruin ere you are aware.
So doth the moment's ease and indulgence prevail over distant advantage.
As to your measures, you will in prudence, I presume, consult hereafter by yourselves. I will furnish you with such an
answer as it becomes the assembly to decide upon.
[Here the proposed answer was read.]
It were just, men of Athens, to call the persons who brought
those promises, on the faith whereof you concluded peace.
For I should never have submitted to go as embassador, and
you would certainly not have discontinued the war, had you
supposed that Philip, on obtaining peace, would act thus; but
the statements then made were very different. Ay, and others
you should call.  Whom? The men who declared —after the
peace, when I had returned from my second mission, that for
the oaths, when, perceiving your delusion, I gave warning,
and protested, and opposed the abandonment of Thermopylse
and the Phocians —that I, being a water-drinker,2 was naturally a churlish and morose fellow, that Philip, if he passed
the straits, Would do just as you desired, fortify Thespioa and
Plataa, humble the Thebans, cut through the Chersonese3 at
his own expense, and give you Oropus and Euboea in exchange
for Amphipolis. All these declarations on the hustings I am
sure you remember, though you are not famous for remembering injuries. And, the most disgraceful thing of all, you voted
in your confidence, that this same peace should descend to your
posterity; so completely were you misled.  Why mention I
this now, and desire these men to be called?  By the gods, I
will tell you the truth frankly and without reserve.  Not that
I may fall a-wrangling, to provoke recrimination before you,4
TWhether this was moved by the orator himself, or formally read as
his motion by the officer of the assembly, does not appear.
2 It was Philocrates who said this. There were many jokes against
Demosthenes as a water-drinker.
3 This peninsula being exposed to incursions from Thrace, a plan
was conceived of cutting through the isthmus fiom Pteleon to LeuceActe, to protect the Athenian settlements. See the Appendix to this
volume, on the Thracian Chersonese.
4 Similarly Augel: "Ce n'est pas pour m'attirer les invectives de
mes anciens adversaires en les invectivant moi-meme." Jacobs otherwise: Nieht um dutrch Schlllhugenr mir wctf gleiche Weise Gehir bei




88         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
and afford my old adversaries a fresh pretext for getting more
from Philip, nor for the purpose of idle garrulity. But I
imagine that what Philip is doing will grieve you hereafter
more than it does now. I see the thing progressing, and
would that my surmises were false; but I doubt it is too near
already. So when you are able no longer to disregard events,
when, instead of hearing from me or others that these measures are against Athens, you all see it yourselves, and know
it for certain, I expect you will be wrathful and exasperated.
I fear then, as your embassadors have concealed the purpose
for which they know they were corrupted, those who endeavor
to repair what the others have lost may chance to encounter
your resentment; for I see it is a practice with many to vent
their anger, not upon the guilty, but on persons most in their
power.  While therefore the mischief is only coming and preparing, while we hear one another speak, I wish every man,
though he knows it well, to be reminded, who it was' persuaded you to abandon Phocis and Thermopyla, by the command of which Philip commands the road to Attica and Peloponnesus, and has brought it to this, that your deliberation
must be, not about claims and interests abroad, but concerning the defense of your home and a war in Attica, which will
grieve every citizen when it comes, and indeed it has commenced from that day. Had you not been then deceived,
there would be nothing to distress the state. Philip would
certainly never have prevailed at sea and come to Attica with
a fleet, nor would he have marched with a land-force by
Phocis and Thermopylm: he must either have acted honorably, observing the peace and keeping quiet, or been immediately in a war similar to that which made him desire the
peace. Enough has been said to awaken recollection. Grant,
O ye gods, it be not all fully confirmed! I would have no
man punished, though death he may deserve, to the damage
and danger of the country.
Euch zu verschaffen. But I do not think that Eluavr5 bo6yov zrotWO can
bear the sense of o6yov riTXotut, "get a hearing for myself." And the
orator's object is, not so much to sneer at the people by hinting that
they are ready to hear abuse, as to deter his opponents from retaliation, or weaken its effect, by denouncing their opposition as corrupt.
Leland saw the meaning: "Not that, by breaking out into invectives,
I may expose myself to the like treatment."
1 He means 2Eschines.




ON HALONNESUS.                        89
THE ORATION ON HALONNESUS.
THE ARGUMENT.
The occasion from which this Oration has received its title, was a dispute between Philip and the Athenians concerning the small island of Halonnesus, which lies off the coast of Thessaly, below the
entrance to the Thermaic gulf. A group of small islands here,
among which were also Sciathus, Scopelus, and Peparethus, belonged to Athens. Halonnesus, not long after the termination of the
Phocian war, was taken by a pirate named Sostratus. He, having
given annoyance to Philip, was expelled by that king from the
island; but Philip, instead of restoring it to the Athenians, kept it in
his own hands. At this the Athenians took umbrage, and probably
thought that Halonnesus being so near to Eubcea, as well as to the
other islands, it might be dangerous to leave it in Philip's possession.
An embassy was sent to Macedonia, B.c. 343, to negotiate about this,
and also various other subjects of dispute which at that time existed,
such as Amphipolis, Potideea, and the affairs of the Chersonese. At
the head of the embassy was Hegesippus, a friend of Demosthenes.
The claims made by the Athenians were deemed by Philip so preposterous, that he rejected them at once, and dismissed the envoys.
Soon after, he sent an embassy to Athens, with a letter written by
himself, in which he pointed out the extravagance of their demands,
but expressed his willingness to make certain concessions.  With
respect to Halonnesus, he contended that it had become his by conquest, the Athenians having lost it, but offered to make them a
present of the island. The letter was read in the assembly. All
that we know of it is from the following speech, in which the orator
commlents on its various statements, and endeavors to show that
Philip was in the wrong. The whole of the speech has not come
down to us; for it appears to have contained a resolution, moved by
the orator, by way of reply to Philip.
Most modern critics, following Libanius, have come to the opinion, that
not Demosthenes, but Hegesippus, was the author of this Oration.
The argument rests, not only upon the style of the Oration itself,
which is beneath the general character of Demosthenes, but also on
collateral circumstances, some of which will be noticed in the course
of the notes. There is, indeed, good evidence that Demosthenes
made a speech on the same question, and also that he took the same
views upon it as I-egesippus, with whom he generally agreed in
politics. This may account for the fact, that the only extant speech
on the subject has been attributed to Demosthenes, when his own is
lost.
MEN of Athens, never can we who maintain your rights in
this assembly be deterred by the complaints of Philip from




90          THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
advising you for the best.  It would be monstrous, if our
privilege on the hustings could be destroyed by his epistles.
I will first, men of Athens, go through the articles of Philip's
letter; and then I will answer the statements of the embassadors.
Philip begins about Halonnesus, saying, it belongs to him,
but he gives it you. He denies your claim to restitution, as
he neither took it from Athens, nor detains it from her. HIe
addressed the like argument to us on our embassy to Macedon;' that he had won the island from pirates, and it was
properly his own. It is not difficult to deprive him of this
argument, by showing its fallacy. All pirates seizing places
wrongfully, and fortifying themselves therein, make excursions to annoy other people. One who has chastised and
vanquished the pirates surely can not urge with reason, that
what they robbed the owners of becomes his property. If
you grant this, then, supposing that pirates seized a place in
Attica,2 or Lemnos, or Imbrus, or Scyrus, and some persons
dislodged the pirates, what is to prevent that place where the
pirates were, and which belonged to us, from instantly becoming their property who chastised the pirates?   Philip
is not ignorant of the injustice of this plea; he knows it
better than any one; but he expects you will be cajoled by a
set of men, who, having undertaken to manage things here as
he desires, are performing that service now.  Moreover, he
can not fail to see, that under either title, whichever you
adopt, you will have the island, whether it be given, or
given back.3  Why then is it material to him, not to use
1 This tends to prove that Hegesippus was the speaker. For he conducted the embassy referred to, and Demosthenes did not accompany
him.
2 The example put by the orator carries the argument no further,
looking on it as a question of international law. The right of the new
conqueror might depend on the length of time since the first conquest,
or any other circumstances, showing an acquiescence therein by the
original owner. If France now were to take Gibraltar from England,
this would afford no casus belli for Spain against France. No doubt
the general argument here rests on the piratical character of the first
seizure. And vet a successful robber becomes a conqueror after a certain lapse of time.
3 This passage is relied on by Weiske as a proof that Demosthenes
made the speech; because it is an undoubted fact, that Demosthenes
was ridiculed by Eschines and others for the distinction which he drew




ON HALONNESUS.                        91
the just phrase and restore it to you, but to use the unjust,
and make it a present?  His object is, not to charge it to
you as an obligation, (for such an obligation would be ridiculous,) but to display to all Greece, that the Athenians are glad
to receive their maritime dependencies from the Macedonian.
This you must not allow, men of Athens.
When he says that he wishes to submit to arbitration on
these questions, he only mocks you, in asking Athenians to
refer a dispute with a man of Pella concerning their title to
the islands.  And besides, if your power, which  delivered
Greece, is unable to preserve your maritime dominion, and
the judges to whom you refer, and with whom the award
rests, preserve it for you, supposing Philip does not corrupt
theIn; do you not confessedly, by taking such course, renounce all possessions on the continent, and demonstrate to
the world that you will not contend with him for any, when
even for possessions on the sea, where you consider your
strength lies, you contend not by arms, but litigation?
Further, he says he has sent commissioners here to settle a
judicial treaty,1 to be in force not after ratification in your
between the giving and the giving back of the island. It proves very
little, in my opinion. The argument here used must have occurred to
any orator who spoke on the same side of the question, and was doubtless urged both by Hegesippus and Demosthenes. It is far from being
a captious quibble. I)aily it happens that men refuse to take as a gift
what they claim as a right. But with nations this is a more important
matter than with individuals: what is pride in the one case, is policy
in the other. The point was first made by Philip himself. If he was
so anxious about the distinction, the question naturally arose, why was
he so a and the reason was not difficult to see.
1 Arrangements (called cuy/poa) were sometimes made between different countries, for the administration of justice between their respective people. These arrangements would embrace certain general principles of jurisprudence, according to which any dispute between a native and an alien should be determined by the tribunal of either country; the complainant always seeking justice in the court of his adversary's domicile. Thus, supposing such a legal tariff to be agreed upon
between Athens and Philip, an Athenian having a complaint against
one of his subjects would prefer his suit in Macedonia, but the judge
must decide the cause not entirely by Macedonian law, but in aecordance with the articles of the compact; and conversely if a Macedonian
were the plaintiff. For further information see title Symbolon in the
Archaeological Dictionary. The argument of the orator here is somewhat captious. How the proposed arrangement could affect the claim
of Athens to Potidea, does not appear. Philip's letter indeed might




92           THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
court, as the law commands, but after reference to him;
giving an appeal to himself from your judgment. He wishes
to get this advantage of you, and procure an admission in
the treaty, that you made no complaint for his aggression on
Potidaea, but confirm the lawfulness both of his taking and
holding it. Yet the Athenians who dwelt in Potidaea, while
they were not at war, but in alliance with Philip, and notwithstanding the oath which Philip swore to the inhabitants
of Potidaea, were deprived by him of their property. I say,
he wishes to get your absolute acknowledgment, that you
complain not of these wrongful acts, nor deem yourselves
injured.  That there is no need of a judicial treaty between
Athens and Macedonia, past times may suffice to  show.
Neither Amyntas, Philip's father, nor any other kings of
Macedon, ever had such a contract with our state; although
the intercourse between us was formerly greater than it is
now: for Macedonia was dependent on us, and paid us
tribute,' and we then resorted to their ports, and they to ours,
more frequently than now, and there were not the monthly
sittings punctually held, as at present, for mercantile causes,2
dispensing with the necessity of a law-treaty between such
distant countries. Though nothing of the sort then existed,
it was not requisite to make a treaty, so that people should
sail from Macedonia to Athens for justice, or Athenians to
Mlacedonia: we obtained redress by their laws and they by
ours.  Be assured, therefore, these articles are drawn for an
admission that you have no further pretense for claiming
Potidaea.
have thrown some light on the question. It is not improbable that
Potidea may have been named for the seat of Macedonian jurisdiction,
as being more convenient for the trial of international causes than
Pella. or any inland town. Athens then, agreeing to the arrangement,
might be said to have acknowledged Philip's right.
1 We have seen a similar boast in the third Olynthiac. But neither
of the statements is to be understood as strictly true. While the kings
of Macedonia possessed no towns on the coast, they (no doubt) submitted to the maritime supremacy of Athens, and paid harbor dues and
tolls, which might be called tribute in loose language. Or it may be
a mere oratorical flourish, for which the dependency of the maritime
towns and the friendly relations between Athens and Macedonia afforded some color.
2 The sittings here alluded to had not very long been established.
They were held in the six winter months for the speedy trial of mercantile suits.




ON HALONNESUS.                      93
As to pirates, you ought jointly, he says, you and himself, to guard the sea against these depredators: but he really
asks to be introduced by us to maritime power, for you to
confess that you are unable even to keep guard of the sea
without Philip, and further for the privilege to be granted
him  of sailing about and touching at the islands, under the
pretense of watching pirates, so that he may corrupt the
islanders and seduce them from you; and besides restoring
to Thasus1 by means of your commanders the exiles whom
he harbored, he designs to gain over the other islands, by
sending his agents to sail with your commanders on the joint
protective service. And yet some persons deny that he wants
the sea. But, without any want, he is equipping galleys,
building docks, seeking to send out armaments and incur no
trifling expense for maritime enterprises on which he sets no
value.2
Do you think, then, Athenians, that Philip would ask you
to make these concessions, if he did not despise you, and rely
on the men whom he has chosen to be his friends here? men
who are not ashamed to live for Philip and not for their country, and think they carry home his presents, when all at home
they sell!
Concerning the peace, which the embassadors sent by him3
permitted us to amend, because we made an amendment,
which all mankind allow to be just, that each party should
hold his own, he denies that he gave the permission, or that
his embassadors so stated to you; doubtless, having been
instructed by his friends here, that you remember not what is
said before the people. This, however, of all things it is impossible for you to forget; since it was in the same assembly
1 Thasus is an island off the coast of Thrace opposite the mouth of
the Nestus. It was celebrated for its wine, and also for its marble
quarries and mines. The gold mines on the adjacent continent belonged to the Thasians, when they were seized by Philip. The island, having been wrested from the Athenians in the Peloponnesian war, was
afterward recovered, and at this time they kept a garrison in it.
2 So Jacobs: das ihm so gleichgiiltig ist. And Reiske so explains it
in his index. The irony is of course continued. Pabst, however, contends that this is wrong, and takes the more ordinary construction of
the words: worauf er den grossten Werth legt.
3 This Macedonian embassy preceded the one from Athens, which
Hegesippus conducted, and which conveyed the Athenian proposals for
the amendment of the treaty.




94          THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
that his embassadors addressed you, and that the decree was
drawn; and so it is not possible, as the words had just been
spoken and the decree was instantly read, that you could have
passed a resolution which misrepresented the embassadors.
Wherefore, this charge in his letter is not against me, but
against you, that you sent a decree in answer to something
which you never heard.  And the embassadors themselves,
whom the decree misrepresented, when you read them your
answer and invited them to partake your hospitality, ventured
not to come forward and say, "You misrepresent us, Athenians, and make us to have stated what we never did," but
went their way in silence.
I wish, men of Athens, (as Python,' who was then embassador, obtained credit with you for his address,) to remind you
of the very words which he spoke. I am sure you will remember them; they were exactly like what Philip has now written. While he complained of us who decry Philip, he found
fault with you also, that notwithstanding his intentions to
serve you, his preference of your friendship to that of any of
the Greeks, you oppose him yourselves, and listen to slanderers
who ask him for money and abuse him: that by such language-when people report that he was calumniated, and you
listened to it-his feelings are altered, finding himself mistrusted by those whom he had purposed to befriend. He therefore
advised the public speakers not to disparage the peace, for it
were better not to break peace; but if there were aught amiss
in the articles, to rectify it, as Philip would concur in any resolution of yours. Should they persist in slander, without proposing any thing themselves, by which the peace might stand
and Philip cease to be suspected, you ought not (he said) to
attend to such persons.
You heard and approved these statements, and said that
Python's argument was just.  And just it was.  But he made
1 Python of Byzantium, who was an able speaker and diplomatist,
and employed with great advantage by Philip in his negotiations with
other states. Dermosthenes seems to have been the only man who could
cope with him, and boasts in his speech on the Crown, that on one occasion he reduced him to silence in the presence of a multitude of embassadors. Perhaps it was on the embassy here referred to; or it might
be on that which gave occasion to the second Philippic. It is probable, but not certain, that this was the same Python who murdered
Cotys, king of Thrace.




ON HALONNESUS.                    95
those statements, not that any articles might be canceled,
which were advantageous to Philip, and for the insertion of
which he had spent large sums of money, but at the suggestion of his instructors here, who thought no man would move
any thing counter to the decree of Philocrates, which lost
Amphipolis. I, men of Athens, have never dared to make an
unlawful motion, but I made one contravening the decree of
Philocrates, which was unlawful, as I will show. The decree
of Philocrates, according to which you lost Amphipolis, ran
counter to the former decrees, through which you acquired
that territory. Therefore that decree of Philocrates was unlawful, and it was impossible for the author of a legal motion
to move in accordance with an unlawful decree. But moving
in accordance with those former decrees, which were lawful
and preserved your territory, I moved a lawful resolution, and
convicted Philip of deceiving you, and desiring, not to amend
the peace, but to bring your honest counselors into discredit.
That he then allowed the amendment and now denies it,
you all know. But he says Amphipolis belongs to him,
because you declared it to be his, when you resolved he
should keep what he held.' You did indeed pass that resolution, but not that Amphipolis should be his: for it is
possible to hold the property of another, and all holders hold
not their own. Many possess what belongs to others; therefore this sophistry of his is absurd. And he remembers the
decree of Philocrates, but has forgotten the letter which he
sent you when he was besieging Amphipolis, in which he
acknowledged that Amphipolis was yours; for he promised
after its reduction to restore it to Athens, as it belonged to
her, and not to the holders. So they, it seems, who occupied
Amphipolis before Philip's conquest, held the domain of
Athenians, but, since Philip has conquered it, he holds not
the domain of Athenians, but his own. Olynthus too, Apollonia and Pallene, belong to him, not by usurpation, but in
his own right. Think you he studies in all his dispatches to
you, to show himself by word and deed an observer of what
1 The treaty had for its basis the principle of the uti possidetis, to
adopt the expression of modern diplomacy. According to the true
construction of this, Amphipolis would belong to Philip, and the reasoning of the orator is unsound. But no doubt, in the whole affair of
Amphipolis, and the peace also, Philip overreached the Athenians.




96         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
the world calls justice, or rather has he set it at defiance, when
a land, which the Greeks and the Persian monarch have voted
and acknowledged to be yours, he asserts to be not yours, but
his own?
As to the other amendment which you made in the articles,
that the Greeks not included in the peace should be free
and independent, and, if any one attacked them, should be
succored by all parties to the treaty, you deeming it equitable and righteous, that not only we and our allies, and
Philip and his allies, should enjoy the peace, while those who
were neither our allies nor Philip's were exposed, and might
be oppressed by the powerful, but that they also should have
security by your peace, and we should lay down our arms and
enjoy peace in reality; although he confesses in the letter, as
you hear, that this amendment is just, and that he allows it,
he has taken their town from the Pheraeans and put a garrison
in the citadel, doubtless to make them independent; he marches
against Ambracia,l bursts into three Cassopian2 cities, Pandosia, Bucheta, and Elatea, colonies of Elis, after ravaging their
territories, and gives them in vassalage to his kinsman Alexander. Proofs how much he desires the freedom and independence of Greece!
Respecting his continual promises of doing you important
service, he says that I misrepresent and slander him to the
Greeks; for he never promised you any thing. So impudent
is this man, who has written in a letter, which is now in the
senate-house, (when he declared he would silence us his
opponents if the peace were made,) that he would confer on
you such an obligation as, were he sure of the peace, he
would instantly communicate; implying that these favors,
intended for us in the event of peace, were ready and pro1 Philip's expedition against Ambracia followed the campaign in
Epirus, which took place in B.c. 343. His designs against Ambracia
were defeated by the exertions of the Athenians, who formed a league
against him, and sent troops to assist the Ambracians. Demosthenes in
the third Philippic speaks of an embassy, in which both himself and
Hegesippus were engaged, which had the effect of stopping Philip's invasion of Ambracia and Peloponnesus.
2 Cassopia is a district of Epirus, which Philip invaded B.C. 343, and
added to the kingdom of Alexander his brother-in-law, between whom
and Philip's uncle, Arymbas, the province of Epirus was divided. The
Cassopian Elatea must not be confounded with the Phocian.




ON HALONNESUS.                      9!
vided. After the peace was made, the good things intended
for us all vanished, and among the Greeks has been wrought
such ruin as you have seen.- In his present letter he promises you, that if you will trust his firiends and advocates,
and punish us who slander him to the people, he will greatly
serve you. Such, however, will be the character of his service; he will not return you your own, for he claims it himself; nor will his grants be in this part of the world, for
fear of offending the Greeks: but I suppose some other
land and locality will be found, where his gifts may take
effect.
As to the places which he has taken during the peace,
taken from you in contempt of the treaty and violation of
its terms, since he has nothing to urge, but stands convicted
of injustice, he offers to submit to a fair and impartial tribunal, on a question which, of all others, requires no arbitration, for the number of days determines it. We all know
the month and the day when the peace was concluded. As
surely do we know in what month and on what day Serrium, Ergisce, and the Sacred Mount' were taken.  These
transactions are not so obscure; they need no trial; it is
notorious to all, which month was the earlier, that in which
the peace was signed, or that in which the places were captured.
He says also that he has returned all our prisoners who
were taken in war.  Yet in the case of that Carystian,2 the
friend of our state, for whom you sent three embassies to demand his liberty, Philip was so anxious to oblige you that he
killed the man, and would not even suffer him to be taken up
for burial.
It is worth while to examine what lihe writes to you about
These were places in Thrace, taken by Philip from Cersobleptes.
2 Carystus is a town of Eubcea. The Proxenus, or public friend of a
foreign state, was one who protected its interests in his own country,
performing duties not unlike that of a modern consul. A relation of
mutual hospitality subsisted (as the word imports) between him and
the citizens of the friendly state; and he was expected to entertain the
embassadors, or any persons who came on public business. (See title
Hospitium, Arch. Dict.) We have no word by which Proxenus can be
translated; nor any indeed which expresses the double relation of host
and guest, as Sivoc and hospes do.  In German we have Slaatsgastfreund.
Vor,. I.-E




98          THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
the Chersonese, and likewise to ascertain what his conduct
is. All the district beyond Agora,' as if it were his own,
and belonged not to you, he has given into the possession
of Apollonides  the  Cardian.  Yet the boundary  of the
Chersonese is not Agora, but the altar of Terminal Jupiter, which is between Pteleum and Leuce-Acte, where the
canal was to be cut through  the Chersonese, as the inscription on the altar of Terminal Jupiter shows.  Mark the
words:This holy altar built by native hands,'Twixt Ptelcum and Chalky Beach it stands,
Stands for the limit of their just domains,
The guardian He who in Olympus reigns.
This territory, large as most of you know it to be, he
claims: part he enjoys himself, part he has given to others,
and so he reduces all your property into his possession. And
not only does he appropriate the country beyond Agora, but
also with reference to the Cardians, who dwell on this side
Agora, he writes in his present letter, that if you have any
difference with the Cardians, (who dwell in your dominions,)
you must refer it to arbitration. They have a difference with
you; see if it is about a small matter. They say, the land
they inhabit belongs to them, not to you; that yours are mere
occupations in a foreign country, theirs are possessions in
their own; and that your fellow-citizen, Callippus of Peania,2
alleged this in a decree. And here they are right; he did so
allege, and, on my indicting him for an unlawful measure, you
acquitted him; and thus he has caused your title to the land
to be contested. But if you could bring yourselves to refer
this dispute with the Cardians, whether the land be yours or
theirs, why should not the other people of the Chersonese be
This was a place in the Chersonese, the whole of which, except
Cardia, belonged to Athens. The orator contends, that the boundary
of the Chersonese was a line drawn across the isthmus from Pteleum to
Leuce-Acte, the latter of which places was probably named from the
white cliffs on the beach. In the centre of this line was erected the
altar, which anciently separated the boundaries of those towns. Agora
was within the line. For further information concerning the Chersonese, see the following oration, and Appendix III.
2 Paeania is one of the townships, d/uzot, into which Attica was divided.
Libanius says, it was Hegesippus who preferred this indictment against
Callippuea




ON HALONNESUS.                       99
dealt with on the same principle? His treatment of you is
so insolent, that he says, if the Cardians will not submit to
arbifration, he will compel them, as if you were unable even
to compel Cardians to do you justice. As you are unable, he
says he will himself compel them. Don't you really find him
a great benefactor? And some men have declared this epistle
to be well written; men who are far more deserving of your
detestation than Philip.  He, by constant opposition to you,
acquires honor and signal advantage for himself: Athenians
who exhibit zeal, not for their country, but for Philip, are
wretches that ought to be exterminated by you, if you carry
your brains in your temples, and not trodden down in your
heels. 1
It now remains, that to this well-drawn epistle and the
speeches of the embassadors I propose an answer, which in
my opinion is just and expedient for Athens.
Libanius censures the coarseness of this expression, and contends
that Demosthenes never could have used it. Weiske thinks differently,
and quotes the examples of coarse language adduced against his rival
by Efschines. (Or. cont. Ctes.) Libanius, however, thinks that the
whole style of this oration is beneath the Demosthenic character. The
reader must form his own opinion. It has been remarked, both by
Photius and Dr. Johnson, that there may be much difference between
the best and the worst productions of an author. Yet there is in most
good authors a general character, by which those who are familiar
with them may form a judgment of what is genuine.




100          THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTIIENES.
THE ORATION ON THE CHtIRSONESE,
THE ARGUMENT.
The Athenians had sent a body of citizens, commanded by Diopithes,
to receive allotments of land in the Chersonese, and at the same time
to protect the interests of Athens by acting as an army of observation.  They soon fell into disputes with the Cardians about the
limits of their territory. Philip, who at this time was engaged in a
Thracian war, sent assistance to the Cardians; but Diopithes, having
collected a troop of mercenaries, kept the field successfully, and, not
content with acting on the defensive, carried the war into Thrace,
assisted the enemies of Philip, and wrested from him some of his
conquests. Philip, who, as we have seen in the last oration, had
written before to the Athenians on the subject of Cardia, now wrote
them a letter complaining of the conduct of Diopithes, charging them
with an infringement of the peace. This letter arrived early in the
summer of the year B.C. 342, and an assembly was immediately called to consider what measures should be taken. The Macedonian
party were vehement in denouncing Diopithes, and urging his recall.
Demosthenes, seeing that Athens, though nominally at peace with
Philip, was really defending herself against his aggressions, rose to
justify Diopithes, insisted on the necessity, which he had so strongly
urged in the first Philippic, of keeping a permanent force on the
northern coast, and contended that the army of Diopithes should rather be reinforced, than recalled at a time when its presence was peculiarly necessary. He again warns his countrymen of impending
danger, and points out the measures which, as men of spirit and
prudence, they ought to pursue.
This oration is full of good sense and manly eloquence. It had the
success which it deserved. Diopithes was continued in his command; and the exertions of Athens in the next few years had the effect of preserving the Chersonese and the Bosphorus.
Diopithes was father to Menander, the celebrated comic poet, whose
plays have been copied by Terence.
For further information on the subject of the Chersonese, see Appendix
III. to this volume.
IT were just, men ofAthens, that the orators in your assembly should make no speeches to gratify either friendship or
malice, but every one declare what he considers for the best,
especially when you are deliberating on public measures of
importance.   However, since there are persons who are impelled to address you from factious motives, or others which




ON THE CHERSONESE.                  101
I can not name, it becomes you, Athenians, the majority, laying all else aside, to determine and to do what you find beneficial to the state.  The serious question here is, the position
of the Chersonese, and the campaign in Thrace, which Philip
has now for upward of ten months been carrying on; yet
most of the speeches have been about Diopithes, his conduct
and designs. It seems to me, that on a charge against any
of these men, whom according to the laws you may punish
when you please, it is in your option either to proceed immediately or at a later time, and needless for me, or for any
one, to argue the point strongly: but for the defense of our
dominions, which Philip, our standing enemy, and now in
great force about the Hellespont, is making haste to conquer, and, if we are once too late, we shall never recover, our
duty is to consult and prepare with the utmost speed, and not
for clamors and charges about other matters to run off from
this.
I wonder at many things which are commonly said here,
but I have been particularly surprised, Athenians, at what
I lately heard a man declare in the Council,' that a statesman's advice should be, either to make war decidedly, or to
observe the peace.  True; if Philip keeps quiet, neither
holding any of our territories contrary to the treaty, nor
packing a world of enemies against us, there is nothing to
say: peace we must absolutely observe, and I see every
readiness on your part. But if the conditions of the peace,
which we swore to, are recorded and open to inspection; if it
appears that from the beginning, (before Diopithes and the
settlers,2 who are accused as authors of the war, ever sailed
from Athens,) Philip has robbed us of divers territories, of
which you still complain in these unrepealed resolutions, and
has been all along incessantly gathering the spoil of other
nations, Greek and barbarian, for the materials of an attack
upon you, what mean they by saying we must have war or
1 The Council or Senate of Five Hundred, of which Demosthenes
became a member when he was thirty-six years of age.
2 The settlers called Ic,71pofXoot were citizens sent out to receive parcels of land in some country dependent on Athens, but who still retained
rights of Athenian citizenship, whether or not they permanently resided
abroad. The word signifies "allotment-holders,"'' or "allottees of lands."
Jacobs: die Ansiedler.




102         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
peace?  W'e have no choice in the matter: there remains
but one most just and necessary course, which these men
purposely overlook.  What is it?   To  defend  ourselves
against an aggressor. Unless indeed they mean, that, so long
as Philip keeps aloof from  Attica and Piraeus, he neither
wrongs you nor commits hostility.'  But if they put our
rights on this principle, and so define the peace, besides that
the argument is iniquitous, monstrous, and perilous for Athens, as I imagine is evident to all, it happens also to be
inconsistent with  their complaint against Diopitlhes.   For
why, I wonder, should we give Philip license to do what he
pleases, provided he abstain from Attica, while Diopithes is
not suffered even to assist the Thracians, without our saying
that he makes war? Here, it will be granted, they are shown
in the wrong: but the mercenaries make sad work ravaging
the Hellespontine coast, and Diopithes has no right to detain
vessels, and we must not allow him!  VWell; be it so!  I am
content.  Yet I think, if they really give this counsel in
good faith, as their object is to disband a force in your
service, while they denounce the general who maintains it,
they ought likewise to show that Philip's army will be disbanded if you follow their advice. Otherwise, observe, they
just bring the country into the same way, through which all
our past measures have miscarried.2  For you surely know,
that by nothing in the world has Philip beaten us so much, as
by being earlier in his operations.  He with an army always
attending him, knowing his own designs, pounces on whom
he pleases in a moment:3 we, when we hear that something
1 Philip sought to conquer Athens in Thrace, as Napoleon to conquer
England in Egypt or Portugal. And we shall find that precisely the
same arguments were used in our Parliament, to show the necessity
of continuing the French war, which Demosthenes here urges to alarm
the Athenians against Philip.
2 I follow the common. reading dw7r62oLev. The explanation which
Schaefer gives of his own reading does not satisfy me.
3 More closely, "is upon the enemy, whom he pleases to attack, in
a moment." Francis:'ssurprises upon the instant whom he thinks
proper to destroy;" which is not bad, except for the last two words.
Leland is too wide: "can in a moment strike the blow where he
pleases." Jacobs is good: "steht augenblicklich Jedem gegeniiber, den
er angreifen will. Compare Virgil, Georgic III.
Hosti
Ante expectatem positis stat in agmine castris.




ON THE CHERSONESE.                 103
is going on, begin to bustle and prepare.  Methinks the
result is, that he very quietly secures what he goes for; we
arrive too late, and have incurred all the expense for nothing.
Our enmity and our hostile intention we manifest, and get
the disgrace of missing the time for action.
Then be sure, Athenians, now, that all the rest is talk and
pretense, the real aim and contrivance is, that while you remain at home, and the country has no force abroad, Philip
may accomplish what he pleases without interruption. First,
consider what is actually going on. Philip is staying with a
large army in Thrace, and sending for reinforcements, as eyewitnesses report, from Macedonia and Thessaly. Now, should
he wait for the trade-winds, and then march to the siege of
Byzantium,l think ye the Byzantines would persist in their
present folly, and would not invite you and implore your
assistance?  I don't believe it. No; they will receive any
people, even those they distrust more than us, sooner than
surrender their city to Philip; unless indeed he is beforehand with them and captures it.  If then we are unable to
sail northward, and there be no help at hand, nothing can
prevent their destruction. WXell! the men are infatuated and
besotted. Very likely; yet they must be rescued for all
that, because it is good for Athens. And this also is not
clear to us, that he will not attack the Chersonese: nay, if
we may judge from the letter which he sent us, he says he
will chastise the people in the Chersonese. Then if the
present army be kept on foot, it will be able to defend that
country, and attack some of Philip's dominions; but if it be
once disbanded, what shall we do, if he march against the
Chersonese?  Try Diopithes, I suppose.  And how will our
affairs be bettered?  But we shall send succor from Athens.
And suppose the winds prevent us? Oh, but he won't come!
And who will insure that? Do you mark and consider, men
of Athens, the approaching season of the year, against which
certain persons desire to get the Hellespont clear of you, and
deliver it up to Philip? Suppose he should leave Thrace,
1 Athens and Byzantium had not been on good terms since the Social
war. Even at this period the Byzantines looked with more suspicion
upon the Athenians than on Philip. Yet less than a year elapsed before
the predictions of Demosthenes were fulfilled. Athens was in alliance
with Byzantium, and defending her successfully against Philip.




104        THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
and without going near Chersonesus or Byzantium, (I beg you
also to consider this,) he should invade Chalcis or Megara, as
he lately did Orcus,j think you it is better to resist him here
and suffer the war to approach Attica, or to find employment
for him yonder?  I think the last.
With such facts and arguments before you, so far from disparaging and seeking to disband this army, which Diopithes
is endeavoring to organize for Athens, you ought yourselves
to provide an additional one, to support him with money
and other friendly co-operation. For if Philip where asked,
"Which would you prefer, that these soldiers of Diopithes,
whatever be their character, (I dispute not about that,)
should thrive and have credit at Athens, and be reinforced
with the assistance of the state, or that they should be dispersed and destroyed at the instance of calumniators and
accusers?" —I think he would say, the latter. And what
Philip would pray to the gods for, certain persons among us
are bringing about; and after this you ask how the state is
ruined!
I wish, therefore, to c-xamine with freedom our present
affairs, to consider how we are dealing with them, and what
we are ourselves about. We like not to contribute money,
we dare not take the field, we can not abstain from the public
funds, we neither give supplies to Diopithes nor approve
what he finds for himself, but grumble and inquire how he
got them, and what he intends to do, and the like; and yet,
though thus disposed, we are not willing to mind our own
business, but with our mouths applaud those who speak
worthily of the state, while in action we co-operate with their
adversaries.  You like always to ask the speaker-What
must we do? I will ask you this-What must I say?  For
if you will neither contribute, nor take the field, nor abstain
from the public funds, nor give supplies to Diopithes, nor let
alone what he finds for himself, nor be content to mind your
own business, I have nothing to say. If to these men, so
prompt to accuse and calumniate, you already give such a
license, as to hear them complain by anticipation of projects
which they impute to Diopithes, what can one say?
Oreus of Euboea was betrayed to Philip not long before this time,
as explained in the third Philippic. The designs of Philip on Megara
were baffled.




ON THE CHERSONESE.                  105
But the probable effect of such conduct some of you
should hear.  I will speak frankly; indeed, I could not
speak otherwise. All the generals who have ever sailed from
Athens, (or let me suffer any penalty,) take money from Chlians, from Erythrseans', from whom they severally can, I mean
from the people who dwell in Asia. Those who have one or
two galleys take less, those who have a greater fleet, more.
And the givers give not, either the small or the larger sums,
for nothing, (they are not so mad,) but by way of bargain,
that the merchants who leave their harbors may not be
wronged or plundered, that their vessels may be convoyed,
or the like. They say they give benevolences:2 that is the
name of the presents. And so Diopithes, having an army, is
well aware that all these people will give money: for how
else do you suppose, that a man who has received nothing
from you, and has nothing of his own to pay withal, can
maintain his troops?  From  the skies?  Impossible.  Hle
goes on with what he collects, begs, or borrows. Therefore
they, who accuse him before you, in effect warn all people to
give him nothing, as being sure to be punished for his intentions, much more for his acts, either as principal or auxiliary.
Hence their clamors —he is preparing a siege! he is giving
up the Greeks!  So concerned are many of these persons
for the Asiatic Greeks: perhaps quicker to feel for strangers than for their country. And this is the meaning of
our sending another general to the Hellespont.3 Why, if
Diopithes commits outrage and detains vessels, a small, very
small summons, men of Athens, can stop it all; and the laws
prescribe this, to impeach the guilty parties, but not to
watch them ourselves at a great expense and with a large
navy, for that were the extreme of madness. Against our
enemies, whom we can not bring under the laws, it is right
Erythrie is a city of Asia Minor.
2 It is singular that the same name should be given so many centuries after to the illegal contributions which were extorted by some of
our English kings from their subjects, under the pretense of their being
voluntary gifts. Edward the Fourth and Henry the Seventh were most
oppressive in this way.
3 The argument is-This is what my opponents mean by recommending, that another general should be sent to supersede and send back
Diopithes. Such a course is wholly unnecessary, for you can summon
him home by an order of state.
E2




106        THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
and needful to maintain troops, and dispatch a fleet, and contribute money; but against ourselves a decree, an impeachment, the state-galley,' are sufficient. Thus would men of
discretion act; malignant and mischievous politicians would
proceed as these do. And that certain of these men are thus
disposed, bad though it be, is not the worst. For you of the
assembly are so minded now, that if any one comes forward
and says, that Diopithes is the author of all your misfortunes, or Chares, or Aristophon, or what citizen he likes to
name, you instantly assent and shout approbation; but if
one rises to speak the truth-Athenians, you are trifling; of
all these misfortunes and troubles Philip is the cause; had
he only kept quiet, the state would have had no trouble-you
are unable to contradict these statements, yet, methinks, you
are annoyed,' and feel as if something were lost. The reason
is —and pray allow me, when I speak for the best, to speak
freely —certaih statesmen have long since got you to be
severe and terrible in the assemblies, in warlike preparations
feeble and contemptible. If the party blamed be one whom
you are certain to find within your reach, you say ay, and
are content: but if one be accused, whom you can not punish without vanquishing him by arms, you appear confounded and pained at the exposure.. It ought, Athenians, to have
been the reverse; your statesmen should have accustomed
you to be mild and merciful in the assembly, since there
your dealings are with citizens and allies; in warlike preparations they should have shown you to be terrible and severe,
since in them the contest is with adversaries and foes. But
by excessive coaxing and humoring they have brought you to
such a condition, that in the assembly you give yourselves
airs and are flattered at hearing nothing but compliments,
while in your measures and proceedings you are putting every
thing to hazard.
By Jupiter! suppose the Greeks called you to account for
the opportunities which you have indolently lost, and asked
you, saying, "Men of Athens, you send-us embassadors on
every occasion, and assert that Philip is plotting against us
1 The Paralus, or the Salamninia, which were e-nployed for state purposes, and sometimes to fetch home criminals to be tried or punished.,Thus the Salaminia was dispatched to bring Alcibiades back from
Sicily.




ON THE CHERSONESE.                  107
and all the Greeks, and that we should take precautions
against the man, and more to the same effect:" (we must
admit and acknowledge it; for so we do:) "and yet, 0 ye
wretchedest of mankind, though Philip has been ten months
away, and by illness and winter and wars prevented from returning home, you have neither liberated Eubcea, nor recovered any of your dominions. He, on the contrary, while you
were staying at home, at leisure, in health, (if men so acting
may,be called in health,) established two rulers in Euboea,
one like a hostile fortress opposite Attica, one threatening
Sciathus;1 and these -nuisances you have never got rid of;
not even this would ye attempt; you have submitted, left the
road open to him  clearly, and made it manifest that, if he
died a hundred times, you would stir never a step the more.
Then wherefore send embassies and make accusations and
give us trouble?" If they asked this, what could we answer
or say, men of Athens? I really can not tell.
There are some persons indeed, who imagine they confute
the speaker by asking, What must we do? I can give them
a perfectly just and true answer-Do not what you are now
doing: however, I will enter into more full detail; and I
trust they will be as ready to act as to interrogate. First,
mnen of Athens, you must be satisfied in your minds that
Philip is at war with the republic, and has broken the peace;
(pray cease reproaching one another about this;) that he is
ill-disposed and hostile to all Athens, to her very ground, and
(I may say) to all her inhabitants, even those who think they
oblige him most. Or let them look at Euthycrates and
Lasthenes the Olynthians,2 who fancied themselves on the
most friendly footing with him, but, since they betrayed their
country, are sunk to the most abject state. But there is
nothing that his wars and his schemes are directed against so
I Clitarchus was established in Eretria, which is opposite the coast
of Athens; Philistides in Oreus, which is in the north of Euboea. The
island of Sciathus is a little above Eubcea, and off the Magnesian coast
of Thessaly. As the group of islands, of which Sciathus was one, be.
longed to Athens, Oreus was a dangerous position to be occupied by an
enemy.
2 They betrayed Olynthus to Philip, and went to reside afterward at
his court. But they were universally scouted as traitors, and on their
complaining to Philip, he said, the Macedonians were a plain-spoken
people, who called a spade a spade,




108         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
much, as our constitution; nothing in the world is he so
earnest to destroy. And this policy is in some sort natural
for him. He knows perfectly, that even if he conquer every
thing else, he can hold nothing secure, while your democracy
subsists; but on the occurrence of any reverse, (and many
may happen to a man,) all who are now under constraint will
come and seek refuge with you.  For you are not inclined
yourselves to encroach and usurp dominion; you are famous
for checking the usurper or depriving him of his conquest;
ever ready to molest the aspirants for empire, and vindicate
the liberties of all people.  He likes not that a fiee spirit
should proceed fiom  Athens, to watch the moments of' his
peril: far otherwise; nor is his reasoning weak or' idle.
First then, you must assumne him  for this reason to be an
irreconcilable enemy of our constitution and democracy:
without such conviction upon your minds, you will have no
zeal for public duty.   Secondly, you must be assured that
all his operations and contrivances are planned against our
country, and, wherever he is resisted, the resistance will be for
our benefit.  None of you surely is so foolish, as to suppose
that Philip covets those miseries' in Thrace, (for what else
can one call Drongilus, and Cabyle, and Mastira, and the
places which he is taking and conquering now?) and to get
them endures toils and winters and the extreme of danger,
but covets not the Athenian harbors, and docks, and galleys,
and silver mines,2 and revenues of such value; and that he
will suffer you to keep them, while for the sake of the barley
and millet in Thracian caverns he winters in the midst of
horrors.3  Impossible.  The object of that and every other
enterprise is to become master here.  What then is the
duty of wise men? With these assurances and convictions,
to lay asidle an indolence which is becoming outrageous and
incurable, to pay contributions and to call upon your allies,
I thought it better to adhere to the original, which explains itself,
than to use any such expression as "paltry villages," or "bieoques," or
elenden Besitzthiiinern. Jacobs has the simple Armseligkeiten.
2 The mines of Laurium in Attica. See Appendix II.' The original /3apdOpp signifies a pit, into which condemned criminals were thrown at Athens. It, is pretty much the same as if we were
to speak of the black hole: and the horrors of Thrace would convey
to an Athenian the same sort of idea as the horrors of Siberia to an
Englishman.




ON THE CHERSONESE.                 109
see to and provide for the continuance of the present force,
that, as Philip has a power ready to injure and enslave all
the Greeks, so you may have one ready to save and to succor all. It is not possible with hasty levies to perform any
effective service. You must have an army on foot, provide
maintenance for it, and paymasters and commissaries, so
ordering it that the strictest care shall be taken of your
funds, a1nd demand from those officers an account of the expenditure, from your general an account of the campaign.
If ye so act and so resolve in earnest, you will compel Philip
to observe a just peace and abide in his own country, (the
greatest of all blessings,) or you will fight him  on equal
terms.
It may be thought, and truly enough, that these are affairs
of great expense and toil and trouble: yet only consider what
the consequences to us must be, if we decline these measures,
and you will find it is our interest to perform our duties cheerfully.  Suppose some god would be your surety-for certainly no mortal could guarantee such an event —that, notwithstanding you kept quiet and abandoned every thing,
Philip would not attack you at last, yet, by Jupiter and
all the gods, it were disgraceful, unworthy of yourselves, of
the character of Athens and the deeds of your ancestors, for
the sake of selfish ease to abandon the rest of Greece to
servitude. For my own part, I would rather die than have
given such counsel; though, if another man advises it, and
you are satisfied, well and good; make no resistance, abandon all. If however no man holds this opinion, if, on the
contrary, we all foresee, that the more we let Philip conquer the more ruthless and powerful an enemy we shall
find him, what subterfuge remains? what excuse for delay?
Or when, O Athenians, shall we be willing to perform our
duty?  Peradventure, when there is some necessity. But
what may be called the necessity of freemen, is not only come,
but past long ago: and surely you must deprecate that of
slaves. What is the difference?  To a freeman, the greatest
necessity is shame for his proceedings; I know not what
greater you can suggest: to a slave, stripes and bodily chastisement; abonminable things! too shocking to mention!
I would gladly enter into every particular, and show how
certain politicians abuse you; but I confine myself to one.




110        THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
When any question about Philip arises, people start up and
cry, What a blessing it is to be at peace! what a burden to
maintain a large army! certain persons wish to plunder our
treasury!-and more to the same effect; by which they amuse
you, and leave him at leisure to do what he pleases. The
result is, to you, Athenians, ease and idleness for the present,
which, I fear, you may hereafter think dearly purchased; to
these men, popularity and payment for their speeches.  Methinks it is not you that need persuading to peace, who sit
here pacifically disposed; but the person who commits hostilities: let him be persuaded, and all is ready on your part.
Burdensome we should deem, not' what we expend for our deliverance, but what we shall suffer in case of our refusal to do
so. Plunder of the treasury should be prevented by a plan
for its safe keeping, not by abandonment of our interests.
But this very thing makes me indignant, that some of you,
Athenians, are grieved at the thought of your treasury being
robbed, though it depends on yourselves to keep it safe and to
chastise the peculator, yet are not grieved at Philip's conduct,
seizing thus successively on every country in Greece, and
seizing them for his designs upon you.
What then is the reason, men of Athens, that while Philip
is thus openly in arms, committing aggressions, capturing
cities, none of these persons ever say that he is making war;
but they denounce as authors of the war, whoever advises
you to oppose him and prevent these losses?  I will explain.
Their desire is, that any anger, which may be naturally excited
by your sufferings in the war, may be turned upon your honest
counselors, so that you may try them instead of resisting
ZPhilip, and they themselves be accusers instead of paying the
penalty of their conduct. Such is the meaning of their assertion, that there is a war-party among you; and such is the
object of this present debate. I am indeed sure, that, before any Athenian moved a declaration of war, Philip had
taken many of our possessions, and recently sent succor to
Cardia. If however we choose to assume that he is not at
war with us, it were extreme folly in him to convince us of
our mistake. But when lie marches to attack us, what shall
we say?  He will assure us that he is not making war, as he
assured the people of Oreus when his troops were in their
country, as he assured the Pherxans before he assaulted their




ON THE CHERSONESE.                   111
walls, and the Olynthians at first, until he was actually in
their territories with his army. Shall we then declare, that
men who bid us'defend ourselves make war?  If so, we must
be slaves: nothing else remains, if we neither resist nor are
suffered to be at peace. And remember, you have more at
stake than other people: Philip seeks not to subdue, but to
extirpate our city. He knows for certain, you will not submit to servitude; you could not if you would, being accustomed to empire; and if you get the opportunity, you will be
able to give him more annoyance than all the rest of the
world.
You must therefore be convinced that this is a struggle
for existence: these men who have sold themselves to Philip
you must execrate and cudgel to death; for it is impossible,
impossible to overcome your enemies abroad, until you have
punished your enemies (his ministers) at home.  They will be
the stumbling-blocks that prevent your reaching the others.'
Why do you suppose Philip now insults you, (for to this, in
my opinion, his conduct amounts,) and while to other people,
though he deceives them, he at least renders services, he is
already threatening you?  For example, the Thessalians by
xrmny benefits he seduced into their presenb servitude: how
he cheated the wretched Olynthians, first giving them Potidoea
and divers other things, no man can describe: now he is
enticing the Thebans by giving up to them Bceotia, and
delivering them from a toilsome and vexatious war. Thus
did each of these people grasp a certain advantage, but some
of them have suffered what all the world know, others will
suffer what may hereafter befall them. From you —all that
has been taken I recount not: but in the very making of
the peace, how have you been abused! how despoiled!  Of
Phocis, Thermopylhe, places in Thrace, Doriscus, Serrium,
Cersobleptes himself! Does he not now possess the city of
Cardia and avow it?  Wherefore, I say, deals he thus with
The word'rp6ooRoo is explained by Wolf: "impedimentum, sive
sit scopulus in mari, sire vallum in terra." Leland translates the sentence: " else, while we strike on these, as so many obstacles, our enemies must necessarily prove superior to us." This is both vague and
weak. Auger avoids the simile.  Francis introduces " quicksands,"
Pabst: es ist unvermeidlich, dass Alhr an sie wie an Klippen anstosst auxd
dadurch aufgehalten werdet. Jacobs: ir7nner wird dureh sie, wie durch
Felsen des Anstosses, Euer Fortgang geheammt werden.




112        THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
other people, and not in the same manner with you? Because
yours is the only state in which a privilege is allowed of
speaking for the enemy, and an individual taking a bribe
may safely address the assembly, though you have been robbed
of your dominions. It was not safe at Olynthus to be Philip's
advocate unless the Olynthian commonalty had shared the
advantage by possession of Potidxea: it was not safe in Thessaly to be Philip's advocate, unless the people of Thessaly
had shared the advantage, by Philip's expelling their tyrants
and restoring the Pylsean synod: it was not safe in Thebes,
until he gave up Boeotia to them and destroyed the Phocians.
Yet at Athens, though Philip has deprived you of Amphipolis
and the Cardian territory, nay, is even making Euboea a fortress to curb us, and advancing to attack Byzantium,' it is
safe to speak on Philip's behalf. Therefore of these men,
some, from being poor, have become rapidly rich, from nameless and obscure, have become honored and distinguished; you
have done the reverse, fallen from honor to obscurity, from
wealth to poverty; for I deem the riches of a state, allies,
confidence, attachment, of all which you are destitute. And
from your neglecting these matters and suffering them to be
lost, Philip has grown prosperous and mighty, formidable to
all the Greeks and barbarians, while you are abject and forlorn, magnificent in the abundance of your market, but in
provision for actual need ridiculous. I observe however, that
some of our orators take different thought for you and for
themselves. You, they say, should be quiet even under injustice; they can not live in quiet among you themselves,
though no man injures them.
Then some one steps forward and says, "Why, you won't
move any resolution, or run any risk;2 you are cowardly and
faint-hearted." Let me say this: bold, brutal, and impudent
I neither am nor wish to be; yet, methinks, I possess far
more courage than your headstrong politicians. For a man
who, neglecting the interest of the state, tries, confiscates,
Not that Philip had commenced any operations against Byzantium,
but from his march in that direction Demosthenes rightly conjectured
that he had designs thereupon.
2 By subjecting yourself to a ypaoe 7rapav6ov,,, "indictment for having proposed an illegal decree;" and also to the general responsibility
which a statesman incurred by advising important measures.




ON THE CHERSONESE.                113
bribes, accuses, does not act from any courage, Athenians;
the popularity of his speeches and his measures serves for a
pledge of security, and he is bold without danger. But one
who acting for the best frequently opposes your wishes, who
never speaks to flatter but always to benefit you, and
adopts a line of policy in which more depends on fortune
than on calculations, while he makes himself' responsible to
you for both, this is a courageous man, ay, and a useful
citizen is he; not they who for ephemeral pleasure have
thrown away the main resources of the country; whom I am
so far from emulating or esteeming as worthy citizens of
Athens, that if I were asked to declare, what service I had
done the state, although, ye men of Athens, I could mention services as ship-captain and choir-master, payment of
contributions, ransom of prisoners, and similar acts of liberality, I would mention none of' them; I would say, that
I espouse a different course of politics from these, that
although I might perhaps, like others, accuse and bribe and
confiscate and do every thing which these men do, I have
never engaged myself in such a task, never been induced
either by avarice or ambition; I continue to offer counsel, by
which I sink below others in your regard; but you, if you
followed it, would be exalted. So perhaps might one speak
without offense. I consider it not the part of an honest citizen, to devise measures by which I shall speedily become the
first among you, and you the last among nations: with the
measures of good citizens the advancement of their country
should keep pace: their counsel should still be the salutary,
rather than the agreeable; to the latter will nature herself
incline; to the former a good citizen must direct by argument
and instruction.
I have ere now heard an objection of this kind, that true it
is I always advise for the best, yet my services are only words,
and you want deeds and something practical. Upon which I
will tell you my sentiments without reserve. I do not think
a counselor has any other business but to give the best advice: and that this is so, I can easily demonstrate. You are
aware doubtless, that the brave Timotheus once harangued the
people, urging them to send troops and save the Euboeans,
when the Thebans were attempting their conquest; and to this
effect he spake: —" What? do you deliberate," said he, " when




114          THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
you have Thebans in the island, how to deal with them, how
to proceed?  Will you not cover the sea, Athenians, with
your galleys?  Will you not start up and march to Pirmus?
will you not launch your vessels?" Thus Timotheus spake
and you acted,' and through both together success was obtained. But had his advice been ever so good, as it was, and
you shrunk from exertion and disregarded it, would any of
those results have accrued to Athens? Impossible. Then do
likewise in regard to my counsels or any other man's; for action look to yourselves, to the orator for the best instruction
in his power.
I will sum up my advice, and quit the platform. I say,
you must contribute money, maintain the existing troops, rectifying what abuses you may discover, but not on the first accusation disbanding the force.  Send out embassadors every
where, to instruct, to warn, to effect what they can for Athens.
Yet further I say, punish your corrupt statesmen, execrate
them at all times and places, to prove that men of virtue and
honorable conduct have consulted wisely both for others and
themselves. If you thus attend to your affairs, and cease entirely neglecting them, perhaps, perhaps even yet they may improve.  But while ye sit here, zealous as far as clamor and
applause, laggards when any action is required, I see not how
any talking, unaided by your needful exertions, can possibly
save the country.
1 Diocles and Chares conducted this expedition, which took place
B.C. 357, and which, after various combats in the island of Eubcea, ended in the expulsion of the Thebans. Just at that time the finances of
the Athenians were exceedingly low, and the generosity of the wealth,
ier citizens was largely taxed to provide necessaries for the armament.
Demosthenes himself came forward as a liberal contributor. The language of Timotheus on this occasion may be compared with Virgil's
2Eneid, IV. 592.
Non arma expedient totaque ex urbe sequentur,
Deripientque rates alii navalibus? Ite,
Ferte citi flammas, date vela, impellite remos.




THE THIRD PHILIPPIC.                   115
THE THIRD PHILIPPIC.
THE ARGUMENT.
This speech was delivered about three months after the last, while
Philip was advancing into Thrace, and threatening both the Chersonese and the Propontine coast.:No new event had happened, which
called for any special consultation; but Demosthenes, alarmed by
the formidable character of Philip's enterprises and vast military
preparations, felt the necessity of rousing the Athenians to exertion.
He repeats in substance the arguments which he had used in the
Oration on the Chersonese; points out the danger to be apprehended
from the disunion among the Greek states, from their general apathy
and lack of patriotism, which he contrasts with the high and noble
spirit of ancient times. From the past conduct of Philip he shows
what is to be expected in future; explains the difference between
Philip's new method of warfare and that adopted in the Peloponnesian war, and urges the necessity of corresponding measures for
defense. The peaceful professions of Philip were not to be trusted;
he was never more dangerous than when he made overtures of peace
and fiiendship. The most powerful instruments that he employed
for gaining ascendency were the venal orators, who were to be found
in every Grecian city, and on whom it was necessary to inflict signal
punishment, before they had a chance of opposing foreign enemies.
The advice of Demosthenes now is, to dispatch reinforcements to the
Chersonese, to stir up the people of Greece, and even to solicit the
assistance of the Persian king, who had no less reason than themselves to dread the ambition of Philip.
The events of the following year, when Philip attacked the Propontine
cities, fully justified the warning of Demosthenes. And the extraordinary activity, which the Athenians displayed in resisting him,
shows that the exertions of the orator had their due effect. Even
Mitford confesses, with reference to the operations of that period,
that Athens found in Demosthenes an able and effective minister.
MANY speeches, men of Athens, are made in almost every
assembly about the hostilities of Philip, hostilities which
ever since the treaty of peace he has been committing as well
against you as against the rest of the Greeks; and all (I am
sure) are ready to avow, though they forbear to do so, that
our counsels and our measures should be directed to his humiliation and chastisement: nevertheless, so low have our
affairs been brought by inattention and negligence, I fear it
is a harsh truth to say, that if all the orators had sought to




116        THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
suggest, and you to pass resolutions for the utter ruining of
the commonwealth, we could not methinks be worse off than
we are. A variety of circumstances may have brought us to
this state; our affaiirs have not declined from one or two
causes only: but, if' you rightly examine, you will find it
chiefly owing to the orators, who study to please you rather
than advise for the best. Some of whom, Athenians, seeking
to maintain the basis of their own power and repute, have no
forethought for the future, and therefore think you also ought
to have none; others, accusing and calumniating practical
statesmen, labor only to make Athens punish Athens, and in
such occupations to engage her, that Philip may have liberty to say and do what lie pleases. Politics of this kind are
common here, but are the causes of your failures and embarrassment.  I beg, Athenians, that you will not resent
my plain speaking of the truth.  Only consider.  You hold
liberty of speech in other matters to be the general right of
all residents in Athens, insomuch that you allow a measure
of it even to foreigners and slaves, and many servants may
be seen among you speaking their thoughts more freely than
citizens in some other states; and yet you have altogether
banished it from your councils. The result has been, that in
the assembly you give yourselves airs and are flattered at
hearing nothing but compliments, in your measures and proceedings you are brought to the utmost peril. If such be
your disposition now, I must be silent: if you will listen to
good advice without flattery, I am  ready to speak.  For
though our affairs are in a deplorable condition, though
many sacrifices have been made, still, if you will choose to
perform your duty, it is possible to repair it all. A paradox,
and yet a truth, am I about to state. That which is the
most lamentable in the past is best for the future. Hlow is
this? Because you performed no part of your duty, great or
small, and therefore you fared ill: had you done all that
became you, and your situation were the same, there would
be no hope of amendment.  Philip has indeed prevailed
over your sloth and negligence, but not over the country:
you have not been worsted; you have not, even bestirred
yourselves.
If now we were all agreed that Philip is at war with
Athens and infringing the peace, nothing would a speaker




THE THIRD PHILIPPIC.               117
need to urge or advise but the safest and easiest way of resisting him. But since, at the very time when Philip is capturing cities and retaining divers of our dominions and assailing
all people, there are men so unreasonable as to listen to repeated declarations in the assembly, that some of us aite kindling war, one must be cautious and' set this matter right: for
whoever moves or advises a measure of defense, is in danger
of being accused afterward as author of the war.
I will first then examine and determine this point, whether
it be in our power to deliberate on peace or war. If the country may be at peace, if it depends on us, (to begin with this,)
I say we ought to maintain peace, and I call upon the affirmant to move a resolution, to take some measure, and not to
palter with us. But if another, having arms in his hand and
a large force around him, amuses you with the name of peace,
while he carries on the operations of war, what is left but to
defend yourselves? You may profess to be at peace, if you
like, as he does; I quarrel not with that. But if any man
supposes this to be a peace, which will enable Philip to master all else and attack you last, he is a madman, or he talks
of a peace observed toward him by you, not toward you
by him. This it is that Philip purchases by all his expenditure, the privilege of assailing you without being assailed in
turn.
If we really wait until he avows that he is at war with
us, we are the simplest of mortals, for he would not declare
that, though he marched even against Attica and Piraeus, at
least if we may judge from his conduct to others. For
example, to the Olynthians he declared, when he was forty
furlongs from their city, that there was no alternative, but
either they must quit Olynthus or he Macedonia; though
before that time, whenever he was accused of such an intent,
he took it ill and sent embassadors to justify himself. Again,
he marched towards the Phocions as if they were allies, and
there were Phocian envoys who accompanied!is march, and
many among you contended that his advance would not
benefit the Thebans. And he came into Thessaly of late
as a friend and ally, yet he has taken possession of Pherae:
and lastly he told these wretched people of Oreus,l that he
lWhen he established his creature Philistides in the government of
Oreus, as mentioned in the last oration and at the end of this.




118         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
had sent his soldiers out of good-will to visit them, as he
heard they were in trouble and dissension, and it was the part
of allies and true friends to lend assistance on such occasions.
People who would never have harmed him, though they
might have adopted measures of defense, he chose to deceive
rather than warn them of his attack; and think ye he would
declare war against you before he began it, and that while
you are willing to be deceived? Impossible. He would be
the silliest of mankind, if, while you the injured parties
make no complaint against him, but are accusing your own
countrymen, he should terminate your intestine strife and
jealousies, warn you to turn against him, and remove the
pretexts of his hirelings for asserting, to amuse you, that
he makes no war upon Athens. O heavens! would any
rational being judge by words rather than by actions, who is
at peace with him and who at' war? Surely none. Well
then; Philip immediately after the peace, before Diopithes
was in command or the settlers in the Chersonese had been
sent out, took Serrium and Doriscus, and expelled from
Serrium and the Sacred Mount the troops whom your
general had stationed there.'  What do you call such conduct? He had sworn the peace. Don't say —what does it
signify? how is the state concerned?-Whether it be a trifling
matter, or of no concernment to you, is a different question:
religion and justice have the same obligation, be the subject
of the offense great or small.  Tell me now; when he sends
mercenaries into Chersonesus, which the king and all the
Greeks have acknowledged to be yours, when he avows himself an auxiliary and writes us word so, what are such proceedings? He says he is not at war; I can not however
admit such conduct to be an observance of the peace; far
This general was Chares, to whom Cersobleptes had intrusted the
defense of those places. The Sacred Mount was a fortified position on
the northern coast of the Hellespont.  It was here that Miltocythes
intrenched himself, when he rebelled against Cotys; and Philip took
possession of it just before the peace with Athens was concluded, as
being important to his operations against Cersobleptes.  The statement of Demosthenes, that the oaths had then been taken, is, as Jacobs
observes, incorrect; for they were sworn afterward in Thessaly. But
the argument is substantially the same; for the peace had been agreed
to, and the ratification was purposely delayed by Philip, to gain time
for the completion of his designs.




THE THIRD PHILIPPIC.                 119
otherwise: I say, by his attempt on Megara,l by his setting
up despotism in Euboea, by his present advance into Thrace,
by his intrigues in Peloponnesus, by the whole course of operations with his army, he has been breaking the peace and
making war upon you; unless indeed you will say, that
those who establish batteries are not at war, until they apply
them to the walls. But that you will not say: for whoever
contrives and prepares the means for my conquest, is at war
with me, before he darts or draws the bow. What, if any
thing should happen, is the risk you run?  The alienation of the Hellespont, the subjection of Megara and Eubcea
to your enemy, the siding of the Peloponnesians with him.
Then can I allow, that one who sets Such an engine at work
against Athens is at peace with her?  Quite the contrary.
From the day that he destroyed the Phocians I date his commencement of hostilities. Defend yourselves instantly, and
I say you will be wise: delay it, and you may wish in vain
to do so hereafter. So much do I dissent from your other
counselors, men of Athens, that I deem any discussion
about Chersonesus or Byzantium  out of place.  Succor
them-I advise that —watch that no harm befalls them, send
all necessary supplies to your troops in that quarter; but let
your deliberations be for the safety of all Greece, as being in
the utmost peril.  I must tell you why I am so alarmed at
the state of' our affairs: that, if my reasonings are correct,
you may share them, and make some provision at least for
yourselves, however disinclined to do so for others: but if,
in your judgment, I talk nonsense and absurdity, you may
treat me as crazed, and not listen to me, either now or in
future.
That Philip from a mean and humble origin has grown
mighty, that the Greeks are jealous and quarreling among
1 Not long before this oration was delivered, Philip was suspected of
a design to seize Megara. Demosthenes gives an account, in his speech
on the Embassy, of a conspiracy between two Megairians, Ptfeodorus and
-Perilaus, to introduce Macedonian troops into the city. Phocion was
sent by the Athenians to Megara, with the consent of the Megarian
people, to protect them against foreign attack. Ile fortified the city
and port,'connecting them by long walls, and put them in security.
The occupation of Megara by Philip must have been most perilous to
Athens, especially while Euboea and Thebes were in his intelest; he
would thus have inclosed her as it were in a net.




120         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
themselves, that it was far more wonderful for him to rise
from that insignificance, than it would now be, after so
many acquisitions, to conquer what is left; these and similar matters, which I might dwell upon, I pass over. But I
observe that all people, beginning with you, have conceded
to him a right, which in former times has been the subject
of contest in every Grecian war. And what is this? The
right of doing what he pleases, openly fleecing and pillaging
the Greeks, one after another, attacking and enslaving their
cities. You were at the head of the Greeks for seventythree years,' the Lacedemonians for twenty-nine;2 and the
Thebans had some power in these latter times after the
battle of Leuctra.  Yet neither you, my countrymen, nor
Thebans nor Lacedaemonians, were ever licensed by the
Greeks to act as you pleased; far otherwise.  When you, or
rather the Athenians at that time, appeared to be dealing
harshly with certain people, all the rest, even such as had
no complaint against Athens, thought proper to side with
the injured parties in a war against her.  So, when the
Lacedminonians became masters and succeeded to your empire, on their attempting to encroach and make oppressive
innovations,3 a general war was declared against them, even
I This would be from about the end of the Persian war to the end
of the Peloponnesian, B.c. 405. Isocrates speaks of the Athenian sway
as having lasted sixty-five or seventy years. But statements of this
kind are hardly intended to be made with perfect accuracy. In the
third Olynthiac, as we have seen, (page 57,) Demosthenes says, the
Athenians had the leadership by consent of the Greeks for forty-five
years. This would exclude the Peloponnesian war.
2 From the end of the Peloponnesian war to the battle of Naxos,
B.C. 376.
3 The Spartans, whose severe military discipline rendered them far
the best soldiers in Greece, were totally unfit to manage the empire,
at the head of which they found themselves after the humiliation of
Athens. Their attempt to force an oligarchy upon every dependent
state was an unwise policy, which made them generally odious. The
decemvirates of Lysander, and the governors ('dpyocra2) established in
various Greek cities to maintain Laceduemonian influence, were regarded as instruments of tyranny. It was found that Spartan governors and generals, when away from home, gave loose to their vicious
inclinations, as if to indemnify themselves for the strictness of domestic discipline. It became a maxim in their politics, that the end justified the means. The most flagrant proof was given by the seizure of
the Cadmea at Thebes; a measure, which led to a formidable confederacy against Sparta, and brought her to the verge of destruction.




THE THIRD PHILIPPIC.                   121
by such as had no cause of complaint.  But wherefore
mention other people? We ourselves and the Lacedaemonians, although at the outset we could not allege any natural injuries, thought proper to make war for the injustice
that we saw done to our neighbors.  Yet all the faults committed by the Spartans in those thirty years, and by our
ancestors in the seventy, are less, men of Athens, than the
wrongs which, in thirteen incomplete years that Philip has
been uppermost,1 he has inflicted on the Greeks: nay they
are scarcely a fraction of these, as may easily be shown in
a few  words.  Olynthus and Methone and Apollonia, and
thirty-two cities2 on the borders of Thrace, I pass over; all
which he has so cruelly destroyed, that a visitor could hardly
tell if they were ever inhabited: and of the Phocians, so
considerable a people exterminated, I say nothing.  But
what is the condition of Thessaly? Has he not taken away
her constitutions and her cities, and established tetrarchies,
to parcelb her out,3 not only by cities, but also by provinces,
for subjection?  Are not the Eubcean states governed now
by despots, and that in an island near to Thebes and Athens?
Does he not expressly write in his epistles, "I am  at peace
with those who are willing to obey me?"  Nor does he write
so and not act accordingly. Ile is gone to the Hellespont;
he marched formerly against Ambracia; Elis, such an important city in Peloponnesus, he possesses;4 he plotted lately
1 1 e. in power; but, as Smead, an American editor, truly observes,
gE'7wtoZd'eL has a contemptuous signification. Jacobs: oben schwimmt.
The thirteen years are reckoned from the time when Philip's interference in Thessaly began; before which he had not assumed an important character in southern Greece.
2 The Chalcidian cities.
3 This statement does not disagree with the mention of the rc&Ka6apXpa
in the second Philippic. Supposing that Thessaly was not only divided
into tetrarchies, four provinces or cantons, but also governed by decemvirates of Philip's appointment, placed in divers of her cities, then
by the former contrivance she might be said doveewrtv Kacr fOvn, by the
latter iKa-a 7'6Xet. It is not clear indeed whether several decemvirates,
or one for the whole country, is to be understood. The singular number is equally capable of either interpretation.
4 That is to say; a Macedonian faction prevailed in Elis. The democratical party had some time before endeavored to regain the ascendency, by aid of the Phocian mercenaries of Phlalecus; but they had
been defeated by the troops of Arcadia and Elis.
VOLo I.-1"




122        THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
to get Megara: neither Hellenic nor Barbaric land contains
the man's ambition.l And we the Greek community, seeing
and hearing this, instead of sending embassies to one another about it and expressing indignation, are in such a
miserable state, so intrenched in our miserable towns, that to
this day we can attempt nothing that interest or necessity
requires; we can not combine, or form any association for
succor and alliance; we look unconcernedly on the man's
growing power, each resolving (methinks) to enjoy the interval that another is destroyed in, not caring or striving for
the salvation of Greece: for none can be ignorant, that
Philip, like some course or attack of fever or other disease, is
coming even on those that yet seem very far removed. And
you must be sensible, that whatever wrong the Greeks sustained from Lacedaemonians or from us, was at least inflicted by genuine people of Greece; and it might be felt in
the same manner as if a lawful son, born to a large fortune,
committed some fault or error in the management of it; on
that ground one would consider him open to censure and
reproach, yet it could not be said that he was an alien, and
not heir to the property which he so dealt with. But if a
slave or a spurious child wasted and spoiled what he had no
interest in-Heavens! how much more heinous and hateful
would all have pronounced it! And yet in regard to Philip
and his conduct they feel not this, although he is not only no
Greek and noway akin to Greeks, but not even a barbarian
of a place honorable to mention; in fact, a vile fellow of
Macedon, from which a respectable slave could not be purchased formerly.
What is wanting to make his insolence complete?  Besides his destruction of Grecian cities, does he not hold the
Pythian games, the common festival of Greece, and, if he
comes not himself, send his vassals to preside? Is he not
master of Thermopyla and the passes into Greece, and holds
he not those places by garrisons and mercenaries? Has he
not thrust aside Thessalians, ourselves, Dorians, the whole
1 So Juvenal, Sat. X. 169:
AEstuat infelix angusto limite mundi,
Ut Gyarwe clausus scopulis parvAque Seripho.
And Virgil, ZEn. IX. 644:
Nec te Troja capit.




THE THIRD PHILIPPIC.                   123
Amphietyonic body, and got preaudience of the oracle,I to
which even the Greeks do not all pretend?  Does he not write
to the Thessalians, what form of government to adopt? send
mercenaries to Porthmus,2 to expel the Eretrian commonalty; others to Oreus, to set up Philistides as ruler? Yet
the Greeks endure to see all this; methinks they view it as
they would a hailstorm, each praying that it may not fall on
himself, none trying to prevent it. And not only are the
outrages which he does to Greece submitted to, but even the
private wrongs of every people: nothing can go beyond this!
Has he not wronged the Corinthians by attacking Ambracia3
and Leucas? the Achaians, by swearing to give Naupactus4 to
the 2Etolians? from  the Thebans taken Echinus?.5  Is he
not marching against the Byzantines his allies?  From usI omit the rest-but keeps he not Cardia, the greatest city of
the Chersonese?  Still under these indignities we are all
1 This privilege, which had belonged to the Phocians, was transferred
to Philip. It was considered an advantage as well as an honor in
ancient times; for there were only certain days appointed in every
month, when the oracle could be consulted, and the order of consultation was determined by lot in common cases. The Delphians used to
confer the right of pre-consultation on particular states or persons as a
reward for some service or act of piety. Thus the Spartans received
it; and Croesus, king of Lydia, for the magnificent presents which he
sent to the temple.
2 Porthmus was the port of Eretria, on the strait, opposite Athens.
The circumstances are stated by Demosthenes at the latter end of the
speech. By expelling the j6pog of Eretria, he means of course the
popular party, die Volkspartei, as Pabst has it; but they would by
their own partisans be called the people.
3 Divers colonies were planted on the northwestern coast of Greece
by the Corinthians, and also by the Corcyroeans, who were themselves
colonists from Corinth. Among them were Leucas, Ambracia, Anactorium, Epidamnus, and Apollonia. Leucas afterward became insular,
by cutting through the isthmus. Philip's meditated attack was in
343 B.c. after the conquest of Cassopia. Leucas, by its insular position, would have been convenient for a descent on Peloponnesus. We
have seen that this design of Philip was baffled by the exertions of
Demosthenes.
4 Naupactus, now Lepanto, lay on the northern coast of the Corinthian gulf. At the close of the Peloponnesian war it came into the hands
of the Achaians, from whom it was taken by Epaminondas, but after
his death they regained it. The ~Etolians got possession of the town
some time after, perhaps by Macedonian assistance.
5 The Echinus here mentioned was a city on the northern coast of
the Maliac gulf in Thessaly.




124        THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
slack and disheartened, and look toward our neighbors, distrusting one another, instead of the common enemy. And
how think ye a man, who behaves so insolently to all, how
will he act, when he gets each separately under his control?
But what has caused the mischief?  There must be some
cause, some good reason, why the Greeks were so eager for
liberty then, and now are eager for servitude. There was
something, men of Athens, something in the hearts of the
multitude then, which there is not now, which overcame the
wealth of Persia and maintained the freedom of Greece, and
quailed not under any battle by land or sea; the loss whereof
has ruined all, and thrown the affairs of Greece into confusion. What was this?  Nothing subtle or clever: simply
that whoever took money from the aspirants for power or the
corruptors of Greece were universally detested: it was dreadful to be convicted of bribery; the severest punishment was
inflicted on the guilty, and there was no intercession or
pardon. The favorable moments for enterprise, which fortune frequently offers to the careless against the vigilant, to
them that will do nothing against those that discharge all
their duty, could not be bought from orators or generals;
no more could mutual concord, nor distrust of tyrants and
barbarians, nor any thing of the kind. But now all such
principles have been sold as in open market, and those imported in exchange, by which Greece is ruined and diseased.'
What are they?  Envy where a man gets a bribe; laughter
if he confesses it.; mercy to the convicted; hatred of those
that denounce the crime: all the usual attendants upon corruption.2 For as to ships and men and revenues and abundance of other materials, all that may be reckoned as constituting national strength-assuredly the Greeks of our
day are more fully and perfectly supplied with such advantages than Greeks of the olden time. But they are all rendered useless, unavailable, unprofitable, by the agency of these
traffickers.''A'6oRwRe in reference to foreign affairs; vevaciKev in regard to internal broils and commotions. Compare Shakspeare, Macbeth IV. 3.
O nation miserable,
When shalt thou see thy wholesome days again?
2 He glances more particularly at Philocrates, Demades, and ~Eschines.




THE THIRD PHILIPPIC.                  125
That such is the present state of things, you must see,
without requiring my testimony: that it was different in
former times, I will demonstrate, not by speaking my own
words, but by showing an inscription of your ancestors,
which they graved on a brazen column and deposited in the
citadel, not for their own benefit, (they were right-minded
enough without such records,) but for a memorial and example to instruct you, how seriously such conduct should be
taken up.  What says the inscription then?  It says: "Let
Arthmius, son of Pythonax the Zelite,l be declared an outlaw,2 and an enemy of the Athenian people and their allies,
him and his family." Then the cause is written why this
was done: because he brought the Median gold into Peloponnesus.  That is the inscription.  By the gods! only consider and reflect among yourselves, what must have been the
spirit, what the dignity of those Athenians who acted so!
One Arthmius a Zelite, subject of the king, (for Zelea is in
Asia,) because in his master's service he brought gold into
Peloponnesus, not to Athens, they proclaimed an enemy of
the Athenians and their allies, him  and his family, and outlawed. That is, not the outlawry commonly spoken of: for
what would a Zelite care, to be excluded from Athenian
franchises? It means not that; but in the statutes of homicide it is written, in cases where a prosecution for murder is
not allowed, but killing is sanctioned, "and let him die an
outlaw," says the legislator: by which he means, that whoever kills such a person shall be unpolluted.3  Therefore they
considered that the preservation of all Greece was their own
concern: (but for such opinion, they would not have cared,
whether people in Peloponnesus were bought and corrupted:)
and whomsoever they discovered taking bribes, they chastised
1 Zelea is a town in Mysia. Arthmius was sent by Artaxerxes into
Peloponnesus, to stir up a war against the Athenians, who had irritated
him by the assistance which they lent to Egypt. 2Eschines says that
Arthmius was the Trpo'Sevoc of Athens, which may partly account for
the decree passed against him.
2 Of the various degrees of clrtyta at Athens I shall speak hereafter.
I translate the word here, so as to meet the case of a foreigner, who had
nothing to do with the franchises of the Athenians, but who by their
decree was excommunicated from the benefit of all international law.
3 That is, his act being justifiable homicide, he shall not be deemed
(in a religious point of view) impure. As to the Athenian law of homicide, see llmy article Phoanos in the Archveological Dictionary.




126          THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
and punished so severely as to record their names in brass.
The natural result was, that Greece was formidable to the
Barbarian, not the Barbarian to Greece.'Tis not so now:
since neither in this nor in other respects are your sentiments the same. But what are they? You know yourselves: why am I to upbraid you with every thing?  The
Greeks in general are alike and no better than you. Therefore I say, our present affairs demand earnest attention and
wholesome counsel. Shall I say what? Do you bid me, and
won't you be angry?
[Here is read the public document which Demosthenes produces,
after which he resumes his address.']
There is a foolish saying of persons who wish to make us
easy, that Philip is not yet as powerful as the Lacedwemonians
were formerly, who ruled every where by land and sea, and
had the king for their ally, and nothing withstood them; yet
Athens resisted even that nation, and was not destroyed. I
myself believe, that, while every thing has received great improvement, and the present bears no resemblance to the past,
nothing has been so changed and improved as the practice of
war. For anciently, as I am informed, the Laced3emonians
and all Grecian people would for four or five months, during
the season2 only, invade and ravage the land of their enemies
with heavy-armed and national troops, and return home
again: and their ideas were so old-fashioned, or rather
national, they never purchased3 an advantage from any;
theirs was a legitimate and open warfare. But now you
doubtless perceive, that the majority of disasters have been
I The Secretary of the Assembly stood by the side of the orator, and
read any public documents, such as statutes, decrees, bills and the like,
which the orator desired to refer to or to verify. It does not appear
what the document was, which Demosthenes caused to be read here.
If we may judge from the argument, it was some energetic resolution
of the people, such as he would propose for an example on the present
occasion.
2 The campaigning season, during the summer and fine time of the
year. The Peloponnesians generally invaded Attica when the corn was
ripe, burning and plundering all in their route. Thucydides in his
history divides the year into two parts, summer and winter.
Compare the old lines of Ennius:
Non cauponantes bellum sed belligerantes
Ferro, non auro, vitam cernamus utrique.




THE THIRD PHILIPPIC.              127
effected by treason; nothing is done in fair field or combat.
You hear of Philip marching where he pleases, not because
he commands troops of the line, but because he has attached
to him a host of skirmishers, cavalry, archers, mercenaries,
and the like. When with these he falls upon a people in
civil dissension, and none (for mistrust) will march out to
defend the country, he applies engines and besieges them. I
need not mention, that he makes no difference between winter
and summer, that he has no stated season of repose. You,
knowing these things, reflecting on them, must not let the
war approach your territories, nor get your necks broken, relying on the simplicity of the old war with the Lacedaemonians, but take the longest time beforehand for defensive
measures and preparations, see that he stirs not from home,
avoid any decisive engagement. For a war, if we choose,
men of Athens, to pursue a right course, we have many natural advantages; such as the position of his kingdom, which
we may extensively plunder and ravage, and a thousand more;
but for a battle he is better trained than we are.'
Nor is it enough to adopt these resolutions and oppose him
by warlike measures: you must on calculation and on principle abhor his advocates here, remembering that it is impossible to overcome your enemies abroad, until you have chastised those who are his ministers within the city. Which,
by Jupiter and all the gods, you can not and will not do!
You have arrived at such a pitch of folly or madness orI know not what to call it: I am tempted often to think,
that some evil genius is driving you to ruin-for the sake of
scandal or envy or jest or any other cause, you command
hirelings to speak, (some of whom would not deny themselves
to be hirelings,) and laugh when they abuse people. And
this, bad as it is, is not the worst: you have allowed these
persons more liberty for their political conduct than your
faithful counselors: and see what evils are caused by listening to such men with indulgence. I will mention facts that
you will all remember:
In Olynthus some of the statesmen were in Philip's interChreronea proved the wisdom of this advice. Similar counsel was
given by Pericles in the Peloponnesian war. Had the Athenians attempted to meet the invading army in the field, they must inevitably
have been defeated in the early period of the war.




128        THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
est, doing every thing for him; some were on the honest side,
aiming to preserve their fellow-citizens from slavery. Which
party now destroyed their country? or which betrayed the
cavalry,' by whose betrayal Olynthus fell?  The creatures
of Philip; they that, while the city stood, slandered and calumniated the honest counselors so effectually, that the Olynthian people were induced to banish Apollonides.
Nor is it there only, and nowhere else, that such practice
has been ruinous.  In Eretria, when, after riddance of Plutarch2 and his mercenaries, the people got possession of their
city and of Porthmus, some were for bringing the government over to you, others to Philip.  His partisans were
generally, rather exclusively, attended to by the wretched
and unfortunate Eretrians, who at length were persuaded to
expel their faithful advisers.  Philip, their ally and friend,
sent Hipponicus and a thousand mercenaries, demolished the
walls of Porthmus, and established three rulers, HIipparchus,
Automedon, Clitarchus.  Since that he has driven them out
of the country, twice attempting their deliverance: once
he sent the troops with Eurylochus, afterward those of Parmenio.
What need of many words?  In Oreus Philip's agents
were Philistides, Menippus, Socrates, Thoas, and Agapeus,
wcho now hold the government: that was quite notorious: one
Euphreus, a man that formerly dwelt here among you, was
laboring for freedom and independence. How this man was
in other respects insulted and trampled on by the people of
Oreus, were long to tell: but a year before the capture, discovering what Philistides and his accomplices were about, he
laid an information against them for treason.  A multitude
then combining, having Philip for their paymaster, and acting under his direction, take Euphreus off to prison as a disturber of the public peace. Seeing which, the people of
Oreus, instead of assisting the one and beating the others to
death, with them were not angry, but said his punishment
After Olynthus was besieged by Philip, various sal.lies were made
from the city, some of which were successful. But the treachery of
Lasthenes and his accomplices ruined all. A body of five hundred
horse were led by him into an amnbuscade, and captured by the besiegers. See Appendix 1.
2 When he was expelled by Phocion after the battle of Tamyna,
B.C. 354.




THE THIRD PHILIPPIC.              129
was just, and rejoiced at it.. So the conspirators, having full
liberty of action, laid their schemes and took their measures
for the surrender qf the city; if any of the people observed
it, they were silent and intimidated, remembering the treatment of Euphreeus; and so wretched was their condition, that
on the approach of such a calamity none dared to utter a
word, until the enemy drew up before the walls: then some
were for defense, others for betrayal.  Since the city was
thus basely and wickedly taken, the traitors have held despotic rule.; people who formerly rescued them, and were
ready for any maltreatment of Euphraeus, they have either
banished or put to death; Euphreus killed himself, proving
by deed, that he had resisted Philip honestly and purely for
the good of his countrymen.
What can be the reason-perhaps you wonder-why the
Olynthians and Eretrians and Orites were more indulgent to
Philip's advocates than to their own? The same which
operates with you. They who advise for the best can not
always gratify their audience, though they would; for the
safety of the state must be attended to: their opponents by
the very counsel which is agreeable advance Philip's interest.
One party required contribution; the other said there was
no necessity: one were for war and mistrust; the other for
peace, until they were ensnared. And so on for every thing
else; (not to dwell on particulars;) the one made speeches to
please for the moment, and gave no annoyance; the other
offered salutary counsel, that was offensive. Many rights did
the people surrender at last, not from any such motive of
indulgence or ignorance, but submitting in the belief that all
was lost. Which, by Jupiter and Apollo, I fear will be your
case, when on calculation you see that nothing can be done.
I pray, men of Athens, it may never come to this! Better
die a thousand deaths than render homage to Philip, or sacrifice any of your faithful counselors.  A fine irecompense
have the people of Oreus got, for trusting themselves to Philip's friends and spurning Euphreus! Finely are the Eretrian
commons rewarded, for having driven away your embassadors
and yielded to Clitarchus! Yes; they are slaves, exposed to
the lash and the torture. Finally he spared the Olynthians,
who appointed Lasthenes to command their horse, and expelled Apollonides! It is folly and cowardice to cherish such
F2




130         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHIENES.
hopes, and, while you take evil counsel and shirk every duty,
and even listen to those who plead for your enemies, to think
you inhabit a city of such magnitude, that you can not suffer
any serious misfortune. Yea, and it is disgraceful to exclaim
on any occurrence, when it is too late, "Who would have
expected it?  However-this or that should have been done,
the other left undone."  Many things could the Olynthians
mention now, which, if foreseen at the time, would have prevented their destruction. Many could the Orites mention,
many the Phocians, and each of the ruined states.  But
what would it avail them? As long as the vessel is safe,
whether it be great or small, the mariner, the pilot, every
man in turn should exert himself, and prevent its being overturned either- by accident or design: but when the sea hath
rolled over it, their efforts are vain. And we, likewise,
O Athenians, while we are safe, with a magnificent city,
plentiful resources, lofty reputation —what1 must we do?
Many of you,2 I dare say, have been longing to ask. Well
then, I will tell you; I will move a resolution: pass it, if you
please.
First, let us prepare for our own defense; provide ourselves,
I mean, with ships, money, and troops — for surely, though
all other people consented to be slaves, we at least ought to
struggle for freedom. When we have completed our own
preparations and made them apparent to the Greeks, then let
us invite the rest, and send our embassadors every where with
the intelligence, to Peloponnesus, to Rhodes, to Chios, to the
king, I say; (for it concerns his interests, not to let Philip
make universal conquest;) that, if you prevail, you may
have partners of your dangers and expenses, in case of necessity, or at all events that you may delay the operations. For,
1 Smead remarks here on the adroitness of the orator, who, instead
of applying the simile of the ship to the administration of the state,
which he felt that his quick-minded hearers had already done, suddenly interrupts himself with a question, which would naturally occur
to the audience.
2 You, 0o KaOi/jevot. See my observations in the preface. I can not
forbear noticing the manner in which Francis translates the following
vi7 Alt -p). "Let Jupiter be witness, with what integrity I shall declare my opinion." The original means nothing of the kind. It is
rare that vw) Ala can be translated literally with effect. Jacobs here
has wohlan.




THE THIRD PHILIPPIC.               131
since the war is against an individual,' not against the collected power of a state, even this may be useful; as were the
embassies last year to Peloponnesus, and the remonstrances
with which I and Polyeuctus, that excellent man, and Hegesippus, and Clitomachus, and Lycurgus, and the other envoys went round, and arrested Philip's progress, so that he
neither attacked Ambracia nor started for Peloponnesus. I
say not, however, that you should invite the rest without
adopting measures to protect yourselves: it would be folly,
while you sacrifice your own interest, to profess a regard for
that of strangers, or to alarm others about the future, while
for the present you are unconcerned. I advise not this: I bid
you send supplies to the troops in Chersonesus, and do what
else they require; prepare yourselves and make every effort
first, then summon, gather, instruct the rest of the Greeks.
That is the duty of a state possessing a dignity such as yours.
If you imagine that Chalcidians or Megarians will save Greece,
while you run away from the contest, you imagine wrong.
Well for any of those people, if they are safe themselves.
This work belongs to you: this privilege your ancestors bequeathed to you, the prize of many perilous exertions. But
if every one will sit seeking his pleasure, and studying to be
idle himself, never will he find others to do his work, and
more than this, I fear we shall be under the necessity of
doing all that we like not at one time. Were proxies to be
had, our inactivity would have found them long ago; but
they are not.
Such are the measures which I advise, which I propose:
adopt them, and even yet, I believe, our prosperity may be
re-established. If any man has better advice to offer, let him
communicate it openly. Whatever you determine, I pray to
all the gods for a happy result.
1 Because a state is a permanent power; a single man is liable to a
variety of accidents, and his power terminates with his life.




132         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
THE FOURTH PHILIPPIC.
THE ARGUMENT.
The subject of this Oration is the same as the last, viz., the necessity
of resistance to Philip. The time of its delivery would appear to
have been a little later, while Philip was yet in Thrace, and before
he commenced the siege of the Propontine towns. No new event is
alluded to, except the seizure of Hermias by the satrap Mentor, the
exact date of which is uncertain. The orator urges here, still more
strongly than he had done in the third Philippic, the necessity of
applying to Persia for assistance. His advice was followed, and a
negotiation was opened with that monarchy, which led to the effective relief of Perinthus. There is a remarkable passage in this speech,
on the importance of general unanimity, which seems to imply that
disputes had arisen between the richer and poorer classes, chiefly in
regard to the application of the public revenue. The view which is
here taken on the subject of the Theoric distributions is so different
from the argument in the Olynthiacs, that modern critics have
generally considered this Oration to be spurious. Another ground
for such opinion is, that it contains various passages borrowed from
other speeches, and not very skillfully put together. Yet the genuineness seems not to have been doubted by any of the ancient grammarians.
BELIEVING, men of Athens, that the subject of your consultation is serious and momentous to the state, I will endeavor to advise what I think important.  Many have been the
faults, accumulated for some time past, which have brought
us to this wretched condition; but none is under the circumstances so distressing as this, men of Athens; that your minds
are alienated from public business; you are attentive just
while you sit listening to some news, afterward you all go
away, and, so far from caring for what you heard, you forget
it altogether.
Well; of the extent of Philip's arrogance and ambition, as
evinced in his dealings with every people, you have been informed.  That it is not possible to restrain  him  in such
course by speeches and harangues, no man can be ignorant:
or, if other reasons fail to convince you, reflect on this.
Whenever we have had to discuss our claims, on no occasion




THE FOURTH PHILIPPIC.               133
have we been worsted or judged in the wrong; we have still
beaten and got the better of all in argument. But do his
affairs go badly on this account, or ours well? By no
means. For as Philip immediately proceeds, with arms in
his hand, to put all he possesses boldly at stake, while we
with our equities, the speakers as well as the hearers, are
sitting still, actions (naturally enough) outstrip words, and
people attend not to what we have argued or may argue, but
to what we do. And our doings are not likely to protect any
of our injured neighbors: I need not say more upon the
subject. Therefore, as the states are divided into two parties,
one that would neither hold arbitrary government nor submit
to it, but live under free and equal laws; another desiring to
govern their fellow-citizens, and be subject to some third
power, by whose assistance they hope to accomplish that
object; the partisans of Philip,l who desire tyranny and
despotism, have every where prevailed, and I know not whether there is any state left, besides our own, with a popular constitution firmly established. And those, that hold the government through him, have prevailed by all the means efficacious
in worldly affairs; principally and mainly, by having a person
to bribe the corruptible; secondly, a point no less important,
by having at their command, at whatever season they required, an army to put down their opponents.  We, men of
Athens, are not only in these respects behindhand; we can not
even be awaked; like men that have drunk mandrake2 or some
other sleeping potion; and methinks-for I judge the truth
must be spoken-we are by reason thereof held in such disrepute and contempt, that, among the states in imminent
danger, some dispute with us for the lead, some for the place
of congress; others have resolved to defend themselves separately rather than in union with us.
Why am I so particular in mentioning these things?  I
t I agree with Pabst and Auger that EKEiVOV signifies Philip. Schaefer takes it neutrally.
2 Used for a powerful opiate by the ancients. It is called Mandragora also in English. See Othello, Act III. Sc. 3.
Not poppy, nor mandragora,
Nor all the drowsy sirups of the world,
Shall ever medicine thee to that sweet sleep
Which thou ow'dst yesterday.




134         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
seek not to give offense; so help me all the powers of heaven!
I wish, men of Athens, to make it clear and manifest to you
all, that habitual sloth and indolence, the same in public
matters as in private life, is not immediately felt on every
occasion of neglect, but shows itself in the general result.l
Look at Serrium. and Doriscus; which were first disregarded
after the peace. Their names perhaps are unknown to many
of you: yet your careless abandonment of these lost Thrace
and Cersobleptes your ally. Again, seeing these places neglected and unsupported by you, he demolished Porthmus, and
raised a tyrant in Euboea like a fortress against Attica. This
being disregarded, Megara was very nearly taken. You were
insensible, indifferent to all his aggressions; gave no intimation that you would not permit their continuance.  He purchased Antrones,2 and not long after had got Oreus into his
power. Many transactions I omit; Pherae, the march against
Ambracia, the massacres at Elis,3 and numberless others: for
I have not entered upon these details, to enumerate the
people whom Philip has oppressed and wronged, but to show
you that Philip will not desist from wronging all people'
and pursuing his conquests, until an effort is made to prevent
him.
There are persons whose custom it is, before they hear any
speech in the debate, to ask immediately —" What must we
do?" —not with the intention of doing what they are told,
(or they would be the most serviceable of men,) but in order
to get rid of the speaker. Nevertheless you should be advised
what to do. First, O my countrymen, you must be firmly
convinced in your minds, that Philip is at war with our
1 Auger: "presentent a la fin un total effra ant."
2 A town in Thessaly. We do not know all the details of Philip's
proceedings in that country, but we have seen enough to show, that
under the guise of a protector he was not far short of being the master
of the Thessalian people. Some of their towns were actually in his
possession, as Pherve and Pagasne. But that the Thessalians were never
entirely subjugated to Macedonia, and still retained a hankering after
independence, was proved at a later period by their desertion of Antipater.
3 The Elean exiles, having engaged in their service a body of the
Phocian mercenaries, made an irruption into Elis, but were defeated.
A large number of prisoners were taken and put to death. This happened B.C. 343. The government of Elis was at that time in the hands
of a Macedonian party.




THE FOURTH PHILIPPIC.              135
state, and has broken the peace; that, while he is inimical
and hostile to the whole of Athens, to the ground of Athens,
and I may add, to the gods in Athens, (may they exterminate
him!) there is nothing which he strives and plots against so
much as our constitution, nothing in the world that he is so
anxious about, as its destruction. And thereunto he is driven
in some sort by necessity. Consider. He wishes for empire:
he believes you to be his only opponents. He has been a
long time injuring you, as his own conscience best informs
him; for by means of your possessions, which he is able to
enjoy, he secures all the rest of his kingdom: had he given
up Amphipolis and Potidaa, he would not have deemed himself safe even in Macedonia. He knows therefore, both that
he is plotting against you, and that you are aware of it; and,
supposing you to have common sense, he judges that you
detest him as you ought. Besides these important considerations, he is assured that, though he became master of
every thing else, nothing can be safe for him while you are
under popular government: should any reverse ever befall
him, (and many may happen to a man,) all who are now
under constraint will come for refuge to you. For you are
not inclined yourselves to encroach and usurp dominion;
but famous rather for checking the usurper or depriving him
of his conquests, ever ready to molest the aspirants for empire,
and vindicate the liberty of all nations. He would not like
that a free spirit should proceed from Athens, to watch the
occasions of his weakness; nor is such reasoning foolish or
idle. First then you must assume, that he is an irreconcilable enemy of our constitution and democracy; secondly, you
must be convinced, that all his operations and contrivances
are designed for the injury of our state. None of you can be
so silly as to suppose, that Philip covets those miseries in
Thrace, (for what else can one call Drongilus and Cabyle
and Mastira and the places which he is said now to occupy?)
and that to get possession of them he endures hardships and
winters and the utmost peril, but covets not the harbors
of Athens, the docks, the galleys, the silver mines, the revenues of such value, the place and the glory —never may he
or any other man obtain these by the conquest of our city!or that he will suffer you to keep these things, while for the
sake of the barley and millet in Thracian caverns he winters




136         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
in the midst of horrors.1 Impossible. The object of that and
every other enterprise of Philip is, to become master here.
So should every man be persuaded and convinced; and
therefore, I say, should not call upon your faithful and upright
counselor to move a resolution for war:2 such were the part
of men seeking an enemy to fight with, not men forwarding
the interests of the state.  Only see.  Suppose for the first
breach of the treaty by Philip, or for the second or third, (for
there is a series of breaches,) any one had made a motion for
war with him, and Philip, just as he has now without such
motion, had aided the Cardians, would not the mover have
been sacrificed?3 would not all have imputed Philip's aid of
the Cardians to that cause? Don't then look for a person to
vent your anger on for Philip's trespasses, to throw to Philip's
hirelings to be torn in pieces. Do not, after yourselves voting
for war, dispute with each other, whether you ought or ought
not to have done so.  As Philip conducts the war, so resist
him: furnish those who are resisting him now4 with money
and what else they demand; pay your contributions, men of
Athens, provide an army, swift-sailing galleys, horses, transports, all the materials of war. Our present mode of operation is ridiculous; and by the gods I believe, that Philip
could not wish our republic to take any other course than.
what ye now pursue. You miss your time, waste your money,
look for a person to manage your affairs, are discontented, accuse one another. How all this comes about, I will explain,
and how it may cease I will inform you.
Nothing, O men of Athens, have you ever set on foot or
contrived rightly in the beginning: you always follow the
event, stop when yoa are too late, on any new occurrence
prepare and bustle again. But that is not the way of proceeding. It is never possible with sudden levies to perform
1 See the note in the Oration on the Chersonese, page 108, where the
same words nearly are repeated,
2 He deprecates here, as elsewhere, the factious proceedings of certain opponents, who sought to fasten the responsibility of a war on the
orator, by forcing him to propose a decree. This (argues Demosthenes)
was unnecessary, as they were at war already.
3 Pabst, following Wolf, takes this in the more limited sense of being
carried off to prison: ins Gefdngniss geworfen. Tile English t)gnslators, who have "torn to pieces," understand the word in the samle sense
that I do, as meaning generally "destroyed, exterminated."' Referring to Diopithes and his troops in the Chersonese.




THE FOURTH PHILIPPIC.              137
any essential service. You must establish an army, provide
maintenance for it, and paymasters, and commissaries, so ordering it that the strictest care be taken of your funds; demand from those officers an account of the expenditure, from
your general an account of the campaign; and leave not the
general any excuse for sailing elsewhere or prosecuting another enterprise. If ye so act and so resolve in earnest, you will
compel Philip to observe a just peace and remain in his own
country, or will contend with him on equal terms; and perhaps, Athenians, perhaps, as you now inquire what Philip is
doing, and whither marching, so he may be anxious to learn,
whither the troops of Athens are bound, and where they will
make their appearance.
Should any man think that these are affairs of great expense
and toil and difficulty, he thinks rightly enough: but let him
consider what the consequences to Athens must be, if she refuse so to act, and he will find it is our interest to perform our
duties cheerfully. Suppose you had some god for your surety
-for certainly no mortal could guarantee a thing so fortunate
-that, although you kept quiet and sacrificed every thing,
Philip would not attack you at last, yet, by Jupiter and all
the gods, it would be disgraceful, unworthy of yourselves, of
the dignity of your state, and the deeds of your ancestors, for
the sake of selfish indolence to abandon the rest of Greece to
servitude. For my part, I would rather die than have advised such a course: however, if any other man advises it,
and can prevail on you, be it so; make no defense, abandon
all. But if no man holds such an opinion, if on the contrary
we all foresee, that, the more we permit Philip to conquer,
the more fierce and formidable an enemy we shall find him,
what subterfuge remains? what excuse for delay?  Or when,
O Athenians, shall we be willing to act as becomes us? Peradventure, when there is some necessity. But what may be
called the necessity of freemen is not only come, but past long
ago; and that of slaves you must surely deprecate. What
is the difference?  To a freeman shame for what is occurring
is the strongest necessity; I know of none stronger that can
be mentioned: to a slave, stripes and bodily chastisement;
abominable things! too shocking to name!
To be backward, men of Athens, in performing those services to which the person and property of every one are liable,




138         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
is wrong, very wrong, and yet it admits of some excuse: but
refusing even to hear what is necessary to be heard, and fit
to be considered, this calls for the severest censure. Your
practice however is, neither to attend until the business actually presses, as it does now, nor to deliberate about any thing
at leisure. When Philip is preparing, you, instead of doing
the like and making counter-preparation, remain listless, and,
if any one speaks a word, clamor him down: when you receive
news that any place is lost or besieged, then you listen and
prepare. But the time to have heard and consulted was then
when you declined; the time to act and employ your preparations is now that you are hearing. Such being your habits,
you are the only people who adopt this singular course: others deliberate usually before action, you deliberate after action.
One thing' remains, which should have been done long
ago, but even yet is not too late: I will mention it. Nothing in the world does Athens need so much, as money for
approaching exigencies. Lucky events have occurred, and,
if we rightly improve them, perhaps good service may be
done. In the first place, those,2 whom the king trusts and
regards as his benefactors, are at enmity and war with Philip.
Secondly, the agent and confidant3 of all Philip's preparations
against the king has been snatched off, and the king will hear
all the proceedings, not from Athenian accusers, whom he
might consider to be speaking for their own interests, but
from the acting minister himself; the charges therefore will
be credible, and the only remaining argument for our embassadors will be, one which the Persian monarch will rejoice to
hear, that we should take common vengeance on the injurer
of both, and that Philip is much more formidable to the king,
if he attack us first; for, should we be left in the lurch and
suffer any mishap, he will march against the king without
He means negotiation with Persia, to obtain pecuniary assistance.
2 The Thracians, who had always been regarded as benefactors of
the Persian king, since they assisted Darius on his invasion of Scythia.
Philip was making war in Thrace at this time, and had subjected a
considerable part of the country.
3 Hermias, governor of Atarneus in Mysia, who for his treasonable
practices against Artaxerxes was seized by Mentor and sent in chains
to Susa, where he was put to death. He was a friend of Aristotle, who
was at his court, when he was taken prisoner. The philosopher afterward married his sister.




THE FOURTH PHILIPPIC.                 139
fear. On all these matters then I advise that you dispatch
an embassy to confer with the king, and put aside that nonsense which has so often damaged you-" the barbarian,"
forsooth, "the common enemy"-and the like.  I confess,
when I see a man alarmed at a prince in Susa and Ecbatana,
and declaring him to be an enemy of Athens, him that formerly1 assisted in re-establishing her power, and lately made
overtures2-if you did not accept them, but voted refusal,
the fault is not his —while the same man speaks a different language of one who is close at our doors, and growing
up in the centre of Greece to be the plunderer of her people;
I marvel, I dread this man, whoever he is, because he dreads
not Philip.
There is another thing too, the attacking of which by
unjust reproach and improper language hurts the state, and
affords an excuse to men who are unwilling to perform any
public duty: indeed you will find that every failure to discharge the obligation of a citizen is attributable to this. I
am really afraid to discuss the matter; however, I will speak
out.
I believe I can suggest, for the advantage of the state, a
plea for the poor against the rich, and for men of property
against the indigent; could we remove the clamor which
some persons unfairly raise about the theatric fund,3 and the
In the confederate war, when the Persian fleet enabled Conon to
defeat the Lacedaemonians at Cnidus, m.c. 394.
2 Artaxerxes had applied both to Athens and Lacedaemon to aid him
in the recovery of Egypt, which for many years had been held in a
state of revolt. Both these states refused to assist him. He then applied to Thebes and Argos, each of which sent an auxiliary force.
3 Boeckh, Schaefer, and others, regard it as conclusive against the
genuineness of this Oration, that a different view is here taken on the
subject of the Theoric fund from that which Demosthenes had expressed
in the Olynthiacs. And certainly it is a strong argument. It is possible, however, that circumstances may have induced him to modify his
opinion, or he may have thought it dangerous to meddle with the law
of Eubulus at the present crisis, which called for the greatest unanimity among all classes. We may partly gather from this speech, that
there had been some agitation among the lower classes, occasioned by
the complaints of the wealthy against this law. Any agitation tending to a spirit of communism must have been extremely dangerous at
Athens, where the people had such power of muleting the higher
classes by their votes in the popular assembly and courts of justice. It
might therefore be better to let the people alone with their theatrical




140          THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
fear that it can not stand without some signal mischief. No
greater help to our affairs could we introduce;I none that
would more strengthen the whole community. Look at it
thus.   I will commence on behalf of those who are considered the needy class.  There was a time with us, not long
ago, when only a hundred and thirty talents came into the
state;2 and among the persons qualified to command ships
or pay property-tax, there was not one who claimed exemption from his duty because no surplus existed:3 galleys
sailed, money was forthcoming, every thing needful was done.
Since that time fortune happily has increased the revenue,
and four hundred talents come in instead of one, without loss
to any men of property, but with gain to them; for all the
wealthy come for their share of the fund, and they are
welcome to it.4  Why then do we reproach one another on
this account, and make it an excuse for declining our duties,
unless we grudge the relief given by fortune to the poor?  I
would be sorry to blame them myself, and I think it not
right. In private families I never see a young man behaving
treats, their fees and largesses, than to provoke retaliation by abridging
such enjoyments. Leland observes on the subject as foliows- "All
that the orator here says in defense of the theatrical appointments is
expressed with a caution and reserve quite opposite to his usual openness and freedom; and which plainly betray a consciousness of his being inconsistent with his former sentiments. I-ow far he may be excused by the supposed necessity of yielding to the violent prepossessions
of the people, and giving up a favorite point, I can not pretend to
determine. But it is certainly not very honorable to Demosthenes, to
suppose with Ulpian, that his former opposition was merely personal,
and that the death of Eubulus now put an end to it.'"
1 Viz., than the removal of this clamor and alarm about the theatric
fund.
2 This must be understood (according to Boeckh) of the tribute only,
which came in from the allies. The total revenue of Athens must have
greatly exceeded this.
3 There was as much ground for legal exemption then as there is
now; and yet it was never claimed. Why should the rich seek to be
relieved from their burdens because of an abundance of revenue? That
abundance is for the general benefit of the state, not for theirs in particular. Such appears to be the argument, perhaps not quite satisfactory; but such it is. Pabst, apparently reading ad' kavro7, has: der
nicht aus eigenem Antrieb seine Schuldigkeit zu thous bereit war, weil
kein Geldiiberschuss vorhanden war.
4. e. the Theoric fund, in which every member of the commonwealth had a right to share.




THE FOURTH PHILIPPIC.                   141
so to his elders, so unfeeling or so unreasonable, as to refuse
to do alny thing himself; unless all the rest will do what he
does.  Such a person would certainly be amenable to the
laws against undutiful conduct:' for I ween there is a tribute
assigned to parents both by nature and by law, which ought
to be cheerfully offered and amply paid. Accordingly, as
each individual among us hath a parent, so should we regard
the whole people as parents of the state, and, so far from
depriving them  of what the state bestows, we ought, in the
absence of such bounty, to find other means to keep them
from  destitution.  If the rich will adopt this principle, I
think they will act both justly and wisely; for to deprive any
class of a necessary provision, is to unite them in disaffection
to the commonwealth.
To the poor I would recommend, that they remove the
cause, which makes men of property discontented with the
present system, and excites their just complaints. I shall
take the same course on behalf of the wealthy as I did just
now, and not hesitate to speak the truth.  There can not, I
believe, be found a wretch so hard-hearted-I will not say
among Athenians, but among any other people-who would
be sorry to see poor men, men without the necessaries of life,
receiving these bounties.  Where then is the pinch2 of the
matter? where the difficulty?  When they see certain persons
transferring the usage established for the public revenue to
private property, and the orator becoming immediately powerful with you, yea, (so far as privilege can make him,) imnmortal, and your secret vote contradicting your public clam1 Pabst: die Gesetze weger ungebiihrlicher Behandlung der Eltern.
KdKicwat, " maltreatment," was a technical term in the Attic law, denoting a failure of duty on the part of husbands, children, or guardians,
toward their wives, parents, or wards, for which they were liable to be
tried and punished in a suit called KaKej6eofd diKr. The jurisdiction
over this offense belonged to the Archon, who was the protector of all
family rights.
2 The expression " Where is the rub?" would be still nearer to the
original, and the expression reminds one of the line in Hamlet:
To sleep! perchance to dream! ay, there's the rub.
Reiske says the simile is taken from the collision of chariots in the
race; but this is confining it too much. His vernacular explanation
is: woran stdsst es sich? wo ist der Haken?  Pabst has: woran stbst
sich die Sache, und was erzeugt dean Verdruss?




142         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
or.l  Hence arises mistrust, hence indignation.  We ought,
O ye men of Athens, to have a just communion of political
rights; the opulent holding themselves secure in their fortunes, and without fear of losing them, yet in time of danger imparting their substance freely for the defense of their
country; while the rest consider the public revenue as public,
and receive their share, but look on private property as belonging to the individual owner. Thus it is that a small commonwealth becomes great, and a great one is preserved. To speak
generally then, such are the obligations of each class; to insure their performance according to law, some regulation
should be made.
The causes of our present troubles and embarrassment are
many and of ancient date: if you are willing to hear, I will
declare them. You have quitted, O Athenians, the position
in which your ancestors left you; you have been persuaded
by these politicians, that to stand foremost of the GCreeks, to
keep a permanent force and redress injured nations, is all
vanity and idle expense; you imagine that to live in quiet, to
perform no duty, to abandon one thing after another and let
strangers seize on all, brings with it marvelous welfare and
abundant security. By such means a stranger has advanced
I Having admonished the higher classes to pay their property-tax
and perform their public services cheerfully, and without seeking to
be relieved at the expense of the public revenue, he proceeds to remind the lower classes of their duty. He warns them, that, while
they receive a benefit from the funds of the state, they must not endeavor to increase those funds unduly by an invasion of the rights
of property. His language is not open, but would easily be understood by his audience. The Athenians ought not to promote lawsuits to increase court-fees; not to encourage prosecutions against
wealthy citizens, ill order to obtain fines and confiscations. He insinuates that there was too much cause for complaint already. Tbv
Zeeyovra is, not as Schaefer contends, the rich man pleading his cause
before the people, but, as Wolf explains it, the popular orator or informer, who speedily rose to favor and influence, of which it was not
easy to deprive him. His opponent, speaking in a just cause, might be
applauded at the time, but the votes showed what was the real bias of
the people. In courts of justice at Athens the voting was usually by a
secret ballot; (see my article Psephus in the Archeological Dictionary;)
and there being a large number of jurors, it would be difficult to discover by whose votes the verdict was obtained. It is impossible to
read the frequent appeals made by Athenian speakers to the passions
and prejudices of the jury, without seeing that there was some ground
for the insinuations of the orator in this passage.




THE FOURTH PHILIPPIC.               143
to the post which you ought to have occupied, has become
prosperous and great, and made large conquests; naturally
enough. A prize there was, noble, great, and glorious, one
for which the mightiest states were contending all along; but
as the Lacedecmonians were humbled, the Thebans had their
hands full through the Phocian war, and we took no regard,
he carried it off without competition. The result has been,
to others terror, to him a vast alliance and extended power;
while difficulties so many and so distressing surround the
Greeks, that even advice is not easy to be found.
Yet, perilous as I conceive the present crisis to be for all,
no people are in such danger as you, men of Athens; not
only because Philip's designs are especially aimed at you, but
because of all people you are the most remiss. If, seeing the
abundance of commodities and cheapness in your market,
you are beguiled into a belief that the state is in no danger,
your judgment is neither becoming nor correct. A market
or a fair one may, from such appearances, judge to be well or
ill supplied: but for a state, which every aspirant for the
empire of Greece has deemed to be alone capable of opposing
him, and defending the liberty of all- for such a state!
verily her marketable commodities are not the test of prosperity, but this-whether she can depend on the good-will of
her allies; whether she is puissant in arms. On behalf of
such a state these are the things to be considered; and in
these respects your condition is wretched and deplorable.
You will understand it by a simple reflection. When have
the affairs of Greece been in the greatest confusion? No
other time could any man point out but the present. In
former times Greece was divided into two parties, that of the
Lacedaemonians and ours: some of the Greeks were subject
to us, some to them. The Persian, on his own account, was
mistrusted equally by all, but he used to make friends of the
vanquished parties, and retain their confidence, until he put
them on an equality with the other side; after which those
that he succored would hate him as much as his original
enemies. Now however the king is on friendly terms with
all the Greeks, though least friendly with us, unless we put
matters right. Now too there are protectors' springing up
1 This is said with some irony: many states offer to come forward as
protectors, but only on condition of taking the lead: they will not join




144         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
in every quarter, and all claim the precedency, though some
indeed have abandoned the cause, or envy and distrust each
other-more shame for them-and every state is isolated,
Argives, Thebans, Lacedaemonians, Corinthians, Arcadians,
and ourselves.  But, divided as Greece is among so many
parties and so many leaderships, if I must speak the truth
freely, there is no state whose offices and halls of council
appear more deserted by Grecian politics than ours. And
no wonder; when neither friendship, nor confidence, nor fear
leads any to negotiate with us.
This, ye men of Athens, has come not from any single
cause, (or you might easily mend it,) but from a great variety
and long series of errors. I will not stop to recount them,
but will mention one, to which all may be referred, beseeching you not to be offended, if I boldly speak the truth.
Your interests are sold on every favorable opportunity:
you partake of the idleness and ease, under the charm
-!eroof you resent not your wrongs; while other persons
get the reward.'  Into all these cases I could not enter now:
but when any question about Philip arises, some one starts up
directly and says-" We must have no trifling, no proposal of
war" —and then goes on to say —" What a blessing it is to
be at peace! what a grievance to maintain a large army!"and again-" Certain persons wish to plunder the treasury"and other arguments they urge, no doubt, in the full conviction of their truth.2  But surely there is no need of persuading you to observe peace, you that sit here persuaded
already. It is Philip (who is making war) that needs persuasion: prevail on him, and all is ready on your part. We
should consider as grievous, not what we expend for our
the common cause on fair terms. Many of the translations miss the
sense here. Leland understands it rightly: "there are several cities
which affect the character of guardians and protectors." Auger confounds this sentence with the next: " il s' 6leve de tous c8tes plusieurs
puissances qui aspirent toutes a la primaut6."
1 Schaefer rightly explains rt/aCi to mean the price received for treason. But most of the translators, following Wolf, understand it to
mean the honors won by Philip. ToZi ddtcKOVatV is rendered by Auger,
Leland, and Francis, " the traitors."  I think it rather refers to, or at
least includes, the enemies who profited by the treason, and made conquests from Athens: of course meaning Philip in particular.
2 There is no difficulty in this, if we understand it to be ironical;
and no need of any amendment.




THE FOURTH PHILIPPIC.                145
deliverance, but what we shall suffer in case of refusal. Plunder of the treasury should be prevented by devising a plan for
its safe custody, not by abandoning our interests. Yet this
very thing makes me indignant, that some of you are pained
at the thought of your treasury being robbed, though it depends on yourselves to guard it and to punish the criminal, but
are not pained to see Philip plundering Greece, plundering as
he does one people after another, to forward his designs upon
you.
How comes it, ye men of Athens, that of this flagrant aggressor, this capturer of cities, no one has ever declared that
he commits hostility or injustice, while those who counsel
against submission and sacrifice are charged as the authors of
war? The reason is, that people wish to cast upon your faithful counselors the blame of any untoward events in the war;
for war must necessarily be attended with many misfortunes.
They believe that, if you resist Philip with one heart and mind,
you will prevail against him, and they can be hirelings no longer; but that if on the first outcry' you arraign certain persons
and bring them to trial, they by accusing such persons. will
gain a double advantage, repute among the Athenians and recompense from Philip; and that you will punish your friendly
advisers for a cause for which you ought to punish the traitors. Such are the hopes, such the contrivance of these charges,
"that certain persons wish to kindle a war."  I am sure, however, that, without any Athenian moving a declaration of war,
Philip has taken many of our possessions, and has recently sent
succor to Cqrdia.  If we choose to assume that he is not
making war against us, he would be the simplest of mankind
to convince us of our mistake: for when the sufferers disclaim
the injury, what should the offenders do?   But when he
marches to attack us, what shall we say then? He will assure us that he is not making war, as he assured the Orites,
when his troops were in their country, as he assured the Pherwmans before he assaulted their walls, and the Olynthians in
the first instance, until he was in their territories with his
army. Shall we then say, that persons who bid us defend our-' Leland: "the first unhappy accident." Francis gives the right
meaning, but with too many words; " the first tumults occasioned by
any unfortunate success." Spillan: "the first alarm."
Vor. I.- G.




146        THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
selves kindle a war?  If so, we must be slaves; for nothing
else remains.
But remember: you have more at stake than some other
people. Philip desires not to subjugate your city, but to destroy it utterly. He is convinced, you will not submit to be
slaves; if you were inclined, you would not know how, having
been accustomed to command: you will be able, should occasion offer, to give him more trouble than any people in the
world. For this reason he will show us no mercy, if he get
us into his power: and therefore you must make up your
minds, that the struggle will be one for life and death. These
persons, who have openly sold themselves to Philip, you must
execrate, you must beat their brains out: for it is impossible,
I say impossible, to vanquish your foreign enemies, until you
have punished your enemies within the city: these are the
stumbling-blocks that must cripple your efforts against the foreigner.
From what cause, do ye think, Philip insults you now; (for
his conduct, in my judgment, amounts to nothing less;) and
while he deceives other people by doing them services —this at
least is something-you he threatens already? For example,
the Thessalians by many benefits he seduced into their present
servitude: no man can tell how he cheated the poor Olynthians, giving them first Potidea' and many other places: now
he is luring the Thebans, having delivered up Bceotia to them,
and freed them from a tedious and harassing war. Of these
people, who each got a certain advantage, some have suffered
what is notorious to all, others have yet to suffer what may
befall them. As to yourselves; the amount of your losses I do
not mention: but in the very making of the peace how have
you been deceived! how plundered! Lost you not the Phocians, Thermopylse, country toward Thrace, Doriscus, Serrium, Cersobleptes himself? Holds he not Cardia now, and
avows it?  Why then does he behave thus to other people,
and in a different way to you? Because our city is the only
one where liberty is allowed to speak for the enemy, where a
man taking a bribe may safely address the people, though they
have been deprived of their possessions. It was not safe at
Olynthus to advocate Philip's cause, without the Olynthian
people sharing the benefit by possession of Potidoea. It was
sot safe to advocate Philip's cause in Thessaly, without




THE FOURTH PHILIPPIC.                  147
the people of Thessaly sharing the benefit, by Philip's expelling their tyrants and restoring the Pylaean Synod.  It
was not safe at Thebes, until he restored Boeotia to them,
and destroyed the Phocians. But at Athens, though Philip
has taken from you Amphipolis and the Cardian territory,
and is even turning Euboea into a hostile post, and advancing
to attack Byzantium, it is safe to speak on Philip's behalf.
Yea, among these men, some have risen rapidly from poverty to wealth, from meanness and obscurity to repute and
honor, while you, on the contrary, have fallen from  honor
to obscurity, from wealth to indigence. For the riches of
a state I consider to be allies, confidence, good-will; of all
which you are destitute. And by your neglecting these
things and suffering your interests thus to be swept away,
Philip has grown prosperous and mighty, formidable to all
the Greeks and barbarians, while you are forlorn and abject,
in the abundance of your market magnificent, but in your
national defenses ridiculous.l
Some of our orators, I observe, take not the same thought
for you as for themselves. They say that you should keep
quiet, though you are injured; but they can not themselves
keep quiet among you, though no one injures them.  Come,
raillery apart, suppose you were thus questioned, Aristodemus,2-"m Tell me, as you know perfectly well, what every one
else knows, that the life of private men is secure and free
from trouble and danger, while that of statesmen is exposed
to scandal3 and misfortune, full of trials and hardships every
1 The whole of the foregoing passage is taken, with some little variation, from the speech on the Chersonese. It certainly would seem
strange, if this Oration had been forged by any grammarian, that he
should have borrowed thus by wholesale from Demosthenes. There is
perhaps less difficulty in the supposition that Demosthenes repeated
his own words.
2 This man was a tragic actor, and charged by Demosthenes with
being a partisan of Philip. He was the first person who proposed
peace with Macedonia, shortly before the embassy of ten. See the
Argument to the Oration on the Peace.
3 I have taken XatrciTLov in the passive sense, as it is explained by
Reiske and Schaefer, though it scarcely suits the character of the word.
Compare Shakspeare, Henry V. Act IV. Sc. 1.
O hard condition, twin-born with greatness,
Subjected to the breath of every fool I
What infinite heart's ease must kings neglect,
That private men enjoy I




148        THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
day, how comes it that you prefer, not the quiet and easy
lifb, but the one surrounded with peril?"-;-what should you
say?  If we admitted the truth of what would be your
best possible answer, namely, that all you do is for honor
and renown, I wonder what puts it into your head, that you
ought from such motives to exert yourself and undergo toil
and danger, while you advise the state to give up exertion
and remain idle. You can not surely allege, that Aristodemus ought to be of importance at Athens, and Athens to be
of no account among the Greeks. Nor again do I see, that
for the commonwealth it is safe to mind her own affairs only,
and hazardous for you, not to be a superlative busy-body.'
On the contrary, to you I see the utmost peril from your
meddling and over-meddling, to the commonwealth peril from
her inactivity. But I suppose, you inherit a reputation from
your father and grandfather, which it were disgraceful in
your own person to extinguish, whereas the ancestry of the
state was ignoble and mean. This again is not so. Your
father was a thief,2 if he resembled you, whereas by the ancestors of the commonwealth, as all men know, the Greeks
have twice been rescued from the brink of destruction. Truly
the behaviour of some persons, in private and in public,
is neither equitable nor constitutional. How is it equitable,
that certain of these men, returned from prison, should not
know themselves, while the state, that once protected all
Greece and held the foremost place, is sunk in ignominy and
humiliation?
Much could I add on many points, but I will forbear. It
is not, I believe, to lack of words that our distresses have
been owing either now or heretofore. The mischief is when
you, after listening to sound arguments, and all agreeing in
their justice, sit to hear with equal favor those who try to
defeat and pervert them; not that you are ignorant of the
men; (you are certain at the first glance, who speak for hire
and are Philip's political agents, and who speak sincerely for
I All the translators have mistaken 7d-v Jci2 av 7r2:ov, which is simply " more than others," as Wolf explains it.
2 This seems to shock Leland, who spoils the pungency of the expression by rendering it: " Your father was like you, and therefore base
and infamous." Auger remarks: "L'invective de Demosthene est fort
6loquente, mais bien violente. L'amour de la patrie, contre laquelle
sans doute agissait Aristod~me, peut seul en excuser la vivacit6."




ON THE LETTER.                      149
your good;) your object is to find fault with these, turn the
thing into laughter and raillery, and escape the performance
of your duty.
Such is thd truth, spoken with perfect freedom, purely
from good-will and for the best: not a speech fraught with
flattery and mischief and deceit, to  earn money for the
speaker, and to put the commonwealth into the hands of our
enemies. I say, you must either desist from these practices,
or blame none but yourselves for the wretched condition of
your affairs.
THE ORATION OF THE LETTER.
THE ARGUMENT.
The Athenians had been persuaded by the advice of Demosthenes to
solicit the aid of Persia. This was accorded, and events had happened on the Propontine coast, which made it peculiarly needful.
Toward the close of the year B.c. 342 Philip commenced the siege
of Selymbria, and early in the following year, that city having been
taken, laid siege to Perinthus. But here he met with an obstinate
resistance: Perinthus was strong by nature and well fortified. The
satraps of Western Asia had supplied it with a stock of provisions
and ammunition, and a large body of Greek mercenaries. Byzantium also had sent assistance. Philip, after making great efforts to
take Perinthus by storm, turned the siege into a blockade, and
marched northward against Byzantium. Here he was no more
successful than he had been at Perinthus. The Byzantines had well
prepared themselves to resist his attack, and received powerful aid
not only from their old allies of Cos, Chios, and Rhodes, but also
from other parts of Greece, and especially from Athens. In order to
reconcile the Byzantines to his countrymen, with whom they had
been at variance ever since the Social war, Demosthenes himself
undertook a voyage to the Bosphorus. By his exertions an alliance
was concluded, and an Athenian fleet was sent under the command
of Chares; but Chares being feared and disliked by the Byzantines,
they refused to admit him into the town; and afterward Phocion
was dispatched with a hundred and twenty ships and a considerable
body of troops. The result of these effective measures was, that
Philip was baffled in his attempts on both cities, and compelled to
raise the siege.
In the mean time important operations had taken place elsewhere.
An expedition had been sent under the command of Phocion to Eubcea, of which we have no detailed account, but the result was, that




150          THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
the Macedonian party was overpowered, and Clitarchus and Philistides, the partisans of Philip, were expelled from the island. A fleet
was then sent by the Athenians into the Pagasnean bay, which took
some Thessalian towns, and seized Macedonian merchant-men on the
coast. The island of Halonnesus was recovered from Philip by a.
sudden incursion of the Peparethians. This was revenged by Philip,
who ravaged Peparethus, and compelled the islanders to restore their
conquest.
Philip saw that peace with Athens could no longer be preserved even
in name. Under this conviction, and not, as Mitford says, in alarm
at the fourth Philippic, he wrote a letter to the Athenians, (the letter which follows this Oration,) in which he reproaches them with the
various acts of hostility which they had committed, and concludes
with a virtual declaration of war. An assembly was held, at which
this letter was read, and Demosthenes is supposed to have delivered
the following speech in reply to it. The exact time when the letter
was received is uncertain; but it would appear from the internal
evidence, to have been after the siege of Perinthus had commenced,
and before that of Byzantium. The arguments of Philip produced
no effect; things had gone too far for reconciliation; and it was not
difficult for Demosthenes to obtain a decree for the vigorous prosecution of the war.
It will be seen on a perusal of the letter and answer, that the orator
does not attempt to meet the specific charges and complaints of
Philip. We have nothing but the old arguments, showing the necessity of succoring Perinthus and Byzantium, as formerly of succoring Olynthus; the real weakness of Philip's empire, and the good
chance that by vigorous measures it might be overturned. Mitford
considers that it was impossible to confute the reasoning of Philip,
and therefore that bold invective was the only thing that remained
for the orator. And even Leland says, it would have been difficult
to answer the letter particularly, because, though Athens had the
better cause, she had committed many irrlegularities. I can not agree
with this view of the question. If Philip had been the good-natured,
easy person that Mitford represents, who was raised to the surface
of Greek affairs by the merest accidents, and rather had greatness
thrust upon him by the opposition of the Athenians, than either
sought or desired it himself, then indeed the acts of hostility which
Philip complains of might justly be regarded as breaches of good
faith, and violations by Athens of the law of nations. But I read
the history of the times very differently. Philip had been for many
years pursuing his career of conquest steadily and successfully. The
Chersonese, Eubcea, all the possessions of the Athenians, their commerce and their corn-trade, were at this time in imminent danger.
War between Athens and Macedonia, if not open, was understood:
argument was out of the question.
But why should Philip address a letter of complaint to a people so bent
on hostilities.  Why did the wolf complain of the lamb? An aggressive power has never lacked a pretext for making war in either
ancient times or modern. It was a part of Philip's system, not only
in his dealings with Athens, but with other states, to make friendly




ON THE LETTER.                      151
overtures and pacific professions, when he meditated some decisive
blow. By this means he gained credit for moderation with neutral
states, and he created a party for himself within the state which he
had designs upon. He put colorable arguments into the mouths of
his adherents, distracted the efforts of the people, and at all events
gained time for the prosecution of his schemes. It is argued with
much force and justice in the exordium of the Oration on Halonnesus, that the tendency of such correspondence was, to deter the
adversaries of Philip from expressing their opinions freely.
But for motives of this kind, Philip would hardly have adopted the
strain of remonstrance which we read in the Letter. He could never
seriously believe, that the Athenians would resign their claims on
Amphipolis, because it belonged to Macedonia in very early times, or
would give up the Persian alliance because it was a disgraceful connection. It should be observed, however, that the Athenians afforded him a handle for using such arguments, by declaiming in the
same style themselves when it suited them; and Philip perhaps was
pleased at the idea of beating them with their own weapons. The
language of the epistle is simple and dignified, and may be regarded
as a good specimen of a diplomatic paper. The pith lies in the last
clause, which contains a threat of war.
For these reasons it could scarcely have been worth while for the orator, to answer every particular charge contained in the Letter. Nor
can such omission be deemed an argument against the genuineness of
the Oration. This, however, hIas been doubted by many critics; and
it may be allowed, that a good part of the speech is not very suitable to the occasion upon which it purports to have been spoken.
ATHE-NIANS! that Philip, instead of concluding peace with
us, only deferred the war, has now become manifest to you
all.  Ever since he gave Halus to the Pharsalians,' and
settled the Phocian business, and subdued all Thrace, making
fictitious charges and inventing unjust pretexts, he has been
actually carrying on war against Athens; and now in the
letter which he has sent he avowedly declares it.  That it
becomes you, neither to fear his power nor to withstand him
ignobly, but with men li~d money and ships, in short, with
all you have unsparingly to prosecute the war, I will endeavor
to show.
In the first place, O Athenians, you may expect that the
gods are your greatest allies and defenders, when Philip,
violating his faith and disregarding his oaths to them, has
Parmenio was besieging Halus in Thessaly during the first embassy
of the Athenians for peace. Philip told the embassadors, he desired
their mediation between the people of Halus and Pharsalus. He afterward took the former city, and gave it up to the Pharsalians, who were
his devoted allies.




152        THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
perfidiously broken the peace. In the second place, he has
exhausted all the tricks by which he once rose to greatness,
continually deceiving some people and promising them signal
benefits. It is understood by the Perinthians and Byzantines
and their allies, that he wishes to deal with them in the same
manner that he dealt with the Olynthians formerly: it escapes not the Thessalians, that he designs to be the master
of his allies and not their chief: he is suspected by the Thebans, for holding Nicaeal with a garrison, for having crept
into the Amphictyonic council, for drawing to himself the
embassies from Peloponnesus,2 and stealing their confederacy
from them: so that of his former friends some are at war
with him irreconcilably, some are no longer hearty auxiliaries,
all are jealous and complaining of him.  Besides-what is of'
no small moment-the satraps of Asia have just thrown in
mercenary troops for the relief of Perinthus, and now that
hostility has begun between them, and the peril is imminent
if Byzantium should be reduced, not only will they assist us
with alacrity themselves, but they will urge the Persian king
to supply us with money; and he possesses greater  wealth
than all nations put together; he has such influence over
proceedings here, that in our former wars with Lacedaemon,
whichsoever side he joined, he caused them to vanquish their
opponents, and now siding with us he will easily beat down
the power of Philip.
With these advantages, I will not deny, that Philip has
by favor of the peace snatched from us many fortresses and
harbors and other like conveniences for war; yet I observe,
that if an alliance is consolidated by good-will, and all who
take part in the wars have a common interest, the union is
firm and lasting; whereas, if it be kept up by deceit and
violence, with insidious and ambitious views, (as this of
On account of its neighborhood to the pass of Thermopylie.
2 The Messenians and'Arcadians. See the Argument to the second
Philippic. Those people had been the allies of the Thebans since the
time of Epaminondas, but were now more inclined to Philip, as being
better atble to protect them. Jacobs renders the following words: und
ein Biirdniss mit Jenen beabsichtigt hat, reading rrpoatpot/uevog. Mitford, who in his history of Greece has given a full translation of Philip's
letter and the speech in answer, renders this passage vaguely: "The
Peloponnesians he requires to attend him by their embassies, and to
make their alliance with him exclusive."




ON THE LETTER.                     153
Philip is,) any slight pretense, any accidental failure, shakes
to pieces and destroys it all in a moment.' And by much
consideration, men of Athens, I find, not only that the allies
of Philip have come to distrust and dislike him, but that
even his own subjects are not well-disposed or loyal, or what
people imagine.  Generally speaking, the Macedonian power,
as an auxiliary,2 is important and useful, but by itself it is
feeble, and ridiculously disproportioned to these gigantic
enterprises. Moreover this very man by his wars, his expeditions, and all the proceedings which may seem to establish
his greatness, has rendered it more precarious for himself.
Don't suppose, men of Athens, that Philip and his subjects
delight in the same things. Bear in mind, that he desires
glory, they security; he cannot gain his object without
hazard; they want not to leave parents, wives, and children
at home, to wear themselves out and risk their lives for him
every day.3
Hence one may judge, what the feelings of the Macedonian
people toward Philip are. As to his guards and the leaders
of his mercenaries, you will find they have a reputation for
courage, yet live in greater terror than men of no repute.
For those are in danger only from the enemy; these fear
flatterers and calumniators more than battles: those together
with the whole army fight their opponents in the field;
these have their full share in the hardships of war, and it is
also their peculiar lot to dread the humors of the king.
Besides, if any common soldier does wrong, he is punished
according to his desert; buit with these men, it is when they
have achieved the most signal success that they are most
outrageously vilified and abused. No reasonable man can disbelieve this statement; for he is reported by those who have
1 Compare the second Olynthiac, p. 47, where this same passage occurs with some variation.
2 The following is Mitford's translation of this passage —" The Macedonian power is become considerable by accretion. Of itself it is weak,
and utterly unproportioned to support the authority which must ultimately rest on it." This is a strange mistake. Jacobs' version is:Kann zwar die makedonische Macht als Zugabe einen Ausschlaq geben,
an sich uber ist sie schwach, und in Kiicksicht auf die Grdsse der Sache
verachtlich.
3 Many of these observations are applicable to France, harassed and
worn out by conscriptions in the latter part of Napoleon's reign.
G




154         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
lived with him to be so covetous of honor,l that, wishing all
the noblest exploits to be considered his own, he is more
offended with the generals and officers who have achieved
any thing praiseworthy, than with those who have altogether
miscarried.
How then, under such circumstances, have they for a long
time faithfully adhered to him? Because for the present, men
of Athens, success throws a shade over all this: good fortune
covers the faults of men, screens them wonderfully: but let
him fail in something, and all will be fully revealed. It is
the same as in the human body.  When a man is healthy, he
has no feeling of local disorders; but when he falls ill, every
sore is felt, whether he has a rupture, or a sprain, or any
member not perfectly sound. Just so with monarchies or
other states: while they are successful in war, their weaknesses are imperceptible to most men; but when they have
suffered a reverse, (which Philip very likely will, having taken
on him a burden beyond his strength,) all their difficulties become manifest to the world.
Yet if any Athenian, seeing that Philip has been fortunate,
therefore thinks it hard and terrible to contend with him,
such person, I grant, exercises a prudent forethought.  For
indeed fortune is the prime-nay, the sole mover in all the
business of mankind. Nevertheless in many respects might
our good fortune be preferred to Philip's. The leadership
that we have received from our ancestors takes its date, not
before Philip only, but (let me say roundly) before all the
kings that ever reigned in Macedonia. They have paid tribute
to the Athenians, but Athens has never paid tribute to any
nation. We have more title than Philip to the favor of the
gods, inasmuch as we have invariably shown more regard to
religion and justice.
In the similar passage, in the second Olynthiac, p. 49, I have translated t0oztoruia jealousy, not, with the majority of translators, ambition.
My reason was, that the Greek word appears to be used in a bad sense,
which would not be suitably expressed by ambition. I concede, however, thatjealousy does not comprehend the whole meaning. Nor would
any single word. Shakspeare's "jealous in honor" has a somewhat
different application. The expression in the text here is Shakspearian.
See Henry V. Act IV. Sc. 3.
But if it be a sin to covet honor,.I am the most offending soul alive.




ON THE LETTER.                    155
How comes it then, that Philip has obtained more successes
than you in the former war? Because, O men of Athens, (I
will tell you candidly,) he takes the field himself, he toils, he
faces the danger, letting slip no opportunity, omitting no
season of the year: while we-the truth must be spokensit idling here, delaying always and voting, and asking in the
market-place if there is any news. But what greater news
could there be, than a man of Macedonia contemning Athenians, and- daring to send such an epistle as you have just
heard? Again; he keeps soldiers in his pay, ay, and some
of our orators besides, who, imagining they carry his presents
home, are not ashamed to live for Philip, and perceive not,
that they are selling for petty lucre all that belongs to their
country and themselves.  We neither attempt to disturb any
of his proceedings, nor like to maintain mercenaries, nor dare
to take the field in person. It is no wonder then, that he
has gained advantages over us in the former war: it is rather,strange that we, doing nothing that becomes a people at war,
expect to vanquish one who pursues all the measures necessary
to conquest.
You must reflect on all this, men of Athens, consider that
we have not even the power of saying we are at peace-since
Philip has now declared war and commenced it in earnestspare not any treasures, public or private; march eagerly all
to battle, wherever occasion calls; and employ better generals
than before.  Let none of you suppose, that by the same
proceedings' which have damaged the commonwealth it can
again recover and improve. Imagine not, that while you are
as remiss as you have been, others will strive zealously for
your welfare:  Bear in mind how disgraceful it is, that your
fathers underwent numerous hardships and fearful dangers
warring with the Lacedemonians, while you will not courageously defend even the well-earned honors which they bequeathed you; and that a man springing from Miacedonia is
so enamored of danger, that, to enlarge his empire, he has
Auger and the English translators take dt' cGv-da& -roVr1ov to mean
persons, supposing yap to refer only to the last clause of the preceding
sentence. I understand yap as referring to the whole of the orator's
advice, not to the last point only. The reader will find that in the
similar passage in the second Olynthiac (26, Bekker's edition) the words
rnov avrS-iv rp6(ieov are introduced: which makes it more probable that
rovrTov here is neuter. Jacobs and Pabst take it as I do.




156         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
been wounded all over his body fighting with the enemy,
while Athenians, whose birthright it is to submit to none
but to conquer all in war, through slackness or effeminacy
desert the conduct of their ancestors and the interests of their
country.
Not to be tedious, I say we must all prepare ourselves for
war; the Greeks we must invite, not by words but by deeds,
to espouse our alliance. All speech is idle, unattended by action; and Athenian speech the more so on this account, that
we are reputed more dexterous in the use of it than any of the
Greeks.
THE LETTER OF PHILIP.
THE ARGUMENT.
This is the Letter to which the preceding Oration purports to be a
reply. For the circumstances which gave rise to it, see the Argument of the Oration.
PHILIP to the senate and people of Athens greeting:Whereas I have frequently sent embassadors, that we may
abide by our oaths and agreements, and you paid them no regard, I thought proper to write to you concerning the matters
in which I consider myself aggrieved.  Marvel not at the
length of this epistle; for, there being many articles of complaint, it is necessary to explain myself clearly upon all.
First then; after Nicias the herald was snatched from my
dominions, you chastised not the culprits, but imprisoned the
injured party for ten months; and my letters, of which he was
the bearer, you read on the hustings.1
Secondly, when the Thasians were receiving in their port
the Byzantine galleys and all pirates that chose to enter, you
took no notice, although the treaty expressly declares, that
whoever act thus shall be enemies.
Again, about the same time Diopithes made an irruption' It is mentioned by Plutarch that a letter from Philip to hisQueen
Olympias, which fell into the hands of the Athenians, was returned
unopened. But whether it was on this or another occasion, does not
appear.




THE LETTER OF PHILIP.                   157
into my territory, carried off the inhabitants of Crobyle and
Tiristasis' for slaves, and ravaged the adjacent parts of Thrace;
proceeding to such lawless extremities, that he seized Amphilochus who came to negotiate about the prisoners, and, after
putting on him the hardest durance, took from him a ransom
of nine talents. And this he did with the approbation of the
people.  Howbeit, to offer violence to a herald and embassadors is considered impious by all nations, and especially by
you.  Certain it is, when the Megarians killed Anthemocritus,2 your people went so far as to exclude them from the
mysteries, and erect a statue before their gates for a monument of the crime. Then is it not shameful that you are
seen committing the same offense, for which, when you were
the sufferers, you so detested the authors?
Further, Callias3'your general took all the towns situate
Crobvl]e must have been in Thrace. Tiristasis is mentioned by
Pliny as a place in the Chersonese. Probably then it was near Cardia,
not far from the isthmus.
2 The Athenians, having charged the people of Megara with profaning a piece of consecrated ground, sent Anthemocritus to admonish
them to desist from the sacrilege. The Megalians put him to death,
and drew upon themselves the wrath of their powerful neighbors, who
passed the decree of excommunication here referred to. The monument
which recorded their impiety was to be seen in the time of Pausanias,
on the sacred road leading from Athens to Eleusis.
3 This is the same Callias, ruler of Chalcis, whom we have seen
opposing the Athenians at the time when Phocion was sent to assist
Plutarch of Eretria. (See the Oration on the Peace, p. 75, note.) At
the battle of Tamyne Callias had been aided by Macedonian troops;
but after the departure of Phocion, and the decline of the Athenian
interest in Eubcea, he formed the scheme of bringing the whole island
under his own sway, or at least of making it independent. This did
not suit the views of Philip, and Callias, having lost his favor, tried to
form a connection with the Thebans. Failing in this attempt, he determined to unite himself to Athens, and accordingly came over and
concerted with Demosthenes and his party a plan for a revolution in
Euboea. It was not possible to accomplish this by negotiation, owing
to the strength of Macedonian influence, which was confirmed by the
occurrences at Oreus and Eretria. (See the Oration on the Chersonese,
p. 107, note 1.) At length, by the exertions of Demosthenes, a decree
was passed to send troops into Euboea; and Phocion, to whom the
command was intrusted, overpowered the Macedonian garrisons, and
expelled Clitarchus and Philistides from the island. This was B.c. 341.
Afterward, it seems, an Athenian force, under the command of Callias,
crossed the narrow strait that separates the north of Eubcea from
Thessaly, and made the attack, which Philip here speaks of, on the
towns in the bay of Pagasm.




158         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
in the Pagassean bay, towns under treaty with you and in
alliance with me; and sold all people bound for Macedonia,
adjudging them enemies; and on this account you praised
him in your decrees. So that I am puzzled to think, what
Worse could happen, if you were confessedly at war with me:
for when we were in open hostility, you used to send out privateers and sell people sailing to our coast, you assisted my
enemies, infested my country.
Yet more; you have carried your animosity and violence
so far, that you have even sent embassadors to the Persian,
to persuade him to make war against me: a thing which is
most surprising: for before he gained Egypt and Phoenicia,
you resolved,' in case of any aggression on his part, to invite
me as well as the other Greeks to oppose him; but now you
have such an overflow of malice against me, as to negotiate
with him for an offensive alliance. Anciently, as I am informed, your ancestors condemned the Pisistratids for bringing the Persian to invade Greece: yet you are not ashamed
of doing the same thing, for which you continue to reproach
the tyrants.2
In addition to other matters, you write in your decrees,
commanding me to let Teres3 and Cersobleptes rule in Thrace,
because they are Athenians.  I know  nothing of them  as
being included in the treaty of peace with you, or as inscribed
on the pillars, or as being Athenians; I know however, that
Teres took arms with me against you, and that Cersobleptes
was anxious to take the oaths separately to my embassadors,
1 The time referred to is B.C. 354, when there was a rumor of a Persian invasion, and a proposal at Athens to declare war against Artaxerxes, upon which Demosthenes made the speech de Symrnoriis. Phoenicia and Egypt were recovered some years after that. The argument
of Philip is, that since the recovery of those provinces Persia was more
dangerous than before, and therefore it was more disgraceful for a
Greek state to be connected with that monarchy.
2 If the Emperor of Russia at the present day was to reproach England with the alliance of Turkey, designating the Sultan as the common enemy of Europe, we should scarcely think it worth a serious reply. His relation to us is not unlike that of Philip to the Athenians;
nor would it be very surprising, if some years hence an English garrison occupied Constantinople.
3 Of Teres nothing is known, but from this passage: he must have
been a prince in the interior of Thrace. As to Cersobleptes, so frequently mentioned in the orations of Demosthenes, see Appendix III.
on the Thracian Chersonese.




THE LETTER OF PHILIP.                   159
but was prevented by your generals pronouncing him an
enemy of Athens. How can it be equitable or just, when it
suits your purpose, to call him an enemy of the state, and
when you desire to calumniate me, to declare the same person
your citizen-and on the death of Sitalces,l to whom you imparted the freedom  of your city, to make friendship immediately with his murderer, but on behalf of Cersobleptes to
espouse a war with me? —knowing too as you must, that, of
the persons who receive such gifts, none have the least regard
for your laws or decrees?  However-to omit all else and be
concise-you bestowed citizenship on Evagoras of Cyprus,2
It is impossible, for the reasons stated in Jacobs' note, that this can
refer to the Sitalces, King of the Odrysoe, and ally of the Athenians,
whose wars and death are related by Thucydides. He fell in a battle
with the Triballi, and was succeeded by his nephew Seuthes. It was
his son Sadocus, and not he, that was made a citizen of Athens. Tourneil tries to get over the difficulty by suggesting that Seuthes was suspected of murdering him; but there is no evidence that the Athenians
entered into treaty with Seuthes till long afterward. However, the
circumstances here mentioned exactly apply to Cotys, father of Cersobleptes, who had the honor of Athenian citizenship conferred on him,
for which he showed very little gratitude in his subsequent conduct,
and accordingly, when he was murdered by Python and IIeraclides of
~/Enus, the Athenians rewarded themn with citizenship and a golden
crown. Sitalces therefore may have been a mistake, or a slip of the pen,
for Cotys. Mitford had come to the same conclusion before Jacobs.
2 Evagoras, the friend of Conon, who assisted the Athenians in the reestablishment of their independence, was made a citizen of Athens, and
statues of him and of Conon were placed side by side in the Ceramicus.
He aimed at becoming absolute master of Cyprus, and was engaged in
a long war against the Persian king, in which he was ultimately overpowered, but, on submission to Artaxerxes, was permitted to rule in Salamis. On his death, B.c. 374, he was succeeded by his son Nicocles, who
was father of the Evagoras here referred to. Nicocles did not reign
long, and the young Evagoras was afterward driven from Salamis by a
successful usurper. Cyprus was at this period divided among several
princes, who afterward joined the great rebellion of Phcenicia and
Egypt against Artaxerxes. Meanwhile Evagoras had passed into the
service of the Persian king, and was perhaps dwelling in Caria, when
Idrieus the prince of Caria appointed him, together with Phocion the
Athenian, to command the armament collected for the reduction of
Cyprus. This was B.c. 351. Cyprus was reduced in the following
year; but Evagoras, instead of being rewarded, as he expected, with
the principality of his native town, was appointed to a government in
Asia. In this he misconducted himself, and fled to Cyprus, where he
was arrested and put to death. The honor which it appears he received, of Athenian citizenship, may have been owing to respect to his




160         THIE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
and Dionysius of' Syracuse,' and their descendants.  If you
can persuade the people who expelled each of those princes
to reinstate them in their government, then recover Thrace
from me, all that Teres and Cersobleptes reigned over. But
if against the parties, who mastered Evagoras and Dionysius,
you will not utter a word of complaint, and yet continue to
annoy me, how can I be wrong in resisting you?
On this head I have many arguments yet remaining, which
I purposely omit. But as to the Cardians, I avow myself
their auxiliary; for I was allied to them before the peace,
and you refused to come to an arbitration, although I made
many offers, and they not a few. Surely I should be the basest
of men, if, deserting my allies, I paid more regard to you, who
have harassed me all along, than to those who have always
been my steadfast friends.
Another thing I must not leave unnoticed. You have arrived at such a pitch of arrogance, that, while formerly you
did but remonstrate with me on the matters aforesaid, in the
recent case, where the Peparethians complained of harsh treatment, you ordered your general to obtain satisfaction from
me on their account.2 Yet I punished them less severely
than they deserved. For they in time of peace seized Halonnesus, and would restore neither the place nor the garrison,
though I sent many times about them. You objected3 not
to the injury which the Peparethians had done me, but only
grandfather's memory and his connection with Phocion. Or perhaps
the honor inherited from his grandfather may be referred to, or possibly Philip may be confounding the elder and younger Evagoras. At
all events, the comparison is not a happy one.
This refers to the younger Dionysius, twice expelled from Syracuse,
first by Dion, B.c. 356, afterward by Timoleon, B.c. 343. He was in
alliance with Sparta, and sent troops to her assistance against Epaminondas. His connection with Athens began, after she had made common cause with Sparta: from that time many Athenians resorted to
his court, and (among others) Plato is said to have visited him.
2 Peparethus is in the same group of islands with Halonnesus.
Philip's ravaging of Peparethus is spoken of in the Oration for the
Crown. As to these circumstances, see the Argument to the Oration
on Halonnesus.
3 The critics find a difficulty here, because E7rttsx7rrw commonly governs a dative case; and it has been proposed to read er'eaKeCpaOe,,which
Auger, Jacobs, and Schaefer prefer. But it might well be, that Philip's
Greek was not the very best Attic; of which there is more than one
example to be found in this letter.




THE LETTER OF PHILIP.                 161
to their punishment, well knowing that I took the island
neither from them nor from you, but from the pirate Sostratus. If now you declare, that you gave it up to Sostratus,
you acknowledge to having commissioned pirates; but if he
got possession against your will, what hardship have you
suffered by my taking it and rendering the coast safe for
navigators? I had such regard for your state, that I offered
you the island; yet your orators would not let you accept it,
but counseled you to obtain restitution, in order that, if I
submitted to your command, I might confess my occupation
to be unlawful, if I refused to abandon the place, your commonalty might suspect me. Perceiving which, I challenged
you to a reference of the question, so that, if it were decided
to be mine, the place should be given by me to you, if it were
adjudged yours, then I should restore it to the people. This
I frequently urged; you would not listen; and the Peparethians seized the island.  WVhat then became it me to do?
Not to punish the violators of their oaths? not to avenge myself on the perpetrators of these gross outrages?  If the island
belonged to the Peparethians, what business had Athenians to
demand it? If it was yours, why resent you not their unlawful seizure?
To such a degree of enmity have we advanced, that, wishing
to pass with my ships into the Hellespont, I was compelled
to escort them along the coast through the Chersonese with
my army, as your colonists according to the resolution of
Polycrates were making war against me, and you were sanctioning it by your decrees, and your general was inviting the
Byzantines to join him, and proclaiming every where, that he
had your instructions to commence war on the first opportunity. Notwithstanding these injuries, I refrained from attacking either your fleet or your territory,' though I was in a
1 I take rCS rr'6;eow to be the genitive governed by rdlv -rptopwv and
rF X6pag, while all other translators take it to be dependent on dcwre;ro-,uev. Leland and Spillan render it "your city," meaning the city of
Athens, I suppose. Jacobs and Pabst are to the same effect. It appears
to me, that there is no reference here to any measures against Attica or
the city of Athens, nor to any other hostilities against her but such as
might have been taken in the neighborhood of the Hellespont. Philip
says: "I did not attack either the ships or the territory of your
state;" that is; "I neither attacked your fleet which was watching in
the Hellespont to prevent the passage of minc into the Propontis, nor




162          THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENiES.
condition to take the greater part, if not all; and I have
persisted in offering to submit our mutual complaints to arbitration. Consider now, whether it is fairer to decide by arms
or by argument, to pronounce the award yourselves or persuade others to do so: reflect also, how unreasonable it is,
that Athens should compel Thasians and Maronites to a judicial settlement of their claims to Stryme,1 yet refuse to determine her disputes with me in the same manner, especially
when you know, that, if beaten, you will lose nothing, if successful, you will get what is in my possession.
The most unaccountable thing of all, in my opinion, is this
-when I sent embassadors from the whole confederacy,2 that
they might be witnesses, and desired to make a just arrangement with you on behalf- of the Greeks, you would not even
hear what the deputies had to propose on the subject, though
it was in your power, either to secure against all danger the
parties mistrustful of me, or plainly to prove me the basest
of mankind.  That was the interest of the people, but it
suited not the orators.  To them —as persons acquainted with
your government say-peace is war, and war is peace: for
they always get something from the generals, either by supporting or calumniating them, and also, by railing on your
hustings at the most eminent citizens and most illustrious
did I commit any hostilities in the Chersonese, but only marched
through it, as a measure of necessity, passing along the coast to protect
my fleet."-The presence of a land force on the coast, to protect a fleet,
was not uncommon in Greek warfare.-Francis saw the difficulty of
supposing an allusion to the city of Athens, and has rendered it: " We
restrained ourselves from attempting aught against your republic, your
galleys, and your territories." And Auger too, whose translation is:
"Je vous 6pargnai; je ne touchai ni a nos vaisseaux ni a vos domaines."
Next to the construction which I adopt, I should prefer taking the two
last genitives as an epexegesis of 7T7 T2uRerO. By the Tii 7reiaZv a
rav7ra, I understand both the ships and the towns in the Chersonese.
Philip's boast would be an extraordinary one, according to the majority
of the translators. Mitford avoided the difficulty by rendering 7Tt'
r'O52e., "your towns."
1 Maronea and Stryme were neighboring towns, on the coast of
Thrace, northeast of the island of Thasos. Stryme was founded by
the Thasians, whom  the Maronites endeavored to deprive of their
colony.
2 This seems to have been the embassy that led to the second Philippie. See the argument to that Oration. By "the whole confederacy,"
he means the Amphictyonic union, and affects to treat the Athenians
as belonging to it.




THE LETTER OF PHILIP.                   163
foreigners, they acquire credit with the multitude for being
friends,of the constitution.
Easy were it for me, at a very small expense, to silence
their invectives, and make them  pronounce my panegyric.l
But I should be ashamed to purchase your good-will from
these men, who-besides other things-have reached such a
point of assurance, as to contest Amphipolis with me, to
which I conceive I have a f r juster title than the claimants.
For if it belongs to the  arliest conquerors, how  can my
right be questioned, when Alexander my ancestor first occupied the place, from which, as the first fruits of the captive
AMedes, he brought the offering of a golden statue to Delphi?2
Or, should this be disputed, and the argument be, that it
belongs to the last possessors, so likewise I have the best title;
for I besieged and took the place from a people, who expelled
you and were planted by the Lacedamonians.3  But we all
hold cities either by inheritance from our ancestors, or by
conquest in war. You claim this city, not being either the
first occupants or the present possessors, having abode for a
very short period in the district, and after having yourselves
given the strongest testimony in my favor.   For I have
l This observation laid Philip open to a severe retort. What experience had he of the facility of bribing orators at Athens or elsewhere? If
he had none, it was a gratuitous piece of slander, and an insult to the
Athenians, to suppose their leading statesmen so corruptible. If he
spoke from experience, he proved the justice of what Demosthenes asserted of him, and the danger to be apprehended from his intrigues.
2 Auger has justly remarked, that Philip's assertion here is contrary
to the historical evidence which has been handed down to us. The city
of Amphipolis did not exist in the time of this Alexander, but was founded many years after by Hagnon the Athenian. Nor is there any account of his having gained a victory over the Persians, though HIerodotus speaks of the golden statue which he erected at Delphi. He was
at first compelled to follow in the train of Xerxes, though he afterward
came over to the Greeks, and his desertion wvas considered by them as
highly meritorious. It is not unlikely, that there were traditions concerning him in Macedonia, unknown to the southern Greeks, and Philip
himself might well put faith in them. Supposing the facts here asserted to be true, the argument, as against the Athenians, who set up a
prior title in point of time, was conclnsive. But, except as an argumentum ad homninem, it could be worth little or nothing.
3 After the death of Brasidas, the Amphipolitans paid divine honors
to his memory, and treated him as their founder, destroying every vestige of Hagnon the Athenian. Therefore they are spoken of as being
a Lacedaemonian colony.




164         THE ORATIONS OF DIEMOSTHENES.
frequently written in letters concerning it, and you have acknowledged the justice of my tenure, first by making the
peace while I held the city, and next by concluding alliance
on the same terms. How can any property stand on a firmer
title then this, which was left to me originally by my forefathers, has again become mine in war, and thirdly has been
conceded by you, who are accustomed to claim what you have
not the least pretensions to?
Such are the complaints which I prefer. As you are the
aggressors, as by reason of my forbearance you are making
new encroachments, and doing me all the mischief you can,
I will in a just cause defend myself, and, calling the gods to
witness, bring the quarrel between us to an issue.
THE ORATION ON THE DUTIES OF THE STATE.
THE ARGUMENT.
The object of this Oration is, to show the necessity of making a proper
application of the public revenue, and compelling every citizen to
perform service to the state. With respect to the first point, the
advice given in the first and third Olynthiacs is in substance repeated,
viz., that the Theoric distributions should be put on a different footing; that the fund should either not be distributed at all, or that
every man should accept his share as a remuneration for service in
the army and navy, or the discharge of some other duty. This was
but a circuitous way of proposing (as before observed) that the law
of Eubulus should be repealed. (See the argument to the first Olynthiac.) It is here further recommended, that the duties required by
the state should be systematically divided among all classes, and
performed with regularity. No specific plan however is pointed
out.
At what time or on what occasion this speech was delivered, we can not
determine. It is mentioned in the exordium, that an assembly of the
people was held to consider how certain public moneys should be disposed of. But this gives us no clew to the circumstances. There is
no mention of Philip, or of any historical event in connection with
the subject. It is stated by the orator, that he had discussed the same
question before; and perhaps it may be inferred firom hence, that the
present speech was later than the Olynthiacs. Again, it may be presumed to have been earlier than the fourth Philippic, in which
Demosthenes appears to have changed or modified his views on the




ON THE DUTIES OF THE STATE.                 165
subject of the Theoric fund. If however the fourth Philippic be not
genuine, as some persons contend, the last argument can have no
weight.
In consequence of this uncertainty, commentators are not agreed as to
the date of the Oration before us. Pabst and some others think it
was spoken soon after the Olynthiacs. Mitford, following Ulpian,
places it before all the Philippics. Leland and Francis place it after
the Philippics; but there is very little ground for their opinion.
Dionysius makes no mention of this speech in his letter to Ammaeus;
and some critics have thought it spurious.
WITH respect to the present money and the purpose for
which you hold the assembly, men of Athens, it appears to
me that two courses are equally easy; either to condemn
those who distribute and give away the public funds, to gain
their esteem who think the commonwealth is injured by such
means, or to advocate and recommend the system of allowances, to gratify those who are pressingly in need of them.
Both parties praise or blame the practice, not out of regard,
to the public interest, but according to their several conditions of indigence or affluence. For my part, I would neither
propose that the allowances be discontinued, nor speak against
them; yet I advise you to consider and reflect in your minds,
that this money about which you are deliberating is a trifle,
but the usage that grows up with it is important. If you will
ordain it so, that your allowances be associated with the perf6rmance of duty, so far from injuring, you will signally benefit the commonwealth and yourselves. But if for your allowances a festival or any excuse be sufficient, while about your
further obligations you will not even hear a word, beware lest,
what you now consider a right practice, you may hereafter
deem a grievous error.
My opinion is-don't clamor at what I am  going to say,
but hear and judge-that, as we appointed an assembly for
the receiving of money, so should we appoint an assembly for
the regulation of dutiesl and the making provision for war;
a1 vvratC, which often signifies an assessment of taxes or tribute, is
here used in a more enlarged sense, importing a general arrangement
of political duties, under which every citizen is obliged to perform some
service befitting his age and condition; for example, to pay taxes, or
serve in the army, or hold some civil office. Thus the word bears a
meaning similar to Shakspeare's Act of Order: Henry V. Act I. Sc.
2. I have adopted a title to the Oration, which seemed nearer to the
sense than any of the old. Leland calls it, The Oration on the Regulation of the State. Francis, On the State of the Republic. Pabst, Ueber




166         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
qnd every man should exhibit not only a willingness to hear
tte discussion, but a readiness to act, that you may derive
your hopes of advantage from yourselves, Athenians, and not
be inquiring what this or that person is about.  All the
revenue of the state, what you now expend out of your
private fortunes to no purpose, and what is obtained from
your allies, I say you ought to receive, every man his share,
those of the military age as pay, those exempt from the roll'
as inspection-money,2 or what you please to call it; but you
must take the field yourselves, yield that privilege to none;
the force of the state must be native, and provided from these
resources; that you may want for nothing while you perform
your obligations.  And the general should command3 that
force, so that you, Athenians, may experience not the same
results as at present-you try the generals, and the issue of
your affairs is, " Such a one, the son of such a one, impeached
such a one;" nothing else-but what results?-first, that your
allies may be attached to you not by garrisons, but by community of interest; secondly, that your generals may not
have mercenaries to plunder the allies, without even seeing
the enemy, (a course from which the emoluments are theirs
in private, while the odium and reproach fall upon the whole
country,) but have citizens to follow them, and do unto the
enemy what they now do unto your friends.  Besides, many
operations require your presence, and (not to mention the
advantage of employing our own army for our own wars) it
is necessary also for other purposes.  If indeed you were
content to be quiet, and not to meddle with the politics of
die Einrichtung des Staats.  Auger, Sur le Gouvcrnenmest de la Ripublique. Wolf, De Ordinandde Republica. From some of these expressions it might be inferred, that the speech was about constitutional reform.
The roll in which were inscribed the names of all citizens qualified
to serve in the cavally or heavy-armed infantry.. Men past the military age were exempt.
2 Pabst: Aufsehergebiihren. It would be the duty of these persons
who received such fees, to inspect the militia roll, see that it was complete, that all the qualified citizens took their turns of service, were
properly armed and equipped, &c.
3 I e. really and effectually command it; not be reduced by their
necessities to relax the discipline of the troops, or to employ them on a
service foreign to the interests of Athens. See the second Olynthiac,
p. 61, note 1.




ON THE DUTIES OF THE STATE.             167
Greece, it would be a different matter: but you assume to
take the lSad and determine the rights of others, and yet
have not provided, nor endeavor to provide for yourselves,
a force to guard and maintain that superiority.  While you
never stirred, while you kept entirely aloof; the people of
Mlitylenel have lost their constitution; while you never
stirred, the Rhodians2 have lost theirs —our enemies, it may
be said —true: men of Athens; but a strife with oligarchies
for the principle of government should be considered more
deadly than a strife with popular states on any account
whatsoever.
But let me return to the point-I say, your duties must
be marshaled; there must be the same rule for receiving
money and performing what service is required. I have discussed this question with you before, and shown the method
of arranging you all, you of the heavy-armed, you of the
cavalry, and you that are neither, and how to make a common
provision for all. But what has caused me the greatest despondency, I will tell you without reserve. Amidst such a
number of important and noble objects, no man remembers
any of the rest, but all remember the two obols.3 Yet two
obols can never be worth more than two obols; while, what
I proposed in connection therewith, is worth the treasures of
the Persian king-that a state possessing such a force of infantry, such a navy, cavalry, and revenue, should be put in
order and preparation.
Why, it may be asked, do I mention these things now?
For this reason. There are men shocked at the idea of enlisting all the citizens on hire, while the advantage of order
and preparation is universally acknowledged.  Here then, I
say, you should begin, and permit any person that pleases to
deliver his opinion upon the subject. For thus it is. If you
can be persuaded to believe that now is the time for making
arrangements, when you come to want them, they will be
ready: but if you neglect the present time as unseasonable,
you will be compelled to make preparations when you have
occasion for their use.
1 The establishment of oligarchy at Mitylene is again alluded to inl
the speech on the Liberty of the Rhodians.
2 For further particulars with respect to the Rhodians, see the argument to the speech above referred to.
3The sum distributed as the price of admittance to the theatrcs.




168         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
It has been said before now, I believe, Athenians, not by
you the multitude, but by persons who would burst if these
measures were carried into effect-" What benefit have we got
from the harangues of Demosthenes? He comes forward
when he likes, he stuffs' our ears with declamation, he abuses
the present state of things, he praises our forefathers, he excites
and puffs up our imaginations, and then sits down." I can
only say, could I persuade you to follow some of my counsels,
I should confer upon the state such important benefits, as, if
I now attempted to describe them, would appear incredible to
many, as exceeding possibility. Yet even this I conceive to
be no small advantage, if I accustom you to hear the best
advice. For it is necessary, O men of Athens, that whosoever
desires to render your commonwealth a service should begin
by curing your ears. They are corrupted: so many falsehoods have you been accustomed to hear, any thing indeed
rather than what is salutary. For instance-let me not be
interrupted by clamor, before I have finished-certain persons lately, you know, broke open the treasury:2 and all the
orators cried out, that the democracy was overthrown, the
laws were annihilated; or to that effect. Now, ye men of
Athens-only see whether I speak truly —the guilty parties
committed a crime worthy of death; but the democracy is
not overthrown by such means. Again, some oars were stolen:3 and people clamored for stripes and torture, saying
Compare Shakspeare, Henry IV. Second Part, Prologue:
Stuffing the ears of men with false reports.
1 The 0wrtao66dotouo was a chamber at the back of the Parthenon, used
for a treasury,
3 If this circumstance in any way related to the story of Antiphon,
mentioned in the Oration on the Crown, it might help to determine the
date of this Oration. But the connection is not sufficiently apparent.
Leland has the following note on this passage: "We can not well
suppose, that the depredations made in their naval stores were really so
slight and inconsiderable as they are represented in these extenuating
terms. A design had lately been concerted of a very momentous and
alarming nature, and an attempt made on the naval stores at Athens,
which Demosthenes himself labored with the utmost zeal to detect
and punish. A man named Antiphon had been for some time considered an Athenian citizen, till by examination of the registers he
was found to be really a foreigner, was accordingly deprived of all the
privileges of a native, and driven with ignominy from the city.
Enraged at this disgrace, he went to Philip, and proposed to him to
steal privately into Athens and set fire to the arsenal. The Macedonian




ON THE DUTIES OF THE STATE.                169
the democracy was in danger. But what do I say? I agree
with them, that the thief merits death; but I deny that the
constitution is by such means overturned.  How indeed it is
in danger of subversion, no man is bold enough to tell you;
but I will declare. It is when you, men of Athens, are under
bad leading,l a helpless multitude, without arms, without
order, without unanimity; when neither general nor any other
person pays regard to your resolutions, no one will inform you
of your errors, or correct them, or endeavor to effect a change.
This it is that happens now.
And by Jupiter, O Athenians, another sort of language is
current among you, false and most injurious to the constitution; such as this, that your safety lies in the courts of
justice, and you must guard the constitution by your votes.
It is true, these courts are public tribunals for the decision of
your mutual rights; but by arms must your enemies be vanquished, by arms the safety of the constitution must be maintained.  Voting will not make your soldiers victorious, but
they who by soldiership have overcome the enemy provide
you with liberty and security for voting and doing what you
please. In arms you should be terrible, in courts of justice
humane.
If any one thinks I talk a language above my position, this
very quality of the speech is laudable. An oration to be
listened readily to the proposal, and by bribes and promises encouraged
him to make the attempt.  Antiphon repaired to Athens, and was
lodged in the port, ready to put the enterprise into execution, when
Demosthenes, who received intimation of the design, flew to the Piraeus,
seized and dragged the delinquent before an assembly of the people.
Here the clamors of the Macedonian party were so violent, that the
accusation was slighted, and Antiphon dismissed without the formality
of a trial. He departed, triumphing in his escape, to pursue his designs with greater confidence.  But the court of Areopagus, whose
province it was to take cognizance of all matters of treason against the
state, caused him to be again seized and examined. Torture forced
from him a full confession of his guilt, and sentence of death was passed and executed upon him. The detection of so dangerous a design
might have quickened the vigilance of the people, and exasperated
their resentment against the least attempts made on their military
stores." This seems to have happened some time after the peace.
So Pabst: schlecht geleitet. Auger: "mal gouverne.'  Leland:
" without conduct." Wolf takes it in a different sense: " male educati."
Francis: "held in contempt."  I take 7#'yvot to be used as in
Thucydides, IT. 65, oi itero/aT i7ouc.2_ov tir' airoi  cI' ar7 17e.
VOL. I1 —H




170         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
spoken for a state so illustrious, and on affairs so important,
should transcend the character of the speaker, whoever he
be; it should approximate to your dignity rather than his.
Why none of your favorites speak in such a style, I will explain to you. The candidates for office and employment go
about and cringe to the-voting interest,' each ambitious to be
created2 general, not to perform any man-like deed. Or if
there be a man capable of noble enterprise, he thinks now,
that starting with the name and reputation of the state, profiting by the absence of opponents, holding out hopes to you,
and nothing else, he shall himself inherit your advantageswhich really happens-whereas, if you did every thing by
yourselves, you would share with the rest, not in the actions
only, but also in their results. Your politicians and that class
of men, neglecting to give you honest advice, ally themselves
to the former class: and as you once had boards for taxes,
so now you have boards for politics; an orator presiding, a
general under him, and three hundred men to shout on either
side; while the rest of you are attached some to one party,
some to the other.3 Accordingly-this is what you get by
the system-such and such a person has a brazen statue; here
and there is an individual more thriving than the commonwealth: you, the people, sit as witnesses of their good fortune,
abandoning to them fbr an ephemeral indolence your great and
glorious heritage of prosperity.
But see how it was in the time of your ancestors; for by
domestic (not foreign) examples you may learn your lesson of
I Pabst: Gehen mit sklavischer Demuth herum, um sich die Begiinstigung durch Stimmen zu verschaffen. Auger: "Vous font bassement
la cour, et briguent vos suffrages." Tab 1Eri r) XetpoToveao0at X dptTro, I
understand to mean, "favor or interest for being elected," xdpiC being
"the favor of the voters toward the candidate." But Reiske takes
xdappl to signify " the courting of the voters by the candidate," and thus
explains it: " Ea gratia activa, ea contentio alii gratificandi, studium
placendi alii, penes quem sit potestas tibi honorem, quem ambis, suffragio tuo addicendi."
2 I have followed Reiske in giving a simple meaning to releaOivat.
But Schaefer thinks, and perhaps with reason, that it means something
more. He says: "Videtur locutio esse oratoris stomachantis: singuli
operam dantes ut strategie initientur mysteriis: Jeder sich abmiihend
zum Strategos geweiht zu werden. Pabst translates it: Sich zu Strategen
woeihen zu lassen: thinking it refers to the solemnity of an election by
votes, as contradistinguished fiom an appointment by lot.
3 See the second Olynthiac, p. 51, note 3.




ON THE DUTIES OF THE STATE.                171
duty. Themistocles who commanded in the sea-fight at
Salamis, and Miltiades who led at Marathon, and many
others, who performed services unlike the generals of the
present day-assuredly they were not set up in brass nor
overvalued by your forefathers, who honored them, but only
as persons on a level with themselves. Your forefathers, O
my countrymen, surrendered not their part in any of those
glories. There is no man who will attribute the victory of
Salamis to Themistocles, but to the Athenians; nor the
battle of Marathon to Miltiades, but to the republic. But
now people say, that Timotheus took Corcyra,1 and Iphicrates
cut off the Spartan division,2 and Chabrias won the naval
victory at Naxos:3 for you seem to resign the merit of these
actions, by the extravagance of the honors which you have
bestowed on their account upon each of the commanders.
So wisely did the Athenians of that day confer political
rewards; so improperly do you. But how the rewards of
foreigners?  To Menon the Pharsalian, wlio gave twelve
talents in money for the war at Eion4 by Amphipolis, and
1 Timotheus brought back Corcyra to the Athenian alliance, B.C. 376.
The Lacedaemonians attempted to recover it three years after, but were
defeated.
2 At Lechoum near Corinth. See the first Philippic, p. 66, note 1.
The division of the Lacedemonian army called /t6pa, which Iphicrates
defeated, was little more than four hundred men. The fame of the
exploit, so disproportioned to the numbers engaged, was owing, partly to the great renown of the Spartan infantry, which had not been
defeated in a pitched battle for a long period before, and partly to the
new kind of troops employed by the Athenian general. These were the
peltastce or targeteers, who were something between heavy-armed and
light-armed soldiers, combining in some degree the advantages of both.
Their shield (pelta) was lighter, their spear and sword were longer.
Until this occasion they had never been fairly tried against the heavy
troops of the line. Afterward they came into more general use.
3 Which annihilated the Spartan navy, B.c. 376. In this battle Phocion first distinguished himself.
4 Eion is a city on the Strymon below Amphipolis. In the eighth
year of the Peloponnesian war, when Brasidas had taken Amphipolis,
he sailed down the Strymon to attack Eion, but the town had been put
in a posture of defense by Thucydides the historian, who came to its
relief with some ships from Thasos. There is no mention in Thucydides
of Menon the Pharsalian. Brasidas had partisans in Pharsalus, and
marched through Thessaly on his expedition to Chalcidice, aided by
some of the nobles of that country. But the Thessalian people in
general sided with the Athenians, and an endeavor was made to prevent his march. Afterward they stopped the passage of the Spartan




172         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
assisted them with two hundred horsemen of his own retainers,' the Athenians then voted not the freedom of their
city, but only granted immunity from imposts.2 And in
earlier times to Perdiccas,3 who reigned in Macedonia during
the invasion of the Barbarian —when he had destroyed the
Persians who retreated from  Platsea after their defeat, and
completed the disaster of the king-they voted not the
freedom of their city, but only granted immunity froln
imposts; doubtless, esteeming their country to be of high
value, honor, and dignity, surpassing all possible obligation.
But now, ye men of Athens, ye adopt the vilest of mankind,
menials and the sons of menials, to be your citizens, receiving
a price as for any other saleable commodity. And you have
fallen into such a practice, not because your natures are inferior to your ancestors, but because they were in a condition
to think highly of themselves, while from you, men of Athens,
this power is taken away. It can never be, methinks, that
your spirit is generous and noble, while you are engaged in
petty and mean employments; no more than you can be
abject and mean-spirited, while your actions are honorable
and glorious.  Whatever be the pursuits of men, their sentiments must necessarily be similar.
Mark what a summary view may be taken of the deeds
performed by your ancestors and by you.  Possibly from such
comparison you may rise superior to yourselves. They for
a period of five-and-forty years took the lead of the Greeks
by general consent, and carried up more than ten thousand
re-enforcements. We can have no difficulty therefore in believing this
story of Menon. There was little regular government in Thessaly; and
the great families, among whom it was parceled, would not always
agree in their policy and alliances.
I The Penestce of Thessaly were serfs or vassals, whose condition was
somewhat like, though superior to, that of the Laconian Helots. They
were in fact the ancient inhabitants, reduced to a state of dependence
by the Thessalian conquerors.
2 Such an immunity, when granted to a foreigner, would exempt
him from customs and harbor dues. In the case of a person like
Menon, it would be little more than an honorary distinction. But to
a citizen or a foreigner residing at Athens an exemption from duties
and taxes would be more important, as we shall see hereafter.
3 It was Alexander who reigned in Macedonia at this time. This
then is either a mistake of the orator, or we may suppose with Lucchesini, that Perdiccas, the son of Alexander, was governor of a principality, and therefore dignified'with the kingly title.




ON THE DUTIES OF THE STATE.                 173
talents into the citadel; and many glorious trophies they
erected for victories by land and sea, wherein even yet we
take a pride. And remember, they erected these, not merely
that we may survey them with admiration, but also that we
may emulate the virtues of the dedicators.I  Such was their
conduct: but for ours-fallen as we have on a solitude2
manifest to you all-look if it bears any resemblance.  Have
not more than fifteen hundred talents been lavished ineffectually on the distressed people of Greece?3  Have not all
private fortunes, the revenues of the state, the contributions
from our allies, been squandered?  Have not the allies, whom
we gained in the war, been lost recently in the peace?4 But
forsooth, in these respects only was it better anciently than
now, in other respects worse. Very far from that! Let us
examine what instances you please. The edifices which they
left, the ornaments of the city in temples, harbors, and the
like, were so magnificent and beautiful, that room is not left
T The trophy, which consisted of armor and spoils taken from the
enemy, was hung up, usually on a tree, near the field of battle, and
consecrated to some god, with an inscription showing the names of the
conquerors and the conquered. See Juvenal, Sat. X. 133.
Bellorum exuvive, truncis affixa troppeis
Lorica, et fractA de casside buccula pendens,
Et curtum temone jugum, victaeque triremis
Aplustre.
And Virgil, ZEn. XI. 5.
Ingentem quercum decisis undique ramis
Constituit tumulo, fulgentiaque induit arma,
Mezenti ducis exuvias; tibi, magne, tropmum,
Bellipotens.
But sometimes pillars of brass and stone were erected, as lasting memorials of important victories.
2 I e. an absence of competitors.
3 What this refers to is unknown. It has been suggested, that Athens may have sent supplies of corn for the relief of certain Greek cities. Schaefer, justly considering this an unsatisfactory explanation,
prefers the reading of di0roar6ovC, which Pabst follows, and translates,
fiir die Seemacht der Hellenen. There is still however a difficulty in
understanding what Trv'EXZ7v)ov means. The passage is suspicious,
as being a clumsy adaptation of a similar passage in the third Olynthiac. See p. 58 of this volume.
W4 hat this particularly refers to, can not be understood without
determining the date of the Oration.




174        THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
for any succeeding generation to surpass them: yonder gateway,' the Parthenon, docks, porticoes, and other structures,
which they adorned the city withal and bequeathed to us.
The private houses of the men in power were so modest and
in accordance with the name of the constitution, that if any
one knows the style of house which Themistocles occupied,
or Cimon, or Aristides, or Mliltiades, and the illustrious of
that day, he perceives it to be no grander than that of the
neighbors.  But now, ye men of Athens-as regards public
measures-our government is content to furnish roads, fountains, white-washing, and trumpery; not that I blame the
authors of these works; far otherwise; I blame you, if you
suppose that such measures are all you have to execute. As
regards individual conduct-your men in office have (some
of them) made their private houses, not only more ostentatious than the multitude, but more splendid than the public
buildings; others are farming land which they have purchased of such an extent, as once they never hoped for in a
dream.
The cause of this difference is, that formerly the people were
lords and masters of all; any individual citizen was glad to
receive from them his share of honor, office, or profit. Now,
on the contrary, these persons are the disposers of emoluments; every thing is done by their agency; the people are
treated as underlings and dependents, and you are happy to
take what these men allow you for your portion.
Accordingly the affairs of the republic are in such a state,
that, if any one read your decrees and recounted your actions
directly afterward, no man would believe that both came
from  the same persons.  Take for example the decrees
that you passed against the accursed Megarians,2 when
they were cultivating the sacred ground; that you would
sally forth and prevent and not allow it: your decrees in
1 The Propylhea, which could be seen from the Pnyx, where the
people assembled, and were pointed to by the orator. This was an
ornamental fortification in front of the Acropolis, considered the most
beautiful structure in Athens. It was constructed of white marble, at
an immense expense, in the time of Pericles, and took five years in
building. Particular descriptions of it may be found in Thirlwall's
and Grote's Histories of Greece, and various works on the Antiquities
of Athens.
2 See the Letter of Philip, p. 157, note 2.




ON THE DUTIES OF THE STATE.                  175
regard to the Phliasians,l when they were driven lately into
exile; that you would assist, and not abandon them to the
murderers, and invite the Peloponnesians who were inclined
to join you. All these were honorable, men of Athens, and
just and worthy of the country: but the deeds that followed
them, utterly worthless.2   Thus by  decrees you  manifest
your hostility, yet can not execute a single undertaking: for
your decrees are proportioned to the dignity of the state,
while your power corresponds not with them. I would advise
you-and let no man be angry with me —to  lower your
pride and be content with minding your own business, or to
provide yourselves with a greater force. If I knew you to
be Siphnians or Cythnians3 or any other people of that sort,
I would have advised you to lower your pride; but, as you
are Athenians, I recommend the providing a force. It were
disgraceful, men of Athens, disgraceful, to desert that post of
magnanimity, which your ancestors bequeathed to you.
Besides, even should you desire to withdraw  from  Grecian
affairs, it is not in your power. For many feats have been
performed by you from the earliest time; and your established friends it were disgraceful to abandon, your enemies
you can not trust and suffer to become great. In short, the
position which your statesmen hold relative to you-they
can not retire when they choose —is precisely that which you
have arrived at: for you have interfered in the politics of
Greece.
I can sum up all that has been spoken, men of Athens.
Tile Pllhliasians had for some time been at enmity with their neighbors the Argives, partly in consequence of lheir attachment to Sparta.
When the Thebans invaded Peloponnesus, a.c. 366, Chares was sent
from Athens to assist the Phliasians, whose city was threatened by the
confederates. The events here referred to must have been of a much
later date, though we can not exactly determine it. We learn from
Diodorus, that as early as B.c. 374 some Phliasian exiles made an ineffectual attempt to betray their city to the Argives. It seems, this attempt was afterward repeated with more success.  Whether Philip
had any thing to do with it, as Lucchesini supposes; or whether the
Argives alone, or in conjunction with their Peloponnesian allies, effected the reduction of Phlils, we can not ascertain. The exiled party
implored the assistance of Athens, and obtained the promises which the
orator refers to.
2 I agree with Schaefer's interpretation.  Others take the words
differently, as Auger: "Les actions qui devoient suivre, ou sont-elles."
3 Siphnos and Cythnos are small islands in the.Egean Sea.




176          THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
Your orators never make you either vicious or good, but you
make them whichever you please: for you aim not at what
they desire, but they at what they suppose to be your objects.
You therefbre must begin by having noble purposes, and all
will be well. Either men will abstain from unworthy counsels, or will gain nothing by them, having none to follow their
advice.
THE ORATION ON THE NAVY BOARDS.
THE ARGUMENT.
This was (according to Dionysius) the first speech delivered by Demosthenes before the popular assembly. The date of it was B.c. 354;
the occasion as follows.
In the second year of the Social war Chares, who commanded the
Athenian fleet, either from inability to maintain his troops, or from
motives of selfish avarice, or both causes combined, went into the
service of Artabazus, the Ionian satrap, then in revolt against Artaxerxes. To him Chares rendered important assistance, and received
a rich r-compense in money. At irst this measure was approved
of at Athens; but in the beginning of the next year an embassy
was sent by Artaxerxes, to prefer a formal complaint against Chares,
for his violation of the peace between Athens and Persia. Chares
was immediately ordered to quit the service of Artabazus; but the
Athenians soon received intelligence, that the Persian king was making vast naval preparations, and they conjectured, not without reason, that these were intended to support their revolted allies. Accordingly they hastened to put an end to the Social war, in which
they had met with nothing but disasters, and the same year a negotiation was opened with the allies, and a peace concluded, by which
their independence was acknowledged.
Meanwhile the Persian armament was still talked of at Athens, and
there were rumors of a threatened invasion, which excited alarm in
some, and stirred up the patriotism of others. Statesmen of the old
school recalled to mind the glorious days of their ancestors, and
imagined the time was come for taking vengeance on the common
enemy of Greece. Isocrates was a patriot of that class, as we learn
from his extant orations.  Others, less honest than Isocrates, took
advantage of the general agitation, and would, for selfish purposes,
have precipitated their country into a useless and unseasonable war.
An assembly was held to consider what measures should be adopted. A proposal was actually made, to declare war against Persia, and invite the other states of Greece to join in the common
cause. Orators who supported this motion declaimed about the older
times, boasted of Marathon and Salamis, flattered the vanity of their




ON THE NAVY BOARDS.                     177
countrymen, and appealed to the national prejudices.  What the
temper of the assembly was, may partly be gathered from the following Oration. Demosthenes rose, (then in his thirty-first year of
age, according to others, in his twenty-eighth,) and in a calm and
temperate speech dissuaded the Athenians from adopting any such
absurd resolution. He pointed out the folly of commencing hostilities, which they had not sufficient means to carry on: that the project of uniting the Greeks for such a purpose was chimerical: they
were too jealous of one another and especially of Athens, to join in
any aggressive war, though they might possibly combine to resist a
Persian invasion, if it were really attempted. At present there was
no cause for alarm: if Athens would keep quiet, the Persian king
would leave her alone; but if she attacked him without provocation,
he would in all probability get some of the Greek people on his own
side. The true way of averting the supposed danger was, not to begin the attack, but to put the country in a posture of defense, so that,
whether menaced with war from Persia or from any other quarter,
they might not be taken unprepared. How to make their defensive
preparations, was the chief thing to be considered; and to this question Demosthenes addressed himself in so masterly and practical a
style, that in the youthful orator might already be discerned the future statesman.
In this speech there is no effort to make a display of eloquence: it is
confined to the giving of useful and simple advice. A definite plan
is proposed for the regulation of the Athenian navy, by which the
number of ships might be increased to three hundred, and a provision made for their speedy and punctual equipment. To effect this
object, Demosthenes proposes a reform, from which the Oration takes
its title, in the system of Symmorice, or Boardsfor the Management of
the Trierarchy: for a full explanation whereof I must refer to Appendix V. at the end of this volume. The details of the proposed
scheme are plainly set forth in the Oration itself, and will easily be
understood by the reader, when he has made himself acquainted
with the general features of the existing law.
It is pleasing to see Demosthenes, at the outset of his political career,
coming forward to moderate the intemperate zeal of the people, to
allay the ferment excited by factious demagogues and foolish dreamers-showing himself at the same time attached to the government
of his country, and even to the form of her institutions, while he is
desirous of adapting them to circumstances, and correcting the abuses
by which their proper working was impeded. Here indeed is struck
the key-note of that which for many years continued to be the policy
of this great man: viz., to uphold the dignity of Athens on the basis
of wise laws, to maintain her independence by the spirit and exertions of her own people, to rally round her, for empire and for safety,
a host of willing confederates, united by the bonds of common interest, mutual confidence, and esteem.
IT appears to me, 0 Athenians, that the men who praise
your ancestors adopt a flattering language, not a course beneficial to the people whom they eulogize. For attempting to
It 2




178        TIlE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
speak on subjects, which no man can fully reach by words,
they carry away the reputation of clever speakers themselves,
but cause the glory of those ancients to fall below its estimation in the minds of the hearers. For my part, I consider the
highest praise of our ancestors to be the length of time which
has elapsed, during which no other men have been able to
excel the pattern of their deeds.  I will myself endeavor to
show, in what way, according to my judgment, your preparations may most conveniently be made. For thus it is. Though
all of us who1 intend to speak should prove ourselves capital
orators, your affairs, I am certain, would prosper none the
more: but if any person whomsoever2 came forward, and could
show and convince you what kind and what amount of force
will be serviceable to the state, and from what resources it
should be provided, all our present apprehensions would be
removed. This will I endeavor to do, as far as I am able,
first briefly informing you, what my opinion is concerning our
relations with the king.
I hold the king to be the common enemy of all the Greeks;
yet not on this account would I advise you, without the rest,
to undertake a war against him. For I do not observe that
the Greeks themselves are common friends to one another;
on the contrary, some have more confidence in him than in
certain of their own people. Such being the case, I deem it
expedient for you, to look that the cause of war be equitable
and just, that all necessary preparations should be made, and
that this should be the groundwork of your resolution. For
I think, men of Athens, if there were any clear and manifest
proof that the Persian king was about to attack the Greeks,
they would join alliance and be exceedingly grateful to those,
who sided with and defended them against him: but if we rush
into a quarrel before his intentions are declared, I fear, men of
Athens, we shall be driven to a war with both, the king and
the people whom we are anxious to protect. He will suspend
his designs-if he really has resolved to attack the Greekswill give money to some of them and promise friendship:
they, desiring to carry on their private wars with better
1 Reiske makes a difficulty about the o0 /,tU12ov7-ref 2tyetv. I understand it thus. Demosthenes guessed that many other orators would
follow him on the opposite side of the question. He endeavors by a
gentle sarcasm to weaken the effect of their arguments.
2 This is a modest allusion to himself.




ON THE NTAVY BOARDS.                179
success, and intent on projects of that kind, will disregard
the common safety of all.
I beseech you, not to betray our country into such embarrassment and folly. For you, I see, can not adopt the same
principles of action in reference to the king as the other Greeks
can. It is open, I conceive, to many of them, to prosecute
their selfish interests and neglect the body of the nation: it
would be dishonorable in you, though you had suffered wrong,
to punish the offenders in such a way, as to let any of them
fall under the power of the barbarian.
Under these circumstances, we must take care, that we ourselves engage not in the war upon unequal terms, and that
he, whom we suppose to entertain designs upon the Greeks,
do not gain the credit of appearing their friend. How can it
be managed? By giving proof to the world, that the forces
of our state are mustered and prepared, and that possessing
such forces we espouse sentiments of justice. To the overdaring, who are vehement in urging you to war, I have this
to say:-It is'not difficult, in the season for deliberation to
earn the repute of courage, or, when danger is nigh, to be exceeding eloquent: it is however both difficult and becoming,
in the hour of danger to exhibit courage, in counsel to find
better advice than other men.
It is my opinion, men of Athens, that a war with the king
would distress our republic, though any action in the course
of the war would be an easy affair.  Why so?  Because, methinks, every war necessarily requires a fleet and money and
posts; and of all these things I perceive that he has a greater
abundance than ourselves: but for action, I observe, nothing
is so much needed as brave soldiers, and of these, I imagine,
we and our confederates have the greater number. My advice
therefore is, that we should by no means begin the war,
though for action we ought to be fully prepared. If indeed
there were one description of force wherewith barbarians
could be resisted, and another wherewith Greeks, we might
reasonably perhaps be regarded as arraying ourselves against
Persia: but since all arming is of the same character; and
your force must amount to the same thing,' namely, the
means of resisting your enemies, of succouring your allies, of
1 Jacobs: es immner dabei auf dieselben Hauptsachen ankommt.
Pabst: es bei einer Kriegsmacht auf dieselben Hauptpunkte ankommt.




180         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
preserving your valuable possessions; why, when we have
professed enemies,' do we look out for others? why do we not
rather prepare ourselves against the former, and be ready to
resist the king also, if he attempt to injure us?
And now you invite the Greeks to join you. But if you
will not act as they desire, some of them having no good-will
toward you, how can you expect they will obey your call?
Because, forsooth, they will hear from you that the Persian
has designs against them. And pray, do you imagine they
don't foresee it themselves? I believe they do: but at present
this fear outweighs not the enmity, which some of them bear
toward you and toward each other.  Your embassadors then
will only travel round and rhapsodize.2 But when the time
1 This refers principally to the Thebans, between whom and the
Athenians an enmity had subsisted ever since the severance of their
alliance, when the Athenians, jealous of the growing power of Thebes
under Epaminondas, went over to the side of Sparta. This enmity was
increased by the events of the Sacred war, which had now been raging
for two years, and in which the Thebans were engaged as principals
on one side, while the Phocians received assistance from Athens and
Lacedremon. The Locrians and most of the tribes of Thessaly, then in
alliance with Thebes, are to be reckoned among the enemies, whom
Demosthenes refers to: perhaps also the Olynthians and the revolted
subjects of Athens.
2 I have chosen to preserve the original word, which has come
into use familiar enough in our own language. Francis has done the
same. Leland has: "the remonstrances of your embassadors will but
appear like the tales of idle wanderers."  Jacobs: werden eure Gesaendten nichts ausrichten, sondern mit irhem Spruche wie Bdcnkelsc#nger
umher ziehn. The meaning is, that they will go about from city to
city, and repeat the same idle tale or sing-song, which no one will listen to: as Pabst expresses it: vergeblich dasselbe Lied wiederholen.
The rhapsodists were a class of persons who in the early times of
Greece went about reciting pieces of poetry, and in particular the
Homeric. By the constant practice of reciting, they could retain an
immense number of verses in their memory; and, before the art of
writing was much known, this talent was a source of amusement and
instruction, and made the rhapsodist welcome wherever he came. In
the time of Demosthenes this class of men had fallen into disrepute,
and indeed their occupation was nearly gone. Afterward [aicwdeLv
came to be synonymous with 02vapeiv, "to talk nonsense, to string
words together without meaning;" and in this sense the word has
been appropriated to our own language. Compare Shakspeare, tarmlet, Act III. Sc. 4.
Oh, such a deed
As from the body of contraction plucks\
The very soul, and sweet religion makes
A rhapsody of words.




ON THE NAVY BOARDS.                   181
comes, if what we now expect be really brought to pass, I
fancy none of the Greek community rate themselves so high,
that, when they see you possessed of a thousand horse, as
many infantry soldiers as one could desire, and three hundred
ships, they would not come with entreaties, and regard such aid
as their surest means of deliverance.  The consequences then
are-by inviting them now, you are suppliants, and, if your
petition be not granted, you fail: whereas, by waiting your
time and completing your preparations, you save men at their
own request, and are sure they will all come over to you.
Swayed by these and the like considerations, men of Athens,
I sought not to compose a bold harangue of tedious length:
but have taken exceeding pains in devising a plan, the best
and the speediest, for getting your forces ready. It will be
for you to hear it, and, if it meet your approval, to vote for
its adoption.
The first and most essential part of preparation, men of
Athens, is to be so disposed in your minds, that every citizen
is willing and earnest to perform his duty.  For you see, 0
Athenians: whenever you have had a common wish, and every
man has thought afterward, that the accomplishment belonged
to himself, nothing has ever escaped you; but when you have
wished only, and then looked to one another, each expecting
to be idle while his neighbor did the work, none of your designs have been executed.
You being so animated and determined, I advise that we
fill up the twelve hundred and make two thousand, adding
eight hundred to them: for if you appoint that number,
I reckon that, after deducting the heiresses and wards, and
holders of allotments and partnership property,l and persons
1 The persons here enumerated were exempt from service of the
Trierarchia. Heiresses and wards were exempt, because, although
they might have property enough to defray the contingent expense, yet
the service was connected with a personal trust, which by reason of
sex and age they were incapable of performing. The colonial allottees
(KcXfpoeXot) were exempt, by reason of their absence., (See p. 101, note 2.)
KoLtvovo are any partners or joint owners, who would fairly be exempt,
when the share of each was not sufficient to qualify him; as in the
case suggested by Harpocration, of brothers having an undivided inheritance. The operation of the law would be as follows. The state
in the first instance looks to the visible property of the citizens, such as
land, houses, stock in trade or agriculture. A register is formed of the
twelve hundred owners of property most competent to serve the office




182         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
in reduced circumstances, you will still have your twelve
hundred  members.   Of them  I think  you should make
twenty boards, as at present, each having sixty members.
Each of these boards I would have you divide into five sections of twelve men, putting always with the wealthiest person some of the least wealth, to preserve equality. And thus
I say the members ought to be arranged: the reason you will
understand, when you have heard the whole scheme of arrangement.  But how about the ships?  I recommend you to
fix the whole number at three hundred, and form twenty divisions of fifteen vessels each, giving five of the first hundred and
five of the second hundred and five of the third hundred to
each division; then allot one division of fifteen ships to every
board of men, and let the board assign three ships to each of
their own sections.
When these regulations have been made, I propose-as the
of trierarch. This register continues the same, until circumstances
have happened which call for an alteration; and, practically speaking,
the same families continue for a long period in the register. But (says
Demosthenes) the thing worked so, that at any given time, when there
was a call for service, the register could not be depended on for the
whole number. Thus, the name of Timon is found in the register; but
Timon is dead, and the estate has descended to his three sons, or his
three brothers, who are not liable, because the share of each is inadequate. Or Timon has sold his property, and it is in the hands of three
or four partners. Or Timon has mortgaged it, and become himself too
poor to undertake the office. There would not be time always to investigate the excuses alleged by the registered party, or the condition
of his heirs or successors. That false excuses and evasions were sometimes resorted to, we learn from the orators. On the other hand, the
presumption against a man, from his name being in the register, would
sometimes operate unjustly to a man in reduced circumstances. The
law of the exchange was indeed a mode of relief, but attended with
difficulty. (See Appendix V.)'
We- may suppose, that when a registered estate was found to have
devolved upon several joint proprietors, the excuse would at once be
admitted in the first instance; though, if a man's separate estate, together with his joint estate, were of the requisite amount, one can hardly
suppose he would escape ultimate liability. Thus, if Callias be one of
Timon's heirs, his share of that inheritance not being sufficient to serve
the trierarchy, and his other property not being sufficient, but both
together being sufficient, he would not have his name immediately
substituted for Timon's, but the fact afterward appearing, either in a
judicial contest, or on a general revision of the register, his name would
be entered.
With respect to the adjectives 6pqavtcd(v, &c., I understand awcudrov,
"persons of the class of orphans," &c.




ON THE NAVY BOARDS.                    183
ratable capital of the country is six thousand talentsl —in
order that your supplies may be apportioned, you should divide this capital and make a hundred parts of sixty talents
each; then allot five of these hundredth parts to each of the
twenty larger boards, and let the board assign one hundredth
part to each of their own sections; so that, if you have need
of a hundred ships, sixty talents may be applied2 to the expense, and there may be twelve to serve as commanders;3
if of two hundred, there may be thirty talents applied to the
expense, and six persons to serve; if of three hundred, there
may be twenty talents defraying the expense, and' four persons to serve.
In the same manner, O Athenians, I advise that all the
furniture of the ships, which is out on loan,4 should be valued
according to the register, and divided into twenty parts; that
you then allot one good5 portion to every large board; that
every board distribute equal shares among their own sections;
that the twelve in each section call their implements in, and
get the ships which are severally allotted to them in readiness.
Thus do I think the supplies, the vessels, the commanders, and
the collection of implements, may be most effectually provided
and arranged.  How the manning may be made sure and easy,
I proceed to explain.
I say the generals should divide the dock-yards into ten departments, taking care that there be thirty docks in each as
near as possible to one another; and when they have done this,
let them attach two boards and thirty ships to each of these
departments, then allot the tribes and the several commanders to each dock-yard, so that there may be two boards, thirty
ships, one tribe. And whichever department be allotted to a
tribe, let them divide it in three and the ships likewise, and
1 See Appendix IV.
2 I e. that shall be the proportion of the whole ratable capita], upon
which a tax shall be levied to meet the expense. It is a short way of
expressing this. See Appendix IV. and V.
3 Trierarchs. The name was kept up, when it had become a matter
of contribution and civil trust, rather than of naval service. So, the
Lord High Admiral of our own government might never have seen the
sea.
4 It was customary for individuals to borrow the naval implements
and stores from the public arsenal, when the state had no occasion for
them.
6 Al. XprarCtv, debtors.




184        THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
then allot the third of a tribe to each, so that of the whole
dock-yards there may be one division belonging to every tribe,
and the third of a tribe may have the third part of every division, and you may know, in case of necessity, first, where the
tribe is stationed, next, where the third of the tribe next, who
are the commanders and how many ships there are; and the
tribe may have thirty ships, and every third of a tribe have
ten. Let the system be only put in train, and though we
should forget something now-for it is difficult to make all the
details perfect-it will be ascertained in the working; and
there will be one arrangement for all the ships and every division.
In regard to money and real supplies, I know that I am
about to make an extraordinary statement, yet still it shall be
made; for I am persuaded that, on a correct view, I alone shall
be found to have declared and predicted the truth. I say, we
ought not at present to speak of money: a supply there is, if
occasion require it, ample, honorable, and just: if we look for
it immediately, we shall not think we have it even in reserve; so far shall we be from providing it now; but if we
leave it alone, we shall have it. What then is this supply,
which hath no being now, but will exist hereafter?-for certainly it is like a riddle. I will explain.
You see the extent of this city, men of Athens. It contains treasures equal, I may almost say, to the rest of the states
put together. But the owners are so minded, that-if all your
orators alarmed them with intelligence that the king was coming, that he was at hand, that the danger was inevitable-if,
besides the orators, an equal number of persons gave oracular warning — so far from contributing, they would not even
discover their wealth or acknowledge the possession. Yet if
they knew that these proceedings, so terrible in report, were
actually begun, there is not a man so foolish, who would
not be ready to give -and foremost to contribute. For who
would rather perish with all his possessions, than contribute a
part of his possessions to preserve himself and the remainder?
Thus, I say, we have money against the time of actual need,
but not before. And therefore I advise you not to search
for it now. Indeed what you would raise, if you determined to raise it, would be more ridiculous than nothing at
all. For example: —Let a tax be proposed of one per cent




ON THE NAVY BOARDS.                  185
-there are sixty talents. Let twice as much, namely two
per cent, be proposed-there are a hundred and twenty.  But
what is this to the twelve hundred camels, which, these
men say, carry the king's gold?  Let me suppose however,
that we contributed the twelfth of our property, five hundred
talents. This you would not submit to; but if you did
pay it, the sum would be insufficient for the war. Your
proper course then is, to complete your other preparations;
let the owners retain their money for the present; (it can
not be in better keeping' for the state;) and should the occasion ever arrive, then take it from them in voluntary contributions.
These, O my countrymen, are practicable measures, these
are honorable and advantageous, fit to be reported as your
proceedings to the king; and by them no little terror would
be excited in him. Hle knows right well, that by three hundred galleys, whereof we furnished a hundred, his ancestors
lost a thousand ships; and he will hear that we ourselves have
now equipped three hundred; so that, were he ever so mad, he
could hardly deem it a light matter to provoke the hostility
of our republic. Should he however entertain an overweening confidence in his wealth, even this he will find to be a
weaker support than yours.  He is coming, they say, with
gold. But if he give it away he will lack supplies: for even
wells and fountains are apt to fail, if you draw from them
constantly and by wholesale. He will hear that the valuation
of our land is a capital of six thousand talents. That we
shall defend it against invaders from that quarter, his ancestors who were at Marathon would know best: and certainly,
as long as we are victorious, money can never fail us.
Nor is there, as it appears to me, any ground for what
some persons fear, that having money he will collect a large
body of mercenaries. I do indeed believe, that against Egypt2
Direct taxation in time of peace, when there is no urgent necessity,
is like killing the goose for the golden eggs.
2 Egypt had been in a state of revolt from Persia ever since the reign
of Darius Nothus. An attempt was made to recover it by his successor
Artaxerxes Mnemon, who engaged the services of the Athenian Iphicrates, and sent him with a powerful fleet and army under the satrap
Pharnabazus B.c. 374. This expedition failed, owing to the misconduct
of Pharnabazus. After the accession of Artaxerxes Ochus, repeated
efforts were made to reconquer this valuable province. At length




186         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
and Orontes,' and any other barbarians, many of the Greeks
would be willing to serve in his pay, not that he may subdue
any of those adversaries, but in order to obtain supplies for
themselves to relieve their several necessities. Against Greece
however I do not believe that any Grecian would march. For
whither could he betake himself afterward?  Go to Phrygia
and be a slave?-Remember, a war with the barbarian can
be for no other stake, than for country and life and customs
and freedom and every thing of the kind.  Who then is so
wretched, that he would sacrifice himself, parents, sepulchres,
fatherland, for the sake of a paltry pittance? I believe, no
man.  But further-it is not even the king's interest, that
mercenaries should conquer the Greeks. For they that conquer us must have been his masters already: and he desires,
not to subdue us and then be dependent on others, but to rule,
if possible, over all; if that be not possible, at least over his
present subjects.
Should any one think the Thebans will be on his side —I
know it is difficult to speak to you about that people: you
hate them so, you will not like to hear even the truth or any
thing favorable of them-however men who are considering
important questions must not omit any useful argument on
any pretext.  My opinion then is, the Thebans, so far from
being likely to join him in any attack upon Greece, would
about the year B.c. 348 or later the king collected a considerable force
of Greek mercenaries, and marched against Egypt in person. Mentor
of Rhodes, and the Theban Lacrates greatly distinguished themselves in
the king's service on this occasion, and Egypt was again brought under
the dominion of Persia; in which it remained until the overthrow of
that empire by Alexander.
Orontes was satrap of Mysia in the reign of Artaxerxes Mnemon.
He joined the great conspiracy of the satraps and the king of Egypt in
the year B.C. 362. He was chosen to command their forces, and intrusted with a large fund which had been collected to carry on the war.
He was induced however to change sides; and the trust which had been
reposed in him enabled him to betray his party to the king most effectually. Other rebels followed his example; and this confederacy which
at one time had threatened the very existence of the Persian monarchy,
was suddenly dissolved. What became of Orontes afterward, is unknown. The other satraps who joined this coalition were Ariobarzanes of Phrygia, Autophradates of Lydia, Datames of Cappadocia, and
Mausolus king of Caria. Datames was a man of great ability. The
treacherous manner in which his destruction was accomplished is recorded by Cornelius Nepos, who wrote his life.




ON THE NAVY BOARDS.                   187
give a large sum of money, if they had it, for the opportunity
of repairing their former offenses against her.' But supposing
the Thebans to be so utterly wrong-headed, of this at least you
are all aware, that, if the Thebans are in his interest, their
enemies must necessarily be in the interest of the Greeks.
I believe then, that our cause (the cause of justice) and its
adherents will be better armed against all adversaries than
the traitors and the barbarian can be. And therefore my
advice is-be not over-alarmed at the war; neither be led on
to commence it. I do not see indeed, that any other people
of Greece have reason to fear this war.  For which of them
is ignorant, that while, looking on the Persian as a common
enemy, they were in concord among themselves, they enjoyed
many advantages; but since they have regarded him  as a
friend and quarreled about private disputes with each other,
they have suffered greater calamities than could have been
wished in pronouncing a curse upon them?  Then should we
fear a man, whom fortune and heaven declare to be unprof1 The Thebans had always been reproached for siding with Xerxes
against the Greeks. (See the second Philippic, p. 83.) After the capture of Thebes by Alexander, this old charge was (not very fairly) revived against them by their enemies: " studia in Persas non prmsentia
tantum, verum et vetera adversus Grsecim libc: tatem increpantes; quamobrem odium eos omnium populorum esse:" as Justin says. The penalty which had been denounced against them ever since the Persian
war was then inflicted, and Thebes was razed to the ground.
Here we find Demosthenes speaking more liberally of the Thebans
than his countrymen were wont to do. The Athenians, besides their
recent grounds of quarrel, had a long standing e6mity with that people, arising out of various causes. The Thebans had been their most
bitter opponents in the Peloponnesian war, and at its termination had
proposed to destroy Athens altogether. Their merciless treatment of
the Platteans, both in that war, and afterward B.c. 373, when they destroyed the city, could never be forgotten by the Athenians, between
whom and the Platreans the closest friendship had subsisted ever since
the battle of Marathon. Neighborhood had brought the two people
into frequent contest about their frontiers; and their estrangement
was increased by dissimilarity of character, customs, and institutions.
Athenians sneered at Bceotian stupidity, while they had reason to dread
Theban arms: and Thebans were jealous of a city, which by its external splendor and attractions of every kind so grleatly eclipsed their own.
Sixteen years after this speech was delivered, Thebes and Athens were
united in a mortal struggle against a common enemy; vet owing to
their long dissension, the utmost difficulty was found in bringing them
together; and this was only effected by the powerful exertions of Demosthenes.




188        THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
itable as a friend, and useful as an enemy? Let us do no
such thingm! Yet do him no injustice either; having regard
to ourselves, and to the disturbances and jealousies among
the other people of Greece. If it were possible with one
heart and with combined forces to attack him alone, such an
injury I would not have pronounced an injustice.  But since
this can not be, I say we must be cautious, and not afford the
king a pretense for vindicating the rights of the other Greeks.
As long as we remain quiet, any such attempt on his part
would awaken suspicion; but if we are the first to commence
hostilities, it will naturally be thought, that he courts their
friendship because of his enmity with us.
Do not expose the melancholy condition of Greece, by convoking her people when you can not persuade them, and making war when you can not carry it on. Only keep quiet, fear
nothing, and prepare yourselves. Let it be reported of you to
the king-not (for heaven's sake) that all the Greeks and the
Athenians are in distress and alarm and confusion; which is
very far from  the truth-but that, if falsehood and perjury
were not considered as disgraceful by the Greeks, as by him
they are considered honorable, you would have marched
against him long ago; that you will forbear to do this for
your own sakes, but you pray unto all the gods, that he may
be inspired with the same madness that his ancestors were
formerly. Should he come to reflect on these matters, he will
find that your resolutions are taken with prudence. I-Ie knows
assuredly, that Athens by her wars with his ancestors became
prosperous and great, while by the repose, which she enjoyed
before, she was not raised above any Grecian state so much as
she is at present. And as to the Greeks, he perceives that
they stand in need of some mediator, either a voluntary or an
involuntary one; and he knows that he should himself step in
as such a mediator, if he stirred up war.  Therefore the accounts that he will receive from his informants will be intelligible and credible.
Not to trouble you, men of Athens, with over-many words,
I will give a summary of my advice and retire. I bid you
prepare yourselves against existing enemies, and I declare
that with this same force you should resist the king and all
other people, if they attempt to injure you; but never commence an injustice either in word or deed. Let us look that




ON THE LIBERTY OF THE RHODIANS.                189
our actions, and not our speeches on the platform, be worthy
of our ancestors.  If you pursue this course, you will do service, not only to yourselves, but also to them who give the
opposite counsel; since you will not be angry with them afterward for your errors committed now.1
THE ORATION ON T-IE LIBERTY OF THE RHODIANS.
THE ARGUMENT.
This Oration was delivered B.C. 351 on the following occasion.
In the island of Rhodes, as in divers other of the Grecian states, there
had been many contests between the democratical party and the
oligarchical. At the close of the Peloponnesian war it was in the
hands of an oligarchy, under the protection of Lacedvemon. About
the year 396 Conon, being at the head of a considerable fleet in that
part of the ~Egean, drove the Peloponnesians from the port of
Rhodes, and compelled the islanders to renew their connection with
Athens. Democracy was then re-established; but four years afterward the opposite faction again prevailed, a Spartan fleet made its
appearance, the popular leaders and the friends of Athens were
banished or put to death. For the next thirty years or more following that event little is known of Rhodian history. After the destruction of the Spartan navy, Rhodes with most of the zEgean isles returned to the Athenian confederacy, and we may fairly presume that
a new dermocratical revolution was effected in the island during that
period. But in the year 358 a rupture of a most serious kind took
place between Rhodes and Athens, pregnant with disastrous consequences to both. This was the breaking out of the Social war, the
immediate causes of which are obscurely reported to us, though there
is sufficient evidence to show, that the provocation to revolt proceeded from the misconduct, or at least the imprudence of the Athenians themselves.
We learn from various parts of Demosthenes, especially from the
Oration on the Chersonese, (p. 105,) how the Athenian commanders
at this period, sent out with inadequate forces and supplies, were
tempted or driven to commit irregularities, amounting often to acts
of plunder and violence, in order to maintain their armaments or
carry on their wars. Not confining their aggressions to the enemies
The speech of Demosthenes was so far successful, that it calmed
the excitement of the Athenians; and they were content to make a
show of preparation, without adopting any actual measures of war.
In the following Oration he refers with some satisfaction to this result.




190         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
of Athens, or even to neutrals, they harassed the allies, by extorting
from them loans and contributions, and thus brought the name of
their country into general odium and discredit. It seems that Chares,
having the command of a fleet destined to act against Amphipolis,
and conceiving himself to hold large discretionary powers, sailed to
Rhodes, and by his vexatious and arbitrary proceedings so irritated
the people, that they were ready on the first opportunity to throw
off their connection with Athens. The islands of Cos and Chios had
been alienated from the Athenians by similar causes, and desired to
recover their independence. These three states entered into a league
with Byzantium, which in fact had been meditated some years before, and raising a fleet powerful enough set the Athenians at defiance, commenced the Social war, which, after a three years' continuance, was terminated (as we have seen) by a peace humiliating to
Athens B.C. 355.
In the course of this war the allies received assistance from Mausolus,
king of Caria. lIe had formed the design of annexing Rhodes to
his own dominions, to Vwhich it was so conveniently adjacent; but
there was little hope of accomplishing this purpose, unless he could
sever it from the Athenian alliance. The oligarchical party in Rhodes,
still watching for a new revolution, were easily brought over to his
views; and at the close of the war a. Carian garrison was introduced
into the island, which established the oligarchy, and in effect brought
the island in subjection to a foreign yoke. The Rhodians had no
hopes of recovering their liberty; they had lost the protection of a
powerful state; while Mausolus could obtain effectual aid from the
Persian king, whose vassal he was, and to whom it was important to
acquire any of the islands near Asia Minor. Mausolus died in the
year B.C. 353, and was succeeded by his queen Artemisia. In her
reign the government of Rhodes became oppressive to the people;
who at length resolving to throw off their yoke, sent a deputation to
Athens, to implore her assistance. These petitioners, who were not
very favorably received at Athens, found an advocate in Demosthenes.
It was natural to expect, that there would be a strong feeling at Athens
against a people who had deeply injured her. A very few years had
elapsed since the Social war, and the events were fresh in the memory
of all. To overcome this feeling of resentment was the principal
difficulty which an advocate of the Rhodian people had to encounter.
Demosthenes appeals to the higher and nobler feelings of his countrymen. Motives of honor, generosity and compassion should influence Athenians: it was not worth while to remember the wrongs
done them by so insignificant a people as the Rhodian; they should
consider only what was due from them to Athens and to Greece. It
was their duty as well as their interest, to vindicate the liberties of
a Greek people under oppression, and more especially to defend the
cause of popular government against oligarchs and tyrants. Unless
they did so, their own constitution might soon be in danger; for
there was a perpetual strife going on between oligarchy and democracy, and, if all other democracies were put down, the Athenian must
be assailed at last. It was urged on the other side, that interference
with Rhodes might provoke the hostility of the Persian king. De



ON THE LIBERTY OF THE RHODIANS.             191
mosthenes contends, that the loss of Rhodes, which did not properly belong to him, was not likely to provoke the king; that in thepresent state of the Persian empire both he and Artemisia would
probably remain neutral; but that at all events the Athenians ought
to espouse the cause of the Rhodian people, even at the risk of Persian hostility.
I THINK, men of Athens, that on a consultation of such moment you ought to grant liberty of speech to every one of your
advisers. For my own part, I have never thought it difficult
to make you understand right counsel-for to speak plainly,
you seem all to possess the knowledge yourselves-but to
persuade you to follow it I have found difficult; for when
any measure has been voted and resolved, you are then
as far from the perforfmance as you were from the resolution
before.
One of the events, for which I consider you should be
thankful to the gods, is that a people, who to gratify their
own insolence went to war with you not long ago, now place
their hopes of safety in you alone. Well may we be rejoiced
at the present crisis: for if your measures thereupon be
wisely taken, the result will be, that the calumnies of those
who traduce our country you will practically and with credit
and honor refute.  The Chians, Byzantines, and Rhodians,
accused us of a design to oppress them, and therefore combined to make the last war against us. It will turn out, that
Mausolus, who contrived and instigated these proceedings,
pretending to be a friend of the Rhodians, has deprived them
of their liberty; the Chians and Byzantines, who called them
allies, have not aided them in misfortune; while you, whom
they dreaded, are the only people who have wrought their
deliverance. And, this being seen by all the world, you will
cause the people in every state to regard your friendship as
the token of their security: nor can there be a greater blessing for you, than thus to obtain from all men a voluntary attachment and confidence.
I marvel to see the same persons advising you to oppose the
king on behalf of the Egyptians,l and afraid of him in the
1 This can have no reference to the expedition, conducted by the
king in person, when by aid of the Greek mercenaries he finally conquered Egypt. For that expedition certainly took place at a later
period, though the exact date is a matter of controversy. See Thirlwall's History of Greece, vol. vi. p. 142, note 2. It appears from




192         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
matter of the Rhodian people. All men know, that the latter
are Greeks, the former a portion of his subjects. And I think
some of you remember, that, when you were debating about
the king's business, I first came forward and advised-nay, I
was the only one, or one of two, that gave such counselthat your prudent course in my opinion was, not to allege
your quarrel with the king as the excuse for your arming, but
to arm  against your existing enemies, and defend yourselves
against him also, if he attempted to injure you. Nor did I
offer this advice without obtaining your approval; for you
agreed with me.  Well then: my reasoning of to-day is' consistent with the argument on that occasion.'  For, would the
Diodorus, that there had been various attempts made by Artaxerxes to
recover Egypt, and it is likely enough that the Egyptian king applied
to Athens for succor, and that the question of granting succor was discussed at Athens. TheAthenians however appear to have abstained from
all interference, not wishing to violate their treaty of peace with Persia. Chabrias indeed was appointed to command the fleet of Tachos in
i. B.c., but Diodorus expressly states that he was not sent out by his
country, but went as a volunteer at the solicitation of Tachos. On the
last occasion, when Artaxerxes applied to Athens for assistance against
Egypt, the Athenians refused it, but promised neutrality. The passage
of Diodorus above referred to is in lib. xvi. s. 40, and the words are
as follows:-" The Egyptians having revolted from Persia at a former
period, Artaxerxes Ochus, not liking war, remained himself inactive,
but dispatched troops and generals, and incurred numerous failures by
the cowardice and ignorance of his commanders. Wherefore he was
despised by the Egyptians, but forced to submit, by reason of his indolence and love of peace. At this crisis however, as the Phoenicians
and princes of Cyprus had followed the example of the Egyptians, and
broken into rebellion out of contempt for his authority, he was roused
to anger and resolved on war with his revolted subjects. He decided
not to commission generals, but to contend in person for the preservation of his empire." It appears from another circumstance in the narrative of Diodorus, that the king had not commenced his final invasion
of Egypt when this speech was delivered. It did not take place, according to the historian, till after he had given orders for the expedition against Cyprus; but those orders were given to Idrieus, after he
had succeeded to the kingdom of Caria, which was at the close of the
year 351; and at the time of the speech Artemisia was alive. There
is a great difficulty attending the inference that we must draw from
Diodorus, that the king only once invaded Egypt in person; for it is
not only inconsistent with the express statement of Isocrates, quoted by
Thirlwall in the passage above-mentioned, but it is not easily reconcilable with the language of Demosthenes in this Oration (below,
page 194).
1 The argument runs thus-I advised you then [in the last Oration]




ON THE LIBERTY OF THE RHODIANS.                193
king take me to his counsels, I should advise him as I advise
you, in defense of his own possessions to make war upon any
Greeks that opposed him, but not to think of claiming dominions to which he had no manner of title. If now it be your
general determination, Athenians, to surrender to the king all
places that he gets possession of, whether by surprise, or by
deluding certain of the inhabitants, you have determined, in
my judgment, unwisely: but if in the cause of justice you
esteem it your duty, either to make war, if needful, or to
suffer any extremity; in the first place, there will be the less
necessity for such trials, in proportion as you are resolved to
meet them; and secondly, you will manifest a spirit that becomes you.
That I suggest nothing new, in urging you to liberate the
Rhodians-that you will do nothing new, in following my
counsel —will appear, if I remind you of certain measures
that succeeded. Once, O Athenians, you sent Timotheus out
to assist Ariobarzanes,l annexing to the decree, " that he was
not to declare war against Persia, because such war would have been
aggressive, and attended with serious difficulties. At the same time I
recommended you to make defensive preparations, as the surest means
of averting hostilities on the side of Persia, or defeating them if undertaken. I now advise you to assist the Rhodians, on the same principle
that I counseled measures of defense; because they are a Greek people,
with whom the Persian king has no right to interfere. It is not his
interest to interfere with them, if he sees you in earnest (as you ought
to be) for their defense: so I should tell him myself, if I were his adviser: and therefore I calculate he will be neutral.
The state of the Persian empire at this time fully justified the calculation of Demosthenes. See the last note.
1 Ariobarzanes, satrap of Phrygia, was concerned in the rebellion of
B.C. 362. See p. 186, note. It seems that, in soliciting Athenian aid,
which he obtained the more easily on account of his connection with the
state-he having received the honor of citizenship-Ariobarzanes had
concealed the object of his preparations; and therefore the Athenians,
in sending Timotheus, took the precaution of restricting his powers in
the way mentioned by the orator.  Timotheus, in return for some
service which he had done, was helped by the satrap to get possession of
Sestus and Crithote in the Chersonese. Cornelius Nepos praises the
Athenian general, because, instead of getting any private recompense
from Ariobarzanes, he had looked only to the advantage of his country;
while Agesilaus, who had gone out on the same service, took a pecuniary reward for himself. Timotheus then proceeded to besiege Samos,
which was occupied by a Persian garrison, and took it in the course of
the following year. Isocrates the orator, who acted as the secretary of
VOL. 1.-I




194         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
not to infringe your treaty with the king." Timotheus, seeing
that Ariobarzanes had openly revolted from the king, and
that Samos was garrisoned by Cyprothemis, under the appointment of Tigranes, the king's deputy, renounced the intention of assisting Ariobarzanes, but invested the island with
his forces and delivered it. And to this day there has been
no war against you on that account. MEen will not fight for
aggressive purposes so readily as for defensive. To resist
spoliation they strive with all their might; not so to gratify
ambition: this they will attempt, if there be none to hinder
them; but, if prevented, they regard not their opponents as
having done them an injury.
My belief is, that Artemisia would not even oppose this
enterprise now,l if our state were embarked in the measure.
Attend a moment and see, whether my calculation be right
or wrong.  I consider-were the king succeeding in all his
designs in Egypt, Artemisia would make a strenuous effort
to get Rhodes into his power, not from affection to the king,
but from  a desire, while he tarried in her neighborhood,2
to confer an important obligation upon him, so that he
might give her the most friendly reception: but since he
Timotheus, was at the siege of Samos, and praises the general for having taken it with little or no cost to Athens.
The occupation of Samos by the Persians was an infringement of the
peace of Antalcidas, by the terms of which the Greek islands were to
be independent.  Therefore the conduct of Timotheus, in wresting
Samos from Persia, afforded an apt illustration for the argument of
Demosthenes.
1 Leland erroneously translates this as follows: "Nor do I think
that Artemisia will act contrary to these principles."  The position of
the word ovi'  shows this to be wrong. Jacobs renders it: Glaube
ich nun aber, dass Artemisia der Stadt, wenn sie sich auf dieses Unternehmen einliesse, keinen Widerstand thun wivrde.
2 These words, 7r2oatov avrT  dtarpi3ovror tKEiVOV, which are loosely
rendered by most translators, suppose the case of Artaxerxes having
conquered Egypt in person. In that event he would be brought nearer
to Caria, than if he had remained at Susa. Then would Demosthenes
put this case here, if he had not heard of an expedition conducted by
the king in person? One can hardly think he would. Leland and
other critics, assuming that Demosthenes speaks of the final invasion
which led to the conquest of Egypt, explain the words, 7rpcrrovro7f GS
/iyerat Kac elt7luap-rlKoro', by suggesting that false rumors may have
come to Athens. This however does not solve the whole difficulty;
and it seems more probable, that there were two occasions on which
Artaxerxes marched in person against Egypt. See p. 191, note.




ON THE LIBERTY OF THE RHODIANS.               195
fares as they report, having miscarried in his attempts, she
judges that this island —and so the fact is-would be of no
further use to the king at present, but only a fortress to overawe her kingdom and prevent disturbances. Therefbre it
seems to me, she would rather you had the island, without her
appearing to have surrendered it, than that he should obtain
possession. I think indeed, she will send no succors at all,l
but, if she do, they will be scanty and feeble. As to the king
-what he will do, I can not pretend to know; but this I will
maintain, that it is expedient for Athens to have it immediately understood, whether he means to claim the Rhodian city
or not; for, if he should, you will have to deliberate not on
the concerns of Rhodes only, but on those of Athens and all
Greece.
Even2 if the Rhodians, who are now in the government,
had held it by themselves, I would not have advised you to
espouse their cause; not though they promised to do every
thing for you. But I see, that in the beginning, in order to
put down the democracy, they gained over a certain number
of citizens, and afterward banished those very men, when
they had accomplished their purpose.  I think therefore, that
people who have been false to two parties,3 would be no
steadier allies to you. And never would I have proffered this
counsel, had I thought it would benefit the Rhodian people
only; for I am not their state-friend,4 nor is any one of them
connected with me by ties of private hospitality. And even
if both these causes had existed, I would not have spoken, unless I had considered it for your advantage. Indeed, as far as
the Rhodians are concerned, if the advocate for their deliver-' To the Rhodian government, in case of Athenian interference: as
Schaefer rightly explains it.
2 Leland mistranslates this: "Yet, were these IRhodians who now
possess the city strong enough to maintain their possession, I should
not have advised you to grant them aid:" as if Demosthenes actually
did advise the Athenians to aid the Rhodian government. And then
he has a long note, which is transcribed by Jacobs, to explain this mistranslation. The meaning of Demosthenes is as follows:-If this had
been a question not between Rhodes and a foreign power, but only between the Rhodian government and the popular party, still I would
have advised you to side with the latter against the former.
3 I e. to the people at large, and to the select few whom they associated with themselves in the first instance.
4 See p. 97, note 2.




196         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
ance may be allowed to say so, I am rejoiced at what has
happened-that, after grudging to you the recovery of your
rights, they have lost their own liberty; and, when they might
have had an alliance on equal terms with Greeks and their
betters, they are under subjection to barbarians and slaves,
whom they have admitted into their fortresses.l I would
almost say, that, if you determine to assist them, these events
have turned out for their good.  For, during prosperity, I
doubt whether they would. have learned discretion, being
Rhodians;2 but since they are taught by experience, that folly
is mightily injurious to men, they may possibly perhaps become wiser for the future; and this I think would be no small
advantage to them. I say therefore, you should endeavor to
rescue these people, and not harbor resentment, considering
that you too have often been deceived by miscreants, but for
no such deceit would you allow that you merited punishment
yourselves.
Observe also, men of Athens, that you have waged many
wars both against democracies and against oligarchies-this
indeed you know without my telling —but for what cause you
have been at war.with either, perhaps not one of you con-.
siders.  What are the causes'?  Against democratical states
your wars have been either for private grievances, when you
could not make public satisfaction, or for territory, or bound1 Vitruvius relates a strategem, by which Artemisia got complete
dominion of Rhodes. The Rhodians had plotted with a party in HIalicarnassus to overthrow the Carian government, and sent a fleet with
troops to assist in the execution of their design. The troops landed
and advanced to the city, where the inhabitants were ranged under the
walls as if to give them a friendly reception. But this was done by
order of Artemisia, who had discovered the plot and laid an ambush
for the Rhodians. They were surrounded and slain. Artemisia took
their ships, and put a Carian force on board, which sailing to Rhodes,
and being mistaken by the people for their own armament returning,
got possession of the Rhodian capital. If the story be well founded,
the occurrence was probably later than this Oration, which refers to
no act of hostility between the Rhodians and the ruler of Caria.  It
should be noticed, that besides the capital city of Rhodes, there were
other considerable and much more ancient towns in the island, Lindus,
lalysus, and Camirus.
2 Homer calls the Rhodians dciyrepXot, which is translated nmagnanimi
or superbi, and seems to be a term of praise. Though the orator
speaks slightingly of them, they became celebrated for their commerce
and their laws.




ON THE LIBERTY OF THE RHODIANS.              197
aries, or a point of honor, or the leadership: against oligarchies, for none of these matters, but for your constitution
and freedom. Therefore I would not hesitate to say, I think
it better that all the Greeks should be your enemies with a
popular government, than your friends under oligarchal. For
with freemen I consider you would have no difficulty in making peace when you chose; but with people under an oligarchy even friendship I hold to be insecure. It is impossible
that the few can be attached to the many, the seekers of
power to the lovers of constitutional equality.
I marvel none of you conceive-when the Chians and
Mitylenveans are governed by oligarchies, when the Rhodians
and nearly all people are about being drawn into this slavery-that our constitution is in the same peril: and none
consider, it is impossible, if all establishments are on the principle of oligarchy, that they will let your democracy alone.
They know too well, that no other people will bring things
back to the state of liberty: therefore they will wish to
destroy a government, from which they apprehend mischief
to themselves. Ordinary doers of wrong you may regard as
enemies to the sufferers only; they that subvert constitutions
and transform  them  into oligarchies must be looked upon,
I say, as the common enemies to all lovers of freedom. And
besides, men of Athens, it is right that you,' living under selfgovernment, should show the same feeling for a free people in
misfortune, that you would expect others to have for you in
case of a similar calamity; which I trust may never befall!
Though indeed it may be said that the Rhodians have had
their deserts, the occasion is not a fit one for triumph: the
fortunate should always be seen to interest themselves for the
benefit of the unfortunate, since the future is uncertain to all
men.)
I often hear it said before this assembly, that, when our
commonwealth was in misfortune, certain people were solicitous for its preservation; among whom —I will here men1 The Melian orator, in the debate written by Thucydides, warns the
Athenians not to be cruel and oppressive to others, for fear of retaliation at some future time; lest, rendering no mercy, they should find
none. Demosthenes recommends a still higher policy, to succor the
unfortunate; to win golden opinions in the hour of prosperity, and
secure friends against the day of misfortune.




198          THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
tion a little circumstance of the Argives alone.' I would
not have you, famous as you have ever been for succoring
the distressed, appear in a matter of this kind inferior to the
Argives: who, inhabiting a country adjacent to the Lacedaemonians, seeing them to have dominion over land and sea, did
not fear or hesitate to show their attachment to you, but even
passed a vote-when embassadors had come from Lacedaemon
(as we are told) to demand certain Athenian refugees-that,
unless they departed before sunset, they should be adjudged
enemies.  Would it not be disgraceful, my countrymen, if,
when the commons of Argos dreaded not the power and
empire of the Lacedemonians in those times, you, who are
Athenians, should be frightened at a person of barbarian
origin, and a woman too? They indeed might allege, that
they have often been defeated by the Lacedtemonians: whereas
you have often vanquished the king, and not once been defeated either by the king himself or by his subjects; for, if
ever the king has obtained an advantage over our state, he
has obtained it in this way-and in no other-by bribing the
betrayers of Greece and the basest of her people. And even
such advantage has not benefited him.  At the very time, when
he had enfeebled Athens by aid of the Lacediemonians, you
will find him struggling for his kingdom with Clearchus and
Cyrus.2  Thus he has neither beaten us openly, nor done himself any good by his intrigues.   There are some, I observe,
who are used to slight Philip3 as a person of no account, but
This occurred soon after the Peloponnesian war, when Athens was
under the dominion of the thirty tyrants, and a large number of Athenian citizens were compelled to seek safety in exile.
2 It was to the pecuniary assistance of Persia, obtained by the management of Lysander, that the Spartans were mainly indebted for their
success in the Peloponnesian war. A few years afterward Cyrus, who
had been most active in the Spartan cause, marched from his province
in Asia Minor to contend for the crown with his brother Artaxerxes.
Clearchus commanded the Greek mercenaries in his service. The death
of Cyrus, who was slain charging at the head of his troops in the battle of Cunaxa, delivered Artaxerxes and his kingdom from further danger. This expedition is the subject of Xenophon's Anabasis. The retreat of the ten thousand Greeks, (after the treacherous murder of their
generals,) under the skilJful conduct of Xenophon himself, is one of the
most interesting pieces of Grecian history.
3 About a year only had elapsed since the speaking of the first Philippic. Whatever effect that speech may have produced at the time,
it seems to have made no lasting impression. The inaction of Philip




ON THE LIBERTY OF THE RHODIANS.               199
dread the king as an enemy terrible to any that he chooses.
However, if we are not to oppose the one, because he is contemptible, and yield every thing to the other, because he is formidable, against whom shall we take the field, 0 Athenians?
There are persons here, men of Athens, famous for advocating the rights of others against you; to whom I would
give one little piece of advice-to undertake the defense of
your rights against others, that they may set an example of
dutiful conduct. It is absurd for any one to instruct you in
the principles of justice, without acting justly himself: and it
is not just, that a citizen should have considered the arguments against you, and not the arguments in your favor.
Look you, I pray! How happens it there is none in Byzantium, who will admonish them not to take possession of
Chalcedon,l which belongs to the king, and you held it once,
and by no manner of title is it theirs?-also that they are
not to make Selymbria,2 a city formerly in your alliance,
tributary to themselves, and that Byzantium is not to determine the limits of the Selymbrian territory, contrary to the
oaths and the treaties, by which it is declared that the cities
shall be independent?  And none has there been to advise
Mausolus in his lifetime, none since his death to advise Artemisia, not to seize upon Cos3 and Rhodes and other Grecian
in the two following years relieved the Athenians from any immediate
apprehension of danger. They were roused to new alarm by the rupture of Philip with Olynthus.
1 Chalcedon, founded by the Megarians on the Asiatic coast of the
Bosphorus, was called the city of the blind, because the settlers had
overlooked the more beautiful spot on the European coast, where afterward Byzantium (site of the modern Constantinople) was built. The
fate of Chalcedon, like many other towns similarly situated, was to fall
alternately under the dominion of Persia, Athens, and Lacedaemdn. It
was taken from the Lacedemonians by Alcibiades, but surrendered to
Lysander after the decisive battle of IEgos-Potamos. The peace of Antalcidas restored it to Persia. At this time the Byzantines, who had
acquired considerable power since the Social war, were endeavoring
to draw it over to their alliance.
2 Selymbria is on the Propontine coast, between Byzantium and Perinthus.
3 The island of Cos, celebrated as the birth-place of Hippocrates the
physician and Apelles the painter, lies a little off the coast of Caria,
not far from Halicarnassus. It is mentioned in the Oration on the
Peace, that Cos, Chios, and Rhodes were seized upon by the Carian
government. (See p. 80.)' Shortly before this time the city of Cos'ad




200         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
cities, which the king their master ceded by his treaty to the
Greeks, and for which the Greeks of that period sustained numerous perils and honorable contests.  Or, if they have both
of them' such a monitor, yet seemingly there ale none to follow his advice.
I esteem it a just measure, to restore the Rhodian democracy: yet, granting it were not just, when I look at the
conduct of these people, I conceive it right to advise the
measure.2   And why?  Because, O  Athenians, if all men
were inclined to observe justice, it would be disgraceful for
us alone to refuse; but, when all the rest are seeking the
power to do wrong, for us to profess high principle and undertake no enterprise, would in my opinion be not justice,
but cowardice. I see that men have their rights allowed
them in proportion to their power: of which I can produce
an example familiar to you all. There are two treaties between the Greeks and the king; that which our republic
made, which is universally praised, and this latter one, concluded by the Lacedamonians, which is the subject of complaint.3 And the definition of rights in both the treaties is
been rebuilt on a scale of great splendor, and had become one of the
richest and most beautiful in Greece.
1 L e. the Byzantines and Artemisia.
2 Demosthenes may seem here to be setting up expediency against
right and justice; but his reasoning, properly understood, does not
amount to this. He means to say-in the politics of nations it is impossible, that the same rules of justice, which ought to regulate the
conduct of individuals toward each other, can be strictly applied. To
a great people, in order that they may perform their duty to weaker
states and administer justice on a large scale, the maintenance of power is essential. They must not permit their neighbors, because they
are nominally at peace with them, to commit aggressions upon neutral
states. The end of such acquiescence would be the destruction of their
own empire. Such is the principle on which in modern times our own
and other governments have frequently gone to war, to preserve the
balance of power in Europe. To apply this argument to the present
case-Persia has a treaty of peace with Athens: therefore Athens
ought not to attack Persia. But Persia has oppressed Rhodes: therefore Athens may break the treaty with Persia, because Persia has committed an injustice, tending (at least in its remote consequence) to ruin
Athens. In reality the protection of Rhodes against Persia is not an
act of injustice; but granting for argument's sake that it is, Athens has
done right in committing it; and the discussion about justice or injustice is nothing but a verbal dispute.
3 The first of these treaties is supposed to be the peace of C;mon,




ON THE LIBERTY OF THE RHODIANS.                  201
not the same.   For, although private political rights- are
granted by the laws impartially to all, the same for the weak
as for the strong; the rule of Hellenic right is prescribed by
the greater powers to the less.'
Since then it is your fixed resolution to pursue a just
policy,2 you must look that you have the means to carry it
according to which the Greek cities on the coast of Asia Minor were
made independent, the Persian king was precluded fromn approaching
the coast within the distance of a day's journey on horseback, and from
sending any ship of war between the Cyanean islands at the mouth
of the Bosphorus and the Chelidonian islands off the Lycian coast.
Whether this peace was made after the battle of the Eurymedon, gained
by Cimon over the Persians B.c. 466, or after his expedition to Cyprus
D.c. 449, has been a matter of controversy; and some historians have
doubted whether such a peace was ever made.
The second of the treaties here referred to is the peace of Antalcidas,
negotiated by the Lacedaemonians B.c. 387; according to which the
Greek cities were to be independent, Sparta retaining her dominions in
Peloponnesus, and Athens keeping only Lemnos, Imbrus, and Scyrus;
the Greek cities of Asia, and the islands of Cyprus and Clazomenam were
acknowledged to belong to the Persian empire. The Lacedaemonians,
by sacrificing the Asiatic Greeks to Persia, detached that monarchy
from the Athenian alliance, and were enabled to maintain their own
ascendency over the Grecian states.
1 The argument is thus pursued-In national affairs right follows
might. An illustration of this is afforded by the two treaties with
Persia. In each case the various claims and questions of right were
settled upon a different plan, and according to a different rule. This
proves that there can be no fixed principle of international justice, by
which the relations of different states to each other can be immutably
preserved. The civil law of every free country prescribes a uniform
rule of right and justice for all. But there is no such rule in the law
of nations, as experience demonstrates.
2 This observation is in accordance with the argument as above
explained. He assumes that his countrymen were sincerely desirous
of acting on the principle of justice, but contends that they could not
carry out their purposes by abstaining from interference with other
nations. If they espoused the cause of the oppressed, they would be
looked up to and respected as the patrons of freedom; if they kept
aloof, they would be despised, and their allies would gradually fall
away from them. Jacobs translates this clause: D)a Euch nun die Kenntniss dessen, was zu thun recht ist, nicht.mangelt. Leland and Francis
read Kai 7troLeZv. Leland has: " You assume the character of arbitrators
and defenders of justice." Francis: "It becomes the dignity of your
character to determine those bounds [of justice] for others, and to act
in consequence of that determination." Pabst follows Jacobs; but their
version of Eyvomtcivas'ocZv, is incorrect. Reiske and Schaefer explain it
rightly.
IS




202         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
out. Such means you will possess, if you are supposed to be
the common protectors of Grecian liberty. It is, doubtless,
very difficult for you to adopt proper measures. The rest
of mankind have one battle to fight, namely, against their
avowed enemies: if they conquer those, nothing hinders them
accomplishing their desires. You, Athenians, have a double
contest; that which the rest have, and also another, prior to
that, and more arduous: for you must in council overcome a
faction, who act among you in systematic opposition to the
state. Since therefore through these men it is impossible
for any good measure to be effected without a struggle, the
natural consequence is that you lose many advantages. Perhaps the chief cause why so many adopt this line of politics without scruple, is the support afforded them by their
hirers: at thq same time you are yourselves chargeable with
blame. You ought, O Athenians, to hold the same opinion
concerning the post of civil duty, as you hold concerning the
military. What is that? You consider that one, who deserts
the post assigned by his general, should be degraded and
deprived of constitutional privileges.' It is right therefore,
that men who desert the political post received from their
ancestors, and support oligarchical measures, should be disabled to act as your counselors.  Among your allies you
regard those to be the most attached, who have sworn to have
the same friends and enemies with yourselves; and yet of
your statesmen you esteem those the most faithful, who to
your certain knowledge have sided with the enemies of
Athens.
However-matter of accusation against these men, matter
of censure against the people, is not hard to discover: the
difficulty is to know, by what counsels or what conduct our
present evils may be repaired. This perhaps is not the occasion to speak of all: could you only give effect to your policy
by some useful effort, things in general perhaps, one after
another, would go on improving. My opinion is, that you
should take this enterprise vigorously in hand, and act
1 An Athenian who deserted the army in time of war was liable to
prosecution by a process called Zet7rocrpariov'pao7/. One who deserted
his post or rank was liable to a 2XetroraSiov ypasi. A conviction for
either of such offenses was followed by disfranchisement, drtuila. The
Generals were the presiding magistrates, who took cognizance of these
matters.




ON THE LIBERTY OF THE RHODIANS.               203
worthily of the state, remembering, that you love to hear men
praise your ancestors and recount their exploits and speak of
their trophies. Consider then, your forefathers erected these,
not that you may view and admire them only, but that you
may imitate also the virtues of the dedicators.'
1 The speech of Demosthenes produced no effect. Athens abstained
from interference; the Rhodians continued under the government of an
oligarchy, and subjection to Caria. (See pp. 80 and 167 of this volume.)
Artemisia died soon after the delivery of this Oration,. having reigned
two years. She is said to have been inconsolable for the death of her
husband Mausolus, whose ashes she drank dissolved in scented water,
and to whose memory she paid the most extravagant honors. The
monument which she erected was so magnificent as to be considered
one of the wonders of the world; and from this the name of Mausoleum
has been applied to all sepulchres built on a grand scale. She invited
the most eminent literary men to her court, and offered a reward for
the best funeral panegyric. Theopompus the historian, a native of
Chios, and pupil of Isocrates, gained the prize. Artemisia was succeeded on the throne by her brother Idrieus, who reigned seven years.




204         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
THE ORATION FOR THE MEGALOPOLITANS.
THE ARGUMENT.
Megalopolis was an Arcadian city near the frontiers of Laconia. It was
founded in the year B.C. 371, and, being designed for the metropolis
of the whole Arcadian people, who then united themselves into one
body, it was built on a scale of magnitude corresponding with that
purpose, having a circumference of more than six miles, and received
the name of the great city. Next to Athens, it is said to have been
the most beautiful ity in Greece. The population was obtained by
migration from the existing Arcadian towns, no less than forty of
which were required to contribute to it. Most of these were entirely deserted by their inhabitants, others were reduced to the condition of villages dependent on Megalopolis. A supreme council of
ten thousand, taken from the whole Arcadian body, held their public
deliberations in the capital. About half a century afterward, when
it was besieged by Polysperchon, there were found to be fifteen thousand citizens capable of bearing arms in its defense.
The chief object of building this metropolis was, to establish a permanent union among the Arcadians and preserve their national independence. Before that time, the Arcadians as a body had very little influence in the affairs of Peloponnesus, though they occupied a
large portion of its territory.  They had generally been in the alliance of Sparta, whose armies they strengthened by a brave and
hardy race of soldiers. It was therefore the policy of Sparta to
keep them feeble and divided among themselves. In the time of the
Peloponnesian war Mantinea, then the principal city of Arcadia,
formed a small confederacy among her neighbors, renounced her
connection with the Lacedwemonians, and joined an offensive alliance
with Athens and Argos. But this was soon put an end to. The
Mantineans were compelled, by the success of the Lacedsemonian
arms, to abandon their confederacy; and at a later period, nc. 387,
paid dearly for their disaffection to Sparta, by having their city dismantled and being dispersed into villages.
The defeat of the Spartans at Leuctra changed the aspect of affairs in
Greece. The prestige of ancient victory was gone; and it was soon
found that the vast alliance, of which Sparta had been the head, and
which had enabled her for many years to give the law to Greece,
would crumble almost entirely away. One of the first effects of this
change in Peloponnesus was the rebuilding of Mantinea; which was
soon followed by the establishment of Megalopolis. But the heaviest
blow to the pride and power of Lacedsemon was the loss of her
ancient province of Messenia, which for more than three centuries
had been the fairest portion of her domain. Whether the Arcadians




FOR THE MIEGALOPOLITANS.                 205
could have maintained their independence against Sparta without
foreign aid, may perhaps be doubted; but this last revolution was
wholly due to the arms of Thebes and the genius of Epaminondas.
That general, having assembled a large army in Bceotia, marched across
the isthmus and was joined in Arcadia by his Peloponnesian allies.
At the head of an overpowering force he invaded and ravaged
Laconia. Troops of divers people-who not many years before
had followed the Lacedsemonians in their wars, or would hardly
have dared to face them in the field-Thebans, Phocians, Locrians, Eubceans, Thessalians, Acarnanians, Argives, Arcadians, Eleans,
marched now almost without opposition to the gates of Sparta; and
nothing but the shadow of the Spartan name preserved that haughty
capital from destruction. Epaminondas did not venture to make a
general assault upon the town, but, after continuing his ravages for
some time longer, proceeded to execute his well-laid scheme, which
he rightly judged would reduce Sparta to the condition of a second
or third-rate power in Greece.
The Messenian population had long been, like the Laconian helots, in
a state of vassalage to Sparta, but were ripe for insurrection at any
favorable opportunity, as they had proved during the Athenian occupation of Pylus. The march of Epaminondas into Laconia was
the signal for a universal rising of that people, who were now again
to form a nation, and to build a capital city under the protection of
the Theban general. But it was not only the existing inhabitants
of the country, by whom this task, of reconstituting the nation, was
to be accomplished; for which, after their long servitude, they might
not have been so well fitted by themselves. Mlessenian exiles from
every quarter, and especially those of Naupactus, who had been
expelled after the Peloponnesian war, and migrated to Sicily and
Africa, were invited to return to their ancient home, and assist in
the glorious restoration. It has been mentioned as a remarkable
example of the love of country, that these exiles, during so long an
absence, had jealously preserved their ancestral usages and the
purity of their original language. They returned in great numbers
and formed the nucleus of a Messenian government. The new
city was founded on the site of the ancient Ithome, Epaminondas
laying the first stone, and received the name of Messene. This was
B.C. 369.
The humiliation of Sparta was now complete. She had no power
to disturb the new settlement. She was hemmed in by a chain of
enemies, who cut off her communication with Peloponnesus; by the
Messenians on the west, the Arcadians and Argives on the north.
Her war with Thebes continued for eight more years. The succor
of Athens and her few remaining allies saved her from further disasters; and the death of her great enemy, Epaminondas, brought on
a general peace, B.c. 361.
From the negotiations of this peace the Lacedtemonians kept aloof,
refusing to acknowledge the independence of Messenia, which they
regarded as a deep disgrace to themselves. Their spirit, though
depressed, was not extinguished; and they only waited for an opportunity of recovering their lost dominion. Archidamus, son of




206         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
Agesilaus, who had acquired honor in the late war by the tearless
victory, (in which he defeated the Arcadians and Argives without
losing a single Spartan life,) kept alive the ambitious hopes of his
countrymen, and continually stimulated them to fresh exertions. He
was a man of ardent character; to recover Messenia was the principal object of his desire; in which he had even been encouraged by
a pamphlet of Isocrates, entitled Archidamus, and still extant. In
the course of seven or eight years events occurred which favored the
views of this prince. There had been disturbances in Arcadia. The
Sacred war had broken out, in which the principal parties were Phocis and Thebes. An obstinate struggle was yet going on; neither
party had gained any decisive advantage, and both were greatly
weakened. The Phocian generals had carried the war into the enemy's country; somne of the Bceotian towns had been taken; and the
Thebans, distressed at home, and burdened with heavy expenses,
seemed no longer ill a condition to assist their Peloponnesian allies.
Under these circumstances, about the year 353, Archidamus thought
the time had arrived fo effect a counter-revolution, which should restore the influence of his country. His real aim was the destruction
of Megalopolis and Messene. But to avow this purpose, or attempt
to execute it without further pretext than the desire to satisfy
Spartan ambition, might have drawn on him the hostility of those
states which were unconnected with the Theban alliance. Accordingly, he conceived the idea of announcing a principle which would
secure certain advantages to the states hostile to Thebes, and induce
them to concur in his own scheme of aggrandizement. He gave it
out, that ancient rights ought to be resumed; that Athens should
have Oropus, the towns of Thespise, Plateea, and Archomenus should
be restored; Elis and Phlius should have certain claims conceded to
them. While he published these declarations, he kept in the background that portion of the scheme in which Sparta was interested,
viz., the recovery of Messenia and the dissolution of the Arcadian
union.
Notwithstanding all the care which Archidamus took to conceal his
views, they could not fail to be apparent; and it was soon understood that the warlike preparations in Laconia were designed against
Megalopolis. Two embassies were sent at the same time to Athens,
one by the Spartans, and one by the Megalopolitans, each to solicit
assistance in the approaching war. The Spartan embassadors reminded the Athenians of their former alliance, and showed what
advantage would accrue to them from the plan of Archidamus, by
which Thebes their old enemy would be depressed. The Megalopolitan deputies urged the justice of their own cause, and the danger
that would result from the revival of Spartan supremacy.
There were many speakers on both sides in the Athenian assembly.
Demosthenes espoused the cause of the Megalopolitans, and delivered
what Auger pronounces to be one of the most subtle of his orations.
He begins by condemning the warmth with which both parties had
assailed their adversaries. It became them, (he argues,) without any
feeling or prejudice for or against either of the contending states, to
decide the question by reference to justice and the good of Athens.




FOR THE MEGALOPOLITANS.                 207
Justice required that no people should be oppressed by another.
Their alliance with Sparta had been based on that principle, and
they had saved her from ruin; but if Sparta commenced ambitious
enterprises inconsistent with the spirit of their alliance, they were
justified in breaking it off. It was the interest of Athens, that neither Sparta nor Thebes should be too powerful. The dissolution
of Megalopolis would lead to the reconquest of Messenia, and that
would destroy the balance of power in Peloponnesus. The advantage
offered to Athens might be obtained in a more honorable manner,
without sacrificing the Peloponnesians; and as to Thebes, it was
better to weaken her by conferring an obligation upon her allies, and
attaching them to Athens, than by allowing them to suffer injustice.
IT appears to me, 0 Athenians, that both are in fault, they
who have spoken for the Arcadians and they who have spoken
for the Lacedsmonians. For as if they were deputies from
either people, not citizens of Athens, to which both direct
their embassies, they accuse and attack one another. This
might be the duty of the envoys; but to speak independently
on the question, and consider your interests dispassionately,
was the part of men who presume to offer counsel here. I
really think-setting aside the knowledge of their persons and
their Attic tongue-many would take them for either Arcadians or Laconians.
I see how vexatious a thing it is to advise for the best.
For when you are carried away by delusion, some taking one
view and some another, if any man attempts to advise a
middle course, and you are too impatient to listen, he will
please neither party and fall into disgrace with both. However, if this be my case, I will rather myself be thought a
babbler, than leave you to be misled by certain people, contrary to my notion of Athenian interests. On other points
I will speak, with your permission, afterward; but will begin
with principles admitted by all, and explain what I consider
your wisest course.
Well then: no man will deny it to be good for Athens,
that both the Lacedaemonians and our Theban neighbors
should be weak. But things are in this sort of position, if we
may form a conjecture from the statements repeatedly made
in our assembly-the Thebans will be weakened by the re-establishment of Orchomenus,l Thespice, and Plataea; the Lace1 The Bceotian cities were at an early period connected by a federal
union, each having an independent government. Thebes was at their
head, and received a council of deputies from the league. Every state




208         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
daemonians will grow powerful again, if they subdue Arcadia
and take Megalopolis.  WVe must mind therefore, that we suffer not the one people to wax mighty and formidable, before
the other has become weak; that the power of Lacedzemon do
not increase (unremarked by us) in a greater degree than it
is well for that of Thebes to be reduced. For we shall hardly
say this, that we should like to have Lacedaemonians instead
of Thebans for our rivals. It is not this we are anxious for,
but that neither may have the means of injuring us: so shall
we enjoy the best security.
But granting this ought to be sol-it were scandalous forsooth, to take those'men for allies, against whom  we were
arrayed at Mantinea, and then to assist them  against the
people with whom, we shared the peril of that day. I think
so too, but with one addition -  "provided the others are
willing to act justly." If all will choose to observe peace, we
appointed a Bceotarch, who took his share of military command and
some other executive duties.' In process of time Thebes asserted an imperial authority over the federal cities, and most of them were compelled
to submit. Platnea espoused the alliance of Athens, and for a long time
enjoyed her protection, but in the Peloponnesian war fell a victim to
Theban revenge. The exiles returned and rebuilt the city after the
peace of Antalcidas, but it was again destroyed by the Thebans B.C. 373.
Thespime was destroyed about the same time; having long been suspected
of disaffection to Thebes and favor to Athens. The Thebans had dismantled its walls in the Peloponnesian war, though the flower of the
Thespian youth had fallen in their cause at the battle of Delium. Orchomenus was taken and depopulated by the Thebans B.c. 368. They
had resolved on that measure some years before, but were induced by
Epaminondas to change their intention. Afterward, being alarmed by
a conspiracy of certain Orchomenian exiles, they fell upon the city,
massacred the adult citizens, and sold the women and children for
slaves. During the Phocian war, and shortly before or after the date
of this Oration, Orchomenus was seized upon by the Phocian general,
Onomarchus, and occupied as a fortified post. At the close of that war
it was delivered by Philip to the Thebans, who razed it to the ground.
After the battle of Chaeronea Philip caused all these three cities, Platea,
Thespine, and Orchomenus, to be restored.
1 Viz., that neither Lacedaemonians nor Thebans should be powerful
&c. Most of the translators seem to have neglected the word 6eZv in
this clause. Jacobs has: Aber dieses Alles zugegeben. Auger: "Nous
conviendrons peut-etre de ce point." Pabst and Francis commit the
same error. Leland errs only in giving too much force to deZv: "But
it will be said-yes! this is indeed a point of utmost moment "
The force of the argument is not impaired by this trifling error. But
inattention to minutiae sometimes leads to considerable mistakes; and
I therefore notice it for the sake of the student.




FOR THE MEGALOPOLITANS.                  209
shall not help the Mlegalopolitans; for there will be no necessity; and thus we shall be in no opposition to our fellows in
arms: one people are, as they profess, our allies already, the
other will become so now. And what more could we desire?
But should they' attempt injustice and determine on warthen —if this be the only question, whether we ought or ought
not to abandon Megalopolis to the Lacedaemonians, although
it would be unjust, I concede the point; let things take their
course, don't oppose your former partners in danger: but if
you all know, that after taking that city they will march to
attack MIessene, let any of the speakers who are now so hard
upon the Magalopolitans tell me, what in that case he will
advise us to do. None will declare. However, you all know,
that you would be obliged to support them, whether these
men recommend it or not, both by the oaths that we have
sworn to the Messenians,2 and because it is expedient that
their city should be preserved.  Reflect therefore in your
minds, whether it would be more noble and generous, to begin
your resistance to Lacedaemonian aggression with the defense
I' e. the Lacedaemonians; whom the orator does not expressly
name, because they are uppermost in his mind, since the clause ending
TnrV &irpwv.
2 This engagement was probably entered into at the general peace,
which was concluded after the battle of Mantinea, and by which the
Athenians, as well as other states of Greece, recognized the independence of Messenia. Pausanias mentions, that at this time, when the assistance of Athens was prayed for by the nMessenians, it was promised
in the event of a Spartan invasion.
It is quite clear from the argument of Demosthenes, that the claims
of Megalopolis upon the Athenians stood upon a different footing from
those of Messene, not being grounded upon any former alliance. Yet
in the narrative of Diodorus, XV. 94, we read that the Athenians sent
a body of troops under Pamrnenes to quell an insurrection in Arcadia,
which broke out in about a year's time after the peace, and threatened
to dissolve the Megalopolitan community; that Pammenes reduced the
malcontents to submission, and compelled those who had seceded from
Megalopolis, and gone back to their ancient homes, to return to the
capital. The name of Pammenes, a distinguished Theban general and
colleague of Epaminondas, pretty well indicates (as Thirlwall has remarked) that Ofigaiovg ought to be read in Diodorus instead of'AO6vaiovC.
Besides, (independently of the proof afforded by this Oration,) what
could be more improbable, than that the Megalopolitans should so
soon after the battle of Mantinea request the assistance of Athens, their
opponent? On the other hand, what more probable, than that they
should solicit the aid of Thebes, their ally?




210         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
of Megalopolis, or with that of Messene. You will now be
considered as protectors of the Arcadians, and striving for the
maintenance of that peace, for which you exposed yourselves
in the battle-field: whereas then it will be manifest to the
world, that you desire Messene to stand not so much for the
sake of justice, as for fear of Lacedxemon. Our purposes and
our actions should always be just; but we must also be careful, tht they are attended with advantage.
There is an argument of this kind urged by my opponents,
that we should attempt to recover Oropus,' and, if we now
make enemies of the men who would assist us to gain it, we
shall have no allies. I also say, we should try to recover
Oropus: but, that Lacedoemon will be our enemy, if we join
alliance with the Arcadians who wish to be our friends, they
of all men, I consider, are not at liberty to assert, who persuaded you to assist the Lacedsemonians in their hour of
danger. The men who argue thus actually persuaded youwhen all the Peloponnesians2 came to Athens and desired to
march with you against the Lacedsemonians-to reject their
Oropus was on the confines of Attica and Bceotia, on the coast opposite Eretria in Euboea. It anciently belonged to Athens, but frequently changed masters. In the twentieth year of the Peloponnesian war
it was betrayed to the Bceotians and Eretrians. It became independent
at the close of the war; but a few years after, the Thebans took advantage of some internal disturbances to seize upon the city, which they removed nearly a mile from the coast, and annexed to the Bceotian confederacy. A new revolution some time after restored it to Athens. But
in the year 366 B.c. Themison, ruler of Eretria, got possession of it by
tile aid of some exiles. The Athenians marched against him, but, the
Thebans also making their appearance with an army, they were induced to leave Oropus under Theban protection, until the dispute could
be amicably settled. The Thebans however kept it in their own hands;
and so it remained until after the battle of Cheeronea, when Philip gave
it up to the Athenians.
2 This statement accords not with the narrative of Xenophon, who
makes no mention of such an application to Athens, though he states
that the Athenians invited a congress to their own city, which was attended by many of the Peloponnesians. Diodorus however relates,
that in the second year after the battle of Leuctra the Spartans sent a
force into Arcadia, and took possession of Orchomenus; that they were
afterward defeated by Lycomedes of Mantinea, but the Arcadians, still
fearing the power of Sparta, even after they had been joined by the
Eleans and Argives, sent an embassy for assistance to Athens. The
Athenians having refused their request, they applied to the Thebans,
who sent an army under Epaminondas and Pelopidas.




FOR THE MEGALOPOLITANS.                 211
overtures, (on which account, as a last resource, they applied
to Thebes,) and to contribute money and risk your lives for
the safety of Lacedaemnon. You would hardly, I think, have
been disposed to save them, had they told you, that after their
deliverance, unless you suffered them to have their own way
and commit injustice again, they should owe you no thanks
for your protection. And indeed, however repugnant it may
be to the designs of the Spartans, that we should adopt the
Arcadian alliance, surely their gratitude, for having been
saved by us in a crisis of extreme peril, ought to outweigh
their resentment for being checked in their aggression now.
How then can they avoid assisting you to regain Oropus, or
being thought the basest of mankind?  By the gods I can not
see.
I wonder also to hear it argued, that, if we espouse the Arcadian alliance and adopt these measures, our state will be
chargeable with inconstancy and bad faith. It seems to me,
O Athenians, the reverse. Why? Because no man, I apprehend, will question, that in defending the Lacedaemonians, and
the Thebans1 before them, and lastly the Euboeans,2 and inaking them afterward her allies, our republic has always had one
and the same object.  What is that?  To protect the injured.
If this be so, the inconstancy will not be ours, but theirs who
refuse to adhere to justice; and it will appear, that while circumstances change, through people continually encroaching,
Athens changes not.
It seems to me, the Lacedoemonians are acting the part of
very crafty men. For now they say that the Eleans ought to
recover a certain part of Triphylia,3 the Phliasians Tricara1 He alludes to the war that followed the seizure of the Cadmea,
commenced by the invasion of Cleombrotus B.c. 378. See the Historical
Abstract.
2 When the Thebans attempted to get possession of the island. See
the Oration on the Chersonese, p. 113.
3 Triphylia was a small province on the Cyparissian bay, between
Elis and Messenia. Concerning this there had been many disputes between the Eleans and the Arcadians. The chief town was Lepreum,
which in the Peloponnesian war became the cause of a rupture between
Elis and Sparta. The Eleans had assisted Lepreum against the Arcadians, on condition of receiving half the Leprean territory: for which
the Lepreans afterward paid a sort of rent or tribute of one talent to
Olympian Jupiter. On their refusing to pay this during the war, the
matter was referred to Sparta, who decided in favor of the Lepreans;




212         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
num,.certain other Arcadians their territory, and we Oropus:
not from a desire to see us each possessing our own-far from
this-it would be late for them to have become generous-but
to make it appear as if they helped all to recover their claims,
so that, when they march themselves to attack Messene, all
these people may readily join and assist them, or be deemed
ungrateful, after having obtained their concurrence in the
question of their own several claims, for not returning the
obligation.'My opinion is, first, that our state, even without
sacrificing any Arcadian people to the Lacedoemonians, may
recover Oropus, both with their aid, if they are willing to be
just, and that of others who hold that Theban usurpation
ought not to be tolerated.  Secondly, supposing it were evident to us, that, unless we permit the Lacedsmnonians to reduce the Peloponnese, we cannot obtain possession of Oropus, allow me to say, I deem it more advisable to let Oropus
alone, than to abandon Messene and Peloponnesus to the Lacedsemonians. I imagine, the question between us and them
would soon be about other matters.  However — I will forbear
to say what occurs to me —only I think, we should in many
respects be endangered.
whereupon the Eleans went over to the alliance of Argos and Athens.
In the year B.C. 366, the Arcadians were in possession of Triphylia,
when a body of their exiles who had fled to Elis assisted the Eleans
to surprise Lasion, one of the Triphylian towns.  A war then broke
out between Arcadia and Elis, in which the Eleans greatly suffered,
though at the close of the war they distinguished themselves by a
victory gained over the Arcadians and Argives at Olympia. It was
the time of the festival, which the enemy had determined to celebrate
under the presidency of Pisa; the games had actually begun, when
they were vigorously attacked and routed by the Eleans on the sacred
ground.
I Tricaranum was a fortress in the Phliasian territory. The city of
Phlius was on the confines of Argolis, Achaia, and Arcadia. During
the Theban war, when most of their allies had deserted the LacedTemonians, Phlius continued faithful, and was exposed to the attacks of
her neighbors.  The Argives fortified Tricaranum, and kept it as a
hostile post, making incursions to plunder the Phliasian country, and
attack the city, which at one time was nearly surprised by an ArgiveArcadian force, assisted by some exiles. The Phliasians, whose constancy is praised by Xenophon, baffled all the attempts of their enemies. In the year 366, Chares the Athenian was sent to their assistance, and took Thyamia, another hostile fortress occupied by the Sicyonians. Tricaranum, it seems, remained in possession of the Argives.
See further as to the history of Phlius, p. 175, note 1.




FOR THE MEGALOPOLITANS.              213
As to what the Megalopolitans have done against you (as
they say) under the influence of Thebes, it is absurd to bring
that now as a charge against them; and yet, when they proffer
their friendship, with an intention of doing you good instead
of harm, to mistriust and look for an excuse to reject them,
without considering that, the more zealous they prove this
people to have been in the Theban cause, the more will they
themselves deserve your anger, for having deprived Athens of
such allies, when they applied to her before they applied to
Thebes. It looks indeed, as if they wished a second time to
turn these people to another alliance.
I am  sure- to judge from  rational observation —and I
think most Athenians will agree with me, that, if the Lacedoemonians take Megalopolis, Messene will be in danger; and,
if they take that also, I predict that you and the Thebans
will be allies. Then it is much better and more honorable
for us, to receive the Theban confederacy as our friends, and
resist Lacedaemonian ambition, than, out of reluctance to
preserve the allies of Thebes, to abandon them now, and have
afterward to preserve Thebes herself, and be in fear also for
our own safety. I can not but regard it as perilous to our
state, should the Lacedaemonians take Megalopolis, and again
become strong. For I see, they have undertaken this war,
not to defend themselves, but to recover their ancient power:
what were their designs, when they possessed that power, you
perhaps know better than I, and therefore may have reason
to be alarmed.
I would fain ask the men, who tell us and say, they detest
the Thebans and the Lacedaemonians, whether they detest
whom they detest respectively out of regard to you and your
interests, or detest Thebans for the sake of Lacedatmonians,
and Lacedaemonians for the sake of Thebans. If' for their
sakes, to neither as rational beings ought you to listen: if
they say for your sake, wherefore do they exalt either people
unduly?  It is possible, surely possible, to humble Thebes
without increasing the power of Lacedaemon. Ay; and it is
much easier too. I will endeavor to show you how.
It is well known, that up to a certain point all men (however disinclined) are ashamed not to observe justice, and that
they openly oppose the transgressors, especially where any
people suffer damage: it will be found moreover, that what




/214         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
mars every thing, and originates every mischief, is the unwillingness to observe justice uniformly. Therefore, that no such
obstacle may arise to the depression of Thebes, let us declare
that Thespise and Orchomenus and Platsea ought to be reestablished, and let us co-operate with their people and call on
others to assist us-just and honorable were this, not to regard with indifference the extermination of ancient citiesbut let us not abandon Megalopolis and Messene to the aggressors, nor, on the pretense of Thespise and Plataea, suffer
existing and flourishing cities to be annihilated. If such be
your declared policy, every one will desire, that Thebes should
no longer hold her neighbor's dominion.  If not-in the first
place, we may expect to find these men oppose the other
scheme, when they see that the establishment of those towns
would be their own ruin: secondly, we shall have an interminable business of it ourselves; for where indeed can it end,
if wc continually allow existing cities to be destroyed, and recl're those which are in ruins to be restored?
It is urged by the most plausible speakers, that the pillarsl
1 It was the practice among Grecian states to inscribe their treaties
on pillars of stone or brass, which, so long as the treaties remained in
force, were religiously preserved, and exposed to view in temples and
other public places. And it was frequently provided in the treaty itself, where the pillars recording it should be deposited. Thus, in the
treaty of peace between Athens, Lacedoemon, and their respective allies,
in the tenth year of the Peloponnesian war, it was stipulated that pillars should be erected at Olympia, Delphi, and the Isthmus; and also
in the Acropolis at Athens, and in the temple of Apollo at Amyclhe.
In the treaty between Athens, Elis, Argos, and Mantinea, made in the
following year, it was agreed that stone pillars should be set up by the
Athenians on the Acropolis, by the Argives in the temple of Apollo
in their market-place, by the Mantineans in the temple of Jupiter in
their market-place; and that they should jointly erect one of brass at
Olympia.  This (among many others) was seen by Pausanias in the
Olympian temple.
There is some difficulty attending the words that follow: ol & ftati',iv
aVtrof OViK elvat arheLac, ai2'2ii ro avrly0pov elvat rob 7otolov rv /taiav. I
have followed the interpretation of Leland and Pabst, which makes good
sense and agrees with the tenor of the argument.  Jacobs however
expresses a doubt whether the words will admit of that interpretation;
and Ulpian, whom Reiske follows, explains them, 6ack ycap IwA V7rcipXetv
CT77af, " they say they have no pillars." Now it is impossible to admit
this last explanation, when Demosthenes, without denying the truth of
the Megalopolitan statement, still insists that the pillars should be
taken down. It may also be urged that if this be the true meaning,
the latter clause would scarcely harmonize with the former; for if the




FOR THE MEGALOPOLITANS.                   215
of their treaty with Thebes must be taken down, if they
mean to be our steadfast allies. These people say, that with
them it is not pillars, but interest that binds friendship, and
they consider those who assist them to be allies. Granting
such to be their views, my notion is this. I say, we should
both require of them the destruction of the pillars, and of the
Lacedemonians the observance of peace; if either party refuse
to comply, whichever it be, we should side immediately with
those that will.  Should the Mlegalopolitans, notwithstanding
the maintenance of peace, adhere to the Theban alliance, it
will surely be evident to all, that they favor the ambition of
the Thebans instead of justice.  On the other hand, if the Megalopolitans in good faith espouse our alliance, and the Lacedaemonians do not choose to observe peace, they will surely
prove to the world, that they are striving not only for the
restoration of Thespiae, but for an opportunity of conquering
Peloponnesus while the Thebans are entangled in this war.
One thing in certain men surprises me; that they dread the
enemies of Lacedremon becoming allies of Thebes, and yet
see no danger in the Lacedammonians conquering them; although we have actual experience furnished by the past, that
the Thebans always use these allies against Lacedoemon,
whereas the Tacedemonians, while they had the same people,
used them against us.
I think further, you ought to consider this.  If you reject
the Megalopolitans-should their city be destroyed and themselves dispersed,' the Lacedemonians at once become powerful: should they chance to escape, (as unhoped-for events
people of Megalopolis had no pillars, further argument was useless.
Besides, it is very unlikely they had none. The doubt of Jacobs is
founded upon too minute a view of grammatical nicety. It would have
been better had the order of words been, o' arCTaf ciai ar'b 7  vp0pov
eivat. At the same time, the words as they stand may, according
to strict rules of grammar, be literally translated thus: " They say that
with them it is not pillars, it is interest that makes friendship," —the
elvat being repeated twice. The sentence is not so well constructed as
in the other case; but we can not always expect from an author the
most neat and elegant modes of expression.  In this clause lay an
emphasis on oivc and on CT72lac, but not upon Eivat, and then the reading will express the true sense.
Few persons will approve of Schaefer's conjecture, substituting Kerv'
for Levat, or Weiske's far-fetched explanation of —ovc eivat for ovdaptov
eivat, i. e. oivevor?oyov.
1 Into villages. See p. 76, note S.




216         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
do happen,) they will in justice be steadfast allies of the
Thebans.1 If you accept them for allies, the immediate consequence to them  will be deliverance by your means-but
passing from their case-let us consider what may be looked
for and apprehended with reference to Thebes and Lacedaemon.
Well then: if the Thebans be vanquished in war, as they
ought to be, the Lacedoemonians will not be unduly great,
having these Arcadians for their rivals, living near them. If
the Thebans chance to recover and come off safe, they will
at all events be the weaker for these men having become our
allies and been preserved through us.  So that in every point
of view it is expedient, that we should not abandon the Arcadians, and that they should not appear (in case they do escape)
to have owed their deliverance to themselves, or to any other
people but you.
I have spoken, 0 Athenians, (Heaven is my witness,) not
from private affection or malice toward either party, but what
I consider advantageous for you: and I exhort you not to abandon the Megalopolitans, nor indeed any other of the weaker
states to the stronger.
1 The event proved the justice of this remark. Demosthenes could
not prevail on the Athenians to follow his counsel. They joined the
alliance of neither party. Archidamus commenced war against the
Arcadians, who were assisted by Argos, Sicyon, and Messene. In the
course of the same year, Philip having defeated Onomarchus in the
great battle of Pagasxe, the Thebans were enabled to send forces to the
succor of their old allies. On the other hand, the Lacedaenonians were
reinforced by some Phocian mercenaries; and the war was carried on
for two years with various success, and at length terminated by a
truce. The Arcadian confederacy, however, were alienated from
Athens, and the bad effects of this were discovered some -time after,
when, alarmed at the designs of Sparta, they applied not to Athens,
but to Philip, for assistance, and thus caused Macedonian influence to
extend itself in PeloponnesuS. See the Argument to the Second Philippic.




ON THE TREATY WITH ALEXANDER.                 217
ON THE TREATY WITH ALEXANDER.
THE ARGUMENT.
This is one of the Orations which has generally been considered spurious; yet as it is published in Becker's and other editions of Demosthenes, it finds a place in this translation.
It purports to be an address to the Athenian people, rousing them to
take arms against Alexander, king of Macedon, and shake off the ignominious yoke to which they were subjected, on account of certain
injurious acts committed by that monarch, in violation of his engagements. It appears that in the year B.c. 335, a treaty was entered
into between Alexander and the Greek States, according to which a
general peace was to be maintained by all the members of the Greek
community, both with Macedonia and among themselves, every state
enjoying political independence, and Alexander being the common
protector of all. It is alleged that Alexander had broken the treaty
by sundry acts of interference with Greek cities, more especially
Messene, where the sons of Philiades had by his influence regained
possession of the government.  Another complaint is, that some
Athenian ships returning from the Euxine had been seized by Macedonian officers; and that Athens had been insulted by a Macedonian
galley sailing into the Pireus without leave.
The date of the speech may have been B.c. 334, after Alexander had
crossed over into Asia.
IT is right, O Athenians, that those who bid you observe
your oaths and engagements should, if they do so from conviction, have your entire concurrence. For I think nothing
so becomes a people who enjoy self-government, as to be regardful of equity and justice. The persons then, who are so
vehement in urging this course, should not trouble you with
declamations on the principle, while their conduct is directly
opposite; but should submit to inquiry now, and either have
you under their direction in such matters for the future, or
retire and leave you to advisers who expound the rules of
justice more truly —so that you may either tamely endure
your wrongs, and let the aggressor have his way, or, preferring
justice to every other consideration, you may be above all reproach, and consult your own interest without delay.' From
1: e. by taking arms against Alexander, which is a measure of prudence as well as justice.
VoL. 1. -K




218          THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
the very terms of the treaty, from the oaths by which the colllmon peace was ratified, you may see at once who the transgressors are,-in what important particulars, I will briefly explain.1
Were you asked, men of Athens, what would most strongly
excite your indignation, methinks you would all say, that if
you were constrained2 —I mean, if the Pisistratids were alive
at this day, and an attempt were made to reinstate them by
force, that you would snatch up your arms and encounter
every peril rather than receive them; or, yielding, you must
be slaves, like those that are purchased in the market —and
far worse,3'inasmuch as no man will kill a servant wantonly,
while the subjects of tyrants are notoriously destroyed without
trial, and have outrages also committed upon their wives and
children. Well then-Alexander has, contrary to his oath
and the express conditions of the general peace, brought back
to Messene the sons of Philiades, her tyrants.4  In so doing
has he paid regard to justice-or has he not rather acted on
Reiske explains it differently: " e, brevitate, qume locum habet in
tanta argumenti amplitudine;" i. e. "briefly, considering the importance
and magnitude of the question."
2 Schaefer thinks the words Et i-tr aivayKadot ought to be connected
with dyacva/crgatre, from which they have been disjoined by an error
of the copyist. I connect them with the following clause, and explain
it thus: —The orator was intending simply to add 7rooodEaocOat 70ro
HIetmrpatrri6aC, but then it occurring to him that the family of Pisistratus were extinct, he inserts the hypothetical clause el laav K. r. A.,
which interrupting the first train of thought, the sentence becomes
somewhat irregular. We need not be surprised at examples of loose
construction among the orators. At the present day few of our public
speakers attend closely to rules of syntax. An Attic audience was more
fastidious than an English, yet would tolerate occasional anacolutha.
Many of these would be retained in the published orations; and some
even by design; for now and then a loose mode of speech is more happy than a formal sentence.
3 Reiske takes roGOVr7, /uia;;ov in connection with dpTrdaavarac v-,7ro/yeZvat. I agree with Pabst and Leland who connect it with
dovev'etv.
4 Philiades was tyrant of Messene in the lifetime of Philip. His
sons, Neos and Thrasylochus, were expelled for oppressive conduct, but
afterward restored by Alexander. They are mentioned in the Orations on the Crown among the list of traitors by whom, as Demosthenes contends, Grecian liberty was sold to Macedonia. Polybius however maintains that the reproaches of Demosthenes were unjust, and
that the connection of these men with Macedonia was for their country's benefit. (XVII. 14.)




ON THE TREATY WITH ALEXANDER.                219
his own arbitrary principles, in contempt of you and the common agreement? If then such violence done to yourselves
would rouse your utmost resentment, you ought not to remain
passive, when it has been committed elsewhere in violation
of the oaths taken to you: nor should certain persons here
require us to observe the oaths, yet leave to men who have so
flagrantly broken them a liberty like this. It can not indeed
be permitted, if you mean to do your duty: for it is further
declared in the articles, that whoever acts as Alexander has
done shall be deemed an enemy by all parties to the peace,
himself and his country, and that all shall take arms against
him.  Therefore, if we perform  our engagements, we shall
treat the restorer of these exiles as an enemy.
Perhaps these friends of tyranny may say, that the sons of
Philiades reigned in Messene before the treaty was made,
and therefore Alexander restores them. But the argument is
ridiculous-to expel tyrants from Lesbos, who reigned before
the treaty, that is, the tyrants of Antissa and Eresus,l on the
plea that such form of government is oppressive; yet hold
that it makes no difference in Messene, when the same nuisance is established!
Besides-the treaty prescribes in the very commencement,
that the Greeks shall be free and independent. Would it not
be the height of absurdity, that the clause making them free
and independent should stand first in the treaty, yet that
one who reduces them to servitude should not be deemed to
have violated the compact? If then, 0 men of Athens, we
mean to abide by our oaths'and covenants, and do that act of
justice which they require of you, as I just now mentioned,
we must certainly take up arms and march against the
offenders with such allies as will join us.  Or think ye that
opportunity has such force sometimes, as to carry out policy
without right2-and now, when opportunity and policy meet
1 Antissa and Eresus are cities in Lesbos.
2 "Sic construe," says Wolf —ilXetv r'padrretv tb auv/uEpov Kat avev
roV dticatov-'O cKatpbf laXVet 7rprretv  Tb aCVFL0pOV, TOVTrErt, Gvarat.
Reiske: "Brevius sic dictum est, quod plenius et planius ad hune modum dixisset: oTroW iaXEltv aTre latdCeOaL t u   Ng ca? civev tro 6tcKalov,
&c. tanturn valere ut cogat nos."
Schaefer: "tu audi Wolfium."
Reiske explains the indirect meaning of the words, and Wolf their
direct meaning. But thle point of the manttcr i intelligible enough




220         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
together for the same right, will ye wait for any other time,
to assert your own freedom and the freedom of all Greece?
I come to another point under the articles. It is written,
that if any persons subvert the constitutions, which existed in
the several states when they swore the oaths of ratification,
they shall be deemed enemies by all parties to the peace.
Now consider, men of Athens: the Achaians of Peloponnesus
were living under popular government. Among them, the
Macedonian has overthrown the democracy of Pellene, expelling most of the citizens: their property he has given to
their servants, and set up Chberon the wrestler as tyrant: We
are parties to the treaty, which directs us to regard as enemies the authors of such proceedings. Then must we obey
this article of the convention, and treat them as enemies-or
will any of these hirelings be impudent enough to say nothese hirelings of the Macedonian, who have grown rich by
betraying you! For assuredly they are not ignorant of these
proceedings: but they have arrived at such a pitch of insolence, that, guarded by the armies of the tyrant, they exhort
you to abide by the violated oaths, as if perjury were his prerogafive;1 they compel you to abolish your own laws, releasing persons who have been condemned in courts of justice,
and forcing you into numerous other unconstitutional acts.
Naturally enough. It is impossible that men who have sold
themselves to oppose their country's interests, should care for
laws or oaths: they use their empty names, to cajole people
who assemble here for pastime, not for discussion, and who
little think that the calm of the moment will lead to strange
disturbances hereafter. I repeat, as I declared at the outsethearken to them who advise you to observe the treaty: unless
they consider, in recommending observance of the oaths, that
they forbid not the commission of injustice, or suppose, that
the establishment of despotism instead of democracy and the
without a paraphrase; and in translating we need not cut down every
figurative expression into plain prose. French translators are apt to do
this, aiming chiefly at clearness, in which they excel. Auger's version
is: " Ou bien, pensez-vous que 1'occasion est quelquefois suffisante pour
nous faire suivre notre int6ret aux d6pens de la justice?"
I have borrowed this expression from Leland. We might say"he had the privilege of perjury." But Leland's word better suits a
monarch. Auger: "comme si cc Prince disposoit du parjure en maitre
absolu,"




ON THE TREATY WITH ALEXANDER.                  221
subversion of constitutional governments will be felt by
none.
But what is yet more ridiculous-it is in the articles, that
all members of the congress,' all guardians of the public safety,
shall see that in the confederating states there be no bloodshed
or banishment contrary to the laws established in each, no
confiscations of property, nor divisions of land, nor abolishing
of debts, nor liberating of slaves for revolutionary purposes.
They however-so far from checking any of such proceedings
-even help to bring them about. Are they not worthy of
death, when they promote such plagues in our cities, plagues
which (because they are so grievous) the whole body were
commissioned to prevent?2
I will show  you a further breach of the articles.  It is
declared, that it shall not be lawful for exiles3 to make an
1 Which met at Corinth, where the treaty was made.
2 The nominative case to iterEtaav is either at avvOiKcaz or at r-6etgr.
3 From most of the Greek cities there were exiles banished for
political causes, and ready to take advantage of any revolution, to
return to their country. If these were many in number, more especially if they were connected with a party at home, or supported by a
foreign power, they would cause considerable uneasiness to the government. Such for example were the exiles from Elis and Phlius, who
have already come under our notice. (See pp. 134, 174, notes.) Such
also were the Bceotian exiles, while their country was subject to Thebes.
As the treaty of Corinth recognized the independence of the Greek
states, and preserved their institutions inviolate, the clause regarding
exiles was in the spirit of such arrangement, and introduced as an
additional security.  Alexander conceded this, being intent on the
Persian war, and wishing at that time to conciliate the Greeks; afterward, caring less about their favor, he, or his regent, Antipa.ter, sought
to extend Macedonian influence by means of a different kind. Of the
facts mentioned here little is known from other sources: but this restoration of the exiles is a measure not only probable of itself, but in
accordance with one taken by Alexander at a later period, of which an
account is given by Diodorus. About a year before his-death, Alexander caused an edict to be published at Olympia, by which the Greek
cities were commanded to receive back their exiles, except such as
had committed sacrilege or murder. Great consternation was produced
by this order, the object of which was to make the Macedonian
interest, by means of the returned exiles, preponderant in every state.
Demosthenes was sent to Olympia, to remonstrate with Nicanor the
Macedonian envoy. Nicanor however had no option but to execute his
master's commission. The alarm of the Athenians was increased by
the appearance of a large body of their exiles at Megara. They resolved to send an embassy to Alexander to entreat his forbearance. This
was done, and the mission was successful: but on Alexander's death,




222      1THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
excursion with arms from any cities included in the peace, to
attack any other city comprehended in the peace; if they do,
the city from which they start shall be excluded from the
treaty. Well! The Macedonian has carried his arms about
with so little scruple, that he has never yet laid them down,
but still marches wherever he can with arms in hand, and
more now than before, inasmuch as by an edict he has restored various exiles in different places, and the wrestlingmaster in Sicyon. If we are bound then to obey the terms
of the convention, as these men declare, the states guilty of
such conduct are under treaty with us no longer. I allow, if
the truth is to be suppressed, we must not say they are the
Macedonian: but when these traitorous ministers of Macedonia never cease urging you to fulfill the conditions of the
treaty, let us hearken to their counsel, as it is just, and let us
deliberate —putting them under your ban, as the oath requires-how to treat people whose tempers are so imperious
and insolent, who are always either forming or executing
some designs, and making a mockery of the peace. How
can my opponents dispute the propriety of this? Do they
require the clauses against our country to be in force, and not
allow those which are for our protection? Does this appear
to be justice? Will they confirm whatever is against us in
the oaths and favorable to our adversaries-yet think proper
continually to oppose any fair advantage that is secured to us
against them?
To convince you still more clearly that the Greeks will
never charge you with infringing any part of the convention,
but will even thank you for taking upon yourselves to expose
the guilty parties-I will, as the articles are numerous, glance
cursorily at a few points.
I believe one article is, that all the contracting parties
may navigate the sea, that none shall molest them, that none
of them shall force a vessel into port; that whoever breaks
this condition shall be deemed an enemy by all parties. Now,
men of Athens, you know perfectly well, that this has been
done by the Macedonians. They have come to be so lawless,
which followed soon after, a rising of the Greeks took place, which had
well-nigh overthrown the Macedonian power. This was the war called
the Lamian, in which the Athenians and their allies were at first victorious, but were finally crushed by Antipater.




ON THE TREATY WITH ALEXANDER.                223
that they carried into Tenedos all our vessels from the Euxine,
and under pretenses refused to refused to release them, until you determined to man a hundred ships of war and launch them
immediately, and appointed Menestheus to the command.  Is
it not absurd, when the wrongs done by others are of such
number and magnitude, that their friends here, instead of restraining them the trangressors, should advise us to observe a
compact so little regarded? As if it were further declared,
that trespass should be allowed to one party, and not even
resistance to the other!  Were not their acts both lawless
and senseless, when they violated their oaths to such an extent, as had well-nigh justly deprived them of their maritime
supremacy?2 And as it is, they have left you this plea beyond a question, when you choose to enforce it: for assuredly
they have not the less broken the convention, because they
left off committing trespasses: they are only fortunate in
profiting by your indolence, that will not even take advantage
of a right.
The most humiliating circumstance is this-that while all
others, Greeks and barbarians, dread your enmity, these upstarts3 alone compel you to despise yourselves, either persuading or forcing you into measures, as if they were statesmen of Abdera or Maronea,4 not of Athens. At the same
time they weaken your power, and strengthen that of your
adversaries; and yet (without perceiving it) acknowledge our
republic to be irresistible; for they forbid her to maintain
justice justly,5 as though she could easily vanquish her enemies, if she chose to consult her own interests. And their
notion is reasonable. For as long as we can be indisputably
I Schaefer takes dwEiaav in the sense of fE7awaavro.
2 Alexander having by the treaty been declared generalissimo of
the Greeks, a supremacy both on land and sea was accorded to Macedonia, although that kingdom did not actually possess so large a fleet
as Athens. The Athenians furnished twenty galleys to the armament
which conveyed Alexander across the Hellespont.
3 The original vebrbiovroe (nouveaux riches, as the French say,) is
noticed by Libanius as a term not likely to be used by Demosthenes.
So is d6evpevaerat. The former appears to me a very good word. We
have none that exactly corresponds with it.
4 These were cities in Thrace. Abdera was famous for the stupidity
of the inhabitants, though it produced Democritus the philosopher.
5 Because they recommend that the Athenians should observe the
treaty, and the Macedonians be allowed to break it.




224         THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
masters of the sea alone, we may find other defenses for the
land, in addition to our existing force, especially if by good
fortune these men, who are now guarded by the tyrant's
armies, should be put down, some of them destroyed, some
proved to be utterly worthless.
So grave an offense (in addition to what I have mentioned
before) has the Macedonian committed in the affair of the
ships. But the most outrageous and overbearing act of the
Macedonians is what has lately occurred-their daring to sail
into the Piraeus contrary to our convention with them. And
you must not regard it as a light matter, men of Athens,
because there was only one ship; but' as an experiment on
our patience, that they may have liberty to do it with more,
and a contempt of the agreement, as in the former instances.
That they meant to creep along by degrees, and accustom us
to tolerate such intrusions, is evident from this only-the
commander who put into port, (who ought with his galley to
have been instantly destroyed by you,) asked permission to
build small boats in our harbors-does it not show that their
contrivance was, instead of sailing into port, to be inside at
once?  And if iwe allow small Loats, we shall shortly allow
vessels of war; if a small number at first, very soon a large.
It is impossible, you know, to make this excuse,2 that in
Athens there is plenty of ship-timber, (which is brought with
trouble from a distance,) and a scarcity in Macedonia (which
supplies it at the cheapest rate to all purchasers). No. They
looked both to build vessels here, and to man them  in the
same harbor, although it was expressed in the treaty, that
nothing of the kind should be allowed. And these liberties
will increase more and more. With such contempt in every
way do they treat our republic, through their instructors
here, who suggest to them what course to pursue. And such
is the estimate which, in common with these men, they have
formed of Athens, that she is inexpressibly feeble and imbecile,
I I do not, with Schaefer and Pabst, understand /tya before Ort, but
simply take Virrorlnriov to be repeated. The words oviK E06vrTaav K.
r. L. may be literally translated: " They [in so doing] disregarded the
common articles, just as they disregarded the articles before-mentioned:" that is: "' they disregarded the convention in this particular,
as they disregarded those articles which I mentioned before."
2 Understand rrotzcal 7oV7ro,." to say they did it because," &c.




ON THE TREATY WITH ALEXANDER.                  225
that she has no forethought for the future, nor takes any account how the tyrant observes the treaty.'
That treaty, O Athenians, I exhort you to obey, in such
manner as I explained, insisting2 (under the privilege of my
age) that you might at the same time exercise your rights
without reproach, and use without danger the opportunities
which impel you to your good. For there is a further addition to the articles-" if we will be parties to the common
peace."  This, " if we will," means also a different thing" if we ever ought to cease shamefully following others, and
forgetting those honors, of which we, beyond all people, have
won so many from the earliest time." Therefore, with your
permission, men of Athens, I will move, as the treaty commands, to make war upon the transgressors.3
1 Wolf has a note on this passage, not very complimentary to the
Athenians-" Recte quidem senserunt, nisi Demosthenes ubique mentitur, qui talem nobis depingit Atheniensem populum, ut asino ignavissimo, qui vix contis et fustibus excitari queat, comparandus videatur."
2 I connect dzeiefei3auttcdpv with caOa'rep, dcv with:XpOaat. The following sentence I have rendered according to Schaefer's interpretation; but so far agree with Reiske, that I think it is too ill written to
be worth a note.
3 Almost all critics, ancient and modern, have pronounced this Oration to be spurious. Lybanius ascribes it to Hyperides, Ulpian to Hegesippus. History affords no confirmation of the fact that such a speech
ever was made. And it would also be strange, if Demosthenes had purposed to make war against Alexander, that there should be no allusion
to it in either of the speeches on the Crown. Auger makes the following remarks on the inferiority of the style:
"Quoique cce discours se trouve dans les ceuvres de D6mosthene, tous
les critiques s'accordent a dire qu'il n'est pas de Demosthene. Je suis
tr's fort de leur avis. Je n'y trouve point cette vehemence et cette
rapidit6 de style, cette nettete, cette clart6 lumineuse, cette profondeur
dans les id6es, qui caracterisent D6mosthbne."
Francis says:
"Our editors have preserved to us the Orations upon Halonnesus
and Alexander's treaty with Athens, even while they hold them written by other authors, and unworthy of our orator's character. The
translator therefore hopes to be forgiven his not attempting to preserve what in themselves are confessedly spurious, and, if they were
genuine, would be injurious to the reputation of his author. A painting would do little honor to the cabinet of the curious, merely because
ignorance and false taste had once given it to the divine Raphael."
The only commentator that I have seen, who maintains the genuineness of this Oration, is Leland. It is but fair to hear his reasons:
"Critics seem willing to ascribe this oration to Hegesippus, or to
K2




226          THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
Hyperides. It is observed that the style is diffuse, languid, and disgraced by some affected phrases; and that the whole composition by
no means breathes that spirit of boldness and freedom which appears
in the orations of Demosthenes. But these differences may possibly
be accounted for, without ascribing it to another author. Dejection
and vexation, a consciousness of the fallen condition of his country,
despair and terror at the view of the Macedonian power, might have
naturally produced an alteration in the style and manner of the orator's address. A great epic genius, when in its decline, is said by Longinus to fall naturally into the fabulous. In like manner, a great popular speaker, when hopeless and desponding, checked and controlled
by his fears, may find leisure to coin words, and naturally recur to affected expressions, when the torrent of his native eloquence is stopped.
Nor is the Oration now before us entirely destitute of force and spirit.
It appears strong and vehement, but embarrassed. The fire of Demosthenes sometimes breaks forth through all obstacles, but is instantly
allayed and suppressed, as if by fear and caution. The author, as U1pian expresses it, speaks freely, and not freely: he encourages the citizens to war, and yet scruples to move for war in form; as if his mind
was distracted between fear and confidence. In a word, I regard this
Oration on the Treaty with Alexander as the real work of Demosthenes, but of Demosthenes dejected and terrified, willing to speak
consistently with himself, yet not daring to speak all that he feels.
It may be compared to the performance of an eminent painter, necessarily executed at a time when his hands or eyes labored under some
disorder, in which we find the traces of his genius and abilities obscured by many marks of his present infirmity."




APPENDIX I.
O L Y N THU S.
THE taking of Olynthus was one of the turning points of Philip's
success, and merits particular attention.
Olynthus was the chief city of the Chalcidic peninsula, which is
separated from the inland part of Macedonia by a range of mountains, crossing from the Thermaic to the Strymonic gulf. The
peninsula itself runs out into three smaller peninsulas or tongues of
land, the eastern of which is overshadowed by Mount Athos, and
was called Acte; the central was named Sithonia, and the western
Pallene. The whole district was called Chalcidice, on account of
the numerous colonies planted there by the Chalcidians of Euboea.
In early times, and long before Athens took a prominent part in
Grecian affairs, Chalcis and Eretria, the chief cities of Euboea, had
acquired considerable eminence, and sent out colonies not only to
the northern parts of Greece, but to Sicily and Italy. Of their Macedonian colonies the most ancient was Methone, founded by the
Eretrians in Pieria. In the Chalcidic region there were established
upwards of thirty towns, many of Euboic origin. The principal
among them were, Apollonia, Stagira, Acanthus, Cleonse, Argilus,
Mende, Scione, Torone, Mecyberna, Anthemus, Sane, AEneia, Spartolus, Potidaea. This last city, so important in Athenian history,
was founded by Corinth.
Olynthus, which stood at the head of the Toronaic gulf, was
originally inhabited by a Bottisean tribe; but having been taken by
Artabazus, the Persian satrap, who massacred the population, it
was repeopled by Chalcidians.L At the close of the Persian war,
the Greek cities on that coast became attached to the general confederacy, of which Athens was at the head. But Potidsea and many
of the Chalcidian cities were induced to revolt from Athens, B.C.
432, chiefly by the persuasion of Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, and
under promise of assistance from Peloponnesus. Perdiccas at the
same time advised, that the inhabitants of the smaller towns on the' Herodotus, vii. 127.




228                    APPENDIX  I.
coast should remove to Olynthus, and concentrate their power in
that city, which, on account of its position, a little inland, was less
exposed to an attack from the sea. This was done, and by such
means Olynthus became the capital of the Chalcidic population.1
During the Peloponnesian war, although Potidaea was taken, the
members of the Chalcidian league maintained their independence
against Athens. In the third year of the war they defeated the
Athenians near Spartolus. It was partly at their invitation that
Brasidas was sent to attack the Athenian possessions in the neighborhood; and it was their jealousy that in a great measure prevented the restitution of Amphipolis, after the peace of Nicias.
In the eleventh year of the war, the Olynthians took Mecyberna,
which was defended by an Athenian garrison. This place, which
is near Olynthus on the Toronaic gulf, they afterwards made the
port of their own city.2 A truce followed between Athens and
Olynthus, and the misfortune of the Athenians in Sicily prevented
them from making any further attempt to restore their empire in
this quarter.
At the close of the Peloponnesian war, when the power of Athens
was annihilated, a new prospect was opened to the ambition of the
Olynthians. Potidaea and many other towns joined their confederacy. A large military force was kept on foot, and they began
to turn their thoughts to the establishment of a navy, for which
their peninsular situation and the abundance of ship-timber in the
country were eminently favorable. It might have been better for
them, had they confined their attention (at least for some time) to
the acquisition of maritime power; but the weakness of their neighbors tempted them to make inland conquests in Thrace and Macedonia, which led to a combination against them before their strength
was sufficiently consolidated. History is silent as to any operations
in Thrace, but we are informed, that they had acquired considerable
influence among the independent Thracian tribes, who inhabited the
country stretching eastward of the Strymon towards Rhodope; and
it is probable that they coveted possession of the mine district of
Pangreus. But the hostilities in which they engaged with Amyntas
king of Macedonia led to most important results. At first they
were completely successful: they either took or seduced from his
allegiance a great number of-Macedonian towns. They even got
possession of Pella, which afterwards became the capital of Macedonia; and Amyntas, who had about the same time suffered a great
defeat from the Illyrians, appeared to have lost all his dominions.
Diodorus says, that he surrendered Pella to the Olynthians in the' Thucydides, i. 58. The war in the Chalcidic is related in divers
parts of his history. See particularly iv. 79; v. 21, 88, 39, 80; vi. 7.
2 Fragment from the end of Strabo's seventh book, rT7'O;vy0ov tErivetOv Acts-.




OLYNTHUS.                       229
time of his distress, and they refused to restore it when his affairs
were retrieved. However this be, it was certainly in their hands
shortly before the year s.c. 383, when Sparta commenced the war,
which I am about to mention.'
Amyntas applied to Sparta for aid; but it was not his solicitation
so much, as one from another quarter, that induced the Lacedoemonians to interfere. Apollonia and Acanthus, the two greatest (next
to Olynthus) of the Chalcidian cities, had sent an embassy to Sparta
for the same purpose, to implore her protection against the Olynthians, who threatened them with war, unless they would join their
confederacy.
It may seem surprising, that people situated as these were, exposed to aggression from powerful states and monarchies, should
not have perceived the advantage of a federal union such as that of
which Olynthus was the head. But this was the feeling of Greek
states in general; they preferred independence to safety. The same
jealous feeling had overthrown the Athenian empire; it was destined to work the ruin of Olynthus, and lead ultimately to the subjugation of Greece. Apollonia and Acanthus had never joined the
league which had been formed under the advice of Perdiccas; the
conditions of which, though liberal, involved a submission to Olynthus as the ruling state. Appollonia had once been the most considerable city of the district; it lay far inland, about twelve miles
from Olynthus, at the foot of the Cissoean mountains. Acanthus
was a coast-town on the Strymonic gulf, north of the isthmus of
Mount Athos, across which the famous canal was cut for Xerxes.
The Acanthians were the first people that revolted from Athens,
when Brasidas came into their country. Their jealousy of Athens
was now transferred to Olynthus.
The embassadors from these two cities were introduced by the
Ephors to the Spartan assembly, which was attended by deputies
from the Peloponnesian allies. The Acanthian envoy addressed to
them an elaborate speech, in which he set forth the growing power
and ambitious projects of Olynthus, her military force and resources,
the towns that she had wrested from Macedonia, the extreme weakness of Amyntas, and the danger that threatened themselves. He
stated that he had left embassadors from Thebes and Athens at
Olynthus, and that the Olynthians had passed a resolution to negotiate alliance with those cities.  Many of the Chalcidians were
ready to revolt, he said, if the Lacedemonians would send them
assistance.
The Spartans and their allies were prevailed on by these arguments, and it was resolved that an army of ten thousand men
should be raised in Peloponnesus, to carry on the war. The AcanThe history of these events is related by Xenophon, Hellen. lib. v.
c. 2, 3. Diodorus Siculus, lib. xv. c. 19-23.




230                   APPENDIX  L
thian embassadors requested that a Spartan general with a smaller
force should be at once sent off; and accordingly Eudamidas was
dispatched with two thousand men, to be followed by his brother
Phcebidas with reinforcements.
Eudamidas marched to Thrace, and put garrisons in the towns
that were friendly to him. Potidsea immediately revolted, and
there he established himself, and commenced hostilities against
Olynthus. Phoebidas, who was sent after him, stopped on his road
at Thebes, and seized the Cadmea, a measure, which had the immediate effect of bringing Thebes under subjection to Sparta, though it
ultimately led to the overthrow of the Spartan empire. Teleutias,
brother of Agesilaus, followed with the bulk of the Peloponnesian
army, and passing Thebes on his way, received a contingent of
horse and foot from that city. Amyntas had been ordered to join
him with as large a force as he could collect, and Derdas, prince of
Elymia, was solicited for aid on behalf of Amyntas his kinsman.
When Teleutias arrived at Potideea, he was joined by these auxiliaries, and marched directly against Olynthus. According to Xenophon, the first campaign was favorable to Teleutias; the Olynthians,
after a battle which they had very nearly gained,- were shut within
their walls, and the Spartans ravaged the country; though, after
the dismissal of the Macedonian and Elymian troops, the Olynthians
made destructive incursions into the hostile states, and plundered
their territories. Diodorus relates that the Spartans were defeated
in several battles, and mentions no victory won by Teleutias. But
both he and Xenophon agree in the result, which Xenophon assigns
to the second campaign, viz. that Teleutias fell in a hard fought battle under the walls of Olynthus, in which his army was completely
routed and dispersed.
The Lacedsemonians, on receiving intelligence of this defeat, felt
the necessity of making still greater exertions. A large army,
chiefly of volunteers, was raised in Peloponnesus, and put under the
command of Agesipolis, one of the kings. He marched through
Thessaly, which supplied him with a troop of cavalry; and being
joined by Derdas and Amyntas, whose zeal in the cause was nowise
abated, he marched straight against Olynthus. His force was so
overpowering, that the Olynthians dared not meet him in the field,
but confined themselves to the defence of the city, which they had
well stored with provisions against a siege. Agesipolis ravaged the
country, and took Torone, soon after which he was seized with
a fever, and died. Polybiades was sent out as his successor, and
commenced the siege of Olynthus with great vigor. The Olynthians
were defeated in various sallies, and the siege was turned into a
blockade; yet they held out till the following year, B.c. 379, when
they submitted to Sparta, on the terms of becoming her dependent
allies. This involved the necessity of following the Lacedaemonians in all their wars; and accordingly, we find a body of Olyn



OLYNTHUS.                       231
thian cavalry serving afterwards under the Spartan general against
Thebes.L
In ten years after this event important changes had taken plate
in Greece. The power of Sparta was broken by the Theban war;
Epaminondas had been at her gates, and threatened her very existence. Her navy had been beaten by the Athenians in the iEgean
and Ionian seas. Athens had regained her maritime supremacy;
most of the LEgean islands, besides Coreyra and Byzantium, had
again become her allies. Thebes was the only state that appeared
to be her rival.
In another ten years events had happened of more immediate concern to the Olynthians. During a long peace they had risen again
to prosperity, and seem to have resumed in a great degree their
sway or influence over the Chalcidian peninsula. It is not stated
either by Xenophon or Diodorus, that all the dominion which Olynthus exercised in the peninsula was taken away by the Lacedaemonians. We may rather suppose that her willing allies were left to
be subject to her as before; for so long as Olynthus was subservient
to Sparta, it was even better for Sparta that she should be at the
head of a respectable confederacy. Certain it is that the influence
of Olynthus greatly revived after the humiliation of Sparta. Demosthenes2 gives us to understand that she had become at a much
later period more powerful than she was before the Spartan war.
But at the time that we are now sp~eaking of a new enemy appeared.
Athens, having become mistress of the sea, had turned her attention
to the coasts of Macedonia and Thrace, with a view to recover the
towns and dependencies which formerly belonged to her. Many
expeditions were sent for that purpose, especially against Amphipolis, the possession of which was greatly coveted by the Athenians.
These measures necessarily brought them into conflict with the Olynthians, who saw with alarm the revival of an empire which threatened their own independence. A war ensued, of which we have no
full or clear account, but the general result was to the disadvantage
of Olynthus; for many cities near her coast were taken by the
Athenians, and especially Methone, Pydna, Potidaea, and Torone, the
two last of which had probably been re-annexed to the Olynthian
alliance. Such things had occurred, and the relations between Athens
and Olynthus were still of a hostile character, when, at the close of
this last decennial period, B.c. 359, Philip ascended the throne of
Macedon.
1 Xenoph. Hellen. lib. v. c. 4, s. 64.
2 De Fals4 Leg. 425. He also represents the terms of peace with
Sparta to have been more favorable to Olynthus: 687rwc 7i/3oVovro  7'bv
7r6ae/Iov KartEevro. But we must make allowance for exaggeration in
this passage, where the orator is drawing a contrast between two periods.




232                    APPENDIX I.
In order that the position of things at this time may be understood, it is necessary to state more particularly what had passed in
the interval.
Amyntas, ever since the restoration of his kingdom by the aid of
the Lacedsemonians, had remained firmly attached to that people,
and his friendship was extended afterwards to Athens, when the
Athenians had entered into a treaty of peace and alliance with Sparta.
In the year B.C. 371 a congress was held at Athens, attended by the
Spartans and their allies, to settle the affairs of Greece. A deputy
of Amyntas was there, who publicly declared that Amphipolis belonged to Athens, and that he would support her in the assertion of
her claim.L With such encouragement, the Athenians conceived
hopes of recovering their ancient colony; and Iphicrates was selected
as the most suitable person to accomplish that object, on account of
his personal friendship with Amyntas, who had adopted him for a
son. It does not distinctly appear when the first expedition was sent
against Amphipolis. Amyntas died in the year B.c. 370, and the
opportunity for obtaining his assistance was gone. The Amphipolitans themselves were averse to the alliance of Athens, from which
they had been entirely alienated ever since the revolution effected
by Brasidas. However, in the year B.C. 368, Iphicrates was sent
to the coast of Thrace on an exploring expedition, with a small
armament.
It happened soon after this, that Alexander, who succeeded
Amyntas, was murdered, and Pausanias, a pretender to the crown,
having gained a large party in Macedonia, and collected some force,
invaded the country, and took various towns on the coast. Eurydice,
the queen-mother, sent for Iphicrates, who was still cruising in the
neighborhood, and reminding him of his former attachment to
Amyntas, implored his protection for her children, Perdiccas and
Philip, the latter of whom was then about fifteen years of age. Iphicrates espoused the cause of the queen, judging it, doubtless, the best
policy for Athens. Turning then his arms against Pausanias, he
expelled him from the kingdom; after which, being at liberty to prosecute his main design, he took into his service Charidemus of Oreus,
with a body of mercenary troops, and commenced operations against
Amphipolis.
Charidemus, a native of Oreus in Eubcea, who fom this time began to make a figure in Athenian warfare, was a soldier of fortune,
who had first been a slinger, and afterwards set up a pirate vessel,
with which he infested the tEgean sea. Having contrived to draw
together a band of needy adventurers like himself, he became the
2vaveratpeZv #era ridv d2ov'EEr2vov, is the expression said to have
been used by the deputy. AEschines, De Falsa Leg. 33; from whom
we get most of our information concerning these transactions. Compare Demosth. contra Aristoc. 669. Corn. Nepos in vit. Iphic.




OLYNTHUS.                         233
leader of a mercenary force, ready to engage himself in the service
of Athens, or the Persian king, or any other government that would
employ him. Iphicrates at this period was glad to engage such a
man; and Charidemus was retained in his service for upwards of
three years.
Of the operations of Iphicrates we have no detailed account. We
learn that he was completely disappointed in his expectations of
Macedonian aid. After the expulsion of Pausanias, the government
fell into the hands of a man named Ptolemy, suspected to be the
queen's paramour, and even to have been the murderer of Alexander.
So far from assisting Iphicrates to recover Amphipolis, he exerted
his influence' the other way, probably through fear of the Thebans.2
Iphicrates for three years kept up a sort of blockade on the coast,
and at length prevailed on the Amphipolitans to negotiate for the
surrender of their city. Matters had gone so far, that hostages were
given to him for the performance of the agreement. But an unaccountable event occurred, which baffled all the calculations of the
commander. Iphicrates, having been recalled home, left the hostages with Charidemus; who, on receiving an order from the Athenians to bring them to Athens, sent them back to Amphipolis. Mitford conjectures, (and possibly he is right,) that the hostages had
been intrusted to the faith of Iphicrates; that Charidemus, being
under an engagement to Iphicrates, did not consider himself bound
to pbey orders from Athens. The Amphipolitans might regard the
Athenian decree as a breach of faith, and as evidence of a treacherous design. Under some such impression, they broke off all further
negotiation.
The Athenians then appointed Callisthenes to command the fleet.
But now Perdiccas, who had killed the regent and assumed the
government of Macedonia, appeared as their enemy, and declared
war. Callisthenes defeated him in battle, and compelled him to
solicit an armistice. But that general, from some unexplained reason,
was recalled to Athens, and put to death. Timotheus was his successor; who so ably managed affairs, that in a few years he effected
many important conquests for his country.
Timotheus, on taking the command, engaged the services of Charidemus, it being desirable to strengthen his armament by the mercenaries of that officer; for the Athenians had got into the practice
1 The words dvrelrparre Tr; tr;6et do not warrant us in supposing that
Ptolemy made war against Iphicrates, especially when it is said of Perdiccas immediately after, E7ro24,u7ae Tr ir6~?et. Eschin. ib. 32.
2 Pelopidas, invited into Macedonia by the nobles, compelled Ptolemy
to give hostages for his good conduct, with a view to preserve the
crown to the heirs of Amyntas. Philip himself is said to have been one.
But the date and circumstances of this transaction are matters of controversy. See Plutarch in vit. Pelop. Thirlwall, Grecian Hist. v. 164.
Leland's Life of Philip, i. 41.




234                      APPENDIX  I.
of sending out vessels without a proper complement of men,I trusting to their generals to supply the deficiency. Charidemus, however,
obtaining what he thought a more profitable employment under
Cotys, king of Thrace, broke his promise to Timotheus, and carried
away his own troops with some of the Athenian vessels.  Timotheus,
left to his own resources, vigorously prosecuted the war; and then
it was that Olynthus, as the principal protector and ally of Amphipolis, came into serious conflict with the Athenians.2
Whether this proceeding on the part of Olynthus was the cause,
or the effect, of a change in the policy of Macedonia, we can not tell.
Perdiccas abided by his engagement with Callisthenes, and not long
afterwards entered into an alliance with Athens, and co-operated
with Timotheus against the Olynthians.3 The result was that Timotheus captured Potidsea and Torone, and divers other towns on the
Chalcidian coast, by which the power of Olynthus was seriously impaired.  If we could implicitly adopt the statement of Isocrates,4 he
reduced the whole of Chalcidice; but this would have increased the
power of Athens, and the weakness of Olynthus, to a degree which
is not reconcilable with the events that followed. All that we can
fairly gather from the words of Isocrates is, that the influence of
Athens was greatly extended in the Chalcidian peninsula, and that
some of the cities joined her alliance, perhaps without receiving an
Athenian garrison. Isocrates might be disposed to exaggerate the
merits of Timotheus, who had been his friend and benefactor. Yet
history furnishes strong testimony to the abilities of that general.
He appears to have had more capacity for operations on a great
scale than either Iphicrates or Chabrias. The good discipline which
he kept among his troops, and the uprightness and moderation of his
character, were greatly instrumental to his success. 2Eschines says,
that he added seventy-five cities to the dominions of Athens: Isocrates mentions only twenty-four, referring perhaps to such only, as
were actually taken by arms. His reputation for success was so
great, that a picture represented him sleeping in a tent, whilst Fortune was catching cities for him in a net.
The operations of Timotheus against Olynthus began about the
Kevczf vaiS, with no more than the bare nautical crew. Demosth.
01. xxix.
2 The words of Demosthenes, contra Aristoc. 669, are not referable,
as Thirlwall intimates, to the time of Iphicrates, but to the time when
Timotheus was commander. But it is very probable that the Olynthians, though not openly at war with Athens, had secretly aided the Amphipolitans against Iphicrates.
3 Demosth. 01. ii. 14.
4 On the Exchange, 119. Xa;~tetZf 4IravafC Kae7ro;/zurEe.v. These
words agree with the literal expression of Cornelius Nepos, Olynthios
subegit. (Vit. Timoth.) Compare Demosth. Philipp. i. 41. EtXouev7rdvra rOv r6rrov otVrOV oiKErCov KI;CKL. Dinarch. cont. Demosth. 91.




OLYNTHUS.                       235
year B.C. 364. Two years after that we find him making war in the
Hellespont, where he took the cities of Sestos and Crithote in the
Chersonese. He was occupied for eleven months in the siege of
Samos, which ultimately capitulated. Isocrates boasts of his friend,
that with a fleet of thirty sail and eight thousand targeteers, and
without any cost to the state, he had reduced an island, for the conquest of which Pericles had employed two hundred galleys and
spent a thousand talents of the public money.
During all this time, Amphipolis had, with the aid of the Olynthians, successfully defended herself.. But in the year B.C. 360
Timotheus resolved to make another effort for the conquest of that
important city. The Olynthians, in close alliance with the Amphipolitans, prepared to defend them, and engaged the services of
Charidemus, who set sail from Cardia, but was captured on his way
by the Athenian fleet, and compelled to unite his forces to those of
Athens. Timotheus sailed up the Strymon, and landed his troops
to attack the city; but here his fortune failed him. He was attacked
by an army superior to his own, and compelled to make a disastrous
retreat. This was the last attempt which the Athenians made to
recover Amphipolis by arms.'
In the following year Perdiccas was slain in battle by the Illyrians, and Philip ascended his throne. At this time the king of Macedonia possessed not a single maritime town of importance.2
Athens had Pydna and Methone, Potidaea and some other towns
of Chalcidice, besides possessions in the Chersonese. She was in
alliance with Byzantium and other Propontine cities. Thasos, Lemnos, and Imbrus belonged to her; and also the group of islands off
the coast of Thessaly. She had thus the means, with her powerful
navy, of infesting all the northern continent of the JEgean, and
making a sudden descent where she pleased for the purposes.of war
or conquest. Olynthus seemed the only power capable of opposing
aer in that neighborhood; but Olynthus had been much weakened;
and there can be little doubt, that, had the affairs of Athens been
conducted by a Pericles, Olynthus and the whole of Chalcidice must
soon have fallen under Athenian dominion. Yet in the space of a
twelve-month from this time the position of things became so totally changed, that we find Olynthus, the old enemy of Athens,
courting her alliance, and even Amphipolis doing the same, not
from any fear of Athenian armaments, but from dread of a more
formidable power. That power was Philip; whose extraordinary
successes and rapid movements had already excited alarm in his
own neighborhood.' Thirlwall, v. 189.
2 Anthemus was perhaps on the sea, but had no importance except
from its vicinity to Olynthus. Perdiccas had probably taken it from the
Olynthians in the late war.




236                    APPENDIX I.
Never did any king succeed to his throne under greater disadvantages than Philip. He was only twenty-three years of age.
His kingdom  was threatened on all sides. In the west the Illyrians, flushed with recent victory, were preparing for a new inroad.
The Pmeonians made an incursion from the north, and ravaged his
country. At the same time there appeared two pretenders to the
crown; Pausanias, the ancient rival of Perdiccas, who was now assisted by Cotys, king of Thrace; and Argmeus, who was supported by
the Athenians. Argmeus had made them his friends by promising to
forward their designs against Amphipolis and Olynthus;lI and accordingly an Athenian armament, under the command of Mantias,
was sent to Methone, with directions to advance from thence, and
support his cause in Macedonia.
Meanwhile Philip, doubtful on which side to defend himself made
terms for the present with the Peconians, bribed Cotys to abandon
the cause of Pausanias, and. proceeded to attack Argseus and the
Athenians. They had marched from Methone thirty miles into the
interior of Macedonia, to /Egse, the ancient capital of the kingdom,
where they expected to find a party in their favor. In this hope
they were disappointed, and made a hasty retreat, but were overtaken and attacked by Philip. Their general Mantias had remained at Methone, and the troops, after suffering a severe loss,
retreated to a hill, where, having no means of escape, they capitulated and were allowed to depart on giving up the Macedonian exiles. Philip carried his lenity so far, that he restored to the Athenians all the booty which he had taken; and being anxious at this
time to conciliate them, he sent embassadors with a letter to' Diodorus, xvi. 3. The following words respecting Amphipolis,
E~iytprae rTjf r6XeoSf, dertf acrfv afr6vogov, may seem perhaps to imply, that Philip at this time possessed the city, but there is more than
one difficulty in the way of such a supposition. In the first place, there
is no historical evidence that Amphipolis had at this time been taken
or occupied by Macedonian troops. Perdiccas had very lately been in
alliance with Athens, nor is there any reason to suppose that he had
turned against her at the last, when Timotheus attacked Amphipolis.
Even if he did so, it does not follow that the Amphipolitans received a
Macedonian garrison. In the next place, it is not very likely that
Philip would have given up Amphipolis if he really possessed it; especially at the time indicated by Diodorus, when he was about to attack
the Athenian forces. He would hardly be desirous of conciliating the
Athenians at that moment. On the other hand, it would be his interest
to conciliate the Olynthians and Amphipolitans, and confirm them in
their hostility to Athens. With such view it would have been a wise
measure to declare that Amphipolis should be independent both of
Athens and Macedonia.'Eerxpyae then may signify nothing more
than wrapeXcrprce, "he withdrew all claim to dominion over the city."
See Thirwall, v. 173.




OLYNTHUS.                      237
Athens, proposing peace and amity with the republic, and renouncing
all claim of his own to Amphipolis. The proposal was joyfully
accepted.'
No sooner was this danger averted than Philip hastened to chastise the Paeonians. It so happened, their king Agis had just died.
Philip invaded their country, overthrew them in battle, and reduced
them to entire subjection. Immediately afterwards he marched
into Illyria, and rejecting the offers of peace made by the old king
Bardylis, defeated that veteran warrior in a hard-fought battle, in
which more than seven thousand Illyrians were slain. Bardylis
then obtained peace, on condition of ceding to Macedonia all the
country that lay to the east of Lake Lychnus.
The next step taken by Philip was one yet bolder, and pregnant
with more momentous consequences. Without any delay, and apparently without any ground of quarrel, he advanced and laid siege
to Amphipolis. We are told by Diodorus, that the Amphipolitans
had afforded him some pretext for war. But we need look for
no further cause or pretext, than Philip's own interest and ambition.
Great must have been the surprise and alarm of the Olynthians, to
see their old enemy, the king of Macedonia, at the head of a powerful army flushed with conquest, besieging a city scarcely less considerable than their own, and connected by close alliance with
themselves. A semi-barbarous continental monarch, with a large
standing army, was a power far more to be dreaded than even Athens, the mistress of the sea. Perhaps they began to see, that a union
on liberal terms with Athens was the best protection for the Greek
cities on the coast. At all events they resolved to apply for Athenian aid, and an embassy was sent for that purpose.
But whatever sensation the attack upon Amphipolis might produce at Olynthus, it created neither alarm nor surprise among the
Athenians. They were quite prepared for the event. Philip had
by vague promises deluded them into a belief, that he meant to take
Amphipolis for them. No distinct engagement to that effect seems
ever to have been made; but after the receipt of Philip's letter, in
which he had given a hint of his friendly intentions, Antiphon and
Charidemus2 were sent from Athens to conclude terms of alliance,
and especially to treat with him on the subject of Amphipolis. They
did so, and an understanding was come to, that Philip, if he got
possession of that city, should surrender it to Athens, and the
Athenians should, as a recompense, deliver up Pydna to him. Pydna was strictly a Macedonian town, and formerly belonged to the
kingdom, while Athens had, on more than one account, a strong
claim to Amphipolis; so that there appeared nothing objectionable'Diodorus, xvi. 4. Leland's, Life of Philip, i. 86. Demosth. contra
Aristoc. 660.
2 Not Chai-idc-mus of Or.eu, but an Athenian of the same name.




238                     APPENDIX  I.
in this arrangement, nor any great difficulty about carrying it into
effect.
There was indeed no formal treaty to bind the parties; but such
a contract, from its very nature, could not. safely be reduced to writing; and therefore, when the embassadors communicated the result
of their negotiation to the Athenian magistrates, it was considered
perfectly satisfactory, and the people were given to understand that
Amphipolis would soon be theirs. 
Under this persuasion, the people of Athens not only spurned
the application of the Olynthians, but at a later period, when the
Amphipolitans themselves, pressed by the besieging army, sent a
deputation to Athens and offered to surrender their city, the offer
was refused.2
We can hardly wonder at this conduct on the part of the Athenians. To have entered into terms with Olynthus or Amphipolis
after their engagement with Philip, might well have been considered
not only a breach of faith, but an unwise policy at that time. There
appeared no reason to distrust Philip. The kings of Macedonia had
frequently been allies of Athens, ever since the time of the second
Perdiccas. Their friendship had certainly been precarious, but their
hostility had not been very violent or very mischievous. Philip himself had merited the gratitude of the Athenian people by his generosity. On the other hand, Olynthus had for a long time past been
the enemy of Athens. The Amphipolitans had exhibited a malignant hostility ever since their revolt in the Peloponnesian war, and
their repudiation of the treaty with Iphicrates caused their promises
to be suspected.
Philip sent a letter to the Athenians, renewing his assurances,3
and meanwhile the siege of Amphipolis was pressed with vigor.
Diodorus says, it was taken by storm; Demosthenes, that it was
betrayed. It is likely enough, that there was an Amphipolitan
party favorable to Macedonia, and that, after the siege had continued for some time, and their appeared no prospect of relief, this
party induced the citizens to capitulate.
To hold out long would have been impossible; for not only had
Athens refused assistance, but eoven the Olynthians had abandoned
the cause of their ally. Had the Olynthians taken the same vigorous measures against Philip, which they did against Timotheus, the
issue might perhaps have been doubtful. But Philip, anxious to get
speedy possession of Amphipolis, and ndt to be embarrassed at so
critical a time by a war with the Olynthians, bought off their opposition by the cession of Anthemus, a town in their neighborhood,
1 Thirlwall, v. 192. Leland's Philip, i. 96. This was the ro' pvwovt(levov dwr6p'yr'ov. (Olynth. ii. 19, page 48 in this volume.)
2 Olynth. i. 11; ii. 19.' Contra Aristoc. 659. De lHalonn, 2.8




OLYNTHUS.                       239
which had formerly belonged to them.  Having thus disarmed the
two opponents, from whom he had most to fear, Amphipolis became an easy prey.
But Philip had now to consider, whether he should keep his
promise to the Athenians, and offer to deliver up Amphipolis in exchange for Pydna. HIe appears to have made up his mind with
very little hesitation; for immediately after the capture of the one
city, he appeared with his army before the walls of the other.
IHere also he found a party in his favor. Whether he had concerted
any plans with them beforehand, does not appear; but by their assistance he was admitted into Pydna without difficulty; and it soon
became apparent, that he intended to keep both cities on his own
account, and set the Athenians at defiance.
The Athenians, as might have been expected, were not slow to
express their resentment of such treachery; but how to avenge
themselves on the deceiver, was a more difficult matter. Whether
Philip was able at this time to cope single-handed with the power
of Athens, may be doubted; but he was too prudent to venture on
such a chance. An opportunity was open to him, for obtaining an
important ally, and he hastened to seize it. Experience had proved;
that a combination between two of the three powers, (Athens,
Olynthus, and Macedonia,) would turn the scale against the third.
Philip proposed to the Olynthians to join them in an offensive war
against Athens, to expel the Athenians from their possessions on the
Macedonian coast, and to share the spoils. This offer was accepted.
The war that followed was called the Amphipolitan war, and, as far
as Philip and the Athenians were concerned, it lasted till the year
B.C. 346, when peace was concluded by the Embassy of Ten. On
the part of Athens, the war was prosecuted with neither skill nor
vigor. She incurred a large amount of expense in fruitless expeditions, and hardly obtained a single advantage.2  Her efforts were
indeed, during a part of this time, distracted by the Social war, and
by the affairs of Eubcea and the Chersonese. The loss of Byzantium and the confederate islands, followed by that of Corcyra, crippled her power, and greatly reduced her revenues;3 nor was the
cession of the Chersonese by any means a sufficient compensation.
The most important achievement by the united arms of Philip
and the Olynthians, was the reduction of Potidea. An Athenian
garrison, stationed here, and holding considerable property in the
town, was obliged to surrender. Philip, to whom the merit of the
conquest was principally due, seized the Athenian possessions, and
1 As to the position of Anthemus, see Thirlwall, v. 194.
2 Olynth. iii. 36. Tamynae and Thermopylae were creditable affairs,
but brought no permanent advantage to Athens.' Philipp. iv. 141.




240                    APPENDIX  I.
gave them up, together with the town itself, to the Olynthians: the
garrison he treated kindly and sent back to Athens.1
Philip does not appear to have taken an active part in any other
military operation in favor of Olynthus. It can not however be
doubted, that the war was carried on in Chalcidice between Athens
and Olynthus for several years, and that divers of the Chalcidian
towns were again wrested from the Athenian alliance, and brought
back to the Olynthian; among others, Torone, which was taken by
Philip from the Olynthians at a later period. 2 We read of an expedition sent by the Athenians against Olynthus somewhere about
this time,3 which turned out a failure. Philip might well leave
Athens and Olynthus to fight it out by themselves, when he knew
that the Athenians had their hands so full; and the Chalcidians
were easily persuaded to desert the cause of Athens, when not
controlled by a garrison.  Leland sagaciously observes,4 that
Philip saw the advantage of keeping his own army undivided,
while he left Potidsea and other places to be garrisoned by the
Olynthians.
Philip indeed was turning his attention to another quarter, where
he had an important conquest to make on his own account. This: s;." the mine district of Mount Pangseus, which commenced on the
left bank of the Strymon and extended eastward as far as Scapte
Hyle, where lay the property of Thucydides the historian. From
the Pangaean hills flowed the Hebrus with its golden sands. There
were mines here both of gold and silver. The Thasians, who had
mines also in their own island, had planted various colonies for
mining purposes on the adjoining continent. The principal of these
was Datus. They had lately formed a new settlement more inland,
called Crenides, in a beautiful spot, watered by numerous mountain
rivulets, and abounding with veins of gold. The Thasians were
I Diod. xvi. 8. Dem. cont. Aristoe. 656. De Halonn. 79.
2 Demosthenes more than once enumerates the towns taken by Philip
from the Athenians, apparently in historical order, thus —Amphipolis,
Pydna, Potidwea, Methone, (Olynth. i. 11, 12; Philipp. i. 41.) Had any
other important town been taken by him during the same period, Demosthenes would hardly have forborne to mention it. On the other
hand, he was not so likely to speak in these orations of conquests made
by the Olynthians alone, towards whom he desired his countrymen to
have none but friendly feelings. In the Oration de Chers. 105, Philip
is said to have given to the Olynthians floridatov cKnai r62' 7eTpa. His
assistance, no doubt, enabled them to get other places. In the Oration
of Demosthenes on the Embassy (426), it is represented that all the
Chalcidian cities had again become allies of Olynthus.  Compare
IEschines De Fals& Leg. 37.
3 Contra Midiam, 666, 578. The date of this expedition was probably the year B.c. 355.
4 Life of Philip, i. 105.




OLYNTHUS.                       241
subject to Athens; and Philip had no hesitation in expelling them
from their possessions, and seizing upon the whole district. At
Crenides he established a Macedonian colony; the place was soon
enlarged into a considerable city, and called firom  the founder
Philippi. A new method of working the mines was adopted, the
waters being drained off into canals; and in a short time they
yielded to the king of Macedonia such an amount of revenue, as
enabled him not only to maintain a large standing army, but to extend his influence among the Greek states by corruption. A gold
coin was struck, called Philippeum, which quickly circulated over
Greece; and from this time Philip owed his success as much to his
gold as to his arms, according to the general tradition of antiquity,l
-as expressed in the well known lines of HoraceDiffidit urbium
Portas vir Macedo, et subruit semulos
Reges muneribus.
The last mentioned conquest was effected B.c. 356, not long after
the reduction of Potidma. In the same year his son Alexander was
born. For the two following years Philip was (comparatively
speaking) inactive; that is, in a military point of view; for we can
not doubt that he was actively engaged in the affairs of his kingdom, directing its internal administration, improving the revenue,
fortifying and embellishing his towns,2 training his army, collecting
mercenary soldiers, stores and materials. He commenced at the
same time (what no Macedonian king had done before) the establishment of a navy, for which the coast-towns that he now possessed, and especially Amphipolis (whose situation was like that of
the modern Antwerp), afforded him abundant facilities. He was
busy with his negotiations in foreign states, sending emissaries
wherever he was likely, either by corruption or otherwise, to promote Macedonian influence. The effects of this were soon visible
in Euboea, where in the year 354 his intrigues fomented the quarrel
between Callias and Plutarch, and drew the Athenians into the
perilous battle of Tamynae.
In the year 353 Philip laid siege to Methone, a city on the Thermaic Gulf, about five miles from Pydna. It was held by the Athenians, and strongly fortified. To them it was useful as a sallying
place into the interior of Macedonia, as had been seen in the case of
Argxeus, as well as on former occasions.3 Philip was therefore exDemosth. cont. Lept. 476. Diodorus, xvi. 8. Leland's Life of
Philip, i. 110. Thirlwall, v. 202.
2 Justin, viii. 3, where it is related that he defrauded the contractors
of their money. But this is not credible.'Thucydides, vi. 7.
Vor. L-L




242                    APPENDIX  I
tremely anxious to take it. The Methoneans defended themselves
with the utmost obstinacy, and the siege lasted for nearly a twelvemonth.
While Philip was eagerly pressing the attack, he was wounded in
the eye by an arrow shot from the walls. The arrow being extracted was found to have this inscription: "Aster to Philip's right
eye."  It is said that Aster, being a skillful archer, had offered his
services to Philip, assuring him that he could kill any birds flying.
"Well I" said Philip, "I will employ you when I make war upon
starlings." Aster, in revenge for the slight, threw himself into Methone, and shot this arrow which deprived Philip of the sight of one
eye. Philip ordered the arrow-to be shot back with another inscription: "If Philip takes Methone, he will hang Aster," a threat
that was afterwards executed.
The city was open to relief from the sea, and a blockade would
have been unavailing. The Athenians were actually sending fresh
succors, when Philip ordered a general assault. A large number of
besiegers had mounted the battlements, when, to cut off their
retreat, Philip ordered the scaling ladders to be removed, leaving
his men to conquer or to perish. They fought with desperation,
and carried every thing before them. The besieged laid down their
arms. Philip accepted their surrender on these conditions, that
they should be suffered to depart with one suit of apparel only, that
the city and all within it should be given up to pillage. Methone
was razed to the ground. 
Immediately after this followed the campaign in Thessaly, the
defeat and death of Onomarchus, the expulsion of the tyrants of
Pherve, the capture by Philip of Pagasae and Magnesia, his march to
Thermopylae, and his retreat on finding the pass occupied by Athenan troops. From Thessaly he marched into Thrace. In the interior of that country were various tribes, ruled by divers princes.
One at least of these had not long before conspired with the Illyrians and Peeonians to make war against Macedonia.2  Philip resolved to avenge this insult, and at the same time to establish his
own influence among the barbarous tribes, who were able to furnish useful recruits to his armies.3 Here Philip was occupied for some
time, establishing friendly princes in their dominions, and expelling
others;4 after which he suddenly marched to the Propontine coast,
and attacked Hervaum, a fortress near Perinthus, held by the Athe-' Diodorus, xvi. 34. Demosth. Philipp. i. 50. Leland's Life of
Philip, i. 194.
2 Diodorus, xvi. 22.' The Thracian Peltastre made excellent light troops, and had often
been employed by the Athenians. See Thucydides, vii. 9, 27, 30.
4 Toi,/uv t3aX6v, T rov d KaraaT7jr aa Tv 9aaat iawv.  Demosth.
Olynth. i. 13.




OLYNTIHUS.                        243
nians, and important to them for the protection of their corn trade.
The alarm which this excited at Athens, the vigorous resolutions
and dilatory measures of the people are particularly mentioned by
Demosthenes.'  The siege was begun in the latter end of the year
352, nor does it clearly appear whether or not Herzeum was taken.
Philip however, fatigued by his long marches and incessant toil, fell
dangerously ill; and for a time his military operations were suspended. No sooner had he recovered, than he quitted Thrace, and
marching towards Chalcidice, early in the year 351, surprised the
Olynthians by making a hostile inroad into the peninsula.2
Why or on what pretense he took such a step, is doubtful. It
appears however, that some time before this the Olynthians had
broken off their connection with Philip, and made friendly overtures
to the Athenians.3  They had discovered soon after the capture of
Potidsea, that Philip would do nothing more for them, that he was
beginning to make conquests on his own account in their neighborhood, and acquiring power of a formidable character. They were
acquainted with the value of the mine district, and saw the great
advantages that he was deriving from it. To them, living on the
confines of Macedonia, all his plans and proceedings, his naval and
military preparations, became speedily known. The fall of Methone,
one of the strongest fbrtresses of Greece, revealed to them, that few
cities would be protected by their walls from the assault of the Macedonian army. The late occurrences in Thessaly and Thrace must
have greatly increased their apprehensions. Philip had defeated in
a pitched battle the veterans of Onomarchus, and made the Thessalians his allies. Olynthus was surrounded by his power on every
side. For even the sea was now open to Philip. He had not indeed such a navy as could meet the Athenians in a fair sea-fight;
but he sent out piratical expeditions to infest their commerce and
plunder their allies.4  His cruisers had lately made a descent upon
Lemnos and Imbrus, captured a fleet of merchantmen off the Eu1 Olynth. iii. 29. Demosthenes intimates, that if the armament first
decreed had sailed in time, they might have surprised Philip during his
illness and destroyed him, otK c v niv6jXei vvv raUtv gOwEir.
2 Olynth. i. 13. EV09f'OOvvO6otl Ee7rEXEpip7aev. " He made an aggression (oran attack) upon the Olynthians." The words themselves are ambiguous, not denoting any particular mode of aggression; and it is probable, that if Philip had committed any decided act of hostility, Demosthenes would not have mentioned it so slightly.
s Demosth. contra Aristoc. 652. That speech was delivered in the
year 352. The orator assigns no cause for a rupture between Philip
and the Olynthians, except their alarm at his growing power. Athens
and Olynthus were at that time friends, but not allies: vi c6  iaovc lre7roil7vrat.Opai. d6  Kai avwudovf wrotrjaevaat.
4 Justin, viii 3. " Piraticam exercere instituit." Ib. ix. 1.




244                     APPENDIX  I.
bmean coast, and even sailed into the bay of Marathon and carried
off the Athenian state galley. 
The time when the Olynthians began to change their policy was
about the year 353, perhaps before the siege of Methone. Overtures were soon afterwards made to Athens for peace; and they
were joyfully accepted.2  Yet, although the two cities had resumed
their friendly intercourse, it does not appear that an offensive
alliance had been formed between them against Macedonia, and
certainly the Olynthians had taken no hostile measures, at the time
when Philip, as above mentioned, crossed the Chalcidian frontier.
It is likely enough that Philip considered, or chose to consider, the
revival of their connection with Athens an act of hostility towards
himself; and undoubtedly from that time he looked with an evil
eye upon Olynthus.3 But another cause of offense is alleged by
Justin.4 Philip had three half-brothers, Archelaus, Aridaeus, and
Menelaus. One of these, Archelaus, he had put to death for treason; the other two escaped, and found refuge in Olynthus.
Whatever may have been Philip's pretext, he now appeared in
the character of an enemy; though what overt act of hostility he
committed, is not disclosed to us. From the loose language of the
orator I should infer, that Philip at this time showed his teeth without biting; he infringed (as we should say) the law of nations by
some aggressive act, but his enterprise, whatever it was, did not
succeed. He may have crossed the mountains and attempted to
surprise some towns, or seduce them from the Olynthian confederacy; not succeeding in this, he retired, like the lion who has
missed his spring, to wait for a better opportunity.
This view is confirmed by the subsequent conduct of Philip. It
was nearly two years before war actually broke out, by his invasion
of Chalcidice.5  He had little else meanwhile to engage his attention. The Sacred war was left to run its course without his interference. Athens had a breathing time allowed her. A few murmurs were heard from the Thessalians, for his holding Pagasse and' This happened after his Thessalian campaign: and, as Thirlwall
observes, he probably made use of the ships which he found in the harbor of Pagasme. Vol. v. 284. IEsch. De Fals. Leg. 37.
3 Olynth. i. 11; iii. 30.
Olynth. iii. 30.
4 Justin, vii. 4; viii. 2, 3.
5 Thirlwall (Hist. v. 289) conjectures that Apollonia was taken soon
after Methone. But the reason which he assigns is unsatisfactory,
namely the mention which Demosthenes makes of the three cities,
Olynthus, Methone, and Apollonia, in the third Philippic, p. 117. They
are only mentioned together on account of their importance, and the
similarity of their fates. If Apollonia had then been taken, it would
have brought on a war earlier, and probably Demosthenes would have
spoken of it.




OLYNTVHS,                       245
Magnesia; but them he pacified by promises, and in the year 350
conferred a new obligation upon them by the expulsion of Pitholaus
from Pherse. But all this while he was silently and secretly preparing
for the destruction of Olynthus, which he saw was essential to the
accomplishment of his further objects. Therefore he suspended his
operations against Athens, and lulled her into a false security. She
had been roused by the first Philippic in 352. Little more than a
year had passed, when all the alarm had died away, and Philip was
talked of as a person from whom nothing was to be feared.' This
was just what the king of Macedon desired. He had rightly judged,
that the Athenians would not make a good use of the respite which
he allowed them. He feared that, if he attacked the Olynthians at
once, he might have to encounter the whole force of the Chalcidian
body, a formidable conjunction, when the Olynthians alone could
bring into the field ten thousand infantry and-a thousand horse;
and still more difficult to overcome, should they be reinforced by
Athenian auxiliaries. His safest course was, to divide his enemies
and cripple their means of subsistence. How was this to be done?
Philip had discovered by experience, if he had not learned by his
residence at Thebes, that in most Grecian cities there were different
parties contending for the upper hand; that the influence of faction
was strong; that corruptible citizens were always to be found, and
that the laws gave equal liberty of speech to the patriot and the
traitor. Acting on this persuasion, he sent his emissaries to the
Chalcidian towns, and in each of these, by dint of artifice and intrigue, established a Macedonian party. Gold was lavished without
stint. He had now ampler means than before; since, in addition
to the resources of his own kingdom, and what he had gained by
plunder, he was receiving a large portion of the revenues of Thessaly.2  Bribery he judged to be the best economy; it would save
him expense in the end, by rendering his conquest more easy; and
the price of corruption would be reimbursed by the spoils of the
vanquished."
In none of these towns was Macedonian gold more efficacious
I Demosth. de Rhod. lib. 197. It may be thought that even Demosthenes was not then fully alive to the real state of things, as he quotes
what was said of Philip without contradicting it. But it was not his
business to mix two questions together. He may well have thought,
that it would strengthen Athens to gain Rhodes for an ally, and that to
keep the Athenian forces in active employment was a means of preparing them for war with Macedonia. It might not be prudent to tell the
people all his reasons.. think, however, that Demosthenes was not yet
sensible of the danger-to be apprehended from an extensive system of
corruption.
2 Olynth. i. 15.
3 Diodorus, xvi. 54. Hence callidus emptor Olynthi. Juvenal, Sat.
xii. 45.




246                    APPENDIX  L
than in the capital itself. Olynthus beheld many of her citizens
grow suddenly rich; their stock of possessions was increased, no
one knew how; they improved their houses and displayed an unusual magnificence.' Yet were the people so blinded, they withheld not their confidence from  such men. It was studiously disseminated, that Philip had been their benefactor, that he would be
still, and that Macedonian protection was their best security. Thus,
instead of preparing for their defense betimes, instead of throwing
themselves into the arms of Athens, and soliciting her immediate
co-operation against the common enemy, they left him to choose
the moment of attack, and began to prepare when it was too
late.
Towards the end of 350 B.C., Philip at the head of a powerful
army marched into Chalcidice, determined to effect its final conquest. He made no declaration of war, but summoned town after
town, as he advanced, to surrender. Which first opened its gates
to him, is uncertain. Diodorus, who does not profess to give the
details of the campaign, relates that he laid siege to Stagiri2 and
razed it to the ground.  Apollonia3 shared the same fate. Other
towns, intimidated or corrupted, hastened to make terms with the
conqueror. After reducing the whole, or nearly the whole, of the
peninsula, he marched against Olynthus.
What were the Olynthians doing all this time? On the first intelligence of Philip's invasion they sent to Athens, imploring succor.
They sent to Philip also, to demand an explanation; he assured
them positively, that he was not at war with them, and still continued his progress.  They sent again, and received the same answer;
Philip affecting to treat the Chalcidians as independent, and refusing
to hear any remonstrance on their behalf. It was not till he had
approached within five miles of the capital, that he threw off the
mask, and told them plainly, that either they must quit Olynthus, or
he Macedonia.4
On the arrival of the Olynthian ambassadors at Athens, an assembly was immediately called to consider what should be done. The
feeling was almost universal, to send assistance to Olynthus. Demades5 alone opposed it; but on what grounds we are not informed.
I Demosth. De Fals. Leg. 426. Mitford contends that these were
only innocent presents. Hist. Gr. iv. p. 432.
2 Such is the true reading, instead of Peipav, xvi. 52.' Demosth. Philipp. iii. 117. From this passage it might perhaps be
inferred, that thirty-two Chalcidian cities were actually destroyed by
Philip. The number is probably exaggerated. I can imagine that his
jealousy of the Chalcidian race would prompt him to take severe measures. Potidea he preserved. Or, de Halonn. 80.
4 Demosth. Philipp. iii. 113; iv. 147.
6 Suidas in v. Aqycdis. He was a man of natural wit and eloquence,
but of a coarse mind and profligate character. Throughout his whole




OLYNTHUS.                      247
Probably he enlarged on the difficulty of contending with Philip in
Chalcidice, and the want of sufficient funds to carry on the war.
He was the first Athenian orator in the pay of Macedonia. Philip
had calculated on a burst of popular enthusiasm at Athens, and a
warlike vote in favor of Olynthus; but he calculated also on confusion and delay, and, to augment these, a clever and reckless man
like Demades was exceedingly useful. The debate seems to have
turned on questions of ways and means-how the troops were to
be provided, when to be dispatched —what number-whether citizens or mercenaries, &c.  Demosthenes, who rose after many
speakers had been heard, breaking at once into the subject, contended that an Athenian force should be sent off immediately, that the
crisis was important, they ought to take arms in person, and contribute to the expenses of the war. He had little difficulty in procuring a vote for a considerable armament.
Some days elapsed before any troops could be got ready, and in
the meantime Demades and his party were busy creating obstacles,
and disheartening the people. They had, for the last two years,
without any formal truce, been enjoying a respite from war, and
were now called upon to make new exertions. The first excitement
caused by the Olynthian embassy had a little cooled. It was thought
necessary to convene another assembly; Demosthenes made a second speech, in which he encouraged the Athenians, showed the
precarious nature of Philip's power, and the importance of prosecuting the war. At length succors were shipped off; not such a force,
however, as the urgency of the case required, and probably not all
that had been decreed, but only two thousand mercenaries, commanded by Chares. Hardly had they gone, when the misgivings
of the people were exchanged for an overweening confidence; such
was the fickle temper of the people. It was imagined that Athens
and Olynthus would be more than a match for Macedonia, and the
general talk was about punishing Philip for his perfidy. In this state
of the public feeling, another assembly was held; the cry was for
war; the orators spoke in a tone of exultation, as if what was to be
done had been done already. Demosthenes himself, perhaps, not
fully alive to the danger, yet appreciating it far better than the
others, reminded his countrymen that the question was not about
punishing Philip, but about saving Olynthus. He saw that very inadequate succors had been sent; the citizens were reluctant to serve
in person; there was difficulty about providing for the expenses;
no one had dared to propose an application of the surplus revenue,
though Demosthenes had hinted the expediency of such a measure.
He ventured now to press this point more openly, urged the neceslife he was in opposition to Demostbenes, and quite his match on some
occasions. Many anecdotes are told of him in Plutarch's Lives of Phoeion and Demosthenes.




248                      APPENDIX  L
sity oP making a great sacrifice, and concluded with an eloquent
appeal, calling upon the Athenians to maintain the ancient honor of
their country.'
Chares meanwhile had sailed to the Chalcidian coast. There he
made a sudden descent, and cut off a body of stragglers from Philip's
army. Content with this achievement, and not finding himself
strong enough to attempt a more serious diversion, he returned to
Athens, and, in honor of his victory, gave a public entertainment,
which cost no less than sixty talents.  The money, it seems, was
obtained from the spoils of Delphi, given by the Phocians to Chares,
for some service that he had done. While the Athenians were
amused with this piece of vanity, and little thinking of the serious
nature of the case, a second embassy came from the Olynthians and
their confederates, imploring immediate succor, representing that
their country was overrun by the Macedonian army, and they were
in the greatest distress. The Athenians sent off directly a body of
I The notion, that the three Olynthiac orations were connected with
the three Olynthian embassies, though derived from the respectable authority of Dionysius, and assented to by Leland and many other critics,
is wholly unsupported by the internal evidence of the Orations themselves, in whatever order we like to arrange them. The arguments
are all of a general character.  The necessity of assisting the Olynthians, and assisting them vigo,'ously anl effectively, is urged over and
over again; but there is no reference to that extremity of danger, as towhich Demosthenes could not have been silent, if he had spoken on the
occasion of the third embassy. In not one of the speeches is there the
slightest mention of a second or third embassy, or any allusion to the
operations of Chares, or Charidemus, or Philip. lNieither history nor
probability confirms the fancy of Dionysius. It is likely that there
would be several debates upon the original resolution, to embark in t'le
war: Philochorus says that on the occasion of the first embassy, oi'AOqrvaiot av/luatcav re'7rotaav7ro Kal /aTOetav e-rEupav, whereas on the
two second embassies there is no mention by him of any formal vote.
And this view agrees with the arguments of Libanius. When the second message-and still more when the third-arrived from Olynthusi
there was no need of debate; the principle had been agreed to; every
one saw that the case was pressing; and succors were sent off without
any opposition. It may be gathered from Philochorus, that embassadors came on the second occasion from the Chalcidian body, so that the
deputation being more imposing, and the emergency more critical, one
need not be surprised that the Athenians did not wait for a speech
from Demosthenes, before they sent off their reinforcements. Besides,
it is likely that the Athenians were preparing reinforcements in the interval between the first and second expedition. never intending the
troops of Chares to be their only succors. I fully assent to what is
said by Jacobs on this point in the introduction to his translation of the
Olynthiacs.




OLYNTHUS.                        249
four thousand mercenaries, of the middle-armed kind, with a hundred and fifty horse, and appointed Charidemus to the command.'
Charidemus, who was in the Hellespont when the armament sailed
from Athens, as soon as he received notice of his appointment, hastened to Olynthus. Philip had by this time reduced a considerable
part of Chalcidice, and had sent some of his forces into Pallene,
probably to summon Potidaea. Charidemus put himself at the head
of his troops, in conjunction with those of Olynthus, attacked the
Macedonians in Pallene, and took some prisoners. Afterwards, to
make a diversion, he sailed to Bottisea, where he landed and ravaged
the country. Returning to Olynthus, instead of pursuing his instructions, or concerting any plan with the people whom he was sent
to protect, he gave himself up to vicious pleasure, indulging his licentious humor so far at to offer a gross insult to the Olynthian magistrates.2  This was not to be tolerated; nor was his military services
any compensation for his misbehavior. The Olynthians had no
confidence in his abilities as a general, and not much in the valor of
his troops, who were mercenary adventurers like himself. In the
extremity of their alarm, they sent once more to Athens, praying
for a reinforcement of native Athenians. This was granted. Two
thousand heavy-armed citizens, and three hundred cavalry, were
shipped off, and Chares, who was then in Athens, had influence
enough to procure his own reappointment as general.3
Philip, little disturbed by the proceedings of Chares or Charidemus, had been steadily pursuing his object. Having entered the
Sithonian peninsula, and received the submission of Torone, he
marched to Mecyberna, whose gates were opened to him by the
same treachery. He was now within a few miles of Olynthus, and
it was here that he made the terrible denunciation, which left to the
Olynthians no hope of mercy. They marched bravely to meet him
with all the forces they could muster, and were defeated. They
hazarded a second battle with no better success, and were shut up
within their walls.4 Philip immediately commenced the siege, and
made bold efforts to carry the place by assault; for he knew the
importance of time, and feared the arrival of fresh succors from
Athens. Yet, so obstinate was the defense, that all his efforts were
1 Philochorus, apud Dyonis. Epist. ad Amm. ix. Theopompus, apud
Athen. xii. 43. Leland (in the Life of Philip, ii. 13) states that Chares
was sent for by the Athenians; but the passage of IEschines (De Fals.
Leg. 37) refers to a different time.
a Theopompus, apud Athen. x. 47. Ehk roaodrov w7poi;7Oev ciKpact'ac,
dSare zetpdIKt6v rt wrapa Tr: 83ovC riF r73v'OXvviov alreiv kEwexeipriarv,
o r7v /L.v 6Oul,v ev Ciet6Ld  Kal XdpLev, &rvyXave 6e #iera AEpdov trov MaKed6vog alX, d2(corov yeyevnulvov.  The name of Derdas, the Elymian
prince, may seem to suggest that this Derdas was a person of rank.
3 Philochorus, 1. c.' Diodorus, xvi. 63.
L 2




250                    APPENDIX I.
baffled, and he was repulsed from the walls with considerable loss.
The prompt arrival of Chares might have saved Olynthus. But now
began to be seen the effects of Macedonian bribery. One of the
most eminent Olynthians, and the commander of their forces, was
Apollonides, who had served his country with zeal and fidelity.
As long as he was intrusted with the conduct of affairs, there was
little hope that treason would prosper. The Macedonian party accused him before the people, as the author of their misfortunes. It
is the nature of men who are in trouble to lay the blame somewhere.
The Olynthians were unhappily persuaded to deprive Apollonides
of his command, and to confer it upon Euthycrates and Lasthenes,
the paid agents of Philip. From that moment the doom of Olynthus was sealed.'
Meetings were now held in the city to propose negotiations with
Philip; but the people were not yet prepared for submission. The
Athenians were expected; their soldiers, though outnumbered, were
brave; they had a fine body of five hundred horse, which had greatly
distinguished itself in the field. It was resolved to try the effect of
a sally. But the design was betrayed to Philip. Lasthenes, who
commanded the horse, led them into an ambuscade, where they
were surrounded by the Macedonians, and made prisoners of war.2
This consummate piece of treachery threw the whole city into
consternation. No man any longer could trust his neighbor. The
besieging army surrounded the walls. If Chares had arrived, it
would have been too late now.3  Olynthus was not on the sea, so
that he could throw his forces into the town; and he was not strong
enough to attack Philip in his lines. All hope of raising the siege
was gone; and the Olynthians, in utter despair, were driven to surrender. The only terms which they could obtain were, that their
lives should be spared.
Thus, in less than a year from the time that he invaded Chalcidice,
Philip terminated the war, and entered Olynthus in triumph. He
kept his promise to the inhabitants, and spared their lives, putting
to death only his fugitive-brothers, Menelaus and Aridaeus:4 but the
whole body of the Olynthian people, without distinction of sex, age,
or rank, were put up to sale by public auction, and reduced to
Philipp. 67, 79. It is true, as Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. v. 314) observes
that'Ic/3aKeZv does not necessarily signify that Apollonides was expelled, but it may signify that, and there is no reason to think that it
does not. So Leland takes it; (Life of Philip, ii. 22.)
2 Demosti. De Fals. Leg. 426.
3 What Chares did with himself, does not appear. Probably finding
he could not relieve Olynthus, he did nothing, and attempted nothing.
Some Athenians were taken in Olynthus by Philip, as we learn from
ZEschines, (De Fals. Leg. 30) but clearly not Chares or his troops.
4 Justin, viii 3.




OLYNTHUS.                       251
slavery.l  The walls, the houses, the whole city of Olynthus was
demolished; and the lands distributed as a reward among the officers of Philip.2
The total destruction of this great city, which had once defied
Lacedaemon in the plenitude of her power, excited a feeling of dismay throughout the whole of Greece. " Has Philip destroyed
Olynthus?" said one; " he himself never raised such a city I" But
nowhere was it felt so deeply as at Athens. The grief and indignation of the people were mingled with shame and fear. The
words of Demosthenes were recollected,-that unless they saved
Olynthus, the war would soon be on their own frontiers. In the
first moment of their anger, they passed a vote of outlawry against
the traitors who had sold their country, making it lawful to slay
them wherever they could be found. Chares came in for his share
of their resentment, yet contrived, by means of his influence, to escape any public censure.3 What became of Charidemus is unknown:
whether he was slain in battle, or whether he saved his life and
liberty. No more is heard of him in Athenian history.
Euthycrates and Lasthenes received the recompense of their
treason, though not exactly in the way that they expected. Philip
maintained them at his court, but only as servile dependents and
parasites. The Macedonian courtiers held them in contempt, the
soldiers reviled them for their baseness. On one occasion they complained to Philip. " Never mind," said he; " the Macedonians are
a blunt people; they call a spade a spade."4
The conquest of Olynthus was of the utmost importance to Philip.
It secured his dominions from being attacked by Athens or any
other maritime power. The Chalcidian peninsula had separated
one part of his kingdom from the other, and, while it remained subject to Olynthus, gave an access to his enemies into the heart of
Macedonia. Now it became a province of his own; and the severe
measures which he resorted to, in rooting out the hostile population,
prove how anxious he was to prevent all disturbances in that quarter for the future. A glance at the map will show us what progress
Philip had made in the ten years since he ascended the throne.
From the bay of Pagasae to the mouths of the Nestus in Thrace,
all the coast of Northern Greece had been brought under his power.
Thessaly was devoted to him. His territories were extended on
the Illyrian and Pseonian frontiers; and he had made an impression
I Diodorus, xvi. 63. Dinarchus cont. Den. 93. Demosth. Doe Fals.
Leg. 439.
2 Thirlwall, Gr. Hist. v. 316, citing Theopompus.
8 Aristotle, Rhet. iii. 10. The interpretation of this passage is doubtful. See Mitford, Gr. Hist. iv. Leland's Life of Philip, ii. 30.
Demosth. de Chers. 99; de Coron 241.  Leland'  Life of Philip,
ii. 31.




252                    APPENDIX  I.
upon Thrace. In the north he menaced the Athenian dominions
in Chersonesus; while on the south he came in contact with Euboea,
and alarmed Athens for her owrn safety.
While the Athenians were lamenting the disasters of the late war,
and preparing to send embassies among the Greek states, to raise
up a new confederacy against Macedonia, Philip had given orders
for a solemn festival in honor of the Muses to celebrate his triumph.
Archelaus, one of his predecessors, had instituted this festival at
LEgse, after the model of the Olympian. It was held by Philip at
Dium in Pieria, a district of his own kingdom, on the borders of
Thessaly, sacred from the earliest time to the goddesses of song. It
was solemnized with extraordinary pomp, with games, sacrifices,
banquets, and theatrical exhibitions, and continued for nine days.
Nor was this intended by Philip for an idle display. A concourse
of visitors flocked from all parts of Greece, to enjoy his hospitality;
and while all were dazzled with the grandeur of the spectacle, and
impressed with admiration of the king's fortune and power, many
eminent men from foreign states were won over to his friendship:
military adventurers were lured by his gifts and promises, and led
to believe that the camp of Philip was the place to look for honor
and reward.'
It is pleasing to record one or two acts of clemency and generosity on the part of the conqueror. At the sale of Olynthian citizens,
at which Philip himself was present, one prisoner, who was about
to be put up to auction, loudly demanded his liberty, declaring that
he was a friend to the king, and desiring to be brought near him,
that he might prove his word. This having been allowed by the
king, the man begged him in a whisper to let fall the skirt of his
robe, as he was exposed in an indecent manner. Philip entered
into the joke, and said: "' Yes: this man is my friend: let him be
set at liberty."2
At a banquet given during the festival, Philip, observing the melancholy countenance of Satyrus the actor, and that, while other
artists and performers claimed a recompense for their services, he
alone asked for nothing, inquired the cause. " I am indifferent,"
replied Satyrus, "to what the others desire; there is one favor I
would gladly ask, and one that Philip could easily grant, but I fear
he would refuse it me." Philip pressed him to speak out, and declared that he would deny him nothing: on which Satyrus preferred
his request as follows:-" Apollophanes of Pydna was my friend.
When he was murdered, his relations sent his two daughters, then
children, to Olynthus, as a place of security. They are among the
captives of the fallen city, and are now of marriageble age. I pray
and beseech you to give me them. But I would have you know
what is the nature of the boon I ask. It is one for which I seek
X Diodorus, xvi. 55,              2 Leland, 1. c.




ATI-IENIAN MONEY AND MINES.                253
no personal advantage. If you deliver them to me, I shall give
them each a marriage portion, and they shall be treated in a manner
worthy of me and of their father." This speech was received with
a tumult of applause from all the company: Philip was greatly
affected, and set the girls free, although Apollophanes their father
had been one of the murderers of his brother Alexander. 
Diodorus adds, that there were numerous other instances in which
Philip displayed a similar generosity.
APPENDIX II.
ATHENIAN MONEY AND MINES.
PHIDON, an ancient king of Argos, said to have lived in the eighth
century before Christ, was the first person in Greece who established a system of weights and measures, and also a coinage in silver and copper. It acquired the name of the _Eginetan, because
the people of Egina, by their commercial intercourse with other
parts of Greece, brought it into general use. There was another
system called the Euboic, introduced to the Greeks by the people
of Chalcis and Eretria, who at an early period were celebrated for
their commercial activity, and who worked mines of silver and copper in their own island.d
In fact however, both these systems were derived from the East,
having been invented in very ancient times by the Chaldees of
Babylon, and brought into Greece by the commerce of the Phcenicians. The standard of weights, which became known as the
Euboic, was one used in Asia for gold. ierodotus expressly informs us, that in the reign of Darius I. the silver tribute collected
from the satrapies of the Persian empire was estimated by the
Babylonian talent, the gold tribute by the Euboic.3 Whether
Herodotus means that the term Euboic was adopted by the Persian
government, or only the weight so called by the Greeks, does not
appear.
The denominations under both these systems were the same,
although the scales were different; viz. the talent, the mina, the
Demosth. De Fals. Leg. 402. Diodorus, 1. c.
2 For more full information upon this subject the reader is referred
to the Archaeological Dictionary, titles Nummu8 and Pondera.
I Herod. iii. 89.




254:                   APPENDIX  II.
drachm, and the obol; which bore the following invariable relation
to each other:
A talent                   60 minas.
A mina                    100 drachms.
A drachm        --          6 obols.
The word talent originally signified weight, that is, any weight, or
weight in general; and was also used to signify a pair of scales. In
such sense it is used by Homer. Afterwards the term was applied
to a specific weight, and became the principal standard in the
Greek systems. Mina was a term of oriental origin. Drachm and
obol are Greek words. Drachm is said by the lexicographers to
signify a handful, that is, as much coin as could be held in the
clenched hand.' Obol takes its name from a spit, which it somewhat resembled in figure.2
The weights under each system were as follows:
Eginetan talent    about      96 lb.
Euboic talent        "        80 lb.
The denominations of money in Greece were the same as those
of weight, and the proportions the same likewise. Money (as is
well known) has always been founded on a system of weight. In
process of time the coinage ceases to represent the original standard,
although the name is preserved. For example a pound, in our own
country, formerly represented a pound weight of metal; now it
signifies a sum of twenty shillings. So in Greece an Euboic talent
(in a pecuniary sense) anciently denoted eighty pounds of silverthat being the metal generally current in Greece-afterwards its
value would be measured by the number of draehms that were
paid for it; and, if the drachm-piece had fallen below the ancient
standard of weight, so would the talent.
The._Eginetan system was adopted in Peloponnesus and most of
the Dorian states. The Euboid prevailed in the Ionian settlements,
and in Attica. Solon however, for certain political reasons which
will be noticed elsewhere, lowered the standard of money, and the
Attic talent, according to his regulation, was reduced about twentyseven per cent.3 The money computed on the Solonian scale
is that which we have generally to deal with in perusing the Attic
As if it were dpayyed, from dpaiao. —It must then have been a copper coin, when it received that name.
2'03e2bf is a spit or broach. Scopula says in his Lexicon of the
Obol: "Ah 6be;tbc derivatum putatur, quod 6,ieroi figuram haberet, ita
tamen ut non in acutum desineret."
3 The Euboic scale still continued in use at Athens for merchandise,
though the scale for money was altered. See Grote's Hist. of Greece,
iii. 228.




ATHENIAN  MONEY AND  MINES.                  255
writers. Judging from  the ancient coins which have been preserved, the value of the Attic money has been thus estimated in
English:
~ s. d.
An obol          -0  0 1I
A drachm        ---          0 0 9
A mina           =3 15 0
A talent         =         225  0 0
The value however has been put by others both higher and lower.
It must be observed that the talent and the mina are sums only,
the drachm and the obol are coins also. And it will be found in
perusing the orators, that the Athenians generally made their computations in drachms, so that, when no specific sum is mentioned,
drachms are understood.
The coinage at Athens was principally silver, consisting of
drachms and obols, with fractions and multiples of those pieces.
The obol and half-obol were small coins, like our silver penny.
There were also copper coins, as the quarter-obol, the chalcus.5
The following is a table of Attic coins:
s. d.
The four-drachm piece..... value  3 0
The two-drachm piece.......     1"  6
The drachm..............."   0 9
The four-obol piece.........    0"  6
The three-obol piece......... "    0 41
The two-obol piece......... "   0 3
The obol.................. "      1
The half-obol............... 3
The quarter-obol................ 1
c  farthings.
The chalcus................ "....
The lepton...............  "....  
Thus the lowest Attic coin was pretty nearly equal to the French
centime.
There was no gold coined at Athens before the time of the Macedonian empire. But there was gold in circulation, the coinage of
other countries, chiefly the stater and the daric.
The gold stater was equal in value to twenty drachms, or fifteen
shillings. It was first coined by Crcesus king of Lydia, or at least
first became known to the Greeks as a Lydian coin. There were
various other staters brought into Greece from Asia Minor and the
islands; for example, from Smyrna, Cyzicus, Phoceea, Samos, Siphnos, Thasos.
The daric, named after the first Darius, who reformed the Persian
currency, was of the same value as the stater. This coin, which
1 So its name imports. Xa.;uSc is copper.




256                    APPENDIX  II.
had an extensive circulation, was retained by the Macedonian kings,
who melted down all the gold coinage of Greece, and had their own
image stamped upon it.
There were also half-staters and half-darics in circulation, which
are mentioned by Greek writers.
The daric was stamped on one side with the figure of an archer,
which gave rise to a good saying of Agesilaus, related by Plutarch.
While the Spartan king was overrunning the provinces of Asia
Minor, Tithraustes the satrap, to get rid of so formidable an enemy,
sent Timocrates of Rhodes with fifty talents of gold into Greece, to
stir up war against Lacedemon. This money was distributed in
Thebes, Argos, and Corinth-Xenophon says the Athenians had no
share of it'-and the effects were quickly seen. The Spartans,
alarmed at the confederacy against them, recalled Agesilaus; whereupon he declared " that a thousand Persian archers had driven him
out of Asia."
There was but a scanty supply of the precious metals in Greece
at an early period, while the eastern monarchs collected the treasures of Cholcis, Lydia, Phrygia, Armenia, and India. The wars of
Xerxes opened a more extensive intercourse with Asia, and enriched the Greeks by commerce and by plunder. Thus, and by an
increase in the produce of their native mines, money became more
plentiful among them; and in the time of Demosthenes its value
was five times less than in the days of Solon. The relative value
of gold to silver, in the time of Herodotus, was thirteen to one, in
the time of Demosthenes, ten to one.
The Greek islands that most abounded in precious metals were
Samos, Siphnos, and Thasos, in which there was both gold and silver. The mines of Thasos were anciently worked by the Pheenicians, to whom the Greeks were at an early period indebted for
their supply of metal in general. They brbught the common metals
from Spain and Arabia, tin2 from Britain, and probably taught the
art of mining to the Greeks. The Thasians found gold and silver
on the adjacent continent of Thrace. But when the island was
conquered by Cimon, their settlements also fell into the hands of
the Athenians, who worked the mines until the close of the Peloponnesian war. The gold, which they obtained from this district,
they used not for coinage, but for commercial purposes. Philip
afterwards took possession of these mines, and worked them, as we
have already seen, with great advantage.3'There were silver mines also in Thessaly. But the most valuable
H ell. iii. 5. 1.
2 They purchased it in the Cassiterides Insulae (Scilly Islands) so
called anciently from the Greek KaaatirpoC, tin. The islanders are sup,
posed to have obtained the tin from the mainland of Britain.' See p. 240 of this volume.




ATHENIAN MONEY AND MINES.                  257
in Greece were those of Laurium in Attica, to which Xenophon has
devoted a long chapter of his treatise on the Athenian revenues,
and on which in modern times a dissertation has been written by
Bsckh, the celebrated author of the Staatshaushaltung der Athener,
or Public Economy of Athens, from whom English scholars have
derived most of their information upon these subjects.
The mines of Laurium were the property of the Athenian people,
but were worked by private speculators, to whom the state granted
allotments, receiving a certain sum by way of premium or purchasemoney, and receiving a perpetual rent of a 24th part of the produce.
These persons were thus in point of law tenants of the state; but
for most purposes might be regarded as the absolute owners. Many
wealthy citizens embarked their capital in the mining business,
which they carried on by means of agents or sub-tenants. Nicias
had several mines, with a thousand slaves at work in them, for each
of whom he received from his lessee a clear rent of an obol a day.
Thus was Laurium an important source of revenue to Athens.
When Decelia was occupied by the Lacedoemonian army, she suffered greatly by losing the profit of the mines. They had yielded
a considerable income in the time of Themistocles, who persuaded
his countrymen to apply the money to ship-building, instead of distributing it among themselves. In the time of Demosthenes, though
he speaks in high terms of the value of this property,' the quantity
of silver obtained was diminished; and Strabo tells us, that in the
first century of the Christian era the Laurian mines were exhausted.
Foreigners in Attica were allowed equal privileges with citizens
in the renting of the mines:2 so anxious was the state, that they
should be let. To prevent frauds on the revenue, every mine in
work was required to be registered, and an indictment lay against
any person who evaded this regulation.3
Xenophon, who seems to have thought that the riches of Laurium
were inexhaustible, recommended that his countrymen should improve their finances by abolishing the middle-men, and letting the
mines, together with mining-slaves, to the working tenants, in the
same way that other revenues were let to farm. He advised that
they should buy slaves gradually, until they had got three slaves to
every citizen; and he calculated that the mines would afford profitable employment for all, and the revenue would be immensely increased.
The trade of Athens was much promoted by the purity of her
silver coin, which was every where exchanged with advantage, while
1 See the Oration de Chersoneso, p. 100; the fourth Philippic, 135.
2 Xenophon, de Vectig. iv. 12. The student should peruse thia
treatise.
3 This was called dypaqov?ertd;?ov ypaopj.




258                    APPENDIX  II.
that of other states would only pass at home. One instance only is
recorded of her issuing a debased gold coinage; but this was in a
time of distress, at the close of the Peloponnesian war.l The right
of coining money was (no doubt) vested in the state, and forgery
was a capital crime.The Attic coins were generally stamped with a head of Pallas on
one side, and an owl (her sacred bird) on the other. Hence the
point of the story told by Plutarch, in his life of Lysander-That
general sent Gylippus with a bag of money to Sparta. Gylippus
unsewed the bottom of the bag, took out a portion of the money,
and sewed it up again. But unfortunately for him, the bag contained a paper which gave an account of the sum sent home. The
magistrates, finding the money short, were surprised, and made
inquiries. Gylippus had concealed the stolen coins, which were
Athenian with the owl-stamp, under the tiles of his house; but his
servant, who was in the secret, betrayed him by declaring, that he
had observed a great many owls roost in the Ceramicus.3 The theft
was thus discovered, and Gylippus tarnished the good name which
he had acquired by his victories at Syracuse.
Although the Attic money has been reduced into terms of our
own, to give the reader some notion of its value, it is plain enough,
that the relative values of Attic and English money could only be
fully determined by a comparison of the quantities of the precious
metals, the different modes of living in the two countries, and many
other considerations of the same kind. For these reasons, besides
the awkwardness of making Demosthenes talk of pounds, shillings
and pence, I have, in the translation, adhered to the Attic terms for
money. The following particulars will help to throw some light on
the subject.
An Athenian could live respectably on the interest of a talent,that is, on seven or eight minas a year. In the speech written by
Demosthenes against Boeotus, the plaintiff  says he had been supported and educated out of such an income. Isseus speaks of an
estate of fifty minas as sufficient to live comfortably, but not to perform public services. The expenses of Demosthenes, his mother and
sister, during his minority, amounted to seven minas annually, exclusive of house rent. His father, who was a merchant,5 left to his
family an estate of fourteen talents, and is represented as a person
of considerable property. But we read of larger fortunes than his at
1 But even this instance is questioned by Grote. Hist. of Greece, iii.
153.
2 Demosth. cont. Lept. sub fin.
3 A pun on the Ceramicus at Athens and Kipaflot, tiles.
The person for whom Demosthenes composed the speech, pp. 1014,
1023.
6 Thirlwall's Hist. v. 247.




ATHENIAN MONEY AND MINES.                  259
Athens. Conon possessed forty talents; Nicias one hundred; Alcibiades still more. One of the richest men was Callias, son of Hipponicus, whose property was valued at two hundred talents, partly
acquired by the plunder of the Persian war. He had a son Hipponicus (who was killed at the battle of Delium) who gave his
daughter in marriage to Alcibiades, with a portion of ten talents, and
a promise of ten more after the birth of a son; the largest portion
ever given by a Greek.
I have spoken of seven or eight minas as being the interest of
a talent; that is, about twelve or thirteen per cent. per annum.
Such in fact was a common rate of interest at Athens, but it was
considered low; eighteen per cent. being frequently paid for loans
on good security. There was no laws against usury; and although
usurious money-lenders were regarded, as they have been in all
ages, with an evil eye by the people, much higher rates than those
above mentioned were exacted from needy borrowers, and wherever
the risk was considerable. Thus, we read of thirty per cent. being
paid on a bottomry contract for one summer. The lowness of personal credit, frequency of wars, instability of governments, and imperfection of national law, besides other causes of risk, would render
all mercantile adventures perilous.  The chief money-lenders at
Athens were bankers; who kept the cash of their customers pretty
much in the same manner as bankers of the present day, and made
a profit by lending it out to others. They were serviceable to their
customers in various ways; as the depositaries of important documents; as referees; as witnesses to payments and other transactions
between them and third persons; and generally by extending their
credit. They were usually men of high repute in the commercial
world. IsocratesI tells us that money was lent to them without
witnesses; and this need not surprise us, when we consider that
writing materials were not so plentiful or easy to be had, and men
were obliged to place more reliance on their agents.
The interest above referred to has been calculated, after the English fashion, by the year; but it must be remembered that it was
usually reserved at Athens by the month, which makes it really
higher.
Trateziticus, 358.




260                   APPENDIX III.
APPENDIX III.
THE THRACIAN CHERSONESE.
THE peninsula known anciently by the name of the Thracian'
Chersonese is washed on its eastern coast by the Hellespont, on its
west by the AEgean sea. It stretches about fifty-two miles in length
from its most southern point to the isthmus where it joins the continent of Thrace. The isthmus was between four and five miles long,
being the same length as the isthmus of Corinth. It contained in
Xenophon's time eleven or twelve cities. There were many good
harbors on the coast, and the land was generally fertile both for
corn and pasture. We read in Thucydides, that in the time of the
Trojan war this land was cultivated by the Greek army for their
subsistence. It was here, according to the legend, that Polydorus,
the son of Priam, was murderedt by the treacherous king Polymnestor. 2
The southernmost town was Eleus opposite Sigeum in the Troad.
Here was a tomb and temple of Protesilaus, the first of the Grecian
warriors who leaped ashore at the siege of Troy, and who was slain
by Hector, according to the prediction of the oracle.3
Sors quoque nescio quem fato designat iniquo,
Qui primus Danatm Troada tangat humum.
The temple was conspicuous on the shore, and held in great veneration. It contained valuable treasures in gold and silver, which
were seized by Artayctes, the Persian satrap, during the invasion
of Xerxes; for which the people of Elaeus were so incensed against
him, that afterwards, when he fell into the hands of the Athenians,
they caused him to be crucified, and his son to be stoned to death
before his eyes.4
Erom Elaeus the land curves eastward to the promontory of Cynossema, or Dog's-tomb, so called from Hecuba, the queen of Priam,
who was fabled to have been changed into a dog and buried there.5
The student must not confound this with the Tauric Chersonese,
(the modern Crim Tartary,) which projects into the Euxine sea beyond
the Borysthenes; the ancient name of which is preserved in the present
town of Cherson.
2 Xenophon, Hell. iii. c. 2, s. 10. Thucvdides, i. 11. Herodotus, vi.
36. Virgil,.&n. iii. 49. Euripid. Hecuba, 8.' Ovid, Epist. Laodamire, 93.
4 Herod. ix. 116, 120. Thucyd. viii. 102.
Euripid. Hecuba, 1265. Ovid, Metamorph. xiii. 560.  Diodorus
Siculus, xiii. 40.




THE THRACIAN CHERSONESE.                    261
The projection at this point is sharp and angular.1 Afterwards it
bends inward, and forms a deep bay, on which are the towns of
Madytus and Sestus.
Sestus stood at the northern corner of the bay, nearly at the point
where the strait is narrowest, so as to command the entrance. It
was an XEolic city, of ancient foundation, famous both in history and
in song. The story of Leander is familiar to all readers. Hero with
her torch in the Sestian watch-tower lighted him over the deep, as
he swam from Abydos. Their love-tale is the theme of two epistles
of Ovid; and in modern times the feat of Leander was imitated by
Lord Byron, who swam across the Hellespont at the same point.
The classic lines in the Bride of Abydos have added a further interest
to the spot:
The winds are high on Helle's wave,
As on that night of stormy water,
When Love who sent forgot to save
The young, the beautiful, the brave,
The lonely hope of Sestos' daughter.
Oh! when alone along the sky
Her turret torch was blazing high,
Though rising gale, and breaking foam,
And shrieking sea-birds warn'd him home;
And clouds aloft, and tides below,
With signs and sounds forbade to go,
He could not see, he would not hear,
Or sound or sign foreboding fear;
His eye but saw that light of love,
The only star it hail'd above:
His ear but rang with Hero's song,
" Ye waves, divide not lovers long!"
Oh yet-for there my steps have been;
These feet have press'd the sacred shore;
These limbs that buoyant wave hath borneMinstrel! with thee to muse, to mourn,
To trace again those fields of yore,
Believing every hillock green
Contains no fabled hero's ashes,
And that around th' undoubted scene
Thine own broad Hellespont still dashes,
Be long my lot! and cold were he
Who there could gaze denying thee!
The stream of the Hellespont flows rapidly toward the.Egean,
and gave the Greeks the idea of a river rather than a sea; whence
1 Thucyd. viii. 104. As to the situation the reader may consult
Goeller's note




262                     APPENDIX  III.
probably was derived Homer's epithet of broad, which has been the
subject of much controversy,I
The sea of Helle is the sea where Helle, the sister of Phryxus,
was drowned, falling from the golden ram; according to the ancient
legend:2
Et satis amissA locus hic infamis ab Helle est;
Utque mihi parcat, crimine nomen habet.
Invideo Phryxo, quem per fireta tristia tutum,
Aurea lanigero vellere vexit ovis.
Her tomb was at the Isthmus. The modern name of the strait is the
Dardanelles, apparently a compound of her name and the Asiatic
city of Dardanus.
It was to a rugged part of the coast between Sestus and Madytus,
that Xerxes carried his double bridge of boats across the strait, about
a mile in length from Abydos. The army was seven days in crossing. Then it marched right up to the isthmus, and turning off to the
left passed along the shore of the Sinus Melanis, and arrived at Doriscus on the Thracian coast, where the king held a grand review of
his forces.3
The bridge was afterwards broken by a storm, and when Xerxes
arrived at the Hellespont on his retreat, he carried his troops over in
sailing vessels to Abydos.  Herodotus mentions another story, of
which he declares his own disbelief; that Xerxes crossed over to
Asia in a single vessel from Eion on the Strymon, and was only
saved from shipwreck by causing his Persian followers to jump overboard.4  To this last story, as it would seem, Juvenal alludes in the
following lines: 5
Ille tamen qualis rediit Salamine relicta,
In Corum atque Eurum solitus saevire flagefis,
Barbarus, LEolio nunquam hoc in carcere passos,
Ipsum compedibus qui vinxerat Ennosigeeum,
Sed qualis rediit! nempe unD nave cruentis
Fluctibus, ac tard, per densa cadavera prodg.
Further to the north was the little stream called /Egos Potamos,
or Goat's River, near to which the great fleet of the Athenians,
through the negligence of their commanders, was captured by Lysander in the last year of the Peloponnesian war. It was exactly
opposite the Mysian Lampsacus, which was given by the Persian
king to Themistocles, to supply him with wine; as Magnesia for his'E l 7rarde'ELncwr6v7ro9. Iliad, vii. 86; Odyssey, xxiv. 82.
2 Ovid, Leand. Epist. 141.
3 Herod. vii. 33, 56, 69.' Ib. viii. 117, 118.
Juv. Sat. x. 178.




THE THRACIAN CHERSONESE.                  263
bread, and Myus for his meat.' This city was long famous for its
wealth and luxury, and also for the worship of the god Priapus, who
had a temple there. To this Virgil alludes in the line:2
Hellespontiaci servet tutela Priapi.
Further on was the city of Crithote, and a little beyond was Pactya.
The terminus of the Chersonese at an early period was a supposed
line drawn from Pactya to Cardia, where the wall was afterwards
built. Cardia was a Milesian settlement, and stood at the head of
the Melanis Sinus. In later times it became a city of importance,
and was considered the key of the peninsula; its possession giving
facility for a hostile inroad from the interior of Thrace.3
For the better understanding of that part of Athenian history
which relates to the occupation of the Chersonese by Athens, it will
be needful to give a brief account of the Thracian kingdom.
The people inhabiting the country that lay between the AEgean
sea and the Danube, the Strymon and the Euxine, where known
generally to the Greeks by the name of Thracians. They consisted
of numerous tribes. Could they have been united (says Herodotus)
under a single monarch, they would have been invincible.4 The more
warlike and ferocious among them were the mountaineers who dwelt
on the ridges of Htemus and Rhodope. Those who lived in the plain
were more peaceable, especially those who came into contact with
the Greek colonies on the lEgean and Propontine coasts. They
were devoted to the worship of Mars and Bacchus.5 With their
warlike character was mixed a wild religious enthusiasm; and down
to a very late period they were notorious among the nations for
quarreling over their cups: Horace says,
Non ego sanius
Bacchabor Edonis.
And again,
Natis in usum leetitiae scyphis
Pugnare Thracum est.
In the time of the Peloponnesian war the most considerable of
Thucyd. i. 138. Cornelius Nepos in vit Themist.
2 Georgics, iv. 111. See Pausanias, ix. 31. For the artifice by which
Anaximenes the orator saved Lampsacus from the wrath of Alexander,
see Pausanias, vi. 18.
3 Demosth. contra Aristoc. 681.
4 Herod. v. 3, 7.
0'O OpTIft 2iV7t At6vvcog, Euripid. Hecuba, 1267. He was the god
of the Orphic mysteries, perhaps derived from Egypt. Herod. ii. 81,
108.




264                   APPENDIX  III.
the tribes were the Odrysae, who occupied the centre of the country
below Mount Haemus. The sway of their king Sitalces extended
from the city of Abdera to the Euxine and the mouths of the Danube.
He was in alliance with Athens, and in pursuance of his engagement
with her led an innumerable host to attack Perdiccas and the Chalcidians. His invasion excited the utmost terror all through Macedonia and Thessaly; but the Athenians derived little advantage from
it; for Sitalces, after ravaging the enemy's country for some time,
entered into a negotiation with Perdiccas and returned home. Thucydides expresses the same opinion with Herodotus as to the formidable character of the Thracian people, if they could all have been
united.'
The first connection of the Athenians with the Thracian Chersonese
took place in the following way. The story is somewhat romantic.
In the time of Pisistratus the Chersonese was inhabited by a
Thracian tribe called Doloncians. They, pressed by a war of the
Absinthians, sent their princes to Delphi to consult the oracle; which
directed them to invite the first person who offered them hospitality to come and settle among them as their chief.  The princes
passed through Phocis and Boeotia and came to Athens. There, as
they walked through the town, their strange dress and arms were
observed by Militiades, the son of Cypselus; who invited them to
his house and entertained them. They told him of the oracle, and
entreated him to comply with it. Miltiades was a man of good family and wealth, and not very well satisfied with his position in
Athens, were Pisistratus held the supreme rule. He was therefore
not indisposed to accept the offer of the strangers. He took the
precaution, however, to consult the oracle in person, and having received a favorable answer, proceeded with the Doloncians and a
body of Athenian emigrants to the Chersonese, where he was made
ruler of the country, and building a wall from Pactya to Cardia repressed the incursions of the Absinthians.2
Divine honors were paid to Miltiades after his death by the Chersonesites, who looked upon him as the founder of a colony.3  He
was succeeded by his nephew  Stesagoras, son of Cimon; who
having been soon after assassinated, his brother Miltiades was sent
by Hippias from Athens, to take possession of the government.
This happened B.c. 518. The young Miltiades commenced his reign
by seizing the persons of the Chersonesite princes, whom he suspected probably of being concerned in his brother's murder; he
Thucyd. ii. 95 —101.
2 Herod. vi. 34-39. The Athenians had at an early period occupied
Sigeum in the Troad, and so became known in the Chersonesite region
before the migration under Miltiades.
3 OIKrTrC. See Thucyd. v. 11. Cornelius Nepos confounds the elder
Miltiades with the younger.




THE THRACIAN  CHERSONESE.                    265
then established a body of mercenaries, and strengthened his connection by marrying the daughter of a Thracian king.
About three years after, viz. B.C. 515, Darius invaded Scythia.
He crossed by a bridge of boats over the Thracian Bosphorus, and
marched through the eastern part of Thrace to the Danube, where
the Ionians, who commanded the fleet, had prepared a bridge for
his passage. MIany Thracian chiefs joined his army, and among
others, Miltiades; for the Chersonese, though ruled by the Athenian prince, was tributary to the Persian empire.  Miltiades remained with the Ionians who guarded the bridge, while Darius was
in the enemy's country.  He advised them to break it up, after the
expiration of the sixty days which Darius had prescribed for his return; but this advice was overruled, and Darius re-crossed the
Danube in safety.  Megabazus the satrap was left in Thrace to
complete the subjugation of the country. Miltiades returned to the
Chersonese, where for many years he reigned without disturbance,
except for a short period, when he was driven out by a Scythian
invasion.'
At length, however, after he had reigned about twenty-four
years, Miltiades was compelled to fly from his kingdom for fear of
Persian hostility. After the suppression of the Ionian revolt, B.C.
4941 Darius sent his Phoenician fleet to chastise the cities on the
European side of the Hellespont and Propontis, which had assisted
his rebellious subjects. Miltiades, conscious of having merited the
king's displeasure, either for his treacherous counsel on the Danube,
or by some other act of disloyalty, prepared for flight. He set sail
from Cardia with five ships, while the Phoenician fleet was anchored
at Tenedos. One of the ships, containing his eldest son Metiochus,
was captured by the Phoenicians, who sent him a prisoner to Susa.
Darius, instead of visiting the father's crime upon the son, treated
him with the utmost generosity; gave him a Persian lady in marriage, and an estate with her. Miltiades escaped to Athens, where
he was again admitted to the rights of citizenship. He was reserved
for a more glorious destiny than the government of a Thracian prinHerod. iv. 89-98, 137; vi. 40. Thirlwall, in an appendix to the
second volume of his history, contends that the counsel imputed to Miltiades at the Danube was a fiction, and that his second flight from the
Chersonese was occasioned by his having taken Lemnos from the Persians. The arguments which he advances in support of this view are
exceedingly strong.  Grote, on the other hand, in his History of Greece,
vol. iv. 368, maintains that the story bf Herodotus, as to the advice
given by Miltiades, is correct; but that Herodotus ascribed the first
flight of Miltiades from the Chersonese to the wrong cause; viz. to his
fear of the Scythian incursion; whereas the real cause was the fear of
Persia. The dates of Herodotus can scarcely be made to agree with
this latter view. Miltiades was a man very likely to have invented the
story.
Vo'l. I —M31




266                   APPENDIX  III.
cipality. In a few years afterwards he was the hero of Marathon.
The cities of Chersonesus, all excepting Cardia, were brought under
subjection to the Persian king.L
So things remained till after the defeat of the second Persian invasion. The united fleet of the Greeks sailed then to the Hellespont, where finding the bridge of Xerxes broken, the Peloponnesians returned home; the Athenians, under Xanthippus, stayed to
recover the dominion of Miltiades. All the Persian troops in the
neighborhood were drawn from the different towns into Sestus,
which was strongly fortified. The Athenians laid siege to that
city, and took it after a long resistance, putting Artayctes the
satrap to death, as we have already seen. Among other spoils
which fell into their hands were the cables of the famous bridge,
which they carried home to be deposited in the temples of
Athens.2
It was Cimon, the son of Miltiades, who completed the conquest
of Chersonesus. After the departure of the Athenian fleet from
Sestus, the Persians came over again, and recovered their possessions. Cimon sailed against them with only four galleys, defeated a
much larger squadron, and chased the Persians out of the peninsula,
together with a body of continental Thracians, whom they had invited to their assistance.3 To this period we may refer the following story related by Plutarch:4The Athenians and their allies having taken a great number of
barbarians prisoners in Sestus and Byzantium, Cimon, being chosen
to divide the booty, put the naked prisoners in one lot, and the rich
attire and jewels in another. The allies complaining of this as an
unequal division, he said they might take which lot they pleased,
and the Athenians would be content. Herophytus of Samos advised the allies to take the ornaments, and leave the slaves to the
Athenians. This was done, and Cimon at first was laughed at for
his liberality; but soon after, the parents and kinsmen of the prisoners came from Lydia and Phrygia, and paid a high price for their
ransom; whereby Cimon collected money enough to maintain his
fleet for four months, and even to reserve something for the Athenian treasury.
At a later period, when Pericles held the administration at
Athens, it being his policy to extend the influence of his country
by establishing numerous colonies, he sent out a thousand Athenians to take allotments of land in the Chersonese, and caused the
wall across the isthmus, which had been damaged by hostile inroads,
to be repaired.5
l Herod. vi. 33, 41.
2 Herod. ix. 114-121. Thucyd. i. 89.' Plutarch. in vit. Cimon.  Ibid.
Plutrch in vit. Peril.




THE THRACIAN CHERSONESE.                   267
In the last six years of the Peloponnesian war the Hellespont and
Propontis became the scene of most important military operations,
which it will be sufficient briefly to notice; —viz. the battle gained
by the Athenians off the headland of Cynossema'-the action off
Abydos, where they defeated the Poloponnesian fleet under Mindarus2-the victory of Alcibiades at Cyzicus in the Propontis3-his
successful sieges of Chalcedon and Byzantium.   The importance
of the struggle in these seas will be apparent, when we consider
that they were the great thoroughfare of the corn-trade, on which
Athens was entirely dependent for the subsistence of her people.
Euboea, once the granary of Athens, had revolted.5 Attica was
virtually in the hands of the enemy, by means of the garrison at
Deceleia.  Yet it was impossible to starve out the Athenians
whilst they possessed a navy which protected their commerce, and
enabled them to import corn from the shores of the Hellespont
and the Euxine. This had forcibly struck Agis the Spartan king,
who commanded at Deceleia, as from that fortress one day he
espied a multitude of corn-ships sailing into the Pirmeus. It was
no use, he said, to exclude the Athenians from Attica, unless they
stopped the passage of corn by sea: and accordingly he advised
that measures should be taken to cut off their commerce. His advice was followed; and on this in fact the issue of the war ultimately turned.6
Hitherto the Athenians had been victorious in the northern seas;
but in the year B.c. 405, Lysander, already famous by his victory at
Notium, sailed with a considerable fleet to Abydos, then in alliance
with the Peloponnesians. From hence he sailed to Lampsacus, a
few miles north of Abydos, which he attacked by sea, while the
Abydenes, under Thorax the Lacedeemonian, besieged it from the
land side. That city had just been taken by storm, when the
Athenian fleet, consisting of 180 ships, arrived at Elaeus. It was
commanded by six generals, Conon, Philocles, Adimantus, Menander, Tydeus, and Cephisodotus. Hearing that Lampsacus was taken,
they sailed up the channel, and, putting in at Sestus for provisions,
proceeded to.Egos Potamos, just opposite Lampsacus, where the
enemy still lay at anchor. The width of the channel at this point
was fifteen furlongs; the two fleets were in sight of each other, and
a decisive battle was expected.7
Early the next morning the Athenians crossed the Hellespont,
and drew up in order of battle opposite the harbor of Lampsacus.
Lysander, whose fleet seems to have been inferior in number, had
given strict injunctions to his men to make every preparation for a
X Thucyd. viii. 104.       2 Xenoph. Hellen.i. c. 1, s. 5.
s Ib. s. 16.               4 lb. c. 3, s. 2,14.
8 Tlhucyd. viii. 95.     6 Xenoph. Hellen. i. c. 1, s. 35.
T Xenoph. Hellen. ii c. 1, s. 16-29.




268                    APPENDIX  III.
sea-fight, but not to stir from their position. The Athenians continued offering battle till late in the afternoon, when, finding that
the enemy would not move, they sailed back to lEgos Potamos.
Lysander ordered two or three of his swiftest ships to follow them,
and see what they did after landing: his own troops he kept on
board till the messengers returned. These operations on both sides
were repeated for four days. The Athenians each day, after returning to their station, dispersed themselves to Sestus and other places
to seek provisions.
It so happened, there was one vigilant eye which discerned the
stratagem of the Spartan general. Alcibiades, in disgrace and exile
since the affair of Notium, had retired to an estate which he possessed in the Chersonese, not far from Pactya; there he had fortified three castles, to serve him, in case of need, for places of refuge.
From one of these, which stood near the coast, he descried the
manceuvres of the hostile fleets. Seeing the peril of his countrymen, he rode on horseback down to the Athenian camp, and pointed
out to the generals two important oversights which they had committed,-first, that they had stationed their fleet on an open beach,
without cover or shelter; secondly, that they were too far removed
from Sestus, to which they were obliged to resort for a market,
and which was nearly two miles off. He advised them to sail to
Sestus immediately, where they would enjoy the convenience of the
town and harbor, and have it in their power to fight when they
pleased. He reproved them also for their negligence in suffering
the crews to be dispersed, when the enemy was so near. This wise
counsel was utterly disregarded.  Tydeus and Menander reminded
him, they were the generals, not he, and ordered him to be gone.
He told the few friends who accompanied him out of the camp, that
if the generals would put themselves under his directions, he could
brine to their aid a body of Thracians, and that he would force
Lysander into a battle by attacking him on land. This was looked
upon as an idle boast; but very likely it was no more than the
truth, for it appears that Alcibiades during his sojourn in the Chersonese had made excursions beyond the isthmus, and ingratiated
himself with some of the princes in the interior of Thrace. All he
could say, however, had no effect.'
On the fifth morning the Athenians advanced to Lampascus, and
returned as before, looking with contempt on the Peloponnesians
for their cowardice; and landing again, they dispersed themselves
with still greater carelessness over the country. The captains that
followed them were ordered by Lysander to watch the moment of
their dispersal, then to row back, and, when they were half-way, to
hoist a shield. He himself kept his whole fleet in readiness. The
I Plutarch in vit. Alcib. Id. in vit. Lysand. Diodorus Siculus, xiii.
105. Cornelius Nepos in vit. Alcib.




THE THRACIAN CHERSONESE.                 269
shield was raised, and the Peloponnesian galleys, with Thorax and
his land forces on board, were soon crossing the channel at full
speed. Conon saw their advance, and gave the signal to his men
to come on board; but it was too late; they were scattered too far;
and of the whole fleet only eight ships besides his own could be
manned and put to sea. One of these was the Paralus or stategalley, which sailed off to Athens, to bear the melancholy tidings.
Conon with the other eight escaped from the enemy, and found
refuge in Cyprus; from which, some years after, he issued forth to
be the restorer of his country. Meanwhile, the rest of the fleet
became, without a struggle, the prize of Lysander. The few Athenians who had run down to their ships were put to the sword; the
rest were pursued over the country, and nearly the whole body of
them were made prisoners, and massacred in cold blood in the
streets of Lampsacus.'
Thus, by the extraordinary negligence of the Athenian commanders, Lysander acquired the glory of terminating the Peloponnesian war.
The Chersonese, together with the rest of her empire, was lost
to Athens; and it was more than forty years before she recovered
anfiy of her dominion in this quarter. The Spartans did not seize the
vacant possession for themselves, but, content with having destroyed the Athenian empire, and established their own preponderating influence, left the inhabitants to a nominal independence.
Lysander indeed, having taken Sestus, gave up the whole town as
a property to his troops; but the Spartan government were'displeased at his conduct, and restored the Sestians to their rights.2
We may presume that many Athenian colonists were compelled to
imigrate. Alcibiades, deeming it unsafe to remain in the neighborhood, departed, with all the treasure that he could carry away, into
Bithynia, where, having been plundered by Thracian robbers, he
sought the protection of the satrap Pharnabazus, who assigned him
a dwelling in Phrygia, and for a time treated him kindly, but afterwards, at the instance of Lysander, caused him to be treacherously
murdered.3
The Chersonesite Greeks, no longer under the protection of a
powerful empire, were again exposed to the inroads of their continental neighbors, insomuch that it was almost useless to cultivate
the land. In the year B.C. 398 Dercyllidas, the Spartan general,
who was then with his army at Lampsacus, was informed by some
commissioners from home, that a deputation of the Chersonesites
had been at Sparta, praying to have the isthmus fortified against the
According to Pausanias, ix. 32, four thousand prisoners were massacred, and their bodies left unburied.
2 Plutarch. in vit. Lysand.' Diodorus xiv. 11. Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos in vit. Alcibiad.




2 70                   APPENDIX III.
barbarous Thracians. It seems that little or none of the old wall
was then remnaining.  Dercyllidas marched into Thrace, and after
passing some time at the court of Seuthes, king of the Odrysse,
arrived at the isthmus, where he first chased away the marauders,
and then set his troops to work at the fortification, dividing the
ground among them in portions, and stimulating them by rewards.
The new wall was completed in half a year.'
The great kingdom of the Odrysse, after the death of Sitalces,
who was slain by the Triballi B.c. 424, was inherited by his nephew
Seuthes. He enjoyed a long and prosperous reign. His revenues
are said to have amounted to four hundred talents a year, besides
presents to an equal amount in gold and silver, which it was usual
for the kings of Thrace to receive.2 Towards the end of the fifth
century B.C. this kingdom had devolved upon Amadocus or Medocus; but it was divided and greatly we~akened.  A prince named
Msesades ruled the southern and eastern parts, extending to the
lower shores of the Euxine and the Propontis, as far as the city of
Ganus. The tribes subject to him were named Melanditoe, Thyni,
and TranipsTe. But he was expelled from his kingdom, and his son
Seuthes was brought up at the court of Amadocus. Seuthes, when
he arrived at man's estate, endeavored, with the assistance of the
Odrysian monarch, to recover his dominions, but was unable to do
more than live by plunder.3  Alcibiades had made friends of both
these princes in the year B.C. 405, but what position Seuthes then
held we are not informed.4 Indeed, we have so little historical information about the Thracian people, except when they are brought
into contact with the southern Greeks, that it is difficult to make
out the geography of the country reigned over by their kings, or
the boundaries of the various tribes that composed the nation. We
read occasionally of incursions made by particular triibes into the territories occupied by Greek colonies; and it appears clear enough
that the mountaineers of Hsemus and Rhodope always n-aintained
a rude independence against the Thracian monarchs of the plain.
When Xenophon and his Cyrean troops, on their return from Persia, arrived on the coast of the Bosphorus, in the year B.c. 400,
Seuthes applied to him for assistance against his rebellious subjects.
This, after some delay, was granted. Xenophon marched from
Perinthus into the interior of the country, defeated the rebellious
mountaineers, and re-established the power of Seuthes, from whom
he with some difficulty obtained the promised reward for his solXenoph. Hell. iii. c. 2, s. 8. Diodorus, xiv. 38.
3 Thucyd. ii. 97; iv. 101.' Xenoph. Anab. vii. c. 2, s. 32-38.
4 iodorus, xiii. 105.
6Thucyd. ii. 96. Xenoph. Hell. v. c. 2, s. 17. Diodorus, xiv. 12;;v. 86.




THE THRACIAN CHERSONESE.                  2'1
diers.' It has already been mentioned that Dercillidas the Lacedaemonian was hospitably entertained at the court of Seuthes. We
read that in the year B.C. 392 Thrasybulus, then commanding an
Athenian fleet in the.Egoean, visited the Chersonese, and brought
over Amadocus and Seuthes to the alliance of Athens.2  A few
years later, Seuthes was again disturbed by insurrection, and in his
distress applied for the aid of Iphicrates, who had rendered himself
famous by the success of his peltastm or targeteers. By the arms
of that general he recovered his dominion.3
In the year B.c. 382 Cotys succeeded to the monarchy of Thrace;
but whether to the kingdom of Amadocus as well as that of Seuthes
does not appear. The latter he certainly possessed; and it is not
unlikely that he enlarged his power by conquest of the former. The
long sojourn of Iphicrates in Thrace-for since the peace of Antalcidas he had no employment for his troops in the south-had
brought him into connection with Cotys, to whom, after the death
of Seuthes, he transferred his services.  Cotys, to reward and
attach him more closely to his own interests, gave him his daughter
in marriage, and assigned to him for his domain a Thracian town
called Drys, situated near the mouth of the Hebrus, which Iphicrates strengthened by fortifications, and by the introduction of a
Greek colony.4  Thus, says Grote,5 "Iphicrates became a great
man in Thrace, yet by no means abandoning his connection with
Athens, but making his position in each subservient to his importance in the other. While he was in a situation to favor the projects of Athenian citizens for mercantile and territorial acquisitions
in the Chersonese and other parts of Thrace, he could also lend the
aid of Athenian naval and military art, not merely to princes in
Thrace, but to others even beyond those limits; since we learn that
Amyntas, king of Macedonia, became so attached or indebted to
him as to adopt him for his son."
Here it is convenient to notice the loose and irregular practices
of which the Athenian generals of this period were so frequently
guilty, but which scarcely drew upon them any rebuke or censure
1 Xenoph. Anab. vii. c. 1, s. 5-c. 7, s. 55.
2 Diodorus, xiv. 94.
8 Cornelius Nepos in vit. Iphicrat.
4 Suidas, s. v. K(6rvf and Apve. Anaxandridas apud Athen. iv. 6,
where there is an amusing description of the wedding feast. A good
saying of Menestheus, the son of Iphicrates, is related by Cornelius
Nepos: "Is chm interrogaretur, utrum pluris patrern matremve faceret; matrem inquit. Id chim omnibus mirum videretur; at ille, merito
inquit facio. Nam pater, quantum in se fuit, Thracem me genuit; contra mater Atheniensem." The absence of Iphicrates in Thrace is mentioned by Isseus, de Menecl. Hered. s. 7.
5 History of Greece, x. 146.




272                   APPENDIX  III.
from their own people. I allude to their constant residence
abroad, their roaming in quest of adventures, their service under
foreign princes, forming connections with them by marriage and
otherwise, receiving gifts of cities and fortified posts, and acting
independently without the order or permission of the state. Much
of this may be traced to the consequences of the Peloponnesian
war. A large number of men accustomed to warfare were thrown
out of employment, and glad to find any service where pay and
plunder could be got. The march of the ten thousand Greeks into
Persia was one of the first demonstrations given of the importance
of this class of men. The remnant that returned under Xenophon
were employed in Asia Minor by the Lacedoemonians. Athens
owed her restoration to the foreign troops commanded by Conon.
Mercenary soldiers began to be necessary for her wars. Her generals, if successful, acquired an influence over them, and in proportion as the soldiers were attached to the general, he was less under
the control of the state. Thus was the power of the state weakened,
and a change wrought in the temper and feelings of the people.
Necessity itself prevented the Athenians from scrutinizing the conduct of their generals too nicely. They were compelled to send
them out unprovided with the sinews of war; and the generals had
no choice but to get money in irregular ways, by contributions from
allies, by plunder, or by for: gn se~rvice. When Athens began to
recover her maritime empire, she ought to have established a better
rule of discipline. But she did not; the people imagined that they
could make foreign conquests in the same scrambling way that they
had extricated themselves from their difficulties. Hence, not only
did they allow such men as Iphicrates and Timotheus to use their
armaments on expeditions that were not immediately connected
with the interests of Athens, but they tolerated, if they did not
encourage, the mischievous irregularities of such men as Chares and
Charidemus. It is true, the Athenians sometimes profited by these
irregularities, but they lost by them in the long run. We shall see
presently what damage was done to the affairs of Athens in the
Chersonese by the adventurer Charidemus. And even Iphicrates,
greatly as he had served his country on former occasions, was induced by his alliance with Cotys to commit open treason.'
These remarks are quite distinct from another charge, which has
been brought against the Athenian people both in ancient and modern times, viz. that their leading men resided abroad, because, owing
to the jealousy of their fellow-citizens, they could not live in comfort and security at home. Theopompus was the original author of
such accusation, which has been repeated by Cornelius Nepos in the
Life of Chabrias:
1 See pages 51, 105, 189, 232, of this volume. Also Thirlwall, Gr.
Hist. v. 209-212.




THE THRACIAN CHERSONESE.                   273
"Non enim libenter erat ante oculos civium suorum, quod et
vivebat laute, et indulgebat sibi liberalius quam ut invidium vulgi
posset effugere. Est enim hoc commune vitium in magnis liberisque
civitatibus, ut invidia gloriTe comes sit, et libenter de his detrahant,
quos eminere videant altius; neque animo aequo pauperes alienam
opulentam intuentur fortunam. Itaque Chabrias, quoad ei licebat,
plurimum aberat: Neque vero solus ille aberat Athenis libentur, sed
omnes fere principes fecerunt idem, qubd tantum se ab invidia putabant abfuturos, quantum a conspectu suorum recessissent. Itaque
Conon plurimum Cypri vixit, Iphicrates in Thracia, Timotheus Lesbi,
Chares in Sigeo."
Grote, who has given proof of a clearer insight into the spirit of
Greek history, and especially of Athenian character, than any English historian who has preceded him, successfully refutes the sweeping charge of Theopompus and Nepos. I can not do better than
quote his own words: l
"That the people of Athens, among other human frailties, had
their fair share of envy and jealousy, is not to be denied; but that
these attributes belonged to them in a marked or peculiar manner,
can not (in my judgment) be shown by any evidence extant, and most
assuredly is not shown by the evidence here alluded to.
" Chabrias was fond of a life of enjoyment and luxurious indulgence. If, instead of being an Athenian, he had been a Spartan, he
would undoubtedly have been compelled to expatriate, in order to
gratify this taste; for it was the express drift and purpose of the
Spartan discipline, not to equalize property, but to equalize the
habits, enjoyments, and personal toils, of the rich and poor. This is
a point which the admirers of Lycurgus-Xenophon and Plutarchattest not less clearly than Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, and others.
If then it were considered a proof of envy and ill temper, to debar
rich men from spending their money in procuring enjoyments, we
might fairly consider the reproach as made out against Lycurgus and
Sparta. Not so against Athens. There was no city in Greece where
the means of luxurious and comfortable living were more abundantly
exhibited for sale, nor where a rich man was more perfectly at liberty
to purchase them. Of this the proofs are every where to be found.
Even the son of this very Chabrias-Ctesippus-who inherited the
appetite for enjoyment, without the greater qualities, of his fatherfound the means of gratifying his appetite so unfortunately easy at
Athens, that he wasted his whole substance in such expenses.
(Plutarch, Phocion, c. 7; Athenmeus, iv. p. 165.) And Chares was
even better liked at Athens in consequence of his love of enjoyment
and license-if we are to believe another fragment (238) of the same
Theopompus.
"The allegation of Theopompus and Nepos, therefore, is neither
1 History of Greece, x. 147.
M 2




2'74                   APPENDIX  III.
true as matter of fact, nor sufficient, if it had been true, to sustain
the hypothesis of a malignant Athenian public, with which they
connect it. Iphicrates and Chabrias did not stay away from Athens
because they loved enjoyments or feared the envy of their countrymen; but because both of them were large gainers by doing so, in
importance, in profit, and in tastes. Both of them loved war and
had great abilities for war-qualities quite compatible with a strong
appetite for enjoyment; while neither of them had either taste or
talent for the civil routine and debate of Athens when at peace.
Besides, each of them was commander of a body of peltasts, through
whose means he could obtain lucrative service as well as foreign distinction; so that we can assign a sufficient reason why both of
them preferred to be absent from Athens during most part of the
nine years that the peace of Antalcides continued.  Afterwards,
Iphicrates was abroad three or four years in service with the Persian satraps, by order of the Athenians: Chabrias also went, a long
time afterwards, again on foreign service, to Egypt, at the same
time when the Spartan king Agesilaus was there; (yet without
staying long away, since we find him going out on command from
Athens to the Chersonese in 359- 358 B. c.- Demosth. cont.
Aristoc. p. 677;) but neither he, nor Agesilaus, went there to escape
the mischief of envious countrymen. Demosthenes does not talk of
Iphicrates as being uncomfortable in Athens, or anxious to get out
of it: see Orat. cont. Meidiam, p. 535."
The case of Conon residing at Cyprus, as Grote justly remarks,
is far from being an illustration of Athenian jealousy or ill temper.
It is not a case at all in point, as from any common history may be
gathered.
But I must return from this disgression.
Events that occurred somewhere about the year B. C. 362 brought
Cotys into collision with the Athenians.
Towards the close of the year B. c. 363 Timotheus, who then commanded the Athenian fleet in the,Egean, was sent to the coast of
Asia Minor to assist Ariobarzanes, satrap of Phrygia. Ariobarzanes
about five years before had sent an agent to Delphi, named Philiscus,
who held a congress for the pacification of the Greek states. The
Thebans thwarted his views, upon which Philiscus threatened them
with war, and began to levy troops against them.' The Athenians,
then in alliance with Lacedemon against Thebes, conferred the
honor of citizenship on Ariobarzanes and his deputy;2 and the connection thus formed with the satrap apparently led to the mission of
Timotheus. What were the precise objects of the Athenians, we are
not informed. It appears however that in the same year the Thebans sent a naval armament under the command of Epaminondas
X Xenoph. Hell. vii. c. 1, s. 27.
Demosth. contra Aristoc. 666, 687.




THE THRACIAN CHERSONESE.                  275
to the Hellespont and Propontis, which defeated a small force under
Laches at Byzantium. Epaminondas was well received at that city,
and exerted himself (not without effect) to detach it from the Athenian alliance. 1 After scouring the seas for some time, he was obliged
to return home to attend to more pressing affairs, but his appearance
in the Egean had greatly alarmed the Athenians; and it is probable
that they desired the aid of the Persian satrap, (especially in money,)
to counteract the efforts of the Thebans in that direction. Ariobarzanes had views of his own, which caused him to need the assistance of an able general like Timotheus. In fact, he was meditating revolt from his master Artaxerxes, and wanted men and officers.
The Athenians had some suspicion of his intention; and therefore,2
while they permitted their general to co-operate with the satrap, to
save appearances, they inserted a clause in their decree, forbidding
any infringement of their treaty with the king of Persia. Agesilaus
was allowed by the Spartans to go out on the same mission, but
without any such limitation of his powers. The result of the ex.
pedition-as far as concerns our present inquiry-was, that Timotheus, in requital of the services which he rendered, was assisted
by Ariobarzanes to get possession of Sestus and Crithote; and the
Athenians, having thus again got a footing on their ancient territory,
were encouraged to claim the whole dominion of the Chersonese.3
Cotys, who considered the peninsula as rightly belonging to
his own kingdom, by no means acquiesced in this claim. He had
already made an attempt on the town of Sestus, which was defeated by Agesilaus,4 and he now prepared for war with the Athenians.
He engaged in his service Iphicrates, who being at this time out of
employment, and in some disgrace on account of his bad success at
Amphipolis, did not scruple to assist his father-in-law against his
country. 5 Timotheus nevertheless took Elseus, carried the war into
Thrace, and acquired a considerable amount of plunder. But he
had not much leisure for operations in the Chersonese; for he was
now called off to the siege of Samos, where he was occupied for
nearly a twelvemonth, until some part of the year B.C. 361. At the
end of that year he went on his last disastrous expedition against
Amphipolis; and we do not find him  again employed as general
until the occasion of the Social war.6
Meanwhile Cotys had been greatly alarmed by a rebellion which
broke out in his own kingdom. A Thracian chieftain, named MilDiod. xv. 79. Isocr. Phil. 59.
Demosth. de Rhod. Lib. 192, 193.
9 Isocrates, On the Exchange, 115, 119. Cornelius Nepos in vit.
Timoth.
Xenoph. Agesil. ii. 26.
5 Demosth. contra Aristoc. 663.
6 See page 234 of this volume.




2'76                   APPENDIX  III.
tocythes, at the close of the year 372, rose in arms, and seized upon
the Sacred Mountain.' He sent off an embassy to Athens, proposing alliance and offering to give up to her the Chersonese.  Ergophilus, then commanding on that coast, prepared to support him:
but Cotys, probably under the advice of Iphicrates, sent a submissive letter to the Athenians, which induced them to suppose they
should gain more by the friendship than by the punishment of that
monarch; and accordingly they sent out a new general, Autocles,
with a commission which gave him discretionary power to act according to circumstances. The result of this double-faced policy
was, that Miltocythes, having no assurance of support, and rather
supposing the Athenians were against him, abandoned his stronghold, and withdrew: Cotys, being relieved from danger, soon gave
the Athenians to understand that they had merited no recompense
from him. They vented their anger upon Autocles, whom  tl:cy
brought to trial for having permitted the rebellion to be quashed;
and sent out Menon as his successor.  Menon in a short time was
superseded by Timomachus. Neither of them gained any success
in their warlike operations against Cotys. He on the contrary was
able to annoy the Athenian commerce: and the presence of a naval
force in the northern seas became necessary for the protection of
the corn-trade, not only against Cotys, but also against the Byzantines and others who detained the Athenian vessels and intercepted
their supplies.2
Towards the end of the year B.c. 361 Cotys led an army into the
Chersonese, and contrived, with assistance from Abydos, which had
generally been hostile to Athens, to take Sestus. In this enterprise
he was no longer aided by Iphicrates, who, either drawing a distinction between offensive and defensive measures, or repenting of
his past conduct, or for some other cause dissatisfied with his fatherin-law, would serve no longer against Athens. He had, as Demosthenes represents, saved Cotys from ruin-referring probably to the
rebellion of Miltocythes —and expected from his gratitude, that he
would change his policy towards Athens: but instead of this, his
own service was required for further hostilities. Refusing to comply with this demand, and fearing the resentment of the king, he
retired to Antissa, and afterwards to Drys.3 The Athenians overI A district about fifteen miles north of the Chersonese, stretching
wvest of the river Zoralus, nearly down to the sea above Ganus.
X Demosth. contra Aristoc. 655, 658; contra Polyclem. 1207, 1210,
1211, 1213.:  Demosth. contra Aristoc. 663, 664. It is possible that a feeling of
rivalry against Timotheus influenced the conduct of Iphicrates. Timotheus threatened him with a ypaoy 5evicaf, but they were afterwards
reconciled, and joint commanders in the Social war. See Demosth. contraTimoth. 1204. Cornelius Nepos in vit. Iphic. and Timoth.




THE THIRACIAN CHERSONESE.                 277
looked his treasonable conduct, and employed him at a later period
in the Social war. Cotys, deprived of his ablest officer, engaged in
his stead Charidemus.
Of this adventurer's character I have already spoken. After the
defeat of Timotheus, under whom he had served by compulsion, at
Amphipolis, he had passed over to Asia, and, breaking an engagement which he had entered into with Memnon and Mentor, brothers-in-law of the satrap Artabazus, took forcible possession of Scepsis, Cebren, and Ilium, in the Troad. These being inland towns, he
had no means of maintaining himself against the power of the
satrap, who soon collected his forces for a siege. Charidemus, in
his distress, wrote a letter to Cephisodotus, then the Athenian commander in the Hellespont, begging the loan of some ships to convey
him and his troops from Asia, and promising in return to reduce the
Chersonese under Athenian dominion. He was lucky enough to
escape without such help; for Mentor and Memnon, hearing of the
design, persuaded Artabazus to let him go. Charidemus, having
crossed over to the Chersonese, instead of performing his promise
to Cephisodotus, joined the army of Cotys, from whom probably he
expected a more ample reward, and proceeded with him to besiege
Elkeus and Crithote.'
The siege of these places had continued for some time without
success, when the Athenians were relieved from further peril by
the violent death of Cotys, who was assassinated by two natives
of Enus, Python and Heraclides. The alleged motive of the deed
was revenge for some insult which Cotys had offered to their father.
Cotys with much energy and strength of character united the rude
ferocity common among his people. He was addicted to hard
drinking and licentious habits, and it not unfrequently happened,
that the courtiers and companions of the king were the victims of
his intemperance. Strange stories are told of him by Theopompus
— that he used to make excursions over his kingdom, and wherever
he found pleasant spots, well wooded and watered, he established
places of entertainment, to which he resorted with his generals
and officers, and gave himself up to sensual enjoyment. Sacrifices
to the gods formed a part of these festivities, until the habit of unrestrained indulgence overcame his piety as well as his discretion,
and he conceived the idea that he was beloved by the goddess Minerva. Full of this belief, he actually ordered a wedding-feast, and
fitted up a nuptial chamber for his bride. In a state of intoxication
he awaited her arrival; till at length, becoming impatient, he sent
one of his guards to see if the goddess had come. The guard informed him that there was no one in the chamber, and for this unwelcome news was shot by the king with an arrow. A second
messenger shared the same fate: a third, more prudent, told him,
I Demosth. contra Aristoc. 670-672.




i278                  APPENDIX  III.
the goddess had been waiting for him some time. Another story
is, that, being jealous of his queen, he killed her in a most brutal
manner, cutting her up the middle with his own sword. Such was
the man, who now, for some outrage upon a Greek citizen, fell a
victim to filial vengeance.1
The murderers fled to Athens, and were well received. The
Athenians were weak enough to pass a vote, conferring on them
the honor of citizenship and crowns of gold.' Nothing could justify
this step. It would have been wrong in the Athenians to have
murdered Cotys themselves, whether as a tyrant or an enemy; and
if so, it could not be decent to reward others for doing such a deed.
I mention this, because some writeis speak loosely about tyrannicide, as if the Greeks were excusable for encouraging it. Python,
one of the brothers, did -not regard the honor bestowed on him as
in any way binding him to the interests of Athens; for not long
afterwards he passed over into the service of Philip.2
Another instance of the same folly, on a more memorable occasion-when the Athenians, on the news of Philip's death, offered
sacrifice to the gods, and voted a crown to Pausanias, his murderer-is thus animadverted on by Plutarch in the life of Demosthenes:
"For my part, I can not say that the behavior of the Athenians
on this occasion was at all decent or honorable, to crown themselves
with garlands, to sacrifice to the gods, for the death of a prince, who
in the midst of his success and victories, when they were a conquered people, had used them with so much clemency and humanity.
It was a practice both unworthy and base, to make him free of
their city, and honor him while he lived; and yet, as soon as he fell
by treason, to set no bounds to their joy, to insult over his death,
and sing triumphant songs of victory, as if by their own valor they
had conquered him."
The death of Cotys occurred B.C. 358. Three princes claimed the
succession, to the whole, or to different parts of his kingdom; Cersobleptes, Berisades, and Amadocus. Cersobleptes was the son of
Cotys; the other two were either sons, or more distant relatives.
They were all very young, and sought the aid of Greek generals to
make good their pretensions. Charidemus espoused the cause of
Cersobleptes, whose sister he had -married: Berisades was supported
by Athenodorus, a citizen of Athens, with whom he had formed a
Aristotle, Polit. v. 8, 12. Theopompus apud Athen. xii. 42.
2 Demosth. contra Aristocr. 659, 662. Whether this Pythou was the
same as the Byzantine Python, who at a later period distinguished himself as an orator and embassador of Philip, is a matter of doubt. See
Thirlwall, Gr. Hist. v. 221, (note), who assigns good reasons for believing them to be the same. Jacobs' Dem. 319.




THE THRACIAN CHERSONESE.                   279
nuptial alliance; Amadocus by Simon and Bianor, who were similarly connected with him.'
Meanwhile Cephisodotus, the Athenian commander, ignorant of
the plans of Charidemus, arrived at Perinthus with ten ships to
claim the fulfillment of the promises which he had made in the
Troad. Charidemus with some cavalry and light troops, watching
his opportunity, attacked the Athenian soldiers while they were on
shore taking their meal, and slew a considerable number of them.
He continued his hostilities for seven months, and the Chersonese
again became the scene of war. Cephisodotus sailed with his
squadron to Alopeconnesus, a promontory on the south-west coast
of the Peninsula, lying over against Imbrus, where a band of pirates
had established themselves; but Charidemus, marching across the
country, attacked the Athenians, and forced Cephisodotus into a
disadvantageous convention. As soon as this was known at Athens,
it was indignantly repudiated. Cephisodotus was recalled, and sentenced to a fine of five talents. Athenodorus was appointed to take
his place.2
No war had hitherto broken out between Cersobleptes and the
other two princes; nor does it exactly appear over what parts of
the kingdom they respectively reigned, except that Cersobleptes
must have held the country north of the Chersonese and the Propontine coast; Amadocus seems to have had dominion west of the
Hebrus.3  It happened that about this time Miltocythes made a
new attempt to get the crown, but was betrayed, and delivered into
the hands of Charidemus. That general was at Cardia, which city
had at his special desire been reserved to him by the terms of the
convention. Knowing that it was the custom of the Thracians not
to put their prisoners to death, he gave up Miltocythes, not to Cersobleptes, but to the Cardian people; who, to gratify Charidemus,
took the captive and his son out in a boat, slew the son before his
father's eyes, and then threw the father into the sea. This act of
cruelty roused the anger of the Thracians. iBerisades and Amadocus united their forces against Cersobleptes, who was charged as the
author of the crime; and concluded an alliance with Athenodorus,
who was now upon the coast. The object of the princes was to
enlarge their dominions, or secure themselves in what they already
possessed; that of the Athenians was to obtain a cessiou of the
Chersonese. Cersobleptes, assailed by a superior force, was driven
into a treaty, whereby it was agreed that the kingdom of Cotys
Demosth. contra Aristoc. 623, 624, 661, 674. Isocrates, De Pace,
164. Grote, Hist. of Greece, x. 518. Thirlwall, v. 222.
2 Demosth. contra Aristoc. 675, 676. The pirates were sent probably by Alexander of Pherme. See Thirlwall, 1. c. Reiske thinks differently. See his Index in Demosth.
3 Demosth. contra Aristoc. 681.




280                   APPENDIX III.
should be equally divided among the three princes, and the Chersonese should be ceded to Athens. This occurred in the beginning
of the year 357. Chabrias, who had been appointed to succeed
Athenodorus, came with a single ship only to the coast of Thrace,
expecting to receive a formal surrender of the Chersonese. But
Athenodorus had in the meantime been compelled for want of
money to disband his troops; Charidemus then persuaded Cersobleptes to renounce his engagement; and Chabrias, entirely destitute of means, was in his turn forced into a convention more
humiliating than that of Cephisodotus. It was soon reported to the
Athenian assembly, where, after an angry debate, the act of Chabrias was repudiated, and ten commissioners were chosen with instructions to go out to Thrace, and either procure a ratification of
the treaty, or take measures for war. The commission was dispatched, but, being unprovided with force, it produced no result but
evasion and delay on the part of Cersobleptes and Charidemus,
while Berisades and Amadocus sent letters of complaint to Athens.
There seemed no prospect of bringing the affairs to a desirable
issue, unless the Athenians could send an armament strong enough
to overawe their opponents. This was not accomplished till the
conclusion of the war in Euboea.
During the above-mentioned operations in Thrace, the Athenians
were for about a month engaged in a harrassing war in Euboea, to
expel the Thebans, who had made an attempt to establish their
power in the island. Great exertions were made on that important
occasion, although the finances of the state were in a low condition.
A body of mercenaries was raised, who together with the citizen
troops were put under the command of Chares and Diocles. After
various skirmishes, in which sometimes the Athenians and sometimes the Thebans had the advantage, an armistice was agreed
upon, and the Thebans evacuated Euboea.' The troops were then
at liberty to be sent elsewhere, and accordingly they were shipped off
to the Hellespont under the command of Chares. It was no longer
in the power of Charidemus to resist the demands of the Athenians;
and at length he made, on behalf of Cersobleptes, an actual surrender of all the territories of the Chersonese. There was one exception however, which, though not deemed of importance at the time,
led to serious disputes at a later period. That was the city of Cardia; which by a special clause, at the instance of Charidemus, was
declared to be independent; on the ground, as it would seem, that
it lay without the boundaries of the Peninsula. Thrace was partitioned among the three princes; and this was supposed to be an
additional security to the Athenian power. 2
Diodorus, xvi. 7. Demosth. contra Mid. 570. De Cherson. 103.
ZEsch. contra Ctesiph. 65.
2 Demosth. contra Aristoc. 676-6679, 681, 623.




THE THRACIAN CHERSONESE.                  281
While their ancient dominion of the Chersonese, its territory and
its revenue,' were thus recovered by the Athenians, events had
occurred elsewhere, which greatly counterbalanced the advantage; 
and new disasters were at hand. In this very year, B.C. 357, the
Social war broke out. Byzantium, Chios, Cos, and Rhodes revolted
from Athens, and waged against her a successful war until their independence was acknowledged B.C. 355. Corcyra had also thrown
off her allegiance. Potidaea was taken by Philip B.c. 356. The
Olynthians were wresting from Athens her dominion in Chalcidice.3
These misfortunes appear to have encouraged the Sestians, notwithstanding the compact entered into by Cersobleptes, to dispute
the sovereignty of Athens and assert their own independence. It
was not till the end of the Social war, that the Athenians were able
to chastise them. Chares then besieged and took Sestus. The importance of the place, which from its position, commanding the passage of the Hellespont, was called the corn-bin of the Piraeus,4 was
thought to justify a rigorous punishment. Chares massacred all the
adult population, and reduced the others to slavery. Soon afterwards the Athenians, imitating the policy of Pericles, sent out a
body of their own citizens to take possession of the vacant land in
Chersonesus, and thereby to strengthen and consolidate the empire
of Athens.5 Such resumption of their ancient rights appears to
have given cause of offence. Isocrates, who about this time wrote
a pamphlet, in the form of an oration, recommending his countrymen to maintain an equitable peace with their allies, and to give up
a useless struggle for empire, condemns these colonial acquisitions
as impolitic and unjust.6
Philip of Macedon had not hitherto taken any part in the contests
of the Thracian kings, either among themselves or with the Athenians. Cotys had, after the death of Perdiccas, espoused the cause
of the pretender Pausanias, but had been induced by presents
or promises to abandon it." Philip, occupied elsewhere, remained
at peace with Cotys, and for some years made no attempt to encroach upon Thracian ground beyond the bank of the Nestus.
But about the year B.C. 353 he conceived the idea of forming an
alliance with Cersobleptes, and attacking the Athenians in the
Chersonese. How far Cersobleptes himself encouraged this design,
I As to the amount see Demosth. contra Aristoc. 657.
2 The capture of Amphipolis and Pydna by Philip, and his offensive
league with the Olynthians. See Appendix I. pp. 236 —238.
3 Appendix I. 239.
4 Thtia roie letpatEoa. Aristotle Rhet. iii. 10.
b Diodorus, xvi. 34. ~Eschines, De Fals. Leg. 37.
6 Isocrates, De Pace, 159. Compare Aristotle, Rhet. ii. 6.
7 Diodorus, xvi. ii. 3.




282                   APPENDIX  III.
is not very clear. Since the treaty, by which he finally surrendered
Chersonesus to the Athenians, he had apparently been on amicable
terms with them. An Athenian fleet was constantly stationed in
the Hellespont, ready to act if occasion required; and the partition
of the Thracian kingdom among three princes restrained the ambitious projects of each.l The death of Berisades disturbed this
peaceful arrangement, and led to new  combinations.  He died
somewhere about the year B.c. 353, leaving children under the
guardianship of Athenodorus.  That Cersobleptes meditated war
against both Amadocus and the sons of Berisades, is distinctly
asserted by Demosthenes.2 Philip took advantage of these occurrences, to propose an alliance with Cersobleptes, for the conquest of
Thrace and the expulsion of the Athenians from Chersonesus. In
furtherance of this purpose he marched to Maronea, and had an interview with Apollonides, an envoy of the Thracian king. At the
same time a negotiation was opened with Pammenes the Theban
general, who some time before had been sent to Asia to assist Artabazus against the Persian satraps. It does not appear from the
language of the orator, that Pammenes had any direct communication with Philip; but rather that he communicated only with Cersobleptes. The project however was disconcerted by Amadocus,
who refused to the king of Macedon a passage through his territory; and for the present the designs of Philip upon Thrace were
suspended.3
Then followed an extraordinary measure on'the part of the Athenians, which we must attribute partly to the weakness of their
government, partly to financial embarrassment, and the difficulty
which they experienced in finding troops and money for the support
of their empire. Charidemus, as we have seen, had been one of
their most active opponents in the recovery of the Chersonese.
Yet no sooner had he been brought to reason by the arrival of
Chares in the Hellespont, than the Athenians passed a decree
bestowing on him the franchise of their city and a golden crown.4
His military skill and his influence in Thrace were highly extolled
at Athens, where he contrived to secure a party in his favor; and it
was said that he was the only person capable of recovering Amphipolis. The repdrt of an intended alliance between Philip and Cersobleptes, of which it seems Chares had informed his countrymen
by letter,- excited alarm at Athens; and the partisans of Charidemus deemed it a favorable opportunity to promote his advancement.
1 Demosth. contra Aristoc. 623, 680.
2 Ibid. 624.
3 Ibid. 681.
4 Aristoc. Rhet. ii. 23. Libanius in Argum. Or. Demosth. contra
Aristoc.
5 Demosth. contra Aristoc. 682.




THE THRACIAN  CHERSONESE.                   283
It was necessary, they said, to keep on good terms with Cersobleptes, and for that purpose they should secure the attachment of
Charidemus, his favorite minister. It was contended also, that he
had rendered signal service to Athens in the surrender of the Chersonese. One Aristocrates now moved a decree, making it a capital
crime against the laws of Athens to kill Charidemus. The people
were persuaded to pass this decree; but the mover was afterwards
prosecuted by Euthycles, for whom Demosthenes composed an
elaborate speech, showing that the measure of Aristocrates was not
only contrary to the spirit of the Athenian law, but was fraught
with danger to the country; that Charidemus was a profligate and
treacherous person, who had always been the enemy of Athens;
that the effect of the decree would be to deter Athenodorus and
the other Greek commanders in Thrace from opposing Charidemus;
that by his aid Cersobleptes would crush the rival princes, and, once
master of the whole Thracian kingdom, would drive the Athenians
from Chersonesus.  It is from this oration that we get most of the
historical materials relating to Athenian affairs in Thrace. The trial
took place in the year B.c. 352. Notwithstanding all the exertions
of the orator, Aristocrates was acquitted, and the decree confirmed. 
Strange as it was to pass such a decree in favor of this man, the
event in some measure accorded with the declarations of his party.
Cersobleptes from this time became the firm friend of Athens, while
Amadocus, seeing his cause abandoned by the Athenians, espoused
the alliance of Philip, and assisted his projects in Thrace.2
In was in this same year that Philip, after gaining his great victory in Thessaly, made an expedition into Thrace, which is said by
Thirlwall to be one of the most obscure parts of his history. It does
not appear that he made at this time any attack upon Cersobleptes,
although he approached so near as to alarm the Athenians who had
settled in the Chersonese.3  His invasionrwas at first directed to
the interior, and perhaps to the central and northern parts of the
kingdom, where he was engaged for a considerable time, chastising
hostile tribes, and establishing his own dependents in authority and
power. He may very likely have assisted Amadocus in pushing his
conquests over the territory of his neighbors. It is vaguely stated
by the Athenian orators, that he made what kings he pleased, and
we know not enongh of Thracian history to get more precise
1 The whole of this speech should be perused, to obtain a proper insight into the events of the period. See Thirlwall, Gr. Hist. v. 290293.
2 Harpocration s. v.'Aai'doKco. Demosth. de Chers. 105.  Philipp.
iv. 133.
s Zschines, De Fals. Leg. 37.




284                   APPENDIX  III.
information.' No certain account of Philip's movements reached
the Athenians, until they heard that he had marched eastward to
the Propontine coast, and laid siege to Heraeum.2 The importance
of this place, which was held by an Athenian garrison for the protection of the corn-trade, was well understood by the people. They
instantly convened an assembly, voted an armament of forty galleys, to carry out all the citizens under forty-five years of age, and
ordered sixty talents to be raised by general contribution. It was
then the month of November in the year 352. Notwithstanding
the energetic resolutions of the people, nine months were consumed
in preparation. Reports came to Athens, that Philip was dead or
ill, and this served as an excuse for delay. At length, in the autumn
of 351, ten galleys were dispatched with the bare crews only, and
a sum of five talents. Charidemus, who was then at Athens, and
had probably been sent ly Cersobleptes to warn the Athenians of
the danger, was appointed to the command. Such a force would
hardly have been sufficient to check the progress of Philip, had he
been inclined to pursue it. But it was then considered by the
Athenians, that the danger was past. And so in fact it was. For
Philip had been seized with a severe illness, and returned to his own
kingdom.3
For above four years Philip abstained from any further aggression
in that quarter. But in the year B.. 347, having consolidated his
power by the reduction of Olynthus and Chalcidice, he prepared
himself for new schemes of conquest. His most formidable enemies were the Athenians. It was necessary to humble them. Two
methods of doing so presented themselves: first, to put himself at
at the head of the Amphictyonic confederacy, invade Phocis, terminate the Sacred war, and acquire a preponderating power in
southern Greece; secondly, to invade the Chersonese, drive the
Athenians from  the coast of the Hellespont and Propontis, and
starve them out, as the Lacedeemonians had done, by stopping their
importation of corn. For this last purpose it was necessary to subdue the kingdom of Cersobleptes, which lay between him and the
Chersonese, and protected the Greek cities on the northern shore
of the Propontis. To accomplish his objects more easily, Philip had
recourse to stratagem.4
It may seem to us, reading history after the event, that Philip
might with ease have overrun the kingdom of Cersobleptes and the
Isocrates, Philipp. 86. Demosth. Olynth. i. 13. See p. 241 of this
volume. In Athenweus, xiii. 557, mention is made of Cothelas, a Thracian prince, who submitted to Philip, and gave his daughter Meda to be
one of his wives or concubines.
2 As to its situation near Perinthus, see Herodotus, iv. 90.
3 Demosth. Olynth. iii. 29.
4 Demosth. de Cor. 254. De Fals. Leg. 367, 397.




THE THRACIAN  CHERSONESE.                  285
Chersonese in spite of any resistance which the Athenians could
have offered and that afterwards he might have led an overpowering army into Phocis, and beaten down all opposition. Such, however, was not the view which he himself took of the matter. It
was a maxim with that politic prince, not to employ force, where
he could succeed as well by negotiation or intrigue; nor to let his
enemies combine, but to separate and beat them one after another.
Nor were the difficulties in his way so inconsiderable. The Athenians, driven from the Macedonian and Chalcidic shores, having
fewer garrisons to maintain, and fewer objects to distract their
attention, might concentrate all their naval power for the defence of
the Hellespont, which they felt to be so important. The commerce
of Macedonia had already suffered greatly by the presence of
their cruisers. Again, they might with the Lacedoemonians send
troops to the assistance of Phalhecus, and occupy the pass of Thermopylae, as they had done some years before. In such case the
issue of -the war in Phocis might be doubtful, even with the forces
of Thebes and Thessaly at his disposal. It was well known how
Demosthenes had exerted himself to rouse his countrymen against
Macedonia. Defeat would be greatly injurious to Philip's reputation and prospects; and he saw a way of gaining his ends without
incurring any such risk.'
Hie caused a negotiation for peace to be opened with the Athenians, and so contrived matters, that the first formal proposal came
from the Athenians themselves. His wishes were made known at
Athens by some Euboean embassadors, and by other indirect communications. The Athenians, weary of an unprofitable war, were
not indisposed to accept his overtures. A motion was then made
by Philocrates, that he should have liberty to send a herald to
Athens. The motion was carried; and Philocrates, having been
prosecuted for it, was successfully defended by Demosthenes, who
appears at this time to have been in favor of a peace. Aristodemus
the actor was sent to Macedonia, to treat for the ransom of the
Athenian prisoners, who had been taken at Olynthus; and on his
return reported, that Philip was desirous not only of peace, but of
alliance with Athens. Thereupon Philocrates moved and carried
another decree, to send embassadors to Philip with full powers to
negotiate a treaty. Ten embassadors were appointed accordingly
— LEschines, Demosthenes, Aristodemus, Philocrates, Ctesiphon,
Phrynon, Iatrocles, Nausicles, Dercylus, Cimon.  Another was
added, to represent the Athenian confederacy; Agladreon of Tenedos. They started for Macedonia in the beginning of the year 346B.c.2' Demosth. Olynth. ii. 20. De Cherson. 105. De Cor. 276. De
Fals. Leg. 442. Diodorus, xvi. 54. Pausanias, viii. 7.
2 AEschines, De Fals. Leg. 29, 30. Demosth. de Cor. 232. 2Eschines
contra Ctcs, 62




286                    APPENDIX  II.
The transactions of this embassy are revealed to us by the two
principal embassadors, YEschines and Demosthenes, in their celebrated speeches on the trial which took place a few years after, on
which JEschines was charged by his rival with corruption and treason. The speeches must be' perused with the closest attention by
any one who desires to gain full information; and even this will not
be satisfactory; for the speeches so abound in contradictions, and
have so little the appearance of fairness and candor, that it is difficult
even to form an opinion of tile truth.' Here it will be sufficient to
notice what concerns the subject before us.
Parmenio, Philip's general, was besieging ialus in Thessaly;
Philip himself was at Pella, preparing for a new invasion of Thrace,
when the embassadors arrived. They were admitted to an audience,
and addressed the king in order of seniority. _YEschines made a long
speech about the ancient connection between Iphicrates and Amyntas, and the rightful claims of his countrymen to Amphipolis. Demosthenes, either abashed in the presence of a man against whom
he had so fiercely declaimed at home, or feeling that no arguments
of his'could have any effect on this occasion, after speaking a few
words, stopped suddenly short, and made an abrupt ending. Neither
of them said a word about the terms or conditions of the proposed
treaty. It was known to them, that Philip was about to march
against Cersobleptes; yet, although that prince was an ally of Athens,
no remonstrance was made on his behalf. Philip promised only,
that he would make no attack upon the Chersonese pending his
negotiation with the Athenians. He made a formal reply to the
statements of the embassadors, invited them to supper, and afterwards dismissed them with a letter to the people of Athens, in which
he assured them of his pacific intentions, and sincere wish to become
their ally and benefactor. It was arranged that his own ministers
should speedily follow the embassadors to Athens, where the conditions of peace were to be decided on.2
The embassadors, on their return, made a report of their proceedings to the senate and people, and delivered Philip's letter. On the
motion of Demosthenes, two special days, the seventeenth and eighteenth of Elaphebolion (March,) were appointed to consider the offers of peace and alliance. Before that time the ministers of Philip
arrived; three distinguished men, Parmenio, Antipater, and Eury-'See Thirlwall, Gr. Hist. v. 338. Mitford, Gr. list. iv. c. 39, s. 4;
c. 40, s. 2. Leland's Life of Philip, ii. 56.
2 EsEch. De Fals. Leg. 31-33, 38, 39. Demosth. De Fals. Leg. 353,
354. De Halonn. 85. Plutarch, in the Life of Demosthenes, gives a
different account of his address to Philip on the embassy. He represents, that Philip took more pains to reply to Demosthenes than to the
other embassadors, though in other respects he treated him with less
kindness and civility.




THE THRACIAN CHERSONESE.                   287
lochus. They were hospitably entertained by Demosthenes himself,
who showed them marked attention, and from first to last displayed
an earnest desire to press the conclusion of the treaty. A congress
of deputies from the Athenian allies was then sitting at Athens, who
passed a resolution, that, as the envoys sent to rouse the Grecian
states to the defence of their freedom had not returned, it was better
to wait for their return before debating the question of peace.
_/Eschines condemns Demosthenes for having frustrated this resolution
by his decree, which fixed an arbitrary day for the discussion.
Demosthenes probably thought that, as things had gone so far, it
was better to terminate the war as soon as possible, and prevent
Philip's designs upon the Chersonese. On the first day of the assembly there was a stormy debate, of which we have no clear or
consistent account. There was much discussion, whether peace only,
or peace and alliance should be agreed upon. Various proposals
were made about the restoration of Amphipolis, the Phocians, and
other matters. The Macedonian envoys would not hear of Amphipolis being given up; nor would they permit the Phocians to be
treated as allies of Athens. Of Cersobleptes they did not condescend
to speak, but insisted oh the recognition of Cardia as an independent
state in alliance with Macedonia. Philocrates supported them in
all their claims, but met with much opposition, and even from
_iEschines himself, if we can trust the assertion of Demosthenes, who
charges him with having espoused different sides on the first and
second days, as if he had been brought over in the meantime.
1_Eschines denies this, and alleges that it was impossible he could
have spoken on the second day, as Demosthenes prevailed on the
presidents to put the question without debate. However this be,
certain it is, that on the second day the treaty with Philip was concluded almost in the very terms proposed by his ministers.'
Before the ministers of Philip had departed, there came to Athens
a representative of Cersobleptes, one Critobulus, a citizen of Lampsacus; who demanded, on behalf of the Thracian king, that he
should be included in the treaty as one of the allies of Athens. This,
if _Eschines is to be believed, was opposed by Demosthenes, but carried by the people in spite of him; whereas Demosthenes asserts,
that Critobulus was afterwards prevented from taking the oath by
iEschines. A different account is given by Philip himself, in his
letter to the Athenians, viz. that Cersobleptes desired to make a
separate treaty with him, but was prevented by the Athenian generals, who represented him to be an enemy of the Athenians. It is
not indeed clear, that what Philip alleges took place at Athens, or
had any connection with the proceedings of which we are now
speaking. That Cersobleptes, however, was exclnded from the treaty
I Esch. De Fals. Leg. 34 —36, 39. Demosth. De Fals. Leg. 345..Each. contra Ctes. 62, 63.




288                    APPENDIX  III.
is certain; and the probability is, that Philip's ministers at Athens
would not permit his name to be inserted.'
An embassy was now appointed to proceed immediately to Macedonia, to receive Philip's oath in ratification of the treaty.  The
same embassadors were chosen as before. While they were yet
preparing for departure, a letter was brought from Chares, who
commanded the Athenian fleet in the Hellespont, announcing that
Cersobleptes had lost his kingdom, and Philip had seized the Sacred
Mountain. The senate, in alarm, passed a decree, ordering the embassadors to set out instantly upon their mission. This was on the
third of Munychion, or April.2
Philip had in truth been making the best use of his time, while
the Athenians were deliberating about peace and alliance with him.
In the very month (Elaphebolion) when his embassadors were sent
to Athens, he was overrunning the kingdom of Thrace. Myrtium,
Ergisce, Serrium, Doriscus, cities on the iegean coast, yielded to
his arms. He seized upon the fortresses of the Sacred Mountain,
defeated Cersobleptes in divers battles, and compelled him to deliver up his son as a hostage, and engage to pay tribute to Macedonia.
No attempt was made by the Athenian general Chares to check the
progress of Philip. How far he may have been guilty of neglect,
as _Eschines insinuates he was, it is impossible, in the absence of
historical evidence, to determine. Athenian troops are said to have
been stationed at Serrium, and on the Sacred Mountain, and to have
been driven away by Philip. We may presume they were not
strong enough to offer any resistance to his arms.3
The Athenian embassadors proceeded to Oreus in Eubeea, from
whence they were to be conveyed by sea to the nearest place
where they could find the kiug of Macedon. Notwithstanding this
injunction of the senate, they lost some time at Oreus, and then
took a circuitous route to Pella, by which they consumed twentythree days. At Pella they had to wait nearly a month, while Philip
was in Thrace. He returned with the son of Cersobleptes, and the
1 ~,sch. De Fals. Leg. 38, 39; contra Ctes. 63, 64. Demosth. Do
Fals. Leg. 395, 398. Epist. Philipp: ad Athen. 160.
2,Eschin. De Fals. Leg. 40. Demosth. De Fals. Leg. 389. De Coron. 235. The decree set forth in this last passage is manifestly incorrect. See Jacobs' note (20) to his translation of the Oration on the
Crown.
3 Diodorus, xvi. 71. Justin, viii. 3. Demosth. de Coron. 234, 235.
Dc Fals. Leg. 390, 447, 448.,Esch. de Fals. Leg. 37, 38. It is here
stated, that Antiochus was sent to find Chares, and inform him, that the
people of Athens were astonished, that, while Philip was marching
against the Chersonese, they did not even know where their general or
his armament was. It is not quite clear, whether the story has reference to this period. Compare Or. de Chers. 105. Philipp. iii. 114; iv.
133, 2Esch. contra Ctes. 65.




THE THRACIAN CHERSONESE.                  289
reports of his conquest were confirmed. Meanwhile embassies from
divers parts of Greece had arrived at Philip's court, the most important being those from Thessaly, Thebes, and Lacedaemon. Warlike preparations were going on. It was easy to see that Phocis was
their object, and that Philip was about to take some decisive step for
the termination of the Sacred war. What were the Athenian embassadors to do? They had no power to interfere with Philip's
designs. Their business was simply to receive Philip's oath and signature to the treaty, the terms of which had already been drawn
up. It is true, there was a clause in their instructions, empowering
them generally to consult the interest of the commonwealth. But
it might be dangerous to construe this with too much latitude, and,
unless it authorized them to break off the treaty altogether, any
mere remonstrance of theirs against the proceedings of Philip would
be disregarded by him. The result may be briefly stated. Philip
preserved silence as to his intentions, and induced the Athenian
embassadors to accompany him as far as Pherae, on -the pretext
that he desired their mediation between the Pharsalians and the
people of Halus. The signature of the treaty was delayed until
their arrival at Pheran.  Here he demanded, that both Halus and
the Phocians should be expressly excepted from it, and the colleagues of Demosthenes, in opposition to his opinion, allowed the
clause to be introduced. This first excited the suspicions of Demosthenes, according to his own account; yet, although a letter was
sent by his colleagues to Athens, misrepresenting the position of
affairs, he took no step himself to warn his countrymen or counteract the danger. The embassadors returned to Athens, where they
arrived on the thirteenth of Scirrophorion (June), while Philip set
out on his march for Thermopylse. The success of his schemes was
complete. An assembly was held at Athens on the sixteenth, when
iEschines and Philocrates buoyed up their countrymen with hopes
of advantage to be derived from Philip's expedition. The capitulation of Phalecus, the occupation of Phocis and Thermopylae, the
delivery of the Bceotian cities to Thebes, and the election of Philip
into the Amphictyonic council, awakened them from their delusion.'
Among the many perplexing questions which suggest themselves
to the historian concerning these transactions, the most interesting
are those which arise upon the conduct of Demosthenes himself.
How came it that he allowed the peace to be concluded, without
having Cersobleptes and the Phocians comprehended in its provisions? He complains himself of their exclusion. He complains of
the delay on the second embassy, which enabled Philip to conquer' aEsch. De Fals. Leg. 40, 41, 44.  Demosth. de Coron. 236, 237.
De Pace, 59. Philipp. ii 74. De Fals. Leg. 355, 359. Diodorus, xvi.
60, 64.
VOL. I.-N




290                   APPENDIX IIL
Thrace before the peace was ratified. But, assuming that Eschines
has not answered this charge, it does not appear how Philip could
have been prevented from completing his conquest, if the embassadors had caught him during his progress; for he would still have
contended, that Cersobleptes, not being named in the treaty, was
not entitled to its benefits. Demosthenes indeed might argue, that,
as the peace was made with Athens and her allies, Cersobleptes,
being an ally of Athens, was virtually included in it. But if so,
Philip was to blame for violating the treaty, rather than JEschines
and others for having sanctioned it: and all parties were in some
measure to blame, for having left so important a question open to
dispute. But if we look at the circumstances, it can hardly be
thought that Philip committed any breach of faith by pursuing his
Thracian campaign. The ernbassadors, on their first visit to Pella,
were distinctly apprised of his intentions; and therefore, if it had
been intended to give protection to Cersobleptes, there ought to
have been an express clause to that effect. It may be that Demosthenes, never having been friendly to Cersobleptes, or regarding
the success of Philip in a Thracian war as doubtful, or thinking the
danger remote, did not think it worth while to require such a
clause; or perhaps he considered that peace was desirable for the
security of the Chersonese. With respect to the Phocians, it did
not appear at the time when the peace was first made, what the
designs of Philip were. It might be open to the Athenians, notwithstanding the treaty, or even the rather on that account, to
insist that Philip should not pass the Straits of Thermopylke for the
purpose of any hostile invasion. And it might well seem, that
there was plenty of time for the consideration of any future question concerning Phocis. When, however, Demosthenes was the
second time at Pella, when he found that Cersobleptes had been
subdued, and vast preparations made for an invasion of Phocis, then
his eyes were opened to the danger; he saw that the peace was a
delusion; that the Phocians would be overwhelmed, unless his
countrymen came to their assistance; and that there was no security against Philip's ulterior projects. The danger was augmented,
in his opinion, when Philip had prevailed on his colleagues to exclude the Phocians expressly from the benefits of the peace; and
then, it seems, he first suspected that JEschines was a traitor. His
true course then was, to return instantly to Athens, to call a special
meeting of the people, and urge them to take arms and march with
the Lacedoemonians to the defence of Phocis. But for this his
courage or presence of mind was not sufficient, and he let things
take their course. Afterwards, when  Eschines and Philocrates,
playing the game of Philip, amused the Athenian people with reports of his friendly intentions, Demosthenes raised a warning voice:
but it was too late; the people, thinking that his colleagues were
in the secrets of Philip, believed them rather than him; and De



THE THRACIAiN CHERSONESE.                 291
mosthenes himself did not then assume that confident tone, either
as counsellor or accuser, which was likely to gain credence to his
assertions. In the speech which he delivered three years afterwards on the subject of the embassy, having a case to make out
against Eschines, —and there was a very good one as far as regarded his conduct upon the second journey to Pella,-he overcharges
it by imputing blame to 2Eschines for mistakes, in which ~Eschines
was either not implicated at all, or no more implicated than others:
and he may have been partly induced to do so by the consciousness, that he himself was to some extent duped and deluded in
common with the rest of his countrymen, and had neglected to provide those guarantees and securities for his country, which were
indispensable in a negotiation with so crafty a monarch as Philip.
The general result of the whole proceedings was, that Philip had
made a conquest of Thrace; he had acquired the honor of terminating the Sacred war, by which he greatly increased his influence
and ascendancy in Greece; he had conferred obligations upon the
people of Thebes and Thessaly, and been elected a member of the
Amphictyonic council; he had got possession of Nicaea, Thronium,
and Alponus, which commanded the pass of Thermopylke, and gave
him admittance into Phocis and Boeotia. The only advantage which
Athens had gained by the peace, was the security of Chersonesus;
and even that, as Demosthenes justly observed, was in reality weakened by the augmentation of Philip's power.' It was at this time
that Isocrates, struck with admiration at the achievements of Philip,
composed a pamphlet in the form of an address to that monarch;
in which, eulogizing his good fortune and magnanimity, he exhorts
him to effect by his influence a pacification of all the Greek states,
and then to unite them under his own standard for a war against
the Persian empire.
For the chain of events which followed, but which can not here
be enlarged upon-such as the debate on the embassy of Amphictyons to Athens; the negotiations in Peloponnesus; the intrigues
of Philip at Megara; his invasion of Epirus and Ambracia; the establishment of his partisans in Euboea-the reader is referred to the
Historical Abstract in this volume, and the arguments and notes to
divers Orations.2
In the year following the peace, that is, B.c. 345, the Athenians
sent a body of their citizens to take allotments of land in the Chersonese. The object was, not so much to make a provision for a
poor class of emigrants, as to establish an army of obversation, to
strengthen their position in that important peninsula. At the head
I De Fals. Leg. 865, 366.
2 See the Argument to the Oration on the Peace, p. 73. Argument
to the second Philippic, p. 81. Argument to the Oration on Halonnesus, p. 89. Text and notes in pp. 96, 119, 123, 134, 157.




292                   APPENDIX  III.
of them was Diopithes, a man of considerable military ability.
The colonists in taking possession of their lands, (allotted to them
in the neighborhood of the Isthmus, where it was peculiarly necessary to establish a protective force, and where probably they occupied the ancient fortresses of Alcibiades,) came into collision with
the Cardians, between whose domains and those of Athens the
boundaries were not very well defined. No immediate rupture
took place; but the grounds were laid of a quarrel which afterwards became serious.' Philip meanwhile was extending his power in the north and north-west. He attacked the Triballi, with
whom his Thracian conquests had brought him into contact. He
invaded Illyria, and, after ravaging the country and taking many
towns, returned home laden with spoil.2  It was perhaps during
his absence on this expedition that an embassy arrived from Artaxerxes, and was received by Alexander, then only twelve years old,
who astonished the Persian envoys by the questions he put to
them concerning the state of the Persian empire, the army, the
roads, and the character of their king.3  About the same time
Philip, to secure and consolidate his power in Thrace, began to
found new cities in different parts of the kingdom, peopling them
either with Macedonian colonists, or with the inhabitants of countries which lh had conquered and depopulated. One of these was
Cabyla, situated on the river Taxus, among the tribe of the Asti
below Mount Hsemus. Another was Philippopolis, on the river
Hebrus, between the ridges of Hsemus and Rhodope, which, from
the vile character of the population transported to it, received the
nickname of Poneropolis, or Rogue-town.4  Returning from his
northern expeditions, Philip marched into Thessaly, where a new
revolution at Pherse called for his interference; and he was for
some time occupied in settling the government of the Thessalian
provinces on a new basis, calculated to secure Macedonian ascendancy.
Demosthenes and his party watched all the movements of Philip
with anxiety. In the second Philippic, which was spoken in the
Libanii Argumentum in Demosth. Or. de Cherson.
2 Diodorus, xvi. 69. Justin, viii. 6. Demosth. de Coron. 240.
9 Plutarch in Vit. Alexand. v. Leland's Life of Philip, ii. 149. Thirnwall assigns this story to a later period: Gr. Hist. vi. 91.
4 Diodorus, xvi. 71. Justin, viii. 5.  Strabo, vii. 320.  Leland's
Life of Philip, ii. 147. Thirlwall, Gr. Hist. vi. 32. Demosthenes de
Cherson. 100. Philipp. iv. 135. It is doubtful, whether the orator is
there speaking of places conquered by Philip, or settlements founded
by him. His own knowledge of the facts was probably imperfect,
Nor can the date of these settlements be determined accurately.
6 Diodorus, xvi 69. Demosthenes, Philipp. ii 71; iii. 119. De Coron. 241. Thirlwall, Gr. Hist. vi 13, 14.




THE THRIACIAN  CHEtSOlNME                  293
year B.C. 344, we find a particular allusion to Philip's proceedings in
Thessaly. But during the same year an event occurred, which induced the Athenians to send envoys to Philip, with a formal complaint against him for infraction of the peace. This was the seizure
by him of the island Halonnesus, which had a short time before
been wrested from the Athenians by Sostratus a pirate. Sostratus,
having committed plunder on the Macedonian coast, was expelled
by Philip, who, regarding the island as a fair conquest, kept it for
himself. The Athenians, taking a different view of the matter, resolved to demand restitution; and an embassy having been decreed
for that purpose, it was thought proper at the same time to speak of
other grievances, arising out of the late treaty of peace. Philip
thereupon sent Python to Athens; who, in a speech made before
the people, which was heard with applause, gave them strong but
vague assurances of his master's desire to settle their disputes
amicably, and to amend the treaty in any way that was reasonable.' This led to another embassy from Athens, at the head of
which was Hegisippus, instructed to demand such concessions as
from the language of Python it was imagined they could obtain.
Among them were an alteration of that article in the treaty, which
declared that both parties should retain what they possessed. It
was proposed to substitute a clause, "that each should have his
own;" the Athenians having especially in view the restoration of
Amphipolis.2 Another amendment was, that Greek states not included in the treaty should be free and independent. This was
demanded, in order to prevent Philip's making new conquests, or
extending his influence in Greece; and it had particular reference
to his aggressions in Thessaly and Epirus.3 A third proposal was,
that those places which Philip had taken after the peace should be
restored; meaning in particular the towns and fortresses in Thrace
which he had got possession of since the negotiation had begun: for
the Athenians had now discovered their mistake in not insisting
that, hostilities should be suspended on both sides during the progress of the treaty, and they sought to rectify it by an equitable construction, that the peace was to be reckoned as having commenced
before the final ratification.4 A complaint was also preferred on
the subject of Cardia and the Chersonese, which will be presently
explained.
Philip was so incensed at these demands, that he could hardly
treat the embassadors with common civility, and even ordered the
poet Xenoclides to quit his dominions, because he had received
1 Or. de Halonneso,'7, 78, 81, 82, and Liban. Argument.
2 Ib. 83. Confer Epist. Philipp. 165.' Or de Halonneso, 84. Confer Philipp. iii. 118, 120.
4 lb. 85. Confer Philipp. iii. 114. De Coron. 233, 234




294                    APPENDIX  II.
them with hospitality.' Nevertheless he sent a letter by them to
Athens, in which he discussed the various questions which had
been raised. Halonnesus, he said, was his own by right of conquest, but he was willing to make a present of it to the Athenians:
an offer which roused the indignation of the orators.2  With regard to Amphipolis he asserted with perfect justice, that the
treaty, which took the basis of the uti possidetis, had confirmed his
title;3 and he said the Athenians had misconstrued the language of
his ministers. He agreed to introduce a clause providing for the
independence of the Greek states, and offered to refer the dispute
concerning Cardia and the Thracian towns to arbitration.4
A debate was held on this letter in the Athenian assembly, where
Demosthenes and his party declaimed against it with vehemence.
The oration on Halonnesus, which is printed among the works of
Demosthenes, is ascribed by the best critics to Hegesippus.i  That
their arguments prevailed, and that the offers of Philip were
rejected, we may infer from the events that followed. Halonnesus
was not given up. Shortly afterwards the Peparethians made a
descent on the island, and surprised the Macedonian garrison.
Philip sent fresh troops to recover his conquest, and then revenged
himself by ravaging the island of Peparethus; for which the Athenians again demanded satisfaction, but in vain.6
The dispute about the Chersonese was a question of boundary.
The Cardians had applied to Philip for assistance against the encroachments of the Athenian settlers; and Philip, as their ally-as
such he was acknowledged by the late treaty of peace-had engaged
to support them.7 Cardia was (no doubt) included within the
ancient wall across the Isthmus; so that its territories, or most of
them, lay within the Peninsula. The Athenians, dissatisfied with
the treaty which declared Cardia independent, were anxious at all
events to straiten its limits, while the Cardians contended that they,
as residents, had a much better title to land in Chersonesus than
Athenian colonists, who came to a country which was not their
home, still retaining their rights as citizens of Athens. Another
question arose about the boundary of the Chersonese itself. The
old wall must have been destroyed, in or before the time of Cotys:
for there had been a talk of cutting a canal through the Isthmus,
Demosth. De Fals. Leg. 447.
2 See p. 90 of this volume, notes 2 and 3.
3 See p. 95, note 1.
Or. de Halonn. 87. Confer Philipp. Epist. 161.
5 1Eschin. contra Ctes. 65. Jacobs' Introduction to the Oration on
Halonnesus, p. 298, et seq. Ib. note 3, p. 314.
8 Philipp. Epist. 162. Demosth. de Coron. 248. Plutarch in Vit.
Demosth.' Demosth. De Fals. Leg. 396. Philipp. Epist. 161.




TEE THRACIAN  CHERSONESE.                  295
and a promise held out that Philip would do it at his own expense.'
The intended line of the canal was not in the direction of the wall,
but further on, perhaps making a shorter cut, from Pteleum to
Leuce Acte.2  Midway between these two places stood an altar of
Jupiter, erected apparently to mark their boundaries. Hegesippus
contended that this altar was the land-mark of the Chersonese.
And his argument was a little helped by the circumstance of the
projected canal. Philip, conceiving that the town of Agora,3 which
stood midway between Pactya and Cardia, in the line of the old
wall, marked the extreme limit of Chersonesus, had taken possession of a tract of land which lay between it and the altar. This,
according to Hegesippus, was an act of injustice to Athens; and
the offence was not diminished by his having given a portion of
the land to Apollonides of Cardia. Philip disdained to make any
answer to this complaint, but, with respect to the boundary question between the Athenians and his allies, he repeated his proposal
of an arbitration. The Cardians made the same offer; but it did
not suit the Athenians, who, while they asserted their own title to
Cardia itself, knew that it could not be supported by international
law in derogation of their own compact, and that there was an unrepealed decree at Athens which distinctly acknowledged the rights
of the Cardians. To find an impartial umpire would have been
almost impossible; and neither party could seriously have entertained the project.4
The remonstrances on neither side having produced any result,
Philip, in the year B.C. 343, sent troops into Chersonesus to assist
the Cardians.5  Diopithes, unable with his Athenians only to resist
this accession of force, collected a body of mercenaries, and then,
returning to the attack, drove the Macedonians out of the Peninsula. Not content with this advantage, he roused Cersobleptes and
the Thracians to take arms to recover their independence. It has
been remarked by Pausanias, that none but the Romans ever effected a complete conquest of Thrace.6 Philip, absent at this time
in Epirus, found it necessary on his return to march with a powerful army against his rude eastern neighbors, to protect his infant
settlements, and re-establish his power in the country. But this
time it was not quite so easy a matter. Besides Cersobleptes, an
Odrysian prince named Teres, who had formerly been Philip's ally,
had now risen in arms against him; and Diopithes seized every op1 Philipp. ii. 73.
2 This place is mentioned by Lysias, contra Alcib. 142.
3 Herodotus, vii. 58.
4 Or. de Halonn. 86, 87. Philipp. Epist. 161.
6 Demosthenes, De Coron. 274. De Cherson. 104. Philipp. iii. 114;
iv. 147.
6 Pausanias, i. 9.




296                    APPENDIX  III.
portunity to make diversions in their favor. While Philip was engaged in the interior, Diopithes attacked the adjoining parts of
Thrace, which were subject to Macedonia. Two cities, Cr.obyle and
Tiristasis-probably on or near to the Sacred Mountain-he took
by storm, and made the garrisons prisoners.  Amphilochus, a Macedonian, who came to demand their release, was himself cast into
prison, and forced to pay a heavy ransom. L
The length of time, that Philip was occupied in Thrace, proves
the great difficulties which he encountered. After nearly a twelvemonth's campaign he was obliged to send for large reinforcements'
from Macedonia and Thessaly; and not being at leisure to turn his
arms against Diopithes, he sent a letter to Athens, to complain of'his conduct.2 The charge was, that Diopithes by attacking his
allies, and assisting his enemies, had violated the treaty of peace
The manifest object was to gain time, and to criyple the eflorts of
an active general, by setting his countrymen against him. Philip
knew that the Macedonian party at Athens would second his endeavors; and so in fact they did.  A clamor was raised against
the general, not only for making war against Macedonia, but for
divers irregularities of which he had been guilty. Diopithes, being
at the head of a troop of mercenaries, unprovided for by any supply from home, had adopted the same methods of raising r money,
which Chares and others 1 -:fore him had done; ti at is to:ay, he
had begged, borrowed, or extorted it ficm mclrclLnts, fiocm the
islands, or cities on the coast of' Asia. [the orators opposed to him
declaimed loudly against these practices, and pressed for his recall.3
They were answered by Demosthenes in one of the most powerful
speeches which he ever addressed to the Athenian acscsrmby.
The true question for the people to consider wts (said he), not
the conduct of Diopithes, but the safety of Althens. If Diopithes
had raised troops and money by improper means, it was the fault of
the Athenians themselves, who had not supplied him Mwith the rraterials of war. There would be time enough to punish him hereafter:
to recall him now, and leave the Hellespont and the Chersonese unguarded, was what Philip and his partisans most most desired, but
what no friend of his country could advise.  It was not Diopithes
who had first broken the peace, but Philip himself, by his proceedings in Thrace, in Epirus, and elsewhere. If Philip might attack
the allies of Athens, why might not Diopithes defend them? Philip
was virtually attacking Athens in Thrace: all his plans and operations were directed against Athens.  If their armament was withPhilipp. Epist. 159, 160. Demosth. de Cherson. 92. Liban Argument.
2 Demosth. de Cherson. 90, 93. Liban. Argument.
3 Demosth. de Cherson. 95, 96. Olynth. ii. 26. Compare Isocrates
de Pace, 164, 165, 167, 168




THE THRACIAN  CHERSONESE.                   297
drawn from the Hellespont, there would be nothing to prevent him
from besieging the Propontine cities or invading the Chersonese.
Unless they found employment for him where he was, he might
attack Megara or Euboea, or even march against Attica. Instead
of discouraging Diopithes, they ought to support him; instead of
disbanding their forccs, they ought to increase them. It was idle
to wait until Philip declared war: this he would never do until he
was at their gates. They should exert themselves in every possible
way; shake off their indolence, submit to pecuniary contribution
and to military service; send embassies among the Greek states
and excite them to arms; for not Athens only, but all Greece was in
peril. Finally, they should denounce and punish the corrupt statesmen who sold their interests to the enemy, and prove to men of a
different stamp that they could serve their country with honor and
advantage.
Such was the substance of this oration. The arguments were
sound and just,' and produced the desired effect on the hearers.
Philip's complaint was disregarded; and the Athenians not only
retained Diopithes in his command, but prepared to give him vigorous support.
Philip however was not deterred by any resolution of the Athenian assembly from prosecuting his designs. It may be gathered
from his extant letter, that the Athenians had sent a message informing him that Teres and Cersobleptes were allies and citizens of
Athens, and requiring him not to meddle with their dominions.2
1 Other writers however have expressed a different opinion. I am
surprised to read the following remarks in Thirlwall, Gr. Hist. vi. 36:
" Diopithes retained his command, and it may be presumed, after such
a mark of his sovereign's approbation, was not much more circumspect
in his conduct. There can be no doubt that he had given cause for such
complaint, and that in his invasion of Thrace, at least, if not in his hostilities with Cardia, he had violated both the letter and the spirit of the
treaty with Philip. The wisest, as well as the most honorable course
would have been, to disavow his proceedings, and remove him from his
command. Demosthenes, we may be sure, would have been very willing that an armament should have been sent under another general to
supply his place. But he knew that a decree to this effect would probably be only so far executed as to disarm Diopithes, and to leave the
Athenian interests near the seat of war unprotected. How far he was
misled by the fallacy of his own reasoning, which appears to a modern
reader flagrantly sophistical, we can not determine. His view however
of the perilous position of his country is not the less sound, and may be
admitted as an excuse for some indistinctness of ideas as to the precise
line of separation between offensive and defensive measures. Compare
Leland's Life of Philip, ii. 201-210. Jacob's Introduction to his translation of the speech. Mitford, iv. 521.
2 Philipp. Epist. 160.
N2




298                   APPENDIX  IIL
At such an intimation the King of Macedon would only smile. He
was determined, if possible, to crush the rebellious princes of Thrace,
and knowing by experience how lightly they regarded the observance
of treaties, and how easily they repaired the disasters of a short
campaign, he encamped himself in their country during the winter
of 1842-1841, with the intention of completing his conquest in the
spring, and then proceeding to those ulterior measures, for which
his war in Thrace was paving the way.  Demosthenes had rightly
conjectured, that, altliough the Byzantine people were in alliance
with Philip, he would not hesitate to attack them, if they presumed
in any manner to thwart his purposes, or even refused to co-operate
with him.2 IIe saw how important the possession of the Propontine
cities would be to Philip; that it would enable him to intercept the
commerce of Athens with the Euxine and the Hellespont, and in a
short time to deprive her of Chersonesus.  The long continuance of
the campaigns in Thrace, while it created in the minds of other men
a doubt of Philip's success, caused uneasiness to Demosthenes, who
saw in it an indication of Philip's perseverance in his plans. What
Philip was exactly about, was unknown to Demosthenes himself;
as we may infer from the vague manner in which he speaks of
Drongilus, Mastira, and other places which Philip was either taking
or fortifying.3 It was enough for him that a Macedonian army was
advancing to the neighborhood of the Greek coast: and the very uncertainty augmented his alarm.
In this state of suspense, an assembly was held at Athens, and
Demosthenes deemed it necessary to animate his countrymen to
fresh exertions. He delivered the oration which is known by the
name of the Third Philippic, which in substance repeats the arguments already urged in the oration on the Chersonese. The Athenians, had not done their duty. They had not sent sufficient reinforcements to the Hellespont. Clitarchus and Philistides, partisans
of Philip, had been suffered to establish themselves in Euboea. The
peril was imminent. He urges them to reinforce Diopithes both
with men and money; to apply for succor to Peloponnesus, to
Rhodes and Chios, the ancient allies of Byzantium, and also to the
king of Persia. This is memorable as the first occasion on which
Demosthenes advised an alliance with Persia. He was justified by
the necessity of the case; and it shows how critical the position of
affairs had in his opinion become.4
Philip, having completed the overthrow of Teres and Cersobleptes,5' Demosthenes, de Cherson, 101. Philipp. iv, 185.
2 De Cherson. 93. Philipp. iii. 118, 120; iv. 149. De Coron. 254.
a De Cherson. 100.
4 Philipp. iii. 111, 125, 126, 129. Compare Philipp. iv. 139, 140.
Philipp. Epist. 161. I have referred the passage in Diodorus, xvi.
11, to the first and not the second war with Cevsobleptes, notwith



THE THRACIAN CHERSONESE.                    299
and settled other affairs in the interior of Thrace, suddenly marched
southward, and appeared in the neighborhood of Chersonesus.
His immediate purpose was, not to attack the Athenian general, but
to protect the passage through the Hellespont of a Macedonian
fleet, which he had ordered to sail to the Propontis. He was preparing to besiege Selymbria, a city which stood on the Propontine
coast between Byzantium and Perinthus; and, that the siege might
be brought to a speedy issue, he resolved to invest it both by land
and sea. Speed was of great importance to him on this occasion.
Selymbria was an ally, or subject, of Byzantium.1 It might receive
aid from that powerful city. Its capture might determine the submission both of Byzantium and Perinthus, which had hitherto refused to join him in any offensive measures against the Athenians.2
Once master of the whole Propontine coast, it would not be difficult
for him to bring the Athenians to terms; and the command of the
Bosphorus would facilitate that which had become the great object
of his ambition, the invasion of Persia.3 His intentions were a profound secret. He knew that the Athenian forces in the Hellespont
were ready to attack him, if they could find an opportunity, and
would certainly, unless he took precautions, intercept the advance
of his fleet.  Accordingly, while his vessels were sailing up the
Hellespont, he himself, making a sudden irruption into Chersonesus,
marched along the coast for their protection.  The presence of a
land force on the shore was often of great service in the maritime
warfare of the Greeks:4 and Philip very likely desired, not only to
strike terror into the Athenians, but also to mask his real design
with respect to Selymbria.  It does not appear that any actual
hostilities took place between the troops of Athens and Macedonia.
Diopithes was probably not strong enongh to meet Philip in the
field, though his naval and military force would enable him to
protect the Chersonesite cities. Philip still affected to be at peace
standing the date which he assigns, because it agrees better with his
facts. He states that the Propontine cities, -which had been attacked
by Cersobleptes, became allies of Philip after his defeat. But this can
not apply to the second war, after which they became hostile to Philip,
and in which they probably rendered secret assistance to Cersobleptes
and the Athenians. (Philipp. Epist. 159, 163. Diod. xvi. 74.) It does
apply to the first war, after which Byzantium undoubtedly became
Philip's ally. (Dem. Philipp. iii. 120. De Coron. 254.) Nor is it
likely that Cersobleptes, after being so humbled in 346 B.C., and giving
his son as a hostage to Philip, would have ventured to attack the cities
on the Greek coast on his own account.
1 Demosthenes, de Rhod. Libert. 198.
e Demosthenes, de Coron. 254.
9 Polybius, iii. 6.
4 Thucydides, ii. 86, 90; vii. 53.




300                   APPENDIX  III.
with Athens, and complains in his letter, that the warlike measures
of Diopithes and the Chersonesites had placed him under the necessity of entering their territories. He alleges also, that it was in his
power, if he had chosen, to capture the fleet and fortresses of the
Athenians; an assertion to which we can hardly give credence,
more especially as it is not consistent with his previous complaint.'
When his fleet had passed through the straits, Philip marched
rapidly to Selymbria, which was soon blockaded on all sides. The
Greek cities were so surprised by this movement, that they had no
time to send relief, and Selymbria, in the course of the year, was
forced to capitulate. An incident occurred during this time which
marks the dubious character of the relations between Athens and
Philip. Twenty Athenian corn-ships, passing from the Propontis to
the Hellespont, were seized by Amyntas, the Macedonian admiral,
and carried away as prize. Messengers were sent from Athens to
demand restitution, who brought back the following letter:2 —
"Philip, king of Macedon, to the senate and people of Athens,
greeting:- Your embassadors, Cephisophon, Democritus, and Polycritus, have been with me, and conferred about the restoration of
the ships which Laomedon commanded. I must indeed regard you
as very simple, if you imagine I do not see, that your ships were
dispatched under the pretense of conveying corn from the Hellespont to Lemnos, but really to assist the Selymbrians whom I am
besieging, and who are not comprehended in our treaty of peace.
These orders were given to your commander, without the sanction
of the people of Athens, by certain magistrates and other persons
not now in office, who are urgent for the people to break off the
treaty and begin the war again, and are far more anxious to accomplish this than to assist the Selymbrians. And they suppose that
such an event will be a source of profit to them. I do not think it
will be advantageous either to you or to me. Accordingly, I restore
the vessels which have been carried into my ports, and for the
future, if you will not permit your statesmen to pursue their malignant policy, but rebuke them for it, I will, on my part, endeavor to
maintain the peace. Farewell." -
The correspondence was a piece of coquetry on both sides. Philip
had made a lucky prize of some merchantmen, but was well aware
that he might be greatly embarrassed in his operations by the ships
of war, which the Athenians could send against him. The Athenians, in order to obtain restitution of their squadron, had condescended to use the language of peaceful negotiation. Philip adopted
the same artifice, hoping that possibly, by a small sacrifice, he niight
Philipp. Epist. 163. The ravaging of the Chersonese mentioned iu
Demosth. de Coron. is not referable to this occasion.
2 Demosthenes, de Coron. 249-251.




THE THRACIAN  CHERSONESE.                   301
purchase their neutrality in his contest with the Propontine cities.
He soon found himself mistaken.
Selymbria having been surrendered, Philip laid siege to Perinthnls.
There can be little doubt that the Perinthians and Byzantines had
not only attempted to relieve Selymbria, but had been concerting
measures of defence with Diopithes and the Athenians. It was
enough for Philip that they had refused to join him in an offensive
war; and he had no more hesitation in attacking them, than he had
formerly in besieging Olynthus.  Succor, however, was promptly
sent from Byzantium, and the Propontine fleet, assisted by the Athenian, was more than sufficient to protect Perinthus from blockade.
Philip resolved to take it by storm.  The Macedonian army was
thirty thousand strong, and well provided-with all the materials for
a siege. The usual methods were resorted to, of battery, scale, and
mine. Movable towers were advanced against the wall, and the
besieged wTere driven from their ramparts by a storm of missiles. A
breach was effected, but the citizens rushed to the opening and
defended it obstinately, until it was repaired by a new wall. At
length, after a hard struggle, which was continued by night as well
as by day, the whole outer circle of defence was carried by the
besiegers. But their difficulties had still.to begin again. Perinthus
was built on a sloping isthmus: the houses stood close together on
a succession of terraces; and the passages were blocked up by the
inhabitants, so that each terrace formed a new rampart, on which
a more desperate resistance had to be encountered. The numbers
and discipline of the Macedoniaus might still have prevailed, had
not a powerful reinforcement been sent into the town by Arsites,
Satrap of Phrygia. A negotiation had, under the advice of Demosthenes, been opened with the Persian king,' who, alarmed at' the
ambition and victorious progress of Philip, ordered his satraps to render every possible assistance to the Perinthians. A large body of
mercenaries came to their relief, with all kinds of provisions and
military stores. They were commanded by Apollodorus, an Athenian. Philip, seeing that all his efforts to take the city were unavailing, withdrew from the attack; and, leaving one half of his army
before Perinthus, marched with the other half to surprise Byzantium,
which, weakened by its efforts to relieve the Perinthians, he hoped
to find unprovided for defense.2
Before he left Perintlius, or perhaps shortly before he commenced
Demosthenes, Or. ad Epist. 153. Philipp. iv. 139, 140. The-orator and his countrymen were both reproached for this, but unjustly.
Demosthenes has also been censured for receiving money from Persia;
but the real question is, for what purpose he received it, and how he
used it. See Philipp. Epist. 160. Plutarch in Vit. Demosth. ZEschinea
contra Ctes. 88, 90.
2 Diodorus, xvi. 74 —76. Pausanins, i. 29.




302                   APPENDIX  III.
the siege, he had sent a letter to the Athenians, which is still extant,
and is a remarkable document. It is a letter of reproof and menace.
In style it is clear and forcible, in argument weak, except where it
confutes the false points made by his adversaries. -He complains of
various breaches of treaty, and violations of international law, committed by the Athenians; referring particularly to the operations of
Diopithes in Thrace. He denounces their embassy to Persia as an
offense against the Greek community. He defends his own conduct
with respect to Cardia and the Thracian princes, and declares that
his march into Chersonesus was necessitated by the hostilities of the
Athenian general and the Chersonesites themselves. His own pacific
intentions had been manifested by the Amphictyonic embassy after
the peace, when the Athenians spurned every proposal made to
secure the safety of Greece. For this the orators were chargeable,
who consulted their own interests rather than the advantage of
their country. In every respect the Athenians were the aggressors:
he had given them no provocation; he had shown the utmost forbearince: but as this had produced no effect, he must decide the
quarrel by arms.'
Such arguments might have come well from a king who remained
quietly at home, and interfered not with his neighbors. But coming
from the conqneror of Olynthus, the invader of Epirus and Thrace,
the dictator of Thessaly, the plotter in Eubcea and Megara, they
appear somewhat ludicrous, until one reflects what the real object of
Philip was-viz. to encourage his own party at Athens, including
not only his paid advocates, but all who were afraid of war, or selfishly attached to mercantile pursuits, or to a life of idleness and
amusement. He might distract the counsels of the Athenians, impede their warlike preparations, and so create a diversion in his own
favor. There is a current of ill humor in the letter, arguing that he
had been annoyed by the Athenian operations in the Hellespont,
and that he discerned symptoms of more than usual vigor in their
administration.2
Demosthenes, at this time all-powerful at Athens, replied to the
letter by an animated speech, in which, repeating the old arguments,
he urged his countrymen to redouble their exertions in the war.3
They had been greatly encouraged by the success of their arms-in
Euboea, from which, at the close of the year B.c. 341, they expelled
the tyrants Clitarchus and Philistides. It was the generalship of'-Philippi Epistola. See p. 156 of this volume.
2 Mitford praises the energy of Demosthenes at this period. Hist.
of Greece, iv. e. 41, s. 1.
3 Demosth. Oratio ad Epistola. See p. 149 of this volume. Whether
we have this oration in an entirely genuine state, may perhaps be
doubted.




THE THRACIAN  CHERSONESE.                 &03
Phocion, the counsel of Demosthenes, that secured this important
victory; and the latter was rewarded with a golden crown.'
The Byzantines, on the approach of Philip, sent an embassy to
Athens to solicit succor; and such was the state of public feeling,
that the Athenians were easily induced to forget former injuries, and
pass a decree in their favor. It was resolved, on the motion of
Demosthenes, that the pillar, on which the treaty with Philip was
inscribed, should be taken down, and an armament sent instantly to
the Propontis.2 He himself went beforehand to encourage the
people of Byzantium, and conclude a treaty of alliance.3  It seems
there was a party in that city who preferred submission to Macedonia. Demosthenes silenced their opposition, confirmed the waverers, and animated the people to resistance.4  The Athenian armament arrived; but great was the disappointment of the Byzantines
when they found that Chares was in command. Chares was the
man whose rapacious exactions had brought on the Social war; who
had caused the revolt of Corcyra; who had massacred the Sestian
population.5  He was generally feared and detested throughout the.EAlgean and the Hellespont. The citizens refused to receive his fleet
into their harbor, so that he was forced to cruise about the Euxine,
committing piracy, and subsisting by plunder. An attack which he
made on the Macedonian fleet was disgracefnlly repulsed. When the
news of this came to Athens, it excited indignation among the
people, who regarded the disrespect shown to their general as an
insult to themselves. Demosthenes had not returned; and the
people in their angry mood were about to take some rash step;
when Phocion addressed them in a calm speech, showing that the
fault lay in the character of their general, and not in the fickleness
of their allies. A vote was then carried to send reinforcements,
and Phocion himself was put in command. He sailed immediately
to the Bosphorus, and, landing his forces on the beach, encamped
outside the walls. He had an intimate friend in Byzantium, one of
the principal statesmen, named Cleon, who had formerly been his
fellow-student in the Academy at Athens. Cleon pledged his own
responsibility for the good behavior of his friend; and Phocion was
at once admitted into the city, where both he and his soldiers exDemosthenes, De Coron. 253. Diodorus, xvi. 74.
2 Philochorus apud Dionys. Epist. ad Amm. i. 11. (This, according
to him, was the first formal breaking of the peace.) Plutarch in Vit.
Demosth.
3 He had advised this course in the case of Olynthus, nrpeai3eiav r,etlv i7rtg r7aTh''pEI Kla'apcFrat ro70g rpyuaats. Olynth. i. 10.
4 Demosth. de Coron. 308. Eschines contra Ctes. 90, sneers at his
rival's boast.
5 Diodorus, xv. 95. Argument. Isocr. De Pace. Compare pp. 189,
281, of this volume.




304                    APPENDIX  III.
cited the esteem and admiration of the Byzantines by their zeal,
their valor, and their sobriety.'
Philip had, in the meantime, been vigorously carrying on the
siege; but Byzantium was not only strong by its position and its
fortifications,2 but had received considerable succors from Cos, Chios,
Rhodes, and other states of Greece. On Phocion's arrival,. the
aspect of affairs was so greatly changed, that Philip deemed it prudent to abandon his enterprise. He raised the siege both of Byzantium and Perinthus, and after ravaging the territory that lay between
those cities, retired to his own kingdom.3  That on his way he
made an attempt to surprise the cities of Chersonesus, is indeed
very probable; and that his failure was owing partly to the courageous resistance of Diopithes and the inhabitants, partly to the
activity of the gallant Phocion. Plutuarch relates, that Phocion,
after expelling Philip from Byzantium, captured some of his ships,
and recovered places which Philip had taken and garrisoned; that
then he made incursions into the enemy's territory, and levied contributions; but, being at length wounded in a battle with the Macedonians, was forced to return. From this vague narrative it may
be collected, that Phocion sailed with his fleet to the Chersonese,
to protect it against Philip's inroad: that having chased him from
thence, he pursued his victory into the continent of Thrace, and
recovered some of the fortresses which Philip had there taken. This
is more reasonable, than to suppose that Phocion invaded Macedonia; and it partly agrees with the statement of Justin, and with
that of Demosthenes, which implies that the Chersonese had been
in danger.4
Such was the issue of this memorable campaign; the first in
which Philip suffered defeat and loss of reputation. Perinthus and
Byzantium testified their gratitude to the Athenians by a joint decree, which is preserved to us in the oration of Demosthenes on the
Crown. By this it was resolved, that the rights of citizenship, intermarriage, and other honorable privileges, should be conferred on
their allies-that three colossal statues should be erected in the
harbor of Byzantium, representing the people of Athens crQwned
by the Byzantines and Perinthians-and that a religious deputation
should be sent to the Istllmian, Nemean, Olympian, and Pythian
Plutarch in Vit. Phoc. s. 14. Leland's Life of Philip, ii. 257.
a Pausanias, iv. 31.
s Diodorus, xvi. 77. Justin, ix. 1, 2. Plutarch,'. e. Demosthenes,
de Coron. 255.
4 It may be presumed that the Chersonesites would not have passed
the decree cited by Demosthenes, had not their country been in danger
of conquest. The statement of Justin, (I. c.) multas urbes Chersonensium expugnat, is an exaggeration of the truth. Compare Leland's Life
of Philip, i. 267.




THE THRACIAN  CHERSONESE.                   305
festivals, to proclaim these well-earned honors to the Grecian world.
Nor were the Chersonesites behindhand in their acknowledgments.
The inhabitants of Sestus, Eleus, Madytus, and Alopeconnesus,
honored the senate and people of Athens with a golden crown, and
built an altar consecrated to Gratitude and the Athenian people, in
requital for the preservation of their country, their laws, their liberty, and their sanctuaries. Demosthenes justly boasted, that these
glories were in a great measure attributable to his own counsels and
exertions.'
Of Diopithes, whose able measures contributed so much to the
discomfiture of Philip, history says nothing further. We may infer
that he died shortly afterwards; for Aristotle mentions a present
having been sent to him from the King of Persia, which arrived
after his death. The exact date, however, is uncertain.2
Within two years after these occurrences, the liberties of Greece
were extinguished at Cheronea. The Athenians were still permitted
to retain their possessions in Chersonesus, though their real independence was gone. In the year 334 B.c., twenty Athenian galleys
assisted in the transportation of Alexander's army from Sestus to
Abydos. At a somewhat later period the Chersonese itself fell
under Macedonian dominion.  Lysimachus built a town at the
Isthmus, between Pactya and Cardia, which was named after him
Lysimachia.3
During the reign of Philip, the Thracian Chersonese gave birth
to one great man-Enmenes of Cardia-concerning whom Plutarch
writes as follow:4" Duris reports that Eumenes the Cardian was the son of a poor
wagoner in the Thracian Chersonese, but liberally educated, both as
a scholar and a soldier; that, while he was very young, Philip,
passing through Cardia, amused himself with seeing the youth of the
place perform their gymnastic exercises; and, being struck with the
cleverness and activity of Eumenes, took him at once into his service. But the more credible story is, that Philip promoted him on
account of the friendship which he bore to his father, whose guest
he had often been."
Eumenes accompanied Alexander into Asia as his principal secretary, and after his death played a conspicuous part in the theatre of
the world.' Demosthenes, De Coron. 255-257.
2 Aristotle, Rhet. ii. 8, 11.
3 Strabo, Excerpta ex lib. sept. fine, 26. Polybius, xviii 34.
4 In Vit.Eumen. init.




306                    APPENDIX  IV.
APPENDIX IV.
THE PROPERTY TAX.
WE frequently read in Demosthenes of contributions' for the service of the state, of the reluctance of the Athenians to pay contributions, the necessity of contributing, &c. These expressions almost
always relate to an extraordinary tax, in the nature of a property or
income-tax, which was levied at Athens in times of danger and necessity, to defray the expenses of war.
In ancient times there was no such thing as a standing army in
any Grecian state, and little occasion to employ a military force for
any length of time at a distance from home. The citizens formed
a national militia for the defense of their country, and were bound
to serve for a certain period at their own expense. Afterwards,
when wars became long anti frequent, not only was it necessary to
pay to citizens who performed military duty, but large bodies of
mercenary soldiers had to be maintained at the public cost. For
this purpose the Athenians resorted to the extraordinary tax
above mentioned, when the proceeds of their ordinary revenue
were found insufficient.
The first instance that we know of this tax being levied was in
the fourth year of the Peloponnesian war, when two hundred talents
were raised to carry on the siege of Mitylene.  The principle of its
assessment, however, was established long before, according to the
classification of the people by Solon, which I am about to explain.
Solon distributed all the citizens of Athens into four classes.
according to the amount of their property, which he caused to be
assessed and entered in a public schedule. The highest class were
those whose land yielded an annual income of five hundred measures (medimni) of corn, and hence they were called Pentacosiomedimni. 2  The second class consisted of those whose income
amounted to three hundred measures; they were therefore called
Triacosiomedimni; and also Knights, because they were reckoned
able to keep a war-horse.  The third class were those whose
income amounted to two hundred measures:3 they were called
1 The expressions are eriaopa', contribution or payment of propertytax  eia06peLv, to contribute, to pay, &c.: sometimes eiaoepetv Xptra,
eiaOppelV Ef r7'  67i/,6tov.
2 The y/chtuvoc was about a bushel and a half. The estimate might
also be made in liquid produce, and then it was calculated by the ue7P71riT, or nine gallon measure.
3 I have here followed Grote's view in preference to Bickh's. See
his History of Greece, iii. 157.




THE  PROPERTY  TAX.                     307
Zeugitae, or yeomen, because they were able to keep a yoke of oxen.
The fourth and most numerous class comprised all whose income
was below the last amount. They constituted the free laboring
population.
These classes had their respective duties and privileges. The
highest honors of the state, that is the offices of the nine Archons
and Senate of Areopagus, were reserved for the first class. They
also took the principal military commands. Posts of inferior distinction were filled by the second and third classes, who were bound
to military services, tile one on horseback, the other as heavy-armed
soldiers on foot. Among these three classes-besides direct taxation-there were distributed, according to certain rules, the honorable but expensive duties that bore the name of Liturgice.' The
members of the fourth class were disqualified to hold any office of
dignity. They served as light troops in the army, and manned the
ships; but were exempt from the expensive duties and all direct
taxation.
Solon thus introduced a new feature into the constitution of
Athens, viz. a property qualification.  His classes were distinctions
not of caste, nor of birth, but of wealth only. The scale is stated as
if none but landed property were taken into account. This was to
be expected in the infancy of a state not yet enriched by commerce.
Perhaps, however, as Grote supposes, property of other kinds was
intended to be included, since it served as the basis of every man's
liability to taxation.
As the state became more democratical, the distinctions between
the four classes were gradually abolished, and the highest offices of
the republic were thrown open to all. But the principle, according
to which they were assessed to the public taxes, was preserved from
first to last.
The members of the first three classes were entered in the stateschedule as possessed of a certain taxable capital, which was estimated by reference to their income, but in a proportion diminishing
according to the scale of such income; and they paid taxes according to the sums for which they were respectively rated in the schedule.
The rateable property of the first-class man was calculated at twelve
years' purchase of his income; that of the second-class man at ten
years' purchase; that of the third-class man at five years' purchase.
The medimnus then being taken as worth a drachm; the first-class
man, whose income was exactly 500 drachms, the minimum qualification of his class, stood rated in the schedule for a capital of 6,000
drachms, or one talent; or, if his income were larger, for a capital
proportionally increased. The second-class man, whose income was
exactly 300 drachms, the minimum qualification of his class, stood
rated for 3,000 drachms, and so on, in proportion, for any income' Public Offices. See Appendix V.




308                   APPENDIX  IV.
between 300 and 500 drachms. The third-class man, whose income
was exactly 200 drachins, the minimum qualification of his class,
stood rated for 1,000 drachms, and so on, in proportion, for any
income between 200 and 300 drachms. The members of the fourth
class were not taxed, as we have already mentioned.
If therefore a property-tax had been levied of one per cent., the
poorest man of the first class would have paid, upon 6,000 drachms,
60 drachms; the poorest of the second class, upon 3,000 drachms,
30; the poorest of the third class, upon 1,000 drachms, 10. Thus
the mode of assessment established by Solon was, in some measure, like a graduated income-tax.
With the advance of wealth and power pecuniary contributions
became more frequent; and then there is no doubt that the personal property of Athenians formed a considerable part of their
rateable capital. Also, while the Solonian principle of graduation
was maintained, the scale of assessment must have been altered,
and the number of classes was probably increased.
In the year B.c. 377, in the Archonship of Nausinicus, when the
Athenians had joined the alliance of Thebes against Sparta, a new
valuation was made of the whole taxable capital of the country,
which amounted, as Demosthenes states in round numbers, to 6,000
talents, and according to Polybius, who perhaps gives the exact estimate, to 5,750 talents.'  This, it must be understood, was the
capital estimated for the purpose of taxation, not the whole capital
of the people, which was (as Bockh supposes) five or six times
that amount.
At the same time, for the better management of the propertytax, the following method was introduced. From each of the ten
Attic tribes were selected 120 of the wealthiest citizens, making a
body of 1,200, from whom again were selected the wealthiest 300,
30 from each tribe, to exercise a general superintendence. To this
select body of 300 the State looked for immediate payment of the
tax, in case of need. They might be called upon to advance the
whole sum required; and then have to be reimbursed by contributions from the rest. To facilitate this, the 1,200 were divided into
20 Symmorice, or Boards, of 60, two for every tribe, whose business it was to collect the taxes from the members of their respective tribes, a certain number of whom were assigned to each Board.
The course then was, that the 300 advanced the tax; they obtained
contribution from the 900 by means of the Boards; and the Boards
cxacted contribution from the general body of rate-payers. Every
Board had its Chairman,2 and subordinate officers to collect the
rates, summon defaulters, &c.
It appears that in the year referred to a property-tax was imposed. Demosthenes, then an infant of seven years, his father' See p. 183 of this volume.         2'Hye/anC'.




THE PROPERTY TAX.                            309
having just died, was returned by his guardians as possessing an estate of fifteen talents. He was assessed by the state at three talents, and this was the highest scale of assessment, as he himself
expressly tells us in his oration against Aphobus.  It seems also,
that. the tax extended as low as to estates of twenty-five minas.
Bdckh has supposed, that there were four classes of rate-payers;
the first having estates which amounted to twelve talents; the second, estates amounting to six talents; the third, estates amounting
to two talents; the fourth, estates amounting to twenty-five minas;
— that these classes were assessed at one fifth, one sixth, one eighth,
and one tenth of the value of their estates, respectively. If we
adopt this hypothesis, which, whether exact or not, is equally good
for the purpose of illustration; and if we further assume, that a tax
of five per cent. was at that time levied;2 the following tables will
serve to exhibit specimens of the entries in the Athenian ratebook:FIRST CLASS.
Name of Person,  Value of Property.  Taxable Value.      Tax.
Onetor             30 talents     6 talents          18 minas.
Timotheus          25 talents.5 talents          15 minas.
Demosthenes        15 talents     3 talents           9 minas.
Phaenippus         12 talents     2 tal. 24 min.    720 drachms.
SECOND CLASS.
Name of Person.   Value of Property.  Taxable Value,    Tax.
Timocrates         10 talents      I tal. 40 min.     5 minas.
Philo               9 talents      I tal. 30 min.   450 drachms.
Menestheus          8 talents      1 tal. 20 min.     4 minas.
Antidorus           6 talents      1 talent           3 minas.
THIRD CLASS.
Name of Person.  Value of Property.  Taxcble Value.      Tax.      1
Strepsiades         5 talents      3750 drachms 187 drachms, 3 obols.
Nausicrates         4 talents        30 minas   150 drachms.
Phanias             3 talents      2250 drachms 112 drachms, 3 obols.
Euphron             2 talents        15 minas    75 drachms.
Contra Aphobum, 815, 816.
2 Bockh thinks that a tax of five per cent. was actually imposed at
that time, and that the amount which it produced was three hundred
talents. He relies upon the words of Demosthenes, cont. Androt. p.
606.  Grote contends that he is wrong.  See the note to his History of
Greece, p. 158, vol. x.




310                     APPENDIX  IV.
FOURTH CLASS.
Name of Person. Value of Property. Taxable Value.  Tax.
Archippus      1 talent, 30 minas    9 minas    45 drachms.
Stratocles     I talent          6 minas    30 drachms.
Tisias        30 minas           3 minas    15 drachms.
Mantitheus    25 minas          250 drachms  12 drachms, 3 obols.
Many of the details connected with the Athenian property-tax
resembled those which we have become familiar with in our own
country, and which serve to make the tax generally odious. Every
citizen had to make a return of the value of his property, to be
entered in the register; and his return was open to cavil and dispute. Examples of such disputes were common; the officers being
often induced, from  motives of personal dislike, to surcharge the
rate-payer. Thus numerous inequalities crept into the register
from time to time. The process called the Exchange was allowed
in respect of this tax, as well as in respect of the Liturgice.' Any
citizen who believed himself to be overcharged, while his neighbor,
as rich or richer than himself, bore not his fair share of the burden,
might call upon the other to take his place, or submit to an exchange of property. This was designed as a measure of relief, like
our own right of appeal against an unequal rate; but it must have
been attended with a vast deal of trouble and annoyance. The
Generals held a court for the decision of all disputes relative to the
rating, collecting, &c., and also to the process of the Exchange.
The whole affair was under their control and superintendence; and
it was their business particularly to see, that the richest citizens
were included in the select body of three hundred.
The tax could never be imposed without a decree of the people,
which fixed the amount, the number of classes, the estates included
in each, the scales of assessment, &c. It is clear from many passages in Demosthenes,2 that there was great reluctance on the part
of the people to impose this tax, and that it required some special
necessity to make it tolerable. Demosthenes himself, during his
minority, paid eighteen minas property-tax to the state, on a capital of fifteen talents;3 so that in ten years he paid one-fiftieth part
of his property. This (says Bbckh) can not be deemed an unreasonable tax, when we consider that the capital of Demosthenes might
in that time have been doubled by good management on the part
1 See Appendix V.
2 See particularly the first Olynthiac, p. 44 of this volume; second
Olynthiac, p. 52; on the Chersonese, p. 104; on the Navy Boards, pp.
184, 185.,' Contra Aphobum, 826,




THE TRIERARCHY.                     311
of his guardians; and more especially, when we consider the low
rate of the custom duties, and the cheapness of the necessaries of
life at Athens. The graduated scale of assessment, (according to
Solon's plan of taxing the rich in a higher proportion than the
poor,) though contrary to the English principle of taxation, appears
to me to have been exceedingly fair. And it must be observed in
favor of the untaxed Athenian multitude, that they showed no disposition to impose the burden unnecessarily or too often.
When the tax was granted, there could be no exemption from it,
on personal or any other grounds. The mines, being public property, were not included in the assessment. Aliens resident in Attica were subject to the tax, but were included in a distinct register
from the citizens, and were rated on a higher scale.
APPENDIX V.
THE TRIERARCHY.
ATHEnS owed her glory and her empire to her navy. Until she
turned her attention to the sea, she was but a second or third-rate
power among the states of Greece. The character therefore, of her
naval establishment, and the provisions made by law for its maintenance, are matters of considerable interest to the reader of Athenian history.
The situation of Attica was eminently favorable for maritime enterprise; being a kind of peninsula, with most commodious harbors,
in the centre of the Grecian world. Solon perceived these natural
advantages, and laid the foundation of a navy, by imposing on each
of the forty-eight divisions,' into which the country was then disg
tributed, the charge of providing a ship. But it was not till after
the first Persian war that the importance of a national marine came
to be fully understood; and the person who first enlightened the
Athenians on the subject was Themistocles. It has already been
mentioned, that he persuaded them to apply the rent of the Laurian
silver-mines to ship-building.2 This was in the year B.c. 483. Athens had been at war with _Egina, and had been compelled some
years before to borrow Corinthian galleys to meet her enemy at
1 Navlcpapat. " The name seems to have nothing to do with navigation, but to be derived from vain. NatKcpapof is another form of
vaVKItrlpor, in the sense of a householder, as va2Aov was used for the
rent of a house." Thirlwall, Gr. Hist. ii. 52.
2 Page 254. Iocrodotus, vii 144.




312                    APPENDIX V.
sea. Peace had not yet been established, and the navy of AEgina
was still greatly superior. Themistocles prevailed on his countrymen to increase theirs to two hundred ships; and soon afterwards
he procured a law to be passed, that twenty triremes, or ships of
war, should be built every year. The wisdom of these measures
was proved by the victories of Artemisium and Salamis.' I subjoin the comment of Grote:'
"In recommending extraordinary efforts, to create a navy, as
well as to acquire nautical practice, Themistokl1s displayed all that
sagacious appreciation of the circumstances and dangers of the time,
for which Thucydides gives him credit. Not only was there the
struggle with AEgina, a maritime power equal or more than equal,
and within sight of the Athenian harbor, —but there was also in the
distance a still more formidable contingency to guard against. The
Persian armament had been driven with disgrace-from Attica back
to Asia; but the Persian monarch still remained with undiminished
means of aggression and increased thirst for revenge; and Themistocles knew well that the danger from that quarter would recur
greater than ever. He believed that it would recur again in the
same way, by an expedition across the /Egean, like that of Datis
to Marathon; against which the best defence would be found in a
numerous and well-trained fleet. Nor could the large preparations
of Darius for renewing the attack remain unknown to a vigilant
observer, extending as they did over so many Greeks subject to the
Persian empire. Such positive warning was more than enough to
stimulate the active genius of Themistocles, who now prevailed
upon his countrymen to begin with energy the work of' maritime
preparation, as well against iEgina as against Persia. Not only
were two hundred new ships built, and citizens trained as seamen,
-but the important ivork was commenced, during the year when
Themistocles was either archon or general, of forming and fortifying
a new harbor for Athens at Pirseus, instead of the ancient open bay
of Phalerum. The latter was indeed somewhat nearer to the city,
but Pirseus, with its three separate natural ports, admitting of being
closed and fortified, was incomparably superior in safety as well as
in convenience. It is not too much to say, with Herodotus, that
the iEginetan war was the salvation of Greece, by constraining the
Athenians to make themselves a maritime power."
After the second Persian war, Athens became the head of a great
naval confederacy, comprising all the /Egean islands and a great
number of sea-port towns on the continent. It was arranged which
of the allied states were to find money, and which of them ships.
Treasurers were appointed by the Athenians to receive the contributions, which at first amounted to 460 talents. These began in a
short time to fall into arrear, and were exacted by compulsion.
Thirlwall, Gr. Hist. ii 269.  2 History of Greece, v. 69.




THE TRIERARCHY.                     313
Many of the allies, being reluctant to perform military service,
agreed to contribute money instead of ships; and thus, while the
fleet of the Athenians was augmented out of the general fund, their
citizens, by a system  of laborious training, and by constant and
regular employment, became  decidedly the best seamen in
Greece.'
To be mistress of the sea was necessary for the safety as well as
for the pre-eminence of Athens. Her enemies, the Lacedaemonians
and their allies, could bring into the field a land-force which she was
unable to encounter; and by ravaging Attica, or occupying it with
their armies, could deprive her people of all the ordinary means of
subsistence. But having the command of the sea, she could import
the necessaries of life from a distance, while her own ramparts protected her against all assaults from land, and the long walls which
connected her city and harbor gave her the advantages of an island.
It was Themistocles who formed the design, but it was Pericles who
brought it to the test, and fully proved its wisdom. To use our own
expression, the wooden walls of Athens were her real security. At
the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, she had three hundred galleys fit for service. A hundred of the best were laid by,
and captains appointed for them, to be employed only on extraordinary occasions.2
The duty of providing ships, which in Solon's time had been
distributed among the 48 divisions of the people-which number
was increased by Clisthenes to 50-devolved afterwards upon the
state at large. Ship-building was superintended by the Council
of Five-hundred. Each ship of war was the property of the state;
and in general also' the furniture and stores. Pay and provisions
for the crew and the marines3 were found by the public. On the
Sicilian expedition every sailor received a drachm a day from the
treasury.4
The command of a ship, or the trierarchy, was one of those public duties,5 which were imposed upon wealthy citizens without
further reward than the honor of the service. Each appointment
was made by the generals according to a scale of property; and the
ships were assigned to the different captains by lot.
It was a duty attended with expense, as well as personal responsibility. The captain had to find the crew, to keep his galley in
repair, and to restore it, together with the tackle and furniture, in
as good a condition as he received them, making allowance for
ordinary wear and tear and inevitable contingencies. But a crew
was not always readily to be got, and the captain frequently found
it necessary to allure men to the service by bounties or extra pay.' Thucydides, i. 96, 99.
2 Thucydides, i. 93; ii. 13, 24, 65.'Errtfirat.
4 Thucydides, vi. 31.                 6 dcsrovpyiat
VOL. I. O




314                    APPENDIX  V.
Again, the ship and stores might not be in a good condition when
the captain first received them; and divers captious questions
might arise on the subject of repairs, mismanagement, &c. To repair
an old ship might cost as much as to build a new one. Heavy
liabilities might thus fall upon the captain; and therefore Cleon, in
the Knights of Aristophanes, threatens his rival, that he will get him
appointed. to an old ship with a rotten mast. There were Admiralty
officers,5 whose business it was to see to the equipment of the vessels and to expedite their sailing. On one occasion we find them
empowered by a special decree to imprison those captains who had
not left the pier by a certain time; while, on the other hand, a
reward of a crown was given to the man who first brought his vessel off the stocks.2
The command lasted for a year, at the end of which a successor
was appointed, and it became his duty to enter upon the office immediately. If the ship was absent, he was compelled to join it
under a severe penalty, and also to reimburse his predecessor for
any expenses which he had incurred beyond the legal period. An
action might be brought to recover such expenses; of which we
have an example in the speech written by Demosthenes for Apollodorus against Polycles.3
The expense varied from forty minas to a talent. During his
year of service the captain enjoyed an immunity from all other
offices of burden; nor could he be required to serve again for two
years.
Personal exemption from the trierarchy was very rarely granted,
and only as a special honor. Leptines passed a law to prohibit all
exemptions, against which, as being unjust to the few persons who
enjoyed the privilege, and useless as a measure of public economy,
Demosthenes made one of his best early speeches, and procured its
repeal. There were however certain classes of persons exempted
by the general policy of the law. Thus, the nine archons could not
be called upon to command ships, as being incompatible with their
magisterial duties. Orphans were not liable to serve any office till a
year after the expiration of their minority. As to the other cases
mentioned in the speech on the Navy Boards, I may refer to my
note on the passage.4
Notwithstanding the inconveniences and hardships to which the
captains were exposed in the performance of their duty, there was
no reluctance to undertake it in the early times of Athenian great1'A7roctoRe~c.
2 See the Oration of Demosthenes, De Coron. Trierarchb. 1228, and
the Argument.
9 Or. contra Polyclem. 1206. There are mnany details in this speech,
which make it useful for the student to peruse.
4 Pagc-i81.




THE TRIERARCHY.                     315
ness. Those who could afford it were glad of the opportunity to
display their public spirit, their patriotism, and their valor. To
command the best ship, or to have the best outfit, was an object of
emulation. There were occasions when ivealthy men made presents of ships to the state. Thus Clinias, the father of Alcibiades,
brought his own galley to the battle of Artemisium. And if the
best seamen were not to be had without additional cost, the captain
would willingly defray it out of his own nurse. Of this a splendid
example is furnished by Thucydides in his description of the armament which sailed against Syracuse.l  "This," says he, "was the
most costly and magnificent which had ever been sent from Athens.
It was fitted out at a vast expense both on the part of the captains
and the state. For the treasury gave a drachm a day to every
seaman, and provided empty galleys, sixty men-of-war, and forty
transports; while the captains found the crews for them, and gave
gratuities, in addition to their pay, to the officers and superior
rowers. Their ensigns and equipments were of the most expensive
kind; for every commander was anxious that his own ship should
be remarkable for its speed and beauty." He then notices the
rivalry between the land and naval forces; the immense outlay incurred by private citizens for their own arms and accoutrements;
and the provision which the captains must have made for their
future expenditure during the campaign. He then describes the
launching of the fleet, after a solemn libation and prayers to the
gods for success, in which an immense concourse of spectators
on shore, citizens and strangers, all joined. The galleys, having
first sailed out in line, kept up a race as far as _.gina. Such was
the spirit of that day, when Athens had risen to the meridian of her
glory.
At a later period things had greatly changed. After the disasters
in Sicily, neither the state nor private citizens had the same means
at their disposal. As a measure of relief, two captains were frequently appointed to one ship; each of whom took the command
alternately, or one paid the other a sum of money to take the
whole command. This led afterwards to the practice of providing
deputies, which was found highly injurious to the naval service; for
the deputy was generally a person who took the office for the
lowest price, and sought to make a profit of it. Having such purpose only in view, he would be disposed to neglect his duties, to
curtail the time of public service, to attend to his own business
rather than the business of the state, and to reimburse himself for
his outlay by plunder, piracy, and extortion.2  Of the irregularities
committed by Athenian officers in the period subsequent to the
I Thucydides, vi. 31, 32. Plutarch, in the Life of Alcibiades, makes
the fleet to consist of nearly a hundred and forty sail.' Thirlwall, Gr. Hist. v. 215.




318                    APPENDIX  V.
Peloponnesian war, and the mischievous consequences which resulted from them, so much has already been said in this volume,
that it will be unnecessary to recur to the subject. The appointment of deputies was, no doubt, illegal, and subjected the real
servant of the state to a penalty; but having been permitted in
times of distress and difficulty, it grew into a custom, and was
connived at, except where any actual mischief occurred. Thus,
after a sea-fi(ht in which the Athenians were defeated by Alexander of Pherse, the captains who had delegated their command
were brought to trial by Aristophon, and convicted of a treasonable desertion of duty.' "Had not the jury been merciful,"
says the orator, "nothing could have saved them from capital
punishment."
Other abuses also crept into the management of the trierarchy.
The burden was not always equally distributed. The appointments,
which ought to have been made according to a scale of property,
were often capricious and unfair; and when public virtue had decayed, and citizens were not easily found, who were willing to
sacrifice their private interests to their country, an unjust appointment was regarded as an act of oppression. Jacobs truly observes,
that individual patriotism, although it may do wonders on extraordinary occasions, ought not to be made the basis of a legal ordinance; and that the Atheni-l's discovered their mistake in placing
too much reliance upon it.-  Little can be expecced from the selfsacrifice of private citizens, where the state does not perform its
own part honestly and well. Demosthenes complains, that the
commanders were often nominated on the spur of the moment,
when the armament ought to have been ready to sail; and that,
while they were contesting their liability, and the people were inquiring how the ways and means were to be provided, the time for
action had slipped away.3 The captains, thus suddenly appointed,
were put to extreme hardship; since it might be difficult, or even
impossible, to procure a crew by the time of departure; and we
read that, in order to escape the imprisonment, to which they were
liable by law for neglect of duty, they would fly to the temple of
Diana, which was a kind of sanctuary, at Munychia, or appeal as
suppliants to the popular assembly.4
An attempt was made to rectify the injustice of unfair appointments by a method called the Exchange, which is said to have been
introduced by Solon. The course was as follows: —If a man charged
with the command of a ship thought that another, who was not
charged, was better able to bear the burden, he might propose to
l Demosthenes, De Coron. Trierarch. 1230.
2 Introduction to his translation of the speech, De Symmoriis, p. 9.
s Philipp. i. 50. Page 69 of this volume.
D4 emosthenes, De Coron. 262.




THE TRIERARCHY.                     317
transfer the office to him, or to make an exchange of estates. If the
Dther declined these terms, he might be summoned before the
Generals, who exercised a jurisdiction for the decision of all disputes
relating to the naval appointments. If the case could not be settled
by them without a formal trial, it had to be brought into court before
a jury; and the main question for the jury was, whether under all
the circumstances the complainant was entitled to the relief he
prayed for. If they decided in his favor, the defendant was forced
to choose, whether he could take the office or the exchange. If he
took the office, there would be no further trouble. But if the exchange was accepted, a complication of difficulties might arise. Each
of the parties was obliged to give to the other an inventory of his
property within three days after the making the demand; and, to prevent any fraudulent concealment, a summary power was given to
each to enter and make search upon the house and land of his opponent, and to seal up every chamber, closet, barn, outhouse, or other
place where his effects might be deposited. An oath was also taken
by each that he would make a full disclosure of all that he possessed,
and a fair and complete transfer. For the whole property of a man,
real and personal, together with all claims and obligations attached
thereto, was at once in point of law transferred by the exchange;
except, indeed, property in the Laurian mines, the ownership whereof
was vested in the state, and the occupant was a mere lessee.'  Here
was another fertile source of litigation. Whether each party had
made a bonafide disclosure; whether any effects had been concealed
or removed; whether any false or fraudulent claims were put in;
these and a multitude of similar questions were likely enough to spring
out of such an arrangement. It was a clumsy contrivance altogether.2
In the year B. C. 358 an attempt was made to improve the naval
service and lighten the burden of the trierarchy, by putting it under
the management of Boards, much in the same way as the propertytax had been some years before.3 This was by the law of Periander.
The ships required at any time were equally divided among the
Boards, who again apportioned the burden among their own members,
so that a single ship was assigned to five or more persons, and commonly to sixteen.4 The trierarchy so constituted was no longer a
personal service, but a sort of pecuniary obligation imposed upon the
associated members. There was of course a real captain-in the
natural sense of the word-who might either be one of the managing
l See p. 254.
2 The speech of Demosthenes against Phaenippus gives us some account of these proceedings. Also the speech against Aphobus, 840, 841;
and that against Midias, 539, 540.
3 See the last Appendix, p. 301.
4 Called avvreae-f-joint contributors.




318                    APPENDIX  V.
trierarchs, or a deputy appointed by them; but the name of trierarch
was still given to them all. Their duties, with respect to the equipment of the vessels, keeping them in repair, &c., were the same as
under the previous system. But it seems, the wealthier members
abused their trust by letting out the command for the lowest price,
and making a profit by the contributions of the other members.'
And in other respects the arrangements were defective, which caused
Demosthenes, in the year B. c. 354, to propose the reforms set forth
in the Oration on the Navy Boards. His principal objects were, to
insure the full complement of serviceable members, by adding eight
hundred to the twelve hundred whose names were on the navy listto divide the boards into sections. each having about the same
average of property, and then to apportion the ships, the stores,
and the allowance made by the state, equally among them; to
make also a commodious arrangement of the docks, so that the
captains might always know where to find their own ships, and
that when the time came for sailing there might be no confusion or
delay.2
The reform of Demosthenes was not carried; nor does he appear
even to have brought it forward as a motion before the assembly.
And for many years he did not recur to the subject.
But after the year B.C. 346, it became apparent that the naval
service had been greatly neglected. Miscarriage and defeat had attended almost all the Athenian expeditions. This was partly owing
to the want of proper regulations in the war department at home.
The expense of the trierarchal office was'shirked by those who
could best afford it, while, falling on men of moderate and small
fortunes, it greatly abated their zeal in the performance of public
duties. But from the time last mentioned Demosthenes had been
gradually rising to the head of the Athenian administration. He
saw more than ever the necessity for an improvement, and especially for such a regulation of the trierarchy as would distribute the
burden fairly among all classes. In the year B.c. 340, about or before the time when war against Philip was formally decreed, he
procured the passing of a law, by which the burden of the trierarchy
was made to fall more equally upon property. It provided that
every man whose estate was valued at ten talents should take
charge of one galley; at twenty talents, two galleys; at thirty talents, three galleys; but no man should be charged with more than
three galleys and one boat: while men whose estates were estimatA talent was a common price, as we learn from Demosth. contra
Mid. 564.
2 See pp. 181-184 of this volume. On the whole of this subject, as
well as that of the last Appendix, the reader, if he has time, should consult the admirable work of Bockh.




THE TRIERARCHY.                     319
ed at less than ten talents should contribute in a fair proportion to
the expense of one galley. The result was that the poorer citizens
were greatly relieved, while men, who had under the old system
borne but a sixteenth part of the cost of a single ship, were charged
with two ships under the amended law. Demosthenes boasts of
the important advantages which resulted from his plan. There was
no longer any complaint of oppression or unfairness; the duties
were cheerfully undertaken; the ships punctually sailed; and none
were lost or captured during the whole of the war. That the author of such a law should have made enemies among the wealthy
few, who profited by the old abuses, and especially of th&se who
were opposed to war with Macedonia, was a thing to be expected.
He was indicted for having proposed it, but triumphantly acquitted,
the prosecutor not obtaining a fifth part of the votes.'
That the Athenians were greatly indebted to Demosthenes for
their success at Byzantium, has been already shown;2 and it is possible that this very law may have contributed to the result. Such
is the opinion of Thirlwall, who writes on the subject as follows: 3"It seems probable that the success of the expedition was in a
great measure due to Demosthenes, not only as the mover of the
decree which ordered it, but still more on account of a law which
he procured to be passed nearly at the same time, and which effected a most important reform in the naval service of Athens. Down
to this time a regulation had subsisted, which affords a remarkable
instance how, even under the most purely democratical institutions,
the grossest injustice may be authorized by the laws in favor of the
wealthy. The citizens who were liable to the charge of the trierarchy were distributed into classes, each of sixteen members, without any respect to difference of fortune. By the existing law these
sixteen were made to contribute equally to the expense of one galley. Demosthenes had attempted at an earlier period to remedy
this abuse, which was of course cherished by many powerful patrons. We do not know whether his proposal was rejected, or
whether means were found to evade the execution of it. The evil
seems at least to have been as crying as ever, when the necessity
of a vigorous effort in behalf of Byzantium enabled him to carry
his plan. Its object was to distribute the whole burden of the trierarchy with reference nnt to persons, but to property: so that the
part which fell on each cointributor should be in exact proportion to
Demosthenes, De Coron. 260-262.
2 Page 303 of this volume.
3 History of Greece, vi. 51. Demosthenes himself does not claim for
his law any credit on this account. It had perhaps not been long enough
in operation




320                   APPENDIX  V.
his means. Demosthenes himself spoke with exultation of the success of his measure; and the charges, by which his adversaries endeavored to detract from his merit, are hardly intelligible, and are
the less deserving of notice, as they do not seem to impeach the
equity and utility of the reform."
END OF VOL L